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The Philosophical Anarchism Of William Godwin: His Philosophy Of Man, State And Society

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The Philosophical Anarchism Of William Godwin: His Philosophy Of Man, State And Society

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Content This dissertation has been 64-13,511 microfilmed exactly as received THOMAS, James Andrew, 1933- THE PHILOSOPHICAL ANARCHISM OF WILLIAM GODWIN: HIS PHILOSOPHY OF MAN, STATE AND SOCIETY. University of Southern California, Ph.D., 1964 Philosophy University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan TfiB PHILOSOPHICAL AMARCHISM 07 WILLIAM QODWIMl HIB PHILOSOPHY 07 MAM. 8TATB AML SOOHTT *7 J ams Androv t h o u A Diooortotion Prooontod to tho 7ACULTT 07 TH1 0BAD0AT1 SCHOOL UMIVBBBITI 07 SOUTHXBM CALUORHIA In Vnrtlal Tulfillnont of tho Roqulroaonto for tho Dogroo DOCTOR 07 PHIL0307HI (Philosophy) Juno 1964 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA THE OHADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY PARK LOS ANOELES. CALIFORNIA S 0007 This dissertation, written by _______ under the direction of h..lA.J)issertation Com mittee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by the Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of requirements fo r the degree of D O C T O R O F P H IL O S O P H Y Date,..... DISSERTATION COMMITTEE CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1 Chapter Is GODWIN'S PHILOSOPHY OP HUMAN NATURE 34 Chapter II: OPPRESSOR OP MAN: THB POLITICAL INSTITUTION 130 Chapter III: A SOCIETY OP ANARCHISM 189 Chapter IV: SUMMARY AND CRITICISMS 228 BIBLIOGRAPHY 244 INTRODUCTION: PROLEGOMENA It is on# of th# ironies of modern history that William Godwin, historian, pamphleteer, author of children's books, novelist, political propagandist, and author of one of the truly outstanding books on political philosophy, should best be remembered as the second Pather-in-lav of Shelley. But such is the plight of the man, now virtually unknown except to a few specialists, who fought to have the Rights of Man of Thomas Paine published (only to attaok them later), who synthesized and built upon and went beyond those writers who have gained a lasting place for themselves in the histories of liberalism, utilitarianism, socialism, psychological hedonism and, of course, anarchism. Indeed, Godwin is more famouB for the "schools" and movements attributed to him than he is for nis own explicit thought. This is irony built upon irony. As one writer has noted: Godwin, who disapproved of all organized schools of thought and political movements, nas had so many fathered upon him, often opposed to each other. Prom the quarry of Political Justice can be picked out passages to show that he was an advocate not only of lioeral humanism but of utopian socialism, anarchism and communism, as well as distributivism and Victorian self-nelp.x Not omy has Godwin been overlooked by the general reader, ^Grylls, R. G., mn-iym Godwin end hie World (London: Odhams Press, 1953), 38. Hereafter cited in text as WGW. but those who hare botharod to road him, even in hia own time, have foisted views upon hla which ha narar lntandad should baar hla naaa. Ona of tha purpoaaa of thla dieeer- tatlon la to daaonatrata thoaa Idaaa oftan attrlbutad to Godwin which ara (1) rapudlatad by Godwin hlaaalf, or (11) lnoonalatant with tha oorpua of hla writings. It iat perhaps, to ba azpaotad that thara would not ba unanimity of thought on tha part of historians of political thought towards Godwin. In his own day ha was revered, ri- dieulad, and daapisad. Tha same faalinga aziat towards him today. Ha haa baan referred to as a "philosophic horse- leech," an author who shows in hia novels tha "maniacal tendencies of an abnormal character,tha flrat soiantlfic socialist,* ona who oonvarts utilitarianism Into commu nism,^ to mention only a small sampling of tha labels that have baan applied to him. Again’ , his major philosophical 2Godwln, Villiam, Blonamsnt of Percy Bysshe Shelley and Mary Voiletoneoraftoodwin 13x7 Louis:Privately pub lished, l^Il, with noiesDy o. Porman), 12. Hereafter cited in tazt as Klopamant. ^Deen, P. H., "She Genesis of Martin Pabar In Caleb Williams." Modern Language Votes, Lu (I§44), 3l7T ^Driver, C., "William Godwin," in tical Ideas of Soma BaprasantatlTS ThlnEers of ; tlonary fra. adT by F.J. oV Hearnsnaw (London: uzroi traivereityPress, 1931)* 150. Hereafter oitad in tazt as 8PR. ^Halevy, Vila: The Growth of Philosophic Hadlcaliem. trans. by Mary Morris, London, 1928.First American adi- tlon: (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), 204. Hereafter cited in tazt as QPE. 3 work, Political Justice. has been eallsd nothing more than "an •zeroise in the phantasy of Utopian construction” (8PE: 178), an effort in which logical precision takes preoedenes oyer the world about it, and where the author "placidly ig nores all inconvenient facte,"** as well as a work in which any possibility for sentiment in life has been precluded (SEE*: 172). Misinterpretation and invective: these appear to be Godwin'a lot at the hands of the historian of thought. Usually such distortion can be explained by noting that the average commentator reads only Political Juatloe. and this in a cursory fashion only. Godwin wrote more, much more. And his writings, taken together, form one unitary system. However, many interpreters satisfy themselves with a super ficial analysis of the work noted above, with a condescen ding smile being given to his notion of human perfectibil ity. And occasionally it happens that a writer will interpret Godwin in such a way as to make one wonder whether he has read anything of the former at all: Vhat ezoited the repugaanoe of Godwin's contemporaries was the fact that his philosophy, while apparently directing human activity to a noble goal of unselfish achievement, in reality confused ethical values and tended to brutalize oharaoter and to encourage relent less egoism. ^Stephen, L., History of Jtag^ish Thought in the Ught eenth Century (London: Macmillan, 1^02), It, Here after died as (BTH). 7Allen, "Reaction Against Godwin," Iff, XVI (1918), 68. In practically idealiatic, eold and bloodleae, Irration ally optialetic: tha typical "cloaet philosopher." fhia ia tha picture which ia ueually painted of Godwin. What doaa Godwin hiaaelf a ay about auoh oharaotariatioa aa are uaually attributed to hia? Pirat, aa oonoarna ona who would ahut hiaaelf up in a rooa to speculate, totally divorcing hia aelf froa reality, Godwin ia unequivocal: It ia comparatively eaay for the philosopher in hia oloaet to invent Imaginary aoheaea of policy, and to ahew how aankind, if they were without paaeiona and without prejudices, aightpbeat be united in the font of a political community. - - Hothing could be further froa Godwin'a intention than to fall into thia pattern. And, though thia anticipatee a major point to be aade in a later ohapter, it can be pointed out here and now that Godwin expreaaly warna againat taking q too optlaietic a view. Again, he tella ua that nature la "red in tooth and claw" (£J: IV. xi). These are hardly the pronounoeaenta one would expect to hear froa one indulging in the "phantasy of Utopian cone true tion." A point that few coamentatora on Godwin bring out ia Godwin, Villiaa, History of the Coaaonwealth of Eng land . 4 vola. (London: Colburn, lflJ?4-8), IVi 575. here after oited in text aa HOB. ^Godwin, Villiaa: Inquiry Concerning Political Justice and ita Influence on Morale ana Happiness" Photographic faoeiaileor tneTnlrdldiiion corrected. Edited with Var iant Beading of the Piret and Second Bdltione and with a Critical Introduction and lotea, by P. E. L. Prieetley (Toronto: Toronto Univeraity Preaa, 1946), IV. xi. Here after cited in text aa ££. tha fact that Godwin was, for all his faults, and dsspita all of tha unquestioned influence which oparatad upon him, a highly original thinkar. For example (and just to men tion a minute portion of his originality), ona cannot read his major work without seeing a vary obvious anticipation of J.S. Hill*a sphere of individual sovereignty, as wall as Harz's notion of capitalism ending in class warfare (PJ: II. v; VIII. i). Godwin made other contributions to tha history of thought, and these will be brought out in sub sequent chapters. The proceeding paragraph was not meant to convey the idea that Godwin borrowed from no one. He did borrow; but, he was also originals His work, on the one hand, is in a very real sense a synthesis of the speculation of the previous century, possessing all the general features of that specula tion, both as to attitude and as to method. On the other hand, it states for the future its major prob lems and provides the starting-point for muoh of its speculation (SP&:146). Another word should be added about the influences on Godwin. He lived in the eighteenth century, and, it appears fair to say he was foroed, by his position in space and time, to make use of certain ooncepts and means of expres sion which were ourrent at the time: "the language of utility was almost inescapable for a writer of Godwin's generation" (PJ: intro., 15)* In a similar manner, it was perhaps impossible for Godwin to adopt anything but the prevailing sensationalism, derived from Locke. However, and this will become more important aa we proceed, in both instances cited Godwin waa faoed with implications, because of the idioma and conceptions of the day whioh he accepted but which are not compatible with hia fundamental beliefa (PJ: intro., 9)* Herein lies one clue aa to why Godwin is misinterpreted ao often. Another major reason for the misunderstandings whioh permeate much of the literature on Godwin is that "he has been regarded as a political reformer, whereas he was primarily a moralist."10 If one makes the judgment a priori that Godwin was an anarchist, anxious to bring down the walls of Parliament, distortion is inevitable. Because Godwin is so often classified as a "friend" of the so-called revolutionary poets, a brief mention of his attraction to and for certain young writers of his time will perhaps be not uncalled for.11 There can be no question but that Godwin attracted to himself many poets, eager for social justice. Many of these, from being disciples of Rousseau, became diaoiples 10Monro, D. H., Godwin’s Moral Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), 7. Hereafter oited in text as GMP. ^Because Godwin's life has been treated so extensive ly, nothing more than brief biographical glimpses will be made in this present effort. There are many good biograph ies on Godwin; see, e.g., Woodcock, Grylls, Brown, eto. of Godwin (OPR: 200). lBoa£ thon woro (in addition to Shelley) Wordsworth, South*y, and Coleridge. Though impor tant, hla relations with these men will not be discussed, except to point out that, even here, certain authors have been able to see only the macabre in Godwin: The time shows a Godwin for whoa the romantic poets could easily feel a kinship, who shared with them the tastes for nightmares, for abnormal psychology, for the thriller and mxstery, and for the persecuted re jects of society.AZ Cruttwell'a description of Godwin is not only false, but misleading. It presents a picture of an introverted pedant, looking inward for the bisarre. It oannot begin to describe the situations in whioh Godwin found himself, the real danger he experienced, the great constructive work he was looking forward to writing. Consider, for example, the spring of 1791* It was at this time that Thomas Paine, whom Godwin had met just a short time before, published his celebrated pamphlet, "The Rights of Nan," in answer to Burke's "Reflections on the french Revolution." Godwin had seen fragments of Paine's work in manuscript form, and seems to have written of it in terms of praise.1^ ▲ friend of Godwin, Holcroft, having seen the entire pamphlet, 12Cruttw*ll, P., "On Caleb ViUiams," Hudson Review. 11*95, Spring, 1958. 1^Paul, Kegan, William Godwin* His friends and Con temporaries. 2 vols. (Boston*Paul, 1876), 1*69.Hereafter cited in text as Paul. 8 addressed to Godwin a "little twiatod not#," worth insertion here ae evidence of the fervour of spirit whioh animated men in days when such eager utterances esoaped from a press, over which hung the terrors of the pillory* and of prose cutions for high treason: I have got it - If this do not cure my cough it is a damned perverse mule of a cough - The pamphlet - Froa the row - But mum - Ve don't sell it - Oh, no * Bars and Sgge - Verbatim, ezoept the addition of a short preface, which, as you have not seen, I send you ay copy - lot a single castration (Laud be unto God and J. 3. Jordan!) can I discover - Hey for the Hew Jeru salem! The millennium! And peace and eternal beati tude be unto the soul of Thomas Paine (Paulti. 69). Though a bit more reserved than his friend Holcroft, Godwin was, nevertheless, ecstatic with the publication of Paine's work (even though, as we shall see, he opposed Paine on mopt major points). He was eager for change, eager for social Justice. And when, from across the channel, there came signs that the despotism of the decadent French monar chy would perhaps give way to Liberty, Fraternity and Equality, he made his feelings known. He also gave them permanent form by crystallising them in diary form: This 1789 was the year of the French Revolution. Mj heart beat high with great swelling sentiments of Liberty. I had been for nine years in principles a republican. I had read with great satisfaction the writings of Fousseau, Helvetius, and others, the most popular authors of France. I observed in them a system more general and simply philosophioal than in the majority of English writers on political subjects; and I could not refrain from oonceiving sanguine hopes of a revolution of whioh such writings had been the precur sors. Tet I was far froa approving all that I saw even in the ooaaenceaent of the revolution ... I never for a aoaent ceased to disapprove of mob govern ment and violence, and the iapulses which men oollected together in multitudes produce on each other. 1 desired such political ohanges only as should flow purely from the clear light of the understanding, and the erect and generous feelings of the heart (Paul: i, Godwin's continuing interest in practical affairs of men is of great importance, not only because of the light such information casts upon Godwin, the man, but because of the insight which this data gives us into Godwin's 14. purposes as revealed in his writings. He was a specula- tively inclined thinker, with an intense concern for man's affairs of this world. B. Godwin's System. It has been said that "sovereignty is the problem of modem politics."1^ And so it was in Godwin's day. Upon what basis does one erect a political system? Who shall rule, and Why? and, perhaps most crucial of all, What is the nature of political obligation? These are some of the questions of supreme importance to whioh Godwin directed himself, questions the answers to whioh political philosophers froa Plato to Godwin's time had sought, Godwin was a scholar, and was, therefore, conver- 1*Merken, J. V., "Wm. Godwin's writings for the lew Anwufci Register," Modem Jggfggge lotes. Mov. 53, 479. ^Jones, W. T., Masters of Political Thought, 3 vole, s Harrap, 1953)* iisSl. Hereafter cited in text 10 eant with the great thinkers of the past. Butt ... in Godwin'a opinion, the political writers froa Plato to Paine had failed to go to the heart of the natter. He would dig doeper. He would delwe into the baslo principles whioh gorsm hunan relations within sooiety. He would detemine once and for all that form of political institution nost conducive to hunan welfare and happiness. He would show nen the truth, and the truth would liberate thsp. ° If the great thinkers who had proceeded Godwin had failed to lay bare the principles upon which any lasting and just sooiety oust be based, ewen more was this true of his contemporaries• But, whereas the majority of writers of times gone by had stopped short in their analyses of the true foundation of social relations, his friends oloser in time had completed their investigations, but had, in the process, arrived at erroneous conclusions. Their faulty principles were many: about human nature, sovereignty, the purpose of government. But, above all, they had divorced morality from government, and "politics having been thus violently separated from morality, government itself has no longer been compared with its true oriterion" (P£. II. i). Political theorists had lost sight of the true end of man's social arrangements, because they had lost sight of its basic principles. Consequently, what was called for, and ^Preu, J. A., the Bean and the Anarchist. Florida State University Studies, Humber Thirty-three (Tallahasseet Florida State University Press, 1959), 19. Hereafter oited in text as B&. 11 what Godwin wished to offer, m a complete, systematic and unlreraal system, founded upon a few simple but certain principles. "Like Plato and Rousseau, Godwin is ooncexned, not with a political programme, but with an analysis of sooiety and, above all, of the cause of 'prejudice,' or laek of Insight" (QMft 8). And, In Godwin's own wordst At length I conceived the plan of Polltloal Justice* I was convinced that my object of building to myself a name would never be attained, by merely repeating and refining a little upon what other men had said, even though I should Imagine that I delivered things of this sort with a more than usual point and eleganoe* The world, I believed, would aooept nothing from me with distinguishing favour, that did not bear upon the face of it the undoubted stamp of originality* Having long ruminated upon the principles of Political Justioe, I persuaded myself that I could offer to the public, in a treatise on this subject, things at once new, true and important.17 Godwin, then, would write a comprehensive treatise on political philosophy. But he would profit from the mistakes of those who wrote before him, as well as from those of his contemporaries. He would not make the same mistakes as they, for his system would be founded upon an adequate picture of man. He would borrow froa some, reject others; he would Improve, refine, oreate. In particular, he would utilise. Unfortunately, his work on human nature falls a bit short of his expectations, for he has before him a moral ^Godwin, William, Fleetwood (Londons Bentley, 1832), preface, vi. Hereafter cited in text as Fleetwood. 12 portrait of man, and, in hia daaira to breatha life into thia picture, ha 8omatimaa borrows principlaa whioh ara mutually incompatible. Thia antarpriaa, tha infallible reault of which would ba an antira "unity of plot" (Float- wood: prafaoa, viii), waa designed to ba ayntopio in aoopa. Thua, it would be quite irralarant to him to haar a oooman- tator aay: . . . it ia uncompromis ingly intallaotualiatlo in tona, aa examination of tha dootrina reveals, and ia com- plataly lacking in that emotional driving power of romantioiaa which Rousseau introduced into politioal theory OPR: 147) • Arid it might ba, but it would ba trua. Thia waa tha conviotion Godwin had about hia teak. But in hia haata to develop hia aooial and politioal arohitectonio, and baoauaa of hia oloaa proximity to many ideas contemporary with him as wall as those past, it has baan suggested that his "system" is in reality only a patchwork of tha theories of others. Historians of thought have noted that Godwin based his psychology upon tha thaoriaa of Condillac, Hartley, Hume, *nd Locke and that ha draw his arguments against free doms of tha will from Jonathan Bdwards and Hume. Further, it has baan assarted that ha learned tha affect of politioal institutions upon tha formation of character froa Helvetiua, Holbaoh and Rousseau and that Beecaria influenced hia views concerning orima and punishment. Locke, Hably, Nora, 13 Ogilvie, Plato, and Wallace have been cited as ths sources of his theory of property, and it has been pointed out that he borrowed his argument against the divine right of kings from Looks, and his argunents against the contract theory from Hume. It has also been suggested that Godwin's fear of the power of the oantralised state was a part of ,the Dissenting tradition and that he followed Butler, Hume, Hutcheson, and Shaftesbury in asserting the practicability of disinterested action (PA* 30). Ve shall examine some of these charges later in this dissertation. The task Godwin set himself was a broad, one. And, as Priestley points out, "A political philosophy presupposes a moral philosophy; a moral philosophy rests upon metaphysi cal and psychological presuppositions" (PJ: intro., 5)* What were the presuppositions which formed the basis of his system, and froa whioh his goals oould be derived? For one thing, Godwin accepted both physical and psychological determinism. And here, once again, one sees the two forces at work which served as causative faotors, influencing Godwins the ideas current at his time, and his desire to arrive at certain ends. Shust He adopts the familiar eighteenth-century conception, influenced largely by Hdvtonian mechanics, of the universe as a vast system of interrelated events, an eternal ohaln of causes and effects, or, as he prefers to express it in the third edition, of antecedents and consequents. Bvery event is at once cause and effect; all is one determined succession (££t intro., 6). 14 Besides determinism (whioh ho appears to hare borrowod froa Bubo), ho aoooptod Hartloj*o theory of tho association of Idoao (GERi 193) t though ho ahoarod it of tho ldoa of "Tibratioaa," In ordor not to burdon hlnaolf with an untonablo materialism. Ho borrowod froa Hartley again, thia tlao tho thoory of noooaaary and lndofinito progress (QPBi 193)* finally* ho owod to Holvotius what might bo oallod hia lntollootualiaa (though, aa wo ahall boo, thia torn ia not quito appropriato). It waa abaolutoly noooaaary that Godwin oonatruct a acionoo of tho human mind, and it ia for thia roaaon that ho waa forood to raj act freo will. Hia "necessitarian hypo tho aia*1 served hia onda batter than did tho thoala of arbitrary action. To ahow that Godwin waa tendentious in this respect, wo noed only boar in mind that, for Godwin, if thoro waa to bo significant change for tho batter, it had to bo in tho roalm of aorality. And, alao, ho adds (changing hia argument), items of dally experience will support his denial of free will. For example, not a day pasaos that ia without a person being exhorted by another to mend hia ways. But, ho assorts, noral exhortation really presupposes noceoaity (££: IV. vii). His more basic reasons for postu lating psychological determinism will become evident as wo proceed. Godwin's psychology ia of great interest, slnee it 15 shows tha many divergent aehoola of thought whioh Godwin draw upon, for exaapla, ha followa tha aanaatlonaliat psychology in hia dafinition of tha aalf i "nan ia merely a haing oapabla of inpraaaion, a raoipiant of perceptions, a vehicle through which oauaaa oparata (PJ: intro., 10). However, aan appaara to have an inmadiata intuitive know- ladga of tha aziatanoa of hia own thoughts, Ideas, percep tions, or aenaations, and "it ia this oonaoiouanaaa whioh forma tha notion of aalf" (PJ* intro., 10). Again, thoaa writara who hava aaan in Godwin only a oraaa aanaatlonaliat hava ovarlookad a wary important tradition whioh influancad Godwin: tha:Platonic tradition. Bacauaa: from Plato, Godwin adopts a dootrina of atamal and imautable truths, existing indapandantly of tha Craator, and sarring aa a formal causa in tha prooasa of ersation (P£: intro., 8). Msntlon waa mada above of Hartley, and of Godwin's dabt to him. Actually, Godwin's dabt to Hartlay is not graat but is mada to saam ao by thoaa wrltars who hava aaan only ona graat psychological principle, that of association, operating in Godwin's system. We shall sea that association actually plays a rather meager role in his thoughts. It ia usual to classify Godwin, not only aa an asaocl- ationiat and as a determinlst, but aa tha supreme apostle of reason. In point of faot, it ia difficult to elasaify 16 him in this respect. H* wavered between ths two schools of thought concerning man's fundamental source of motivation (i.s.f between reason and feeling); "and in the end he is closer to Hutcheson or Hume than to Clark or Price" (GMT: 36). This problem is probably the most important of those with whioh Godwin had to grapple, and it will be treated extensively in chapter II. Suffloe it to say now that Godwin was not entirely consistent here. His eagerness to establish the supremacy of reason led him at first to underestimate the part played by the emotions; this waa a fault which he remedied progressively, so that his doctrine approaches Hume's (PJ: intro., 12). Godwin1 S treatment of metaphysical and psyohologioal matters is extensive enough only to answer those questions with which le is concerned, and is entered into only for this purpose. The same is true with respeot to religion, and commentators on Godwin present _a spectacle of collective diversity when considering this question. Answers here range from "The place of the Creator in the closed universe is somewhat doubtful" (PJ: intro., 8), to "Por a discover able God he substituted a discoverable universe" (SPR: 133)- I em inclined to accept the latter interpretation here, and for the reasons this commentator gives: Por a discoverable God he substituted a discoverable universe. Por grace working silently in the heart of 17 man he substituted reason . . . For the need of con version he substituted the need for eduostion (9PR: 153). The reason why Godwin tends to give much cursory treat ment to religious questions is that he is; at heart, a humanist. And as a humanist he was anxious to see man's lot improve. He was convinced that change is the very core of our existence, and if we do not change for the better, we must change for the worses Improvement is the appropriate raoe of man. Ve cannot stand still. If we do not go forward, we shall inevitably recede (TQM: 557 • Men improve, Godwin was convinced, when their morals undergo a qualitative change for the betters the change must be internal. Hence, the connection between happiness and virtue is crucial for hla,-as it has been for every political philosopher of great stature. Morality must permeate society, our social relations must hold a position of highest importance in any workable ethics such was God win's conviction. And such would be his program. In this he was helping form the great tradition of utilitarianisms Those who have read Mill's account of his father must have been struck by the extent to whioh Utilitarianism was not merely a political doctrine, but a moral attitude.18 18fawney, H. H., Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (N.T.s Meator, 1926),202. Godwin ostensibly accepted tha theory of utility in morals, and ha considsrsd hiasalf a atriot utilitarian. But ha mada important modifications in tha thsory, so that, in tha and, his version of utilitarianism bsars little rasamblanoa to that, for azampla, of Bantham. The reasons for tha changes ha introduced hare are numerous. Por ona thing, ha inherited "a passionate religious belief in tha aaeredness of tha individual,and this is inconsistent with a calculation of tha greatest good for the greatest number (without a naive faith in the identity of interests). On tha other hand, it has been said that Godwin was a friend of humanity, and that he oared little for mere man (QMI: 57). But this charge is, it is clear, mare invective. Godwin needed tha theory of utilitarianism, and yet ha never felt oomfortable with it. Halevy (QPR: 192) tells us that Godwin's moral theory is tha moral theory of utility. Godwin himself never tires of telling us that virtue is only the calculation of consequences. At one point he is driven to admit that, on utilitarian principles, nothing is positively bast £J: IV. zi). But later he can make tha statement that "The human species at large is interested in . . • justice, as it teaches them to place their respect and affection upon those qualities which best deserve to ^"William Godwinx Apostle of Universal Benevolence," London Times Literary Supplement. April 4, 1936, 289. 19 be esteemed and loved"20 [aj italics^* Tha point hara is that ha is making reference to qualities in an absolute, and not a relative, sense* This has baan seen by only a few writers on Godwin, and than often indistinctly. Godwin's necessity for, and adherence to, absolute values is suggested whan it is said that tha moral and political system Godwin erected is grounded on absolute sincereity; and that sincerity is given the first place on his list of virtues (GER: 202, referring to PJs IV. vi). The writer in question here attempts to show that Godwin Justified sincereity on the basis of its utility value, though this is a different question from that of whether or not Godwin him self adhered to a set of transoedent values. I am convinced Godwin did so adhere; for this would explain his inconsist ency with, and his infidelity to, utilitarianisms The insistence upon absolute and eternal truth means a rejection of the moral relativity of the Utilitar ians, and places Godwin with the Platonic rationalists rather than with the empiricists. The great theoretical stumbling block for utilitarian thinkers was, and remains, the question of altruistic 20Godvin, William, Memoirs of the Author of 'A Vindi cation of the Bights of Woman^ (Condons Johnson, 17$d), 2. Hereafter cited In taxi as Jfcemoira. 2^Priestley, P. S. L., "Platonism in William Godwin's Political Justice." Modern Language Quarterly, IV (1943), 63* Hereafter cited in text as Platonism. behavior. Godwin realized in a sore perceptive manner then did many of hie contemporaries that one 'a answer to this question really resolves Itself into questions of human nature. And on the subject of human nature few utilitarian writers have made lasting contributions. Usually they have failed to do so because of the way in whioh they handled human motives. But, as Godwin himself pointed out, concern for our neighbor must be antecedent to distress at his misfortune; a desire to perform duty must be antecedent to satisfaction in the performance of it (PJ: intro., 22; IV. z). The manner in which Godwin handles human motivation was what truly distinguished film from most thinkers of his time. In the preface to the first (1793) edition of Political Justice. Godwin stated that he conceived politics to be the proper vehicle of a liberal morality (PJ: preface, vi). This was, after all, the conviction that prompted him to write his treatise. His feelings as to what social insti tutions could be have been preserved for us (and it is worthwhile juxtaposing this with hie frequently quoted but seldom understood statement that "It is an old observation, that the history of mankind is little else than a record of crimes” (W: I. ii), in order to show that whatever optimism he possessed was based, not on an unoritlcal faith in man's past performances, but upon his inherent reason ableness, which would form the foundation of Godwin's 21 ideal sooiety: In the summer of 1791 I gave up ay concern in the New Anmifti Register, the historical part of which I had written for seven years, and abdicated, I hope for ever, the task of performing a literary labour, the nature of which should be dictated by anything but the promptings of ay own mind. I suggested to Robinson the bookseller the idea of composing a treatise on Politioal Principles, and he agreed to aid me in executing it. My original conception proceeded on a feeling of the imperfections and errors of Montesquieu, and a desire of supplying a less faulty work. In the first fervour of ay enthusiasm, I entertained the vain imagination of "hewing a stone from the rook," which, by its inherent energy and weight, should overbear and annihilate all opposition, and place the principles of politics on an immoveable basis. It was ay first determination to tell all that I apprehended to be truth, and all that seemed to be truth, confident that from such a proceeding the best results were to be expected (Paul: i, 67). But what of this "proper vehicle of a liberal morali ty"? Probably no aspect of Godwin's thought has been more maligned than has his discussion of the structure and function of the State. A detailed examination of his thoughts on this subject will have to be postponed until Chapters II and III, but a few brief remarks are called for in this Introduction. It is, of oourse, part of Godwin's case that neither despotism nor monarchy aake their citieens as happy as they might be. Obviously, this position is neither unique nor original with Godwin. His reasons for making such an assertion are important, however. And it is here, at the level of justification, that many commentators fail to 22 grasp Godwin's reasoning. Again, 1st us consider his remarks concerning constitutions. Godwin is often repre sented as a republican. He was not. Constitutions, Godwin tells us, are supposed to be permanent; but this (for rea sons to be explained later) is inconsistent with the nature of man (BJ: VI. vii). Again, Godwin has been erroneously presented as one who advocates the return to 'natural man1 and the simple life in the way that some of Rousseau's followers did (GMT: 62). Nothing could be further from Godwin's position, for Rousseau's position really presup poses that man's nature is unalterably fixed. Certainly Godwin would avoid such a conclusion, for a central purpose of his was to demonstate that man is moulded by society. This brings us to a final point as regards Godwin's political pronouncements. Godwin was primarily a moralist and was "chiefly concerned to analyze the causes of preju dice; once we understand these the cure may very well be left to look after itself" ( 0 1 O t 169)* Actually, his posi tive political contributions are rather meager. He was less eager to build a new society than to show the founda tion which any permanent institution would have to possess if it is to persist through time. In this connection, it is of interest to note that his most famous so-called con- 22 tribution to political theory, anarchy, has itself oome 22He expressly repudiated this term. See, FJs II. i. 23 down to us la a fora that he would not haws associated him self with: Another branch of Godwin's political desoendante are the anarchists: aodem English intellectual anarchists, that is, who carry the baton of knighthood, not bombs, in their dlspatch-eases. They claim Godwin beoause he wanted to see "a well-conceived form of society with out government," but to him the term, aa generally understood, was anathema. He referred expressly to "all horrors of anarchy" in connexion with Bobeepierreb fielgn of Terror, and he deplored mob lawlessness; change was not worth disorder (MR: 40). When we disregard the last statement here, this quota tion is a fair presentation of the case. Godwin would say that those who today claim him as their intellectual source have not bothered to understand him: they are suffering from 'prejudice.1 It was stated earlier that Godwin's writings form one intelligible system. This includes not only Political Justice, but his novels as well. It is worth noticing that there is a single theme in all Godwin's novels: the tragedy of loneliness and misunderstanding (GMT: 67), and the way in which this theme coheres with the rest of his theory will become evident shortly. Bven one of Godwin's less friendly reviewers has noticed a unity of theme: . • . sinoe Godwin is primarily concerned with the theme of social justice, the origin and effects of f*i i f i mia • w"ari niimiity* are only of secondary interest. 23 „ . 239tone. I., "Oaleb Vmiaaa ^.Martin labor: a Contrast, "Modern frwiytwy sotii. LXII CI947), 482. 24 Reference will be made to Godwin's novels only in so far as they bsar directly upon his central ideas. So detailed examination of them will be for the specific ideals they 21 embody. £. Purpose and Plan of this Dissertation. She purpose of this dissertation is (i) to give precise formulation to Godwin's thoughts as they relate to man (i.e., human nature), to the state (the structure, function and purpose thereof), and to society (the principles which must undergird any system of social relations the members of which are to be happy, and treated with justice); (ii) to show how the ideas in (i) came to be, i.e., the major sources of Godwin's thought concerning speoifio ideas - utilitarianism, empiri cism, associationism, psychological hedonism, the "moral sense," equ&litarianism, and so on; and (iii) to discuss what I consider to be the most serious difficulties inherent in Godwin's system. These three purposes will be clearly separated in the course of my writing. Is concerns the plan to be employed here, there are certain difficulties which any oommentator on Godwin must faces He must make certain decisions as to method, and the 2*?or a concise description of Godwin's use of his novels for the presentation of his fundamental ideas, sees Onos H., MaJor 3oolal Ideyd.a in Wm. Godwin's Morels. M. A. thesis, University ofSouthern California, 1962. 25 method that ono employs will, to a degree, determine his conclusions* The difficulty is this: Godwin was a politi cal philosopher; hut he was also a moralist. Clearly, these two areas, though interrelated, are not identical. How, then, can Godwin's ideas be presented in a systematic fashion? The problem faced here is summed up well by a modern writer: It is hard to define the subject-matter of politieal philosophy and to distinguish it from moral philosophy. If we say it is concerned with men's duties to their fellow oitizens, it dearly falls within moral philo sophy, which is conoemed with all their duties; and by giving it a special name we might seem to hare as summed that our duties to our fellow dtisens differ from our other duties essentially in a way that our duties to our families or to animals do not, since no special 'philosophy' of these is offered. It might be thought as perhaps Aristotle did, that moral philo sophy is rather a branoh of political philosophy, since our duties as parents, children, wage-earaers, or debtors are part of our duties as citizens. But this ▼lew would imply that there are no rights or duties except between fellow citizens, and is hardly likely to be held now, when we commonly admit that a man may have duties to a foreigner or an animal. The distinction of political philosophy then seems to rest on the assumption that there is a olass of 'political duties' differing essentially from others; and these might be either those duties, if any, whloh we have to all our fellow citizens and to nobody else, or those which we have in respect of making and obeying laws, whether by io doing we affect only our fellow citizens or other persons also ... The question, then, is, Will an analytic treatment of 2^Carritt, B. P., Morals agd Politics - Theories of Their gelations from Hobbes and gpinosa to Marx andTosan- cuet (London: Oxford University Press, 1935;* 3» Here after cited in text as l£F. the writings of a man which, takon collectively, fora ono unitary wholo, result in distortion and/or falsification? Can one separate Godwin's thoughts on morality from thoss concerned with political philosophy? And what of an area which is, perhaps, somewhere between moral and political theory, Tie. social philosophy? For the study of social principles is also a department of morality, according to 26 Godwin. Again, what of the treatment of human nature? At first sight this might appear to be clearly separate from a study of morality, social and political philosophy, and certainly, from economios. But in point of fact these problems were all intertwined for Godwin, and tended to bs treated simultaneously. Bearing in mind the foregoing difficulties, the follow ing plan is that which will be adhered to during the course of this dissertations First, an attempt shall be made to synthesise all of Godwin's thinking as relates to the problem of human nature. This particular area of Godwin's speculation has received very little attention from his commentators. This is particularly unfortunate, when one realises that, though seldom treated fairly, Godwin's conception of man is often singled out for criticism. He is charged with making man a bloodless, emotionless oreaturs, 2^tfoodcock, G., William Godwin (Londons Porcupine Press, 1946), 91* Hereafter cited in text as V£. 