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Patterns In Political Violence And War, 1751-1960

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Patterns In Political Violence And War, 1751-1960

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Content This dissertation has been
microfilmed exactly as received
69-13,054
DENTON, Frank Hardy, 1932-
PATTERNS IN POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND
WAR, 1751-1960.
University of Southern California, PhJD., 1968
Political Science, international law and relations
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan
FRANK HARDY DENTON 1 9 6 9
® _________________________
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
PATTERNS IN POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND WAR,
1751-1960
by
Prank H. Denton
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(international Relations)
August 1968
UNIVERSITY O F S O U TH ER N CALIFORNIA
TH E GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY PARK
LOS ANGELES. CALIFORNIA 9 0 0 0 7
This dissertation, written by
.........JFr ank Ha r_dy__ De nton..........
under the direction of his.....Dissertation Com
mittee, and approved by all its members, has
been presented to and accepted by the Graduate
School, in partial fulfillment of requirements
for the degree of
D O C T O R OF P H IL O S O P H Y
Dean
.D « r/e-...A .U g list*...1.96.8.
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
Chairman
TABLE OP CONTENTS
Page
LIST OP TABLES.......... ' : . Iv
LIST OP ILLUSTRATIONS............................. vi
INTRODUCTION.................. I
Chapter
I. PRE-THEORY................................. 9
War as an Indicator
A Literature Survey
The Initial Typology
Operational Categories
The Hypotheses
II. THE DATA COLLECTION....................... 42
Collection Rules
Reliability
Validity
Some Coding Examples
Distribution of Sources by Time
and National Origin
Limitations on the Data
III. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS ....................... 55
The Basic Data
The Summarized Data
Factor Analyses
Types of System Issues
Predicting the Type and Amount
of War
Time Trends
Summary
IV. TESTING OP HYPOTHESES..................... 92
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 5
ii
Chapter Page
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS................... 108
APPENDIXES.......................................... 114
APPENDIX A. METHODOLOGY................... 116
APPENDIX B. DATA COLLECTION RULES......... 126
APPENDIX C. D A T A .......................... 139
BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................ 224
111
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Distribution of National Origin .............. 51
2. Distribution of Publication Dates ............. 52
3. Distribution of Casualties ................. 56
4. Distribution of Pairs . ' ....................... 57
5. Most Frequent Political Issues .............. 59
6 . Distribution of Incidents per Period ........ 60
7- Distribution of War Initiation and
Termination per Time Period................ 6l
8 . First Factor................................. 63
9 . Second Factor................................. 64
10. Third Factor................................ 65
11. Fourth Factor . 66
12. Fifth Factor................................ 67
1 3. Correlation among Amount Indicators .......... 72
14. Inter-State Factors.......................... 74
15. Power Indices................................. 75
1 6. Civil War Variables.......................... 76
17. Colonial Variables.............. 78
18. Correlations among the Indices .............. 79
19. Years between Peaks for Amount-Large Index . . 94
20. Years between Peaks for Amount-Many Index ... 95
21. Distribution of Amount of War Adjacent
to Peaks and Valleys....................... 96
iv ‘ '
Table Page
22. Consistency of Intense and Quiet Periods
of W a r ..................................... 99
2 3. Haas' Polarity Measures ....................... 101
24. Amounts Versus Polarity ....................... 102
v
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure Page
1. Concepts of Conflict......................... 24
2. Factor Loadings— Factors 1 and 2 ............. 70
3. Amount Indices................................ 85
4. Power Indices................................ 87
5. Civil Indices................................ 88
6. Colonial Index................................ 90
7. Change in Amount--Large Index after a Peak . . 98
vi
INTRODUCTION
Because contemporary events are shrouded in secrecy
and obscured by ideological commitment, as well as being
few in number, it is often said that there is a lack of
data about world events. Moreover, there is little con
fidence, in the minds of many, that laboratory experiments
can ever be shown to validly represent important aspects of
the interactions among nation-states. As a consequence, a
number of international relations scholars have advocated
using history as the "laboratory" for developing and testing
theory in the discipline. 1 That is, it is felt that the
records of the past must form an important base for study
ing the regularities in international behavior.
Despite this advocacy, relatively little rigorous,
historically based research has been done. 2 A primary
1See for example: Stanley Hoffman, Contemporary The
ory in International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., lgbO); Richard N. Rosecrance, Action
and Reaction in World Politics (Boston: Little Brown and
Co., Igb3)J and Gabriel A. Almond, "A Developmental Ap
proach to Political Systems," World Politics, XVII (January,
1965), 183-214.
2These are exceptions, of course. Three examples are:
Lewis P. Richardson, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (Pit
tsburgh: Boxwood Press^ 19bQ); Rosecrance, Action and Re
action in World Politics; and J. David Singer, ed., Quant 1-
1
reason for this paucity of research based on the systematic
study of history is the difficulty of obtaining a record of
past events in a form usable for theoretical research. As
suggested by James Rosenau, in a discussion of the short
comings of research on comparative foreign policy, sys
tematic study requires that data from different units of
observation (time periods, nations, etc.) be collected in
terms of a common system of classification. That is, all
units of observation must be described within a given
framework of factors important to the theoretical issues
in question. Rosenau refers to such an initial framework
for gathering data as a pre-theory.3 However, historians
are often consciously atheoretical. "In our terminology
itself we [historians] have no constants, but only vari
ants."^ Because of this somewhat atheoretical bent of
many historians, the researcher desiring to use history as
tative International Politics (New York: The Free Press,
19bti)j pp. 247-256.
3james N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories of Foreign Policy,"
in Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, ed.
by R. Barry Farrel (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University
Press, 1 9 6 6), pp. 32-36. Other discussions of the require
ments for systematic comparative analysis can be found in:
Stein Rokkan, "Comparative Cross National Research," Com
paring Nations, ed. by Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1 9 6 6), pp. 3-26;
and Arthur L. Kalleberg, "The Logic of Comparison," World
Politics, XIX (October, 1 9 6 6), 6 9-8 2.
^A. F. Pollard, Factors in Modern History (Boston:
Beacon Press, i9 6 0), p. 4.
a data source must usually operate without the conscious
aid of the professional in the field.
Thus* the scholar desiring to use historical events
for theory development is faced with a wealth of historical
data, hut also with an extreme shortage of systematically
comparable descriptions of separate historical events.
Many scholars in the field of international relations have
developed sophisticated theories based on a non-systematic
or unaided reading of history and on an observation of
contemporary events.5 However* if* as this author believes*
further progress in determining historical regularities in
behavior requires tools and techniques to aid the "reader"
of history* such unsystematic analysis is not the optimum
future course.
Further development of theory can be accelerated
through the use of rigorous research aided by modern data
analysis and processing capabilities. Hypotheses must be
carefully tested against representative samples of data.
Because of the volume of materials available* it would
appear that modern statistical methods and electronic data
processing are useful adjuncts to such rigorous research.
5see for example: Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years
Crisis (New York: Harper & Row* Publishers^ 1964); Hans J.
Morgenthau* Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A,
Knopf* 1961); and Frederick L. sHuman* International Poli
tics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc.* 194l).
, 4
A necessary condition for such systematic research
is the existence of some observable^ characteristic or
event which enables the researcher to treat the atheoretical
writings of the historian. As suggested by J. David Singer,
many international activities do not leave a readily ob
servable "trace" in the record of history.7 Singer does
offer alliances as one form of behavior leaving a solid
trace. Another relatively overt and recorded form of be
havior is that of violence or, in a loose use of the term,
war.
The above arguments are that systematic historical
research is valuable for theory building; that data for
such research is difficult to collect because of the ab
sence of a "pre-theory" in historical descriptions; but,
that at least one form of political group behavior, war,
is relatively well recorded and perhaps lends itself to
providing a benchmark for historical enquiry. The re
search project described herein is an effort to examine
international history systematically, using incidents of
violence^ as the "trace" of international activities. The
^An event or characteristic which is sufficiently
well recorded to enable one to collect a representative
sample.
^J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "Formal Alliances,
1815-1939j" Journal of Peace Research, I (1 9 6 6), 1-32.
^The term "violent incidents" is used rather than
"war" because the latter tends to imply certain legal and
research explores hoth the utility of systematic history
and the value of the use of such limited factors as violent
incidents as indicators of important trends. Obviously,
war is of interest as a phenomenon unto itself. However,
previous research by the author has indicated that violence
can also be used as an indicator or a "map" of at least the
major political and social trends of an era.9 Wars are
not, as a rule, ends unto themselves. Rather, violence is
considered as a means to resolve otherwise unresolvable
political and social conflicts. That is, it is believed
that war or violence reflects the political and social
issues of the times, and thus provides an observable for
tracing the politics of the era.
For example, the conflict over the power balance
in Europe is reflected in the Franco-Prussian War, the
Crimean War, and others. The drive for the redress of
perceived social, economic and political deprivations is
reflected in the violence of the French and Russian Revolu
tions. Ideologically based messianic drives of the French
revolution and of Russian and Chinese communism are re
political factors. A violent incident is any event, which
event involved violence causing 1 ,0 0 0 or more casualties.
When the term "war" is used in this paper, it is a short
hand for violent incident.
^prank h. Denton, "Some Regularities in International
Conflict, 1820-1949," Background, IX (February, 1 9 6 6), 283-
2 9 6; and Frank H. Denton and Warren Phillips, "Some Cy
clical Patterns in the History of Violence," Journal of
Conflict Resolution, in press.
fleeted In numerous incidents of civil violence. Border
disputes, drives for international glory, imperialistic
moves often culminate in violence. There is no claim that
all efforts of cohesive political groups1^ to change the
status quo are met with violence. However, a priori ex
pectation as well as a fortiori experience indicate that
war is likely to he a good indicator of at least the major
conflicts in the international system.
Thus, political group violence11 is used as a "map"
or indicator for the study of the historical regularities
in the international system. As stated above, war is a
relatively well recorded event and the number of wars
occurring during the period of interest is not unmanage
able. Some of the data collection problems limiting his
torically based research are thus circumvented. At the
same time, the research provides a basis for the study of
the conditions in which violence was chosen as an instru
ment of conflict resolution.
While there have been a number of studies of war
involving extensive data collection, 12 the presently avall-
^The term "cohesive political group" is used since
the terms "nation" or "state" poorly describe revolutionary,
irredentist and even some colonial groups. It is used to
represent a socio-cultural group acting with some degree of
concert to achieve political ends.
11Again, often shorthanded by the term "war."
12Richardson, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels, pp. 1-
111; Quincy Wright, A Study of War, I (ChicagoV University
able data were Inadequate for the purposes of this research.
The initial effort was to collect descriptive data on each
of the "units of analysis" selected for inclusion in the
population of historical events. As suggested earlier,
such a collection requires a pre-theory of the behavior of
interest. The central theme is not war but rather it is
conflict, of which war is an indicator. A pre-theory of
these conflicts has been derived from the literature, and
from this pre-theory a set of operational indices has been
developed and forms the basis for data collection.
The primary theoretical interest is in the European
based cultural system. The initial hypotheses specify (l)
expected temporal relationships between the various factors
included in the pre-theory, and (2) certain expected cy
clical patterns. Individual incidents do not form the
basis for this analysis; rather, it is the collectivity
of incidents occurring at a given time which is taken to
represent the "issues in the system."
The assumption underlying this decision is that a
few issues and ideas tend to dominate political behavior
for extended periods of time.^ These interactions in the
of Chicago Press, 1942), 641-649; and Pitirim Sorokin, So
cial and Cultural Dynamics (Boston: Porter Sargent, Pub-
lisher, 1957). PP. 600-641.
^Rosecrance refers in a similar manner to the system
as "habits of behavior," Action and Reaction in World Poli-
tics, p. 6.
world political system are reflected in the issues which
are associated with the violent incidents. At any given
time, a few issues should he dominant and these issues
should endure for a considerable period of time. Moreover,
there should be some regularity in the way issues rise and
fall in importance. In summary, there is something of a
system of world-wide interaction in the political ideology
sphere, a limited number of ideas (types of issue) exist
at a given time, and the importance of these types of is-
sue-Ideas rises and falls in a fairly regular manner. The
system, at any given time, is defined by the distribution,
of Issues and their Intensity among the actors. Distribu
tion and Intensity are defined by the summarized data for
all the contemporary violent incidents among the relevant
actors.
The formulation of the pre-theory' and the hypotheses
to be tested are given in the next chapter. Subsequent
chapters give the data collection rules, discuss an ex
ploratory analysis of the data and present the results of
the testing of the hypotheses. Appendixes describe the
methods used and present the raw data employed in the
analysis along with references to the sources from which
the data were collected.
CHAPTER I
PRE-THEORY
Speculative1 theories— formal, informal, implicit
and otherwise— of the conflict behavior between political
groups abound. These theories vary in form, level of
analysis, method of development, and, not least of all, in
substantive content. A multitude of "causal" conditions
and factors are suggested. There is no problem of a
paucity of theory as is sometimes suggested. Rather, the
researcher is faced with an array of non-comparable, com
plementary and contradictory theories expressed in the
jargon of various disciplines, methodological approaches
and even of individuals. Prom this must be sorted a co
herent set of categories which will provide the basis for
ordered data collection. This chapter presents a short
argument for the relevance of war as an indicator of po
litical interaction, derives the pre-theory used in gather
ing the data for this project from a survey of the litera
ture on political violence, and presents a set of hypotheses
about systemic factors in conflict.
l-That is, theories not tested on empirical grounds.
9
War as an Indicator
Previous research., based primarily on the data
collected by Lewis Richardson, has indicated that the his
tory of war (to include violence between political groups
regardless of the legal situation) reflects widely accepted
historical trends. 2 An analysis of Richardson's data shows
a three- or fourfold typology of war.3 The post Napoleonic
times, as are the post Bolshevik times, are characterized
by wars of a type referred to as "civil oppression." The
latter part of the 19th century is characterized by an
absence of civil fighting and by a predominance of a co
lonial type of war. Concern with international security
is typified by the Napoleonic Wars and by World Wars I and
II. Another study based on data collected by Quincy Wright
covering about 400 years indicates a cyclical, action and
4
reaction cycle in attitudes toward change. The cycles
correlate with the Reformation, with the era immediately
after the French Revolution, with the rise of communism
and anti-colonialism and so forth.
These analyses on an "after the fact" basis in
dicated the possible utility of war as an index of behavior
2Denton and Phillips, "Some Cyclical Patterns in the
History of Violence."
^Benton, "Some Regularities in International Con
flict, " p. 295.
^"Denton and Phillips, "Some Cyclical Patterns in the
History of Violence."
11
In the international system. As is often the case, the
result was ohvious once seen. Violence, in general, does
not pop onto the scene because humans love to kill and be
killed. In fact, more generally, violence is deplored as
something to be avoided if possible. However, within cer
tain constraints, it is looked on as an instrument of pol
icy and societal values do condone and even glorify it
under the proper conditions. The proper conditions are
for the ' ’defense1 ' of society, for rectification of unac
ceptable injustices, In some cases for the purification
(glorification) of society, etc. With perhaps a very few
exceptions, societies appear to attach a degree of moral
opprobrium to "unjust" wars.
As a result, wars usually appear to have been the
end result of an ongoing dispute or conflict of sufficient
importance and intensity that a satisfactory agreement
could not be reached short of a test of strength. Not all
wars need be between the disputants; rather, on occasion,
war is used to solidify the internal group. That Is, war
is directed at a third party to create a feeling between
in-group factions that the mutual interests outweigh the
mutual disinterests. Napoleon is said to have used the
Mexican expedition to create solidarity among the dis
puting groups in Prance. But, typically, wars appear to
be between groups perceiving themselves Involved In an
otherwise irresolvable conflict. The American civil war
12
was In large measure the result of an Irreconcilable set of
social values. The European Revolutions of 1848 and 1849
resulted from conflicting social and economic interests.
These were issues on which neither side was willing to make
concessions of sufficient magnitude to placate the other.
And so it goes, wars are the result of drives for
a "place in the sun," for economic and/or political equal
ity, for the resolution of boundary or territorial disputes,
for security, and so forth. Although some such influence
may be present, it would appear that in general wars do not
spring full-blown into a "conflict free arena"^ because of
a human drive to violence. Rather, wars are conscious in
struments of policy occurring in situations in which one
or both sides demand concessions in excess of those which
the other is willing to give short of being forced to do
so. Wars'then are, from this argument, the product of the
unresolvable political disputes.^ And in reverse, the
record of wars provides an index or "map" to the major,
most difficult to resolve, political behavior of an era.
A Literature Survey
Are conflicts between political groups unpatterned
events? Are these conflicts monopatterned as suggested by
^That is, into a situation in which a political dis
pute is absent.
^Disputes which empirically required war as a resolu
tion procedure.
Hans Morgenthau in his power theory or by Marx in his eco
nomic theory? Or, are these conflicts multipatterned as
suggested by many other researchers? These questions have
been explored by sociologists, psychologists, political
scientists and others. Today, perhaps the predominant re
search on violent conflict is centered in the discipline
of international relations. The theories which appear to
be most relevant to the proposed research are explored
below. Rather than an overall summary, this discussion
will center on the hypotheses of those scholars who have
offered the most systematic efforts at categorizing pat
terns of conflict.
For conceptual purposes, conflict is defined as the
mutual perception of divergent interests on the part of two
or more actors.7 This definition implies goal directedness
on the part of both actors. That is, conflict cannot erupt
between actors without desires. The goals may be directed
toward a change in the distribution of goods® or toward the
maintenance of the present distribution. Hans Morgenthau
has suggested at the simplest level such an exhaustive
twofold typology of policy: (l) defense of the status quo,
7The actors may be social groups acting through one
human (or a committee) as their formal or informal leader(s).
Latent or unperceived conflict is excluded.
®To include material and psychic.
14
or (2) anti-status quo which he refers to as imperialism.9
In Morgenthaurs single factor world, an actor can either
favor maintaining power or favor extending power. While
it is possible to consider all policies favoring change as
manifestations of a desire for power, the policies of
change advocated by the North in the U.S. Civil War, by
the Nazis in World War II, or the Mexican conservatives In
support of the French in 1862, seem sufficiently different
in derivation and goals to be considered as distinct forms
of conflict". Similarly, status quo policies appear to
derive from widely divergent conditions and to be expressed
in a variety of forms. If power alone is an adequate ex
planation, It must at least be considered to have multiple
and almost distinct manifestations.
Arnold Wolfers suggests another exhaustive typology
which, although inadequate In itself, seems to offer an
improvement over Morgenthau1s . 10 He suggests self-preser
vation, self-extension, and self-abnegation as his typology.
The first two categories resemble Morgenthaurs status quo-
imperialist division. The third category, defined in terms
of altruism (normative values) rather than self-interest,
is basically contradictory to the system of Morgenthau.
Moreover, Wolfers states that even the self-extension
9Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 3 8-6 8.
■^Arnold Wolfers, "The Pole of Power and the Pole of
Indifference," World Politics, III (January, 1951)j 39-64.
15
policy can take multiple forms.
The aim may be more "power" as an end in itself or
domination over other people and territories; but it
may also represent a quest for the return of lost ter
ritory j . . . the emancipation from foreign control or
imposition on others of an ideology or way of life. 11
A still more exhaustive typology of wars based on
the political relationships between the disputants— Balance-
of-power., Civil and Imperial Wars— has been suggested by
Quincy Wright. 12 Wright goes on to categorize the drives
for war.43
A. Political
1. A statesman's desire to augment or maintain his
position by creating an external threat.
2. National prestige (patriotism-nationalism).
B. Economic
1. Capitalist's drives for war profits.
2. Escape from economic frustrations.
3. Acquisition of markets and resources.
C. Social-Cultural
1. Retaliation for a breach of mores.
2. Escape from humdrum existence.
3. Survival of national culture.
D. Religious-Ideological
1;LIbid., p. 42.
12Wright, A Study of War, p. 645.
^ibid., pp. 2 7 8-2 8 8.
16
1. Crusade for religion, nationalism, reform
(a "cause").
2. Moral release of aggressions.
However, Wright does not relate the two typologies. That
is, he does not say how the political relationship typology
relates to the set of "drives." His listing does consider
ably expand the range of conflict types over those given by
Wolfers and Morgenthau.
Wright's two separate typologies do offer an im
portant clue toward creating an ordered pre-theory. There
would seem to be a considerable correlation between the set
of "drives" and the political relationship typology. Some
drives are predominantly inter-state, and others are
typically civil, for example. Thus, Wright's formulation
suggests a two-step categorization, first a listing of
political relationships and then a further division into
conflict issues or drives. Before finalizing the typology,
it seems appropriate to survey some of the many other
scholars who have discussed types of issues within a single
one of Wright's political categories.
For example, Pitirim Sorokin in a comprehensive
discussion lists five reasons for internal or civil war.1^
A. Desire for a change in the political regime
B. Desire for a change in the political-social-eco
nomic order
^Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, p. 579.
17
C. Irredentlsm
D. Religious diversity
E. Specific change desired in system (law, official,
etc. )
Neither Sorokin nor Wright discusses his categories
in terms of the status quo-change split. In general, their
discussions are such as to imply that in the usual case one
side in a dispute is status quo-oriented while the other
is change-oriented.
John Burton mentions the "classical conflict" be
tween nations— disputes over boundaries, territories, or
the right to exploit. He also discusses, under the civil
type, the revolt against poverty.^5 Lewis Richardson dis
cusses a variation on the security theme by suggesting that
an arms race spiral can create reciprocally reinforcing
tensions, causing the International situation to become
unstable.16
Another factor which may be a cause of interstate
wars is the system of international anarchy. That is,
because there is the continual perceived "threat" of the
use of force (no supreme power is present to prevent its
use), each actor attempts to further its security by in
creasing its relative power. This continual drive 'for a
^john W. Burton, Peace Theory (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1 9 6 2), pp. 6-25.
-^Richardson, statistics of Deadly War, pp.. 30-70.
18
better position increases further the feeling of insecurity
among all actors. The other actors respond by attempting
to redress the power balance in their favor. Repeated
actions and reactions cause the system to become unstable.
Wright and Richardson (above) allude to this as a cause of
war, but they do not discuss it directly. Morgenthau's
description given earlier also is similar, in result, to
this insecurity model, but Morgenthau attributes this form
of behavior to a different cause.^-7
Several sociologists have suggested the integrating
- I Q
function of conflict with an out-group. ° Richard Rose-
crance, in an excellent historical study of regularities
in the European System of Diplomacy, translates this con
cept into a conscious policy of statesmen. He suggests
that the political decision maker often tries to secure his
tenure by creating an external- threat or by creating an
attractive external success. ^-9 Daniel Katz extends the
concept to the practice of a revolutionary system attempt-
•'17jp0r more explicitly defined systemic analyses one
should see: Morton Kaplan, System and Process in Interna
tional Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957)^
pp. 3-8 8j Charies A. McClelland, Theory and the Interna
tional System (New York: Macmillan Company, l9bb), pp. 90-
113] and Singer, Quantitative International Politics, pp.
247-286.
l^George Simmel, Conflict (New York: Free Press of
Glencoe, 1955); and Lewis Coser, The Function of Social
Conflict (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1956')'.
19Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics,
pp. 280-283.
19
ing to create internal stability by exploiting the external
threat theme and by exploiting the revolutionary fervor to
"extend the benefits" to other groups.
These writers emphasize the interaction between in
group conflict and out-group conflict. This aspect of
conflict has often been ignored by the international re-
lationist concerned only with the relations between states.2!
Rosecrance goes on to suggest not only that internal con
flict can cause external conflict, but also that the ten
sions and instability of external conflict may lead to
internal violence.22 Gabriel Almond presents a similar
theme. After suggesting that a successful aggressive
foreign policy may increase support for the regime in power,
he discusses the possible effects of an aggressive but un
successful foreign policy.
If unsuccessful [aggressive foreign policy] or
excessively costly, it may produce a withdrawal of
support and alienative tendencies in a population. . . .
The radicalization and alienative tendencies of French
political culture during the life of the Third and
Fourth Republics have been attributed in part to the
^Daniel Katz, "Nationalism and Strategies of Inter
national Conflict Resolution," International Behavior, ed.
by Herbert C. Kelman (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1965), PP. 362-365.
2iAt least one exception is Rudolph Rummel's attempt
to relate internal and external conflict. Rudolph J. Rum-
mel, "Dimensions of Conflict Within and Between Nations,"
Yearbook of the Society for the Advancement of General Sys
tems Theory, VIII (1963Jj 1-50.
22Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics,
pp. 283-290. “
20
humiliating defeats and costly victories of the Franco-
Prussian War and World Wars I and II. . . . The fall
of the Fourth Republic was triggered by army officers
who had experienced military defeat and the collapse
of the French colonial empire.23
Crane Brinton, in a classic study of revolutions, suggests
the frustrations of a disadvantaged social group as a cause
of civil conflict. In particular, the frustrations ensuing
when a period of improvement, which brought on rising ex
pectations, is followed by a regression or, at least, by a
slowing of progress,2^
Chalmers Johnson differentiates between a rebellion
and a revolution. A rebellion in his terms is fought to
Improve the implementation of the existing social-political
structure. A revolution has the goal of significantly re
vising the structure. This distinction is similar to
Sorokin’s discussed above. The former Is rather conserva
tive; the latter is change-oriented.25 Johnson states that
simple rebellions are not ideologically motivated, as op-
o c
posed to revolutions which are founded in ideology.^
23Almond, "A Developmental Approach to Political Sys
tems," p. 213.
2^This hypothesis is suggested by Crane Brinton, The
Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Random House, 1 9 6 5) . , PP.
250-252, and it has been empirically tested by Raymond
Tanter and Manus MIdlarsky, "A Theory of Revolution," Jour
nal of Conflict Resolution, XI (September, 1 9 6 7)* 264-250.
25chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1 9 6 6), pp. 135-l4b.
2^ibid., p. 1 3 7.
21
Another form of civil conflict can be drawn from
Dahrendorf’s writings. He suggests that conflict derives
from the unequal distribution of authority which any so
ciety must have in order to coordinate its operations.
Thus, conflict is ubiquitous in that authority is always
unequally distributed.
Colonial type adventures are explained by Marxist-
Leninists in terms of class conflicts and the economic
needs of the capitalist system. It is hypothesized that
surplus capital leads to a need for markets which are
acquired by gaining political control.
Colonial or imperialistic conflicts are further
explained by Frederick Schuman in terms of a thirst for
national glory.Schuman also offers the economic drives
of the capitalist system as a major cause of colonial ex
pansion.2 ^ Hobson went" even beyond the Marxists in claim
ing that the capitalistic drive for commercial conquest
involved a constant risk of war.30
The above speculations about types or causes of
wars are highly varied In form and in level of aggregation.
A common format Is required for this research which re
27Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in. Indus
trial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959).
2®Schuman, International Politics, p. 371.
29lbid., p. 372.
30john Hobson, Imperialism (London: George Allen and
Unwin, Ltd., 1938).
22
quires a regrouping of these "theories." For this purpose,
a typology at a fairly high level of abstraction appears
desirable.
The Initial Typology
As noted, James Rosenau has suggested that the
basic requirement for scientific analysis is a pre-theory
within which to structure the needed data collection.31
That is, in order to rigorously compare units of analysis
(in this case, violent incidents), he suggests it is neces
sary to describe these units in terms of a common frame
work. This section defines a set of theoretical categories
for data collection on conflict based on the readings and
research discussed above.
Violence has a different moral connotation depend
ing on the political relationship existing between the
combatants. International war is often considered a moral
act; intrastate war (revolution, rebellion) is generally
termed immoral. Colonial conflict tends to have aspects
of the morality (as an international war) and immorality
(because of power differences) themes. For this reason,
Quincy Wright's basic division of war into a threefold
typology based on the political relationships between the
31james N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of
Foreign Policy," Approaches to Comparative and Internation
al Politics, ed, by R. Barry Farrell (EvanBton, 111.:
Northwestern University Press, 196 6), pp. 27-92.
