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A critical analysis of the dialectical philosophy of William Temple
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7 0 - 2 6 , 5 2 4
LACORTE, John Joseph, 1944-
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DIALECTICAL
PHILOSOPHY OF WILLIAM TEMPLE.
University of Southern California, Ph.D., 1970
Philosophy
University Microfilms, A X E R O X Company. Arm Arbor. Michigan
COPYRIGHT BY-
JOHN JOSEPH LaCOHTE
1971
THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED
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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DIALECTICAL
PHILOSOPHY OF W ILLIAM TEMPLE
by
John Joseph LaCorte
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(Philosophy)
June 1970
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UNIVERSITY O F S O U T H E R N CALIFO RNIA
T H E GRADUATE SC H O O L
UNIV ERSITY PARK
LO S A N G ELE S, C A LIFO R N IA 9 0 0 0 7
This dissertation, written by
.......................JQHN..JQSERH..LACQRIE_____________
under the direction of /z.is... Dissertation Com
mittee, and approved by all its members, has
been presented to and accepted by The Gradu
ate School, in partial fulfillment of require
ments of the degree of
D O C T O R O F P H I L O S O P H Y
Da te ..J .m- ^ ... V ^ 7 9 ...
D IS S E R T A T IO N C O M M IT T E E
___
.........
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1
PART I. TEMPLE'S M ETH O D A N D METAPHYSICS
II. TEMPLE'S PHILOSOPHICAL M ETH O D ........................................................... 13
I I I. TEMPLE'S METAPHYSICAL VIEW S .......................................................... 31
PART II. THE FIRST DIALECTICAL TRANSITION
IV. A N INTRODUCTION TO PART I I .............................................................. 41
V. fW TER .......................................................................................................... 44
VI. L IF E .............................................................................................................. 52
VII. TEMPLE'S NATURALISTIC VIEW OF M IND A N D HIS REALIST
EPISTEMOLOGY ............................................................................................ 58
VIII. MIND.............................................................................................................. 64
IX. THE M IND-BODY RELATIONSHIP IN TEMPLE'S PHILOSOPHY . . . 76
X. "ABSTRACTION" A N D TEMPLE'S DISTINCTION BETW EEN M IND A N D
BODY............................................................................................................. 84
XI. VALUE.......................................................................................................... 89
XII. PURPOSE...................................................................................................... 99
PART III. THE SECOND DIALECTICAL TRANSITION
XIII. A N INTRODUCTION TO PART I I I ............................................................... 105
XIV. SPIR IT............................................................................................................... 107
n
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XV. TEMPLE'S ARG U M EN T FR O M THE NOTION OF SPIRIT O R
PERSONALITY................................................................................................... 115
XVI. TRANSCENDENCE, PERSONALITY A N D G O D ................................................. 122
XVII. VALUE.................................................................................................................130
XVIII. TEMPLE A N D W HITEHEAD ............................................................................ 136
PART IV. CONCLUSION
XIX. CONCLUSION.................................................................................................... 147
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................. 155
m
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
During his lifetim e, William Temple wrote three major works.
In Mens C reatrix, written in 1917, he seeks a unifying hypothesis that
might bring together what he takes to be the four basic sciences:
Knowledge, Art, Morality, and Religion.^ In Christus V eritas, written
in 1924, his task is sim ilar but far more theological in tone, for here
2
he e x p lic itly sets out to establish a Christocentric metaphysics.
Nature, Man and God, Temple's Gifford Lectures, 1932 to 1934, is his
la s t major work. In i t Temple undertakes to establish the existence
of a transcendent God, and to show the vital part th at such a premise
must play in any attempt to comprehend the world as a rational whole.
Nature, Man and God may be considered the fu lle s t expression of
Temple's systematic philosophical thought and method. For this reason
this c ritic a l analysis will focus on i t . I t is Temple's la s t work and
his magnum opus.
^Mens Creatrix (London: Macmillan & Co., L td., 1917), p. 1.
^Christus Veritas (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1924),
p. ix. The American edition is e n title d , Christ the Truth (New York:
Macmillan Company, 1924).
^Nature, Man and God (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1934).
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2
Nature, Man and God is divided into two broad divisions: the
f i r s t deals with what Temple calls "The Transcendence of the Immanent"
and the second with "The Immanence of the Transcendent." The f i r s t
part, which makes up half of the Gifford Lectures, contains a complete
line of thought by which Temple seeks to establish the existence of
God. The second part deals with certain aspects of the relationship
between man and God, between f i n i t e minds and In fin ite Mind. The
second part is thus an elaboration on the f i r s t , dealing with the role
th a t theism, once established, plays in the l if e of man.
Temple's line of reasoning in Nature, Man and God passes
through four "dialectical tra n sitio n s." Each of the main divisions
contain two tra n s itio n s , and each tran sitio n is supported by arguments
th at begin and end a t the same points a t which the tran sitio n s them
selves begin and end.
In the f i r s t dialectical tra n s itio n . Temple begins with man's
experience of the world, and ends with the conclusion that the world
must contain a principle th at explains i t . This principle'Temple calls
"immanent theism." He uses two arguments in support of this tra n s i
tion. He finds i t impossible to explain the appearance of mind, i . e . ,
man's rational a c tiv ity , in terms of matter alone. He also argues th a t
mind recognizes within the world certain definite "values." Such
values. Temple fe e ls, can be the re su lt only of "purposive a c tiv ity ."
In each case, the conclusion th at Temple draws is th at the world must
contain the principle of "immanent theism."
In the second dialectical tra n sitio n . Temple argues th a t the
order of re a lity must be the re s u lt of personal mind, and therefore
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the principle of immanent theism must be transcendent as well. I t is
at this point th a t a sharp contrast develops between Temple and the
other process philosophers, especially Whitehead, who, in general,
argues for the existence of a deity th at is immanent, in Temple's
sense, but not transcendent, or a t any rate not in any way th at we can
know. This contrast will be taken up in greater detail la te r .^
In the second half of Nature, Man and God, Temple presents two
more d ialectical tra n sitio n s. In the third tra n sitio n he considers
moral ev il. In nature, there is a balance in which good is always
greater than e v il. Man's imagination, however, disturbs this natural
balance when i t expands man's desires to the point of lu st. Because
of the finitude of man's mind apparent good is not always the real
good. Perfection in man is attained only by the complete elimination
of self-centeredness, and man alone is not capable of bringing this
about in himself. "Such radical conversion must be the act of God,
. . . Nothing can suffice but a redemptive a c t ."^
The fourth and final tra n sitio n moves from the existence of
evil and man's aspiration towards perfection and self-d e n ial, to the
need for an object of worship. The culmination of Temple's line of
reasoning points to the need for specific "Revelation," but i t is
beyond the realm of natural theology (philosophy of religion)
Natural theology can give assurance th at there is a God who deserves
^Part I I I , Chapter XVIII.
^Nature, Man and God, p. 397.
®Ibid.
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worship and that such worship is the only way of deliverance from
evil. Temple does not seek to establish anything beyond th is —but
this is certainly enough fo r any philosophical system.
The c ritic a l analysis I am about to undertake will deal
sp ec ific a lly with only the f i r s t two d ialectical tra n s itio n s . These
two tran sitio n s form a complete and self-contained line of thought in
which Temple's d ialectical philosophy is clearly exhibited. The la s t
two tran sitio n s can be meaningful only i f the conclusions of the f i r s t
two are valid: i . e . , i f i t is established th at God exists and th at
he is both immanent and transcendent. Further, the la s t two tra n s i
tions are fa r more theological in tone than philosophical, fo r they
speak of the relationship between man and God in lig h t of the in t e l
lectual certainty of God's existence. I shall therefore deal spe
c if ic a lly with the assumptions and procedures found in the f i r s t two
tra n s itio n s , and I shall attempt to determine the v a lid ity of Temple's
arguments in support of them, and shall show, in te r a l i a , that
O
Temple's arguments for the existence of God are invalid.
^Owen C. Thomas, William Temple's Philosophy of Religion
(London: S.P.C.K., 1961; Greenwich, Conn.: Seabury Press, 1961),
p. 136.
te m p le would consider the arguments th at he uses in support
of the d ia le ctic a l tran sitio n s as being nothing more than d ifferen t
aspects of his basic line of reasoning. Even to distinguish among
the d ialectical tran sitio n s is an abstraction from what is in fa c t
a simple and rational view of the unity of the universe. In this
c ritiq u e , however, I shall speak of Temple's argument^. That Temple
does have a t le a s t two d ifferen t arguments will become clear in the
course of this study. Further, to speak of his thought in terms of
d is tin c t arguments does not d is to rt the structure of Temple's system.
I t provides, rath er, a means fo r greater c la rity and more precise
analysis of Temple's thought.
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5
Temple takes his d ialectical tran sitio n s to be clearly
philosophical in nature. Emphasis on th is point is important. Every
argument within the context of philosophy of religion has theological
consequences, and Temple tends to accept certain philosophical proposi
tions th a t are predicated, to some extent, on his theological presup
positions. The Christian faith was deeply ingrained in Temple's
thought. After a l l , he was a prominent churchman as well as a pro
found philosophical thinker: he was ordained in the Anglican Church
a t the age of twenty-seven and was la te r appointed Bishop of
Manchester, then Archbishop of York (during which time he wrote Nature,
Man arid God), and fin a lly , the highest position in the Anglican Church,
Archbishop of Canterbury. I t i s , of course, true that everyone tends
to accept hidden metaphysical assumptions. However, when one is doing
philosophy, especially philosophy of relig io n , special e ffo rt must be
made to avoid packing into one's arguments the very conclusions th at
one wishes to draw from them. I shall attempt to show th at a t certain
points in his arguments. Temple is not su fficien tly cautious.
According to Temple, there is a rather clear-cut distinction
between philosophy and theology. This d istin ctio n is two-fold for
they d iff e r in aim and method. They d iff e r in aim, fo r while the
philosopher seeks knowledge to deepen his understanding, the theolo
gian seeks knowledge to enhance his fa ith . His is fides qùaérens
intellectum . Methodologically, the philosopher begins with man's
experience and seeks to explain the world in terms of th a t experience.
The theologian begins with the notion of God and attempts to explain
the world with reference to th a t notion. According to Temple,
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. the primary assurances of Religion are the ultimate questions
of Philosophy."^
Temple's Gifford Lectures are intended as a philosophical
analysis of the relationship between man and nature, God and nature,
and man and God. Temple begins with man's experience of nature, or
the world, and seeks to explain the world in terms of this experience.
The conclusion that God exists is a philosophical conclusion arising
out of man's reflectio n upon himself and his relationship to the
world. In this c ritic a l analysis I shall attempt to show th at
Temple's conclusion rests on presuppositions th at have not been suf
fic ie n tly examined. For example, in my analysis of the f i r s t tra n s i
tion I shall attempt to show that Temple's argument from the exis
tence of mind in the material process to immanent theism is not
successful, because Temple does not seriously take into consideration
possible alternative explanations for the appearance of mind. He
assumes that since all other explanations view the world as a "brute
fact" they are incorrect: within the context of Temple's idealist^®
and theological assumptions such an interpretation of the world is
impossible.
I shall also attempt to show that Temple uses the same terms,
and without warning s h ifts back and forth between two d is tin c t
metaphysical systems. Temple is deeply influenced by nineteenth
9
Nature, Man and God, p. 35.
fu lle r analysis of Temple's idealism will be given below
and in Chapter II I.
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7
century idealism and twentieth.century realism, and he attempts to
synthesize both views to form a consistent philosophical line of
reasoning resulting in his th e is tic conclusions. I believe that he
is unsuccessful in his attempt to make this a true synthesis, and
that the re s u lt is , rather, a juxtaposition of the two metaphysical
views.
For a proper evaluation of Tenple's arguments, a clear picture
is needed of what he takes to be his philosophical method and his
view of re a lity . I shall include, therefore, two preliminary chapters
dealing with these aspects of Temple's thought. At present I shall
b rie fly describe Temple's method and metaphysics, and then indicate
some of the basic points on which this c r itic a l analysis is to turn.
Temple re je cts both a s t r i c t l y inductive and a s t r i c t l y
deductive philosophical method. He believes th a t the correct proce
dure fo r any philosophical argument must include aspects of both
deduction and induction. Consistent with this basic assumption.
Temple describes his method as "d ia le c tic a l." However, his interpre
tation of d ia le c tic is also a convergence of two philosophical tr a d i
tions. One is the older Platonic view th at id e n tifie s d ialectical
thinking with c ritic a l thinking. The other is the more modern
Hegelian view th at takes d ia le ctic to be the synthesizing of two
opposing positions or points of view.
Temple's metaphysical thinking was deeply influenced by such
nineteenth century id e alists as Bradley, Bosanquet, and especially
Edward Caird, Temple's teacher a t Oxford. In the preface to Nature,
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Man and God, Temple s ta te s : "Such method in thought as I possess,
and especially such grasp of the principles of Dialectic as I have
acquired, I believe myself to owe to my Master at B a llio l, Edward
C a i r d . B u t early in the twentieth century, idealism fe ll into
disrepute in face of a philosophical revolution. Temple was by no
means uninfluenced by the new "re alist" type of thought; nevertheless;
he retained much of his id e a lis t point of view. For instance, he
continued to believe that the world is a rational unity, and that
the principle of this unity is knowable, to some extent a t le a s t,
by reason. This assumption plays a central role in Temple's thought
in Nature, Man and God. Temple's unabashed acceptance of certain
id e a lis t notions, despite th e ir unpopularity, is indicated by the
fa c t th at he dedicates his Gifford Lectures to Edward Caird, an act
12
that a t le a s t one commentator describes as "courageous."
Two aspects of the r e a lis t movement in the twentieth century
should be considered here. One is developed along the lines of
— fe tu re , Man and God, p. x. Edward Caird (1835-1908) was a
B ritish philosopher who was clearly within the Neo-Hegelian school.
I t is noteworthy th at Temple never mentions John Caird (1820-1898),
Edward's older brother, in any of his w ritings. John was perhaps an
even more prominent figure than Edward since he was Principal of
Glasgow University. Further, i t would appear th at John Caird‘s
thought was more akin to Temple's than was Edward's: John was a
theologian as well as a philosopher--like his brother he was a Neo-
Hegelian. John argued th at universal thought is the re a lity of all
things and that the existence of In fin ite Thought, i . e . , God, is
demonstrated by limited f i n i t e thought: an argument th a t, mutatis
mutandis, is not fa r removed from Temple's basic reasoning.
^^Ralph E. Stedman, Hibbert Journal, XXXIII (January, 1935),
301.
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9
neo-scholasticism, the other in terms of what has come to be known as
"process philosophy." Temple moves with the l a t t e r direction. Yet
he is not at all unsympathetic to neo-thomist i c thought.
“Process philosophy" is a term applied to a group of philoso
phies which, though they d iffe r from one another in some respects,
have in common the tendency to replace the trad itio n al metaphysical
category of substance by the.notion of flux. One may see the
beginnings of th is tendency a t the turn of the century in Henri
Bergson and others. In the la te r Whitehead we have a good example of
a process philosopher. One must distinguish "process" from, on the
one hand, "evolution," and, on the other hand, "progress." Process
philosophy is lik e ly , of course, to have certain tendencies in common
with various sorts of evolutionary and n a tu ra lis tic philosophies.
All process philosophy is influenced by the sciences,
especially the biological sciences. Philosophers such as Morgan and
Alexander tend to look on the universe as continually changing and
progressing. Within the process we are able to recognize general
categories such as m atter, l i f e , and mind, each a step in the pro
gression. Temple views these stages as "abstractions" for he
believed the universe to be a rational whole—a basic id e a lis t assump
tion. He l i s t s the stages of the process as m atter, l i f e , mind, and
s p i r i t . What Temple means by each of these terms, especially mind
and s p i r i t , will be of v ital importance in our study.
In Nature, Man and God, Temple attempts to join his r e a l i s t
or n a tu ra lis tic cosmology with his basic id e a l is t suppositions. I t
is primarily in terms of his idealism th at Temple feels he is able to
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10
establish philosophically the existence of a transcendent God. I shall
attempt to show th at Temple is able to achieve his objectives only by
speaking within the context of an inadequately distinguished dual
metaphysics.
The problem is compounded by the fact th at Temple uses the
same terms in both contexts, despite the fact th at th e ir meanings in
one context are considerably different from, i f not contradictory to,
th eir meanings in the other metaphysical context. In this critiq u e,
I shall be primarily concerned with "mind" and " s p irit," fo r although
these concepts form two of the stages of Temple's r e a lis t cosmology,
they are also the terms, with different meanings, by which he seeks
to establish the existence of God. For example, at one point in
Nature, Man and God, he uses the term "Mind" f i r s t n a tu ra lis tic a lly ,
and then, in the sentence immediately following, he uses i t theis-
tic a lly , without any indication that there is a real difference. He
f i r s t says that " . . . Mind arises in the course of i t [World-
Process], . . . " and then he says that " . . . Mind contains the
13
explanation of the World-Process. . . . " The same ambivalence will
be found to e x ist in Temple's use of such terms as "matter" and
" s p irit."
Because Temple does not adequately distinguish between his
n a tu ra listic and his th e is tic or id e a list uses of certain terms, i t
will be necessary to adopt, for the purposes of this c ritiq u e , a
means by which i t will be clear within which context or metaphysical
^^Nature, Man and God, p. 132.
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n
viewpoint I take Temple to be using a specific term. For th is pur
pose, I shall use the Greek le tte r s "a" and "g" to indicate the
th e is tic and the n a tu ra lis tic contexts respectively. Thus, "Mind"
used in the second sentence quoted above, v i z . , as containing the
explanation of the World-Process, will be w ritten Mind“ . Mind as
found in the f i r s t sentence, i . e . , as i t has arisen in the course of
g
the process, will be w ritten Mind.. This basic notation will be
used in conjunction with such terms as "matter," " s p ir it," and any
other terms used by Temple to which I believe the distinction relevant.
In certain instances, these terms will be used without any specific
reference to e ith er the n a tu ra lis tic or th e is tic contexts, and in
such cases no special signification will be added.
This work is divided into four major parts. The f i r s t part
contains the two chapters that are intended to provide a basis for
the analysis, setting forth an exposition of Temple's philosophical
method and metaphysical views. The second and third parts form
the heart of the c ritic a l analysis, being directed towards an inten
sive study of some of the key concepts found in each of the f i r s t
two d ialectical tran sitio n s. The fourth part is the conclusion.
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PART I . TEMPLE'S METHOD AND METAPHYSICS
12
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CHAPTER II
TEMPLE'S PHILOSOPHICAL M ETH O D
The most important element th at is to be found in Temple's
thought is his constant attempt to bring about a synthesis of opposing
positions. I t will become clear, I believe, in the course of this
paper, th at the f i r s t two dialectical transitions of Nature, Man and
God contain an attempt to unite idealism and realism , theism and natu
ralism. Not only is Temple's metaphysics a synthesis, but his philo
sophical method i t s e l f attempts to bring together divergent in te rp re ta
tions of the manner in which philosophical reasoning should proceed.
Temple's philosophical method has two d is tin c t aspects: logic
and d ia le ctic . In each case. Temple attempts to unite two d ifferen t
views. Within the realm of logic Temple's view amounts to a synthesis
of the deductive and inductive schools of thought. In the realm of
d ia le c tic , the synthesis is between the Platonic and Hegelian view
points.
Temple's view of logic was greatly influenced by the nine
teenth century id e a lis ts , such as Bradley and Bosanquet. These men
attempted to redefine the function of logic as an aspect of thought
so as to bring i t into closer conformity with th e ir view of the
nature of re a lity . In the f i r s t of his systematic works. Mens
C reatrix, Temple defines logic as:
13
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14
. . . the science of mental process, so fa r as this leads to
know!edge ; i t studies the method of the Will to Know, not the
fortuitous emergence of those opinions upon which "practical"
men are ready to take action of momentous consequenceJ
However, in lig h t of what he was to say la te r in Nature, M an and God,
i t is clear that he does not consider logic to be a science th a t can
be studied apart from our knowledge of the world. I t is not indepen
dent of other in tellectu al disciplines. Logic is ". . , but the
science or a rt of dealing appropriately with the subject-m atter of
2
the various objects of study; . . Logic is therefore essential
to philosophy. However, Temple has much to say about the inadequacies
of strin g en t interpretations of the nature of logic.
Temple has several criticisms of traditional logic. Primarily,
the iron-clad framework of traditional logic does not provide the
process of reasoning with a structure th at is pliable enough to
accommodate the in tricacies of "living thought." The development of
traditional logic i s , of course, rooted in the philosophy of the Greeks
and the Schoolmen. In both cases emphasis wa?%i the notion of
"Being" rather than "Becoming": "Knowledge was concerned with the
3
unchanging Forms, the Ideas, the Kinds of Being." The notion of
"Real Kinds" was therefore essential to the framework of traditional
logic. I t is through 1±is notion th a t the form or essence of an
object could be iso lated , thus providing the sta rtin g point fo r the
^Mens C reatrix , p. 12.
^Nature, Man and God, p. xviii
^ Ib id ., p. 101.
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15
logical or deductive process. However, since the Renaissance, i t has
become increasingly evident th at the e a rlie r emphasis on Being, the
absolute and unchanging aspect of r e a lity , is giving way to emphasis
on the contrary notion. Becoming.
Due to elements found in the philosophy of such thinkers as
Heraclitus and A risto tle, as well as to the advances in the sciences,
modern thinkers have been fa r more concerned with the changing aspects
of the world, rather than with its s t a t i c aspects. The meaning of
d is tin c t and unchanging "essence" as supposedly found in the world is
no longer incontrovertible. In lig h t of the constant state of change,
or Becoming, of the world, i t is doubtful that the "Real Kinds" as
conceived by the Greeks and the Schoolmen are in any sense objective
e n titie s . They seem to be nothing more than creations of mind. For
example, according to the theory of biological evolution, there is no
lim it to the number of mutations that can occur in any living thing.
Although we speak of the "species" of living things we do not refer
to "essence," but rather to a collection of characteristics that is
common to a group of p articular living things. When we speak of the
broader notion of "nature" we are not speaking of some s ta t ic e n tity ,
but rather the to ta lity of living things that are found in the world
and are continually changing.
Another aspect of the traditional logic developed f i r s t by
A ristotle and la te r employed by the Scholastics, was the m ultiplicity
of rules that the s t r i c t l y deductive logic entailed. One of Descartes'
beneficial effects on the history of philosophy is derived from his
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16
attempt to eliminate the complexity of the logic of the Scholastics.
Descartes recognized th at the multitude of laws governing deductive
thought were both cumbersome and inadequate. He, therefore, substi
tuted his own rules for valid reasoning which were fa r simpler and
fewer in number.^ However, in sp ite of th is new approach, Descartes
was not able to overcome the most stu ltify in g of the Scholastic
notions, v iz ., that all valid reasoning must be deductive. Descartes'
rules for valid reasoning were patterned a fte r mathematical exemplars.
The real problem i s , according to Temple, that the ". . . mathematical
ideal of knowledge . . . [was] valued for precisely those qualities
which constitute i t s fatal defects; these are its indifference to
Time and i t s precision."^ Descartes carried into his own thinking
the emphasis on the absolute and the unchanging th at characterized
the philosophy of Being of the Greeks and the Scholastics.
Temple does not completely reject a stringent deductive
logic. He recognizes i t as a form of valid reasoning. However, he
in s is ts that alone i t cannot provide meaningful conclusions. I t is
necessary th at we inculcate into our thinking some form of inductive
reasoning. But, as with deduction. Temple maintains that a s t r i c t l y
inductive method cannot yield meaningful re su lts. He rejects the
stringent method of induction as prescribed by Mill and Bosanquet.^
^Cf. , Descartes' Rules fo r the Direction of Mind, and
Discourse on Method.
^Nature, Man and God, p. 87.
^ Ib id ., p. 90.
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17
According to Mill, induction consists in enumerating all p o s s ib ilitie s ,
and then eliminating all but one. Temple maintains that no one truly
believes th at such a method can give us certainty. The tremendous
influence of Temple's idealism is seen in the following statement from
Mens C reatrix, where he rejects the s t r i c t l y inductive method:
W e cannot begin with generalisation; but neither can we begin
with "facts," as Induction requires; we cannot "build upon
the facts" because, until our structure is complete, we do
not know what they are; the aim of our whole enquiry is to
find them. Facts are not always the original data, nor are
these always fa c ts. . . . I t is a t the end, not a t the
beginning, of our in tellectu al process th at we are in posses
sion of the "facts." Hence our "conclusion" should always
modify its own premises; fo r our goal is not the formula
tion of one judgement whose truth is guaranteed by others,
but a whole system whose parts support each other and in
which all the "facts" are found.7
Temple therefore rejects an e ith er s t r i c t l y deductive or s t r i c t l y
inductive logic: ". . . Deduction has no rig h t to its startin g -
O
point and Induction has no rig h t to its conclusion." The way of
true knowledge must r e s t in a synthesis of these two d is tin c t logics.
Temple maintains th at the true science of thought must bring together
the s t r i c t l y deductive and inductive methods in such a way th a t the
advantages of each might be gleaned. ". . . n o living thought is
Q
e ith e r Deductive or Inductive: i t is always both a t once."
Although Temple does not e x p lic itly describe the precise
manner in which these two methods are brought together, nor the manner
^Mens C reatrix, p. 16.
p
Nature, Man and God, p. 90.
9
Mens Creatrix, p. 15.
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18
in which the resulting synthesis is actually applied to reasoning,
both inductive and deductive elements are clearly present in the
arguments with which he seeks to establish his d ialectical tra n sitio n s.
They are clearly seen, for example, in the f i r s t tra n s itio n , in the
manner in which Temple seeks to establish the existence of Mind“ from
the fa c t th at Mind^ is found in the p r o c e s s . A t this c ritic a l
point. Temple employs both the inductive and deductive methods to
arrive at his conclusion. Inductively, Temple purports to have con
sidered all possible explanations of the appearance of Mind®, and
eliminates all but one, v i z . , Mind“ . But the fact th at the existence
of Mind^ requires an explanation th a t is external to the matter of
the process (the only p o ssib ility th at Temple accepts : Mind“ must be
present or else the appearance of Mind^ is "brute fact") is a deduc
tion from his pre-conception of the process and the nature of Mind.
Temple's view of logic takes into account the emphasis of
modern thought on "Becoming" rather than "Being." He was able to
free himself from the chains of the "unchanging" more thoroughly than
Descartes. For example, "the Law of the Excluded Middle," although
a basic precept of the A ristotelian-Scholastic logic, was undoubtedly
subscribed to by Descartes, In opposition to this law, however.
Temple adopts what might be called "the Law of the Included Middle."
Through modern science we have come to realize that "far from i t being
^^The d istin ctio n between Mind“ and Mind® has already been
outlined in the Introduction, supra, p. 11.
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19
true that A is never non-A, i t is often the case th at A is becoming
non-A and vice versa.
In Temple's view of logic we find elements of synthesis and
of a c ritic a l approach to reasoning. He attempts to bring together
contrary views of the nature of logic, and he seeks to examine the
central notions of the e a r lie r logic. These are basically the two
aspects that characterize Temple's dialectical method.
Because of the great influence that Idealism played in Temple's
thought in the early days of his philosophical thinking, Plato
inevitably had a great e ffe ct on Temple. Thus, Temple's conception
of the nature of d ia le ctic i s , to a great extent, Platonic. Moreover,
because Temple saw Plato through the eyes of Bosanquet as well as
Caird, i t was the Plato of the Republic, Phaedrus, Theaetetus, and
12
Sophist who most greatly influenced him.
In general, Platonic d ialectic is characterized primarily as
being a " c r i t i c a l " method. Plato certainly did not accept without
reservation (as well as a certain amount of contempt) the world
that presents i t s e l f to our senses. He severely questioned the extent
to which the senses can render knowledge of the universe. P lato's
philosophy was not, however, a skeptical philosophy. He maintained
a firm faith in the capacity of the in te lle c t to grasp absolute truth.
William Fletcher, William Temple, Twentieth Century
Christian (New York: Seabury Press, 1963), p. 295. (Hereinafter
referred to as William Temple.)
12
William D. Geoghegan, Platonism in Recent Religious Thought
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 83.
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In this sense, P lato's d ialectical method was c r i t i c a l , but i t was
also positive and rational. I t sought understanding through grasping
the universe as a whole, not by dividing i t up into it s smallest
13
parts. P lato's d ia le ctic was directed towards attaining knowledge
of the highest or ultimate.
All of these elements are to be found in Temple's dialectical
method. However, his view of d ialectic is not purely Platonic any more
than his view of logic is purely deductive or inductive. Also, Temple
was influenced greatly by a different interpretation of the nature of
d ia le c tic , sp ecifically that of Hegel.
Temple sees the triad of th e sis, an tith e sis, and synthesis as
the primary ch aracteristic of the Hegelian d ialectic. But i t has been
pointed out by such recent commentators as J. N. Findlay and Frederick
Copleston^^ that the triad is not especially ch aracteristic of Hegel.
For example, Findlay points out th at the three-fold pattern of
di a lecti c
. . . had already been read into Kant by Fichte, who had
grounded the Kantian categories in the relations of the Ego
to the non-Ego, and who had also treated these relations in
a series of three-fold movements, a thesis being confronted
by a contradictory a n tith e s is , and both being combined in
a sy n th esis, which in i t s turn becomes the starting-point
for a new tria d ic movement. . . . The terms "thesis".
13
Georges Gurvitch, Dialectique e t sociologie (Paris:
Flammarion, 1962), p. 35.
N. Findlay, Hegel : A Re-Examination (London: George
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1958), pp. 58-82. Frederick Copleston, S. J . ,
A History of Philosophy, VII, Part I (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books,
1965), 215!
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21
"antithesis" and "synthesis", so often used in expositions
of Hegel's doctrine, are in fa c t not frequently u s e d ^
Hegel: they are much more ch aracteristic of F ich te.* ^
From this point of view, i t is a mistake to imply that the Hegelian
d ia le ctic is characterized completely and uniquely by the triad ic
pattern of thinking. However, i t does appear in Hegel's writings
and his system is usually characterized in this way, even in the most
learned c irc le s, and we cannot seriously fa u lt Temple in attempting
to bring this interpretation of Hegel into his own d ialectical system.
For Temple, the triad represents not only the process of
thought, but the process of re a lity as well. For example, in the
notion of Being (Sein) , there is implied the contrary notion of
Non-Being (Nicht-sein) . Since these are to ta lly contradictory con
cepts, they negate each other and, according to Hegel, a new concept
arises. Becoming (Werden) is the synthesis of Being and Non-Being.
Negation, the destruction of the thesis and the antithesis in order
to form the synthesis, is therefore a central notion in Hegelian
d ia le ctic . I t is by means of negation, a kind of regression, that
progression is possible.
Temple is deeply impressed by Hegel's attempt to bring
together two contradictory elements and create a new en tity . However,
Temple was far too taken up with the d ia le ctic of Plato to allow
negation to pla^ a central role in his philosophy. He therefore seeks
to redefine the Hegelian triad in the following manner:
^^Findlay, pp. 69-70.
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22
The "antithesis" is born of the lim itations of the "thesis".
The "thesis" is never a complete statement; there are aspects
of the problem which i t ignores. As men become conscious
of these, they feel the need to assert them. There i s , as
a ru le , no room for them within the accepted formulation
of the "th esis", so i t becomes necessary to make a new
s t a r t from the assertion of these hitherto neglected aspects,
or from a deliberate questioning of what has h itherto been
unquestioned. So the "antithesis" receives statement. As
compared with the "thesis" i t is a r t i f i c i a l , a thing con
sciously constructed; i t may be defended with conspicuous
ingenuity, but i t is not likely to be a fount of wisdom.
When the "antithesis" has been worked out, and its
shortcomings also have become apparent, the time is come
fo r the "synthesis". This is not a mere average struck
between the two. I t is always a reassertion of the "thesis"
with all th at has proved valuable in the "antithesis" digested
into i t . 16
Although Temple feels th at he has d efin itely improved on
Hegel's d ia le c tic , making i t more positive in character, there is
some question as to whether he has really altered i t : whether
there is a sig n ifican t difference between the tria d ic system as i t
exists in Hegel's writings and what Temple claims to be a modifica
tion of this system. I t must be pointed out that the notion of
mutual negation characterizes only some of Hegel's tria d s . The
tria d of Being, Non-Being, and Becoming is certainly an instance of
th is . But in many other triads the final synthesis does not arise
out of the mutual negation of the thesis and antithesis at a l l .
Findlay notes:
In others the opposition is of a much less extreme character
(as where, for instance, the notion of a Whole and i t s
Parts is superseded by the very sim ilar notion of a Force
and its Manifestations). In some triads the th ird member
is an obvious choice as mediating between the other two—
^^Nature, Man and God, pp. 58-59.
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23
as where S p ir it mediates between the Logical Idea and Nature,
or as where Measure synthetizes Quality and Quantity. In
other cases, the third member of the triad is merely one of
the things in which the f i r s t two members could be united,
as where the notion of Ground is said to mediate Identity
with Difference. In y e t other cases the reconciling func
tions of the third member are not a t all obvious, as where
Teleology reconciles the Mechanical and the Chemical, or
an Unhappy Other-worldliness emerges out of Stoicism and
Scepticism. There are many more triads in which the th ird
member emerges out of the second member alone, than triads
in which i t emerges out of the two previous members conjointly.
In these less extreme instances of the tria d ic d ia le c tic there is a
d efin ite turning away from the s t r i c t l y negative character of a triad
such as Being, Non-Being, and Becoming. Thus, i t is not clear that
Temple has really redefined Hegel's system at a l l , nor th a t he has
improved on i t .
The question of the proper reading of Hegel aside, i t is
clear th at Temple feels th at the proper tria d ic d ia le c tic should be
always progressive and never regressive. He sees great value in
Hegel's method of joining two opposing concepts, and feels th a t i t is
an essential element for valid philosophical reasoning. "Synthesis"
then is a central element in Temple's philosophical method. However,
i t is a Platonic synthesis in the sense that i t seeks to bring
together opposing concepts without destroying or o b literatin g eith er
one. The objective is the total understanding of the universe. Temple
describes his method as ". . . the progressive systématisation of our
18
experience as we apprehend i t ; . . ." And i t is this th at he hopes
^^Findlay, Hegel: A Re-Examination, pp. 72-73.
^^Mens C reatrix , p. 20.
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2 4
to achieve through his d ialectical method. William Fletcher speaks of
19
Temple's unique a b ility to think "unitively": . . he was able
to see quickly middle terms, and common elements, and connecting
20
links in an i renie and conciliatory reinterp retatio n ."
In p ractice. Temple applies his dialectical method by means of
what he calls a process of "encirclement." He would "surround" all
the relevant elements related to a problem, including, of course, the
contradictory elements, and continually go around them until he would
form them into a coherent synthesis th at would include the basic
truths of all the original elements. This approach is found in
Temple's thought as early as 1910 when he wrote Faith and Modern
21
Thought. Fletcher picturesquely describes Temple's method in the
following manner: "He encircles round and round a problem like a
22
mongoose around a cobra." Temple speaks of "living thought" as
"circu lar": ". . . i t moves round and round a system of fa c ts ,
improving it s understanding of the system and its constituent parts
OO
at every stage." He saw no d iffic u lty in the "circular" method of
reasoning as long as i t does not involve a vicious c irc le as in the
^^William Temple, p. 9.
ZOlbid., p. 10.
?1
Faith and Modern Thought (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.,
1910), cited by Fletcher, p. 296.
^^William Temple, p. 9.
^^Mens C reatrix, p. 17.
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25
case of the "Cartesian Circle." Temple quotes Caird when he says that
"there is no harm in arguing in a c irc le i f the c irc le is large
24
enough." Assuming th at this is tru e, I shall argue in the c ritic a l
parts of this paper th a t Temple's circle is not large enough, and
th at i t is in fact a "vicious c ircle."
Although Hegel had a very strong influence on Temple's
25
philosophical thought long before Nature, Man and God, Temple does
not make any e x p lic it reference to Hegel in any of his works except
the Gifford Lectures in which, as has already been pointed out, he
redefines the Hegelian triad . I believe Temple was not fully aware
of the various thinkers who proved to be a great influence upon his
philosophy. I t is even questionable th at he recognized the dialec
tical nature of his method until a fte r the Gifford Lectures were
w ritten and delivered. Owen C. Thomas, in a short and excellent work
27
mentioned e a r lie r , e n title d , William Temple's Philosophy of
Religion, suggests that the dialectical nature of Nature, Man and
God was an after-thought. In the "Introductory Outline" Temple
speaks of each of the "dialectical tran sitio n s," indicating very
William Temple, Studies in the S p irit and Truth of
C hristianity (London: Macmillan & Co., L td., 1914), p. 43, cited by
Fletcher, William Temple, p. 19.
^^The influence of the Hegelian tria d is clearly present in
both Mens Creatrix (1917) and especially Christus Veritas (1924).
pc
For this information I rely on the helpful work of J. 0.
Hoffman, J r . , "A William Temple Word-Book" (unpublished Ph.D. d isse r
ta tio n , University of Southern California, 1964), p. 187.
27
Introduction, p. 4.
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precisely a t what point in the development of his reasoning they occur.
But in the body of Nature, Man and God there is no mention a t all of
the "dialectical tra n sitio n s." I t i s , therefore, quite plausible
th at the use of the term occurred to Temple only a f te r the work was
28
completed.
There is a further confusion as to whether Temple believes
Nature, Man and God to be a "dialectical" development i f one compares
what he says in the Preface and what he says in the Introductory
29
Note. In the former case he says:
M y purpose has not been to construct, stage by stage, a
philosophical fabric where each conclusion becomes the basis
of the next advance. I fully recognise the value of th at
method of thought, though I believe i t to be more fru itfu l
in exposition than in enquiry.30
Clearly, in lig h t of the philosophical rather than the purely theolo
gical context of Nature, Man and God, the work, a t le a st in Temple's
eyes, is enquiry. But he contradicts himself in the Introductory
31
Note in which he sets out the "stages of the argument." In reading
his Gifford Lectures i t becomes clear th a t each stage of his argument
re lie s upon what has gone before i t . This is especially true with
regard to the reliance of the second d ialectical tran sitio n upon the
f i r s t . I t will become apparent in the following sections of this
^^Thomas, William Temple's Philosophy of Religion, p. 115.
Z^Ibid., p. 16.
^*^Nature, M an and God, p. v i i i .
^h b i d . , p. xi.
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2 7
critiq u e th a t the second tra n sitio n can stand only i f the conclusions
of the f i r s t have been established.
There is l i t t l e doubt, therefore, th a t the line of thought
found in Nature, Man and God can validly be described as "d ia lec tic a l."
However, Temple took pains to distinguish his d ialectical method from
th a t of the left-wing Hegelians such as Karl Marx, v iz ., "Dialectical
Materialism." For Marx the m a te ria listic philosophy could be the only
consistent philosophy, for i t alone can accept the knowledge rendered
through science without the d istortion derived from s p ir itu a lis tic
in terp retatio n s. Temple, on the other hand, insofar as his d ialectic
was Hegelian, was a right-wing Hegelian in that he believed th at
Hegelianism could be interpreted in a way that is consistent with the
central beliefs of C hristianity.
The basic difference between Temple's d ia le c tic and Marx's can
be most easily seen in terms of the mind-body problen. Marx, in order
to be consistent with his materialism, could not admit any "spiritual"
or non-material interpretation of mind. His position can be described
as a form of "epiphenomenalism": mind is nothing more than a somewhat
accidental accretion to the complex operations of the brain and nervous
system, which are themselves explicable in terms of material causality.
Temple maintained, however, th a t there is a very clear d is tin c
tion to be found between mind and body. He claimed that Marx implic
i t l y acknowledges this fa c t when he sets forth his epiphenomenalism,
for he is admitting th at there i s , in f a c t, a d istinction between the
body and the "effect" of the body called mind. Temple believed that
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28
the very recognition of a distinction between body and mind must lead
inevitably to e ith e r theism or pantheism for . . once the d istin c
tion between mind and matter is allowed, attention to the behaviour of
mind is bound to bring men to an interpretation of experience in
sp iritu a l terms.
But despite his basic metaphysical disagreements with Marx,
Temple realized th a t dialectical materialism was extremely in flu e n tia l,
i f for no other reason than i t purported to be able consistently to
explain the nature of re a lity without having to go beyond the matter
of the world. Thus, he knew th a t i t must be taken into account in his
own d ialectical philosophy.
At one time I thought of giving to these Lectures a descriptive
s u b - title : A Study in Dialectical Realism. But th a t might
suggest an ambition to inaugurate a philosophical tra d itio n
suitably so designated. I have no such desire. But I believe
th at the Dialectical Materialism of Marx, Engels and Lenin
has so strong an appeal to the minds of many of our contem
poraries, and has so strong a foundation in contemporary
experience, th a t only a D ialectic more comprehensive in it s
range of apprehension and more thorough in i t s appreciation
of the inter-play of factors in the real world, can overthrow
i t or seriously modify i t as a guide to actio n .33
Temple f e l t th at d ialectical materialism had failed to be com
prehensive enough in at least two areas. Metaphysically, as has been
noted. Temple viewed the s t r i c t l y m aterialist in terp retatio n of the
nature of mind as an intolerable gloss over the real ch aracteristics
O p
The C entrality of Christ (New York: Morehouse-Gorham, 1936),
p. 6, cited by Fletcher, William Temple, p. 319.
33
Nature, Man -and God, pp. ix-x.
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29
of mind that we experience. Economics was the other area of importance
to Marxist philosophy. Of this Temple wrote:
I t i s , of course, well known th a t Karl Marx applied the Hegelian
d ia le c tic in the economic f ie ld , and presented Communism as
the "synthesis" which was to solve all problems, the "dicta
torship of the p ro le ta ria t", now established to some extent
in Russia, being the necessary "antithesis" to the "thesis"
of Capitalism. But i t is hazardous to construct the "synthesis"
in advance, and almost equally hazardous to apply with any g.
thoroughness in practice an a r t i f i c a l l y constructed "antithesis".
For Temple i t was clear th at the economic development of Russia did
not accurately r e fle c t the Marxist d ia le c tic . He goes on to say:
"Human thinking is sure to omit some of the relevant facts; often i t
has not even the opportunity of becoming aware of them. But unknown
35
facts produce th e ir consequences equally with known,. . ."
According to Temple, Marx did not appreciate the complex in te r
play of factors in the real world because he had constructed his
synthesis before he had fully investigated all the facts. Temple was
very much aware of the material aspect of the world, and, despite his
early idealism, did not seek to down-grade th is aspect of the world
as "appearance." However, his d ialectical realism, unlike Marx's
dialectical materialism, does not eliminate a priori the existence
of mind as an e n tity th at is clearly d is tin c t from matter.
If Nature, Man and God is tru ly an enquiry into the explana
tion of the process, i t would seem th a t Temple's dialectical method,
as outlined in this chapter, would be ideally suited for i t . By
34lbid., p. 59.
35lbid., pp. 59-60.
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30
combining the Platonic and Hegelian interpretations of the nature
of d ia le c tic . Temple's method might be called " c ritic a l synthesis."
If this is his philosophical method we would expect him to investigate
g
all possible explanations of the process as a whole, and for Mind in
p articu lar. He should be equally c ritic a l of all explanations, and
where he sees partial truth in two or more, he should seek to bring
together these elements. Although i t i s , of course, true that
"intuition" is to some extent necessary in any metaphysical pursuit,
we may expect th at before an appeal to intuition is made. Temple would
attempt to apply his method as vigorously as possible. Indeed, an
intuitional response is certainly implied by Temple's synthesis of
the deductive and inductive forms of logical reasoning. But to appeal
to in tu itio n alone, without a serious c ritic a l analysis of all the
p o s s ib ilitie s , would indicate an inconsistent application of the
philosophical method, and would therefore tend to invalidate any
conclusions derived from Temple's line of reasoning. Instances of
this will be found in the discussions of Temple's refusal to accept
"brute fact" as an explanation of the world, and his attempt to
36
establish a transcendent source of Value.
^Gpart I I , Chapter VIII, and Part I I I , Chapter XVII.
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CHAPTER III
TEMPLE'S M ETAPHYSICAL VIEW S
The nature of Temple's method of synthesis is strikingly
evident in his metaphysical views where he brings together some con
trary elements of two schools of thought, sp ecifically , idealism and
realism. In general, Temple joins some very specific id e a list pre
suppositions concerning the universe with some basic elements of the
"process" view of the universe. In this chapter I shall discuss the
nature of this synthesis, as well as some further aspects of Temple's
view of the mind-body problem.
The most important id e a list supposition found throughout
Temple's writings up to Nature, Man and God is th at the universe is
rational and is a unity.^
The ra tio n a lity of the Universe is the primary certainty.
This certainty i s , no doubt, an act of fa ith , but all other
certain ty depends on i t . I have no rig h t to say th a t 2+2=4,
2 apples + 2 apples = 4 apples, except on the supposition ?
that my principles of reasoning are valid of the real world.
I t would be overextending the lim its of this work to under
take a study of the change th a t took place in Temple's thought a fte r
the Gifford Lectures. I t is clear, however, that Temple became
increasingly uncertain about the "rationality" of the Universe. See,
for example, John M . Gessel, "Beyond 'Nature, Man and God,"' The
Anglican Theological Review, XLII, No. 3 (July, 1960), 234-246, and
Thomas, William Temple's Philosophy of Religion, p. 23.
2
Mens Creatrix, p. 89.
31
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32
According to Temple, the very nature of reason requires th a t the
universe be ratio n al. I f i t were otherwise, i t would be impossible
th at there would be any science or philosophy. ". . .w e have to
choose between postulating a rational universe and accepting complete
3
scepticism."
The universe is also a single unity. "There is throughout the
world a system of in te r-re la tio n s , such th a t each separate entity
a ffe c ts, and is affected by, all other things. To each e n tity ,
therefore, every other e n tity makes a difference."^ "The goal of the
in te lle c t is the apprehension of the whole universe as a nexus of
relatio n s."^ As we shall see shortly, according to Temple's r e a lis t
cosmology the universe is made up of several "stages" or "levels" of
re a lity . Within the context of his id e a lis t view of the universe as
a rational unity, however. Temple relegates these levels to "abstrac
tions" from the unity of the universe. They are created by the mind
so that i t might b etter grasp the nature of the unity of the
6
universe.
By the turn of the twentieth century, the impact of idealism
as developed f i r s t by Hegel and la te r by Bradley and Bosanquet (the
id e a lists who were most influential upon Temple) had spent i t s e l f . In
^Christus V eritas, p. 9.
^Nature, Man and God, p. 504.
5
Mens C reatrix , p. 71.
^Cf., Christus V eritas, pp. 5-7.
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33
its stead arose another metaphysical view, v i z ., "realism."^ In many
respect the "new realism," as i t is sometimes called, contradicts the
idealism of the nineteenth century. Whereas the id e alists emphasized
the "oneness" of the universe, the r e a lis ts emphasized the multi
p lic ity of e n titie s in the universe. The id e a lists stressed the
"Being" of the universe maintaining th a t, although i t "appears" con
tin u ally to change, in essence the world is unchanging. The r e a l i s t s '
emphasis, on the other hand, was on "Becoming." The world is con
stan tly developing and progressing, and therefore changing. The
id e a lists viewed matter, space, and time as unreal, thus placing
l i t t l e credence in science. The r e a lis t s fu lly accepted the material
nature of the world in space and time, and sought to encompass the
renderings of science in their metaphysical views.
The term "realism" has been used to signify different things
throughout the history of philosophy. Some basic distinctions may
therefore be helpful. I t should be emphasized that there is no
relationship between the "new realism" of the twentieth century and
the "realism" of Plato which, in maintaining the real existence of
essences or "Ideas," was a form of idealism. Further, there is a
d istin ctio n between r e a l i s t epistemology and r e a l i s t metaphysics,
although they are related.
R ealist epistemology, for example, th a t of G. E. Moore, maintains
th at we have d ire c t knowledge of the world around us. In this sense
Temple was indisputably a re a lis t. However, he was not a "naive
r e a l i s t ," i . e . , he did not maintain th a t the object perceived exists
exactly as i t is perceived. He would admit th at the disposition of
the perceiver does effect the nature of the perception (Nature, Man
and God, pp. 125-127).
TRi’ r e a l i s t metaphysics of the twentieth century a sse rts, in
contradistinction to idealism, the existence of a material world.
Such a metaphysical view lies between idealism and the m a te ria listic
naturalism of the nineteenth century. This view also emphasizes the
existence of the world in time and space, and readily accepts the
m u ltip licity and constant change in the universe. I t may be referred
as the "new naturalism."
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3 4
Temple adopts a cosmology th a t was patterned a fte r the thought
O
of the "Process Philosophers," especially Samuel Alexander and Alfred
North Whitehead. Whitehead had the g reatest influence upon Temple,
and throughout Nature, Man and God Temple freely makes reference to
Whitehead's own Gifford Lectures, Process and R ea lity , given four
years before Temple's lectures. In the course of this work, i t will
become clear th a t there are points of resemblance and difference
between Temple and Whitehead. In the f i r s t dialectical tran sitio n
Temple is in substantial agreement with Whitehead, while in the
second tra n s itio n , in which he seeks to establish the transcendence
of God, he is in sharp disagreement with Whitehead.
Temple feels th a t in his p articu lar interpretation of the
process of the universe he has successfully accomplished the synthesis
of the contrary elements of idealism and realism. This synthesis is
not achieved in the Hegelian manner of bringing forth an en tirely new
creation from the negation of the opposing views. Rather, Temple
selects the aspects of each view that he believes to be true of
9
r e a lity . He accepts the r e a l i s t emphasis upon matter and becoming.
^ h i s is despite the fact that Temple mentions Alexander only
once in Nature, Man and God, and a t th at somewhat incidentally,
pp. 162-T65:
^Temple's emphasis on matter is clearly seen in his theology
as well as his philosophy. "C hristianity alone of re lig io n s," Temple
says, "does ju s tic e to the physical. Other s p i r i t u a l i s t in terp reta
tions of l i f e tre a t i t as illu so ry , or a t best negligible." (The
Nature of Personality [London: Macmillan & Co., L td., 1911], p. xxx.)
Recognition of the material nature of the universe does not weaken
C hristianity, i t strengthens i t : i t s central b e lie f in the
Incarnation-God takes on a material nature.
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35
rejecting the id e a lis t view th at the world of change is nothing more
than appearance. However, he accepts also the id e a lis t emphasis upon
mind. I t is on the basis of the existence of Mind“ th a t Temple pur
ports to be able to explain ra tio n ally the process. Mind“ i s , in
e ffe c t. Being. However, within Temple's philosophy, Mind“ is of such
great importance th a t, in contrast with the other process philoso
phers, matter is relegated a purely passive role in the progression
of the universe.
Despite it s passivity, however, matter remains an important
part of the argument of the f i r s t d ialectical tran sitio n . I t is the
startin g point of the tra n sitio n , as well as the ultimate point of
origin of the world-process. At times Temple seems to equate the
world-process with matter; however, in his more common usage he views
matter as simply the f i r s t stage or level of the process. Matter is
the f i r s t stage of the process that is known to us. I t is from matter
th a t the process ultim ately arises.
Yet, despite his very clear awareness of the change th a t he
takes to be in tr in s ic to the world. Temple retains the notion of Being.
He seeks to argue th a t i t is Mind^ th a t is the true source and direc
to r of the process. Mind“ is essen tially unchanging, and as such is
outside the process. This notion i s i of course, of primary importance
in any id e a l is t philosophy since i t provides a rational explanation
fo r the contradictory appearances found in our perception of re a lity .
I t shall become clear in the next section of this work th a t, although
Temple a ttrib u te s fu ll m ateriality to the world, he rejects the b elief
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36
th at the process is the re su lt of matter alone. The process can be
the re su lt only of the activ ity of some mind, or something that is
like mind. To re je c t this would relegate the world to nothing more
than "brute fact": a conclusion th a t contradicts Temple's f i r s t and
most important presupposition, the id e a lis t position that the universe
is a rational unity. The notion of Mind^ is intended to f i l l a dual
role in Temple's metaphysics. In my analysis of mind in the second
d ialectical tra n s itio n , I shall attempt to show that while on the one
hand Temple wishes to make Mind^ commensurate with the process, the
world in the s ta te of becoming, on the other hand he attrib u tes to
Mind‘ d an unchanging aspect—the notion of "Being"—consistent with
the traditional Christian view of God.
The core of Temple's r e a lis t metaphysics is his view of the
process and the levels or stages th a t constitute i t . Temple defines
each stage as "a mode of action or reaction," and l i s t s four principal
stages th a t are known to us, v iz ., matter, l i f e , mind, and s p ir it.
No level is s ta t ic : all the e n titie s contained within any particular
level are in a constant sta te of development and progression towards
the next higher stage. Thus, the stages are hierarchically related
to one another: the higher stage being ultim ately dependent upon
the lower stage or stages: while the lower stages find th eir f u ll e s t
actualization through the higher stages.
Thus we see each grade dependent fo r its existence on the
grades below, and dependent for its own fu ll actualisation
on the grade or grades above. Such seems, apart from any
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37
theory of it s origin or raison d 'e t r e , to be in fa c t the
structure of R e a lity .'0
Temple leaves open the question as to whether the four levels
constitute the entire unity of re a lity , as well as the question as
to whether matter is the lowest possible category and s p i r i t the
highest. He feels that i t is not contradictory to maintain that the
process extends in fin ite ly in e ith er direction.
Whether there is in fa c t a lowest and a highest term in this
scale of fin ite existences I do not know, and I do not greatly
care. . . . [But] the in fin ite series is not necessarily meaning
less in logic or f u ti le in e th ic s .'
A detailed analysis of each of the four levels will be given
in the course of the c ritic a l study. Here I shall indicate b riefly
the general characteristics that Temple wishes to a ttrib u te to each
le v e l.
Matter is the same as "thing." I t is the mode of action and
reaction th at is the object of study of the natural sciences. I t has
no l if e or consciousness, and can bring about no motion of i t s e l f .
Yet i t is the startin g point for all the la te r levels which, when
they emerge, manifest characteristics that are quite d ifferen t from
those of matter.
Life is found f i r s t in plants and la te r emerges in the
form of animals. Plants are the most primitive form of l i f e . They
T^Christus V eritas, p. 6, and, "Symbolism as a Metaphysical
Principle," Mind, New Series XXXI (October, 1922), 469.
11
Christus V eritas, p. 4, and, "Symbolism as a Metaphysical
Principle," p. 467.
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38
bring about some self-adaptation to th e ir environment, including a
limited self-motion. Animals, the more highly developed life-form s,
possess a su b jectiv ity , a consciousness. However, according to
Temple, this consciousness is limited to the present. In its higher
form l i f e is in fa c t nascent mind.
Mind appears whenever there is a determination and selection
of means to ends. S p ir it is the f u ll e s t actualization of mind. I t
takes account of both the past and the future, as well as the present,
and is the subject of rig h ts, duties, and obligations. In practice.
Temple does not make any clear d istin ctio n between mind and s p i r i t .
I t will become evident in the section of this work on the second
tran sitio n th at mind and s p i r i t are v irtu a lly id entical.
Although, Temple takes no d efin ite stand regarding the limits
of the process in e ith er direction, he does indicate th a t there is an
"Ideal Limit," a point towards which the process is directed. This
"Ideal Limit" is identified in one of his early works as s p i r i t or
person. "W e have suggested to us as an ideal lim it in the process
from thing to Person, a Being W ho should care fo r the whole of
12
history." S p ir it thus becomes not only the highest stage of the
process th a t we can know, but iJie "rational principle" of the process.
I t is perhaps evident th at all process philosophies are
likely to transcend the contrary id e a l i s t - r e a l i s t elements outlined
in this chapter. In the process philosophy of Whitehead, fo r example.
^^The Nature of Personality, p. 63.
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mind and matter are not a n tith e tic a l. They complement each other
within the process, and i t is by means of th e ir mutual dependence
that the process takes place. The explanation of the process is
obtainable from a clear understanding of the nature of, and the
relationship between, mind and matter in the process. But for
Whitehead the explanation remains within the process i t s e l f . Although,
with regard to the explanation of the process. Temple ostensively
appears to be maintaining a position very close to th at of Whitehead
and the other process philosophers, his equivocal use of the term,
"Mind," takes him outside of the process. I t is primarily because of
this th at Temple's process philosophy is wholly unique and, as I shall
attempt to establish in this work, invalid.
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PART I I . THE FIRST DIALECTICAL TRANSITION
40
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CHAPTER IV
A N INTRODUCTION TO PART II
As I have pointed out, this c ritic a l analysis will be
re stric ted to the f i r s t two d ialectical transitions found in Temple's
Nature, Man and God. Taken together, these transitions form the
clearest and most unified expression of Temple's d ialectical philoso
phy. Through the line of reasoning found in these transitions Temple
wishes to establish the existence of a personal, and therefore tran
scendent, deity. Each tran sitio n is a vital step towards achieving
this conclusion. The f i r s t does not go far enough fo r i t establishes
only an "immanent deity," a mind within the process, not a transcen
dent one. The second tra n s itio n , which does seek to establish a
transcendent deity , cannot stand without the f i r s t . Temple's view
of the tran sitio n s is sim ilar to his view of re a lity . Each tra n s i
tion, like each p a rticu lar category of the world, is an abstraction
from what is a complete and rational whole.
There is one rather striking difference in this comparison
however. I t has been seen th a t in Temple's view of the process the
fa c t th at l i f e emerges from matter, th at mind emerges from l i f e , and
th a t s p i r i t emerges from mind is a posteriori in character. I t is
known only by looking a t the process and seeing what has happened.
41
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42
That l i f e emerges from matter is not a fa c t that can be known simply
by knowing matter alone. The step from matter to mind is a leap and
one th a t we could not know beforehand. I t is for this reason that
Temple appeals so strongly to his argument concerning the appearance
of mind to establish his th e is tic conclusions. Without the existence
of a deity, the appearance of mind is "brute fa c t."
In the tra n sitio n s, on the other hand, the line of reasoning
found in going from the f i r s t to the second is quite different. I t
shall be seen th a t much of what is found in the second d ialectical
tran sitio n is already present in the f i r s t tra n sitio n . That immanent
mind is also transcendent mind is not a sudden and unexpected fa c t,
but simply a fu rth er explication of what i t means to be immanent mind.
For Temple, therefore, the process of reasoning from immanent theism
to transcendent theism is both rational and necessary. Knowledge of
the transcendent mind is a priori once we have knowledge of immanent
mind. This line of reasoning is d ifferen t from th a t of Whitehead, for
example, who argues only for an immanent theism. As shall be d is
cussed within the context of Temple's second d ialectical tra n sitio n ,
Whitehead feels that i t is presumptuous, and philosophically u n ju sti
f ia b le , to argue for the transcendent nature of the immanent deity.
Such a nature simply cannot be known by f i n i t e minds.
The in i t i a l steps of Temple's f i r s t d ialectical tran sitio n are
clearly patterned a fte r his r e a l i s t metaphysics. I t begins with
observing th a t mind emerges from the process, from matter. Temple
O
maintains th a t the appearance of Mind cannot be explained simply in
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43
terms of matter, and th a t therefore another element, v iz ., Mind“ , must
exist.
To support each of the f i r s t two tra n s itio n s . Temple offers
two basic lines of argument. One is based on the existence and nature
8 6
of Mind (more properly S p irit in the second tra n sitio n ). The other
argument is based on the existence and nature of "Value" in the world.
In this c ritic a l analysis I shall be concerned, not only with the
consistency with which Temple applies his philosophical arguments, but
with the meanings th at he applies to his basic concepts. Thus in the
analysis of the f i r s t dialectical tra n sitio n there will be chapters
on matter, mind, value, and purpose. I shall also include chapters
that will deal with some concepts found in Temple's thought th at
might be referred to as "secondary." Such concepts are e ith e r not
emphasized by Temple, but seem to me to have a v ital relationship
with the dialectical transitions considered as a whole (for example,
"L ife"), or are concepts of which Temple does not seem to have a
clear understanding but are im plicit in his arguments (for example,
"abstraction").
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CHAPTER V
M ATTER
In an e a r lie r chapter I spoke of Temple's view of re a lity .
Basically, he maintains th at the world is in a state of continual pro
gression from one stage of re a lity to another higher stage. There are
four basic levels or categories th a t we usually abstract from the pro
cess: Matter, Life, Mind, and S p ir it. Matter is the most basic level
of the process, and i t is the foundation of all the la te r stages. This
is what can be referred to as Temple's n a tu ra lis tic view of matter,
or Matter^. However, we find in studying Temple's argument from mind
in the f i r s t d ialectical tra n sitio n th a t he also sets forth another
in terp retatio n of the nature of matter, one th at is considerably d if
ferent from the n a tu ra lis tic view. In th is second in terp retatio n ,
matter is no longer the f i r s t and ultimate element of the process,
but is rather subordinated to an even more ultimate element, v iz .,
Mind“ . Because of its close relationship to Temple's conception of
Mind‘ d, I shall re fe r to this second conception of matter as Matter^.
However, this notion should not be construed as indicating th a t mat
te r i t s e l f has any th e is tic c h arac te ristic —Temple is in no sense a
pantheist—but rather i t indicates th a t th is notion of matter is the
d irect resul of Temple's surreptitious s h if t in his meaning of mind.
44
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45
Temple's f i r s t conception of matter is patterned a fte r the
n a tu ra lis tic views of Alexander and Whitehead. From this point of
view, matter contains within i t s e l f the p o te n tia litie s th a t, in the
course of the world-process, are actualized bringing about the higher
categories of re a lity . According to Temple, the direction of the
process, the levels of r e a lity hat la te r emerge, are all the re su lt
of the p o te n tia litie s contained in matter.^ Thus, according to the
n a tu ra lis tic view, matter is prior to every other e n tity in the uni
verse. The world (matter) existed before the appearance of lif e or
mi nd.
. . . the world as apprehended is now something which antedates
apprehension. The world which we apprehend is apprehended as
having been extant h isto ric a lly before anyone apprehended i t .
So fa r as our experience is concerned. Apprehension takes place
within the world, not the world within-apprehension.~ 2
This statement seems to be a clear repudiation of Temple's
early id e a lis t position th a t re a lity is one and unchanging. However,
before we can conclude that Temple has given up his idealism we must
come to realize the fu ll import of the statement, "So far as our
experience is concerned, . . . " I t will be recalled th a t even such
a staunch id e a lis t as F. H. Bradley would admit that we do experience
change. However, he q u alifies this by saying th at such experience
can be nothing more than "appearance." Temple himself does not
e x p lic itly make the distinction between "appearance" and "reality" that
Bradley makes, but i t seems to me th a t a consideration of his dual
I
The Nature of Personality, p. xxix.
^Nature, Man and God, p. 111.
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46
conception of matter will show th at such a dichotomy is not alien to
Temple's thinking.
As Temple progresses in his argument from mind in the f i r s t
tra n s itio n , we find a subtle s h if t in his interpretation of the nature
of matter. In this second in terp retatio n , matter is no longer the
primary "stuff" of the universe. Further, i t is denuded of its poten
t i a l i t y to bring about, of i t s e l f , the la te r stages of the process of
l i f e and mind. That Temple is not fu lly aware of this s h if t in
meaning is evidenced, I believe, in the following quote from Christus
V eritas, which is found in the midst of his presentation of his
n a tu ra lis tic interpretation of matter:
The term Matter is here taken to cover the substances, or the
modes of action and re-action, which are studied in the sciences
of Physics and Chemistry. I t is a t once quite clear th a t those
sciences give no account of the self-movement which is one
ch aracteristic of Life, or of the comprehension of spaces and
times which is one ch aracteristic of Mind. The lower cannot
explain the higher.3
This statement carries with i t a point of view towards matter
th a t appears to me to be contrary to Temple's original description of
matter. In the f i r s t view, matter, as the source of the process,
does have the potential to bring about the la te r stages. Therefore,
the lower can explain the higher. In the l a s t quote, however, we find
a denial of this very point.
3
Christus V eritas, p. 4. Biochemistry, sometimes called
physiological chemistry, has been a d is tin c t science only since about
1900. I t is the science th a t borders between biology and the sciences
of physics and chemistry. When Temple wrote th is , in 1924, biochemis
try was s t i l l in i t s infancy and the major discovery of the D N A and
RN A molecules, the basic components of the chemistry of l i f e , had not
y e t been made.
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47
That this is not simply a single instance of a lack of c la rity
in Temple's thinking is indicated by referring to Nature, Man and God,
w ritten ten years la te r . Here also we find an in terp retatio n of mat
t e r quite contrary to Temple's original view. Here Temple views mat
t e r as being metaphysically in ert: of i t s e l f i t is incapable of
bringing about e ith er li f e or consciousness. Therefore, the unity and
direction of the process no longer has an in tr in s ic organizing prin
c ip le , v iz ., the p o te n tia lity of matter. Matter no longer possesses
the necessary qualifications to be considered the ultimate ground of
the world-process.
But i f the Process of the cosmos produces beings capable of
understanding and evaluating the cosmos, that t e l l s us, as has
been repeatedly urged, a great deal about the process i t s e l f .
The more deeply mind is seen to be rooted in nature—in matter
i f you lik e —the more manifestly is i t impossible to account
for nature or matter in any other terms than those of mind;
and so as that enterprise is attempted, mind increasingly d is
closes i t s e l f as qualified to be the ultimate ground of all
th in g s.4
g
According to Temple, therefore, the more Mind^ comprehends of
the process, the more i t is impelled towards the conclusion th at the
source of process, including its own emergence, is not, and cannot be,
merely m aterial. The ultimate principle must be Mind‘ d. But this is
quite a d ifferen t view of the material universe than the one found in
Temple's n a tu ra lis tic view of re a lity .
I t is at this point th a t some of Temple's idealism is clearly
evidenced. I t has been noted that Temple does not ex p lic itly make the
^Nature, Man and God, p. 490.
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48
id e a lis t distinction between appearance and re a lity . However, a form
of this distinction is to be found in his dual metaphysics. The f i r s t
metaphysical position th at Temple sets forth is the n a tu ra lis tic one.
At f i r s t i t appears th at matter is the source of the process--that i t
provides the rational ground of the process. However, when we
ra tio n ally approach the process, i t is inevitable that we come to
realize th at the real nature of process is quite d ifferent. W e come
to realize th a t the world, which according to experience "antedates
apprehension," is in fa c t a world th at is permeated with Mind“ , not
simply p o ten tially , but actually. Mind^ exists even in the e a r lie s t
stages of the process, and even precedes the process, since i t would
be manifestly " . . . impossible to account for nature or matter in
5
any other terms than those of mind; . . ."
Temple does not seem to be to ta lly unaware of the s h if t in
his metaphysical view, although I do not believe he ever fu lly recog
nizes the d eb ilitatin g effect th a t his dual metaphysics has upon his
e n tire philosophical system. He indicates his knowledge of the s h if t
in the following quotation from Nature, Man and God:
But when we turn from the World as apprehended by Mind to Mind
which apprehends the World, we find among its functions a prin
ciple which is self-explanatory--the principle of Purpose or of
In te llig e n t Choice.6
Temple, therefore, does recognize a distinction between what
he calls "the World apprehended by Mind" and "Mind which apprehends
the World." This is the only place th a t he indicates any s h if t a t
^Ib id . , p. 490. ^Ib id ., p. 131.
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49
a l l , but in spite of i t s obvious importance, he does l i t t l e to amplify
his meaning. The term, "Mind," remains ambiguous. Is mind the same
in both cases? I f we assume that Temple means Mind^ in each case,
then we are confronted with a staunch idealism. If he means Mind^ in
each case, then i t seems d if f ic u l t to deny th at what he is saying is
nothing more than a tautology: one phrase is in the active voice while
the other is in the passive voice, but ultim ately they mean the same.
I t seems to me th a t the only way Temple's statement can have any
meaning is by interpreting the f i r s t instance of "Mind" as Mind®, and
the second instance, the active voice, as Mind°^. Also, i t might be
noted th at a sim ilar question as to meaning can be posed with regard
to "world." In e ffe c t. Temple does l i t t l e to clarify his dual meta
physics, or even to distinguish them.
Implied in Temple's thought, perhaps, is the Scholastic dis
tinction between the ordo inveniendi and the ordo essendi. This dis
tinction has been used by some historians of philosophy to describe
the progression of thought of Rene Descartes.^ However, there is a
sig n ific a n t difference in the re su lt when the distinction is applied
to the thought of Descartes and to the thought of Temple. For
Descartes, the discovery of the thinking "I" precedes everything else,
including the discovery of the innate idea of God. However, the fact
that God is found to be ultim ate, and therefore prior in the order of
r e a lity , has no effect upon the "I" i t s e l f . The "I" is identical in
both the ordo inveniendi and in the ordo essendi.
^Frederick Copieston, A History of Philosophy, IV (Garden City,
New York: Image Books, 1963), 90, 99, 103, 105, 115, 123.
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50
In Temple's thought, on the other hand, there is a considerable
difference between the nature of matter and the process as found in
the ordo inveniendi and in the ordo essendi. In the f i r s t case, mat
te r is seen not only as the object of apprehension, but as the u l t i
mate ground of the en tire process. Matter alone contains within i t s e l f
all the potential necessary for the actualization of the la te r stages
of the process. In the second case, we determine that i t is not mat
t e r but mind that is the ultimate re a lity . Thus, the natures of both
matter and the process are considerably d ifferen t.
The differences in Temple's thought concerning his concept of
matter have been pointed out. But a s h if t in the meaning of matter
en tails a s h if t in the meaning of the process as a whole. In the f i r s t
view, mind is the product of the progression of the process: i t is
the third stage or level of re a lity being preceeded by matter and l i f e .
In the second view, mind is not the "product" of the process, but the
"cause" of the process. The ambiguity in Temple's dual metaphysics is
evident here for clearly mind cannot be identical in both cases, nor
can matter. If this were the case we would have a process in which
both mind and matter would be simultaneously cause and product, and
this is not what Temple wishes to estab lish .
W e find, therefore, th at the d istinction between ordo
inveniendi and ordo essendi not only f a ils to eliminate an inherent
contradiction in Temple's thought, but in fact helps to place the
contradictory elements into sharper contrast. The process seen from
the point of view of the ordo inveniendi yields an interpretation of
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51
matter as primary, i . e . , chronologically prior to mind. From the point
of view of the ordo essendi, not only is the order reversed, but the
natures of both matter and mind are completely reinterpreted.
Another means of describing the dichotomy in Temple's thought
might be found within the context of the d istin ctio n between the uncri
tic a l or undialectical view of re a lity , and the c ritic a l or dialectical
view of re a lity . W e have seen that Temple considers his philosophy to
be c r i t i c a l . But is he consistent with his c r itic a l method? Does he
in fa c t weigh all the p o ssib ilitie s of explanation of the process and
allow them to stand on th e ir own merits?
I t seems to me that Temple is consistent with his critic a l c r i
te r ia when he is speaking within the context of his n a tu ra listic meta
physics. However, when he sh ifts to his th e is tic metaphysics all
serious consideration of a c ritic a l philosophy are put aside. This
will become very clear, I believe, when I take up the c ritic a l analysis
of Temple's argument from mind.
I believe i t apparent that Temple does not consciously intend
to produce the dual metaphysical views th at occur in his tran sitio n s,
fo r he at no point indicates this intention. His attempt was to stay
within the realm of the r e a lis t metaphysics, and to extend i t far
enough so as to include a deity that is in some way outside of the
process. Apparently he feels that he can do so without doing violence
to his n a tu ra lis tic understanding of the process. He wants to remain
in the single world of the r e a lis t s , but, in fa c t, re lie s on the dual
world of the id e a lists . The influence of Temple's id e a lis t supposi
tions will become increasingly evident in the chapters to follow.
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CHAPTER VI
LIFE
Whenever Temple speaks of his view of re a lity in terms of
evolving stages, "Life" is always lis te d as the second of the four
broad stages or categories th a t constitute the universe. In the two
dialectical tran sitio n s th at are under study in this work all the
stages that Temple l i s t s , except l i f e , play a vital role in the
development of his reasoning towards establishing the existence of
a transcendent God. Yet i t would seem th a t lif e should play a vital
part in the arguments of the dialectical tran sitio n s. I t is not only
the intermediary stage between matter and mind, but i t is also the
f i r s t instance in the process in which matter manifests ch aracteris
tic s quite d ifferen t from the in ert substance th at i t would otherwise
be taken to be.^
The primary argument with which Temple seeks to ju s tif y his
f i r s t dialectical tran sitio n derives from the relationship th a t exists
6 8
between Mind‘ d and matter. Man's ra tio n a lity , Mind^, apprehends the
material world and concludes th a t i t must contain a principle th a t is
C f., Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955), a process philosopher
fo r whom the stage of l i f e is extremely important. In T eilhard's view
there are two c r itic a l moments in the process of the earth: the
appearance of l i f e , forming the "biosphere," and the appearance of
re fle c tiv e thought in man, forming the "noosphere." Both moments are
c ritic a l and equally important.
52
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5 3
like i t s e l f , or at le a st "akin" to i t s e l f . Mind^ sees in the material
world both value and purpose, and these can be manifestations only of
Mind^\ But no significance is given to the appearance of li f e in the
process, y e t l i f e , within the context of Tanple's cosmology, is as
important as the other three categories. For Temple i t seems, as one
2
commentator points out, li f e is nothing more than "nascent thought."
Temple says l i t t l e as to what he takes l i f e to be. He describes i t
simply as being characterized by self-movement, and by the a b ility of
the organism in which i t inheres to adjust to it s environment.
I f the process is the rational whole th at Temple supposes i t
to be, then there must be a reason why l i f e appears in the process
between matter and mind. To support the f i r s t tra n s itio n . Temple
g
argues th at i t is necessary to explain the appearance of Mind in the
process because i t is "a breach of continuity."^ But certainly the
appearance of l if e in the process is as much a breach of the continuity
of matter as mind is . The fa c t that matter can evolve into an organism
capable of adapting i t s e l f to its material environment is indeed an
astounding occurrence, as Teilhard de Chardin and the other process
philosophers were well aware. But Temple does not make any special
note of th is . He is far more concerned with the conscious element
th at li f e gives rise to than with li f e i t s e l f . If he were to ta lly
consistent, no single stage could be eliminated as he v irtu ally
2
Geoghegan, Platonism in Recent Religious Thought, p. 106.
3 ..........................
Cf., Nature, Man and God, p. 121, and Christus V eritas, p. 4.
^Nature, Man and God, p. 214.
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5 4
eliminates l i f e . The reason he does this i s , I believe, a t le a s t
p a rtia lly explained by the id e a lis t suppositions that Tenple wishes
to maintain.
W e find th at we have in the case of l i f e , as in the case of
m atter, a dual view. The dualism is less pronounced since lif e does
not play a vital part in Temple's th e is tic metaphysics; however, i t is
an underlying ch aracteristic of Temple's thought.
Viewed in terms of Temple's n a tu ra lis tic or r e a l i s t metaphy
s ic s , l if e emerges from apparently lif e le s s matter: i t is the a ctu a li
zation of the p o te n tia litie s th at seem to be inherent in matter. In
terms of biochemistry, the molecular constituents of matter are able,
under the proper environmental conditions, to form into special mole
cules, D N A molecules, which are the basic elements of l i f e . This
s c ie n tif ic description of the emergence of li f e from matter undoubtedly
is consistent with Temple's f i r s t view of the process, "the World
apprehended by Mind." However, when we consider l i f e in terms of the
"Mind which apprehends the World," the more developed and therefore
the more accurate apprehension, i t is d if f ic u l t to give l i f e any
sig n ific a n t place in Temple's metaphysics.
As a t le a st a partial ju s tific a tio n of the existence of matter
("ju stific a tio n " meaning th at i t has a sig n ifican t place in the
rational unity of the universe). Temple speaks of matter in terms of
Mindy's need for i t . ^ But what s o rt of ju s tific a tio n can be given for
the appearance of li f e in the process? I t is not clear th a t l if e is
5
Further discussion of Temple's ju s tific a tio n of matter will
be found in Chapter X.
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55
g g
necessary to Mind^, except perhaps with regard to Mindy's need for
mobility. If a mind must inhere in some specific quantified matter,
life-forms would be necessary in order th a t the embodied consciousness
might "get around." But, as we shall see la te r . Temple does not give
a clear description of the relationship between mind and body. On
the one hand, he speaks of mind and body as being a single and in d i
v isib le unity, th e ir separation being nothing more than the product of
abstraction.^ On the other hand, he speaks of mind as a " f i r s t cause"
that is transcendent of matter, and therefore, to some extent, indepen
dent of i t . ^
I t is Temple's ultimate conclusion th at the process is a
rational whole formed and directed by Mind^. But i f this were indeed
the case, then i t would seem th a t the appearance of l i f e in the pro
cess requires fa r more ju s tific a tio n than the simple a posteriori
g
recognition that Temple gives for i t . For given Mindy's transcendence
with regard to matter i t would appear th at Mindy's need for a l i f e -
form in order to achieve mobility is superfluous. I t would seem
very plausible that Mind^ could d ire c t the process in such a manner
th at when Mind^ does appear and begins to apprehend the world i t would
be able to move about, in much the same manner that some consider
"sp irits" to move about the earth, v iz ., by means of th e ir w ills .
Such a view would be consistent with Temple's view of mind since he
maintains that the primary c h arac te ristic of mind is will or purpose
S a tiire , Man and God, p. 201.
^Ibid. , p. 282, n.2.
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56
O
which is not causally determined by matter. A mind th a t would thus
be able to “will" i t s geographical position in the world would seem
to be fa r more akin to Temple's conception of the ultimate ground of
the universe, Mind“ , than a mind that must rely on a life-form for
this purpose. In short, i t seems th at mind's material embodiment
along with the life-form th at this e n ta ils, in terms of Temple's con
ceptions of Mind“ and Mind^, is not necessary.
The views presented in the la s t paragraphs are, of course,
speculation about Temple's thought. However, i t seems to me that
they are more consistent with Temple's basic premises ( i . e . , his
id e a list premises) than the concept of lif e that Temple himself pre
sents. Such speculation would be unnecessary but for Temple's lack
of ju s tific a tio n for the second stage of the process. This lack is
surprising since his description of lif e fa ils to f u l f i l l his ideal
of a unified and consistent line of reasoning. Life is an undeniable
fact in Temple's r e a l i s t metaphysics. However, he does not give any
rational ju s tific a tio n for l if e in terms of his th e is tic metaphysics—
the point of view of "Mind apprehending the World"—the metaphysics
of re a lity rather than appearance.
Arguments, sim ilar to the one that I have used in an attempt
to show th at, although Temple does not provide any ju s tific a tio n for
l i f e , to be consistent such a ju stific a tio n is necessary, can be used
against matter as well. I f Mind^ indeed directs the process, and is
in fact prior to the process, then i t is hard to conceive why i t
^C f., Chapter XII.
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57
appeals to the instrumentality of matter to achieve its apparent end
of bringing forth other minds. The epistemological reason for matter
th a t Temple seems to offer is indeed shaky. Further, i t might be
questioned why Mind“ brings about other minds. These issues, however,
are unapproachable philosophically, and must be taken up within the
context of theological speculation.
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CHAPTER VII
TEMPLE'S NATURALISTIC VIEW OF M IND A N D
HIS REALIST EPISTEMOLGGY
Temple bases his primary argument fo r immanent theism on the
S 6
appearance of Mind in the process. Mind is "a breach of con
t i n u i t y , a n d , as such, i t s appearance in the rational universe must
have some (rational) explanation. I t is Temple's attempt to establish
such an explanation th a t I shall discuss in the following chapters.
In th is chapter I shall take up some general epistemological con
siderations th a t are associated with Temple's concept of mind. In
the la te r sections I shall proceed along more c r itic a l lin e s , ana-
lyzing more closely Temple's argument from Mind^, attempting to
decipher, in greater detail than has been done thus f a r . Temple's
meanings of the term "Mind," and drawing out some implications asso
ciated with Temple's ambiguity.
g
Temple's n a tu ra lis tic conception of the appearance of Mind
in the process is closely patterned a fte r the thought of Whitehead,
Alexander and Bergson. According to Temple, " . . . thinking is
grounded in the process of adjustment between organism and environment
and is indeed an extension of th at process." Thus a t the point in
^Nature, Man and God, p. 214.
^ Ib id ., p. 128.
58
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59
the process a t which mind begins to appear, i t is l i t t l e more than a
vague primordial consciousness. Self-conscious mind is the re su lt of
a long process beginning f i r s t with in s tin c t, and then developing
into intelligence. Temple substantially agrees with Bergson's view,
which he paraphrases in the following manner:
. . . the clearest available d istin ctio n between in s tin c t and
intelligence is that drawn between the adjustment of the organism
of i t s e l f to its environment and its adjustment of the environ
ment to i t s e l f ; thus he says th a t when nature produced a crea
ture who^needed clothes to maintain himself in l i f e , i t gave
the conge to the in s tin c t.3
The less that in stin c t is relied upon by the organism to main
tain i t s growth and survival, the more i t re lie s upon intelligence.
And as consciousness continues to develop, there is an increasing
awareness of what is "self" and what is "non-self": the d istin ctio n
between the subject perceiving and the object perceived. And with
this awareness, mind increases in i t s a b ility to form mental abstrac
tions by which i t can more readily cope with the apparent m u ltip licity
of i t s environment. The organism as a whole (mind and body) finds
th a t
. . . i t is the general quality of the various objects in the
environment, and not th e ir p a rtic u la rity , which is of impor
tance. . . . For attention, in fixing i t s e l f on the general
q u alities of objects, detaches these in thought from the objects
themselves, and so forms concepts, which the mind can handle
in complete independence of p articu lar objects, . . .^
The lack of this basic insight is responsible for such episte-
5
mological d iff ic u ltie s as are found in Zeno's paradoxes. The force of
-5 ^
Ib id ., p. 122, citing Henri Bergson, L'Evolution créatrice
(Paris: Libraire Felix Alcan, 1934), pp. 152 and 155.
^ I b id ., p. 201. ^Ib id ., p. 115.
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60
Zeno's arguments is derived from the manner in which he assumes reason
conceives r e a lity : the view that the mind pictures re a lity by means
of a series of concepts or pictures which, when placed in proper suc
cession, render the perception of change in the world. However, our
concepts of the world are general and not p a rtic u la r, according to
Temple. W e grasp continuous change as a whole, not the particular
stages of change individually. To view knowledge, as well as re a lity ,
in this way is an abstraction from a single rational whole.^
Epistemologically. Temple is to be included among the re a l
i s t s , yet he maintains th at we do not perceive re a lity as i t is . He
qualifies his view in the following manner:
What i t [the mental organism] apprehends is the real world,
and no lim it can be s e t a priori to the extent in space or
time of its potential apprehension. Sensa and the like are
part of the organism's machinery of this apprehension; but
they are not the objects apprehended. Of course I do not
claim with "naive realism" th at an object i s , apart from
knowledge, exactly what i t is for knowledge: to ask what
we can know i t to be apart from knowledge is like asking
what i t looks like to a blind man. M y contention is that
in cognition the subject-object relation is ultim ate, and
neither term is in any degree reducible to the o th e r.7
All knowledge is therefore, to some extent, interpretive. I t
is not possible for the mind to form a concept th a t corresponds exactly
to the world. And even i f i t were possible we could not know i t .
Every concept is always, to some extent, the re s u lt of subjective
determination. The basic reason that Temple gives fo r the fa c t that
every concept is subjectively determined is based, strangely, not on
^Christus V eritas, p. 6.
^Nature, Man and God, p. 126.
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61
the mind's in a b ility to come to d irect grips with the material re a lity
with which i t is surrounded, but rather on a purely conceptual con
sideration: " . . . the presence of other general q u alities involves
O
some modifications of th at which is the special object of attention."
Temple does not s ta te clearly what he means by th is , but the conclusion
that he wishes to draw is certain: ". . . conceptual thought is more
precise and clear-cut than the experience from which i t abstracts its
Q
general q u alities for detached consideration, . . . " Primary con
fidence is placed in mind's a b ility to form general concepts of re a lity
rather than its a b ility to grasp the significance of any p articu lar
e x p e r i e n c e . T e m p l e fe e ls, apparently, that this must be established
in order th at the conclusions he will maintain concerning re a lity may
be deemed cogent. —-
As a re s u lt of mind's a b ility to form general ideas or con
cepts, i t is freed from bondage of p articu lar occasions. Ideas
obtained in one context of experience can be applied to another con
text. Thus, Temple calls the concept a "free idea."^^ The a b ility
of the mind to form "free ideas" is indicative of mind's characteris
t ic free a c tiv ity , illu s tra te d by what Temple takes to be "the f i r s t
and most conspicious feature of the free a ctiv ity of mind," v iz .,
12
". . . i t s detachment from successiveness." "The 'present' is never
^ Ib id ., 202.
^^Unfortunately, a thorough analysis of this epistemological
position would lead us too fa r astray from the primary focus of this
cri ti que.
Nature, Man and God, p. 202. ^^Ibid.
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62
the mathematical point a t which past and future meet; that is a f r u i t
of abstraction. The present is so much of the empirical process as is
13
immediately apprehended."
When mind is confronted with r e a lity , i t finds that everything
is in tra n sitio n . All things are tran sito ry . This aspect of re a lity
was, of course, the chief concern of Heraclitus. However, according
to Tenple, the conceptual character of mind's knowledge cannot cope
with the constant change, and therefore seeks to impose upon re a lity
some form of permanence, the Parmenidean view of re a lity . "Arising
out of the flux, and i t s e l f in origin an episode of the flux out of
which i t a rises, mind declares it s own nature by demanding per
manence."^^ Temple describes the manner in which mind imposes per
manence on i t s experience of the tra n sito ry as two-fold:
One is by formulating changeless principles of the constant
change of experience—laws which, themselves unchanging, des
cribe the course of change which the various objects of atten
tion follow; this is the method of science. The other is by
holding a durational period in a single apprehension so th a t
process becomes a constituent of the non-successive experience
achieved. This is the method of A rt.15
Temple claims in lig h t of this th at we find that the concep
tion of the "Eternal Now" is not contradictory. As long as the
reference to duration is su ffic ie n t, i t is possible for mind to come
to know the process from which i t a r i s e s . A n d it is on the premise
that the process i s , a t le ast in part, in te llig ib le that Temple's
entire th e is tic argument re s ts. He assumes that the process is a
T^lbid., p. 203. ^^Ibid., p. 204.
T^lbid. ^^Ibid., p. 206.
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63
rational unity brought about by a rational principle th at pervades i t .
And, as has been indicated here, he feels th at mind is quite capable
of turning back upon the flux from which i t has arisen, and of recog
nizing the changeless principles that he is certain are contained in
i t . I t is Temple's contention, as we shall see la te r , th a t there is
only one possible principle th at can provide the process with the
rational unity th at he takes i t to indubitably have, v iz ., Mind“ , or,
more precisely, a th e is tic principle.
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CHAPTER VIII
M IND
In the la s t chapter I reviewed some of the basic epistemologi
cal premises on which Temple bases his arguments for the d ialectical
tra n s itio n s. The f i r s t and primary argument th a t he uses is founded
g
on the existence of Mind in the process. However, Temple's concep
tion of the nature of mind is neither clear nor consistent. In the
following passage Thomas gives an. excellent summary of the d iff ic u l
ties found in Temple's thought:
. . . again there is considerable confusion in the Gifford
Lectures in the use of the terms "mind" and "Mind". These
two terms seem to be used almost interchangeably with the
following meanings: the complete generic sense including
animal, human, and divine mind, a generic sense including
animal and human mind, a generic sense including human and
divine mind, the human mind as a class, the human mind as
a p articu lar (singular and p lu ra l), the animal mind as a
class, the animal mind as a p a rticu lar (singular and p lu ra l),
individual minds both animal and human, divine mind in a
generic sense, and the divine mind as a p a r tic u la r .1
I have attempted to help clarify these confusions by adopting the
terminology, Mind‘ d and Mind^.^
Thomas, William Temple's Philosophy of Religion, pp. 71-72.
Thomas gives the following references to Nature, Man an? God, p. 72,
n. 1: "pp. 120, 130, 132, 134, 149, 153, 156, 212f, 219ff, 249, 251,
256f, 280ff, 316, 384f."
^Cf., Introduction, pp. lO -ll.
64
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65
As I have pointed out. Temple barely hints a t a distinction
between these two basic meanings of mind. He indicates a distinction
only as to point of view, without any apparent concern for the essen
tia l difference between Mind“ and Mind^, which is so v ital to any
clear understanding of his philosophical arguments. I t is by means
of this fa ilu re th a t Temple believes he has made a smooth and logical
tra n sitio n from the recognition of the existence of Mind^ to the
affirmation of the existence of Mind°^.
So far I have pointed out Temple's n a tu ra lis tic in terp reta
tion of the nature of mind. However, within the context of the f i r s t
dialectical tra n s itio n , he pursues the question of origin beyond the
basic evolutionary notion of adaptation. He questions how i t is that
Mind^, which is clearly very d ifferen t from the matter from which i t
emerges in the process, could come into being. For Temple, "A phi
losophy which leaves the appearance of consciousness or mind as a
brute fa c t incapable of explanation or of in te llig ib le relatio n to the
3 S
general scheme of things is self-condemned as bankrupt." Mind can
not be explained given our understanding of the nature of matter.
Consciousness is a "breach in the continuity" in an otherwise unified
material universe. For Temple, this explanation must lie outside the
4
process.
^Nature, Man and God, p. 199.
^ I t should be noted here th at such a position en tails the
"transcendent" nature of the unifying principle of the process. I t is
this fa c t, i . e . , immanent mind is also transcendent mind, th at forms
the basis of the second tra n sitio n . However, i t is already present in
Temple's f i r s t tra n sitio n , a point th&t will be of considerable impor
tance in my critiq u e of the second d ialectical tran sitio n .
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66
In an attempt to be true to his c ritic a l method. Temple does
take into consideration other views of the origin of Mind^ that would
explain the appearance of i t from within the process. For example, he
considers the solution based on "probability." According to this
view, although the chances of the material world evolving into the
stages of lif e and mind are remote, when the universe is considered
as in fin ite in space and time, even the s lig h te s t p o ssib ility becomes
5
a probability.
Temple rejects this solution in terms of his basic assumption
that the universe is a rational unity. He u n critically appeals to his
idealism when he maintains that i t cannot be doubted th at there is
in te llig e n t "purpose" exhibited in the structure of the universe.
"An organism is not a mere collection of juxtaposed particles or
c ells. Its nature is determined by it s principle of unity; and this
also determines the organisms that proceed from i t." ^ Purpose, Temple
maintains, is an inextricable aspect of the universe, an aspect that
is not taken into account in any theory of probability concerning the
origin of Mind^.^
Later in the Gifford Lectures Temple states that there are
only three p o s sib ilitie s as to how consciousness appeared in the
process:
^Nature, Man and God, p. 131. ^Ibid.
^This is essen tially the teleological argument for the exis
tence of God. The principle on which i t is based is exhibited in the
following analogy: one can throw together all the parts of a watch
an in fin ite number of times, but i t will never be the case that they
will by chance fa ll together in such a way as to construct a working
timepiece.
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67
. . . consciousness. . . must be e ith er due to a combination
of circumstances which are in th eir own nature not conscious
ness, or must be there inserted by a fresh creative act of
whatever gives rise to existence in all it s forms, or else
must have been present throughout, though in a form so rudi
mentary as to be imperceptible and negligible.8
Temple then goes on to discuss the acceptability of the f i r s t
p o ssib ility :
Of these alternatives the f i r s t may be immediately ruled out.
To suppose that a combination of non-conscious physiological
functions can be the cause of consciousness in the organism
concerned is to assert so great disparity between cause and
e ffe ct as to rob the notion of causation of all meaning. To
suppose th at a physiological organism becomes conscious only
because i t s own evolution has brought i t to a certain stage
of complexity would be like supposing that the mechanical
robot a t a s tr e e t corner will automatically turn into a police
man i f the t r a f f i c is su fficien tly congested. . . . A philo
sophy which leaves the appearance of consciousness or mind
as a brute fa c t incapable of explanation or of in te llig ib le
relatio n to the general scheme of things is self-condemned
as bankrupt.9
But within the context of a "critic al" philosophy, such an explanation
seems in su fficien t to ju s tify such a gross rejection of this f i r s t
p o ssib ility . This is made especially true by the fa c t th a t i t is
precisely this explanation that is maintained not only by the propo
nents of materialism, but also by the process philosophers, such as
Whitehead and Alexander, a fte r whom Temple has patterned much of his
own r e a l i s t metaphysics.
As for the other altern ativ es, v iz ., that consciousness is
eith er the re su lt of a fresh creative act or is present throughout
the process. Temple maintains th at no ultimate issue hangs on
^Nature, Man and God, p. 198.
^ Ib id ., pp. 198-199.
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5 8
selecting one solution over the other. He does go on to say, however,
that " . . . there is the convenience of more obvious continuity i f i t
be assumed that the novel factor a t this stage is the appearance rather
than the creation of consciousness."^^
The view that mind is an element to be found throughout the
process is certainly consistent with Temple's r e a l i s t metaphysics.
In fa c t, he la te r makes i t clear th at i t is necessary to select this
a ltern ativ e. He states th at i t is "inconceivable" th at mind should
be placed in the process a t a certain point. This would involve saying
al 1
that Mind " . . . should have no connexion with the process except
at th at point, so that the physical account of i t was never complete
1 ?
a fte r a ll." The reason that Temple would i n s i s t upon the absurdity
of such a postion again rests upon the id e a lis t supposition th a t the
universe is a rational unity. To maintain that Mind^ is placed in
the process at a specific point in time and space would mean th a t the
physical account of the process is "incomplete," and th at the immanent
mind that Temple is attempting to establish is in fa c t not truly
immanent, a t le a s t no throughout the process.
I t is clear that the presence of immanent mind throughout the
entire process is essen tial, fo r Temple appeals to th is f a c t, now
l° I b id ., p. 199.
^ V t this point (Temple is s t i l l speaking within the context
of his f i r s t dialectical tra n s itio n ). Temple's subject is not "Mind,"
but a "Creator," which he refers to with the term "He."
IP
Nature, Man and God, p. 214.
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interpreted as Mind^, to establish the f i r s t d ialectical tran sitio n :
the principle of the process is immanent theism. If Mind^ is found
not to be present in the process at every point; i f , for example,
matter evolved into l i f e in the absence of Mind‘ d, then the entire
basis for the f i r s t tra n sitio n is called into serious question. Temple
does not offer a substantial argument maintaining th a t Mind“ is to be
found throughout the process. He simply assumes th a t since Mind“ is
necessarily responsible for the appearance of Mind^ i t must be respon
sib le for the process as a whole: a conclusion th a t is not derived
from valid philosophical argument, but based on a blind appeal to his
id e a lis t suppositions.
For the purposes of this study, I shall adopt Temple's conten
tion th at Mind“ is present throughout the process, and th a t, as a
re s u lt of i t s direction, Mind^ appears at a p articu lar point in the
process. But i t is here th at the primary confusion concerning Temple's
conception of mind is most c r it i c a l . Temple wishes to maintain that
mind is present as a principle throughout the process, and th a t i t
appears at a certain point within the process. But what does he mean
by "Mind"?
W e have seen th at contrary to his s t r i c t l y r e a l i s t view of the
g
process. Temple maintains that Mind^ does not e x ist in matter as such,
even as a p o te n tia lity , and therefore the principle th a t explains the
appearance of Mind^ must lie outside the process. But i f this is
tru ly the case, then his assertion that " . . . i t must have been pre
sent throughout, though in a form so rudimentary as to be imperceptible
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13
and negligible," is simply wrong. Tt is not consistent with what
he says e a r lie r when he denies th a t consciousness can emerge from
matter. If mind is present throughout the process, then i t is present
in matter, a t least potentially. Such a contradiction is a d ire c t
re s u lt of Temple's equivocation of two d is tin c t and very d ifferen t
meanings of "Mind," and can be resolved only i f the d istin ctio n that
I have suggested between Mind“ and Mind^ is adopted.
There is no doubt th at Mind^ has its origin at a specific
point in time and space within the p r o c e s s . B u t Temple does not
take up the question of the origin of Mind“ . Because of his lack of
d istin c tio n , he implies that Mind^, like Mind^, is the product of the
very process th at i t supposedly d ire c ts. But such a position leads
us into a c irc le of reasoning th at is vicious, and as such is
unacceptable even within the context of a "dialectical" philosophy
such as Temple's. The only a ltern ativ e is that Mind^ has no origin
a t a l l . I t is this p o ssib ility th a t Temple adopts, as shall be seen
in Chapter XII which will include a discussion of Temple's conception
of the A ristotelian "F irst Cause."
The seriousness of Temple's equivocation is further evidenced
in the following passage from Nature, Man and God:
l^ lb id ., p. 198.
^^If this were not the case, then Temple would be forced into
the s t r i c t l y monistic id e a list view, v iz ., that there is only one
Mind, all p a rticu lar minds being nothing more than d ifferen t a t t r i
butes or aspects of the One. This can be the only re su lt i f MindB
is considered to be identical with Mind“ .
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. . . we find that the Process is akin to Mind, th a t Mind
arises in the course of i t , and that Mind does exhibit what
is essen tially the thing required—a self-explanatory principle
of origination. I t is then more reasonable to te s t the hypothe
sis that Mind contains the explanation of the World-Process
than to refuse to te s t it.TS
The term "Mind" appears four times in this passage. However,
i f studied closely, i t becomes apparent th at mind as i t appears in the
f i r s t three instances means something quite d ifferen t from its la s t
occurrence. The f i r s t instances are, I would contend, equivalent to
my usage of Mind^, while the la s t is the same as Mind“ . Thomas, who
cites this particular passage, maintains that Temple, in speaking of
the mind that arises in the course of the process and exhibits a
self-explanatory principle of origination, means human mind. But,
Thomas points out, i t is clear th at this category cannot be attributed
to the la s t use of the term "Mind," for that would re s u lt in a type
of subjective ideal ism.
Thomas then suggests that Temple apparently wishes to use the
fourth instance of "Mind" in its ". . . generic sense including
divine mind, . . If this were the case, the f i r s t three
instances of "Mind" would have to be used also in this way in order
^^Nature, Man and God, p. 132
^^William Temple's Philosophy of Religion, p. 120.
^^Ibid. Temple defines the generic use of mind as follows:
" . . . when the subject of in te re s t is not the p articu lar minds as
such but the mode of being and activ ity in virtue of which each is
en title d to be called mind. That i s , a t a certain stage of the evolu
tionary process, a new mode of being and a c tiv ity ." (Nature, Man and
God, p. 120). In lig h t of this d efin itio n , I find i t d if f ic u lt to
see how Thomas could hope to include "divine mind" within th is con
text.
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72
for the passage to be consistent. Thomas then points out why this is
not possible:
. . . the process is akin only to mind as we know i t in
ourselves. The expansion of this to refer to generic mind
would require demonstration th at what is true of human mind
is also true of animal and divine mind or at le ast the l a t t e r .
But such demonstration is impossible, because animal mind
does not exhibit the self-explanatory principle of origination
and divine mind does not arise in the process.*®
In lig h t of these d iff ic u ltie s Thomas suggests th at Temple's
argument can perhaps be reconstructed and made consistent i f "Mind"
in all four cases were interpreted in more general terms, such as
19
simply "a mode of being and a ctiv ity ." This is basically the
general definition that Temple gives to each stage of the process,
20
including mind. Thomas feels th at this would accommodate all i n t e r
pretations of "Mind." Further he states:
Such a mode of being does arise in the process and exhibits
the required self-explanatory principle of origination. And
the hypothesis th at such an immanent principle or mode of
being and activ ity contains the explanation of the world
process can be called immanent theism.21
In making such a proposal, Thomas is overlooking, i t seem to
me, the issue really in question here. At this point. Temple feels
no doubt as to the fa c t th at mind does emerge within the process.
^^William Temple's Philosophy of Religion, pp. 120-121.
l^ I b id ., p. 121.
20
Christus V eritas, p. 4. "These grades may be for our pre
sent purpose indifferently regarded as various e n titie s or as d if
ferent modes of action and re-action."
^^William Temple's Philosophy of Religion, p. 121.
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73
This is in accord with the r e a l i s t metaphysics of Whitehead, with
which Temple has thus fa r been quite consistent. However, in order
to snatch this line of reasoning from total emergence in the f i n i t i s t
framework of Whitehead, i t is essential th at Temple make a d istin c
tion: mind not only emerges within the process, but i t directs i t
from the outside. To fa il to add this qualification would render
Temple's metaphysics v irtu ally identical with Whitehead's, and would
thus deny the p o ssib ility of philosophically establishing the existence
of a transcendent deity. As I shall attempt to show more precisely in
Part III, Temple feels th at he can establish such a deity.
I t i s , of course, contradictory to say th a t the same mind is
both the ex trin sic principle of origin of the process, and the product
of the process. The term "extrinsic" is essential for Temple's
th e is tic presuppositions: within the context of Temple's argument,
"extrinsic" is ultimately changed into "transcendent." By contrast,
within the metaphysics of Whitehead, the transcendence of mind,
although logically possible, is unnecessary as well as unknowable. A
22
basic premise of Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism is that all
re a lity has two aspects, a mental pole as well as a physical pole.
Mind is therefore present throughout the process. Even an inanimate
stone has a mental aspect in a most rudimentary way, although i t might
not, in any real sense, be conscious. Given this premise, i t is not
a t all surprising th a t mind should fin a lly emerge in the fully
22
This phrase is often used to signify Whitehead's metaphysics.
Further discussion of Whitehead's metaphysics, and its relationship to
Temple's thought, will be found in Part III, Chapter XVIII.
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7 4
conscious form as found in animals and human beings. I t is not, for
Whitehead, "a breach of the continuity" since i t is already an in tr in
sic element throughout the process, ’’ ’his is "immanent theism"
according to Temple's d efinition: i f mind is a principle throughout
the process, i t is the immanent principle th a t establishes immanent
23
theism. But the immanent theism that is found in Temple's thought
is d ifferen t from th at which is found in Whitehead's. The difference
is basically represented by my distinction between Mind“ and Mind^.
The mind th at is immanent to the process in Whitehead's philosophy is
Mind^. The mind that is immanent in Temple's philosophy is ultim ately
M in d O .2 4
I t is clear th at Thomas' broader interpretation of "Mind"
renders Temple's statement ineffective in attaining the d istin ctio n
th a t he hopes to estab lish , and reduces his thought to the Whiteheadian
immanentism that Temple clearly wishes to re je ct. Thus, although
Thomas' interpretation of "Mind" in the passage might remove the
logical inconsistency, i t renders the passage devoid of any real
meaning.
The distinction between Mind^ and Mind^ is obviously crucial
to Temple's thought. The fa c t th a t he so readily glosses over the
^^Nature, Man and God, p. 133.
^ S t r i c t l y speaking, Whitehead's "Mental Pole" f i t s neither
within the meaning that I have given to Mindct nor to MindG. However,
i f Minda is interpreted simply as being external to the process while
MindG is interpreted as being internal to the process, the d istin ctio n
th a t is re a lly a t issue here, then i t is clear th at Whitehead's Mental
Pole f a l l s within the category of Mind3.
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75
distin ctio n is unacceptable, not only in relation to generally accepted
c r ite r ia of philosophical reasoning, but also in relation to his own
dialectical method which, as has been pointed out, includes a c ritic a l
approach to philosophical reasoning.
I t is to be noted that there is one aspect of Temple's dialec
tic a l philosophy with which the concept of "Mind" might appear to be
more consistent. D ialectic, taken in the Hegelian sense, entails the
mutual negation of two opposed e n titie s to form a new entity. W e saw
that Temple's interpretation of this method eliminates the "negative"
ch aracteristic of Hegel's method. I t appears th at Temple's conception
of mind is an attempt to bring about a synthesis between what I have
termed Mind“ and Mind^. Unfortunately, not even Temple, for all his
"thinking unitively," is able to bring about a synthesis here. The
differences between the two concepts are unbridgeable without some
form of negation. Mind^\ which, as shall be shown in Part III, is
in fin ite as well as transcendent, simply cannot be combined with the
f in i te Mind^. The synthesis cannot be accomplished without denying
some essential aspect of one or the other. Temple does not see this
clearly , and thus f a ils in this aspect of his dialectical philosophy
as well as in the c r itic a l aspect.
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CHAPTER IX
THE MIND-BODY RELATIONSHIP
IN TEMPLE'S PHILOSOPHY
Temple's rather uncritical attempt to unify two disparate
e n titie s is also to be found in his treatment of the mind-body problem.
This dichotomy is sim ilar to the one he is confronted with regarding
Mind and Mind . On the one hand. Temple wishes to speak of mind
(both th e is tic and n atu ralistic) as being transcendent of matter:
while on the other hand, he wants to maintain that there is a perfect
unity and inter-dependence between Mind^ and matter. Temple's view
amounts ultimately to a doctrine of "a unity in difference." However,
on examination we find that neither is i t clear that there is a true
unity, nor is the nature of the difference su fficien tly explained.
According to Temple's r e a l i s t metaphysical view, mind emerges
from the process, i . e . , from matter. When the level of mind is
achieved, however, through the reflectiv e states of consciousness that
gradually emerge, i t is determined th at the mind is sig n ific a n tly d if
feren t from the process from which i t takes i t s origin. Mind is "a
breach of the continuity": mind cannot be explained simply in terms
of the matter of the process.^ Temple has an excellent sense of
history with regard to philosophical problems, and he therefore wishes
^Nature, Man and God, pp. 130-134.
76
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77
to avoid the epistemological p itf a lls that the Cartesian metaphysical
outlook was veritably pushed into. Yet when Temple summarily states
his position we find confusion:
Thus, sta rtin g without any of the presuppositions of Idealism,
and from an i n itia l view fa r nearer to Materialism, we are
none the less led to an account of the living organism, and
specially the human organism, as e sse n tially and fundamentally
s p ir itu a l, or at the least mental.2
Temple wishes to adopt the position neither of the Id e a lis t nor
of the M aterialist. However, he sees valuable elements in both points
of view and wishes to bring forth some form of synthesis of the two
points of view. In this regard Temple's approach is clearly d ia le c ti
cal; however i t must be determined whether i t is successful.
Temple is aware of the disastrous ontological d iff ic u ltie s that
resulted from Descartes' d u alistic in terp retatio n of mind and body.
For Descartes, mind and body are separate kinds of substances. As a
re su lt there are no s im ila ritie s , no point a t which mind and body could
be considered to be, in some sense a t le a s t, united. The obvious
objection that mind and body do a ffe c t one another was "solved" by
Descartes' assertion th at these two substances are somehow brought
together in the "pineal gland." Neither this solution, nor the occa
sionalism, which is the real re s u lt of Descartes' thought, is
acceptable to Temple. In e ffe ct, a d u a list view of the relationship
between mind and matter must be avoided.
Yet i t is certain that the d istin ctio n between mind and body
must be maintained. I t is this distinction th a t forms the very core
^ Ib id ., p. 201.
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7 8
of the f i r s t dialectical tra n sitio n . Mind must be able to look back on
i t s e l f and on the body in which i t inheres, and understand th at i t is
q u alitativ ely d ifferen t from both the matter and li f e th a t characterize
the human body. But how is Cartesian dualism to be avoided? Temple
summarizes his position:
I t [mind] is not another thing, so that we have to choose
between the absurdities of psycho-physical parallelism and
the semi-mechanical treatment of Mind involved in a theory
of Interaction between Mind and Body. But where Mind is
actively present with Body a t all Mind and Body are one
thing, of which the dominant character is Mind so fa r as
Mind is a ctiv e.3
Thus, he wishes to adopt a position th a t is neither Id e a lis t, nor
M aterialist, nor Dualist.
Temple, in order to avoid the consequences of dualism, must
maintain th at there is a true unity between mind and body; but he also
must recognize the distinction between them. The solution th at he
seeks is basically a monistic view of the mind-body relationship but
one that at the same time recognizes a duality. Within th is monistic
context there is another a n tith e sis, v iz ., that of idealism versus
materialism. Temple, to be s t r i c t l y monistic, would have to adopt
eith er one or the other. But the metaphysical re s u lt of eith er s t r i c t
idealism or s t r i c t materialism would be unacceptable. He wants to
express the importance of mind without relegating matter to virtual
nothingness as idealism does. He is confronted with a d if f ic u l t
dilemma th at he understandably attempts to resolve. Unfortunately, he
is not successful.
^ Ib id ., p. 201.
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79
Temple daim s th a t, although his view is neither m a te ria listic
nor id e a lis tic , i t is to be considered more m a te ria list than id e a lis t
4
in nature. However, when he comes to describe his position more pre
cise ly , we find that mind always transcends matter: " . . . where Mind
is actively present with Body a t all Mind and Body are one thing, of
5
which the dominant character is Mind so fa r as Mind is active." This
would seem to constitute a position contradictory to Temple's statement
concerning his view being more m a te ria list than id e a lis t. But perhaps
this paradox can be re c tifie d by examining more closely the precise
relationship th at obtains between mind and body.
Separated from all other considerations. Temple's view of the
relationship of mind and body is that together they constitute a unity.
Implied is that there is no "real" distinction between mind and body:
the separation is purely conceptual—the product of abstraction. This
would seem to contradict Temple's en tire metaphysics since, i f mind and
body form a real unity, then neither can be the same in separation from
one another. But Temple does not indicate th at there is an essential
difference in mind when i t is considered as united to body, or when i t
is considered by i t s e l f as the third level of the process, or when con
sidered as independent of both process and body.^ W e are therefore
confronted with the very real question of the nature of the unity of
body and mind.
^ Ib id ., p. 201. ^Ib id .
^Temple maintains th at the human mind is immortal. This being
the case we are provided with a basis fo r considering mind in this la s t
in terp retatio n . For example, see Nature, Man and God, p. 452.
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80
In the same paragraph in which Temple states that " . . . Mind
and Body are one thing, . . . " h e also says the following:
Where Mind is found, i t is found as p o ten tially , and always
in some degree actually, the principle of unity of that
through which i t is a c tiv e .7
Mind, therefore, can be considered " . . . the principle of unity of
th at through which i t is active." W e must consider here what Temple
means by "a principle of unity," as well as what he is referring to
when he states ". . . o f that through which i t is active."
Taking the la s t question f i r s t , i t seems th a t Temple is
referring to the organism, mind and body considered as a whole. For
convenience I shall speak sp ecifically of the human organism, although
Temple's meaning would include all conscious living e n titie s . Thus,
mind is the "principle of unity" of the human person. But what is
meant precisely by a "principle of unity" is not clear.
Prima f a c ie , the "principle of unity" looks like a doctrine
very close to A ristotelian hylomorphism. The mind "informs" the
body in such a way th a t the re s u lt is a human person. This is a
d efin ite metaphysical p o s sib ility , but Temple does not mention i t ,
nor does he consider a relationship between his own view and th a t
of A risto tle. Even i f th is were Temple's position, in th is form i t
would not c la rify the very serious questions involved in the tr a d i
tional mind-body problem. For, although mind might bestow upon the
body a "human nature," the explanation of the relationship between
7
Nature, Man and God, p. 201
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81
the person's rational a c tiv itie s and his physical a c tiv itie s is not
given. Further, i t must be realized th a t we are dealing here with
something quite d ifferen t from A ris to tle 's conception of matter, pure
and simple, being given an essence. For A risto tle, pure matter cannot
be actualized, cannot e x ist in r e a lity , unless i t is informed by an
essence. Temple, however, is dealing with matter th at does in fact
e x ist, and is attempting to add an en tity to i t th at does not actualize
i t , but rather gives i t additional q u a litie s: body becomes a person.
What Temple means by a "principle of unity" is s t i l l unclear,
and i t seems to me th at further c la rific a tio n is impossible. His
"principle" is not something that we can point to, even in terms of
philosophical argument. For this reason I believe i t to be insuf
f ic ie n t to explain the mind-body relationship. I t is to be noted here
that some so rt of "principle of unity" is not foreign to our everyday
thinking, and i t is not d if f ic u l t to see why Temple would appeal to
such a concept in order to extricate himself from the dilemma I have
described. Despite the discontinuity th at we experience in nature,
we nonetheless a ttrib u te to i t some unifying principle. W e assume
e .g ., that there is a "principle of unity" between the acorn and the
oak, although we seldom, i f ever, speak of the correlation between
them in such terms. Temple, by contrast, explicates the relationship
between the disparate e n titie s of mind and body. The "principle of
unity" is no longer im plicit but th ru st into the position of a philo
sophical explanation of the unity. But one does not claim on philo
sophical grounds th a t a "principle of unity" is immediately known.
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82
There are some exceptions to th is , Descartes certainly being one of
them. I t seems to me th a t Temple should be included here as well.
His "principle of unity" is not simply some unknown entity th a t we
know exists y e t remains out of the reach of d ire c t apprehension. I t
is for him a sp ecific entity that in fact holds mind and body together,
forming a total unity. But to maintain this a t the outset is to beg
the entire question of the relation between mind and body. He is
saying, in e ffe ct, th at mind and body are unified; therefore, there is
a "principle of unity." This is basically what Descartes said, but he
was naive enough to attempt to specify what i t is (v iz ., the pineal
gland). Temple is more prudent, although no less a t fa u lt. The
"principle of unity" is devoid of any real meaning in Temple's usage
for he views i t as a concrete e n tity , whereas i t is nothing more than
a mental construct.
W e have seen here that Temple does not wish to adopt dualism
due, a t le ast in p a rt, to the epistemological consequences th a t such
a position e n ta ils. On the other hand, his metaphysical view of
re a lity , as well as his argument for the existence of God, demands
th at a distinction between mind and body be maintained. He wishes
to reduce the d istin ctio n to nothing more than a conceptual abstrac
tion, maintaining the unity of mind and body. W e have also seen th a t,
unlike the abstraction contained in separating matter from form in
A risto tle 's metaphysics, the two elements of Temple's abstraction can,
and in fa c t do, e x ist independently of one another. Thus, although
i t might be true th at Temple takes a position th at is essentially a
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83
synthesis of idealism and materialism, he gives up the very charac
t e r i s t i c th at makes those positions so appealing—the basic monistic
approach to the world in general, and to the perennial problems of
philosophy in p articular, especially the mind-body problem. Temple,
in effect, despite his claims to the contrary, adopts a doctrine of
dualism and of interaction.
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CHAPTER X
"ABSTRACTION" A N D TEMPLE'S DISTINCTION
BETW EEN M IND A N D BO D Y
W e have seen in the la s t chapter th a t Temple, while asserting
th a t mind and body are one, continues to speak of them as separate and
independent e n titie s . In this chapter I wish to approach the problem
from a somewhat d ifferen t point of view, v iz .. Temple's notion of
abstraction.
I t seems to me th at one of the reasons why Temple so readily
allows himself to speak of "the unity in difference" involved in his
conception of mind-body is his over-reliance upon the power of abstrac
tion to separate out aspects of any given whole. I shall attempt to
show that Temple is in fa c t confusing two very d iffe re n t kinds of
abstraction. I shall f i r s t give a b rie f description of what I take
these two types of abstraction to be, and then go on to show sp ec ifi
cally how Temple confuses the two, thus leading into the contradictions
found in his view of mind and body.
In general, all abstraction rests on the a ctiv ity of the
mind. A d istin ctio n a ris e s , however, when we consider the precise
nature of that which is abstracted. One type of abstraction is
based on the approach to the world as found in the thought of Plato.
Mind, in perceiving the world with which i t is surrounded, abstracts
84
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85
from i t e n titie s that i t considers to be "real kinds." The mind looks
on the world and c la ssifie s objects that i t perceives within specific
categories such as "horse," "tree," "man," etc. This I shall call
"real abstraction."
The most important ch aracteristic of real abstraction, for my
purposes here, is that the categories are independent of one another.
That is to say, the category of horse has no relationship with the
category of man. One can think of a horse without necessarily thinking
of a man. Real abstraction is grounded in the older philosophical
emphasis on "Being." The real kinds or categories are unchanging.
The individual instances of our experience of the members of the
categories are, of course, always changing, but the categories them
selves are permanent.
The other type of abstraction is grounded in the more recent
philosophical emphasis on "Becoming": an element th a t is dominant
in any process metaphysics. In this view there can be no real kinds
since the universe is in a constant state of change. If we take this
view, as Temple does, within the context of idealism we find th at,
despite the constant progression of the universe, i t remains a
rational unity. Thus, any attempt to abstract out a single aspect
of the universe is in some way to fa ls ify i t . However, i t is done,
and i t is useful in broadening our understanding of the world. But
i t is valid only i f we keep in mind that i t involves a f a ls ific a tio n
of some so rt. Since this type of abstraction does not r e s t on real
kinds, but rather on the a ctiv ity of mind, I shall call i t "pure
abstraction."
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86
Pure abstraction is analogous to the A ristotelian doctrine of
hylomorphism. For A risto tle, all real substances are in fa c t a com
bination of matter and form. That is to say, although we can mentally
abstract from any given object its matter and i t s form, neither of
these aspects can e x ist independently of one another. Thus, for
example, one cannot think of the form, "horse," without at le ast
implying the matter that is informed. A horse is a rational unity and
to speak of its matter or it s form is a fa ls ific a tio n . But i t is a
fa lsific a tio n th at can be helpful as long as i t is remembered th at we
are s t i l l speaking of a horse, a single object.
I t is i t s e l f a philosophical question as to which, i f e ith e r,
of these types of abstraction is the one that re fle c ts re a lity most
accurately. Probably each has some element of truth. But the answer
to this question is not important here. What is important is that
the d istin ctio n be kept in mind, and that we remain certain th a t the
resu lt of one type of abstraction is- not indiscriminately treated as
i f i t were the re s u lt of the other type. I shall presently attempt
to show th at Temple f a ils in both aspects.
I t appears that Temple's primary notion of abstraction is the
type I have called "pure abstraction." In Christus V eritas, a fte r
describing each of the four main steps of the process. Temple goes on
to say:
I t is to be admitted, and indeed emphasised, th a t these "grades"
taken singly are abstractions. Reality is a continuous whole
within which the mind of each individual finds i t s e l f . The
mind draws fo r i t s e l f the distinctions which i t makes in this
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87
continuous whole—the distinction of Self and Not-self being
being one of the most fundamental.!
Temple conceives of the process, as well as the mind-body relationship
that constitutes part of the process, as a "continuous whole." To
separate any aspect of the whole, although inevitable in lig h t of
p
the nature of mental activ ity , is a fa lsific a tio n of re a lity .
In Nature, Man and God, Temple emphasizes the unity of mind
and body. However, as we have seen, he does not give a clear analysis
of the nature of the unity beyond his basic id e a list supposition that
the world is in fa c t a unified whole. Yet a t times when he speaks of
the mind-body relationship. Temple relies on th e ir separation and
independence. This is the case, for example, when he says: " . . .
where Mind is actively present with Body a t all Mind and Body are
3
one thing, . . . " To make such a statement necessarily implies that
mind and body can e x ist separately and there is a "real" d istin ctio n
to be made between them. I f this is the case, then Temple is no
longer engaged in "pure abstraction" but rather "real abstraction."
When Temple speaks of mind and body as a unity, he is viewing
them as elements of pure abstraction. They are like A ris to tle 's
matter and form: we do not consider them existing apart from one
another for when they are together they form a unified and single
e n tity . But when Temple goes on to speak of one aspect being "domi
nant" over the other, he sh ifts his type of abstraction from "pure"
^Christus V eritas, p. 5. ^Ibid. , pp. 5-6.
^Nature, Man and God, p. 201.
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88
to "real," Mind must in some way be d is tin c t from body i f i t is to
be dominant.
The s h if t is also evident when Temple's view of the process
is contrasted with his arguments for the existence of Mind“ . As we
have seen. Temple views the "grades" of the process as abstractions
from a "continuous whole." Yet in his argument fo r the existence
of Mind“ he calls on the "breach of the continuity" of the process
th at occurs when Mind^ appears. But i f the grades of the process are
abstractions from a continuous whole, how can mind in any way be a
breach of the continuity? The only solution is th a t Temple sh ifts
in his type of abstraction. He introduces the grades of the process
simply as d ifferen t aspects of the whole. He then te l l s us that mind
and matter are far more than d ifferen t aspects of a whole: they are
in some sense a n tith e tic a l; matter alone is not capable of producing
the ch aracteristics of mind. This can be the re s u lt only of "real
abstraction," not "pure abstraction," from the process.
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CHAPTER XI
V A LUE
So fa r I have discussed the primary argument th a t Temple uses
in support of his f i r s t dialectical tra n sitio n , v iz ., the argument
based on the appearance of Mind in the process. Temple, however,
offers another line of argument that is closely related to the f i r s t
argument yet distinguishable from i t . Whereas in the f i r s t argument
Temple goes from the appearance of Mind^ to the existence of Mind“ as
g
the only rational explanation for Mind , in the second argument he
goes from the existence of "value" in the world as apprehended by
Mind^ to the existence of Mind‘ d, the only rational explanation for
the existence of value in the world.
Temple maintains th a t value in the world is recognizable by
all human minds and is therefore objectively real. Further, the pre
sence of value in the universe can be plained only by means of pur
posive a c tiv ity such as is present in Mind^. Thus, i t appears th a t
g
Mind^, or something "akin" to i t , exists since the presence of value
in the world provides us with an indubitable manifestation of some
mental principle. Ultimately, we find th at this mental principle is
the Mind^ of "immanent theism." In this chapter I shall f i r s t d is
cuss Temple's view of the nature of value in the world, and then go on
to analyze his argument for the f i r s t d ialectical tra n sitio n .
8 9
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90
Temple's conception of the nature of value is consistent with
his organic view of the relationship between mind and its environment.
As mind evolves, its capacity to adjust to its environment increases—
there is a continual growth of mental capacities. Thus, Temple speaks
of the traditional tria d of absolute values in the following manner:
In tellectu al growth is a perpetually f u ll e r responsiveness to
the truth of the environment; aesthetic growth to its beauty;
moral growth to i t s goodness; . . .1
The perception of value in the process is therefore concomitant with
mind's perception of the world as a whole. To perceive the process is
to perceive, to some extent a t le a s t, value in the process.
There is a s h if t in Temple's view of value from his e a rlie r
work, Christus Veritas to his la te r work. Nature, Man and God. In
Christus V eritas, he states: "Value, in short, is a system of
experience in which a subject free from inner causes of change finds
satisfactio n in an object which (therefore) i t does not seek to
2
change." In the Gifford Lectures, on the other hand. Temple speaks
of value as a relation between mind and i t s environment in which mind
sees something of i t s e l f in the process. At the same time, however,
he wishes to maintain that value is to be found in the object i t s e l f :
the perception of an object is not simply the occasion that permits
3
mind to experience value—the object is of i t s e l f valuable. This is
d ifferen t from the e a r lie r formulation. However, there appears to be
^Nature, Man and God, p. 128.
^Christus V eritas, p. 33.
^Nature, Man and God, p. 165.
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91
some equivocation since Temple does not make clear whether i t is the
relation between the object of value and mind that possesses the value,
or the object of value i t s e l f . I t seems that he wishes to maintain
both positions simultaneously.
Value theory was the subject of liv ely philosophical discus
sion a t the time Temple wrote his major works. The scene was dominated
by two primary and mutually exclusive points of view concerning the
nature of value. On the one hand, there were the in tu itio n is ts or
absolutists who maintained th at value, specifically goodness, tru th ,
and beauty, is objective and unchanging. Value is knowable by all
human beings who have the mental (in tu itiv e) capacity to know i t .
Opposed to this view were the su b jectiv ists who maintained th a t value
has no objective basis a t a l l , i t s perception being grounded only in
the perceiving mind. Temple's view is typically synthetic in charac
te r. He attempts, in e ffe c t, to bring the opposing schools of thought
together within a single consistent theory. He puts forth a view of
value th a t, while being neither s t r i c t l y su b jectiv ist nor a b so lu tist,
is compatible with both views. His position i s , therefore, th a t value
is ". . . objectively re a l, but subjectively conditioned."^
Temple feels th a t he must maintain an objective basis for
value. If this were not the case the world could have no rational
basis, thus eliminating his assumption th at the world is a rational
unity. Further, he feels that the universal recognition of value,
especially goodness, is an indisputable fa c t.
S b i d . , p. 212.
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9 2
I f man's mental a ctiv ity in relation to the world is so to ta lly
a t fa u lt in this department th at he mistakes for a judgement
on the object what is really an expression of his own feelings,
there can be l i t t l e hope for any philosophic enterprise, and
science i t s e l f could be trusted only so fa r as it s results
could be experimentally tested. To doubt the objectivity of
Value is to adopt what has been called Scepticism of the Instru
ment in so extreme a form as to make all intellectual e ffo rt
f u t i l e . 5
Temple's view of our knowledge of value is consistent with his
epistemological realism. He clearly maintains th at there is a sub
je ctiv e element in the perception of all value (which is i t s e l f objec
tiv e ). The value that one perceives is inevitably determined, to
some extent at le a s t, by the disposition of the perceiver. Further,
he is aware that there is no way in which we can be sure th a t our
perceptions correctly correspond to th at which is outside the per
ceiver. He maintains th a t " . . . our sense of value is ultimate and
fin a l. And since there is no court of appeal, i t is idle to inquire
i f this sense is in fa llib le ." ^
Temple feels that his view is saved from degeneration into
subjectivism by the fa c t th a t all values must be realized by persons
within a society considered as a whole. No single individual is
capable of perceiving all value: there is what Temple calls a "Common
wealth of V a l u e .T h r o u g h o u t the process there is a harmony of minds
and values. However, i t is interesting to note th at this solution
comes only a fte r his f i r s t two d ialectical tra n sitio n s, th a t i s , a fte r
^Ibid. , p. 215.
^The Nature of Personality, p. 72.
^Nature, Man and God, pp. 404-426.
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93
he feels he has proven the existence of transcendent Mind^ or God. I t
Is God who brings about the commonwealth of value. W e find, therefore,
a form of the Cartesian c irc le in th a t, as we shall see la te r , he uses
the argument from value to prove the existence of Mind‘ d but at the
same time re lie s on Mind^ to guarantee the cogency of his view of
value. The existence of value, as well as Mindy's perception of i t ,
CL 8
rests ultimately upon the veracity of mind .
Temple discusses value in terms of the traditional triad of
goodness, tru th , and beauty. Here too, there is a s h if t in his
thinking. In Christus Veritas he considers all three to be absolute
values, or at le ast forms of a single absolute value, v iz ., love.
There is , of course, always the p o ssib ility of co n flict among the
9
three forms, but in such cases goodness always has p rio rity . In
Nature, Man and God, however. Temple considers goodness to be absolute
while truth and beauty are relativ e.
Truth and beauty, says Temple, can be considered absolute,
but only ceteris paribus. H e notes that this would be true of other
values which are normally considered to be re la tiv e , e .g ., pleasure.
But he feels th at truth and beauty are distinguishable from the
^ h i s p articu lar critiq u e is not unique with regard to Temple's
specific metaphysical system, for i t could apply, mutatis mutandis, to
any argument th at seeks to establish the existence of a transcendent
God from experience of the f i n i t e world. This type of argument always
en tails the interpretation of some aspect of the world in terms of an
effect of some transcendent being. But such a position could never be
argued i f i t were not already assumed th at in some way God exists and
acts in the universe.
^Christus V eritas, pp. 31-34.
^S a t u r e , Man and God, p. 138.
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9 4
re la tiv e values in th at they always e x is t, although perhaps only
po ten tially , in the process, and that they are actualized through
apprehension. However, this does not seem to be a truly differen
tia tin g factor since the same thing can be said of pleasure. Pleasure
can be said to e x ist p otentially, being actualized only when i t is
apprehended. Further, i t would seem th a t the value of pleasure has
the advantage over truth and beauty of being less susceptible to
environmental influences: often there can be questions as to whether
something is true or b eau tifu l, but i t is seldom the case with regard
to pleasure. In e ffe ct, therefore. Temple views truth and beauty as
re la tiv e values.
A question th a t is related to the perception of value deals
with the satisfa c tio n that is derived from its apprehension. All
value, according to Temple, is in the object, not in the perceiver.
Yet, to be sure, the satisfa c tio n of the act of perception must reside
in the perceiver. As Thomas points out, "Value is recognized by the
sense of satisfactio n f e l t when mind finds what is akin to i t s e l f in
its ob je c t.T em pl e does not deny th a t there is satisfactio n derived
from the apprehension of value and th a t such satisfa c tio n is good and
therefore of value. But he does not give this type of value any clear
place in his schema. Thomas goes on to say:
Pleasure is not the highest value, but is derivative and secondary
and finds only a subordinate place in a perfect l i f e . Although
Temple holds th at satisfa c tio n , pleasure, and enjoyment, whether
or not associated with the higher values, are real values, i t
is not clear how they fa ll under the general definition of value
^^VJilliam Temple's Philosophy of Religion, pp. 58-59.
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95
as the discovery by mind of what is akin to i t s e l f in its
o b ject.12
So fa r I have presented a general study of Temple's view of
value, offering some criticism of certain aspects of his theory. Since
I am less concerned with his value theory as such, and fa r more con
cerned with his argument for the f i r s t d ialectical tran sitio n based on
his view of value, I shall not pursue the analysis of his value theory
further. To do so would lead us too fa r afield of my primary concern
here. Therefore I shall now turn to an analysis of the manner in which
Temple attempts to e l i c i t support from his view of value to come to
the conclusion th at there is a Mind^ in the process.
Temple's argument from value depends heavily on the notion
of "kinship." When mind emerges from the process i t comes to perceive
aspects of the process in which i t apprehends a correlation with it s e l f .
Mind perceives objective value and i t concludes that this can be
nothing but the product of purposive activ ity as is manifested only by
mental a ctiv ity . Surprisingly, Temple has re la tiv e ly l i t t l e to say
of the kinship th a t mind apprehends between i t s e l f and the process.
The only attempt a t c la rific a tio n appears in the appendix to the sixth
1ecture:
When I say that Mind finds i t s e l f or what is akin to i t s e l f in
its object, I mean an experience which has two aspects; f i r s t ,
th at i t finds the counterpart of the principle of its own
a c tiv itie s as fo r example the mathematical properities of
mechanical combinations of forces or of aesthetic proportions;
secondly, that with this discovery goes a feeling of being at
home with the object, not lo s t or bewildered in presence of i t .
T^lbid., p. 59.
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96
The l a t t e r aspect is not capable of d efinition, but seems to
me to be easily recognisable and profoundly s i g n i f i c a n t
But even here. Temple does not present to us any serious c r ite r ia by
which we might determine what aspects of the process are "akin" to
mind. The perception is almost wholly in tu itiv e in nature, being
based for its ultimate v erification on a "feeling" th at is not capable
of being defined. Certainly there is something to be said for such a
position. The in tu itio n is t view of the nature of value and our per
ception of i t , for example, commanded great respect in the early part
of the twentieth century. However, any attempt to proceed from this
to an indubitable indication of the presence of an immanent Mind^ goes
fa r beyond the bounds of the speculative position of the in tu itio n is ts .
The reason Temple has l i t t l e or no hesitation concerning this
point is rooted in his assumption that there can be only two possi
b i l i t i e s concerning the origin of value. I t is here that his argument
from value comes close to his argument from mind: "Starting from the
physical end we can never account for Mind; and Value shares i t s pre
carious lo t. If primary Reality is purely physical, i t is impossible
to a ttrib u te Value to i t in i t s e l f . F o r Temple, therefore, i t is
simply impossible that value (or mind) can have its origin from
physical re a lity only. But i f this were the unquestioned case,
philosophers certainly would have agreed on i t long ago.^^ The point
is th at Temple u n c ritic a lly accepts into his thought a position th a t
^^Nature, Man and God, p. 165.
^^Ibid. , p. 214. ^^C f., Stedman, Hibbert Journal, p. 303.
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9 7
he takes to be absolutely indisputable, but which has been a basic
question in philosophy throughout i t s history. He is assuming not
only that value in the world is objective, but th a t i t is the product
of Mind“ . He does not consider any possible contrary explanation with
regard to his position that value is " . . . grounded in the discovery
by Mind of i t s e l f —or its kin—in i t s object." He states simply:
I f the object is apprehended as good—whether noble, beautiful
or tru e, according to its own nature—th a t means th a t Mind
finds there an expression, such as the nature of the object
permits, of i t s e l f as i t is or as i t would wish to be. If the
object is apprehended as bad, that means th at Mind finds there
e ith e r no expression of Mind at a l l , or else an expression of
antagonistic Mind—the base, the ugly, the f a l s e . 16
But i f this is the case, i t is d if f ic u l t to see how Temple
arrives so easily a t his th e is tic position. I t must be remembered
that whether or not Mind^ is a "breach of the continuity" of the pro
cess i t nonetheless does a rise, or emerge, out of the process. I t
would therefore seem inevitable th at there should be some characteris
tic s th at the mind perceives as being valuable and akin to i t s e l f .
Mind is part of the process and is therefore in teg rally related to i t .
I t seems very likely that since mind arises from the adjustment of
the organism to it s environment, some kinship with the process is
inevitable: Mind^ might in some way recognize i t s e l f in the process.
But the mind that is recognized need not be Mind^. W e simply cannot
know that Mind^ ex ists. Rather i t would be a "mental pole" such as
Whitehead p o s t u l a t e s . T e m p l e does not seriously consider this
^S a tiir e , Man and God, p. 218.
^^I shall discuss Whitehead's metaphysics in Chapter XVIII.
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9 8
p o s sib ility , for he is too immersed in his supposition th a t the pro
cess, as well as every p articu lar aspect of i t , can be the re s u lt only
of Mind^. This will become clear, I believe, when I discuss his
arguments in the second d ialectical tra n sitio n .
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CHAPTER XII
PURPOSE
W e have seen that Temple bases his f i r s t d ialectical tra n sitio n
on two arguments, one from the appearance of Mind^ in the process, the
other from the presence of value in the process. There is one element
common to both of these arguments, and on which both ultimately r e s t,
v iz ., purpose: ". . . when Mind expresses i t s e l f through the Process,
1 a
i t s a c tiv ity is called Purpose." Mind is known only by means of the
element of purpose, and is therefore, in a sense, the primary element
in Temple's f i r s t dialectical tra n sitio n . Further, as we shall see in
Part I I I , purpose is the pivot upon which Temple goes on to argue for
the personal and transcendent nature of Mind‘ d. In this chapter I shall
attempt to analyze c r itic a lly his notion of purpose as a basis for
establishing his immanent theism. I hope to show his argument from
purpose to Mind‘ d is circular and there inconclusive.
I t is not hard to realize why Temple would find the concept of
purpose so appealing as a means to bridge the gap between the process
and Mind°\ In his view, purpose is i t s e l f an ultimate principle
requiring no antecedent to explain the a c tiv ity th a t resu lts from i t .
Mind, the e n tity th at possesses the ch arac te ristic of purpose, acts
^Nature, Man and God, p. 219.
99
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100
towards specific ends, and the fact that i t does, needs no further
explanation; i t is the ultimate fa c t.
. . . Purpose is self-explanatory. When we have traced an
occurrence to the Purpose of an in te llig e n t being, we are
s a tis fie d . And this is natural enough, for in such a case
Mind has referred the occurrence to i t s e l f as cause.2
The concept of purpose is especially well suited to provide
the basic unifying principle for Temple's rational universe. I t
combines e ffic ie n t causality with rational coherence, thus being able
to account fo r the entire material process as i t presents i t s e l f to
us. Further, Temple maintains that i f there is any one principle able
to explain the world without i t s e l f requiring an explanation, than
3
that principle provides a basis for theism. Thus, his arguments for
the f i r s t dialectical tra n sitio n are, in e ffect, arguments for the
existence of a deity.
Of his line of reasoning Temple says:
This argument is obviously modelled on A ris to tle 's argument
to a F irs t Cause, which must be an Unmoved Mover, in Book A
of the Metaphysics. But he developed i t along lines of
e ffic ie n t causation; this is the same argument transferred
to the category of final c au satio n .4
He is saying, in e ffe c t, that his line of thought follows the teleo-
logical, rath er than the cosmological, argument for the existence of
God. But i f this is the case, i t is surprising th a t Temple does not
^Ib id . , pp. 219-220.
^Ib id . , p. 220.
^ Ib id . , p. 220, n.l.
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101
mention Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, probably the
most devastating attack on the teleological argument ever w ritten.^
The real question seems to be whether or not Temple has truly
transformed A ris to tle 's argument. As Thomas points out: " It is not
clear, however, how Temple's formulation d iffers fin a lly from the f i r s t
cause argument which he c r itic iz e s , how 'purposer purposes' differs
basically from ' f i r s t cause causes.'"^ By his very appeal to purpose
as the defining ch aracteristic of mind. Temple is speaking in terms
of e ffic ie n t causation. I t is to be remembered that the great appeal
of the element of purpose is th at i t is "self-explanatory." Thus, in
spite of what he says to the contrary. Temple is arguing for a form
of the cosmological argument, an argument th at has not been s a ti s
fa c to rily defended as a means of philosophically establishing the
existence of God. And i t appears th a t his formulation in no way
strengthens the basic argument.
Temple has been roundly c ritic iz e d fo r his use of the category
of purpose in th at he applies i t fa r too freely , not only to certain
7
types of a ctiv ity in the world, but also to the world as a whole.
As he presents i t , purpose, of i t s e l f , is not adequate to be the
basis of the rational principle of the process. The term "purpose"
5
I t may be noted in th is regard th a t Temple also fa ils to men
tion Kant. Although he did not accept the teleological argument, Kant
was more respectful of i t than any of the other arguments and in this
he sees beyond Hume.
^Thomas, William Temple's Philosophy of Religion, p. 122.
^ Ib id ., p. 121.
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102
logically entails being directed towards some end. Temple, i t seems,
would have us assume th at we have in some way a "pure purpose," much
in the same way th at "pure act" exists in A risto tle 's metaphysics.
However, whereas A ris to tle 's conception is consistent Temple's is
self-contradictory. A ristotle means an e n tity th at is free of all
po ten tialities--p u re being without any element of becoming. This is
not the case with Temple's purposer however. The very meaning of
purpose includes something th at is purposed. Thus, to postulate pur
pose as the ultimate principle of the process entails postulating
someting else, v iz ., th at which is purposed.
Let us assume th a t Mind“ does in fa c t e x ist and th a t i t is
characterized by purpose manifested in the process. In Temple's
view, mind is free , and he defines freedom in the following manner:
Freedom is not absence of determination; i t is sp iritu a l
determination, as d is tin c t from mechanical or even organic,
determination. I t is determination by what seems good as
contrasted with determination by ir r e s is tib le compulsion.8
I f Mind“ is determined "by what seems good," then Mind“ is determined
by value. And, as we saw in the l a s t chapter, for Temple, good is an
objective value in the universe. But i t will also be remembered that
i t is Mind“ th at creates this good—i t is the manifestation by which
we are assured th at Mind‘ d ex ists. I f this is the case, then Temple
has placed himself in a vicious circle: Mind^ must not only act
towards a good, i t must also create the good towards which i t acts.
^Nature, Man and God, p. 229.
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W e have seen Temple maintain th a t absolute values are in trin sic
to the process, and th at Mind‘ d is the source of value. But the primary
c h arac te ristic of mind is purpose, and more sp ec ific a lly , purpose
directed towards value. In e ffe c t. Temple is saying th at Mind“ is the
source of value and is determined by value. But i f Mind“ creates value
i t must be determined by some other value: a good th a t transcends the
process and which is known only to Mind“ . Seemingly i t is the only way
th a t Temple can ex tricate himself from his c irc le . In other words, we
must distinguish a t le ast two kinds of value: the value th at is found
in the process by Mind^, towards which i t always acts—we can call
this Value^; and the value th at is known only by Mind*^, and towards
which i t always acts—Value'^. But Value“ cannot be the creation of
Mind^ because Mind^ is determined by Value°^. Value^ i t s e l f must be
created by some mind that transcends Mind“ , and which is directed by
some higher value, e tc ., ad infinitum, or Value^ must be the ultimate
principle of the rational universe. To adopt the view that leads to
an in f in ite regress is meaningless to the f i n i t e mind; to adopt the
view th a t Value“ is the ultimate principle of the rational universe is
a form of Platonic Idealism: the idea of the Good is the ultimate
principle of the universe. This position is one th at Temple clearly
wishes to avoid.
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PART I I I . THE SECOND DIALECTICAL TRANSITION
1 0 4
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CHAPTER XIII
INTRODUCTION TO PART III
In the f i r s t d ialectical tra n sitio n . Temple attempts to
establish that there is an "immanent principle" in the process,
directing i t and responsible fo r all i t s stages. Although the term
"immanent" signifies an e n tity th at exists within the process, i t is
quite obvious that Temple's description of this principle en tails con
siderably more. When he speaks of the principle of the process as
being immanent he also means th at i t is transcendent.^ In the second
dialectical tran sitio n Temple explicates the element im plicit in his
e a r lie r arguments. The line of reasoning he uses to establish th at
immanent Mind“ is also transcendent Mind^ is based on the same elements
found in the f i r s t tra n sitio n , v iz ., Mindy's presence in the process,
and value.
Temple speaks more of s p i r i t than mind in the second tra n s i
tio n . He maintains th at s p i r i t is the highest stage of the process
and is therefore the f u lle s t development of mind. However, I shall
argue that Temple does not s e t forth any real distinction between mind
and s p i r i t and that the separation is vacuous. I shall then ex p lic itly
take up his line of argument: the primary ch aracteristic of s p i r i t is
V here is a sense in which "immanence" and "transcendence" are
necessary correlates. However, i t does not seem to be the case here.
105
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personality—again, there is no real distinction between these ele
ments. He argues further that the primary ch aracteristic of per-
g
sonality is transcendence. He assumes that since Mind is transcen
dent, Mind“ must be transcendent. However, as with mind, we shall
see that he equivocates in his use of terms, thereby invalidating his
arguments.
In the second tra n sitio n Temple returns to the notion of
value. He is no longer concerned with simply determining the rational
principle responsible for the existence of value in the process, but
now argues that man "reverences" tru th , beauty, and goodness, and thus,
the source of these values is personal and deserving of reverence.
I t is clear th a t by transcendent Mind^, or S p irit^ , Temple
means the God of C hristianity. The problem is th a t when he maintains
that Mind“ is God he completely ignores his philosophical method.
He does l i t t l e more than s e t forth his theological preconceptions and
assert that he has established a v irtu ally indubitable philosophical
conclusion: God exists. I t will provide a clearer understanding of
the a priori nature of his assumptions and conclusions i f I devote a
chapter to an analysis of Temple's thought as compared with
Whitehead's. Insofar as the f i r s t dialectical tra n sitio n is con
cerned, Whitehead and Temple are in virtual agreement (although for
somewhat d iffe re n t reasons): there is to be found within the process
a "mental" aspect. However, by the nature of his argument, Whitehead
can go no further. Temple, on the other hand, because of the various
elements th at he has placed into his notion of "immanent Mind“ ," goes
on to argue for the transcendence of Mind^.
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CHAPTER XIV
SPIRIT
S p ir it, viewed from Temple's n a tu ra lis tic metaphysics, is the
highest stage of the process known to us. When we try to understand,
however, precisely what Temple intends by "S p irit," we find th a t he
does not provide any means by which we can clearly distinguish s p i r i t
from mind. Unlike the tran sitio n from matter to lif e and from lif e
to mind, there is no obvious t r a i t by which we can recognize the
tran sitio n from mind to s p i r i t . I t will be my objective to show that
Temple f a ils to make any meaningful d istin ctio n between his concepts
of mind and s p i r i t in e ith er his n a tu ra lis tic or th e is tic meta
physics.^ If this is established, we are faced with the question as
to whether the second tran sitio n is truly a "transition" or simply an
extension of the f i r s t tra n sitio n .
Temple refers d irectly to the distinction between mind and
s p i r i t only once in Nature, Man and God, in a footnote to the seventh
lecture:
I f th is is the case, part of the d iffic u lty is derived from
the translation of the basic id e a lis t concept from the German. There
is no English equivalent for the German word, Geist. The term
"Mind," happens to carry with i t the connotation, "in te lle ctu a l," as
well as implying a personal "I." The English word "Spirit" carries
with i t the connotation of "spooky." Geist does not have any of these
connotations.
107
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108
The main point is that Mind may be chiefly, or indeed wholly,
concerned with the finding of means to fixed ends, whereas
S p ir it (the d istin c tiv e element in Personality) appears in
the choice between ends, which is made possible by the capacity
of Mind for "free ideas".2
If we compare this statement with what Temple says about mind, we shall
find th at there i s , in fa c t, no distinction between mind and s p i r i t .
Temple's statement th a t s p i r i t " . . . appears in the choice
between ends, . . ." is an attempt, i t seems, to s e t forth a specific
difference between mind and s p i r i t . This being the case, s p i r i t can
be interpreted as mind which chooses between ends. But is this not
a tautology? In lig h t of what Temple says in the f i r s t tra n s itio n ,
i t seems clear th at mind is capable of choosing between ends. This
is at le ast im plicit in Temple's description of mind as capable of
forming "free ideas." Mind forms free ideas to choose among them.
And i t is on this a b ility to choose th at the f i r s t tran sitio n stands:
Mind‘ d directs the process, but i t , ju s t as Mind^, is directed towards
the good--Mind“ chooses what i t takes to be good. I t is the "purpose"
manifested in the process th at provides us with the evidence th a t the
process is the r e s u lt of rational activ ity and not simply "brute fa c t."
There is no doubt in reading Temple's argument in the f i r s t tran sitio n
that mind does have the "ab ility to choose." Therefore, to c ite this
ch aracteristic as a specific difference between mind and s p i r i t is
meaningless.
P
Nature, Man and God, p. 190, n .l.
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In Christus V eritas, Temple offers another explanation of
s p i r i t which he seems to intend as a definition: " . . . S p ir it i s ,
O
or has, the sense of absolute value." But here again we see th at
there is no real distinction between mind and s p i r i t . In the f i r s t
tra n sitio n , when Temple speaks of Mindy's perception of value in the
g
process, there is no doubt that Mind‘ d is capable of recognizing, a t
least to some extent, absolute values. I t will be recalled th a t this
is the very basis on which Temple seeks to argue for the f i r s t tra n si-
g
tion: Mind^ does truly recognize in the process certain vjues which
must be considered absolute. Either we are deluded in t h i s , or we
must conclude that some rational principle has placed these values in
the process. To distinguish s p i r i t from mind in terms of s p i r i t 's
a b ility to "sense" absolute values is vacuous.
W e find, therefore, th at neither the ch arac te ristic of choice,
nor the a b ility to know absolute values is capable of providing us
with an adequate concept of s p i r i t . This would seem to indicate th at
there is no real distin ctio n between mind and s p i r i t e ith e r n atu ralis-
tic a lly , or th e is tic a lly for Temple. This fa c t will be fu rth er evi
denced as I proceed to take up Temple's argument from s p i r i t in the
following chapters.
There are several words th at appear in Nature, Man and God
th at Temple seems to use interchangeably with s p i r i t : personality,
w ill, choice, purpose, and "sense of v a l u e . O f these, personality
3
Christus V eritas, p. 5. I ta lic s mine.
^ I t will be recalled th at Temple e x p lic itly speaks of these
same ch aracteristics as in tr in s ic to mind.
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no
is by fa r the concept he most often uses in lieu of s p i r i t . I t will
5
be recalled th at in the quote cited above. Temple states parenthe
tic a lly th at s p i r i t is "the d istin ctiv e element of Personality."^ In
terms of his cosmology, this is surprising. Temple l i s t s only four
general levels of re a lity . However, in this statement he implies that
there is a t le a s t one more level of re a lity readily known to us, and
which i s , in fa c t, a more general category than s p i r i t , v iz ., person
a lity . I t would seem that i f personality were the more general cate
gory of being, r t should be lis te d as the fourth level of re a lity . I
can find no reason why Temple does not do th is. However, i t shall
become evident shortly th a t, despite what he says with regard to s p i r i t
being an element within personality, personality and s p i r i t (and there
fore mind also) are v irtu ally synonymous. Therefore, whether s p i r i t
or personality is liste d as the fourth level of re a lity , i t i s , in
lig h t of Temple's definition for both, of l i t t l e consequence.
In Temple's most detailed exposition of his concept of
personality, as found in The Nature of Personality, there is no d is
tinction between s p i r i t and personality. This is furth er borne out
by the fa c t th a t Thomas, who provides a very fine analysis of Temple's
d ialectical philosophy, readily id e n tifie s the two concepts.^ I t is
by means of the d ifferen t terms th at Temple uses to speak of a single
en tity th a t he is able to provide an apparent basis for the re a lity of
^P. 108.
^Nature, Man and God, p. 190.
^William Temple's Philosophy of Religion, p. 25.
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m
the second dialectical tran sitio n . In Temple's argument for the second
tran sitio n based on s p i r i t , he appeals to attrib u tes th at he considers
ch arac te ristic of personality. But, I hope to make clear th at these
a ttrib u te s are already present in his conception of mind in the f i r s t
tra n sitio n . For the present, however, I shall concentrate on Temple's
view of s p i r i t and personality, two e n titie s that are v irtu a lly impos
sib le to distinguish or separate.
Personality, according to Temple, is truly the unique charac
t e r i s t i c of man and of God, and i t is mind that gives them "kinship."
Mind is also the c h arac te ristic th at sets man and God off from the
process. One aspect of such a position arises when we consider con
scious e n titie s other than man, v iz ., animals, or, what Temple refers
to as "brutes." He wishes to take the position th a t, although brutes
can be said to have minds, they do not have personality. The reasons
that l ie behind his insistence on this point are unclear. However,
i t seems that he is motivated to some extent by his theological sup
positions (much in the manner of Descartes) to reserve for only God
and man the c h arac te ristic of personality.
In The Nature of Personality, Temple makes the following
statement:
W e should take the term Brute, as applied to animals, to mean
th a t the animal is a subject, and not only an object, but that
its su b jectiv ity is limited to feeling: its conscious l i f e
is only in the present. . . . But Personality is s t i l l more
than th is . W e should never call a living creature Personal
unless he were conscious of continued existence, and attributed
value not only to the present, but to the past and to the
fu tu r e .8
^ h e Nature of Personality, p. 7.
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112
Later he says:
The Brute has no effective claim upon us, though i t has a point
of view and can feel pain we in f l i c t : but i t lives (qua con
sciousness) in i t s sensations. To to rtu re a brute is cruel
but not criminal, and only indirectly immoral; I mean i t is the
act of an immoral person not an immoral act. The brute is not
a possible member of society, because as society is always a
number of persons united by a common purpose; and the brute has
no purpose,9
Iremonger, Temple's b i o g r a p h e r , d o e s not indicate whether
Temple had any prolonged relationship with animals. However, i t would
seem from the above statements th at he did not. I t is not a t all cer
tain th a t animals do not a ttrib u te value to the past and to the future.
This would, of course, be greatly dependent upon what one means by
"Value," Temple speaks of value as being subjectively determined,
Ralph Barton Perry defines value as "any object of i n t e r e s t , I n
e ith er case, the p o ssib ility that an animal can a ttrib u te value to the
past and to the future does not seem to be eliminated. I t would seem
that value judgements of some so rt are involved when, for example, a
cat leaves an owner who has treated i t cruelly. I t seems th at a choice
is in some way involved, and i f there is a choice some c r ite r ia is
implied, v iz ,, value.
The statement th at Temple makes to the effect that cruelty to
animals is not in i t s e l f immoral, but is an act of an immoral person
^Ib id , , pp, 8-9,
"*^F. A, Iremonger, William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury;
His Life and Letters (London: Oxford University Press, 1948),
^^Ralph Barton Perry, General Theory of Value (New York:
Longmans, Green and Co,, 1926),
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113
is revealing. Most m oralists are agreed th a t no act of i t s e l f is
moral or immoral. The morality of action i s , in all cases, determined
by the outlook of the person performing the action. Thus, Temple's
statement about animals is not much d ifferen t than the m oralist's
statement about human beings. By making the statement. Temple is
placing the question of cruelty to animals within a very definite
moral context. For Temple, to be cruel to animals is an act of an
immoral person: animals do make moral claims on us. Certainly this
claim is not as great as i t is with human beings, but by Temple's own
statement, i t is present. His argument, therefore, has been turned
around in support of the very position th at he wishes to deny.
The statement th a t " . . . the brute has no purpose." is also
surprising. In winter, for example, animals gather together to pro
te c t themselves from the piercing cold: a very evident purpose. In
Christus V eritas, Temple takes up this objection. He admits that
animals do occasionally manifest that which we in te rp re t as purpose.
I t seems, for example, th a t a dog's loyalty is a purposive a ctiv ity .
However, Temple maintains that
. . . i t seems likely th at th is only becomes apparent in the
a c tiv itie s which i t prompts, and is never present to the con
sciousness of the dog as a principle f i t t e d to control all pos
sib le actions for an indefinite period of time. Consequently,
while a dog may f a ir ly be said to have a "character" and even
"moral q u a litie s," he cannot reasonably be said to have "moral
principles." He has a memory, and can have hopes; but he has
not (one supposes) an ideal towards which he constantly s t r i v e s . *2
^^Christus V eritas, p. 52.
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114
Temple states here th at animals do not have any moral p rin ci
ples. And a moral principle seems to be any principle th a t is taken
. . t o control all possible actions fo r an indefinite period of
time." But i f this is how "moral principle" is to be defined, then,
again, i t is not clear th a t animals do not possess such principles.
They do a t times seem to be motivated in specific directions over
indefinite periods of time. Further, Temple's parenthetical s ta te
ment, "one supposes," certainly detracts from an otherwise d efin itiv e
statement of his position, and calls into doubt the assertions he is
making. Clearly, even for Temple, i t is not necessarily the case
th at animals have no moral principles. I t might be the case, although
we presently lack evidence to make a decisive judgement on i t . In
e ffe c t, then, an appeal to moral principles, or value, or purpose,
is not s u ffic ie n t to distinguish animals from human beings, or, more
importantly, mind from personality.
I t is rather interesting to note th a t, although, as we saw in
the analysis of the f i r s t dialectical tra n s itio n . Temple's thought
is shot through with id e a lis t presuppositions, when he gets to the
highest level of re a lity , s p i r i t , he leans fa r more towards per
sonalism than idealism. S p irit is personal: th is is considerably
d ifferen t from the orthodox id e a lis t position as found, fo r example,
in Hegel's G eist. Geist transcends all p a rtic u la rity including both
mind and s p i r i t or personality. In lig h t of Temple's idealism, i t
would seem that he would also postulate an e n tity that would possess
these c h a rac te ristic s—even as a level of the process over and above
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115
Mind“ . But here again, i t seems that Temple was too taken up with
his th e is tic presuppositions to trace without bias the id e a lis t
conclusions th at would be more consistent with his philosophical
system.
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CHAPTER X V
TEMPLE'S ARGUM ENT FR O M THE NOTION
OF SPIRIT O R PERSONALITY
Early in the presentation of his arguments for the second
d ia le ctic a l tra n sitio n . Temple asks the following questions:
Is this Mind, which pervades, sustains, and directs the Whole,
so e n tirely expressed in i t , as to have its whole being in i t
or is i t something over and above all th at the Process contains
or ever could contain? Plainly i t is immanent; is i t also
transcendent?^
I t is his objective, therefore, to show th at the immanent Mind^ he
feels he has established in the f i r s t dialectical tran sitio n is in
fa c t transcendent as well. I t will be recalled th at he does not make
a distin ctio n between mind and s p i r i t , although he attempts to a t t r i
bute the notion of s p i r i t only to man and to transcendent Mind^L
Temple believes the notions of s p i r i t and personality are v irtu ally
id en tical. This identity is essential for Temple since i t is in terms
of personality, rather than s p i r i t , that he attempts to establish the
transcendent nature of Mind“ . He argues th a t Mind^ is personal; there
fore i t is transcendent. In this chapter I shall analyze the manner
in which he comes to this conclusion.
To help explain his position. Temple l i s t s three types of
action and reaction: mechanical is found in individual changes th at
^Nature, Man and God, p. 257.
116
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th at occur in the process, for example, one object h ittin g another
thus causing the struck object to move; organic, involves several
mechanical actions working together to produce a total e fe ct, the pro
cess of plant photosynthesis being a typical example; fin a lly , pur
posive action which is determined not only by the immediate environ
mental circumstances, but also by a conscious agent which determines
i t s e l f , and chooses its course of conduct from among various possi
b i l i t i e s . Temple points out that transcendent activ ity is manifested
2
in this la s t type of action. "What we have called the freedom of
mind, with the kind of self-determination th at results from i t , implies
3
also self-transcendence and therefore a s e lf that transcends."
In this n a tu ra lis tic context. Temple's use of the term tran
scendence, is v irtu a lly synonymous with the notion of freedom with
regard to human acts. Clearly, in Temple's usage self-determination
does not simply imply self-transcendence, i t is_ self-transcendence,
Q
or simply Transcendence . There is nothing really wrong with this
use of the term. However, i t is important that we keep in mind his
meaning of transcendence, for immediately a f te r this position is set
fo rth , he attempts to show that this element exists in Mind“ .
2
Ibid. , p. 261. I t is sig n ific a n t, th a t Temple l i s t s only
three modes of action and reaction whereas he l i s t s four levels in
the process. Clearly, mechanical action is the primary ch aracteristic
of the f i r s t lev el, matter; organic of the second, l i f e . However, to
which level shall we a ttrib u te purposive action? There is no doubt
Temple would have to a ttrib u te i t to both, thus supporting my thesis
th at there is no real difference between mind and s p i r i t , and th at
the re a lity of the second d ialectical tra n sitio n is questionable.
^Ibid. , p. 262.
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According to Temple, "Purposive action or reaction. . . is a
chief ch arac te ristic of Personality, . . . Therefore, to anything
that we can a ttrib u te purposive a c tiv ity , we can also a ttrib u te per
sonality; human beings by virtue of the fa c t th a t they are Transcen
dent^ have Personalities^. But Temple wishes to carry th is concept
of transcendence and personality far beyond i t s human or n a tu ra listic
context. Accordingly, "The principle th at is to account for the
World-Process must account for this fact [Transcendence^] as (amongst
other things) an episode in that Process. The principle of Organism^
will not do this unless i t be so expanded as to deserve the name of
Personality."^ He then goes on to give three reasons why the prin
ciple of personality is adequate to explain the process:
. . . i t supplies, as has already been said, a ground of
explanation which calls for no further explanation, thus
delivering us from the in fin ite regress. Further, i t is
adequate in the sense th a t i t is equal in richness of content
to those episodes in the process which are ric h e st, so that
we are not under the necessity of explaining any ex isten t by
reference to a principle lower in the scale of being than
i t s e l f . Thirdly, i t is a principle of which the ch aracteris
t i c is action in the present with a view to a future fr u itio n ,
so th at i t combines, as nothing else does, e ffic ie n t causation
with rational coherence; for when a person acts purposively
his several actions cohere in one in te llig ib le scheme, while
in each action the present choice, which is a t th a t stage expres
sive of the constant purpose, is an e ffic ie n t cause of the
changes effected in the environment./
The f i r s t reason fo r Temple's b e lie f th a t personality is an
adequate principle of the process is , we find, nothing more than the
^Tbid. , p. 261.
^This is Whitehead's term. A discussion of the comparison of
Whitehead and Temple will be found in Chapter XVIII.
Sature, Man and God, p. 262. ^ I b i d . , pp. 262-263.
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119
trad itio n al cosmological argument for the existence of God. I t rests
on the assumption th at there cannot be ( i . e . , i t is irra tio n a l) an
in fin ite regress in the universe. This argument is fa r from being an
indubitable proof, and Temple has made no case for i t . I t is sur
prising he would use this line of reasoning since he e a r lie r stated
that he had recast A ris to tle 's argument to a f i r s t cause along the
O
lines of final causation.
In the second reason. Temple states th at personality " . . . is
adequate in the sense that i t is equal in richness of content to those
episodes in the process which are ric h e s t,. . . therefore we do not
have to appeal to a lower level for an explanation. But i t must be
remembered th at all he has described thus far is Personality^, i . e . ,
personality as i t appears in human beings. W e suddenly find we are
speaking of Personality^, i . e . , transcendent Mind^. But he does not
s ta te this or make any distinction a t all between personality as i t is
found within the process, and the personality he wishes to re fe r to as
the principle of the process.
Temple is decidedly equivocating on the term, personality. W e
g
experience, and therefore are acquainted with Personality‘ s, but we
must in some way project this understanding beyond the process so that
we can explain i t . Certainly there might be some truth to the prin
ciple that a cause must be equal to or greater than its e ffe c t. But
Temple does not speak of such a principle, and thus does not attempt
to investigate its v a lid ity . But even i f the principle is tru e , on
^ Ib id ., p. 220.
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120
g
what basis do we say th a t since Personality is the highest stage of
the process. Personality^ must, therefore, be the principle of the
process? As I argued with regard to Mind“ , the principle of the pro
cess, i f there is one, might very well be something quite different
from anything that man can imagine. Personality^ entails Transcen-
g
dence— a man can make choices from various p o ssib ilitie s and act on
those choices. But can we say the same for Personality‘ s, and can such
an e n ta ilment bear any meaning for us?
In the f i r s t dialectical tra n sitio n . Temple argues that the
process must be the re s u lt of either Mind“ or "brute fa c t." Assuming
that the process is not the resu lt of "brute fa c t," and that there is
some mental principle to explain the process, what can we know about
such a principle? Can we know that i t exercises freedom in the sense
that Temple describes freedom in man? I t would seem th at we cannot,
regardless of how much philosophical argumentation one might offer
(and of which Temple offers l i t t l e or none). To speak of Personality^
as explaining Personality^ in particu lar, and the process in general,
f i t s in quite neatly with Temple's thought, but i t is unjustified.
Temple's th ird reason is that personality " . . . combines, as
nothing else does, e ffic ie n t causation with rational coherence; . . . "
This is perhaps true of Personality^, but the same certainty cannot
be maintained with regard to Personality‘ s. W e can know neither of its
e ffic ie n t causality (the cosmological argument) nor of its ratio n ality .
Temple assumes (and this is made clear by his lack of distinction)
th at to know Personality^ is to know Personality‘ S—but nothing could
be further from the tru th .
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Temple does not stop here. After he feels he has established
Personality^ as the principle of the process, he goes on to describe
aspects of this principle which, I believe, are philosophically
unknowable. In the next chapter I shall attempt to show th a t Temple
puts aside his academic gown and dons his surplice.
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CHAPTER XVI
TRANSCENDENCE, PERSONALITY, A N D G O D
W e have seen, thus fa r, th a t Temple recognizes Transcendence^
to e x ist within the process, and th at he believes Personality*^ to be
the only principle that can explain the presence of such a character
i s t i c . I shall pursue Temple's view of Personality*^ as God, and then
return to a consideration of his notion of transcendence.
Temple describes the nature of personality in the following
manner:
Personality exhibits i t s e l f supremely in purposes of fellow
ship or love—supremely, because here is i t fu rth est removed
from the mechanical or organic. Therefore i t needs, for its
fu ll self-expression, the existence of other persons. If we
take as our ultimate principle Personality, not only as pur
posive mind, but as mind of which the actual purpose is love,
then the occurrence of persons within the World-PrOcess is
tru ly explained by the principle to which that process is
referred; and there is no other principle known to us whereby
human fellowship, which is the culmination of the Process
h ith e rto , is tru ly explained at a l l . l
Here again, there seems to be an equivocation on the term,
personality. In the beginning of the paragraph Temple is apparently
g
making a statement about human personality, i . e . . Personality . The
way Temple states i t , i t seems th at he is making an absolute pronounce-
g
ment about the nature of Personality : he does not consider other
^Nature, Man and God, p. 263.
122
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123
in terp retatio n s, nor does he indicate that there are other possible
interpretations of the nature of Personality^. But despite the d is
tin c t d u b itab ility of such a position, he immediately proceeds to
characterize the principle of the process, Personality‘ s, in th is man
ner. Even i f we were to accept his statement about the nature of Per-
sonalityP, i t is d if f ic u l t to see how he can so readily extend this
view beyond human personality, and a ttrib u te i t to divine personality,
v iz ., God.
That Temple take Personality^ to be God, there is no doubt.
For example, he says:
To adopt the hypothesis th a t the process of nature in all i t s
range is to be Recounted fo r by the in te llig e n t purpose of
Mind is Theism. 2
Later he says :
But our argument has led us, provisionally at le a s t, to the
conclusion th a t the explanation of the world is to be sought
in a Personal Reality, or to use the h isto ric phrase, in a
Living God. 3
In lig h t of this f a c t. Temple makes some s ta rtlin g statements.
Apparently he believes he has answered, in philosophical terms, a
question that has been nothing short of a mystery throughout the h is
tory of Christian theology.
"Personality," Temple says, "exhibits i t s e l f supremely in pur
poses of fellowship or love." This statement applies to God as well
as to man. He la te r says, " If God is Personal, He must express Him
s e lf; . . . "^ And th is expression he takes to be the world-process.
^Ibid. , p. 257. ^Ib id . , p. 265. ^Ibid. , Ita lic s mine.
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T raditionally, in Christian theology, the question has been
unanswerable as to why God has made the world and man. I t is true
most theologians maintain that God chooses to make the world because
of His love; nevertheless, the fact th at He chooses to do so, in lig h t
of His in fin ity , remains a mystery. What is most important is th at
no orthodox theologian has maintained that God creates because He must,
or because He is in some way required by His nature.
As I have discussed. Temple's notion of transcendence is very
closely related to personality. However, within the traditional
Christian context, transcendence is taken to mean "to ta lly other" or
a t le a s t apart from the material world as we know i t . This is neces
sita ted by God's in fin ity . In terms of A ristotelian-Scholasticism ,
there is no potency in God: He is Pure Act. Thus God cannot be in
any way characterized by matter, for matter always involves poten
t i a l i t y . God, as in f in ite , is completely su ffic ie n t unto Himself,
needing nothing, desiring nothing. This doctrine is in sharp contrast
with Temple's position.
He is creator and therefore transcendent. Because He i s , and
creativ e. He must create; therefore the universe is necessary
to Him in the sense that He can only be Himself by creating
i t . 5
For Temple, God needs the world—in e ffe c t, there is potency to be
found in Him, and thus, the traditional Christian notion of the tran
scendence and in fin ity of God is put aside. Yet he continues to speak
of God as transcendent. What is the meaning of his use of the term
in th is context?
^Ibid. , pp. 269-270.
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I t appears th a t Temple is applying to God the same notion of
transcendence that he described when speaking of human beings.
g
Transcendence , i t will be recalled, means the a b ility to choose among
various p o s sib ilitie s and is d irectly contradictory to (material)
determinism. Ultimately, i t means freedom of the w ill. I t seems then
th at when Temple a ttrib u tes transcendence to God he means th a t God is
free. But is this consistent with what he says about God's creation
of the process? I think i t is clear, in lig h t of the la s t few passages
quoted from Nature, Man and God, that Temple does not conceive God as
being free: with regard to the process, God does not have any choice.
Temple says th at God must create: " . . . the universe is necessary
to Him in the sense that He can only be Himself by creating i t . " God
cannot choose not to create the process.
I t might be the case, given this need of God to create, that
there are a number of p o s s ib ilitie s , i . e . , d ifferen t kinds of worlds
from which God might choose. But any selection th a t God might make
in th is regard must be perceived by Him as being good: i f one world
were b e tte r in some way than the r e s t, God would have to create that
one. In e ffe ct we would have a determinism: God does not have any
real freedom.^ If this is the case, He cannot be transcendent (in
I t i s , of course, true that this determinism would amount to
a s p iritu a l determinism, which is what Temple appeals to when he des
cribes the nature of man's freedom. Also, some philosophers will argue
th a t determination by the Good cannot validly be called determinism at
a l l . I am not convinced by these arguments: they do, to say the
le a s t, leave many questions unanswered. But, putting aside the ques
tion of the v alid ity of such an argument, I would like to suggest i t
is possible to take the position th a t sp iritu a l determinism is as much
a determinism with regard to God, who is completely sp iritu al (Temple
a t no points denies t h i s ) , as mechanical or material determinism is
with regard to man.
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Temple's sense), and fin a lly , i f God is not transcendent. He cannot
be personal. If this line of attack is valid, then Temple's entire
second dialectical tran sitio n f a lls apart: God is not proven to be
transcendent, and we are l e f t simply with the conclusion of the f i r s t
tra n sitio n , v iz ., immanent theism.
As I have pointed out, essential to God's in fin ity and there
fore His transcendence, is His unchanging nature. In contrast to this
traditional view of God, Temple makes the following statement:
The naive religious view is that God made the world and imposed
laws upon i t , which i t invariable observes unless He intervenes
to modify the operation of His own laws. From th is naive view
springs the suggestion th a t i t would b etter comport with the
in fin ite Majestry of God th at He should from the outset impose
such laws as would never stand in need of modification. But
i f , as we have seen ground fo r holding, the World-Process is
i t s e l f the medium of God's personal action, the whole situation
is altered. There is nothing majestic about invariable con
stancy of personal action, which remains unaltered whether the
circumstances are the same or not; rather should i t be called
mulish. Constancy of purpose is a noble c h arac te ristic , but
i t shows i t s e l f , not in unalterable uniformity of conduct, but
in perpetual self-adaptation, with an in fin ite delicacy of
graduation, to d ifferen t circumstances, so th a t, however these
may vary, the one unchanging purpose is always served.?
Temple thus brings into question not only God's transcendence,
but His unchanging nature as well. I t is naive to believe th a t God
is unchanging according to Temple: God is characterized by constant
self-adaptation. If God were tru ly in fin ite , however, there could be
no question of self-adaptation since there could be no change in God:
^Nature, Man and God, p. 267.
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127
Q
for Him everything would nothing would be Becoming. Temple
appears to make some attempt a t rescuing his thought from total unor
thodoxy when he explains that God's unchanging nature is to be found
in His unchanging purpose but this is insufficient.
Temple's notion of transcendence and personality, as i t exists
in God, is derived from his view of man. I t would seem, therefore, a t
le ast from the point of view of internal consistency, th a t his descrip
tion of God's nature should conform throughout to th is in terp retatio n .
W e find, however, th at when he arrives at the question of God's
changing nature, he departs from the original model. Temple, in
e ffe c t, attrib u te s to God two very different aspects: on the one hand,
God changes, for He is in a constant state of self-adaptation; on the
other hand, God has, in spite of His constant change, an aspect of
eternal s e lf -id e n tity and single purpose. But on what basis does
Temple maintain th at there is an unchanging aspect in God? There
does not seem to be any evidence of this in man.
The only exemplar th at we have to appeal to is human per
sonality. Does such a continued se lf-id e n tity and single purpose
e x ist in man? From a s t r i c t l y psychological viewpoint, i t is impos
sib le to a ttrib u te to an individual any particular c h ara c te ristic th at
would be a ttrib u ta b le to him throughout his l i f e . Change is as basic
a c h arac te ristic of man's mind and body, as i t is of the world.
^T raditionally, theologians have attempted to overcome the
dichotomy between our constantly changing world and the unchanging
world of God by maintaining th at God sees the en tire world, a t every
point of its temporal existence, as a single perception. The entire
world, despite i t s change, is for God an "eternal now."
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1 28
Constancy of purpose is foreign to the human personality, and
change from one objective in l i f e to another is considered normal. I t
would be ridiculous to expect a man of twenty to have the same goals
as a man of sixty. Much of the change brought about in man's thinking
is due in great measure to changes in the physical and environmental
conditions of the individual. But i t must be kept in mind th a t mental
changes occurring under these circumstances are directed towards s e l f
adaptation, entailing change in both the body and the mind. To a t t r i
bute change to only the non-mental aspects of man is a fa ls ific a tio n
of the human personality. Thus, when Temple a ttrib u tes the character
i s tic s of s e lf-id e n tity and purpose to Personality^, he is not using
Personality^ as a basis, but rather his own theological preconceptions,
which he u n c ritic a lly interpolates into his thought.
I t appears to me that there is l i t t l e difference between
Temple's view of the nature of God, and the view of the panentheist:
although God is in essence unchanging. He completes Himself through
advancing experience. Charles Harthshorne, one of the best known
panentheists of the twentieth century, maintained th a t a s t a t i c God
is not essential to C hristianity, rather, i t is an tith etical to i t .
John Macquarrie describes Harthshorne's reasoning in the following
manner:
I f we take the teaching that God is love seriously, then we must
believe that he is really involved with his creatures, acting
upon them and being himself acted upon in turn. Divinity is
not the privilege of standing beyond all suffering, but rather
of sharina in i t . 9
9
John Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought (New
York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 274.
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129
I t may be noted th a t by the time Temple wrote Nature, Man and God, the
panentheistic position was f a ir ly well known in in tellectu al circles
and while Temple was s t i l l alive i t was sometimes attrib u ted to him.
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CHAPTER XVII
VALUE
The second argument of the second dialectical tran sitio n is
based on man's experience of value. Temple is no longer concerned
with establishing the argument that the presence of value in the pro
cess can be the re s u lt only of some mind. He is concerned now with
demonstrating th at the nature of our experience of value, sp ecifically
the tria d of goodness, tru th , and beauty, renders indubitable evidence
th at Mind“ not only e x ists, but is personal and worthy of reverence.
In this chapter I shall attempt to prove th at Temple again puts aside
his dialectical method: he adopts a point of view concerning our
experience of value th a t is consistent with his theological supposi
tio n s, and sets i t forth as the only reasonable analysis.
Truth is the f i r s t of the tria d of values th a t Temple takes
up. Of truth he says:
. . . the mind recognises in Truth, or in the Mind expressed
in Truth, a proper object of reverence quite other than is
appropriate as part of mind's apprehension of bare f a c t . Whi1e
a fa c t is apprehended as an almost bare p a rticu lar occurrence,
which is what i t is but might as well have been something e lse ,
i t evokes no reverence. . . . But when i t is apprehended as a
constituent element in the system of Truth, i t begins to acquire
the qualities which compel reverence.1
^Nature, Man and God, pp. 249-250.
130
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’ 31
There is found in man an insatiable desire fo r tru th . Man
continually seeks truth because, for him, truth is "august and com
pelling." No doubt in specific instances and from time to time a man
will try to avoid the tru th , or perhaps say something that he know is
not true. This, however, does not effect the reverence th a t truth
evokes since man's overall desire for truth remains constant.
Temple then goes on to argue that man's reverence for truth
would certainly be unreasonable i f the world were nothing more than
"brute fa c t." I t can, therefore, be ju s tifie d only " . . . i f the
2
order of re a lity is the expression of a personal mind, . . . "
Temple's use of the term reverence, with regard to man's
experience of tru th , is clearly an attempt to weight the argument
towards the conclusion that he wishes to draw. Reverence does not
necessarily entail any theological meaning: i t could mean nothing
more than awe or respect. Temple's in itia l use seems rather innocent
for i t is not clear th at for him reverence necessarily implies God.
Certainly I can have reverence for a person without implying in any
way that I see God in him. I can reverence nature, but th is need not
mean anything more than that I am awed by nature in some way. But
Temple's in terp retatio n is clearly, and exclusively, th e is tic . I t
seems, therefore, th at Temple is again equivocating in his use of a
word. However, in this case, a s h ift from one metaphysical system to
another is not involved. Temple is introducing a word th a t does not
necessarily have any metaphysical connotations, and then, without
^Ibid. , p. 250.
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132
su ffic ie n t reason, he is claiming that to admit we have reverence is
to admit that God exists since such reverence, i f i t is tru ly demanded,
cannot be directed towards mere "brute fact."
Temple realizes the weakness of his position for he says:
I must confess that I know no way of arguing this la s t point,
to which, none the le ss, I attach great importance. I t is an
intuitional judgement. 3
Thus, Temple's argument th at man's reverence for truth can be accounted
fo r only i f there is a personal mind, is not the re su lt of the phi
losophical method th at he has purported to be applying so fa r. In
sp ite of the fact that th is argument from truth constitutes part of
his reasoning in support of the second tra n sitio n , he does not seem
to be disturbed th at the manner in which he comes to this conclusion
is wholly unphilosophical. He seems to be placing the conclusions he
derives from in tu itio n on the same level as the conclusions he derives
from his philosophical arguments. I t would seem, then, th at for
Temple, one is as good as the other.
Temple does not consider other p o ssib ilitie s to explain man's
quest for tru th . For example, i t might be an inherent t r a i t in man's
psyche that has no reference a t all to anything outside the process,
or outside man himself. I t might be the resu lt of some cultural t r a i t
that has developed over the decades. I t might be nothing more than
a psychological accident. Considering none of these p o s s ib ilitie s , he
says simply th at we must e ith e r accept his conclusions, or consider our
4
perception of this phenomenon as a mistake and discard i t .
^ Ib id ., Ita lic s mine. ^ Ib id ., p. 251.
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When Temple goes on to speak of the next value, beauty, we
find the same appeal to intuitional judgement, rather than philosophi
cal argument, as well as the equivocation of reverence. Temple s ta te s ,
"the intimation i t s e l f ," (that which the in tu itio n apprehends) with
regard to beauty, "is far clearer and more decisive."^ He goes on to
say:
I t is not only that the reverence which men feel in the pre
sence of great Beauty, as before the claim of Truth, is such
as to be reasonable only i f in the appreciation of Beauty we
are in communion with a master-mind, but because the appre
hension of Beauty is in its own essence such communion.&
Man's experience of beauty is not simply the r e s u lt of some psychic
agitation th at happens to follow certain physical stim uli. Rather,
beauty is ".. . . a revelation from s p i r i t to s p i r i t , . . ."^ Temple
assumes th a t aesthetic experience becomes u n in te llig ib le unless i t
is understood in these terms.
Now, such a theory does indeed have some v a lid ity . To in te r
pret a r t as a revelation from s p i r i t to s p i r i t is certainly valid i f
we in te rp re t s p i r i t in terms of human mind. But Temple extends the
statement far beyond these lim its, drawing a philosophically unfounded
conclusion. He says, "There is more in Beauty than Beauty alone.
8
There is communication from, and communication w ith, personal S p i r i t ."
Although in Temple's usage personal s p i r i t can refer to eith er man or
God (or both), there is l i t t l e doubt he means personal S pirit^. He
offers no furth er analysis of man's experience of beauty, but pro
ceeds to take up the la s t of the tr ia d , goodness.
^ Ib id ., p. 252. ^Ibid. ^ I b i d ., p. 253.
^Ibid.
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134
Temple attrib u tes to moral goodness two d is tin c t aspects:
f i r s t , . . the essence of morality is personal fellowship, or
respect for persons as persons, . . second, the performance of
9
duty. Moral obligation is determined by personal fellowship. In a
sense, therefore, duty is the a c tiv ity that manifests "respect for
persons as persons." "To fa il in duty is f e l t . . . not only as an
injury to a neighbour, not only as a degradation of s e lf , not only as
a breach of . . . Moral Law. . . , but as the flouting of what ju s tly
claims our reverence.
Again, Temple appeals to the term reverence in order to bring
su rrep titio u sly into the argument his preconceived theological con
clusion. In terestingly, he notes th at the experience of moral good
ness th a t he describes is not confined to those who are th e is tic a lly
orientated, but can be found to e x ist apart from any th e is tic b e lie f.
Nonetheless, according to Temple, such an experience " . . . manifestly
points to Theism as i t s only ju s tific a tio n ." He then says:
For no Law, apart from a Lawgiver, is a proper object of
reverence. I t is a mere brute fa c t; and every living thing,
s t i l l more every person exercising in te llig e n t choice, is
i t s superior. The reverence of persons can be appropriately
given only to th at which i t s e l f is at le a st personal. 11
The equivocation on the terms, personal and reverence, is apparent.
I t appears, therefore, th at Temple's argument from value, in
support of the second tra n s itio n , is not valid. I t could be valid only
^ Ibid. , p. 254. T°Ib id .
T^Ibid. A close reading of the passage w ill, I believe e sta
blish th a t there are d efin ite elements of the moral argument for the
existence of God contained in Temple's thought.
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135
i f the conclusion of the second tran sitio n were already established:
we must f i r s t find th at Mind°\ the source of value in the process, is
personal and deserving of reverence; and then speak of the tria d of
value as commanding reverence (in Temple's sense). W e have here, in
e ffe c t, a form of the Cartesian Circle: he seeks to use our experience
of value to show th a t Mind^ is personal. But before we can argue in
this way, we must already know that Mind“ is personal and creates
value in the process. Temple, of course, does not argue in th is man
ner. But, i t seems to me th at his appeal to intuition in preference
to his own d ialectical philosophy clearly indicates he is arguing in
a c irc le.
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CHAPTER XVIII
TEM PLE A N D W HITEHEAD
Temple's r e a l i s t metaphysics was greatly influenced by Alfred
North Whitehead, who gave his Gifford Lectures, Process and R eality,
in 1927 and 1928. The th e is tic views th at Temple propounds in the
f i r s t d ialectical tran sitio n are basically the same views found in
Whitehead's philosophical theology: there is contained within the
process some mental principle responsible for the order and direction
of the process. However, the manner in which Temple argues for his
conclusion is considerably different from the way that Whitehead
arrives a t his. Temple fe e ls , p a rtia lly as a re s u lt of the difference
in argument, p a rtia lly due to a different interpretation of the nature
of the mind that both view as the source of the process, th a t he can
freely go on to establish the transcendent character of this mental
element. Whitehead, on the other hand, maintains:
Any proof which commences with the consideration of the
character of the actual world cannot ris e above the actu ality
of this world. I t can only discover all the factors d is
closed in the world as experienced. In other words, i t may ■ ,
discover an immanent God, but not a God wholly transcendent.
Thus, when Whitehead speaks of God, we find a view considerably d if
ferent from th at of Temple's transcendent Mind“ .
^Religion in the Making (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1926), p. 71.
136
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137
In this chapter I shall give a b rie f sketch of the key concepts
found in Whitehead's philosophy th a t are relevant to his conception of
God, and then go on to contrast Whitehead's views with Temple's.
The general view of the temporal world shows the presence of
a t le a s t three universal factors: actual e n titie s , c re ativ ity , and
eternal objects. In Process and Reality Whitehead uses the term,
actual, to signify existence. " I t means 'existence' in the f u lle s t
2
sense of that term, beyond which there is no other." Thus, by actual
e n tity Whitehead means a fully existent e n tity . He uses the term to
distinguish i t from the notion of an e n tity in a more general context:
actual e n tity is independent, and is opposed to a dependent entity
3
such as an idea, thought, or quality.
"Creativity," according to one of the foremost commentators on
Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism, "is the notion of pure activ ity
underlying the nature of things. . . . Creativity i t s e l f is simply
pure, formless a ctiv ity ; and i t is uncharacterized, tellin g of i t s e l f
no ta le of the creatures which may characterize i t ." ^ Thus, c reativ ity
is not i t s e l f an entity but is found only in the actual beings of the
process through which i t is manifested.
Since the c reativ ity in the universe is not i t s e l f the product
of some rational a ctiv ity (at le a s t none th a t we can know), i t would
o
Alfred North Whitehead, Process and R eality, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1929), p. 103.
An excellent and somewhat detailed exposition of Whitehead's
notion of an actual e n tity is to be found in Ivor LeClerc, Whitehead's
Metaphysics (London: George Allen and Unwin L td., 1958), pp. 20-28.
^Dorothy Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1966), second edition, jjp. 72-73.
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138
appear that the order in the progression of the world needs some
further explanation. The fact that we speak of the process as pro
gressing indicates that we experience a universe th a t is not chaotic,
but seems ordered in some way. Here, the Platonic influence on
Whitehead becomes evident. He maintains that the direction of the
progress of the universe is accounted for in terms of "eternal
5
objects." Eternal objects are p o te n tia litie s within the universe and
therefore have no actu ality or causal efficacy in th e ir own rig h t. I t
is God that joins cre ativ ity with these eternal objects. James Collins
writes :
In order to make the entire realm of p o te n tia litie s or eternal
objects relevant to every p articu lar temporal occasion, the
actual ground of eternal objects must i t s e l f be intemporal.
God is this nontemporal, actual e n tity which "prehends," or
actively relates i t s e l f to, the eternal objects in such
fashion th at i t grounds them in a c tu a lity , renders them
available to the creative advance of all temporal e n titie s , g
and achieves th e ir actual ingression into the order of nature.
Whitehead believes all re a lity is characterized by two aspects,
the mental pole and the physical pole. This same division is found
in God: a primordial nature or conceptual nature, and a concrete
nature or a physical nature. God's primordial nature is :
. . . a unity of pure conceptual feelin g s, which have the
eternal objects as th e ir data. I t organizes, graduates, and
adjusts the eternal objects, both to atta in the fu ll esthetic
s atisfactio n of God's own subjective aim and to render them
accessible to temporal e n t i t i e s . 7
5
A fine study of the nature of eternal objects is found in
Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism, Chapter V, "Are Eternal
Objects Platonic Ideas?"
fi
James C ollins, God in Modern Philosophy (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1959), p. 318.
^ Ib id ., p. 320.
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139
In his primordial nature He is complete and in f in ite . However, in
term's of God's consequent nature. He is f in i te and in process.
"Through His physical prehensions, God is continually receiving new
objective data from the temporal a c tu a litie s , which now react upon
Him."8
This is , of course, an extremely b rie f sketch of Whitehead's
view of God, but hopefully i t is su ffic ie n t for an adequate under
standing of Temple's criticism of Whitehead's position.
The question confronting both Temple and Whitehead is how may
the ordered progression of the universe be explained. Temple main
tains th at Whitehead's primordial nature of God is not an answer a t
a ll.
I t is a mere name for a desideratum. For this "primordial
nature of God" is nothing at all except the occasion for the
in itia tio n of the flux with which we are fam iliar. . . . 'Apart
from God, there could be no relevant novelty.' But this s t i l l
does not te ll us how, with God there can be relevant novelty.
Truly there i ^ relevant novelty. To say th at God is the ground
of the p o ssib ility of this is to say nothing unless God is
something other than such ground of p o ssib ility . To say God,
or to say X, or to say abracadabra, is all one, i f a t the end
we have only declared th at the ground of p o ssib ility is the
ground of po ssib ility .^
But God's primordial nature is far more than what Temple indicates
here. God's primordial nature does not merely in itia te the flu x . He
orders i t according to the eternal objects th at He possesses in His
conceptual nature. The eternal objects are inseparable from God's
primordial nature and they form the basis fo r the "relevant novelty"
in the universe. Temple's conclusion, "To say that God is the ground
^Ibid. ^Nature, Man and God, p. 258.
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of p o ssib ility of th is is to say nothing unless God is something other
than such a ground of p o ssib ility ," is unwarranted. Whitehead is aware
th a t to introduce the notion of some e n tity outside of the process
would be destructive of his entire cosmological system. Such a notion
is not as essential as Temple believes. I t is not clear th at we must
postulate something beyond Whitehead's notions of God and the eternal
objects. Although he doesnot maintain th a t God has made the universe
ex n ih ilo , nor that He is in any sense outside the process, Whitehead
does maintain th at God is unique in the process. Unlike everything
else in the process there is one aspect of God th a t is fully completed,
and, as such, all other e n titie s are influenced by i t , v iz ., God's p ri
mordial nature. I t is in terms of this nature th a t God seeks to direct
the process in accordance with His complete knowledge of the eternal
objects.
According to Whitehead, “The perfection of God's subjective
aim, derived from the completeness of his primordial nature, issues
into the character of his consequent n a t u r e . B u t Temple sees no
grounds for such a confidence in the perfection of God's aim. He
accuses Whitehead of attempting to "round off the philosophy of
organism." He goes on to say:
But i t is rash to affirm propositions on the ground th a t, i f
true, they would, in combination with those already affirmed,
achieve th a t union, especially i f the data of ordinary experience
are h o stile . Professor Whitehead's optim istic conclusion is
not a necessary, or in the judgement of many people even a ,,
probable, inference from the facts of ordinary experience.
^^Prdcess and R eality, p. 489.
^^Nature, Man and God, pp. 259-260.
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141
Temple maintains that our experience of the world would tend to deny
the perfection of God's aim; although he does not offer any c rite r ia
by which we might evaluate this perfection. More impotantly Temple,
i t seems, does not give full recognition to the dual aspects th at
Whitehead a ttrib u te s to God. I t is true that in His primordial nature,
in His knowledge of the eternal objects, God is complete: He is in
this sense perfect. But in His consequent or physical nature, God is
not complete. Thus God, in terms of His consequent nature. His acting
on the process, is Becoming. Therefore, we cannot expect perfection
in every aspect of the process. The process is incomplete and, in this
sense, imperfect. The determination of the perfection of God's aim,
as fa r as we are able to judge i t , must be derived from our under
standing of the process as a whole. Temple, as well as Whitehead,
would maintain th at there is a very evident progression in the pro
cess, and th at i t is the re s u lt of a rational and good e n tity .
One of the principal differences between Temple's conception
of God and that of Whitehead's is derived from th e ir d ifferen t views
of personality in God. For Temple, immanent mind implies transcendent
mind, and, as a re su lt of his rather unique interpretation of the term,
"transcendent," transcendent mind necessarily implies personal mind.
For Whitehead, however, God remains impersonal, to some extent uncon
scious, and within the process. To place personality in God would be
to a ttrib u te to a conscious e n tity both c reativ ity and eternal objects,
and such a conclusion f a lls beyond the philosophy of organism. Yet
despite %his position, there are certain places in Whitehead's writings
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142
strongly indicating th at God is in some sense personal: he uses
terminology and images belonging to the category of personality. For
example, towards the end of Process and R eality, Whitehead w rites,
"God is the poet of the world, with tender patience leading i t by his
12
vision of tru th , beauty and goodness." Temple asks, "And how many
13
questions are begged by the use of the word 'patience'?" He is con
vinced th at Whitehead's God is personal.
The confusion in this matter is confirmed by the differing
opinions found among Whitehead's commentators. Charles Harthshorne,
for example, has no hesitation in saying that Whitehead attributes
personality to God.^^ Dorothy Emmet, on the other hand, maintains
that he does not, although she does admit that he uses quasi-personal
language: "Whitehead leads us fin ally to the conception of a logical-
aesthetic order, and Temple is , I think, ju s tifie d in his criticism
th at much of the quasi-personalist language th at Whitehead uses a t the
end of his Process and Reality goes beyond what is warranted by his
1 c
own theory." .. -
Temple feels th a t Whitehead does use personalistic terminology,
and th at this tends to indicate he has stopped too soon: he must go
^^Process and R eality, p. 490.
^^Nature, Man and God, p. 260.
^^Charles Hartshorne, "Whitehead's Idea of God," in The
Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, ed. by Paul Arthur Schlipp
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1941), pp. 528-529.
^^Dorothy Emmet, "The Philosopher," F. A. Iremonger, William
Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury, p. 128.
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143
beyond the philosophy of organism in order for i t to be complete.
Temple maintains th at because Whitehead does not go fu rth er, ". . . h e
has to present God and the world as completely correlated to each
other. But because they are thus correlated and each is explained by
the other, the complex to ta lity of God + World is not explained a t
all."^ ^ Thus, according to Temple, Whitehead's explanation of the
relationship between God and the world is in su fficien t. He goes on to
sta te reasons fo r his b e lie f th at a personal God is superior to
Whitehead's :
(1) I t employs for the explanation of all things the "highest"
category in our experience, whereas Professor Whitehead employs
one less than the highest whereby to account for the highest
with the re s t. (2) I t offers a real explanation alike of i t s e l f
and of the World, whereas Professor Whitehead leaves us with
a t o t a lity of God + World, wherein each explains the other but
the t o t a lity i t s e l f is unexplained.T?
With regard to the f i r s t point. Temple, of course, takes the
highest category to be personality, s p i r i t , or Mind“ . Whitehead, on
the other hand, remains completely within the process, appealing to
an e n tity that is wholly the re su lt of the process to explain i t s
novelty and progression. I t is perhaps true that Temple's metaphysical
system, given i t s highest category (and of course assuming it s
v a lid ity ), is superior, but i t is not d if f ic u lt to see why Whitehead
is not able to accept the consequences of incorporating Temple's
highest category into his own system.
Temple believes that he has achieved assurance of the existence
of Mind‘ d by means of his dialectical philosophy. But fo r Whitehead
T^Nature, Man and God, p. 260. '^ Ibid. , p. 263.
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144
metaphysics must be the re s u lt of purely speculative reason. He is
highly d istru stfu l of any method of metaphysical analysis, including
any form of d ia le ctic a l method. According to Whitehead, speculative
18
reason must be "in i t s essence untrammelled by method."
But the question of methodology aside, Whitehead is very much
aware of the implications of Temple's highest category. He seeks to
avoid including in his system any concept th at would imply a form of
a deiis ex machina fo r this would be contradictory to a consistent pro
cess metaphysics. According to Temple's view Mind^ must, a t some
point, stands outside the process, and Whitehead can find no philo
sophical grounds to support such an assumption.
The second point Temple.makes is that his system "offers a
real explanation" of the relationship between God and the world,
whereas Whitehead's system f a ils to do th is . But th is too is ques
tionable. Primarily, i t seems Temple has again failed to grasp the
full meaning of the dual nature of Whitehead's God. God's primordial
nature is inextricably joined to His consequent nature. His knowledge
of the eternal objects is united to His action in the world. Thus,
God and the world are not simply juxtaposed, they are unified in such
a way th at although d is tin c t, they cannot e x ist (and remain what they
are) without each other. "God's conceptual nature is unchanged, by
reason of i t s fin al completeness. But his derivative nature is
19
consequent upon the creative advance of the world."
1R
The Function of Reason (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1929), p. 52. Cited in LeClerc, Whitehead's Metaphysics, p. 42.
^^Process and Reality, p. 488.
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145
I do not believe th a t Temple is accurate when he designates
Whitehead's view as "God + World," and since he does not render a
clear exposition of Whitehead's notion of the dual nature of God, I
feel that his criticism s of Whitehead's philosophy are not rooted in
a su ffic ie n t knowledge of Whiteheadian metaphysics. In fa c t, from
a logical standpoint, i t seems to me that Whitehead's view is philo
sophically more feasible than Temple's view. In terms of Whitehead's
system, the question as to why God brings about the process does not
arise. Temple's view of Mind , however, does suggest this question.
The process is not logically necessary to God's nature in Temple's
system, and therefore an explanation of why the process exists is
required, but not given.
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PART IV . CONCLUSION
1 4 6
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CHAPTER XIX
CONCLUSION
William Temple was confident th a t, by means of the f i r s t two
dialectical tran sitio n s of Nature, Man and God, he had established
that God as tra d itio n a lly conceived, i . e . , an in fin ite God, does exist.
Such a God is unlimited in all respects, possessing such attrib u tes as
omniscience, omnipotence, and immutability. Working within the con
text of his process metaphysics and his view of dialectical philoso
phy, Temple was certain that he had provided s u ffic ie n t rational
grounds for b e lie f in the ontological re a lity of God. The purpose of
this study has been to show that he was not successful, in terms of
his own methodology, either in establishing the existence of such a
God, or in synthesizing his basic id e a lis t assumptions with the cen
tral features of twentieth century process philosophy.
The primary criterio n used to judge Temple's effo rt as unsuc
cessful has been the question whether he consistently adhered to the
d ialectical method th at he took to be the means of achieving valid
philosophical conclusions. If we take the “c ritic a l" aspect of
Temple's dialectical philosophy to be primary, i t is evident th a t a t
several points in the development of Temple's d ialectical progression
he neither su ffic ie n tly questioned his basic assumptions nor seriously
took into account the weight of alternative solutions to the central
147
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148
problems arising in the course of his argument. Temple was too ready
to use the other aspect of his method, v iz ., synthesis. For example,
he sought to conjoin the assumption that the universe is rational (an
id e a l is t presupposition) with his process view of the universe. With
out seriously considering the alte rn ativ e. Temple in sisted th a t the
universe cannot be the product eith er of chance or of what he called
"brute fa c t." Further, as we have seen, there is considerable con
fusion in his writings with regard to the concepts he took to be cen
tral to the analysis of the universe, v iz ., "Matter, L ife, Mind, and
S p ir it." This is especially true of mind.
The notion of mind is essential to the development of Temple's
g
d ialectical progression from matter to s p i r i t . I t is because Mind
does arise in the process th at there must be some mental principle
th at directs i t . This principle i s , sp ec ific a lly , Mind^. Thus, i f
Temple is to be clear at any point in his argument, he must be so with
regard to the nature of the stage of the process th a t he calls "mind."
However, i t has been shown that he equivocated in his use of the term,
predicating of i t at le a st two mutually exclusive meanings. He indis
criminately used the term "mind" to signify the Being who is respon
sib le for the process and who is ontologically independent of i t , as
well as that rational e n tity , as found in man, th at arises in the
course of the process. That is why, in this study, I have devised
used the d istin ctio n : Mind“ - Mind^. Similar d iff ic u ltie s have been
pointed out with regard to the other central notions in Temple's pro
cess metaphysics, d iff ic u ltie s th a t are primarily the re s u lt of his
fa ilu re to approach these ideas in a su fficien tly c r itic a l manner.
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149
Then was what Temple did in Nature, Man and God worthwhile?
In terms of his position in the development of metaphysics in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, what he did can be shown to
be of importance. Temple was a "transitional" figure. His early con
ta c t with idealism influenced his la te r thought in sp ite of his very
d e fin ite s h if t to the r e a l i s t view of process metaphysics. To this
extent Temple was a "mixed" philosopher. His great desire was to join
his basic id e a lis t assumptions with the more empirical aspects of
twentieth century realism. Temple was attempting an ingenious synthe
sis of the central elements of idealism, naturalism, thomism, and
even materialism, while avoidig th e ir deficiencies—a synthesis th at
might well be impossible. I t is sig n ifican t that such an attempt was
accepted by many thinkers of the nineteen t h i r t i e s .
I f Temple had been successful, he undoubtedly would have been
among the greatest thinkers in the history of western philosophy. The
fa c t th a t he was not successful should not undermine the significance
of his achievement. His conclusions fa il only in terms of his methodo
logy. Thus his attempted synthesis is not v itia te d on any a priori
grounds. His aim is not in trin s ic a lly impossible.
At the present time, attempts a t metaphysical system-making
are unfashionable. Philosophers seem to be increasingly convinced
th at the world is irratio n al and th a t, therefore, any attempt a t con
structing a coherent explanation of the universe i s , fo r the most part,
impossible. The kind of synthesis Temple sought is considered even
more outrageous. Philosophical fashions change, however, and i f
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150
Temple's aim became again a generally accepted one, his h isto rical
importance could be very great indeed.
In any synthesis of Being and Becoming, a substantial modifica
tion in the traditional understanding of one or both of these basis
notions is required. Temple perceived that some compromise is neces
sary, but he was not willing to go fa r enough in examining his basic
suppositions. He maintained throughout his w ritings, not only in
Nature, Man and God, but his other philosophical works as well, th at
there is to be found in the universe a single immutable Being respon
sible for all change and progress in i t . He finds th is Being in terms
of the Augustinian view of God. Temple, however, was neither a
thoroughgoing id e a lis t nor a thoroughgoing Augustinian since i t is
clear he was willing to make concessions in favor of his r e a lis t posi
tion, as may be seen in his treatment of the relationship between God
and the process.
According to the s t r i c t Augustinian view, God is Being and
therefore unchanging, having no desires or needs. Thus, He has no
need to create. He is to ta lly s e lf-s u ffic ie n t. For the Augustinian,
this is a necessary concomitant to God's nature. In contradistinction
to this position. Temple e x p lic itly states th a t God must create the
process.
Temple subscribed to the Augustinian position insofar as he
viewed God, Mind^, as Being: the immutable absolute that provides the
process with a rational principle. However, his view of God was not
to ta lly free of the notion of Becoming, although he seemed reluctant
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151
to accept th is , or it s metaphysical consequences. He rejected
Whitehead's position th at God is to ta lly within the process for he
f e l t this would eliminate the p o ssib ility of God's being personal or
transcendent. Whitehead's view was the only alternative taken
seriously. Temple f e l t th at the only other conceivable p o ssib ility
was his own, v i z ., God is Being, in fin ’ _ in all respects, responsible
for the process while not a part of i t .
Are these the only p o ssib ilitie s? For example, might we view
God as being the rational principle of the process, but a t the same
time the product of some other process th a t is not knowable to us?
Might we conceive of God as having the same relationship to this
other process th a t Mind^ has to the known process? If God were the
product of another process, then, to be consistent with Temple's
presupposition th a t the process requires a rational principle, we
would have to maintain th at the process from which God has arisen has
i ts own rational principle. But where does this rational principle
come from? I t must be the product of s t i l l another process, and we
would find ourselves postulating an in fin ite series of processes.
Because i t entails an in f in ite regress. Temple would maintain this
view to be irra tio n a l.
Not all possible theories have been exhausted, however. Per
haps i t is feasible to modify some of Temple's basic concepts to
bring about a view th a t would not be contradictory to his basic pre
mises, and therefore acceptable to him.
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152
Consistent with the Augustinian view. Temple maintained that
God is s p ir itu a l: God does not have a material aspect such as is
found in the process. I t is primarily because of this th at Temple's
philosophy runs into i t s greatest d iff ic u ltie s . But process philo
sophers such as Henri Bergson find no need to give mind that Platonic
superiority and independence th at is clearly part of Temple's meta
physics. For Bergson, the universe is both mind and matter: these
two elements can never be meaningfully separated. Whitehead also
adopts th is type of approach in his "bi-polar" metaphysics. Clearly,
such a view sim plifies some of the philosophical d iff ic u ltie s th at
a rise when mind and matter are viewed to be substantially d is tin c t
and independent. I t is interesting that in spite of Temple's rejec
tion of Cartesianism a t the outset of Nature, Man and God, he was
unwittingly influenced by Descartes, as had been the early British
em piricists.
As we have seen, there are serious problems th a t arise in
Temple's treatment of the mind-body problem. He did not maintain a
consistent position as to the precise nature of the relatio n sh ip , and
a t le a s t part of this d iffic u lty is a ttrib u ta b le to his im plicit
acceptance of Descartes' bifurcation. I f he had been able to overcome
this dichotomy and maintain a position compatible with the view that
mind and matter are mutually dependent throughout the universe, he
might have avoided some major d iff ic u ltie s .
I f mind and matter are taken to be mutually dependent, i t is
not d i f f i c u l t to suggest a direction in which Temple's philosophy
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153
might have been developed. I t seems at le a s t plausible to postulate
a God who, re la tiv e to the process, is " in fin ite ," but who is f in i te
in His own essence. In this context, the notion of in fin ity is not
taken in its trad itio n al sense. I t can be taken to mean simply that
God would be unlimited with regard to the ends th a t He might want to
bring about in the process. But God would not be pure s p i r i t : He
would have a material aspect; He would be limited in power and in the
knowledge of His own Being, and He would have, so to speak, desires
and needs.
I f Temple had so reinterpreted the contrasted notions of
Being and Becoming, of in fin ity and fin itu d e, many of the d iff ic u ltie s
that we have found in his philosophy could have been overcome. I t
should be noted th a t the view I have suggested is but one of perhaps
many directions in which Temple's basic philosophical orientation
might have been developed. Clearly, there are other approaches not
essen tially a n tith etical to Temple's basic assumptions. In this
study I have attempted to show only th at the p articu lar approach th at
Temple adopted was in su ffic ie n t, however noble and in te lle ctu ally
plausible his objective.
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SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
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SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books by William Temple
The Centrality of C hrist. New York: Morehouse Printing Company,
1936.
Christus V eritas. London: Macmillan and Company, L td ., 1924.
C hristianity in Thought and P ractice. New York: Morehouse Publishing
Company, 1936.
Mens C reatrix. London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1917.
Nature, Man and God. London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1934.
The Nature of Personality. London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1911.
Plato and C h ris tia n ity . London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1916.
Religious Experience and Other Essays and Addresses by William Temple.
Edited by A. E. Baker. London: James Clarke and Company, Ltd.,
1958.
Studies in the S p ir it and Truth of C h ristian ity . London: Macmillan
and Company, Ltd., 1914.
Books about William Temple
*F1etcher, Joseph. William Temple, Twentieth Century C hristian.
New York: Seabury Press, 1963.
Geoghegan, William D. Platonism in Recent Religious Thought.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1958.
Iremonger, F. A. William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury: His Life
and L e tte rs . London: Oxford University Press, 1948.
*Thomas, Owen C. William Temple's Philosophy of Religion. New York:
Seabury Press, 1961.
155
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156
A rticle about William Temple
Gessel, John M . "Beyond 'Nature, Man and God,"' The Anglican
Theological Review, XLII (July, 1960), 234-246.
Reviews of Nature, Man and God
Stedman, Ralph E. The Hibbert Journal, XXXIII (January, 1935),
301-305.
Tennant, F. R. The Journal of Theological Studies, XXXVI (July.
1935), 3T3=3T5:------------------------------------- '
Unpublished Work about William Temple
*Hoffman, J. 0. "A William Temple Word-Book." Unpublished Ph.D. d is
s e rta tio n , Graduate School of Religion, University of Southern
California, 1964.
Other Sources
Collins, James, God in Modern Philosophy. London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1959.
Copleston, Frederick. A History of Philosophy. Vol. 4: Modern
Philosophy: Descartes to Leibniz. New York: Image Books.
1963.
. A History of Philosophy. Vol. 7:_ Modern Philosophy.
Part T1 Fichte to Hegel. New York: Image Books, 1965.
Emmet, Dorothy. Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism. 2nd edition.
London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1966.
Findlay, J. N. Hegel: A Re-Examination. London: George Allen and
Unwin, L td., 1958.
LeClerc, Ivor. Whitehead's Metaphysics: An Introductory Exposition.
London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1958.
Macquarrie, John. Twentieth Century Religious Thought. New York:
Harper & Row, 1963.
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157
Schlipp, Paul Arthur, ed. The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead.
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1941.
Whitehead, A. N. Process and R eality. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1929.
Religion in the Making. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1926.
*Indicates books containing extensive bibliographies dealing with
William Temple.
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A critical analysis of the dialectical philosophy of William Temple
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