27 sole faculty la a disembodied reason, unaffected by human desire. It is to counter the charge that Godwin created a "fictitious human nature" (GMT: 57) that an extensive investigation of his views on this subject will be under taken. In order to make Godwin's conception of human nature meaningful, it will be necessary to give some treatment to certain metaphysical presuppositions which Godwin made. Our discussion of these postulates will be limited sinoe it is prompted only by the need for laying bare the most funda mental principles which apply to everything within the sphere of nature. This sphere includes, of course, man. Secondly, some attention will be given to Godwin's position concerning the basic motivating factors in man. i This discussion of reason vs. feeling will include a survey of those persons and ideas which had the greatest influence on Godwin's conceptions in this area. I shall be selective in this field, since it is not my purpose to show Godwin's position in a given tradition of psychology. The guiding purpose throughout this dissertation will be the desire to present Godwin's position; other discussions will be tangential to this. Thirdly, an investigation will be made of Godwin's epistemology. This matter is of supreme importance for an understanding of Godwin, since his position concerning the 28 nature, sources and scope of knowledge will bear directly upon his moral and political precepts. Here I shall show to what extent empiricism, rationalism, sensationalism, assoolationism, Platonism, Cartesianism, Spinosism, psycho logical hedonism, disinterested benerolence, and the tradi tion of the moral sense school influenced Godwin and were taken up by him. Fourthly, I hope to show that Godwin had before him a normative conception of man, and that his treatment of psychological ami metaphysical matters was designed merely to support this pioture of fully actualized human nature. Fifthly, and finally, an attempt will be made to show that Godwin's conception of human nature is his fundamental contribution to the histozy of political philosophy, and that it forms the basic postulational-set upon which all his moral, social, political and economic doctrines are based. It has been suggested before that in the oase of Godwin we are dealing with a man who consciously and deli berately deduced the whole of his political ideas from certain assumptions (SPR: 154)* What is to be suggested in this dissertation is that the fundamental assumptions Godwin makes relate to man's nature, and that such assumptions are not always consciously held. Further, it will be suggested that the difficulties Godwin encounters when treating moral, political and other matters, and the apparent contradictions 29 Into which ho la forced, aro tho roaulta of hia ascribing ineoapatiblo oharaotoriatloa to aan. In tho third chapter, a troataont of what aro porhapa Godwin'a aoat faaouo oontrlbutiona to tho erltiolaa of political philosophy will bo given. Hie cauatie and pro found critiques of monarchy, republicanism and constitution alism will bo exhibited, along with hia lesser known, but equally important, analyses of nearly all extant political institutions: punishment, marrisge, private property, eto. My fundamental thesis in chapter (III),will be that Godwin reacted so violently against the above-mentioned forms of government, as well as against institutions they generate, because of his normative picture ox human nature. That is to say, Godwin opposed political institutions as he did becauae of his belief that they oppress and inhibit the development of the truly human qualities. I snail attempt to show that each of his criticisms of the State can be deduced from his philosophy of aan. Chapter III will also include reference to Godwin's moral philosophy (as do chapters II and IV). It was deemed desirable to integrate his moral theory with the root of his thought when it was called for, and to avoid a specific treatment of it. Beoause of Monro's rather extensive expli cation of Godwin's moral philosophy, 1 feel a re-statement of it would be repetitious and pretentious. Even so, it is 30 dear that* as with hia political io, too, with hia moral philosophy. They both can ba infarrad from hia conception of human nature. following a diaeuaeion of Godwin'a oriticiama, a brief treatment of hia "positive" political pronouncementa will take place. Shis will coaetitute Chapter III. Any deecrip- tion of Godwin'a positive views concerning aooial and poli tical inatitutiona muat neoeaaarily be brief, if auch ia to be treated honeatly. Godwin really aaid vary little about hia eo-called "ideal aodety," erroneoua coamenta to the contrary notwithatending. He waa interacted in formulating principlee and ideale, not in inaugurating immediate admin istrative or legialative modifications. Chapter III will include Godwin's ideas aa they relate to cooperation, socialism, communism, and constitutional democracy. Aleo to be included are his viewa concerning "trial marriages," and his reasons for supporting such institutions. Onoe again a demonstration will be attempted the purpose of which will be to show that the little that Godwin did have to say conoeming ideal aooial relations la a direct consequence of hia philosophical anthropology. In the fourth and final chapter, two projects will ba attempteds (i) a summary statement of Godwin's fundamental principles of Nan, State and Society, and (11) a brief cri ticism of hia ays tea aa a whole. Of particular ooneera will be those principles employed by Godwin which are not eoapat- 31 ible. This criticism will terminate my dissertation* D. 4 Hots on Spavin1 a Multiple Bditiona of ' Political Jus tice. ' and on His Inconsistencies. Godwin's Political Jus tice went through three editions, and, as is to be ezpeoted, there were certain changes aade in the two later editions* Rather than enter into an extensive discussion of these changes,2^ it appears more profitable to allow Godwin him self to argue his own cases Some readers of my graver productions will perhaps, in perusing these little volumes &•«•» his novelsj, accuse me of inconsistency; the affections and chari ties of private life being every where in this publi cation a topic of the warmest eulogium, while in the Enquiry concerning Political Justice they seemed to be treated with no great degree of indulgence and favour. In answer to this objeotion, all I think it neoessary to say on the present occasion is, that, for more than four years, I have been anxious for opportunity and leisure to modify some of the earlier chapters of that work in conformity to the sentiments inculcated in this. Hot that I see cause to make any change respect ing the prlnoiple of justice, or anything else funda mental to the system there delivered; but that I apprehend domestic and private affections inseparable from the nature of man, and from what may be styled the culture of the heart, and am fully persuaded that they are not incompatible with a profound and aotive sense of justice in the mind of him that cherishes them . . *zs The above was written to show that Godwin conceived of 2^Por a detailed examination of the changes introduced by Godwin in Political Justice, see PJs intro., 81-99* 2®Oodwin, William, Travels of St. Leon (Londons Bent ley, 18^1), ix-x. Hereafter cited in text as St. Leon. 32 of ono purpose, and of one system. Whether one talks about his novels, his essays or his political writings, it is clear that Godwin saw himself as the author of certain central ideas, expressed in various ways. So, even if a commentator can say that Godwin is propagandists in his novels,^ one can be sure, regardless of such allegations, that Godwin's intentions are one. The charge of inconsistency was, apparently, of great concern to Godwin. In the preface to the second edition (1796) of Political Justice. Godwin tells us, concerning charges of inconsistency, that, the spirit and great outlines of the work . . . remain untouched, and it is reasoned in various particulars with more accuracy from the premises and fundamental positions, than it was before (JVJ: 2nd ed., xv)'. But such charges were to hound him during his own day, and into our own. I shall be concerned with internal ' consistency in Chapter 17, and shall, therefore, allow one final quote from Godwin to suffice concerning the linear or chronological consistency of his works: Certain persons, who condescend to make my supposed inconsistencies the favourite object of their researoh, will perhaps remark with exultation on the respect expressed in this work for marriage; and exclaim, 2^Cruttwell, P., "On Caleb Williams." Hudson Review, 11, spring, 1938, 93. 33 "It was not always thus!" referring to the pages In which this subject is treated in the Enquiry concerning Political Justice for the proof of their assertion. 4he answer to this remark is exceedingly simple. The production referred to in it, the first foundation of its author's claim to public distinction and favour, was a treatise, aiming to ascertain what new institu tions in political society might be found more condu cive to general happiness than those whioh at present prevail. In the course of this disquisition it was enquired, whether marriage, aa it stands desorlbed and supported in the laws of England, might not with advantage admit of certain modifications? Can any thing be more distinct, than such a proposition on the one hand, and a recommendation on the other that each man for himself should supersede and trample upon the institutions of the country in which he livea? ▲ thousand things might be found exoellent and salutary, if brought into general practice, which would in some cases appear ridiculous, and in others be attended with tragical consequences, if prematurely acted upon by a solitary individual. The author of Politioal Justice. IB the last man in the world to recommend a pitiful attempt, by scattered examples to renovate the faoe of sooiety, instead of endeavouring by discussion and reasoning, to effect a grand and comprehensive improve ment in the sentiments of its members. 7 On the assumption that questions concerning Godwin's consistency, or lack thereof, have been anticipated and successfully answered, let us proceed to the main body of this dissertation. ^Godwin, william Pleetwood (London! Bentley, 1832), preface, xvi. Herearxercited in text as Pleetwood. Chapter I MStlPHiaiCS AID Mils QODVII'S philosophy op humah haturb A. Introduction. 1. Human natur* and political philosophy. It has been said that every account of politics has to begin with human nature - its possibilities and limita tions. For, what we take man to be, obviously determines both the kind of government which we think he deserves and the kind of which we think he is capable ( MPT: 29). Again: What sort of things do men want? What sort of things do they value? She answers to these questions deter mine not only the kind of state which is feasible, but the policy of the ruler who wishes to maintain himself in power . . . and ... no politioal theory can possibly be valid unless its basis be true to human nature (MPT; 29; 151). The history of political philosophy could be renamed the history of the philosophy of human nature, for in every instance when a political theorist has made a noticeable contribution to his field, he has, at the same time, added to our understanding of man. In fact, a good argument could be made for the thesis that it is his conception of man that distinguishes one philosopher of state from another. Consi der Thomas Hobbess the conception of man set forth in the 34 35 opening pages of tho the basis for ovary conclusion ho roaohoo concerning the necooaary nature, structure and function of the state. It is also Hobbes' conception of nan that dictates the type of aan who should be ruler, his role, and the techniques he should employ to maintain power. In the next century following Hobbes, we find John Locke, whose political philosophy differs radically from that of Hobbes. An examination of the whole of Locke's writings shows why this great difference exists s Locke has conceived man to be a creature markedly different from the one depicted by Hobbes. Locke's political theory rests on a certain conception of human nature. This not only deter mines, at the moral level, the end or purpose for whioh the state exists, but also, at the psychological levd, the means (i.e., the precise form of state organization recom mended in the theory) for attaining this end. Ands Locke . . . and Hobbes . • • disagree fundamentally about the way' a state's end can best be attained, because their conceptions of human motivation differ so profoundly ( MPT: 155). Godwin was acutely aware that he must construct a conceptual society that would coincide with man's true make up. Thus, the first book of Political Justice was devoted to an appraisal of man's nature. And it has been remarked that this work is a systematic treatise on human nature (WOi viii). That Godwin's intention with respect to this question was clear there can be no doubt. Shat he sucoeed- ed in this venture is questionable and forms the basis of this chapter. Critics of Godwin ordinarily choose what they consider to be his idea of human nature as that point upon which to launch their attack. Sometimes it is said by these critics that Godwin's theory of man is simply false; sometimes the criticism is that he has appealed to "human nature" at all. But the two complaints are usually combined. Por, it is said: To consider what all men have in common is to ignore the extent to which Sen are moulded by society and to appeal to human nature is to create an asocial monster that never existed; for, while all men belong to some communityf no one community is quite like another (QMP: Those persons who constitute the group of critics who say Godwin's conception of human nature is false often single out one particular tenet of his to hold up to ridi cule: his presumed absurd optimism for man. So patently false is this idea (so the argument goes) that no serious discussion of it is necessary. This area is probably the most misunderstood of all of Godwin's thought. Godwin believed that a true analysis of aan would liberate humanity from what he believed to be evils: beliefs in an unalterable human nature (GMP: 61), man's inherent avarice, his indelible competitiveness, etc. It 37 is at least doubtful whether wo oan Bay, quite bo definitely ae some would, at vhat point human nature stopa and the influence of aooiety begins. Such a delimiting of spheres is possible, but it must proceed by patient analysis. And this task he set before himself in the first book of Politi cal Justice. 2. Man’s *«"»■>«" and unique nature. In order for his moral philosophy to be satisfied, it was necessary for Godwin to demonstrate the following propositions concerning man's natures (i) there is indeed a nature common to all men; but (ii) each man possesses a peculiar character which predisposes him for certain acti vities; and, thus, (iii) man is infinitely malleable. He argues now for one thesis, now for another, often confusing them. . In arguing for the first of these propositions Godwin tells us thats . • . man is more like and more equal to man, deformi ties of body and abortions of intellect expected, than the disdainful and fastidious censors of our oommon nature are willing to admit. I am inclined to believe, that, putting idiots and extraordinary oases out of ths question, every human creature is endowed with talents, which, if rightly directed, would shew hia to be apt, adroit, intelligent and acute, in the walk for which his orga nization especially fitted him (TOM: 25)* His theory of man, then, is fundamental. All men, whatever 38 their color and wherever they are born, are made In the same manner. But, not only are men related to each other by being members of the same species; they are united in a more fundamental way, toos Man, and generations of men, are not links broken off from the great chain of beings they are not like some of the inferior sorts of animals, having no opportunity of intercourse with those that went before them, and indebted for their system of action only to their internal cons i tut ion and the laws of the universe, and not to imitation. Generations of men are linked and devetailed into each other (HOB: 3, 16-17). Godwin is not saying here merely that each generation pro fits from those which have proceeded it. His use of the phrase "great chain of being" is not accidental, but is used to express his conviction in a self-identical human nature. That Godwin is speaking as an ontologist and not as an anthropologist can be seen by remembering that he is a moralist, and his conception of a common and presupposes, and is presupposed by, man's common natures those moral causes that awaken the mind, that inspire sensibility, imagination and perserveranoe, are dis tributed without distinction to the tall or the dwarf ish, the graceful or the deformed, the lynx-eyed or the blind (B£: I. iv). (my italics ▲gain, and showing his essentially moral purposes We have a common nature, and that common nature ought to be consulted. There is one thing, or series of things, that constitutes the true perfection of man (PJ: IV. xi). And* finally, to show not only hit moralist orientation but hit oppoaition to relativism aa well: There la but one perfection to aan; one thing moat honourable; one thing that, to a well organized and healthful mind, will produce the moat exquisite pleasure. All else ia deviation and error; a diaeaae, to be cured, not to be encouraged (£J: III. vli). Men are of the same basic nature, then. What, then, accounts for the differences which are apparent to all? In a word, differences can be traced to impressions: It ia impression that makes the man, and, compared with the empire of impression, the mere differences of animal structure are inexpressibly unimportant and powerless (PJ: I. iv). If impressions are the true source of one's individu ality, it then follows that human beings are infinitely malleable: One need only to manipulate an individual's impressions to produce an organism of a certain uniqueness. That this is the case is clear when Godwin explains the tremendous importance impressions play in man's development: impressions are the sources of our opinions, and: The essential differences that are to be found between individual and individual, originate in the opinions they form • • . (PJ; I. iv). But Godwin does not really mean what he appears to mean here, for, if man is completely the product of his environment (as the notion of infinite malleability would 40 suggest), talk of a common nature becomes contradictory. It is for this reason that Godwin wishes to demonstrate his second point* vis. that each aan 1b "predisposed" towards certain activity. The most radical position with respect to the influence of environment on man's development had been stated by Helvetius, according to whom every human creature that is born into the world is capable of becoming "or being made the equal of Homer* Bacon or Newton* and as easily and surely of the one as the other" (TOMi 42). Godwin cannot accept such a doctrine* for this leads only too readily to a moral scepticism. Thus* the principle of inherent dispo sitions is introduced in an effort to bridge the gap between two equally unacceptable positions* viz. the total absence of any common nature in man* and the denial that* beoause of iron-clad laws of man improvement is impossible. If the latter view is too restrictive, that of Helvetius is too vast and indefinite: We shall be left long perhaps in a state of balance as to what species of excellence we shall choose; and ... it is scarcely possible that we should feel that assured confidence and anticipation of success, which are perhaps indispensibly required to the completion of a truly arduous undertaking ( TOM: 42-43* ▲t the same time * we should not lapse into false opti mism concerning society's role in man's development. We must follow nature, but we should not impute to the latter 41 powers it does not possess. That is, we must noti . . • suppose nature to be guided in her operations by the infinite divlsibleness of human pursuits in civi lized society. But it is not the less true that one man is by his structure best fitted to excel in some one in particular of these multifarious pursuits, how ever fortuitously his individual structure and that pursuit may be brought into oontact (TOM: 31-52). We see here the poles between which Godwin's thought fluctuates. He has said that men are essentially the same, and now tells us that they are nevertheless different. He continues this inconsistent emphasis, throughout all his works: But, though the original differences of man and man be arithmetically speaking something, speaking in the way of a general and comprehensive estimate they may be said to be almost nothing (BJ: I. iv). Despite his almost constant shifting of emphasis concerning man's basic nature, we can draw certain rather clear conclusions. Godwin wants to maintain that minds at birth are a tabula rasa, and we bring into the world with us no innate principles. Also, from the everyday observation that men tend to shrink from pain and to move in the direc tion of pleasurable experiences, he infers the moral equali ty of mankind (PJ: II. iii).^ ^Godwin's apparent hedonism will be examined shortly. Por now it is enough to say that, by moral equality, Godwin meant the propriety of applying the same principle of justice to all men: P£: II. ill). Again, Godwin wishes to insist upon the intellectual equality of all human beings, at least potentially (BJ: I. vlij. 42 However, he wavered on thia last point, and relinquished hie belief in the intellectual equality of oinde at birth 32 later in hie writing career. finally, he appears to insist upon, if not the principle of the natural identity of interests, then certainly the principles of the fusion of interests (GPR: 194)* The importance of this last point will become evident in our discussion of psychological hedonism and benevolence. B. De*«wHat— » & necessary metaphysical postulate. In order to change man for the better, it is necessary first to understand him. In order to understand man, it is necessary that he be of an understandable nature. And in order for man to be capable of being understood, it was . * necessary, for Godwin, living in the eighteenth century, to conceive of aan as a being operating according to natural laws. This meant that the principle of causality had to apply to man, Just as it did to all of nature. But once again we see an interesting inconsistency in Godwin's thought, for he is again forced to maintain two theses whose compatibility is far from obvious, for Godwin wishes to hold not only that man operates according to 52fltisher, D., William Godwin - A Study in liberalism (Londons Allen and Unwin, 1951), §4. Hereazter cited in text as S£. 43 causal lava, but also that aan is ths source of his own malleability. It is unquestionably true that a man's political theo ry, when ne sets out to construct a system, is to a large extent determined by his basic conceptions concerning the nature of man and the nature of the general world-process (3P&: 133)- The first of these basic conceptions has been suggested already, and will be explored more fully later. The latter conception is no less Important for Godwin, even though it must be admitted that speculation on the meta physics of nature was not nis primary concern. His inquiry into this realm was prompted by the intellectual climate in which he lived, and by the moral purposes he held before MJm Hume had shown that cause and effect are not connected by logical neoessity. Soon it came to be assumed that there are no necessary connections in nature at all, and no guides to experience or to conduct except em pirical success. This is, of course, the mental oli- mate of the Knglish Utilitarians and reformers • . Thus, Godwin had either to accept or to reject Hume's thesis concerning causality. One who is concerned with the moral behavior of man obviously must examine the question of responsibility and, therefore, of causation. He really needs to reject Hume, for he has a true need for the doc trine of determinism. At the same timet 33 'Bronowski, J., d Haslish, B., The Western Intellec tual l^d^tio^from Leonardo tg Hegel (lew fork t Harper A 44 Bvery thing In nan nay ba said to ba in a stata of flux; ha la a Protaua whom wa know not how to dataln (^: II.1t ). How, than, was ha to satisfy thasa two naads? Part of tha answar to his questions cam# from his lntallaotual pradaoassors, for tha problem of free-will and determinism is a perennial one, and had received much attention from ethical theorists of Godwin's era. One solution to this problem, suggested by Hartley, is to make mind a mechanism, thereby making one's psyohology and one's ethic insepara ble.^ Godwin was indeed drawn to Hartley's position here, because of his oonviotlon of the inseparability of human nature and conduct. But Godwin will a coept only those aspects of Hartley's system which are consistent with his own ethical views. Another possible solution is that developed by Priest ly, for whom political man is not a separate, self- determined moral entity; he is a small but essential part of that great mechanism in which God works out His purposes for the world. In this scheme the effects of one's political affiliations could be given the importanoe they deserve.^ Godwin would also borrow from this doctrine, ^Albee, B., A History of Jbglish Utilitarianism (Hew Torki MaomiUan, 1902), 121. Hereafter olted in text as HHU. ^Lincoln, A., Some Political and Sooial Ideas of grut- lish Dissent. 1763-1800 (LondoniCambridge university Press, 19$&)» 136* Hereafter cited in text as IBP. ♦5 for* a* hu boon suggested, ha ia coneamod with tha expo- aitioa of hia metaphysics and psychology only in ao far aa it ia naeaaaary to aatabliah tha ground a of hia moral and politioal philoaophy. and: Ha can parhapa ba Justly chargad with a failura to raoogniaa tha iaportanoa of thaaa foundationa to hia aoral and politioal auparstructura, ainoa thay aachibit tha atraaa resulting froa tha affort to oonbine alaaanta derived froa diffarant and oftan inooapatlbla traditiona (P£: intro., 6). Godwin waa of tha conviction that* ragardlaaa of how ona procaada in davaloping a metaphysics, ha nuat acoapt tha axiom that nature is to ba followed here (PJ: I. v). And it was hia further conviction that in hia expoaition of nature ha waa following nature more oloaaly than had anyone who had praoaadad hia. It waa aurprising* ha believed* that anyone could observe nature and not see immediately that it ia a vast network of interrelated events * just aa Heaton had aaid: Everything in tha universe is linked and united together. Ho event, however minute and imper ceptible, ia barren of a train of conaequencea, however comparatively evanescent thoee conse quences may in soma instances be found (PJ: I iv) But if all nature operates according to discernible » lav, if every event in nature ia caused, what are we to aay 46 of man? Are we to aay that, because he possesses something called "mind" he should oe excluded froa these governing principles which are recognised by every literate person? Are we, that is to say, to deny that mind is natural. Ho, for; Hind is a real principle, an indispenslble link in the great chain of the universe; but not, as has soaetiaes been supposed, a principle of that paramount descrip tion, as to supercede all necessities, and be itself subject to no laws and methods of operation (PJ: 17. ▼ill). And why should not mind itself be governed by necessity; for, what do we mean when we say that we experience causa tion operating in nature except that we discern (as Hume has said) a constant conjunction of events? And; . . . mind, as well as matter, exhibits a constant conjunction of events, and furnishes all the ground that any subject will afford, for an opinion of necessity (PJ: 17. vli). Consequently, it can be affirmed with great certainty that the mind is a mechanism (PJ; 17. ix). But it is not man as such that is Godwin's object of analysis. It is man in the concrete, in his personal and social relations, that we are concerned with. And it thus becomes clear why Godwin must insist upon his knowableness and, therefore, his causally influenced existence; 47 The general features of tho nature of man are capable of being understood, and a node nay be delineated whieh* in itself considered, is beet adapted to the condition of man In society (Tit IV. lllT (_mj iiaiios.J The type of determinisn to which man is subject, however, is of a peculiar variety, for he who affirms that all actions are necessary means that the man who is acquainted with all the circumstanoea under which a living or intelligent being is placed upon any given situation, is "qualified to predict the conduct he will hold, with as much certainty, as he oan predict any of the phenomena of inanimate nature" (PJ: IV. vii). Por how do we predict the motion of an object, living or dead, except by under standing the forces acting upon it. Consider, for example, a knifes The mode in which a knife is made subservient is by material impulse. The mode in which a man is made subservient is by inducement and persuasion. But both are equally the affair of necessity. The man differs from the knife, as the iron candlestick differs from the brass one; he has one more way of being aoted upon. This additional way in man, is motive; in the candlestick, is magnetism (££: IV. viii). Godwin's analogy here is far from dear, for he seems to be saying only that man is pushed, as it were, by a force which differs but little from that which impels the knife. But, as a matter of fact, Godwin means that man is not pushed at all: man is pulled along, by a necessity 48 quite different from mechanical or electrical force. Concerning this second type of mechanism, i.e., mental necessity, Godwin states that: In volition, if the doctrine of necessity he true, the mind is altogether passive. Two ideas present them selves in some way connected with eaoh other; and a perception of preferableness necessarily follows lilt IV. ix). And this new type of mechanism is all that is required to show that the doctrine of free-will is a myth. Jonathan Edwards had argued against free-will in a most forceful and convincing fashion, but he lacked an insight into the "new necessity" Godwin developed (FJ: IV. vii). With this principle accepted as having been demonstrated, Godwin's task will be simplified greatly. At this point it would be well to mention that, of the two sorts of determinism, that in which the mind is deter mined by past experience, and that in which it is deter mined by a judgment of the future, the latter is of greater fundamental importance to Godwin's scheme. At the same time, is eagerness to construct an exact science of morality; based upon regularity of response, predictability of beha vior, discovery of general principles, and control of prooess, leads him towards the more empirical form (PJ: IV. vii; FJ: intro., 17). This is simply one more instance of his need for two principles, i.e., determinism and, in 49 effect, free-will, which are incompatible (at least as developed by Godwin). Godwin's argument for necessity in human behavior is not limited to a priori appeals to Jfewtonian mechanics. He asks us to look closely at our daily experiences to see that his argument is valid. Consider, for example, one's character. Ve assume, in our day-to-day existence, that the persons with whom we have on-going relationships are the same persons they were two years ago, and are the same as those to which we shall relate five years hence. This in itself proves tnat the argument for necessity must be true, at least here, for: If tnere were not this original and essential conjunc tion Detween motives and actions, and, which forms one particular branch ox this principle, between man's past and future actions, there could be no suoh thing as character, or as a ground of inference, enabling us to predict what men would be, from what they have been (PJ: IV. vii). And still appealing to our daily experiences, Godwin points out that moral exhortation, which is known to and praoticed by every person above the age of an infant, presupposed necessity. For what is the point in preaching to (or, what is more often the case, punishing) one near you if you do not expect such exhortation and/or punishment to cause a change in the behavior of the recipient of your attention? Obviously, then, necessity is taken for granted in many of 50 our activities. Godwin asks only that vs become consistent, and accept the general principle of necessity. Those who suscribe to the doctrine of free-will don't realize how untenable their position is. For these propon ents can ascribe freedom neither to involuntary nor to voluntary actions. This is because "no motion is voluntary, any further than it is accompanied with intention and design, and has for its proper antecedent, the apprehension of an end to be accomplished" (FJ: IV. vii). But the above conditions are exactly what the free-will proponent must maintain exist during a voluntary act. And it is precisely Godwin's point that, given certain antecedent conditions and the apprehension of an end to be accomplished one's actions are automatic. Where, then, is there need, or room, for the doctrine of free-will? Free-will is almost always presented as a most desirable characteristic, but, in point of fact, this would be disadvantageous to its possessor. For, man being a creature . . . whose actions flow from the simplest principle, and who is governed by the apprehensions of his under standing, nothing further is requisite but the improve ment of his reasoning faculty, to make him virtuous and happy. But did he possess a faculty independent of the understanding, and capable of resisting from mere caprice the most powerful arguments, the best education and the most sedulous instruction might be of no use to him (FJ: IV. vii). 51 And what if it be admitted that all our actions ara necessary? Will this then be an invitation for moral indifference, an excuse from responsibility? Bo, for* Nothing could be more unreasonable, than that the sentiment of necessity should produce in me a spirit of neutrality and indifference. The more certain is the conjunction between antecedents and consequents, the more cheerfulness Laid should I feel in yielding to painful and labourRR9r employments (PJ: IV. viii). What is to be made of this strange doctrine, which calls itself determinism but which still leaves room for personal responsibility and, it should be noted, free choice? Here is what Godwin appears to means We are usually biased in our choice of actions by the factors upon which the various sciences lay stress, but we can on occas- sion eliminate this bias and impartially weigh the merits of alternatives. In making the estimate of their various merits, what others would call the will is determined by what it perceives to be the superior goodness of the alter native chosen. But, “this ability to be determined solely by the good is all that the advocate of free will can fairly claim," that is, "this second type of determinism, rational and teleological, is hard to distinguish from what is usually considered free will" (PJ: intro., 18). Thus, it certainly appears that Godwin does, after all support a type of free will. Why, then, did Godwin argue so forcefully for the "necessitarian Hypothesis"? The answer is fairly clear. The faculty of free will represented itself to Godwin as just another "blind and capricious principle" with the power of frustrating our most reasoned hopes of human development. Once human conduct is brought under the prin ciple of necessity "the social engineer need not fear the intrusion of chance or caprice . . . for . . . the notion of free will introduced an element of chanoe into human conduct which rendered it . . . something precarious, uncer tain, and essentially unpredictable" (SLs 74-7$). But, further, Godwin saw the potential of abuse in a doctrine which gives support to those who would maintain the oppres sive status q u o . He realised that as long as a man is held absolutely and solely responsible for his actions, the political institutions of his time (such as retributive punishment) must prevail. And at the same time he refused to make.man an automaton, without hope or possibility of improvement. It was for these reasons that he wanted to maintain the best of both principles. And it was for these reasons that he never quite solved the problem. Por, towards the end of his writing career, he was to writes There is a particular characteristic in the nature of the human mind, which is somewhat difficult to be explained. Nan is a being of a rational and an irrational nature (TOMt 93)• C. Godwin’s Theory of Knowledge. 53 1, General Remarks. Godwin wished to retain freedom of private judgment while, at the same time, maintaining individual responsi bility. Both of these he attempted to insure by an analysis of human nature. It is evident in his epistemology that this dual desire determines his methods, if not his results. Both desires can be satisfied if three doctrines can be fused, or integrated, properly: The first, that of such Dissenting Platonists as Price, is to postulate eternal truths, which are apprehended by the individual reason. The second, that of Vhig Dissenters • . • is to accept the doctrine of 'natural law,' intuitively self-evident. The third, that of Socinian Dissenters like Priestley, is to accept the laws of associationist psychology. Godwin used all three methods of escape, appealing now to absolute truth, now to an equally absolute reason, now to the laws of the human mind . . in epistemology, as in metaphysics, Godwin is a mora list. He considers man's means of knowing in order to better assess his potentiality of improvement. He recog nizes that man has made great triumphs in the intellectual (i.e., scientific) sphere, and contrasts this with his failure in the moral sphere, asking himself whether such disparity was really inevitable, tfas it not possible that ^Bodway, A. s., Godwin and the Age of Transition (London: Allen and Unwin, 1952)» 27 Hereafier cited in text as GAT. 54 as man was capable of making progress in otner things, so, too, ne might hare tne capacity to advance in morals? 1PJ: I. i.). If bo, we must look to the means by which man h** made such advances in other areas, vis. his capacity for knowing. 2. Godwin1s ttnpirlcism. In psychology, it was perhaps impossible for Godwin to adopt anything but the prevailing sensationalism, derived from Locke. But here again he is faced with implications which are not compatible with his fundamental beliefs. Por example, he is ready enough to follow Locke in rejecting innate ideas and instincts, a little less ready to be dogmatic about congenital "propensities" (PJ: intro., 9). Whether or not he was consistent in his beliefs, Godwin considered himself an empiricist. He was convinced that the mind of man is simply and exclusively the product of sensations, impressed upon a tabula rasa. It is the envi ronment that writes its later character upon it, and bene- ficient alterations of the environment will necessarily produce alterations of the mind. And, "there can be no native and ineradicable propensity to evil ... In sensa tional psychology Godwin found "scientific" proof of the malleability of the human mind" (3L: 62). Godwin sounds explicit enough in his discussion of his empiricism. But, 55 he had the unfortunate habit of later changing hie mind, in a section of hie work quite unrelated with hie epistemology. "All our knowledge, all our ideas, everything we possess as intelligent beings, cones fron impression. All the minds that exist, set out from absolute Ignorance . . (PJs I. v). This sounds like little more than a superfi cial continuation of the tradition of the earlier British Empiricists. Continuing, he tells us that: t f e know nothing of the substance or substratum of matter, or of that which is the recipient of thought and perception. Ve do not even know that the idea annexed to the word substance is correct, or has any counterpart in the reality of existence (PJ: I. iv). But, again, Godwin seems to perceive where this line of thought is taking him, and he avoids the sceptical conclu sions of certain of his predecessors, conclusions which are inconsistent with his belief in rational process, by pos iting as an item of knowledge something quite inconsistent with the empiricist tradition (especially as presented by Hume): But, if there be any one thing that we know more oer- tainly than another, it is the existence of our own thoughts, ideas, perceptions or sensations . . . and that they are ordinarily linked together, so as to produce the comples notion of unity or personal iden tity. Now it is this series of thoughts thus linked together, without considering whether they reside in any or what substratum, that is most aptly expressed by the tern mind; and in this sense the term is intended to be used throughout the following work (PJ: I. iv). 56 But he does not use this term in the same way "throughout the following work," or else where. For what he has done is to admit an item of intuitive knowledge, i.e., the self. And this will play an increasingly impor tant role for him. Continuing as an empiricist, he tells us that we can not deny the existence of our sensations, or the series in which they occur. Neither can we deny the axioms of mathematics, for they "exhibit nothing more than a con sistent use of words, and affirm of some idea that it is itself and not something else" (FJ: I. iv). This again sounds as if he is only perpetuating the empiricist tradition. Following a most interesting survey of the history of the development of abstraction, language, hieroglyphics, and the alphabet (to show that, at last the last three, are but human contrivances j, he begins one of the most crucial of his discussions, viz. that concerning the status of ideas. Ideas, Godwin says, are either primary (of the senses), or secondary (of the memory). These can be divi ded into four more classes, giving a total of eight: (i) perfect, which he says are non-existent; (ii) imperfect, "such as those which are produced in us by a near and care ful inspection of any visible object"; (iii) imperfect, produced by a distant object; and (iv) imperfect, of a 57 nature that we would call universal ideas. These last ideas have no resemblance to an image of any external objects The perception produced in ua in slight and current discourse by the words, river, field, are of this nature; and have no more resemblance to the image of any visible object, than the perception ordinarily produced in us by the words, conquest, government, virtue (P£: I. viii). Godwin has thus denied that we have any perfect idea (because of the probabilistic nature of our knowing pro cesses), and has taken a purely nominalistic attitude toward universale. But his entire doctrine of determinism demands knowledge that is certain. This appears to be a cul-de-sac, but, true to his fashion, Godwin escapes the legitimate conclusion he should have drawn by saying that: ... to know the exact quantity of probability which I ought to ascribe to any proposition, may be said to be in one sense the possessing of certain knowledge (P£: I. v). Though the preceding appears to be a materialistic theory of knowledge, Godwin in fact decalres against materialism. The reason is apparent: any theory whieh makes the mind nothing more than the physical organ of sensation, or reduces it to an epiphenomenon, is incompati ble with Godwin's whole system of thought. "Mind must be ... a real principle, an essential link in the chain " (PJ: intro., 7). Godwin joins with Looke in rejecting innate ideas, 58 saying that the arguments for innate Ideas turn entirely upon an appeal to our ignorance: what cannot be explained empirically is attributed to genetics. And he makes use of what appears to be Occam's razor as further reason for rejecting this doctrine (PJ: I. iv). And what of instincts? First of all, this principle is again an appeal to our ignorance. But secondly, after overthrowing the doctrine of free will Godwin is not about to allow another source of caprice and uncontrollableness be introduced: The notion of instincts as unknown causes in unac ceptable because its tendency is to break that train of antecedents and consequents, of which the history of the universe is composed. It introduced an action apparently extraneous, instead of imputing the nature of what follows, the properties of that which preceded . . . and ... it allows nothing to the future advancement of human knowledge; but represents the limits of what is already known, as the limits of human understanding (PJ: I. iv). With the same sort of argument he denies that either self-preservation, self-love, or pity are innate. What of intuitionsY Godwin is really inconsistent here, for, as we have seen, he believes that the self is known by intuition, he claims to rollow Locke concerning intuition, though he can't really accept Locke's rejection of moral intuitions. ^ Once more Godwin needs more than ^Bonar, J.. Moral Sense (London: Hutcheson Universi ty Library, 1950), £6. Hereafter cited in text as MS. 59 one principle: intuition of tortl precepts, and a tabula rasa, unlimited by predispositions to intuit anything. Sines Godwin wants to maintain that environment pro duces the man, he must reject the idea of capacity (F£x II. i t f j And in a moment of eloquence, he paraphrases Locke: Vhat is born into the world is an unfinished sketch, without character or decisive features impressed upon it (PJ: I. iv) For we are born into the world without foresight, without instincts, without innate ideas, and without propensities to do either virtuous.or vicious actions (PJ: I. i; I. iv). We are what our environments make us. We are infinitely malleable, to the point of plasticity: an empiricits*s approach to human nature. But: the conduct of human beings in every situation is governed, by the judgments they make and the sensations that are communicated to them (P£: I. iv). Sensations are sensations, and already have been accounted for. But judgments are rational: Godwin requires another principle. 