23
combatants is accepted (see Figure l). The types of war
referred to in the literature survey section are grouped
under one of these three headings.
At the inter-state level, the system of anarchy
itself leads to conflict. For those actors desiring in
creased power, the system permits and even encourages (for
reasons of greater security) the use of whatever means
necessary to gain that power. Alternatively, the system
itself creates a sense of insecurity and any change in the
power distribution is seen as a possible threat which fre
quently leads to conflict (Figure 1, types 1 and 2),
Divergent ideological beliefs and ideological
drives may also lead to international conflict. Two types
of conflict are considered to result, one resulting from
the ideological divergence of states and another resulting
from the nationalistic drives for prestige (3 and 4), As
many have suggested, internal stress can lead to interna
tional conflict. This may result either from social or
regime instability (5 and 6). Finally, the decision
maker's drive for a place in the sun or in history can lead
to conflict at the international level (7).
The sovereign versus not sovereign war is usually
a contest between unequals. Thus, direct concern with the
balance of power, security and insecurity are less likely
to be present. Rather, this level of conflict is usually
a manifestation of the stronger contestant's drive for
24
Political
Relationship Major Types Final Sub-Types
Power Acquisition (1)
System Anarchy
Insecurity (2)
Ideological Divergence
(3)
Inter-state
International Prestige (4)
Social Instability
(5)
Internal Stress
Elite Instability (6)
Place-in-the-sun
(T)
Sovereign Prestige - (4)
versus
Not Sovereign
Elite Instability (6)
Place-in-the-sun
(7)
Economic Drive (8)
Cultural Drive
(9)
Try for Political Autonomy (10)
Internal to
a State
Elite for Power
Civil Oppression
Ideological
(11)
( 12)
(l?)
Pig. 1.— Concepts of conflict
25
aggrandizement, in some sense of the word, or of a try for
independence or greater autonomy by the weaker group (10).
Three of the conflict types listed at the international
level (4, 6 and 7) may be manifested in a drive to politi
cally subdue a weaker power. Other forms of conflict be
tween contestants with this political relationship might
be economic or cultural expansion (8 and 9).
Finally, there are the incidents of violence which
occur within a single sovereign state. Three types appear
to exist. The attempt of an elite to gain political power
without a significant socio-political reform is referred to
as elite power grab (ll). The violence engendered by an
effort to rectify a perceived maladministration of the sys
tem is referred to by the title civil oppression (12). A
third category of "ideo-theological" dispute is also of
fered (13). Whether such a dispute can erupt without a
maldistribution of economic or political rewards is open
to question.
These are the types of conflicts most often dis
cussed by scholars in the field. Not all of them are ex
pected to be independent from one another. As suggested
by some scholars, nationalism or national glory may go hand
in hand with economic expansion. Moreover, nationalism-
economic expansionism may well be correlated with the de
cision makers' place-ln-the-sun syndrome and with an ideo-
26
logical or cultural divergence on the part of the contest
ants .
Operational Categories
The types of war listed in Figure 1 are at too high
a level of abstraction to permit reliable direct coding
from historical documentation. Historians' descriptions
are typified by the following condensed statements. England
was concerned that an increase in Russia's influence over
Turkey might eventually threaten the power balance in the
Middle East. Russia desired to control the strategic Bos
porus. Napoleon III tried to placate the conservatives at
home (and thus strengthen his hold on office) by creating
a French, Catholic empire in Mexico. The Vietnamese at
tempted to exploit France's weakness and distraction in
World War II in an effort to gain political independence.
A final typology of issues was derived from an
iterative process. Typologies were derived from the lit
erature survey and from these expressions of historians.
The variables selected were a compromise between those
theoretically desired and those which were thought to be
observable. The following set of categories defines the
pre-theory within which the data were extracted from the
historical survey.
As noted from Figure 1, the political relationship
of the conflict pair is of importance. The following six
27
political relationships are based on the earlier concept
that social mores define certain types of violence as just
or unjust depending on the political context. International
wars (at least of self defense) are defined as moral in most
social codes. On the other hand, many (if not most) social
codes proscribe the use of violence to redress greivances
within the nation.32 These variations in the rules for
"just" war will cause the types of war to vary with the
political relationship involved.
A. Political Relationship of Pair
PI— Both sovereign nation before and after incident
P2— Sovereign nation _vs. a group internal to itself—
not a colony but one which both sides have seen as
part of nation at the time of the incident
P3--Sovereign nation versus a separate national group
politically controlled by itself— internal and
external policy control (control can first occur
up to 5 years after Incident)
P4— Sovereign versus a "sovereign" national group
politically tributary to itself (pays tribute,
foreign policy controlled, limited policy veto,
etc.) (up to 5 years after)
32obviously this Is only an approximation. But it
Is felt to be sufficiently close to the truth to cause the
Issues In war to be correlated with the political relation
ships .
P5— Sovereign nation versus a group with a P2, P3 or
P4 relationship to another nation
P6— A non-sovereign group versus a non-sovereign group
B. Internal Tensions
As noted in Figure 1, internal stress is postulated
as a factor in violence. The following set of items en- .
compasses internal political, social and economic stress
indicators.
T1 (n)— Number of years (n) since illegal change in
head of state or government up to maximum of 5
T2— Economic depression or major inflation (economic
tensions high) occur in 5 years before the incident
T3— Internal socio-political tensions rated as high
(not just competition for government, but with
basic socio-political form)
T4— Government role holders have insecure tenure
T5— Rapid economic-technological changes causing dis
location
T7--Significant increase in arms expenditures in the
2 to 5 years before incident
C. Territorial-Population Issues
Territory and population represent power, political
control, security and prestige. Thus a number of the types
of conflict outlined in Figure 1 should manifest themselves
in conflict over territory.
29
B1— Mutual border or territorial dispute (includes
colonial acquisition)
B2— Dispute over 3rd party's territory
B3— Dispute over territory of a strategic nature (al
ways code B1 or B2 with this one, though not vice
versa)
B4— Attempt to regain lost territory (replaces B1 or
B2)
B5— Dispute over location and/or control of ethnic
minorities
B6~-Intervention to "protect” citizens, culturally
empathetic group, etc.
D. Political Power Issues
Types 1 and 2 in Figure 1 will reflect themselves
in power balance issues which are represented by categories
SI, S2, and S3* S4 (dynastic or friendly regime succes
sion) is somewhat of this nature as well. And, of course,
the general question of international prestige, security
and power balance on occasion leads to peace-keeping ef
forts in order to assure that minor conflicts do not spread
to engulf the major powers.
Sl--Recent change in power alignments or distribution
of power among major actors creates concern for
security
52— One side fears future power potential of opponent
(preventive engagement, domino theory, etc.)
53— Concern with immediate Balance of Power including
intervention to protect a threatened weaker group
(difficult to differentiate from SI)
54— Dynastic succession, intervention to install or
protect friendly regime, etc.
S7— General peace keeping, suppression of potential
delicate issue, for order, etc.
E. Economic and Social Issues
Internal war is not usually fought over territorial
or power balance issues. Types 12 and 13 from Figure 1 are
likely to he reflected in conflicts over the distribution
of rewards in society or over the form which society should
take. To a certain extent it is felt that the "rewards"
and "form of society" issues are one and the same. The E
categories represent these types of issues.
El— Economic differential of pair a source of dispute
(requires statement by historian that this is a
source)
E5— Dispute over political form
E6— Dispute over socioeconomic form
E7--Dispute over role of church in society and politics
(disputes about separate church and state as a rule)
31
E8— Ethnic, cultural or religious antagonisms a source
of conflict
E10— Disputes over discriminatory or asymmetric laws
(taxes appear most common)
F. Colonial Type Issues
Colonial wars on Figure 1 assume a fairly wide
range of forms. Many of the issues are subsumed under
categories already cited— for example, B1 (mutual terri
tory) and E8 (ethnic-religious conflict). In addition,
political autonomy, trade, economic investments, etc., are
expected sourced of conflict.
C2— Dispute over degree of political autonomy (inde
pendence, local self government, etc.)
C3— Retaliation for insult, massacre, ship sinking,
etc.
C4— Dispute over mutual trade arrangements
C5— Dispute over economic investment including inter
vention to protect investment
G. Elite Group Ploys
A number of theorists expressed elite group motiva
tions as factors In violence. To a certain extent these
actions cut across the political relationship typology.
From Figure 1 It is suggested that decision-maker prestige
is a factor or that elite instability might cause an ex-
32
ternal conflict. Internally, coups or counter-revolutions
are expected.
Kl--Party In power tries to create an external threat
or success In order to strengthen hold on office
K2— A decision-maker's desire for place-in-sun or
place-in-history
K3— Elite group's try for political office or for
privilege
K4— Elite group's desire to go back to good old days
(privilege, political form, etc.) against recent
changes
H. Miscellaneous
Ml— Attempt to share in spoils of the winning side
M3— Natural disaster— drought, plague, earthquake, etc.
— a source
M4— Repression, brutality, poor rule
M5— Effort to exploit the weakness or distraction of
opponent
M6— General concern with trade and commerce except
mutual trade
I. Previous Conflict— Alliance
Relationship
N1 (n)— Number of years (n) since pair last fought one
another (n£ 60 years)
33
N2 (n)— Number of years (n) since pair last fought
common foe (n^6o years)
<1. Results of Incident
U4 (G or L)--Gain or loss of territory
U5 (G or L)— Gain or loss of political autonomy
U6 (G or L)— Gain or loss of indemnity
U7 (G or L)— Accepted (L) or made (G) occupation
The list of incident descriptors given above is the
result of the application of the original proposed listing
of variables. A number of categories in the original code
were either impossible to code reliably or occurred very
infrequently. The missing numbers in the above list repre
sent variables of this type. A more detailed description
of the categories is given in Appendix B.
The next chapter discusses in detail the coding
operation in terms of the rules, the types of sources, and
data reliability and validity. Appendix C gives the data
on an incident-by-incident basis and specifies the sources
for each incident description. In addition, each incident
was specified by its start and end dates and by the number
of casualties occurring. The items above were specified
separately for each pair of social groups which were en
gaged in active combat.
The data cover all incidents meeting the following
conditions:
3^
1. Occurring between 1751 and i960
2. Resulting in 1,000 or more battle deaths
3. Involving one or more participants from Europe
(including Russia) or the Western Hemisphere.
Basically all events with at least one nation of
European origin as participant are included.
The Hypotheses
This initial typology was meant to be as exhaustive
as possible of the basic types of conflicts which have been
discussed in the literature. It is hoped that the data so
gathered will have many uses. It was gathered with an
initial specific investigation In mind. As stated earlier,
it was desired to test for certain patterns and relation
ships In the European culture system. This section de
scribes how the data are aggregated for this analysis and
presents the hypothesized relationships which were tested
against these data.
The data were collected on the basis of an incident
as the observational unit. The planned analysis required
that the incident descriptions be aggregated for a given
time period in order to describe the conflict system at
that time.
The first decision which had to be made was to
determine the length of time to use as one system obser
vation. A short"time period was desired In order to ensure
that the observation time would be small with respect to
expected system rates of change. The shortest cycle ex
pected in the system was on the order of 25 years. Thus*
any observation time of 5 years or less in duration would
be'adequately short. At the same time* it was desired to
keep an observation period long enough to ensure that
several incidents would occur in the interval in order to
average out the random occurrences. Several incidents
were also needed in an interval to make sure that they cut
across the major system conflicts existing at that time.
It was found that a three-year interval ensured at least
three incidents per interval in about 90 percent of the
cases. Three years was then selected as a good compromise
between these conflicting requirements.
An incident (or a pair of combatants) was included
in a given interval if it occurred totally within that in
terval or if it overlapped that interval by three months
or more. The data for all incidents occurring in a given
time period were then aggregated as follows.
First* several indices of the amount* scope or
intensity of war in a system were formulated.
1. The summation of the pair years of conflict in
the Interval. An incident was given a minimum of
one month duration. For incidents partially oc~
c
curring in the interval* only that portion occur
ring within the interval was counted (£Y).
2. The summation for all incidents in the interval of
the product of the pair years of an incident and
the incident magnitude (sY x Mg).
3. The total number of incidents in the interval (#¥).
4. The summation of the magnitude indices for the
incidents in the interval (SMg).
5. The number of pairs in the interval with a PI re
lationship (#Pl).
6. The number of pairs in the interval with a P2 re
lationship (#P2),
7. The number of pairs in the interval with a P3 or
P4 relationship (#P3 + 4).
8. The number of pairs in the interval with a P5 or
P6 relationship (#P5 +6).
The remaining data were aggregated as the percent
of all pairs in an interval exhibiting a given relation
ship or issue. The above four political relationships were
treated on a percent of pairs basis as were all of the data
items listed in the previous section. It does not seem
worthwhile to list each of them again. In each case, the
aggregated item is the percent of all pairs in an interval
exhibiting the given characteristic.^3 The symbols given
in that list are used throughout this report.
33pairs in an interval are defined as above.
37
There has been considerable recent research on the
relationship of conflict to systemic variables. The final
goal of this research was to test some of the hypotheses
from contemporary theory against the empirical events de
scribed in these data. The most closely relevant research
is that of Lewis Richardson, Richard Rosecrance, and J.
David Singer.34 Each of these scholars has suggested theo
retical relationships between system descriptors and con
flict based on the analysis of historical incidents. Other
researchers have contributed relevant material based on
research on contemporary conflict.35 The following hy
potheses are derived from the findings of these researchers
or from the author’s own prior work.
Hypothesis 1.--There will be a 20-30 year cycle in
the intensity or scope of violence in the system. Previous
research by the author has indicated such a cycle. Richard
3^Richardson, Statistics of Deadly War, PP. 1-75;
Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics, pp. 267-
277; and Singer, Quantitative International Politics, pp.
240-255.
35see for example: Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind
Feierabend, "Aggressive Behavior Within Politics, 1948-
1962," Journal of Conflict Resolution, X (September, 1 9 6 6),
249-271; Michael Haas, "Societal Approaches to the Study of
War," Journal of Peace Research, IV (1965)* 307-323; and
RummelT "Dimensions of Conflict Within and Between Na
tions, " pp. 1-50.
3^Denton, "Some Regularities in International•Con
flict," p. 28 9* and Denton and Phillips, "Some Cyclical
Patterns in the History of Violence."
38
Rosecrance also suggested the possibility of such a rela
tionship when discussing the political acceptability of
future war. "Especially disastrous wars have often con
tributed to a conviction against future wars."37 Thus, it
is expected that a large war would not be likely to occur
immediately after another. However, the memory decay
during a generation (20 to 30 years) lessens the perceived
horror of the last war and thus creates a condition more
permissive of violent solutions to disputes.
Hypothesis 2.— A tendency for a long term 100-year
cycle will be exhibited in the intensity of war. Previous
research has suggested that periods of continuous intense
international unrest exist in the system; in these periods
civil unrest also tends to be very widespread.3^ Such
conditions tend to endure for perhaps 50 years. These
periods of widespread and intense conflict have been fol
lowed by relative internal and international stability. A
possible explanation of why stability tends to follow
periods of intense conflict is indirectly offered by George
Sabine. Sabine suggests that conservative political phi
losophies justifying and glorifying the existing status quo
are often developed in direct reaction to the violence
37Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics,
p. 2 8 8.
38penton and Phillips, "Some Cyclical Patterns in the
History of Violence."
39
engendered by revolutionary philosophies. Bodin, Burke,
the German nationalists of the Bismarkian era, etc., are
offered as examples of this behavior.39 Thus, stability
ensues because of the glorification of the existing order
which eliminates conflicts deriving from'efforts to reform
or revolutionize the system. A limit on the testing of
this hypothesis is that the data will cover only about 210
years. At best, it is only possible to see if the pattern
holds for this, limited time.
Hypothesis 3*— Periods of bipolarity are associated
with system instability. J. David Singer, Michael Haas and
Richard Rosecrance, among others, have written on the in
fluence of bipolarity and multipolarity on system stability.
The above hypothesis is taken from Singer's work on alli
ance aggregation and the onset of war.^
Hypothesis 4.--Internal instability is associated
with widespread system violence. This hypothesis, although
more specific, is related to a degree to the second hy
pothesis. Rummel has suggested on a cross national com-
39George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), pp. 399* 617,
720.
^Singer, Quantitative International Politics, pp.
247-250.
4o
parison that no such relationship exists.^1 Rosecrance, on
the other hand., found, as the result of his longitudinal
analysis that "the four disequilibrlal systems . . . were
either immediately preceded or accompanied by fundamental
changes in the security of the tenure of the national
elite.In the proposed longitudinal study It is ex
pected that this latter relationship will hold. More
specifically, the following two sub-hypotheses are offered.
4.1 System periods of widespread violence are associ
ated with a high frequency of Internal wars.
4.2 System periods of widespread violence are associ
ated with a high frequency of perceptions of elite In
security.
Hypothesis 5.--Periods of relative internal and
international stability are marked by conflict between
central system members and peripheral members. This hy
pothesis is associated with hypothesis 4. It is suggested
by earlier research.^3 such a relationship is also alluded
to by Richard Rosecrance when he states: "National Imperi
alism was the device to win new acquiescence to conserva-
^Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Within and Between
Nations," pp. 45-50.
^Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics,
p. 2 8 1.
^Denton and Phillips, "Some Cyclical Patterns in the
History of Violence."
4l
tive rule."^ Many others have as well suggested that an
aspect of status quo Internal policies is often the glor
ification of the nation which can be manifested with low
risk in expansion against much weaker groups.^ More spe
cifically:
5.1 There should be a negative correlation between in
ternal and colonial wars.
5.2 Periods of relatively low violence should be marked
by a high relative frequency of colonial violence.
^•Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics,
pp. 290-291.
^5see Sabine, A History of Political Theory, pp. 664-
668, or Carlton J. H. Hayes, A Generation of Materialism,
1871-1900 (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, l94l), pp.
200-202.
CHAPTER II
THE DATA COLLECTION
As indicated this research is an effort to compromise
between the needs of rigorous scientific analysis and the
requirements for broad coverage of complex concepts. In or
der to obtain the benefits of covering a long period of time
over a wide geographical area secondary (publications of his
torians) sources have been used for the basic materials. A
content analysis has been performed on these writings in or
der to code the characteristics of the violent incidents de
tected. This chapter describes the rules used in collecting
these data, discusses questions of reliability and validity,
analyzes briefly the distribution of sources and presents
the author's evaluation of the limitations of these data.
Collection Rules
The basic concept underlying this research was to
use the descriptions given by reliable historians as repre
senting the actual events. That is, it is assumed that re
liable historiography reflects actual events not just the
biases of the historiographer.'1 ' However, as a partial guard
Some might argue that this is poor assumption. To a
42
43
against possible biases of individual historians the follow
ing rules were employed:
1. Only positive statements of the existence of an
event or issue were coded. It was assumed that any
given historian might employ a different framework
of important factors and* therefore, the failure to
mention an item might only reflect the absence of
that item In the writer's framework not necessarily
In the real world. Thus, the coded items are only
those items positively mentioned.
2. Only items cited by more than one historian were
included In the final code, insofar as possible.2
At least two citations were desired. Items "felt"
by the author to be reliable and not having two or
more citations are noted in the coded data (appen
dix C) .
3. As possible, historical references from different
parts of the world were employed. The extent to
which this criterion could be employed was more
limited than might be wished because of the diffi
culty of working in a foreign language and the
limited number of translated historical works from
some areas.3 A discussion will be given below on
the countries of origin of the sources used.
4. Where possible sources which were recommended In
the American Historical Association's Guide to His
torical Literature were used.4 Such sources were
frequently used In the basic search for data. How
ever, in adding the finishing touches it was gener-
certain extent this research is an investigation of the va
lidity of this assumption.
2
This generally presented no great problem for the
more important events. However, for relatively obscure oc
currences or for some Latin American and African centered
events "multiple citations" was an unworkable requirement.
^The author reads, other than English, only French
and Spanish. Moreover, his knowledge of these languages is
not such as to permit rapid and reliable scanning of materi
als written in them.
^George F. Howe, et al., ed., The American Historical
Association's Guide to Historical Literature (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1961) .
44
ally found to be most fruitful to simply go to the
shelves of the library and search by trial and er
ror for a reference containing the particular item
of interest.
5. Normally three to five general references were
scanned for coverage of a given time and area.
These sources provided, as a rule, a sketch of
most events of violence. These initial data were
then supplemented by reference to works covering
in more detail indicated events and by reference
to works covering areas, or times obviously not well
covered in the general references.
It is believed that this procedure gave a reasonably
reliable coverage of the important incidents of violence and
the factors involved in these incidents.
Reliability
Given the assumption that the historians' descrip
tions represent that of interest, the problem of reliably
coding this description must be solved. Two types of reli
ability were considered--intracoder reliability and inter
coder reliability. Since the author did all the coding it
is the former, intracoder reliability--which is of greater
interest.
With regard to the problem of consistent coding
habits by the author it is not felt that this is a signifi
cant problem. The material coded is based largely^on rather
straightforward and explicit statements by historians.
Little effort was made to infer meaning from a suggestive
description. This mode of operation increased the reliabil
ity at some cost in possibly missed inferred factors. How-
45
ever, it was decided that the data of interest was that
which the writers of history explicitly stated.
Despite this feeling of confidence a test of the
intracoder reliability was made by coding fifteen incidents
twice during the data gathering. Numerical reliability is
not easily defined for these events.. For example, how
should one treat an issue coded in one case and not in the
other as compared to a coding discrepancy in the size of
the war? Or, how should one compare a code mentioned by
multiple sources versus one mentioned by a single source?
The following equation appears to provide as representative
as any description of the information gleaned from the re
liability check.
N3
R = 1/2 (N1 4- N2)
where
N1 = Number of items coded about these
15 incidents on trial one.
N2 = Number of items coded about these
15 incidents on trial two.
N3 = Number of identical coded items
in sets one and two.
The N's include all items coded about these events except
for the existence of the events, the participating groups
and the dates for initiation and termination. These items
were excluded as approaching 100 percent reliability. The
achieved reliability value is about 0.87.
46
An Intercoder reliability test was made by having
another graduate student duplicate the coding of all wars
between 1851 and 1872. This is a more recent time period
and one covered by the data collected by Lewis F. Richard
son. As a consequence the resulting intercoder reliability
is probably a little better than could be obtained for the
entire time period.
In any case, the author coded forty-six wars and
the second coder coded forty-five events. It was subse
quently decided that the war in dispute should not be in
cluded. The agreement calculated by use of the above equa
tion was about 0.80. It thus appears that the coding can
be done with an acceptable degree of reliability.
Validity
Validity is not answered simply as reliability. As
mentioned earlier the basic assumption is that the data are
valid. That is, it is assumed that the writings of histori
ans do reflect something about the real world. At the most
conservative level the study can validly be considered an
analysis of the trends and relationships in violent events
as seen by Western historians. Although such a conserva
tive assumption would somewhat reduce the value of this re
search it would not result in concluding that the research
has no value. However, it Is this author's belief that the
data, as well, represent something about the real world.
Since only intuitive arguments can be offered to support
this belief, the reader must make his own judgment as to
the validity of the data.
Some Coding Examples
In order to transmit a better feel for the coding
process a few examples will be given. Several thousand in
dividual citations were taken and it does not appear feasi
ble to attempt to explicitly reproduce each of them here.
Rather, it is hoped that the content analysis method will
be illustrated with these few representative examples.
The following quotation refers to France's motivat
ing for declaring war on Russia in the Crimean War.
The war grew out of a dispute between France and
Russia regarding the custody of holy places in Pales
tine. ... In part to please the clericals, in part
to assert French claims and maintain French prestige,
Napoleon III, mindful of the poor impression made by
Louis Philippe's cautious foreign policy, took a
strong line ... .5
This statement was coded as a K4 type conflict for
the France-Russia conflict pair. That is, the statement is
interpreted to represent a try by Napoleon III to create an
external threat or success in order to strengthen his hold
on office.
Again referring to the Crimean War, but looking at
Russia's motivations for fighting Turkey, the following
passage was coded. — --
^William L. Langer, An Encyclopedia of World History
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), p. 6 3 3.
48
. . . Russia might go to the length of war with Tur
key, the outcome of which . . , Russia would have
the Bosporus ....
The indication is of a conflict over territory.
Items B1 (mutual territory) and B3 (strategic territory)
were coded from this statement.
ATbrecht-Carrie refers to the English expedition to
Egypt in 1882 in the following statement,
Egypt was endowed . . . with a ruler whose finan
cial management was less than efficient. . . . Salis
bury [England] being unwilling either "to renounce
[England's investments] or monopolize" . . . [led to]
joint Anglo-French control of Egyptian finance . . .
when riots in June resulted in the killing of Europeans,
the British fleet bombarded the forts.7
British troops soon followed the fleet. The state
ment was coded as C5 (protect economic investment) and C3
(retaliation for massacre).
The investment theme is noted again in Langer's
reference to the Mexican expedition in the mid-Nineteenth
Century.
Owing to the refusal of the revolutionary Jdarez
government to meet its obligations, France, England
and Spain . . . decided to force fulfillment of these
obligations.°
Again the C5 category (protect economic investment)
was coded.
^Rene Albrecht-Carrie, A Diplomatic History of Europe
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 195&)> p. o7•
^Ibid., pp. I88-I89.
O
Langer, An Encyclopedia of World History, p. 634.
49
The Polish Revolution was coded as a try for politi
cal autonomy (C2) based on the following passage.
The Russian garrison was expelled from Poland, a
revolutionary government proclaimed, the Romanav dyn
asty declared deposed ... .9
Another conflict over territory (Bl) is noted in
the Chile-Bolivia dispute in the War of the Pacific.
The Issue was utilization of the Atacama Desert
[nitrate deposits] . . . . - * - 0
Not all of the passages were as unambiguous as
these. But, in general the coding was relatively straight
forward.
Distribution of Sources by Time
and National Origin
Two immediate possible biases come to mind when one
thinks of using the writings of historians. First, histori
ans from different cultures and polities may see the same
event quite differently. Second, fads exist at a given
time and the historian is subject to the fads of his time.
For these reasons an effort was made to get something of a
cross section of writings from various geographical areas
and times.
9Ibid., p. 7 0 2.
"^John E. Fagg, Latin America: A General History (New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1963)* P* 661.
50
Distribution of Sources
by National Origin
Language capability and book availability limited
the author's ability to cut across a spectrum of areas of
origin. The author reads Spanish with moderate facility
and French to a lesser extent. Thus* references in these
languages were potentially accessible although only at a
penalty in speed of reference and in reliability. To fur
ther increase the range of areas covered an effort was made
to find translations or books written in English from non-
American sources.
The author's belief is that among the sources con
sulted there was a considerable element of consistency.^
Essentially only Western European and American Hemisphere
sources were consulted. Such historians seem to perceive
the world in quite consistent terms. The following table
presents the basic distribution of points of origin for the
references used.
Distribution by Publication Date
Even a cursory reading of historical works indi
cates a change in standards of research starting in the
early 20th Centuryj especially in the United States. Prior
to this one notes a much larger content of the writer's
emotional beliefs. For this reason it was decided to util-
1 1
Which may only reflect the fact that historians tend
to read one another.
51
TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OP NATIONAL ORIGIN
Percent of Total References
by Language of Source
Place of
Publication
Original English or
Translated to English Spanish French
United States 67.2 0 0
England 17.7 0 0
Prance 1.6 0 2.0
Other Europe 1.6 0 0.4
Spanish America 1.6
6.3
0
Miscellaneous 1.2 0 0.4
ize recent works wherever possible. Another important time
dependent factor is the variation in attitude toward the
very recent events. Generally the contemporary historian
treats almost all post 1950 events in terms of East-West
ideological conflict. Perhaps the emotions of the historian
creep more strongly into these near contemporary events.
As a consequence the reader can legitimately question the
12
utility of the post-1954 data on Issues.
12
The participantsj magnitudes, and political rela
tionships should be quite reliable.
52
TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION 0E PUBLICATION DATES
Date of
Publication
Percent of
Sample
Before 1900
0.9
1901 to 1920
1921 to 1940
1941 to 1950
4.4
1951 and later
13-9
11.4
69.4
Limitations on the Data
These data must be evaluated in terms of the effort
expended, the sources used and the theoretical framework
used in gathering them. They are, in no sense of the word,
any absolutely "true" representation of the universe of vio
lent events. They should be thought of as another iteration
in a continuing effort to define the political Issues In
volved in relatively large scale violent conflict. These
data are more extensive than previous sets in that a wider
range of issues are coded. Based on the intra and inter
coder reliability results they are reasonably objective (re
producible) representations of what historians have said.
They do incorporate the existing theory regarding the types
of Issues involved. They, as well, will undoubtedly be re
placed by more sophisticated collections. Several specific
limitations are mentioned in the following paragraphs.
53
The validity issue is discussed above; it is only
reiterated here. Also reliability was mentioned above.
The overall reliability figures are probably reasonable
enough. However3 some of the data items are more reliably
coded than others. Some of the less frequently occurring
variables were not coded with the reliability indicated by
the overall average.
The data are based almost exclusively on Western
sources. What the world would look like to non-Western eyes
is not known. Even more limiting is the fact that two-
thirds of the sources are American and over eighty percent
are either American or English.
The initial theoretical framework which determined
the items to be recorded was imperfect. It became obvious
during the coding and in the analysis that certain other
items could have been usefully recorded. Also, some of the
items were unclear and several occurred quite infrequently.
Any subsequent research should incorporate an improved
framework based on the errors made here.
The data for the 18th Century are not as reliable
as the later material. Similarly the Latin American data
are not as reliable as the European or North American inci
dents.1- ^ In particular in Latin America there were many
"^The l8th Century data precede the Richardson Col
lection which provided a valuable source for crosschecking.
A greater difficulty was experienced in finding redundant
references for the more obscure Latin American and 18th
events of* internal strife in which it was very difficult to
determine the number of casualties.
Again, the data are quite useful as one step along
the trail; they are not the final word.
Century incidents. These two factors are the basis for
this perception of lesser reliability.
CHAPTER III
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
The data gathered during this research were col
lected with two thoughts in mind. First it was planned to
test some specific hypotheses about relationships among
conflict variables. Second it was desired to do certain
exploratory, descriptive analyses with the expectation that
some unforeseen, but theoretically interesting, patterns
would be suggested.
Testing hypotheses is the ultimate step in building
a body of scientific knowledge. On the other hand, explor
atory research is valuable in suggesting testable hypothe
ses; this is especially true when the research is in a
field in which there is not an extensive body of validated
theory already developed. It Is the belief of the author-
that this relatively comprehensive and exhaustive collec
tion of systematic descriptions of violent conflicts pro
vides a rich potential for suggesting trends and relation
ships in the conflicts among organized political groups.
This chapter presents some basic descriptive analyses of
these materials.
55
56
The Basic Data
During the 210 years covered by this research there
were 296 violent incidents which could be found to meet the
criteria of size and European civilization participation.
These incidents vary widely in character from apparently
unplanned riots and massacres enduring for a few hours or
days'1 ' to organized world wide conflicts which lasted for
years. Some of the basic statistics on these events are
presented below.
Most of the events tend to cluster at the lower end
of the scale in terms of casualties. About 90 percent of
TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OP CASUALTIES
Casualty Range Percent of Incidents
1,000 - 2,000 40.6
2,001 - 6,000 21.2
6,001 - 15.000 16.2
15.001 - 30,000 8 .1
30,001 - 60,000
3.7
61,000 - 120,000
2.7
Over ro
- £ r
O
O
O
O
5.3
the incidents resulted in 60,000 or fewer casualties. Al
most half the incidents fell into the first interval with
-1
Por example the draft riots in New York in 1863 or
the anti-Jew riots in Rumania in 1907.
57
2
between 1,000 and 2,000 casualties. About 5 percent of the
incidents can be considered as very large with over a quar
ter of a million casualties.
Another parameter of some interest is the number of
combatant pairs per incident. That is, the number of pairs
who were actually engaged in combat. This number provides
some additional indication of the size and complexity of
the incident. Prom Table 4 it is seen that over 80 percent
of the incidents involve no more than two combatant pairs.
Only five percent of the incidents involved as many as
seven pairs.
TABLE 4
DISTRIBUTION OP PAIRS
Number of Percent of
Pairs Incidents
1 61.8
2 19-5
3 6 .0
4 3-7
5 2.0
6 2.0
7-15 3.^
Over 15 1.6
2
Determining casualties for some obscure incidents
was difficult. In some cases Incidents are coded as at
least 1,000. Thus, this category may be overweighted to
some extent. However, it is not a major effect.
58
Thus, most violent incidents involve relatively simple po
litical patterns,^
The political relationship of the combatant pair is
another parameter of interest in this study. About 35 per
cent of the pairs involved sovereign versus sovereign na
tions. About 25 percent involved a sovereign nation fight
ing a group considered to be within that nation. Some 28
percent were between groups having some colonial type rela
tionship. Another 12 percent involved other types of polit
ical relationships. This latter type included a sovereign
versus a non-sovereign group in another country (interven
tion) and the conflict of two non-sovereign groups (such as
in riots or independent groups in revolutions).
The three primary types of relationships--interna-
tionalj civil and colonial— account for almost 90 percent
of the conflict and the three types occur with roughly equal
frequency. Somewhat unexpected was the 12 percent of other
type s.
Appendix C gives the frequencies of occurrence for
the other political issue variables included in the study.
An important finding is that almost no single issue occurs
with a high degree of regularity. Most of the issues ex
amined occur in less than 10 percent of the pairs. The ex
ceptions are shown in Table 5-
^In the sense of conflictual and alliance dyads.
59
TABLE 5
MOST FREQUENT POLITICAL ISSUES
Conflict over mutual or third party
territory, B1
Fight for political autonomy, 02
Ethnic, cultural or religious
antagonisms involved, E8
Retaliation for insult, massacre,
ship sinking, etc., C3
Disputes over political form, E5
Dispute over discriminatory-asymmetric
laws or taxes, E10 10
The Summarized Data
For this research the, data are summarized for a
given time. That is, the data are aggregated for all inci
dents occurring within (or overlapping) a given Interval of
h.
time. A time interval was specified as three years as an
estimate of the minimum interval which would normally en
compass at least three Incidents.
Table 6 gives the distribution of number of Inci
dents occurring within or overlapping the JO time periods
from 1751 to i9 6 0.
2i
See Chapter I for details on this aggregation pro
cedure .
Percent of
Pairs
36
26
18
12
11
6o
TABLE 6
DISTRIBUTION OE INCIDENTS PER PERIOD
Number of Incidents Percent of All
in Period Periods
0 - 2
5.7
3 - 4 8.6
5 - 6 22.8
7 - 8
25.7
9 - 1 0
14.3
Over 10 22.8
Average incidents per period =8.0
Moyal and others have used war initiations per unit
of time as a unit of analysis. Although this measure
seems to carry less information about the existence of war
in the system than does the number of ongoing wars it is of
some interest at least for purposes of comparison with
these previous studies. It is seldom (2.9 percent of cases)
that a three year interval has passed without at least one
new violent incident being initiated.
E. Moyal, "The Distribution of Wars in Time, "
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, CXII (1949), 446-
¥58^
61
TABLE 7
DISTRIBUTION OF WAR INITIATION AND
TERMINATION PER TIME PERIOD
Number of Changes Percent of All Periods
Per Time Period War Initiation War Termination
0
2.9 4.3
1 7.1
8.6
2
15.7
17.2
3
24.3
14.3
4 11.4
14.3
5
12.8
15.7
6
7.1 5-7
7
8.6
7.1
8
4.3 5.7
ir 8 5.7 7.1
These tables provide basic descriptive materials on
the frequency and magnitude of incidents. The following
sections discuss some multivariate relationships.
Factor Analyses
The matrix consisting of the aggregated data for
each variable over the 70 time periods provided the basis
for two factor analyses. The first factor analysis used
the time periods as the rows and the descriptive variables
as the columns. The second input matrix was a 90 degree ro
tation of the first. The time periods were the columns;
the descriptive variables were the rows.
62
Factor analysis is a useful atheoretical, explora
tory tool. In the opinion of the author, however, the find
ings cannot he interpreted as anything other than a sugges
tive clustering of related variables. That is, the factor
matrix should probably not be interpreted as representing
any "true" set of underlying factors.^ However, the factor
analysis clustering of many-variable data matrices is an ef
ficient and often very suggestive tool for initial investi
gation .
First Factor Analysis
The first thirteen factors have eigenvalues equal
to or greater than one. Although it is somewhat conven
tional to treat all such factors, in this case only the
first five of these seem to have any theoretical signifi
cance and only these will be discussed. The first five fac
tors account for 53 percent of the total variance of the
matrix. The fifth factor only accounts for an additional
5 percent of the variance, another reason for not consider
ing more than five.
This factor has a positive association with large,
sovereign-sovereign (Pi), national power-security (Si) dis
putes in Europe (C-C). Of some interest on the positive
side is the moderate loading of previously allied (N2<10)
f -
A more complete description of factor analysis can
be found in: Harry Harmon, Modern Factor Analysis (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press" i960) .
63
TABLE 8
FIRST FACTOR
Factor&
Variable Loading
% PI - Sovereign vs_ Sovereign Pairs 0.88
# PI
- Sovereign ve Sovereign Pairs
0.73
$> SI
- Concern over Recent Change in B-O-P 0.72
% c-c - Christian v£ Christian 0.70
EY x Mg - Z Pair Years x Magnitude 0.70
Y
- E Pair Years 0.52
% N2(<10) - Previously Allies in Past 10 Years 0.49
% K2 - D-M for Place-in-Sun 0.43
% C3
- Retaliation for Insult, Massacre -0.43
% E2 - Civil Pairs
-0.48
# P3 + 4
- Colonial Pairs -0.48
C-M - Christian - Moslem Pairs -0.58
$> U5L
- One of Pair Loses Political Autonomy -0.58
% E8 - Ethnic, Cultural, Religious Antagonism -0.58
% C2
- Fight for Political Autonomy -0.72
% ENE
- European vs_ Non-European Pair -0.72
% P3 + 4 Colonial Pair -0.74
a0nly factor loadings over 0.40 are presented.
and decision-maker try for place-In-the-sun (K2). To a
great extent this factor would appear to reflect the real
ists' theory of International conflict. Recent changes in
64
the balance of power occur concurrently with the existence
of an aggressive decision-maker resulting in large wars and
in relatively rapid changes in alliances. The latter Indi
cates, probably, alliances of convenience rather than alli
ances based on ideological conviction. Thus, the realists'
theory of power motivation independent of ideology would
nicely explain this cluster.
The negative end of the factor shows a quite differ
ent type of conflict. It consists of a cluster of variables
associated with expansionary (loss of political autonomy)
colonialism. It Is interesting to note that this type of
conflict is often associated with retaliation for an insult
or massacre.
The implication of the Indicated pattern is that,
to a great extent, the variation in conflict can be ex
plained by the alternation (in time) of large, internation
al wars with frequent, colonial conflicts. Years with much
of one type of conflict tend to have little of the other.
TABLE 9
SECOND FACTOR
# P2
% E5
Mg
Variable
- Conflict over Political Form
Civil Pairs
£ Magnitude Indices
Factor
Loading
0.69
O .63
0.62
65
TABLE 9— Continued
Factor
Variable Loading
% T3 - Internal Tensions Rated High 0.62
$ E6 - Dispute over Socioeconomic System 0.60
$ P2 - Civil Pairs O .58
$ K4 - Elite Counter-coup 0.49
< f o T1 - Recent Illegal Change in Government 0.48
$ P3 + 4 - Colonial Pairs -0.45
% B1 - Dispute over Territory -0.54
$ U5L - Loss of Political Autonomy -0.54
This factor seems to represent eras in which there
were social-political revolutions. E5j E6, T3 and P2 are
the high scoring variables. It is interesting to note that
the magnitude index tends to be high during these items.
To some extent such conflicts are negatively correlated
with colonial conflict.
TABLE 10
THIRD FACTOR
Variable
$ P3 + 4 - Colonial Pairs
# W - Number of Wars
Mg - £ Magnitude Indices
Y - ^ Pair-Years
$ B3 - Conflict over Strategic Territory
Factor
Loading
0.63
0.61
0.59
0.55
o.4i
66
TABLE 10— Continued
Factor
Variable Loading
# PI
- Sovereign vs Sovereign Pairs 0.41
# El - Economic difference Source of Antagonism -0.40
% U5G - Gain Political Autonomy -0.46
% M5 - Exploit Opponents Weakness -0.67
% E10 - Conflict over Asymmetric Laws -0.74
The negative end of this factor is associated with
a group of variables apparently representing the efforts of
a disadvantaged minority (El., E10) to gain independence
(TJ5G) while the dominant group is weak or distracted (M5) ^
This type of conflict is somewhat negatively correlated with
periods of many wars.
TABLE 11
FOURTH FACTOR
Factor
Variable Loading
% M4 - Repression, Poor Rule
0.71
% U5G - Gain Political Autonomy 0.67
% E10 - Asymmetric Laws 0.49
Y - £ Pair Years 0.42
% K4 - Elite Counter Coup -0.49
7
'Such as when it is at war or in the midst of a rev
olution .
The fourth factor appears somewhat like the nega
tive end of the third in terms of motivation. That is.,
asymmetric laws are involved. However, it is not the chance
to take advantage of the opponents weakness-distraction,
hut, rather it seems to represent an explosion caused by
repression and/or poor rule (M4). The factor does not seem
to be terribly suggestive in theoretical terms.
The fifth factor is probably mainly picking up
fringe variance. It is suggestive to some extent as pos
sibly representative of situations in which an autocratic
decision-maker attempts to utilize foreign exploits for
personal gain (Kl, K2).
TABLE 12
FIFTH FACTOR
Variable
t
% Kl - D-M try to create threat
% S2 - Fear future power potential
$ K2 - D-M try for place-in-sun
^ S3 - Intervention to protect threatened weaker
group because of Immediate B-O-P
Second Factor Analysis
A brief factor analysis was made with time periods
as the variables (columns) and the political issues as the
observations (rows). This Involved the same data matrix as
Factor
Loading
0.48
0.47
0.44
-0.45
68
in the above case with the data matrix rotated 90°• The
primary purposes of this analysis was (l) to see the extent
to which all time periods appeared basically alike3 and (2)
to determine if the deviant time periods tend to cluster
together in time.
The first factor in this case accounts for 62 per
cent of the data variance and the second accounts for an
additional 16 percent. The next factor drops to a little
less than four percent. Only the first two factors are ex
amined here since they account for far more variance than
subsequent factors.
Q
All time periods correlate positively with the
first factor. Only 4 percent of the time periods correlate
(load) at less than the 0.40 level and 60 percent correlate
at least 0.80. Thus to a great extent there is a consider
able degree of similarity across time in the distribution
of issues involved. The second factor appears to differ
from the first primarily in that the time periods loading
highly on it are time periods of intense conflict. Thus*
the primary residual after accounting for the basic simi
larity of the system over time is a function of the amount
of conflict in the system. The implication is that con
flict is ubiquitous and the type of conflict at any time
tends to be more like that of any other time than, it is
Q
Have a positive factor loading.
69
different. Rather than the conventional vertical tabular
presentation of the factor loadings it seems more appropri
ate to plot these two factors versus time as in Figure 2.
Types of System Issues
The basic assumptions underlying this research are
that a few recurring types of conflicts account for much of
the violence in the system and that these types of conflicts
are reflected in a cluster of issues. The original typology
attempted to specify what these types and issues might be.
Initially it was quite uncertain as to whether the individ
ual sub-types specified would tend to occur separately in
the system or in conjunction with certain other parameters.
For example, it would seem that decision-maker try for a
place-in-the-sun as an issue on one side might be matched
by a fear of change in the power distribution on the other
side.^ Similarly power issues and territorial disputes
could well be correlated. A priori, the initial thirteen
sub-types probably constituted an unduly detailed break
down. Empirically the factor analysis discussed above indi
cates that this was true. About five factors account for
most of the important variation in patterns. This section
describes the final derivation of the basic types of issues
and trends in violence which are taken to be representative
^The first factor discussed above tends to support
this idea.
ll^ 'C lO X IO TO THE CENTIMETER 4G 1512
If ' & t s I B X 25 C M . “ »CC IN U . S . * ,
K E U F F E L ft E S S C R C O ,
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71
of these empirical patterns. These types will be employed
in the testing of the hypotheses in the next chapter.
In this process a technique known as construct-map
ping (CON-MAP) is used to fit composite indices to represent
cluster of issues. This technique uses precisely the same
mathematical model as factor analysis except in terms of
how the factors (concepts) are fitted.^ In construct-map
ping the analyst specifies which variables are to be in
cluded in the cluster and has the option to define their
11
relative loadings on the concept or factor. Once the con
cept is fitted conventional factor score techniques are used
to compute concept scores. On occasion several trial fits
including a principal component fit are tried for a given
concept. In the cases where the fits appear radically dif
ferent one must be picked intuitively or more than one fit
must be used.- The technique is discussed in detail in Ap
pendix A.
Amount of Conflict
The first requisite index for the testing of the hy
potheses is one reflecting the amount of conflict. Table 13
defines the correlations between the several variables rep
resenting amount of conflict.
10
Rotated rather than fitted to use conventional fac
tor analysis terminology.
The analyst may either define the relative loadings
or specify that a principal component fit be used.
72
TABLE 13
CORRELATION AMONG AMOUNT INDICATORS
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1. 2 Pair Years -
2.2 Pair Years x
Mag
.90 -
3-
Number of Wars
.31
-.02 -
4. 2 Mag
• 51 • 39 • 71
-
5-
Number of PI
.83
0
ON
•
.02 .38 -
6. Number of P2
.32 .09 .64 .64 .11 -
7.
Number of P3 + 4 .21 -.06 .80 .47 -.11 .27 -
8. Number of P5 + 6
CON-MAP Indices
• 55
.44 .23 .27 .28 .22 .11 —
9-
Amount-Total8 ,
•22
•ii .62 .80
■12
•58 .42
■21
-
10. Amount-Large
•28 •22 • 15
.46
.89
.21 .08
.51
.84 -
11. Amount-Many .44 .20
•22 •22
.22
•69
.68 .27
• 77 • 33
8f
The underlined values specify variables used in defining the
index.
Almost all of the correlations are positive, indica
tive that these size or amount indicators do tend to co
occur. However, variables, 1, 2, 5 and 8 intercorrelate
more strongly and tend to form one cluster while variables
3, 4, 6 and 7 tend to form another cluster. For this reason
three indices were formed with the concept-mapping tech
niques. The first is a principal component fit to the
73
eight variables (Amount-Total). Referring back to Table 13
it is seen that this index does correlate quite strongly
with each of the original variables although it is more
strongly related to the 1, 2 , 5 and 8 cluster.
A second index (Amount-Large) is formed from vari
ables 1 and 2 as representative of the first cluster dis
cussed above. A third index (Amount-Many) is formed from
variables 3 and 4 of the second cluster. It is seen that
these two concepts of amount-of-war are somewhat independ
ent in that they only correlate O.33. It seems appropriate
to treat a great amount of violence from large wars as sepa
rate from a great amount as a consequence of many wars.
Thus., both of these Indices will be used during the analy
sis .
Inter-state Wars
The first general type of war specified in the pre
theory was the inter-state war. Several sub-types of inter
state wars were specified. Table l4 gives the correlations
among the variables which represent these sub-types. Ex
amining this table there seems to be only one cluster of
variables present. The percent of PI pairs variable corre
lates positively with two of the power variables (SI and
S3) and with the place-in-the-sun (K2) variable. The other
variables do not seem to be particularly related to one
another or to the PI variable. Thus, a single Index is
■TABLE l4
IMER-STATE FACTORS
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1. # Sot-Soy (#Pl) -
2. # Soy-Soy (#Pl)
0.75
-
3. Chrst-Chrst (C-C)
0.33 0-53
-
4. Mutl Terr. (Bl) -0.28 -0.17 -0.19 -
5. Strt Terr. (B3) 0.09 -0.18 -0.31
0.13 -
6. Chnge B-O-P (Si)
0.35
0.60
0.63
-0.09 -0.14 -
7. Futre B-O-P (S2) 0.03
-0.01 -0.12 -0.24 -O.15 -0.18 -
8. Immed B-O-P (S3) 0.31 0.47 0.18 -0.06 0.08
0.37
-0.23 -
9. Intm Tens. (T3) -0.06 -0.16 -0.03 -0.22 -0.06 -0.05 0.22
-0.15 -
10. Ext Thrt (Kl) -0.12 -0.07 0.17 -0.01 -0.22 -0.13 0.29 0.10 0.19 -
11. Plce-ln-Sun (K2) 0.17
0.20
0.35
0.13 -0.08 0.43 0.15 -0.22 0.06 -0.07
-C
- 1 ^
75
formulated.- Two separate tries were made at fitting an in
dex to the power variables. Despite the seeming divergence
of S2 from SI and S3* an attempt was made to force a con-
map fit equally weighting these three variables. A second
fit was made to SI, S2, S3 with the principal component op
tion .
TABLE 15
POWER INDICES
SI S2
S3
#P1 #Pl #K2
Power 1 = Equal Weight SI, S2, S$a
•55 .55 •55
.36
• 54
.20
Power 2 = Principal Component
SI, S2, S3
•15
-.60 .J8
• 31 • 54 .04
£ l
Underlined values specify the variables used in defining the
Index.
The two indices are both used to represent the concept of
the prevalence of power issues in the system.
Civil War
It was suggested that civil war might be either
conducted by the elite as a coup or by the mass because of
oppression or ideology. It does not seem impossible when
considering the system as a whole that all three types
might be strongly correlated.
Three general clusters of civil war issues seem to
be present. First is the conventional concept of the large
TABLE 16
CIVIL WAR VARIABLES
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 11
12
13 14 15
1. Wo. Civ. Pairs (#P2) -
2. j o Civ. Pairs (# P2) .62 -
3-
j o Chnge Govt. (Tl)
.19 • 35
-
4. j o Econ. Tens. (T2) .09 .26 .52 -
5.
j o Intern. Tens. (Tj) .24 .27
.63 .46 -
6. j o Econ. Diff. (El) -.18 .4o
.19
.18 .28 -
7.
j o Polit. Eorm (E5) .12 • 38 • 31 .37
.62 .29 -
8. j o Socio. Form (E6)
-.13
.43
.33 • 39
.40 .46 .52 -
9-
j o Asymmet. Laws (E10) -.24
• 37 •19
-.04 .02 .24 -.24 -.06 -
10. j o Elite Coup (K3)
.13
,4l .34
-35
.10 .22 .18 .32 -.28 -
n. j o Elite Contr-Rev. (K4) .10
• 17
.22 .27 .44 .24
.49 .51 -.15 .02 -
CON-MAP Indices
12.
£ 1
Instab. .20
•35
•82 •§2
•83
.21
.53
.45
.05 .32 .38 -
j
]
13*
Civ. Oppress. .28 .44
• 33 • 37 .51
.74 .74 .j4
-.03
.22 .74 .51
-
l i t - .Ethn.-Relig.^3 .26 •52
.14 .12 .10
.31
-.02 -.01
.65
-.06 .04 .14 .09 -
15.
Q
Minor. Esc. .24 .42 .20
-.03 .03
.16 -.20 -.02
•§2
-.20 -.16
• 07
-.05 .72 -
E L
Underlined values indicate the variables used in the definition of the indices.
T .
Ethnic-religious hatred, Eq, and repression, poor rule, M4, were also used In the definition of
this index. 1
depression M4, exploit distraction M5, and gain autonomy U5L were used as well for this index.
CT\
77
scale socio-political revolution. This is represented by
the Instability and Civil Oppression indices (correlation of
0.51). Second., there is noted a civil war type engendered
by a minority subject to asymmetric laws and desirous of
gaining some autonomy. This is represented by the Ethnic-
Religious and the Minority Escape indices (correlation of
0.72). A third type Is represented by variables K3 and K4
which relate to elite coups.
Colonial Conflicts
Colonial conflicts are suggested to some extent as
substitutes for international war. Thus, a try for external
success and perhaps even for a threat or for a place-in-the-
sun by the decision-maker can Involve a colonial political
relationship. The traditional concepts of trade should, as
well, be involved.
The first colonial index accounts for about half of
the variance in $ P 3 + 4. The trade heavy colonial index
appears to add relatively little. The Minority-Escape In
dex does not appear to be at all related to the colonial
variables. Similarly the elite or decision-maker ploys (K1
and K2) do not account for any significant amount of the
colonial variation.
A total of 11 primary indices are formulated to ac
count for the variation In these data.
TABLE IT
COLONIAL VARIABLES
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 11 12 13 14
1. § Sov-Not Sov (# P3 + 4) -
2. j Sov-Mot Soy { j o P3 + 4) • 3k -
3-
j o Mut. Terr. (Bl) .07 .48 -
4. j o Ethnic Antag. (E8) .29
• 35
-.01 -
5.
j o Pol. Auton. (C2) .38
• 57 .19
.4o
6. j o Massacre (C3) .44 .46 .26 .18 .30 -
7*
j o Mut. Trde (C4) • 34 • 32 .16 .07 • 35 • 39
-
8. j> Extrn. Thrt (Kl) .14
• 13
-.01 -.12 .02 .26 .10 -
9-
j o Plce-in-Sun (K2) -.03 .09
.13
-.23
-.33
-.16 -.14
-.07
-
10. j o Repression (m4) .08 .10 -.16 .23
.51 .19
-.01 —. 21 -.11 -
11. j o W e a k n e s s (M5) -.26 -.26 .11 -.10 -.02 -.10 -.15 -.04 -.06 .28 -
12. j o Gen. Commrce (m6)
1
•
0
.14 -.02 -.07 -.02
.19
-.11 -.11 -.23 .13 -.08 -
CON-MAP Indices
13-
Colonial
•33 .69
.64 .19 .64 .64
• i i 1
.03
-.24 .24 -.04
• h i
-
14. Colonial-Trade Heavy .18
•3k •51
.03 .40 .40
•51
-.05
-.20 .06
-.07 •51
.89
15.
Minority-Escape -.14 -.12 -.04 .04,
.31
.04 -.12 -.16 -.09 .80
•71
.10 .14 .02
-a
oo
Correlation Among
Primary Indices
Table 18 presents the intercorrelations among these
indices. Also given in this table are the correlations of
these indices with the political relationship variables.
It is seen that in each case most of the variation in these
variables is accounted for by one or more of the indices.
TABLE 18
CORRELATIONS AMONG THE INDICES
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1. Amount-Large
2. Amount-Many
• 33
3-
Power 1 .23 -.11
A. Power 2 .18 -.26
.33
5-
Instability
-.15 .19
-.14 -.15
6. Civil Oppres
sion
-.18 .24 -.17 -.27 .54
7*
Ethnic-Reli
gious
-.28 -.01 -.52 -.25
.14
.03
8. Minority Escape -.09 -.14
-.35 -.09 • 07
-.08 .72
9-
Colonial -.47
-.03
-.42
-.17 -.02 -.27 .25
.14
10. Number PI
.82
.22 .36
.31 -.19
-.18
-.37
-.18
-•51
11. Number P2 .21
-§2
-.15 -.33
.20 •32 .27
.24
-.07
12. Number P3 + 4 .07 .68
-.15
-.27 .02 -.02
.03
-.14
.33
13-
PI
•51 -.17 •54 .54 -.27 -.22 -.44 -.17 -♦56
1^. < $ > P2
-.33
.20
-.39 -.39 •35 ■45 •52
.42
.07
15. $ P3 + 4
-.41 .00
-.33
- .26
• 05
-.11 .14 -.12
.69
There is a tendency for the internation-power indices to
correlate weakly negatively with all the indices represent
ing civil and colonial war. Civil war and colonial war fac
tors similarly show a weak negative relationship.
Predicting the Type and Amount of War
The original postulation that there would be three
major types of war based on the political relationships be
tween the conflict seems to be supported. This section dis
cusses the amount of variance in the data which can be ac
counted for by these variables. The political issue indices
will be used to explain the variation in the amount-of-war
measures and the distribution of political relationships in
the system.
Amount-of-War
Three of the indices can explain 34 percent of the
12
variation in the Amount-Large index.
Amount-Large = -0.51 (Colon.)-0.31 (Civ. Oprs.)
-0.15 (Ethn-Rel.) (l)
r2 = .34
Using all the indices representing types of war,, about 37
percent of the variation is explained. The eight type in
dices explain only about 17 percent of the variation in the
12
Using a step-wise multiple regression model.
81
Amount-Many Indicator. Thus, the types do a fairly good
job of explaining whether there are large number of partici
pants and casualties in the conflict in the system and rath
er poorly explain the variation in the number of incidents.
Referring back to equation (l) it is interesting to
note the signs of the coefficients. The Amount-Large index
tends to be at its lowest when the Colonial, Civil Oppres-
1?
sion and Ethnic-Religious indices are at their highest. J
Also of interest is the extent to which the indices
based on issues explain the relative importance of the po
litical relationship types. As noted in the previous sec
tion each of the variables representing the relative impor-
14
tance of particular political relationships correlated
highly with at least one of the issue indices.
Multiple regression was employed to investigate the
extent to which the variation in political relationships
among combatants could be explained from a knowledge of the
issues involved.
jo PI
As a single variable the colonialism index provides
the best explanation of the amount of sovereign war. When
"^Looking forward for a moment, in the chapter on
testing hypotheses it will be seen that utilizing certain
time lags it is possible to change some of these relation
ships. If time lags had been used here the percent of ex
plained variation could have been raised considerably.
PI, $> P2 and % P3 + 4.
82
colonial wars dominate the system the $ PI variable is low.
and if all the issue indices are employed 66.5 percent of
the variance in $ PI is explained. Thus, the three main
types of issues explain most of the variance of $ PI. Sov
ereign-Sovereign Wars predominate when power issues are in
question and are negatively related to colonial and civil
oppression conflicts.
P2
The prevalence of civil war is best explained by the
Ethnic-Religious index.
0 PI = -13-3 (Colon.) + 34.7
r2 = 0 .3 1
(2)
The best three predictors of $ PI are:
$ PI = 8.85 (Power 2) -13.50 (Colon.)
- 6.47 (Civ.-Oprs.) + 34.7
r2 = O .58
(3)
$ P2 = 8.52 (Ethn-Rel.) + 2 5.I
r2 = 0 .2 7
(4)
The best three predictors are:
P2 = -2.78 (Power 2) + 6.44 (Civ.-Oprs.)
+ 7-66 (Ethn-Rel.) + 2 5.7
r2 = 0.49
(5)
83
The total percent of variance explained by the eight indices
is 5 2.8.
Again over half of the variance is explained. Civil
wars are negatively related to power issues and positively
related to Ethnic-Religious factors and oppressive rule.
% P3 + 4
Colonial type relationships can best be explained,
encouragingly so, from the Colonial index.
% P3 + 4 = 13-60 (Colon.) + 28.4 (6)
r2 - 0.48
The three best predictors are:
$ P3 + 4 = 22.75 (Colon.) - 9.47 (Colon.-Trde)
- 5 .3 8 (Minority-Escape) + 28.4 (7)
r2 = 0 .5 8
All issue indices account for 60.1 percent of the variance
in $ P3 + 4.
It is interesting to note that $ P3 + 4 is negative
ly related to Colonial-Trade after the effects of Colonial
index are removed. The most appropriate interpretation of
this relationship appears to be that conflict over mutual
trade was not a predominating factor in colonial wars when
colonial wars were most frequent in the system. That is,
systemic factors other than conflict over trade must account
for periods of frequent and recurring colonial violence.
Synopsis
These various Indices do account for much of the
variation in amount of war and for most of the variation in
political relationships. Without claiming exhaustiveness it
would appear that the original typology covers much of the
field of violent conflict.
Time Trends '
The various statistical tools used above describe
much about the data. However, they all involve linear func
tions and thus cannot depict cyclical relationships. In ad-
'dition no effort was made to search for possible time-lag
relationships. A simple plot across time of the variables
and indices of interest is an efficient way of examining
for the possibility of these types of patterns. In the fol
lowing graphs the row data for each time period are plotted
15
along with a nine-year running average. ^ It was found,
empirically, that the nine-year running average provides a
good compromise between smoothness of the basic patterns
and minimal observation time.
Figure 3 plots the Amount-Large and Amount-Many in
dices over time. In each case the 9 year average shows a
quite smooth pattern of gradual rise and fall. The Amount-
Large index shows two periods of extended high values. The
first period is during the French Revolutionary-Napoleonic
■^The nine-year average is plotted at the center of
three time periods involved.
5 E E I E
I\) :ri
” 11786
E U 7 9 8 r i
8 2 2 -
*•*+■■:........
.I834rr
858-:
: 870-
882-
E|894r-.
' (906^.r
::1::|918-
930-
E1942-H
p 9 5 4
E tr£i±E
86
Wars; the second is during the Twentieth Century since
World War I. The Amount-Many index shows something of a
tendency to exhibit a continuing increase with time. A
careful examination of the two plots will also show that
there is something of a tendency for the Amount-Many index
to be at its highest just after or concurrently with the
Amount-Large index.
Figure 4 presents the plots for the two power indi
ces. The patterns here are less smooth than was true in
the "Amount" indices. The two power indices exhibit much
the same trends except during the years from 1831 to l86l.
In each case, with a few exceptions, it is indicated that
the power issue is enduring in the system. Exceptionally
high values are noted in the mid-l8th Century as might be
expected. Since that time these indices have tended to
fluctuate about a fairly constant value, indicating as
noted above, a reasonably constant presence.
Figure 5 presents the plots for the Instability and
Civil Oppression indices. The two curves show much the
same pattern. Comparing these curves to the Amount-Large
curve it can be noted that there is something of a tendency
for there to be a correlation between peaks, with the Civil
peaks lagging six to nine years behind the Amount curve.
Again as in the Amount plots the trends tend to be rather
regular and smooth.
= i :
1774s
1786-
1798^
1 8 2 2 - ^
^ 3 3 4 ^ : =
^'1858^:^!?
3 7 0 r
^1882--
£ 1894-
1918 —
1 9 4 2 -
^1964 ^
S$1
I O X I d TOTHECENTIMETEH AG 1512
i o X 1 0 t o t h e c r . H i i m l : i l h AG 1 5 1 2
I * - X T . ' - y C ' l . “ ah i r i U . S . * . ♦
K C U T F C L 0. C 3 S K R CO.
i i w n
riimii
I i n;: :,;:ii;ii
n! 4 ; : i j I H \! ; ! : ;
j:Hr'v....
In sta b ility Index
x - x - x R unning A v e ra g e
! i ' I i : M
M FfH H i i n jp
luiv . - I ? H
1 1 ■ 11;
iHliiii
(tl) 1 1 1
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l i l i i i
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iiti it; J
’ii Ii!
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l i i i i i i i
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1iT:
l i i
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I'ii'tTjT: j . . !
vilv-Indice.SH
j:!i Hr; Mil i:b
r
n i i i . f i ; :
ill; ;;ii
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t iT j
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89
The Ethnic-Religious and the Minority Escape plots
offered nothing of particular Interest and are, thus, not
shown here.
Figure 6 plots the Colonial index. A large peak is
noted In the late 19th Century as would he expected. And
as indicated In the factor analysis, the Colonial index
tends to be high when the amount-large index is low.
Summary
A few issues tend to dominate the system for a peri
od of time.
The Issues dominating In adjacent time periods tend
to be similar.
There are no indications of any monotonic time trend
in the political issues leading to violence.
Rather, there Is a tendency for issues to predomi
nate for several time periods, to decay in importance and
then subsequently to return.
That Is to say, the world system of conflict does
tend to behave somewhat as postulated. Issues, as repre
senting habits of action, do not come and go randomly, they
come and endure and then go (a cyclic tendency). When one
type of conflict exists other types tend to fade into the
background.
Certain time dependent relationships are noted
among the indices. The Amount-Many index tends to be high-
1930
k c u pf c l
91
est concurrently or slightly after (a lag of 6 to 9 years)
the Amount-Large index. That is periods with many wars
tend to occur with or soon after system periods of wide
spread large conflicts.
The Instability index also tends to be quite strong
ly positively correlated with the Amount-Large index with a
lag centered at about six years. Colonial wars occur in
those times when civil and international war are relatively
absent,
CHAPTER IV
TESTING OP HYPOTHESES
The previous chapter was devoted to describing some
of the basic characteristics of the data and to formulating
indicators of the types of wars existing in the conflict
system. The concepts necessary for testing the hypotheses
presented earlier were also operationalized. This chapter
is devoted to describing the testing of these hypotheses
and presenting the theoretical implication of the findings.
Hypothesis 1
There will be a 20-30 year cycle in the intensity or
scope of violence in the system.
The two indicators of amount-of-war in the system
will be used to test for this pattern. It Is felt, however,
that the amount Indicator associated with large, widespread
wars is a more appropriate representation of the original
concept than is the "many war” associated index. On the
other hand, each indicator carries some Information about
the scope and intensity and both of them will be examined
for the postulated relationship.
92
93
Figure 3 showed a plot of the amount indices over
the entire time period. The plots show a 9 year (3 time
periods) running average plotted at the center time period.
The 9 year average was found to smooth out most of the ap
parently random fluctuation. The smoothing makes it much
easier to observe the postulated longer trend.
It is readily noted that in the Amount-Large index
there is a very smooth pattern of rise and fall. The Amount-
Many index is less regular in its behavior. A question
existed as to how to test statistically for the significance
of the postulated relationship even though visually it Is
obvious that some such tendency is exhibited. As far as is
known by the author most time series analysis techniques
are based on the assumption of a fairly constant period.
However, it is apparent from Figure 3 that the time between
peaks (the period) varies considerably. Yet the basis of
the hypothesis is only that the probability of war increases
with time since the last major outbreak. It Is a probabil
istic hypothesis and is not invalidated by the fact that
the inter-peak period varies about a median value. It was
not desired to use a technique which would discount the pat
tern because of this variation.
For this reason the following rather simple tests
were employed. In the first case, a peak was defined as a
reversal of slope from positive to negative when this rever
sal was at least one-half standard deviation above the
previous and succeeding low points. This representation
worked well for the Amount-Large index which showed no par
ticular tendency to have a long term trend for increase or
decrease. However, the Amount-Many index tended to show an
increase over time with a tendency to have a plateau rather
than a valley following a change in slope from positive to
negative. A second operationalization required that the
change in slope he only flanked on at least one side by a
valley one-half or more standard deviation below the peak
(change in slope). The following tables define the result
ing inter-peak times (the period of the cycle).
TABUS 19
YEARS BETWEEN PEAKS FOR
AMOUNT-LARGE INDEX
Year of
Peak
Years £
Last I
1759
-
1804
45
1837 33
1867 30
1897
30
1918 21
1945 27
95
TABLE 20
YEARS BETWEEN PEAKS FOR AMOUNT-MANY INDEX
Test 1 Test 2
Year of
Peak
Years Since
Last Peak
Year of
Peak
Years Since
Last Peak
1771
42
1771
-
1813 42
1795
24
1840
27
1813 18
1864 24 1840
27
1900 36 1864 24
1918
18 1879 15
1951 33
1900 21
1918 18
1939
21
1951
12
The Amount-Large index behaves largely as expected;
that is, peaks in war occur about every 20 to 30 years.
Even in the one case of significant deviation, 1759 to 1804,
the deviation could be explained by the extreme duration of
the French Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars.'*' Using the ini
tiation of this very lengthy hump in 1789j rather than its
peak, one finds a time between periods of intense war of
only 30 years (1759 to 1789). The Amount-Many index also
tends to follow something of the same pattern although with
a somewhat shorter period.
The hypothesis was for an increased probability of
war 20 to 30 years after the last peak. The next peak is a
reasonable measure of this succeeding increase except in
the case of a very lengthy period of widespread war such as
this one.
The Amount-Large peaks exceed the preceding valleys
by an average 1 .6 2 standard deviations indicating a statis
tically significant difference. More rigorously the statis
tical significance can be tested using the following logic.
Adjacent to the peaks the amount should be low. To the ex
tent there is regularity (smoothness) in the curves this re
lationship should always hold.
For testing purpose adjacent to the peak is defined
(on each side) as one-fourth of the distance to the next
2
peak. Table 21 shows the distribution of amounts for the
peak and valley adjacent times and the statistical signifi
cance of the distribution.
TABLE 21
DISTRIBUTION OF AMOUNT OF WAR ADJACENT
TO PEAKS AND VALLEYS
Index Score
>0
Peak Adjacent 8
19
Valley Adjacent
27 7
X2 = 13.3
p < .001
The hypothesis^ thusj tends to be rather strongly
supported. However, the chi-square should be discounted
p
This divides the time space into equal "peak" and
"valley" times.
97
somewhat because a running average is used which makes the
data points correlated rather than independent. The signif
icance is probably strong enough to stand up despite this
limitation.
Figure 7 shows the depicted relationship in another
manner. In this figure the index values for Amount-Large
are plotted versus the years since the last peak.^ The
average value shows the expected trend quite strongly.
Hypothesis 2
A tendency will be exhibited for a long term, about
100 year, cycle in the intensity of war.
Referring back to Figure 3j two definite extended
periods of high scores on the Amount-La.rge index can be
noted. The index rises above zero (the mean) in 1793 and
remains above that value, except for one short dip, until
1846. Again the index scores exceed the mean in 1913 and
except for a short dip remain that way until the end of the
data in i9 6 0. All other index scores are below the mean.
The first Intense war period endures for about 50 years,
4
the second for at least 45 years. The time between the two
periods is about 65 years. Considering the time from cen-
^The peaks are defined as above. The data points
are from the first interval after the peak through the next
peak.
^It has not necessarily ended by i9 60, the last data
point available.
IO X IO T O THE CENTIMETER 4 6
M
-I n d iv id u a l C y cles
1 A v era g e
A m ount
L arge
Index
m
6 ^ 12 ^ J5^ \ ^i,2< - .24_ -27^.30 " 33 36
Y ea rs S in ce L a st P e a k
“HJ23
- < a . : r g e e-un
Index!: A ite r : a : P e a-fc
99
ter of the intense periods, the period is about 110 to 120
years.
The data only cover about two cycles, thus, it isn't
possible to test for the endurance of the noted pattern.
However, the following test was derived to determine the
significance of the noted tendency for war to be relatively
intense (or alternatively quiet) for extended periods of
time. The data were divided into intense periods (1793 to
1846 and 1913 to i9 6 0) and not intense periods (all times
other than the above). A chi-square was run to see if
there was a significantly different distribution of above
and below the mean values of amount-large during these two
separate times.
TABLE 22
CONSISTENCY OF INTENSE AND
QUIET PERIODS OF WAR
Amount-Large Index
gO >0
8 25
35 0
x2 = 38.2
p « .001
The tendency is quite strong for years of most intense wars
to be grouped into contiguous, extended periods of time.
The data then support the concept within the limitations of
limited time coverage.
Time Period
1793-1846 and 1913-1960
All Other Times
Hypothesis 3
Periods of bipolarity are associated with system In
stability .
Michael Haas, using the concepts developed by.Morton
Kaplan, has examined European system polarity from 1649 to
1 9 6 3. Although Haas' estimates of system polarity are bas
ically subjective, they are carefully reasoned and quite
well explained in terms of the logic involved. He also uses
R. N. Rosecrance's earlier formulation of the power distri-
< 5
bution in the European interstate system.
These data by Haas provide one source by which to
partially test the hypothesis of an association between
fewer poles of power and greater conflict. A significant
problem does exist, however. It is easy to test if the
time periods rated as bipolar had more conflict than those
not so rated. J. D. Singer postulates that the bipolarity
causes increased conflict.^ Even if a test using these data
shows an empirical association, as predicted, it isn't pos
sible to test for the causal direction. An equally appeal
ing hypothesis can be offered that increased conflict (which
is reflected in higher violence) causes a bipolar alliance
structure. Despite these limitations some information can
be gleaned from such a testing.
^Michael Haas, International Conflict (San Francisco:
Chandler Press, in press), pp. bj-bb.
^Singer, "Quantitative International Politics," pp.
247-250.
101
Table 23 gives the rating of system polarity speci
fied by M. Haas and the distribution of above and below
average values for the Amount-Large and Amount-Many indices.
TABLE 23
HAAS' POLARITY MEASURES
Intensity Distribution
Amount-Large Amount-Many
<0 >0 <0 >0
1714-1789
loose multipolar 12 0 12 0
1790-1814 tight bipolar 1
7 7
1
1815-1822 tight multipolar 2 1 2 1
1823-1847
loose bipolar 1
7
0 8
1848-1871
loose multipolar 8 0 4 4
I872-1890 loose unipolar 7
0 6 1
1891-1918 tight bipolar
7
2 2
7
1919-1945
loose bipolar
5
4
3
6
1946-1963 tight bipolar 0 4 0 4
The original hypothesis did not differentiate be
tween tight and loose polarity nor did it consider a uni
polar system. Discarding the data for the unipolar system
and ignoring the tight-loose division the following 2 x 2
tables are obtained.
102
TABLE 24
AMOUNT VERSUS POLARITY
Amount-Large Amount-Many
<0 >0 <0 >0
22 1 18 5
14 24 12 26
X2 = 18.1 X2 = 1 0 .3
p < .001 p « .001
Periods rated as bipolar tended to have signifi
cantly more and larger wars than systems rated as multipo
lar. Again the relationship is very pronounced.
Singer and Small also made a test on the relation
ship between the amount-of-war and system polarity. With
some caveats, they found a relationship between bipolarity
and amount-of-war. In an effort to resolve the ambiguity
they looked at various time lags between bipolarity and war.
That is, they assumed that war cannot cause bipolarity if
7
the latter occurs first. As indicated earlier the author1s
concept is that war, in most cases, is probably best thought
of as an intensification of an already existing conflict.
Thus, Singer and Small1s time lag may be misleading. That
is, the conflict antedating the war still might have occur
red prior to the polarization and been a cause of it. For
example, for many years prior to World War I the French-
Multipolar
Bipolar
7Ibid.
103
German conflict, the Austria-Slav-Russia conflict, the com
petition for empire were factors causing the actors to seek
alliances in the expectation of eventual war. Thus it might
be hypothesized that World War I (as the manifestation of
an ongoing conflict) caused the system bipolarity not the
reverse, even though the alliances were largely formed sev
eral years before the initiation of violence.
At this point it seems safe to say that relatively
intense conflict and bipolarity are associated in time.
However, the use of war alone does not permit one to differ
entiate which of two apparently equally plausible, causal
hypotheses is the better explanation. Further research in
volving indices of international conflict encompassing con
flicts other than violent ones might permit a testing of
which causal direction seems the more appropriate.
Hypothesis 4
Internal Instability is associated with widespread
System Violence.
Two variations on this hypothesis are:
4.1 System periods of widespread violence are associ
ated with a high frequency of internal war.
4.2 System periods of widespread violence are associ
ated with a high frequency of perceptions of
elite insecurity.
io4'
The number of P2 (Civil War) pairs and. the percent
age of P2 pairs will be used to test the first sub-hypothe
sis.
The Amount-Large index will be employed to represent
the extent of violence in the system. The correlation be
tween P2 and $ P2 and the Amount-Large index is fairly high.
However with a time lag it is even higher. Table 25 gives
the chi-square values for various time lags between the
Civil War indicators and the Amount indicator.
TABLE 25
CORRELATION OF CIVIL AND AMOUNT INDICES
Lag of Civil Index
after Amount Index
Chi-Square Value for
Two-way Mean Test
P2 < ? 0 P2
- 9
years » 0 0.43
- 6 years
0.39
0.20
- 3
years 3.90
*
0 years 2.95 0.69
3
years 7.10 0 .6 1
6 years 8.05
4.24
9
years
5.93
3.00
*Relationship is reverse of that predicted.
The maximum chi-square values are significant at
less than .01 and .04 for P2 and $ P2 respectively. In each
case the maximum relationship is obtained when the Civil War
Indicators are lagged six years behind the Amount index.
Thus., there Is a significant tendency for time periods soon
after eras of widespread violence to both reflect more civil
war and to have a greater percentage of all wars as civil
wars.
The second sub-hypothesis predicted a greater per
ception of elite instability as a factor in wars during pe
riods of widespread violence. This hypothesis was made by
associating the Instability index with the Amount-Large in
dex. Again a six year lag maximized the association. Fig
ure 5 showed a plot of the Instability Index. A visual
comparison of Figures 3 and 5 indicates a tendency for In
stability to reach a peak somewhat after the peaks In
Amount-Large.
TABLE 26
INSTABILITY VERSUS AMOUNT-LARGE
6 YEAR LAG
<0
Amount-Large
>0
ThuSj the sub-hypotheses are supported. One inter
pretation of the time lag is that internal instability tends
Instability
<0 >0
31
13
7 17
2
x = 9.3
p ~.003
10 6
to be caused by the dislocation and tensions of widespread
and intense conflict. A reflection on the instability fol
lowing the Napoleonic WarSj World War I and World War II in
tuitively supports this interpretation.
Hypothesis 5
Periods of relative internal and international sta
bility are marked by conflicts between central system mem
bers and peripheral members.
'Or., in terms of the data available:
5.1 There should be a negative correlation between
internal and colonial wars.
5.2 Periods of relatively low violence should be
marked by a high frequency of colonial violence.
Examining the associations between the Colonial in
dex and the number of P2 wars or the Internal Instability
index it is found that a very small positive correlation
exists between internal war and colonial war. Trying vari
ous lead and lag times between the internal war and colonial
war indices does not significantly change this relationship.
Thus sub-hypothesis 5*1 is not supported.
Table 27 shows the relationship between the Amount-
Large index (9 year average) and the Colonial index („9 year
average). In this case the postulated negative relationship
holds quite strongly without any lead or lag.
107
TABLE 27
COLONIAL -VERSUS AMOUNT-LARGE
Colonial Index
<0 >0
<0 15 27
Amount-Large
>0 22 4
X2 = 7.59
p < .01
All of the hypotheses, except for 5-lj are signifi
cantly supported. In most cases the relationships are quite
strong. As Indicated in the previous section, these data
tend to show a significant degree of regularity in the con
flict system.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The previous chapters have dealt with the details
of patterns and relationships in the collected data. Such
analyses are probably the grounds on which theory is built.
However, they are specific and narrow in content. This re
search carries several implications of a broader but less
scientific nature. In this chapter I shall attempt to eval
uate on a subjective basis this overall effort and to sum
marize in general terms the findings already discussed in
specifics.
As noted earlier there was some concern about using
this form of a content analysis on the writings of histori
ans in order to obtain a representation of real world
events. It is the opinion of this author that the experi
ment was quite successful. It is possible to systematically
and reliably code the descriptions of important events given
in standard historical works. There is considerable com
monality from historian to historian in the mode of de
scribing events. Moreover, the patterns noted in the de
scriptions certainly seem consistent with one's expecta-
108
109
tlons. No readily apparent strongly misleading biases are
detected.^"
Similarly, the results tend to affirm the value of
the use of violent events to provide a trace of otherwise
difficult to observe political occurrences. To a certain
extent, historians apparently trace events by following
riots, wars, revolutions and so forth. Such events provide
the overt manifestations of the underlying conflicts in the
system. The events of violence studied here are almost all
manifestations of conflicts which endure for some time both
before and after the violence. In reverse, certainly not
all major political issues erupt into violence. On the
other hand, many certainly do. Moreover, diplomatic and
political moves which represent the greatest amount of di
vergence among the actors are the ones which do reflect
themselves in violence. To varying degrees, the political
groups on both the national and international scene view
violence as the ultimate means of achieving their ends.
Historians have traditionally broken history down
into eras in which particular issues or habits tended to
One definite problem in the use of historical works
is the variable threshold habit of historians. A riot dur
ing World War II Is often not reported when the same event
would get considerable attention if it occurred when there
was no other major violence In progress. To some extent
there appears to be some bias Introduced by omitting dis
tasteful events. Thus, one sees little about the anti-
Negro violence In American histories.
110
2
endure, Richard Rosecrance uses this idea explicitly in
his study of European diplomacy. He refers to a diplomatic
system— the analogue of a historian's era--as "habits of
b e h a v i o r . The concept of a system of behavior based on
common perceptions of "proper" behavior was a basic point
of departure for this research.
One must be concerned about the possible tautology
4
involved in finding what one expected to find. Despite
this, I believe that the research reported here strongly
bears out this original idea. A particular set of issues
reflected in a given type of violence does tend to dominate
the system for a time and then is replaced by another set
of issues or habits of conflict. However, one cannot sepa
rate intranational from international. Some international
activity does seem to take place somewhat in a sphere of
its own; however, even here the feedback into the intrana-
national system is great.^ Moreover, many international
2
Two references whose title amply illustrates this
point are: Robert C. Binkley, Realism and Nationalism,
1852-71 (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1935)J and
Carlton J. H. Hayes, A Generation of Materialism, 1871-1900
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1941).
■^Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics,
p. 6.
4
Because the theoretical framework and one's precon
ceptions guided one to the proper conclusions.
^As illustrated by the high frequency of civil vio
lence in the years immediately following large internation
al disturbances.
Ill
events directly reflect a decision-maker's reaction to an
intranational need. Perhaps the most illustrative example
of intra and international interaction for Americans is the
coincidence of racial violence with periods of large scale
seemingly unrelated violence at the national level. In
these data the anti-draft riots in New York in 1863 and the
widespread racial violence of 1943 examples. All Ameri
cans are well aware of the contemporary racial unrest which
many relate directly to the Vietnam war. Although the dis
turbances were described as relatively small., several refer
ences were made to racial unrest during World War I as well.
The patterns noted seem to suggest that a comprehen
sive theory of international relations will have to consider
some intranational aspects. Moreover, the theory may have
to reflect different relationships among the important vari
ables for different eras or systems.^ For periods of time,
certain concepts carrying their own logic are assumed to be
virtually universally true. For example, in our own era
"Munich" and "containment" carry a virtually unquestioned
theory of behavior. In the thirties the "accident of Sare-
jevo" carried an unquestioned logic virtually the opposite
of today’s "Munich Syndrome." Eventually the dissonance
^For example. Singer's noted reversal of the rela
tionship between dipolarity and the onset of war between the
19th and 20th Centuries. J. David Singer and Melvin Small,
Alliance Aggregation and the Onset of War, 1815-1945 (Ann
Arbor: Mental Health Research Institute, The University of
Michigan), p. 44.
112
between reality and concept becomes so great from repeated
empirical failures that the concept loses credence and a
new system Is formulated.
As suggested by the above examples, by the work of
rj Q
Rosecrance' and by this author's own earlier work the new
system tends to be formulated by a catastrophic event of
violence. The possibility of habits of behavior being based
on the last major failure or success carries intriguing
theoretical interest. Intervention to quell popular revolts
in the first half of the 19th Century reflected the French
experience in 1 7 8 9. Vietnam negotiations are feared because
of the protracted length of the discussions involved in the
Korean conflict. Munich was a reaction against the unin
tended war following Sarejevo.
In short, there Is a time dependency in political
behavior on the scene of world politics. Diplomats and poli
ticians react to the past and perhaps most strongly to the
last significant success or failure. The habits change
slowly with time and perhaps a new major event can consider
ably speed the process of change.
The final pattern which appears to be of particular
general Interest is the lack of any monotonic time trends.
^Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics,
pp. 267-275.
Q
Denton, "Some Regularities in International Con
flict, 1820-19^9j" P. 2 9 5.
Although the level and types of violence vary with time.,
the variation appears to involve a rise, a fall and a sub
sequent return rather than a unidirectional change. The
data cover a limited time period. Thus, one cannot be sure
how long the indicated patterns have endured. But, it is
interesting to note that violence now looks very much as
violence has. The relatively few types of violence covered
in the pre-theory used in this research seem to cover most
of that which has occurred, past and present.
A P P E N D I X E S
114
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX A
METHODOLOGY
Most of the methods employed in this research are
fairly standard techniques which are now widely used in the
field of international relations. It does not appear neces
sary to discuss these techniques on which there are many
good references as well as Illustrative applications. The
technique of construct-mapping is not so well known and is
discussed In some detail here.
Construct-mapping is directly derived from the fac
tor analysis model. It evolved as a consequence of a felt
limitation of the factor analysis technique. In particular
the fitting or, rotating of a factor in factor analysis is
based on statistical criteria rather than on theoretical
grounds. The statistical criteria.are meant to be analogou
to a conception of how a theory might be developed. That
Is, autonomous clusters are searched for. However, the
technique empirically frequently appears to be somewhat
arbitrary. Often times the first one, two or even three
factors are theoretically quite suggestive, but it is sel
dom that the remainder seem of particular relevance. For
the above reason, it is this author's belief that factor
116
117
analysis is of considerable use as an exploratory technique
and of relatively little use as a tool for testing hypothe
ses.
On the other hand., the factor analysis concept of
using a cluster of related variables to formulate an index
to represent a theoretical construct is a useful one."'' The
factor analysis mathematical model is, moreover, a very use
ful way to construct such an index given an appropriate way
to define the location of the factor with respect to that
cluster of variables. The remainder of this section is de
voted to developing the logic of the technique of construct-
mapping which was designed to attack the problem of appro
priately placing the theoretically desired factor.
Logic Underlying Construct-Mapping
As has long been recognized, one limitation of fac
tor analysis is the inability to specify factors based on a
substantive theory. This seriously limits the utility of
this technique in testing for the presence and "reasonable-
ness" of patterns expected on a theoretical basis.
^This is very similar to the definition of a con
struct suggested by Peter Caws in The Philosophy of Science
(New York: D. Van Nostrand, Inc., T9^57T~PP^51-59^
2
Some specialists have developed factor analysis
programs which partially circumvent this limitation. Pro
grams have been developed which permit the researcher to
partially specify an expected pattern. See Yrjfl Ahmavaara,
"On the Unified Theory of Mind,1 1 Annales Akademiae Scien-
tiarium Fennicae, Serial B, 160 (Helsinki, 1957)> or John
R. Hurley and Raymond S. Cattell, "The Procrustes Program,"
Behavioral Science, VII, No. 2 (April, 1962), 258-262.
118
Yet the concept of the use of a cluster of indica
tors rather than a single indicator is a valuable one.
Theoretical constructs may be abstractions which summarize
a number of more nearly concrete manifestations. For ex
ample, the cost of living is not something that is priced
on the economic market. It is a construct, an abstract or
conceptual composite cost of the many necessities of living
which do have a price. The price of any single item cannot
provide a good indicator of the cost of living; however, a
composite formed from the prices of a number of items can
be thought of as more nearly representing the construct.
A construct may, on the other hand, be developed to
explain an empirical cluster of co-occurring variables. For
example, in biology suckling young occurs in the same animal
with warm blooded, fur bearing, vertebrate, etc. far more
often than it does without these characteristics. The con
struct mammal is a shorthand description of this empirically
correlating, cluster of variables.
In political science, democracy is an abstract con
struct specifying a cluster of conditions associated with
the idea of mass or popular control of the political proc
ess. There is no single indicator which is considered to
be a good index of democracy; but, a number of conditions
can be specified which correlate with democracy. Those
^To a certain extent the two idealized ways of form
ulating constructs correspond to deductive and inductive
formations, respectively.
119
entitles which exhibit more of these conditions are more
democratic (by the definition) than those meeting a lesser
l i
number of the conditions.
Max Weber generalized the idea of an intercorrelated
cluster in his use of the "ideal type." Several character
istics of a more concrete nature define the ideal type of a
theoretical construct. This "ideal type" definition may be
applied to the study of real world phenomena by analyzing
5
the extent to which they meet the conditions of the ideal.
If the construct is representative of a real world tendency
the ideal characteristics will correlate in real data.
That is, if the ideal type is describing a real world tend
ency, entities will tend to exhibit all or none of these
characteristics. As a result, in a sample of observations
over several entities, the ideal characteristics should
empirically correlate with one another. This general con
cept has been translated into a method of operationalizing
theoretical constructs. The logic of the method is de
scribed below. For the mathematical aspects of the method
See for example, Seymour Lipset's "Social Requisites
of Democracy" and Phillip Outright's "National Political
Development," in Politics and Social Life, ed. by Nelson
Polsby (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963)• In these
articles the authors discuss the cluster of conditions
which constitute stable democracy.
^Max Weber, Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford
University Press, 194b).
120
the reader should refer to the paper by Ron Jones.^
1. A construct is assumed to represent a cluster of
characteristics which tend to occur together hut
not (or at least less often) separately in enti
ties. Pur bearing tends to go with suckling young
more often than not. Co-occurrence is interpreted
in terms of mathematical correlation. Items oc
curring together but not separately over a set of
entities of interest will empirically correlate
with one another.
2. Entities exhibiting more of the indicated ideal
characteristics are assumed to be more like the
ideal than those exhibiting fewer of the charac
teristics. The factor analysis model is consis
tent with the above assumption. A factor is spec
ified by a cluster of correlated variables. En
tities can be scored on the factor by computing
factor scores based on the raw data. These
scores have the characteristic that the entities
exhibiting the greatest number of the character
istics measured by the variables In the cluster
will get the highest scores. Those entities
exhibiting the fewest number of the Indicated
^Ron D. Jones, "Construct Mapping," The University
of Missouri, 196 6. (Mimeographed.)
121
characteristics will get the lowest scores.
Those in between will get in between scores.
The Construct-Mapping Solution
The problem in the use of the conventional factor
analysis model is that an a priori theory cannot guide the
placement of the factor in the space defined by the empiri
cal data. The author and Professor Ronald D, Jones were
recently faced with this limitation in a cooperative proj
ect. As the result of this felt need to improve on the
factor analysis method, Jones conceptualized an excellent
solution. The method developed permits the analyst to
specify which variables he would like to have his factor
correlate with.
This technique is, in many senses of the word, di
rectly analogous to the conventional additive index.
Xi = alxli + a2x2i + ’'' + anxni
Where X^ represents the degree to which
+-h
the i entity manifests the construct X.
7
The a's are selected a priori.
However, the suggested technique offers certain very impor
tant operational advantages over a simple index formed from
the a priori specification of the aj1 s i-n equation (l).
7
'See for example Outright1s use of such an index in
the above article, ibid.
122
1. The meaning of the a 's. What is meant when a
- ----- ---- _ J
large positive valued a^ is inserted in an equa
tion such as (l)? Does it mean that X should
tend to be high when x^ is high and low when x^
is low? If so (as the author contends it does
for many cases), this is heuristically equivalent to
saying that X should mathematically correlate
positively with x .. However, it is well known
phenomenon that in an equation of type (l) the
correlation of X with x^ (rxx ) depends not just
j
on a^ but also on the correlation of Xj with x^,
Q
k = 1 ••• n, k / j. Because rXx depends both
J
on a. and r specifying a. does not neces-
j * j X k , j
sarily determine the extent to which the index
value (X^) is going to be influenced by the
value of Xj. In the extreme, it is even possible
for X to correlate negatively with x. when a. is
J J
positive. This would be contradictory to the
meaning assumed above for a positive a^.
The technique suggested here derives the a^1s
•from a desired pattern of rXx 's. That is the
J
index is specified not by designating a set of
coefficients in a linear equation, but rather by
specifying a set of relative correlations that the
Q
See Phillip Dubois, Multivariate Correlational Anal
ysis (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957)•
index should have with the variables used in form
ulating it. Thus, the index formulated must cor
relate with the individual indicators as specified.
Relation of the theory to the data. The conven
tional index scheme provides for little interaction
between the a priori expectations and the actual
empirical relationships in the data.
On the other hand., the construct mapping scheme
involves the computation of the intercorrelations
of the raw variables. As was stated above the con
cept of a construct was that of a cluster of co
occurring (correlating) variables. Do such corre
lations exist in the data to be used? The first
step in construct mapping involves testing to de
termine if the raw indicators correlate as expected.
Secondj the construct mapping scheme gives the
correlation between the index and each indicator.
The magnitude of these correlations provides a
good indication of how well the construct fits
these data.
The construct mapping scheme operates with stand
ard data (n = 0, c r = l) which offers many advantages
for convenient comparison of diverse measures.
In summary the method involves three steps.
A definition is made of a construct in terms of
a cluster of correlated (with each other and the
construct) observable variables.
2. An estimator (index) of the construct is formed
by specifying a pattern of correlations between
the final index and the original variables.
This index is, mathematically, directly analo
gous to a factor in factor analysts.^
3. Indicator scores are computed with the factor
score model. These scores are computed from the
raw data for each entity or observation. The
scores then provide a "measure" of the degree to
which each observation manifests the construct.
The patterns of correlations provide an indica
tion of the extent to which the data support the
original theory. The index scores are concep
tually of better quality (reliability and valid
ity) than any of the raw variable scores (involved
in the index) taken separately.^
^Conceptually it is quite different. As indicated
above the factor analysis model is quite atheoretical. The
construct-mapping scheme allows the analyst to fit his
theory to the data.
10This improvement in quality is partially based on
the concept of suppression of noise with multiple variables
as in communication theory. It is also based on the idea
that no one variable is likely to represent all aspects of
a theoretical construct as is discussed in the early part
of this appendix.
APPENDIX B
APPENDIX B
DATA COLLECTION RULES
This appendix is devoted to specifying In detail
the rules and Interpretations Involved In the data collec
tion process. Detailed definitions of the variables are
given and problems of ambiguities between certain categories
are discussed.
An Event and Participants
A violent event cannot be defined in rigorously ob
jective terms. There are always a few fringe cases in which
the judgment of the researcher must be the final arbiter.
However., in this research there was relatively little diffi
culty In coding well over 90 percent of the incidents. Con
ceptually, an incident involved a period of continuous ac~
1
tive fighting which resulted in 1,000 casualties or more.
It is something of a problem to define initiation and termi
nation dates in some cases, particularly in some of the
civil or colonial conflicts. The following general rules
were followed in the coding.
■^Casualties Include killed and wounded.
126
127
1. An event Is considered as Initiated by active
fighting which involved at least 20 to 25
casualties immediately.
2. Continuous is defined as not involving a
recognized (by the participants) interruption
in fighting of six months or more or a recog
nized interruption equal or greater in length
to the period of fighting, whichever is shorter.
3. An event is terminated by a cessation in fight
ing as above or by a truce, cease fire or sur
render. The more difficult cases are those
which gradually taper off with no particular
demarcation. In such cases the usual procedure
was to accept the historian's date of the end
of significant hostilities as the termination date.
It is felt that from 95 to 98 percent of the inci
dents have quite unambiguous beginning and ending dates.
A participant in an incident is a somewhat more
difficult concept to abstractly define. Many ad hoc groups
fight In violent Incidents. Sometimes It Is difficult to
be certain whether there should be two groups or a single
one on a given side. Conceptually, a participant in a vio
lent incident is a group which sees Itself as such, with at
least a minimum organization for control and combat and
which actively engages in violence with one or more other
groups; or a participant can be a more or less passive re-
128
cipient of violence from such an organized group. The fol
lowing rules were followed in defining a participant.
1. The group must either suffer or inflict at least
50 casualties in the conflict.
2. Mercenary and bandit groups are excluded. Only
groups with issues which can be considered social
or political in nature are included.
3. The group must have its own organization and struc
ture for combat or be singled out for violence by
a group with such an organization. The organiza
tion can be ad hoc as in the case of a riot.
The data cover the time period from 1751 to i960 and
include events occurring within or overlapping by three
months or more this time period. In addition, to be in
cluded, a violent incident must involve at least one partic
ipant from Europe or the continent of North, Central and
South America. Europe is defined as encompassing the area
2
of Russia and the area North and West of present day Turkey
and of the Mediterranean Sea. The islands of Crete, Sicily,
Sardinia, Corsica and the Greek islands are included.
Number of Casualties
There has been much data collected on the number of
casualties involved in wars. There is considerable spread
2
The Russian borders on the date of the incident.
129
In some of the estimates, but still the data are accurate
enough for the purposes of this research. For some inci
dents no data could be found on casualties. In a few of
these cases data on force sizes along with qualitative es
timates of casualties were found which were converted to
numerical estimates as follows.
Light casualties -- 8$
Moderate casualties -- 17$
Heavy casualties ----27$
In about two percent of the cases, only very vague data
were available. A few incidents were accepted in the list
as involving at least 1,000 casualties even though in some
of these incidents one could be fairly certain that consid
erably more than 1,000 casualties were involved.
The estimated casualty data were converted to a
magnitude index utilizing the following conversion table.
There is considerable confidence that the magnitude Indices
are correct.
Casualty Magnitude
Estimate Index
1,000 - 2,000 1
2,001 - 6,000 2
6,001 - 15,000
3
15,001 - 30,000 4
30,001 - 60,000
5
130
Casualty Magnitude
Estimate Index
6 0 ,0 0 1 - 120,000 6
120.001 - 240,000 7
240.001 - 500,000 8
50 0.001 - 1,000,000 9
1,000,001 - 10,000,000 10
-> 10,000,000 11
The Issues or Conditions
The Issue or conditions of the conflict are based
on the statements of historians. As practicable, an item
had to be mentioned by two or more authors for it to be in
cluded. In perhaps 8 or 10 percent of the pairs, it was
difficult to find two or more historical descriptions of
sufficient detail to justify assuming that an opportunity
was present for two occurrences. In these cases, a single
reference was accepted as the criterion for inclusion. In
about 1 percent of the pairs, the author's judgment was
used to include an item indirectly or not at all referred
to. For those persons not wishing to rely on this judgment,
the items are so noted in the data listing. _
Many of the titles of the coded variables given in
the chapter on pre-theory are clear unto themselves. A few
are somewhat vague or could be ambiguously construed. The
list below attempts to reduce the ambiguity of these items
where it is deemed necessary.
131
Internal Tensions
T1 - Number of years (n) since illegal change
in head of state or government (n £ 5).
f0 = 7_3
Coups, forced resignations, assassinations,
special elections and revolutionary over
throws are included as "illegal." The data
are relatively easily coded from historical
references except for some Latin American
countries. Generally, the coding of this
variable is quite reliable.
T2 - Economic depression or major inflation
(high economic tensions) occur in the
5 years before the incident.
% = 4
The title is self-explanatory. Coding is
moderately reliable. It Is felt that there
is something of a tendency for historians
to concentrate on political Issues some
what at the expense of economic factors.
T3 - Internal social or political tensions
rated as high before incident.
% = 7
Encompasses cases in which the basic social
or political form is in question. Not coded
for civil war. Coding reliability is good.
T4 - Government role holders have insecure ten
ure before Incident.
< f o = 4
Any statement by historians that the group
decision makers feel themselves threatened.
Can involve a threat of a coup rather than
of revolution. Not coded for civil war.
Reliability is moderate.
T5 - Rapid economic-technological change Is
causing dislocations.
f 0 = 2
3That is, the percent of all pairs exhibiting this
category.
132
Any evidence of political tensions resulting
from such change. Reliability is not good
and this variable must be used with caution.
T6 - Significant increase in arms expenditures
in the 2 to 5 years before the incident.
% = 2
Occurs rarely and may have a low coding
reliability.
All of the T variables apply to only one actor in a
pair.
Territorial-Population Issues
B1 - Mutual border or territorial disputes in
cluding colonial territorial acquisitions.
% = 36
Reliability is high.
B2 - Dispute over 3rd party territory.
f a = 8
Usually dispute over acquisition of small
or backward nations.
Reliability is high.
B3 - Dispute over territory of a strategic
nature (includes a B1 or B2 code).
% = 4
Reliability is high.
B4 - Attempt to regain lost territory (replaces
B1 or B2).
< ? o = 2
Reliability is moderate and occurs fairly
infrequently.
B5 - Dispute of location and/or control of
ethnic minorities.
f o = 3
Reliability is moderate to high.
133
B6 - Intervention to protect citizens in alien
country:, culturally empathetic group* etc.
% = 2
Sometimes difficult to differentiate from
B5. Reliability is moderate.
Power Issues
51 - Recent change in power alignments or change
in power distribution among major actors
causes concern.
$ = 4
Difficult to differentiate from S2 and S3.
Would suggest that some users might wish
to collapse SI* S2 and S3 into a single
variable. The collapsed variable would
have high reliability. SI reliability is
moderate.
52 - One side expresses concern with future
power potential of opponent.
% = 3
Reliability is moderate.
53 - Immediate balance of power threatened
(including intervention to protect a
threatened group important to the power
balance*) .
% = 8
Reliability is moderate.
54 - Dispute over dynastic succession or inter
vention to protect or install friendly regime.
< ? o = 2
Reliability is moderate to high.
S7 - General peace-keeping or suppression of
conflicts which involve delicate issues or
are considered as potentially spreading.
f = 3
Not too common. Reliability is moderate.
134
Social Economic Issues
El - Indicated that economic differential Is
a source of dispute.
f o = 6
Frequently was not mentioned by historians
at times when it seemed appropriate.
Reliability is low to moderate.
E5 - Dispute over political form.
% = 11
Indications that a group wanted to reform
the political system without desiring to
. change the social structure. Difficult to
differentiate from E6. Reliability is
moderate. Some users may wish to collapse E5
and E6 to a single more reliable variable.
E6 - Dispute over social-economic form.
% = 3
Reliability is moderate.
E7 - Dispute over role of church in society
and politics.
= 4
Occurs rarely and mainly in Latin America.
Reliability is moderate.
E8 - Ethnic, cultural or religious antagonisms
a source of conflict.
% = 18
Requires a specific statement that this type
of difference contributed to the conflict.
Reliability is high.
E10 - Disputes over asymmetric or discriminatory
laws.
% = 10
The most common occurrence is a dispute
ov£r taxes.
Reliability is high.
135
Colonial Issues
C2 - Conflict over the degree of political
autonomy.
f o = 2 7
Can involve a try for independence., an at
tempt at annexation or simply an effort by
a group to attain a greater degree of auton
omy within a given political framework. A
try for autonomy versus independence could
have been usefully treated as a separate
variable.
Reliability is high.
C3 - Retaliation for raid, massacre, ship sink
ing or other relatively minor incident
construed as an insult.
f = 12
Reliability is moderate to high.
C4 - Dispute over mutual trade arrangements.
f o = 2
Reliability is moderate.
C5 - Dispute over economic investment.
f > = 2
Either intervention to protect investment,
to gain greater concessions or resentment
at foreign investment.
Reliability is high.
Elite Ploys
K1 - Party in power tries to create an external
threat and/or success in order to strengthen
hold on office.
f o = 2
This has to occur in response to an internal
need for stability.
Reliability is moderate.
136
K2 - A leader's desire for prestige., place-in-
sun or in-history.
f > = 5
Difficult to code and not well discussed
in the historical literature.
K3 - A try for office by an elite group such
as a coup attempt.
% = 5
Reliability is moderate.
K4 - Elite group try to reverse recent changes.
f o - 6
A try to regain privileges, status, or to
return to an old political form. A counter
revolution .
■Reliability is moderate.
Miscellaneous
Ml - A try to share in winner's spoils.
0-1
Usually involves a late entry into an
almost decided war.
Reliability is high.
M3 - A natural disaster occurred immediately
prior to the incident.
f o = 2
This variable is suggestive, but it is
not well covered by historians.
Reliability is low.
M4 - Repression, brutality or poor rule.
f > = 8
This applies when the implementation of
the political process itself is a source
of dispute.
Reliability is moderate.
137
M5 - Effort to exploit the weakness or dis
traction of the opponent.
fo = 8
This occurs most commonly when a minority
or colonial group attempts to gain autonomy
when the mother country is weakened by
dissension or distracted by external war.
Reliability is high.
M6 - General concern with trade and commerce
excluding mutual trade.
fo = 8
Freedom of the seas is the most common
source of this category.
Reliability is moderate.
M7 - Culturalj dynastic or political empathy.
f> = 2
Rare and not very important category.
Reliability is low to moderate.
Previous Conflict Alliance Pattern
Nl(n) - Number of years (n) since pair last fought
one another (n ^ 6o).
f > = 18
Probably not reliably coded for the time
period 1750 to 1800. Must have occurred
in a conflict meeting the requirements for
inclusion in these data.
N2(n) - Number of years (n) since pair last fought
a common opponent (n ^ 6o) .
fo = 9
Same rules as Nl(n).
APPENDIX G
138
APPENDIX C
DATA
This appendix lists the raw data and the sources from which
the data were extracted. The following code is given for the data
listing.
Master Common Size Start-End Dates
Number Title Index for Incident
! ■ 4 I
1. Dutch East Indies (l) 1750 Jun - 1755 Apr
Pair
Issues Referring Start-End Dates if
to One Participant Different from Incident
------------ I s-----------------1-----------
Holland, U^G - Mataram, U5L, T^ -1755 Mar
Fk, C2, M6
t
Pair Issue
Ref: 30, 22k, 235
t
Reference number (see list at end of appendix).
ORIGINAL DATA
Conflict
1. Dutch East Indies (l) 1750 - 1755
Holland, U^G - Mataram and Bantam, U5L, T4
P4, C2, M6
Ref: 30, 22k, 235
139
140
2. Guarani War, La Plata (l) 1752 - 1756
Spain, U4G - Guarani, U5L
P3, Bl*
Portugal, U4G - Guarani, U5L
P3, Bl*
Ref: 45
3- Seven Years War (8) 1754 Jun ~ 1763 Feb
Prussia - Austria, T7j 1756 Aug -
PI, B4, SI, S3, S5, Ml (8)
Prussia - France, U4L, 1756 Aug -
PI, SI, S2, S3, N2 (8)
Prussia - Saxony, 1756 Aug -
PI, Ml (8)
Prussia - Sweden, 1756 Aug -
PI
Prussia - Russia, Ul, 1756 Aug - 1762 May
PI, SI, S3
Prussia - Spain, U4L
PI, Bl*
England, u4g - Austria, T7, 1756 Aug
PI, S3, M2 (8)
England, U4G - France, U4L
PI, Bl, SI*, S3*, M6, Ml (8)
England, U4G - Saxony, 1756 Aug -
PI, N2 (8)
England, U4G - Sweden, 1756 Aug -
PI
England, u4g - Russia, Ul, 1756 Aug ~ 1762 May
PI, S3
England, u4g - Spain, u4l, 1762 Jan -
PI, B4, C3*, M6*
*Designates entry supported by fewer than 2 references.
141
Portugal - Prance u4l, 1762 Jan -
P1
Portugal - Spain U4l, 1762 Jan -
PI, M2 (0)
Eef: 10, 54, 64, 97, 130, 147, 152, 162, 244
4. La Plata Area (l) I762 - I777 Oct
Spain - Portugal
PI, Bl, Ml (0), M2 (6)
Ref: 1, 45, 116
5. India (5) I765 Jun - 1764 Oct
England, u4g - Mir Kasim, U4L, U5L
P4, C2*, C5*, E10
England, u4g - Oudh., 1763 Jul -
PI, M7*
Ref: 7, 56
6. Pontiac1s Rebellion (l) 1763 May - 1765 Oct
England - Pontiac’s Group, U5L
P4, Bl, C2*, E8, ’ S3*, M4, Ml (0), M2 (0)
Ref: 27, 130
7. Polish Ukraine (3) 1768
Peasants - Poland Elite
P2, El*, E8*
Peasants - Russia
P5, S7*
Ref: 97
8. Montenegro (2) 1768
Montenegro - Turkey
P3, C2, E8, m4
Montenegro - Venetia
P4, S2*
Ref: 124, 246
142
9. Corsica (l) 1768 May - 1769 Summer
France, U4G - Corsica, U5L
P3, C2
Ref: 7, 10
10. Russo-Pollsh (4) 1768 Mar - 1773 Mar
Poland, U4L - Russia, U4G, t4
P4, Bl, B6, C2, Kl, K4
Poland, U4L - Prussia, u4g, 1772 -
PI, Bl*, B3*, S3
Poland, U4L - Austria, U4G, 1772 -
PI, Bl, S3
Ref: 7, 52, 54, 86, 97, 130, 244
11. Russia ys Turkey' (6) 1768 Oct - 1774 July
Russia T4, U4G, U6G - 'Turkey U4L, U6L
PI, B2, C3, S3, N1 (29)
Greece - Turkey u4l, U6L
P2, E8, M5
Ref: 7, 10, 86, 97, 130, 162
12. Rohilla War-India (l) 1773 Mar - 1774 Oct
England - Rohilla, T4
PI, S3*, M5*
Oudh - Rohilla, T4
PI, M5*
Ref: 222
13. Pugachev Revolt (3) 1773 Sep - 1775 Jan
Russia - Cossacks
P2, C2, K2, K4
Russia - Serfs under Pugachev
P2, El*, E10
Russia - Bashkirs
P2, E8*
Ref: 7, 97, 244
143
14. Morocco (1) 1774 - 1775
Spain - Morocco
P4, Bl, C£
Ref: 17, 150
15. Algiers (3) 1775 Jul
Spain - Algiers
PI, C3*
Ref: 7
16. American Revolution (3) 1775 Apr - 1783 Jan
England, U4L - Colonies, U5G
P2, C2, E10, M6, N2 (10)
England, u4l - France, U4G, T7 1778 -
PI, Bl, M5, Ml (12)
England, U4L - Spain, U4G 1779 -
PI, Bl, M3, S3*, Ml (12)
England, U4L - Holland, u4l I78O -
PI, C3, M3*, M6
England, U4L - Indians, A
P4, E8*, Ml
Indians, B - Colonies
P4, Bl*, Ml, M3-
Indians, A - Indians, B
P6, Bl*, E8*
Ref: 7, 27, 130, 147, 151, 159, 162, 173, 244
17. Bavarian Succession (l) 1778 Jul - 1779 May
Austria - Prussia
PI, B2, S3, S4, Ml (15)
Austria - Saxony, U6G
PI, S3*, M2 (13)
Ref: 7, 54, 86, 162
144
18. Mahratta War - India (2) 1778 Nov - 1782 Dec
England, u4g - Mahratta, u4l
PI, Bl, S4
Ragh.un.ath Rao ~ Mahratta, U4L
P2, K3
Ref: 7, 56
19. Inca Rising (4) 1780 Nov - 1784 Feb
Spain 4 Inca
P2, El, E8*, E10, M2*
Ref: 74, 248
20. India-Mysore (3) 1780 Jul - 1784 Mar
England - Ryder Ali
PI, Bl*, S3*, M3*
Ref: 58
21. New Granada Socorro (l) 1781 Mar - 1782 Jan
Spain - Peasants
P2, El*, E10*
Ref: 74
22. Crimea (2) 1783
Russia, U4G - Crimean, t4, U5L
P4, Bl, B3, S7
Crimean Faction, T4, U5L - Crimean Faction, T4, U5L
P2, K3*
Ref: 119, 130, 154, 177, 182
23. Wallachia (2) 1784
Govt, and Landlords - Peasants
P2, El*, E10*, M3*
Ref: 63
145
24. Russia vs Turkey (5) 1787 Aug - 1792 Jan
Turkey, U4L - Russia,, U4G
PI, Bl, b4, hi (13)
Turkey, U4L - Austria 1787 Dec - 1790 Aug
PI
Turkey, u4l - Montenegro
P4, C2, HI (21)
Ref: 29, 63, 86, 96, 97, 143, 218
25. Russia vs Sweden (l) 1788 Jul - 1790 Aug
Russia - Sweden, T3, T7
PI, Bl, B4, Kl*, M3, S2*
Denmark - Sweden 1788 Sep - 1788 Dec
PI, Bl
Ref: 7, 10, 63, 86, 97, 130
26. French Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars (10) 1789 Jul - 1815 Jun
French Republican Bourgeois, U4L, Tl, T3, vs Royalists,
Vendee, Britany, French, T2 1789 Jul - 1796
P2, E5, E10, E7, K4, M3
F. Bourgeois, U4L, Tl ( 0), T3 - French Proletariat
P6, El, E6 1791 Jul - 1798 Mar
F. Bourgeois, U4L, Tl (o), T3 - England, U5G, U4G
PI, HI (30), SI, K2 1793 Feb - 1815 Jun
F. Bourgeois, U4L, Tl (0), T3 - Austria, u4g, U5G
PI, Bl, K2, SI, S4, H2 (30) 1792 Apr - 1809 Oct
1813 Aug - 1815 Jun
F. Bourgeois, U4L, Tl (0), T3 - Prussia, U4G, U5G
PI, Bl, SI*, S4, K2, H2 (0), HI (30) 1792 Apr - 1795 Mar
1806 Jun - 1807 Jul
1813 Mar - 1815 Jun
F. Bourgeois, U4L, Tl ( 0), T3 - Russia, u4g, U5G
PI, Bl, K2, H2 (36), SI, S4 1799 Jan - 1815 Jun
F. Bourgeois, U4L, Tl (0), T3 - Sweden
PI, Bl, K2, H2 (38) 1801 - 1815 Jun
146
F. Bourgeois, U4L, Tl
PI, Bl, K2
F. Bourgeois, U4L, Tl
PI, Bl, K2, N20,
F. Bourgeois, u4l, Tl
PI, Bl, K2, N1 (30
F. Bourgeois, U4l, Tl
PI, Bl, K2,.N20
F. Bourgeois, U4L, Tl
PI, Bl, K2, S4
F. Bourgeois, U4L, Tl
PI, Bl, K2, S4
F. Bourgeois, U4L, Tl
PI, Bl, K2
F. Bourgeois, U4L, Tl
PI, Bl, K2
F. Bourgeois, U4L, Tl
PI, Bl, K2
F. Bourgeois, U4L, Tl
PI, Bl, K2
F. Bourgeois, U4L, Tl
PI, Bl, K2
F. Bourgeois, U4l, Tl
PI, M4, M6, N2 (15
0
,'T3 - Spain
M2 (30), SI, S4 1793 Feb - 1795 Jun
I808 Mar - 1815 Jun
0
0
0
0
0
0
, T3 - Piedmont
1792 Jul - 1797 Apr
, T3 - Portugal
1793 Jan - 1814
, T3 - Holland, U5G, U4L, T3
1793 Feb - 1795
1813 Hoy - I8l4 Mar
, T3 - Swiss Conservat, T3
1798 Feb - 1802
, T3 - Naples
1793 - 1805
, T3 - Sa ony, U4l
1792 Apr - 1795 Mar
1813 Oct - I8l4 Mar
, T3 - Venice, U5L
1797 May - May
, T3 - Denmark
, T3 - Turkey
1801
1798 May - 1802 Mar
, T3 - Bavaria, U4L
1792 Apr - 1796 Aug
1813 Oct - I8l4 Mar
, T3 - US
1798 Hov - 1800 Oct
French Proletariat-Royalists, Vendee, Britany, French, T2
P2, El, E5, E6, K4, M3
Holland - England, U4g, U5G
P5, H2 (0)
Holland - Austria, U4G, U5G
P5, H2 (0)
Holland - Prussia, U4G, U5G
P5, H2 (0)
1789 Jul - 1791 Jul
1795 Mid - 1813 Nov
1793 Mid - 1813 Nov
1793 Mid - 1813 Nov
147
Holland - Russia, U4G, U5G
P5
1812 Jun - 1812 Dec
Denmark - England, U4G, U5G
P5, M6*, B3, K2 (0) 1801 Apr - 1814 Jan
Spain - England, U4G, U5G
PI, E3 (0) 1796 Aug - 1807 Jun
Spain - Austria, u4g, U5G
PI, E3 (0) 1805 Jun - 1805 Dec
Spain - Portugal
PI, Bl, M2 (6) 1801 Jun - 1807 Jun
Piedmont - England, u4g, U5G
P5, N2 (0) 1799 - 1812
Piedmont - Austria, U4G, U5G
P5, N2 (0) 1799 - 1812
Piedmont - Prussia, U4G, U5G
P5, N2 (0) 1799 - 1812
Piedmont - Russia, U4G, U5G
P5, N2 (13) 1812 Jun - 1812 Dec
Naples - Russia, U4G, U5G
PI 1812 Jun - 1812 Dec
Swiss Republicans - Swiss Conservat, T3
P2, E5 1792 Dec - 1798 Feb
Bavaria - Austria, U4G, U5G
PI, N2 (0) 1805 Jun - 1805 Dec
Russia - Austria, u4g, U5G
PI, N2 (22)
1809 Apr - 1809 Oct
1812 Jun - 1812 Dec
Russia - Prussia, U4G, U5G
PI, E2 (5) 1812 Jun - 1812 Dec
Ref: 10, 29, 35, 36, 61, 63, 86, 94, 97, 126, 130, 14-7,
152, 139, 161, 178, 186
27. Belgium (2) 1789 Oct - 1790 Dee
Belgium Aristocrats -Austria Hungary
P3, C2*, E7, E10*, k4
148
Belgium Aristocrats - Belgium Democrats
P6, E5*, E7*, K4
Belgium Democrats - Austria - Hungary
P3, C2*, E5
Ref: 7, 29, 4l
28. India (3) 1790 May - 1792 Mar
Mysore,, U4L, U6L - England, U4G, U6g
P4, B4, E10, K2, Bl (6)
Mysore, U4L, U6L - Nizam of Decan., U4G, U6G
P 6, Bl 1791 Jul -
Mysore, U4L, U6L - Mahratta, u4g, u6g
P6, Bl 1791 Jul -
Ref: 57/ 239
29. U.S. (1) 1790 Oct - 179^ Aug
U.S., U4G - Ohio Valley Indians, U4L
P3, Bl, 03, E10
Ref: 27
30. Poland (3) 1792 May - 1795 Oct
Russia, U4G ~ Poland, U5L
P3, Bl, C2, M5*
Prussia - Poland, U5L
P5, Bl 1792 Oct -
Polish Elite - Poland, U5L
P2, K4
Ref: 7/ 63, 96, 97
31. Philippines (l) 1793 - 1800
Moros - Spain
PI, C3*
Ref: 24
149
32. Russia - Persia (2)
1795 - 1797 Apr
Russia - Persia, u4g
PI, Bl* 1796 -
Georgia - Persia, u4g
P4, Bl*, C2*
Ref: 220
55* France vs Haiti (4) 1795 - 1805 Nov
France, U4L - Haiti, U5G
P5, C2, E8, E10, M5*
Ref: 4l, 74, 159
54. Serbia (3) 1796 - 1815 Aug
Serbia, U5G - Turkey, U4L
P3, C2, E10, M4
Serbia, U5G - Janissaries
P3, K4, M4
Ref: J, 130, 218
35- Ireland (3) 1798 May - 1799 Jun
England - Ireland
P3, C2, El*, E7, E10, M5
Ref: 7, 178, 239
36. India (2) 1799 Feb - I799 May
England, u4g - Mysore, U5L
P3, B4*, M3*, N1 (7), S2
Ref: 7, 57, 239
37. India (3) 1802 Oct - 1805 Jan
England, U4G - Sindhin, Bhonsla and Holkar of
Mahratta Confed., U4L
P4, C3*, K2*, N2 (10), HI (20), S2*, S7*
Ref: 7, 57, 96, 239
150
58. Russia - Persia (5) 1804 - 1813 Set.
Russia, Tl (5), VkG - Persia, U^L
PI, Bl, B^, SI*, Ml (7)
Ref: 7, 97, 220
59. Gold Coast (3) 1805 Mid - 1806 Jul
Ashanti - Fante
PI, C3*
Ashanti - England
PI, S4* I806 May -
Ref: 237
kO. _ _ _ _ _ _ (3) 1806 Nov - 1812 May
Russia, U^G, Tl (5) - Turkey, U^t-L, Tl (0), T3
PI, Bl*, 2k, E10, M5, Ml (14)
England - Turkey, U^L, Tl (0), T3
PI, S2, N2 (k) 1806 Nov - 1809 Jan
Ref: 7, 97
^1. Central Sumatra (l) 1807 - 1837
Malays - Padres, U5L /
P 6 J
Dutch, UJ+G - Padres, U5L
P3, C2*, E8*, m6*
Ref: 2k
k2. Russo - Swedish (3) 1808 Eeh - 1809 Sep
Russia, U4G - Sweden, U4L
PI, Bl, 2k, Ml (18), N2 (0)
Denmark - Sweden, U^L
PI, Bl, 2k, Ml (18), M6
Ref: 7, 11, 61, 98
43. South America (4)
Spain, U4L, Tl (4) - Nev Granada, U5G
PI, C2*, E10, M4, M5
Spain, U4l, Tl (4) - Peru, U5G
P2, C2, E10, M4, M5
Spain, U4L, Tl (4) - Chile, U5G
P2, C2, E10, M4, M5
Spain, U4l>, Tl (4) - Argentina, U4L, U5G
P2, C2, E10, M4, M5
Spain, U4L, Tl (4) - Uruguay, U5G
P2, C2, E10, M4, M5
Spain, U4L, Tl (4) - Venezuela, U5G
P2, C2, E10, M4, M5
Brazil, u4g - Argentina, U4L, U5G
PI, Bl, s4
Ref: 74, 98, 106, 107, 160, 243
44. Mexico (3)
Indians led by Hidalgo, Moreles, etc. -
Spain and Mex. Elite, Tl (4)
P2, El, E6, E8, E10, M3
Ref: 7, 34, 243
45. U.S. (l)
U.S. - Indian Groups led by Tecumseh, U5L
P3, Bl, C3*, E10
Ref: 27, 161
46. Central America (l)
Central America, U5G - Spain, U4L, Tl (5) ,
P2, C2, E10, M3
Ref: 74, 103, 186
151
1809 Aug - 1824 Dec
1809 Aug -
1817 -
1810 Jun -
1810 May -
1811 Feb -
1810 Apr -
I8l4 - 1817
1810 Sep - 1819 Nov
1811 Jul - 1814 Aug
1811 Nov - 1821
T3
^7- United States ( i t - )
England, T2 - U.S.
PI, C3, Bl, M 6, El (29)
Creeks, U5L - U.S.
P2, Bl, E10
Spanish and Indians in Florida - U.S.
PI, B3, C3
Ref: 27, 130, 159, 161
i t - 8. India (2)
England, U^G - Gurkha, U5L
P3, Bl*, C3
Ref: 7, 57, 239
i j - 9 . Maples (2)
Austria - Maples
PI, Kl*, K2*, Sk
Ref: 2
50. Bombardment of Algiers (2)
Algiers - England
PI, C3, M6
Algiers - Holland
PI, C3, M6
Ref: 96, Ilk
51. India (2)
England - Pendari Bands
P5, S7, C3
Ref: 7, 57
52. India (2)
England, Uit-G - Mahratta Confed., U5L
P3, Bl, C2, C3, Ml (12)
Ref: 57, 236
152
1812 Jun — 181A Aug
1813 Aug -
1814 Nov - 1816 Feb
1815 Apr - 1815 Jun
1816 Aug
1816 Nov - 1817 Nov
1817 Nov - 1818 May
53* Maples Revolt (l)
Austria - Maple Republicans
PI, S i t -
Maples Conservatives - Maple Republicans
P2, E5
Ref: 2, 96
5^+. Mexico (l)
Mexican Elite, UpG - Spain, U^L, T3
P2, C2, E7, K ^ t - , M2 (2)
Ref: 3 i t - , 7^, 186
55* England vs Ashantis (2)
England, U6G, T2 - Ashantis, U6L
PI, Bl, C3
Ref: 96, 196
56. Spanish Civil (2)
Republicans, T2 - France
P5, 34
Republicans, T2 - Spain Monarchists, T2
P2, E5, E7, Mi+
Ref: k, l i t - , 29, Mt-, 70, 71, 152
57* Greek Revolt ( i t - )
Turkey, U-U-L - Greeks, U5G
P2, C2, E8, M5
Turkey, Uit-L - French
PI, B6, S3, N1 (26)
Turkey, Uit-L - England
PI, B6, M6, S3, M2 (20), Ml (18)
Turkey, Uit-L - Russia, T3
PI, B6, N1 (15), Bl, S3
Egypt, I J i t - G - Greeks, U5G
P6, Bl
153
1820 Jul - 1821 Apr
1821 Mar -
1821 Feb ~ 1821 Sep
1821 Apr - 1826 Oct
1821 Dec - 1823 Nov
1823 Apr - Mov
1821 - 1830 Feb
1827 -
1827 -
1827 -
154
Egypt , u4g - French
PI, B 6, S3, HI (19) 1827 -
Egypt, U4G - England
PI, B6, S3, m6 1827 -
Egypt, u4g - Russia, T3
PI, B6 1827 - .
Wallachia - Greeks, U5G
P6, E8 1821 - 1821
Ref: 14, 52, 70, 71, 76, 96, 130, 196
58. First Burmese War (3) 1823 Nov - 1826 Feb
England, U4G, U6G - Burma, U4L, U6L
PI, Bl, C3*, M6*
Ref: 56, 70, 96, 186
39* Selge of Bharatpur (2) 1825 Jul - 1826 Jan
England - Jat Hindus, Ul, T4
P4, S4, El (20)
Ref: 71, 186
60. First La Plata (l) 1825 Apr - 1828 Aug
Brazil, T4, U3, U4L - Uruguay, U5G
P2, C2, El (2)
Brazil, T4, U3, u4l - Argentina, T4, Tl (l)
PI, Bl, El (2)
Ref: 70, 105, 130, 158, 248
61. Russian - Persian (2) 1825 - 1828
Russia, U4G, U6G - r Persia, U4L, U6l
PI, Bl, B 4, El (12)
Ref: 56, 70, 97. 150
62. Javanese Rebellion (3) 1825 - 1830
Dipa Eegara, U5L - Dutch
P3, Bl, C5*, E8*
155
Dipa Negara, U5L - Court at Jogjakarta
' P6, K3*
Ref: 186
65. Tasmania (l)
England - Tasmania
P5, C3
Ref: 130, 186
64. First Central American (l)
Literals - Conservatives
P2, E5j> E7, E9*
Ref: 70, 105, 130, 158, 248
65. Russia - Turkey (6)
Russia, U6G, T3 - Turkey, u4l, U6L
PI, Bl, B3, B5, HI (0), E8, S3
Rumanians, U5G - Turkey, U4L, u6l
P3, E8, C2
Ref: 4, 61, 71. 76, 97
66. Miguelite War (3)
Miguelite - Portuguese Liberals, T6
P2, E5, K4
Miguelite - Spain
P5, S4*, S7*
Miguelite - England
P5, S4
Miguelite - France
P5, B6, N1 (17), S4
England - Portuguese Liberals, T6
P5, S7
Ref: 14, 70, 130, 186
I823 - 1835
1826 - 1826
1828 Apr - 1829 Sep
1828 - 1834 May
1827 -
1828 -
I831 or 2 -
156
67. Mexico - Spanish (l) 1829 -
Mexico., Tl (3) - Spain, 12, T3, T4
PI, B4, B6, 02
Ref: 105, 186, 248
68. Chile (l) 1829 - 30
Liberals, T5 - Conservatives
P2, E5, E7*
Ref: 103, 186
69. French Revolution (2) 1830 Jul
Liberals - Govt.
P2, E2*, E4*, E3, E7, K4
Ref: 4, 14, 70, 71, 152, 196
70. Polish Insurrection (4) 1830 - 1831
Russia - Poles
P3, C2, m4
Ref: 4, 14, 68, 96, 97, 130
71. Belgium Revolt (2) I83O Aug - 1833 May
Belgians, U5G - Dutch, u4l
P3, Cl, C2, E8, E10
France, Tl (l), T4 - Dutch, U4L
PI, S7* 1831 -
-England - Dutch, U4L
PI, S7* 1831 -
Ref: 14, 29, 130, 152, 186, 198
72. Algeria (4) I83O Jul - 1847
Algeria Abel El Kader, U5L - France, Tl (0), T3, u4g
P3, Kl, C3
Morocco - France, Tl (0), T3, U4G
PI, M7*, S2*
Ref: 14, 17, 70, 71, 130
73* Caucasian Campaign (4)
Russians, u4g, T7* - Circassians, U5L
P3, Bl, C2
Russians, u4g, T7 - Murids of Shamyl, U5L
P3, Bl, C2, C3*, M2
Ref: 6, 186
74. Bosnian Revolt (2)
Bosnian Aristocracy - Turkey
P3, K4, Nl (2)
Ref: 71, 186
75* Revolt of Mehemet Ali (3)
Russia - Egypt, U4G
P5, B3*, S3
Turkey, U4L - Egypt, U4g
P2, Bl, E5*, K2
Ref: 4, 32, 76, 97
76. U.S. vs Sauk and Fox Indians (l)
U.S., U4G - Indians, U5L
P3, Bl, C3
Ref: 27
77« Argentines - Indian War (l)
Indians, U5L - Argentines of Buenos Aires
P3, Bl*
Ref: 105, 248
78. Cazaland (l)
Portugal - Matshangana
P3, Bl, K2*
Ref: 71, 186
157
1830 - 1847
T7
1831
1831 Nov - 1833 May
I832 - Jun - Jul
1832 - 1834
Tl (1), u4g
1833 ~ 1836
79* Annam (2)
Annamese - Annamese Christians
P2, E8
Annamese - French
P3, Bl
Ref: 130, 186
80. First Carlist War (3)
Cristine and Moderates, T6 - Carlists
P2, E2*, E5, Kb*, Nl (10)
Christina and Moderates, T6 - Basques
P2, C2*, E8*
Literals - Carlists
P6, E2*, E5, E7, Nl (10), K b *
Liberals - Moderates
P2, E5, N2 (0)
Liberals - Basques
P6, C2*, E8*
England - Carlists
P5, S4
Ref: 1^, kb, 71, 130
81. Peru vs Bolivia (l)
Peru - Bolivia
P3, C2, K2
Ref: 105, 130, 158
82. Texas Independence (l)
Mexico, Tl (3) } U^L - Texas, U5G
P2, Bl, C2, E8
Ref: 27, 71, 105, 126, 138, 186, 2^8
83. Seminole War (l)
United States - Seminoles
P3, Bl, C2, C3
Ref: 33
158
1833 - 1839
1833 Sep - I839 Aug
1833 - 1839
1833 - 1836
1833 - 1838
183^ Apr - 1839 Aug
1835 Aug - I836 Feb
1835 Oct - I836 Apr
1835 - lQb2
159
84. Brazilian Revolt (l)
Brazil Govt., Tl (o) - Rio Grande Du Sul
P2, C2, E5*
Ref: 105, 158, 248
85. Bosnia (l)
Turkey - Bosnia
1855 - 1845
1836 - 1837
P3, Hi (5), K4*
Ref: 71
86. Chile - Peru and Bolivia (l) 1836 Nov - 1839 Jan
Chile - Peru, T3, T4
PI, S2, M6, K1
Chile - Bolivia
PI, Bl, S2, Kl, M6
Argentina - Peru, T3, T4
PI, S2, K2
Argentina - Bolivia
PI, S2
Peru exiles - Peru
P2, K3
Ref: 105, 130, 158, 248
87. Second La Plata War (4) 1836 - 1852 Feh
Blancas of Uruguay - Colorados of Uruguay, U4L
P2, B5, K3*
1836 - 1852
Blancas of Uruguay - Argentines H•W. Provinces
1836 - 1852
Blancas of Uruguay - Brazil, u4g
P5, B6, Bl, M6*, HI (23), S2*
1851 May - 1852 Feb
Blancas of Uruguay - England
P5, B6*, m6, HI (38) 1845 Jul - 1847
Blancas of Uruguay - France
P5, B6, M6 1845 Jul - 1847
160
Argentine under Rosas, U1 - Colorados of Uruguay, U4L
PI, Bl, K2 1838 Mar - 1852 Feb
Argentine under Eosas, U1 - Argentine's N.W. Provinces
P2, E3, M4, El (7) I838 Mar - 1852
Argentine under Rosas - Brazil, U4G
PI, Bl,. B6, M6*, El (23), S2* 1851 May - I852 Feb
Argentine under Rosas, U1 - England
PI, B6, M6, El (38) 1845 Jul - 1847
Argentine under Rosas, U1 - France
PI, B6, m6 1845 Jul - 1847
Ref: 105, 130, 158, 239, 248
88. 2nd Central American (l) 1837 - 1840
Confederation Government - Groups opposed to Govt.
P2, C2, E5, E7, E8*, k4*, M3*, Nl (ll)
Ref: 105, 130, 158, 248
89. First England - Afghan (4) 1838 Oct - 1842 Oct
Afghan Dost Muhammed - England
PI, S3, s4
Afghan Dost Muhammed - Afghan's Shah Suja
P2, K3*, El (4)
Afghan Dost Muhammed - Sikhs
PI, Bl, S4*, El (l)
Ref: 42, 56, 95, 186, 220
90. Colombia (l) 1838 - 1842
Liberals - Conservatives
P2, E7, E5
Ref: 105, 130, 186, 248
91. Egypt - Turkey (3) 1839 Apr - l84l Jan
Egypt, U4L - Turkey, U4g, T3
P3, Bl, C2, K2, El (6)
- a
Egypt, U4L - England
F5j S3, S7, El (13) 1840 Aug - Eov
Egypt, U4L - Austria
P5, S3, S7, Nl (49)
Egypt, u4l - Druse
P2, C2*, Nl (5)
Ref: 52, 70, 71, 76, 186
92. 1st Opium War (3)
England, U4G, U6G - China, U4L, U6L
PI, C3, C4, E8*
Ref: 4, 70, 71, 88
93- Russia ys Khivan (l)
Khivan - Russia
PI, Bl, C3, M6
Ref: 56, 71, 186
94. Peru - Bolivia (l)
Peru, Tl (2) - Bolivia, Tl (0)
PI, Bl, Nl (23), N2 (2)
Ref: 71, 105, 130
95. Conquest of Sind (2)
England, U4G - Baluchis, U5L
P3, Bl, Cl*, C2*, B3*, E8, Nl (3)
Ref: 56, 71, 186
96. Gwalior War (l)
England, u4g - Mahrattas, U5L, T3, T4,
P3, Bl*, Nl (40), S7
Ref: 71. 186
97. Borneo Pirates (l)
England, u4g - Borneo, U4l
p4, C3
Ref: 71, 186
161
1840 Aug - Nov
I839 Oct - 1842 Aug
I839 - 1842
1841 Aug - 1841 Nov
1843 Jan - 1843 Apr
1843 Bee
T6
1845
162
98. 1st England - Sikh War (2) 1845 Jul - 181+6 Mar
England, U4G, U6G, T7 - Sikh's, U5L, U6L, t4, T7
Pl+, C2, N2 (J), S3
Ref: 42, 56, 71, 96,-186
99- Galician Revolt (l) 1846
Galician Peasants, M3 - Austrian Govt.
P3, E10*, K4
Galician Peasants, M3 - Galician Nobles
El, E2, K4
Ref: 71, 186
100. U.S. - Mexico (3) 1846 Apr - 1848 Feb
Mexico, U3, U4L, U6G, Tl (3), T3 - U.S., U4G, M2
PI, Bl, B4, B6, S3
Mexico, U3, U4L, u6G, Tl (3), T3 - Californians
P2, C2, E8
Ref: 27, 105, 126, 130, 158, 186
101. Bali (1) 1846 - 1849
Dutch, U4G - Balinese, U5L
P3, C2, C3
Ref: 71, 186
102. Revolt in Wallachia (l) 1848 -
Russia - Wallachia
P5, k4*, S7*
Turkey - Wallachia
P4, C2, El, E5, N2 (18)
Wallachia Aristocrats - Wallachia
P2, El, E5, K4
Ref: 7, 130, 186
103. French Revolt (3) 1848 Feb - 1848 Jul
French Govt., Ul, T2 - Middle Class, Ul, T2
P2, E5, m4
163
French Govt., Ul, T2 - Proletariat, T2
F2, El, E5, E6
Proletariat, Ul, 12 - Middle Class, Ul, T2
P2, El, E4, E6
Ref: 152, 190
104. 1848 Revolutions in Austrian Empiro (5) 1848 Mar - 1849 Oct
Liberals in Vienna, T2 - Austrian Govt., T2
P2, El, E5 1848 Mar - 1848 Nov
Magyars of Hungary - Austrian Govt., T2
P2, C2, E8 1848 Mar - 1849 Oct
Magyars of Hungary - Russians
P5, k4, S7 1848 Jul - 1849 Oct
Magyars of Hungary - Croats under Jellacic
P6, C6, E8
Ref: 4, 14, 71, 150, 190
105. Second England - Sikh War (3) 1848 Apr - 1849 Max
England, U4G - Sikh's, U5L
P3, Nl (2), C2
England, U4G - Afghan's Dost Muhammed
PI, B2*, B4*, Nl (6)
Ref: 42, 56, 71
106. Austria vs Piedmont and other Italian 1848 Jan - 1849 May
States (3)
Piedmont, T4 - Austria, T3, T4, u4L
PI, B6, C2
Piedmont, T4 - Rome
PI
Italian States, T4, T5, U5G - Austria, T3, T4, u4L
P3, C2, C6, E5
Italian States, T4, T5j U5G - France, T4
P5, Kl, Nl (45), N2 (33)
Italian States, T4, T5/ U5G - Rome, T4
P5, k4
107.
108.
109-
110.
111.
112.
164
Rome, T4 - Austria, T3, T4, u4l
PI, B6
Ref: 70, 71, 95, 152, 190, 213
Denmark - German (l) 1848 Mar - I85O
(late)
Danes, T6 - Prussians, M2
PI, B5, B6 " ' “
Ref: 4, 71, 130
South Africa (l) I85O Dec - 1853
(early)
England, U4G - Kaffirs, M3, U5L
P3, Bl, C3
England, U4g - Basuto
P3, Bl, C3
Hottentots - Basuto
P6
Ref: 71, 130, 186
French Coup d'etat (l) 1851 Dec
Republicans, Tl (3) - Louis Napolean, Tl (3), Ul, U2
P2, E5*, K2, K3
Ref: 71
Chile Revolt (2) I85I Oct - Nov
Liberals, T6 - Conservatives, T6
P2, E5, E7*, M4*
Ref: 71, 158
Second Burmese War (l) 1852 Apr - I852 Dec
England, u4g - Burma, u4l
PI, C3, M6, Nl (25)
Ref: 56, 70
Montenegro ~ Turkey (2) 1852 Oct - 1853 Mar
Turkey - Montenegro, T3
PI, Bl, C2, Nl (56)
Ref: 71, 130, 155, 186
113-
ill*.
115.
116.
165
Crimean War (8) 1853 Oct - 1856 Feb
Russia/U4L - France, Tl (2), T3, T4, T5
PI, B2, Kl, Nl (39), N2 (27), S2 1854 Apr - 1856 Feb
Russia, u4l - England
PI, B2, N2 (27), Nl (44), S2 1854 Apr - 1856 Feb
Russia, U4L - Turkey, U4g
PI, B3*, B6, E8, M2*, HI (24), N2 (20) 1853 Oct-1856 Feb
Russia, U4L - Piedmont, T3
PI, Ml 1855 Jan - 1856 Feb
Russia, U4L - Murids of Shamyl
P3, Bl, C2, M2, HI (6)
Russia, U4L - Circassians
P3, Bl, C2, HI (6)
Ref: 4, 6, 28, 29, 6l, 79, 130, 155, 169, 180, 186, 198,
213, 248
Colombia (l) 1854 Apr - Hot
General Melo, T2 - GoTt, T2
P2, E7, K4
Ref: 105, 248
Nicaragua (l) 1855 May - 1857 May
Walker's Group, K2 - Nicaragua Conservatives, T3, T4
P5
Walker's Group, K2 - Costa Rica, T3, T4
P5
Nicaraguan Liberals, T3, T4 - Nicaraguan Conservatives, T3, T4
P2, E5
Ref: 105
1st Mexican Revolution (2) 1855 - l86l
Jaurez - Conservatives
P2, El, E5, E6, E7, E8, K4
Ref: 130, 180, 186, 243, 248
117. England - Persia (l)
England - Persia
PI, B2, S3*
Afghans of Herat , Tl (l) - Persia
PI, Bl, S4*, Nl (18)
Ref: 4, 130, 186, 220
118. Second Opium War (3)
England, U4G, U6G - China, U4L, u6L
PI, B6, C3, C4, m6
‘ " ~ Prance, U6G - China, U4L, U6L
PI, B6, Cl, C4
Ref: 28, 78, 102, I30, 135, l86
119. Senegal (l)
Prance, T3 - Fula Muslims
P3, Bl, C2, M6
Ref: 73, 186
120. Great Indian Mutiny (3)
England - Indian Troops, T5
P3, El, E8, E10, M5
Ref: 28, 48, 121, 130, 186
121. Caucasia (l)
Russia, u4g - Murids of Shamyl, U5L
P3, Bl, C3*, C2, M2, Nl (2)
Ref: 180, 248
122. Indo-China (l)
Indo-China, U5L - Prance, U4G
P3, Bl, C2, C3, M2, M8
Indo-China, U5L - Spain
P5, Bl, M2
Ref: 39, 130, 186
166
1856 Nov - 1857 Apr
1856 Oct - i860 Oct
1857
1837 May - 1859 Apr
1857 - 1859
1857 Sep - 1863 Apr
167
123. Montenegro vs Turkey (2)
Turkey - Montenegro
PI, C2, Nl (5)
Ref: 71, 186
1 2k. War of Italian Union (5 )
Piedmont, U^+G - Austria, lA-L
PI, Bl, B3*, C2, B5, Nl (10)
Piedmont, U^t-G - Papal states
PI, E5, Nl (10)
France, U^G - Austria
PI, B2, N2 (10)
Ref: k, 28, 29, 71, 102, 130, 186
125. Dutch vs Boni (l)
Dutch - Boni, U5L
P4, Bl, C2, C i l -
Ref: 186, 2^7
126. Spain - Morocco (3)
Spain, T3, T4 - Morocco, T6
P4, C2, C3*, Bl*, Nl (38)
Ref: 71, 130, 186
127. Argentine Confederation (l)
United Provinces - Buenos Aires
P2, C2*, E5, E10, M6
Ref: 130, 186, 2^3
128. South Borneo (l)
Dutch, U^G - Bandjarmasin, U5L
P3, Bl, C2, C4
Ref: 186, 2kj
129. Colombia (l)
Liberals - Conservatives
P2, E5, E7
1858
1859 Apr - 1859 Nov
1859 - i860
1859 Oct - i860 Apr
1859 Oct - 1862 Feb
1859 - 1863
i860 - I96I Jul
ljo.
151.
132.
133.
168
Ref: 105, 130, 186
Italian Unification (l) i860 May - l86l Feb
Piedmont, U^t-G - Naples - Sicily, T2, T5, T6, U5
PI, C2*
Piedmont, U^G - Papal States, U^L
PI, C2*, Bl, N1 (l)
Piedmont, U^G - France, T4
PI, M7*, S^l, N2 (1)
Forces of Garibaldi - Naples - Sicily, T2, T3, T6, U5
P2, E6, El, E5
Forces of Garibaldi - Papal States, irt-L
P5, El, E5*, E6
Ref: k, 28, 71, 115, 213
Brigandage in South. Italy (2) l86l - I865 (early)
Govt, of Unified Italy - Forces encouraged by Bourbons,
P2, E5
Govt, of Unified Italy - Papal States
PI, E5, E7*, N1 (0)
Ref: 28, 71, 213
U.S. Civil War (9) l86l Apr - 1865 Apr
North, T2 - South, T2
P2, C2, E5, C5, E6
Ref: 126, 186
Mexican Expedition (3) l 86l Dec - 1867 Mar
Mexican Govt., T1 (l) - Mexican Conservatives
P2, El, E5, E7, K ^ t - 1861 Dec - 1867 Mar
Mexican Govt., T1 (l) - France, T^, K1
PI, C5, C2, C4, S3 1861 Dec - 1867 Mar
Mexican Govt., T1 (l) - England
PI, C5* 1861 Dec - 1862 Apr
169
Mexican Govt., T1 (l) - Spain
PI, C5*, HI (33) 1861 Dec - 1862 Apr
Ref: 4, 96, 102, 130, I98, 21+3, 248
134. Montenegro (l) 1862
Turkey, T6 - Montenegro
PI, C2*, HI (4)
Turkey, T6 - Christian Hercegovina
P4, C2, m4*, E8*
Ref: 71, 130
133• Belgrade (l) 1862
Serbia - Turkey's Troops, T6
P4, C2*, E8
Ref: 71, 155
136. Caucasia (l) 1862 May - 1864 May
Russia, U4G - Circassia, U5L
P3, Bl, C2, HI (7)
Ref: 6, 186
137. United States (l) 1863 Jun
Irish - Hegroes
P6, E10, E8
Ref: 159
138. Colombia - Ecuador (l) 1863
Colombia - Ecuador
PI, S4*, C7"
Ecuador Rebels - Ecuador
P2, E5*, E7, M2
Ref: 103, 130, 186
139- Polish Insurrection (l) 1863 Jan - 1864 May
Poland - Russia
P3, B4*, C2, HI (32)
Ref: 4, 28, 79, 130
170
140. Schleswig - Holstein (3) 186*1- Feb - 1864 Oct
Denmark,, U4L - Prussia, u4g
PI, Bl, B5, HI (l4)
Denmark, u4l - Austria, U4G
PI, Bl, B5
Ref: 4, 28, 29, 130
141. United States vs Cheyenne Arapohos (l) 1864 Jun - 1865 Oct
United States, U4G - Cheyenne Arapohos, u4l
P4, Bl, C3, E8
Ref: 27
142. Spain vs Peru and Chile (l) 1864 - 1865 Sep
Spain, T3 - Peru, T4
PI, Bl, B6, C2, N1 (38)
Spain, T3 - Chile
PI, M7, HI (38)
Ref: 71, 105, 130, 186
143. Great Way in La Plata (9) 1864 Jul - I87O Mar
Paraguay, K2, U4L, U6L, U7L - Brazil, U4G, U6G, U7G
PI, Bl, S4 1864 Nov - 1870 Mar
Paraguay, K2, U4L, U6L, U7L - Argentina, T1 (3), U4G, U6G, U7L
PI, Bl, S3 1865 May - I87O May
Paraguay, K2, U4L, U6L, U7L - Uruguay Colorados, T1 (l)
PI, Bl 1865 Feb - 1870 Mar
Uruguay Blancos - Brazil, u4g, U6G, U7G
P5, S7*, HI (12) 1864 Oct - 1870 May
Uruguay Blancos - Argentina, T1 (3); U4G, U6G, U7L
P3, Bl* 1865 Mar - 1870 Mar
Uruguay Blancos - Uruguay Colorados, T1 (l)
P2, K3 1864 Jul - I87O Mar
French - Argentina, T1 (3)j U4G, U6G, U7L
PI, S4*
l44.
145.
l46.
ikj.
148.
171
England - Argentina, T1 (3), U4G, U6G, U7L
PI, S4*
Ref: 105, 130, 186, 243, 248
Bhutan (l) 1865 - 1865 Nov
England, U4a, U6L - Bhutan, U4L, U6G
P4, C3
Ref: 71, 186
U.S. vs Sioux of Dakota (l) 1865 - 1868 Apr
(summer)
United States, U4G - Sioux, U5L
P3, Bl, C3
Ref: 27
Russia vs Bokhara (l) 1865 - 1868
Russia, U4G - Bokhara, U5L
P4, Bl*
Ref: 186
Seven Weeks War ( 5) 1866 Jun - 1866 Jul
Prussia, U4G, U6G - Austria, T3, U4L, U6L
PI, Kl, Bl, N2 (2), S6
Prussia, u4g, u6G - Bavaria
P4, C2*
Prussia, U4G, U6G - Saxony, U6L
P4, C2*
Prussia, U4G, U6G - Hanover, T6, U5L
P4, C2*
Piedmont, U4g - Austria, T3, U4L, U6L
PI, Bl, Kl, Kl (8)
Ref: 4, 28, 71, 130, 186, 213
Crete (2) 1866 Sep - 1869 Jan
Christian Crete - Turkey
P2, C2*, E8*, E10*
Ref: 115
1*4-9 • England - Abyssinia (l)
England - Abyssinia
PI, 03
Ref: 71, 186
150. Spanish Civil War (3)
Liberals, T2, Conservatives, 12
P2, El*, E5, E7, HI (20)
Ref: 4*4, 186
151. Cuban Revolt (7)
Spain, T1 (0) - Cuba
P2, C2, E5, E10, HI (17)
Ref: 130, 186, 2^3
152. Franco-Prussian War (8)
France, T3, T*4, U*4L, U6L, U7L, Ul, U2, IT
- Prussia and other German States, U*+G.
PI, Kl, SI, S3, S3, HI (55)
Ref: k, 28, 102, 130
153- Paris Commune (k)
Govt, of France, T1 (0) - Communards
P2, El, E5, E6, E7*, HI (23)
Ref: 110/ 152, 178
154. Algeria (l)
France, T1 (0), T3, T*4 - Algeria
P3, K3, K4, M5
Ref: 71, 186
155. Dutch vs Atjenese (l)
Dutch, U*4G - Atjenese, U5L
P3, Bl, C2, Ok, C3*, S3
Ref: 235, 2^7
172
1867 Sep - 1868 Apr
1868 - I873
;
1868 Oct - I878 Jan
1870 Jul - 1871 May
U6G, U7G
1871 Mar - I87I May
I87I Mar - 1872 Jan
1871 - 1873
156.
157-
158.
159-
160.
173
Tongking (1) 1873 - lB7^ Mar
France, T1 (2) - Tongking., T3, U5G
P3, Bl*, M6*
France, T1 (2) - Black Flag Bandits
P5
Ref: 71
Russo - Turkish (8) 1875 Jul ~ 1878 Feb
Turkey, T2, T3, Ul, UlL, u6l - Russia, Ul, UtG, U6G
PI, Bl*, M7, B6, E8, HI (19), S3 1877 Apr
Turkey, T2, T3, Ul, U*+L, U6L - Herzegovina, U5G
P3, C2, M*t, E8, HI (13) 1875 Jul -
Turkey, T2, T3, Ul, Ul+L, U6L - Bulgaria, U5G, U6G
PI, E8, M7, HI (1*0, C2, M * l - I876 Mar
Turkey, T2, T3, Ul, U*+L, U6L - Montenegro, U5L, U6G
pi, e8 , M7, h i (1* 1 - ) 1876 Jul -
Turkey, T2, T3, Ul, U*4-L, U6L - Serbia, U5G, U6G
pi, Bl*, e8, M7, hi (l*t) 1876 Jul -
Turkey, T2,’ T3, Ul, U*tL, U6L - Rumania, U5G
P * 4 - , Bl*, C2, E8, -M5- 1877 May _
Ref: kj W-, 19, 91, 103, 130, 186
U.S. - Sioux (1) 1875 Oct - I876 Hov
United States, T2, U*t-G - Sioux, U5L
P3, Bl, E8
Ref: 27, 159, 161, 186
Colombia (l) I876 Jun - 1877 Jan
Liberals - Conservatives
P2, E5, E7
Ref: 105, 2^3, 2k&
Austria - Bosnia (3) I878 Jul - 1878 Oct
Austria - Bosnia-Hercegovina, U5L
Pk, Bl*, C2*, S3*
Ref: 71
161. England vs Afghan (2)
England, U4G - Afghan, U5L, u4q
P4, C2, S3, S7*, N1 (36)
Ref: 4, 96
162. Selge of Geok feke (4)
Russia, U4G, T7 - Tekke, U5L, T7
P3, Bl, C2
Ref: 79, 186
163. Patagonia (l)
Argentina - Indians
P2, Bl*
Ref: 74
164. Zulu War (2)
England, U4G - Zulu, U5L
P3, Bl, C2*, C3*, M6
Ref: 96, 186, 197
165. England - Basuto (l)
England, u4g - Basuto, U5L
P3, Bl, C2
Ref: 71
166. War of Pacific (3)
Chile, U4G - Peru, u4l
PI, Bl, C5, M6, N1 (40), H2 (13)
Chile, U4G - Bolivia, U4L
PI, Bl, E10, C5, El (40), M6*
Ref: 74, 105, 130^ 186, 243
167. Chile (l)
Chile - Araucania
P2, Bl, M5
Ref: 105, 164
174
I878 Nov - 1880 Sep
1878 - 1881
I878 Mid - 1883
Early
I879 Jan - 1879 Aug
1879 - 1881
1879 Feh - 1883 Dec
1880 ~ I883 late
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
Dalmatia (l)
Austria - Dalmatians
P2, E10*
Ref: 186
Russian Pogrom (l)
Russia, T1 (0), T2 - Jews
P2, E8
Ref: 79, 97
Mahdl War (5)
Sudan, M2, U5L - England, U^G
Pb, Bl, BJ, C2, S3
Sudan, M2, U5L - Egypt, U^G
P3, Bl, B3, C2, R1 (5)
Sudan, M2, U5L - Abyssina
P5
Sudan, M2, U5L - Italy
P5, Bl*, E8
Ref: 130, 131, 186
Egypt (2)
England, T2, u4g - Egypt, T1 (3), T2,
pb, B3, C2, C3, C5, E8
Ref: k, 96, 130, lk6, 201
Tongking (3)
France, UUG - Tongking, U5L
P3, Bl, C3*, M6, HI (8)
France, U^G - Black Flag Bandits
P3, 03*, HI (8)
France, TAG - China
pi, S3, sb, Hi (23)
Ref: 71, 130
175
1881
l88l Apr
1881 Aug - 1900 Jan
1883 Mar -
1885 - 1889 Mar
1893 Dec - lQ9b Jul
1882 Jun - Sep
, U5L
1882 Mar - I885 Jun
1883 Nov - 1885 Jun
173- Madagascar (l)
France - Madagascar, U5L
P4, Bl, M6
Ref: 71, 90
174. Colombia (l)
Govt. - Liberals
P2, E5, E7*, K3
Ref: 105, 186
175. Serbia - Bulgaria (2)
Serbia - Bulgaria
PI, B2, N2 (7)
Ref: 4, 96, 103, 131, 186
176. Burma (3)
England, U4G - Burma, U5L
P3, Bl, c4, E8, N1 (33)
Ref: 71, 1°5, 130, 186
177. East Africa (2)
Germans, U4G - Coast Arabs, U5L
P3, Bl, C2, E8, m4
Ref: 71, 113, 130
178. Senegal Area (l)
France, U4g - Ahmadu, U5L
P3, Bl, C2, C3*
Ref: 186, 24l
179. Dahomey (2)
Dahomey, U5L - French. U4G
P3, Bl, C2, C3, C4
Ref: 71, 186, 2hl
176
1883 Jun - 1885 Dec
1884 Nov - I885 Aug
1885 Nov - 1886 Apr
1885 Nov - 1886 Jan
1888 Aug - I89O Jun
1888 - I898 Sep
1889 Mid - 1894 Jan
l8o.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
177
U.S. Lynchings (2) 1889 - 1918
Whites - Negroes
P2, E8*
Ref: 152
Chile (3) 1891 Jan - I89I Sep
Chile Govt. - Revolutionaries
P2, E5, E7, K3
Ref: 74, 105, 130j 186
Bali (1) 1891 - 1894 Nov
Holland, U4G - Balinese Hindu Rulers, U5L
P3, S2*, S7* 1894 Jul -
Sasaks, U5L - Balinese Hindu Rulers, U5L
P2, E8, m4
Ref: 186
German Conquest of East Africa (2) 189I ~ 1898
Germany, U4G - East African Tribes, U5L
P3, Bl*, C2, C3*
Ref: 113, 186
Congo (3) 1892 May - 1900 Oct
Belgium - Arab Slave Raiders
P3, C3, Bl
Ref: 71, 186, 200
Brazil (2) 1892 Jun - 1894
Brazil Govt., T1 (3)> T2 - Rebels
P2, E5, K3j K4*, M4
Ref: 71, 74, 105, 130, 186
Matabele War (l) 1893 Jul - 1899
England, U4G - Matabele and Mashone, U5L
P3, Bl, C2, C3, M3*
Ref: 186, 197, 241
187. Race to Lake Chad (l)
France - Tribes on Western Lake Chad
P3, Bl
Ref: 200
188. Madagascar ( 2 )
France - Madagascar
P3, 02, E8, M6, N1 (9)
Ref: 103, 130, 186
189. Peru (l)
Rebel Faction - Peru Govt., T2
P2, K3, M h
Ref: 7^, 230
190. Chitral (l)
England - Chitral
PL, C3*, S3*
Ref: 7L, 96
191. Kenya (l)
England - Coast Arabs
P3, E8, K3
Ref: 71, 186
192. Spanish American (6)
Spain, U^L, U6G - U.S., U^G, U6L
PI, Bl, B3, Kl*, C5*, M4, M2, M6
Spain, U^L, U6G - - Cuba. U5G, T2
P2, C2, M^, El (17)
Ref: 12, 71, 105, 130, 159, 161
193. Greece - Turkey (l)
Greece, U6L - Turkey, U6G, ULL
PI, Bl, B6, e8
178
1893 - 190L
189^ Wov - 1896 Jan
1895 Mar
1895 Mar - 1893 Apr
1895 Jun - 1896
1893 Feb - 1898 Jul
1898 Apr -
1896 May - 1897 May
1897 Feb -
179
Crete, U5G - Turkey, U6G, u4l
P2, C2, E8, m4, N1 (30)
Ref; 71, 96, 130
194. Canudos Revolt (2) 1896 Oet - 1897 Oct
Brazil Govt., T1 (2) - Jaguncoes
P2, C2, E8*
Ref: 51j 186
195- Philippine Revolt (l) I896 Aug - 1898 Feh
Spain - Philippines
P2, C2, E10*, m4
Ref: 24, 176
196. N.W. India (2) 1897 Jul - 1898 Apr
England, U6G - Afrldl, U6L
P4, C3, e8
England, U6G - Mohmand
P4, C3, E8
Ref: 71, 186
197* England - Benin (l) 1897 Jun - 1900
England, U4G - Benin, U5L
P3, C2*, C3
Ref: 71, 186, 2kl
198. Buganda (l) 1897 Jun - 1901
Mwanga of Buganda, U5L - England, U4G
P3, K3*
Sudanese Mercenaries - England, u4g
P3
Ref: 130, 241
199- Sierra Leone (2) 1898 Apr
England, U4G - Mende, U5L
P3, Bl, C3, E10
Ref: 71, 186, 200
200. Venezuela (l)
Rebels - Govt.
PS, K 3
Ref: 71, 7^
201. China (i+)
China,, T3, U6L, U^t-L - China Christians
P2, E8, KU*
China, T3, U^+L, U6L - Japan, U6G
PI, B6, C2, C^, E8, Kl (5)
China, T3, U^L, U6L - Russia, U^G, U6G
PI, Bl, B6, C2, C4, E8, M5
China, T3j U^L, U6L - England, U6G
PI, B6, C2, Ok, E8, Kl (4)
China, T3, U^L, U6L - U.S. ~ U6G
PI, B6, C2, C4, E8
China, T3, U^L, U6L - Germany, U6G
PI, B6, C2, Ck} E8
Ref: 71, 97, 103, 130, 132, 159, 161
202. Colombian Civil War (6)
Liberals - Conservatives
P2, E7, E5, Kl (U)
Ref: 71. 105, 186
203. United States - Philippines (k)
U.S., U^G— Philippines, U5L
P3, Bl, C2
Ref: 159> l6l, 186
20b. Boer War (^)
Boer, U5L - England, UUG
P2, Bl, B6, C2, C4, M^, Kl (18)
Ref: 71, 96, 131, 132, 186
180
1898 Dec - 1903
1899 Oct - 1900 Oct
1900 Jun -
1900 Jun -
1900 Jun -
1900 Jun -
1900 Jun
1899 Jul - 1902 Oct
1899 Feb - 1902 Jun
1899 Oct - 1902 May
205.
206.
2 07.
2 08.
209.
210.
British Somaliland, (l)
England - Mullah
P3, C3
Somali Tribes - Mullah
P2, C3
Italy - Mullah
P5, C3
Ahyssinia - Mullah
P5, C3
Ref: $6, 186, 21*6
Ashanti (l)
England - Ashanti
P3, Bl*, 02*, C3
Ref: 186, 21*1 v
Baluchi (l)
England, Ul*G - Yola, Bornu, Sokoto and
P3, Bl, 03*, m6*
Ref: 71, 186, 200
Macedonia (2)
Macedonia - Turkey
P3, C2, E10, MU
Ref: 33, 71
Angola (l)
Portugal - Bailundi
P3, M6, E10
Ref: 200
Pogrom in Russia (2)
Russia, T3, Tl* - Jews
P2, E8, Kl*
Ref: 223
181
1899 Jun - 190^ May
1903 Apr -
1903 Apr -
1900 Mar - 1900 Oct
1901 Feb - 1903 Feb
Baluchi, etc., U5L
1902 Apr - 1903 Sep
1902 - 1910
1903 Apr - 1905 Oct
211. Tibet (1)
England - Tibet
PI, S2
Ref: 185
212. Uruguay (l)
Colorados - Blancos
P2, K3
Ref: 16k
213. Russo - Japan War (7)
Russia, T3, T5, U^L - Japan, U^G
PI, B2, B3*, M6, E2 (!+), S2
Ref: 97, 130, 131, 1^0, 186
2l!+. Germans vs Hereros (6)
Germans, U^G - Hereros, U^L, U6L
P3, Bl*, C2*, E8*, M^*, El (7); M6
Ref: 130, 186
213. Russia (2)
Govt. - Workers, Peasants
P2, El, E5, E6, M^+
Ref: 79, 97, 130, 178, 186
216. Germans vs Wangoni (7)
Germans, U^G - Wangoni, U^L, U6L
P3, C2*, E8, m6
Ref: 186
217. Zulu War (2)
England - Zulu
P3, E10, M (27)
Ref: 186, 197
182
1904 Jan ~ Apr
190J +
190U Feb - 1905 Aug
190^ Jan - 1908
1905 Jan - 1906 Jan
1905 Jul - 1907 Jan
1906 Mar - Jul
218. Rumania (2)
Peasants - Govt, and Landlords
P2, El, E10
Peasants - Jews
P6, El*, E8
Ref: 71, 186, 246
219. Morocco (l)
Morocco, U5L - France, U4G
P4, Bl, C3, C5, E8, S7
Morocco, U5L - Spain
P 5 , C 3
Ref: 40, 71, 95, 150, 186
220. Spain vs Rifs. (3)
Spain, U4G, U6G - Rifs., U5L, U6L
P3, Bl, C2, C3, E8, El (49)
Ref: 17, 71, 128, 183, 186
221. Mexican Revolution (7)
Diaz - Madero
P2, E5, E7, m4
Diaz - Carranza
P2, E5, E6, E7
Diaz - Villa
P2, C3, K2
Diaz - Zapata
P2, El, E6, E8, M2
Huerta - Madero
P2, E7, K4, K2, N2 (l)
Huerta - Carranza
P2, E5, E7, K2, N2 (1)
Huerta - Villa
P2, C3, K2, N2 (l)
183
I907 Mar - May-
1907 Mar - 1908 Jan
1909 - 1912
1910 Nov - 1919 Jul
1910 Nov - 1911 May
1910 Nov - 1911 May
1910 Nov - 1911 May
1910 Nov - 1911 May
1911 May - 1913 Feb
1913 - 1914 Jul
1911 Nov - 1914 Jul
222.
223.
224.
184
Huerta - Zapata
P2, El, E6, E8, M2, H2 (l) I91I Nov - 1914 Jul
Huerta - U.S.
Pi, C3, 05, s4 1913 - 1914
Villa - Carranza
P2, C3, K2, W2 (1) 1914 Aug - 1915 Jul
Villa - U.S.
P5, C3, K2 1916 Jan - 1917 Feb
Zapata - Madero 1911 Hov - 1913 Feb
P2, El, E6, E8, M2, N2 (l)
Zapata — Carranza
P2, El, E6, E8, M2, N2 (l) 1914 Aug - 1919 Jul
U.S. - Carranza
PI, C3 1916 Jan - 1917 Feb
Ref: 67, 74, 105, 186, 243
Portugal (3) 1910 Oct - 1927 Jun
Various Factions for Change, Ul - Against Change, Ul
F2, El*, E3, E7, K3, K4
Ref: 67, 71, 130
French Conquest of Morocco. (3) 19IO Nov - 193^
France, U4G - Various Moroccan Groups, T1 (2), U5L
P4, Bl, C2, C5, E8, HI (2)
Moro.ccan. Groups Allied with France - Various Moroccan Groups,
T1 (2), U5L
P6, Bl, K3
Ref: 17, 128, 186
Tripolitanlan War (4) 1911 Sep - 1912 Oct
Italy, U4G - Turkey, U4L
PI, Bl, M5, S3
Italy, U4G - Senussi
P3, Bl, S3*
Ref: 4, 76, 130, 186, 211
185
225. 1st Balkan War (6) 1912 Oct - 1915 May
Turkey,, T1 (4), T3, U4L - Bulgaria, U4G
PI, Bl, B6, B5, E8*, M5, N1 (34)
Turkey, T1 (4), T3, U4L - Greece, u4g
PI, Bl, B5, B6, E8*, M5, HI (Ik)
Turkey, T1 (4), T3, U4L - Montenegro, U4G
PI, Bl, B5, B6, E8, M5, HI (34)
Turkey, T1 (4), TJ, U4L - Serbia, U4G
PI, Bl, B5, B6, E8, M5, HI (3k)
Ref: k, 75, 130, 211
226. Second Balkan War (4) 1913 Jun
Bulgaria, U4L - Greece, U4G
PI, Bl, H2 (0)
Bulgaria, U4L - Serbia, U4G
PI, Bl, H2 (0)
Bulgaria, U4L - Rumania, u4g
PI, Bl, H2 (0)
Bulgaria, U4L - Turkey, U4G, T1 (5), T3
PI, Bl, Bit, M5, HI (0)
Ref: 130, 211
227. World War I (ll) 1914 Aug - 1918 Hov
Germany, U4L, Ul, U2, U3, U7A, T7 - England, UlfG, U6G, U7G, T7
PI, B2, K2, M6, S3, SI, S5
Germany, U4L, Ul, U2, U3, U7A, T7 - France, U4G, U6G, U7G, T7
PI, Bl, Bit, K2, SI, S3, H2 (lk)
Germany, U4L, Ul, U2, U3, U7A, T7 - U.S.', U6G
PI, C3, M2, M6, H2 (17), S3 . 1917 Apr -
Germany, U4L, Ul, U2, U3, U7A, T7 - Arabs, U5G
P5, C2 1916 Jun
Germany, UltL, Ul, U2, U3, U7A, T7 - Russia, T7
PI, B2, K2, H2 (14), SI, S3
Germany, U4L, Ul, U2, U3, U7A, T7 - Serbia, T7
PI, K2*, SI*, S3
186
Germany, U4L, Ul, U2, U3, U7A, T7 - Belgians, U6G
P I , S 3
Germany, U4l, Ul, U2, U3, U7A, T7 - Japan, U4G
PI, Bl, H2 (14)
Germany, U4L, Ul, U2, U3, U7A, T7 - Italy, U4G
PI, Bl, Ml, m (16) 1916 Mar -
Germany, U4L, Ul, U2, U3, U7A, T7 - Rumania, U4G
PI, Bl, Ml 1916 Aug -
Germany, U4l, Ul, U2, U3, U7A, T7 - Portugal
PI
Austria-Hungary, U4L, Ul, U2, U7A, T3, T7 - England, U6G, u4g,
U7M, T7
PI, S3
Austria-Hungary, U4L, Ul, U2, U7A, T3, T7 - France, U4G, U6G,
U7M, U4G, T7
PI, S3, H2 (14-), HI (55)
Austria-Hungary, U4L, Ul, U2, U7A, T3, TJ - U.S., U6G
PI, M2, N2 (IT), S3 1917 Apr -
Austria-Hungary, U4L, Ul, U2, U7A, T3, T7 - Arats, U5G
F5, C 2 1918 H ot -
Austria-Hungary, U4L, Ul, U2, U7A, T3, T7 - Russia, T7
PI, B6, SI, S3
Austria-Hungary, U4L, Ul, U2, U7A, T3, T7 - SerMa, T7
PI, Bl, B5, Kl, S2, S5
Austria-Hungary, U4L, Ul, U2, U7A, T3, T7 - Japan, U4G
PI, Bl, H2 (l4)
Austria;Hungary, U4L, Ul, U2, U7A, T3, T7 - Italy, U4G, U6G, .
T7
PI, Bl, Ml, N1 (48), H2 (14) 1915 Jun -
Austria-Hungary, U4l, Ul, U2, U7A, T3, T7 - Rumania, u4g
PI, Bl, Ml 1916 Aug
Austria-Hungary, U4L, Ul, U2, U7A, T3, T7 - Czechoslavakia,
U5G
P2, C2, E8
Austria-Hungary, U4L, Ul, U2, U7A, T3, T7 - Armenians
P2, C2,-E8
187
Austria-Hungary, UAL, Ul, U2, UJA, T3, T7 - Portugal
PI
Turkey, T3, U^L, U6L - England, U^+Q, U6G, U7M, T7
PI, Bl, HI (58), S3
Turkey, T3, U^L, U6l - Prance, U^+G, U6G, U7M, T7
PI, Bl, N1 (58), S3
Turkey, T3, U^L, U6L - Arabs, U5G
P3, 02, E8 1916 Jun -
Turkey, T3, U^L, U6L - Russia, T7
PI, B3, E8, HI (36)
Turkey, T3, U^-L, U6L - Japan
PI
Turkey, T3, U^L, U6L - Italy, U^G, U6G, T7
PI, Bl, HI (3) 1915 Aug -
Turkey, T3, UAL, U6L - Greece, T3
PI, Bl, E8, HI (U), H2 (4)
Turkey, T3, U7L, U6L - Persia
PI
Bulgaria, U6L, U^L - England, U^G, U6G, U7M, T7
PI 1915 Oct -
Bulgaria, U^L, U6L - France, UAG, U6G, U7M, T7
PI 1915 Oct -
Bulgaria, U^L, U6L - Russia, T7
PI, N2 (37) 1915 Oct
Bulgaria, U^L, U6L - Serbia, T7
PI, Bl, E8*, Ml*, HI (2), H2 (37) 1915 Oct
Bulgaria, U^L, U6L - Italy, U^G, U6G, T7
PI 1916 Aug
Bulgaria, U^L, U6L - Rumania, U^+G
PI, Bl, Ml, HI (3), H2 (3) 1916 Aug -
Bulgaria, U4L, U6L - Greece, T3
PI, Bl, E8*, HI (4), H2 (1+) 1917 Jun -
Ref: 4, 75, 97, 130, 152, 157, 183, 186, 204, 205, 225
228.
229.
230.
231.
188
U.S. Intervention In Haiti (2) 1915 Jul - 1920 May
U.S. - Haiti, U5L
P4, B3, B6, C2, Ed, S3, 87, C5
Ref: 23, 71, 105, 130, 191
Turkestan (3) 1916 Jul ~ 1916 Dec
Govt. Russia, T3, T4 - Groups in Turkestan
P2, Bl*, E8, MU, Ul (4l)
Ref: 31, 186
Dag1stan Revolt (2) 1917 late - 1921 Feb
Govt. Russia, T.1 (0), T3 - Dagistan
P2, C2*, E8*, M2*, M5*
Ref: 6
Russian Revolution (9) 1917 Dec - 1922 Nov
Red Russia, T1 (0), U^L - Groups of White Russia
P2, El, E5, E6, Kk, M4
Red Russia, T1 (0), U^L - Groups of Former Russian Empire,
U5G
P2, Bk, C2
Red Russian, T1 (0), U^L - Czechs
P5
Red Russians, T1 (0), U^L - England
PI, N2 (0), SJ+ 1918 Jun - 1919
Red Russia, T1 (0), U^L - France
PI, N2 (0), Si+ 1918 Aug - 1919
Red Russia, T1 (0), U-^L - U.S.
PI, N2 (0), Sk 1918 Sep - 1919
Red Russia, T1 (0), U^L - Japan
PI, Bl, S l l - , N2 (0) 1917 Dec - 1922 Nov
Red Russia, T1 (0), U^L - Italy
PI, S4, N2 (0) 1918 - 1919
Ref: k, 75, 97. 152, 157. 183. 20^, 205, 225
189
232. Finland (b) 1918 Mar - 1918 Jul
Red Finland - White Finland, U5G
P2, El*, E5, E6
Eed Finland - Germany, T3, T^
P5, B6
Eussia, T1 (0), T3 - White Finland, U5G
P5, Bl*, B6*, C2*
Eussia, T1 (0), T3 - Germany, T3, Hb
Pl, B2*, El (0), S2
Ref: b, 71, 130, 186
233. Poland vs Ukraine (l) 1918 Nov - 1919 Apr
Poland, U^G - Ukraine, T ^ t - , U^L
PI, Bl
Eef: 4, 75, 97, 157, 204, 205
23^. Eussia vs Poland (3) 1918 Nov - 1920 Oct
Eussia, T1 (0), T3, Ute, U6L - Poland, U5G, U6G
P3, Bl, C2, HI (5*0
Eef: 67, 71, 130, 186
235. Argentina (l) 1919 Jan
Govt., T5 ~ Workers, T5
P2, El, M**-*
Jews - Workers, T5
P6, E8*
Eef: 71, jb, 2b8
236. Third Afghan War (2) 1919 May
England - Afghan, T1 (0), U5G
P4, C2*, K3, M5*, El (39)
Ref: 55, 219
190
237-
238.
239.
2kO.
2kl.
Amritsar Massacre^ l) 1919 Apr
England - India, M3
P3, S7*> C3*
Ref: 71, 130
India (2) 1919 May ~ 1920 May
England - Wazirs and Mashuds . -
P3, C2*, E8, El (2), S7
Ref: 71, 186
Hungary (2) 1919 Mar - 1920 Feb
Hungary of Bela Kun, Ul - Hungary Aristocrats, Ul
P2, El, E5, E6
Hungary of Bela Kun, Ul ~ Czechoslavakia
PI, Bl
Hungary of Bela Kun, Ul - Rumania
PI, Bl, S4
Ref: 67, 71, 186
Anatolia (5) 1919 May - 1922 Oct
Turkey Kemal, T3 - Greece
PI, Bl, B k-, M5* 1922 Oct
Turkey Kemal, T3 - France
PI, Bl, B i t - , M3, M6, El (1) 1921 Oct
Turkey Kemal, T3 - Italy
PI, Bl, M3, El (1) 1921 Feb
Turkey Kemal, T3 - Turkey Conservatives
P2, K4
Turkey Kemal, T3 - England
PI, Bl, B6*, B i t - , M5, Ml (l) 1921 Feb
Ref: - h, 67, 76, 130, l l t - 9 , 186
Ireland (l) 1919 Eov - 1922 Jun
England, T2, U lt - L - Southern Ireland, U5G
P2, C2, E8, ___
Ref: 67, 71
242. Germany Communist Revolt (2)
Government - Communists
P2, El, E5, E6
Government - Conservative
P2, K4 ■ -
Ref: 71, 67, 130
243. Iraq. (2)
England, u4G - Iraq., U5L
P3, Bl, C2, E8*, M6*
Ref: 76, 130, 148, 186
244. Prance vs Syria (2)
France, U4G - Syria, U5L
P3, Bl, B3, B6, C2, M6*
Ref: 76, 149, 186, 194
243. Rif War (5)
Rifs, U5L - Spain, T3, Ul, U4G
P3, Bl, C2, E8, M4*, N1 (10)
Rifs, U5L - France
P4, S3
Ref: 17, 67, 71, 128, 130
246. Moplah Revolt (3)
England - Moplah
P3, C3, E8
Hindu India - Moplah
P6, E8
Ref: 71, 186
247. Libya (5)
Italy, T1 (0), U4G - Senussi and other
P3, Bl, C2, E8*
Ref: 4, 71, 186
191
1919 Jan - 1920 Jun
1920 Jul - 1920 Dec
1920 Jul
1920 Apr - 1926 May
1925 Apr - 1926 May
1921 Aug
1922 Jul - I929 Oct
Libyan groups
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
Bulgaria (2)
Govt. Bulgaria - Agraro - Communists
P2, El, E5, E6
Eef: 67, 71, 130
Indonesia (l)
Dutch - Indonesia Communists, T2
P3, C2, M2
Ref: 93
Druse Rehellion (2)
French - Druse, T2
P3, Bl, C2, C5, C6, M4
French - Arab Syria, T2
P3, C2
Ref: 71, 1^9
Nicaragua (l)
Nicaragua Rebels - Nicaragua Govt., Ul
P2, K3
Nicaragua Rebels - U.S.
P5, B3, B6*, S3, S4, S7
Ref: 23, 105, 130, 163, 243, 248
Colombia (2)
Government - Peasants
P2, El*, E10*
Ref: 80
French Indo-China (l)
French - Indo-China Communists
P3, C2, C3, M2, N1 (4^
Ref: 93, 186
192
I923 Sep - 1926 Feb
1925 late - 1927 Jan
1925 Jul ~ 1927 Feb
1925 Aug - 1927 Feb
1926 May - 1929
1929
1930 Feb - 1931
25*1-. India (l)
England - Followers of CSiandi
P3, C2, C6, M2*
Ref: 62, 238
255. El Salvador (2)
Government - Indians
P2, El, E5, E6,
Ref: 193, 199
256. Brazil (l)
Govt. Brazil, T1 (2), T2 - Sao Paulo, T2
P2, C2*, K3*
Ref: U , 130
257. Colombia vs Peru (l)
Colombia, T2, T3 - Peru, T1 (l), 12, T3,
PI, B1
Ref: 105, 111, 130
258. Chaco War (7)
Bolivia, T2, Ul, U^L - Paraguay, T2, Ul,
PI, Bl, B3
Ref: 105, 130, 186, 2V5
259. Nazi Coup try in Austria (l)
Austrian Govt. - Nazi
P2, E5, E9
Ref: * 1 - , 67, V-j 130, 172
260. Germany vs Jews (10)
Germany - Jews
P2, P5, E8, E3, E4, M2
Ref: k, 67, 71, 130, 172
193
1930 Apr - 1931 Pec
1932 early
1932 Jun - 1932 Aug
1932 Sep - 1933 May
T*+, Ul
1932 Jul - 1935 Jun
U*i-G
1933 Dec - 193**- Aug
1933 - 19^5
261. Spain (2)
Govt. Spain - Catalonia
P2, C2, E5, E6
Ref: 67, 130
262. Stalinist Purges (4)
Govt. Russia - Bureaucracy
P2, K3
Ref: 97, 130, 172
263. Ethiopian War (3)
Italy, U4G - Ethiopia, U5L
F3, Bl, C2, K2, Ml (39)
Ref:
264. Waziristan (l)
England - Faqir of Ipi
P3, C3*, E8, M2*, HI (l4)
Ref: 62, 172
265. Spanish Civil War (10)
Spanish Govt. - Spain Falangists
P2, E5, E6, E7, K4, M2*
Spanish Govt. - Italy
P5, S4
Spanish Govt. - Germany, T3
P5, S4
Spanish Govt. - Basques
P2, C2
Russia, T4 - Spain Falangists
P5, S4
Russia, T4 - Italy
PI, S4
Russia, t4 - Germany, T3
PI, S i t -
19^
1934 Oct
1934 - 1939
1935 Oct - 1937 Oct
1936 - 1938
1936 Jul - 1939 Mar
1936 Nov -
1937 May -
1936 Oct - 1936 Nov
1936 Nov
1936 Nov -
195
Basques - Spain Falangists
P2, C2*
Ref: 4, 67, 71, 130, 172, 186
266. Russia vs Japan (2) 1938 Jul - 1939 Aug
Japan - Russia, t4
PI, Bl*, B2*, S6, El (33)
Ref: 97, 172
267. Russia vs Finland ( 6) 1939 Roy - 1940 Mar
Russia, U4G - Finland, u4l
PI, B3, SI, S3, N1 ( 21)
Ref: 97, 172, 186
268. World War II (ll) 1939 Sep - 1943 Aug
Germany, Ul, U4L, U6L, U7L, T7 (out 1945 May) - Poland, T7
PI, Bl, M2, S6
Germany, Ul, U4L, U6L, U7L, T7 (out 1945 May) - Czechoslavakia
PI, Bl, B5, M2, S6 1940 -
Germany, Ul, U4L, U6L, U7L, T7 (-1945 May) - French, T7
PI, B4, M2, R1 (21), SI, S3, S5, S6
Germany, Ul, U4l, U6L, U7L, T1 - England, U4G, U6g, U7G, T7
PI, M2, El ( 21), SI, S3, S5, S 6 - 1945 May
Germany, Ul, U4l, U6L, U7L, T7 - U.S., U4G, U6G, U7G, T7
PI, M2, N1 (22), S3, S6 1941 Dec - 1945 May
Germany, Ul, U4l, U6L, U7L, T7 - Canada, T7 - 1945 May
_ PI, M2, S6
Germany, Ul, u4l, U6L, U7L, T7 - Denmark
PI, B3, M2, S6 1940 Apr - 1945 May
Germany, Ul, U4L, U6L, U7L, T7 - Norway
PI, B3, M2, S 6 1940 Apr - 1945 May
Germany, Ul, U4L, U6L, U7L, T7 - Belgium
PI, B3, M2, N1 (22), S6 1940 May - 1945 May
Germany, Ul, U4L, U6L, U7L, T7 - Holland
PI, B3, M2, S6 1940 May - 1945 May
196
Germany, Ul, U4L, U6L, U7L, T7 - Greece
PI, M2, S6 19^1 Apr - 19^5 May
Germany, Ul, U4L, U6L, U7L, T7 - Russia, T7
PI, N1 (24), SI, S3, S3 1941 Jun - 1945 May
Germany, Ul, U4L, U6L, U7L, 17 - Yugoslavia
P5 1940 - 1945 May
Germany, Ul, U4L, U6L, U7L, T7 - Brazil
PI, MS 1942 Aug - 1943 May
Germany, Ul, U4L, U6L, U7L, T7 - Australia
PI - 1945 May
Germany, Ul, U4L, U6L, T7 - New Zealand
PI - 1945 May
Japan, U4L, U6L, U7L, T7 - French, T7
PI, S6 1945 Mar
Japan, U4L, U6L, U7L, T7 - England, U4G, U6G, U7G, T7
PI, N2 (21), S6 1941 Dec -
Japan, u4l, U6L, U7L, T7 - U.S., u4g, U6G, U7G, T7
PI, M6, N2 (22), S3, S6 1941 Dec -
Japan, U4L, U6L, U7L, T7 - Canada, T7
PI, S6 1941 Dec -
Japan, U4L, U6L, U7L, T7 - Holland
PI, S6 1941 Dec -
Japan, u4l, U6L, U7L, T7 - Russia, T7
PI, Ml, N1 (7) 1945 Aug -
Japan, U4L, U6L, U7L, T7 - Australia
PI 1941 Dec -
Japan, U4L, U6L, U7L, T7 - New Zealand
PI 1941 Dec -
Japan, u4l, U6l, U7L, T7 - China, T7
PI, Bl, S4, S6
Italy, T7 (-1943 Sep) - Poland, T7
PI 1940 Jun - 1943 Sep
Italy, T7 (-I943 Sep) - Free French, T7
PI, Bl, N2 (22) 1940 Jun - 1943 Sep
19'
Italy, T7 (-1943 Sep) - England, U4g, U6G, U7G, T7
PI, N2 (21) 194o Jun - 1943 Sep
Italy, T7 (-1943 Sep) - U.S., u4g, U6G,
PI, N2 ( 23)
U7G, T7
1941 Dec - 1943 Sep
Italy, T7 (-1943 Sep) - Canada, T7
PI 1940 Jun - 1943 Sep
Italy, T7 (-1943 SeP) - Belgium
PI 1940 Not - 1943 Sep
Italy, T7 (-1943 Sep) - Holland
PI 1941 Dec - 1943 Sep
Italy, T7 (-1943 Sep) - Greece
PI 1940 Oct - 1943 Sep
Italy, T7 (-1943 Sep) - Russia, T7
PI, S3 1941 Jun - 1943 Sep
Italy, T7 (“1943 Sep) - Yugoslayia
P5
1940 1943 Sep
Italy, T7 (-1943 Sep) - Brazil
PI, M6 1942 Aug - 1943 Sep
Italy, T7 (-1943 Sep) - Australia
PI 1940 Jun - 1943 Sep
Italy, T7 (-1943 Sep) - Ethiopia
P3, C2, N1 (4) 1940 Jul - 1941 Nov
Italy, T7 (-1943 Sep) - New Zealand
PI
1940 Jun - 1943 Sep
Vichy France, Ul, T7 _ Free French, T7
P2 1941 Jun - 1945
Vichy France, Ul, T7 - England, U4G, U6G, U7U, T7
PI, N2 ( 0) 1940 Jul - 1943
Vichy France, Ul, T7 - U.S., U4G, U6G,
PI, N2 (22)
U7G, T7
1942 Nov - 1945
Vichy France, Ul, T7 ~ Norway
PI 194l Jun - 1945
Vichy France, Ul, T7 - Australia
PI 194l Jun - 1945
198
Finland, U4L, U6L - Russia, T7
PI, B3, C2, N1 (2) 1941 Jun - 1944 Sep
Rumania - England, U4G, U6G, U7G, T7
PI, Ml 1941 Pec - 1945 May
Rumania - Russia, T7
PI 194-1 Jun - 1944 Aug
Thailand - China
PI 1942 Feb -
Thailand - England
PI 1942 Feb -
Thailand - Australia
PI 1942 Feb -
Ref: 4, 67, 97> 130, 172, 186, 194
269. England ys Iraq, (l) 1941 Apr - 1941 May
England - Iraq. Rashid All, T1 ( 0)
P4, B3, C2, E8*
Ref: 149, 194
270. Palestine ( 3) 1940 - 1949 Feb
England - Jews, U5G
P3, B3*, C2*, C3*, S7*, M3 to 1948 May
Arabs of Palestine, u4l - England
P3, C3*, S7* 1947 Nov - 1948 May
Arabs of Palestine, U4L - Jews, U5G
P6, Bl, E8
Arab States of Egypt: Iraq., Jordon, Syria, Lebanon - Jews, U5G
PI, Bl, B6 1948 May - 1949 Feb
Ref: 92, 185, 207
271. Peru vs Ecuador (l) 1941 May - 1941 Aug
Peru, T3 - Ecuador, T4
PI, Bl
Ref: 105, 130, 133/ 227, 243
199
272. U.S. (1) 19-5 Mar - 19^3 Sep'
U.S. “ Whites - Negroes in Various Cities
P2, E8, Ml (25), T5
Ref: Morrison, Riot Report
273* Greece (2) 19^ Dec - 19^5 Feb
Greek Right - Greek Left
P2, El, E5, E6
England - Greek Left
P5, S i t - , S7
Ref: lJO
274. Syria (l) 19^5 Juri
French, T3 - Syrians, U5 (G)
PI, C2, E8*, HI (19)
Ref: 11*9
275. Algeria (l) 19^5 Apr
France, T3 ~ Moslem Algeria
P3, C2*, E8*
Ref: 130
276. Indonesia (4) 19^5 Sep - 19^9 Dec
Holland, U^L - Republic Indonesia, U5G
P3, C2, E8, M5
Holland, ulj-L - Communist Indonesia
P3, E5, E8 I9I8 Sep - 1948 Nov
England - Republic Indonesia, U5G
P5, S7
Communist Indonesia - Republic Indonesia, U5G
P2, E5 19^8 Sep - 19^+8 Nov
Ref: kj 156, 207
277-
278.
279-
280.
281.
200
Bolivia (1) 19^6 Jul
Govt., T1 (j) - Rioters
P2, El*, E5, K4, T2, Ul
Ref: 67, 7^, 105, 1^, 186
Indian Communal Riots (9) 19^-6 Feb - 19^8 Dec
Hindus - England
F3, S7
Hindus - Govt. Pakistan
P2, C2, E8, S7
Hindus - Moslems
P6, C2*, E8*, M3*
Moslems - England
P3, S7
Moslems - Govt. India
P2, C2, E8, S7
Govt. India - Govt. Pakistan
PI, Bl, B3, E8
Ref: 67, 130, 207
Greece (3) 19^6 Sep — 19^9 Dec
Govt. - Communists ’
P2, El*, E5, E6, KJ+*, M^*, T2, HI (l)
Ref: 92, 206
1st Vietnam War (8) 19^-6 Jan - 195^-
French, T3, U^t-L - Vietminh, U5G-
P3, C2, C5*, E5*, E6, E8, E10, M2*, M5, N1 (15)
Vietnam Elite - Vietminh, U5G
P2, El, K3
Ref: k, 67, 127, 175, 207, 216
Madagascar (l) 19^7 Mar - 19^7 Jul
France, T3 - Madagascar
P3, C2, E8
Ref: 130, 186
282. Aprista Revolt Peru (l)
Peru right - Peru Aprista
P2, E5, E6, uk*, K^, T1 (0), T3
Ref: jk, 231, 2^3
283. Colombia (7)
Conservatives - Liberals
P2, El*, E5, J&, MU, N1 (19), T2
Conservatives - Protestants
P2, E8*
Conservatives - Pinellas
P2, K2, UK*
Pinellas - Literals
P2, K2, M^*
Ref: 67, 7^, 92, 105, l^1 ) - , 2^3
28^. Malaya (k)
England - Communist
P3, E5, C2
Moslem Malaya - Communists
P2, E5, E8
Ref: 181, 207
285. Korea (10)
North Korea - U.S.
PI, S2, S3, S4
North Korea - South Korea
PI, Bl, S6
North Korea - England
PI, S2, S3
North Korea - Turkey
PI
North Korea - Australia
PI
201
19^8 Jul - 19^9 Jan
1948 Apr - 1958 Dec
1953 - 1957 May
1953 - 1957 May
19^8 Jun - i960 Jul
1950 Jun - 1953 Jul
North Korea - Canada
PI 1950 Dec
North Korea - France
PI
North Korea - Thailand
PI
North Korea - Greece
PI
North Korea - Netherlands
PI
North Korea - Ethiopia
PI
North Korea - Colombia
PI
North Korea - Philippines
PI
China, T1 (l) - U.S.
PI, N2, S2, SU, S5
China, T1 (l) - South Korea
PI
China, T1 (l) - England
PI, N2, S2, S5
China, T1 (l) - Turkey
PI
China, T1 (l) - Australia
PI, N2
China, T1 (l) - Canada
PI, N2
China, T1 (l) - France
PI, N2
China, T1 (l) - Thailand
PI, N1
China, T1 (l) - Greece
PI
China, T1 (l) - Netherlands
PI, N2
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
China, T1 (l) - Ethiopia
PI
China, T1 (l) - Colombia
PI
China, T1 (l) « Philippines
Ref: 137, 148, 161, 207, .214, 216
Bolivia (l)
Government - MNR .
P2, El, E5, N1 (6), T2, Ul
Ref: 67, 74, 105, 144
Morocco (2)
France, U4L, T3 - Morocco, U5G
P4, C2, E8
Ref: 53, 128, 166
Kenya (4)
England,- Mau Mau
P3, C2*, El, E5*, E8, E10, M2*
Ref: 195, 207
French vs Tunisia (2)
French, U4L, T3 - Tunisia, U5G-
P3, C2, E5*, E8
Ref: 67, 166
East Germany (l)
Protestors - East German Govt.
P2, E5, M4*
Protestors - Russia
P5, E5, M4*
Ref: 67, 189, 232
Algeria (6)
France, T3, U4L - Moslem Algeria, U5G-
P3, C2, E8, M5, R1 (9)
1952 Apr
1952 Sep - 1955 Nov
1952 Oct - 1956 Nov
1952 Feb - 1956 May
1953 Jun
1954 Jul - 1962 Jul
204
Ref: 4, 125, 207
292. Suez (4)
Egypt, T1 (5), T7 - England
PI, B3, C5, E8, S3*, S6*
Egypt, T1 (5), T7 - Prance
PI, B3, C5, E8, S3, S6
Egypt, T1 (5), T7 - Israel, T7
PI, SI, S5, E8
Ref: 4, 18, 67, 159, 194, 207, 216
293. Hungary (5)
Russia, T4 - Hungary Rebels
p4,- C2, B3*, c4*, E5, e8, m4*
Hungary Govt. ~ Hungary Repels
P2, E5, m4*
Ref: 3, 67, 189, 207
294. Spanish Africa (l)
Spain, U4L - Morocco, U4G
P2, Bl, E8
Ref: 53
295. Congo (4)
Belgium - Congo Army
PI, B6, E8, m6
Katanga - Congo Army
P2, C2
Katanga - U.K.
P5, B6, S7
Baluha Tribe - Congo Army
P2, C2
Baluba Tribe - U.K.
P5, B6, S7
Baluba Tribe - Belgium
P5, B6, E8, M6
1956 Oct - Nov
1956 Oct - I957 Jan
1957 Jun - 1958 Feb
i960 Jul - past end
of i960
205
Congo People - Congo Army
P 6
United MatIons - Congo Army
PI, S7
Ref: 55, 166, 23J +
296. United States - Vietnam (9) i960 Jun -
Vietcong - S. Vietnams
P2, El, E5, E6, K5, N1 (6)
Vietcong - U.S.
P5, S2, S^
Worth Vietnams - South Vietnam
PI, Bl, N1 (9) 1963
Worth Vietnams - U.S.
PI, S2, Sk 1965 Jun -
Ref: 38, 55
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Creator Denton, Frank Hardy (author)

Core Title Patterns In Political Violence And War, 1751-1960

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program International Relations

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,political science, international law and relations

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Advisor Berkes, Rose N. (committee chair), McClelland, Charles A. (committee member), Murray, Ray (committee member)

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