Management Of Change In Organizations--A Process Analysis

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Content This dissertation has been
microfilmed exactly as received
70-368
SIVASUBRAMANIAN, Sridaran, 1929-
MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE IN
ORGANIZATIONS - A PROCESS ANALYSIS.
U niversity of Southern California, Ph.D., 1969
P olitical Science, public administration
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan
MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE IN ORGANIZATIONS
A PROCESS ANALYSIS
by
Sridaran Sivasubramanian
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements fox the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(Public Administration)
June 1969
UNIVERSITY O F SO U TH ERN CALIFORNIA
TH E GRADUATE SC H O O L
UNIVERSITY PA RK
LO S A N G ELES, C A L IFO R N IA 9 0 0 0 7
This dissertation, written by
Sr idaran ,„Siv_asubramani_M........
under the direction of A...4-JL Dissertation Com
mittee, and approved by all its members, has
been presented to and accepted by The Gradu
ate School, in partial fulfillment of require
ments of the degree of
D O C T O R OF P H IL O S O P H Y
' 7 r , a jf °
Dean
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
No great improvements in the lot of
mankind are possible, unless a great
change takes place in the fundamental
constitution of their modes of thought.
— JOHN STUART MILL (1806-1873)
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The writer wishes to express his deep appreciation
to all those who helped him in the preparation of this
study.
From Professor Alexander W. McEachern, he re
ceived at all stages intellectual stimulation, day-to-day
counsel, and moral support.
For both criticism and encouragement, he is in
debted to Dr. Lyle Knowles and Dr. Herman Turk.
It is a pleasure to acknowledge grateful indebt
edness to Dr. William Herrmann and Dr* Robert H. Berkov
for their earlier inspiration.
Several scores of persons who gave so generously
of their time to make the field observation possible
cannot be named, inasmuch as it was agreed that they
should remain anonymous. These include the Field Assist
ants, Supervisors, Assistant Director, and the Director
of "C"; the consultants, Deputy Directors, and the Direc
tor of "H.M
iii
PREFACE
This is an exploratory study on the management of
change in formal organizations. The subject is so vast
that one is forced to deal with it suggestively rather
than exhaustively. The case anecdotes cited are something
like an abbreviated record of the writer's experience and
hence tends to be impressionistic. Readers might note
that in certain instances, the writer has reduced the
scope of this vast area by making explicit assumptions
about what is desirable and by overstating the empirical
truth of several assertions that he has made. Such pro
cedures, he feels, were needed in order to lend some
semblance of focus to an as yet ill-defined aspect of
administrative practice and study. Perhaps, one may find
in this inquiry situations so familiar as to be trite and
obvious.
However, the study seeks to develop a way of
thinking about the obvious that gives it depth and takes
into account the everyday behavior at work, instead of
dismissing it. It is submitted that in the penetration
of the obvious lies the adventure of human behavior and
change.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
PREFACE iv
LIST OF TABLES
LIST OF FIGURES ix
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION 1
Statement of the Problem
Objectives of the Study
Scope of the Study
Importance and Significance
of the Study
Methodology
Data Collection
Limitations of the Study
Organization of the Study
Nature of Work Change
Achieving Change in People
Cognitive Change
The Effects of Inducements
Effects on Seeking Information
Effects of Personal Contact
Effects of Participation
Individual Resistance (or Acceptance)
Group Resistance (or Acceptance)
What Is Resistance?
Bureaucracy*s Resistance to Change
Approaches Toward Reducing Resistance
Restoring Understanding
Conflict and Change
Conflicts Between Organizations
II. NATURE OF CHANGE 14
III. RESISTANCE TO CHANGE 37
Chapter
IV. THE UNFOLDING OF A PROCESS
OF CHANGE — A GENERIC SCHEME
State of the Organization
Before Change
State of the Organization
Before Change: Organization HCM
State of the Organization
Before Change: Organization HHH
Recognizing the Forces of and the
Need for Change
The Need for Change in "C"
The Need for Change in MHM
Planning for Change
The Plan for Change in "C"
The Plan for Change in "H"
Taking Action Steps to Make the Change
Taking Action Steps to Make
the Change at "C"
Taking Action Steps to Make
the Change at "H**
Stabilizing the Change
Stabilizing the Change at nCM
Stabilizing the Change at MH"
V. TOWARD A CONCEPTUALIZATION
OF STRATEGIC FACTORS . . . ...........
VI. THE GIVENS
Time
Applications to the Two
Organizations "C** and MHM
The Uniqueness of the Organization
HCH and "H“ Compared
Leadership
Leadership in "Ct t
Leadership in WHM
VII. THE PROCESSES .....................
Communication
Cybernetic Analysis and Change
Communication Breakdown
Communication in MCB
Communication in "H"
Page
75
111
123
154
vi
Chapter
Reinforcement
Extrinsic vs Intrinsic Rewards
Effects of Punishment
The Timing and Schedules of
Reinforcement
Co-optation
Extent of Co-optation in
"C" and "H"
VIII. THE OUTCOME...................
Learning New Skills
Factors Facilitating Learning
New Work Patterns for Key
Personnel
Quality of the Key Personnel
Control of Anxiety
Anxiety in "C*1
Anxiety in "H"
IX. SUMMARY AND GENERALIZATIONS . .
Strategies in Managing Changes
Pacing the Change
Using Power
Future Research
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................
vii
LIST OF TABLES
Table
1. Five-Phase Framework to
Study Change Process
viii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1. Roethlisbergerts "X" Chart ................ 19
2. Different Individual Reactions
to Change Are Sometimes Uni
fied Through Social Action ............. 20
3. Quasi Stationary Equilibrium 42
4. Quasi Stationary Equilibrium
for Non-Participating Group ............. 44
5. Quasi Stationary Equilibrium
for Participation Groups ............... 45
6* Stage of "Idea" ............. 91
7. Forces Affecting an On-Going
Social Process .......................... 92
8. Stage of "General Plan".................... 94
9. Interplay of Strategic Factors ........... 112
ix
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Every growing organization at some time faces the
problem of making substantial changes; growth may require
that goals may be changed, added to or further differen
tiated. The required changes may be local or widespread,
may consist of organizational restructuring, work reorgan
ization, or of the redefinition of executive and adminis
trative functions. In general, such changes are painful
and are usually dreaded by those who feel it necessary to
initiate them as by those who will find it necessary to
adjust to them.
Yet, most people when they can view the process
objectively will concede the necessity of change in organ
izations. Unfortunately, change in the established
routine of doing work inevitably produces change in em
ployees* work habits and often disturbs their position in
both the formal and the informal organization structure.
As Drucker observes, "Change is not only an intellectual
process but a psychological one as well."I
^Peter F. Drucker, The Practice of Management
(New York! Harper and Brothers, Publishers, -1954j, p. 269.
2
Administrators regularly face the problem of
effecting change in the behavior of others; employees
regularly face the problem of learning and adjusting the
expected changes* Despite the pressures on organizations
to change, there are many forces within the organization
that operate against a ready response to the need for
change* People expect changes to be planned to take cog
nizance of them as individuals with inalienable rights as
human beings, not simply as pawns to be manipulated for
the attainment of impersonal organizational objectives*
This then is the problem*
Statement of the Problem
In a highly dynamic society where demands for
change must be encountered, how can change and its pos
sible disruption be managed efficiently with reasonable
care for the feelings and rights of all members? How can
the changes required for the survival of an organization
be introduced, administered, and assimilated by the system
so that the internal requirements for equilibrium can also
be maintained?
Objectives of the Study
This is an exploratory study of the problem of
managing changes in formal organizations* The major
objective is to review the literature on organizational
change and focus on the problems surrounding the introduc
tion of planned changes. The second objective is to
develop a theoretical framework within which one can
operate and generate hypotheses for future inquiry.
Scope of the Study
The study includes the following:
A review of the literature on planned change in
organizations; the development of a generic scheme of the
change process; the identification of some strategic
factors in the management of change; and illustrations of
the theoretical formulations drawn from two on-going
organizations in California.
Importance and Significance
of the Study
Most organizational studies, observes Etzioni,
implicitly, if not explicitly, involve the study of change
of some variable or property.^ The subject of change is
commonly dealt with as a distinct, separate process apart
from the normal functioning of the system. It is the
difficulty of introducing change into a resistant system
2Amitai Etzioni (ed.) in introduction to section
on organizational change, Complex Organizations; A Socio
logical Reader (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc.,
1961), pp. 341-343.
which has captured the attention of most students of the
subject. The purpose here is to broaden the analysis to
include the total process of change. This means viewing
change as an intimate integral part of the administrator's
task of managing and stabilizing a system of human rela
tions. Among contemporary theorists, Sorokin^ and Mac-
Ivez4 stand out as scholars who show a major and insistent
concern for change as a part of the very nature of social
existence rather than a disturbance in the normally placid
interdependence of self-equilibrating systems.
The study assumes added significance for the fol
lowing reasons: The survival of civilization today de
pends upon man's ability to create social inventions
capable of harnessing for society's constructive use the
vast physical energies now at man's disposal. In social
technology, just as in physical technology, progress con
sists of the creation of new mechanisms for the accom
plishment of goals. Changes occurring in organizations
over the last hundred years have led to organizations that
while ostensibly welcoming change are in effect highly
3
Pitirim A* Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics
(New York: American Book Company, 1937-41). 4 vols.;
Sorokin, Society. Culture and Personality (New York:
Harper, 194^ J.
^Robert M. Maclver, Social Causation (Boston:
Ginn, 1942); Robert M. Maclver and Charles H. Page,
Society (New York: Rinehart, 1949)., Chapters 22-29.
resistant to change. Thexe would seem to be tension be
tween the demands of the external environment leading to
an emphasis on innovation and the organizations need for
planning and stability, causing resistances to change.
The pxocess of organizational development is dia-
5
lectical. Innovations or changes to solve one problem
often create others; problems appear, and while the proc
ess of solving them tends to give rise to new problems,
learning has occurred which influences the way the new
challenges are met. Conflicts of interest between various
groups in the organization are yet another source of dia
lectical change. Increasing attention, therefore, is
called to managing the changes rather than to viewing them
with alarm!
The rise of bureaucracy as a dominant form of or
ganization in modern industrial society has, on the whole,
been an organizational adjustment to problems that were
posed by antecedent changes, especially those of a tech
nological nature. Every advance in efficiency secured,
however, incidentally erects a barrier to further changes,
technological or otherwise, as bureaucracy discourages the
emergence of changes from within, and resists the impact
^Peter M. Blau and Richard W. Scott, Formal Organ
ization; A Comparative Approach (San Francisco: Chandler
Publishing Company, 1962), p. 250.
6
of changes imposed from without.^ It tends to isolate
itself from the context in which it operates and to move
towards a condition of stability; it becomes a self-
maintaining and self-validating system, and organizational
struggle for survival takes the direction of preserving
the organization*s status quo* This is especially true in
developing nations where it is not uncommon for an admin
istrator to be discredited if he happens to be the ad
vocate of change, not to speak of the tendencies to bring
discredit upon the change so advocated*
The idea of experiment in new approaches to work,
and to organization for work, is surprisingly slow, be
cause it is feared that experiment might threaten stable
organization or relationships of authority* It appears
that both the top echelons and the lower ones are afraid
of instability. Under such circumstances, it is the duty
of the social scientist to prove that the theory of the
stable state of the organization is inimical to adaptive
change and that continuing experimental change implies not
instability but adaptation to reality.
^The danger that progressive bureaucratization of
modern society will bring to an end the period of social
dynamism is argued by Joseph Bensman, in Mass. Class and
Bureaucracy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J*: Prentice-Hall, Inc*,
1963); and Robert Presthus, in The Organizational Society;
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1962)*
The extension of government into welfare functions
has led to an increasing demand upon trained, semiprofes
sional administrators in place of elected or appointed
politicians. Unfortunately, modern administrative tech
nicians also tend to be dedicated to the status quo — to
that body of existing ideas, values, knowledge and skills
that is honored within the occupation of which they are
members — like any other highly integrated occupational
group and make them resistant to change. Hence, pointed
focus on the management of change has become imperative.
In developing societies which are engaged in mas
sive programs of social innovation and community devel
opment,7 public servants must adapt to new and challenging
responsibilities. A basic requirement for them is com
mitment to larger goals of the welfare society, to the
norms of the new bureaucracy, to the function of adminis
tration as the agent of change.8
^Charles F. Cannell, Fred G. Wales and Stephen B.
Withey (issue eds.), "Community Change: An Action Program
in Puerto Rico,* Journal of Social Issues. 9:2-60, Quar
terly (1953); and S. C. Dube, India’s Changing Villages:
Human Factors in Community Development (Ithaca; Cornell
University Press, 1958).
^Samuel J. Eldersveld, V. Jagannadham and A. P.
Barnabas, The Citizen and the Administrator in a Developing
Democracy: An Empirical Study in Delhi State. India (Glen
view, 111.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1968), p . 2.
The key to the problem, according to Lawrence,^
is to understand the true nature of resistance. Actually,
what employees resist is usually not technical change, but
social change — the change in their human relationships
that generally accompanies technical change.
Whereas only a few years ago the target of change
was limited to a small work group or single department,
the focus is now converging on the organization as a whole.
There is a critical need at this time to understand better
this complex process, especially in terms of which ap
proaches lead to successful changes and which actions fail
to achieve the desired results.*0
For many years, change was regarded more as an
evolutionary than a revolutionary process. But as a re
sult of computer technology narrowing the decision time
span, with the intensification of social drives for
equality, the multiplication of technological discoveries,
managements are coming around to adopting a revolutionary
attitude toward change, in order to bridge the gap between
a dynamic environment and a stagnant organization.
The study stresses that research effort should en
compass the systematic collection of materials; comparative
^Paul R. Lawrence, "How to Deal with Resistance to
Change,1 1 Harvard Business Review (May-June 1954), p. 49.
l°Larry E. Greiner, "Patterns of Organization
Change," Harvard Business Review (May-June 1967), p. 130*
analysis of organizations which have undergone and are
undergoing change, insure a better understanding of the
process and management of change, and borrowing from the
theoretical and methodological advances of the social
sciences and psychology and applying relevant findings to
the study of change*
Finally, this study will grapple with the question
of the degree of convergence of the goals of those persons
being led and the goals of those who plan; the type of
activities of the leadership which initiate change and
the actions necessary to sustain it.
Methodology
The main purpose of the study is to discover and
bring together theoretical principles that can explain
the process of change in oxganizations, analyze them and
offer generalizations for the development of a conceptual
framework*
To understand the behavior of organizations, it
is usually helpful and sometimes essential to have first
hand observation of social events in the milieu and at the
times when these actually occur* A body of theory and
related empirical knowledge must be derived from several
but related kinds of endeavor — actual observation,
generalizing, theory building and application* For this
10
purpose, two public organizations from California were
chosen for naturalistic observation; the names and some
descriptive details of the organizations are fictitious,
but not in ways that distort the features relevant to the
study. The two public oxganizations shall be referred to
as «C» and "H.**
Data Collection
Besides the review of the relevant literature,
data on which the report on the two organizations are
based on recorded notes made during and after each visit
to the agencies, which constituted a kind of log of activ
ities. These included on-the-spot observations of people
at work, and interviews with the personnel of the organi
zations. The interviews were for the most part open-ended
and focused on the speaker and his reactions rather than on
the topic he chose to talk about. This enabled the re
searcher to focus on social relations among individuals
and groups in a natural setting, reflecting the realities
of organizational life.
Limitations of the Study
As mentioned earlier, the study is an exploratory
one and, hence, is only suggestive.
The study of change in a complex human group em
braces several disciplines and no single discipline has
a corner on the organization market* In the words of
Haire, "It [the study of organization] is the natural
focus of several disciplines,”11 including those involving
game theory, small group phenomena, operations research,
motivation theory, and many others* Hence, the study
tends to be interdisciplinary in character.
The study is not a field experiment1^ in that the
investigator did not manipulate certain factors within the
research setting* Rather, he capitalized upon some on
going changes and studied their effects and impact on the
functioning of the organization. Although this method
does not approach the controlled experiment in rigor of
design and, hence, in validity of conclusion, its useful
ness cannot be underestimated. A theoretical idea, however
tersely stated may sometimes stump the reader; but by
browsing in zeal life-situations, one may understand what
the writer is after* It is with this purpose, the anec
dotes from two public agencies are given to illuminate the
various concepts*
11Mason Haire, "Introduction," in Mason Haire (ed.)
Modern Organization Theory (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., 1959), p. 2.
1%or detailed description of field experiments,
Victor H. Vroom, Methods of Organizational Research (Pitts
burgh: University of Pittsburgh Press),pp* 5?-l07, 1967.
Organization of the Study
12
The study consists of nine chapters* Chapter I
is introductory; it describes the nature, scope, import
ance, methodology and limitations of the study* Chapter
II discusses the nature of change, focusing on how work
change and changes in the work environment present prob
lems to any management engaged in a program of initiating
changes* Changing people basically involves changing
their attitudes* Here the major concept of cognitive dis
sonance and its implications for the practicing adminis
trator are discussed.
Chapter III grapples with the problem of resist
ance to change* Individual, group resistance and ap
proaches toward reducing resistance are described.
How to introduce and manage changes is the focus
of attention in Chapter IV. A generic framework is pro
vided for this purpose; the framework is utilized to
study the changes in two public organizations in Cali
fornia.
Astute diagnosis, imaginative planning and skill
ful presentation are desirable if a plan is to succeed*
But they are not sufficient. Critically important are
certain key factors in managing changes* Chapter V con
ceptualizes these factors under three headings — Givens,
13
Processes, and Outcome.
Chapters VI, VII and VIII describe these factors.
Chapter IX recapitulates and presents some gener
alizations.
The terms used in this study, although having
other implications as well, are to be understood in the
following context:
Orqanization(s) — The term refers to formal or-
ganization(s) unless otherwise stated. A formal organiza
tion is defined as a system of consciously coordinated
activities ox forces of two or more persons to serve cer
tain purposes.^
Change — This is defined as a shift from one
established pattern of behavior to another so as to lead
to growth and development.
Management of Change — This is characteized by a
process of conscious, deliberate and collaborative efforts
on the part of oxganization(s) toward some specific goal.
Process — Process denotes progressive actions
(characterized by regularity) performed by persons to move
an organization from one state to another.
13Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Execu
tive (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938), p. 73.
CHAPTER II
NATURE OF CHANGE
Change is all axound man — in the seasons, in his
social environment, and in his own biological processes.
Beginning with the first few moments of his life, man
learns to meet change by being adaptive. In fact, his
very first breath depends upon his ability to adapt from
one environment to another. Since man is adaptive and
used to change, how is it that in his work environment he
tends to resist change? This problem has troubled many
researchers since the beginning of the Industrial Revolu
tion. The ease with which changes in work situation are
made will in part be dependent upon the attitude of the
people. So more needs to be known about achieving change
in people and their cognitive skills. The aim of this
chapter is to explore the above areas in the total change
process. Once this has been done, the next question is:
Will the people accept or acquiesce fully or with reserva
tions, or reject and resist the change? and .Why? — which
is the subject of discussion in the following chapter.
In any organization of human beings there accumu
lates through time a common fund of experience, out of
14
15
which theie develops certain ways of behaving, ways of
working, ways of cooperating, and ways of resisting*
Altogether, there emerges a kind of culture peculiar to
the organization. It is axiomatic that workers resist
attempts to change their accustomed ways of working or
the organizational structure within which they work.
Hence, the nature of work change will be examined first.
The Nature of Work Change
Work change refers to any alteration which occurs
in the overall work environment. Each new development may
contribute something to the creation of new jobs and new
geographical areas of employment or the abolition of old
jobs and decline of areas offering traditional work. The
change imposed on the individual worker may require him to
move to another district, to change to a different type of
work or to learn some entirely new skill. Here an ob
vious pressure, representing change, may produce an ob
vious deviation at the point of pressure. What is not so
obvious is that the entire organization might be affected;
employees have to adjust to a new location as some dis
placement is inevitable. Two generalizations may be drawn
at this point;
1. The whole organization tends to be affected by
change in any part of it.
16
2* Change is a human relations problem as well as
a technical problem*
The two generalizations about change are illus
trated by the reaction of workers in an electric utility
company which built a new power plant more automated than
its other plants* The new plant was basically a techno
logical change. It was also geographically distant from
the old plants and did not replace them, but workers in
them were nevertheless affected. Their overtime work was
reduced as the company came to depend more on its new
lower-cost plant, and they developed job insecurity* In
response to a survey, 87 percent of employees at the old
plant felt that would have a layoff at their plant in case
the company needed to reduce the work force, but only 14
percent of the new plant employees thought their plant
would have a layoff. From the point of the total organiza
tion, the greater feeling of importance for new plant
workers was offset by the insecurity and lowered the im
portance felt by workers at the old plants* Thus, change
in the form of a new plant affected employees in all
plants; and although the change was technological, the
feelings of employees were also involved.1
^Floyd C. Mann and L. Richard Hoffman, Automation
and the Worker (New Yorki Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc.,
1960), pp. 52-55.
Work change is further complicated by the fact
that it does not produce a direct adjustment, but operates
through each employee1s attitudes to produce a response
conditioned by his feelings toward change. This relation
ship was illustrated in a series of classic experiments by
Roethlisberger and his associates. In one instance,
lighting was regularly improved according to the theory
that better lighting would get greater productivity. As
was expected, productivity did increase. Then lighting
was decreased to illustrate the reverse effect — reduced
productivity. Instead, productivity increased further!
Lighting was further decreased and the result was still
greater productivity. Finally, lighting was decreased
to 0.06 of a foot-candle, which is approximately equiv
alent to moonlight. According to Roethlisberger, "Not
until this point was reached was there any appreciable
decline in the output rate."^
Obviously, better lighting was not by itself
causing greater output. There was no direct connection
between the change and response. Some other influential
factor, later diagnosed as employee attitudes, had crept
in to upset the expected pattern. Roethlisberger later
O
F. J. Roethlisberger, Management and Morale
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941), p. 10;
F. J. Roethlisberger and William J. Dickson, Management and
the Worker (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939)
18
illustrated the new pattern by means of the "X* Chart
shown in Figure 1. Each changed situation is interpreted
by an individual according to his attitudes. The way that
he feels about the change then determines how he will re"
spond to it. Attitudes are not the result of change;
they are caused. One cause is personal history which
refers to a man's biological processes, his background,
and all his social experiences away from work and this is
what he brings to the workplace. A second cause is the
work environment itself which is reflected by the fact
that he is a member of a group and is influenced by its
codes, patterns, and attitudes. Though each person indi
vidually interprets change, he often shows his attachment
to the group by joining with it in some uniform response
to the change as shown in Figure 2. This phenomenon makes
possible such seemingly illogical actions as walkouts.
Attitudes toward change depend on whether the in
dividual thinks the new system would be advantageous or
disadvantageous to him. He may also have preconceptions
about change based on his own hopes and fears, or even
hard facts. Furthermore, his own basic motivations may
incline him to support or to pppose change. In analyzing
the forces affecting attitudes toward change, it will be
apparent that the prospect of having to alter a habit has
19
CHANGE
Figure 1
Roethlisberger* s "XM Chart
ATTITUDES
(SENTIMENTS)
RESPONSE
PERSONAL
HISTORY
SOCIAL
SITUATION
AT WORK
Source: F* J. Roethlisberger, Management and
Morale (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941), p. 21
20
Figure 2
Different Individual Reactions to Change Are
Sometimes Unified Through Social Action.
INDIVIDUAL ACTUAL
STIMULUS DESIRE RESPONSE
SOCIAL"
ACTION
DEMANDS
CHANGE
STRIKE
SULLENNESS
DEMANDS
ABSENTEEISM
DEMANDS
HARDER WORK
to
Cel
LU
Q -
Source: Keith Davis, The Dynamics of Organiza
tional Behavior: Human Relations at Work. 3rd edition
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967), p. 391.
21
a complex motivational effect which is often easier to
understand in retrospect than to predict in advance.
To a considerable extent, the smoothness or turbu
lence with which an organization carries out a transition
to new ways of operating may be predetermined by its
history of prior changes. This interesting possibility
emerges from a review by Mann and Neff3 of the experiences
of four companies which had introduced major organiza
tional changes. It was found that the employees of a
company which has had to make fairly frequent changes in
the past can be expected to take further changes more or
less in stride. On the other hand, a previously stable
organization which has to undertake a major modification
of its methods may find the transition unsettling or even
chaotic. In addition to the previous experience of the
organization as a whole, the individual motivations of its
members will have an important effect on the overall re
action to change. Four reasons may be given for the way
in which a given employee reacts to the prospect of change
in his working environment. First, the kinds of changes
that have been taking place in industry on a large scale,
for example, the increasing proportion of clerical workers,
3Floyd C. Mann and Franklin W. Neff, Managing
Major Change in Organizations (Ann Arbor: The Foundation
for Research on Human Behavior, December 1964), 5th
printing•
22
the displacement of many traditional jobs by automation
and the xise of new industxies cleaxly woxk to the eco
nomic advantage of some workers, to the disadvantage of
othexs. Second, an individuals attitudes towaxd change
depend on his position in his organization's powex hier-
axchy pxiox to the change. New opexating methods can
change the powex xelationships within an oxganization ox
at least cxeate the possibility that old powex distribu-
tions can be challenged* The thixd major influence on
attitudes towaxd change is the individual's own motiva
tion, and the degxee to which the job envixonment under
the old system supported his psychological advantage*
The fourth factor is information — the opinion of an in
dividual as to whether a change would benefit him is not
always realistic* If the change has fax-xeaching ramifi
cations, he is likely to be unaware of many of its salient
points* Organizational and technological changes can have
a profound effect on the satisfactions derived from work*
Status may be enhanced ox decreased, the challenge to
one's skills may be increased or lessened, and job security
may also be affected. Consequently, all changes can im
pinge, potentially at least, on powerful motives*
The preceding discussion leads to the idea that
the dynamic force of change affects the whole social
23
system. All elements of the social system are involved —
its people, formal organizations, operating environment,
informal organizations, communication patterns, decision
making and the patterns of cooperation* Whether it is a
department or a whole society, the system is operating in
some sort of equilibrium by which the parts are related
to each other* As Sofer puts it:
Although not all problems are equally inter
connected, the organization is a social
system, i*e*, a set of closely interwoven
and interdependent activities functionally
related to each other* Accordingly, if an
attempt is made to deal with one problem
without recognition of the larger problem
of which it is a part, it is virtually cer
tain that the attempt will fail.4
Achieving Change in People^
The real victims of change are those people who
cannot work out some kind of viable compromise with it
and still retain enough of their original self-concept to
feel that they have been left intact. This is partly due
to semantic problems as the word "change** produces emo
tional reactions. To many people, it is threatening and
conjures up visions of a revolutionary, dissatisfied
idealist, and a mal-content, since it is not a neutral
^Cyril Sofer, The Organization from Within
(Tavistock, London, 1961), pp. 152-153.
^Dorwin Cartwright, "Achieving Change in People:
Some Applications of Group Dynamics Theory," Human Rela
tions. Vol. IV, No. 4 (November 1951), p. 381.
24
word. The other words like education, therapy, training,
orientation, guidance, and indoctrination are more widely
used. The cold, unmodified word, "change,* promises no
respect for values and might even tamper with values them
selves. Yet, Cartwright feels that for this very reason,
it will foster straight t h i n k i n g ,^ if we force ourselves
to struggle directly and self-consciously with the prob
lems of values that are involved.
Organizational change involves variable causes and
effects not easily isolated from each other. An analyst
has to choose a limited number of variables which are
dynamically interdependent and then try to work from there
toward a more accurate understanding of reality. In order
to do this, Leavitt selected four interacting variables
which he called Task, People, Technology, and Structure.^
Task refers to the organization's production of goods and
services and, while these sometimes change independently,
according to Leavitt, they change more often in response
to people, technology or structural approaches which in
fluence the task variable and each other. These ap
proaches represent potential strategies for organizational
6Ibid., p. 382.
7Harold J. Leavitt, "Applied Organizational Change
in Industry: Structural, Technological, and Humanistic Ap
proaches," James 6. March (ed.), Handbook of Organizations
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 1144-1170.
25
change. Each attracts specialists who develop expertise
in changing the strategic variable and then use this
strategy as their lever for improving organizational task
performance. The people specialists tend to focus on
personnel placement, management development programs, job
counseling and human relationships within organizations.
Cognitive Change
Achieving change in people — whether subordi
nates, superiors, or colleagues in one's own organization,
or those in other organizations — leads to an awareness
of the importance of attitudes. One may be perplexed
when others do not change their attitudes even after one
has presented facts that obviously should cause them to
change.
Scientists studying behavior have devoted much
effort to the field of attitudes and have gathered data
on the functions that attitudes serve the ways in which
they develop, the conditions that lead to change in atti
tudes, and the resistance to change of attitudes. A
review of some of the theoretical formulations that
account for attitude change would be a useful backdrop for
the case illustrations provided in the later part of the
study.
26
Some of the theoretical discussions on attitude
change are applications of more general theory, while
others were devised especially to deal with attitude
change* All are concerned with attitude change as an
effect of communications. The more general theories that
have been applied specifically to attitude change problems
include Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance,
O
Heider's balance theory, and learning theory. Some of
the especially devised approaches are Rosenberg's affec
tive-cognitive consistency approach, McGuire's rational-
syllogistic formulation, Osgood and Tannenbaum's congruity
theory, and Newcomb's strain toward symmetry.9 Brehm,
Q
L. Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
(Evanston, 111.: Row, Peterson, 1957); F. Heider, "Atti
tudes and Coqnitive Organization," Journal of Psychology,
Vol. XXI (1946), pp. 107-112.
J. Rosenberg, "An Analysis of Affective-Cogni
tive Consistency," C. I* Hovland and M. J. Rosenberg (eds.)
Attitude Organization and Change (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press. 1960); M. J. Rosenberg, "A Structural
Theory of Attitude Dynamics," Public Opinion Quarterly.
Vol. XXIV (1960), pp. 319-340; W. J. McGuire, "A Syl
logistic Analysis of Cognitive Relationships," Hovland and
Rosenberg, op. cit.; C. E. Osgood and P. H. Tannenbaum,
"The Principle of Congruity in the Prediction of Attitude
Change," Psychological Review. Vol. LXII (1955), pp. 42-
55; C. E. Osgood, "Cognitive Dynamics in the Conduct of
Human Affairs," Public Opinion Quarterly. Vol. XXIV (1960),
g
p. 341-365; T. M. Newcomb, "An Approach to the Study of
ommunicative Acts," Psychological Review. Vol. LX (1953),
pp. 393-404.
27
Cohen, Adams, Romney, and the Maccobys have applied dis
sonance theory to attitude change problems-10 Cartwright
and Harary have developed theoretical applications to
attitude change from Heider's balance theory.11
Most of these theoretical approaches to attitude
change have at least one major characteristic in common.
They involve a kind of balance-of-forces approach in
which the overloading of one type of factor gives rise to
changes designed to restore balance- In short, all employ
homeostasis in some form or other-1^
10J. W. Brehm, "Attitudinal Consequences of Com
mitment to Unpleasant Behavior,” Journal of Abnormal and
Social Psychology- Vol- LX (I960), pp- 379-683; J. W-
Brehm and A. R- Cohen, “Choice and Chance Relative De
privation as Determinants of Cognitive Dissonance,” j* of
Abnormal and Social Psychology- Vol- LVIII, pp. 383-367;
A- R. Cohen, "Attitudinal Consequences of Induced Dis
crepancies between Cognitions and Behavior,” Public Opin
ion Quarterly- Vol. XXIV (I960), pp. 297-318; J. 6* Adams,
**The Reduction of Cognitive Dissonance by Seeking Conso
nant Information,** J. of Abnormal and Social Psychology -
Vol. LXII (1961), pp. 74-78; E. E. Maccoby, N. Maccoby,
A. K. Romney and J. S. Adams, "Social Reinforcement and
Attitude Change," J. of Abnormal and Social Psychology-
Vol. LXIII (1961), pp. 108-114.
^D. Cartwright and F. Harary, "Structural Balance:
A Generalization of Heider's Theory." Psvcholoqical Review.
Vol. LXIII (1956), pp. 277-293.
^^Zajonc has pointed out the similarity in
Heider*s, Festinger's and Osgood's approaches; see R. B.
Zajonc, "The Concepts of Balance, Congruity and Dis
sonance," Public Opinion Quarterly. Vol. XXIV (I960),
pp. 280-29^1
28
Festinger's^ theory of cognitive dissonance
states that two cognitive elements are in a dissonant
relation if, considering these two alone, the obverse of
one element would follow from the other. X and Y are
dissonant if not X follows from Y. Dissonance can result
not only from the perception of such logical inconsist
encies, but also from conflicting motivations ox desired
consequences. The occurrence of such dissonance gives
rise to motivation to reduce it, that is, to change the
cognitive dissonance to cognitive consonance. One way of
doing this is by changing one of the dissonant cognitions
or changing an attitude.
According to the theory, when there is dissonance
there will be corresponding pressures to reduce the dis
sonance, the magnitude of these pressures depending upon
the magnitude of the dissonance. Three methods for re
ducing dissonance stemming from social disagreement sug
gest themselves:
1. Dissonance may be reduced or perhaps elimi
nated completely by changing one's own opinion so that it
corresponds more closely with one's knowledge of what
others believe.
2. To influence those persons who disagree to
change their opinion so that it more closely corresponds
^■^Festinger, o p . cit.
29
to one*s own, which is of course, analogous to changing
the environment and thereby changing the cognitive ele
ments reflecting that environment.
3. Another way of reducing dissonance between
one's own opinion and the knowledge that someone else
holds a different opinion is to make the other person, in
some manner, not comparable to oneself.
All these processes may potentially reduce dis
sonance and it is possible to expect to see all of them
intensified in degree as the magnitude of the dissonance
increased. Thus, as the magnitude of difference of opin
ion increased, as the relevance of the opinion to the
group increased, as the attraction to the group increased,
and as the number of other cognitive elements consonant
with the opinion decreased, one would expect greater tend
encies to change one's own opinion in response to dis
agreement, greater effort expended at influencing those
who disagreed, and a greater tendency to make those who
disagreed non-comfortable. In short, returning once
again to the basic theory, the pressure to reduce dis
sonance will be a function of the magnitude of the dis
sonance.
The Effectsof Inducements
Much research has been taking place in recent
30
years to follow up the implications of the dissonance
theory. In particular, the theory has been of unique
value in leading to predictions, verified by later re
search that run counter to our everyday ideas of influ
encing attitudes — the use of inducements.
Trying to offer a reward ox inducements of some
sort to encourage attitude change poses some vexing prob
lems. Research by Smith^-4 suggests that inducements of
fered to get someone to behave differently in the hope that
he will also change his attitudes may help to bring abo
behavior changes, but may reduce any pressure within the
individual to make his attitude consistent with his
changed behavior. If the inducement is perceived as suf
ficiently large, there will be little feeling of dissonance
within the person because he can justify his shift of be
havior solely as a means of seeking the reward offered.
Thus, compliance in overt behavior may occur, without a
need for attitude change being induced. For instance, a
specific large inducement may be less effective than a
small one in shifting attitudes. If the administrator's
goal is to change behavior without worrying about whether
the attitude changes will also occur, to support the new
E. Smith, "The Power of Dissonance Techniques
to Change AttitudesPublic Opinion Quarterly. 25, No. 4
(1961), pp» 626-639.
31
behavior when the inducement is no longer present, then
specific one-shot inducements may be of value. But
greater value will come from the more complete process of
changing attitudes by working to create a need for chang
ing attitudes as well as for behavioral change.
An administrator might expect that beyond a cer
tain level, the greater the added inducement the less the
individual will shift his attitudes. One cannot easily
anticipate in advance the level or threshold for the other
person above which an inducement is perceived as large,
and thus produce behavioral, but not attitudinal shifts.
It is the latter difficulty that makes the use of induce
ments for attitude change a risky administrative pro
cedure.
Effects on Seeking Information
One consequence of producing dissonance is that
the seeking of information by the recipient may increase.
It has been shown with some attitudes that people who are
given information that produces feelings of dissonance
will more likely seek additional information on the topic
than those who received consonant information.^ This
may operate in two directions. Firstly, a person may
^Adams, "The Reduction of Cognitive Dissonance
. . ., * * pp. 74—78.
32
look fox moxe information to support his initial attitude.
Secondly| those whose attitudes are influenced by informa
tion communicated to them are likely at a later time to
seek out conversations that reinforce their newly ac
quired beliefs. It was found by Maccoby et al..^ that
these conversations helped to prevent back sliding to the
original views. The administrator might.learn from these
studies that providing access both to information and to
other people may help a person to reinforce newly ac
quired beliefs. Furthermore, pointing out inconsistencies
in someone else*s point of view, he may be upset by the
fact that the other person does not seem bothered by the
contradictions. He should be aware that what he feels to
be inconsistent may not necessarily be perceived as such
by another.
From the above discussion, some guidlines may be
drawn at this point. The administrator should recognize
that attitudes serve different functions. In order to
change, a person must feel a need to change and this need
should be stronger than the need to maintain the old
attitude.
It is the need to change that must be aroused.
Other needs that are satisfied by outside inducements may
^Maccoby et al.. op. cit.„ pp. 108-114.
33
bring about compliance, but not bring shift of attitudes
that will serve as the basis for maintaining new behavior
without the inducement. For example, a reward system for
punctuality and promptness may cut lateness when the re
inforcements are sought by the individual, but may later
decline in effectiveness, or may not work to change at
titude toward lateness. The individuals may seek to beat
the system (as in the lower bureaucracies in developing
nations) or show up late if the rewards seem lost.
An individual (or group) may be given a special
role, if possible, that leads to behavior that arouses
feelings of dissonance and that leads to attitude changes.
Or the present roles may be used to see that a presently
existing role is incompatible with certain attitudes.
An expression of commitment to changed behavior
must be secured, and if possible, to a kind of behavior
that is linked to existing values or attitudes that may
in turn act as magnets to attract other attitudes. As
Brehm and Cohen put it,^ the role of commitment in the
theory of cognitive dissonance is to aid the specification
of psychological implication and hence the determination
of what is consonant and what is dissonant, and to aid in
17
J. W. Brehm and Arthur R. Cohen, Explorations in
Cognitive Dissonance (New York and London: John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 1962), p. 9.
34
the specification of the ways in which a peison may try to
reduce dissonance*
The useful limits of information must be recog
nized* Provision should be made for access to informa
tion, and efforts should be made to insure its credibility
as a source.
Effects of Personal Contact
For the administrator, there are a number of sit
uations where he might be seeking to induce more favorable
attitudes toward others; for instance, toward members of
another department with whom there has been friction*
Contact is often thought to change prejudiced attitudes
toward other people* The administrator, thinking of using
personal contact as an influence for favorable change,
must remember that the contacts must not be of an "unequal
status" sort* The changes that result in increased con
tact with other groups must be introduced as another
aspect of the organization's goals — goals generally
acceptable to all members of the organization. He will
have to guard against having the increased contacts per
ceived as an attack on the members of already established
groups*
Effects of Participation
35
The principle of getting people to participate has
formed the basis fox various programs of attitude change*
It is useful in reducing ego-defensive attitudes; it can
provide changes for equal status contact, group support,
and identification; it also offers reinforcement for
changing through satisfaction of ego needs.
Finally, and most significantly, the administrator
must realize that attitude change can work in two direc
tions. Others are seeking to change the administrator's
attitudes too. He should ask himself (without being de
fensive) why should his attitudes never change?
Man's work environment is quite dynamic. This
disturbs the equilibrium and forces him regularly to make
adjustments. Man's response to change depends upon his
attitudes, as shown by Roethlisberger*s MXW Chart. This
means that people react emotionally to change and are
often not particularly influenced by the cold-hard logic
for change. The reader's hunch that attitude change is
not eacily obtained is underscored by using the concept
of Cognitive Dissonance of Festinger. In order to change,
the person must feel the need to change; a need stronger
than the need to maintain the old attitude. One need
that may at times be helpfully axoused is the need to
reduce feelings of inconsistency or dissonance* Using
dissonance as the thread, an attempt is made to tie to
gether the effects of inducements, seeking information
and participation to modify the behavior of individuals.
Obvious improvements sometimes cause intense re
sistance. Even when one uses the most logical arguments
to support a change, modify the behavior of others, it is
often met with opposition. It is therefore necessary to
examine the nature of resistance and the means whereby
it may be prevented or decreased.
CHAPTER III
RESISTANCE TO CHANGE
Regardless of who may initiate a change, the per
sons affected are compelled to react in some manner to the
specific change that is proposed. The problem for the
administrator, therefore, is to recognize the resistant
factors in the process of change. In fact, he may have to
initiate change in such a fashion as to prevent the devel
opment of resistance or use approaches to overcome the
resistance when it does develop* This chapter looks at
resistance at the individual and group levels, and high
lights some of the approaches toward reducing resistance;
explains the relationship between coping with resistance
to change and resolving conflicts, and incidentally ex
amines the relevance of inter-organizational relationship
in this context.
All organizations, irrespective of their size,
form, and manifest function, have some characteristics in
common — a delimited membership, with a distinction be
tween members and nonmembers; some established criteria
for selecting new members and a procedure for applying
criteria; some method by which new members are inducted
37
38
into the special values, sentiments, ideas, and practices
of the organization; some ways of rewarding individual
members for good conduct and punishing them for bad; and
some division of the membership into organizational roles,
some of which are positions that bear various organiza
tional powers and responsibilities. Each of these organ
izational characteristics operates to subordinate the
individual members to the organizational whole and thus
to discourage, if not entirely preclude, the development
and expression of individuality. Thus, it may be assumed
that the more functionally integrated an organization,
the less.likely that any one of its members will develop
those personal characteristics which lead to innovative,
advocatory or adoptive behavior.
Not even in theory can an organization prevent, or
for that matter survive without, some deviant conduct on
the part of its members; always and everywhere the indi
vidual has and must have some personal freedom. A well
integrated, functionally effective organization can and
does, however, discourage the appearance of those special
kinds of deviations that may result in innovation advocacy
for a change, or adoption of what has been innovated or
advocated. The various and mainly subtle ways in which
this end is achieved can be summarized by saying that
39
organizational membership binds the individual to the
roles that he occupies, and in the process blinds him to
the possibility that there might be alternatives to the
particular forms of conduct that the organization demands.
It is obvious, therefore, that resistance to
change is a universal phenomenon. Almost every change
introduced sets up a countervailing force to resist it.
Resistance to anything new, however frustrating to the
advocate, is a normal expression of the fact that the mem
bers of society are for the most part creatures of
society, not that they are innately stupid or indifferent
to their welfare. The universal tendency for men to re
sist changes of any sort has often and for long prevented
the adoption of functionally valuable innovations; but it
has also and perhaps quite as often, prevented men from
destroying themselves by adopting malfunctioning devices
or procedures. Many battles and some wars have been lost
because military leaders have refused to try out a new
weapon or strategy; on the other hand, many lives have
no doubt been saved for the same reason. Innovators have
r —
offered the world some potentially disastrous proposals
and in spite of men's inherent resistance to something
new, some have been put into practice that have proved to
be disastrous. The normal resistance of men to change Is,
40
therefore, a protection against misadventure and a mani
festation of the forces which bind the individual to the
system itself.
One of the illustrations that provides dramatic
evidence of resistance to even small changes in the per
formance of relatively unskilled work might serve as an
introduction to the whole problem of resistance in work
environment.
The research at the Harwood Manufacturing Company*
involved experimental efforts to overcome worker resist
ance to change. The company which had tried to introduce
changes in the jobs and the methods of production workers
found worker attitudes to be markedly negative and their
behavior revealed a general resistance to the changes.
In other words, they tried to hold to the steady state or
established pattern of behavior. Coch and French used
the field forces theory of Lewin to explain this behavior.
According to Lewin^ a state of equilibrium can
exist in social life even though it undergoes a change.
Lewin called this steady state "quasi stationary equi
librium" and he used the concept to describe change
processes which are kept at some given level by "opposing
1-Lester Coch and John R. P. French, Jr., "Over-
cominq Resistance to Chanqe." Human Relations. I (Auqust
1948), pp. 512-532.
^Kurt Lewin, "Frontiers in Group Dynamics," Human
Relations. I (1947), pp. 5-42.
41
field forces.M The field forces operate in such a way
that opposition to an increase is strengthened as the
increase approaches an equilibrium level, and at the same
time other forces are strengthened against a decrease as
the decrease comes closer to the level of equilibrium
(see Figure 3).
For example, a change such as an increase in the
expected unit output prescribed by the technical sub
system may be opposed by the output norm of the social sub
system. Inducements such as an increase in supervisory
pressure, an increase in monetary rewards, promises of
promotion and other benefits may be used by the technical
sub-system to change unit output. However, opposing field
forces, such as individual and group pressures, may in
crease as the output level approaches an equilibrium level.
Figure 3 illustrates an equilibrium level established at
thirty units by two sets of opposing forces. In this il
lustration the field forces are composed of behavioral
elements of the technical and social sub-systems but other
forces and other combinations may prevail in establishing
a steady state position.
In the Coch and French experiment, workers were
divided into four groups. One group called the control
group was simply fold about the job changes. The three
Units o f Output (per hour)
Figure 3
Quasi Stationary Equilibrium
50
40
30
20
10
Field Forces
Source: Lester Coch and John R. P. French, Jr.,
"Overcoming Resistance to Chanqe." Human Relations.
Vol. I (August 1948).
G roup
Norms
Social
Reward
Work
A voidance
O ther
Forces
nk
A
Supervisory
Norms .
A *
M onetary
Reward
Promise of
Promotion
O ther
Forces
43
other groups, called experimental groups, were allowed to
participate in formulating as well as implementing the
changes.
The productivity results in terms of unit output
per hour for the control group (nonparticipation group)
over a thirty day period after the job changes were intro
duced remained at about fifty units per hour. The re
sultant field forces depicted in Figure 4 by arrows ap
pear to be equal at the level of fifty units per hour.
The productivity level remained constant because the re
sultant upward forces were equal to the resultant downward
forces.
The results of the experimental groups (participa
tion groups) depicted in Figure 5 show that although the
output level increased from fifty units per hour to ap
proximately seventy-three units per hour, the increase
appears to be in a quasi stationary equilibrium at about
seventy units per hour.
The control group resisted change and maintained
the prechange level of output, whereas the participating
group accommodated the change and increased output to a
higher level. The increase in output, however, stabilized
at about seventy units per hour.
44
Figure 4
Quasi Stationary Equilibrium for
Non-Participating Group
D
O
_ c
0 )
JS -
D
a-
3
o
tt-
o
VI
80
4*
40
20
10 15 0 5 20 25 30
Days after change
Source: Lester Coch and John R. P. French, Jr.,
"Overcoming Resistance to Change," Human Relations»
Vol. I (August 1948).
45
Figure 5
Quasi Stationary Equilibrium for
Participation Groups
10 15 20
Days after change
25 30
Source: Lester Coch and John R. P. French, Jr.,
"Overcoming Resistance to Chanqe," Human Relations,
Vol. I (August 1948).
46
The Haxwood experiments reveal that workers may
or may not resist change. Whether or not change is re
sisted depends partly on the method of organizing for
change. These experiments suggest that worker resistance
to change can be reduced if the organizational structure
and processes are designed in a manner which allows
worker participation in planning change. In other words,
through participation the workers act as the change
agents. In terms of organizational stability, these re
search results illustrate change as the movement from one
steady state to a higher steady state.
Despite the complexity of the problem, social
scientists are making encouraging progress along three
lines. First, in understanding the reasons for the re
sistance; second, in more carefully planning and timing
the changes; and third, in more skillfully communicating
any proposed change before and after the actual change
is made. It would be useful to make a further probe on
some of the research findings on the nature of resistance
and the attempts to deal with such opposing factors to
change.
In the study conducted by Coch and French, it was
concluded that resistance to changes could be overcome by
getting the people involved in the change to participate
in making it. But the problem centers around the word
"participation." Such participation is not something that‘
can be conjured up or created artifically. It is a feel
ing on the part of the people, not just the mechanical
act of being called in to take part in discussions. As a
matter of fact, the question remains whether participation
was the determining factor in the Coch and French experi
ment or whether there was something of deeper significance
underlying it.
Participation may not work so long as it is
treated as a device to get someone to do what he is asked
to do. It is acquired when the staff personnel face the
reality that they need the contributions of the line per
sonnel. Again, the question is — whether it is resist
ance to change or is it resentment over the way change is
introduced. Once we come to grips with these problems,
the management is well on the way to the solution. It be
comes evident that there are three possible methods of
introducing change with respect to the personnel — intro
duction without warning, introduction preceded by informa
tion, and introduction with participation of employees in
the development of the arrangements. A realistic study of
the methods of introducing change in terms of domination,
manipulation and participation in the decisions, would
48
probably produce interesting results.
Individual Resistance (or Acceptance)
A familiar economic interpretation3 of individual
reactions is that a person invests efforts and abilities
in the organization and expects a reward in return. If
he loses by the change, he will resist it, but will ac
cept it if his previous situation is maintained or im
proved. His behavior is considered rational, even though
the individual himself may be unaware of this rationality.
A parallel conception is known as the Barnard-
Simon theory of organizational equilibrium.4 The central
assumption of this theory is related more directly to the
organization in the broad sense of an operating system
than Homans* interpretation of behavior. The assumption
is that each member of the organization will continue to
participate so long as he considers that the reward he
receives is as great as, or greater than, the contribution
he is required to make. The conclusion is that there will
be an equilibrium in the case of organizational changes in
roles, statuses or authority, where the individual has
found compensations.
3G. C. Homans, Sentiments and Activities (Glencoe,
111•: The Free Press, 1962).
4J. G. March and H. A. Simon, Organizations (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958), pp. 84-8$.
49
The Coch and French experiment mentioned pre
viously showed that in one type of organization a change
of role introduced without warning led to a specific form
of restriction of output. If we apply contribution-reward
system to this result, it will be interpreted as accept
ance, although it is obtained at a price of a compensa
tion at the level of production. This kind of interpre
tation is useful in trying to understand the actual
functioning of a system. But if we wish to assess the
change, we have to find a reference point outside the
system. If we choose productivity measurement, it appears
that there is not acceptance but resistance.
Another series of studies, through a kind of in
troversion of the idea of reference groups,^ considers
the individual as the holder of a number of roles or a
number of status dimensions. If the organizational change
affects one of his roles or one of his positions on a
status dimension, a hypothesis can be formulated on the
individual*s satisfaction and behavior. Conflict of roles
has been studied on several occasions, more or less ab-
stractly. It is suggested that we should distinguish
R# K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure
(Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1957), Chapter VIII.
^J. W* Getzel and E. G. Guba, nRole Conflict and
Effectiveness: An Empirical Study," American Sociological
Review. 19 (1954), pp. 164-1?5.
between the extent of the conflict of roles and its in
tensity in the individual. Generally, the individual can
resolve the conflict by adjusting himself to the ambiva
lence of the situation or by stressing one of the roles
to the detriment of the others. The functionalist inter
pretation predicts that the system tends to lead the
individual to readjust all his roles to make them con
gruent. There is, therefore, a force in the established
system which works against the change. Once the change
has been introduced the tendency for the balance to be
restored will bring the individual to acceptance.
In order to understand the individuals reaction
to a change in role, a comparison can be made between the
new and the old roles. In a study on the introduction of
a computer into office work, Jacobson, et al., indicates
that the staff and junior executives expect the new sit
uation to bring them more responsibility and that more
accuracy in work will be necessary.^
It is also necessary to appreciate the situation
in the light of the degree of involvement of the individ
ual in his role. Among the various scales of invovement
that are suggested, the one given by Argyris distinguishes:
^E. Jacobson, et al.. "Employee Attitudes Toward
Technological Change in a Medium Sized Insurance Com
pany," Journal of Applied Psychology (December 1959),
pp. 349-354.
51
the zero degree of fusion between the individual and the
organization (the individual has no expression of person
ality through the organization); the number of three
degree, maximum fusion (the individual obtains all the
expression he desires); and the intermediate degrees of
neither adequate nor inadequate expression.8 The implica
tion from all these studies is that a change which sug
gests an improvement in the employee’s status is more
easily introduced than one which merely maintains it.
Group Resistance (or Acceptance)
In organizational sociology, the organization is
seen as an operating system, covering at the same time
things which have been organized in the strict sense of
the word and also the sphere of informal organization.
In order to produce a plausible hypothesis concerning the
reactions of groups, data would be necessary on the method
of introduction of change, the type of organization, and
degree of involvement. In this connection, Sayles*
reasoning is of interest.^ Contrary to previously estab
lished thinking, he goes so far as to recognize that even
®Chris Argyris, "The Fusion of the Individual
with the Organization," American Sociological Review. 19
(1954), pp. 267-272.
^Leonard R. Sayles, Behavior of Industrial Work
Groups (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1953), pp.
372-380.
52
at a stage of strong organization implying little personal
involvement of the members and also when the advantages
and the disadvantages of the situation are clearly vis
ible, a change may generate a wave of offensives* The
vigor of the pressure groups may be such that their in
teraction provokes more and more discontent. The reaction
of the personnel is no longer defensive and may lead to
something more active than conservatism* Instead of a
static equilibrium, there is a danger of disequilibrium*
Ronken and Lawrence's study10 demonstrates the
futility of accusing the so-called informal groups of
always being resistant to change* Generalizations at this
level carry little weight. The authors like those who
emphasize the importance of informal group resistance as
a general reaction to the introduction of change, are also
pleased to suggest finally that informal solutions can
improve the management of change* A process of disorgan
ization is sometimes necessary before a change can be
integrated into a restructured and readapted operating
system*
Comparative international research has in recent
years banished the easy assumption which identified Amer
ican organizational behavior with universal behavior.
10H. Ronken and P. Lawrence, Administering Change;
A Case Study of Human Relations in a Factory ikosxon;
Harvard School of Business Administration, 1952).
53
Whyte and Williams^- report that in factories with
comparable technical systems, although American workers
react negatively to close supervision and to a foreman who
pushes production, Peruvian workers accept this behavior
pattern. Pitts^-2 and C r o z i e r ^ in various studies show
that face to face authority relations in France are full
of problems and take place as rarely as possible. This
has an influence on the operation of the organizational
system, resulting in a pathological attitude toward organ
izational matters blocking the introduction of change.
Crozier^ identifies three strategic centers of resistance
to change in French Bureaucracy: the world of teaching and
the system of education and intellectual research; the
11W. F. Whyte and L. K. Williams, "Supervisory
Leadership, An International Comparison," C.I.O.S.. XIII
(1963), pp. 1-8, quoted by Alain Touraine, Claude Durand,
Daniel Pecaut and Alfred Willener, Workers* Attitude to
Technical Change (Paris: Organization for Economic Co
operation and Development, 1965).
12J. R. Pitts, "Change in Bourgeois France," in
Hoffman et al.. In Search of France (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1963), p. 443.
^Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press; London: Tavistock
Publications, 1964).
14Michel Crozier, "Indications of Change in the
Pattern of French Administration," (trans. I. D. Bryant),
Human Relationsi 19, No. 3 (August 1966), pp. 323-334.
54
world of traditional public administration with its bu
reaucratic patterns of action; and the world of politics
with its traditions of partition, revolutionary intran
sigence, and refusal to engage in conflicts*
One can deduce from the above discussion some
hypotheses to account for a favorable reaction in some
cultures toward innovation and change in general* They
are based on different socialization processes. Thus, a
child or adolescent is explicitly expected by his teachers
and parents to let himself be guided by the standards of
the social groups to which he belongs or will belong and
consequently trained to have a relative facility for ad
justment to change. If a person has strong feelings of
inadequacy or insufficiency in regard to his own inter
nalized standards and his diminishing consciousness of
identity, he looks for help through the prestige of the
groups or categories other than his family* The adjust
ment mechanism of these people will be an abrupt and
exaggerated identification with the values of innovation
and of advanced ideas*
What Is Resistance?
The most characteristic individual and group
reaction to change may be called resistance.^ It is a
behavior which is intended to protect an individual from
the effects of real or imagined change. For the admin
istrator, resistance may occur under many conditions.
When he attempts to create a change, he may develop, un
intentionally, many threats to the person or groups with
whom he works. One must understand the underlying causes
for such resistance and recognize the symptoms in order
to deal with the opposing forces.
The existence of interdependence among the sub
parts of a system and between the system and its environ
ment has many implications for change. Interdependence
can generate an emergent force toward change if change in
one part of a system sets up forces on other parts to
match the change or utilize the new resources. By the
same token, interdependence can serve as a source of re
sistance. Readiness for change in one part of a system
may be negated by the unwillingness or inability of other
interdependent parts to change. A change sequence which
would be strong enough to modify a subpart if it existed
15
x Alvin Zander, "Resistance to Change — Its
Analysis and Prevention," Advanced Management. Vol. XV,
No. 1 (January 1950); Warren G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne
and Robert Chin (eds.), The Planning of Change (New York:
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1969), Part III, Chapter
56
in isolation may have no effect on the system as a whole,
and consequently it may fail to have any effect on any
part of the system.
Many behavior patterns, characteristic of a given
system, will have multiple meanings for that system. Each
subpart has its own impulses to act, but the unitary
nature of the system makes separate and independent action
by the subparts impossible. Therefore, some compromise is
developed so that the system can act in a way that is gen
erally satisfactory to all of its subparts but not exclu
sively or fully satisfactory to any of them.
Parsons describes a case of multiple determination
of behavior in his analysis of how to influence Germany to
change from a totalitarian to a democratic state.His
analysis pays particular attention to the interlocking of
the motivational structure of individuals with the insti
tutional structure of society. In Hitler's Germany, for
example, both structures included strong hierarchical-
authoritarian elements. The result of such coincidence
of personal motivation and institutional requiredness is
that in institutional behavior self-interested elements
of motivation and disinterested moral sentiments of duty
tend to motivate toothe same concrete goals.
^Talcott Parsons, "The Problem of Controlled In
stitutional Change,1 * Essays in Sociological Theory (rev.
ed.) (Glencoe, 111.: the tree Press, 19&4J, p. 240.
57
The multiple detezmination of behavior which is
likely to occur in any system of interdependent parts can
contribute to the promotion or obstruction of change. If
a change is proposed which would meet some of the needs
satisfied by the existing arrangements and ignore others,
then the subparts whose needs are ignored would oppose the
change and insist on preservation of the status quo. On
the other hand, forces toward change would be generated
if the proposed change seemed likely to give satisfaction
to subparts not previously satisfied, or if it led to new
coalitions within the system.
Resistance occurs when a proposed change seems to
promise benefits to one part of the client system at the
expense of the other parts. The defensive reaction is to
oppose the change automatically without even considering
its actual advantages or disadvantages. This readiness
to feel threatened can occur both among competing subparts
which share more or less equal benefits under the existing
arrangements and among subparts which benefit quite dif
ferently from the existing arrangements. Change agents
working with large organizations have recognized the im
portance of multiple entry, which ensures that a change
proposal is associated not exclusively with one part of
the system but with all parts. Hence, interdependence
58
among parts of a system is often associated with a fear
that the improvement of one part can be gained only at
the expense of another and there is, thus, a tendency to
feel threatened by any proposal for change except, per
haps, one*s own.
Many types of resistance may emerge either at the
beginning of the change process or after it is under way,
or both at the beginning and later on. Resistance forces
which might arise early in the change project include a
general opposition to change, opposition to a proposed
change objective, and a desire to preserve existing satis
factions. Resistance may also arise from the relationship
between the client system and the change agent. Most of
these forms of resistance can occur early or late in the
change process. In addition, there are some resistance
forces which can arise after the project is under way.
These include a reevaluation' of costs and difficulties
which seemed possible to handle at the beginning but which
the client system later finds it cannot handle, a loss of
energy and motivation through excessive prolongation of
the diagnostic phase of the project, and a premature ces
sation of change activities because of the impending end
of the relationship with the change agent.
59
A few other sources of resistance may also be
identified at this point.^ They are: reluctance to admit
weaknesses, fear of failure or awkwardness in trying to
initiate a new practice or behavior pattern, a fatalistic
expectation of failure instilled by previous unsuccessful
attempts to change, and a fear of losing some current
satisfaction (for example, power, dependency, etc.). A
given item or place may also make many competing demands
on the client system's resources, and these may interfere
with the drive toward change. In fact, the tempo of
modern life with its manifold pressures and demands may
make it very difficult to find a good time and place for
the kind of reflection and intense self-awareness which
is required for the processes of assessment and change.
Perhaps the greatest resistance force operating
in small groups is the members' imperfect awareness of
their own interpersonal processes and their lack of a
frame of reference in which to judge their performances
and their possibilities for improvement. Coupled with
these factors is the insecurity which one finds among
group leaders who feel that any diagnosis of group func
tions is a threat to the stability of their own roles.
•^Ronald Lippitt, Jeanne Watson and Bruce Westley
(eds.), The Dynamics of Planned Change (New York: Harcourt,
Brace & World, Inc., 1958), Chapter VII.
60
In some groups, an ideological resistance to self-ap
praisal is found.
In the case of organizations, we encounter the
criterion of productivity as a main factor in motivations
toward or away from change. The principal resistance
force in any organization may be a fear that change will
adversely affect the organization’s productivity. Another
frequent source of resistance in organizations springs
from conflicts which may be only latent, between various
strata of authority, or between subparts as already noted.
This often means that one part's effort to seek and obtain
help is viewed by other subparts as an attempt to buttress
a particular vested interest. Such a misunderstanding
leads naturally to resistance by the rest of the organ
ization.
Bureaucracy's Resistance to Change
Bureaucratic organizations have to administer
change carefully. Resistance to change may be exaggerated
by insecure officials; it may become bureaupathic.^-® In
an organizational context dominated by the need to con
trol, innovation is dangerous because, by definition, it
^Victor A. Thompson, Modern Organization (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1961}, Chapter VIII, pp. 152-
169.
61
is not controlled behavior* It creates risks of errors
and therefore of sanctions* Innovation is facilitated
by a secure noncompetitive group, administrative effort
dominated by a professional outlook. Since this kind of
situation is thought to be rare in modern bureaucracy,
some people might regard excessive resistance to change
as an inherent feature of bureaucratic organization,
rather than as a form of buxeaupathology.^9 it is felt,
however, by some that excessive bureaucratic inertia is
much less widespread than is supposed.^®
There is another source of resistance to change
which can be subject to rational corrective procedures*
The communication pattern determines who gets feedback
information.
A particular official may never get intimate
knowledge of the results of his own actions* Conse
quently, he may feel no need for a change which others
19Ibid.
2°In a state employment office and a federal en
forcement agency, Blau found little evidence of resistance
to change* The cases he did find were based upon the fear
of a superior and fear of the loss of security in rela
tions with subordinates or clients* See Peter Blau, The
Dynamics of Bureaucracy (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1955), pp. 164-189. He found that new employees
and less competent employees were more resistive to change
than others (ibid, p. 197)* He found also that ritualistic
compliance with rules and regulations stemmed from personal
insecurity and important relationships at work (ibid*, p.
188)• Secure officials welcomed change because it made
their work interesting by providing new challenges*
62
who do have this knowledge think should be made. Bringing
the official into direct communication with the respond
ents might cure in a hurry this particular case of re
sistance to change.
Approaches Toward Reducing
Resistance
Some procedures on the part of the administrator
might be useful in preventing or decreasing the resist
ance which arises in a changed situation.
Resistance will be prevented to the degree that
the changer helps the changees to develop their own under
standing of the need for the change, and an explicit
awareness of how they feel about it, and what can be done
about those feelings. An individual's reaction to a
change appears to be related directly to the clarity of
his perception of the meaning of the change and his eval
uation of the effect that the change will have on him as
an individual with certain aspirations and expectations.
The administrator can use the nature of resistance as an
indicator of the cause of resistance. One method is to
provide information in advance about the change. Such
information can include the reasons requiring the change,
its nature, planned timing, and likely impact upon the
organization and personnel. When the individual is clear
63
about what the character of the change will be, when he
feels he has all of the information necessary to do the
private calculus to decide what the change will hold for
him, he can then make an evaluation. He can then decide
whether to support, tolerate or oppose the change.
Restoring Understanding
Management must be able to provide for means of
releasing tensions resulting from the introduction of
change. It should be aware of the necessity for the re
lease of emotional tensions surrounding the possible
losses due to change. There is a value in blowing off
steam. The psychologists call this a Hcatharsis.M There
is good evidence that new attitudes can be accepted by a
person only if he has a chance to thoroughly air his
original attitude. Management should not attempt to meet
hostility with hostility, nor emotions with logic. After
the resentment has been aired, it is then possible that
the employee may accept finally the change.
Resistance may be less likely to occur if the
group participates in making the decisions about how the
change should be implemented, what the change should be
like, how people might perform in the changed situation,
or any other problems that are within their area of
freedom to decide*
The state of equilibrium which exists in a group
at any time is a dynamic balance of forces favoring and
opposing each practice within the group* In other words,
the group operates within a field of forces both for and
against its way of life* The group is an instrument for
bringing strong forces on its members to change, and a
change in internal group forces will encourage a change
in the behavior of the individual. The group may be a
medium for introducing change as well as a target for the
proposed change. On occasion, the group has also a third
function — change agent. That is, management goes beyond
encouraging employees to accept change; it stimulates them
to join in producing change. When this kind of climate is
built, the employees are true partners with management in
seeking organizational goals. Such group decision-making
involves subordinates actively in the processes of intro
ducing change and enhances their sense of control over the
environment.
Lewin breaks down the problem of change into three
major parts: (1) unfreezing the present level, (2) moving
to the new level, and (3) refreezing group life at the new
oi
level. ^ Before undertaking a change, management should
Lewin, op. cit*. p. 34.
65
fixst devote more attention to the unfreezing process,
the reduction of possible resistance to changes of the
status quo. After moving to the new level, the change
must be frozen into a new status quo, keeping in mind that
this new status quo will also have to be unfrozen sometime
in the future. To quote Lewin again:
A theory emerges that one of the causes of re
sistance to change lies in the relation between
the individual and the value of group standards.
This theory permits conclusions concerning the
resistance of certain types of social equi
libria to change, the unfreezing, moving, and
freezing of a level, and the effectiveness of
group procedures for changing attitudes or
conduct.22
The preceding discussion boils down to this: One
cannot speak of resistance without knowing against what
this resistance is directed. Is it a refusal of the ends
or a refusal of the system of means? Is it inspired by
mistrust of the organization or indifference to innova
tion? It is tempting for all who have to take decisions
to identify themselves with society and to accuse those
who resist them of apathy, routine, or narrow-minded indi
vidualism. It is, however, only possible to deal with
resistance to change if one recognizes the validity of
orientations which surpass it, either because they are
centered on the individual or because they aim directly
22Ibid.. p. 39
66
at certain social values, like technical ox economic
rationality, which cannot be fully realized in a system
as it is only a specific organization with its own inter
ests. Employees* attitude toward change cannot be under
stood, therefore, independently of the way in which the
organization itself behaves toward this change.
Conflict and Change
A number of the nineteenth century social theories
evolved the idea that all change is and can be accom
plished only through conflict, through a clash between
those who represent the new and those who have a vested
interest in the old, between a progressive society and the
one that is decadent. Perhaps, the social philosophers
of the late nineteenth century should have deduced from
the disaster of the French experience that conflict, both
internal and external, is detrimental to social progress;
but the focus of attention on such concepts as Darwin*s
idea that the struggle for survival is a part of the
mechanism of biological evolution led many of them to
regard conflict as the means to social improvement. No
analysis of social change would, therefore, be complete
without a consideration of the role that social conflict
67
plays in the making of social change*^
While the nineteenth century writers used the term
conflict to refer to the physical clash of people who had
unalterably opposed and irreconcilable interests, values,
sentiments, and loyalties, today, conflict is often used
as a blanket term to encompass all kinds of contrasts,
oppositions, and contradictions — between various ele
ments within the personality of the individual, between
individuals, between social groups, and organizations ir
respective of the nature of the conduct that they produce*
Any change involves considerable stress, both in
dividual and collective* Once accomplished, a change may
reduce an antecedent incongruence and the strains imposed
on the members of the society; but in the process of being
accomplished, the change produces its own stress and
strains — discontents, frustrations, dissensions, and
disappointments* In this general sense, it is a conflict
within his own personality that incites an innovator to his
OO
^’ ■'Othex attempts to analyze the relationship be
tween social conflict and social change are: Oliver C*
Cox, Caste* Class and Race: A Study in Social Dynamics
(Garden City, N*Y*: Doubleday & Company, Inc*, 1948);
Lewis A* Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York:
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1956); and Ralf Dahrendorf,
Class and Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stan-
foxd University Press, 1959)*
68
innovative endeavors; a conflict of ambitions and oppor
tunities that leads an advocate to seek personal success
in a socially atypical manner; and a conflict of values,
interests, and status prospects that induces an adopter
to venture to use something new. Moreover, the resist
ance that both advocates and adopters encounter from
those who resent the appearance of the new may be regarded
as conflict. Insofar as social change is concerned, it
may be argued that conflict need not be the modus operandi
of change, but that, on the contrary, change, at least
change in social organization, is the way to eliminate
conflict.
It follows, therefore, that there seems to be a
relation of mutual dependence between conflict and change
in formal organization; between coping with resistance to
change and resolving conflicts. The relationship seems to
be bilateral. Not only does change lead to new conflicts
and the need for new personnel; existing conflicts and the
introduction of new personnel might also act as forces to
increase the pressure for change. Changes in social
structure often precipitate conflict, and conflicts tend
24
to generate innovations. Conflicts between individuals
and groups are often functional for organizations and
^4Blau and Scott, op. cit.« p. 240.
69
productive of positive adaptive changes. The flaring up
of conflict displays in extreme terms problems that other
wise may be held at the margin of organization*s atten
tion, such as strains between people and departments,
between subparts of the organization and also between
organizations. It imposes upon the directorate the need
for change and provides a rationale for action. It pro
vides an opportunity of observing how leading staff
tolerate or fail to tolerate tensions. It also makes pos
sible for those staff to learn the levels of their own
maturity or long term management abilities. It may be
said that various conflicts in complex organizations,
which rigid bureaucratization is designed to conceal and
suppress, are an inevitable source of change.
Any analysis of the effects of conflict on organ
izational change must take some account of the relation
ship between the dominant values and goals of the organ
ization and the goals and values held by relevant actors
and organizations which constitute its environment.
Among the more obvious such relationships would be the
consistency of the organizational goals identified by its
management and those identified by a governing board or
individual. Probably of as much importance would be the
relationship between two organizations whose roles within
70
the larger society could be said to overlap at least to
the extent of requiring, under a rational model, coordi
nated management and a mutually agreed division of labor.
Conflicts between Organizations
Social welfare agencies within a given community
offer an excellent opportunity for exploring patterns of
relationships among organizations. Most of them are small
so that relatively few individuals need be interviewed to
obtain information on their interaction. Furthermore, by
distinguishing between intraorganizational and interorgan-
izational analysis, the investigator is sensitized to the
organizational correlates of value conflict and value
consistency. Without such a distinction, he might con
centrate on showing that value conflicts lead to organi
zational breakdown without appreciating that interorgan-
izational relations permit and encourage conflict without
destruction of the overall societal relations.
The focus here is on multiple organizations
existing in a state of partial conflict. Thus, in one
city there may be twenty family agencies, with no rational
basis for separation except that their growth was an un
planned consequence of immediate social pressure or
crisis. They might indeed be in the process of consoli
dation. There might also be two or more welfare agencies
71
competing with each other in serving the community* They
might be in the process of amalgamation. Yet, at any
given time in a changing society, the investigator must
expect to find multiple organizations. Culture values
also condition the development of such organizations. In
the field of business enterprise, there is a tendency to
argue that a competitive situation is a good per se.
Even where a monopoly is more efficient, society might
reject it. In short, where there is a situation of par
tial conflict, where a society is constantly changing,
and where cultural values dictate it, the problem of
multiple organizations is an important one and there is a
need for a study of the interorganizational conflict and
its effect on organizational change as such.
There is another reason why interorganizational
relations should be studied in a discussion of management
of change. All formal organizations are embedded in an
environment of other organizations as well as in a complex
of norms, values, and collectivities of society at large.
Inherent in the relationship between any formal organiza
tion and its environment is the fact that it is to some
degree dependent upon its environment; in other words, it
is a subsystem of the more inclusive social system of
society, As distinct from a society, which in some
72
respects is relatively self-sufficient in that it runs
the gamut of all human institutions, a formal organization
is a partial social system inasmuch as it defines only a
specific set of goals and statuses as relevant to its
functioning*
One of the tasks of this study is to explore in
a preliminary manner interorganizational relations as a
dimension in examining the problem of managing changes
in organizations, and in the process extend, it is hoped,
the scope of the theories of organizational change* With
such a broad aim in view, the case illustrations are pro
vided to focus on the relationship of two public organi
zations engaged basically in similar pursuits (i*e*, social
change and community welfare), their internal structures,
their degree of goal perception and goal achievement, the
forces that impel them to cooperate or compete with each
other, and consequently the factors that stimulate or
obstruct them in the processes of change*
Resistance to change is universal* It is a prob
lem which any person who is responsible for social change
must face* The causes of the development of this phenom
enon may be understood, and resistance may be prevented,
if the administrator can help the changes develop their
73
own understanding of the need for change and explicit
awareness of how they feel about it, and what can be
done about those feelings. Employees1 reactions to
change also vary according to the level of participation:
as individuals, as members of groups or as persons com
mitted to the objectives of an organization. A number of
ways by which management is able to handle these re
sponsibilities were discussed with illustrations from
previous researches.
The resistance that both advocates and adopters
encounter from those who resent the appearance of the new
may be regarded as conflict. Such internalized, inter
personal or inter-group stresses often accompany the
change; and hence there is a relationship between looking
at resistance and resolving conflicts. Such conflicts are
not necessarily restricted to relations within organiza
tions, but also between organizations. This provides one
of the bases for the case illustrations in subsequent
chapters.
An examination of the nature of change and re
sistance to it leads us to the next question — How to
introduce and manage changes in an organization? Here,
we are concerned with the evolution of the process of
74
change and ordering the data in a sequence; it will de
scribe the existing state of an organization, the need
for a change, planning the change, action steps, and
stabilizing. The next chapter offers a scheme for this
purpose*
CHAPTER IV
THE UNFOLDING OF A PROCESS OF
CHANGE — A GENERIC SCHEME
The preceding two chapters reviewed some of the
literature on the nature of change and its resistant
factors. Now, what is needed is an analytical framework
to examine large and extended changes in organizations —
how changes are introduced and managed, and to what ex
tent the methods of introduction and implementation are
important to the realization of the change objectives*
To do this, the present chapter identifies five phases:
(see Table 1)
1. State of the organization before change
2. Recognizing the forces of and the need for
change
3* Planning for change
4* Taking action steps to make the change
5. Stabilizing the change.
It is not suggested here that all planned changes
necessarily progress in an orderly sequential way through
each of these phases. Indeed, one can usually see more
than one phase going or. at the same time. Nevertheless,
75
76
TABLE 1
FIVE-PHASE FRAMEWORK TO STUDY CHANGE PROCESS
Order of
Sequence Phases Rationale
First State of the organiza
tion before change
Second Recognizing the forces
of and the need for
change
Third Planning for change
Fourth Taking action steps to
make the change
Fifth Stabilizing the change
To know the existing
state of affairs of
the organization
What is wrong with
the existing situa
tion and the "why"
of change
Preparation of a
blueprint for change
Execution of the
plan, assessment of
its working while it
is being implemented;
replan if necessary
Consolidate and re
inforce patterns of
behavior in tune with
the plan and develop
new equilibrium for
the organization
77
it would be helpful to review descriptions of change in
organizations in terms of this sequence of phases, and in
the present study in two public organizations.
State of the Organization
Before Change
This is a description of the organization in its
steady state when operations are relatively normal and
management is meeting the usual set of problems and making
minor adjustments necessary to keep the organization in
equilibrium.
Paradoxically, the management's job is to accom
plish both stability and change. In order to maximize
both the productivity of the processes under its juris
diction and maintain high motivation among subordinates,
it is necessary to minimize the frequency with which the
patterns of work flow and coordination are disturbed.
In fact, the frequency with which such actual or potential
interruptions to the work patterns occur, are the prime
determinants of the work load of the manager. It is the
development and maintenance of work flow routine which is
his major objective and these predictable and repeated
patterns of interactions are the source of morale or the
absence of debilitating stress and its concomitant:
78
destructive emotional reaction.^
In other words, the manager faces constant internal
and external interruptions. Some of these require mere
palliatives — readjustments in order to bring the system
of relationships back to stability, for example, a dis
ciplinary action. Other disturbances require more drastic
action if the system is to be stabilized; for example, the
introduction of new methods or personnel as a result of a
change in market conditions or the demands of some other
part of the organization. Presumably one might call this
a moving equilibrium. External pressures and internal
problems require constant change, but the manager en
deavors to accomplish this as he returns the system to
equilibrium.
State of the Organization before
Change; Organization "C**
This is a case of scattered field offices and the
attendant problems of supervisory and administrative be
havior of the top person (the director) and his staff.
Each of the five field offices had its own supervisor who
directly reported to the director. The latter was most
•hsliot D* Chappie and Leonard E. Sayles, The Meas
ure of Management (New York; Macmillan Company, 1961),
pp. 46-68, and 114-141.
79
of the time absent from the central office as he had to
represent the organization in policy discussions at the
county level. This resulted in less and less interaction
and communication with the field supervisors and more and
more distance * — both physical and psychological between
them. A look at the formal structure of the organization
will reveal the aforesaid gap.
Assistant
Director
Supervisor Supervisor Supervisor Supervisor Supervisor
Director
Field Assistants
80
As the chart indicates, the supervisors reported directly
to the director, short circuiting the assistant director.
Since the meetings between the head and the staff were
infrequent, there was no real coordination of the activ
ities of the field supervisors. The trend of the latter
was to give priority to their own field offices (sub
systems) ignoring the total system*s objectives. There
was very little effort to bring the system back to equi
librium when entropic elements threatened it.
State of the Organization before
Change: Organization WHH
This is a case of an organization engaged in a
sensitive area of human relations, namely, promotion of
interracial understanding. This agency was headed by a
director assisted by a few professional staff experienced
in social work. At the time of the birth of the agency
in 1958, the then director Harris managed the organization
building up informal relationships with the men around
him and the whole system resembled a round table, as
follows:
81
D irector
Assistant
Director
c = Consultant
As the chart Indicates, the director and the professional
staff worked as a plural body, avoiding all formal hier
archical barriers of interaction. This was further
strengthened by the charismatic personality of Harris and
his intuitive communicative skill in capitalizing the
personality strengths of each of the staff.
82
Recognizing the Forces of and
the Need for Change
No subject deserves greater attention from the top
management than planning and implementing purposeful
change* Yet, frequently it is very badly handled or
virtually ignored. There seem to be two basic reasons
for this:
(a) Failure to accept the inevitability of
change: While one can easily recognize and accept the
changes which have occurred already, the flaw in the rea
soning is that change is thought of as final rather than
continuing* The inclination is to think that the latest
change is the last change.
(b) Failure to comprehend the accelerating rate
of change: This shortcoming is perhaps due to the fact
that a heavy proportion of senior management jobs are
occupied by administrators rather than innovators whose
inclinations are to operate the business tidily for today
rather than to imagine what tomorrow might bring.
Consequently, the first requirement in grappling
with change is to understand the forces of change and to
gain an appreciation of the kinds of technological and
social developments that are being introduced. Curiosity
about developments in all areas of human endeavor may be
rewarding.
83
Recognition consists in localizing and identify
ing social difficulties hitherto unpexceived. At this
state they axe only pexceived in a fragmentary fashion;
they axe not connected. Sometimes they axe placed in
juxtaposition without any order, sometimes one of them
is so emphasized that it obscures all the others. It
might also happen that the difficulties are perceived in
different ways by different members of the social groups
and are not integrated into a common frame of reference.
Recognition appears in the first reactions of a group
when, through the mechanism of self regulation and the
reappearance of spontaneous communication within the
group, messages hitherto suppressed suddenly find ex
pression.
It is interesting to note that recognition is
accompanied by an increase of overt tension in the group.
This can be explained by the resumption of communication
between subgroups subject to tension that had remained
isolated from one another. Both carriers and recipients
of messages adopt many defense reactions which might take
the form of: (a) expression of a large number of value
judgments, (b) aggressive remarks directed against others
as well as against themselves, (c) explanations of diffi
culties largely based on individual personality factors,
84
and (d) rationalizations tending to deny or to minimize
O
problems or to present them as unavoidable.
For all these reasons it is impossible to regard
the material emerging at the recognition stage as truly
explanatory, in spite of the fact that the remarks are
often presented as an analysis of the causes of diffi
culties. In fact, the evidence they produce concerns
symptoms rather than causes.
Two sub stages may be identified during this
process, that is, diagnosis and action. At this point,
the group tends to perceive the connecting links between
various symptoms. It discovers the existence of a com
plex network of causes that affect the work of the group
and its problems. It is a synthetic perception of a sit
uation. This is due to the increase of relevant informa
tion that becomes available regarding the life of a group
and due to the effect of the explicit discussion of
grievances. Both these factors bring about a decrease of
tension — catharsis — and an increase in the mobility
of perception.
In the next sub stage of this continuing process,
the network of causes discovered by the group constitutes
% ax Pages, “The Sociotherapy of the Enterprise,*
Human Relations, Vol. XII, No. 4 (November 1959), p. 326.
85
a map of possible action capable of bringing about co-
ordinated action of the group upon its environment. In
terms of dynamics, during this stage tensions between
the groups and the environment take precedence over the
internal group tensions. As action develops, new tensions
may appear inside the group until such time as self
regulating mechanisms set in motion a new process of
tension reduction.
The above description shows how closely the phe
nomena of modification of tensions with a psychological
field are linked with those of the reorganization of group
perception — cognitive reorganization achieved by com
munication between the various parts of the field.
It seems obvious, therefore, that during this
period some technological, economic or other event occurs
which is perceived by some or all members of the organi
zation as so disquieting or dissatisfying as to motivate
a search for new and more satisfying arrangements.
A major responsibility of the management is to
insure that the organization has a capability to gather
and analyze information on those forces which may have a
profound influence on the system in the future. Fore
casting must reach well beyond extrapolation of present
activities and particular consideration to long-term
86
changes in size and the nature and effect of social,
political and economic forces locally and globally.
Careful attention should be paid to the timing of fore
cast changes and the rate at which they will materialize.
Such ability to change successfully depends on the will
ingness of the management to devote substantial time to
the process; commitment of the top management to the
long-range process planning; recognition of the normal
human reaction to resist change and the consequent need
to adopt a strategy designed to overcome reaction;
achieving a tolerable balance in top management between
administrative and innovative types.
The Need for Change in WCW
It was observed that three people were concerned
about the increasing trend toward disintegration: the
assistant director, one of the field supervisors, and the
director. They felt that the agency was not progressing
as it should and attributed it to poor organization. They
decided to analyze the internal problems and to lay plans
to improve the functioning of the system.
The Need for Change in WH*
When Harris was called to a federal position,
there was a change of leadership. The assistant director
87
abdicated his claims in favor of a fellow worker Cooley,
who was appointed to the position of director, while the
assistant director continued in his assigned position.
Meanwhile, the organization grew in size as more personnel
were employed. Cooley and his assistant director found
the increased staff and complexity of the organization
required reassignment of responsibilities and some regu
lation of the activities of the organization on a more
rational basis. In other words, they thought the former
informal structure would no longer be effective to meet
the new problems and situations, and decided to introduce
some structural changes. It must not be forgotten that
this structural change was in part a response to the
threat of a.merger.
Planning for Change
This involves clarifying the problem and defining
objectives, developing and reviewing alternative courses
of actions, determining strategies and tactics and iden
tifying and developing needed skill.
Top management must insist that thorough plans be
made before embarking on a program of change. The inter
action of functional activities in a complex environment
makes it essential to analyze cause and effect in every
88
phase of the project to be undertaken* It is important
to relate plans to long-range corporate objectives and
to management*s statements of its philosophy on change.
Here are some criteria that may be considered:
1. One must be sure to establish the objective
of the change and that it is compatible with the corporate
goals.
2. In analyzing the effect of the change due
consideration should be given to the outside world and
the individual employee.
3. Sufficient time and funds must be allowed for
problems which are bound to arise. Many worthwhile
changes fail because of inadequate financial resources to
carry the schemes through periods of unexpected diffi
culties. The implementation rarely goes as well as
planned.
4. Operational strategies should be formulated
in such a way that the responsibility, authority and
accountability for implementations are clearly assigned.
It is seldom possible or advisable to try to lay
out a complete, detailed overall plan for a change. It
is probably better to design a plan which recognizes that
there will be a number of phases or action steps and the
completion of one phase is the time to evaluate progress
and replan before resuming action towards the change
objective. Phasing and periodic evaluation are also con
sistent with other principles of psychology regarding
motivational learning. Phases can be used as sub goals.
When a task is too complex or extends over too long a
period of time, it is useful to break it into parts and
have an individual or group work on each part in succes
sion. Thus, as sub goals are achieved and passed, the
overall goal does not seem so impossible, so distant, or
psychologically irrelevant. An evaluation at the end of
each of the phases also provides immediate feedback about
progress and facilitates learning regarding the planning
and execution of change.
According to Lewin, planned action usually starts
with a more or less vague idea. This idea is transformed
into a plan when the objective has been clarified, the
means to the objective have been determined and one of
these means has been selected and a strategy of action
developed. These three items together make up the “gen-
exal plan*1 which is to precede action.
The development of a general plan presupposes
fact finding. The original state of the idea of the goal
%urt Lewin, “Frontiers in Group Dynamics,”
Human Relations. Vol. I, No. 2 (1947), pp. 143-153.
90
corresponds to an area in the social field or the life
space of the individual that is but little structured
in itself (Figure 6) and the relation of which to the
rest of the field is not clearly determined. Fact find
ing is necessary to structure the goal, its relation to
the total setting and the path and means which may lead
to the goal. On the basis of this fact finding, the goal
is usually somewhat altered in the light of the findings
concerning the means available.
However, before a general plan can be devised,
it is necessary to make a thorough diagnosis of the force
field (Figure 7) and to evaluate the likelihood of being
able to change significantly each of the specific forces
determining the present equilibrium. Once this has been
done, a strategy for change can be blueprinted. The best
first action step can be positively identified, the
second step estimated, the third and the fourth envisaged
on the assumption that the earlier steps are successful.
Thus, while the first step is definitely decided, ac
cepting the plan does not mean that all further steps
are fixed. On the contrary, the objective is to keep
the plan flexible enough to make adjustments for things
which cannot be foreseen at the beginning but which will
affect the future course of events. The emerging general
Figure 6
Stage of "Idea"
G oal
G r
Source: Kurt Lewin, "Frontiers in Group Dynamics
Human Relations, Vol. I, No* 2 (1947), p. 149*
I
92
Figure 7
Forces Affecting an On-Going
Social Process
Level at Which
a Social Process
Occurs Over Time
Social and Technological Forces
Tending to Lower the Level
i . I
4 . I
Tt
1 T
Social and Technological Forces
Tending to Raise the Level
Source: Floyd Mann and Franklin W• Neff, Managing
Major Change in Organizations (Ann Arbor, Mich.: The
Foundation for Research on Human Behavior, December,
1964), 5th Printing, p. 62.
93
plan corresponds to a field (Figure 8) which contains the
structure of the goal, and the steps to the goal in suf
ficient detail to serve as a blueprint for action.
Once the objective, the general plan, and the
action steps for the first phase are determined, the
change process can be initiated and the actions for the
first step carried out. At the end of this phase, an
evaluation of progress (a reconnaissance) can be made,
data and information can be collected to determine where
things now stand and whether the field has changed sig
nificantly. These results provide the basis for altering
the general plan, if necessary, and for replanning the
second phase. Thus, after each step, adjustments in the
field to the changes under way are fed back for use in
assessing the progress of the change. This step becomes
the basis for planning the next step in multiple step
process, and for the selection of the action alternatives
most likely to gain the next sub objective.
In many fields of social management, the lack of
signposts of exactly where one is and in what direction
one is moving and with what velocity, is oftentimes keenly
felt as a gap. Consequently, the actors themselves are
uncertain, and are at the mercy of the likes and dislikes
of bosses, colleagues, or the public. Perhaps, what they
94
Figure 8
Stage of “General Plan'*
G r
Step
Source: Kurt Lewin, "Frontiers in Group Dynamics,"
Human Relations, Vol. I, No. 2 (1947), p. 149.
95
need is learning. If we cannot judge whether an action
has led forward ox backward, if we have no criteria for
evaluating the relation between effort and achievement,
there is nothing to prevent us from making the wrong con
clusions and to encourage the wrong work habits* Real
istic fact finding and evaluation is a prerequisite for
any learning*
Hence, an efficient steering of social action
presupposes that fact-finding methods have to be developed
which permit a sufficiently realistic determination of the
nature and position of the social goal and of the direc
tion and the amount of locomotion resulting from a given
action. To be effective, this fact finding has to be
linked with the organization itself; it has to be part of
a feedback system which links a reconnaissance branch of
the organization with the branches which do the action*
The feedback has to be done so that a discrepancy between
the desired and the actual direction leads automatically
to a correction of actions or to a change of planning*4
The above approach of Lewin emphasizes defining
the objectives of the change and planning ahead, but still
maintains that the plan should be flexible enough to make
adjustments for random events. If it is found, for ex
4
Lewin, op. cit.* p* 150.
96
ample, when progress of the change is evaluated, that the
change is moving faster and in different directions than
one of the kc/y persons to be affected by the change had
expected, it is usually advisable to postpone further
steps until there is an agreement once again on the ob
jectives and probable implications of the change. Moving
ahead without fully working through the problems un
covered in the first phases will probably only create
other problems later.
The Plan for Change in -C1 1
From all accounts, it seems that the planning
stage in **Ca was not done systematically. Though there
was discussion with the field staff about the need for a
coordinator to integrate the field activities, sufficient
time was not provided for the personnel to study the
proposals and offer constructive suggestions in improving
the plan. The proposal to restructure the organization
seems to have been imposed rather than introduced for
trial and evaluation. Even the supervisor who had a hand
in the plan added the proviso that his acceptance of the
plan was conditional upon additional changes in the over
all purposes of the system* This person observed that
there was considerable discrepancy between the theoretical
97
goals of the top management and the actual behavior of
the rest of the employees.
However, the director decided to go ahead with the
reorganization plan without really getting meaningful
feedback from the staff. The plan called for three co
ordinators in charge of various activities of the organ
ization. What now emerged is a climate of suspicion and
more control of the field staff rather than supportive
guidance and stimulation. There was neither an attempt
on clarifying the objective of the change, nor sufficient
time allowed to formulate operational strategies to assign
responsibility, authority, and accountability for imple
mentation.
The Plan for Change in "H1 1
There was a good deal of discussion and exchange
of views on the intended changes between the director and
his staff. The nature of the dialogue, however, differed
from that of MC." While in "C” comments came at random
from the personnel at the request and prodding of the
head (which showed that the personnel were not really in
volved in the debate), “H1 1 showed a lot of potential for
spontaneous and meaningful exchange. Sometimes the at
mosphere had an academic flavor with citations from
98
management theorists. In short, there was involvement
and participation. Opposition to the new plan came from
those members who felt sensitive about reporting to a
possible junior member. A few others felt that the plan
would destroy the freedom of operation of the personnel.
The supporters were those who stood to benefit by the
plan.
It must be noted at this point that WHM had vast
opportunities to engage in fact finding about the plan.
For example, it had a research section and qualified full
time research personnel to take care of this function.
But strangely enough, the research personnel were not
seriously involved in getting feedback from the employees.
Nor was there any evidence to prove that there was pur
poseful interaction between the research wing and the rest
of the organization.
Taking the Action Steps
to Make the Change
In this phase, action is taken to execute the
change plan, methods for assessing how the change is pro
ceeding are devised and used periodically, the change is
replanned and new action steps are taken. It is necessary
to reappraise progress continuously; ensure that com
munications about the change have been received and
understood.
The equilibrium and the planning-replanning phases
depend upon the collection and analysis of facts con
cerning the social and technological- forces in the field
relevant to the change. Systematic measurement plays an
important role in the managing of change using this ap
proach. The measurement of forces supporting the steady
state before the change is introduced is dictated by the
need for orderly and relatively harmonious change. An
assessment of how these forces are shifting as the change
proceeds would assist in diagnosing the progress of the
change and in the replanning of the change strategy and
tactics. Measurement of the forces shaping up in the new
configuration would also be important in helping the
change agent evaluate if he has created a situation that
will have some permanency.
Architects of change frequently use a number of
different indirect cues to estimate how the change is
proceeding, but they have seldom conceived of following
with direct measurement the forces facilitating or imped
ing the change they are attempting to engineer. It must
be admitted that the currently available measures of some
variables are relatively crude. Yet, they do provide
more information than is usually obtained, and constant
100
use of such measures promotes their subsequent revision
and improvement.
Periodic measurements recording the rate at which
the change is perceived as taking place are particularly
important* Changes that seem to unfold too slowly axe
disturbing in that those affected are held in a state of
turmoil longer than necessary* Changes that move along
too swiftly for the participants are frequently slowed
down precipitously when subordinates are eventually able
to control the rate of change in its final phases* While
it is undoubtedly very difficult to develop measures which
can be used to evaluate rates of progress, such measures
can make major contributions to the management of change,
and should be refined and developed where possible*
Another p o in t a t which measurement i s im portant i s
at the end of the change. Once the change is completed,
a thorough, overall assessment is in order if knowledge
regarding this new and relatively unchartered area is to
be developed* Regardless of how vivid the change experi
ences were for the participants, these experiences cannot
become the basis for intelligent subsequent action unless
they are conceptualized, systematized, evaluated and
recorded in written form.
The traditional human relations literature con-
101
centrated on the problem of gaining acceptance fox struc
tural changes* Here is where one reads about participation
and timing, the use of informal leaders, and so forth*
Arensberg,^ however, from the point of view of the applied
anthropologist, has provided an operational description of
the implementing process:
1* First an increase in managerial initiative to
subordinates*
2. Opportunity for increased inter-worker con
tacts .
3* Followed by an increase in redressive con
tacts or initiations to the manager (and in turn the man
ager must be prepared time-wise to accept these)•
4. Rewarding managerial responses to these sub
ordinate initiations; often, the change period is such a
hectic one that time is not available for this step*
One might call (lj and (3) as compensatory be
havior — reactions of the individual to the stress of
changed jobs, managerial contact patterns, and so forth*
5
Conrad Arensberg and Geofferey Tootell, "Plant
Sociology: Real Discoveries and New Problems," in Mirra
Komarovsky (ed«), Common Frontier of the Social Sciences
(Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1957).
102
Taking Action Steps to
Make the Change at "C"
The first step in this phase occurred when the
two members of the planning group came into administra
tive control of the organization* The field supervisor
who was involved in the plan to be a coordinator and
designated as Deputy Director* The assistant director's
position was renamed as Deputy Director and he became an
equal with his former subordinate. The new plan looked
as follows:
Supervisor 2 Supervisor 4 Supervisor Supervisor 5
Deputy
D irector
Supervisor 3
Deputy
Director
Deputy
Director
D irector
Field Assistants
N ewly created positions
103
According to the new plan, the Deputy Director 2
was in charge of coordinating the activities of field
supervisors. The reaction of the field supervisors to
this arrangement was mixed, some viewing it with skepti
cism while others expressed indifference. This was
because very little effort was made to reappraise the plan
in the light of criticism. Most of the personnel seemed
to have the impression that the whole thing was a gimmick
of the top management to exercise more control over the
field staff.
Taking Action Steps to
Make the Change at WHH
The new plan was put into effect in the summer of
1968. It called for the creation of three Deputy Direc
tors to coordinate the activities of the professional
consultants and channel the operation to the top. The
whole staff functions were divided into three areas:
Community organization and development, youth services,
and administrative services, each under a Deputy Director.
The research section, however, reported directly to the
Director. The reorganized structure looked as follows:
104
Deputy
D irector 3
Director
Research
Deputy
D irector
Deputy
D irector ^
Consultants Consultants Consultants
N ew ly created positions
It was explained to the personnel that the intent of the
new plan was to enhance the effectiveness and productivity
of the organisation while at the same time maintaining the
tradition of freedom and flexibility of operations, char
acteristic of the agency.
But the chart indicates a different trend — a
trend toward loss of flexibility and at the same time a
tightening of control devices. Though it might not have
been the intent of the management, it seems to have been
the effect. While there was considerable freedom of
access to the director before the change, the introduction
of a level presupposes travel through it. Any attempt to
overlook the Deputy Directors might affect the inter
personal relations among the staff.
105
Stabilizing the Change
This deals with the action which must be taken to
consolidate and reinforce patterns of behavior and ex
pectations which are required under the new system and
thus to develop the new equilibrium for the system. Man
agement cannot afford to assume that a change that has
been introduced will actually become part of the operating
system. It is well-known that human relations systems
tend to return to previous equilibria when pressures are
removed which have shifted them away from that position.
However, it would be a mistake to assume that all changes
are imposed on comfortable equilibria, although these are
the ones which are grist for the case writers. There are
many situations in which people are under substantial
stress and tension; the organization is not providing them
with personal satisfaction and they welcome change.
Whether initially welcomed or not, the manager must uti
lize methods of appraisal to validate that a change has
become stabilized. Essentially, this means checking to
see that the flow, sequence and coordinating patterns
are as planned.
In planning for change, it is important to ex
amine carefully the probable impact of a technical or a
social change on not only the sub-part directly affected
106
but all other parts of the organization which interact
with this sub-part. Such an examination to start in the
area in which the change will have its major impact and
trace the connections of that area to the other areas.
The requirements of these other areas being met by the
present relations with the change impact area should be
reviewed to make certain that the new arrangements to be
established in the change also meet those requirements.
At the same time, determining the meaning or significance
of the present arrangements to the people working in the
areas to be affected by the change should be accomplished.
Having this information helps the managers anticipate the
impact which the coming change will have. Secondly
effects, resulting from the adjustment of other sub-parts
to the original change in the target sub-part, should
also be expected and prepared for.
Focusing attention on the immediate impact of the
change is not enough, however. One cannot ignore the
wholeness of a system and fail to plan for the effects
that the change will have on other sub-parts. A change
that enhances the prestige of one group may very well do
so at the expense of another.
The above delineation is an endeavor to opera
tionalize the change process as an integral part of
107
organizational activities* This analysis lends itself
to objective validation so that the organization can pro
vide for change within its structure and appraise the
success of its members in carrying forth these patterns.
Change here is viewed not as a last straw, when all else
has failed, but can precede serious crises. Furthermore,
administrators can be trained in terms of unambiguous
behavioral skills to carry forth such programs.
In terms of managerial action, the process of
change consists of such interrelated sequences as specific
organizational and technical checks on the stability of
the system under the jurisdiction of the manager; estab
lishing criteria for evaluating significant deviations
from the desired stable state; prescribed administrative
patterns of collective action to bring the system back to
equilibrium (short-run change); appraisals of recurring
or continuing instabilities in the system with provision
for staff assistance in investigating potential structural
sources of organization stress and remedial measure; ad
ministrative patterns for implementing long-run organiza
tional structural change; and finally administrative
action to validate the change.^
^Leonard R. Sayles, "The Change Process in Organ
izations: An Applied Anthropology Analysis,*4 Human Organ
ization. Vol. 21, No. 2 (Summer 1962), pp. 62-67.
Stabilizing the Change at "C1 1
108
While the change-over process was not complete
and the final adoption of the plan was still going on at
the time of this study, the evidence suggests that the
organization was not fully prepared to accept the plan.
The top management seemed to be under the impression that
the change which had been initiated had actually become
part of the system. It remains to be seen how the people
responsible for change would handle the remainder of the
change-over process.
Stabilizing the Change at WH"
Six months after the change was initiated, there
was an attempt to review the working of the new plan.
The observer noted that the influence of ethnic groups
was predominant in viewing the plan with favor or dis
favor. Deputy Directors who belonged to a particular
ethnic group were supported by the members of the same
group. In fact, the change was accepted by this group as
functional and contributory to the effectiveness of the
system. The rest were either ambivalent or declined to
be drawn into discussions on the subject.
It was observed that there was some griping about
reassignment of responsibilities as some of the staff had
109
to work in new fields which were unfamiliar to them* The
management, however, allowed the affected individuals to
air their grievances; efforts were made to rectify some
of the problems*
The major factor, i.e*, flexibility and freedom
of operation was not seriously affected at the time of the
study. It was too early for evaluation. However, the re
searcher suggested that the research section could make a
positive contribution by studying the implications of the
change and work out methods for appraisal of the effec
tiveness of the process; check that the inflow of mate
rials and coordinating patterns are as planned.
Major changes provide unique opportunities for the
organization to rethink the distribution of functions
among divisions, to identify essential objectives, to
question ancillary ones that have been added during the
years, and to assess the relative contribution of differ
ent units to the organization's principal objective. It
is useful to think of the impact of a change on specific
groups of personnel as well as separate individuals.
Those responsible for introducing change should provide
such a plan that provides for a process of interaction
whereby there is a gradual merging of the objectives of
the innovators and the goals and aspirations of the people
110
who are affected by the change and on whom the change is
dependent for execution.
A five-phase framework was introduced in this
chapter to examine large and extended changes in organiza
tions with particular reference to two public organiza
tions in California. While the model of Lewin gives us
the foundation for extending the understanding of how
people respond to change, and what procedures might be
followed under different circumstances, application of the
framework to the two organizations disclosed the import
ance of systematic planning, the effectiveness of commun
ication about change to the organization members, the need
for reinforcement devices and positive leadership during
the transitional period. Furthermore, certain other
factors like time, uniqueness of organization are also
crucial in the change process. The emergent factors in
the process are learning new skills, and new patterns and
anxiety control. Co-optation as a means to achieve inte
gration of elements working at cross-purposes comes also
to sharp focus.
The next chapter is designed to conceptualize
these strategic factors and describe how these factors
are crucial in the management of change.
CHAPTER V
TOWARD A CONCEPTUALIZATION
OF STRATEGIC FACTORS
This chapter draws upon the specific ideas turned
up in the previous chapters, and is, therefore, designed
to identify some critical factors regarding the managing
of change in formal organizations. Hitherto, an attempt
was made to open up the problem of directed change in
formal organizations rather than to take an exhaustive
analysis. Now, it might be useful to conceptualize the
strategic factors involved in the process, Identify them
and examine their relevance to the study of organizational
change (see Figure 9).
One of the most general factors is time. It is
the major theme of this study that effecting changes is
never an event but always a process. Time is the central
consideration. The reason for emphasizing temporal
factors is based on two related facets of the process.
Considerable time elapses before a management becomes
aware that it is confronted with operating difficulties
because of organized shortcomings. Once the difficulties
111
Figure 9
Interplay of Strategic Factors
"GIVENS'* "PROCESSES'* "OUTCOME"
Time-
Uniqueness of
Organization
Leadership.
^
Communication
Reinforcement
Co-optation
Learning New Skills
New Work Patterns for
Key Personnel
Control of Anxiety
113
have been recognized and a decision made to remedy them,
it requires considerable additional time to develop a
plan of change. Such a plan cannot be a duplicate of
another organization's; it must be hammered out in dis
cussion with the organization's personnel in the light of
the unique history, present circumstances and future
prospects.
The second reason why time must elapse before
change is effected is that even when the plan has been
approved, the desired changes will not ensue as a matter
of course. Success depends on alterations in the behavior
patterns of many groups and individuals within the organ
ization. And it takes time for people to change their
habits of working, especially if, as is true for most
executives, these are deeply ingrained.
To outline the distinguishable stages in the
process of change will support our emphasis about the
significance of time: initial recognition of difficulties,
determination to take corrective action, finding appro
priate methods of analyzing the situation, developing the
plan, decision to accept the plan, announcement of the
plan to the organization, detailing new functions and
responsibilities, alignment of various operating systems
and incentives to reinforce the plan, active instruction
114
of key personnel in new methods to facilitate a change
in their behavior, monitoring the plan and adjusting in
the light of experience. Obviously, these stages under
score the fact that time is the essential element in
the process of change.
The second factor, related to time, is the unique
ness of the organization.
It may be argued that the history of an organiza
tion largely determines the nature of and limits of change.
In a rigid organization characterized by the centraliza
tion of decisions, change cannot be made until the degree
of malfunctioning has become so considerable that it
threatens the survival of the organization. For the in
novator (if we could find one), when speaking as an indi
vidual, speaks in general as an intellectual. He may be
bubbling over with ideas, but he turns conservative again
when he acts as a member of the specific group to which
he belongs with the result there is an alternation of long
periods of routine and short periods of crisis.
It is never possible to delineate completely the
major principles that shape and direct a large organiza
tion through the influence which they exert on the be
havior of the key members. Many decisions which are made,
as well as others which are not made, reflect the
115
strengths of these forces of tradition that are the more
powerful because they are deeply imbedded in the leader
ship and are transferred from one generation of management
to the next as a result of shared experience and exposure*
Although every large organization is unique, large
organizations have much in common, and lessons learned in
one are often applicable to others. But unless a plan
for change is sensitive to the unique elements, both in
design and in implementation, it will inevitably founder.
Organization planners must take the time and make the
effort to know these unique characteristics. People have
come to recognize that while government organizations can
frequently be restructured to advantage, more is involved
than the direct transfer of practices which had been fol
lowed successfully in business. Among the unique factors
with which government organizations have to live are
Congress, the press and size itself.
Finally, organizational change implies changes in
policies and hence in outlooks, and this calls for new
personnel where the existing ones cannot adapt themselves
to the new situation. The succession of a man to a key
role implies a new personality, a new interpretation, and
a new set of social relationships, each of which may lead
to changes in policies and ultimately to changes in
J
116
organization itself. The third key factor, therefore,
is leadership.
Organizations undergo change as a result of a
number of internal and external forces acting upon them.
New technology may be introduced. New markets are found
and new products are developed. Scientific and engineer
ing innovations can have marked effects in stimulating
change as can external economic conditions.
Too often those who criticize existing organiza
tions and are concerned about their constraining effects
on individuals seem to suggest that organizations have a
will and purpose of their own. Even the best designed
organization, now and in the future, is but a tool, albeit
a complex one, for the achievement of human purposes.
Organizations are and always will be run by people. They
are infused with purpose and meaning only through the
imagination and will of people — by acts of leadership.
As Chandler-^ emphasized, organization design and structure
must follow from and be subservient to strategy — human
purposes formulated into organizational goals. Specific
actions to initiate change are taken by people and, com
plex organizations being what they are, those at the head
Alfred Chandler, Strategy and Structure; Chapters
in the History of Industrial Enterprise (Cambridqe:
W;T.T7"Press, B 5 ) . --------------E----
117
are the primary change agents, and it is by the revital
izing acts of leadership that organizations remain useful
tools and not stultifying masters. Hence, more needs to
be known about the actions by persons in positions of
leadership that start the change process going.
Time, uniqueness of the organization and leader
ship are factors that may be conceptualized as the
"Givens" in the management of change.
A second group of factors — communication, rein
forcement and co-optation — constitute the processes in
managing changes.
People cannot meet a challenge unless they under
stand it. If members of an organization do not understand
the changes which a management desires to introduce, the
reasons why changes are necessary, and the likely benefits
that accrue from them, they will not be able, even with
the best will in the world, to do their part in bringing
them about. For this reason, effective communications
are essential in the process of change.
Since to alter the human behavior is difficult
and complicated, a management engaged in a program of
change would be well advised to make the maximum use of
the personnel and control measures which might assist it.
Where necessary, it should change personnel policies
118
governing recruitment, assignment, and reassignment, pro
motion, compensation, to stimulate people to give up old
patterns of behaving and to strive to acquire the new
patterns called for by the changes*
As an agent of change, the administrator must see
himself as a manager of reinforcement. How he manages the
reinforcements available for use in the organization will
be the most important determiner of whether or not change
will take place and in what direction. Practice without
reinforcement may provide only fatigue, or elimination
of a response.
Co-optation as an adjustmental process is sig
nificant because it details a striking paradox in our
mass society — the position of formal organizations that
must promote cooperation in a democratic context and yet
preserve the continuity of leadership and the stability
of their control structures. This strategy has reference
to absorption of new elements that are usually in the form
of persons who represent different values threatening to
disrupt the organization*s stability or existence. This
is particularly relevant to this study because as a
defensive mechanism, it may be a useful process to manage
inter-organizational conflicts especially when the two
organizations under study were engaged in a mutual com-
119
petitive atmosphere.
These three factors form the foci of discussions
in Chapter VII.
The third group of factors that emerges as a re
sult of the “Givens1 1 and “Processes" may be called the
"OutcomeLearning new skills and new work patterns are
the results of change.
The strength of a large organization arises pri
marily from the shared experiences of the members who have
learned how to carry on their specific tasks in effective
collaboration and coordination. The growth and develop
ment of the organization depends on the knowledge and
competence of each individual which enables him to perform
his assigned tasks without elaborate supervision and in
the relationships which can also be considered a skill,
which enable individuals and groups to work in unison.
Regardless of the direction of the proposed
change, or the complexity of the change process, change
in the organization resulting in improved organizational
performance is obviously only possible if change takes
place in the behavior of the individuals. In a major
organizational change, men who have acquired a consid
erable expertness in performing their work over the years
and have developed easy and constructive relations with
120
others may suddenly discover that their accumulated ex
perience will not enable them to cope adequately with
their new functions. When an organization moves from a
highly centralized to a largely decentralized structure,
those down the line must learn how to perform functions
formerly carried out at the centralized level. In doing
so, they may have to alter their previous relationships
with their superiors, peers, and subordinates. Learning
new skills involves the learning of new relationships;
and the new cannot be learned unless the old is unlearned.
New work patterns for key personnel: Effecting
change in large organizations is primarily a question of
alterations in the behavior of personnel who carry major
responsibility. The management must recognize that its
success in carrying out major changes will largely depend
on how well it mobilizes the psychological forces that can
facilitate acceptance of the new and how well it dimin
ishes those forces which reinforce people's adherence to
the existing pattern.
It was pointed out earlier that the success of
implementation of change will depend on the opportunities
afforded the members of an organization to acquire new
skills. Such acquisition of new skills is the crux of
the implementation process. For instance, if a series of
121
changes are introduced which directly affect the work
assignments of members of an organization, the persons
to whom they report, the criteria used to assess their
work, alternations in conventional rewards and punish
ments — if all of these basic aspects of the working
environment are altered, only then will acquisition of
new behavior patterns occur* The challenge that manage
ment faces is to alter the basic mechanisms and controls
available to it in such a manner that they contribute
individually and collectively to bringing about the
changes in behavior required to make a success of the new
organizational plan*
Control of anxiety: The prospect of the new and
unknown are likely to arouse uneasiness or anxiety in some
people* Since change necessitates their abandoning estab
lished ways of acting and reacting for new ways that can
only be dimly outlined, some people will inevitably be
concerned* The more confidence they have in the integrity
and the reasonableness of the management, the more such
feelings will be under control* However, the management
that understands some of the more likely sources of un- .
easiness can take steps to prevent its precipitation; at
least it can provide support for those who might be dis
turbed* Control of anxiety is another outcome of the
122
management of change — a responsibility of the people
initiating changes*
The nine factors listed seem to be crucial in a
management's decision to enter upon a program of organ
izational change; in its development of the plan of
change; and in the choice of methods of implementation.
The next three chapters will deal with the "Givens,"
"Processes," and the "Outcome" in more detail*
CHAPTER VI
THE GIVENS
Time
Any discussion of social change will remain vague
and causal links fax from clear, unless theorists face
the relevance of time to their explanations.
As Toynbee puts it, at the social and cultural
level of human life, time spells change whether deliberate
or involuntary.^ Heirich has identified four different
ways in which time may be used in the analysis of social
change. It may be regarded as a social factor, as a
causal link, as a quantitative measure of change, and as
a qualitative measure of change.
Guest shows increasing concern over the time
factor when he declares that understanding organizational
dynamics by definition requires consideration of a time
^"Arnold J. Toynbee, Change and Habit (New York and
London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 19.
^Max Heirich, "The Use of Time in the Study of
Social Change," American Sociological Review, Vol. 28,
(1964), pp. 386-397.
123
124
d i m e n s i o n .^ Useful hypotheses have been developed from
recent research yet it is becoming clear that not enough
is known about the process by which a complex purposive
group shifts from a condition of failure to success over
time. Arensberg, dissatisfied with the descriptions of
social systems and their static properties, urges the
study of specific events of specific persons in identi
fiable orders of stimulation in space and time.4
Lack of data on the process of change over a time
span leaves unanswered the question: How is it possible
to create an organization in which the individual may ob
tain optimum expression, and simultaneously in which the
organization itself may obtain optimum satisfaction of
its demands?^
There is the need to understand the "conditions
favorable to continuous adjustive development. We do not
have sufficient empirical evidence to give a conclusive
3
Robert H. Guest, Organizational Change — The
Effect of Successful Leadership (Homewood, 111.: Richard
D* Irwin,’ Inc., and The Dorsey Press, 1962), p. 2.
4Conrad M. Arensberg, "Behavipr and Organization:
Industrial Studies," in John H. Rohrer and Muzafer Sherif
(.eds.), Social Psychology at the Crossroads (New York:
Harper & Bros., 1951), p. 349.
^Chris Argyris, "The Individual and Organization:
Some Problems of Mutual Adjustment," Administrative
Science Quarterly. Vol. II, No. 1 (June 1957), p. 3.
125
answer to this question."^ Elsewhere, Blau observes with
regret the empirical data for most studies were collected
at one time and patterns of change had to be inferred
7
subsequently,
Gouldner’s work in the Gypsum plant was concerned
with problems of change and the relationship of leadership
to bureaucratic functions.® Most of his major hypotheses
at the end of the study implicitly call for further re
search on the processes of change in on-going organiza
tions over a span of time. Homans, with his emphasis on
the mutual dependence of interaction, activity, and senti
ment, urges continued research to substantiate his
hypotheses concerning social structure in a "moving
equilibrium."^
Leavitt observed that in a complex organization
the greatest productivity was achieved when there was a
^Peter M. Blau, Bureaucracy in Modern Society
(Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 60.
^Peter M. Blau, "Formal Organization: Dimensions
of Analysis," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 63,
No. 1 (July 1957), p. 69.
8Alvin Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureauc
racy (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1954).
^George C. Homans, The Human Group (New York:
Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1950).
126
“high degree of participation, maximum joint responsi
bility for decision-making, and maximum freedom of ex
pression."^® He went on to point out that the hierarchical
design of most organizations make participation difficult
but that "an effective compromise is possible."1* But
Leavitt, as with many others, does not fully spell out
what happens to the group internally and to its perform
ance over time after it has been allowed to participate
in decisions.
Time, therefore, is a crucial dimension. It fol
lows logically that the data for studying change should be
collected not at a single point in time but either con
tinuously or at intervals* "Only by comparing different
structures in a time series can one discover whether a
system has manifested self-maintaining processes or proc-
12
esses of change, short-term or long-term."
Application to the Two
Organizations "C". and "H"
Social change should not be confused with social
process. Where other processes may represent phases of
*^Harold Leavitt, "Small Groups in Large Organiza
tions." Journal of Business of the University of Chicaqo,
Vol. 28," n o T T {January I355J, p. 12.------- ----------
11Ibid.. p. 17.
12Bernard Barber, "Structural-Functional Analysis:
Some Problems and Misunderstandings," American Socio-
127
equilibrium in a stable social context, social change im
plies a qualitative difference as its culmination. In the
two organizations under study, it may be noted that the
process of change could culminate in new structural rela
tionships and in new perceptions of relationships. The
time interval required for structural changes also vary
according to the level of system organization involved.
For example, changes in the facilities of the system
should require the smallest time interval for completion.
In organization "H,M the structural change initiated was
completed within a period of six months, whereas in "C"
it was still to take place.
When observing the two organizational heads in
action, it was found that the management of "C" acted
chiefly in response to immediate emergencies while the
management of "H" devoted a greater part of time to mat
ters related to future planning. From this, it may be
hypothesized that the leader*s efforts to induce sub
ordinates to meet the organization's goals will be suc
cessful to the extent that its activities are focused on
a longer time perspective. The same hypothesis would
appear to hold true for other members at different levels
of the organizations.
logical Review. Vol. 21, No. 2 (April 1956), p. 133.
128
It must be mentioned at this point that from 1958
to 1966 (when a new man took over), there were almost no
changes in the organization structure of "H." The first
major change took place after eight years of charismatic
leadership. Under the stewardship of Harris, the former
Director, it seems that there was frequent interaction
between him and the employees and the meetings were char
acterized by regularity. Agendas were planned; recom
mendations leading to decisions were considered in
advance. A sense of order without constraint developed.
The meetings, according to the employees who attended
them, were a means by which subordinates could originate
to the boss as well as the reverse. It appears such a
frequency in interactional pattern could not be found
under Cooley, who took over from the charismatic Harris.
This comparison, however, may be sterile, simply in in
teraction terms. But what is worth repeating is the fact
that during the period of Cooley, it seems that the
superior-originated interaction was on the increase.
The story is different in "C." Ever since the
disorganization, Fisher had been at the helm of affairs.
As one views interpersonal events from 1958 (particularly
between 1967-1968), it was apparent that the members of
the organization acted-primarily in response to actions
129
initiated by the boss. The direction was predominantly
downward. In 1967 there were approximately five superior-
originated interactions for every one subordinate-
originated interactions (based on analysis of 18 out of
24 respondents). In contrast, it was found that in “H"
during the same period, the ratio was approximately two
to one (based on analysis of 16 out of 20 respondents).
All these interactional data, however, have been derived
from statements by those interviewed. The most that can
be expected are generalized statements about what appeared
to be typical differences in the interaction patterns
during the time period in both organizations. Further,
the presentation is not wholly free of comments about the
content of interactions and circumstances under which
they occurred. Yet, the use of interaction as an ana
lytical device, however crudely applied, was found to be
one among several useful ways of describing the two sys
tems under time perspective.
Comparing the two organizations under the time
period 1967-1968, two distinct patterns were observed.
"C1 1 was characterized by a communications system in which
a high proportion of interactions were originated by
superior to subordinates. Organization “H* was marked by
a greater balance in interactions. This may appear to be
130
an oversimplification of an extremely complex set of con
ditions and relationships. Nevertheless, this may be
regarded as a first step in the handling of qualitative
data in a quantitative manner. As more sophisticated
quantitative tools of description are devised, the organ
izations can be described at two separate intervals in
time. If it is found that a given interaction-sentiment
pattern can be associated with certain predicted perform
ance results, this kind of finding should be important to
practitioner and theorists. Time, therefore, is relevant
to describe what happened, how it happened, why it hap
pened at that period, and why something else did not
happen.
The Uniqueness of the
Organization
In recent years, sociologists have become in
creasingly aware of what are regarded as the shortcomings
of over-rational approaches to industrial organizations.
The logical rational approaches range from Taylor*s prin
ciples of scientific management^ to Weber’s infinitely
richer, sociologically penetrating analysis of bureauc-
^F. W. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific
Management (New York: Harper, 1911).
131
racy.Both are aspects of a rationalist stream of
thought that prevailed earlier in the present century.
In the recent literature what McGregor-*-^ calls "Theory
X," A r g y r i s ^ "Directive Leadership," Shepherd "mech
anistic systems,"^ and Gouldner^® "punishment-centered
bureaucracy," is presented as a method of management whose
general aim is a machine-like efficiency in industrial
organizations at the expense of satisfaction and good
morale generally. Each of these writers explicitly or
implicitly contrasts this with more enlightened approaches
that take into account the personal needs of individuals
and their greater willingness to cooperate under more
flexible conditions. It is increasingly claimed that the
less closely regulated approach is more consistent with
14
M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic
Organization, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons,
Talcott Parsons (ed.) (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press,
1947).
^D. McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960).
-^Chris Argyris, Understanding Organizational
Behavior (Homewood, 111.: The Dorsey Press, 1960).
I^h . a . Shepherd and R. R. Blake, "Changing Be
havior Through Cognitive Change," Human Organization
(Special issue), 1962.
^®A. W. Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bu
reaucracy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1965).
132
notions of democracy and also leads to an efficiency that
is better adapted to conditions of change*
la 20
Well documented examples by Gouldner, 7 Argyris
and Guest^ all draw the similar conclusion that a rigid
system of administration is liable to produce low effi
ciency, low productivity, high labor turnover, and high
absentee rates. For example, bureaucracies as portrayed
by Weber appear to be very inflexible and impersonal;
individual members at all levels must invariably give
their official duties priority over their personal incli
nations or interests so that complex tasks can be effi
ciently performed through rational calculated processes.
Yet, as Blau^ has pointed out, such a system is more
likely to have been successful and appropriate in Germany
in Weber1s time than in most other cultures. Elsewhere,
systems of bureaucracy less adapted to the particular
society or circumstances may be more likely to prove too
inflexible to accommodate change and more likely to lead
to defensive reactions and withdrawal among those con-
10
Gouldner, op. cit.
2®Argyris, Understanding Organizational . . . .
^■Guest, op. cit.
22
Peter M. Blau, Dynamics of Bureaucracy (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 202. '
133
cerned, as has been shown by M e r t o n , Sofer,^4 Menzies^
and Levenson.26
At the other extreme, the highly adaptable
"organic" type of organization envisaged by Shepherd and
Blake^7 appears platonic in which there is a free inter
action and work group behavior patterns are allowed to
modify themselves spontaneously. This is the very an
tithesis of bureaucracy. It almost expressly denies the
benefits of a stable, formal system designed to protect
members and clients through published and consistently
operated rules, and relies heavily on the good will and
altruistic motives of the working members. However, if
Weber*s analysis reflects a Germanic outlook on the bene
fits of order and prescription, Shepherd and Blake*s
analysis reflects American democratic optimism.
^Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social
Structure (rev. ed.) (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press,
1957), p. 195.
^4Cyril Sofer, "Reactions to Administrative
Change: A Study of Staff Relations in Three British
Hospitals," Human Relations. 8 (1955), pp. 291-316.
^1* E. P. Menzies, "A Case Study in the Func
tioning of Social Systems as a Defense Against Anxiety,"
Human Relations. 13 (1960), pp. 9.5-121.
26
B. Levenson, "Bureaucratic Succession," in A.
Etzioni*s, Complex Organizations (New York: Holt, Rinehart
& Winston, Inc., 1961).
Shepherd and Blake, op. cit.
134
In discussing these two extremes of organizational
28
form, Burns and Stalker ° suggest the existence of a con
tinuum between them, combining their advantages and dis
advantages to a varying extent in each particular
instance* They note that a change in an organization may
require a shift along the inflexibility-flexibility con
tinuum. As an organization oscillates between relative
stability and changeability so it must oscillate between
the less flexible "mechanistic" form and the more flexible
"organic" form.
It is evident that if an organization has to in
crease the extent to which it makes innovations, or needs
to react to environmental changes, it needs also to in
crease its scope for flexibility. Innovation means the
generation, acceptance, and implementation of new ideas,
processes, products or services. Innovation implies the
capacity to change or adapt. An adaptive organization
may not be innovative, but an innovative organization will
be adaptive because it is able to implement new ideas.
Perhaps, Cadwallader*s concept of "ultrastable"
s y s t e m 2 ^ will reinforce the above contention. According
2®T. Burns and G. M. Stalker, The Management of
Innovation (London; Tavistock Publications, 19olJ, p. 122.
2^Mervyn L. Cadwallader, "The Cybernetic Analysis
of Change in Complex Social Organizations," Walter Buckley
(ed.K Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scien
tist (Chicago: Al'cTi'ne PTIEllsTi'ing CoT,' T36'&T;"pp. 437-4*0.
135
to him, an open system, whether social or biological, in
a changing environment either changes or perishes. The
capacity to persist through a change of structure and
behavior has been called "ultrastabilityIf a complex
social organization is to survive critical changes in its
environment, it can do so only by changing its structure
and behavior. If Great Britain has survived through
medieval, mercantile and capitalist periods, it is be
cause it has ultrastability. Any industrial corporation
like General Electric that has survived the last fifty
years of social change in the United States has done so
through a process of self-transformation and not through
continuation of original organizational and operational
patterns. To put it in another way, complex social sys
tems adapt to a fluctuating environment through processes
of learning and innovation. As learning and innovating
systems, complex organizations must possess greater flex
ibility in a world where the rate of change is accel
erating.
"C" and "H" Compared
Hence, the policies and procedures at one stage of
an organizations history can be unsuitable at another.
Among the great strengths of an organization is the way in
136
which its traditions influence the behavior of all its
members. Both "C" and "H" had their own past hanging
over them to such an extent that different strategies
had to be planned to meet different situations and demands.
The experience of "C's" directorate made them see
the dangers of flexibility as too great and hence there
was a trend of thinking toward bureaucratic, centralized
and conservative direction. To its management, its de
centralized pattern appeared too loose and denied the
benefits of a stable and more formal system designed to
protect the members and clients through published and con
sistently operated rules, instead of relying on the good
will and altruistic motives of its employees scattered
all over the field. It was also feared (though it hap
pened to be true), that owing to freedom of movement
allowed to field supervisors, it might increase inter
personal rivalry which might act against the primary aims
of the total organization. But the fact remains that such
a decentralized pattern was found necessary to meet situ
ations where specialized local knowledge was important.
The point is that HC'sn head had a different
orientation. This was a desire to retain power which
stemmed from attitudes which were deeply rooted in the
man's whole approach to working for an organization.
137
Such attitudes prevented him from grasping the fact that
decentralization implies different rather than fewer
responsibilities for the Director. It entails delegating
authority in routine matters to subordinates so as to
give the head more time for new responsibilities in
assessing the external environment and planning; unless
this essential feature is grasped, "C's" Fisher is bound
to have problems. One sees in "Cw also another character
istic: the principle every man for himself (the field
supervisors) tends to obscure the ideal and introduce
dysfunctional aspects. As there is some ambiguity in the
goals of "C" and also some latitude for manipulation,
there is evidence to suggest that decentralization in
creased the opportunity for people to work for their own
personal ends.
"C^s" mode of operation had lagged behind the need
to function in a less tradition bound, more economical
fashion. With increasing external competition and pres
sure from the environment, the organization appears to be
drifting into increased operational difficulty through
reliance on approaches more appropriate to a less com
petitive age. If the organization is to function effec
tively, the crust of traditional methods has to be broken
somewhere. Out of 22 members of the field staff inter-
138
viewed, the comment of 18 had this tone:
My boss is telling me to do something and
then he jumps down my throat five minutes
later. He should know what I am doing and try
to give me some answers or else they should
let me do it. Oftentimes, X do not know what
the goals of this organization are; and I do
not think the Director knows it either.
This also suggests that the staff of "C*1 had a low tol
erance for ambiguity and uncertainty and seemed to be
looking for more directions from top.
"H* s" past history shows a different orientation.
The first director, Harris, believed probably in an ideal
type of organization in which there is free interaction
and work group behavior patterns that are conducive to
spontaneous modification. He attempted to do the spade
work for a system characterized by personal involvement,
achievement oriented, adaptive efficiency, continual ad
justment and redefinition of individual tasks to achieve
the shared group tasks, lateral and vertical communica
tions with an emphasis on consultation rather than direc
tion. The legacy of Harris was not completely followed
by his successor Cooley. In the meanwhile, the organiza
tion had grown not only in complexity but in size.
Cooley found different procedures were appropriate to the
different phases of the organization's life. He detected
symptoms associated with extreme flexibility; observed
139
some anxiety for those who felt the lack of definition
and security a strain. His task was, therefore, to manage
changes in a way that would vitalize the resources of the
organization and not wither them, and help the staff to
see the new policies and new people as accretions to their
strength rather than threats. As a result, the organiza
tion was oscillating between high flexibility and a less
flexible pattern.
While there was definite expression of satisfaction
in general in the conditions of work and the treatment
afforded to the personnel by the present director, Cooley,
some had reservations about the present incumbent. The
number of people who expressed this reservation was, how
ever, small, viz., 4 out of 18. This was because of the
personality traits of Harris and Cooley, which is another
factor for discussion. What is worth noting is the fact
that the same 4 personnel who had worked under "C" before
and came away from it to "H" had this to say:
Our present organization allows us as
individuals to more formally play a role
in decision-making, which we did not do
before. We can see the results of our
efforts more realistically than we could
before. This is refreshing switch from
the organization where we had previously
worked. We do see groupism sometimes but
it has not come to the stage of being dys
functional to the total system.
140
There was, however, near unanimity on this:
(19 out of 20 interviewed)
We have not gotten into any disagreements
yet where we let emotions stand in the way.
We do have problems when we discuss goals of
the organization. But we realize the diffi
culties of goal-specificity in this organiza
tion. We are trying to put up with it.
This suggests that UH* s" employees had more tolerance for
ambiguity and seemed to prefer more independence.
The similarities of "C" and "H" are also important
from the point of view of this study. The striking one is
that both are involved in introducing integrating devices
within the systems to maintain the equilibrium. In both
cases, structural manipulations are used for this purpose.
Whereas the structural devices are used to check the ex
tremes of flexibility in "H," the same strategies are
used in MC" for meeting the problems of decentralization.
Leadership
To devote a short section on leadership as a part
of this chapter would appear to be a gross under-emphasis
in a discussion of change management and administrative
behavior, unless we can believe that we have been talking
about leadership throughout the study — or at least the
kind of knowledge about human behavior on which leadership
can build effective action. Here, specifically, the role
141
of leadership in the process of change (rather than the
broader type of administrative leadership described
throughout the study), will be examined.
Most of the early studies of leadership were con
cerned with enumerating inherent "traits" of personality
which somehow could be associated with successful leader-
O f )
ship. u But in time more people studying more leaders
added more traits, and no one could find a leader who
possessed at any given time most or all of the traits.
However, it cannot be denied that the continued refinement
of personality tests has been of pragmatic value in the
selection of supervisors and managers. Yet, as Sanford
reminds us, "the search for leadership traits has not been
very rewarding."31
The search for traits led to the study of the kinds
0 9
of observed behavior that effective leaders display. ^
30
J. A. C. Brown, The Social Psychology of In
dustry (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books,
Ltd., 1954), p. 219; Ralph M. Stogdhill, "Personal Factors
Associated with Leadership: A Survey of Literature,"
Journal of Psychology. Vol. 25 (1948), pp. 35-71.
3^Fillmore H. Sanford, "The Followers Role in the
Leadership: Phenomena," in Guy E. Swanson, Theodore N.
Newcomb and Eugene L. Hartley (eds.), Readings in Social
Psychology (New York: Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 1952), p.328.
32A. W. Halpin and B. J. Winer, The Leadership Be
havior of the Airplane Commander (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio
State University Research Foundation, 1952).
142
But those who enumerated the behavior characteristics
failed to define their psychological terms operation
ally.33
From the sociological point of view, the enumera
tion of behavior characteristics of leaders has serious
limitations. Because it neglects or does not place ade
quate emphasis on the social and technical system of
which the leader is a part. Acceptance of a leader in
the primary group, for instance, comes from the group and
should be regarded as a patterned social relationship in
volving both leader and followers.34 The fact that a
leader possesses the qualities of consideration or of
sensitivity or of being democratic or authoritarian does
not explain why or how a person obtains and maintains his
authority to induce others to act.
The concept of the leaders behaving in accordance
with the needs and expectations of subordinates is a use
ful point of departure, but it is also much too simple.
The researcherfs problem and, indeed, the leader's prob
lems become more complicated when the social group is a
large organization with many units. The leader of one
unit under these circumstances is a follower as well as a
33
Arensberg and Tootell, op. cit.. p. 326#
34
Merton, op. cit.. p. 339.
143
leader. McGregor3* * recognized the conflicts which often
arise in carrying out this dual role but he held that the
conflicts can be minimized: (a) when the leader wholly
acknowledges his dependence upon subordinates; (b) when
the leader and subordinates set targets which are worked
out in a collaborative effort; and (c) when the sub
ordinates perceive that their own needs will be best
fulfilled when they work toward the goals of the organ
ization.
Writers in the Weber tradition have pointed out
that when heads of organizations utilize only their
formal powers, they are unable to discern the needs of
their subordinates and therefore cannot act in accordance
with them. The manager in Gouldner*s study, upon suc
ceeding to office, found that he had to rely increasingly
upon "punishment-centered" actions to force production
results.3^ No matter how much he demonstrated to his
superiors how well he was carrying out their orders, the
group below resisted, and resistance was strongest in the
one area of the organization which over the years had
35
Douglas McGregor, "Notes on Organization Theory,"
unpublished manuscript, Massachusetts Institute of Tech
nology, 1958, cited by Warren G. Bennis, "Leadership
Theory and Administrative Behavior," Administrative
Science Quarterly. Vol. 4, No. 3 (December 19^9), p. 262.
S^Gouldner, op. cit.
144
developed uniform and strong reinforcing norms concerning
what its members considered to be legitimate actions on
management's part.
Gouldner's punishment-centered mode of leadership
is called "directive" by Argyris who observes that:
. . . the impact of directive leadership upon
subordinates is similar to that which the
formal organization has on subordinates. Pres
sure-oriented directive leadership "compounds
the felony . • . ," perpetuates the damage
created by the organization's structure.37
It is this extreme form of leadership behavior
and its consequent effects on the entire social system
that characterized in the early period of the case study
by Guest.38 This study shows how significant the role of
leadership is in introducing change. This plant was one
of several similar plants in the company, and it was in
trouble because it had the poorest record in productivity,
quality, safety, turnover, absenteeism, and indirect
labor costs. Higher management decided to appoint a new
top manager, instructing him to take corrective action.
It was reported by Guest that the actual behavioral pat
terns, as measured by interactions, sentiments, and
activities of the workers and supervisors changed sig
nificantly with a change in the plant manager.
^Chris Argyris, Personality and Organization
(New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), p. 130.
38Guest, op. cit.
145
Under the new plant manager, a greater proportion
of communications were originated by subordinates and
directed to superiors than under the deposed leader.
Fewer emergencies and more time to plan was another re
sult of the new leadership. The shift in the pattern of
interactions was accompanied by a marked change in senti
ments from negative to positive as expressed by the
workers about the top management. In general, the mode
of social behavior approximated the type of behavior ex
pected among friends and neighbors in the culture which
prevailed outside of the work situation. During the
annual automobile model change over, the performance of
this plant improved as measured by production costs,
quality, safety, labor grievances, turnover, and ab
senteeism.
A key part of the new manager's leadership was
his focus on an overall climate of cooperation and prog
ress toward goals. Rather than trying to control pro
cedural and operating details, he tried to develop a
general climate in which his lower managers could handle
these matters. He served as a top level change agent,
instead of an operational manager of change.
Capable leadership, therefore, reinforces a climate
of psychological support for change. The leader presents
146
change on the basis of the impersonal requirements of the
situation, rather than on personal grounds. He carefully
tries to time his changes to fit the psychological needs
of his group.
With the increasing incursion of professionals in
modern organizations, the latters* complexity have as
sumed large proportions. These organizations require
not a few leaders and change catalysts but multiple
leaders. As these complex systems cope with heterogeneous
and dynamic environments, the issues and knowledge in
volved become too complicated for only a few leaders to
understand. Perhaps, several leadership roles will be
required to meet various complex situations; those parts
of the organization that are the centers of innovation
must be led by people skilled in dealing with the unpre
dictable and ambiguous sectors of environment, while
those parts of the organization performing more routine
tasks will require different kinds of leaders who will
fit more closely with the traditional leadership models.
All these require multiple centers and styles of leader
ship and the task ahead of the future management is to
design new forms of complex organizations to better
achieve the multiple purposes of our evolving civiliza
tion.
147
Viewing fxom what has been said so fax, thexe is
a pattern of agxeement as to the souxces of tension and
stxess and the conditions fox theix xeduction in complex
organizations. Changes and contxols imposed by the top
hiexaxchy do not assuxe eithex efficiency ox the coopera-
tion of suboxdinates. Thexe must be some kind of involve
ment fxom below which makes it possible fox suboxdinates
to accept changes and even to initiate a cextain amount
of change themselves. If a change is to be made, then
the leadex in his own actions must somehow institute
mechanisms, othex than those available to him in the
foxmal oxganization, fox finding out about and acting in
telligently in response to matters which axe important
to those at the lower levels. In other words, with the
introduction of such social mechanisms which permit those
in the subordinate positions to participate in making
decisions affecting their present and future roles, ten
sions and stresses due to change might be reduced in
organizations.
Leadership in ‘ ‘ C1 1
In times of change, it is particularly important
for the management to look realistically outside and in
side the organization, and to relate the two aspects
148
effectively. And that effectiveness must be one that
refers to the long term rather than the present day
opportunism. Looking outside, the leader must be able
to judge what the real needs of the present or potential
problems are, and how they could be handled. Looking
inward, the leader is obliged to treat the structure as
an instrument planned to do the indicated job or to amend
that instrument, if necessary. No change will succeed
unless views on means and ends are widely shared among
members of the organization.
It was observed during the study that "C's" lead
ership left a lot to be desired from the point of view of
the organization's members. All the evidence indicated
that the interaction pattern in the organization was such
that the members of "C" did not recognize Fisher as a
natural leader — a leader accepted by the group both
formally and informally. One general comment that was
repeatedly heard was:
This organization operates in a constant
atmosphere of suspicion and pressure.
Here are a few comments of field supervisors on the Direc
tor as a leader:
He does not know what we have to face
in the field. He does not know how to
get down to our level.
149
I cannot treat my assistants the way I
get treated. They would just pack up and
go home.
This agency is a one man's show, and
that is how they want to keep it. People
are not taught to be self-reliant here.
These are some of the comments of the field assistants
on the Director:
He says that this is centrally con
trolled cooperation; centrally controlled
all right, but it is not cooperation.
He is too quick to condemn, but never
compliments us for a good job. He talks
always about human relations, but I do
not think he practices it.
The subordinate staff (both supervisors and field assist
ants) repeatedly expressed to this observer that their
ability to communicate upward was blocked because of the
emphasis of formal status and the use of power inherent
in the office. Here are some samples:
The higher-up never listens to us.
He just issues orders but does not
understand the effects.
Under such conditions, a leader of a group must
have a realistic understanding of the needs of his fol
lowers in order to introduce any change in his organiza
tion. Learning about these needs is one of the early
phases in successful organizational change under a lead
ership. To accomplish this, Fisher must establish
150
informal relationships with the personnel and create con
ditions of collaborative atmosphere approximating to the
type of behavior expected from friends outside the work
situation. He should learn to command through persuasion.
The researcher looked in vain for this type of strategy
from Fisher. Added to this lack of strategy, Fisher*s
frequent absence from the central office created a psy
chological distance between him and his staff. When he
was sought by those under him, he was not available; and
when he was available, he was not very helpful in answer
ing them. His words were more in the form of directives
than discussion. His role as a coordinator was a passive
and stereotyped one, just receiving information and making
traditional moves and postponing decisions.
Under these circumstances, what is needed is
multiple centers of leadership in the organization as a
single leader was unable to cope up with the unpredictable
and ambiguous environment. The structural reorganization
proposed would have met this purpose partially; but
Fisher*s method of introducing the change was outmoded.
It was as if he suddenly had a brainwave and decided to
put it into operation. There was very little deliberation
and discussion with the staff. "C" needs a leader, an
integrator who must identify himself with and be committed
151
to the success of the objectives; one who can take initi
ative in setting goals and who has interpersonal skills
to achieve the resolution of difficult situations and
conflicts; a leadership that can formulate the general
framework of purpose to guide the efforts of the parts.
Leadership in 1 1 H”
The difference in leadership between "C" and "H"
was marked; in fact, it was the conflicting leadership
traits that gave birth to , , H" as a separate organization
breaking away from "C.M Harris, the first director of
’ 'H,1 1 was described by all the members of this organization
as a charismatic figure. He was praised by the staff as
an intuitive communicator capable of capitalizing on the
strengths of his staff. It must also be said to the
credit of Harris that he acted as an agent of the county
and at the same time was able to act upon the need of his
subordinates. There was a degree of interdependence in
the exercise of authority — a reciprocal and acknowledged
recognition of the leader*s dependence on subordinates and
a greater balance in the origination of interactions. The
employees were unanimous in declaring that during his
regime the conditions were such that they perceived inte
gration of their individual needs and organizational goals.;
152
Harris* success was due to his handling of the
job and men. He seemed to have focused more on problems
than on people. Individuals were not singled out as
scapegoats. He acted as the group*s representative to
the county and also the county's representative to the
organization; neither role was subordinated to the other.
He left the organization at the peak of his popularity.
Cooley who succeeded Harris had to step into the
shoes of a charismatic leader. None in the organization
described him as magnetic as Harris. Still none down
graded him as poor. What he could not achieve by charisma,
Cooley wanted to do by his own method. Fortunately for
him, the merger threat came up. He rose to the occasion
and successfully challenged the county with the distinct
ness of his operation. What was needed, he argued, was
internal reorganization of the organization and not amal
gamation of the two organizations. Even if it is revived
in the future, Cooley made it clear that it could only be
under the banner of MH." It was an impressive perform
ance which pleased his staff.
The reaction to Cooley's leadership was elicited
from those employees who had worked for Fisher before,
but now work with Cooley are suggestive.
We still have pressure, but the pressure
comes from us. It is not based on fear or
suspicion.
He certainly listens to my ideas.
It is not perfect yet, but we are moving
in the right direction.
His reorganization plan is not perfect,
but we will give a fair trial.
He cannot be compared to Harris, but
Cooley is doing his best in his own way.
He is a lot better than Fisher.
A question may be raised at this point — Was it
not so that Harris* personality, intelligence and knowl
edge were the crucial factors in explaining why he was
able to exercise his authority successfully? The answer
is yes, partially. Again, if personality, intelligence
and experience of a person are used as primary arguments
fox explaining his success, it leaves unanswered the ques
tion as to why the organization continues to show signs of
progress rather than decay.
The answer is simple. The groundwork had been
laid earlier. The system was geared to meet the changing
external conditions; it was capable of generating new
ideas for improvement. The fact of continued growth makes
it clear that once a pattern of relationships has been
found rewarding and productive, an organization does not
have to depend on any unique actions of its leader to
sustain itself.
CHAPTER VII
THE PROCESSES
Communication
It is obvious from the anecdotes of MC" and t t HH
that a leader must possess adequate skills in communi
cating to the employees what the change is and why it is
brought about and get the feedback before plunging seri
ously into action. Communication processes, therefore,
have a lot to do with the success or failure of change.
To best comprehend the relationship between people
and communication, we need to look at that relationship
from at least three different points of view: individual
behavior, interpersonal behavior, and organizational
behavior.
At the level of the individual, the role of com
munication in one's intellectual and emotional existence
might well be compared to the role of breathing in one's
physiological processes. Communication is to human feel
ing and intellect what physical metabolism is to the
body's physiological processes. Thus, it can be looked
upon as one of the two basic processes of all living
154
155
systems — one, transformation of food into energy; the
other, the transformation of event data into information.
All living systems — people and organizations alike —
exist only in and through these two basic processes.
Communication may thus be conceived as the dynamic
process underlying the existence, growth, change, the be
havior of all living systems, individual or organization.
Communication can be understood as that indispensable
function of people and organizations through which the
organization or the organism relates itself to the en
vironment, and relates its parts and its internal proc
esses one to the other.^ Communication processes are
thus the crucial processes which both enable and deter
mine the conditions, the operations and the interrela
tionships of all living systems.
As the focus of attention shifts from individual
to interpersonal behavior, it might be asked: How do two
(or more) self-xegulative systems (individuals) succeed
or fail in their attempts to control or change each other?
At the level of organization, one is concerned with the
communication patterns among members of the organization
with an eye on efficiency and effectiveness. At this
^J. G. Miller, Living Systems (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1968); and N. Wiener, Cybernetics:
Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1948).
156
level, it is a matter of designing that communication
system which simultaneously enables that organization to
cope with its environment, to maintain its internal func
tioning, and to be cognizant of and capable of carrying
out necessary or opportunistic change.
An organization may, therefore, be viewed as a
social invention for increasing certain sets of proba-
2
bilities. Probabilities of success are increased only
by taking relevant and appropriate actions. These actions
are in the form of reports, schedules, estimates, and so
forth. It is entirely possible to conceive an organiza
tion as an elaborate system for gathering, evaluating,
recombining and disseminating information. The effec
tiveness of an organization with respect to the achieve
ment of its goals should be closely related to its
effectiveness in handling information. In an enterprise
whose success hinges upon the coordination of the efforts
of all its members, the management completely depends
upon the quality, the amount and the rate at which rele
vant information reaches them. The rest of the organi
zation in turn, depends upon the efficiency with which
the managers can deal with this information and reach
^Alex Bavelas and Dermot Barrett, "An Experimental
Approach to Organizational Communication," Personnel
(March 1951), p. 368.
157
conclusions, decisions, and so forth. This line of rea
soning leads us to the belief that communication is not
a secondary or derived aspect of organization. Rather,
it is the essence of organized activity and is the basic
process out of which all other functions derive. The
goals an organization selects, the methods it applies,
the changes it introduces to improve its own procedures
all these hinge upon the quality and availability of the
information in the system.
Cybernetic Analysis and Change^
Any social organization that is to change through
learning and innovation must contain certain very specific
feedback mechanisms, a certain variety of information,
certain kinds of input, channel, storage, and decision
making facilities. In other words, any large scale formal
social organization is a communication network. The com
plexity of purposeful behavior is a function of the
complexity of the communication components or parts of
the system. Every open system whose purposeful behavior
is predictive, must also have mechanisms for the selective
^Mervyn L. Cadwallader, "The Cybernetic Analysis
of Change in Complex Social Organizations," in Walter
Buckley (ed.Jj. Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral
Scientist (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1968)•
158
storage and recall of information. It must have memory.
The communication net must contain or acquire information
that makes learning and innovative behavior possible. In
order to change and innovate, the system must be able to
analyze information, that is, it must separate it into
constituent parts. In a social system, this is a conse
quence of certain explicit operating rules about what can
and should be done, by whom, when, and why.
Communication Breakdown
Communication has many pathological states which
beset administrators. According to Scott, all communi
cation breakdowns can be traced to the following five
causes:4 (1) the nature and functions of language, (2)
deliberate misrepresentation, (3) organization size and
complexity, (4) lack of acceptance, and (b) failure to
understand.
The first two may be traced to distortion and
filtering. Distortion is caused by the nature of language
while filtering is produced by deliberate misrepresenta
tion.
4William G. Scott, Organization Theory — A Be
havioral Analysis for Management (Homewood, 111.: Richard
D* Irwin, Inc., 1967), p. 301.
159
The problems of overload, timing, and short cir
cuiting are related to organization size and complexity.
Overload refers to the conditions under which an executive
cannot absorb or adequately respond to all messages im
pinging upon him. Communication should be regulated in
terms of both quality and quantity. Sufficiency is im-
t
plemented by what Dubin calls the " m o n i t o r i n g s effect."^
Timing involves the strategic release of informa
tion, and the simultaneous, correct sequential, receipt
of information by individual or organizational units.
Short circuiting is a common failure of the rout
ing mechanism. It means that someone has been left out
of the communication chain who normally should be in
cluded.
Administrative communication fails not only be
cause of language problems, misrepresentation, or dif
ficulties of size. Lack of acceptance and lack of
understanding also contribute to failure. Acceptance is
a psychological phenomenon based on, among other things,
the needs, motives, experience, and education of the re
ceiver, plus the environment in which he finds himself.
5
Robert Dubin, "Stability of Human Organizations,"
in Mason Haire (ed.), Modern Organization Theory (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959), pp. 247-248.
160
Escher comments that, “since unconscious selection of
information is closely allied to our psychological needs
and desires it may be said quite aptly that we hear what
we want to hear and reject what we don’t want to hear."^
Several factors condition human acceptance of
7
communication. They are:
Reality: This is a person’s definition of his
environment.
Ambiguity: Lack of clarity. The more ambig
uous a communication situation, the less likely
the receiver will be to accept a message.
Credibility: The trustworthiness of the
source of information is an important variable
promoting or hindering acceptance.
Congruency: This applies to the relevancy
of the communication to the needs, motives, and
values of the receiver. Conflicts between the
contents of the message and the receiver’s
value-need system lowers the probability of
acceptance.
Changing one’s perceptions of reality is an ex
tremely delicate practice. Its implications extend far
beyond the topic of communication. The fundamental
^Albert J. Escher, “But I Thought . . . . , “
Supervision (July 1959), p. 24.
7These factors are adapted from, Franklin Fearing,
"Toward a Psychological Theory of Human Communication,"
Journal of Personality. 22 (1953-1954), pp. 81-84; and
Robert Zajonc, “Distortion at the Receiving End," Com
munication in Organizations: Some New Research Findings
(Ann Arbor: Foundation for Research on Human Behavior,
1959), p. 6.
161
integrity of the individual rests upon keeping the organ
ization life and his personal life separated as much as
possible.
A person's view of reality defines what informa
tion is ambiguous, who is credible, and what communication
is congruent with his needs and values. The administrator
who wants acceptance of his communication should first
work on his subordinates' definitions of reality. If
these definitions can be changed to conform with the ad
ministrator* s (organization's) view of reality, then
higher levels of communication acceptance are reasonably
assured.
Administrators frequently think of their job as
being one of solving problems, formulating policy, making
decisions, delegating authority, and checking up to make
sure that their subordinates are living up to their dele
gated responsibilities. It follows from this concept of
their job that they spend considerable time in making
value judgments about their subordinates, in trying to
find the individual who was to blame for some trouble,
in giving orders to subordinates, and in trying to please
their superiors so that they will give favorable judg
ments.
162
On the other hand, would it not be better if the
administrator worked under the assumption that he would
be best performing the job by maintaining the conditions
for clear and candid communication with his work asso
ciates? From this it would follow that he and his asso
ciates would be spending the time defining, clarifying,
and solving common problems. Instead of thinking it was
up to him to supply the answers, he would then be search
ing with others for the answers in the situation itself.
Only the administrator who is thinking of his job
in terms of communication will observe these all-important
implicit messages. Only the administrator who is inter
ested in developing his skills of self-awareness will be
able to act in ways that take these communication problems
into account. When this is done, there will be fewer
words and reports and better understanding; less log
rolling and pressuring and more sense of common purpose;
more criticism and less anxiety; more forthright expres
sion of feeling and fewer hurt feelings; less griping and
more attention to the specific details of common problems.
Many of the problems in the two organizations and
the process of working them through had to do with the
ability of the people to communicate with one another.
In fact, this third factor is directly related to the
163
first two mentioned — Time and Uniqueness of the organ
ization. While "H's" management spent considerable time
in discussion and feedback, the pattern of confrontation
among the staff itself made it unique. The only fear was
that the structural change might not facilitate the
smoothness of communication. "C*1 however was not blessed
with such an atmosphere. Many of the operational bottle
necks of MCM could be directly traced to the lack of
communication devices or their inadequacies. It would be
useful to explore this area further.
Communication in “C1 1
When HC" decided upon decentralized field offices
to handle local problems, the coordination of all field
supervisors was retained by Fisher in spite of suggestions
to the contrary. It is true that the ultimate coordinator
of all personnel should be the head of the agency, but to
have him as the immediate coordinator suggests a lack of
understanding of the requirements of the situation. The
reason given for such a step was that the Director wanted
to have a personal eye on the field staff. The whole
thing, therefore, seemed to have been built on lack of
trust of the employees. Subsequent developments in the
organization — increase in size and added responsi-
bilities — made it difficult for him to maintain a close
watch over the field offices. Since trust is mutual, the
field staff reciprocated the same feeling — lack of
trust toward the chief. The physical distance between
the Director and the field staff, and his preoccupation
with other matters and consequent absence from head
quarters, resulted in a communication gap and to some
extent alienation of the field staff from the chief.
Since each individual has his own frame of reference, a
way of interpreting his experiences, a set of feelings,
assumptions and expectations, there must be some point
at which all these things are brought out and discussed.
The chief was not available for such a dialogue and there
was no one to substitute for him. Consequently, each
field office (subsystem) began to assume sovereign status
and for a moment forgot the accountability to the total
system.
It so happened that some questionable deviation
on the part of one field staff made the Director realize
that something should be done. The result was the struc
tural change as shown in the figure on page 102. The
Deputy Director 2 was to be in charge of coordinating the
field staff and their activities. The idea of a coordi
nator itself might be sound but the Director seemed to
have overlooked the importance of taking time and making
the effort to explain to the members the why's and where
fore's of the contemplated actions. Furthermore, com
munication was impaired when the people involved — the
Director and the supervisors — had incompatible frames
of reference, which led them into behavior that seemed
to deny the validity of one another's feelings, assump
tions and expectations. Under those circumstances,
people tended to have no more contact with one another
than was strictly necessary, to dislike, discount, resist
ideas from, and even resent one another, and to make com
paratively little progress on the task. The result was
that the proposed change did not have the desired impact
on the field supervisors and, in fact, still did not
materialize.
Communication in “H1 1
The reaction toward the change in "H" was of
three kinds. With the introduction of one more level
(the Deputy Directors), some members expressed uneasiness
and disappointment at the new structure. They thought
that the new structure might lose some of the adaptability
of the old system. Consequently, the individuals (10 out
of 20 interviewed) who did not like the change seemed to
166
have their own perception, or their awareness of self
environment. This can be diagramed as below:
Conflict and Expectations of
Individuals1 _____ . insecure , _________ the traditional
self-concept feelings organizational
pattern
Adaptive Response
We have chosen to be maverick
but are willing to live with
it in the system.
However, the individuals were ready to enter into
a dialogue with the management, no matter whether their
ideas were acceptable or not. There was communication
through confrontation.
A second group of individuals (8 out of 20 inter
viewed) were those who were ambivalent in their reactions.
They were for it but they were also against. Their adap
tive response was to try changing their self-concepts
tentatively. They were experimenting with changing the
customary way of thinking and behavior, while still re
taining many of the habitual attitudes and practices.
They could see the difference between their self-concept,
new demands and the resultant painful conflicts and have
achieved a degree of awareness of self-environment. This
167
can be represented as follows:
Conflict and New required
Traditional _______ . insecure 4 ______ organizational
self-concept feelings role
i
Adaptive Response
We will experiment with
changing our self-concept
and behavior, even though
painful>
A third group of people (2 out of 20 interviewed)
gave the impression that they were willing to comply with
the new plan and confident of their ability to do so- At
least, this was the overt response to the reorganization
plan. However, in private meetings with the researcher,
this group did express disagreement toward the change
which is inconsistent with their overt behavior. It was
purely a conformist response to the new situation. It
lacked an explicit awareness of their own self-concept
and its conflict with the new demands which did not even
permit them to see any alternative response. Here was a
case of people who were not capable of making an adaptive
response — a paradox of men trapped into deviant position
by their own desire to conform and committed to denying
that they are deviant. It can be diagramed as follows:
168
Conflict and
Traditional ______^ insecure
self-concept feelings
Conformist Response
We are willing and
able to comply with
the new demands.
It may be seen from the above diagrams the nature
of the behavioristic communication. In the first case,
communication was facilitated when there was in the sit
uation some people who were able to recognize and accept
a frame of reference different from their own; who were
able to state their point of view in terms that made
sense from the Listeners frame of reference. There was
a purposive and meaningful feedback to help the system.
In the second diagram, we can see the ambivalent attitude
and response of the people wherein the feedback lacked
vigor. In the third, we find that communication was im
paired by people with frames of reference which were
incompatible. They tended to have no more contact with
one another than was strictly necessary. There was very
little feedback, inadequate flow of necessary information,
ideas and suggestions.
New organizational
role requirement
169
It follows from the above observations that
everyone in a system brings to the situation a set of
feelings, assumptions and expectations, and in short, a
frame of reference from which he looks at the world.
These factors were prime determinants of what was com
municated in any interaction — what was said, what was
heard and what was done.
Reinforcement
While communication as a key factor in a program
of change was emphasized earlier, knowledge of the results
of change initiated must be communicated to the employees
affected by the change. Some of the types of reinforce
ment and the influence of different time sequences in
reinforcement for effecting a change in the behavior of
organization members will be examined here.
Q
Extrinsic vs Intrinsic Rewards0
A reinforcement, in a sense, can be considered as
an event that satisfied an individual. It may be the
presentation of something that he wants (for example, a
salary increase) or the reduction or elimination of
Q
F. H. Sanford, Psychology (San Francisco:
Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1961), pp. 339-343.
170
something unpleasant (for example, lowering of anxiety
when a job is done well). Extrinsic reinforcements are
those that bear no inherent relationship to the behavior
itself, but are selected artificially, and in some cases
arbitrarily, to reinforce the behavior in which change is
sought. A suggestion system that awards money for ac
ceptable suggestions is an example. The money unques
tionably serves to reinforce the behavior of providing
suggestions, but the award is not a natural consequence
of the behavior. Intrinsic reinforcements are those that
are a natural consequence of the behavior; from the in
dividuals point of view, they bear a psychologically
expected relationship to the behavior itself. Knowledge
of a job well done, the experience of knowing that one has
worked up to capacity, or becoming qualified to do a dif
ferent kind of work are illustrations.
Management must consider whether it is placing too
much emphasis on the desirability of using only extrinsic
rewards — a salary increase, a bonus or a special prize,
and so on. It should not ignore the possibility that
other types of satisfactions may be equally reinforcing.
Although economic rewards must continue to hold a place
in the reinforcement system of an organization, exclusive
dependence on such rewards has disadvantages. Such
171
reinforcers are limited in supply and they focus attention
on the external incentive rather than on good and satis
fying performance. Many people soon learn other tech
niques, less acceptable to management for obtaining this
kind of reinforcement, like putting pressure on for a
salary increase. At times work may even be viewed as a
source of frustration, a barrier to reward, rather than
as a process providing a variety of intrinsic satis
factions.^
Intrinsic reinforcements are more difficult to use
than are extrinsic ones. Nevertheless, in the long run,
they must be used in the organization. They will not be
used though, unless the administrator keeps in mind the
whole array of satisfactions that can be used to rein
force behavior and depends on extrinsic reinforcement
only when it is appropriate. To think of extrinsic
financial incentives as the only workable type of rein
forcement is as damaging as to ignore them altogether.
The Effects of Punishment
Research indicates that, seen from the point of
view of reinforcement theory, the effect of punishment
is not simply the opposite of reward. Reward tends to
Q
Ross Stagner, The Psychology of Industrial Con-
flict (New York: John Wilev & Sons, Inc., 1956), pp. 134-
T357”
172
increase the probability of a response^ future occur
rence. The effect of punishment cannot be said, unequiv
ocally, to decrease its probability.
Many years ago, Thorndike demonstrated in a con
trolled experiment that a simple punishment (telling the
subject he was wrong) did not weaken the strength of the
punished response. Quite the contrary, in his research
the punished responses tended to occur somewhat more fre
quently than non-punished (but also, non-rewarded)
responses.^
The Thorndike research does not reveal the full
picture. There is research to suggest that punishment
under differing circumstances may function in any of the
following ways:
1. Increase the occurrence of undesired behavior.i- * "
2. Cause undesired behavior to last longer.*^
3. Have a short-lived deterrent effect.^
^E. L. Thorndike, The Fundamentals of Learning
(New York: Teachers College, Bureau of Publications, 1932).
^Ibid.
12W. K. Estes, An Experimental Study of Punish
ment. Psychological Monographs, 1944, 57, no. 263.
13Ibid.
173
4. Cause the individual to vary his behavior
at the impact of punishment but not con
trol the direction of the variability*14
5. Tend to arouse negative feelings that
often serve as the instigation for even
less desired behavior.
6. Mild punishment may help improve behavior
by at least providing negative feedback
on performance, thus calling the indi-
vidual*s attention to incorrect behavior*1^
In the face of the above evidence, the adminis
trator may learn that reward will be more useful in
trying to change behavior than punishment. He has to
make possible the positive reinforcement of right re
sponses.
The Timing and the Schedules
of Reinforcement
The effect of reinforcement on behavior is not
only a matter of what the reinforcement is, but also when
and what schedule or pattern of presentation it is im
mediately after the desired response, each time it occurs.
M. W. Whiting and 0. H* Mowrer, “Habit Pro
gression and Regression: A Laboratory Study of Some
Factors Relevant to Human Socialization," Journal of
Comparative Psychology, 36 (1943), pp. 229-253*
^Harold W. Stevenson, Morton W. Weir and Edward
F. Sigler, "Discrimination Learning in Children as a
Function of Motive-Incentive Conditions," Psychological
Reports* 5 (1959), pp. 95-98.
174
The least effective timing of reinforcement is one in
which the reinforcement is provided on a fixed time basis
with no relationship to the behavior involved.
For the administrator, providing continuous re
inforcement, except in the very beginning of any learning
experience, seems too impractical when extrinsic rewards
are used. This suggests an additional advantage for
using intrinsic rewards. A most effective and practical
approach in using either extrinsic or intrinsic rewards
is some adaptation of a variable reinforcement schedule.
For example, salary raises and appraisal interviews might
be planned more in relation to what a man is doing than
to the calendar. In fact, reinforcement must be seen as
linked to desired performance.
Since management must keep a check on the effec
tiveness with which subordinates are doing their work,
and since the subordinates themselves must know how well
they are doing and where they may be falling behind, a
program of change may be expedited if effective measuring
devices are developed. Feedback of the results of the
changes that are being introduced and a periodic audit
can also facilitate the learning process by informing top
16
Burrhus Frederic Skinner, Science and Human
Behavior (New York: Macmillan Co., 1953), pp. 384-391.
175
management of where further action is indicated.
It is no doubt obvious that positive results have
a strong reinforcing effect, that is, people are rewarded
and encouraged to continue and even to expand the changes
they are making. One can see this expansion effect
occurring as more and more problems are identified and a
greater number of people participate in the solution of
them. The most significant effect is probably a greater
and more permanent acceptance at all levels of the under
lying methods used to bring about change. The use of
"shared power" should be of an institutionalized and con
tinuing practice than just a temporary device to introduce
change. With such a reorientation in the decision-making
practices of the power structure, it hardly appears
likely that organizations will slip back to their pre
vious behavior.
In the two organizations under observation, one
finds little evidence of reinforcement devices. Initial
recognition of reinforcement and managing it tactfully
would have solved many of the problems that are faced by
the two agencies.
It is a debatable question whether monetary re
wards and special bonuses would be desirable for social
service agencies like "C" and "H." However, intrinsic
176
reinforcements like applauding individual excellence in
the performance of a job might be useful instruments of
motivation. Both the agencies need to institute proper
measurement devices to evaluate the effectiveness of the
organizations. Both were evading doing this. There was
no attempt to evaluate the personnel and the whole thing
seemed to move under trust and goodwill in "H." While
this is essential, an organization.as a system must have
some devices to check deviance. The subordinates must
also know how well they are doing while the management
should ultimately know the effectiveness of the system.
When the question of measuring the effectiveness of the
system and its attendant reinforcement devices were men
tioned, most of the members of "Hn were disturbed and
anxious for different reasons. Here are some typical
reactions:
It is impossible to measure the effec
tiveness of this organization. We know
what we are doing and the community is the
best judge.
The very fact that we had got a good
grade from the news media is and will be
a reinforcing factor.
I think that the research wing should
take this up. Sometimes I am in the dark
what my colleagues are doing, and whether
they are right or wrong.
The management should visit the field
and find out individual performances. I
177
do not agree that this type of job cannot
be measured. The truth is some are afraid
and touchy about it.
But the management of “H" did make a start in
this direction. With the introduction of Deputy Direc
tors) there was a need on the part of the consultants
to keep a log book and report their daily activities.
To what extent these things would be effective and useful
to the system remains to be seen. One control measure
which was resented by most of the staff was the order of
the Director that each member report to the office before
field visits. It is obvious that while management was
anxious to have reinforcement devices, the staff was
equally disturbed about it.
In HCW the position is different. Here is an or
ganization which needed very badly reviewing strategies
of the work of its members. There were some cases of
questionable deviation on the part of a few personnel in
the fields. Though these things were detected before
serious harm could befall the system, this organization
needs some overhauling. Periodic audit and performance
appraisal of some sort seemed to be essential. In short,
the head of the organization did not seem to know what
was going on in the field as he did not have the time, and
the field staff had their own ways of taking advantage of
the circumstances.
178
Co-optation
When dissident elements of change seriously
threaten an organization*s survival (particularly in the
infancy of an innovative-prone organization), it may
attempt to incorporate those elements into its own struc
ture. Selznick calls this maneuver "Co-optation" — "the
process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or
policy-determining structure of an organization as a means
of averting threats to its stability or existence."1^ The
co-optative response may have as its aim the neutraliza
tion of opposition by making it share responsibility for
controversial actions,1® or it may be a genuine attempt
at adaptation and flexibility through the introduction of
new values and information into policy making. Co-opta-
tion is a defensive mechanism formulated as one of a
number of possible predicates available for the interpre
tation of organizational behavior. Co-optation tells us
something about the process by which an institutional
^Philip Selznick, "Foundations of the Theory of
Organization," American Sociological Review. 13 (1948),
pp. 25-35.
18
At political conventions, the necessary party
unity dictates that opposition leaders second, and thus
bless, the nominated candidates whom they had previously
bitterly opposed.
179
environment impinges upon an organization and effects
changes in its leadership and policy. Co-optation may
be formal or informal, depending upon the specific prob
lem to be solved.
When there exists a hiatus between consent and
control, the legitimacy of the formal authority is called
into question. Where control lacks an adequate measure
of consent, it may revert to coercive measures or attempt
to win the consent of the governed. One means of winning
consent is to co-opt elements into the leadership or or
ganization elements which in some way reflect the senti
ment of the mass public. As a result, it is expected
that the new elements will lend respectability or legit
imacy to the organs of control and thus re-establish the
stability of formal authority. This process is widely
used in different contexts.
Selznick*s analysis of the process of co-optation
illustrates how this mechanism brought changes in a
government agency, namely the Tennessee Valley Authority.
The reform program of the TVA encountered strong opposi
tion from powerful entrenched forces in the area, and the
TVA*s grass roots policy required that it achieve success
*9Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grassroots
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949).
180
by coming to terms with opposition forces rather than
impose its will upon them by relying on the power of the
federal government• Therefore, the TVA co-opted some
representatives of the opposition into its management.
However, since these new elements helped to shape the
policies of the organization in accordance with their own
interests, the earlier objectives of the TVA were modi
fied and transformed. For example, an initial policy of
the TVA was to purchase large land strips around the
reservoirs created by its dam building operations in
order to enable the public to benefit from the increased
value of this land resulting from the expenditure of
public funds. But the representatives of the local agri
cultural interests who had been co-opted into the policy
making bodies of the TVA succeeded in reversing this
policy and adopting the procedure of purchasing only the
minimum amount of land required for reservoirs to reap
20
the benefits from the improved surrounding land.
Again, changes introduced to promote the adjustment of an
organization to a hostile environment modified the organ
ization* s objectives.
Several studies are illustrative of this orien
tation.
^°Ibid., pp. 196-204.
181
Kaufman,2- * - in a study of the United States Forest
Service, presented a highly sophisticated analysis of the
techniques by which the field menwere conditioned to
carry out the agency policy.
The absorption of lower participants with leader
ship ability into higher organizational ranks is sometimes
resorted to as a mechanism for organizational adaptation.
Special positions and tasks are developed which make it
possible for them to contribute to organizational goals
and to become committed through participation without
special training, education or full-time devotion to organ
izational activities. Membership on boards or committees
and volunteer work are typical examples of such roles.
Fichter22 describes the large network of such ancillary
positions in athletic, welfare, and social activities
which develops around the church as part of the parish
structure. Although all these activities are directly or
indirectly controlled by the pastor, they supply positions
for active and powerful lay leaders.^ Holding a lay
position in the church or an ancillary organization
probably increases the tendency of the emergent leaders to
Kaufman, The Forest Ranger (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, I960).
*^2J. H. Fichter, Social Relations in the Urban
Parish (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).
23Ibid., pp. 3-49.
182
use their influence in support of the church and its full
time formal elites.
As stated earlier, co-optation has reference to
absorption of elements that are usually in the form of
persons who represent interests or forces clamoring for
change or reform. Attention is directed here to a major
defensive move that received an enormous amount of pub
licity shortly after the end of World War II, that of the
establishment of the famed "Doolittle Board" and the im-
Q A
plementation of its conclusive suggestions.
The Board was directed by the Secretary of War to
investigate the whole issue of officer enlisted-man rela
tionships and make recommendations for their improvement.
Four of the six members were enlisted men or officers who
rose from the ranks and all of them were heroes. It may
be regarded as the absorption of the elements into the
policy-determining structure, since the recommendations
of this Board were presumed to provide suggestions for
changes in the existing structure. It is formal co-op
tation, for its very publicity was a part of an attempt
to defend the legitimacy of the criticized authority, and
eventually enhance the reliability of the channels of
24
G. Dearborn Spindler, "The Doolittle Board and
the Co-optation in the Army," Social Forces. Vol. 29,
No. 3 (March 1951), pp. 305-310.
183
communication — the important medium of change, through
out the administrative hierarchy.
The significance of co-optation for organizational
analysis is not simply that there is a change in or a
broadening of leadership, and that this is an adaptive
response but also that this change is consequential for
25
the character and role of the organization. It is an
adaptive response of a cooperative system to a stable
need, generating transformations which reflect constraints
enforced by recalcitrant tools of action. Regardless of
its intention, co-optation often results in loss of some
degree of organizational control to the elements that
have been co-opted.
Extent of Co-optation
in »C" and "H»
The ambiguities in goal definition and conflict
between the two agencies led to an incident which is sig
nificant from the point of focus of this study. The case
in point is the Hippie influx episode. Staff of "C" met
with the affected property owners* association, while
"H* s" staff met with individual hippies and groups
25
Selznick, "Foundations of the Theory of Organ
ization," p. 35.
184
representing the hippie point of view. Two opposing
dialogues emerged which seemed to emphasize the gulf
between the different points of view rather than stress
the importance of bringing them together. The inter-
organizational relationships continued to deteriorate
ever since as a result of conflict in approach to prob
lems. A subsequent incident caused frustration and
anxiety in both organizations. It was reported that
during a student demonstration in one of the schools, the
staff of "C" met with the rebel group and exhorted them
not to indulge in such tactics, while a little later the
staff of "H" met with the same group and explained to
them the value of dissenting and demonstration.
The episodes mentioned are relevant to the concept
under discussion, because one of the tasks of this study
is to explore inter-organizational conflict in the domain
of change. The conflict itself may be viewed as func
tional in the sense that it generated competition between
the agencies, and that it displayed in extreme terms prob
lems that might otherwise have been held at the margin of
the organizations* attention. It impressed upon the man
agement the need for clarification or change in goals and
provided a rationale for decisive action. At the time of
the inquiry, both agencies were seriously engaged in a
185
discussion of the goals and objectives of their respec
tive systems.
The problem in this inter-organizational analysis
concerns co-optation, a somewhat specialized coordination,
since a possibility of both conflict and cooperation exist
in the present context. If the conflict is complete, the
issue could be settled by complete lack of interaction
or by some analogue to war. Where conflict overlaps with
areas of support, as in the present case, the question
arises: What procedures ensure the individual organiza
tions their autonomy in areas of conflict while at the
same time permitting their united effort in areas of
agreement?
One such mechanism is co-optation. It is an ad-
justmental process by which two or more organizations
promote cooperation yet preserve their independence. It
is merely an adaptive response to a situation in which
"H*' and "C" have conflicting values and the demands of
efficiency suggest organizational specialization, yet
share some common goal which demands cooperation.
There was evidence that co-optation did work at
least with some people in both organizations. The ob
server had occasion to note that a few members of "H** and
MC, t were involved in discussing together before embarking
186
upon a field activity where a face-to-face confrontation
could not be avoided. This move seemed to be a good
device for increasing the likelihood of these two agen
cies relating to one another in ways which might in fact
result in the definition of compatible goals. For in
stance, youth services is an area where co-optation
could be tried; research and information services would
be another field where the device could be usefully
applied.
Both agencies seemed to be nervous about resorting
to co-optation on a more formal level, possibly because
of the fear that it might result in a change in leader
ship. While this skepticism is understandable, the ab
sence of some agreement by the two organizations might
lead to renewed threats of merger. At the time of the
study, there was no evidence to prove co-optation was
contemplated by the leadership of the two systems. The
only possible explanation is the polar extremes of the
leaders of the respective organizations.
CHAPTER VIII
THE OUTCOME
This chapter will examine the third set of fac
tors in change dynamics — the results of the two previous
factors, givens and processes. What is the outcome of
all the factors mentioned so far? Learning new skills,
alteration of behavior patterns of organization members
toward new ways that might contribute to the realization
of organizational objectives. Anxiety and frustration
might be controlled while motivation to perform better
might be generated. Theoretical bases for these factors
will be described followed by illustrations from the two
organizations observed.
Learning New Skills
The administrator has the responsibility not only
for recognizing the need to change, and deciding upon the
direction of change, with an awareness of the interacting
forces unleashed by any such decision. He also holds the
responsibility for creating organizational conditions
under which change in the behavior of organizational
187
188
members will take place in conformity with his decisions.
Such responsibility leads him to the point where
he must be concerned with the process of learning, which
places emphasis on his role of educator. There is a need
to teach the grand purposes of the organization,■ * - and to
engender an identification with this goal and a willing
ness to put aside merely local identifications. As
Barnard has clearly indicated, there is, in addition,
the educational process of inculcating a belief in the
O
real existence of a common purpose. Beyond these pri
mary educational processes a continuing readiness for
change itself must be taught, based on the point of view
that change, adaptive to the goals of the organization
(which themselves, might change), is the only way in
which organizations survive. There are, as well, spe
cific skills to be developed and information to be
imparted.
Factors Facilitating Learning
One of the safest generalizations that could be
drawn about favorable conditions for learning is that it
•^Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938), p. 233.
2Xbid., p. 87.
189
is facilitated in direct proportion to the amount of
feedback the learner is given about his performance.^
If the educator does not provide knowledge of the re
sults in relation to the educator*s own criterion, the
learner sets up some subjective criterion and evaluates
his performance in relation to this irrelevant and per
haps undesirable criterion.
Learning is a direct function of the meaningful
ness of the material and the way in which it is organized.
Information theory (an interdisciplinary study dealing
with the transmission of information, messages, or sig
nals) suggests that meaningful or well-organized material
is learned more rapidly because it requires that we learn
less. The pattern of the meaning or the organization is
already known; we have only to fit into the pattern the
new information or the context of what is to be learned.
When the material is not organized for us, we have to
learn both pattern (or organization) and content
Unless time is taken to provide reasons and meaning,
learning will be slow and inefficient. In addition, even
O
R. B. Ammons, "Effects of Knowledge of Perform
ance: A Survey and Tentative Theoretical Formulation,1 1
Journal of General Psychology. 54 (1956), pp. 279-299.
^G. A. Miller and J. Selfridge, "Verbal Context
and the Recall of Meaningful Material," American Journal
of Psychology. 63 (1950), pp. 176-185.
190
when learning does take place, there is the danger of
developing what Veblen has called "trained incapacity":
rules are learned well but without an understanding of
the meaning behind them. The rules are then applied but
often without achieving the objectives for which they
were designed.
In its efforts to speed learning, management must
make use of appropriate motives. For people who are not
ambitious, a warning might generate some anxiety which
may help speed the change. Since it takes time to learn,
it might be useful to reallocate workloads in order to
provide the opportunity for learning and practice. Many
individuals can learn more readily as members of a group.
Management must be on the alert to elicit the reinforce
ment that comes from informal groups in a learning situa
tion.
There is one lesson for management that emerges
from this review of learning that has particular appli
cability to problems of organizational change. An admin
istrator does not determine whether or not a man will
learn. The former is interested in what is learned. All
he can do is to help the people learn. Hence, the more
Thorstein B. Veblen, as mentioned in E. G. You-
man's, "The Administrative Mind," Public Personnel Review,
15 (1954), pp. 72-76.
191
men can discover for themselves the need for change, the
more likely they will be to accept it. Likewise, the
more men become involved in the search for solutions, the
more readily they will acquire the ability and the skill
which they will need to operate successfully under the
new situation.
To develop his people so that they contribute to
the organization’s goals, and to make them responsive to
the variety of changes that are part of organizational
life, the administrator must use the learning principles
and procedures that develop what he wants them to learn.
The main responsibility is to set educational goals, the
kinds of behavior required for necessary job skills,
requisite information; secondly, it is a matter of creat
ing organizational and work conditions under which effec
tive principles of learning can operate to influence the
individual toward the desired goal.
Turning to the two organizations under observa
tion, one reason why the plan for change did not fully
accomplish their objectives in HC" was the failure of
the management to provide adequate opportunities for
individuals to learn new skills, and new patterns of
behavior. Some of the members viewed change with mis
giving because they did not believe they had the ability
192
to meet the new demands* They wondered whether they
would have the opportunity to learn and who would in
struct them. In the new plan, the field supervisors
were expected to report to a new man and through him to
the Director. None had any idea about the intermediary
who would control their activities. Here is a question
of alteration of their previous relationships with their
superior. This involved learning new relationships which
takes time; and men are impelled to keep acting in ways
to which they have long been accustomed. Unless provi
sion is made so that all who need fresh knowledge will
have adequate learning opportunities, changes cannot be
successfully introduced.
"H" was fortunate in this respect because of its
members1 extra-organizational affiliations. Twenty-seven
out of its twenty-nine professional staff were members of
some professional associations, which facilitate learning
and help alter their behavior in the light of exposure to
new knowledge. Management also provided them with more
learning opportunities by arranging seminars both inside
and outside the work setting. Academicians from uni
versities were frequent visitors to the organization;
sensitivity training laboratories were in session at the
time of the study. What is more, some of the learning
193
that took place was without management assistance — in
informal work groups, on the job experiences, in casual
but unplanned exchanges with experts outside.
New Work Patterns for
Key Personnel
The second outcome of the change process is the
new work patterns for key personnel. While a major
structural change might result in shift of responsibility,
the success or failure of the plan depends on how and to
what extent the men responsible for operations alter
their ways of acting and reacting to the new situations.
To this end, management must introduce appropriate
changes in its personnel policies and in its control meas
ures; provide for audit and feedback of the changes that
are instituted. It must also consider to what extent it
can accelerate the learning process by making use of a
series of formal learning devices.
In bringing about change, it is essential to see
what the change is going to mean to the individuals and
work groups involved. In introducing change at the indi
vidual level, it is important that management establish
an atmosphere of permissiveness which suggests mutual
respect as well as confidence in and concern for the
individual. The management must attempt to be non-evalu-
194
ative or non-judgmental in its approach to the individual.
From the group point of view, the participative technique
may be employed; the group is given an opportunity to
suggest ways in which the change might be made and to
adjust to the change in ways that are meaningful to the
group.
The above approaches seem to be in conflict with
the traditional managerial practices such as unilateral
authority, conformity to procedures, outmoded rating
systems, and so forth. The effective implementation of
new methods requires changed behavior on the part of key
personnel. They must divest themselves of the tradi
tional ways of work pattern and management. These men
will not find it easy to relinquish authority over others
and to alter their ways of acting and reacting toward
subordinates. The traditional methods of managing are
very much a product of the personalities of the key ex
ecutives and they represent the executives' own islands
of security. A new type of behavior poses a threat to
these men, because it means that they too, will have to
change. This suggests that it may be the resistance of
the key executives themselves to the adoption of new
patterns of behavior which represents one of the most
serious barriers to the introduction of change in
195
organizations J3
Quality of the Key Personnel
The management philosophy or the type of admin
istration desired by the organization is clearly reflected
in the quality of the key personnel. There are many dif
ferent qualities which might be set up as objectives for
the key personnel of a system. Technical competence,
daring rugged individualism, social attitude, persua
siveness, and so forth, might be considered in establish-
ing personnel goals. The personnel objective should be
related to several of the other basic objectives. For
instance, if the organization chooses to emphasize sta
bility rather than dynamics, it would not normally seek
highly aggressive men as executives. Likewise, if it is
going to emphasize decentralized administration, it will
have to get key executives who are resourceful and able
to carry responsibility.
So then, we are here concerned with the question:
What is the nature of the basic behavior patterns in an
organization and what are the key factors involved in
changing these patterns? Lawrence identifies three
^Robert Tannenbaum, Irving R. Weschler and Fred
Massarik, Leadership and Organization: A Behavioral
Science Approach (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1961),
p. 87.
196
dimensions that act as goals for people and thereby act
as powerful basic influences on concrete human behavior.
They are: the achievement of organizational purpose, the
achievement of self-maintenance and growth, and the
achievement of social satisfactions.^
To achieve its purpose, an organization must have
a set of activities designed to perform its purpose — a
production system, a communication-decision system, a
sanction system.
In the achievement of self-maintenance and growth,
we look at individual behavior. Every individual has a
self-concept which is a set of ideas, beliefs and atti
tudes that he attempts to keep internally consistent.
The self-concept tends to change over time along certain
trend lines; from the simple, dependent, and immature;
by a process of learning, complication and growth; toward
a condition that has not been very clearly defined but
O
has been variously labeled self-actualization, maturity,
7Paul R. Lawrence, The Changing of Organizational
Behavior Patterns: A Case Study of Decentralization
(Boston: Harvard School of Business Administration,
Division of Research, 1958), pp. 206-207.
O
A. H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New
York: Harper & Sons, 1954)•
197
fully f u n c t i o n i n g ,^ or self-determination.*-® These
tendencies are never completely fulfilled in any indi
vidual, though if they are sufficiently blocked, an
individual will develop psychoneurotic symptoms. What
is important is the fact that the self-concept changes
very slowly and can stubbornly resist outside efforts to
change it that are perceived as threats to the self.
It would be useful, therefore, to adopt the way of think
ing about individual growth that facilitates increased
conscious awareness of one's own self-environment rela
tionship, and try to work with, rather than against, the
built-in growth tendencies of people, and try to create
the conditions in the organization in which self-growth
is fostered.
Achievement of social satisfaction relates to the
influence of small groups. These groups offer their
members the satisfactions of sociability, spontaneity,
and a sense of belonging.* - * • The behavior routines built
^Carl R. Rogers, "Toward a Theory of Creativity,"
ETC, Vol. XI (1954), II and III.
lOurie Bronfenbrenner, "Toward an Integrated
Theory of Personality," in Robert R. Blake and Glen V.
Ramsey, Perception: Approach to Personality (New York:
Ronald Press, 1951), pp. 206-257.
^See especially, George C. Homans, The Human
Group (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1950); Geo. F. F.
Lombard, Behavior in a Selling Group (Boston: Harvard
University Business School, brvision of Research, 1956)•
198
up in the groups axe developed into group norms that are
strong influences on the behavior of every group member.
It would be better to give some latitude to routine in
teractions rather than viewing them with skepticism.
The implications of the above three dimensional
approach to the work patterns of key personnel are clear.
There are values inherent in each of these dimensions and
the hazard of perversion in each dimension. One might
consider the possibility of constructing a model fox be
havior in an organization that would be functional in all
these dimensions. But the main question is: What does
all this mean for the administrator's behavior? The ad
ministrator has to live in a multi-dimensional world with
a responsibility for taking action in leading people and
in dealing with concrete problems and hence must seek
multi-dimensional solutions. He must constantly strive
to maintain consistency in his own behavior while ac
cepting the fact that his behavior will always appear
inconsistent from any simple one-dimensional frame of
reference.
In sum, it may be said that the essence of suc
cessful change lies not in the design of a plan but
rather in the ability of the key personnel to alter their
behavior in accordance with the new principles which the
199
plan seeks to realize*
To illustrate, "C" did not possess adequate
learning devices to teach its members. Most of their
knowledge was taken fox granted by the Director. For
instance, this was the comment of one field supervisor
to another toward the change:
Have you heard the new definition of a
Deputy Director? It is a field supervisor
with a raise in pay.
To the researcher, another supervisor had this to say on
the same subject:
It seems to be an answer to “H" —
that we also have Deputy Directors.
Why should we have Deputy Directors
simply because MHH has them?
Out of seventeen field assistants, thirteen said:
Well, sometimes we do not know what
is going on in this organization. We
will simply do what we are told; no more
questions please.
Asked how the Deputy Director designate was after his
promotion, most of his staff remarked:
He was a good man when he was a field
supervisor. Now he does not hide the
fact he is a boss.
It is evident that there was very little inclination on
the part of key personnel to alter their previous ways
of thinking in the absence of motivation to learn. They
did not seem to have gotten the message about the change
at all.
200
Let us look at the responses of some of the key
people of "H." Here are some of the typical comments
on the new plan by the Deputy Directors:
This job is not too easy. I can use
all the help I can get on it.
I am trying to learn as I go along.
The consultants had this to say on their Deputy Direc
tors :
I like a Deputy Director who is really
a boss, really running things, a take-
charge guy.
I think I can work much better with
this man who has learned to accept my
criticisms and welcome them instead of
someone who seemed to be fighting them.
My Deputy Director should not be upset
if there is some minor mistake. This is
the trouble with him. He used to be like
that before but I thought he would change.
Not yet.
It was maintained above (pages 196-198) that it
would be useful to have a three-dimensional approach to
look at the behavior of organizational members, focusing
on achievement of organizational purpose, self-maintenance
and growth, and social satisfactions. Applying this ap
proach, one finds that the reorganization plans of both
"C" and "H" were not multi-functional by conscious design.
They were primarily interested in achieving organizational
purpose. In MHH there was an occasional reference to
201
developing individuals and making the agency a better
place to work, but this was not the focus of their con
scious attention. In "C" there was no mention of this
at all.
As regards the second dimension, one sees some
evidence that "H1 1 did succeed to a limited extent in
providing conditions that better fostered self-growth.
Some of this could be seen in the behavior of the Deputy
Directors toward their consultants, in the formal and
informal training sessions, and in the frequent inter
actions of the personnel outside the system. There was
greater awareness of self-environment, conflict, and
choice (which constituted self-growth) than in ••C."
The evidence of achievement of social satisfac
tions was striking in HH." The ethnic groups were solid
in their support or opposition to new proposals and
ideas. The researcher often noted that the interaction
pattern was characterized by such ethnic considerations.
The management seems to have played it up well in their
choice of Deputy Directors. In "C" the ethnic groups did
emerge conspicuously in their criticisms against the man
agement; in fact, it seemed to give the employees quite
a bit of satisfaction. To what extent this is functional
to the system is another question.
202
Control of Anxiety
Control of anxiety is another crucial variable in
change dynamics. The successful implementation of a
change is in part dependent on the extent to which anxiety
of the organization members affected by the change is con
tained. Anxiety is a basic and almost universal experi
ence. It is often the central problem of many psychiatric
conditions but It also plays a part in the everyday
experiences of normally functioning, healthy human beings.
It manifests its presence In an array of symptoms, includ
ing the extreme of personality breakdown, purely physical
symptoms, defense mechanisms, and simple worry and fret
ting. It serves as a powerful motivating force, in some
cases forcing the most intense concentration on narrow
and sometimes irrelevant aspects of the environment, thus
leading to generalized maladjustment; in other cases,
pressing the individual to venture forth, to intensify
his efforts and to accomplish more as a result of the
anxiety.
The characteristics of anxiety are the feelings
of uncertainty and helplessness in the face of threat or
danger. Anxiety is the apprehension cued off by a threat
to some value which the individual holds essential to
203
12
his existence as a personality.
Several studies have been made on anxiety and its
implications for social behavior.It would be useful
to examine and highlight some of the studies and their
significance to the practitioner.
Changes, obviously unsettling, and the anxieties
provoked by change, require alleviation during the course
of transformation. Until then, the anxiety is expressed
in mutual antagonism and in hostility toward the indi
viduals who act as agents of change. The lay adminis
trators especially, as agents of imposed change, became
recipients of hostilities having their origin in the
change, but easier to direct against human beings than
impersonal systems. Sofer*s study of staff relations in
three British hospitals revealed that drastic adminis
trative change as the hospital service required some
■^Rollo May, The Meaning of Anxiety (New York:
Ronald Press, 1950), Chap. VI, pp. 190-191; 194-195;
226-229.
13
J. W. Atkinson, "Motivational Determinants of
Risk-Taking Behavior," Psychological Review. 64 (1957),
pp. 359-372; J. W. Atkinson, J. R. Bastion, R. W. Earl
and G. H. Litwin, "The Achievement Motive, Goal-Setting
and Probability Preferences," Journal of Abnormal and
Social Psychology. 60 (i960), pp. 27-36; and J. W. At
kinson and G. H. Litwin, "Achievement Motive and Text
Anxiety Conceived as Motive to Approach Success and Mo
tive to Avoid Failure," Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology. 60 (1960), pp. 52-63.
painful readjustments,14
For anxious people, every situation is viewed
as a test of themselves* The administrator will want
to be supportive, assume responsibility for the outcome
himself and focus attention on the task itself, and not
on the employee. It might also be added that the admin
istrator should confront the low anxiety person with
challenge and even a sense of stress to gain his maximum
response. As indicated earlier, anxiety is a compelling
motivator1^ and anxiety-reduction, a universal goal.1^
The administrator must therefore recognize frus
tration, anxiety, or conflict where he finds it; try to
understand its underlying dynamics; tolerate its pres-
_ *
ence; avoid being drawn into the behavior that fre
quently accompanies it. For example, when frustration
l4Cyril Sofer, "Reactions to Administrative
Change," Human Relations, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (1955), A
Study of Sta£f Relations in Three British Hospitals,
pp. 291-316.
15I. E. Farber, "Anxiety as a Drive State," in
M. R. Jones (ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation
(Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1954),
pp. 1-46.
16
Robert Presthus in Organizational Society con
siders in detail the role of anxiety reduction in molding
organizational behavior conforming the individuals
style to that of the organization (Chapter IV).
205
leads to griping, ox hostile ox aggressive feelings, the
expression of this feeling ought to be accepted. Re
search suggests that up to a point, ventilation of feel
ings is desirable.The administrator has to avoid
intensifying the response either by too much sympathy or
by arguing against it. His skill lies in timing his
attempt to re-focus attention in another area where
accomplishment is possible.
While many men can face and adjust to change
without difficulty, others are likely to become uneasy,
if not upset, when they learn about a proposed change.
But anxiety does not always contraindicate proceeding
with a plan. In fact, a small degree of anxiety may
actually facilitate acceptance of change.
The fact that considerable anxiety is frequently
precipitated by major changes can be seen in the over
compliance, foot-dragging, endless discussions and many
other forms of uncooperative behavior that frequently
accompany change. These are all manifestations of under
lying anxiety. These dangers need not be viewed as a
necessary cause of trouble but rather as a type of trouble
that a management can largely avoid or control.
17S. Feshbach, "The Drive-Reducing Function of
Fantasy Behavior," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psy
chology. 50 (1955), pp. 3-11.
206
Just as attack is frequently the best defense,
so prevention is the key to the control of anxiety. If
management recognizes that many employees are uneasy be
cause they expect that the plan for change may separate
them from their group, they can give early reassurance
wherever possible that such separation is not contemplated.
Although each individual will react to the chal
lenge of change primarily in terms of his own life
history and experience, his responses will also be af
fected by the attitudes of his immediate associates.
Every organization has a galaxy of small groups, many of
them informal. In periods of organizational change, both
formal and informal groups can provide important reassur
ance to many. A management can more readily obtain
acceptance of its plans if It makes special efforts to
win the support of group leaders who are often able to
prevent irrational fears from arising or to help allay
them if they exist.
In sum, none of the psychological adversities
{anxiety, frustration, conflict, and so forth) can be
assumed always to have either a certain positive or nega
tive influence on individual behavior and performance.
Their impact is a complex function of the kind of individ
ual, the way each condition is presented and the degree
to which other conditions facilitate or hamper alternative
207
behavior. The very nature of administrative leadership
requires that an executive must learn to live with such
emotional stresses and strains.
Anxiety in "C"
The lack of or the inadequacies in communication
generates anxiety and frustration among the employees in
an organization. This was very evident in most of the
people in "C." Here are some reactions:
One thing I have learned is that you are
never going to find perfection in this organ
ization so you might as well never expect it.
The top management people are no fools,
but they do not always appreciate what we
are up against in the field. They do not
give proper directions, and if they do,
they are conflicting ones.
You can afford to resist a top management
proposal only so much, regardless of what you
think of it.
There is some pressure in this organiza
tion to say "yes” when your boss asks you how
you like the new plan. When I report prob
lems, he thinks I am resisting just because X
do not like the change. So I can say it just
so often, and then I have to stop because I
am beginning to get a bad reputation for
bucking everything.
How can we express our reaction toward the
new plan? To whom? When?
No one in the central office is interested
in my opinions.
The above comments reflect the predicament of the
208
personnel in "C." It seems that the management did not
provide frequent consultations during the initiation
period of change; left the employees to themselves to
guess and arrive at their own judgments. The result was
a sense of resignation and helplessness.
Anxiety in “H1 1
The type of anxiety shown by the staff of *'Hn
was like this:
The big problem of the whole plan is that
of teaching old dogs new tricks. Well, it is
a tough one. Sometimes it gets on your nerves.
Some of us are old-timers and we are doing
what we have been trained to do for the past
so many years. It is hard for us to suddenly
change, and there is very little appreciation
for that.
The change itself may be good, but it is
coming too fast, I think.
I think that sometimes we talk too much
under the notion it is participative system;
at the end we are where we began. This is
very frustrating.
Perhaps, I am one of the very few guys
who thinks this whole reorganization plan
simply will not work. I do not think I will
have the same freedom that I used to have be
fore in meeting the boss; now I have someone
immediately above me without whose knowledge
I cannot reach the top.
The above comments reveal that the fear or anxiety
is not against the change per se, but more against the
209
possible difficulties in implementation. The last com
ment came from a very senior person who lost in the race
for the Deputy Director*s job, which is quite under
standable.
The task of the management in the control of
anxiety is very urgent. By providing clarifications and
assurances, and by reassigning and restructuring task
groups, it can go far to contain anxiety, which if it
were not brought under control, could weaken the pros
pects of successfully introducing changes. A limited
degree of anxiety may actually work as a catalyst in
bringing about change if there is a promise that the
existing difficulties would be eliminated. As was in
dicated earlier, in the control of anxiety, as in so
many other factors, the effectiveness of leadership is
crucial. Those in the lower echelons are much less likely
to be disturbed if they have trust and faith in the com
petence of those in the top.
CHAPTER IX
SUMMARY AND GENERALIZATIONS
The purpose of this chapter is to recapitulate
briefly what has been said thus far and present in prop-
ositional form certain tentative generalizations to which
the case illustrations lead or which they underline.
This chapter is, therefore, relevant to the claim that
studies of this type have a contribution to make toward
general theories of organizational change.
The generalizations stated are based on retro
spective study and not on the testing of hypotheses
formally set up; but the claim made here is that a review
of the literature on organizational change with observa
tions derived from on-the-spot study lead to a better
understanding of management of change that can be checked
against other intimate experiences with organizations and
against new data which may be sought in studies more con
ventionally and rigorously organized and controlled.
To recapitulate, in this survey of the literature
on management of change, three basic dimensions were
singled out as significant. These were work change,
210
2X1
change in people and cognitive change. Changes in each
of these were found to be areas of activity that have
interested many of the writers referred to. The reasons
for confining to these dimensions were largely because
each of them was closely related to management of change
in general. Work change is important because it is one
of the areas where resistance starts. Effective change
occurs only when people alter their behavior. Hence, the
psychological factors in change were discussed under
"achieving change in people" and "cognitive change."
In addition to these three dimensions, a chapter
was devoted to the problem of coping with resistance to
change, both individual and group resistance and resolving
interorganizational conflicts.
The core of the matter was introduced in Chapter
IV where attention was directed to considerations in
volved in the introduction and management of change. A
fivefold scheme to study extended changes in two public
organizations was attempted. Here, the factors that or
ganizational planners must take into account in designing
a plan were set out.
Application of the fivefold framework to the two
organizations revealed the inter-play of some crucial
factors in handling changes. Nine such crucial factors
212
were identified — Time, Uniqueness of the Organization,
Leadership, Communication, Reinforcement, Co-optation,
Learning New Skills, New Work Patterns for Key Personnel,
and Control of Anxiety.
These factors were further analyzed with relevant
theoretical backdrop in the last three chapters.
On the basis of what has been said thus far, it
seems possible to present some major propositions, and
techniques regarding the management of change. The rest
of this chapter attempts to do this.
Healthy organizations are always under pressure
to grow. This pressure may come from outside the system
in the form of requests to undertake new or expanded
tasks, or it may come from inside from members who seek
a wider scope for their own activities and who see new
opportunities to be developed. These pressures create
the need to make strategic choices about the direction
and the rate of change. In the case of "H," the indica
tions are that the pressure is from both inside and
outside. Public recognition of "H" seemed to be greater
than "C" in that the services of the former were sought
more often. The personnel of **HM seemed to show in
creasing awareness of their own involvement and to gen
erate more ideas for development.
213
The study also suggests that a point may be
reached when an organization is not capable of initiating
growth internally. The spiraling effect of superior-
originated interactions, of increased tension, and of low
performance may be broken only by action of some agent
outside the immediate organization. "C" seems to be in
this predicament.
It was also confirmed in the course of the study
the importance of leadership in the process of change.
Indeed, some crises seem to be provoked largely by the
need of the members of the organization to test their
leadership1s capacity to lead. If proper advantage is
taken of the situation, the management can both provide
a reasonable solution of the concrete problem and go
about it in such a way as to make an effective communica
tion about the way in which problems should be handled
and the ways in which the needs of the organization are
balanced against those of the members. Achieving a goal
requires an acknowledged interdependence between the
leader and the subordinates and this goal should not be
established as a personal requirement of the head. It
should be a collaborative process of goal attainment, as
McGregor would call it.* Data revealed that while "H"
*Douglas McGregor, "Notes on Organization Theory,"
cited by Warren Bennis, "Leadership Theory and Adminis
trative Behavior," Administrative Science Quarterly
(December 1959).
214
was making attempts toward that collaborative process,
"C^s" leadership seemed to allow its actions be deter
mined by individual idiosyncrasies. An alternative
explanation may be that this is due to the fact that
while a large majority of "H^1 1 members were professionals
and hence self-motivated and self-confident, "C" seemed
to have relatively few men who would be called profes
sionals as such.
A comparative analysis also points to the fact
that organizations need specific and explicit objectives
to function as rational systems. Goal ambiguity presents
problems in interpretation; goal intangibility creates
difficulties in evaluation of the effectiveness of the
system. Coupled with these is the added problems of
similarity in goals of both "C" and "H." Intangibility
of goals makes it possible for organizations to accept
the assumption that they are effective. Assuming effec
tiveness as a given prevents adequate evaluation which in
turn might force the systems and their programs into non-
rational forms. Goal ambiguity and intangibility not
only tell upon the effectiveness of both HC" and "H,1 1 but
also affect interorganizational relations. It generated
conflict between the two agencies. However, such conflict
had its functional as well as dysfunctional aspects.
215
The functional aspect suggests the following hypothesis:
The greater the degree of similarity of
goals between two systems, the greater is
the competition; the greater such competi
tion, the greater are the possibilities of
change in either of them.
The above hypothesis in turn leads to another re
lated aspect of the problem. It deals with interorgani-
zational exchange as an activity leading to goal-attain-
ment. Such an exchange may be viewed as any voluntary
activity between two organizations for the realization
of their respective objectives* In order that such an
exchange could take place, it may be assumed that spe
cificity of goals is a prerequisite. It may be hypoth
esised:
The more specific the objectives of two
systems, the greater is the degree of ex
change, and greater readjustments within
the systems.
The elements that could be exchanged in the
present case are, for example, professional personnel,
research data, and so forth, and such cooperative effort
might contribute to accomplishments which they would
otherwise not be able to marshal unaided. It might also
restore better understanding between them in areas of
conflict.
The intention here is not to overemphasize ex
change and de-emphasize conflict. On the contrary, it
216
is held that if interoxganizational character is to be
retained, both autonomy and conflict must be preserved.
One type of mechanism to preserve areas of conflict and
autonomy is the existence of differences in objectives.
That explains the assumption about specificity of ob
jectives. In short, while inter-agency interaction be
tween "C" and "H" requires both cooperation and conflict,
at any given time emphasis might be on one or the other.
Such an orientation itself will be sufficient inducement
to conscious change in both systems.
Strategies in Managing Changes
The study also indicates the importance of strat
egies in managing changes in formal organizations like
"C" and "H." An introspective view of the two organiza
tions engaged in changes reveals the significance of the
following strategies:
To determine how to handle support, resist
ance or opposition to a change, it is necessary
to consider managements estimate of the mean
ing of the change for the individuals. If an
employee estimates that a change is incompatible
with his own goals, managements own estimate of
whether the change is compatible or incompatible
with the individuals goals will be of key im
portance in determining further steps.
Where the management believes the change
will be compatible with individual goals but
the individual is not sure yet, and is simply
marking time until he obtains more informa
tion, management can increase the individuals
217
inclination to accept the change by giving
more information. This is probably the
situation in "H.**
If management inaugurates a change which
has unfavorable effects on individuals, it
is likely that the management will be viewed
as callous and unconcerned with the rights of
the individuals. Individuals' efforts will
be limited by this perception. They may
feel the need to organize and defend their
rights. This is not to argue that changes
should not be made, but rather to question
whether management has explored fully al
ternative courses of action that might re
duce such negative effects. This is appli
cable to "C."
On the whole, most of the strategies for managing
change are concerned with the amount of information
shared by management and the individuals to be affected.
Here participation might help the change process. The
emphasis is on psychological rather than actual partici
pation. If one feels that he has been personally in
volved, the amount of actual participation may not be
important. In "H1 * the indications were that the em
ployees felt that they were consulted though they could
not agree with the change itself, whereas in "C” the em
ployees seemed to feel that it was not real participation,
but merely an apparent one. Some of them remarked that
the whole idea of participation was a ruse.
Pacing the Change
Change can proceed no faster than those who are
involved in it can understand, accept and respond cor
rectly. A change is more likely to be smooth, appro
priate and lasting when its introduction allows for a
greater exchange of information between those engineering
the change and those being directly affected by it. In
"H" the management took considerable pains to search for
and exchange information in the initial stages. Conse
quently, the transition was orderly. , , C*sM management
were more involved in transmitting information from the
top down, and the employees were not really involved in
the scheme. This may explain in part why the implemen
tation was delayed.
Using Power
In a formal organization, the key person in charge
of a change has at his disposal different types of power.
The study also confirms that organizational role-generated
bases of power are seldom enough to accomplish the job.
In "C" the employees seemed to feel that the Director just
ordered minimum compliance to change. This strategy did
not seem to work. Whereas in "H*1 Cooley made efforts to
enlist the cooperation of others to follow his directions
to the objective at hand.
Finally, it must not be forgotten that any program
of change could be carried out only if the organization
and its members showed a certain degree of flexibility
and could be consolidated only if some of that flexibility
was removed once the program was complete.
The field study also raised the question whether
structural manipulations are always necessary for an or
ganization to move from one pattern of behavior to
another. "C^s" management seemed to have resorted to
structural manipulation similar to that of "H" more on a
competitive spirit than on rational grounds. Those in
command must, therefore, seriously consider the organi
zations performance potential under the existing struc
ture before shifting functions and levels on an organiza
tion chart.
Future Research
A consideration of desirable areas for future
research points toward the need for the systematic col
lection of data on organizational change; for undertaking
comparative analyses; for experimenting with various
methods of implementation; and for intensive application
of social science and psychological theory to the proc
esses of change.
220
It is very difficult at present to know what
actually transpires in any particular organizational
change, for the simple reason that those who participate
are preoccupied with results. Perhaps, the major dif
ficulty facing both management and social scientists has
been the problem of feedback during a program of change,
so that it can be modified in the light of reactions at
earlier stages. Too often, some possible improvement is
discovered too late, when the period of change has passed
and the organization has already ossified sufficiently to
preclude further modification.
Therefore, considerable progress toward a better
understanding of the strategic factors might be made at
a conference table of junior and senior executives who
have participated in developing and implementing a plan of
change in their own organizations, especially if they
would address themselves to the issues raised in a study
like the present one.
A comparative approach could be usefully employed
in a systematic study of governmental and non-govern
mental organizations to discover the influences of the
environment on problems of change. It could help to
illuminate whether size or mission plays the more import
ant role in influencing the processes of change in formal
221
organizations. A cross-cultural survey would indicate
other points of similarity and difference and might
prove rewarding.
There is a great need for controlled experiments
and quantitative studies to answer basic questions in the
area of group dynamics — investigations in complicated
life situations involving groups in a power hierarchy,
the control of anxiety arising out of change, communica
tions, and so forth. It would be necessary to experiment
within the specific environment of organizational change
to discover the optimum size of the effective group; how
much democratic expression is desirable in effective
groups that are part of an organization in which power is
definitely structured; the extent to which men are able
to identify with the organization and thus be better
motivated to alter their behavior; the different ap
proaches to be followed in seeking to alter the behavior
of different levels of management.
Finally, this study poses one more question:
What attempts have been made to assess the effectiveness
of an organization and its program of change? Until
social scientists and managers have carefully and criti
cally considered the techniques and criteria available
222
for making such assessments, and have adopted or devel
oped instruments for this, the whole idea of planned
organizational change must be regarded as confined to
intelligent and intuitive guesses.
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Core Title Management Of Change In Organizations--A Process Analysis

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