3. Ihe Theory of Association. Godwin inherited, or at least employed, the theory of association as developed by Hartley. Further, he assumed a familiarity on his readers's part with Hartley's 60 ideas ia required. Hartley's general position is based on that of Locke. Sensation is the prior element in cognition, and antece dently to sensation the mind is empty or blank. "Hence the need of shoving how man's ideas in all their diversity and complexity are formed from the date of the senses."^® And here Hartley makes use of Locke's notion of the association of ideas. The two most important association principles employed by Hartley are similarity and continguity. It is important to note that the principle of associa tion was employed by Hartley not only to explain the origin and development of our ideas for describing the world, but was used to explain the genesis of man's moral ideas and feelings as well. In thiB regard it is important to note his insistence that the product of association can be a new idea, in the sense that it is more than the mere summation of its component elements (HP: 192). Again, (and this is important as it relates to Godwin), Hartley insisted that that which is prior in the order of nature is less perfect than that which is posterior. In other words, Hartley did not attempt to reduce the moral life to non-moral elements by saying that it is no more than the latter (HP: 192). ^Copleston, 7. C., A History of Philosophy. 6 vols* (London: Newman Press, 1$62), V: T$l. Hereafter cited in text as HP. 61 For what Hartley is here attempting Is to explain, by employing the idea of association, how the higher and new emergent is produced from lower elements, and ultimately from one original source, vis. sensation. Hartley's theory is primarily physiological, and assumes the complete correspondence of mind and body; for example, he explains how "compound vlbratiuncles” in some ▼ague organ referred to as the "medullary substance" are formed from the original vibrations that arise in the organ of sense; and how, correspondingly, the repetition of sensations, contemporaneously or in immediate succession, tends to produce cohering groups of the "miniatures" or traces of the original feelings. The latter coalese into wq emotions and ideas: really complex but apparently simple. 7 But Hartley's physiology leads him in directions he does not choose to go, and from which Godwin will be repel led. For so long as we speak with a vague generality of the functions of sense and brain, the mind may be allowed to use its instruments at will without any obvious contra diction. But as soon as we attempt to carry into detail the general idea, it becomes dear that the material brain also is subject to the laws of material nature. And the vibrations which appeared to accompany thought so inno- oently, "discover themselves now as products of a mechanism 39aid«*lck, H., Outlln.. of tfeS gUSSEX al (Londons Beacon Press, 1931J,210. Hereafter cited in text as OHB. 62 which, set In motion from without, must work according to tho laws of the material world."*® And, thus. In accordance with the demand of his physiological and psychological theories, embraced, if reluctantly, the deterainist position * ($s 193). As far as Godwin is concerned, Hartley's importance lies mainly in his comprehensive application of the laws of association of ideas to the explanation of all our more complex and refined emotions. For he showed, by means of association, pleasures and pains oould give rise to self- interest, sympathy, and the moral sense. (More about this last faculty later in this dissertation). And a thorough and systematic application of the principle of the associa tion of ideas to ethical psychology is first found in Hartley's effort (IgQSs 219). Such a synthesis of psycho logy and ethics was most desirable for Godwin, with his empirical disposition but moral absolutes. For, though Hartley appears to be saying that the way one's pleasures combine are what they are, neither to be praised nor degraded, he is really saying something quite different. He is saying that some associations fit together better than others. this "integration" theory of ethics, of *°Lange, F. A., The History of Materialism, tr. by B. C. Thomas (New Torts kacmlllan, 1925}, 11s 5. Here after oited in text as HM. 65 which Hartley was probably the father (GMP: 25)* fitted Godwin's needs. Paraphrasing Hartley, Godwin states that there is but one principle of the human mind, vis. association: There are but two ways in which a thought can be excited in the mind, first, by external impression, secondly by the property, whioh one thought existing in the mind, is found to have, of introducing a seoond thought through the means of some link of connection between them . • . and . . . every idea that now offers itself to the mind, is modified by all the ideas that ever existed in it according to the lavs of asso ciation (PJ: IV. ix) And the use which Godwin makes of his newly discovered principle is apparent when he tells us that it is this circumstances - the modification of every new idea by every pre-existing one - that: • . . constitutes the insensible empire of prejudice; and causes every object, which is exhibited to a number of individuals, to assume as many forms in their mind, as there are Individuals who view it (PJ: IV. ix). Godwin has thus made immediate use of Hartley's doc trine of association in his moral system. For this provides an answer to the question as to why so many persons are misled in their ethical behavior: their earliest associa tions have predisposed them to interpret every subsequent experience in an undesirable fashion. It has also given Godwin the theoretical means for remodeling human behavior: 64 education, and education by design (PJ: I. iv). Hot all of Hartley's system is acceptable, however* His theory of vibrations must be rejected because of its tendency to exclude mind, and to become "a system of materi* al automatism" (PJ: IV. ix). For the inner world of mind, according to Hartley, is as much a casual system as the outer world of matter. Again, Hartley left no place in his psychology for reflection: the only source of ideas is sensation. Godwin, on the other hand, recognized associa tion as one of the activities of the mind, but later argues that it is supplemented. Reason must be a real principle for Godwin, and association reserves no sufficient function for reason (PJ: intro., 11). I have maintained throughout this chapter that Godwin was interested in psychology only in so far as it was essential to his moral picture of man. Ihis is surely true as regards association. He employs it as long as it serves his purpose. When it ceases to do so, he discards it. He would be much more reluctant to relinquish activities of reason than he would to give up the doctrine of association. For, as one reads Godwin it becomes more and more clear that he should be classified as a rationalist, rather than as an empiricist. And, "the doctrine of association is fundamental, not to Godwin's rationalism, but to Bentham and his school" (W: intro., 11). She part played by association in Godwin's psychology is far less important 65 than la oftan supposed, as la hla dabt to Hartley. For It la pradaaly at tha point where Hartley'a doctrine termi- nataa - In tha formation of tha moral aanaa - that Godwin aaparatea hlmaalf from aaaociatlonlam. For moral judgmenta muat have a rational alaaant within them, and ao muat man. 4* Godwin'a Rationalism: General Remarks. Next to tha doctrine of tha perfectibility of man, probably no aapect of Godwin la atraaaed ordinarily by hla critlca than hla extrema rationalism. For example, "man kind is, or ought to be, in Godwin's view, a vast collection 40 of incarnate syllogisms." Godwin seems never to tira of eulogising man's thinking faoulty: Man is a rational being. It is by this particular thathe is eminently distinguished from the brute cre ation. Ha collects premiaea and deduces conclusions. Ha antara into aysteas of thinking, and combines aysteas of actiona, which ha pursues from day to day, and from year to year . . . (TOM: 93). Again: Man is a rational being. If there be any man who is incapable of making inferences for himself, or of understanding, when stated in the moat explicit terms, the inferences of another, him wa consider as an abor tive production, and not in strictness belonging to the human species (FJ; I. v). *°Lange, F. A., The History of Materialism, tr. by J S . C. Thomas (Mew York: Macmillan, 1923), II: 5. Here after oited in text as f i t . 66 ftationality, too, is In tho repository of nan's motives; The genuine propensity of nan, la to venerate mind in his fellow nan (P£: Til. vi). And what is usually considered the most irrational of acts is, according to Godwin, ultimately rational; The thoughts of the murderer will frequently he in a state of the most tempestuous fluctuations; he may make and unmake his diabolical purpose fifty times in an hour . . . but, whenever his resolution is formed, it is formed upon the suggestions of the rational faculty (^; I. v) Reason must be a real principle for Godwin, and must have a real function. A strict empricism (of sensationa- listic bent) would preclude such. Consequently, Godwin is determined to supplement his empiricist foundation with a cornerstone of reason. His purpose here is apparent; if man's improvement is to occur, it must take the form of rational improvement; but rational improvement is possible only if reason is supreme. The doctrine that man's actions are ultimately irra tional is highly worthy of minute analysis, Godwin believes. For, "if true, it is no less than the doctrine of innate principles, opposes a bar to the efforts of philanthropy, and the improvement of social institution" (PJ: I. v). And, again assuming the truth of the proposition that man is basically irrational, then our reason becomes not only 67 Impotent, but harmful; it would ba "rather an abortion than a substantial benefit" (PJx I. ii). But above all, if it is true that there is an opposing tendency within us, making reason Inadequate to its task, "the most rational principles of society may be rendered abortive . . • folly may be the fittest instrument to effect the purposes of wisdom, and vice to disseminate and establish the public benefit" (PJ: I. v). If reason is powerless, then, social progress is impos sible. Many persons have taken just such a position in order to prevent social advances; all the arguments that have been employed to prove the insufficiency of democracy grow out of this one root, the supposed necessity of decep tion and prejudice for restraining the irrationality of man (PJ: V. xv) Godwin thus needs a source of rationality in man, just as he needed the principles of determinisn and associationism. And he will find this source by an analysis of man's motives: On the question of the human mind and its motives I shall attempt to prove two things: first, that the actions and dispositions of mankind are the offspring of circumstances and events, and not of any original determination that they bring into the world; and, secondly, that the great.stream of our voluntary actions essentially depends, not upon the direct and immediate impulses of sense, but upon the decisions of the understanding. If these propositions can be suf ficiently established, it will follow that the happi ness men are able to aggain, is proportioned to the justness of the opinions they take as guides in the pursuit . . . (PJ: I. iv). 68 Bat what does it mean to say that man is a rational being? Godwin’s reference to our ability to make deductions is a bit misleading* for he really means to say that reason can impel us to action. He is probably unaware of this shift in meaning* for he continues to speak of man as a being with the capacity for discerning cause and effect in phenomena* and of the human mind as a faculty capable of improvement (TOM: 64)• And it i B this inconsistency in meaning that has given rise to criticisms like the follow ings Godwin* in his haste to make man a reasonable creature* assumes that he is potentially oniscient* and there fore capable, like the Divine Being* of acting without reference to those intermediate maxims which neces sarily imply some admixture of error. He thus quietly passes over, as an unimportant exception* what is really a vital condition of the problem - namely* the limited capacity of man ( BTBs lit 271)* X think it must be admitted that Godwin is himself unsure as to the proper role of reason. For* after implying its inherent thrust toward action* he states that: Reason, accurately speaking* has not the smallest degree of power to put any one limb or articulation of our bodies into motion. Its province* in a practical view* is wholly confined to adjusting the comparison between different objects of desire* and investigating the most successful mode of attaining those objeots. (Paul: I; 294). It would appear* then* that reason's sole function in knowing is to make comparisons, but not preferences. But 69 such a restriction would be detrimental to Godwin1a belief in progress. And some way must be found to mitigate against Godwin's greatest theoretical enemy - moral scepti cism. The solution Godwin is looking for is found in the notion that man is, after all, passive in nature ( GBR: 201). For it may be possible that man, though passive, responds in a selective fashion: he responds to truth. And once the truth has been seen, it will be the only ezperienoe acceptable to reason. For, how do we gain knowledge? Once again, let us examine the mind: The nature of the human mind is such, as to oblige us, after having seen two events perpetually conjoined, to pass, as soon as one of them occurs, to the recollec tion of the other: and, in cases where this transition never misleads us, but the ideal succession is always found to be an exact copy of the future event, it is impossible that this species of foresight should not be coverted into a general foundation of inference and reasoning (PJ: IV. vii). Godwin is not repeating the Humean view for the manner in which we gain the idea of necessity. Godwin accepts the doctrine of necessity, and our true knowledge thereof. For he is suggesting that the principle of necessity is a rational principle, which imposes itself upon reason. Thus, this is at least one area in which absolute knowledge is possible, and this because of reason's passivity. Certain consequences follow from this conception of the passivity of reason and the immutability of truth. 70 First, it is of ths nature of truth that it cannot be imposed by external constraint, but must be adhered to free ly* Force is an expedient, the use of whioh is muct to be deplored. It is contrary to the nature of intellect, which cannot be improved but by conviction and persua sion. It corrupts the man that employs it, and the man upon whom it is employed (FJ: IV. i). This means that if things are presented "as they are," the faculty of reason receives them willingly. But if there is distortion or falsification, reason will detect this, and will withhold consent. Secondly, reason knows the truth of its own beings Its powers and limitations (TOM* 55)* Thirdly, because it knows its own resources, and judges them to be limited only by experience, reason will, if not suppressed, advance perpetually through an inherent restless desire, modifying its earlier conceptions in the light of later knowledge (PJ* I. viii). At this point Godwin has attributed a characteristic to reason which, strictly speaking, should not be so pre dicated. For, he has told us that reason is passive, making only non-commital comparisons. But now we are told that reason, the means to man's regeneration, is not passive but active. Reason is, in fact, compulsive: it is compel led to strive after truth. Godwin appears to recognise 71 this, for he states that: The human understanding has so powerful a tendency to improvement, that It Is more than probable that . . . the arguments which once appeared to us sufficient, would upon re-examination appear inadequate and futile (P£: I. v). And this "rational cybernetics" is nothing more than a statement of reason's inherent tendency to correct itself, and to seek after truth. Godwin has surreptitiously introduced the idea that knowledge should be pursued for its own sake, openly contra dicting his previous utilitarian remarks. Xn the light of what he has said of the power of reason, this is to be expected. What is perhaps unexpected is his utilization of a utilitarian argument to support the truth-for-its-own- sake principle: Knowledge contributes two ways to our happiness: first by the new sources of enjoyment which it opens to us, and next by furnishing us with a clue in the selection of all other pleasures (W: IV. ▼). And, along the same line: . . . it . . . does not follow that the pleasures of the external organs, are more exquisite than any other pleasure. It is by no means unexamples for the result of a combination i.e., by means of the intellect of materials to be more excellent than the materials them selves . • . and, in faot . . . our sensual pleasures, commonly so called, would be almost universally despised, had we not the art to combine them with the pleasures of intellect and cultivation (FJ: I. v). Season, and its object knowledge, are Important, then. But, what are we to say of the circuitous route Godwin took in order to demonstrate what most of us would accept unquestioned? Once again it must be noted that Godwin's purpose is to prove, by an analysis of human nature (and, later, of social institutions), the feasibility of a society founded in reason and justice (3L: 7)* His first moves in an examination of man led him into sensationalism, associa- tionism, and determinism* Baoh of these three dootrines were necessary, Godwin was convinced. But these theories dragged along with them Implications which were totally inconsistent with Godwin's more fundamental beliefs. Con sequently, he was forced to include other principles, founded upon reason, to derive the desired results. But he desired to retain as much consistency within his system as was possible. This he thought was possible by again appealing to experience. What he said in effect was that he had overstated the case for man's sensory - and deter mined nature, and he would correct this by asking us to consider man's other side, his reason. This appears to be what he means when he tells us thati Man is not a vegetable to be governed by sensations of heat and cold, dryness and moisture. He is a reasonable creature, capable of perceiving what is eligible and right, of fixing indelibly certain prin ciples upon his mind, and adhering inflexibly to the resolution he has made (PJ: 1. v) 75 Regardless of whether or not Godwin's arguments for man's rational nature are convincing, the laborious and almost strained attention he pays to the problem of present ing man in the concrete should convince us that the reason to which Godwin appeals is not "the abstract logic that ignores men in its search for Man" (GMP: 12). Godwin's concern is with real men. Ve have seen that Godwin believes that man, real man, possesses the means for attaining absolute truth: reason. In doing so he has divorced himself from much which he once claimed as his own. Pori It is upon the question of the function of reason that Godwin breaks with the whole sensationalistic school of psychology, and • • . finds himself with the Pla tonic tradition of rationalism (W: intro., 12). 5. Godwin's Platonism. On the first page of his novel St. Leon Godwin writes this line: There is nothing that human Imagination can figure brilliant and enviable, that human genius and skill do not aspire to realise (St. Leon: 1). And in so doing he summarises the principle that he needs as a ooplng-stone for his rationalisms if man knows the 74 true and tha good, ho will purouo It. Godwin had a tradition of Platonism to draw upon, es- pocially as that tradition was continued by Price. For Price was a moralist, as was Godwin. According to Price, there are simple and self-evident Ideas which are Immediately perceived or Intuited by the understanding. Among them are the Ideas of right and wrong. If we confuse the understanding with the imagination, we shall necessarily tend to confine unduly the scope of the former. But reasoning, considered as a distinct Intellec tual operation, studies the relation between ideas which we already possess. Consequently, this must be distin guished from the understanding, which intuits self-evident ideas which cannot be resolved Into elements derived from sense-ezperience. This, of course, allows moral ideas a status qualitatively distinct from those of a sensory basis. And this is precisely what Godwin needed. Godwin's utilization of Platonism can be seen most easily by bearing In mind one of the two propositions he wished to demonstrate*1* man's actions result from his opinions. Consider thati Actions . . . which are preceded by a judgment "this is good," or "this is desirable," originate in the state of judgment or opinion upon that subject. It may happen that the opinion may be exceedingly fugi- ^See above, p. 67* 75 tive; it may have been preceded by aversion and follow ed by remorse; but it was unquestionably the opinion of the mind at the instant in which the action commenced (F£s I. v). This is the assetion that all action, at least all voluntary action, is rationally motivated. But not only is voluntary action reasonable in its impetus. It is also necessary. For every action of a voluntary nature involves foresight of consequences. And, as we have seen, to have foresight of consequences is to have absolute knowledge. Further, reason is so constituted that, when it is placed before a true state of affairs, it responds by impulsively seeking to improve its knowledge thereof. But "knowledge" is a wide term, whose connotations include much more than narrow intellectual characteristicst to know in the fullest sense of the term is to utilize every means we, as humans, pos sess. And to gain such wide knowledge we are forced to act. As a result, the bridge between knowing and doing has been erected. Godwin was convinced of the correctness of this idea of "rational necessity," and he refers to it time and againx ghow me in the clearest and most unambiguous manner that a certain mode of proceeding is most reasonable in itself or most conducive to my interest, and I shall infallibly pursue that mode, as long as the views you ested to me continue present to my mind (PJx I And though some persons will be sceptical of this notions 76 Still it remains true that, when the understanding clearly perceives rectitude, propriety and eligibility to belong to a certain conduct, and so long as it has that perception, that conduct will infallibly be adopted (P£: I. v). It is interesting to note that, not only has Godwin placed himself in the Platonist tradition concerning the apprehension of scientific ideas by reason, but has also shown his platonism by insisting that we immediately perceive "rectitude, propriety and eligibility," i.e., moral ideas. And, he does not say only that we perceive right and wrong, but that we act accordingly. It is when he ie arguing thusly that it has been suggested that no other faculty besides reason intervenes in action. For, Godwin clearly suggests that, given the perception of truth, and actions follow automatically in accordance with that perception (3P&: 155)* This opinion is shared by another writer, who argues that "Godwin adheres to the Platonic tradition here by insisting on the motive power of reason."*2 And such appraisals appear to be justified, for at one point Godwin argues that we never prefer anything but because it is apprehended to be good (PJs I. iv). Though his interest here appears to be epistemology, morality is still Godwin's prime province. For he has just *2Prieetley, F. S. L., "Platonism in William Godwin's Political Justice," Modern Language Quarterly. 17 (194?), 64. Hereafter cited in text as Platonism. established the proposition that mental muddle is the root of all evil: "Vice and weakness are founded upon ignorance and error" (PJ: I. v). But if vice is ignorance, and virtue is knowledge, and if we can apprehend morally right actions, may our immediate knowledge extend so as to include complete moral principles? It would appear that it can. For, though Godwin tells us repeatedly that virtue is nothing but the calculation of consequences, he has insisted that our knowledge of consequences is absolute: reflection can confirm our choice. Consequently, "the greatest happi ness principle, or something like it, is immediately apparent to reason" (QMP: 17-18). It has been suggested that Godwin's conception of reason takes on still another characteristic at this point: something like Spinoza's scientia intuitiva. We progress from abstract generalisa tion (e.g., the greatest happiness of the greatest number) to grasping the particular in all its particularity (by seeing the inherent truth of this principle as it is mani fested in the concrete individual) (GMP: 12). Godwin's Platonism has not always been recognized by his commentators, particularly by those who consider him to be only an inconsistent utilitarian. For example: Having established utility and expediency, however, as the sole principle of approbation, Godwin, falling apparently into a species of hypnosis induced by the contemplation of abstract truth, which both Godwin and Holcroft almost reach to apotheosis of, arrives at 78 something that looks very much llks the 'eternal and immutable' truth of the late seventeenth-century rationalists. Perhaps one reason why such writers as this have failed to understand Godwin is that* after introducing certain "eternal truths," he chooses to Justify them on utilitarian grounds. The fact that the utilitarian value (or laok thereof) is quite irrelevant to the existence or non existence of these truths does not appear to have occured to Godwin. For, if truth is immutable, as he wishes to main tain, its influence is not germane to the issue. Another reason that Godwin is misunderstood here is that hedges on the question of the unchangeableness of truths He that speaks of its Qi.e., truth's] immutability, does nothing more than predict with greater or less probability, and say, "This is what 1 believe, and what all reasonable beings, till they shall fall short of me in their degree of information, will continue to believe (PJ: 1. v). Is he here saying that our knowledge is, after all, only probable, or is he saying that, while truth remains iden tical with itself, our knowledge of it varies? It would certainly appear that he means the latter, and any other ^Vfhitney, L., Primitivism and the Idea of Progress in sngiiah Popular fritsrsture ofHEEs flighissntE Oenvurv TBaltimoret Maryland University Press, l9^4J, 211. Here after cited in text as PIP. 79 miming would be utterly inconsistent with his ideas on the sources and cures of evil. There is a most interesting series of passages in Political Justice in which Godwin introduces a suggestion which, if developed, would "have overturned the whole atomistic psychology and its doctrine of simple ideas form ing by association more complex ones'* (PJ: intro., 11). Por here Godwin suggests that the mind may be incapable of entertaining any but general ideas, and that the operations of the mind may be analytical rather than synthetical: concerning the latter point Ve do not begin with the successive perception of elementary parts till we have obtained an idea of a whole; but, beginning with a whole, are capable of reducing it into its elements (PJ: IV. ix; see also I. viii). This discussion, concerning itself as it does with the distinction between ideas as particular states of conscious ness, and ideas as logical meanings, important as it is for his psychology, is not pursued and is discontinued with no explanation. Though he does not pursue the topic of our knowledge of general ideas, he does discuss the existence of these: There may indeed be propositions, which, though true in themselves, may be beyond the sphere of human know ledge, or respecting which human beings have not yet discovered sufficient arguments for their support. In that cass, though true in themselves, they are not truths to us (S£: I. ▼) 60 Agains Truth • . . has strictly no existence but in the mind of him vho utters or hears it . . • but • • . every subject of enquiry is susceptible of affirmation and negation; and those propositions concerning it, whloh describe the real relations of things, may in a certain sense, whether we be or be not aware that they do so, be said to be true. Taken in this sense, truth is immutable (BJ: I. v). Thus, truth is independent of our awareness of it, and is in no way altered by anything we may say or do. The truth to which he is referring here is absolute truth, known by reason. But since he still maintains that i r e have a lesser, more sensory-grounded type of knowledge, Godwin's relation to Platonism is shown again. For what is here being maintained is that there is a correspondence between the ontological and the epistemological dimensions, with one aspect of the former being known by a specific type of the latter. Godwin's principle of the immutability or omnipotence of truth has a very important implication for morality. Every truth that is capable of being communicated is capable of being brought home to the conviction of the mind. And, as the relation between thought (i.e., opinion) and conduct has been established, it follows that every principle which can be brought home to the conviction of the mind will 81 infallibly produce a corresponding effect upon the conduct (PJ: I. v). G o d w i n 's argument has gone full circle. But, if the truth will necessarily result in desirable behavior, Godwin's hopes for the improvement of man are justified. The greatest problem to date has been the at tempt upon the part of certain individuals, noticeably despots, to mislead and deceive mankind. However, if God win's thesis is true, any attempt to mislead by distortion is bound to failure. The reason that this is the case is found in a further deduction which follows from the omnipo tence of truth and the structure of reason: we automatical ly recoil from fallacious and deceptive arguments, and "communicate in spite of ourselves the materials of just reasoning" (jW: I. iv). And, finally, we should bear in mind that no individual can resiBt the force of truth. The problem, then, is to put the Individual into position where he can see the truth, in its entirety. Godwin postulated certain eternal truths, among them the omnipotence of truth, principles of reasoning, and facts about the nature of reason. But in addition to these ideas, he also believed in certain ultimate values. He has already told us that one such ultimate value is pleasure, and he talks for a while as a hedonist would. But there are • others. One of these ultimate values (besides pleasure) is individuality (to be treated in the next chapter). Another is sincerity. The latter must be the foundation for any 82 practicabable ethic, and is the theme, a favorite one for Godwin, of St. Leon (QMP: 10X)i Sincerity may be the true foundation of Godwin's hierarchy of values, for it i B this value, along with his doctrine of rational neeeseity, that provides him with the most cause for optimism concerning man's fate. Sincerity is, at the behavioral level, just another name for truth. If this value could ever be made viewable to man, not only would it persist but it would lead to the practice of still other virtues: Sincerity therefore, once introduced into the manners of mankind, would necessarily bring every other virtue in its train (FJ: IV. vi). Two more values that appear to be ultimate for Godwin, and which are related to individuality and sincerity, are seourity and self-respect. It was Godwin's conviction that maw could neither develop his individuality, nor could he practice sincerity, withort the feeling of security and that of self-respect (fJ: 1. ill), that the latter is an integral part of our make-up is suggested by the following lines: lor is it merely the wish to be admired that excites him: he acts, that he may be satisfied with himself. Self-respect is a sentiment dear to every heart (TOM: 35). It may appear strange to the reader that Godwin would give ultimate status to the values mentioned thus far and relegate than to an apparant Platonic realm, and yet pay no attantlon to tha question of individual rights (assuming that individuality is not such a right), for Godwin livad during the pariod of agalitarianism's flowering: Ha was opposed to Burks and appears to have worked for an era of unqualified equality. Why, than, does ha not include personal rights in his collection of ultimata values? ▲ detailed examination of his opposition to individual rights will have to be postponed until Chapter II, but it oan be said now that he refused to grant individual rights ultimate status because of his attributing of such position to still another value, vis. duty; for man is an intellectual being, who is capable of learning from immutable justice what his duties are. Thus, all talk of rights beoome meaning less. For any position or set of circumstances in which a man might find himself there is one, and only one, most reasonable course of conduct to follow (W: II. iv). In general, this most worthy path is the one dictated by the principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. What, then, is the importance of the doctrine of eternal truths for Godwin's system, and what is its impor tance for Godwin the man? Both parts of this question require the same answer. Godwin was a fervent believer in the possibility of rational progress. But all progress demands some external standards toward which progress is 84 made, and to which all is relative. And, perhaps sensing the impossibility of generating unquestioned criteria from a system of pure utility, Godwin posited absolute, timeless values. ?or, "rational progress demands as its external standard a system of absolute truth discoverable by reason" (PJi intro., 8-9). It will be seen that, with the introduction of hiB Platonic elements, the nature and function of reason have been enlarged further. Reason is now more than a mere faculty of apprehension, or something that makes compari sons. Reason now not only judges the rightness of an action or the truth of a proposition but, in the case of the former, irresistibly urges toward that action or the end it manifests. Godwin now rejects totally Hartley's distinction between rational and practical assent (PJi intro., 13); and he is able to do so because of his Platonism. Several traditions exerted their influence upon Godwin, and each strove for expression. We have seen how this was accomplished in the caBe of Platonism. But there was still another tradition which showed itself in Godwin's theory of knowledge. And this was the "moral sense" school. 6. Godwin and the Moral Sense. A hundred years before Godwin's time Hutcheson had said that there is in man "another superior sense, natural also to men,vdetermining them to be pleased with motions, 85 characters, affections. This is the Moral Sense" (Mgs 70- 71). This is the faculty by means of which we apprehend and then either approve or disapprove certain qualities in others. This sense is inherent but is not innate (because of its passivity), and can do its work antecedently to any education or custom. When the fit occasions arise the perceptions arise, in the same natural way as the percep tions of pain and pleasure in connection with the external senses operate. But, though inherent and seemingly auto matic in the discharge of its function, the moral sense can be corrupted through undesirable experiences (MS: 72). According to Hutcheson, the disposition which most naturally gains the highest approbation is either that of stable universal goodwill, or the desire and love of moral excellence ( HOB: 201). Only in a secondary sense is approval due to veracity, candor, fortitude, and sense of honor. In addition to perceiving and judging persons and actions worthy of approbation or disapprobation, the moral sense also practices a regulating and controlling function. This last point is of great concern to Godwin, for it posits as the basis for the comparing, regulating and controlling of our moral perceptions something which is non-rational. The theory of a Moral Sense is hit hard by Price. Hutcheson, probably because of his stressing of the aesthe tic receptivity of man, has confused sense and reason. More accurately, be baa allowed sense to usurp tbe legiti mate function of reason. For what Hutcheson baa said is that that which judges concerning tbe perceptions of tbe sense, and contradicts their decisions, is itself sense. But this is impossible. Thus, for Price, reason, and not emotion, is authoritative in morals (HP: 362). Reason can discern objective moral distinctions, can tell us those actions which are intrinsically right or wrong. And this is the sort of faculty we must possess if subjectivism in ethics is to be avoided, and if the basis of moral judgments is not to be relegated to instinct and feeling. By rejecting the moral sense theory, Price does not commit himself to rejecting the emotional element in morals. All he does is to oust feeling from a central position and to keep it as an accompaniment of rational intuition (HP: 363). The next person whose relations with the moral sense theory affected Godwin most directly, was Hartley. Just as Price's insistence on the primacy of reason in moral knowing and judging attracted Godwin, so, too, does Hartley's conception of a hierarchy of values. For Hartley, the moral sense arises out of a particu lar set of associations. As the result of the accumulated experience of a given community, certain types of actions become associated, rightly or wrongly, with the approval 87 of other men ('ambition*), the blessing of God ('refined self-interest'), the possibility of having friendly rela tions with one's fellows ('sympathy'), the possibility of feeling at one with the universe ('theopathy'). These actions are called 'right.' And, like the love of money, the desire to do right actions, arising at first as a means, becomes an end in itself. Vhen that happens, the moral sense has come into existence (QMP: 25)* Thus, for Hartley, the harmony of our other affections in some way produces the moral sense; and, just as an action once pursued as a means can become an end in itself, so, too, the moral sense, vhen it once exists, exercises a regulative function and produces a harmony of all the other affections (HBU: 128). The moral sense, then, is not only the latest in development but the highest in quality as well. The proceeding sketch of the development of the theory of the moral sense will serve as a backdrop before which 44 Godwin's appraisal of this theory can be reviewed. Here, as elsewhere, Godwin is not entirely consistent. The moral sense as developed by Hutcheson is acceptable in so far as it stresses the natural basis for normative perceiving and judging, unacceptable in so far as it denies ^Butler and Hume were omitted here because of the slight influence they had on Godwin. 88 cognitive value* to ouch Judgments. Again, he agrees with Hutcheson in identifying virtue with the disposition of a character, as well as in his insistence upon the importance of intention in judging actions (PJ: IV. v; IV. x). But Hutcheson provides no adequate basis for benevolence, a quality upon which Godwin must insist (PJ: V. xvi). From Hartley, Godwin accepted the notion that the • * latest in development (from the standpoint of time) is highest in quality. (This will allow Godwin to insist upon maturity as a prerequisite for the practice of vir tue) . Hartley has also contributed to Godwin's theory by giving further proof that the origin of vice is to be found in ignorance, i.e., in the undesirable associations which subsequently corrupt the moral sense. But inherent in Hartley's theory is moral relativism, since the "unde sirable associations" are purely factitious: one ie not morally preferable (in an absolute sense) to any other association. Price's insistence upon the role of reason in our coming to know moral principles made an appeal to Godwin. For Price showed how, through intuition, normative precepts are grasped. This activity of reason, along with its inherent propensity to recoil from error, provided a foun dation for an absolute theory of morality: disinterested- 89 ness, essential to such an ethic, had been established in principle. In summary, it must be said that Godwin was not exces sively influenced by the moral-sense school. It was Godwin's belief that, though general principles may be grasped in their generality, they lack meaning for us until they have been applied in their particularity. For example, to act morally is not merely to act from the motive of doing one's duty: this should be reinforced by a rational insight into the nature of duty. But the converse of this is also trues knowledge of the principle of doing one's duty is not truly knowledge until it has been experienced in the concrete. But reason is qualified to rise to immediate knowledge of principles, and man's general make-up is in the direction of concrete verification. Consequently, the moral sense, as a distinct and separate faculty, is unnecessary. Moreover, belief in a divinely implanted moral sense may make tend towards immorality, because of the false sense of security that might be generated. Finally, Godwin objects to the moral sense because this theory could lead to automatic behavior, without an under standing on our part as to why we so act. And to act with out exactly knowing why we are acting is to be acting from vice, for we are here suffering from prejudice. 7. Godwin's Conception of "Prejudice." 90 The use of quotation marks in the sub-heading immedi ately above is justified* for Godwin uses the term "preju dice" in a rather unique way. It describes a state one is in when one does not "see things as they are," i.e., when one acts from ignorance. Godwin's argument against prejudice is actually an argument against any and every generalization, whether it be of a factual or of a normative nature. It may sound odd to hear one who stresses the apprehension of principles by reason arguing in such a fashion. If so, this is because Godwin's position is a many-faceted one, and I have not presented all aspects of it adequately. It is a matter of common knowledge that men do often choose things which they recognize to be undesirable. Or so it would appear. Godwin is convinced that one may recognize the undesirability on reflection, but not at the moment of choices It may happen that the opinion may be exceedingly fugitive; it may have been preceded by aversion and followed by remorse; but it was unquestionably the opinion of the mind in the instant at which the action commenced (PJ: I. v). But if man always acts reasonably in voluntary action, why is it that he does such foolish and perverse things? Because, Godwin would say, the information he acted from was inadequate; the opinion he acted from was erroneous; he was, that is to say, acting from prejudice. 91 And why does Ignorance prewall over knowledge* and vice over virtue? Ihe first reason Is to be found in an exami nation of our social development. We form undesirable association* thereby establishing and enforcing sentiments and habits which, collectively* provide an effective screen to prevent us from seeing the truth. And government has conferred a power and durability on error through the former's discharge of duty.^ This error has been nourished and propagated until it has poisoned the mind of man (SL: 76). Ihe fundamental fact about human nature that explains how prejudices develop has already been given: "every idea that now offers itself to the mind is modified by all the ideas that ever existed in it. It is this circumstance* that constitutes the insensible empire of prejudice" (PJ: IV. ix). Ihe most important cause of prejudice* then, is asso ciation: the illegitimate extension of some principle (X la to be admired* despised* revemced* etc.) to something else, Y* which is like X in some respects, but not in the respects that make it admirable, despicable* etc. (QMP: 142). This is only possible when we have forgotten what those respects were; when* that is* we "separate a tenet from the evidence on which its validity depends." But* of course* we may not have forgotten the evidence: ***For a detailed discussion of this* see Chapter II. 92 for it often happens that we newer have known the evidence for a general principles it was merely acoepted "on faith." Ihe effects of prejudice are far from trivial. Godwin talks as if prejudice reaches to the very core of mans An individual surrenders the best attribute of man, the moment he resolves to adhere to certain fixed prin ciples, for reasons not now present to his mind, but which formerly were . . . There can be no scheme more egregiously stamped with folly, than that of separating a tenet from the evidence upon which its validity depends. If I cease from the habit of being able to recall this evidence, my belief is no longer a percep tion, but a prejudice; it may influence me like a pre judice; but cannot animate me like a real apprehension of truth (W: VI. viii). Thus, there are two opposite errors which we must avoids barren dogma, which does not really touch our "hearts and characters," and principles which are indeed reinforced by emotion, but only because of quite adventi tious associations. If we fall into either error, we hold a principle without really understanding it, and "a princi ple so held is always a prejudice, whether it happens to be true or false" (GMPs 141). It would appear that prejudice begins shortly after birth. Certainly it has gone far in its development by the time our social development reaches its plateau. Prejudice is to blame for the child's Inhibitions and failures to develop: he has fallen prey to the prejudice of "the wisdom of the elders," so that he soon learns to "wrap himself up in that neutrality towards his seniors, that may best 93 protect him from their reprimand and their despotism** (TOM* 20). Thus, before he has arrived at a degree of indepen dence of judgment that would sustain him throughout his life, prejudice has intervened, and the fate of the indivi dual is too often decided forever (TOM: 23). By now it should be apparent that prejudice, because it results from the development of undesirable habit and sentiment associations, is essentially irrational. Desire has been allowed to feed upon itself, and has insinuated itself between reason and the world. For even abstract principles, though rational enough in themselves, may be held because of desire. And if they are so held, the desire which led to their acquisition will prevent their being understood. Add to this set of circumstances political institutions which rely upon the assertion and dominance of desire, and prejudice becomes not only inevitable but insuperable. Consider an example of a politically supported preju dice: our leaders may tell us that the best course for us is to accept their program because of the immediate returns it will bring. If we do so, without understanding the proposal, we will be acting upon "outward ceremonies" only (GMP: 141). We shall have missed those conorete particu lars that really constitutes its meaning, and we shall have, out of short-sightedness, preferred the immediate small pleasures they promised to the (possible) remote greater 94 one. What Godwin suggests is that we could not choose the lesser of two goods if we really understood how and why the remote pleasure is greater (GMP: 42). But there is another most important point to be made here. Seeing things as they are and really understanding them effects both our opinion of what is desirable and our desires themselves. This notion is crucial for Godwin, for he recognized fully the necessary emotional aspects of mor ality. He insures a rational and fervent ethic by insisting that, through understanding, our true opinions and our jus tified desires become fused. In the proceeding discussion I have tended to combine two sets of opinions (as does Godwin): normative and the descriptive. That is to say, one may be prejudiced either with respect to the world of facts, or concerning the realm of values. Godwin's argument is the same irrespective of the type of prejudice we are plagued by: if we see the truth we shall respond accordingly. Such a mingling of the descriptive and the normative is just what we would expect from Godwin. It is, in fact, just what he would insist upon. Is Godwin saying, then, that we are corrupted by the mere process of living? Is he suggesting that we can never see things as they are because of the psychological fact that the present impression is modified by preconceived ideas, the effect of past impressions? Though he gives 95 such an impression at tines, hia essential meaning is clears the mass of experience which we bring to every new percept usually helps into see more clearly, rather than less. It is not experience as such that inclines us towards error and misconception, but only illegitimate rules of thumb - unsubstantiated ideas, or those which we fail to really understand. Generalizations, then, are inadequate as guides, particularly as guides to the emotions. It is only when we apprehend the particular instance in the light of the generalization that the appropriate emotions are kindled, and the proper actions are instigated. "Godwin insists that 'reason' does not stop with general principles (and he is speaking specificially of moral principles)" (QMP: 32): It would be preposterous to suppose that, in order to judge fairly, and to conduct myself properly, I ought only to look at a thing from a certain distance, and not consider it minutely. On the contrary, I ought, as far as lies in my power, to examine everything upon its own grounds, and decide concerning it upon its own merits. To rest in general rules is sometimes a necessity which our imperfection imposes on us, and sometimes the refuge of our indolences but the true dignity of human reason is. as much as we are able, to gobeyoncT"them, to have our faculties in aot Upon every occasion that occurs, and to conduct ourselves accordingly (fJ: XV. vi). And with this exhortation to improve, Godwin suggests the means for such. If the root of vice, prejudice, is to be found in man's constitution, so too is the possibility for virtue. And this possibility could take the fora only of the ability for man to be objective in his judgments* i.e.* impartial.^ 8. The Principle of Impartiality. There is a line in Politioal Justice that runes That which gives the last zest to our enjoyments* is the approbation of our own minds* the consciousness that the exertion we have made* was such as was oalled for by impartial justice and reason . . . (P£: I. v). Here Godwin has given* in an abbreviated form, the essence of the principle of impartiality. He is calling attention to the dual fact that both justice and reason are* and ought to be* governed by this principle. This is another instance of his correlation of the ontological and epistemological dimensions* vie. that* as justice and truth (for these terms are interchangeable) are immutable and impartial, so* too* must reason be if the latter is to know the former. And there is the further suggestion here that man's highest form of happiness is of an intellectual nature* one that comes from his realisation that his efforts are in accord with the rules of justioe and the laws of reason. *^Por Godwin's utilization of this theme* and that of the possibility of our ending prejudice* see Fleetwood1 I. 46-47; 142-4. 97 Earlier in this chapter there was a discussion of Godwin's belief in the omnipotence of truth, and in its J7 eventual triumph. We are now in a position to understand more fully his reason for such optimism* It comes down to this* there is something inherent within the very nature of the human mind that will assert itself if conditions conducive to such prevail. For it is a condition of reason that it is impartial, just as it is a condition of reasoning that you follow the argument to which ever conclusion it leads, Heither principle can be proved* they are not in that sense, facts. But we can hardly reason unless we adopt them (QMP: 29) * For Godwin, then, the prinoiple of impartiality is implicit in reason in much the same way as the principle of non-contradiction is. We cannot understand the universe unless we see "things as they are." "But to see things as they are is necessarily to feel certain emotions towards them. Knowledge is impossible unless we can bring ourselves to adopt the 'scientific attitude,' the impartial, objective viewpoint" ( QMP: 28-9). This is really a re-statement of the idea that reason, being a unifying faculty, will bring about a fusion of desire and opinion if allowed full expres sion. It is not required that reason be aided in this; all that is required is that it be not hindered. This is so ^See: pp. 73 ff. 98 because Godwin la describing raaaon itself; it would have its way la unlmpadad. Fort Daluaion and falsification ara [utterly Incompatible] with tha wholaaoaa tona of tha huaan understanding (£[; V. xv). And if all minds were allowed free rain, wa could even for*- get about laws against slander: Tha mind spontaneously shrinks from tha prosecution of a libel (PJ: VI. vi). Tha principle of impartiality, than, is an axiom of reason. But it directly contradicts tha principle of self- interest, to which our actions must, by an inexorable psychological law, conform (QMP: 18).^ How, than, are these two principles to be reconciled? The answer is to be found in the principle of impartiality itself, and by a re-examination of our sensory nature: We find by observation that we are surrounded by beings of the same nature with ourselves. They have the same senses, are susceptible of the same pleasures and pains, capable of being raised to the same excellence, and employed in the same usefulness. We are able in imagination to go out of ourselves, and become impar tial spectators of the system of which we are a part. We ean then make an estimate of their intrinsic and absolute value; and detect the imposition of that self- regard, which would represent our own interest, as of as much value as that of all the world beside (PJ: IV. x). *^For an examination of psychological hedonism and self-love, see below, pp. 114-124. 99 It la thua easy to sea that tha principle of imparti ality is really an ultimata moral principle for Godwin. This principle follows from the omnipotence of truth, and la required to insure Godwin's program of rational progress. But this principle could not be deduoed from egoism (QMP: 19). It is introduced to bolster Godwin's argument for the essential rationality of man. Its ultimate purpose appears to be that of controlling the passions, for it is through this means that the "greatest pleasure for the greatest number" dictum is demonstrated (i.e., as that principle which, if all the facts were known, would be assented to by all men) (£J: IV. z). Beason is now well fitted to provide man with the vivid apprehension Godwin desires, for such apprehension is to be achieved by exposure to a greater range of experience, "by knowledge, in the full sense of knowledge, of more facts" (GMP: 49). It will be on the basis of the principle of impartiality, reinforced by concrete experience, that Godwin will be able to bridge the gap between egoism and rational benevolence. It iB his nearest approach to the moral sense, and compares favorably with Bentham's "every one to count as one, and no one for more than one" (GMP: 19). For this is to be Godwin's version of the natural basis of utility: man's natural tendency impartially to apply the criterion of utility (OPR: 194). 100 Nan* a re aeon has now been Bade to include principles of impartiality, sincerity, an impulse toward truth, to operate (within limits) according to the laws of association, to be determined by a rational necessity. What is now required is proof that man is a unitary being, without a multiplicity of faculties, and that, in the model case, reason and desire are inseparable. 9. The Places of Reason and Feeling in Knowing. In order to complete his moral picture of man, Godwin must demonstrate the falsity of the proposition that the will operates separately from the understanding. The reason for this is to be found when we once again remind ourselves of one of the two fundamental theses which Godwin wished to prove, viz. that our voluntary actions originate in our opinions. Our opinions are rationally constructed, and we always consult them before acting voluntarily. Further, our voluntary actions are necessary, in the sense of "rational necessity" discussed earlier. If he were now to separate our understanding from our will, he would be postulating another source of voluntary action. And with this his entire scheme for rational progress would collapse. In order to avoid the disastrous consequences of such a separation, it is necessary for Godwin to re-define the mind. Thus: 101 By the mind we understand that within us which feels and thinks* the seat of sensation and reason (TOM: 7). Next* it is necessary to show that the new definition of the mind is consistent with his belief as to the origin of voluntary actioni Vhen we discourse of the comparative powers of appetite and reason* we speak of those actions* which have the consent of the mind* and partake of the nature of the voluntary. The question neither is nor deserves to be* respecting cases where no choice is exerted* and no preference shown. Every man is aware* that the case, into which volition enters either.for a part or the whole* are sufficiently numerous, to decide upon all that is most important in the events of our life (Ws I. v). Finally* it is postulated that not only should the will and intellect not be separated* but that to separate them is quite impossible; for "virtuous desire is wholly inseparable from a strong and vivid perception of the nature and value of the object of virtue" (PJ: IV. v). Godwin refused to separate the will from the under standing, in order to save his belief in rational progress. And in order to make his system consistent with felt- experience* and in order to create a workable ethic* he had to show that passions have their rational aspect, and reason its appetitive side. Hartley had shown Godwin how* through the principle of association* ideas possess an emotional element because of 102 the intermingling of sentiment and habit with abstract notions* But Godwin was convinced that Hartley's system consisted in a denial of reason altogether. Thus, Godwin tried to amend it. Godwin's amendments of the theory of association amounts to a total revision. Godwin now pictures reason not as a machine forming ideas on the basis of mechanical laws, but as an inherently compulsive faculty which strives toward knowledge. And it is by the postulation of this compulsive aspect of reason that Godwin is able to fuse emotion and intellect; the understanding now possesses . desires of its own. Further, Godwin interprets the term "knowledge" to include data from the entire spectrum of experience. So knowledge is now presented as being an inseparable combination of reason and emotion. And, this being the case, that which knows must be capable of grasping the whole range of experience. This can be accomplished only by seeing the will and the understanding as two aspects of one faculty. The knowledge referred to in the proceeding paragraph meant, for Godwin, moral knowledge. And for moral precepts to be meaningful they must be such as to appeal to the whole person. Thus, the charges that Godwin wished to sacrifice emotion to reason is false. For Godwin wants reason to be charged with emotions 103 Pven knowledge, and tha enlargement of intellect, ara poor, whan unmlxed with a antimanta of benevolence and aympathy (£J: 17. v). In hla traatment of tha quaation of tha placaa of raaaon and feeling In knowledge Godwin waa guided by an ideal, tha ideal of perfect knowledge (i.e., moral know- ledge). For this ideal waa required by his theory of rational progreaa. It would enable man to "see things as they are,1 * for here knowledge would be perfect. It is not a quaation of perfect knowledge being reinforced by emotion (when viewed ideally); knowledge before waa imperfect. When it becomes perfect, it necessarily brings the emotion with it, and it is no longer possible for desire and emotion to conflict (QMP: 32). Here, then, ia Godwin's final judgment on the relative importance of desire and reasons passion as arduous is inseparable from reason; passion in the sense of "ruling passion" is a delusion of the understanding; passion as natural appetite should be controlled by reason. This is merely to assert the appetitive side of reason, while sub ordinating the irrational appetitess Passion is so far from being incompatible with reason, that it is inseparable from it. Virtue, sincerity, justice, and all those principles . . • will never be very strsnously espoused, till they are ardently loved . . . and . . . volition and foresight, in their strict and accurate construction, are inseparable (PJ: I. v). 104 Finally, reason ought to reign supreme, though not at the expense of the passionst . . . the passions ought to he purified, but not to be eradicated . . . and . . . passion is not to be conquered by reason, but by bringing some other passion i.e., a morally approved one into contention with it (PJ* I. ▼). But, if the passions must be guided and refined in their role in knowing, and if reason must be fortified with fervor in its cognitive function, it is just as important that their respective operations and consitituions be understood as they operate to motivate man. And to this question we now turn. D. Man*s Springs of Action. 1. Motivation and Political Philosophy - general The importance of man's sources of motivation and their relations to social and political theorizing was recognized by Oodwins No question has more memorably exercised the ingenuity of men who have speculated upon the structure of the human mind, than that of the motives by which we are actuated in our intercourse with our fellow-creatures (TOM: 203). What are man's fundamental motives? What are his supreme needs and desires? The answers to these questions are pre supposed by the political theorist and moralist, for they 105 will determine the absolute limits within which one's speculations and ideals must fall. If, for example, man's sole motive is self-interest, all talk of a society based upon a program of altruism beoomes utter nonsense. At the same time, one who underrates man's potentials and denies, e.g., disinterestedness, will, if proven wrong, superimpose a social structure upon man which would preclude his full development. This would be as false as the former position. The question of man's fundamental sources of motivation seems to have bothered Godwin a great deal, for he devotes much thought to it. But here, as in many other areas, Godwin does not saddle himself with utter consistency. He says, for example, that the original impulse of man is uncontrollableness (TOM: 105)* This oertainly suggests an emotional basis for action. On the other hand, he writes that: If thought, in order to be the source of animal motion, need not have, either the nature of volition, or the ooncomitant of consciousness, and if a single thought may become a complex source, and produce a variety of motions ... it appears that all those motions, which are observed to exist in substances having perception . . . may reasonably be suspected to have thought, the distinguishing peculiarity of such substanoes, for their source (PJ: IV. ix). < Thus, there is the suggestion that it is thought, and not emotion, that is the source of motion. But at another point it is stated that man is not an active being at all, but is of a passive nature, thus throwing doubt on both the above proposals. Godwin's problems in the area of motivation are aimi lar to those he encountered when considering man's sources and kinds of knowledge. He must remain true to experience, which means man's passions must be recognized; he must give a commanding position to reason so that his rational neces sity might be preserved; and he must integrate these two aspects of man's nature so that they may function in har mony. For, if he can establish the true nature of man's motives, he will be able (assuming the truth of his episte- mology) to deduce the optimal types of social relations for man to engage in. Godwin's early emphasis on reason tends to give way more and more to feeling. Ihis transition is fostered by three considerations (in addition to those listed above)* Godwin is eager to rebut the egoists and to assert the existence of disinterested desires; he wishes to provide an answer to the question raised by the doctrine of utility, "Vhy should I care for the general good?," and he wishes to supplement his too narrow definition of reason (as being a mechanism), which, by making reason merely comparative, threatened its appetitive power (PJ: intro., 21). In some sense, then, desire is and must be the source of all action, for Godwin must generate action for the public good, and, thus, the public good must be desired. 107 That la, he is determined to retain desire as the basis of action, but oust allow for non-egotiscial behavior as well. «- * ■ This can best be accomplished by setting up a distinction between direct and indirect motives, the direct being conscious and purely disinterested, the indirect unconscious and egoistic. Not only is the direct motive the more important for Godwin, but it is to become increasingly so as man's actions become more "voluntary" and more rational. Ultimately, the reliance is to be on the exercise of the understanding (PJ: IV. v; II. vi; intro., 24).^° Thus, desire will become interwined with intellect in 9 Godwin's theory of motivation, as it was in his theory of knowledge. Further, desire will become "reasonable," in the sense that it will not conflict with reason and, fur ther, in the sense that it will be subject to the same rational necessity which we have seen reason to be subject to. This last qualification is to avoid an arbitrary and self-indulgent free-will theory. To prove his case for a theory of motivation necessity Godwin invokes an argument against infinite regress: The mind cannot first choose to be influenced by a motive, and afterwards submit to its operations for in that case the preference would belong wholly to this previous volition (PJ: IV. vii). Godwin is asserting the "necessitarian hypothesis" ^°See* pp. 109-114 below. 108 again, but this form of determinism still ramaina a bit paculiar. For ha ia really assarting tha baliaf that (moral) action will follow necessarily onca tha agant has axpariancad and understands certain moral precepts. That is to say, ha is assarting the belief that the moral consciousness, when awakened, is intuitive and self- evidencing and "carries in it an inherent imperative author ity" (W: intro. 13) i In order to change the actions of another the necessarian . . . would suggest motives to the mind, but he would not call upon it to comply, as if it had a power to comply, or not to comply. His office would consist of two parts, the exhibition of motives to the pursuit of a certain end, and the delineation of the easiest and most effectual way of attaining that end (W: IV. viii). And this necessary behavior would be accompanied by a state of cheerfulness, and by the proper emotionst In proportion therefore to the virtue of the indivi- dual, will be the permanence of his chearfulness [sic] and the exquisiteness of his emotions (FJs IV. vf* This, then, is a summary of Godwin's theory of motiva tion. But it must be mentioned here, before an intensive examination of its elements, that Godwin's system has had introduced into it certain rational elements. Thus, it is to be expected that his determinism will be something sharply different from materialistic or hedonistice deter minism. And "whether this something is to be called free- 109 dome or necessity seems simply a matter of terminology" (PJ: intro., 19)• But whether it is to be called free or deterministic, Godwin's theory must account for man's actions. And there were, according to Godwin, three typea of action. 2. Voluntary. Involuntary and Indirect Voluntary Actions. The importance between voluntary and involuntary actions is to be found in Godwin's purpose in making such a distinction. It is suggested that involuntary behavior exhibits one sort of necessity - that, namely, which is dictated by past experience, while voluntary actions are always determined by a judgment and proceed "upon the apprehended truth of some proposition" (PJ: I* v; IV. ix). This is a re-statement of the teleological, or rational necessity discussed earlier. Godwin is determined to maintain his unitary view of man, his knowledge and his motives. Thus, he gives two versions of voluntary action: Voluntary actions is, where the event is foreseen previously to its occurence, and the hope or fear of that event forms the excitement, or, as it is most frequently termed, the motive, inducing us, if hope be the passion, to endeavor to forward, and if fear, to endeavor to prevent it (PJ: I. v): Bvery voluntary action is an act of obedience; in performing it, we comply with some view, and are guided by some incitement or motive. The purest kind of obedience is, where an action flows from the independ- 110 ent conviction of our private judgment, where we are directed, not by the precarious and mutable interfere enoe of another, but by a recollection of the intrinsic and indefeasible tendency of the action to be performed <^: III. vi). Perhaps it is not fair to state that Godwin gave two different versions of voluntary action. Actually, he was probably giving two sides of the same operation, for, on his view, all human action is necessary. And in saying this he is really only re-affirming the principle that the volun tary actions of men originate in their moral judgments. Svery voluntary act is performed with a view to certain consequences that are calculated to result from it; the idea of these consequences is its motive. The act is performed necessarily because the motives which prompt it, the anti cipated consequences for the sake of which it is performed, are regarded by the understanding, whether truly or falsely, as preferable to all contending motives, to the anticipated consequences which would discourage its performance or prompt the performance of alternative acts (3Ls 75)* She mind decides 'this is good' or 'desirable'; and immediately upon that decision, if accompanied with a persuasion that we are- competent to accomplish this good or desirable thing, the limbs proceed to their office. She mind decides, 'this is better than some thing else' ; either wine and cordials are before us, and I ohoose the wine rather than the cordials; or wine is better than to abstain from it. Shus it appears that in every voluntary action there is preference or choioe. which indeed are synonymous terms" (F£i I. v; IV. iv). m The importance of the above passage is that it is Godwin*s proof of his primary principle that "the voluntary actions of men originate in their opinions"; and he argues from this both that to think something is desirable is to desire it» and that to desire something is to think it desirable (GMP: 37). The validity of this argument is dependent entirely upon the merging of the will and the understanding, for the term "opinion" has been broadened to include emotional as well as intellectual content. A corollary of the principle that man's voluntary actions originate in their opinions is that attention is proportionate to our apprehension of the importance of the subject at hand (PJ: IV. viii). This is not only a deduc tion from, but evidence for, the idea that, at bottom, man's actions are guided by his understanding. The true importance of voluntary actions for Godwin is in his doctrine of rational progress, or, in other words, in the belief in the perfection of the human character. For such perfection will consist in approaching as nearly as possible for the perfectly voluntary state. But, almost as an after-thought, Godwin informs us that what he has here proposed is more in the realm of the ideal than in that of the real; for "perhaps no action of a man arrived at years of maturity is, in the sense above defined, perfectly volun tary" (P£: I. v). Man has other sources of action, one of which is not under rational control; that is, some actions 112 are involuntary. (todwin's treatment of involuntary actions is brief, and it is obvious that he gives very little importance to them as sources of man's behavior, first, he defines involuntary action as any action which occurs either without foresight on our part, or behavior which is contrary to the "full bent of our inclinations" (PJ: I. v). In addition to the fact that this statement appears to contradict the earlier and fundamental one that action is always accompanied by fore sight, Godwin has defined involuntary action in a circular fashion. This i B one more interesting example of Godwin wrestling with all the facts of experience, and his trying to give a universal explanation that will account for all of them. His purpose here is to explain the obvious, viz. that, contrary to his wishes, some of the actions of mankind are not consciously motivated, i.e., are not voluntary. It is for this reason that he must deny that volition is the necessary concomitant of the production of motion (W: I. v). ▲ species of action that appears to partake both of the voluntary and the involuntary is that behavior referred to by Godwin as "indirect voluntary" action. This is a very important variety of behavior, and Godwin makes some genuine contributions in his explication of it. This type of action originates in habit and is originally involuntary and me chanical. It often has a pernicious influence, in that it 113 tends to modify in various ways such of our actions as are voluntary* In other words, its net affect is to withdraw from our hank of voluntary actions and to supply in their atead unconsciously inspired acts. It is this sort of habit occuring when one feels inclined to abridge the process of deliberation, and to* act today conformably to the determination of yesterday . . . Thus man acquires habits, from which it is very difficult to wean him, and which he obeys without being able to assigns either to himself or others, any expli cit reason for his proceeding. This is the history of prepossession and prejudice (PJ; I. vT py italicsJT Godwin cites as an example of one who is behaving according to such habit patterns the habitual churchgoer. He likens such a person to the individual who has gone through a course of geometry, and who now believes the truth of the propositions upon the testimony of his memory, though the proofs are by no means present to his understanding (PJ: I. v). The use of the churchgoer as an example here is not accidental. In front of Godwin's mind is the need to estab lish a moral system which is true to man's nature, and to which man will readily adhere. But a moral system is a living, vital thing only for so long as its precepts are believed truly by its followers; and to believe is to have full understanding, emotional as well as intellectual. If such full understanding is wanting, one has, not a dynamic ethic, but a system of barren rules followed merely from force of habit. It is for this reason that Godwin urges 114 us to question the principles by which we live daily, to insure that they still haws meaning for us, and are able to motivate us. in action is necessary. Voluntary action is necessary in a rational, teleological sense. Involuntary action is determined mechanically. Indirect voluntary behavior falls somewhere between these two poles, being now determined teleologically, now inspired mechanically. The possibility of progress for man lies in his ability to bring about the former type of necessity, by making his actions as fully conscious as possible. But in order to accomplish this, man must be able to rise above a principle held by some to be absolutely fundamental: the principle of pleasure and pain. 3* Psychological Hedonism and Self-love. Though there was some wavering on Godwin's part early in life on the question of psychological hedonism, his position later in life was quite clear on this points The advooates of self-love have, very unjustly, sub stituted the abstract definition of a voluntary agent, and made that stand for the motive by whloh he is prompted to act. It is true, that we oannot act with out the impulse of desire or uneasiness; but we do not think of that desire and uneasiness; and it is the thing upon which the mind is fixed that constitutes our motive. In the boundless variety of acts, passions and pursuits of human beings, it is absurd on the face of it to say* that we are all governed by one motive, and that, however dissimilar are the ends we pursue, all this dissimilarity is the fruit of a single cause (TOM: 212). 115 The primary reason for Godwin*a vehement insistence that we are motivated by desires other than that of our personal pleasure is not hard to finds 1 will therefore venture to add, that, upon the hypoth esis of self-love, there can be no such thing as virtue (20M: 209). Again: If self-love be the only principle of action, there can be no such thing as virtue (PJ: IV. x). Godwin's mission is still moral, and if hedonism be true his variety of morality is so much nonsense. Still, those theorists who have supported the idea of psychological hedonism have not been dunces, and this principle deserves the utmost attention. And, in addition to its famous proponents, there does appear to be something in man which gives ftome credence to its man possesses a seemingly irra tional side. The three principles which account for his irrational appearance are theses First, the love of enterprise and adventure • . . Secondly, the love of novelty. A third principle, which discovers itself in early childhood, and which never entirely quits us, is the love of power (TOM: 97). Further, the love of distinction is characteristic of every human mind (P£: VIII. i). How, then, are these facts of man's nature to be reconciled with an essentially rational view of him? 116 Godwin believes that the groundwork for euoh a recon ciliation had been established by some of his predecessors, and that, therefore, a "more noble and generous view of the subject" was possible. Ihe first such person to whom Godwin paid tribute was Hutcheson. Hutcheson's treatment of the moral sense suggested that preferences will be made in favor of self-interest. But this suggestion is only apparent, for, though our approba tion will be based upon sense rather than upon reason, the moral sense will not be bribed by self-interest. It decleares what is good or evil in abstraction from self- interest (M3: 72). Again, Hutcheson has distinguished be tween "calm" self-love and "calm" benevolence on the one hand, and the "turbulent" passions - selfish or social, on the other. Thus, though the point is not developed, there is the suggestion here that disinterestedness in action and preference is possible (OHBs 201). Ihe oase of Hartley is somewhat different. According to "the associationist" we are so constituted that pleasure and pain impel us to action. Thus "active" love becomes "desire," and "active" hatred "aversion." These are the moving forces in man (HBU: 118). Pleasures are blended together (as a result of association) to produce qualita tively higher affections. A similar blending of pains causes the sense of guilt and anxiety that arises when we reflect on our vices (OHB: 220). This, again, is the doc- trine that the latest in development is the highest in quality. Hartley's doctrine appealed to Godwin because of its emphasis on man's training and education (i.e., his associ ations). But, though Hartley declares unequivocally against psychological hedonism, he recognizes no original principle of disinterestedness and sympathy (HBU: 119). And it is precisely that latter that Godwin must account for. Though often overlooked by commentators, Adam Smith exerted a certain influence on Godwin with the former's treatment of self-interest. For Smith, too, was concerned with the establishing of a smoothly-running social system, and he had to found this on man's nature. Further, Godwin claims that he is a utilitarian, deriving his central idea here from Smith. Smith's main importance for us is in the equivocal and rather naive way he handled sympathy and interest. The suggestion is that without interference the self-interest of one person will not interfere with that of another: every one in pursuing his own advantage at the same time furthers the good of all. And the possibility of benevolence (which waa undoubtedly the highest morality) was derived from individual self-interest. Sympathy (or benevolence) had utilitarian value for the individual, and could, under optimal conditions, be generated from self- interest (WIT: 351; III, 234-5). Hume appealed to Godwin for several reasons. For one 118 thing, he agreed with Hume that we must not say that virtue ia natural And vica unnatural (jf§: 126). Again, Hume's insistence on tha role of desire in action was viewed with favor by Godwin. In fact, Godwin gave a qualified assent to Hume's famous statement that reason is the slave of the passions. On the other hand, Hume emphatically maintains that motive is no motive to action, except so far as it "directs the impulse received from appetite or inclination"; and he does not appear to recognize any obligation to vir tues except that of the agent's interest or happiness (OHB: 211). Again, Hume does not seem to think that moral senti ment or "taste" can become a motive to action either, ex cept as it gives pleasure or pain to the agent. As far as the real root of moral approbation is concerned, Hume denies that this is reducible to self-love (proven, as he said, by "crucial experiments"). He thus presents to Godwin a system in which &oral approbation, though non-rational and subjec tive, can nevertheless be disinterested; and a system in which reason must be subservient to the passions. Though some of these items are inconsistent with Godwin's theory of man, Godwin does appear to have accepted from Hume the letter's naturalism, with its stressing that the general sentiments of morality are common to all men (g£: V, 331)* Indeed, Godwin was influenced by Hume to a degree not usual ly recognized. Godwin's problem here is approximately this: if all 119 our voluntary actions, thoaa which coaprlae the aoet impor tant actions of our life, originate In our opinions that these actions are desirable; and if the sensations of the individual are the only possible source of ideas, how can the altruistic sentiments be derived without reducing them to feelings of self-love? At the outset Godwin appears to be attempting just this latter task: Ihe things first desired by every thinking being will be agreeable sensation, and the means of agreeable sensations. If he forsees anything this is not appre hended to be pleasure or pain, or the means of plea sure or pain, this will excite no desire, and lead to no voluntary action (PJ: IV* x). This seems complete psychological hedonism. But the emphasis is on the word "first" in the first sentence. Godwin goes on to modify the doctrine by introducing the principle of association of ideas as laid down by Hartley. He uses the classic illustration of the miser who, desiring money originally as a means, comes to prize it for its own sake. "Something of this sort happens very early in the history of every passion." Benevolence is in this respect no different from avarice. "The good of my neighbor could not, in the first instance, have been chosen, but as the means of agreeable sensations." But, like wealth, or fame, or the drunkard's craving, it speedily becomes a motive in its own right (GMP: 17). Thus, Godwin believes that we are incapable, in the 120 beginning, of desiring anything except aa a means to our own pleasure. But that leads v i e to desire to understand ourselves and our surroundings, (i) in order to control them, and (ii) because of reason's inherent compulsiveness. And in the process of gaining understanding we come to see that our own happiness has no claim to be preferred to any one else*s. "We come to see this because it is on some sense a fact, an axiom to be grasped by reason" (QMP: 28). This principle, in conjunction with that of impartiality, may be compared with another principle of reason, that we must accept the conclusion to whioh the evidence points. And Godwin accepts this, not as an ideal, but as a fact about the very structure of our minds (QMP: 28). Godwin never rejects the principle that good is a plea sure. What he insists upon is that it is merely our own pleasure; Ihe doctrine that we can desire only pleasure becomes, for him: Ihe voluntary actions of men are under the direction of their feelings; nothing can have a tendency to produoe this species of action, except so far as it is connected with ideas of future pleasures or pain to ourselves or others ( Paul: I, 294) [my italicsJ. With this last qualification Godwin begins the prooees of divorcing himself from hedonism. Por with this modifi cation the door is opened for the inclusion of altruistio behavior, including duty, fidelity, sincerity, eto. But Godwin was far from rejecting the emotional aspect 121 of behavior, and pleasure and pain continue to have an important, though not the commanding, positions . • . pleasure and pain, however, though not the authors of my determination, undoubtedly tend to per petuate and strengthen it (PJ: IV. z). lor does he deny that an opinion that something is desirable is really a feeling. The important point is that it is a feeling that we cannot help having when faced with certain facts. For, just as action flows automatically when reason grasps a certain principle, so, too, do the proper emotions. Godwin has put forward two irreducible theses. First, that pleasure is good, and secondly, that the greater plea sure (either for myBelf or for others) is preferred to the lesser. These are guaranteed by instinct, and confirmed by reason (PJ: I. v). For we necessarily desire pleasure, and just as necessarily strive to see the world as it is. But to see thingB as they are is to see what is desirable. And to see what is desirable is to desire it (this follows from the previous statement). Oodwin, then, has refuted the hedonist's argument. He rejects the view that sympathy is merely a mors refined form of self-interest, claiming instead that disinterested ness in choice is possible. The hedonist's argument is really circular, for it insists that the strongest desire always conquers. And if anyone points to a negative instance, the answer 1st 'It couldn't really have been the 122 strongest desire.1 Again, the hypothesis of self-love is in direct opposition to experience, and to what every man seems to know of himself (F£: IV. x). For, Why did the liberal-minded man perform his first act of benevolence? the answer of these persons i.e. hedonists ought to be, because the recollection of a generous deed is a source of the truest delight. But there is an absurdity on the face of this solution. We do not experimentally know the delight which attends the recollection of a generous deed, till a generous deed has been performed by us . . . And surely it is inconsistent with all sound reasoning, to represent that as the sole spring of benevolent actions, which by the very terms will not fit the first benevolent sot in which any man is engaged (TOM: 215). What, then, is to be said of those seemingly irrational desires we all possess, such as love of distinction? Godwin would say that the desire as such is desirable, and should be allowed expression. But it is neither necessary nor desirable that such a desire should manifest itself in the fora of self-interest (coarse or refined). If, for example, it takes the form of prestige, it will be eelf-stultifying; for what one wants is the respeot and admiration of one's fellows, and it is supposed that wealth and rank will rouse these emotions. Such behavior will actually cut one off 51 from those less privileged. Sympathy, not self-interest, is itsiOwn reward. But self-love and sympathy are not warring instinots eaoh of which is to be kept within its own proper sphere. ^As is the case with Falkland in Caleb Williams. 123 If we really think about our own pleasure, we cannot help coming to realize that what is desirable for us is also desirable for other people. For self-interest is, for God win, merely one form of partial benevolence. And, We do not need to alter human nature; all we need la greater knowledge, at least of the kind that makes for sympathetic understanding. And • . . self-interest itself gives us the incentive to increase our under standing of other human beings. As our understanding increases, we cannot but be convinced of the principle of impartiality (QMP: 47; 161). Thus, "man is not in truth so poor and pusillanimous a creature as hedonism would represent" (TOM: 210), and Godwin has rejected the famous equation, psychological hedonism = ethical egoism * utilitarianism. He puts forth the paradox that egoism transcends itself, viz. that it becomes a form of utilitarianism. He has rejected the sys tem which would have made impossible a happy and just society. But he is not really as free from psychological hedonism as it would appear, for, in his zeal to retain a naturalistic basis for his morality, in order to derive what has been called an ethic of "self-abnegation and duty" (PJ: intro., 22), Godwin has confused "X is desired" and "X is desirable." The second statement simply does not follow from the first. It was, perhaps, to solve this dif ficulty that Godwin reverts in his more specifically moral passages, to abstract principles known intuitively by reason. 124 Han is, thus, oapabls of true benevolence. In fact, it is when man practices this that his own happiness is most assuredly found. Benevolence is the only virtuous motive because it is the only reliable motive. And, if men knew all the facts it would be stronger than self-interest: After having habituated ourselves to promote the hap piness of our child, our family, our country or our species, we are at length brought to approve and desire their happiness without retrospect to ourselves (PJ: IV. x). Psychological hedonism and egoism have been transcend ed, and it is now fair to speak of Godwin's most famous contributions concerning man's nature. 5. The Hfttmal Goodness of Han. Godwin has taken issue with those writers (espe cially Helvetius and Holbach) who denied that man is capable of genuinely desiring other men's happiness as well as his own. And it is because of the ability of man to practice disinterested or impartial benevolence that he is said to possess natural goodness. Godwin's belief in natural good ness has nothing to do with the extent or the frequency of evil. It is the hypothesis that evil is causedv as is every other natural phenomenon. Further, we ought to look for them. To talk about original sin is to give up the search for the causes of sin (GMP: 175)* Han possesses a dispo sition to promote the benefit of another; this is one of the 125 passions. In this sense the origin of benevolence is con ceived of as irrational, flat there seems little doubt that to Godwin its operations are rational (PJ: intro., 24)* And beoause it is rational it is capable of refinement and expansion. It is through benevolence that universal Justice must come, if it is ever to occur. It is because of the possibility that man can live with man free of coeroion or compulsion that we are entitled to speak of him as posses sing at least the potentiality of goodness. And it is because of the same potentiality that we may speak of the perfectibility of man. 6. Human Perfectibility. The twin doctrine of the natural goodness of man, and that of human perfectibility is, as a hypothesis, quite unverifiable. But, though unverifiable, it is not meaning less, for it points the way to a method of procedure. In this procedural sense, then, it is perhaps indirectly veri fiable . There is a passage in Political Justice (IV. xi) in which Godwin constructs what he refers to as a "scale hap piness" in four stages. This appears to be a simplified version of Hartley’s hierarchy of pleasure (QMP: 91). Ve * may first of all conceive, says Godwin, of an exceptionally uncultivated peasant, gaining a bare subsistence by hard physical labor, and conscious of very little but the sensa- 126 tlon of the moment. "this 1b in a certain aenae happy. He la happier than a atone." But "the general train of hie sensations comes as near as the nature of human existence will admit to the region of Indifference." As a first refinement of this, we have the man of wealth and fashion, who "enjoys all the luxuries of the palate." But he is not as happy as he might be. Happier atill is the man of taste, who adds to "the gratification of expense" an appreciation of the beauties of nature and art, and of the pleasures of study. "In this person," Godwin concludes, "compared with the two preceding classes, we acknowledge something of the features of men. They were only a better sort of brutes; but he has sensations and transports of whioh they have no conception." But man is not yet complete. The pleasures of taste are cold, unless they are given meaning by sympathy for others. The whole person has a heart as well as a head. Mere study and aesthetic enjoyment will seem pointless, unless they are somehow interfused with a desire for human happiness. There would appear to be two points here that Godwin is makings first, that the intellectual and aesthetic pleasures are not themselves fully satisfying unless we feel that they are somehow important for human happiness in general; and, secondly, that the pleasures of benevolence are greater than these (GMP: 92). 127 Ihu8f the man of benevolence is at the top of the soale of happiness. And hla pleaaure la disinterested, In the » - aenae that for him doing good la ita own reward (PJ: IV. xl). And this la the embodiment of Godwin'a conception of human perfectibility. Paith in the perfectibility of man la expreaaed In Godwin'a earliest publication, Life of William Pitt (3L: 15). Because he retained this notion all hla life, and because it waa for him such an important notion, this idea has been virtually identified with Godwin. And with this identification has come distortion and misunderstanding. This principle has been identified with theories of evolu tion which were prevalent during Godwin's time (GAT: 23), as well as with the less flamboyant but equally wrong Vic- torian ideas of progress. Godwin was arguing merely that vice is only the consequence of an erroneous opinion as to what is good, and that a true opinion will invariably be followed by virtuous conduct. This is his belief in the essential neutrality of minds at birth (S£: 64). By adding the belief that we cannot but desire the pleasure of others, and, further, that to see that something is desirable is necessarily to desire it, we have transcended psychological hedonism and have put forth the idea of human perfectibili ty. Godwin's theory of perfectibility is neither so naive nor so optimistic as it has been pictured by some. He is 126 veil aware that man is often evil, and he la the last person to ezpeot man to change overnight. Godwin makes it quite clear that it is only the cultivated man who is able to see things as they are, the only one who can practice impartial justice* And the cultivated man must be produced. But unless we have an idea of what the fully cultivated, happy and perfected man would be, progress will never begin. Bven if this is no more than ideal it is worth serious consideration, for unless an idea is open to the imagination it will never find its way into practice. The fact that this idea is tied to the often objectionable one of the denial of free will (the latter would endanger perfectibil ity ) ia no justification for the unkind care it has received at the hands of the average historian of thought. It is said that Godwin's anarchism was derived from his belief in human perfectibility (BA: 59). It would appear that it was, and this supports the fundamental thesis of this dissertation, viz. that the whole of Godwin's moral and political philosophy are deducible from his theory of human nature. But if his theory of human nature is true, and if his deductions are valid, why, then, do political organizations other than his anarchism exist? Why, that is, has man not been perfected, and why is not universal benevolence practiced according to Impartial justice? What is it, that is to say, that has prevented man from develop ing as Godwin has shown he might. The answer to all these questions is, for Godwin, the same; for there is something in existence by the very nature of which man must expeot stifling and oppression. And to this we now proceed. Chapter II 0FFRX930B OF MAXI XHB POLITICAL INSTITUTION In the last chapter an attempt was made to show what Godwin considered to be basic to man's constitution. The description offered there was guided by the belief that the view taken by Godwin of human nature was a normative one, i.e., that Godwin'e view of man was influenced by the con ception he had of how man's nature ought to be expressed. In the present chapter an attempt will be made to describe that which was most responsible for the non-development of man, viz. artificial society, or political institutions. Godwin saw man's original social relations as being rooted in man's needs. Society has the ability to supply our wants, and also tends to promote our general well being, over and above the more pedestrian functions it serves (FJ: I. ii). Hen associated at first for the sake of mutual assistance; the necessity of restraint grew out of the errors and perverseness of a few (£J: II. i). Thus, soci ety is a natural end necessary entity; the organs of re straint are natural but not necessary (and thus, for Godwin, artificial). It is due largely to the practices of the latter that Godwin is impressed by the disturbing contrast between man's progressive achievement in science, art and philosophy and the miserable record of their moral life. 130 131 He sees the mesa of mankind being held down in a state of abject penury, comaiting acts of violence against their more fortunate neighbors. And the only mode which is employed to repress this violence, and to maintain the order and peace of society, is punishment. Zhus, the product of the perverseness of a few has been raised to the level of abso lute dominance, and, far from insuring peace and order, this product, government, now works to the detriment of all but a select, powerful few. Godwin sees existing society as necessarily confused by abstractions; he is concerned to reveal and rescue the individual (GMP: 66). His real argument against political institutions is that they overpower, oppress and constrict the development of the individual citizen in the name of f 52 mystical and meaningless concepts. The society of the eighteenth-century went out of its way to conceal men from each other. Between large sections of them there could be no question of understanding, because society sometimes forbade, and always disoouraged, complete frankness and sin cerity (GMP: 66). And the politioal institution was the means by which such lack of understanding was reinforced. Bor it creates and fosters certain attitudes that make men incapable of seeing things (and people) as they are. ^2But Godwin was certainly not "looking forward to the life of simplicity ... of which Rousseau was the chief advocate,1 1 as is suggested at GAT: 23* 132 Society urgea its members with a distempered ambition, unfavorable to independence of mind* liberality, and openly promotes selfishness (K)M; 467)* Integrity, virtue and understanding are held to be nothing, and opulence is every thing (PJ: I, iii). Youth, still fresh with ambition and a desire for understanding, hears his elders, already tamed down and emasculated by the corrupt commerce of the world, tell him that his impractical idealism will soon vanish, and that soon he too will see self-indulgence as the only road of:life to follow (TOM: 458-64). In short, in society as it now exists, virtue is impossible. A very large proportion of Political Justice is taken up with expounding the deleterious effects of existing institutions and with pointing out the evils of the prevail ing social environment (some of which having been suggested in the proceeding paragraph). There are six institutions that Godwin particularly denounced. These are government, promises, law (including punishment), inequality, economics and marriage. These shall be considered in turn. It will be recalled that, when considering the question of the human mind and its motives, Godwin sought to prove two things: first, that man's actions are determined (largely by his social environment) and, secondly, that what we refer to as voluntary action originates in the deci sions of the understanding. Assuming these propositions to have been demonstrated, Godwin is eager to show that two conclusions can be deduced therefrom: 133 . . . the happiness sen are able to attain, is propor tioned to the justness of the opinions they take as guides in the pursuits and . . . these opinions are for the aost part, under the absolute control of poli tical Institution (P£: 1. iv). Thus, it is the political institution that prevents nan from attaining his full stature. It is government that "insinuates itself into our personal dispositions and in sensibly communicates its own spirit to our private trans actions" ( Paul: I. 67). In his search for first principles for purposes of criticising current institutions and in his attempt to construct his own ideal society, Godwin was led by his belief in the simplicity of man's nature, and the paucity of his wants:. "How different from the man of artificial soci- ety."*^ His reading in Swift and the Latin historians had already convinced him that the monarchial system of govern ment was unavoidably corrupt. Night it not be, Godwin reasoned, that all system of governments are necessarily corrupt and totally pernicious in their effects? (DA: 20). And may it not happen that: . . . the grand moral evils that exist in the world, the calamities by which we are so grievously oppressed, ^Godwin, William: Caleb Williams. or. Things as They Are (New Tork: Greenberg, 1926), 232. Hereafter cited in text as gW. 134 are to be traced to political institution as their source* and that their removal is only to be expected from its correction? (PJt I. 1). In the suggestion here that anarchism is the only answer to man's political ills* Godwin appears to be making systematic and explicit what was suggested by Paine in Rights of Kan. After introducing the idea of a "well- informed society without government*" Paine seems afraid to go through with his ideas* and "does not conclude* as per haps he ought to do* with the radical dissolution of all governments" (OPR: 192). Paine's criticisms seems to bear not on the actual idea of government* but only on govern ments as they are* although the former idea is more consis tent with his apparent position. Be that as it may* it is but a short step from the ideas as set forth in the second part of the Rights of Man to those set forth by Godwin a year later in Political Justioe (GBR: 191) ■ According to Godwin, vice has been able to triumph over virtue beoause governments have conferred a power and dura bility on error which is not its own* and have ceaselessly nourished and propagated it and infused its poison into the mind of men (S£: 76). The true interests of mankind dictate incessant change and everlasting innovation. But government is the perpetual enemy of change (FJ: III. vl). Virtue is discouraged, and individual initiative is suppres- Righte of Man (New York: Liberal Arts 135 seds But of what use ere talents and sentiments in the cor rupt wilderness of human society? It is a rank and rotten soil, from which every finer shrub draws poison as it grows. All that, in a happier field and purer air, would expand into virtue and germinate into use fulness is thus concerted into henbane and deadly nightshade (CV: 411)* Government's most inslduous activity has been in the area of opinion manipulation. Information has been rendered a topic of political superintendence, man's imagination has been stiffled, and the mercurialness of man has been assign ed to a permanent station (PJ; 17. i). Thus, even the best government is evil, for it constitutes in essence a syste matic interference with the activity of reason. For govern ments foster and support certain political associations. But such associations are always injurious, because they seek to impress by weight and numbers and prestige and not by propagating the truth. Their appeals are concerned with the effect they will have on the people rather than with whether or not they are near the truth. But action which is not based on knowledge is unsure and equivocal in its nature (VG: 61). Governments appeal constantly for the people's confi dence, and cannot proceed without this. But confidence can not exist without ignorance. Thus, the true supporters of government are weak and uninformed, and not the wise. "In proportion as weakness and ignorance shall diminish, the 136 basis of government will also decay" (PJr III. vi). All governments are based upon inequality. But nature distributes her gifts without any reference to the distinc tions of artificial society (2BB> 29) • Consequently, disappointment and frustration are inevitable as long as the unjust relations exist in society and as long as man's emotions, and not his reason, are the foundation thereofs The government under which we are placed, must either increase our passions and prejudices by fanning the flame, or, by gradually discouraging, tend to extirpate them. In reality, it is impossible to oonoeive a government that shall have the latter tendency. By its very nature positive institution has a tendency to suspend the elasticity and progress of mind (PJ: III. vii). Because of the irrational basis of government injustice abounds. Hundreds of victims are annually sacrificed at the shrine of positive law and political institution; in their names inhuman tortures and terrifying deaths are inflioted yearly (P£: I. 11; VII. vi). And Injustice feeds upon Itself no matter what form it might take. Persona consider ing government service as a career in the present society must consider the salary to be offered them. But more often than not these persons, because of the selfishness whioh government reinforces, think more of their salary and posi tion than their duties (PJ; VI. ix). If one takes a dispassionate view of the situation, he must at least question the necessity of the present situa tion continuing. And, he will be at a loss which of the two 137 to pronounce moat worthy or regret, the misery that la The Idea that governments are responsible for the cor ruption of men's morals was not new with Godwin. Both Hel- vetius and Holbach had asserted the same principle. But Helvetius meant that governments had failed in their duty of so distributing reward and punishment, that each man might be constrained into a course of action that benefitted the greatest number. Holbach, on the other hand, meant that governments had failed to point out to men the natural harmony that exists between enlightened self-interest and public interest, and that they had failed to strengthen this natural harmony artificially by a proper distribution of rewards and punishments (S£: 71). Godwin disagrees with both these men, of course. For government to pass laws according to what they consider to be inexorable laws of human nature, i.e., according to the prinoiple of greed, and for government to reinforce such action aocording to the pleasure-pain principle, was anti thetical to everything Godwin stands fort our investigation of government is calculated to induce us to lament, not the apathy and indifference, but the inauspicious activity of government and to look for the moral improvement of the speoles, not in jig of regulations, but in their repeal inflicted, or the depravity by which it is produced (PJ: I. 11). (PJ: 71. ; For an omnipotent government infiltrates into all of man's 138 activities, until at last a man's ideas are themselves a produot of his institutions. It is dangerous folly to allow government unlimited activity because of its ostensive know ledge. For the pretence of colleotive wisdom, whether at the social or at the governmental level, is among the most palpable of all impostures (££: V. zziii). And no where do the harmful effects of such imposture show themselves than in the sphere of international war. Var has hitherto been found the inseparable ally of political Institution. Var is, in fact, the necessary con- commitant of government. And it is largely via war that man shows himself to be of all other beings the most for midable to man (PJ: I. ii). Greed, opulence, avarice and oovetnesB, qualities all of which are inseparable from government, are the necessary and sufficient causes for 55 war. But a nation's people must be prepared for war. And this preparation the government accomplished through preju dice. A typical interpretation of Godwin's notion of preju dice (as applied to political institutions) is as follows: Godwin from his intellectual eminence saw in all the follies and crimes of mankind nothing worse than the cc "See PJ; I. ii for Godwin's account of his indebted ness to SwiTt concerning the causes of war. 139 offsets of "prejudice." Pains saw sore self-interest in the world than prejudice.56 What this writer (just cited) fails to understand is that Godwin's conception of prejudice was such that self-interest is subsumable under it* And, if properly understood, and if Godwin's premises are accepted, there is indeed nothing worse in the world than prejudice. For, prejudice is, in general, the illegitimate extension of some principle (e.g., Z is good) to something else, T, whioh is like X in some respects, hut not in the respects that make it (in this case) good. That is to say, prejudice is Godwin's universal explanation for evil, since evil results from ignorance, and ignorance, in turn, usually manifests itself as an erroneous pre-conception which stands between an individual and the world about him. This is perhaps the key principle for Godwin, and its importance for him is apparent. He tells us that an individual surrenders the best attributes of man, the moment he resolves to adhere to certain fixed princi ples, if he is unmindful of the grounds for holding such principle! In reality, by as many instances as I act contrary to the unbiased dictates of my own judgment, by so much I abdicate the most valuable part of the character of man (PJ; II. vi). ^Brailsford, N. A., Shelley. Godwin, and Their Circle (Londons Holt, 1913), 71* Hereafter cited in text as SQAC. V A But political Institutions ars built upon certain forms of association, conceived of and supported by the government. If the other members of these groups accept an empty concept of the government, and act according to it, the chances of me being able to act acoording to ay own judgment are diminished. That is, Qodvin was not unmindful of the roles of social approval and reputation in the development of character. Indeed, these two principles are seized upon and employed by the government in order to gain its ends. Both are essentially emotional, and are ideally suited for the formation of desired (but undesirable) habits (P£: VII. v). And seen in this light the down-playing of the principle of prejudice (as in the case of Brailsford) is seen to be erroneous. A government can propagate prejudice in several ways. One of the more obvious ways is to place great value on prestige. It was to explore the effects of this form of politically-inspired prejudice that led Godwin to write Oaleb Williams. Here the character Tyrrel pursues popular ity and respect and ignores his other needs and potentials. Godwin shows how habit-patterns can be developed to the point where they aotually preclude a more impartial and objective view of life. In the case of Tyrrel it is shown how one can be motivated by a desire of such magnitude that he can not change, and, at the same time, he can sense his inability to behave acoording to any principle other than 141 that for prestige. In the case cited, Tyrrel senses his insensibility to the higher pleasures, knows this to be a laok in himself, and realizes it is that for which others despise him. The fate he fears most (of finding himself an outcast) overtakes him because of this very lack of refine ment. Without taste or benevolence he is unable to achieve even his limited aim of popularity and respect (GMP: 95). In the oase of prejudioe found in a society based on prestige, then, one sees men led to conceal the evidence on which principles should be based, and so tend to the forma tion of wrong principles. The second cause of prejudice is the complexity of most modem communities, which makes it impossible to keep clear ly in mind the evidence on which principles are based. Dealing with men in large groups, we can no longer see them as individuals. It was Godwin's conviction that human beings are unique, and any generalization about them only approximately correct. Thus, generalizations can be used safely only when the number of instances to which they apply is so small that the differences between each can be easily kept in mind (GMP: 145). The third cause of prejudice is the partiality we have for a few friends and relations as against the rest of man kind. It is because of Godwin's insistence on the imparti ality of our decisions and notions that he has been casti gated as a cold and bloodless thinker. But he recognized 142 that if justice is to be operative it must be according to principles, and if one allows sentiment and personal friend ship to enter the picture when decisions are made all hope of objectivity is lost. If justice is to be universal, as Godwin is convinced it must be, it oust apply equally in every case. The fourth source of prejudice is the institution of punishment.^ Contrary to popular opinion, Godwin's views on punishment are not momentary responses directed against the society of his time only. Bather, they are a oentral part of his whole social theory (GMP: 145). Persons cling to the idea of punishment (retributive, usually) without knowing why they hold such a view. This is a clear instance of prejudice. The prejudices described above are made necessary by two factors. First, the very complexity of our society demands impersonal treatment of each other; thus, generali zations are required to expedite our activity. But every generalization, when applied to cm individual, is to some extent false. And the cumulative effect of many such slight errors is the mass of misunderstandings which divide human beings. Besides the size and complexity of our society, pre- ^For a discussion of the institution of punishment Bee pages 165 ff*» below. 143 Judlees a re made unavoidable by governments. It was God win's belief that the mass of our institutions (punishment, marriage, taxes, economics, ate.) are reflections of the underlying political structure. In soma instances the government is directly responsible, as in the case of the tax laws. But in most cases the government's action is in direct, inculating ideas, sentiments and habits which pre vent the citizen from viewing the world objectlvily (e.g. "self-interest is the best interest," or "my country right or wrong"). The latter type of government action is by far the more corrupting: This sacred individuality, as Godwin understood it, would be far less compromised and corrupted by strong government, authoritative, visible and defined, which took cognizance only of act and left opinion free, than it was by the insidious circumambience of the unquestioned traditions and conventions of soolety (Times. '36: 285). Godwin insists that right emotions, true opinions about what is good, arise from acquaintance with individuals, from knowledge and not generalizations, but of the particulars which they embody. But government, by its very nature, must and does discourage objectivity and impartiality. Hence the first step to virtue is to remodel society so that men will be able to see "things as they are" (GMP: 35). It is only through man's faculties and possessions that he is able to render services to others, and it is with time that these means can develop their useful effects. Thus, 144 there is nothing the free disposal of which is more saored than that of time. Bat we diminish our freedom in the use we make of our time, when we foree ourselves, today, to act at a given time in some determinate way. And governments are able to exist only because we do aot in stereotyped ways. And thus do they reinforce such. At times Godwin's optimism does shine through, and he appears to believe that sooner or later people will see what governments are: i . . . Godwin's point was that the people will ultimate ly recognize the institutions for what they are and despise them accordingly.” And because action originates in opinion (the latter being changed because of the aforementioned recognition) we may at least hope for desirable change. Thus far only the propagation of error and distortion on the part of government has been considered. What, then, if the government propagated truth? To this Godwin would reply that we would still be having prejudices inculcated into us, for a principle without vital, meaningful founda tion is not a principle but dogma. It is in political society as it is in religion: Beligion is nothing, if it stops at a theoretical persuasion of certain propositions. It must beoome a ^^tferkmeister, L., "Coleridge and Godwin on the Com munication of Truth." Modern Phllogy. 55» 7, 1958, 171. Hereafter oited in text As uuOx. 145 vital principle , it must affect the heart and act upon the paasiona, before it can greatly modify the charac ter of man in society.59 a h governments are anathema to Godwin, and no form of governing is treated less kindly than monarchy. Monarchy is founded upon and is sustained by systematic prejudloe. It is based upon Inequality of the worst kindi If we recollect the physical and moral equality of man kind, it will appear a very violent usurpation of this principle, to plaoe one individual at so vast an inter val from the rest of his species (RJs Y. ii). One who is "at so vast an interval" from his subjects does not see the world as it is, nor the people in it. Their needs and ambitions are totally unknown to him, and indif ference towards them is his permanent attitude. Even an elected monarchy violates experiential fact, fort To suppose a mind in which genius and virtue are united and permanent, is also undoubtedly to suppose some thing, which no calculation will teach us to expect should occur upon every vacancy (PJ: V. vii). But above all, monarchy is evil because it vilifies its subjects. They become deluded by the pomp and mysteries of regal show, and come to accept a false social valuation, regarding kings and courtiers as beings superior to them- ^Godwin. William, Life of Geoffrey Chaucer (Londons Johnson, 1803), 585. Hereafter cited in text as Chaucer. selves. They regard riches and birth as the criteria of well-being. Instead of listening to the dictates of their own conscience OPR; 164).60 In Caleb Williams Falkland is a kind of Incarnation of monarchy, manifesting the ideal of honor (GMP: 88). He appears to be the man of taste, full of the most genuine and perceptive sympathy, with the amount and quality of the latter being dictated by the former. Honor demands that he shall be considerate and sympathetic, especially to his social inferiors. But his benevolence is more a kind of good taste than a genuine desire for man kind's happiness, and is subordinated to the desire for ambition and prestige (CW: 128). A society in which every man is primarily concerned with the impression he makes on others, i.e., his prestige, is not one in which men will be objective in their relations or just in their decisions.**1 Thus, Montesquieu was quite wrong (according to Godwin) in supposing that in a stratified society everyone will work for the common good while thinking only of his own interest. "In the last resort . . . you can only make people act bene volent. It is not enough simply to make them proud" (GMP: 97). For in a monarchy nine-tenths of our energy goes in emulating our neighbors. And this, Godwin is convinced, is ^°For an extended discussion of the effects of the sys tem of monarchy on man, see Fleetwood. ^^See gt. Leon and Mandeville for his ideas on honor. 147 the result of a particular social system. It is to be condeaned for two reasons. First, causes unnecessary strain, and is thus the direot cause of such misery (e.g., in its unfair distribution of econonic goods). Secondly, it prevents our development of objective attitudes, i.e., attitudes that arise from seeing "things as they are." A . final reason for Godwin*s rejection of monarohy and its ideal of honor is his disbelief in the indirect paths to social harmony. For no matter how cleverly the legis lator may try to manipulate social institutions so that man's self-interest will lead to public benefits, these arrangements are (i) immoral, and (ii) equivocal in results. The public good may very well conflict with greed and desire for prestige, and if "you want men to behave benevolently there is, in the long run, no substitute for benevolence" (2j£: 102). To be virtuous is to be benevolent, and to practice impartial justice is to be happy. But virtue was never yet held in much honor and esteem in a monarchy (PJ: V. vi). Indeed, the ideal of honor stands opposed to that of virtue and impartiality. Godwin's basic argument against monarchy is not so much that it (and like it, despotism) oppress its citlsens, but that they mould them so as to make them less capable of attaining the full stature of human beings (GMP: 94). His arguments against aristocracy are essentially the same. 148 Bach generates a whole system of class distinctions whioh represent an insurmountable obstacle to seeing men and society as they really are. Both forms of government are complete failures, for neither succeeds in creating harmo nious social relations so as to make a just and stable society; and neither make for the inner harmony of those who imbibe their ideal of honor. Both try to instill a deep love of country, often in order to justify international war. Godwin makes it clear that the vindication of national honor is a very insufficient reason for hostilities (PJ: V. xvi). And, more importantly, the manufactured zeal for one's country may make one neglect the real welfare of one's countrymen in favor of this unreal abstraction (PJ: 1. vil; V. xvi). Though Less obnoxious than either monarchy or aristo cracy, the republican form of government and its ideal of virtue is unacceptable to Godwin also. The republican form of government did not reinforce the citizens' desire for wealth and luxury, and in this it made advances over both monarchy and aristocracy. Indeed, the republican ideal of virtue discouraged luxury. But its purposes for such dis couragement were ulterior, and man's individual development was not considered. The objection to luxury here is that it made the citizen unfit in body, and so unable or unwil ling to defend his country in war. It also made him unfit in mind, because he cared more for his personal possessions 149 than for the body politic (QMP: 110). But neither of these objections to luxury are, for Godwin, justified in and of themselves. For the result of this doing away with luxury is the creation of a mystical entity called "the State," the appeal to which is necessarily emotional deluding* The ideal of honor, then, distort*s men*s judgments of "things as they are." And, "the citizen of the republic has been indoctrinated even more assidu-ouely than the Han of Honor" (QMP: 114). In addition to the ideals of honor and republican vir tue, there was current during Godwin's time still another ideal. Indeed, this ideal persists to our own day. I am referring to the view taken by forerunners of laissez-faire economists that the desire for material goods, if left to itself, was capable of securing a harmonious and well-regu lated society. Godwin realizes (as many are yet to realize) that such a view is unsubstantiated dogma, and that self- interest, if uncontrolled, is antithetical to the public good. He very cleverly plays the first of these against the 62 second (PJ: V. xiii; VIII. i). Far from being necessary (as many of its proponents argued), a society based on the profit motive is certainly not desirable (and for the same reason as the theory of indirection: it is immoral and unreliable). "If we want public benefits, we can never be 62 It is here that he discusses "conspicuous consump tion," and, in so doing, anticipates Veblen. 190 sure of getting them from this private vice" ( QMP: 105)* Godwin's fundamental objection against all such doc trines (honor, virtue, the state, self-interest in econo mics) is that they make it a virtue for the individual to sink his own judgment in the collective wisdom of the com munity. And this is precisely the way that prejudices are created: persona pursuing a cause or course of action for reasons they know not and, perhaps, have never known. A modem writer has expressed a view almost identical with that of Godwin: Nationalism is our form of incest, is our idolatry, is our insanity. "Patriotism" is its cult ... by "pa triotism" I mean that attitude which puts one's own nation above humanity, above principles of truth and justice; not the loving interest in one's own nation, which is the concern with the nation's spiritual as much as with its material welfare— never with its power over other nations. Just as love for one individual which exoludes the love for others is not love, love for one's country which is not part of one's love for humanity is not love, but idolatrous worship.6? Godwin gives specific treatment to the question of representational government, to reinforce his statements concerning the ideal of virtue in a republic. His position here is not entirely consistent, but, in general, it can be said that he does not approve os such an arrangement. This idea is expressed clearly in one of his novels: So imperfect are the effects of the boasted laws of a ^fromm, B., The Sane Sooiety (New Tork: Rinehart, 1999), 98-99. Hereafter cited in text as §g. 151 country whose legislators hold their assembly from four to six months in every year I I could newer discover with certainty whether this delay were owing to any interference on the part of my prosecutor, or whether it fell out in the regular administration of Justice, which is too solemn and dignified to aooomodate itself to the rights or benefit of an insignificant individual (2W: 236)7 Republican legislators take it on themselves to make decisions that affect every member of the country. This is not only an intrusion of these members' consciences, but is inefficient, equivocal and unstable as a procedure. On the other hand, Godwin realises that a state of anarchism cannot be introduced immediately. He is not the secluded, impractical idealist that he is often painted. He must struggle with the problem of a transitional form of government, which is prerequisite to the abolition of the entire state. And he is of the opinion that, imperfect as . national assemblies are, they are probably the best form of intermediate government one can find. Thus, he argues both for and against representational democracy at £J: V. xiv, and offers a refutation of the major objections to ouch a government on the basis of his theory of human nature (PJ: V. xv). Again, he suggests that the oharge that democracy is unfavorable to secrecy in time of war is really a com mendation, since this is consistent with his basic belief in impartiality and freedom of expression (£J: V. xx). Godwin, then, gives representative institutions his approval (PJ: II. v; VIII. viii), but withholds ouch appro- 1 5 2 ; val at other times (PJ: V. xxi). And tfie latter position is the more consistent when his system as a whole is con sidered. The reason is not difficult to find. Godwin is Convinced that there can be no such thing as legislation in any real sense. Law cannot be made, for it simply is; and the most venerable and wise Senate "can only Interpret and announce the law which derives its real validity from a higher and less mutable authority" (PJ: V. xxili). This is a clear instance of Godwin's Platonism, and also of his including of political theory under his wider moral views. On this latter point it is interesting to note that he ob jects to national assemblies being considered to be "moral individuals." This hypostatizatlon includes the attributing to the assemblies the characteristics which belong properly only to persons. This is the basis of the erroneous opinion held by many to the effect that such bodies can "make laws." Laws are what they are, and we can only give or withhold our approval thereof: Legislation, as it has been usually understood, is not an affair of human competence. Immutable reason is the true legislator, and her decrees behoves us to inves tigate. The function of society extended, not to the making, but the interpreting of law; it cannot decree, it oan only declare that, which the nature of things has already decreed, and the propriety of which ir- restibly flows from the circumstances of the case (PJ: HI. v; V. xxiii). The contrast between Godwin and the school of Holbach and Helvetius is seen even more clearly now. The latter 153 pair had maintained that it was in the power of legislators to hold out such rewardB to public service and to impose such penalties on anti-social conduct that man, necessitated by the law of his nature to pursue his own interests, would find that he could not advance his interests but by serving the public (3L: 69). Godwin not only would withhold the right of reward and punishment on the part of the legisla tors; he would deny them the right to make the laws in terms of which reward and punishment would be administered. A fundamental point Godwin makes in opposition to national assemblies is that, despite all their discussion, they are, at bottom, unreasonable. They are unreasonable because they must terminate in a vote. Debate and discus sion are in themselves highly conducive to intellectual improvement; but they lose this salutary character the mo ment they are subjected to this unfortunate condition, for a vote produces an unnatural or fictitious unanimity. The delegates must consider the effects of their vote before they cast them, must consider their own legislative programs and the support they will need. The dogma of majority rule*** means that desire for success will take the place of desire for truth, and that parties, inseparable from such gatherings, will be organized. There will then follow the perversions of reason by mere oratory, contentious disputes, ***For a discussion of the general principles of major ity rule, see pp. 155 ff., below. 154 and the triumph of Ignorance and Tice (SjPB: 166). Assemblies and the entailed acquiescence on the part of some legislators are to be rejected, for it is precisely this procedure that gives rise to rules of thumb, i.e., to prejudices. Thus, Godwin rejects the view that Rousseau appears to hold to the effect that the general will is infallible. In fact, Godwin is of the opinion that assemblies, far from being a body of collective wisdom, are on the whole less wise than individuals. For the individual legislator no longer feels the same personal responsibility for his deci sion, and, further, he must pander to the prejudices of his followers (GUP: 127). The institution of two houses of assembly is to be rejected also, since it suffers from all the ills of a sin gle house plus one more, viz. it is designed to divide a nation against itself (PJ: V. xxi). For the same reasons Godwin rejeets the principle of the separation of the legis lative and executive branches of government. Similarly an executive without a legislature is unacceptable. Though the latter arrangement would do away with the evils of law- 65 making, and would substitute specific for general judg ments, it would require a further sanotion to guarantee the *^For a discussion of Godwin's views on law, see pp. 161 ff., below. 155 execution of these decisions, and the non-execution of the command oust involve the infliotion of punishment. But the latter institution is rejected by Godwin, too.66 Thus, even a democratized society, governed by a single national assembly (the most acceptable version of represen tation for Godwin) only marks one step toward the final goal to which the progress of human society is tending, i.e., anarchism. The former is perhaps a necessary intermediate step, but it is, after all, just another version of the gospel of indirection (GE&: 196). Godwin's arguments against representative government are based on his convictions concerning majority rule. He realizes that majority rule was an alternative to minority rule originally, i.e., to the rule by a kind of feudal lord. It did not mean that the majority was right, but only that it is better for the majority to be wrong than for a minor ity to impose its will on the majority. But in his time (as in our own) the democratic method has more and more assumed the meaning that a majority decision is necessarily right, and morally superior to that of the minority. Hence, the majority has the moral right to impose its will on the majority. This is the most fundamental of all problems for democracy, i.e., the identification of "right" with "power." A modern writer appears to be paraphrasing Godwin when he 66?or a discussion of punishment, see pp. 165 ff•, below. 156 sayss To identify the political relationship with power has at least these consequences s that one may he a member of a body politic without having rights or duties, that a ruler may have no responsibilities or duties, that membership need involve no sharing of a common purpose, and that 'political freedom' becomes a virtually self- oontradictory notion.®* Godwin saw all these implications only too dearly. If I agree with the majority judgment am I forbidden to oom-r plete and to modify my estimation of things for the rest of my life, or for the following year, week, or hour? Again, it is surely sophistry to maintain that truth can be made more true by the number of its votaries (PJ: III. ii; III. iv). Again, it is the need to acquiesce in the decision of others that is largely responsible for prejudice in the form of mere habit. Rousseau had said that the need to compron' mise led to man's salvation, since it led him to substitute the public interest, the general will, for his private interest or particular will (BMP: 125). In point of fact just the opposite is the case, for, rather than finding his salvation here man submerges in his individuality, loses eight of the purpose of his agreement, and makes a false identification with his party: ... in political associations, the object of eaoh man, is to Identify his creed with that of his neigh- ^Tussman, J., Obligation and the Body Politic (New jgjk: Oxford Press, I960), 5. Hereafter died in”text as 157 I)our* We learn the Shibboleth of a party. We dare not leave our minds at large in the field of enquiry, leet we should arrive at some tenet disrelished by our party (W: 17. iii). I do not even have the right to give my consent to a government aa such, for justice demands of me that 1 consult the dictates of my own understanding, and not the dictates of any other man or body of men, whoever they may be or how ever they may have come into power (PJ: IV. i). Bven if a vote is the basis for such a decision I must refrain, for a vote follows debate, and, in so doing, deprives the debate of any real value and produces an artificial unanimity (PJ: V. xxiii). Whether the citizen acquiesces in something he strongly believes to be wrong, or in a matter on which he has no very strong feeling, no matter. In both cases he may be said to commit his conscience to another man's keeping. And this is, for Godwin, the supreme sin (PJ: III. vi). The argu ment that acquiescence in the majority decision is necessary to government is not denied by Godwin. What he declares is that, though necessary, it is far from being good, and we must not identify this process with the very different one by which the individual comes to identify his fellows' good with his own. That, Godwin says, is the fundamental error of those who praised the republican ideal (GMP: 126). Acquiescence of the outvoted results in the depravation of the understanding. The culmulative effect of such cease- 158 leas compromise la mental muddle, i.e. prejudice. The point ia put well b a r Prommi If democracy means that the individual expressed hia conviction and asserts his will, the premise ia that he has a conviction, and that he has a will. The facta, however, are that the modern, alienated individual has opinions and prejudices but no convictions, has likes and dislikes, but has no will. His opinions and preju dices, likes and dislikes, are manipulated in the same way as his taste is, by powerful propaganda machines (33: 339). Godwin perceives the conflict inevitable in a democracy that practices sheer majority rules it becomes a tyranny of the many. But he also saw the failure to the attempt to amend this difficulty by postulating a number of inalienable rights. And this latter difficulty is still with uss there are two broad principles of policy-making today which are often uneasy bedfellows— the majority principle and the "Ho Trespassing" i.e., inalienable rights principle.68 Godwin is opposed to republicanism, national assem blies, and majority rule. He is also opposed, on much the same grounds, to constitutions, contraots, and promises. ▲11 of these arrangements are attempts to generate obliga tion, but all of them are against the nature of man, and are, in addition, ineffective. Consider the case of federal oaths s Why is it that one is bound to be more especially **®Meyo, H., £n Introduction to Democratic Theory (Hew Torkt Oxford Press, 1960J, 195 • ""Serearter el tea in text as JDg. 159 cartful of what he affirms in a court of justice? Clearly, he is not to be believed upon his mere word. The addition of such terms as "office" and "duty" are pointless, for they supply nothing that was not present before. And the intro duction of the threat of punishment contradicts the very foundation of a promise (M: VI. v). But there is another reason for rejecting the institu tion of promises. I may agree to abide with a certain deci sion today because of certain knowledge I possess. But tomorrow, or the next day, or the day after that my fund of knowledge and experience will have increased. Should I then be bound to an agreement I now possibly know to be false? ttust I forever be condemned to refrain from correcting my judgments? Such a permanent agreement is inconsistent with the nature of man. For similar reasons contracts must be repudiated as a social foundation (FJ: III. ii). The respect for contracts is founded on the obligation to keep one's promises. And since there is no justification for keeping the latter, the former is without foundation. Godwin here separates himself from Bentham and the letter's version of utilitarianism, for what Godwin abominates in the idea of the contract and of the promise isjuet this element of permanence or generality (GFR: 197). Thus, it is true to say that Godwin worked out all the ultimate consequences of the social contract, but it is quite untrue to call him a "theoretical defender" of 160 it, as has bean done.^ Tbs sans objections which apply to contracts and pro mises apply even more forcibly to the institution of consti tutions. The latter are provided with special safeguard against future amendments, and are designed to be permanent. But this contradicts man's nature (PJ: VI. vii). They deny freedom of conscience and respect for private judgment. further, constitutions are baaed upon certain fundamental 70 principles, as, for example, the "rights of man."' But how does this selection of the most fundamental and perma nent principles proceed? Generally, the procedure has been one of dogma and prejudice. And though the avowed purpose of these so-called rights has been the protection of man, its true result is often quite different! Superficial thinkers lay great stress upon the exter nal situation of men, and little upon their internal sentiments . . . but ... to be free is a circum stance of little value, if we could suppose men in a state of external freedom, without magnanimity, energy and firmness, that constitute almost all that is valu able in a state of freedom (W: IV. i). One does not make men benevolent and just by fiat, nor by majority agreement, nor by a combination of these. Godwin's treatment of the doctrine of natural or **^As in Zenker, B. V., Anarchism. A Criticism and His tory of the An^yohiet Theory (Mew York:" £uinam’ s"~l597), i£. Hereafter cited in text as OAT. ^°3ee PJ: VI. vii, for a criticism of ffeine's support of constitutions. 161 inalienable righte is suggested in his treatment of consti tutions, i.e., such postulation is indemonstrable dogma. 0 But further, Godwin abominates the idea of a society in which one does as he pleases, without thought of his ac tions' effects. And if these effects are considered one is practicing not natural rights but utilitarianism. Godwin is firmly convinced that it is impossible to derive social obligation from a system in which we may "do as we list." It is for this reason that he substitutes duties for natural rights, duties towards society which must never be neglected on any arbitrary and self-indulgent pleas of private rights. For the latter practice really amounts to an arbitrary ignoring of the obligations of justices There is no sphere in which a human being can be sup posed to act, where one mode of proceeding will not, in every instance, be more reasonable than any other mode. That mode the being is bound by every principle of justice to pursue (PJ: II. v). And the principle of justice to which he here refers is that we have no right to anything except what will make for the greatest happiness of the greatest number. For we have in reality nothing that is strictly speaking our owns We have nothing that has not a destination prescribed to it by the immutable voice of reason and justices and respecting which, if we supercede that destination, we do not entail upon ourselves a certain portion of guilt (£J: II. v). Thus, Godwin distinguishes between active and passive 162 rights, understanding by the former the absolute right to act as we arbitrarily choose, and by the latter the rights to freedom from interference, to free exercise of private Judgment, and to the assistance of one's neighbor. These passive rights are correlatives of duties, Godwin insists, and do not constitute active demands: "I have a right to that which my neighbor ought to give me in accordance with the principles of impartiality and utility but I have no right to take it from him" (PJ: intro., 35). It will be observed that these passive or negative rights are derived from two sources: "the immutable law of nature," and from a psychological view of man's capabilities and limitations (PJ: intro., 35). In the novel by the same name Caleb Williams tells us that: The law has neither eyes, nor ears, nor bowels of hu manity; and it turns into marble the hearts of all those that are nursed in its principles (£W: vi). The law is concerned with generalities and abstractions; Godwin is concerned with the individual human being. The law would proscribe duties and restrictions for mankind; Godwin would allow man absolute freedom (couples with the greatest happiness principle), convinced that, with enough knowledge and experience man would come to know the good and would pursue it. The law consists in barren dogma; Godwin would have a vital ethic flowing from man's heart as well as 163 from his head. Adherence to lav is baaed upon knowledge and facta of man'a world. In sum, morality cannot be legis lated t it must be learned and lived. Traditionally, governments have been thought of as law making bodies. But the objection which is valid against the notion of law. Again, Godwin's arguments against contracts and promises is directly applicable in the case of law, for all of these run counter of man's nature and the sum of his experiences. For laws generated by an institution tends to mould men's minds, and the attitudes thus created are wrong whether the laws are right or erroneous: for "he that believes the most fundamental proposition, through the in fluence of authority, does not believe a truth but a false hood." Every law is bad because every law is a general rule, and general rules never do apply to particular cases: There is no maxim more clear than this: that every case is a rule to itself. Ho action of any man was ever the same as any other action or had the same degree of utility and injury. It should seem to be the business of justice to distinguish the qualities of men, and not, which has hitherto been the praotice, to confound them . . . The fable of Procrustes presents us with a faint shadow of the perpetual effort of law. In defiance of the great principle of natural philoso phy, that there are not so much as two atoms of matter of the same form, through the whole universe, it endea vours to reduce the actions of men, whioh are composed of a thousand evanescent elements, to one standard (PJ: VII. viii). Thus, the law is essentially indefinite, and it has to multiply is prescriptions in order to try to equal by its 164 complexity the multiplicity of the particular cases. Con sequently, it is uncertain and inherently unjust (CPE: 197). But if no two persons are alike (and, thus, lavs, must he multiplied ad inf ini turn). still less are two crimes the same. And the reducing them, either explicitly or implicit ly# to general classes, is absurd. But the very idea of criminal and legal example implies just such a reduction to broad categories. Therefore, the idea of legal classifica tion is absurd. Again, the lav presumes to foretell the future. This is the very foundation of legal precedent and citation. But not only does the lav attempt to predict the future; it also aims at laying down decisions about them. And if no two men or crimes contiguous in time are the same, still less will they be when separated by great durations. Still further, the government standards of innocence and guilt are arbitrary, as an examination of the penalties pertaining thereunto shows (PJ: VI. viii). Degress of delinquency is likewise absurd (W: VI. iv). But most absurd of all is the very concept of a criminal trial: we bring one to trial because he has broken the law, and he must be punished; we then say he is to get an impartial hearing. This is obviously self-contradictory (PJ: VII. ii). Thus, the administration of law is not less iniquitous than the spirit in which it is framed (PJ: I. iii). Finally, Godwin believes that constitutional laws are 165 no more Important than others, since the arguments that apply to one apply equally to the other (££: VI. Til). Bven international treaties, a composite of lav, contract and promise, are unjustified in hie eyes (££: V. xix). And Godwin critizes the institution of punishment, just as he criticizes that of laws. No where does Godwin*s doctrine of determinism (ration al necessity) evidence itself more than in the discussion of punishment, tor only the guilty should be punished; but no one is guilty if he could not help doing what he did; and Godwin wants to maintain that in fact no one can help doing anything he does (PJ: IV. viii; VII. i). Chance has no place in Godwin's scheme of things. Godwin refused to consider punishment as a rational retaliation. On the one hand, it is impossible to make punishment proportionate to the crime (as it is impossible to make the law fit the act), for the determination of pro portion depends on the knowledge of the motives of the action and of the reaction of the punishment on the whole future conduct of the criminal. But such knowledge is, in principle, impossible to attain, since what is demanded is omniscience. And on the other hand, and above all, the na ture of punishment is incompatible with the nature of human understanding. Por the purpose of punishment is to teach men what actions they must hold just, and what actions they must hold unjust. But to teach is to prove. Nov to punish 166 is not to prove. Therefore to punish is not to teach (OPR: 198). Reformative punishment is ruled out as useless, then, sinoe punishment cannot reform. And punishment to deter the offender is condemned because it is directed against a pos sible future crime, not against an actual past one (PJ: VIZ. iii). In fact, imprisonment ia in itself an obstacle to reform, since it serves to develop in the prisoner atti tudes which mitigate against receptivity of knowledge. In a sense, imprisonment is far more damaging than the whip or the rack (CV: 224). Thus far the discussion of punishment has been restric ted to the utilitarian or reformative variety. But man is not so rational as he likes to picture himself, and the great bulk of punishment is motivated not by utilitarian desires but by retributive. Godwin believes the principle of retribution is included in the definition of puniBhment. Punishment is defined as: . . . the voluntary infliction of evil upon a vicious being, not merely because the public advantage demands it, but beoause there is apprehended to be a certain fitness and propriety in the nature of things, that render suffering, abstractedly from the benefit to result, the suitable concomitant to vice (PJ: VII. i). Godwin refuses to accept the retribution principle in any form because it is based upon irrational desire, and, above all, because his determinism rules out such treatment: 167 The assassin cannot help the murder he commits, any more than the dagger (PJ: VII. 1). Punishment is unacceptable in any form, then. It is unacceptable based on retribution because of the inherent irrationality of such practice, and because suoh is incon sistent with determinism. Punishment is unacceptable on reformative grounds because its mission oannot be served! man's nature is such that he learns by example and teaching, not by force and punishment. But besides all this, punish ment does much more harm than good. The reason is that it is one of the main reasons for prejudice. First, it ob scures the real reasons for doing right, i.e., punishment is based upon fear and pain, not understanding; it prevents us from seeing "things as they are," in this case, moral consequences of actions. Secondly, the institution of punishment makes us see an artificially categorized world, a world of X-degree crimes and T-degree punishments. But humans are far too complex to be pidgeon-holed thusly. Oon- 71 sequently, punishment has no foundations. The arguments against punishment apply equally well against force in any form. First and foremost, force is contrary to man's nature: ^But at PJ: VII v Godwin attempts to justify it on grounds of expediency. He probably felt forced to make such a concession of practical grounds, though it is not consistent with his system as a whole. 168 Force le an expedient, the uee of which is much to he deplored. It is contrary to the nature of intellect, which cannot be improved but by conviction and persua sion. It corrupts the man that employe it, and the man upon whom it ia employed (PJ: IV. i). Thus, the actions of a government in any organized society to interfere for the purpose of influencing opinions and standards, is (i) useless, and (ii) pernicious (PJ: VI. i). For the most such a government could hope for is obedi ence, never conviction based on understanding and acceptance of principles. And the usual result would be an uncommitted citizenry, operating through habits of obedience (W: III. vi). After what has been said about force in general, it will come as no surprise to hear Godwin reject revolutions. We should have reforms, not revolutions (PJ: III. vii). For he had seen the excesses which tend to follow revolu tions, in which a movement designed to remove tyranny itself becomes tyrannical. This was certainly the case in France. And it was the case, to a degree, in the American Revolu tion, when the pro-Tories were forced to flee into Canada for safety.^2 Force can change buildings and geography; it can never change men. If men are to be changed, i.e., made virtuous, society ^2See Godwin, V., Of Population: An Enquiry Concerning the Power of Increase in tne Juabers of~Hank£nd. Being an Anawar to Hr. Halthus'a Bsaay~on that""3ub.1ect (London: Longman, l52o), iv. Hereafter cited in text as Population. 169 must operate aocording to the p r i n c i p l e of impartiality. Throughout the century in which Godwin lived he and the other Dissenters continued to pursue the semi-medieval ideal of universal science. This was a quest in which they were strengthened by their belief in the unity of knowledge (HD: 77). And a correlative of this belief was the one in the nature of the mind to the effect that it shrinks from error and logical distortions The first sentiment of an uncorrupted mind, when it enters upon the theatre of human life, is, Remove from me and my fellows all arbitrary hindrances; let us start fair; render all the advantages and honours of social institutions accessible to every man, in pro portion to his talents and exertions (PJ: V. xi). The mind shrinks not only from error and fallacy, but from inequality as well: impartiality is implicit in man. Godwin is concerned with the development of virtuous public service, i.e., with benevolence and obligation. But he is convinced that both these are impossible with current political institutions, and the practices thereof. In par ticular does he disapprove of virtuous public actions per formed for the sake of the selfish benefits which Holbach had taught naturally resulted from it, and of the public service stimulated by the artificial inducements which both Helvetius and Holbach had recommended to the legislator (3L: 70). Unfortunately, the legislators have listened to Holbach and Helvetius, and have failed to consult man's nature. It is because of this disregarding, especially the 170 urge for impartiality, that public service has become a contradiction in terms. According to Godwin there are some attitudes that will result quite automatically from seeing things as they are. In one way, this only poses the problem in another form; for institutions may be favorable or unfavorable to seeing , * things as they are. And a discovery of the Institutions that belong to these two categories must precede the more positive program of construction. It is for this purpose that Godwin analyzes the results, or institutions, of soci eties. He was convinced that men cannot be totally blind to all the facts for ever (QMP: 81). And between man's inherent desire for truth and the social engineer's program of pointing out obstacles to the practice of impartiality, there is room for hope. First on the list of those institutions which blind men to the facts are those that prevent unlimited and un controlled communication (FJ: IV. iii; VI. vi). If these were done away with life would be made much simpler., since libel, as an example, would cease to exist.^ Again, any statute or practice which is detrimental to the individual's free exercise of judgment must be abolish ed. Besides preventing the free flow of communication, this "Tor an anticipation of J. 3. Mill's ideas concerning the suppression of erroneous opinion and individual sover eignty, see. FJ: VI. iii; VIII. i. 171 practice is "utterly incompatible with the wholesome tone of the human understanding" (PJ: V. xv). Unreasonable sentiments which bind us to the family, partly or creed must be made subservient to principles of impartial justice. That existing institutions thrive on and in fact are dependent upon such irrationality points up the difficulty here. Such feelings are not wrong in themselves; but they tend to blind us and falsify the "moral arithmetic" (GPB: 194)* Impartiality cannot be equated with refined self-inter est i this is the principle which Godwin learned, and, in so doing made a noticeable advance over Bentham. Port Bentham would seem to have lived all his life in the childlike faith that the interests of a community on the whole and of every member are always identical ( MfcP: 9). Social institutions that suppress the principle of impartiality must be removed. But in order for this to occur a system of equality must exist. Godwin maintains against Montesquieu that Individual differences in the human race could all, or almost all, be explained from moral or social causes. The effects of physical causes on the history of mankind he was willing to allow, but he holds that they "sink into nothing, when com pared with the great and inexpressible operations of reflec tion" (PJ: I. v). And it is the political or social insti tution, operating through reflection, that creates such 172 Inequality as does exist. It is by such unreasonable means as class-stratification that men grow up accepting the institution of slavery, when this praotice is totally unsup ported by an examination of human differences (FJ: II. iii). The notion of high birth and nobility assumes the genetic transmission of morals (F£: V. x); but morality is the product of our social environment. And if in large societies we do not desire equality, it is because we do not, in the full sense of know, know that it is desirable. Han shall come to know that this is desirable when the inhibiting institutions are removed. Godwin is not concerned primarily with the political or with the economic consequences of inequality (though he gives these considerable thought). He hates a society sys tem built on inequality because it means selfishness, ser vility, suppression of free thought, and prevention of the free development essential to full manhood (FJ: VIII. ii; VIII. iv; intro., 71). Equality is the indispensable pre condition for individual development. But unlimited perso nal development is the equivalent of morality. So equality must exist if virtue is to be practiced. For virtue comes through the improving of intelligence. And without equality one gains not intelligence, but prejudices. But if man's endowments, needs, and ends are equal, there is yet another major institution that stands in the way, viz., economics. No other area of Godwin's thought is a greater subject of controversy than is that which concerns economics. It has been said that his criticisms of existing economic con ditions firmly established the idea of property as the fundamental problem of human societyt and that it is on the basis of economics rather than that of its ideals that he rejects republicanism OPR; 150). This pictures him as a practical philosopher indeed* involved with man's daily needs. On the other hand, he has been charged with handling his criticisms on "very philosophical grounds, quite apart from the interests of the ordinary citizen."7^ Arguments for and against his being a scientific socialist in his criticisms of property are adduced as well (DA: 85). My position in the following discussion shall be that Godwin's primary concern, here as elsewhere, is with man's moral development. He cannot be classified as neatly as some commentators would like. Godwin begins his analysis of the existing economic institutions with the belief that the grossly unfair econo mic conditions are not only undesirable but unnecessary. Man has the power to improve his unfortunate condition. Today much that was new ground for Godwin is taken for 74Hall, V. P., "British Radicalism, 1791-1797," in f tudiea in History. Boonomlcs and Public Lgv, edited by the acuity o? Political Science of Columbia University, vol. 49 (New Torks Columbia University Press, 1912), 107. 174 granted, and we tend to lose sight of his uniqueness. In his views he was opposed to the religious and intellectual ideas of his century. Common opinion at that time was to the effect that man is a fragile vessel, conceived in weak ness and iniquity, fostered at the best in ignoranoe; no matter how remarkable his progress in piety and learning, he must infallibly remain helpless in the hands of tremendous 75 and unseen powers. But religion was not the only insti tution that oppressed man with ignorance and a sense of h 76 helplessness and blinded him to the facts; for a dogma surrounds property and the ownership of the means of pro duction which is quite as unyielding and unreasonable as any other tenet of faith. NThe subject of property is the key-stone that com pletes the fabric of political justice" (FJ: VIII. i). An examination of this is then indispensable. But the doctrine of property is deep-rooted and dearly held by many, and: It is, in the last resort, the palladium of all that ought to be dear to us, and must never be approached but with awe and veneration (FJ: VIII. ii). This institution, above all others, calls for dispassionate ^Brown, F. K., The Life of William Godwin (London and Toronto: Button, 1926), 47. Hereafterciied as 1WG. *^For a discussion of Godwin's views on religion, and his criticisms thereof, see pp. 186 ff., below. 175 and objective analysis. 4 . A correct theory of economics Is Important for two reasons: first, there is nothing that more powerfully tends to disrot our judgment and opinions than erroneous notions concerning the goods of fortune (i.e., this is the source of many prejudices (RJ: VIII. 1). Secondly, the time at which there would be put an end to the system of coercion and punishment is intimately connected "with the circum stances of propertys being placed upon an equitable basis" (PJ: VIII. i). Thus, Godwin is convinced that a system of equality is possible only if there is universal equality, in economics as well as in, e.g., education. To show his concern with the immediacy of events, and with the needs of the individual, it should be noted that Godwin points out that in almost every country legislation is grossly unfair, favoring the rich against the poor (PJ: 77 I. ill). This leads him to make a distinction in the general problem of property, between two special problems. Pirst, who is the person designed for the use of a particu lar object? In the second place, who is the person to whom the preservation and distribution of any given quantity of these articles can most justly and most usefully be entrust ed? (QPR: 209)* The second problem is that of property. The first problem is answered in a very general way, ^Godwin thus anticipates Harx's economic interpreta tion of the origin of law and legislation. 176 and says, In effect, that one should act always in that way which will be most profitable to society as a whole (PJ: VIII. i). This problem is never dealt with in a proper man* ner, for it concerns Godwin but little His primary con cern is with property as such. And this leads to a discus sion of the degrees of property, upon which his analysis turns. The first form or degree of property is the means of subsistence and happiness; or, . . . that of my permanent right in those things, the use of which being attributed to me, a greater sum of benefit or pleasure will result, than could have arisen from their being otherwise appropriated (PJ: VIII. ii). This is an application of the principle of utility, and may be stated as "To everyone according to his needs" (GPR: 210) . The second degree of property as seen by Godwin is the "empire to which every man is entitled over the produce of his own industry, even that part of it the use of which ought not to be appropriated to himself" (PJ: VIII. ii). This is an instance of Godwin's "passive" or "negative" rights, and is a correlative of the obligation of others never to force by by constraint to dispose in a certain way discussion of Godwin's positive economic views, i.e., those designed for an anarchist society, will be undertaken in Chapter III. 177 of the products of his labor. But this is a negative not a positive right. I do not have the right to dispose as I please of my labor's product* without considering society at large. This is the first sort of usurpation, for it is here that many, reinforced by self-interest, begin accumulating wealth, and, in so doing, sow the seeds of economic inequal ity. Godwin sees clearly that the pursuit of wealth tends to become an end in itself, and "seldom for the sensual gra tifications it can purchase" but for "the love of distinc tion and the fear of contempt" (FJ: I. iii). That such a pursuit is self-defeating has been demonstrated already. Finally, the third degree of property is a system, "in whatever manner established, by which one man enters into the faculty of disposing of the produce of another man's industry" (W: VIII. ii). This is the system of hereditary property, found in all civilized countries. It is thorough ly immoral, for "The property is produced by the daily labour of men who are now in existence. All that their an cestors bequeathed to them, was a mouldy patent, which they show as a title to extor from their neighbours what the la bour 'of those neighbours has produced" (W: VIII. ii). The doctrine of accumulated property is Godwin's pri mary target here. It has been, he says, condemned by all 178 70 religious morality. 9 It precludes security and independ ence; leads men astray in their desires; perverts the inte grity of their judgments; discourages intellectual attain ment; multiplies vice by generating the crimes of the poor; entrenches certain attitudes of the rich; and often causes war (FJ: VIII. i; VIII. iii).80 Godwin does not want to admit into the world any wealth other than the labor of man (OPR: 211) , for this is the only true wealth. The term "wealth" is now misunderstood. It is truly nothing more than power, power "vested in certain individuals by the institutions of society, to compel others to labor for their advantage" (PJ: VIII. ii). Thus, he argues (against Adam Smith) that capitalism and landed property, far from being natural and desirable, are only artificial contrivances of the dominant political hierarchy. It is Godwin's contention that the rich man as suoh cannot be socially useful. The categories of "rich" and "poor" are as artificial as that of capitalism; and such artificial distinctions serve to destroy the natural identi- by of interests (GPR: 213). For a class of rich means a society founded on luxury, and luxury is inseparable from inequality of fortune. It is sheer sophistry to argue (as 7^lnd he quotes Mark, x. 32; Acts, ii, 44-45 to sub stantiate hiB point. O Q And thus anticipated Marx's and Lenin's theory of the origin of imperialistic international warfare. 179 some have done) that luxury, as such, is indispensable to civilization (W: VIII. ii). Unrestricted luxury is not only undesirable, but not useful either. It is not useful in the first place to the rich man, who enjoys it or who is held to enjoy it. Godwin introduces a distinction here between four classes of good things: "subsistence, the means of intellectual and moral improvement, inexpensive gratifications, and such gratifi cations as are by no means essential to healthful and vigor ous existence" (FJ: VIII. ii). This last class includes the pleasures of luxury, and is the one which sets the most obstacles in the way of a fair distribution of wealth. For the amount of labor and produce which provide the first three kinds of satisfaction are markedly smaller than those required to produce the fourth. It is because of the great amount of labor needed to satisfy the desires of the rich that the great masses must live their life in non-formal ST servitude. Consequently, social equality can occur only with a re-distribution of labor. If so many men work their lives away for bare subsistence it is because, by reason of the unequal distribution of fortunes, the great mass of man kind works in order to supply the minority of the rich with pleasure is vain and futile, and whose emptiness is demon- 8T Godwin calculated that only a twentieth of the in habitants of a simple state could produce all the absolute necessaries of life for all that state's inhabitants. 180 strable; pleasures whose essence lies In the love of social renown and distinction (OPR: 214)* But though luxury is useless even to the rich man who enjoys it, may it not be useful to the laborer who earns his livelihood by supplying these needs? So. For to the degree that the rich expand their means of enjoyment (as they must, given the insatiableness of desire), a similar increase in the quantity of labor imposed on the lowest classes of soci ety will result (in order to supply such desires). And this increase in labor would not be followed by a like increase in wages: For the rich are few, and the poor many; that is why, when the rich offer labour and the poor ask for it, the rich are masters and able to fix the wages of the labor at will, that is to say very low . . . Those who by fraud or force, have usurped the power of buying and selling the labour of the great mass of the community, are sufficiently disposed to take care that they should never do more than subsist (PJ; VIII. ii). Given a state of society in which wealth is unequally dis tributed, the poor can only find means of subsistence in so far as the rich offer them wages for labor. So it would appear that the more the rich contrive to find new ways of spending their wealth, and invent new superfluities, the poor will suffer not benefit. Still, it is not quite accurate to say that Godwin is opposed to luxury in every form. His opposition is to inequality and degradation, not pleasure as such: X8X If we understand by luxury, something which is to be enjoyed exclusively by some, at the expense of undue privations, and a partial burden upon others; to in dulge ourselves in luxury is then a vice. But, if we understand by luxury, which is frequently the case, every accommodation which is not absolutely necessary to maintain us in sound and healthful existence, the procuring and communicating luxuries may then be vir- tous. fhe end of virtue is to add to the sum of pleasurable sensations (W: VIII. ii). But such "accommodation which is not absolutely necessary to maintain us in sound and healthful existence" should be sought only after all the basic needs of all the people are met. And, sounding a word of warning to entrenched economic 82 interests, Godwin suggests possible things to comet Human beings are capable of encountering with cheer fulness I sic I considerable hardships, when those hard ships are 'impartially shared with the rest of society. But it is a bitter aggravation of their own calamity, to have the privileges of others forced on their ob servation, and, while they are perpetually and vainly endeavoring to secure for themselves and their families the poorest conveniences, to find others revelling in the fruits of their labours (BJs I. iii). In actual society, then, founded as it is on the insti tution of individual property, there is a conflict and not a harmony of interests between the capitalist and the wage- earning laborer (as had been supposed by other economists). And this conflict must remain as long as these institutions remain. But remaining consistent with his belief that law in all form is evil, Godwin refuses to substitute a system 82 Thereby anticipating the notion of "class-warfare," but substituting history for histrionics. 182 of legal reetraint to bring about a more equitable distri bution of goods. This would not really solve the problem, for the corrupt institutions would remain. Unbounded luxury corrupts, but so does poverty. Godwin does not accept the thesis that poverty was, in its own right, the nurse of virtue and happiness (GMfP: 109). On the contrary, overwhelming poverty degrades one to the point where he is no longer capable of attaining the full stature of man (just as uninhibited luxury vilifies the spirit). And prolonged struggles with the "evils of poverty" will produce a counter-acting force, i.e., a "painful feeling of their oppressed situation will itself deprive them of the power of surmounting it" (PJ: I. iii). It is these long term effects of economic inequality that Godwin has before him when he attacks existing institutions of property and capitalism.*^ According to the principles of equal and impartial jus tice, "the good things of the world are a common stock, upon which one man has as valid a title as another to draw for what he wants" (PJ: VIII. i). It is this line, more than any other, that is responsible for the charges that Godwin was criticizing the economic conditions of his time in the name of communism.0* That this interpretation is erroneous °^Por expression of these ideas in novel form, see CW: 144. 8*i)iscussed in more detail in Chapter III. 183 it ia only necessary to read a few pages further, where God win criticizes cooperation in every form, saying that all cooperation is, in some degree evil, and where he explicitly criticizes common meals, labor, recreation, etc. v£J: VIII. viii). Cooperation is linked in Godwin's mind with routines of action and stereotypes of thought (GMP: 156). But it is precisely routines of action and stereotypes of thought ("prejudices") that constitutes the prime evils of contempo rary society. He would hardly dispose of one system of inequality and degradation only to introduce another one. If it is ever just to call Godwin an optimist, his po sition concerning the increase in population must qualify. He rejected the conclusion of Halthus and Rioardo that any attempt to raise the standard of living of the poor would be self-stultifying, since the poor, when fed, would merely breed more rapidly.Godwin is convinced that the culti vation of Burope could be improved to the point at which it would nourish five times the present number of inhabitants. The reason that such improvement is not forthcoming iB that "there is a principle in human society by which population is perpetually held down to the level of the means of sub sistence" (PJ: VIII. ix). The "principle" here referred to is none other than the established system of property. It ®^Ruggiero, G. de, The History of European Liberalism, tr. by R. G. Gollingwood (Mew York: "Beacon Press, 1927), 111. Hereafter cited as HML. 184 la thla that "atranglea in our cradlea a considerable number of our children." Thus, the preaent ayatem puts an end to four-fifths of this happiness and value at the threehhold of exiatenee (GFR: 218). Godwin believes the problem of population lncreaae can be solved by the suppression of artificial needs (the fourth type of good), and by the progress of cultivation and indus try. This would make it easier for a far larger number of men to be supported in a given apace than was possible at preaent time. Besides, three-quarters of the world were not under cultivation (FJ: VIII. ix). In sum, there is no jus tification for the dark pessimism of certain agronomists. Godwin's approach to the question of population is less dispassionate than are his other analyses. It is true that he believed those who opposed him were tisohg in their be liefs about the earth's capabilities. But it is no less true that he thought they (Halthus in particular) had mis judged man; Halthus' doctrine is directly calculated to bring our human nature into "hatred and contempt," by saying that man ** i s unalterably such a brute and insensible animal, that . . . nothing can prevent him from sacrificing himself . . . to what the ancient philosophers called the 'gross impulses of the lower part of our nature'" (0£ Population: 105; 525). Bven here Godwin's arguments are directed by a 185 86 concept of man, one normative in nature. What according to the advocates and adherents of the theory of indirection is a political problem resolves it self, for Godwin, into a problem of pedagogy. Formal edu cation ends at childhood, reaches only a few, and, when compared in terms of its influence with political lnstltu- . tions is virtually impotent. The latter reaches into each strata of society, influencing every man and the thoughts of every man. It insinuates itself between man and the world of nature, and between one individual and another. Educa tion, in the ordinary sense, cannot contend with government, for our instructors themselves are not immune to its effects. And, imbibing the ideas of his society, the schoolmaster more resembles a despot than a teacher (TOM; 18). Godwin rejects the principle of national education, for experience has shown that such public instruction tends to expend its energies in the support of prejudice. It teaches its pupils: . . . not the fortitude that shall bring every propo sition to the test of examination, but the art of vindicating such tenets as may chance to be established (PJ: VI. tiii). In the same section he argues that the idea of public education is not only undesirable but inefficient, this 8^See, Paul: II., 272, for one reaction to Godwin's refutation of Maithus. 186 because of its propagandists practices* and because of the principle of impartiality Implicit in the understanding ♦ which repels such attempts at indoctrination (FJ: VI. viii). It can now be seen why the social institutions which will arise in an ideal society carry such importance for Godwin. It is through these that education-considered as a life-long accumulation of experiences-wiU be transmitted. In a sense* then, a just society is a vast educational institution. Godwin's criticisms extend to all existing institu tions, including that of religion. His criticisms here are limited, but important. His main objections are two in numbers the tendency of a code of religious conformity is to make men hypocrites; and an established religion works as a governments it demands adherence to certain unques tionable opinions or "prejudices" (PJ: VI. ii). It seems fair to say that to some agnostics God is an unnecessary hypothesis; to Godwin He was a tyrant to be deposed (S f l f t C : 80). For, though he admits that some of the more famous religious thinkers have been men of extraordinary abilities (such as Thomas Aquinas), he adds that it is unfortunate that these abilities were not properly directed; something useful to mankind might have resulted from his labor (Paul: I. 101-02). His truest position here is found in m letter he wrote to a more-than-friendly acquaintance: 187 i Will 1am Godwin to Klia Harriot lot. 8-1798: . . . Bi- goto bare pretenled that the will of 3odls the founda tion. of morality, that what He commands is therefore right, and what He forbids is therefore wrong. But rational theism teaches that morality is antecedent to the diwine will, and is a rule to which God himself delights to conform. Rational theism teaches that Qod is good; andto prove that He is so, compares his pro vidence and works with the immediate standard of rec titude to which God and good men equally adhere. Che will of God therefore is by no means the foundation of morality, but merely its sanction, an additional reason why we should conform to it . . . (Paul: 1. 310). In other words, religion is acceptable only to the extent 87 that it is conformable to the standards of utility. Of all the institutions criticized by Godwin, none is more famous than marriage. And none jolted his society more. For the ideas he suggests contradict most Western mores, then and now. Concerning marriage Godwin tells us that the method is: . , • for a thoughtless and romantic youth of each sex, to come together, to see each other, for a few times, and under circumstances full of delusion, and then to vow eternal attachment ... In almost every instance they find themselves deceived. They are reduced to make the beet of an irretrievable mistake . . . Thus the institution of marriage is a fraud; and men who carefully mislead their judgments in the daily affair of their life, must be expected to have a cripples judgment in every other concern (PJ: VIII. viii). Godwin makes two points here: first, his position on promises precludes any "vow of eternal attachment"; second ly, he is saying that one who comprises his judgments and ^Religion is discussed further in Chapter III. 168 decisions (as one must in marriage) is bound to be socially less useful than one whose vision is unclouded! Co-habitation ... is hostile to that fortitude, which should accustom a man, in his actions, as well as in his opinions, to judge for himself, and feel competent to the discharge of his own duties (FJi VIII. viii). Again, marriage appears to be unnatural, and for two reasons! first, it is absurd to expect the inclinations and wishes of two human, beings to coincide through any long pe- iod of time; and, secondly, society is forced to pass laws in the attempt to restrain vices (e.g., adultery). The result is that these vices are irritated and multiplied (by making legal as well as religious or moral rules to be broken)! (PJi VIII. viii). The institution of marriage, then, retards individual development and, because of the inevitable incompatability of two persons, inimical to happiness. Finally, Godwin was protesting against the conventional marriage which was very often a form of licensed prostitu tion (WGW; 42). But rather than pass more laws or relax the existing ones, Godwin, consistent with his principles, called for the eradication of this institution. But Godwin was not all critic • He was speculative and constructive at times. And to a synthesis of these latter times we now turn. Chapter III ▲ 30CIKTT OF AHA&0HI8M In his history of England Godwin tells us that* How nations and races of men are to be so governed as may be most conducive to the improvement and happiness of all* is one of the most interesting questions that can be offered to our consideration (HOB: I, 1). In this chapter I shall be concerned with a statement of how Godwin would answer this "most interesting question." Godwin sees a group of people'from three different points of view. It is true that in personal composition the legal and the social organization (i.e., the State and Soci ety) are one. But in terms of purpose (Godwin's first point of view) they are different. The State exists for one • great, but single purpose; Society exists for a number of 88 purposes, some great and some small. The second point of view from which the nation may be seen in its double aspect is that of organization or struc ture. Function determines structure; thus, (as the first point of view suggests) the members of a nation belong to one legal organization only, the State; but as organized socially, the multiplicity of purposes here necessitates Op Barker, £., Principles of Social and Political Theory (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 42“ Hereafter cited in text as PSP. 189 190 that the members of the nation belong to many organizations. And this multiplicity of Society remains despite the tend ency of the groups to merge and coalesce in the general com plex. Thus, there is not only economic society (as many,of Godwin's contemporaries seem to assume), but also the soci eties of religion, art and aesthetic taste, education and culture, of moral conscience and of the virtue of charity. That is to say, there are as many forms of society as there are needs and aspirations of mankind (PSP: 43)* It was the attempt on the part of certain writers (e.g., self- • interest theorists, laissez-faire proponents, etc.) to reduce society to one purpose that prompted Godwin to find a truer form of social relationships. The third point of view from which the double aspect of the nation can be seen is that of method. The State has always employed the methods of coercion, compulsion and punishment; the fact that it is a legal organization founded upon and operating in terms of laws makes such methods neo- oessary and inevitable. On the other hand, Society uses the method of voluntary action and persuasion without coer cion. This is again to be explained in terms of purpose, for the ends of Society can be achieved best by non-forceful means (PSP: 43) These distinctions appear to be obvious, but they have ®^This is true at least in principle, if not in fact. And principles must precede practice. been overlooked or Ignored many times. A . principle reason that such confusion has occured is that these two aspeota— State and Society— have been seen as one self-identical unit. That is, the legal association and the social orga nization have been equated one with the other. So far from wishing to identify the two, Godwin insists that they not only should be separated in principle, but that only one should be admitted in practice. For he is convinced that only the social realm, manifesting as it does the genuine needs and aspirations of man, and employing only non-force- ful persuasion as a means, is a legitimate endeavor. The State, on the other hand, not only fails to represent the true needs of humanity, its ordinary result is to work to man's detriment. Originating because of the perversion and non-reflection of a few, the State has developed into an all-embracing institution that systematically represses man's legitimate aspirations. Godwin is sure that the mea ger showing man has made thus far in the moral sphere is due to the presence and continuation of an immoral political structure. But amendments, revisions and additions of and to the existing framework of law is not what is required for man's liberation: the State, as a formal, legal struc ture must be abolished. Godwin's anarchism is a complex and turbid phenomenon containing in itself germs of liberalism, democracy, and socialism (HBL: 106). It distinguishes itself from other 192 theories of utility by making explicit the inconsistencies inherent in the latter idea, vis. the conflict between the strict individualism demanded by a system founded on self- interest, and the notion of universal benevolence, or "greatest happiness" principle. For this second principle can assert itself only artificially, through the authority of a state, impersonating in itself the needs of the major ity, and ensuring their prevalence over the selfishness of individuals (HEL: 106). But a manufactured benevolence is a false and immoral one, equivocal in method and evil in effect. Therefore, the State (and all instruments of the theory of indirection) is to be excluded from a society founded on anarchism. And, therefore, self-interest must be passed over as our society's foundation. The end of the progress of civil society is anarchism. This form of society (a "well conceived theory of society without government" (FJ: VII. v; VIII. i)) is to be dis tinguished from anarchy (a term which Godwin repudiates). "Anarchy" means: ... in its ideal sense, the perfect, unfettered self-government of the individual, and, consequently, the absence of any kind of external government . • . It demands the unconditional realisation of freedom, both subjectively and objectively, equally in politi cal and in economic life (OAT: 3). But Godwin is repulsed by the notion of a society in which there is "the unconditional realisation of freedom," 193 where every member can "do as we list." For In such a society any talk of obligation, duty, or morality would be so much nonsense. A definition somewhat closer to Godwin's is the fol lowing: Anarchism, as its derivation indicates, is the theory which is opposed to every kind of forcible government. It is opposed to the State as the embodiment of the force employed in the government of the community. Such government as Anarchism can tolerate must be free government, not merely in the sense that it is that of a majority, but in the sense that it is assented to by all ... In their view, the democratic form of govern ment is not very enormously preferable to other forms so long as minorities are compelled by force or its potentiality to submit to the will of majorities. Liberty is the supreme good in the Anarchist creed, and liberty is sought by the direct road of abolishing all forcible control over the individual by the com munity. Russell's definition is generally applicable to God win's theory, with these reservations: first, if a govern ment is freely assented to by all, its existence would be superfluous; and secondly, the "direct road of abolishing Gill forcible control" must be accomplished without force. But because Godwin insists upon progress without force (be cause force never changes men's hearts), it is not fair to make disparaging remarks about the "mischief of his faith in logic as a force" (8040: 104). Godwin is quite aware ^Russell, B., Roads to Freedom: Socialism. Anarchism. and Syndicalism (Londons Alien 4 Unwin, 1918), 50. Here after cited in text as RIF. 194 that he la framing an Idealf and that It cannot be intro duced immediately (PJ: VII. v). But he is convinced that ultimately it can be brought into existence • And the first prerequisite for such is for man to become aware of the nature and potential of his understanding, i.e., to have a "faith in logic as a force." Godwin's outlines of his anarchist society must neces sarily be vague. Por he believes that achievements in philosophy and science are soon outdated. Knowledge is progressive, and what was once deemed excellent soon appears to be full of error and absurdity (DA: 61). But his cen tral points are clear enough. Man must be made to rely upon man. He must free himself from prejudice and dogma• He must free himself from dependence upon artificial and harmful contrivances. And one such artificial and oppres sive institution he must free himself from is that of supernatural religion. Godwin never denies that man has a genuine religious impulse. But this can be explained in naturalistic termss There are two considerations, the force of which made man a religious animal. The first is, his proneness to ascribe hostility or benevolent intention to every thing of a memorable sort that oocurs to him in the order of nature. The second is . . . the superior dignity of mind over body. This, we persuade our selves, shall subsist uninjured by the mutations of our corporeal framd, and undestroyed by the wreck of the material universe (TOM: 15). His empirical bent likewise prevents him from accepting most supernatural tenets of faith: 195 But all that can he told me of a future world, a world of spirits, or of glorified bodies, where the employ ments are spiritual, and the first cause is to be rendered a subject of immediate perception, or of a scene of retribution, where the mind, doomed to ever lasting Inactivity, shall be wholly a prey to the up- braidings of remorse, and the sarcasms of devils, is so foreign to everything with which I am acquainted, that my mind in vain endeavors to believe, or to understand it (PJ: V. xv)• Thus, if religion is to have a place in our ideal society, it must take a role subservient and supplementary to man's unfettered activities. Godwin has read Montesquieu, of course. And he 1b cognizant of the valid points made by the latter concerning the relativity of social relations and mores, and of the fact that certain forms of society are better suited for one group of people than is another form. But Godwin in sists that the special circumstances in which particular societies find themselves call for social systems that are different only temporarily. In the long run, and as an ultimate objective, there is one species of society con formable to all men: This sooiety, according to Godwin never completely realizable, will embody absolute moral truth, but moral truth absolute in the sense that it alone is consistent with the absolute end of the happiness of the greatest number (S£: 66). The reason for this belief in "one species of society 196 conformable to all Den" la hie more fundamental belief that man's nature is everywhere the same in essentials; thus, he always needs the same things; The general features of the nature of man are capable of being understood, and a mode may be delineated which, in itself considered, is best adaoted to the condition of man in society (^: 17. ii). From the fact that men are the same in their nature, that all men seek happiness, the criterion of virtuous con duct in Godwin's society is utility; the good society is one in which the actions of individuals conduce to the hap piness of the greatest number. Thus, social obligation is founded upon the psychological fact that all men desire pleasure, and upon the verifiable fact that pleasures of the most rewarding nature (those concommitant with acts of benevolence and impartial justice) result from adhering to the precept of the greatest happiness of the greatest num ber. Thus, self-interest and egoism are trancended by acts flowing from qualitatively higher motives (and accompanied by qualitatively higher pleasures). Perfectibility, ac cordingly, becomes a process of progressive approximation to the defined goal of perfect self-consciousness and impartiality. One of the immediate results of such moral objectivity aB envisioned by Godwin shall occur in the sphere of punish ment. Laws concerning the punishment of an offender will not exist, for we shall be concerned not with the up holding of law but with the moral uplifting of the individ ual. Punishment has been shown to be unreasonable, without beneficial results, socially depraving, and founded on muddle-headedness. An individual who has gone counter to the moral precepts of our society will be brought before a jury of his neighbors to be judged. They will know him intimately, and so will not treat him under the category of "offender." Realizing that puniBhment rests on the fear response only, his jury of peers will attempt to change his behavior through persuasion. This will not be a session of moralizing or castigation, for morality is not passionless, nevertheless, desirable changes can be produced through non-forceful means. For, while the offender may follow the suggestions of his neighbors only because he holds it elemrly in mind, repeated action along these lines will produce changes in oharacter as well. For without fear ot punishment before him, the individual may soon come to see that his own best interest is identical with that of his society (M: V. xxiv). In other words, Godwin makes the distinction between acts which lead to, and those which flow from, a good character. And this is, after all, the (oatensive) purpose of all punishment (££: VII. iv). The habits of choice which we acquire as members of a community should be based, as far as possible, on a full consideration of the facts, and not, as is usual, on a 198 partial consideration of them. Ve should also acquire the habit of questioning even these attitudes validly achieved, and of varying them as circumstances dictate. But this means that ve oust live In a small, self-governing communi ty, where generalizations are likely to be based on a real apprehension of particulars. For it will be recalled that one of the causes of prejudice is the unavoidable complex ity found in modern Industrial society, where rules of thumb and generalizations are required. Our physical as well as our moral facilities must be so designed as to rule out grounds for error, as much as is possible. Thus, the large society will have to be broken up into smaller ones. Bquallty must be insured in our society, not, as some would suggest, through an oppressive legal system, but through the cultivation of morally mature individuals who perceive the principles of impartiality and justice as not only necessary but desirable aB well. Godwin denies the thesis held by some that a system of equality would be short-lived, to be followed by a separation into new classes i (PJ: VIII. v). The reason that such a separation has been anticipated is that, as yet, equality has been introduced artificially and reinforced through legalities and coercion. But equality is natural not artificial, and will arise of itself when man is unhindered. In addition to the abolition of the more obvious 199 varieties of class distinctions, a total dissolution of discrimination will follow if the citizens are given the opportunity to know each other intimately * This is one of the reasons the size of the community will he limited. Given unlimited communication and social intercourse each man will recognize the common nature he shares with his fellow citizen. He will recognize that titles, positions, and stations are artificial contrivances, created and fostered in a day when the desire for distinction manifested itself in the perverse form of ostentation and display, when self-indulgence and avarice attempted enterprises which only impartiality and benevolence are designed to accomplish. Adequate leisure and education (in the formal sense) are the indispensable bases for Godwin's community (3PH: 150). For one does not develop his higher faculties through ignorance and drudgery. And prejudice formed through association is most likely to be avoided in a com munity of independent craftsmen. It is here, and not on an assemblyline, that one develops pride in his work and ex presses himself through it. Regardless of hislivelihood, love of work is indispensablet The humblest mechanic, who works con amore. and feels that he discharges his office creditably, has a sober satisfaction in the retrospect, and is able to express himself perspicuously and well on the subJ sot that has occupied his industry. He has a just confidence in himself (TOM* 58). 200 Not only 1b the independent craftsman happier than his maas-produoing colleague, but he ie leas susceptible to prejudice than the latter. For he will understand the reasons for his actions, and is not likely to forget them and act from mere habit. Further, an individual's prac tices in one sphere of life tend to pour over into another. Thus, the man who deals in particulars rather than generali ties in his daily labor is leBS likely to think and act in terms of labels and meaningless categories when relating to his neighbor. Though he is independent, the craftsmen will not be solitary. Because their society is a pleasant one, they will meet together often. They understand that the exchange of ideas without coercion is valuable, and this reinforoes each man's desire to think for himself. A subtle form of social control will occur here, for each other's conduct will be a topic of discussion eagerly engaged in: What could be more beneficial, than for each man to derive assistance for correcting and moulding his conduct, from the perspicacity of his neighbors (PJ: VIII. viii)? No more will the inexhaustible varieties of man be pressed into one uniform exercise, "as the raw recruit is treated when he is brought under the direction of his drill sergeant" (TOM: 25). For one of the great values on which anarchism stands is that of diversity, and it is here, more 201 than anywhere else, that the stimulus of ambition can find expression, for an anarchist morality is a social morality: a recluse has no place here. And the desire, inherent in all, that he shall be somebody, and "not a mere undistin guished paw, destined to fill up a square in the chess board of human society," is fully realisable only under a system of absolute equality and non-coercion (29SL 35). for, during the formative years of education (the latter no longer producing an artificially uniform opinion hos tile to change) the individual's true interests and talents will be evidenced. Everyone comes into the world with a like nature but different disposition. The mistake made by societies of the past is that they have denied the first of these and overlooked the second. But anarchism is founded upon the knowledge of both these facts. Godwin is firmly convinced that the man without preju dice is as much a social product as the man of prejudice. The difference b etween them depends on the distinction between indoctrination and education (GMP: 113). One in doctrinates with prejudice; you educate people to see the truth. But education is a very broad term for Godwin, not at all limited to formal schooling. In fact, our most important learning comes not from books, but from the world around us and the people it houses, for example, the greatest happiness principle (a pillar of our society) must become the passion of universal benevolence. But we are 202 not born with this or any other Innate idea* It oust be learned. Ve mint learn ita inherent reaaonableneaa and truth, and must verify it through experience. This sort of broad experience will cauee auch a principle to be grounded in reason and reinforced by emotion, the two as pect! which must be constitutive of any meaningful ethical tenet. And ve gain ouch ideas, and such accompanying emo tions, when we really see something clearly, instead of "looking at things from a distance." This is eduoation in its truest sense, the fulfillment of the ideal of intel lectual emanicipation (OPR: 203 The key to Godwin's conception of a life-long educa tion is a dual ones association, and unlimited communica tion: But, though association, in tne received sense of that term, must be granted to be an instrument or very dangerous nature, unreserved communication, especially among persons who are already awakened to the pursuit of truth, xs of no less unquestionable advantage (PJ: I?, ill). And the right associations are those which he does fora when he has access to all the facts: Seeing the great disparity there is between different conditions of human life, he ought oonstantly to en deavour to raise each olass, and every individual of each olass, to a olass above it. This is the true ^Godwin looked forward to a state of society in which all positive institutions shall have been abolished, includ ing education (P£: VIII. x). 20? equalisation of mankind. Hot to pull down those who are exhalted, and reduce to a naked and savage equal ity. But to raise those who are abased; to communi cate to every man all genuine pleasures, to elevate every man to all true wisdom, and .to make all men participators of a liberal and comprehensive benevo- lenoe. This is the path in which the reformers of man kind ought to travel. This is the prize they should pursue (PJt IV. xi). In his characteristic fashion, Godwin urges for one universally best form of social organization from two very different bases.^ On the one hand, he often puts forward a strictly rationalist argument that institutions are good only if they "have constant relation to the rules of im mutable justice," and that those rules "uniform in their nature, are equally applicable to the whole human race" (PJ: V. i). On the other hand, a psychological argument is employed which says, in effect, that men show more resemb lances that differences; thus, variations in habit and taste are accidental. Consequently, what will bring pleasure and happiness to one mind will bring them to all (PJ: III. vii). But, clearly, his central pre-occupation is with discovering the society conformable with immutable reason and justice. That is to say, the "right associations" are so designated because of their ability to build the proper moral fiber, not for the pleasures they might give rise to. It is for its tendency to promote men's morals that ^Such inconsistencies are discussed further in Chapter IV. Godwin gives his qualified assent to a "modified democracy," an acceptable transitional form of society to be pursued before a completed anarchism can be ushered in. Even so, it is clear that Godwin has before him an ideal much more radical than republican egalitarianism. He refuses to allow social questions to be decided either by lot or by ballot, at least in principle (PJ: IV. x). Por such practices are nothing more than the fictitious and unnatural unanimity in a disguised form. If the populace decide by vote they confuse the majority opinion with the right opinion, i.e., the fact that in every imaginable situation one decision is more reasonable and proper than any other, is soon forgotten. And if, during the transitional stages of our progress we are forced to resort to voting on practical grounds, it should be borne in mind that there is no alter native that can be offered to our choice, "that does not Include in it a better and a worse" (PJ: VI. x). Mention was made earlier in connection with punish ment by juries in an ideal society. It should be added that juries here would suggest and recommend only, and that even this meager function might be removed ultimately. The purpose in having a jury of the offender's neighbors is that they will know the subject intimately. But what, after all, is the use of setting up Buch juries? Will not each of these men have had penetrating knowledge of the offend er? And does not the reasoning of any one of these men 205 . carry aa ouch weight aa the other? Why, then, would it not be possible to do sway with juries altogether, substi tuting for them the reasonable suggestions and recommenda tions of one man, say, a friend? Ve still think in terms of the categories of thought imposed upon us by political institutions of old. Remove these, and old concepts (such aa that of the jury system) will be replaced by new ones (such as that of persuasion and suggestion)! Once annihilate the quackery of government, and the most homebred understanding might be strong enough to deteot the artifices, of the state juggler that would mislead him (PJ: V. xxiil). Another such old concept which would be discarded is that of marriage, at least as the term is usually under stood. This is not to suggest that there will be no bi sexual co-habitation in our society, but only that it will be more reasonable than is the current one. In a reason able society, each man would select for himself a partner, to whom he would adhere, as long as that adherence should continue to be the choice of both parties ( Jtf: VIII. viii). No longer will two persons with dissimilar inclinations, tastes and desires be bound one to the other for all their lives. The belief that each man and each woman should have desires that remain constant all their lives is as foolish and naive as is the adolescent belief in one and only one true love. The facts of the matter are that people do 206 change, and that partners do grow tirad of aaoh other. Why, than, should thay deprive themselves of a aourca of happl- naaa in ordar to satisfy unraasonabla religious dogna? In our sooiaty thara will ba no such depravations. Tha proceeding discussion should not ba intarpratad in tarms of a cooparativa saxual vantura. Our disoussion of tha ganaral concapt of cooperation has ruled out this possibility* In a just society tha public official or functionary would embody tha ideal of disinterestedness and public benevolence, and ha Mwould hourly improve in tha vigour and disinterestedness of his character* ^PJ: VI. ix). Ha will work without salary, for it has bean shown that sala ries for government employees is immoral (PJ: IV* ix). And in time it is to ba hoped that tha moral consciences of tha citizens will have bean improved to tha point where such officials are unnecessary. Because we cannot say truly where or when the advance of science will stop, Godwin speculates on the possibility of human life prolonged to the point of immortality. He is further supported in this speculation in his belief in the progressive development of consciousness, of an escalation of the habitual and the instinctive to the level of the hereby anticipating Bertrand Bussell's views on marriage, but without the proviso concerning children. See the letter's Marriage and Morals for a comparison. 207 conscious and the voluntary. Because of both of these fac tors the day may be looked forward to when all of man,s actions will become conscious and voluntary* when the mind will beoome master of the body. If such a time were to come reproduction would become a useless physiological phe nomenon; the human race would remain always equal in numbers; and truth would not be bound to a generation-cycle: The whole (of humanity) will be a people of men and not of children. Generation will not succeed genera tion* nor truth have in a certain degree to recommence her career at the end of every thirty years (PJ: VIII. viii). Godwin does not mean that progress is inevitable* and his discussion of immortality may appear fanciful (to say the least). But he is making a valid point here* viz.* that it is unsafe to suppose that sociological "laws," drawn from the behavior of human beings in a particular social setting* will continue to apply in the remote future (GMP: 82). One's mental set or state of mind will deter mine his principles and procedures. Is it not more reason able* then, to maintain optimism (even if fanciful) and keep one's mind open to possibilities than to preclude any thing which does not fit in with our preconceptions? Just as with reproduction, so* too* with the final result of anarchism: "The scene in which anarchy i.e., anarchism shall terminate* principally depends upon the state of mind by which it has been preceded (PJ: VII. v). 208 And a noat important aapoot of thia atato of mind oonoaraa tha funotion of government in our anarohiat society, to which wa now turn. Godwin eonaidara himaalf a diaoipla of Adama Smith, aaaing hia abaolute political liberalism to ha a mara ex- tanaion of Smith'a aoonomic liberaliam. In fact, however, Godwin*a political theory no more resembles Smith*a than doaa hia economic ayataa. The reason that tha government of our anarchist society will ba markedly different from that advocated either by Smith or by utilitariana ia that both tha latter ware really advoeatea of tha theory of in direction. But any intrusion into tha lives of man on tha part of government is evil, whether tha purpose ia to insure the maintainence of tha law of supply and demand, or to create an artificial identity of interests. Society can not change eternal truth, and in Godwin’ s society there will be no attempt at such. Nor can eternal truth be im posed, for in thia case it ceases being a truth and instead becomes inflexible, meaningless dogma. Thus, no government imposition of principles, be they true or falae. The social institutions— the organisations which re flect the legitimate urges of the people— are the organs through which improvement will be channeled. And there la only one way of improving theae institutions, and‘that ia to improve the intelligence of their members ( GPB: 195-6). So government aotivity here will be restricted to that of 209 providing the condltlona for the most efficient dissemina tion and communication of knowledge. This ia more a nega tive than a positive function (££: IT. ii). The end of all rational politics is.to produce the greatest quantity of happiness in a given territory* But this can occur only when the leaders are disinterested (i.e., in their personal welfare). For even these men will welcome the day when their services are no longer needed, and this day will come only when the character of the popu lace is of a certain quality. Thus, the true politician must not only practice but encourage the perfection of mind, i.e., disinterestedness (PJ: IV. x). The government will expect no obedience whatever, for none is due it. I am bound only to submit to justice and truth; but, as these are antecedent to government, the lat ter has no grounds for expecting obedience. Even in an imperfect society, I submit to erroneous government only because there is no alternative (PJ: II. vi). Our transitional government will be a form of demo cracy, an intermediate stage in the long process towards anarchism. Godwin chooses this government only because it contains a lesser amount of evil than do others. It is nec essary for the simple reason that man along with institution must be re-made, and it is foolhardy to expect the most radical of political changes to work without preparation. Such government as we are forced by necessity to have, 210 at whatever stage of our society's development, will be a simple arrangement. There will not be a distinction between the legislative and executive powers, for a separation of powers suggests permanence and oppressiveness. (PJ: V. xxl). No legislative or law-making power will be held by the government, for there will be no laws nor any need for such. Laws etlffle the spirit and retard human develop ment, and ours is a society founded on the absolute respect for human intelligence, the internal progressiveness and expansiveness of which are negated by legal restrictions. This government will not be established on the basis of a constitution, for this too means a permanent polltioal Institution, and all such are bad. Constitutional govern ments are particularly to be avoided, for constitutions contain restrictions to make modifications difficult. But by his nature man must continually modify his opinions and judgments. Consequently, we shall deny governments this solidity. If, then, the government can make use neither of the legislative nor of the executive power without threatening individual freedom of conscience, the only power Godwin will allow it is the power of arbitration, i.e., it may make suggestions to the citizens, with no threat for non- complianoe attending (GFg: 199)* But, why, in this oase, let the government retain the character of a permanent 211 institution at all? Ve have seen that courtrooms and trials oan he replaced by juries. It seems reasonable that they could function in the place of government as well. This would sweep away the last vestige of permanence, for these juries, comprised of the citizens of our small communities, would not remain in permanent session. They would come Into being and would continue to exist for a given occasion only. Thus, government can have no more than two legitimate purposes heret the suppression of injustice against indi viduals (and this only in the beginning), and the common defense against external invasion (££: V. xxii). Rational assemblies (which would have to exist during transition to anarchism) would be forced to "issue commands to the dif ferent members of the confederacy.. Later, however, their task would be one of inviting them to co-operate for the common advantage, and, by arguments and addresses, convince them of the reasonableness of the measures they propose" (W: V. xxiv). In a country in which universal justice was already established, there would be virtually no need of a repre sentative assembly. Unfortunately, such justice does not everywhere exist. And not until men have thoroughly pre pared their minds for the government of reason can they with safety and profit sever the bonds of all forms of govern ment. It is when men forsake false opinions for true and 212 vice for virtue that all remains of the political Insti tution will be disposed of. It is Impossible to say pre cisely when this will be. The only good a government can do, then, is negatives It can avoid Interfering with the free spread of knowledge and virtue; and it can see that each individual 1b left free to pursue them (KT: intro., 29)* But we must not be overzealous in our attempt to establish radical equality. It is a supreme mistake to imagine that the mere destruc tion of government would itself Involve, as a natural and inevitable consequence, an improvement in men's morals. Suoh an idea is nothing more than indirection once again. For it would be an utter and total defeat of our society to mistake anarchism for despotism, or to practice tyranny in the name of equality: Anarchy awakens thought, and diffused energy and enter prise through the community, though it does not effect this in the best manner, as its fruits, forced into ripeness, must not be expected to have the vigorous stamina of true excellence . • . for ... in des potism, mind is trampled into an equality of the most odious sort (PJ: VII. v). Common deliberation will be the only true foundation of government (and society), and the government of a nation should thus be in conformity with the opinion of its inhabi tants. This is "not because their opinion is a oriterium of truth, but because, however erroneous this opinion may be, we cannot find any better criterium” (PJ: V. v). 213 k government without legislative or executive powers, and one without any judiciary whatever. Godwin's general stand on punishment explains in part why the judiciary has no place in his society, but there is a reason even more fundamentals force is contrary to the nature of mind, and has no effect whatever on truth. Godwin will never contenance violence in any form; it is always to be condemned. Violence, used in the service of truth, defeats its own end. No where does Godwin have to restrain himself more than in his discussion of the urgency of making the transition to anarchism. It is the same tone of voice employed when he was trying to rouse England to the affairs across the Channel: Can you really think that that the new constitution of France is the most glorious fabric ever raised by human integrity since the creation of man, and yet believe that what is good there would be bad here? Does truth alter its nature by crossing the Straits, and become falsehood? Are men entitled to perfect equality in France, and is it just to deprive them of it in England? Did the French do well in extinguishing no bility, and is it right that we should preserve heredi tary honours? Or are these questions so very trifling in their nature, so uninteresting to the general weal, that it is no matter which side of them we embrace? . . . (Paul; I., 175)• Then, as later, he refused to indulge in violence, as this brief entry by his daughter suggests: Godwin acted in strict conformity to his principles. He was an advocate for improvements brought in by the enlightened and sober-minded, but he deprecated abrupt innovations, and appeals to the passions of the multitude (Paul: I, 80) 214 Godwin's Insistence on the absence of all violence and restraint in his ideal society is best understood if it is borne in mind . that the stock argument against a society founded on the equality of rights is that such an arrange ment is not capable of permanence. Godwin agrees that this is indeed true, if such a society iB brought about by or practices either a violent or accidental revolution. It is necessary that the reform of laws (at our intermediate peri od of transition) or their abolition (as out ideal is ap proached) should not precede the reform of custom andi Of ways of thinking. Por, "if by positive institution the property of every man were equalised to-day, without a con temporary change in men's dispositions and sentiments, it would become unequal to-morrow" (PJ: VIII. iii). But the uniqueness of Godwin's society lies precisely in the fact that existing institutions, even evil ones, will not be at tacked directly. Instead, man will himself undergo a trans formation, such that institutions of an oppressive nature will be seen to be evil, will be despised accordingly, and will collapse. Bven a peaceful change in our society will be objected to, unless that change were something whose benefits the people had really come to understand, and whose institution they now earnestly desired (3L: 84). Godwin's society, brought into being neither by 215 legislative Intervention nor by revolutionary action, will conduct her affairs with her neighbors in a manner con sistent with her internal policy of non-violence. Thus, there is to be no interference in the domestic affairs of another country,^ and this policy is to be compromised only in the event of warfare. Non-violence in the areas of legislation and interna tional relations is also to be reflected in the morality of Godwin's anarchism. The principle of utility, devoid of all force and constraint, is that precept in terms of which this society is to conduct itself. The actual interpre tation given to the principle of utility by Godwin remains very uncertain, largely because of the Platonic influence in his thought. He insists that virtue is essentially so cial; he will not grant the name of virtue to "the true solitaire" (PJ: VII. ij. Thus, the greatest happiness of the greatest number is to be pursued by all the citizens, this principle having been followed perhaps by determina tion in the beginning, but later, either because of its essential truth bein£ perceived intuitively, or, because of its value having been verified through experience, it will then be an integral part of one's character, and will direct our actions accordingly. ^Norman, P., "A Godwin Pamphlet," London Times Literary aupplement. July 28, 1942, 367. Hereafter cited in text as Times. *42. 216 Godwin asst insist thst i u in a ststs of virtue is not ths sane as nan in s stats of Ties. Our sooiety is to bs founded on nan's character, not on his bshsTior ss such. Thus, as nan passts from a oondition of Tios to on# of ▼irtu# a change oust bs wrought in ths nan hisselfs not only is his oonduot ohanged* but his disposition! too, is altsrsd. "So Godwin, good and SYil ars intsmal oonditions as well as sztsmal faots" (SLi 71)* Bran ths social con trol that is praetiosd in Godwin's soeioty has as its ain ths regeneration of ths rsoipisnt's character rathsr than his notions only. It is only ths cultivated nan who is able to sss things as they ars (QMP» 113); it is only ths cul tivated nan whoa one can call aoral and soeially useful. Norality, though sooial in nature and purpose! sust be the result of individual Judgment. lndv although each nan will be guided by his individual reason* there will be no oonfliot because the rules of reason are universal and unvarying. Therefore, as the reason of eaoh individual beoones clearer and stronger* and as sen's interests serge towards identity, sen will draw oloser and oloser to uni- forsity of judgment and conduct.^ This* Godwin insists* is a true sorality* because it is founded on nan's true nature. It is not supported artificially by the isseral ^Preu, J., "Swift's Influenoe on Godwin's Doctrine of Anarchism," Journal of tj» History of Ideas* 13* June 1954 * 374* Hereafter oitedln texVas Preu. praotioa of preaisaa sad ooatraotas 217 Oonaral jvitloi, and antual latirtit, an found nor* oapabla of bind If m b , than aignaturaa and aaala • * * (22> ▼* zzil). Virtua, than, raaldaa in tha notiwa. It ia darirad, rainforoad and Juatifiad aooially. But Godwin doaa not oonnit hinaalf to tha idaa that tha notiwa alona ia wirtu- oua and lnportant. 1 t j duty ia to do whatawar doaa aa a ■attar of faot naka for tha ganaral happinaaa, not what I think will naka for it. Thna, oonaaquanoaa aa wall aa no- tiwaa oonatituta Morality in thia aooiaty. But, if conaa- quancaa ara lnportant, thay nuat ba oaloulatad prior to any notion. Giiwin of oouraa raaliaaa that it ia lnpoaaibla to naka a ooaplata calculation of tha hadonio oonaaquanoaa of aaoh and arary notion. And ha adnita that, awan in an idaal aooiaty, ganaral rulaa of eonduet oannot ba awoidad; ■oat of our ehoieaa nuat ba habitual. It ia for thia raaaon that all tha oitisana nuat raeogniia and undaratand tha inharant worth of tha graataat happinaaa prinoipla. For aueh a prinoipla to baeona habitual ia, though not totally daairabla, at laaat baarabla, for ona*a aotiona would at laaat ba oonaiatant with tha rulaa of juatioa awan if ha haa forgottan tha lattar'a foundation. If a daoiaion ia foroad upon a oitiaan in whioh a ehoiea nuat ba aada batwaan hinaalf and aooiaty, ha nay hawa to (and ahould) ohooaa in fawor of aooiaty* But wa 218 oanaot ramain aatlaflad with a aooiaty that praaanta aa vith a ohoioa. Qodvla doaa not, it oouraa, baliara that tha oltlsan ahoold aacrifioa hia ova valfara to that of "tha 8 tat a," oonoairad aa aoaathlng apart from tha indl- riduala ooapriaing It; hut ha did baliara that tha oitiaaa ahould aiak hia ova happiaaaa in tha graataat happiaaaa of tha graataat auabar COUP; 115). For tha lattar la tha only aura prlaolpla upoa vhioh a aooiaty oaa ba fouadad. To ooaproaiaa it la to rarart to agoiatio hadoaiaa aad ararioat What ara tha aaatiaaata in thia raapaot that ara alona worthy of a rational balng? Giro aa that, aad that only, vhioh without injuatica you cannot rafoaa. More than juatiea it would ba diagraeaful for aa to aak, and you to baatov (F£s VII. ix). lad Juatiea ia iapartial. Tha aorality of aaarohlaa inoludaa tha faaoua "four fraadoaaM of aodam daaooraoiaa, but with a diffaranoo. For, vharaaa in aoat aooiatiaa fraadoa of oonaoianoo and of tha praaa ara aaan aa "righta," aada axplioit and aup- portad by lava and by tha judiciary, thay aarra in anaroh- iaa aa tha indlapanaabla foundatlona of aorality, without baing obaourad aa lagaliaaa. Thay ara nalthar dirina nor iaalianabla, but ara juatifiad on tha baaia of thalr utility. Thalr ralua, aa that of raliglon, llaa in thair aoral taadanoy (££t VII. ii). Thara ia anothar, aora baaio, raaaoa why "righta” hiTi bo place 1b aairehint It is but s short stop from s resolution that bob srs free to "do as vs list" in obs arsa (or arsas) to obs in vhioh thsrs ars bo rsstrletiens what ever, slthsr legal or aoral. Shs tvs groat questions upon vhioh ths theory of gevernaent depends, arss Upon vhat foundation oan polltioal authority vith tho grsatsst pro- pristy root? and, Vhat ars ths considerations vhioh bind us to polltioal obsdienes (PJ: III* ri). Shs introduction of rights inpliss snsvsrs to both thsss questions vhioh ars unetabls and iaBoral* For polltioal authority rssts upon obligation, and obligation in turn rests upon duties* It does not rest upon rights* And Godwin believes that unless one uses ths tern "right" in an squivooal sense, ths vord amst bs taken to aean ths privlledge of arbitrarily ignor ing ths obligations of justice. Thus, thsrs is an all- eabraoing conception of the duties of nan, and this leaves no rooa for ths rights of nan: Vs have in reality nothing that is strictly speaking our own. Vs have nothing that has not a destination prescribed to it by ths ianutabls voios of reason and justices end respecting vhioh, if vs supersede that destination, ve do not entail upon ourselves a certain portion of guilt (|£: II. v). Vhat is called for is natural independence, a freedoa froa all constraint* Moral independence, on the other hand, is always injurious and alvays to be avoided (PJ: VIII. viii). 220 Bat although we have no aotlve righta, ve have a pae- aira right to tha non-lnterferenoe of otharat aaoh aaa haa hia ova aphara of discretion. further, our duty to aaaiat our neighbor oonfara a oorralatiTa benefit! But justice ia raoiprooal. If it ba just that I should oonfar a bsnsfit, it is just that aaothar should raosira it, and, if I withhold froa hia that to vhioh ha ia entitled, ha aay justly ooaplain and rioa versa (££: II. ii). So all tha doetrina of rights in tha polities! sansa ooaplataly disappears. Sha aoral laws prasoriba what duty tha individual owas his neighbors, and what duty thsy owa hia. lothing nora is naoassary or aorally dafanaiblat Duty ia that aoda of action on tha part of tha indi vidual, vhioh oonstitutas tha bast possibls applica tion of his oapaoity to tha ganaral bsnsf it (PJ: II. ii). Godwin haa told us that tha subjact of property is tha key-stone that coapletes tha fabrio of political justioe (PJ: VIII. i). And thus it is in his theory of anarohian. Perhaps novhara la thara lass agrsausnt aaong his historians than thara is on his traataant of property and eoonoalos generally. It has baan argued that Godwin's traataant of individual property is only an extension of his rigorous eritlolsas of all existing institutions, based on tha prinoipla of utility rather than on tha idea of abstract right (OPR: 208). Bat it has also boon aaintained that 221 Godwin's eoonomiea ara based upon ona consideration only— abetraot Justice (BPS: 175)* Again* it la suggested that Godwin's econood.cs war* merely a re-statement of Swift1 a Houyhnhnm prlnoiplaa (Prau: 378). But* parhapa tha interpretation given moat oftan to tha aoonoaloa of Godwin'a ldaal aooiaty la that vhioh suggests Godwin to have haan tha praouraor of aoolalism* or communism, or anarohlatlo oommunlan, or oqualitarlan communism. It ahould by now ba obTioua that Godwin'a aya- tam ia not ooanuniatlo in any regularly aooaptad moaning of tha word ainoa ha would have no common ownarahip and an abaoluta minimum of oooparation: Nan la a baing who can never ba an objeot of Juat approbation* any furthar than ha ia lndapandant (PJ; II. ▼)• And oooparation usually maana a compromise of both moral and intallaotual indapandanoa. So it aaama more truthful to agree that Godwin'a eyo- 96 tan ia "the axaot oppoaita of modern atata aoolalism." Nan ia not at hia happlaat whan ha ia involved in group projeots* for Godwin telle ua that "Home ia tha place where a man ia principally at aaaa (TOM: 101). Let thia aufflce to ahow that tha use of such terms as "sooiallst" or 9*lioholeon* J. S., "The British Socialists*• Cambridge Modern History, ad. A. V. Ward* e£ j^., 13 vola. (Maw Ion: Oambrldga University Press* 1911)« X* 779* in 92. 222 "coaaunlat" to daaoriba aithar Godwin or hia ayataa la arronaoua mad harmful. am la tha oaaa in aoat of hia thought, two prinoiplaa ara oparatira whila Godwin oonaldara tha aeononioa of hia aooiaty. Xhaaa ara ntllitarlaniaa on tha oaa hand, and a ▼araion of Platoniaa on tha othar. deploying both thaaa prinoiplaa ha ahowa how tha problan of tha "thraa dagraaa of pro party" will ba handlad in hia anarchian. tha firat fora of proparty ia that whioh la aora oon- duoira to ay own banafit or plaaaura than would haw# raoult- ad had tha pzoparty in quaation baan othanriaa apprapriatad (££: ▼III. 11). Shia dagraa of proparty ia oonaiatant with Godwin'a waraion of ut ill tarianiaa, and la tfaua to ba apptrowad and introduead into hia idaal aooiaty. Tha aaoond dagraa of proparty* or "tha aaplra to whioh awary nan ia antitlad owar tha produoo of hia own induatxy* •ran that of it tha uaa of whioh ought not to bo appropri- atad to hiaaalf," ia to ba aceaptad* but with cartaln ra- atrlctlona. for thia ia a nagatiwa* not a poaitlra right. Nanbara of an anarehiat aooiaty auat aooapt tha firat form of proparty aa fundaaantal, i.a.* "to aaoh aeeording to hia naada." Sha aaoond fora* "to aaoh according to hia labor*" auat alwaya giro way whan in conflict with tha firat fora. I poaaaaa tha right to tha produota of ay own labor only in tha aanaa that ay naighbora ara undar tha obligation nawar to forca aa by conatraint to dlapoaa in a cartain way 223 of tho products of ay Industry. Tor from ths point.of view of absolute right sio nothing belongs to no slone (PJ: VIII. 11). The third degree of property, that of capitalist, *a system, in whatever nsnner established, by whioh one asm enters Into the faculty of disposing of the produoe of another nan's industry," is in direct contradiction to the second. This last fora of property is iaaoral, and has no plaoe in our society. It Is not that Oodwin is unalterably opposed to the right of property; on the contrary! he warns us to approaoh the whole toplo carefully, and even speaks of the "sacredness of property." His point is not that private property should be abolished, but only the speoial Banner in whioh it has been utilised by and expressed through oapitalisn. The absence of capitalism is not to be equated with socialism; still less is it to be equated with the super-oapitalien one finds in, e.g., the Soviet Union. Thus, the end to be pursued is a society at one civi lised and equal!tarian, in which no one would be the owner either of the product of soneone else's labor or even of the product of his own toll, but in which everyone would enjoy the products of his own labor, in proportion to his needs (OPR: 217). Such a system would not be supported by law, but would be praoticed by the dtlsens of the society in a cheerful fashion, once they understood the worth of 224 their sjitni When tha lavs shall hs dearly understood, thslr excel lence universally apprehended, and thaaaalves saaa to ha oolaoldaat with aaeh nan's private aAianta|«, tha idaa of proparty la this sense will reaain, hut no aan will hawa tha laast desire, for pnrpasas of astantation or luxury, to posaass aora than hia neigh- hour <£[: II. ▼)• The naw syataa of proparty, than, will do aora than aaraly equalise aconoaio aooiaty. It will also out tha foundation frou undar luxurys If every oan could with parfaot facility obtain tha naeaaaarias of Ufa, and, obtaining than, faal no unaasy orawing aftar ita auparfluitiao, tanptatlon would looa ita powar (PJ: I. Hi). And: . . • a systaa of equality would raault in nan's re orientation: desires for wealth and greed would ha replaoed with a deaire for a sore Epicurean axiatanoa (££: VIII. ▼). On tha other hand, Godwin's soolaty ia not an aaoatio ana. Tha kind of aan wa should aim at produoing will need a good aany things that are beyond tha reach of tha poor. Bran if ha aata bread and cheese and drinks water (and God win does not say that ha will) ha will certainly want books, paintings, Musical instruments (GMP: 112). Tha essential point hare is that, whatever tha eoonoalo level, of our soolaty, no undue advantage will ba given to parties ular individuals. Any good fortune will ba a hared by all. 225 In tha vorld aa it it, luxury it to bo avoidad, bteautt it tddt to tht burdta of tht poor ond it inttporoblo froo inequality. But in on idtnl tooitty luxury, rtftrdod tiaply tt an additional aourot of ploaturt, it to bt ooaotndtd. Onoo tha axlating regime of unnatural intqualitj ia aboliahad, and a ayatan of aoononio aquality takes ita plaoa, tha naohinaa in our induatrial ayatan would have tha raault of enabling nan to do without lnduatrial co-opara tion, and tha division of labor whioh raaulta fron it— which enslaves and rapraaaaa tha individual intelligence (PJ: VIII. will) • And if tha labor naoaaaary for tha naintananoa of lifa wara "amicably dlwidad among tha whola, it would oooupy tha twantiath part of ovary nan'a tine." So lat ua: • • • oonputa tha indua try of a labouring aan angroaaaa tan houra in ovary day, whioh, whan wa hava daduotad hia houra for raat, raoraatlon and aaana, a tana an aaplt allowanoa. It followa that half an hour a day, auployad in aanual labour by ovary aaabar of tha con- nunity, would sufficiently aupply tha whola with naeaa- aarias (££: VIII. vlil). With tha vain and anpty plaaauraa gona (whioh required tha graat naaa of nankind to ahara an inordinata burdan of labor), thia praaant diatributlon of labor la auffleiant for our naada. Baaidaa tha aquitabla diatributlon of labor and for- tuna, our utilitarian norality ia axpaotad to apraad. With 226 the primary oauit of war out of tho way, and with othor nations practicing our 07ston of utility* wars will no long er bo noooosary. And if our offieialo neither receive nor can anticipate financial reward for their servloes* this* in conjunction with the abolition of foreign wars* will aean the virtual extinction of taxes: If we had neither foreign wars nor donestio stipends* taxation would be alaoot unknown; and* if we had no taxes to eolleet* we should want no clerks to keep an account of then YI. ix). And with less taxation* all our resources could be turned upon our pressing probleas at hone. For our sooiety is one of progress* in the field of social institutions as well as in the sphere of nan's character. And because we are eoanitted to progress* the benefits of science will be utilised to their utmost. Already we can look upon marvelous Inventions* devices whioh liberate aan and his potentials. And this is the wave of the future. Where will this progress stop? At present suoh inventions alara the labouring part of the oonaunity; and they aay be productive of tem porary distress* though they oonduoe in the eequal sio to the aost Important interests of their multi tude. But in a state of equal labour their utility will be open to no dispute. Hereafter it is by no means clear that the aost extensive operations will not be within the reaeh of one aan; or* to make use of a familiar instance* that a plough nay not be turned into a field* and perform its of floe without the need of superintendence. It was in this sense that the celebrated Tranklyn conjectured that alnd would one day beooae omnipotent over matter . . . 227 lad in tht futurt a tat# vhxoh our aociatj la htadad towards, thtra will ba a ooiaoidtnot batvaaa tha gradual lnoraaat of ooaaoioua function*, and aa lncraaaa la laiaura to anjoj auehs Nat tar, or, to apaak mara aoourataly, tha oartala aad uaraaittiag lava of tha uaiTtraa, will ba tha flalota of tha pariod va ara ooataaplatlng (PJ» Till, iz). Thua did Godwin's aaarohiaa graat tha world. Chapter I? SUIDUHT AID 0R1TICI8NS a. fnrn In the Introduction the purpose and plan of this diaaartation vaa atatad. There it was pointod out that* though tha ralation batvaan a philosopher*a political theory and hia theory of huaan nature haa long bean reoognised* no original work deeigned to axplieata Godwin'a philoeophy of nan haa been attanptad. thus* a prinary purpoae of thia diaaartation waa to ahow what Godwin oonoaiwad huaan nature to bo* and how thia conception of aan affooted hia aoral and politieal philosophy. In addition* tha thaaia waa conaidered to tha affect that Godwin'a theory of aan ia not only iaportant, but la paraaount for hia ayataa. Once hia philoaoptay of huaan nature had bean formulated* hia aoral and political ideas could ba deduced froa tha former. It waa for tha foregoing raaaona that Chapter I waa exten sive and detailed. In tha first chapter Godwin's theory of huaan nature was foraulated. (His theory of aan was preceded by a dis cussion of hia aetaphyaical postulate of deterainlsa* upon which hia doetrine of aan rested). Aa the first aajor 228 229 division of hia theory of aan, Godwin's epioteaology was considered. The rolo whioh eapiriolsm played in tho devel opment of Godwin's epiatemology vns discussed, and it was shown that ho believed hiasolf to ho continuing tho epiete- aologloal tradition of tho British Bapirioists. Godwin sidos with Looks in his rejection of innato idoao, and argues that all our knowlodgo is aonsual in nature. Bo is a bit hositant to follow Looks in tho letter's rejection of tho notion of inborn disposition* although Godwin affirms with Looks that tho theory of instincts is unnecessary and untenable. Thus far* Godwin's episteaology boars tho appearance of sensationalism. After tho discussion of empiricism and aoasatiomalisn* Godwin's use and modifioatlon of tho thoory of tho associ ation of ideas (as derived from Looks and Hartley) was considered. The particular appeal which this theory had for Godwin was stressed* in that it (i) explained the moral development of man in a consistent and thorough-going fashion* and (li) provided Godwin with a theory consistent with his metaphysical determinism. Godwin is not prepared to employ assoclatlonism consistently* for its implications are a mechanistic, materialistic picture of aan. Godwin's rationalism was next considered. Eero the first truly notioeable inconsistencies in his thought ap pear. Tor* though he has affirmed determinism and denied free will* hio true position is really that of a proponent 230 of freedom of oholoo. Again, hio employment of tho thoorloo of oonootloBollOB and aseoeiationlaa I o o t o o no legitim ate plooo In hio opiot•oology fo r o roflootiT« typo of under- otonding. Sho Platonic influence on Godwin'o thought waa next considered. Here it vaa shown that Godwin does indeed em- ploy the notion that reason lo a faculty superior to the senses, that it has access to knowledge qualitatively superior to that which the senses can know, and that ouch knowledge ocours in a direct, intuitive Banner. It vaa further shown that Godwin needs just this sort of knovlsdge and knover thereof in order to satisfy his larger picture of aan, and the aoral ends of the latter which Godwin con ceives. The place and function of the "aoral sense" vaa the next subject discussed. It vaa iuggested that Godwin's debt here is niniaal, for his position on the question of that fhich judges of the worth of approbation is closer to that of Price and other rationalists, the aoral sense, aa a faculty separate froa other senses, seeas to Godwin to serve no useful purpose. The topio of Godwin's use of the term "prejudice" waa next considered, and it vaa suggested that this ooneopt is the aost iaportant one in his theory of knowledge. "Prejudioe" means a pre-ooncelved idea, the grounds for whioh have either (1) been forgotten, or (11) hav# never 251 been known. A prejudice ineinuatea iteelf between tho individual and reality, dletortlng and preventing tho IndlTldnal froa knowing tho world aa It ia. A eorrolatiTo of tho dootrlno of prejudice ia that of impartiality. It waa pointod out that thia prinoiplo ia both an opiatonologieal and a aoral ono for Godwin; for on# who aota in accordance with it will both know and do tho good. Sho prinoiplo of impartiality ia implicit in roaaon, and atrivea to aaaort itaolf. Thua, roaaon ahrinka froa oontradiotion and falaity. ▲ final diaeuaaion undar tho hooding "Godwin'a eplote- mology" oonoomod itaolf with tha raapootiY# plaooa and oporationa of roaaon and fooling in knowing. It waa pointod out that, contrary to oartain conaantatora, Godwin dooa not atraaa roaaon to tho ozoluaion of foaling. On tho con trary, tho noat daairabla typo of knowing ia that in whioh roaaon and oaotion ara intarainglad and fuaod. Vezt, a troataant of Godwin'a thoughta on aan'a aotivea waa giran. It waa pointed out that motivation and epiete- aology ara inaoparablo only for purpoaaa of analyaias thoy ara navor oonaidarad aeparately by Godwin. Godwin'a conception of voluntary, involuntary, and indirect voluntary aetiona ware treated of nazt. Hare it vaa ahown that Godwin'a uae of tha tarn "voluntary* ia deliberate, and plaoea hia in tha camp of free will advo- oataa. Hia view vaa that aan*a voluntary aetiona originate 232 in hia opinions• Thus, to reform nan it is neoessary to ass that ha possassas tha doairable opinions. Tha oonnao- tion between prejudice and indiraot voluntary action was disoussod, tha lattar nanifeating itself in tha Torn of non-reflooting and habitual behavior. Tha rola and iapaot of psyohologloal hadonisa and self- lora wara nazt disoussad. it tiaas Godwin appears to ba a whole-hearted adwooate of hadonisa (as is attested to by his utilization of assoeiationisa), but this la aora appar ent than real, for ha realizes that if nan auat act only so as to inorease his own pleasure or eonfort an objective morality is impossible. His final position on this subject is one that finds egoism transcending itself. Tha disoussion of psychological hadonisa was followed by an examination of Godwin's resulting position on tha former, viz., tna natural goodness of aan. Though often misquoted and poorly understood, Godwin's belief in nan's natural goodness is really nothing more than a belief that disinterestedness U*o., altruism) is possible. It has nothing whatever to do vita the existenoe or extent of evil, or of nan's production thereof. Chapter Z closed with a discussion of Godwin's aost fanous prinoiplo, i.e., that of human perfectibility. It was pointed out that this tern means neither psrfeot nor perfectible. On the contrary, he is convinced that the two latter terns stand in direct opposition to uhat he meant by 233 nan'* perfectibility. In general, his thesis here is that prograss (in tht fora of s grsatar and grtatar oonsolous control of behavior) is possibla, and that to rula it out aa hopelessly optiaistio is dognatio and hindering. Chaptar IX oonotrntd itsalf with Godwin's traataant of political institutions. In this ha was following Montesquieu, for tha lattar also oonsidtrod that institu tions fora opinion and oharaoter. Godwin is of tho opinion that thsrs ia a natural and necessary basis for aan's social rslations. Originally, aan gatharad togathar because of tha bsnsfieial results such an arrangement offered. Because of the perversion of a few, it was necessary that means for controlling behavior and enforcing group opinion should cone about. But theee artificial contrivances have worked thus far to nan's disadvantage, oppressing and stifling him rather than helping to liberate hia. Hext, a general discussion of the effects of political institutions occurred. Godwin telle us that by their very nature political inatitutiona are evil, for they insinuate theaselves into the daily lives of every oitisen. Their influence includes the lnculoation of ideas and unreasonable sentiments into the populace. Thus, all governaents are repressive. In the past political institutions have been insepa rable froa war, Godwin tells us. these ooatrivaneas, 234 themselves uawiioMblt, fares the citieanry Into unreason able acts of brutality and atrocity in tha naa# of atate- oonoeived ay tha* Thus, without lorinumit, thara would ba bo warfare. Of all foraa of government, nona la aora offaaalTa than aonarohy. For thia fora of government ia baaad upon tha prapoataroua idaa that wiadoa and aorality ara oonoen- tratad in ana aan and, in tha haraditary version of king- ahipa, it ia aaauaad that aueh qualities follow ganatlo lava of tranaaiaaion. Monarchies ara founded on foroa, and on tha idaa that tha aaaaaa ara lnoapabla of governing them selves. Godwin will aooapt naithar of thaaa ldaaa. Chough auparior to aonarchiaa, national aaaaabliaa ara objectionable to Godwin too. Dabata and dlaouaalon ara foatarad and praotioad hara, but thay auat ba terminated in a vote. But Godwin bolievea that voting daprlvaa discus- aion of whatever value it night have poaaaaaad, for voting really ueana a falaa and unnatural unanimity, a ayatan in whioh tha dietatea of one'a conscience have to ba ooapre- aiaed. igain, national aaaaabliaa ara ineffectual, and tend to ganarata party ayatana. She latter ara an evil in thanaalvaa, for their reault ia internecine warfare, and attention payed to one*a supporters rather than to tha merit of tha issue at hand. Godwin'a arguments against national aaaaabliaa ara based on tha conviction that majority rule la immoral. In 235 addition to tho false uhaniaity aontionod above* majority rolo rosto on tho fallaey that tho nxaahor of Totarioo will, if ouffioiont, oroato truth. But truth oimply ii, and ia changed noithor by legislation nor by a plurality of votes. Constitutions, oontraoto and proaioos aro all repudi- atod by Godwin. All of thooo imply peraanenoe* but tho naturo of aan io ono of flux and ohange. Thuo, a oonstitu- tion that oxproooly prohibito radical ohanges io in diroot oppooition to huaan naturo. Again* boeauao ono agroos to abido by a certain ruling* is ho forbidden to change hia aind and behavior vith tho acquioition of aoro faoto and oxporionoo? Pronieee aitigate against* rather than for* programs. Godwin io absolutely opposed to tho doctrine of in alienable or divine righto. 3ueh a oyotoa suggests that ono has tho freedom to arbitrarily disregard tho preoepts of justioe and bonovolonoo in tho name of self-interest. Godwin sees that the idea of righto conflicts with that of aajority welfare, and choosee in favor of the latter. Godwin next oritioises the notion of law. Law is in adequate* for it triee to subsume the infinity of huaan aotione under a few limited categories. In order to make up for this deficiency* law has to be multiplied to infinity. In the process the individual involved is seen as an in stance of a generalisation* rather than as he is. Thus* our legal systeas are networks of prejudices. 236 Itxt, the topio of pHBiihuat m considered. Punish* sent li barbarous and ineffeotual, and runs oountsr to tht oonstitution of nan. Ons doss not ohange bp punishasnt but bj example. Thus, punlshnsnt for rstribution or for ths oaks of soelety is rejected by Godwin. What was said about punishasnt appliss squally to all fores. Ons loams ths truth whsn hs is plaosd in ths propsr position, and fores cannot aid in this positioning. It is to bs avoided. Ths prinoiplo of inpartiality as an ethioal prsospt was next discussed. Governments are unalterably opposed to ths practice of impartiality, for, if people were governed by this principle, there would be no need for governments. As they resist Impartiality, so, too, are governments designed to preolude equality. The very o.oncept of govern ment implies at least two olasses— the governed and ths governing. But true no rail ty is possible only where equali ty is praotieed. And man's true potentials are realised only when he is moral. Thus, governments, by resisting equality, resist morality and man's development. The next major institution to be eriticisod by Godwin was the economic bases of hio time. They were found to be based on luxury, which is inseparable from inequality. For « . in order for a small, seleot group to live lavishly it is neoeseary that the masses live in poverty. Thus, equality is possible only if the distribution of fortune is more 257 just. And ths idea that free-enterprise, based on self- interest, la ths moot dsslrabls fora of soononj Is shown to bs falss. Finally, Godwin shows that ths systsa of pro- psrty praotlesd in a given soeisty is dspsndsnt upon ths government in powsr. Bduoation undsr prsssnt governnente is aors a praotios of propaganda than of psdagogy. Ths stats instills esrtaln idsas and ssntiasnts in ths alnds of ths youth, and eduoa- tion is its rshlols. Ths tsaehsrs ars, psrhape nconsolous- ly, oaptlTss of this gOTsmasnt prijudics also. Ths prsssnt praotios of aarriage should bs abolishsd, according to Godwin, it is unreasonable and repressive, and expects two persons to live together for all their lives even though their desires nay bs far froa identleai. Marriage is another source of prejudice. The final institution discussed in the third chapter vaa religion. Godwin's ideas on this subject are not altogether olear, but he appears to make religion subser vient to aan, and sees it (as usually praoticed) as a systsa of hypoority and oppression, togaa, rather than reflection, is the essenoe of religion. In Chapter III an atteapt was aade to desoribe Godwin's "ideal society." His stateaents here are Halted, and ara distributed throughout all his writings. It began with a disousslon of the distinction between "anarchy" and 258 "anarohian.” It waa pointad out that tho foraar* a aooiaty in vhioh thara would ba no dutloa or raaponalbllitiaa* la aa rapugnant to Godwin aa any daapotlaa. Hia "well- oonoairad aooiaty without govarnaant" la ono in whioh tha oitiaana would ba bound ad by dutloa« and in whioh lleanao would bo totally abaant. Thia vaa followed by a rathar lengthy diaouaalon of tha aoolal atruotura of Godwin'a anarohian. Thia aohaaa Involved aaall* a elf-governing coaaunitieo* tha naabara of whioh would know aaoh othar intinataly. Thara would ba frequent aeetings and diaouaalon* but no aora co-oparation than ia abaolutaly neceeeary. . Godwin aaaa eooparation aa tha baaia of nany prejudicea* or ataraotypaa of thought. Tha labour in thia aooiaty would ba diatributad equitably* ao aa to allow a aarlaua aaount of tlaa for lauaura and adueation. Work would ba dona by indapandant craft naan* ao aa to oaxlaisa ona'a Iowa forhie work. Punishment would ba raplaoad by auggaatlon and coauant froa ona'a nalghbora. Offandara would ba haard by a jury of thalr paara, who know thaa intinataly. Ihua* law would ba abaant. Tha govaraaant in Godwin'a aooiaty would ba aimlnal* with naithar lagialativa nor executive powar. Tha judici ary would ba totally abaant. Gowaraaant officiala would ba aaalgnad poaitiona for abort* taaporazy parioda» and would raealva no pay for thalr aarvloaa • Ihay would ba 239 bound by the principles of impartiality end utility. the normlity of anarchies would be one of utility, with the proriso that the individual has a sphere of acti vity over whioh he alone is sovereign. His actions, how ever, would be consistent with the principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number. There would be no active rights In an anarchist soci ety. Only passive rights would exist I such as the right to the assistance of one's neighbor, and to his non-inter ference). Passive rights are insisted upon because they are inseparable froa duties, upon whioh any Just society must be founded. — The economies of anarchism would be governed by the principle of utility. There would be no common ownership of property or of the means of production, but each person would be obligated to supply his neighbor with goods on the basis of the letter's needs. Private property would thus be retained, but, as mentioned, it would be subservi ent to the greatest happiness principle. Capitalism msy or may not be practiced, depending on its aoral effects. B. Criticisms. Because there has been an attempt made throughout this paper to be oritieal as the explication of Godwin's thoughts proceeded, this section can be short. 240 Oodvin'a thought* are guided froa the outaet by a aoral picture of aan i and by tho idoaa vhioh vore prevalent during tho tiao la vhioh ho lirod. fheae tvo faotora explain, I bolioro, tho incoaoiotonoioo in Oodvin'a oyotoa. Concerning tho lattor footor, that boeauoo of vhioh Oodvin io "culture bound,H it oan bo oaid that ho found it iaposaiblo to apeak in any language othor than that of tho oapirioiot poyohologiot and tho utilitarian aoraliot. On tho ono hand, ho aoooptod tho ooneoption of tho univeroo aa a eloaod cauaal ayatoa in vhioh nan ia an integral and related part, and vrote within thia fraaevork. On tho other hand, ho aoooptod tho prinoiplo that benevolence io noooaaary if a aoral and juat aooiaty io to bo poeaiblo, and thua aoooptod tho prinoiplo of tho groatoat happineaa of tho groatoat nuabor aa a paraaount precept. Again, hio intoroat in and knovledge of tho payohologloal writing! of hia tiao oatabliohod a vocabulary and roaorvolr of idoaa ho could not overlook. And thia lattor influence, eepecial- ly tho dootrino of tho aaaociation of idoaa, vaa aulted adairably aa tho aoana for explaining botn nan*a fallen atato, and tho poaoioiiity of nia rebirth, for, if ono atatoa that nan1a voluntary aetiona originate in hio opini- ona, and alao that tho development of theae opiniona follov lava vhioh oan bo known, it follow that tho way io pointod for tho alteration of nan'o opiniona and, therefore, of hie aetiona. 241 But there is another factor to consider. Morality must have a foundation, and this foundation oust ha other than tha lavs of association and psychological hadonisa. Othervise, all normative statements are meaningless. Thus, the foundation for morality must be objective and unchang ing. It is for this reason that Oodvin employs his version of Platonism, for the latter guarantees sueh a system of morality. Unfortunately, the introduction of absolute ideals and lavs of immutable reason are inconsistent vith a thorough going application of the principle of the association of ideas. For the notion of assoeiationism is tied to the belief that all our ideas originate in the senses, either primarily or secondarily (i.e., through sensation or reflec tion). And this is a universal explanation for the origin and development of ideas. It leaves no plaoe for an intuiting, immediately-perceiving reason. But it also makes the association of ideas purely factitious, including moral ideas. Consequently, sensationalism and assoeiation- ism alone seem to demand a moral relativism. But this is quite unacceptable to Oodvin. Thus, his attempt to correct it by the addition of Platonism and absolute values; and, the introduction of inconsistencies. got only does Oodvin introduce an illegitimate source of ideas; he also brings in an unjustifiable function of reason. Por, instead of simply being the mechanism vhioh 242 associationisa demands, reason, in Oodvin'a bands, baoonas an inherently compulsive faculty, striving aftar truth bj ita own lntamal necessity. Tha prinolpla of impartiality, upon vhioh hia morality and politioal philoaophy xaata, ia derived from thia praaumad aotivity of raaaon. Tha impli- oitnaaa of tha prinolpla of impartiality in raaaon is tha foundation upon vhioh all hopa for progress roots. Thus, vlth tha raotriotion of tha activities of raaaon (vhioh assooiatlonism would damand) goao Oodvin'a athio. But on tha question of hia athio thara ia also oonsid- arabla doubt concerning ita consistency; for va have aaan that Oodvin holds several absolute values, other than that of tha greatest happiness prinolpla (e.g., tha lntrinslo vorth of the individual, truth as such). But thara is neither tha need nor tha opportunity for tha introduction of thaaa if one aooapta utilitarianism without equivocation. And Oodvin viahaa to maintain both seta of values simulta neously. Again, on tha subject of hia moral and politioal phi losophy, it would appear that Oodvin doaa not lay tha pro per groundwork for assarting tha supreme oy of tha theory of utility (even if ha did not attempt to add other supreme values, vhioh ha does); for one must ask tha question, Vhy should tha principle of tha greatest happiness for tha greatest number of people demand mj support? To this question Oodvin gives two separata answers, not logically 243 oonn*ct*d. On th* on* hand, h* atttapta to "prow#" th* truth of thl* prinelpl* on th* bool* of th* *truotur* of ■an'* aind, 1.*., through psychological h*donl*a. But it i* certainly iUieit to argu* from th* fnotunllj tru* atat*- ■*nt "All n*n d**lr* plaaaur*” (assuming it i* tru*) to th* nomatir* *tat*a*nt, "All n*n should purau* pl*a*ur*. ” Th* a*oond aiaply do** not follov froa th* firat. P*rhapa in aanaing that h*donisn oan n*v*r g*n*rat* thia noraatiT* principl*, and that obligation ia iapoaaibl* on ground* of a*lf-int*r*at alon*9 Oodvin introduo** th* notion of a a*lf-*vid*nt utilitarian prinoipl*, known intu it irely. But h* than ohang** hia fi*ld again by aaying that not only ia thia prinoipl* known iaa*dlat*ly, but it ia justified through *zp*rl*ne*. If th* prinoipl* ia tru* (aa it auat b* on hia intuit It* grounda), th* value d*riv*d froa it ia irrelevant. On th* oth*r hand, if it oan b* ▼*rifi*d or confirmed *aplrioally, th*r* i* no point in arguing that it ia known intuitiv*ly. Th* two arguments ar* not only quit* aaparat*, but art, it would a**a, d*atruotiT* of on* anoth*r. It ia thia doubl* train of thought whioh runa through Oodvin'a writing* that involves hia in hia difficulties. H* vanta to r*aain abaolut*ly *apirioal in hia a*thod, and y*t h* demands nil** of justic* and aorality that transocnd tin* and apae*. 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Asset Metadata

Creator Thomas, James Andrew (author)

Core Title The Philosophical Anarchism Of William Godwin: His Philosophy Of Man, State And Society

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Philosophy

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,Philosophy

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Werkmeister, William H. (committee chair), [Hadwen] (committee member), Long, Wilbur H. (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-346540

Unique identifier UC11359110

Identifier 6413511.pdf (filename),usctheses-c18-346540 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 6413511.pdf

Dmrecord 346540

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Thomas, James Andrew

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA