University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

The 1961 Mayoralty Election In Los Angeles: The Political Party In A Nonpartisan Election

(USC Thesis Other)

The 1961 Mayoralty Election In Los Angeles: The Political Party In A Nonpartisan Election

PDF

Download a page range

Download transcript

Copy asset link

Request this asset

Transcript (if available)

Content This dissertation has been 64-5159 m icrofilm ed exactly a s received MAYO, C harles G eorge, 1931- THE 1961 MAYORALTY ELECTION IN LOS ANGELES: THE,POLITICAL PARTY IN A NON- PARTISAN ELECTION. U niversity of Southern California, Ph. D ., 1963 P olitical Science, general U niversity M icrofilm s, Inc., A nn A rbor, M ichigan THE 1961 MAYORALTY ELECTION IN LOS ANGELES THE POLITICAL PARTY IN A NONPARTISAN ELECTION by Charles George Kayo A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Political Science) January 1963 UN IV ERSITY O F S O U T H E R N C A L IFO R N IA G R A D U A T E S C H O O L U N IV E R S IT Y P A R K L O S A N O E L E S 7 . C A L IF O R N IA This dissertation, written by CHARLES GEORGE MATO ........................ 't.............................................................................. under the direction of his.....Dissertation Com mittee, and approved by ‘ all its members, has been presented to and accepted by the Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of D O C T O R O F P H I L O S O P H Y ..... Date ........... DISSERTATION. COMMITTEE Chairman C L . Rcdu. PLEASE NOTE* Plates and maps are not original copy. These pages tend to "curl". Filmed in the best possible way. UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS, INC TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF TABLES....................................... Iv LIST OF MAPS......................................... vi LIST OF PLATES....................................... vii Chapter I. INTRODUCTION ................................ 1 Objective of the Study Research Methodology Source Materials II. THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT OF LOS ANGELES . . 13 The Geographic Characteristics of Los Angeles The Demographic Characteristics of Los Angeles The Institutional Aspects of Politics in Los Angeles Nonpartisan Elections and the Local Political Process Political Campaigning in Los Angeles The Political History of Twentieth Century Los Angeles III. THE 1961 MAYORALTY ELECTION: AN OVERVIEW . . 61 The Candidates - Norris Poulson Samuel W. Yorty Other candidates ii Chapter Page The Primary Election Campaign The General Election Campaign Campaign Organization and Strategy The Poulson organization The Yorty organization The McGee organization Mass Media in the Election Newspapers Television and radio Campaign Finance The Poulson campaign The Yorty campaign The McGee campaign IV. THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE ELECTION..................................... 145 The Republican Party The Democratic Party V. VOTING BEHAVIOR IN THE 1961 MAYORALTY ELECTION..................................... 164 Public Opinion Polls Post-primary election survey Post-general election survey Political Alienation and the Election VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 193 « BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . ! ................................ 207 APPENDIX A. Community Newspaper Survey ............ 218 APPENDIX B. Newspapers Included in Survey of Candidate Endorsements ............... 220 APPENDIX C. "Flip, Flop, Flip, with Sam Yorty" . . 225 ill LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Population Growth by Statistical Areas— City of Los Angeles, 1930 to 1 9 6 1 .... 18 2. Endorsement of Poulson and Yorty by Los Angeles Newspapers................ 118 3. Helpful Sources of Information, by Candidate Voted f o r .................. 135 4. Source of Information Most Helpful, by Candidate Voted f o r .................. 136 5. Effectiveness of Radio, Television, or Newspapers in Winning Votes, by Candidate Voted f o r .................. 137 6. Effectiveness of Radio, Television, or Newspapers in Winning Votes, by Area .... 138 7. Voting Intentions for Mayor, by Registra tion, Sex, and Voting Behavior in Primary Election ................. ..... 166 8. Voting Intentions for Mayor, by Area........ 168 9. Voting in the General Election, by Area . . . 173 10. Voting in the General Election, by Race, Age, and Years Lived in Los Angeles .... 174 11. Voting in the General Election, by Standard of Living, Registration, and Labor Union Affiliation................................ 175 Table Page 12. Voting in the General Election, by Occupation.................................. 176 13. Reasons Given for Voting for Poulson ........ 177 14. Most Influential Factor in Decision to Vote for Poulson............................ 178 15. Reasons Given for Voting for Yorty.......... 179 « 16. Most Influential Factor in Decision to Vote for Yorty.............................. 180 17. When Decision to Vote for Poulson or Yorty Was Made.............................. 182 v LIST OF MAPS Map Page I. Communities of the City of Los Angeles .... 15 II. Population Distribution, City of Los Angeles, April 1, 1960 ............ ..... 21 III. Population, Los Angeles City: Percentage Change by Communities, 1950 to 1960 ............................. . 24 vi LIST OF PLATES Plate Page I. First Edition of Los Angeles Democrat .... 152 II. Second Edition of Los Angeles Democrat .... 156 III. Letter to Democrats.......................... 161 vii CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION On May 31, 1961, after two terms as mayor of Los Angeles, Norris Poulson was defeated in his bid for re-election. The victor, Samuel W. Yorty, won the election the hard way, having been opposed by all the Los Angeles daily newspapers and, unofficially, by his own political party. Earlier, on April 4, Yorty had earned the right to run against Poulson in the general election by garnering more votes than any of the seven other candidates entered in the primary contest. Poulson, while not an exception ally popular mayor, had nonetheless kept his political fences so well mended that his defeat surprised even impartial observers. A number of explanations for Yorty’s victory have been advanced by political scientists, journalists, and the candidates themselves. Some persons attribute his success to the support of minority groups , particularly Negroes and Mexican-Americans, which were protesting against alleged police brutality and discrimination under the Poulson administration. Others find the cause of his victory in a heavy suburban vote which reflected dissatis faction with the way in which the city had met the needs of the sprawling San Fernando Valley and its burgeoning population. Still others hypothesize that the basis for Yorty's victory lay in the fact that the identification of Democrats with the Democratic party was so strong that even the Democratic party was unable to divert support to a Republican. Certain characteristics of the election have also led to speculation that alienation was a factor favoring Yorty. This hypothesis finds support among those who see an analogy between the 1961 mayoralty election in Los Angeles and the 1959 mayoralty election in Boston as described in The Alienated Voter.^ Another explanation advanced is that Yorty owed his victory to his adroit use of television and to the support of community newspapers. Hfurray B. Levin, The Alienated Voter (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960). Objective of the Study The purpose of this study is to examine each of these hypotheses and to provide as complete a picture, as possible of the campaigns of Yorty and Poulson. In addition, attention is focused upon an unusual aspect of the 1961 mayoralty election in Los Angeles: The fact that the Democratic party found itself in the anomalous position of opposing the election of a Democrat who was running against a Republican in a nonpartisan contest. Important questions to which answers are sought in this study are, therefore: How did the Democratic party attempt to achieve its ends? Was it able to accomplish them without violating the legal tenets of nonpartisanship and without offending the nonpartisan expectations of the Los Angeles voters? Research Methodology Several differing but complementary research methods were employed to obtain the information for the study. The libraries of the Los Angeles Times and the Mirror, which maintain clipping services, were searched for general background information about the election. The Examiner and the Herald & Express , both daily papers published by the Hearst Publishing Company, did not have files which were available for use by the public. In the case of these two newspapers, the microfilm records of the 2 Los Angeles Public Library were consulted. To ascertain the editorial support and endorsement given the candidates by the community newspapers of Los Angeles , a questionnaire was prepared that was mailed to the editors of each of the papers. See Appendix A for copy of questionnaire and Appendix B for list of newspapers to which it was sent. Telephone calls and personal visits were used to obtain information regarding community news- % papers which did-not answer the questionnaire. Statistical information regarding voting behavior in the election was obtained from two Facts Consolidated public opinion polls , one undertaken in the period between the primary and the general election and the other shortly after the general election. Data on the role of the mass media were also obtained from these surveys. ^The Los Angeles Examiner ceased publication in January, 1962 , and was merged with the Herald & Express to form the Herald-Examiner. The Mirror also ceased publication at this time and was merged with the Los Angeles Times. 5 Interviews were conducted with Norris Poulson, Samuel W. Yorty, and persons who were prominent in their campaigns. In addition, the campaign receipt and expendi ture statements filed with the county registrar of voters by the candidates and their campaign committees were consulted. Source Materials The literature pertaining specifically to the pol itics of Los Angeles is extremely limited in both quantity and quality. A useful but inadequately documented study is Wilson's A Report on Politics in Los Angeles. a publication of the Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University. "Labor \ Unions in Los Angeles Politics by Baisden, traces the development of labor union activity in the political arena but is largely historical in its treatment.^ Lane's 3 James Q. Wilson, A Report on Politics in Los Angeles (Cambridge: Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard Univer sity, 1959). See also Wilson's more recent work, The Amateur Democrat (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), for information regarding the Democratic club movement in California. A Richard Norman Baisden, Labor Unions in Los Angeles Politics" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1958). 6 Master's thesis, written at the University of Southern California in 1954, is a study of the political campaigns of Mayor Fletcher Bowron.^ A number of journalistic, undocumented analyses of Los Angeles politics have also been written. Finney's Angel City in Turmoil deals with the events which led to £ the recall of Mayor Frank Shaw, and Blake's You Wear the Big Shoe discusses, in a satirical vein, the 1945 mayoralty election.^ "Politics in Paradise," a chapter in Nadeau's Los Angeles: From Mission to Modern City, provides a colorful picture of campaigning and politics in Los Angeles .® Two publications of the Bureau of Governmental Research of the University of California at Los Angeles are ^Robert Gerhart Lane, "The Administration of Fletcher Bowron as Mayor of the City of Los Angeles" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Southern California, 1954). ®Guy W. Finney, Angel City in Turmoil (Los Angeles: American Press, 1945). ^Aldrich Blake, You Wear the Big Shoe (Los Angeles: Aldrich Blake, 1945). g Remi Nadeau, Los Angeles: From Mission to Modern City (New York: Longmans, Green, 1960). Q of particular value. How the Cities Grew describes the growth of metropolitan Los Angeles through annexation and suburbs, and Voting Behavior in the Forty-Five Cities of Los Angeles County is a compendium of election statistics.^ The John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation has also supported research on a number of governmental prob lems which have beset Los Angeles and neighboring communities. For statistical information regarding the San Fernando Valley, one of the most fruitful sources is The Growth and Economic Stature of the San Fernando Valley. 1 1 prepared by the Security First National Bank. The quarterly Population Estimate reports published by the City Planning Commission of Los Angeles provide statistics on population change che city as a whole. Anderson's g ^Richard Bigger and James D. Kitchen, How the Cities Grew (Los Angeles: Bureau of Governmental Research, University of California, Los Angeles, 1952). ^Lawrence 01Rourke, Voting Behavior in the Forty- Five Cities of Los Angeles County (Los Angeles: Bureau of Governmental Research, University of California, Los Angeles, 1953). ^Security First National Bank, Research Depart ment , The Growth and Economic Stature of the San Fernando Valley (Los Angeles, 1960). "Bibliography on California Politics" is the only compre hensive listing of materials relating to California politics and contains citations of publications of interest 12 to persons studying local politics in California. In recent years political scientists have exhibited considerable interest in urban government and politics. Two collections of articles originally published in the professional journals which are convenient sources of information on this subject are Banfield's Urban Govern- 13 ment and Williams and Press' Democracy in Urban America.^ The literature on the nonpartisan election process is not extensive but contains some valuable works, most important among them being Lee's The Politics of Nonpar tisanship . a study of nonpartisan elections in six small 12 Totton J. Anderson, "Bibliography on California Politics," in Frank H. Jonas, editor, Bibliography on Western Politics . Supplement to Western Political Quarterly, XI (December, 1958), 23-51. 13 Edward C. Banfield, ed., Urban Government: A Reader in Politics and Administration (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961). ^Oliver P. Williams and Charles Press, eds., Democracy in Urban America: Readings on Government and Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1961). California cities.^ Harder's Eagleton Foundation case- study of the 1957 municipal election in Wichita, Kansas, is also useful.^ Adrian has developed a typology for nonpartisan elections which provides a theoretical frame work upon which analyses of nonpartisan elections can be based.^ It is to the sociologists that one must turn for studies of the demographic and ecological facets of Los Angeles. The Population Research Laboratory of the Univer sity of Southern California, with financial support from the Haynes Foundation, is at present conducting research on residential mobility in Los Angeles and Orange counties. One phase of this research, directed by the Department of Political Science at the University, is a study of the relationship between residential mobility and voting ^Eugene C. Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960). ^^Marvin A. Harder, Nonpartisan Election: A Political Illusion? (New York: Holt, 1958). ^Charles R. Adrian, "Some General Characteristics of Nonpartisan Elections ," American Political Science Review, XLVI (September, 1952), 766-776. For an updating of this study, see Charles R. Adrian, "A Typology for Nonpartisan Elections," Western Political Quarterly. XII (June, 1959), 449-458. 10 behavior. A series of reports is being prepared as the research progresses.*- ® Pioneering research on the social areas of Los l Angeles has been reported in the writings of Shevky and 19 Williams. Much useful Information is found in a seminar paper written at the University of Southern California in which a number of demographic characteristics related to each of the fifteen councilmanic districts in the city of Reports prepared to date by the staff of the Population Research Laboratory are: Edgar W. Butler, Georges Sabagh, and Maurice D. Van Arsdol, Jr.t "Some Social Psychological Factors in Intrametropolitan Residen tial Mobility," paper presented to the American Sociologi cal Association, St. Louis, Missouri, September, 1961; Elizabeth Jones, Georges Sabagh, Maurice D. Van Arsdol, Jr., and Edgar W. Butler, "Family Cohesion in a Metropoli tan Area," paper presented to the Pacific Sociological Association, Sacramento, California, April, 1962; Edgar W. Butler, Georges Sabagh, and Maurice D. Van Arsdol, Jr. , "Progress Report on Residential Mobility in the Los Angeles SMSA," paper presented to Pacific Sociological Association, Sacramento, California, April, 1962; Edgar W.. Butler, Georges Sabagh, and Maurice D. Van Arsdol, Jr., "Residen tial Mobility within the Los Angeles Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area," paper presented to Western Section Regional Science Association, Berkeley, California, June, 1962. 19 Eshref Shevky and Marilyn Williams, The Social Areas of Los Angeles (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1948). 11 20 Los Angeles were tabulated from 1960 Census data. The interdisciplinary approach to the study of politics is nowhere more evident than in the areas of voting behavior analysis and political decision-making. Of particular use to the investigator working in municipal politics are the findings of the sociologists , social- psychologlsts, and political scientists who have studied urbanism, community power structures, and the consequent problems posed for the democratic political process. Among the most important of these are Kornhauser's The Politics 21 of Mass Society, Janowitz's Community Political 22 23 Systems , Sussman's Community Structure and Analysis . O / and Wood's Suburbia. 20 Barry D. Eaton, "A Brief Ecological Look at the Los Angeles City Councilmanic Districts and Their Council Representatives," unpublished seminar paper submitted to the Seminar in Human Ecology, University of Southern California, 1961. 21 William Komhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1959). 22 Morris Janowitz, ed., Community Political Systems (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1961). 23 Marvin B. Sussman, ed., Community Structure and Analysis (New York: Crowell, 1959). 24 Robert C. Wood, Suburbia: Its People and their Politics (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959). 12 Alienation, a concept used to explain certain types of political behavior, has been analyzed in a par- 25 ticular election in Levin's The Alienated Voter. More theoretical treatments of alienation are to be found in 26 27 28 the writings of Seeman, Nettler, Dean, and Thompson 29 and Horton. The only detailed study of the community press is 30 Janowitz's The Community Press in an Urban Setting. It is centered upon the community newspapers of the city of Chicago. Levin, op. cit. See also Murray B. Levin and Murray Eden, "Political Strategy for the Alienated Voter," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXVI (Spring, 1962), 47-63. Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation," American Sociological Review. XXIV (December, 1959), 783- 791. 27 Gwynn Nettler, "A Measure of Alienation," Ameri can Sociological Review. XXII (December, 1957), 670-677. ^Dwight G. Dean, "Alienation and Political Apathy," Social Forces. XXXVIII (March, 1960), 185-189. 29 Wayne E. Thompson and John E. Horton, "Political Alienation as a Force in Political Action," Social Forces , XXXVIII (March, 1960), 190-195. 30 Morris Janowitz, The Community Press in an Urban Setting (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1952). CHAPTER II THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT OF LOS ANGELES The political environment of Los Angeles, like the physical boundaries of the city, embraces a great many diverse factors and is not susceptible of easy character ization. Some persons consider Los Angeles merely to be "sixty suburbs in search of a city," while others see it as being a sophisticated and integrated metropolis rival ing, if not surpassing, New York, Chicago, and its northern California competitor, San Francisco. Such capsule descriptions are, of course, quite misleading. The purpose of this chapter will, therefore, be to present as balanced a picture as possible of the geographic characteristics of the city of Los Angeles, the city's inhabitants, and the milieu in which the political process functions. The Geographic Characteristics of Los Angeles The largest city in area in the United States, Los Angeles in April, 1961, encompassed 455 square miles. 13 14 When Los Angeles was incorporated in 1850, it had within its boundaries only twenty-eight square miles. This tremendous increase in area was achieved through the process of annexation, 121 annexations having been effected in the period 1859 to 1951 (see Map I). A number of fac tors contributed to the annexation process. Some smaller V communities sought the advantages to be gained from the superior public services provided by the city of Los Angeles. Many of these saw access to an adequate water supply as ample reason for joining with Los Angeles. Los Angeles , on its part, was eager to obtain land for addi tional recreational areas and industrial expansion. In recent years , the annexation process has been retarded largely because neighboring communities have come to resent the "bigness" represented by Los Angeles , and because Los Angeles has been less willing to assume the economic and social burdens which ensue from annexation.^ Perhaps the most important annexation in terms of its impact upon present-day politics in Los Angeles was the incorporation of most of the San Fernando Valley into ^James.Q. Wilson, A Report on Politics in Los Angeles (Cambridge: Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard Univer sity, 1959), pp. 1-1, 1-2. 15 MAP I the city between 1915 and 1923. As a geographical entity, the Valley is divided into four political jurisdictions: the portion incorporated into the city of Los Angeles, the city of Burbank, the city of San Fernando, and Universal City, composed of unincorporated Los Angeles county territory. Of the Valley's 150,256 acres, representing an area of 234.8 square miles, 137,614 acres, or 91.6 per cent of the Valley total, lie within the city of Los Angeles.^ Physically separated from the rest of Los Angeles by the Santa Monica mountains , the Valley is about twenty- two miles in length and ten miles in width. Mulholland Drive, which runs along the crest of the mountain range, is the southern boundary for the Valley. To the south of the Valley are the communities of Hollywood, Westwood, west Los Angeles, Bel-Air, Brentwood, and Pacific Pali sades , all of which are located within the city limits of Los Angeles , and the cities of Beverly Hills and Santa Monica. To the east is Glendale, a separate city, and to the west is the Calabasas-Agoura area in Los Angeles 2 Security First National Bank, Research Department, The Growth and Economic Stature of the San Fernando Valley (Los Angeles^ 1960), pp. 5-6. 17 county. To the north are mountains which lie in Los 3 Angeles county territory. The San Fernando Valley can be regarded as a whole only in a geographical sense, since that portion of it located within the city limits of Los Angeles is actually composed of seventeen communities. They are: Canoga Park Sherman Oaks Chatsworth Studio City Encino-Tarzana Sunland Granada Hills Sun Valley North Hollywood Sylmar Northridge Tujunga Pacoima Van Nuys Reseda Woodland Hills Sepulveda For statistical purposes , the Los Angeles City Planning Commission divides the non-Valley areas of the city into three divisions: central Los Angeles, western Los .Angeles, and southern Los Angeles. Each of these divisions is made up of a number of communities--thirty in the central portion, eleven in the western portion, and four in the southern portion (see Table 1). One of the factors which contributes most to the unusual, almost grotesque, geographical contours of the 3 Security First National Bank, Growth and Economic Stature. pp. 5-6. II TAILS 1 Population Growth by Statistical Araac — City of Los Angolos, 1930 to 1911 I t N I J H I M IJMjn I M M r l.m H N L I H M I U U .M I U T M I I El Elyelan U laeaaitU n Par* Santa iaaOara SMrar L a ta SauMi Vavnamt UMvaaHty . .. W a r n .................. uj_^ IAMIAIm VW talnali ln4m»ry WUtfrifa-WeM Plea feaw ty Craat Oat P a r Dal Pay PaMaaOat M ar Vlata .......... Pacltrc PaHaaPea H > » M H 1,090 1 , 7 7 7 M 2 19,107 • 17 4,701 1.009 1,943 1,099 (In 1.749 2,921 2.741 2.739 11.244 917 10.043 40,402 110401 4,900 3 . 0 0 1 9.202 1.240 30,902 1.104 7.240 4,147 2.903 9.047 3.700 4.0 9 4 4.304 9 . 1 0 3 20.200 1410.100 1 1 , 0 0 0 92.009 00.447 2 0,290 37,203 14.444 12.490 27.940 74.444 11,412 94.403 4,449 30.440 114.449 24.011 30.940 13.404 99.090 31,414 40,722 27,097 • 9.244 90,041 0,497 44.004 21.940 24.047 40.007 24.902 •0 ,7 0 4 1,019 3,433 1,004 241 9.340 2,040 0.407 14,932 174 19,020 2.412 44.474 1,423 34.091 2 . 1 1 0 19.404 9,3 7 0 2,4 4 0 4.972 1.044 47 ,9 0 9 1.330 10.430 7,991 3,901 10.309 92,90 31,020 30.294 14,717 14,372 20.904 74.942 14,201 40,044 0.903 32.924 13 0 ,4 7 0 • 34 ,0 7 9 31 .9 9 0 14.132 90,910 30.340 40.470 31.340 14.099 94.300 13.903 79.031 32,241 23,147 70 .9 9 0 40.340 1 0 0 , 0 0 1 1 , 0 2 1 4.444 2,000 903 11,303 7,737 10.440 23,243 393 24,797 1 1 . 0 3 1 1,047 13,000 9.941 7,313 27,030 1^ 41,100 1 2 , 0 2 : 42.920 untM 10401 03,944 39,700 43.007 17.010 21,403 31.099 77.399 14.130 • 1,332 0,394 34,337 140,102 4 4.994 31,934 14,740 42,410 41.009 44.379 33.021 27,020 44.407 14,404 02,430 40.224 20.931 09. *42 4 3,034 2,103 41,004 2,414 17,424 2.014 7.414 4.012 1 , 0 0 0 21.433 0,207 24.072 24 .0 2 0 14.397 20,974 14,444 100.014 2.904 41.341 4,2 4 0 30,712 9 M L 0 0 0 m u »#: 70.490 1,7 7 9 34.301 ir*a 19.429 10,703 0,143 29,090 12.400 0,300 97.093 4.404 13,900 41,440 7.010 00,090 34,210 34.707 10.470 24,219 20.147 <34.343 17,734 04.904 14.743 34.234 137.071 41.449 31,302 19,417 41,911 40 .4 0 0 44.103 1 0 , 0 2 1 20.704 40.144 19 ,4 1 I 73,177 37.701 21.470 •0 ,0 9 4 44,271 131.040 3.442 0,470 10,337 1.410 37.014 14,770 34.140 2 0 . 0 0 1 13.490 30,710 24.201 •1.931 4 ,9 4 0 44,077 7,490 12.440 11.279 9.994 2 1 , 0 * 0 0.904 04,090 4.704 41.000 44.044 19.014 10.074 32.411 12,440 39.900 14.234 10.021 •4 ,7 7 4 0,237 971,049 29.001 7.920 29.040 33.402 01,734 0,474 94.440 90,309 20.047 22.400 24.001 14,904 41,000 22.209 11.217 100.304 13.009 710*091 94.101 21,017 32,049 41.744 07,099 14.470 40 .0 9 0 44.107 12.444 30.334 29,477 1 0 , 1 1 1 44.202 11.070 14.277 1 1 2 . 1 1 0 23.790 41 .0 0 0 21.400 31.300 44.300 1 0 0 , 1 0 0 • 0.200 40.000 47.300 34.400 20.100 24.300 10.400 44.700 19.000 14.700 114.000 24.000 .942^943 1 J I 3 J O O 1,170,194 I J I I J M 12.042 12,942 10.400 10.900 93.007 91.140 92.404 91.000 11.070 14,021 21.404 21,000 04,104 •2 .1 2 0 •4 ,7 3 1 •4 .4 0 0 27.417 29.410 21.347 21.400 20,044 24,000 20.404 20,900 10.049 10,414 20.240 20,100 29.079 24.007 20.477 20,000 29.901 29.133 24.490 24.900 70.017 40.714 70,400 70,700 10.190 10.107 10.070 10,200 •9 .9 4 1 04.037 01.901 04,400 14.711 11.091 11,412 11,900 11.201 12.744 13.714 14.000 120,710 121.920 110.111 130.000 42.943 42.730 4 3.20* 41.400 32,144 31,474 3 1,104 31.400 19.130 14,144 19.147 19,200 97,202 94.214 9 0,049 90.400 30.490 10.411 40,404 40,000 4 1,010 41,071 . 41,242 41,700 24.324 21.090 20.779 20.000 29.424 20.000 34.001 14,100 47.004 44.707 40,477 70,100 19.300 14.141 10.030 10.200 44.740 41.132 90.400 90.000 10.949 10.424 10.790 10.000 10,907 14,321 0,400 0.400 77,144 74.770 70,494 •0 .2 0 0 44.110 49.070 44.702 44,100 104*401 111.470 110.111 144.400 4,024 9.290 7,17* 7,000 10.419 11.024 14,141 14,900 19.941 21.221 23,407 21,000 2.074 1,031 4,019 9.000 44.901 90.022 94.020 94,700 24.117 31.041 30.111 10,100 40.997 41,040 44,700 47,400 34.912 34.302 10.349 10.000 40.1 to 90.3*0 91.141 91.900 20.402 30.104 10.020 11.000 27.004 20,101 20,702 10,100 100.017 109.944 121.404 114,190 0.121 10.217 13.009 11.200 92.404 90.009 90,274 90,000 11,047 13,040 19,399 19.400 20,149 31,410 14.972 19.900 Lae Angela* California 19 city of Los Angeles Is the narrow strip of land which connects central Los Angeles with the harbor communities of San Pedro and Wilmington. Until recently, California law "permitted the annexation of communities which could be linked by a strip of land sufficiently wide to carry i»4 essential municipal services. The vast geographical spread of Los Angeles, coupled with the community identifications engendered in its suburban areas, has deprived the city as a whole of the affective allegiar^e of many of its citizens. The problem of creating over-all city identification is com plicated , among other things, by the absence of an effective system of mass transportation, by the presence of community newspapers , and by the influx of thousands of new residents each year. The Demographic Characteristics of Los Angeles The United States Census of April 1, 1960 reported Los Angeles as having a total population of 2,479,015. One year later, at the time of the primary election, it was estimated by the Los Angeles City Planning Commission that ^Wilson, op. cit.. p. 1-2. 20 the city's population had risen to 2,525,000.^ Of the city's 1,128,070 registered voters, approximately 409,000 were Republicans and 678,000 were Democrats on April 1, 1960. During the decade following the 1950 Census, Los Angeles was the only one of the ten largest cities in the United States to experience a population increase. The average annual growth during these years was approximately 53,000. Map II shows the population distribution of the city of Los Angeles, April 1, 1960. Most of the population increase occurred in the San Fernando Valley. Between April 1, 1960 and April 1, 1961, the Valley gained 32,000 persons, representing 70 per cent of the total city increase. The other areas of Los Angeles experienced growth but in a lesser degree. Thus, central Los Angeles experienced an increase of 7,045 persons , western Los Angeles 5 ,300 persons , and southern Los Angeles approxi mately 1,500 persons.^ ^Los Angeles, City Planning Commission, Population Estimate, April 1, 1961. ^Los Angeles, City Planning Commission, Population Estimate. October 1, 1960. ^Los Angeles, City Planning Commission, Population Estimate, April 1, 1961. 21 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION CITY or LJOS ANGELES MAP II 22 The rate of mobility of the civilian population of the city of Los Angeles is much greater than that of the population of other large cities in the United States. Thus, a Bureau of the Census study has revealed that during the year preceding the 1960 Census . . . 24.2% were found to be living in a house other than the one in which they resided a year earlier. Of these, 17.4% had moved from a home within Los Angeles County; 1.6% from another county in Califor nia; 5.1% had moved from another state; and 0.5% , from abroad. Notable is the high percentage of interstate movers in Los Angeles City. This far exceeds the 1.0% for the central cities of the New York-Northeastern New Jersey Metropolitan Area or the 1.5% for the City of Chicago.® In 1950, when Los Angeles had a population of 1,970,358, the number of persons under eighteen years of age represented 23.5 per cent of the total. By 1960, this group had increased in size to the point where it repre sented 30.5 per cent. The median age accordingly declined from 35 years to 33.2 years during this period. A signifi cant augmentation of the numbers of persons sixty-five years of age or older was also recorded, the total of such persons in 1961 being approximately 250,000 and accounting o Los Angeles, County Regional Planning Commission, Population and Dwelling Units. Quarterly Bulletin No. 76, April 1, 1962, p. 1. < 23 9 for 10.2 per cent of the total population. Because the San Fernando Valley has witnessed greater Increases in population than the other areas of Los Angeles , and because it has been hypothesized that one factor contributing to Yorty's victory was a heavy Valley vote, attention should be given to the nature of this growth. If the portions of the Valley located in the city limits of Los Angeles were incorporated as a separate city, it would probably rank as the ninth largest in the United States. Between 1950 and 1960, the Valley's population increased by approximately 109 per cent. During the 1950- 1960 decade, the increase for the Valley as a whole averaged 49,500 persons per year, the current rate of growth being between 35,000 and 40,000."^ (See Map III.) Valley residents tend to be concentrated in the younger and*middle-age categories. The Valley has under gone extensive commercial and industrial development since the end of World War II, but it still remains predominantly a suburban residential area.^ One could speak of it as ^Los Angeles, City Planning Commission, Population Estimate, July 1, 1961. ^Security First National Bank, op. cit. , p. 3. 11Ibid., p. 7. POPULATION Ln >»|riw CHy PCIICCNTAM CHANGE •V COMMUNITIES isao «• m o IMCMAJC O C C M M E TOTAL «M N TOR CITY i f t .0 % mum i w . a. aaaaaa - anht. i. M i m* aaau. i, C ITY PLANNING COMMISSION czj o - CZ3 on* 4 0 0 % 400 % • 0% ■ 4% 10 * ' I 0* 25 being one of the city's principal bedrooms. Many of the Valley's residents work and live in the Valley, but a great many work in other portions of Los Angeles and reside in the Valley because it offers the "advantages" of sub urban living. The building of single family dwellings has proceeded at the rate of about 12,000 dwelling units a year during the past decade. Multiple unit dwellings have 12 also been constructed in large numbers. Such a phenomenal increase in the population of the Valley has placed considerable strain upon the capacity of the city of Los Angeles to provide the services needed-- indeed demanded--by the residents of the Valley. A conspicuous example of the kind of problems with which the city government has had to grapple is that of linking the many Valley communities to the other sections of Los Angeles by means of highways and roads. Because Los Angeles does not have an effective system of mass, public transportation, it has been necessary for its citizens to rely upon the automobile. To tie the Valley to central Los Angeles, a freeway system has been built, but it is inadequate to carry the volume of traffic that must use it. 12 Security First National Bank, Growth and Economic Stature, p. 22. 26 Having originated as separate communities when the Valley was much less well populated, the various communities located in it are not connected by arteries sufficient for the job of integrating them. The lag in road and freeway construction has undoubtedly created some dissatisfaction among Valley residents with the way in which the city government has dealt with this problem. The demand for other municipal services has followed the same pattern. Chambers of com merce, women'8 clubs, and other civic organizations have voiced their concern over what appears to them to be insufficient attention on the part of the people at "city hall" to the problems of the Valley. Some years before World War II, it had been the residents of the San Pedro area in southern Los Angeles who felt somewhat disen franchised with respect to the city as a whole. In the post World War II period it was the San Fernando Valley which developed a degree of political consciousness and which sought equality with the other areas of Los Angeles.^ 13 James Bassett, "Poulson's Feuds Aid to Yorty: Vote of Protest Spurred by Growth of ControversiesLos Angeles Times» June 4, 1961. 27 No detailed studies of the political behavior of residents of the Valley have been published, but it would appear that the Valley, with its high rate of residential and social mobility, is an example of the conservative suburban community. The Republican vote predominates in the Valley, except for small Democratic pockets centered around Van Nuys and North Hollywood, As used by the Bureau of the Census, the term "race" does not reflect clear-cut definitions of biological stock, and several categories refer to nationality. Furthermore, the Bureau defines the term "color" to reflect the division of population into two groups , white and non white. The nonwhite group consists of the Negro, Indian, Japanese, Chinese, Filipino Korean, Asian Indian, and Malayan races. Persons of Mexican birth or ancestry, who are not Indians or members of other nonwhite races, are classified as white. Ufring these definitions, the 1960 Census reports the racial composition of Los Angeles as being: 28 Per Cent Category Number of Total White 2,061,808 83.17 Negro 334,916 13.51 Japanese 51,468 2.08 Chinese 15,443 .62 Filipino 7,681 .31 Indian 3,822 .15 Other races _____3,877 .16 Total 2,479,015 100.00 The Negro population of the city of Los Angeles is concentrated in the central and south-central portions of the city. Negroes of higher socioeconomic status have, however, during recent years, moved not only into the older residential areas in western Los Angeles but also into the relatively new and expensive Windsor Hills and Baldwin Hills sections , located to the west of the central portion of the city. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the pattern of occupancy in Los Angeles affects the distribution of Negroes and the character of Negro civic action. Although most Negroes live in all-Negro areas, these are spread out over a wide expanse and are characterized by single-family, owner-occupied dwellings. The Negro areas tend to be differentiated by class. Higher income and higher education Negroes live in the western parts of the Negro community many miles from the lower Income areas of Watts and Willowbrook.^ ^Sfllson, op. cit.. p. 1-5. 29 Ic is difficult to assess the degree of political self-consciousness which exists in the Los Angeles Negro community. The record of the Negro population in electing members of that race to political office is very poor. No Negro has ever served on the City Council or on the county Board of Supervisors; and Augustus Hawkins, a Democrat elected from the Sixty-second Assembly district, is the only Negro from southern California serving as a member of the California legislature. As a political force in Los Angeles and in the * state of California as a whole, Negroes have been rendered ineffectual by the absence of political organization, by power struggles within the Negro community, by the tradi tion of nonpartisanship, and by their high rate of mobility. In addition, as has been demonstrated by studies of voting behavior, the Negro population, being less well educated and ranking generally lower on the socioeconomic scale, has lacked the sense of efficacy and level of interest which contributes to a high degree of political participation and voting. Also, it is probable that Negroes who seek acceptance by the white community are subject to cross-pressures which lead to lessened 30 participation in those political activities which are racially-oriented. Los Angeles Negroes are predominantly Democratic in registration. Another factor which prevents the Negro community from becoming a more effective voting bloc in Los Angeles municipal elections is the gerrymandering of councilmanic districts by the City Council so that effective opposition by Negro candidates is thwarted. Moreover, the migration of large numbers of Negroes to California from the South has brought into the Negro community persons who, because of their low socio-economic status and their established .political behavior patterns , are not easily educated about the value of concerted political activity. Although there is a Negro press in Los Angeles, * there is no one paper which speaks for the majority of the i , Negro population. In the 1961 mayoralty election, for ekample', the five Negro newspapers published in Los Angeles were divided in their endorsements of the candidates.^ The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Urban League, while active ^See Chapter III, p. 123, for a discussion of the role of the Negro press in the 1961 mayoralty election. 31 in their attempts to achieve social and economic betterment for the Negro, have not entered the Los Angeles political arena in a significant way. Politics is of concern to other Negro groups in Los Angeles, particularly the churches, but unity of purpose has not been realized with respect to the achievement of political goals because of the splintering of leadership. The difficulties which hinder Negroes in their efforts to use political means for ameliorating their situation and for exercising greater influence in the affairs of local government have been summarized as follows: What the Negro community of Los Angeles lacks most is a militant, determined and awakened com munity and leadership. The Negro community seems to be unaware of the recent arrivals from the South who are ignorant of the power of the ballot. Negro professionals fail to lean back to pull up the less fortunates of the race. In general, the Los Angeles Negro is more supine than assertive, more confused than aware, more heterogeneous than organized, and more "status-minded" than rights conscious.16 Two departments of the city government have been the targets of considerable criticism among members of the Negro community in recent years. A few years before the ^Thadeaus Henry Hobbs , "The Dynamics of Negroes in Politics in the Los Angeles Metropolitan Area: 1945-1956" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Southern California, 1960), p. 169. 32 1961 mayoralty election— during Poulson's second term-- the NAACP had spearheaded a movement to end segregation In the assignment of Negro firemen to fire stations In Los Angeles. In the year immediately preceding the elec tion, the Negro community, particularly the Negro press, had been disturbed about the treatment which Negroes were receiving at the hands of the Police Department. It was alleged that Chief of Police William H. Parker and his force were being unnecessarily severe in their handling of what Parker called the "problem" posed by the higher crime rate among Negroes. The NAACP and other Negro civic groups were quick not only to dispute Parker's crime rate statis tics, but also to argue that even if the statistics were true, police brutality was not justified. The Mexican-American population of Los Angeles , based upon a count of individuals with Spanish surnames in the 1960 Census, is estimated to be 260,389. This figure is only approximate, of course, since many persons having Spanish surnames are not of Mexican ancestry or background. The Mexican-American population residing in Los Angeles is concentrated in the Boyle Heights area of east Los Angeles and represents 10.5 per cent of the city's total popula tion. Like the Negro population, it has a low median 33 income, inferior housing, and a low education level.^ Similarly, Mexican-Americans have not been an organized political force in Los Angeles for many of the same reasons that Negroes have not been effective. The Mexican-American community is heavily Democratic in registration. Edward R. Roybal, elected to the City Council from the Ninth District in east Los Angeles, is the most promi nent political figure in the Mexican-American community of Los Angeles. Even Roybal, however, cannot speak for the Mexican-Americans as a whole because of their relatively low level of interest in politics and because of the competition for leadership. The Mexican-American press, as was the case with the Negro press , was unable to agree upon which of the two major candidates should be endorsed 1 f t in the 1961 mayoralty election. The Japanese and Chinese communities of Los Angeles have not attempted to make themselves felt as identifiable power centers in municipal politics. Unlike the Mexican- Americans , whose number is constantly being increased by ^Wilson, op. cit. , p. 1-6. ^®See Chapter III, p. 123, for a discussion of the role of the Mexican-American press in the 1961 ma/oralty election. 34 immigration from Mexico, the expansion of these groups is almost entirely due to the birth rate. The Jewish population of Los Angeles is estimated to be in excess of 325 ,000. The areas in Los Angeles and vicinity having heavy concentrations of Jewish persons are western Los Angeles, Hollywood, the Beverly-Fairfax section, and Beverly Hills. Although no extensive research has been done on the political complexion of the Jewish population, it is believed that the majority of Jewish persons residing in Los Angeles are Democratic in political orientation. The political atmosphere of Los Angeles is condi tioned by the fact that intense conflict among the racial 19 and ethnic groups of the city is virtually unknown. The Black Muslim movement, which received considerable news paper publicity regarding its extremist views during the year following the 1961 mayoralty election, does not appear to have much support among Los Angeles Negroes. 19 Wilson, op. cit.. p. 1-7. The Institutional Aspects of Politics in Los Angeles The city of Los Angeles, for purposes of classifi cation, has a weak-mayor type of government. As specified in the city charter of 1924, as amended, the basic institu tions of government are the office of mayor, the City Council of fifteen members, and twenty-eight departments. The mayor and the members of the Council are elected for four years on a nonpartisan ballot, eight members of the Council being elected at the time of the mayoralty election and seven being elected two years later. Of the twenty- eight departments , only nine are directly responsible to the mayor. Nineteen of the departments are responsible to independent commissions or boards whose members are appointed by the mayor for staggered terms of five years. Appointments to, and removals from, these commissions cannot be made by the mayor without the approval of the City Council. The salary of the mayor is $25,000 a year. The position of the mayor in the governmental structure of the city of Los Angeles is “weak" primarily for three reasons: 36 1. The patronage power of the mayor ia extremely limited because of the city's civil service system. The mayor's patronage is, for all practical purposes , restricted to the commis sioner ships and the members of his personal staff. 2. The mayor is confronted with a full-time city council which is jealous of its prerogatives and which frequently engages him in battle. The members of the council are elected on a district basis and are backed by personal campaign organizations which permit them to exhibit a high degree of independence. 3. The mayor does not possess adequate control over the membership of commissions and boards because of overlapping terms. Also, since some departments control their own funds, the mayor lacks sufficient budgetary authority to exer cise effective coordination. Elected at the same time as the mayor are the city attorney and the comptroller. To assist in the administration of the city government, the mayor appoints the city administrative officer. The city of Los Angeles and the county of Los Angeles enjoy a complex relationship which is difficult to summarize briefly. It will suffice for the purposes of this study to say that the city and the county, which is governed by the five members of the Board of Supervisors, experience many problems which result from overlapping jurisdictions and duplication of services. The county, as the agent of the state, exercises authority over unincorpo rated territory. This function has been decreasing in magnitude in recent years because of the incorporation of former county territory into the city of Los Angeles through annexation and the incorporation of other such territory as separate municipalities. Nonpartisan Elections and the Local Political Process The legal basis for nonpartisanship in the munici pal politics of Los Angeles is found in Section 326 of the city charter: The names of candidates for each office shall be arranged on the ballot for the primary nominating and general municipal elections in alphabetical order. There shall be nothing on any ballot 38 indicative of the party affiliation, source of candidacy or support of any candidate. The legal requirement of nonpartisanship in ballot prepa ration does not, of course, prevent campaign activity on the part of political parties. The failure of either of the two major parties to enter the realm of Los Angeles municipal politics prior to 1961 may partly be attributed to the belief of a majority of Californians that municipal government and politics ought to be insulated from partisan state and national elections , and to the virtual absence of effective competition at the state level prior to 1958. The most important manifestation of nonpartisanship at the state level was the practice of cross-filing, which rendered the Democratic party relatively impotent in state 20 politics during the decade following World War II. It In April, 1959, the California legislature abol ished the provision in the state Elections Code which permitted candidates for public office to seek the nomina tion of other parties in addition to their own. This action was taken by a legislature which for the first time in many years was controlled by the Democratic party. Republican candidates, taking advantage of the failure of the Elections Code to provide for party designations on the ballot and of their superior publicity activities, managed, prior to 1954, to capture a significant number of dual nominations. In 1952, a referendum measure was approved by the voters which required that the ballot indicate the party affiliation of the candidate, thus destroying the cloak of anonymity previously enjoyed by the candidates who cross-filed. 39 was abolished by the Democrat-controlled state legislature in April, 1959. Lee, in discussing the "rationale of nonpartisan ship ," identifies the principal arguments advanced by proponents of the nonpartisan ballot during the Progressive era. City government is largely a matter of "good business practice" or . . . "municipal housekeep ing." The problems and issues that come before a city council are not really political, and the role of "politics" is small. Party labels are associated in people's minds with national issues, . . . and these ought not to be the basis for selecting local officials. . . . The political parties have never developed meaningful programs at the local level; the non partisan system emphasizes and highlights local issues which should feature the election of a mayor or councilman and, subsequently, the vote of these officials on questions of public policy. The voter* - must be set free from the "entangling web of inher ited traditions" when he casts his ballot for local candidates. Although simply removing the label from the ballot does not remove partisanship from the local scene, it reduces party influence and promotes independence. The evils of the machine, the boss , and the spoils system require that all "good" citizens, regardless of party, combine in the interests of good government, and the nonpartisan ballot will aid in this move. The nonpartisan ballot promotes the strength of independent civic associations. The political parties will never be meaning ful and useful instruments on the stat£ and national scene as long as they must concern 40 themselves with the minutiae of local government and be subject to the temptation of local spoils and patronage. . . . Better candidates can be recruited for local office if they do not have to fight their way through the party machines to get there. Members of the national party which is in a minority in the city can still play their full role as partici pating citizens in the work of their city govern ment under the nonpartisan system. As cities gain independence from the state through the extension of home rule, the need for political ties is reduced and the possibility of "political home rule" (i.e. , local or independent parties and candidates) is made more feasible. , Similarly, the extension of the short ballot makes the nonpartisan election practical. Parties are unable to promote group responsi bility for candidates and programs in the city hall, as can also be seen by the fact: that such responsibility has never really existed at either the state or national levels of government. Local responsibility becomes possible when attention can be focused on community issues and programs as under the nonpartisan system.21 That the spokesmen for nonpartisanship in municipal politics were successful in their efforts is evidenced by the fact that by 1913 all local government officials and judges were elected on nonpartisan ballots. This has continued to the present day, with all city, county, and 21 Eugene C. Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), pp. 28- 30. 41 district officials being elected "under a nonpartisan system In which party labels do not appear on the ballot 22 nor are party-nominating primaries employed." Lee evaluates the nonpartisan political process in the six California cities that he studied in terms of the objectives sought by the leaders of the movement for non- partisanship in municipal politics and government as follows: "Pretty good" on general measures of competi tion, frequency of contests, opportunities for dissent and ability to "kick the rascals out." "Pretty bad" on the participation of certain segments of the community, both in terms of membership in civic bodies and voting, with a - • resulting reduction in the representativeness of the local government.. "About average" on the presentation of candi dates who offer issues and platforms to the voters for consideration. "Above average” on the ability and integrity of elected public officials.23 22 Lee, Politics of Nonpartisanship, p. 14. ^ Ibid. , pp. 170-171. The six cities made the. subject of investigation by Lee were Chico, Berkeley, San Leandro, Fresno, Pomona, and Maywood. None of the cities has a population in excess of 110,000. For a dis cussion of Lee's findings regarding political parties in nonpartisan elections, see Chapter IV, pp. 145-1^6, of this study. 42 Lee admits that data are not now available to permit a valid comparison of the nonpartisan election system with the partisan election system, and that his "score card" is highly subjective and subject to revision as more research is done in this area. The attorney general of California is of the opinion that charter cities , of which Los Angeles is one, could adopt the partisan primary and the partisan ballot by action of the city council, if not prohibited by the city charter. An alternative method, which could be used if the city council were prohibited from so doing, would be to amend the city charter. In the case of general law cities , the legislature may provide for a partisan primary 24 and partisan ballot by amending the Elections Code. Political Campaigning in Los Angeles Machine politics of the kind found in some eastern cities has not been a characteristic part of the Los Angeles political landscape. The Progressive era's empha sis upon the trappings of direct democracy and the absence of partisan organization have militated against the 24 Lee, Politics of Nonpartisanship, p. 14. 43 establishment of a boss-dominated system. San Francisco experienced machine politics early in the twentieth century under Boss Rnef, and it was the corruption of his organiza tion that brought the Progressives into power. Los Angeles, too, has had a "bossed" city hall from time to time, but periodic reform movements have succeeded in 25 ridding city hall of its corrupt occupants. Typically, the campaign team of a candidate for mayor is formed on an ad hoc basis , having no past and having no future, as an organization, beyond election day. A candidate gathers together an assortment of journalists, public relations specialists, and volunteer workers who perform the various campaign tasks--often with inadequate coordination. A candidate who possesses fairly ample campaign funds may obtain the services of a professional campaign management firm. Essentially a product of a society in which the mass media have become the accepted means of communicating political appeals to the voting public, the professional campaign management firm has assumed a promi nent role in the conduct of political campaigns in 25 See pp. 55-60 for a discussion of the political history of twentieth century Los Angeles. 44 California. The highly technical processes inherent in the use of the various information media have forced politicians and interest groups to rely upon public rela tions experts to ensure the maximum return for the great expense involved. The absence of machine politics as means of "controlling government and stabilizing power relations" is partially the result of the fact that the mass media provide a broader channel through which office seekers and interest groups can appeal directly to the 26 voter. It is into this vacuum that the professional political publicist has entered. Several elements in California’s political environ ment have contributed to the growth and development of professional campaign management firms: the weakness of the official party organizations which has led to the development of personal campaign organizations; the pro cedure of cross-filing which has given a nonpartisan quality to campaigning in California; the proclivity of Californians for direct legislation which has created a market for the talents of the professional organizer of 26 Stanley Kelley, Jr., Professional Public Relations and Political Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), p. 209. 45 electoral support; and the fluid nature of California's population which has led to the substitution of mass media appeals for the approach traditionally employed by well- organized political machines. The strength of pressure groups and unofficial party organizations is also attrib utable to the weakness of the official party structures. There are approximately twenty professional cam paign management firms in California which regularly participate in political campaigns, six of which are located in Los Angeles. The firm of Whitaker and Baxter dominates the field in northern California and has exer cised the most influence on the profession. The Baus and Ross Company, the second largest firm, has come in recent years to occupy much the same position in southern California politics. Campaign management specialists have directed candidate and issue campaigns at both the state wide and local levels and have assisted in the management of presidential campaigns. In addition to professional campaign management firms, there are ' veral firms in California which specialize in the circulation of petitions for the purpose of qualifying measures for the California ballot. 46 Although there is some variation in the organiza tional structure of campaign management firms, they provide nearly identical services for their clients. The most commonly offered services are: organizational planning, strategic and tactical planning, radio and television programing, billboard advertising, direct mail advertising, fund raising and financial control of campaigns, speakers' bureau, newspaper publicity, and, in some cases, motion pictures. The size of the staffs of the firms depends upon the types of campaigns undertaken, their scope, and the political milieu which prevails at the time of a par ticular campaign. During campaign periods, staffs are augmented by the recruitment of additional personnel from the newspaper, advertising, and public relations professions. A leading campaign management firm will usually charge a fee between $25 ,000 and $75 ,000 for a state-wide campaign, but a less well-known firm will charge between $15,000 and $20,000. Although specific information is not available regarding the fees which are charged for a mayoralty campaign in Los Angeles, it is estimated that 47 27 they probably would be between $5,000 and $10,000. Campaign management firms supplement the income derived from management fees with a 15 per cent commission on all advertising placed with the mass media and with the fees charged commercial clients. It is not, however, the fees of campaign management firms which raise the cost of political campaigning to phenomenal heights but the cost of using the mass media for communicating political appeals. Norris Poulson used the services of the Baus and Ross Company in his campaigns of 1953, 1957, and 1961. Second in size and scope of operations to Whitaker and Baxter, the firm has directed approximately fifty cam paigns in behalf of candidates and for or against ballot propositions since 1945. It has achieved success in about 90 per cent of the campaigns. Among the candidates, in addition to Poulson, whose campaigns have been directed by Baus and Ross are Samuel W. Yorty, candidate for the California Assembly in 1949; Eugene W. Biscailuz, candidate for re-election as sheriff of Los Angeles county in 1954; ^See Chapter III, pp. 139-144, for information regarding finance in the campaigns of mayoralty candidates in 1961. 48 Robert C. Kirkwood, candidate for state controller in 1954 and 1958; Ernest E. Debs, candidate for Los Angeles county supervisor in 1958; Richard M. Nixon, presidential candi date in 1960. In addition to handling candidate campaigns, the Baus and Ross Company has directed campaigns for and against propositions on the state and municipal ballots. On several occasions the firm has managed campaigns in southern California in which it achieved a vote heavy enough to offset a deficit in the rest of the state. This was possible becatise the forty-six counties in northern California possess only 40 per cent of the state's popula tion, whereas the twelve counties in southern California possess 60 per cent. Moreover, 42 per cent of the state's population resides in Los Angeles county, the focal point of the activities of Baus and Ross. The firm usually refuses to direct the campaigns of Democrats except in non partisan contests , and it is closely identified with busi- 9 0 ness interests both at the state and municipal levels. ° 28yor additional information on professional campaign management, see Charles George Mayo, "Professional Campaign Management Firms in California Politics" (unpub lished Master's thesis, University of Southern California, 1960); and Robert J. Pitchell, "The Influence of Profes sional Campaign Management Firms in Partisan Elections in California," Western Political Quarterly, XI (June, 1958), 278-300. 49 Two other professional campaign management firms were active in Poulson's 1961 campaign: John R. MacFaden and Snyder-Smith. Engaged in political public relations activities since 1938 , MacFaden has enjoyed considerable success in his direction of candidate and issue campaigns in the southern California area. In recent years he has directed, or assisted in the direction of, Adlai Stevenson's southern California campaign in 1952, Edmund G. Brown's campaign for re-election as attorney general in 1954, Harold J. Powers' campaign for the office of lieuten ant governor in 1954 and 1958, and A. Ronald Button's campaign for state treasurer in 1958. In addition, MacFaden has done some work in promoting the passage of municipal ballot propositions. MacFaden makes his services available to candidates of both major political parties. On a number of occasions prior to the 1961 mayoralty election, MacFaden had cooperated with Baus and Ross in the management of political campaigns. Snyder-Smith, an advertising firm which has directed a number of campaigns, is closely identified with the Democratic party and does not work for Republicans running in partisan contests. The special circumstances which led to the firm's participation in Poulson's campaign 50 are explained in Chapter 111. Other professional campaign management firms headquartered in Los Angeles are the Bob Voigt Agency, Keene and Associates, and the Stephen L. Wells Company. Samuel W. Yorty did not rely upon the services of a pro fessional campaign management firm in his 1961 campaign for mayor of Los Angeles. The image which the campaign strategists try to create for mayoralty candidates is one of nonpartisan devotion to the affairs of the city of Los Angeles. There is a concerted effort to raise local issues above politics and to adhere to the adage, "There's no Democratic or Republican way to build a road." A candidate who is a Republican and who is accept able to "business" may obtain the backing of the downtown business interests and the chamber of commerce. Poulson was drafted by a group of prominent businessmen to run for mayor in 1953 , and was prevailed upon by them to run for re-election in 1957 and 1961. Labor unions, on the other hand, have never played an important role in the recruit ment or support of mayoralty candidates in Los Angeles. The Democratic and Republican parties have not organized the city of Los Angeles for municipal elections. 51 The parties have been active In state-wide campaigns, but even activity at that level was, prior to 1958, restricted because of the absence of effective two-party competition. With the election of Edmund G. Brown as governor, and with the subsequent abolition of cross-filing by the California legislature, nonpartisanship as a campaign technique lost a great deal of its unique utility, and the words "Democrat" and "Republican" became more meaningful labels in California politics. The Democratic party, by means of the 1960 reapportionment, has reinforced its political hold on the state, a position reflected in its four-to- three registration advantage. Because of the weakness of official party organiza tions , unofficial bodies , the California Republican Assembly (CRA) and the California Democratic Council (CDC), have undertaken the function of endorsing candidates prior to the primary. This function was, of course, particularly important at the time when cross-filing was permitted. In recent years the CRA has lost much of the influence which it wielded when it was an integral part of the political organizations of Governors Earl Warren and Goodwin J. Knight. The CDC, and its constituent clubs, has come during the last ten years to overshadow its Republican counterpart. The CDC itself has quite recently lost some of its influence, however, because of a split within the Demo cratic party. This split can be characterized, in general terms, as being reflective of the differences between the "ins" and the "outs" in the party. The "in" group, circa 1962, was composed of persons never closely identified with the CDC, and included Edmund G. Brown, the governor; Jesse M. Unruh, the speaker of the California Assembly and probably the most powerful member of the state legislature; and Carmen Warschaw, chairman of the Women's Division of the Democratic State Central Committee. The "out" group, composed of persons who were active in CDC work and who * represented the liberal wing of the party, included Paul Ziffren, former Democratic national committeeman; Joseph Wyatt, former state president of the CDC; and Richard Richards, state senator from Los Angeles county. The "ins" were solidly behind John F. Kennedy and his campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1960. The CDC group, on the other hand, was closely iden tified with Adlai E. Stevenson in 1952 and 1956, and was disappointed when he was denied a third chance as the Democratic party's candidate. The effects which this 53 division in the ranks of the leaders of the Democratic party had on the activities of the party in the Poulson 29 campaign are discussed in Chapter IV. The mass media serving the people of Los Angeles are important factors in creating the city's political environment. The press of Los Angeles is anything but nonpartisan in its endorsement of candidates and its presentation of local political news. The daily papers in April, 1961, consisted of the Los Angeles Times . the 30 Mirror , the Examiner, and the Herald & Express. The Los Angeles Times and the Mirror were controlled by the Chandler family which has long been known for its militant Republicanism and anti-unionism, attitudes determined, in part, by the fact that the Times1 building was dynamited in 1910 during a labor war. The Examiner and the H raid & Express were Hearst papers. Although the Examiner was a ^For additional information regarding the CDC, see Francis Carney, The Rise of the Democratic Clubs in California (New York: Holt, 1958); and James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). 30 Within approximately six months after the election the number of daily newspapers was reduced from four to two. The Mirror was merged with the Los Angeles Times, a morning paper, and the Examiner was absorbed by the Herald & Express . a late afternoon paper, to form the Herald-Examiner. 54 labor-oriented paper at the time of its establishment, in later years it exhibited a Republican bias less blatant but nevertheless similar to that of the Los Angeles Times and the Mirror. Los Angeles has not had a major newspaper with Democratic sympathies since the demise of Manchester Boddy's Daily News in 1954. In addition to the metropolitan dallies , Los Angeles has approximately seventy-five community papers, the vast majority of which give editorial support to 31 mayoralty candidates. The city of Los Angeles is also served by seven television channels, one of which-- Channel ll--is owned by the Times-Mirror Company. Because of the regulations of the Federal Communications Commis sion, the television stations have exhibited a high degree of objectivity in the presentation of political news. Since about 1960, the Los Angeles Times has con fined most of its political editorializing to its editorial page and has accorded much more equitable news coverage to Democratic candidates than it did in previous years. It may be hypothesized that this change in policy is partially 31 See Chapter III, pp. 116-125, for a discussion of the role of community newspapers in the 1961 mayoralty election. « 55 the result of the competition of television, an increased awareness of the preponderantly Democratic registration of the residents of Los Angeles, and the announcement by the New York Times that it would publish a western edition beginning October 1, 1962. The Political History of Twentieth Century Los Angeles Remi Nadeau has graphically described the political condition of Los Angeles in the nineteenth century and the factors which continue to condition the practice of poli tics in Los Angeles of the twentieth century. In nineteenth century Los Angeles politics was a crude caricature of the American democracy that had supposedly been transplanted to the Pacific. Votes were bought at the going rate of $2 apiece. Since it was often possible for the same man to vote two or three times , it was not unusual for the seller to get paid by both sides. And, as there was no registration, both parties by common consent voted any two-legged specimen they could deliver to the ballot box. . . . By the end of the century Los Angeles was ruled by a cynical machine, and the machine was ruled by the Southern Pacific Railroad. It was common knowledge that Walter F. Parker, an S. P. employee, named most of the elective and appointive officers of the city. In the early 1900's a revolt against bossism flared throughout the United States. Spurred by the political and economic reforms of Theodore 56 Roosevelt, progressive elements turned their attention to the municipal graft then being exposed by the muckraking journalists. The cutting edge of Los Angeles reform was sharpened by Dr. John R. Haynes. . . . As a young doctor in Philadelphia he had been repelled by the Injustice of machine rule. . . . He resolved to perform basic surgery on the system with three radical measures to make government more responsive to the public will--the initi ative . . . ; the referendum . . . ; and the most radical of all, the recall. . . .32 Haynes’ efforts in behalf of direct democracy were successful, the initiative, referendum, and recall having been approved by the voters of Los Angeles in 1902. The recall was given its first test when J. P. Davenport, a city councilman, was removed from office in 1904. During the first decade of the new century, reform groups in Los Angeles, in conjunction with like-minded groups in other parts of the state, won the battle for direct primary 33 legislation at both the state and municipal levels. In 1909, the reformers directed their attention to Mayor Arthur C. Harper, a Democrat who had the backing of the Southern Pacific interests and the Los Angeles Times. The Express and the Herald, newspapers which supported the 32 Remi Nadeau, Los Angeles: From Mission to Modern City (New York: Longmans, Green, 1960), pp. 252-253. 33Ibid. , p. 253. 57 reform movement, exposed the corruption which emanated from city hall, and petitions were circulated for Harper's recall. George Alexander was chosen as the candidate of the reformers. Mayor Harper resigned, however, when Walter Parker of Southern Pacific decided that Harper would lose in the recall election. After considerable legal maneuvering, Alexander was elected mayor of Los Angeles, and the Southern Pacific machine lost its grip on Los 34 Angeles politics. During the 1920's, nonpartisanship prevailed in Los Angeles politics , but corruption continued to pervade the Police Department and other departments of the city government. In 1933 , Councilman Frank Shaw was elected mayor, and it was not long before a new group of reformers, successors in spirit and purpose to the reformers of two decades earlier, sought to rid "city hall" of its allegedly corrupt occupant. Shaw was re-elected in 1937, but the efforts of the reformers were undaunted. The Citizens Independent Vice Investigating Committee (CIVIC) , composed of nearly five hundred civic leaders and headed by restau rant owner Clifford E. Clinton, undertook to expose the ■^Nadeau, Los Angeles. p. 258. 58 graft and corruption which flourished in the city and which was protected by the Police Department. After a number of acts of violence directed at the reformers, a recall petition was circulated; and in the ensuing election the reform candidate, Judge Fletcher Bowron, was elected 35 mayor. Bowron instituted many reform measures and succeeded in cleansing Los Angeles of the stigma of cor ruption which it had borne for so long. Although in 1950 Bowron himself was confronted with a recall attempt, this 36 move proved abortive. He was defeated in his bid for re-election in 1953 by Norris Poulson. Poulson was re-elected by a substantial majority in 1957. Probably the most controversial issue that arose during his second term was his role in the negotiations which brought the baseball franchise of the Brooklyn Dodgers, owned by Walter O'Malley, to Los Angeles. In 1957, Poulson obtained approval by the City Council of a contract which embodied the following provisions. ^Nadeau, Los Angeles. pp. 259-263. ^See Robert Gerhart Lane, "The Administration of Fletcher Bowron as Mayor of Los Angeles" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Southern California, 1954), pp. 107-112. 59 1. The city was to give the Dodgers 300 acres in Chavez Ravine, situated just north of downtown Los .Angeles and estimated to be worth $2,289,204. 2. The city was to grade the property and build streets within the area up to a cost of $2,000,000. 3. The county Board of Supervisors was to allocate up to $2,760,000 from state gasoline-tax funds to build access roads to connect the stadium with the freeways. 4. The Dodgers would turn over Wrigley Field, estimated to be worth $2,000,000, to the city. 5. The Dodgers agreed to construct recreational facilities on 40 of the 300 acres and to maintain them at a cost of $60,000 a year for 20 years. 6. The Dodgers agreed to construct a modern base-* ball stadium with a minimum seating capacity 37 of 50,000 in Chavez Ravine. 37 Tim Cohane, "The West Coast Produces Baseball's Strangest Story," Look, XXII (August 19, 1958), 53. 60 In June, 1958, the ordinance incorporating these provisions was ratified in a referendum, but in July the Superior Court ruled that the transaction was illegal because 185 acres of the land involved had been deeded by the federal government to the city for public purposes 38 only. On appeal, however, the contract was upheld. Among the most outspoken critics of the Dodgers contract negotiated by Poulson, Councilwoman Rosalind Wyman, and other city and county officials were Councilmen Karl L. Rundberg , Patrick D. McGee, and John C. Holland. They charged that the deal was a "give away" and that Poulson had betrayed the trust of the citizens of Los Angeles. Even in light of these accusations regarding Poulson’s behavior in the Dodgers affair, on the eve of the 1961 mayoralty election few impartial observers pre dicted defeat in his bid for a third term. 38Cohane, Look. XXII, 52. \ CHAPTER III THE 1961 MAYORALTY ELECTION: AN OVERVIEW A political campaign is a composite of many things— the candidates, their supporters, the issues as posed by the candidates and seen by the electorate, and the political milieu which prevails at the time. These aspects are, however, only the starting points for a study of an election contest. In this chapter, the 1961 mayor alty election in Los Angeles is viewed as a story which had its beginning several months before the April 4 primary and which had ita conclusion on May 31, when the voters gave their answer to the question of who would be the city's mayor for the next four years. The Candidates Norris Poulson.— Entered in the primary election which was held on April 4 were nine candidates. Norris Poulson, the incumbent, was born in Baker, Oregon in 1895 and came to Los Angeles in the early 1920's. He obtained 61 62 his license as a certified public accountant in 1933 and was engaged in accounting work for several years. A life-long Republican, he was elected to the Assembly of the California legislature in 1938 and was re-elected in 1940. In 1942, Poulson was elected to Congress, was defeated in his campaign for re-election in 1944, but won again in 1946, 1948, 1950, and 1952. He resigned from Congress in 1953 in order to campaign against Fletcher Bowron for mayor of Los Angeles. Poulson made his opposi tion to public housing, a position espoused by Bowron, one of the principal issues in that election. Having been persuaded by his business backers to seek re-election in 1957, Poulson was returned to office by a substantial majority. His opponent was Robert A. Yeakel, a successful automobile dealer who had become known to many Los Angeles voters because of his television advertising. In May, 1960, Poulson announced that he would not run for a third term, but in September, 1960, he changed his mind. A Lo« Angeles Times editorial responded to Poulson's decision not to run, as follows: Norris Poulson . . . has announced that he will not run for a third term after he has fin ished his eighth year. The news is not surprising, 63 . but it is bad news . . . Poulson is the best mayor modern Los Angeles has had and it will not be easy to find a successor to measure up to him.l The announcement by Poulson that he would seek a third term was the occasion for the following editorial comment: We are happy to support Mr. Poulson again. No man is indispensable but a few are irreplace able. 2 When asked why he decided to become a candidate in the 1961 election, Poulson indicated that he sincerely had had no desire to run when, in May, 1960, he said that he would not do so. He desired, after many years of public service, to leave the political arena. He reversed his position only because prominent business and professional groups, including the Los Angeles Times. prevailed upon him to run, promising to underwrite all the financial aspects of the campaign. Poulson informed the persons who urged him to enter the campaign that he was not pre- 3 pared to expend any of his personal funds. Samuel W. Yorty.--Samuel W. Yorty was born in Lincoln, Nebraska, in 1909. Moving to Los Angeles in 1927, ^Los Angeles Times . May 5, 1960. 2 Los Angeles Times, September 2, 1960. ^Interview with Norris Poulson, June 14, 1962. 64 Yorty launched his political career by winning election as a Democrat to the Assembly of the California legislature in 1938. Yorty acquired a reputation for being a "liberal" by sponsoring legislation for slum clearance and legisla tion regulating the activities of loan companies, dairy interests, public utilities, and the oil Industry. Furthermore, he voted for legislation to fix the work week at thirty hours, to curb strikebreaking, and to limit the use of the court injunction in labor disputes. Yorty endorsed the attempt by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to reorganize the Supreme Court. While an assemblyman, he also Introduced a resolution that established the first California Un-American Activities Committee and served as 4 its first chairman. In 1938, Yorty was eager to run against Frank Shaw for mayor of Los Angeles but was unable to obtain suffi cient support. In April, 1939, he ran unsuccessfully for the Los Angeles City Council in a close race. In 1940, Yorty broke with Governor Culbert L. Olson because Olson refused to act on Yorty's assertion that the Los Angeles 4 Jack Smith, "Samuel Yorty: Often on Floor, Now on Top at City Hall," Los Angeles Times. June 25, 1961. 65 office of the State Relief Administration was ridden with "Communist termites."^ Yorty ran for the Democratic nomination for United States senator in 1940, but Hiram W. Johnson, the Repub lican incumbent, captured both party nominations. Yorty campaigned without the benefit of a strong organization and lost badly. He made intervention the central issue in his campaign and used billboards which read "Stop Hitler Now! Elect Sam Yorty." In 1941, Yorty started to enter the race against Mayor Bowron who was running for re- election, but withdrew when he found the field too crowded. He announced his intention to campaign for governor in 1942, but changed his mind when Earl Warren became a candidate. In 1942, Yorty won the Democratic nomination for his old Assembly seat which he forfeited when he ran £ for the Senate. Once again, however, he met with defeat. After military service in World War II, Yorty ran sixth among thirteen candidates in the 1945 mayoralty ^ Smith, "Samuel Yorty: Often on Floor ..." Los Angeles Times . June 25, 1961. See also, Robert E. Burke, Olson1s New Deal for California (Berkeley: Univer sity of California Press, 1953), pp. 129-136, 156-157, 168. * * Smith, "Samuel Yorty: Often on Floor ..." Los Angeles Times . June 25, 1961. 66 election in which Bowron was re-elected. In 1949, he was successful in winning back his old seat in the Assembly at Sacramento. In 1950, Yorty won the seat in Congress vacated by Helen Gahagan Douglas, who had entered the race for the United States Senate against Richard M. Nixon. During his two terms in Congress, he worked with his fellow California Congressman Norris Poulson to block the Central Arizona Project which involved Colorado River water rights. In 1954, Yorty, with the endorsement of the California Democratic Council (CDC) , won the Democratic nomination for Nixon's unexpired term in the Senate, but lost in a close race to Thomas H. Kuchel. In the campaign, Yorty questioned Kuchel's war record, and, in turn, his opponent alleged that Yorty had abused his congressional franking privilege by sending copies of his speeches to California voters at a cost of $500,000 to the taxpayers.^ Yorty was unsuccessful in his bid for the Demo cratic nomination for United States Senator in 1956, having failed to secure the endorsement of the CDC in a bitter ^ Smith, "Samuel Yorty: Often on Floor . . Los Angeles Times . June 25, 1961. session that left scars on all the participants. When state Senator Richard Richards received the endorsement of that body, Yorty charged that the CDC was "wired, stacked, rigged, and packed" by a "rule or ruin clique." He also accused Democratic National Committeeman Paul Ziffren of attempting to control the California Democratic party "in g the pattern of a Chicago machine." From 1956 to 1961, Yorty was engaged in the practice of law. In October, 1960, Yorty further alienated himself from the leadership of the Democratic party by announcing that he supported Vice-President Nixon in his campaign against Senator John F. Kennedy for the presi dency. He avowed that he had no personal quarrel with Kennedy but said: "I cannot convince myself that John F. Kennedy is ready to be President of the United States at this critical point in history." He based his support of Nixon rather than Kennedy on five arguments: Q A candidate who is not endorsed by the appropriate pre-primary endorsing body is disadvantaged with respect to obtaining his party's nomination. See Francis Carney, The Rise of the Democratic Clubs in California (New York: Holt, 1958). 9 Ibid. 68 1. The Kennedy family had obtained the nomination by the expenditure of "lavish amounts of money and a calculated exploitation of his religious affiliation." 2. Kennedy had criticized United States foreign policy but as a senator had offered no concrete suggestions for changes. 3. Kennedy would utilize federal controls to a greater extent than would Nixon in dealing with domestic problems. Thus, Kennedy would attempt to solve the farm problem by putting the gov ernment in the farming business. 4. Kennedy was dissatisfied with "tight money" policies but was unable to explain how he would meet the cost of the domestic and defense projects and the high farm prices that he promised. 3. Kennedy was much more under the influence of labor leaders than Nixon. From this review of the political career of Samuel W. Yorty, it can be seen that on three occasions prior to ^ Los Angeles Times, October 25, 1960. 69 1961 he entertained the Idea of running for mayor of Los Angeles: in 1938, 1941, and 1945. On the first two occasions he failed to enter the race because of lack of support; on the last he entered the primary but was defeated. The factors which motivated Yorty to enter the 1961 mayoralty election are probably as complex as his political career. Yorty explains that his decision was based upon the premise that Los Angeles needed a change and that he was the man to effect this change.^ Another explanation, one which is less personal but which is compatible with the former, is that Yorty had so thoroughly antagonized the leadership of the Democratic party of California by his actions in 1956 and 1960 that the only hope for reviving his political life lay in a campaign for a nonpartisan office. Yorty denies that his entrance into the mayoralty election was dictated by the assurance of support from any particular groups. On the contrary, Yorty maintains that his decision was determined by an intuitive feeling on his part that large numbers of Los Angeles voters wanted a change and that they would 12 support him. ^Interview with Samuel W. Yorty, June 20, 1962. 12Ibid. 70 Other candidates.— Also entered as mayoralty candidates in the primary election were seven other hope fuls. Councilman Patrick D. McGee, elected to the Los Angeles City Council In 1957, while a Republican member of the Assembly of the California legislature, was the only one of these who was considered by most observers to be a serious contender. A resident of Van Nuys, McGee repre sented the Third Council district, which encompasses the western portion of the San Fernando Valley. Prior to the election, McGee had been critical of the way in which Poulson had managed tidelands oil development of the Los Angeles harbor and of some oil leases let by the city during Poulson’s administration. The other candidates entered in the primary were, in California political terminology, "self-starters." They were William Carpenter, a transportation counselor; Oscar G. Cover, a carpenter and merchant seaman, who was a member of the Socialist Workers party; Howard M. Kessler, a real estate investor; Wallace J. Lauria, who withdrew prior to the primary in favor of Yorty, but whose name appeared on the ballot; Mrs. M. Garet Rogers Miller, an attorney; and Robert Carrillo Ronstadt, an industrial 71 13 relations director. In addition to the candidates for mayor, there were on the primary ballot two candidates for city attorney, four candidates for city controller, a large number of candidates vying for seats on the City Council and the Board of Education, and several charter amendments and bond issues. The Primary Election Campaign Early in January, 1961, Mayor Poulson, the first of the mayoralty candidates to file for the primary, issued a statement in which he vowed to conduct a campaign that would be free of mud-slinging. I shall run strictly on my record, which has been to build all Los Angeles with no sectional favoritism and no partisanship. My platform is to continue and develop policies and programs which are good for the city as a whole. As our city continues its impressive growth towards greatness, we must strive for solidarity and achievement.14 Although Yorty*s opening shots were somewhat more colorful, they, like Poulson's, gave no indication of the extreme positions to be taken by both candidates later in the ^ Valley Times Today, April 1, 1961. ^ o s Angeles Times, January 5, 1961. 72 campaign. There is in Los Angeles today a public mandate for vigorous new programs to meet the needs of a growing city. Poulson's pathetic pretense has brought stagnation, has stunted our civic growth and weakened the financial structure of the city. He has brought Los Angeles to the brink of finan cial instability and bankruptcy by a reactionary do-nothing administration. We have more taxes, more traffic congestion, more smog, more dope problems, more bus fares, more crime, more government costs , more wasteful expenditures and false promises and more stagnant local government than at anytime in our history.15 Poulson responded to Yorty's charges in the following words, and the campaign was underway. 1 have previously announced that I will not engage in any mudslinging or cheap political dog fights in this campaign. One of my opponents has already issued the standard political brand of misinformation in a feeble attempt to start one. My record will speak for itself.16 On February 2, the Los Angeles Times reported that Poulson's voice had become so strained as the result of recent speeches that he had made in the ordinary conduct of his office that "he was forced to speak in a hoarse whisper." Throat specialists advised Poulson that this difficulty could be overcome only if he were to stop ^~*Los Angeles Times . January 19, 1961. 16Ibid. talking.17 Faced with the prospect of having to wage a campaign with a voiceless candidate, the Poulson strate gists announced, on February 3, the formation of a "strong and thoroughly informed 'Facts Brigade' of leading citizens to inform the public of the economic and civic progress" which had been achieved under Poulson's leadership.1® The Yorty campaign group, unhappy because of Poulson*8 alleged refusal to debate with Yorty or the other mayoralty candidates, simultaneously announced the creation of a "Truth Squad" to counter the efforts of Poulson's "Facts Brigade."19 On February 10, Yorty stated that he favored additional pay raises for the members of the Police Department. Furthermore, he said he would, if elected, form a thirty-member citizens committee, with eighteen alternates, to mediate labor disputes; form a "committee on aging" to assist senior citizens; advocate state Senate reapportionment; and institute tax reforms and assessment changes and "overhaul" the city charter to permit ^Los Angeles Times» February 2, 1961. ^ Los Angeles Times . February 3, 1961. 19Ibid. 74 20 consolidation of some city-county departments. It was McGee who first made Poulson's health an overt campaign issue. On March 1, he stated that rumors were circulating that "Mr. Poulson is gravely ill . . . as a matter of fact that he is suffering from cancer of 21 the throat." Poulson, who had been making very few public appearances because of his voice troubles , was examined by a throat specialist who issued the following statement: Mayor Poulson has been a patient under my care off and on since January 9, 1961, for a mild throat irritation. Any statement that he has a throat condition which threatens his health or life or his capacity to carry on his accustomed and normal activities as he has in the past is unequivocally u n t r u e .22 Aware of the need to indicate to the residents of the San Fernando Valley that he would give renewed and increased attention to their problems if re-elected, Poulson, on March 20, promised continued vigilance in meeting the Valley's many needs, and stated that he planned 20 Los Angeles Times. February 10, 1961. ^ Los Angeles Times. March 2 , 1961. 22 Statement by Morris Pies, M.D., quoted in Los Angeles Times « March 2, 1961. 75 23 to hold conferences in the Valley every third Thursday. On the same day, Jesse M. Unruh, Democratic speaker of the Assembly of the California legislature and John F. Kennedy's southern California campaign manager in I960, announced his support of Poulson, saying: On the great non-partisan issues of law enforcement, smog and water, Mayor Poulson has provided Los Angeles and the state of California with dedicated, truly non-partisan leadership. . . . Furthermore, and this is very important to me as a Democrat, Norris Poulson has never to my knowledge succumbed to the temptation to use his high office and great personal prestige for cheap partisan g a i n .24 Five days i.ater Paul Zif fren, former Democratic national committeeman from California, endorsed Poulson and, like Unruh, charged Yorty with attempting to introduce partisan ship into a nonpartisan election. Like many other Democrats who have had occasion to work with Mayor Poulson on matters affecting this community, I am disturbed by the fact that certain of his opponents are trying to inject naked partisanship into the mayoralty r a c e .25 Yorty, who had remained relatively silent in the campaign up to this point, charged on March 23 that the 2^Lob Angeles Times . March 21, 1961. 24Ibid. 25 Los Angeles Times. March 26, 1961. Los Angeles city government was In the clutches of a "powerful and ruthless political machine that is hiding 26 the issues and is even hiding their candidate." He alleged that Poulson had been ordered to run for a third term "under a physical handicap which is used personally by Poulson as an excuse to avoid debate at the exact time 27 that it is being called an insignificant ailment." Yorty claimed that the "machine" had squandered the public*3 money on "give-aways to insiders, shady oil deals, and costly rubbish blunders." He pointed to the city's negotiations with Walter O'Malley and the Dodgers as evidence of the misdealings of the Poulson administra tion. Furthermore, Yorty vowed to end secrecy and shady deals, to restore representative government to the citizens of Los Angeles, to fight the "dope menace," to strive to solve the smog problem, to work for an effective system of rapid transit, and to initiate a practical rubbish collec tion system "instead of one to serve a salvage monopoly 28 which is part of the Machine." Poulson adopted the 26press release issued by Yorty's campaign head quarters, March 23, 1961. 27Ibid. 28Ibid. 77 strategy of not replying to Yorty's charges. On March 27, Yorty issued another press statement in which he intimated that Ben G. Griffith, Poulson*s campaign finance chairman, and Martin Pollard, general chairman of the Committee to Re-elect Mayor Poulson, were members of the "machine." Yorty asserted that Griffith "is a paving contractor, and the City of Los Angelas does 29 lots of paving." About Pollard, he said: [Pollard is] Mr. General Motors of the West Coast. The City buys a lot of automobiles. General Motors also has a large advertising budget which can be used to wield influence. Mr. Pollard spent a fortune to keep Poulson from being elected in 1953 because he was closely asso ciated with the administration of Fletcher Bowron. Now, Pollard has moved into the Poulson camp and plays the role of spokesman for Poulson and the City Hall crowd.30 In a March 28 speech to members of the American Legion, Yorty charged that leases on oil lands in the Los Angeles harbor, granted to the city in trust, had been made to friends of Poulson without competitive bidding, and that the city was still spending money in an effort to appeal the decision of the Superior Court which had 29 Press release issued by Yorty's campaign head quarters, March 27, 1961. 30Ibid. 78 invalidated the leases on the grounds of constructive fraud. It is painfully clear that in making these leases in a manner declared fraudulent by the Los Angeles Superior Court t the Poulson admin istration has risked loss to the City of not only the potentially great oil and gas revenues from harbor oil, but even title to the Harbor itself. This is a dangerous risk to take with our City assets in order to hand a plum to friends with an inside track to the City Hall.31 On March 27, Poulson declared that he was not supporting and would not endorse any candidate in the City Council races. Yorty, on the same day, denounced Paul Ziffren's endorsement of Poulson, charging that Ziffren had been "ousted" by Governor Brown from his position as Democratic national committeeman and that he was also in 32 difficulty with the Democratic party for other reasons. McGee released a statement on March 30 , in which he charged that supporters of Poulson were trying to dis courage a large turnout of voters at the primary on the assumption that a light vote would be to Poulson1s advan tage. He also complained that the "downtown metropolitan 31 Press release issued by Yorty's campaign head quarters, March 28, 1961. 32 Los Angeles Times . March 28, 1961. 79 newspapers, usually In the forefront of urging voters to 33 go to the polls, have played down this campaign . . The Mirror replied to McGee's accusations In these terms: In the final round of his uninspired issueless campaign for Mayor, Councilman Pat McGee has charged that supporters of Mayor Norris Poulson want to discourage a large turnout at the polls Tuesday. He said that Poulson's friends believe a light turnout would help the Mayor win re-election. McGee charged that the metropolitan papers have contributed to this discouragement, reversing their usual drive to get out the vote. The fact is that the Mirror always has encour aged all voters to cast their ballots, regardless of whom they support . . . Furthermore, Poulson's backers do want a large turnout. If enough voters go to the polls, they are sure Poulson can receive more votes than the rest of the candidates combined, eliminating any need to go into a run-off in May. On March 31, Yorty, in an address to the Architects and Engineers Association, charged that Poulson was deceiv ing home owners by "wild claims that property taxes have decreased during his tenure in office, when such taxes ~^Los Angeles Times. March 30, 1961. ^ Mirror (Los Angeles), April 3, 1961. 80 35 actually have Increased more than 60 per cent." Yorty pledged himself to support the efforts of the Property Taxpayers Councils to obtain assessment reforms. PorIson's endorsement by W. J. Bassett, executive director of the County Federation of Labor, and by the Committee on Political Education (COPE) of the AFL-CIO 36 was announced on March 30. On April 1, Yorty accused Poulson of failing to support Police Chief William H. 37 Parker in his job of law enforcement in Los Angeles. In a press release issued on April 2, Yorty stated that Poulson was conducting a Madison Avenue type of campaign in which he was merely a "puppet" in the hands of the "machine." At this time Yorty outlined an eleven- point program which he promised to institute if-elected. He promised: 1. To increase the membership of the police force so that it could deal more effectively with narcotics and other crime problems. 3^Press release issued by Yorty1s campaign head quarters, March 31, 1961. ^Los Angeles Times , March 31, 1961. 37 Press release issued by Yorty’s campaign head quarters, April 1, 1961. Tax reform; including creation of an elected tax appeal board. Control by the mayor's office of the Metro politan Transit Authority, expediting of freeway construction, and "insistence that gasoline taxes collected by the state in southern California be spent in southern California." Creation of a Labor-Management Citizens Committee, composed of representatives of labor, management, and the public, to serve as a "volunteer mediation group" in labor- management disputes. A program of public works which would seek out rather than ignore "financial assistance available from the Federal Government to meet pressing needs of urban areas." Immediate action to modernize the city charter. Appointment of a "committee on aging" to "plan for and assist senior citizens as recommended by the President’s Conference on Aging." Maintenance of "strictly open, above-board action in conducting City business." 82 9. To urge reapportionment of the state Senate to secure adequate representation for the county of Los Angeles and thus to assure that the county receives Its "fair share of gaso line taxes for completion of freeways." 10. To give the citizens of Los Angeles the "true facts regarding the smog situation" and to work for the elimination of the problem. 11. Institution of regular public press conferences on television and radio at which he would Infoxrm the public about the activities of the oo city government. ° On the day before the primary, Yorty reiterated the charge that Poulson had conspired with Walter O'Malley to defraud the city in their negotiations regarding the moving of the Dodgers from Brooklyn to Los Angeles. Yorty produced a letter, written by Poulson to O'Malley on June 6, 1957, In which Poulson said: 1 can assure you that I am out to expedite this as fast as I possibly can. Enclosed is a copy of a letter which I had rather expected and so was prepared for. That was one of the reasons 38 Press release issued by Yorty's campaign head quarters, April 3, 1961. 83 for the appraisal idea and the exchange idea. The Federal Government angle is in the mill and will be worked out satisfactorily. X am talking in riddles for reasons best known to yourself.39 Yorty challenged Poulson to explain what he had meant by the word "riddles." Poulson, who had continued to ignore most of Yorty's charges, explained the phrase ology used in the letter, as follows: . . . the pressure was on in New York to keep the Dodgers there. There was a Congressional investigation underway, and I didn't propose to put in written form anything that could be sub poenaed and become a public document, disclosing my plan to oppose New York interests. [Yorty] is trying to make something that isn't and never was there out of my activities designed solely to prevent New York Interests from keeping major league baseball out of Los Angeles.40 In the primary election on Tuesday, April 4, ballots were marked by 469,882 voters, or 41.8 per cent of the city's 1,124,236 registered voters. Of these, 457,063 cast votes for mayoralty candidates. The distribution of votes, including absentee ballots cast, was: ^^Herald & Express . April 3, 1961. 40Ibid. 84 Carpenter 7,261 Cover 2,170 Kessler 7,598 Lauria 1,593 McGee 116,774 Miller 4,405 Poulson 181,653 Ronstadt 11,387 Yorty 123,810 Scattering 412 Since no candidate received a majority of the votes cast-- Poulson received 39.74 per cent, Yorty 27.09 per cent, and McGee 25.54 per cent--the general election would be a run-off between the two candidates who received the highest number of votes in the primary. The General Election Campaign With the question of who were to be the contenders in the May 31 general election answered, the general election campaign got underway when, on April 5, Yorty repeated the charge that Poulson was dominated by a "machine” from which he could not extricate himself.4* " On the same day, at a press conference held at his Wilshire Boulevard campaign headquarters, Poulson replied to Yorty*s accusation with a charge of his own. When asked by a reporter to comment on Yorty*s statement, he declared, "I might reply that Yorty is backed by an underworld ^ 2 machine." He added that a new mayor could appoint a new police commission and "open the town up" in a few days. Poulson*s allegation that Yorty had "underworld" connec tions evoked the terse rejoinder from Yorty, "It is not worth commenting on. This is a statement made by the 43 ^ mayor in his wild desperation." Poulson, whose campaign activities were severely j restricted by the continuation of his voice problem, issued a press release on April 20, in which he stated that his voice had improved considerably and that he had ceased to receive therapy and medical treatment. Three days later, the Los Angelas Times quoted Poulson as saying: 4^Los Angeles Times , April 6, 1961. 42ibid. 43Ibid. 86 Early last January, I caught cold in my throat. I continued to use my voice in the primary campaign and 1 strained it. 1 rested my voice at Palm Springs and it is getting stronger every day. The upcoming campaign will be the best answer to the questions about my health. People are going to see me and hear me enough on television and at public appearances to make up their own minds.^ On April 25, Yorty attempted to pin the "under world" label on Poulson by implying that a visit by Poulson to Governor Brown at Sacramento was for the purpose of making a deal against the Los Angeles Police Department, and by challenging Poulson to answer the charge that the mayor received . . . a campaign contribution in 1953 from Jimmy Utley, who is now serving time in one of the penitentiaries. . . . I'm informed that in the campaign against Fletcher Bowron in 1953, the deal to fire [Police Chief] Parker was made, but a pre mature exposure forced Mr. Poulson to abandon the plan. And so his luncheon with Mr. Brown takes on added significance in view of the background and also the fact that some kind of a deal has been made between Poulson and Paul Ziffren, whose animosity toward law enforcement in this city, particularly the Chief, is very well known . . . Eastern mob money [is] moving into this prime area of Los Angeles and using fronts for its operations. . . . I'll do anything to prevent ^*Los Angeles Times, April 23, 1961. 87 this infiltration. There is a danger of an over world as well as an underworld, and even District Attorney McKesson says so.^5 Poulson termed Yorty's assertions "just a lot of hooey. The month of May was witness to even more extreme charges by both candidates. On May 3, the Baus and Ross Company sent a press release to Los Angeles newspapers in which Yorty was called the "flip-flop" candidate for mayor. The purpose of the release was to prove that Yorty had at one time sided with "radicals" and at another with "con servatives" ; at one time with "gambling promoters" and at another with the forces of "law and order.During the first week, Yorty brought a defamation suit against Poulson in Superior Court for $2,200,000 in damages. On May 11, Poulson outlined the charges which Yorty considered to be sufficient grounds for legal action and which Yorty emphatically denied. 1. That Yorty, as a member of the California Assembly, led a fight to legalize boo}anaking. ^~*Los Angeles Times. April 25, 1961. 46ibid. 47A copy of this press release is Included in Appendix C. 2. That during 1955-1957, Yorty received $12,500 from the operators of a Las Vegas casino-hotel for attempting to obtain a Nevada gambling license for them. 3. That in 1955, Yorty was offered $50,000 a year by Las Vegas hotel and casino interests to resolve "mutual problems then concerning the Nevada concerns." 4. That on November 28, 1958, Yorty was appointed assistant city attorney of Cabazon, a small community incorporated for the purpose of legalizing poker in the area. 5. That Yorty, a few years before the 1961 election, had operated a rubbish dump in the San Pedro area which had been cited a number of times for violations by the county engineer's office. That Yorty had been a leader in trying to create another dump in the San Fernando Valley, an activity that "led to the suspension and eventual resignation of a county engineer 48 who was associated with" this venture. ^ Los Angeles Times . May 12, 1961. 89 On May 8, Yorty alleged that Poulson also had had dealings with dump operators, dealings which illustrated his charges of "influence peddling" under the Poulson administration. Yorty reiterated the assertion, which he had made throughout the campaign, that the "machine" behind Poulson was using its vastly superior financial resources to further its policy of "news blackouts and 49 refusal to discuss the issues in the campaign." The Los Angeles Times. on May 10, reported that the Los Angeles County Democratic Central Committee had voted 26 to 8 against endorsing Yorty. Yorty responded to the decision of the Democratic body not to support him by charging that "double-dealing" by Democratic and Republican machine politicians had kept Los Angeles from having a Democratic mayor for forty years. Yorty characterized the decision as having been "made by a few ivory-tower self- appointed bosses who do not represent the rank-and-file members of the Democratic party. During the first ten days of May, Yorty injected a new element into the campaign in the form of the charge 49 Los Angeles Times. April 18, 1961. 5QLos Angeles Times . May 14, 1961. 90 that Poulson owned land and cattle in Baker, Oregon, valued at $250,000. He demanded that Poulson explain "where he got the money when his public salary was $25 ,000 a year." Yorty offered to open his federal income tax records to the public if Poulson would do the same. Not only has Poulson acquired these lucrative holdings free and clear since after he took office as mayor, but he also is presently involved in a ski resort deal near his holdings that could enhance his property several hundreds of thousands of dollars.51 Poulson labeled Yorty1s statements as "lies" and said that his entire investment in the Baker properties would not exceed $135 ,000 and that this represented "the savings of c o a lifetime." He denied that he had received any gifts in connection with the properties. Yorty declared that 1 have on my farm black angus bulls . . . worth between $15 ,000 and $25,000 each. I bought two black angus bulls which cost $600 each. I have a record of the sale and the name of the man who sold them to me. 53 Yorty rejected Poulson's explanation of the value of his Oregon holdings and elaborated on the allegation 3^Los Angeles Times . May 9, 1961. ^ Los Angeles Times . May 10, 1961. 53Ibid. 91 that the mayor must have obtained the money to purchase the land and cattle from sources other than his salary as a public official. It Is apparent that while Foulson was on the public payroll as a Congressman, like other legislators In Washington, D.C., he found It Impossible to save any money. It was In 1953, after he left Congress, that salaries were Increased from $15,000 yearly to $25,000 so legislators could cover their expenses. He had been Mayor only a year and a half before he began acquiring the real estate and cattle holdings in Oregon, estimated at $250,000, a figure we believe is the true value. . . . The investigation shows that there are no trust deeds or mortgages on the property in Oregon, and that it is free and clear of debt. Our mayor . . . has been living in an apartment and investing in his Oregon holdings. In the first five years , according to his own figures, Foulson invested a total of $66,000 in his ranch and $10,000 in the purchase of cattle, while most of us have been investing our savings in Los Angeles and con tributing in taxes for subminimal services and improvements.54 On May 13, Poulson offered to sell Yorty all his land holdings in Baker for $100,000 and all his cattle for $25,000. He advised Yorty that he would sell him any one of his bulls for $600.^ ~^Los Angeles Times. May 11, 1961. ~ * - * Los Angeles Times. May 14, 1961. 92 » On May 15, the Poulson campaign headquarters announced that it had discovered that Yorty was getting the "solid backing'1 of local bar-owners . As evidence of this, Martin Pollard pointed to Yorty's endorsement by the local chapter of the California Tavern Association. In a special bulletin, prepared by the Association for distribu tion to Its members, it was allegedly said that, "We need a mayor whose door will be open understandingly. "^7 Poulson headquarters reported on the same day that the mayor was planning a series of press conferences and television appearances. Yorty charged that the "machine" backing Poulson was sacrificing the health of the mayor and "perhaps endangering his very life by its callous and total indifference to his physical condition."^8 Yorty averred, furthermore, that it appeared to him that his opponent was "incapable of conducting his office now or for another term."^^ ^ Los Angeles Times , May 15, 1961 57Ibid. 58Ibid. 59Ibid. 93 Foulson, on May 15, declared that he was going to "leave all smear and mudslinglng tactics In the . . . 60 mayoralty campaign to their originator, Samuel W. Yorty." The mayor told a luncheon held in the Valley that he was aware of the Valley's Inadequate representation in the City Council and that he would work to get the Valley another City Council seat. He also said that he intended to expedite "on a crash basis" action to build four-lane and six-lane north-south arterial roads to feed traffic to the Ventura freeway.^ On the same day, Yorty proposed to place redistricting on the ballot, saying that the San 62 Fernando Valley was entitled to another Council district. On May 16, Yorty asked the Superior Court for per mission to name three additional defendants in his suit for $2,200,000 damages against Foulson. These were Herbert M. Baus and William B. Ross, heads of the professional cam paign management firm handling Foulson*s campaign, and Walter Ely, Poulson's attorney. The conspiracy of which Poulson and the others were accused allegedly consisted of ^ Los Angeles Times » May 16, 1961. 61Ibid. 62Ibid. 94 accusing Yorty of consorting with Communists, of being unpatriotic, of engaging in criminal acts, and of associ- go ating with gamblers. McGee and his campaign manager,.Glenn C. Ames, announced their unqualified endorsement of Poulson on May 18. Yorty responded by saying that he felt that his chances had not been hurt by McGee's announcement of sup port for Poulson. Later, the Los Angeles Times reported that McGee would appear in special five-minute telecasts entitled "Pat McGee Backs Mayor Poulson." On May 24, the Police Commission in regular session adopted a statement, reflecting unanimous agree ment , in which it was declared that Yorty would not have an opportunity to dismiss the Commission members because all of them would resign if Yorty were to win. The Commission predicted that "a complete breakdown" of law enforcement in Los Angeles would be a consequence of Yorty's election. Poulson, earlier in the same day, had issued a statement in which he said that, if re-elected, he would retain all of the Commission members. Yorty Indicated that he would accept resignations and that two of his nominees for ^ Los Angeles Times. May 17, 1961. membership on the Commission would be Gordon G. MacLean, former newspaper publisher and Valley resident, and Everett Porter, Negro attorney and chairman of a committee which had protested alleged vice conditions in the Western 64 Avenue-Adam8 Boulevard area. Julius A. (Jud) Leetham, chairman of the Republican County Central Committee, announced on May 24 his personal endorsement of Poulson. Leetham stressed the fact that his support of the mayor was dictated, by his "personal choice" and that the Republican party as such always refrained from making endorsements in nonpartisan races.^ Previously, the Sixty-fourth Assembly district Republican organization, covering parts of the Valley, had reported its support for Poulson. During the last two weeks of the campaign, various religious groups proclaimed their hacking for the two candidates. On May 19, twenty Negro ministers, members of the Interdenominational Ministers Committee, announced their support for Poulson, the mayor promising the group that he would name a Negro and a Mexican-American to his k^Los Angeles Times. May 25, 1961. 65Ibid. 96 staff to assist with minority group problems.^ On May 24, the Reverend P. G. Elias, an official of the Baptist Ministers Union, stated that Yorty's program to strengthen the Police Department was supported by churches with congregations aggregating more than 100,000.*^ The Reverend W. Clarence Wright, pastor of the Wilshire Presbyterian Church, said in endorsing Poulson that the moral issue in the election could not be overlooked. Other persons who lent their names to Poulson's campaign were Democratic Congressman James C. Corman from the San Fernando Valley, Republican Assemblyman Harold K. Levering from Pacific Palisades, W. J. Bassett, executive director of the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor, AFL-C10, and Dan Kimball, president of the Aerojet-General Corporation. On Saturday, May 27, Poulson added one more charge to those which he had already made regarding Yorty's qualifications for being mayor of Los Angeles. Poulson said that police and other "government records" indicated ^ Los Angeles Times , May 20, 1961. ^ Los Angeles Times , May 25, 1961. ^ Los Angeles Times, May 26, 1961. 97 that Yorty had been associated in rubbish and mining stock ventures both in Los Angeles and Nevada with Joseph Satin, who at one time had been convicted of grand larceny in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Yorty assailed the remark as an attack on an "innocent bystander," saying that his rela tionship with Satin had been that of an attorney and that he was unaware of any criminal record that Satin might have.^ Since Memorial Day fell on Tuesday, May 30, the day upon which the election would normally have been held, the election was postponed until Wednesday, May 31. The fact that a holiday preceded election day was signifi cant because it produced a set of circumstances which, some persons say, influenced the outcome of the election. On Memorial Day many Negro families had visited Griffith Park, a large municipally-owned recreation area, for the purpose of picknicking and relaxation. A dis turbance occurred which led to the summoning of police. Tempers flared, and approximately two hundred Negroes became involved in what the newspapers called a riot. ^ Los Angeles Times, May 28, 1961. 98 Television camera crews photographed the event, and some of the films showed police officers exercising physical restraint upon the more outspoken and belligerent Negroes. The police, in an effort to prevent an outbreak of vio lence , cleared the park not only of the Negroes who had participated in the disturbance but also of those who had been mere observers.^0 The newspapers and the television channels reported the affair as a news item. The Negro press gave it exten sive coverage and characterized it as being another example of the kind of brutality accorded Negroes in their dealings with the Los Angeles police. The "Negro grapevine" carried the story throughout the Negro community, no doubt embel lishing it as it was transmitted. On May 30, Walter C. Peterson, city clerk of Los Angeles, predicted that of the 1,128,070 persons eligible to vote, only 47 per cent would actually cast ballots. When the votes were counted, it was determined that a total of 553,699 persons had gone to the polls or filed absentee ballots and that of these, 538,679 had cast votes for a mayoralty candidate. Mr. Peterson's estimate of ^Los Angeles Times, May 31, 1961. 99 voter turnout had, therefore, been a little low, as 49.08 per cent of the registered voters had voted. The distribution of votes between Poulson and Yorty was as follows: Number Per Cent Poulson 260,381 48.34 Yorty 276,106 51.26 Scattering 2,192 .40 Foulson conceded defeat early in the evening of election day. The polls closed at 7:00 p.m., and from the first count Yorty polled about 52 per cent of the vote, and his edge varied but little throughout the evening.^ On June 17, Yorty was quoted in the Los Angeles Times as saying that he had no intention of dropping the defamation suit which he was pressing in Superior Court against Poulson and his campaign managers, Baus and Ross. On June 23, Yorty increased the total damages he demanded to $4,400,000. However, on June 28, Yorty announced that he would continue to press legal action against Baus and ^Los Angeles Times. June 1, 1961. 100 72 Ross, but would abandon the action against Foulson. Baus and Ross, in response to Yorty*8 statement, issued a ijoint statement in which they declared: The lawsuit against us is based upon a press- radio-television interview with Mayor Poulson the day following the primary election. We did not arrange nor send out the invita tions for that conference. Neither of us had any knowledge in advance of the mayor's observations and charges. We made no press releases concerning these observations and charges at the time or subsequently.73 Thereupon Yorty, through his attorney, Phill Silver, announced that he would drop the suit against all three defendants. When asked why he decided to discontinue his efforts to obtain redress from Poulson and his political publicists, Yorty replied: How could 1 continue to press the case when 1 won the election? If I had lost the election, I might have carried it through, but my victory would have made any attempt on my part to prove that I had been injured by Poulson*s charges pointless.74 7^Los Angeles Times. June 28, 1961. 73Ibid. ^Interview with Samuel W. Yorty, June 20, 1962. Campaign Organization and Strategy 101 The campaign organizations of Foulson and Yorty reflected the political and economic positions of the two candidates. Poulson, who had already served two terms as mayor, could draw upon the reservoir of support which an Incumbent usually acquires and upon the financial resources available to a candidate who Is looked upon with favor by the business community. Moreover, Poulson could resurrect elements of the campaign structure which had put him into the mayor's office on two previous occasions. Yorty, by contrast, had no such "built in" support. As a politician who had been out of political office for seven years and who had been alienated from the leadership of his own political party for five, Yorty faced his opponent without comparable campaign revenues and manpower. The terms "professional" and "amateur" are not entirely appropriate for describing the differences between the two campaign organizations , but they nonetheless convey the Impression which most observers had of them. The Poulson organization.--For purposes of analysis, Poulson1s campaign organization may be viewed as having had five components: 1. The Baus and Ross Company 2. The Committee to Re-elect Mayor Poulson 3. John R. MacFaden Public Relations 4. Snyder-Smlth Advertising 5. The Committee for Election of John S. Gibson, Jr. , for Councilman and Nomination of Norris Poulson The Baus and Ross Company directed Poulson's 1953 and 1957 campaigns for mayor of Los Angeles. Although the firm had conducted successful campaigns for Poulson on two previous occasions, Poulson was not eager to use its services again because he felt that the firm was not effec tive in its contacts with the great mass of the voters. Poulson said, when interviewed, that before the campaign began he had come to the conclusion that a more broadly based campaign would have to be pursued in 1961 than in 1953 and 195 7.75 The Baus and Ross Company, which was closely identified with the business-Republiean interests of the city, could not, in Poulson's opinion, establish rapport with the Democratic voters of the city. Since, ^Interview with Norris Poulson, June 14, 1962. 103 however, his business backers--who were underwriting all of the costs of the campaign— Insisted upon the use of the firm, Poulson reluctantly acquiesced In the decision that the Baus and Ross Company would undertake the over-all direction of the campaign.^ The Baus and Ross Company, which offers about the most complete campaign management service available, divides Its services Into eight categories: campaign supervision, organization work, production, radlo- television , press, office management, accounting, and client service. To perform these services the agency maintains a staff composed of the following specialists. Campaign Supervlsers and Field Staff experi enced in organizing business, labor, civic and social groups, obtaining endorsements, arranging speaking engagements; Newspaper Publicists . including men and women who specialize In metropolitan dally press as well as community press and house organ work; s Radio-TV and Advertising Copywriters trained to write convincing copy designed to sell ideas rather than products; Production Staff geared to develop a variety of campaign aids with speed and effectiveness through year-around contact with suppliers in all branches of the graphic arts; ^Interview with Norris Poulson, June 14, 1962. 104 Fund Raisers with experience in soliciting organizations, business groups, and the general public.77 The firm operates with a staff of seven persons in non- campaign periods and a staff of twenty-seven to thirty persons in campaign periods. Herbert M. Baus, who received his introduction to * political campaign management as an employee of Whitaker and Baxter and who has done considerable writing in the field of public relations, has articulated his views on 78 campaigning in his book Publicity in Action. He divides a political campaign into four basic elements: facts, strategy, people, and publicity, the last element consist ing of four aspects which Baus terms "weapons": 1. Printing and distribution of literature of every description, including both direct mail and outdoor-display type; 2. Manning, training, and operating of a speakers' bureau; 3. Making, processing, and handling of news through press , radio and TV; and 79 4. Effective paid advertising through all media. ^^From an untitled brochure advertising the services offered by the Baus and Ross Company. ^Herbert M. Baus, Publicity in Action (New York: Harper, 1954). 79lbid., p. 256. 105 There are eight "fundamentals" of a Baus and Ross campaign, all of which are coordinated in a "packaged" operation: 1. A winning campaign strategy, 2. Thorough organization and field work. 3. An effective endorsement drive. 4. An intensive publicity campaign, including press and radio work. 5. Direct mail and pamphlet distribution. 6. A speakers' bureau. including registration of speakers and scheduling of engagements. 7. Hard-hitting advertising promotion. 80 8. Counsel and assistance in fund-raising. Baus believes that the electorate will make the "right decision" if it is given the "right information." The task of educating the public regarding political questions is the most demanding'activity in which the publicity agent can engage. Campaign management "boils down to the art of juggling in the air simultaneously a million details, keeping them from getting crossed up, keeping 80 From an untitled brochure advertising the services offered by the Baus and Ross Company. them moving."®*' The second part of the Poulson campaign organiza tion was the citizens' Committee to Re-elect Mayor Poulson, headed by Martin Pollard. The Committee was composed of members of the business and professional community and other persons who sought Poulson*s re-election. Pollard, a successful automobile distributor, a Democrat, and a former supporter of Fletcher Bowron, was a close friend of Poulson and assumed the position of general chairman of the Committee at the mayor's requebt. Because Poulson was unhappy with the selection of Baus and Ross as the firm to handle the campaign, he wanted a "personal" campaign 82 organization over which he could exercise some control. The Baus and Ross Company, which was retained on a contract basis, subcontracted with two other professional campaign management firms for specific aspects of the campaign. John R. MacFaden, with whom the firm had worked on several previous occasions, was hired to handle the "Special Campaign" among the Mexican-Americans, the Negroes, and the Democrats in the primary. MacFaden had ^Baus , Publicity in Action, p. 259. 82 Interview with Norris Poulson, June 14, 1962. 107 directed campaigns for both Republicans and Democrats and had developed extensive contacts among the minority groups of Los Angeles. Since the Baus and Ross Company found MacFaden very cooperative, it was able to exercise over-all 83 direction and budgetary control in the primary campaign. Because Poulson and Pollard were dissatisfied with the way in which MacFaden had handled the primary campaign, at their insistence Baus and Ross reluctantly replaced MacFaden with Snyder-Smith Advertising for the general election campaign. Snyder-Smith, a firm which works exclusively for Democrats in partisan elections , and which entered the 1961 mayoralty election on the side of Poulson because of the antipathy of the Democratic party toward Yorty, did not function congenially with Baus and Ross. In contrast to the relationship that had existed between Baus and Ross and MacFaden, Snyder-Smith usually reported to Poulson and Pollard; and Baus and Ross encountered great difficulty in its attempts to maintain general supervision over the campaign. Snyder-Smith spent approximately 40 per cent of the funds expended in Poulson1s general elec tion campaign, and over its expenditures Baus and Ross ^Interview with William B. Ross, June 26, 1962. 108 exercised only limited control.8^ The Committee for Election of John S. Gibson, Jr., for Councilman and Nomination of Norris Poulson was a established during the primary campaign by a dissident group of Poulson supporters In the San Pedro area that was dissatisfied with the way In which the Baus and Ross Company had been handling the campaign. Gibson was unop posed In his bid for re-election to the City Council, and the activities of the Committee were, therefore, directed 85 entirely to the benefit of Poulson. The Baus and Ross Company, which, In the Whitaker and Baxter tradition, favors a packaged type of operation In which the firm undertakes to plan all, or nearly all, aspects of a campaign, was thus confronted with several competing bodies within the Poulson compaign organization. The Committee to Re-elect Mayor Poulson was not responsive to the direction which Baus and Ross sought to exert, and the firm was consequently unable to achieve centralized determination of issues to be exploited and control of receipts and expenditures.®8 ^Interview with William B. Ross, June 26, 1962. 85Ibid. 86Ibid. 109 i Because Poulson was unable to use his voice to any great extent In either the primary or the general election campaign, Baus and Ross advised the mayor that his wisest course of action lay in making as few personal appearances as possible. Until the last week of the general election campaign the firm was successful in its efforts to keep Poulson off television, but the opinion of Pollard and Poulson's family that he should "go to the people" finally prevailed. When he appeared on six filmed 8 7 programs, Poulson was unable to speak above a whisper. During the last three days before the primary election, Baus and Ross, at Pollard's and Poulson's insist ence , employed a telephonic recording device in the harbor areas pf Los Angeles. The device, manufactured in the East, had been used for commercial selling purposes, but, to Ross' knowledge, had never been used in a political campaign. A recording of Poulson's voice was made--on a day when it was better than usual— and various electronic devices were used to "doctor it up."88 Names of registered voters were obtained from precinct sheets, and telephone ^Interview with William B. Ross, June 26, 1962. 88Ibid. 110 numbers were obtained from a reverse directory. Dialing was done manually by a group of volunteer campaign workers. When the person whose telephone number was dialed picked up the receiver, he heard a brief message in which the mayor asked for his vote. Baus and Ross opposed the use of the telephonic device on the grounds that it merely emphasized the fact that Poulson was unable to make "live" 89 appearances The community headquarters for Poulson were staffed by volunteers. In the San Fernando Valley, two headquarters were established, one run by Baus and Ross for the purpose of contacting Republicans , and one run by Snyder-Smith for the purpose of contacting Democrats. The only precinct canvassing in the Poulson campaign was done 90 in the Valley. MacFaden and Snyder-Smith worked through Negro Assemblyman August F. Hawkins and his brother, Edward, to win the Negro vote. "Gus" Hawkins, elected from the Sixty-second Assembly district, which is almost completely Negro in racial composition, has been in office ®^Interview with William B. Ross, June 26, 1962. 90Ibid. Ill 91 continuously since 1934. In past campaigns, Baus and Ross had approached the Mexican-American community of Los Angeles through the Community Service Organization (CSO). The Community Service Organization . . . was begun after the Second World War in order to mobilize the voting strength of Mexicans. It was built on a base of labor unions and social workers, stimulated by workers from a Chicago organization called the Industrial Areas Foundation headed by Saul Alinsky. A non-partisan organization, the CSO does not endorse candidates but does take posi tions on issues and particularly emphasizes voter participation. Its voter registration drives have usually been exceptionally successful. Working door-to-door in the Mexican community, it has enrolled, in some years , as many as 25 ,000 voters. The ability of CSO to turn out the vote is widely believed to have been crucial in the election of Edward Roybal, a Mexican-American social worker, to the Los Angeles City Council. Roybal, like Hawkins among the Negroes, has remained the sole elective official from his ethnic group. In addition to the CSO, the Mexican community has two or three other, less important community organizations, such as the American G. I. Forum (a veteran's organization) and the Mexican- Amerlcan Political Association (MAPA). The CSO is remarkable in that it has a solid working- class base, which is rare in organizations.of this kind.92 91 James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 278. 92Ibid. , p. 286. 112 In 1961, however, MacFaden and Snyder-Smith were unable to work through the CSO because Roybal, the most prominent Mexican-American identified with the organiza tion , was an active supporter of Yorty. MacFaden and Snyder-Smith sent two mailings of campaign literature to Mexican-Americans, but, in Ross1 judgment, their efforts were futile. An "Arriba Poulson" committee was established 93 but met with little success. The Yorty organization.--Like Poulson's, the Yorty campaign organization had several components. 1. Eleanor Chambers 2. Irvin L. Edelstein Associates 3. Individuals who volunteered their services, particularly George Putnam Chambers, a Democrat who has been associated with Yorty in his political campaigns since 1945, acted as his campaign manager in the 1961 mayoralty election. During the campaign she maintained an office at the main head quarters located on Wilshire Boulevard, and from this office she supervised and coordinated the activities of ^Interview with William B. Ross, June 26, 1962. 113 the thirty campaign centers which were established. Chambers Is not a professional political publicist of the sort typified by Baus and Ross, and Whitaker and Baxter. She has acquired considerable experience In the general phases of campaign management but does not undertake to handle all the mass media aspects of campaigning. At one time she served as state director of the Federal Works Agency. Among the other candidates for whom she has worked are Thomas H. Kuchel, candidate for United States senator In 1956, and William F. Knowland, candidate for 94 governor of California in 1958. Edelstein, head of a Los Angeles advertising- public relations firm, became Yorty's public relations counsel in January, 1961. In January, Yorty had visited Edelstein's office for the purpose of obtaining some information regarding a campaign which sought revision of real estate assessment methods and on which Edelstein had done some publicity work. Yorty thought that he might 95 want to exploit the issue in his campaign for mayor. 94 Interview with Eleanor Chambers, June 19, 1962. Mrs. Chambers was appointed Yorty*s chief executive assistant upon his election. ^Interview with Irvin L. Edelstein, June 22, 1962. 114 Prior to his visit, Edelstein had never met Yorty. A few days later Yorty returned to Edelstein's office to seek assistance in the writing of some press releases. Although Yorty advised him that he had virtually no money to spend in the primary campaign, Edelstein agreed to help him because he was extremely impressed with Yorty*s sin cerity and ability to sell himself. What began as an agency-client relationship developed, as the campaign progressed, into a close friendship.9^ Throughout both the primary and the general election campaigns, Edelstein provided many professional services for which he received 97 no financial remuneration. All political advertising and television time were arranged by Edelstein. Attached to the Yorty "political camp" during the primary campaign was a small, dedicated corps of volunteer workers. Their number increased in size after the primary--when the field of candidates had been narrowed to two. The factors which motivated these persons to volun teer their services to Yorty were, of course, varied and not easy to identify. Some undoubtedly agreed with the 96 Interview with Irvin L. Edelstein, June 22, 1962. 97Ibid. 115 issues of the election as Yorty defined them; others just as probably--particularly after the primary--saw Yorty as a vehicle on which they could "ride to city hall." A Youth for Yorty organization was formed for the purpose of enlisting the support of college students , and the members of this group helped staff the various campaign head quarters and performed many of the routine campaign tasks 98 required in a campaign. Two direct mailings of campaign literature were used in the Yorty campaign. No large billboards were used because of the expense involved, but seven hundred poster- size billboards bearing a picture of Yorty were placed throughout the city." Four hundred poster-size billboards were employed in the Poulson campaign at a cost of $40 per w j 100 board. The McGee organization.--Councilman McGee's primary election campaign was directed by the Bob Voigt Agency, a professional campaign management firm. Several campaign centers were established that were staffed by volunteer "interview with Irvin L. Edelstein, June 22, 1962. "ibid. ^■"interview with William B. Ross, June 26, 1962. 116 campaign workers. McGee's organization does not appear to have been large or to have undertaken an elaborate cam paign. An effort was made, however, to recruit support among the Mexican-Americans by establishing a campaign headquarters in east Los Angeles. Mass Media in the Election The mass media that were utilized in the 1961 mayoralty election were the daily and community Newspapers, television, and, to a much lesser extent, radio. With the rise of television to a commanding position in the enter tainment industry, radio, a much less expensive medium, has declined in terms of its use as a means for communicat ing political appeals. What effects the increased importance of television has had upon newspapers is yet to be determined and is the subject of debate among mass media specialists. Newspapers.--In April, 1961, the city of Los Angeles had four metropolitan daily newspapers. The Los Angeles Times and the Examiner had average circulations for their Sunday editions of 907,027 and 678,280, respectively. The Mirror . with an average^daily circulation. 117 of 312,238, and the Herald & Express. with an average daily circulation of 364,690, did not publish Sunday editions. There were approximately seventy-five community newspapers serving particular geographical areas of Los Angeles. As explained in Chapter I, a questionnaire was mailed to seventy-seven newspapers, including the four dailies, listed in Ayer's Directory as being published and circulated within the city limits of Los Angeles.The editors of the papers were asked whether or not their papers endorse candidates in political campaigns, and, if so, to name the candidate endorsed in the 1961 mayoralty 102 election. See Table 2 for data concerning the endorse ment of Foulson and Yorty by Los Angeles newspapers. No attempt was made to ascertain the number of column inches devoted to the favored candidate or the other information which a thorough content analysis would reveal. In addi tion, the following problems were encountered in the survey. *®^N. W. Ayer and Son, Directory of Newspapers and Periodicals (Philadelphia: N. W. Ayer and Son, 1961). 102 See Appendix A for copy of questionnaire and Appendix B for list of newspapers to which it was sent. TABLE 2 ENDORSEMENT OF POULSON AND YORTY BY LOS ANGELES NEWSPAPERS® f___________________ NO. OF PAPERS CIRCULATION OF PAPERSb 4 u 4 ) a 4 Total 1 1 4 Number 2 of J Candidate Papers 5 5 Poulson 35 3 1 4 5 2,859,921 597,686 59,782 15,270 16,114 171,183 Yorty 27 2 1 2 3 377,943 377,943 61,875 17,250 4,410 26,000 Not - • Ascertained 6 0 0 1 3 39,923° t 39,923 0 0 d 39,923 g Questionnaires sent to 77 papers listed in Ayer's Directory of Newspapers and Periodicals. 1961, Nine of the 71 papers answering the questionnaire did not endorse any candidate, ^Figures represent r'erage circulation per issue (paid subscriptions plus those distributed free of charge) as reported in Aver's Directory. Sunday circulation used for Los Angeles Times and Examiner. Circulation figures not available for three of the six papers, ^Circulation figures not available for the one paper in this category. eThe San Fernando Sun, listed in Ayer's Directory as having a circulation of 27,492, did not answer the questionnaire sent to its post office box. It is not listed in the appropriate telephone directory. 0 1 k 4 ) 0 S * 4 4 O a S P > > f i U C 4 0 0 *rl 5 J k k u 4 ) O •H C 4 a c U 00 k 4 ) •H 4 ) ' tuX 1 4 1 a 4 < k 4 k ^ 00 1 O Ik 4 1 y C C h & • H * 4 3 a 4 C T 3 « 0 k k 4 1 Ik 23 h tI 4) 4 ) H B H 4 1 X a a h H Boo. 4 ) 4J 4 4 H 0 C 4 X 0 a > < 0 H Ik 4 k 4 1 4 ) 6l a 4 4 O a c i 4 a 0 • H c 4 0 ) k 60 k k 4 1 • H 4 ) 4 1 i 4 1 , a a < k 4 4 i O a a c a 4 4 * 0 O k k 4 ) k • H 4 ) 4 ) H 6 0 X a a H 4 1 4! a 4 4 z x o a > Although a paper may be listed In Aver1 s Directory as being published and circulated In Los Angeles , Its circulation may, In fact, extend to areas outside Los Angeles. Some papers which are not published In Los Angeles may circulate In Los Angeles and may endorse Los Angeles mayoralty candidates. Community newspapers, In most cases, have either no paid circulation or only a small paid circulation, the greater part of their circulation being in the form of "throwaways." While it may be assumed that the paid sub scribers of these papers have some use for them, it is Impossible, without a systematic survey, to determine the extent and level of interest to be found among subscribers and nonsubscribers. Given the survey technique employed in this study, it was not possible to measure the degree of influence which any particular paper exercises on the opinion formation process of the public. Some papers are no doubt seen as being more authoritative with respect to political questions than others. 5. Because one publisher may circulate as many as six different papers in Los Angeles as parts of a chain, a figure representing the total number of papers supporting a candidate, without circulation data, is meaningless. The news and advertising content of the papers in a chain may vary, but the editorship and the editorial policy are usually the same for all the papers in the chain. Morris Janowltz, in The Community Press in an Urban Setting» views the community press of metropolitan Chicago as an operating system. In discussing the future of the community press , he summarizes his findings as follows: After three decades of growth, the community press has been established as a sound business venture. This was possible as a result of the decentralization of the central business district combined with technological innovations in the press trades. . . . Contentwise, the distinctive aspects of the community press relate to the division of labor in supplying news which has grown up between the daily and the community press. . . . The community news paper presents a content which is low in controversy 121 and thereby affords stark relief from the "noise" of the daily press, and the other mass media. Moreover, it extends prestige to those individuals who are without influence or reputation and who by their sheer numbers are excluded from the columns of the daily press. . . . The extensive reader interest in the community press is related to family attributes and community orientations. . . . Moreover, the impact of the community press is conditioned by the imagery of its audience which sees the contents in a non commercialized, non-partisan perspective. . . . Finally the community newspaper is characterized by a network of personal communications which sur rounds its formal and mass character.103 The relationship between the daily press and the community press of Los Angeles has been characterized by some persons as being conditioned by an intense competi tion for advertising. The fact that the dailies have begun to publish special advertising editions for various communities in Los Angeles is cited as evidence of this. It is also asserted that the community’ papers reinforce community identification and thus retard efforts to promote affective allegiance to the city as a whole. Both Poulson and Yorty have stated their belief that the community papers of Los Angeles played a signifi cant role in the 1961 mayoralty election. Poulson 1 0“ ^ Morris Janowitz, The Community Press in an Urban Setting (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1952), pp. 226- 227. 122 maintains that the vast majority of the papers editorially supported Yorty and that this support was dictated by 9 desire to "discredit" the metropolitan dailies and to "make a grab for circulation and advertising. He further averred that . . . the community papers used Chavez Ravine as the stick with which to beat the drum. They screamed that the mayor, encouraged by the L. A. dailies, was giving away the people's land.105 Yorty concurs in Poulson's estimate of the amount of sup port which he was given by the community papers. Eleanor Chambers has also stated that Yorty owed his victory, in part at least, to the fact that a majority of the papers backed Yorty. As can be seen from Table 2, the hypothesis that one factor contributing to Yorty's victory was his support by a majority of the Los Angeles community newspapers must be rejected. Of the seventy-one papers for which informa tion was obtained, sixty-two endorsed a candidate in the 1961 mayoralty election. Thirty-five papers , including the ^■^Norris Poulson, "The Untold Story of Chavez Ravine," Los Angeles, III (April, 1962), 17. 105Ibid. ^■^Interview with Eleanor Chambers, June 19, 1962. 123 four dailies , endorsed Poulson, and twenty-seven endorsed Yorty. The total average daily circulation of all the Poulson papers was 2,859,921, the Yorty papers, 377,943. When the circulation for the daily papers is not included, the total circulation figure for the Poulson papers drops to 597,686. The Negro press of Los Angeles was closely divided in its support of the two candidates. The Sentinel, the Firestone Park News . and the Star Review. having a total circulation of 59,782, supported Poulson. The Firestone Park News and the Star Review» while not usually classified as Negro papers , were included in the Negro press because they serve areas which are predominantly Negro in racial composition and because the editor of the chain with which both papers are associated is a Negro. The Herald-Dispatch and the California Eagle, Negro papers with a total circu lation of 61,875, backed Yorty1s candidacy. The Mexican-American press was also almost evenly divided in its endorsement of mayoralty candidates. La Opinion, with 15,270 circulation, supported Poulson, whereas the Belvedere Citizen, with 17,250 circulation, supported Yorty. 124 The community papers serving the San Fernando Valley were divided five to three in favor of Poulson, and the total circulation of the Poulson papers was 171,183 as opposed to 26,000 for the Yorty papers. Thus, the hypothe sis regarding community newspaper support cannot be substantiated even in the Valley where Yorty resided. The Peopled World, a newspaper published by the Communist party, expressed its dislike for both Yorty and Poulson in an editorial which appeared on Saturday, April 15, 1961. On May 31, in less that [sic] seven weeks, Los Angeles will elect a Mayor. Who will be chief executive of the country's third largest city? It could be Jack Tenney's predecessor and first chairman of the "Little Dies" committee, the State's first Un-American Activities group. It could be a candidate who was for Richard M. Nixon in November and a few months later was plaster ing campaign stickers all over town proclaiming himself a Democrat. It could £e a candidate professing himself as a champion of minorities and a foe of police brutality while giving Chief of Police William H. Parker a pat on the back and blaring the need for 5,000 more cops. It could be Sam W. Yorty. Widespread discontent with the administration of Mayor Norris Poulson, amply documented by the. primary, contributed largely to the present 125 situation. And the Incumbent, underestimating and possibly insensitive to this resentment, was con tent to stand pat, advancing no new policies. But the basic factor was the failure of the liberal forces, who express themselves through the Democratic party, to put forward a recognized spokesman. Leaders of the Democratic party abdicated their responsibility to project such a spokesman. They helped to create a political vacuum made to order for a demagogue to pin the Democratic label on himself and grab the nomination. Meanwhile, leaders of the Republican party played it snug under the phoney label of non partisanship by having two candidates in the primary— Poulson and Councilman Patrick McGee. The fact they nearly managed to nominate both of them serves to underscore the folly of the Demo cratic party leaders in letting themselves in for this nonpartisan fiction. The people of Los Angeles thus are confronted with a dangerous situation. In the succeeding weeks, The People's World proposes to dig into the basic considerations and issues as the campaign develops. More is at stake than the political fortunes of two candidates.107 The Yorty campaign staff thereupon prepared campaign literature in which the editorial was reprinted and in which it was pointed out that the Communists feared the election of Yorty because of the role he had played in * fighting the party at the state and national levels. ^ ^ People's World (San Francisco), April 15, 1961. 126 Television and radio.--Irvin L. Edelsteln has commented on the strategy which guided use of television In the Yorty campaign. During the entire primary campaign, we spent only $800--for one quarter-hour tv show. . . . But we took every chance that was offered for a free appearance on radio and television. Mr. Yorty encouraged the broadcast reporters to cover his news conferences and they did. More than that, he called on the newscasters and commenta tors and made himself available for Interviews or brief appearances on news programs and he saw to it that he always had something newsworthy to say. I felt the thing most needed was for Mr. Yorty to impress his personality on the Los Angeles voters, to let them get to know his true person ality , not a contrived Madison Avenue 'image1 but the man as he really is. . . . The best, the only way to do this was with television and I felt that the best way to use tv was to have our candi date appear alone for a half-hour stand-up talk direct to the viewers. This was a hard thing to sell. Mr. Yorty and his political advisers wanted to have other people around to break up the monotony of a one-man show.108 The lack of extensive campaign funds severely limited the amount of television time which Yorty could purchase and, as Edelsteln indicates , full advantage was taken of the opportunity to appear on news and public-affairs programs. ■*"^®Irvin L. Edelsteln, as quoted in "The Best TV Candidate Wins the Election," Broadcasting, LXI (July 10, 1961), 86. 127 George Putnam, a Los Angeles news commentator employed by KTTV, Channel 11, was Yorty's greatest asset in the presentation of his campaign case to the public. Putnam, who employs a rather emotional approach to the reporting of news events, offered Poulson, Yorty, and McGee equal time--on film--on his 6:45 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. news broadcasts to answer any charges made in the campaign. Whenever one of the candidates indicated a desire to appear on his program, Putnam called the others and offered them the same opportunity. According to Putnam, Poulson never accepted his offer, McGee did on several occasions, and Yorty accepted every offer, appearing about once a week 109 during the primary and general election campaigns. After the primary, Putnam made a number of personal appearances in behalf of Yorty. He spoke to approximately fifteen different groups--Negro, Jewish, Filipino, Chinese, * Nisei, Catholic, and non-minority. Yorty and Putnam appeared together on about five of these occasions. Robert Goe, who was appointed an executive assistant to the mayor when Yorty assumed office, was an 1 09 Interview with George Putnam, June 20, 1962. 110Ibid. 128 employee of KTTV at 'the time of the election and worked with Putnam in the Yorty campaign. Because Putnam, Goe, and Edelstein believed that Yorty was a "natural for the use of television in a campaign," they adopted the strategy of trying to provoke Poulson into replying to the charges about his land and cattle holdings in Oregon.Goe was assigned the task of collecting information about the Baker properties. He ascertained the value of Aberdeen Angus bulls from the breeders' association and then assisted in the preparation of news releases in which Yorty alleged that Poulson had prize bulls worth $250,000. It was the hope of the Yorty campaign staff to alienate Poulson from Baus and Ross, who were doing everything possible to keep Poulson off television and from public appearanaes. This was accomplished, and shortly before the general election Poulson held a press-radio-television interview at which he was able to speak only in a whisper. Films and tape recordings of the interview were used as campaign material by the Yorty campaign organization. ^^Interview with Robert Goe, June 19, 1962. 129 Yorty, through Edelsteln, "bought five half-hours on KRCA (TV) for . . . weekly live telecasts, starting 1 I O May 1 and running right up to election day." This series , entitled "Report to the Citizens," presented Yorty with an opportunity to talk about what he considered to be the problems of the city. Seen during "prime evening time," Yorty appeared alone and used no scripts. Edelsteln describes how he felt after the first of these broadcasts. After the first of these programs , I expected to be besieged with telephone calls at the station and at campaign headquarters because I thought that Yorty had done a magnificent job. No calls came, and I began to think that Mr. Yorty, who had been reluctant to appear on the program, had been right. I went home feeling terrible, but the next day I was delighted with the fact that tele phone calls praising Yorty1s performance started to come in.ll^ Yorty appeared as a guest on several local tele vision programs during the general election campaign. Among these were the "Tom Duggan" show on KCOP, Channel 13, and Ed Fleming's "Candidate" series on KABC, Channel 7. On general election eve, Putnam acted as master of cere monies for a one-hour, paid, question and answer program ^■^Irvin L. Edelsteln, as quoted in "The Best TV Candidate Wins the Election," p. 86. 114 Interview with Irvin L. Edelsteln, June 22, 1962. on KTTV. Yorty answered questions asked by the studio audience. Poulson was invited to be present, but he |declined to appear personally or to be represented. In I all, Putnam participated in three television programs paid i for by the Yorty campaign organization. Goe estimates i that about $6,000 was spent for television time during the primary campaign and about $70,000 during the general election campaign. KTTV, Channel 11, the television station to which Putnam is under contract, Is owned by the Times-Mirror Company, which also owns the Los Angeles Times. Putnam, when asked how he was able to take such an active part in Yorty*s campaign at a time when his employer was supporting Poulson, replied that he was accorded complete freedom of action. Putnam said that he backed Yorty because he agreed with him that too many special interests were being served by the Poulson administration. The principal issues of the election, as Putnam saw them, were "Influence peddling, shady dealing, and preferential treatment. Interview with George Putnam, June 20, 1962. ^^Interview with Robert Goe, June 19, 1962. ^^Intervlew with George Putnam, June 20, 1962. 131 At least one observer of the 1961 mayoralty election has commented on the ethical question posed when a television news commentator openly supports a candidate 118 seeking public office. Putnam, while denying that his news broadcasts displayed any partiality with respect to Yorty, nonetheless admits that a conflict between his personal and professional lives did exist. In fact, if Yorty were to decide to run for governor of California in 1966 , Putnam would probably resign from his position with 119 KTTV to work full time in Yorty's campaign. The same philosophy which guided the use of tele vision in the Yorty campaign also guided the use of radio. We bought very little time on radio. We took advantage of every opportunity for free time, however, and tapes of Yorty's voice were heard on many occasions. We had only one paid program on radio: a taped interview with George Putnam. This was a last minute e f f o r t .120 Edelsteln argues that Yorty had to turn to television and radio to ensure that his campaign case would be heard. The support given Poulson by the metropolitan newspapers 118"TV and the Election,” Frontier, XII (July, 1961), 23-24. 119 Interview with George Putnam, June 20, 1962. 120 Interview with Irvin L. Edelsteln, June 22, 1962. 132 necessitated exploitation of competing media of communica tion. Although the dallies were solidly behind Poulson, and Yorty was severely disadvantaged with respect to news coverage in the primary, Edelsteln nevertheless believes that the metropolitan papers aided Yorty during the general election campaign. There was a virtual news blackout during the primary campaign with respect to Yorty. After the primary, the Los Angeles Times assigned a reporter to the Yorty campaign, and we began to get some better coverage. The coverage favored Poulson, but I feel that we got a pretty fair "shake.'* Although Yorty disagrees with me, I think that the metropolitan papers aided him in his campaign. He was news, and they had to say something about him.121 Very little can be said about the use of television and radio in the Poulson campaign because very little use was made of them. Campaign spot announcements were used, but personal appearances by Poulson were effectively dis couraged by Baus and Ross. It was not until May 22 that Poulson, against the advice of Baus and Ross, appeared in the first of a television series called "The Man and the City." The series, which was filmed, consisted of six, five-minute programs and was shown on several television ^-^Interview with Irvin L. Edelstein, June 22, 1962. 133 channels. Poulson was also seen, on film, on Ed Fleming's "Candidate" and on a few news broadcasts. Poulson's appearance on the Fleming program was most unfortunate for him. Film clips of Poulson and Yorty were shown one after the other, and Poulson, whose voice had not improved, suffered greatly by comparison. Under the best of circum stances, Poulson was not as adroit a public speaker as Yorty. With a scarcely audible voice, Poulson was no match for his opponent. Facts Consolidated, a commercial polling organiza tion , conducted a survey of Los Angeles voters during the 122 period July 13 to July 24, 1961. Among the questions asked the respondents were: 122 The information regarding the Facts Consolidated poll was obtained from a copy of the survey results which was made available to the writer by a source who asked that his name not be revealed. Because the poll was conducted for a private party and because the results were confiden tial , it was not possible to obtain precise information regarding the sampling methods used. The report of the survey results indicates, however, that to "accomplish the purposes of this study a sampling plan was developed, a sample was selected, and respondent quotas were estab lished. The personal 'face-to-face' interviewing method was used, yielding 627 completed Interviews." Further more, "the sample was determined by first dividing the City of Los Angeles into nine arbitrarily defined areas. Within each area, census tracts, as defined by the Bureau of the Census 1960, were randomly chosen. The number of tracts to be chosen for any given area was determined by 134 1. In this election for mayor, what sources of information did you find helpful In under standing the issues and helping you decide for whom to vote? 2. Of these sources of information, which did you find most helpful? In other words , where did you get most of your Information that aided you in your decision? 3. In this election, do you think radio, tele vision, or the newspapers were the most effective in winning votes for either candidate? The responses to these questions are reported in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6. It will be seen that whereas 77 per cent of all the respondents considered television to have been a help ful source of information about the election issues and candidates, 81.3 per cent of the Yorty voters--as opposed to 69.2 per cent of the Poulson voters— listed television among the helpful sources of information. Similarly, when making it proportional to the population of the area it represented. A map of each census tract was prepared and given to interviewers with a specific quota to be com pleted. Within each census tract assigned interviewers were instructed to obtain half the interviews with men and half with women. Interviews were completed with, and the results indicate data from, registered voters in the City of Los Angeles. In addition, a further quota control was imposed so that within each tract, interviewers were to obtain information only from men and women in age groups proportional to the actual population of these age groups within the area. ..." 135 TABLE 3 HELPFUL SOURCES OF INFORMATION, BY CANDIDATE VOTED FOR Total Poulson Yorty Number of respondents voting for mayor 365 130 235 Per cent saying the sources of information they found helpful were: 7. 7. % Television 77.0 69.2 81.3 Metropolitan newspapers 75.6 83.1 71.5 Friends and relatives 43.0 43.1 43.0 Radio 43.0 41.5 43.8 Local newspapers r - « . • CM 50.0 38.7 Political clubs or organizat ions 19.2 16.9 20.4 Sample ballot booklet 18.4 19.2 17.9 Direct mail brochures 13.2 13.9 12.8 Civic organizations 9.3 10.0 8.9 Business associates 7.9 6.2 8.9 Unions 5.2 1.5 7.2 Don't know .3 • • .4 None of these 3.0 5.4 1.7 357.8 360.0 356.5 Note: Sums of columns exceed 100 per cent because of multiple answers. Source: Facts Consolidated poll, August 4, 1961. 136 TABLE 4 SOURCE OF INFORMATION MOST HELPFUL, BY CANDIDATE VOTED FOR Total Poulson Yorty Number of respondents voting for mayor 365 130 235 Per cent paying the sources of information they found helpful were: % % % Television 43.3 26.9 52.3 Metropolitan newspapers 23.6 36.9 16.2 Friends and relatives 10.4 8.5 11.5 Radio 4.1 3.9 4.3 Local newspapers 4.7 8.5 2.6 Political clubs or organiz at ions 2.2 3.1 1.7 Sample ballot booklet 1.9 1.5 2.1 Direct mail brochures .5 1.5 * • Civic organizations .8 1.5 .4 Business associates .6 • • .8 Unions .5 • • .8 Don1t know 2.5 1.5 3.0 None of these 4.9 6.2 4.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Facts Consolidated poll, August 4, 1961. 137 TABLE 5 EFFECTIVENESS OF RADIO, TELEVISION, OR NEWSPAPERS IN WINNING VOTES, BY CANDIDATE VOTED FOR Total Poulson Yorty Not Voting Number of respondents 627 130 235 262 Per cent saying in this election the most effective me dium in winning votes was: % % % 7. Television 60.8 51.1 72.7 55.6 Newspapers 21.8 23.7 16.0 25.6 Radio 6.7 5.9 5.0 8.5 Don't know 10.7 19.3 6.3 10.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Facts Consolidated poll, August 4, 1961. 138 TABLE 6 EFFECTIVENESS OF RADIO, TELEVISION, OR NEWSPAPERS IN WINNING VOTES, BY AREA 4 ) h 9 W f c 0 Vi H 00 H V < 9 s> 0 1 § h 9 W H 0 >i W 4 ) Vi H C H 0 0 O > 0 • o 4 1 h Vi H 0 0 H 0 id M > 00 4 ) H 4 1 ! 00 5 u 00 £ & 0 & A U 4 ) 0 O Vi r l o o e 4 ) 4 ) S S > 0 4J « 00 >» 4 1 4 1 a p4 o o 0 hJ 00 H V i 0 4 V i V o 0 S* 4 ) M O o o 4 ) £ H V i 4 1 4 ) V I • H J C 00 s 1 3 I I 0 ■i h) P i 0 H > H H 0 - H X C O 0 V i 3 3 0 H Io o V I 043 0 * 400 < rl H 0 0 «* | V l 0 < V i H a >i« 333 Number of respondents 72 52 54 54 55 53 108 92 87 Per cent saying In this election the most effec tive medium in winning votes was: 7 . I X % I I I I I Television 74.0 48.1 70.4 61.1 47.3 64.1 73.1 47.7 62.1 Newspapers 2.7 21.2 16.7 18.5 40.0 18.9 17.6 29.2 27.6 Radio • • 3.8 7.4 5.6 7.3 3.8 5.6 16.2 3.4 Don't know 23.3 26.9 5.5 14.8 5.4 13.2 3.7 6.9 6.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Facts Consolidated poll, August 4, 1961, ♦ 139 the respondents were asked what was the most helpful source of Information, nearly twice as many Yorty voters cited television as did Poulson voters. Conversely, Poulson voters, by more than two to one, saw the metropolitan news papers as having been the most helpful source. When the respondents were asked to rate the effectiveness of tele vision, radio, and the newspapers, the Yorty voters felt that television was more effective than did the Poulson voters. However, both the Yorty and the Poulson voters-- 72.7 and 51.1 per cent, respectively-ranked television first among the three media in terms of effectiveness in winning votes. Campaign Finance The Elections Code of the state of California provides that each candidate and each campaign committee "organized for the purpose or charged with the duty of conducting the election campaign of any political party or of any candidate or group of candidates" must file state ments of campaign receipts and expenses with the clerk of the county in which the election is held. A candidate or nominee for a municipal office need not file a campaign statement if the lawful receipts and expenses of his 140 campaign did not exceed two hundred dollars. However, elected candidates or candidates nominated at a primary election must file a written declaration stating that their campaign receipts and expenses did not exceed that amount. A candidate and the treasurer of each committee must file their campaign statements within thirty-five days after the election or primary, or not later than the day pre ceding the day upon which the candidate takes office, whichever occurs first. A certificate of nomination or election may not be issued until the candidate has filed 123 the required forms. The Poulson campaign.--On April 27, 1961, Norris Poulson filed with the county registrar of voters a state ment in which he reported that he had neither personally received nor expended any funds in behalf of his candidacy in the primary campaign. Malcolm M. Devore, treasurer of the Committee to Re-elect Mayor Poulson, on May 5, filed a 123Sections 11501, 11502, 11561, 11563, 11564, 11565, 11568. Recent modifications of the Elections Code, effective September 15, 1961, require that candidates for municipal offices and treasurers of campaign committees file their statements with the office of the clerk of the city in which the election is held, not with the county clerk. statement which reflected that the Committee had received $152,663.00 in contributions and that it had made expendi tures in the Poulson primary campaign totaling $147,682.58. The statement indicated that all but approximately $400.00 had been paid to Baus and Ross who had exercised budgetary control over the expenditures. The $400.00 was paid for a public opinion poll. On May 8, John R. MacFaden, treasurer of the "Special Campaign," filed a statement in which he reported that he had received $28,407.00 in con tributions and had supervised the expenditure of $33,226.67. The Committee for Election of John S. Gibson, Jr., for Councilman and Nomination of Norris Poulson reported that its receipts amounted to $1,785.33 and its expenditures to $1,771.31. Thus, in the primary election, the total reported receipts of the Poulson campaign organization were $182,855.33 and the expenditures $182,680.56. On June 8, Poulson reported that he had not person ally received or spent any monies in his general election campaign. Richard S. Drake, assistant treasurer of the Committee to Re-elect Mayor Poulson, filed a statement on July 3 in which he declared that the Committee had received and spent $162,364.25. Of this amount, $54,383.45 was paid to Snyder-Smith, $102,958.96 to Baus and Ross, and 142 $4,871.84 to John R. MacFaden. A public opinion polling firm was paid $150.00. In all, therefore, the total receipts reported for the Poulson primary and general election campaigns were $345,219.58; the total expenditures reported for both campaigns were $345,044.81. Attached to the various statements filed by the treasurers of the campaign committees that worked In behalf of Poulson were lists of the names of persons from whom contributions had been received and to whom payments had been made. These lists, however, yield very little information regarding the precise nature of the receipts and expenditures. The Yorty campaign.--Yorty, in his personal state ment of campaign receipts and expenditures , reported that in the primary he had received $8,424.37 in contributions from his supporters and that he had spent none of his own money in that campaign. The report, which was filed on April 10, 1961, indicated that $8,111.30 had been expended by the Yorty campaign organization in the primary. On June 22, Yorty filed a statement in which he declared that he personally had received no funds from other persons, but that he had spent $200.00 of his own 143 money in the general election campaign. A report filed by Edith Cetto, treasurer of the Yorty general election cam paign committee, states that $13,907.07, including the balance of $313.07 left from the primary campaign, had been received and $13,865.57 spent by that committee. Total receipts of $22,218.37 and expenditures of $22,176.87 were, therefore, reported for Yorty1s primary and general elec tion campaigns. When queried about Robert Goe's estimate that approximately $70,000 had been spent in the general election campaign for television time, Yorty replied that the true figure would be at least that amount but that he 10/ could not provide more accurate information. Like Poulson's, the statements of receipts and expenditures filed by the Yorty campaign organization are not sufficiently explicit and detailed to be of real value in determining the ways in which the funds were obtained and spent. This is the case, in large measure, because the provisions of the Elections Code relating to campaign finance statements have many inadequacies and loopholes ^^Interview with Samuel W. Yorty, June 20, 1962. 144 125 and have never been properly enforced. The McGee campaign.--McGee filed a statement on May 9 in which he declared that he had spent $880.00 of his own money during the primary campaign. The Bob Voigt Agency, the professional campaign management firm which directed McGee's campaign, reported on the same day that the Pat McGee for Mayor Committee had received $9,335.00 in campaign revenues and had spent $10,844.96. Voigt was paid $3,000 for his services as campaign manager. Leonard Carl Rowe, "Political Campaign Funds in California" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1957). CHAPTER IV THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE ELECTION Nonpartisanship in municipal politics is premised on the assumption that city government is essentially different from government at the state and national levels. The reformers of the first decade of the twentieth century believed that the two-party system, with its supposedly inherent vices of bossism, patronage, and spoils, would distort democracy at the local level and divert attention from the important issues of public policy. Lee, in his study of the nonpartisan political process in California, states that i Of the groups active in local politics only one is of specific concern in the statutes govern ing nonpartisan municipal elections: the political party. The statutes deny to the party the place ment on the ballot of the local candidate's political affiliation. Thus the political party, despite its preferred place at the state or national level, is reduced to the same legal status in the political arena as all other groups 145 146 in the local community-social, religious, economic, or geographical.1 Nevertheless, the political parties may play an influential role in local politics, regardless of the ballot form. In fact, the California evidence would suggest that, even in a strongly nonpartisan environment, the parties and partisan influences remain less exceptional than the gen eralization cited above implies. . . . 2 In a survey of local officials and party leaders in 192 California cities , it was ascertained that in eighteen of the cities parties were reported as having been active in city or school elections during the preceding four-year period. Of the eighteen cities , one party or both were reported active in mayoralty campaigns in four cities; in school-board campaigns in seven cities; and in clty-council races in sixteen cities. (The relatively low figure for mayoralty races indicates the small number of separately elected mayors in the state.) Democratic activity only was reported in five cities , Republican activity only in three cities, and both parties active in nine cities. (For one city, this phase of the question was not answered.)3 % In the 1961 mayoralty election in Los Angeles, elements of partisanship, in a rather peculiar form, were ^Eugene C. Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1960), p. 97. 2Ibid. , p. 98. 3Ibid., p. 102. 147 Introduced by prominent leaders of one of the two major parties for the purpose of accomplishing a particular objective. The other major party did not feel obliged to play an identifiable role in the election. The Republican Party Norris Poulson, a life-long Republican who had served in Congress under that party's banner for more than ten years, entered the 1961 mayoralty election with the tacit, if not expressed, blessings of the Republican business and professional groups of Los Angeles. In 1953, 1957, and 1961, Poulson was recruited as a candidate by these groups, and it was they who underwrote the financial aspects of his campaigns. During his tenure as mayor, Poulson had done little to disturb the political milieu that these interests favored. In fact, because on the threshold of the election, few persons--Republicans and Democrats alike--appeared to be unhappy with the way in which Poulson had managed the city's affairs, the Republi can party probably saw no need to intervene, officially or unofficially, in the 1961 election. The mayor's campaign was to be managed by a professional campaign management 148 firm which was closely identified with the Republican business interests of the city and which had successfully directed his 1953 and 1957 campaigns. Also, in view of the fact that only approximately 409,000 of the city's 1,128,070 registered voters were Republicans, the Republi can party no doubt considered nonpartisanship to be a political necessity. Julius A. (Jud) Leetham, chairman of the Los Angeles County Republican Central Committee, announced, on May 23, his personal endorsement of Poulson, but at the same time emphasized that it should not be construed to be an official endorsement by the Republican party. The Democratic Party In 1961, the Democratic party found itself in the anomalous position of opposing the election of a Democrat who was running against a Republican in a nonpartisan contest. The factors that led to this situation were dis cussed in Chapter III, but they should be reviewed at this point. 1. In 1956, Yorty failed to secure the endorsement of the California Democratic Council (CDC). When state Senator Richard Richards received 149 Che CDC recommendation, Yorty charged that the organization was "bossed'1 and "rigged" by ■ Democratic National Committeeman Paul Ziffren. 2. In 1960, Yorty announced that he supported Vice-President Richard M. Nixon in his cam paign against Senator John F. Kennedy for the presidency. He stated that he did not believe that Kennedy was ready to be president. The leadership of the Democratic party in southern California returned Yorty's bitterness with bitterness. Particularly displeased with Yorty were Richards, Ziffren, and the CDC faction in the party. Jesse M. Unruh, speaker of the Assembly of the California legislature, and Stanley Mosk, state attorney general, shared the CDC's antipathy 4 toward Yorty, but, because of the factional split within the party, did not feel that they could work effectively 4 with the CDC to defeat him. One consideration which probably motivated the Democrats to seek Yorty's defeat was the fear that he might support Nixon if Nixon were to decide to run for governor of California in 1962. ^This information was obtained in an interview with an official of the Democratic party who asked that his name not be revealed. The Baus and Ross Company counseled that partisan ship should not be made an issue In the election. While . m the heads of that firm saw the necessity to gain the support of as many Democrats as possible, they nevertheless feared that an appeal to Democrats to vote against a "traitorous" Democrat might boomerang.^ For this reason, the firm worked unobtrusively through John R. MacFaden in the primary to reach Democratic voters and members of minority groups. After the primary, Baus and Ross, at the insistence of Poulson and Pollard, replaced MacFaden with Snyder-Smith Advertising. It was Snyder-Smith that engineered the general election effort to use partisanship as a weapon against Yorty. The split in the Democratic party between the CDC and the non-CDC elements was reflected in the way in which efforts were made to solicit the support of Democrats. Baus and Ross worked through Joseph Wyatt, former state president of the CDC, and Ziffren. Wyatt attended several strategy conferences held at the Baus and Ross campaign headquarters, and he talked with members of CDC clubs about the need to back Poulson. Ziffren discussed campaign ^Interview with William B. Ross, June 26, 1962. strategy with Baus and Ross by telephone on a number of occasions. Assemblyman Unruh and Carmen H. Warschaw, chairman of the Women's Division of the Democratic State Central Committee, worked through Snyder-Smith and partici pated in the strategy planning of that firm.** The efforts of the Snyder-Smith group to convince Democrats that they should vote for Poulson resulted in the publication of two editions of the Los Angeles Democrat, a newspaper' created for the specific purpose of aroysing antagonism toward Yorty among Democrats.^ The editorial board for the first edition, which was dated / May lf was composed of Rosalind Wyman, member of the Los Angeles City Council; Thelma Thomas, coordinator of the Los Angeles County Council on Political Education. (COPE) , AFL-CIO; Berrien Moore, state president of the Young Democrats; and Delwin Smith, partner in Snyder-Smith Advertising. The paper bore the headlines "Democrats Benefit by Progress with Poulson," and on the front page appeared a picture of President Kennedy and the Coliseum in which he accepted the Democratic nomination in 1960. ^Interview with William B. Ross, June 26, 1962. ^See Plate I, p. 152. Los Anijeles Democrat 152 M I.Mkl CRATS BINIFIT BY ■SS WITH POULSON PLATE I FIRST EDITION OF LOS ANGELES DEMOCRAT (Front P«gt) 153 Poulson was praised for his role In the negotiations that brought the 1960 Democratic National Convention to Los Angeles and for the fact that he had appointed a number of Democrats to Important positions In his administration. The following editorial, entitled "The Best Man for the Job," was printed in the first edition of the Los Angeles Democrat. By the same fair and Impartial standards that he has used in evaluating the best men and women to serve our city, Norris Poulson qualifies as the best man for the biggest job--Mayor of Los Angeles. As Democrats , we can point with pride to the eight-year record of our non-partisan mayor. In this and subsequent issues of the LOS ANGELES DEMOCRAT, we are presenting highlights of Mayor Poulson'8 outstanding achievements in office— achievements which have greatly benefited the Democratic Party as well as our entire city. The partisan issue has been injected into this campaign not by Mayor Norris Poulson nor by leaders of the Democratic Party. The partisan issue has been injected by a renegade Democrat, Samuel Yorty, who is trying to whitewash himself by hurling false accusations against Mayor Poulson--just as he has repeatedly done against the Democratic Party and its leaders. Yorty has repudiated the Democratic Party, not once but many times. He has called conventions of Democrats "rigged, stacked, wired and packed." He has denounced State Senator Richards for "slick double-talk," and Governor Brown for "failing to meet a challenge." 154 Yorty has accused President Kennedy of "destroy ing the internal integrity of the Democratic Party" and of "a calculated exploitation of his religious affiliation." Yorty has injected much more than the partisan issue into this campaign. He has injected dis honesty, false accusations, appeals to prejudice. He is an embittered little man who tries to explain away his own failures and short comings by crying "I was robbed'." If, because of a lack of action on the part of honest Democrats, Yorty should win election as Mayor of Los Angeles, it would be a disgrace to the Democratic Party--and a catastrophe to our city. We must not let this happen! Norris Poulson has proved himself a man of prin ciple. His appointments have been on the basis of merit, without prejudice. Minority groups, as well as both major parties, are actively represented in our City Government. Poulson has proved himself an able administra tor, he has kept pace with the explosive growth of our city during the past eight years , and prepared for the breathtaking rate of Los Angeles' continued expansion. He has acted, to the best of his knowl edge and ability, for the good of all citizens. Mayor Poulson proved a major factor in bringing the 1960 Democratic National Convention to Los Angeles. Under his administration, the Democratic Party has thrived in Los Angeles, Democrats have participated actively in our City Government and all have shared in the prosperity and progress of our city. We must do our share now. 155 Norris Poulson has worked for us— we must work for him! Fqr our best Interests, as Democrats and as Angelenos, we must re-elect Mayor Norris Poulson. On the four pages of the paper appeared photographs of, and/or statements from, the following Democrats: Rosalind Wyman; Paul Ziffren; State Senator Richard Richards; United States Senator Clair Engle; Congressman Chet Hollfleld; Assemblymen Jesse M. Unruh and Augustus F. Hawkins; Berrien Moore; B. Jack Ansley, vice-chairman of the Los Angeles County Democratic Central Committee; W. J. Bassett, secretary-treasurer of the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor; and Carmen H. Warschaw. In addition, photographs were printed that showed Poulson performing various civic acts which, in the opinion of the editors , illustrated the progress which had been achieved under the Poulson administration. The second edition of the Los Angeles Democrat was published on May 25, and it carried the headline "Yorty Q Traitor to Democrats." The editorial board remained the same as that which prepared the first edition except for the omission of the name of Rosalind Wyman. The front 8See Plate II, p. 156. 156 Los Angeles Democrat TY TRAITOR ■M OCRATS Y «tr lw M n H A* Ami n t h a I h h I* H i M nm H • P w i i m t — — < aak t e r w r watel D m I M Y w tr M ymml B a a l tea iwaacl. r w * r M M - h . i w i ' i CANNOT TAKE KENNEDY" . . K a a a a A b M t m b ' b W p r a U i a t . . . I te al W b m r l f th a t M k H *a b a tte r . . . l i t DaaaaaraMa MaMaaal O m - ■afl flatesaMr K Mm DaaMavaMt P u b . • * l r abaaa i f Mm r t r w mt mmmmr wmt a a t U b M t t y i a t e i t e a t tee ra* . . . I CANNOT TAKE KKNNBDY." Tmrty yaW — la I t t e : L « y r ^ 8 s s i c 5^ A r i % I W O W N B *** w r o n g " S S £ X C S S jL * lt% ^ f la te S I Y iiM i a l iiatltMaMr tea a a M h r a aariaa at aaMMteAaa»ajCTa»faMa1lteartl ,Wi i i | , | | | L i,D late n htn t l hr the PtaMirato a HMtMaakMr.MM | a BL mm k ^ ■Ob PTpombmd VMRy mrmeoO o w n n tWcaawl— a w a f ST-JSSta * 5 3 S ? * r n r n am . - aw r.aai.imi rrar *•»»> ...nbiaiwnaa" f a k m a a t e i i M a l i ta atart aaaiaaliac Mawetf tea a Mt liagatr. te h a t tettar alar M tte ■ ‘ ■ • e aa a aaaaatpi Kaawteaal for r t r f r MW-b IfM t " R I C H A R D S IS N O T R E A D Y " — ----------------------- - i t . — -------------T U Il Btatlar M a d B kterta b M h | m - Y o r t y A b t M M P u b B c T r v a t ■alacdr hi M eHag Ite r w f a UA Beaatoc ■ Cao oo m i • a m IO» Ota I* dw ta o r n d . - - - _______ hrO m m t M N IM Lyg-gfT^THCa*. m * c5jaS.i T jggbtei a f * . Hi CDC taateat laa w hich wJw L. *<*52 -|,f................ Yartr mMi - lh h n a n alii a t o I M 6 M N • CilRDMdlR. * tad od rl|ll to MtaMD H» ' j r j F J Z z g s s : E T K n E f T P S l f f T -rT— 1 _________________ *** -..............- - 'I * 1. ” « » M - . a a M a t t o M M l . WM* *M If n w r i ( mS<C£n PLATE II SECOND EDITION OF frp s AMCELR S DEMOCRAT (Front Fagt) 157 page bore a cartoon which pictured Yorty in the act of stabbing President Kennedy in the back. The editorial, which appeared on page two, was entitled "Protect Our City and Our Party." Over this mayoralty election hangs a sinister threat to the clean government of our city and to the clean politics of our party. Los Angeles has been able to keep itself free from the corruption that plagues eastern cities, where control of many city governments has fallen into the greedy hands of rubbish racketeers and gambler gangsters. The all-out attempt of the multi-million dollar rubbish octopus to grab a stranglehold on our city--including bribery, blackmail, intimida tion, even to arson and murder--was broken by Mayor Poulson during the first term in office. He had full County and State cooperation in clean ing up the private, rubbish racket--including a clean-up of Sam Yorty's dump in San Pedro, with its 24 bad reports and 6 citations for violations. Los Angeles' present municipal operation and plans, by which its citizens are in control of waste disposal, has won national acclaim as a model for keeping the city clean, in more ways than one. Our city has also maintained a strong stand against the encroachment of gambling syndicates. Renewed, intensive pressure to break into Los Angeles can now be expected from Las Vegas gam blers , as a result of the State of Nevada's cam paign to promote attractions other than gambling. We must be more than ever on guard! 158 Sam Yorty has shown his true colors. Documented evidence points to his connection with private rub bish operations and outside gambling interests. He failed to comply with the law in operating his own rubbish dump, and tried to foist another one on the city at high cost. As special assistant attorney for the gambling town of Cabazon, Yorty was to receive his payoff as commission on the sale of municipal water bonds. For "exerting his political influence" to obtain licenses for Las Vegas gamblers, Yorty received checks for $12,500.00. As Congressman in 1954--the last elective public office he held--Yorty betrayed the public trust by free-franking his own campaign litera ture at a cost to the taxpayers of more than $120,000.00. We do not attempt to predict what Sam Yorty would do as Mayor of Los Angeles. No one can-- he is too adept at talking out of both sides of his mouth. But we can and do ask, whether such a Man can be entrusted with the management of our city. Can we risk our public funds with a man who has shown himself irresponsible and wasteful of the people's money? Can we endanger the integrity of our city by having as mayor a man whose connec tions with rubbish and gambling interests are strongly established? Can we allow the threat of underworld and overworld control of our city government ? The answer must be an overwhelming "NO"'. As good citizens of the City of Los Angeles, we must repudiate Sam Yorty and all he stands for by an overwhelming defeat at the polls on May 31st. And as good Democrats, we must repudiate this renegade turncoat. Sam Yorty has denounced state and national nominees of the Democratic Party. 159 He has termed the Democratic platform "of little importance." By word and deed, Yorty has proved a TRAITOR TO THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND ITS PRINCIPLES. We must repudiate this traitor by democracy's most effective and decisive weapon— the voteI To protect ourselves--our families--our city-- our party--we must RE-ELECT MAYOR POULSON May 31st! As in the first edition, the second edition contained pictures of, and statements from, prominent Democrats who urged rank-and-file members of the party not to vote for Yorty. Both editions of the Los Angeles Democrat were mailed to registered Democrats residing in Los Angeles. The mailing list was compiled through the use of precinct sheets. Persons identified with the CDC and the non-CDC factions of the Democratic party signed a joint letter which w&3 mailed to registered Democrats during the last week of the general election campaign. The signatures of Jesse M. Unruh, Paul Ziffren, B. Jack Ansley, Jack J. Spitzer, Carmen H. Warschaw, Elizabeth Snyder, Edward A. Hawkins , Edith Seros , Joseph Wyatt, Milton Gordon, and Berrien Moore were reproduced on the mimeographed letter. In the letter, which was not dated, Democrats were reminded 160 of the "disloyal" actions of Yorty and told that only by supporting Poulson could the good government of Los Angeles be assured and the welfare of the Democratic party be 9 protected. On several occasions during the primary and general election campaigns, leaders of the Democratic party announced their backing of Poulson. Unruh and Ziffren were quoted most often by the metropolitan press about their strong preference for Poulson. During the first week in May, Yorty attempted, without success, to obtain the support of the Los Angeles County Democratic Central Committee, and this appears to have been the only time that he sought to inject partisanship into the campaign. To the actions of Unruh, Ziffren, and the County Central Committee, Yorty responded with the charge that the Democratic party was "bossed" like a political machine. On May 14, the Los Angeles Times quoted Yorty as denying that he had ever sought official Democratic party support and alleging that . . . [Poulson] has deliberately sought official partisan Republican support. 9See Plate III, p. 161. >. w h iMltjr, yint Iwl— i * Jm m H. M * ! IbAiBaMMd* O f » l Ooa. M M k l y M J r i i i m r , yurt f h l n — i Oh m 1 .1 K U « m OM«n,b.a. r u M i m x y o u r n a n to h l t ■ - ■ m c t m o o r hom os k o l s o r o r met a i « t. PLATS III LKTTSS TO DEMOCKATS 162 1 have not sought official Democratic Party support although many Democrats are supporting me right alongside many Republicans who really believe the office of mayor should be nonpartisan. 1 don't think they can Induce Democrats to vote for the machine candidate just because I have not allowed so-called Democratic leaders like Paul Ziffren to dictate to me or determine my course of action contrary to my independent judgment. Poulson has no record of ever being independent enough to differ with the Republican Party bosses. The real hypocrisy of the campaign is now emerging. Republicans are to be ordered to vote for Poulson because he is a Republican. Democrats are to be told they must be nonparcisan and must not support me because I have a record of independ ence. In other words, true nonpartisanship, to which the Poulson press gives lip service is to be twisted and turned to mean nonpartisanship only for the Democrats. In concluding this discussion of the role of political parties in the 1961 mayoralty election, it must be emphasized that the Democratic party took no "official" part in the election. It is, however, difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between official and unofficial actions in a campaign in which the party's leadership made such a bold appeal to partisanship. No funds were taken from the treasury of the party, because, as one party ^ Los Angeles Times. May 14, 1962. 163 official stated, there were no funds available to be spent.^ Nonetheless, the Democrat who received copies of the Los Angeles Democrat and the letter was scarcely in a position to make the subtle distinction between official and unofficial. ^Interview with official of Democratic party who asked that his name not be revealed. CHAPTER V VOTING BEHAVIOR IN THE 1961 MAYORALTY ELECTION Recent studies o£ voting behavior have identified a number of factors which influence participation in the political process.^" These studies are almost exclusively concerned with politics in a partisan environment and at the national level. Very little research has been done on the subject of participation in nonpartisan, municipal elections. It may be assumed, however, that the basic finding that voting and other forms of political activity are directly related to socioeconomic status holds true for both partisan and nonpartisan political systems. The purpose of this chapter Is to examine the evidence which is available regarding the way in which the electorate voted in the 1961 mayoralty election and to consider the ^See, for example, Robert E. Lane, Political Life (Glencoe, 111.: Free Fress, 1959); Seymour Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1960); and Angus Campbell, et al,, The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960). 164 165 various hypotheses which have been advanced to explain It. Public Opinion Polls During the primary and general election campaigns, several confidential polls were made by commercial polling organizations, the results of which were not made available to the Los Angeles newspapers or to the other news media. These polls were undertaken on a contract basis for persons active In the campaigns of Poulson and Yorty. Because the Yorty campaign organization had much less money to spend, the polls made for It were much less elaborate than those made for the Poulson organization. For this study, reports of the findings of two surveys made by Facts Consolidated were obtained; one conducted during the two weeks Immedi ately following the primary election, and the other conducted after the general election. It was not possible to obtain precise information regarding other surveys. Post-primary election survey.--The voting inten- $ tions of Los Angeles voters, as ascertained in the first Facts Consolidated poll, are reported in Tables 7 and S. From Table 7 it will be seen that Poulson enjoyed an advantage of 8.2 per cent among all respondents, 35.4 per ¥ 166 TAIL! 7 t o i k htiitiom rot m a m , it ugutiatioi, sex, AID WTUCIEHA7I0IIIF11MAR ILECTIOH UGUTIATIOR S E X w r n c b h a t i o i n p um ai t Total lapob* llcan DaMcrat Other Male Faaala Voted In Frliary Did lot Tota Don't Enow tabar of respondents 1024 375 597 52 519 505 705 288 31 Far cant sarklng ballots la favor of: X X I I X 1 X X X Ponlson 47.6 61.3 39.9 36.5 48.6 46.5 48.1 45.5 54.8 Torty 39.4 25.9 47.2 48.1 39.3 39.6 40.3 38.5 29.1 Ho opinion 13.0 12.8 12.9 15.4 12.1 13.9 11.6 16.0 16.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Ficti Consolidated poll, Nay 22, 1961. 167 cent among Republicans, 9.3 per cent among men and 6.9 per cent among women, and 7.8 per cent among those respondents who had voted in the primary election. Yorty led Poulson among Democratic respondents by 7.3 per cent. Of the 1,024 respondents, 13.0 per cent were undecided or had no opinion. When broken down by area, it appeared that Poulson in the general election would carry the San Fernando Valley; west Los Angeles; Westchester, Playa Del Rey, and Venice; central Los Angeles; and south central Los Angeles. Yorty appeared to have strong support in the Hollywood- Wilshire, Highland Park-Eagle Rock, and Boyle Heights-east Los Angeles areas of the city. Yorty had only a slight edge in the harbor area, and the support for the candidates was evenly divided in the Silver Lake-Los Feliz area. Table 8 indicates that Poulson seemed to have considerable backing among the members of the Negro community (south central Los Angeles-Watts). Yorty, on the other hand, had the Mexican-American community (Boyle Heights-east Los Angeles) solidly behind him. Because the results of this poll were confidential, it was not possible to obtain detailed information regard ing the sampling methods used and the rationale which TABLE 8 VOTING INTENTIONS FOR MAYOR, BY AREA AREA 0 ■0 4 u 4 f l 4 h 4 4 0 4 0 * 4 ,4 4 V a f l 1 4 41 # u 4 0 6 u 0 4 n 4 > 0 4) 3 a 4 1 4 H a, u J 4 4 f l e f l 4 * it 4 « < H C c 40 >fl 3 * u u 4 4 p 4 6 h 4 4 4 £ « 4 H h 4 h < 4> « X XX 404 0 U in u ■4 4 4 * r l hi f l a f l « tt * O J 4 O 4 4 4 4 O « * 0 B X X to H y 4 «>* 4 * n >, J £ 5 k 4 f l 4 4 4 1 u V 4 U 04 fc 4 4 H 4 4 <t h U H *J H *J u H > ■H £ H u U 4 I H 4 H 4 «H H H 00 40 >,« f l 3 » U 41 4 y > 4 4 U > 1 0 H rl 41 M h <H 4 m u 4 y lighted 45 #< <5 s 44 o * « w « 00 # 0 f l i „ . 3> y> m> s so u Mh sw flj 0 w < n Total Total Number of respondents 1024 81 83 90 90 86 87 61 79 50 95 144 78 Fer cent marking ballots In favor of: Z I 7 . I Z Z I I Z Z Z Z Z Poulson 48.2 47,6 45.7 47.0 62.2 68.9 44,2 39.1 41.0 26.6 24.0 45.3 58.3 46,2 Yorty 39.1 39.4 33.3 38.6 23.3 27,8 40.7 46.0 41.0 59.5 40.0 36.8 41,0 48,7 No opinion 12,7 13.0 21,0 14.4 14.5 3.3 15.1 14.9 18,0 13,9 36,0 17.9 0,7 5.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 1 0 0,0 1 00,0 100,0 100.0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Facts Consolidated poll, May 22, 1901. 169 dictated the division of Los Angeles into twelve geograph- ical areas. A number of the survey findings cast doubt upon the research techniques employed, particularly the 2 The survey report contains the following state ments regarding the methodology employed in the study. "The city of Los Angeles was divided into 12 areas. Each individual interviewer was assigned a specific sub- area in which to interview. Specific respondents were chosen with the Intention of getting as wide a spread and as representative a sample as possible for studies of this character. "The 12 major areas or divisions of the city, the per cent of registered voters residing in that area and the completed sample is as follows: PER CENT OF REG- * ISTERED VOTERS RESIDING IN SIZE OF AREA AREA SAMPLE West San Fernando Valley 12.1 81 Central San Fernando Valley 8.3 83 East San Fernando Valley 8.7 90 West Los Angeles 6.0 90 Westchester-Playa Del Rey-Venice 8.6 86 Hollywood-Wilshire 16.9 87 Silver Lake-Los Feliz 1.8 61 Highland Park-Eagle Rock 3.7 79 Boyle Heights-East Los Angeles 5.0 50 Central Los Angeles 4.7 95 South Central Los Angeles-Watts 20.3 144 Harbor 3.9 78 Total 100.0 1,024 "It will be noticed that the size of sample for any given area is not proportionate to the population of registered voters in that area. This disproportionate sample technique was chosen for this study in order to make 170 figure of .7 per cent reported as having "no opinion" in the south central-Watts portion of the city. Since the heaviest concentration of Negro population is to be found in that area, it would be expected--on the basis of the research findings of behavioral scientists that persons of low socioeconomic status tend to have less interest in political affairs than persons of high socioeconomic status— that a much larger percentage would have "no opinion." The .7 per cent figure appears especially an analysis by area possible. The raw data was [sic] then statistically manipulated to give a more accurate picture of the total results. This weighted total involved adjusting the sample size for each area in order to make it proportionate to the actual Los Angeles population of registered voters. The mathematical adjustments appear only in the column called 'Weighted Total.' "Characteristics of the respondents interviewed are as follows: BY SEX BY REGISTRATION Sample Actual Registration in Los Angeles as of December 31, 1960 % % Male 50.7 Republicans Female 49.3 Democrats Others 36.6 58.3 5.1 36.6 59.8 3.6 100.0 100.0 100.0" 0 171 questionable when compared with the much more reasonable figure of 36.0 per cent "no opinion1 ’ reported for the Boyle Heights-east Los Angeles area in which the Mexican- Axnerican population concentration is heavy. These survey results are reported here, however, not because they are accepted as being completely valid, but because it is believed that they may have influenced the thinking of persons who directed strategy-planning in the election campaign. Baus and Ross, Poulson, and Pollard had access to the Facts Consolidated poll, and their optimism about Poulson*s chances for re-election was probably based, in part at least, on the assumption that the poll accurately forecast the way in which the people of Los Angeles would vote in the general election. Post-general election survey.--The post-general election survey of Los Angeles voters was conducted during the period July 13 to July 24, 1961. For this study, Facts Consolidated divided Los Angeles into nine geographical 3 areas instead of twelve as was done in the previous poll. The findings of the post-general election survey are 3 The research techniques used in the post-general election survey are discussed e in Chapter III, pp. 133-134. 172 reported in Tables 9 through 17. The questions raised about the methodology employed in the post-primary election poll are also relevant to the post-general election survey. It is difficult to evaluate the survey results and to assess the importance to be attached to them. The grouping of reasons given by respondents for having voted for the candidates in some cases appears to be arbitrary and illogical, and the occupational categories into which the respondents are divided are somewhat lacking in precision. Nevertheless, the poll was the only one undertaken that sought to probe the attitudes and behavior of the electorate in depth, and it is believed that, in spite of any methodological limita tions it may possess , the survey provides considerable u s e fu1 in format ion. From Table 9 it will be seen that Yorty carried the entire San Fernando Valley, the east and central por tions, however, having been much more enthusiastic in their support than the west portion. Yorty also did very well in the Westchester-Playa Del Rey-Venice area, the harbor area, and the Hollywood-Wilshire-Silver Lake area. The last probably reflects support by Jewish voters who are heavily represented in that section of the city. That Yorty TABLE 9 VOTING IN THE GENERAL ELECTION, BY AREA 173 AREA 0 p , * TJ 4 ) to 4J C f l ) 4 ) 1 0 0 f l ) 0 * to t I h 9 T) g T) ( A f l ) 0 £ 4) W s C 4 ) H 4 ) hJ to t> 0 0 ) f l) H 0 to H 5 . ‘ W g £ g 4 ) to ■ H " c H *J fl) *J 3 0 ) e 4 ) M 4 ) U fl 4) 1 0 £ < 0 < 0 fc 4 ) > W 3 0 60 4 ) w W C T) « J iH H c C to to « y « O hI 4) 4 ) fl) H f l) 0 4 ) >s U to O H X 60 n ^ C O * w * £ 4 ) U 4 ) 3 M l i > $ 4 ) U 4 ) 4 ) o O £ ft * 4 ) W i-l 4J H U H 4J 4J X y 4 1 H > 4J H to h d H 0 0 H to 0 9 H u 3 00 H i — 1 c ► > 0 0 0 ) f l ) 4 ) f l) C D 0 1 4 ) 4 ) 4 ) f l) 0 c O r l 4) 0 O 3 > O > u > 3 D t 0 s w < X w U « J Number of respondents 600 72 47 54 53 54 44 108 81 87 Per cent who said in general election they 7. 7 . X X X X X 7. X X Voted for Poulson 21.7 23.6 25.5 14,8 32.1 25.9 18.2 18.5 21.0 19.* Did not vote but favored Poulson 5.7 12.5 6.4 1.9 1.9 7.4 11.4 5.6 3.7 2. Voted for Yorty 39.2 25.0 42.6 40.7 17.0 42.6 34.1 46.3 38.3 54. Did not vote but favored Yorty 16.3 18.1 10.6 20.4 26.4 13.0 29.5 13.0 12.3 12. Did not vote because did not like either Poulson or Yorty 13.0 8.3 12.8 20.4 15.1 9.3 4.5 11.1 22.2 11. Voted but did not mark ballot for mayor 4.1 12.5 2.1 1.8 7.5 1.8 2.3 5.5 2.5 • * 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Decimal portions not available. Source: Facts Consolidated poll, August 4, 1961. 174 TABLE 10 VOTING IN THE GENERAL ELECTION, BY RACE, AGE, AND YEARS LIVED IN LOS ANGELES a a a H a R B O B B a a E t E B E a a m a B B B s a RACE AGE YEARS IN LOS ANGELES Total Caucasian Negro Mexican Oriental 21 to 35 36 to 50 Over 50 Less than 1 year 1 to 5 years 5 to 10 years Over 10 years Number of respondents 600 421 63 48 8* 158 250 192 6* 49 111 434 Per cent who said in general election that they: * Z Z I 1 ' Z I 'z Z Z Z Z Voted for Poulson 21.7 27.6 15.9 6.3 1 13,9 20.4 29.7 * 16.3 18,9 23.3 Did not vote but favored Poulson 5.7 6.4 3.2 6.2 2 6.3 4.8 6,3 1 6.1 6.3 5.3 Voted for Yorty 39.2 27.8 50,8 47.9 3 36.7 43.2 35.9 1 34,8 36.9 40.6 Did not vote but favored Yorty 16,3 17.3 17,4 29.2 ■ 23,4 16.0 10.9 3 20.4 21.7 14.0 Did not vote because did not like either Poulson or Yorty 13.0 15.9 7.9 10.4 1 15.9 12.0 12.0 1 16.3 13,5 12.4 Voted but did not mark ballot for mayor 4,1 5.0 4,8 - 1 3.8 3.6 5,2 • 6.1 2.7 4,4 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 8 100.0 100.0 100.0 6 100.0 100.0 100.0 ♦Base too small for percentaging Source; Facts Consolidated poll, August 4, 1961, TABLE 11 VOTING IN THE GENERAL ELECTION, IT STANDARD OF LIVING, REGISTRATION, AND LABOR UNION AFFILIATION STANDARD OF LIVING REGISTRATION LABOR UNION AFFILIATION Upper Repub- Non- Total Upper Kiddle Kiddle Lover licin Democrat Other Keaber member Refused Number of respondents 600 18 183 328 71 180 364 56 202 370 28 Fer cent who said that In general election they; I I I 1 1 I I I 1 I I Voted for Poulson 21.7 38.9 22.4 20.7 19,7 45.0 11.3 14.3 16.3 25.1 14.3 Did not vote but fivored Poulson 5.7 • 6.0 5.2 8.5 10,0 3.0 8.9 4,9 4,6 25.0 Voted for Yorty 39.2 22.2 37.7 41,5 36.6 25.6 48.3 23.2 44,1 37.6 25,0 Did not vote but favored Yorty 16.3 5,6 14.8 16.8 21.1 7.8 20.6 16,1 19.3 14.9 14.3 Did not vote because did not like either Poulson or Yorty 13.0 33,3 10.9 13.1 12.7 7,8 13.5 26.8 12.4 12.9 17.8 Voted but did not nark ballot for aayor 4,1 ■ 8.2 2.7 1,4 3,8 3.3 10.7 3.0 4.9 3.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 luv.O 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Facts Consolidated poll, August 4, 19(1. TABLE 12 VOTING IN THE GENERAL ELECTION, BY OCCUPATION 176 0 c C U P A T I 0 N u ft 0 4) t I H 00 4-1 « <0 (4 c C (0 41 0 $ 4) B «iM X H Q H (A id Q <d < A * w C «) Pi # i i. 0 M M 0 * c 4) < u •rl 0 U rM « > M M w M 4i id id 8 c t I 44 n •rl i i ■8 T3 (A P M r l r l u on id U 0 4) ? 3 41 41 1 M U •iM <0 t I Pi 41 4) Pi M M M r l 0 . - r l u Ml <s U > 0 IA T3 t I 3 0 e 0 M M 4» <d u 4) $ M JO 3 3 y Ml )-( 4) U M M H Pi O a 4) id O 4J 41 41 Total pm w Pm 0 U 0 Pm o w B M OS Number of respondents 600 55 101 84 112 75 42 34 4* 81 12* Per cent who said in general election they 7 , I I 7 . 7 . 7 . 7. I # 7 . # Voted for Poulson. 21.7 21.8 28.7 25.0 14.3 12.0 14.3 32.4 i * 29.6 2 Did not vote but favored Poulson 5.7 5.5 4.0 3.5 7.1 8.0 4.8 • • • t 8.7 1 Voted for Yorty 39.2 36.4 41.6 39.4 41.1 44.0 38.1 17.6 3 40.7 3 Did not vote but favored Yorty 16.3 12.7 9.9 15.5 20.5 20.0 33.3 23.5 • • 7.4 2 Did not vote because did not like either Poulson or Yorty 13.0 21.8 8.9 13.1 14.3 12.0 9.5 20.6 1 8.7 2 Voted but did not mark ballot for mayor 4.1 1.8 6.9 3.5 2.7 4.0 i i 5.9 • - 4.9 2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 4 100.0 12 ic Base too small for percentaging. Source: Facts Consolidated poll, August 4, 1961. 177 TABLE 13 REASONS GIVEN FOR VOTING FOR POULSON Total Number of respondents voting for Poulson 130 Per cent saying they voted for Poulson because: 7. His good record/did good job/good city setup 49.2 He is better man/better for job 25.4 Don't like Yorty/can't trust him 23.1 He is experienced 20.8 He is honest/fair/substantial 18.4 He is lesser of two evils 10.0 I vote party/Republican/agree with Republican thinking 9.2 Influenced by newspapers/TV/radio/friends 1.5 Other 2.3 Don't know 1.6 161.5* *Sum of column exceeds 100 per cent because of multiple answers. Source: Facts Consolidated poll, August 4, 1961. 178 TABLE 14 MOST INFLUENTIAL FACTOR IN DECISION TO VOTE FOR POULSON Total Number of respondents voting for Poulson 130 Per cent saying the most influential factor in their decision to vote for Poulson was: % Don't like Yorty/reputation/tactics 34.6 His good record/did good job/good city setup 26.2 He is experienced/more capable/honest 23.1 I like Poulson/know more about him 6.2 I vote for party/Republiean 5.4 Influenced by newspapers/TV/radio/friends 3.8 Approval of Chavez Ravine/Dodgers 3.8 Know nothing about Yorty 1.5 Other 3.1 Don1t know 4.6 112.3* Sum of column exceeds 100 per cent because of multiple answers. Source: Facts Consolidated, August 4, 1961. 179 TABLE 15 • REASONS GIVEN FOR VOTING FOR YORTY Total Number of respondents voting for Yorty 235 Per* cent saying they voted for Yorty because: % Time for change/Poulson in long enough 45.1 His program/took stand/will make changes for good/better man 28.9 Dislike of Poulson 11.5 Lesser of two evils/did not like either 11.1 Poulson*s record/did poor job 9.4 Vote for party/Democratic 9.4 Influenced by TV appearances 5.9 Best for minorities/poor/Mexicans/Negroes 5.5 Poulson wrong on Chavez Ravine/Dodger give-away 4.3 Poulson partial to special interests 3.8 Other 2.1 Don * t know 1. 7 138.7* answers. Source: Facts Consolidated poll, August 4, 1961. 180 TABLE 16 MOST INFLUENTIAL FACTOR IN DECISION TO VOTE FOR YORTY Total Number of respondents voting for Yorty 235 Per cent saying the most influential factor in their decision to vote for Yorty was: % His program/took stand/will make changes for good 23.8 Time for change/Poulson in long enough 18.3 Poulson's record/did poor job 14.9 Better man/younger/honest 14.4 Poulson partial to special interests/rich/ Los Angeles Times 9.4 Influenced by TV appearances 8.9 Dislike of Poulson 8.1 Best for minorities/poor/Mexicans/Negroes 6.4 Poulson wrong on Chavez Ravine/Dodger give-away 5.1 Yorty not backed by machine/metropolitan papers 4.2 Poulson refused to debate on TV/poor campaigner 3.4 Influenced by his speeches 3.0 Vote for party/Democratic 2.6 181 TABLE 16--Continued Total Influenced by friends/relatives 2.1 Other 5.1 Don't Know 4.3 134.0* *Sum of column exceeds 100 per cent because of multiple answers. Source: Facts Consolidated poll, August 4, 1961. 182 TABLE 17 WHEN DECISION TO VOTE FOR POULSON OR YORTY WAS MADE Total Candidate Poulson Voted For Yorty Number of respondents voting for mayor 365 130 235 Per cent saying they made up their minds to vote % % % On election day 5.5 6.1 5.1 The day before the election 1.6 .8 2.1 2 to 4 days before the election 3.3 • • 5.1 5 to 7 days before the election 4.9 3.8 5.5 8 days to 2 weeks before the election 8.0 6.9 8.5 15 days to 3 weeks before the election 8.0 3.1 10.6 22 days to a month before the election 7.1 8.5 6.4 32 days to 2 months/ since primary 19. 7 16.9 21.3 62 days to 6 months/ since candidacy 22.7 27.7 20.0 Over 6 months/always liked candidate 9.6 20.8 3.4 Over 6 months/always disliked opposition 8.0 3.1 10.7 Don't know 1.6 2.3 1.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Facts Consolidated poll, August 4, 1961. 183 received a heavy vote among the Mexlean-Americana and the Negroes is evidenced by the fact that in the central Los Angeles-Boyle Heights-east Los Angeles area he received approximately 35 per cent more of the vote than did Poulson, and 28 per cent more in the south central Los Angeles-Watts area. The only portion of the city carried by Poulson was west Los Angeles, an area having a high proportion of upper and upper-middle class homes and a heavy Republican registration. The findings reported in Table 10 further substan tiate the hypothesis that the Negro and Mexican-American vote was an important factor in Yorty’s victory. The Caucasian vote was almost evenly divided between the two candidates. Neither age nor length of residence in Los Angeles appears to have been a means of distinguishing between Poulson and Yorty voters, since persons in all age and residence categories favored Yorty. Poulson had the backing of persons classified as having an upper class standard of living, but Yorty enjoyed the support of the upper-middle, middle, and lower classes. Registered Republicans favored Poulson heavily, and Democrats overwhelmingly voted for Yorty. Members and non-members of labor unions tended to back Yorty, but the 184 former in much larger numbers. All occupational groups except housewives supported Yorty. When asked their reasons for voting for Poulson, 49.2 per cent of the Poulson voters cited his "good record" more often than any other reason. When Poulson voters were asked what was the most influential factor, "dislike of Yorty" was the answer given most frequently. Yorty voters answered that "time for a change" was the principal factor which determined the way in which they voted. It was not until the last week before the general election that 15.3 per cent of all the respondents made their decision regarding the candidate for whom they would vote. Of the respondents who voted for Poulson, 10.7 per cent decided during the last week; of those who voted for Yorty, 17.8 per cent made up their minds during that period. It was reported in Broadcasting that a motivation survey was made by Ward J. Jenssen, Inc. , a management services firm, during the last three weeks before the general election. In it interviews with some 2,000 voters were conducted three weeks, two weeks and one-week before election day. They found that as late as a week before election about 2 07* had still not decided which way they were going to cast their ballots. After election, a checkback with 185 undecided individuals revealed that some had remained undecided, some had voted for Mr. Poulson, but the great majority, about 70%, chose Mr. Yorty.4 Political Alienation and the Election In The Alienated Voter, the 1959 mayoralty election in Boston is described as follows. The Boston mayoralty election of 1959 was one of the most stunning upsets in the history of the city. John F. Collins, register of probate, with practically no endorsements from important public figures and a small campaign fund, defeated his opponent, John E. Powers, president of the Massa chusetts State Senate, whose election was regarded as a certainty by almost everyone. Powers had put together an organization which seemed as formidable as the machine that made James M. Curley the city's foremost politician of the twentieth century. Both Senators from Massachusetts and almost all the major political leaders of Boston endorsed his candidacy; he appeared to have large sums of money at his disposal, was much better known than his opponent at the start of the campaign, and had a decided edge in political experience. From the moment the first returns came in on the night of November 3, however, it was evident that Collins had won easily. When all 278 precincts had reported, Collins received 114,074 votes to Powers' 90,035.5 ^"The Best TV Candidate Wins the Election," Broadcasting, LXI (July 10, 1961), 87. ^Murray B. Levin, The Alienated Voter (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 1. 186 In the 1961 mayoralty election in Los Angeles , Norris Poulson was defeated in his bid for a third term by Samuel W. Yorty. Yorty, decidedly the ’ ’ underdog," had many fewer endorsements , much less newspaper support, and considerably less ample campaign funds. Furthermore, Yorty won the election against the open opposition of his own political party which sought to exact revenge against him for what it considered to be "disloyal” behavior. Both the Boston and the Los Angeles elections were charac terized by charges of corruption and machine politics , although the Los Angeles election definitely had an edge with respect to warranting the appellation "dirty.” Because of these similarities it might be hypothe sized that some underlying, common factor was responsible for both election upsets. In The Alienated Voter, the concept of political alienation is used to explain Powers’ defeat. Our analysis of this post-election survey has shown that a large proportion of the electorate feels politically powerless because it believes that the community is controlled by a small group of powerful and selfish individuals who use public office for personal gain. Many voters assume that this power elite is irresponsible and unaffected by the outcome of the elections. Those who embrace this view feel that voting is meaningless because 187 they see the candidates as undesirable and the electoral process as a s h a m . 6 Political alienation is the feeling of an individual that he is not a part of the political process. The politically alienated believe that their vote makes no difference. This belief arises from the feeling that political decisions are made by a group of political insiders who are not responsive to average citizens— the political outsiders. Political alienation may be expressed in feelings of political powerlessness, meaning lessness , estrangement from political activity, and normlessness.7 In the post-election survey of Boston voters , it was found that 50 per cent of those who voted for Collins supported him because they did not like Powers. Many voters believed that Collins was the lesser of two evils and voted for him not because of a ’’rational" estimate of the issues in the election and the qualifications of the candidates , but because of "gut reactions" or instinctual feelings. These so-called visceral responses , together with the antipathy of the electorate toward "power politics ," led the researchers to the opinion that This election was not "won" by Collins, it was lost by Powers. Many individuals voted for Collins, not because they t were convinced he was the superior candidate, but rather because they disliked him less than his opponent. Collins was seen by many as the ^Levin, The Alienated Voter, p. 58. 7Ibid. , pp. 61-62. lesser of two evils. He received more votes than Powers because many of those who did not vote in the preliminary voted in the final and supported him more than two to one. In this election the most important effect of the campaign was to acti vate nonvoters. Collins did not win because large numbers of Powers' supporters switched to Collins.® Before examining the evidence regarding the presence or absence of alienation in the Los Angeles elec torate, attention should be given to the dissimilarities between the Los Angeles and Boston elections. 1. The Los Angeles election was closer. Yorty received 51.3 per cent of the vote, whereas Collins received 55.9 per cent. 2. Boston has a long history of corruption but Los Angeles does not. Although Los Angeles politics has not been free of scandal, the instances have not been as numerous or as flagrant. 3. Boston has nonpartisan elections , but they are colored by the fact that nearly 90 per cent of the electorate is Democratic in regis tration. The last Republican mayor of Boston was elected in 1925. In Los Angeles, on the ®Levin, The Alienated Voter , p. 45. other hand, 60 per cent of the electorate is Democratic but nonpartisanship and the superior financial and publicity resources of the Repub lican mayoralty candidates have, prior to 1961, combined to keep Democratic candidates from winning. The immigrant basis of Boston politics , which underlay the machine politics of the city’s recent past and which rested upon personal obligations and strong personal loyalties, is not present in Los Angeles. The Mexican- Americans , the largest immigrant group in Los Angeles , are not well enough organized to play a decisive role in the politics of the city as a whole. The Los Angeles election involved an incumbent mayor who was seeking re-election, but the Boston election did not. The health factor, which affected one of the candidates in the Los Angeles election, was not present in the Boston election. 190 7. The mobility rate of the Los Angeles popula tion is much greater than that of the Boston population. The post-election survey of Boston voters was based upon 500 interviews made within 72 hours after the final election. The research design was directed to the specific purpose of obtaining information regarding the attitudes of the respondents toward the mayoralty candidates. Unfortu nately, the Facts Consolidated post-general election poll was designed for a less academic purpose and consequently is not entirely comparable to the Boston study. The Facts Consolidated survey does, however, reveal that some attitudes found among the Los Angeles electorate parallel those found among the Boston voters. When respondents were asked why they had voted for Yorty, 11.1 per cent replied that he was the lesser of two evils , or that they did not like either candidate. The Boston study similarly indicated that 13 per cent of the persons who had voted for Collins made their decision because they con sidered him to be the lesser of two evils. It is interest ing that 10.0 per cent of the Poulson voters stated that their choice of Poulson was dictated by the same reason. Furthermore, the Los Angeles study revealed that 45.1 per 191 cent of the Yorty voters said that they supported him because it was time for a change. It is difficult, of course, to determine the significance of this last finding, since the "time for a change" answer may merely reflect belief in the Jacksonian principle of rotation in office. When an election has an outcome as close as that experienced in the 1961 mayoralty election in Los Angeles , any explanation of why a particular candidate won is fraught with danger. An explanation predicated on a single cause is undoubtedly too simple, and in a multi variate explanation it is difficult to assess the relative importance to be assigned to the various factors. It would be unrealistic to dismiss alienation as a factor which may have influenced the voting behavior of some Los Angeles voters , but it would be even more unrealistic to ignore the elements that differentiate the Los Angeles from the Boston election. In The Alienated Voter, it is argued that one factor which conditioned the outlook of the Boston voters was the city's long history of corruption and the apathy and distrust of politicians that it engendered in the electorate. It was found that "feelings of desperation, hopelessness, and cynicism about politics and politicians" 192 were strongest among those who had lived in Boston for o many years. It is questionable whether this situation is duplicated in Los Angeles, given its much better record for clean city government and the much higher mobility rate of its population. The health of the incumbent mayor of Los Angeles, and the Introduction of partisanship into the campaign by the Democratic party so complicated the election proceedings that any attempt to test the hypothe sis of an alienation vote in the 1961 mayoralty election must be deferred until more research has been done on the Los Angeles population.^ o Levin, The Alienated Voter, p. 57. ^Preliminary tabulations of data obtained in the University of Southern California study of residential mobility within Los Angeles and Orange counties indicate that 13.9 per cent of the "movers" and 12.7 per cent of the "nonmovers" approve strongly the following statement. "There's little use in writing to public officials because often they aren't really interested in the problems of the average man." Furthermore, 18.4 per cent of the "movers" and 15.6 per cent of the "nonmovers" approve the statement. When the percentage of those who approve strongly is added to the percentage of those who approve, it is found that approxi mately 30 per cent of both groups share an opinion which is probably characteristic of alienated voters. Data on the basis of which voters can be distinguished from non voters are not yet available. CHAPTER VI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS In this study, the 1961 mayoralty election in Los Angeles has been examined from several points of view. First, the political environment of Los Angeles was sur veyed in terms of the city's geographic and demographic characteristics, the institutional aspects of politics in Los Angeles, political campaigning, and the city's politi cal history in the twentieth century. Los Angeles was described as encompassing a huge geographic area within which are located approximately sixty communities. It was pointed out that the vast geographic spread of Los Angeles , coupled with the com munity identifications engendered in its suburban areas, has deprived the city of the affective allegiance of many of its citizens. Nowhere is this more evident than in the San Fernando Valley, the portion of Los Angeles which has experienced the greatest development in the post World 193 * 194 War II period. The absence of an effective system of mass transportation, the presence of community newspapers, and the influx of thousands of new residents each year have also complicated the problem of creating over-all city identification. The population of Los Angeles, like the geographic aspects of the city, is complex and huge. The growth rate of the city's population has been phenomenal, particularly in the San Fernando Valley, and the mobility rate of the city's inhabitants is considerably higher than that found in most other large metropolitan areas. Such a great increase in the Valley's population has strained the capacity of the city of Los Angeles to provide the services F sought by its residents. The Negro and Mexican-American communities of Los Angeles have been rendered relatively ineffectual as political forces by the absence of political organization, by power struggles within the two communities , by the tradition of nonpartisanship, by a high rate of mobility, and by a relatively low level of interest in politics. The last-named hindrance to concerted political activity is probably a reflection of the low socioeconomic status of most of the members of these groups. Some leaders of the 195 Negro community have been quite vocal in their protests about alleged police brutality in recent years. The Japanese and Chinese communities of Los Angeles have not attempted to make themselves felt as identifiable power centers in municipal politics. Nonpartisanship in the municipal elections of Los Angeles has both institutional and noninstitutional bases. As a legal requirement, nonpartisanship is reflective of the belief of a majority of Californians that municipal government and politics ought to be insulated from the partisan state and national elections. Indeed, the failure of either of the two major parties to enter the realm of Los Angeles municipal politics prior to 1961 is partly attributable to this attitude and to the absence of effec tive competition at the state level before 1958. Campaigning in Los Angeles municipal politics has been influenced by the fact that machine politics of the kind found in some eastern cities has not been a character istic part of the Los Angeles political landscape. The emphasis of the Progressive era upon direct democracy and the lack of partisan organization militated against the appearance of a boss-dominated system. The campaign organization of a candidate for mayor is usually formed 196 on an ad hoc basis and does not have a continuing exist ence. A candidate with adequate campaign funds may rely upon the services of a professional campaign management firm. The image which the campaign strategists try to create by means of the mass media is one of nonpartisan devotion to the affairs of the city of Los Angeles. Norris Poulson, the incumbent in the 1961 mayoralty election, served as a Republican member of Congress for several terms before he was elected mayor of Los Angeles in 1953. He was re-elected in 1957 by a substantial majority, and his administration was not marked by any notable reve lations of corruption. When he ran for a third term as mayor, he did so with the blessings of the business and professional groups which had backed him in 1953 and 1957. On the surface at least, the political waters appeared to be undisturbed in 1961. Samuel W. Yorty served as a Democratic member of the Assembly of the California legislature and of Congress before he ran for mayor of Los Angeles in 1961. Three times prior to 1961, he entertained the idea of running for mayor, and on one occasion he entered the primary but was defeated. Yorty was unsuccessful in several other bids for public office. In 1956, Yorty alienated himself from 197 the leadership of the Democratic party by alleging that the California Democratic Council--which had not endorsed him in his campaign for the Democratic senatorial nomina- tion--was controlled by a "rule or ruin clique." In 1960, Yorty further antagonized party officials by supporting Nixon in his presidential campaign against Kennedy. Poulson's political philosophy can perhaps most accurately be called "moderate Republican." While his political backing emanated from the Republican-oriented business groups of Los Angeles, Poulson was careful, both as a congressman and as mayor, not to espouse positions which would cost him political support from other sectors. Yorty's political philosophy is another matter. On the one hand, as an assemblyman, Yorty acquired a reputation for being a "liberal" because of his support for slum clearance legislation and legislation protecting labor and regulating business. On the other hand, as an assemblyman, he introduced a resolution that established the first California Un-American Activities Committee and served as its first chairman. Furthermore, in 1940, Yorty broke with Governor Olson because he failed to act on Yorty's charge that the Los Angeles office of the State Relief Administration was filled with Communists. In the 198 same year, Yorty ran for the United States Senate on an interventionist platform. The primary and general election campaigns were witness to sensational charges made by both Poulson and Yorty. Yorty promised, if elected, to wrest the city government out of the hands of the "machine" behind Poulson and to restore popular government to Los Angeles. Poulson countered by alleging that Yorty had associated with gamblers , had operated a rubbish dump which had been cited for violations by the county engineer's office, and had underworld connections. These charges led Yorty to file a defamation suit in Superior Court against Poulson and his campaign managers. The results of the primary election gave evidence that the complacency and optimism which had prevailed in the Poulson organization before and during the primary campaign had been ill-founded. The fact that Poulson received only 181,653 votes out of the 457,063 total votes cast indicated that the voters of Los Angeles were not as satisfied with their mayor as had been supposed. Further more, the attempt by McGee to transfer the support he had received in the primary to Poulson in the general election was unsuccessful. 199 The Baus and Ross Company, a professional campaign management firm, undertook the over-all direction of the Poulson campaign. In 1953 and 1957, the firm supervised all aspects of the mayor's campaigns. In 1961, however, the organizational structure of the Poulson campaign was complicated by the fact that the citizens' committee and one of the campaign management firms to which work with the Democrats and minority groups was subcontracted refused to subordinate their activities to the over-all * planning and direction that Baus and Ross sought to exer cise. Baus and Ross believed that the wisest political strategy would be to ignore Yorty's charges of machine politics , not to attempt to enlist the support of Democrats through blatantly partisan appeals , and to keep Poulson from displaying his voice difficulties by avoiding public appearances. Snyder-Smith Advertising and the c’ itizens' committee did not subscribe to these views , and at times pursued strategies directly counter to those favored by Baus and Ross. Because the Yorty campaign was not nearly as well- financed as the Poulson campaign, the Yorty "team" was less professionalized in terms of its personnel and its tech niques. During the primary campaign, Yorty had the backing 200 of only a small corps of volunteer workers , headed by Eleanor Chambers. Irvin L. Edelstein provided mass media services through his advertising agency. Television was the principal vehicle by means of which Yorty communicated his case to the voters , and news commentator George Putnam was his greatest ally in the use of that medium. After the primary, the number of campaign workers increased sub stantially, but the Yorty campaign organization remained essentially amateurish in comparison with the Poulson organization. The professionalism of the Poulson campaign was, however, dissipated by lack of coordination, and it was probably more than matched by the enthusiasm of the supporters of Yorty. The Democratic party in southern California unofficially intervened in the 1961 mayoralty election largely for a punitive purpose. It wished to exact revenge against Yorty because of his criticisms of the party hierarchy and his endorsement of Nixon in 1960. Prominent leaders of the party publicly announced their support of Poulson, and Snyder-Smith Advertising prepared two editions of the Los Angeles Democrat and a letter bearing the signatures of party officials for distribution to registered Democrats. 201 Paul Ziffren and Jesse M. Unruh accused Yorty of attempting to Introduce partisanship into the election and proclaimed their continued belief in the principle of non- partisanship in Los Angeles municipal politics. But the evidence is virtually incontrovertible that it was the Democratic party which attempted to use partisanship as a weapon against a member of the party. It hoped to arouse feelings of party loyalty to the point where Democrats would vote against a "disloyal" Democrat who was running against a "nonpartisan" Republican. To accomplish this purpose, it was necessary to acquaint Democrats with the fact that Yorty was a Democrat, and thereby Yorty1s name became better known to persons who previously had known very little about his political history. The split in the Democratic party between the CDC and the non-CDC factions further complicated the problem of coordination in the Poulson campaign organization. The Republican party played no discernible role in the 1961 mayoralty election. In Chapter I, it was said that a number of explana tions for Yorty's victory have been advanced by political scientists, journalists, and the candidates themselves. Both Poulson and Yorty have argued that one factor that 202 made Yorty's victory possible was his support by a majority of the community newspapers of Los Angeles. In this study, however, it has been demonstrated that not only was Poulson ♦ endorsed by all four of the metropolitan dailies , but he was also endorsed by a majority of the community news papers . Even the newspapers serving the San Fernando Valley, the area in which Yorty resided, overwhelmingly supported Poulson in terms of total circulation. Yorty and the persons who directed his campaign have also said that Yorty owed his election, at least in part, to his adroit use of television. Poulson, who was unable to make effective use of this medium because of his throat condition, concurs in this opinion. The Facts Consolidated post-general election poll revealed evidence which supports this hypothesis. It was found that 77 per cent of all respondents considered television to have been a helpful source of information about the election issues and candidates. Yorty and Poulson voters alike ranked television first among three media in terms of effective ness in winning votes, Some persons attribute Yorty's success to the support of minority groups , particularly Negroes and Mexican-Americans. The Facts Consolidated poll conducted 203 in the period between the primary and general elections indicated that a majority of the respondents residing in the area having the heaviest concentration of Negro popula tion intended to vote for Poulson. The post-general election survey, on the other hand, revealed that Negroes voted for Yorty in the general election in a three to one ratio. It is difficult, with the evidence available, to determine the reasons for this dramatic change. The amount of support given Yorty by Negroes in the general election may be exaggerated because of defects inherent in the sampling procedures used by Facts Consolidated. Even if allowance is made for such a distorting factor, however, it may reasonably be assumed that a majority of the Negro voters cast ballots for Yorty. The explanation may lie in the fact that the Memorial Day riot in Griffith Park involving Negroes and the Los Angeles Police Department solidified the Negro vote and caused the shift to Yorty. The Facts Consolidated polls revealed that the Mexican-American community of Los Angeles voted heavily for Yorty in both the primary and general elections. Yorty's backing by Councilman Roybal and the Community Service Organization probably was instrumental in welding together the Mexican-American voters in support of Yorty. 204 A more complete answer to the question of why they voted this way must await further research on the voting behavior and the political attitudes of the Mexican-American com munity of Los Angeles. Other observers of the 1961 mayoralty election have hypothesized that one factor in the victory of Yorty was the support of suburban voters , particularly those residing in the San Fernando Valley. The post-general election survey revealed that Yorty carried the entire San Fernando • Valley in the general election, and this explanation would thus appear to have some validity. It has also been suggested in this study that one factor in the victory of Yorty may have been the fact that the identification of Democrats with the Democratic party was so strong that even the party was unable to divert support to the candidate known to be a Republican. In the post-general election survey, it was reported that 48.3 per cent of the Democratic respondents cast ballots for Yorty, whereas only 11.3 per cent of the Democratic respondents voted for Poulson. Among the Republican respondents, it was founa that 45.0 per cent voted for Poulson and 25.6 per cent voted for Yorty. The tenacity erf party identi fication as a factor influencing voting behavior was, 205 therefore, demonstrated by the findings of the Facts Consolidated surveys. The introduction of partisanship as a weapon for use against Yorty may--as was feared by Baus and Ross--have ’'backfired." It may have succeeded only in making Yorty better known to Democrats and in affixing the label "Democrat" to him, disloyal or otherwise. The question of why Yorty won the election is not answered simply by identifying those segments of the electorate that voted for him. Many voters were undoubt- m edly influenced by Poulson's health and age; others were just as probably guided by the belief that Poulson had been in office long enough and that, as at the national level, a third term should be denied to the city’s chief executive. Alienation may have influenced the decision of some voters , and dissatisfaction with the way in which Poulson had handled the Dodgers negotiations may have been determina tive in the thinking of others. Some Democrats may have voted for Yorty not because he was a Democrat, but because they resented the attempt on the part of the Democratic party to interfere in a nonpartisan election. Through television many voters may have been impressed by the issues as posed by Yorty and by what they considered to be Yorty’s capacity to do something about them. 206 In view of the intensification of partisan alignments in Sacramento and the preponderant Democratic registration of the people of Los Angeles, it might be prophesied that in the future the Democratic party will seek to introduce partisanship into the municipal politics of Los Angeles in support of Democratic mayoralty candi dates. In the 1961 mayoralty election, prominent leaders of the Democratic party unsuccessfully attempted to per suade Democrats to vote against a Democrat who was cam paigning for a nonpartisan political office. This may be one step toward the party's attempting to mobilize support for a Democrat in such an election. B I B L I O G R A P H Y 0 BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Anderson, Totton James. "California: Enigma of National Politics," in Frank H. Jonas, editor, Western Politics. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1961. Ayer, N. W. and Son. Directory of Newspapers and Periodi cals . Philadelphia: N. W. Ayer and Son, 1961. BanfieId, Edward C., ed. Urban Government: A Reader in Politics and Administration. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961. Baus, Herbert M. Publicity in Action. New York: Harper, 1954. Bigger, Richard, and James D. Kitchen. How the Cities Grew. Los Angeles: Bureau of Governmental Research, University of California, Los Angeles, 1952. Blake, Aldrich. You Wear the Big Shoe. Los Angeles: Aldrich Blake, 1945. Burke, Robert E. Olson's New Deal for California. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953. Campbell, Angus, et al. The American Voter. New York: Wiley, 1960. Carney, Francis. The Rise of the Democratic Clubs in California. New York: Holt, 1958. Cresap, Dean R. Party Politics in the Golden State. Los Angeles: Haynes Foundation, 1954. 208 209 Crouch, Winston W., et al. California Government and Politics. Second edition. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1961. Finney, Guy W. Angel City in Turmoil. Los Angeles: American Press , 1945. Harder, Marvin A. Nonpartisan Election: A Political Illusion? New York: Holt, 1958. Harris, Joseph P. California Politics. Third edition. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961. Hatt, Paul K., and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., eds. Cities and Society. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1957. Janowitz, Morris, ed. Community Political Systems. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1961. ________ . The Community Press in an Urban Setting. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1952. Kelley, Stanley, Jr. Professional Public Relations and Political Power. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956. Klapper, Joseph T. The Effects of Mass Communication. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1960. Komhauser, William. The Politics of Mass Society. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1959. Lane, Robert E. Political Life. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1959. Lee, Eugene C. The Politics of Nonpartisanship. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960. Levin, Murray B. The Alienated Voter. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960. Lipset, Seymour M. Political Man. Garden City, New^York: Doubleday, 1960. 210 Long, Norton E. The Polity. Edited by Charles Press. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1962. McWilliams, Carey. California: The Great Exception. New York: Wyn, 1949. Marvick, Dwaine, ed. Political Decision-Makers. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961. Nadeau, Remi. Los Angeles: From Mission to Modern City. New York: Longmans, Green, 1960. O'Rourke, Lawrence W. Voting Behavior in the Forty-Five Cities of Los Angeles County. Los Angeles: Bureau of Governmental Research, University of California, Los Angeles, 1953. Schattschneider, E. E. , and Victor Jones. Local Political Surveys. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962. Security First National Bank. Research Department. The Growth and Economic Stature of the San Fernando Valley. Los Angeles, 1960. Shevky, Eshref, and Marilyn Williams. The Social Areas of Los Angeles. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1948. Sussman, Marvin B., ed. Community Structure and Analysis. New York: Crowell, 1959. Vieg, John A. , and Henry A. Turner. The Government and Politics of California. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960. Williams, Oliver P., and Charles Press, eds. Democracy in Urban America: Readings on Government and Politics. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1961. Wilson, James Q. A Report on Politics in Los Angeles. Cambridge: Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, 1959. 211 Wilson, James Q. The Amateur Democrat. Chicago: Univer sity of Chicago Press, 1962. Wood, Robert C. Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959. Periodicals Adrian, Charles R. "A Typology for Nonpartisan Elections," Western Political Quarterly, XII (June, 1959), 449-458. ________ . "Some General Characteristics of Nonpartisan Elections," American Political Science Review, XLVI (September, 1952), 766-776. Agger, Robert E., and Daniel Goldrich. "Community Power Structures and Partisanship," American Sociological Review, XXXIII (August, 1958), 383-392. Anderson, Totton J. "Bibliography on California Politics," in Frank H. Jonas, editor, Bibliography on Western Politics, Supplement to Western Political Quarterly, XI (December, 1958), 23-51. BanfieId, Edward C. "The Politics of Metropolitan Area Organization," Midwest Journal of Political Science, I (May, 1957) , 77-91. Bell, Wendell. "Anomie, Social Isolation, and the Class Structure," Sociometry. XX (June, 1957), 105-116. Clark, John P. "Measuring Alienation within a Social System," American Sociological Review. XXIV (December, 1959), 849-852. Cohane, Tim. "The West Coast Produces Baseball's Strangest Story," Look. XXII (August 19, 1958), 50-53, 55-58. Daland, R. T. "Political Science and the Study of Urbanism," American Political Science Review. LI (June, 195 7), 491-509. 212 Dean, Dwight G. "Alienation and Political Apathy," Social Forces. XXXVIII (March, 1960), 185-189. Duncan, Beverly, Georges Sabagh, and Maurice D. Van Arsdol, Jr. "Patterns of City Growth," American Journal of Sociology. LXVII (January, 1962), 418-429. Greer, Scott. "The Social Structure and Political Process of Suburbia," American Sociological Review, XXV (August, 1960), 514-526. ________ . "Urbanism Reconsidered: A Comparative Study of Local Areas in a Metropolis," American Sociological Review. XXI (February, 1956), 19-25. Levin, Murray B., and Murray Eden. "Political Strategy for the Alienated Voter,” Public Opinion Quarterly„ XXVI (Spring, 1962), 47-63. Manis, Jerome G., and. Leo C. Stine. "Suburban Residence and Political Behavior," Public Opinion Quarterly. XXII (Winter, 1958), 483-489. "Mayor Yorty Frontier. XII (July, 1961), 4. Nettler, Gwynn. "A Measure of Alienation," American Sociological Review, XXII (December, 1957), 670-677. Pearson, George W. "Prediction in a Non-Partisan Election," Public Opinion Quarterly, XII (Spring, 1948) , 112-117. Pitchell, Robert J. "The Influence of Professional Campaign Management Firms in Partisan Elections in California," Western Political Quarterly. XI (June, 1958), 278-300. Poulson, Norris. "The Untold Story of Chavez Ravine," Los Angeles, III (April, 1962), 14-17, 50. Seeman, Melvin. "On the Meaning of Alienation," American Sociological Review, XXIV (December, 1959), 783-791. 213 "The Best TV Candidate Wins the Election," Broadcasting, LXI (July 10, 1961), 86-87. Thompson, Wayne E., and John E. Horton. "Political Alienation as a Force in Political Action," Social Forces, XXXVIII (March, 1960), 190-195. "TV and the Election," Frontier, XII (July, 1961), 23-24. Williams, Oliver P., and Charles R. Adrian. "The Insula tion of Local Politics under the Nonpartisan Ballot," American Political Science Review, LIII (December, 1959), 1052-1063. Government Publications California. Elections Code. 1961. Los Angeles. City Planning Commission. Population Estimate, October 1, 1960; April 1, 1961; July 1, 1961. ________ . The Charter of the City of Los Angeles . 1924. As amended through 1961. ________ . County Regional Planning Commission. Population and Dwelling Units. Quarterly Bulletin No. 76, April 1, 1962. » United States. Bureau of the Census. United States Census of Population 1960: California. Washington: 1961. Unpublished Materials Baisden, Richard Norman. "Labor Unions in Los Angeles Politics." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1958. 214 Bell, Charles Gordon. "A Study of Four Selected Factors Which Have Contributed to the Inability of the Demo cratic Party to Successfully Mobilize Its Latent Majority in California." Unpublished Master's thesis, University of Southern California, 1958. Butler, Edgar W., Georges Sabagh, and Maurice D. Van Arsdol, Jr. "Progress Report on Residential Mobility in the Los Angeles SMSA." Paper presented to the Pacific Sociological Association, Sacramento, California, April, 1962. ________ . "Residential Mobility within the Los Angeles Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area." Paper presented to the Western Section Regional Science Association, Berkeley, California, June, 1962. ________ . "Some Social Psychological Factors in Intra metropolitan Residential Mobility." Paper presented to the American Sociological Association, St. Louis, Missouri, September, 1961. Eaton,.Barry D. "A Brief Ecological Look at the Los Angeles City Councilmanic Districts and Their Council Representatives." Paper submitted to the Seminar in Human Ecology, University of Southern California, 1961. Hobbs, Thadeaus Henry. "The Dynamics of Negroes in Politics in the Los Angeles Metropolitan Area: 1945- 1956." Unpublished Master's thesis, University of Southern California, 1960. *-,Jones, Elizabeth, Georges Sabagh, Maurice D. Van Arsdol, Jr., and Edgar W. Butler. "Family Cohesion in a Metropolitan Area." Paper presented to the Pacific Sociological Association, Sacramento, California, April, 1962. Lane, Robert Gerhart. "The Administration of Fletcher Bowron as Mayor of Los Angeles." Unpublished Master's thesis, University of Southern California, 1954. Mayo, Charles George. "Professional Campaign Management Firms in California Politics." Unpublished Master's thesis, University of Southern California, 1960. 215 Rowe, Leonard Carl. "Political Campaign Funds in California." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univer sity of California, Berkeley, 1957. Scigliano, Robert G. "Democratic Political Organization in Los Angeles." Unpublished Master's thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1952. Newspapers Bassett, James. "Poulson Feuds Aid to Yorty: Vote of Protest Spurred by Growth of Controversies ," Los Angeles Times , June 4, 1961. Examiner (Los Angeles), January 1, 1961 to June 1, 1961. Los Angeles Times . May 5 , 1960 to June 28, 1961. Mirror (Los Angeles), April 3, 1961. New York Times. April 2, 1961 to June 25, 1961. People's World (San Francisco), April 15, 1961. Smith, Jack. "Samuel Yorty: Often on Floor, Now on Top at City Hall," Los Angeles Times , June 25, 1961. Valley Times Today (North Hollywood), April 1, 1961. Interviews Chambers, Eleanor. June 19, 1962. Edelstein, Irvin L. June 22, 1962. Goe, Robert. June 19, 1962. Official of Democratic party who asked that his name not be disclosed. June 21, 1962. Poulson, Norris. June 14, 1962. 216 Putnam, George. June 20, 1962. Ross, William B. June 26, 1962. Yorty, Samuel W. June 20, 1962. Miscellaneous Baus and Ross Company. Untitled brochure advertising the services offered by the firm. ' v Campaign receipt and expense statements filed by candidates and their campaign committees with the office of the county registrar of voters. Facts Consolidated polls, May 22, 1961 and August 4, 1961. Letter to Democrats, not dated. Los Angeles Democrat, May 1, 1961 and May 25, 1961. Press releases issued by the Yorty campaign headquarters. Press releases issued by the Baus and Ross Company. A P P E N D I C E S % APPENDIX A COMMUNITY NEWSPAPER SURVEY c 0 COMMUNITY NEWSPAPER SURVEY P Y Name of newspaper ____________________________________ Business address _____________________________________ Boundaries of area served by newspaper (Please be as specific as possible) ________________________________ Approximately how many column inches per week are devoted to political news? ______ Has the newspaper ever endorsed candidates for political office? ______ If so, please provide the following information: 1. Candidate for governor endorsed in 1954 __________ 2. Candidate for governor endorsed in 1958 __________ 3. Candidate for president endorsed in 1956 _________ 4. Candidate for president endorsed in 1960 _________ 5. Candidate in 1953 for mayor of Los Angeles endorsed 6. Candidate in 195 7 for mayor of Los Angeles endorsed 7. Candidate in 1961 for mayor of Los Angeles endorsed Name of person answering questionnaire Position ______________________ Date 219 APPENDIX B NEWSPAPERS INCLUDED IN SURVEY CANDIDATE ENDORSEMENTS NEWSPAPERS INCLUDED IN SURVEY OF CANDIDATE ENDORSEMENTS Average Daily Endorsed Poulson Circulation^ Angeles Mesa News-Advertiser 28,258 California Daily News (Japanese) 5 ,500 California Jewish Press 11,500 California Jewish Voice 28 ,600 Citizen-News (Hollywood) 36,492 Crossroads (Japanese) 1,800 Examiner 678,280 Firestone Park News (Negro) 10,000 Herald & Express 364,690 Herald-Tribune (Reseda) 16 ,421 Independent 27 ,355 Italo Americano 3,314 Los Angeles Reporter 12 ,000 As reported in N. W. Ayer and Son, Directory of Newspapers and Periodicals (Philadelphia: N. W. Ayer and Son, 1961). Figure represents total of paid and unpaid circulation. Sunday circulation used for Los Angeles Times and Examiner. 221 222 Los Angeles Times 907 ,027 Mirror 312,238 Morningside News-Advertiser 15,412 New Japanese American News 5,500 La Opinion (Spanish) 15 ,270 News-Pilot (San Pedro) 15 ,340 North Valley Herald-Tribune 25,470 Park La Brea Reporter 4,750 Press-Journal (Wilmington) 4,662 Record-Ledger of the Verdugo Hills 6,196 Sentinel (Negro) 24,782 Southeast Wave-Star 15,412 Southwest News-Advertiser 20,179 Southwestern Sun li,144 Southwest Topics-Wave » 27,164 Southwest Wave 35 ,452 Star Review (Negro) 25 ,000 Tribune News-Advertiser 16,706 Valley Times Today (North Hollywood) 48 ,490 Van Nuys News 74,606 Westchester News-Advertiser 15,618 Westwood Hills Press 9 ,293 TOTAL 2,859,921 223 Average Daily Endorsed Yorty Circulation Belvedere Citizen (Spanish) 17 ,250 Brooklyn-Belvedere City Terrace Comet 5,000 California Eagle (Negro) 26,875 California Magyarsag (Hungarian) 2,250 California Veckoblad (Swedish) 2,160 Eagle Rock Sentinel 7,465 Eastside Journal 13 ,864 Eastside Sun 10 ,000 El Sereno Star 10 ,161 Encinian 7,500 Griffith Park News 10 ,105 Herald-Dispatch (Negro) 35 ,000 Highland Park News 15 ,364 Lincoln Heights Bulletin-News 11 ,142 Los Angeles City News 13 ,720 Los Angeles City Press 12 ,753 Los Feliz Hills News 15 ,251 Northeast Star Review 7,918 Northwest Leader 11 ,044 Parkside Journal 10 ,602 224 Pico Post Southside Journal Studio City Graphic Sun (Sherman Oaks) Westlake Post Wilshire Press Wyvemwood Chronicle Not Ascertained TOTAL California Staats-Zeitung (German) El Sereno Reporter-News Jewish News (Van Nuys) % Reporter (Woodland Hills) The Spectator Sun (San Fernando) TOTAL 27,225 34,700 8 ,500 10,000 13 ,437 31,507 7,150 377 ,943 Not available Not available 8,800 3,631 Not available 27,492 39,CC3 APPENDIX C "FLIP, FLOP, FLIP, WITH SAM YORTY" (Copy) FLIP FLOP FLIP With Sam Yorty READ THE RECORD SAM YORTY THE FLIP-FLOP CANDIDATE FOR MAYOR Look it overI Decide for yourself is he pro-red or a "red-baiter?" Is he for gambling or against gambling? Is he a radical Democrat or a conservative Democrat? It's hard to -tell when you have a FLIP FLOP FLIP candidate. FLIP ! With the Radicals: Item 1 Assemblyman Sam Yorty joins with Don R.*Healey, Southern California Communist Party Central Com mittee member in political picket lines set up by North'American Committee for Defense of the Spanish Democracy. (Source: Los Angeles Examiner - 6/26/38) Item 2 The Communist-line People's World reported Yorty was a leader of a political picket line along with Leo Gallagher, candidate for California Secretary of State on the Communist ticket. (Source: People's World - 7/18/38) (more) 226 227 Item 3 As an Assemblyman, he co-authored the bill to repeal the Criminal Syndicalism Act. He sought to destroy the law which makes it a crime to advocate the overthrow of our government by force and violence1 . (Source: AB 311 of 1/11/37, California Legislative Record) Item 4 The People's World printed what it said was a New Year's greeting from Assemblyman Yorty, stating "It is a very wholesome thing to have an official newspaper (People's World) to present labor's side." 'Does he now deny this printed report? * (Source: People's World - 1/1/38) FLOP \ With the Conservatives: But after all of the above, Mr. Yorty became a self described staunch foe of Communism. Item 1 Became chairman of the Assembly "UnAmerican Activities" committee. f (Source: Los Angeles Examiner - 1939) Item 2 Made super-patriotic speeches, and was accused by the People's World of "specializing in anti-Soviet tirades." {Source: People1s World - 8/13/43) - • Item 3 With President Truman apparentTy on the ropes, he endorsed Dewey for President. Then, when Truman won, he rein for Congress as a Democrat and strong supporter of Truman. (Source: United Press - Sacramento files - October, 1948) FLIP I With the Liberals: (more) 228 Then after proper billing as an opponent of "red infiltra tion" and a staunch supporter of UnAmerican investigations, Yorty reversed himself again: Item 1 Worked to abolish the State UnAmerican Activities Committee. (Source: Assembly Journal - 6/24/49) Item 2 Led the attack to cut off the funds and thus destroy the Senate UnAmerican Activities Committee. (Source: Assembly Journal - 6/24/49) Item 3 Made the motion to kill a bill requiring Loyalty Oaths of State employees.' (Source: Press Dispatches Reviewing Yorty Record - 10/30/54) Item 4 As Congressman, voted against resolutions to investigate tax-free foundations to determine if their monies were being used unwittingly for Communist purposes. # (Source: Congressional Record, Volume 99 - 7/27/53) Item 5 Listed as absent from Congress the two times vote taken to outlaw Communist Party. (Source: Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1954, page 444) WHICH IS THE REAL SAM YORTY? The leader of picket lines , demonstrations, and rallies on behalf of radical causes or the "Little McCarthy" investigator.of Communist infiltration or the opponent of investigating committees. (more) 229 FLIP ! Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4 ON GAMBLING AND VICE With the Gambling Promoters: As Assemblyman, Yorty led the fight to legalize bookmaking. (Source: Los Angeles Examiner - 5/19/49) Assembly Bill 533 - 5/18/49 Yorty was appointed and served two years as Assistant City Attorney at Cabazon, described by Time Magazine as "sordid" and incorporated in order to establish a "drive-in draw poker palace." Named as City Attorney at the same time Yorty was named the Assistant, was the attorney for the corpora tion that held the monopoly licenses for draw poker in Cabazon. (Source: Los Angeles Examiner - 12/1/56) Yorty told the press he had been offered the lucra- * tive post of gambling commissioner for Nevada. He said he was turning it down (not on moral grounds'.) because he "wanted to stay in politics." Later he said it really wasn't a gambling job--but a "public relations" job for the hotels conducting the gambling! (Source: Los Angeles Herald-Express - 12/2/55) He attacked the police force for raiding beer parlors illegally open after the 2 a.m. closing period. While Mayor Bowron was fighting prostitu tion and vice, Yorty said the police force was harassing the bar owners, and campaigned to make "Los Angeles a friendly metropolis." (Source: Los Angeles Examiner - 1/31/41) (more ) 230 Item 5 He supported the corrupt Frank Shaw regime in the recall election which elected Fletcher Bowron to office. (Source: Raymond P. Smith Defense League affidavit - 3/14/39) FLOP ! With Law and Order Despite the above record of association with the gambling element, Yorty then announces himself as the champion of the foes of gambling and racketeers as follows: Item 1 Yorty announces that if elected Mayor, he will fight for a stronger and more efficient Police Department. He says he would keep Mayor Poulson's Chief of Police in office'. (Source: Campaign speech - primary election 1961) WHICH IS THE REAL SAM YORTY spokesman for legalized bookmaking, attorney for a legalized gambling town, and boastful nominee for Commissioner of gambling in Nevada--- or the champion of law and order and decency in government? With a FLIP FLOP FLIP candidate, it's hard to know! Miscellaneous FLIP FLOPS He supported Roosevelt and Garner, Roosevelt and Wallace, Roosevelt and Truman. He endorsed Dewey for President when Truman appeared to be on the ropes...October, 1958. Ran for Congress and was elected on a Truman platform... anr1 supported the Truman program in Congress... 1950. Opposed the Eisenhower-Nixon legislative program...1953. * (more) 231 Praised the California Democratic Council and ran as their candidate for U. S. Senator... fall of 1954. Attacked the California Democratic Council as a vicious and rigged organization and ran for U. S. Senator against Kuchel...summer 1956. Endorsed Richard Nixon for President...October, 1960. Pointed to his own Irish Catholic Mother to "prove" he was unbiased, but wrote against Kennedy, injecting the reli gious issue as follows: "For some reason the Communist Party on the outside of the Iron Curtain is strongest in heavily Catholic countries such gs Italy."...October, 1960. Says he is for the taxpayer on one hand, but on the other he campaigned for Senator against Kuchel at taxpayers' expense. As a then-Congressman, he used his franking privilege to mail at government expense 4,108,500 pieces of literature to California voters in the primary, and again in the final campaign. DO YOU WANT A FLIP FLOP FLIP CANDIDATE? DO YOU WANT A "YO-YO" CANDIDATE? He goes up, he goes down, depending on who is pulling the string. DON’T LET SAM "YO-YO YORTY" STRING YOU ALONG ' .

Linked assets

University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Conceptually similar

PDF

Political Development And Political Parties In Turkey

PDF

Voting Alignments In The California Legislature: A Roll Call Analysis Of The 1957-1959-1961 Sessions

PDF

The Cultural Institute In Mexico City As An Example Of United States Policy In Cultural Relations

PDF

Representation Theory And Apportionment Models: A Study Of California Constituencies

PDF

Alienation And Integration In The Political Attitudes Of Suburban Adolescents

PDF

The Interaction Between The Private, Public And Third Sector In The Defense Contract Award Process: Lobbying For Defense Contracts For Los Angeles County, 1952-1972

PDF

The Formal Organization Of The Democratic Party At The State Level In California

PDF

Civil Rights And The Public Employee. An Analysis Of Legal Protections Available To Public Employees Dismissed Or Facing Dismissal

PDF

The Influence Of Anti-Poverty Policy-Making Upon Poverty Decision-Making: 1964-1974

PDF

United States Of Europe: A Twentieth-Century Challenge To Nationalism

PDF

Some Administrative Relations Of The Indian States And Union, 1950-1956

PDF

Political Aspects Of State Coordination Of Higher Education: The Processof Influence

PDF

Admission To Membership In The United Nations As An Instrument Of Diplomacy

PDF

An Examination Of Economic Expectations As A Determinant Of Political Behavior

PDF

Robert Todd Lincoln In Politics And Diplomacy

PDF

Technical Assistance Programs Of The United Nations And Of The United States: A Comparative Study

PDF

Graduated Deterrence: The Use Of Nuclear Weapons In A Strategy Of Limited War

PDF

Liberalism And Conservatism: A Study Of Mass-Media Foreign Policy Attitudes

PDF

Models In The Study Of Political Development: A Critique

PDF

The Socialist Labor Party, 1890-1903

Asset Metadata

Creator Mayo, Charles George (author)

Core Title The 1961 Mayoralty Election In Los Angeles: The Political Party In A Nonpartisan Election

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Political Science

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,political science, general

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Anderson, Totton J. (committee chair), Kooker, Arthur R. (committee member), Rodee, Carlton C. (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-316293

Unique identifier UC11358911

Identifier 6405159.pdf (filename),usctheses-c18-316293 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 6405159.pdf

Dmrecord 316293

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Mayo, Charles George

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA