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A Critical Examination Of Heidegger'S And Jasper'S Interpretations Of Nietzsche

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A Critical Examination Of Heidegger'S And Jasper'S Interpretations Of Nietzsche

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Content This dissertation has been
microfilmed exactly as received 69-19,375
HOWEY, Richard Lowell, 1937-
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF HEIDEGGER’S
AND JASPERS’ INTERPRETATIONS OF
NIETZSCHE.
University of Southern California, Ph.D., 1969
Philosophy
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan
@ Copyright by
RICHARD LO W ELL H O W E Y
A CRITICAL EXAM INATION O F HEIDEGGER'S A N D
JASPERS' INTERPRETATIONS OF NIETZSCHE
by
Richard Lowell Howey
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE G RA D U A TE SCH O O L
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirement for the Degree
DO CTO R OF PHILOSOPHY
(Philosophy)
June 1969
UNIVERSITY O F SO U T H E R N CALIFORNIA
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY PARK
LOS ANGELES. CALIFORNIA 9 0 0 0 7
This dissertation, written by
RICHARD LOWELL H O W E Y
under the direction of h.l$.... Dissertation Com
mittee, and approved by all its members, has
been presented to and accepted by The Gradu
ate School, in partial fulfillment of require
ments of the degree of
D O C T O R O F P H I L O S O P H Y
Dean
Date J .¥ £ e ..l9 6 ? .
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
■ j - T '
xrman
ACKNOW LEDGEMENTS
I wish to express my appreciation to
my'dissertation committee: Professor
W . H. Werkmeister, Professor Dallas
Willard, and Professor Spalek. I also
wish to thank Professor Geddes MacGregor
for his kindness and encouragement.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
Chapter
I. NIETZSCHE AS A MM A N D AS_A PHILOSOPHER.........................................20
II. NIETZSCHE'S METAPHYSICS & EPISTEMOLOGY..................... . . . 71
III. NIETZSCHE'S PHILOSOPHICAL A N TH RO PO LO G Y . . . . ..................... 165
IV. A N EVALUATION OF HEIDEGGER'S A N D JASPERS'
INTERPRETATIONS.......................................... 259
V. A N ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION: A FU N D A M EN TA L
DUALISM IN NIETZSCHE'S TH O U G H T ................................................ 290
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . 1 ............................................... 304
i i i
1
INTRODUCTION
General Problems in Nietzsche Interpretation
Every philosopher presents special problems of in terp retatio n .
With Nietzsche these problems are especially crucial. The very ric h
ness of'Nietzsche's thought and expression becomes a trap for the
incautious, or imaginative mind. Perhaps the greatest temptation for
the interpreter of Nietzsche is to attempt to "systematize" his thought
into a consistent whole. Any such attempt necessarily resu lts in
distortion, for there is a flu id ity in Nietzsche's thought which does
not lend i t s e l f to s t r i c t categorization. This is not to deny that
there are certain organic patterns in his philosophy. These patterns
emerge, however, as Jaspers correctly in sists, only upon careful,
critical comparison of pertinent passages drawn from the en tire corpus
of Nietzsche's works. No single passage can be taken as a d efin itiv e
statement of Nietzsche's views on any particular subject. Frequently,
by presenting two or three especially relevant quotations from the
author being considered, a c r i ti c can support the correctness of his
interpretation. With Nietzsche, however, such a procedure is' inade
quate, for in many cases other passages can be found which will support
an alternative, i f not opposite, interpretation. Nor is th is d i f f i
culty alleviated by vast compilations of relevant passages, fo r then
one could gain ju s t as much, and quite likely more, from re-reading
Nietzsche's works themselves. Thus, a compromise must be effected.
The interpreter of Nietzsche must weigh each remark of Nietzsche not
2
only with Regard to its actual context within the work, but with
regard to the context of all of Nietzsche's other utterances on the
same subject as well. Only in this way can the in terp reter arrive
at an understanding which truly represents Nietzsche's basic thought,
and only thus will he be able to present those inconsistencies which
truly belong to Nietzsche. These inconsistencies are important, for
they point up certain basic d iffic u ltie s in Nietzsche's general pro
gram of philosophizing.
Another d iffic u lty inevitably encountered in interpreting
Nietzsche is one of emotional involvement. No matter how clear
sightedly one begins, there is the continual temptation e ith er to
agree ecstatic ally or to re je c t vociferously. In fa c t, i t is almost
impossible to remain indifferent to Nietzsche, to be "neutral" or
*
"objective." Nietzsche's very manner of philosophizing demands a
response; the problem is so to direct that response th a t i t is not
merely a personal response, but a genuine philosophical response as
well.
Every in terpretation of Nietzsche presupposes a particu lar
orientation or disposition toward Nietzsche's thought as a whole.
This disposition will condition the final conclusions and evaluations
and i t is therefore essential in a critical study such as the one
here undertaken th a t we examine the fundamental dispositions with
regard to th e ir adequacy from the many perspectives and aspects of
Nietzsche's thought i t s e l f . That an inadequate or distorted dispo
sition can lead to a distortion of the basic character and structure
3
of Nietzsche's work is beyond question. The distortion and misuse
of Nietzsche's thought by Stefan George and his disciples--especially
Ernst Bertram, but also Gundolf—is a case in point. And the Nazi
distortions in the manner of Baumler are so well known th a t they
require no elucidation here. Such orientations are designed to make
use of Nietzsche's thought rather than to understand i t . I t is d if
ferent in the case of Jaspers and Heidegger. S t i l l , even when con
sidering the Nietzsche interpretations of Jaspers and Heidegger we
shall have to examine the basic dispositions of these authors toward
Nietzsche's thought and we shall have to consider also the question
as to whether Heidegger and Jaspers are trying to make use of
Nietzsche's thought for purposes of th eir own. I t ought to be made
clear here that i t is possible both to understand and to use
Nietzsche's thought. However, we should maintain a healthy suspicion
for any and every attempt to use Nietzsche's thought for the j u s t i
fication of some position which lies essentially outside the context
of Nietzsche's thought it s e l f . Thus, the main purpose of the present
study is to present a c ritic a l examination of the Nietzsche in te r
pretations of Heidegger and Jaspers, and then, from th at basis, to
present the outline of an alternative interpretation.
Special Problems in Jaspers' Nietzsche Interpretation
Jaspers is most helpful regarding the problems of his method
of approach to', and his basic disposition toward, Nietzsche's thought,
for he devotes almost twenty pages at the beginning of his Nietzsche
4
book to these topics. Jaspers' most basic attitude is th a t no single
mode o f approach to Nietzsche's thought is by i t s e l f adequate. An
adequate interpretation for Jaspers is one which is based on an exami
nation of the e n tire corpus of Nietzsche's writing, the published
works, the l e t t e r s , and the posthumous fragments, without giving undue
emphasis to any p art or aspect. "It must be realized th a t none of
Nietzsche's forms of communication has a privileged character.
Regarding the posthumous material (Nachlass) Jaspers does not agree
with e ith e r Schlechta or Heidegger. -Schlechta s ta te s , "I omit the
already published posthumous material, because to my knowledge no
new central thought is to be found there."3 On the other hand,
Heidegger claims, "What Nietzsche himself published during the period
of his c re a tiv ity remains always a foreground . . . . The genuine
philosophy remains behind as 'posthumous m a te ria l'." 3 Jaspers again
presents a very balanced view and sees in the posthumous material
"a fragmentary kind of thinking which constantly brings forth some
thing new from inexhaustible wealth."4 However, he immediately adds
the cautionary remark, "Nowhere is Nietzsche's work tru ly centralized;
^Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche: An Introduction to the
Understanding of His Philosophical Activity, trans. Charles F.
Wall ra ff and Frederick J. Schmitz (Tucson, 1966), p. 5.
i, 2pr -iedrich Nietzsche, Friedrich Nietzsche: Werke in drei
Banden, ed. Karl Schlechta (Munich, 1956), III, 1433, my translation.
3Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche (2 vols.; Pfullingen, 1961), I,
17, (my tra n sla tio n ). All translations from Heidegger are mine unless
otherwise indicated.
^Jaspers, Nietzsche, p. 5.
5
there is no magnum opus. On the other hand, what is essential to
his thought is also discernible particularly in what seems incidental
and secondary."^
Jaspers also objects to interpretations which attempt to
subsume Nietzsche under some category, such as poet, modern pre-
Socratic, or prophet. Nietzsche is to be regarded primarily and
most importantly as a philosopher. Every great philosopher is a
unique, individual event, and every attempt to classify and cate
gorize his thought is at best an oversimplification.
Genuine interpretation, however, does not subsume but pentrates;
i t does not claim to know with f in a lity ; but, while always taking
cognizance of what has ju st been apprehended, i t proceeds by a
method of questioning and answering.6
This remark gives us also the important clue that Jaspers' method is
to be understood as a dialectical examination of Nietzsche's thought.
Such a d ialectic will (ideally) proceed expositorily and c ritic a lly .
In following Jaspers' dialectical investigations we shall have to
examine continually his expositions for adequacy and his criticism s
v
for appropriateness and accuracy.
Jaspers in s is ts , as does Nietzsche himself, th at any in terpre
tation must be based on a careful reading of the works, which is not
merely a reading but a meditating along with Nietzsche. In a section
title d "Principles of Interpretation," Jaspers asserts th a t there
can be no final interpretation of Nietzsche's thought. He stresses
5I b id ., p. 5.
5Ibid., p. 6.
6
the process character of genuine interpretation; he sees the method
ology of interpretation primarily as a laying open of essential ques
tions. This questioning becomes the guide to an understanding of
Nietzsche's thought, even though we cannot answer these questions
"once and for a l l ."
What Nietzsche means can never be assimilated by a will to possess
the truth in fixed and final form but only by a will to truth
which rises from the depths and strives toward the depths, which
is prepared to encounter all that is questionable, is not closed
to anything, and is able to w ait.'
Here one is reminded of a similar remark which Heidegger makes at
the very end of Introduction to Metaphysics with regard to questioning.
"To know how to question means-to know how to wait, even a whole
o
lifetim e." While i t is quite true that we should be suspicious of
interpretations which make claims of correctness, with dogmatic-
f in a lity , i t is equally true that we should be suspicious of in te r
pretations which leave fundamental questions up in the a i r without
even a tentative attempt at resolution.
Jaspers, in th is same section on interpretation, puts forth
six theses regarding an adequate approach to Nietzsche. F irst of
a l l , Jaspers argues, Nietzsche is fundamentally a philosopher of
contradiction. For nearly every statement he makes a counter
statement can be found.
^Ib id . , p. 9.
O
Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans.
Ralph Manheim (New Haven, 1959), p. 206.
7
In any case, i t is the task of the interpreter to be forever
d iss a tisfie d until he has also found the contradiction, to search
out contradictions in all their forms, and then, i f possible, to
gain d ire ct experience of their necessity. Instead of being pro
voked by contradiction, one should pursue contradictoriness to
its source.9
As appealing as this thesis is, there remains the question as to
whether these contradictions are really at the heart of Nietzsche's
thought and not simply superficial or apparent contradictions.
Jaspers' position that "self-contradiction is the fundamental ingre
dient of N ietzsche's thought" contains several d i f f i c u l t i e s . ^ His
position here suggests a sententially reductive approach which, i t
seems, overemphasizes the particular at the expense of the general
theses of Nietzsche. This approach seems reductive in another sense
also, in the sense, namely, that i t tends to impose a "logical" struc
ture on Nietzsche's thought. Here it would seem that Nietzsche's
own description of his philosophy as "perspectivism" is more appro
priate and not fraught with the reductive d iffic u ltie s of the notion
of "logical contradiction." This becomes especially apparent when
the so-called contradictions are examined in context, fo r one d is
covers then th a t the differences are precisely "contextual differences"
and provide simply an additional or new perspective. This is, of
course, not to say that there are no genuine contradictions in
Nietzsche's thought. Some of these contradictions play an important
role in the development of Nietzsche's philosophy. W e shall have
g
J a s p e r s , N ietzsche, p. 10.
^ I b i d . , p. 10.
8
occasion later to examine this problem of contradiction in some
d e ta il.
Jaspers' second point is that any adequate interpretation
must systematically examine the many repetitions. In this way one
discovers all of the variations and modifications concerning any
one topic and also discovers those topics which Nietzsche tre a ts
in only one passage. Again, i t would seem th at this point is more
consonant with an interpretation based on the idea of perspectivism
rather than contradiction.
Thirdly, Jaspers asserts that by looking for contradictions,
through the juxtaposition of Nietzsche's ideas, one is able to
arrive a t the "real dialectic" .of Nietzsche's thought. Jaspers sees
th is dialectic as a kind of "logical" analysis.
But i t [the dialectical clarificatio n ] cannot be attained simply
through logical insight alone; i t really occurs only insofar as
an expansion and illumination of the realm of possible Existenz
takes place. Whoever lacks the patience to labor over logical
and substantive connections and has no leeway in his soul for
the abundance of p o ssib ilitie s cannot read Nietzsche with com
prehension. 11
Jaspers here uses the word "Existenz" in his own technical sense with
a series of connotations and associations which are intimately related
to the central core of his philosophy. W e shall have occasion la te r
to inquire into Jaspers' meaning of "Existenz" and also to raise the
crucial question of the relation between a set of concepts peculiar
to Jaspers and Jaspers' use of these concepts in his interpretation
11 Ib id ., p. 11.
/
9
of Nietzsche. For the moment i t is sufficient to note th a t Jaspers
does attempt to use such concepts to elucidate Nietzsche.
Jaspers' fourth point is ambiguous. He in sists th at
Nietzsche's philosophy can be grasped as a whole. However, as Jaspers
points out:
This whole is not a concept, a world-view, or a system, i t is the
passion of the quest for being, together with its constant over
coming through relentless criticism , as i t rises to the level of
genuine t r u t h J 2
Yet, at the same time, he asserts that this whole is inexhaustible.
If Jaspers simply means that this "passion of the quest for being"
provides a psychological continuity for the development of Nietzsche's
thought, th is is not especially informative nor does i t provide grounds
for distinguishing Nietzsche from many other philosophers. On the
other hand, if Jaspers is talking about a whole from the point of
view of metaphysics and epistemology, then i t would seem th a t this
whole is a set of related concepts which describe a world-view, even
if not a perfectly consistent one. In fact, on the very next page
Jaspers presents th is very view: "the idea of a timeless systematic
whole becomes our guide as we search for the timeless position of
13
each thought and for the architechtonic of the system i t s e l f ."
F ifth ly , Jaspers maintains that any examination of Nietzsche's
thought requires a close correlation with the events in Nietzsche's
life . Nietzsche himself supports this idea when he says:
12Ib id ., p. 11.
13Ib id . , p. 12.
10
It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy
up t i l l now has consisted of—namely, the confession of its
originator and a species of involuntary and unconscious auto
biography.^
Jaspers devotes p rac tic a lly a fif th of his book directly to Nietzsche's
life and in the r e s t of the book he demonstrates in impressive fashion
the inextricable relation between Nietzsche's life and thought.
Heidegger's position on th is point is somewhat different, as we shall
presently discover.
Finally, Jaspers demands a study of the "systematic in te r
relations" of Nietzsche's thoughts. Here Jaspers' use of the term
"systematic" must be understood in a limited sense, for ultimately
he rejects the idea that any single absolute system can be derived
from the works of Nietzsche.
In the study of Nietzsche the unity of the whole, i . e . , of
life and thought, of temporal development and timeless system,
can only be the guiding idea, for Nietzsche's thinking will
always elude a ll attempts at a well-ordered presentation. I t
is impossible to foresee how far one will get, objectively
speaking, in an attempt to obtain a definite and well-substantiated
conception of the whole . . . . What provides the ir r e s is tib ly
compelling agitation in the study of Nietzsche is precisely
this ever-recurring d iffic u lty : neither of these ways makes
sense when taken separately while both, taken together, cannot
be brought into complete harmonyJ5
Two other.major problems s t i l l remain. Jaspers argues th a t
any adequate interpretation necessarily involves an adequate presen
tation, which goes beyond criticism in that i t attempts to present
the dialectical movements of the subject its e lf. He adds:
^Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil in The Philosophy
of Nietzsche, ed. Willard H. Wright (New York, 1954), p. 386.
^Jaspers, Nietzsche, p. 13.
11
A presentation attempts to efface its own thinking in favor of
that which is presented; i t must not use its subject as an occasion
for any philosophizing of its own. Such thinking is a constant
endeavor to yield completely to the thinking of the other person;
i t is thinking which seeks simply to present what someone else has
thought.16
Here Jaspers has ex p licitly provided us with a powerful criterio n of
adequacy, and i t is one which we shall apply to Jaspers himself.
The final problem pertains to the relation of the in terp reter
to truth. Nietzsche presents a doctrine of the essential ambiguity
of truth. In one respect, tru th , for Nietzsche, is dependent upon
passion. Truth is not capable of being grasped by the in te lle c t alone;
i t must be seized through the senses, and one must come to understand
that all truth is a becoming and, therefore, only a perspective, a
partial truth. Thus, according to Jaspers, the interpreter of
Nietzsche must attempt to see with Nietzsche's eyes and feel with
Nietzsche's passion. Any such attempt must, of course, fail in any
final sense, since we are necessarily limited by our own experiences
and passions. Thus, an attempt to "present" Nietzsche necessarily .
becomes an existential dialogue with Nietzsche, which is a s e lf-
discovery as well as a discovery of Nietzsche.
Our task is to become ourselves by appropriating Nietzsche.
Instead of yielding to the temptation to take the apparent uni
vocal ity of doctrines and laws as proof of their universal v a lid ity ,
each of us should respond to his challenge by attaining individu
ally the highest rank of which his nature is capable. W e should
not subordinate ourselves to oversimplified principles and impera
tives but, rather, through him find the way to the genuine sim
p licity of t r u t h . *7
^^Ibjd., p. 14.
^ I b i d . , p. 23.
12
This rejection of uni vocality raises, of course, the inevitable prob
lem of the subjectivity of interpretation.
Jaspers' approach to Nietzsche, then, is not as straight
forward and explicit as i t seems on the surface. Jaspers has attempted
to draw some rather fine lines while at the same time admitting a ce r
tain degree of overlapping. What makes an examination and evaluation
of Jaspers' interpretation especially d iffic u lt is that he, like
Nietzsche, has a tendency to regard ambiguity as a virtue. As an
interpreter Jaspers has a t le a st the responsibility to make clear the
nature of Nietzsche's ambiguities. Thus, in considering Jaspers, we
shall have to concern ourselves repeatedly with the question of whether
his ambiguities are obfuscations or extreme subtleties.
Special Problems in Heidegger's Nietzsche Interpretation
Heidegger's approach to Nietzsche is radically different from
Jaspers' and poses its own set of problems. Heidegger is concerned
primarily with Nietzsche's metaphysics and views the rest of
Nietzsche's philosophy as essentially derivative from metaphysics.
To understand this approach we must f i r s t understand the historical
perspective in which Heidegger places Nietzsche.
For Heidegger the entire history of metaphysics is grounded
in a mistake made in the development of philosophy after Heraclitus
and Parmenides. Heraclitus and Parmenides had started movements
toward a genuine ontology. Later Greek philosophers, however, turned
away from those e a rlie r insights and, instead of being concerned
13
with the meaning of Being as such, turned toward the meaning of Being
understood as the to ta lity of beings. The formalization of this mis
take was primarily a result of A ris to tle 's metaphysics. According to
Heidegger, this fundamental mistake was a part of the unfolding of the
history of Being and had to be brought to a final development through
Descartes and Kant, culminating in Hegel and, especially, Nietzsche.
For Heidegger, Nietzsche is the la st metaphysician and, in some ways,
the greatest, for not only did he bring to fulfillm ent the historical
unfolding of metaphysics, but he prepared as w ell,.the ground for the
p o ssibility of a fundamental ontology. Thus, for Heidegger, Nietzsche
is the great turning-point in the history of philosophy. Here we
have one of the most crucial problems in Heidegger's Nietzsche inter
pretation: Heidegger regards Nietzsche primarily as a metaphysician
and tre a ts all other aspects of his philosophy as systematically deri
vative from his metaphysics. Apparently Jaspers and Heidegger agree
at th is point, for Jaspers' notion, th a t the continuity of Nietzsche's
philosophy is provided by his "passion of the quest for being" sounds
very Heideggerian indeed. The agreement i s , however, only an apparent
one, for Heidegger and Jaspers assign very different meanings to the
phrase in quotation marks. For Jaspers the continuity is a result of
Nietzsche's passion as an e x iste n tia lly unique being, and i t is through
this passion that he. is able to reveal Being. Heidegger, however,
maintains that it is through Nietzsche's passion that Being is able
to reveal i t s e l f . The major difference here is that Heidegger tends
to give thought (as a revelation of Being) a kind of historical
autonomy, which i t does not possess for Jaspers. W e have here a basic
difference between Heidegger and Jaspers in th e i r respective approaches
to Nietzsche. Jaspers explicitly accepts the t i t l e "e x isten tialist,"
whereas Heidegger explicitly rejects i t . For Jaspers everything arises
out of the particu larity of Existenz; whereas for Heidegger human
existence or Dasein is the place at which Being reveals i t s e l f . For
Heidegger the existential analytic of human Dasein as presented in
Being and Time is simply preparatory to the real issue which is
ontology.
In contrast to Heidegger, Jaspers does not acknowledge the need
fo r an ontology, that is, a fundamental d iscip lin e embracing the
t o t a l i t y of being. The "philosophy of existence"--a t i t l e to
which the philosophy of Jaspers defin itely lays claim—must be
s a tis fie d with the illumination of the p o s sib ilitie s of indi
vidual, concrete existence in its freedom, uniqueness, and
i n e f f a b i l i t y J 8
One other observation regarding the h isto ric a l development of
metaphysics needs to be made here, v iz . , that Heidegger regards his
own ontology as an "overcoming" of metaphysics and yet a further stage
in the historical unfolding of Being. This, then, means that Heidegger
quite ex p licitly establishes a definite perspective from which to
regard Nietzsche's work. He sees Nietzsche as providing the seeds
which ripen in Heidegger's own ontology. This means that Heidegger
regards Nietzsche's doctrines in the lig h t of his own philosophy.
The introductory sections of Heidegger's book are concerned
with establishing the foundations of Nietzsche's metaphysics.
Heidegger argues that the nucleus of Nietzsche's philosophy is to be
^8Kurt Reinhardt, The E x isten tialist Revolt (New York, 1960),
p. 177.
15
found in the conception of the Will to Power.
The question as to what beings are, seeks the Being of beings.
All Being is, for Nietzsche, a Becoming. This Becoming, however,
has the character of the action and a c tiv ity of w illing. Will,
however, is in its essence, Will to Pow erJ9
The Will to Power, as the Being of beings, is thus the foundation of
Nietzsche's metaphysics. But then Heidegger asks, "What and how is
the Will to Power itse lf? Answer: the Eternal Recurrence of the
same."20 In other words, he sees the doctrines of the Will to Power
and of the Eternal Recurrence as indissoluably bound up one with the
other—a unity brought about through the doctrine of the Transvaluation
of All Values. Thus, i t is clear from the beginning that Heidegger
cannot claim the kind of "neutrality" which Jaspers claims, and yet
both would claim a kind of "objectivity." Operative here, however,
are two different senses of "objectivity." Jaspers, even though he
is willing to risk the ambiguity of an ex isten tial encounter with the
thought of Nietzsche, would nonetheless argue th at such an encounter
is not subjective, for i t goes beyond the individual to the foundation
of the cultural situation within which the encounter takes place.
Heidegger's claim to "objectivity" must be seen as a re su lt of the
historical revelation of Being through thought. Thus, for Heidegger,
in terpretation becomes the hermeneutic unfolding of the history of
Being. But with Heidegger, as with Jaspers, we shall have to be con
cerned with the legitimacy of his own concepts as used to interpret
Nietzsche.
^H eidegger,- N ietzsche, p. 15.
20I b i d . , p. 27.
A fu rth e r problem with Heidegger's interpretation is the great
emphasis th a t he gives to the book, The Will to Power. Heidegger sees
i t as the preparation for a great system which Nietzsche planned to
write; a system, which would be a unified expression of Nietzsche's
most mature thought. Heidegger is careful to point out, however, that
The Will to Pov/er is a collection of fragments which are not related
in any essential way, nor is there anything au thoritative about th eir
arrangement. Thus, an essential part of Heidegger's book is his
attempt to "construct" Nietzsche's "system," drawing from all the
writings of Nietzsche but using The Will to Power as a guiding- nucleus.
In contrast to Jaspers, Heidegger limits his interpretation to
a basic mode of approach which is simultaneously one of the greatest
weaknesses and greatest strengths of Heidegger's interp retatio n . By
so organizing his interpretation, Heidegger is able to present a major
aspect of Nietzsche's thought in great depth, but he is not able to
provide the m u ltip licity of perspectives which Jaspers discloses. I t
is in tere stin g to note here that Heidegger, like Jaspers, also in sists
upon a d ire c t encounter with the s p irit and passion of Nietzsche's
thought, y et each understands something quite d iffe re n t by this
encounter. For Jaspers this encounter is a d ialectical interchange;
for Heidegger i t is permitting Being to manifest i t s e l f in its unhid-
dennes. In Heidegger's work, the interpreter plays a more or less
passive role in r'elation to the self-revelation of Being. The basic
difference between the two approaches may therefore be stated as
follows: Jaspers' interpretation is essentially investigatory, an
exploration which attempts to chart an unknown sp iritu al te rrito ry .
In contrast, Heidegger's interpretation is not simply an investigation;
i t is rather an e x p lic it attempt to demonstrate a specific th esis,
viz. , that Nietzsche is most importantly a metaphysician and that his
metaphysics represents the culmination of metaphysics and at the same
time provides also the ground for a new ontology, specifically
Heidegger's.
An Alternative Interpretation: A Fundamental Dualism
Any c r itic a l examination of Heidegger's and Jaspers' interpre
tations is incomplete without an evaluation. An evaluation implies a
standpoint from which to evaluate. The standpoint in th is case
involves the presentation and defense of a particular th e sis, v iz . ,
that Nietzsche's epistemology and metaphysics, on the one hand, and
his philosophical anthropology and value theory, on the other, cannot
be brought harmoniously into systematic relation. There are certainly
real and profound sets of relations between Nietzsche's major concepts,
but there is also this fundamental dualism which runs through the very
core of Nietzsche's thought. I t will also be argued th a t any attempt
to impose a unity or to provide a bridge of systematic relations
between these two aspects, is fundamentally mistaken. Throughout our
examination of Heidegger's and Jaspers' interpretations we shall be
concerned with accumulating evidence for this thesis in terms of an
investigation of the major doctrines of Nietzsche.
18
The question th at must be raised here, then, is whether Jaspers
and Heidegger do attempt to relate systematically the two major aspects
of Nietzsche's thought. With Heidegger, the answer is clearly affirma
tive, for he in sists that the whole of Nietzsche's thought can be
systematically derived from Nietzsche's metaphysics. In certain
respects Heidegger presents a very strong case for. his position, and
we shall have to examine his view in some detail. With Jaspers,
however, the answer is not so immediately clear. However, we can find
an important guideline for our investigations in a criticism which
both Heidegger and Walter Kaufmann advance against Jaspers' Nietzsche
interpretation. The main charge is that Jaspers emphasizes Nietzsche's
"philosophizing" a t the expense of Nietzsche's philosophy; that i s ,
Jaspers attempts to establish a kind of synthetic unity in Nietzsche's
thought by dismissing his major metaphysical constructs... In other
words, such doctrines as the Will to Power and Eternal Recurrence,
Jaspers refuses to tre a t metaphysically. He considers them only
insofar as they relate to the position of his own.Existenzphilosophie.
"First, Jaspers .admittedly discounts Nietzsche's philosophy as opposed
to his 'philosophizing;' he refuses to take seriously superman and
recurrence, will to power and sublimation, or any other definite con-
21
cept." Heidegger advances almost precisely the same criticism :
^W alter Kaufmann, "Jaspers' Relation to Nietzsche," in The
Philosophy of Karl Jasp ers, ed. by Paul Schilpp (New York, 1957),
p. 431.
19
For Baeumler the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence is not recon
cilable with the p o litical interpretation of Nietzsche; for
Jaspers i t is not possible to take this doctrine seriously and
as an essential question, because according to him there is in
philosophy no truth in the concept nor in conceptual k n o w l e d g e . 22
This is, of course, a serious charge and one which we must investigate
as we proceed.
22
Heidegger, Nietzsche, pp. 31-32.
CHAPTER 1
NIETZSCHE AS A M A N A N D AS A PHILOSOPHER
The Relevance of Nietzsche's Life to His Thought
It is not our intention here to present or even to outline
a biography of Nietzsche. This would take us too fa r afield from
the real intention of our investigations. There is a multitude of
special problems pertaining to a Nietzsche biography and most existing
biographies suffer from two-serious lim itations: (1) most biogra
phies of Nietzsche display a radical bias of some sort on the part
of the biographer (e.g ., Alfred Baeumler, Ernst Bertram, Elizabeth
Fdrster-Nietzsche) and (2) almost every biographer of Nietzsche
approaches his subject from only a few of the essential perspectives
from .which he can be viewed. In other words, there is at present
no authoritative comprehensive biography of Nietzsche. However,
for our purposes, such a biography is not esse n tia l, since our in te r
est here is a less complex one; namely, the problem of the psycho
logical and existential relevance of Nietzsche's life -situ a tio n to
his thought in general. What we shall be concerned with demonstrating
is simply that there is a set of events and concerns in Nietzsche's
lif e that is crucial for the understanding of Nietzsche's thought.
Our in te re st here is not simply biographical, nor is i t simply philo
sophical; rather, we are concerned with the existential psychological
relations between the two, or more accurately, the personal philosophy
of Nietzsche as an expression of his life-world. Nietzsche himself
emphasizes this aspect of the interpretation of past systems when
he says, "The only thing of interest in a refuted system is the per
sonal element. I t alone is what is forever irrefutable.
Almost every interpreter of Nietzsche makes a special point
of the importance of Nietzsche's life for understanding his thought.
However, too much emphasis can be given to this relation. While the
events in Nietzsche's lif e certainly have considerable significance
fo r, and influence upon, his thought, Nietzsche should not be thought
of as a singular case in this respect. The same argument could be
advanced for Plato, Descarte, Aquinas, Berkeley, and almost every
other great thinker. With Nietzsche, however, biography has a special
prominence for at least two major reasons. F irst of a l l , we know more
about Nietzsche's life than we do about the lives of most other great
philosophers. This is partly due to the fa c t that Nietzsche was an
inveterate le tte r w riter, and in these le tte rs he often provides a
d irect connection between some set of events and the ideas with which
he was preoccupied at the moment. In addition to these le tte r s , there
is the mass of fragments which he le f t behind, as well as numerous
reminiscences by people who were acquainted with Nietzsche. There
are even li s t s of books in Nietzsche's library which provide some clue
to influences on his thought. Also there were a number of rather
^Friedrich Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the
Greeks, trans. Marianne Cowan (Gateway edition; Chicago, Henry Regnery
Company, 1962), p. 25.
22
dramatic events and situations in Nietzsche's life which were
undoubtedly of great psychological significance; e .g ., his friendship
and break with Wagner, his relationships with his s is te r and Lou
Andreas Salome, his epiphany in the mountains (Eternal Recurrence),
and, of course, his mental breakdown. The second reason revolves
around these events which had such extraordinary effects on Nietzsche's
thought. In fact, we might even say that these events resulted in
a set of psychological fixations in Nietzsche. By "fixation" we do
not mean any sort of pathological obsession in a psychiatric sense,
rather what is meant here is an extreme concern and pre-occupation
with certain ideas which are absolutely crucial to an understanding
of Nietzsche and his philosophy.
I t is a trib u te to Nietzsche's depth of insight as a psycho
logist that he himself was, to an astonishing degree, aware of these
fixations and further understood that they conditioned the character
of his philosophizing in an essential manner. Freud paid an immense
compliment to the power of Nietzsche's intuitive psychology.
In later years I have denied myself the very great pleasure of
. reading the works of Nietzsche, with the deliberate object of
not being hampered in working out the impressions received in
psycho-analysis by any sort of anticipatory ideas. I had th ere
fore to be prepared--and I am so, gladly--to forgo all claims
to priority in the many instances in which laborious psycho
analytic investigation can merely confirm the truths which the
philosopher recognized by in tu itio n .2
2
Sigmund Freud, On the History of the Psycho-analytic Movement,
Vol. XIV (1914-1916) of The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund
Freud, trans. and ed. James Strachey (London, 1957), pp. 15-16.
23
Jung, likewise, found in Nietzsche a wealth of psychological insight.
For my part, I had the great advantage over both Freud and Adler
of not having grown up within the narrow confines of a psychology
of the neuroses; rather, I approached from the side of psychiatry,
well prepared for modern psychology by Nietzsche.3
It is precisely this extraordinary ability to analyze his own person
a lity in depth that leads Nietzsche to his penetrating insights into
the psychological and value structures of modern society as manifested
in his own life-world. Zarathustra's struggles to overcome himself
(and thereby his "culture") are a concrete and vital expression of
Nietzsche's attempts at self-overcoming. Self-overcoming must be
understood in relation to the life-world of the se lf (and in its most
immediate and objective character--as "culture") and so i t is not a
conflict reducible to an egocentric subjectivism. In other words,
a self-overcoming must, within the context of Nietzsche's thought,
be understood as a d ialectic. These fixations we have mentioned form
important poles in the dialectic of Nietzsche's self-overcoming. W e
shall examine these fixations under six groupings.
Friendship
Nietzsche had an almost overwhelming need for friendship, but
his own sensitivity and_the rigorous demands which he made created a
set of conditions which i t was virtu ally impossible for any human
being to f u l f i l l . This is , of course, not to say that Nietzsche had
3
Carl Gustav Jung, Two Essays on Analytical Psychology, Vol.
VII of The Collected Works of C. G. Jung, trans. R. F. C. Hull
(New York, 1953), pp. 115-16.
24
no friends in the ordinary sense of th at word. However, "friend" for
Nietzsche meant something more like "spiritual companion." Three per
sons f ille d th is role for a time, but eventually Nietzsche suffered
disillusionment with all three: Richard.Wagner, Erwin Rhode, and
Lou Andreas Salome. Wagner was perhaps the greatest human disappoint
ment in Nietzsche's life , primarily because, a t f i r s t , Wagner seemed
to Nietzsche the fulfillm ent of his dream for a friend who was at
once spiritual companion, mentor, and disciple. The breach which
fin a lly resulted between them was largely due to reciprocal misunder
standing and to Nietzsche's sp iritu a lly a risto c ra tic passion for
honesty. Nietzsche's appropriation of Wagner's notions of the
Apollonian and the Dionysian led to Nietzsche's own extension and
synthesis of these ideas to produce an aesthetic to which Nietzsche
expected Wagner to remain true. This aesthetic, which Nietzsche for
mulates in The Birth of Tragedy, centers around the Apolloriian-
Dionysian synthesis which Nietzsche saw as the highest expression of
4
the Will to Power.
Nietzsche f e l t that within the context of genuine friendship
Wagner should have been able to accept honest criticism . At f i r s t ,
Nietzsche was overwhelmed by the forceful personality of Wagner and
Nietzsche's early attitude verged on hero-worship, and also Nietzsche
did not immediately realize that Wagner was incapable of accepting
criticism . Thus gradually Wagner became "human, all-too-human" in
^This view runs through the entire body of Nietzsche's work
up to and including The Will to Power.
25
Nietzsche's eyes. Furthermore, the aesthetic which Nietzsche wished
to impose on Wagner's work was alien to i t and Nietzsche's rejection
of Wagner's a r t as "ph ilistin e'1 was the resu lt of the application of
this alien standard. Nonetheless, Nietzsche continued to regard Wagner
as a great genius of the age and his criticisms of Wagner were simul
taneously criticism s of the historical and cultural situation which
produced Wagner. The opening of Bayreuth was the beginning of the
end, for Nietzsche saw Wagner as having yielded to the cultural
P hilistines. Nietzsche expressed what he f e l t were honest, i f extreme,
criticism s, a fte r having, for some considerable time, withheld his
most severe remarks out of a concern for the continuance of th eir
friendship. However, a certain s p irit and tone of reservation is
already clearly apparent even in Nietzsche's monograph Richard Wagner
in Bayreuth. The final break came in Italy when Wagner told Nietzsche
of his plans for P a rsifa l. Nietzsche, with his a n ti-C h ristian ity , saw
this as a betrayal of the aesthetic which he attributed to Wagner and
accused Wagner of hypocrisy. There were moments la te r when Nietzsche
f e l t very keenly that he should have supressed his criticism s of
Wagner as is reflected when Zarathustra says, " It is nobler to declare
oneself wrong than tc in s is t on being right--especially when one is
right. Only one must be rich enough for that."^ Be th is as i t may,
Nietzsche's compulsion toward honesty took precedence a t the time and
i t should be noted that Nietzsche made his demands as rigorously on
^Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra in The Portable
Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York, 1967), p. 180.
26
himself as he did upon others, as we shall la te r see.
I t is evident that the relationship between Wagner and
Nietzsche is of immense complexity. However, we can find a number of
important psychological clues which give us an insight into both
Nietzsche's personality and his thought. Nietzsche's concept of
"friend" is essentially th at of the "higher man," whom Zarathustra
seeks; the man who is on his way to becoming the Superman. Thus, i t
is important to realize that this concept of the Superman arises out
of Nietzsche's own particular psychology. Also, what Georg Brandes
speaks of as Nietzsche's "aristo cratic radicalism" is a resu lt of
Nietzsche's psychological constitution. Nietzsche sensed in himself
and a few others the tremendous p o ten tialitie s of the individual human
being. This recognition was in large part the result of Nietzsche's
in tuitive psychological investigations into the structure of his own
personality. This recognition led to a vast complex of ideas.
Nietzsche's vision of the p o ten tialitie s of the human being became
in his early work an important aspect of his aesthetic. In fa c t, this
ideal conception of man is profoundly Greek and i t views the individual
as a potential work of a rt which is self-created. The disparity
between this ideal and the re a l, ordinary man was a source of great
pain and disillusionment for Nietzsche. Moreover, this disparity is
the source of Nietzsche's contempt for ordinary men or the "herd."
This contempt is at the root of Nietzsche's humanism. For Nietzsche,
the contempt that arises from the disparity between the real and the
ideal is the psychologically motivating fa c t, a manifestation of the
Will to Power, that can lead man to overcome himself and set out on
the path toward the Superman. There is a profound parallel between
the Greek conception of the "pursuit of excellence" and the Nietzschean
conception of the pursuit of the Superman, but there is also a profound
difference. This difference lies in Nietzsche's rejection of Greek
rationalism, since for Nietzsche the shaping s p ir i t of man as a poten
tia l work of a rt is not simply the in te lle c t, but in stin ct as well.
Man is not simply s p ir i t , but animal as well, and while for the Greeks
man's fulfillm ent was the transcendence of his animality through rea
son, for Nietzsche any transcendence must be a synthesis which inte
grates man's animality with his s p ir itu a lity . A rejection of in stin ct
leads, from Nietzsche's point of view, to sp iritu al degeneration.
The same basic problem also arises in Nietzsche's relation
ships with Rhode and Lou Salome. Rhode, a contemporary and fellow
student, shared Nietzsche's early in tere sts and evidently manifested
a sim ilar passion for rebellion against the established values of the
period. Rhode, however, in contradistinction to Nietzsche, remained
primarily a philologist and sought personal security within the con
texts of his family l if e and his academic pursuits. Again Nietzsche
saw here a subtle kind of betrayal, for he despised a security which,
in his eyes, could be attained only at the sacrifice of oneself and
one's most immediate values. Nietzsche and Rhode continued to be
friends, but the warmth and v ita lity of th e ir early relationship was
lo st. In a sense Rhode's "betrayal" was as great as Wagner's, because
Rhode had not remained true to the youthful visions and passions which
28
remained as a powerful motivating force throughout Nietzsche's l i f e .
Throughout Nietzsche's work there is this aspect of the visionary and
Nietzsche could only regard Rhode's growing conservatism as a s a c ri
lege against the most fundamentally spiritual foundations of man's
existence as an attempt to "overcome" and "go beyond" himself.
Nietzsche's strong sense of disappointment with other human
beings is also sharply illu strated in his brief friendship with Lou
Salome. Nietzsche's side of this relationship might, without exag
geration, be termed an infatuation. But from all indications, this
passionate involvement was not reciprocal and she seemed much more
interested in Paul Ree. Nietzsche probably projected much more into
the relationship than was actually present. At f i r s t , he believed
Lou Salome to be the ideal disciple, and although Nietzsche rarely
gave anyone credit for understanding him, he believed th a t she genu
inely understood his philosophy. In fact, he goes so fa r as to say,
in a l e t t e r to Overbeck, "Lou is by far the most in te llig e n t human
being I have met." .However, Nietzsche's disenchantment came quickly,
partly as a resu lt of a campaign against Lou which Nietzsche's s is te r
undertook. His reaction was for a time so extreme th a t only six
months la te r he wrote to Malvida von Meysenbug; "Above a l l , what
I have now come to know, unfortunately,’much too l a t e l - - i s that these
two persons, Ree and Lou are not worthy of licking my boot soles.
Nietzsche l e t t e r to Franz Overbeck in Schlechta, Nietzsche:
Werke, I I I , 1203, my translation.
^Nietzsche l e t t e r to Malwida von Meysenbug in Schlechta,
Nietzsche: Werke, I I I , 1210, my translation.
29
Later, however, Nietzsche modified this attitu d e toward Lou, for he
f e l t that he had come under the malicious influence of his s is te r.
Nonetheless, this strong tendency to extremism is an important topic
which we shall have occasion to examine more closely a b it la te r.
Nietzsche's relationships with women were, on the whole,
ambivalent and frequently painful. The most important woman in his
lif e was, of course, his s is t e r , Elizabeth Forster-Nietzsche.
Nietzsche f e l t a very deep bond with his s is te r , but also expressed
much h o stility toward her. Even though she was a great defender of
her brother's works, she could never be a satisfactory disciple, for
the simple reason that she appropriated ideas from him which she
blended (and distorted with ideas of her own. She is , in f a c t, largely
responsible for the myths th at grew up around Nietzsche in the early
part of this century). For example, Elizabeth's anti-Semitism dis
gusted Nietzsche, as is evident from this passage in one of his le tte rs
to her.
You have committed one of the greatest stu p id itie s—for yourself
and for mel Your association with an anti-Semitic chief expresses
a foreignness to my whole way of l if e which f i l l s me again and
again with ire or melancholy . . . . I t is a matter of honor with
me to be absolutely clean and unequivocal in relation to anti-
Semitism, namely, opposed to i t , as I am in my writings. I have
• recently been persecuted with le tte rs and Anti-Semitic Correspon
dence Sheets. M y disgust with this party (which would like the
benefit of my name only too well!) is as pronounced as possible,
but the relation to Forster, as well as the a fte r effects of my
former publisher, the anti-Semitic Schmeitzner, always brings
the adherent of this disagreeable party back to the idea that I
must belong to them a fte r a ll . . . . I t arouses mistrust against
my character, as i f publicly I condemned something which I favored
secretly—and that I am unable to do anything against i t that the
30
name of Zarathustra is used in every Anti-Semitic Correspondence
Sheet, has almost made me sick several tim es.8
Nonetheless, she tried to use Nietzsche's philosophy of power as a
foundation for her anti-Semitic views. Thus, Elizabeth could never
be a disciple in Nietzsche's sense nor could Peter Gast (pseudonym
for Heinrich Koselitz), who blindly accepted and revered everything
that Nietzsche uttered. Von Gersdorff, Overbeck, Gast, Lou, Elizabeth,
and Paul Ree were hardly candidates for th at group of "higher men"
which Nietzsche sought after and longed for. Nietzsche understood
only too well that propensity for distortion and abuse which disciples
practice on the ideas of th eir mentors, but he understood equally well
the disastrous results of uncritical obeisance. The "higher men" whom
Nietzsche sought had to be at once pupil and master, friend and c ritic .
Throughout his lif e he was b itte rly disappointed th at he found no suoh
friend and disciple among his contemporaries. Out of his solitude
he sought out the "higher men" of the past, the "super-historical
individuals" who, like Nietzsche, had stood alone and isolated beyond
th e ir age. Nietzsche'thus sought comfort in his isolation through a
sp iritual kinship with such "super-historical individuals" as Goethe
and Spinoza.
The conditions and demands entailed by Nietzsche's conception
of friendship result in part from Nietzsche's isolation which at the
same time exempted him from most of the usual social and familial
resp o n sib ilities. The lack of these obligations permitted him to
O
Nietzsche le tte r to his s is te r in The Portable Nietzsche,
trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York, 1967), pp. 456-57.
live in a situation relatively free from the practical pressures of
day-to-day social l i f e and i t was precisely this situation that per
mitted him to make such extreme demands upon himself in the realm of
the s p ir it.
With Nietzsche man stands alone, as he himself did, neurotic,
financially dependent, godless, and worldless. This is no ideal
for a real man 'who has a family to support and taxes to pay.
Nothing can argue the reality of the world out of existence, there
is no miraculous way round i t . 9
Thus the sp iritu al intensity of Nietzsche's views is a direct result
of his life -s itu a tio n and Nietzsche made relativ e ly l i t t l e allowance
for the radically different 1ife-situations of others. His conception
of sp iritu al interaction with other human beings presupposed a lif e -
situation sim ilar to his own in terms of relativ e freedom from respon
s i b i l i t y and in th is respect Nietzsche was a dogmatist. The p rio rity
which he gives to sp iritu al interaction between human beings has many
profound and extensive ramifications with regard to a theory of social
interactio n , and, on an even more basic level, creates the demand for
a radical restructuring of values, a transvaluation. Here we encounter
the other major aspect involved in Nietzsche's conception of friend
ship. In order to in teract with another on a sp iritu a l plane, one
must f i r s t have achieved the level of striving toward Selfhood or,
to use Nietzsche's phrase, a "returning home" to the Self. Before
one can in te ra c t meaningfully with another, he must f i r s t a tta in an
understanding of who he is and where he is metaphysically. The u l t i
mate achievement of sp iritual companionship, then, arises out of the
Q
Jung, Two Essays on Analytical Psychology, VII, p. 235.
most profound solitude and isolation which are necessary conditions
for the attainment of Self and the relation of Self to the Other.
This is one of the "contradictions" in Nietzsche that Jaspers is fond
of pointing out. Properly understood Nietzsche's position here is
not a contradiction or, i f i t is , i t is merely a logical contradic
tion, for Nietzsche's contentions th at solitude and isolation are
pre-conditions for Selfhood and that Selfhood is a pre-condition for
entering into a sp iritu al community, certainly do not re su lt in a
psychological or existential contradiction. Here one is strongly
reminded of the parallel in Hesse's Journey to the East which is a
metaphysical rather than a physical journey. The double theme of
solitude and loneliness play a central role in Nietzsche's conception
of the essential nature of philosophy and i t is these topics which we
must now examine.
Solitude, Loneliness, and Philosophy
Nietzsche had the extraordinary a b ility to transform negative
factors in his environment and personal make-up into factors of at
least partial positive import. Nietzsche recognized the danger of
his desire for diciples and recognized further that this desire arose
out of his loneliness. Of even greater consequence, however, is his
understanding th a t the indulgence of this desire constituted a s p ir
itual weakness which contained within i t an immense destructive force,
for its ultimate object was the satisfaction of vanity. The eloquent
speech which Zarathustra gives at the end of the f i r s t book contains
33
a double message, in f a c t, a double warning. The warning to the
disciples is obvious enough.
Now I go alone, my disciples. You too go now, alone. Thus
I want i t . Verily, I counsel you: go away from me and r e s is t
Zarathustra! And even better: be ashamed of him! Perhaps he
deceived you.
The man of knowledge must not only love his enemies, he must
also be able to hate his friends.
One repays a teacher badly i f one always remains nothing but
a pupil. And why do you not want to pluck at my wreath?
You revere me; but what i f your reverence tumbles.one day?
Beware le st a statue slay you.10
However, less obviously Zarathustra's speech contains a warning for
himself.
You say you believe in Zarathustra? But what matters
Zarathustra? You are my believers--but what matter all believers?
You had not yet sought yourselves: and you found me. Thus do
all believers; therefore all fa ith amounts to so l i t t l e . H
Zarathustra's warning of the disciples against himself is also a
warning to himself against disciples or "believers." Here and e lse
where Thus Spoke Zarathustra can serve as a guide to the central core
of Nietzsche's thought, for i t is in th is book that most of Nietzsche's
early major ideas achieve fru itio n and the works which follow i t are,
in a very important sense, explications and elaborations of the major
themes, both ex p licit and im plicit, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In
this sense one can speak of this book as the axis of Nietzsche's phi
losophy. What is interesting here is not only Nietzsche's recognition
of the danger of potential appeal to his vanity, but the further
awareness that this danger arose from his spiritual isolation. This
^ N ie tz s c h e , Thus Spoke Z a r a th u s tr a , p. 190.
^ I b id . , p. 190.
34
struggle, which is a painful r e a lity for many, was greatly heightened
in Nietzsche's case due to his almost overwhelming need for sympathetic
concern and encouragement with regard to his work. Here we encounter
another of those existential oppositions which are central to
Nietzsche's life-situ atio n . The very intensity of Nietzsche's self-
absorbtion and self-concern made i t v irtu a lly impossible for him to
manifest a reciprocal concern fo r the life -s itu a tio n of another human
being. The resulting isolation is a consequence of the dialectical
relation between solitude and loneliness re lativ e to the essential
meaning of philosophy for Nietzsche. For Nietzsche all genuine phi
losophy arises out of the life -s itu a tio n of the individual philosopher.
Gradually i t has become clear to me what every great philosophy
so fa r has been: namely, the personal confession of its author
and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir; also that the
moral (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy constituted the
real germ of life from which the whole plant had grownJ2
Thus, philosophy is dependent upon the existential uniqueness of the
thinker and finds significant expression only in those who have plumbed
the most ecstatic heights and the most terrify in g depths of their own
identity. I t is for this reason th a t Nietzsche can say of Kant that
he remained at the level of c r i t i c and never attained the heights
and depths of philosophy. The continuous process of the discovery
of Self is, then, a necessary aspect of genuine philosophizing and
a pre-requisite for such discovery is solitude. Only by being alone
with oneself can one aspire to philosophy. Here the word "solitude"
1 o
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and E v il, trans. Walter
Kaufmann (New York, 1966), p. 13.
35
is ambiguous, for certainly Kant's work too required a kind of s o li
tude. W e must understand the phrase, "being alone with oneself," in
its most lite ra l sense. Kant's solitude usually had an "external"
content, whereas the solitude of which Nietzsche speaks has as its
content aspects of the life-situ atio n of Nietzsche himself. This,
of course, does not mean that Nietzsche's philosophy is "merely sub
je c tiv e ." Nietzsche, like Kierkegaard, realized th at the c rite ria
of truth arise from the life -situ a tio n of the individual and, fu rth er
more, th at "objectivity" frequently means nothing more than "collec
tive subjectivity."
A solitude, which has as i t s primary c h aracteristic a s e lf-
directedness, becomes a prime requisite fo r genuine philosophy. This
self-understanding creates a recognition’ of the need of relationship
to the Other as a fulfillm ent of one's own being. For Nietzsche, such
interrelationship is immensely complicated by the demand that one never
sacrifice the interests of the Self to the Other, for to do so would,
in Nietzsche's eyes, .produce a mutual degradation. Nietzsche in sists
th at significant relationships with other human beings are possible
only by uncompromisingly becoming what one is. One can never sacrifice
his own in terest to the Other, for such an a c t, far from being a ltr u
i s t i c , is a betrayal both of himself and of the Other. The re su lt of
such demands is isolation and loneliness, unless one is able to find
some other human being who lives with the same se lf-in te n sity and can
thus provide a spiritual companionship. As we have discovered,
Nietzsche was never able to find such an individual. Solitude was
for him not only necessary, but highly positive, for i t s product was
a "joyful wisdom"; but at the same time there' was the immense need
to share the fru its of this solitude. Loneliness haunted Nietzsche;
in fa c t, i t is extremely likely that the oppression of his loneliness
was ultim ately fa r more painful than all of his physical torments.
I t should now be clear that, for Nietzsche, the realizatio n of the
Self meant becoming a philosopher in his sense of th at word. Thus,
i t is not surprising that Nietzsche found no "friend" among his con
temporaries who could p alliate his loneliness, for such a "friend"
(who would of necessity also be a great spiritual enemy) would have
had to have been a philosopher equal to Nietzsche in rank. Out of
his loneliness and his great need for communion and self-expression,
Nietzsche turned to writing. I t is perhaps fortunate for us that
he did not find his spiritual companion; had he done so we might not
have his writings. For philosophy, Nietzsche contends, solitude is
esse n tia l, for philosophy is a "voluntary living amid ice and mountain
13
heights." Perhaps loneliness was essential as well. What is cer
tain is that this loneliness plays a crucial role in Nietzsche's
extremism.
Sickness and Health
In addition to the mental anguish which Nietzsche suffered,
he was a fflic te d with migrane, insomnia, and serious stomach ailments.
13
Nietzsche quoted in Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics,
pp. 12-13.
37
It is also known that Nietzsche had considerable difficulty with his
eyes and at times could barely use them for reading or writing and
thus had to dictate his thought, usually to von Gersdorff or Peter
Gast. One commentator has gone so fa r as to suggest that Nietzsche's
migrane, insomnia, dyspepsia, hypertension, and even his mental break
down were the resu lt of severe e y e stra in .1^ Here we are not particu
larly interested in speculating about the causes, but rather we shall
concern ourselves with the effects of these illnesses on Nietzsche
and his attitudes toward them.
Nietzsche's most frequent complaints in his letters concern
his insomnia and his migrane attacks and i t is well known that he
rather indiscriminately used all kinds of medicines in an e ffo rt to
get re lie f. I t has been suggested by some commentators that there
is a correlation between Nietzsche's use of drugs and the ecstatic
states during the writing of Thus Spoke Zarathustra and moments such
as his epiphany of Eternal Recurrence on the mountain. There i s ,
however, l i t t l e concrete evidence for such a conjecture and any
rejection of ideas ostensibly propounded under such influences is
simply a case of the genetic fallacy.
A more important question is the question of Nietzsche's
sanity prior to his breakdown at the end of 1888. Extremists have
wished to dismiss the whole of Nietzsche's writings as the ravings
of a madman. On the other hand, Nietzsche's apologists have con
structed elaborate and tenuous arguments trying to establish that
lAGeorge M . Gould, Biographic C lin ics, II (Philadelphia,1904).
he was unquestionably sane and lucid up to the very moment of his
complete breakdown. In fact, both kinds of arguments are irrelevant
for two reasons. F irst of a l l , this is again an example of the
genetic fallacy; Nietzsche's ideas must be evaluated in terms of
th e ir value and quality as ideas. I t is quite possible that a
"madman" can be the creator of highly sig nificant and insightful
thoughts. Lucidity is not the exclusive property of normality, nor
even of sanity. The second d ifficu lty is the ambiguity of the word
"insanity." "Insanity" is not a technical term and has been applied
to everything from psychoses resulting from physiological damage,
to any form of behavior or expression not consonant with the views
of the particular c ritic . If by "sane" we mean "rationally meaningful
and coherent," then certainly even Nietzsche's la s t writings were
"sane" i f somewhat extreme. What can be said is that Nietzsche was
certainly medically insane a fter the end of 1888, but on no rea
sonable grounds can one dismiss any of Nietzsche's works as "mere
ravings of a madman." I t is an extremely instructive exercise to
compare one of Nietzsche's la s t works, The A nti-C hrist, for example,
with The Diaries of Vaslav Nijinsky. The tone of Nietzsche's book
is sometimes sh rill and harsh, but i t is nonetheless lucid and
coherent, whereas the Nijinsky Diaries are clearly a product of
insanity, at once touching and terrifying. What we must remember
is th at none of Nietzsche's writings, no matter how extreme or
caustic, can simply be dismissed as products of insanity.
39
The most significant aspect of Nietzsche's illnesses derives
from his attitu d e towards them. For Nietzsche his illnesses became
concrete manifestations of the metaphysical principle of the world-
obstacle. Every individual encounters his own lim itations and in
addition importunities inflicted by his environment; obstacles to
the realization of one's Self and one's freedom. The important thing
is not the negativity of these obstacles, but rather th e ir positive
aspect as something to be overcome, something to t e s t one's strength
against. The overcoming of such obstacles is an in trin s ic part of
the process of se lf-realizatio n . These obstacles are a direct chal
lenge to the individual's Will to Power, and here again Nietzsche
is merciless in his demands; he will not countenance self-indulgent
rationalization. As Zarathustra says, "Life is hard to bear; but do
not act so tend erly ."15 His position here is one of an all-consuming
Will to Strength. This doctrine is a call to n o b ility , a challenge
to p it one's strength against the world-obstacle and i f one cannot
overcome, then a t least one fa ils magnificently. I t is true that
sometimes Nietzsche in his le tte rs complains b itte rly of his a f f l i c
tions in a fashion "human, all-too-human," but he nevertheless con
tinues to wrestle with them and attempts to overcome them up to the
very moment of his breakdown. Nietzsche may have fa lte re d , but he
never succumbed.
Out of this basic doctrine Nietzsche developed a whole phi
losophy of strength and health, spiritual as well as physical. Just
l 5N ietzsche, Thus Spoke Z ara th u stra, p. 153.
40
as there are diseases of the body, so there are diseases of the s p ir i t .
Indeed, Nietzsche's writings on ethics might be regarded as textbooks
on moral pathology. There are diseases of the s p irit th a t are
especially virulent and even the strongest men fa ll prey to them.
I t is highly sig n ifican t that in the process of Zarathustra's strug-
gle to achieve Selfhood, he describes himself as a convalescent.
Even the great individual, who is on the path to the Superman, suffers
from the diseases of his culture and must undergo a radical "cure"
in order to overcome himself and become what as yet he is only poten
tia lly . Thus, the doctrine of strength and its Will to Power lead
inexorably to the doctrine of the Superman.
It is also here that we discover the roots of N ietzsche's
conception of the freedom of the individual and the psychological
ramifications of th a t conception. The entire notion of man's poten
tia l nobility and superiority as the Superman re st upon the possi
b ility for the ini dividual to combat and overcome not only his inherent
weaknesses, but also the weaknesses that have been conditioned into
him by his culture. This, of course, presupposes that man is not
a t the mercy of his environment, that he has the freedom to create
himself through and in spite of his environment. Here again we
encounter a strong parallel between Nietzsche's concept of man and
the Greek concept of man as a potential self-created work of a r t .
The f i r s t stage in th is self-creation is the discovery of the disease,
so that a cure might be effected. I t is the disease which we must
now consider.
41
Christianity and the Anti-Christ
To Nietzsche the most dangerous and the most te rrib le disease
of contemporary European man was Christianity. W e must be careful
here to distinguish between Nietzsche's attitude toward the h is to r i
cal person of Jesus and his attitu d e toward Jesus as the Christ and
his influence on world history. Nietzsche found things to admire in
the person of Jesus, p a rtic u la rly his anarchism, his kindness, and
his hatred of hypocrisy; but he rejected the essentially passive and
negative attitude of Jesus toward earthly life . Nietzsche regarded
this as an inversion of the Will to Power, such that i t turned inward
against its e lf . Ultimately he is an antagonist of Jesus, but he
respects the honesty embodied in the acting out of his life -s itu a tio n .
For Nietzsche, the ultimate "sin" of Jesus was his permitting himself
to be overcome by p ity , thus becoming the progenitor of the "noble
lie" which promised the meek the dominion of the earth and a p riv i
leged position in the l i f e beyond death. Zarathustra's remark about
God also applies here to Jesus as an historical person:' "He offended
the taste of m y ears and eyes; I do not want to say anything worse
about him now that he is dead."16 Zarathustra also warns against
pity.
One ought to hold on to one's heart; for if one lets i t go,
one soon loses control of the head too. Alas, where in the world
has there been more fo lly than among the pitying? And what in
the world has caused more suffering than the folly of the pitying?
W oe to all who love without having a height that is above th e ir
pity!
1^N ietzsche, Thus Spoke Z a ra th u s tra , p. 373.
42
Thus spoke the devil to me once: "God too has his hell: that
is his love of man." And most recently I heard him say th is:
"God is dead; God died of his pity for man."
Thus be warned of pity: from there a heavy cloud will yet
come to man.*'
Pity for Nietzsche, was the greatest danger to the individual's own
Will to Power.
The Christ of C h ristian ity —essentially the creation of Paul
is quite a different matter, for in Christianity, Nietzsche argues,
even that which is good in the model of Jesus is perverted and used
by the weak to gain dominance over those who are superior to them.
I t is the la tte r point which Nietzsche also objects to in democracy,
in socialism, and in liberalism ; all three of which he sees as essen
tia lly derivative from the historical development of Christianity.
This perversion Nietzsche c a lls the "Will to Equality."
Thus I speak to you in a parable—you who make souls whirl,
you preachers of e q u a lity . To me you are tarantulas, and secretly
vengeful. But I shall bring your secrets to light; therefore I
laugh in your faces with my laughter of the heights. Therefore
I tear a t your webs, th at your rage may lure you out of your lie -
holes and your revenge may leap out from behind your word ju stic e .
For that man be delivered from revenge, that is for me the bridge
to the highest hope, and a rainbow a fte r long sto rm sJ8
To Zarathustra ju stice speaks a different truth.
I do not wish to be mixed up and confused with these preachers
of equality. For, to m e^ ju stic e speaks thus: "Men are not
equal." Nor shall they become equal 1 What would my love of the
overman be if I spoke otherwise?^9
The prophets of equality, both religious and social, Nietzsche regards
as motivated primarily by revenge. The egalitarian passion is the
drive to destroy the superior, to reduce all things to the level of
1 7 lb id ., p. 202. T8 I b i d . , p. 211. 19I b id ., p. 213.
43
uniform, and therefore innocuous, mediocrity. The virtues of Chris
tia n ity allow the punishment of the transgressor by claiming concern
for a higher good, the salvation of the transgressor's soul. In
re a lity the motive is not the promotion of a higher good, but, on
the contrary, an indulgence in man's basest passion—revenge, the
desire to demean and destroy th a t which is superior. This, of course,
Nietzsche regards as a perversion of the Will to Power, a perversion
we have experienced in the fascism of Nazi Germany, in the People's
Democracies of Communism, and in the pseudo-egalitarianism of American
capitalism.
In liberalism, in socialism, in democracy—however anti-
Christian the poses they may s tr ik e —Nietzsche sees essentially
the result of enervated C h ristianity. In them Christianity lives
on, and in comfortable mendacities of Christian origin, maintains
a secular existence. Philosophy, morality, modern humanism and
its egalitarian ideals in p a rtic u la r, are also Christian ideals
in disguise. That the weak as such, the impotent of any kind,
must be aided; that the mere fa c t of being biologically human
ju s tifie s a claim to all which is attainable only by men of excel
lence; that every simpleton and lowbrow should be given a chance
to learn what is f i t only for an original thinker; th at absolute
primacy goes to man's mere existence and not to his substance,
not to his enthusiasm, not to whatever is genuine and spontaneous
in him;.that we le t i t appear as though everyone were capable of
everything; that we do not acknowledge the rigor of given facts;
that we do not accept decisions; th at, in fa c t, we use sp iritu a lity
and ideality as mere means of self-preservation, to gain power in
a struggle for existence which is actually going on all the time,
and that this makes all things untrue—th is , to Nietzsche, is
the result of the primal d isto rtio n which he lays to late Antiquity
to Judaism, and to C h ristia n ity .20
These remarks should indicate th a t Nietzsche by no means intended the
doctrine of the Will to Power to be used as a foundation for and
20
Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche and C h ristian ity , trans. E. B. Ashton
(Chicago, 1967), p. 39.
44
ju stific a tio n of political and economic machinations. The Will to
Power and the doctrine of the Superman are primarily metaphysical doc
trines directed at the highest sp iritu al development of the poten
t i a l i t i e s of the individual human being and apply to politics only in
the sense of "great p o litic s," which notion too Nietzsche derives p r i
marily from the Greeks. There i s , of course, im plicit in this posi
tion a theory of social interaction and we shall as we proceed, be con
cerned with expounding i t and its ram ifications. What is important
here, however, is the recognition that the metaphysical doctrine, of
the Will to Power does not inherently involve a value disposition,
that is , i t is by its nature neither good nor bad—its individual
manifestations may be eith er.
Nietzsche's anti-C hristianity is essentially religious as
Nietzsche himself realized when he le ts the old pope say to
Zarathustra:
"What is this I hear?" said the old pope at this point pricking
up his ears. "0 Zarathustra, with such disbelief you are more
pious than you believe. Some god in you must have converted you
to your godlessness. Is i t not your piety i t s e l f that no longer
lets you believe in a god? And your overgreat honesty will yet
lead you beyond good and evil to o .21
Nietzsche's upbringing as a p astor's son was deeply religious and his
gradual disappointment and disillusionment with Christianity came as
a resu lt of the deeply inbedded stra ta of hypocrisy both in Christian
dogma and practice.
^ N ie tz s c h e , Thus Spoke Z a r a th u s tr a , p. 374.
45
Aga,inst C h ristian ity , Nietzsche repeats the largely ju stified
charge which has been raised in the Far East ever since the Thir
teenth century: that Christians do not practice what they preach,
no matter what th e ir holy books say. As Nietzsche puts it: "A
Buddhist acts differently from a non-Buddhist; a Christian acts
like everybody else and practices a C hristianity of moods and
ritual s . "^2
For Nietzsche, Christianity was not religious enough and many of his
criticism s precisely parallel criticism s of the profoundly Christian,
Kierkegaard. In fact, many of the virtues which Nietzsche praises can
be found in the primordial substance of the Christian attitude.
However, Nietzsche's reaction to nineteenth century Christianity is
as profound as i t is extreme.
The two deadly themes of revenge and pity along with their
myriad variations provide the psychological underpinnings for h is to ri
cal Christianity and are, in Nietzsche's eyes, positively Machiavellian.
Christianity exploits man's baset desires, f i r s t of a l l , by its appeal
to that most dangerous of illu sio n s--eq u ality ; and secondly, through
its distortion of the individual Will to Power by teaching the Chris
tian that he is one of God's Elect. The dialectical interplay of
humility and h.ybris in C hristianity would be an extremely fru itfu l
area of study for the psychologist of religion. Nietzsche's analyses
of the motivations underlying the world-view of historical Christianity
•reveal his great powers of penetration as a psychologist, for even
Zarathustra had to wrestle with the immense forces of revenge and pity.
Nietzsche was basically an extremely kind-hearted human being and
suffering almost invariably moved him deeply. He was keenly aware of
22
J a s p e rs , N ietzsche and C h r i s t i a n i t y , p. 47.
46
the fatal temptation of pity or compassion in his own person. ^ For
Nietzsche, the emotion of pity concealed a double danger. If one
yields to pity, one endangers his own Will to Power by making sacri
fices which are dSstructive to his own becoming’as an individual.
Also pity degrades the potential n o b ility and strength of the Other
and thereby threatens the Will to Power of the Other, for this emotion
engenders an attitude which regards i t s object as weak and helpless.
Even worse i t provides the foundation for a kind of false superiority.
Here we need to reflect for a moment on Nietzsche's meaning of supe
r io r ity , in order to avoid certain egregious, but nonetheless frequent,
types of confusion. It should be obvious that when Nietzsche speaks
of superiority, he does not mean economic, social, p o litical, r e l i
gious, or racial superiority. His conception of superiority centers
on the 1ife-situation of the individual and its spiritual quality more
than anything else; that is, the individual must always strive to be
superior to what he is at the moment. His superiority can never be
the arrogance of self-satisfactio n . The individual must be his own
severest c r itic recognizing both his strengths and,his weaknesses,
which means he must avoid false modesty and pseudo-humility as s trin
gently as arrogance.
In spite of Nietzsche's harsh condemnations of Christianity
there is , as we have seen, a strong religious motivation behind his
^Nietzsche uses the word "Mitleid" for pity or compassion and
‘ puns on i t : "mit lei den.1 1 As a re s u lt he argues th at "mit lei den"
(com-passion) merely increases "leiden" or suffering.
47
philosophy. But what do we niean here by "religious?" Mircea Eliade
in his excellent l i t t l e book, The Sacred and the Profane, describes
two primordial impulses which he believes characterize the essence of
re lig io n .24 The f i r s t is an impulse toward the absolute, toward per
manence, and the second is the attempt to create a system of explana
tion which organizes one's experience into a comprehensive coherent
whole. This second impulse Eliade describes as the attempt to produce
kosmos out of Chaos. A highly graphic presentation of the f i r s t
impulse is to be found in Zarathustra's roundelay.
0 man, take care I
What does the deep midnight declare?
"I was asleep—
From a deep dream I woke and swear:
The world is deep,
Deeper than the day had been aware.
Deep is its woe;
Joy—deeper yet than agony:
W oe implores: Go!
But all joy wants ete rn ity —
Wants deep, wants deep e te rn ity ." 25
This longing for eternity is also the ex isten tial foundation for
Nietzsche's doctrine of Eternal Recurrence.
The second impulse basic to relig io n , the movement from Chaos
to kosmos, is found in Nietzsche's philosophy taken as a whole. That
he did not succeed in presenting a unified kosmos, we shall try to
demonstrate in the chapters which follow. The important thing here
is to understand Nietzsche's philosophy as such an attempt at kosmos.
24Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane (New York: 1961).
25N ietzsche, Thus Spoke Z a r a th u s tr a , p. 436.
48
Epistemologically Nietzsche, with his doctrine of perspectivism, is
a Heraclitean, but ontologically, he does not have the foundational
underpinning of Logos which we find in Heraclitus. Nietzsche's quest
for such a foundation led him again and again to the doctrine of
Eternal Recurrence. But the appearance of this doctrine is far more •
than simply the result of an ontological-epistemological exercise.
This longing for permanence and etern ity reveals an e x iste n tia l-
psychological limitation of the human life -s itu a tio n , namely the
impossibility of ever grasping and accepting our own death. Freud,
in his essay, "Thoughts on War and Death," puts i t very succinctly.
Our own death is indeed unimaginable, and whenever we make the
attempt to imagine i t we can perceive that we really survive as
spectators. Hence the psychoanalytic school could venture on the
assertion that at bottom no one believes in his own death, or to
put the same thing in another way, in the unconscious everyone
of us is convinced of his own immortality.26
But Eternal Recurrence was not, even for Nietzsche, a completely
satisfactory solution to the problems of permanence and Being. There
is a deeply rooted ambivalence in Nietzsche's attitude toward his own
doctrine.
Transvaluation and Humanism
Nietzsche's philosophy has often been criticized and rejected
as nihilism. Such a judgment misses the whole point of his philosophy.
- Nietzsche's declaration that God is dead simply makes explicit a
26Sigmund Freud, "Thoughts on War and Death," in On Creativity
and the Unconscious, ed. Benjamin Nelson (New York, 1965), pp. 222-23.
49
nihilism which had already penetrated and permeated the very founda-
tions of Western culture. The entire project of transvaluation is
Nietzsche's attempt to overcome nihilism . One of Nietzsche's char*
acterizations of the philosopher is th at he is a "physician of cul
ture"; and he means this in two respects. F irst of a l l , the philoso
pher is the diagnostician of culture and he makes apparent the diseases
which infect his culture. Functioning as a c r i ti c of contemporary
culture, Nietzsche produced some of his fin e st insights as well as
some of his bitterest condemnations. Many of the cultural illnesses
which Nietzsche diagnosed are to be found as spiritual illnesses
against which Nietzsche had to struggle as aspects of his own most
intimate 1 ife-situation. Nietzsche's obsession with rooting out the
diseases of culture tended at times toward a kind of fascination and
pre-occupation rather like that of Hans Castorp's in Thomas Mann's
The Magic Mountain.
The second aspect of the philosopher as. a "physician of cul
ture" is th at of a healer of the s p ir i t and i t is here that Transval
uation comes in. Nietzsche could come to terms with physical and
spiritual sickness only as something to be overcome. Such overcoming
requires strength and a certain hardness toward oneself and others.
In terms of the doctrine of the Superman, Nietzsche is merciless with
regard to self-p ity . The greatest danger, however, is that of pity
for others, for such an attitude tends to indulge and excuse th eir
f o llie s . Thus, the Superman must harden himself and appear aloof and
cruel, for otherwise there is no Transvaluation and everything col
lapses once again into nihilism. One is here reminded of Buber's
50
remark that i t is-sometimes necessary to be cruel in order ultimately
to be kind. I t is in this manner that Nietzsche's humanism is grounded
in contempt and a hardness toward oneself and others. Nietzsche firmly
believed that any indulgence of weakness in human beings would lead
ultim ately to the destruction of humanity.
There are people who become hypochondriacal through th eir sympathy
and concern for another person; the kind of sympathy which results
therefrom is nothing but a disease. Thus there is also a Christian
hypochondria, which a fflic ts those s o lita ry , religiously-minded
people who keep constantly before th e ir eyes the sufferings and
-death of C hrist.27
The allusion to Christianity here is no mere passing reference, for
Nietzsche saw Christianity as one of the most virulent forms of
nihilism . From this i t should be clear th at Nietzsche's charac
te riz a tio n of himself as an anti-C hrist must also be understood as
a characterization of himself as an a n t i - n i h i l i s t .
In his very earlie st works Nietzsche tackled th is problem of
nihilism in terms of the relationship between philosophy and culture.
In his book Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, he says:
A period which suffers from a so-called high level of liberal edu
cation but which is devoid of culture in the sense of a unity of
style which characterizes all its l i f e , will not quite know what
to do with philosophy and wouldn't, i f the Genius of Truth himself
were to proclaim i t in the streets and the market places. During
such times philosophy remains the learned monologue of the lonely
s tr o lle r , the accidental loot of the individual, the secret skele
ton in the closet, or the harmless chatter between senile academics
and children. No one may venture to f u l f i l l philosophy's law with
his own person, no one may live philosophically with that simple
loyalty which compelled an ancient, no matter where he was or what
71
Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, Vol. I in The
Philosophy of Nietzsche, ed. Geoffrey Clive (New York, 1965), p. 600.
he was doing, to deport himself as a Stoic i f he once had pledged
faith to the Stoa. All modern philosophizing is p o litic a l,
policed by governments, churches, academies, custom, fashion, and
human cowardice, all of which lim it i t to a fake l e a r n e d n e s s . 28
For Nietzsche, a healthy culture is one in which philosophy flourishes
as something in trin sic to the culture and even promotes that culture
and helps guarantee its survival. Thus, by its very nature philosophy
stands opposed to nihilism. Again, i t is important to note that this
model of culture, like the model of the Superman, is drawn from the
Greeks. Nietzsche's orientation toward, the Greeks was in large part,
no doubt, a re su lt.o f his philological investigations, but the roots
of the matter go much deeper; for there was a profound spiritual
a ffin ity for Nietzsche between the Greek temperament and his own.
Nietzsche's fixation-with regard to the notion of Transvalua
tion is now in te llig ib le , since we can see that Transvaluation is the
key to the Superman and to authentic culture as well. To reach its
ultimate goals, this process of Transvaluation must take place on two
levels, the individual existential level and the in stitutional cul
tural level. Nietzsche was never so much an id e a list as to believe
that every human being would seek the path to the Superman, and so i t
became supremely important to transform the in stitu tio n s of culture
to nurture and preserve those great individuals who could bring cul
ture to its highest expression. This is the foundation of his
"aristo cratic radicalism." I t parallels the position of Socrates,
that only the best and the wisest should rule. Nietzsche, like his
^N ietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks,
pp. 37-38
spiritual ancestors Heraclitus and Socrates, possessed a deeply rooted
suspicion of the masses or the "herd," and strongly rejected democracy
(not to mention, socialism and communism) as a form of nihilism which
created precisely the same types of cultural disease and insanity
which Christianity perpetuated. Ultimately, however, Transvaluation
and aristo cratic radicalism are not directed toward the production
of this or that kind of p o litical 'state, but rather are directed
toward the creation of a great culture. This is politics in the man
ner of what Nietzsche calls "great p o litic s ." Great politics concerns
i t s e l f with the whole range of man's expression and organization of
himself and seeks to create a 1 ife -situ a tio n which raises the s p irit
to its highest manifestation as authentic culture. I t is here in
terms of the notion of great p o litic s th a t we see Nietzsche as the
physician of culture going beyond his role as diagnostician to begin
to function as the healer of the s p i r i t .
Aesthetics versus Positivism
Nietzsche's fixation on an aesthetic perspective as a founda
tion for his philosophizing is evident from his e a rlie st works through
his la te s t. In fact, for Nietzsche the questions of values and
morality are inextricably bound up with aesthetics. This aestheticism
is , in large part, the resu lt of two extremely important influences;
the ancient Greeks (especially relevant is the effect of Heraclitus)
and Schopenhauer with his doctrine of creative Will. From the early
Greeks he inherited a sense for philosophy as conceptual drama and
was profoundly influenced by the power and v ita lity of their language.
For Nietzsche, the pre-Socratics were involved in the unfolding and
revelation of a cosmic drama which achieved its highest expression
in the tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles. Already in The Birth
of Tragedy Nietzsche regards the Greek way of l i f e , perhaps somewhat
romantically, as its e lf an a r t form. Greek tragedy was the highest
expression of the synthesis of the Apollonian and the Dionysian which
human culture has ever achieved. He argues that such an expression
was possible only on the basis th at the Greek culture was it s e l f
already pervaded by these Apollonian and Dionysian elements. Thus,
for Nietzsche, the ultimate achievement of culture is a manner of
living such that its everyday lif e is an a r t is t i c expression. During
his early years of study he was deeply affected by the quest of the
ancient Greeks for unity and harmony. He achieved what for him was
a basic insight which was to pervade his philosophy ever a fte r, namely,
that the highest and ultimate form of philosophy is cosmology.
Nietzsche's cosmology, like the pre-Socratic cosmologies, is monistic.
"The decisive point of Nietzsche's cosmology . . . can be expressed in
two words: Nietzsche was a d ialectical monist. " ^ For Nietzsche, as
for the pre-Socratics, philosophy must "begin" with cosmology and,
of course, cosmology is the "science of beginnings" (archai) . It
is only in terms of the ultimate principles (archai) of harmony and
unity that there is any p o ssib ility of truly ordering man's individual
^W alter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist,
A ntichrist (Cleveland and New York, 1966), p. 204.
54
existence and the in stitu tio n s of his social existence. Thus, all
the "true" manifestations of man's existence are grounded in aesthe
tics as mimesis, since the highest and therefore tru est in stitu tio n s
are those which "imitate" and are modelled on the "ultimate p rin c i
ples," for, as Nietzsche puts i t , " it is only as an aesthetic phenome
non that existence and the world are eternally j u s t i f i e d . H o w this
view is compatible with Nietzsche's theory of truth as "perspectivism"
is a question which we will have to consider later.
The other major.influence which helped produce Nietzsche's
aestheticism was Schopenhauer. The general orientation of Schopen
hauer's philosophy, his metaphysics of the Will, his elevation of a rt
and especially of music, all had a pronounced effect in guiding
Nietzsche's thought into new dimensions. In one respect i t is possible
to discuss Schopenhauer's e ffect on Nietzsche only in very general
terms, since i t is quite clear th at from the e a rlie st encounter with
Schopenhauer's thought Nietzsche interpreted him for his own purposes .
and, in fact, projected many of his own ideas into Schopenhauer's
position. Nietzsche evidently had some awareness of th is , for in
Schopenhauer as Educator, he remarks:
And Schopenhauer's philosophy should always be f i r s t of all in te r
preted in this way: individually, by the individual for himself
alone, in order to gain insight into his own misery, needs, and
limitations and to know the antidotes and consolations; namely
sacrifice of the ego, submission to the noblest intentions, and
above all ju stice and m ercy.31
•^Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, trans. Walter
Kaufmann (New York, 1967), p. 52.
31 Friedrich Nietzsche, Schopenhauer as Educator, trans. James
W . Hillesheim and Mai com R. Simpson (Chicago, 1965), p. 26.
55
I t is significant to note that the "antidotes and consolations" which
are mentioned a t the end of this quotation are later radically
re-interpreted or rejected by Nietzsche. The influence of Schopen
hauer is not be be understood in terms of specific doctrines, but
rather in terms of a metaphysical re-orientation of Nietzsche's
thought. It is also interesting to observe that the elevated stance .
Nietzsche gives to a r t parallels Hegel's position and, furthermore,
Nietzsche, like Hegel is f i r s t and fin a lly involved in developing a
metaphysic of the S p i r i t . 32 Needless to say, Wagner also exerted an
important influence on the development of Nietzsche's aesthetic per
spective and th is influence has been well documented both by Nietzsche
himself and by his c r i ti c s .
In the middle period of Nietzsche's creative life a new in flu
ence comes into play and is to have lasting effects through the re st
of his writings.
For a time, in what is known as his second or "P o sitiv istic"
period, Nietzsche entertained the possibility that science might
answer such questions as we can meaningfully ask, and th a t, i f
through anything, "through science does one really approach the
real nature of the world and a knowledge of i t . "33
This scientific perspective has some peculiar consequences for
Nietzsche's philosophy. An opposition arises between a view of the
world grounded in aesthetics and a view grounded in the cau salities
^ F o r a discussion of the parallels between Nietzsche and
Hegel, see Kaufmann's Nietzsche, pp. 204-13.
•^Arthus C. Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher (New York, 1965),
p. 69.
56
of the physical sciences. The effects of these p o s itiv is tic leanings
are s till present in the fragments which compose The Will to Power,
where Nietzsche claims of the Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence th at,
"It is the most sc ie n tific of all possible hypotheses."3^ The fragment
from which this quotation is taken is a late one, having been written
in June of 1887. Thus, i t is clear that a concern with this s c ie n ti
fic perspective is present from the middle years of Nietzsche's pro
ductivity right up until the end. During this time Nietzsche o s c il
lated between this s c ie n tific perspective and the aesthetic perspective
which had been established e a rlie r. As any careful reader of Nietzsche
would expect, Nietzsche remains c ritic a l of both perspectives and there
is a growing awareness in his la te r works of an opposition between
these perspectives. At f i r s t , there is no evidence that Nietzsche
was concerned about reconciling this opposition, but as he progressed
he seemed to feel a greater and greater demand to provide a unified
systematic presentation of his philosophy. During the period from
1882 to 1888, Nietzsche drew up five different plans for such a com
prehensive work and in each plan the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence
plays a central role. All of the other facets of his philosophy were
evidently to be brought into relation to his doctrine.35 That
Nietzsche f e l t the necessity to reconcile this opposition is a fa c t
of the utmost significance as we shall la te r discover.
34priedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter
Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York, 1967), pp. 36.
35Friedrich Nietzsche, Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft,
ed. Karl Lowith (Frankfurt am Main, 1959),pp.169-78.
57
For Nietzsche all of the pre-occupations discussed above were
deeply rooted in his most intimate life -situ a tio n . The unfolding of
his own spiritual dimension was a project which simultaneously revealed
a cultural and world view characterized by an incredible se n sitiv ity
to the spiritual dislocations of the modern age. In a significant
sense Nietzsche's philosophy is a personalized version of Hegel. Both
Nietzsche and Hegel were dominated by a cosmic vision which they sought
to express in terms of S p irit. In spite of their many significant
differences, both philosophers present a view that is characterized
by a grandeur which has been lo st to most contemporary philosophy,
and both have a vision of man which extends far beyond the chaos and
despiritualization which characterizes the contemporary life -s itu a tio n
of most men.
Jaspers on the Relevance of Nietzsche's
Life to his Thought
As we have already observed, Jaspers devotes almost one-fourth
of his Nietzsche book-to a consideration of Nietzsche's l i f e . In
These sections Jaspers, on the whole, proceeds descriptively, offering
very many quotations from Nietzsche as support for interpretive
remarks. In fa c t, Jaspers' method of proceeding here might be char
acterized as "hermeneutic phenomenology," although certainly not in
the sense in which Heidegger uses this phrase. The phenomenologically
descriptive aspect of Jaspers' discussion consists in allowing
'Nietzsche to present himself as he is by means of constant d irect
quotation without presupposing or imposing any c ritic a l models of
58
interpretation. From Jaspers' point of view the f i r s t task is to
le t Nietzsche speak for himself, while the interpreter keeps his mind
free of all external theories and biases. The "hermeneutic" or in t e r
pretive aspect of the enterprise is for Jaspers primarily internal.
Interpretation is the unfolding of what is already im plicit; genuine
interpretation can impose-nothing external; i t must work within the
context of the self-revelation of the thinker himself. This, of
course, does not exclude the use of biographical material which is
not presented by the thinker himself, but Jaspers in s is ts , and rig h tly
so, that such material must always be understood in relation to the
total context of the thinker with special emphasis on its relation to
the self-revelation and self-understanding of the thinker.
The hermeneutic model which Jaspers employs (and there must
be such a model, for hermeneutics by its very nature demands a model)
is Existenz. The question now arises as to how Jaspers can escape
violating his own c rite rio n for interpretation, namely, that no
external interpretive model be imposed. Jaspers is very careful to
point out here that Existenz is not an external model but rather a
dialectically developed internal model. But what is Existenz?
Jaspers who philosophizes in terms of an elaborate d ialectic, char
a c te ristic a lly provides no simple description of Existenz. However,
William Earle in his introduction to Jaspers' Reason and Existenz pre-
sents an accurate and re la tiv e ly succinct description.
59
This fundamental center, each individual in his inwardness as he
is to himself as ju st this unique, historical s e lf, is Existenz.
"Existenz," again, is an index; i t names without characterizing.
What i t names is not the individual in his organic v ita lity , his
abstract understanding, or his s p ir it; i t is the individual him
self, as he comprehends himself, in his freedom and authenticity
standing before Transcendence. I t is the ultimate ground, basis,
or root of each historical s e lf; i t is not the content of any con
cept. And since Existenz is actual only in authentic self-
awareness, a corruption of that awareness may corrupt Existenz
its e lf . Existenz is but a p o ssibility for men; i t is not a prop
erty with which we are endowed by nature. I t must be enacted
inwardly i f i t is to be a t a l l ; and i t need not ever be. I t is '
the possibility in men of coming to themselves, of the self
rejoining i t s e l f for a moment. Existenz is only a po ssib ility
for human nature; things in the world have no such p o s sib ility .36
For Jaspers, then, to in terp ret Nietzsche means to enter into dialogue
with Nietzsche's Existenz as i t finds expression in Nietzsche's
writings. Here we must understand Jaspers' position very carefully.
This dialogue is a dialogue between Jaspers' Existenz and Nietzsche's
Existenz. However, Jaspers himself warns that Existenz as p o ssib ility
is subject to corruption. This means that Jaspers is confronted with
two problems. F irst of a l l , Jaspers must be certain that within this
dialogue he is interacting as authentic Existenz and then he must
establish c rite ria for determining when Nietzsche is speaking out of
his authentic Existenz and when he is not. The second problem revolves
around a criterion of v alid ity for the dialogue its e lf . Jaspers
emphatically denies that such dialogue is "merely subjective," and,
since i t is clearly not "objective" in any ordinary empirical sense,
this suggests that there is some kind of self-validating objectivity
36William Earle, "Introduction" to Karl Jaspers' Reason and
Existenz, (New York, 1960), p. 11.
which resides with the transcendental character of Existenz it s e l f .
Since Jaspers regards truth as a d ia le c tic a l consequence and this
dialectic is always open-ended, there is no final "objectivity," no
final truth. Truth is a relation which can only exist as a relation
between one Existenz and another and so truth is always a becoming.
Even though this middle ground which Jaspers occupies between subjec
tiv ity and objectivity is well protected, i t is nonetheless problema
tic and we shall have to keep the two above-mentioned problems clearly
in mind as we examine Jaspers' specific interpretations of Nietzsche's
doctrines. Finally, i t is clear that in terms of Jaspers' conception
of interpretation, biography (in its extended sense as contributory
to a grasping of Existenz) is not only relevant to an interpretation
of Nietzsche, but absolutely essential. A congruent view of in terp re
tation is to be found in Nietzsche himself as expressed in his preface
to Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks. For Jaspers and
Nietzsche both, genuine interpretation can only be "ad hominem."
Heidegger on the Relevance of Nietzsche's
Life to his Thought
In addition to his two volume Nietzsche, Heidegger has written
a number of essays that deal with various facets of Nietzsche's works,
but in none of these works does he concern himself with the biographi
cal aspect of Nietzsche. There is less than ten pages devoted to
biographical considerations in his 1155 page Nietzsche! and most of
the material is in relation to The Will to Power plus a few references
to works where biographical information may be obtained. He specially
mentions Baeumler and Frau Forster-Nietzsche and refers to her Das
Leben Friedrich Nietzsche's a fte r which he adds the cautionary remark,
"However, this publication like all th at is biographical requires much
reflection."3^ H e then adds, "We.shall forgo any further statement
and discussion of the highly heterogenous literature about Nietzsche,
since none of i t could be useful for the task of this course of lec
tures."38 The only concern that Heidegger has for biographical
materials is a few le tte r s which mention either Eternal Recurrence or
the doctrine of the Will to Power and some sketches for the book, The
Will to Power which are to be found in the Nachlass. This already
te lls us that the basic approaches of Heidegger and Jaspers are
radically different.
Michael Hamburger in his book From Prophecy to Exorcism com
ments harshly on Heidegger's position on Nietzsche.
In the case of a w riter whose thought flowed so directly out of
his life , who was consistent only in being unreservedly true to
his own nature and his own moods, i t is absurd to argue, as
Heidegger, did, th at the biographical approach is outdated and
irrelevant. Nietzsche himself claimed that only what is personal
remains forever in co n tro v ertib le.39
If, then, Heidegger re je c ts any biographical or life-situational
approach, what approach does he adopt? At this point only a b rie f
indication can be given. Heidegger is most fundamentally concerned
with Nietzsche's metaphysics, but not ju st Nietzsche's metaphysics as
37Heidegger, N ietzsche, p. 19. 38ibid. , p. 19.
^M ichael Hamburger, From Prophecy to Exorcism (London, 1965),
p. 32.
the culmination of the h isto rical unfolding of metaphysics. For those
acquainted with almost any of Heidegger's writings i t is a familiar
story. Heidegger argues th at the pre-Socratics and especially
Heraclitus and Parmenides were moving in the direction of genuine
ontology, i . e . , the asking of the question about the meaning of Being
as such. However, a confusion arises in Plato and becomes firmly
rooted in Aristotle and the inquiry goes astray. Philosophers no
longer ask the genuine question about Being as such, but now instead
ask the question about the Being of beings, thus going off on the
tangent of metaphysics. This tangent, according to Heidegger, reaches
its final expression in Hegel and especially Nietzsche, who thereby
opened up the way to a "return" to the possibility of a genuine
fundamental onteTogy (which, of course, for Heidegger is his own
philosophy). Briefly, then, Heidegger's interpretive approach is a
metaphysical-historical one and in all fairness we should recognize
that in spite of its one-sidedness this kind of interpretation has
a long and rich history, which has yielded many important insights.
The existential life -s itu a tio n a l approach is a fte r all relatively
recent and, one might even, say, begins in earnest with Nietzsche him
self. I t should also be noted that Heidegger does place great empha
sis on the texts and establishes as a criterion for genuine interpre
tation a "thinking along with" Nietzsche through the corpus of his
writings and this approach also includes for Heidegger a "thinking
through" of Nietzsche's ideas to th e ir full conclusions even where
Nietzsche himself did not do th is.
63
Nietzsche's Extremism and Honesty;
A Theory of Communication
Nietzsche was a passionate thinker. He was also a c ritic a l
one. I t is well known that he worked and reworked his fragments
before arriving at th e ir final published form. Why, then, are so many
of his statements cast in such extreme forms of expression? At times
Nietzsche thunders like a penetential preacher or shrieks like a mad
prophet. It is d iffic u lt to believe that this extremism is uninten
tional and y et, in his la te r work, he becomes c ritic a l of extremism.
In August of 1881, in a le tte r to Peter Gast, he says, "Do I speak as
one who has had a revelation? If so despise me and do not listen to
me."4° Nonetheless, Nietzsche was firmly convinced that authentic
philosophy could not be communicated in abstract systems. For
Nietzsche philosophy is an a c tiv ity , a process-philosophizing.
•Jaspers makes much of this notion of philosophizing and to such an
extreme that he v irtually denies th at Nietzsche has any philosophical
doctrines. This dynamic conception of philosophy permitted Nietzsche
to adopt an experimental attitu d e in his attempts to communicate his
ideas and. as a result we find great variety in his modes of expression:
aphorism, metaphor, simile, poetry, symbol, and indirectness as in
Kierkegaard (although Nietzsche did not know of Kierkegaard's work
until 1888). In all of these modes, Nietzsche sometimes used the
technique of exaggeration, thus giving rise to extremism. Nietzsche,
like many other w riters, realized that the majority of readers are
4 °Jasp ers, N ietzsc h e, p. 405.
64
somewhat casual and so Nietzsche frequently uses the technique of
exaggeration as a shock tactic to "awaken" the reader, to sting him
to thought. This, of course, is a technique as old as Socrates, but
Nietzsche uses i t with a fine precision. Also involved here is
Nietzsche's conviction that philosophy is a passionate and vital con
cern, and he frequently uses the simile of dancing as an illu stratio n
and contrast to the traditional view that philosophy is something
solemn and ponderous.
That genuinely philosophical combination, for example, of a
bold and exuberant sp iritu a lity th at runs presto and a dialectic
severity and necessity that takes no false step is unknown to most
thinkers and scholars from th e ir own experience, and therefore
would seem incredible to them i f somebody should speak of i t in
th e ir presence. They picture every necessity as a kind of need,
as a painstaking having-to-follow and being-compelled. And
thinking i t s e l f they consider as something slow and hesitant,
almost as t o i l , and often enough as "worthy of the sweat of the
noble"—but not in the least as something lig h t, divine, closely
related to dancing and high s p ir its . "Thinking" and taking a mat
te r "seriously," considering i t "grave"--for them all this belongs
together: that is the only way they have "experienced" i t . 41
Thus, for Nietzsche, there is in philosophical communication a certain
amount of play and lightness and a considerable amount of irony.
Nietzsche's extremism is no accident of temperament, but rather a
quite intentional attempt to enhance communication and stimulate
thought.
A second fundamental aspect of Nietzsche's concept of communi
cation is honesty and self-criticism . No matter how extreme the for
mulation and expression of his ideas, i t was never his intention to
^ N i e tz s c h e , Beyond Good and E v i l , p. 139.
65
deceive or misguide, for his will to communicate was too strong. In
spite of his celebration of deception as a "virtue" and his castiga
tion of "serious-mindedness," the simple fa c t is that Nietzsche was
too serious about his ideas to undertake any project of deception
regarding th eir communication. Again and again he complains of being
misunderstood in his most "honest" e ffo rts. Nietzsche was merciless
in applying his standard of honesty to other persons, as we have seen
in the case of Wagner; yet he was equally s t r i c t with himself and even
demanded s t r i c t honesty from others in th e ir criticism s of him. An
amusing example of this occurred when Nietzsche sent one of his musi
cal compositions to Hans von Bulow. Von Bulow's reply is an aston
ishing c r itic a l devastation.
Your Manfred Meditation is the most fa n ta stic a lly extravagant,
the most unedifying, the most anti-musical thing I have come across
for a long time in the way of notes put on paper. Several times
I had to ask myself whether i t is all a joke, whether, perhaps,
your object was to produce a parody of the so-called music of the
future. Is i t by intent that you p e r s is te n tly ‘defy every rule of
tonal connection, from the higher syntax down to the merest
spelling? Apart from its psychological in te re st--fo r your musical
fever suggests, for all its aberrations, an uncommon, a d is tin
guished mind—your Meditation, looked a t from a musical standpoint,
is the precise equivalent of a crime in the moral sphere. Of the
Apollonian element I have not been able to discover the smallest
trace; and as for the Dionysian, I must say frankly that I have
been reminded less of this than of the "day after" a bacchanal.
If you really feel a passionate urge to express yourself in music,
you should master the rudiments of the musical language: a fren
zied imagination, revelling in reminiscences of Wagnerian har
monies, is not the sort of foundation to build upon. Wagner's
most unprecendented audacities, apart from the fact that they
derive from a dramatic web and'are ju s tifie d by the words--for in
his purely instrumental works he wisely denies himself prodigious
things of the kind—are without exception grammatically correct,
down to the tin ie s t detail of notation . . . But i f you, highly
esteemed Herr professor, really take th is aberration of yours into
the fie ld of music quite seriously (as to which I am s t i l l doubt
fu l) , then at least confine yourself to vocal music and surrender
66
to the words the helm of the boat in which you rove the raging
seas of tone. You yourself, not without reason, describe your
music as " te rrib le ." I t is indeed more te rrib le than you think—
not detrimental to the common weal, of course, but something worse
than th at, detrimental to yourself, seeing that you can find no
worse way of killing time than raping Euterpe in th i s f a s h io n .42
And Nietzsche's response to this le tte r is equally astonishing, for
he discusses von Billow's criticisms objectively, accepts them, and
thanks him for them. Years la te r, he even ventures to send another
composition to von Bulow and in the accompanying le tte r he remarks,
"Once upon a time I sent you a piece of my music and you passed sen
tence of death upon i t in the most ju s tifia b le manner p o s sib le ." ^
However, i t must be admitted that Nietzsche did not receive criticism
of his philosophy with such equanimity. His ju stific a tio n for the
rejection of his philosophical c r itic s was his claim that they mis
understood him and in most cases he was probably rig h t. Yet, in trin
sic in Nietzsche's mode of philosophizing is a repeated struggle with
himself and his ideas, a self-criticism which is epitomized in his
evaluation of The Birth of Tragedy in Ecce Homo.
Let me repeat that today the book appears impossible to me,—
I consider i t badly w ritten, heavy, painful, full of a straining
a fte r images, maudlin, sugared a t times to the point of effemi
nacy, uneven in tempo, devoid of the will to logical c la rity ,
u tte rly convinced and therefore contemptuous of demonstration,
d istru stfu l even of the propriety of demonstration."44
42Ernest Newman, The Life of Richard Wagner (New York, 1946),
IV, 324.
^N ietzsche, The Philosophy of Nietzsche, ed. Clive, p. 91.
44Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo in The Philosophy of Nietzsche,
ed. Willard Huntington Wright (New York, 1954), pp. 937-38.
67
Nietzsche was never quite satisfied with his attempts to communicate,
and his compulsion to honesty, i ts e lf a form of extremism, drove him
more and more to consider a final comprehensive "systematic" formula
tion of his entire philosophy. Lacking this "system," the interpreter
must be as s e lf-c ritic a l of himself as was Nietzsche, and must con
tinually re-examine his interpretation with the framework of
Nietzsche's texts in order to avoid reading into Nietzsche th at which
is external.
Nietzsche: Poet, Philosopher, Psychologist,
or Social Critic
Numerous c r itic s , including some philosophers, have contended
that Nietzsche was not primarily a philosopher. For example, the
lite ra ry c r itic James Huneker says, "Friedrich Nietzsche was more poet
than original th in k e r." ^ Santayana makes a sim ilar judgment: "It
is hardly f a ir to a w riter like Nietzsche, so poetical, fragmentary,
and immature, to judge him as a philosopher."^6 Santayana's c ritic a l
essays on Nietzsche are excellent examples of what criticism and in te r
pretation should not be. Santayana's misunderstandings of Nietzsche
are truly monumental. Fortunately, in dealing with Jaspers and
Heidegger, we have no such gross and superficial distortions to deal
with. Despite the problems inherent in th eir interpretive approaches,
^6James Huneker, Egoists: A Book of Superman (New York, 1910),
p. 238.
^G eorge Santayana, Egotism in German Philosophy (New York,
n .d .), p. 114.
68
Jaspers and Heidegger have carefully studied Nietzsche's writings and
make profoundly serious attempts to be faithful to the character of
his philosophy.
Jaspers' View
Jaspers attempts to understand Nietzsche in terms of
Nietzsche's own Existenz, but more specifically in terms of Nietzsche's
Existenz as a philosopher. There can be no doubt th a t, for Jaspers,
Nietzsche must, f i r s t and foremost, be understood as a philosopher.
That Nietzsche was a b r illia n t psychologist, a penetrating social c r i
tic and, a t times, superbly poetic, is undeniable; but for Jaspers
all of these o th e rfa c e ts must be understood in terms of Nietzsche's
being as a philosopher, but as a "new" kind of philosopher; one who
speaks from the destiny of his own Existenz.
They [Kierkegaard and Nietzsche] cannot be classed under any
e a r lie r type (poet, philosopher, prophet, savior, genius). With
them a new form of human reality appears in history. They are, so
to speak, representative destinies, sacrifices whose way out of
the world leads to experiences for others. They are by the total
staking of th e ir whole natures like modern martyrs, which however,
they precisely denied being. Through th eir character as excep
tio n s, they solved th eir problem.47
Thus, although Nietzsche is to be understood primarily as a philoso
pher, he must be understood as an in itia to r of a new kind of phi
losophizing, a philosophizing out of Existenz.
4?Karl Jaspers, Reason and Existenz, trans. William Earle
(New York, 1960), p. 38.
69
Heidegger's View
Heidegger, too, is c ritica l of any interpretation of Nietzsche
which does not retain Nietzsche's being as a philosopher at its core.
In fa c t, in this respect, Heidegger is much more traditional than
Jaspers. This is evident from the fact that Heidegger's concern with
Nietzsche is primarily a concern with Nietzsche's metaphysics and
with how this metaphysics f i t s into the historical unfolding of Being.
Heidegger rejects the idea that Nietzsche is primarily a poet-
philosopher and also attacks the notion that Nietzsche's philosophy
is a "philosophy of life " (Lebensphilosophie) . Here he seems to have
Jaspers in mind, among others.
However, for a long time i t has been passed down from the
German chairs of philosophy that Nietzsche is not a rigorous
thinker, but rather a "poet-philosopher." Nietzsche does not
belong to the philosophers, who think out only abstract and
shadowy matters remote from life . If, however, one does call
him a philosopher, then he must be understood as a "philosopher
of l i f e ." This t i t l e , already popular for some time, should at
once cause suspicion, as though philosophy is otherwise for the
dead and therefore basically superfluous. Such a view corresponds
fu lly with the opinion of those who welcome in Nietzsche "the
philosopher of life " who has fin a lly done away with abstract
thinking. These customary judgments regarding Nietzsche are
erroneous.^8
For Heidegger, also, there is no-question that Nietzsche must be fun
damentally understood and interpreted as a philosopher, and Heidegger,
like Jaspers, sees Nietzsche as the advent of a "new kind of philoso
phy." For Heidegger, this new kind of philosophy is not an Existenz-
philosophy, but rather, Heidegger believes, metaphysics reaches its
^ H e id e g g e r, N ietzsch e, I , 13-14.
70
culmination in Nietzsche, and thereby the possibility for fundamental
ontology has been opened up once more.
Summary • -
I t should now be quite clear that both, Heidegger and Jaspers,
approach Nietzsche as a serious and profound philosopher. However,
i t should also be clear that th eir respective grounds for doing so are
radically d ifferen t. Jaspers wishes to concern himself with
Nietzsche's philosophy in terms of the vital core of Nietzsche's
Existenz and thereby to enter into existential dialogue with
Nietzsche. Heidegger, too, emphasizes the notion of dialogue, but
for him i t is a dialogue with Nietzsche's metaphysics rather than an
existential dialogue. Jaspers' approach to Nietzsche is many-faceted,
whereas Heidegger's approach remains .fundamentally one-sided. Each
approach has i t s virtues and i t s inadequacies and in the following
chapters we shall concern ourselves with the adequacy of these two
interpretations in terms of explicit examinations of the major ideas
in Nietzsche's philosophy.
71
CHAPTER II
NIETZSCHE'S M ETAPHYSICS A N D EPISTEM OLOGY
I t is necessary for us here to remind ourselves of the direc
tion in which we wish to proceed. The thesis which we wish to demon
strate is th at there is a fundamental dualism a t the heart of
Nietzsche's philosophy. W e have already discussed how Jaspers and
Heidegger arrive a t radically different in terpretations. Thus, we
are here going to undertake a detailed examination of these two in te r
pretations regarding the central ideas in Nietzsche's philosophy in
order to show that this dualism of which we have spoken is the ground
for the p o ssib ility of two such radically different in terpretations.
How is i t to be characterized? Here we can give only a brief indica
tion. W e have already suggested that there is an opposition between
an aesthetic perspective and a p o sitiv istic perspective. However,
this dualism is more fundamentally stated in terms of an opposition
between Nietzsche's metaphysics and epistemology, on the one hand,
and his philosophical anthropology on the other. What makes, this
problem all the more fascinating is that Nietzsche himself was aware
of this opposition. W e must be very careful here as to how we under
stand this notion of a dualism. F irst of a l l , i t in no way denies
the fact th at there are extremely important and even consistent re la
tionships between Nietzsche's metaphysics and epistemology and his
philosophical anthropology. Secondly, the basic opposition which
defines th is dualism is a radical one which goes to the very heart
72
of the manner in which Nietzsche chose to philosophize. As radical
as this opposition is , i t is by no means simple, fo r, in its most
fundamental aspect, i t raises the question of the very nature of
thought it s e l f . Finally, although this dualism does have a single
focus, its ramifications touch every aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy
and i t manifests i t s e l f in terms of many specific, less fundamental
oppositions, such as the one we have already mentioned—the opposition
between an aesthetic perspective and a p o s itiv is tic one.
Being and Becoming
By fa r the majority of Nietzsche's discussions of the problems
of Being and Becoming are to be found in The Will to Power. W e have
previously remarked that cosmology constitutes the center of
Nietzsche’s thought and as soon as we begin to examine the questions
about the nature of Being and Becoming, this becomes evident. U lti
mately, Nietzsche's theory of re a lity is the ground for his theory of
truth which, in turn, is the ground for all values. In other words,
Nietzsche approaches metaphysics as "First Philosophy." Nietzsche's
metaphysics has two aspects which i t is important to distinguish care
fully. The f i r s t is a c ritic a l or "destructive" aspect which consti
tutes a critique of traditional metaphysical notions of Being and
re a lity . The second aspect consists of Nietzsche's own positive con
tributions to metaphysics, which we shall call his theory of REALITY
in order to distinguish i t from the traditional notions which he is
73
criticizing.^ Nietzsche's conception of the problem of REALITY is
inseparably bound up with the conceptions of logic and ra tio n a lity ,
i . e . , with the nature of thought, conceptualization, and categoriza
tion.
Nietzsche's critique of traditional metaphysics is of con
siderable in te re st in that we once again discover strong p arallels
with the pre-Socratics, especially with Heraclitus.
Today we are again getting close to all those fundamental forms
of world interpretation devised by the Greek s p ir i t through
Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles, Democritus, and
Anaxagoras—we are growing more Greek by the day; at f i r s t , as
is only f a i r , in concepts and evaluations, as Hellenizing ghosts,
as i t were: but one day, l e t us hope, also in our b o d ie s!2
Nietzsche believes that metaphysics was led astray by the categories
of Being, r e a lity , and truth. At f i r s t , i t appears that Nietzsche
to ta lly rejects the classical metaphysical two-world view of Appearance
and re a lity , or Becoming and Being. However, on closer examination,
i t becomes clear th at Nietzsche wishes to transform what has been
trad itio n ally regarded as a dualism into a "dialectical monism," thus
lln various places throughout the text full capitalization has
been used for seven words: VIRTUE, TRANSCENDENCE, TRUTH, NIHILISM,
REALITY, THOUGHT, and KNOW LEDGE. This has been done in order to indi
cate clearly the fundamental differences between the perspectives of
philosophical anthropology and the cosmological perspective. Whenever
any of the seven words is written in the above manner with fu ll capi
ta liz a tio n , this is to indicate that the statement containing such
capitalized words is made from the perspective of cosmology. If these
words are not capitalized they refer to the perspectives of philoso
phical anthropology. For example, Nietzsche's theory of TRUTH (cos
mological perspective) states th at th ere’are no truths (philosophical
anthropological perspectives).
^N ietzsche, The Will to Power, pp. 225-26.
74
achieving a synthesis of Heraclitus and Parmenides. "To impose upon
O
becoming the character of being— -that is the supreme will to power."
But the question which remains for us here is that of how such a
"unification" is possible. Again at th is point we can only give a
brief anticipatory indication. The key to this "unity" is time or,
more specifically in Nietzsche's terminology, the doctrine of Eternal
Recurrence. A fundamental grasp of the "unification" of Being and
Becoming depends upon the elaboration of th is doctrine with which we
shall concern ourselves shortly. However, at the moment, le t us take
a closer look at the grounds for Nietzsche's critique of traditional
metaphysics.
Nietzsche believes th at traditional metaphysics is based on
a fundamental deception grounded in the very nature of thought it s e l f .
In order to think and infer i t is necessary to assume beings:
logic handles only formulas for what remains the same. That is
why this assumption would not be proof of re ality : "beings" are
part of our perspective.4
For Nietzsche, all things are in continuous Becoming; all forms of
permanence and endurance are apparent and illusory; they are necessary
fictio n s. That they are necessary does not, however, change th eir
ontological status--they remain deceptions. Here we have the preisen-
tation of an ontological lim itation of human being; namely, that
human knowledge is by i t s very nature grounded in the fictions of per
manence and endurance, th at i s , in the illusion of Being. Thus, in
3Ib id ., p. 330. 4Ib id ., p. 280.
this respect, we can say of Nietzsche's metaphysical and epistemologi-
cal position that i t is anti-anthropocentric.
Knowledge and becoming exclude one another. Consequently, "know
ledge" must be something else: there must f i r s t of all be a will
to make knowable, a kind of becoming must i t s e l f create the decep
tion of beings.5
Nonetheless, Nietzsche recognizes the fact that we must act as if
there were Being both in our practical lives and in our pursuit of
science.5 For Nietzsche, REALITY must be understood as Becoming, and
Being is simply a conceptual illusion we have created in order to
think and communicate. Thus, logic becomes a kind of necessary mis
take which we need for conceptualization, but here again we need to
make a distinction between thought in the traditional metaphysical
sense and the special kind of THOUGHT by means of which Nietzsche,
in one sense, transcends traditional metaphysics and thereby arrives
a t the diagnosis of necessary fictio n s and goes beyond this to estab
lish his own conception of REALITY. What we must remember here is
that Nietzsche grounds his metaphysics in Becoming, and that the other
aspects of his metaphysics and epistemology are to be derived from
this grounding.
5Ibid. , p . 280.
6For a discussion of Nietzsche's notion of fictions in re la
tion to the Kantian "as if" see Hans Vaihinger, The Philosophy of 'As
I f ,' trans. C. K. Ogden (New York, 1924), pp. 341.62.
76
Jaspers' View
Jaspers is highly suspicious of any and every attempt to
in terpret Nietzsche in terms of specific, doctrines. Jaspers rejects
the notion that Nietzsche had any coherent doctrine of Being and
instead places emphasis on the dialectical aspects of Nietzsche's
thinking about Being and Becoming. Jaspers repeatedly concerns him
se lf with the dynamic aspect of Nietzsche's thought and thus prefers
to discuss Nietzsche's "philosophizing" rather than his concepts.
This approach seems, at f i r s t , consistent with Nietzsche's own
approach to the character of philosophy as conceptualization. Jaspers
seems to place more importance on the process of Nietzsche's thinking
than in any "results" at which he arrived.
The movement of Nietzsche's thinking seems to become stranded
whenever, as frequently occurs, the will to truth requires its
own surrender. But always a new progression begins; for the goal
is authentic being rather than nothingness. I t is authentic being
toward which the passionate will to tru th , in the form of an ine
radicable skepticism, strives with ever renewed insistence . . . .
As though driven by fate, he seems compelled to expose every in te l
lectual triumph immediately to unlimited skepticism. He does not
relapse into the nothingness of the theory of truth that annihi
lates it s e l f by moving in a c irc le , but he f i l l s the circle with
ever new developments through which his will to truth reasserts
i t s e l f . He does not get bogged down on any purportedly definitive
correct insight into the nature of truth but draws all such
insights back into the whirlpool of his th o u g h ts .7
This passage is important for two reasons. F irs t of a l l , Jaspers
points out that dialectic is not a random process, but must be .
directed toward some goal. In this case the goal is "authentic
^ Jasp ers, N ietzsche, p. 211.
77
being." However, we should note that there is a fundamental ambiguity
in this phrase. There is the metaphysical sense of Being with which
we are concerned here, and there is the anthropological-philosophical
sense of Being which we shall consider in the next chapter. This
brings us to the second point regarding the above quotation. Jaspers
suggests that Nietzsche never really attains the goal of his d iale c tic ,
that what insights he does attain are always thrown "back into the
whirlpool of his thoughts." Thus, Jaspers tends to minimize the impor
tance of Nietzsche's metaphysical insights in favor of the dialectical
anthropological-philosophical sense of Being which he explicates out
of Nietzsche's Existenz.
Jaspers' approach to the problems of Being and Becoming is
peculiar in that he tends to s h ift emphases in order to create an
interpretive method consistent with his notions of d ia le c tic and con
tradiction. Jaspers sees three aspects to Nietzsche's "philosophizing"
about Being.
But though Nietzsche's philosophizing is immersed in
"becoming," he does not stop with i t , but again lays hold of being
(1) as the intel 1 igib.le necessity of 1 ife within existence, (2) in
his transcending philosophy that aims at being per se and (3) by
virtue of his existential a ttitu d e .8
The f i r s t aspect is that of the necessary or "life-preserving1 1 fictions
about which we have already spoken. They provide, in p art, the bridge
between Nietzsche's metaphysics and epistemology and his philosophical
anthropology. They are, therefore, also the bridge between the
S lbid., p. 350.
78
anti-anthropocentric perspective of the metaphysics and epistemology
and the anthropocentric perspective of his philosophical anthropology.
The second aspect is the metaphysical, which Jaspers regards
as fragmentary, inconsistent, and confused. The third aspect i s , of
course, the one to which Jaspers gives most emphasis as i t involves
interpretation out of Nietzsche's Existenz understood as "real dialec
tic ." At the moment we are concerned with the second aspect—the
metaphysical one. Jaspers wishes to interpret Nietzsche's conception
of Being as essentially contradictory and regards th is contradic-
toriness as one which arises out of Nietzsche's e x iste n tia l-
psychological situ atio n , rather than as an essential metaphysical con-
tradictoriness which lies at the heart of the meaning of Nietzsche's
metaphysics.
As a young man Nietzsche tried out the metaphysical thought:
"If contradiction i f . . . true being, and i f becoming belongs
to appearance, then profound understanding of the world consists
in understanding contradiction." . . . . The question arises:
Do oppositions and contradictions inhere in being i t s e l f , or are
they merely modes of appearance devoid of real existence? Is
becoming an ultimate re a lity that resolves all opposition and
overcomes all con'tradictoriness, or are contradictions the re a lity
which the appearance of becoming merely obscures? Nietzsche did
not think with any consistency beyond these beginnings, but again
and again he touched upon this perennial problem of philosophy
in which logic and metaphysics meet.9
This passage is strange for two reasons. Jaspers does not seem to
take Nietzsche's youthful remark very seriously and he repeatedly
remarks on the strangeness (and inconsistency!) of Nietzsche's remarks
on "logic." Yet as late as 1888, in a fragment, Nietzsche wrote, "The
9I b i d . , pp. 395-96.
79
conceptual ban on contradiction proceeds.from the belief th at we are
able to form concepts, that the concept not only designates the
essence of a thing but comprehends i t . " ^ Also in a fragmentary note
of 1887 he wrote, "The character of the world in a state of becoming
as incapable of formulation, as 'f a ls e ,' as 'self-contradictory.
Thus, this problem of Being and Becoming and the nature of the "logic"
for formulating these notions was of perennial concern to Nietzsche,
as Jaspers himself admits, which makes his remark that Nietzsche "did
not think with any consistency beyond these beginnings" seem a ll the
stranger. Secondly., Jaspers' questions in the passage quoted above
seem merely rhetorical and there is the implication that Nietzsche
never really thought these problems through. However, once we realize
what Jaspers has done some of the strangeness disappears. Unfortu
nately, Jaspers' interpretive methodology does not in practice remain
true to the theory of interpretation which he originally presents and
which we have already sketched.
Jaspers violates his own theoretical model of in terpretation
in two important ways. This in no way, however, undermines Jaspers'
enterprise which contains much that is enlightening and stim ulating,
but i t does underline the fact that we must be very cautious about
accepting any interpretation of Nietzsche until we have carefully
examined its foundations. F irst of a ll, as we have already observed,
Jaspers uses the notion of Existenz as a hermeneutic model and
^ N i e t z s c h e , The Will to Power, p. 280. ^ I b i d . , p. 280.
80
attempts to ju stify i t as a model on the grounds that i t is developed
internally rather than being imposed externally. W e also noted that
this interpretation is to be understood as a dialectic between Jaspers'
Existenz and Nietzsche's Existenz or, more accurately, Nietzsche's
Existenz as Jaspers in te rp re ts i t . Jaspers denies that the notion of
Existenz is purely subjective and, of course, i t is not purely objec
tive either, and so i t is a matter of interpretation. Thus, already
hidden in Jaspers' hermeneutic model is a presumptive interpretation.
However, someone might argue th at Jaspers' Nietzsche is i t s e l f the
elucidation of Nietzsche's Existenz. If, however, that were the case,
than Jaspers could not legitim ately appeal to the notion of Existenz
as the supporting foundation of various facets of his interpretation.
Furthermore, i t is clear th a t with regard to Nietzsche's metaphysical
notions, Jaspers is disinclined to take them very seriously and almost
hints that they are aberrations of Nietzsche's Existenz. Thus, we can
see that a c la rific a tio n and elucidation of the notion of Existenz in
general and the c r ite r ia of interpretation of Nietzsche's Existenz in
particular are crucial to Jaspers' Nietzsche interpretation. Unfortu
nately, Jaspers does not d ire c tly face this problem and, as a re su lt,
some of his attitudes and c riticism s, especially in the areas of
Nietzsche's metaphysics and epistemology, seem somewhat arbitrary.
Jaspers'.second violation is considerably more subtle and cen
ters around the notion of contradiction. Here again there are two
aspects to the problem. F irs t, when Jaspers uses the phrase "real
d ialectic," he means a d ia le c tic of contradiction.
81
In any case, i t is the task of the interpreter to be forever
dissatisfied until he has also found'the contradiction, to search
out contradictions in all th e ir forms, and then, if possible, to
gain direct experience of th e ir necessity. Instead of being
occasionally provoked by contradiction, one should pursue contra
dictor!' ness to its s o u rc e J 2
If this were put forth simply as a general suggestion, i t would have
to be accepted as good advice, but presented, as i t i s , as a method
ological principle, i t is quite misleading. I t is true that an in te r
pretation which omitted taking into account Nietzsche's dialectic of
contradiction would be deficien t, but Jaspers' overemphasis on this
aspect of Nietzsche's thinking is reductive.
The second aspect of the problem about this notion of contra
diction involves Jaspers' use of the conception of transcendence.
Transcendence plays an extremely important role in Jaspers'own phi
losophy and carries with i t certain dynamic overtones which provide'
connective links to the notion of Existenz. Here, in relation to
the problem of interpreting Nietzsche's conceptions of Being and
Becoming, Jaspers has imported his own notion of transcendence. What
is Nietzsche's notion of Being, according to Jaspers? .
His metaphysical doctrine t e l l s us what that being per se,
conceived as nothing but pure this-w orldliness, actually is:
Being is the eternal recurrence of all things. The insight into
this recurrence, with its consequences for our awareness of being,
our conduct, and our experience, has taken the place of belief in
God. Being is will to power; all that occurs is nothing but a
mode of the will to power which in i t s endless- appearances fu r
nishes the sole propulsion of becoming. Being is l i f e ; i t is
designated by the mythical symbol, Dionysus. The meaning of
being is the superman. '3
^ J a s p e r s , N ietzsche, p. 10. 13i b i d . , pp. 430-31.
82
But how is i t possible that Being is all of these things? According
to Jaspers, i t is the result of a contradiction in Nietzsche's notion
of Being which leads him to posit a kind of transcendence which is
total immanence, since Nietzsche was a severe c r i ti c of all the tra d i
tional forms of transcendence.
In each case, being is no longer the transcendence of God;
instead i t is the immanence that I can discover, investigate, and
produce . . . . The being that Nietzsche has in mind can only be
observed and ‘ conceived in actual specific objects within the
world. Hence the constant transformation of transcending total
immanence into the known immanence of p a rtic u la rity pertaining .
only to specific mundane things. This comes about because, having
previously identified the essence of being metaphysically with an
absolutized specific world-being, he can always return to the
la tte r . Thus his meaning is constantly changing from transcending
thinking to discursive thinking within the world as he shifts
from one method of thinking to a n o th e r J 4
One's f i r s t impulse is to dismiss this as sophistry. However, upon
taking a closer look, one can see what leads Jaspers to adopt this
peculiar position. F irst, l e t us remind ourselves of three things:
(1) Jaspers interpretation based on Existenz emphasizes that aspect
of Nietizsche's thought which we have called philosophical anthro
pology; (2) there are significant d isp a ritie s between Jaspers' own
metaphysics and Nietzsche's; and (3) Jaspers believes th at there is a
contradiction in Nietzsche's notion of Being. However, not even
Jaspers can deny that there is a metaphysical dimension to Nietzsche's
philosophy and, since Nietzsche appears to r e je c t.a ll forms of
transcendence, Jaspers is led to his notion of transcendence in
14Ibid.., p. 431.
83
immanence in order to distinguish a metaphysical and a mundane level,
which at the same time reinforces his notion that there is a contra
diction in Nietzsche's thought about Being. I t is possible that
Nietzsche, who was very subtle as a psychologist, was exceptionally
clumsy as a metaphysician; but i t is also possible th at Nietzsche's
youthful thought about contradiction, which persisted throughout his
active l i f e , was the attempt to open up a new dimension of metaphysi
cal thought or, as Heidegger would put i t , an attempt to prepare the
ground for the "overcoming" of metaphysics, which is precisely
Heidegger's view,.as we shall now see.
Heidegger's View
For Heidegger, the problems of Being and Becoming are central
to the interp retatio n of Nietzsche. In fact, Heidegger believes
that the re a lly great philosophers, in spite of the great variety of
concerns and methodologies, are all ultimately concerned with a
single question—the question about the nature of Being. However,
Heidegger also feels that this question is ju st th at question which
the history of philosophy has not unfolded. The reason for this is,
of course, from Heidegger's point of view, the h isto rical "mistake"
which the Greeks made in turning from fundamental ontology to meta
physics. Nietzsche is the culmination of the h isto rical development
of metaphysics and a t the same time he opens up the p o ssib ility for
an authentic re-orientation to Being its e lf . Nonetheless, Nietzsche
failed to "stand beyond" the tradition of metaphysics and thus is its
84
culmination, since he forced metaphysics to it s most extreme conclu
sion—nihilism.
Nietzsche's failure to "stand beyond" traditional metaphysics
is a resu lt of the way in which he directed his thought about Being.
In several places Nietzsche describes his own philosophy as a "reversal
of Platonism." Platonism is guilty of having made Being into something
s ta tic and permanent—namely "idea"—in conformity with the lim ita
tions of the human epistemological situation. Thus, "metaphysics is
anthropomorphism—the forming and viewing of the world according to
the image of m an."^ However, anthropomorphism is precisely what
Nietzsche hopes to escape through his reversal of Platonism, but,
according to Heidegger, he cannot, "for this metaphysics, to which
the doctrine of the superman belongs, places man, as no previous meta
physics has, in the role of the unconditioned and only measure of all
th in g s ." ^ Thus Nietzsche's metaphysics is not only Heraclitean, but
leads to a kind of hyper<-Protagoreanism as well.
However, a t the moment, we must take a closer look a t this
problem of Being. Our discussion here must necessarily remain incom
plete and can only be fu lly developed in the following sections,
since for both, Jaspers and Heidegger, Nietzsche's notion of Being is
fully in tellig ib le-o n ly in relation to the notions of the Will to
Power, Transvaluation, Eternal Recurrence, and truth. An examination,
not to mention an evaluation, of Heidegger's interpretation of
l 5Heidegger, Nietzsche, II, 127. ^ Ibid. , I I , 127.
85
Nietzsche's doctrine of Being is d iffic u lt for several reasons. F irst
of a ll, Heidegger's manner of proceeding is ponderous and he is highly
repetitious. At times i t seems as though the preliminaries and prep
arations for discussing the "basic questions" are interminable and
Heidegger has the annoying habit of making frequent important, but
poorly integrated, digressions. Secondly, i t is a major undertaking
in its e lf to untangle Heidegger's ideas from Nietzsche's. Heidegger
rather blithely assumes that Nietzsche f i t s comfortably into his con
ception of the h isto ric ity of metaphysics as the unfolding of the
question about Being. Finally, Heidegger uses Nietzsche's philosophy
as an occasion for philosophizing "beyond" Nietzsche, and toward the
end of the second volume of his Nietzsche, Nietzsche v irtu a lly
disappears from the discussion.
With these d iff ic u ltie s in mind, le t us attempt to present the
nucleus of Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's notion of Being.
Like Jaspers, Heidegger emphasizes that for Nietzsche, Being, must
be grasped as Becoming, and also that Nietzsche's "theory" of REALITY
has two aspects—a critique of traditional metaphysics and an attempt
to provide the groundwork for a "new" metaphysics. I t is th is l a t t e r
aspect that is of primary importance here. Nietzsche's critique of
the traditional conceptiorts of Being or, more accurately, of all the
traditional forms of transcendence immediately directs our attention
to this second "creative" aspect which is an attempt on Nietzsche's
part to "transcend" traditional metaphysical thinking.
In the f i r s t th ird of the f i r s t volume of his Nietzsche,
Heidegger approaches Nietzsche's notion of Being through an analysis
of his aesthetic perspective and .the "reversal of Platonism." These
two facets of Nietzsche's thought are inextricably bound up with one
another. For Platonism tru th is more valuable than a r t, but in
17
Nietzsche's reversal "Art is more valuable than truth." For the
Platonist, re a lity and tru th are to be found only in the realm of
the supersensible and with respect to re a lity and truth the realm
of the sensible is d eficien t. For Nietzsche, however, a rt is the
fundamental ground for the revelation of Being, since in his early
period when Nietzsche's aeth etic perspective pre-dominates, a r t is
the highest expression of the Will to Power. In part, Heidegger is
very sympathetic with th is view since i t strongly parallels his own
position that poetry and painting can be revelations of B eingJ 8
Nietzsche rejects the tra n slatio n of Being by the Platonists to a
supersensible plane, since this imposes s ta tic anthropomorphic cate
gories on that which is continually in process. REALITY must be
grasped as Becoming and can, therefore, only be grasped in terms of
the sensible. Genuine Art is th at which reveals to us the sensible
as Becoming and, understood as the Will to Power, leads us to a
genuine apprehension of REALITY.
Ultimately, however, Heidegger rejects Nietzsche's attempt
i . 1 1 1 1 1 '■ ■ ■ > '■ —— • - . 1
17I b id ., I. 250.
18see Heidegger's essay, The Origin of the Work of A rt.
87
at a reversal of Platonism and calls him "the most unbridled Platonist
in the history of Western metaphysics. '^ 9 Heidegger goes even further,
for he argues that Nietzsche never really asks the fundamental ques
tion, "What is Being?," but instead asks only the introductory ques
tions (Leitfrage) , "What is the being (das Seiende) ? " ^ "The funda
mental question remains as foreign to Nietzsche as to the history of
thinking before him."^ W e must keep in mind, however, that
Heidegger's criticisms of Nietzsche are based on what Heidegger appre
hends as an incongruence between his own thinking and Nietzsche's.
W e shall also have to consider the degree to which Heidegger's in te r
pretation has been conditioned by his own philosophical project; and
this raises the question of the adequacy and unbiasedness of
Heidegger's interpretation.
Comparison and Contrast
Heidegger and Jaspers agree that Nietzsche's notion of Being
»
must be grasped as a d ialectic of Becoming. They further agree that
Nietzsche's metaphysical project must be understood as a critique of
traditional metaphysics, which then leads into the attempt to provide
a "new" kind of metaphysics. Both agree that this attempt f a i l s , but
th eir reasons for this opinion are radically different. For Jaspers,
^William B.'Macomber, The Anatomy of Disillusion: Martin
Heidegger's Notion of Truth (Evanston, 1967), p. 197.
20Heidegger, Nietzsche, I, 80. 21 ib id . , I, 80.
these reasons stem from what he regards as Nietzsche's inability as
Existenz to escape the fundamental impulse toward transcendence. For
Heidegger, Nietzsche's project f a ils because Nietzsche does not "over
come" metaphysics by asking the fundamental question about Being as
such. Basically Jaspers believes that Nietzsche f a ils because there
is a contradiction inherent in his notion of Being. Heidegger, on the
other hand, emphasizes Nietzsche's fa ilu re in terms of what he regards
as Nietzsche's anthropomorphism of metaphysics. This is a curious
situation. Jaspers ignores the consequences of Nietzsche's attack on
conceptualization, especially as i t applies to the notion of contradic
tion. As Jaspers himself points out, Nietzsche very early in.his phi
losophical career became convinced of the necessity for thinking
through the nature of metaphysics as a contradiction. Thus, Jaspers
f a ils to make the distinction between Nietzsche's notion of Being con
taining a contradiction—which view is a misunderstanding on Jaspers'
p art—and the view Nietzsche actually presents, namely, that Being
i t s e l f as apprehended by the thought of traditional metaphysics is
inherently a contradiction. This is a d irect consequence of
Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics. In other words, Nietzsche is
saying that a new kind of THOUGHT is necessary in order to grasp
REALITY. The traditional modes of thought, due to th e ir notion of
"logic," have imposed s ta tic categories to create a permanent notion
of Being as the essence of re a lity . True REALITY, however, requires
a different kind of THOUGHT, one which can grasp the essentially con
tradictory nature of the ordinary conceptualization of Being.
Heidegger, too, curiously ignores Nietzsche's own suggestions
and guidelines. Nietzsche, in his criticisms of Platonism, makes i t
quite clear that he rejects the anthropomorphism of metaphysics and
epistemology. Heidegger, however, believes th at Nietzsche is guilty
to the extreme of ju st such an anthropomorphism. I t i s , of course,
possible that Nietzsche does violate his own prohibition, but before
deciding th at this is the case we should f i r s t examine Nietzsche's
position in this regard with great care. Heidegger, however, makes
no such examination and takes i t as self-evident th a t Nietzsche is
guilty. In anticipation we might suggest that Heidegger arrives at
this verdict because he fa ils to recognize the fundamental dualism
between Nietzsche's metaphysics and epistemology and his philosophical
anthropology. Heidegger attempts to subsume a ll aspects of Nietzsche's
thought under his metaphysics. Jaspers, on the other hand, basically
attempts to subsume all of Nietzsche's thought under philosophical
anthropology and thus produces similar distortions from the other
side. Ultimately we hope to show that two such rad ically d ifferent
interpretations are possible precisely because of th is fundamental
dualism a t the heart of Nietzsche's philosophy and, fu rth er, th at any
interpretation which f a ils to take into account th is dualism will of
necessity be one-sided. To grasp fully Nietzsche's THOUGHT about
REALITY, W e must examine the other basic aspects of his metaphysics
and, fin a lly , attempt to understand these in relatio n to his notion
of Being.
90
The Will to Power
The doctrine of the Will to Power is central to any attempt to
gain an understanding of Nietzsche's metaphysics. Nonetheless, this
doctrine has been repeatedly and perversely misunderstood. I t is with
regard to this doctrine th at we once again encounter Nietzsche as a
cosmologist in much the same way in which the pre-Socratics were cos-
mologists. There i s , of course, also the influence here of
Schopenhauer in terms of the general doctrine of the metaphysical
primordiality of the Will. Nietzsche, however, very soon rejected
Schopenhauer's conception as associated with negativity and pessimism,
and transformed his own doctrine of Will into a doctrine of cosmic
affirmation. In most of the pre-Socratics the primordial arche was
conceived of as dynamic, that is , i t was imbued with the power of
self-d ifferen tiatio n and, in fa c t, the life-fo rce was thought of as
i t s e l f a specific manifestation of this power which characterized the
primordial arche. This is the doctrine of "animism" and in this sense
Nietzsche's conception is "animistic."
The mechanistic representation of a "lifeless" Nature is only an
hypothesis for the purposes of calculation; i t overlooks the fa c t
that here too power relations and therewith relationships of per
spective held sway. Every point of power is in i t s e l f perspecti-
val. From th is i t becomes clear, "that there is no inorganic
World." Everything "real" is alive, i t is in i t s e l f "perspecti-
val" and asserts i t s e l f in its perspective against o th e rs .22
For Nietzsche, the doctrine of the Will to Power is the foundation of
metaphysics; i t is the ultimate expression of the primordial arche,
2 2 ib id ., I, 245.
91
that is, the Will to Power is_ in the most radical metaphysical sense,
what there i s . As Danto puts i t :
It is hardly avoidable that we think of Will-to-Power in
almost exactly the terms in which men once thought of substance,
as that which underlies everything else and was the most funda
mental of a ll. For Will-to-Power is not something we have, but
something we a r e . Not only are w e_ Will-to-Power, but so is every
thing, human and animal, animate and material. The entire world
is Will-to-Power; there is nothing more basic, for there is
nothing other than i t and i t s modifications.
Plainly, then, Will-to-Power is an elemental concept in
Nietzsche's thinking, a concept in whose terms everything is to
be understood and to which everything is finally to be reduced.
It is metaphysical or, b e tte r, an ontological concept, for "Will-
to-Power" is Nietzsche's answer to the question "What is there?"23
Clearly, then, this metaphysical doctrine of power has nothing to do
with a "politics of power" as i t is ordinarily understood.
Here we must make a d istinction between the Will to Power as
such, understood as arche, and the specific manifestations of the Will
to Power as individualized "beings" or, as Nietzsche might put i t , as
individualized "becomings." Metaphysically considered the Will to
Power is, with regard to the question of value, neutral. That is to
say, the Will to Power in i t s e l f is neither good nor bad; i t simply i s .
However, a man, as an individuation of the Will to Power, "exists" as
a valuational creature, th a t i s , the very becoming of man essentially
is_as a creator of values, as is exemplified in Nietzsche's doctrine
of the Superman as the "goal" of man's Becoming. In the next chapter,
we shall consider the human being as a specific manifestation of the
Will to Power. W e ought, however, to note here that there are two
23Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, p. 215.
92
corresponding senses of kosmos. In the metaphysical sense the Will to
Power is the structural and regulative principle as well as the dynamic
one. The philosophical anthropological sense of kosmos, man, by means
of conceptualization and abstraction, imposes order on "Chaos." There
are many sub-types of this second notion of kosmos, such as, political
order, social order, and religious order.
On the metaphysical level, however, Nietzsche sharply contrasts
his sense of kosmos as Will to Power with the mechanistic physicalistic
interpretation of kosmos. He thus says:
Physicists believe in a "true world" in th eir own fashion: a
firm systematization of atoms in necessary motion, the same for
all beings--so for them the "apparent world" is reduced to the side
of universal and universally necessary being which is accessible
to every being in its own way (accessible and also already
adapted-made "subjective"). But they are in error. The atom
they posit is inferred according to the logic of perspectivism
of consciousness—and is therefore i t s e l f a subjective fiction.
This world picture that they sketch d iffe rs in no essential way
from the subjective world picture: i t is only construed with more
extended senses, but with our senses nonetheless—And in any case
they le f t something out of the constellation without knowing it:
precisely this necessary perspectivism by virtue of which every
center of force—and not only man—construes all the re st of the
world from its own viewpoint, i . e . , measures, fe e ls, forms,
according to its own force—They forgot to include this perspec
tiv e-settin g force in "true being"--in school language: the
su b jec t.24
Here we have again an underscoring of perspectivism and another s ta te
ment of Nietzsche's rejection of anthropomorphism in metaphysics and
epistemology. As we shall see la te r , the becoming of human being
certainly relates to the Will to Power, "for lif e is merely a special
case of the will to power,"25 but th is is not grounds, for Nietzsche,
^N ietzsche, The Mill to Power, p. 339. 25ib id . , p. 369.
93
for anthropomorphic projections into metaphysics.
Jaspers1View
Jaspers begins his discussion of the Will to Power with a
brief statement of Nietzsche's e a rlie r "world exegesis" and then con
tra s ts th is with the notion of the Will to Power. Nietzsche's ea rlie r
position belongs to his critique of traditional metaphysics.
Nietzsche warns us against aVJ_ notions of the whole: "Let us
guard against thinking that the world is a living being . . .
or th at the universe is a machine . . . . Let us guard against
saying that there are laws of nature . . . . Let us guard against
thinking that the world eternally creates novelties." All these
"shadows of God" darken actuality. W e are within the world, and
the whole of the world is , as a whole, not accessible to us .26
In view of this position, Jaspers is "astonished" th at Nietzsche
arrives at the notion of the Will to Power.
He rejects every determinate species of e n tity th at as such is
supposed to express the nature of Being. Nevertheless, his world-
exegesis appears in fa c t to revive ju s t the so rt of specification
th a t he r e je c ts .27
This position of Jaspers is an amplification of his belief that
Nietzsche's notion o f’Being is contradictory.
Jaspers continues his discussion with a b rie f consideration of
the development of the Will to Power out of the concept of " life ." He
argues that Nietzsche observed that wherever there is l i f e , there is
a manifestation of the Will to Power. He further argues th at,
i n i t i a l l y , Will to Power is simply a specification of the notion of
l if e . Later, however, Nietzsche states that l if e is merely one way
26jaspers, N ietzsche, p. 293. 27Ib id . , p. 294.
in which the Will to Power manifests itse lf. Jaspers chooses to view
this as a contradiction rather than as a progression and development.
This dual tendency of Jaspers to see everything in Nietzsche through
the lenses of contradiction and to ignore the p o ssibility of concep
tual sophistication and development is , perhaps, the greatest weakness
of Jaspers' in terp retatio n , for i t forces Jaspers to deny again and
again that Nietzsche expressed anything like "doctrines." Furthermore,
i t creates a situation in which Jaspers has to accept the principle
that the whole of Nietzsche's philosophy is essentially ambiguous.
To be sure, there are ambiguities in Nietzsche and the general sugges
tion that we be aware of these and attempt to account fo r them is
excellent. However, the characterization of Nietzsche's philosophy
as essentially ambiguous and the adoption of the search for ambiguities
as a methodological principle is extremely dubious.
The major part of Jaspers' discussion of the Will to Power
relates to specific manifestations, which we shall consider in the
next chapter. However, toward the end of his discussion he does pre
sent a "critic a l characterization" of the Will to Power as a meta
physical notion. F irst of a l l , he charges that Nietzsche is guilty
of reifying the Will to Power.
Thus Nietzsche, who does everything he can to arouse and
preserve our awareness of what is possible, to reveal every la s t
perspective, and to discover countless in terpretations, appears
to conclude by absolutizing something specific. Instead of
reacting to the liberating questions that can no longer be
answered in general terms by referring back to the h is to r ic ity of
95
contemporary autonomous Existenz, he seems rather to reply in
universal terms when he accounts for authentic being by reifying
the will to power.28
This charge of reificatio n is i t s e l f ambiguous, because the notion
"thing-like" is ambiguous. Nietzsche nowhere suggests that the Will
to Power is anything at a ll like a perceptual "object." He repeatedly
emphasizes the process character of the Will to Power. Will to Power
is dynamic—i t is Becoming—and, therefore, certainly not "thing-like"
in any usual sense. However, the Will to Power £ua concept and qua
abstraction is something s ta t i c which suggests unity and permanence;
but this is a problem which is rooted in the very nature of language,
as Nietzsche himself was well aware. "In order to think and infer
i t is necessary to assume beings: logic handles only formulas for
29
what remains the same." This, then, points at a radical experiment
on Nietzsche's part to communicate "beyond" the radical strictu res of
the "logic of language. "There is no such thing as 'w ill'; i t is
only a simplifying conception of understanding, as is 'm atter. ' " 88
Here we can see a kinship with Berkeley, who was also attempting to
communicate beyond the boundaries of traditional conceptualization.
It is curious that Jaspers, who strongly, emphasizes Nietzsche's ra d i
cal "experiments in communication," persists in evaluating these in
traditional terms.
A second criticism which Jaspers has of the Will to Power is
that Nietzsche's monism is the resu lt of an illegitim ate
88Ibid. , p. 309. ^N ietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 280.
3QIb id ., p. 254.
96
"absolutizing."
The many sense-verifications in empirical observation are fused
with an interpretative construct as absolutizing thinking applies
them to being its e lf in a manner that is no longer empirically
v erifiable or controllable.31
The real root of the problem, for Jaspers, however, is once again
transcendence. Here also Jaspers understands Nietzsche's critique of
the traditional notions of transcendence to mean a total rejection of
the very notion of transcendence. W e noted previously, that Jaspers
spoke of Nietzsche’s position as "transcendence in immanence," but
here Jaspers' formulation is even stronger and he suggests an absolute
separation of immanence and transcendence. I t is strange that Jaspers
does not advance this same criticism against Spinoza's monism.32
Jaspers believes that Nietzsche's exegesis in terms of the Will to
Power is fundamentally deficient in that i t omits a facet of human
Existenz which cannot be grasped in terms of a doctrine of immanence.
However, the exegesis misses something within the original being
of human Existenz that has nothing to do with will to power and
i s , in fa c t, only discoverable apart from i t . The will to power
is unrelated to the self-being that acknowledges responsibility
for i t s e l f , to the independent point th at is unconditioned and
exists only in relation to transcendence, to communication as
loving struggle that neither.w ills nor exerts power, and to the
truly free and open horizon. To be sure Nietzsche's metaphysics
unveils the perversions of these types of essential being, but
th e ir true substance remains untouched.
The essential point here is that this metaphysics of radical
immanence undertakes to read the ciphers of being as will to
power apart from transcendence. He who knows himself to exist
31Jaspers, Nietzsche, p. 316.
32«arl Jaspers, The Great Philosophers, ed ., Hannah Arendt,
trans. Ralph Manheim (New York, 1966), I I , 273-387,
97
in relation to transcendence cannot see himself as having any
kinship within its confines. Existence reveals a being that
struggles against the possibility of this metaphysics (although
the struggle for power is alien to its nature) and that refuses
to be encompassed by this exegesis. I t accepts Nietzsche's
endeavor to illumine specific aspects of the world in a r e a lis tic
manner, but i t turns away when he thereby attempts to apprehend
being i t s e l f . ^
I t is interesting to contemplate how Nietzsche himself might have
reacted to this criticism . It seems likely that he would have accused
Jaspers of introducing a surreptitious theology with his notion of
transcendence. Jaspers' judgments here are not the re su lt of an
“internal hermeneutic"; rather, they are rooted in Jaspers' own meta
physics. Jaspers is using his own special notions of transcendence
and "ciphers of being" as the foundation for a critiq u e of Nietzsche's
position. This would seem to be a more subtle and sophisticated ver
sion of the charge that Nietzsche's philosophy is deficient because
i t rejects the traditional notions of God as espoused by the
"Christian" interpreters of Nietzsche. The fa c t th at Jaspers' bias
here is a metaphysical one, makes i t no less a bias. When we regard
Jaspers' conclusion about the doctrine of the Will to Power, i t
becomes further evident that Jaspers imposes his own conception of
metaphysics in evaluating Nietzsche. "The doctrine of the will to
power is not his definitive metaphysics, but a thought-experiment
performed within the more extensive whole of his investigation of
being. J a s p e r s ' insistence upon an interpretive methodology with
33jaspers, N ietzsche, pp. 317-18. ^ I b i d . , pt 3 1 8.
98
regard to Nietzsche which centers around a "dialectic of contradict
tion" leads him to view Nietzsche's metaphysics as e sse n tia lly frag
mented in such a manner th at other aspects of Nietzsche's metaphysics
are not harmoniously related to the doctrine of the Will to Power.
His discontent with this metaphysics is shown by the f a c t th at i t
contrasts with and supplements his account of l if e and by the
further fa c t th a t i t is overshadowed by his doctrine of eternal
recurrence, which, in its turn, proves to be merely r e l a t i v e . ^
Heidegger, however, emphatically rejects any such notion of fragmenta
tion and in s is ts upon the essential unity of the basic aspects of
Nietzsche's metaphysics, as we shall now see.
Heidegger's View
For Heidegger, the key to Nietzsche's metaphysics is to be
found in the doctrine of the Will to Power understood in relatio n to
Eternal Recurrence and Transvaluation.
All Being i s , for Nietzsche, a Becoming. This Becoming has the
character of the action and the activity of Willing. Will,
however, i s , in its essence, Will to Power. 36
Later Heidegger adds:
The doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence of the same belongs
together with the doctrine of the Will to Power in the most i n t i
mate fashion. The unifiedness of this doctrine manifests i t s e l f
h isto ric a lly as the Transvaluation of all previous v a lu e s .37
Thus a fu ll grasp of Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's meta
physics will have to wait upon a discussion of Eternal Recurrence and
35Ib id . , p. 318. 36Heidegger, Nietzsche, I, 15.
37Ib id ., I, 26.
99
Transvaluation. However, in the la st third of the f i r s t volume of
his Nietzsche, Heidegger approaches the Will to Power from a somewhat
different direction, which we shall pursue here and in the section on
truth, which is to follow. The second approach involves not only the
notion of truth, but Nietzsche's conceptions of knowledge and l i f e as
well.
Let us begin, then, with a general outline of this approach.
F irst, we should note th at Heidegger is here less concerned with the
book, The Will to Power, than with following out the course of
Nietzsche's thought concerning the.doctrine of the Will to Power. 38
Heidegger t i t l e s th is part of his book, "The Will to Power as Know
ledge" and begins i t with a discussion of Nietzsche's thought as the
culmination of metaphysics. Let us here introduce the word "entity"
as a translation for Heidegger's "das Seiende," since its lite r a l
translation as "that which is" tends to be awkward. W e may now refor
mulate Heidegger's diagnosis of Nietzsche's metaphysics as a culmina
tion. According to Heidegger's view, Nietzsche presents a critique
of traditional metaphysics as the basis for the "overcoming" of tra d i
tional metaphysics. However, Heidegger believes that Nietzsche's
attempt is a fa ilu re and th at he remains firmly rooted in the tra d i
tion of metaphysics., for Nietzsche asks only the question of meta
physics—What is the Being of e n titie s? —and does not ask the funda
mental question fo r the "overcoming" of metaphysics—What is Being as
38Ib id ., I, 481-87.
100
such?. The basis for Nietzsche's attempt at the "overcoming" of meta-'
physics is his doctrine of the Will to Power, and Heidegger believes
that his elaboration of this doctrine is a demonstration of Nietzsche's
"failure." This elaboration begins with a presentation of the Will to
Power as "the principle of a new establishment of value." 39 Also,
Nietzsche uses the word "world" as "the to tality of e n titie s" to mean
"life" and Heidegger quotes him as saying, " 'This world is the Will to
Power—and nothing besides! And you also are this Will to Power—and
nothing besides!' ";40 and then concludes that "the to ta lity of
en tities is 'l i f e '" and that "the essence of life is 'Will to
Power'."4^ Further, "Knowledge, according to Nietzsche is a form of
the Will to P o w e r . "^2 Thus, i t would appear that we are now in a
position to begin the main discussion; unfortunately, however,
Heidegger's discussion is full of linguistic gymnastics th a t seem
endlessly involved. W e are being told that knowledge can be under
stood only in terms of the essence of truth and also in terms of
knowing as techne, but the essence of truth must be grasped in the
sense of "correctness" as an "establishing of value," which notion,
Heidegger in s is ts , must be approached through Nietzsche's biologism." 43
And this is not the end of i t , for Heidegger now proceeds by connecting
39Ibid., I, 487.
40Nietzsche as quoted in Heidegger Nietzsche, I, 492.
41 Ibid., I, 492. 42Ib id ., I, 494. 43Ib id ., I, 495-527.
101
Nietzsche's "biologism" with "logic," since i t is the "trust in Reason"
that creates "truths"—life-preserving fic tio n s —and man projects these
"truths" out of his confrontation with Chaos, which is understood in
relation to the "collapse" of the A ristotelian law of co n tra d ic tio n .^
Finally, this "collapse" of the law of contradiction results in a
"destruction" of the d istin ctio n between the real and the apparent
world and, thus, the metaphysics of truth is subjectivism understood
as anthropomorphism and the "ground" of the "justification" for truth
is "justice" or "correctness" (G e r e c h t i g k e i t ) Stated in this bald
and incomplete manner, Heidegger's "analysis" sounds like a s e lf
parody.
This "analysis," however, is important for three reasons:
0 ) i t does contain some genuine and profound insights into Nietzsche's
metaphysics, (2) i t presents some new insights into Heidegger's own
philosophy, and (3) i t presents hints of an im plicit critique of
Husserlian phenomenology. The f i r s t and the third points are the
ones of interest to us here, and i t may be that the third point will
help us to understand why there is so much of Heidegger's own thought
super-imposed upon Nietzsche's. For example, in another discussion
on the Will to Power, Heidegger again presents his criticism that
Nietzsche remained rooted in the realm of metaphysics and never
attained ontology. Ontology, in Heidegger's sense, is concerned with
the distinction between Being and beings or e n titie s. Heidegger then
44lbid., I , 527-625. 4 5 ib id ., 625-658.
102
comments that i t is ontology in this sense that is the concern of his
book, Being and Time. 46 In another discussion of Heidegger's, this
time on Eternal Recurrence, he argues, as we shall see la te r, that
in his doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, Nietzsche attempted to think
Being through the notion of time. But, of course, Nietzsche f a ils ,
for otherwise he would have produced Heidegger's fundamental ontology.
From this i t is clear that Heidegger's interpretation is, indeed, of
a very special kind. Heidegger uses Nietzsche's philosophy as an
occasion for doing his own philosophizing. However, le t us see what
insight we can gain-about the Will to Power from Heidegger's
"analysis."
Heidegger and Jaspers agree that Nietzsche's doctrine of the
Will to Power is a radical experiment in communication. Furthermore,
Heidegger reminds us, as does Jaspers, that we should be most careful
not to be misled by the language, for as Nietzsche himself says, Will
"is merely a word." 47 Nietzsche uses various lin g u istic means to
approach the essential nucleus of the idea which he most fundamentally
calls the Will to Power. Like Jaspers, Heidegger notes th at Nietzsche
sometimes speaks of the Will to Power as l i f e and th a t, at other
times, he speaks of lif e as one form of the Will to Power; but also
like Jaspers, Heidegger f a ils to distinguish between the metaphysical
doctrine of the Will to Power and the doctrine of the Will to Power
as philosophical anthropology. For Heidegger, Nietzsche's philosophy
46Ib id ., I I , 209. 47I b id ., I, 650.
103
is metaphysics with occasional excursions into the mundane world,
whereas for Jaspers, Nietzsche's philosophy is philosophical anthro^
pology with occasional excursions into metaphysics.
For Heidegger, Nietzsche's epistemology is a direct consequence
of his metaphysics and is , in f a c t, inseparable from i t , since "Know
ledge is , according to Nietzsche, a form of the Will to Power." 48
But what is knowledge? Nietzsche's conception of knowledge, Heidegger
argues, is graspable only in terms of an understanding of the essence
of truth. So, le t us now proceed to a discussion of Nietzsche's notion
of truth.
Nietzsche's Doctrine of Truth
Here we have one of the most original and most interesting
facets of Nietzsche's philosophy. His doctrine of truth is also an
illu stra tio n of his philosophical "extremism." I t is here that we
discover the "crisis point" of Nietzsche's philosophy. I t is in
Nietzsche's epistemology that we find the attempt to lay the ground-
‘work for a "new" metaphysics. Nietzsche himself characterizes his
epistomology as "perspectivism." Human knowledge is always to be
understood as the adoption of a p articular perspective and this is
the case for sc ie n tific , cu ltu ra l, or individual forms of knowledge.
Thus, at f i r s t glance, i t would appear that Nietzsche's epistemology
provides a consistent link between his metaphysics and his philosophi
cal anthropology, since the epistemological notion of perspectivism
48Ib id ., I, 494.
104
is quite compatible with the metaphysical notion of the Will to Power
as Becoming. However, i f we look closer, we find a radical critique
of the traditional notions of truth— -a critique which lies at the
heart of Nietzsche's own notion of TRUTH. Nietzsche denies repeatedly
th a t truth is an absolute and views truth and knowledge as forms of
the Will to Power which human beings have "created" for th eir own self-
perpetuation. In a posthumously published fragment from 1873 title d
"On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense," Nietzsche makes i t clear
th a t he regards the Will to truth as the "creation" of "necessary"
life-preserving fictio n s; necessary, in that they preserve and promote
the human Will to Power.
In some remote corner of the universe, poured out and g l i t
tering in innumerable solar systems, there once was a sta r on
which clever animals invented knowledge. That was the haughtiest
and most mendacious minute of "world h isto ry "—y et only a minute.
After nature had drawn a few breaths the s ta r grew cold, and the
clever animals had to die.
One might invent such a fable and s t i l l not have illu stra te d
sufficien tly how wretched, how shadowy and flig h ty , how aimless
and arb itrary , the human in te lle c t appears in nature. There have
been e te rn itie s when i t did not e x ist; and when i t is done for
again, nothing will have happened. For th is in te lle c t has no
further mission that would lead beyond human l i f e . I t is human,
rather, and only its owner and producer gives i t such importance,
as i f the world pivoted around i t . 49.
But what about the passage just quoted? Is i t true? Here we come to
understand the necessity for making a d istin ctio n between the tra d i
tional theories of truth and Nietzsche's theory of TRUTH. For
Nietzsche, there is a fundamental perspective, namely, the cosmologi
cal perspective, which so to speak, puts all other perspectives "in
49Nietzsche, The Portable N ietzsche, p. 42.
105
perspective."
Nietzsche's critique of the traditional theories of truth goes
even fu rth er, for ultimately i t turns out to be an attack on the very
foundations of logic and rational thinking. Sometime in the year 1887
o r 1888 Nietzsche decisively formulated his attack on the "law of con-
tradi cti on."
W e are unable to affirm and to deny one and the same thing:
th is is a subjective empirical law, not the expression of any
"necessity" but only of an in ability.
I f, according to A ristotle, the law of contradiction is the
most certain of all principles, i f i t is the ultimate and most
basic, upon which every demonstrative proof r e s ts , i f the principle
of every axiom lie s in i t ; then one should consider all the more
rigorously what presuppositions already lie at the bottom of i t .
Either i t asserts something about actuality, about being, as i f
one already knew this from another source; that i s , as i f opposite
a ttrib u te s could not be ascribed to i t . Or the proposition means:
opposite attrib u tes should not be ascribed to i t . In that case,
logic would be an imperative, not to know the true, but to posit
and arrange a world that shall be called true by us.
In short, the question remains open: are the axioms of logic
adequate to re a lity or are they a means and measure for us to
create r e a lity , the concept "reality," for ourselves?--To affirm
the former one would, as already said, have to have a previous
knowledge of being—which is certainly not the case. The propo
sition therefore contains no criterion of t r u t h , but an imperative
concerning that which should count as true.bu
Here Nietzsche emphasized that logic and, with i t , knowledge, are
human creations designed for the purposes of "rational" thought and
communication. Again we have the implied distinction between tra d i
tional thought and Nietzsche's THOUGHT. For Nietzsche, THOUGHT about
REALITY is the thinking through of the contradiction which defines and
delimits the epistemological-ontological situation of being human.
50Nietzsche- , The Will to Power, p. 270.
106
Thus, even though Nietzsche rejects all the traditional forms of
transcendence, there is for him, nonetheless, a TRANSCENDENT perspec
tive, namely the cosmological perspective, which is THOUGHT about
REALITY. This TRANSCENDENCE is rooted in the p o ssib ility of bur
Being, as human, to move "beyond" the context of knowledge and to
grasp i t as life-preserving f ic tio n s . That is to say, the cosmologi
cal perspective can grasp the TRUTH of the anthropological perspec
tive and thereby achieve an understanding of REALITY. However, this
conception of REALITY drives a wedge between thought and THOUGHT thus
creating a fundamental dualism between Nietzsche's metaphysics and
epistemology and his philosophical anthropology. TRUTH, then, for
Nietzsche is the understanding that all truths are perspectival and,
as such, are manifestations of the human Will to Power. KNOW LEDGE,
then, is THOUGHT about knowledge, that is , the apprehension of truths
as life-preserving fic tio n s. Thus, TH O U G H T creates a dualism which
is irrevocably rooted in the epistemological-ontological situ atio n of
being human, since it.depends upon the "rejection" of the "law of
contradiction" in order to achieve TRUTH, i . e . , the cosmological per
spective, but a t the same time human life , as the Will to Power,
depends upon the "acceptance" of the "law of contradiction" as
ontologically necessary from the perspective of philosophical anthro
pology. The same principle is at work here in the doctrine of Being
as Becoming, fo r, in TRUTH, Becoming is Being and i t is only our
anthropological perspective that "necessitates" our hypostatization
107
of Becoming into "graspable" Being. As we shall see la te r , i t is the
ontological p o ssib ility of man's being able to take up a TRANSCENDENT
perspective which creates th is dualism at the heart of Nietzsche's phi
losophy, of which he himself was well aware.
Jaspers' View
Jaspers divides his discussion of Nietzsche's notion of tru th
into three major parts.
Nietzsche's various reflections as he seeks to discover what
i t means to be tru e can scarcely be brought into a single systema
tic order. Although they are actually fused with each other, we
shall trace them from three independent sources indicated by
Nietzsche himself: (1) methodical science, (2) the theory that
truth has its being in a construction devised by living e x iste n ts,
and (3) a boundless passion for tr u th . In all cases we arrive at
in te llig ib le positions located on a route that seems to end in
failure: Nietzsche is intent, on the dissolution of reason.
Finally, all of these reflections on truth lead to a transcending
breakthrough.51
The notion of sc ie n tific truth belongs primarily to Nietzsche's so-
called Positivistic phase. Nietzsche's emphasis here is on the meth
odological aspect and he seems more concerned with the discipline
which such a method can provide than with any particular s c ie n tific
results which accrue from the application of such a method. The most
interesting and most important aspect of this part of Nietzsche's con
cern with truth is his exposition of the .limitations of science, which
Jaspers summarizes in five propositions. (1) "Factual sc ie n tific
knowledge is not knowledge of being. "52 Here, of course, Nietzsche
^ Jasp ers, N ie tz s c h e , p. 171. ^2Ibid. , p. 176.
is already suggesting that there are "truths" that lie outside of the
grasp of science. Science is concerned with particular realms of
related "facts" and by its very nature cannot attempt to exposit the
Whole which is the task of cosmological philosophy. (2) "I t is not
the possession of the truth but the quest for i t that is sa tisfy in g .
Here we have an underscoring of Nietzsche's conviction that the quest
for TRUTH is more important than any particular truths that are
obtained. The Will to TRUTH is an open-ended dialectic which essen
tia lly characterizes Nietzsche's "new" kind of philosophizing. Even
TRUTH, as grasped from the TRANSCENDENT perspective of cosmology, is
fu lly in te llig ib le only when understood d ialectically . "Scientific
certainty provides no security in connection with the things that
really matter most. " ^ For Nietzsche, there can never be any full
certainty or absolute security and th is is the K N O W LED G E of knowledge,
namely, that philosophy, in i t s inmost and most intimate Being, is
forever dynamic. Every absolute is a degeneration from the TRUTH of
philosophy to the dogma of the generalized perspective. (4) "S cienti
fic knowledge simply cannot give purpose to l i f e ." 53 For Nietzsche,
the Knowledge which science achieves, may or may not benefit man;
there is no necessary relation between sc ie n tific progress and human
progress. (5) "Science cannot answer the question concerning its own
meaning." 55 The meaning of science must be understood in relation to
53Ib id ., p. 176. S ^Ibid., p. 177. 55Ib id ., p. 177
56lbid., p. 177.
Life and, in particular to the human Will to Power. If, then, there
is meaning to l i f e , th is is not discoverable by science, but remains
rather in the province of philosophy. "The philosopher discovers his
task where being in it s en tirety emerges, whereas science offers
methodical certainty about p a rtic u la rs ."57 Thus, though science is.
relevant to philosophy, philosophy must go "beyond" i t , for science
offers only a certain range of possible perspectives or truths.
The second part of Jaspers' discussion of Nietzsche's views of
truth centers around the conception of truth "as illusion." This is ,
of course, Nietzsche's conception of perspectivism with its im plicit
critique of the previous philosophical and theological theories of
absolute truth.
All knowledge is an interpretation of being provided by a living
and cognizing subject; there is no truth that is not entertained
in thought and believed, that i s , that is not found within that
encompassing being that we are . . ., and that is possibly all
the being there is . Thus conceived, truth is not something inde
pendent, unconditioned, and absolutely universal. Rather i t is
inextricably involved with the being of a living subject and.the
world that he has constructed. But this world as i t appears to 58
us is , like ourselves, in a constant process of temporal change.
This insight that human knowledge is by it s very nature defined and
delimited by the f a c tic ity of the possible human perspectives is one
that has been stated by many philosophers, but none has pushed i t
to the radical extremes that Nietzsche has. However, Jaspers also
in sists that this view forces Nietzsche to distinguish between two
"levels of truth."
57Ib id ., p. 182. 58I b id ., pp. 184-85.
110
Such utterances can surely be meaningful only from the standpoint
of a kind of tru th -u n a tta in a b le as i t may be from the level of
l i f e —that can detect the erroneousness of the knowledge that
serves life . This involves two d istin c t concepts of truth: To_
begin with, truth appears as the kind of error that supports lif e .
But again i t appears as remote from l i f e , as though one must aban
don life in order to arrive a t the criterion through which l i f e 's
errors can be recognized.59
This second concept is what we have called "TRUTH." Jaspers also
recognizes that along with this TRUTH.there is a kind of K N O W LED G E
which is not the knowledge gained from the.perspective of life . As
Jaspers points out, this notion of TRUTH raises some d iffic u lt ques
tions. I t would now seem th at in spite of himself Nietzsche has
posited an absolute truth, since, as Jaspers also points out,
Nietzsche's position here does imply a TRANSCENDENT perspective. *
However, we must be very careful here not to jump to conclusions,
especially since Nietzsche himself repeatedly c ritic iz e s all the
traditional absolutistic theories of tru th . This should lead us to
suspect that Nietzsche is trying to communicate something else about
the nature of TRUTH.
I t is here that we encounter the third phase of Jaspers' d is
cussion concerning Nietzsche's theory of TRUTH. Jaspers correctly
observes that Nietzsche cannot accept any theory which posits some
final tru th , since this would be a betrayal of the dialectical charac
te r which essentially determines the course of Nietzsche's philoso
phizing. Thus, "his thoughts about tru th , since they deny what is
59Ib id ., p. 186.
I ll
required for their formulation, must run into incessant contradic
tions."®® The contradictions, according to Jaspers, arise because
Nietzsche's notion of TRUTH repeatedly points to a TRANSCENDENCE.
W e have already taken note of this fact and must now carefully examine
how Jaspers interprets i t . For Jaspers, these contradictions are the
result of Nietzsche's radically dialectical approach to the problem of
TRUTH.
His theory is not a theory about a given state of a ffa irs; i t
is a philosophical means of expressing f i r s t the existential
appeal to the essential truth born by essential l i f e and, second,
the possibility of a life-transcending intimate awareness of
being.61
The f i r s t point is, of course, a reference to the notion of Existenz.
The second point is an interpretation of the f i r s t in terms of
Existenz as transcendence (in Jaspers' sense). According to Jaspers'
interpretation, then, TRUTH turns out to be something very much like
the e x iste n tia lis t notion of authenticity. Ultimately, TRUTH resides
in Existenz and Existenz as an essential and positive notion, when
used by Jaspers, already im plicitly contains the idea of a positive
form of transcendence. Jaspers believes that Nietzsche attempts this
"transcending breakthrough to tru th ," because he could not fully
accept the consequences of his "dissolution of reason."6^ Jaspers
is convinced that while Nietzsche never tru ly resolved this "opposi
tion," he did at least point to TRUTH through the use of poetic
devices, thus implying, according to Jaspers, that TRUTH is by its
very nature "indeterminate."
60I b id ., 190. 61 I b id ., p. 190. 62Ib id . , pp. 218-19.
112
W hen Nietzsche views truth in its determinacy as error
required by l i f e , always and inevitably the idea of a truth per se
stands in the background, not only as the negation of all deter-
minate tru th , but as the p o ssib ility of making contact with being
it s e l f . This truth that is a t once negative and positive, insofar
as i t lies beyond all determinacy, and is simply its e lf , and
insofar as i t also can appear as knowledge of being, must in
every form prove dangerous to l i f e , i’.e ., to existence that is
bound up with error. Consequently from the standpoint of life
i t s e l f , the will to truth is questionable. ^
If the TRUTH is that there are no tru th s, then TRUTH is a great danger
to life and results fin a lly in the most extreme of all nihil isms.
Thus, the heart of the conflict resides in the fact that TRUTH is
death. However, Jaspers asserts th at there is also a positive aspect
to TRUTH.
The passion for tru th , in the guise of radical and incessant
doubt, causes a ll determinate appearances to perish. While truth
as transcendence--as the completely indeterminate and indetermin
able truth i t s e l f —cannot l i e , yet every specific truth within
the world can. Only the concrete h isto ric ity of Existenz,
indubitably present though uncognizable, is then true. What
sets a lim it to doubt is not some truth or other, not the thought
of an absolute tru th , but this Existenz.64
Here Jaspers' use of his hermeneutic model of Existenz has provided
an impressive and plausible in terp retatio n , but i f we look more
closely we shall see that Jaspers has made some subtle, but nonethe
less extremely important, sh ifts of emphasis. However, from this part
of Jaspers' interpretation, we can now understand how he grounds his
"ju stification" for emphasizing Nietzsche's philosophical anthropology
and minimizing the importance of the metaphysics and epistemology.
Jaspers exposits very well the dialectical tension which
characterizes Nietzsche's discussion of TRUTH, yet i t seems rather
63I b id ., pp. 221-22. 64Ib id ., p. 227.
113
odd to conclude that Nietzsche, who was so intimately concerned with
the notion of contradiction, ultim ately ends up with a theory of TRUTH
that is contradictory (in the sense of "unresolved" and "confused").
Jaspers softens this judgment somewhat by reference to the implicit
positive notion of transcendence as a form of quasi-resolution. Here
we need to remind ourselves of the nature of philosophical inquiry
for Nietzsche. Jaspers arrives at his interpretation of Nietzsche's
theory of TRUTH partly as a re su lt of his insistence on viewing
Nietzsche's conception of philosophical THOUGHT s tr ic tly through the
lenses of philosophical anthropology, thus grounding TH O U G H T primarily
in l i f e . Heidegger, however, grasps the essential nature of phi
losophical TH O U G H T in almost precisely the same way in which Nietzsche
did.
Nietzsche once said (Werke, 7, 269): "A philosopher is a man who
never ceases to experience, see, hear, suspect, hope, and dream,
extraordinary things . . . "
To philosophize is to inquire into the extra-ordinary. But
because, as we have just suggested, th is questioning recoils upon
i t s e l f , not only what is asked a f te r is extraordinary but also
the asking its e lf , In other words: th is questioning does not
lie along the way so that we bump into i t one day unexpectedly.
Nor is i t part of everyday l i f e : there is ho requirement or regu
latio n -th at forces us into i t ; i t g ra tifie s no urgent or pre
vailing need. The questioning i t s e l f is "out of order." I t is
entirely voluntary, based wholly and uniquely on the mystery of
freedom, on what we have called the leap. The same Nietzsche
said: "Philosophy . . . is a voluntary living amid ice and moun
tain heights" (Werke, 15, 2). To philosophize, we may now say,
is an extra-ordinary inquiry into the extra-ordinary.
Thus, philosophical TH O U G H T is not grounded in lif e and is possible
only on the ground of a TRANSCENDENCE which inheres in the very nature
65Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 12-13.
114
of being human. M an qua THINKER is an anomaly of Being. TH O U G H T is
a philosophical enterprise and discovers that thought in its service
to Life is always perspectival, but THOUGHT is also a perspective--a
cosmological one. However, the THINKER is also a thinker, i . e . , he
is enmeshed in concerns of everyday Life. As a resu lt there is an
opposition; a "contradiction," but i t is not a contradiction contained
in THOUGHT, rather i t is a contradiction between THOUGHT and thought.
This means two things: (1) that contradiction is rooted in the nature
of d ialectic i t s e l f , and (2) that Nietzsche's theory of TRUTH implies
an ontology. If man were simply limited to the perspectives of l if e ,
this conflict would not occur. However, through the dialectic of
philosophy, man has the possibility of taking up a perspective which
TRANSCENDS life and which, thereby, places him in the position of
being able to TRANSvalue. The entire metaphysics of Nietzsche
requires this form of TRANSCENDENCE which we have characterized as
the po ssib ility of taking up a cosmological perspective, for without
th is TRANSCENDENCE no "evaluation" of lif e would be possible and,
therefore, no Transvaluation as an attempt to overcome nihilism would
be possible. Nietzsche's doctrine of contradiction goes much further
than Jaspers suggests. I t is not simply th at there is a contradic
tion in Nietzsche's notion of TRUTH, but rather th at we here truly
have Nietzsche's "dialectic of contradiction." In f a c t, we might even
say th at Nietzsche's position here is a phenomenological description
of the nature of the dialectic between the perspectives of life and
the perspective of philosophy as cosmology. That there is such a
115
dialectical opposition between these perspectives has to do with the
nature of Being in general and man's Being in particular.
I t is at this point that we arrive a t Nietzsche's implicit
ontology. This position is a "negative" ontology in two ways. First
of a l l , man's grasp of Being as sta tic and permanent is error and this
error may be understood through THO U G H T which grasps Being as Becoming.
Here, as Jaspers points out, TH O U G H T threatens life and in an attempt
to resolve this opposition Jaspers introduces his notion of Existenz
as a positive form of transcendence. However, this move would seem
to subvert the basic goal of Nietzsche's philosophy, for i t is only
on the ground of this dialectical negativity that human Being as
the Hill to Power can ever achieve the Transvaluation of all values.
In fa c t, i t is ju s t this dialectical negativity which is the motive
force of Nietzsche's philosophy. The second form of negativity is
also dialectical and centers around man's discovery of the limitations
of his Being as Will to Power. Nietzsche again and again emphasizes,
in Heraclitean fashion, the constant struggle between the individual
Will to Power and the World Obstacle.’ His emphasis on struggle is
another reason for accepting the notion of the essential negativity
of the d ialectic between life and philosophy. I t is through this
discovery of his own defining lim itations, that man comes to have a
vague glimmer of the vast number of possible perspectives that lie
forever outside of his realm of experience and thereby he can attain
some small notion of Being by understanding what is denied him. Thus
man's self-understanding becomes immensely important philosophically,
116
for i t resu lts in a sharpening and clarificatio n of the dialectical
poles and enhances the quality of genuine THINKING.
Jaspers sees certain ontological implications in Nietzsche.'s
theory of TRUTH and ultimately grounds Nietzsche's conception in man's
"inner Being" or Existenz. "Only this attitude of unlimited openness
to the possible under the s tr i c t leadership of something unknown,
Existenz i t s e l f , can truly say: 'Nothing is tru e . '"66 Somewhat later
Jaspers adds:
As we deliberately go through the d ialectical movements in
which the truth never attains its goal (since i t can never be
possessed but in the end even denies i t s e l f ) , we are forced back
to find fulfillm ent in our own histo rically present Existenz.
Through our knowledge of this movement we become aware of not
• possessing the tru th . Only perseverance in this movement can
overcome the danger of deception which will re su lt i f we thought
lessly use Nietzsche's isolated and isolating formulae as dead-
sure dicta and, with the aid of these dialectical thoughts,
a r b itr a r ily ju s tify or condemn everything.6'
This notion of Existenz, as "something unknown" which resides a t the
core of the individual human Being, is something th at we shall have
to examine in the next chapter, in terms of Nietzsche's theory of man.
However, i t is clear that the TRANSCENDENCE which is relevant here to
Nietzsche's metaphysics and epistemology is not unknown and i_s_
describable in terms of man's possibility of taking up a cosmological
perspective. Jaspers' notion of Existenz may be a part of the dialec
tical relationship between TRUTH and tru th , but i t is certainly not
a complete picture. The strength of Jaspers' interpretation lies
in what we have called the aspect of philosophical anthropology, but
66Jaspers, N ietzsche, p. 227. 67 jb id . , p. 228.
117
the corresponding weaknesses on the side of metaphysics and e p iste
mology produce distortions of the essential core of Nietzsche's phi
losophy.
Heidegger's View
W e are now in a position to return to our examination of
Heidegger's interpretation of the relationship between the Will to
Power and TRUTH. Heidegger's "analysis" is composed of very many
"sub-analyses" which are provocative in the dual sense of stimulating
and ir r ita tin g . The "logic" of the relationships between these various
sub-parts is not always clear; therefore, we shall not follow
Heidegger's "analysis" step by step, but rather we shall here be con
cerned with extracting the essential core of his in terpretation. W e
shall postpone an examination of certain aspects of Heidegger's d is
cussion until the next chapter.
Heidegger regards Nietzsche's theory of TRUTH as the "crisis
point" in his philosophy and, like Jaspers, he distinguishes between
two forms—what we have called TRUTH and truth. The in itia l exposi
tion of truth as illusion and error follows the basic pattern that we
have already discovered in Jaspers. However, Heidegger then in tro
duces a new facet into the discussion, namely, the notion of truth,
when grasped in i t s essence as TRUTH, is to be understood as
homoiosis—a likeness or correspondence between the "glance" and what
i t grasps.
118
And in the age in which the fulfillm ent of modern times com
mences Nietzsche sharpens the above statement even more: "Truth
is the kind of error without which a definite kind of living
species would not be able to live. The value of life decides in
the end." (Notation made in 1885, Per M i lie zur Macht, n. 493).
If truth according to Nietzsche is a kind of error, then i t s
essence lies in a manner of thinking which always and necessarily
fa ls ifie s the real in so far as every act of representation causes
the unexposed "becoming" to be s t i l l and set up something th at
does not correspond ( i.e . something incorrect) with what has thus
been established in contradistinction to the fluent "becoming,"
thereby establishing something erroneous as the alledgedly real.
In Nietzsche's defining of truth as incorrectness of thinking
there lie s the concession to thinking of the traditional essence
of tru th 'a s the correctness of making an assertion . . . .
Nietzsche's concept of truth is an example of the la s t reflection
of the extreme consequence of that changing of truth from the
unhiddenness of beings to the correctness of the glance. The
change i t s e l f takes place in the definition of the Being of
beings.68
In Heidegger's judgment, Nietzsche's theory of TRUTH is not at all
an "overcoming" of metaphysics, but, on the contrary, remains deeply
rooted in the historical unfolding of traditional metaphysics. W e
should also note that Heidegger here criticize s Nietzsche's notion
of TRUTH by contrasting i t with his own theory of truth as "unhidden
ness" or a le th e ia . Heidegger also introduces another approach to
interpreting Nietzsche's conception of TRUTH. TRUTH is to be under
stood as "holding-something-to-be-true. 1,69 This, Heidegger argues,
is a consequence of Nietzsche's "destruction" of the distinction
between an apparent world and a real world. Thus, as Heidegger in te r
prets Nietzsche, TRUTH no longer transcends man, since this "holding-
something-to-be-true has in terms of its origin the character of a
68Martin Heidegger, Plato 's Doctrine of Truth in Philosophy in
the Twentieth Century, trans. John Barlow (New York, 1962)," I I I , 267.
69Heidegger, N ietzsche, I, 634.
command." 70 Here we have one of the more ingenious facets of
Heidegger's interpretation. Where does th is command originate? The
command arises out of the individual Will as an expression of his Will
to Power. The command is not, however, simply the arbitrary expres
sion of Power, but rather th is Will is conditioned by "justice"
(Gerechtigkeit). Heidegger plays with the word Gerechtigkeit in such
a way that i t also comes to mean "correctness," "rightness," "corres
pondence," and " ju stific a tio n 1 .'71 Thus, TRUTH understood as homo i os is
is Gerechtigkeit and both "possess" the same essence, namely, assimi
lation into and identification (Eingleichung) with Chaos.72 And what
is Chaos? Chaos here has a two fold meaning: (1) In its broadest
sense i t means the "world" o r, in other words, the to ta lity of e n titie s
(das Seiende im Ganzen) and (2) in a more specific sense i t means
"our realm of sensation, which we recognize as the realm of the body"
and which is "only a section of the great Chaos that is the world
i t s e l f . " 7^ Now le t us see what sense we can make out of these ver
tiginous tergiversations.
Heidegger is here playing with certain words in order to
create metaphorical (and, therefore, for him, metaphysical) connections
between various facets of Nietzsche's philosophy. TRUTH as homoiosis
consists of a holding-something-to-be-true as the result of a command.
Traditionally this command has been the Aristotelian "law of contra
diction." However, we have already seen how Nietzsche attacks this
70Ib id ., I, 634. 71 Ib id ., I. 636. 72Ibid., I, 636-37.
73ibid., I, 566-67.
t
120
"law" and concludes that this life-preserving fictio n te lls us what
we should regard as true. Heidegger adds th a t, due to the intimate
connection between TRU TH and Being, this imperative also legislates
what shall count as Being. 74 Nietzsche claims that his attack on this
imperative and, thereby, on traditional metaphysics, opens up the
ground for the possibility of a new command--a command which arises
out of the individual Will to Power it s e l f . However, the primordial
confrontation of the individual Will to Power with i t s world, i . e . ,
with Chaos, provides no directive. M an must create order, that is ,
he must transform Chaos into kosmos. TRUTH te lls us that there is
no tel os, so man must create a tel os, but this cannot be done arb i
tra rily . The tel os arises out of the individual Will to Power in its
TRUTH as "justice" (Gerechtigkeit). The new command, then, arises
out of "justice" as a kind of te rrib le freedom, for this freedom is
7 c
in i t s essence a "self-overcoming. 3 As Zarathustra asks:
Can you give yourself your own evil and your own good and
hang your own will over yourself as a law? Can you be your own
judge and avenger of your law? Terrible i t is to be alone with
the judge and avenger of one's own law. Thus is a s ta rfithrown
out into the void and into the icy breath of so litu d e / 5
Such creative freedom is the "W ay of the Creator" and i t is in this
self-overcoming that man himself becomes an a r t i s t i c creation and, as
such, the highest expression of the Will to Power. Power in its
highest form, then, is power over one's Self and this is the greatest
of all struggles as well as the most d iff ic u lt. For Zarathustra adds,
74I b id ., I, 609. 75I b id ., I, 639.
76Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 175.
121
“But the worst enemy you can encounter will always be you, yourself;
you lie in wait fo r yourself in caves and woods." 77
The new command, with which Nietzsche replaces the old "law
of contradiction," originates from the innermost Being of man as Will
to Power. I t is only in terms of this "justice" which characterizes
man's te lo s - -the Superman—that Transvaluation becomes possible. It
is th is "justice" which lays the foundation for the highest of all
forms of a r t —the creation of new values. For Heidegger, Nietzsche's
conception of Will is to be understood ultimately as command and the
Will to Power is a self-domination, out of which one "overcomes"
oneself.
Heidegger's final judgment is that Nietzsche does not succeed
in "overcoming" metaphysics, but, to the contrary, is so deeply rooted
in the historical tradition that his philosophy is the "consumation"
of metaphysics. In addition, Heidegger makes two further charges
which are of in te re st. The f i r s t is that Nietzsche is "guilty" of
"humanizing" all e n titie s . "Is not the world thought of a fte r the
image of man? Is not such thought pure anthropomorphism?"7®
Heidegger's answer to both of these questions is affirmative and he
then adds th at Nietzsche was not only aware of th is , "humanization,"
but intended i t . 79 The second charge is th at, ultim ately, Nietzsche's
position is a kind of necessary "subjectivism" which brings the his
tory of traditional metaphysics to an end. Thus, Nietzsche does not
77I b id . , p. 176. H e i d e g g e r , N ietzsche, I , 653.
79I b id ., I, 653-54.
122
attain the "true" heights of fundamental ontology, since he does not
think the question of Being as such, but, nonetheless, Heidegger
admits that Nietzsche's "subjectivism" and anthropomorphism are in
"the grand sty le." This charge of "subjectivism" is also the charge
of nihilism and for Heidegger, nihilism is equatable with metaphysics.
What we must now concern ourselves with is an evaluation of
Heidegger's interpretation and critiq u e. There are a number of c r i t i
cisms which could be advanced against some of Heidegger's more extreme
linguistic machinations, but, on the whole, they are peripheral and
we shall try to focus on the central issues. The f i r s t point to be
considered is Heidegger's somewhat dubious rendering of Nietzsche's
notion of TRUTH as homoiosis. Heidegger seems obsessed with finding
unifying connections between everything. Whenever Heidegger expli
cates a theory of TRUTH, be i t his own or someone e ls e 's , he invari
ably attempts to link the problem of TRUTH to some form of perceptual
immediacy. In his own philosophy he subsumes epistemology under the
rubric of fundamental, ontology, thereby creating the impression th at
he has avoided the charges of "subjectivism" and anthropomorphism.
However, this avoidance i s , i t would seem, purely formal and stru c
tural. Richardson, in explicating Heidegger's interpretation of how
Zarathustra creates a path to the Superman by teaching the doctrine
of Eternal Recurrence, says:
Zarathustra preaches the super-man because, and only inasmuch
as, he preaches the eternal return. He proclaims both a t once,
for they are co rrelative: The Being of beings and the nature of
man, fita lic s minel . . .
But farther than th is Nietzsche cannot go. To go farther
123
would be to think the correlation between Being and the nature of
man as such . . . . To think i t means to go beyond metaphysics
with its interpretation of man as rational animal. I t means to
pass from present-ative thinking into foundational thought.
Nietzsche, slave to present-ative thinking, could not take this
step. That is why Heidegger feels he has the right to ask if
this "bridge to the highest hope" does not in fact lead to a
desolation s t i l l more profound, the desolate nihilism of remaining
oblivious to the Being-process i t s e l f . 80
Unfortunately, this notion of "being-process" does not really provide
a basis for an evaluation of Nietzsche, for Heidegger has not yet pro
vided us.with his fundamental ontology. What Richardson does say
about "Being-process" makes Heidegger's charges of "subjectivism" and
anthropomorphism seem all the more suspicious.
The shelter for the Being-process comes-to-presence along with
this positive-negative process i t s e l f in the very moment of its
arrival among being. In fa c t, " . . . this arrival of Being is
in i t s e l f the arrival of a shelter for Being . . . ." And
where precisely is_the shelter for Being among beings? In the
nature of man! This explains the intimacy between Being and man.
Here i t is d iff ic u lt to see what precisely distinguishes Heidegger's
own position from Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's position.
That Heidegger claims a kind of "objectivity" for his position and
further claims that he has escaped "subjectivism," is quite empty.
Simply to label a position "fundamental.ontology" does not exempt i t
from the demand for an explication. Without having the statement of
, Heidegger's fundamental ontology, all criticism s which are based on
a comparison and contrast with i t are vacuous. Furthermore,
^William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to
Thought (The Hague, 1963), pp. 380-81.
SI Ib id ., pp. 510-11.
124
Heidegger's discussion of the relationship between the ontological
and perceptual facets of TRUTH as homoiosis and as aletheia are at
best ambiguous. However, his discussion of homoiosis in relation to
"justice" and the Will to Power is thought-provoking.
Heidegger's charge th at Nietzsche's metaphysics is anthropo
morphic is somewhat strange. F irst of a l l , in the most extensive
sense, everything that man conceives of, does, perceives, and creates
is a d irect consequence of the nature of his Being as anthropos. But
this is merely tautological. Even i f , as Heidegger claims, Being
thinks us, we s t i l l have in some way to appropriate that thinking and
make i t our own; otherwise i t would remain forever beyond us and,
therefore, would be irrelevant to us. However, Nietzsche repeatedly
emphasizes—and as we have already seen his whole philosophy depends
upon i t —that inherent in man is the p o ssib ility fo r a kind of
TRANSCENDENCE which through the THINKING of philosophy can place man
in a perspective "beyond" and "outside" of himself, namely, the cos
mological perspective. I t is precisely when man takes up this cos
mological perspective that he encounters the lim itations of all of
his other perspectives as an anthropos which lives and Thinks in
the context of a world. This is the paradox that is grounded in the
very core of the Being of man and as such constitutes the fundamental
dualism between the cosmological perspective of metaphysics and the
u tilita r ia n perspectives of lif e . Again, without Heidegger's funda
mental ontology, Heidegger's charge of anthropomorphism is vacuous.
125
Excursus: An Implicit Critique
of Phenomenology?
W e have already observed that Heidegger's Nietzsche interpre
tation is not simply interpretation, but serves as an occasion for
Heidegger to do some philosophizing of his own. W e also suggested
that parts of his Nietzsche interpretation might contain hints of a
critique of Husserlian phenomenology and its derivatives. If this is
the case, th is suggestion would go a long way toward explaining why
i t is th at certain facets of Heidegger's interpretation seem rather
foreign and out of place in connection with Nietzsche. W e certainly
cannot fu lly explore here the possibility of such an im plicit critiq u e,
but there are certain rather provocative hints worth noting. This
p o ssib ility may also enable us to gain a better perspective on
Heidegger's interpretation and lead us to a p artial understanding of
the motivating forces behind some of the more radical aspects of
Heidegger's "analysis." Let us, therefore, b rie fly take note of a
few of the more important "parallels."
I t is well known that after Heidegger's so called "turning
point" in the t h i r t i e s , phenomenology virtually disappears from his
work. However, Heidegger has said almost nothing e x p lic it about the
reasons for this "abandonment." Nonetheless, in the preface to
Richardson's book, which is a le tte r from Heidegger, there are several
very interesting remarks by Heidegger.
As my fam iliarity with phenomenology grew, no longer merely
through lite ra tu re but by actual practice, the question about
Being, aroused by Brentano's work, nevertheless remained always
126
in view. So i t was the doubt arose whether the "thing its e lf"
was to be characterized as intentional consciousness, or even
as the transcendental ego. I f , indeed, phenomenology, as the
process of le ttin g things manifest themselves, should characterize
the standard method of philosophy, and i f from-ancient times the
guide-question of philosophy has perdured in the most diverse forms
as the question about the Being of beings, then Being had to remain
the f i r s t and la s t th in g -itse lf of thought.
Meanwhile "phenomenology" in Husserl's sense was elaborated
into a d istin ctiv e philosophical position according to a pattern
set by Descartes, Kant and Fichte. The h isto ric ity of thought
remained completely foreign to such a position . . . . The
Being-question, unfolded in Being and Time, parted company with
this philosophical position, and that on the basis of what to
this day I s t i l l consider a more faithful adherence to the princi
ple of phenomenology . . . . Now i f in the t i t l e of your book,
From Phenomenology to Thought, you understand "Phenomenology" in
the sense ju s t described as a philosophical position of Husserl,
the t i t l e is to the point, insofar as the Being-question as posed
by me is something completely different from that po sitio n . 82
There are several things here worth noting. F irst of a l l , part of
Heidegger's Nietzsche interpretation is an attempt to show that
Nietzsche's philosophy is grounded in a "subjectivism," which in its
modern form begins with Descartes and continues through Leibniz and
Kant. In the passage quoted above, Heidegger's rejection of the
"thing its e lf " as "intentional consciousness, or even as the trans
cendental ego," and his connecting the elaboration of Husserlian
phenomenology with the tradition established by Descartes, Kant, and
Fichte; all of th is suggests th a t, ultimately, Husserl, like Nietzsche,
was caught in "subjectivism" and never succeeded in "overcoming" meta
physics. If th is is so, then Husserl, too, must be understood as a
part of the "consummation" of metaphysics. This, then, would mean
that Heidegger's critique of the tradition of "subjectivism," using
82Richardson, Heidegger, trans. William J. Richardson, pp. XII-
XIV.
127
Nietzsche as i t s culminative example', would also be an im plicit c r i
tique of Husserl's phenomenology.
I t is also well known that Heidegger, in order to create and
nurture the impression of "objectivity," scrupulously avoids the use
of words such as "subjectivity," "ego," "consciousness," and "subject"
when expounding his own position. In Richardson, w .e find the following
in a passage in which he is explicating Heidegger's in terpretation of
Nietzsche's conception of Will: "Nietzsche so conceives pure Will(ing)
that the immutable 'was' or time is dissolved in a 'now' th at abides,
O O
a nunc stans." But i t is precisely this phrase, "nunc sta n s," that
Husserl uses to describe his most fu lly developed conception of the
ego
A sig nificant portion of the third part of volume 1 of
Heidegger's Nietzsche is quite consistent with Heidegger's general
criticism s of Husserlian phenomenology, including especially the analy
ses of human "bodily" life as "Chaos" (pure sensation), the notion of
a creative Will, and the charges of subjectivism and anthropomorphism.
I t is a nice irony that Husserl, in a marginal note in his copy of
Heidegger's Being and Time, attacks Heidegger for anthropomorphism!
"H. [Heidegger] transposes or transverses the constitutive phenomeno
logical c la rific a tio n of all of the regions of e n titie s and
83I b id ., p. 379.
^Alwin Diemer, Edmund Husserl: Versuch einer systematischen
Darstellung seiner Phanomenologie (Meisenheim am Gian, 1956), p. 45
and p. 181. '
128'
universals—the total region, world--into the realm of the anthro
pological . "88
I t may be, then, that through his Nietzsche interp retatio n ,
Heidegger is im plicitly giving an account of the reasons for his move
ment away from phenomenology as Husserl conceived i t . Furthermore,
there are suggestions here and there of further elaborations of the
"new" "hermeneutic" phenomenology which Heidegger creates "beyond"
the Husserlian version. As provocative as these p o ssib ilitie s are,
we cannot pursue them further here. Such an investigation requires
a separate study.
,Comparison and Contrast
There are three major, points which we should consider here.
F irst of a l l , Heidegger and Jaspers agree that Nietzsche's attempt
to "go beyond" or "overcome" traditional metaphysics does not succeed.
Both arrive at th is judgment on the basis of th eir own sp ecific, and
radically d ifferen t, philosophical positions. That this procedure
results in distortions of certain perspectives of Nietzsche, i s , of
course, unavoidable, even by Nietzsche's own c rite ria . Nonetheless,
there are two objections we can advance against this manner of pro
ceeding. Both Heidegger and Jaspers read certain facets of th e ir own
philosophy into th at of Nietzsche's. This is an ex p licit violation
of Jaspers' own canons of interpretation and an im plicit one of
Heidegger's, However, the other point is even more important: both
85Ibid. , p. 29. M y tran slation .
129
use their own philosophical position as a c ritic a l foil for evaluating
Nietzsche's philosophy, yet nowhere does either of them ex p licitly
present a statement of the f o il . Heidegger remains the s ile n t ontolo-
g ist, who throws out only vague hints and clues, but certainly nothing
substantial enough to constitute a c ritic a l foil and Jaspers is the
philosopher of ambiguity, who in sists that we must somehow "sense"
through our own Existenz—"an unknown"—what this c ritica l foil is.
Clearly, these are both rather tenuous grounds for c ritic a l evaluation.
The second major point concerns Jaspers' and Heidegger's c r i t i
cisms of Nietzsche's notion of TRANSCENDENCE. Nietzsche's meaning i s ,
on the whole, quite clear. Man is the being who contains within him
s e lf, a t the very core of his Being, a dualism, a paradox. Man is
that being who exists with the p o ssib ility of taking up a perspective
"outside" of and "beyond" himself—a cosmological perspective which
stands opposed to and threatens the perspectives of his lif e as
anthropos. However, neither Jaspers nor Heidegger finds this position
acceptable. Jaspers suggests th at Nietzsche hints a t another, more
positive, kind of transcendence, and Jaspers' tentative explication
of this other kind of transcendence is presented in terms of his own
conceptions of Existenz and the Encompassing. Heidegger simply says
that Nietzsche's'notion of TRANSCENDENCE is not really transcendence
a t a l l , for Nietzsche remains rooted in traditional metaphysics and
does not raise the question of Being as such at a ll. From Heidegger's
standpoint, the raising of the Being-question is decisive, for "Being
130
is the t r a n s c e n d e n s pure and simple. 1 '86 One would suspect
that with regard to these two notions, Nietzsche would accuse both,
Heidegger and Jaspers, of surreptitious theology.
The final point is of special in te re st. Both Heidegger and
Jaspers seek to find connecting links between what we have called the
cosmological and the anthropological perspectives. Both are concerned
with grounding values in ontology, and both believe that there are
hints of such an attempt on Nietzsche's part, although he did not
succeed because of the nature of his conception of TRANSCENDENCE as
discussed above. However, according to Jaspers, Nietzsche pinpoints
the source of the creation of values in some unknown aspect within
the Being of the individual man, and this notion J.aspers interprets
as a parallel to his notion of Existenz. Also, in Heidegger's explica
tion of Nietzsche's notion of Gerechtigkeit, there are strong
parallels to Heidegger's own notion of authenticity as the ontological
manifestation of Care as the call of c o n s c ie n c e .W h e th e r or not
these parallels are truly sig n ifican t, we shall have to consider when
we discuss Nietzsche's conception of the ultimate source of the crea
tion of values.
^M artin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and
Edward Robinson (London, 1962), p. 62.
8^Heidegger, Nietzsche, I, 632-48. See also Being and Time,
pp. 312-48. ” ~
131
Eternal Recurrence
The problem of Eternal Recurrence is without question the most
vexatious aspect of Nietzsche's whole philosophy. On the whole, even
Nietzsche's most sympathetic c r itic s have found this doctrine to be
a maze of confusion and inconsistencies. Many have simply dismissed
this part of Nietzsche's philosophy as "a phantastic hypothesis" or
as a "half-mystic doctrine."®8 Others, such as Danto, have made care
ful examinations of the manifold inconsistencies of this doctrine and
have attempted to discover the histo rical and scie n tific influences
that led Nietzsche to this peculiar view.89 Some, of course, have
even suggested that this doctrine is a revelation of Nietzsche's
incipient insanity. However, i f we remain true to the s p irit of
Nietzsche's philosophy, we shall discover that Nietzsche's own strug
gle with this doctrine, is far from being insane or even "phantastic."
What i t is necessary for us to do here is to attempt to understand
those elements within Nietzsche's philosophy which led to this posi
tion. Here the search for external influence, which may be of interest
h isto ric a lly , will not lead us to an understanding of the philosophical
grounds for Nietzsche's promulgation of th is troublesome doctrine.
Furthermore, anyone with a course in freshman’ logic can s i t down and
88Wil liam Salter, Nietzsche the Thinker: A Study (New York,
1917), p. 163.
^Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, pp. 200-13.
132
point out several egregious inconsistencies. A piano student, after
hearing a recital by Arthur Rubenstein, went to his piano lesson the
next day and asked his teacher in a triumphant manner, "Did you notice
that Rubenstein made three mistakes la s t night?" His teacher replied,
"Any id io t can hear mistakes, but did you hear the music?" The in
consistencies in the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence have already been
su fficien tly exposed; what we are a fte r is Nietzsche's "music."
Here we need to take note of two things. F irst of a l l ,
Nietzsche himself was profoundly ambivalent toward the idea of Eternal
Recurrence. In The Joyful Wisdom, Nietzsche speaks of this idea as
"the heaviest b u r d e n . " 9 ° He also speaks of the conditions which are
Q1
necessary in order to "endure" this idea. He even goes so far as
to say, "perhaps i t is not true; le t others wrestle with i t . "92 Were
i t not for the fact that Nietzsche took th is idea of Eternal Recurrence
so seriously, one would be tempted to take th is la s t statement as an
expression of mischievious delight, for "wrestle" with i t others cer
tain ly have. On the other hand, he speaks of Eternal Recurrence as
n o
‘ "the triumphant idea." He also goes on to speak of the ecstatic
joy which this idea can bring to those who are strong enough for it.
^ F rie d ric h Nietzsche, The Joyful Wisdom, trans. Thomas Common
(New York, 1960), pp. 270-71.
^N ietzsche, The Will to Power, pp. 545-46.
92
Nietzsche quoted in S alter, Nietzsche the Thinker, p. 176.
93
Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 544.
Secondly, i t is also important to note th a t there are less than half
a dozen references to Eternal Recurrence in Nietzsche's published
works and even in the Nachlass, there are only about twenty-five frag
ments which deal with i t , and then only in a very sketchy fashion.
Yet, in spite of all th is, Nietzsche placed such extraordinary impor
tance on th is idea that he wanted to be known as "the teacher of the
eternal re cu rren ce."^
With all this in mind, le t us now consider the "structure" of
Nietzsche's philosophy in relation to Eternal Recurrence. As a
"metaphysician" Nietzsche is a philosopher of Becoming, but he is
also an "aesthetician" in the profoundest sense, since for him a rt
is higher than truth. For Nietzsche, only aesthetics can ultimately
provide a "justification" for existence. In spite of his physical
and mental anguish, Nietzsche found so much in lif e to affirm, so
much th at was ecstatically b eautiful, th at he could not bear the
idea th at all things simply perish and disappear forever in the folds
of time. This feeling is, as Nietzsche himself describes i t , "the
longing for Eternity."
A certain emperor always bore in mind the tra nsitori ness of
a ll things so.as not to take them too seriously and to live at
peace among them. To me, on the contrary, everything seems far
too valuable to be so fleeting: I seek an eternity for everything
ought one to pour the most precious salves and wines into the
sea?—M y consolation is th at everything th a t has been is eternal:
the sea will cast i t up again. 5
^ F rie d ric h Nietzsche, The Twilight of the Gods in The Portable
Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann, p. 563.
95N ietzsche, The Will to Power, pp. 547-48.
134
Thus the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence becomes a surrogate for a
doctrine of Being! "To impose upon becoming the character of being—
th at is the supreme will to power. . . . That everything recurs is the
closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being." 96
Here Nietzsche as a man enmeshed in the perspectives of Life becomes
a "victim" of the THOUGHT of Nietzsche as a philosopher. Nietzsche's
THOUGHT about the TRANSCENDENCE of man as philosopher, who can take
up the cosmological perspective, grasps the Being of man as an ines
capable paradox; that i s , there is an irreconcilable and irrevocable
dualism in the Being of man, namely, the unbridgeable opposition
between the perspectives of lif e and the cosmological perspective. It
is precisely here th at Nietzsche violates the ultim ate foundations of
his own metaphysics by attempting to bridge the unbridgeable dualism
through the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. As a man, Nietzsche finds
the idea that all things perish, never to return, "unbearable." As
a philosopher, he rejects the anthropomorphism of metaphysics and
with i t the idea of Being. As a result, man is the Being in which
there is a metaphysical opposition and struggle between the eternally
opposed perspectives of Heraclitus and Parmenides. This d ialectic
of opposition rests at the heart of Nietzsche's philosophy, y et, at
the same time, Nietzsche's "religious" impulse demanded a t least a
partial resolution and this he attempted to achieve through the doc
trin e of Eternal Recurrence. Partly as a re s u lt of his suffering,
96lb id ., p. 330.
135
Nietzsche had a great passion for that which was beautiful in life
and, therefore, his attempt to resolve the very dualism, which he him
self so p ersiste n tly eludicated as irresolvable, is the most human of
failin g s. Thus, a vast problem comes to haunt the late philosophy of
Nietzsche: which is primary, the perspective of l if e or the cosmologi
cal perspective? Either position taken by i t s e l f seems to collapse
into nihilism , and thus Nietzsche began to sketch the foundations for
the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence as a way of overcoming "meaningless
ness." However, philosophically the cost was too great, fo r, u l t i
mately, th is doctrine was a rejection of the most basic groundwork of
Nietzsche's metaphysics and, as a consequence, we find the ramifica
tions of the fundamental dualism in the Being of man thrusting deeper
and deeper into the whole fabric of Nietzsche's philosophy. As we
shall soon see th is opposition penetrates into the innermost recesses
of Nietzsche's philosophical anthropology and accounts fo r much of
what has been labeled "Nietzsche's extremism."
Jasper's View
Jaspers places his discussion of the problem of Eternal
Recurrence under a general section t i t l e d , "The Affirmation of the
Concept of Being." His discussion is divided into three main parts
which take up three perspectives on the problem of Eternal Recurrence:
metaphysical, individual e x iste n tia l, and h isto ric a l. The la s t two,
to which Jaspers gives the greatest emphasis, we shall consider in
the next chapter under Nietzsche's philosophical anthropology.
136
However, we should once again notice the consistent emphasis which
Jaspers gives to this side of Nietzsche's philosophy. Jaspers' tr e a t
ment of the metaphysical aspect reveals a certain impatience which
verges on irrita tio n .
He begins his discussion with a series of questions which
reveal the general direction of his interpretive approach.
But what i.f the philosopher nevertheless in sists upon com
prehending becoming as the true essence of being? If l i f e cannot
be satisfied by. a view of becoming and cannot renounce cognition
of being without dying as a result of i t , is th is true also of
philosophizing which, a fte r a l l , is a form of lif e ? 9?
Philosophizing—a form of life? Yes and no. There is the phi
losophizing about lif e which is grounded in the Transvaluation, but
the Transvaluation i t s e l f is grounded in a philosophical THOUGHT which
TRANSCENDS the perspectives of l if e . This cosmological perspective
is not grounded in l if e and is , in fa c t, antithetical to l i f e in the
sense that i t provides the necessary opposition to l i f e in the most
radical philosophical dialectic that makes Transvaluation possible.
However, Jaspers does.recognize that the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence
and the idea of the Superman are inextricably related. Thus, from
the very beginning, Jaspers sets up a pattern of interpretation in
which the idea of Eternal Recurrence "is philosophically as essential
as i t is questionable."9® Jaspers then adds, "To him i t was most over
powering, while probably no one since then has taken i t serio u sly ." 99
9^Jaspers, N ietzsche, p. 351. 9^Ibid. , p. 352.
" i b i d . , p. 352.
137
Jaspers does say th a t Nietzsche was pointing by means of this
doctrine to a transcending to a d ifferen t kind of Being, but in what
follows he virtually ignores this po ssib ility in favor of the existen
tia l form of transcendence in relation to Existenz. In general,
Jaspers has very l i t t l e th at is positive to say about Eternal
Recurrence.
W hen we deal an aly tically and c r itic a lly with this idea, we
encounter on its physical side a form of scien tific argument th at
in this case cannot but f a i l . Its metaphysical meaning proves to
be a version of dogmatic metaphysics of the pre-Kantian v ariety,
while its existen tial significance simply expresses godlessness. 100
Jaspers proceeds by examining the presuppositions of Nietzsche's
"arguments" for Eternal Recurrence. Nietzsche presupposes unceasing
change, infinite time, and a lim itation of space and e n e r g y .^ From
these "unproved assumptions" Nietzsche argues that there must be a
very large, but nonetheless, f in ite number of possible energy sta te s
and that, given in fin ite time, the cosmos would have to achieve a
state of equilibrium or else would have to repeat previous combina
tions. He further argues’ th a t the fa c t that a state of equilibrium
has not been achieved, again given in fin ite time, is proof th at i t is
not possible. But, surely, Jaspers' assumptions are no more "sc ie n ti
fic" nor less unproved than are Nietzsche's when he says:
Because of the ir r e v e r s ib ility of time and the unrepeatability of
temporal existence, Existenz in i t s relation to transcendence, pre
cisely because i t never returns, can mean either eternal f u l f i l l
ment or final and irreparable loss. W hen we say with reference
to Nietzsche that his thought is without transcendence, we are
right only with respect to the way in which we can conceive of
i t but not about the way in which he_experienced i t . Through
10QIbid., p. 353. 101Ib id . , pp. 353-54.
9
138
i t , Nietzsche, as i t were, enters an atmosphere that is inacci
sible to us; i t is as though he l e f t us and sank into a void.
S tric tly speaking, this la s t criticism of Jaspers is a fallacy of
relevance known as tu quoque, but i t does, nonetheless, point up the
essentially speculative character of "scientific" cosmology and we
should after all remember that Nietzsche does call Eternal Recurrence
an "hypothesis." It is , of course, true that Nietzsche did try to .
find some "evidence" for his hypothesis, but i t is also clear that
the primary significance of this doctrine is rooted in. his metaphysics
and not in some quasi-scientific demonstration. I t is on this point
that we must take issue with Jaspers.
Eternal recurrence is , in the f i r s t place, a physico-cosmological
hypothesis. Nietzsche, as it s author, succumbs to the charm of
its presumptive harmony with the convincingly demonstrable know
ledge of science. As a re su lt he loses the philosophical sub
stance of the thought without succeeding s c ie n tific a lly . 10,5
Eternal Recurrence is not i t s e l f a "physico-cosmological hypothesis,"
but rather i t is to be the bridge between the perspectives of phi
losophical anthropology and the cosmological perspective, which means
th at its foundations must be discovered in both realms.
Jaspers also raises the question about possible historical
roots for Eternal‘Recurrence and considers Christianity and pre-
Socratic philosophy as possible sources, but he fin a lly decides that
Nietzsche regarded this doctrine as something essentially new.
Since the thought of recurrence, as Nietzsche viewed i t , is
rooted neither in the Christian nor in the Greek world and is thus
devoid of history, i t may be said to have been forcibly fashioned
10?Ibid., p. 365. 103Ib id . , p. 363.
139
out of a state of historical forlornness--out of nothingness, so
to speak—and to be all-inclusive only in its historical nullity.
I t might be considered as Nietzsche's means of catching man, as
i t were, after his total rejection of all traditional matters of
b elief, with a view to keeping humanity going and—what is even
more important—forcing i t upwards J 04
Basically this is the accusation that Eternal Recurrence is a "noble
l i e ." But surely such an interpretation would be radically at odds
with Nietzsche's conception of "breeding," fo r i t is only through the
TRUTH of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence th at the weak are selected
out.
Thus Nietzsche does occasionally speak of "natural selection"—
but in his conception of i t "the s p ir it" is not "forgotten," as
i t is in biologistic constructions and "breeding" is at least as
spiritual as i t is physical. One would go wrong, however, i f one
assumed that Nietzsche had sp ecifically devised his doctrine as a
factor in a "breeding" scheme. The eternal recurrence was not
• meant to be a "noble lie ," and- i t has been seen that Nietzsche
had the greatest scorn for such unholy means.105
I t seems rather odd that Jaspers would impute such a motive to
Nietzsche in light of his analyses of Nietzsche's sense of "justice"
and almost obsessive honesty.
Jaspers' interpretation of Eternal Recurrence seems to go
astray as a result of his insistence on interpreting the notions of
TRUTH and TRANSCENDENCE in relation to his own philosophy. Jaspers'
persists in attempting to re-o rien t the metaphysical aspects of
Nietzsche's philosophy in order to bring them into harmony with his
own emphasis on philosophical anthropology. This shows up especially
104ibjd., pp. 366-67.
~T05Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 281.
140
in his repeated attempts to subsume Nietzsche's cosmological perspec-
106
tiv e under his own conception-of Existenz.
Heidegger's View
Once again, in dealing with Heidegger's in terp retatio n , we are
forced to proceed selectively, since Heidegger's path is a tangled and
torturous one, full of digressions and lin g u istic gymnastics. How
ever, the essential form and structure of his in terpretation are re la
tiv e ly straightforward and these are our concern here. In volume two
of his Nietzsche, Heidegger gives a brief summary of his in terp reta
tion of the nature of the "argument" for Eternal Recurrence.
If the to ta lity of entities as such is Will to-Power and
there-with eternal Becoming and if the Will to Power demands the
absence of a goal and endless progression toward a goal is in i t
se lf excluded; i f , at the same time, the eternal Becoming of the
Will to Power is limited in its possible forms and domain of crea
tio n s, because i t cannot be endlessly new, then the to ta lity of
e n titie s as the Will to Power must permit the return of the same
and the Recurrence of the same must be etern al. This "cycle" con
tains the "primordial law" of the to ta lity of e n titie s , i f the
t o ta lity of e n titie s is the Will to PowerJO?
However, there is a hidden assumption here, fo r, a b it la te r ,
Heidegger interprets the Will to Power as l i f e . "'L ife i t s e l f ' , that
is the Will to P o w e r . T h i s permits Heidegger to charge, once
again, th a t Nietzsche has "humanized" knowledge and metaphysics and,
th erefo re, in his view, Nietzsche has not "overcome" metaphysics. Also
Heidegger here reduces the notion of TRUTH to tru th as error and
^ K a u f m a n n , Nietzsche, p. 281.
1 ^ H eidegger, Nietzsche, I I, 286. ^^Ibi_d. , 290.
141
ignores TRUTH as TRANSCENDENCEJ09 W e should also take note of the
fact that Heidegger interprets Recurrence as that which transforms the
transitoriness of the entity as Becoming into the permanence, duration,
and fixedness c la ssic a lly attributed to Being.However, Nietzsche,
as we have already observed says that Recurrence is the most extreme
"approximation of a World of Becoming to that of Being." I t is curious
that Heidegger with his fondness for linguistic nuances completely
ignores the word "approximation."
Now l e t us take a closer look at some of these problems by
examining a more extended discussion of Eternal Recurrence, which
occurs in volume one. Heidegger regards Eternal Recurrence as the fun
damental doctrine in Nietzsche's philosophy. H istorically, Eternal
Recurrence is to be understood as standing in opposition to the-Chris
tian and the Platonic trad itio n s. The source of the doctrine i t s e l f
with regard to Nietzsche is , Heidegger asserts, to be found in
Nietzsche's own l i f e J ^ Eternal Recurrence is an idea of great per
sonal significance,- which was not the result of a "logical" considera
tion of series of propositions, but rather i t came to Nietzsche as an
extremely forceful experience. In fact, Heidegger waxes mystical con
cerning this experience.
The realm of vision, into which the thinker sees, is no longer the
horizon of his "personal experiences," i t is a something Other
than he himself, something which passes over and under him and is
henceforth there, something which no longer belongs to him, the
thinker, rather something remains to which he only belongsJ12
109I b id ., I I , 288-89. 110Ibid., II 287-88.
111 I b id ., I , .261. 112Ibid., I, 264.
142
Here Heidegger seems to admit the possibility for a kind of TRAN
SCENDING TRUTH which man can attain . However, Heidegger's position on
this point is not clear, as we shall soon see. At this point,
Heidegger digresses in order to prepare a defense against the c ritic s
of his interpretation and, indirectly, of the whole of his philosophy.
He asserts that " i t belongs to the essence of every genuine philos
ophy, th at i t will necessarily be misunderstood by i t s contempo
raries.
Following a fa irly detailed discussion of the various passages
in Nietzsche's works, which deal with Eternal Recurrence, Heidegger
begins his in terpretation. Heidegger dismisses the idea th at Eternal
Recurrence is to be understood as a "scientific" doctrine a t a l l .
Heidegger attempts to impose a unity of interpretation upon the d i
verse character of the fragments concerning Eternal Recurrence and he
adds a cautionary remark which is , indeed, an understatement: "The
connection between the individual parts is in no way immediately
c lear."I* 4 Heidegger once again returns to the theme th at Nietzsche
is guilty of "humanizing" metaphysics and, according to Heidegger, the
doctrine of Eternal Recurrence epitomized this "humanizing." For
Heidegger, Hegel is clearly guilty of this "humanizing" when he as
serts his famous principle,"That which is ratio n al, is re a l; and that
which is re a l, is rational"; but Nietzsche is no less guilty with his
doctrine of "unreason." "However, i f we posit unreason as a world-
principle, this also is a h u m a n i z i n g . T h e consequence of this
113Ib id . , I , 268-69 114Ib id ., I, 340. 115Ib id ., I , 350.
143
"humanizing" is that eternity and therewith the whole conception of
time which is grounded in the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, is not
"objective" and, therefore, not truly ontological in Heidegger's sense.
Yet Heidegger admits that his "humanizing" is something "which
Nietzsche by all means and in all ways wants to avoid. 8 At th is
point we encounter a Heideggerian thesis which goes fa r beyond the
interpretation of Nietzsche, y et, as a philosophical bias, absolutely
conditions his interpretation of Nietzsche.
Every representation of the to ta lity of e n titie s , every world-
interpretation is therefore unavoidably humanization.
Such considerations are so obvious, that even one who has f o l
lowed this out only roughly must see that the human being with all
of his representing, intuiting, and determining of e n titie s is
always pushed into the blind alley of his own humanness.117
Heidegger proceeds by raising the problem of meaning in such a way as
to indulge his ta ste for philosophical puns. Once again, th is passage
below may be seen not only as a prelude to his critique of Nietzsche's
"anthropomorphism," but also as an implicit critique of Husserl.
All of our representing and intuiting is such th at in i t we
mean something, an e n tity . In every [act of] meaning [Meinung]
I make the meant fdas Gemeinte], simultaneously and inevitably,
into my own [zum Meinigenl. All meaning fMeinenl, which is
apparently related only to the object i t s e l f , becomes a possessing
and appropriation of the meant [des Gemeinten] by the human ego.
[An act of] meaning [Meinen], is in i t s e l f simultaneously: to
represent something and to make the represented into my own [zu
dem Meinigen machen].H 8
This move is , of course, part of Heidegger's program to show that
Nietzsche ends up in a su bjectivistic nihilism. But how is i t that
Nietzsche is gu ilty of "humanizing" his position, when his ex p licit
116Ib id ., I, 357. 117Ibid., I, 358. 118Ib id ., I, 358.
144
project is the "de-humanization" [Entmenschunq], of metaphysics? Here
Heidegger plays a game which we might call "the essential unity of an-'
tinomies." Heidegger argues that world-interpretation is inextricably
bound up with "humanizing." The project of "de-humanizing" is also a
human project and thus, ultimately i t too is laten tly a "human
i z i n g . " ^ Heidegger is playing on the ambiguity of the notion of "hu
manization," fo r he adds that any thinking which regards "humanizing"
as something which cannot be overcome, is su p erficial, regardless of
how "c ritic a l" i t pretends to be.*29 The solution to th is problem is
an inquiry into the Being of man or, more accurately, into the Being of
Dasein. This, of course, is an implicit reference to Heidegger's own
project in Being and Time. But is not this project of man attempting
to understand his own essence also a "humanizing?" Heidegger admits
th a t, in one sense, i t is ; however, in another sense, there is the pos
s ib ility "th at, the determination it s e l f , its tru th , raises man above
himself and thereby this truth is cte-humanized."^ This is because
the question about who man i s , contains within i t s e l f a more funda
mental question-- the Being-question—"which neither Nietzsche nor the
the philosophy before him unfolded or could unfold."*22 This discus
sion permits us to understand more concretely, though not necessarily
more clearly , Heidegger's basis for his charge of anthropomorphism.
Here we run up against the question of the "ju stificatio n " of'onto- ‘
logical propositions" as being somehow "objective." Heidegger wishes
119Ib id . , I, 359. 120Ib id ., I, 359-60. 121Ib id ., I, 361.
122Ib id ., I, 365.
145
to argue th a t there are unique structures which uniquely define and
delimit what i t means to be human and that these are grounded in Being
as such. Nietzsche, however, with his perspectivism persists in
regarding philosophy, and ontology, too, in a special way, as "auto-^
biographical." In this regard, William Earle presents a very in te r
esting th esis, which he calls "ontological autobiography."
In the cases of both Heidegger and Sartre we have, properly
speaking, "ontological autobiographies," that i s , an analysis of
a fundamental sense of life pushed to ontology. Heidegger's is
"fundamental-Ontologie," and Sartre's is "phenomenological ontolo^
gy." In both, however, the analysis pushes toward a pretended
universality, and the explicit autobiographical content is muted
or absent. I should like to suggest th at i f ontology aims at
what is ontologically richest, and therefore a t what Being has
become, i t should reverse this traditional aspiration toward the
universal, that which everything exemplifies or which all men
exemplify, and aim at what Nietzsche aimed at when he said:
Against the value of the forever unchanging, the value of the
b rie fe s t, most perishable, the most seductive g lin ts of gold on
the belly of the serpent, v ita . And even Hegel has shown , in
his reiterated demonstrations, that Being as such is the emptiest
of concepts, v irtu ally nothing, whereas the ric h est is what these
universals have become by differentiating themselves into the
concrete universal, the historical and unrepeatable fulfillm ent
of ontology.
I t is then by no means certain that to be authentic is to pose
a question about Being, or to confront the im possibility of being
God, or anything else formulable in advance. 123
Thus, unless Heidegger can provide some "ju stificatio n " for the move
from the particu lar (Heidegger's analysis of his own Dasein and its
structures) to the universal (fundamental ontology), he 'cannot exempt
his own philosophy from the charge of anthropomorphism and his charge
against Nietzsche is essentially vacuous.
^23Wi11iam Earle, "Ontological Autobiography" in Phenomenology
in America, ed. James Edie (Chicago, 1967), p. 78.
146
Heidegger devotes several sections to a consideration of the
character of Nietzsche's "proof" for Eternal Recurrence. He rejects
the idea th at there is any point in trying to affirm or deny
Nietzsche's "proof" as "scientific." Heidegger in s is ts th at Eternal
Recurrence must be understood metaphysically--the "scien tific" aspect
is to be interpreted as simply a sort of foreground to the essential
metaphysical aspect. . "What here counts and can count as proof, must
be determined purely out of the unique essence of the thought of
thoughts [Eternal Recurrence]." ^ 4 The "essence" of this thought of
thoughts is once more an occasion for Heidegger to return to the
theme of "humanizing," this time in terms of the notion of perspec-
tivism. Heidegger raises the question about the p o ssib ility of taking
up a "standpoint" which is " s ta n d p o in tle s s ." ^ He quotes Nietzsche
as saying th a t each of us has a corner to stand in and we cannot see
beyond th at corner, yet Nietzsche also says th a t there is a
TRANSCENDING standpoint, that is , a standpoint which is free from
standpoint. How does. Nietzsche decide between these two? Here we
come to the crux of the problem which i t has taken us so long to
elucidate.
Either the exclusion of every humanization is regarded as
possible, in which case i t must be possible for there to be such
a thing as the standpoint of the freedom from standpoint; or else
the human being is recognized in his essence as a corner-stander,
in which case a non-humanizing conception of the World-whole must
be rejected. How does Nietzsche decide th is Either-Or? . . . . He
decides for both; for the Will to the de-humanization of the
^Heidegger, Nietzsche, I, 381. ^ Ibid. ^ 378-8!.
147
to ta lity of e n titie s , as well as for the Will to take seriously
the essence of man as corner-stander.'26
This, of course, is the very dualism of which we have spoken and
Heidegger does go on to admit the possibility of there being a
TRANSCENDENT perspective—the perspective which we have called cosmo
logical. The question which faces us now then is: How does Heidegger
interpret th is dualism and how does he understand i t s significance?
Unfortunately, Heidegger postpones the consideration of th is question
and introduces another involution into his discussion—the problem of
freedom versus determinism, which, fortunately, we can summarize
briefly.
This problem rises directly out of the heart of the doctrine
of Eternal Recurrence. If each event in every existence is but a
repetition of a previous cycle, then everything is already determined
including a ll the individual acts of Willing. If, then we in terpret
the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence lite ra lly , there can never be a
Superman, fo r Zarathustra himself says:
Never y e t has there been an overman. Naked I saw both the greatest
and the smallest man: they are s t i l l all-to o -sim ilar to each
other. Verily, even the greatest I found all-too-human.*27
Clearly Nietzsche’could not have meant the doctrine of Eternal Recur
rence to be interpreted l ite r a lly as absolute determinism. Ultimately,
Heidegger leaves this question suspended and says,that Nietzsche never
pursued the problem of these connections. He adds th at i t would be a
mistake to attempt to push Nietzsche's doctrine into the antimony of
126Ibid., I, 380. 1 ^N ietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 205.
148
freedom and necessity. In a highly significant way this problem fru s
trates Heidegger's passion for discovering u nities.
The same fru stratio n "recurs" when Heidegger comes to make his
concluding remarks about the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence as a whole.
Here again he asserts that there is an in trin sic unity between the
three poles which constitute the essential form of Nietzsche's phi
losophy: Eternal Recurrence, the Will to Power, and the Transvaluation
of all values. Heidegger's conclusion is p articularly exasperating
a fte r one has worked through lite ra lly hundreds of pages of highly
involuted discussion, for Heidegger's conclusion is not a conclusion
a t a l l , but rather a resignation from the discussion. He refers to
the various plans and outlines which are to be found in Nietzsche's
Nachlass and then "concludes":
However, these plans and the dry arrangements of t i t l e s and
numbers speak for us only if they, are illuminated and f u lf ille d
by a knowledge of that which they wish to master. W e do not have
such knowledge. I t will require decades for i t to a r i s e . 128
(M y it a l i c s .)
The reasons for this resignation are apparent i f we r e fle c t fo r a
moment on Heidegger's insistence on discovering a "unified" in terpre
tation of Nietzsche's philosophy. The dualism of which Heidegger him
se lf does take partial note, is not resolvable through the rather
a r tif ic ia l device of imposing unities. The "coherence" of Nietzsche's
philosophy is in te llig ib le only insofar as we understand the notion
*
of Eternal Recurrence d ia le c tic a lly as the attempt to provide a bridge
128neidegger, Nietzsche, I, 430-31.
149
between the two esse n tia lly irreconcilable perspectives of l i f e and
cosmology. Heidegger's very method of proceeding is , of necessity,
frustrated by the most fundamental character of Nietzsche's approach
to philosophy.
Transvaluation and Nihilism
The doctrine of Eternal Recurrence was Nietzsche's rath er
desperate and desultory attempt to reconcile the dualism th at he
knew was ultimately irreconcilable. I t is highly significant that
right up until his breakdown, Nietzsche continued to work on the prob
lems of Transvaluation and nihilism and wrote hundreds of pages on
these topics, while writing only a relatively few pages on Eternal
Recurrence. Unlike Eternal Recurrence, Transvaluation and nihilism
are consonant with the re st of Nietzsche's philosophy and remain
grounded in the metaphysics of Becoming. In fact, i t is the problem
of nihilism which is the motive force for the dialectic between the
perspectives of l i f e and cosmology and which finally leads to the
doctrine of Transvaluation. Thus, i t is through nihilism and Trans
valuation that a flialectical relation is established between
Nietzsche's metaphysics and epistemology as the cosmological per
spective and his philosophical anthropology as the anthropological
or life perspective, but we do not find here the attempt to stab lize
Becoming as a kind of quasi-Being. The dialectic with which we are
concerned here is , lik e Hegel's, open ended.'
150
Here we must be very c a re fu l, for Nietzsche approaches the
problem of nihilism from a variety of directions, which can be divided
into three basic senses. The f i r s t sense of nihilism, which we shall
continue to write as "nihilism," is perjorative. I f refers to all
traditional froms of transcendence which result in the positing of
some principle or e n tity which is absolutized as an essential unity.
It also includes any value system, such as "Socratism" and C h risti
anity, which grounds it s values in a non-human or trans-human principle
or entity. And fin a lly , i t includes any "truths" derivative from such
value systems. Sometime between November 1887 and March 1888,
Nietzsche wrote: "Nihilism . . . is. reached . . . when one has
posited a to ta lity , a systematization, indeed any organization in all
events, and underneath all e v e n t s . "129 i t -js f or this very reason,
that ultimately the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence must be rejected
within the context of Nietzsche's metaphysics. The second sense of
"nihilism," which we shall hereafter call "radical nihilism ," is a
more or less positive, sense. Radical nihilism is a position of -
strength insofar as i t recognizes the "meaninglessness" of all values
grounded in a transcendent principle and further recognizes the
"relativity" of all humanly grounded values.
Radical nihilism is the conviction of an absolute'untenability
of existence when i t comes to the highest values one recognizes;
plus the realizatio n th at we lack the least right to posit a
beyond or an i n - i t s e l f of things that might be "divine" or morality
incarnate. 130
129Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p, 12. 130 lb id . , p. 9.
\
However, "meaninglessness" cannot be the final stage. The third sense
of nihilism and the one which primarily concerns us here, for which
we shall hereafter write NIHILISM, is that TRUTH which we arrive at
through the TRANSCENDING or cosmological perspective. TRUTH as an
endless Becoming without a goal, TRUTH as a threat to all of the
truths of l i f e , TRUTH as the recognition of ultimate annihilation of
the individual—th is is , to say the le a s t, not a comforting view.
However, th is is not yet the final sta te , for in this form of NIHILISM,
Nietzsche sees the motive force for. a dialectic with life which
focuses on man and the creation of values with an intensity which no
philosopher prior to Nietzsche achieved. The prospect of such a
dialectic was extremely exciting to Nietzsche and because of its
p o ssib ility , Nietzsche came to believe th at, even though the human
struggle was fin a lly tra g ic , i t nonetheless could achieve an extra
ordinary kind of dignity and nobility. For Nietzsche, th is d ia le c tic ,
like Becoming i t s e l f , must be understood as endless. There are no
final answers, no final tru th s--th ere is only the endless challenge
of the dialectic for man to create himself as a higher and ever
higher type of Becoming.
• But how does this d ialectic manifest itself? The answer:
as transvaluation! There are two aspects to Transvaluation. The
f i r s t is a critique of all the tra d itio n ally highest values, and we
have already seen how, in terms of metaphysics, Nietzsche would pro
ceed against all doctrines which re st on the foundation of transcen
dence. W e shall have to raise the question of a critique again,
152
however, in the next chapter, where we shall be concerned with the
anthropological perspective. The second aspect centers around pro
viding principles for a new evaluation. Nietzsche gives a clue to the
method of proceeding in a fragment from 1885-1886. "Profound aversion
to reposing once and for all in any one total view of the world. Fas
cination of the opposing point of view: refusal to be deprived of the
stimulus of the enigmatic."-*-^ The d ialectic of Transvaluation must,
then, be a dialectic of opposition or even a- "dialectic of contradic
tion." This insight goes a long way toward explaining the fragmentary
and "contradictory" style in Nietzsche's method of communication,which
some writers have attributed to Nietzsche's failin g eyesight. Clearly,
even with bad eyes, Nietzsche could have written "systematically" and
"logically." Nietzsche placed great emphasis on the idea of method,
but rejected almost to tally the idea of "system," although he was
tempted from time to time to attempt a "system", as we have seen in
connection with the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence.
The metaphysical content of NIHILISM we have already eluci
dated in our discussions of TRUTH and the Will to Power. Trans
valuation manifests i t s e l f within the anthropological perspective.
However, i t is NIHILISM which provides the impetus for anthropo-
centrism in its profoundest sense and emphasizes man as the creator of
value, who can achieve his highest sp iritu al expression only in terms
*
of his dialectical relationship to the cosmological perspective.
Transvaluation is the creation of the "Self" in the face of the
ISllbid., p. 262.
153
Nothingness revealed by the cosmological perspective.
Jasp ers1 View
Jaspers' exposition of the metaphysical aspects of NIHILISM
and Transvaluation is brief and once again betrays Jaspers' funda
mentally ambivalent attitude toward Nietzsche's philosophy. In the
opening of his discussion, Jaspers' im plicitly recognized the cos
mological perspective, but he again sh ifts the emphasis of his in te r
pretation to Existenz along with its implication of a Being that
stands related to a kind of transcendence which Nietzsche does not re
cognize.
From the question about meaning and value his philosophizing gains
its overwhelming impetus, and from the way in which he affirms
being, or rather from his thinking of the affirm ation— synon
ymous for him with being i t s e l f —i t atta in s fulfillm ent.
The question of the value and meaning of existence is unlike
any other question: man does not seem to become really serious
until he faces i t . Nietzsche is astonished by the fact that i t is
rarely asked and even more, astonished by the observation that
man's desire for knowledge can proceed without i t . . . . Once the
question has been raised, existence is deprived of i t s veil and
appears desolate to the scrutinizing eye: i t is "nothing but an
uninterpreted has-been, a thing th at lives by denying, consuming,
and contradicting its e lf." One who views the whole in this way
seeks solace and support in his despair. But reflective thinking
only increases the despair by making i t more and more clear that
mankind has no goals, so that all human lif e seems inundated by a
sense of aimlessness. W hen the question of ultimate meaning and
value arises, lif e no doubt gains seriousness through the possi
b ility of an Existenz that can now be tru ly grasped, but a t the
same time i t loses its unquestioned s e c u rity .132
Even i f the model of Existenz and its accompanying affirmation of
132jaspers> Nietzsche, pp. 333-34.
154
Being prove adequate in the context of Nietzsche's philosophical
anthropology, the cosmological perspective cannot be subsumed under
i t without radically altering the structure and meaning of Nietzsche's
metaphysics and a t the same time robbing his whole philosophy of the
motive force for i t s essential dialectic.
Jaspers remarks that Nietzsche even goes on to attack the
question of the value of existence, because i t cannot be answered.
W e can never have a perspective of the whole of lif e and, therefore,
we are never in a position to formulate any final view or ultimate
answer.
Nietzsche thus arrives at the basis of his philosophizing by
calling in question the question concerning the value of l i f e ,
the fact that the question is asked, and the very way in which
i t is answered. Instead of s t i l l raising the question concerning
the value of existence, he questions the value of the question
and the value of affirming and negating lif e ; and he does so in
order to arrive at the sources where the inviolable, unques
tionably unbiased affirmation of existence will be re v e a le d j 33
Here again we discover a subtle twisting of Nietzsche's idea in order
that Jaspers might in sert the existential categories of his own phi
losophy into the interpretation. Jaspers cites a passage in which
Zarathustra asks himself this question about the value of existence
and then, Jaspers observes, Zarathustra asks pardon for his "weakness
of mood." Jaspers understands this as a rejection of the question
of the value of existence, but surely this is not so. Zarathustra
is not the Superman, but he is on the path to the Superman—a d ialec
tical path, in part conditioned by this very question of the value
133ibjd. , p. 335.
155
of existence. There can be no final judgment on existence; Nietzsche
does not "affirm being," as Jaspers says. What Nietzsche does affirm
is the potentiality of lif e as a Willed Becoming— -it is the richness
and superabundance of p o ssib ility that Nietzsche exuberantly affirms.
I t is as though Nietzsche were speaking, when Kierkegaard says:
If I were to wish for anything, I should not wish for wealth and
power, but for the passionate sense of the potential, for the
eye which, ever young and ardent, sees the possible. Pleasure
disappoints, p o ssib ility never. And what wine is so sparkling,
what so fragrant, what so intoxicating as p o s sib ility !‘34
In this respect Nietzsche is a thorough-going Heraclitean, for i t is
not a philosophy of life prescribed by rules which he presents, but
rather a philosophy of liv in g , the nature of whose dialectic precludes
any circumscription by rules.
In terms of the problem of overcoming radical nihilism,
Jaspers once more introduces the idea of Existenz, but this time in
a fashion so d ire c t, that there can be l i t t l e question that he is
reading his own philosophy into Nietzsche's.
Nietzsche discovers what is of genuine consequence precisely when
reason seems to terminate in a void . . . . He finds i t beyond
all reason in the being revealed to him through his own actual
self . . . . It is the existence (Dasein) of Existenz which as
such never really becomes an object; i t is the disclosure of
being which experiences it s own se lf and never is except through
this self-experience. I t does not experience anything foreign;
on the contrary, i t experiences that which truly is_only through
its e lf . I t is basis, source, and boundary of all our self-
awareness and therewith of our affirmation and negation of
• existence J3 5
134s0ren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, trans. David F. Swenson and
Lillian Marvin Swenson (New York, 1959), I, 40.
135jaSpers, Nietzsche, pp. 336-37.
156
I t is this notion of Existenz that Jaspers proposes as the ground of
Transvaluation, but even Jaspers is not altogether satisfied with
this model. His d issatisfaction, however, is not with his interpre
tatio n , but rather with Nietzsche, since Nietzsche does not ground his
notion in transcendence!
In grandiose illumination, Nietzsche brings into focus the abso
lute awareness of Existenz that is se lf-su ffic ie n t and heroically
independent; and so he utters the immortal truth concerning the
human condition. But this turns into a paradoxical autonomous
being without God, a depth of godlessness whose independence,
contrary to it s very meaning, seems to surrender i t s e l f to
particular causalities in the world by way of literaln ess of
deviating formulas.!36
And so i t is that Nietzsche, in spite of himself, becomes the d is
coverer of an "immortal truth," The remainder of Jaspers in terp reta
tion is devoted to the problem of nihilism and values in relation to
the perspectives of life and we shall consider th at discussion in the
next chapter.
Heidegger's View
Heidegger's discussion of the three forms of nihilism and
Transvaluation is in part rep etitiv e, for he once again advances his
thesis of the essential unity of the "five main parts" of Nietzsche's
metaphysics: nihilism, Transvaluation, Will to Power, Eternal Recur-
-1 * 3 7
rence, and the Superman. The main discussion is in volume two of
his Nietzsche and is of special in te re st in th at here he presents his
strongest c r itic a l "destruction" of Nietzsche's metaphysics. The
^ Ibid. > pp# 348-49. ^ Heidegger, Nietzsche, I I , 40.
157
conception of Transvaluation stands in direct relation to radical
nihilism as something to be "overcome." Heidegger's exposition of
Transvaluation as a critique of previous values and a positing of new
values, and his exposition of the three forms of nihilism, follow the
outline which we presented above. However, from this point on his
interpretation re -in states i t s e l f in full Heideggerian peculiarity.
In seeking unity of the basic themes, Heidegger grounds Trans
valuation and the forms of nihilism in the Will to PowerJ38 This
means that the Will to Power is the ground of the principle for the
positing of new values, and since Nietzsche rejects all the tr a d i
tional forms of transcendence, this principle "can have no other
goal external to the to ta lity of e n t i t i e s . " ^ 9 Transvaluation
according to Heidegger, is grounded in the Will to Power as_ an attempt
to "overcome" radical nihilism. At this point, Heidegger digresses
for a discussion of one of his favorite themes-the Nothing. He
accomplishes th is by raising the question of the relation between
the Nothing and radical nihilism and he arrives at the conclusion th at,
"perhaps the essence of nihilism li e s 'i n the fact that one has not
taken seriously the question of the N othing."^9
W hen Heidegger returns to the main stream of the discussion,
he makes a "distinction" between Nietzsche's cosmology and his
psychology. The reason for the quotation marks is that a few pages
la te r Heidegger "dissolves" the "distinction." Cosmology, as we
138Ib id ,, I I , 36. 139Ib id ., I I , 37. 140Ib id ., p. 37.
158
have understood i t , is that TRANSCENDENT perspective which arrives a t
the TRU TH of Becoming. Heidegger points out th at Nietzsche's cos
mology is not to be understood in the traditional sense i . e . , in i t s
relation to man and God, but rath er, i t is to be understood as another
name for "world" and "world is the name for the to ta lity of enti
t i e s . " ^ And what is the to ta lity of e n titie s? Heidegger answers:
the Will to Power. Thus, cosmology, as grounded in the Will to Power,
is metaphysics. However, Heidegger admits that the NIHILISM of cos
mology "in no way leads into the Nothing."^42 The other pole of the
"distinction" is psychology, which, Heidegger warns, is not to be.
understood as the experimental science nor as character analysis.
W hen Nietzsche speaks of psychology, he means i t in the sense of
"anthropology," "if 'anthropology' is understood as: philosophical
inquiry about the essence of man with regard to the essential rela
tions' of man to the t o ta lity of e n titie s . 'Anthropology' is then
the'metaphysics' of man."^43 Heidegger then presents a series of
connections, which are as imaginative as they are dubious. He states
that psychology is the inquiry into the "psychic," which is to be
understood in the sense of " life ," which is to be understood in the
sense of "Becoming," which is to be understood in the sense of "the
Will to Power." ^ 4 prom this Heidegger concludes that "psychology"
is metaphysics and, since cosmology is metaphysics, i t follows that
141 Ibid., I I, 37. 142Ib id ., I I, 60. 143Ibid., II, 61.
144Ib id ., II, 61.
"psychology" and "cosmology" mean the same as "metaphysics"! From
this Heidegger further "concludes" that, since "psychology" is in its
primary aspect the "psychology of man" and, since man as the measure
of e n titie s is the "subject," Nietzsche has ended up in a radical
doctrine of "subjectivity" and has thus "anthropomorphized" meta
physics, because "psychology" is m e t a p h y s i c s ! ! ^ 5 This is surely
nothing more than a bad pun. Such a d isto rtio n of Nietzsche's
thought is much too high a price to pay in order to achieve a unity
of interpretation. - I t is, however, significant th at Heidegger does
arrive at the notion of two essential perspectives in Nietzsche's
thought--the anthropological and the cosmological. If we interpret
the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence as Nietzsche's own ambivalent
attempt to bridge these two perspectives, then th is alone would be
enough to show that Nietzsche could not accept Heidegger's attempt
a t "unification."
Heidegger presents a second approach when he comes to con
sider the question of values themselves. He observes that Nietzsche
speaks of the superiority of "instinct" over "categorical" reason.
According to Heidegger, the ultimate source of value is grounded in
"instinct" which is "subjective" and a manifestation of the Will to
Power. The direction in which Heidegger's criticism is moving is
quite clear. He wishes to reduce Nietzsche's principle for the
positing of new values to "psychology" understood as "anthropology"
145Ib id ., I I , 61.
160
which is "metaphysics" and so, once again, Nietzsche is charged with
not having "overcome" metaphysics. Heidegger refuses to recognize
the possibility of a genuine "value theory," which is ontologically
grounded in a philosophical anthropology. In fa c t, Heidegger d is
misses the philosophy and phenomenology of value as pseudo-objective,
i.e . as "subjective," "systems."^-4® Heidegger observes th at Nietzsche
does claim that there is a hierarchy of values and that the particular
manifestations of value are the resu lt of the individual Will to
Power.1^7 From th is , he draws the conclusion th at the whole problem
of values collapses inward upon i t s e l f as absolute "subjectivity."
For Heidegger, Nietzsche's theory of value is the most radical expres
sion, and therefore the culmination, of a tradition in itia te d by
Protagoras and brought into its modern form by Descartes. The d irect
consequence of the "subjectivity" is the relativizing of value such
that value is posited in terms of its "u tility " in increasing the
Power of the individual Will to Power.*48 But i f a ll of this is so,
how can we understand Nietzsche's claim that there is a hierarchy of
values? This is a complex question which we shall have to consider
in connection with Nietzsche's theory of man, but th is much is clear:
Heidegger has arrived a t his position p a rtia lly as a resu lt of his
failure to distinguish the different senses of the Will to Power.
In terms of his project of "unifying" Nietzsche's Metaphysics,
Heidegger interprets the Will to Power exclusively and reductively
146Ibid.., 98-99.' 147Ibid.. II, 101-05.
148Ib id ., II, 106.
161
as metaphysical.
However, even a cursory examination of Nietzsche's philosophy
reveals that the metaphysical notion of the Will to Power is value-
wise "neutral," whereas the particular manifestations of the Will to
Power in the realm of the in stitu tio n s of anthropos can be understood
either "negatively" or "positively." Certainly the "egalitarianism"
of Christianity and democracy is an expression of the Will to Power,
but one which Nietzsche r e je c ts . Nietzsche's whole project of pro
viding a critique of previous values demands a hierarchy which d iff e r
entiates between positive and negative manifestations of the individ
ual and institutional forms of the Will to Power.
Heidegger's interpretation fin a lly arrives a t two basic con
clusions with regard to Nietzsche's philosophy. The f i r s t is th a t,
"W e must grasp Nietzsche's philosophy as the metaphysics of subject
iv ity . " ^ The second is th a t, "Metaphysics is , as metaphysics, the
genuine nihilism . "150 These conclusions s t i l l leave us with a ques
tion: What kind of an analysis would, for Heidegger, count as "over
coming" this "subjectivity"? The answer i s , of course, no surprise.
According to Heidegger, th is analysis must be an ontological ana-
ly tic of man or Dasein grounded in "fundamental ontology."15^ How
ever, we have already seen how the absence of such a "fundamental onto
logy" renders vacuous any attempt to use i t as a c ritic a l f o il.
l 49ib id ., II, 199. 150Ib id ., II, 343. *51Ibid., I I, 209.
162
Some Concluding Remarks
With respect to the interpretations of both Heidegger and
Jaspers, we have seen how the attempt to "unify" Nietzsche's philos
ophy is disastrous. In Jaspers confrontation with Nietzsche there is
a certain anxiety. Jaspers in sists that some form of transcendence
must be found as a means of "overcoming" nihilism, "or else Nietzsche
in the end will leave us nothing but a collection of a b s u rd itie s ." -^
Heidegger in his metaphysical f lig h ts , on the other hand, often seems
remote and abstracted from the v i t a l i t y of Nietzsche's philosophy.
There is a sense in which i t is f a i r to say that Jaspers is too in
volved with Nietzsche and Heidegger not involved enough.
I t is extremely significant that both Jaspers and Heidegger
take cognizance of what we have called a dualism in Nietzsche's phi
losophy, yet both, each in his own individual way, attempt to impose a
unity of interpretation. Nietzsche himself regards the category of
unity as a fiction of interpretation which arises out of the category
of Being. Not only is Becoming the arche of Nietzsche's metaphysics,
i t is the ultimate principle of philosophy as d ialectic.
For both Jaspers and Heidegger, the doctrine of Eternal Recur
rence is an embarrassment. Heidegger attempts to escape the interpre
tive problem which i t presents by saying that this idea has not yet
been sufficiently thought and Jaspers attempts to dismiss i t as a mys
tical aberration. The fact that th is doctrine is an embarrassment
152jaspers> Nietzsche and C h ristia n ity , p. 87.
163
arises d irectly out of th eir respective attempts to "bridge" the fun
damental dualism which characterizes the essential nature of
Nietzsche's philosophy. Heidegger attempts to "reduce" Nietzsche's
philosophy to metaphysics and Jaspers attempts a similar "reduction"
to Existenz-phi1osophy or what we have called philosophical anthro
pology. To ignore either of these poles of Nietzsche's philosophy
necessitates a warping and distortion of that philosophy, in such a
way, that certain aspects become v irtu ally impossible to account for.
The strength of Heidegger's interpretation is to be found in
the "manner" in which he thinks about Nietzsche and also in the often
penetrating questions which he raises. Heidegger's interpretation
forces one to re-think all the basic doctrines of Nietzsche's meta
physics. I t also forces a continual re-examination of the re la tio n
ship of Nietzsche's metaphysics to the re st of his philosophy. There
is no question but what some of the aspects of Heidegger's interpre
tation are a r tif ic ia l in the extreme, but, nonetheless, there is much
to be learned from Heidegger's undertaking. The inordinate emphasis
which Heidegger gives to Nietzsche's metaphysics i s , a t le a s t, a cor
rective to the view that Nietzsche is merely a "philosopher-poet."
Heidegger's interpretation also has the great virtue of placing
Nietzsche's philosophy in an historical perspective, even though
Heidegger's historical theses are sometimes dubious. Heidegger under
scores the necessity for taking Nietzsche seriously as a metaphysician,
who, rather than being a philosophical anomaly, belongs essentially to
a rich philosophical tradition.
164
The real strength of Jaspers' interpretation remains to be
seen, since he focuses primarily on Nietzsche's philosophical anthro
pology. Although Jaspers'actual interpretation sometimes f a lls short
of the theoretical c r ite ria which he himself establishes for interpre
tatio n , he nonetheless, raises a number of provocative questions in
relation to Nietzsche's metaphysics. Jaspers' attempts a t dialogue
with Nietzsche re-in state a human element which is lacking Heidegger'
interpretation. Jaspers reminds us that Nietzsche's ideas were the
product of a very re a l, and very human struggle. In f a c t, i t is pre
cisely here that the real depths of Jaspers' interpretation are to be
found. Genuine THINKING is the product of individual philosophers
and an understanding of the full penetration of Nietzsche's insights
must fin a lly be understood in terms of Nietzsche himself.
165
CHAPTER III
NIETZSCHE'S PHILOSOPHICAL A N THROPOLOGY
W e must begin our discussion here by inquiring briefly into
the meaning of the term "philosophical anthropology." Historically,
philosophical anthropology has frequently been characterized as "meta
physical." However, in our discussion we wish to use the term in
such a way as to create a contrast between metaphysics and philosophi
cal anthropology. In the preceding chapter we used "metaphysics" to
designate the cosmological perspective--a perspective which TRANSCENDS
the "practical" concerns of man's l i f e . Thus, by "philosophical
anthropology," we shall mean those perspectives which center around ,
the Life-concerns of the human being. I t can be argued, as we shall
see, that there is a "metaphysical" dimension to philosophical anthro
pology. W e shall accept th is argument with qualification, for u l t i
mately even the TRANSCENDENT cosmological perspective is a human
perspective, although not_ an anthropological one in the sense in which
we wish to use the term "anthropological" here. At this point, we
once again encounter the problem which Heidegger raised previously.
There is a sense in which i t is tautological to say that all of the
perspectives which man can adopt are perspectives of anthropos and
are, therefore, "anthropological." Heidegger attacks the notion of
philosophical anthropology because, for him, anthropology is the
highest, most radical, and therefore also the most n ih ilis tic , form
166
of "subjectivism." However, even Heidegger admits the p o ssibility
of an analysis of anthropos, which is i ts e lf not anthropological.
Heidegger calls this analysis "an existential analytic of human
Dasein," and argues that i t is grounded in his "fundamental ontology."
Heidegger's analysis of Nietzsche's philosophy as the "consummation"
of Western metaphysics precludes, as fa r as Heidegger is concerned,
any possibility that Nietzsche has escaped "subjectivism" and thereby
"overcomes" metaphysics. This is a pre-judgment which, for the pur
poses of our discussion here, we must be careful to avoid. W e shall
be concerned with inquiring into Nietzsche's theory of man and investi
gating the nature of the dialectic which is operative between the
perspectives of lif e and the cosmological perspective. This in v esti
gation will include a consideration of the question as to whether
Nietzsche can escape the charge of "subjectivism." In this way, i t
is hoped, that we shall arrive at an understanding of the innermost
workings of Nietzsche's philosophy. There are already in existence
several good expositions of various facets of Nietzsche's philosophi
cal anthropology. W e shall try to avoid duplication by thinking
through Nietzsche's position in terms of the fundamental dualism which
we are in the process of elucidating. However, a certain amount of
repetition is unavoidable. Our primary purpose here is not simply to
exposit Nietzsche, but rather to attempt a re-thinking of his philo
sophical anthropology from a new direction.
167
Nietzsche's Theory of M an and
* the Will to Power
There are two aspects to Nietzsche's theory of man. The f i r s t
is his vision of man 1n terms of possibility and this he expounds in
his doctrine of the Superman, which we shall consider in a la te r sec
tion. The second aspect, and the one with which we are concerned
here, might be termed Nietzsche's "critique of man." Both Nietzsche's
"critique" and his doctrine of the Superman are examples of
Nietzsche's extremism, for he wished to create the greatest possible
contrast between man as he is at his p e ttie st and his vision of.a
possible man at his noblest. Nietzsche thunders and rages and de
nounces man as he is in order to s t i r man out of his complacency and
self-sa tisfa c tio n , so that he might create "beyond" himself. This
"beyond" is not otherworldly, but is , rather, man as a future and
radical possibility. But before man can create beyond himself, he
must f i r s t involve himself in a total reappraisal of what he is and
what motivates him--thus, the necessity for the critique.
What is man's basic motivation? The Will to Power is
Nietzsche's answer. But i f everything i s , metaphysically speaking,
a manifestation of the Will to Power, then how is i t possible for
there to be a critique at all? From th is the necessity for d is tin
guishing between metaphysics and philosophical anthropology becomes
immediately clear. Within the realm of anthropos there are positive
and negative manifestations of the Will to Power. W e shall use the
168
terms "positive" and "negative" rather than the terms "good" and "evil"
or "bad," since Nietzsche plays upon this la t t e r set of terms in a
dizzying fashion. Similarly, he plays ironically with the terms "vir
tue" and "vice." When we wish to designate unequivocally something
which Nietzsche regards as positive, we shall write i t as "VIRTUE."
Let us begin with a consideration of those things which
Nietzsche regards as negative.manifestations of the Will to Power.
These may be divided into two kinds. F irst, there are those which
Nietzsche regards as simply base and despicable. Secondly, there are
those manifestations which on the surface appear positive, but which
in the long run turn out to be negative and destructive. Those of the
f i r s t class all have, at bottom, the same basic motive—revenge or
vengeance. I t is revenge that motivates the "priest-type" and the
"democrat," who are the preachers of equality; Nietzsche calls them
the tarantulas.
• "W e shall wreak vengeance and abuse on all whose equals we are
not"—thus do the tarantulas-hearts vow. "And 'will to equality'
shall henceforth be the name for virtue; and against all that has
power we want to raise our cl amor 1"!
Here we already have an indication that Nietzsche firmly believes that
the Will to Power can be misdirected. Those who wish to dominate
others hide th eir motives behind "virtues," which they wish to impose.
But thus I counsel you, my friends: Mistrust all in whom the
impulse to punish is powerful. They, are people of a low sort and
stock; the hangman and the bloodhound look out of th e ir faces.
Mistrust all who talk much of th eir ju stice! Verily, th e ir souls
lack more than honey. And when they call themselves the good and
1
Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 212.
169
the ju s t, do not forget that they would be pharisees, i f only they
had—power.2
From this passage i t is quite clear, that Nietzsche wishes to make
value judgments with regard to the manner in which power is made mani
fest and the use to which i t is put. Nietzsche also calls the taran-
' tulas the "preachers of death." • They deny lif e and wish to r e s tr ic t
and leg islate against anything th at threatens to surpass th e ir "vir
tues." Scattered throughout the total corpus of Nietzsche's works,
there are lite r a lly hundreds of passages in which he presents p a r ti
cular cases of this perverted Will to Power. Let us consider an
example—c h a stity .
Do I counsel you to slay your senses? I counsel the innocence
of the senses.
D o I counsel you to chastity? Chastity is a virtue in some,
but almost a vice in many. They abstain, but the bitch, sen
su ality , leers enviously out of everything they do. Even to the
heights of th e ir virtues and to the cold regions of the s p ir it
th is beast follows them with her lack of peace. And how nicely
the bitch, sensuality, knows how to beg for a piece of s p ir it
when denied a piece of meat . . . . Those for whom chastity is
d iffic u lt should be counseled against i t , le st i t become th e ir
road to h e ll—the mud and heat of th e ir soul s . 3
This, of course, must not be taken as an apologia for indulgence in
lu st. The key sentence here is: "I counsel the innocence of the
senses." What Nietzsche has presented here is the nucleus for a
psychological (in the best and most human sense) theory of repression.
Nietzsche realized that one can also become a slave to one's passions
by denying them.
2Ibid. , p. 212. ^Ibid. f p# ]g6.
170
Chastity in and of i t s e l f cannot be said to be a virtue. How
ever, the preachers of death wish to absolutize "virtues," for they
would have us believe that all men are the same and are equal. For
Nietzsche, there are no absolutes; there are no unconditionals.
"Everything unconditional belongs in p a t h o l o g y . I t is the preachers
of equality, who have strived so successfully to keep men from creating
beyond themselves. To Nietzsche, i t is imperative that men recognize
th eir differences and preserve them. "I do not wish to be mixed up
and confused with these preachers of equality. For, to me ju stice
5
speaks thus: 'Men are not equal.' Nor shall they become equal!"
Equality breeds mediocrity, could almost be a motto for Nietzsche.
In the realm of man, as in the realm of metaphysics, Nietzsche is a
Heraclitean. I t is only through struggle and opposition that one
creates beyond himself. Metaphysically speaking, there is no tel os;
anthropologically speaking, man must create, out of his innermost
nature, a te lo s—the Superman. An absolutely essential step in this
direction is the overcoming of revenge. "For that man be delivered
from revenge, that is for me the bridge to the highest hope, and a
rainbow a fte r long storms."® Nietzsche celebrates the struggle,
extols the true enemy, and praises "war"; but this "war of opposites"
is a spiritual war. "Your enemy you shall seek, your war you shall
wage--for your thoughts. And if your thought be vanquished, then your
^Nietzsche, Beyond Good and E v il, p. 90.
^Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 213.- ®Ibid. , p. 211.
171
7
honesty should s t i l l find cause for triumph in th a t." ' (M y i t a l i c s ) .
From the above we can see that there are two kinds of
"enemies." There are the negative enemies and the positive enemies.
The negative enemies are the despisers of the body, the preachers of
death, the preachers of equality, and the flie s in the market place.
Numberless are these small and miserable creatures; and many a
proud building has perished of raindrops and weeds. You are no
stone, but you have already become hollow from many drops. You
will yet burst from many drops. I see you wearied by poisonous
flie s , bloody in a hundred places; and your pride refuses even
to be angry. Blood is what they want from you in all innocence
. . . . You are too proud to kill these greedy creatures. But
beware le st i t become your downfall that you suffer all th e ir
poisonous in ju s tic e .8
The positive enemies are those who, though s till far from overcoming
themselves, are on the path to the Superman. Nowhere does Nietzsche
say that these "seekers of TRUTH" shall agree; the path he describes
is not a path to Platonic absolutes, rather, i t is a path of endless
"war" or, philosophically speaking, of endless dialectic.
If the f i r s t type of negative manifestation is characterized
by revenge, then the second type, that which on the surface appears
positive, but is ultim ately negative, is characterized by compassion
(in the sense which we discussed in the f i r s t chapter). In the pas
sage quoted above on the flie s in the market place, Nietzsche warns
a'gainst compassion, fo r even though they want blood "in all innocence,"
they will destroy those who act with compassion toward them. Compas
sion, i t will be remembered, is "the la st and greatest temptation" for
Zarathustra. Here Nietzsche wrestles with the profoundest depths of
7Ibid., p. 159. 8Ibid. , p. 165.
172
the problem of humanism, and here we have a collision between the per
spectives of. l if e and the cosmological perspective. M an is the animal
of insecurity, because he has self-consciousness and seeks a meaning
for his existence which is grounded in some ultimate and absolute
tel o s. Man's search for security has led him into a desperate chase
a fte r a principle, beyond himself, which would "justify" his existence.
"There is an ancient story that King Midas hunted in the
forest a long time for the wise Silenus, the companion of Dionysus,
without capturing him. W hen Silenus at la s t fell into his hands,
the king asked what was the best and most desirable of all things
for man. Fixed and immovable, the demigod said not a word, t i l l
at la s t, urged by the king, he gave a sh rill laugh and broke out
into these words: 'Oh, wretched ephemeral race, children of chance
and misery, why do you compel me to te ll you what i t would be •
most expedient for you not to hear? What is best of all is utterly
beyond your reach: not to be born, not to be, to be nothing. But
the second best for you i s —to die soon.'"9
Few can live with such a consciousness of l i f e and even the Greeks
found i t necessary to project the fictio n of the Olympians in order
to make th e ir existence tolerable. The many, the "superfluous ones"
are too weak to accept the tragic character of existence and to create
th eir own existences as works of a rt out of the flux of Becoming. As
a result they seek reassurances and comfort and fall victim to the
preachers of death. They defend the absoluticity of th eir beliefs
with enormous ferocity, because they recognize the threat to th eir
security and fear th e ir own weakness.
"No shepherd and one herd! Everybody wants the same, every
body is the same: whoever feels different goes voluntarily into
a mad house.
^Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 42.
173
1 1 1 Formerly, all the world was mad,' say the most refined and
they blink.
"One is clever and knows everything that has ever happened:
so there is no end of derision. One s till quarrels, but one is
soon reconciled—else i t might spoil the digestion.
"One has one's l i t t l e pleasure for the day and one's l i t t l e
pleasure for the night: but one has a regard for health.
'"We have invented happiness,' say the la st men, and they
blink. "10
Here we encounter a profound ambivalence in Nietzsche. He despises
the la s t men, yet there is the omnipresent temptation of compassion,
for Nietzsche realizes that there are many who need th e ir absolutes,
th eir life-preserving fic tio n s, in order to survive. Ultimately, how
ever, Nietzsche has to reject compassion, for i t is f u ti l e . Compas
sion results in an im plicit consent to indulge oneself in one's weak
ness. Compassion is destructive, in that i t increases the suffering
of the one who feels i t and destroys the potential dignity of the one
who is its object.
Nietzsche despises the la s t men for what they are, but he also
loves them for what they could become.
Misunderstanding of love. There is a slavish love th at sub
mits and gives i t s e l f ; that idealizes, and deceives i t s e l f —there
is a divine love that despises and loves, and reshapes and
elevates the beloved.^
Nietzsche, in h i s ’most extreme fashion, speaks of the necessity for
war, suffering, and the annihilation of great numbers of men who are
too weak to p articip ate in the "Great Politics" of the future. He
also speaks of the necessity for discipline, "breeding," and the
^ N ie tz s c h e , Zarathustra, p. 130.
^ N ie tz s c h e , The Will to Power, p. 506.
174
"masters of the e a r t h . 2 Here we must be very careful to balance the
extremes, if we wish to arrive at a genuine understanding of
Nietzsche's position. I t is all too easy to d istort this aspect of
Nietzsche's philosophy and see him as a proto-Nazi. W hen Nietzsche
speaks of annihilation, he does not mean mass murder. He wishes to
"eliminate" the weak by creating conditions in which only the strong
can survive. The war of which Nietzsche speaks has two aspects. The
f i r s t is the "war" of self-overcoming, which is the greatest and most
d iffic u lt battle of a l l . The second is the "war" against the preachers
of death and the la st men, which is carried out by creating conditions
in which they cannot survive, except by overcoming themselves.
Not to make men "better," not to preach morality to them in
any form, as i f "morality in it s e l f ," or any ideal kind of man,
were given; but to create conditions that require stronger men
who for th eir part need and consequently will have, a morality
(more clearly; a physical-spiritual discipline) that makes them
strong!
The "breeding" of which Nietzsche speaks is not so much a program of
eugenics as i t is the creation of conditions which require strength
and also education in the sense of paideia.
Education in those ru le rs ' virtues that master even one's
benevolence and pity: the great c u ltiv a to r's virtues ("forgiving
one's enemies" is c h ild 's play by comparison), the affect of the
creator must be elevated--no longer to work on marble!--The excep
tional situation and powerful position of those beings (compared
with any prince hitherto): the Roman Caesar with C hrist's s o u l.1^
This is hardly the design for a Hitlerian tyrannt! It should now be
clear th at, for Nietzsche, the self-overcoming of the individual also
requires an overcoming of the conditions that have led man to become
12I b id ., pp. 500-04. 13Ibid . , p. 513. 14Ib id ., p. 513.
175
what he is. This is the essential meaning of Nietzsche's "Great
P o litics." W e shall see the ramifications of these transformations
when we come to a consideration of the doctrine of the Superman.
The "critique" of man, as one aspect of Nietzsche's theory of
man, reveals three central ideas. The f i r s t is the extension of the
metaphysical principle of Becoming into the realm of anthropos. The
second is that there are positive and negative manifestations of the
Will to Power within the context of anthropos and, thus, there is an
im plicit hierarchy of values. Finally, there is the view that man's
existence is potentially a work of a r t and th at the highest expression
of the Will to Power is man's self-overcoming.
Jaspers' View
Jaspers begins his discussion of Nietzsche's "critique" of
man with an observation about Nietzsche's ambivalence in his attitude
toward man.
Hence a fundamental feature of Nietzsche's thought is the movement
of his love, th at, when disillusioned, expressed i t s e l f as a most
frightful denial of human existence, only to reappear in the,.guise
of a passionate affirmation of the essential nature of man.
Nietzsche believed that genuine humanism was a dialectic between con
tempt for-man and the vision of what man could become. The dialectic
of self-overcoming operates between the pole of self-respect and se lf-
contempt. For Nietzsche, only one who has despised mankind can truly
love mankind and be, thereby, a genuine humanist. Jaspers argues
^ J a s p e r s , N ietzsche, p. 125
176
rightly when he says that the priest-type has too l i t t l e love for man
and because of his d issatisfaction, the p rie st or saint projects his
love "beyond" man into a Godhead, rather than helping to create the
conditions that would lead man to an overcoming of h im s e lfJ 6
However, Nietzsche believes that even th is disgust and con
tempt is something which must fin ally be overcome. I t is Nietzsche's
"longing for the genuine man," that leads him to his contempt and in
his own l i f e created great strains in his relationships with Wagner,
Rhode, and Lou Salome. However, as Jaspers points-out, Nietzsche's
vision of authentic man was not some impossible ideal which he posited.
In fa c t, ultimately, Nietzsche affirms man as he actually is with his
p o s s ib ilitie s . Nietzsche does not leg islate p articular p o ssib ilitie s
for individuals which must be realized in order for them to strive
toward authenticity. Rather, Nietzsche provides only a general frame
work which points a direction to the path of self-overcoming, but the
p a rtic u la ritie s of the struggle must remain radically individual.
Nietzsche's demands cannot be of the sort that set up definite
prescriptions and proscriptions which could guide the purposeful
w ill. He s ta rts much deeper because he wishes to reach the pos
sible Existenz of man through indirect illumination of those modes
of existential actualization which he envisages.17
Here, once again, we encounter Jaspers' use of Existenz as a hermeneu
ti c model for the fundamental Being of man. I t is time th at we
directly confront the problem of the adequacy of th is model for in te r
preting Nietzsche.
IG lbid., p. 125. 17I b id ., p. 149.
One of the greatest d if f ic u l t ie s about the term "E xistenz1 1 is
its ambiguity and by some this ambiguity is regarded as a necessity
with regard to Jaspers' radical experiment in communication.
All expressions in Existenz-philosophy are ambiguous in prin
c ip le . All i t s essential terms may be taken not as the indicators
which they are, but as lite ra l descriptions. Its "propositions"
may be taken as objective assertions about a knowable object.
Such a m isinterpretation is always possible and cannot be prevented
by further words, by warnings and instructions; for they too can
all be m isinterpreted. But Existenz-philosophy may have the effect
of needling the reader to perform the same inner acts of tra n
scending which Jaspers intends. This is neither mysticism nor
simple incommunicability; i t is a recognition that only Existenz
can understand Existenz. Thus, for Jaspers, the most essential
thing men have to say to one another cannot quite be said; or
rather its comprehension cannot be forced, nor can i t s tru th be
objectively established. Nevertheless, i t remains the most impor
tant thing, and i t remains true. Such expressions are corrigible
only in ex isten tial communication, by authentic Existenz. There
i s , as Jaspers in s is ts , an essential risk in such matters
Such a defense is d iff ic u lt to respond to, for one is always open to
the charge th at one has not understood authentically in terms of one's
own Existenz. However, i t is neither our purpose nor our intention
here to c r itic iz e Jaspers' philosophy as such, for certainly even the
most radical experiments in communication on the part of a philosopher
with the statu re of Jaspers are worth careful examination. What we are
concerned with is only the adequacy of the model for interpreting
Nietzsche. One strongly suspects that Nietzsche, while sympathizing
with the immense problems of communication, would, nonetheless,
probably dismiss the notion of essential ambiguity as Schaumschlagerei.
One thing, however, is quite clear—Jaspers' "doctrine of ambiguity"
Ify-arle, "Introduction" to Jaspers' Reason and E x iste n z , p. 13.
178
leads him to find "ambiguities" in Nietzsche which are not really
ambiguities at all when examined in the context of Nietzsche's total
work.
More importantly, there is a second objection to the use of
the model of Existenz and th is objection might be said to come from
Nietzsche himself. I t is indubitable that Jaspers' notion of Existenz
inherently contains a conception of a positive kind of transcendence,
which is no way related to the TRANSCENDENCE' of the cosmological per
spective which we have elucidated. I t is also clear that this tra n
scendence, as thought by Jaspers, is in some sense "theological, "thus,
the repeated charge of "godlessness" against N ietzsche.^ Clearly,
Nietzsche would reject any such notion of transcendence which has over
tones of the "super-sensible." A third d ifficulty with the notion of
Existenz is that, in spite of all of Earle's "warnings," i t suggests
an inherent structure within the Being of man. Just the fact that
Jaspers persists in speaking of the "Being of man" in connection with
Existenz is already suspicious and, at le a s t, suggests the sort of
"categorization" which Nietzsche rejects. But what is. man then, for
Nietzsche? M an "is" Becoming as an individuation of the Will to Power.
The authenticity of man Nietzsche conceives of in terms of self-over-
coming. Thus, perhaps, the Will to self-overcoming is what Jaspers'
means by Existenz and certainly Nietzsche's notion of Will is enigmatic
enough to qualify as an "essential ambiguity." It might be said of
T^See Jaspers, Nietzsche, pp. 139 f . , p. 167,pp. 209 f . ,
pp. 363 f f . , p. 375, pp. 429 f f . , pp. 437 f.
179
the notion of Will that i t is a limiting case and no explication of
i t can be giv'en other than in terms of i t s particular manifestations.
The same might be said for Jaspers1 Existenz with this difference,
Nietzsche can point to concrete instances of Willing, but i t is d i f f i
cult to imagine instances of "Existenz-ing." Ultimately, as a model
of interpretation, Existenz creates more problems than i t solves. I t
imports a notion of transcendence which Nietzsche would reject and i t
tends to de-emphasize the process-character of human existence. The
notion of self-overcoming is much closer to the s p ir it of Nietzsche
and emphasizes the dynamic nature of Nietzsche's view of man.
Jaspers continues his discussion of Nietzsche's theory of man
by examining Nietzsche's attitu d e toward the view that man is a
rational animal. Nietzsche regards man as a special kind of animal
that has a capacity for ra tio n a lity and s p ir itu a lity , but he adds
that man must pay a high price for forgetting his animality. Nietzsche
is very lite ra l in his fusion of "rational" and "animal" as a designa
tion for man. If man. forgets his ra tio n a lity , he becomes barbaric and
b estial; i f man forgets his animality he becomes weak and insipid.
Man is , in the most radical and lite r a l sense, a spiritual animal.
Yet, there is another sense in which man is indeterminate, for he is
in the process of defining what he is .
In contrast to the animals, every one of which behaves in accord
ance with the laws of his species, man is "the animal that is
s t i l l not fixated (das noch nicht fe stg e s te llte Tier)." That is
to say that man is indeed no longer merely an animal, but a being
whose nature is s t i l l to be determined. The indeterminacy of his
his boundless p o ssib ilitie s carries with i t the threat of disorder,
with the result that he appears as a sickness with which existence
180
is infected: "That which has brought man victory in his struggle
with the brutes has also brought about his perilous pathological
development." Consequently "there is a basic flaw in man."20
Nietzsche plays on this notion of sickness in a variety of ways. Some
times he speaks of man himself as a sickness, a disease. Other times
he says th at there is a sickness in the nature of man, that led him to
distinguish himself from the other animals. I t is th is second sense
of sickness which is especially interesting. M an was possible, not
only due to his capacity for self-awareness and s e lf-re fle c tio n , but
also because of his capacity for self-d ecep tio n .’ The animal in him
demanded illusions., lie s , and delusions of grandeur in order to sur
vive.
. The errors that were indispensable to the development of humanity
are reducible to the "basic view that man alone is free in a world
of the unfree; that he is the eternal miracle-worker, the super
animal , the demi-god, the meaning of creation, the one whose non
existence is unthinkable, and who furnished the key to the riddle
of the cosmos."21
Here again we encounter the fundamental dualism. The sickness of man
in his ego. I t is his ego that te lls him that "he is the meaning of
creation" and that he is the one "whose non-existence is unthinkable."
But, a t the same time, man is the creature who can take up the cos
mological perspective and TRANSCEND his existence as anthropos, as
ego and, thereby, apprehend himself as "meaningless." Jaspers sees
all of th is , but he does not go on to draw the conclusion: Nietzsche's
theory of man asserts that there is a "basic flaw," a fundamental
dual ism at the very core of the nature of man. The cosmological
2QI b id ., p. 130. 21 I b id ., p. 130.
181
perspective threatens the perspectives of l i f e , but the anthropologi
cal perspective, without the cosmological one, leads to stagnation and
an absurd se lf-sa tisfa c tio n . Authenticity or self-overcoming is pos
sible only in terms of the dialectic which takes place between the
cosmological perspective and the anthropological perspectives and the
possibility for th is d ialectic resides within the nature of man him
self.
Heidegger's View
Incredible as i t may seem, in the 1155 pages of his two volume
Nietzsche, Heidegger does not directly address himself to Nietzsche's
"critique" of man. He does discuss the critique of past values and
the "essence" of man in relation to the problem of radical nihilism,
but always and only in terms of the Will to Power, Eternal Recurrence,
and Transvaluation. In other words, Heidegger's approach is almost
exclusively metaphysical, and he tends to deal with man and the anthro
pological perspectives only in the greatest generality and presupposes
that they.are subsumable under Nietzsche's metaphysics. However, in
this essay, "W ho is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?," Heidegger does have a
brief discussion of the problem of revenge. ^
Heidegger centers his discussion around the passage we have
already cited regarding the deliverance from revenge as the "bridge to
the highest hope." This deliverance, says Heidegger, opens up a new
„ 22Martin Heidegger, "Wer i s t Nietzsches Zarathustra?" in
Vortrage und Aufsatze (Pfullingen, 1959). All translations from this
essay are mine.
182
kind of freedom. "The space of th is freedom from revenge lie s in the
same way outside of pacifism and power-politics and calculated neu
t r a l i t y . " ^ I t is not to be understood as a new social or political
freedom, but rather as an individual freedom which as self-overcoming
is a self-commanding and a self-obeying. Heidegger correctly observes
th a t, for Nietzsche, the highest individual expression of the Will to
Power is self-mastery and the attempt to impose one's Will on another
is that perversion of the Will to Power which Nietzsche calls revenge.
However, Heidegger wishes to go on to "ground" this discussion of
revenge in metaphysics. Heidegger argues the revenge as "Spirit" is
the determinate of one form of relation between man and en tities.
Revenge, metaphysically speaking, manifests i t s e l f as ill Will and
from this point on Heidegger makes his usual metaphysical "connec
tions": Will as Will to Power is the to ta lity of en tities as Becoming.
Revenge here is no mere thesis of morality and the deliverance
from revenge is no task of moral education. Just as l i t t l e is
revenge and the passion for revenge an object of psychology
Nietzsche views the essence and range of revenge metaphysically.24
At th is point Heidegger brings in Schel.ling, Leibniz, Fichte, Hegel,
and Schopenhauer and draws some rather dubious connections with
Nietzsche. However, the core of his analysis as to why revenge is
foreign to the Will as such is interesting.
The " sp irit of vengeance" is foreign to Will as Will. W hy?
Because i t implies that whatever i t is to which violence is done
somehow re sists Will, hence, in i t i a l ly at le a s t, would seem to lie
beyond its power and need to be subdued. But i t is repugnant to
universal Will that anything r e s is t i t in any way. The reason is
that willing in its purity implies a domination over what is
23I b id ., p. 110. 24I b id ., p. 112.
183
willed. The only "subduing" is a self-subduing, as, for example,
when Will poses and then overcomes the conditions of its own
unfolding. In the process of willing as such, the Will wills
i t s e l f and nothing outside of i t can "re sist" . . . . The "sp irit
of vengeance," then, is repugnant to Pure Will, hence no response
to Being-as-Will that is marked by th is s p i r i t is authentic.25
However questionable this "metaphysicalization" of the notion of
revenge may be, Heidegger has, nonetheless, presented a provocative
characterization of the overcoming of the s p i r i t of revenge. In
Heidegger's What is Thinking?, there are also discussions of
Nietzsche's notion of revenge, but there is nothing essentially d if
feren t from what we have discussed here.26
In "W ho is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?," Heidegger raises one
other point with regard to revenge that is worth taking note of. He
quotes Zarathustra's statement: "This, indeed th is alone, is what
revenge is: the w ill's il l will against time and it s ' i t w as.'"27
This, of course, is an occasion fo r Heidegger to relate the notion of
revenge as i l l Will to the metaphysics of time and especially to the
doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. Here Heidegger unconsciously slips
into the perspective of philosophical anthropology and observes that
Nietzsche conceives of the "redemption" of man from revenge in terms of
the "eternalization" of each moment. This is to be understood as an
appropriation of the past by the Will in such a way th at for the f ir s t
time i t becomes genuinely mine. Thus the past is transformed from the
pc
Richardson, Heidegger, p. 378.
2^Martin Heidegger, W as heisst Denken? (Tubingen, 1954).
27Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 252.
184
simple " it was" into " it was, but thus I willed i t . " 28 This i s , as
we shall la te r see, an anthropological application of the doctrine of
Eternal Recurrence as a principle for creating man's individual
existence as the highest and noblest expression of the Will to Power.
To tre a t the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence exclusively as a meta
physical principle, as Heidegger does, leads one into a blind alley,
as we have already seen. Heidegger's treatment of Nietzsche's "c ri
tique" of man is interesting, but inadequate. His neglect of the
anthropological aspects of Nietzsche's thought results in a very
unbalanced conception of Nietzsche's philosophy and tends to ignore
the fundamentally dialectical nature of his thinking.
The Death of God and Nihilism
Nietzsche's pronouncement that God is dead has long been a
subject of controversy. Some c ritic s have been so literal-m inded as
to point out th at i f God is dead, then he must have at some time been
alive. And then they.proceed to ask what God died from. But Nietzsche
anticipates such c r itic s and has an.answer ready for them—God died
out of his compassion for man.
"When he was young, this god out of the Orient, he was harsh
and vengeful and he built himself a hell to amuse his favorites.
Eventually, however, he became old and soft and mellow and pitying,
more like a grandfather than a father, but most like a shaky old
grandmother. Then he sat in his nook by the hearth, w ilted,
grieving over his weak legs, weary of the world, weary of w illing,
and one day he choked on his all-too-great p ity ."29
28I b id ., p. 253. 29I b id ., p. 373.
185
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche frequently uses the device of
parable and often couples i t with a mischievous sort of irony. In
the same section from which the above passage is taken, the old pope
says of the old God, "He was a concealed god, addicted to secrecy.
Verily, even a son he got himself in a sneaky way. At the door of
his faith stands adultery."30 A b it la te r Zarathustra says to the
old pope, "He offended the ta ste of my ear and eyes; I do not want
to say anything worse about him now that he is dead."3! Considering
what Nietzsche is capable of, e.g. some of his polemical remarks
against Schopenhauer, Luther, and Kant, th is is, indeed, a gentle sort
of irony. In fa c t, in th is respect Zarathustra is quite remarkable
in that most often there is an undercurrent of sympathy behind his
irony. Yet, extraordinarily, Jaspers f a ils to find genuine humor in
Nietzsche.
In fact humor is almost completely absent in Nietzsche's nature;
he was capable of a grim so rt of humor without the soul of humor;
he uses irony as a keen weapon, but i t has no role in the i.llumina
tion of the source where i t has its proper protective and impelling
function.32
But what does all of this have to do with the death of,God and
Nihilism? Just th is: Jaspers dogmatic insistence on the necessity of
transcendence is deadly serious; i t is tru ly in "the s p irit of
gravity."
The final result of the sort of thinking that is intended to sub
stitu te fo r transcendence is indulgence in merely imaginary situ a
tions that leave the impression of being a future reality of the
3QI b id ., p. 373. 31 I b id ., p. 373.
^ J a sp ers, N ietzsche, p. 348.
186
highest order; but being nothing but vain illu sio n s, they do not
constitute transcendence.33
Not only would Nietzsche reject this notion of transcendence as n ih il
i s t i c , he would regard this seriousness, th is humorlessness as n ih il
i s t i c . In fact i t is this "sp irit of gravity" th a t is partly respon
sib le for the death of God. Not only is Jaspers temperamentally at
odds with Nietzsche, but Jaspers' conception of the "seriousness" of
philosophy would be rejected by Nietzsche.
What a philosopher is , that is hard to learn because i t cannot
be taught: one must "know" i t , from experience—or one should
have the pride not to know i t . But nowadays a ll the world talks
of things of which i t cannot have any experience, and th is is most
true, and in the worst way, concerning philosophers and philoso
phical states: exceedingly few know them, may know them, and all
popular opinions about them are false.
That genuinely philosophical combination, for example, of a
bold and exuberant sp iritu a lity th a t runs presto and is a dialec
tical severity and necessity that takes no fa lse step is unknown
to most thinkers and scholars from th eir own experience, and
therefore would seem incredible to them i f somebody should speak
of i t in th eir presence. They picture every necessity as a kind
of need, as a painstaking having-to-follow and being-compelled.
And thinking it s e l f they consider something slow and hesitant,
almost as t o i l , and often enough as "worthy of the sweat of the
noble"—but not in the least as something lig h t, divine, closely
related to dancing and high s p ir its . "Thinking" and taking a mat
te r "seriously," considering i t "grave"—for them all th is belongs
together: that is the only way they have "experienced" i t . 3^
This charge applies to Heidegger as well with his interminable pre
liminaries" and ponderous "preparatory analyses." Also, Heidegger
repeatedly in sists that Being is "transcendence". Nietzsche sees nih
ilism as something deeply rooted in the en tire history of Western
33Ib id . , p. 432. 34Nietzsche, Beyond Good and E v il, p. 139.
187
thought and i t is characterized by a kind of thinking in which man
takes himself too seriously and in the wrong way. The f i r s t symptom
of th is disease of nihilism is the appearance of the notion of tra n
scendence. The "death" of the idea of transcendence signals the
arrival of radical nihilism , but this is the f i r s t step on the path
toward self-overcoming and the Superman. Out of the despair and
sense of "meaninglessness" of radical nihilism, there must arise a
sense of joy and even ecstacy, which is a celebration of Life and its
p o ssib ilitie s and which is characterized by a kind of cosmic laughter.
Zarathustra is the perfect vehicle for the revelation of the path to
the Superman, fo r, according to ancient Persian legend, Zarathustra
3c
was born laughing.
Nietzsche's notion of the death of God is not a n i h ilis tic
device which he uses simply to attack C hristianity, rather, i t is an
attack upon an en tire trad itio n of thinking. For Nietzsche, tra n
scendence is man's projection of his own highest qualities and noblest
aspirations into an absolute subject or principle beyond himself. The
result is th at man himself is l e f t in a state of spiritual poverty;
he has impersonalized all of his own best attributes and kept for him
self only the baser drives—g u ilt, revenge, and despair. In short,
man brings about his own de-humanization. Nietzsche abhors th is loss
and believes that man must sieze these "divine" attrib u tes and
o r
James Hope Moulton, Early Religious Poetry of Persia
(Cambridge, 1911), p. 51.
188
re-integrate them ’into his own nature giving him the richness and pro
fundity which truly constitute the meaning of being human. For
Nietzsche, the.elimination of the fic tio n s of God and immortality, in
fa c t, all forms of transcendence, is a call to the re-education and
development of humanity in its f u lle s t sense.
Nihilism is'n o t a sudden event, rather i t is deeply rooted in
the historical development of mankind and the same is true of the death
of God. The "critique" of transcendence is something which began
already in the ancient world, but the age that can fu lly appropriate
i t and overcome i t has not yet arrived. In The Joyful Wisdom, in his
parable of the madman, who has come to announce the death of God,
Nietzsche says:
At la st he threw his lantern on the ground, so that i t broke in
pieces and was extinguished. "I come too early," he then said,
"I am not yet at the right time. This prodigious event is s till
on its way, and is tra v e llin g ,—i t has not yet reached men's ears.
Lightning and thunder need time, the lig h t of the stars needs
time, deeds need time, even a fte r they are done, to be seen and
heard. This deed is as yet further from them than the furthest
s t a r , —and yet they have done i t l"3°
Thus, history too must be grasped d ia le c tic a lly . Nietzsche's vision
of man is not ju st a wish-projection, but, in part, arises out of a
psychological and anthropological analysis of the historical develop
ment of human cultures. The Superman is not another escapist fic tio n —
i t is a vision of possibility based on Nietzsche's notion of dialectic
and an analysis of man as he is now and as he was in the past. How
ever, the great age of "joyful wisdom" s t i l l remains in the future.
36Nietzsche, The Joyful Wisdom, pp. 168-69.
189
"Meanwhile, however, i t is quite otherwise, meanwhile the comedy of
existence has not yet 'become-conscious1 of i t s e l f , meanwhile i t is
37
s t i l l the period of tragedy, the period of morals and relig io n s."
But even the age of "joyful wisdom" is not the final goal. When i t
is achieved men will s t i l l have visions even beyond i t . The d ialectic
of the human Will to Power is open-ended; i t becomes s ta tic only at
the cost of also becoming n ih ilis tic . Every age will posit its
"absolutes," which in the next age must be overcome.
Man has gradually become a visionary animal, who has to f u l f i l l
one more condition of existence than the other animals: man
must from time to time believe that he knows why he e x ists; his
species cannot flourish without periodically confiding i n 'l i f e 1
Without the belief in reason in l i f e ! And always from time to
time will the human race decree anew that "there is something
which really may not be laughed a t." 38
The d ia le c tic between the cosmological perspective and the anthropolo
gical perspective is the one thing that can never be fin a lly overcome
and thus, i t and i t alone can provide that motive .force fo r man to
create himself even higher and "beyond" himself.
Jaspers' View
Jaspers discussion of the death of God and the anthropological
significance of nihilism is quite brief, but his position is clear.
Jaspers places great importance on the formulation of Nietzsche's
proclamation. "Nietzsche does not say, 'There is no God,' or 'I do
not believe in God,' but 'God is dead.' He believes th at he is
37I b i d . , p. 33. 38I b id ., p. 35.
190
ascertaining a fact of present-day re a lity when he peers clairvoyantly
into his age and his own n a t u r e . J a s p e r s underscores the importance
of understanding the death of God in relation to the historical
unfolding of nihilism. This nihilism is not only a result of tran-
scendence-projections, but is partly a consequence of man's fa ith in
reason and logic..
. Nietzsche-believes th a t, from a logical standpoint, the situ a
tion in which such nihilism arose can best be characterized as
a result of erroneously believing that such categories as meaning
and wholeness have absolute validity when applied to the worid.
Jaspers also points out that the d ialectic of history is not an evolu
tionary development toward some tel o s . There is no necessary progress
which human history must make; the Superman is not inevitable. Any
given period in history will contain both advancement and regression.
Nietzsche's historical d ia le c tic does not dictate some supreme end-
state; man changes, but not necessarily for the better. However,
Nietzsche hopes to help bring about the death of transcendence and an
overcoming of radical nihilism.
With regard to the overcoming of the radical nihilism which
results from "God is dead," Jaspers takes up a strange position con
cerning the "truth" of th is utterance.
Hence definitive knowledge of our age, which we would have to
accept as universally v alid, cannot be intended when he writes:
"God is dead." Such a statement would be without meaning, in
spite of the apodictic form which he employs here as elsewhere.41
39Jaspers, N ietzsche, p. 242. 4Qlbid. , p . 243.
41 Ib id ., p. 246.
191
There are two reasons why Jaspers arrives a t this peculiar notion.
The f i r s t is that he is not consistent with regard to the two forms
of truth which he earlier explicated. Here he denies that dimension
which we have called TRUTH and, thereby, .im p!icitly repudiates his
e a rlie r distinction which even a t that point was treated equivocally.
The second reason is that he wishes to leave open the po ssib ility for
the re-instatement of God. It is for th is reason also that Jaspers .
here makes no connection between the sentence, "God is dead," and
Nietzsche's universal attack on all forms of traditional transcendence.
Jaspers here charges Nietzsche with dogmatism.
Perhaps the actual content of this statement can be realized only
by those who dogmatically believe in i t (Nietzsche would then
become the seducer who in s tills nihilism through suggestion, but
he would agree that i t befits this type of human being to succumb
to th is seduction). I t may also be said that th is statement
in itia te s a new and higher human re a lity conceived as a way of
thinking that impels man upward, or i t may serve to arouse us to
do all the more resolutely anything th at will refute i t and thus
gain the assurance that God is not dead.42
The question is not what Jaspers believes, but what Nietzsche believes
and Jaspers, with his. continual insertion of a notion of transcendence
which Nietzsche would unquestionably re je c t, subtly misdirects
. Nietzsche's whole discussion of radical nihilism and a lte rs its sig
nificance. If there is s t i l l any doubt that Jaspers is trying to
smuggle in a notion of transcendence, consider the following:
If the regnant directive in Nietzsche's thought is the a tta in
ment in actuality of the highest and best that is possible for man
without God, nevertheless, Nietzsche, in spite of himself and with
out being aware of i t , shows decisively th at the limited existence
42Ib id ., p. 246.
192
of man cannot f u lf ill i t s e l f without transcendence. The negation
of transcendence brings about its own reappearance. I t appears
to thought in' falsifying constructions of substitutes and to the
authentic s e lf in a s t i l l uncomprehended shattering confrontation
of true transcendence in opposition to false. Nietzsche's nobility
and honesty, in a time of apparently universal godlessness, produce
in him the restiv e form of godlessness that, so far as we are able
to discover, issues in the most extreme fa ls ity of thought as well
as the most genuine confrontation with transcendence. 43 (My
i t a l i c s ) .
Certainly th is is not the internal dialogue which Jaspers promised us
in his introduction. However, the major problem here is th a t i t is not
the case th a t Nietzsche "shows decisively" that "the limited existence
of man cannot f u l f i l l i t s e l f without transcendence." Nor is i t the
case that Nietzsche's "substitutes" are necessarily "falsifying con
structions." The "substitutes" to which Jaspers refers are, of course,
the Superman and Eternal Recurrence. However, we have already seen
that i t is not necessary, in fa c t, not desirable, to in te rp re t Eternal
Recurrence in the way in which Jaspers does. As for the Superman,
within the context of Nietzsche's thought, the only way in which i t
could genuinely be considered as "falsifying construction," is by
attempting to understand i t in terms of transcendence. The attempt
to keep open the p o ssibility of re-instating transcendence within the
context of Nietzsche's THOUGHT is to destroy the entire foundation
for the d ia le c tic which resides at the heart of Nietzsche's philosophy.
Heidegger's View
Once again we turn to a source other than the two volume
Nietzsche. Heidegger has written an essay explicitly devoted to the
43I b id . , p. 430.
193
two problems we are considering here. I t is t i t l e d , "Nietzsche's
Saying 'God is d e a d .'" ^ If one approaches th is essay with the hope
of finding a new perspective on Heidegger's interpretation of
Nietzsche, he will be disappointed. In fa c t, most of the material in
the essay has been worked into the Nietzsche volumes and in some cases
passages have been incorporated almost word for w ord.^ The essay
does, however, have the advantage of being a more concentrated dis-
»
cussion, even though, Heidegger does give a general outline of his
whole approach to the interpretation of metaphysics.
Heidegger begins with his thesis about the historical unfolding
of the history of metaphysics and here, as elsewhere, there is the
suggestion that there is a certain kind of autonomy, as though meta
physics were itsel.f a "force" which dictates its. own course, There
is also the suggestion that i t contains as its telos its own over
coming as a preparation for the re-establishment of Being, which will
reveal its e lf and create the p o ssib ility for fundamental ontology.
Certainly such a conception of history is alien to Nietzsche, for
even when he speaks of the history of nihilism, he does not incor
porate into its development the notion of a te lo s . Nietzsche d istin
guishes three types of history--the monumental, the antiquarian, and
the c r itic a l. Heidegger's version of the "history" of the unfolding
^M artin Heidegger, "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott i s t to t " ' in Holzwege
(Frankfurt am Main, 1957), pp. 193-247.
45Compare, for example, p. 101 of Nietzsche vol. II with p. 210
of Holzwege and pp. 638-39 of Nietzsche vol. I with pp. 227-28 of
Holzwege.
194
of metaphysics probably comes closest to Nietzsche's conception of
monumental history.
The great moments in the individual battle form a chain, a high
road for humanity through the ages, and the highest points of those
vanished moments are yet great and living for men; and th is is the
fundamental idea of the belief in humanity that finds a voice in
the demand for a "monumental" h istory.46
The "chain" of which Nietzsche speaks here is a human chain, the
"super-historical individual" and there is in Nietzsche's conception
nothing of Heidegger's notion of the autonomy of Being behind this
historical unfolding. Heidegger also makes a very dubious statement
here about the nature of "thinking" for Nietzsche. "Thinking, however,
also for Nietzsche means: to represent the entity as the en tity . Every
genuine thinking is onto-logy or otherwise i t is nothing."4? Clearly
this is another aspect of Heidegger's program to "metaphysicalize"
Nietzsche.
In his discussion of the,"God is dead" saying of Nietzsche,
Heidegger makes the interesting point, that this saying is not simply
the expression of a particular belief-disposition which happens to
belong to the individual person of Nietzsche. I t is a metaphysical
statement about a dialectical process rooted in the historical develop
ment of mankind. • I t cannot be understood simply as a personal expres
sion of atheism. Heidegger also points out that as early as 1870,
Nietzsche relates his view to that expressed in the ancient Teutonic
4^Friedrich Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of H istory, trans. •
Adrian Collins (New York, 1957), p. 13.
4?Heidegger, Holzwege, p. 194.
195
legends and quotes Nietzsche's remark regarding th is: "I believe in
the primitive Germanic saying: all gods must d ie ."48 Thus, for
Nietzsche, the historical roots of radical nihilism are very ancient.
Heidegger, unlike Jaspers, d irectly connects the notion of the
death of God with the traditional forms of transcendence. "The names
God and Christian God come, in Nietzsche's thinking, to be used as a
designation for the super-sensible World in general. God is the name
for the realm of Ideas and the Id e a l."49 Heidegger argues that
Nietzsche regarded the history of Western philosophy as Platonism and
once again cites Nietzsche's characterization of his own philosophy
as an inversion of Platonism. This inversion is accomplished through
the death of God. In th is inversion nihilism is replaced by radical
nihilism which reduces to nothing "the super-sensible World, Ideas,
God, Moral Law, the authority of Reason, Progress, the happiness of
the most, Culture, C iv iliz a tio n ."59 This is the "de-valuation of all
previously highest values" and is a necessary step to Transvaluation.
«
This radical nihilismr-Nietzsche's diagnosis of the "mood" of his age—
he affirms, but only as something to be la te r overcome through Trans
valuation. This, as Heidegger observes, is the basis for Nietzsche's
distinction between the "pessimism of weakness" and the "pessimism of
stre n g th ."^ In his mature years, Nietzsche became a severe c r itic
of the "pessimism of weakness," the chief representative of which is
48Ibid., p. 197. 49Ib id ., p. 199. 50I b id ., p. 204.
51 Ib id ., p. 207.
196
Schopenhauer. Radical nihilism is, however, a "pessimism of strength,"
precisely because i t aims at overcoming its e lf . As Heidegger points
out, Nietzsche's analysis of the forms of nihilism is very subtle.
Nietzsche recognizes the danger that the inversion of Platonism may
bring about an incomplete nihilism--one which, in terms of its rejec
tion of "dogmatic Christianity," would posit new anti-Christian abso
lute values.
The ground of the principle for the positing of new values
can no longer be situated in some super-sensible realm. I t must be
situated in the perspectival life of the individual Will to Power.52
Heidegger concludes from this that the ultimate ground i s , for
Nietzsche, "subjectivity." From this it follows th at all Willing is
at the same time a valuing. This means, according to Heidegger, that
Being, for Nietzsche, has become v a lu e .^ But, fo r Heidegger, this
does not permit Being to be as i t is in i t s e l f and, thus, Nietzsche's
so-called overcoming of metaphysics is not really an overcoming, but
simply the fulfillm ent and consummation of metaphysics as nihilism.
Here we need to examine the adequacy of Heidegger's interpretive model
of "subjectivity," ju st as we had to examine Jaspers' model of
Existenz.
Let us remind ourselves of the outcome of th at analysis of
Existenz. In the end we decided that Existenz has to be rejected as
an interpretive model for two major reasons: (1) Existenz tends to
obscure the dynamic character of the Will to Power and (2) Existenz
52lbid.t p. 209. 53Ibid., p. 238. 54ibid.,- p. 239.
197
illegitim ately introduces a notion of transcendence. However, we do
not reject that aspect of Existenz which can stand for the dynamic
ground of valuing as self-overcoming. That is to say, there is a c e r
tain over-lapping between Existenz and the Will to Power understood as
self-overcoming and as names for the ultimate source of the individual
Will to Power as Becoming, both are ambiguous. Here Jaspers and
Nietzsche agree th a t, at th is point, we encounter a limiting or
"border-situation." However, Jaspers' uses this as an excuse to posit
a form of transcendence, whereas Nietzsche would reject any such
positing and simply say th at th is is a TRUTH which reveals man to him
self as perspectival.
Now, as Heidegger would say, "How does i t stand with 'subjec
tiv ity '? " F irst we must be clear concerning the nature of Heidegger's
criticism . For Heidegger, the fundamental error of metaphysics pro
duces a corresponding error in epistemology. This error is the
subject-object dichotomy.
The Dasein directs i t s e l f towards something and grasps i t , i t
does not somehow f i r s t get out of an inner sphere in which it has
been proximally encapulated, but its primary kind of Being is such
that i t is always 'outside' alongside en tities which i t encounters
and which belong to a world already discovered. Nor is any inner
sphere abandoned when Dasein dwells alongside the entity to be
known, and determines i t s character; but even in this 'Being-
outside' alongside the object, Dasein is s t i l l 'in sid e ', i f we
understand th is in the correct sense; that is to say, i t is i t s e l f
'inside' as a Being-in-the-world which knows. And furthermore,
the perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with
one's booty to the 'cabinet' of consciousness after one has gone
out and grasped i t ; even in perceiving, retaining, and preserving
the Dasein which knows remains outside, and i t does so as D a s e i n . 55
55Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 89.
But seemingly Nietzsche too rejects the subject-object dichotomy.
"There is no question of 'subject and object,' but of a particular
species of animal that can prosper only through a certain relative
rig h tn ess."55 In another passage i t sounds as though Nietzsche a n ti
cipates Heidegger's criticism . "'Everything is su b jec tiv e,' you say;
but even th is is interpretation. The 'subject' is not something given,
i t is something added and invented and projected behind what there
57
is. And again, "'Subject,' 'object,' 'a ttr ib u te '- -th e s e d istin c
tions are fabricated and are now imposed as a schematism upon all the
apparent f a c ts ." 58 However, Heidegger is fu lly aware of these pas
sages and, y et, he goes on to argue that Nietzsche i s , nonetheless,
rooted in the tradition of "subjectivism" in itia te d in modern times
by Descartes. His argument regarding Descartes is peculiar. Heidegger
t r i e s to show th at Descartes and Nietzsche are both philosophizing in
terms of the same basic underlying position, namely, a grounding of
%
knowledge and, therefore, Being, in the body. He quotes Nietzsche's
remark: "The belief in the body is more fundamental than the belief
in the so u l."58 From th is Heidegger concludes th a t Nietzsche has pre
supposed the fundamental position of Descartes, in th a t Descartes pre
supposes th at "we have eyes to see."58 Thus, in th is way, according
56Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 266.
57I b id ., p. 267. 58Ib id ., p. 294.
5^Heidegger, Nietzsche, II, 186. 6®Ibi_d., I I , 186.
199
to Heidegger, Descartes methodologically pre-establishes the body.
Heidegger goes on to suggest by implication, that the "nucleus" of
Nietzsche's idea that knowledge is useful to lif e (as the Will to
Power) is to be found in Descartes. The implication is established
by quoting a passage from Descartes.
But as soon as I had acquired some general notions concerning
physics, and when I began to t e s t them in various particular
problems and noticed where they could lead and how much they
differed from the principles used up to the present, I believed
that I could not keep them secret, without sinning gravely against
the law which obliges us to procure, to the best of our a b ility ,
the general good of all men. For they made me see that i t is
possible to arrive at knowledge which is very useful in this l i f e ,
and that instead of that speculative philosophy taught in the
schools, we can'discover a practical one through which, knowing
the force and action of f i r e , water, a ir , the sta rs , the heavens,
and all the other bodies which surround us, as d istin c tly as we
know the different s k ills of our artisa n s, we can use them in
the same way for all the purposes to which they are suited, and
so make ourselves the masters and possessors, as i t were, of
nature.61
In spite of the tenuous character of these "connections," Heidegger
asserts that both Descartes and Nietzsche grasp the meaning of truth
as "correspondence." Thus, the word "body" as Nietzsche uses i t is
really ju st another name for Descartes' "subject," i f we understand
62
Descartes "properly." Heidegger also objects to Nietzsche's notion
of "objectivity," which Heidegger interprets as "collective subjec
tiv ity ." All through this discussion Heidegger implies th at there is
*^Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method in Discourse on Method,
Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology, trans. Paul 0. 01 scamp
(Indianapolis, 1965), p. 50. This is the entire passage. Heidegger
quotes only the la s t half.
62Heidegger, Nietzsche, II, 189-91.
200
some sort of "objectivity," beyond any that can be arrived at within
the context of the anthropological perspective.63 This other sort of
"objectivity" is , of course, derived from Being as "transcendens" and
we have already discussed the critic a l problems which th is view pre
sents. However, we are s t i l l faced with the question as to what
Nietzsche's position is.
Heidegger and Jaspers are correct when they say th at Nietzsche
has not fu lly thought out a ll.o f the aspects of the grounding of the
principle for positing new values. But, ju st as Existenz will not
serve as a model for understanding this aspect of Nietzsche, neither
will "subjectivity." Nietzsche's notion of the body includes within
i t the notion of "self" as something to be overcome. Values are not
to be found in nature, nor are they simply whims of an individual Will
to Power. Values are conditions for the existence of the individual
Will to Power as perspectival. Thus, nihilism, radical nihilism , and •
Transvaluation are not merely "subjective" processes, but are part
of the development and adaptation of the human Will to Power as a
species and are in th at sense "objective." Without th is sense of
"objectivity" there would be no possibility for a hierarchy of values
as Nietzsche conceives i t .
Let us attempt a re-statement and c la rific a tio n . The nihilism
expressed in the traditional theories of transcendence is deeply rooted
in the historical dialectic of Western culture. This nihilism is
201
fin a lly made explicit in Nietzsche's saying, "God is dead." This
means that the old values have de-valued themselves and as this insight
comes to cultural consciousness, radical nihilism sets in. However,
this radical nihilism is something'to be overcome through the princi
ple for the positing of new values. Nietzsche grounds this principle
in l if e and human life in particular, which is not to be understood
merely in terms of a "subject," but as "body"~-the fusion of ration
a lity and animality. The life of this body (understood as this fusion)
constitutes a world. The notion of world in the anthropological per
spective is not separable from life . This means th at values are not
something "objective" and discoverable in nature and neither are they
simply "subjective." The principle of positing new values and the
general framework and hierarchy of values are d ia le c tic a lly determined
through the interaction between the l i f e of anthropos and its world.
The l i f e of anthropos is understood in terms of the dialectic between
the anthropological perspective and the cosmological perspective. In
other words, through the cosmological perspective man can achieve an
understanding of himself in terms of those conditions which define and
delimit his perspective as anthropos. "Put b riefly: perhaps the
entire evolution of the s p irit is a question of the body; i t is the
history of the development of a higher body that emerges into our
s e n sib ility ." 6^ I t is precisely this s e n sib ility which grasps the
conditions which define and delimit man as_man and i t is through this
^N ietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 358.
202
sensibility that the principle for the positing of new values is
grounded in the d ia le c tic between the cosmological and the anthropo
logical perspectives which create the possibility for the Superman.
The Superman
Nietzsche's vision of the Superman is one of the most fa sc i
nating aspects of his philosophy, as well as one of the most m isinter
preted. With the doctrine of the Superman we get the other half of
Nietzsche's theory of man—man understood as possibility. I t is
extraordinarily d if f ic u lt to unfold the inner workings of any single
aspect of Nietzsche's d ia le c tic in an expository fashion—d if f ic u lt,
even for Nietzsche!—so, as a re su lt, the most coherent and cohesive
account of the notion of the Superman is to be found in the parables
and poetry of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. From the very beginning we must
keep in mind that the Superman(or "overman" in Kaufmann's tra n sla
tion) is not to be conceived of as a state which man can achieve.
One never j_s a Superman except in a relative sense. Relative to the
rest of society, we might speak of Goethe as a Superman, but even
Goethe had not fu lly overcome himself and so was, in terms of his
p o ssib ilitie s, s t i l l on the path to the Superman. No matter how fu lly
and richly a man liv e s, there is s t i l l always the po ssib ility for
future self-overcoming.
The f i r s t step on the path to the Superman is , as we have
already seen, the overcoming of radical nihilism. This opens up the
203
p ossibility for the creation of new values and Nietzsche often refers
to the Supermen as the creating ones—the ones on the path to s e lf
overcoming. "And life its e lf confided th is secret to me: 'Behold,'
i t said, 'I am that which must always overcome i t s e l f . ' " 65 I t becomes
clear in terms of the doctrine of the Superman, that even though there
is a general framework and hierarchy of values, particu lar values are
to be determined d ialectically with .reference to the struggle for self-
overcoming.
And you te ll me, friend's, th at there is no disputing of taste
and tasting? But all of lif e is a dispute over ta ste and tasting.
Taste—that is at the same time weight and scales and weigher; and
woe unto all the living that would live with disputes over weight
and scales and weighers!66
Here is Nietzsche's ground of values—"weight and scales and
weighers"—i t is neither simply "objective" or simply "subjective,"
but rather a dialectical relationship.
Zarathustra is the teacher of the doctrine of the Superman,
but at the same time he himself is on the path to the Superman. Here
again we must be careful, for there is no single path to the Superman.
Each has his own path as a s e lf - overcoming. "'This is m y. way; where
is yours?'—thus I answered those who asked me 'the way.' For the
way—that does not e x ist." 67 This new vision of man depends upon two
forms of freedom. The f i r s t is the freedom from nihilism , that is,
the b elief in transcendence and the second is the freedom to create,
65Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 227. 66Ibid.., p. 229.
67I b id ., p. 307.
204
for i t is only in creating as a Willing and valuing that self-overcom
ing is possible.
The two great VIRTUES of the Superman are honesty and nobiTity.
In terms of the notion of nobility we are presented with some very
subtle distinctions which provide a partial clue to Transvaluation.
The Superman can hate his enemy, but he should not despise him; on the
contrary he whould be proud of him. But even in despising there is
the hope of overcoming. "That you despise, you higher men, that le ts '
me hope. For the great despisers are the great re v e re rs ." ^ Also the
Superman can have contempt for the herd, but not malicious scorn. In
the end, even contempt is overcome through the struggle with one's
greatest enemy--oneself. The Superman may feel concern and love for
the other, but he cannot yield to compassion, the greatest of all
^ temptations.
Nietzsche placed an extremely high value upon honesty. "Take
good care there, you higher men! For nothing today is more precious
to me and rarer than honesty."6^ Nietzsche's conception of honesty
is inextricably bound up with strength. Self-overcoming is a Willing
that is simultaneously a commanding and an obeying grounded in a
s tr ic t, even severe, sense of honesty with oneself. This includes a
merciless recognition of one's own weakness and limitations.
Will nothing beyond your capacity: there is a wicked fa lse
ness among those who will beyond th eir capacity. Especially i f
they will great things! For they arouse mistrust against great
things, these subtle counterfeiters and actors—until fin a lly
6 8 lb id ., p. 399. 69i b i d . , p. 401.
205
they are false before themselves, squinters, whited worm-eaten-
decay, cloaked with strong words, with display-virtues, with
splendid'false deeds.70
Needless to say, this honesty also applies to one's relations with
others.
Here there is something of a problem, for Nietzsche's des
criptions are not always consistent and he himself sometimes forgets
th a t the Superman is not a type. From these various descriptions one
gets a picture of the Superman as a man with incredible se n sitiv ity
and yet a kind of hardness and strength that verges on in sen sitiv ity .
In part this is a result of Nietzsche's own extreme s e n sitiv ity
coupled with his obsession concerning health and strength, both phy
sical and sp iritu a l. Nietzsche was aware of the immense d iffic u lty
of bringing about such a fusion.
W hy the philosopher rarely turns out well. His requirements
include qualities that usually destroy a man:
1. a tremendous m ultiplicity of q u a litie s; he must be a
brief abstract of man, of all man's higher and lower
desires: danger from antitheses, also from disgust at
himself;
2. he must be inquisitive in the most various directions:
' danger of going to pieces;
3. he must be ju st and fa ir in the highest sense, but pro
found in love, hate (and in ju stic e ), too;
4. he must be not only a spectator, but also a le g isla to r:
judge and judged (to the extent th at he is a brief ab
stract of the world);
5. extremely multifarious, yet firm and hard. Supple.'*
There is much that is autobiographical in th is passage and i t also
reveals the keenness of Nietzsche's insight into himself. Yet only
70lbid., p. 401.
^N ietzsche, The Will to Power, pp. 517-18.
206
a year or two la te r he writes:
The sublime man has the highest value, even i f he is terrib ly
delicate and fra g ile , because an abundance of very d iffic u lt and
rare things has been bred and preserved together through many
generations.72
What is clear, however, and also most important, is that the path to
the Superman is a self-overcoming, which cannot be determined in ad
vance, but which must be accompanied by the VIRTUES of honesty and
nobility.
0
Jaspers' View
Jaspers prepares the ground fo r the discussion of the Superman
in a very interesting way. He argues th at the notion of creation is
absolutely fundamental in Nietzsche's philosophy. Jaspers' exposition
is especially valuable in that-he paints out all the various meanings
.and levels of meaning contained in Nietzsche's notion of creation.
Here more than anywhere else in his interpretation one can sense an
a ffin ity between Jaspers and Nietzsche.
Creation is the highest demand; i t is authentic being, the
ground of all essential activ ity :
Creation is evaluation . . . . Creation is faith . . . .
Creation is love . . . . In creation is annihilation . . . .
"All creation is communication (Mitteilen) .". . . S t i l l , all
of creation is great pain and lack of knowledge . . . . In
creation authentic being is a tta in e d . 73
Here, as Jaspers rightly points out, we have the groundwork for the .
e x iste n tia lis t conception of authenticity. In fa c t, creation, authen
t i c i t y , and self-overcoming are all attempts to describe the same
72ibid. , p. 518. 73Jaspers, Nietzsche, pp. 151-52.
207
fundamental process. Creation is the highest form of Willing and
even in the la te s t fragments of the Nachlass, Nietzsche celebrates
a r t is t i c creation. Nietzsche never really departs from his youthful
aestheticism, although he does come to understand the notion of cre
ation in a richer way. The highest form of a r tis tic creation becomes
the individual human l i f e . Man himself becomes the block of marble
out of which the highest expression of beauty is to reveal i t s e l f . »
M an ultimately becomes the highest work of a rt.
The statement that creation is faith tends to be misleading,
for Nietzsche certainly did not mean anything connected with theo
logical dogmatics. What Nietzsche really means is a faith in vision,
in "prophetics dreams."74 Imaginative vision, the plunge into pos
s i b i l i t i e s , is inseparable from genuine creation. Creation is also
a love which both brings forth that which is new and annihilates the
old. Some c r itic s have not been able to see beyond Nietzsche's " c ri
tiques" and, thus, they grasp only the f i r s t phase, the "destruction"
phase of Nietzsche's philosophy. For Nietzsche, "destruction" is
ju stifie d only in so far as one creates "beyond" that which is "des
troyed." Nietzsche's "philosophizing with a hammer" is only a pre
paratory stage to authentic creation.
Nietzsche's insistence on the relationship between suffering
and creating has frequently earned his philosophy the label of Rom
anticism. Kaufmann presents a good counter-argument to th is view
and presents the thesis that Nietzsche'is fundamentally an
74lbid., p. 151.
208
a n t i - R o m a n t i c . 75 t 0 Nietzsche a Romanticizing of suffering would be
a form of decadence, fo r, though suffering is regarded as a necessary
condition of creation, i t is, nonetheless, something to be overcome
through creation. He regards Beethoven as a great creative genius,
not because of his suffering, but because of the way in which he
"transcended" his suffering. Creation is also communication, because
i t is a self-revelation of the highest type.
In spite of all this Jaspers says th at the notion of creation
"remains necessarily indefinite."
It is one of those signa of Nietzsche's philosophizing th at, like
" life ," "will to power," and "eternal recurrence", is never con
ceptualized. . . . Nietzsche always tre a ts creation as though i t
were self-evident, but v irtu ally never takes i t directly as his
theme. He does not develop and explain its nature. I t is never
a possible goal of the w ill. But his formulations have all the
power of an as yet indefinite appeal to recall and to come to grips
with authentic being.76
However, we should take careful note of the fact th at Jaspers is not
saying that we cannot understand Nietzsche's notion of creation.
Rather, i t is simply the case, that we cannot present a few verbal
formulae which express the full richness of the idea of creation.
Jaspers is extremely sensitive to the problems of communication and
emphasizes again and again th at i t is not possible to attain a gen
uine understanding of Nietzsche by examining isolated statements. The
notion of creation is perfectly in te llig ib le , but only within the con
text of the whole of Nietzsche's philosophy.
Jaspers emphasizes the distinction between the superior man
75Kaufmann, Nietzsche, pp. 277-78. 76jaspers, Nietzsche, p . 152,
209
and the Superman. Superior men have already appeared in history, but
the Superman has not yet arrived.
As Nietzsche sees i t , superior men do actually exist, even
though they are constantly threatened and are forever coming to
grief. They are in extreme danger, both from without and from
within. Being extraordinary, they come to ruin in a society that
is in bondage to the ordinary; they are made submissive, mel
ancholy, and sick. Only "those with iron constitutions, like
Beethoven and Goethe," were able to stand firm. But "even they
show the effect of the most fatiguing struggle and tension: they
breathe more heavily and th e ir manner easily becomes too violent."
Society is the relen tless enemy of th'ese great ones.77
As a result of these conditions, even the noblest man f a lls prey to
his own pettiness, which manifests i t s e l f as contempt, i r r i t a b i l i t y ,
withdrawal, and impatience. This leads Nietzsche to ask whether or
not the superior men are tru ly involved in the process of self-over
coming, since i t frequently appears that i t is merely discontent with
pervading conditions th at has pushed them to th eir superior le v e l.78
As an answer to th is , Nietzsche arrives at the doctrine of the Super
man, for the striving must have the fundamental positivity of se lf-
overcoming, rather than being a negative reaction to conditions. How
ever, this insight gradually leads Nietzsche to modify his conception
of the "political" and social roles which the Superman must adopt.
In itia lly , he was content with a situation which would "permit" the
Superman to exist in his own context as a self-creating being in a
relationship of mutual tolerance between the Superman and the herd.
In his la te r thought, however, Nietzsche comes to believe more and
more strongly that the Superman must achieve the power to transform
77ibid. , pp. 163-64. 78ib id . , p. 164.
210
the nature of social and "political" in stitu tio n s. Thus, the pos
s i b i l i t y of the. Superman comes to depend upon a concommitant a l t e r
ation of the conditions of existence. Ultimately, the doctrine of the
Superman brings with i t the vision of a new kind of humanity and the
Superman becomes the "legislator of the future".
After having tried in vain for a long time to attach a def
in ite concept to the word "philosopher"—for I found many contra
dictory characteristics—I recognized a t la s t th at there are two
d istin c t kinds of philosopher:
1. those who want to ascertain a complex fa c t of evaluations
(logical or moral);
2. those who are legislators of such evaluations. The fo r
mer try to master the world of the present or the past by con
centrating and abridging the m ultiplicity of events through signs:
th e ir aim is to make previous events surveyable, comprehensible,
graspable, and usable—they assist the task of man to employ all
past things for the benefit of his future.
The l a t t e r , however, are commanders; they say: "thus i t shall
be!" They alone determine the "whither" and the "wherefore,"
what is useful and what constitutes u t i l i t y for men; they d is
pose of the preparatory work of scie n tific men, and all know
ledge is for them only a means for creation. 79
Here we have an explicit statement of the link between creation and
the role of the Superman. Nietzsche gradually comes to the conclusion
th a t the Superman must also create the conditions for his own s e lf-
overcoming. The creation, of these conditions becomes th.e theme for
what Nietzsche calls "Great Politics".
This conception of Great Politics has been grossly misunder
stood. Great P olitics is a struggle for power, but not fo r the sake
of some State. The conception of State power is anathema to
Nietzsche and he calls the State, "the new idol".
^ N i e tz s c h e , The Will to Power, pp. 509-10.
211
State is the name of the coldest of all cold monsters.
Coldly i t te lls lie s too; and th is l i e crawls out of its mouth:
"I, the sta te , am the people." That is a l i e ! ' . . . It will give
you everything i f you will adore i t , th is new idol: thus i t buys
the splendor of your virtues and the look of your proud eyes. . . .
State I call i t where all drink poison, the good and the wicked,
state, where all lose themselves, the good and the wicked; sta te ,
. where the slow suicide of all is called l i f e . 80
Nietzsche's attitude toward the State could hardly be less unequiv
ocal. The celebration of the State is one of the dangers of incomplete
nihilism—i t may attempt to replace the smashed idol of God with the
idol of the State. . There is the omnipresent danger that God-sur-
rogates will be placed before men as an Ideal and, for Nietzsche, this
is simply the replacement of one form of transcendence by another.
If the struggle is not for p o litical power, then what is i t
for? Jaspers puts i t very well.
From the standpoint of great p o litic s i t means fighting with the
aid of the creative thoughts which invisibly shape and transform
men. Truth attains actu ality only in the struggle for power;
here lies both its source and lim it.
The new masters for whom Nietzsche longs will represent and
bring forth the noble man in a world that has become godless;
Nietzsche's great p o litics takes upon i t s e l f the task of pro
viding the philosophical interpretation these masters need and of
making them aware of themselves: "I am writing for a species of
men who do not yet ex istr "j-the masters of the earth"81
Ultimately, the, Great P o litics becomes the struggle to attain the
power for creative Transvaluation. Man as.he is now is the "bridge"
to the Superman, and in Nietzsche's mature thought the Superman
becomes a model in a two-fold sense—a psychological or, better, an
80Nietzsche, Zarathustra, pp. 160.
^Jaspers, Nietzsche, p. 273.
212
existential model and an historical model. The notion of the Super
man has an existential immediacy for the individual in terms of s e lf
overcoming and y et, at the same time, takes on a cultural significance
as a model for a future humanity. If we conceive of man as a Becom
ing, in the form of Will to Power, then any genuine understanding of
man's situation must grasp his social in stitu tio n s as Becoming also.
The stagnation and ossification of social in stitu tio n s is a massive
obstacle to self-overcoming and the Great P olitics of the Superman is
Nietzsche's solution to th is problem.
Heidegger's View
As we would expect, Heidegger's explication of the doctrine of
the Superman is primarily from within the perspective of metaphysics.
Once again, Heidegger brings in the theme of "subjectivity" and in sists
th at since metaphysics is nihilism, the Superman must be understood
o p
in terms of its " n ih ilis tic - historical essence." The Superman is
a denial or disavowal.of what has been previously regarded as the
essence of man--reason. However, Heidegger adds, th is denial is
n i h i l i s t i c , since i t s t i l l thinks the essence of man as "rational
a n i m a l . T h i s is one of Heidegger's favorite games and is a deriva
tive and perverse application of Hegel's d ialectic of negation.
Heidegger argues that Nietzsche's philosophy is anti-metaphysics in
the traditional sense of metaphysics and as such is an antithesis and
i
82Heidegger, N ietzsc h e, I I , 292. 83I b i d . , I I , 294.
213
not a "synthesis," from which i t ostensibly follows that Nietzsche's
philosophy is a fter all metaphysics. Structurally Heidegger applies
the same argument to Nietzsche's an ti-C h ristian ity and anti-
anthropomorphism. If Nietzsche's anti-metaphysics were nothing more
than a "critique," then this conclusion might be ju stifie d . However,
as i t is , Heidegger can arrive at th is conclusion only by virtually .
ignoring the fundamental character of the dialectic between the cos
mological and anthropological perspectives. In terms of this dialec
t i c , i t would be l i t t l e less than absurd to claim that Nietzsche
remains rooted in metaphysics, i . e . , traditional metaphysics.'
It is in the discussion of the doctrine of the Superman and
its relation to the rest of Nietzsche's philosophy that the weaknesses
of Heidegger's interpretation are most evident. Here Heidegger forces
his arguments and creates connections by making oracular pronounce- .
ments. "The consummated subjectivity of the Will to Power is the meta-
84
physical origin of the essential necessity of the 'Superman'."
This charge of "subjectivity," while formally correct within the frame
work of Heidegger's schemata, i s , nonetheless, tautological in exactly
the same manner in which his charge of anthropomorphism is. This
means that the charge is irrelevant unless Heidegger can provide an
adequate critic a l f o il, which would be his fundamental ontology and
th is , as we have seen, he has not done. However, even more exasper
ating is Heidegger's egregious forcing of Nietzsche's tex t. He takes
84I b i d . , I I , 302.
214
Nietzsche's remark that man is the "not yet determined animal" and
O C
"deduces" from th is that man is now determined, namely, as "animal."!
"The metaphysical determining of man as animal signifies the nihil is-
QjT
tic affirmation of the Superman." Heidegger further asserts that
the doctrine of the Superman can be brought to completion only "where
the en tity as such is the Will to Power and the to ta lity of e n titie s
0 7
is the Eternal Recurrence of the s a m e . 7 However, th is statement is
meaningless in lig h t of Heidegger's "suspension" of the metaphysical
significance of the doctrine of Eternal R e c u r r e n c e . 8 8 Heidegger's
refusal to recognize the anthropological dimension (in any but a
reductive sense) of Nietzsche's philosophy results in an interpreta
tion which ignores the immense existential significance of the doc
trin e of. Eternal Recurrence as a creative force.
Nietzsche's Ethics and the Transvaluation
of All Values
In terms of the essentially dialectical character of
Nietzsche's philosophy, ethics presents a set of special problems. W e
shall be primarily concerned here with explicating the general struc
tures and the dialectical character of Nietzsche's ethics and doc
trin e of Transvaluation, rather than presenting a detailed exposition
85I b i d . , I I , 306-07. 86I b i d . , I I , 307.
87I b id ., I I, 307.
QO
See the section on Eternal Recurrence in Chapter II.
215
oq
of the wealth of particulars which Nietzsche examines.
Nietzsche himself characterizes his metaphysics as a n ti-
anthropomorphic, however, his theories of ethics and Transvaluation
might be characterized as "hyper-anthropomorphic." The hue and cry
of the doctrine of Transvaluation is that man has not yet taken him
se lf "seriously" in the right way. Man has taken himself seriously,
but in the " s p irit of gravity." For man to take himself seriously in
the right way means, for Nietzsche, a "joyful wisdom," an e c static
understanding of himself and a celebration of the limiting conditions
which define his p o ssib ilitie s. Man can become truly man only insofar
as he grasps himself as perspectival within the dialectic between the
anthropological and cosmological perspectives. Only in th is way can
man "become what he is."
Nietzsche distinguishes two basic types of morality—the
"slave" or herd morality and the "master" morality. Here we must pro
ceed with great care, for the dialectical inter-relationships which
characterize Nietzsche's ethics are quite complex. Nietzsche increases
the complexity by playing with the fundamental'oppositions. Here
again we find operative, Nietzsche's implicit distinction between posi
tive and negative manifestations of the Will to Power. Only by
keeping th is d istinction .constantly in mind, will we be able to unravel
*%or a thorough expostion of Nietzsche's ethics and doctrine
of Transvaluation, see William Henry Werkmeister, "Nietzsche's Trans
valuation of Values" in Theories of Ethics (Lincoln, Nebraska; 1961),
' pp. 168-241.
216
the intricacies of Nietzsche's eth ics. At f i r s t glance i t might
appear that the master morality is th a t of the ty ran t, who imposes
his Will on the herd. But th is is not the case; the Will to tyranny
is c h a ra c te ristic ‘of the herd morality, not th em aster morality. The
"ascetic priestly-type" is the p ra c titio n e r of the herd morality,
even though he "rules." The herd m orality is characterized by resent
ment, which fin ally leads to the Will to revenge—a negative manifesta
tion of the Will to Power. In the herd morality there is a strong
desire to punish those who are superior. The basic foundation for
moral judgment within the herd morality is the opposition of "good"
and "evil." In the master morality the opposition is "good" and "bad."
This "good" of the master morality, we shall hereafter write as "Good,"
for though the two have the same name, there is an important d if
ference.9^
In the herd morality, evil is the more fundamental of the two
concepts and, for the man of resentment, good is secondary and by i t
th is man means himself. Anything or anyone who is superior to him is
automatically judged evil. The herd morality also.uses the fiction
of transcendence as a "ju stification" for its moral condemnations.
This, for Nietzsche, is the most egregious manifestation of nihilism.
In the master morality, the primary concept of the Good arises out of
the.VIRTUES of nobility and honesty which we have already discussed.
The noble man respects and values superiority and does not attempt to
217
suppress i t , but rather accepts i t and attempts through a dialectical
struggle with i t to raise himself to a higher level. The bad for the
noble man is the "vulgar," the "ignoble," which is characterized by
the man of resentment, the "last man." The noble man does not attempt
to impose his Will, but rather attempts through dialectic to create
conditions which will elevate himself and create the demand for s e lf
overcoming on the part of others. The judgment "bad" is not a repres
sive judgment; i t is more like a challenge. The master morality wishes
to raise others to the level of creative dialogue and is thus a "sel
fish" benevolence. On the other hand, the judgment "evil" is motivated
by a destructive impulse and refuses to acknowledge superiority; i t
is the demand for "equality." For the herd morality, opposition is
e v il, whereas, fo r the master morality, opposition is not only Good,
but necessary. Opposition is a condition fo r growth, for creating
"beyond" oneself. For Nietzsche, the notions of herd morality and
master morality are interpretive models and Nietzsche is fu lly aware
that in practice we often find a mixture of the two.
W e have seen in what sense Nietzsche speaks of a "morality of
masters" and a "morality of slaves." "In all higher and mixed cul
tures," Nietzsche finds, "attempts are.made at reconciliation of
these two m oralities, s t i l l oftener there is an inter-mixture of
the two, and a mutual misunderstanding, at times even a so lid ified
coexistence--even within the same man, with one soul" (XII:227);
and th is is the very situation which bodes ill for the f u t u r e . 91
W hy is i t th at th is "bodes ill for the future."? I t bodes i l l pre
cisely because Transvaluation depends upon the recognition of an "order
91 I b i d . , p. 229.
218
of rank." For Nietzsche, ju stic e teaches that men are not equal. To
aspire to that which is u tterly beyond one's capabilities is s e lf
destructive and breeds resentment, which in turn leads to the desire
for revenge upon those who are superior. However, Nietzsche warns
that we must beware of modesty and humility, for there are false and
genuine forms. _ False modesty and false humility can become repres
sive tools of a negative Will to Power. In fa c t, the whole herd
morality is directed against the notion of an order of rank. At the
most fundamental level there are two orders of rank and they are
distinguished in terms of the way in which the Will to Power is
directed.
I distinguish between a type of ascending l i f e and another
type of decay, disintegration, weakness. Is i t credible that the
question of the relativ e rank of these two types s t i l l needs to
. be posed?y< i
The "mastery" of the master morality is primarily "self-mastery."
The highest positive expression of the Will to Power is the power of
a "master," who feels no psychological need to impose th is power, a
strength which does not need recognition and adulation.
In the dialectic between the moralities o f'th e slave and the
master, the superior man is labeled the "immoralist." Nietzsche
appropriates this label and i t becomes a sign for the dialectic of
Transvaluation. The immoralist as creator and le g isla to r is the "law
breaker," the one who threatens all the old values. I t is the immora
l i s t , who for the f i r s t time desires the creation of a human morality
^ N ie tz s c h e , The Will to Power, p. 457.
219
rather than a transcendent morality. The. demands of self-creation are
overwhelming and offer l i t t l e security or comfort. As a re su lt, this
threat of insecurity causes most men to flee from the struggle of s e lf-
overcoming. The herd man prefers to have answers given to him, rather
than having to wrest his own from the struggle with existence. This
explains how i t is that the priest-type gains dominance. The p rie st-
type is the one who directs resentment outside of the herd toward the
superior man.
The immensity of the conflict between the immoralist who is
striving for self-overcoming and an essentially repressive, social
order leads Nietzsche into inconsistencies. At times he f a lls prey
to the illu sio n that future "freedoms" will "justify" present extremes.
In some passages Nietzsche explicitly states a belief th a t the master
morality must establish i t s e l f as a tyranny over the herd.93 Yet at
other times he strongly emphasizes the necessarily individual and
existential struggle to achieve a self-overcoming, which by its very
nature cannot impose its Will on the other. That Nietzsche does not
"solve" all the intricacies of these extraordinarily complex problems
is hardly surprising. In the end, however, Nietzsche does achieve his
goal, for his position presents a set of p o ssib ilitie s which, i f we
enter into the d iale c tic , becomes an occasion for genuine philosophical
dialogue. Werkmeister puts i t very well.
Nietzsche, properly understood, is s ti l l the radical challenge
to any complacency in moral matters. His extreme views require
93I b i d . , pp. 457-93.
220
an answer—and now, in our times of positivism, emotivism, and
persuasive definitions, more than ever; for how would the emoti-
vists and the hedonists answer Nietzsche? To set dogma against
dogma is hardly su fficient. And Nietzsche has already branded
them "nihilists" and has pointed up the necessity of a positive
reconstruction of morals.94
W e need only recall Nietzsche's attitude toward disciples to recognize
the call of Nietzsche's challenge.
Jaspers' View
Jaspers begins his discussion with Nietzsche's attack on
morality. Nietzsche's severest criticism s are leveled at so-called
moral judgments. In fa c t, one might even say th at, for Nietzsche,
these so-called moral judgments are immoral. What Nietzsche is
attacking is the absoluticity claimed for such judgments. Not only •
are epistemological judgments perspectival, but moral ones as well.
This means that often our moral judgments are nothing more than a
revelation of the limitation of our own perspective. Nietzsche's
analyses of the psychological foundations for specific moral judg
ments are extremely perceptive and incisive.
His psychological observations concerning the origin and develop
ment of such judgments are inexhaustible. Among other things, he
unmasks the pleasure taken in causing pain, the release of impo
tent instincts for revenge, the habit of furtive self-aggrandize
ment, the joy in feelings of power, and the mendacity of all moral
indignation and the presumptuous judgment in all moral pathos.
His magnificent "ridicule of all the moralizing of the present
day" is conclusive.95
The hatred of hypocrisy was undoubtedly one of Nietzsche's strongest
Q 4
Werkmeister, Theories of Ethics, p. 240.
95Jaspers, Nietzsche, p. 141.
221
emotions and his passion for honesty led him to penetrate very deeply
into the human psyche. W e have already had occasion to observe the
great respect that both Jung and Freud had for Nietzsche's power of
insight.
According to Jaspers, Nietzsche places the historical origins
of ab solutistic and repressive morality, i .e . slave morality, in
"Socratism" and Judaeo-Christianity, but especially in Pauline
C hristianity.
The powerless, too, have their will to power: i t is "the in stinct
of the herd opposed to the strong and independent, the in stin ct of
the sorrowful and poorly endowed opposed to the fortunate, the
in stin ct of the mediocre opposed to the exceptional." In spite
of th eir impotence, all of them find in morality the means to
mastery and to the creation of an. internal (and eventually an ex
ternal) power. For these moral values are fundamentally evalua
tions, by inferior people, of behavior patterns that afford them
protection; and wherever these values prevail, the existence of
th e ir creators and bearers, namely the in fe rio r people, attains
increased value while that of the in trin sic a lly powerful and rad
iant people is depreciated.96
Both Socratism and Christianity place the "highest values" in a tran
scendent realm and as a result both are N ih ilistic . The above passage
from Jaspers supports the distinction we have been making between pos
itiv e and negative manifestations of the Will to Power and also under
scores the fact that there is an implicit hierarchy of values in
Nietzsche's philosophy. Perhaps, i t would be more accurate i f we were
to say that there is an implicit hierarchy of meta-values, for
Nietzsche rarely leg islates particular concrete values. Particular
values are, for Nietzsche, always to be determined d iale c tic a lly
96I b i d . , p. 141.
222
within the context of specific situ atio n s. The meta-values which he
expounds are dynamic, that i s , they project a value "direction" with
out themselves dictating p a rtic u la r values in individual cases.
Specific values are d ia le c tic a lly determined, but meta-values
are not. Nietzsche is quite clear on th is point. These meta-values
are a part of the essential delimitation and definition of anthropos
as such in terms of his p o s s ib ilitie s . The two highest meta-values,
for Nietzsche, are the fu lfillm ent and challenge of self-overcoming
and the ecstacy of creation. I t is these two meta-values that con
s titu te Nietzsche's central conception of man as potential work’ of a rt.
As we have already seen, Jaspers places great emphasis on self-over
coming and creation in his interp retatio n . "Thus Nietzsche's freedom
without transcendence is by no means intent upon simply returning to
mere lif e ; i t aspires to the l i f e of authentic creation"9? Other meta
values, for Nietzsche, are "spiritual companionship," strength (both
physical and s p iritu a l), and the satisfactio n of physical and psy
chological needs. This la s t is also the "lowest." I t is clear that
these meta-values are a part of Nietzsche's "ontological autobiogra
phy," yet they are also more than th a t. Werkmeister, who has been
influenced by Hegel and Kant (both of whom Nietzsche misunderstood),
has derived independently, as a value th e o rist, a hierarchy of values
which is in astonishing agreement with Nietzsche's. Werkmeister's
i
hierarchy, from highest to lowest, is as follows: (1) the sense of
9? I b id ., pp. 156-67.
223
se lf-fu lfillm e n t, (2) the joy of doing something, especially creative
a c tiv ity , (3) the satisfaction of a ffilia tiv e needs, (4) the feeling
98
of well-being, and (5) the gratification of appetites. This par
allelism strongly suggests that, although these hierarchies are cer
tain ly anthropological, they are by no means merely "subjective."
Jaspers, however, refuses to recognize anything like what we
have called meta-values. Jaspers argues that:
Nietzsche, in seeking to reject any "unconditionality,"
[absoluticity] can do this only on the basis of a new uncon
d itio n a lity . He himself knows this to be unavoidable. Whenever
we value something unconditionally our experience is moral,, and
contrariwise, whenever our experience is moral in nature, we are
dealing with something unconditional. I t is "simply not possible
to relativ ize a moral experience; i t is essen tially uncondi
tioned." Hence in unconditionally opposing the value accorded
to "nature" to the unconditionality of morality, Nietzsche himself
does precisely what he condemns: he pronounces an absolute value-
judgment.
Jaspers does not ex p licitly pronounce the charge o f."su b jec tiv ity ,"
but i t is, nonetheless, present. Jaspers believes th a t, even though
he grounds the source of value in man, he escapes the charge of "sub
jectivism" since this- ground is Existenz as a form of transcendence.
However, Nietzsche rejects this transcendence and, as a re su lt, is
g u ilty , in Jaspers' eyes, of producing another basic contradiction.
'The unambiguous arguments against morality can thus all be
robbed of th e ir decisive effect by an appeal to certain of
Nietzsche's other tenents. He has a new way of raising c ritic a l
questions—more ambiguous ones—by moving in inescapable circles.
F irs t he asserts that morality is i t s e l f a product of immorality,
»
98pr0m seminar notes and also William Henry Werkmeister, M an
and His Values (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1967), p. 117.
^Jasp ers, N ietzsch e, p. 146.
224
and then he urges that the criticism of morality it s e l f derives
from the highest kind of m orality.100
Here we must take very seriously our e a rlie r warning that Nietzsche
plays upon the notions of morality and immorality. In fa c t, when
discussing morality and immorality, Nietzsche's communicative device
is frequently a kind of irony which depends upon equivocation. How
ever, Jaspers takes these notions univocally and as a resu lt not only
does he miss the ironic word play, but he is forced into the position
of interpreting Nietzsche's remarks as an "inescapable contradiction.1 1
What does Jaspers offer as evidence for this "contradiction"?
But if one retains these positions, they remain in in
escapable contradiction, so that while one is being expressed the
other has to be le f t out of consideration. W e hear that " it is
not possible to live outside of morality," as well as the con
trary, that "one can live only with an absolutely immoral way of
thinking." Or again, morality "is the only interpretative scheme
with which man can endure" and, on the other.hand, "the world,
morally interpreted, is u n b e a r a b l e . " 1 0 1
However, this is not convincing. If we recall Nietzsche's d is tin c t
ions between the good and the evil and the Good and the bad and also
his play on the conception of the "immoralist," then the "inescapable
contradiction" dissolves. From the point of view of Nietzsche's phi
losophical anthropology, Jaspers has not taken man seriously enough,
that is , he is not yet tru ly anthropological, for he s t i l l wishes to
retain the notion of a transcendence. ,
In his explication of Nietzsche's conception of the "new mas
ters," Jaspers points out that the ultimate goal is based on an
t
lO O lbid., p . 146. 101 Ib id .^ p. 148.
225
overcoming of democracy which eventually resu lts in a fusion of the
Wills of the ruler and the ruled.
Nietzsche's hope is for "an audacious ruling race resting on the
broad expanse of an extremely in te llig e n t herdlike mass."
Hence the fate of humanity rests with the future masters.
Nietzsche is alert to. both th e ir p o s sib ilitie s and th e ir p e r ils .
From a psychological point of view, the so rt of masses which are
to be ruled determines what the masters can be. For they are not
dictators who command merely on the basis of some abstract truth
or as a result of th eir own superhuman greatness; they must be men
who f i r s t win the unconditional confidence of the masses in a god
less world by being men of the people. There must be effective
and intimate interaction between the masters and the people whom
they rule. . . .On the one hand, the nature of the masses is det
ermined through the, nature of the m asters. . . . On the other hand,
however, the masters depend on the nature of the masses.102
From this i t is clear that the highest goal of society is a kind of
conditioned freedom which creates conditions which permit each to a- .
chieve his highest level. Such a goal is by no means a final one, but
i t is the fa rth e st one that our present perspectives permit. Nietzsche
was aware that the achievement of such a society would require a "new"
philosophy, only the dimmest outlines of which we can now discern.
Transvaluation becomes a perpetual "obligation".
Heidegger's View
Heidegger's view of Nietzsche's ethics and the anthropological
aspect of Transvaluation is conspicuous by i t s absence. Heidegger does
discuss briefly the problem of technology, but once again th is is sub
sumed under the perspective of metaphysics. Even the doctrine of the
Superman really interests Heidegger only as a dimension of metaphysics
T ° 2 lb id ., p. 270.
226
and Heidegger repeatedly uses i t to raise the questions about the
nature of metaphysics and the thinking of Being. The two major rea
sons for this almost total ignoring of the anthropological dimension
of Nietzsche's thought are to be found in Heidegger's book, What is
Thinking? The f i r s t reason is to be found in the nature of Heidegger's
conception of philosophy. Heidegger's belief that all genuine Thinkers
think only a single thought gets transformed into an ultimate principle
of philosophy. That is to say, Heidegger has taken this notion so
seriously, that all of his own philosophizing and his interpretations-
of other philosophies have been cast into the framework of the single
thought which Heidegger thinks--Being. For this reason Heidegger
rejects the notion that Nietzsche can be interpreted from the point
of view of an "existential anthropology."\03 He argues that any
philosophy which inquires into the essence of man, necessarily inquires
into the essence of Being as such, i f i t is to reach i t s fulfillm ent.
In other words, fo r Heidegger, Nietzsche's anthropology is secondary
or even te rtia ry and the genuine issues are to be found in his
metaphysics.
the second reason has to do with Heidegger's conception1 of
thinking it s e l f . For him, the concerns of thinking are of necessity
highly abstruse. He l i s t s four propositions which he believes
popularly characterize thinking.
1. Thinking leads to no knowledge as do the sciences. .
^ 3Heidegger, Was H eisst Denken?,.p . 73.
227
2. Thinking brings no useful wisdom for l i f e .
3. Thinking solves.none of the riddles of the World.
4. Thinking does not d irectly provide any of the energies for
practical a f f a i r s . 104
Heidegger warns that these views "overvalue" and "demand to much of"
thinking. Heidegger does not mean that these views are wrong, only
that they are misdirected. He makes th is very clear in his book,
Introduction to Metaphysics.
This might suggest that philosophy can and must provide a foun
dation on which a nation will build i t s historical l if e and cul
ture. But this is beyond the power of philosophy. As a rule
such excessive demands take the form of a b e littlin g of philoso
phy. I t is said, for example: Because metaphysics did nothing
to pave the way for the revolution i t should be rejected. This
is no cleverer than saying that because the carpenter's bench
is useless for flying i t should be abolished. Philosophy can never
directly supply the energies and create the opportunities and meth- '
ods that bring about a historical change; for one thing, because
philosophy is always the concern of the few. Which few? The
creators, those who in itia te profound transformations. I t spreads
only indirectly, by devious paths th at never can be laid out in
advance, until at la s t, at some future date, i t sinks to the level
of a commonplace; but by then i t has long been forgotten as orig
inal philosophy.105
Whether we agree or disagree with th is position is not important here.
What is important is the contrast between Heidegger's conception of
thinking and genuine philosophy and Nietzsche's conception. However
abstruse Nietzsche's metaphysics may be, i t is not for nothing that
the e x iste n tia lis ts claim Nietzsche as a forerunner. His philosophy
is fille d with a wealth of concrete analyses of, and insights into, the
world of the ordinary concerns of man. The depth of Nietzsche's
IQ^Ibid. , p. 161. (M y translation)
105neidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 10.
228
exploration of the psychological and value situation of man makes
these insights a t least as important as the visions contained in his
metaphysics. In this respect, Heidegger's remarks on the essential
nature of philosophy seem odd, for from these one would expect that
the anthropological dimension of Nietzsche's thought would be of great
significance to Heidegger.
What philosophy essentially can and must be is th is: a think
ing that breaks the paths and opens the perspectives of the know
ledge th at sets the norms and hierarchies, of the knowledge in
which and by which a people f u l f i l l s i t s e l f histo rically and cul
tu ra lly , the knowledge that kindles and necessitates all inquiries
_ and thereby threatens all v a l u e s J O G
This statement is an excellent description of Nietzsche's very i n t
ention with regard to his analyses of the anthropological perspective
and yet Heidegger almost to ta lly ignores this aspect. A fu rth e r s ta te
ment by Heidegger makes this ignoring seem even stranger.
I t is absolutely correct and proper to say that "You c an 't do
anything with philosophy." It is only wrong to suppose th a t this
is the la s t word on philosophy. For the rejoinder imposes -itself:
granted th at we cannot do anything with philosophy, might not phi- '
losophy, i f we concern ourselves with i t , do something with us?107
This concerning oneself with philosophy might be taken.to be a des
cription of Nietzsche's notion of self-overcoming. Both Nietzsche and
Heidegger take up a risto c ra tic attitudes toward philosophy, but
Nietzsche's philosophy with its concrete concern for man and his pos
sible development is much more likely to be a force which "threatens
all values" and permits philosophy to "do-something with u s," than is
Heidegger's more abstruse and less immediate kind of philosophy.
106ibld., p. 10. IQ^lbid., P. 12.
229
Eternal Recurrence,TRUTH, and Truths
W e have seen how in one respect the notion of self-overcoming
may be said to be the central "thesis" of Nietzsche's philosophical
anthropology. With the doctrine of Eternal'Recurrence we arrive at
the motivating force which stands behind self-overcoming and the dia
lectic which takes place between TRUTH and truths. Even though the
doctrine of Eternal Recurrencd as a metaphysical doctrine "shipwrecks"
its importance as a doctrine in Nietzsche's philosophical anthropology
is immense. If we think of Eternal Recurrence metaphysically as a
1iteral doctrine, then anthropologically we might describe i t as a
"metaphorical" doctrine. This is in keeping with Nietzsche's notion
of truths as "necessary fic tio n s." Here again we are reminded of
Vaihinger's theory of fictio n s; the philosophy of "as if ." If this
parallel is genuine, we would then be able to regard Eternal Recur
rence as analogous to Kant's Categorical Imperative. However, we must
proceed with great care here and examine Nietzsche's texts and attempt
to answer a criticism by Kaufmann to the effect that such an analogy
is a "misapprehension.". Let us here quote at some length Nietzsche's
most eloquent statement of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence.
How, i f some day or night, a demon were to sneak a fte r you into
your loneliest loneliness and say to you: "This l i f e , as you now
live i t and have lived i t , you will have to live once more and
innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in i t , but
every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh. . . . must
return to you--all in the same succession and sequence--even this
spider and this moonlight between the tre e s, and even this moment
and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned over
and over--and you with i t , a dust grain of dust!" Would you not
throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who
230
spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment
when you would have answered him: "You are a god, and never did
I hear anything more godlike!" I f this thought were to gain pos-
ession of you, i t would change you as you are, or perhaps crush
you. The question in each and everything "do you want th is once
more and innumerable times more?" would weigh upon your actions
as the greatest stress. Or how well disposed would you have to
become to yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently
than this ultimate eternal confirmation . . . . ?I08
The conclusion of the passage would certainly seem to contain an im
perative—Live in such a manner that you can say, "I want th is once
more and innumerable times more". Notice also that the question which
Nietzsche says' Eternal Recurrence poses, would be omnipresent and
"would weigh upon your actions." This would seem to apply to the par
tic u la r actions that comprise man's behavior, but Kaufmann rejects
th is idea.
I t is easy to see how this aphorism [the passage quoted above]
gave rise to the misapprehension that the recurrence represents
an analogy to Kant's Categorical Imperative. This passage was
taken to show that the doctrine was intended to require man to
ask himself constantly: "Do you want th is once more and innum
erable times more?" th a t, however, is not the meaning'of
Nietzsche's conception of "the greatest stress". As ever, he
is not concerned with particular actions but with the individ
uals state of b e in g .109
However,this la s t remark by Kaufmann is only a h a lf-tru th . Nietzsche
certainly did not mean that we affirm only the past and the present.
What more can the "individual's state of being" be than the total set
of particular actions that have defined him up to the present moment?
W e might say that the individual is more in the sense th a t he has
108Nietzsche quoted in Kaufmann, N ietzsch e, p. 280.
^Kaufmann, N ietzsche, p. 180.
231
possibilities and this immediately re -in states the temporal flow, for
possibilities project into the future. What is here required is an
affirmation of p o ssib ility , as well as past and present, and pos
s ib ility is Becoming, a self-overcoming in terms of the affirmation.
This self-overcoming is not. a "state of being," but is rather a dia
lectical struggle which manifests it s e l f in particular actions.
Kaufmann seems to realize the connection between Eternal Recurrence
and self-overcoming, for he says th at Eternal Recurrence may provide
the motive power for the individual s t i l l trapped in radical nihilism
to go beyond this condition and affirm himself and l if e , yet his con
clusion is s till one which denies the analogy of Kant.
The problem is plainly not one of devising a criterion for par
ticular acts, but, insofar as i t concerns our behavior at a l l ,
to provide an incentive fo r man to raise his state of being
(cf.FW 335), to cross the c le f t from the animals to true hum
anity—or, in Nietzsche's word, to become an overman.HO
The passage to which Kaufmann refers in the above quotation is sec
tion 335 of The Joyful Wisdom, in,which Nietzsche attacks Kant's
Categorical Imperative. However, what Nietzsche attacks there, namely
t'he absoluticity of the Categorical Imperative as a foundation for
moral judgments , is not what is at issue here. What is analogous
between the Categorical Imperative and Eternal Recurrence is that both
posit a goal for action. Nietzsche's imperative is dynamic; i t is an
imperative which indicates a direction. "We, however, would seek to
become what we a re , —the new, the unique,' the incomparable, making
llO lb id ., p. 281.
232
laws fo r ourselves and creating o u rse lv e s."m Nietzsche does not
le g isla te p articular actions—these must be determined within the
context of existential individuality—but, he does le g isla te the
direction of those actions. Also Nietzsche does universalize his
meta-values, but these too must be grasped as processes, as direc
t i v e s . This is especially clear with regard to self-overcoming and
creation. Kaufmann is misled as to the nature of the analogy, for
Eternal Recurrence as an existential imperative has nothing to do
with moral judgments in the traditional sense. (Kaufmann, like
Jaspers, seems to forget the manner in which Nietzsche plays with the
notion of morality.) Nietzsche's imperative is: Create for your
s e lf as many moments as possible that you would be willing to live
again and again throughout eternityl
Here the weakness of the lite ra l metaphysical interpretation
of Eternal Recurrence comes to the fore. If the repetitions are iden
t i c a l , then the number of repetitions is irrelevant, for I would never
know th a t i t was a repetition and the situation would be the same as
though i t only.occurred once. If, however, the repetitions were var
iable, I would then know that all possible variations would recur an
in fin ite number of times, so there would be no incentive to Will one
altern ativ e over another. However, i f there were no repetitions at
a l l , i f th is is the "once and only" Life, then the imperative to create
"eternal" moments could raise man's struggle to the greatest heights
^ N i e t z s c h e , The Joyful Wisdom, p. 263.
233
of nobility and tragedy. This is why Eternal Recurrence is a t once
the "greatest stre ss," or the "heaviest burden" and "the triumphant
idea." Thus man raises himself to the level of a ’ work of a r t, the
highest, expression of the Will to Power, by creating for himself as
many "eternal"moments as is humanly possible, while at the same time
confronting the te rrib le TRUTH, that he must die— -forever a unique
and unrepeatable event. This TRUTH is grounded in the very nature of
man, for he is the creature who can TRANSCEND the perspectives of Life
and view his own Nothingness from the cosmological perspective. This
is the ultimate ground of man's po ssib ility to achieve dignity and
nobility, and Nietzsche, whose Being was so thoroughly permeated with
Greek tragedy, pronounces his ultimate imperative in the most pro
foundly Greek fashion—amor f a t i , the love of fate. The highest s e lf
overcoming becomes fin a lly to Will one's own annihilation. Surely,
there would be nothing of dignity in the endless repetition of such a
struggle, for tragedy would then be transformed into a sardonic farce.
This TRUTH of Nietzsche's about man's condition requires the great
est strength. In another passage in The Joyful Wisdom Nietzsche says,
"' W ho will give thee the strength to do so? No one has yet had th is
strength! '"112 (M y i t a l i c s . ) Even for Nietzsche this "heaviest bur
den" was sometimes.too much to bear. I t was at such times that he was
led to try to bridge the unbridgeable dualism that lie s at the heart
of man's Being by transforming Becoming into eternal Being through
2Ib id . , p. 221.
234
a metaphysical version of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. U lti
mately, Nietzsche has to reject the metaphysical version, for what i t
really amounts to is an attempt to smuggle back in the notion of a
transcendence. Life is only once and we must affirm i t as unique,
thereby affirming (and loving) our own annihilation, fo r i t is the
condition of our uniqueness--this is Nietzsche's "heaviest burden"
and "triumphant idea." A total confrontation with th is TRUTH cannot
help but transform one's existence. One's own temporality takes on a
new significance and the contents of one's day-to-day existence take
on a new significance. This dualism at the heart of man's Being pre
sents a demand for the realization of those most essential and most
authentic p o s s ib ilitie s. Self-overcoming, as the highest realization
of these p o s s ib ilitie s , becomes the condition for all other values.
There is another dimension to the doctrine of Eternal Recur
rence that we have not yet considered, namely, it s social dimension.
Here, the multitude of problems is.overwhelming. If an entire society
lived and acted in terms of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence as
self-overcoming, then the problems would be minimal. However,
Nietzsche is fu lly aware that only a very few have the necessary
strength. The Superman must be able to create viable truths out of
the context of the TRUTH of his finitude. These tru th s must be viable
not only for him, but for the "intelligent masses of the herd" as
well. But since few have the strength to fu lly encounter and affirm
the TRUTH of th e ir finitude, how is i t possible to create viable
truths without deception? Here we need to remind ourselves th a t,
235
for Nietzsche, truths are p erspectival; they are necessary fictions.
In a sense, even the Superman has his necessary fic tio n —Eternal
Recurrence, for he must liv e "as if" each moment were eternal. This,
however, is a different dimension of the dialectic. With regard to
the herd, Nietzsche believes that to give them what is necessary is
not a deception. For the man who cannot master algegra, tensor cal
culus holds no tru th s. But then why not leave the herd to live, with
their truths of C hristianity and "Socratism"? For the simple reason
that Nietzsche does not believe that fic tio n s of transcendence are
necessary—this is Nietzsche's great fa ith in the p o ssib ilitie s of
the human Being. In one respect, this is perhaps the weakest part of
Nietzsche's philosophy, but i t is also one of the noblest. In spite
of all of his contempt, rage, disgust, and mockery, Nietzsche is moti
vated by a profound humanism. In the face of this subterranean but,
nonetheless, overwhelming fa ith in the human Being, one can forgive
Nietzsche his excesses.
One other major problem yet remains and that is the problem of
suffering. Here Nietzsche's ambivalence is at its most extreme. At
times, especially when discussing the "Great Human Being," Nietzsche's
arrogance is repugnant and he speaks as though the achievement of a
future Good would ju s tify causing great suffering.
To gain th a t tremendous energy of greatness in order to shape
the man of the future through breeding and, on the other hand, the
annihilation of millions of fa ilu re s , and not to perish of the
suffering one creates, though noting like i t has ever e x i s t e d ! " 3
^ N i e t z s c h e , The Will to Power, p. 506.
236
Even though we have already seen what Nietzsche means by "breeding"
and "annihilation of millions of fa ilu re s," this statement is , none
theless, most extreme. However, this statement does not represent
Nietzsche's considered opinion. What he is consistently c ritic a l of,
is the Romanticizing of suffering.
The preoccupation with suffering on the part of metaphysi-
cians--is quite naive. "Eternal b liss": psychological non
sense. Brave and creative men never consider pleasure and pain
as ultimate values--they are epiphenomena: one must desire
both if one is to achieve anything--. That they see the problem
of pleasure and pain in the foreground reveals something weary and
sick in metaphysicians and religious people. Even morality is
so important to them only because they see in i t an essential
condition f o r tthe abolition of suffering. 114
I t is clear from this passage that Nietzsche makes an im plicit d is t
inction between two kinds of suffering. The kind that he is most
concerned with is the personal suffering of the individual in his
struggle to come to terms with his own existence. The second kind of
suffering takes two forms: (1) the suffering caused by others im
posing th e ir Will and (2) the suffering which resu lts from the par
tic u la r circumstances.of the individual existence. This l a t t e r , which
resu lts from poor health, emotional hypersensitivity, e tc ., Nietzsche
regards as obstacles to be overcome. He in sis ts on a kind of strength
that will not permit the individual to indulge himself in misfortunes
due to circumstance. In this respect Nietzsche is very close to
Spinoza.. The suffering caused by imposition of the Will, however,
Nietzsche does not sanction even for the Superman. The nobility of
I H l b i d . , p. 311.
237
the Superman, if he is genuinely superior, excludes the po ssib ility
of his imposing his Will upon the mediocrity of the herd in such a
way as to make them su ffer, for there must ultimately be a fusion of
the Will of the Superman and the Will of the herd. In some places,
Nietzsche even describes the role of the Superman as a protective one.
Hatred for mediocrity is unworthy of a philosopher: i t is
almost a quesion mark against his "right to philosophy." Precisely,
because he is an exception he has to take the rule under his pro-,
tection, he has to keep'the mediocre in good heart.115
Thus there are really two problems concerning suffering. The f i r s t is
individual and is involved with the individual attempt at self-over
coming. This kind of suffering, Nietzsche argues, one must appro
priate and even affirm,-'for i t becomes a condition for creating "bey
ond" oneself. The second kind of suffering—that produced by the Will
of other men—must be eliminated by altering the social conditions of
man's existence and th is is the task of the Superman. Nietzsche is
not a moral monster. Even the Superman cannot ultimately affirm the
suffering and torture of innocent people, the exploitation and en
slavement of the masses, nor the dissolution of the body and s p ir i t
brought about by d e b ilitatin g diseases. I t is for these reasons th at
the Dionysian affirm ation, amor f a t i , remains finally an individual
affirmation. Nietzsche could affirm his own suffering, but not the
suffering of others and. because of th is , compassion becomes the g reat
est of all temptations for Zarathustra.
n S i b i d . , p. 276.
238
Jaspers' View
Jaspers discussion of the anthropological significance of the
doctrine of Eternal Recurrence centers around i t s transformation of
the meaning of time and the existential ramifications of the trans
formation. He begins with a consideration of the actual moment of
Nietzsche's epiphany on the mountain. Nietzsche describes this
moment as follows:
I would now like to te ll you the history of my Zarathustra. Its
fundamental conception, the idea of Eternal Recurrence, the highest
formula of affirmation that can ever be attained, belongs to
August, 1881. I made a hasty note of i t on a sheet of paper, with
the postscript: "Six thousand feet beyond man and time." That
day I was walking through the woods beside Lake Silvaplana; I
halted not far from Surlei, beside a hugh, towering, pyramidal
rock. It was there that the idea came to me.'16
I t is the character of the moment i t s e l f th a t leads Nietzsche to
celebrate and affirm Eternal Recurrence. Jaspers points out that this
moment became one of Nietzsche's "eternal" moments and the archetype
for his imperative to create for oneself as many moments as possible .
which are "beyond man and time."
Of decisive importance is only th at significance which the
moment attains through its philosophical substance. If the moment
is at once revelation of being and, in th is sense, etern ity , then
recurrence is merely a symbol for th is etern ity . Nietzsche knew,
by way of transcending, of the eradication of time as the revela
tion of being in (the flash of) the moment: He has Zarathustra
say "at the hour of full noon": "Quiet! Quiet! Did the world
not become perfect ju st now? . . . . Did I not f a l l —hark! into
the well of eternity?" This noon is "noon and e te rn ity ." * *?
^ N i e t z s c h e , Ecce Homo in The Philosophy of N ietzsche, p. 892.
^ ^ Jasp ers, Nietzsche, p. 358.
239
From this i t is clear, that Jaspers finds the "metaphorical" or
anthropological interpretation of Eternal Recurrence to be of much
greater significance than the metaphysical one. Jaspers argues that
this "revelation of being" can be the condition for Transvaluing the
whole significance of one's existence, by means of th is "transcending"
experience. However, this is not any traditional form of transcen
dence, rather, i t is the TRANSCENDENCE to the cosmological perspective
which is a revelation of Becoming, not Being,—a revelation both
sublime and terrify in g .
Jaspers also points out that Nietzsche's conception of noon or
midday is a symbol for the midpoint of the path between man and the
Superman. I t is only through a full encounter with the TRUTH of
Eternal Recurrence that man can begin to truly create "beyond" himself
toward the Superman. Thus, the revelation of Becoming is the turning
point in the struggle for self-overcoming. Eternal Recurrence is the
supreme risk , for it s impact may overwhelm and even destroy the one
who experiences i t . Nietzsche realized this and because of the mag
nificence of his vision of the p o ssib ilitie s of man, he preferred that
man succumb, i f he did not have the necessary strength to create him
se lf as the highest work of a rt.
He believes th at the effect of th is thought must be tremendous.
The structure of Zarathustra was ta c itly already oriented to i t ,
so that its effect might be proclaimed symbolically: this thought,
like no other, is dangerous for the one thinking i t . Hence
Zarathustra must f i r s t run the risk himself--he must have the
courage to think what he already knows—and experience profound
personal crises as he, under the impact of the thought, undergoes
240
a complete transformation th a t will make him mature and ready to
proclaim i t and, consequently, be destroyed. Nietzsche communi
cated this thought, in soft whispers, w}th all the symptoms o f,
terro r, and like a secret, to Lou Salome and Overbeck.118
The existential impact of the idea of Eternal Recurrence will produce
a reaction of radical nihilism, but th is must be transformed into an
affirmation.
Earlier we arrived at the. conclusion th at the doctrine of
Eternal Recurrence can be understood as a new kind of imperative.
Jaspers too takes this view and regards Eternal Recurrence as that
which can provide the motive force for the necessary transformation.
This is like a new ethical imperative’, which demands that I
measure everything I fe e l, will , do, and am by one standard:
whether I accomplish i t in such a way that I should like to do
i t repeatedly in the same way o r, in other words, whether I can
will that this same existence occur time and again. This impera
tive is a mere form, capable of receiving a lim itless number of
contents. Perhaps each one can experience the eternally desirable
only in his own special way and never as something universally
valid. 119
What Jaspers here describes as "mere form" with regard to the impera
tive is what we have called a meta-value. Jaspers fully recognizes
that Eternal Recurrence is only the general framework; i t does not
provide specific c rite ria for p a rtic u la r choice situations, but it
does, nonetheless, come to condition all authentic valuations.
Nietzsche rejects the validity of moral judgments outside' of their
particular perspective, but he does posit a higher, i . e . , a creative,
morality which shapes and defines the conditions of value. This is
Nietzsche's morality of aesthetics and even in his very la st writings
118I b id ., pp. 358-59. 119I b id . , p. 359.
241
he remains true to the position which he expounded in The Birth of
Tragedy—that the only "justification" for existence is an aesthetic
one. Here one is reminded of W ittgenstein's equating of ethics and
aesthetics in some remarks toward the end of the Notebooks. As
Jaspers shows, this aesthetic "justification" of existence is to be
accomplished through the "eternalization" of p artic u la r moments.
This imperative does not demand definite types of action, ways
behavior, and modes of living; i t even leaves room for the most
radical contrasts and for judgments th a t mutually exclude each
other as contrary with respect to value. The imperative demands
only th is one thing: "Let us impress the image of eternity upon
our liv e s!" !20
In a sense, the affirmation of any single moment is an affirmation of
the whole of l i f e , for everything which has preceded has been a condi
tion for that moment which is affirmed. Nietzsche says th at one must
liv e in such a manner th at at the end of his l i f e he can say, "I
regret nothing!"
At th is point, Jaspers shifts back for a moment to a lite ra l
interpretation of Eternal Recurrence.
But if "every moment of becoming is ju s tif ie d (or escapes
evaluation—and this amounts to the same th in g )," then i t follows
th at "the present is not to be ju s tifie d for the sake of the
future nor the past for the sake of the p r e s e n t."121
If we interpret th is l ite r a lly , then the entire notion of value becomes
meaningless. Nietzsche was fully aware th at i t was u tterly impossible
to transform every moment. What must be transformed is the sig n ifi
cance of time in relation to value such that one seeks out only that
which is essential and authentic insofar as th at is possible.
12QIbid. , pp. 359-60. ^ Ib id . , p. 360.
242
Jaspers also discusses what he calls the "redeeming character"
of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. Once again, Jaspers inadver
tently demonstrates what an embarrassment the doctrine of Eternal
Recurrence i s , i f one does not distinguish it s two forms—metaphysical
and anthropological. Jaspers says that this redemption "turns into
knowledge of im m o r ta lity ." ^ Nietzsche's views on the nature of
knowledge are, alone, enough to fa lsify this assertion. Furthermore,
as Jaspers himself la te r points out, the notion of redemption applies
primarily to the past. Zarathustra says, "To recreate all ' i t was'
1 23
into a 'thus I willed i t ' - -that alone should I call redemption."
(M y it a l i c s .) A b it la te r he adds, "All 'i t was' is a fragment, a
riddle, a dreadful accident—until the creative will says to i t , 'But
thus I willed i t . ' " ^ However, Jaspers persists in interpreting
Eternal Recurrence l ite r a lly and understanding i t in terms of the
kind of immortality, i .e . endless repetition, which we discovered had
to be rejected, since i t would transform tragedy into farce. As a
re su lt, Jaspers "discovers" an antinomy here in Nietzsche.
But, without Nietzsche's being aware of i t , an antinomy a ris e s —
as always happens in the course of any thinking th at transcends.
It takes the form of asserting both that the will expresses the
freedom to bring forth what is yet to come, and th at the will
i t s e l f is a fte r all the cycle that simply repeats what has been.
The re su lt is th a t, i f this type of philosophizing is genuine,
the statements cannot but n ullify each o th e r.1
^ Ibid. , p. 361. ^ N i e t z s c h e , Zarathustra, p. 251.
T^ I b i d . , p. 253. 1 ^ J a s p e r s , N ietzsche, p. 362.
243
These statements "nullify each other" only i f they are on the same
plane. However, th is is not the case, for one is a statement from
within the anthropological perspective and the other is a metaphysical
statement which illegitim ately attempts to establish a bridge between
the anthropological perspective and the cosmological perspective.
In addition to th is ex isten tial dimension of the doctrine
of Eternal Recurrence, Jaspers shows th at there is also an historical
dimension. Nietzsche was very much afraid that Eternal Recurrence
would become a catch-phrase and a fad for "the credulous and enthusias
tic ones."' In fa c t, there is the strong suggestion that Nietzsche
almost wanted to tre a t Eternal Recurrence as a secret doctrine much
in the fashion of the secret knowledge of the inner.brotherhood of
the mathematici in Pythagoreanism. He even comes to speak of his
idea as a religion—a religion without transcendence, but nonetheless,
a religion! "It is to be the religion of the fre e s t, most serene,
and most sublime souls—a lovely meadow-1 and between gilded ice and
pure sky!""*^
With regard to the problem of suffering, Jaspers shows that,
for Nietzsche, there are two fundamental approaches to the problem.
These are the Dionysian and the Christian a ttitu d es. Nietzsche says,
Dionysus versus the "Crucified": there you have the antithe
sis. I t is not a difference in regard to th e ir martyrdomr-it is
a difference in the meaning of i t . . . . One will see that the
problem is that of the meaning of suffering: whether a Christian
meaning or a tragic meaning. In the former case, i t is supposed
to be the path to a holy existence; in the la t t e r case, being is
1 ?fi
Nietzsche quoted in Jaspers, N ietzsche, p. 363.
244
counted as holy enough to ju stify even a monstrous amount of
_ suffering. The tragic man affirms even the harshest suffering:
he is sufficien tly strong, rich, and capable of deifying to do
so. The Christian denies even the happiest lo t on earth: he is
sufficien tly weak, poor, disinherited to suffer from lif e in what
ever form he meets i t . The god on the cross is a curse on l i f e ,
a signpost to seek redemption from l i f e ; Dionysus cut to pieces
is a promise of l i f e . 127
Notice here how Nietzsche plays on the notion of redemption. Nietzsche
does not wish to celebrate suffering; however, he believes that since
i t is a necessary part of man's existence, i t must be accepted and man
must learn to create "out of and beyond" suffering.
W e have already- seen that Jaspers quite emphatically rejects
Nietzsche's conception of the world as being without transcendence.
In the end Jaspers' rejection of Nietzsche's philosophy is almost
t o t a l .
While the basis and language of modern philosophizing has been
enriched, through imperceptible appropriation, by Nietzsche's
original nature-mysticism, no one has adopted his Dionysus as
a symbol or, for that matter, any of the affirm atively defined
ancJ ipso facto narrowly delimited, metaphysical hypostatizations
that he formulated, including the superman and eternal recur
rence.! 28
Ultimately, Jaspers cannot accept any.view of the world which does not
ground man's existence and his values in some form of transcendence,
and this means that he must fin a lly reject not only Nietzsche's meta
physics, but his philosophical anthropology as w ell.
l^ N ie t z s c h e , The Will to Power, pp. 542-43.
128jaspers> Nietzsche, p. 378.
245
Heidegger's View
Again we are faced with the problem that Heidegger offers no
interpretation of Eternal Recurrence or truth from the perspective of
philosophical anthropology. This is somewhat perplexing at f i r s t ,
since i t would seem th at the TRUTH revealed by Eternal Recurrence,
namely, that man is f in ite and must fully confront his own death if
he is to achieve self-overcoming or authenticity, would be embraced
by Heidegger, since i t parallels his own philosophy. Heidegger, as
we have already pointed put, does recognize the distinction between
truths and TRUTH, but he never elaborates i t or examines its s ig n if i
cance for Nietzsche's philosophy. If we think carefully about
Heidegger's major interpretive thesis in connection with Nietzsche,
the reason soon becomes apparent. For Heidegger, Nietzsche's phi
losophy, as the "consummation" of metaphysics, is s t i l l grounded in
traditional metaphysics and thus he never achieves an "overcoming" by
means of thinking the question of Being as such. However, i f Heidegger
admitted that the TRUTH of the cosmological perspective reveals man's
finitude to himself, he would then also have to admit th at Nietzsche
is doing existential analysis in precisely the same sense in which he
is in Being and Time. This, however, would bring Heidegger's thesis
that Nietzsche has not "overcome" metaphysics to d isaster!! This is
by no means to say th at th is is a conscious project of obfuscation on
the part of Heidegger. Rather, i t is simply the re su lt of Heidegger's
whole approach to the interpretation of the historical development of
246
philosophy. As fa r as Nietzsche's philosophical anthropology is con
cerned, Heidegger not only reje c ts i t , he refuses to recognize i t at
a l l .
Nietzsche's Anthropocentrism
Nietzsche's inversion of Platonism is an extremely interesting
event in the history of Western philosophy. Nietzsche's theory of
man contains a critique of the traditional ways of philosophizing about
man and also a vision of what man can possibly become. For Nietzsche,
traditional philosophies have not taken man seriously enough. Tradi
tional views have almost always sought to ground man's existence and
his values in some form of transcendence. Nietzsche argues that doc
trines of transcendence lead man to project his action toward goals
which are "outside" of himself and, as a re su lt, there has never been
the demand that man become what he is in the fullness of his Being as
human. For Nietzsche, any manifestation of the Will to Power that
seeks to direct man "outside" of himself is negative and in opposition
to the meta-values of self-overcoming and creation. It is the case,
however, that man cannot fu lly grasp his situation as man within the
perspectives of l if e . Such an understanding is achieveable only from
a-perspective outside of l i f e , and th is is possible in terms of the
cosmological perspective. For Nietzsche, man's nature contains within
it s e l f an irreconcilable dual ism—man'is the creature who knows he
must die, but he is also the creature whose non-existence is incon
ceivable to himself. From the standpoint of existence, the
247
individual's non-existence is inconceivable. M y non-existence from
within the perspectives of lif e is an "ontological contradiction."
Yet, at the same time, the individual knows th at he is f in ite by means
of adopting the perspective of cosmology. But how are these two
insights reconcilable? They are not; they stand d ialectically opposed
to one another and provide the ground fo r man's self-overcoming.
From Nietzsche's point of view, the cosmological perspective,
if its TRUTH is confronted, opens up the p o ssib ility for a new and
genuine kind of anthropocentrism. From within the perspectives of
life alone, man comes to believe that he is the measure of all things.
He becomes immensely self-important and believes in himself as the
creature who can discover the absolutes which forever govern the con
ditions of existence. He becomes the supreme dogmatist and comes to
regard himself as the center of the universe, the special creature
for whose sake the universe exists. From within the cosmological p e r-'
spective alone, man discovers his Nothingness, his f u ti l i t y and use
lessness. He realizes that he is not the center, that his existence
has no special meaning which will earn him "Eternal Bliss." For
Nietzsche, these are the two poles of the dualism that man is. There
are three choices for man: (1) he can fle e into the nihilism of
transcendence, (2) he can flee into the radical nihilism of meaning
lessness, or (3) he can enter into the d ia le c tic of his existence and
by accepting the conditions of his existence with dignity and honesty
attempt to create himself as a work of a r t . Man cannot escape his
condition and even his self-overcoming is of necessity tra g ic , but
248
Nietzsche would say, that i t is better for i t to be transformed into
a tragedy than for i t to remain a farce. In terms of th is tragedy,
man does not become the center of the cosmos, but neither is his exis
tence u tterly meaningless. By entering into the d ialectic of exis
tence, man has the p o ssib ility , for the f i r s t time, of tru ly appro
priating l i f e and becoming the center of his own individual existence.
This means that there is a new focus on man as man. He no longer pro
jects himself into a principle or entity which stands outside of his
existence; rather, he devotes his energies toward fu lly embracing his.
own existence in such a way that he can affirm himself as past, pre
sent, and future. He is able to say, "Thus would I have i t . Thus do
I will i t ."
Nietzsche believes that doctrines of transcendence have
enslaved man; they have made a prisoner of the Will. Man can realize
his p o ssib ilitie s only insofar as he has the freedom to create his
own values d ia le c tic a lly . This anthropocentrism is not egotism, for
the dialectic necessarily includes an interaction with other human
beings. This freedom is achieveable only in an atmosphere in which
one Will does not attempt to impose its values on another as though
they were absolutes. The notion of d ialectic, for Nietzsche, is not
exclusively individual. One must create himself in relation to
others. This is a profoundly Hegelian idea, for Hegel in s is ts that
self-creation is fu lly meaningful only in terms of a d ialectic with
other human beings. This idea is at the core of Nietzsche's applica
tion of his theory of man to the creation of a new social order.
249
The individual needs the confrontation with perspectives other than
his own. Perspectivism is the framework for Nietzsche's philosophi
cal anthropology as well as for his metaphysics and epistemology.
Within the context of an absolute system of meanings and values an
individual is prevented from discovering the richness of the perspec
tives of existence. Absolutism leads to stagnation and Nietzsche
vehemently opposes anything which s tif le s man's creativity. By means
of this creativ ity , man once more comes to occupy the center, but this
time it is the center of l i f e , the center between the hybris and
arrogance of nihilism and the despair and meaninglessness of radical
nihilism.
Jaspers' View
W e have already observed that Jaspers rejects Nietzsche's
philosophical anthropology, but we have not yet fully determined the
reasons for th is. Jaspers notes that Nietzsche regards the whole
attitude of modern man's existence as a kind of hybris. M an is impor
tant, but not in the way in which he presently conceives of himself.
Man's understanding of himself is diseased and he must cure himself.
This can only be achieved through the self-overcoming which places
man on the path to the Superman. Also Nietzsche says that this strug
gle will have to be accomplished through the "magic of extremes."
Nietzsche firmly believes th a t i f one is calm and moderate, no one
will listen . Jaspers finds Nietzsche's extremism disturbing and
charges .him with a kind of qualified fananticism. However, he goes
250
even further and turns Nietzsche's own charge of hybris back upon
Nietzsche himself.
Nietzsche appears as the representative of one kind of fanaticism
a fte r another, although his nature, his frame of mind, and his
goal are far removed from fanaticism. He cannot attain the
detached wisdom and steadfast circumspection possible to the non
revolutionary s p irit. Since he conceals nothing and gives of him
se lf freely, his own profound wisdom—like that of Prometheus—
becomes hybris. '^9
The question which confronts us here is th a t concerning the perspec
tiv e from which i t is possible for Jaspers to make th is charge of
hybris. While i t is true that Jaspers finds Nietzsche's extremism
d ista ste fu l, the reasons for the charge of hybris are to be found at
a deeper level. For Jaspers, a world which is not in some way grounded
in a form of transcendence is inconceivable. As a re su lt, he even
goes so fa r as to suggest that there is an "existential deficiency"
in Nietzsche's Being which would not permit him to recognize his own
Existenz, even though he frequently, so Jaspers claims, speaks from
th at source.
When one examines such constructions as the above and then
discovers how much Nietzsche really knows of ju s t that of which
the constructions, s tric tly applied, would show him to be
ignorant—the fullness of historical Existenz—then paradoxical
questions arise: Could i t be that the existential deficiency of
his being gives rise to a new and to us, unfamiliar Existenz
devoted to mankind as a whole? Is i t possible th at the standpoint
to which he banished himself affords him a perspective and a medium
for insights that are of incomparable value to the rest of us?
Perhaps these insights touch so clearly and decisively upon exis
tential p o ssib ilitie s precisely because they relate to an Existenz
that is not granted to the one who illumines them—the existential
exception whose awareness of this fa c t springs from another level.
129Ib id ., p. 426.
251
In this case, Nietzsche's greatness consists in an awareness of
nothingness which enables him to speak more clearly and passion
ately of the other-~of being--and to know i t better than those
who perhaps share in i t without even being sure of i t and con
sequently remain i n a r t i c u l a t e J 30
This kind of argument verges on sophistry. I t is as though a Christian
were to note that on the whole Nietzsche led a very moral l i f e even by
the standards of C hristianity and from th is went on to conclude th a t,
even though Nietzsche did not recognize God, nevertheless his phi
losophy and his l i f e enable him "to speak more clearly and passionately
of the other"—of God—" and to know i t better than those who perhaps
share in i t without even being sure of i t and consequently remain
in articu late." Nietzsche himself would unquestionably brand Jaspers
a n ih ilis t.
The doctrine of the Superman when considered within the con
text of the whole of Nietzsche's philosophy is not in i t s e l f extremist.
Nietzsche would deny that he is guilty of hybris, for the d ialectic
between the cosmological and the anthropological perspectives is meant
to produce in man a balanced view of himself. He is neither the
despicable, v ile , weak creature who can never deserve grace and salva
tion, nor is he the lord of the universe by whose standards all things
must be measured. He is the animal who is attempting to become lord
of his own l i f e and f u lf i l l himself in his highest and most human
way.
13QI b id ., p. 426.
252
Heidegger's View
It will be remembered th a t Heidegger, from the very beginning,
charges that Nietzsche's philosophy is anthropomorphic. Furthermore,
anthropomorphism is , for Heidegger, nihilism. He argues that Nietzsche
belongs to the tradition of philosophical "subjectivism" dating back
in modern times to Descartes. In ancient times there was also a
tradition of "subjectivism," namely, Protagorean relativism, but this
w«ts a "subjectivism" of a d ifferen t type in that i t was grounded in
a theory of truth (and, therefore, of Being also) which was fundamen
ta lly different from the one th at manifests i t s e l f in modern times.
Nonetheless, however, they stand related in that in both types man is
made the center of tru th , Being, and value.
For Heidegger, the history of Western philosophy from Descartes
to Nietzsche is the onto-logical unfolding of metaphysics as "subjec
tivism" and, therefore, nihilism . Much th at was implicit and simplis
ti c in Descartes' philosophy is made ex p lic it and is sophisticated in
the philosophies of Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The
"consummation" of this anthropomorphic kind of philosophy is achieved
in Nietzsche with the elevation of the Will to the supreme principle
in terms of which all else must be understood. However, now we are in
a better position to examine more closely Heidegger's charge of'
anthropomorphism against Nietzsche.
Anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism are not identical.
Anthropomorphism is the position which conceives of man as the absolute
253
measure of all Being, meaning, truth, and value. Nietzsche's
anthropocentrism, however, denies that man is the absolute measure of
anything. This is due to the cosmological perspective, which Heidegger
attempts to subsume under the categories of traditional metaphysics,
thus ignoring the very real way in which Nietzsche does succeed in
"overcoming" traditional metaphysics. From the cosmological perspec
tiv e , man discovers that Being, meaning, tru th , and value are all the
resu lt of particular perspectives which he adopts within the context
of his existence as anthropos. What one man measures cannot even be
a measure for mankind, le t alone the en tire cosmos. Thus, for
Nietzsche, the cosmological point of view was to be a corrective to
anthropomorphism. Furthermore, when Nietzsche speaks of perspectives
as necessary f ic tio n s , he does not mean th at these are fictions in
the sense in which a unicorn is a fic tio n , nor does he mean that
they are merely the arbitrary whims of the individual "subject."
They are fictions only from the standpoint of the cosmological per
spective. From within the context of the particular l i f e situation,
these perspectives are, within th eir limited range, perfectly v alid .
I t is for this reason that Nietzsche c a lls them "necessary." The
range of th eir validity may be s tr ic tly individual, in which case the
values and meanings arising out of these perspectives would be "sub
jectiv e." However, in a vast number of cases, the conditions which
define and delimit the perspective are social and cultural applying
to large groups of human beings and are, therefore, in Nietzsche's
sense "objective.". This sense is, of course, unacceptable to
254
Heidegger, since he argues for an "objectivity" which is in i ts e lf a
revelation of a transcendent Being. I t is interesting to note in this
.» V
respect th at Nietzsche would turn Heidegger's charge of nihilism back
upon Heidegger himself. From Nietzsche's point of view, both Jaspers
and Heidegger are s t i l l rooted in traditional metaphysics, since both
s t i l l want to retain some form of transcendence. Such a situation is
one of the traditional ironies in the history of philosophy and one
feels sure that Nietzsche, with his doctrine of perspectivism, would
have enjoyed the irony.
W e noted ea rlie r that Nietzsche rejects traditional metaphys
ics on the grounds that it_ is anthropomorphic with i t s doctrines of
transcendence and he regarded his own metaphysics as anti-anthropomor
phic. Once again, Heidegger does not take Nietzsche's claim seriously.
To do so, would again mean that Heidegger would be forced either to
modify or even abandon his whole conception of the nature of the h is
torical unfolding of metaphysics. Here Nietzsche's own conception of
the conditioning of perspectives by th e ir lim itations applies very
well. Heidegger seems so to ta lly obsessed with the idea of Being as
transcendens, that i t is virtually.im possible for him to adopt any
other perspective. Unfortunately, however, we are not even in a posi
tion to explore fully the lim itations of Heidegger's perspectives,
for he has never published his "fundamental ontology." However, the
outlines that are discernible, suggest that perhaps many of the roots
of Heidegger's own philosophy are discoverable in Nietzsche. Heidegger
255
has concerned himself with Nietzsche over a considerable number of
' years and his pre-occupation with Nietzsche sometimes seems rather
odd in lig h t of his often sweeping and sometimes eccentric criticism .
Some Concluding Remarks
As we can now see, the elaboration of Nietzsche's theory of
man requires an examination of all of the basic doctrines of
Nietzsche's philosophy. This is not to say that Nietzsche's phi
losophy is a unified "system." There are certainly aspects of
Nietzsche's philosophy which he does not completely think through,
and there are genuine contradictions, such as the one between the
lite ra l and the "metaphorical" conceptions of Eternal Recurrence.
However, we have throughout tried to show th at, on the whole, the
various doctrines which comprise Nietzsche's philosophy are coherent.
His philosophy cannot be regarded as a collection .of random remarks
and aphorisms. Nietzsche's theory of man is interesting not only in
terms of i t s general structure, which is primarily what we have been
concerned with here, but also because of its wealth of concrete
psychological and cultural insights. I t is this l a t t e r which makes
the reading of Nietzsche a constant delight, for, although the.major
outlines of the basic doctrines are fairly well fixed, Nietzsche f i l l s
these outlines with an almost endless number of ironical and incisive
observations regarding situations and events which are encountered
daily. This mass of particular observation lends great weight to many
of Nietzsche's theses and, as is not the case in many philosophies,
256
transforms the theory of man into something vital and immediate.
At the beginning of th is chapter we said that there is a
sense in which Nietzsche's philosophical anthropology is "metaphysi
cal." W e are now in' a position to specify that sense. For Nietzsche,
man's essence is fundamentally dualistic--man is the creature who.,
through the knowledge th a t he must die, can take up the cosmological
perspective which stands opposed to his existence as anthropos. The
dualism as such is irreconcilable; however, the two poles of the
dualism create the p o ssib ility for a metaphysical dialectic. Even •
though the two poles are opposed, they stand in essential relation
to each other in that they "reside" a t the very heart of man's Being.
In this sense we can say th a t man is the metaphysical creature and i t
is only because of his esse n tia lly d u alistic nature that the dialectic
of self-overcoming is possible at a l l .
This also means th at Nietzsche's metaphysics is a thorough
going anthropology in the sense of anthropocentrism and not in the
sense of anthropomorphism. Anthropocentrism, for Nietzsche, opens
'up for the f i r s t time the p o ssib ility for a truly profound and meaning
ful humanism. Man no longer de-values himself in the face of some
abstract or emotional principle of transcendence. He is given the
freedom to focus fully upon himself in a creative fashion. He becomes
the fusion of his animal nature and his spiritual nature. Nietzsche
firmly believes that any philosophy th at permits and promotes the
ascendancy of either the animal or the spiritual side of man without
bring them into a proper balance is a perversion. It is a mistake to
257
understand Nietzsche's conception of the Superman single-mindedly in
terms of his metaphor of the "blond beast." Nietzsche emphasizes
repeatedly that the greatest and most d iff ic u lt task which faces man
on the path to the Superman is the overcoming of the desire for
revenge. Nietzsche's conceptions of ju s tic e , honesty, dignity, and
the overcoming of revenge must always be kept in mind in any evalua
tion of his doctrine of the Superman. Nietzsche's belief in the
p o te n tia litie s of man is so great th at he thinks of the society com
prised of the Supermen and the herd in terms of a fusion of th eir
Wills in such a manner that they can live together creatively.
Nietzsche's doctrine of "immorality" is really the morality
of his radical humanism. The severest criticism he can make against
a view is that i t is anti-human. This is the basis for. his rejection
of C hristianity, "Socratism," and democracy, not to mention socialism
and tyranny. To Nietzsche, conventional morality is a prison. It
promises punishment for those who do not submit and, for Nietzsche,
one of the most, inhuman threats of all was the transcendently derived,
th at is , n i h i lis tic ,d o c tr in e of eternal punishment. Nietzsche
strongly believed th at any "morality" th at had to be enforced by the
threat of punishment was degenerate. Nietzsche desires that man
' learn to live in this-world and love l i f e , rather than denying this
l i f e and projecting all of his energies into some ficticio u s "super
sensible" realm. This is perhaps the most fundamental of all of
•
N ietzsche's lessons: Learn to love l i f e !
258
In the main, I agree more with the a r tis ts than with any phi
losopher hitherto: they have not lo st the scent of l i f e , they
have loved the things of "this world"--they have loved th e ir
senses. To striv e for "desensualization": that seems to me a.
misunderstanding or an illness or a cure, where i t is not merely
hypocrisy or self-deception. I desire for myself and for all who
live, may, liv e , without being tormented by a puritanical con
science, an ever-greater spiritualization and m ultiplication of
the senses; indeed, we should be grateful to the senses for th e ir
subtlety, plenitude, and power and offer them in return the best
we have in the way of s p ir it. What are priestly and metaphysical
calumnies against the senses to usl W e no longer need these
calumnies: • i t is a sign that one has turned out well when, like
Goethe, one clings with ever-greater pleasure and warmth to the
"things of th is w orld":--for in this way he holds firmly to the
great conception of man, that man becomes the transfigurer of
existence when he learns to transfigure himself.131
I t is hard to imagine a profounder or more vital sense fo r the
p o te n tia litie s of the human being. For Nietzsche, this was the central
vision which dominated his lif e and his thought.
l^Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 434.
259
. CHAPTER IV
A N EVALUATION OF HEIDEGGER'S A N D
JASPERS' INTERPRETATIONS
The task of c ritic a l evaluation carries with i t an immense
responsibility. Criticism is not simply dissection; i t presupposes
a genuine attempt to gain an internal understanding. Even i f we
fin a lly decide that Jaspers faile d in this attempt, there is l i t t l e
question about the authenticity of the attempt i ts e lf . With Heidegger
the situation is somewhat d ifferen t. I t is clear from the beginning
that Heidegger is not so much interested in Nietzsche for his own
sake as he is in Nietzsche as an illu s tra tio n of his thesis about
the historical unfolding of the nature of metaphysics. Thus, part
of our responsibility in attempting a c ritic a l evaluation of Heidegger
and Jaspers is a recognition of the fundamental aims of th eir interpre
tations;. This does not mean that we are compelled to accept th e ir
aims, but we must take these aims into account i f we are to understand
fu lly the nature of Heidegger's' and Jaspers' interpretive projects.
There are three basic aspects involved in the project of pre
senting a Nietzsche interpretation: (1) a careful examination of the
texts themselves, (2) an attempt to understand and explicate
Nietzsche's ideas within the framework of his own philosophy, and
(3) the presentation of a c r itic a l standpoint as the basis for an
evaluation of Nietzsche's philosophy. A careful examination of the
texts is especially crucial in the case of Nietzsche, because of his
non-systematic method of communicating. Also a random reading of
Nietzsche can produce a very distorted view indeed. The attempt to
understand and explicate Nietzsche presupposes a careful weighing of
Nietzsche's remarks and the establishment of a certain rapport with
Nietzsche's style of philosophizing. Finally, in attempting a c r i t i
cal evaluation i t is important to examine one's own c ritic a l standpoint
in order to avoid adopting a bias which f a lls subject to Nietzsche's
own c ritic a l enterprise. This last is extremely important, for unless
one can provide a ju stific a tio n for one's c r itic a l standpoint which
will remove i t from the realm of Nietzsche's own criticism , then such
a bias must be rejected as dogmatic.
Two other considerations apply to Nietzsche interpretation.
A genuine interpretation must take into account the development of
Nietzsche's philosophical ideas and attempt to understand the patterns
of this development. Secondly, genuine interpretation must grasp the
essen tially dialectical character of his philosophy. This is no easy
task, and there is the omnipresent danger of interpreting one dialec
tical pole as the representative position, when in fact Nietzsche pur
sues the ramifications of the idea in terms of further and more complex
dialectical convolutions.
Perhaps the greatest complication of all in dealing with the
interpretations of Heidegger and Jaspers is the fact that neither of
them make ex p licit the c ritic a l standpoint from which they make th eir
own evaluations of Nietzsche. As a re su lt, a certain fam iliarity with
the philosophies of Jaspers and Heidegger becomes necessary in order
261
to grasp the context out of which their evaluative enterprise arises.
W e have made some attempt to explicate the essential aspects as we
proceeded. A fu ll-sc a le investigation of these philosophies i s , of
course, impossible here; however, certain basic concepts in th e ir
philosophies will provide.us with a sufficient understanding to see
the direction of th e ir c ritic a l and evaluative thought.
With regard to Heidegger, we must remember that his Nietzsche
interpretation is part of much larger c ritic a l project which extends
from the pre-Socratics up to the present. Nonetheless, his work on
Nietzsche holds a position of special prominence. Jaspers' in terp re
tation is somewhat conditioned by the existential-psychological back
ground which he has. In fa c t, one of Jaspers' f i r s t major publications
was his General Psychopathology and, in European circles and more
recently in America, his early works in the area of psychiatry are
highly regarded. This background occasionally reveals its e lf in his
Nietzsche interpretation when, in certain discussions, Jaspers seems
on the verge of treating Nietzsche as a clinical case study. However,
on the whole, this particular aspect of Jaspers' background rarely .
conditions his interpretation in any e x p licit way. A factor of back
ground which Jaspers and Heidegger share is. the discipline of a late
nineteenth century and early twentieth century European education.
This discipline manifests i t s e l f in two important ways. F irst of a l l ,
i t produces a certain special so rt of thoroughness which is grounded
in an extensive cultural background and which is,on the whole, a
valuable asset. However, this discipline also breeds a rather
262
unfortunate tendency toward dogmatism which often results in a certain
narrowness of perspective. However, th is discipline has served to
make Jaspers and Heidegger philosophers of considerable stature and
an examination of th eir thought about Nietzsche cannot help but be
stimulating and enriching. In fa c t, a c ritic a l evaluation of their
Nietzsche interpretations must also be undertaken in the s p irit of
dialogue, and in this way i t is hoped that we may arrive at a better
understanding of Jaspers and Heidegger as well as Nietzsche.
How Jaspers Reads His Own Philosophy
into Nietzsche
There are two major concepts of Jaspers' own philosophy that
appear very frequently in his Nietzsche interpretation. These, of
course, are Existenz and transcendence. A third concept which appears
much less frequently is Jaspers' idea of the Encompassing. These
three concepts provide the basis for Jaspers' c ritic a l standpoint.
W e have already presented-a descriptive optline of the essential
meaning of Existenz and have made frequent reference to the notion of
transcendence. However, here i t is necessary that we take a somewhat
closer look at the meaning of transcendence for Jaspers, and also pro
vide a brief discription of the concept of the Encompassing. Until
now we have only made passing reference to the Encompassing, because
th is notion is morp relevant to Jaspers' final criticism s of Nietzsche
than i t is to an explication of Nietzsche's philosophy.
The conception of transcendence which Jaspers attempts to
explicate is essentially and consciously ambiguous. The attempt to
263
understand i t is further complicated by the fact th a t, according to
Jaspers, transcendence can only be genuinely grasped through Existenz.
Only through Existenz can Transcendence become present without
superstition, as the genuine reality which to i t s e l f never d is
appears.
Further, Existenz is like the counterpart to s p ir i t . S p irit
is the will to become whole; potential Existenz is the will to
be authentic . . . . S p irit lets everything disappear and vanish
into universality and to ta lity . The individual as s p ir it is not
himself but, so to speak, the unity of contingent individuals and
of the necessary universal. Existenz however is irreducibly in
' another; i t is the absolutely firm, the irreplaceable, and there
fore, as against all mere empirical existence, consciousness as
such, and s p i r i t , i t is authentic being before Transcendence to
which alone i t surrenders its e lf without reserv atio n J
If the notion of Existenz is ambiguous, then the notion of transcen
dence is doubly so. The sentence, "Spirit is the will to become
whole," is especially interesting. W hen we consider the essential
dualism which characterizes Nietzsche's theory of man, i t immediately
becomes clear th at Jaspers and Nietzsche are philosophically opposed
in terms of the most fundamental groundwork. I t is true th at in terms
of the metaphysical doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, Nietzsche himself
yielded to th is "will to become whole." However, in the end Nietzsche
in sists that th is "will" is a fundamental mistake which would produce
a paralysis of the essential dialectic which creates the po ssib ility
for the highest development of man's existence. I t also seems certain
that Nietzsche would be puzzled by Jaspers' statement th at "only
through Existenz can Transcendence become present without supersti
tio n ." Nietzsche regards all appeals to traditional forms of
^Jaspers, Reason and Existenz, p. 62.
264
transcendence as superstitious. But perhaps Jaspers' notion of tran
scendence is not a traditional form. Let us examine another passage.
The idea which grasps Transcendence from the unfulfillment of all
communication and from the ship-wrecking of every form of truth
in the world is like a proof of God: from the unfulfillment of
every sense of truth and under the assumption that truth must be,
thought touches upon Transcendence. Such an idea is valid only ■
for Existenz which is an absolute concern for tru th , and to whose
honesty truth, as a single, unique, and s ta tic possession of time
lessness, nevqr shows i t s e l f in the w orld.2
Nietzsche and Jaspers are very close here with regard to the limited
ness of truth, and out of this Nietzsche develops his doctrine of
perspectivism. Jaspers, .however, takes up a very traditional position,
which can be found in many philosophies and theologies, and argues
that this limitedness in some way implies that which is lim itless.
I t is also clear that he follows tra dition in continuing to accept
the notion of some kind of absolute tru th , and he admits that this
truth "never shows i t s e l f in the .world." The other traditional a t t r i
butes of timelessness, singularity, uniqueness, and stasis are also
present.- Thus, in the end, there can be l i t t l e question but what
Jaspers does espouse a quite traditional form of the concept of
transcendence.
The problem of communication is also important here. Jaspers
wants to argue th at, since all communication is somehow incomplete,
this necessarily leads to the notion that somewhere there is the possi
b ility for a complete perspective and this he variously calls Being,
2Ib id . , p. 98.
265
transcendence, and God. Nietzsche, however, reje c ts the idea that the
notion of perspective implies some complete perspective that consti
tutes an absolute truth. The conceptions of unity and to ta lity are,
for Nietzsche, simply convenient fictions. As fa r as Nietzsche is
concerned, incommunicability is no argument for absolute truth.
In one respect-Jaspers1 problem with Nietzsche is a very per
sonal one which Jaspers translates into the realm of theology. When
discussing Nietzsche's saying, "God is dead," Jaspers is careful to
point out that this is not a declaration of atheism. Nonetheless,
Jaspers comes to that very conclusion in Reason and Existenz.
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are distinguished from the other
great philosophers in that both consciously subverted philosophy
its e lf : one in favor of faith in absurd paradox and martyrdom
as the only true l i f e , the other [Nietzsche] in order to arrive
at atheism.'3
Jaspers also makes i t clear that he regards atheism as something which
is an tithetical to philosophy.
Or, philosophical thinking can seek its realization in atheism
which presents i t s e l f as the conclusion of a philosophizing which
opposes revealed religion; and then, retroactively, philosophy
as such tends to be annulled in favor of it s f in i t e knowledge of
the world. Atheism however applies philosophy, now robbed of its
essence, as a disintegrating force against everything permanent
or a u th o ritativ e, so long as this is not the authority affirmed
by atheism i t s e l f of dominance in empirical existence.4 (M y
ita lic s .)
It should now be very clear that the disagreement between Jaspers and
Nietzsche is no mere verbal one. Jaspers regards Nietzsche as a
genuine threat and a very dangerous one. If we push Jaspers' remarks
to th e ir logical conclusions, then, in effect, Jaspers accuses
31bid. , p. 137. 4 l b i d . , p.. 139.
266
Nietzsche of having robbed philosophy of its essence. Jaspers also
takes i t for granted that there is something more than the "fin ite
knowledge of the world," but he argues that he cannot say what this
is, since by i t s very nature i t is incommunicable. To say on the one
hand, that empirical truth is deficient and on the other hand, that
there is an absolute tru th , but i t is incommunicable and then to assert
further that one must recognize the authority of this uncommunicable
truth is an example of the dogmatism of which we spoke e a rlie r. Cer
tainly, such an argument would have enraged Nietzsche.
With regard to the Encompassing, Jaspers distinguishes two
major modes.
The Encompassing appears and disappears for us in two opposed
perspectives: either as Being i t s e l f , in and through which we
are—or else as the Encompassing which we ourselves are, and in ■
which every mode of Being appears to us. The la tte r would be as
the medium or condition under which all Being appears as Being
for us. In neither case is the Encompassing the sum of some pro
visional kinds of being, a part of whose contents we know, but
rather i t is the whole as the most extreme, self-supporting ground
of Being, whether i t is Being in i t s e l f , or Being as i t is for
u s.5
For sheer opacity th is passage rivals Heidegger. However, th is much
is clear: Jaspers is distinguishing between the world as we experience
i t and a "super-sensible" realm of Being in it s e l f . Jaspers uses this
notion of Being in i t s e l f to make the move to God as absolute tra n
scendence. With regard to this move, Nietzsche makes some very in te r
esting remarks in the Twilight of the Idols. He suggests that this
metaphysical move from beings to Being (subsequently interpreted as
51bid., p. 52.
267
absolute ground or God) is ^nothing more than a mistake in grammar.
Formerly, alteratio n , change, any becoming at a l l , were taken as
proof of mere appearance, as an indication that there must be some
thing which led us astray. Today, conversely, precisely insofar
as the prejudice of reason forces us to posit unity, identity,
permanence, substance, cause, thinghood, being, we see ourselves
somehow caught in error, compelled into error . . . . Everywhere
"being" is projected by thought, pushed underneath, as the cause;
the concept of being follows, and. is a derivative of, the concept
of ego . . . . I am afraid we are not rid of God because we s t i l l
have faith in grammar.6
Thus, Jaspers' notion of Encompassing would be regarded by Nietzsche
as simply another step in the development of dogmatic metaphysics to
which he hoped that his own philosophy would provide a corrective.
W e now need to consider e x p lic itly the problem of the vulner
a b ility of Jaspers' c ritic a l standpoint to Nietzsche's own criticism s.
Certainly Jaspers has the advantage of knowing beforehand the precise
nature of the criticisms which Nietzsche could d ire ct against his c r i
tical standpoint. Yet apparently Jaspers does not take such possible
criticism s very seriously, and judging from his almost total silence
on this issue, he regards these criticism s as self-refuting. Con
sidering the antithesis that Nietzsche represents in relation to
Jaspers, i t is interesting th at Jaspers should undertake to write a
book on Nietzsche's philosophy, for in many ways Jaspers' book is a
very sympathetic and understanding examination. His book is by no
means a mere diatribe or polemic. That Jaspers undertook such an
enterprise is a tribute to the strength of Nietzsche's fascination.
^Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols in The Portable N ietzsche,
pp. 482-83.
268
Again and again Jaspers introduces the concepts which consti
tute the foundation of his own philosophy into his Nietzsche interpre
tation. However, he provides v irtually no defense for these notions
as an adequate standpoint for a criticism and evaluation of Nietzsche.
Perhaps the reasons for this are to be discovered within the context
of the interp retatio n . With this in mind, le t us review some of the
more important aspects of Jaspers' interpretation. At the same time,
we shall attempt to bring into closer relation the two major facets
of the in terp retatio n , namely, metaphysics and philosophical anthro
pology.
From the beginning i t is clear that Jaspers regards Nietzsche's
metaphysics as in some way deficient. The f i r s t indication of this
we found in Jaspers' attitu d e toward Nietzsche's doctrine of Being as
Becoming. Jaspers does very definitely appreciate the essen tially
d ialectical character of Nietzsche's philosophy and places much more
importance on the process of Nietzsche's philosophizing than on
Nietzsche's doctrines, Nonetheless, there are very real indications
of reservation on Jaspers' part regarding any metaphysics that so
radically and thoroughly rejects every notion of Being as permanence,
unity, and transcendence. As a resu lt, Jaspers concludes that
Nietzsche's thought is repeatedly forced into inescapable circles
and fin a lly undermines i t s e l f . It does th is, Jaspers argues, by
attacking the very conditions for philosophizing as such. Jaspers
arrives at this conclusion because he fa ils to distinguish adequately
the two levels which constitute the radically opposed perspectives
269
of cosmology and philosophical anthropology. The TRANSCENDENCE of the
cosmological perspective is unsatisfactory as far as Jaspers is con
cerned, for the very reason th at i t does not have the characteristics
of the traditional forms of transcendence.
The key to this opposition is to be found in the theory of
truth. For Jaspers, truth and communication are inextricably bound
up with one another.
Truth therefore cannot be separated from communicability.
I t only appears in time as a reality-through-communication.
Abstracted from communication, truth hardens into an unreality.
The movement of communication is at one and the same time the
preservation of, and the search fo r, the tru th .'
Jaspers distinguishes three basic types of communication. The f i r s t
is a practical sort which has to do with the preservation and func
tioning of the individual and the community. The second type involves
consciousness as such and deals primarily with the abstractions and
logical categories which characterize the relationships of individual
and social consciousness to what is knowable. The third type Jaspers
defines as follows:
The communication of s p i r i t is the emergence of the Idea of
a whole out of the communal substance. The individual is con
scious of standing in a place which has its proper meaning only
in that whole. His communication is that of a member with its
organism. He is d ifferen t, as all the others are, but agrees with
them in the order which comprehends a l l . They communicate with
one another out of the common presence of the Idea. In this com
munication, i t is as though some whole not clearly knowable by
consciousness as such spoke, limited i t s e l f , and gave indications
of whence i t came. W hen the communication is not enlivened with
the actual content of this whole, to that extent i t slips into
the indifferent and t r i v i a l . 8 (M y ita lic s .)
^Jaspers, Reason and E xisten z, pp. 79-80. 8Ib id . , p. 82.
270
I t is this third form which is of in tere st to us here.
This notion, insofar as i t is conceived d ia le c tic a lly , comes
very close to being the cultural "Idea" of a destiny. Jaspers uni
versalizes the "Idea," but within a limited range and trie s to pre
serve the notion of perspective.
As a community of s p ir i t , the members are united through the
knowledge of a whole into the community of its Idea. I t is always
a_ whole, never the_ whole, and i t must as a whole relate i t s e l f to
other wholes and always remain uncompleted in i t s own actual
existence. .
However, as a cultural idea, this "whole" is a cultural phenomenon
and, from Nietzsche's point of view, a fic tio n . The fact that an idea
is central to a culture does not ju stify its transformation into an
absolute. Nietzsche would never deny the u t i l i t y of such ideas; how
ever, he would in s is t on grasping them in terms of their lim itations.
Furthermore, Nietzsche is very suspicious of an "Idea" which is so
established that i t can be appealed to as "authority." Even cultural
"Ideas" must be dynamic, i f the culture is not to stagnate. For
Nietzsche, these "wholes" of which Jaspers speaks can be dealt with
as manifestations of "group fictions" within the realm of philosophi
cal anthropology. The fact that they are collective in no way j u s t i
fies a leap into transcendence.
Later in his discussion, Jaspers approaches the problem of
communication in another way. He makes the d istinction between ratio n
al and existential communication. Rational communication refers p r i
marily to the f i r s t two forms which we mentioned above. Existential
271
communication, however, is of a very special nature and comes very
close to the religious notion of communion. Jaspers admits that every
real attempt at communication is limited, even this existential one
which is the communication of Existenz with another Existenz. Thus,
in this one respect at le a st, he agrees with Nietzsche that truth is
always particular and limited in such a way as to be perspectival.
However, behind th is perspective Jaspers posits an absolute truth
which in and of i t s e l f and for the particular Existenz which appre
hends i t , is unconditional.
Since i t is impossible for man to have Transcendence in time as a
knowable object, identical for everybody like something in the
world, every mode of the One Truth as absolute in the world can
in fact only be h isto ric a l” : unconditional for this Existenz but,
precisely for this reason, not universally v a lid .10
From this we can see th at, for Nietzsche, Jaspers has to be regarded
as a Platonist. Nietzsche's inversion of Platonism stands in -d irect
opposition to Jaspers' position with regard to the most fundamental
issues. For Jaspers, metaphysics without transcendence is simply
not metaphysics or, a t le a st, deficient metaphysics. Jaspers has,
of course, the weight of an immense historical tradition behind his
position and i t would seem th at .this is his ultimate ju stific a tio n
for neither ex p lic itly stating his c ritic a l standpoint nor defending
his position against Nietzsche's criticism s of transcendence. How
ever, such a position does not really face Nietzsche's criticism s and
the appeal to the authority of tradition i s , in this case, not
convincing.
1QIb id ., p. 100.
272
A methodological problem in relation to Jaspers' interpreta
tion is his notion of Nietzsche's d ialectic of contradiction. Again
this arises from Jaspers' dissatisfaction with the idea that there
are "doctrines" in Nietzsche's philosophy. The weakness of this
approach is that i t tends to obscure the very interesting cases in
which there genuinely is contradiction. In other words, Jaspers'
view creates a kind of leveling and leads him to attrib u te all con
tradictions to the working of Nietzsche's d ialectic. However, as
we have already discovered many of these contradictions which Jaspers
elaborates are only apparent contradictions, e .g ., Nietzsche's play
upon the words 'morality' and 'immorality.' As a re su lt, the genuine
cases of contradiction, such as the metaphysical version of the doc
trine of Eternal Recurrence, are not pursued by Jaspers to th eir
source. This is a partial explanation for Jaspers' virtual dismissal
of Eternal Recurrence as a metaphysical position.
Jaspers regards Eternal Recurrence as Nietzsche's attempt and
fa ilu re to provide a doctrine of transcendence. This is , of course,
the case. However, Jaspers does not go on to explore the reasons
for Nietzsche's extraordinary attempt. I t is extraordinary, because
Nietzsche is so severe in criticism s of all forms of transcendence.
The reasons for this metaphysical aberration, which we have already
discussed, provide a glimpse into the existential depths of Nietzsche's
humanness. The judgment that i t is an aberration i s , as we have
developed i t , an internal one derived from Nietzsche's own c rite ria
for metaphysics and not an external judgment imposed from a context
273
outside of Nietzsche's philosophy. Jaspers'rejection of the meta
physics of Eternal Recurrence i s , however, grounded in reasons external
to Nietzsche's philosophy. However, when Nietzsche does outline a
more or less traditional doctrine of transcendence in his metaphysical
version of Eternal Recurrence, Jaspers cannot accent i t , because i t
is impersonal and non-teleological. In this respect, Jaspers is very
deeply rooted in the Platonic and Christian tra d itio n s, and his c r i t i
cism suggest at times that he considers Eternal Recurrence to be a
rather pagan notion.
Jaspers also has d ifficu lty in his interpretation of the Will
to Power, and some of his reservations are psychological ones.
Jaspers seems to fear that Nietzsche's attempt to liberate man from
the re stric tiv e s implied by transcendence will resu lt in a violent
eruption of man's unconscious d r iv e s .^ The phrase, "Will to Power,"
is highly emotive and can be easily misinterpreted, but even when in t
erpreted correctly the phrase i t s e l f tends to exert an almost magical
influence. However, Nietzsche sharply distinguishes positive and neg
ative manifestations of the Will to Power. Permissiveness and se lf-
indulgence are not part of Nietzsche's notion of the positive Will to
Power of the Superman. Jaspers' criticisms of the anthropological as
pect of Will to Power indicate that he does not always recognize the
distinction between the positive and the negative forms. Furthermore,
^ Ja sp e rs' fear was, of course, well-founded. His Nietzsche
book was published in 1936 a fter he had observed the rise of Hitler
and the outrageous persecutions which followed the election of a
National S ocialist Majority.
274
Jaspers is in many ways committed to a more traditional morality. He
acknowledges the depth and correctness of many aspects of Nietzsche's
critique of traditional m orality, but he is reluctant to abandon en
tire ly some trans-human source of authority. There is a certain irony
here, for Nietzsche's conception of morality has frequently been a t
tacked as being inhuman, yet i t is his extraordinary faith in the pos-
s ib ilitie s of the human being that-leads him to be willing to risk
breaking the fe tte rs of transcendent authority thus providing man with
a new kind of creative freedom. On the other hand, Jaspers, who is
frequently regarded as a great humanist, is incapable of sharing
Nietzsche's faith in man and believes that certain forms of trans
human authority must be preserved to restrain man and protect him from
himself. There are good arguments for both positions and in terms of
our dominant contemporary pragmatism, many might regard Nietzsche's
faith as somewhat naive and u n re a listic , but nonetheless one has to
admit that i t is rather a magnificent kind of faith .
Jaspers is also afraid that the creative morality of the Super
man will lead from .anthropocentrism to egoism. However, Nietzsche un
derstood very well the su b tleties of the relationship which would have
to exist between the Superman and the herd and his conception of the
Superman of necessity rules out any kind of willful egoism. Whether in
actual fact such a relationship is achievable and workable cannot be
determined in advance. Jaspers' reservations are certainly to be re
spected in terms of his extensive background in humanistic psychology,
but we also need to remember th at for Nietzsche the achievement of
275
such a sophisticated society was a far from immediate goal, he ex
p lic itly states that thousands of years would be required for man even
to begin to actualize such a society. Even i f we wish to regard this
notion as Utopian, i t is certainly d ifferent from the classical Utopias
in th at i t is always dynamic; there is no final perfect state posited
as a goal. Thus, even his concept of Utopia remains true to his in
version of Platonism.
In his criticisms of Nietzsche, Jaspers refers to what he calls
the "thought experiments" of Nietzsche. This notion is derivative
from Jaspers' interpretation of the "dialectic of contradiction'", and
must be rejected for reasons similar to those for rejecting this dia
le c tic . Two major examples of what Jaspers considers to be thought
experiments are Nietzsche's notions of Being as Becoming and truth as
fic tio n s. Here again we encounter Jaspers' charge of dialectical c i r
c u larity and again i t is a resu lt of the fact that he regards this
d ialectic as operative only on one level. The two examples are re l-.
ated in that Nietzsche regards Being as one of the fictions that we
need in order to explain the world to ourselves from within the anthro
pological perspective. However, for there to be any dialectic at all
Nietzsche realized that there must be a perspective which provided a
kind of TRUTH which is not a life-preserving fic tio n . This is the
cosmological perspective and the judgment derived from i t that all
Being is Becoming is not a relative truth of the anthropological per
spective, for i t does nothing to preserve l i f e , but rather threatens
i t . The very judgment that truths are fic tio n s designed to meet the
276
needs of anthropos collapses into u tter nonsense, if there is no per
spective "outside" of lif e from which to make this judgment. Certainly
Nietzsche was much too subtle a dialectician to fall into such an ob
vious trap, This perspective "outside" of life is what we have called
the TRANSCENDENCE of the cosmological perspective, precisely because
i t is "beyond" and opposed to the perspectives of life and forms one
pole of the essential dualism which resides a t the center of man's
Being (or nature). Jaspers, however, argues that these thought exp
eriments lead to a "dissolution of reason." Nietzsche's critiq u e of
reason is certainly thorough, but i t is by no means a total abandon
ment of reason. Nietzsche can hardly be fairly represented as a phi
losopher of "irrationalism ." Even Nietzsche's most ecstatic Dionysian
flig h ts are eventually tempered by the Apollonian counter-balances of
harmony and form.In fa c t, Nietzsche's later and more mature conception
of the Dionysian is really a synthesis of Dionysian and Apollonian
elements. Nietzsche does not want to discard reason; he wants to fuse
i t harmoniously with man's "animality," thus creating the p o ssib ility
for i t to achieve its highest estate through man's fu lle s t and richest
development of all of his aspects. Jaspers' failure to explicate fu lly
<
the two d istin c t levels that are the ground of Nietzsche's d ialectic
leads him to an interpretation that makes Nietzsche's philosophy seem
highly ambiguous and rather mysterious, if not mystical. This is per
haps one of the most ex p licit examples of a case where Jaspers reads
his own philosophy into Nietzsche's. Jaspers, in terms of his own
philosophy, not only regards ambiguity as necessary, he comes to
277
regard i t as a virtue. As we have already seen, his theory of comm
unication suggests that anything which is not essentially ambiguous,in
that i t relates to a whole not fu lly known, "slips into the in d iffer
ent and triv ia l." This is an unnecessary complication, for there is a
great abundance of problems in Nietzsche, the interpretation of which
fu lly challenges one's best c a p a b ilitie s, and there is no reason to
augment that challenge.
The confusion which resu lts from this imposed ambiguity is
also visible in Jaspers' discussion of nihilism. Jaspers' reluctance
to interpret Nietzsche in terms of "doctrines" tends to obscure the
full development of Nietzsche's thought and also makes i t extremely
d iff ic u lt to deal with the juxtapositions of various sets of ideas
within Nietzsche's philosophy. As a re su lt Jaspers sometimes reacts
to Nietzsche's doctrine of nihilism as though Nietzsche were advocating
total anarchy. Jaspers' search for contradictions makes i t d iffic u lt
for him to view Nietzsche's doctrine of nihilism within the context of
Nietzsche's humanism., Without this context as a background
Nietzsche's radical nihilism certainly would be alarming, but within
this context i t may be properly viewed as a necessary step in the pro-
* ,
cess of self-overcoming. This self-overcoming i s , of course, the key
to Nietzsche's humanism.
From the foregoing i t seems quite clear that Jaspers very per
siste n tly reads his own philosophy into his interpretation of
Nietzsche. He continually seeks to link up various aspects of
Nietzsche's thought with his own notions of Existenz, transcendence,
278
and Encompassing. Furthermore, he uses his own philosophy as a c r i
tical foil in such a way that his own c ritic a l standpoint is s t i l l
subject to Nietzsche's criticism s. Jaspers' interpretation also re
veals that his own temperament is in .many ways radically opposed to
Nietzsche's. Perhaps the greatest objection to Jaspers' interpre
tation is that as a Nietzsche interpretation i t is not really in t e l
ligible without a knowledge of Jaspers' own philosophy. Nonetheless,
Jaspers' interpretation is an exciting challenge and succeeds in lay
ing open many c ritic a l questions which must be thoroughly investigated,
if one is to understand Nietzsche at a l l . What .is most remarkable of .
all is the genuineness of the attempt at dialogue with a thinker who
so radically opposes so much in Jaspers' own thinking. Nietzsche did
'not demand agreement, in fa c t, he was suspicious of i t . The dialogue
which he envisioned as a part of the movement along the path to the
Superman was of necessity characterized by opposition. At times such
dialogue takes place here between Jaspers and Nietzsche.
How Heidegger Reads His O w n Philosophy
into Nietzsche
W e have already taken note of the fa c t that Heidegger's r e l
ation to Nietzsche is different from that of Jaspers' in that
Heidegger's interpretation is an ex p licit attempt to illu s tr a te a
thesis which extends beyond the context of Nietzsche's philosophy.
Nonetheless, one can f a irly expect an interpretation which remains
true to the s p ir i t of Nietzsche's philosophy. Heidegger's in te re st in
and emphasis on Nietzsche's metaphysics is understandable, however,
279
his attempt to subsume Nietzsche's philosophical anthropology under
metaphysics must be rejected. This attempted subsumption is one of the
major ways in which Heidegger reads his own philosophy into
Nietzsche's. Heidegger's c r i t i c a l standpoint, like Jaspers', is sub
je c t to Nietzsche's own criticism s. Heidegger also seems to take i t
for granted that these possible criticism s by Nietzsche are either
self-refuting or else he believes that his own c ritic a l standpoint is
self-ju stify in g .
Heidegger's major thesis is that Nietzsche's philosophy, far
from being an "overcoming" of metaphysics, is in many respects the
acme of metaphysics. What is metaphysics in Heidegger's sense? W e
have already discussed what Heidegger calls the fundamental "mistake"
of metaphysics and discovered that i t consisted of the concern with
the question of the Being of e n titie s rather than the genuine question
of ontology which seeks the essence of Being as such. However, much
more is involved here. This "mistake" resulted in a gradual separa
tion of ontology (which "degenerates" into metaphysics) and epistem-
ology. Heidegger's conception of fundamental ontology involves an
"overcoming" of metaphysics which is p a rtia lly achieved through a re
uniting of ontology and epistemology. The root of the "mistake" which
led to this separation i s , for Heidegger, to be found in the basic
metaphysical distinction between subject and object. For Heidegger,
this is the "original sin" of metaphysics and one which all t r a
ditional philosophy up until the present has inherited. W e have a l
ready seen how Heidegger places Nietzsche in the epistemological
280
trad itio n of "subjectivism" which in its modern version dates from
Descartes. W e have also remarked that-this historical analysis of
Heidegger's is rather dubious. However, more importantly, Heidegger's
criterio n for metaphysics can viewed in another way. Heidegger re
gards every system of philosophy as "metaphysical," i f i t does not
grasp Being as transcendence. He argues that the only philosophers
who have even begun to approximate genuine ontology are Heraclitus and
Parmenides. The subsequent development of the history of Western phi
losophy as metaphysics was a necessary stage in the history of the un
folding of Being-according to Heidegger's view—and Nietzsche simul
taneously brings metaphysics to its highest development and also to
its conclusive end as a dead-end. This event opens up the po ssib ility
for genuine ontology once more and Heidegger sees his own work on the
problem of Being as such as the foundation for this new tra d itio n .
Heidegger's concern with the problem of Being dates back to
his e a r lie s t concern with philosophy.
From the very beginning, Heidegger's exclusive preoccupation,
hence the unique sense of his way, has been to lay a foundation
for metaphysics. By his own account, i t all began on a summer day
in 1907 when, as an eighteen-year-old gymnasiast in Constance, he
received from Dr. Conrad Grober, later archbishop of Freiburg
(1932-48) but at th at time pastor of Trinity Chruch in Constance,
a book that was only gathering dust on Dr. Grober's shelf. I t was
Franz Brentano's dissertation, On the Manifold Sense of Being acc
ording to A ristotle (1862), and i t served not only to open
Heidegger's eyes to the problem of Being, but to introduce him
into the philosophical world of the Greeks.12
Also Heidegger's f i r s t major philosophical work was in the area of
Scholastic philosophy and was t i t l e d , The Doctrine of Categories and
12Richardson, Heidegger, pp. 3-4.
281
Signification in Duns Scotus (the texts were at th at time attributed
to Scotus, but were la te r discovered to be the work of Thomas of
Erfurt). Heidegger has an almost'mystical attitude about the begin
nings of philosophical thought (both historical and individual) dic
tating the subsequent course of that thinking toward what he calls its
"destiny." In any case, Heidegger has unswervingly pursued the ques
tion of Being and none of his work is untouched by this concern. To
many Heidegger's concern with Being is anachronistic in an age charac
terized by s c ie n tific technology, lin g u istic analysis, and logical pos
itivism, yet in Heidegger's writing there is often a'kind of urgency,
since Heidegger is to ta lly convinced that unless th is modern era does
concern i t s e l f with the question of Being, all of its other achieve
ments will be vacuous. I t is clear that this, question of Being is , for
Heidegger, no mere in tellectual game. His total involvement with Being
and its destiny is strongly remeniscent of-the A ristotelian Scho
la stic s who were an early and lasting influence on his thinking. It
is precisely this quality in his thinking that creates an ambivalence.
On the one hand,, his p artic u la r analyses of Dasein and of contemporary
society are often penetrating and precise. On the other hand, his
concern with Being often seems as nebulous and distant as the more
abstruse parts of the philosophizing of the Scholastics.
One can readily react with precisely this ambivalence to
Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche. There are aspects of his
interp retatio n .th at are highly stimulating and lead to new insights
regarding the nature of Nietzsche's metaphysical enterprise. However,
282
all too often, Nietzsche gets buried under Heidegger's attempt to dem
onstrate his thesis. Heidegger's committment to a doctrine of tran
scendence also strongly conditions the nature of his interpretive in
vestigation and c ritic ism ’of Nietzsche. The ways in which Heidegger
reads his own position into' Nietzsche can best be seen by a brief re
examination of the general outlines and movement of his interpretation.
One of Heidegger's main interpretive aims is to explicate the
"essential unity" of Nietzsche's philosophy. He argues that the notion
of Being as Becoming is equivalent to the Will to Power which is in
turn equivalent to Eternal Recurrence. Furthermore, Heidegger derives
the notion of truth from Becoming and the doctrine of Transvaluation
from Eternal Recurrence. The doctrine of the Superman is , for •
Heidegger, also derivative from the Will to Power and we have already
examined the very peculiar nature of this argument, which fuses cos
mology and "psychology" (philosophical anthropology) and "concludes"
from ‘ this th a t, since cosmology centers around the Will to Power,
Nietzsche's metaphysics as a kind of "psychology" is a "subjectivism"
which "necessarily" leads to the Superman as a manifestation of the
metaphysics of the Will to Power.
If we accept the notion that.there is an essential dualism at
the core of Nietzsche's philosophy characterized by the opposition of
the cosmological and anthropological perspectives, then Heidegger's
attempt to unify Nietzsche is contrary to the essential nature of
Nietzsche's philosophy. However, even i f one does not accept the the
s i s of a dualism in Nietzsche, Heidegger's arguments can hardly be
283
regarded as convincing. Certainly his fusion of cosmology and "psy
chology" is very tenuous indeed. Furthermore, if we re je c t the notion
of dualism,, we are l e f t with Heidegger's d ifficulty of not being able
to make sense of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence.
W e have already mentioned Heidegger's fondness for playing on
the relationships which e x ist between thesis and antithesis. He uses
this device in his c r itic a l rejections of Nietzsche's claim th a t his
philosophy is a reversal or inversion of Platonism. Heidegger takes
Platonism to be a characterization of all philosophy since Plato and
prior to Nietzsche and thereby regards i t as also being a charac
terization of metaphysics as such. From this Heidegger argues th a t
Nietzsche's inversion is also s t i l l metaphysics because i t is the an
tithesis of the thesis of Platonism. However, Heidegger arrives a t
this conclusion only by already assuming in advance that Nietzsche's
attempt to "overcome" metaphysics is not successful.
' Heidegger characterizes Nietzsche's inversion of Platonism in
terms of the relationship between, a rt and truth. For Plato, truth is
higher than a r t, but fo r Nietzsche a r t is higher than truth. Heidegger
argues that Plato and Nietzsche both have essentially the same basic
notion of truth as "representation." This alone, for Heidegger,places
Nietzsche in the tra d itio n of metaphysics as Platonism. Heidegger r e
gards the only, genuine notion'of truth to be that of aletheia or "un-
hiddenness" and argues that only by means’of this notion of Truth is
the "overcoming" of metaphysics to be accomplished. Heidegger argues
that Nietzsche's conception of truth is that presented by the
tradition of classical metaphysics by means of his interpretation of
Nietzsche's notion of truth as homoiosis. As we have already seen,
this argument is certainly questionable and illu s tra te s very well
Heidegger's penchant for imposing the structure of his own philoso
phizing on th a t'o f Nietzsche.
Heidegger's charge of anthropomorphism or ''humanization" with
regard to Nietzsche's metaphysics is. also questionable, for i t req
uires some highly dubious "interpretations" of some of Nietzsche's re
marks, in which he clearly and e x p lic itly states an anti-anthropo
morphic view of metaphysics. Here, as in a number of other cases,
Heidegger establishes the connections he wants by means of metaphy
sical puns. He plays on the notion of anthropomorphism in such a way
that sometimes he uses i t in a tautological sense, when he is c r i t
icising Nietzsche, and other times he uses i t in a restricted sense
such that' i t can be "overcome" and i t is th is sense which he uses in
defending his own analytic of Dasein.
This punning also extends to his discussion of nihilism, for
he fin a lly comes to regard metaphysics as equivalent to nihilism. From
his previous "conclusion" th at Nietzsche is s t i l l rooted in trad
itional metaphysics, i t is an easy step to the charge that Nietzsche's
philosophy is n ih ilis tic . This, of course, has v irtu ally nothing to
do with Nietzsche's discussions of nihilism. Heidegger's charge rests
on a c ritic a l basis which is external to Nietzsche's own philosophy.
This basis is , of course, his doctrine of Being as transcendence and
from our discussion of Jaspers, i t is already apparent what criticisms
285
could be advanced against this view from Nietzsche's standpoint.
Heidegger's interpretation suffers from several major weak
nesses. (1) Heidegger reads his own special concern with the problem
of Being into Nietzsche. (2) Heidegger attempts to unify Nietzsche's
philosophy in such a way that he virtually discounts the entire d i
mension of philosophical anthropology. (3) Some of Heidegger's argu
ments re st on what can only be regarded as a "forcing" of Nietzsche's
tex ts. (4) Heidegger leaves certain central issues in "suspension",
especially the problem of the metaphysical meaning of the doctrine of
Eternal Recurrence. S tric tly speaking, this "suspension" has disas
trous consequences. Heidegger virtually admits th at his interpretation
of Eternal Recurrence comes to a dead-end when he says that i t may re
quire decades before this thought can be fu lly thought, but i f this is
true and i f , as Heidegger claims, Eternal Recurrence is equivalent to
the doctrine of Being as Becoming, then Nietzsche's entire metaphysics
is in "suspension" and Heidegger has, in effe c t, said that at this
time no interpretation of Nietzsche is possible!
Heidegger's Nietzsche interpretation reveals much more about
Heidegger's own philosophy than i t does about Nietzsche's. W e have
seen that Jaspers' interpretation presupposes a certain fam iliarity
which his philosophy and th is is even more true in the case of
Heidegger's interpretation. On the whole, Heidegger's interpretation,
as an interpretation of Nietzsche is a fa ilu re . I t does force one to
examine more deeply certain aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy, espe
cially metaphysical ones, but'in general the contexts in which
286
Nietzsche's ideas are presented are misleading. There are some in
teresting and sometimes penetrating insights into Nietzsche, but one
could hard-ly recommend Heidegger's interpretation as an explication of
Nietzsche's thought.. There is much here of interest to the Heidegger
sp ecialist, some of which is not to be found in any of Heidegger's
other writings, but unfortunately Heidegger reads his own philosophy
into his interpretations in such a way that i t tends to dominate and
thereby obscure Nietzsche's philosophy.
Doctrines versus Contradictions
One way of characterizing Jaspers' method of interpreting
Nietzsche might be as a "radicalization" of dialectic. At every point
Jaspers is interested in discovering oppositions to Nietzsche's theses
and attempts to map out the often complex paths in Nietzsche's think
ing. Jaspers succeeds in showing the in tricate convolutions of
Nietzsche's highly associative style of thinking. Nietzsche' think
ing is often exploratory, investigative, tentative and he returns a-
gain and again to the same problems to examine them from new perspec
tives. His usual method of dividing his works into many short sec
tions can be misleading, for these short, sections are by no means ran
dom jottings. It is well known that Nietzsche spent much time polish
ing and re-working'these sections before he would publish them as a
book. Furthermore, the relations between the various sections are not
as random as they might appear on a casual reading. One can often
discern a flow of associated ideas moving in a rather well-defined
287
direction. Sometimes, Jaspers' discussions show th is inner movement
very well, though at other times his dissection of the texts in his
search for contradictions tends to obscure th is movement. On the
whole, Jaspers method succeeds in bringing to the foreground the es
sen tially dynamic character of Nietzsche's thought. However, an in ter
pretation which so strongly emphasizes th is "dialectic of contradic
tion" tends to obscure the internal coherence of Nietzsche's thought.
Heidegger's interpretation-, on the other hand, centers around
an investigation of Nietzsche's doctrines. Heidegger succeeds in dem
onstrating that Nietzsche's philosophy contains d efin ite sets of con-,
cepts that are essentially interrelated. Heidegger shows quite con
vincingly that Nietzsche does take up d efinite positions which come to
define the framework within which the d ialectic is possible. Howevery".
Heidegger's interpretation focuses so exclusively on the doctrines
th a t one gets l i t t l e sense of Nietzsche's d ia le c tic .
The obvious conclusion to be drawn is th at any adequate in ter
pretation of Nietzsche must take into account both his d ialectic and
his. doctrines. In fa c t, a careful study of Nietzsche will show that
Nietzsche uses his dialectical method of philosophizing as a means of
explicating the central doctrines of his philosophy. Here, however,
we need to be careful .how we understand the notion of doctrine.
Nietzsche's doctrines are essentially frameworks within which he phi
losophizes d ialectically . The doctrine of the Superman is a good i l
lu stration of th is. For Nietzsche, the "nature" of the Superman is to
be indicated in two ways. The f i r s t involves a presentation of
certain defining c h aracteristics, which is essential, for otherwise we
would have an u tte rly empty concept. Examples of such defining charac
te r is tic s are, as we have already seen, self-overcoming, honesty, and
dignity. The other way in which the "nature" of the Superman is made
determinate is in terms-of relative goals, which are related to the
specific circumstances th at obtain in the present. • That is to say,
Nietzsche's "critique" of the contemporary situation posits certain
more or less immediate goals which-lie along the path to the Superman,
but they are nonetheless relative goals, for when they are achieved
they too must be surpassed. An example of this is Nietzsche's notion
of the "democratization" of Europe which he sees as a temporary goal
along the path to the Superman, Democratization is not in i t s e l f a
goal, but rather a stage to be realized and then overcome in man's
struggle for self-overcoming. -Total self-overcoming is , for Nietzsche,
a contradiction in terms. Man will always have the task of overcoming
himself, but as he proceeds higher and higher along th is path, his im
mediate goal will no longer be visible to us from where we now stand.
Thus the dialectical contents of the new philosophies cannot be de
termined in advance, but the dynamics of self-overcoming will' continue
to provide the conceptual framework. From this we can see th at the
doctrines of Nietzsche's philosophy are not designed to le g isla te par
tic u la r values th at are then to be absolutized. On the contrary, s p e
c ific values must be determined situationaliy and these situations
cannot be predicted.
The deeper one attempts to penetrate into N ietzsche's thought
the clearer i t becomes that Nietzsche's whole project was in many ways
a radical experiment beyond tradition. Nietzsche himself-describes his
work as a "philosophy for the future." In order to grasp fully
Nietzsche's philosophical "revolution," an interpretation is needed
which explicates his doctrines in terms of his d ialectical mode of
communication. Nietzsche's aim in communication was the involvement
of the whole person not simply the in te lle c t. Nietzsche rejects tr a
ditional dualisms and his notion of communication is an illu stra tio n of
his attempt to overcome the dichotomy of reason and emotion. In spite
of Heidegger's arguments to the contrary, Nietzsche also rejects the
dualism of subject and object. His conception of life in some ways
anticipates Heidegger's notion of Being-in-the-World, although
Heidegger's notion is more fully developed in a systematic fashion.
Furthermore, Nietzsche goes beyond tra d itio n in the penetration of his
psychological insights and creates a new focus on the motivations for
human behavior, especially in i t s relation to value problems.
All the evidence points to a b elief on Nietzsche's part that
he is presenting a new and fundamental in sig h t into the human condition
and while this insight may not be precisely new, certainly Nietzsche
presents i t with much greater force than any philosopher prior to his
time. To grasp the essential nature of th is insight depends upon rec
ognizing the essential dualism in the essence of the human being which
is the motive force for the d ialectical development of the whole of
Nietzsche's philosophy.
290
CHAPTER V _
A N ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION: A‘FUNDAM ENTAL' < - *
DUALISM IN NIETZSCHE'S TH O U G H T
In the preceding chapters we have tried to show, by means of
an examination of the interpretations of Jaspers and Heidegger, the
negative consequences of attempting an interpretation of Nietzsche
without having f i r s t taken into account the essential dualism in
Nietzsche's theory of man which constitutes the core of his philos
ophy. In fa c t, i t is precisely because Jaspers and Heidegger have bas
ically ignored th is dualism that they can arrive at two rad ically d if
ferent in terpretations. Certain aspects of these interpretations are
so starkly in opposition, that one sometimes wonders i f they are both
talking about the same philosopher. One of the best illu stra tio n s of
this opposition is -to be found in a comparison between Heidegger's
derivation of truth from homoiosis and Jaspers' explication of truth
as contradiction in the form of vicious circularity. Heidegger seizes
on the metaphysical or cosmological pole of the dualism, and Jaspqrs
on the pole of philosophical anthropology. For Heidegger, all of
Nietzsche's philosophy can be subsumed under metaphysics and, for
Jaspers, what cannot be subsumed under philosophical anthropology is
eith er aberrant or more or less irrelevant.
I t is interesting th at both Heidegger and Jaspers im plicitly
recognize this dualism, as we saw in the course of our analysis; but
because of the in i t i a l biases which condition their in terp retatio n s,
neither of them goes on to explore i t s ramifications. In their own
way, each of their interpretations points to the need for a recogni
tion of this fundamental, dualism. This shows up in terms of the con
sequences of ignoring or denying th is dialectical interplay between
the cosmological and the anthropological perspectives. Consider, for
example, Jaspers' emphasis on philosophical anthropology. From his
discussions i t is clear th at, even though he often does not agree with
Nietzsche, Jaspers has great respect for Nietzsche's powers of insight
and his a b ility to push the analysis of a problem to i t s most primor
dial foundations. Yet, at the same time, his interpretation neces
s ita te s accepting the idea th at Nietzsche's metaphysical insights are
naive to the point of s e lf-re fu ta tio n . This is a d iffic u lt view to
accept, and in terms of the thesis of the dualism i t is not necessary
to accept i t . However, one might ask in defense of Jaspers, if
Jaspers is so naive as not to see th is dualism in Nietzsche's thought.
And, of course, the answer is that Jaspers is not naive. W e have
already pointed out that he does recognize the dualism, but he does
not develop i t . The reasons for th is are to be found in Jaspers' own
philosophical position and his rejection of Nietzsche's non-
traditional notion of TRANSCENDENCE.
Heidegger's "resolution" of the dualism in terms of meta
physics is equally unsatisfactory. His "metaphysicalization" of
Nietzsche leaves one in a quandary regarding large and significant
sections of-Nietzsche's thought. This is in part due to an over
reaction oh Heidegger's part against the previous interpretations of
292
Nietzsche as a 1ife-philosopher, a value philosopher, or a philosopher-
poet. Certainly there is ju st cause for Heidegger's reaction, but the
extremism of his reaction tends to cast the whole dimension of philo
sophical anthropology into limbo. As a result, Heidegger's interpre
tation is not only one-sided, but is misleading as well. Let us,
therefore, take a retrospective look at Nietzsche's philosophy, in terms
of the th esis of the dualism presented by the opposition of the per
spectives of cosmology and philosophical anthropology in an attempt to
discover the significance and the ramifications o f.th is th e sis for in
terpreting Nietzsche.
Nietzsche's Metaphysics and Epistemolog.y
•In the metaphysics and epistemology of Nietzsche, there are
two problems which lead to the thesis of a fundamental dualism—the
problem of tru th and the problem of Eternal Recurrence. Nietzsche's
statement th a t all truths are fictions (perspectives of anthropos)
leads e ith e r to vicious circu larity or else to a d istin ctio n between
levels. That is to say, either the statement i t s e l f is a fic tio n , in
which case we have a paradox, or else the statement is a meta-truth
which does not apply to it s e l f . W e have already examined some of the
arguments against accepting i t as a paradox and have seen some of the
advantages of accepting i t as a meta-truth or TRUTH. On reflectio n ,
we can see th a t the acceptance of the paradox is absolutely disas
trous with regard to Nietzsche's metaphysics, fo r then his funda
mental doctrines of Being as Becoming, the Will to Power as Becoming,
293
the doctrine of Transvaluation as the means to the Superman-all of
this and much more would be reduced to fictions and would create more
paradoxes. If, however, we accept the notion of a TRUTH that is not
fiction, then we are faced with the question as to how th is difference
' in levels is possible, for the level of TRUTH has to be one which is
not within the perspectives of l i f e . The answer must be that there is
a possibility inherent in the human being for adopting a perspective
which is opposed to the perspectives of l i f e . This is the cosmological
perspective which we have described as TRANSCENDENCE because of its
opposition to the perspectives of l i f e . There is nothing new or rad
ically mystical about th is perspective; i t has been with us since man
f i r s t began to philosophize. The French biologist.Rostand states the
vision of this perspective in an especially powerful way.
The human species will disappear. L ittle by l i t t l e the small s ta r
which is our sun will lose its lightening and warming force. Then,
of all this human and superhuman c iv iliz a tio n , these discoveries,
philosophies, ideals, relig io n s, nothing will subsist. In this
minuscule corner of the universe, the pale adventure of the proto
plasm will be eliminated forever—the adventure which perhaps is ■
finished already in other worlds and may be renewed in another J-
world, which is everywhere supported by the same illu sio n s,
creating the same to rtu re s, everywhere equally absurd and vain,
everywhere promised final fa ilu re and in fin ite darkness from the
s t a r t J
This is the perspective opposed to l i f e and i t is contained in the es
sential nature of man. Its mere acceptance results in radical n ih il
ism which, for Nietzsche, must be overcome. The n ullity revealed by
the thought of death becomes a double reflection and gives a new
"•Rostand quoted in Wilfrid Desan, The Traqic Finale (New
York, 1960), p .2.
294
significance to Itfe and leads to Nietzsche's notion of the "eternal-
ization" of the moment. For Nietzsche, the cosmological perspective
must not result in a stagnation and resignation, but rather should es
tablish a dialogue with lif e which reveals not only its transitoriness,
' but its beauty and meaning as well. In The Joyful Wisdom Nietzsche ob
serves (in a section called "The Thought of Death") that men do not
want to think of death. Nietzsche regards th is as good and states his
wish that men would devote th e ir attentions to lif e .
It gives me a melancholy happiness to live in the midst of this
confusion of streets, of necessities, of voices: how much enjoy
ment, impatience and desire, how much th irs ty l i f e and drunken
ness of life comes to light here every moment! And yet i t will
soon be so s ti l l for all these shouting, lively, life-loving
people! How everyone's shadow, his gloomy travel!ing-companion
stands behind him! I t is always as in the la s t moment before the
departure of an emigrant-ship: people have more than ever to say
to one another, the hour presses, the ocean with its lonely s i
lence waits impatiently behind all the noise—so greedy,so certain
of its prey! And a l l , a l l , suppose th a t the past has been nothing
or a small matter, th at the near future is everything: hence this
haste, this crying, this self-deafening and self-overreaching!
Everyone wants to be foremost in th is f u tu r e ,—and yet death and
the stilln e ss of death are the only things certain and common to
all in this future! How strange th at th is sole thing that is cer
tain and common to a l l , exercises almost no influence on men, and
that they are the furthest from regarding themselves as the bro
therhood of death! I t makes me happy to see that men do not want
to think at all of the idea of death! I would fain do something
to make the idea of l i f e even a hundred times more worthy of their
a tte n tio n .2
This passage is especially important in two ways. F irst of a l l , i t
emphasizes Nietzsche's central focus on l i f e and its celebration. Sec
ondly, i t underscores the fin a lity of the vision of the cosmological
perspective that "death and the s tilln e s s of death are the only things
2Nietzsche, The Joyful Wisdom, pp. 215-16.
295
certain and common to all in this future!" This is consistent with
Nietzsche's view that ultimately lif e is tragic, that woven into the
fabric of l i f e is the terrifying aspect of death, but th is too must
be fin a lly affirmed. This view is one that Nietzsche held throughout
his active l i f e and in- 1888 he wrote the following:
The profundity of the tragic a r tis t lie s in th is , th a t his aes
th etic in s tin c t surveys the more remote consequences, th a t he does
not halt shortsightedly a t what is closest at hand, th at he affirms
the large-scale economy which ju stifie s the te rrify in g , the e v i l ,
the questionable—and more than merely ju stifie s t h e m .3
It is at th is point that we arrive at the,full significance of
Nietzsche's th esis th a t a rt is higher than truth. In knowledge and
action man is always limited by the perspectives of his existence. His
highest creative act is not the pursuit of truth, but the attempt to
create himself as a work of a rt. This for Nietzsche is the source of
redemption—not a redemption "beyond" l i f e , but a redemption within
lif e i t s e l f . In 1886 he wrote,
Art as the redemption of the man of knowledge—of those who
see the te rrify in g and questionable character of existence, who
want to see i t , the men of tragic knowledge.
Art .as the redemption of the man of action—of those who not •
only see the terrifying and questionable character of existence
but live it,w ant to live i t , the tragic-warlike man, the hero.4
For Nietzsche, the rejection of all traditional forms of transcendence
is a necessity, for only through this rejection is i t possible for man
to appropriate l i f e for himself and create himself as the highest ex
pression of the Will to Power. From all of t h i s , i t seems ju s tif ie d
to argue that there is rooted in Nietzsche's theory of man the
^Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 451. 4ibid. , p. 452.
296
irreconcilable dualism between the'cosmological perspective and the
perspectives of philosohical anthropology.
This leaves us with the problem of accounting for the meta
physical or lite ra l version of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. As
we have seen, neither Jaspers' interpretation nor Heidegger's can con
vincingly account for this aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy. I t is
important here to remember that Nietzsche himself is ambivalent about
this doctrine and even goes so fa r as to say that i t may not be tru e—
"Let others wrestle with i t . " In terms of the thesis of the i r
reconcilable dualism in the nature of man, an explanation comes im
mediately to the fore, namely, that the metaphysical doctrine of Eter
nal Recurrence is the attempt to reconcile the two poles of the dual- .
ism. However, the only p o ssibility for such a "reconciliation"is a
doctrine of transcendence. Jaspers is quite right in pointing out
that Nietzsche's thought does at times push out in th is direction. To
the very end, however, Nietzsche continues to reject the traditional
forms of transcendence. The impulse toward transcendence, toward the
absolute, is far from mysterious. Nietzsche accounts for i t in his
discussion of the perspectives of philosophical anthropology. Man has
the urgent need to discover some absolute foundation which ju s tif ie s
and gives permanence to his existence. He has the desperate desire
to see himself as somehow central to the issues of the cosmos. For
Nietzsche, philosophy is no mere in tellectual game; i t is the most
intense involvement with existence it s e l f . Thus, i t is not only not
surprising that Nietzsche himself experienced th is impulse toward the
297
absolute, i t is a revelation of the depths of his experience of the
human condition. Nietzsche recognizes this impulse in himself and
.calls i t the "longing for etern ity ." "All joy wants deep profound
etern ity ." This is the source of Nietzsche's desire to reconcile the
irreconcilable. From the standpoint of ontology only, excluding any
theological dimensions, the metaphysical doctrine of Eternal Recurrence
demands a doctrine of Being-as transcendence which would not only in
troduce paradoxes into Nietzsche's metaphysics, but would raise ques
tions about the "scientific" nature of his presuppositions as well.
There are five advantages to interpreting-Nietzsche in terms
of this thesis of an irreconcilable dualism grounded in his theory of
man. (1) This thesis eliminates unnecessary paradoxes in Nietzsche's
philosophy as a whole and presents a more coherent view of the re la -'
tionships between the various doctrines. (2) This interpretive ap
proach explains Nietzsche's self-admitted ambivalence toward the doc
trin e of Eternal Recurrence. (3) I t also accounts for the origin of
the metaphysical version of Eternal Recurrence in such a way as to re
main consistent with Nietzsche's rejection of the traditional doc
trines of transcendence. (4) This thesis transforms the meaning of
the anthropological version of Eternal Recurrence in such a way as to
make i t of even greater significance. (5) The thesis of a dualism,
both poles of which are grounded in the essence of man himself, pro
vides the basis fo r the notion of a dialectic which grasps the es
sen tially dynamic character of Nietzsche's philosophizing. In fa c t,
i t is only in terms of such a notion of dialectic that the fu ll
298
meaning of the Transvaluation of all values can be grasped.
Nietzsche's Philosophical Anthropology
With regard to Nietzsche's philosophical anthropology, there
are two major interpretive problems--Transvaluation and Eternal Recur
rence as a doctrine of the "eternalization" of the moment. In both
Jaspers' and Heidegger's interpretations i t is d iff ic u lt to under
stand the workings of Transvaluation. I f , however, we accept the the
sis of the dualism, then the general outlines of the d ialectic of
Transvaluation become visible. The confrontation with the TRUTH re
vealed by the cosmological perspective creates a new significance for
life through the transformation of the meaning of time. T.S. Eliot
expresses this insight regarding time in the f i r s t of his Four
Quartets.
If all time is eternally present
All time is unredeemable.
What might have been is an abstraction
Remaining a perpetual p o ssibility
Only in a world of speculation.^
Nietzsche's demand is that one not live in a "world of speculation."
The past takes on its significance because we appropriate i t and a f
firm i t ; we Will i t to have been thus. If "all time is unredeemable"
then we must create in the present in the f u ll e s t and highest manner
of which we are capable. However, Nietzsche's celebration of the pre
sent, the "eternal izati on" of the moment, is not a doctrine of
^T.S.Eliot, Four Quartets (New York, 1943), p .3.
299
hedonism. There is a radical distinction between the ecstatic a f
firmation of existence and the pursuit of pleasure. The pursuit of
pleasure is directed outside of oneself in that it s satisfaction de
pends on externals which define one's situation. Nietzsche's con
ception of affirm ation, however, comes from the inner depths of the
individual himself. For Nietzsche, pleasure can never be the goal of
existence; the goal is self-overcoming and the attempt to 're a liz e
one's p o s sib ilitie s in the richest way. This goal is determined by
the dialectical opposition of the perspectives of cosmology and l i f e .
The highest a rt of living is to create for oneself as many moments as
possible that one would be willing to live again and again. This is
the anthropological significance of Eternal Recurrence. To live a
l if e dominated by th is vision would be to demand continuously the very
best of which one is capable. To Nietzsche this "aesthetic" of ex
istence is the only possible "justificatio n " for life .
In terms of the d ialectic demanded by the dualism of perspec
tives the dynamic character of the doctrine of the Superman receives a
new emphasis. Man, as the "not-yet fixated animal," w ill, as long as
his species survives, be in the process of self-d efin itio n . There will
always be something in man which must be overcome. Nietzsche fully
realized that human advancement is an e rra tic thing. He even points
out th at, in spite of man's cleverness and inventiveness, he has not
yet sufficien tly matured to "humanize" his technological creations.He
also realized th a t every age will have its "sacred" b eliefs, its "new"
absolutes to r e s t r i c t and supress c reativ ity . In every age i t will be
300
a fundamental TRUTH that "the Superman has not.yet arrived."
The doctrines of Eternal Recurrence (anthropologically con
sidered) and Transvaluation are Nietzsche's answer to radical nihilism.
It is an answer of tragic strength. Nietzsche had l i t t l e sympathy for
those who indulge in se lf-p ity . For Nietzsche, those who do not have
the strength to face the TRUTH of th e ir existence, ju st pass away and
are forgotten, for they are the despisers of‘ l i f e , the poisoners who
want to keep man enslaved through doctrines of a better lif e "beyond."
This is the meaning of Nietzsche's conceptions of "breeding" and "an
nihilation," manely, the overcoming of the despisers of lif e and the
creation of conditions which will demand the strength to create values
in the face of one's own finitude. Consider the figure of Oedipus had
he bemoaned his fa te . His fellow citizens would soon have come to re
gard him as irrita tin g and troublesome. Only by accepting his fate
with dignity could he maintain his tragic dimension and keep i t from
degenerating into something merely pathetic. For Nietzsche, only,
through amor fati is i t possible for man to retain his dignity and cre
ate for himself a tra g ic , but noble existence. Nietzsche firmly be
lieves that i f man cannot do th is , then he deserves to succumb. If
mankind can preserve i t s e l f only as .the "last men," then i t is better
that such a species does not survive.
• For Nietzsche, doctrines of transcendence are flights from the
TRUTH which is revealed to us by the cosmological perspective and are,
thereby, flights from l i f e as well. The thesis-of the dualism helps,
us to understand Nietzsche's criticism of doctrines of transcendence
301
as a form of hybris. Nietzsche argues that notions of transcendence
are designed to give man a special place in the cosmos as though, cre
ation had taken place for his benefit. At the same time such doc
trin es rob man of his dignity and freedom by leg islatin g his acts.
This claim to special significance within the cosmos Nietzsche un
reservedly brands as hybris. His own conception of the Superman, he
believes, escapes the charge, for in the d ialectic of Transvaluation
there is always the opposing cosmological perspective to balance man's
view of himself and crush his conceit and arrogance. For Nietzsche,
man's only possible claim to dignity is grounded in the p o ssib ility
of s e lf - creating and self-overcoming in the face of his recognition
of his own fin itu d e —and insight which is revealed to him through the
cosmological perspective.
Some Concluding Remarks
I-t'is not the function of .interpretation to render its subject
immune from criticism and, in any case, Nietzsche needs no apologist.
However, i t is the responsibility of interpretation to explicate its
subject in such a way as to bring out its f u lle s t significance. There
is much that can be criticized in Nietzsche and many perspectives from
which such an enterprise can be undertaken. However, an age which has
heaped so much blame on Nietzsche and has perversely distorted so many
of his ideas owes him a f a ir hearing. The thesis of the fundamental
dualism in Nietzsche's thought is here presented as an insight which
has th a t aim in mind. The insights we have gained in our analyses
302
present the outline for an interpretation of Nietzsche which is an
attempt to understand his philosophy in his own terms. No interpre
tation can be completely unbiased, but obvious biases and distortions
must be eliminated. In fa c t, an interpretation which does not c r i t i
cally examine its own standpoint is always in danger of reading its
own presuppositions into its subject.
There is no fear th at anyone will have "the last word" about
Nietzsche. For Nietzsche, philosophy i t s e l f is process and i t becomes
dogmatic only at the cost of undermining it s e l f . The dialogue that
is genuine philosophy pushes man to the lim its of his self-under
standing. This is the dialogue between cosmology and anthropology.
M an can attain a cosmic perspective "beyond" and opposed to l i f e —a
perspective which reveals to him th at Becoming has no absolute values
or goals. The metaphysics of the Will to Power is neutral value-wise;
the cosmos neither values nor dis-values man. However, man as a sper
cific individualized manifestation of the Will to Power must ex ist in
terms of evaluation apd so there arises an unbridgeable gap between
his cosmic perspective and his "existential" perspectives—a gap that
Nietzsche himself was a t times tempted to try and bridge. It was
perhaps this very temptation which Nietzsche was thinking about when
he had Zarathustra say:
How lovely i t is th a t there are words and sounds! Are not
words and sounds rainbows and illu siv e bridges between things
which are eternally apart?
To every soul there belongs another world; for every soul,
every other soul, is an afterworld. Precisely between what
303
is most sim ilar, illusion lie s most beautifully; for the
smallest c le ft is the hardest to bridge.6
^Nietzsche,Zarathustra, p. 329.
304
BIBLIOGRAPHY .
Nietzsche's Works
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a
Philosophy of the Future. Translated by Walter Kaufmann.
New York: Random House, Inc., 1966.
_. The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner. Translated by
Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, Inc., 1967.
_. The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche. Vol. I: The
Birth of Tragedy. Translated by William A. Haussmann. Vol.
II: Early Greek Philosophy and Other Essays. Translated by
M . A. Mugge. Vol . I I I : The Future of Our Educational I n s t i
tutions . Translated by J. M . Kennedy. VoT. IT: Thoughts Uut
of Season, Part I . Translated by A. M . Ludovici. Vol. V:
Thoughts Out of Season, Part I I . Translated by Adrian Collins.
Vol. VI: Human, All Too Human, Part I . Translated by Helen
Zimmern. Vol. VII: Human, All Too Human, Part I I . Translated
by Paul V. Cohn. Vol. VIII: The Case of Wagner.' Translated
by A. M . Ludovici. Vol. IX: The Dawn of Day. Translated by
J. M . Kennedy. Vol. X: The Joyful Wisdom. Translated by
Thomas Common. Vol. XI: Thus Spake Zarathustra. Translated
by Thomas Common. Vol. XII: Beyond Good and E vil. Translated
by Helen Zimmern. Vol. XIII: The Genealogy of Morals. Trans
lated by Horace B. Samuel. Vol. XIV: The Will to Power, Part
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Creator Howey, Richard Lowell (author)

Core Title A Critical Examination Of Heidegger'S And Jasper'S Interpretations Of Nietzsche

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Philosophy

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,Philosophy

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Werkmeister, William H. (committee chair), Macgregor, Geddes (committee member), Spalek, John M. (committee member), Willard, Dallas (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-712669

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