University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Kant'S Doctrine Of Existence As A Predicate

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Kant'S Doctrine Of Existence As A Predicate

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Content This dissertation has been
microfilmed exactly as received 69-5 0 7 4
VICK, George Robert, 1930- —
KANT’S DOCTRINE OF EXISTENCE AS A PREDICATE,
U niversity of Southern California, Ph.D., 1968
Philosophy
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan
C o p y r ig h t (c) b y
G E O R G E R O B E R T V IC K
1969
KANT’S DOCTRINE OF EXISTENCE
AS A PREDICATE
by
G eorge R obert Vick
A D i s s e r t a t i o n P r e s e n t e d to th e
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In P a r t i a l F u l f i l l r a e n t o f t h e
R e q u ire m e n ts f o r th e Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
( P h ilo s o p h y )
A u g u s t 1 9 6 8
UNIVERSITY O F SO U TH ERN CALIFORNIA
TH E GRADUATE SCH O O L
U N IV ER SITY PARK
LO S A N G ELES, CA LIFO R N IA 9 0 0 0 7
This dissertation, written by
...........................Q®orjfe__Rp_ber_t_.Y_ick_...........................
under the direction, of /zi.a Dissertation Com
mittee, and approved by all its members, has
been presented to and accepted by the Graduate
School, in partial fulfillment of requirements
for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Date A u g u s tJ..1.9.68.
DISSERTATION COM M ITTEE
..(2
Chairman
PREFACE
The q u e s t i o n w h e th e r e x i s t e n c e i s a p r e d i c a t e has
f a s c i n a t e d c o n te m p o ra ry p h i l o s o p h e r s . I t i s a q u e s t i o n i n
term s o f which m ajor p o s i t i o n s have b e e n s e t f o r t h . One
need o n ly t h i n k of R u s s e l l ' s t h e o r y o f d e s c r i p t i o n s , or o f
1
S t r a w s o n ’s t h e o r y of r e f e r r i n g . But i t i s a l s o a q u e s t i o n
t h a t i s r e c o g n i z e d as h a v in g r o o t s i n th e p a s t , e s p e c i a l l y
2
i n th e work o f Immanuel K ant. As one r e c e n t a u t h o r has
s a i d :
I t was m a in ly K a n t ’ s e x t e n s i v e c r i t i c i s m o f
t h e o n t o l o g i c a l argum ent t h a t gave c u r r e n c y
t o th e d ic tu m t h a t " e x i s t e n c e i s n o t a p r e d i
c a t e . . . ." 3
A n o th er has w r i t t e n :
K ant. . . .g a v e th e d o c t r i n e " ' E x i s t s i s n o t
^See B e r t r a n d R u s s e l l , "The P h i l o s o p h y o f L o g i c a l
Atomism," The M o n is t, XXVIII ( O c to b e r , 1 9 1 8 ), 495-527; XXIX
( J a n u a r y , T 9 1 9 ) , 32-6 3 ; XXIX ( A p r i l , 1 9 1 9 ), 190-222; XXIX
( J u l y , 1 9 1 9 ), 345-380. See P. F. S tra w so n , I n t r o d u c t i o n to
L o g i c a l Theory (New York: Jo h n W iley and Sons, I n c . , 1952) ,
e s p . pp. 176, 190-1; I n d i v i d u a l s (London: Methuen and C o . ,
L t d . , 1 9 5 7 ), pp. 2 2 7 -8 , 239-40.
2cf. Immanuel K ant, C r i t i q u e o f Pure R e a s o n , t r a n s .
Norman Kemp Sm ith (New York: St". M a r t i n ’s P r e s s , 1965),
e s p . B220-2, B265-73, B620-9.
3
A lv in P l a n t i n g a ( e d . ) , The O n t o l o g i c a l Argument
(G arden C i t y , New York: Doubledlay & C o ., 1 9 6 5 ), pi 57.
a p r e d i c a t e " th e prom inence i t has s in c e r e
t a i n e d i n p h i l o s o p h y . 4
I t w i l l be my c o n t e n t i o n t h a t Kant has been m isu n
d e r s t o o d , and t h a t i n th e d e b a te over w hether e x i s t e n c e i s
a p r e d i c a t e , he has u s u a l l y been p la c e d on th e wrong s i d e .
T h a t i s , he has been m is p la c e d by b e in g a s s o c i a t e d w ith
th o s e who have g iv e n to t h i s q u e s t i o n an answer t h a t i s , in
f a c t , q u i t e opposed to h i s . By r e - e x a m in in g h i s p o s i t i o n
and r e - e v a l u a t i n g i t , i n th e l i g h t of r e c e n t c o n t r o v e r s y , I
i n t e n d to show t h a t Kant a c t u a l l y d id r e c o g n i z e e x i s t e n c e
as a p r e d i c a t e , and as more th a n a g ra m m a tic a l o r "m ere ly
l o g i c a l " p r e d i c a t e - - a l t h o u g h he d id n o t r e g a r d i t as what
he c a l l e d a " r e a l " p r e d i c a t e , which i s t o say, one t h a t
c o u ld e n t e r i n t o th e c o n c e p t of an o b j e c t . (Hence, he was
opposed to th e o n t o l o g i c a l argum ent, inasmuch as th e l a t t e r
would i n c l u d e 'e x is t e n c e in th e c o n c e p t o f God.)
But I w i l l show t h a t th e r e a s o n why Kant m a in ta in e d
t h a t e x i s t e n c e co u ld n o t e n t e r i n t o the c o n c e p t o f an ob
j e c t , and why, th e n , he opposed th e o n t o l o g i c a l argum ent,
was n o t , as some t h i n k , b e c a u s e of any b e l i e f t h a t i f we
succeed i n t h i n k i n g or r e f e r r i n g t o an o b j e c t a t a l l , we
must p re su p p o s e the o b j e c t ’ s e x i s t e n c e . T h is l a s t i s th e
p o s i t i o n o f Hume, R u s s e l l , and th o s e a u th o r s who have used
^ M ilto n M unitz, The M ystery of E x i s t e n c e (New York:
A p p l e t o n - C e n t u r y - C r a f t s , 1965), p^ 74.
i t i n what has been c a l l e d th e " s t a n d a r d ” argument a g a i n s t
e x i s t e n c e as a p r e d i c a t e , e . g . , J . Wisdom, Broad, Ayer,
5
S traw so n , A ls to n e t a l . But, a c t u a l l y , K a n t Ts p o s i t i o n was
q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . I t was, t h a t no c o n c e p t of an o b j e c t could
p o s s i b l y i n c l u d e c o n s c io u s n e s s of the o b j e c t ’ s e x i s t e n c e ,
which i s to say ( f o r i t would come t o th e same i n K a n t ’s
s y s te m ), t h a t no mere r e f e r e n c e to an o b j e c t could p o s s i b l y
i n c l u d e r e f e r e n c e to th e o b j e c t ' s e x i s t e n c e .
We s h a l l d i s c o v e r t h a t , i n K a n t ’s d o c t r i n e , our
c o n s c io u s n e s s o f an o b j e c t ' s a c t u a l e x i s t i n g co u ld not be
had i n a c o n c e p t, e i t h e r in t h a t of th e o b j e c t or in th e so -
c a l l e d c o n c e p t of e x i s t e n c e . For in a c o n c e p t a lo n e , he
h e ld t h a t we c o u ld n e i t h e r know t h a t an o b j e c t e x i s t s , nor
even t h i n k an o b j e c t as more th a n m erely p o s s i b l e . T h a t i s
to say , in the c o n c e p t alone we c o u ld n o t even t h i n k or i n
ten d an o b j e c t as e x i s t i n g , in th e s e n s e t h a t t h i n k i n g or
i n t e n d i n g i t as e x i s t i n g would i n v o l v e s p e c i f y i n g some n o te
5 c f. David Hume, A T r e a t i s e of Human N atu re (O xford:
C laren d o n P r e s s , 1949), Book I , P a r t I I , S e c t i o n VI;
R u s s e l l , op. c i t . , e s p . L e c tu re V; John Wisdom, I n t e r p r e t a
t i o n and A n a ly s is (London: Kegan P au l and Co., 1931),
60 f f , , e s p . 62-69; C h a r l i e Dunbar Broad, R e l i g i o n ,
P h ilo s o p h y and P s y c h i c a l R e s e a rc h (New York: H a r c o u r t ,
B r a c e , 1953), pp. 182-3; A l f r e d J u l e s Ayer, Language, T r u th
and Logic (New York: Dover, 1948), pp. 42-3"; S traw so n ,
op. c i t . ; W illiam P. A ls to n , "The O n t o l o g i c a l Argument
R e v i s i t e d , " The P h i l o s o p h i c a l Review, LXIX (1 9 6 0 ), as
p r i n t e d in A lv in P l a n t i n g a ( e d . ) , op. c i t . , pp. 86-110.
w h erein th e o b j e c t ’s e x i s t e n c e would be th o u g h t as more th a n
i t s mere p o s s i b i l i t y .
At th e same tim e , th e c o n c e p t was f o r Kant b o th a
n e c e s s a r y and ( i f th e c o n c e p t was e m p i r i c a l ) a s u f f i c i e n t
means of our b e in g c o n s c io u s of an o b j e c t as such, t h a t i s
o f an o b j e c t as t h i s or t h a t p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t . To be s u r e ,
th e d a ta f o r t h i n k i n g an o b j e c t had to be g iv e n i n sen se
i n t u i t i o n , b u t i t had a l s o t o be i n t e g r a t e d i n a c o n c e p t
b e f o r e we co u ld be c o n s c io u s of th e o b j e c t as a p a r t i c u l a r
i d e n t i t y . Only in such a c o n c e p t co u ld we a c t u a l l y t h i n k
th e o b j e c t . But i n i t s c o n c e p t, we c o u ld , in p r i n c i p l e ,
t h i n k a p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t in e v e ry c h a r a c t e r i s t i c c o n s t i -
t u i t i v e of i t s i d e n t i t y .
Thus, we s h a l l d i s c o v e r t h a t i n K a n t ’ s view, our
r e f e r e n c e to an o b j e c t n o t o n ly c o u ld , b u t had, to ta k e
p la c e th ro u g h a medium in which we could n o t know, or i n
te n d , th e o b j e c t as a c t u a l l y e x i s t e n t .
Hence, we s h a l l c o n clu d e t h a t Kant i s b a d ly m isun
d e r s t o o d when he i s i n t e r p r e t e d as b e in g among th o s e who
b ase t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n t o e x i s t e n c e as a p r e d i c a t e , on th e
b e l i e f t h a t we can i n t e n d an o b j e c t only as e x i s t e n t .
I n s t e a d , Kant i s t o be p la c e d i n the company of th e p h i l o s
opher who was th e fo re m o s t o pponent of t h i s view, t h a t i s ,
A le x is von Meinong, who h e ld t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s e x t r i n s i c t o
o b j e c t s , o r, i n M einong's words, t h a t o b j e c t s a r e , as such,
a u s s e r s e i e n d ( " i n d i f f e r e n t t o b e i n g " ) . ^ With Meinong, Kant
must be r e c o g n iz e d as h a v in g h e ld t h a t i f we i n t e n d , sim p ly ,
an o b j e c t , th e n what we i n t e n d does n o t i n c l u d e e x i s t e n c e .
For a c c o r d in g t o b o th of t h e s e p h i l o s o p h e r s , e x i s t e n c e i s
n o t a f a c t o r t h a t can e n t e r i n t o th e i d e n t i t y or e s se n c e o f
of any o b j e c t .
Y et, we s h a l l d i s c o v e r t h a t , f o r K ant, e x i s t e n c e was
d e f i n i t e l y so m eth in g o f which we could be c o n s c i o u s . He
c e r t a i n l y d id not f a i l to r e c o g n i z e t h a t we are aware o f an
o b j e c t ' s e x i s t e n c e as so m eth in g more th a n i t s mere p o s s i
b i l i t y . He sim p ly i n s i s t e d t h a t an o b j e c t ’ s e x i s t e n c e i s
som ething o f which we can be c o n s c io u s o n ly i n t u i t i v e l y , i n
and th ro u g h a c t u a l p e r c e p t i o n . For a l th o u g h , in h i s view,
e x i s t e n c e c o u ld n o t e n t e r i n t o th e c o n c e p ts o f o b j e c t s , i t
^Cf. A le x is von Meinong, "The Theory of O b j e c t s , "
in R o d e ric k M. Chisholm ( e d . ) , R ea lism and the Background
of Phenomenology (G len co e, 111."! The P ree P r e s s , I 9 6 0 ),
e s p . pp- ! 76-86; c f . R u d o lf Carnap, "The E l i m i n a t i o n of
Metaphys-ics Through L o g ic a l A n a ly s is of L a n g u ag e," t r a n s .
A rth u r Pap, i n D a n ie l J . B r o n s t e i n , Y e rv a n t H. K r i k o r i a n ,
and P h i l i p P. W einer, B a s ic Problem s o f P h ilo s o p h y
(Englewood C l i f f s , New J e r s e y : P r e n t i c e - H a 11, I n c . , 1964,
p. 344; A l f r e d J u l e s Ayer, Language, T r u t h and Logic (New
York: Dover, 1948), pp. 42 -3 ; c f . P l a n t i n g a , op. c T t . ;
M unitz, op. c i t . ; Murray K i t e l y , " I s E x i s t e n c e a P r e d i c a t e ? "
M ind, LXXIII (1964), 364; W illia m Baumer, " O n t o l o g i c a l
Arguments S t i l l F a i l , " M o n is t , L (1 9 6 6 ), 130 f f . ; c f. an
a u t h o r i t y on Kant, such as Norman Kemp Sm ith, A Commentary
on K a n t 's C r i t i q u e of Pure Reason (London: M acm illan,
1 923), p~ 530"; c f ” a l s o a h i s t o r i a n such as C o p le s to n , A
H i s t o r y o f P h i l o s o p h y , VI (W e stm in ste r, M d.: The Newman
P r e s s , 1960), 297.
vi
co u ld and d id e n t e r i n t o judgm ents a s s e r t i n g the exis-tence
o f o b j e c t s . And we s h a l l see t h a t i n th e s e ju d g m en ts, Kant .
u n d o u b te d ly a s s ig n e d t o e x i s t e n c e , t h e - r o l e of th e p r e d i
c a t e .
For we s h a l l d i s c o v e r Kant to have h e ld t h a t in
knowing an o b j e c t to e x i s t , what happens i s t h a t we c o n n e c t
th e c o n t e n t of a s u b j e c t c o n c e p t (which i s t o say, th e ob
ject.) w ith an e x t r a - c o n c e p t u a l c o n s c io u s n e s s o f e x i s t e n c e .
(We s h a l l see t h a t he d id n o t, as a t l e a s t one a u th o r b e
l i e v e s , m a i n t a i n t h a t we m erely c o n n e c t th e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t
w ith i t s o b j e c t , f o r i n th e c o n c e p t i t s e l t , Kant h e ld t h a t
th e o b j e c t i s a l r e a d y s u f f i c i e n t l y th o u g h t qua o b j e c t . )
S in ce t h e r e was a c o n n e c t i o n made in th o u g h t, the a c t of
knowing a t h i n g as e x i s t e n t was, f o r Kant, a judgm ent. And.
s in c e t h e r e was som ething w ith which th e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t was
c o n n e c te d , th e judgment d id have a p r e d i c a t e . And s in c e
t h i s " so m e th in g " or p r e d i c a t e was th e e x i s t e n c e of which we
co u ld be c o n s c io u s i n p e r c e p t i o n , we s h a l l c o n clu d e t h a t ,
f o r K ant, th e p r e d i c a t e of an e x i s t e n t i a l judgment was e x
i s t e n c e .
F u rth e rm o re , we s h a l l see t h a t d e s p i t e a c e r t a i n
l a c k of c l a r i t y i n K a n t ’s p r e s e n t a t i o n of h i s view, he could
n o t, f i n a l l y , have c a l l e d e x i s t e n c e a m erely g ra m m a tic a l or
l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e . For he would have u n d e r s to o d t h e s e l a s t
as e x p r e s s i n g n o t h in g i n a d d i t i o n to t h e i r s u b j e c t s ,
w h ereas, as we have seen , e x i s t e n c e was, f o r him, b o th some
t h i n g t h a t i s n o t i d e n t i c a l w ith any o b j e c t , and so m eth in g
o f which c o n s c io u s n e s s i s g iv e n i n t u i t i v e l y i n p e r c e p t i o n .
We s h a l l m a i n t a i n , th e n , t h a t in K a n t ’s view, e x i s t e n c e was
what we s h a l l c a l l an r' a d d i t i v e ” p r e d i c a t e , which i s to say
som ething t h a t i s always o t h e r th a n , or i n a d d i t i o n to , any
o b j e c t of which i t m ight be a f f i r m e d .
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I s h o u ld l i k e to m e n tio n my v e r y g r e a t d e b t t o
P r o f e s s o r W illia m H. W e r k m e is te r , f o r s h a r i n g h i s know ledge
of t h e f i e l d i n w hich t h i s e s s a y i s w r i t t e n , f o r h i s w is e
and p e n e t r a t i n g c r i t i c i s m and, a t t h e same tim e , f o r h i s
c o n t i n u a l e n c o u ra g e m e n t.
I sh o u ld a l s o l i k e to th a n k my d e a r w i f e , f o r h er
p a t i e n t and v a l i a n t t r a n s l a t i o n of my a lm o s t i l l e g i b l e
h a n d w r itin g i n t o t y p e w r i t t e n form .
I sh o u ld a l s o l i k e t o th a n k P r o f e s s o r s Geddes
MacGregor, J . O. Wisdom, M o rr is E n g e l, and D a l l a s W i l l a r d
f o r t h e i r h e l p f u l s u g g e s t i o n s and c r i t i c i s m s .
ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE................................................................................................................. i i
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................ ix
C h ap ter
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 1
SECTION ONE
I I . PRELIMINARY ARGUMENTS ........................................................ 16
I I I . ALTERNATIVE THEORIES AND THEIR
REFU TA TIO N................................................................ 30
IV. A PROOF OF THESIS K 1 ............................................ 65
V. REINFORCEMENT OF OUR ARGUMENT FOR K1 . . . 86
VI. ANOTHER DERIVATION OF OUR THESIS K1 . . . . 116
V II. A PROOF OF THESIS K 2 ............................................. 124
SECTION TWO
V III. HOW KANT COULD HAVE COME TO THEOREM Q . . . 141
IX. AN ARGUMENT FOR THEOREM T | .................................. 150
X. KANTIAN REASONS FOR THEOREM y ' .................. 178
x
Page
SUMMARY...................................................................................................................... 194
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................... 201
xi
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
I t has o f t e n been s a id t h a t Kant d e n ie d t h a t e x i s t -
1
ence i s a p r e d i c a t e . I t has sometim es been s a id t h a t he
r e g a r d e d e x i s t e n c e as b e in g m e re ly a l o g i c a l , or gram m ati-
2
c a l , p r e d i c a t e . In the pages t h a t f o ll o w , I s h a l l a tte m p t
t o p ro v e b o t h t h a t he r e g a rd e d e x i s t e n c e as some kind of
p r e d i c a t e , and t h a t he r e g a rd e d i t as more th a n a m erely
l o g i c a l , or g r a m m a tic a l, p r e d i c a t e . On th e o th e r hand, I
s h a l l r e c o g n i z e t h a t he d id n o t r e g a r d e x i s t e n c e as what he
Cf. R u d o lf C arnap, "The E l i m i n a t i o n o f M e ta p h y sic s
Through L o g i c a l A n a l y s i s of L a n g u a g e ," t r a n s . A r th u r P ap , in
D a n ie l J . B r o n s t e i n , Y erv an t H. K r i k o r i a n , and P h i l i p P .
W einer, B a sic P ro b lem s of P h i l o s o p h y (Englewood C l i f f s , New
J e r s e y : P r e n t i c e - H a l l , I n c ., 1 9 6 4 ), p . 344. C f. a l s o
A l f r e d J u l e s A yer, Language, T r u t h and L ogic (New York:
Dover, 1948), p. 43; F r e d e r i c k C o p le s to n , A H i s t o r y of
P h i l o s o p h y , VI ( W e s tm in s te r , Md. : The Newman P r e s s , 1960),
297; Murray K i t e l y , " I s E x i s t e n c e a P r e d i c a t e ? " M ind, LXXIII
(1 9 6 4 ), 364; A lv in P l a n t i n g a ( e d . ) , The O n t o l o g i c a l Argument
(G arden C i t y , New York: Doubleday & C o . , 1965) , p^ 51; a n d ,
W illia m Baumer, " O n t o l o g i c a l Arguments S t i l l F a i l , " M o n is t,
L (1 9 6 6 ), 130 f f .
2
M ilto n M unitz, The M y stery of E x i s t e n c e (New York:
A p p l e t o n - C e n t u r y - C r a f t s , 1965;; c f . a l s o Jerome S h a f f e r ,
" E x i s t e n c e , P r e d i c a t i o n and th e O n t o l o g i c a l A rg u m en t," Mind,
LXXI ( 1 9 6 2 ), 309.
1
c a l l e d a " r e a l " p r e d i c a t e , t h a t i s t o sa y , one c a p a b le of
e n t e r i n g i n t o t h e e s s e n c e or c o n c e p t of an o b j e c t . A cco rd
i n g l y , I s h a l l c la im t h a t he r e g a rd e d e x i s t e n c e as what we
m ig h t c a l l an " a d d i t i v e " p r e d i c a t e , which i s to sa y , a p r e d
i c a t e t h a t i s g iv e n in i n t u i t i o n , b u t t h a t i s not c a p a b le of
e n t e r i n g i n t o an o b j e c t ’s c o n c e p t or e s s e n c e .
M istak en I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s
The b e l i e f i s w id e s p re a d t h a t Kant sim p ly den ied
t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s a p r e d i c a t e . In t h e e a r l y 1 9 3 0 Ts Rudolf
Carnap w r o te :
The v e r b a l form [o f e x i s t e n t i a l s t a t e m e n t s ] f e i g n s a
p r e d i c a t e where t h e r e i s none. To be s u r e , i t has
been known fo r a long tim e t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s n o t a
p r o p e r t y . ^
And to s u b s t a n t i a t e h i s p o i n t , he f e l t t h a t he needed only
to add:
( c f . K a n t ’ s r e f u t a t i o n o f th e o n t o l o g i c a l p r o o f of
th e e x i s t e n c e of G od.)4
Nor i s t h i s b e l i e f t h a t Kant showed t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s not a
p r o p e r t y or p r e d i c a t e (Carnap u s e s th e te rm s i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y
i n t h i s c o n t e x t ) a mere r e l i c o f p o s i t i v i s t d a y s , and l i k e
c e r t a i n o t h e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n s th e n p o p u l a r , no l o n g e r h e l d .
For in 1960, th e em inent c r i t i c of p o s i t i v i s m , F a th e r
F r e d e r i c k C o p le to n , w ro te i n th e s i x t h volume of h i s H i s t o r y
of P h i l o s o p h y :
3
Carnap, op. cit. 4Ibid.
3
For K a n t, how ever, e x i s t e n c e i s n o t r e a l l y a
p r e d i c a t e a t a l l .
In 1964 in an a r t i c l e i n Mind e n t i t l e d " I s E x i s t e n c e a
P r e d i c a t e ? " an a u th o r began by s a y i n g :
K a n t 's l a c o n i c o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s n o t
a p r e d i c a t e has enjoyed an a lm o st s p o t l e s s r e p u t a
t i o n .
The a u th o r went on to a r g u e , i n e f f e c t , t h a t the r e p u t a t i o n
of t h e l a c o n i c o b s e r v a t i o n i s u n d e s e rv e d , b u t he d id not
c o r r e c t th e b e l i e f t h a t Kant had made the o b s e r v a t i o n . Nor
was th e s ta t e m e n t i n Mind u n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of th o s e to be
found i n o th e r j o u r n a l s . As l a t e as 1966, one could read in
The M o n i s t :
One of t h e most famous c r i t i c i s m s of th e o n t o l o g i c a l
argum ent i s t h a t p ro v id e d by K ant in h i s C r i t i q u e o f
P u re R e a so n , and two of th e most f r e q u e n t comments
on i t a r e e s s e n t i a l l y t h e s e : Kant p o i n t s out t h a t
e x i s t e n c e i s no p r e d i c a t e ; h is c r i t i c i s m c o n t a i n s
s e v e r a l p u z z l i n g e le m e n ts which can j u s t as w e l l be
n e g l e c t e d , s in c e th e f i r s t p o i n t i s enough.
The a u th o r of t h e s e l i n e s went on t o d i s a g r e e w ith th e s e c
ond o f th e comments, b u t he did n o t q u e s t i o n th e b e l i e f t h a t
K ant h e ld th e p o s i t i o n t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s no p r e d i c a t e . I n
d eed , th e p u rp o se of th e e s s a y was t o show t h a t Kant was
r i g h t i n h o ld in g t h i s p o s i t i o n .
e r r o r t o i n t e r p r e t Kant as d en y in g t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s a
On th e c o n t r a r y , I should l i k e to show t h a t i t i s an
c ;
C o p le s to n , op. c i t .
7
Baumer, op. cit.
6.
K i t e l y , op. c i t .
p r e d i c a t e . I s h a l l a tte m p t t o p ro v e t h a t i n h i s s e n s e of
t h e word " p r e d i c a t e , ” Kant most c e r t a i n l y h e ld t h a t e x i s t
ence i s a p r e d i c a t e .
Of c o u r s e , t h e r e a r e some who m a i n t a i n t h a t w h ile
Kant a c c e p te d e x i s t e n c e as some s o r t of p r e d i c a t e , he did
n o t a c c e p t i t as b e in g more th a n what he c a l l e d a ’' l o g i c a l 1'
p r e d i c a t e . For exam ple, M il t o n M unitz w r i t e s :
K ant, of c o u r s e , a llo w s t h a t " e x i s t s " i s a gram
m a t i c a l o r - - a s he c a l l s i t - - a " l o g i c a l ” p r e d i c a t e .
What he i s c h a l l e n g i n g i s th e view t h a t " e x i s t s " i s
( i n h i s te r m i n o l o g y ) a " r e a l " or " d e t e r m i n i n g " p r e d
i c a t e . °
9
Now, w h ile M u n itz, and o t h e r s who speak i n a s i m i l a r v e i n ,
do n o t a c t u a l l y say t h a t Kant r e g a rd e d e x i s t e n c e as m erely a
l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e , t h e i r dichotom y would s u g g e s t t h a t such
i s t h e i r view of h i s p o s i t i o n . For having s t a t e d t h e i r
p o i n t in term s o f th e dichotom y b etw een " r e a l " and " l o g i c a l "
p r e d i c a t e s , th e y th e n i g n o r e th e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t , w h i l e r e
g a rd in g e x i s t e n c e , a lo n g w i t h e v e ry o t h e r p r e d i c a t e , as a
l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e , Kant may have r e g a rd e d i t as som ething
more th a n a m erely l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e , w i t h o u t , of c o u r s e ,
hav in g r e g a rd e d i t as " r e a l . " For them, i t would ap p ear
t h a t th e o n ly a l t e r n a t i v e t o h i s having r e g a r d e d i t as
" r e a l , " was h i s hav in g ta k e n i t m e re ly as l o g i c a l .
As I s h a l l e x p l a i n l a t e r , i t i s d i f f i c u l t to know
p r e c i s e l y what Kant had i n mind when he i n t r o d u c e d th e term
Munitz, op. cit. Cf. Shaffer, op. cit.
5
" l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e ” i n t o h i s d i s c u s s i o n of e x i s t e n c e ; ^ i t
i s , a c c o r d i n g l y , d i f f i c u l t t o a s c e r t a i n what he would have
meant had he h e ld t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s m e re ly a l o g i c a l p r e d i
c a t e . (He d id n o t , o f c o u r s e , h o ld t h i s position.)'*''*' But
th o s e who t a k e him to have h e ld t h i s p o s i t i o n would appear
to b e l i e v e t h a t he m eant, t h e r e b y , to m a in ta in a t l e a s t two
p o i n t s : f i r s t , t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s n o t what he c a l l e d a
" r e a l " p r e d i c a t e ( i . e . , a d e t e r m i n a t i o n or c o n t e n t c a p a b le
of e n t e r i n g i n t o th e e s s e n c e or c o n cep t o f an o b j e c t - - c f .
our d i s c u s s i o n o f t h i s term in C h a p te r I I ) ; and s e c o n d ly ,
t h a t b e c a u s e e x i s t e n c e i s n o t c a p a b le o f e n t e r i n g i n t o th e
e s s e n c e or c o n c e p t o f an o b j e c t , t h e r e i s n o th in g o f which
we a r e aware i n i n t u i t i o n , t h a t Kant would have c a l l e d
" e x i s t e n c e ."
T h is l a s t p o i n t , some a u t h o r s seem to b e l i e v e , can
be d e r i v e d from th e xvell-known p a s s a g e in t h e f i r s t
C r i t i q u e (B 626b-7a) i n which Kant sp eak s o f th e word " i s " as
m e re ly p o s i t i n g th e o b j e c t ( i n t h i s c a s e , God) r a t h e r th a n
12
adding to i t s c o n c e p t. A lso , t h e same p o i n t m ight p o s s i
b l y appear t o be d e r i v e d as f o l l o w s : b e c a u s e Kant to o k f o r
h i s example o f a m erely l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e , an a n a l y t i c a l
10C f . C h ap ter I I I , p. 32; a l s o C h a p te r V II.
n C f. C h a p te r IV.
12C f. S. M o rris E n g e l, " K a n t ’ s ’R e f u t a t i o n ’ of th e
O n t o l o g i c a l A rgum ent," P h i l o s o p h y and P h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l Re
s e a r c h , XXIV (1 9 6 3 ), 2 5 -9 ; c f . a l s o Baumer, op. c i t .
13
p r e d i c a t e Cor a t h i n g p r e d i c a t e d o f i t s e l f , he must have
r e g a r d e d a m e re ly l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e as one which would b u t
r e - e x p r e s s t h e s u b j e c t w i t h o u t adding a n y th in g to i t ; and
b e c a u s e he h e ld t h a t as " u n r e a l , " e x i s t e n c e i s n o t c a p a b le
14
of b e in g p a r t of t h e e s s e n c e of a s u b j e c t , he must have
th o u g h t t h a t t h e p r e d i c a t e " e x i s t s ” ca n n o t s i g n i f y any con
t e n t a t a l l ; f o r as m e re ly l o g i c a l , i t would s i g n i f y n o th in g
o u t s i d e th e s u b j e c t , and as " u n r e a l , ” i t would s i g n i f y n o t h
ing w i t h i n t h e s u b je c t* In any e v e n t, in t h i s view t h e r e
would s u p p o s e d ly be n o t h i n g , f o r K a n t, t h a t one co u ld be
aware o f , e i t h e r in or o u t s i d e t h e o b j e c t , which could be
15
c a l l e d ’' e x i s t e n c e . ” Hence, f o r him, an e x i s t e n t i a l j u d g
ment w o u ld - - s u p p o s e d ly ~ - h a v e e x p r e s s e d n o t h i n g more th a n th e
o b j e c t i t s e l f . * ^ E s s e n t i a l l y th e same view can be e x p r e s s e d
somewhat more l i n g u i s t i c a l l y by s a y in g t h a t , f o r K ant, th e
word " e x i s t s ” was m erely a " g r a m m a t i c a l ” p r e d i c a t e . Thus,
Jerom e S h a f f e r w r i t e s :
Kant argued t h a t . . . " e x i s t s ” i s n o t , as he p u t i t
(p . 504) a " r e a l ” or " d e t e r m i n i n g ” p r e d i c a t e , (he
a d m itte d t h a t , g r a m m a ti c a ll y , " e x i s t s " i s a p r e d i
c a t e ) .
13
Immanuel K ant, C r i t i q u e of P u r e R e a s o n , t r a n s .
Norman Kemp Smith (New York: S t. M a r t i n ' s P r e s s , 1965),
B626b.
14
I b i d . , B626c-7a.
15
Cf. Baumer, o p . c i t . ; E n g e l, o p . c i t . ; a l s o ,
C o p i e s t o n , op. c i t .
I b i d . " ^ S h a f f e r , op. c i t .
S ince S h a f f e r a p p e a r s to mean t h a t , f o r K an t, " e x i s t s ” would
be no more than a g ra m m a tic a l p r e d i c a t e , he i s , in e f f e c t ,
h o ld in g t h a t f o r Kant th e word " e x i s t s " and i t s synonyms
would have e x p r e s s e d n o t h i n g above and beyond th e o b j e c t
t h a t i s s a i d t o e x i s t . The p h r a s e s , " t h e o b j e c t " and " th e
o b j e c t e x i s t s " would s u p p o s e d ly have e x p r e s s e d an i d e n t i c a l
c o n t e n t , i n th e s e n s e t h a t th ro u g h t h e l a t t e r we sh o u ld i n
te n d n o t h i n g more th a n th r o u g h th e f o rm e r . ( I n e f f e c t ,
th e n , Kant would be i n t e r p r e t e d as h av in g ag reed w ith Hume,
who did h o ld t h a t what we mean by " e x i s t e n c e " i s n o t h i n g
18
more th a n th e o b j e c t t h a t we c o n c e iv e to be e x i s t e n t . )
On th e c o n t r a r y , I s h a l l a rg u e t h a t w h ile Kant d e
n ie d t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s a " r e a l ” p r e d i c a t e , he d id r e g a r d i t
19
as som ething of which c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s g iv e n i n i n t u i t i o n ,
and t h u s , in t h i s s e n s e , as a " c o n t e n t " (th o u g h n o t , of
c o u r s e , a " c o n t e n t " in e x a c t l y th e same s e n se as t h e o b j e c t
20
t h a t i s g iv e n as e x i s t e n t ) . Hence, he r e g a r d e d e x i s t e n c e
as a s p e c i a l kind of p r e d i c a t e t h a t i s n e i t h e r " r e a l " nor
m erely l o g i c a l . Because i t was g iv e n i n i n t u i t i o n , i t was
n o t r e g a rd e d by him as m e re ly l o g i c a l ; and b e c a u s e , though
xs
Cf. D. Hume, A T r e a t i s e o f Human N atu re (O x fo rd :
C la re n d o n P r e s s , 1949), Book I , P a r t I I , S e c t i o n VI.
19
K an t, o p . c i t . , B629c.
20
For K an t, c o n t e n t i s t h a t of w hich we a r e aware in
s e n s e - - i n t u i t i o n . C f. i b i d . ; B60-1; a l s o B74-5.
g iv e n i n i n t u i t i o n , i t was n o t c a p a b le of e n t e r i n g i n t o the
e s s e n c e or c o n c e p t o f th e o b j e c t , i t was not r e g a rd e d as
" r e a l . ” B ecause, t h e n , i t was r e g a r d e d by him as something
o t h e r t h a n , of i n a d d i t i o n t o , any o b j e c t t h a t might be s a id
to e x i s t , we s h a l l say t h a t he r e g a r d e d i t as an " a d d i t i v e "
p r e d i c a t e ( a l th o u g h he d id n o t use t h i s t e r m ) . In any ju d g
ment of w hich i t i s th e p r e d i c a t e , " e x i s t s " would always ex
p r e s s so m eth in g more than m e re ly th e s u b j e c t . T hus, I s h a l l
m a i n t a i n , i n e f f e c t , t h a t Kant was q u i t e opposed to Hume,
and to t h o s e who a r g u e in a Humean way a g a i n s t th e p r e d i c a t e
21
o f e x i s t e n c e .
The P l a n of My Argument
T here a r e as many p o s s i b l e ways of d e m o n s tr a tin g my
t h e s i s as t h e r e a r e s t a r t i n g p o i n t s , and in t h e f i r s t
C r i t i q u e t h e r e a r e many p o s s i b l e s t a r t i n g p o i n t s from which
B e rtra n d R u s s e l l , "On D e n o t i n g ," M in d , XIV (O cto
b e r , 1 9 0 5 ), 478-93; "The P h i l o s o p h y o f L o g i c a l Atomism," The
M o n is t, XXVIII ( O c to b e r, 1 9 1 8 ), 4 9 5 -5 2 7 ; XXIX ( J a n u a r y ,
191977 32-63; XXIX ( A p r i l , 1919), 190-222; XXIX ( J u l y ,
1919), 345-380; I n t r o d u c t i on to M a th e m a tic a l P h ilo s o p h y
(London: G. A l l e n and Unwin, L t d . , 1919), C h a p te r 16; John
Wisdom, I n t e r p r e t a t i o n and A n a l y s is (London: Kegan P aul and
C o ., 1931) , p p . f f . ; Ayer , o p . c i t . ; P. F. Straw son,
I n t r o d u c t i o n to L o g ic a l T heory (New York: Jo h n Wiley and
S o n s , I n c . , 1952), p p . 174 -9 2 ; I n d i v i d u a l s (London: Methuen
and C o ., L t d . , 1 9 5 7 ), pp. 226-42; C h a r l i e Dunbar Broad,
R e l i g i o n , P h i l o s o p h y , and P s y c h i c a l R e se a rc h (New York:
H a r e o u r t , B r a c e , 1 9 5 3 ), p p . 182-3; W illia m P . A l s t o n , "The
O n t o l o g i c a l Argument R e v i s i t e d , " The P h i l o s o p h i c a l Review,
LXIX ( 1 9 6 0 ), as p r i n t e d i n A l v i n P l a n t i n g a ( e d . ) , o p . ci t . ,
89-90, 106-9; R ic h a rd G a le , " E x i s t e n c e , Tense and P r e o p p o s i
t i o n , " The M o n i s t , L ( J a n u a r y , 1966), 98 f f .
one could r e a s o n t o my c o n c l u s i o n . Each way would be com
p l e x . S in c e the p a r t i c u l a r way t h a t I have chosen i s no
e x c e p t i o n t o t h i s r u l e , th e r e a d e r may be h e lp e d by th e f o l
lowing o u t l i n e of t h e o rd er i n which we s h a l l p ro c e e d .
A g a i n s t th e b e l i e f t h a t Kant d id not r e g a r d e x i s t
ence as a p r e d i c a t e , I s h a l l argue t h a t :
1. Nowhere d id Kant say t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s n o t a
p r e d i c a t e . The c l o s e s t he came was i n s a y in g t h a t i t i s n o t
a T ,r e a l ,r p r e d i c a t e , b u t th e t e c h n i c a l meaning he gave to
t h i s p h r a s e does n o t imply t h a t he r e g a r d e d e x i s t e n c e as no
p r e d i c a t e a t a l l . 22
2. Kant a c t u a l l y c a l l e d the second o f th e modal
c a t e g o r i e s ( i . e . , t h e c o n c e p t of e x i s t e n c e or r e a l i t y ) a
p r e d i c a t e a s c r i b e d to o b j e c t s ; and th e c o n t e x t s u g g e s t s t h a t
a lth o u g h he d i s t i n g u i s h e d betw een e x i s t e n c e and th e c a t e g o r y
o f e x i s t e n c e , he in t e n d e d h i s s t a t e m e n t to a p p ly to e x i s t -
23
e n c e , a l s o .
3. Kant a c c e p te d t h a t t h e r e a r e e x i s t e n t i a l j u d g -
24
m ents. U n t i l d i s p r o v e n , our p r e s u m p tio n should be t h a t he
r e g a rd e d a l l judgm ents as h a v in g p r e d i c a t e s , and t h a t he r e
garded th e p r e d i c a t e of e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ents as b e in g e x
i s t e n c e . In o rd e r t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h i s s h o u ld be our
^ C f . K ant, o p . c i t . , B626.
2 3 I b i d . , B265f.
24
C f. I b i d . , B 2 7 2 -4 , B620-30.
10
p r e s u m p tio n , I s h a l l o f f e r two prim a f a c i e argum ents based
on v a r i o u s t e x t s i n B620-5. These argum ents a r e n o t , how
e v e r , in t e n d e d to p ro v e t h a t our p re s u m p tio n i s t r u e , f o r
t h i s l a s t cannot be done u n t i l we s h a l l have overcome a r g u
ments in fa v o r of two a l t e r n a t i v e , or c o u n t e r , p o s s i b i l i
t i e s , nam ely:
a. t h a t Kant did n o t r e g a r d e x i s t e n t i a l j u d g
ments as having p r e d i c a t e s ; and
b. t h a t he r e g a r d e d e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent as
u n i t i n g a s u b j e c t c o n c e p t w i t h i t s o b j e c t , so t h a t i f th e
judgm ent were to have a p r e d i c a t e , th e p r e d i c a t e would be
th e o b j e c t .
In o rd e r t o r e f u t e a., I w i l l show t h a t a p a s s a g e
which m ight seem to s u p p o r t i t (B 626), r e a l l y does n o t do
so; and I w i l l show t h a t a i s c o n t r a r y to an im p o rta n t t h e
s i s o f Kant which I s h a l l c a l l
Theorem a : t h a t e x i s t e n t i a l jud g m en ts a re
25
alw ays s y n t h e t i c .
For i t i s c l e a r t h a t as s y n t h e t i c , e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ents
must have b o th a s u b j e c t and som ething o t h e r th a n a s u b j e c t
26
( i . e . , som ething which Kant c a l l e d a p r e d i c a t e ) .
In o rd e r to r e f u t e one p a r t i c u l a r v e r s i o n o f b
( c l a i m i n g t h a t an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent o n ly p o s i t s th e sub
j e c t co n cep t as an o b j e c t ) , I w i l l show f i r s t t h a t i t i s
25I b i d ., B626a. 26C f. I b i d . , B lO f.
11
c o n t r a r y to a n o th e r K a n t i a n t h e s i s ,
Theorem 3: t h a t e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ents as always
. 27
a p o s t e r i o r i .
I w i l l th e n c r i t i c i z e a common m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of th e
p a s s a g e which m ight seem to j u s t i f y t h i s v e r s i o n of b
( B 6 2 6 c - 7 a ) . A f t e r w a r d s , I w i l l r e f u t e every form of b by
showing t h a t b i s c o n t r a r y to Theorem C X when C t i s ta k e n i n
c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h a n o th e r im p o rta n t K a n tia n t h e s i s ,
Theorem Y- t h a t th e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t of an e x
i s t e n t i a l judgm ent, and i t s o b j e c t , a r e i d e n t i -
1 • + 4- 2 8
c a l m c o n t e n t .
From a c o n j u n c t i o n of a w ith Y i t must f o llo w t h a t th e
p r e d i c a t e of an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent can n o t be th e o b j e c t
t h a t i s s a id to e x i s t .
Having d is p o s e d o f t h e p r i n c i p a l a l t e r n a t i v e s to our
p r e s u m p tio n , and i n so d o in g having b r o u g h t fo rw ard c e r t a i n
key t h e s e s i n K a n t, I w i l l p ro c e e d to c o n s t r u c t a d e m o n s tr a
t i o n showing th e t r u t h o f w hat we have presumed ( i . e . , of
th e f i r s t t h e s i s o f my p o s i t i o n ) ,
T h e s is K1: t h a t Kant r e g a r d e d e x i s t e n c e as th e
p r e d i c a t e o f e x i s t e n t i a l ju d g m e n ts.
From K a n t ’ s h a v in g h eld Y and e i t h e r ot or 3 ( in f a c t , of
c o u r s e , he h eld b o t h ) , we can deduce t h a t he must have held
2 7 I b i d . , B221, B270c, B272-3, B628c-9.
28I b i d . , B627-8.
12
Theorem t h a t i n e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent the
c o n t e n t of th e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t ( i . e . , th e
o b j e c t ) , must be ’fconnected"w ith som ething
( i . e . , a p r e d i c a t e ) , o th e r t h a n i t s e l f .
K a n t ' s h av in g h e ld 5 can a l s o be e s t a b l i s h e d d i r e c t l y from a
p a r t i c u l a r t e x t (B 6 2 8 -9 ). From 5 and from a c l o s e exam ina
t i o n of t h i s l a s t t e x t and o t h e r s (B220-1 and B 265-74), we
can i n f e r t h a t Kant must have h e ld
Theorem e: t h a t i n e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent, t h a t
w i t h which th e o b j e c t must be " c o n n e c te d " is
e x i s t e n c e ( o f w hich we a r e c o n s c io u s d i r e c t l y
o n ly in p e r c e p t i o n [ i . e . , i n t u i t i o n ] ) .
And from e and a d e f i n i t i o n of what Kant meant by " p r e d i
c a t e , " we can co n c lu d e to our f i r s t T h e s i s , ICl, t h a t Kant
h e ld :
Theorem Y: t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s t h e p r e d i c a t e
of e x i s t e n t i a l ju d g m en ts.
But i n o rd e r t o defen d our i n f e r r i n g of e and Y from B628-9,
we must r e f u t e t h r e e a l t e r n a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s h o ld in g , i n
e f f e c t , t h a t i f an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent, Kant would have
h e ld th e p r e d i c a t e to be e i t h e r : -
- th e o b j e c t ' s p e r c e p t i o n ; or
- th e p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e o b j e c t ' s p e r
c e p t i o n ; or
- t h e o b j e c t ’ s b e lo n g in g to e x p e r ie n c e
as a w hole.
13
In o r d e r to r e f u t e th e se i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , I w i l l show t h a t
Kant h e l d or i m p l i e d the f o l l o w i n g :
Theorem Y^: t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s som ething o th e r -
th a n p e r c e p t i o n .
_ Theorem Y^: t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s som ething o th e r
th a n th e p o s s i b i l i t y of p e r c e p t i o n .
Theorem Y^: t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s som ething o th e r
th a n b e lo n g in g t o e x p e r i e n c e as a w hole.
We ca n a l s o d e r i v e K1 from a n o th e r t e x t (B 627c). And from
t h i s l a s t t e x t , we can a l s o i n f e r t h a t Kant ( l i k e Meinong)
must have h e ld :
Theorem §: t h a t e x i s t e n c e does n o t e n t e r i n t o
t h e e s se n c e o r i d e n t i t y of o b j e c t s ( i . e . , ob
j e c t s a r e a u s s e r s e i e n d ) .
A g a in s t t h e view t h a t Kant r e g a r d e d th e p r e d i c a t e of
e x i s t e n c e as a m e r e ly l o g i c a l , or g r a m m a tic a l, p r e d i c a t e , we
s h a l l proceed a s fo llo w s : from our a n a l y s i s o f B627c, or
from K1 and th e f a c t t h a t K ant h eld e i t h e r a , P or or §,
we c a n c o n c lu d e , th e n , to our T h e s is K2, t h a t Kant must have
held r
Theorem t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s an a d d i t i v e p r e d i
c a t e of e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ents ( i . e . , a p r e d i c a t e
t h a t i s always som ething more t h a n , or i n a d d i
t i o n t o , the o b j e c t t h a t i s s a id t o e x i s t ) .
I w i l l then show t h a t th e one t e x t which m ig h t seem to s u p
p o r t t h e a d v e rse p o s i t i o n (B 6 2 6 -7 ), does n o t i n f a c t do so .
14
And by a n a l y z i n g h i s r e f u t a t i o n of th e o n t o l o g i c a l argum ent,
I w i l l a ls o show t h a t K a n t ’s s t r a t e g y t h e r e i n did n o t p r e
su p p o se h i s h o ld in g t h e a d v e r s e p o s i t i o n .
H aving shown t h a t Kant d id hold e x i s t e n c e to be th e
a d d i t i v e p r e d i c a t e of e x i s t e n t i a l ju d g m e n ts, I w i l l th e n
p r o c e e d , i n t h e Second S e c t i o n of my e s s a y , t o show why he
h e l d t h i s p o s i t i o n ( i . e . , how i t must f o l l o w from h i s g e n e r -
29
a l th e o r y o f th e n a t u r e of t h e c o n c e p t ) . I w i l l show how
t h i s th e o r y r e q u i r e s b o t h Y and a n o th e r t h e s i s ,
Theorem T \ z t h a t th ro u g h c o n c e p ts a l o n e , we a r e
u n a b le t o know t h e e x i s t e n c e of o b j e c t s ,
w h ic h t o g e t h e r imply b o t h ? and fi.
29
C f . Ibid., A98c-130, esp . A103-4, A121a; a l s o
B 1 3 3 , 137b, I39bc.
SECTION ONE
CHAPTER II
PRELIMINARY ARGUMENTS
L a t e r , i n th e second s e c t i o n o f t h i s e s s a y , we—s h a l l
see how K a n t 's t h e o r y o f th e c o n c e p t r e q u i r e d him to r e g a r d
e x i s t e n c e as t h a t w hich we have c a l l e d an " a d d i t i v e " p r e d i
c a t e . But in t h i s , and th e o th e r c h a p t e r s w hich make up th e
f i r s t s e c t i o n , we s h a l l c o n t e n t o u r s e l v e s w ith p r o v in g mere
l y t h a t Kant d i d , i n f a c t , h o ld t h i s view .
T here a r e some who b e l i e v e Kant t o have d e c l a r e d ,
e x p l i c i t l y , t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s n o t a p r e d i c a t e . As we have
se e n , one a u th o r even sp eak s o f " K a n t 's l a c o n i c o b s e r v a t i o n
t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s n o t a p r e d i c a t e . ” ^ " The f a c t i s t h a t Kant
nev er s a i d , l a c o n i c a l l y or o t h e r w i s e , t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s not
a p r e d i c a t e . He d id s a y t h a t " b e in g " (which he to o k as sy n
onymous w i t h " e x i s t e n c e " ) i s n o t a r e a l p r e d i c a t e . And, of
c o u r s e , some have i n t e r p r e t e d t h i s s ta t e m e n t to mean t h a t
" b e in g " or " e x i s t e n c e " i s n o t r e a l l y a p r e d i c a t e ( i . e . , not
1
Murray K i t e l y , " I s E x i s t e n c e a P r e d i c a t e ? " Mind,
LXXII (1 9 6 4 ), 364.
16
17
2
a p r e d i c a t e a t a l l ) . But as c e r t a i n c r i t i c s have p o i n t e d
o u t , t h e p h r a s e " r e a l p r e d i c a t e " was n o t employed by Kant to
3
mean " r e a l l y a p r e d i c a t e . " I n s t e a d , i t was used as a t e c h
n i c a l term h a v in g th e c l e a r l y d e f i n e d meaning of som ething
4
w hich d e t e r m in e s t h e n a t u r e or e s s e n c e of a t h i n g . Thus,
Kant s a i d , i f a r e a l p r e d i c a t e i s a f f i r m e d o f a t h i n g , i t
5
w i l l e n l a r g e t h e c o n c e p t of t h e t h i n g . The key p a s s a g e s m
Kant which e x h i b i t t h i s meaning a r e :
. . . th e i l l u s i o n w hich i s caused by th e c o n f u s io n
of a l o g i c a l w ith a r e a l p r e d i c a t e ( t h a t i s , w i t h a
p r e d i c a t e w hich d e t e r m in e s a t h i n g ) i s alm o st beyond
c o r r e c t i o n .
But a d e t e r m in i n g p r e d i c a t e i s a p r e d i c a t e which
i s added to th e c o n c e p t o f a s u b j e c t and e n l a r g e s
i t .
" B e in g ” i s o b v i o u s l y n o t a r e a l p r e d i c a t e ; t h a t
i s , n o t a c o n c e p t o f"so m e th in g w h ich could be added
to th e c o n cep t o f a t h i n g .
Thus, when Kant d e n ie d t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s a " r e a l " p r e d i c a t e ,
he meant o n ly t h a t i t i s n o t th e s o r t of p r e d i c a t e \vhich
e n t e r s i n t o th e "m ake-up" of a t h i n g , or w hich when a f fir m e d
2
C f. S. M o rr is Engel,*w ho t a k e s n o t e of t h i s f a c t ,
" K a n t ’s ’R e f u t a t i o n 1 o f t h e O n t o l o g i c a l A rgum ent," P h i l o s o
phy and P h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l R e s e a r c h , XXIV (1 9 6 3 ), 23.
3I b i d . , 2 3 -4 .
^Cf. M ilto n M u n itz, The M y stery o f E x i s t e n c e (New
Y o rk : A p p le t o n -C e n tu ry -C r a f t s’, 1965,); a l s o Jerome S h a f f e r ,
" E x i s t e n c e , P r e d i c a t i o n and th e O n t o l o g i c a l A rg u m en t," Mind,
LXXI (1 9 6 2 ), 309.
“’Immanuel K a n t, C r i t i q u e o f P u re R e a so n , t r a n s .
Norman Kemp Smith (New Yorlc: St - M a r t i n ’ s P r e s s , 1 9 6 5 ),
B626.
6
I b id .
18
o f a t h i n g , w i l l augment i t s c o n c e p t.
But l e t me e x h i b i t t h i s p o i n t in g r e a t e r d e t a i l .
For K ant, t h e word " p r e d i c a t e " d i d not r e f e r p r i m a r i l y to a
p a r t of s p e e c h ( i . e . , t o the g ra m m a tic a l p r e d i c a t e ) . I n
s t e a d , i t was o r d i n a r i l y used t o r e f e r t o a c o n c e p t - - i f the
concept was r e l a t e d i n judgment to a s u b j e c t c o n c e p t. For
i t was b e in g co n n e c te d w ith a s u b j e c t in judgm ent, t h a t ac-
7
counted f o r a n y t h i n g ’ s being c a l l e d a " p r e d i c a t e . ” I f a
concept had c o n te n t ( i . e . , a n y t h i n g of w h ic h c o n s c io u s n e s s
i s g iv en i n e x p e r i e n c e ) , i t was c a l l e d a " c o n c e p t of e x p e r i -
g
ence" or an " e m p i r i c a l ” c o n c e p t (w hereas i f i t had no con-
g
t e n t , i t was c a l l e d a " p u r e " c o n c e p t ) . I f i t d e te r m in e d
th e c o n t e n t of a s u b j e c t c o n c e p t w i t h w h ic h i t was j o i n e d in
judgm ent, i t was c a l l e d a " d e t e r m i n i n g p r e d i c a t e " ( c f . the
f i r s t t e x t above) or a " r e a l p r e d i c a t e ” ( c f . the second
t e x t ) . (One must remember t h a t , f o r K a n t, c o n c e p tio n and
judgment a c t u a l l y d e te rm in e d t h e phenom enal o b j e c t ; th e y did
10
n o t m erely r e f l e c t i t . Thus, f o r K an t, a " r e a l " p r e d i c a t e
concept would a c t u a l l y d e t e r m in e th e " t h i n g " or o b j e c t w ith
whose c o n c e p t i t was j o i n e d . ) A " r e a l " p r e d i c a t e w ould,
7Ibid., BIO-12.
8I b i d . , B267c; B376c-7; B596; t h e f o u n d a t i o n s of
t h i s usag e a r e d e v e lo p e d e sp . i n B92c-3, B102-3 and A95-110.
9I b i d .
l0 Ibid., B59-73; A95-110; B129 ff.; B164-5.
19
t h u s , " e n l a r g e " a s u b j e c t c o n c e p t , in t h a t i t would add new
d e t e r m i n a t i o n s t o t h o s e a l r e a d y d e t e r m in i n g th e c o n t e n t o f
th e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t .
But the t h i r d t e x t can be i n t e r p r e t e d a s p r e s e n t i n g
a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t n o tio n o f " r e a l p r e d i c a t e . " For i t can
be i n t e r p r e t e d as s a y in g t h a t a r e a l p r e d i c a t e adds to t h e
s u b j e c t con cep t, n o t merely a new d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f i t s con
t e n t , b u t new c o n t e n t . For t h i s p a s s a g e can be i n t e r p r e t e d
as s a y in g t h a t t h e r e a l p r e d i c a t e adds t h e " so m e th in g " of
which i t i s a c o n c e p t ( i . e . , a c o n t e n t which i t a l r e a d y c o n
t a i n s ) to th e c o n t e n t of t h e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t. T h is could
happen i f the s u b j e c t c o n te n t t h a t was t o be d e te rm in e d by
bein g subsumed u n d e r the p r e d i c a t e c o n c e p t , d id n o t y e t i n
clude t h e e m p i r i c a l ( i . e . , p e r c e p t u a l o r i m a g i n a t i v e ) m a t t e r
p ro p e r to the p r e d i c a t e c o n c e p t , e . g . , the s e n s a t i o n o f red
t h a t c o rre s p o n d s t o t h e p r e d i c a t e c o n c e p t " r e d . " For th e n
th e a d d i t i o n of t h e p r e d i c a t e concept would f u r n i s h to th e
s u b j e c t concept t h e means w hereby th e l a t t e r c o u ld e x h i b i t - -
th ro u g h th e s c h e m a ta of t h e i m a g i n a t i o n - - i t s c o n t e n t i n an
augmented image, e . g . , by a d d in g r e d n e s s to i t s o r i g i n a l
11
im ag e.
F u r th e r m o r e , th e r e a r e p a s s a g e s i n which Kant used
the word " p r e d i c a t e " to mean, n o t th e p r e d i c a t e c o n c e p t, b u t
th e c o n t e n t of t h e p r e d i c a t e c o n c e p t; f o r in some p a s s a g e s
1 1 Ibid., B151b-152, B176-1S7.
20
he b o th d i s t i n g u i s h e d between a c o n cep t and i t s c o n t e n t , and
r e f e r r e d t o t h e l a t t e r as a p r e d i c a t e , e . g . , B l l - 1 2 . To do
t h i s l a s t was q u i t e a p p r o p r i a t e i f , as seems to be th e c a s e ,
Kant took as h i s r o o t meaning o f " p r e d i c a t e , " a n y th in g t h a t
i s t o g e t h e r i n judgment w ith a s u b j e c t . For n o t o n ly a r e
th e s u b j e c t and p r e d i c a t e c o n c e p ts u n i t e d i n an a f f i r m a t i v e
judgm ent; t h e i r c o n t e n t s a r e e x p r e s s e d t o g e t h e r in th e j u d g
ment .
Thus, th e term " r e a l p r e d i c a t e " could a p p ly , n o t
only to a c o n c e p t c a p a b le of d e t e r m in i n g a s u b j e c t c o n t e n t ,
b u t a l s o to t h e c o n t e n t of a p r e d i c a t e c o n c e p t - - t h a t i s , i f
th e c o n c e p t had c o n te n t p r i o r to subsuming t h e s u b j e c t under
i t , and i f , th ro u g h t h i s subsum ing, th e s u b j e c t c o n t e n t were
e n l a r g e d . A c c o r d i n g l y , a c o n c e p t could f a i l to be a " r e a l "
p r e d i c a t e b o th th ro u g h f a i l i n g t o d e te r m in e f u r t h e r a su b
j e c t c o n t e n t , and th ro u g h f a i l i n g to add to a s u b j e c t co n
c e p t new c o n t e n t . And a c o n t e n t co u ld f a i l t o be a " r e a l "
p r e d i c a t e th ro u g h not b e in g a b l e t o e n t e r i n t o a s u b j e c t
c o n t e n t .
In a n o th e r p a s s a g e , Kant s a i d , i n e f f e c t , t h a t add
in g a r e a l p r e d i c a t e would make a t h i n g "no lo n g e r th e e x a c t
same t h i n g " (B 6 2 8 ). T h e r e f o r e , we can say t h a t , f o r K an t, a
r e a l p r e d i c a t e d e te r m in e s or e n t e r s i n t o t h e " e s s e n c e " of an
o b j e c t - - i n th e s e n se t h a t " e s s e n c e " i s ta k e n to mean th e en
t i r e " w h a tn e s s ” of an o b j e c t , r a t h e r t h a n , in i t s A r i s t o t e
l i a n u s e , m erely th e " e s s e n t i a l " and n o t th e " a c c i d e n t a l "
21
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f a t h i n g . F or, o f c o u r s e , many a p r e d i
c a t e t h a t Kant would have c a l l e d " r e a l , " e . g . , " r e d , " would
n o t have d e te r m in e d i t s s u b j e c t i n t o a new " s u b s t a n c e , " b u t
12
o n ly m o d ifie d i t a c c i d e n t a l l y . Yet i n th e p a s s a g e c i t e d
(B628) Kant i n s i s t e d , i n e f f e c t , t h a t th e a d d i t i o n of a r e a l
p r e d i c a t e would make a t h i n g t o be no lo n g e r e x a c t l y th e
same t h i n g ( i . e . , i t s e s s e n c e , i n t h i s l a r g e r s e n s e o f " e s
s e n c e , " would c h a n g e ) .
What, t h e n , d id Kant mean i n s a y in g t h a t " b e i n g ” i s
not a r e a l p r e d i c a t e ? At f i r s t s i g h t , h i s s t a t e m e n t might
seem to r e f e r p r i m a r i l y t o t h e word " b e i n g ” (o r i t s syno
nyms, such as " e x i s t e n c e ” ) . But t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would
le a d us a s t r a y , f o r Kant was o b v i o u s l y s p e a k in g , h e r e , of
t h a t which th e word i s used to e x p r e s s . ( I t would have been
p o i n t l e s s f o r him to say t h a t th e word " b e i n g ” i s n o t a p a r
t i c u l a r k in d of c o n c e p t; f o r he did n o t i d e n t i f y c o n c e p ts
w ith w o rd s, b u t w i t h a c t s o f t h i n k i n g of a c e r t a i n t y p e . )
Thus, he must have meant t h a t what t h e word " b e in g " i s used
to convey can n o t add t o a s u b j e c t c o n c e p t a new d e t e r m i n a
t i o n or c o n t e n t , or a l t e r t h e e s s e n c e of i t s o b j e c t . He d id
n o t, of c o u r s e , mean t h a t th e word i s n e v e r used to r e f e r to
a c o n c e p t a t a l l - - f o r he commonly used i t ( o r synonyms such
as " e x i s t e n c e , " " r e a l i t y " and " a c t u a l i t y " ) t o s ta n d f o r t h e
12
Cf. K a n t ' s t r e a t m e n t o f s u b s t a n c e i n i b i d . , B224-
232.
22
13
second of th e modal c a t e g o r i e s . Nor d id he mean t h a t ,
when used to r e p r e s e n t t h e c a t e g o r y , th e word " b e in g " c o u ld
s ta n d f o r a c o n c e p t, b u t n o t f o r a p r e d i c a t e . For we s h a l l
see t h a t he s p e c i f i c a l l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d the modal c a t e g o r y as
a p r e d i c a t e , a l b e i t of aT s p e c i a l k i n d , namely one which
would n o t augment a s u b j e c t c o n c e p t . T h a t i s t o say , i n the
te r m in o lo g y ad o p ted in B626-7, th e c a t e g o r y of e x i s t e n c e was
a p r e d i c a t e , b u t n o t a " r e a l " p r e d i c a t e .
B ut, a c t u a l l y , Kant seems n o t to have meant h i s d e
n i a l , i n B627, to a p p ly m e re ly t o th e c a t e g o r y or c o n c e p t of
e x i s t e n c e . F o r, as we s h a l l s e e , t h i n k i n g an o b j e c t th ro u g h
t h e mere c o n c e p t of e x i s t e n c e was n o t , f o r K ant, an e x i s t e n
t i a l judgm ent; fo r th ro u g h t h e p u r e c o n c e p t, one could n o t
14
t h i n k an o b j e c t as more th an m e re ly p o s s i b l e . Yet i n t h e
c o n t e x t from which t h e p r e s e n t t e x t i s t a k e n , Kant was o b v i
o u s ly c o n cern ed w ith what he to o k to be e x i s t e n t i a l j u d g
m ents. T h a t i s t o say , he was co n cern ed w ith judgm ents i n
which " i s " or " e x i s t s " would be used t o e x p r e s s t h a t f a c t o r
o f w hich, Kant had s a i d , c o n s c i o u s n e s s could n o t be g iv e n in
any c o n c e p t (e v e n i n t h a t of e x i s t e n c e ) , namely th e a c t u a l
e x i s t e n c e of an o b j e c t . Thus, t h e r e i s a b a s i s i n the c o n
t e x t o f th e p r e s e n t t e x t f o r assum ing t h a t Kant meant h i s
words r e g a r d i n g " r e a l " p r e d i c a t e s to a p p ly a l s o to e x is te n c e ;
l3 Ibid., B629a; also, B272b-74a.
14
I b i d . , B629a; a l s o , B220-2, B272-4.
23
t h a t i s , t h e r e i s r e a s o n f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g him t o have meant
to say t h a t i t , t o o , could n o t e n te r i n t o the c o n c e p t or e s
sence of an o b j e c t . ( I n C h a p te r IX, i t w i l l be shown a t
some l e n g t h why h i s th e o r y o f th e c o n c e p t would le a d him to
t h i s c o n c l u s i o n . )
Y et sim p ly from h i s d e n i a l t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s a
" r e a l " p r e d i c a t e , we cannot conclude t h a t Kant d e n ie d t h a t
e x i s t e n c e i s some k in d of p r e d i c a t e , or even t h a t i t i s what
we have c a l l e d an " a d d i t i v e 1 1 p r e d i c a t e . For h i s d e n i a l
l e a v e s open t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t " e x i s t s " might e x p re ss
som ething which would n o t e n t e r i n t o an o b j e c t Ts con cep t or
e s s e n c e , b u t of w hich we m ig h t n e v e r t h e l e s s be g iv e n con
s c i o u s n e s s in i n t u i t i o n and w i t h which we might con n ect an
o b j e c t i n judgm ent. .T h is p o s s i b i l i t y i s , s im p ly , n o t e x
c lu d e d .
But l e t us now examine K a n t Ts t r e a t m e n t of th e modal
c a te g o r y of e x i s t e n c e . For in i t we s h a l l f i n d a p o s i t i v e
i n d i c a t i o n t h a t he r e g a r d e d , n o t m e r e ly the c a t e g o r y , b u t
a l s o e x i s t e n c e , as a p r e d i c a t e .
Kant a c t u a l l y spoke of the second of th e modal c a t e
g o r i e s , t h e c o n cep t of e x i s t e n c e or r e a l i t y , as a p r e d i c a t e
a s c r i b e d t o o b j e c t s .
The c a t e g o r i e s of m o d a l i t y p o s s e s s t h i s p e c u l i a r i t y ,
t h a t th e y do not i n th e l e a s t d e te r m in e th e o b j e c t ,
or e n l a r g e the c o n c e p t i o n to_w hich they a r e annexed
as p r e d i c a t e s [ i t a l i c s a d d e d ], b u t only e x p r e s s i t s
r e l a t i o n t o th e f a c u l t y o f c o g n i t i o n . Though my
c o n c e p tio n of th i n g i s i t s e l f c o m p le te , I am s t i l l
e n t i t l e d to ask w h e th e r th e o b j e c t o f i t i s m erely
24
p o s s i b l e , or w h eth er i t i s a l s o r e a l , o r, i f the
l a t t e r , w h eth er i t i s a l s o n e c e s s a r y . But h e re b y
th e o b j e c t i t s e l f i s not more d e f i n i t e l y d e te rm in e d
i n t h o u g h t , b u t t h e q u e s t i o n i s only in w hat r e l a
t i o n i t , i n c l u d i n g a l l i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n s , s t a n d s to
t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g .
T h is p a s s a g e i s v e ry r i c h and com plex, as i s K a n t Ts e n t i r e
t r e a t m e n t of e x i s t e n c e . For t h e moment l e t us draw from i t
m erely th e p o i n t t h a t Kant d id speak of the s e c o n d of th e
modal c a t e g o r i e s , or e x i s t e n c e , as a p r e d i c a t e annexed t o
th e c o n c e p t i o n of an o b j e c t . Thus t h e r e can be no q u e s t i o n
t h a t i n t h i s s e c t i o n of the F i r s t C r i t i q u e , K ant re g a rd e d
the c o n c e p t of e x i s t e n c e as some k in d o f p r e d i c a t e . B ut, of
c o u r s e , t h i s a lo n e would not n e c e s s a r i l y mean t h a t he r e
garded e x i s t e n c e as a p r e d i c a t e . For Kant i n s i s t e d on d i s
t i n g u i s h i n g betw een e x i s t e n c e and the c o n c e p tu a l r e p r e s e n t a
t i o n o f e x i s t e n c e or what can be th o u g h t m erely th ro u g h t h e
c o n c e p t of e x i s t e n c e .
I t i s n o t , t h e r e f o r e , s u r p r i s i n g t h a t , i f we atte m p t
t o t h i n k e x i s t e n c e th ro u g h th e p u re c a t e g o r y , i . e .
c o n c e p t, of e x i s t e n c e , we c a n n o t -sp e c ify a s i n g l e
mark d i s t i n g u i s h i n g i t from mere p o s s i b i l i t y .
W hatever, t h e r e f o r e , and however much o u r con
c e p t of an o b j e c t may c o n t a i n , we must go o u t s i d e o f
i t i f we a r e to a s c r i b e e x i s t e n c e to the o b j e c t . 1.6
I n t h i s p a s s a g e , Kant would seem v e r y c l e a r l y t o say t h a t ,
in t h i n k i n g an o b j e c t as e x i s t e n t , we cannot do so m erely
th r o u g h th e c o n c e p t o f th e o b j e c t , nor th ro u g h t h e pure c a t
e g o ry , or c o n c e p t, of e x i s t e n c e . But d e s p i t e K a n t ’s
1 5 Ibid., B266. 1 6 Ibid., B629.
25
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g in t h i s way b etw een e x i s t e n c e and t h a t which
we can t h i n k m e re ly th ro u g h a c o n c e p t (e v e n th e c o n c e p t of
e x i s t e n c e ) he seemed a t tim es t o b lo c k e x i s t e n c e and i t s
c o n c e p t t o g e t h e r , and t o t r e a t one as th e o t h e r . Thus i n
t h e f i r s t of t h e p a s s a g e s c i t e d , he went on, a f t e r b e g in n in g
to sp eak o f th e modal c a t e g o r i e s as p r e d i c a t e s , t o i l l u s
t r a t e h i s meaning by m e n tio n in g a q u e s t i o n whose answer
would in v o lv e a f f i r m i n g of an o b j e c t , n o t m e re ly what can be
th o u g h t th ro u g h th e c o n c e p t o f e x i s t e n c e , b u t e x i s t e n c e i t
s e l f . In d o in g so he would seem t o have t r e a t e d e x i s t e n c e ,
and n o t m erely th e c o n t e n t o f th e c o n c e p t of e x i s t e n c e , as a
p r e d i c a t e annexed to o b j e c t s .
F u r th e r m o r e , Kant a c c e p te d t h a t t h e r e a r e e x i s t e n -
17 18
t i a l p r o p o s i t i o n s , w hich he a l s o c a l l e d " j u d g m e n t s ," and
u n l e s s he used the word "ju d g m e n t" i n an e q u i v o c a l manner,
he must have r e g a rd e d e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ents as hav in g p r e d i
c a t e s ; fo r in p r e v i o u s l y d e f i n i n g what he meant by " j u d g
m e n t," he had shown t h a t he re g a rd e d a l l judgm ents as hav in g
19
b o th a s u b j e c t and a p r e d i c a t e ; f o r he d e f i n e d judgm ent as
alw ays u n i f y i n g two " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , " or " g iv e n modes of
20
k n o w le d g e ." And i n p a s s a g e s w h e r e in he gave names to th e
f a c t o r s t h a t a re th u s u n i t e d i n judgm ent, he c a l l e d t h e s e
17I b id . , B622-9. 18I b i d . , B623b.
19I b i d . , B 1 0 b -1 3 , B93-4, B140c-142.
2QI b i d . , B94.
A P re s u m p tio n
Now, i t might be claim ed t h a t Kant c o n s id e r e d th e
p r e d i c a t e of an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent to be som ething o th e r
t h a n e x i s t e n c e . But u n t i l such a c la im i s j u s t i f i e d by e v i
d e n c e , I b e l i e v e t h a t our p r e s u m p tio n ought t o be t h a t Kant
to o k e x i s t e n c e t o be t h e p r e d i c a t e of an e x i s t e n t i a l j u d g
m ent.
In f a v o r o f th e p re s u m p tio n t h a t Kant r e g a r d e d e x
i s t e n c e as th e p r e d i c a t e o f th e e x i s t e n t i a l judgment or
p r o p o s i t i o n , we may n o t e , f i r s t , t h a t he took e x i s t e n t i a l
22
p r o p o s i t i o n s to have th e form o f " t h i s t h i n g e x i s t s . "
Kant o b v i o u s l y r e g a rd e d th e p h r a s e " t h i s t h i n g " as r e p r e
s e n t i n g what he c a l l e d th e " s u b j e c t . " For he u s u a l l y r e
f e r r e d to th e o b j e c t or t h i n g whose e x i s t e n c e was a f f ir m e d
23
as t h e " s u b j e c t . " (What some m ight c a l l th e s u b j e c t of
t h e judgm ent, K ant most o f t e n c a l l e d t h e " c o n c e p t of th e
24
s u b j e c t " r a t h e r t h a n . t h e " s u b j e c t . " ) The o n ly o th e r word
which could r e p r e s e n t what he c a l l e d th e " p r e d i c a t e " would
b e , t h e n , the word " e x i s t s . " But when he used a noun to
speak o f what " e x i s t s " means, he most o f t e n used th e word
" e x i s t e n c e " ( a l t h o u g h he sometim es used th e words " r e a l i t y ”
21I b i d . , B 1 0 b -1 3 , B94
^ 2I b i d . , B.625c, 626c.
22I b i d . , B625b.
24I b i d .
27
25
and " a c t u a l i t y . " ) Thus, i t would seem t h a t th e word " e x
i s t e n c e " was t h e name he u s u a l l y gave to th e p r e d i c a t e o f an
e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent.
That i s to sa y , i f we may p u t th e m a t t e r a b i t more
e x p l i c i t l y , t h a t by i t s e l f th e p h r a s e " t h i s t h i n g T "-was n o t
r e g a r d e d by Kant as e x p r e s s i n g an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent, b u t
only t h e p o t e n t i a l s u b j e c t of such a judgm ent. What was
needed i n o r d e r to e x p r e s s th e judgment was, t h e n , a p r e d i
c a t e t o be u n i t e d w i t h th e s u b j e c t . But i f t h e p h r a s e " t h i s
t h i n g " would n o t s u f f i c e t o e x p r e s s a l l t h a t i s needed i n
o rd er to have a judgm ent, w h ereas th e word " t h i s t h i n g e x
i s t s " would s u f f i c e , i t would seem t o f o l l o w t h a t th e word
" e x i s t s " must s e rv e to e x p r e s s t h a t w hich was l a c k i n g ( i . e . ,
th e p r e d i c a t e ) .
I do n o t p r e t e n d t h a t t h i s argum ent i s s tr o n g enough
t o p ro v e t h a t Kant r e g a r d e d e x i s t e n c e as th e p r e d i c a t e of an
e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent. I b r i n g i t forw ard o n ly to show t h a t
on f i n d i n g Kant to speak of e x i s t e n t i a l p r o p o s i t i o n s , or
p r o p o s i t i o n s of th e form, " t h i s t h i n g e x i s t s , " we should
n a t u r a l l y presume t h a t he r e g a r d e d " e x i s t e n c e " as the name
of t h e p r e d i c a t e of such a p r o p o s i t i o n . F u r th e r m o r e , b e
cause our p re s u m p tio n seems to have n o t h in g p e c u l i a r to our
tim e or p l a c e , we may, I b e l i e v e , f u r t h e r suppose t h a t th e
r e a d e r s to whom Kant a d d r e s s e d h i m s e l f would have sh ared
25
I b i d . , B265-74; B620-7.
28
t h i s p r e s u m p t i o n . F u r th e r m o r e , I b e l i e v e i t i s o n ly good
s e n se t o h o ld t h a t K ant must have r e c o g n i z e d th e f a c t t h a t
h i s r e a d e r s would make t h i s a s s u m p tio n . U n l e s s , t h e n , he
can be shown to have t r i e d t o c o r r e c t t h i s a s s u m p t i o n , I b e
l i e v e t h a t we s h o u ld have to suppose t h a t K ant must have
a s s e n t e d t o t h e f a c t of h i s r e a d e r s ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g him in
t h i s way. But t h i s would be ta n ta m o u n t t o s u p p o s in g e i t h e r
t h a t he meant t o le a v e h i s r e a d e r s i n e r r o r r e g a r d i n g h i s
v ie w s , or e l s e t h a t he meant to say t h a t which h i s r e a d e r s
would n a t u r a l l y u n d e r s t a n d him as m eaning. S in c e K ant was a
man who d e v o te d an u n u s u a l e f f o r t t o making h i m s e l f u n d e r
s to o d in i m p o r t a n t m a t t e r s , and s i n c e he o b v i o u s l y re g a rd e d
th e s t a t u s of e x i s t e n c e as a p r e d i c a t e as an i m p o r t a n t m at
t e r , I b e l i e v e thatf- we must r e g a r d him as h a v in g meant t h a t
w hich h i s r e a d e r s would i n t e r p r e t him as m e a n i n g - - u n l e s s , of
c o u r s e , we w ere to f i n d e v id e n c e showing him t o have a t
te m p ted t o c o r r e c t th e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t he r e g a r d e d e x i s t e n c e
as t h e p r e d i c a t e of an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent.
In f u r t h e r s u p p o r t o f our p r e s u m p tio n we f i n d t h a t
when K ant arg u ed t h a t G od’s e x i s t e n c e can be d e n ie d w i t h o u t
c o n t r a d i c t i o n (even th o u g h i n o n e ' s c o n c e p t o f God, e x i s t
ence were p o s i t e d as a n e c e s s a r y a t t r i b u t e ) , 2 ^ he seems to
have r e g a r d e d th e e x i s t e n c e which co u ld be d e n ie d of God, as
p a r t of t h e p r e d i c a t e o f th e p r o p o s i t i o n or judgm ent
26
Ibid., B622c-4.
29
e x p r e s s i n g t h e d e n i a l . For he argued t h a t i n den y in g th e
e x i s t e n c e of a Being t h a t i s c o n c e iv e d as n e c e s s a r y , we a r e
n o t l e f t w i t h a s u b j e c t i n which t h e r e i s s t i l l a f f ir m e d
t h a t which i s being n e g a te d i n t h e p r e d i c a t e . ( F o r , he
s a i d , in a n e g a t i v e e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent, t h e s u b j e c t i s
s u p p re s s e d a lo n g w ith t h a t which i s n e g a te d i n th e p r e d i
c a t e . ) ^ / T h a t which K ant r e g a r d e d as n e g a te d i n th e p r e d i
c a t e would seem o b v i o u s l y to have been th e e x i s t e n c e of t h e
s u b j e c t . But t h i s w ould make e x i s t e n c e t h a t w hich i s d e n ie d
i n t h e p r e d i c a t e of a n e g a t i v e e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent or a f
f ir m e d in t h e p r e d i c a t e of a p o s i t i v e e x i s t e n t i a l ju d g m en t.
But I do not c o n s id e r t h a t e i t h e r of th e f o r e g o i n g
two argum ents can be t a k e n as s u f f i c i e n t to e s t a b l i s h th e
t r u t h of our p r e s u m p tio n t h a t K ant r e g a rd e d e x i s t e n c e as t h e
p r e d i c a t e o f th e e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent; f o r t h e r e a r e o t h e r
argum ents t h a t might seem to undo t h e s e arg u m en ts and to
p r o v e a c o n t r a r y c o n c l u s i o n . U n t i l th e y have b een faced and
overcome, our p r e s u m p tio n w i l l be in a r a t h e r p r e c a r i o u s
p o s i t i o n .
2 7 Ibid., B622c.
CHAPTER III
ALTERNATIVE THEORIES AND THEIR REPUTATION
To th e two argum ents g iv e n i n b e h a l f o f our p resum p
t i o n , one m ight p o s s i b l y r a i s e th e o b j e c t i o n t h a t th e y r e s t
on t e x t s ta k e n from th e b e g i n n i n g p o r t i o n of K a n t 's c r i t i q u e
o f th e o n t o l o g i c a l argum ent, and t h a t i n t h i s p o r t i o n Kant
only p r o v i s i o n a l l y a c c e p te d e x i s t e n t i a l s t a t e m e n t s as h a v in g
th e a p p a r e n t s u b j e c t - p r e d i c a t e form which p r o p o n e n ts o f th e
1
o n t o l o g i c a l argument b e l i e v e d them t o have. L a t e r , one
might c la im , Kant went on t o show t h a t th e rTt r u e l o g i c a l
form tr o f t h e s e s t a t e m e n t s was r e a l l y q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . One
m ight c la im t h a t o n ly l a t e r , when Kant began to d i s c u s s th e
d i f f e r e n c e betw een " r e a l " and l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e s , was he
a b le t o t r e a t t h e s e s t a t e m e n t s i n an a d e q u a te way. The
words i n t r o d u c i n g h i s l a t e r t r e a t m e n t m ight seem t o s u g g e s t
such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n :
I s h o u ld have hoped t o p u t an end to t h e s e i d l e
and f r u i t l e s s d i s p u t a t i o n s i n a d i r e c t manner,
by an a c c u r a t e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f th e c o n c e p t o f
Immanuel K ant, C r i t i q u e o f P ure R e a so n , t r a n s .
Norman Kemp Smith (New York: S t . M a r t i n 1s P r e s s , 1965),
B620-6.
2Ibid., B620b-9.
30
31
e x i s t e n c e , had I n o t found t h a t th e i l l u s i o n which
i s cau sed by th e c o n f u s i o n o f a l o g i c a l w ith a r e a l
p r e d i c a t e . . . i s a lm o st beyond c o r r e c t i o n . 3
I t was o n ly a f t e r seem ing, t h u s , t o d e s i r e t o go beyond h i s
p r e v i o u s t r e a t m e n t o f th e m a t t e r , t h a t , a c c o r d in g to one
view , Kant began d e s c r i b i n g th e t r u e form o f an e x i s t e n t i a l
judgm ent. And t h i s form, one m ight m a i n t a i n , i s n o t one in
which e x i s t e n c e i s a p r e d i c a t e , n o t even a l o g i c a l p r e d i
c a t e .
The F i r s t A dverse Argument and My R eply
a. F i r s t , i t m ight be c la im e d t h a t Kant d id n o t
r e g a r d e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ents as h a v in g a s u b j e c t - p r e d i c a t e
form, b e c a u s e he d id n o t r e g a r d them as h av in g what he
c a l l e d a " p r e d i c a t e , ” t h a t i s , a g iv e n c o n t e n t o r " r e p r e
s e n t a t i o n " t h a t may be u n i t e d t o a s u b j e c t . One m ight t r y
t o f i n d s u p p o r t f o r t h i s view in th e w ell-know n p a s s a g e in
which- Kant t r e a t e d o f th e c o n f u s i o n o f l o g i c a l w ith r e a l
p r e d i c a t e s , f o r one m ight t r y t o arg u e t h a t b e c a u s e in t h i s
p a s s a g e , Kant t r e a t e d e x i s t e n c e as b e in g o n ly a " l o g i c a l
p r e d i c a t e , " he must have p r e s u p p o s e d t h a t th e e x i s t e n t i a l
judgment i s l a c k i n g what we would p r o p e r l y c a l l a p r e d i c a t e ,
( i „ e . , a g iv e n c o n t e n t o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t m ight be
u n i t e d t o th e s u b j e c t ) :
I sh o u ld have hoped t o p u t an end to t h e s e i d l e
3
Ibid., B626b.
32
and f r u i t l e s s d i s p u t a t i o n s i n a d i r e c t manner, by
an a c c u r a t e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f th e c o n c e p t o f e x i s t
en ce, had I n o t found t h a t t h e i l l u s i o n which i s
cau sed by th e c o n f u s i o n of a l o g i c a l w ith a r e a l
p r e d i c a t e ( t h a t i s , w ith a p r e d i c a t e which d e t e r
mines a t h i n g ) i s alm ost beyond c o r r e c t i o n . Any
t h i n g we p l e a s e can be made t o s e rv e as a l o g i c a l
p r e d i c a t e ' th e s u b j e c t can even be p r e d i c a t e d o f
i t s e l f ; f o r l o g i c a b s t r a c t s from a l l c o n t e n t .
But a d e t e r m in i n g p r e d i c a t e i s a p r e d i c a t e which
i s added to th e c o n c e p t o f t h e s u b j e c t and e n l a r g e s
i t . C o n s e q u e n tly , i t must n o t be a l r e a d y c o n t a i n e d
in th e c o n c e p t . ^
As I s h a l l argue l a t e r ( i n C h a p te r V I I ) , Kant d id
n o t h o ld t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s a m e re ly l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e . But
even i f he had, one would s t i l l have no ground f o r s a y in g
t h a t he r e g a rd e d a m e re ly l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e as n o t h a v in g
(o r b e in g ) a c o n t e n t . I t i s v e r y d i f f i c u l t to say j u s t
what Kant d id have i n a i n d when he i n t r o d u c e d , i n t o h i s
C r i t i q u e o f t h e O n t o l o g i c a l Argument, th e m a t t e r o f th e
" l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e . " F o r, as we s h a l l s e e , t h e r e are a
number o f c o n f u s io n s i n h i s p r e s e n t a t i o n ( j u s t as t h e r e are
c o n t r a d i c t i o n s in v o lv e d i n h o l d i n g t h a t he r e g a r d e d e x i s t
ence as a m erely l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e ) . B ut th e example which
he gave o f a judgm ent t h a t would a p p a r e n t l y have a m e re ly
l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e was a judgment p r e d i c a t i n g so m eth in g o f
i t s e l f and th e p r e d i c a t e of su c h a judgm ent would most c e r
t a i n l y have, or b e, a c o n t e n t ( i . e . , t h e o b j e c t i t s e l f ) . ^
Kant a p p e a rs t o have r e g a r d e d e v e r y p r e d i c a t e as a t
l e a s t a l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e , and " m e re ly l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e s "
4
I b i d
5
I b i d .
33
he a p p e a rs t o have re g a rd e d as th o s e i n which n o t h i n g i s
c o n t a i n e d t h a t has n o t been e x p r e s s e d in th e c o n c e p t o f th e
s u b j e c t . T h a t i s , he a p p ears t o have r e g a rd e d th e a n a l y t i c
p r e d i c a t e as th e "m ere ly l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e . ” But he un
d o u b te d ly b e l i e v e d t h a t th e p r e d i c a t e o f an a n a l y t i c j u d g
ment e x p r e s s e s or e x p l i c a t e s th e c o n t e n t found in th e s u b
j e c t . ^ Thus, even i f Kant had r e g a r d e d e x i s t e n c e as b e in g
a m erely l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e , we c o u ld n o t c o n clu d e from t h i s
t h a t he r e g a r d e d e x i s t e n c e dev o id of c o n t e n t , or t h a t he
re g a rd e d th e e x i s t e n t i a l judgment (o r any "m ere ly l o g i c a l
judgm ent” } a s , t h e r e f o r e , l a c k i n g th e c o n t e n t which he
c a l l e d a " p r e d i c a t e . ”
F u rth e rm o re , t h e r e i s a n o t h e r , p e rh a p s even s t r o n g
e r , r e a s o n which p r e v e n t s us from h o l d i n g t h a t Kant r e g a rd e d
e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ents as l a c k i n g a p r e d i c a t e , which i s to
say, as n o t h av in g a s u b j e c t - p r e d i c a t e form. T h is re a so n
i s t h a t , in f a c t , Kant r e g a rd e d a l l e x i s t e n t i a l judgments
as b e in g s y n t h e t i c (Theorem a ) . Thus, he s a i d :
We must ask, Is th e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t h i s or
t h a t t h i n g (which w hatever i t may be, i t allo w ed
i s p o s s i b l e ) e x i s t s , an a n a l y t i c or s y n t h e t i c
p r o p o s i t i o n ? . . . We ad m it, as e v e ry r e a s o n a b l e
p e rso n m ust, t h a t a l l e x i s t e n t i a l p r o p o s i t i o n s
a re s y n t h e t i c . . . .7
And i t i s im p o s s ib le t o i n t e r p r e t t h a t which Kant c a l l e d a
6I b i d . , BIO..
^ I b i d . , B6256-C. Cf. a l s o Chap. V, p. 17, Chap.
VI, pp. 1-4.
34
" s y n t h e t i c judgm ent" as h a v in g no p r e d i c a t e . For i n K a n t ’s
v ie w , a judgm ent is s y n t h e t i c , r a t h e r t h a n a n a l y t i c , only i f
i t h a s a p r e d i c a t e c o n t e n t Cor d e t e r m i n a t i o n - - c f . Chap. I I ,
O
pp. 2 -3 ) above and beyond t h a t o f i t s s u b j e c t .
To be s u r e , Kant r e g a r d e d th e c a t e g o r y of e x i s t e n c e
as o n ly a " s u b j e c t i v e l y ” s y n t h e t i c p r e d i c a t e . ^ I t would n o t
be " o b j e c t i v e " i n t h a t i t would add n o t h i n g t o th e e s se n c e
or c o n c e p t o f th e o b j e c t . I n s t e a d , i t would add t o th e
o b j e c t only a r e l a t i o n t o the f a c u l t y of p e r c e p t i o n , an
a d d i t i o n w hich would be " s u b j e c t i v e " i n t h e sense t h a t th e
f a c u l t y i s p a r t of th e knowing s u b j e c t . B u t from the f a c t
t h a t Kant r e g a r d e d t h i s p r e d i c a t e as s u b j e c t i v e , one c o u ld
n o t , of c o u r s e , co n clu d e t h a t t h e r e i s no p r e d i c a t e o f an
e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent. F o r , i n th e f i r s t p l a c e , even a
" s u b j e c t i v e " p r e d i c a t e i s s t i l l a p r e d i c a t e , and, s e c o n d ly ,
as we s h a l l s e e , Kant c o u l d n o t a c t u a l l y have i d e n t i f i e d th e
modal c a t e g o r y of e x i s t e n c e w ith t h e p r e d i c a t e of an a u t h e n
t i c a l l y e x i s t e n t i a l ju d g m e n t. F o r , a c c o r d i n g to K ant,
t h i n k i n g an o b j e c t t h r o u g h the mere c a t e g o r y was n o t s u f f i -
1 1
c i e n t f o r t h i n k i n g i t as e x i s t e n t . The c a t e g o r y co u ld add
o n l y t h a t w hich could be e x h i b i t e d a p r i o r i ( i . e . , th e n o
t i o n of an o b j e c t b e in g r e l a t e d to some p e r c e p t i o n or
8 9
I b i d . , BIO-12. I b i d . , B286b-7a.
10 11
I b i d . I b i d . , B629a.
35
o t h e r ) . ^ I t could n o t add t o th e o b j e c t an a c t u a l c o n n e c
t i o n with t h e a p p r o p r i a t e p e r c e p t i o n in which, a lo n e , one
1 * 3
m i g h t be c o n s c io u s o f th e e x i s t e n c e of th e o b j e c t .
T h e r e f o r e , sitn p ly b e c a u s e the modal c a t e g o r y was
o n l y ” s u b j e c t i v e l y w s y n t h e t i c , one c o u ld i n f e r n e i t h e r t h a t
an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent would have no p r e d i c a t e n o r t h a t i t s
p r e d i c a t e would be o n l y * * su b jec tiv etr- - a l t h o u g h we s h a l l see
i t could n o t be wo b j e c t i v e tt i n th e se n se o f e n t e r i n g th e
e s s e n c e o f t h e o b j e c t ( c f . more e x t e n s i v e t r e a t m e n t o f t h i s
e n t i r e m a t t e r in C h a p t e r V, pp. 17-21, a l s o C h a p te r IX,
p p . 1 1 -2 4 ).
b. The Second Adverse Argument. But g iv e n t h a t
K an t r e g a rd e d e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ents as h a v in g p r e d i c a t e s ,
i t might s t i l l be c la im e d t h a t he r e g a rd e d t h e i r p r e d i c a t e s
as b ein g som ething o t h e r th a n e x i s t e n c e , namely, as b e in g
t h e o b j e c t whose e x i s t e n c e i s a f f i r m e d . C e r t a i n r e c e n t
a u t h o r s h av e, in e f f e c t , h e ld t h i s p o s i t i o n ; f o r th e y have
a n a ly z e d t h e s t r u c t u r e of e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent as b e in g the
l i n k i n g or r e l a t i n g o f a s u b j e c t c o n cep t to an o b j e c t .
J-2I b i d ., B272, a ls o C h a p te r IX, pp. 15-17.
13C f . I b i d . , B221, B629.
■^Cf. S. M o r r i s E n g e l, ’’K a n t 's ' R e f u t a t i o n ' of th e
O n t o l o g i c a l Argument, ** P h ilo s o p h y and P h en o m en o lo g ical
R e s e a r c h , XXIV (1 9 6 3 ), 25-7; a l s o W illiam Baumer,
'^ O n to lo g ic a l Arguments S t i l l F a i l , T ’ M o n ist, L (1 9 6 6 ),
130 f f .
36
And s i n c e t h a t w ith which th e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t i s l i n k e d in
judgm ent i s what Kant c a l l e d the ^ p r e d i c a t e , ” th e y h av e, in
e f f e c t , r e g a r d e d th e o b j e c t as the p r e d i c a t e .
One a u t h o r , W illia m Baumer, t r e a t s th e word ’’e x i s t s "
as f u n c t i o n i n g o n ly t o e x p r e s s the r e l a t i o n o f th e s u b j e c t
c o n c e p t to an o b j e c t g iv e n i n p e r c e p t i o n . Baumer w r i t e s :
For K ant, a judgment i s a f u n c t i o n o f u n i t y among
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , and i t is. the c o p u la which shows
th e u n i t y . To say t h i s , however, i s n o t t o say
t h a t th e l o g i c a l use of **to b e" i s sim ply u n i f i
c a t i o n o f c o n c e p t s , f o r t h e r e a r e on K a n t 's a n a l
y s i s s e v e r a l v a r i e t i e s o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , i n c l u d
in g i n t u i t i o n s o f p a r t i c u l a r s . A gain, Kant c l e a r l y
r e g a r d s th e c o p u la as n o t i t s e l f a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ;
i t i s p a r t o f th e form o f the p r o p o s i t i o n ; i t
p o s i t s th e u n i t y of th e s u b j e c t and p r e d i c a t e
term s, b u t i t has n e i t h e r c o n t e n t nor r e f e r e n c e
as terms do. T h is i s o f i n t e r e s t b e c a u s e , i f we
do n o t r e g a r d " t o be** as e n t i r e l y ambiguous, and
Kant g iv e s no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t he does so r e g a r d
i t , th e n t h e r e w i l l be c e r t a i n common e le m e n ts
in th e v a r i o u s u ses of t h a t term . In p a r t i c u l a r ,
one can e x p e c t t h a t , though th e p r e c i s e r e l a t i o n
v a r i e s i n th e two c a s e s , ’H o be** in i t s e x i s t e n c e -
a s s e r t i n g use as in i t s l o g i c a l use is n o t a r e p r e
s e n t a t i o n , hence n o t a c o n c e p t, hence n e i t h e r a
l o g i c a l nor a r e a l p r e d i c a t e . 15
. . . . The im p o r ta n t p o i n t made in th e d i s c u s s i o n
o f th e P o s t u l a t e s of E m p i r i c a l Thought i s t h a t
m o d a l i t i e s are q u a l i t i e s of th o u g h t, n o t of t h i n g s ,
so t h a t th e y do n o t e n l a r g e our c o n c e p ts of t h i n g s .
In p a r t i c u l a r , Kant t h e r e a rg u es t h a t the s o le d i s
t i n c t i o n o f p o s s i b l e and a c t u a l c o n c e p ts i s t h a t
p o s s i b l e ones are n o t w h ile a c t u a l ones a re r e l a t e d
t o so m eth in g g iv e n i n i n t u i t i o n . P l a i n l y t h i s i s
t o say t h a t i t i s the t a s k of th e e x i s t e n c e -
a s s e r t i n g use of " t o be" to r e l a t e c o n c e p ts to
t h i n g s . I d
. . . . Of c o u r s e , he [K a n t] d id n o te t h a t the
15_ _ 16
Baumer, op. c i t . I b i d .
37
hundred a c t u a l t h a l e r s do d i f f e r from th e hundred
p o s s i b l e t h a l e r s ; in th e fo rm er case b u t n o t in
th e l a t t e r t h e r e i s an o b j e c t c o r r e s p o n d in g t o
th e c o n c e p t. But t h i s i s p r e c i s e l y th e c o n f i r
m a tio n r e q u i r e d to s u p p o r t th e i n i t i a l c la im of
t h i s p a p e r c o n c e r n i n g th e e x i s t e n c e - a s s e r t i n g
. use of " t o b e . " There i t was argued t h a t th e
common meaning of th e l o g i c a l and e x i s t e n c e -
a s s e r t i n g u s e s of " t o b e " i s t h a t b o th r e l a t e
c o n c e p t s , and t h a t Kant i s u s in g t h i s common
e le m e n t in h i s argum ent. While the l o g i c a l
use r e l a t e s c o n c e p ts t o c o n c e p ts , th e e x i s t e n c e -
a s s e r t i n g use r e l a t e s c o n c e p ts to t h i n g s . As
a co n se q u e n c e , to a s s e r t t h a t so m eth in g e x i s t s
i s t o say more than i t s s u b j e c t c o n c e p t i n
c l u d e s , b u t th e more h e re i s n o t a c o n c e p t u a l
more. I t i s th e r e l a t i o n to an o b j e c t , n o t a
f u r t h e r c o n c e p t u a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n , which i s
added when one says "God i s " r a t h e r th a n
"G o d ."17
A nother a u t h o r , M o rris E n g e l, t r e a t s the word
" e x i s t s " as f u n c t i o n i n g t o e x p r e s s b o th th e p o s i t i n g of th e
c o n t e n t o f the s u b j e c t c o n c e p t as an o b j e c t , and th e r e l a
t i o n of th e p o s i t e d o b j e c t to th e c o n c e p t and th e one t h i n k
in g th e c o n c e p t.
What [K an t] seems to be s a y in g , i f n o t e x p l i c
i t l y th e n as l e a s t by i m p l i c a t i o n , i s t h a t th e
p r e d i c a t e " i s " has as i t s m ajor f u n c t i o n the
job o f a s s e r t i n g , e s t a b l i s h i n g , or p o s i t i n g
the s u b j e c t .
. . . . In a sim ple p r o p o s i t i o n of t h i s type
which has a s u b j e c t , c o p u la , and p r e d i c a t e ,
i t i s the f u n c t i o n of th e c o p u la , a c c o r d in g
to K ant, t o r e l a t e t h e "m eaning" of th e
c o n c e p t - t e r m o f the p r e d i c a t e to th e "m eaning"
of th e c o n c e p t - t e r m o f the s u b j e c t . What,
however, happens in c a s e s o f th o s e p r o p o s i t i o n s
which seem to have no p r e d i c a t e and i n which
th e word " i s " ap p ears t o be i t s e l f a " c o n c e p t "
h a v in g i t s own " o b j e c t " as, f o r example, in
18
Engel, op. cit„, pp. 25-6.
th e p r o p o s i t i o n "God i s ? M Here K a n t 's a n a l y s i s
becomes somewhat more c o m p l i c a t e d . In th e case
of the p r o p o s i t i o n "God i s " we seem to be m is s in g
a p r e d i c a t e ; the s e n te n c e seems t o be in c o m p le te .
"God i s " what? one i s tem pted t o ask. T h is q u e s
t i o n , Kant i m p l i e s , need not a r i s e . The s e n te n c e
i s com plete and i n t e l l i g i b l e . And n o t o n ly i s i t
com plete and p e r f e c t l y i n t e l l i g i b l e b u t th e word
" i s " i n t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n has a p a r a l l e l f u n c t i o n
to t h a t which i t has i n th e p r o p o s i t i o n "God i s
o m n i p o t e n t ." How i s t h a t p o s s i b l e ? Kant answers
t h a t th e m iss in g p r e d i c a t e - t e r m h e re i s the
" o b j e c t " ( u n i t o f m eaning) conveyed by th e c o n c e p t
term "God" in th e p r o p o s i t i o n . The term "God"
which a p p e a rs i n th e s u b j e c t - p o s i t i o n i n t h i s prop
o s i t i o n , t h a t i s , i s p r o j e c t e d by th e s p e a k e r i n t o
th e p r e d i c a t e - p o s i t i o n . The p r e d i c a t e - p o s i t i o n i s
now f i l l e d , b u t i t a p p e a rs we have done so by
d i s p o s i n g of th e s u b j e c t and th e s e n te n c e now
a p p ears to be d ev o id of a s u b j e c t . T h is however
i s n o t th e c a s e . The s u b j e c t p o s i t i o n , a c c o r d in g
to K ant, i s now o c c u p ie d by t h e ^ S u b j e c t ( th e
s p e a k e r ) h i m s e l f . The p r o p o s i t i o n "God i s " , in
o t h e r words, has an e x t e r n a l s u b j e c t - - t h e s p e a k e r
h i m s e l f who by means of th e " i s " p o s i t s , or e n
t e r t a i n s , th e o b j e c t "God" and e n t e r t a i n s i t as
the " o b j e c t " of h i s " c o n c e p t . "
K a n t’ s rem ark, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t in th e p r o p
o s i t i o n "Gott i s t , oder es i s t e j n G o tt, so s e t z e
i c h k e j n n e u e s P r a d i k a t zum B e g r i f f e von G o tt7
so n d e rn nur das S u b je k t an s i c h s e l b s t m it aTXen
s e i n e n P r a d i k a t e n , und zwar den G egenstand in
Beziehung auf meinen B e g r i f t " seems to me t o
most r e a d i l y lend i t s e l f ( to summarize) t o th e
f o l l o w i n g r e a d i n g : from a l o g i c a l p o i n t o f
view the word " i s " m erely p o s i t s th e p r e d i c a t e
i n i t s r e l a t i o n t o th e s u b j e c t ; i n th o s e p r o p
o s i t i o n s i n which the word " i s " i s n o t fo llo w e d
by a p r e d i c a t e and th u s has no p r e d i c a t e which
i t c o u ld p o s i t i n r e l a t i o n to a s u b j e c t and
t h e r e f o r e seems t o f u n c t i o n i n an e n t i r e l y
d i f f e r e n t w a y - - f u n c t i o n s as i f i t were a s s e r t
in g or p o s i t i n g an " o b j e c t " o f i t s own- - a l i t t l e
a n a l y s i s w i l l show t h a t t h i s i s ” m is ta k e n , t h a t
i t s f u n c t i o n i s s t i l l t o p o s i t ( n o t i t s e l f , i . e . ,
some m y th ic a l " o b j e c t " a n sw e rin g t o " i s " ) b u t the
p r e d i c a t e ( i n t h i s c a se th e s u b j e c t - t u r n e d -
p r e d i c a t e ) i n i t s r e l a t i o n t o th e s u b j e c t ( i n
t h i s case me or my c o n c e p t ) . In th e p r o p o s i t i o n
"God i s " , t h e r e f o r e , th e word " i s " has a p a r a l l e l
39
f u n c t i o n t o t h a t w hich i t has i n th e p r o p o s i t i o n
"God i s o m n ip o te n t” i n t h a t i t c o n n e c ts or p o s i t s
t h e s u b j e c t (God) as t h e o b j e c t o f my c o n c e p t, or
p o s i t s i t i n r e l a t i o n t o m e - - i t s e x t e r n a l s u b j e c t .
I n th e p r o p o s i t i o n ' "God i s o m n ip o te n t, * « i n s h o r t ,
th e s u b j e c t (God) i s w i t h i n th e p r o p o s i t i o n ; i n
t h e p r o p o s i t i o n "God is** th e s u b j e c t (God) becomes
an o b j e c t w hich has as i t s s u b j e c t th e " I ”' which
does the p o s i t i n g . 19
In e a c h of th e s e view s, " e x i s t s " or " i s " ( i n i t s e x i s t e n t i a l
s e n s e ) might be s a i d to e x p r e s s th e p r e d i c a t e ( i . e . , the
o b j e c t ) i n the s e n s e t h a t " e x i s t s ” or " i s " would have to be
c o n j o i n e d w ith t h e s u b j e c t word i n o r d e r t o make t h e l a t t e r
e x p r e s s n o t m e re ly the s u b j e c t c o n c e p t, b u t a l s o th e o b j e c t
as s t a n d i n g i n r e l a t i o n t o the s u b j e c t c o n c e p t (o r even, i n
E n g e l ' s view, t o th e s p e a k e r ) . But n e i t h e r a u th o r would
a c c o rd t o " e x i s t s " th e r o l e of e x p r e s s i n g any r e p r e s e n t a
t i o n , or c o n t e n t , n o t e x p r e s s e d by th e word which we sh o u ld
o r d i n a r i l y c o n s i d e r the s u b j e c t word o f an e x i s t e n t i a l
s t a t e m e n t . T h e re would be n o t h i n g d i s t i n c t from th e o b j e c t ,
which we might c a l l " e x i s t e n c e " and which we co u ld c o n s id e r
as th e p r e d i c a t e o f an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent.
In s u p p o r t of t h e s e a d v e rse p o s i t i o n s , one o f K a n t 's
t e x t s seems e s p e c i a l l y p e r t i n e n t .
" B e in g " i s o b v i o u s l y n o t a r e a l p r e d i c a t e ; t h a t
i s , i t i s n o t a c o n c e p t of so m e th in g which c o u ld
be added to t h e c o n c e p t o f a t h i n g . I t i s m e re ly
th e p o s i t i n g o f a t h i n g , or o f c e r t a i n d e t e r m i n a
t i o n s , as e x i s t i n g i n th e m s e lv e s . L o g i c a l l y , i t
i s m erely th e copula o f a judgm ent. The p ro p o
s i t i o n , "God i s o m n ip o te n t" c o n t a i n s two c o n c e p t s ,
19
I b i d . , p. 26.
40
each of which has i t s o b je c t- - G o d and om nipo
t e n c e . The small word " i s ” adds no new p r e d i
c a t e , b u t only s e r v e s t o p o s i t t h e p r e d i c a t e
i n i t s r e l a t i o n to t h e s u b j e c t . I f , now, we
ta k e th e s u b j e c t (God) w ith a l l i t s p r e d i c a t e s
(among w h ich is om nipotence) and say “God i s , ”
or “T h e re i s a God,“ we a t t a c h no new p r e d i c a t e
to the c o n c e p t of God, b u t o n ly p o s i t th e s u b j e c t
w ith a l l i t s p r e d i c a t e s , and in d e e d p o s i t i t as
b e in g an o b j e c t t h a t s ta n d s i n r e l a t i o n t o my
c o n c e p t . 2T3
In t h i s p a s s a g e Kant seems t o say:
^ ( i ) t h a t the word “being™ ( o r “ to b e ” ) does n o t
e x p r e s s a “real** or c o n c e p t u a l l y a d d i t i v e p r e d i c a t e .
( i i ) t h a t in i t s l o g i c a l u s e , the word “ i s ” e x
p r e s s e s m e re ly the c o p u la o f a ju d g m en t. T h a t i s , i t does
n o t e x p r e s s any o b je c t o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of i t s own, b u t
only p o s i t s a r e l a t i o n ( o f u n ity ) betw een t h e p r e d i c a t e
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and the s u b j e c t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .
( i i i ) t h a t in i t s e x i s t e n t i a l use, ” i s “ i s l i k e
th e l o g i c a l or c o p u l a t i v e “ i s , 1 '* ' i n t h a t the e x i s t e n t i a l
“ i s " does n o t e x p re ss any o b j e c t o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n p ro p e r
to i t s e l f . I n s t e a d ,
( i v ) th e e x i s t e n t i a l ”l s “ e x p r e s s e s (a ) the p o s i t
in g o f the s u b j e c t as an o b j e c t , o r a t l e a s t (b) the r e l a
t i o n in which the o b j e c t s ta n d s to t h e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t.
An O u tlin e of My Reply t o Both V e r s io n s
° t the Second Adverse Argument'
I s h a l l argue t h a t , when t a k e n in c o n t e x t , th e t e x t
20
I b i d . , p. 26.
41
j u s t i f i e s n e i t h e r ( i i i ) nor ( i v ) , and t h a t t o co n c lu d e from
t h i s p a s s a g e t h a t Kant r e g a r d e d th e s t r u c t u r e of an e x i s t e n
t i a l judgment as one i n which th e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t i s l i n k e d
to an o b j e c t c o n s t i t u t e d by p o s i t i n g th e c o n t e n t of t h e s u b
j e c t c o n c e p t as an o b j e c t ( E n g e l 's o p i n i o n ) , i s to m is u n d e r
s ta n d K a n t ’s p o s i t i o n - I s h a l l a l s o argue t h a t i t i s a m is
t a k e to i n t e r p r e t Kant as h av in g h e l d t h a t i n an e x i s t e n t i a l
judgm ent, th e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t i s l i n k e d t o even a non-
p o s i t e d b u t e x p e r ie n c e d o b j e c t (B au m er's o p i n i o n ) . That i s
to say , I s h a l l a rg u e t h a t Kant did n o t r e g a rd t h e s t r u c t u r e
of e x i s t e n t i a l jud g m en ts as th e l i n k i n g of a s u b j e c t c o n c e p t
w ith i t s o b j e c t .
For the f i r s t , or E n g e l ’s t h e s i s ( c o n t a i n i n g i i i and
b o th i v [ a ] and i v [ b ] ) , I s h a l l seek to r e f u t e as f o l l o w s :
Because K ant h e l d :
Theorem P: t h a t a l l e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ents
^ . . 21
a r e a p o s t e r i o r i ,
I s h a l l a rg u e t h a t he must have r e g a r d e d e x i s t e n t i a l j u d g
ments as need in g a ground i n e x p e r i e n c e o t h e r th a n t h a t i n
volved sim p ly in t h i n k i n g t h e i r s u b j e c t c o n c e p t s . Thus, he
could not have r e g a r d e d such judgm ents as m e re ly p o s i t i n g a
c o n t e n t t h a t has been th o u g h t in a s u b j e c t c o n c e p t; f o r he
r e g a rd e d a judgment t h a t would m e re ly p o s i t t h e c o n t e n t of
i t s s u b j e c t , as n e e d in g no ground i n e x p e r i e n c e o t h e r th a n
2 1 Ibid., B62Sc-29; also B270bc, 272-4.
42
2 2
t h a t in v o lv e d i n t h i n k i n g th e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t .
I s h a l l a l s o a rg u e t h a t Kant c o u ld n o t have r e g a rd e d
th e p h r a s e "God i s , ” as b e in g t r u l y an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent;
f o r he d id n o t r e g a r d "God i s " as c a p a b le of h av in g an a
23
p o s t e r i o r i ground i n e x p e r i e n c e . Nor indeed would Kant
seem t o have had t h e r i g h t - - b y r e a s o n o f h i s own e p i s t e m o l -
o g y - - f o r r e g a r d i n g t h e c o n c e p t "God" as p o s s e s s i n g a c o n t e n t
24
t h a t could even be p o s i t e d . T hat i s t o say, we c a n n o t
t r e a t K a n t ’s a n a l y s i s o f "God i s " as th e a n a l y s i s of t h e
s t r u c t u r e of an e x i s t e n t i a l ju d g m en t. Thus, m erely b e c a u s e
Kant r e g a r d e d " i s " in "God i s ” as e x p r e s s i n g no c o n t e n t of
i t s own, b u t o n ly ( t h e p o s i t i n g o f) a s u b j e c t c o n t e n t in
r e l a t i o n to i t s c o n c e p t , we c a n n o t c o n c lu d e t h a t Kant r e
garded t h e " i s ” (o r " e x i s t s " ) o f an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent as
e x p r e s s i n g no c o n t e n t o f i t s own, or as e x p r e s s i n g o n ly th e
r e l a t i o n of a s u b j e c t c o n t e n t (w h eth er p o s i t e d or e x p e r i
enced) to i t s c o n c e p t.
The second or Baumer’ s t h e s i s (co m b in in g i i i and
i v [ b ] ) I s h a l l a t t e m p t to r e f u t e by t a k i n g in c o n j u n c t i o n
22° f ' i b i d . , B 1 0 - U . 23I b i d . , B6296-30.
24I b i d . ; a l s o B 595ff; B6426-8a; B659-70. The
f o u n d a t i o n s of h i s r e a s o n i n g on t h i s p o i n t a r e : t h a t God
i s n o t th o u g h t as s u b j e c t t o s p a c e and tim e ( c f . B 7 1 -2 ),
and t h a t f o r a c o n c e p t t o have c o n t e n t , t h a t c o n t e n t most
c a p a b le o f b e in g e x h i b i t e d i n e x p e r i e n c e ( c f . B 5 9 5 -6 ), a t
l e a s t i m a g i n a t i v e l y ( c f . B176-187), w hich i s to say , as
s u b j e c t to space and tim e .
43
two v e r y c e n t r a l t h e s e s o f Kant (one of which I have a l r e a d y
m e n t i o n e d , n a m e ly ):
Theorem ct: E x i s t e n t i a l judgm ents a r e
s y n t h e t i c and th u s have p r e d i c a t e con
t e n t s t h a t a r e n o t i d e n t i c a l w i t h t h e i r
25
s u b j e c t c o n t e n t s .
The o t h e r t h e s i s , which I s h a l l d i s c u s s a t l e n g t h , i s :
Theorem y: The c o n t e n t of t h e s u b j e c t
co n c e p t of an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent i s
i d e n t i c a l w i t h t h e o b j e c t whose e x i s t
ence i s a f f i r m e d .
By means of t a k i n g p o i n t s a, and Y t o g e t h e r , I s h a l l arg u e
t h a t K ant did n o t r e g a r d th e o b j e c t as t h e p r e d i c a t e of an
e x i s t e n t i a l ju d g m en t, and t h a t he d id n o t , t h e n , r e g a r d th e
e x i s t e n t i a l T T i s ,r as e x p r e s s i n g o n ly th e r e l a t i o n , or u n i t
ing, o f the s u b j e c t c o n c e p t to i t s o b j e c t ( i v [ b ] ) . In t h i s
way, I s h a l l r e f u t e Baum er’ s r e a s o n s f o r h o l d i n g ( i i i ) t h a t
Kant re g a rd e d t h e e x i s t e n t i a l " i s " as e x p r e s s i n g no i n t u i t e d
c o n t e n t of i t s own; f o r Baumer a p p e a r s to r e s t t h i s t h e s i s
on h i s o p in io n t h a t Kant r e g a rd e d t h e e x i s t e n t i a l T Ii s n as
e x p r e s s i n g o n ly t h e r e l a t i o n or u n i o n of a s u b j e c t c o n c e p t
w ith i t s o b j e c t .
I s h a l l arg u e t h e s e v a r i o u s p o i n t s i n some d e t a i l :
2 5 Ibid., B625-6a; BIO-11.
2 6 Ibid., B6276-8.
44
R eply ( i n d e t a i l ) to th e F i r s t ,
or E n g e l ' s V e rsio n ~ 1
Kant u n d o u b te d ly r e g a r d e d e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ents as
b e in g a p o s t e r i o r i and as r e q u i r i n g , t h u s , a f o u n d a t i o n i n
27
e x p e r i e n c e . On th e o t h e r hand, i f th ey were t o c o n s i s t
m erely i n p o s i t i n g the c o n t e n t o f a s u b j e c t c o n c e p t as an
o b j e c t , th e n th e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t s h o u ld i t s e l f be a s u f f i
c i e n t ground f o r making th e judgm ent, s i n c e t h e c o n t e n t of
th e c o n c e p t would be g iv e n i n th e c o n c e p t i t s e l f , and s i n c e
an a c t of p o s i t i n g was r e g a r d e d by Kant as the k in d of a c t
which th e u n d e r s t a n d i n g c o u ld draw from i t s own s p o n t a n e i -
28
ty , once i t had some c o n t e n t on which t o o p e r a t e . T hat
i s to sa y , a c o n c e p t co u ld be f u r n i s h e d c o n t e n t by use of
29
th e i m a g i n a t i o n , th ro u g h which th e c o n t e n t of th e c o n c e p t
30
c o u ld be r e p r e s e n t e d as p o s s i b l e . But i f we were th e n
m e re ly t o p o s i t t h e c o n t e n t as an o b j e c t , w ith o u t d i s c o v e r
in g i t i n a c t u a l p e r c e p t i o n or i n f e r r i n g i t s e x i s t e n c e from
th e p e r c e p t i o n o f some o t h e r content^, we should n o t produce
an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent.
In th e mere c o n c e p t of a t h i n g no mark of i t s e x
i s t e n c e i s t o be found; . . . th e p e r c e p t i o n w hich
s u p p l i e s t h e c o n t e n t t o th e c o n c e p t i s t h e s o le
mark o f a c t u a l i t y .
P1 28
Ibid., B628c-9. Cf. ibid., B74-5, B93.
29 30
Ibid., B176-87. Ibid., B267b-72a.
3 1 Ibid., B272c.
45
W hatever, t h e r e f o r e , and however much our c o n c e p t
o f an o b j e c t may c o n t a i n , we must go o u t s i d e i t ,
i f we a re to a s c r i b e e x i s t e n c e to th e o b j e c t . In
th e c a s e of o b j e c t s o f th e s e n s e s , t h i s ta k e s
p la c e th ro u g h t h e i r c o n n e c t i o n w ith some one of
our p e r c e p t i o n s in a c c o rd a n c e w ith e m p i r i c a l law s.
. . . Our c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f a l l e x i s t e n c e (w h eth er
im m e d ia te ly th ro u g h p e r c e p t i o n , or m e d i a t e l y
th ro u g h i n f e r e n c e s w hich c o n n e c t so m eth in g w ith
p e r c e p t i o n } b e lo n g s e x c l u s i v e l y to th e u n i t y of
e x p e r i e n c e ; any ( a l l e g e d ) e x i s t e n c e o u t s i d e t h i s
f i e l d , w h ile n o t in d e e d such as we can d e c l a r e to
be a b s o l u t e l y i m p o s s i b l e , i s o f th e n a t u r e o f an
assu m p tio n which we can n e v e r be in a p o s i t i o n to
jus t i f y .32
Kant a d m itte d t h a t we need not p e r c e i v e an o b j e c t i n o rd e r
to a s c r i b e e x i s t e n c e to i t , b u t he h e ld t h a t we must a t
l e a s t i n f e r the o b j e c t ’ s e x i s t e n c e from the f a c t t h a t some
t h i n g e l s e e x i s t s o f which we do have p e r c e p t i o n .
. . . knowledge o f t h i n g s as a c t u a l does n o t, i n
deed, demand im m ediate p e r c e p t i o n (and, t h e r e f o r e ,
s e n s a t i o n of which we are c o n s c i o u s ) of the o b j e c t
whose e x i s t e n c e i s to be known. What we do, how
e v e r , r e q u i r e i s th e c o n n e c t i o n o f t h e o b j e c t w ith
some a c t u a l p e r c e p t i o n , in a c c o rd a n c e w ith th e an
a l o g i e s of e x p e r i e n c e , which d e f i n e a l l r e a l co n
n e c t i o n in e x p e r i e n c e i n g e n e r a l . 33
We can . . . know th e e x i s t e n c e of th e t h i n g p r i o r
t o i t s p e r c e p t i o n and, c o n s e q u e n t l y , c o m p a r a tiv e ly
s p e a k in g i n an a_ p r i o r i manner, o n ly i f i t be
bound up w ith c e r t a i n p e r c e p t i o n s , i n a cco rd an ce
w ith th e p r i n c i p l e s of e m p i r i c a l c o n n e c t i o n ( th e
a n a l o g i e s ) . For th e e x i s t e n c e of th e t h i n g b e in g
bound up w ith our p e r c e p t i o n s i n a p o s s i b l e e x p e r
i e n c e , we a r e a b le i n th e s e r i e s o f p o s s i b l e p e r
c e p t i o n s and under th e g u id a n c e of t h e a n a l o g i e s
t o make th e t r a n s i t i o n from our a c t u a l p e r c e p t i o n
t o the t h i n g i n q u e s t i o n . Thus, from the p e r c e p
t i o n o f th e a t t r a c t e d i r o n f i l i n g s we know o f th e
e x i s t e n c e of a m a g n e tic m a t t e r p e r v a d in g a l l b od
i e s , a l th o u g h the c o n s t i t u t i o n of our o rg an s c u ts
7 ?
Ibid., B629b. 3 3 Ibid., B272b.
46
us o f f from a l l im m ediate p e r c e p t i o n of t h i s m ed i
um. For i n a c c o rd a n c e w ith th e laws of s e n s i b i l i
t y and th e c o n t e x t of our p e r c e p t i o n s , we s h o u ld ,
were our' s e n s e s more r e f i n e d , come a l s o in an e x
p e r i e n c e upon the im m ediate e m p i r i c a l i n t u i t i o n of
i t . . . . Our knowledge of th e e x T ste n c e of t h i n g s
r e a c h e s , t h e n , o n ly so f a r as p e r c e p t i o n and i t s
advance a c c o r d in g t o e m p i r i c a l laws can e x t e n d .
I f we do n o t s t a r t from e x p e r i e n c e , or p ro c e e d i n
a c c o rd a n c e w ith laws of th e e m p i r i c a l c o n n e c t i o n
o f a p p e a r a n c e s , our g u e s s i n g or e n q u ir in g i n t o the
e x i s t e n c e of a n y t h i n g w i l l be o n ly an i d l e p r e
te n c e . 34
The p a s sa g e c i t e d i s one in which Kant s t r o v e t o e x p l a i n
what i t would be to c o n n e c t an u n p e r c e iv e d o b j e c t to a c t u a l
p e r c e p t i o n v i a the p r i n c i p l e s of e m p i r i c a l c o n n e c t i o n .
T h is p a s sa g e m ight seem t o s u g g e s t t h a t he would have a l
lowed us to a s c r i b e e x i s t e n c e t o an o b j e c t i f we co u ld b u t
p o s i t the o b j e c t as th e k in d o f t h i n g o f which we could
have se n su o u s i n t u i t i o n ,were our s e n s e s keen enough, t h a t
i s , were our s e n s e s a b le to e x te n d t o th e s i z e or p la c e in
which th e o b j e c t would be r e p r e s e n t e d as b e i n g . But t h i s
would n o t be so, f o r as th e b e g in n in g of th e p a s s a g e shows,
Kant was c o n cern ed w ith e x p l a i n i n g judgm ents o f a c t u a l e x
i s t e n c e , i n w hich we sh o u ld know a t h i n g t o e x i s t . And he
c e r t a i n l y d id n o t b e l i e v e t h a t e v e r y t h i n g e x i s t s which can
be c o n c e iv e d and r e p r e s e n t e d i n th e i m a g i n a t i o n as s e n s i b l e .
I can c o n c e iv e an a p p le , and r e p r e s e n t i t to m y s e lf as
b r i g h t red and s u c c u l e n t ; b u t Kant would n o t have allow ed
me to say t h a t , t h e r e f o r e , th e a p p le i s e x i s t e n t . No, the
3 4 Ibid., B273-4a.
47
f a c t t h a t we might p o s i t th e c o n t e n t of a c o n c e p t i n the
im a g i n a t i o n , e i t h e r i n a d e t a i l e d way or m erely th ro u g h
schem ata, was n o t r e g a r d e d by K ant as s u f f i c i e n t ground f o r
knowing t h a t th e o b j e c t e x i s t s . P o s i t i n g an o b j e c t in t h i s
way was, in d e e d , r e g a r d e d by K ant as n e c e s s a r y i n o r d e r f o r
us to know an o b j e c t as p o s s i b l e , b u t knowing an o b j e c t as
p o s s i b l e was n o t r e g a r d e d by K ant as s u f f i c i e n t f o r knowing
35
i t as e x i s t e n t .
But g r a n t e d t h a t m erely p o s i t i n g an o b j e c t would
n o t s u f f i c e f o r knowing t h a t th e o b j e c t e x i s t s , one might
s t i l l ask w h e th e r we c o u ld not c a l l such an a c t o f p o s i t i n g
an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent. S u r e l y , we sometimes c o n j e c t u r e
t h a t th i n g s e x i s t , even when we do not know t h a t th e y do.
And the a c t of c o n j e c t u r i n g m ig h t seem to in v o lv e judgment
which, by b e a r i n g on e x i s t e n c e , sh o u ld be c a l l e d e x i s t e n t i a l .
For example, we might sa y c o n j e c t u r a l l y , TtL i f e on o t h e r
p l a n e t s e x i s t s . ” In t h i s example we m ight seem t o e x p r e s s
a judgment b e a r i n g on e x i s t e n c e , and i t m ight seem t h e r e
f o r e t h a t su c h a judgm ent sh o u ld be c a l l e d e x i s t e n t i a l .
B ut, in t h i s c a s e , we sh o u ld n eed a new d i v i s i o n o f te rm s ,
f o r we s h o u ld have t o d i s t i n g u i s h b etw een m erely c o n j e c t u r
a l e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ents and e x i s t e n t i a l , judgm ents which
e x p re s s knowledge o f a t h i n g ' s e x i s t e n c e . For c e r t a i n p u r
p o s e s, such a d i s t i n c t i o n m ight be u s e f u l , f o r c o n j e c t u r i n g
35
Ibid., B628c-9.
48
about s o m e t h i n g ’ s e x i s t e n c e m ight i n v o l v e judgment ( a l
th o u g h i t i s n o t e n t i r e l y c l e a r t h a t i t d o e s, inasm uch as
we m ig h t p o s s i b l y be a b le to " c o n j e c t u r e so m e th in g as e x
i s t e n t " th ro u g h a c o n c e p t a l o n e ) . And we m ight w ish t o
speak o f such a " c o n j e c t u r a l judgm ent" as one o f th e c l a s s
of judgm ents which seem t o b e a r on e x i s t e n c e . But su c h a
judgm ent would n o t be t h a t which Kant r e g a r d e d as an e x i s
t e n t i a l judgm ent. For such c o n j e c t u r e would f i n a l l y e x p r e s s
no knowledge beyond t h a t of th e o b j e c t ' s p o s s i b i l i t y , w h ere
as Kant r e g a r d e d e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent as e x p r e s s i n g know l-
36
edge o f an o b j e c t ' s e x i s t e n c e .
But i f the a c t o f p o s i t i n g th e c o n t e n t of a c o n c e p t
as an o b j e c t i s n o t what-Kant r e g a r d e d as an e x i s t e n t i a l
judgm ent, th e n one i s s u r e l y e n t i t l e d to ask, why d id Kant
in B626-7 a n a ly z e the judgm ent, "God i s , " as th e p o s i t i n g of
a s u b j e c t c o n c e p t 's c o n t e n t as an o b j e c t ? To answer t h i s
q u e s t i o n , we must r a i s e a p o i n t t h a t seems t o have been a l
most c o m p le te ly o v e rlo o k e d i n com m entaries on K a n t 's t r e a t
ment o f th e p r e d i c a t e of e x i s t e n c e , nam ely, t h a t th e p h ra s e
"God is"' c o u ld , or a t l e a s t o u g h t, not have b een r e g a r d e d by
Kant as an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent; f o r th e c o n c e p t of God was
what Kant c a l l e d an " I d e a o f pure r e a s o n " - - t h a t i s , a con-
37
c e p t w i t h o u t e m p i r i c a l c o n t e n t or r e l a t i o n to e x p e r i e n c e .
I f i t i s t h a t , th e n , we c a n n o t ju d g e t h a t i t s c o n t e n t
37
Cf. footnote 24.
49
e x i s t s .
In th e c a se o f o b j e c t s o f th e se n se s t h i s ( i . e .
a s c r i b i n g e x i s t e n c e to them) t a k e s p l a c e th ro u g h
t h e i r c o n n e c t i o n w ith some one of our p e r c e p t i o n s ,
in a c c o rd a n c e w ith e m p i r i c a l la w s . But i n th e
case o f o b j e c t s or pure t h o u g h t , we have no means
w h a tso e v e r o f knowing t h e i r e x i s t e n c e , s in c e i t
would have t o be known in a c o m p le te ly a p r i o r i
m anner. Our c o n s c io u s n e s s o f a l l e x i s t e n c e
(w hether im m e d ia te ly th ro u g h p e r c e p t i o n , or m edi
a t e l y th ro u g h i n f e r e n c e s w hich c o n n e c t som ething
w ith p e r c e p t i o n ) b e lo n g s e x c l u s i v e l y to th e u n i t y
of e x p e r i e n c e ; any L a l l e g e d j e x i s t e n c e o u t s i d e
t h i s f i e l d , w h ile n o t in d e e d such as we can d e c l a r e
t o be a b o l u t e l y i m p o s s i b l e , i s o f th e n a t u r e o f an
a s su m p tio n which we can n ev er be i n a p o s i t i o n to
ju s t i f y .
The c o n c e p t of a supreme b e in g i s i n many r e
s p e c t s a v e ry u s e f u l i d e a ; b u t j u s t b e c a u s e i t i s
a mere i d e a , i t i s a l t o g e t h e r i n c a p a b l e , by i t s e l f
a l o n e , o f e n l a r g i n g our knowledge in r e g a r d to
what e x i s t s . I t i s n o t even c o m p eten t to e n l i g h t
en us as t o the p o s s i b i l i ty o f any e x is te n c e beyond
t h a t which i s known i n and th ro u g h e x p e r i e n c e . The
a n a l y t i c c r i t e r i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y , as c o n s i s t i n g i n
th e p r i n c i p l e t h a t b a r e p o s i t i v e s ( r e a l i t i e s ) g iv e
r i s e t o no c o n t r a d i c t i o n , c a n n o t be d e n ie d t o t i .
But s in c e th e r e a l i t i e s a re n o t g iv e n t o us i n
t h e i r s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r s ; s i n c e even i f th e y were,
we should s t i l l n o t be in a p o s i t i o n to p a ss j u d g
ment; s in c e th e c r i t e r i o n o f th e p o s s i b i l i t y of
s n y t h e t i c knowledge i s n e v e r to be lo o k e d f o r save
i n e x p e r i e n c e , to which th e o b j e c t o f an id e a c a n
n o t b e lo n g , the c o n n e c t i o n of- a l l r e a l p r o p e r t i e s
i n a t h i n g i s a s n y t h e s i s , th e p o s s i b i l i t y of which
we a re u n a b le to d e te r m in e a p r i o r i .
Kant would n o t allo w us t o judge even t h a t th e c o n t e n t o f
th e c o n c e p t o f God i s p o s s i b l e , much l e s s , th e n , t h a t t h i s
c o n t e n t ^ i s e x i s t e n t .
Indeed, we may w e ll wonder w h e th e r, in keep in g w ith
K a n t 's p r i n c i p l e s , we sh o u ld r e g a r d the i d e a , or c o n c e p t,
3 8 Ibid., B629-630b.
50
of God as h a v in g any c o n t e n t t h a t c o u ld even be p o s i t e d as
an o b j e c t . For i t would seem q u e s t i o n a b l e w hether an id e a
ought t o have any c o n t e n t ; f o r Kant h e l d t h a t any c o n t e n t
of our t h i n k i n g must be s u p p l i e d , o r i g i n a l l y , by sensuous
39
i n t u i t i o n i n p e r c e p t i o n . To be s u r e , we can c o n c e iv e ob
j e c t s which we have n o t p e r c e i v e d , b u t o n ly th ro u g h c o n
c e i v i n g them as b e i n g a n a lo g o u s t o t h i n g s we do p e r c e i v e
( i . e . , th ro u g h r e p r e s e n t i n g them i n the i m a g i n a t i o n as s e n
s u o u s ) . F u r th e r m o r e , th e form s, or c o n c e p t s , i n which we
t h i n k of se n su o u s c o n t e n t may th e m se lv e s be r e p r e s e n t e d as
o b j e c t s to our t h i n k i n g , b u t o n ly by v i r t u e o f t h e i r e m p i r
i c a l c o n t e n t , f o r w i t h o u t t h i s c o n t e n t , th e y s h o u ld n o t
40
emerge a t a l l i n our c o n s c i o u s n e s s . On the o t h e r hand,
th e i d e a was c o n s i d e r e d by Kant p r e c i s e l y as a c o n c e p t which
l a c k s s e n su o u s c o n t e n t , which has no o b j e c t t h a t would be
41
r e p r e s e n t a b l e as s e n s u o u s . Kant s t r o v e a t l e n g t h to show
how such an i d e a m ight s t i l l p la y a r o l e in our t h i n k i n g ,
b u t I do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t he showed how th e id e a co u ld be
s a i d t o have c o n t e n t . B ut, i n any c a s e , we s h o u ld n o t say
t h a t such an i d e a has an o b j e c t r e p r e s e n t a b l e as s e n s u o u s .
And I do n o t see how we co u ld sp eak o f ^ p o s i t i n g ” i t s ob
j e c t , f o r I do n o t see what " p o s i t i n g ” c o u ld mean i f i t d id
39
)I b i d .
C f. i b i d . , B33-4; B74-6; B92c-3.
40.
4 1 Ibid., B368-77; cf. also B595-619.
51
n o t mean an a c t of r e p r e s e n t i n g an im a g in a b le c o n t e n t .
I t would seem, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t a s e r i o u s m i s t a k e
has been made when com m entators have based t h e i r i n t e r p r e
t a t i o n o f K a n t ’s t r e a t m e n t o f e x i s t e n c e as a p r e d i c a t e , on
h i s t r e a t m e n t of " i s " i n the s t a t e m e n t "God i s ; n f o r as we
have s e e n , "God i s " sh o u ld n o t be r e g a rd e d as having e x
p r e s s e d , f o r K ant, a t r u l y e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent. K ant p r e
s e n te d " i s " i n "God i s " as e x p r e s s i n g th e p o s i t i n g o f an
o b j e c t , w hereas i n a t r u l y e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent, " i s " must
e x p r e s s an o b j e c t t h a t i s n o t m e re ly p o s i t e d , but i s e i t h e r
p e r c e i v e d or i n f e r r e d from som ething t h a t i s p e r c e i v e d .
K a n t ’s A n a ly s is of "God i s " O f f e r s No
Ground f o r Denying That the
E x i s t e n t i a l " i s " E x p re s s e s
A C o n te n t of I t s Own
But to r e c o g n i z e t h a t " i s " in "God i s " does n o t
p la y th e same r o l e as th e " i s " of an e x i s t e n t i a l s t a t e m e n t
is a l r e a d y t o b e g in b r e a k in g down th e p a r a l l e l t h a t Kant i s
so o f t e n th o u g h t to have drawn between t h e e x i s t e n t i a l " i s "
and th e co p u la ( i n B 6 2 6 - 7 ) ; f o r even th o u g h th e r o l e of
" i s " i n "God i s ” m ight be v e ry l i k e t h a t o f the c o p u l a ,
t h a t o f th e t r u l y e x i s t e n t i a l " i s " must d i f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t
l y from t h a t of th e c o p u la . For the r o l e o f the c o p u l a was,
f o r K ant, a p o s i t i n g r o l e , inasm uch as t h e u n i f i c a t i o n of
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s in judgm ent was re g a rd e d by Kant as some
t h i n g f o r which th e ground m ight be g iv e n i n e x p e r i e n c e ( in
th e c a se o f a p o s t e r i o r j ju d g m en ts) but w hich was i t s e l f an
52
a c t i s s u i n g from the s p o n t a n e i t y of th e u n d e r s t a n d i n g ( i . e . ,
a p o s i t i n g } . The f o l l o w i n g t e x t w i l l b e a r out my p o i n t :
The P o s s i b i l i t y of C om bination
i n G en eral
The m a n ifo ld of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s can be g iv en i n an
i n t u i t i o n which i s p u r e l y s e n s i b l e , t h a t i s , n o t h
ing b u t r e c e p t i v i t y ; and th e form o f t h i s i n t u i
t i o n can l i e a _ p r i o r i in our f a c u l t y o f r e p r e s e n
t a t i o n , w ith o u t b e i n g a n y th in g more t h a n th e mode
in which the s u b j e c t i s a f f e c t e d . But the com bin
a t i o n ( c o n j u n c t i o n ) o f a m a n ifo ld in g e n e r a l can
never come to us t h r o u g h th e s e n s e s , and c a n n o t,
t h e r e f o r e , be a l r e a d y c o n t a i n e d i n th e pure form
of s e n s i b l e i n t u i t i o n . For i t i s an a c t of s p o n
t a n e i t y o f the f a c u l t y of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ; and
s in c e t h i s f a c u l t y , t o d i s t i n g u i s h i t from s e n s i
b i l i t y , must be e n t i t l e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a l l com-
b i n a t i o n - - b e we c o n s c io u s of i t o r n o t , be i t a
c o m b in a tio n of t h e m a n ifo ld o f i n t u i t i o n , e m p i r i
c a l or n o n - e m p i r i c a l , or of v a r i o u s c o n c e p t s - ~ i s
an a c t o f the u n d e r s t a n d i n g . To t h i s a c t the g e n
e r a l t i t l e “s y n t h e s i s ” may be a s s i g n e d , as i n d i
c a t i n g t h a t we c a n n o t r e p r e s e n t t o o u r s e l v e s a n y
t h i n g as combined i n th e o b j e c t which we have n o t
o u r s e l v e s p r e v i o u s l y combined, and t h a t of a l l
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s c o m b in a tio n i s th e o n ly one which
cannot be given t h r o u g h o b j e c t s . B ein g an a c t of
th e s e l f - a c t i v i t y o f the s u b j e c t , i t can n o t be e x
e c u te d save by th e s u b j e c t i t s e l f . ^2
But we have shown t h a t what Kant s a i d o f th e f u n c t i o n of
" i s " i n "God i s ”1 1 was n o t s a i d of a t r u l y e x i s t e n t i a l " i s , ”
and s in c e we have, n e x t , shown the l a c k o f s i m i l a r i t y b e
tween the ( p o s i t i n g ) f u n c t i o n i n g of th e copula and the
( n o n - p o s i t i n g ) f u n c t i o n of a t r u l y e x i s t e n t i a l " i s , ” then
we are s u r e l y in a p o s i t i o n t o doubt w h e th e r K a n t ' s sa y in g
t h a t n e i t h e r th e c o p u la nor th e " i s ” i n "God i s " p o s i t s a
c o n te n t or r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f i t s own a llo w s us t o conclude
42
Ibid., B129-30b.
53
t h a t th e t r u l y e x i s t e n t i a l " i s " e x p r e s s e s no c o n t e n t or r e p
r e s e n t a t i o n o f i t s own. We may n o t be i n a p o s i t i o n , a t
l e a s t n o t y e t , to c o n c lu d e t h a t th e e x i s t e n t i a l " i s " does
e x p r e s s a c o n t e n t o f i t s own, n o t e x p r e s s e d by t h e s u b j e c t
word. But we a r e s u r e l y n o t p u t in a p o s i t i o n t o deny t h a t
i t d o e s . For t h e a n a lo g y on w hich the d e n i a l would be
b a s e d , has b ro k e n down.
R ep ly i n D e t a i l to Baum er1s V e r s io n of
th e Second A d v e rse Argument
Kant i n s i t e d , n o t o n ly i n t h e c a s e o f "God i s , " b u t
a l s o in t h a t o f t r u l y e x i s t e n t i a l jud g m en ts on th eo rem Y,
w hich i s to s a y , an i d e n t i t y b etw een t h e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t ' s
c o n t e n t and t h e o b j e c t whose e x i s t e n c e i s a f f i r m e d .
I f , now, we t a k e t h e s u b j e c t (God) w i t h a l l i t s
p r e d i c a t e s (among which i s o m n ip o te n c e ), and say
"God i s , " or "T here i s a G od," we a t t a c h no new
p r e d i c a t e t o th e c o n c e p t of God, b u t o n ly p o s i t th e
s u b j e c t i n i t s e l f w ith a l l i t s p r e d i c a t e s , and i n
deed p o s i t i t as b e in g an o b j e c t t h a t s ta n d s i n r e
l a t i o n to my c o n c e p t . The c o n t e n t of b o th must be
one and t h e same; n o t h i n g can have b e e n added t o th e
c o n c e p t, w hich e x p r e s s e s m e re ly what i s p o s s i b l e . A
hundred r e a l t h a l e r s do n o t c o n t a i n th e l e a s t c o in
more th a n a hundred p o s s i b l e t h a l e r s . For as t h e
l a t t e r s i g n i f y t h e c o n c e p t, and th e form er t h e ob
j e c t and t h e p o s i t i n g o f t h e o b j e c t , s h o u ld t h e f o r
mer c o n t a i n more th a n t h e l a t t e r , my c o n c e p t would
n o t , i n t h a t c a s e , e x p r e s s th e whole o b j e c t , and
would n o t t h e r e f o r e be an a d e q u a te c o n c e p t of i t .
By w h a t e v e r and by however many p r e d i c a t e s we
may t h i n k a t h i n g - - e v e n i f we c o m p l e t e l y d e t e r m in e
i t - - w e do n o t make t h e l e a s t a d d i t i o n t o t h e t h i n g
when we f u r t h e r ' d e c l a r e t h a t t h i s t h i n g i s .
O th e r w is e , i t would n o t be e x a c t l y t h e same t h i n g
t h a t e x i s t s , b u t som ething more th a n we had
th o u g h t i n t h e c o n c e p t; and we could n o t , t h e r e
f o r e , say t h a t t h e e x a c t o b j e c t o f my c o n c e p t
54
( a ) t h a t e v e ry e x i s t e n -
has a p r e d i c a t e w hich
I t seems i m p o s s i b l e ,
th e n , t h a t K ant co u ld have r e g a r d e d th e o b j e c t as t h e p r e d i
c a t e o f a s y n t h e t i c e x i s t e n t i a l ju d g m en t, s i n c e th e o b j e c t
was r e g a r d e d by K ant as n e c e s s a r i l y i d e n t i c a l w i t h th e con
t e n t of th e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t ( i . e . , w i t h t h e s u b j e c t o f th e
ju d g m e n t). I f th e o b j e c t were n o t i d e n t i c a l w ith t h e s u b
j e c t c o n c e p t , K ant i n s i s t e d , we c o u ld n o t , a f t e r t h i n k i n g a
c o n c e p t o f an o b j e c t as p o s s i b l e , go on t o d i s c o v e r and say
t h a t t h a t same o b j e c t e x i s t s or i s r e a l ; f o r i f t h e r e were
som ething more c o n s t i t u t i v e of th e o b j e c t th a n what i s
th o u g h t of in t h e c o n c e p t, th e n t h e o b j e c t would be c o n s t i
t u t e d by t h i s a d d i t i o n a l f a c t o r as som ething d i f f e r e n t from
t h a t which was t h o u g h t in t h e c o n c e p t.
To be s u r e , Bauraer a t t e m p t s t o hold t h a t , even
though th e e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent i s s y n t h e t i c , th e o b j e c t
can s t i l l be th e judgm ent as a w hole; f o r i n t h i s c a s e th e
o b j e c t co u ld n o t s t i l l be i d e n t i c a l l y th e same as t h a t
which was th o u g h t as p o s s i b l e . For Baumer would r e g a r d
t h i s "so m e th in g more" th a n i s in t h e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t , as
e n t e r i n g i n t o th e c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e o b j e c t and as
43I b i d . , B627-8.
44
I b i d . , B625b~6a; c f . a l s o C h a p te r I I I , pp. 33-35;
C h a p te r VI, p p . 116-23.
e x i s t s .
We have a l s o s e e n t h a t Kant a c c e p te d
i
t i a l p r o p o s i t i o n i s s y n t h e t i c ( i . e . ,
44
i s n o t i d e n t i c a l w i t h i t s s u b j e c t .
55
c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e o b j e c t as som ething d i f f e r e n t from th e con-
45
t e n t o f th e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t . To be s u r e , we m ight n o t e x
p r e s s th e n a t u r e of t h i s d i f f e r e n c e i n a c o n c e p t, b u t we
co u ld s t i l l be aware of i t , and t h u s , a c c o r d in g t o K a n t ’s
r e a s o n i n g , we c o u ld r e c o g n i z e t h a t the e x i s t e n t o b j e c t i s
n o t th e i d e n t i c a l o b j e c t o f which we th o u g h t i n t h i n k i n g i t
as p o s s i b l e . One might n o t ag re e w ith K a n t 's r e a s o n i n g ( a l
th o u g h I s h a l l , i n e f f e c t , defen d i t i n C h a p te r X ). But one
must ad m it, I b e l i e v e , t h a t B aum er's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Kant
would c o n t r a d i c t t h a t r e a s o n i n g . T h e r e f o r e , h i s p r o p o s a l
s h o u ld n o t be ta k e n t o e x p r e s s K a n t ’s d o c t r i n e r e g a r d i n g the
n a t u r e of e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent, f o r i t v i o l a t e s one of
K a n t 's most i n s i s t e n t d i c t a ( i . e . , Theorem y ) : t h a t th e
c o n t e n t of the s u b j e c t c o n c e p t must be i d e n t i c a l w ith t h a t
which c o n s t i t u t e s the o b j e c t t h a t i s s a i d to e x i s t .
Theorem y . T h is i s to s a y t h a t Kant b e l i e v e d t h a t ,
s i n c e we a r e a b le f i r s t t o t h i n k o f a p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t
w i t h o u t knowing t h a t i t e x i s t s , and th e n l a t e r t o f i n d t h a t
t h i s p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t does e x i s t , our p r e v io u s t h i n k i n g
must have ’’c o n t a i n e d ” t h i s p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t . T h a t i s , in
K a n t ’s te rm s , our c o n c e p t i o n must have u n i f i e d g iv e n d a t a
i n t o r e l a t i o n t o t h i s p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t which, i n and
th ro u g h t h e d a t a , was th o u g h t i n i t s p a r t i c u l a r i t y p r i o r t o
46
our knowing o f i t s e x i s t e n c e . I f Kant had th o u g h t t h a t ,
^Baumer, op. cit. ^Cf. Kant, op. cit. , B627b-8a.
56
p r i o r t o p e r c e i v i n g a t h i n g , we w e re a b le o n ly to c o n c e iv e
the k i n d of t h i n g which we could l a t e r d i s c o v e r , t h e n he
might p o s s i b l y have a llo w e d t h a t t h e o b j e c t could be d i f f e r
e n t , i n i t s n o n - c o n c e p t u a l c h a r a c t e r , from t h e m e re ly c o n
c e p t u a l c o n te n t o f i t s c o n c e p t. But Kant d i d not say m erely
t h a t we could d i s c o v e r , a s e x i s t e n t , th e k in d of t h i n g which
we had p r e v i o u s l y c o n c e iv e d . He i n s i s t e d t h a t we co u ld d i s
cover th e i d e n t i c a l t h i n g which we had p r e v i o u s l y c o n c e iv e d .
I t may seem s t r a n g e fo r us to i n t e r p r e t Kant as h a v
ing p e r m it t e d u s to c o n c e i v e a p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t and n o t
m e re ly a kind o f o b j e c t . S u re ly , among many p h i l o s o p h e r s
( A r i s t o t e l i a n s and T h o m is ts , fo r exam ple) t h e o p in io n i s
h e ld t h a t m e re ly c o n c e p t u a l t h i n k i n g n e c e s s a r i l y a b s t r a c t s
from t h e i n d i v i d u a l . ^ Y e t, I s h a l l a rg u e t h a t our i n t e r
p r e t a t i o n of K a n t is in acco rd b o t h w ith h i s w r i t i n g i n th e
p r e s e n t c o n te x t ( i . e . , h i s d i s c u s s i o n of e x i s t e n c e ) and w i t h
h is e p is te m o lo g y in g e n e r a l .
I f K ant had meant t h a t t h e c o n te n t o f th e c o n c e p t
is i d e n t i c a l m e r e l y vtfith only a p a r t of t h e o b j e c t , w hich
would be i t s c o n c e p t u a l ( o r c o n c e p t u a l i z a b l e ) c o n t e n t , th en
i t would have b e e n very sim p le f o r him to h a v e s a id so ; and
he c o u ld t h e r e b y have e a s i l y a v o id e d many o f th e d i f f i c u l
t i e s and c o m p l e x i t i e s o f h i s d i s c u s s i o n of t h e i d e n t i t y of
47
C f . A r i s t o t l e , De Anima (New Haven: Yale U n i v e r s
i t y P r e s s , 1 9 5 1 ) , 4 3 1 b 2 0 -4 3 2 a l4 ; Thomas A q u in a s , Summa
T h e o lo g ia e (Rome: M a r i e t t i , 1 9 5 2 ), l a , a . 86, a r t . 1.
57
th e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t and the o b j e c t which i t d e n o t e s . The
f a c t t h a t t h e r e a re l i m i t s t o th e power o f c o n c e i v i n g was
e n t i r e l y f a m i l i a r t o Kant, f o r perhaps no one had devoted
more e f f o r t to d e l i n e a t i n g t h e s e l i m i t s th a n he. I f he
could have s a i d what he was t r y i n g to s a y , m erely by b r i n g
in g to b e a r t h i s f a m i l i a r c o n s i d e r a t i o n , he would v e ry
p ro b a b ly have done s o . But he d id not do so. And i t i s
only good s e n s e t o sa y t h a t he must have r e f r a i n e d from
d o in g so f o r a r e a s o n . I p r o p o s e t h a t t h e r e a so n must have
been what t h e prima f a c i e m eaning of h i s words s u g g e s t ;
namely, t h a t he m a i n ta in e d an i d e n t i t y betw een t h e c o n t e n t
of the s u b j e c t c o n c e p t and t h e p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t which i s
e m p i r i c a l l y judged t o e x i s t .
T h a t i s t o s a y , Kant d i d not s p e a k of a " k in d of
object** as b e in g i d e n t i c a l w i t h the c o n t e n t of th e s u b j e c t
c o n c e p t. He did n o t , in t h i s c o n t e x t , sp e a k of a n y th in g
l i k e " k i n d s of o b j e c t s , ” a l t h o u g h he m ig h t w e ll h a v e , had
he wished t o . He spoke of t h e o b j e c t . To be s u r e , in
German, more than i n E n g l i s h , th e a r t i c l e " t h e ” i s p r e f i x e d
to the word f o r an o b j e c t i n o r d e r to s p e a k of a k i n d . But
the most common use o f " t h e ” i n e i t h e r la n g u ag e i s in
s p e a k in g o f o b j e c t s as p a r t i c u l a r s . For t h i s r e a s o n we
should presum e, u n l e s s the c o n t e x t were c l e a r l y t o i n d i c a t e
th e c o n t r a r y , t h a t when " t h e ” i s used, i t s i g n i f i e s some
t h i n g p a r t i c u l a r . And, of c o u r s e , a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n t h a t
Kant meant so m eth in g o th e r t h a n a p a r t i c u l a r is p r e c i s e l y
58
what i s l a c k i n g . The f a c t t h a t i t is l a c k i n g , when i t would
have s i m p l i f i e d K a n t 's p r e s e n t a t i o n im m ensely, i s i n d i c a t i v e
of t h e f a c t t h a t i t s absence was i n t e n t i o n a l .
But I have no need to r e s t my c a se on a c l o s e e x e
g e s i s of K a n t 's t e x t in B627-8; f o r th e o p i n io n t h a t he
would allo w us t o c o n c e iv e of a p a r t i c u l a r , and not m e re ly
of a k in d , i s i n c l o s e a c c o rd w ith h i s t h e o r y of knowledge
as a whole.
How O th e r P a r t s of K a n t 's System E n t a i l y
A c c o rd in g to K ant, th e c o n t e n t o f an e m p i r i c a l c o n
c e p t could be r e p r e s e n t e d th ro u g h "schemata** i n the i m a g i
n a t i o n . ^ And th ro u g h schem ata an o b j e c t t h a t was n o t
i t s e l f p e r c e i v e d c o u ld s t i l l be d e t e r m i n a t i v e l y th o u g h t as
b e i n g in a p a r t i c u l a r s p a c e . T h a t i s , th ro u g h sch em ata,
th e one u n iq u e space in. which, a lo n e , f u t u r e e x p e r i e n c e
m ig h t occur was a l r e a d y s u b j e c t to d e t e r m i n a t i o n in i n t u i
t i o n , and in such a way t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r p l a c e in sp ace
c o u l d be d e te rm in e d as d i f f e r e n t from a n o th e r p la c e i n
s p a c e . But s i n c e a p a r t i c u l a r p la c e i n space dould be
d e t e r m in e d , a p a r t i c u l a r p o s s i b l e o b j e c t c o u ld be d e t e r
m ined, inasm uch as d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f an o b j e c t i n t o a space
w ould e n a b le us to r e p r e s e n t th e o b j e c t as p a r t i c u l a r .
T h a t i s , an o b j e c t a l r e a d y d e te rm in e d i n th o u g h t as t o i t s
48
Cf. Kant, op. cit., B176-87.
59
k in d or n a t u r e m ight be d e te rm in e d as p a r t i c u l a r th ro u g h
b e i n g r e p r e s e n t e d as s i t u a t e d i n a p a r t i c u l a r s p a c e .
F u r th e r m o r e , as we have a l r e a d y se e n in B273, Kant
r e g a r d e d th e " a n a l o g i e s o f e x p e r i e n c e " as e n a b l i n g us t o
c o n c e iv e a p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t p r i o r t o i t s p e r c e p t i o n . The
p o i n t w ith which Kant was c o n cern ed i n B273 was t h a t the
a n a l o g i e s c o u ld go even f u r t h e r , i n t h a t th e y would a llo w
us a c t u a l l y to judge t h a t th e o b j e c t e x i s t s , p r i o r t o our
p e r c e i v i n g ' i t . But th e y would a l s o , o b v i o u s l y , a llo w us t o
c o n c e iv e th e o b j e c t as p a r t i c u l a r , b e f o r e g o in g on to com
p l e t e our t h i n k i n g i n j u d g in g t h a t th e o b j e c t e x i s t s ; f o r
by u s i n g th e a n a l o g i e s of e x p e r i e n c e i n o r d e r t o p ass from
d a t a a c t u a l l y p e r c e i v e d t o an o b j e c t w ith which, a c c o r d in g
t o th e a n a l o g i e s , the d a t a would have t o be c o n n e c te d , we
49
c o u ld t h i n k our way t o a p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t . T h a t i s to
say, th ro u g h th e p a r t i c u l a r i t y o f th e p e r c e i v e d d a t a , and
th ro u g h th e p a r t i c u l a r i t y of th e c o n n e c t i o n s th ro u g h which
we s h o u ld u n d e r s t a n d th e d a t a as c o n n e c te d w ith th e o b j e c t ,
we c o u ld t h i n k th e o b j e c t as p a r t i c u l a r even though we had
n o t as y e t p e r c e i v e d th e o b j e c t . For exam ple, by u s in g the
an alo g y of c a u s a t i o n , we might r e a s o n from th e f a c t t h a t
i r o n f i l i n g s were p e r c e i v e d to move, to m ag n e tic f o r c e i n
g e n e r a l ; b u t from th e f a c t t h a t p a r t i c u l a r g iv e n i r o n
f i l i n g s were p e r c e i v e d to move, Kant b e l i e v e d t h a t we co u ld
4 9 Cf. also our argument in Chap. X.
60
r e a s o n t o m a g n e tic f o r c e as in v o lv e d i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r
movement of t h e s e p a r t i c u l a r f i l i n g s , and th u s to p a r t i c u l a r
m a g n e tic f o r c e which would be in v o lv e d i n moving t h e s e p a r -
50
t i c u l a r f i l i n g s . Or a g a i n , by u s in g t h e a n a lo g y of s u b
s t a n c e , we m ight r e a s o n from sen su o u s q u a l i t i e s to s u b s t a n c e
i n g e n e r a l , as t h a t which i s q u a l i f i e d by q u a l i t i e s ; but
from p a r t i c u l a r g iv e n q u a l i t i e s , we m ight a l s o r e a s o n t o the
p a r t i c u l a r s u b s t a n c e or o b j e c t , w hich th e y would be under -
51
sto o d as q u a l i f y i n g . W e should th e n be i n a p o s i t i o n to
ju d g e t h a t th e p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t e x i s t s . But even p r i o r to
e x p r e s s i n g t h i s ju d g m en t, we sh o u ld have th o u g h t the o b j e c t
i n i t s p a r t i c u l a r i t y , as t h e i d e n t i c a l o b j e c t w hich we
c o u ld , t h e n , say e x i s t s . U n t i l we had r e c o g n i z e d , or
ju d g e d , t h a t the c o n n e c t i o n of the o b j e c t w i t h p e r c e i v e d
d a t a i n v o l v e s th e o b j e c t ’s e x i s t e n c e , we should n o t y e t know
i t as e x i s t e n t ( a l t h o u g h we sh o u ld a l r e a d y be in p o s s e s s i o n
o f th e f o u n d a t i o n f o r t h i s judgm ent [ i . e . , th e o b j e c t ’s r e p
r e s e n t a t i o n as p o s s i b l e - - b y means of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f
p e r c e i v e d d a t a ] ) . But we sh o u ld a l r e a d y be t h i n k i n g , or
c o n c e i v i n g , th e o b j e c t as p a r t i c u l a r . That i s to say , p r i o r
to knowing or j u d g i n g t h a t th e o b j e c t e x i s t s , we may co n
c e iv e or t h i n k i t in i t s p a r t i c u l a r i t y .
But t h e r e i s one d i f f i c u l t y t h a t we must r e s o l v e .
~*^Kant, op . c i t . , B273; B 232ff.
51Cf. i b i d . , B224c-32.
61
Kant spoke o f an e x i s t e n t i a l ju d g m e n t’ s c o n n e c t i o n o f an
o b j e c t w ith p e r c e i v e d d a ta as " g o in g beyond th e c o n c e p t of
th e o b j e c t . " Thus, w h ile th e above p a r a g r a p h m ight s e rv e to
show Kant as h a v in g h e ld t h a t we can t h i n k an o b j e c t in i t s
p a r t i c u l a r i t y p r i o r to i t s p e r c e p t i o n , i t might n o t seem to
show t h a t we can t h i n k an o b j e c t in i t s p a r t i c u l a r i t y w i t h
o u t g o in g beyond i t s c o n c e p t. To t h i s o b j e c t i o n I sh o u ld
r e p l y t h a t , f o r K ant, a l l o f t h e sen su o u s d a ta and c o n n e c
t i o n s th ro u g h which an o b j e c t m ight be th o u g h t as p a r t i c u
l a r , may be r e p r e s e n t e d , as p o s s i b l e , m e re ly th ro u g h con
c e p t s e x p r e s s e d by schem ata i n th e i m a g i n a t i o n , and t h e i r
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n would s t i l l f u r n i s h us w i t h the same d e t e r
m in a tio n s th ro u g h which to t h i n k an o b j e c t as p a r t i c u l a r as
th o s e w hich are f u r n i s h e d by a c t u a l l y p e r c e i v i n g th e d a t a .
For I c o u ld t h i n k , " I f t h e r e were d a t a o f such and such a
k in d p a r t i c u l a r i z e d by b e in g h e r e and now ( i . e . , l o c a t e d in
th e s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l f i e l d w hich I a c t u a l l y i n t u i t ) , they
would p re su p p o se t h i s p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t which I c o n c e iv e as
p a r t i c u l a r by r e l a t i n g i t t o t h e s e d a t a . " In c o m p le tin g
t h i s a c t of t h i n k i n g , I s h o u ld n o t have t o go beyond the
re a lm o f c o n c e p tio n , f o r a l l o f th e c o n t e n t would m erely be
e x p r e s s i v e of c o n c e p t s . Thus, i t i s n o t p r e c i s e l y an ob
j e c t ' s c o n n e c t i o n w ith p e r c e i v e d d a ta t h a t would r e q u i r e us
t o go beyond c o n c e p t i o n , f o r t h e s e c o n n e c t i o n s and th e d a ta
t o which c o n n e c tio n s a te made, can a l s o be c o n c e iv e d .
Indeed, th e y may e n t e r i n t o th e c o n c e p t o f the o b j e c t .
62
T h a t which c a n n o t be c o n c e iv e d , of which we can be c o n
s c i o u s only by going beyond any c o n c e p t, i s n o t a p a r t i c u
l a r c o n n e c t i o n w ith p a r t i c u l a r d a t a , b u t th e a c t u a l i t y of
th e d a t a . I t i s only th ro u g h th e p e r c e i v e d a c t u a l i t y ( o r
e x i s t e n c e ) o f th e d a t a , t h a t the a c t u a l i t y o f th e c o n n e c
t i o n and t h a t o f th e c o n n e c te d o b j e c t are known; b u t on th e
o t h e r hand, t h e p a r t i c u l a r i t y of th e d a t a , o f th e c o n n e c
t i o n s , and o f th e o b j e c t , may a l r e a d y be t h o u g h t , by means
of c o n c e p ts e x p r e s s e d th ro u g h schem ata and th e a n a l o g i e s .
Thus, Kant must have allo w ed t h a t th ro u g h c o n c e p ts
a l o n e , we can t h i n k p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t s . We can t h i n k them
e i t h e r sim p ly th ro u g h s c h e m a t i c a l l y r e p r e s e n t i n g th e c o n
t e n t o f t h e i r c o n c e p t s , or we can t a k e th e more r o u n d -a b o u t
way o f s c h e m a t i c a l l y r e p r e s e n t i n g p a r t i c u l a r se n su o u s d a t a
and c o n n e c t i n g such d a t a by T,th e a n a l o g i e s o f e x p e r i e n c e "
to o b j e c t s . But in e i t h e r c a s e , Kant must have r e c o g n iz e d
t h a t we are a b l e to c o n c e iv e o b j e c t s as p a r t i c u l a r w i t h o u t
g o in g beyond th e realm o f c o n c e p t u a l t h i n k i n g . Thus, when
Kant h e ld t h a t th e c o n t e n t of an o b j e c t ' s c o n c e p t must be
e n t i r e l y i d e n t i c a l w ith th e o b j e c t i t s e l f , he p l a i n l y d id
n o t mean to a llo w t h a t , above and beyond t h a t which i s
c o n c e p t u a l i n th e o b j e c t , t h e r e c o u ld s t i l l be so m eth in g
n o n - c o n c e p t u a l which would a l s o be c o n s t i t u i t i v e of th e
o b j e c t as th e p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t i t i s . For t h a t which i s
c o n s t i t u i t i v e o f an o b j e c t as p a r t i c u l a r c o u ld i t s e l f be
c o n c e p t u a l i z e d , and be th u s c o n t a i n e d in th e o b j e c t ' s
63
c o n c e p t .
B ut s in c e t h e o b j e c t i t s e l f , i n a l l t h a t which c o n
s t i t u t e s i t as th e p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t i t i s , c o u ld be con
t a i n e d i n i t s c o n c e p t, and s i n c e t h i s c o n cep t would se rv e
as the s u b j e c t o f a judgment a f f i r m i n g the o b j e c t ' s e x i s t
ence, i t must f o l l o w t h a t t h e o b j e c t i t s e l f , i n a l l t h a t
which c o n s t i t u t e s i t as the p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t i t i s , c o u ld
be c o n t a i n e d i n t h e s u b j e c t o f the judgm ent. T h e r e f o r e ,
sin c e K an t i n s i s t e d t h a t e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ents a r e always
a _ p o s t e r i o r i , and w ith p r e d i c a t e s t h a t are n o t c o n t a i n e d i n
t h e i r s u b j e c t s , he could n o t have r e g a r d e d th e o b j e c t i t
s e l f as t h e p r e d i c a t e of a judgm ent a s s e r t i n g th e o b j e c t ' s
e x i s t e n c e . That i s , he c o u l d not have ta k e n th e o b j e c t to
be the p r e d i c a t e o f the e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent. Thus, the way
i s open f o r us to argue t h a t he r e g a r d e d so m eth in g o t h e r
than th e o b j e c t , namely e x i s t e n c e , as th e p r e d i c a t e o f e x i s
t e n t i a l ju d g m en ts.
A n t i c i p a t i o n of Two More K a n t i a n T h e ses:
O b je c ts Are " I n d i f f e r e n t to
~ "E x i s t e n c e " and (.p.) E x i s t e n c e
C annot be Thought i n an
O b j e c t ' s Concept
What I am say in g , o f c o u rse , i s ' t h a t Kant must have
re g a rd e d o b j e c t s i n somewhat the same way as d id Meinong,
/
t h a t i s , as not i n c l u d i n g e x i s t e n c e i n t h a t w hich c o n s t i
t u t e s t h e i r i d e n - y itie s , or a s what Meinong c a l l e d
64
a u s s e r s e i e n d , 52 o r - - a s F i n d l a y and o t h e r s t r a n s l a t e i t - -
" i n d i f f e r e n t " to e x i s t e n c e . 53 L ik e w is e , Kant must have h e ld
t h a t i n e x i s t i n g , and i n a judgm ent e x p r e s s i n g th e f a c t o f
i t s e x i s t i n g , an o b j e c t i s "com bined" w ith som ething which
d.oes n o t e n t e r i n t o th e i d e n t i t y of th e o b j e c t . Such a view
i s s u r e l y s u g g e s te d by th e f a c t t h a t Kant h e ld t h e s e s y ( th e
s u b j e c t c o n t e n t o f an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent i s e n t i r e l y i d e n
t i c a l i n c o n t e n t w ith t h e o b j e c t whose e x i s t e n c e i s a f
f i r m e d ) , a ( e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ents are s y n t h e t i c ) and P ( e x
i s t e n t i a l judgm ents are _a p o s t e r i o r i ) . But l e t us, in th e
f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r , p ro c e e d w ith a l i n e a r developm ent of my
argument t o show our t h e s i s Kj_: t h a t Kant h e ld theorem Y:
t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s th e p r e d i c a t e o f e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent;
and t h e s i s K2 or t h a t Kant h e ld theorem Q: t h a t e x i s t e n c e
i s an a d d i t i v e p r e d i c a t e .
52Cf . A le x is von Meinong, "The Theory of O b j e c t s , "
i n R o d e r ic k M. Chisholm ( e d . ) , R e a lism and th e Background
o f Phenomenology (G len co e, 111.: The F ree P r e s s , I 9 6 0 ),
pp. 76-117.
53Cf. A. N. F i n d l a y , M einongTs Theory of O b je c ts
and Value (O xford: The C la re n d o n P r e s s , 1963), p. 4 2 f ; _
c£~ a l s o Meinong, op. c i t .
CHAPTER IV
PROOF OF THESIS K1
In t h i s c h a p t e r , I s h a l l c o n s t r u c t a p r o o f of our
T h e s is K1, t h a t Kant h e l d :
Theorem V: t h a t i n an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent,
t h e p r e d i c a t e w ith w hich the s u b j e c t i s c o n
n e c t e d i s e x i s t e n c e .
From K a n t ’s h av in g h eld Y ( t h a t th e s u b j e c t c o n cep t
of an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent i s e n t i r e l y i d e n t i c a l i n c o n t e n t
w ith th e o b j e c t whose e x i s t e n c e i s a f f i r m e d ) and e i t h e r c l
( t h a t e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ents a r e s y n t h e t i c ) or 3 ( t h a t th e y
a re a p o s t e r i o r i ) , we can i n f e r t h a t he must have h e l d :
Theorem &: t h a t i n an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent,
th e o b j e c t must be c o n n e c te d i n th o u g h t w ith
som ething o th e r th a n i t s e l f .
F or, as we have s e e n , b o th ct and 3 r e q u i r e t h a t the s u b j e c t
c o n c e p t o f an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent be c o n n e c te d w ith some
t h i n g o t h e r th a n i t s own c o n t e n t .
But t h a t Kant h e ld 6 can a l s o be d e r i v e d from a p a r
t i c u l a r t e x t , w hich w i l l a l s o show ( o r a t l e a s t im ply) t h a t
he h e l d :
65
66
Theorem e: t h a t in an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent,
t h a t w i t h w hich th e o b j e c t i s f i n a l l y con
n e c t e d i s e x i s t e n c e .
And from e, t o g e t h e r w ith a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f what he meant
by " p r e d i c a t e , " we can co n c lu d e t o our T h e s i s K1, t h a t Kant
must have h e ld Theorem ¥.
The f o l l o w i n g t e x t w i l l show Kant to have h e ld
Theorem 6.
W hatever, t h e r e f o r e , and however much, our con
c e p t of an o b j e c t may c o n t a i n , we must go o u t s i d e
i t , i f we a r e to a s c r i b e e x i s t e n c e t o th e o b j e c t .
In th e c a s e of o b j e c t s of t h e s e n s e s , t h i s t a k e s
p l a c e th ro u g h t h e i r c o n n e c t i o n w i t h some one o f our
p e r c e p t i o n s , in a c c o rd a n c e w i t h e m p i r i c a l la w s . But
i n d e a l i n g w ith o b j e c t s of p u r e t h o u g h t , we have no
means w h a ts o e v e r o f knowing t h e i r e x i s t e n c e , s i n c e
i t would have to be known i n a c o m p le te ly a p r i o r i
manner. Our c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f a l l e x i s t e n c e (w hether
im m e d ia te ly th ro u g h p e r c e p t i o n , or m e d i a t e l y th ro u g h
i n f e r e n c e s which c o n n e c t som ething w i t h p e r c e p t i o n )
b e lo n g s e x c l u s i v e l y to th e u n i t y o f e x p e r i e n c e ; any
[ a l l e g e d ] e x i s t e n c e o u t s i d e t h i s f i e l d , w h ile n o t
in d eed su ch as we can d e c l a r e to be a b s o l u t e l y im
p o s s i b l e , i s of t h e n a t u r e o f an a s su m p tio n w hich we
can never be i n a p o s i t i o n t o j u s t i f y .
In t h i s p a s s a g e , a number of p o i n t s a re made e v i d e n t :
1. We must go o u t s i d e i t s c o n c e p t i f we a r e to
ju d g e an o b j e c t t o e x i s t .
2. I f the o b j e c t i s one whose e x i s t e n c e can be
known ( i . e . , i f i t i s e m p i r i c a l ) i t s e x i s t e n c e can be known
■'"Immanuel K an t, C r i t i q u e of P u r e R e a so n , t r a n s .
Norman Kemp Smith (New Y o rk : S t . M a r t i n ’ s P r e s s , 1965),
B629.
67
only th ro u g h c o n n e c t i n g th e o b j e c t w i t h a p e r c e p t i o n . (We
s h a l l see t h a t t h i s need h o l d s even i f the o b j e c t is p e r
ceiv e d ( i . e . , i t must be c o n n e c te d w i t h p e r c e p t i o n in an a c t
o th e r t h a n t h e a c t [ o f c o n c e p tio n ] i n which t h e m a n ifo ld o f
a p p e r c e p t i o n i s s y n t h e s i z e d i n t o t h e o b j e c t ) .
3. The c o n n e c t i o n must ta k e p l a c e in a c c o rd a n c e
w i t h e m p i r i c a l la w s .
4. Only i n th e p e r c e p t i o n t o which we co n n ect t h e
o b j e c t , can we be c o n s c io u s im m e d ia te ly of i t s e x i s t e n c e .
And as we s h a l l s e e more c l e a r l y a f t e r examining c e r t a i n
o th e r t e x t s , th e above t e x t i m p l i e s :
5. The r e a s o n f o r c o n n e c t i n g t h e o b j e c t w i t h a p e r
c e p t i o n i s to be c o n s c i o u s t h e r e i n ( o r t h e r e b y ) o f th e
o b j e c t ’ s e x i s t e n c e .
6. I f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f th e o b j e c t i s g iv e n immedi
a t e l y i n t h e p e r c e p t i o n , t h a t w ith w hich we m ust f i n a l l y
c o n n e c t t h e o b j e c t i s i t s im m e d ia te ly known e x i s t e n c e
(Theorem e - a ) .
7. I f th e e x i s t e n c e o f th e o b j e c t i s n o t g iv e n im
m e d i a t e l y i n the p e r c e p t i o n , the o b j e c t can be r e l a t e d t o i t
th ro u g h i n f e r e n c e s c o n n e c t i n g the o b j e c t to t h e e x i s t e n c e
w hich i s known im m e d ia te ly i n th e p e r c e p t i o n (Theorem e - b ) .
8. The te r m w ith w hich th e o b j e c t i s f i n a l l y c o n
n e c t e d , i s i t s e x i s t e n c e , w hich i s t h e p r e d i c a t e o f th e
judgm ent (Theorems e and Y).
68
9. The e x i s t e n c e o f . a n o b j e c t cannot be i d e n t i f i e d
w i t h any other f a c t o r , such a s the o b j e c t ’s p e r c e p t i o n , or
t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f i t s p e r c e p t i o n , or i t s being c o n n e c te d ,
or b e l o n g i n g , to e x p e r i e n c e a s a w hole. I t i s , i n s t e a d ,
u n i q u e and i n d e f i n a b l e .
The f i r s t two p o i n t s show a g a i n th e t r u t h of a c l a i m
t h a t we have p r e s s e d in our p r e v i o u s a rg u m en t: t h a t fo r
Kant the c o n n e c t i o n in an e x i s t e n t i a l judgment i s not b e -
2
tw een th e con cep t and i t s o b j e c t . I n s t e a d , as th e t e x t
show s, the o b j e c t (n o t m e re ly i t s c o n c e p t ) must be co n n e c te d
in th o u g h t with so m eth in g o u t s i d e the c o n c e p t. T h a t is t o
s a y , t h a t the o b j e c t , of w h ic h we are c o n s c io u s i n i t s c o n
c e p t , must be t h o u g h t t o g e t h e r w ith a f a c t o r o f w hich we
c a n n o t be c o n s c io u s in i t s , or any, c o n c e p t ( c f . p t . 4 ) .
I w i l l now show t h a t t h i s f a c t o r must b e , f i n a l l y ,
th e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e o b je c t (Theorem e ) .
This p o i n t i s a t l e a s t i m p l i e d , I b e l i e v e , in th e
t e x t above. For t h e p a s sa g e p a r a p h r a s e d in p o i n t 4 has t h e
o b v io u s e f f e c t of e x p l a i n i n g why the o b j e c t must be con
n e c t e d with a p e r c e p t i o n ( i . e . , for t h e sake of t h e e x i s t
ence of which we ca n be c o n s c i o u s , im m e d ia te ly or m e d i a t e l y ,
o n l y in or th ro u g h th e p e r c e p t i o n ) . But we need n o t r e s t
our c a se on t h i s ev id e n c e a l o n e . We can proceed much more
2Cf. Chapter III.
69
r i g o r o u s l y .
L e t us b e g i n by c o n s i d e r i n g th e n a t u r e o f th e "em
p i r i c a l la w s" i n acco rd w i t h w hich -the c o n n e c t i o n i s to be
th o u g h t ( c f . p t - 3 ). We s h a l l d i s c o v e r t h a t t h e y a r e th e
3
" a n a l o g i e s of e x p e r i e n c e / ' and t h a t , f o r K an t, t h e a n a l o
g i e s have th e u n iq u e t r a i t o f b e in g c o n cern ed o n ly w ith th e
e x i s t e n c e o f o b j e c t s ( n o t w i t h th e o b j e c t s t h e m s e l v e s - - e x -
c e p t , o f c o u r s e , in r e g a r d to t h e i r e x i s t e n c e , n o r w i t h t h e
mode or manner of t h e i r i n t u i t i o n , e . g . , t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n as
4
s u c h ) . We s h a l l a l s o see why, in an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent,
5
th e f i r s t o f th e a n a l o g i e s ( t h e p r i n c i p l e of s u b s t a n c e )
must f u n c t i o n in c o n n e c tin g a p e r c e i v e d o b j e c t w i t h i t s e x
i s t e n c e (and t h i s w i l l show, of c o u r s e , t h a t i n t h e above
t e x t , Kant d id n o t mean to d e s c r i b e a c o n n e c t i o n t h a t would
be needed only i f th e o b j e c t were n o t p e r c e i v e d ) . We s h a l l
see how th e o t h e r two a n a l o g i e s ( t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f c a u s a t i o n
6
and community) can f u n c t i o n in c o n n e c t i n g an u n p e r c e iv e d
o b j e c t w ith i t s e x i s t e n c e . We s h a l l see t h a t th e term w ith
which th e a n a l o g i e s f u n c t i o n t o c o n n e c t th e o b j e c t , i s f i
n a l l y th e o b j e c t ’s e x i s t e n c e . We s h a l l a l s o se e how th e
a n a l o g i e s can f u n c t i o n , p r e c i s e l y as a n a l o g i e s , in p e r m i t
t i n g us to t h i n k t h i s l a s t , or u n p e r c e i v e d , e x i s t e n c e ( I
mean n o t m e re ly how t h e y j u s t i f y our p o s i t i n g i t , b u t how in
3Kant, op. cit. , B272-3. 4 Ibid . , B220c-1..^
5Cf. ibid., B224cf. 6Cf. ibid., B232f.
70
a s e n s e th e y s u p p ly us w i t h the c o n t e n t t h a t we t h i n k ) .
And t h e n , f i n a l l y , we s h a l l see how th ro u g h b e in g c o n n e c te d
w i t h i t s e x i s t e n c e by means o f t h e a n a l o g i e s , the o b j e c t i s
n e c e s s a r i l y c o n n e c te d w i t h e x p e r i e n c e as a w hole ( b u t , as we
s h a l l s e e , n o t i n such a way as to make t h i s l a s t th e f i n a l
term o f th e c o n n e c t i o n , or p r e d i c a t e of th e ju d g m e n t).
In t h e f o ll o w i n g t e x t , Kant i n d i c a t e d v ery c l e a r l y
t h a t th e u n p e r c e iv e d o b j e c t can be c o n n e c te d i n t h o u g h t w ith
i t s e x i s t e n c e , th ro u g h th e a n a l o g i e s .
The p o s t u l a t e b e a r i n g on th e knowledge of t h i n g s
as a c t u a l does n o t , i n d e e d , demand im m ediate p e r c e p
t i o n ( a n d , t h e r e f o r e , s e n s a t i o n o f which we are c o n
s c i o u s ) of th e o b j e c t whose e x i s t e n c e i s t o be
known. . . . We can a l s o , however, know t h e e x i s t
ence of th e t h i n g p r i o r to i t s p e r c e p t i o n and, c o n
s e q u e n t l y , c o m p a r a t i v e l y s p e a k i n g , i n an a p r i o r i
manner, i f o n ly i t be bound up w i t h c e r t a i n p e r c e p
t i o n s , in a c c o rd a n c e w i t h th e p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e i r
e m p i r i c a l c o n n e c t i o n ( t h e a n a l o g i e s ) . For th e e x
i s t e n c e o f th e t h i n g b e in g th u s bound up w ith our
p e r c e p t i o n s in a p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e , we a re a b l e in
th e s e r i e s o f p o s s i b l e p e r c e p t i o n s and u n d e r the
g u id a n c e o f th e a n a l o g i e s to make th e t r a n s i t i o n
from our a c t u a l p e r c e p t i o n to t h e t h i n g in q u e s
t i o n . ^
In th e t e x t above, Kant p r e s e n t e d th e a n a l o g i e s as c o n n e c t
ing th e c o n c e p t of th e o b j e c t w i t h a p e r c e p t i o n . But th e
f o ll o w i n g i s a t e x t in which Kant c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d t h a t the
a n a l o g i e s a r e e s s e n t i a l l y c o n cern ed o n ly w i t h th e e x i s t e n c e
?C f. i b i d . , B222-3.
8C f. i b i d . , B223b-4; B629c.
9I b i d . , B 2 7 2 -3 .
71
of o b j e c t s ( i . e . , " a p p e a r a n c e s , " w hich are o b j e c t s g iv e n i n
e m p i r i c a l i n t u i t i o n ) and n o t w ith th e o b j e c t s t h e m s e l v e s , as
such, or w i t h t h e i r mode or manner o f b e in g g i v e n , e . g . ,
t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n as such. (We h a s t e n to add, however, t h a t
some r e f e r e n c e t o th e l a t t e r must be in v o lv e d in u s in g t h e
a n a lo g y to t h i n k th e e x i s t e n c e of an o b j e c t , as we s h a l l
s e e . )
These p r i n c i p l e s have t h i s p e c u l i a r i t y , t h a t
t h e y are n o t concerned w i t h a p p e a ra n c e s and th e
s y n t h e s i s of t h e i r e m p i r i c a l i n t u i t i o n , b u t only
w i t h th e e x i s t e n c e of such a p p e a ra n c e s and t h e i r
r e l a t i o n to one a n o th e r i n r e s p e c t of t h e i r e x i s t
e n c e . The manner i n w hich som ething i s ap p reh en d ed
i n a p p e a ra n c e can be so d e te rm in e d a p r i o r i t h a t th e
r u l e of i t s s n y t h e s i s can a t once g iv e , t h a t i s t o
s a y , can b r i n g i n t o b e i n g , t h i s [ele m e n t o f] a
p r i o r i i n t u i t i o n in e v e r y example t h a t comes b e f o r e
us e m p i r i c a l l y . The e x i s t e n c e o f a p p e a ra n c e s c a n
n o t , however, be th u s known a p r i o r i ; and even
g r a n t i n g t h a t we could i n any such manner c o n t r i v e
t o i n f e r t h a t som ething e x i s t s , we could n o t know i t
d e t e r m i n a t e l y , could n o t , t h a t i s , a n t i c i p a t e th e
f e a t u r e s th ro u g h w hich i t s e m p i r i c a l i n t u i t i o n is
d i s t i n g u i s h e d from o t h e r i n t u i t i o n s .
As we s e e above, Kant d i s t i n g u i s h e d v e r y c l e a r l y b e
tween t h i n k i n g w h i c h - - t h r o u g h th e a n a l o g i e s - - i s c o n n e c te d
w ith t h e e x i s t e n c e of a p p e a ra n c e s ( o b j e c t s o f e m p i r i c a l i n
t u i t i o n ) , and t h i n k i n g which i s concerned s o l e l y w ith a p
p e a r a n c e s t h e m s e l v e s , or w ith th e s y n t h e s i s o f t h e i r e m p i r i
c a l i n t u i t i o n or th e manner of t h e i r being g i v e n , e . g . , in
e m p i r i c a l i n t u i t i o n , or th r o u g h p e r c e p t i o n . T h is would i n
d i c a t e t h a t th e f u n c t i o n o f the a n a l o g i e s i n judgment i s to
1 0Ibid., B220-1.
72
d e te r m in e the judgment t o be c o n cern ed w ith th e f a c t o r of
e x i s t e n c e . So t h a t i f , th ro u g h th e a n a l o g i e s , t h e c o n cep t
of an o b j e c t i s co n n e c te d w ith an a c t u a l p e r c e p t i o n , as i n
an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent, i t must be f o r the sak e of c o n n e c t
ing t h e o b j e c t w i t h th e f a c t o r of e x i s t e n c e ( i . e . , th e e x
i s t e n c e of w hich, Kant s a i d b o th i n B221 and B626c, we can
be c o n s c io u s o n ly in or th ro u g h th e p e r c e p t i o n ) . That i s to
say, t h a t th ro u g h t h e a n a l o g i e s , t h e c o n n e c tio n of the ob
j e c t w i t h the p e r c e p t i o n must be t h o u g h t in such a way t h a t
one i s t h e r e i n c o n s c io u s o f th e o b j e c t as e x i s t e n t .
Of c o u r s e , a d i f f i c u l t y a r i s e s i n th e f a c t t h a t , as
we s h a l l se e , t h e a n a l o g i e s can be in v o lv e d i n judgment o f
p o s s i b i l i t y w hich do n o t a s s e r t th e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e i r s u b
j e c t . For exam ple, we can p o s i t an o b j e c t a s - - p o s s i b l y - - t h e
cause o f a c e r t a i n p e r c e i v e d o b j e c t ; and in so d o in g , we
would have to make u se o f th e second analogy ( t h a t of " s u c
c e s s i o n in tim e , in a c c o rd a n c e w ith t h e law o f th e co n n e c
t i o n o f cause and e f f e c t " ) . Or we could p o s i t an o b j e c t as
a p o s s i b l e s u b s ta n c e o f a c e r t a i n k i n d ; and i n so d o in g , we
would have to make u se of th e f i r s t a n a lo g y ( t h a t of th e
"permanence o f s u b s t a n c e " ) . In e a c h c a s e , th e o b j e c t would
be t h o u g h t th ro u g h one of the a n a l o g i e s ; y e t i n n e i t h e r c a s e
would i t be th o u g h t as e x i s t e n t . How, th e n , c o u ld Kant say
t h a t t h e a n a l o g i e s a r e c o n cern ed u n i q u e l y w ith e x i s t e n c e ?
Ye-t t h i s d i f f i c u l t y can be r e s o l v e d i f we i n t e r p r e t j u d g
ments o f p o s s i b i l i t y as b e in g c o n c e r n e d , n o n e t h e l e s s , w i t h
73
e x i s t e n c e , i n the s e n s e t h a t i n th e se judgm ents t h e o b j e c t
i s t h o u g h t to be c a p a b l e of e x i s t e n c e . But t h a t of which
t h e o b j e c t would be th o u g h t c a p a b l e , w ould have t o be
th o u g h t in th e ju d g m e n t, and t h u s even t h e judgment of p o s
s i b i l i t y would i n v o l v e t h i n k i n g the o b j e c t w ith r e s p e c t to
e x i s t e n c e .
Thus, among th e e le m e n ts in v o lv e d in an e x i s t e n t i a l
ju d g m en t, we must r e s e r v e a p l a c e for e x i s t e n c e . T h is f a c t
would u n d o u b te d ly seem obvious in a n o t h e r age th a n o u rs, b u t,
of c o u r s e , in our age i t has t o be re a s o n e d to ; f o r we must
overcome p r e j u d i c e s a g a i n s t r e c o g n i z i n g e x i s t e n c e as a f a c
t o r d i s t i n c t from o b j e c t s or a p p e a r a n c e s - - a d i s t i n c t i o n
which Kant so o b v i o u s l y r e c o g n iz e d in d i s t i n g u i s h i n g the
a n a l o g i e s from th e o t h e r " p r i n c i p l e s " i n B220-1, and which
i s o f c o u r s e im p lie d by h is h o ld in g th e o re m s Y and P. And,
of c o u r s e , we must a l s o overcome a c e r t a i n te n d e n c y to o v e r
lo o k th e d i s t i n c t i o n in Kant between w h at he meant by an
o b j e c t ’s " e x i s t e n c e ” and what he o r d i n a r i l y meant by " p e r
c e p t i o n ” or by " p o s s i b i l i t y of p e r c e p t i o n " - - d i s t i n c t i o n s
11
w hich we s h a l l d i s c u s s a t some l e n g th l a t e r .
But once t h e f a c t o r o f e x i s t e n c e can be i d e n t i f i e d
in Kant th ro u g h d i s t i n g u i s h i n g i t from a p p e a ra n c e or e m p i r i
c a l o b j e c t s , from t h e i r s y n t h e s i s i n t u i t i o n , or from t h e i r
manner o f being g i v e n , th en we a re i n a p o s i t i o n t o
■^Cf. Chapter V.
r e c o g n i z e e x i s t e n c e as th e term w ith which th e o b j e c t was
f i n a l l y co n n ected by the a n a l o g i e s , in e x i s t e n t i a l j u d g
m ents.
T h is may be seen i f we o b s e rv e , f i r s t , j u s t how the
c o n n e c tio n of a p re c o n c e iv e d o b j e c t w ith th e im m ed iately
known f a c t o r of e x i s t e n c e i s s p e c i f i e d in such a way t h a t
th e o b j e c t i s th o u g h t as e x i s t e n t . In th e c a s e where th e
o b j e c t i s i t s e l f p e r c e i v e d (and where i t s e x i s t e n c e i s given
to our im m ediate i n t u i t i o n ) , th e o b j e c t must s t i l l be i d e n
t i f i e d in th o u g h t w ith th e p e r c e p t i o n i n which c o n s c io u s n e s s
of e x i s t e n c e i s g iv e n - ~ n o t f o r th e sake of th e s u b j e c t
12
c o n c e p t ’s having c o n t e n t (as Baumer t h i n k s ) ; b u t f o r th e
sake of b e in g c o n s c io u s of i t s c o n te n t as e x i s t e n t ( i . e . ,
f o r th e sake o f knowing in c o n j u n c t i o n w ith th e c o n t e n t ,
t h a t which i s g iv en only in p e r c e p t i o n , which i s to say, th e
13
c o n t e n t ’ s e x i s t e n c e ) . But l e t me e x p l a i n .
A m anifold o f i n t u i t i o n i s s y n t h e s i z e d th ro u g h a
14
concept i n t o an o b j e c t . In t h i s c o n c e p t, th e o b j e c t which
does e x i s t i s known e m p i r i c a l l y ; but i t i s n o t y e t known a_s
15 ,
e x i s t e n t . (For a l l t h a t we know m erely th ro u g h i t s con
c e p t , i t might have ceased t o e x i s t . ) For c o n s c io u s n e s s of
12C f . C h ap ter I I I . , .
13 r
Cf. a l s o C hapter X, p . 182.
14K ant, op. c i t . , A103-4; B137, B141-2.
4^Cf. ibid., B629ab; also Chapter IX.
75
e x i s t e n c e sim p ly can n o t be had in a c o n c e p t ( i n s e c t i o n I I
16
we s h a l l see more f u l l y why i t c a n n o t ) . Thus, in o rd er t o
know th e o b j e c t as e x i s t e n t we must go beyond i t s c o n c e p t;
we must r e t u r n to t h e p e r c e p t i o n i n w hich the (m a n ifo ld
S y n th e s iz e d i n t o t h e ) o b j e c t i s g i v e n - - n o t in o r d e r to know,
s im p ly , t h e o b j e c t , b u t t o become aware o f i t s e x i s t e n c e .
For c o n s c i o u s n e s s of i t s e x i s t e n c e i s g iv e n o n ly in th e p e r -
17
c e p t i o n . That i s t o say , e x i s t e n c e i s g iv e n o n ly in a
c o n s c i o u s n e s s ( p e r c e p t i o n ) i n which we do not s y n t h e s i z e th e
i n t u i t i v e m a n ifo ld i n t o an o b j e c t ( f o r d o in g so would r e s u l t
i n our no l o n g e r b e in g c o n s c io u s of e x i s t e n c e , i n t h a t th e
s y n t h e s i s c o u ld be a c c o m p lish e d o n ly i n a form o f c o n s c i o u s
n e s s which n e c e s s a r i l y l e a v e s out e x i s t e n c e [ i . e . , in a con-
18
c e p t ] ) . I n s t e a d we must know t h e m a n ifo ld as e x i s t i n g .
Yet t h i s s t e p , in w hich we would have r e t u r n e d from th e con
c e p t to th e p e r c e p t i o n , would not be s u f f i c i e n t . For we
should n o t y e t have co n n e c te d our c o n s c io u s n e s s of th e ob
j e c t w ith our c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f e x i s t e n c e ; we sh o u ld o n ly
have p assed from one to th e o t h e r . T hus, we s h o u ld n o t y e t
know th e o b j e c t as e x i s t e n t . In o r d e r to know t h e l a t t e r ,
th e o b j e c t , as t h o u g h t in th e c o n c e p t, must be r e c o g n iz e d as
i d e n t i c a l w i t h th e m a n ifo ld o f which we a r e c o n s c io u s as
16
Cf. Chapter IX.
^Kant, op. cit., B221, B629c.
18
Ibid., A103-4; B137; also Chapter IX.
76
e x i s t e n t . And t h i s can be done o n ly i f we r e c o g n i z e th e
m an ifo ld as coming n e c e s s a r i l y u n d er th e c o n c e p t o f th e ob
j e c t . I t i s a t t h i s c r u c i a l s t e p t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e o f s u b
s ta n c e must be made u se o f . We s h a l l see how t h i s can o c
cur .
To b e g in w i t h , we may r e f l e c t t h a t th e d a t a s y n t h e
s iz e d i n our th o u g h t of th e o b j e c t have had t h e i r o r i g i n in
19
the i n t u i t i v e m a n ifo ld . And t h i s r e f l e c t i o n w i l l b e a r
upon t h e p r i n c i p l e of s u b s t a n c e , i n as much as th e l a t t e r
has been a means whereby th e d a t a have b een d e te rm in e d i n t o
the o b j e c t . F o r, as Kant h e l d , t h e t r a n s i e n t d a t a of th e
m an ifo ld can have been d e te r m in e d i n t o an o b j e c t of u n d e r
s t a n d i n g , or e x p e r i e n c e , o n ly th ro u g h t h i n k i n g t h e l a t t e r as
som ething perm anent u n d e r l y i n g th e t r a n s i e n c y o f th e fo rm e r ,
20
t h a t i s , as a s u b s t a n c e . (And, of c o u r s e , t h i s p o s i t i n g
must have been done th ro u g h th e p r i n c i p l e of s u b s t a n c e i n
t h a t th e p r i n c i p l e s u p p l i e s th e r u l e f o r a p p ly in g th e a
.21
p r i o r i c o n c e p t o f s u b s t a n c e to e m p i r i c a l d a t a . ) Hence,
when we w ish to r e c o g n i z e th e o b j e c t as e x i s t e n t , th ro u g h
r e f l e c t i n g on i t s i d e n t i t y w i t h th e m a n ifo ld o f i n t u i t i o n ,
th e i d e n t i t y on which we r e f l e c t i s so m eth in g t h a t has come
about th ro u g h a p r o c e s s of t h i n k i n g t h a t has been governed
by th e p r i n c i p l e o f s u b s t a n c e .
1 Q 20
Ibid. Ibid., B224c-7a.
2 lCf. ibid., B218b-24, esp. B222C-3.
Yet t h i s i s n o t th e o n ly way, or th e m ost i m p o r t a n t ,
i n w hich t h i s p r i n c i p l e i s in v o lv e d in r e c o g n i z i n g the o b
j e c t as e x i s t e n t . I f i t w ere, i t would be so m eth in g i n
v o lv ed i n t h a t on w hich our r e f l e c t i o n would b e a r ( i . e . , th e
i d e n t i t y ) , b u t i t would n o t be som ething t h r o u g h which t h e
r e f l e c t i o n i t s e l f p r o c e e d s . Yet i n K a n t ' s sy ste m i t must be
b o t h . For:
I f th e i d e n t i t y of th e o b j e c t w i t h th e d a t a were
th o u g h t o n ly as o n e .b e tw e e n th e o b j e c t and th e p a r t i c u l a r
d a t a w hich have been s y n t h e s i z e d i n t o th e o b j e c t , i t c o u ld
n o t , s t r i c t l y s p e a k in g , be t h o u g h t t h e r e b y as e x i s t e n t . For
t h e p a r t i c u l a r d a t a t h a t were s y n t h e s i z e d i n t o th e o b j e c t
would have ceased b e in g given i n p e r c e p t i o n d u r i n g the tim e
in w hich t h e i r s y n t h e s i s was b e i n g th o u g h t ( f o r a f u l l e r e x
p l a n a t i o n o f t h i s p o i n t , see C h a p te r IX ). H ence, we c o u ld
a t b e s t i d e n t i f y th e o b j e c t w i t h d a t a which we could remem
b er as hav in g e x i s t e d v e ry r e c e n t l y ; b u t t h i s would le a d
o n ly t o t h i n k i n g the o b j e c t as h a v in g a t l e a s t v e ry r e c e n t l y
e x i s t e d , n o t t o t h i n k i n g i t as e x i s t i n g a c t u a l l y (which i s
22
to s a y , s im p ly , as e x i s t i n g ) . I t i s c l e a r t h a t so m eth in g
more i s n ee d e d , namely a means f o r i d e n t i f y i n g th e o b j e c t
w i t h t h e d a t a t h a t a r e b e in g a c t u a l l y p e r c e i v e d . This means
i s to be found ag ain i n the p r i n c i p l e o f s u b s t a n c e .
For t h e p r i n c i p l e in fo rm s us t h a t i f any t r a n s i e n t
2 2Cf. Chapter IX, p.
78
d a t a of i n t u i t i o n a r e to e n t e r i n t o our e x p e r i e n c e th ro u g h
b ein g u n d e r s t o o d , th e y can be so only t h r o u g h b e in g th o u g h t
as m o d i f i c a t i o n s o f an u n d e r l y i n g s u b s t a n c e ( i . e . , o f an ob.-
23
j e c t i n t o which t h e y are s y n t h e s i z e d ) . Thus we may know,
p r i o r t o t h e i r s y n t h e s i s in a c o n c e p t, t h a t p r e s e n t l y p e r
ceiv ed d a t a , a l s o , can be t h o u g h t in th e u n d e r s t a n d i n g only
th ro u g h s y n t h e s i z i n g them i n t o t h e o b j e c t i n the same way as
t h a t i n w hich t h e i r v e ry r e c e n t p r e d e c e s s o r s were s y n t h e -
24 ,
s i z e d . (To be s u r e , we m ust p r e s u p p o s e t h a t th e d a t a
p r e s e n t l y b ein g r e c e i v e d are n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y d i v e r s e to r e
q u i r e t h e i r s y n t h e s i s in to a d i f f e r e n t o b j e c t ; more e x a c t l y ,
we must p r e s u p p o s e t h a t they a r e d a ta g i v e n in s u f f i c i e n t
l i k e n e s s and c o n t i n u i t y w ith t h e p r e v io u s d a t a f o r us to be
r e q u i r e d to subsume them under t h e c o n c e p t of th e same ob
j e c t . T h is p r e s u p p o s i t i o n may be d i f f i c u l t to j u s t i f y in
K a n t 's sy stem , b u t i t must be made in o r d e r for h i s system
to acco u n t f o r our a b i l i t y t o r e c o g n iz e t h e same s u b s t a n c e
25
as b e in g g iv e n in d i f f e r e n t p e r c e p t i o n s . ) Hence, we can
judge t h a t th e d a t a of whose e x i s t e n c e we may be im m e d ia te ly
c o n s c io u s i n th e p e r c e p t i o n , m ust be t h o u g h t as i d e n t i c a l
w ith th e o b j e c t whose e x i s t e n c e we wish t o a s s e r t - In t h i s
way, t h e n , we can judge t h a t t h e e x i s t e n c e o f w hich we are
^ K a n t , o p . c i t . , B 2 2 4 c -7 a .
24
C f. a l s o i b i d . , B 2 2 3 -4 .
25
c f * i b i d . , A100-01.
aware i n p e r c e p t i o n of th e d a t a , i s t h a t of th e o b j e c t ; and
by c o n n e c tin g th e o b j e c t i n t h i s way w ith i t s e x i s t e n c e , we
can th i n k ( i . e . , ju d g e ) th e o b j e c t to e x i s t .
The c o n n e c tio n of th e o b j e c t w i t h i t s e x i s t e n c e w i l l
ta k e p l a c e th ro u g h th e o b j e c t ’s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , by means of
th e second a n a lo g y , w ith th e d a t a in whose p e r c e p t i o n we
are c o n s c io u s of e x i s t e n c e . But th e term to which our c o n
s c io u s n e s s of th e o b j e c t i s c o n n e c te d , i s , f i n a l l y , th e e x
i s t e n c e of which we are c o n s c io u s . (Our end i s n o t sim ply
to i n t e g r a t e th e d a t a i n t o th e o b j e c t , or s u b s t a n c e , f o r
doing t h i s would, of c o u r s e , le a v e us where we were at th e
b e g in n in g , t h a t i s , w ith c o n s c io u s n e s s o f th e o b j e c t , b u t
not w ith c o n s c io u s n e s s of th e o b j e c t as e x i s t i n g . )
We must a l s o r e c a l l t h a t when an u n p e rc e iv e d o b j e c t
i s s a id t o e x i s t , i t , t o o , i s c o n n ected f i n a l l y w ith th e
26
e x i s t e n c e t h a t i s a ffirm e d of i t . But s i n c e t h i s l a s t i s
n o t th e e x i s t e n c e of which we are im m e d ia te ly aware in th e
p e r c e p t i o n w ith which Kant s a i d , we must co n n ect the ob
j e c t , we must f i n d a medium f o r p ro c e e d in g from the p e r c e p
t i o n to the e x i s t e n c e of which Kant s a id ( i n B629c) we
could be m e d ia te ly conscip_us th ro u g h the p e r c e p t i o n , name
l y , th e o b j e c t ’s own.
The medium f o r t h i s p a s sa g e would b e , f o r K ant,
e i t h e r the second or t h i r d a n a lo g y , t h a t i s , e i t h e r th e
26
Cf. ibid., B272-3; B629c.
80
p r i n c i p l e of c a u s a t i o n or t h a t of r e c i p r o c i t y or community:
f o r he u n d e r s to o d t h e s e as a llo w in g one to r e a s o n from th e
e x i s t e n c e of som ething p e r c e i v e d t o th e e x i s t e n c e o f some
t h i n g u n p e r c e i v e d - - i n a s m u c h as we must r e c o g n i z e t h e l a t t e r
as n e c e s s a r y f o r our u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e fo rm er ( t h a t i s to
say , inasmuch as t h i n k i n g th e p e r c e i v e d o b j e c t a s , sa y ,
caused by th e u n p e r c e iv e d o b j e c t , i s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n
f o r t h e p e r c e i v e d c o n t e n t t o be u n d e r s t o o d , and f o r i t ,
t h u s , to e n t e r as an o b j e c t i n t o t h e c o n t e x t of e x p e r i e n c e
27 —
as a w h o le .)
But th e term w i t h w hich t h e o b j e c t i s f i n a l l y " c o n
n e c t e d , ” w i l l b e , of c o u r s e , n o t th e e x i s t e n c e g i v e n i n th e
p e r c e p t i o n , b u t t h a t which i s th o u g h t t h r o u g h , or by means
o f, t h a t which i s g i v e n . For i n t h e p a r t i c u l a r judgment
w ith w hich we a re c o n c e r n e d , our c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f th e g iv e n
e x i s t e n c e i s sought o n ly f o r t h e sake o f knowing th e e x i s t
ence of th e o b j e c t w hich i s n o t g iv e n i n p e r c e p t i o n . Thus
i t sh o u ld be o b v io u s , a g a i n , t h a t t h e f i n a l term o f th e
o b j e c t ' s c o n n e c tio n c a n n o t be th e a c t u a l p e r c e p t i o n w ith
which i t must be c o n n e c te d . Nor i s i t n e c e s s a r i l y th e ex
i s t e n c e w hich i s g iv e n d i r e c t l y i n t h a t p e r c e p t i o n ; fo r i n
some c a s e s , i t w i l l be the e x i s t e n c e w hich i s " g i v e n " i n d i -
2 S
r e c t l y in th e p e r c e p t i o n ( i . e . , th e e x i s t e n c e o f which we
are c o n s c io u s by means of t h i n k i n g t h e g iv e n o b j e c t ' s
27
Ibid., B232-65. 2 8 Ibid., B629c.
81
29
e x i s t e n c e th r o u g h th e second or t h i r d a n a l o g y ) . But what
th e u l t i m a t e te rm w i l l b e , in e v e r y c a s e , i s th e e x i s t e n c e
w hich i s th o u g h t as b e l o n g in g t o the s u b j e c t ( i . e . , t o th e
p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t which th e judgm ent a f f i r m s as e x i s t e n t ) .
To be s u r e , f o r K an t, th e u n p e r c e iv e d e x i s t e n c e must
be th o u g h t as som ething o f which we co u ld be im m e d ia te ly
c o n s c io u s only i n p e r c e p t i o n ; f o r e x i s t e n c e i s n o t a t r a i t
t h a t can be r e p r e s e n t e d as such ( i . e . , as e x i s t e n t in a con-
30
c e p t ) . Hence, Kant s a id t h a t i n t h i n k i n g an u n p e r c e i v e d
o b j e c t ’s e x i s t e n c e , our th o u g h t o n ly g a i n s "an a d d i t i o n a l
„31
p o s s i b l e p e r c e p t i o n . But as we s h a l l see v e r y c l e a r l y
l a t e r , he d id n o t mean t h a t th e p o s s i b l e p e r c e p t i o n would be
t h e f i n a l te rm w i t h w hich th e o b j e c t i s c o n n e c te d , nor t h a t
th e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a t h i n g ’ s p e r c e p t i o n would be the same as
32
i t s e x i s t e n c e . He meant o n ly th a t t h e u n p e r c e iv e d e x i s t
ence must be r e p r e s e n t e d in th o u g h t as som ething of w hich we
could be d i r e c t l y c o n s c io u s o n ly i n a p e r c e p t i o n . But t h a t
of which we could be c o n s c io u s i n t h e p e r c e p t i o n i s th e
f i n a l term of our t h o u g h t , i n t h a t i t i s f o r i t s sake t h a t
we t h i n k of th e p o s s i b l e p e r c e p t i o n i n w hich i t would be
g i v e n . (A more e x t e n s i v e t r e a t m e n t o f t h i s p o i n t f o ll o w s i n
C h a p te r V.)
A ls o , we must ad m it t h a t i n ju d g in g an o b j e c t to
29
Ibid., B273.
3 1Ibid., B629a.
3 0Ibid., B221, B629c.
3^Cf. Chapter V.
e x i s t , th e o b j e c t i s c o n n e c te d , in t h i s p r o c e d u r e , w ith e x
p e r i e n c e as a w hole, f o r th e a n a l o g i e s a r e a p r i o r i c o n d i-
33
t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e ; th u s th e n e c e s s i t y w hich t h e y g iv e t o
a judgm ent depends on r e f e r e n c e to th e u n i v e r s a l i t y o f t h e i r
34
a p p l i c a t i o n t o a l l c o n t e n t e n t e r i n g i n t o our e x p e r i e n c e .
When an o b j e c t and a p e r c e p t i o n a r e c o n n e c te d th ro u g h th e
a n a l o g i e s t h e i r c o n n e c t i o n i s th o u g h t as n e c e s s a r y ( r a t h e r
th a n a r b i t r a r y ) o n ly th ro u g h r e c o g n i z i n g - - a t l e a s t i m p l i c i t -
, l y - - t h a t t h e o b je c t and the p e r c e p t i o n n e c e s s a r i l y f a l l u n
d e r t h e a n a l o g i e s , inasm uch a s t h e l a t t e r a r e c o n d i t i o n s
p re s u p p o s e d by a l l e x p e r i e n c e . In t h i s r e c o g n i t i o n th e ob
j e c t and th e p e r c e p t i o n a re b o t h i n t e g r a t e d i n t o e x p e r i e n c e
as a whole ( f o r e x p e r i e n c e i s a w h o l e - - o b j e c t i v e l y — only
35
th ro u g h coming under t.he a p r i o r i c o n d i t i o n s ) . But th e
i n t e g r a t i o n o f th e o b j e c t w i t h the whole i s f o r t h e sake of
th e n e c e s s i t y w ith w h ich the o b j e c t i s c o n n e c te d , by th e a n
a l o g i e s , to the e x i s t e n c e g i v e n in or t h r o u g h th e p e r c e p
t i o n . Thus, i t s c o n n e c t i o n w i t h e x p e r i e n c e as a w hole i s
p a r t of th e means w hereby t h e o b j e c t i s c o n n e c te d w i t h th e
e x i s t e n c e of which we are c o n s c i o u s o n ly in or th ro u g h t h e
p e r c e p t i o n ; i t i s n o t an a l t e r n a t i v e , or even c o - e q u a l ,
33K ant, op. c i t . , B 223-4.
3 4C f. i b i d . , B141-2; B146-9; B161; B164-5.
35C f. i b i d . , B143.
83
te rm . (T h is p o i n t , t o o , w i l l be d i s c u s s e d a t g r e a t e r le n g t h
in C h a p te r V.)
Thus, t h e v a r i o u s o th er f a c t o r s b e s i d e s our c o n
s c i o u s n e s s of e x i s t e n c e and our c o n s c i o u s n e s s of th e o b j e c t
( i n t h e c o n n e c t i o n o f t h e o b j e c t th ro u g h th e a n a l o g i e s w ith
a p e r c e p t i o n and th u s w i t h e x p e r i e n c e as a w h o le ), a r e means
whereby our c o n s c i o u s n e s s of the o b j e c t i s co n n ected w i t h
our c o n s c i o u s n e s s of e x i s t e n c e . They are t h a t th ro u g h which
the fo rm e r i s c o n n e c te d w i t h th e l a t t e r . And even o u r con
s c i o u s n e s s of e x i s t e n c e and our c o n c e p t o f t h e o b j e c t , must
th e m s e lv e s be means, f o r t h a t of w h ich e x i s t e n c e i s p r e d i
c a t e d , i s n o t our c o n c e p t , but t h e o b j e c t ; and t h a t w i t h
which t h e o b j e c t i s c o n n e c te d - - a n d which i s th u s p r e d i c a t e d
of i t - - i s n o t o u r c o n s c io u s n e s s o f e x i s t e n c e , but e x i s t e n c e
i t s e l f . (For K an t d i s t i n g u i s h e d betw een judgm ents a s s e r t i n g
som ething o f an o b j e c t i t s e l f and m e re ly s u b j e c t i v e j u d g
ments such as we would p o s i t i f we were t o say m erely "I am
c o n s c io u s o f t h e o b j e c t as e x i s t e n t ” or ”The o b je c t a p p e a r s
e x i s t e n t [ l y ]
Thus, t h e f i n a l term w i t h w hich an o b j e c t i s c o n
n e c t e d i n an e x i s t e n t i a l judgment must c e r t a i n l y have been,
f o r K a n t, th e f a c t o r o f e x i s t e n c e i t s e l f : f o r the f u n c t i o n
of t h e re m a in in g e le m e n ts ( o th e r t h a n the o b j e c t ) was
^ /
■ I b i d . , B142, B220-1; Immanuel K ant, P ro le g o m
ena t o Any F u t u r e M e ta p h y sic s ( I n d i a n a p o l i s : B o b b s - M e r r ill
C o ., I n c . , 1 9 5 0 ), 9 19, 20.
84
e v i d e n t l y one of c o n n e c tin g th e o b j e c t w i t h , f i n a l l y , e x i s t
en ce.
The f a c t t h a t th e term w i l l alw ays be t h e s u b j e c t ’s
e x i s t e n c e , means, of c o u r s e , t h a t th e l a t t e r w i l l always be
th e p r e d i c a t e of an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent. For what Kant
meant by p r e d i c a t e was t h a t w i t h w hich th e s u b j e c t i s con-
37
n e c te d m a judgm ent.
T hus, we may co n c lu d e to th e f i r s t t h e s i s o f our
s tu d y , T h e s i s K 1: t h a t Kant h e l d :
Theorem t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s t h e p r e d i c a t e
of an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent.
To be s u r e , th e s u b j e c t i s a l s o , i n a s e n s e , con
n e c t e d w ith t h e v a r i o u s e le m e n ts o f t h e c o n n e c t i o n , t h a t i s ,
w ith t h e e le m e n ts th ro u g h which i t i s c o n n e c te d w ith th e
p r e d i c a t e . But t h e s e were n o t r e g a r d e d by Kant as th e p r e d
i c a t e , as can be seen v e ry e a s i l y : i f he had done so, th e n
he would have had t o r e g a r d th e a. p r i o r i c o n d i t i o n s of t h e
u n d e r s t a n d i n g , and, t h u s , e x p e r i e n c e as a w h o le, as th e
p r e d i c a t e of e v e ry judgm ent th o u g h t t h r o u g h , or by means o f ,
t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s - - f o r , of c o u r s e , th e a_ p r i o r i c o n d i t i o n
can n o t be th o u g h t as n e c e s s a r y e x c e p t th ro u g h t h e u n i v e r s a l
i t y of i t s a p p l i c a t i o n to e x p e r i e n c e , and th u s th ro u g h an a t
3 S
l e a s t i m p l i c i t r e f e r e n c e t o e x p e r i e n c e as a w h o le . But
37C f. K an t, C r i t i q u e o f P u r e R e a s o n , B lO f.
3SC f. i b i d . , B 1 4 1 -2 ; B146-9; B164-5.
85
Kant most c e r t a i n l y d id n o t r e g a rd e i t h e r e x p e r i e n c e as a
w hole, or th e a p r i o r i c o n d i t i o n s , as th e p r e d i c a t e of e v e ry
ju d g m e n t^ in v o lv in g them, t h a t i s t o s a y , i n t h e la n g u a g e of
39
t h e P ro lo g o m e n a , e v e ry judgm ent of e x p e r i e n c e . Thus e l e
ments e n t e r i n g i n t o th e c o n n e c t i o n by w hich a s u b j e c t i s
c o n n e c te d to t h a t w ith w hich i t f i n a l l y i s c o n n e c te d , would
n o t have been r e g a r d e d by Kant as e n t e r i n g i n t o th e p r e d i
c a t e of th e ju d g m en t. In t h i s c a s e , t h e n , t h e v a r i o u s e l e
ments th ro u g h w hich our c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f th e o b j e c t i s c o n
n e c te d w i t h e x i s t e n c e , could n o t have been r e g a rd e d by him
as e n t e r i n g i n t o th e p r e d i c a t e of th e e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent.
Only t h e f i n a l te rm , which i s to s a y , t h e e x i s t e n c e o f th e
o b j e c t , would be th e p r e d i c a t e .
39
Cf. Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics,
? 20.
CHAPTER V
REINFORCEMENT OF OUR ARGUMENT FOR K1
D e s p i t e our argum ent th u s f a r , i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t
i n t h e r e a d e r ’ s mind, th e b e l i e f m ight endure t h a t , f o r
K a n t, p e r c e p t i o n was r e a l l y th e p r e d i c a t e of e x i s t e n t i a l
ju d g m e n ts. T h i s b e l i e f m ight seem t o f in d s u p p o rt from th e
f o ll o w i n g t e x t s , i n which Kant spoke o f th e modal c a t e g o r i e s
as p r e d i c a t e s a d d in g , t o th e c o n c e p t of t h e o b j e c t , o n ly a
r e l a t i o n to a c o g n i t i v e f a c u l t y :
The c a t e g o r i e s o f m o d a lity have t h e p e c u l i a r i t y
t h a t , in d e t e r m in i n g an o b j e c t , th e y do n o t in t h e
l e a s t e n l a r g e th e c o n c e p t to which t h e y a r e a t t a c h e d
as p r e d i c a t e s . They only e x p r e s s th e r e l a t i o n of
th e c o n cep t to the f a c u l t y of know ledge. Even when
th e c o n c e p t of a t h i n g i s q u i t e c o m p le te , I can
s t i l l e n q u i r e w h e th e r t h i s o b j e c t i s m e re ly p o s s i b l e
or i s a l s o a c t u a l , or i f a c t u a l , w h e th e r i t i s n o t
a l s o n e c e s s a r y . No a d d i t i o n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n s a re
t h e r e b y th o u g h t in th e o b j e c t i t s e l f ; t h e q u e s t i o n
i s o n ly how t h e o b j e c t , t o g e t h e r w ith a l l i t s d e t e r
m i n a t i o n s , i s r e l a t e d to u n d e r s t a n d i n g and i t s em
p i r i c a l employment, to e m p i r i c a l ju d g m en t, and t o
r e a s o n in i t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o e x p e r i e n c e . ^
The p r i n c i p l e s of m o d a lity a r e n o t , however, ob
j e c t i v e l y s y n t h e t i c . For t h e p r e d i c a t e s of
Immanuel K an t, C r i t i q u e of Pure R e a s o n , t r a n s .
Norman Kemp Smith (New Y o r k : S t . M a r t i n ’s P r e s s , 1965)
B629.
86
87
p o s s i b i l i t y , a c t u a l i t y , and n e c e s s i t y do not i n th e
l e a s t e n l a r g e th e co n cep t o f which th e y a re a f
f ir m e d , adding som ething to t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f
t h e o b j e c t - But s i n c e th e y a r e none th e l e s s s y n
t h e t i c , th e y a r e so s u b j e c t i v e l y o n ly , t h a t i s , th ey
add to th e c o n cep t o f a t h i n g ( o f som ething r e a l ) ,
of which o t h e r w i s e th e y say n o t h i n g , t h e c o g n i t i v e
f a c u l t y from which i t s p r i n g s and in which i t has
i t s s e a t . Thus i f i t i s i n c o n n e c t i o n only w ith the
fo rm al c o n d i t i o n s o f e x p e r i e n c e , and so m erely i n
t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , i t s o b j e c t i s c a l l e d p o s s i b l e .
I f i t s ta n d s i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h p e r c e p t i o n , t h a t i s ,
w i t h s e n s a t i o n as m a t e r i a l s u p p l i e d by th e s e n s e s ,
and th ro u g h p e r c e p t i o n i s d e te r m in e d by means o f th e
u n d e r s t a n d i n g , th e o b j e c t i s a c t u a l . I f i t i s d e
te rm in e d th ro u g h t h e c o n n e c t i o n of p e r c e p t i o n s a c
c o r d in g to c o n c e p t s , th e o b j e c t i s e n t i t l e d n e c e s
s a r y . The p r i n c i p l e s of m o d a l i t y th u s p r e d i c a t e of
a co n cep t n o t h i n g b u t th e a c t i o n of t h e f a c u l t y of
knowledge th ro u g h which i t i s g e n e r a t e d .^
One m ight be le d by t h e s e t e x t s t o b e l i e v e t h a t , f o r K ant,
an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent would c o n n e c t t h e c o n c e p t o f the
o b j e c t only w ith p e r c e p t i o n as su c h . One m ig h t, th e n , b e
l i e v e t h a t when Kant s a id t h a t an o b j e c t e x i s t s , he meant
m e re ly t h a t i t i s p e r c e i v e d - - o r , i f th e o b j e c t i s u n p e r
c e i v e d , m erely t h a t i t could be p e r c e i v e d . This c o n c l u s io n
m ight a l s o seem to f o l l o w from th e f o ll o w i n g t e x t :
For th ro u g h th e c o n c e p t th e o b j e c t i s th o u g h t only
as conform ing to t h e u n i v e r s a l c o n d i t i o n s of p o s s i
b l e e m p i r i c a l knowledge i n g e n e r a l , w h ereas th ro u g h
i t s e x i s t e n c e i t i s th o u g h t as b e l o n g in g to t h e con
t e x t of e x p e r i e n c e as a w h o le. In b e in g th u s con
n e c te d w ith th e c o n t e n t of e x p e r i e n c e as a w hole,
t h e c o n c e p t of th e o b j e c t i s n o t , how ever, i n th e
l e a s t e n l a r g e d ; a l l t h a t has happened i s t h a t our
th o u g h t has t h e r e b y o b t a i n e d an a d d i t i o n a l p o s s i b l e
p e r c e p t i o n . 3
On t h e b a s i s o f t h e s e t e x t s , t h e r e a d e r m ig h t be i n c l i n e d to
2Ibid., B2S6-7. 3Ibid., B628-9.
88
b e l i e v e t h a t Kant a c t u a l l y r e g a r d e d p e r c e p t i o n , or e l s e th e
p o s s i b i l i t y t h e r e o f , as t h a t which he c a l l e d " e x i s t e n c e " ;
and th u s p e r c e p t i o n , or th e p o s s i b i l i t y ' o f p e r c e p t i o n , would
be th e p r e d i c a t e of an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent.
Or th e r e a d e r m ight b e l i e v e t h a t s i n c e Kant s a id
t h a t i n ju d g in g an o b j e c t t o e x i s t , t h e o b j e c t i s co n n ected
w ith e x p e r i e n c e as a w hole, he must have r e g a r d e d th e p r e d i
c a t e a s , s im p ly , t h e o b j e c t ’s b e lo n g in g to e x p e r i e n c e as a
w hole. S in c e a s s e r t i n g th e e x i s t e n c e of an o b j e c t w o u ld --
s u p p o s e d l y - - a s s e r t m e re ly t h a t i t b e lo n g s to e x p e r i e n c e as a
w hole, an o b j e c t ’ s " e x i s t e n c e " might seem to mean, s im p ly ,
i t s b e lo n g in g to th e w hole of e x p e r i e n c e .
In o rd e r to p r e s s our argument a g a i n s t t h e s e v iew s,
I s h a l l c r i t i c i z e each i n t u r n . In d o in g so, I w i l l show
Kant t o have h e l d :
Theorem Y^: t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s som ething
o th e r th a n p e r c e p t i o n .
Theorem Y^: t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s som ething
o t h e r th a n th e p o s s i b i l i t y of p e r c e p t i o n .
Theorem Y^: t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s som ething
o t h e r t h a n b e l o n g i n g to e x p e r i e n c e as a
wh o1e .
Theorems Y and Y
1 2
In th e pag es t h a t f o l l o w , th e p o i n t I w ish t o make
i s t h a t , w h ile Kant d id r e g a r d an o b j e c t ’s p e r c e p t i o n , or a t
l e a s t th e p o s s i b i l i t y t h e r e o f , as a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r
our b e in g c o n s c io u s of th e o b j e c t Ts e x i s t e n c e , he d id n o t
i d e n t i f y t h e e x i s t e n c e of w hich we a r e t h e r e b y c o n s c io u s
w i t h e i t h e r t h e p e r c e p t i o n or i t s p o s s i b i l i t y .
P r o o f of Theorem
The word ''p e r c e p t i o n " c a r r i e s a c e r t a i n a m b ig u ity in
K a n t ' s u s a g e . I t can mean:
^ in0^ e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n Cor of c o n s c i o u s n e s s ) ,
as when he spoke of an a p p e a r a n c e 's b e in g r e p r e s e n t e d in
p e r c e p t i o n , as opposed to i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n i m a g i n a t i v e
4
r e p r o d u c t i o n ; or when he spoke o f p e r c e p t i o n as e m p i r i c a l
c o n s c i o u s n e s s , or c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n w hich s e n s a t i o n i s to be
found ( i . e . , whose o b j e c t i s an a p p e a ra n c e r e p r e s e n t e d
th ro u g h s e n s e J .
2. A p a r t i c u l a r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n or c o n s c i o u s n e s s in
t h e above mode, as when Kant spoke of each p e r c e p t i o n of an
a p p e a ra n c e as b e in g b ro k e n o f f from ev ery o t h e r .
3. The c o n t e n t of a p e r c e p t i o n , as when Kant spoke
o f a p e r c e p t i o n as a th in g g iv e n in sp a c e and tim e ( i . e . , a
7
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n accompanied by s e n s a t i o n ) .
The t h i r d meaning i s , o f c o u r s e , v e ry l o o s e ; b u t i t i s not
in v o lv e d i n e i t h e r of t h e key p a s s a g e s in which Kant spoke
4 I b i d . , A115.
jL
Ibid., A121.
5 Ibid., B207.
1 Ibid., B147b.
90
of hence we can i g n o r e i t . In B272-4, b o th o f t h e o t h e r two
m eanings a r e i n v o l v e d , however; f o r Kant spoke b o th o f our
knowledge of an o b j e c t ’ s e x i s t e n c e n o t r e q u i r i n g im m ediate
p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e o b j e c t , and a l s o of t h e need f o r c o n n e c t
ing th e o b j e c t w i t h a p e r c e p t i o n . In B629c, b o th m eanings
a r e a l s o d i r e c t l y in v o lv e d ; f o r Kant spoke o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s
of e x i s t e n c e b e in g g iv e n im m e d ia te ly th ro u g h p e r c e p t i o n , and
a l s o of c o n n e c t i n g th e o b j e c t w i t h some one o f our p e r c e p
t i o n s .
L e t us t a k e p e r c e p t i o n i n i t s f i r s t s e n s e ( i . e . , as
a mode o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n [o r of c o n s c i o u s n e s s ] ) . K a n t ’ s
words i n B220-1 would seem d e f i n i t e l y to e x c lu d e p e r c e p t i o n
from b e in g t h a t w hich K ant c a l l e d " e x i s t e n c e , " or b e in g th e
p r e d i c a t e of e x i s t e n t i a l ju d g m en t. For Kant i n d i c a t e d t h a t
t h e a n a l o g i e s a r e n o t c o n cern ed w i t h th e mode or manner in
which so m eth in g i s apprehended i n a p p e a r a n c e , e . g . , w i t h
p e r c e p t i o n as s u c h , i n t h a t what p e r t a i n s to t h e mode as
such can be known a p r i o r i th ro u g h b e in g e x h i b i t e d in ’’e v e ry
example t h a t comes b e f o r e us e m p i r i c a l l y , " w h ereas e x is te n c e ,
he i n s i s t e d , ca n n o t be known a p r i o r i w i t h r e s p e c t to t h a t
which i s most p r o p e r to i t . F o r, as K ant s a i d :
The e x i s t e n c e o f a p p e a r a n c e s c a n n o t, how ever, be
th u s known a p r i o r i ; and even g r a n t i n g t h a t we could
in any such manner c o n t r i v e t o i n f e r t h a t so m eth in g
e x i s t s , we could n o t know i t d e t e r m i n a t e l y , could
n o t , t h a t i s , a n t i c i p a t e th e f e a t u r e s th r o u g h w hich
i t s e m p i r i c a l i n t u i t i o n i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from o t h e r
i n t u i t i o n s .
T hat i s to s a y , th e f e a t u r e s whereby p e r c e p t i o n o f a t h i n g
d i f f e r s from o t h e r modes of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , can be known a_
p r i o r i th ro u g h t h e i r e x e m p l i c a t i o n i n every a c t of p e r c e p
t i o n ; w hereas t h e d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f e a t u r e s of th e e x i s t e n c e
of so m eth in g ( o r of th e o c c u r r i n g - - o r e x i s t e n c e - - o f a p a r
t i c u l a r p e r c e p t i o n ) c a n n o t be a n t i c i p a t e d , or known, i n
a n y th in g e l s e . Thus, t h a t w hich i s p r o p e r t o p e r c e p t i o n as
a mode must be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from e x i s t e n c e .
F u r th e r m o r e , K ant c o n t r a s t e d t h a t w i t h which t h e
a n a l o g i e s a r e co n cern ed ( i . e . , th e e x i s t e n c e o f a p p e a ra n c e s
[ o b j e c t s of e m p i r i c a l i n t u i t i o n ] ) , w i t h th e s y n t h e s i s of th e
9
e m p i r i c a l i n t u i t i o n s i n which a p p e a r a n c e s a r e g iv e n . T h is
was, o f c o u r s e , a s i m i l a r d i s t i n c t i o n to t h a t which he made
in t h e P rolegom ena b etw een judgm ents o f e x p e r i e n c e i n v o l v i n g
th e a n a l o g i e s and mere judgm ents of p e r c e p t i o n . ^ In b o th
th e P ro leg o m en a and h e r e i n t h e C r i t i q u e of P u re R e a s o n ,
Kant s a i d , i n e f f e c t , t h a t judgm ents h av in g to do s o l e l y
w i t h p e r c e p t i o n , as s u c h , a r e c h a r a c t e r i z e d p r e c i s e l y by
t h e i r f a i l u r e to be concerned w ith th e e x i s t e n c e of o b j e c t s .
( N e e d le ss t o say , a judgm ent b e a r i n g on t h e o c c u r r e n c e of a
p e r c e p t i o n , however, i s concerned w i t h e x i s t e n c e - - b u t i t i s
SIbid., B221. 9 Ibid.
10
Immanuel K a n t, P rolegom ena to Any F u tu re M eta
p h y s i c s ( I n d i a n a p o l i s : B o b b 's-M e rrill C o., Inc . , 1950) ,
$ 18, pp. 4 5 -4 6 .
92
n o t c o n cern ed w i t h th e p e r c e p t i o n p r e c i s e l y as p e r c e p t i o n .
On th e o t h e r hand, a judgment co n cern ed only w i t h p e r c e p t i o n
as su ch , w i l l be co n cern ed w i t h what i s a c o n d i t i o n of our
knowledge of e x i s t e n c e , b u t i t w i l l n o t b e c o n c e rn e d w ith
t h e f u l f i l l m e n t of t h i s c o n d i t i o n , t h a t i s w ith t h e a c t u a l
i t y of s o m e t h i n g 's b e in g g iv e n in p e r c e p t i o n . )
The d i s t i n c t i o n b etw een e x i s t e n c e and p e r c e p t i o n
e i t h e r as a mode or a p a r t i c u l a r a c t i n t h i s mode, i s c l e a r
ly im p lie d i n th e f o ll o w i n g p a s s a g e :
Our c o n s c i o u s n e s s of a l l ex i s te n c e (w hether immedi
a t e l y th ro u g h p e r c e p t i o n , or m e d i a t e l y th ro u g h i n
f e r e n c e s which c o n n e c t som ething w i t h p e r c e p t i o n ) .
In t h i s p a s s a g e , e x i s t e n c e i s i m p l i c i t l y , b u t v e ry c l e a r l y ,
d i s t i n g u i s h e d , f o r i t i s p r e s e n t e d as som ething o_f which we
a re c o n s c i o u s , w hereas ( a ) p e r c e p t i o n i s p r e s e n t e d as t h a t
t h ro u g h which we a r e c o n s c i o u s . Thus, e x i s t e n c e i s some
t h i n g of which c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s g iv e n th ro u g h t h e mode and
a c t of p e r c e p t i o n ; i t i s n o t t h e mode or a c t i t s e l f .
The f o ll o w i n g argum ents ap p ly more d i r e c t l y to " p e r
c e p t i o n ” where t h e word i s t a k e n to mean a p a r t i c u l a r r e p r e
s e n t a t i o n or c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n t h e p e r c e p t u a l mode.
Any p a r t i c u l a r p e r c e p t i o n w hich m ig h t, i n f a c t , be
a c t u a l d u r in g a p e r i o d of t i m e , Kant would have r e g a rd e d as
i d e n t i c a l , i n c o n t e n t , w i t h t h e c o n c e p t th ro u g h which we
1 1
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B629c.
93
m ight have th o u g h t of i t as p o s s i b l e p r i o r to i t s a c t u a l oc
c u r r i n g . For i t would seem o n ly r e a s o n a b l e to suppose t h a t
i n s o f a r as Kant r e c o g n iz e d t h a t we may t h in k as p o s s i b l e an
12
o b j e c t which l a t e r e x i s t s , so he would a llo w t h a t we may
t h i n k as p o s s i b l e th e c o n t e n t of a c e r t a i n p e r c e p t i o n b e f o r e
i t a c t u a l l y o c c u r s . Thus, s i n c e he would a l s o a llo w us to
t h i n k what i s p r o p e r to i t by r e a s o n o f i t s mode ( i . e . , as
13
p e r c e p t i o n ) , he would a llo w us t o t h i n k t h e p e r c e p t i o n i n
a l l i t s p a r t i c u l a r i t y ( i . e . , w i t h r e s p e c t to a l l t h a t would
c o n s t i t u t e i t as t h e p a r t i c u l a r p e r c e p t i o n i t i s - - f o r t h i s
would be n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n i t s c o n t e n t and w hat p e r t a i n s to
i t s mode). On th e o th e r hand, we have seen t h a t he would
n o t a llo w a t a l l t h a t we c o u ld , b e f o r e h a n d , t h i n k th e
p e r c e p t i o n ' s o c c u r r i n g - - o r e x i s t e n c e - - i n what i s p r o p e r or
14
p e c u l i a r to e x i s t e n c e as s u c h . Thus, j u s t as he d i s t i n
g u ish e d betw een e x i s t e n c e and o b j e c t s , he would seem to have
a llo w ed f o r a “d i s t i n c t i o n b etw een th e e x i s t e n c e of a p a r t i c
u l a r p e r c e p t i o n and th e p e r c e p t i o n i t s e l f . Thus by " e x i s t
e n c e , ” he could n o t have meant what he meant by "a p e r c e p
t i o n . "
F u rth e rm o re , in a s c r i b i n g e x i s t e n c e t o a p e r c e i v e d
o b j e c t , som ething i s , as i t w e re , "borrow ed" or " a p p r o p r i
a t e d ” from th e p e r c e p t i o n i n o r d e r to a s c r i b e i t to t h e
l2 Ibid., B627-S. 1 3Cf. ibid., B221.
94
o b j e c t . T hat i s to say, e x i s t e n c e , o f w h ic h , we a r e con
s c i o u s in th e p e r c e p t i o n , comes to be t h o u g h t , no lo n g e r as
b e lo n g in g t o t h e p e r c e p t i o n , b u t as b e l o n g i n g to t h e o b j e c t ;
f o r i t i s n o t , s t r i c t l y s p e a k in g , a p e r c e p t i o n t h a t i s a s
c r i b e d to t h e o b j e c t i n t h i n k i n g t h e o b j e c t as e x i s t e n t , b u t
r a t h e r t h e e x i s t e n c e of w hich we a r e c o n s c io u s i n a p e r c e p
t i o n .
Kant would, i n a s e n s e , say t h a t we ''a s c r i b e " a p e r
c e p t i o n t o an o b j e c t , i n s o f a r as we may t h i n k of t h e p e r c e p
t i o n as r e p r e s e n t i n g th e o b j e c t ; ’* ’^ b u t he would say t h a t we
do n o t , i n t h i s k in d o f " a s c r i b i n g , " do t h e same as we do in
a s c r i b i n g e x i s t e n c e to t h e o b j e c t ; f o r th e e x i s t e n c e which
we a s c r i b e to th e o b j e c t he r e g a rd e d as s y n t h e s i z e d w ith t h e
o b j e c t i n a way d i f f e r e n t from th e way i n w hich a p e r c e p t i o n
i s s y n t h e s i z e d w i t h th e o b j e c t . A lth o u g h we may d i s t i n g u i s h
s u b se q u e n t t o t h i s s y n t h e s i s , betw een an o b j e c t and i t s ex
i s t e n c e Ccf. our d i s c u s s i o n of ? in C h a p te r V I), as Kant
would adm it t h a t we can n o t d i s t i n g u i s h b etw een them in t h e
same way as we d i s t i n g u i s h b etw een an o b j e c t and i t s p e r c e p
t i o n ; f o r w h ile he m a in ta in e d t h a t we may c o n s id e r a p e r c e p
t i o n as cau sed by an o b j e c t , or as r e p r e s e n t i n g an o b j e c t ,
he would n o t have c o n s id e r e d an o b j e c t ' s e x i s t e n c e as caused
by th e o b j e c t , or as r e p r e s e n t i n g th e o b j e c t . W ithout go
ing any f u r t h e r i n t o K a n t ’s d o c t r i n e r e g a r d i n g th e r e l a t i o n
1 5Cf. ibid., AlOSc.
16
Ibid., B72.
95
betw een an o b j e c t and t h e p e r c e p t i o n t h o u g h t t o r e p r e s e n t
t h a t o b j e c t , I b e l i e v e t h a t we can r e c o g n i z e a d i f f e r e n c e
betw een t h e way i n w hich an o b j e c t would be r e l a t e d t o such
a p e r c e p t i o n , and th e way i n w hich, a f t e r b e in g c o n c e iv e d in
i t s c o n c e p t ( i n such a way as t o le a v e o u t e x i s t e n c e ) , an
o b j e c t would th e n be s y n t h e s i z e d w i t h e x i s t e n c e in e x i s t e n
t i a l ju d g m en t. But t h i s i s to say t h a t Kant must have r e c
ognized t h a t when we a s c r i b e e x i s t e n c e t o an o b j e c t , what we
a s c r i b e t o i t i s n o t a p e r c e p t i o n , b u t som ething of w hich we
have become c o n s c i o u s i n p e r c e p t i o n , nam ely e x i s t e n c e .
Kant p l a i n l y e n v isa g e d a c a s e o f e x i s t e n t i a l j u d g
ment i n which a d i s t i n c t i o n b etw een th e r o l e s o f e x i s t e n c e
and p e r c e p t i o n i s even more e v i d e n t - I r e f e r t o th e c a s e in
which he would n o t r e g a r d t h e p e r c e p t i o n which would a llo w
one to a s c r i b e e x i s t e n c e to an o b j e c t , as b e in g a p e r c e p t i o n
of th e o b j e c t ( i . e . , t h e c a s e i n w hich we would co n c lu d e v i a
" a n a l o g i e s of e x p e r i e n c e s " or " e m p i r i c a l l a w s , " from th e
p e r c e p t i o n of one o b j e c t to t h e e x i s t e n c e of a second ob-
17
j e c t ) . I n such a c a s e , th e p e r c e p t i o n would be " a s c r i b e d
t o " or s y n t h e s i z e d w i t h th e o b j e c t o f w hich i t i s th o u g h t to
be a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , b u t th e p e r c e p t i o n would n o t be a s
c r i b e d i n t h i s way t o t h e second o b j e c t ( t o w h ich , however,
e x i s t e n c e , o f w hich we a r e g iv e n c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n th e p e r
c e p t i o n , would be a s c r i b e d . ) We would n o t t h i n k th e
17 .
Ibid. , B272-3.
p e r c e p t i o n as p e r c e p t i o n of th e second o b j e c t . That i s to
sa y , we would " a p p r o p r i a t e " or a s c r i b e e x i s t e n c e to an ob
j e c t , w i t h o u t in a p a r a l l e l way a s c r i b i n g t h e . p e r c e p t i o n in
w hich we h av e become c o n s c io u s of e x i s t e n c e , t o t h a t o b j e c t .
I b e l i e v e t h i s f a c t w i l l show t h a t Kant was aware of a s i t u
a t i o n in w hich i t would v e ry c l e a r l y b e , not t h e p e r c e p t i o n
in which we become c o n s c io u s o f e x i s t e n c e , b u t e x i s t e n c e ,
which i s b o t h a s c r i b e d to t h e o b j e c t , and i s t h a t f o r th e
sa k e of w hich th e o b j e c t i s c o n n ected w i t h th e p e r c e p t i o n .
P r o o f of Theorem
We have seen t h a t K ant did n o t i d e n t i f y e x i s t e n c e
w i t h p e r c e p t i o n , b u t r e g a r d e d th e l a t t e r as t h a t th ro u g h
18
which c o n s c i o u s n e s s of e x i s t e n c e i s g i v e n . Because we
have g ra sp e d t h i s t r u t h ^we sh o u ld now be i n a b e t t e r p o s i
t i o n to u n d e r s t a n d h i s r e f e r e n c e i n B629a to a " p o s s i b l e
p e r c e p t i o n . " T h a t i s , we sh o u ld be a b l e to s e e t h a t he did
n o t mean t o i d e n t i f y e x i s t e n c e w ith e i t h e r a p o s s i b l e p e r
c e p t i o n or w ith t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of p e r c e p t i o n ; and t h a t , i n
s t e a d , h i s r e f e r e n c e was f o r q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t p u r p o s e . But
s i n c e th e c o n te x t i s i m p o r t a n t , l e t us q u o te th e p a s s a g e in
w hich th e r e f e r e n c e i s made:
For th o u g h , i n my c o n c e p t , n o th in g may be la c k in g o f
th e p o s s i b l e r e a l c o n t e n t of a t h i n g in g e n e r a l ,
som ething i s s t i l l l a c k i n g in i t s r e l a t i o n to my
whole s t a t e of t h o u g h t , namely, [ i n so f a r as I am
18
Ibid., B629c.
97
u n a b le t o a s s e r t ] t h a t knowledge o f t h i s o b j e c t i s
a l s o p o s s i b l e a p o s t e r i o r i . And h e r e we f i n d th e
s o u rc e of our p r e s e n t d i f f i c u l t y . Were we d e a l i n g
w i t h an o b j e c t o f th e s e n s e s , we could not confound
th e e x i s t e n c e o f th e t h i n g w ith t h e mere c o n c e p t of
i t . For th ro u g h t h e concept t h e o b j e c t i s th o u g h t
o n ly as conform ing to th e u n i v e r s a l c o n d i t i o n s of
p o s s i b l e e m p i r i c a l knowledge i n g e n e r a l , w h e re a s
th ro u g h i t s e x i s t e n c e i t i s th o u g h t as b e lo n g in g to
t h e c o n t e x t o f e x p e r i e n c e as a w h o le . In b e in g th u s
c o n n ected w ith t h e c o n t e n t o f e x p e r ie n c e as a w hole,
th e c o n c e p t of th e o b j e c t i s n o t , however, i n th e
l e a s t e n l a r g e d ; a l l t h a t has happened i s t h a t our
th o u g h t h as t h e r e b y o b ta in e d an a d d i t i o n a l p o s s i b l e
p e r c e p t i o n . I t i s n o t , t h e r e f o r e , s u r p r i s i n g t h a t ,
i f we a t t e m p t t o t h i n k e x i s t e n c e th ro u g h th e p u re
c a t e g o r y a l o n e , we c a n n o t s p e c i f y a s i n g l e mark d i s
t i n g u i s h i n g i t from mere p o s s i b i l i t y . i
A c t u a l l y , K a n t ' s i n t e n t h e re was not so much t o d e
f i n e i n what th e e x i s t e n c e o f an o b j e c t c o n s i s t s , as i t was
to show t h a t b e c a u s e an o b j e c t ’s e x i s t e n c e i s som ething o f
which we can be d i r e c t l y aware o n ly i n a p e r c e p t i o n , i-t i s
not a t r a i t c a p a b l e of e n t e r i n g i n t o th e c o n c e p t of an ob
j e c t , n o t som ething which c o u ld , t h e n , be d i s p l a y e d in
i m a g i n a t i o n even i f i t s p e r c e p t i o n w ere l a c k i n g . To be
s u r e , i f th e o b j e c t were n o t , in f a c t , a c t u a l l y p e r c e i v e d ,
20
i t co u ld s t i l l be th o u g h t as e x i s t e n t . But our t h i n k i n g
would n o t c o n s i s t in adding a new d e t e r m i n a t i o n to th e
o b j e c t ' s c o n c e p t . I t \vould c o n s i s t , Kant wished to make
c l e a r , i n t h i n k i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e of th e o b j e c t as som ething
c a p a b le of b e in g g iv e n d i r e c t l y i n p e r c e p t i o n ( i . e . , t h a t a
p e r c e p t i o n i s p o s s i b l e i n which we could be im m e d ia te ly
1 9 Ibid., B628-9.
2°Cf- ibid., B272.
98
c o n s c io u s of t h a t f a c t o r of which Kant s a id we can be imme
d i a t e l y c o n s c io u s o n ly in a p e r c e p t i o n , nam ely, th e o b j e c t ' s
. . x 21
e x i s t e n c e ; .
T here i s a t e m p t a t i o n to b e l i e v e t h a t Kant meant to
say t h a t what we t h i n k i s sim p ly t h a t th e o b j e c t i s c a p a b le
o f b e in g p e r c e i v e d ( r a t h e r th an t h a t i t s e x i s t e n c e i s c a p
a b le of b e in g g iv e n in p e r c e p t i o n ) . Hence, t h i n k i n g an ob
j e c t as e x i s t e n t would c o n s i s t o n ly i n t h i n k i n g t h a t i t can
be g iv e n in p e r c e p t i o n . And t h u s , " e x i s t e n c e " would mean
th e same as " c a p a b l e of b e in g g iv e n in p e r c e p t i o n . "
But as we have s e e n , even i f an o b j e c t were g iv e n in
p e r c e p t i o n , we sh o u ld n o t know i t as an e x i s t e n t o b j e c t u n
t i l we had become c o n s c io u s s p e c i f i c a l l y of i t s e x i s t e n c e
( f o r among o t h e r r e a s o n s , we a r e a b l e to t h i n k of an a p p e a r
a n c e , i n o t h e r ways th a n th ro u g h th e a n a l o g i e s , in ways t h a t
22
a r e not concerned w i t h t h e o b j e c t as e x i s t e n t , e . g . , in
what Kant r e f e r r e d to i n th e P ro leg o m en a as "judgm ents of
2 3
p e r c e p t i o n . " ) Thus t h i n k i n g sim p ly of an o b j e c t as
( e i t h e r a c t u a l l y or p o s s i b l y ) p e r c e i v e d , would n o t a llo w us
t o t h i n k e x p l i c i t l y of th e o b j e c t ' s e x i s t e n c e .
T h e re re m a in e d , th e n , a d i s t i n c t i o n in K a n t ' s mind
betw een th e p e r c e p t i o n t h a t i s th o u g h t as p o s s i b l e and th e-
f a c t o r of e x i s t e n c e of which we would be g iv e n c o n s c io u s n e s s
2 lIbid., B629. 2 2 Ibid., B221.
23
Cf. Kant, Prolegomena, § 18.
99
i n t h a t p e r c e p t i o n ( c f . a l s o B629c). The p o i n t t h a t he
w ished t o s t r e s s h e r e , i n B629a, i s sim p ly t h a t b e c a u s e we
can n o t r e p r e s e n t e x i s t e n c e as a d e t e r m i n a t i o n c a p a b le o f en
t e r i n g i n t o an o b j e c t ' s c o n c e p t or e s s e n c e , t h e e x i s t e n c e of
an ( u n p e r c e i v e d ) o b j e c t can be th o u g h t o n ly as so m eth in g of
w hich we could be aware i n p e r c e p t i o n .
Yet th e s e n se i n w hich Kant co u ld say t h a t an
o b j e c t ’s e x i s t e n c e could be th o u g h t as som ething of which xve
could be aware in p e r c e p t i o n , must be d e te rm in e d v e ry c a r e
f u l l y . For t h e r e a r e two s e n s e s i n which Kant would have
s a id t h a t we " c o u l d ” be aware o f an o b j e c t in p e r c e p t i o n , or
t h a t i t i s " c a p a b l e " of b e in g p e r c e i v e d , or t h a t i t i s an
o b j e c t o f " p o s s i b l e p e r c e p t i o n , " or t h a t i t s p e r c e p t i o n i s
" p o s s i b l e . " I f we u n d e r s t a n d t h e s e p h r a s e s i n one s e n s e , we
can see t h a t Kant c o u ld n o t p o s s i b l y have i d e n t i f i e d what
th e y mean w ith what he meant by " e x i s t e n c e . " On th e o th e r
hand, we s h a l l see t h a t th e o t h e r s e n s e " i n c l u d e s " what Kant
meant by " e x i s t e n c e " or " e x i s t e n t , " b u t o n ly i n s o f a r as i t
p re s u p p o s e s t h e s e l a s t m ean in g s.
The s e n s e t h a t c a n n o t be i d e n t i c a l w i t h - e x i s t e n c e i s
t h a t i n which we say t h a t a t h in g w hich does n o t e x i s t , i s
y e t p o s s i b l e , or i n which we sometimes say t h a t a p e r c e p t i o n
which does n o t e x i s t , i s y e t p o s s i b l e . T h is i s t h e s e n se of
" p o s s i b l e " t h a t i s e x p r e s s e d i n h i s a c c o u n t of judgm ents of
p o s s i b i l i t y i n B 6 2 5 ff. In t h i s c o n t e x t , he o b v i o u s l y d i s
t i n g u i s h e d b e t w e e n knowing an o b j e c t o n ly as p o s s i b l e and
100
knowing i t as e x i s t e n t ; and y e t , a t th e same tim e , he r e
g ard ed th e form er as i n v o l v i n g our t h i n k i n g th e p o s s i b i l i t y
of t h e o b j e c t ' s b e in g p e r c e i v e d . For an o b j e c t could n o t be
th o u g h t as p o s s i b l e u n l e s s i t were th o u g h t as som ething
24
w hich could be g iv e n in e x p e r i e n c e . For we must remember
t h a t f o r K an t, a t h i n g was n o t to be r e g a rd e d as p o s s i b l e
25
m e re ly b e c a u s e i t s c o n c e p t c o n ta in e d no c o n t r a d i c t i o n ; f o r
he made a p o i n t of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g betw een t h e l o g i c a l p o s s i -
. . . _ 26
b i l i t y of a c o n c e p t and t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of th e o b j e c t ( t o
w h ich , i n t h e f o o t n o t e t o B624c, he seems to g iv e t h e name
" r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y " ) .
Thus, th e s e n s e in which Kant h e ld t h a t p e r c e p t i o n
o f a p o s s i b l e o b j e c t i s " p o s s i b l e , " must be d i f f e r e n t from
t h a t i n which he s a id t h a t p e r c e p t i o n of an e x i s t e n t o b j e c t
i s " p o s s i b l e . " (We s h a l l c a l l t h i s l a t t e r " e x i s t e n t i a l p o s
s i b i l i t y . " ) For Kant p l a i n l y d id n o t mean t h a t an o b j e c t
can be th o u g h t as e x i s t e n t m erely i f i t s p e r c e p t i o n i s "p o s
s i b l e " ( o r t h a t we " c o u ld " p e r c e i v e i t ) i n th e f i r s t s e n se
27
of t h e s e w ords. No, i t i s o b v io u s t h a t when he s a i d t h a t
24
K an t, C r i t i q u e of P u re R e a so n , B267-72.
25I b i d . , B26S. 2 6 I b i d . ; a l s o B624c.
^ 1 I b i d . , B624c-5a, i n c l u d i n g f o o t n o t e . K ant p l a i n l y
meant to d i s t i n g u i s h e x i s t e n c e ( r a t h e r t h a n , as he seems to
sa y , i t s c o n c e p t) from r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y . C f. a l s o i b i d . ,
B629, where Kant d e s c r i b e s how we go beyond t h i n k i n g an ob
j e c t as m e re ly ( a l b e i t r e a l l y ) p o s s i b l e , t h a t i s , by going
o u t s i d e of c o n c e p t i o n to a c t u a l p e r c e p t i o n , in w hich, a lo n e ,
c o n s c i o u s n e s s of e x i s t e n c e i s g iv e n . C a s s i r e r was o b v io u s ly
101
p e r c e p t i o n of th e e x i s t e n t o b j e c t i s p o s s i b l e , he m eant, n o t
o n ly t h a t t h e o b j e c t i s t h e s o r t of t h i n g o f which p e r c e p
t i o n i s p o s s i b l e ( i n th e f i r s t s e n s e ) , b u t t h a t p e r c e p t i o n
o f i t i s p o s s i b l e i n the s e n s e t h a t th e o b j e c t i s t h e r e to
be p e r c e i v e d , even though we may n o t , in f a c t , p e r c e i v e i t .
T h u s, fo r example, when an u n p e r c e iv e d o b j e c t i s th o u g h t as
e x i s t e n t , v i a th e a n a lo g y of c a u s a t i o n - - t h r o u g h w hich i t can
be th o u g h t, s a y , . a s being th e c a u s e of a p e r c e i v e d o b j e c t - -
i t i s th o u g h t as som ething t h a t c o u ld be p e r c e i v e d ( i . e . , as
p e r c e i v a b l e , or as an o b j e c t o f p o s s i b l e p e r c e p t i o n ) . But
t h e o b j e c t which i s th o u g h t as b e in g a n - o b j e c t o f p o s s i b l e
p e r c e p t i o n , i s th o u g h t as b e in g a c t u a l l y , n o t m e re ly p o s s i
b l y , th e c a u s e of t h e p e r c e i v e d o b j e c t ; t h u s , i t i s th o u g h t
2 8
as a c t u a l ( o r e x i s t e n t ) , though u n p e r c e i v e d . T h a t i s to
s a y , a lth o u g h i t i s th o u g h t as p e r c e i v a b l e , r a t h e r th a n
m ista k e n when he h e ld t h a t Kant i d e n t i f i e d th e a c t u a l i t y or
e x i s t e n c e of an o b j e c t w ith i t s p o s s i b i l i t y . (C f. H e i n r i c h
W a lte r C a s s i r e r , K a n t Ts F i r s t C r i t i q u e [New York: Macmillan,
1 9 5 4 ], pp. 207-8)1 C a s s i r e r m isto o k our i n a b i l i t y , a c c o r d
ing to K a n t, to d i s t i n g u i s h b etw een a c t u a l i t y and p o s s i b i l
i t y s o l e l y by means of t h e i r c o n c e p t s , f o r an i n a b i l i t y to
d i s t i n g u i s h between them i n any way, even e x t r a - c o n c e p t u a l l y .
C f. our d i s c u s s i o n , f o l l o w i n g , of B286-7, and a l s o th e l a t
t e r h a l f o f our C h a p te r IX.
P R
C f. i b i d . , B273bc. Cf. a l s o B e l l a Kussy Milmed,
Kant and C u r r e n t P h i l o s o p h i c a l I s s u e s (New York: New York
U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1961), p p. 2 1 7 -1 8 . Milmed a rg u e s t h a t th e
i r r e d u c i b i l i t y of e x i s t e n c e to th e m erely s u b j e c t i v e p o s s i
b i l i t y of p e r c e p t i o n , i s r e q u i r e d by K a n t r s d o c t r i n e of th e
Ding an S i c h . We have a tte m p te d t o arg u e t o th e same e f f e c t
on o th e r g ro u n d s. There i s no r e a s o n why t h e s e two l i n e s of
argument sh o u ld n o t r e i n f o r c e each o t h e r .
102
p e r c e i v e d , i t i s n o t th o u g h t m erely as p e r c e i v a b l e . A cco rd
i n g l y , th e p o s s i b i l i t y o f i t s p e r c e p t i o n i s r e c o g n iz e d as
d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of a m e re ly p o s s i b l e o b j e c t ; i n t h a t th e
e x i s t e n t , b u t u n p e r c e i v e d , o b j e c t i s th o u g h t as b e in g t h e r e
to be p e r c e i v e d . Thus t h e ’’e x i s t e n t i a l ” p o s s i b i l i t y of an
o b j e c t ’s p e r c e p t i o n i n c l u d e s r e f e r e n c e to th e o b j e c t ’s ’’b e
ing t h e r e ” or e x i s t e n c e . Only th ro u g h t h i s r e f e r e n c e can
t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from t h e o t h e r .
But s i n c e th e p o s s i b i l i t y of an o b j e c t ’s p e r c e p t i o n
i s , i n t h i s s e n s e , founded upon t h e o b j e c t ’s e x i s t e n c e , t h e
o b j e c t ’s e x i s t e n c e must be r e c o g n iz e d as a f a c t o r d i s t i n c t
from th e p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s p e r c e p t i o n ( a l th o u g h t h i s f a c t o r
can be known i n what i s p r o p e r to i t o n ly in or th ro u g h p e r
c e p t i o n ) .
H ence, th e te rm w ith w hich th e o b j e c t must f i n a l l y
be c o n n e c te d i n an e x i s t e n t i a l judgment i s n o t sim p ly th e
e x i s t e n t i a l p o s s i b i l i t y o f i t s p e r c e p t i o n , b u t th e f a c t
w hich c o n s t i t u t e s t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y as e x i s t e n t i a l ( i . e . , t h e
o b j e c t ’ s e x i s t e n c e ) .
Kant d id n o t e x p l a i n p r e c i s e l y how we a r e a b l e to
t h i n k th e u n p e r c e iv e d e x i s t e n c e whereby we r e c o g n i z e th e
p o s s i b i l i t y of an o b j e c t ' s p e r c e p t i o n as b e in g more than
t h a t of a p o s s i b l e o b j e c t . Yet i n h i s i n t r o d u c t o r y d e s c r i p
t i o n of th e a n a l o g i e s qua a n a l o g i e s ( i . e . , as ways o f t h i n k
ing th e m is s in g member of a p r o p o r t i o n th ro u g h our knowledge
of th e o t h e r t h r e e members) he d i d , i n e f f e c t , g iv e an
103
i n d i c a t i o n of how t h i s t h i n k i n g of an u n p e r c e iv e d e x i s t e n c e
29
might t a k e p l a c e . For when an u n p e r c e iv e d o b j e c t i s
th o u g h t as som ething whose e x i s t e n c e co u ld be g iv e n in a
p e r c e p t i o n , i t s e x i s t e n c e i s t h o u g h t th ro u g h b e in g r e l a t e d - -
by th e a n a l o g i e s — to e x i s t e n c e t h a t i s g iv e n i n an a c t u a l
30
p e r c e p t i o n . And when th e u n p e r c e iv e d o b j e c t i s th o u g h t i n
t h i s way, th e e x i s t e n c e w hich could be given o n l y in a p e r
c e p t i o n , can be th o u g h t as b e in g r e l a t e d to th e p o s s i b l e
p e r c e p t i o n of t h i s o b j e c t as t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e p e r c e i v e d
o b j e c t i s r e l a t e d to t h e a c t u a l p e r c e p t i o n of t h a t o b j e c t .
That i s to say, we co u ld t h i n k t h e u n p e r c e i v e d o b j e c t ’s e x
i s t e n c e th ro u g h th e f o ll o w i n g a n a lo g y or p r o p o r t i o n :
a c t u a l p e r c e p t i o n p o s s i b l e p e r c e p t i o n of
of an o b j e c t u n p e r c e iv e d o b j e c t
o b j e c t ' s e x i s t e n c e u n p e r c e iv e d o b j e c t ’s
( o f w hich we a r e e x i s t e n c e
im m e d ia te ly con
s c io u s in the p e r
c e p t i o n )
In t h i s , th e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e u n p e r c e i v e d o b j e c t would be
th o u g h t as b e in g r e l a t e d to t h e p o s s i b l e p e r c e p t i o n o f t h i s
o b j e c t , i n some way s i m i l a r to th e way i n w hich th e e x i s t
ence of th e p e r c e i v e d o b j e c t i s r e l a t e d to t h e a c t u a l p e r
c e p t i o n o f t h a t o b j e c t . Yet we must n o t e t h a t i n t h i s
2 9
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B222-3.
30
Cf. ibid., B629c.
104
manner o f t h i n k i n g th e u n p e r c e iv e d e x i s t e n c e , we do n o t a t
t a i n c o n s c io u s n e s s o f i t i n i t s e l f , t h a t i s , we c a n n o t a n
t i c i p a t e t h e f e a t u r e th ro u g h which th e e m p i r i c a l i n t u i t i o n
of an o b j e c t i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from o t h e r i n t u i t i o n s , which
i s to say th e p a r t i c u l a r e x i s t e n c e o f w hich im m ediate con
s c i o u s n e s s i s g iv e n o n ly in th e e m p i r i c a l i n t u i t i o n . F o r,
as Kant s a i d :
The e x i s t e n c e of a p p e a ra n c e s c a n n o t, however, be
th u s known a_ p r i o r i ; and even g r a n t i n g t h a t we could
i n any such manner c o n t r i v e to i n f e r t h a t som ething
e x i s t s , we co u ld n o t know i t d e t e r m i n a t e l y , co u ld
n o t , t h a t i s , a n t i c i p a t e th e f e a t u r e s th ro u g h which
i t s e m p i r i c a l i n t u i t i o n i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from o t h e r
i n t u t i o n s . 3 1
T h a t i s to say , t h a t we must t h i n k th e u n p e r c e iv e d e x i s t e n c e
as a k in d o f nx , ” or more e x a c t l y , o n ly th ro u g h i t s b e in g
the term of a r e l a t i o n Which we know more s p e c i f i c a l l y .
T h a t i s t o say, we can know t h a t th e t e r m ’ s r e l a t i o n to th e
a n t i c i p a t e d p e r c e p t i o n , w i l l be s i m i l a r , i n some way, t o th e
known r e l a t i o n b etw een a g iv e n e x i s t e n c e and th e p e r c e p t i o n
in w hich we a r e c o n s c io u s of i t . But we ca n n o t know, i n i t
s e l f , t h a t which w i l l be r e l a t e d to t h e p o s s i b l e p e r c e p t i o n
i n t h i s f a s h i o n .
Y et, i n t h i n k i n g t h e " u n p e r c e i v e d ,T e x i s t e n c e in t h i s
way, we do t h i n k i t as d i f f e r e n t from t h e p o s s i b l e p e r c e p
t i o n to which we t h i n k i t as r e l a t e d . And, a c c o r d i n g l y , we
p r e d i c a t e of th e u n p e r c e iv e d o b j e c t , n o t p r e c i s e l y th e
31
Ibid., B221.
10 5
p o s s i b l e p e r c e p t i o n , b u t th e e x i s t e n c e of w hich we would b e
come im m e d ia te ly c o n s c io u s in t h a t p e r c e p t i o n i f i t were
a c t u a l .
B e fo re going on t o Theorem l ei us f i r s t c l a r i f y
th e p r e v i o u s l y q u o ted p a s s a g e from B286-7 t h a t m ight seem,
a t f i r s t , to ground th e p o s i t i o n a g a i n s t w hich we have a r -
gu e d .
In th e f i r s t p l a c e , l e t us n o t e t h a t K a n t ' s aim in
th e p a r a g r a p h b e f o r e th e one q u o te d , and i n b e g in n in g t h i s
p a s s a g e , was t o e x p l a i n how t h e modal c a t e g o r i e s c o u ld , as
a p r i o r i c o n c e p t s , be added s y n t h e t i c a l l y t o th e c o n c e p t of
a t h i n g - His c o n c e rn would seem, t h e n , to have been t o ex
p l a i n how th e r e s u l t i n g judgm ent co u ld have b een b o th s y n
t h e t i c and a. p r i o r i . But of c o u r s e Kant did n o t r e g a r d t h e
e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent as c a p a b le of b e in g £i p r i o r i i n th e
s t r i c t s e n s e ; nor d id he hold t h a t th ro u g h t h e mere c a t e g o r y
of e x i s t e n c e , we could t h i n k an o b j e c t as more th a n m erely
32
p o s s i b l e , o r, in d e e d , make a s y n t h e t i c judgment a t a l l .
T h e r e f o r e , from th e b e g i n n i n g , we sh o u ld be on guard t h a t
t h e r e i s l i k e l y t o be a c e r t a i n a m b ig u ity i n th e p a s s a g e
t h a t f o l l o w s , namely an u n c e r t a i n t y as t o w h e th e r t h e e x
p l a n a t i o n w i l l a p p ly to judgm ents of e x i s t e n c e , or m e re ly to
cf- ibid. , B628-9, also B221-2.
10 6
33
w hat we can t h i n k th r o u g h th e c a t e g o r y a l o n e .
The a m b ig u ity m ight seem to be a c c e n t u a t e d when we
f in d t h a t even K a n t ’ s b r i e f r e f e r e n c e t o ju d g in g an o b j e c t
a s ' p o s s i b l e , i s n o t e n t i r e l y i n accord w i t h h i s p r e v i o u s
t r e a t m e n t of t h i s m a t t e r ; f o r p r e v i o u s l y he had i n s i s t e d
t h a t i f an o b j e c t ’ s c o n c e p t w ere e m p i r i c a l ( i . e . , i f i t
c o n ta in e d more d e t a i l e d s y n th e s e s th an t h o s e w hich p e r t a i n
to e x p e r i e n c e in g e n e r a l ) , th e p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s o b j e c t
could n o t be known sim p ly th ro u g h i t s a c c o rd w i t h th e fo rm a l
t r a d i t i o n s of e x p e r i e n c e ; i n s t e a d t h e r e had to be r e f e r e n c e
to a c t u a l e x p e r i e n c e , t o f in d examples or o th e r grounds f o r
34
th e s n y t h e s e s t h a t would be c o n c e iv e d . But a c t u a l l y t h i s
l a s t p o i n t sh o u ld i n d i c a t e th e d i r e c t i o n i n which th e am bi
g u i t y i s to be r e s o l v e d . For i t s u g g e s t s t h a t t h i s p a s s a g e
i s n o t t o be t a k e n as a c t u a l l y d e f i n i n g judgm ents of e i t h e r
p o s s i b i l i t y or e x i s t e n c e . For t h e d i s t i n c t i o n i n B286c b e
tween p o s s i b l e and a c t u a l i s o b v i o u s l y i n s u f f i c i e n t i f we
were t o ta k e i t as s e t t i n g f o r t h c r i t e r i a f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g
a judgm ent of p o s s i b i l i t y from a judgm ent of e x i s t e n c e . For
th e k in d of o b j e c t of w hich we would p r e d i c a t e e x i s t e n c e
would v e r y l i k e l y be one t h a t we had a l r e a d y r e l a t e d t o p e r
c e p t i o n (and s e n s a t i o n ) i n c o n c e iv in g i t as p o s s i b l e .
C a s s i r e r ’s f a i l u r e to make t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n led
him t o i d e n t i f y what K an t meant by " a c t u a l i t y " w i t h what he
meant by " p o s s i b i l i t y . ” Cf. C a s s i r e r , op. c i t .
34
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B266-71.
107
S e n s a t i o n i n th e p a s t m ight even have f u r n i s h e d th e m a t t e r
which we have s y n t h e s i z e d i n t o th e o b j e c t . O r, i f one were
to t r y t o s a lv a g e t h e d i s t i n c t i o n i n B286 by s a y in g t h a t th e
s e n s a t i o n t h a t i s m entioned must be u n d e r s to o d as a c t u a l ,
r a t h e r th an m e re ly p a s t , th e n th e c r i t e r i a m ig h t s t i l l f a i l ,
f o r t h e p e r c e p t i o n to which one r e f e r s in t h i n k i n g an o b j e c t
as p o s s i b l e may i t s e l f be an a c t u a l p e r c e p t i o n . On th e
o th e r hand, i f one were to i n t e r p r e t t h e c r i t e r i a of a c t u a l
i t y s e t f o r t h i n B286, as r e q u i r i n g t h a t th e s e n s a t i o n w hich
i s a c t u a l be t h e " m a t e r i a l ” t h a t i s s y n t h e s i z e d i n t o t h e ob
j e c t i t s e l f , t h e n th e c r i t e r i o n would be to o s t r i c t , f o r
Kant h as p r e v i o u s l y ta k e n p a i n s t o show t h a t we may know an
o b j e c t as e x i s t e n t even i f we do n o t p e r c e i v e i t ( i . e . , by
c o n n e c tin g i t w i t h s e n s a t i o n which does n o t e n t e r m a t e r i a l l y
35
i n t o t h e o b j e c t ' s c o n c e p t ) .
But s i n c e th e c r i t e r i a s e t f o r t h sh o u ld n o t be ta k e n
as d e f i n i n g th e d i f f e r e n c e betw een judgm ents o f e x i s t e n c e
and judgm ents o f p o s s i b i l i t y , i t would seem, t h e n , t h a t th e
e n t i r e p a s s a g e should be ta k e n as d e s c r i b i n g o n ly what i s
added t o a c o n c e p t by t h i n k i n g i t th ro u g h (o r combining i t
w ith ) t h e modal c a t e g o r i e s . T his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e p a s
sage i s a l s o s u g g e s te d by b o th th e i n t r o d u c t o r y and c o n c l u d
ing p a r t s of t h e t e x t .
But in t h i s c a s e , th e c r i t e r i o n of " a c t u a l i t y " in
3 5 Ibid., B272-4, B629.
108
B286 would e x p r e s s o n ly what could be th o u g h t o f an o b j e c t
th ro u g h t h e second modal c a t e g o r y ( i . e . , t h e p u r e c o n c e p t of
e x i s t e n c e ) . And t h i s would be o n ly t h a t which could be d i s
p la y e d i n an a p r i o r i f a s h i o n ( i . e . , th ro u g h b e in g e x p re ss e d
i n th e i m a g i n a t i o n or th ro u g h b ein g e x e m p lif ie d i n every i n
s ta n c e of e x p e r i e n c e ) ( c f . our d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e c a t e g o r y i n
o £
C h a p te r IX ). But t h i s c o u ld n o t be th e e x i s t e n c e o f th e
o b j e c t , f o r t h i s c o u ld be known o n ly a p o s t e r i o r i ( i . e . ,
th ro u g h c o n n e c tin g t h e o b j e c t w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r p e r c e p t i o n
in which th e o b j e c t ' s own e x i s t e n c e i s a c t u a l l y g i v e n [ a l b e -
37
i t o n ly m e d i a t e l y ] ) . I n s t e a d , i n h a v in g th e c a t e g o r y
p r e d i c a t e d o f i t , t h e o b j e c t would be combined o n ly w i t h an
a n t i c i p a t i o n of th e ty p e of c o n n e c tio n th ro u g h w hich i t
could be known as e x i s t e n t - - i f i t w ere, i n f a c t , c o n n ected
w i t h a p e r c e p t i o n i n which i t s e x i s t e n c e were a c t u a l l y
g iv e n . To r e p r e s e n t a n t i c i p a t i v e l y t h i s ty p e of c o n n e c tio n
could be th o u g h t m e re ly th r o u g h th e c a t e g o r y , b e c a u s e what
p e r t a i n s to c o n c e p t i o n and p e r c e p t i o n as such can be d i s -
3 S
p la y e d i n any i n s t a n c e s of c o n c e p t i o n and p e r c e p t i o n .
That i s to sa y , t h a t th e c o n c e p t o f a c o n c e p t ' s b e in g con
n e c te d w ith a p e r c e p t i o n , w hich i s p a r t of th e c o n c e p t of
e x i s t e n c e , can be d i s p l a y e d a_ p r i o r i , p r i o r t o t h e p a r t i c u
l a r p e r c e p t i o n in w hich an o b j e c t would a c t u a l l y be g iv e n as
3 6 Ibid., B220-1.
3 R
Cf. ibid., B220-1.
31 Ibid., B272-4, B629a.
10 9
e x i s t e n t . Through p r e d i c a t i n g t h e c a t e g o r y of t h e o b j e c t ,
t h e n , one would o n ly p o s i t th e ty p e o f c o n n e c t i o n th ro u g h
which one could know t h e o b j e c t as e x i s t i n g i f th e c o n n e c
t i o n were a c t u a l l y made t o t h e r e q u i r e d p e r c e p t i o n .
And, of c o u r s e , i n t h i n k i n g an o b j e c t i n t h i s f a s h
i o n , one would t h i n k o n ly i t s c o n n e c t i o n w i t h a c o g n i t i v e
f a c u l t y , t h a t i s , w ith p e r c e p t i o n as su c h . For one would
n o t c o n n e c t i t w i t h t h e p a r t i c u l a r a c t of t h a t f a c u l t y
( i . e . , t h e p a r t i c u l a r p e r c e p t i o n , i n which c o n s c i o u s n e s s of
t h e o b j e c t Ts e x i s t e n c e would be g iv e n ) n o r , a _ f o r t i o r i , w ith
t h e e x i s t e n c e o f which one would be c o n s c io u s i n th e p e r c e p
t i o n . Thus i t would be q u i t e t r u e t o sa y , as K ant d i d , t h a t
i n p r e d i c a t i n g of th e o b j e c t , th e modal c o n c e p t o f e x i s t
e n c e , one would o n ly show " t h e manner in which th e o b j e c t i s
39
co n n e c te d w ith t h e f a c u l t y of k n o w le d g e .” But i t would
a l s o be t r u e t o say , as Kant d i d , t h a t th ro u g h p r e d i c a t i n g
t h e mere c a t e g o r y one would not a r r i v e a t t h i n k i n g th e ob-
40
j e c t as more th a n p o s s i b l e . F o r , as we have s e e n , i n
o r d e r to t h i n k an e m p i r i c a l o b j e c t m e re ly as p o s s i b l e , i t i s
n e c e s s a r y to t h i n k i t as an o b j e c t of p o s s i b l e p e r c e p t i o n ,
th u s i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o p o s i t a p o s s i b l e c o n n e c t i o n w ith
p e r c e p t i o n , j u s t as i n t h e c a s e , h e r e , o f p r e d i c a t i n g th e
41
c a t e g o r y of e x i s t e n c e . Hence, a judgment t h a t would
3 9 Ibid., B286-7. 4°Ibid . , B629a.
41 r
Cf. ibid., B267-71.
110
p r e d i c a t e o f an o b j e c t , th e mere c a t e g o r y of e x i s t e n c e ,
would n o t be an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent.
But we ought n o t , th e n , i d e n t i f y what i s a s s e r t e d
th ro u g h t h e m erely c a t e g o r i c a l p r e d i c a t e w i t h what i s a s
s e r t e d th ro u g h th e p r e d i c a t e of an a u t h e n t i c a l l y e x i s t e n t i a l
judgment (w hich p r e d i c a t e , i s , o f c o u r s e , n o t th e c a t e g o r y ,
42.
b u t e x i s t e n c e as a c t u a l l y g iv e n in p e r c e p t i o n ) . In p a r
t i c u l a r , we sh o u ld n o t t h i n k t h a t s im p ly b e c a u s e th e one
adds to t h e c o n c e p t o f th e o b j e c t , o n ly a r e l a t i o n to a c o g
n i t i v e f a c u l t y ( i . e . , p e r c e p t i o n ) , t h a t th e o t h e r adds no
more th a n such a r e l a t i o n . F o r, in summary, w hereas th e a _
p r i o r i use of t h e c a t e g o r y can add no more th a n t h i s , in
43
t h a t an o b j e c t Ts a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e ca n n o t be a n t i c i p a t e d ,
th e c o n n e c t i o n t h a t i s th o u g h t i n an e x i s t e n t i a l judgment
does add more, f o r i t c o n n e c ts th e o b j e c t w ith t h a t of which
we can be c o n s c io u s only i n or th ro u g h th e a p p r o p r i a t e p a r -
44
t i c u l a r p e r c e p t i o n ( i . e . , th e o b j e c t Ts e x i s t e n c e ) .
We w ould, o f c o u r s e , s t i l l say t h a t a c t u a l e x i s t
ence, l i k e th e modal c a t e g o r y , i s n o t an " o b j e c t i v e l y " s y n
t h e t i c p r e d i c a t e ( i n th e s e n s e of e n t e r i n g i n t o th e co n cep t
or e s s e n c e o f th e o b j e c t ) . But we sh o u ld n o t say t h a t , l i k e
th e modal c a t e g o r y , i t i s o n ly " s u b j e c t i v e l y " s y n t h e t i c .
For w h i l e t h i n k i n g th e c o n c e p t o f an o b j e c t th ro u g h th e modal
AO A 1
^Cf. ibid. , B629. Ibid. , B221.
44
Ibid.; cf. also B272-4, B629c.
Ill
c a t e g o r y w i l l add o n ly a r e l a t i o n t o th e s u b j e c t i v e f a c u l t y ,
c o n n e c tin g i t w ith e x i s t e n c e c o n n e c ts t h e c o n c e p t w ith some
th i n g which Kant i n s i s t e d i s t r a n s - s u b j e c t i v e . For he i n
s i s t e d t h a t th e o b j e c t ’s e x i s t e n c e i s p re su p p o s e d by the
o b j e c t ’s e f f e c t on our i n t u i t i o n , which i s to say, t h a t i t
i s som ething p r i o r t o , and not d e r i v e d from , th e s u b j e c t i v e
45
f a c u l t y o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .
P r o o f s of Theorem
I t i s t r u e t h a t i n e x i s t e n t i a l ju d g m e n ts, as Kant
saw them, we do t h i n k b o th th e p e r c e p t i o n and th e o b j e c t in
such a way t h a t th e y b e lo n g to th e c o n t e x t o f e x p e r ie n c e as
46
a w h o le. For our way of c o n n e c tin g th e o b j e c t w i t h th e
p e r c e p t i o n i s th ro u g h u n i t i n g them under c e r t a i n a p r i o r i
47
c o n d i t i o n s of e x p e r ie n c e in g e n e r a l ( i . e . , th e a n a l o g i e s ) .
And th ro u g h b e in g th o u g h t under th e a n a l o g i e s , th e y a r e ,
i n d e e d , i n t e g r a t e d i n t o th e c o n t e x t of e x p e r i e n c e as a
w hole, f o r t h i s c o n t e x t i s , p r e c i s e l y , t h a t o f a l l p e r
c e iv e d c o n t e n t w hich i s th o u g h t under th e a p r i o r i c o n d i-
48 . . .
t i o n s . But i n t e g r a t i n g an o b j e c t i n t o t h e c o n t e x t of e x
p e r i e n c e as a whole i s n o t som ething p r o p e r to e x i s t e n t i a l
judgm ent. For an o b j e c t can be th o u g h t i n such a way t h a t
45 46
I b i d . , B72. Cf. i b i d . , B628c-9a.
4 7 I b i d . , B272-3-
48
Cf. ibid., B161, B164-5.
112
i t b e lo n g s t o th e c o n t e x t of e x p e r i e n c e as a w hole, i f i t i s
th o u g h t in judgm ents of e x p e r i e n c e o th e r th a n t h o s e th o u g h t
by means of th e a n a l o g i e s , 49 or i n judgm ents of p o s s i b i l i t y ,
50
i n w hich u s e i s made of th e a n a l o g i e s . And in n e i t h e r
ty p e of c a s e w i l l t h e o b j e c t be th o u g h t as e x i s t e n t . For
exam ple, an e m p i r i c a l l y g iv e n o b j e c t can be d e te rm in e d
th ro u g h b e in g th o u g h t u n d e r t h e " f i r s t axiom of i n t u i t i o n , "
and i t w i l l , t h e r e b y , be i n t e g r a t e d i n t o th e whole of expe-
51
r i e n c e . But i t w i l l n o t , sim p ly t h e r e b y , be th o u g h t as
e x i s t e n t . For, as Kant makes c l e a r , an a p p e a r a n c e can be
d e te rm in e d by us a. p r i o r i w i t h o u t our being concerned w ith
5 “ 2
i t s e x i s t e n c e . Or a g a i n , in t h i n k i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of
an o b j e c t a p o s t e r i o r i (a s we must i f i t s c o n c e p t e x p r e s s e s
more th a n th e a p r i o r i s y n th e s e s of e x p e r i e n c e i n g e n e r a l ) ,
we must r e l a t e th e o b j e c t ’ s c o n c e p t to c o n t e n t giv en in e x
p e r i e n c e , n o t in o rd e r t o know t h a t th e o b j e c t e x i s t s , b u t
53 ^
in o r d e r to know i t s p o s s i b i l i t y . To be s u r e , m some or
most c a s e s , th e p e r c e p t i o n s to w h ich we r e l a t e the o b j e c t
w i l l be p a s t p e r c e p t i o n s , m ed ia te d th r o u g h memory ( f o r in
some c a s e s , we may have need o f knowing only t h a t th e kind
of t h i n g o f w hich we a r e t h i n k i n g , h as been g iv e n in
49
I b i d . , B202-18, B221bc.
50
C f . Chap. IV, p p. 72 -3 ; a l s o Chap. V, p. 100, f. 27.
51
K a n t, C r i t i q u e of P u re R e a so n , B 2 0 2 ff.
3 Ibid., B220-1. Ibid., B267-71.
. - 113
e x p e r i e n c e ) . But th e p e r c e p t i o n may be an a c t u a l one, and
i f i t i s , th e o b j e c t i s i n t e g r a t e d a lo n g w i t h i t i n t o th e
c o n t e x t o f e x p e r i e n c e as a w hole, f o r b o th a r e s y n t h e s i z e d
i n t o t h a t c o n t e x t , or w hole, th ro u g h b e in g th o u g h t t o g e t h e r
u n d e r t h e a n a l o g i e s ( f o r , as Kant makes c l e a r , th e a n a l o g i e s
54
a r e n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o lv e d i n such judgm ents of p o s s i b i l i t y ) .
Y e t , m erely th ro u g h b e l o n g i n g , in t h i s way, to th e c o n t e x t
o f e x p e r i e n c e as a w hole, t h e o b j e c t i s n o t , n e c e s s a r i l y ,
e x i s t e n t , nor i s i t th o u g h t to be e x i s t e n t .
A s s e r t i n g t h a t an o b j e c t b e lo n g s t o t h e c o n t e x t of
e x p e r i e n c e as a w hole, ca n , t h e n , a s s e r t so m eth in g ( i . e . , a .
r e l a t i o n of b e l o n g i n g ) which may ensue from a non-
e x i s t e n t i a l ju d g m e n t, and which may o b t a i n even when th e ob
j e c t does n o t e x i s t . A s s e r t i n g t h i s c a n n o t, t h e r e f o r e , be
p r o p e r t o , or u n i q u e l y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f, t h o s e a c t s in
w hich we t h i n k an o b j e c t as e x i s t e n t . Nor, t h e n , can t h i s
b e lo n g in g be what t h e s e judgm ents a s s e r t ; ( f o r , o f c o u r s e ,
i f an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent a s s e r t e d only som ething f o llo w in g
m e re ly from t h i n k i n g a t h i n g as p o s s i b l e , i t would a t most
a s s e r t t h a t t h i s t h i n g i s p o s s i b l e ) .
T h e re a r e o t h e r ways of d i s p o s i n g of th e b e l i e f t h a t
K ant could have r e g a rd e d e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ents as a s s e r t i n g
t h a t an o b j e c t b e lo n g s to th e c o n t e x t o f e x p e r i e n c e as a
w h o le . For t h i s view would s a y , i n e f f e c t , t h a t by th e
5 4 Ibid., B268-70.
114
’’e x i s t e n c e " o f so m e th in g , he meant o n ly i t s b e lo n g in g t o t h e
c o n t e x t of e x p e r i e n c e as a w hole. And t h e r e a r e a number of
ways i n w hich th e e q u a t i o n o f an o b j e c t ’ s e x i s t e n c e w ith i t s
b e lo n g in g to th e c o n t e x t o f e x p e r i e n c e , can be r e f u t e d . For
example, we may s t a r t from t h e s y n ta x of K a n t ’ s s t a t e m e n t .
For he s a i d t h a t th ro u g h i t s e x i s t e n c e , an o b j e c t i s th o u g h t
as b e l o n g i n g to t h e c o n t e x t of e x p e r i e n c e as a w h o le .'3'3 His
s ta t e m e n t i n d i c a t e s , th e n , t h a t our t h i n k i n g of t h e o b j e c t
as b e l o n g i n g to t h i s c o n t e x t , depends on th e o b j e c t ’s e x i s t
en ce, and i s , t h u s , d i s t i n g u i s h e d i n some way from t h a t ex
i s t e n c e . B ut, f o r K a n t, t h i s f a c t would mean t h a t what i s
t h o u g h t , namely t h e o b j e c t ’ s b e l o n g i n g , i s d e p e n d e n t on t h e
o b j e c t ’s e x i s t e n c e , and i s , i n t h i s way, d i s t i n g u i s h e d from
56
i t . For we must remember t h a t in K a n t ’ s sy ste m , t h e r e i s
no r e l a t i o n , th u s no b e l o n g in g ( f o r b e lo n g in g i s , of c o u r s e ,
a r e l a t i o n ) , p r i o r to t h e a c t i n w hich i t i s t h o u g h t ; f o r
Kant h eld t h a t a l l r e l a t i o n , or c o n n e c t i o n , d e r i v e s from th e
57
s p o n t a n e i t y of our t h i n k i n g .
Or sh o u ld we w ish to b e g in w i t h an a n a l y s i s o f what
i s meant by " b e l o n g i n g , ” we could a r r i v e a t t h e same c o n c l u
s i o n , namely t h a t by an o b j e c t ’s " e x i s t e n c e , " Kant co u ld n o t
have meant i t s b e l o n g i n g to t h e c o n t e x t of e x p e r i e n c e . F o r,
as we have seen , s i n c e th e b e lo n g in g of an o b j e c t to
5 5 Ibid., B628c-9a.
56 „
Cf. also ibid., B72.
57 .
I b i d . , B129-31.
115
so m e th in g , i s a r e l a t i o n or " c o n n e c t i o n , " i t i s som ething
t h a t , f o r K ant, would d e r i v e from t h e s p o n t a n e i t y of our
er o
t h i n k i n g . That i s to s a y , i t i s " c o n s t r u c t e d . " On th e
o t h e r h and, th e e x i s t e n c e o f an o b j e c t i s g iv e n to our c o n
s c i o u s n e s s i n an a c t of p e r c e p t i o n , th ro u g h se n se i n t u i t i o n ;
and i n an a c t of t h i s s o r t , we do n o t o r i g i n a t e what i s
59
g iv e n , b u t r e c e i v e i t . Thus, as Kant s a i d , e x i s t e n c e c a n -
60
n o t be c o n s t r u c t e d .
In summary, th e n , l e t us s a y t h a t , f o r K a n t, th e r e
l a t i o n of b e l o n g i n g to t h e c o n t e x t o f e x p e r i e n c e as a w hole,
r e s u l t s from th e s p o n t a n e i t y of t h i n k i n g , and a c c o r d i n g l y i s
c o n s t r u c t e d ; ^ w h ereas t h e e x i s t e n c e of an o b j e c t does n o t
d e r i v e from th e s p o n t a n e i t y of our t h i n k i n g , f o r i t i s n o t
62
c o n s t r u c t e d , b u t r e c e i v e d . Our i n t u i t i o n p r e s u p p o s e s i t ,
63
r a t h e r th a n p ro d u c e s i t . Thus, th e e x i s t e n c e o f an o b j e c t
ca n n o t be i t s b e l o n g in g t o th e c o n t e x t o f e x p e r i e n c e as a
w h o le. Nor, t h e n , i s an a s s e r t i o n sim ply o f e x i s t e n c e , an
a s s e r t i o n of b e lo n g in g t o e x p e r i e n c e as a w hole.
58I b i d . 59I b i d . , B72.
6° I b i d . , B222a. 61I b i d . , B129-31.
62I b i d . , B72, B 2 2 l-2 a . 63I b i d .
CHAPTER VI
ANOTHER DERIVATION OF OUR THESIS K1
Our t h e s i s , t h a t Kant r e g a rd e d e x i s t e n c e as th e
p r e d i c a t e of e x i s t e n t i a l ju d g m en ts, can be d e r i v e d i n a
d i f f e r e n t way from t h a t we have fo llo w e d i n C h ap ter IV. We
can ta k e as our s t a r t i n g p o i n t , a d i f f e r e n t t e x t (which i s ,
how ever, s t i l l drawn from K a n t 's c r i t i q u e of th e o n t o l o g i
c a l a r g u m e n t ) :
. . . . th e o b j e c t as i t a c t u a l l y e x i s t s i s not
c o n t a i n e d a n a l y t i c a l l y i n my c o n c e p t, b u t is
added to my c o n c e p t (which i s a d e t e r m i n a t i o n
of my s t a t e ) s y n t h e t i c a l l y ; !
At f i r s t s i g h t , t h i s t e x t m ight seem t o imply e x a c t
l y th e o p p o s i t e of our t h e s i s . I t might seem to say , in
e f f e c t , t h a t th e o b j e c t i s o t h e r th a n th e c o n t e n t of th e
s u b j e c t c o n c e p t, and t h a t i t i s , th e n , added s y n t h e t i c a l l y
to i t s c o n c e p t as a p r e d i c a t e . The o b j e c t , and n o t e x i s t
e n c e , would th e n be the p r e d i c a t e a f f ir m e d i n an e x i s t e n
t i a l judgm ent.
I n t e r p r e t e d in t h i s f a s h i o n , th e t e x t m ight seem to
•^Immanuel K ant, C r i t i q u e o f Pure R e a so n , t r a n s .
Norman Kemp Smith (New York: S t . M a r t i n 's P r e s s , 1965),
B627c.
116
117
e x p r e s s a second th o u g h t on K a n t rs p a r t , one i n which he
would have so u g h t a way out o f th e p o i n t on which he had
j u s t p r e v i o u s l y i n s i s t e d , t h a t i s , th e com plete i d e n t i t y of
an o b j e c t w ith th e c o n t e n t o f i t s c o n c e p t (Theorem y ) . I t
m ight seem to s u p p o r t the view t h a t he r e g a r d e d o n ly th e
c o n c e p t u a l a s p e c t s o f an o b j e c t as i d e n t i c a l w ith th e c o n
t e n t of t h e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t, w h ile o t h e r a s p e c t s , c o n s t i
t u t i v e o f the " o b j e c t i t s e l f , " were r e g a r d e d as n o t i d e n
t i c a l w i t h th e c o n t e n t of th e c o n c e p t. And in t h i s t e x t ,
th e p r e d i c a t e of e x i s t e n t i a l judgment would be, n o t e x i s t
en ce, b u t th e o b j e c t .
B u t, as we have se e n i n C h a p te r I I I , t h i s l a t t e r
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would run c o u n t e r , n o t o n ly t o K a n t 's r e -
-ppeated i n s i s t e n c e on the co m p le te i d e n t i t y o f th e o b j e c t
i t s e l f w i t h the c o n t e n t of th e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t ( y ) , b u t
a l s o to t h e f a c t t h a t h is e p is te m o lo g y would a llo w as t o
p
i n c lu d e i n our c o n c e p t i o n th e p a r t i c u l a r i t y o f th e o b j e c t .
For the v e r y s t r u c t u r e of h i s e p is te m o lo g y f u r n i s h e s us
w ith th e f o u n d a t i o n we need f o r h o l d i n g t h a t th e c o n c e p t
could i n c l u d e th e p a r t i c u l a r i t y of th e o b j e c t , or i f you
w i l l , t h a t which i s c o n s t i t u i t i v e of th e o b j e c t as th e
p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t i t i s , w hich i s to say , th e " o b j e c t i t
s e l f . " T h e r e f o r e , we sh o u ld i n t e r p r e t th e p a s sa g e above as
2
Cf. Chapters III and X.
118
c o r r e c t i n g a m e re ly t e n t a t i v e or p r o v i s i o n a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n
of th e o b j e c t w ith th e c o n t e n t o f th e c o n c e p t ( i . e . , y ) ,
o n ly i f we a r e p r e p a re d t o a c c e p t c o n t r a d i c t i o n a t th e v e r y
h e a r t of K a n t Ts t r e a t m e n t of e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent. B ut, i n
f a c t , we need n o t i n t e r p r e t the p a s s a g e as c o n t r a d i c t i n g
th e i d e n t i t y t h e o r y a t a l l ; f o r t h e r e i s a way to see t h i s
p a s s a g e as a g r e e i n g w i t h the i d e n t i t y t h e o r y , and as e x
p r e s s i n g th e o re m e ( t h a t in e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent th e o b j e c t
i s c o n n e c te d i n th o u g h t w ith e x i s t e n c e .
F i r s t , l e t us n o t e t h a t i n the p a s s a g e in q u e s t i o n ,
Kant d id n o t s a y t h a t t h e o b j e c t i s not c o n t a i n e d a n a l y t i
c a l l y in o n e ' s c o n c e p t. He s a id t h a t th e " o b j e c t as i t
a c t u a l l y e x i s t s " is n o t c o n t a i n e d in o n e 's c o n c e p t ( b u t i s
added s y n t h e t i c a l l y ) . The words " a s i t a c t u a l l y e x i s t s "
a re v e ry i m p o r t a n t , f o r th e y p r e v e n t what i s b e in g s a i d i n
t h i s p assag e from c o n t r a d i c t i n g t h e p o i n t on which Kant had
i n s i s t e d im m e d ia te ly p r i o r to t h i s p a ssa g e (B267b) and to
which he was t o r e t u r n i n the p a s s a g e im m e d ia te ly f o ll o w i n g
(B628), nam ely f o r th e i d e n t i t y o f the o b j e c t w ith th e c o n
t e n t of i t s c o n c e p t. I f we v ery c a r e f u l l y x"egard t h e s e
words , " t h e o b j e c t as i t a c t u a l l y e x i s t s , " th e y s u g g e s t a
way i n which we may u n d e r s t a n d how t h a t which i s s i g n i f i e d
by " t h e o b j e c t as i t a c t u a l l y e x i s t s " can in d e e d be added
s y n t h e t i c a l l y t o the o b j e c t ' s c o n c e p t , w h ile th e n a t u r e of
th e o b j e c t i t s e l f is a n a l y t i c a l l y i d e n t i c a l w i t h th e c o n t e n t
o f i t s c o n c e p t . The way i s to a c c e p t t h a t t h e r e i s more
119
s i g n i f i e d by t h e w ords, " t h e o b j e c t as i t a c t u a l l y e x i s t s , "
th a n th e o b j e c t i t s e l f , which i s t o say t h a t t h e r e i s a f a c
t o r i n a d d i t i o n to t h e o b j e c t , namely i t s a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e .
T hat i s t o sa y , t h a t i f we i d e n t i f y th e o b j e c t w i t h
t h e c o n t e n t of i t s c o n c e p t, as Kant most a s s u r e d l y d i d , and
i f we hold t h a t by " t h e o b j e c t as i t a c t u a l l y e x i s t s " i s
s i g n i f i e d so m eth in g more th a n th e c o n t e n t o f th e o b j e c t ' s
c o n c e p t , as Kant a l s o d i d , th e n we must r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e
p h r a s e " th e o b j e c t as i t a c t u a l l y e x i s t s " s i g n i f i e s some
t h i n g more th a n th e o b j e c t i t s e l f . When t h a t w h ich , f o r
K an t, was t h e same i n b o th th e c o n c e p t and th e o b j e c t as i t
a c t u a l l y e x i s t s ( i . e . , t h e o b j e c t ) i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from th e
t o t a l i t y of t h a t which i s s y n b o li z e d by " o b j e c t as. i t a c t u
a l l y e x i s t s , " th e n t h a t w hich re m a in s would be som ething
a d d i t i v e to th e c o n t e n t of t h e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t, w hich "some
t h i n g ” Kant would c a l l " e x i s t e n c e " ( i n th e se n se of " a c t u a l
e x i s t e n c e ” ); f o r i t i s o n ly by r e c o g n i z i n g so m eth in g i n a d
d i t i o n to th e o b j e c t i t s e l f , and by s i g n i f y i n g t h i s a d d i
t i o n a l f a c t o r t o g e t h e r w ith t h e o b j e c t i n t h e p h r a s e " th e
o b j e c t as i t a c t u a l l y e x i s t s , " t h a t Kant c o u ld have h eld
b o th t h a t th e o b j e c t i s i d e n t i c a l w ith th e c o n t e n t o f i t s
c o n c e p t and t h a t t h e r e i s more in " th e o b j e c t as i t a c t u a l l y
e x i s t s ” t h a n th e c o n t e n t of i t s c o n c e p t.
Now s i n c e " t h e o b j e c t as i t a c t u a l l y e x i s t s " must be
a s y n t h e s i s o f th e o b j e c t w i t h som ething e l s e , we m ight n a t
u r a l l y b e l i e v e t h a t " t h e o b j e c t as i t a c t u a l l y e x i s t s " i s
120
th e same s y n t h e s i s as t h a t which Kant b e l i e v e d was e x p re ss e d
i n an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent. ( S u r e ly i t i s r e a s o n a b l e to
suppose t h a t e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ents e x p re s s something l i k e
r,o b j e c t s as a c t u a l l y e x i s t i n g ” ) . But in t h i s c a s e , t h a t
w ith which th e o b j e c t would be s y n th e s i z e d i n an e x i s t e n t i a l
judgm ent, would be t h a t which i s l e f t when th e o b j e c t i s
d i s t i n g u i s h e d from t h a t which i s s i g n i f i e d by "th e o b j e c t as
i t a c t u a l l y e x i s t s '' (o r " t h e o b j e c t as a c t u a l l y e x i s t i n g " ) - -
which i s to say t h a t i t i s t h a t which Kant would c a l l " e x
i s t e n c e " ( i n the s e n s e of " a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e " ) . Thus we now
a r r i v e at theorem Y. And s in c e th e o b j e c t would be th e su b
j e c t of an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent, t h a t w ith which th e o b j e c t
would be s y n th e s i z e d in t h a t judgment would be th e p r e d i
c a t e . I t would f o ll o w , th e n , t h a t th e p r e d i c a t e of an e x
i s t e n t i a l judgment would be t h a t which Kant c a l l e d " e x i s t
ence . ”
And s in c e in th e f o re g o in g a n a l y s i s we have seen
t h a t Kant im p lie d a d i s t i n c t i o n b etw een th e o b j e c t and i t s
e x i s t e n c e , we can conclude t h a t Kant must have h e l d :
Theorem ?: t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s e x t r i n s i c
to o b j e c t s , t h a t i t does n o t e n t e r i n t o
th e e s s e n c e , or i d e n t i t y , o f any o b j e c t .
T h a t i s to say , Kant must have r e g a rd e d o b j e c t s in
much the same way as did Meinong ( i . e . , as " i n d i f f e r e n t " to
e x i s t e n c e , or as th e o b j e c t s they " a r e " q u i t e in d e p e n d e n tly
121
3
o f w h e th e r th e y e x i s t or n o t ) . For Kant i n s i s t e d t h a t an
o b j e c t w hich was m e re ly p o s s i b l e could be th e i d e n t i c a l ob
j e c t as t h a t which has come t o e x i s t . H is view i s shown i n
a t e x t w hich we have u sed to e s t a b l i s h t h a t he h e ld Y or
t h a t th e c o n t e n t o f th e s u b j e c t c o n cep t and th e o b j e c t a r e
i d e n t i c a l :
By w h a te v e r and by however many p r e d i c a t e s we may
t h i n k a t h i n g - - e v e n i f we c o m p le te ly d e te r m in e i t - -
we do n o t make th e l e a s t a d d i t i o n to th e t h i n g when
we f u r t h e r d e c l a r e t h a t t h i s t h i n g is_. O th e r w is e ,
i t would n o t be e x a c t l y th e same t h i n g t h a t e x i s t s ,
b u t som ething more th a n we had th o u g h t in t h e c o n
c e p t ; and we c o u ld n o t , t h e r e f o r e , s a y t h a t t h e ex
a c t o b j e c t o f my c o n c e p t e x i s t s . 4
To be s u r e , i n t h e t e x t Kant was p r i m a r i l y c o n cern ed w ith
showing ( y ) or th e i d e n t i t y of th e " c o n t e n t " of t h e s u b j e c t
c o n c e p t w i t h th e o b j e c t which i s judged t o e x i s t , b u t t h e r e
can be no d o u b t t h a t he a l s o r e g a rd e d t h e " c o n t e n t " of th e
c o n c e p t as th e same as t h e o b j e c t as m e re ly p o s s i b l e . S in c e
Kant r e g a r d e d i t s e x i s t e n c e as in no way c o n s t i t u t i n g the
o b j e c t as a d i f f e r e n t o b j e c t from th e o b j e c t i t was as m e re
ly p o s s i b l e , i t f o ll o w s t h a t he must have r e g a r d e d e x i s t e n c e
as n o t b e in g one of th e f a c t o r s which c o n s t i t u t e the- o b j e c t
as i t s e l f , f o r rem oval of a c o n s t i t u t i v e f a c t o r would make
i t a d i f f e r e n t o b j e c t . Thus, Kant must have r e g a r d e d
3Cf. A l e x i s von Meinong, "The T heory of O b j e c t s , " i n
R o d e ric k M. C hisholm C e d .), R e a lism and t h e Background of
Phenomenology (G le n c o e , 111.": The""Free P r e s s , I960.), pp.
7 6 -1 1 7 .
4Kant, op. cit., B628a.
e x i s t e n c e as e x t r i n s i c to o b j e c t s .
An E rro n e o u s I n t e r p r e t a t i o n
Kant was o b v i o u s l y a t v a r i a n c e w i t h th o s e who main
t a i n t h a t e x i s t e n c e c a n n o t be a p r o p e r t y o f an o b j e c t b e
ca u se e x i s t e n c e must be p re su p p o s e d i f t h e o b j e c t i s to have
any p r o p e r t i e s a t a l l . ' ’ D e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t he i s some
tim e s i n t e r p r e t e d as h a v in g h eld p r e c i s e l y t h i s v ie w , K a n t 's
p o s i t i o n was q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . ^ I t was t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s n o t
one o f t h e p r o p e r t i e s or " d e t e r m i n a t i o n s ” which c o n s t i t u t e
t h e i d e n t i t y of an o b j e c t fo r th e r e a s o n t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s
n o t p re s u p p o s e d to th e o b j e c t iri s_e, f o r t h e o b j e c t i s th e
same iri s_e w h e th e r i t i s m erely p o s s i b l e or e x i s t e n t . On
th e o t h e r hand, Kant d id r e g a r d e x i s t e n c e as an a d d i t i v e
p r e d i c a t e , and even, I v e n t u r e to s a y , w hat could be c a l l e d
a ”p r o p e r t y ” - - a t l e a s t in th e s e n se in which " p r o p e r t y "
would s i g n i f y som ething lcnowable p e r t a i n i n g to an o b j e c t ,
a l b e i t n o t b e lo n g in g to th e e s s e n c e of th e o b j e c t ' s c o n s t i
t u t i o n or i d e n t i t y .
Kant A g a in s t Moore, A l s t o n , e t a l .
F u rth e rm o re , K a n t ' s r e a s o n s f o r h o ld in g t h a t e x i s t
ence i s n o t p re su p p o s e d by an o b j e c t ’ s b e in g d e te r m in e d
~*Cf. f o o t n o t e 24 i n C h ap ter I .
&Cf. A lv in P l a n t i n g a ( e d . ) , The O n t o l o g i c a l Argument
(Garden C i t y , N. Y .: D oubleday & Co” 1^65^, p . 5 7.
123
i n s e , sh o u ld s e rv e as argum ents a g a i n s t t h o s e p h i l o s o p h e r s
who hold t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s not a p r o p e r t y of a th i n g b e c a u s e
e x i s t e n c e i s p re s u p p o s e d by a t h i n g ’s h a v in g any p r o p e r t i e s .
T h a t i s , K a n t ' s re a s o n s should s e r v e as a rg u m e n ts a g a i n s t
7
what i s som etim es c a l l e d th e " s t a n d a r d ” argum ent a g a i n s t
e x i s t e n c e a s a p r e d i c a t e - - a n argum ent o r i g i n a t e d by
8
R u s s e l l , "worked o v e r " ( I can f i n d no more a c c u r a t e term )
9 10
by John Wisdom, given a v a r i a n t form by S tra w so n , and
p e r f e c t e d b y A l s t o n . ^
7
C f . W illiam P . A l s t o n , " T h e - O n t o l o g i c a l Argument
R e v i s i t e d , " The P h i l o s o p h i c a l R e v ie w , LXIX (I960), as p r i n t
ed i n A lv in P 1 an tin g aT T ed . ) , o p . c i t .
8
C f . B e rtra n d R u s s e l l , . " P h ilo s o p h y o f L o g i c a l
Atomism," L e c t u r e s V and V I ; a l s o , B e r tr a n d R u s s e l l , I n t r o
d u c t i o n to M a th e m a tic a l P h i l o s o p h y (London: G. A l l e n and
Unwin, L t d . , - 1919), C h a p t e r XVI.
9
C f . John Wisdom, I n t e r p r e t a t i o n and A n a l y s is
(London: K e g a l P a u l and C o ~ 1 9 3 1 ).
10
C f . P . F. S tra w so n , I n t r o d u c t i o n to L o g i c a l T heory
(New York: John Wiley and SonTj I n c . , 1 9 5 2 ) .
11
Cf. Alston, op. cit-
CHAPTER VII
A PROOF OF THESIS K2
I t i s now a sim p le m a t t e r t o p ro v e our t h e s i s IC2,
t h a t Kant h e ld *
Theorem 0: t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s th e a d d i
t i v e p r e d i c a t e o f e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent
( i . e . , a p r e d i c a t e t h a t i s alw ays some
t h i n g o t h e r th a n th e o b j e c t t h a t i s
s a i d t o e x i s t ) .
F i r s t , we c o u ld n o te sim p ly t h a t in our l a s t a r g u
ment f o r Theorem K l, we have b o th d i s t i n g u i s h e d t h e p r e d i
c a t e of th e e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent from th e s u b j e c t ( i . e . , th e
o b j e c t ) and i d e n t i f i e d the p r e d i c a t e w i t h th e o b j e c t Ts ex
i s t e n c e . S in c e , t h e n , e x i s t e n c e would be b o th th e p r e d i c a t e
and o th e r th a n the o b j e c t , i t would be an a d d i t i v e p r e d i
c a t e , i n t h e se n se t h a t an ’’a d d itiv e * ' p r e d i c a t e would e x
p r e s s more th a n th e s u b j e c t o f w hich i t i s p r e d i c a t e d .
(B u t, of c o u r s e , i n t h a t i t could n o t e n t e r i n t o th e c o n c e p t
o f t h e o b j e c t , i t co u ld n o t be a l s o a ’’r e a l " p r e d i c a t e . I t
w ould, t h e r e f o r e , be s im p ly I!a d d i t i ve . ” )
Or, a g a i n : K2 f o ll o w s d i r e c t l y from Kl and K a n t ’ s
124
125
h av in g h e ld e i t h e r a o r P o r 6 . To say t h a t he r e g a rd e d th e
p r e d i c a t e o f e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent as b e in g som ething o th e r
th a n t h e c o n t e n t o f i t s s u b j e c t c o n c e p t, i s to say t h a t he
re g a rd e d t h e p r e d i c a t e as b e in g what we have c a l l e d " a d d i
t i v e ” ;'*' and to say t h a t he re g a rd e d e x i s t e n c e as b e in g t h i s
p r e d i c a t e i s to say t h a t he r e g a r d e d e x i s t e n c e as b e in g an
a d d i t i v e p r e d i c a t e .
B ut, of c o u r s e , d e s p i t e our argum ent, some m ight say
t h a t a t l e a s t in one p a s s a g e (B 6 2 6 ), Kant p r e s e n t e d e x i s t
ence as a m e re ly l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e . F u r th e r m o r e , some might
c la im t h a t t h e v e r y n a t u r e of h i s a t t a c k on t h e o n t o l o g i c a l
2
argum ent p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t he h e ld t h i s view . Such c o u n t e r
a t t a c k s on our t h e s i s w ould, a t m o st, show o n ly t h a t K a n t ' s
t r e a t m e n t of e x i s t e n c e as a p r e d i c a t e i n v o l v e s c o n t r a d i c t o r y
t h e s e s ; f o r th e p o s i t i v e argum ents we have made in f a v o r of
K2 would r e t a i n a s t r e n g t h i n d e p e n d e n t o f argum ent b a s e d on
an a d v e r s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e p a s s a g e in q u e s t i o n . But
c o u n t e r a t t a c k s of t h i s s o r t c a n n o t , of c o u r s e , su cceed even
t o t h i s l i m i t e d d e g r e e . For, as I s h a l l e x p l a i n , n e i t h e r
B626 n o r th e s t r a t e g y of h i s a t t a c k on t h e o n t o l o g i c a l a r g u
ment sh o u ld le a d us to t h i n k t h a t Kant r e g a r d e d e x i s t e n c e as
^Cf. C h a p te r I , p p. 7 - 8 .
2
C f. M urray K i t e l y , " I s E x i s t e n c e a P r e d i c a t e ? "
M in d , LXXIII (19643, 364; Jerom e S h a f f e r , " E x i s t e n c e , P r e d i
c a t i o n and th e O n t o l o g i c a l A rg u m e n t," M in d , LXXI (1 9 6 2 ),
309; Norman Malcolm, "A n se lm 's O n t o l o g i c a l A r g u m e n ts ,” The
P h i l o s o p h i c a l R e v ie w , LXIX ( J a n u a r y , 1960).
126
m e re ly a l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e .
To b e g in w i t h , l e t us n o t e t h a t i n B626 Kant d id n o t
c a l l e x i s t e n c e m e re ly a l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e .
I sh o u ld have hoped to p u t an end to t h e s e i d l e
and f r u i t l e s s d i s p u t a t i o n s i n a d i r e c t manner, by an
a c c u r a t e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of th e co n cep t o f e x i s t e n c e ,
had I n o t found t h a t t h e i l l u s i o n which i s caused by
t h e c o n f u s i o n of a l o g i c a l w i t h a r e a l p r e d i c a t e
( t h a t i s , w i t h a p r e d i c a t e w h ich d e te r m in e s a t h i n g )
i s a lm o st beyond c o r r e c t i o n . A ny th in g we p l e a s e can
be made t o s e r v e as a l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e ; th e s u b j e c t
can even be p r e d i c a t e d of i t s e l f ; f o r l o g i c a b
s t r a c t s from a l l c o n t e n t . But a d e t e r m in i n g p r e d i
c a t e i s a p r e d i c a t e w hich i s added t o t h e c o n c e p t of
t h e s u b j e c t and e n l a r g e s i t . C o n s e q u e n tly , i t must
n o t be a l r e a d y c o n ta in e d i n t h e c o n c e p t . ^
In t h i s p a s s a g e he c o n t r a s t e d t h e 1,r e a l " p r e d i c a t e ( i . e . , a
p r e d i c a t e w hich can augment t h e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t) w i t h t h e
l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e ; th e n he p ro c e e d e d t o deny t h a t e x i s t e n c e
i s a r e a l p r e d i c a t e . The a rra n g e m e n t of h i s argument m ight
s u g g e s t t h a t he was a b o u t t o say t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s a l o g i c a l
p r e d i c a t e . Y et, of c o u r s e , every p r e d i c a t e was, f o r K a n t, a
l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e . Thus, i f h i s d i s t i n c t i o n was to have any
p a r t i c u l a r s i g n i f i c a n c e - - a s i d e from i n t r o d u c i n g th e n o t i o n
of r e a l and n o n - r e a l p r e d i c a t e s - - w e must i n t e r p r e t him as
h av in g meant to c o n t r a s t t h e r e a l p r e d i c a t e w ith th e m e re ly
l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e . His example of a t h i n g p r e d i c a t e d o f i t
s e l f s u g g e s t t h a t he would r e g a r d a m e re ly l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e
as one in which n o t h i n g i s e x p r e s s e d t h a t has n o t a l r e a d y
3
Immanuel K ant, C r i t i q u e of P u re R e a s o n , t r a n s .
Norman Kemp Smith (New Y o r k : S t. Mart i n r s' P r e s s , 1965),
B626.
127
b e e n e x p r e s s e d i n the s u b j e c t c o n c e p t . But Kant d id not go
on t h e n to say t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s m erely a l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e .
I n s t e a d , he p ro ceed ed t o ig n o re t h e term " l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e "
e n t i r e l y , and say i n s t e a d :
" B e in g " i s o b v i o u s l y n o t a r e a l p r e d i c a t e ; t h a t
i s , i t i s n o t a c o n c e p t of so m e th in g w hich could be
added to t h e c o n c e p t o f a t h i n g . I t i s m erely th e
p o s i t i n g o f a t h i n g , or of c e r t a i n d e t e r m i n a t i o n s ,
a s e x i s t i n g in t h e m s e l v e s .^
What he s a id h e r e was t h a t " b e in g " Cor p re su m a b ly what th e
word e x p r e s s e s ) i s m e r e ly the " p o s i t i n g " o f som ething as e x
i s t i n g i n i t s e l f . But t h i s s t a t e m e n t can be m i s l e a d i n g , b e
c a u se i f " b e i n g " h ere e x p r e s s e s w hat Kant c a l l e d " e x i s t
e n c e , " i t could not e x p r e s s th e mere p o s i t i n g , s i n c e , fo r
K ant, p o s i t i n g was an a c t d e r i v i n g from t h e s p o n t a n e i t y of
our t h i n k i n g , “* w hereas e x i s t e n c e i s a f a c t o r of w hich con-
6
s c i o u s n e s s i s g iv e n i n i n t u i t i o n , thus n o t som ething i n i t i -
7
a te d by u s . In d eed , K a n t i n s i s t e d t h a t our t h i n k i n g i s d e -
S
p e n d e n t f o r i t s c o n t e n t on i n t u i t i o n , and t h a t i n t u i t i o n i s
9
d e p e n d e n t on t h e o b j e c t ’ s e x i s t e n c e . B u t, of c o u r s e , th e
judgm ent in w hich we e x p r e s s an o b j e c t ’s e x i s t e n c e can be
p o s i t e d , th ro u g h our u s e of th e word " i s . " But sim p ly from
4I b i d . 5Cf. i b i d . , B74-76a.
6I b i d . , B221; B272; B629c.
7I b id . , B72.
SI b i d . , B33-4; B74-5; B146-7; B 194-6.
9
Ibid., B72.
128
t h e f a c t t h a t we p o s i t a judgm ent, we could n o t i n f e r t h a t
i t s p r e d i c a t e i s m erely l o g i c a l . In o rd er t o show t h i s we
would have to show t h a t what i s e x p re ss e d th r o u g h p o s i t i n g
t h e judgm ent, i s n o th in g more th an th e c o n te n t o f t h e s u b
j e c t c o n c e p t . " ^ But, of c o u r s e , K ant had a c t u a l l y j u s t p r e
c lu d e d showing t h i s by s a y in g t h a t what i s " p o s i t e d ” i s t h e
" t h i n g as e x i s t i n g i n i t s e l f , " fo r as we have seen ( i n Chap
t e r VI, pp. 1 1 6 -2 0 ) t h i s p h r a s e must e x p r e s s more th a n t h e
t h i n g i t s e l f , w h ereas th e t h i n g i t s e l f i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h th e
c o n t e n t o f i t s c o n c e p t ( c f . B627c).
Yet t h r o u g h o u t most of t h e re m a in d e r o f t h i s p a r a
g r a p h , Kant seems to have been a t t e m p t i n g to r e a s o n to j u s t
t h i s p o i n t , nam ely, t h a t what i s e x p r e s s e d th r o u g h ( t h e " i s "
i n ) an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent i s n o t h i n g more th a n th e s u b
j e c t . He d id n o t need to do so, o f c o u r s e , f o r as he came
to r e c o g n i z e i n th e n e x t p a r a g r a p h , i t would have s u f f i c e d
t o show o n ly t h a t n o th in g c o n c e p t u a l i s a f f i r m e d in a d d i t i o n
to th e s u b j e c t c o n t e n t th ro u g h th e e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent
( i . e . , n o t h i n g i s added to t h e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t ) . (For h i s
s o l u t i o n l a t e r was to show t h a t a l t h o u g h e x i s t e n c e i s a f a c
t o r of which we a r e c o n s c io u s in a d d i t i o n to t h e c o n t e n t o f
th e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t , i t i s n o t a d e t e r m i n a t i o n c a p a b le o f
e n t e r i n g i n t o t h a t c o n t e n t , b e c a u s e i t i s so m eth in g of w hich
■^Cf. our a n a l y s i s o f th e p h r a s e " m e re ly l o g i c a l " in
C h a p te r I I I , p p . 31-35.
129
we can n o t be c o n s c io u s i n a c o n c e p t . ) ^ That i s , he needed
to show (and i n f a c t d id show) o n ly t h a t w h i l e e x i s t e n c e i s
an a d d i t i v e p r e d i c a t e ( e x p r e s s i n g so m eth in g more than th e
o b j e c t , w hich i s th o u g h t th r o u g h t h e c o n c e p t ) , i t i s n o t a
" r e a l 1 1 p r e d i c a t e . For t o show t h i s s e rv e d q u i t e a d e q u a t e l y
h i s a t t a c k on t h e o n t o l o g i c a l arg u m en t, s i n c e f o r t h a t he
needed o n ly t o show t h a t e x i s t e n c e could n o t be a f a c t o r
c o n t a i n e d in th e c o n c e p t of a s u b j e c t ( i . e . , God [ c f . our
d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s p o i n t l a t e r in t h i s c h a p t e r on pp. 135-
1 3 9 ] ).
But as we have n o t e d , m ost of t h e r e m a in d e r of
B626-7 seems to have been aimed a t showing the p o i n t w hich,
l a t e r , i n B628, he abandoned; nam ely, t h a t what i s e x p re ss e d
i n th e e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent i s no more t h a n th e s u b j e c t .
For h i s d e s i g n in th e r e s t o f t h e p a r a g r a p h , seems to have
been t o show t h a t e x i s t e n c e ca n n o t be p a r t o f t h e s u b j e c t
c o n c e p t, e . g . , t h a t of God, th ro u g h showing t h a t a judgment
a f f i r m i n g i t e x p r e s s e s n o t h i n g more th a n th e s u b j e c t i t s e l f
(so t h a t e x i s t e n c e would b e , in e f f e c t , m e re ly a " l o g i c a l "
p r e d i c a t e ) .
B ut, a c t u a l l y , th e argum ent w hich he made seems to
have v e e r e d more to w ard s s a y in g t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s no p r e d i
c a t e a t a l l : f o r what he chose to do was to em phasize t h e
s i m i l a r i t y betw een t h e e x i s t e n t i a l " i s " and th e c o p u la ,
Cf. Kant, op. cit. , B62S-9.
130
w hich i s , of c o u r s e , n o t a p r e d i c a t e , b u t th e c o n n e c t i o n of
a p r e d i c a t e w i t h a s u b j e c t :
L o g i c a l l y , i t i s m e re ly th e c o p u la o f a judgm ent.
The p r o p o s i t i o n , "God i s o m n i p o t e n t ," c o n t a i n s two
c o n c e p t s , each of which has i t s o b je c t- - G o d and om
n i p o t e n c e . The s m a ll word " i s ” adds no new p r e d i
c a t e , b u t o n ly s e r v e s to p o s i t th e p r e d i c a t e iri i t s
r e l a t i o n to the s u b j e c t . I f , now, we ta k e t h e su b -
j e c t CGod) w i t h a l l i t s p r e d i c a t e s (among which i s
o m n ip o te n c e ), and say "God i s , " or "There i s a God,"
• we a t t a c h no new p r e d i c a t e to th e c o n c e p t o f God,
b u t o n ly p o s i t th e s u b j e c t i n i t s e l f w i t h a l l i t s
p r e d i c a t e s , and in d eed p o s i t i t as b e in g an obj e c t
t h a t s t a n d s i n r e l a t i o n to my c o n c e p t . ^
The e x i s t e n t i a l " i s ” i s p r e s e n t e d i n term s o f a p r o p o s i t i o n :
j u s t a s , l o g i c a l l y , " i s " i s t h e c o p u la of th e ju d g m en t, and
■thus adds no c o n t e n t to th e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t , so th e e x i s t e n
t i a l " i s ” adds no c o n t e n t to i t s s u b j e c t ’ s c o n c e p t , b u t
o n ly p o s i t s t h a t c o n t e n t as b e in g an o b j e c t t h a t s ta n d s in
r e l a t i o n to th e c o n c e p t.
Y e t, of c o u r s e , h i s i n c l u s i o n o f t h e words " a s b e
i n g " and " s t a n d s " i n d i c a t e d a c e r t a i n t e n s i o n i n h i s t h i n k
i n g , t e n d in g t o p r e v e n t t h e com plete r e d u c t i o n o f t h e e x i s
t e n t i a l " i s " t o t h e c o p u la . For a l t h o u g h t h e co p u la p o s i t s
th e r e l a t i o n , or c o n n e c t i o n , o f t h e p r e d i c a t e and s u b j e c t
c o n t e n t s , i t does n o t " p o s i t " th e p r e d i c a t e c o n t e n t as
b e in g an o b j e c t . Yet even t h i s i n d i c a t i o n of a s p e c i f i c a l l y
e x i s t e n t i a l f u n c t i o n f o r th e " i s " i s am biguous, f o r t h e word
" b e i n g " may v e ry w e l l have been u sed h e r e i n t h e
~*~^Ibid . , B626c-7a.
131
n o n - e x i s t e n t i a l s e n s e s o f " e q u a l s " or " b e in g t h e same a s . "
On th e o th e r hand, we sh o u ld n o t o r d i n a r i l y t h i n k of a
c o p u la as e x p r e s s i n g or even " p o s i t i n g " the " s t a n d i n g ” o f a
p r e d i c a t e c o n t e n t - ~ a t l e a s t i n s o f a r as " s t a n d i n g " m ight be
u n d e r s to o d t o r e f e r , n o t so much to t h e r e l a t i o n as t o th e
p r e d i c a t e ’s b e in g t h e r e t o be r e l a t e d .
In any e v e n t, i n th e n e x t s t a g e o f h i s a rg u m e n t, he
seems to have l o s t s i g h t , f o r th e moment, of e x i s t e n c e as an
i r r e d u c i b l e f a c t o r , f o r when he p ro c e e d e d to i n s i s t t h a t the
o b j e c t t h a t i s " p o s i t e d " by th e " i s " i s i d e n t i c a l in c o n t e n t
w i t h th e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t , K ant seems to have i n te n d e d to
show t h a t , s i n c e th e o b j e c t i s - - s u p p o s e d l y - - w h a t i s " p o s i t
e d ” by th e e x i s t e n t i a l " i s , " t h e r e i s n o t h i n g t h a t th e e x i s
t e n t i a l " i s " (o r th e a c t o f p r e d i c a t i n g e x i s t e n c e ) co u ld ex
p r e s s above and beyond th e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t.
I f , now, we t a k e t h e s u b j e c t (God) w i t h a l l i t s
p r e d i c a t e s (among w hich i s o m n ip o te n c e ) , and say
"God i s , " or "T h e re i s a G o d ," we a t t a c h no new
p r e d i c a t e t o th e c o n c e p t o f God, b u t o n ly p o s i t t h e
s u b j e c t in i t s e l f w ith a l l i t s p r e d i c a t e s , and i n
deed p o s i t i t as b e in g an o b j e c t t h a t s ta n d s i n r e
l a t i o n to my c o n c e p t . The c o n t e n t o f b o th must be
one and the same; n o th in g can have been added to t h e
c o n c e p t, w hich e x p r e s s e s m e re ly what i s p o s s i b l e , by
my t h i n k i n g i t s o b j e c t ( t h r o u g h t h e e x p r e s s i o n " i t
i s " ) as g iv e n a b s o l u t e l y . O th e r w is e s t a t e d , the
r e a l c o n t a i n s no more th a n t h e m e re ly p o s s i b l e . A
hundred r e a l t h a l e r s do n o t c o n t a i n th e l e a s t c o in
more th a n a hundred p o s s i b l e t h a l e r s . For as th e
l a t t e r s i g n i f y th e c o n c e p t, and th e fo rm er th e ob
j e c t and th e p o s i t i n g o f t h e o b j e c t , sh o u ld th e
fo rm er c o n t a i n more th a n th e l a t t e r , my c o n c e p t
would n o t , i n t h a t c a s e , e x p r e s s th e whole o b j e c t ,
and would n o t t h e r e f o r e be an a d e q u a te c o n c e p t of
132
13
i t .
But t h i s l i n e of argument had to depend on h i s a c
c e p t i n g th e p o i n t t h a t th e o b j e c t i t s e l f i s a l l t h a t i s
" p o s i t e d ” or th o u g h t by means o f t h e e x i s t e n t i a l " i s , " and
t h i s was th e f a c t o r t h a t f i n a l l y le d to h i s abandonment of
t h i s p a r t i c u l a r l i n e of r e a s o n i n g . For a lth o u g h Kant f i r s t
embraced t h i s i m p l i c a t i o n i n h i s r a t h e r unhappy p h r a s e " th e
r e a l c o n t a i n s no more th a n th e p o s s i b l e , ” and e x e m p l i f i e d i t
i n s a y in g t h a t ” a hundred r e a l t h a l e r s c o n t a i n n o t th e l e a s t
c o in more th an a hundred p o s s i b l e t h a l e r s , ” h i s common se n se
b r o u g h t him up s h a r p l y :
My f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n i s , however, a f f e c t e d v e ry
d i f f e r e n t l y by a hundred r e a l t h a l e r s th a n i t i s by
t h e mere con cep t of them ( t h a t i s , of t h e i r p o s s i
b i l i t y ) . For th e o b j e c t , as i t a c t u a l l y e x i s t s , i s
n o t a n a l y t i c a l l y c o n ta in e d i n my c o n c e p t, b u t i s
added to my c o n c e p t (w hich i s a d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f my
s t a t e ) s y n t h e t i c a l l y ; and y e t t h e c o n c e iv e d hundred
t h a l e r s are n o t th e m s e lv e s i n t h e l e a s t i n c r e a s e d
th ro u g h th u s a c q u i r i n g e x i s t e n c e o u t s i d e my con
c e p t . 1-4
He r e c o g n i z e d t h a t h i s f i n a n c i a l c o n d i t i o n was q u i t e d e f i
n i t e l y a f f e c t e d by th e t h a l e r s b e i n g r e a l . A c c o r d i n g l y , he
began to r e f o r m u l a t e h i s argument in such a way as to le a v e
out a l t o g e t h e r t h e d u b io u s t h e s i s t h a t t h e e x i s t e n t i a l ." i s ”
" p o s i t s " n o th in g b u t the o b j e c t . For w h ile s t i l l i n s i s t i n g
t h a t t h e o b j e c t i t s e l f and th e c o n t e n t of i t s c o n c e p t a r e
i d e n t i c a l , he p ro c e e d e d to adm it t h a t th e obj e c t as i t
1 3 Ibid., B627b. 1 4 Ibid., B627c.
133
15
a c t u a l l y e x i s t s i s n o t c o n ta in e d in i t s c o n c e p t . That i s
t o say, he came to r e c o g n i z e t h a t i n knowing an o b j e c t as
e x i s t i n g we know so m eth in g more t h a n the o b j e c t . (C f. our
e x t e n s i v e e x e g e s i s o f t h i s p a r t i c u l a r p a s s a g e in C h a p te r
V I .) That i s to say , we know i t s e x i s t e n c e .
From t h i s p o i n t on, t h r o u g h B230, he r e v e r t e d , w ith
a s u re s t e p , to th e a n a l y s i s of e x i s t e n t i a l judgment which
he had p r e v i o u s l y d e v e lo p e d in B72, B220-1, and B272-4, in
which he had r e c o g n i z e d e x i s t e n c e as an i r r e d u c i b l e f a c t o r
( c f . e s p e c i a l l y B72 and B220-1), b u t a f a c t o r of w h ic h con
s c i o u s n e s s i s g iv en o n l y in p e r c e p t i o n . F o r , as we s h a l l
see d i r e c t l y , t h i s p o i n t was a l l t h a t he a c t u a l l y needed i n
o r d e r to p r e s s h i s c r i t i c i s m of t h e o n t o l o g i c a l argum ent.
And, o f " c o u r s e , in t h i s f o r m u l a t i o n , th e e x i s t e n t i a l ju d g
ment was p r e s e n t e d a s a c o n n e c t i o n of t h e o b j e c t ( n o t m erely
i t s c o n c e p t) w ith t h e f a c t o r o f e x i s t e n c e , of w hich \ve can
be c o n s c io u s only i n or th ro u g h a p e r c e p t i o n .
Thus, th e f o u n d a t i o n or p o i n t on which e x i s t e n c e
would be judged a m e re ly l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e - - o r even none a t
a l l - - w a s g iv e n up, and i n i t s p l a c e was s u b s t i t u t e d th e a n
a l y s i s on w hich we have based our own e x e g e s i s of K a n t ’s
p o s i t i o n .
But b e f o r e l e a v i n g o f f o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f th e
t e n t a t i v e f o r m u l a t i o n s essayed i n B626-7, l e t us n o t i c e one
15Ibid . 1 6 Ibid., B629.
134
of th e f a c t o r s c o n t r i b u t i n g to t h e i r i n c o n c l u s i v e n e s s . That
i s , th e f a c t t h a t th e judgment w ith which Kant i s p r i m a r i l y
c o n cern ed i n h i s c r i t i c i s m o f th e o n t o l o g i c a l arg u m en t, and
i n term s o f w hich th e f o r m u l a t i o n s i n B626-7 were l a r g e l y
th o u g h t o u t , was n o t one in w hich we c o u ld a c t u a l l y p r e d i
c a t e e x i s t e n c e . For i t was, of c o u r s e , th e n o n - e m p i r i c a l
p r o p o s i t i o n , "God i s . " In t h e c a s e o f t h i s example, most o f
w hat he s a i d i n B626-7 of th e r o l e of th e " i s " would be
t r u e , f o r as he l a t e r re m a rk e d , t h i n k i n g a n o n - e m p i r i c a l ob
j e c t as e x i s t e n t would not d i f f e r from what i s th o u g h t sim
p l y i n i t s c o n c e p t . There would be n o t h i n g more in t h i n k i n g
i t as r e a l th a n in t h i n k i n g i t as p o s s i b l e ( f o r we could n o t
t h i n k i t as r e a l , n o r even as p o s s i b l e - - f o r p o s s i b i l i t y i t
s e l f could be th o u g h t only th ro u g h r e f e r e n c e to e x p e r i e n c e .
B u t, of c o u r s e , a c o r r e c t f o r m u l a t i o n of t h i s ty p e o f " ju d g -
17
m ent" i s n o t a f o r m u l a t i o n of th e e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent.
For th e e x i s t e n t i a l judgment i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by th e a b i l i t y ,
t h e r e i n , o f t h e " i s " t o e x p r e s s what i t does n o t e x p r e s s i n
th e o th e r ty p e of t h i n k i n g ( i . e . , e x i s t e n c e , known e m p i r i -
18
c a l l y th ro u g h p e r c e p t i o n ) .
Having shown t h a t B626 does n o t r e q u i r e (o r j u s t i f y )
1 7Cf. our d i s c u s s i o n i n C h a p te r I I I , p p. 4 S -5 3 .
18
Cf. the contrast mentioned in Kant, op. cit.,
B628-9.
135
our t h i n k i n g t h a t Kant r e g a r d e d e x i s t e n c e as a m erely l o g i
c a l p r e d i c a t e , l e t me show why he d id n o t need to hold t h i s
view in o rd e r t o p r e s s h i s a t t a c k on th e o n t o l o g i c a l a r g u
ment. I s h a l l o f f e r an o u t l i n e of h i s r e f u t a t i o n which w i l l
show t h i s p o i n t i n a most e x p l i c i t f a s h i o n .
An O u t l i n e of K a n t ’s R e f u t a t i o n of
th e O n t o l o g i c a l Argument
A f t e r r h e t o r i c a l l y q u e s t i o n i n g ( i n B620-1) w h e th e r
t h e r e could be any c o n t e n t to the c o n c e p t of a N e c e s sa ry
B e in g , Kant began h i s a c t u a l r e f u t a t i o n of th e O n t o l o g i c a l
Argument (B621-2) by c l a i m i n g , in e f f e c t , t h a t i f from th e
c o n c e p t o f a N e c e s sa ry Being we could co n c lu d e to t h e e x i s t
ence o f i t s o b j e c t , i t would o n ly be b e c a u s e t h e e x i s t e n c e
o f th e o b j e c t would have been p o s i t e d in th e c o n c e p t .
A few p a r a g r a p h s l a t e r ( i n B625), Kant was v i r t u a l l y
to r e p e a t t h i s argum ent by c o n te n d in g t h a t i f th e p r o p o s i
t i o n nGod i s ” i s a n a l y t i c , i t i s so m e re ly b e c a u s e we have
p o s i t e d e x i s t e n c e in the c o n c e p t o f God, and i n th e p r e d i
c a t e we do no more th a n r e p e a t th e p o s i t i n g a l r e a d y th o u g h t
i n th e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t . But j u s t b e f o r e t h i s , i n B622c04,
he chose t o p u r s u e a d i f f e r e n t l i n e of a t t a c k , one which d id
n o t c o n s i s t in showing th e m e re ly ’h y p o t h e t i c a l , ” or p o s i t
i n g , c h a r a c t e r of th e a n a l y t i c p r o p o s i t i o n . I n s t e a d , he
so u g h t to show t h a t n e i t h e r ”God i s ” n o r any e x i s t e n t i a l
p r o p o s i t i o n could be a n a l y t i c - - a s i t would have t o be i f t h e
e x i s t e n c e e x p r e s s e d i n t h e p r e d i c a t e were d e r i v e d m erely
136
from th e c o n c e p t of t h e s u b j e c t . That i s , he so u g h t to d i s
p ro v e th e c o n t r a r y o f 3, or t h a t a l l e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ents
a r e s y n t h e t i c . His way of d i s p r o v i n g th e a n a l y t i c i t y o f
"God i s " was by a r g u in g t h a t i f a p a r t i c u l a r e x i s t e n t i a l
p r o p o s i t i o n were a n a l y t i c , i t s n e g a t i o n ought to be s e l f
c o n t r a d i c t o r y , w h e re a s, he m a i n t a i n e d , t h e n e g a t i o n o f any
e x i s t e n t i a l p r o p o s i t i o n c a n n o t be s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y , t h a t
i s , i t ca n n o t oppose a n e g a t i o n of e x i s t e n c e in t h e p r e d i
c a t e to an a f f i r m a t i o n of e x i s t e n c e in the s u b j e c t b e c a u s e
t h e s u b j e c t i s i t s e l f s u p p re s s e d by th e n e g a t i o n in th e
p r e d i c a t e . F in d in g h i s r e f u t a t i o n i n c o n c l u s i v e ( b e c a u s e the
p r o p o n e n ts of th e O n t o l o g i c a l Argument would c la im t h a t i t
begs th e q u e s t i o n i n su p p o sin g t h a t when th e s u b j e c t o f an
e x i s t e n t i a l p r o p o s i t i o n i s N e c e s s a ry B ein g , or R e a l i t y I t
s e l f , i t can be s u p p re s s e d by i t s b e in g n e g a te d i n th e p r e d
i c a t e ) , he th e n p ro c e e d e d to seek t o show t h a t the O n t o l o g i
c a l Argument i s m is ta k e n b e c a u s e i t t r i e s to d e r i v e t h e con
c e p t of e x i s t e n c e from th e c o n c e p t o f a t h i n g ' s p o s s i b i l i t y .
Such a d e r i v a t i o n would be prim a f a c i e e r r o n e o u s , Kant a r
gued; b u t i f i t s l e g i t i m a c y were a llo w e d , i t would s t i l l be
w i t h o u t v a l u e ; f o r i f the p r e d i c a t e of e x i s t e n c e were d e
r i v e d from t h e c o n c e p t of th e s u b j e c t ' s p o s s i b i l i t y , i t
could o n ly be b e c a u s e e x i s t e n c e had been p o s i t e d t h e r e i n
t h i n k i n g th e c o n c e p t of th e s u b j e c t and, t h u s , t h e judgm ent
e x p l i c a t i n g th e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t, though a n a l y t i c , would be
"a mere t a u t o l o g y " ( i . e . , i t would e x p r e s s only a p o s i t e d
137
e x i s t e n c e ) . In t h i s l a s t s e c t i o n , K a n t rs argum ent came to
be, i n e f f e c t , t h a t i f "God i s " were a n a l y t i c , a f t e r a l l , i t
would be a mere t a u t o l o g y , and th e e x i s t e n c e e x p r e s s e d would
be t h e r e only by v i r t u e of i t s h a v in g been p o s i t e d in th e
pr e d i c a t e .
In th e n e x t , or t h i r d and v e r y s h o r t p a r t of h i s
arg u m en t, Kant showed t h a t i f "God i s " i s s y n t h e t i c - - a s
" e v e ry r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n ” r e g a r d s e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ents as
b e i n g - - t h e n th e s u b j e c t would be s u p p r e s s e d by th e n e g a t i o n
of i t s e x i s t e n c e in th e p r e d i c a t e , f o r t h e p r e d i c a t e e x i s t
ence would n o t b e lo n g i n t r i n s i c a l l y , or u n s u p p r e s s a b l y , to
the s u b j e c t (G od), and th u s God would n o t be (known as)
N e c e s s a r y B ein g .
I t i s u n d e n i a b l e t h a t in ( a l l t h r e e p a r t s o f ) t h i s
f i r s t s e c t i o n , Kant did n o t seek to draw e i t h e r a or P from
a n a l y s i s of th e c o n c e p t, w hich would g iv e Y and theorem t i
( t h a t th ro u g h c o n c e p t i o n a lo n e we c a n n o t be c o n s c io u s o f an
o b j e c t ’s e x i s t e n c e ) from w hich a and 3 c o u ld be d e r i v e d .
I n s t e a d , he a rg u e d on g ro u n d s f a r more l o g i c a l th a n e p i s t e -
m o l o g i c a l . But o b v io u s ly d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h i s l i n e of
d i s c u s s i o n ( c f . B626b), he th e n p ro c e e d e d to g iv e an e p i s t e -
m o lo g ic a l r e a s o n which would show, in e f f e c t , why th e d e r i
v a t i o n of e x i s t e n c e from p o s s i b i l i t y (w hich he had r e j e c t e d
in t h e second p a r t of t h e f i r s t s e c t i o n - - B 6 2 5 a ) , would be
i l l e g i t i m a t e and n o t m e re ly t a u t o l o g o u s or a r e p e t i t i o n of a
p r e v i o u s p o s i t i o n of e x i s t e n c e in th e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t - -
namely b ecau se e x i s t e n c e c o u ld not ev en be p o s i t e d in a s u b
j e c t c o n c e p t from w hich i t would s u p p o s e d ly be d e r i v e d a n a
l y t i c a l l y - And th e r e a s o n why e x i s t e n c e could n o t even be
p o s i t e d i n a s u b j e c t c o n c e p t , was b e c a u s e i t was not a
" r e a l " p r e d i c a t e , t h a t i s a p r e d i c a t e which would c o n t r i b u t e
a c o n c e p t u a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n to the s u b j e c t c o n c e p t. I t was
o n ly i n t r y i n g t o show why t h i s l a s t p o i n t was s o , t h a t Kant
f i n a l l y came, by way of Y ( t h e i d e n t i t y in c o n t e n t betw een
t h e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t and i t s o b j e c t - - c f . B 627b-8), to T ) ( t h e
i n a b i l i t y of c o n c e p t i o n a l o n e to g iv e us c o n s c io u s n e s s o f
e x i s t e n c e - - c f . B 6 2 8 c - 9 ) -- w h ic h would show why e x i s t e n c e c a n
n o t be a " r e a l ” p r e d i c a t e . And he w a s, i n f a c t , a b le t o
e s t a b l i s h h o n ly by draw ing i t , n o t from Y, b u t from h i s
i n t u i t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n of e x i s t e n c e a s som ething e x t r a -
c o n c e p t u a l and g iv e n only i n p e r c e p t i o n ( c f . B629bc).
Indeed t h e r e a s o n f o r th e i n t r o d u c t i o n of Y i n t o h i s
argum ent (B 6 2 7 b -8 ), was n o t in o rd e r f o r i t to le a d to r \ and
t h e n c e t o th e " n o n - r e a l ” c h a r a c t e r o f t h e p r e d i c a t e of e x
i s t e n c e (which w ould, i n t u r n , show why knowledge of Godrs
e x i s t e n c e could n o t be c o n t a i n e d i n , or drawn o u t from, th e
c o n c e p t of God). I n s t e a d , Kant would appear t o have i n t r o
duced r \ in o rd e r d i r e c t l y t o show t h e " n o n - r e a l i t y " of t h e
p r e d i c a t e of e x i s t e n c e , and then t o have i n t r o d u c e d Y as
a n o t h e r , though r e l a t e d , way of showing th e same t h i n g .
P e r h a p s he was d i s s a t i s f i e d by Y a l o n e b e c a u se w h ile i t
would show t h a t e x i s t e n c e could n o t be a c o n c e p t u a l l y
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augm enting p r e d i c a t e ( i . e . , show t h i s by e n t a i l i n g t h a t i f
e x i s t e n t i a l judgment were t o add a n y th in g t o th e s u b j e c t
c o n c e p t, t h e l a t t e r would no lo n g e r be a c o n c e p t o f th e same
o b j e c t ) , s t i l l i t , Y, would n o t s u f f i c e f o r showing how i t
i s t h a t e x i s t e n c e ca n n o t be a c o n c e p t u a l l y augm enting p r e d i
c a t e . To show how t h i s i s s o , Kant would seem to have r e c
ognized t h a t he needed t|.
But in any c a s e , he d i d n o t sa y , or need he say,
t h a t th e p r e d i c a t e of e x i s t e n c e i s m e re ly l o g i c a l , t h a t i t
e x p r e s s e s n o t h i n g above--and beyond what i s th o u g h t i n the
s u b j e c t c o n c e p t. F o r , as we have- s e e n , i n o rd e r t o show
t h a t e x i s t e n c e can n o t be d e r i v e d from t h e c o n c e p t o f a
t h i n g , e . g . , th e c o n c e p t o f God, Kant needed o n ly to show
t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s n o t a ,;r e a l , ” or c o n c e p t u a l l y au g m en tin g ,
pr e d i c a t e .
SECTION TWO
CHAPTER VIII
HOW KANT COULD HAVE COME TO THEOREM 0
Having shown t h a t Kant d id h o ld e x i s t e n c e to be the
a d d i t i v e p r e d i c a t e of an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent, I s h a l l now
a tte m p t to show t h a t t h i s p o s i t i o n i s not an a c c i d e n t a l
f e a t u r e o f h is t e a c h i n g , b u t t h a t i t f o llo w s from one o f the
most c e n t r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in h i s system ( i . e . , h i s t h e o r y
of c o n c e p t i o n ) .
T h a t i s , I s h o u ld l i k e to show why, w i t h i n K a n t ’ s
sy stem , t h i s p o s i t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y .
A lthough one may have fo llo w e d each s t e p of my a r
gument, and be re a d y to g iv e a s s e n t t o i t s c o n c l u s i o n s - - t o
th e c o n c l u s i o n , t h a t i s , t h a t Kant r e g a rd e d e x i s t e n c e as an
a d d i t i v e p r e d i c a t e , i t i s s t i l l p o s s i b l e t h a t one may n o t
have an a d e q u a te u n d e r s t a n d i n g of how or why Kant sh o u ld
have come t o t h i s p o s i t i o n . T h is c o u ld be th e c a s e , I b e
l i e v e , b e c a u se one m ight have g iv e n a m erely " f o r m a l" a s s e n t
to the s ig n s i n d i c a t i n g t h a t Kant h e ld t h i s p a r t i c u l a r
t h e o r y , w ith o u t h a v in g a " m a t e r i a l " u n d e r s t a n d i n g of th e
r e a s o n s which le d t o h i s p o s i t i o n . One m ight s t i l l n o t
141
142
u n d e r s ta n d how an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent c o u ld i n v o lv e a s y n
t h e s i s of th e o b j e c t w i t h so m eth in g o t h e r t h a n th e o b j e c t
(even though one were read y to b e l i e v e t h a t Kant d id hold
t h a t such was the c a s e ) . On th e c o n t r a r y , i t m ight seem
t h a t i n e v e ry case i n which so m e th in g e x i s t s , t h e r e i s o n ly
th e t h i n g which e x i s t s , and no o t h e r f a c t o r w ith which i t
would be composed i n e x i s t i n g - - t h a t i s , t h a t t h e r e i s no
e x i s t i n g d i s t i n c t from th e t h i n g . When one h e a r s the word
" e x i s t e n c e , ” t h e r e m ight sim ply be n o t h in g t o which o n e ’ s
mind co u ld r e f e r - - e x c e p t , of c o u r s e , th e o b j e c t .
To be s u r e , one m ight be a b le t o t h i n k a k in d of
"x" to s e rv e as a p o s i t e d c o u n t e r p a r t t o K a n t ' s word
" e x i s t e n c e , " and by t h i n k i n g t h i s x u n d e r s t a n d th e r e a s o n i n g
by which y and e i t h e r a or 3 would imply 6; b u t o n e 's u n d e r
s t a n d i n g would be o n ly on th e l e v e l of a k in d of c a l c u l u s
in which th e r e l a t i o n s h i p of v a r i a b l e s would be th o u g h t b u t
w ith o u t g iv e n c o n s c io u s n e s s of t h e v a r i a b l e s or o f t h a t i n
which, m a t e r i a l l y , t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p s c o n s i s t .
T h is k in d o f t h i n k i n g can n e v e r g iv e knowledge of
th e s i t u a t i o n which Kant meant t o e x p l a i n , or even of h i s
e x p l a n a t i o n , b ecau se i t rem ains on th e l e v e l o f h y p o t h e s i s - -
f o r th e v e ry good r e a s o n t h a t th e " v a l u e s " which would g iv e
to the c a l c u l u s a c o n t e n t are s t i l l in d o u b t o r are a t
l e a s t l a c k i n g . For a l l t h a t one can know i n t h i s way i s
t h a t Tf t h e r e were an o b j e c t o f an e x i s t e n t i a l judgment
which c o u ld be r e g a r d e d as i d e n t i c a l w ith so m eth in g c a l l e d
143
th e " s u b j e c t c o n c e p t , " and i f t h e r e were an e x i s t e n t i a l
judgment which would always be s y n t h e t i c or a p o s t e r i o r i
and t h e r e f o r e a s y n t h e s i s of d i f f e r e n t c o n t e n t s , th e n t h e r e
would have t o be so m e th in g o t h e r t h a n the o b j e c t w ith which
th e l a t t e r c o u ld be s y n t h e s i z e d .
F u rth e rm o re , t h e r e i s l a c k i n g , i n t h i s k in d of
t h i n k i n g , any given or i n t u i t e d c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f t h a t about
which Kant w r o t e . What i s l a c k i n g i s th e p r e s e n c e in c o n
s c io u s n e s s o f an o b j e c t of e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent which i s
re c o g n iz e d as bein g th e same as th e c o n t e n t o f a c o n c e p t
th ro u g h which t h a t o b j e c t i s t h o u g h t in th e judgm ent; and
th e p r e s e n c e i n c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f an e x i s t e n t i a l judgment
which i s r e c o g n i z e d as b e in g one i n which th e o b j e c t i s
s y n t h e s i z e d w i t h s o m e th in g e l s e ; and c o n s c i o u s n e s s in which
an i d e n t i f i a b l e f a c t o r i s r e c o g n i z e d as b e in g b o th t h a t which
we c a l l " e x i s t e n c e " and t h a t w ith which th e s u b j e c t - o b j e c t
i s s y n t h e s i z e d . I n s t e a d of th e m i s s i n g - f a c t o r s , t h e r e i s
only a p o s i t e d x in e a c h c a s e . To be s u r e , th e x t h a t i s
p o s i t e d as t h e o b j e c t i d e n t i c a l w ith th e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t 's
i n t e n t , may be th o u g h t by means o f f a c t o r s g iv e n i n con-
s c i o u s n e s s - - t h a t i s , by c o n j o i n i n g a g iv e n c o n s c i o u s n e s s of
an o b j e c t w ith a g iv e n c o n s c i o u s n e s s of the c o n t e n t of i t s
c o n c e p t, as when one t h i n k s th e h y p o t h e s i s t h a t i s e x p r e s s e d
by s a y in g " I f the o b j e c t were i d e n t i c a l w ith th e c o n t e n t of
th e co n c e p t,' . . . " But i n t h i s c a se th e c o n j u n c t i o n of
th e s e g iv e n f a c t o r s i n th e same o b j e c t i s n o t i t s e l f
144
r e c o g n iz e d in a n y th in g g iv e n ; i t i s o n ly p o s i t e d . T h is i s
to s a y , t h e i r c o n j u n c t i o n i s th o u g h t th ro u g h th e p o s i t i n g
of an o b j e c t - - t h e o b j e c t which would have in t h e i r c o n j u n c
t i o n t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f a c t o r s t h a t have b een g iv e n s e p
a r a t e l y . Thus, i t i s o n ly i n t h i n k i n g a p o s i t e d x i n which
the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of th e c o n jo in e d f a c t o r s would be h e ld
t o g e t h e r t h a t an h y p o t h e s i s s t a t i n g th e u n i t y o f f a c t o r s
g iv e n as s e p a r a t e can be t h o u g h t . And t h i s means t h a t t h a t
about which K a n t 's d i s c o u r s e i s u n d e r s to o d a.s b e in g , i s n o t
so m e th in g g iv e n b u t o n ly som ething p o s i t e d .
There i s a s e r i o u s co n se q u e n c e : l a c k i n g g iv e n or
i n t u i t e d c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f t h a t ab o u t which Kant w ro te , one
l a c k s th e f o u n d a t i o n by which one c o u ld t r a n s f o r m o n e ' s
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f h i s d o c t r i n e from h y p o t h e s i s i n t o t r u t h ;
f o r K a n t 's w r i t i n g s a r e , f i n a l l y , d e s c r i p t i v e of so m eth in g
i n t u i t i v e l y g i v e n - - n a m e l y , th e s t r u c t u r e of p o s s i b l e e x p e
r i e n c e . Unless one keeps in mind what Kant w ro te ab o u t,
one l a c k s t h a t which s e r v e d as th e f o u n d a t i o n f o r h i s j u d g
ments .
In o r d e r to av o id t h i s l a c k , one would have t o p u r
sue a somewhat d i f f e r e n t l i n e of t h i n k i n g th a n t h a t by
which I have a tte m p te d t o show t h a t Kant h e l d Ki and K2 .
I have sought t o p o i n t o u t s ig n s w hich would i n d i c a t e , as
e f f i c i e n t l y as p o s s i b l e , what K a n t 's t h i n k i n g must have
b e e n . Now, one would have t o a tte m p t to show how Kant a r
r i v e d a t t h i s v iew . And t h i s I s h a l l t r y to do.
145
I t i s my p r o p o s a l t h a t K a n t ' s a n a l y s i s o f th e n a t u r e
o f th e c o n c e p t c o u ld have r e v e a l e d t o him b o th y, or th e
i d e n t i t y of th e c o n t e n t o f th e c o n c e p t w ith i t s o b j e c t , and-
a n o th e r theorem ,
Theorem r]: t h a t c o n c e p t i o n alo n e i s u n ab le
t o f u r n i s h c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f th e f a c t t h a t
o b j e c t s e x i s t .
From y and p, Kant c o u ld have c o n c lu d e d 6 t h a t i n knowing
an o b j e c t t o e x i s t , one must know, n o t m e re ly th e o b j e c t ,
b u t a l s o so m eth in g e l s e , nam ely, t h a t f a c t o r c o n s t i t u i t i v e
of th e f a c t t h a t an o b j e c t e x i s t s .
Kant c o u ld have r e c o g n i z e d th e " o t h e r f a c t o r rt as
b e in g what we c a l l " e x i s t e n c e " by r e a s o n i n g as f o l l o w s :
s in c e t h e o b j e c t i s what i t i s , b o t h in or o u t of th e f a c t
t h a t i t e x i s t s ( i . e . , w h eth er i t i s m erely p o s s i b l e or
e x i s t e n t ) th e " o t h e r " f a c t o r i n th e f a c t t h a t th e o b j e c t
e x i s t s must be t h a t which " p e r t a i n s " to , o r i s t o g e t h e r
w ith , th e o b j e c t o n ly when an o b j e c t e x i s t s . S in c e t h a t
which " p e r t a i n s ” t o any o b j e c t o n ly when i t e x i s t s i s what
i s c a l l e d " e x i s t e n c e , " Kant c o u ld th e n have r e c o g n i z e d t h a t
t h i s o t h e r f a c t o r i s e x i s t e n c e .
Once aware of th e f a c t o r which i s o t h e r th a n th e
o b j e c t ( i . e . , i t s e x i s t e n c e ) he c o u ld th e n have r e f l e c t e d
t h a t b e c a u s e e x i s t e n c e i s t o g e t h e r w ith th e o b j e c t in what
an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent a f f i r m s ( i . e . , t h a t an o b j e c t e x
i s t s ) , th e e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent must be s y n t h e t i c O ) ,
e x p r e s s i n g n o t only th e c o n t e n t s o f th e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t
( i . e . , th e o b j e c t ) b u t a l s o th e o t h e r f a c t o r ( i . e . , e x i s t
e n c e ) . By means of th e d e f i n i t i o n o f " s y n t h e t i c p r e d i c a t e ”
( t h a t w ith which a s u b j e c t i s s y n t h e s i z e d in s y n t h e t i c
ju d g m en t), he could th a n have c o n c lu d e d t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s a
s y n t h e t i c p r e d i c a t e .
A s im p l e r , l e s s a r t i c u l a t e d v e r s i o n p f th e p r o c e s s
d e s c r i b e d above would be: t h a t from y and r) Kant co u ld
have co n clu d ed to a and P. For i f th e s u b j e c t o f an e x i s
t e n t i a l judgment can be known c o m p le te ly i n a c o n c e p t, b u t
th ro u g h a c o n c e p t we ca n n o t know o b j e c t s as e x i s t e n t , i t
must f o l l o w b o th t h a t th e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t does n o t o f f e r a
s u f f i c i e n t a p r i o r i ground f o r th e e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent,
and t h a t some c o n t e n t o t h e r th a n th e c o n t e n t of th e s u b j e c t
c o n c e p t must be e x p r e s s e d i n th e e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent.
From t h i s , and from h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f " s y n t h e t i c p r e d i c a t e , "
Kant could have co n clu d ed t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s a s y n t h e t i c
p r e d i c a t e .
By r e v e r t i n g a g a in t o T|, Kant co u ld have r e c o g n i z e d
t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s n o t l i k e o t h e r s y n t h e t i c p r e d i c a t e s i n
t h a t i t does n o t augment th e c o n c e p t o f th e s u b j e c t of
which i t i s a f f i r m e d . Thus, he c o u ld have c o n c lu d e d t h a t
e x i s t e n c e i s n o t a " r e a l " p r e d i c a t e b u t , i n s t e a d , what we
have c a l l e d an " a d d i t i v e " p r e d i c a t e ( i . e . , Theorem 0 ) .
And from t h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , Kant c o u ld have gone
on to use b o th th e " n o n - r e a l " and th e s y n t h e t i c and
147
_a p o s t e r i o r i c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the p r e d i c a t e of e x i s t e n c e ,
a g a i n s t th e O n t o l o g i c a l Argument; f o r a lth o u g h e i t h e r th e
s y n t h e t i c or th e ( r e l a t e d ) a p o s t e r i o r i c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of
th e p r e d i c a t e of e x i s t e n c e would be i n i t s e l f s u f f i c i e n t to
show t h a t th e p r e d i c a t e o f e x i s t e n c e co u ld n o t be d e r i v e d
from th e ( s u b j e c t ) c o n c e p t o f God, t h e " n o n - r e a l " c h a r a c
t e r i s t i c would r e i n f o r c e t h i s c o n c l u s i o n and p r o v id e , as
i t were, a second l i n e o f d e f e n s e . And, in d e e d , a f t e r
making th e f i r s t p a r t of h i s c r i t i q u e o f the O n t o l o g i c a l
Argument r e s t on th e d i s t i n c t i o n b etw een a n a l y t i c and s y n
t h e t i c p r o p o s i t i o n s , and on th e i m p o s s i b i l i t y of r e g a r d i n g
e x i s t e n t i a l p r o p o s i t i o n s as a n a l y t i c , Kant d id p ro c e e d , in
th e second p a r t , to p r e s s home the c o n se q u e n c e s of e x i s t
ence n o t b e in g a " r e a l " p r e d i c a t e . But i n b o th c a s e s th e
purpose was th e same: t o show t h a t t h e p r e d i c a t e of e x
i s t e n c e co u ld n o t be d e r i v e d from t h e c o n c e p t o f God b e
cau se i t co u ld n o t be d e r i v e d from any c o n c e p t.
I do n o t mean to say t h a t when ( i n th e C r i t i q u e o f
Pure R eason) Kant began to r e f u t e th e O n t o l o g i c a l Argument,
he th en p ro ceed ed to p r e s s h i s a t t a c k by p a s s i n g from an
a n a l y s i s of th e c o n c e p t to Y and p, and from t h e r e t o a ,
3 , and th e s y n t h e t i c , y e t " n o n - r e a l , " c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the
p r e d i c a t e of e x i s t e n c e , and th e n t o t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f
d e r i v i n g th e p r e d i c a t e o f e x i s t e n c e from th e c o n c e p t o f
God. For t h i s was n o t a t a l l h i s p r o c e d u r e . I n s t e a d , what
Kant d id was, ro u g h ly , t o p ass from 3 to y to p. (c f.
148
C h a p te r V II, i n which I have d e s c r i b e d i n some d e t a i l the
s t r u c t u r e o f K a n t 's r e f u t a t i o n o f the O n t o l o g i c a l Argument
i n B 6 2 3 - 9 ) . But even i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f y (B 627b-8), he
d id n o t v e r y e x t e n s i v e l y i n t r o d u c e h i s g e n e r a l t h e o r y of
th e c o n c e p t. On th e o t h e r hand, i n t o h i s d i s c u s s i o n of T),
( B 6 2 8 - 9 ) , he b ro u g h t h i s th e o r y o f the c o n c e p t, b u t he did
n o t expose i t i n a n y th in g l i k e t h e d e t a i l or c l a r i t y th a t
was needed ( t h a t i s , which would have c l e a r l y shown p,
a lo n g w ith y, P, and a , as f o l l o w i n g from h is p r e v i o u s l y
e x p l a i n e d th e o r y of c o n c e p t i o n ) .
Yet K a n t 's d o c t r i n e of th e c o n c e p t was, s u r e l y , in
th e background of h i s t h i n k i n g . I t form ed an i n t e g r a l or
e s s e n t i a l p a r t of h i s a c c o u n t ( i n b o th e d i t i o n s ) o f the
T r a n s c e n d e n t a l D e d u c tio n , which i t s e l f s e r v e d as t h e foun
d a t i o n f o r th e r e s t o f th e f i r s t C r i t i q u e . F u rth e rm o re ,
h i s d o c t r i n e of th e c o n c e p t, a lo n g w ith t h e d o c t r i n e of the
schem atism of th e i m a g i n a t i o n (w hich was, r e a l l y , an ex
t e n s i o n of th e d o c t r i n e of the c o n c e p t ) , and the d o c t r i n e
o f th e a n a l o g i e s o f e x p e r i e n c e (w hich was, at l e a s t in
p a r t , an e x t e n s i o n o f th e d o c t r i n e s of t h e concept and the
schem atism o f th e i m a g i n a t i o n ) , p la y e d an e x p l i c i t r o l e in
K a n t 's e a r l i e r and r a t h e r l e n g t h y d i s c u s s i o n of t h e con
c e p t s of p o s s i b i l i t y and e x i s t e n c e ( i n B266-75), w hich h is
d i s c u s s i o n o f p in B628-9 ten d ed t o r e c a p i t u l a t e . I t would
seem p l a u s i b l e , t h e r e f o r e , to b e l i e v e t h a t his p r e v i o u s
a n a l y s i s o f th e c o n c e p t d id im ply h i s h o l d i n g y and p, and
149
th u s a and p, and the r e m a in d e r o f what he s a i d of e x i s t
ence as a p r e d i c a t e .
In th e e n su in g c h a p t e r s o f t h i s s e c t i o n , I sh o u ld
l i k e to e x p l a i n in d e t a i l j u s t how K a n t 's t h e o r y o f c o n
c e p t i o n i m p l i e s b o th y and ’ H, and t h u s , Q . , or t h a t e x i s t
ence i s th e a d d i t i v e p r e d i c a t e of e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent.
In th e pages t h a t f o l l o w , i t w i l l be e a s i e r i f we
f o r m u l a t e our argument i n term s o f showing, n o t p r e c i s e l y
t h a t Kant h e l d y, b u t t h a t he h e ld an e q u i v a l e n t theorem ,
im p lie d by and im p ly in g y:
Theorem y ' : t h a t e v e r y t h i n g c o n s t i t u i t i v e
o f an o b j e c t can be known in th e o b j e c t ' s
c o n c e p t .
CHAPTER IX
AN ARGUMENT FOR THEOREM r \
In h i s f i r s t C r i t i q u e , we f in d Kant to have i n s i s t e d
(r|) t h a t t h e a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e o f no o b j e c t can be known in a
c o n c e p t, and a l s o (Y ‘ ) t h a t e v e r y t h i n g c o n s t i t u t i v e of an
o b j e c t ' s i d e n t i t y can be known i n th e o b j e c t ' s c o n c e p t.
That i s t o s a y , we f i n d him t o have h e ld t h a t we can know
e v e r y t h i n g c o n s t i t u t i v e o f an o b j e c t ' s i d e n t i t y , and n o t
know t h e r e i n i t s a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e . But t h i s was to imply
(5 ) t h a t th e a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e of an o b j e c t i s always some
t h i n g o t h e r th a n th e o b j e c t , so m eth in g t o g e t h e r w i t h which
th e o b j e c t must be known i f we a r e to know th e o b j e c t as ex
i s t e n t ( i . e . , Theorem e ) . Prom e i t f o ll o w s t h a t e x i s t e n c e
i s t h e a d d i t i v e p r e d i c a t e of e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent.
But now we must f o c u s our a t t e n t i o n on th e p a r t i c u
l a r r e a s o n s which Kant had f o r h o l d in g T ) and Y '. T h a t i s t o
s a y , we must c o n s id e r th e r e a s o n s drawn from h i s sy stem t h a t
would i n d i c a t e th e t r u t h o f p o i n t s B and Y / . We a r e n o t now
c o n cern ed ( a s we have b een i n p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s ) w i t h r e a
sons f o r h o l d i n g t h a t K ant h e ld ^ and Y ' , b u t w ith r e a s o n s
w hich would have led K ant to hold ti and Y ' •
150
151
To p ro v e T h e o r e n t , or our i n a b i l i t y t o be c o n s c io u s
o f a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e by means o f a c o n c e p t , K ant advanced no
arg u m en t. But a modicum of r e f l e c t i o n on h i s t e a c h i n g can
r e v e a l an argument t h a t i s , i n f a c t , i m p l i c i t in h i s e p i s t e -
mology; f o r g iv e n th e p l a c e of th e c o n c e p t i n th e o v e r a l l
s t r u c t u r e of K a n t ’s t h e o r y of know ledge, th e i n a b i l i t y of
t h e c o n c e p t t o f u r n i s h knoivledge o f a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e f o ll o w s
i n e v i t a b l y . But l e t us see how t'h is i s so .
Kant r e g a r d e d s e n s a t i o n a l o n e as f u r n i s h i n g c o n t e n t
to our c o n s c i o u s n e s s Cour im m ediate c o n s c i o u s n e s s of t h i s
c o n t e n t he c a l l e d " i n t u i t i o n ” ) ; w i t h o u t s e n s a t i o n , we sh o u ld
have n o t h i n g of w hich to be conscious.'*' To be s u r e , he h e ld
t h a t v a r i o u s c o n t e n t s g iv e n in i n t u i t i o n m ight th e n be sn y -
t h e s i z e d , b o th by th e forms of i n t u i t i o n ( i . e . , sp a c e and
tim e) and by t h a t sp o n ta n e o u s a c t i v i t y of s e l f w hich he
c a l l e d " t h i n k i n g , " i n one s t e p of w hich th e d i v e r s e "m ani
f o l d " g iv e n in i n t u i t i o n m ight be u n i t e d in what Kant c a l l e d
2
a " c o n c e p t . " But th e c o n s c i o u s n e s s a. .a in e d th ro u g h t h e s e
v a r i o u s s y n t h e s e s ( i n c l u d i n g t h a t a c h ie v e d i n a c o n c e p t)
could have no c o n t e n t n o t f u r n i s h e d o r i g i n a l l y th ro u g h
Immanuel K ant, C r i t i q u e of P u re R e a s o n , t r a n s .
Norman Kemp Smith (New Y ork: S t . M a r t i n ' s P r e s s , 1965),
B 3 3 -4 ; B 7 4 -5 -
2Cf. ibid., B37-73; B92c-3; B125-6; A9S-104; B137;
B141-2.
152
3
i n t u i t i o n . However, Kant d id r e g a r d c o n s c i o u s n e s s as a b le
a l s o to r e f l e c t on th e p o s s i b l e n a t u r e of i t s own s y n t h e s e s ,
and s i n c e t h e h ig h e r of t h e s e s y n th e s e s were n o t i n t u i t e d
b u t t h o u g h t , knowledge of t h e i r n a t u r e might seem to have an
4
o b j e c t n o t g iv en to i n t u i t i o n . But t h i s e x c e p t i o n would m
no way im p ly t h a t , i n b e in g c o n s c io u s m e re ly o f t h e n a t u r e
of t h e s e v a r i o u s p o s s i b l e s y n t h e s e s , we should be c o n s c io u s
o f a n y th in g t h a t e i t h e r i s or has been a c t u a l ; f o r our con
s c i o u s n e s s would be m e re ly of ( r e a l ) p o s s i b i l i t y ( i . e . , of
t h e " c o n d i t i o n s o f p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e " ) . Thus, i n no sy n
t h e s i s , i n c l u d i n g t h a t of t h e c o n c e p t, sh o u ld we be con
s c i o u s of any c o n t e n t o th e r th an p o s s i b i l i t y , i f t h a t con
t e n t were n o t g iv e n i n i n t u i t i o n . ' 3 Once t h i s p o i n t has been
g r a s p e d , th e n one may u n d e r s t a n d why Kant r e g a rd e d th e con
c e p t as u n a b le to i n c l u d e c o n s c i o u s n e s s of a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e ;
f o r t h e r e a r e r e a s o n s showing why Kant h e ld t h a t , a lth o u g h
c o n s c i o u s n e s s of a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e i s a c h ie v e d in i n t u i t i o n ,
t h a t c o n s c io u s n e s s c a n n o t be i n c lu d e d in a c o n c e p t. These
r e a s o n s a r e p r e s e n t i n c e r t a i n p a s s a g e s in which K ant d i s
c u ssed the g e n e r a l n a t u r e of th e c o n c e p t, e s p e c i a l l y in one
i n which he d i s c u s s e d t h e r e l a t i o n of t h e c o n c e p t t o th e
3Ibid., B72b-3; B146-7.
4 c f - i b i d . , B79c~S4; BS9-90; B 3 7 7 c-8 f.
5I b i d ., B73; B146-7; B194-6.
153
te m p o ra l c h a r a c t e r of i t s c o n t e n t .
As I have m entioned, K a n t r e g a r d e d th e c o n c e p t as
t h e u n i f i c a t i o n of a m anifold given in i n t u i t i o n . By re a so n
of t h i s s y n t h e s i s , t h e r e i s o ne c o n s c io u s n e s s i n a p l u r a l i t y
o f " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ."
Whereas a l l i n t u i t i o n s , a s s e n s i b l e , r e s t on a f f e c
t i o n s , c o n c e p ts r e s t on f u n c t i o n s . By " f u n c t i o n " I
mean t h e u n i t y o f b r i n g i n g v a r i o u s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s
under one common r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . C o n c e p ts a r e based
on th e s p o n t a n e i t y of t h o u g h t . . . . 1
U n d e rs ta n d in g i s , to use g e n e r a l t e r m s , th e f a c u l t y
of k n o w le d g e . T h is k n ow ledge c o n s i s t s in th e d e
t e r m i n a t e r e l a t i o n s of g i v e n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t o an
o b j e c t ; and an o b je c t i s t h a t in t h e concept o f
which t h e m a n ifo ld of a g i v e n i n t u i t i o n i s u n i t e d .
Now a l l u n i f i c a t i o n of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s demands u n i t y
o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s in the s y n t h e s i s o f them. C onse
q u e n t l y i t i s t h e u n ity o f c o n s c io u s n e s s t h a t a lo n e
c o n s t i t u t e s t h e r e l a t i o n o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t o an
o b j e c t , and t h e r e f o r e t h e i r o b j e c t i v e v a l i d i t y and
th e f a c t t h a t th e y are modes of k n ow ledge. . . . °
F u r th e r m o r e , our know ing a n y th in g th ro u g h a concept
p r e s u p p o s e s our u n i f y i n g s u c c e s s i v e l y i n t u i t e d f a c t o r s of
th e " m a n i f o l d . "
I f we were n o t c o n s c i o u s t h a t w hat we t h i n k i s
th e same as what ive t h o u g h t a moment b e f o r e , a l l r e
p r o d u c t i o n in t h e s e r i e s o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s would be
u s e l e s s . For i t would i n i t s p r e s e n t s t a t e be a new
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n which w ould not i n any way b e lo n g to
th e a c t whereby i t was g r a d u a l l y g e n e r a t e d . The
m a n ifo ld of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n would n e v e r, t h e r e
f o r e , form a w hole, s i n c e i t would l a c k t h a t u n i t y
which o n ly c o n s c io u s n e s s can im p a rt to i t . I f , in
c o u n t i n g , I f o r g o t t h a t t h e u n i t s , w hich now hover
b e f o r e me, have been a d d ed to one a n o t h e r i n
( 7
Ibid., A10 3-4. ‘ Ibid. , B93a.
8
Ibid., B137.
154
s u c c e s s i o n , I s h o u ld n ev er know t h a t a t o t a l i s b e
ing produced th r o u g h t h i s s u c c e s s i v e a d d i t i o n of
u n i t to u n i t , and so would rem ain i g n o r a n t of th e
number. For th e c o n c e p t o f th e number i s n o th in g
b u t th e c o n s c i o u s n e s s of t h i s u n i t y o f s y n t h e s i s .
The word ’'c o n c e p t ” m ight of i t s e l f s u g g e s t t h i s
rem ark. For t h i s u n i t a r y c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s what
combines the m a n i f o l d , s u c c e s s i v e l y i n t u i t e d , and
t h e r e u p o n a l s o r e p r o d u c e d , i n t o one r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .
Such c o n s c i o u s n e s s , however i n d i s t i n c t , must always
be p r e s e n t ; w i t h o u t i t , c o n c e p t s , and t h e r e w i t h g
knowledge of o b j e c t s , a r e a l t o g e t h e r i m p o s s i b l e .
Thus a c o n c e p t would be a s i n g l e c o n s c i o u s n e s s in w hich th e
s u c c e s s i v e m a n ifo ld of i n t u i t i o n in u n i t e d , and t h i s u n i f i
c a t i o n Kant d e s c r i b e d as t a k i n g p l a c e th r o u g h a s i m u l t a n e
ous r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of th e m a n i f o l d , in which th e m a n ifo ld
. ' . r . . 10
i s u n i f i e d by b e in g r e l a t e d to an o b j e c t . But i f t h i s i s
so , th e n th e i n t u i t i v e and s u c c e s s i v e f a c t o r s o f t h e m ani
f o l d would be p r e s e n t in the c o n c e p t o n ly in th e r e p r e s e n t a
t i o n i n which th e y would be s y n t h e s i z e d . 1 '1 ’ The o r i g i n a l
p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e s e f a c t o r s i n i n t u i t i o n would have
c e a s e d . That i s , th e e a r l i e r f a c t o r s would have c e ased b e
in g g iv e n w h i l e th e l a t e r were b e in g g iv e n in i n t u i t i o n ; and
th e l a t e r would have ceased b e in g g iv e n w h i l e t h e i r u n i f i c a
t i o n w ith the e a r l i e r was b e in g r e p r e s e n t e d ( th r o u g h t h e i r
r e p r o d u c t i o n ) i n a c o n c e p t . For such i s th e n a t u r e o f su c -
12
c e s s i o n . The a c t o f c o n c e p t u a l l y r e p r e s e n t i n g , or t h i n k
i n g , f a c t o r s g iv en i n i n t u i t i o n would n e v e r be s im u lta n e o u s
9 I b i d . , A 103-4. 1QI b i d . , B137.
1XC f. a l s o i b i d . , B93b. l 2 C f. i b i d ., A 98c-9.
155
w i t h t h e i n t u i t i n g of t h e s e same f a c t o r s ; f o r t h i n k i n g them
t o g e t h e r in th e c o n c e p t would be an a c t w hich co u ld b e g in
only when a l l t h e f a c t o r s to be th o u g h t had a l r e a d y been
g iv e n . I t c o u ld n o t occur a t th e same tim e as th e i n t u i t i n g
of even th e l a s t f a c t o r . D u rin g th e tim e when I sh o u ld be
engaged i n t h i n k i n g th e f a c t o r s t h a t I had begun to t h i n k
( i . e . , th o s e w hich had been g iv e n a t th e b e g in n in g o f my
t h i n k i n g ) , I s h o u ld n o t be c o n s c i o u s , in t h i s a c t o f t h i n k
i n g , of any s u b s e q u e n t f a c t o r s t h a t m ight a t th e same tim e
be g iv e n i n s e n s a t i o n . The a c t o f t h i n k i n g c o u ld n e v e r come
to i t s term o f u n i t i n g a d i v e r s i t y of f a c t o r s , i f , w h i l e en
gaged i n t r y i n g to u n i t e a p a r t i c u l a r s e t o f f a c t o r s th ro u g h
e x p r e s s i n g t h a t i n which t h e y a re one, i t were i n t e r r u p t e d
by th e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a n o t h e r f a c t o r ; f o r th e n i t \vould
have t o become, i n e f f e c t , a new a c t of t h i n k i n g , engaged in
u n i f y i n g an augmented s e t o f f a c t o r s . I f t h i s a c t , to o ,
were t o i n c l u d e a f a c t o r g iv e n o n ly a f t e r th e a c t had begun,
th e n i t would be i n t e r r u p t e d i n a s i m i l a r f a s h i o n , and so on.
Thus, i t would seem t h a t c o n c e p ts can i n c l u d e only
f a c t o r s o f i n t u i t i o n w hich have been g iv e n in th e p a s t ,
n e v e r any w hich a r e a c t u a l l y b e in g g iv e n ( f o r f a c t o r s which
a r e a c t u a l l y , or p r e s e n t l y , b e in g i n t u i t e d would n o t as y e t
be u n i f i e d by b e in g re p ro d u c e d in th e c o n c e p t - - a s th e y would
have to b e , i f th e y were to be u n i t e d w i t h p r e v i o u s f a c t o r s
in a s i n g l e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ) .
But t h i s i s to say t h a t th e a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e of
15 6
f a c t o r s g iv e n i n i n t u i t i o n i s n e v e r in c l u d e d in t h e c o n c e p t;
f o r w h i l e th e c o n c e p t i s b e in g t h o u g h t , in such a way as t o
u n i f y t h e s e f a c t o r s , th e y a r e no lo n g e r a c t u a l , b u t a re
1 O
p r e s e n t o n ly th r o u g h b e in g r e p r e s e n t e d . And i f , as Kant
and many o t h e r s have m a i n t a i n e d , our a b i l i t y t o t h i n k by
means of a c o n c e p t o f a n y th in g o t h e r th a n f a c t o r s g iv e n in
i n t u t i t i o n i s l i m i t e d t o what can be r e p r e s e n t e d by means of
f a c t o r s f u r n i s h e d to t h e c o n c e p t by i n t u i t i o n , i t would seem
to f o l l o w t h a t th ro u g h a mere c o n c e p t we c a n n o t t h i n k th e
a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e of a n y t h i n g . A c tu a l e x i s t e n c e i s n o t one
of th e f a c t o r s of i n t u i t i o n which can be i n c lu d e d in a con-
c e p t .
A s i m p l i f i e d way of p u t t i n g K a n t ’s p o s i t i o n would be
to say t h a t we can p o s i t or t h i n k an a c t o f c o n c e iv in g o n ly
a f t e r i n t u i t i o n has f u r n i s h e d us w i t h t h a t which we con
c e i v e ; f o r , Kant m a i n t a i n e d , our c o n c e iv in g i s n o t c r e a t i v e
of any c o n t e n t ; we can o n ly b e g in t o t h i n k , once t h e m a tte r
which we a r e to t h i n k has been g iv e n us i n i n t u i t i o n . But
t h i s means t h a t we ca n n o t t h i n k , or c o n c e i v e , a n y th in g t h a t
i s p r e s e n t l y b e in g g iv e n , e s p e c i a l l y n o t t h e " p r e s e n t n e s s "
of what i s p r e s e n t l y b e in g g iv e n , w hich i s to say , i t s a c t u
a l e x i s t e n c e .
I f someone o b j e c t s t o our r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f K a n t ' s
t h i n k i n g b e c a u s e we p r e s u p p o s e t h a t he r e g a r d e d th e a c t of
13 .
Cf. also ibid., B93b.
157
c o n c e iv in g f a c t o r s g iv e n i n i n t u i t i o n as coining l a t e r th an
th e i n t u i t i n g of even t h e l a s t of t h e s e f a c t o r s , we could
e x t r a c t a n o th e r argument from t h e p a s s a g e s c i t e d , one which
would avoid making t h i s p r e s u p p o s i t i o n . We could s a y t h a t ,
inasmuch as th e y a r e s u c c e s s i v e , e a r l i e r f a c t o r s of th e man
i f o l d would have ceased t o be g iv e n w h ile l a t e r f a c t o r s were
bein g g i v e n ; y e t , th e c o n s c i o u s n e s s which one en jo y s th ro u g h
a c t u a l l y i n t u i t i n g th e l a t e r f a c t o r s , would be th e same as
t h a t w h ich one would have in remembering t h e e a r l i e r f a c
t o r s ; f o r Kant p l a i n l y r e g a r d e d th e u n i t y o f c o n s c io u s n e s s
enjoyed i n t h e c o n c e p t a s m ed iated by memory of p a s t f a c t o r s
of th e m a n ifo ld ( c f . h i s example o f c o u n tin g i n A103, quoted
. 14
above}. Thus, t h a t i n th e t h i n k i n g of w h ic h th e u n i t y of
our c o n s c i o u s n e s s of t h e m a n ifo ld i s ach ie v e d ( i . e . , t h e ob
j e c t o f th e c o n c e p t) would be som ething i n d i f f e r e n t b o t h to
th e f a c t t h a t th e e a r l i e r f a c t o r s o f th e m a n ifo ld would no
lo n g e r be g iv e n w h ile i t i s b e in g t h o u g h t, and to th e f a c t
t h a t w h a te v e r l a t e r f a c t o r s m i g h t .b e given a c t u a l l y , would
be a c t u a l l y so g iv e n w h i l e th e o b j e c t i s b e in g t h o u g h t . But
t h i s i s t o say t h a t th e a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e o f th e f a c t o r s b e
ing a c t u a l l y g i v e n in i n t u i t i o n , would n o t be i n c lu d e d in
th e o b j e c t o f a con cep t u n i f y i n g t h e s e f a c t o r s w ith p a s t
f a c t o r s of t h e m a n ifo ld ; fo r i f t h a t which i s being th o u g h t
--w h ic h i s to sa y , th e o b j e c t - - w e r e t o i n c l u d e a c t u a l
1 4 ,
Cf. also ibid., B136, footnote a; Bl37b.
158
e x i s t e n c e , i t could be th o u g h t only th r o u g h f a c t o r s a c t u a l l y
b e in g g iv e n in i n t u i t i o n ; and th u s i t could n o t be th o u g h t
th ro u g h memory f a c t o r s g iv e n i n p a s t i n t u i t i o n . B ut, t h e n ,
one would' n o t have t h e same c o n s c i o u s n e s s th ro u g h o n e 's mem
o r y of p a s t f a c t o r s as one would have th ro u g h p r e s e n t f a c
t o r s . T h a t i s to s a y , p r e v i o u s f a c t o r s of t h e m a n ifo ld
would not be u n i t e d i n one c o n s c i o u s n e s s w ith p r e s e n t f a c
t o r s , and th u s one would n o t have t h a t which Kant c a l l e d a
" c o n c e p t . " I t would seem, t h e n , t h a t even i f th e a c t of
c o n c e p t i o n were n o t n e c e s s a r i l y to s u c c e e d , i n tim e , th e
l a s t of t h e m a n ifo ld in c lu d e d w i t h i n i t , we sh o u ld s t i l l
f i n d r e a s o n fo r K a n t ’ s having s a id t h a t th e c o n c e p t cannot
15
i n c l u d e a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e .
i 5
I have n o t a tte m p te d to a rg u e t h a t Kant h e ld t o be
i n c a p a b l e o f r e p r e s e n t i n g what we m ig h t, v ery l o o s e l y , c a l l
t h e " p a s t e x i s t e n c e " o f an o b j e c t , w hich i s t o sa y , th e ob
j e c t as h a v in g e x i s t e d . Nor, p e r f o r c e , have I sought to
f i n d r e a s o n s why in th e c o n t e x t of h i s sy ste m , or i n t r u t h ,
Kant would have b een j u s t i f i e d in h o l d i n g such a p o s i t i o n .
I should n o t wish to c o n j e c t u r e w h e th e r or n o t he did hold
t h i s p o s i t i o n , f o r t h e r e i s no c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n to be fo u n d .
Kant did n o t say t h a t we c o u ld , c o n c e p t u a l l y r e p r e s e n t th e
p a s t e x i s t e n c e of an o b j e c t , and in th e v a r i o u s p a s s a g e s i n
w hich he spoke of our i n a b i l i t y , by means o f c o n c e p t a lo n e ,
t o t h i n k e x i s t e n c e , he did n o t e x p l i c i t l y d i s t i n g u i s h p a s t
e x i s t e n c e from p r e s e n t , or a c t u a l , e x i s t e n c e . T h e se f a c t s
m ig h t le a d us to t h i n k t h a t he r e g a r d e d a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e as
b e i n g . On th e o t h e r hand, th e r e a s o n s which we have so u g h t
i n K a n t ’s system , t h a t m ight j u s t i f y h i s p o s i t i o n r e g a r d i n g
e x i s t e n c e , have b een such as t o hold o n ly i f " e x i s t e n c e "
w ere i n t e r p r e t e d as " a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e . " From n e i t h e r of
t h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , e i t h e r f o r or a g a i n s t h i s h av in g r e
garded p a s t e x i s t e n c e as r e p r e s e n t a b l e i n a c o n c e p t, a r e we
i n a p o s i t i o n to c o n c lu d e i n a d e f i n i t i v e way. B ut, t h e n ,
we have no need to r e s o l v e t h i s q u e s t i o n , fo r i t i s e x t r a n e
ous to our own t h e s i s , which i s , s im p ly , t h a t a c t u a l
159
C e r t a i n o b j e c t i o n s might be r a i s e d a g a i n s t th e
K a n t i a n r e a s o n s by w hich I have so u g h t t o s u b s t a n t i a t e t h e
s i s 'H Cor t h a t th ro u g h a c o n c e p t a lo n e we c a n n o t be c o n
s c i o u s o f a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e ) . That i s r
(1 ) One m ight i n s i s t t h a t we have no need of any
t h i n g l i k e a " c o n c e p t ” i n which f a c t o r s o r i g i n a l l y g iv e n i n
i n t u i t i o n would no lo n g e r be a c t u a l , b u t m e re ly r e
p r e s e n t e d . T h a t i s t o s a y , one m ight h o ld t h a t our k n o w l
edge o f o b j e c t s need n o t occur th ro u g h any s o r t of a c t in
w hich we could n o t know t h e o b j e c t ’s e x i s t e n c e . I n s t e a d ,
one m ight sa y , we can know o b j e c t s i n a p u r e l y n o n - r e -
p r e s e n t a t i o n a l way, i n w hich t h e i r a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e i s n o t
m is s in g from t h a t which we know; or
(2) One m ight hold t h a t s i n c e even Kant a d m itte d
t h a t we have a c o n cep t of e x i s t e n c e , i t must f o llo w t h a t
16
a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e can be known m a c o n c e p t.
e x i s t e n c e i s n o t a p a r t of any o b j e c t , b u t i s , i n s t e a d , an
a d d i t i v e p r e d i c a t e . T hus, i t would s e r v e no p u rp o se f o r us
t o t r y to show t h a t f o r K ant, p a s t e x i s t e n c e e i t h e r w as, or
was n o t , r e p r e s e n t a b l e i n a c o n c e p t.
A s im p le r way of s t a t i n g t h i s p o i n t would be to say
t h a t by " e x i s t e n c e , ” Kant always meant a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e
( i . e . , th e s t a t e en jo y ed by an o b j e c t o n ly when i t e x i s t s ) .
Thus, he would n o t have a d m itte d any ”n o n - a c t u a l " or " p a s t
e x i s t e n c e . ” And, f o r him, knowledge m e re ly t h a t som ething
has e x i s t e d would sim p ly n o t have been knowledge o f e x i s t
ence a t a l l .
16
Cf. D. P. D ry e r, "The Concept of E x i s t e n c e in
K a n t , ” The M o n is t , L (1 9 6 6 ), p p. 1-20 . D ryer i n t e r p r e t s
th e p r e d i c a t e o f an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent as h a v in g b e e n , f o r
K an t, th e co n cep t o f e x i s t e n c e .
To speak of a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e b e in g "known in a
160
But th e f i r s t o b j e c t i o n would n o t to u c h upon our
p u rp o se i n t h i s c h a p t e r , f o r i t would n o t d i s p r o v e our c o n
t e n t i o n t h a t T ] i s im p lie d by K a n t 's th e o r y of t h e concept*
I f t r u e , i t would show only t h a t h i s th e o r y r e g a r d i n g th e
n e c e s s i t y of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s wrong. Yet, even showing
t h i s p o i n t would n o t n e c e s s a r i l y weaken th e K a n t i a n c a s e f o r
th e d i s t i n c t i o n betw een e x i s t e n c e and o b j e c t s , or f o r e x i s t
ence as an a d d i t i v e p r e d i c a t e .
For a c t u a l l y t h e o b j e c t i o n i s i r r e l e v a n t to t h e s e
i s s u e s . For i n o rd e r t o u s e r \ and y / to p ro v e ? and C, we
need n o t assume or show t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l t o
our knowing o f o b j e c t s . In u s in g 11, a l l we need show i s
t h a t we ca n n o t be c o n s c io u s of ( a c t u a l ) e x i s t e n c e th ro u g h
c o n c e p t" i s , o f c o u r s e , to u s e a p r o v o c a t i v e p h r a s e . One i s
tem pted to r e p l y t h a t a t l e a s t Kant would have a llo w e d us to
th i n k th e e x i s t e n c e o f so m e th in g , by means o f t h e c o n c e p t o f
e x i s t e n c e , even though he d id n o t p e r m i t us to say t h a t we
know th e t h i n g to e x i s t . T hat i s , he would have allo w ed us
to u se t h e c o n c e p t o f e x i s t e n c e to i n t e n d , c o n n o te or d e
n o t e , th e t h i n g as e x i s t e n t . T h is i s e s s e n t i a l l y th e d i s
t i n c t i o n p ro p o se d by S h a f f e r , who would a llo w t h a t i n i t s
c o n c e p t, an o b j e c t can be th o u g h t as e x i s t e n t , a lth o u g h
th ro u g h m erely t h i n k i n g i t as e x i s t e n t , we could n o t know
t h a t i t , i n f a c t , e x i s t s . (C f. Jerom e S h a f f e r , " E x i s t e n c e ,
P r e d i c a t i o n and th e O n t o l o g i c a l A rg u m e n t,” M in d , LXXI
(1 9 6 2 ), 309. But our s u b s e q u e n t d i s c u s s i o n should make i t
e v i d e n t t h a t Kant h e ld t h a t by means of th e mere c o n c e p t of
e x i s t e n c e , we could n o t , i n one s e n s e o f t h e word, even
" t h i n k ” an o b j e c t as e x i s t e n t . F or, as Kant s a i d , by means
of t h e c o n c e p t of e x i s t e n c e , a l o n e , we can n o t d e t e r m in e our
th o u g h t of an o b j e c t to be i n any way more th a n our th o u g h t
of i t as m e re ly p o s s i b l e . We m ight a t t e m p t t h e r e b y to t h i n k
an o b j e c t as e x i s t e n t , b u t we sh o u ld -; in f a c t , be a b l e to
add no d e t e r m in i n g n o t e to our p r e v i o u s c o n c e p t of t h e ob
j e c t as m e re ly p o s s i b l e . (C f. K ant, o p . c i t . , B 6 2 9 a.)
161
c o n c e p t u a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , a p o i n t which i s q u i t e i r r e l e v a n t
to w h e th e r or n o t we a r e a b l e to know some o b j e c t s i n a non-
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l way. And in u s in g Y ' , a l l we need show i s
t h a t we a r e a b l e t o know th e f u l l e s se n c e or i d e n t i t y of ob
j e c t s th ro u g h r e p r e s e n t i n g them i n c o n c e p t s , n o t t h a t we a re
a b l e t o know o b j e c t s o n ly i n t h i s f a s h i o n . For even i f we
were a b l e t o know o b j e c t s n o n - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l l y , i t would
n o t n e c e s s a r i l y f o ll o w t h a t we co u ld n o t know them f u l l y by
means of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . Thus th e argument could s t a n d ,
t h a t b e c a u s e we can know th e f u l l e s se n c e or i d e n t i t y o f ob
j e c t s by means of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ( c o n c e p t s ) i n which we
can n o t know e x i s t e n c e , e x i s t e n c e i s n o t p a r t o f t h e e s s e n c e ,
or i d e n t i t y of o b j e c t s .
But even th o u g h i t i s n o t n e c e s s a r y t o d e fe n d K a n t 's
t h e o r y of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , i t i s q u i t e p o s s i b l e to f i n d in
h i s work t h e schema f o r a v e ry s tr o n g d e f e n s e o f t h i s t h e o
r y . The schema i s found i n K a n t ' s a c c o u n t of i n t u i t i v e a p
p r e h e n s i o n , i n w hich he a rg u e s t h a t i m a g i n a t i v e r e
p r e s e n t a t i o n (o r " r e p r o d u c t i o n " ) i s i n s e p a r a b l e from i n t u i
t i v e a p p r e h e n s i o n o f an o b j e c t ( i . e . , from th e " s y n t h e s i s of
a p p r e h e n s i o n in i n t u i t i o n " ) :
For e x p e r i e n c e as such n e c e s s a r i l y p r e s u p p o s e s th e
r e p r o d u c i b i l i t y of a p p e a r a n c e s . When I seek to draw
a l i n e i n t h o u g h t , or to t h i n k of th e tim e from one
noon to a n o t h e r , or even t o r e p r e s e n t to m y s e lf some
p a r t i c u l a r number, o b v io u s ly th e v a r i o u s m a n ifo ld
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t h a t a r e in v o lv e d must be a p p r e h e n d
ed by me in th o u g h t one a f t e r th e o t h e r . But i f I
were alw ays to drop out o f th o u g h t t h e p r e c e d i n g
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ( t h e f i r s t p a r t s of th e l i n e , t h e
162
a n t e c e d e n t p a r t s of the tim e p e r i o d , or the u n i t s i n
t h e o rd e r r e p r e s e n t e d ) , and did n o t r e p r o d u c e them
- -while ad v an cin g t o th o s e t h a t follox^, a c o m p lete
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n would n e v e r be o b t a i n e d : none of th e
ab o v e-m en tio n ed t h o u g h t s , not even th e p u r e s t and
most e le m e n ta r y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f sp ace and tim e ,
could a r i s e .
The s y n t h e s i s of a p p r e h e n s io n i s th u s i n s e p a r
a b ly bound up w i t h th e s y n t h e s i s of r e p r o d u c t i o n .
And as th e form er c o n s t i t u t e s t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l
ground of th e p o s s i b i l i t y of a l l modes of knowledge
w h a t s o e v e r - ~ o f t h o s e t h a t a re p u r e a p r i o r i no l e s s
th a n of t h o s e t h a t a re e m p i r i c a l - - t h e r e p r o d u c t i v e
s y n t h e s i s of th e i m a g i n a t i o n i s t o be co u n ted among
t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a c t s of th e m in d .^ ?
N e e d le s s t o sa y , i f r e - p r e s e n t a t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y a t t h i s
s t a g e , th e n one c a n n o t arg u e t h a t we can c irc u m v e n t r e
p r e s e n t a t i o n i n knowing o b j e c t s . F u r th e r m o r e , i f r e - p r e
s e n t a t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y even f o r a p p r e h e n s i o n , th e n we could
g r a s p an o b j e c t th ro u g h i n t u i t i v e a p p r e h e n s i o n o n ly a f t e r
th e l a s t of th e i n t u i t e d d a t a had c eased b e in g g iv e n , and
t h u s , s t r i c t l y s p e a k in g , o n ly a f t e r th e y had ceased to ex
i s t . I t would f o l l o w , th e n , t h a t even i f i n t u i t i v e a p p r e
h e n s io n o f an o b j e c t could be acco m p lish e d w i t h o u t u n i f y i n g
d a t a i n a c o n c e p t, t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s of th e o b j e c t t h a t we
would have t h e r e i n , would n o t , s t r i c t l y s p e a k in g , i n c l u d e
c o n s c i o u s n e s s of th e o b j e c t ’s e x i s t e n c e .
The second o b j e c t i o n i s n o t q u i t e so e a s i l y r e
s o lv e d . For t h e s t a t u s of t h e c o n c e p t o f e x i s t e n c e i s n o t
so c l e a r i n Kant as we m ight w ish . S p e c i f i c a l l y , i t i s not
e n t i r e l y c l e a r what c o n t e n t Kant ac c o rd e d to t h i s c o n c e p t.
17
Kant, op. cit., A101c-2.
163
Yet d e s p i t e t h e o b s c u r i t i e s e n c o u n te re d i n i d e n t i f y i n g t h i s
c o n t e n t , we s h a l l se e t h a t w h a te v e r t h i s c o n t e n t may have
b e e n , f o r K a n t, i t co u ld n o t have i n c l u d e d a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e .
I t i s q u i t e t r u e t h a t Kant b e l i e v e d t h a t we have a
con cep t o f e x i s t e n c e . He c o n s id e r e d i t th e second o f th e
t h r e e "modal c a t e g o r i e s , " w hich w ere c a l l e d p o s s i b i l i t y , ex-
18
i s t e n c e or r e a l i t y , and n e c e s s i t y . Sometimes he spoke of
th e second o f t h e s e as th e c o n c e p t or c a t e g o r y of " r e a l i t y , "
b u t more o f t e n he c a l l e d i t t h e c o n c e p t or c a t e g o r y of ex-
• + 19
i s t e n c e .
Y et, as we have s e e n , Kant a l s o h e ld t h a t i f we t r y
to t h i n k e x i s t e n c e th ro u g h th e c a t e g o r y o f e x i s t e n c e , a l o n e ,
we c a n n o t s p e c i f y a s i n g l e mark d i s t i n g u i s h i n g i t from mere
20
p o s s i b i l i t y . F u r th e r m o r e , he i n s i s t e d t h a t i n o rd e r to
a s c r i b e e x i s t e n c e t o an o b j e c t , we must go beyond th e con
c e p t of th e o b j e c t to p e r c e p t i o n , i n which a lo n e i s found
21
c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f e x i s t e n c e .
Combining t h e s e two l i n e s o f K a n t* s t h i n k i n g , we
o b t a i n th e r a t h e r s t r a n g e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t we must be u n a b l e ,
th ro u g h t h e c o n c e p t of e x i s t e n c e , t o t h i n k t h a t w h e re in ex
i s t e n c e i s d i f f e r e n t from mere p o s s i b i l i t y - - w h i c h i s to say
t h a t we must be u n a b le to t h i n k t h a t w hich i s p r o p e r to
18Cf. ibid., B106; B265c-g; B272-3.
19C f. i b i d . , B106. 2° I b i d ; , B221; B629a.
21
Ibid., B272-3; B629a.
164
22
e x i s t e n c e , e x i s t e n c e i t s e l f . But th e q u e s t i o n th e n
a r i s e s , why should we say t h a t we have a c o n c e p t o f e x i s t
ence i f th ro u g h i t we a r e n o t a b l e t o t h i n k t h a t w hich i t
su p p o se d ly d e n o te s ( i . e . , e x i s t e n c e ) ? S u r e ly , t h e r e would
seem to be som ething s t r a n g e s a y in g t h a t we have a c o n c e p t
of som ething when we a r e u n a b l e , in t h a t c o n c e p t, to t h i n k
of t h a t w hich s p e c i f i e s th e " s o m e th in g 1 1 as d i f f e r e n t from
2 3
th e o b j e c t s of o t h e r c o n c e p t s . When we have t h e c o n cep t
of a t r e e , we e x p e c t t o be a b l e to t h i n k by means o f i t of
th e d i s t i n g u i s h i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which make a t r e e a t r e e .
When we have a c o n c e p t of e x i s t e n c e , we sh o u ld e x p e c t to be
a b l e t o t h i n k by means of i t of t h e d i s t i n g u i s h i n g c h a r a c
t e r i s t i c t h a t makes e x i s t e n c e e x i s t e n c e , r a t h e r t h a n mere
p o s s i b i l i t y .
And b e c a u s e t h e r e d o es seem t o be so m eth in g wrong,
th e s u s p i c i o n might grow t h a t , i n s p e a k in g of t h e c o n c e p t of
e x i s t e n c e , Kant may have meant som ething o t h e r by " c o n c e p t"
or by " e x i s t e n c e " th a n what he u s u a l l y meant by t h e s e te r m s ,
or even t h a t he may have c o n t r a d i c t e d h i m s e l f . B u t, in o r
d er t o know more p r e c i s e l y what he d id mean i n t h i s c o n t e n t ,
we must t a k e n o t e of a S e c t i o n of th e F i r s t C r i t i q u e e n
t i t l e d "The P o s t u l a t e s o f E m p i r i c a l Thought i n G e n e r a l , " f o r
22Cf. ibid., B300; B302b; especially A244c-g.
23Ibid., A244c.
16 5
in t h i s s e c t i o n Kant d i s c u s s e d a t some l e n g t h th e c a t e g o r i e s
of m o d a l i t y , i n c l u d i n g th e s e c o n d . The most r e l e v a n t p a s
sa g e s appear to be t h e f o llo w in g ?
The c a t e g o r i e s o f m o d a lity have t h e p e c u l i a r i t y
t h a t , in d e t e r m in i n g an o b j e c t , th e y do n o t in th e
l e a s t e n l a r g e th e con cep t t o which th e y a r e a t t a c h e d
as p r e d i c a t e s . They o n ly e x p r e s s t h e r e l a t i o n of
th e c o n c e p t to th e f a c u l t y o f k n o w le d g e .24
In t h e mere c o n c e p t of a t h i n g no mark of i t s
e x i s t e n c e i s to be fo u n d . For though i t may be so
com plete t h a t n o t h i n g which i s r e q u i r e d f o r t h i n k i n g
t h e t h i n g w ith a l l i t s i n n e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n s i s l a c k
in g to i t , y e t e x i s t e n c e has n o t h in g t o do w i t h a l l
t h i s , b u t o n ly w i t h th e q u e s t i o n w h e th e r such a
t h i n g be so g iv e n us t h a t th e p e r c e p t i o n of i t can,
i f need b e , p r e c e d e th e c o n c e p t. For t h a t th e c o n
c e p t p r e c e d e s th e p e r c e p t i o n s i g n i f i e s t h e c o n c e p t ’s
mere p o s s i b i l i t y ; th e p e r c e p t i o n w hich s u p p l i e s th e
c o n t e n t to t h e c o n c e p t i s th e s o l e mark o f a c t u a l
i t y . ^ ^
In B266 Kant d e s c r i b e d th e c o n c e p t of e x i s t e n c e as
e x p r e s s i n g a r e l a t i o n of t h e o b j e c t and i t s c o n c e p t to th e
f a c u l t y of c o g n i t i o n . Then, i n a mere e x p l a n a t o r y t e x t ,
B272-3, Kant s p e c i f i e d t h a t t h e e x i s t e n c e of an o b j e c t had
to do o n ly w ith w h e th e r th e o b j e c t i s so g iv e n us t h a t th e
p e r c e p t i o n of i t can, i f need be, p r e c e d e i t s c o n c e p t. The
p a s s a g e in B272 seems so e v i d e n t l y to d e s c r i b e t h e r e l a t i o n
m entioned in B266, of an o b j e c t and i t s c o n c e p t t o th e f a c
u l t y o f c o g n i t i o n , t h a t I can only i n t e r p r e t th e p a s s a g e in
B272 as s p e l l i n g out i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l t h a t w h ich , in B266,
th e modal c o n c e p t of e x i s t e n c e was s a id to e x p r e s s . Taken
24Ibid., B266.
25 .
Ibid., B272.
166
t o g e t h e r , t h e n , t h e p a s s a g e s in B266 and B272 s u g g e s t t h a t
Kant r e g a rd e d th e c o n c e p t o f e x i s t e n c e as b e in g t h a t th ro u g h
which an o b j e c t i s th o u g h t as being so g iv en t h a t i t s p e r
c e p t i o n can, i f need b e , p r e c e d e i t s c o n c e p t.
But s i n c e , a c c o r d in g t o K ant, th e c o n c e p t r e l a t e s to
i t s o b j e c t o n ly m e d i a t e l y , by means of a f e a t u r e w hich s e v -
2 6
e r a l t h i n g s may have i n common and i s , t h u s , t h a t whereby
t h e same c o n s c i o u s n e s s could be found in a g r e a t number of
27
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , th e c o n c e p t o f e x i s t e n c e must have been
o f t h a t , p o s s e s s e d i n common, w h e re in o b j e c t s a r e so g iv e n
t h a t p e r c e p t i o n s a s c r i b e d to them can, i f need be, p r e c e d e
t h e i r c o n c e p t s .
But t h a t p o s s e s s e d in common w h e r e in o b j e c t s a r e so
g iv e n t h a t t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n can, i f need b e , p r e c e d e t h e i r
c o n c e p t s , was, f o r K a n t, e x i s t e n c e .
Our mode o f i n t u i t i o n i s d e p e n d e n t upon t h e e x i s t
ence o f th e o b j e c t , and i s t h e r e f o r e p o s s i b l e only
i f th e s u b j e c t ' s f a c u l t y o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n [ i . e . ,
s e n s a t i o n ] i s a f f e c t e d by t h e o b j e c t . 28
This would seem to mean t h a t K ant r e g a r d e d e x i s t e n c e as th e
o b j e c t o f t h e " c o n c e p t o f e x i s t e n c e . " But i f t h i s were a c
t u a l l y so, th e n we sh o u ld a g a in f a c e th e d i f f i c u l t y t h a t we
have p r e v i o u s l y e n c o u n te r e d : i f th e o b j e c t of a c o n c e p t i s
som ething r e c o g n iz e d th ro u g h t h e u n i f i c a t i o n of a number of
26Ibid., B377a.
2^Ibid., B136, footnote. ^Ibid., B72.
167
f a c t o r s , , th e n r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e o b je c t o f the c o n c e p t must
occu r a f t e r t h e i n t u i t i n g of t h e s e f a c t o r s and, t h u s , a f t e r
c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f th e ( a c t u a l ) e x i s t e n c e o f thes& f a c t o r s has
c e a se d b e in g g iv e n in t h e i r i n t u i t i o n . T h u s, i n s o f a r as th e
o b j e c t of a c o n c e p t i s r e c o g n i z e d only th ro u g h a r e p r e s e n t a
t i o n of f a c t o r s whose a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e i s l a c k i n g , t h i s ob
j e c t could n o t c o n t a i n a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e . T his would mean
t h a t t h a t w h e re in o b j e c t s a re so given t h a t t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n
can, i f need b e , p r e c e d e t h e i r c o n c e p t s , would n o t be co n
t a i n e d in i t s c o n c e p t . And we should a g a in f a c e t h e problem
o f t r y i n g t o d i s c o v e r j u s t what c o n t e n t th e c o n c e p t of e x
i s t e n c e might h a v e .
Y e t, I b e l i e v e t h a t a p a r t i a l s o l u t i o n of t h i s p r o b
lem may be found; t h a t i s , some c o n te n t can be found which
can be a s c r i b e d to th e c o n c e p t o f e x i s t e n c e ; f o r a lth o u g h
a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e can n o t be c o n t a i n e d i n any c o n c e p t, even
t h a t of e x i s t e n c e , t h e c o n c e p t o f e x i s t e n c e could c o n t a i n
t h e o th e r e le m e n ts in v o lv e d i n t h i n k i n g an o b j e c t as so
given t h a t i t s p e r c e p t i o n can, i f need b e , p r e c e d e i t s c o n
c e p t. We can have a c o n c e p t o f p e r c e p t i o n , t h a t i s , i f we
u n d e r s ta n d '’p e r c e p t i o n " t o mean n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a c t u a l p e r
c e p t i o n b u t a l s o p a s t and p o s s i b l e p e r c e p t i o n s ; f o r p a s t
p e r c e p t i o n s can be r e p r e s e n t e d , and th ro u g h them we may
29
t h i n k o f p o s s i b l e p e r c e p t i o n s . L ik e w is e , i t would seem
29
The c o n c e p t of p e r c e p t i o n can a l s o be known
168
t h a t we can have th e co n cep t of a c o n c e p t, and t h a t we can
have a c o n c e p t o f th e r e l a t i o n of p r e c e d e n c e . Both o f t h e s e
may be r e p r e s e n t e d in a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in w hich e v e r y t h i n g
c o n s t i t u t i v e of what we mean by " c o n c e p t" or by " p r e c e d e n c e "
can be t h o u g h t . Thus, th ro u g h a c o n c e p t u n i f y i n g th e con
c e p t s of p e r c e p t i o n , of p r e c e d e n c e and o f c o n c e p t , we can
t h i n k of t h e c o n c e p t of an o b j e c t b e in g p r e c e d e d by i t s p e r
c e p t i o n - Yet a v ery i m p o r t a n t l i m i t a t i o n w i l l re m a in t
th ro u g h t h i s c o n c e p t a lo n e we ca n n o t t h i n k t h e p e r c e p t i o n
in v o lv e d as a c t u a l ; t h a t i s , we c a n n o t t h i n k a n y th in g t h a t
would s p e c i f y t h e p e r c e p t i o n as t h e one i n w hich th e e x i s t
ence o f a c e r t a i n o b j e c t i s g i v e n . 30 We can t h in k o n ly of a
p e r c e p t i o n w h ic h , i f i t w ere a c t u a l , w ould, i n f a c t , p r e c e d e
th e o b j e c t ' s c o n c e p t.
N e v e r t h e l e s s , th ro u g h th e " c o n c e p t of e x i s t e n c e " we
could t h i n k t h e " r e l a t i o n of th e c o n c e p t [ o f an o b j e c t o th e r
th a n e x i s t e n c e ] to th e f a c u l t y o f k n o w le d g e ." The " c o n c e p t
o f e x i s t e n c e " would th u s f u l f i l l t h e r o l e t h a t seems to have
been l a i d down f o r i t by Kant i n B266.
The c a t e g o r i e s of m o d a lity have t h e p e c u l i a r i t y
t h a t , -in d e t e r m in i n g an o b j e c t , th e y do n o t i n t h e
l e a s t e n l a r g e th e c o n c e p t t o which th e y a r e a t t a c h e d
as p r e d i c a t e s . They o n ly e x p r e s s th e r e l a t i o n of
a p r i o r i th ro u g h e x e m p lify in g i t i n any p e r c e p t i o n t h a t i s ,
a t th e tim e , a c t u a l . C f . i b i d . , B220c-1.
30
Cf. ibid., B221.
169
31
t h e c o n c e p t to t h e f a c u l t y of know ledge.
But what th e mere c a t e g o r y of e x i s t e n c e cannot a llo w us to
t h i n k i s th e a c t u a l i t y , or e x i s t e n c e , of th e r e l a t i o n of a
c o n c e p t t o th e f a c u l t y o f knowledge ( i . e . , t h e a c t u a l p r e
ced en ce o f t h e c o n c e p t by a p e r c e p t i o n ) .
I must ad m it, how ever, t h a t d e s p i t e th e f a c t t h a t we
have seen how th e c o n c e p t of e x i s t e n c e would have c o n t e n t ,
i t re m a in s v e ry d i f f i c u l t to see j u s t how t h e c o n c e p t of ex
i s t e n c e d i f f e r s from th e c o n c e p t of p o s s i b i l i t y , t h a t i s ,
th e c o n c e p t of e x i s t e n c e can c o n t a i n no knowledge t h a t th e
c o n c e p t of an o b j e c t a c t u a l l y i s or can be p re c e d e d by th e
o b j e c t ’ s p e r c e p t i o n . In t h i n k i n g an o b j e c t as ( " r e a l l y " )
p o s s i b l e , we must t h i n k t h a t i t s c o n c e p t might p o s s i b l y be
p r e c e d e d by i t s p e r c e p t i o n ; f o r o n ly i f i t s p e r c e p t i o n could
p o s s i b l y p r e c e d e i t s c o n c e p t would Kant have r e g a r d e d an ob
j e c t as " r e a l l y " p o s s i b l e - - t h a t i s , as p o s s i b l y b e l o n g in g to
t h e r e a lm of e x p e r ie n c e r a t h e r t h a n as m e re ly hav in g a con-
32
c e p t i n w hich c o n t r a d i c t i o n I s n o t p r e s e n t .
Nor i s much h e lp to be found i n th e p a s s a g e , immedi
a t e l y p r e c e d i n g t h e one q u o te d above, in which Kant d i s t i n
g u ish e d b etw een th e " p o s t u l a t e of p o s s i b i l i t y " and th e " p o s
t u l a t e o f a c t u a l i t y ” (o r e x i s t e n c e ) .
1. That which a g r e e s w i t h t h e f o rm a l c o n d i t i o n s of
e x p e r i e n c e , t h a t i s , w ith c o n d i t i o n s of i n t u i t i o n s
and c o n c e p t s , i s p o s s i b l e .
31Ibid., B266.
32
Ibid., B267-70.
170
2 . T hat w hich i s bound up w i t h t h e m a t e r i a l c o n d i
t i o n s of e x p e r i e n c e , t h a t i s , w i t h s e n s a t i o n , i s
a c t u a l .33
For by " s e n s a t i o n ” i n 2, Kant o b v io u s ly means a c t u a l s e n s a
t i o n , r a t h e r th a n m e re ly p o s s i b l e s e n s a t i o n . Y e t, t h e a c t u
a l i t y of any s e n s a t i o n c a n n o t be c o n t a i n e d in a c o n c e p t ( f o r
by th e tim e t h a t s e n s a t i o n g iv e n in i n t u i t i o n i s b e in g
th o u g h t , i t i s no lo n g e r a c t u a l b u t p a s t ) . Thus, a l th o u g h
th e p o s t u l a t e s of p o s s i b i l i t y and a c t u a l i t y (when ta k e n t o
g e t h e r ) e x p r e s s how som ething a c t u a l would d i f f e r from some
t h i n g m e re ly p o s s i b l e - - t h a t i s , by t h e f o r m e r ’s b e in g bound
up w i t h a c t u a l s e n s a t i o n - - t h e d i f f e r e n c e s e t f o r t h i s one
w hich cannot be c o n t a i n e d in a c o n c e p t; f o r i n a c o n c e p t th e
a c t u a l i t y of a s e n s a t i o n c a n n o t be p r e s e n t .
I t would seem, th e n , t h a t , a l t h o u g h Kant r e c o g n iz e d
t h a t th r o u g h th e mere co n cep t of e x i s t e n c e we ca n n o t t h i n k
any mark s p e c i f y i n g e x i s t e n c e as a n y th in g more t h a n mere
p o s s i b i l i t y (B 629), he d id n o t go f a r enough: he should
have s a id t h a t th e c o n c e p t o f e x i s t e n c e does n o t d i f f e r from
t h a t of p o s s i b i l i t y ; f o r he d id n o t r_egard a n y th in g as
( r e a l l y ) p o s s i b l e u n l e s s i t were bound up w ith a t l e a s t p o s
s i b l e s e n s a t i o n . A lth o u g h i n t h e p a s s a g e qu o ted above, he
spoke o f th e p o s s i b l e o n ly as n e e d in g to be in agreem ent
w i t h th e " fo r m a l c o n d i t i o n s " o f e x p e r i e n c e ( i . e . , w ith i n t u
i t i o n and c o n c e p t s ) he r e g a r d e d t h e s e l a t t e r as r e q u i r i n g
33
Ibid., B265-6.
c o n t e n t " fu r n is h e d by s e n s a t i o n - But t h i n k i n g a th in g as b e
ing bound up w i t h p o s s i b l e s e n s a t i o n i s , as we have s e e n , as
f a r as th e c o n c e p t of e x i s t e n c e could go in a llo w in g us to
t h i n k som ething as a c t u a l l y e x i s t e n t , inasmuch as t h e a c t u
a l i t y o f any s e n s a t i o n sim p ly ca n n o t be th o u g h t i n a co n
c e p t .
Thus, a lth o u g h Kant d id speak of a " c o n c e p t o f ex
i s t e n c e , " th e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f h i s e p is te m o lo g y were such
t h a t t h i s " c o n c e p t of e x i s t e n c e " c o u ld n o t , when a l l i s s a id
and done, be a n y th in g more th a n t h e co n cep t o f p o s s i b i l i t y .
I do n o t mean, of c o u r s e , t h a t K a n t Ts e p is te m o lo g y itfould r e
q u i r e us to say t h a t our c o n s c i o u s n e s s of e x i s t e n c e i s n o t h
ing more th a n our c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f p o s s i b i l i t y , much l e s s
t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s n o t h in g more th a n p o s s i b i l i t y . What I
mean i s sim p ly t h a t Kant r e g a rd e d t h a t which i s p r o p e r to
our c o n s c i o u s n e s s of e x i s t e n c e , t h a t which d i f f e r e n t i a t e s i t
from c o n s c i o u s n e s s of p o s s i b i l i t y , as som ething n e c e s s a r i l y
4- 1 3 4
n o n - c o n c e p t u a l .
Our c o n c l u s io n w i l l be b o rn e o u t, I b e l i e v e , by an
e x a m in a tio n of th e p a s s a g e in w hich, a f t e r d i s c u s s i n g t h e
co n cep t of p o s s i b i l i t y (B 2 6 7 -7 2 ), K ant p ro c e e d e d to d i s c u s s
our know ledge of e x i s t e n c e (B 2 7 2 -4 ). One would presum e t h a t
i n t h i s l a t t e r p a s s a g e Kant meant t o d e s c r i b e th e
■^In a d d i t i o n to t h e argum ent f o l l o w i n g , c f . C h a p te r
V, f o o t n o t e s 27 and 33, and pp. 9 9 -1 1 1 .
172
f u n c t i o n i n g o f th e c o n c e p t of e x i s t e n c e , s i n c e b o th t h i s
p a s s a g e and t h a t d e v o te d t o th e c o n c e p t o f p o s s i b i l i t y , f o l
low and a p p e a r to e x p l i c a t e two i n t r o d u c t o r y p a r a g r a p h s d e
v o te d to a g e n e r a l summary of th e f u n c t i o n i n g o f th e c o n c e p t
o f p o s s i b i l i t y * One would e x p e c t him to go on, i n t h e p a s
sa g e which f o l l o w s , to e x p l a i n th e c o n c e p t of e x i s t e n c e .
But in t h i s p a s s a g e he m e n tio n s n o t h i n g w h ic h would g iv e th e
c o n c e p t of e x i s t e n c e a c o n t e n t n o t sh ared w i t h th e c o n c e p t
o f p o s s i b i l i t y ; f o r w h at he d e s c r i b e s i s , n o t how t h e con
c e p t of e x i s t e n c e m ight f u n c t i o n i n a llo w in g us to know
t h i n g s as e x i s t e n t , b u t how we can know t h i n g s to e x i s t - -
nam ely, by g o in g o u t s i d e c o n c e p ts t o a c t u a l p e r c e p t i o n . To
be s u r e , t h e f o ll o w i n g p a r t of t h e p a s s a g e m ight m is le a d us
i n t o b e l i e v i n g o t h e r w i s e , b u t n o t , I t h i n k i f we re a d i t
c a r e f u l l y :
We can a l s o , how ever, know th e e x i s t e n c e of th e
t h in g p r i o r to i t s p e r c e p t i o n and, c o n s e q u e n t l y ,
c o m p a r a tiv e ly s p e a k i n g , i n an a. p r i o r i manner, i f
only i t be bound up w i t h c e r t a i n p e r c e p t i o n s , in
acco rd w i t h t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e i r e m p i r i c a l con
n e c t i o n ( t h e a n a l o g i e s ) . For t h e e x i s t e n c e of th e
th in g b e in g t h u s bound up w ith our p e r c e p t i o n s i n a
p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e , we a r e a b l e in a s e r i e s of p o s
s i b l e p e r c e p t i o n s and under t h e g u id a n c e of t h e a n a
l o g i e s t o make t h e t r a n s i t i o n from our p e r c e p t i o n of
th e a c t u a l p e r c e p t i o n to th e t h i n g i n q u e s t i o n . 35
He might seem t o say t h a t , th ro u g h u s in g th e c o n c e p t o f e x
i s t e n c e , we may c o n c e iv e an o b j e c t as c o n n e c te d w i t h p o s s i
b l e p e r c e p t i o n , and t h a t t h i s a c t would be s u f f i c i e n t f o r us
35
Ibid., B273.
173
to know t h e o b j e c t as e x i s t e n t . But he does n o t say t h i s ,
( a s I s h a l l show b e lo w ) . What he seems to be t r y i n g t o say
i s t h a t once an o b j e c t i s c o n c e iv e d as being so l i k e t h o s e
g iv e n i n p e r c e p t i o n ( i . e . , th ro u g h i t s b e in g im agined as i n
accord w i t h th e c o n d i t i o n s o f s e n s a t i o n ) , i t i s c o n c e iv e d ,
i n e f f e c t , as an o b j e c t of p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e . I t can th en
be th o u g h t as e x i s t e n t by c o n n e c tin g i t w ith some a c t u a l
p e r c e p t i o n ( i . e . , th ro u g h e m p i r i c a l laws or th ro u g h t h e " a n
a l o g i e s o f e x p e r i e n c e ” ); f o r th e p r o c e s s of t h i n k i n g by
which we r e l a t e o b j e c t s to p e r c e p t i o n s in such a way t h a t we
might c o n c e iv e th e o b j e c t as such as p o s s i b l y t o be g iv e n in
e x p e r i e n c e ( i . e . , as an " o b j e c t o f p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e " ) ,
was, f o r K a n t, n o t t h e same as t h a t o f c o n n e c t i n g an o b j e c t
t o a c t u a l p e r c e p t i o n , which was n e c e s s a r y in o rd e r f o r th e
o b j e c t t o be known as e x i s t e n t . T hat t h e s e two p r o c e s s e s
were n o t th e same i s e v id e n t i n a t l e a s t two ways. F i r s t ,
i f th e fo rm e r were s u f f i c i e n t f o r our knowing an o b j e c t as
e x i s t i n g , th e n we c o u ld know a n y th in g to e x i s t , t h a t we
might c o n c e iv e as b e in g g iv e n i n a ( m e re ly ) p o s s i b l e e x p e r i
ence. But t h i s i s n o t so; and I c a n n o t b e l i e v e t h a t Kant
th o u g h t i t was so; f o r I can c o n e e iv e so m eth in g as s u b j e c t
t o a l l t h e " m a t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n s of e x p e r i e n c e ( i . e . , to sen -
s a t i o n ) - - f o r exam ple, a second car i n my g a r a g e - - b u t I a s
s u r e d l y c a n n o t , by t h i s means a lo n e , know t h a t i t e x i s t s .
S e c o n d ly , th e " a n a l o g i e s " of which K ant spoke and under
whose " g u id a n c e " we m ight make t h e t r a n s i t i o n from a c t u a l
174
p e r c e p t i o n t o knowing t h a t a n o n - p e r c e i v e d o b j e c t e x i s t s ,
were n o t sim ply t h e p r o c e s s e s or ways of t h i n k i n g w hereby we
m ight im agine an u n p e r c e iv e d o b j e c t as being l i k e o b j e c t s
t h a t have been p e r c e i v e d or s e n s e d . T h a t i s to s a y , th e y
xvere n o t th e p r o c e s s e s by w hich an o b j e c t may be c o n c e iv e d
as an o b j e c t o f p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e ( - - a l t h o u g h K ant d id go
on im m e d ia te ly f o l l o w i n g , i n B273c, t o d i s c u s s t h e s e l a t t e r
p r o c e s s e s , and a lth o u g h t h e s e l a t t e r p r o c e s s e s do r e se m b le
what we might o r d i n a r i l y c a l l " a n a l o g i e s " i n a b r o a d e r se n se
of t h e w o rd ).
The p r o c e s s e s by w hich a c o n c e iv e d o b j e c t might be
th o u g h t as b e in g such as to be m e re ly i n accord w i t h th e
c o n d i t i o n s o f p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e ( i n c l u d i n g t h e " m a t e r i a l "
c o n d i t i o n s or s e n s a t i o n ) were c a l l e d by Kant th e " sc h e m a ta
3 6
of th e i m a g i n a t i o n . " On th e o th e r h and, as we have s e e n ,
th e " a n a l o g i e s " o f which Kant spoke i n B273 were th e " a n a l o
g i e s of e x p e r i e n c e , " w hich he had s e t f o r t h i n te rm s of
t h r e e " p r i n c i p l e s " : t h a t o f t h e perm anence of s u b s t a n c e ,
t h a t o f s u c c e s s i o n in tim e i n a c c o r d a n c e w ith t h e law of
c a u s a l i t y , and t h a t of c o - e x i s t e n c e i n a c c o rd a n c e w ith th e
37
laws o f r e c i p r o c i t y or community. We s h a l l n o t r e c a p i t u
l a t e i n d e t a i l th e f u n c t i o n i n g o f t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s , f o r we
have a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d them a t some l e n g t h ( i n C h a p te r s IV
and V). But we must say t h a t th ey a r e ways of r e a s o n i n g
36Cf. ibid., B176-S7. 3^Ibid., B218-65.
175
from a c t u a l s e n s a t i o n to t h i n g s (su ch as s u b s ta n c e s and
c a u s e s ) which Kant re g a rd e d as n e c e s s a r i l y having to be
p o s i t e d , inasmuch as w ith o u t p o s i t i n g them, s e n s a t i o n could
n o t be o rg a n iz e d i n t o e x p e r ie n c e e i t h e r th ro u g h th e forms of
3 8
i n t u i t i o n or th e c a t e g o r i e s of th e u n d e r s t a n d i n g .
That i s to say, t h e " a n a l o g i e s of e x p e r ie n c e " do not
a llo w us to c o n clu d e t h a t an o b j e c t e x i s t s sim p ly b e c a u s e we
m ight ( th ro u g h "sc h e m a ta ") c o n c e iv e th e o b j e c t as an o b j e c t
of p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e . No, th e " a n a l o g i e s " are ways of
c o n c lu d in g to t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h a t which (Kant th o u g h t)
must be p re su p p o s e d i n o rd e r f o r us to u n d e r s ta n d how th e
d a t a of s e n s a t i o n might be o rg a n iz e d i n t o e x p e r ie n c e ; t h a t
i s , in o rd e r f o r us to u n d e rs ta n d how, i n s t e a d o f a mere
flo w of s e n s a t i o n , we m ight e x p e r ie n c e d i s c r i m i n a t e o b j e c t s
39
i n t e r r e l a t e d i n an o r d e r . But b e f o r e we could c o n c lu d e ,
by means of t h e a n a l o g i e s , to th e a c t u a l i t y o f c e r t a i n ob
j e c t s , th e e x p e r ie n c e which would p re s u p p o s e t h e s e o b j e c t s
would i t s e l f have to be a c t u a l ; f o r o n ly from th e a c t u a l i t y
o f th e c o n d itio n e d f a c t o r could we co n clu d e to t h e a c t u a l i t y
of th e c o n d i t i o n i n g , or p r e su p p o s e d , f a c t o r . That i s to
sa y , one could co n clu d e t o th e e x i s t e n c e of an o b j e c t which
one r e g a rd s as p resu p p o sed by e x p e r i e n c e o n ly i f th e l a t t e r
were known as n o t m erely p o s s i b l e b u t as a c t u a l ; which i s to
say , o n ly i f th e o b j e c t were "c o n n e c te d w i t h " ( i . e . ,
3 R
Ibid., B21Sb-24. 39Cf. ibid.
176
. 40
r e c o g n iz e d as p re s u p p o s e d by) e x p e r i e n c e t h a t i s a c t u a l .
But t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t means, i n t u r n , t h a t o n e 's c o n c lu d in g
(by means o f t h e a n a l o g i e s ) to th e o b j e c t as e x i s t e n t could
n o t be th o u g h t i n t h e c o n c e p t o f e x i s t e n c e , inasmuch as th e
a c t u a l i t y o f an e x p e r i e n c e , e . g . , a co m p leted a c t o f e m p i r i
c a l knowing, could n o t be th o u g h t in a c o n c e p t, s i n c e t h e
e x p e r i e n c e would have to be g iv e n p r i o r to i t s r e - p r e
s e n t a t i o n i n i t s c o n c e p t.
However i t may be t h a t th e fra n a l o g i e s ” f u n c t i o n ( i f ,
i n d e e d , th e y do f u n c t i o n so as to g iv e us know ledge of th e
a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e of a n y t h i n g ) , th e y could n o t f u n c t i o n
th ro u g h t h e mere c o n c e p t o f e x i s t e n c e b u t would r e q u i r e
so m eth in g t h a t i s c o n t a i n e d i n no c o n c e p t, nam ely, a c t u a l
e x i s t e n c e . I t sh o u ld be c l e a r , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t when K ant
m entioned t h e i r r o l e , i n a p a s s a g e t h a t i s a p p a r e n t l y d e
s ig n e d t o e x p l a i n th e f u n c t i o n i n g o f t h e c o n c e p t of e x i s t
ence, he d id n o t mean to s u g g e s t t h a t t h e i r f u n c t i o n i n g
could be i n c lu d e d w i t h i n t h e c o n c e p t of e x i s t e n c e , nor t h a t
t h ro u g h th e c o n c e p t of e x i s t e n c e a l o n e we m ight t h i n k of
t h a t t o which th e y would s u p p o s e d ly a llo w us to c o n c lu d e ,
41
nam ely, th e a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e o f o b j e c t s n o t p e r c e i v e d .
4° C f - i b i d • 7 B272, B629c.
41C f. i b i d . , B 2 7 2 -3 .
177
We may c o n c lu d e , t h e n , t h a t , a lth o u g h K a n t ’ s t r e a t
ment of th e ’’c o n c e p t of e x i s t e n c e " i s n o t e n t i r e l y c l e a r ,
t h e r e i s n o t h in g in h i s d o c t r i n e which would j u s t i f y our
t h i n k i n g t h a t he r e g a r d e d th e c o n c e p t o f e x i s t e n c e as a b le
to do t h a t w hich he h e ld no c o n c e p t could do, nam ely, e i t h e r
c o n t a i n or r e - p r e s e n t a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e .
CHAPTER X
KANTIAN REASONS FOR Y '
When we so u g h t to f in d r e a s o n s f o r we found t h a t
we had t o r e c o n s t r u c t an arg u m en t, some of whose p a r t s a re
only i m p l i c i t l y g iv e n i n th e C r i t i q u e o f P u r e R e a s o n . On
th e o t h e r hand, i n s e e k i n g K a n t i a n r e a s o n s f o r y ' ( o r t h a t
i n a c o n c e p t we may know e v e r y t h i n g c o n s t i t u i t i v e o f an ob
j e c t ) , we f i n d t h a t K ant h i m s e l f has f u r n i s h e d u s , n o t m ere
l y th e p o t e n t i a l p a r t s o f an arg u m e n t, b u t an argum ent in a
d e v elo p ed form ( i n B 6 2 7 -8 ). But s i n c e some c r i t i c s have ob-
1
j e c t e d to h i s r e a s o n i n g in t h i s a rg u m e n t, I s h a l l n o t con
t e n t m y s e lf w i t h g i v i n g a p a r a p h r a s e of t h e arg u m e n t. I
s h a l l a t t e m p t to show how K a n t ’ s p o s i t i o n f o llo w s from h i s
th e o r y of t h e phenom enal o b j e c t .
F u r th e r m o r e , I s h a l l r e v ie w a n o t h e r arg u m e n t, which
I o u t l i n e d in C h a p te r I I I , i n w hich I s o u g h t to show why
theorem Y would f o ll o w from c e r t a i n o t h e r , and v e ry b a s i c ,
1
C f . S. M o rris E n g e l, " K a n t ’ s ’R e f u t a t i o n ’ o f th e
O n t o l o g i c a l A rg u m en t," P h i l o s o p h y and P h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l Re
s e a r c h , XXIV (1 9 6 3 ), 25-97
178
179
e le m e n ts o f K a n t ’ s e p is te m o lo g y , nam ely, from e le m e n ts w hich
would a l l o w us t o a n t i c i p a t e , n o t m e r e ly k in d s o f o b j e c t s ,
2
b u t p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t s . I n e f f e c t , t h i s argum ent s u p p l e
ments K a n t ’ s argum ent in B627-8, which s e t s f o r t h why we
must be a b l e i n a c o n c e p t t o know e v e r y t h i n g d e t e r m i n a t i v e
o f th e o b j e c t , w ith an argum ent showing how i t i s t h a t we
can know i n a c o n c e p t e v e r y t h i n g d e t e r m i n a t i v e of an o b j e c t ;
f o r by s e e i n g j u s t how an o b j e c t may be t h o u g h t i n i t s con
c e p t , i n such a way as t o t h i n k i t in a l l i t s p a r t i c u l a r i t y ,
we may come to g r a s p t h e n e c e s s i t y of th eo rem y / ( i . e . , t h a t
i n a c o n c e p t we may t h i n k e v e r y t h i n g d e t e r m i n a t i v e of an
o b j e c t ’s e s s e n c e of i d e n t i t y ) .
K a n t ’ s Argument f o r y '
The argum ent f o r Y ' s e t f o r t h i n the C r i t i q u e of
P u re Reason (B267-S) i s e s s e n t i a l l y t h a t , u n l e s s our co n
c e p t of an o b j e c t c o n t a i n s e v e r y t h i n g d e t e r m i n a t i v e of th e
o b j e c t , we can n o t judge t h a t an o b j e c t , w hich we have p r e
v i o u s l y th o u g h t as p o s s i b l e , now e x i s t s ; f o r i f t h e r e were
in th e o b j e c t t h a t e x i s t s some d e t e r m i n a t i o n d i f f e r e n t from
t h o s e p r e v i o u s l y t h o u g h t , th e n th e e x i s t e n t o b j e c t would n o t
be t h a t o b j e c t w hich we had p r e v i o u s l y t h o u g h t , b u t some
o t h e r o b j e c t .
2Chapter III, pp. 56-63.
ISO
A P re m is e of K a n t ' s Argument f o r y "
Kant a c c e p t e d , o f c o u r s e , t h a t we a r e a b l e to make
t r u e jud g m en ts i n w h ich we a f f i r m th e e x i s t e n c e of o b j e c t s
which we have p r e v i o u s l y t h o u g h t . T h is i s a p r e m is e o f h i s
argum ent in B627-8, and u n l e s s i t i s a c c e p t e d , th e argum ent
t h a t he gave t h e r e f o r Y ' does n o t h o l d . I n f a c t , an a t t a c k
w hich h as r e c e n t l y been made a g a i n s t K a n t ' s r e a s o n i n g i n h i s
argum ent f o r y ' i s , in e f f e c t , d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t t h i s p r e -
m ise. In th e p a g e s t h a t im m e d ia te ly f o l l o w , I should l i k e
t o examine and r e p l y to t h i s o b j e c t i o n . And t h e r e a f t e r I
should l i k e t o show how i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t we a r e , i n f a c t ,
a b l e by means o f a c o n c e p t to know e v e r y t h i n g d e t e r m i n a t i v e
of an o b j e c t .
An A t t a c k on T h is P re m is e
A g a i n s t th e p r e m is e t h a t we can ju d g e t h e i d e n t i c a l
o b j e c t s t h a t we have known as m e re ly p o s s i b l e to e x i s t , S.
M o rris Engel has w r i t t e n t h a t
K a n t ' s answer to th e o b j e c t i o n I am r a i s i n g - - t h a t i f
th e c o n c e p t were n o t c o n g ru e n t w i t h t h e t h i n g and
sh o u ld th e t h i n g c o n t a i n more th a n the c o n c e p t , th e
c o n c e p t would n o t e x p r e s s th e whole o b j e c t and would
t h e r e f o r e n o t be an a d e q u a te c o n c e p t o f i t - - i s h a r d
l y s a t i s f a c t o r y , f o r a p e r s o n m ig h t s t i l l a rg u e t h a t
we can n e v e r be s u r e t h a t our c o n c e p ts a r e a d e q u a te
e x p r e s s i o n s o f t h i n g s or p e r f e c t l y conform to t h e i r
a r c h t y p e s .
Engel a p p e a r s t o be s a y in g t h a t , b e c a u s e we can n e v e r be
^Engel, op. cit. 4Ibid.
181
s u re t h a t our c o n c e p ts a r e a d e q u a te to t h e i r o b j e c t , we can
n e v e r be s u r e t h a t what we have t h o u g h t i n a c o n c e p t i s p r e
c i s e l y t h a t w hich e x i s t s . T h e r e f o r e , K ant must have b een
m is ta k e n i n i n s i s t i n g on an i d e n t i t y of c o n t e n t in the c o n
c e p t and t h e o b j e c t .
But I s h o u ld t h i n k t h a t one i s m is ta k e n in s u g g e s t
ing t h a t we can n e v e r be s u r e t h a t our c o n c e p ts a r e a d e q u a te
to t h e i r o b j e c t s ; f o r i f by " o b j e c t " we mean what Kant
c a l l e d a "phenom enal" o b j e c t - - t h a t i s , an o b j e c t th o u g h t
5
only th r o u g h a s y n t h e s i s of i n t u i t e d f a c t o r s (which we
g
t h i n k as " i n h e r i n g in"" t h i s o b j e c t ) - - t h e n we can be q u i t e
s u re t h a t our c o n c e p t i s a d e q u a te t o t h e o b j e c t ; fo r what
th e o b j e c t i s , i s n o t h i n g more th a n t h a t p o s i t e d term i n b e-
7
ing r e l a t e d t o w hich th e i n t u i t e d f a c t o r s a r e s y n t h e s i z e d .
That i s , i f by " o b j e c t " we do n o t mean some " t h i n g - i n -
i t s e l f " b u t o n ly t h a t which i s p o s i t e d as u n i f y i n g f a c t o r s
g iv e n i n i n t u i t i o n , th e n t h e r e can be no q u e s t i o n t h a t t h e
u n i f i c a t i o n of our i n t u i t i o n in a c o n c e p t i s a d e q u a te to th e
o b j e c t - - f o r th e v e ry good r e a s o n t h a t t h a t by r e l a t i o n to
which t h e u n i f i c a t i o n i s acco m p lish e d i s p r e c i s e l y what we
°Immanuel K a n t, C r i t i q u e of P u r e R e a s o n , t r a n s .
Norman Kemp Smith (New Y o rk : S t . M a r t i n ' s P r e s s , 1965),
B69-71a, i n c l u d i n g f o o t n o t e a ; B294-315.
6I b i d . , B224c-32.
'C f. i b i d . , A103-5; B137; B140c-3; a l s o C h a p te r IX,
PP- 1 5 3 -4 .
182
8
mean by " o b j e c t . ” We m ight e x p r e s s t h i s p o i n t in phenome
n o l o g i c a l la n g u a g e by s a y in g t h a t , i f we r e s t r i c t o u r s e l v e s
to meaning by t h e word " o b j e c t ” o n ly t h a t which a p p e a r s as
i t d o es a p p e a r , then we s h a l l a lw a y s mean by " o b j e c t " some
t h i n g w hich i s c o m p le te ly given i n t h a t s y n t h e s i s ( o r "con-
9
c e p t ” ) in which i t a p p e a r s .
In a K a n t i a n c o n t e x t w h e r e i n " o b j e c t " does mean
phenom enal o b j e c t , th e q u e s t i o n i s , th e n , n o t w h e th e r a con
c e p t i s a d e q u a te to an o b j e c t , b u t w h eth er an o b j e c t (w ith
which t h e c o n t e n t of t h e c o n cep t i s i d e n t i c a l ) e x i s t s or i s
m e re ly remembered or th o u g h t as p o s s i b l e . That i s , t h e
q u e s t i o n i s w h e th e r or n o t th e f a c t o r s g i v e n in i n t u i t i o n
and s y n t h e s i z e d th ro u g h b e in g t h o u g h t i n r e l a t i o n t o an ob
j e c t , a r e r e c o g n i z e d as n o t d i f f e r e n t from f a c t o r s t h a t a r e
a c t u a l l y b e in g g iv e n ( e x c e p t i n s o f a r as t h e y , th e o r i g i n a l
f a c t o r s , have b e e n g iv e n e a r l i e r i n t i m e ) .
F u r th e r m o r e , i t would seem p r o b a b l e t h a t Kant must
have d i s t i n g u i s h e d b etw een th o s e i n t u i t i v e l y given f a c t o r s
which a r e e s s e n t i a l t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of a c e r t a i n o b j e c t
O
K ant, op. c i t . , B69-71a, i n c l u d i n g f o o t n o t e a;
B294-315.
9
Cf. Edmund H u s s e r l , " P r i n c i p l e of A l l P r i n c i p l e s , "
Id eas (London: George A l l e n & Unwin, L t d . , 1958), § 24.
183
and th o s e which a r e m erely a c c i d e n t a l , so t h a t he would n o t
have r e q u i r e d a n y th in g so i m p l a u s i b l e as t h a t i t s c o n c e p t
should have to c o n t a i n every c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f an o b j e c t i f
by i t s c o n c e p t we were to t h i n k o f th e o b j e c t p r i o r to i t s
e x i s t i n g ; f o r inasmuch as he was a h i g h l y p e r c e p t i v e man,
he must have r e c o g n iz e d t h a t v e ry o f t e n we do n o t c o n c e iv e
o b j e c t s in a l l t h e d e t a i l t h a t we may l a t e r d i s c o v e r them to
p o s s e s s . Y e t, he does n o t seem t o have r e s t r i c t e d th e num
b er of our t r u e e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ents ( a f f i r m i n g th e e x i s t
ence o f o b j e c t s p r e v i o u s l y c o n c e iv e d ) m e re ly to th o s e w h e r e
in we had p r e v i o u s l y s p e c i f i e d a l l th e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s w hich
we come to e x p e r i e n c e in th e o b j e c t , as he would have had
t o , i f he had meant t h a t , i n o rd e r to r e c o g n i z e as e x i s t e n t
som ething p r e v i o u s l y c o n c e iv e d , t h e l a t t e r would have b een
co n c e iv e d in a l l i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . And, i n f a c t , Kant
did r e c o g n i z e t h a t o n ly some c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a r e e s s e n t i a l
10
to th e i d e n t i t y of an o b j e c t . Thus, what he must have
meant i n h i s argument ( i n B267-S) i s t h a t , i f we a r e to say
t h a t an o b j e c t which we th o u g h t a c t u a l l y e x i s t e d , we must
p r e v i o u s l y have th o u g h t i n our c o n c e p t e v e r y t h i n g e s s e n t i a l
to th e i d e n t i t y of th e o b j e c t . But i f t h i s i s so , th e n t h e
c o n c e p t would be termed ’'a d e q u a t e ” to i t s o b j e c t , even
though th e c o n c e p t o m itte d a g r e a t many a c c i d e n t a l f a c t o r s
t h a t a r e d i s c o v e r e d in th e o b j e c t , or even th o u g h i t
10 .
Cf. Kant, op. cit., B227b-232.
184
r e p r e s e n t e d a g r e a t many a c c i d e n t a l f a c t o r s as b e i n g i n the
o b j e c t which, i n f a c t , are n o t found i n th e o b j e c t . T h a t i s
to s a y , Kant would adm it an i d e n t i t y b etw een the o b j e c t in
r e l a t i o n to w hich c e r t a i n f a c t o r s of i n t u i t i o n m ig h t be s y n
t h e s i z e d , and th e o b j e c t i n r e l a t i o n to which c e r t a i n o th e r
f a c t o r s might be s y n t h e s i z e d , i f th e d i f f e r e n c e betw een the
s e t s o f f a c t o r s s y n t h e s i z e d were n o t t o in v o lv e f a c t o r s r e
g ard ed as e s s e n t i a l t o th e o b j e c t th o u g h t be means o f e i t h e r
s e t o f f a c t o r s . Thus, i f we were to d i s c o v e r t h a t , in a l l
i t s a c c i d e n t a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , the o b j e c t of a c o n c e p t i s
not as we had p r e v i o u s l y th o u g h t i t to b e, Kant would have
h e ld t h a t th e r e v i s i o n of th e c o n c e p t t h a t would occu r
t h ro u g h t h i s r e c o g n i t i o n would n o t r e n d e r th e c o n c e p t i n t o
the c o n c e p t of a d i f f e r e n t o b j e c t , b u t i n t o an a c c i d e n t a l l y
d i f f e r e n t c o n c e p t of th e same o b j e c t .
T h e r e f o r e , even i f we were t o h o ld a l e s s phenome-
n a l i s t i c or more r e a l i s t i c t h e o r y o f knowledge t o th e e f f e c t
t h a t we do in d e e d know o b j e c t s t h a t e x i s t in ways beyond
t h e i r a p p e a r in g , we m ight s t i l l r e c o g n i z e t h a t in many c a se s
we e n c o u n te r e x i s t e n t o b j e c t s which a r e , w ith r e s p e c t to the
" e s s e n t i a l s " by which we i d e n t i f y them, th e v e r y o b j e c t s of
which we have th o u g h t p r e v i o u s l y ; f o r by f i n d i n g th e e s s e n
t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which s u f f i c e f o r t h e i r r e c o g n i t i o n ,
we know t h a t th e y are in d e e d th e o b j e c t s of c o n c e p ts spee-i--
f i e d by the s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e s e v e ry c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .
Thus, though I may b e l i e v e t h a t a c e r t a i n p a i r of shoes may
185
p o s s e s s a g r e a t d e a l o f r e a l i t y o f which I am n o t aware, I
can know t h a t t h i s p a i r of shoes i s th e p a i r of which I
th o u g h t p r i o r t o p e r c e i v i n g i t , i f i n my p r e v io u s t h i n k i n g I
in t e n d e d th e o b j e c t as s u f f i c i e n t l y c o n s t i t u t e d in i t s i d e n
t i t y by a s e t o f f a c t o r s which I now d i s c o v e r in th e o b j e c t .
But I do n o t w ish m erely t o r e f u t e an o b j e c t i o n t h a t
has been r a i s e d a g a i n s t K a n t ’s argum ent t h a t we make ju d g
ments which p re su p p o s e t h a t in our c o n c e p ts we must be able
t o t h i n k e v e r y t h i n g d e t e r m i n a t i v e of an o b j e c t ' s i d e n t i t y ;
f o r , as I have p r e v i o u s l y arg u ed , t h e r e a re e le m e n ts to be
found i n K a n t 's e p is te m o lo g y w hich w i l l e x p l a i n how, th ro u g h
a c o n c e p t, we may t h i n k e v e r y t h i n g d e t e r m i n a t i v e o f an ob
j e c t ’s i d e n t i t y . 11
In b r i e f , my argum ent in C h a p te r I I I was t h a t we may
c o n c e iv e the e n t i r e t y o f t h a t which c o n s t i t u t e s an o b j e c t as
a p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t , b e c a u s e th ro u g h " sc h e m a ta " ( th r o u g h
which we. may e x p r e s s th e c o n t e n t of a c o n c e p t) we may r e p
r e s e n t , n o t m e re ly th o s e t r a i t s which an o b j e c t m ight a t any
one tim e have i n common w ith o t h e r o b j e c t s (and th u s t h i n k
o n ly o f a k in d of an o b j e c t ) , b u t a l s o th e l o c a t i o n i n space
(and, even, o r d e r i n tim e ) th ro u g h which an o b j e c t would be
g iv e n as a d i f f e r e n t p a r t i c u l a r th a n o t h e r o b j e c t s w ith the
same k in d s of t r a i t s . 12 T h is i s so, I a rg u e d , b e c a u se
1 X C f . i b i d . , B176-87. C f. a l s o , C h a p te r I I I , pp.
56-63-
1 2 Cf. Chapter III, pp. 58-9.
186
t h r o u g h " s c h e m a t a , the one u n iq u e sp a c e i n which a lo n e f u t u r e
e x p e r i e n c e m ight occur i s a l r e a d y s u b j e c t to d e t e r m i n a t i o n
in i n t u i t i o n . T h a t i s , th ro u g h th e a_ p r i o r i form of i n t u i
t i o n which we c a l l " s p a c e , " we are a l r e a d y i n p o s s e s s i o n of
t h a t space i n which a l l f u t u r e e x p e r i e n c e can p o s s i b l y o c
c u r; and th ro u g h schem ata we may r e p r e s e n t t h i s space as
d e te rm in e d i n t o p a r t i c u l a r r e g i o n s or p l a c e s . By r e p r e s e n t
ing i n a p a r t i c u l a r p l a c e an o b j e c t t h a t i s a l r e a d y d e t e r
mined w ith r e s p e c t t o th o s e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ( a b l e t o be
s h a re d w ith o t h e r o b j e c t s ) which would d e te r m in e i t to be a
c e r t a i n k in d of o b j e c t , we a re ab le t o r e p r e s e n t th e o b j e c t
n o t m e re ly as of a c e r t a i n k in d , b u t a l s o as p a r t i c u l a r .
In my argument i n C h a p te r I I I , and th u s f a r i n th e
p r e s e n t c h a p t e r , we have b e e n - c o n c e r n e d o n ly w ith showing
t h a t K a n t 's e p is te m o lo g y p r e s c r i b e d , a t l e a s t i m p l i c i t l y , a
way of r e p r e s e n t i n g a p o s s i b l e p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t . We have
n o t been c o n cern ed w ith j u s t i f y i n g t h i s way of t h i n k i n g ;
f o r our t h e s i s has n o t r e q u i r e d us t o do so . We have needed
only t o show t h a t Kant d id r e g a r d e x i s t e n c e as an a d d i t i v e
p r e d i c a t e . To be s u r e , i n o r d e r to r e i n f o r c e our argum ent
t h a t he d i d , i n f a c t , h o ld t h i s view, we have a tte m p te d to
show how c e r t a i n b a s i c e le m e n ts of h i s sy stem r e q u i r e d him
to h o ld i t . But we have n o t a tte m p te d a c t u a l l y to demon
s t r a t e t h a t h i s system was t r u e or c o r r e c t in th o s e r e
s p e c t s i n which i t im p lie s t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s an a d d i t i v e
p r e d i c a t e . N o r i s i t our p u rp o se now t o a t t e m p t such a
187
d e m o n s t r a t i o n . But i n o r d e r sim ply t o show t h a t K a n t ’s po
s i t i o n i s n o t w i t h o u t s t r e n g t h , l e t us now, b r i e f l y , m ention
a few p o i n t s i n f a v o r of K a n t ’ s p o s i t i o n t h a t we can r e p r e
s e n t o b j e c t s t o o u r s e l v e s i n a l l t h e i r i d e n t i t y or p a r t i c u
l a r i t y .
F i r s t , l e t us n o te t h a t most e x t e n s i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n
f o r t h i s d o c t r i n e was g iv e n by Kant h i m s e l f i n the e p i s t e
mology which he s e t s f o r t h i n th e C r i t i q u e o f Pure R e a so n . ^
But i t would be p o i n t l e s s f o r us,, h e r e t o a tte m p t w h at, in
e f f e c t , would be a j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f h i s g e n e r a l d o c t r i n e s
of sp ace and o f th e n a t u r e o f our a b i l i t y , th ro u g h schem ata,
to r e p r e s e n t the c o n t e n t of a c o n c e p t s p a t i a l l y .
But i t sh o u ld be e v i d e n t , w h eth er or n o t we a c c e p t
a l l of K a n t 's d o c t r i n e r e g a r d i n g th e a p r i o r i n a t u r e of
s p a c e , t h a t th e space which i s p r e s e n t l y a c c e s s i b l e t o our
e x p e r i e n c e i s t h a t space i n which we do e x p e c t f u t u r e e x
p e r i e n c e to o c c u r. By t h i s I mean t h a t , a lth o u g h we may
b e l i e v e t h a t we and o t h e r t h i n g s may move i n space away
from where we are now (and, in d e e d , t h a t our p l a n e t , our
s o l a r system , our g a la x y , e t c . , may be m oving), we " s t i l l
a c c e p t t h a t any movement w i l l be i n a space t h a t i s c o n
ti n u o u s w ith t h a t w h e re in we p r e s e n t l y a r e , and t h a t a l l
space in which we may e x p e r i e n c e a n y th in g i n th e f u t u r e
13
Kant, op. cit., B176-87.
188
w i l l be, i n a c o n tin u o u s way, one w ith the space i n which we
c u r r e n t l y e x p e r i e n c e . (I s h a l l n o t a tte m p t f u r t h e r t o j u s
t i f y the p o i n t I have j u s t made. I b e l i e v e t h a t i t s t r u t h
i s e v i d e n t , w hether or not we can know why i t i s e v i d e n t .
But i f someone sh o u ld l i k e to r e g a r d i t as n e e d in g f u r t h e r
p r o o f , I s h o u ld say t h a t I would make o f i t an a ssu m p tio n
on which, d u l y M f l a g g e d , " th e K a n tia n argument which I am
p r e s e n t l y r e c o n s t r u c t i n g would r e s t . And I would be p r e
p a r e d to ad m it t h a t , by r e s t i n g on t h i s "u n p ro v e n tr p re m is e ,
t h e K a n tia n argum ent would s t i l l be i n th e n a t u r e o f an
h y p o t h e s i s : i f t h i s p o i n t were g r a n t e d , the c o n c l u s i o n
f o l l o w s .)
F u r th e r m o r e , c e r t a i n f a c t o r s th ro u g h which we r e c
o g n iz e the l o c a t i o n o f an o b j e c t have rem ained r e l a t i v e l y
th e same d u r i n g our p a s t e x p e r i e n c e , so t h a t we e x p e c t them
t o remain so in our f u t u r e e x p e r i e n c e . To be s u r e , our
g a l a x y could p o s s i b l y be t o r n a p a r t , o r our sun m ig h t e x
p l o d e , or our own p l a n e t be d e s t r o y e d , and w ith t h e s e e v e n ts
a l l our ways of d e t e r m in i n g l o c a t i o n m ig h t c e a s e . But,
t h e n , our e x p e r i e n c e would c e a s e a l s o . On th e o t h e r hand,
i f our e x p e rie n c e - i s t o c o n t i n u e , i t i s a t l e a s t e x tr e m e ly
l i k e l y t h a t th e p r i n c i p a l f a c t o r s th ro u g h which we r e c o g
n i z e the l o c a t i o n o f o b j e c t s i n sp a c e , w i l l c o n t i n u e a l s o .
T h e r e f o r e , i t would seem t h a t we do " e n v i s a g e " th e l o c a t i o n
o f o b j e c t s t h a t m ight p o s s i b l y be e x p e r i e n c e d i n th e f u t u r e .
And by e n v i s a g in g t h e i r l o c a t i o n , we c o u ld e n v is a g e such
189
o b j e c t s as s e p a r a t e p a r t i c u l a r s : i f two o b j e c t s , th e same in
e v e ry r e s p e c t e x c e p t l o c a t i o n , were e n v is a g e d a t any one
time as in d i f f e r e n t p l a c e s , th e y would be e n v is a g e d as d i f
f e r e n t p a r t i c u l a r s .
We have used th e word " e n v i s a g e " to convey an a c t
which Kant would p r o b a b ly have c a l l e d so m eth in g l i k e an a c t
of " r e p r e s e n t i n g th e c o n t e n t o f a c o n c e p t th ro u g h th e s c h e
m atism of th e i m a g i n a t i o n ; ” f o r i t was th ro u g h schem ata
t h a t , a c c o r d in g to K ant, th e e m p i r i c a l - - o r s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l - -
c o n t e n t of a c o n c e p t was r e p r e s e n t e d . Now, one m ight
d i s a g r e e w ith K a n t 's a c c o u n t of th e sch em atism , b u t w hether
one does or n o t , one ought s t i l l t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e r e i s
a t h i n k i n g i n which we are a b le to t h i n k o f th e l o c a t i o n i n
sp ace o f p o s s i b l e f u t u r e o b j e c t s , and t h a t we are a b l e ,
t h u s , t o t h i n k of them as p a r t i c u l a r and n o t m erely as ob
j e c t s of a c e r t a i n k i n d .
Of c o u r s e , one m ight c la im t h a t our t h i k i n g o f such
p o s s i b l e p a r t i c u l a r s i s n o t m erely th ro u g h c o n c e p t i o n , t h a t
i s , n o t m e re ly th ro u g h t h a t a c t which, we have a rg u e d , i s
i n c a p a b l e o f c o n t a i n i n g or r e p r e s e n t i n g th e a c t u a l e x i s t i n g
of an o b j e c t . The p u rp o se of such an o b j e c t i o n would be to
show t h a t , a lth o u g h a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e m ight l i e o u t s i d e the
c o n c e p t, i t need n o t l i e o u t s i d e th e k in d of t h i n k i n g i n
which a f u t u r e o b j e c t can be th o u g h t as p a r t i c u l a r . And
1 4Cf. ibid, B180.
190
t h a t t h e r e f o r e one c o u ld n o t say t h a t , b e c a u se th e p a r t i c u
l a r o b j e c t i s th o u g h t i n i t s p a r t i c u l a r i t y w ith o u t our
t h i n k i n g o f e x i s t e n c e , i t s a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e must l i e o u t s i d e
t h a t which c o n s t i t u t e s an o b j e c t as the p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t
t h a t i t i s , was, o r would b e . But I b e l i e v e t h a t such an
o b j e c t i o n would f a i l i n i t s p u rp o se , f o r what Kant meant by
" c o n c e p t'' was, e s s e n t i a l l y , t h a t s y n t h e s i s of i n t u i t i v e l y
1 * 5
g iv e n d a t a th ro u g h which an o b j e c t m ight be th o u g h t. I f
we adm it, as I b e l i e v e we must, t h a t we have no d i r e c t i n
t u i t i o n of f u t u r e p a r t i c u l a r s i n t h e i r f u t u r e e x i s t e n c e , and
t h a t , a c c o r d i n g l y , we can t h i n k o f f u t u r e p a r t i c u l a r s only
by means o f r e p r e s e n t i n g them th ro u g h d a t a t h a t have a l r e a d y
b een g iv e n ; th e n we must adm it a l s o t h a t our t h i n k i n g of a
p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t t h a t m ight p o s s i b l y e x i s t can ta k e p l a c e
o n ly by means of some k in d o f s y n t h e s i s of p r e v i o u s l y g iv e n
d a t a . I t would f o l l o w t h a t , w h a te v e r we might c a l l such a
s y n t h e s i s , i t c o u ld c o n t a i n n e i t h e r th e a c t u a l i t y of t h a t
by which we would t h i n k ( i . e . , th e p a s t d a t a ) nor th e a c t u
a l i t y o f t h a t of which we would t h i n k ( t h e o b j e c t which i s
n o t y e t a c t u a l ) ; f o r i f t h a t of which we would t h i n k by
means o f th e s e d a t a , e . g . , th e o b j e c t , can be th o u g h t o n ly
by r e p r e s e n t i n g p r e v i o u s l y g iv e n d a t a , th e n i t s a c t u a l i t y
c o u ld be th o u g h t o n ly i f t h i s a c t u a l i t y were a l r e a d y g iv e n .
15
Ibid., A103-4; B137b.
191
But t h i s would be i m p o s s i b l e , f o r a c t u a l i t y c a n n o t have been
g iv e n i n t h e p a s t , nor in d eed can a c t u a l i t y ever have been
g i v e n - - b e c a u s e by " a c t u a l i t y " we r e f e r to p r e s e n t e x i s t e n c e
p r e c i s e l y as p r e s e n t and n o t as p a s t .
F u r th e r m o r e , in t h e c a se o f a m e re ly p o s s i b l e f u t u r e
o b j e c t , th e " a c t u a l i t y " o f t h e o b j e c t would be " f u t u r e a c -
t u a l i t y " - - a n d w h a te v e r meaning t h e s e words m ight have in
o t h e r forms o f d i s c o u r s e , th e y could have no meaning (a s a
c o m p o site term ) i n our p r e s e n t c o n t e x t ; f o r by " a c t u a l i t y "
and " a c t u a l " (a s when we say " a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e " ) we, w ith
K a n t, have chosen to mean t h a t w hich i s p r o p e r to th e p r e s
ent moment, and w hich, t h e r e f o r e , can n e v e r be s a id to be
e i t h e r p a s t or f u t u r e . I f we were to speak of a " p a s t a c
t u a l i t y " or a " f u t u r e a c t u a l i t y , " we would n o t mean by " a c
t u a l i t y " what we mean by " p r e s e n t a c t u a l i t y . " But i t i s
p r e c i s e l y t h i s l a s t f a c t o r which we mean when we employ th e
term s " a c t u a l " and " a c t u a l i t y , " - - o r " e x i s t e n c e . "
Thus, w h a te v e r we m ight w ish to c a l l th e a c t th ro u g h
which we t h i n k a p a r t i c u l a r p o s s i b l e o b j e c t , i t can n o t i n
clu d e th e e x i s t e n c e which we m ight p r e d i c a t e of th e o b j e c t
i f and when we a c t u a l l y e n c o u n te r i t .
We have now v i r t u a l l y com pleted our r e c o n s t r u c t i o n
o f a K a n tia n argum ent f o r 5; f o r th e th eo rem , t h a t i s , t h a t
e x i s t e n c e i s e x t r i n s i c to o b j e c t s . We have seen t h a t ?
f o ll o w s d i r e c t l y from T ) and Y ' . I f i t i s t r u e t h a t i n a
192
c o n c e p t we can n o t know e x i s t e n c e , and i f i t i s a l s o t r u e
t h a t i n a c o n c e p t we can know e v e r y t h i n g e n t e r i n g i n t o an
o b j e c t ' s e s se n c e or i d e n t i t y , i t f o llo w s t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s
n o t a f a c t o r e n t e r i n g i n t o the e s s e n c e or i d e n t i t y o f ob
j e c t s . E x i s t e n c e i s , in t h i s s e n s e , e x t r i n s i c to o b j e c t s .
Having drawn theorem ? from Kant, we can now p r o
ceed t o draw o u t theorem Q. S in ce e x i s t e n c e i s e x t r i n s i c
to o b j e c t s , i t f o ll o w s t h a t when we are c o n s c io u s o n ly o f
an o b j e c t , we a re n o t c o n s c io u s o f i t s e x i s t i n g . I t must
a l s o f o ll o w , t h e n , t h a t when we a r e c o n s c io u s th ro u g h p e r
c e p t i o n of an o b j e c t as e x i s t i n g , we are c o n s c io u s o f some
t h i n g more th a n th e o b j e c t . Or t o p u t t h i s p o i n t i n a
s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t way, we would say' t h a t s i n c e , as Kant
h e l d , we can d i s t i n g u i s h between an o b j e c t as m erely p o s
s i b l e and the i d e n t i c a l o b j e c t as e x i s t e n t , we must be ab le
t o r e c o g n i z e th e a d d i t i o n a l f a c t o r which i s p r e s e n t o n ly
when an o b j e c t e x i s t s , w hich i s t o say t h a t we must r e c o g
n i z e e x i s t e n c e .
An e x i s t e n t i a l judgment o u g h t, t h e n , to e x p r e s s the
c o m b in a tio n of th e o b j e c t and t h i s o th e r f a c t o r , which we
c a l l " e x i s t e n c e . " And s i n c e t h a t w ith which an o b j e c t i s
composed i n a judgment i s what Kant c a l l e d th e " p r e d i c a t e ”
of th e judgm ent, he would, th e n , h o ld t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s th e
p r e d i c a t e of an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent. And s in c e th e p r e d
i c a t e o f an e x i s t e n t i a l judgment i s always som ething e x
t r i n s i c t o th e o b j e c t , n e v e r e n t e r i n g i n t o i t s c o n c e p t or
193
e s s e n c e , t h i s p r e d i c a t e would be what we have c a l l e d an
" a d d i t i v e p r e d i c a t e . "
I n p r e d i c a t i n g e x i s t e n c e of an o b j e c t , we would,
th e n , n o t augment i t s c o n c e p t or e s s e n c e b u t would a f f i r m
of i t so m eth in g o f which c o n s c io u s n e s s i s g iv e n , im m e d ia te ly
or m e d i a t e l y , in p e r c e p t i o n .
In t h i s way, we have drawn from K a n t's t h e o r y of
p e r c e p t i o n the v e r y same v iew o f the p r e d i c a t e o f e x i s t e n c e
which, on o t h e r g ro u n d s, we had p r e v i o u s l y shown him to
have h e l d - - n a m e l y , t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s an " u n r e a l " b u t " a d d i
t i v e " p r e d i c a t e o f e x i s t e n t i a l ju d g m en ts. W e have now shown
how and why h i s sy stem r e q u i r e d him to h o ld t h i s p o s i t i o n .
SUMMARY
In t h i s e s sa y we have a tte m p te d to show t h a t Kant
r e g a r d e d e x i s t e n c e as an " a d d i t i v e ” p r e d i c a t e , a p r e d i c a t e
t h a t i s , a t th e same tim e , n e i t h e r " r e a l " nor m erely l o g i
c a l . I t was n o t " r e a l " b e c a u s e i t could n o t e n t e r i n t o t h e
c o n c e p t or e s s e n c e of an o b j e c t . On t h e o t h e r hand, i t was
n o t m erely l o g i c a l b e c a u s e i t was so m eth in g o t h e r th a n th e
s u b j e c t . I t was som ething u n iq u e and, i n a s e n s e , u n r e p r e
s e n t a b l e , o f which we could be g iv e n c o n s c i o u s n e s s only i n
t u i t i v e l y , i n a c t u a l p e r c e p t i o n .
We have a l s o sought to d e m o n s tr a te p r e c i s e l y how
K a n t ' s g e n e r a l t h e o r y of c o n c e p t i o n i m p l i e s t h i s view of
e x i s t e n c e as a p r e d i c a t e .
We began by showing t h a t when he d e n ie d t h a t e x i s t
ence i s a " r e a l ” p r e d i c a t e , Kant d id n o t mean t o say t h a t i t
i s no p r e d i c a t e a t a l l . B ecause o f t h e t e c h n i c a l meaning
w hich he a t t a c h e d to t h e term " r e a l p r e d i c a t e , " h i s d e n i a l
was seen to mean sim p ly t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s n o t a f a c t o r which
can e n t e r i n t o th e c o n c e p t o f an o b j e c t - - w h i c h i s t o say
t h a t i t ca n n o t e n t e r i n t o an o b j e c t ' s e s s e n c e or i d e n t i t y .
( K a n t 's p o i n t was seen to be e s s e n t i a l l y th e same as t h a t
194
195
s t r e s s e d by Meinong, who more th a n a c e n tu r y l a t e r claim ed
t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s always e x t r i n s i c t o o b j e c t s , o r - - a s
Meinong p r e f e r r e d to s a y - - t h a t o b j e c t s a r e , as such, " o u t
s i d e b e in g " or a u s s e r s e i e n d .)
We th e n r e f u t e d th e c la im t h a t , i n K a n t ’s mind, an
e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent-w ould have had no p r e d i c a t e a t a l l .
T h is view was shown t o be c o n t r a r y , n o t o n ly to K a n t ’ s g en
e r a l th e o r y o f judgm ent, in which jud g m en ts a r e alw ays th e
e x p r e s s i o n o f a r e l a t i o n betw een a s u b j e c t and a p r e d i c a t e ,
b u t a l s o to h i s i n s i s t e n c e t h a t e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ents a r e
always s y n t h e t i c . For as s y n t h e t i c , th e y would need to
have, n o t m erely a p r e d i c a t e , b u t a p r e d i c a t e t h a t i s o th e r
th a n t h e i r s u b j e c t .
We n e x t p ro c e e d e d to r e f u t e th e c la im t h a t , fo r
K ant, t h e s t r u c t u r e o f an e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent was e s s e n
t i a l l y one in which a s u b j e c t c o n c e p t was c o n n e c te d w ith i t s
o b j e c t , fo r t h i s view would imply t h a t t h e o b j e c t was t h e
p r e d i c a t e o f th e e x i s t e n t i a l ju d g m en t. A lth o u g h t h e r e a re
p a s s a g e s in t h e F i r s t C r i t i q u e w hich may seem a t f i r s t s i g h t
to s u g g e s t t h i s view, we have shown t h a t i t i s n o t in h a r
mony w i t h K a n t ' s i n s i s t e n t cla im t h a t an o b j e c t and th e con
t e n t o f i t s c o n c e p t a r e i d e n t i c a l . For. K a n t ’s i n s i s t e n c e on
th e i d e n t i t y o f t h e o b j e c t and th e c o n t e n t o f i t s c o n c e p t,
meant t h a t an e x i s t e n t i a l judgment could n o t be s y n t h e t i c
i f i t s p r e d i c a t e were t h e o b j e c t . S ince Kant d id i n s i s t
t h a t e'very e x i s t e n t i a l judgment i s s y n t h e t i c , we were a b l e ,
196
t h e n , to r e f u t e th e c la im t h a t he r e g a rd e d th e p r e d i c a t e of
an e x i s t e n t i a l judgment as b e in g th e o b j e c t i t s e l f .
In o rd e r t o r e i n f o r c e our r e f u t a t i o n , we p ro ceed ed
t o show t h a t Kant did n o t r e g a r d th e c o n c e p t as e n a b lin g us
to t h i n k m e re ly a ty p e o f o b j e c t , which i s to say, a c l a s s
or d e s c r i p t i o n r a t h e r th a n a p a r t i c u l a r . I n s t e a d , we showed
him to have h e ld t h a t we can t h i n k an o b j e c t i n e v e ry a s p e c t
o f i t s i d e n t i t y , t h u s , as th e p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t i t may be.
Hence, one sh o u ld n o t i n t e r p r e t Kant as h a v in g r e g a r d e d th e
o b j e c t o f an e x i s t e n t i a l judgment as so m eth in g more th a n th e
c o n t e n t of t h e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t, and as a b l e , i n t h i s way, to
be a s y n t h e t i c p r e d i c a t e . For Kant d id n o t s h a r e t h e b e l i e f
t h a t in a s u b j e c t c o n c e p t , we were ..unable to be c o n s c io u s of
a p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t as su ch . T hat i s , Kant d id n o t r e g a r d
t h e o b j e c t as th e s y n t h e t i c p r e d i c a t e o f an e x i s t e n t i a l
ju d g m en t, b e c a u s e he d id n o t b e l i e v e t h a t i n th e s u b j e c t
c o n c e p t we a r e u n a b le to t h i n k t h e o b j e c t i t s e l f , b u t m erely
i t s t y p e . For K an t, th e o b j e c t was e n t i r e l y i d e n t i c a l w ith
th e c o n t e n t o f th e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t , th u s i t could n o t be
j o i n e d as a s y n t h e t i c p r e d i c a t e to t h e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t.
H aving, by t h i s tim e , d is p o s e d o f c e r t a i n m isc o n
c e p t i o n s which ten d to o b s t r u c t a t r u e view o f K a n t ’s p o s i
t i o n , we p ro c e e d e d to look a t p a s s a g e s i n which Kant v e ry
c l e a r l y p r e s e n t e d th e s t r u c t u r e of th e e x i s t e n t i a l judgm ent
as being one in w hich a p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t (which i s a l r e a d y
th o u g h t i n th e s u b j e c t c o n c e p t) i s c o n n e c te d w ith a f a c t o r
of w hich we can be im m e d ia te ly c o n s c io u s o n ly in a c t u a l
p e r c e p t i o n . T h is f a c t o r was c a l l e d by K an t, ' ' e x i s t e n c e . "
Since t h a t w i t h w hich th e c o n t e n t of a s u b j e c t c o n c e p t was
c o n n e c te d in a judgm ent, was c a l l e d by K a n t, the " p r e d i c a t e "
of t h e judgm ent, we were a b l e to co n c lu d e t h a t , in K a n t 's
view , e x i s t e n c e was th e p r e d i c a t e of an e x i s t e n t i a l j u d g
ment .
And s i n c e , f o r K a n t, our aw aren ess o f an o b j e c t as
e x i s t e n t , was v e r y p l a i n l y som ething more th a n our aw areness
sim p ly of th e o b j e c t , we w ere a b l e t o c o n c lu d e t h a t in h i s
view , e x i s t e n c e was n o t a m e re ly l o g i c a l or g ra m m a tic a l
p r e d i c a t e . On t h e o th e r hand, s i n c e i t was n o t a " r e a l "
p r e d i c a t e , c a p a b le of e n t e r i n g i n t o an o b j e c t ' s c o n c e p t or
i d e n t i t y , we co n clu d ed t h a t i t was t r e a t e d by Kant as a v e ry
s p e c i a l kind of p r e d i c a t e , which we have chosen to c a l l an
" a d d i t i v e " p r e d i c a t e .
In o r d e r t o c l a r i f y what Kant meant by " e x i s t e n c e , "
we have shown t h a t he d id n o t i d e n t i f y t h e e x i s t e n c e of an
o b j e c t w i t h th e o b j e c t ' s b e lo n g in g to t h e context, o f expe
r i e n c e as a w h o l e - - a l t h o u g h b e lo n g in g to t h e l a t t e r would
f o l l o w upon our judgment t h a t an o b j e c t e x i s t s . For th e
judgment i t s e l f would i n t e g r a t e th e o b j e c t i n t o th e c o n t e x t
of e x p e r i e n c e as a w hole. We have a l s o shown t h a t Kant d id
not i d e n t i f y e x i s t e n c e w i t h e i t h e r p e r c e p t i o n or t h e p o s s i
b i l i t y t h e r e o f - - a l t h o u g h he did r e g a r d p e r c e p t i o n as th e
o n ly mode of c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n w hich we can know e x i s t e n c e
198
as such ( i . e . , a s e x i s t i n g ) . F u rth e rm o re , h e re g a rd e d th e
p o s s i b i l i t y of p e r c e i v i n g an o b j e c t as a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n
o f our ju d g in g t h a t th e o b j e c t e x i s t s . Y et, f o r K ant, th e
a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e of a t h i n g was alw ays so m eth in g o th e r th a n
th e p o s s i b i l i t y o f i t s p e r c e p t i o n , i t was som ething u n iq u e ,
so m eth in g whose d i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e could n e v e r be a n t i c i
p a te d i n any r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .
In o rd e r t o d i s p e l re m a in in g doubts r e g a r d i n g K a n t Ts
d o c t r i n e of e x i s t e n c e as a p r e d i c a t e , we p ro c e e d e d to a n a
ly z e p a s s a g e s w hich have le d some i n t e r p r e t e r s to m is u n d e r
stan d K a n t ' s p o s i t i o n . We a l s o showed t h a t our own i n t e r
p r e t a t i o n i s e n t i r e l y in k e e p in g w i t h th e o v e r a l l s t r a t e g y
which K ant employed in h i s r e f u t a t i o n of t h e o n t o l o g i c a l
argument ( i n t h e co u rse o f which a r e to be found the most
commonly c i t e d - - b u t n o t n e c e s s a r i l y th e most i m p o r t a n t - -
p a s s a g e s in w hich he s e t f o r t h h i s d o c t r i n e o f e x i s t e n c e ) .
In o r d e r , f i n a l l y , to r e i n f o r c e and supplem ent t h e
argum ent in w hich we d e te rm in e d what was K a n t ' s d o c t r i n e of
e x i s t e n c e , we s o u g h t to show how t h i s d o c t r i n e must n e c e s
s a r i l y f o llo w from h i s g e n e r a l t h e o r y of t h e co n c e p t. T hat
i s , p r e v i o u s l y we had s o u g h t to e s t a b l i s h w h at K a n t's p o s i
t i o n w as, by c i t i n g e v id e n c e drawn more or l e s s d i r e c t l y
from t e x t s in w hich he t r e a t e d e x p l i c i t l y o f e x i s t e n c e .
But a t t h i s p o i n t , we s o u g h t to show why c e r t a i n very b a s i c
e le m e n ts i n h i s th e o ry o f knowledge led him t o hold th e view
t h a t he d id .
199
S p e c i f i c a l l y , we so u g h t to e x p l a i n how t h e way i n
which Kant viewed th e p r o c e s s of c o n c e p t i o n , t h a t i s , as
t a k i n g p l a c e s u c c e s s i v e l y , n e c e s s a r i l y e x c lu d e s th e p o s s i
b i l i t y o f b e in g c o n s c io u s o f a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e i n a c o n c e p t.
On th e o t h e r hand, we so u g h t to show how Kant c o u ld r e g a r d
c o n c e p t i o n as b e in g c a p a b le o f g i v i n g c o n s c i o u s n e s s of
ev e ry f a c t o r e n t e r i n g i n t o t h e i d e n t i t y o f an o b j e c t ( i n
p a r t , b e c a u s e th e phenomenal, o b j e c t was r e g a r d e d by Kant as
c o n s t i t u t e d by th e v e r y p r o c e s s of c o n c e i v i n g i t ; t h a t i s to
sa y , b e c a u s e i n h i s view , i n t u i t i v e l y g i v e n d a t a were i n t e
g r a t e d i n t o a phenomenal o b j e c t only in t h e c o n c e p t, which
was, t h u s , a d e q u a te to th e o b j e c t , f o r t h e v ery good r e a s o n
t h a t th e c o n c e p t i t s e l f d e te rm in e d th e l i m i t s of th e ob
j e c t ) .
From t h e f a c t t h a t i n K a n t ’s v iew , c o n c e p t i o n could
f u r n i s h us w ith c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f e v e r y t h i n g t h a t i s e s s e n
t i a l to an o b j e c t ’ s i d e n t i t y , b u t n o t w i t h c o n s c i o u s n e s s of
i t s a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e , we were a b l e to c o n c lu d e t h a t Kant
was r e q u i r e d by h i s d o c t r i n e o f c o n c e p t i o n to r e g a r d e x i s t
ence as som ething o u t s i d e t h e o b j e c t , t h a t i s to say , as
som ething whose a s s e r t i o n would alw ays i n v o l v e our e x p r e s s
ing more th a n t h e mere o b j e c t . S in c e , th e n , e x i s t e n c e
would n e c e s s a r i l y be som ething o t h e r th a n th e o b j e c t t h a t
i s s a i d to e x i s t , e x i s t e n c e had to b e , f o r K a n t, what we
have c a l l e d an a d d i t i v e p r e d i c a t e .
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Asset Metadata

Creator Vick, George Robert (author)

Core Title Kant'S Doctrine Of Existence As A Predicate

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Philosophy

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,Philosophy

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Hospers, John (committee chair), Engel, S. Morris (committee member), Macgregor, Geddes (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-653733

Unique identifier UC11361249

Identifier 6905074.pdf (filename),usctheses-c18-653733 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 6905074.pdf

Dmrecord 653733

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Vick, George Robert

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA