University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

United States Of Europe: A Twentieth-Century Challenge To Nationalism

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United States Of Europe: A Twentieth-Century Challenge To Nationalism

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Content T h is d is s e r ta tio n h a s b e e n 65— 3114 m ic r o film e d e x a c tly a s r e c e iv e d O W E N , R ich a rd E w an , 1 9 1 1 - U N IT E D ST A T E S O F E U R O PE : A T W E N T IE T H - C E N T U R Y C H A LLE N G E TO NATIO NALISM . U n iv e r s ity of S ou th ern C a lifo r n ia , P h .D ., 1964 P o lit ic a l S c ie n c e , in te r n a tio n a l law and r e la tio n s U niversity Microfilms. Inc., A nn Arbor, M ichigan C opyright by RICHARD EW A N O W E N 1965 UNITED STATES OF EUROPE: A TWENTIETH-CENTURY CHALLENGE TO NATIONALISM by R ichard Ewan Owen A D is s e r ta tio n P resen te d to th e FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In P a r t i a l F u lf illm e n t o f th e R equirem ents f o r th e Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY ( P o l i t i c a l S cience) June 1964 UNIVERSITY O F S O U T H E R N C A LIFO RN IA T H E G R A D U A TE S C H O O L U N IV E R S IT Y PA.4K L O S A N G E L E S , C A L IF O R N IA 8 0 0 0 7 This dissertation, written by ........RlCHARn-.EMAM.QWEH.......... :>nder the direction of hiJk...Dissertation Com mittee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by the Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of D O C T O R OF P H I L O S O P H Y C , . . ^..... Date... JUNE l.?6U.................................... DISSERTATION COMMITTEE .. Q .,...ficndLsLS-... - Chairman ACKNOW LEDGM ENTS The w r ite r w ishes to acknowledge th e tim e and e f f o r t so generously expended by P ro fe sso r C arlto n C. Rodee of th e Department of P o l i t i c a l S cience of th e U niver s i t y of Southern C a lif o r n ia as chairman of th e committee under whose d ir e c tio n th i s d i s s e r t a t i o n was p rep ared . He a ls o w ishes to express h is g r a titu d e f o r th e guidance and a s s is ta n c e given by P ro fe sso r Rodee and th e o th e r members o f th e com m ittee, P ro fe sso rs C arl Q. C h ris to l of th e Department of P o l i t i c a l Science and C olin R. L ovell of th e Department of H isto ry , as w e ll as th e encouragement o f P ro fe sso rs T o tten J . Anderson and J . Eugene Harley of th e Department of P o l i t i c a l S cience of th e U n iv e rsity of Southern C a lif o r n ia . Many o rg a n iz a tio n s and in d iv id u a ls have a ls o been exceedingly h e lp fu l in supplying th e w r ite r w ith s i g n i f i c a n t p u b lic a tio n s and documents. The D ire c to ra te of Inform ation of th e C ouncil of Europe, fo r example, has k ep t th e w r ite r on th e C o u n c il's re g u la r m ailin g l i s t sin c e 1956 and has se n t him a l l of th e C o u n c il's in fo rm a tio n a l i v p u b lic a tio n s and r e le a s e s s in c e then f r e e of ch a rg e. The A s s is ta n t S e c re ta ry -G e n e ra l of W estern European Union, Mr. P. B. F ra s e r , se n t numerous documents ard a r t i c l e s co n cern ing th e work of W EU. Count R ichard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi not only se n t a copy o f h is book, An Idea Conquers th e W orld, b u t a ls o had Mr. Y. V ib ald , th e S e c re ta ry of th e Pan- european Union, send im portant documents of th e a c t i v i t i e s of t h i s o rg a n iz a tio n in th e cause of u n itin g Europe. F urtherm ore, th e S e c r e ta r ie s o f th e A ction Com m itte e f o r th e U nited S ta te s of Europe, M . F rangois Duehene and Mrs. F. S chonfeld, se n t th e w r ite r every document covering th e a c t i v i t i e s of M. Jean Monnet and th e ACUSE from January 17-18, 1956 through Ju ly 10-11, 1961. The D ire c to r G en eral, M. A lexandre Marc, and h is S e c re ta ry , M . P h ilip p e , o f th e C entre I n te r n a tio n a l de Form ation Europdenne and th e Union Europeenne des F e d e r a lis te s (P a ris ) a ls o su p p lied th e w r ite r w ith many documents and p u b lic a tio n s issu e d by th e se o rg a n iz a tio n s . Signora Edna M arting M ontuori of Rome, in a d d itio n to much encouragement and s u g g e s tio n s , se n t th e w r i t e r back co p ies co v erin g th e y e a rs 1954 to 1960 of L'Europe N a is s a n te , e d ite d by h er l a t e husband "Erem." v i The w r i t e r a ls o d e s ir e s to acknowledge th e many p r i v a t e o rg a n iz a tio n s working f o r European u n i f i c a t io n t h a t w ere sc c o n s id e r a te of t h e i r tim e and expense in re sp o n se t o h is re q u e s ts f o r t h e i r documents and p u b lic a tio n s , not g e n e r a lly a v a ila b le in th e l i b r a r i e s o f th e U nited S ta te s . T h e ir u n s t in ti n g and u n h erald ed work in th e cause of a U nited Europe (s u re ly a h i s t o r i c a l landmark and tu rn in g p o in t in th e c e n tu r ie s - o ld e f f o r t to u n ite Europe) c a l l s f o r g r e a t e r re c o g n itio n which t h i s w r i t e r deems j u s t and f i t t i n g a t t h i s tim e and p la c e to p u b lic iz e . M oreover, he ta k e s g r e a t p le a s u re in b ein g one o f th e f i r s t r e s e a r c h e rs to em phasize th e s e o r g a n iz a tio n s ' p o s it iv e c o n tr ib u tio n s to th e movement f o r a U nited Europe. And f o r t h e i r g e n e ro s ity in h e lp in g to make t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n much more com prehensive, he e s p e c ia lly w ishes to acknowledge h is e t e r n a l in d eb ted n ess and g r a ti tu d e to th e fo llo w in g p r iv a te o rg a n iz a tio n s and t h e i r D ire c to rs and S e c r e ta r ie s : M essrs. John Leech, B r ita in in Europe; Morgan P h i l l i p s , The B r i t i s h Labour P a rty ; th e I n te r n a tio n a l Sec r e t a r i a t , European Youth Campaign; Denis de Rougemont, C en tre Europeen de la C u ltu re (Geneva); H err B eger, C h r i s t - l i c h D em okratische Union D e u tsc h la n d s; Henri Brugmans, C o lleg e o f Europe; Dr. E lfan R ees, Commission of th e v i i Churches on I n te r n a tio n a l A f f a ir s ( P r o t e s t a n t ) , Geneva; Luciano B o lis , Congres du Peuple Europden; J . B a re th , C ouncil o f European M u n ic ip a litie s ; Percy Cohen, C onserva t i v e R esearch D epartm ent; H. H auser and M. Van V assenhove, E d itio n s de la B aconniere ( S u is s e ) , p u b lis h e r of 1 ’A ction F d d d r a lis te E uropeenne; Arn. P e e ts , E sto n ian In fo rm atio n C entre (S tockholm ), p u b lis h e r of E ast and West and News l e t t e r from Behind th e Iro n C u r ta in ; Leonard Tennyson, p u b lis h e r of th e m onthly B u lle tin from th e European Com m unity : Mrs. Y. de W erg ifo sse, European League f o r Economic C o o p eratio n ; Miss S h irle y W illiam s, F abian S o c ie ty ; F in d lay R. Rea, F e d e ra l Union; A. Sadin and Jan e C a v a lie r, Mouvement Europeen; Andrd P h ilip and M. G ir o n e lla , Mbuve- / I ment S o c i a l i s t e pour le s E ta ts-U n is d Europe; Jean S e i t l i n g e r , N ouvelles Equipes I n te r n a tio n a le s : I n t e r n a tio n a l Union of C h r is tia n D em ocrats; W . S ch ev en els, O rg a n isa tio n R egionale Europeenne de la C .I.S .L . (F ree Trade Unions in W estern E urope); L. John Edwards, PEP: P o l i t i c a l and Economic P lan n in g ; A lb e rt C arth y , S o c i a l i s t I n t e r n a t io n a l (London); H ans-Eberhard D in g e ls, S o z ia l- dem o k ratisch e P a r te i D e u tsc h la n d s; Miss M argaret M. Feeny, Sword o f th e S p i r i t (C a th o lic ), London; S ir A rch ib ald Gordon and Miss C h r is tin e C h a ttin , U nited Kingdom C ouncil v i i i of th e European Movement; J . C. S hovelton, A u s tr a lia and New Zealand Bank, L td. (M elbourne); E lis a b e th McKey, B a s il Karp, and B etsey A lexandor, American Committee on U nited Europe. As soon as th e w r ite r can arra n g e a l l of t h e i r documents and p u b lic a tio n s in p roper o rd e r, he w ill p re se n t them to th e World A ff a irs L ib rary of th e U n iv e rsity of Southern C a lifo rn ia in o rd e r t h a t fu tu re s tu d e n ts may have ac cess to them. In a d d itio n , th e w r ite r would l ik e to express h is a p p re c ia tio n f o r th e a s s is ta n c e so k in d ly extended to him in co n nectio n w ith th e re se a rc h n e c e ssa ry f o r t h i s d is - s e r t a t i o n a l study by th e l i b r a r i a n s and s t a f f of th e l i b r a r i e s of th e U n iv e rsity of Southern C a lif o r n ia , th e U n iv e rsity of C a lifo rn ia a t Los A ngeles, th e Los Angeles P u blic L ib ra ry , and th e Hoover I n s t i t u t i o n on War, Revolu tio n , and Peace a t Palo A lto , C a lif o r n ia . F in a lly , of th e many o th e r p e rs o n s --in Europe and in America--who have a claim on th e w r i t e r 's g r a titu d e because of t h e i r encouragement and s u g g e stio n s, th e w r ite r w ishes to emphasize t h a t he i s immeasurably in d eb ted to h is w ife Evelyn and to h is son Stephen, n o t only fo r t h e i r a s s i s t i n g in th e ty p in g and re -ty p in g of th e f i r s t d r a f ts of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n and i t s b ib lio g ra p h y but a ls o ix f o r t h e i r p a tie n c e and c o n s id e ra tio n in h e lp in g him to meet and to keep t o h is d a y -to -d a y re s e a rc h sc h e d u le . And to Miss E liz a b e th C. Handy, who so p a in s ta k in g ly typed th e f i n a l d r a f t and fo u r c o p ie s , and w ith o u t whose ex p e rie n c e and c o n s c ie n tio u s n e s s t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n would n o t have appeared in i t s p re s e n t fo rm a t, th e w r i t e r is ever g r a t e f u l . TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE ACKNOW LEDGM ENTS iv CHAPTER I . INTRODUCTION ......................................................... 1 C om plexities of th e Problem 2 S ig n ific a n c e of I t s S e ttle m e n t 8 I t s M id-T w entieth-C entury C hallenge 12 J u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r th e Study 14 O b je c tiv e s and L im ita tio n 16 I I . TERMS, METHODOLOGY, AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ........................................... 20 C l a r i f i c a t i o n o f Terms 20 Method and Procedure of th e Study 35 Review o f th e L i t e r a t u r e 39 I I I . ANTECEDENTS OF THE EFFORTS TO UNITE EUROPE: 800-1700 62 T ra d itio n of a European U n iv e rsa l Community 63 D is in te g r a tio n o f th e European U n iv e rsa l Community 66 S an ctio n o f N a tio n a l S o v ereig n ty and N atio n alism 69 E a r l i e s t Formal Plans to R e-U nite Europe 72 IV. ANTECEDENTS OF THE EFFORTS TO UNITE EUROPE: 1700-1815 99 U n ific a tio n P ro je c ts in th e Age o f E nlightenm ent 99 x i CHAPTER PAGE U n ific a tio n E f f o r ts from th e French R ev o lu tio n to th e End o f th e N apoleonic Wars 127 U n ific a tio n A ttem pts by th e Holy A llia n c e and th e C oncert o f Europe 136 V. EFFORTS TO UNITE EUROPE BY INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS: 1 8 1 5 -1 9 4 0 ......................... 141 Advancement o f th e Idea of European F e d e ra tio n to 1899 142 T r a n s itio n to th e Idea o f a World A s s o c ia tio n o f N atio n s: 1899-1922 158 R ev iv al of th e Idea o f European F e d e ra tio n from 1922 to World War I I 166 VI. W ORLD W A R I I AND DISUNITED EUROPE IN SUSPENSE ............................................................... 181 E u ro p e 's F a ilu r e to U n ite , Double Jeopardy W ithin a G e n e ra tio n , and B elated R eaction 182 B r i t a i n 's O ffer of A nglo-French Union R ejected 195 Impact o f T o t a l i t a r i a n Conquest and S u b o rd in atio n of E f f o r t to U nite Europe to D rive f o r World F e d e ra tio n 211 V II. THE RATIONALE FOR EUROPEAN FEDERATION AFTER W O RLD W A R I I ........................................... 222 Europe in th e A fterm ath and I n t e r n a tio n a l O rg a n iz a tio n Resumed 224 The Logic o f a U nited S ta te s of Europe 241 I n i t i a t i v e o f W estern Statesm en and In d iv id u a ls fo r a U nited S ta te s o f Europe 256 x i i CHAPTER PAGE VIZI. THE ORGANIZED M O V EM ENT TO UNITE EUROPE . 267 A ction o f Nongovernmental O rg a n iz a tio n s 268 Role o f American A s s is ta n c e 282 Impact o f th e Congress o f Europe and th e European Movement 292 E f f o r ts o f W estern Governments toward U nity and R e a l i t ie s o f I n t e r governm ental C ooperation 306 IX. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE IN OPERATION . . . 340 In a u g u ra tio n of th e C o n s u lta tiv e Assembly: "High Hopes" 341 R e a l i t ie s o f U n ity : th e P o l i t i c a l D ebate C ontinues 355 The S p l it Road to European U nity 374 X. DIVERGENT APPROACHES AND DETERRENTS TO EUROPEAN UNIFICATION ............................ 391 The " L i t t l e Europe" Approach 393 W estern European Union: S ta g n a tio n 412 R evival o f th e Movement f o r a U nited S ta te s o f Europe 433 XI. UNITED STATES OF EUROPE: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT .................................................... 461 APPENDICES ..................................................................................... 487 Appendix A. Supplem entary D ata to C hapter I I I 489 Appendix B. Supplem entary Data to C hapter IV 503 Appendix C. Supplem entary D ata to C hapter V 522 Appendix D. Supplem entary Data to C hapter V II 530 Appendix E. Supplem entary D ata to C hapter V III 534 x i i i CHAPTER PAGE Appendix F. Membership in W estern European O rg a n iz a tio n s 536 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................ 540 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The most u rg e n t problem o f th e w a r-s c a rre d , sm all n a t i o n - s t a t e s o f Europe in rae d la te ly fo llo w in g World War I I was to fin d th e means o f overcoming th e s o c ia l d is o r g a n iz a tio n and economic d e s p a ir o f t h e i r people in o rd e r to r e s t o r e as soon as p o s s ib le th e prewar norms of n a tio n a l e x is te n c e . D uring and a f t e r World War I th e sm all European n a t i o n - s t a t e s had been a b le to s u rv iv e , m ain tain n a tio n a l s e l f - r e s p e c t s , and promote th e w e lfa re o f t h e i r c i t i z e n s . World War I I , however, provided an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t e x p e rie n c e . H i t l e r , M u sso lin i, and o th e r p ro p a g a n d is ts , who had g l o r i f i e d th e t o t a l i t a r i a n n a t i o n - s t a t e and b o a ste d o f i t s s u p e r i o r it y over th e "weak" dem ocratic s t a t e s , i n s t ig a te d t h i s war to absorb a t th e opportune moment a l l European s t a t e s w ith in a c o n tin e n ta l t o t a l i t a r i a n s u p e r s ta te . For a few y e a rs th ey succeeded because th e sm all invaded s t a t e s o f Europe had been u n a b le , i f not u n w illin g , to p r o te c t th e independent n a tio n a l e x is te n c e o f t h e i r people and had l e f t them to th e d esig n s o f t h e i r t o t a l i t a r i a n m a s te rs . As a r e s u l t , f a i t h and c o n fid e n c e in th e c a p a b i l i t i e s o f E u ro p e's sm all n a t i o n s t a t e s became m a tte rs o f in d if f e r e n c e and p r a c t i c a l l y v an ish ed a f t e r th e c o lla p s e and ru in o f H i t l e r 's " F o rtre s s E uro pe." C o m p lex ities of th e Problem So e x te n s iv e was th e m a te r ia l d e v a s ta tio n , th e breakdown o f n a tio n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , and th e d is r u p tio n o f m an's d a ily p u r s u its from World War I I t h a t th e l i b e r a t e d European c o u n tr ie s lacked th e c a p a c ity and re s o u rc e s to r e b u ild t h e i r n a tio n a l domains and to re h a b i l i t a t e t h e i r p eo p le as l a t e as th r e e y e a rs a f t e r th e w ar. F u rth erm o re, th e g e n e ra l s t a t e o f economic co n fu sio n w ith in th e fragm ented European s t a t e s made t h e i r c i t i z e n s e a s i e r prey to Communist propaganda and to p o s s ib le sub ju g a tio n by a second t o t a l i t a r i a n o v e rlo rd . In f a c t , many d em o cratic i n s t i t u t i o n s and groups w ith in th e E astern European c o u n tr ie s had a lre a d y been o b l i t e r a t e d by th e Communists and t h e i r n a tio n s absorbed in to th e S o v iet b lo c . M oreover, s t a r t l i n g g a in s in membership had been made by 3 th e n a tio n a l Communist p a r tie s in Europe, and th e Communists could a lre a d y b o a st o f having th e la r g e s t s in g le p a rty in France and in I t a l y . The f e a r a ro s e , th e r e f o r e , th a t th e Communists m ight ta k e over th e government of th e s e coun t r i e s , extend t h e i r c o n tr o l to n eig h b o rin g s t a t e s , and e v e n tu a lly dom inate th e whole of Europe. Few indeed were th e in d iv id u a ls , on e i t h e r s id e o f th e A t l a n ti c , who f a ile d to g ra sp th e dangerous s i t u a tio n to which th e sm all n a tio n s o f W estern Europe were exposed v i s - a - v i s th e g ia n t S o v iet Union and i t s Communist- expansion aim s. B esid es, th e impotency and obsolescence o f th e s e sm all European n a t io n - s t a t e s were brought in to sh a rp e r r e l i e f when compared w ith th e two g ia n t fe d e ra te d s t a t e s th a t were a b le to rebound from th e same c o s tly war because of t h e i r v a st human and n a tu r a l re so u rc e s as w ell as t h e i r r e l a t i v e t e r r i t o r i a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y . Thus, what was o r i g i n a l ly co n sid ered an economic problem of r e h a b i l i t a t i n g th e w ar-rav ag ed, lib e r a te d European coun t r i e s had developed in to an extrem ely f r u s t r a t i n g problem. Compounded o f economic, p o l i t i c a l , and s e c u r ity im p lic a tio n s d e riv e d from th e dangers Im p lic it in th e postw ar t a c t i c s of th e S oviet Union, th e problem became too 4 complex f o r each European n a tio n t o re s o lv e e q u ita b ly on a u n i l a t e r a l o r b i l a t e r a l b a s is and r e t a i n I t s autonomy. Faced w ith t h i s dilemma, W estern European s t a t e s - men and c iv ic le a d e rs concluded t h a t th e dem ocratic c o u n tr ie s o f Europe must u n it e in o rd e r to en su re a v ia b le economy and t h e i r f u tu r e s e c u r ity o r e l s e r i s k s u r v iv a l as independent n a tio n s . Working in an economic and p o l i t i c a l environm ent conducive to p u b lic sympathy fo r th e id e a o f a u n ite d Europe, th e proponents o f European u n i f i c a t i o n th en e s ta b lis h e d nongovernm ental o rg a n iz a tio n s in each o f th e dem ocratic s t a t e s in o rd e r to promote th e cau se o f u n io n . L a te r , th ey founded th e European Movement, an i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rg a n iz a tio n to c o o rd in a te t h e i r e f f o r t s in se c u rin g both p u b lic and governm ental su p p o rt f o r a u n ite d Europe. In j u s t one y e a r , t h e i r c o n c e rte d a c tio n was in s tru m e n ta l in th e c r e a tio n o f th e C ouncil o f Europe and th e C o n s u lta tiv e Assem bly, b e lie v e d a t th e tim e to be th e p o l i t i c a l organs through which Europe would be u l t i m ately u n if ie d . In th e m eantim e, th e m oral su p p o rt and s u b s t a n t i a l f i n a n c ia l a s s is ta n c e o f th e U nited S ta te s in flu e n c e d s ix te e n governm ents o f Europe to come to g e th e r in o rd e r to 5 c o o rd in a te t h e i r economic re co v ery programs above n a tio n a l le v e ls and to u n i t e . As a r e s u l t , th e O rg a n iz a tio n f o r European Economic C ooperation was e s ta b lis h e d and p u b lic ly proclaim ed f o r t h i s p u rp o se. W ith th e s e f i r s t form al s te p s to u n it e Europe w idely p u b lic iz e d , th e g e n e ra l en th u siasm , optim ism , and expectancy f o r a u n ite d Europe reach ed i t s h ig h e s t le v e l. What seemed a c o n c re te , p r a c t i c a l , and h o p e fu l c o u rse o f a c tio n a t th e tim e w as, however, to become a draw n-out s tr u g g le in th e decade to fo llo w . I n te r r u p tio n s and m odi f i c a t i o n s in th e e f f o r t s tow ard u n itin g Europe r e s u l t e d from in d e c is io n , d e b a te , and d e la y . T hese, in tu r n , were in flu e n c e d by (1) th e r o l e o f a re s u rg e n t and rearm ed West Germany in a u n ite d E urope, (2) th e fo re ig n p o lic y and a c tio n o f th e S o v iet Union and w orld e v e n ts , (3) th e m ilita r y - d e f e n s e g u a ra n te e s o f N.A.T.O. and th e U nited S t a t e s , (A) th e a p p a re n t re c o v e ry and in c re a s in g p r o s p e r i t y o f th e n a tio n a l econom ies, and (5) th e reim ergen ce o f t r a d i t i o n a l c o n f l i c t s o f n a tio n a l economic and p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s . C o n trib u tin g a ls o to th e in te r r u p t i o n s and m o d ifi c a tio n s in th e e f f o r t s to u n i te Europe was th e d is a g r e e ment over th e most f e a s i b l e methods to a c h ie v e t h i s o b je c tiv e . One schoo l o f th o u g h t, led by B r i t a i n , su p p o rte d in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l a s s o c ia tio n and u n ity through go o d w ill and re a s o n . The o th e r , led by F ran ce, a t f i r s t su p p o rted f e d e r a tio n based on a w r itte n c o n s t i t u ti o n and im n ed iate u n i f i c a t i o n . L a te r , however, when i t became e v id e n t t h a t th e m a jo rity o f th e C ouncil o f Europe members w ere n o t ready to make a l l th e n a tio n a l s a c r i f i c e s n e c e s sa ry to c r e a te a f e d e r a l u n io n , a more lim ite d approach to u n ify in g Europe was ad o p ted . T his g ro u p 's new plan o f a c tio n sought to u n ify th e m i l i t a r y d efen ses and a s e c to r a t a tim e o f th e economies o f th o s e n a tio n s w illin g to do so on a s u p ra n a tio n a l l e v e l . In t h i s way, i t was a n tic ip a te d t h a t th e p eo p le o f Europe would w itn e ss th e r e a l ad v antages o f u n i f i c a t i o n by g ra d u a l s te p s and sooner or l a t e r be induced to g iv e up t h e i r narrow n a tio n a l I n t e r e s t s f o r th e g r e a t e r b e n e f its o f a com plete u n io n . S u b seq u en tly , th e European Coal and S te e l Community was e s ta b lis h e d . Then th e European D efense Community was a tte m p te d ; however, a f t e r two y e a rs o f d elay i t was r e j e c t e d , and th e W estern European Union w ith B r i t a i n 's p a r t i c i p a t i o n was i n s t i t u t e d to re p la c e i t . The European P o l i t i c a l Community was n ex t proposed, and a c o n s t i t u t i o n 7 was d r a f te d ; b ut i t n ev er g o t beyond th e s ta g e o f a stu d y o f recom m endations. L a te r , th e su cc ess o f th e European Coal and S te e l Community (ECSC) encouraged th e fo rm atio n o f th e A ctio n Committee f o r a U nited S ta te s o f Europe u nder th e le a d e r s h ip o f Jean Monnet (O ctober 14, 1955). The p e rio d t h a t follow ed was r e f e r r e d to as th e R evival o f th e movement to u n i t e E urope, and th e renewed d riv e r e s u l te d in th e c r e a tio n o f th e European Atomic Energy Community and th e European Economic Community by th e s ix ECSC n a tio n s . In o rd e r to c o n s o lid a te th e c o n tr o l o f th e th r e e s u p ra n a tio n a l com m unities, a s in g le European P a r l i a m entary Assembly was th en e s ta b lis h e d . F in a lly , under th e le a d e r s h ip o f B r i t a i n , th e European F ree Trade A ss o c ia t io n was bro u g h t in to b ein g as a p a r a l l e l o rg a n iz a tio n to th e European Economic Conmunity by seven n a tio n s u n w illin g to jo i n th e l a t t e r . Though some c o n c re te i n s t i t u t i o n a l p ro g re ss toward u n i f i c a t i o n has been made by th e s ix community n a tio n s d u rin g th e p a s t d ecad e, th e e f f o r t s to u n i t e W estern Europe have en co u n tered more c o m p le x itie s th an a t f i r s t ex p e c te d . Delay and th e d iv e rg e n t approaches o f B r ita in and F rance and th e n a tio n s su p p o rtin g them have added to th e c o m p le x itie s o f European u n ity by fo rc in g to th e 8 s u r f a c e th e s tu b b o rn c o n f l i c t s o f n arro w n a t i o n a l i s m , r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e p r e s e n t r e g i o n a l c le a v a g e o f W estern E u ro p e. T hus, th e f u l f i l l m e n t o f t h e p o s tw a r g o a l o f E uropean u n i f i c a t i o n h a s been o b s t r u c t e d . W hether W estern E urope e v e r becomes c o m p le te ly u n i f i e d , o r o n ly p a r t i a l l y (by th e s i x community n a t i o n s and any o t h e r s w is h in g t o j o i n th e m ), th e means m ust f i r s t b e found t o s u b o r d in a te n a t i o n a l i s t i c p a r t i c u l a r i s m s t o th e common i n t e r e s t s o f th e in te n d e d u n io n . P r e s e n t l y , t h e p r o s p e c t f o r p a r t i a l u n i f i c a t i o n a p p e a rs th e more p ro m is in g . S hould t h i s o c c u r , how ever, t h e problem o f u n i t y w ould s t i l l c o n f r o n t W estern E u ro p e , d iv id e d i n t o two o r more co m p etin g r e g io n s o f n a t i o n s and p re v e n te d from a t t a i n i n g i t s maximum p o t e n t i a l e f f e c t i v e n e s s . S i g n i f ic a n c e o f I t s S e ttle m e n t The im p o rta n c e o f t h e p o stw a r e f f o r t t o r e p l a c e d e m o c ra tic E u ro p e 's sy ste m o f c o n te n d in g n a t i o n - s t a t e s w ith a u n i f i e d w hole stem s from s e v e r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s : h i s t o r i c a l , econom ic, p o l i t i c a l , p s y c h o l o g i c a l , s e c u r i t y , and s o c i a l . T u rn in g t o t h e h i s t o r i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e o f th e p ro b lem , one f in d s t h a t f o r c e n t u r i e s p io n e e r E uropean 9 h u m a n ita ria n s and th in k e r s have conceived o f some p lan f o r c lo s e r p o l i t i c a l u n io n . Each proposed p lan was in ten d ed t o r e s t o r e E u ro p e's l o s t u n ity and th e re b y e lim in a te i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l antagonism s which have burdened Europe w ith ru in o u s w a rs, r e ta r d e d i t s f u l l e r developm ent, and d e stro y e d i t s h i s t o r i c le a d e rs h ip in w orld a f f a i r s . None o f th e s e p la n s , b e lie v e d v is io n a ry and im p r a c tic a l, was ev er s e r io u s ly c o n sid e re d by th e le a d e rs o f government a t th e tim e . In s te a d , m o tiv ated by r i s i n g n a tio n a lis m and c o lo n ia lis m , th ey attem p ted th e h arm o n izatio n o f E u ro p e 's n a t i o n - s t a t e system th ro u g h diplom acy, peace t r e a t i e s , a l l i a n c e s , and b alan c e-o f-p o w er arran g em en ts. Because o f th e o p e r a tio n a l f a i l u r e s of th e s e methods and t h e i r i n a b i l i t y to se c u re peace and u n ity in Europe d u rin g th e p a s t hundred y e a r s , i t would seem r a t h e r im prudent to r e ly s o le ly on th e s e d e v ic e s in th e f u tu r e . I t i s a ls o h i s t o r i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t , f o r th e f i r s t tim e in th e h is t o r y o f E urope, i t s b e s t minds have given i n t e l l e c t u a l d i r e c ti o n to th e id ea o f u n ify in g Europe. Many p r iv a te o r g a n iz a tio n s , a c t i v e l y working f o r i t s f u l f i l l m e n t , have provided i t w ith a m oral b a se , and w idespread in d iv id u a l sympathy and su p p o rt have given i t a p o p u lar a p p e a l. F u rth erm o re, th e fa v o ra b le r e a c tio n 10 o f th e p u b lic has encouraged th e re sp o n se and o f f i c i a l a c c e p ta n c e o f th e Idea by f i f t e e n W estern European g o v ern m ents. And now, th e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f u n itin g Europe Is a c t u a l l y b ein g attem p ted by n a tio n a l governm ents and t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . The econom ic, p o l i t i c a l , p s y c h o lo g ic a l, s e c u r i t y , and s o c i a l ad v an tag es o f a u n ite d Europe a r e a ls o o f s u f f i c i e n t m e rit to w a rra n t c a r e f u l c o n s id e r a tio n . A ll o f th e s e a re a s o f human a c t i v i t y , of c o u rse , a r e so c lo s e ly r e l a t e d and In te rd e p e n d e n t t h a t i t is d i f f i c u l t to s e p a r a te one from th e o th e r . T h e ir r e s p e c tiv e p o t e n t i a l i t i e s when harm onized w ith in an in te g r a te d W estern European w hole, m oreover, should complement one a n o th e r in such ways as to maximize th e a g g re g a te p o t e n t i a l ad v an tag es to every c i t i z e n . S ince th e W estern European n a tio n s have more econom ic, p o l i t i c a l , s e c u r i t y , and s o c i a l problem s in common than o th e rw is e , i t would seem to be much more l o g i c a l , econom ical, and advantageous to ta c k le th e s e common problem s as th e g e n e ra l concern o f a u n ite d Europe r a t h e r than on th e piecem eal b a s is o f com peting, h av e-n o t c o u n t r i e s . A u n if ie d W estern European economy would p ro v id e a p ro d u c tiv e m arket com prising some 270 m illio n consum ers, 11 In which s e c tio n a l geographic advantages and th e s p e c i a l i z a tio n and d iv is io n of la b o r could be more e f f i c i e n t l y u t i l i z e d fo r th e economic s t a b i l i t y of th e e n t i r e a re a . The consum ers, b e n e f itin g e v e n tu a lly from g r e a te r p ro s p e r ity and economic s e c u r ity , should enjoy r i s i n g liv in g s ta n d a rd s , g r e a te r c u l t u r a l co h esio n , and an improved p sy c h o lo g ic a l ou tlook (as compared w ith th e s o c ia l dem oral i z a tio n and n a tio n a l i n f e r i o r i t y complexes fo llo w in g World War I I ) . These ad v an tag es, in tu r n , would a s su re more s ta b le government and would se rv e as a pow erful bulwark a g a in s t th e Communists * id e o lo g ic a l in roads and p o s s ib le conquest o f Europe. On th e o th e r hand, p o l i t i c a l u n if ic a tio n would a u to m a tic a lly in te g r a te W estern E urope's economy and m i li t a r y f o rc e s , and i t would go f a r to remove th e causes o f in t e r n a t io n a l antagonism s, economic n a tio n a lis m , and m i li ta r y c o n f li c t among W estern European n a tio n s . I t would a ls o p ro v id e c e n tr a liz e d a c tio n and g r e a te r e ffe c tiv e r n ess in d e a lin g w ith European monetary and f i s c a l m a tte rs , and th e common problems of d efense and fo re ig n p o lic y . F urtherm ore, s in c e no W estern European n a tio n has th e re so u rc e s or i n d u s t r i a l p o te n tia l to defend i t s e l f alo n e a g a in s t th e m assive s tr e n g th o f th e S o v iet Union, lo g ic 12 would seem to c a l l f o r p o l i t i c a l u n i f i c a t i o n as th e b e s t means to a c h ie v e a more p o s i t i v e s e c u r i ty . I t s M id-T w entieth-C entury C hallenge In th e T w en tieth -C en tu ry w o rld , th e s c l e n t i f i c - te c h n o lo g ic a l advances have been g r e a t i n t e g r a t i v e f o r c e s . T ra n s p o rta tio n and com m unication have l i t e r a l l y com pressed th e e a r t h to th e p o in t t h a t tim e and space a r e no lo n g er b a r r i e r s to human c o n ta c t and u n d e rsta n d in g . Y et, th e s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l p ro g re ss in human r e l a t i o n s has no t k ep t p ace, and s o c ia l d is ta n c e and i n t e r n a t i o n a l m isu n d er s ta n d in g among p eo p les have n o t c o rre sp o n d in g ly le s s e n e d . M oreover, th e s e s c i e n t i f i c - t e c h n o l o g i c a l advances have brough t about th e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and c o n s o lid a tio n in th e o r g a n iz a tio n a l and o p e r a tio n a l fu n c tio n s of g o v ern ment and b u s in e s s . L arg er u n i t s o f government have tak en over th e fu n c tio n s fo rm e rly handled by lo c a l u n i t s , and sm all b u s in e s s e n te r p r i s e s have merged i n to b ig g e r ones f o r a d m in is tr a tiv e and economic ad v a n ta g e s. The com bining o f sm all u n i t s in to a more e f f e c t i v e whole has provided g r e a t e r s t a b i l i t y and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y as w e ll as a d im in u tio n o f p ro v in c ia lis m . In th e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c io p o l i t i c a l sp h ere o f m an's a c t i v i t i e s , however, th e impact 13 o f narrow n a tio n a lis m has co n tin u ed to f o s t e r n a t i o n a l i s t i c p a r tic u la r is m , economic n a tio n a lis m , and i n t e r n a tio n a l s t r i f e , d iv is iv e and d is r u p tiv e fo rc e s impeding in te r n a tio n a l c o n s o lid a tio n and o rd e r and d e p riv in g man kin d o f genuine peace and s e c u r ity . U n fo rtu n a te ly , in th e s o c ia l s c ie n c e f i e l d s of endeavor, in c o n tr a s t w ith th e p h y s ic a l s c ie n c e s , th e in ta n g ib le s of human n a tu re and human r e l a t i o n s , f r e e of le g a l c o n tro l and c o e rc io n , have seldom p e rm itte d lo g ic a l or planned s o c ia l advances. Comprised o f m yriad psycho lo g ic a l im pulses and p l u r a l i s t i c c o n f l i c t s o f i n t e r e s t s , in te r n a tio n a l s o c ie ty as a la b o ra to ry o f human b eh av io r has n o t enabled th e s o c ia l s c i e n t i s t s to match th e m ate r i a l achievem ents o f th e p h y sic a l s c i e n t i s t s . N ev erth e l e s s , th e m id-T w entieth C e n tu ry --so pragm atic and u t i l i t a r i a n - - s t i l l c h a lle n g e s th e very b e s t in th e minds and co n scien ce of th e p r a c t it i o n e r s o f th e s o c ia l s c ie n c e s . Indeed, th e e f f o r t to u n ite W estern Europe p re se n ts to th e le a d e rs and c i t i z e n s o f dem ocratic Europe a h i s t o r i c a l c h a lle n g e : tra n sc e n d n a t i o n a l i s t i c p a r tic u la r is m and u n ite ! 14 J u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r th e Study I t was th e s ig n if ic a n c e and c h a lle n g e of a p o s s i b l e U nited S ta te s o f Europe t h a t m o tiv ated th e w r i t e r to u n d e rta k e t h i s s tu d y . The id e a f i r s t o cc u rred d u rin g a seven-m onth so jo u rn in Europe (1954-1955) in o rd e r to r e v i s i t w artim e a c q u a in ta n c e s and th e p la c e s o f a c tio n (from B r i t a i n to Normandie, a c ro s s F ran ce, Belgium, and H olland in to th e German Ruhr, and down through so u th ern Germany i n to C zechoslovakia) where th e w r i t e r had been engaged from A p r il, 1944, to Septem ber, 1945, as a s o l d i e r o f th e U nited S ta te s 79th I n fa n try D iv isio n in World War I I . D uring h is r e v i s i t to Europe, th e f a t e o f th e European D efense Community (EDC) was a t s ta k e and very much in th e news. A fte r th e EDC was r e je c te d by th e French Assembly in A ugust, 1954, th e W estern European Union (WEU) was proposed to re p la c e i t . F in a lly , w ith a ssu ra n c e s o f B r i t i s h p a r t i c i p a t i o n , th e W EU was ac cep ted by th e French Assembly j u s t b e fo re th e y e a r 1954 ended. In th e co u rse of in fo rm al c o n v e rs a tio n s w ith a c q u a in ta n c e s and o th e r E uropeans—trad esm en, s tu d e n ts , and sundry p ersons in a l l W estern European c o u n trie s ex cep t Norway, G reece, and T u rk e y --d u rin g t h i s p e r io d , th e 15 EDC, WEU, and th e p o s s ib le p o l i t i c a l u n if i c a t i o n o f Europe were d is c u s s e d . Except f o r most businessm en and s tu d e n ts , th e w r i t e r d isco v ered th a t o rd in a ry in d iv id u a ls seemed e i t h e r to lack p e rso n a l attach m en t to o r to h e s i t a t e in e x p re ssin g an independent judgment on th e p ro g re s s , p ro s p e c ts , and advantages o f European u n i f i c a t i o n . I f p re sse d f o r an o p in io n , they u s u a lly r e p li e d , " I t ' s a good id e a ," o r " I am in fa v o r of i t . " When each was asked what he was doing to h e lp make a u n ite d Europe p o s s ib le , th e re p ly was more o r l e s s : "There i s very l i t t l e th e i n d i v id u a l can do by h im s e lf. I t i s th e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of th e c o u n tr y 's p o l i t i c a l le a d e rs and th e Government; they a re ca p ab le of doing w hatever should be d o n e." Some i n d iv id u a ls , o f c o u rse , were r a th e r c y n ic a l o r p e s s im is tic in t h e i r o p in io n s. While a d m ittin g th e id e a was a good one in p r i n c i p l e , th ey d e c la re d t h a t Europe would never become a U nited S ta te s in t h e i r lif e tim e because th e re were too many lo n g -sta n d in g n a tio n a l d iffe re n c e s to u n ite th e n a tio n s in th e n e a r f u tu r e . A fte r r e tu r n in g to th e U nited S ta te s in F eb ru ary , 1955, and d is c u s s in g th e e f f o r t s of u n itin g Europe among f r ie n d s and fe llo w s tu d e n ts , th e w r ite r d isco v ered a lack o f r e a l i s t i c a p p re c ia tio n o f th e problem . The g e n e ra l 16 f e e l i n g in A m erica was c h a t Europe sh o u ld f e d e r a t e , t h a t t h i s would e lim in a te i t s n a t i o n a l i s t i c c o n f l i c t s , and t h a t i t s econom ic, p o l i t i c a l , and s e c u r i t y problem s c o u ld th e n be s e t t l e d more e f f e c t i v e l y . R e f le c tin g on th e s e view s and th e European s c e n e , th e w r i t e r d e c id e d t h a t a s tu d y o f th e e f f o r t s t o u n i t e Europe m ight make some c o n t r i b u t i o n t o a b e t t e r u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e d e t e r r e n t s , t h e i r c a u s e s , and t h e i r e f f e c t s on th e p ro g re s s o f th e movement f o r European u n io n . T h is s tu d y , t h e r e f o r e , i s an a tte m p t (1) t o exam ine th e c o m p le x itie s o f th e problem o f u n i t i n g d e m o c ra tic E urope; (2) t o a n a ly z e th e a c ti o n o f g o v ern m en ts, p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , p r i v a t e o r g a n iz a t io n s , t h e i r l e a d e r s , and th e p u b lic in th e p o stw ar movement to u n i t e E urope; (3) to p ro b e th e d e t e r r e n t s o b s tr u c t in g th e ach ievem ent o f European u n i f i c a t i o n ; and (4) t o e v a lu a te th e f e a s i b i l i t y o f a U n ited S ta t e s o f Europe in th e m id -T w e n tie th C e n tu ry . O b je c tiv e s and L im ita tio n I t i s n o t th e i n t e n t i o n o f th e w r i t e r to p e rsu a d e , b u t r a t h e r t o e x p lo re th e p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f u n i t i n g Europe e i t h e r by th e in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l a s s o c i a t i o n method o r by th e f e d e r a t i o n o r th e " s u p r a n a tio n a l" s e c t o r - a t - a - t i m e 17 approach. Nor can t h i s In v e s tig a tio n p re te n d to be e x h a u s tiv e ; n o t o nly because o f th e in c re a s in g , m u lti lin g u a l o u tp u t o f E u ro p e's p r in tin g p r e s s e s ( in an age of advancing m ech an isatio n and re c o rd k e e p in g ), th e q u a n tity o f which p r o h ib its any one in d iv id u a l from c o v e rin g , but a ls o because th e ebb and flow o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s in to d a y 's w orld a r e too v a r ia b le . No statesm an or s c h o la r , l e t alo n e stu d e n t (n o tw ith sta n d in g how ex p e rt he may b e lie v e h im se lf to be in contem porary a f f a i r s and how m iraculous th e means o f communication) can have a c c u ra te o r f u l l knowledge o f th e f a c t s a t any given moment. F urtherm o re, t h i s stu d y makes no p re te n sio n to being d e f i n i t i v e , fo r th e movement to u n it Europe has not proved a sim ple procedure t h a t can be worked out in a given p e rio d of tim e. On th e c o n tra ry , i t appears to be a c o n tin u in g , lo n g -term co u rse of a c tio n which n e c e s s a r ily imposes lim ita tio n s o f tim e on any contem porary re s e a rc h . The w r i t e r , th e r e f o r e , pursues th e p ro g re ss o f th e move ment to u n ite Europe o nly to 1960. And s in c e th e main purpose is to in v e s tig a te th e f e a s i b i l i t y o f European p o l i t i c a l u n i f i c a t i o n , th e scope o f t h i s stu d y w i l l be lim ite d p rim a rily to th e p o l i t i c a l developm ents in 18 t h i s d i r e c tio n . Time and sp ace, m oreover, p re c lu d e going in to a d e ta ile d coverage o f th e European economic and s e c u r ity o rg a n iz a tio n s , such as (1) th e O rg an izatio n f o r European Economic C o o p eratio n , (2) th e European Payments Union, (3) th e European Coal and S te e l Community, (4) th e European D efense Community, (5) th e W estern European Union, (6) th e European Community o f Atomic Energy, and (7) th e European Economic Community, a l l o f which were o s te n s ib ly c re a te d to promote a u n ite d Europe. B esid es, th e work o f th e s e European i n s t i t u t i o n s i s so e x te n s iv e ly documented and recorded th a t each one could w e ll se rv e as th e s u b je c t f o r a s e p a ra te re s e a rc h stu d y . C onsequently, only t h e i r n e g a tiv e or p o s itiv e in flu e n c e s on th e co u rse o f European p o l i t i c a l u n i f i c a ti o n a re ex p lo re d . A nother lim ita tio n i s th a t of E u ro p e's oversea* t e r r i t o r i e s . I t i s beyond th e scope o f t h i s study to s p e c u la te on th e f u tu r e r e la tio n s h i p of th e s e t e r r i t o r i e s w ith a u n ite d Europe. The re c e n t su ccess o f t h e i r demands f o r s e lf- d e te rm in a tio n and independence and th e p o s s ib le movement f o r t h e i r own re g io n a l u n if i c a t io n in d ic a te t h a t c lo s e economic and p o l i t i c a l t i e s w ith European p a r e n t- c o u n trie s w i l l be s i g n i f i c a n t l y a l t e r e d , i f n o t com pletely 19 b ro k en . A lthough th e Conmonwealth o f N ations and th e F rench Union have been more d i r e c t l y in v o lv ed in th e movement to u n i t e E urope, th e y w i l l be c o n sid e re d only in s o f a r as th e problem s o f t h e i r r e l a ti o n s h i p have a f f e c te d th e e f f o r t s o f u n i f i c a t i o n . F i n a l ly , th e r e i s th e l i m it a t i o n in th e t e r r i t o r i a l scope and membership o f a p re s e n t-d a y u n ite d Europe. A lthough th e h i s t o r i c a l id e a l and u ltim a te aim i s to u n it e a l l p eo p les o f Europe, p re s e n t r e a l i t y d i c t a t e s t h a t a u n ite d Europe would be r e s t r i c t e d to th e v o lu n ta ry d em o cratic n a tio n s o f W estern Europe. T his l i m i t a t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , n e c e s s a r ily ex clu d es a l l e a s te r n European s a t e l l i t e s o f th e S o v iet Union, J u g o s la v ia , P o rtu g a l, S p ain , and th e n e u t r a l c o u n trie s f o r th e p r e s e n t. T re a ty p r o v is io n s , however, do en a b le a l l c o u n tr ie s o f Europe (when a b le to q u a lif y as d em o cratic m em ber-states and when w i llin g to a c c e p t th e le g a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ) to j o i n th e proposed U nited S ta te s o f Europe. CHAPTER I I TERMS, METHODOLOGY, AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE Many spokesmen and w r ite r s on th e s u b je c t of u n itin g Europe have used a v a r ie ty o f term s o r ex p ressio n s r a th e r lo o se ly to d e s c rib e i t s i n s t i t u t i o n a l development and p e r s p e c tiv e s . Because th ey may have c re a te d some co n fu sio n in so doing, an e x p la n a tio n o f term s is e s s e n tia L C l a r i f i c a t i o n o f Terms The e x p re ssio n a s s o c i a t i o n i s t s r e f e r s to th o se who advocate th a t Europe can be u n ite d u ltim a te ly by th e c o o p e ra tio n and goodw ill o f European n a tio n s through i n t e r governm ental b o d ie s, c o n fe re n c e s, o r in te r n a t i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n s , e . g . , th e O rg an izatio n f o r European Economic C ooperation and th e C ouncil o f Europe. Sometimes th is term is used r a th e r f r e e ly to r e f e r to th o se r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s o f B r ita in and th e e ig h t o th e r m ender-nations of th e C ouncil o f Europe who have been in stru m e n ta l in p re v e n tin g t h e i r n a tio n s from jo in in g th e European Coal and 21 S te e l Coimaunity and th e o th e r European com m unities. The p h ra se Common Market i s th e p o p u lar term f o r th e European Economic Community. Sometimes f o r th e sake o f b r e v ity i t i s r e f e r r e d to as th e EEC o r Euro-m arket o r (as th e w r i t e r su g g e s ts) to E urm art, which seems a more c o n c is e and euphonic e x p re s s io n . T his o rg a n iz a tio n com prises th e s i x n a tio n s o f Belgium, F ran c e, I t a l y , Luxemburg, th e N e th e rla n d s , and West Germany, which have ag reed by t r e a t y to fu s e t h e i r economies g ra d u a lly in to a u n if ie d system . The term community has been in c o rp o ra te d in to th e names o f such European i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s as th e European Coal and S te e l Community (th e s t i l l - b o r n European P o l i t i c a l Community (EFC), and th e d e fu n c t European D efense Conmunity (EDC)), th e European Community o f Atomic Energy (g e n e ra lly c a lle d E uratom ), and th e European Economic Community. I t in d ic a te s a community of i n t e r e s t in th e j o i n t governm ental u n d e rta k in g o f th e above s ix n a tio n s t o pool o r u n ify t h e i r common fu n c tio n s in one o r more s e c to r s o f econom ics, p o l i t i c s , and s e c u r i ty . The com m unity i s (1) fo rm a lly c r e a te d by t r e a t y , (2) governed by a c o n s t i t u t i o n , and (3) d ir e c te d and c o n tr o lle d by ex ecu t i v e , l e g i s l a t i v e , j u d i c i a l , and a d m in is tr a tiv e b o d ie s , 22 s e le c te d from th e member n a tio n s . By term s o f th e t r e a t y , th e s i x m em ber-nations have endowed th e community w ith a u th o r it y and powers above th o se o f th e member n a tio n s in th e s e c to r s o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t r a n s f e r r e d to i t . Hence, th e s e com m unities a r e fre q u e n tly r e f e r r e d to as " s u p ra n a tio n a l" a u t h o r i t i e s o r o r g a n iz a tio n s . The word c o n fe d e ra tio n as used in t h i s stu d y d en o tes an a s s o c ia tio n o r league o f two o r more n a tio n s t h a t come to g e th e r because o f some m utual i n t e r e s t or problem . S ince each member n a tio n does n o t merge or r e lin q u is h i t s so v e re ig n r i g h t s in t h i s ty p e o f o rg a n iz a t i o n , i t r e s e r v e s th e s o le r i g h t to d eterm in e th e e x te n t o f i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n , i t s c o o p e ra tio n , and i t s c o n tin u a tio n in th e a s s o c i a ti o n . The su cc ess and permanency o f a c o n f e d e ra tio n , t h e r e f o r e , depends on th e g o o d w ill and unanim ity o f i t s members in re a c h in g d e c is io n s and in e x e c u tin g them. J u s t one member n a tio n opposing th e w il l o f th e o th e rs i s th e same as a v e to which im p airs th e work of th e c o n fe d e ra tio n . The p r i n c i p a l g o v ern in g a g e n ts o f a c o n fe d e ra tio n a r e th o s e o f th e m em b er-n atio n s, and th ey endeavor to a c t a c c o rd in g to t h e i r r e s p e c tiv e n a t i o n 's w ish e s. The c e n t r a l governm ent i s th e r e f o r e weak and u s u a lly fu n c tio n s 23 in th e form o f an e x e c u tiv e c o u n c il and a l e g i s l a t u r e whose d e le g a te s a r e , in e s s e n c e , am bassadors o f th e member n a tio n s r a t h e r th an r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s o f th e p e o p le . Con se q u e n tly , th e l e g i s l a t u r e has l i t t l e o r no power and i s g e n e ra lly lim ite d to d is c u s s io n and recom mendation which a r e s u b je c t to th e e x e c u tiv e c o u n c il 's a p p ro v al or r e j e c t i o n . R arely does th e l e g i s l a t u r e have any c o e rc iv e a u t h o r i ty . S ince each member n a tio n is f r e e to make i t s own d e c is io n s o r to w ithdraw from th e g roup , th e c o u rse of a c tio n o f a c o n fe d e ra tio n (even when agreed upon) is le s s p o s i tiv e th an t h a t o f a f e d e r a tio n . T his phenomenon e x i s t s b ecau se th e form er has to compromise i t s a c tio n to t h a t which may be a t t a i n a b l e , o r t o th e common denom inator o f th e d i f f e r e n t n a tio n a l i n t e r e s t s of th e group. Most h i s t o r i c a l p ro p o sa ls to u n i te Europe p r io r to World War 1 su g g ested a c o n fe d e ra tio n p la n . The U nited S ta te s under th e A r t i c l e s o f C o n fe d e ra tio n , th e League of N a tio n s, th e U nited N a tio n s, and th e C ouncil of Europe a r e n o ta b le examples o f a c o n f e d e ra tio n . The words Europe and European as employed in t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n s p e c i f i c a l l y mean th e t e r r i t o r y o r th e in h a b ita n ts o f d em o cratic Europe; a lth o u g h , in a h i s t o r i c a l 24 and g e o g ra p h ic a l s e n s e , th ey would a ls o in c lu d e a l l o f Europe from th e Ib e ria n P en in su la to th e U ral M ountains. A p a r a l l e l to t h i s can be found in th e word America which i s commonly used to in d ic a te t h a t t e r r i t o r y o f th e N orth American c o n tin e n t, e x c lu s iv e o f Canada and Mexico, occupied by th e U nited S ta te s o f A m erica, and th e word American which d en o tes th e c i t i z e n s o f th e U nited S ta te s o f Am erica. In a h em isp h eric o r h i s t o r i c a l se n s e , o f c o u rs e , th e s e words would a ls o in c lu d e Canada, Mexico, C e n tra l and South A m erica, or th e p eo p le th e r e o f . E uropa. E uropean. and E u ro p e a n is t. term s b ein g advanced by th e proponents o f European F e d e ra tio n o r th e U nited S ta te s o f Europe, c a rry a more p a r t i c u l a r m eaning, however. Europa sym bolizes th e p o s s ib le f u tu r e s in g le name o f a u n if ie d Europe; i t i s th e watchword th a t p ro ponents t r u s t w i l l anim ate th e p eop le o f Europe onward to th e u ltim a te g o a l o f u n i f i c a t i o n . I t i s a ls o th e name im p rin te d on common b u ild in g s , m a t e r i a l s , p o s s e s s io n s , and th e common f la g and p o sta g e stamps a u th o riz e d by th e member n a tio n s o f th e above-m entioned com m unities and now p e rm itte d to be used th ro u g h o u t t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s . S im ila r ly , th e words European and E u ro p e an ist a r e b ein g promoted as an a p p e a l and an in flu e n c e in th e movement 25 tow ard u n io n . In t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c o n te x t, E u ro p e a n ist su g g e sts a sta te s m a n , a c i v i c le a d e r , o r an in d iv id u a l who i s a c t i v e l y w orking f o r th e p o l i t i c a l u n i f i c a t i o n o f Europe; w h ile European r e f l e c t s th e day when a l l i n d i v id u a ls in Europe w i l l have common European c i t i z e n s h i p and w i l l th in k o f th e m se lv e s, n o t so much as Frenchmen or I t a l i a n s o r Germans, b u t as E u ro p ean s. A p a r a l l e l to t h i s can a ls o be found in e a r l i e r American h i s t o r y when in d iv id u a ls th o u g h t o f them selves only as V irg in ia n s or G eorgians o r P en n sy lv an ian s, r a t h e r th an p rim a rily as A m ericans, as is th e c a se to d ay . The European Coal and S te e l Community, d e s c rib e d above, i s f r e q u e n tly r e f e r r e d to as th e Schuman Plan or th e Schuman Community in honor o f th e French F oreign M in is te r, R obert Schuman, who f i r s t o f f i c i a l l y endorsed th e p lan on b e h a lf o f th e French governm ent. Sometimes i t i s in d ic a te d by th e l e t t e r s ECSC. The European movement, o r th e movement f o r or tow ard a u n ite d E urope, d en o tes th e d iv e r s e and c o n c e rte d e f f o r t s o f a l l groups and in d iv id u a ls w orking f o r a u n ite d Europe. The European Movement (as a p ro p e r noun) i s th e name o f th e i n t e r n a t i o n a l , nongovernm ental o rg a n iz a tio n e s ta b lis h e d by th e I n te r n a t io n a l Committee o f th e 26 Movements f o r European U n ity . I t has i t s h e a d q u a rte rs in B ru s s e ls , Belgium, and se rv e s as a s e c r e t a r i a t o r c o o rd in a tin g o f f i c e o f th e a f f i l i a t e d nongovernm ental o rg a n iz a tio n s in th e W estern European c o u n tr ie s in o rd e r t o advance more e f f e c t i v e l y th e e f f o r t s to u n i te Europe. E a r l i e r th e r e was th e nongovernm ental o rg a n iz a tio n c a lle d th e U nited Europe Movement. I t was founded in B r ita in a t th e end o f 1946 by prom inent in d iv id u a ls from th e pro* f e s s i o n s , u n i v e r s i t i e s , c h u rc h e s, p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , and tr a d e unions to promote a campaign f o r European u n ity . C h u rc h ill was in s tru m e n ta l in i t s o rg a n iz a tio n and became i t s chairm an. I t s name, however, was changed to th e U nited Kingdom C ouncil o f The European Movement s f te r th e i n t e r n a t i o n a l European Movement o rg a n iz a tio n was e s ta b lis h e d . With r e f e r e n c e to th e word f e d e r a t i o n „ i t s meaning in t h i s stu d y i s e n t i r e l y d i s t i n c t from t h a t o f th e word c o n f e d e r a tio n . Some w r i t e r s and sp eak ers have u n f o r tu n a te ly used th e s e two term s in te rc h a n g e a b ly w ith o u t c a r e f u l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n as to t h e i r e x a c t i n t e n t . F u r th e r more, a f e d e r a tio n should be d is tin g u is h e d from a u n ita r y form o f government where a l l power d e riv e s from one c e n tr a l government as in B r i t a i n o r F ran c e. As h e re em ployed, a 27 f e d e r a tio n i s a union o f two o r more so v e re ig n s t a t e s , p o ss e s s in g governing powers in t h e i r own r i g h t . Through t h i s u n io n , a c e n t r a l ( f e d e r a l) government i s c r e a te d and empowered to l e g i s l a t e on and to c a r r y out th o s e m a tte rs o f common i n t e r e s t to a l l member s t a t e s under a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d iv is io n o f power which p erm its each member s t a t e to r e t a i n c o n tr o l o f i t s own lo c a l a f f a i r s . In a f e d e r a tio n , a m a jo rity d e c is io n o f th e c e n t r a l l e g i s l a t i v e body becomes th e law o f th e land and th e m in o rity must a b id e by i t . Membership i s permanent and can n o t be w ithdraw n except by c i v i l w ar. M oreover, where th e o r g a n iz a tio n o f so v e re ig n s t a t e s le a d s to a m erging by t r e a t y o f t h e i r r e s p e c tiv e s o v e r e ig n tie s , t h e i r i n d i v id u a l membership in th e i n t e r n a t i o n a l fam ily o f n a tio n s is re p la c e d by one new so v e re ig n ( f e d e r a l) s t a t e o r n a tio n . F in a l ly , th e new f e d e r a l s t a t e can o p e ra te by means o f i t s c e n t r a l organs on b e h a lf o f a l l in d iv id u a ls w ith in i t s t e r r i t o r y . I t can l e g a l l y bin d a l l member s t a t e s and can e n fo rc e i t s d e c is io n s d i r e c t l y by a new n a tio n a l law which su p p la n ts th e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law fo rm e rly r e g u la tin g th e in d iv id u a l so v e re ig n s t a t e s in t h e i r r e l a t i o n s w ith one a n o th e r p r i o r to t h e i r f e d e r a tio n . F o reig n a f f a i r s , m onetary and f i s c a l c o n t r o l , m i l i t a r y 28 s e c u r i t y , and o th e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f common concern become th e so v e re ig n p re ro g a tiv e s o f th<3 newly e s ta b lis h e d f e d e r a l governm ent. C o n f lic ts o f i n t e r e s t o c c a s io n a lly do a r i s e , how ever, and th o s e n o t am icably s e t t l e d a r e r e f e r r e d to a Supreme C o u rt, th e f i n a l a r b i t e r in f e d e r a l - s t a t e d is p u te s . The U nited S ta te s o f America and th e S o v iet Union exem plify f e d e r a tio n s o f s t a t e s . The term s f e d e r a l i s t s and f e d e r a t i o n i s t s r e f e r to th o s e in d iv id u a ls in W estern Europe who b e lie v e l i t t l e w i l l be done p o s i t iv e ly about th e common econom ic, p o l i t i c a l , and s e c u r ity problem s o f European c o u n trie s by in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l a s s o c ia tio n s even though p ro ceed in g in th e name o f u n ite d a c tio n and w ith th e in te n tio n o f c o o p e ra tio n . On th e c o n tr a r y , th ey b e lie v e t h a t th e s e common problem s can be r e a l i s t i c a l l y re so lv e d only by th e p o l i t i c a l u n i f i c a t i o n o f Europe th ro u g h f e d e r a tio n . The e x p re s sio n s f u n c ti o n a l , f u n c tio n a lis m , and f u n c t i o n a l i s t emerged in th e co u rse o f th e f i r s t d eb a te s in th e C o n s u lta tiv e Assembly o f th e C ouncil o f Europe (A ugust-S eptem ber, 1949) to a m e lio ra te th e n e g a tiv e sta n d o f th e B r i t i s h tow ard f e d e r a l u n i f i c a t i o n and to su g g est a more p r a c t i c a l , f u n c tio n a l approach tow ard u n itin g Europe. S u b seq u en tly , th e s e words were fre q u e n tly 29 employed by th e a n t i f e d e r a l i s t s - - s e l f - s t y l e d f u n c tio n a l i s t s - - t o r a t i o n a l i z e t h e i r advocacy o f a p rag m atic, e m p iric a l, s te p - a t- a - tim e approach to European u n ity through in terg o v ern m e n ta l o rg a n iz a tio n s . During t h i s same p e rio d , however, th e s e term s had s u f f i c i e n t l a t i t u d e to encourage th e f e d e r a l i s t s to attem p t th e p o l i t i c a l u n if i c a t i o n o f Europe on a more f u n c tio n a l, s te p - a t- a - tim e b a s is when i t appeared im p o ssib le to sec u re s u f f i c i e n t governm ental su p p o rt f o r European fe d e ra tio n a t one s tr o k e . T h eir new f u n c tio n a l approach urged th e European n a tio n s to merge t h e i r economies on a su p ra n a tio n a l, s e c to r - a t- a - tim e b a s i s , e . g . , co a l and s t e e l , atom ic energy, and i n t e r s t a t e tr a d e . By th e s e g rad u al s te p s , i t was b e lie v e d th a t Europe could p ra g m a tic a lly ac h ie v e u ltim a te p o l i t i c a l u n i f i c a t i o n . As a consequence, th e f e d e r a l i s t s , or " s e c to r s u p r a n a t i o n a l i s t s ," a ls o i d e n t i f i e d them selves as f u n c t i o n a l i s t s . And t h e r e a f t e r , fu n c tio n a lism seemed an e s s e n t i a l c o n s id e ra tio n in any f e a s i b le approach to a u n ite d Europe. The term in te g r a tio n as used in connection w ith Europe is an example o f a word th a t is f i r s t used to serv e a p a r t i c u l a r purpose o r to in flu e n c e fa v o ra b le a c tio n ; and th e n , w ith tim e and changing c irc u m sta n c e s, i t lo se s much o f i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e . An in te g r a te d Europe, or European i n t e g r a t i o n , has v a rie d im p lic a tio n s to d i f f e r e n t i n d iv id u a ls . To some p u b l i c i s t s and s u p p o rte rs o f th e movement to u n i t e E urope, th e term has been employed to su g g e st th e id e a l: a u n ite d Europe by p o l i t i c a l u n i f i c a t io n o r f e d e r a tio n in t o t o . To o th e r s , th e e x p re ssio n has been used to in d ic a te th e p o s s ib le : a European economic, m i l i t a r y , o r p o l i t i c a l u n i f i c a t i o n in lim ite d f u n c tio n a l s e c to r s o f th o se n a tio n s so w i l l i n g . Y et, to th e a s s o c ia - t i o n i s t s , a n t i - f e d e r a l i s t s , o r a n t i - s u p r a n a t i o n a l i s t s , European i n te g r a t io n has meant th e u n itin g o f a l l of d em o cratic Europe thro u g h in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l o rg a n iz a tio n and c o o p e ra tio n of a l l dem ocratic European n a tio n s r a th e r th an by th e m erger o f j u s t th e s ix community n a tio n s . On th e o th e r hand, th e word in te g r a tio n has a ls o been c o n sid e re d by some spokesmen in th e movement to u n ite Europe as a le s s o ffe n s iv e o r le s s c o n tr o v e r s ia l term than f e d e r a ti o n , e s p e c ia lly to th e h e s i t a n t and to th e opponents o f t h i s method o f u n itin g Europe. To o th e r s , i t was co n s id e re d an o r i g i n a l or more s i g n i f i c a n t word t h a t would r e f l e c t E u ro p e 's d e s i r e to be i t s e l f and to work out i t s own program f o r u n ity . These p erso n s b e lie v e d t h a t th e term in te g r a t io n was more a d a p ta b le to p re se n t-d a y Europe 31 th an perhaps th e word fe d e ra tio n as I t m ight Imply Im ita t io n o f th e American system which developed in an e ra no t n e c e s s a r ily s u ita b le to Europe. In view o f th e s e v a rie d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , i t is r a th e r d i f f i c u l t to fin d a p re c is e meaning o f European in te g r a tio n .^ The ex p ressio n s th e L i t t l e S ix , th e Big N ine, th e F i f t e e n , th e In ner S ix , and th e O uter Seven have been coined in th e co u rse of th e movement toward u n itin g Europe; and u n fo rtu n a te ly , they a re sometimes used in a ta u n tin g sen se by opponents o f each group. The L i t t l e Six r e f e r s to th e European Coal and S te e l Community n a tio n s of Belgium, F rance, I t a l y , Luxemburg, th e N eth e rlan d s, and West Germany, which have lik e w ise e s ta b lis h e d th e Euratom For an e x c e lle n t a n a ly s is of th e meaning of "European i n t e g r a t i o n ," see John A. L o ftu s, "An In q u iry in to F e a s ib le Forms of European I n te g r a tio n ," in C. Grove H aines, e d ., European I n t e g r a tio n , w ith an In tro d u c tio n by Paul van Zeeland (B altim ore: Johns Hopkins P re ss, 1957), pp. 97-111. For am biguity o f th e term , see H. J . H e ise r, The B r i t i s h P o licy w ith Regard to th e U n ific a tio n E ff o rts on th e European C o n tin e n t. In European A spects: A C o lle c tio n o f S tu d ie s R e la tin g to European I n t e g r a t io n . Pub lis h e d under th e A uspices of th e C ouncil o f Europe, S e rie s C; S tu d ie s on P o l i t i c s , No. 3 (Leydon: S y th o ff, 1959), p. 11. Mr. Edelman, M .P ., d e c la re s th e term "a jarg o n . . ." and i t s d e f in it i o n "m isap p lied " in House o f Commons Deb. , 5th s e r i e s , 1950, v o l. 473 (28 March 1950), 242; and Mr. Mayhew, M.P., c a lle d i t "a fa r-re a c h in g and r a th e r vague te rm ," in House o f Commons Deb. . 5th s e r i e s , 1947-48 v o l. 456 (22 September 1948), 1012. 32 and Common Market C om m unities. The Big Wine a r e th e n in e C o u n cil-o f-E u ro p e c o u n tr ie s o f A u s tr ia , B r i t a i n , Denmark, G reece, Ic e la n d , I r e la n d , Norway, Sweden, and T urkey, which so f a r have opposed m erging w ith th e L i t t l e Six com m unities. The F if te e n d en o tes a l l th e member n a tio n s o f th e C ouncil o f Europe as a w hole. The O uter Seven a r e 2 th e seven n a tio n s which e s ta b lis h e d th e European F ree Trade A s s o c ia tio n o u ts id e th e C o n tin e n ta l t e r r i t o r y of th e s ix Common Market n a tio n s , sometimes c a lle d th e In n er S i x . The O rg a n iz a tio n f o r European Economic C ooperation (th e outgrow th o f th e M arsh all P lan) is an in te r g o v e r n m ental p lan n in g agency o f 18 W estern European c o u n t r i e s . I t is more o fte n in d ic a te d by i t s i n i t i a l s , OEEC, to f a c i l i t a t e re p e a te d r e f e r e n c e . S u p ra n a tio n a l, s u p ra n a tio n a lis m , and s u p r a n a tio n a l- i s t (som etimes w r itte n w ith a hyphen as in s u p r a - n a tio n a l) a r e term s t h a t came in to usage thro ugh th e re s o u r c e f u ln e s s o f spokesmen who endeavored to g iv e t h e i r program b o th a m oral and a s u b s ta n tiv e b a se . Andrd P h ilip , Edouard B onnefous, and Paul Reynaud seemed to have had t h i s in 2 B r i t a i n , Denmark, Norway, Sweden, P o rtu g a l, A u s tr ia , and S w itz e rla n d . 33 mind in t h e i r speeches to c o u n te r th e argum ents o f th e a n ti* * f e d e r a lis ts , o r " a s s o c i a t i o n i s t s ," a g a in s t a com pletely and im m ediately fe d e ra te d Europe in th e f i r s t p a rlia m e n - t a r y s e s s io n o f th e C ouncil o f Europe. For i t was th e y , among o th e r s , who took th e lead in p o in tin g out th e d e f ic ie n c i e s o f an im potent in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l o rg an , l ik e th e OEEC, and in u rg in g a union o f European n a tio n s w ith s p e c i f ic economic and p o l i t i c a l a u th o r ity above t h a t o f th e in d iv id u a l n a t i o n a l - s t a t e s (s u p ra n a tio n a l) i f p o s itiv e a c tio n and r e s u l t s were to be ac h ie v ed . T his a p p a re n tly n o v el concept o f " s u p r a n a tio n a l" u n io n , t h e r e f o r e , was proposed as a compromise between th e weakness o f an in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l o r g a n iz a tio n , o r co n f e d e r a tio n , and th e u n w illin g n e s s o f in d iv id u a l c o u n tr ie s to s u rre n d e r a l l t h e i r n a tio n a l s o v e re ig n ty to a European f e d e r a tio n o f s t a t e s . F o r, in th e sug g ested s u p ra n a tio n a l o r g a n iz a tio n th e r e would be only a lim ite d t r a n s f e r o f s o v e r e ig n ity in a s p e c if ic a r e a , v i z . , in m i l i t a r y d efen se (EDC), in c o a l and s t e e l p ro d u c tio n (ECSC), o r in o th e r 3 C ouncil o f Europe. C o n s u lta tiv e Assembly, O f f i c i a l R eport o f D e b a te s. F i r s t S e s s io n , 10th A u g u st-8 th Septem ber 1949 (S tra sb o u rg : 1949), P a rt I , pp. 78-81; 259-262; 274-284. 34 s im ila r a r e a s . Opponents as w e ll as p u b l i c i s t s l o s t l i t t l e tim e in la b e lin g t h i s th e program o f s u p ra n a tio n a lis m and i t s ad v o cates as th e s u p r a n a t i o n a l i s t s . B ecause some o f th e a g e n cies o f th e s u p ra n a tio n a l ECSC a r e now fu n c tio n in g alm ost l i k e f e d e r a l organs (y e t n o t w ith in a f e d e r a l government b u t under th e s a n c tio n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law ), one p u b l i c i s t r e f e r s to th e s e su p ra n a t i o n a l a g e n c ie s as " q u a s i- f e d e r a l" and "novel ex p erim en ts" in i n t e r n a t i o n a l law .^ On th e o th e r hand, P ro fe sso r Z urcher has used th e term s " n e o fe d e ra l" and " n e o fe d e r a l i s t s " w ith r e fe re n c e to th e words s u p ra n a tio n a l and th e s u p r a n a t i o n a l i s t s .^ T his su g g e sts a new o r m o d ified form o f fe d e ra lis m and f e d e r a l i s t s . F i n a l ly , th e words u n i f i e d , u n io n , o r u n ite d w ith r e f e r e n c e to Europe have been used r a t h e r lo o s e ly by v a rio u s groups and in d iv id u a ls to in d ic a te th e proposed g o a l f o r d em o cratic Europe. These g ro u p s, th e i n t e r n a t i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n i s t s o r a n t i - f e d e r a l i s t s , th e ^ J o s e f L. Kunz, "S u p ra -N a tio n a l O rgans," The Ameri can J o u rn a l o f I n te r n a tio n a l Law. XLVI (O cto b er, 1952), 690-8. ^Arnold J . Z u rc h e r, The S tru g g le to U n ite E urope. 1940-1958 (W ashington Square: New York U n iv e rs ity P re s s , 1958), pp. 56, 62, 67 e t passim . 35 s u p r a n a t io n a li s ts o r n e o f e d e r a l i s t s , and th e a l l - o u t f e d e r a l i s t s , m oreover, have a p p lie d th e s e term s to Europe w ith v ary in g sem antic o v erto n e s in keep ing w ith t h e i r own o b je c tiv e s . The e x p re ssio n U nited Europe is th e most in c lu s iv e o f th e th r e e term s and co v e rs th e aims o f a l l th e above g ro u p s. I t may d e s ig n a te u n ite d in p u rp o se, teamwork in a c tio n , o r p o l i t i c a l u n i f i c a t i o n . The Union o f E urope, o r European U nion, however, is more r e s t r i c t i v e . I t im p lies p o l i t i c a l u n i f i c a t i o n ; y e t , as used in th e name o f W estern European Union (WEU), i t means m erely a m u l t i n a tio n a l a l l i a n c e to c o o rd in a te and p o s s ib ly to i n te g r a t e m i l i t a r y d e fe n s iv e f o r c e s . To some, a u n if ie d Europe s i g n i f i e s u n ity in a c u l t u r a l , s p i r i t u a l , or d em ocratic sen se; to o th e r s , i t means economic o r p o l i t i c a l u n i f i c a t i o n . U nless o th e rw ise in d ic a te d , in t h i s stu d y th e th r e e term s s ig n if y European p o l i t i c a l u n i f i c a t i o n , or f e d e r a tio n . Method and P rocedure o f th e Study The prim ary method o f in v e s tig a tio n in t h i s stu d y i s th e a n a l y t i c a l . The h i s t o r i c a l approach i s a ls o used in c o n ju n c tio n to p ro v id e a f u l l e r a p p r e c ia tio n o f th e 36 p e r s i s t e n t o b s ta c le s th w a rtin g th e e f f o r t s to u n i te Europe down th e c e n tu r ie s . C hapters I I I and IV p re se n t th e h i s t o r i c a l ev id en ce o f th e lo s s o f E u ro p e 's o n ce -p o ssessed u n ity th ro u g h th e r e l i g i o u s schism and th e r i s e o f a b s o lu te , so v ere ig n n a t i o n - s t a t e s . A lso in d ic a te d i s how th e prom otion of n a tio n a l p a r tic u la r is m and economic n a tio n a lis m burdened Europe f o r c e n tu r ie s w ith a c h a in o f d i v i s iv e w ars, out o f which o c c a s io n a lly a ro s e a p lan f o r r e s t o r in g E u ro p e's l o s t u n ity . An e x p lo ra tio n of th e p o l i t i c a l circ u m stan c es p re v e n tin g th e a c c e p ta n c e o f th e s e p lan s th en fo llo w s , to p ro v id e th e b a s is f o r a co m p arativ e a n a ly s is o f E u ro p e 's p re s e n t re a d in e s s to overcome n a t i o n a l i s t i c p a ro c h ia lis m in o rd e r to u n i t e . Throughout th e su cceed in g c h a p te r s , every e f f o r t i s made to u t i l i z e o b je c tiv e c r i t e r i a in a n a ly z in g th e p o s i tiv e and n e g a tiv e in flu e n c e s on th e p re s e n t movement to u n it e Europe. In t h i s a n a l y s i s , th e cau ses and e f f e c t s o f (1) tim e , p la c e , and id e o lo g y ; (2) m oral v ersu s m ate r i a l v a lu e s ; (3) m i l i t a r y c r i s e s v e rsu s p e a c e fu l co ex is te n c e ; (A) f e a r o f n a tio n a l s u r v iv a l v ersu s m a in ta in in g th e s t a t u s quo; and (5) n a tio n a l and p e rso n a l s a c r i f i c e s v e rsu s economic n a tio n a lis m and s e l f - i n t e r e s t a r e examined. 37 With t h i s in m ind, C hapter V tr a c e s th e ebb and flow o f th e id e a o f a European F e d e ra tio n fo llo w in g th e N apoleonic Wars to th e end o f th e n in e te e n th c e n tu ry . I t th en e x p lo re s th e b a s is f o r th e t r a n s i t i o n to th e id e a o f a w orld o rg a n iz a tio n o f n a tio n s a t th e tu rn o f th e p re se n t c e n tu ry and th e sub sequen t r e tu r n to th e id e a o f a European F e d e ra tio n between th e two w orld w ars. C hapter VI a s s e s s e s th e r e s u l t s o f E u ro p e's f a i l u r e to u n it e a f t e r World War I , th e b e la te d r e a c tio n o f E uropeans, and th e r e j e c t i o n o f B r i t a i n 's " e le v e n th - hour" o f f e r o f p o l i t i c a l union w ith F rance d u rin g World War I I . I t a ls o examines th e im pact o f p o s s ib le t o t a l i t a r i a n w orld conquest on th e s u b o rd in a tio n o f th e id ea o f European F e d e ra tio n to t h a t of World F e d e ra tio n o r One World Government. To a s c e r t a i n th e r a t i o n a l e f o r re v iv in g th e id ea o f European F e d e ra tio n a f t e r World War I I , C hapter V II a n a ly z e s th e economic, p o l i t i c a l , and s e c u r i ty circu m s ta n c e s c o n fro n tin g E u ro p e 's fragm ented n a t i o n - s t a t e system . The a l t e r n a t i v e c h o ic e s and consequences f o r th e p eo p les o f Europe a re n ex t w eighed, and th e c o u rse o f a c tio n urged by W estern statesm en and c i v i c le a d e rs is th en t r e a t e d . 38 The d e c is io n t h a t Europe has made i s d e a lt w ith in C hapter V I I I . F i r s t , th e e v e n tu a lity o f th e h i s t o r i c a l t r a n s i t i o n o f th e a g e -o ld dream o f a u n ite d Europe from th e o ry and v is io n to an e m p iric a l and p r a c t i c a l c o u rse o f a c tio n i s c o n sid e re d to d eterm in e w hether i t rem ains a myth o r has v a l i d i t y . For ev id en ce o f th e v a l i d i t y and f e a s i b i l i t y o f th e em erging movement to u n i t e Europe, th e c h a r a c te r and su b sta n c e o f in d iv id u a ls and groups i n i t i a tin g th e new campaign f o r European Union i s in v e s tig a te d . N ext, th e r o l e o f American a s s i s t a n c e to th e p eo p les o f W estern Europe and inducem ents to t h e i r governm ents to work f o r a U nited Europe i s examined. In a d d itio n , th e im pact o f th e Congress o f Europe on p u b lic o p in io n and th e fo llo w -u p a c tio n o f The European Movement to g e t th e W estern governm ents to e s t a b l i s h a C ouncil o f Europe i s pursued in d e t a i l . And th e n , th e e f f o r t s o f European governm ents f o r a U nited Europe a r e weighed in th e l i g h t o f th e r e a l i t i e s o f in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l o rg a n iz a tio n and c o o p e r a tio n . C hapter IX examines th e in a u g u ra tio n o f th e C ouncil o f E urope, th e "high h o p e s," and th e e f f e c tiv e n e s s o f th e C o n s u lta tiv e Assembly in th e l i g h t o f a reaw akening n a t i o n a lis m t h a t has s p l i t th e road to European u n ity . 39 The d iv e rg e n t appraoches to European u n i f i c a t i o n , led by B r ita in and by F ran ce, a re then co n sid ered in C hapter X. Emphasis i s focused on th e EDC vs th e WEU, th e r e la p s e o f th e e f f o r t to u n ite vs th e r e v iv a l o f th e move ment f o r a U nited S ta te s o f Europe, and th e r e s u l t a n t EEC vs th e EFTA. This study o f th e c e n tu r ie s -lo n g q u e st o f Europeans f o r s e c u r ity , s t a b i l i t y , and u n ity concludes in C hapter XI w ith an a p p r a is a l of how th e peoples o f Europe have f a il e d to fa c e up to th e g r e a t e s t c h a lle n g e in t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l s tru g g le -- tr a n s c e n d in g n a tio n a l p a r tic u la r is m and economic n a tio n a lis m in o rd e r to e s t a b li s h a U nited S ta te s o f Europe. Review o f th e L ite r a tu r e P e ru sa l o f th e p u b lish ed m a te r ia l on th e e f f o r t s to u n ite W estern Europe, in e v e r-in c re a s in g volume sin c e 1948, c e r t a i n l y exceeds th e lim its of tim e and space of any s in g le stu d y . There a re th e verb atim r e p o r ts of many, many co n feren ces of in terg o v ern m e n ta l a s s o c ia tio n s and p r iv a te o rg a n iz a tio n s , as w e ll as th e innum erable speeches and w r itin g s o f o f f i c i a l s , p u b l i c i s t s , and j o u r n a l i s t s . P r a c tic a ll y every p e r io d ic a l and newspaper throughout W estern Europe has devoted space re g u la r ly to th e s e e f f o r t s . Governmental re co rd -k e ep in g alo n e (docum entation, 40 r e s e a r c h , and p u b lic a tio n ) has become a c o l l e c t i v e endeavor o f f u l l - t i m e p r o f e s s io n a l s t a f f s whose o u tp u t p ro v id es a c o n tin u ity beyond th e c a p a c ity o f any i n d i v id u a l r e s e a r c h e r . In t h i s r e s p e c t, th e p u b lic and p r iv a te European o r g a n iz a tio n s engaged in th e movement to u n ite Europe have fu rn is h e d a thorough and co n tin u o u s re c o rd o f t h e i r work. T h e ir s e c r e t a r i a t , r e s e a r c h d i r e c t o r a t e , o r in fo rm atio n s e r v ic e s t a f f s have provided th e f u l l e s t docum entation and p u b lic a tio n o f developm ents in th e co u rse o f t h i s movement. Indeed, t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l r o l e has been a sub s t a n t i a l , i f u n h e ra ld e d , accom plishm ent to d a te and has p ro v id ed a p o s i t iv e base and in flu e n c e from which th e movement to u n i te Europe can s c a r c e ly tu rn back. T his e x te n siv e n e ss o f p r in te d m a t e r ia l , as w e ll as th e problem o f language, in c re a se d th e d i f f i c u l t y of s e l e c t i v i t y fo r th e r e s e a r c h e r . A lthough th e w r it e r found an abundance o f p u b lish e d m a te r ia l in th e E n g lish language, he d isc o v e re d t h a t numerous governm ental p u b lic a tio n s were iss u e d only in th e languages o f th e s ix m em ber-nations o f th e European c o m n u n itie s . In th o se in s ta n c e s , th e more a c c e s s ib le French e d itio n s w ere u sed . As to th e g e n e ra l and m isc e lla n e o u s n o n -E n g lish p u b lic a tio n s on u n itin g 41 Europe, th e w rite r attem pted to examine only those sources a v a ila b le In th e French or German languages. For th e convenience of the read er th e bib lio g rap h y has been c la s s i f i e d in to su b je c t and period groupings according to th e follow ing to p ic s : I, Council of Europe; I I , European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), European Economic Community (EEC or Common M arket), European Free Trade A ssociation (EFTA); I I I , European Coal and S te e l Community (ECSC); IV, European Defense Community (EDC) and Western European Union (WEU); V, European P o l it i c a l Com munity (Proposed) and European Parliam entary Assembly of th e European Community ( P o l i ti c a l Developments); VI, O rganization fo r European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and European Payments Union (EPU); V II, P u b licatio n s on U niting Europe P rio r to 1918; V III, P u b lic atio n s on U niting Europe between 1918-1945; and IX, General and M iscellaneous Pub lic a tio n s on U niting Europe from 1945-1960. C la s s ific a tio n IX, moreover, has been subdivided in to (A), Governmental Sources; and (B ), Nongovernmental Groups. The l a t t e r has in tu rn been c la s s if i e d as follow s: (1 ), Business and Ind u stry ; (2 ), Church O rganizations; (3 ), E ducational I n s titu tio n s and Learned S o c ie tie s ; (4 ), O rganizations Devoted to U niting Europe; (5 ), P o litic a l 42 P a r tie s and S upporting B odies; (6 ), Trade Unions; (7 ), In d iv id u a ls and O ther A gencies; (8 ), Newspapers, Radio, and T e le v is io n . In a b ib lio g r a p h ic a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f t h i s arrangem ent, th e re a d e r w i l l no doubt fin d some o v erlap p in g o f re fe re n c e s to th e v a rio u s European in te r n a t i o n a l o rg a n iz a tio n s s in c e each i s endeavoring to c a rry on a program b e lie v e d e s s e n t i a l in th e co u rse o f th e movement to u n it Europe. The s ix n a tio n s in th e ECSC, Euratom, and th e Common M arket, fo r in s ta n c e , a re a ls o working members of th e f i f t e e n - n a ti o n C ouncil o f Europe and th e OEEC; and th e s e a f f i l i a t i o n s n e c e s s a r ily r e q u ir e c o n s id e r a b le in te rc h a n g e of c o n ta c ts , view s, and fu n c tio n s . To d e lin e a te th e a c t i v i t i e s of any one of th e s e o rg a n iz a tio n s w ith o u t re fe re n c e to i t s work w ith or in flu e n c e on th e o th e r s , th e r e f o r e , would r e s u l t in too r e s t r i c t e d a c o v e r age o f th e d iv e rs e a ttem p ts to u n ite Europe. Turning now to th e prim ary so u rces of m a te ria l f o r t h i s stu d y , th e w r it e r w ishes to em phasize th e e x c e l len ce o f p u b lic a tio n s by th e C ouncil o f Europe and by th e European s ix - n a tio n com munities (ECSC, Euratom, and EEC). Although each o f th e a f f i l i a t e d o rg a n iz a tio n s o f th e C ouncil o f Europe has provided documentary evidence o f i t s own a c t i v i t i e s , th e C o u n cil o f E urope, as th e p a re n t European i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n iz a tio n , has se rv e d as th e d o cu m en tatio n c e n t e r , sp o n so r, and p u b lis h e r o f much o f th e work o f i t s a f f i l i a t e s . I t s C o n s u lta tiv e Assembly an n u a l O f f i c i a l R eport o f D e b a te s ; Documents. Working P a p e rs ; and T ex ts A dopted: Recommendations and R esolutions^ a lo n g w ith th e v e rb a tim re c o rd o f speech es d e liv e r e d a t th e C onference o f S tra s b o u rg Between D e le g a tio n s o f th e C ongress o f th e U nited S ta te s . . . and th e C o n s u lta tiv e Assembly o f th e C o u n cil o f Europe a r e among th e b e s t docu m entary s o u rc e s on th e view s and a c tio n s o f n a tio n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and t h e i r governm ents tow ard European un i o n . The w r i t e r had hoped t o exam ine th e e n t i r e docu m e n ta tio n on th e P ro ceed in g s o f th e m eetin g s o f th e Com m itte e o f M in is te r s o f th e C o u n cil o f Europe b e c a u se , as th e e x e c u tiv e body, i t approves o r d isa p p ro v e s o f th e C o n s u lta tiv e Assembly reco m n en d atio n s and th e re b y h o ld s th e r e i n s on th e C ouncil o f Europe alo n g th e c o u rse o f European u n i t y . These p ro c e e d in g s , how ever, w ere c l a s s i f i e d as c o n f i d e n t i a l and a r e o r d i n a r i l y r e s t r i c t e d t o th e u se o f governm ent r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o n ly . F o r tu n a te ly , a few e a r l i e r r e p o r t s o f th e C om nittee o f M in is te rs w ere 44 lo c a te d . These were G reat B r i t a i n 's F oreign O ffic e Report on th e P roceedings o f th e Second S ession of th e Committee o f M in iste rs (November, 1949); . . . T hird S ession (M arch-A pril, 1950); . . . F if t h S ession . . . (August, 1950); . . . S ix th S ession . . . (November, 1950); . . . Seventh S essio n . . . (March, 1951); and th e C ouncil of E urope's r F i r s t 1 Report o f th e Committee o f M in iste rs to th e Con s u l t a t i v e Assembly [1949/19501 and Second R eport . . . C1950/19511. Since then t h e i r a c tio n s have had to be sought from C o n s u lta tiv e Assembly documents and secondary s o u rc e s . An e x c e lle n t prim ary source on th e d ay -to -d ay a c t i v i t i e s , s e tb a c k s , and achievem ents o f th e European o rg a n iz a tio n s in th e movement to u n ite Europe a re th e docum entation volumes p u b lish ed every y e a r o r so s in c e 1951 by th e S e c r e ta ria t-G e n e ra l and th e R esearch D ir e c to r a te O ffic e s o f th e C ouncil o f Europe. For docum entation on agreem ents and r e l a t i o n s of B r ita in w ith th e C ouncil of Europe, th e Command papers o f th e B r i tis h S e c re ta ry o f S ta te f o r Foreign A f f a ir s a re very h e lp f u l. Among o th e r C ouncil o f Europe p u b lic a tio n s , th e w r i te r e s p e c ia lly reconmends th e European Yearbook, 1-V II, p rin te d in both E n g lish and French w ith in each volume. 45 T his p u b lic a tio n p re s e n ts one of th e most s c h o la r ly co v erag es o f th e work o f in d iv id u a ls and th e European i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rg a n iz a tio n s in th e movement to u n it e Europe s in c e 1949 t h a t can be found w ith in a s e t o f seven volum es. Here a r e g a th e re d a l l th e b a s ic s t a t u t e s and t r e a t i e s e s ta b lis h in g th e i n t e r n a t i o n a l European o rg a n iz a t i o n s : th e C ouncil o f Europe, th e ECSC, and o th e r s ; th e European T re a ty S e r ie s , Nos. 1-27; a chronology o f e v e n ts ; and tim e ly a r t i c l e s on th e p ro g re ss o f u n itin g Europe by p e rso n n e l o f and n a tio n a l r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s to th e v a rio u s European o r g a n iz a tio n s . The European Yearbook, m oreover, has an o u ts ta n d in g b i b lio g r a p h ic a l s e c tio n in each volume on th e movement to u n i t e E urope, c l a s s i f i e d ac c o rd in g to y e a r o f p u b lic a tio n and name o f European o rg a n iz a tio n . Books p u b lish e d in th e languages o f a l l th e m em ber-countries of th e C ouncil o f Europe a r e f u l l y c i t e d w ith a d ig e s t o f about 90 p er c e n t o f them in E n g lish , F rench, o r German. The second p a r t o f th e b i b lio g r a p h ic a l s e c tio n s i m il a r ly c l a s s i f i e s th e more s i g n i f i c a n t European p e r io d ic a l a r t i c l e s (and an o c c a s io n a l American o n e). As a f r e e p u b lic s e r v ic e to i n t e r e s t e d i n s t i t u t i o n s and l i b r a r i e s , th e C ouncil o f Europe a ls o p u b lis h e s two 46 b im o n th lie s , th e C ouncil o f Europe News and Forward in E urope. which a r e commendable so u rce s f o r an o f f i c i a l c h ro n o lo g ic a l re c o rd o f th e work and achievem ents o f th e C ouncil o f Europe and r e l a t e d o r g a n iz a tio n s . The b e s t docum entary so u rces fo r th e p o l i t i c a l views and a c tio n o f th e n a tio n a l r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s to th e " L i t t l e - S i x " Communities and th e p ro g re ss tow ard European u n i f i c a t i o n a r e th e p a rlia m e n ta ry D ebats de I'A ssem b lee Commune o f th e ECSC and th o s e o f th e su p e rse d in g European P a rlia m e n ta ry Assembly, which has serv ed a l l th r e e Com m u n itie s s in c e March 19, 1958. In a d d itio n , th e p u b lic a tio n s by th e High A u th o rity of th e ECSC, e s p e c ia lly th e an n u al R eport on th e A c t i v i t i e s . . . o r th e S itu a tio n o f th e Community . . . ; th e annu al A ddresses . . . of th e High A u th o rity P re s id e n ts b e fo re th e Common Assembly; th e annual J o i n t M eeting o f th e Members o f th e C o n s u lta tiv e Assembly . . . and o f th e Common Assembly o f . . . [ECSC] and o f th e [S ucceeding] European P a rlia m e n ta ry A ssem bly: O f f i c i a l R eport o f th e D eb a te; and th e numbered docum entary R ap p o rt[ s] and p u b lic a tio n s on th e problem s, work, and achievem ents o f th e European Communities in economic and p o l i t i c a l i n t e g r a ti o n a f f o r d v a lu a b le d a ta and s t a t i s t i c s co n c ern in g t h e i r o p e r a tio n s . A lso recommended as an 47 e x c e lle n t docum entary so u rc e In E n g lish a r e th e fo u r volumes on The A c t i v i t i e s o f th e European P arliam en t from I t s C o n s titu tio n . . . [ t o I t s S e ssio n s Ending] Jan u a ry 17th 1959. Among o th e r p u b lic a tio n s o f th e European Community t h a t proved very h e lp f u l in keeping a b r e a s t o f th e program and accom plishm ents o f th e ECSC, Euratom , and th e Common Market was th e B u lle tin from th e European Community f o r c o a l and s t e e l , su p ersed ed by th e B u lle tin from th e European Community w ith th e M ay-June, 1958, is s u e . L ib r a r ie s , o r g a n iz a tio n s , and in d iv id u a ls may re c e iv e t h i s p e r io d ic a l as w e ll as v a rio u s o th e r European Community p u b lic a tio n s w ith o u t ch a rg e upon r e q u e s t. With r e f e r e n c e to th e proposed European P o l i t i c a l Community (1952-1953), th e docum entation by th e P u b lic a tio n s Departm ent o f th e European Community of th e Ad Hoc Assembly I n s tr u c te d to Work Out a D ra ft T re a ty S e ttin g Up a European P o l i t i c a l Community and i t s D ebates - - Off i c i a l R eport and D ra ft T re a ty . . . . 1953, p ro v id e s one o f th e b e s t so u rce s o f ev id en ce o f th e genuine e f f o r t s d ir e c te d tow ard European p o l i t i c a l union and th e n e g a tiv e fo rc e s c o n fro n tin g t h i s g o a l. 48 In th e s e c tio n o f G eneral and M iscellan eo u s Pub l i c a t i o n s co n cern in g a U nited Europe between 1945-1960 a r e to be found two e x c e lle n t prim ary so u rces f o r th e a t t i t u d e s o f B r i t i s h and F rench p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s as w e ll as government p o lic y tow ard th e economic, m i l i t a r y , and p o l i t i c a l p ro p o sa ls to u n i t e Europe. These a r e th e p a r lia m e n ta ry d e b a te s , p u b lish e d v e rb a tim in G reat B r i t a i n , House o f Commons D ebates and in F ra n c e , A nnales de l'A sserablde n a ti o n a l e . D 6 b a ts. The secondary so u rce s of books, p am p h lets, and p e r io d ic a l a r t i c l e s on th e movement to u n i te Europe a r e volum inous. The w r it e r s on t h i s s u b je c t re p r e s e n t alm ost every p u b lic and p r i v a t e o rg a n iz a tio n in W estern Europe, and many in America and elsew h ere. They in c lu d e g o vern ment le a d e r s , p u b lic o f f i c i a l s , p o l i t i c a l and c i v i c le a d e r s , b u sin e s s and tra d e -u n io n spokesmen, j o u r n a l i s t s , members of p r o f e s s io n a l g ro u p s, and s tu d e n ts . The b re a d th o f t h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n , m oreover, t e s t i f i e s to th e g r e a t s ig n if ic a n c e o f E u ro p e 's q u e st f o r u n ity . F ollow ing more or le s s in p ro d u c tiv e rhythm w ith th e ebb and flow o f th e e f f o r t to u n i te Europe s in c e 1948, th e s e w r itin g s have ranged in to n e from th e o v e rly o p tim is tic to th e unduly p e s s i m i s tic , from th e n e g a tiv e ly c y n ic a l to th e 49 o b je c tiv e ly c r i t i c a l . A lthough l i m it a t i o n s o f tim e and space p re c lu d e m en tio n in g th e many e x c e lle n t w r i t e r s and t h e i r w orthy p u b lic a tio n s , th e w r i t e r w ishes to em phasize fo u r books, l i s t e d in th e G eneral and M iscellan eo u s c a te g o ry between 1945-1960. These were found to be e s p e c ia lly in fo rm a tiv e and o b je c tiv e on th e p ro g re ss and d i f f i c u l t i e s o f th e movement to u n i t e Europe. The f i r s t o f th e s e i s Count C ou d en h o v e-K alerg i's An Idea Conquers th e World (1 953), an e y e -w itn e ss account o f th e e f f o r t s o f in d iv id u a ls and statesm en s in c e 1922 to u n it e Europe. The second is A rnold J . Z u rc h e r's The S tru g g le to U n ite E urope. 1940-1958 (1958). P ro fe s s o r Z urcher p re s e n ts in t h i s work a com prehensive survey of th e developm ents in th e "European Movement," b eginn in g w ith th e c o n tr ib u tio n s o f Count C oudenhove-K alergi, found er o f th e movement, and ending w ith th e r a t i f i c a t i o n of Euratom and th e European Common M arket. His tre a tm e n t of American p o lic y toward th e movement as w e ll as th e psycho l o g i c a l , l e g a l , and m oral dim ensions of th e problem aid ed g r e a t l y in a s s e s s in g th e m o d ific a tio n o f o b je c tiv e s and e f f o r t s f o r u n itin g Europe in fa c e o f alm ost insu rm o u n tab le o b s ta c le s . A nother c o n tr ib u tio n i s P ro fe s s o r Z u rc h e r's 50 d e s c r i p t i o n o f th e r e v i v a l o f th e id e a o f a U n ited Europe in th e U n ited S ta te s d u rin g World War I I when he and Count C oudenhove-K alergi c o lla b o r a te d a t New York U n iv e r s i t y in c o n d u c tin g a sem in ar (1942-1944) on Postw ar E uro pean F e d e r a tio n . One o f th e r e s u l t s o f t h i s sem inar was th e w r i t in g o f a D r a f t C o n s titu tio n o f th e U nited S ta te s o f E urope, r e p r i n te d in th e Appendix o f h is book. The t h i r d book i s European I n t e g r a t i o n , e d ite d by C. Grove H ain es, w ith an I n tr o d u c tio n by Paul van Z eeland (1 9 5 7 ). T h is work c o n s i s t s o f a s e r i e s o f s c h o la r ly p ap e rs p re s e n te d by tw enty p a r t i c i p a n t s a t a c o n fe re n c e on "The S ta tu s o f European I n t e g r a t io n " in May and Ju n e , 1956, sp o n so red by Johns Hopkins U n iv e r s ity a t i t s Bologna C en ter in I t a l y . D if f e r e n t v ie w p o in ts a r e p re s e n te d on th e su b j e c t , ra n g in g from th e c r i t i c a l to th e f a v o r a b le , w ith w orking knowledge and e y e w itn e ss a c c o u n ts o f developm ents in th e o v e r - a l l movement n o t g e n e r a lly found in o th e r w r i t i n g s . The f o u r th i s Kenneth L in d s a y 's Towards a European P a rlia m e n t (1 9 5 8 ), w hich in p o in t o f tim e makes p o s s ib le a more c r i t i c a l e v a lu a tio n o f th e p a s t decade o f e f f o r t s , i n s i d e and o u ts id e th e C o u n cil o f E urope, tow ard u n i tin g E urope. Q u a lif ie d by e ig h t y e a r s ' m em bership in th e 51 C o n s u lta tiv e Assembly and wide e x p e rie n c e In B r i t i s h Government o f f i c e s , In c lu d in g U n d e r-S e c re ta ry f o r Educa tio n (1935-1940) and 17 y e a rs as an M.P. ( f o r th e E n g lish U n iv e r s itie s from 1945-1950), Mr. Lindsay has p re se n te d th e ca u ses and e f f e c t s o f th e a t t i t u d e s and p o s itio n of th e B r i t i s h and o th e r m em ber-nation r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s to th e C ouncil o f Europe tow ard th e movement to u n i t e Europe. His f o r t h r i g h t and o b je c tiv e a n a ly s is o f th e ro ad b lo ck s and d e to u rs alo n g th e p a th to European union is a n o ta b le c o n t r i b u t i o n . W ith r e f e r e n c e to th e many p e r io d ic a l so u rces s in c e 1945, th e fo llo w in g E n g lish -la n g u a g e jo u r n a ls b e a r em phasis: I n t e r n a t io n a l O rg a n iz a tio n (World Peace Founda t i o n , B oston) f o r i t s r e g u la r r e p o r tin g o f C o uncil o f Europe and r e l a t e d o r g a n iz a tio n s ' a c t i v i t i e s ; F o reig n A f f a ir s (C ouncil on F oreig n R e la tio n s , New York) and World A f f a ir s (American Peace S o c ie ty , W ashington) f o r t h e i r tim e ly a r t i c l e s on th e p ro s p e c ts o f a U nited Europe; and I n t e r n a t io n a l A f f a ir s and World Today (Royal I n s t i t u t e o f I n t e r n a t io n a l A f f a i r s , Chatham House, L o n d o n --" s is te r" i n s t i t u t i o n to F oreign P o lic y A s s o c ia tio n , New York) f o r t h e i r s c h o la r ly a r t i c l e s on th e movement to u n ite Europe. 52 An e x c e lle n t so u rc e on th e B r i t i s h and Commonwealth view s c o n c e rn in g B r i t a i n 's p a r t i c i p a t i o n in th e f e d e r a tio n o f Europe i s Round T ab le: A Q u a r te rly Review o f B r i t i s h Commonwealth A f f a i r s . And e s p e c i a l ly recommended f o r con- t i n u i t y o f a B r i t i s h c r i t i c a l ex am in atio n o f th e e f f o r t s to u n i t e Europe i s The Econom ist (L ondon), p u b lish e d w eekly by th e L ib e r a l P e e r, Lord L ay ton, who r e ta in e d c o n tin u o u s mem bership in th e C o n s u lta tiv e Assembly u n t i l 1956 and su p p o rte d a more p o s i t i v e e f f o r t tow ard u n it in g E urope. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to s i n g l e o u t th e F rench p e r io d i c a l s o u rc e s , f o r alm o st ev ery F rench p e r i o d i c a l d e a lin g w ith econom ic, p o l i t i c a l , and s o c i a l problem s p u b lis h e s from tim e to tim e s tu d ie s o r c r i t i q u e s on th e s u b je c t o f u n i t in g E urope. N o tw ith sta n d in g , th e w r i t e r w ishes e s p e c i a l l y to acknow ledge th e p e r io d i c a ls o f th e many F rench nongovern m en tal o r g a n iz a tio n s and t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f i l i a t e s in o th e r European c o u n t r i e s , d e d ic a te d to th e c a u se of European u n i f i c a t i o n . The work o f th e s e p r i v a t e o rg a n iz a t i o n s , s u b s t a n t i a t e d th ro u g h t h e i r numerous p u b l i c a t i o n s , p ro v id e s h i s t o r i c a l e v id e n c e o f th e many a c t i v e in d iv id u a ls s t r i v i n g s in c e World War I I to a c h ie v e a U n ited E urope. 53 One French p e r io d ic a l, however, t h a t may be s in g le d out f o r i t s s c h o la rly a r t i c l e s on th e e f f o r t s to u n ite Europe is P o litiq u e l£trangfere (C entre d 'd tu d e s de p o litiq u e dtrangferes, P a r is ) . The members of t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n co o p e rate w ith th o se of th e Royal I n s t i t u t e o f I n te r n a t i o n a l A ff a irs in London and u n d erta k e s im ila r re se a rc h s tu d ie s on th e p ro g re ss o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s and th e European movement. For th o se in te r e s te d in German p e r io d ic a l sources w ith an o b je c tiv e coverage of th e a tte m p ts to u n ite Europe, th e w r ite r recommends th e German F oreign A ff a irs p e r io d ic a l, A u sse n p o litik (Bonn) and E uropa-A rkiv. a biw eekly e d ite d by Wilhelm C ornides. Mr. C o rn id es, d e d i c a te d to th e cause o f European u n i f i c a t io n (and working in co o p e ratio n w ith th e Royal I n s t i t u t e of I n te r n a tio n a l A f f a ir s in London), is engaged in p u b lish in g a l l documents and o th e r m a te r ia l lead in g to th e e sta b lish m e n t of a U nited Europe. The German nongovernm ental o rg a n iz a tio n s a s s o c ia te d w ith th e European Movement and o th e rs working fo r a U nited Europe a ls o p u b lish t h e i r own p e r io d ic a ls or pam phlets in o rd e r to in flu e n c e as many German people as p o s s ib le . 54 Located o u ts id e th e m em ber"nations o f th e C ouncil o f Europe a r e two nongovernm ental o rg a n iz a tio n s t h a t a ls o have endeavored to keep th e p u b lic inform ed o f th e p ro g re ss o f th e movement to u n i te Europe. These a r e th e European C u ltu r a l C en tre in Geneva and th e American Committee on U nited Europe in New York. The fo rm er, an autonomous i n s t i t u t i o n e s ta b lis h e d by th e European Movement, is in p ro c e ss o f in v e n to ry in g and in d ex in g a l l documents and o th e r w r itin g s on th e s u b je c t o f u n itin g Europe. In a d d itio n , i t p u b lish e s pam phlets in s e v e r a l languages to prom ote th e ca u se and in 1957 re c e iv e d a $40,000 Ford F oundation g ra n t to h e lp extend i t s p u b lic r e l a t i o n s work on b e h a lf o f a European Union. The l a t t e r o rg a n iz a tio n th rou gh i t s p u b lic a tio n s is s t r i v i n g to aro u se th e i n t e r e s t and su p p o rt o f Americans in th e European e f f o r t to u n i t e . The w r i t e r is in d eb ted to th e s e two o rg a n iz a tio n s as w e ll as to th e s e v e r a l nongovernm ental o rg a n iz a tio n s in Belgium, B r i t a i n , F ran c e, and Germany f o r p u b lic a tio n s co n cern in g t h e i r work in th e e f f o r t to u n i te Europe. Sources f o r th e R ussian a t t i t u d e toward th e move** ment o f European union may be o b ta in e d , o f c o u rse , from R ussian p u b lic a tio n s and some E n g lish t r a n s l a t i o n s th e r e o f in W estern new spaper acco u n ts and o th e r p u b lic a tio n s . Two 55 R ussian E n g lish -la n g u a g e p e r io d i c a ls , New Times and I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a ir s (Moscow), how ever, c o n ta in tim e ly a r t i c l e s on R u s s ia 18 p o s itio n and a r e su g g ested because o f t h e i r g e n e ra l a v a i l a b i l i t y . T urning to th e p e rio d 1918-1945,th e prim ary so u rc e s a v a ila b l e on th e e f f o r t s to u n i t e Europe a r e few and a r e found p r i n c i p a l l y among th e League o f N a tio n 's docum entation o f th e R eports and M inutes o f i t s Commission o f Enquiry f o r European Union, c o v e rin g i t s s ix s e s s io n s o f h e a rin g s between Septem ber 23, 1930, and O ctober 1, 1932. T here i s a ls o M. B rla n d 's "Memorandum on th e O rgani z a tio n . . . of European F e d e ra l Union A ddressed to tw enty- s ix governm ents of Europe, May 17, 1930" and th e " . . . R e p lie s o f Tw enty-Six Governments o f Europe to M . B ria n d 's Memorandum r e p r in te d in I n te r n a tio n a l C o n c ilia tio n : S p e c ia l B u l l e ti n , Ju n e , 1930 and I n te r n a tio n a l C o n c ilia tio n , December, 1930. And th e r e i s G reat B r i t a i n 's F o reign O ffic e Command P aper, No. 3595 (1930) as w e ll as G reat B r i t a i n 's " [D e c la ra tio n o f U nion:] French R epublic (P ro posed Union [16 June 1940] w ith G reat B r i t a i n ) , " in House o f Commons D e b a te s, 5 th s e r i e s , 365 (1939-40), 701-2, not to m ention p re ss r e p o r ts on th e s u b je c t d u rin g t h i s p e rio d . 56 The more s i g n i f i c a n t secondary so u rces d u rin g t h i s p e rio d a r e Count C oudenhove-K alergi1s books: Pan“Europe (1923) aus dem 1 . Jahrgang von Paneuropa . . . Kamp urn Paneuropa (1925), Pan-Europe (1926) [E n g lish e d i t i o n ] , Europa E rw achtl (1934), . . . Kommen d ie V e re in ig te n S ta a ta n von Europa? (1938), Europa Must U nite (1940), and Crusade fo r Pan Europe: A utobiography of a Man and a Movement (1943). Count C oudenhove-K alergi' s u n tir in g e f f o r t s in w r itin g and d e liv e r in g innum erable p u b lic ad d resses were la r g e ly in s tru m e n ta l in keeping th e id e a of a United Europe a l i v e between th e w ars. N ext, th e re is th e work o f Edouard H e r r io t, who, a f t e r su p p o rtin g a U nited Europe in and o u ts id e th e French Assembly from 1924, s e t f o r t h h is id e a s in th e book, The U nited S ta te s o f Europe (1930). Three o th e r books, pub lis h e d in 1940 d u rin g th e e a r ly phases o f World War I I , r e a f f ir m th e lo g ic o f European p o l i t i c a l f e d e r a tio n . Two, by B r i t is h w r i t e r s , c o n ta in proposed D ra ft C o n s titu tio n s : W . Iv o r J e n n in g 's A F e d e ra tio n f o r W estern Europe and R. W . G. M ackay's F e d e ra l Europe: Being th e Case fo r European F e d e ra tio n . T ogether w ith a D ra ft C o n s titu tio n fo r a U nited S ta te s o f Europe. The t h i r d , A lfre d M itc h e ll Bingham's The U nited S ta te s o f Europe, p re se n ts th e case fo r fe d e ra tio n from American sh o re s. In th e p erio d p r io r to 1918, th e o r ig i n a l works (or r e p r i n ts and t r a n s l a t i o n s o f th o se n o t a v a ila b le ) of th e e a r ly p io n eer w r ite r s o f p r o je c ts t o u n ite Europe have been l i s t e d as prim ary so u rc e s. The w r it e r was un able to lo c a te any governm ental docum entation p e r ta in in g to th e u n itin g o f Europe d u rin g t h i s p erio d except a few c i t a tio n s in secondary so u rc e s. Moreover, in tr y in g to fin d th e o r ig in a l works o f a l l p io n eer w r ite r s on th e s u b je c t, i t was d isco v ered th a t no s in g le li b r a r y in Europe or th e U nited S ta te s has a com plete l i s t of e i t h e r th e o r ig in a ls o r r e p r i n t s . I t has been n e c e s sa ry , th e r e f o r e , to r e ly on more re c e n t e d itio n s , ab rid g em en ts, o r t r a n s la ti o n s o f th e o r i g i n a l s . F urtherm ore, re s e a rc h re v e a le d th a t no n in e te e n th - c e n tu ry w r ite r and only f iv e tw e n tie th -c e n tu ry w r ite r s had c a r e f u l l y in v e s tig a te d and brought to l i g h t th e h i s t o r i c a l p r o je c ts and w ritin g s on th e s u b je c t o f u n itin g Europe. T his i s u n d e rsta n d a b le in l i g h t o f th e f a c t t h a t , p r io r to World War I , th e id e a o f a U nited Europe was co n sid ered v is io n a ry and u n r e a l i s t i c by th e v a s t m a jo rity of people and t h e i r le a d e rs ; hence, th e r e was s c a rc e ly any need f o r w r ite r s to d elv e beyond th e few g e n e ra lly known works on th e s u b je c t. These w r i t e r s , whose works p ro v id e th e most e x te n s iv e coverage of p io n e e r l i t e r a r y e f f o r t s in su p p o rt o f th e id ea o f a U nited Europe d e se rv e acknow ledgm ent. A lthough t h e i r works appeared between 1933 and 1949, th ey a r e m entioned h e re because th ey d e a lt p rim a rily w ith p io n e e rs whose p ro p o sa ls appeared in th e p e rio d p r io r to 1918. The f i r s t i s V. J . Lew is, who w ro te a s e r i e s on e ig h te e n p io n e e rs , e n t i t l e d "The P io n eers [: I . - - I n t e r n a tio n a l O rg a n iz a tio n ]" to "The P io n e e rs: X V III.--R o u s s e a u ," and c a r r i e d on by J . 0. M[cLachlan] as "The P ioneers--X IX : Immanuel Kant . . . " to "The Pioneers--X X IV Henry R ich ard , 1812-1888," in The New Commonwealth [London], I , No. 5 --V I, No. 3 (F eb ru a ry , 1933--December, 1937). A lthough Mr. L ew is' prim ary o b je c tiv e was to promote th e cau se of peace among n a tio n s th ro u g h i n t e r n a tio n a l o rg a n iz a tio n w ith p o lic e power s tro n g enough to p re v e n t w ar, he a ls o su p p o rted f e d e r a tio n as a lo g ic a l means o f r e s o lv in g E u ro p e 's i n t e r n a t i o n a l an arch y . The second is E liz a b e th V. Souleyman, whose book, The V isio n o f World Peace in S ev en teen th and E ig h te e n th - C entury F rance (1941), was th e r e s u l t o f a d o c to r a l 59 d i s s e r t a t i o n a t Columbia U n iv e r s ity . As th e t i t l e i n d i c a t e s , Dr. Souleym an's work does n o t co ver th e w r i t e r s on European u n ity b e fo re or a f t e r th e se v e n te e n th and e ig h te e n th c e n tu r ie s , b u t h e r docum entation f o r t h i s p e rio d i s ex ceed in g ly th o ro u g h . The t h i r d is P ro fe s s o r S y lv e s te r J . Hemleben, whose book, Plans f o r World Peace th ro u g h S ix C e n tu rie s (1943), i s th e most in c lu s iv e and b e s t documented co verage of w r i t e r s su g g e s tin g p lan s to u n i t Europe to th e end o f World War I . The l a s t two w r i t e r s , E d ith Wynner and G eorgia Lloyd c o lla b o r a te d to p u b lis h S e a rc h lig h t on Peace P la n s : Choose Your Road to World Government (1949). A lthough t h e i r volume in c lu d e s p la n s to u n i t e th e n a tio n s o f th e w orld as w e ll as th o se of Europe, i t s p a r t i c u l a r m e rit i s t h a t i t p ro v id e s th e most com plete c h ro n o lo g ic a l p r e s e n ta tio n o f th e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and s t r u c t u r a l d e t a i l s o f alm ost every p lan to u n i te n a tio n s to th e end o f World War I I . Perhaps i t should be n o ted t h a t in t e r n a t i o n a l peace was th e c e n t r a l theme behind th e above w orks, as i t was in e a r l i e r w r itin g s whose a u th o rs , s e n s i t i v e to man k i n d 's se tb a c k from s u c c e s s iv e w ars, t r i e d to d e v is e some 60 p lan t h a t would en su re peace. A ll o f th e s e e a rly plans were based on s im ila r means to a t t a i n a common g o al: u n iv e r s a l peace through th e u n ity o f European s t a t e s work ing to g e th e r in some type of assem bly o r c o u n c il. And, even though peace p r o je c ts and t h e i r au th o rs have been looked upon d e r is iv e l y down th e c e n tu r ie s by r u le r s and ag en ts o f governm ent, th e g o al o f peace through European u n ity has p e r s is te d . In f a c t , i t rem ains to t h i s day a prim ary in c e n tiv e fo r th e movement to u n ite Europe. Newspaper sources p re se n te d no s p e c ia l problems o th e r th an s e l e c t i v i t y and a v a i l a b i l i t y , fo r a l l W estern m e tro p o lita n d a i l i e s have c o n s is te n tly covered th e d a y -to - day developm ents o f th e movement to u n ite Europe. For e d i t o r i a l and s p e c ia l re p o rts in th e Los Angeles a r e a , th e w r i te r found most h e lp fu l The (London) Tim es. Man c h e s te r G u ard ian . Le F ig aro and Le Monde ( P a r i s ) , F ra n k fu rte r A llgem eine. Los Angeles Tim es, and New York Tim es. An o u tsta n d in g news source f o r h i s t o r i c a l c o n t i n u ity on th e movement was K eesing*s Contemporary A rc h iv e s: Weekly D iary o f Im portant World Events ( B r is t o l , E ngland), V o ls. V-XII (1943-1960), which provided a weekly d ia ry of 61 s ig n if i c a n t events g ath ered from th e statem en ts of governm ental o f f i c i a l s and newspaper re p o rts throughout th e w orld. CHAPTER I I I ANTECEDENTS OF THE EFFORTS TO UNITE EUROPE: 800-1700 As f a r back a s Che tim e o f th e S to ic s and th e e a r ly C h r is tia n s , h u m a n ita ria n s and p h ilo so p h e rs have sought some form o f o r g a n iz a tio n t h a t would b e s t prom ote th e m oral and p o l i t i c a l u n ity o f th e p eoples o f Europe. To some th e Roman Empire was th e id e a l o r g a n iz a tio n ; to o th e r s , th e Church o f Rome. A fte r th e r i s e o f so v e re ig n n a t i o n - s t a t e s in Europe and th e i n e v it a b l e sp rea d o f n a tio n a lis m , i n t e r n a t i o n a l a n a rc h y , and p e r io d ic w ars, some p u b l i c i s t s su g g ested a c o n fe d e ra tio n o r a union o f European s t a t e s empowered to m a in ta in peace and o rd e r. O thers looked to th e advancement of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and more e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rg a n iz a tio n based upon th e v o lu n ta ry a s s o c ia tio n o f n a tio n s to p re se rv e peace and harmony. 63 T r a d itio n o f a European U n iv e rs a l Community For c e n tu r ie s th e Roman Em pire, which c o n s t i t u t e d th e f i r s t p r a c t i c a l ap p ro ach to European u n i t y , was looked upon as th e i d e a l p o l i t i c a l o r g a n iz a tio n f o r u n iv e r s a l community. The u n ite d Empire o f Rome in c o rp o ra te d a l l men w ith in i t s im p e ria l t e r r i t o r y under a system o f law s, made every fre e b o rn p erso n a Roman c i t i z e n , and governed i t s domain th ro u g h a d e c e n tr a liz e d a d m in is tr a tio n w hich m a in ta in e d law and o rd e r w h ile p e r m ittin g a h ig h d eg ree o f lo c a l s e lf-g o v e rn m e n t. Under th e Roman system o f governm ent, Europe enjoyed peace and u n ity f o r two c e n t u r i e s , an e r a in European h i s t o r y o fte n r e f e r r e d to as th e pax Romana and remembered as E u ro p e 's lo n g e s t p e rio d o f p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . I t was th e lo n g in g f o r a r e tu r n o f t h i s peace and u n ity t h a t f o s te r e d th e m ed iev al n o tio n o f a European u n iv e r s a l em pire u n t i l th e r i s e o f th e modern n a t i o n - s t a t e system . A f te r th e f a l l o f th e Roman Em pire, th e u n iv e r s a l Church endeavored to fu n c tio n a s an organ o f th e im p e ria l i d e a l . A dom inant o r g a n iz a tio n f o r c e n t u r i e s , and th e one 64 u n ify in g elem ent in Europe u n t i l th e s ix te e n th c e n tu ry , th e Church o f Rome had much of th e c h a ra c te r o f a s t a t e . Under i t s claim o f d iv in e a u th o r ity and s p i r i t u a l suprem acy, a new v is io n evolved among Church le a d e rs th a t a pax e c c l e s i a s t i c a m ight prove cap ab le of m a in ta in in g law and o rd e r thro ughout Europe as had th e pax Roroana. The dream of European u n ity through pax e c c l e s i a s t i c a . however, was never r e a liz e d in th e c e n tu r ie s to fo llo w . R iv a lry and d is tu rb in g c o n f li c t s between th e Church and monarchs o f emerging independent s ta te s - - e a c h p ro claim in g preem inence over th e minds o f m en --d isru p ted th e e c c l e s i a s t i c a l e f f o r t to m ain tain a harmonious u n i v e r s a l com nunity. By th e se v e n te e n th c e n tu ry , th e id e a l o f a s in g le E u ro p e an -C h ristia n community under th e c o n tro l o f th e Church o f Rome was d estro y ed by d iv e rg e n t fo rc e s unleashed by th e R eform ation. The Church, of c o u rse , was not th e only exponent of th e Roman id e a l of u n iv e r s a l em pire. S uccessors to th e Roman emperors re ig n e d a t C o n sta n tin o p le u n t i l 1453 and posed a c o n s ta n t t h r e a t to th e peace of Europe. As a sa fe g u a rd , th e r e s t o r a t io n of th e Empire o f th e West gained wide su p p o rt in European Christendom by th e n in th c e n tu ry . 65 The l o g i c a l c h o ic e to head t h i s em pire was C h a rle magne, th e s u c c e s s f u l kin g o f th e Franks and f a i t h f u l f r ie n d o f th e Church. Crowned Emperor o f th e Romans by Pope Leo I I I on C hristm as Day, 800 A .D ., Charlemagne was g iv en th e added r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f p r o te c tin g and prom oting th e s p i r i t u a l l i f e in h is tem poral domain. In tim e , th e E m peror's d u a l r o l e was to b rin g d is u n ity to th e dream of a r e s to r e d u n iv e r s a l em pire. W hatever u n ity f i r s t e x is te d r e s u l t e d from th e le a d e r s h ip and ju d ic io u s r u l e of C h a rle magne, f o r under h is s u c c e s so rs t h i s em pire was reduced to r i v a l kingdoms. King O tto I o f Germany re v iv e d th e id e a o f u n i v e r s a l em pire a f t e r h is p a p a l c o ro n a tio n in 962, and h is realm became known as th e Holy Roman Empire. His c la im o f supreme la w -g iv e r and ju d g e in a l l p o l i t i c a l m a tte r s , how ever, soon came in to prolonged d is p u te w ith th e Church, and h is s u c c e ss o rs were s c a r c e ly more harmonious in t h e i r r e i g n s . Thus, th e e f f o r t s o f th e s e "Holy Roman Em perors" to f u l f i l l th e id e a l o f u n iv e r s a l em pire n ev er succeeded d u rin g th e 1,006 y e a rs o f t h e i r r u l e . In r e a l i t y , th ey were n ev er a b le to e x e r c is e com plete s o v e re ig n ty , nor had th ey a u n iv e r s a l em pire, f o r t h e i r im p e ria l a u t h o r i t y was not reco g n ized beyond Germany and I t a l y . A fte r th e r i s e o f th e independent n a t i o n - s t a t e s , th e Holy Roman Empire co n tin u ed in name d e s p ite i t s growing o b so lesce n ce; and, i f f o r n o th in g more th an th e power o f t r a d i t i o n , i t served as a h i s t o r i c a l lin k between th e Roman Empire and subsequent a tte m p ts to u n ite Europe. Weakened f u r t h e r by th e R eform ation and th e r e li g i o u s wars t h a t fo llo w ed , th e Holy Roman Empire l o s t p r a c t i c a l l y a l l p o l i t i c a l s ig n if ic a n c e as a r e s u l t o f th e T h irty Y ears' War. T h e r e a fte r , i t rem ained l i t t l e more th an a symbol o f th e m edieval q u e st f o r u n iv e r s a l em pire u n t i l i t s d i s s o lu tio n in 1806, when Napoleon, th e "New C harlem agne," f a i l e d in h is e f f o r t s to r e s t o r e i t . D is in te g r a tio n o f th e European U n iv e rsa l Community The s h a tt e r i n g of th e m edieval dream of a u n ite d European community began w ith th e r i s e o f th e independent t e r r i t o r i a l s t a t e s in th e f o u rte e n th c e n tu ry . T his p erio d c o n s titu te d th e l a s t g r e a t s tr u g g le between th e Holy Roman Empire and th e papacy, o f f e r in g a com bination o f c i r cum stances th a t f a c i l i t a t e d th e e x p lo ita tio n o f events by o p p o r tu n is tic m onarchs. By e lim in a tin g fe u d a l lo r d s , 67 c o n tr iv in g th e r i g h t m a rria g e s , com bining sm a lle r kingdom s, c r e a tin g n a tio n a l arm ies and system s o f ta x a tio n , th e more s u c c e s s f u l monarchs w ere a b le to e n la rg e t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s , c e n t r a l i z e t h e i r pow ers, and make them selves suprem e. To a s s u re t h e i r claim s to a b s o lu te s o v e re ig n ty , m oreover, th ey n o t only re fu s e d a lle g ia n c e to any e a r th ly a u th o r ity b u t a ls o r e je c t e d th e id e a o f a u n iv e r s a l p o l i t i c a l com m unity . The R en aissan ce c o n tr ib u te d m a te r ia lly to th e breakdown o f European u n i v e r s a l i t y and a t th e same tim e s tim u la te d th e grow th o f th e independent n a t i o n - s t a t e s . T his r e v iv a l o f le a r n in g awakened in man an in d i v id u a l i s t i c and more c r i t i c a l s p i r i t t h a t underm ined th e i n t e l l e c t u a l and m oral a u t h o r i ty o f th e Church. F u rth erm o re, by encouraging m a te ria lis m and a g r e a t e r s e c u la r i n t e r e s t in o n e 's su rro u n d in g s , i t h elp ed to prom ote n a tio n a lis m ^ and a p l u r a l i s t i c E urope, which su b se q u e n tly abandoned Rome as i t s p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l c e n te r . ^For s u b s t a n t i a l evid en ce on th e in flu e n c e s o f th e R en aissan c e, a s w e ll as th e R eform ation, in th e d e v e lo p ment o f th e modern s t a t e and th e grow th o f n a tio n a lis m , see Hans Kohn, The Idea o f N atio n alism : A Study in I t s O rig in s and Background (New York: M acm illan, 1944), pp. 119-55. 68 C o n cu rren tly w ith th e new s p i r i t o f le a r n in g , th e in v e n tio n o f p r in tin g a ls o sh ared in th e d is r u p tio n of E u ro p e's p o l i t i c a l and s o c ia l u n ity . Through g r e a te r f a c i l i t y in re p ro d u c tio n , i t soon became p r o f i t a b l e to p r i n t books in th e common language o f th e p eo p le. This th en led to th e e sta b lish m e n t o f v a rio u s n a tio n a l languages and th e d is c a rd in g o f L a tin , th e one u n iv e rs a l language of Europe. With each monarch now a b le to re ach h is su b j e c t s more e f f e c ti v e l y through an o f f i c i a l s t a t e language, a more d e l i b e r a te development o f n a tio n a l c u ltu r e and s e lf-c o n s c io u s n e s s ensued a t th e c o s t o f deepening th e i n t e r n a t i o n a l cleav ag es in Europe. The end to a l l hopes fo r th e r e s to r a t io n o f th e European u n iv e rs a l community f i n a l l y came, however, from * th e im pact of a s e r ie s o f i n t e r a c ti n g developm ents: th e d isco v ery o f th e New World, th e ra c e f o r c o lo n ie s , th e r e lig io u s and i n d u s t r i a l r e v o lu tio n s , th e ra p id in c re a s e in commerce and w e a lth , th e r i s e o f a m iddle c l a s s , th e spread o f n a tio n a lis m , and th e d o c trin e of n a tio n a l s o v e r e ig n ty . T ogether they served to e n tre n ch a number of co m p arativ ely sm a ll, independent p o l i t i c a l e n t i t i e s , each vying u n t i l World War I I fo r economic advantages and p o l i t i c a l in flu e n c e in a fragm ented, u n s ta b le Europe. S a n c tio n o f N a tio n a l S o v e re ig n ty 69 and N a tio n a lism The monarchs o f E u ro p e 's em erging s t a t e system n o t on ly j u s t i f i e d t h e i r a b s o lu te t e r r i t o r i a l r u l e as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f God u nder th e a n c ie n t d o c tr in e o f d iv in e r i g h t o f k in g s b u t re c e iv e d su p p o rt in t h e i r claim s to a b s o lu te s o v e re ig n ty from v a rio u s p h ilo s o p h e rs and p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s . In The P rin c e (1 5 1 5 ), f o r exam ple, M a c h ia v e lli- - th e f i r s t to c o in th e term " s t a t e " ( lo s t a t o ) - - b o ld ly p r e s c rib e d th e n a t i o n - s t a t e t h a t was to dom inate th e European economic and p o l i t i c a l developm ent in l a t e r c e n t u r i e s . He i n s i s t e d t h a t a n y th in g s e rv in g th e i n t e r e s t o f th e s t a t e was j u s t i f i a b l e . For s o v e re ig n s t h e r e a f t e r , law and m o r a lity w ere b u t " re a s o n s o f s t a t e , " and no l i m i t a t i o n s co u ld be p la c e d on t h e i r t e r r i t o r i a l s o v e re ig n ty . In The S ix Books on th e S ta te (1 5 7 6 ), B o d i n - - f i r s t to u se th e word s o v e r e ig n ty - - a ls o i n t e r p r e te d th e id e a o f a b s o lu te s o v e re ig n ty as th e head o f th e s t a t e b ein g above th e law and s u b je c t to on one. Hobbes In h is L ev iath an (1651) j u s t i f i e d th e a b s o lu te power o f th e so v e re ig n th ro u g h a s o c i a l c o n t r a c t t h a t b ro u g h t an end to th e an arch y o f man 70 in a s t a t e o f n a tu r e . He f u r t h e r d e c la re d t h a t so v e re ig n ty was " i n d i v i s i b l e and i n a lie n a b le " and t h a t "law is what th e so v e re ig n commands" and cannot be lim ite d . T h e r e a f te r , th e in dependent so v e re ig n s t a t e became th e model f o r th e r i v a l monarchs o f Europe. In tim e , a b s o lu te monarchs g ained u n iv e r s a l a c c e p ta n c e ; b u t t h e i r e f f o r t s a t n a tio n a l aggrandizem ent p ro moted in c re a s in g i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v a l r y , d i s t r u s t , and c o n f l i c t among th e n a t i o n - s t a t e s o f Europe. Under c o n d i tio n s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l a n a rch y , w herein monarchs owed no a c c o u n ta b ility f o r t h e i r t e r r i t o r i a l r u l e to any o th e r so v e re ig n o r e a r th ly a u t h o r i t y , w ar, o r th e t h r e a t of w ar, became th e f i n a l a r b i t e r in c o n f l i c t s o f n a tio n a l i n t e r e s t . R ecognizing th e m i l i t a r y ad v an tag e o f m a in ta in ing th e supreme lo y a lty of t h e i r s u b je c ts in th e s e c i r cum stances, monarchs soon found i t e x p e d ie n t to promote n a t i o n a l i s t i c p a r tic u la r is m and economic n a tio n a lis m - - w ith l i t t l e o r no concern f o r t h e i r e f f e c t s on o th e r c o u n t r i e s . N atio n alism th e n c e fo rth proved a pow erful p sy c h o lo g ic a l means n o t only o f f u r th e r in g a n a t i o n 's s e l f - i n t e r e s t b u t a ls o o f f o s t e r in g th e id e a o f th e supremacy and i n v i o l a b i l i t y o f i t s s o v e re ig n ty . 71 A fte r d is c a rd in g th e d o c trin e o f d iv in e r i g h t o f r u le and th e t r a n s i t i o n from a b s o lu te to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l m onarchies, fo llo w in g th e G lo rio u s R evolution o f 1688 in England, th e t r a d i t i o n o f th e supremacy of n a tio n a l s o v e r e ig n ty c o n tin u e d . L a te r , w ith th e advent o f r e p r e s e n ta tiv e government and th e re c o g n itio n o f po p u lar so v e re ig n ty as th e b a s is fo r dem ocratic governm ent, under th e im pact of th e French R evolution in 1789, th e p r in c ip le o f th e supremacy and i n v i o l a b i l i t y o f n a tio n a l so v e re ig n ty became more w idely p ro c la im e d --th a n k s to th e r i s i n g t i d e of n a tio n a lis m . And n a tio n a lis m and th e d o c trin e of n a tio n a l o s o v e re ig n ty , s u s ta in e d to t h i s day by a c h a u v in is tic t r a d i t i o n and i n t e r n a t i o n a l s a n c tio n , have p e r s is te d and I t sh o u ld , o f c o u rse , be p o in te d out t h a t n a tio n a l s o v e re ig n ty by th e e a rly T w entieth C entury was no lo n g er co n sid ered a r i g h t o f a b s o lu te , u n r e s t r ic te d power in i n t e r n a tio n a l r e l a t i o n s . With advancements in i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and o rg a n iz a tio n , a l l n a t i o n - s t a t e s a re now le g a lly re c o g n ized as e q u a ls ; and no s t a t e is condoned in im posing i t s w i l l upon a n o th e r by th e u se o f fo rc e . The so v e re ig n ty of each s t a t e i s now e n t i t l e d to p ro te c tio n by th e w orld com m unity o f U nited N ations a g a in s t v i o l a t io n . F urtherm ore, n a tio n s have v o lu n ta r ily lim ite d some of t h e i r so v e re ig n ty in n e g o tia tio n s o f t r e a t i e s , agreem ents to a r b i t r a t e d i s p u te s , and in jo in in g i n te r n a t i o n a l o rg a n iz a tio n s and a g re e in g to t h e i r r u le s o f a s s o c ia tio n . Y et, th e r e is some c o n tro v e rsy and much d eb ate between n a t i o n a l i s t s and i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t s over th e lin e s o f dem arcation on so v e re ig n ty to d ay , e s p e c ia lly when n a tio n a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t i s a t s ta k e . Compare th e ch arg es a g a in s t a member n a tio n b rought b e fo re 72 have m ain tain ed a d is u n ite d Europe under an a n a c h r o n is tic n a t i o n - s t a t e system . In r e t r o s p e c t , th e leg acy o f n a tio n a lis m and a b s o lu te s o v e re ig n ty has imposed upon th e peo ples o f Europe a p o l i t i c a l c lim a te o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l an a rch y , th e socioeconom ic c o s ts o f which may n ev er be f u l l y reckoned. I t has k e p t Europeans d iv id e d and has r e s t r i c t e d them to r e l a t i v e l y sm all s e c tio n s o f Europe. I t has f o s te r e d t h e i r p a r o c h ia l te n d e n c ie s and has induced prolonged ig n o ran c e and d i s t r u s t of n e ig h b o rin g p e o p le s. I t has i n t e n s i f i e d t h e i r antagonism s and made p o s s ib le r e c u r r in g w ars. O b s tru c tin g th e f r e e and f u l l developm ent o f th e European p eople th e re b y , i t has indeed re ta rd e d t h e i r econom ic, p o l i t i c a l , and s o c i a l advancement beyond m easure. E a r l i e s t Formal P lans to R e-U nite Europe P h ilo so p h e rs and p u b l i c i s t s th ro u g h th e c e n tu r ie s have re co g n ized th a t d iv is io n and d is s e n s io n in Europe f a c i l i t a t e d s u c c e s s iv e wars and im paired th e s e c u r i ty and p ro g re ss o f European s o c ie ty . Only a few have been d i s posed, however, to w r ite o ut a p lan to t r y to re s o lv e th e U.N. on o ccasio n and th e p le a o f " n a tio n a l dom estic ( i n t e r n a l ) problem ." 73 t h i s c o n tin u in g problem . S in ce th e r a t i o n a l e o f a l l th e s e p la n s was to e lim in a te war and m a in ta in l a s t i n g peace in Europe (a g o a l re q u ir in g genuine i n t e r n a t i o n a l g o o d w ill and c o o p e ra tio n , i f n o t th e union of th e European n a ti o n s t a t e s ) , th e g r e a t m a jo rity o f le a d e rs in Europe c o n sid e re d th e means as w e ll as th e o b je c tiv e s in th e s e p lan s u n r e a l i s t i c and v is io n a r y . In th e y e a rs to fo llo w , m oreover, c y n ic s , s k e p tic s , and n a tio n a l le a d e rs not only b e l i t t l e d th e s e p la n s as im p ra c tic a l bu t a ls o d i s c r e d it e d them w ith la b e ls l i k e "peace" p r o je c ts o r "peace" schemes o f p a c i f i s t s and dream ers. As a r e s u l t , th e a p p r e c ia tio n o f p o t e n t i a l advantages in u n itin g th e n a t i o n - s t a t e s o f Europe was obscured and n o t r e a liz e d by th e peoples o f Europe u n t i l th e p re s e n t day. D e sp ite th e n e g a tiv e r e c e p tio n accorded th e s e s o - c a lle d "peace" p r o j e c t s , th ey w i l l now be examined f o r evid en ce o f any h i s t o r i c a l s ig n if ic a n c e in th e developm ent o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rg a n iz a tio n and th e p re s e n t e f f o r t to u n it e Europe. The f i r s t o f th e s e "peace" p r o je c ts to u n i t e th e independent s t a t e s of Europe can be tra c e d back to th e b e g in n in g o f th e F o u rte e n th C entury, a c e n tu ry t h a t was 74 to w itn e ss a dynamic tu rn in g p o in t in European h i s t o r y . T his was th e p e rio d o f th e l a s t g r e a t s tr u g g le between th e Empire and th e papacy and th e r e j e c t i o n o f u n iv e r s a l a u t h o r i t y ; i t was th e p e rio d o f th e r i s e o f so v ere ig n n a t i o n - s t a t e s and th e t r a n s i t i o n between th e m edieval and th e modern w o rld . Because la rg e s e c tio n s o f Europe a t th e tim e were b ein g ravaged by in c e s s a n t fe u d a l w ars, P i e r r e D ubois, a p r o v in v ia l ad v o cate f o r th e King of F ran c e, was led to w r ite De re c u p e ra tio n e T e rre S ancte 3 (1 3 0 5 -0 7 ), a p lan s u g g e s tin g th e fo rm atio n o f a European leag u e o r c o n fe d e ra tio n of C h r is tia n s t a t e s . A p r a c tic in g law yer w ith a b en t f o r p o l i t i c a l re fo rm , Dubois b e lie v e d t h a t th e wars o f h is day co u ld be p re v en ted i f th e s t a t e s o f Europe u n ite d and made c o n c e rte d e f f o r t s to outlaw w ar. 3 T his work rem ained u n p u b lish ed u n t i l i t s d isc o v e ry d u rin g th e r e li g i o u s wars in th e S ev en teen th C en tu ry , and Dubois was n o t i d e n t i f i e d as i t s a u th o r u n t i l about 1862. For re f e r e n c e to t h i s d is c o v e ry , th e i d e n t i t y of th e author, and th e purpose of h is work by v a rio u s s c h o la r s , see Appendix A, p a r s . 1 -2 . W alther I. B ran d t, " P ie r r e Dubois: Modern or M ed iev al," The American H i s t o r i c a l Review. XXXV (1929- 1930), 507-21. A lso see E ile e n E. Power, " P ie r r e Du Bois and th e D om ination o f F ra n c e ," in F. J . C. Hearnshaw, e d . , The S o c ia l and P o l i t i c a l Ideas o f Some G reat M edieval T h in k e rs . A S e rie s o f L ec tu res D e liv e re d a t K in g 's C o lleg e 75 To t h i s end, he proposed th e u n itin g o f European s t a t e s i n to a " C h r is tia n R e p u b lic ," which was to be governed by a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e C o u n cil, com prised o f th e h e a d s, p r in c e s , and p r e l a t e s o f th e member s t a t e s . In a d d it i o n , he su g g ested e sta b lis h m e n t o f an i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r b i t r a t i o n c o u r t o f n in e ju d g e s , to which th e member s t a t e s pledged them selves to a p p e a l in c a se o f a d is p u te . The d e c is io n o f th e c o u rt was to be f i n a l , ex cep t t h a t an a p p e a l was p e rm itte d to th e Pope, empowered to a l t e r or co n firm th e d e c is io n , making i t th e re b y a b s o lu te ly f i n a l . A ll testim o n y was to be w r i t t e n , and a perm anent re c o rd o f a l l p ro ceed in g s was to be p re se rv e d in th e a rc h iv e s o f th e Church o f Rome to p re v en t f u tu r e fra u d or f o r g e r y .^ In c a se of f a i l u r e to subm it to th e c o u r t 's d e c is io n , o r to f u l f i l l th e o b lig a tio n s o f membership in o f London [1923] (London: H arrap [1923]), pp. 140-1. For f u r th e r d e t a i l s o f D ubois' background and m o tiv e s, see Appendix A, p a r s . 2 -3 . ^D ubois, P i e r r e , De r e c u p e ra tio n e T e rre S a n c te : t r a i t e de p o l i ti q u e g e n ^ r a le . Pub. d'apr& s l e m an u scrit du V atican [ in L a t i n ; w ith an In tro d u c tio n by C h (a rle s ) V. L an g lo is] in C o lle c tio n de T exte: pour s e r v i r a 1 * dtude e t b l'e n se ig n e m e n t de l ' h i s t o i r e . dd. p ar A lphonse P icard ( P a r is : Durand, 1891), IV, 3, p. 6 to V II I, 13, p. 12. 76 th e R ep u b lic, Dubois c a lle d f o r econom ic, r e l i g i o u s , and even m i l i t a r y s a n c tio n . N o tw ith stan d in g h is p ro p o sa l to outlaw w ar, Dubois made one e x c e p tio n : "a war to end w a r."^ S t r u c t u r a l w eaknesses, o f c o u rs e , can be found in D ubois' p lan to u n it e Europe. He pro v id ed no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l framework o r r u l e s o f p ro ced u re and no l e g i s l a t i v e body as a g u id e f o r th e i n i t i a t i o n and d i r e c t i o n o f th e a c t i v i t i e s o f h is R ep u b lic, nor any p o lic e o r m i l i t a r y o rg a n iz a tio n to e n fo rc e i t s d e c is io n s . B e sid e s, th e r e was in e q u a lity of member s t a t e s in h is r e p r e s e n t a t i v e C o u n cil, f o r F rance was a ssig n e d th e le a d in g r o l e . But a c tu a ll y i t was n o t th e s e w eaknesses t h a t doomed D ubois' p lan to o b liv io n ; i t was th e s t a t e o f f lu x in European p o l i t i c s a t t h a t tim e. The u n lim ite d h o rizo n o f in d e pendent p o l i t i c s seemed f a r more c h a lle n g in g to th e am bi tio u s heads o f th e em erging s t a t e s than th e compromises and l im i t a t i o n s o f an o rg a n iz a tio n o f European s t a t e s , a s s o c ia te d f o r th e sake o f peace and t r a n q u i l l i t y . D e sp ite th e d e f e c ts and r e j e c t i o n o f a p lan w r itte n over s ix c e n tu r ie s ago, D ubois' c r i t i c s a g re e on one o r ^ B ran d t, op. c i t . . pp. 511-2; Power, op. c i t . . p. 158. 77 more of h is o u tstan d in g c o n trib u tio n s to p re se n t-d ay i n t e r n a tio n a l r e la ti o n s : He i s : (1) the p io n eer p u b lic is t on i n te r n a tio n a l p o l i t i c a l o rg a n iz a tio n ; (2) th e f i r s t to propose form ally a league of n a tio n s or co n fe d e ra tio n of th e independent s t a t e s of Europe; (3) th e f i r s t to se t f o r th a d e f in i t e plan fo r an in te r n a tio n a l co u rt of a r b i t r a t i o n fo r th e se ttle m e n t of in te r n a tio n a l d is p u te s ; and (4) th e f i r s t to urge in te r n a tio n a l economic and m ilita r y sa n c tio n s a g a in s t ag g resso r n a tio n s .^ As one sc h o la r has d e c la re d : " . . . th e re can be few books more rem arkable in t h e i r p re v isio n of th e fu tu re than th e De R ecu p e ratio n e. . . . Dubois' book was a prophecy r a th e r o than a programme." For a f u l l e r e v a lu a tio n of D ubois' prop osals to u n ite Europe, see B randt, op. c i t .. pp. 507-21; S y lv e ste r John Hemleben, Plans fo r World Peace through Six C enturies (Chicago: U n iv e rsity Press [c . 1943]), pp. 1-4; L an g lo is, In tro d u c tio n to Dubois, op. c i t .. pp. x v i i i - x x i v ; [ V. J .] Lewis, "The P io n e e rs," The New Commonwealth. I , no. 12 (Septem ber, 1933), 10; Power, op. c i t . . pp. 154-66; E liz a b e th Souleyman, The V ision of World Peace in Seven te e n th and E ighteenth-C entury France (New York: Putnam's (c . 1941]), pp. 1-9; and F. Melian S ta w e ll, The Growth of I n te r n a tio n a l Thought (London: B u tterw o rth , [192 9]), pp. 62-8. g Power, op. c i t . . p. 163. For o th e r f i r s t s of Dubois, see i b i d . . p. 165. 78 Three y e a rs a f t e r D ubois' De re c u p e ra tio n e . . . , th e re appeared Dante A l i g h i e r i 's De m onarchia (1310), an a p p e al f o r th e r e s t o r a tio n o f th e u n iv e r s a l Empire. A lthough g e n e ra lly co n sid ered more of an a n t i - p a p a l i s t , im p e r ia lis t t r a c t than a t r e a t i s e o f p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c a l v a lu e , De m onarchia serv e s as a good example of m edieval th in k in g based r a th e r h e a v ily on m edieval symbols and th e 9 t r a d i t i o n of u n iv e rs a l em pire. From th e vantage p o in t of subsequent c e n tu r ie s , i t is c e r t a i n t h a t Dante d id not fo re s e e th e h i s t o r i c a l winds and tid e s o f a r i s i n g so v ereig n n a t i o n - s t a t e system which was to d e stro y fo re v e r th e chances of r e s u r r e c tin g a u n iv e rs a l em pire. His De m onarchia sim ply re p re s e n te d th e v is io n of a m edieval i d e a l i s t who b e lie v e d th a t peace and th e u n ity o f mankind could be a tta in e d in Europe only by means of th e j u s t u n iv e rs a l Emperor. Y et, Dante did p re se n t some cogent arguments in support of s u p ra n a tio n a l government th a t concern in te r n a tio n a l p o l i t i c s to t h i s day. He argued th e need fo r th e s e ttle m e n t of d is p u te s between s t a t e s w ith o u t re c o u rse to war th u s: 9 See Appendix A, p a rs. 4 -3 , fo r D a n te 's in c e n tiv e s and th e papal a t t i t u d e toward De m onarchia. 79 I t i s c l e a r t h a t a d is p u te may a r i s e between two p r in c e s , n e i t h e r of whom i s s u b je c t to th e o th e r . . . th e r e f o r e a judgment between them is in d is p e n s a b le . However, s in c e n e i t h e r can tak e cognizance over th e o th e r ( n e ith e r b ein g s u b je c t to th e o th e r--a n d eq u a ls do n o t r u le over e q u a ls ) , th e r e needs to be a t h i r d person [ a u th o r ity ] e n jo y ing w ider j u r i s d i c t i o n who by r i g h t r u le s over b o th o f them. This person [ a u th o r ity ] must be . . . a f i r s t and supreme judge whose judgment w i ll e i t h e r d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y so lv e a l l d is p u te s : he w i l l be . . . [th e ] Emperor. In a n o th e r in s ta n c e he argued th a t th e n a tu r a l forms o f p o l i t i c a l o rg a n iz a tio n —c o n m u n itie s, c i t y - s t a t e s , and kingdom s--w ere too p r o v in c ia l and in ad eq u ate because th e e v ils of greed and scheming debase t h e i r n a tu re and p u rp o s e .11 And as one of th e f i r s t w r ite r s on th e s u b je c t o f u n iv e r s a l or i n t e r n a ti o n a l government to s e p a ra te th e is s u e o f a s u p ra n a tio n a l a u th o r ity from th a t o f th e i n d i v id u a l n a t i o n - s t a t e 's so v e re ig n ty , Dante d e c la re d : . . . when we say "mankind can be governed by one supreme p rin c e " we do not mean to say th a t m inute d e c is io n s concerning every tow nship can proceed d i r e c t l y from him. . . . For n a tio n s , kingdoms and c i t i e s have d i f f e r e n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which demand d i f f e r e n t laws f o r t h e i r government. . . . But our meaning is t h a t mankind should be l^D ante, Monarchy [ t r a n s l . by Donald N lc h o ll] and Three P o l i t i c a l L e tte r s [ t r a n s l . by C olin H ardie] (New York: Noonday P ress [1 9 5 4 ]), I , p. 14. U I b id . . p. 10. 80 ru le d by one eupreme p rin c e [ a u th o r ity ] and d ir e c te d tow ards peace by a common law is s u in g from him and a p p lie d to th o se c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which a re common to a l l men. T his common r u l e , o r law, should be accep ted from him by p a r ti c u l a r p rin c e s . . . . I t i s not only p o s s ib le fo r one movement to is s u e from a s in g le so u rc e , i t is n e c e ssa ry fo r i t to do so in o rd e r to e lim in a te co n fu sio n about u n iv e rs a l p r in c ip le s . The p o l i t i c s o f t h i s p e rio d , however, were h e a v ily w eighted a g a in s t th e u n ity of mankind through a s t a b l e , u n iv e r s a l government fo r a l l Europe. Monarchs more power f u l than th e Holy Roman Emperor were soon to e s ta b li s h them selves in F rance, S pain, and England and were not in c lin e d to accep t th e s u p ra n a tio n a l p re ro g a tiv e s of any u n iv e r s a l a u th o r ity , l e t alo n e th e E m p ire .^ A c e n tu ry and a h a l f was to pass b e fo re th e next form al p ro je c t to u n ite th e s t a t e s o f Europe was proposed. This p la n , "The Peace League o f George PodSbrad, King of Bohemia'* ( 1 4 6 4 ) ,^ was unique in t h a t i t was "no mere th e o ry , but a p r a c t ic a l p ro p o sal" by one so v ereig n monarch 12 D ante, op. c i t . . pp. 23-4. 13 E. Sharwood Sm ith, "Dante and W orld-Em pire," in Hearnshaw, e d ., op. c i t . . p. 135. For a d d itio n a l r e f e r ences to th e in flu e n c e o f D a n te 's p o l i t i c a l id e a s , see Appendix A, p a r. 6. ^ J o h n K apras* t r a n s l a t i o n o f Podgbrad’s plan in The Czecho-Slovak R ep u b lic. I I , P a rt 5 (Prague, 191 9),5-17 . 81 to h is fe llo w European s o v e re ig n s . ^ At th e tim e , th e European s t a t e s were th re a te n e d by r e v iv a l o f th e Ottoman power, and th e need fo r a u n ite d d efen se a g a in s t th e danger o f T u rk ish a g g re ssio n i n f l u enced th e Bohemian King to seek a s o lu tio n through c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . 16 To ach iev e t h i s , he proposed t h a t a perma nent Union be e s ta b lis h e d by a s e r ie s of p e rp e tu a l f r i e n d sh ip t r e a t i e s between a l l p rin c e s o f F ran ce, Germany, I t a l y , and e v e n tu a lly th e o th e r C h r is tia n s t a t e s o f Europe, in which each pledged u n c o n d itio n a lly th e a b s o lu te re n u n c i a t i o n o f th e u se of arms a g a in s t each o t h e r. ^ The p r in c ip a l organ o f Pod&brad' s Union was to be th e Assembly, composed o f p l e n i p o t e n t i a r i e s re p re s e n tin g « V . J . Lewis, "The P io n e e rs: V III--T h e Bohemian P ro je c t o f 1464," The New Commonwealth. I I , no. 3 (December, 1933), 10. For o th e r background d a ta , see Appendix A, p a r . 7. ^ Loc. c i t . For th e p o s s i b i l i t y th a t Pod&brad 1 s purpose was an a l l i a n c e to p r o te c t h im se lf a g a in s t a p o t e n t i a l c o n f l i c t w ith th e papacy and th e so u rces th e r e o f , see Hemleben, op. c i t . . pp. 14-5. l^K apras, op. c i t . . pp. 12-3. See Appendix A, p a r s . 8-10, on th e s i m i l a r i t i e s o f p o lic y co n cern in g m i l i ta r y a g g re ssio n and m utual a s s i s t a n c e , p re v e n tiv e w ar, and punishment of i n s t ig a to r s o f war and war c rim in a ls in P oddbrad's plan and p o st World War I I p r a c tic e o f v a rio u s i n t e r n a t i o n a l b o d ie s. 82 th e heads or p rin c e s of th e m em ber-states and a g a in s t whose w i l l they could not a c t. Each m em ber-state was to have one v o te , and Assembly d e c isio n s were to be reached by m a jo rity v o te, or unanimous vote on c e r ta in o ccasio n s; but Pod&brad d id not sp e c ify when unanim ity was to be 18 re q u ire d . There was to be a r o ta tin g Assembly p re sid e n t w ith th e French king having th e f i r s t honor. Union member sh ip was to be perm anent, and a l l su ccesso r p rin c e s were to be bound by th e e s ta b lis h e d laws and re g u la tio n s of th e U n io n .^ The Assembly was to have u n r e s tr ic te d l e g i s l a t i v e power and was to be th e supreme a u th o rity w ith in th e Union. I t was to be re s p o n s ib le fo r i t s e n t i r e o rg a n iz a tio n and fu n c tio n and th e adm ission of new m em b er-states. I t was a ls o to decide on peace and w ar, to e s ta b lis h th e Union army, to a l l o c a t e th e s iz e o f each m em b er-state's con tin g e n ts , and to d ir e c t any m ilita r y a c tio n and o th er r e la te d a c t i v i t i e s . In a d d itio n , i t was to appoint th e Union t r e a s u r e r , to c o n tro l th e c o lle c tio n of s p e c ifie d ^®Kapras, op. c i t . . pp. 14-5. For f u r th e r p ro v is io n s of th e com position of th e v o tin g in the Assembly, see Appendix A, p a r. 11. 19 I b id . . p. 15. 83 a n n u a l re v e n u e s , and t o have a u t h o r i t y t o a s s e s s p e n a l t i e s and t o u s e m i l i t a r y f o r c e i f n e c e s s a ry in t h e i r c o l l e c tio n .^ ® The o th e r m ajor o rg an o f th e Union was t o be th e A r b i t r a t i o n C o u rt, c r e a te d by th e Assem bly and h av in g m andatory and e x c lu s iv e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r any d is p u te s a r i s i n g among th e members. And when th e C ourt was n o t a r b i t r a t i n g a c a s e , i t was t o a s s i s t th e Assem bly on l e g i s l a t i v e m a t t e r s . Pod&brad a l s o p rop osed t h a t th e Union have i t s own m arks o f d i s t i n c t i o n : a s e a l , a t r e a s u r y , m i l i t a r y c o in s f o r th e a rm y 's u s e th ro u g h o u t th e U nion, a r c h i v e s , and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p e r s o n n e l, employed f o r a f i v e - y e a r term from th e c o u n try in w hich th e Union was h e a d q u a r te r e d . S t a r t i n g in B a s le (1 4 6 4 ), i t s h e a d q u a r te r s was t o be t r a n s f e r r e d e v e ry f i v e y e a rs to a c i t y in a d i f f e r e n t "fed erated * 21 s t a t e . H ungary, f i r s t t o s u p p o rt th e p la n , fo llo w e d by P o la n d , endeavored to h e lp win th e s u p p o rt o f L ouis XI by se n d in g P o d g b ra d 's F ren ch a d v is e r M a rin i, v e s te d w ith 20 K a p ra s, op. c i t . . pp. 15-16. 21I b i d . , p. 15. 84 f u l l powers fo r b o th c o u n tr ie s , along w ith th e Bohemian Ambassador to th e French C o u rt. King Louis was in fa v o r o f th e p la n ; b u t because h is e c c l e s i a s t i c a l a d v is e rs 22 opposed i t v ig o ro u s ly , i t had to be tu rn ed down. D e sp ite i t s w e ll-d e fin e d o b je c tiv e s and re aso n ab ly sound o rg a n iz a tio n , P odgbrad's p ro p o sa l to u n ite th e C h r is tia n s t a t e s o f Europe was r e je c t e d . N e v e rth e le s s , i t was th e f i r s t p lan to re c o g n iz e n a t i o n - s t a t e s as i n t e r n a tio n a l e n t i t i e s , fo r i t marked in th e words of V. J . Lewis: " th e f i r s t tim e in th e modem w orld t h a t th e id ea o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rg a n iz a tio n was th e s u b je c t of an a c t of S ta te " by a so v e re ig n in t r e a t y form ad d ressed to th e so v ere ig n s o f o th e r s t a t e s , and thus i t " is la r g e ly th e b a s is o f a l l subsequent p r o p o s a l s t o u n ite Europe. No form al p ro p o sa ls to u n ite th e s t a t e s o f Europe A i appeared in th e S ix te e n th C entury, a p erio d th a t ^ K a p r a s , op. c i t . . pp. 11-2. Reasons f o r th e e c c l e s i a s t i c a l o p p o s itio n to th e p lan a re c i t e d in Appendix A, p a r s . 12-3. O < 1 Lewis, l o c . c i t . Lew is' e v a lu a tio n o f th e plan i s c i t e d in Appendix A, p a r. 14. ^Tw o p lan s f o r peace and one f o r m i l i t a r y co o p e ra tio n a g a in s t a comnon fo e to b rin g "Concord" to Europe a re to be found, however, d u rin g t h i s p e rio d ; see Appendix A, p a r s . 15-7. w itn essed a g re a t n a t i o n a l i s t i c upsurge in economic r i v a l r i e s , r e lig i o u s s t r i f e , and in t e r n a ti o n a l c o n f li c t s among th e n a t i o n - s t a t e s o f Europe. Indeed, i t was a p erio d of tu rm o il in which th e European p o l i t i c a l c lim a te not only i n t e n s i f i e d th e growing co n scio u sn ess of n a tio n a lis m b u t a ls o encouraged th e a s s e r tio n of n a tio n a l " r ig h ts " by fo rc e o f arms i f n e c e ssa ry to f u r th e r a n a t i o n 's i n t e r e s t s . In e f f e c t , i n t e r n a ti o n a l wars became th e " f i n a l " a r b i t e r s and were to plague Europeans re p e a te d ly durin g th e n ext fo u r c e n tu r ie s . E arly in th e S ev enteen th Century th e t i d e of n a t i o n a l i s t i c antagonism s b u rs t in to a s e r i e s of E urop e's most b i t t e r c o n f l i c t s , known as th e T h irty Y ears' War. The aim less and c r u e l in d if f e r e n c e to th e liv e s and p o s s e s sio n s o f th e peoples of Europe d u rin g t h i s war aroused th e in te rn a tio n a lly -m in d e d Emeric Cruce to w r ite a p la n , Le Nouveau Cyn^e (1623), fo r u n itin g a l l European s t a t e s . 2 5 Crucd, more u n iv e r s a l in o u tlook th an Dubois o r Podebrad, d id no t r e s t r i c t h is Union to th e C h ris tia n R epublics o f Europe, b u t in clu d ed a l l th e c o u n trie s of Europe and some in A fric a and A sia . See h is Le Nouveau Cyn<Se. ed. w ith an In tro d u c tio n and t r a n s l . by Thomas W illin g Balch (P h ila d e lp h ia : A lle n , Lane, and S c o tt, 1909), pp. 108, 114-6. 86 A ccording to h is p ro p o sa l, th e member s t a t e s , re p re s e n te d by t h e i r am bassadors, were to meet in an assem bly o r Congress t h a t was to s i t r e g u la r ly and p e r p e tu a lly in a 26 n e u tr a l c i t y , p re fe ra b ly V enice. A ll d is p u te s between member s t a t e s were re q u ire d to be p re se n te d to t h i s Congress f o r s e ttle m e n t b e fo re r e s o r t to arm s. The d is p u ta n t s t a t e s were to plead t h e i r ca se s b e fo re th e o th e r r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s , who would s e t t l e th e d is p u te by a m a jo rity vote of th e C ongress. A n t i c i p a tin g th e need fo r enforcem ent of th e asse m b ly 's d e c is io n s on o cc asio n , C ru c^ 's plan provided t h a t a l l heads of member s t a t e s " w ill swear to hold as in v io la b le law" th e m a jo rity d e c is io n of th e assem bly and " to pursue w ith arms 7 7 th o se who would w ish to oppose i t . A p io n eer in re co g n izin g th e o b s tru c tiv e n e s s of economic n a tio n a lis m to i n t e r n a t i o n a l p eace, Crvcd p ro posed th r e e novel i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic refo rm s: (1) freedom and p r o te c tio n of fo re ig n tra d e on an e q u ita b le ^ C r u c ^ , op. c i t . . p. 104. ^ I b i d . . p. 122. For C ru c ^ 's answ ers to th e doubts o f s k e p tic s in u n itin g d i f f e r e n t n a tio n s , see Appendix A, p a r. 18. 87 b a s is in every c o u n tr y ,2® (2) r e g u la tio n o f th e p r ic e , w e ig h t, and law o f moneys in th e d i f f e r e n t c o u n trie s to one common s ta n d a rd , and (3) i n te r n a t io n a l s ta n d a r d iz a tio n 29 o f w eights and m easures. As measured by Pod&brad's plan and to d a y 's s ta n d a rd s o f governm ental s t r u c t u r e , C ru cd 's p la n , of c o u rse , was la c k in g in th e b a s ic organs re q u ire d fo r c o n tin u ity and e f f e c t i v e a d m in is tr a tio n . His sugg ested assem bly was to se rv e p rim a rily as an a r b i t r a t i o n c o u rt to sto p war and m ain tain th e peace. He f a il e d to p re s c rib e a c o n s t i tu e n t framework o f procedure and th e l e g i s l a t i v e and ex e c u tiv e i n s t i t u t i o n s n ec essary f o r th e o p e ra tio n o f h is 30 permanent union o f s t a t e s . I t i s a p p a ren t th a t h is p r o je c t was e s s e n t i a l l y an i n t e l l e c t u a l and m oral ap p eal to E urope's so v ereig n r u l e r s , made by an i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t f a r in advance of h is p e rio d . I d e a l i s t as he proved to b e , Crucd b e lie v e d th a t European u n ity could be e s ta b lis h e d on th e r a ti o n a l e of 28 C rucd, op. c i t . . pp. 270 f f . 29I b i d . . pp. 304, 320, 328-34. 3®For o th e r w eaknesses in C ru cd 's p lan and th e a llo c a t io n o f to p -ra n k in g p la c e s in h is Congress to th e Pope and th e Holy Roman Emperor, see i b i d . . pp. 106-14. 88 u n iv e r s a l b ro th e rh o o d , u n d e rs ta n d in g , and t o l e r a t i o n o f m ankind's d if f e r e n c e s i f only n a tio n s would c o o p e ra te f u l l y in open d is c u s s io n and ab id e by m a jo rity d e c is io n s o f t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a ti v e s in a C ongress. That C ru c d 's p lan was n o t ac cep ted a t th e tim e was due n o t so much to o b je c tio n s to i t s s t r u c t u r e , o r la c k of i t , as to i t s s u b s ta n c e . W ith re s p e c t to th e fo rm e r, th e c o n te n tio u s n a tio n a lis m o f h is tim e was con firm in g th e id e a o f e q u a lity o f so v e re ig n s t a t e s and t h e i r c o o p e ra tio n w ith in th e l i m i t s o f n a tio n a l i n t e r e s t throu gh th e exchange o f am bassadors. C oncerning th e l a t t e r , however, th e s p i r i t o f n a tio n a lis m was f o s t e r in g p a ro c h i a lis m , and th e d i s t r u s t o f o th e r n a tio n s p reclu d ed th e re c e p tio n o f C ru c e 's id e a s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o l i d a r i t y and a u t h o r i t y . Y et, th e essen c e o f C ru c d 's plan was to be r e a l iz e d alm ost th r e e c e n tu r ie s l a t e r when an I n t e r n a tio n a l C ourt was e s ta b lis h e d a t The Hague to ju d g e d is p u te s 31 betw een so v e re ig n n a tio n s . B a lc h 's In tro d u c tio n to Cruce/, op. c i t . . pp. x x v i i i - x x i x . For lo c a tio n o f C ru cd 's o r i g i n a l work, re a so n f o r t i t l e , h is i d e n t i t y in 1890, and o th e r r e f e r e n c e s, se e Appendix A, p a r s . 19-21. 89 F if te e n y e a rs a f t e r th e p u b lic a tio n o f C ru c e 's p r o j e c t , th e Duke o f S u l l y 's G reat D esign o f Henry IV ( 1 6 3 8 ) ,3 2 o fte n c a lle d th e Grand D esign, made i t s a p p e a r an c e . In flu e n c e d by th e d e t e r i o r a t i o n o f European p o l i t i c s and th e b i t t e r h a tre d a r i s i n g between F rance and Germany, S u lly proposed a f e d e r a tio n of f i f t e e n s t a t e s o f Europe to r e d r e s s th e European im balance o f power. T e r r i t o r y was to be a ssig n e d to each s t a t e in such a way to make each a p p ro x im ately eq u a l in t e r r i t o r y , w e a lth , and power and th e re b y remove th e m ajor cau ses o f w a r .33 And to make th e e q u ilib riu m w ith in th e f e d e r a tio n more " n e a rly p e r f e c t" and to e n su re th e p eace, S u lly su g g e ste d t h a t f iv e s t a t e s w ere to be w holly C a th o lic , f i v e L u th eran , and f i v e C a l v i n i s t i c , f o r he was convinced t h a t th e s e 32 C oncerning th e d isc o v e ry o f th e t r u e a u th o rs h ip of t h i s p lan in th e 1 8 9 0 's , see Appendix A, p a r. 22. 3 3 s u lly , M axim ilien de B ethune, Due d e , S u l ly 1s Grand D esign o f Henry IV. From th e Memoirs o f . . . S u l ly . [C h ap ter XXX o f th e E n g lis h t r a n s l a t i o n (6 v o ls . London: 1778) o f th e Abbe de 1 £ c lu s e des Loges' e d it i o n o f 1745]. W ith an In tro d u c tio n by David Ogg. In The G ro tiu s S o c ie ty P u b lic a tio n s : T exts f o r S tu d e n ts o f I n t e r n a t io n a l R ela- t i o n s . No. 2 (London: Sweet and M axwell, 1921), pp. 35- 41. [N ote S u l l y 's s tr a t e g y a g a in s t r e s i s t a n c e to h is p la n in Appendix A, p a r s . 2 3 -4 .] 90 th re e r e lig i o n s had become firm ly e s ta b lis h e d in Europe and c o rId n o t be d e s t r o y e d . 3^ Forming th e "F e d e ra tio n " o r " C h ris tia n R epublic" o f Europe, th e f i f t e e n s t a t e s were to c o n s is t o f s ix h e r e d ita r y m onarchies (England, F rance, S pain, Denmark, Sweden, and Lombardy), f iv e e le c ti v e m onarchies (th e Roman Empire, th e Papacy, Poland, Hungary, and Bohemia), and fo u r so v ere ig n re p u b lic s (th e B elg ian , I t a l i a n , Sw iss, and V enetian) . They were to have w eighted r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ^ in a perm anent, d e li b e r a ti v e C ouncil o r S en ate, w herein a l l th e laws and ord in an ces n e c e ssa ry " to cement a union between a l l th e s e p rin c e s " were to be enacted and to become " f i n a l and irre v o c a b le d e c re e s ," sin c e th ey o r i g i - n ated from th e u n ite d a u th o r ity o f a l l th e so v ereig n s A c h ie f m a g is tr a te , or p r e s id e n t, o f th e fe d e ra tio n was to be e le c te d by th e p re se n t e l e c t o r s ; he would be 3^ S u lly , op. c i t . . pp. 31-3. 35 I b i d . . pp. 41-2. With re s p e c t to S u lly s a t t i t u d e toward R ussia and h is in c o n siste n c y on e q u a lity versu s w eighted r e p r e s e n ta tio n in h is f e d e r a tio n , see Appendix A, p a r. 25. 36I b i d ., pp. 42-3. 91 I n e l i g i b l e t o s u c c e e d h i m s e l f , and t h e f i r s t h o n o r was t o go t o t h e Holy Roman E m peror. The p erm an en t s e a t o f t h e C o u n c il was t o b e ch o se n In t u r n from a l i s t o f c e n t r a l E u ro p ean c i t i e s . The C o u n c il was t o e x e r c i s e suprem e c o n t r o l o v e r I n t e r s t a t e r e l a t i o n s and t h e r e was t o be c o m p le te freed o m o f commerce among a l l members o f t h e f e d e r a t i o n . U nder a u t h o r i t y o f t h e C o u n c il t h e f e d e r a t i o n was t o m a in ta in i t s own m i l i t a r y f o r c e , com posed o f con* t i n g e n t s from e a c h s t a t e ; and a f i n a n c i a l sy ste m t o w hich e a c h s t a t e c o n t r i b u t e d th ro u g h t a x a t i o n was p ro v id e d t o 37 s u s t a i n t h e " F e d e r a t io n o f E u ro p e ." As w ith m ost program s f o r p o l i t i c a l c h a n g e , c r i t i c s h av e p o in te d o u t d e f e c t s in S u l l y 1 s p l a n . The m ore o b v io u s w ere h i s m i l i t a r y m ethods t o e s t a b l i s h t h e f e d e r a t i o n , h i s p r o p o s a l t o s e t up a "m ore e q u i t a b l e b a la n c e o f pow er" among t h e s t a t e s o f E u ro p e , and h i s a tte m p t t o c r e a t e a new s t a t u s quo in E u ropean p o l i t i c s and t o k e e p i t p erm an en t w ith o u t p r o v i s i o n s t o accom m odate u n f o r e s e e n d e v e lo p m e n ts . 37 S u l l y , op. c i t . . pp. 4 2 - 3 . A d d i t i o n a l d a t a on S u l l y 's C o u n c il may be fo u n d in A p pendix A, p a r s . 2 6 -9 . 92 On th e p o s i t iv e s id e o f S u l l y 's G reat D esign, how ever, r e l i g i o u s d if f e r e n c e s w ith in C hristendom w ere to be ac c e p te d and no lo n g e r to be a ca u se o f w ar. No s t a t e was to be a b le to dom inate Europe as in th e p a s t . Europe was to become a F e d e ra tio n o f f i f t e e n s t a t e s having "e q u a l r i g h t s and pow er," w herein th e r e would be no re aso n f o r envy o r f e a r o f th e o th e r s t a t e s no r cau se f o r w ar, and peace would th e re b y be a s s u re d in E urope. M oreover, th e G reat D esign was th e f i r s t p ro p o sa l to u n i te Europe su g g e ste d by an a b le m in is te r o f government and s ta te sm a n , who had a p r a c t i c a l knowledge o f European p o l i t i c s and who foresaw t h a t s t a t e s m ight be persuaded to u n ite f o r p o l i t i c a l and economic ad v an tag es even i f th ey co u ld no lo n g e r be persuaded by m oral a p p e a ls . ^®More e x te n s iv e a n a ly s e s o f th e pros and cons o f S u l ly 's G reat D esign may be found in Hemleben, op. c i t . . pp. 39-40; V. J . Lew is, "The P io n e e rs: X I .- - S u l l y ," The New Commonwealth. I I , no. 8 (May, 1934), 110; S ir John A. R. M a r r io tt, Commonwealth o r Anarchy? A Survey o f P r o je c ts o f Peace from th e S ix te e n th to th e T w e n tieth C entury (London: A lla n [1 9 3 7 ]), pp. 4 0 -1 , 4 7 -9 ; W alter A liso n P h i l l i p s , The C o n fe d e ra tio n o f Europe: A Study o f th e European A llia n c e . 1813-1823 as an Experim ent in I n t e r n a tio n a l O rg a n isa tio n o f P eace. 2d ed. (London: Longmans, G reen, 1920), pp. 22-3; David Ogg in h is I n tro d u c tio n to S u lly , op. c i t . . pp. 9-15; and S ta w e ll, op. c i t . . pp. 10- 5, 113-8, 138. However, S u lly 's Grand Design had l i t t l e chance o f s e rio u s c o n s id e ra tio n a t a tim e when h is su c c e sso rs in th e French m in is tr y , R ic h e lie u and M azarin, were p u rsu in g a s u c c e s s fu l p o lic y o f red u cin g th e power o f th e Habsburgs and expanding F rance in o rd e r to make h er supreme in Europe. B e sid e s, i t s appeal was g r e a tly overshadowed by th e T re aty o f W e stp h a lia, fo llo w in g th e T h irty Y ea rs' War. Under th e in flu e n c e o f Hugo G ro tiu s ' monumental study of th e r e l a ti o n s between n a tio n s , On th e Law of War and Peace (1625), u rg in g a r b i t r a t i o n and m ediation to p rev en t war, th e T re aty in au g u ra te d a new e ra of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law t h a t enabled th e n a t i o n - s t a t e s o f Europe, as so v ereig n and equal in t e r n a ti o n a l e n t i t i e s , to go t h e i r independent w ays. A lthough th e G reat Design was not a c c e p te d , i t "sowed th e seed o f an id ea which l a t e r th in k e rs e la b o ra te d O Q and d ev e lo p e d ." Rousseau f e l t "th e only reason fo r i t s 40 f a i l u r e was t h a t Europe was not r i p e f o r i t . " And W inston C h u rc h ill, a d d re ssin g th e in a u g u ra tio n of th e The European Movement, European Movement and th e C ouncil o f Europe (London: H utchinson [1 9 4 9 ]), p. 24. 94 p resen t-d ay European Movement a t the Hague Congress in May, 1948, d eclared : " 'A fte r t h i s long passage of y e a rs, we a re a l l th e serv a n ts of th e Grand D esig n .' F i f ty - f i v e years and th re e w a r s ^ a f t e r th e G reat Design f i r s t appeared, W illiam Penn, liv in g in re tire m e n t in England, f e l t j u s t i f i e d in p u b lish in g An Essay towards th e P resen t and Future Peace of Europe, by E stablishm ent of an European Dvet. P arliam ent, or E sta te s (1693). No doubt anim ated by h is Quaker c o n v ic tio n s, Penn a lso c re d ite d The G reat Design of Henry IV. which he g e n e ra lly approved, as a major fo reru n n er of h is own plan. In t r y ing to show Europeans th e way to peace through u n itin g , Penn b eliev ed th a t h is proposal fo r a Confederacy of th e sovereign s t a te s of Europe was a p r a c tic a l r a th e r than a ch im erica l plan. As pro of, he pointed to th e success of th e C onfederation of th e United Provinces of the N ether lands ^ T h e European Movement, l o c . c i t . ^ T h e War of D evolution (1667-68), th e Dutch War (1672-78), and th e War of th e League of Augsburg (1688-97). ^^W illiam Penn, An Essay towards th e P resent and F uture Peace of Europe ( F ir s t published in 1693-94. Wash ington: American Peace S o ciety , 1912), pp. 20-1. F u rth er 95 In Penn’s judgm ent, th e b e s t method to in s u re j u s t i c e in th e r e la t i o n s of th e n a ti o n - s t a t e s o f Europe was in some form o f C o n fed e ratio n , where th e i n te r n a l a f f a i r s o f each s t a t e were n o t in te r f e r e d w ith but where t h e i r e x te r n a l r e l a t i o n s were harmonized through "reason upon f r e e d e b a te ," reached by th e re p r e s e n ta tiv e s o f a l l m em ber-states in a European P a r li a m e n t.^ P enn's P a rlia m e n t, or " S ta te of E urope," was to meet a n n u a lly , or as n e c e ssa ry , in a c e n tr a l lo c a tio n of Europe. I t was to l e g i s l a t e f o r th e Confederacy or to s i t as a "Sovereign C ourt" whenever d is p u te s between m em ber-states could not be s e t t l e d through re g u la r methods o f diplomacy F inding i t d i f f i c u l t to a r r i v e a t a j u s t r e p r e s e n ta tio n in th e P arliam ent because o f th e in e q u a lity in d a ta on P enn's p r a c t ic a l background and j u s t i f i c a t i o n in proposing h is plan to Europeans and P ro fe sso r M a r r io tt 's a p p r a is a l of th e p r o je c t may be found in Appendix A, p a r s . 30-1, ^ I b i d . . pp. 3 -6 . Though Penn u ses th e word "Con f e d e ra tio n " throug hout h is e ssa y , h is p ro p o sals fo r th e European P arliam ent more c lo s e ly approxim ates a f e d e ra tio n . ^-*Ibid. , p. 6. For Penn's p ro v isio n f o r compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n and disarm am ent, see Appendix A, p a rs . 32-3. 96 s iz e and power of th e m em ber-states, Penn f i n a l l y proposed a re p re s e n ta tio n weighted upon th e t o t a l annual-revenue income of each s t a t e , and a t th e same tim e suggested th a t each s t a t e 's sh are of taxes fo r th e support of th e Con fed eracy should be determ ined on the same b a s is . A p re sid in g o f f ic e r was to be ro ta te d among th e re p re s e n ta tiv e s of th e m em ber-states; v o tin g was to be by s e c re t b a llo t w ith a th re e -fo u rth s vote re q u ire d fo r a d e c isio n ; and no a b ste n tio n or n e u t r a lit y in th e v o tin g was to be p e rm itte d . A ll com plaints as w ell as th e P arliam entary proceedings were to be in w ritin g and s a fe ly p reserv ed , and L atin or 46 French was to be th e o f f i c i a l language. In flu en ces of th e G reat Design can be seen in Penn's p lan; but many of h is proposals concerning o rg a n iz a tio n and procedure were advances over th o se of h is p red e c e s s o r s , and some have a modern rin g . B esides, Penn f o r e saw th e p o s s i b i li t y of in clu d in g R ussia and Turkey in h is P arliam ent of Europe. And on th e q u estio n of p re cedence of th e s t a t e s ' r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s , a r e a l concern to h is p re d e c e sso rs, Penn suggested: "to avoid Q uarrel fo r Precedency, th e Room may be Round, and have d iv e rs 46 Penn, op. c i t .. pp. 8-11. 97 i * 7 D oors t o come i n and go o u t a t , t o p r e v e n t e x c e p t i o n . " A n o th e r n o t a b l e d i f f e r e n c e in P e n n 's p la n was h i s a n t i c i p a t i o n o f p o s s i b l e o b j e c t i o n s t o some o f h i s p r o - AO p o s a l s and h i s d i r e c t m ethod o f a n s w e rin g them . ° To t h e m ost im p o r ta n t o b j e c t i o n t h a t t h e C o n fe d e ra c y w ould d e s t r o y t h e s o v e r e i g n t y o f P r i n c e s and S t a t e s , Penn d e c la r e d t h a t t h i s w ould n o t b e t r u e b e c a u s e They re m a in a s S o v e re ig n a t Home a s e v e r th e y w e re . N e i t h e r t h e i r Power o v e r t h e i r P e o p le , n o r t h e u s u a l R evenue th e y pay th em , i s d im in is h e d . So t h a t t h e S o v e r e ig n t i e s a r e a s th e y w e re , f o r n o n e o f them h av e now an y S o v e r e ig n ty o v e r one a n o t h e r : And i f t h i s b e c a l l e d a l e s s e n i n g o f t h e i r P ow er, i t m ust b e o n ly b e c a u s e t h e g r e a t F i s h can no lo n g e r e a t up t h e l i t t l e o n e s , and t h a t e a c h S o v e r e ig n ty i s e q u a l l y d e fe n d e d from I n j u r i e s , and d i s a b l e d from c o m m ittin g th e m .49 A f t e r r e f u t i n g t h e p o s s i b l e o b j e c t i o n s t o t h i s p la n , Penn s t r e s s e d e i g h t o r n in e a d v a n ta g e s t h a t w ould a c c r u e t o E u ro p e i f a C o n f e d e r a tio n w ere e s t a b l i s h e d . ^ Then ^ P e n n , o p . c i t . . p p . 9 -1 0 . ^®See A ppendix A, p a r . 3 4 , f o r two e x a m p le s. ^ P e n n , o p . c i t . . p . 13. 50 I b i d . , p p . 1 3 -8 . Two o f t h e a d v a n ta g e s t h a t Penn e n v is a g e d , g r e a t econom ic s a v in g s and g r e a t e r "E a se and S e c u r i t y o f T r a v e l and T r a f f i c k , " w ere n e v e r so w id e ly r e c o g n iz e d a s th e y a r e to d a y . 98 » drawing p a r a l l e l s between th e fam ily and th e s t a t e and th e n e c e s s ity o f d i s c i p l i n e and J u s t i c e to a s s u re h a r monious r e l a t i o n s among t h e i r members, Penn saw no reaso n why th e same p r in c ip le s could n o t govern th e C o n fed eratio n o f Europe. In f a c t , he b e lie v e d t h a t h is " S ta te of Europe" would not be d i f f i c u l t to e s t a b l i s h o r o p e ra te under th e s e g u id e l i n e s . But th e s o v e re ig n tie s of Europe, under th e s p e l l of n a tio n a lis m , p re fe rre d i n t e r n a tio n a l anarchy; and war c o n tin u e d . ^ P e n n , op. c i t . . pp. 3 -6 . For a d d itio n a l a n a ly ses o f P enn's p la n , see Hemleben, op. c i t . . pp. 47-53; and V. J . Lewis, "The P io n eers: X III.--W illia m Penn," The New Commonwealth. I I , no. 12 (Septem ber, 1934), 177. CHAPTER IV ANTECEDENTS OF THE EFFORTS TO UNITE EUROPE: 1700-1815 The e v o lu tio n o f I n te r n a tio n a l p o l i t i c s in Europe by th e e ig h te e n th c e n tu ry re v e a le d th e developm ent o f a d e f i n i t e system o f so v ere ig n s t a t e s . Problems o f p e rio d ic war and peace were now b e lie v e d b e s t re so lv e d through diplomacy and th e r e d re s s in g o f th e b alan c e of power, w ith o c c a s io n a l e f f o r t s to a p p ly , where p r a c t i c a l , p r in c ip le s o f th e Law o f N atio n s. The so v ereig n r ig h ts of s t a t e s (in essence th e r i g h t s o f th e monarchs) had become an e s ta b lis h e d d o c tr in e . And l ik e th e d o c tr in e o f th e f r e e dom o f th e in d iv id u a l t h a t was to develop l a t e r , i t was co n sid ered "sa c re d " and in v io la b le . U n ific a tio n P ro je c ts in th e Age o f Enlightenm ent Europe in th e e ig h te e n th c e n tu ry was a ls o e x p e r i encing a p e rio d o f g r e a t i n t e l l e c t u a l aw akening, c h a ra c te r iz e d by a q u e stio n in g o f a u th o r ity and a c r e a tiv e 100 I n t e r e s t In p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l a f f a i r s . As knowledge sp rea d a c ro s s n a tio n a l b o u n d a rie s, a sen se o f com nunity o f i n t e r e s t s became e v id e n t, and t h i s in s p ire d le a d e rs o f th o u g h t to f in d ways o f im proving th e l o t o f mankind. A greeing on th e need to e lim in a te th e inhuman i n s t i t u t i o n o f war and to e s t a b l i s h a l a s t i n g p eace, th ey d iv id e d o v er th e b e s t means by which to a t t a i n t h i s o b je c tiv e . A few b e lie v e d t h a t th e b e s t method to m a in ta in peace was to g e t th e heads o f th e European s t a t e s to u n i t e in to some form o f p o l i t i c a l u n io n . The majority'*' b e lie v e d t h a t th e e lim in a tio n of war and th e e sta b lish m e n t o f l a s t i n g peace would be r e a l i z e d , i f e v e r, only in th e d i s t a n t f u tu r e a f t e r th e m asses were s u f f i c i e n t l y e n lig h te n e d to change t h e i r p a s s iv e h a b its and to ta k e an a c t i v e p a r t in im proving s o c ie ty and p o l i t i c s . R ather th an w aste e n e r g ie s , t h e r e f o r e , on im p ra c tic a l u n ity p la n s fo r p eace, t h i s group d ir e c te d i t s l i t e r a r y e f f o r t s toward te a c h in g b e t t e r u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e purposes o f s o c ie ty , th e fu n c tio n o f le g a l a u t h o r i t y , and th e b ro th erh o o d of man. ^This group claim ed among o th e rs th e s e o u tsta n d in g men: F en elo n , L e ib n itz , M ontesquieu, Rousseau, V o lta ir e , C o n d o rcet, D 'A lem bert, D id e ro t, and D 'H olbach. 101 The a b i l i t y o f t h i s l a t t e r group to g a in a g r e a t e r o au d ien c e so g r e a t ly overshadowed th e a u th o rs o f European u n ity p la n s t h a t such p ro p o sa ls came to be looked upon as im p r a c tic a l. In f a c t , men o f a f f a i r s and " e n lig h te n e d d e sp o ts" found i t fa s h io n a b le in th e name of "Reason" to r i d i c u l e th e w r i t e r s o f "peace p la n s" as p a c i f i s t s or v i s io n a r ie s and to encourage th e c y n ic a l c r i t i c i s m of 3 t h e i r p ro p o s a ls . F u rth erm o re, i t became r e s p e c ta b le f o r th e r u l e r s o f t h a t day to g iv e l i p s e r v ic e to th e te a c h in g s o f th e w r it e r s o f en lig h ten m en t and to b o a st o f th e p ro g r e s s iv e w e ll-b e in g o f t h e i r s u b je c ts through newly adopted p a t e r n a l i s t i c re fo rm s. Undaunted by th e p ro s p e c ts of r i d i c u l e and r e j e c t i o n , an o c c a s io n a l "peace w r ite r " h eld to th e m in o rity 2 A c tu a lly , so s i g n i f i c a n t were th e combined e f f o r t s o f t h i s group t h a t t h e i r c e n tu ry came to be known as th e "Age o f Reason o r E n lig h te n m e n t." 3 One e x c e p tio n was th e econom ist and French s t a t e s man T u rg o t, who, a lth o u g h he never w ro te a p la n , en v isag ed th e p o s s i b i l i t y o f th e e lim in a tio n o f war th rou gh th e g ra d u a l f e d e r a tio n o f th e s t a t e s o f Europe in to one E uro pean Union. See Ross Hoffman, The G reat R epublic; A H i s t o r i c a l View o f th e I n te r n a t io n a l Community and th e O rg a n iz a tio n o f Peace (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942), p. 34; and Souleyman, op. c i t . . p. 171. 102 view in th e hope t h a t h is l i t e r a r y e f f o r t s f o r peace and i t s l o g i c a l lo n g -ra n g e ad v an tag es m ight convince th e r u l e r s o f Europe to u n i t e t h e i r c o u n tr ie s i n t o a s in g le s t a t e o f Europe. The f i r s t o f th e s e "peace w r i t e r s " in t h i s p erio d was John B e l l e r s , an E n g lish Q uaker, b e t t e r known f o r h is p h ila n th ro p h y in e d u c a tio n and in h o s p i ta l and p riso n refo rm . D uring th e War o f th e S panish S u ccessio n he d r a f te d h is p ro p o s a l, u s u a lly c i t e d by i t s sh o rten e d t i t l e , Some Reasons f o r an European S ta te . . . (1710). The in flu e n c e o f th e G reat D esign o f Henry IV and P enn's P ro je c t can be seen in th e g e n e ra l s i m i l a r i t y o f p ro p o s a ls , b u t B e lle r s su g g ested one im p o rtan t d if f e r e n c e : Europe was to be d iv id e d in to about one hundred eq u al p ro v in ce s o r d i s t r i c t s . ^ B e lle r s found i n s p i r a t i o n in h is p ro p o sa l f o r a S ta te of Europe from th e u n i f i c a t i o n o f th e E n g lis h , I r i s h , S c o t t is h , and Welsh kingdoms in to one government and saw no re a so n why a s im ila r p o l i t i c a l union could n o t be 4 John B e l l e r s , Some Reasons f o r an European S ta te . . . (London: [S o w le], 1710), as c i t e d by V. J . Lewis in "The P io n e e rs: X IV .--John B e l l e r s ," The New Commonwealth. I l l , no. 2 (O ctober, 1934), 197. 103 made on th e c o n tin e n t.-* At th e p eace c o n fe re n c e en d in g th e War o f th e S p a n ish S u c c e s s io n , B e l l e r s p ro p o sed t h a t th e s t a t e s in v o lv e d in th e w ar, as w e ll a s th e n e u t r a l c o u n t r i e s , sh o u ld j o i n in a t r e a t y o f " U n iv e rs a l G u a ra n te e " f o r th e s i n g l e S t a t e o f E urope. They sh o u ld th e n c r e a t e "an a n n u a l C ongress o r P a rlia m e n t" and draw up "su ch a r t i c l e s a s would be n e c e s s a ry f o r th e c r e a t i o n o f a s ta n d in g European la w ," o r C o n s t i t u t i o n ,^ f o r E u ro p e 's one h undred p r o v in c e s . Each p ro v in c e was t o be so m eth in g l i k e a P a rlia m e n ta ry c o n s titu e n c y o r d i s t r i c t w ith th e s m a lle s t s o v e r e ig n ty c o m p risin g a t l e a s t one such d i s t r i c t and th e l a r g e r s o v e r e i g n ti e s h av in g a number p r o p o r t i o n a te t o t h e i r s i z e . ^ B e l l e r s had g r e a t f a i t h in th e p re v a le n c e o f "R eason" and b e lie v e d t h a t i t would g u id e th e P a rlia m e n t o f Europe in re a c h in g j u s t d e c i s i o n s . Assuming t h a t th e ^A. R uth F ry , John B e l l e r s . 1654-1725: Q u ak e r. E con om ist, and S o c ia l R eform er (London and T o ro n to : C a s s e ll [1 9 3 5 ] ) , p . 91; L ew is, l o c . c i t . ^ I b i d . , pp. 9 1 -2 ; L ew is, lo c . c i t . ^ I b i d . . pp. 9 2 -3 ; L ew is, lo c . c i t . 104 m ajo rity of th e members of the P arliam ent would not be in te re s te d in the d is p u te , he reasoned th a t they would be more disposed to nth a t s id e which hath most reason w ith i t . " 8 On the o th er hand, B e lle rs a ls o suggested a u n ite d European m ilita ry fo rc e . Each d i s t r i c t was "to r a is e a thousand men, or money or ships of equal value or charge 9 . . . or any o th er number th a t may be thought b e s t ." In th is way the c o n trib u tio n of each m em ber-sovereignty would be in p ropo rtion to i t s re p re s e n ta tio n in th e P arliam ent. A fter establishm ent of th e u n ited m ilita r y fo rc e , each member-sovereignty was to be lim ite d in the number of i t s own m ilita ry fo rc e s , fo r w arring on neighboring s ta te s would no longer be n ecessary . To the p o ssib le o b jectio n th a t p rin ces and S ta te s would lo se t h e i r so v ereig n ty and s ta tu s by jo in in g the " S ta te of Europe," B e lle rs answered much more b lu n tly than Penn: "The u n lim ited w ill of monarchs to invade th e i r neighbours is no more a p riv ile g e to them than i t would Q B e lle rs , op. c i t . [ n . p . ] , as quoted by Lewis, lo c. c i t . 9 Loc. c i t . 105 be fo r t h e i r s u b je c ts to have l i b e r t y to d e stro y each o th e r. . . ."10 Although B e lle r s ' p ro je c t was never s e rio u s ly con s id e re d , subsequent h is to r y has proved c o r r e c t h is d i s cernment th a t peace in Europe w ithout disarmament was l i t t l e more than a truce**- and th a t genuine peace was im possible in a d is u n ite d Europe. Moreover, one of B e lle r s ' c o n c re te su g g e stio n s, a u n ite d European army, was to become an acknowledged n e c e s s ity in th e 1950's and was a c tu a lly attem pted through th e EDC and th e W EU. In 1713, th e Abbe de S a in t- P ie r r e published h is 12 P ro le t pour re n d re la paix p e rp ^ tu e lle en Europe (2 vols .) L The idea f o r S t. P i e r r e 's European Union of S ta te s emerged from h is fa v o ra b le im pression of th e G reat Design of Henry IV and th e su c c e ss fu l o p e ra tio n of th e fe d e ra l unions of th e Germans, th e Dutch, and th e Swiss. His d ir e c t experience gained as one of th e French diplom atic * ^ B e lle rs, op. c i t . [n.p.], as quoted by Lewis, lo c . c i t . **Fry, op. c i t .. p. 94. 1 7 S a i n t- P ie r r e 's p u b lic a tio n s on la s tin g peace through European Union have had re v is io n and s e v e ra l e d i tio n s . The ex p lan a tio n o f t h i s is s u f f i c i e n t l y d e ta ile d to w arrant treatm en t s e p a ra te ly in Appendix B, p a rs. 1-3. 106 s e c r e t a r i e s a t th e U tre ch t Peace C onference of 1713 a ls o 13 encouraged him to p u b lish h is p r o je c t. In a tte m p tin g to prove E u ro p e's need f o r a perma n ent union o f S ta te s and th e soundness o f h is p ro p o s a ls , S a in t- P ie r r e p o in ted out t h a t th e S ta te s o f Europe had not y e t formed a permanent s o c ie ty nor e s ta b lis h e d "a permanent T rib u n a l, bo th to se c u re th e ex ecu tio n o f t h e i r p a st agreem ents and to r e g u la te w ith o u t war t h e i r fu tu re claim s and d i s p u t e s . To emphasize t h i s in te r n a t i o n a l w eakness, S a in t- P ie r r e d e c la re d : U su ally t r e a t i e s a re m erely c o lle c tio n s of m utual prom ises. But we have, so f a r , no perma nent s o c ie ty s u f f i c i e n t l y pow erful and s u f f i c i e n t l y in te r e s te d in th e ex e cu tio n of th e s e prom ises. Each o f th e p a r ti e s can w ith im punity exempt him s e l f from th e observance o f them, acco rd in g as he fin d s i t to h is i n t e r e s t to observe them o r not 13 As a r e s u l t o f F ra n c e 's d e fe a t in th e War of th e Spanish S u ccessio n , England emerged as a n a tio n a l power in C o n tin e n ta l a f f a i r s , and P ru ss ia ro se to prom inence. For a d d itio n a l m o tiv a tio n o f S a in t- P ie r r e p r io r to h is work a t th e U tre ch t C onference, see Appendix B, p a r. 4. 14 C. I . C a s te l de S a in t- P ie r r e , Abbot of T iro n , S e le c tio n s from th e second e d itio n o f th e Abr^ge/ du P ro le t de Paix P e r p d tu e lle . 1738, in The G ro tiu s S o ciety P u b lic a tio n s : T exts f o r S tu d en ts of I n te r n a tio n a l R e la tio n s . No. 5; t r a n s l a t e d by H. Hale B e llo t, w ith an In tro d u c tio n by Paul C o llin e t (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1927), p. 20. 107 to observe them. So t h a t , without a general a llia n c e , th e re is no complete s e c u rity . To c o rre c t th is s itu a tio n and to bring la s tin g peace to Europe, S a in t-P ie rre proposed a p erp etu al Union of the C h ristia n Sovereigns--m aintained w ithin the fro n t i e r s assigned to them--by the Treaty of U trecht through a formal d e c l a r a t i o n . ^ Although th is Union in i t s incep tio n was to be a voluntary a llia n c e , a f t e r i t was once e s ta b lis h e d , S a in t-P ie rre proposed th a t membership be compulsory and permanent, otherw ise the la s tin g peace of Europe might be broken by some uncooperative S t a t e . ^ ^ S a i n t - P i e r r e , 1738 e d ., B ellot t r a n s l . , o p. c i t ., p. 22. ^ T h i s d e c la ra tio n was to be solemnized by the signing of a tr e a ty , c o n sistin g of Fundamental A rtic le s (explained in Appendix B, p ars. 1-3) which were to serve as the c o n s titu tio n a l framework of the new European Union. *^Aware th a t s ta te s would strong ly object to s u r render of p a rt of t h e i r sovereignty to a perpetual European Union and th a t these o b jectio n s would prevent favorable co n sid eratio n of h is plan fo r la s tin g peace, S a in t-P ie rre argued in g re a t d e t a i l and w ith logic th a t th e re would be l i t t l e or no loss of sovereignty r e a lly in re lin q u ish in g a s t a t e 's so le dependence on i t s own armies to s e t t l e in te rn a tio n a l d isp u tes compared w ith the su p erio r p ro te c tio n of the European Union; see pp. 38-43 in h is 1738 e d ., B ello t t r a n s l . , op. c i t .. for h is exp lan ations. Also see, i b i d . . pp. 24-6 and 31-3, fo r the tr e a ty provisions ( F ir s t Fundamental A rtic le ) to e s ta b lis h the Union and his explanations fo r securing and m aintaining permanent m em ber-states. 108 In h is 1713 e d i t i o n , S a i n t - P i e r r e had s e t f o r t h in r a t h e r p r e c is e d e t a i l th e U nion's o r g a n iz a tio n a l and p ro c e d u ra l re g u la tio n s ,* ® bu t in h is abridged e d itio n s he co n sid ered i t w ise r and le s s presumptuous on h is p a r t to leav e them out and to l e t th e Union Assembly evolve them 1 Q as needed. He did b e l i e v e , however, t h a t i t was e sse n tia l in h is abridged e d itio n to s t i p u l a t e th e method of sh a rin g th e u n io n 's f i n a n c i a l expenses by each m em ber-state (Fundamental A r t i c l e I I ) ; to s p e c ify th e procedures fo r m ain ta in in g th e peace o f th e Union (Fundamental A r t i c l e I I I ) ; and to p rovid e f o r c a rry in g out th e r e g u la tio n s and *®To be found in h is o r i g i n a l tw elve Fundamental A r t i c l e s and e ig h t Im portant and e ig h t U seful A r t i c l e s in S a i n t - P i e r r e , C harles Irdnde C a s te l, Abbd de, A P ro je c t fo r S e t t l i n g an E v e r la s tin g Peace . . . (London: Watts [1714], [no pages g iv e n ], as quoted by E liz a b e th V. S ouley- man in The V ision o f World Peace in S eventeenth and E ig h t eenth-C entury France (New York: Putnam' s [ c . 1941]), pp. 81-90. 19 This was provided in th e F i f t h Fundamental A r t i c l e o f h is ab rid g ed e d i t i o n th u s: th e Union d e le g a te s s h a l l r e g u la te by a p l u r a l i t y v o te a l l a r t i c l e s "which may be n e c e ssa ry and im p ortan t to procu re to th e grand a l l i ance more coherence, more s e c u r i t y , and a l l o th e r p o s s ib le a d v a n ta g e s ." However, n o th in g in th e f iv e Fundamental A r t i c l e s s h a l l ever be "changed w ith o u t th e unanimous con sent o f a l l th e A l l i e s . " See S a i n t - P i e r r e , 1783 e d ., B e llo t t r a n s l . , op. c i t . . p. 29. _Cf. League of N ations and United N ations. 109 d ec isio n s of the Union by i t s u n ited m ilita r y fo rc e (Funda- 2 0 m ental A r tic le IV ). Another problem which S a in t- P ie r r e considered e s s e n ti a l to th e success of the Union and th e maintenance of la s tin g peace was freedom of fo re ig n tra d e among Euro pean S ta te s . T herefore, he proposed th a t a l l m em ber-states agree to "The A r tic le s of Foreign Commerce," which were to be re g u la te d by the G eneral Assembly and which were to guarantee among o th e r p ro vision s no import or export taxes by any S ta te , no p r e f e r e n ti a l tre a tm e n t, and e q u a lity 21 of a l l to be ab le to buy or s e l l anywhere in the Union. As viewed in the li g h t of th e advances in i n t e r n a tio n a l p o l i t i c s and th e experiences of the tw e n tie th ^ S a i n t - P i e r r e , 1738 e d ., B e llo t t r a n s l . , op. c i t .. pp. 26-9. A r ti c l e I I I , moreover, proposed th e re n u n c ia tio n fo re v e r o f th e r e s o r t to arms to s e t t l e in te r n a tio n a l d if f e r e n c e s . In ste a d , m ediation by th e Union Assembly was o b lig a to ry ; and i f u n su c c e ssfu l, a r b i t r a t i o n was com p u lso ry . See Appendix B, p a rs. 5-6, concerning S a in t- P i e r r e ^ plan of in sp ectio n and c o n tro l to m aintain disarm am ent. 21 S a in t-P ie rre [C harles Ir^nde C a s t e l ] , L'Abbe de, "Fundamental A r t i c l e VII and E x p lan atio n ," in Proof-copy [o f the 1713 e d itio n of Paix p e r p d tu e lle . lo cated in the Rare Book C o lle c tio n of th e World A ff a irs L ib rary , Uni v e r s ity of Southern C a lif o r n ia , Los A ngeles], 2 vo ls. [ n .p .: E. P. Goldschmidt, n . d . ] ) , I , 304-8. 110 ce n tu ry , one fin d s more substance in S a in t- P ie r r e 's p ro posals to u n ite Europe in the e a rly eig h teen th century than has g e n e ra lly been r e a liz e d . There were, of course, weaknesses in h is plan, as various c r i t i c s in the e i g h t eenth and n in e te e n th c e n tu rie s had pointed out. But most of the c r it i c i s m of h is day was of a cy n ical or p re ju d i c i a l n a tu re , as many considered i t the scheme of an im p ra c tic a l v isio n a ry , w hile men in public a f f a i r s d i s lik e d th e presumptuousness of the man because he had en tered a f i e l d which they considered t h e i r p riv a te b u s i n ess. Under th ese circum stances, both S a in t-P ie rre and h is p ro je c t became popular ta r g e ts of r i d i c u l e . F rederick the Great ty p if ie d the a t t i t u d e of sovereigns toward h is plan in t h is manner: "The Abb^ de S a in t-P ie rre has sent me an e x c e lle n t t r e a t i s e on the means of r e s to r in g peace to a l l Europe and on th e manner of preserving i t c o n tin u a lly . The thing is exceedingly p r a c t ic a l , nor is anything wanting fo r i t s accomplishment except the consent of a l l Europe and some other such t r i f l e s . "^2 22 As quoted by S ir John A. R. M arriott [no c i t a t i o n given] in h is Commonwealth or Anarchy? A Survey of P ro je c ts of Peace from th e S ixteenth to the Twentieth Century (London: A llan [1937]), pp. 65-6. I l l F rench M in is te r F le u ry , who re g a rd e d S a i n t - P i e r r e as a " tire s o m e and d i s t u r b i n g a g i t a t o r , " more o r le s s r e p r e s e n te d th e f e e l i n g o f government o f f i c i a l s toward h is p r o j e c t In th e s e words: "A dm irable! Save f o r one om is s io n ; I fin d no p ro v is io n f o r sendin g m is s io n a r ie s to c o n v e rt th e h e a r t o f p r i n c e s . V o l t a i r e is s a id to have d i s l i k e d S a i n t - P i e r r e ex trem ely and t o have r e f e r r e d to A * h i s peace p lan as im p r a c tic a b le . Even L e ib n itz was b e lie v e d to have th o u g h t of h i s method o f a t t a i n i n g l a s t i n g peace as u to p ia n ; n o te th e fo llo w in g s ta te m e n t, f r e q u e n tly quoted o ut o f c o n t e x t : I have seen som ething of th e p lan o f M. de S a i n t - P i e r r e f o r th e m aintenance o f an e v e r l a s t i n g peace in Europe. I t rem inds me o f a m otto on a g ra v e , pax p e r p e tu a : f o r th e dead f i g h t n o t; b u t th e l i v i n g a r e o f a n o th e r tem per, and th e most pow erful have l i t t l e r e s p e c t f o r c o u r t s .25 23 As quo ted by M a rr io tt [no c i t a t i o n given] in o p . c i t . . p. 66. 24 . C o l l i n e t b I n tr o d u c tio n to S a i n t - P i e r r e , 1738 ed. B e llo t t r a n s l . , op. c i t .. p. 8; and Souleyman, o p . c i t . , pp. 11-4. 25 As quoted from L e i b n i t z 1 p r i v a t e o p in io n to G rim arest in 1715 by Paul C o l li n e t in h i s In tro d u c tio n t o i b i d . . pp. 7 -8 . However, C o l li n e t adds: "The humorous, i f grim , com parison o f th e g r e a t s c h o la r has become famous, b u t i t has s u f f e r e d a t th e hands o f th o s e who have 112 More o b je c tiv e c r i t i c s of S a i n t - P i e r r e 's p ro je c t have c a ll e d a t t e n t i o n to th e a u th o r 's n a iv e te in b e lie v in g th a t th e more powerful sovereig ns would know t h e i r tr u e i n t e r e s t s and be w illin g to s u rre n d e r c e r t a i n of t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l sovereign p re ro g a tiv e s to a European Union fo r th e id e a l of la s t i n g peace. Others have doubted the o b j e c t i v i t y and statesm an sh ip of th e d e le g a te s th a t were to assem ble in th e European Congress. They questioned w hether th e s e d e le g a te s would r e a l l y be f r e e to d e l i b e r a t e and judge w ith reason and j u s t i c e or whether they would m erely be a g e n ts , bound to th e d i c t a t e s of t h e i r sov ereign monarchs. I f th e Union were e s ta b lis h e d and th e d e le g a te s were not f r e e a g e n ts, such c r i t i c s m aintained, th e European Assembly could accom plish l i t t l e more than 26 what th e more powerful so vereign s w ille d . quoted i t . . . th e m otto on a grave becomes . . . in Kant, a n o th er p ro ta g o n is t of e v e r la s tin g peace, th e sign of an in n ." F u rth e r c l a r i f i c a t i o n of Leibnitz* r e a l f e e l ings toward S a i n t - P i e r r e 's P ro je c t by V. J . Lewis is given in Appendix B, p ar. 7. For James L orim er's comments on th e u n fo rtu n a te e f f e c t o f S a i n t - P i e r r e 's choice of the word " p e rp e tu a l" in h is peace p la n , see Appendix B, p ar. 8. 26 °A more d e t a il e d exam ination of th e c r it i c i s m s of S a i n t - P i e r r e 's plan w ith numerous c i t a t i o n s may be found in S y lv e s te r John Hemleben, Plans fo r World Peace through Six C en tu ries (Chicago: U n iv e rsity o f Chicago Press [c . 1943]), pp. 66-72. 113 More re c e n t c r i t i c s have pointed out d e fe c ts in S a i n t - P i e r r e 1s prop osals fo r th e Union to punish th e r e c a l c i t r a n t or ag g resso r S ta te , in th a t he did n o t p ro vide fo r a stan d in g army permanently under th e immediate c o n tro l o f th e U n io n .^ S t i l l o th e rs have a tta c k e d h is plan to p e rp e tu a te th e s ta tu s quo, as determ ined by th e T reaty of U tre c h t, and to fo rb id a l l changes in clu d in g 28 p eacefu l ones. ° Turning to th e more p o s itiv e sid e of S a in t- P i e r r e ’s p r o j e c t, one fin d s t h a t , u n lik e th o se of h is p red ecesso rs which were confined more or le s s to g e n e r a l i t i e s , S a i n t - P i e r r e 's plan showed c o n sid e ra b le in s ig h t in to in t e r n a t i o n a l o rg a n iz a tio n and o ffe re d d e ta ile d and p r a c t i c a l o p e ra tio n a l procedures through a form al c o n s t i t u t io n . Not only have c e r t a i n of h is p ro posals had 27 This is a v a lid c r i t i c i s m ; but compared w ith th e development of i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rg a n iz a tio n , then and now, t h i s c r i t i c i s m lo se s much of i t s re le v a n c e , fo r an e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l army was a ls o lacking in th e League of Nations a f t e r two hundred years of human p ro g re ss, remains to be seen in th e United N atio n s, and s t i l l is an o b je c t i v e of stu d e n ts of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and o rd e r; c f . EDC, WEU, and NATO. 28 A comparison of th e s t a t u s quo under th e plans of S a in t- P ie r r e and S u lly as w e ll as S a i n t - P i e r r e ’s reaso n in g and R ousseau's stro n g o p p o sitio n to him on t h i s p o in t may be found in Appendix B, p a rs. 9-11. 114 g r e a te r In flu en ce on modern p o l i t i c a l thought than is commonly recognized, but they a ls o have had a d e f i n i t e r e la tio n s h ip w ith th e progress of i n te r n a tio n a l law and a r b i t r a t i o n and must be reckoned w ith in th e f u r th e r advancement of i n te r n a tio n a l o rg a n iz a tio n . As to Europe i t s e l f , a renowned n in e te e n th - century j u r i s t saw the im plementation of th e main fe a tu re s of S a i n t - P i e r r e 's p ro je c t t r i e d in th e Germanic Confedera- 29 tio n of 1815. A European h i s t o r i a n has pointed out th a t h is plan in sp ire d Alexander 1 to attem pt i t in h is Holy A llia n c e , and th a t i t served as a b a s is of procedure which the C o n tin en tal Powers endeavored to follow in th e re c o n s tru c tio n of Europe a f t e r 1814 in the name of the Concert of Europe. A French j u r i s t of t h i s century found p resen t v a l i d i t y in th e p ro je c t fo r avoiding war and m aintaining 29 Henry Wheaton, H istory of th e Law of Nations in Europe and America: from the E a r li e s t Times to th e T reaty of Washington. 1842 (New York: Gould, Banks, 1845), p. 263. ^^H/alter A lliso n P h i l l i p s , The C onfederation of Europe: A Study of th e European A llia n c e . 1813-1823 as an Experiment in the In te r n a tio n a l O rganization of Peace (London: Longmans, Green, 1920), pp. 24, 27, and 34-5. 115 peace among natio ns w ith re sp e c t to th re e e s s e n tia l e l e ments, which S a in t-P ie rre prescrib ed and which s t i l l obtain today: (1) an o b lig ato ry and permanent system of in te r n a tio n a l a r b i t r a t i o n , accepted by each S ta te , and imposed upon th e r e c a l c i t r a n t ; (2) an i n t e r n a tio n a l a r b i t r a l trib u n a l; (3) an in te rn a tio n a l armed force which s h a ll secure re sp e c t fo r the d ecisio n s of th is t r i b u n a l . 31 This same j u r i s t a ls o pointed out th a t S ain t- P i e r r e 's system was, "more or le ss com pletely, the b asis of the Convenant" of the League of N ations, and th a t the g re a t d iffe re n c e between the plan of S a in t-P ie rre and th a t of th e Covenant, "which made everyone b eliev e th a t General Smuts and P resident Wilson were [ i t s ] c r e a to rs , when they were merely unconscious im ita to r s ," was th a t the l a t t e r sought to e s ta b lis h a "Grand A llian ce of the peoples of Paul C o llin e t in h is Introduction to S ain t- P i e r r e 's 1738 e d ., B ello t t r a n s l . , op. c i t .. p. 9. Regard ing th ese th re e e s s e n t i a l s , C o llin e t adds th is c l a r i f i c a tio n : "A system of th is kind was conceived by one of the most learned i n te r n a t i o n a l i s t s of the n in eteen th century, Pasquale F io re, the author of The Sanction of In te rn a tio n a l Law, and everyone gave him c r e d it fo r a serio u s and w e ll- considered scheme. With a l i t t l e tro u b le i t can be seen th a t F io r e 's plan i s th a t of . . . S a in t-P ie rre , and yet th e forerunner is tre a te d as a ra sh adventurer, and almost an im poster." 116 the w orld," while S a in t-P ie rre proposed to form a Grand 32 A llian ce of only the sovereigns of Europe. The d u r a b ility of S a in t- P ie r r e 's ideas fo r the fu tu re peace and u n ity of Europe may be more re a d ily seen in a summarization of h is p rin c ip a l proposals: (1) forma tio n of a Union of S tates by formal tr e a ty ; (2) a w ritte n c o n s titu tio n and by-law s, w ith amending procedures; (3) guaranteeing of e x is tin g boundaries; (4) freedom of tra d e among European S ta te s ; (5) abolishment of se c re t diplomacy; (6) ren u n ciatio n of war as an instrum ent of n a tio n a l p olicy ; (7) c o n tro l and inspection of disarmament; (8) o b lig ato ry mediation and a r b it r a ti o n ; and (9) a united European m ilita ry fo rce to execute i t s decisons and to in su re i t s s e c u rity . The d ir e c t in flu en ce of S a in t- P ie r r e 's plan fo r a 33 permanent European union can be found in an anonymous 32 C o llin e t in h is Introd uctio n to S a in t- P ie r r e 's 1738 e d ., B ello t t r a n s l . , op. c i t .. pp. 9-10. I t might, however, be added th a t the League of Nations Covenant lacked two of S a in t- P ie r r e 's major p ro v isio n s, a u nited m ilita ry fo rce and nonwithdrawal of m em ber-states, both of which might have made th e League a more e f f e c tiv e organiza tio n fo r in te rn a tio n a l u n ity . 33 P u b lic is ts freq u en tly c i t e L eibnitz and Cardinal A lberoni, two i n f l u e n t i a l th in k ers of S a in t- P ie r r e 's day, fo r th e i r ideas on re s to r in g the peace and u n ity of 117 p r o j e c t f o r th e f e d e r a t i o n o f a l l th e s t a t e s o f Europe, p u b lis h e d in 1 7 4 5 . ^ T his unknown w r i t e r m a in ta in e d t h a t t h e r e were j u s t two ways to p re v e n t war in Europe: (1) " t o b re a k up th e power o f th e s tr o n g e r . . . " and (2) " to s tr e n g th e n th e w eaker, a p r i n c i p l e u n d e rly in g a l l f e d e r a - Q C t i o n s and leag u es o f s t a t e s . " The l a t t e r method was th e k ey n o te o f h i s p la n . He s tr o n g ly opposed th e p r i n c i p l e o f b a la n c e o f power to keep th e peace s in c e p a s t h i s t o r y had proved i t an u n s ta b le arran g em en t. Nor could i t be o th e rw is e , f o r i t was based on th e f a l s e prem ise of " a l l i e s o f e q u a l f o r c e , a l l i e s upon whom one may r e l y , who would n o t be le d a s t r a y by j e a l o u s y , a m b itio n , and th e t h i r s t fbr vengeance. It may have p r o te c te d sm all s t a t e s from p ow erful ones a t tim e s , "but i t has no f u t u r e , w h ile Europe. The g i s t o f t h e i r s u g g e s tio n s may be found in Appendix B, p a r s . 12-3. Anonymous, P r o le t d 'u n Nouveau Svsteme de 1 'E uro pe, p r ^ f d r a b l e au Syst&me de 1 ^ q u i l i b r e e n t r e la Maison de F rance e t c e l l e d 'A u t r i c h e . s . 1 ( [ MUnchen: K .b .B ], 1745). M LA R otograph, No. 471 (W ashington: L ib ra ry o f C o n g re ss), 30 s h e e ts . O C I b i d . [ n . p . ] , as c i t e d by Souleyman in op. c i t . . p. 93. 36 Anonymous [ P r o j e c t o f 1745], i b i d . [ n . p . ] , as c i t e d by Souleyman, in op. c i t . . p. 95. 118 an organization based upon the fe d e ra tio n p rin c ip le is f u l l of promise and cannot f a i l to win the adherence of one nation a f t e r the o th er. Two decades l a t e r , a German p u b l i c is t, Jakob H. von L ilie n fe ld , se t fo rth h is proposals fo r the peace and u n ity of Europe in his Neues S taats GebHude (1767). A fter presenting the causes and e f fe c t of war, von L ilie n fe ld advocated the establishm ent of a European Parliam ent, an in te rn a tio n a l Court to s e t t l e the d isp u tes between Sovereigns, and a un ited m ilita ry force to back up adher ence to i t s d ec isio n s. The m ilita ry ascendency and p re s tig e of P russia in the Germanies and the p a t e r n a l is ti c reforms of F rederick the Great overshadowed von L ilie n - f e l d 's book, which was scarcely considered o u tside of i n t e l l e c t u a l c ir c le s in Europe.^® ■^Anonymous [P ro jec t of 1745], o p . c i t . [ n . p . ] , as c ite d by Souleyman, in lo c . c i t . The fa c t th a t the author of th is p ro je c t concealed h is id e n tity may be evidence of the temper of h is time. R ealizing th a t h is suggested Euro pean Union was f a r in advance of h is day, and conceivably since he was one of the leading th in k e rs of th is period, he apparently d esired to escape the abuse and scorn th a t was heaped on S a in t-P ie rre . 38 Jak[ob] H. von L ilie n fe ld , Neues S taats GebHude (Leipzig: B reit Kopf, 1767), c ite d as the "New C o n stitu tio n of S ta te s" [ n .p .] , by The European Movement in Euro pean Movement and the Council of Europe (London: Hutchin son [ 19451); P. 28. --------------------------- 119 Not u n t i l 1782 d i d t h e n e x t t r e a t i s e on u n i t i n g E u ro p e a p p e a r . T h is was R o u s s e a u 's CE x t r a i t d u l P r o l e t d e p a i x p e r p ^ t u e l l e [ de M. l'A b b d d e S a i n t P i e r r e (1761) ] e t 39 J u g e m e n t. Some o f R o u sseau s c o n v i c t i o n s on w ar and p e a c e , e x p r e s s e d in h i s e a r l i e r w ork on The S t a t e o f War ( w r i t t e n som etim e b e tw e e n 1 7 5 3 -5 8 ) w e re p r e s e n t e d , o f c o u r s e , in h i s e d i t i o n o f S a i n t - P i e r r e ' s P r o j e c t t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e arg u m e n t t h a t a f e d e r a t i o n o f E u ro p e a n s t a t e s was t h e b e s t rem edy t o e l i m i n a t e w ar.^® 39 A f t e r a g e n e r a t i o n o f p e a c e f o l l o w i n g t h e T r e a t y o f U t r e c h t , w ar had b ee n resu m ed in 1733 and h a d c o n t i n u e d a lm o s t u n i n t e r r u p t e d l y u n t i l 1783. In 1 75 6, a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e Seven Y e a r s ' W ar, Mably and a few o t h e r p e r s o n s i n t e r e s t e d i n some w o r k a b le p l a n f o r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f p e rm a n e n t p e a c e u r g e d R o u sse a u t o e d i t S a i n t - P i e r r e ' s p o n d e ro u s w ork on P e r p e t u a l P e a c e t o e n a b l e t h e t r u e v a l u e o f t h e A b b d 's p l a n t o becom e m ore w i d e ly known. A f t e r a t e d i o u s t a s k , e x t e n d i n g o v e r some s i x y e a r s , R o u sse a u com p o se d an a b s t r a c t o f S a i n t - P i e r r e ' s p r o j e c t in 1761, b u t n o t u n t i l s i x y e a r s a f t e r t h e d e a t h o f R o u sse a u was h i s t o t a l e f f o r t o f c l a r i f i c a t i o n and e v a l u a t i o n o f S a i n t - P i e r r e ' s p la n made known upon i t s p u b l i c a t i o n i n 1782. F o r f u r t h e r c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f t h i s p u b l i c a t i o n an d i t s t h r e e m ost r e c e n t E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n s , s e e A p p e n d ix B, p a r . 14. 40 See J e a n J a c q u e s R o u s s e a u , A L a s t i n g P e a c e thr-nnfyh t h e F e d e r a t i o n o f E u ro p e and The S t a t e o f War r E x t r a i t du P ro le t: d e p a i x p e r p ^ t u e l l e d e . . . S a i n t - P i e r r e . . . (1 7 6 1 )] ( t r a n s l . and I n t r o d u c t i o n s by C. E. V aughan; London: C o n s t a b l e , 1 9 1 7 ), p p . 1 2 7 -8 , an d V a u g h a n 's I n t r o d u c t i o n t o R o u s s e a u 's The S t a t e o f W ar, i b i d . . p p . 1 1 4 -9 , f o r h i s a rg u m e n ts a g a i n s t w a r. F o r R o u s s e a u 's s t a t e m e n t s u p p o r t i n g S a i n t - P i e r r e ' s p l a n t o f e d e r a t e t h e s t a t e s o f E u ro p e , s e e A p p en d ix B, p a r . 15. 120 To a s s u r e th e su ccess o f an " a u th e n tic F e d e r a tio n ," Rousseau su g g ested th e s e minimum re q u irem en ts: . . . The F e d e ra tio n must embrace a l l th e im p o rtan t powers in i t s membership; i t must have a L e g i s l a t i v e Body, w ith powers to pass laws and o rd in an c es b in d in g upon a l l i t s members; i t must have a c o e rc iv e f o r c e c a p a b le o f com pelling every S t a t e to obey i t s common re s o lv e s w hether in th e way o f command o r of p r o h i b i t io n ; f i n a l l y , i t must be s tro n g and firm enough to make i t im p o ssib le f o r any member to w ithdraw a t h is own p le a s u re th e moment he co n ceiv es h i s p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t to c la s h w ith t h a t o f th e whole b o d y . 4 1 The c e n t r a l organ o f t h i s F e d e ra tio n was to be a 42 r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , d e l i b e r a t i v e D iet o r C ongress, o p e ra tin g under a C o n s titu tio n which was d r a f t e d from th e f i v e p ro posed Fundamental A r t i c l e s o f S a i n t - P i e r r e 's Abrege du P ro le t de p aix p e r p e t u e l l e . 1738 e d i t i o n . ^ A fte r a 4lR ousseau, Vaughan t r a n s l . , op. c i t . . pp. 59-60. A lso see J . J . Rousseau, A P ro je c t o f P e rp e tu a l Peace. Rous s e a u 's E s s a y , t r a n s l a t e d by E d ith H. N u t t a l l ; p r in te d in French and E n g lish ; w ith an In tro d u c tio n by G. Lowes Dickin son (London: Cobden-Sanderson [1 9 2 7 ]), p. 43. H e r e a f te r, q u o ta tio n s from R o u sseau 's work w i l l be from Vaughan's t r a n s l . N u t t a l l 's t r a n s l . w i l l be c i t e d as a second a v a i l a b le s o u rc e . For a l i s t o f R ousseau's n in e te e n so vereign Powers to c o n s t i t u t e th e F e d e ra tio n , see i b i d . (Vaughan t r a n s l . ) , pp. 66-7; ( N u t t a l l t r a n s l . ) , p. 53. ^ F o r R ousseau 's s a t i r e on th e a c t i v i t i e s o f p a st European Congresses o r g e n e ra l D ie ts , see Appendix B ,p a r. 16. 43 Rousseau r e s t a t e d th e s e f i v e Fundamental A r t i c l e s in summary form, see Vaughan's t r a n s l . , op. c i t . . pp. 61-4; N u t t a l l 's t r a n s l . , op. c i t . . pp. 45 -9 . 121 lo g ic a l p re se n tatio n of the pros and cons of th is type of p o l i t i c a l organization fo r Europe, Rousseau endeavored to bring h is readers to the conclusion th a t the adoption of th e Federation plan would appear s e lf- e v id e n t, except for "the consent of the Sovereigns c o n c e rn e d ." ^ As to whether the sovereigns would so consent, Rousseau l e f t h is readers w ith th ese thoughts: This is n o t, of course, to say th a t the Sovereigns w ill adopt th is project--w ho can answer fo r the reason of an o th er?--b u t only th a t they would adopt i t , i f they took counsel of t h e i r tru e i n t e r e s t . I t must be observed th a t we have not assumed men such as they ought to be, good, generous, d is in te r e s te d and devoted to the public good from motives of pure humanity; but such as they a re , u n ju s t, grasping and s e ttin g t h e i r own i n t e r e s t above a l l th in g s. . . . If the p ro je c t remains u n re a liz e d , th a t is not because i t is utopian; i t is because men are crazy. . . In h is "Judgment" of S a in t- P ie r r e 's P ro ject, Rous seau found i t s purpose c o n stru c tiv e and sound and i t s goal p ra c tic a b le ra th e r than u topian, but he c r it i c i z e d S a in t- P ie r r e 's n aiv ete in tr u s tin g to the goodwill of sovereigns to do the r ig h t thing and e s ta b lis h the / | / | Rousseau, Vaughan t r a n s l . , op. c i t .. pp. 69-90; N u tta ll t r a n s l . , op. c i t .. pp. 57-93. ^ I b id . (Vaughan t r a n s l . ) , p. 91; (N u ttall tr a n s l . X p. 95. 122 Federation.^** On th e c o n tra ry , Rousseau feared th a t th e p ro je c t would never be put in to o p eratio n because "in p o l i t i c s , as in m o ra ls," s e l f - i n t e r e s t s too o fte n p reclude th e p u b lic i n t e r e s t , and thereby in c lin e sovereigns to p lace t h e i r p r iv a te i n t e r e s t s above th e g en e ral w e lfa re . He could not conceive i t re a so n a b le to expect sovereigns to submit t h e i r d is p u te s to a su p e rio r t r i b u n a l when they "boast t h a t they hold t h e i r power only by th e sword, and . . . b rin g in th e name of God s o le ly because He ' i s in heaven1. . . . Even assuming, as did S a in t- P ie r r e , the goodw ill of sovereigns and t h e i r m i n is t e r s , Rousseau m aintained th a t i t would be d i f f i c u l t to fin d th e r i g h t moment to put th e p ro je c t in to o p e ra tio n . To do so, i t would be n e c e s sary th a t th e sum of a l l p r iv a te i n t e r e s t s should not outweigh th e g en e ral i n t e r e s t , and th a t everyone should b e lie v e th a t h is own g r e a te s t good was d eriv ed from the ^ R o u s s e a u , Vaughan t r a n s l . , op. c i t . . pp. 92-102; N u tta ll t r a n s l . , op. c i t .. pp. 97-113. ^ I b i d . (Vaughan t r a n s l . ) , pp. 94-5 and 97; (Nut t a l l t r a n s l . ) , pp. 99-101 and 105. Rousseau a ls o a s s a ile d th e r o l e played by m in is te r s in s t a t e d e c isio n s as a d e t e r r e n t to implementing t h i s peace p r o je c t; see h is comments in Appendix B, p a r. 17. 123 common good. This, moreover, would req u ire "a concurrence of wisdom in so many heads, a fo rtu ito u s concourse of so many in te r e s t s , such as chance can hardly be expected to bring about." Hence, the only means l e f t to e s ta b lis h the F ederation, according to Rousseau, was "force; and then the question is no longer to persuade but to compel, not to w rite books but to r a is e armies."^® The conviction th a t the peace project was not a tta in a b le through reason and goodwill represented Rousseau's f in a l p o sitio n as he ended his "judgment" on S a in t-P ie rre 's Project with these words: Let us not say, then, th a t, i f his system has not been adopted, th a t is because i t was not good. Let us ra th e r say th a t i t was too good to be adopted. Evils and abuses, by which so many men p r o f it , come in of themselves. Things of public u t i l i t y , on the other hand, are seldom brought in but by force, fo r the simple reason th at p riv ate in te re s ts are almost always ranged against them. Beyond doubt, a la s tin g peace i s , under present circum stances, a pro ject rid icu lo u s enough. . . . No Federation could ever be established except by a rev o lu tio n . . . .^9 In l a te r years, however, the "madness of monarchs and the poison of war" caused Rousseau to revert to the ^®Rousseau, Vaughan t r a n s l . , op. c i t .. pp. 101-2; N u tta ll t r a n s l . , op. c i t .. pp. 111-3. AQ I b id . (Vaughan t r a n s l . ) , pp. 111-2; (N uttall t r a n s l . ) , pp. 129-31. 124 problem of la s tin g peace and to b eliev e th a t some day i t would be resolved by a D iet or Parliament of Europe, d i r e c ted by c e n tr a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , c o n tro lle d by a p o s itiv e common in te rn a tio n a l law, and backed by a su pranational m ilita ry fo rce. For th is to take p lace, however, he declared th a t monarchies would eventually have to be replaced by a democratic form of government wherein the people were s o v e r e ig n .^ Rousseau's prin cip le of popular sovereignty has by and larg e superseded the ru le of nations by ab so lute monarchies, yet his Federation of Europe has not a rriv e d . This is not n e c e s sa rily because his arguments were without substance, but ra th e r because n a tio n a l so v ere ig n ties under popular ru le have been l i t t l e more disposed to surrender p a rt of t h e i r sovereignty (p a r tic u la r w ills ) to the "general w ill" of a European p o l i t i c a l community. The g reat sig n ific a n c e of Rousseau's re w ritin g of S a in t- P ie r r e 's P roject was not so much the s k i l l with which he j u s t i f i e d the purpose and s u b s ta n tia te d the Jean Jacques Rousseau, P o l it i c a l W ritin g s, ed. with Introduction and notes by C. E. Vaughan (Cambridge: U niversity Press, 1915), I, 396-7. Also see V. J . Lewis, "The Pioneers: X V III.—Rousseau," The New Commonwealth. IV, no. 2 (November, 1935), 438. 125 advantages of th e plan as i t was h is a b i l i t y to provide i t w ith a p o l i t i c a l philosophy. And in so doing, he was a b le to b rin g in to c l e a r e r focus th e n e g a tiv e p o l i t i c a l p ra c t i c e s th a t s u b o rd in a te the p u b lic i n t e r e s t to p r iv a te i n t e r e s t s and thereby o b s tru c t socioeconomic advances fo r the b e n e f it of s o c ie ty . Furtherm ore, Rousseau presented one of th e f i r s t r a t i o n a l approaches to th e achievement of i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rg a n iz a tio n and peace in th e face of the p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c s of h is p e rio d . To a t t a i n th e se o b je c t i v e s , he made i t c l e a r th a t i t was u topian to t r u s t s o le ly to arguments in th e name of humanity, moral r e s t r a i n t , and j u s t i c e ; th e r e f o r e , he openly appealed to expediency, u t i l i t y , and su p e rio r i n t e r n a t i o n a l fo rc e . As a consequence, Rousseau, th e f i r s t of th e g re a t p u b l i c i s t s to b e lie v e th a t i n te r n a t i o n a l peace and u n ity would some day a r r i v e , has ex e rted a s u b s t a n t i a l in flu e n c e on subsequent p o l i t i c a l thought and a c t i o n . ^ During th e same y ea r th a t Rousseau published h is t r e a t i s e on S a i n t - P i e r r e 's P ro je c t, P ierre-A ndrd G argaz1 ^ S e e Hemleben, op. c i t . , pp. 80-2; V. J . Lewis, l o c . c i t .; Souleyman, op. c i t .. pp. 138-50; F. Melian S ta w e ll, The Growth of I n te r n a tio n a l Thought (London: B utterw orth [1 9 2 9 ]), pp. 140-68. 126 A P ro je c t of U n iv ersal and P erp e tu a l Peace (1782) 52 appeared. W ritten p r i o r to 1779 w hile s t i l l in p ris o n , th e in flu e n c e of S a in t- P ie r r e is much in evidence in th e b a sic p r in c ip le s of G argaz' p la n , founded upon e ig h t fundamental a r t i c l e s , c a lle d "Means," which serv e as th e g en e ral C o n s titu tio n a l framework of procedure fo r h is European U niversal Union. Gargaz proposed a p e rp e tu a l C ongress, c o n s is tin g of one r e p r e s e n ta tiv e from each m em ber-state, but member sh ip was not compulsory in th e Union. The q u estio n of precedence in th e Congress was to be s e t t l e d on th e b a sis of s e n io r it y of th e member S overeigns, and a l l member Sovereigns were to be r e s t r i c t e d to th e t e r r i t o r i a l pos sessio n s a c tu a lly held on the d a te of th e f i r s t d e l i b e r a tio n of th e Union C ongress, or as decided by i t on those S2 The o r i g i n a l t i t l e of t h i s l i t t l e p ro je c t was C o n c ilia te u r de to u te s le s n a tio n s d 1Europe, ou P ro le t de paix p e rp d tu e lle e n tre tous le s Souverains de 1 Europe et le u r V o is in s . Benjamin F ran k lin had i t p rin te d a t Passy, France in 1782, but i t was l a t e r r e p r in te d as A P ro je c t of U niversal and P erp e tu a l Peace (w ith an E nglish V ersion, In tro d u c tio n , and Typographical Note by George Simpson Eddy; New York: Eddy, 1922). As to how i t came to Frank l i n ' s a t t e n ti o n and o th e r d e t a i l s , see Appendix B, p a rs. 18-20. ^ S e e i b i d . , pp. 11-38; Souleyman, op. c i t . , pp. 180-1. 127 . 54 d isp u tes p rio r to th e Union s estab lish m en t. D espite G argaz' optimism fo r the new era of E n lig h te n m e n t^ and h is c o n trib u tio n of some good ideas on pub lic works, such as improving r iv e r s and h arb o rs, and sho rtening tra d e ro u tes by c u ttin g canals through Panama and Suez—w ith the moneys wasted on w ars--one could hardly expect h is proposals to re c e iv e serio u s a tte n tio n from the "enlightened" Sovereigns and m in iste rs of th a t day. U n ific a tio n E ffo rts from the French Revolution to th e End of the Napoleonic Wars As the century of Enlightenment drew to a c lo s e , p u b lic is ts on th e European problem of peace and u n ity d ire c te d t h e i r e f f o r t s more to th e u n iv e rs a l understanding Gargaz* plan lacked th e g re a t procedural d e t a i l s and analyses th a t S a in t-P ie rre s e t f o r th in h is ; however, Gargaz declared th a t th ese d e t a i l s could be worked out b e t t e r by th e Congress. Like h is p re d ecesso rs, he con cluded h is p ro je c t w ith a s e c tio n devoted to T hirteen Pos s i b le O bjections and h is r e p li e s th e re to in op. c i t ., pp. 38-46. Also see Gargaz* ideas on precedence being based on s e n io r ity and h is novel requirem ent of the N o b ility in Appendix B, p a rs. 21-3. 55 For Gargaz* idealism and f a i t h in the Age of Enlightenm ent, see Appendix B, par. 24. 128 and cooperation of mankind and le s s to a fe d e ra tio n of European s t a t e s . ^ With the g re a t p o l i t i c a l re v o lu tio n in France and th e new upsurge in n atio n a lism , moreover, th e a tte n tio n of philosophers and p o l i t i c a l reform ers was turned to improving e x is tin g i n s t i t u t i o n s , and the lo t of mankind. ^ Two outstanding contem poraries of th is p erio d , Bentham and Kant, the le g a l and the moral p h ilo so phers of t h e i r age, c o n trib u te d much to n in e te e n th -c e n tu ry le g a l reform and enlightenm ent in the in te r n a tio n a l sphere. Saint-Germain, w ritin g anonymously, more or le ss expressed the a t t i t u d e of the leaders of thought of h is period by d e c la rin g th a t Europe was not ready to e s ta b lis h a United S ta te s of Europe, and perhaps would re q u ire another cen tu ry , as i t was not yet p o ssib le to merge so many v a ria b le and r i v a l n a tio n a l groups w ith so d iv e rse a c o n f lic t of i n t e r e s t s in to a fe d e ra tio n . To e f f e c t a United S ta te s of Europe prem aturely, he f e l t , would expose Europe to c i v i l wars much more c ru e l than th e fo reig n wars w ith which she has had to contend. See [A. F a lie r de S aint Germain], Nouvel E ssai sur le pro/jet de paix p e r p e tu e ile . En S uisse (Lausanne: B. M., 1788). M LA M icrofilm No. 453F (Washington: L ibrary of Congress, 1938), pp. 22-5. ^ S e e Baron Jean B a p tis te de C lo o ts ' th re e works, Bases c o n s titu tio n n e lle s de la R^publique du genre humain . . . (P a ris: Imprimerie N ational [1793]), pp. 4, 25-6, 29-30; L*Orateur du genre humain. ou Depdches du Prussien Cloots au Prussien Herzberg (P a ris: Desenne [1790]), pp. 26-7 e t passim ; and La R^publique u n iv e r s e lle . ou Adresse aux ty ra n n ic id e s . . . (P a ris: Marchands de Nouveautes [1792]), pp. 7, 13 e t passim , as c ite d by Souleyman in op. c i t .. pp. 188-99. 129 Between 1786-89 "A Plan fo r an U niversal and Per- 58 p e tu al Peace," was d ra fte d by the g re a t le g a l reform er Jeremy Bentham, who f i r s t coined the phrase, " I n te rn a tio n a l LaW >"59 To m aintain the peace of Europe, Bentham advocated the establishm ent of a "Common Court of J u d ic a tu r e ," or In te r n a tio n a l Court of J u s t i c e , and a European Congress or D iet c o n s is tin g of two re p re s e n ta tiv e s from each s t a t e of 60 Europe. A fter h is European in te r n a tio n a l o rg an izatio n was e s ta b lis h e d , Bentham did not b e lie v e th a t i t need This work appeared as the fo u rth essay in Ben- tham 's manuscript on P rin c ip le s of In te rn a tio n a l Law and was not published u n t i l 1838 in Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham (Published under the superintendence of h is execu tor, John Bowring; Edinburgh: T a it, 1838-43), 11 v o l s . 59 Jeremy Bentham, . . . Plan fo r an U niversal and P erpetual Peace [1789]. With an In tro d u ctio n by C. John Colombos . . . in The G rotius Society P u b lic atio n s: Texts fo r Students of In te r n a tio n a l R e la tio n s . No. 6 (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1927), p. 3 of the In tro d u c tio n . ^^For a m p lific a tio n of Bentham's pro p o sals, see Bentham, G rotius Society e d ., op. c i t .. pp. 26-30. Accord ing to Bentham, the success of h is plan was based on two fundamental remedies fo r war: (1) disarmament by p e r p e tu a l t r e a t i e s and (2) freedom of a l l c o lo n ie s. Hence, the plan was d ire c te d p rim arily to B rita in and France, i b i d . . pp. 11-26. 130 "be armed w ith any co e rciv e p o w e r s , o t h e r than the fo rc e of public opinion and m o ra lity , th e b e st fo rce fo r backing up th e d ec isio n s of the Court or Congress, so he thought. But to a ss u re the growth of p ublic opinion as a p o s itiv e fo rc e , Bentham c a lle d fo r an end to s e c re t diplomacy and provided fo r a l l proceedings of th e European Parliam ent to be made public and to be given the w idest 62 c i r c u la ti o n by a fre e press throughout each s t a t e . N otw ithstanding the m erits of th e se p roposals, Bentham, "re sp o n sib le fo r n ea rly a l l th e s a lu ta ry [le g a l] reforms of the n in e te e n th c e n t u r y , f a i l e d to publish h is plan. A pparently the changing circum stances in Euro pean p o l i t i c s d iv e rte d him from h is own counsel: Let i t not be objected th a t the age is not r ip e fo r such a p ropo sal. The more i t wants of being r ip e the sooner we should begin to do what can be done to rip en i t ; the more we should do to 61 Bentham, G rotius Society e d ., op. c i t ., pp. 26- 30. Bentham l a t e r adm itted th a t a case might a r i s e where i t would be n ecessary to put a " r e fra c to ry s t a t e under th e ban of Europe" (p. 31). 62I b i d .. pp. 30-2, 36-43. ^ J . 0. M[cLachlan], "The Pioneers--XXI: Jeremy Bentham," The New Commonwealth, V, no. 3 (December, 1936), 41. 131 rip e n i t . A proposal of t h i s s o r t Is one of th o se th in g s th a t can never come too e a rly nor too l a t e . ^ Kant, on th e o th e r hand, pub lished h is proposals f o r u n ity and peace, Zum ewigen F rie d e n . or P erp etu al fi s P eace. in 1795 w ithout delay . He had viewed th e d iv is io n of Europe w ith deep concern, and although he b e lie v e d th a t i t could be u n ite d i f European w ille d , h is t r e a t i s e was intended more as a p h ilo so p h ic a l approach to th e problem ^B entham , G ro tiu s S ociety e d ., op. c i t . . pp. 11-2. Had Bentham follow ed h is own advice and published h is plan fo rth w ith , i t s two r e q u i s i t e s : (1) disarmament and (2) relin q u ish m en t o f c o lo n ies would have doomed i t to r e j e c tio n as h is to r y has proved. N onetheless, Bentham1s endur ing c o n trib u tio n s to th e philosophy of p o l i t i c a l scien c e and th e h is to r y of th e long s tr u g g le to u n ite Europe have been h is f a i t h in and support of an adequate p u b lic r e l a tio n s program, a f r e e p re s s , and an en lig h ten ed public o p in io n . For f u r t h e r a p p r a is a l of Bentham's p ro p o sa ls, see C arl Joachim F r ie d r ic h , In e v ita b le Peace (Cambridge: Harvard U n iv e rsity P re ss, 1948), pp. 198, 203 f f .; Hemle- ben, op. c i t .. pp. 82-7; J . 0. M [cLachlan], loc. c i t . ^-*Kant introd uced h is work w ith a re fe re n c e to th e o ft-q u o te d statem en t of L e ib n itz (see above, p and Appendix B, p ar. 7) t e l l i n g of an inn in Holland th a t had a signboard on which was d e p ic te d a graveyard, i n sc rib e d w ith th e words, " E v e rla s tin g P eace." K an t's l i t t l e book, however, was to give t h i s id ea a much more s i g n i f i can t f u tu r e . For the p o l i t i c a l s i m i l a r i t i e s m otivating S a in t- P ie r r e and Kant in w ritin g t h e i r peace plans and th e d iffe re n c e in th e p u b lic re c e p tio n of t h e i r works, see Appendix B, p a rs. 25-6. 132 66 than a p ro ced u ral guide. For Kant, la s t i n g peace was a moral p r in c ip le th a t ought to be and could be r e a l iz e d . T h erefo re, he devoted much of h is e f f o r t in t h i s essay to th e r o le of p o l i t i c s and m o ra lity in Europe's past d is u n ity as w ell as in i t s f u tu r e h a r m o n iz a tio n .^ Kant shared Hobbes' ideas of mankind in a s t a t e of n a tu re jo in in g to g e th e r to e s t a b l i s h s t a t e s in o rder to avoid the c r u e l t i e s of c i v i l war. But r a th e r than end h ere w ith each s t a t e as th e supreme and u ltim a te e n t i t y in th e development and o rg a n iz a tio n of mankind, he c a rrie d Hobbes' theo ry a s te p f u r t h e r when he reasoned t h a t s t a t e s , 66 [ Immanuel K ant], K an t's P erp etu al Peace . . . [1795]. T ra n sla te d by Helen O 'B rien; w ith an In tro d u c tio n by J e s s i e H. Buckland in The G ro tiu s S o ciety P u b lic a tio n s : Texts fo r S tudents of I n te r n a tio n a l R e la tio n s . No. 7 (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1927), p. 5 of th e In tro d u c tio n . Buckland a ls o p o in ts out th a t K an t's p o l i t i c a l id e a ls more c lo s e ly p a r a lle le d th o se of th e r e v o lu tio n a r ie s than those of th e p h ilo so p h ers of th e Enlightenment ( lo c. c i t . ) . For an e x c e lle n t review and a p p r a is a l of the p o l i t i c a l c lim a te , a t t i t u d e s toward en lig h ten ed d e s potism , th e American and French R evolutions and t h e i r in flu e n c e s on K an t's l i f e and o utlo ok, see B uckland's In tro d u c tio n to Kant, i b i d .. pp. 1-14. 67J . 0. M [cLachlan], "The Pioneers--XIX [and] XX: Immanuel K ant," The New Commonwealth, V, no. 1 (October, 1936), 4; and no. 2 (November, 1936), 25. K an t's more p e r tin e n t statem ents on p o l i t i c s and morals a re quoted in Appendix B, p a rs. 27-8. 133 lik e in d iv id u a ls , must g iv e up t h e i r law less freedom fo r peace and s e c u r ity and band to g e th e r in to a fe d e ra tio n of 68 f r e e s t a t e s . Although Kant was not q u ite sure how f a r fre e s t a t e s could go in f e d e r a t i n g , ^ he foresaw as the u ltim a te id e a l a s in g le world s t a t e of n a tio n s . Yet, he r e a liz e d th e time was not r ip e fo r th e world fe d e ra tio n of s t a t e s s in c e , among o th e r d e t e r r e n t s , i t cannot be expected " th a t kings should p h ilo so p h is e , or th a t p h ilo so phers should become k in g s. . . L a te r, he d eclared th a t sovereign s t a t e s were opposed to "forming an i n t e r n a tio n a l s t a t e . . . which would g ra d u a lly extend and ®Kant, G rotius Society e d ., op. c i t .. pp. 29-30; McLachlan, op. c i t ., no. 1 (October, 1936), 4. For a v a i l a b i l i t y of re fe re n c e s and p re fere n ces of tr a n s l a t i o n of K an t's work, a ls o see Immanuel Kant, P erp etu al Peace [transl. from German 1 st e d ., London, 1796]; w ith an In tro d u c tio n by N icholas Murray B u tle r (Los Angeles: U. S. L ibrary A sso c ia tio n [c . 1932]), pp. 30-1; "Immanuel K an t's Essay on E te rn a l P eace," in C arl Joachim F r ie d r ic h , op. c i t ., pp. 254-5. ^ K a n t was aware th a t each s t a t e possessed a b so lu te s o v e re ig n ty , and could not be com pelled, as in th e case of th e in d iv id u a l, to fo rsa k e th e s t a t e of n a tu re and jo in a world or s u p r a - s ta t e . Furtherm ore, th e concept of th e law of n a tio n s p o s tu la te d th e independent e x iste n c e of many s t a t e s (see Appendix B, p ar. 29), not to mention the d iffe re n c e s of ra c e , r e l i g i o n , and language (a ls o see Kant, G rotius S o ciety e d ., op. c i t ., pp. 29-32, 40-1; B u tle r e d ., op. c i t . . pp. 30-5, 46-8. F rie d ric h t r a n s l . , op. c i t .. pp. 254-7, 264-5. 134 f i n a l l y Include a l l the peoples of th e w orld ," and t h e r e fo re Kant concluded: Since . . . they a re a b s o lu te ly opposed to t h i s by reason of t h e i r conception of the law of n a tio n s , and consequently re p u d ia te in p ra c tic e what they accept in th eo ry , to stem the t i d e of man's unrighteous and m alignant p re d is p o s itio n , th e p o s itiv e idea of a world re p u b lic must be re p la c e d , unless a l l hope is to be renounced, by the n egativ e expedient of an ever-extending co n fed era tio n , e x is tin g to prevent war, y et w ith th e enduring r i s k of i t s proving in e f f e c tiv e . N ev erth eless, Kant r e a l l y believ ed th a t the id e a l of a fe d e ra tio n of fre e s t a t e s would be u ltim a te ly a t t a i n ed. His f a i t h was based, in th e absence of force through conquest, upon (1) the p e rfe c tio n of the republican con s t i t u t i o n w ith in in d iv id u a l s t a t e s and (2) the evidence of h is to r y which re v e a ls man's slow but continued pro g re s s . 7^ Kant a lso foresaw th a t the forces of n atu re would induce men and n atio n s to u n ite in s e l f - i n t e r e s t to avoid war, and he even a n tic ip a te d th a t i t would compel 72 men and n atio n s to u n ite fo r economic advantages. ^ K a n t, G rotius Society e d ., op. c i t . , pp. 43, 32; F rie d ric h t r a n s l . , op. c i t .. pp. 266, 257. 71I b id . . pp. 25-8, 34-6; i b i d . , pp. 250-3, 259-61. 72I b i d . . p. 41; i b i d . . pp. 264-5. 135 I t was one p u b l i c i s t 's judgment th a t "Of a l l the pleas fo r a F ederation of Europe, Rousseau's alone excepted, the Lasting Peace of Kant is the most s t r i k i n g and the 73 most c o g e n t." K ant's p ro p o sals, however, were l i t t l e heeded in the years to follow . I t was to the ideas of Hegel and th e e x a lte r s of th e n a t i o n - s t a t e th a t men 74 turn ed. And w ithin a decade Europe was in the throes of the Napoleonic Wars. From 1800 to 1815 Napoleon dominated the c e n te r of European a tte n tio n because he was ab le to d ir e c t the popular energ ies re le a se d by th e French Revolution to serve h is im p e r ia lis t am bitions. Instead of b u ild in g on the s o c ia l and moral id e a ls of the R evolution, however, 73 Vaughan in h is In tro d u c tio n to Rousseau, Vaughan t r a n s l . , op. c i t ., p. 34. 74 Buckland's In tro d u c tio n to Kant, G rotius Society e d ., op. c i t .. p. 15. One exception , however, was Hofheim, who ap p aren tly was influenced by K ant's book and in 1796 proposed one of th e f i r s t plans of " tr u ly fe d e ra l id e a s ," urging a European Congress com pletely fre e "of n a tio n a l governments th a t sen t them" [as c ite d (no re fe re n c e given) by Andrew and Frances Boyd, Western Union: A Study of th e Trend Toward European Unity (Washington: Public A ffa irs Press [c . 1949]), p. 33]. A d d itio n al sources fo r treatm ent of o th e r p o l i t i c a l ideas of Kant in h is L asting Peace (and e s p e c ia lly h is c o n trib u tio n s to p o lic ie s of the League of Nations) may be found in Appendix B, par. 30. 136 75 he t r i e d to u n ite Europe under French hegemony by m i l i ta ry means, and f a il e d . His attem pt a t fo rc e fu l u n i f i c a tio n was prevented in th e end by an aroused c o a li t i o n of European s t a t e s f e a r f u l of French dom ination. U n ific a tio n Attempts by the Holy A llia n c e and the Concert of Europe Following the Napoleonic Wars, Czar Alexander I i n i t i a t e d in September, 1815, a T reaty of Holy A llia n c e , o b lig a tin g i t s s ig n a to rie s to re g u la te t h e i r in te r n a tio n a l a f f a i r s through th e C h ristia n p rin c ip le s of j u s t i c e , c h a r i ty , and p e a c e . ^ This T reaty simply provided a loose league of sovereigns founded on b ro th e rly love and good w i l l , fo r i t s e t fo r th no p rin c ip le s or s tr u c tu r e of govern ment to guide i t s members. And although the Czar affirm ed For the statem ent th a t Napoleon once envisaged th e c r e a tio n of a United S ta te s Congress fo r Europe, see Emmanuel Las Cases [Comte d e ] , . . . Jo u rn al of the P riv a te L ife and C onversations of th e Emperor Napoleon a t S aint Helena (London: Colburn; and Boston: Wells and L illy , 1823), IV, P t. 7, pp. 17, 125-6. ^ T h i s was the f i r s t plan fo r European u n ity and peace proposed by a sovereign sin ce King Pod£brad's plan in 1464. For background and sources to th e a t t i t u d e s of sovereigns toward European u n ity , sin ce 1648, as w ell as to the C z a r's m o tiv atio n , see Appendix B, p ar. 31. 137 th e id e a ls o f th e T re aty on o c c a sio n , th e s e were r e je c te d by th e o th e r s o v e r e i g n s t h e r e b y n u l lif y in g i t s noble in t e n tio n s . D esp ite i t s in e f f e c tiv e n e s s , th e T re aty of th e Holy A llia n c e " f u l f i l l e d an id e o lo g ic a l function"^® f o r th e m oral u n ity of a p o l i t i c a l l y fragm ented Europe in 79 th e s tr u g g le fo r peace. I t a ls o was in s tru m e n ta l in in d u cin g N icholas I I to convoke th e f i r s t i n t e r n a t i o n a l 80 peace co n feren ce in 1899 a t The Hague. On th e o th e r hand, th e T reaty of th e Holy A llia n c e had l i t t l e in common w ith th e i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y of th e b ig fo u r powers, A u s tria , B r i t a i n , P ru s s ia , and R u ssia , th a t c a r r ie d on i t s name a f t e r th e Quadruple A l i i - 81 ance o f November, 1815. This A llia n c e was in ten d ed as ^ O n ly B r i ta i n , th e Papacy, and th e S u lta n of Turkey f a il e d to sig n th e T re a ty . R eferences to reasons B r ita in re fu se d to sig n and a d d itio n a l d e t a i l s may be found in Appendix B, p a r. 32. 78 Hans J . M orgenthau, P o l it i c s Among N atio n s: The S tru g g le f o r Power and Peace (2nd e d ., Rev. and E n l.; New York: Knopf, 1954), p. 428. 79 See Hemleben, op. c i t . . pp. 101-2, f o r o th e r in flu e n c e s o f th e Holy A llia n c e T re aty and i d e a l. 80 E liz a b e th York, League of N atio n s: A n c ie n t. Medi a e v a l, and Modern (London: Swarthmore, 1919), p. 315. 81 The Q uintuple A llia n c e a f t e r France was ad m itted in 1 818. 138 a league o r "C o n fed eratio n of Europe" to s e t t l e s p e c ia l problems and to m ain tain th e harmony of Europe through a system of " c o n g re ss io n a l governm ent" or am b assad orial co n feren c es ( A r tic le V I). But M e tte rn ic h , f e a r f u l o f th e r i s i n g t i d e of dem ocratic lib e r a lis m , succeeded in u sin g th e A llia n c e to f u r th e r h is p o l i c i e s of m a in ta in in g th e t e r r i t o r i a l and c o n s t i t u ti o n a l s t a t u s quo. In p r a c t ic e , t h i s meant in te r v e n tio n to su p p ress th e new lib e r a lis m and democracy emerging in v a rio u s European s t a t e s . Whether d e r is iv e l y or e u p h e m is tic a lly , t h i s A llia n c e th e r e a f t e r was p o p u la rly la b e le d th e "Holy A llia n c e ." By 1823, th e r o l e of th e "Holy A llia n c e " in p ro m oting European u n ity ceased to have any r e a l j u s t i f i c a tio n o r im portance. H i s t o r i c a l l y , however, i t was th e f i r s t p r a c t ic a l attem p t by th e heads of s t a t e s to e s t a b li s h a u n ite d European o rg a n iz a tio n to h and le th e p o l i t i c a l problems o f Europe. But t h i s attem p t was thw arted from th e very f i r s t because of "two c o n g e n ita l i n f i r m i t i e s " : (1) th e permanent o p p o sitio n between B r ita in and R ussia over th e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f th e s t a t u s quo because of t h e i r d iv ergency of n a tio n a l i n t e r e s t s and (2) th e c o n f l i c t between th e v ested i n t e r e s t s and th e r i s i n g m iddle c la s s 139 over th e p r in c ip le s of c o n s ti t u ti o n a l ab so lu tism , or " le g itim a te " government, and th e p r in c ip le s of dem ocratic 82 lib e r a lis m and n a tio n a l s e lf- d e te rm in a tio n . With th e breakup of th e Q u in tu p le, or "Holy A llia n c e ," and th e end in 1822 of in te r n a tio n a l government 83 by co ng resses a f t e r B r i t a i n 's o p p o sitio n to in te rv e n tio n , th e g re a t powers con tinu ed to assume r e s p o n s i b i l ity fo r re g u la tin g in te r n a tio n a l p o l i t i c a l problems through "con c e rte d a c tio n ." Thus t h e i r p r a c tic e of m eeting in ad hoc co n feren ces of diplomacy whenever th e peace o f Europe was oA th re a te n e d became known as th e C oncert of Europe. Even though th e idea behind th e Concert of Europe was "th e p o l i t i c a l u n ity of Europe," or " 't h e g e n e ra l 82 Morgenthau, op. c i t ., p. 433. A lso see h is re fe r ence (p. 429) to th e compact of A u s tria , P ru s s ia , and R ussia in 1820, known as th e Neo-Holy A llia n c e , to which B rita in re fu se d to jo in because of o p p o sitio n to i t s p o lic y of in te r v e n tio n . For an e x c e lle n t a n a ly s is of th e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between th e T reaty of th e Holy A llia n c e and th e i n te r n a tio n a l government of th e Q uadruple-Q uintuple A llia n c e th a t p o p u la rly , i f m ista k en ly , was c a lle d th e "Holy A llia n c e ," see i b i d . , pp. 196, 428-33. Also see P h i ll i p s , op. c i t . . pp. 298-304, fo r an e v a lu a tio n of th e r o le of th e "Holy A llia n c e ." 83 Morgenthau, op. c i t ., p. 429. 8 4 I b i d . , p. 4 3 4 . 140 sy ste m o f E u r o p e " ' a s C a s t l e r e a g h o f f i c i a l l y r e f e r r e d t o it,® -* i t was n e v e r an a u t h e n t i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l g o v e rn m e n t, f o r i t la c k e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p r o c e d u r e . F u rth e rm o re , s i n c e i t r e p r e s e n t e d p r i m a r i l y t h e n a t i o n a l aim s and i n t e r e s t s o f t h e b ig p o w e rs, i t made no e f f o r t t o c o n s o l i d a t e w h a te v e r m o ra l and p o l i t i c a l u n i t y may h a v e e x i s t e d in E urope o r t o a d a p t t o c h a n g in g c o n d i t i o n s . F i n a l l y , b e c a u s e t h e C o n c e rt o f E urope was h e ld t o g e t h e r by th e b e l i e f t h a t E u ro p ean u n i t y and p e a c e dep en d ed upon t h e e f f e c t i v e u s e o f p ow er, t h e b ig pow ers c o n tin u e d t o p u rs u e t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c i e s o f d i p l o m acy, a l l i a n c e s , and b a la n c e o f pow er. 85 M o rg en th au , op. c i t . . p . 197. CHAPTER V EFFORTS TO UNITE EUROPE BY INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS: 1815-1940 As th e C oncert o f Europe co n tin u ed to assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r th e European s t a t e system , th e c o n ti n u ity and i n i t i a t i v e f o r th e fu rth e ra n c e o f th e id ea o f a European p o l i t i c a l union was to be found p rim a rily among fo u r c iv ic groups: (1) th e French S o c i a l i s t s , S a in t-S im o n ia n s, and F o u r i e r i s t s ; (2) th e M azzinian re p u b lic a n dem ocrats; (3) th e p a c i f i s t s , f o s te r e d by r e li g io u s groups and th e American and E n g lish Peace S o c ie tie s , b o th founded in 1815; and (4) th e f r e e - tr a d e ec o n o m ists. ^ P. Renouvin, L 'ld e e de F ^ d ^ ratio n Europeenne dans la Pensee P o litiq u e du XIXe S ifecle. (The Z ah a ro ff L ectu re f o r 1949; Oxford: C larendon, 1949), pp. 5 -8 . P ro fe sso r Renouvin a ls o p o in ts out t h a t t h e i r a r t i c l e s in books, pam phlets, p e r io d i c a ls , and newspapers m ight w e ll be counted by th e te n s , alth o u g h th e com plete l i s t has never been and perhaps never could be assem bled. Advancement of th e Idea of European 142 F ed eratio n to 1899 One of th e e a r l i e s t p ro je c ts ^ during th e n in e te e n th ce n tu ry was th a t of S aint-S im on, f i r s t o f th e French s o c i a l i s t sch o o l, in c o lla b o ra tio n w ith h is s tu d e n t, A. T h ie rry . M otivated by th e s o c ia l d is ru p tio n s o f the N apoleonic Wars, they pu b lish ed t h e i r plan of The Reorgan iz a tio n o f European S o ciety . . . (1814), which c a lle d fo r a p o l i t i c a l f e d e ra tio n , having a coirmon P arliam ent fo r th e whole of Europe to c o n sid e r a l l in te r n a tio n a l q u estio n s and to s e t t l e a l l d is p u te s between s t a t e s . T h eir plan proposed a two-chamber P arliam en t, c o n s is tin g of 240 r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s and m odelled a f t e r th e B r itis h P arliam en t. A fe d e ra tio n king was su g g ested , and he was to ap point th e 2 I t should be n o ted , however, th a t K arl C. F. Krause p u b lish ed th e same y e a r as Saint-Sim on a sm all pam p h le t e n t i t l e d , Entwurf e in e s europHischen Staatenbundes a l s B asis des allgeroeinen F ried en s . . . [1814]. (Neu hrsg. und e i n g e l e i t e t von Hans R eichel . . . L eip zig : M einer, 1920). Krause proposed a sim ple a l l i a n c e or league of European s t a t e s , excluded use of fo rc e to b rin g s t a t e s in to th e leag u e, minimized chances o f war by p ro h ib itin g members o f th e league from making war on non-members to th e league, and re se rv e d th e r i g h t of peace and war a g a in s t non-members to th e leag ue, which s ta r te d and ended any war in Europe as w ell as assu re d i t s members t h e i r r i g h t s would be p ro te c te d a g a in s t v io la tio n or e x te rn a l a g g re ssio n ; see h is pp. 21-4 [ c f . th e s e p o lic ie s w ith th a t o f NATO and WEU]. 143 members o f th e Chamber o f P e e r s . The r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f th e Chamber o f D e p u tie s w ere to be e le c te d f o r te n - y e a r term s by th e " l i t e r a t e " e l e c t o r a t e . ^ The h i s t o r i c a l s i g n i f ic a n c e o f t h i s p lan i s t h a t i t was th e f i r s t to propose a European F e d e r a tio n , r e p r e s e n tin g th e p e o p le (th e q u a l i f i e d v o te r s o f t h a t day) o f each s t a t e th ro u g h th e low er cham ber.^ In 1840, V ic to r C o n s id e ra n t, a form er S a in t- Simonian tu rn e d F o u r i e r i s t , re v iv e d th e id e a o f a European F e d e ra tio n in h is book, De la p o l i t i q u e g en e'rale e t du ^C laude H enri S aint-S im on [Comte d e ] , De l a re o r g a n i s a t i o n de l a S o c id te europeenne . . . p a r A. T h ie r r y , son dl&ve (o c to b re 1814) . . . ( P a r i s : Les P re s se s f r a n g a i s e s , [1 9 2 5 ]), pp. 4 7 -5 9 . A lso se e S y lv e s te r John Hemleben, P lans f o r World Peace th ro u g h S ix C e n tu rie s (C hicago: U n iv e r s ity P re ss [ c . 1 9 4 3 ]), pp. 9 6 -7 ; and P. R enouvin, o p . c i t . . p. 6 . Among o th e r th in g s , i t was proposed t h a t B r i t a i n and F ra n c e , a lre a d y e x p e rie n c e d w ith a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e system , in a u g u ra te th e Union to a s s u r e i t s s u c c e s s . And as soon as th e o th e r c o u n tr ie s o f Europe had adopted a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e p a r lia m e n t, th e y w ere to be e l i g i b l e to j o i n (S ain t-S im o n , op. c i t . . pp. 3 4 -4 ). ^R enouvin, op. c i t . . p. 6 , m entions t h a t su b seq u en t a d h e re n ts o f th e S a in t-S im o n ia n sc h o o l rem ained t r u e to th e c a l l o f t h e i r m a ste r and added n o th in g new in t h e i r a r t i c l e s on u n i t i n g E urope. Among th e s e w ere P i e r r e L e ro u x 's a r t i c l e , "L 'U nion europeenne . . . " Le G lo b e. VI (27 novembre 1 827), 2 -6 ; M ichel C h e v a l i e r 's a r t i c l e in 1832, and G ustave d 'E i c h t h a l 's De 1 'u n i t e e u ro p een n e. 1840, th e l a t t e r two as c i t e d by Renouvin [ c i t a t i o n s in co m p lete] in f o o tn o te , lo c . c i t . 144 r d l e de l a F rance en E urope. 1840. His p lan d i f f e r e d from th o se o f h is p re d e c e sso rs in t h a t he was one o f th e f i r s t to re c o g n iz e th e n e c e s s ity and t o ad v o c ate e x p re s s ly th e e s ta b lis h m e n t o f a " 's u p e r i o r s o v e re ig n ty to th e in d iv id u a l s o v e re ig n ty ' o f th e S ta te s , a s o v e re ig n ty 'w hich no p eo p le in th e c o u rse o f t h e i r fo re ig n r e l a t i o n s may be a b le to o r should want to e v a d e '; and . . . F ra n c e ," he d e c la re d , " . . . would have t o ta k e th e i n i t i a t i v e in t h i s p r o j e c t ." ^ M azzini, a c ti v e in th e re p u b lic a n movement through* out Europe from about 1830 to 1872 and a b e lie v e r in th e u n ity o f a l l European p e o p le , c a lle d f o r a f e d e r a tio n of European s t a t e s as e a r ly as 1834. There was to be a Euro pean Congress r e p r e s e n tin g th e p eoples o f ev ery s t a t e , and th e s e p eop les were to have genuine independence and e q u a lity . M azzini b e lie v e d , however, t h a t b e fo re th e p eo p les of Europe could be u n ite d i t would be n e c e ssa ry f o r th e governm ents o f th e s t a t e s to be tran sfo rm ed to p e o p le 's r e p u b lic s . A lthough M azzini and h is fo llo w e r s , who had formed th e D em ocratic C e n tra l Committee in 1850 and who h elp ed found th e European A s s o c ia tio n in 1855, f a i l e d in ^As c i t e d and quoted from C o n s id d ra n t' s above work [ n .p .] by Renouvin, pp. c i t . . pp. 6 -7 . 145 t h e i r m issio n , M a z z in i's h i s t o r i c a l im portance to th e id ea o f a u n ite d Europe i s th e f a c t th a t he was th e f i r s t cam paigner to t r a v e l about Europe in o rd e r to h e lp o rg a n iz e groups o f people in v a rio u s towns to work f o r th e u n ity o f a l l th e people o f Europe.** The m ajor a t t e n t i o n o f th e p a c i f i s t group, b e g in ning in 1815, was c o n c e n tra te d in th e m oral approach to war and peace w ith advocacy of disarmament and a r b i t r a t i o n o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l d is p u te s . D uring th e 1830's , however, t h e i r thought tu rn ed to a f e d e r a l union under th e c o n tro l of a Congress of N a tio n s.^ For g r e a te r p u b lic ity of t h i s ^Giuseppe M azzini, "P act of th e F r a te r n ity of Young Europe (1 8 3 4 )," pp. 26-34 and " F a ith and th e F u tu re (1 8 3 5 )," pp. 79-144 in V ol. I l l and "The Holy A llia n c e o f th e People (1 8 4 9 )," pp. 265-82 in Vol. V o f L ife and W rit ings o f Joseph M azzini (New ed; London: Sm ith, E ld e r, 1905), 6 v o ls . I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to n o te t h a t M azzini con s id e re d th e movement f o r th e independence o f I t a l i a n and German peoples as a b eginning s te p toward th e u n itin g of a l l peoples o f Europe e v e n tu a lly in to a s in g le union. A lso see Renouvin, op. c i t . . pp. 7, 9-10, 17. Not to be confused w ith Giuseppe M azzini was L u ig i Andrea M azzini, who d ra fte d a p lan o f fe d e ra tio n in 1847; and li k e th e form er, he b e lie v e d t h a t people o f v a rio u s s t a t e s must have s im ila r governm ental i n s t i t u t i o n s b e fo re they can f e d e ra te ( i b i d . . p. 15). ^ P ro fe sso r Renouvin in h is op. c i t . . p. 4 , s u b s ta n t i a t e s th e in flu e n c e o f th e work o f David Dodge and W illiam Ladd, le a d e rs o f th e American Peace S o ciety movement, in t h i s d ir e c tio n in Europe. For a d d itio n a l background on th e s e men, see Appendix C, p a r. 1. 146 g o a l, th e Peace S ociety o f Geneva o ffe re d a p r iz e fo r th e b e s t essay on th e "O rganization of Europe" to secu re per* manent peace; and a Z urich j u r i s t , Johann S a r to r iu s , won f i r s t p riz e w ith h is Organon des vollkonmenen F rie d e n s . published in 1837. His plan suggested c r e a tio n of a Euro pean Union, based on th e Germanic C onfederation of 1815 but m odified to "a ssu re a re p re s e n ta tio n of th e peoples [o f E urope]. "® The P aris S o ciety of C h ris tia n M orality o ffe re d a s im ila r p riz e in 1840, and C onstantin Pecqueur won i t w ith h is De la paix: de son p rin c ip e e t de sa r e a l i s a t i o n , publish ed in 1842. He c a lle d fo r a " 's u p e r io r c o n fe d e ra l a u t h o r i t y '" to re so lv e economic and p o l i t i c a l c o n f lic ts Q between s ta te s as th e b e s t safeguard of th e peace. But fo r i t to be s u c c e s s fu l, th e member s t a t e s would have to tu rn over a t le a s t p a rt of t h e i r so v ere ig n ty ; and by s ta g e s , th e d e le g a te s to h is European Congress would have to be " 'a b s o lu te ly in d e p e n d e n t.'" For th a t to happen, however, "they must be e le c te d d i r e c tl y by th e peoples" Q Renouvin, op. c i t . , p . 5. ^ I b id . , pp. 5-6. 147 o f each s t a t e as i s r e a l iz e d under th e American C o n s titu - t i o n . I® Around 1847, under th e le a d e r s h ip o f R ichard Cobden, an economic m otive was added to th e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a u n ite d Europe. A lthough p re v io u s ly he had been m erely i n t e r e s t e d in disarm am ent and a r b i t r a t i o n , Cobden saw th e ad v antag e in jo in in g fo rc e s w ith th e p a c i f i s t group to g ain comnon o b j e c t i v e s . H In flu e n c e d th u s by Cobden, Renouvin, op. c i t . , p. 18. Renouvin a l s o i n d i c a te s h e re and on page 6 th e in f lu e n c e o f W illiam L add's Essay on a Congress o f N ation s . . . (R e p rin te d from th e o r i g i n a l e d itio n o f 1840 . . . by James Brown S c o tt . . . New York: Oxford U n iv e r s ity P r e s s , 1916.) (se e Appendix C, p a r s . 2 - 3 ) , as w e ll as th e American system on Pecqueur by c i t i n g t h i s sta te m e n t o f h is [ n . p . ] : " i t would be n e c e ssa ry t o fo llo w th e example o f th e form er E n g lish c o lo n ie s o f America t h a t p assed from th e system o f th e 'A r t ic l e s o f C onfederation* to th e sy stem o f 1787." On th e o th e r hand, Renouvin adds t h a t th e E n g lish and German p a c i f i s t s d id n o t go so f a r as to c a l l f o r a " ’sup er- g o v e rn m e n t," ' and t h a t th e same was t r u e w ith P h ilip p e Marchand, who in h is Nouveau p r o j e t de t r a i t e de p a ix p e r o e t u e l le . 1842, proposed a D ie t, r e p r e s e n tin g th e govern m ents o f Europe, to head h is union o f European s t a t e s . T his was a ls o th e view o f Em ile de G ira rd in as ex p re sse d in h is a r t i c l e s o f 1848, as w e ll as o f th e French C h r is tia n Democrats and H enri F eugueray, who co n tem p lated a C o n fed er a tio n r a t h e r th an a F e d e ra tio n o f S ta te s ( i b i d . . p. 1 7). ^ C a l l i n g f o r f r e e - t r a d e as e a r l y as 1842 to "allo w c a p i t a l to p lay f r e e l y i t s r o l e in th e p ro g re s s o f m ankind," Cobden b e lie v e d t h a t "one would see developed between th e S ta te s an in te rd e p e n d e n c e t h a t would be s u f f i c i e n t to overcome p o l i t i c a l d if f e r e n c e s and keep 148 F rd d d ric B a s tla t and o th e r members o f th e F ree-T rade S o ciety founded a S o c ie ty o f th e F rien d s o f Peace In P a ris (1847) and became I n te r e s te d In th e f e d e ra tio n Id e a. Then a t t h e i r " 'Campaign of th e B a n q u e ts ," 1 December 25, 1847, law yer V £ sin e t, e d i to r of th e J o u rn a l de Rouen and a f r e e t r a d e r , spoke of e s ta b lis h in g th e U nited S ta te s of E urope. ^ During th e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l re v o lu tio n s o f 1848, th e 13 id e a of European F e d e ra tio n spread e x te n s iv e ly . In f a c t , governments from 'h u r lin g t h e i r people in to w a r s '" (as m entioned by Renouvin [no c i t a t i o n given] in op. c i t . . pp. 7 -8 ). One o f C obden's subsequent a r t i c l e s in 1856 urged B r ita in to "ap p eal to a l l s t a t e s , sm all as w e ll as g r e a t, o f th e C o n tin e n t, f o r such a union as would p revent th e p o s s i b i l i t y o f any a c t o f h o s t i l i t y from th e common enemy." The form o f t h i s union was to be "a f e d e ra tio n o f th e s t a t e s o f E urope," and R ussia was co n sid ered th e common enemy ( c ite d by David M itrany [no re fe re n c e given] in "The Case A g ainst P an-E uropa," C u rrent H is to ry . XXXIII (O ctober, 1930), 65-9 [p . 6 6 ]. ■^Renouvin, op. c i t . , p. 8. V esinet was one of th e very f i r s t persons to use th e term "U nited S ta te s of Europe" b e fo re a form al g a th e rin g acco rd in g to Renouvin. 13 ^Because o f th e tremendous enthusiasm aroused by th e s e r e v o lu tio n s , many w r ite r s attem p ted to e x p lo it th e s i t u a t i o n w ith t h e i r pam phlets and newspaper a r t i c l e s . Among o th e r s , th e fo llo w in g a re r e p r e s e n ta tiv e o f th e b re a d th o f coverage: C h arles MacKay, whose e d i t o r i a l s were to appear in th e London Review and Weekly J o u rn a l of P o l i t i c s in 1860 and l a t e r ; Comte, de G ira rd in , L i t t r e , 149 th e s i t u a t i o n looked so fa v o ra b le a f t e r th e 1848 B ru ssels Congress o f th e F rien d s of Peace th a t a huge p o l i t i c a l rally was planned fo r P a r i s . Under th e le a d e rs h ip of E lihu B u r r i t t , American p a c i f i s t movement le a d e r, th e second Congress o f th e F rien d s o f Peace met a t P a ris during August 22-25, 1849. D uring th e opening ad dress of V ic to r Hugo, Congress P re s id e n t, an ap p eal was made f o r a U nited 14 S ta te s o f Europe. B u r r i t t , however, in h is address s e t f o r th th e plan o f a Congress of N atio n s, re s p o n s ib le fo r d r a f tin g i n t e r n a ti o n a l laws and e n tru s te d w ith s e t t l i n g d is p u te s between s t a t e s . Because of th e d iv e rg e n t view s, th e Congress ended on "a vague r e s o lu tio n which 'recom mended to a l l th e f r ie n d s of peace to p rep are p u b lic opinio n in t h e i r r e s p e c tiv e c o u n trie s fo r th e c r e a tio n of a 'C ongress of N a tio n s' [ ' ] , w ith o u t d e fin in g t h i s id ea f u r t h e r . T h e s e c o n f l i c t s of i n t e r e s t among th e and th e C h ris tia n Democrats in F rance; democrat Arnold Ruge and th e th e o lo g ia n s R ichard Rothe and F. F leck in Germany; and C arl C attaneo in I t a l y (see Renouvin, op. c i t .. pp. 8 -9 ). 14 V ic to r Hugo, . . . The U nited S ta te s of Europe. P r e s id e n tia l ad d ress a t th e I n te r n a tio n a l Peace C ongress, P a r is , August 22, 1849 (World Peace Foundation. Pamphlet S e rie s . . . Vol. IV, No. 6, p t . I I ; Boston: World Peace F oundation , 1914}, pp. 1-10! 15 Renouvin, op. c i t . . pp. 8 -9. 150 p a r tic i p a n t groups h e lp to e x p la in th e n ea r s t a n d s t i l l of th e movement between 1850 to 1870.^6 The id ea o f a fe d e ra tio n p e r s i s t e d , n e v e r th e le s s , in th e minds o f a few f a i t h f u l " E u ro p e a n s ," ^ and through th e e f f o r t s of some of them a new Congress of th e F rien d s The re v o lu tio n a ry te n d e n c ie s o f th e M azzinian "d em o crats," th e p a c i f i s t id e a ls o f th e more p a ssiv e r e lig i o u s g ro u p s, th e m iddle c la s s d if f e r e n c e s between th e " p r o te c t io n i s t s " and th e f r e e - t r a d e econom ists, th e con f l i c t over th e means to a t t a i n th e socioeconom ic g o als between e x tre m is t and more l i b e r a l wings of th e s o c i a l i s t s a l l d iffu s e d th e movement and d e p le te d i t s r a n k s . See Renouvin, op. c i t . , pp. 9-10, f o r o th e r n e g a tiv e d ev elo p ments . ^Among th e s e were a C h r is tia n Democrat, F ra n c isc a Bouvet; an old S ain t-S im o n ian , M ichel C h e v a lie r; a man of a f f a i r s , Edmond P o to n i^ , psuedonym o f Jacques C o u rrie r; V illia u m e , who tra c e d th e p lan o f a permanent European Congress in h is book, L1E s p r it de la g u e r r e . 1861; and Proudhon, th e most n o ta b le ad h eren t in t h i s p e rio d , who foresaw in 1863 a European F e d e ra tio n as a sim ple agency re s p o n s ib le f o r a d m in iste rin g c e r t a i n common s e rv ic e s in Europe. There was a ls o a group o f R epublican Democrats who rem ained a c tiv e and a j o u r n a l i s t , named Mangin o f th e Phare de la L o ire , who suggested a new m eeting o f th e Con g re ss o f th e F rien d s o f Peace in 1867. However, th e id ea was s t a r t e d ag ain by th e Moral S ciences Departm ent o f th e Geneva I n s t i t u t e and found a fo llo w in g in th e German s t a t e s lead by Edward Loew enthal, who founded th e League fo r Euro pean Union a t Dresden in 1869. See Renouvin, i b i d . , pp. 10-11, f o r f u l l e r tre a tm e n t o f t h e i r e f f o r t s . E a r lie r in t h i s p e rio d , G ustave de M o lin ari in h is In tro d u c tio n to L'Abb^ de S a in t- P ie r r e . . . (P a ris : G uillaum in, 1857) su g g ested a union o f European s t a t e s w ith power to i n t e r p r e t laws and s e t t l e c o n f li c t s between s t a t e s , b u t i t was r e a l l y c lo s e r to a lo o se league o r c o n fe d e ra tio n of s t a t e s . See Hemleben, op. c i t . . 114-6. 151 of Peace was h e ld a t Geneva In May, 1867. U n fo rtu n a te ly , t h i s C ongress s p l i t over c e r t a i n h o s t i l e r e s o lu tio n s p r e se n te d by d e le g a te s o f th e e x tre m is t [F irs t] I n t e r n a t io n a l 18 and th o s e o f th e Masonic Lodge. In th e end, th e Congress d ecid ed to form a League f o r Peace and L ib e rty , to p u b lis h a w eekly, c a ll e d Les ^ ta ts - U n is d*Europe. ^ and to s t r i v e f o r a F e d e ra tio n of th e Peoples of Europe, m odelled a f t e r th e U nited S ta te s o f America o r th e Swiss C an to n s. Tied t o th e fo rtu n e o f one p a r ty , i t s ap p e al was lim ite d m ainly to th o s e i n t e l l e c t u a l s and r e v o lu t i o n a r i e s , w illin g to assume p e rso n a l r i s k s to prom ote th e f e d e r a tio n o f f r e e p eo p les a g a in s t th e e s ta b lis h e d " le g itim a te " g o v e rn m e n ts .^ l ft °R enouvin, op. c i t . . p. 11. This C ongress o f 6 ,0 0 0 p a r ti c i p a n t s assem bled under th e p re sid e n c y of G a r ib a ld i, b u t th e v a s t m a jo rity stay ed o ut o f th e h e a te d d e b a te s . 1 9 i / . The League s p u b lic a tio n , Les E ta ts -U n is d E urope. appeared i r r e g u l a r l y in F rench, German, I t a l i a n , S p an ish ; and an E n g lish supplem ent, The U nited S ta te s o f E urope. was issu e d f o r aw h ile in 1872. A f te r November, 1888, i t appeared i r r e g u l a r l y as a m onthly (B erne; Geneve: 5 mai 1 8 6 8 -ju in 1919). 20 Renouvin, op. c i t . . pp. 11-2. Renouvin a ls o m entions t h a t th e only im p o rtan t l i t e r a r y e f f o r t s f o r f e d e r a tio n d u rin g t h i s p e rio d were de P a rd ie u 's P rin c ip e s de l a S cien ce p o l i t i q u e , c a l l i n g f o r c r e a tio n o f a European P a rlia m e n t; John S e e le y 's a r t i c l e [ f u l l c i t a t i o n n o t i n d i c a te d ] in th e N on-C onform ist. proposing a f e d e r a l g o v ern ment and th e re b y making s t a t e arm ies u n n ec essary ; th e 152 The League b a re ly su rv iv e d th e war o f 1870-71, arid a f t e r some f i f t e e n y e a rs o f d isc o u ra g in g e f f o r t , Lemmonnier in 1888 w rote in Les E ta ts-U n is d*E urope: "'T h e F e d e ra tio n o f th e p eop les and th e i n s t i t u t i o n o f an i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r i b u n a l does n o t ap p ear to me, a t th e tim e I w r i t e , J 1 r e a l i z a b l e in E u ro p e ." x The movement to u n i t e Europe had been s id e tra c k e d by th e h u m ilia tio n o f th e French m i l i t a r y d e f e a t and th e f l o u r i s h o f " P ru s sia n m egalo m a n i a ." ^ A fte r th e c o n s o lid a tio n o f kingdoms and Dutch S o c i a l i s t , Domela N ieuw enhuis, who su g g ested a s im i l a r p r o j e c t; and E rn e st R enan's a r t i c l e ["La G uerre e n tr e la F rance e t 1 'A llem ag n e," in Revue des Deux Mondes (P a ris ), LXXXIX (15 septem bre 1870), 264-83] co n clu d in g t h a t th e cor- r e c t i v e f o r th e r i v a l r y o f European n a tio n a lis m i s " 'E u ro pean F e d e r a tio n , s u p e rio r to a l l th e n a t i o n a l i t i e s . " ' (As quoted from t h i s work by Renouvin, op . c i t . . p. 1 2.) N ie tz s c h i a ls o su p p o rted th e id e a d u rin g t h i s p e rio d when he was P ro fe s s o r o f P h ilo lo g y a t th e U n iv e rs ity of B a sle . 21 As quoted by Renouvin [ f u l l c i t a t i o n n o t given] in op. c i t . . p. 12. Renouvin a ls o p o in te d out t h a t in 1872 th e above p e r io d ic a l had resumed p u b lic a tio n under th e e d i t o r s h i p o f C h arles Lem nonnier, law yer and form er philo sophy p r o fe s s o r [who t h i s same y e a r , p u b lish e d a book, Leg E t a t s - Unis d 'E u ro p e ( P a r is : B ibliothfeque ddm ocratique, 1872), su g g e s tin g a f e d e r a tio n m odelled a f t e r th e U nited S ta te s o f A m erica, b u t adding l i t t l e t h a t was d i f f e r e n t to th e id e a o th e r th an h is m oral and p h ilo s o p h ic a l s u p p o r t] . The mood o f th e tim es may be n o ted from th e f a c t t h a t V ic to r Hugo, who e x to lle d th e id e a o f a U nited S ta te s o f Europe a t th e C ongress o f th e League f o r Peace and L ib e rty in 1869, G a r i b a l d i , form er p r e s id e n t, and Louis Blanc n ev er a tte n d e d th e Congress a f t e r 1872. 22 George C re e l, "The U nited S ta te s o f E u rop e," C o l l i e r ' s CXVI (December 22, 1945), 14-5, 78-9 [p . 7 8 ]. 153 p r i n c i p a l i t i e s in to th e la r g e r n a t i o n a l i t i e s o f Germany and I t a l y , th e prim ary concern o f th e g re a t m a jo rity in an e ra of stro n g n a tio n a lis m was n a tio n a l independence. While s id e tra c k e d , however, th e id ea o f European F e d e ra tio n re c e iv e d an a s s i s t from a new group o f "Euro p ean s": j u r i s t s and p ro fe s s o rs o f law and p o l i t i c a l s c ie n c e , who were to g iv e th e id ea a new ap p eal and 23 g r e a t e r p l a u s i b i l i t y . With th e a r t i c l e o f P ro fe sso r Lorim er o f th e U n iv e rsity o f Edinburgh in 1877, t h i s group produced th e f i r s t c o n c re te attem p t to s e t f o r t h th e le g a l framework th a t a European F e d e ra tio n should h a v e .24 Lorim er c a lle d f o r a F e d e ra l S ta te having a s e p a ra te E x e c u tiv e ,25 and a tw o-house Congress a b le to determ ine i t s 23 J Renouvin, op. c i t . . pp. 12-3. Renouvin a ls o found th a t h is new tendency began to m a n ife st i t s e l f as e a r ly as 1872 in th e works o f G oblet d 'A lv i e l l a , Dudley F ie ld , and M aurice A d ler, who prep ared a p lan f o r a European C ongress. A / J.[am es] Lorim er, "Le Probl&me F in a l du D ro it I n t e r n a t io n a l," Revue de D ro it I n te r n a tio n a l e t de L e g is la tio n Comparee. IX (1877), 161-206. A l a t e r E n g lish v e rsio n may be found in James Lorim er, The I n s t i t u t e s o f th e Law o f N atio n s: A T r e a tis e o f th e J u r a l R e la tio n s o f S ep arate P o l i t i c a l Communities (Edinburgh; London: Blackwood, 1884), Vol. I I , 271-87. I b i d . . pp. 273-6. Lorimer co n sid ered h im se lf th e f i r s t to p re s e n t th e id e a o f an e x e c u tiv e whose fu n c tio n s were e x c lu s iv e ly in t e r n a t io n a l and a p a rt from n a tio n a l 154 own com petence ex cep t f o r th e d o m estic, c o l o n i a l , and e x tra -E u ro p e problem s o f m em ber-states n o t In v o lv in g con- 26 f l i c t between s t a t e s . He a ls o pro vided f o r a tw o-branch 27 J u d ic ia r y : a c i v i l and a c r im in a l c o u r t. Lorim er d id n o t a n t i c i p a t e e a r ly a c c e p ta n c e o f h is p lan f o r he expected m i l i t a r y men to oppose any p lan le a d in g to disarm am ent as t h i s would e lim in a te t h e i r jo b s . Nor d id he exp ect su p p o rt from p r o f e s s io n a l d ip lo m a ts .2® The fo llo w in g y e a r, P ro fe s s o r B lU n tsc h li o f H eid elb erg U n iv e rs ity p u b lish e d h is p la n , "Die O rg a n isa tio n des europtfischen S ta a te n v e re in s . . . " i n th e B e rlin Gegenwart (1878) p e r i o d i c a l , a p p a re n tly in answer to L o rim e r's p la n . To B ltin ts c h li, th e only r e a l i s t i c p lan was a C o n fed eral a u t h o r i ty , which would perm it each s t a t e governm ents. His f e d e r a tio n was to be c a ll e d in to being by th e s ig n a to ry s t a t e s to a t r e a t y (p. 279); Geneva was su g g ested as th e c a p i t a l (p. 282). 2^L orim er, The I n s t i t u t e s o f th e Law o f N atio n s: A T r e a t is e o f th e J u r a l R e la tio n s o f S e p a ra te P o l i t i c a l C om m unities. op. c i t . . pp. 279-84. 27I b i d . . pp. 284-5. ^ I b i d . . pp. 276-8. See pp. 286-7 f o r L o rlm er's arrangem ent f o r a m i l i t a r y e sta b lis h m e n t and ta x system to sa fe g u a rd and fin a n c e th e f e d e r a tio n . 155 t o r e t a i n i t s own s o v e r e ig n ty . T here were t o be e ig h te e n s t a t e s in h i s C o n fe d e ra tio n , r e p re s e n te d by a C o u n c il; and a S en ate was t o have i t s d e le g a te s s e le c te d by th e l e g i s l a t u r e s o f th e s e s t a t e s . No fin a n c e s o r m i l i t a r y fo r c e was 2<j c o n s id e r e d . * M eanwhile, in 1883, G odin, an e x - F o u r i e r i s t tu rn e d i n d u s t r i a l i s t , c a l l e d f o r a F e d e ra tio n o f Europe w ith a l e g i s l a t i v e C o n g ress. A f e d e r a l army was to a s s u r e th e s e c u r i t y o f th e member s t a t e s w hich w ere to m a in ta in on ly -1 A d o m estic p o lic e f o r c e s . At th e U n iv e rsa l C ongresses o f th e p a c i f i s t s o c i e t i e s in 1889 th e id e a o f European F e d e ra tio n was a g a in c o n s id e r e d . Then on November 16, 1891, th e I n t e r n a t i o n a l ^^R enouvin, op. c i t . . pp. 13, 19; a ls o see Hemle- ben, op. c i t . . pp. 116-8, f o r a d i g e s t o f B lU n ts c h li's m ajor p r o p o s a ls , th e p ro c e d u re s o f h is C o u n cil and S e n a te , and L o rim e r's m ajor c r i t i c i s m o f th e p la n . ■^Jean B a p ti s te Andre G odin, Le G overnem ent: ce q u ' i l a e t e . ce q u ' i l d o i t e t r e e t l e v r a i S o c ia lism e en a c tio n ( P a r is : G u illa u m in , 1883), as c i t e d by Renouvin [ n . p . ] , in op. c i t . . p. 13. For f u r t h e r a p p r a i s a l o f G o d in 's w ork, se e Edouard H e r r io t, The U n ited S ta te s o f Europe (T ra n s1. by R eg in ald J . D in g le ; New York: V iking P r e s s , 1930), pp. 37-41. Renouvin a l s o c i t e s in t h i s p e rio d Kamarovsky, who v ee red from th e id e a o f f e d e r a tio n to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r i b u n a l u n d er th e c o n tr o l o f an I n t e r n a t i o n a l Assembly in h is Le T rib u n a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l . 1887, b u t who made an im p o rta n t c o n tr ib u tio n to th e j u r i d i c a l th e o ry o f a r b i t r a t i o n ( lo c . c i t . ) . 156 Congress of Rome passed a re s o lu tio n urg in g: "The European s o c ie tie s of peace and t h e i r ad h eren ts to make th e United S ta te s of Europe th e supreme g o al of t h e i r propaganda" and to recommend th e i n s t i t u t i o n of a "permanent Congress of N ation s, to which must be subm itted th e s o lu tio n of every in te r n a tio n a l q u e s tio n , so th a t every c o n f lic t may be re so lv e d by law, not by f o r c e . L a te r, Eugfene Labbde proposed a European fe d e ra l government s im ila r to th a t of th e United S ta te s of America (U.S.A.) in h is book, U .S .£ .. le s E tates-U n is d 1Europe. 1895. And f i n a l l y , W . T. Stead gave ex p ressio n to th e renewed optimism in l i b e r a l c ir c le s a t th e tu rn of th e cen tu ry when he hastened to p u b lish The U nited S ta te s of Europe on th e Eve of th e P arliam ent of Peace, 1899.-^ In a p p ra isin g th e e f f o r t s to u n ite Europe in th e n in e te e n th c e n tu ry , one fin d s th a t th e high tid e of popular enthusiasm and support appeared around th e years of 1815, 1840, 1848, 1866, and 1871--periods follow ing wars or years ^ A s c ite d and quoted by Renouvin [no re fe re n c e given] in op. c i t .. p. 13. For s u b s ta n tia tio n of S te a d 's g re a t e x p e c ta tio n s th a t th e United S ta te s of Europe was " ju s t around th e co rn er" and h is j u s t i f i c a t i o n th e r e f o r , see Appendix C, p a rs. 4 -8 . 157 o f d em o cratic movements f o r p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l ch an g es. Except f o r l i t e r a r y exposure and th e o c c a s io n a l l i p s e r v ic e o f men of p u b lic a f f a i r s , th e e s ta b lis h m e n t o f a European F e d e ra tio n rem ained o u ts id e t h e i r c o n s id e r a tio n . W rite rs, w ith th e ex c e p tio n o f L orim er, added few p o s i tiv e c o n t r i b u tio n s to th e o rg an ic s t r u c t u r e o f a European governm ent; t h e i r w r itin g s were r a t h e r th e work o f d o c t r i n a i r e s aim ing p rim a rily a t th e en lig h ten m en t o f p u b lic o p in io n . The g r e a t e s t w eakness, however, was th e d if f u s io n o f a c tio n among th e m ajor c iv ic g ro u p s, s tr u g g lin g to re s o lv e th e dilemma o f European p o l i t i c s . T h e ir d if f e r e n c e s in th e means to a t t a i n a u n ite d Europe ranged from th e e x tre m is t r e v o lu t i o n a r i e s , th roug h shades o f l i b e r a l "dem ocrats" and f r e e - t r a d e eco n o m ists, to th e most c o n s e rv a tiv e p a c i f i s t s , who were s a t i s f i e d to b ase t h e i r a c tio n sim ply on m oral With th e e x c e p tio n o f Czar A le x a n d e r’s Holy A l l i ance a tte m p t (see above, C hapter IV); th e f o r c e f u l a tte m p t (and b e la te d claim ) o f Napoleon I (se e above, C hapter IV and f o o tn o te ) ; and th e a llu s io n s o f Napoleon I I I t o th e European F e d e ra tio n in h is book, Iddes n a p o le o n ie n n e s . p u b lish e d in London in 1839, and su b se q u e n tly d u rin g a speech on F ebruary 14, 1867, in which he r e f e r r e d to th e p o s s ib le " 'u n io n o f European s t a t e s in a s in g le c o n fe d e ra t i o n . ' " But th e r e i s no h i s t o r i c a l ev id en ce t h a t he a c tiv e ly t r i e d to promote European u n ity in t h i s d i r e c ti o n (as c i t e d and quoted by Renouvin from above work [ n .p .] and speech [no r e fe re n c e given] in op. c i t . . pp. 22, 4 ) . 158 p e rs u a s io n and good w i l l . T r a n s itio n to th e Idea o f a World A s s o c ia tio n o f N atio n s: 1899-1922 The id e a o f a f e d e r a tio n o f s t a t e s which dom inated th e f i r s t h a l f o f th e c e n tu ry gave way l i t t l e by l i t t l e to a more modest arrangem ent o f a c o n fe d e ra tio n o r a s s o c ia tio n o f s t a t e s . ^ F in a lly around th e tu r n o f th e c e n tu ry , th e e f f o r t s to u n i t e Europe became absorbed in th e emerging movement f o r a u n iv e r s a l a s s o c ia tio n o r leag ue o f n a tio n s 35 An i n d ic a tio n o f t h i s tendency may be found in th e a r t i c l e s o f C h arles MacKay ap p e arin g in th e London Review and Weekly J o u rn a l o f P o l i t i c s . . . as e a r ly as 1860. A lthough MacKay p ro fe s s e d to fo llo w th e system o f U nited S ta te s o f America in h is p lan f o r a U nited S ta te s o f E urope, he f a i l e d to p re s e n t th e e s s e n t i a l s o f th e American C o n s titu tio n and m erely su g g ested t h a t th e Euro pean C ongress would need convene only when one o f th e member s t a t e s o f th e " ’F e d e r a tio n '" re q u e s te d , ac co rd in g to R enouvin, in op. c i t . . p. 18. 35 I n t e r n a t io n a l developm ents in flu e n c e d by educa t i o n a l and s c i e n t i f i c p ro g re ss h elp ed m o tiv a te t r a n s f e r o f th e problem o f European p o l i t i c a l o rg a n iz a tio n to th e w orld w ide sp h e re . The i n t e r n a t i o n a l C ongress o f Peace seemed s a t i s f i e d sim ply to t a l k about a union o f European s t a t e s and v eered tow ard a u n iv e r s a l Congress o r League o f s t a t e s as th e tw e n tie th c e n tu ry approached. At th e Congress of P o l i t i c a l S cien ces in 1900 a t P a r i s , th e id e a o f a European Union was r e le g a te d to an a s s o c ia tio n o r league o f s t a t e s . In f a c t , th e m ajor d is c u s s io n focused on th e e u lo g ie s of £roile Boutmy and A n ato le L ero y -B eau lieu co n cern in g th e 159 I n d i c a ti v e o f t h i s tendency was th e Hague I n t e r n a t i o n a l Peace C o n feren ce. Held in 1899, i t succeeded in e s t a b l i s h i n g th e f i r s t i n t e r n a t i o n a l Permanent C ourt o f A r b i t r a t i o n . As a r e s u l t , th e p a r t i s a n s o f peace became p a c i f i e d , t h e i r u n e a s in e s s over th e q u e s tio n o f war o r peace was a p p e a s e d -- fo r a decade a t l e a s t - - a n d few b e lie v e d i t any lo n g e r n e c e s s a ry to f e d e r a te E urope. In 1901, how ever, a b e la te d p u b lic a tio n o f 807 pages appeared w hich seemed somewhat out o f p la c e . I t t r i e d to r e v iv e th e id e a s o f Pecqueur w ith o u t b o th e rin g to c i t e them a c c o rd in g to R en o u v in .^7 Y et, i t d id ten d to u p -d a te f o r a new g e n e ra tio n th e long h i s t o r i c a l s tr u g g le f o r European u n it y . p ro g re s s o f mankind in i n t e r n a t i o n a l com m unication, th e o r g a n iz a tio n and e n lig h te n m e n t o f th e w orking c l a s s e s in E urope, and th e c o o p e ra tio n o f European s t a t e s in c o l o n i a l developm ent. In th e end th e C ongress took up th e id e a o f economic u n ity th ro u g h a European custom s union (se e R enouvin, op. c i t . . pp. 2 0 -3 , f o r an e x c e lle n t commentary and a n a ly s i s o f th e movement to u n i t e Europe d u rin g t h i s p e r i o d ) . ^ I a k o v Novikov, La F e d e ra tio n de 1 'Europe . . . ( P a r is : A lcan , 1901). 37 N ovikov's s u g g e s tio n s a r e summarized by Renouvin in op. c i t . . p. 20. A lso see P e c q u e u r's id e a s above, p . 146. 160 A nother in d ic a tio n o f th e tre n d tow ard a w orld a s s o c ia tio n o f n a tio n s was th e a c tio n o f th e I n t e r p a r l i a m entary Union in 1905. In s e l e c ti n g i t s Commission to stu d y th e o r g a n iz a tio n o f an I n te r n a t io n a l P a rlia m e n t, f o r exam ple, i t d id so on a w orld-w ide b a s i s . A lso co n firm in g th e new u n iv e r s a l o u tlo o k , th e German j u r i s t Schiicking in 1912 d e c la re d t h a t th e o v e r-s e a i n t e r e s t s o f European s t a t e s p re c lu d e d t h e i r f e d e r a tio n u n le s s o th e r c o n tin e n ts should a s s o c i a te w ith them. "The id e a o f a 'U n ite d S ta te s o f E u ro p e ,'" he added, " th u s forms an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f a l a r g e r c o n c e p tio n , t h a t o f th e 'S o c ie ty o f N a tio n s .’"-*® F or some n in e ty y e a r s , m oreover, Europe had e x is te d under th e d i r e c t i o n o f th e C oncert o f Europe, o fte n c r e d ite d w ith p re s e rv in g th e " u n ity and g e n e ra l Q Q peace o f Europe. W ith th e o v e r-s e a c o lo n ia l o u t l e t f o r o o C ite d by Renouvin [no r e f e r e n c e given] in o p . c i t . . pp. 21-2. 39 Gaps in th e u n ity and peace o f Europe d u rin g t h i s p e r io d , however, were th e Crim ean, A u s tro -P ru s s ia n , Franco-Germ an, T u r k o - I ta l ia n , and s e v e r a l Balkan Wars. For o th e r s i g n i f i c a n t r e s u l t s o f th e C oncert o f Europe, see Ross Hoffman, The G reat R epub lic: A H i s t o r i c a l View o f th e I n t e r n a t io n a l Community and th e O rg a n iz a tio n o f Peace (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942), 10-1, 97, 126 f f . ; Hans J . M orgenthau, P o l i t i c s among N atio n s: The S tru g g le f o r Power and Peace (2d e d . , Rev. and E n l . ; New 161 economic and p o l i t i c a l te n s io n s , and th e r e l a t i v e peace and m a te r ia l p ro g re ss d u rin g th e t r a n s i t i o n to th e tw en t i e t h c e n tu ry , a growing sen se of u n iv e rs a lis m and p o l l t i c a l optim ism p re v a ile d . F u rth erm o re, th e men o f s t a t e a f f a i r s had become s e l f - s a t i s f i e d w ith t h e i r European ste w a rd sh ip under th e p r i n c i p l e s o f a l l i a n c e s , b a la n c e 40 o f power, and diplom acy th ro u g h ad hoc c o n fe re n c e s. Under such c irc u m s ta n c e s, th e argum ents f o r a European F e d e ra tio n were l o s t in th e g r e a t e x p e c ta tio n s o f i n t e r n a tio n a l c o o p e ra tio n and a s s o c i a t i o n . ^ When World War I York: Knopf, 1954), pp. 196-7, 434-5; W alter A llis o n P h i l l i p s , The C o n fed e ratio n of Europe: A Study o f th e European A llia n c e . 1813-1823 as an Experim ent in th e I n t e r n a tio n a l O rg a n iz a tio n o f Peace (London: Longmans, G reen, 1920), pp. 11-2, 14-33, 275. ^ B e s i d e s , a growing body o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rg a n i z a t io n was s e a te d in S w itz e rla n d , se e Appendix C, p a r. 9. For an e x c e lle n t a n a ly s is o f th e pros and cons of th e p r in c ip le o f a l l i a n c e s and b a la n c e o f power to m ain tain i n t e r n a t i o n a l p eace, see M orgenthau, op. c i t ., pp. 155-201. ^*-This, o f c o u rse , was n o t t r u e in a few c i r c l e s , however sm all a m in o rity . But even in th e c a se o f S ir Max WHchter, who p re se n te d h is p lan f o r a European U nity League to King Edward V II in 1909, c o n d itio n s d id n o t seem to w a rra n t i t s founding u n t i l 1913, ac c o rd in g to Renouvin in op. c i t . . p. 14. W ith th e advent o f World War I , however, t h i s o rg a n iz a tio n proved o f no a v a i l . 162 e ru p te d w ith a vengeance, however, i t s ru d e awakening proved th e inadequacy o f th e C oncert o f Europe system A 0 and i t s undoing. The shock o f a w orld war j o l t e d peace-m inded le a d e rs in th e a l l i e d c o u n tr ie s in to o rg a n iz in g s o c i e t i e s t h a t would h e lp end war once and fo r a l l . By th e c lo s e o f th e w ar, th e momentum o f th e e f f o r t s o f more th an a dozen of th e s e peace o rg a n iz a tio n s backed up P re s id e n t W ilson in g e tt i n g a w orld a s s o c ia tio n o f n a tio n s i n c o r p o ra te d in to th e V e r s a ille s Peace T re a ty . S u b s ta n tia l c o n c e ssio n s had to be made, however, to th e n a t i o n a l i s t i c i n t e r e s t s o f th e peace c o n feren c e r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s of B r i t a i n , F ran c e, and I t a l y to a s s u re i t s c r e a t i o n . ^ A fte r th e e s ta b lis h m e n t o f t h i s w orld League o f N ations on Jan u ary 10, 1920, a new e ra in th e h i s t o r y o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rg a n iz a tio n began. W ith th e h ig h e s t hopes f o r w orld peace and u n d e r s ta n d in g , Europeans s e t t l e d back to l e t th e League o f 42 I t a ls o was to mark an end to a p e rio d in which f o r c e n tu r ie s th e r e l a t i o n s between n a tio n s had been th e s p e c ia l p re se rv e o r "game" o f th e a r is to c r a c y and t h e i r c i v i l s e r v a n ts . 43 Thus from th e s t a r t , th e e f f e c tiv e n e s s o f th e League was im peded. 163 44 N atio n s, through th e p r in c ip le o f c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i ty , become th e g u ard ian an g e l o f t h e i r in t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . ^ B r ita in re tu rn e d to h e r p o lic y o f "sp le n d id i s o l a t io n " from C o n tin e n ta l a f f a i r s . F ran ce, h u m ilia te d by th e lo s s o f le a d e rs h ip in Europe, s tro v e to re g a in h er form er p r e s t i g e . ^ An au ra o f w orld peace d u rin g th e 1920's was to l u l l th e masses in to b e lie v in g th a t th e 44 As fo rm ally p io n eered in A r t ic l e 16 of th e Cove n a n t. Morgenthau in op. c i t ., pp. 274-86, e v a lu a te s c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r ity as an i d e a l , and in p r a c tic e under A r t i c l e 16, as lim ite d to th e v io la tio n o f p ro v is io n s s e t f o r th in A r ti c l e s 12, 13, and 13. / C T h irty European s t a t e s were members o f th e League of N a tio n s. In f a c t , i t was th e European s t a t e s th a t r e a l l y c o n tr o lle d i t . ^ O n e o f th e very few "Europeans" who d isc e rn e d as e a rly as 1918 th e inadequacy of a u n iv e r s a l o rg a n iz a tio n f o r harm onizing th e d is u n ity o f Europe was P ro fe sso r E in au d i, a f r e e - t r a d e econom ist of re p u te a t th e U n iv e rsity o f T u rin . S harply c r i t i c i z i n g " th e plans f o r a mere League of N ations th a t l e f t i n t a c t th e so v e re ig n ty o f s t a t e s " in two l e t t e r s to th e e d i t o r o f a new spaper, P ro fe sso r E inaudi compared "such a league to th e American A r tic le s o f Con fe d e ra tio n and i n s i s t e d th a t what Europe r e a l l y needed was a r e p l i c a o f th e American C o n s titu tio n ." As f u r th e r sub s t a n t i a t i o n , he p o in te d to th e " f in e example of f e d e r a tio n . . . [ th a t] was th e B r i t i s h Union w ith S cotland . . ." (as c i t e d and quoted by C h arles F. D e lz e ll in "The European F e d e r a lis t Movement in I t a l y : F i r s t P h ase," The J o u rn a l o f Modern H is to r y . XXXII [I9 6 0 ], 241-50 [p . 2 4 1 ]). But h is judgment was submerged in th e t i d e o f postw ar optim ism a t th e dawn of a new w orld o rd e r o f peace and s e lf - d e te r m in a tio n . 164 emancipated peoples of Europe would never t o l e r a t e nor have to endure another war.^7 Meanwhile, c e r ta in hard socioeconomic fa c ts slowly unfolded to d is ru p t th e m agnificent postwar ex p ectatio n s of Europeans. The " in to x ic a tin g illu s io n s " of the T reaty of V e rs a ille s soon wore o ff when Europeans discovered th a t t h e i r economic l i f e had been d r a s t i c a lly changed sin ce th e war.**® Europe was no longer th e w o rld 's c r e d ito r sin ce she owed a c o lo s s a l war debt to th e young and prosperous United S ta te s of America. And th is was becoming im possible to repay because of the lo ss of former American and Russian export m ark ets. Unemployment and popular d isc o n te n t were in c re a sin g . Instead of g re a te r c o n tin e n ta l s o lid a r ity r e s u ltin g from th e war, Europe was more fragmented and 49 diso rg an ized than ever. Moreover, in th e e f f o r t of each ^Some reasons fo r th is a t t i t u d e in the 1920's may be found in Appendix C, p ar. 10. A o For o th er evidence of E urope's economic p lig h t in th e 1920's , see Count C arlo S forza, "The Proposed Federa tio n of European S ta te s ," C urrent H is to ry . XXXII (Ju ly , 1930), 658-61; and Winston C h u rc h ill, "The United S tates of Europe," Saturday Evening P o s t. CCII (February 15, 1930), 25, 48, 51. ^F rom "26 customs b a r r ie r s and 13 monetary sy s tems" in 1914, Europe had d ivided fu rth e r in to "35 customs b a r r ie r s and 27 monetary system s" by 1930 according to S forza, o p. c i t .. p. 658. 165 l i t t l e s t a t e t o prom ote I t s own w e l f a r e , a "m ania f o r econom ic n a tio n a lis m " s p r e a d . In tim e , t h i s o n ly a g g r a v a te d f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s a t home and a b ro a d and f o s t e r e d n a t i o n a l i s t i c d is s e n s io n .^ ® D uring th e e a r l y p o stw ar y e a r s from 1919-1923, b e f o r e th e economic p l i g h t o f th e European s t a t e s had become g e n e r a l l y r e a l i z e d , th e Id e a o f a E uropean U nion, overshadow ed by th e League o f N a tio n s , had a t t r a c t e d l i t t l e o r no a t t e n t i o n . ^ P o l i t i c a l l y Europe was in v o lv e d in t h r e e i d e o l o g i c a l g ro u p in g s : (1) th e r e v o lu t i o n a r y Com m u n is ts , who w anted to t u r n E urope i n t o a S o v ie t w o rk e rs ' p a r a d is e in u n io n w ith R u s s ia ; (2) th e m id d le - o f - th e - r o a d P a c i f i s t s , who "w ere i r r e v o c a b ly wedded t o th e c o n c e p t o f th e League" and s u s p e c te d t h a t anyone who s u g g e s te d in d e p en d en t European a c ti o n was a d i s r u p t e r o f th e L e a g u e 's m is s io n o f u n i v e r s a l i t y ; and (3) th e o ld -g u a rd N a tio n a l i s t s , who p u rsu ed th e t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c i e s o f a l l i a n c e s , ^® S forza, op. c i t .. p . 658. A lse se e C h u r c h il l , op. c i t .. pp. 25, 48. 51Cf. S e c tio n V I I I o f B ib lio g ra p h y . 166 armaments, and economic n a tio n a lism in th e hope of r e s t o r ing and m ain tain in g t h e i r v ested i n t e r e s t s . ^ i n th e end, th e N a tio n a lis ts p re v a ile d . R evival of th e Idea of European F ed eratio n from 1922 to World War I I A young i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t , who was to devote h is e n t i r e l i f e to th e cause of a u n ite d Europe, envisaged th e dead-end fu tu re of Europe, dismembered by so many p e tty s t a t e s as compared w ith America and R ussia. By th e summer o f 1922 he had an a r t i c l e on "The European Q uestion" CO p rin te d in a B e rlin and a Vienna newspaper. J The following ^ Count [R ichard N.] Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers th e World (With a P reface by . . . S ir Winston S. C h u rc h ill; London: Huthinson [1 9 5 3 ]), p. 89. ^ I b id . . p. 91. On pp. 81-91 Coudenhove-Kalergi r e l a t e s how he became in te r e s te d in th e idea of a u n ite d Europe, why he chose th e name of Pan-Europa, how he t r i e d to secure governm ental i n i t i a t i v e fo r th e idea by having P re sid e n t Masaryk launch th e movement, why Masaryk d e c lin e d (although he to ld Coudenhove-Kalergi th a t " 't h e day w i l l come when th e United S ta te s of Europe w i l l be e s ta b lis h e d . . .'"[p. 87]; and s h o rtly b e fo re h is death he s a id to a r e p o r t e r I f I were t h i r t y - f i v e , I would put every ounce of energy in to th e r e a liz a t i o n o f th e United S ta te s of E u ro p e ." 1 [p . 8 8 ]), how he f a il e d to g e t any respo nse from M ussolini and th e re fo re decided th a t he had to w rite a book on th e su b je c t in order to appeal to th e people o f Europe. 167 y e a r C oudenhove-K alergi p u b lish e d h is £ i r s t book on th e s u b je c t o f European u n i t y , d e d ic a te d to th e y o u th o f E urope. I t was an a tte m p t th ro u g h h i s t o r i c a l , m o ra l, and p s y c h o lo g ic a l re a s o n in g t o r a l l y p eo p le around economic and p o l i t i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r European U n i o n . ^4 The h i s t o r i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h i s book may be ju d g ed from th e p u b lic re sp o n s e and f i n a n c i a l su p p o rt which i t in d u ced . Thousands w ere t o j o i n th e Pan-European m o v e m e n t,^ and b ra n ch o f f i c e s w ere to be opened in every c o u n try e x c e p t R u ssia . Newspapers th ro u g h o u t Europe p ro vid ed fa v o ra b le c o v e ra g e , and th e id e a o f a U nited S ta te s 54 Pan-Europe (Wien: Paneuropa V e rla g , 1923). C oudenhove-K alergi p u b lis h e d an Am erican e d i t i o n o f t h i s book, Pan-Europe (W ith an I n tr o d u c tio n by N ich o las Murray B u tle r ; New York: Knopf, 1926), w hich has been used in t h i s s tu d y . See h is pp. 8-116 f o r th e economic and p o l i t i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n ; and pp. 172-93 f o r th e s te p s (in c lu d in g a tw o-house l e g i s l a t u r e m odelled a f t e r th e U n ited S ta te s C ongress) to European Union. ^ R e p r e s e n tin g p erso n s in ev e ry s t a t e in a l l w alks o f l i f e - - f r o m o rd in a ry c i t i z e n s t o men in th e h ig h e s t o f f i c e s o f governm ent--som e o f th e more w id ely known w ere Bene£, M asaryk, D o llf u s s , R enner, A denauer, Loebe, S t r e s e - mann, W arburg, Blum, B oncour, B ria n d , C a illa u x , H e r r io t, C roce, N l t t i , S fo rz a , Amery, C h u r c h ill, C ooper, K e re n sk i, L oder, M oltke, Nansen, V e n iz e lo s , E i n s t e i n , F reu d , Ludwig, Mann, and O rtega y G a s s e t. For o th e r d is tin g u is h e d su p p o r t e r s , se e C oudenhove-K alergi, An Id ea Conquers th e W orld, pp. 99-112, 115-7, 121, 125-7, 130, 134-5, 137-8, 196-8, 216-9. 168 o f Europe was r e v i v e d . ^ W ith a d e q u a te f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t, th e movement e s t a b l i s h e d i t s h e a d q u a rte rs a t V ienna, o p e ra te d i t s own p u b lis h in g h o u se , and f i r s t is s u e d th e m onthly J o u r n a l, P an-E urope, in A p r i l , 1 9 2 4 .^ H e r r i o t , F r a n c e 's Prime M in is te r and M in is te r o f F o re ig n A f f a i r s , was t o p le a d f o r a U n ited S t a t e s o f Europe in an a d d re s s a t th e Sarbonne in O c to b e r, 1924. Then on J a n u a ry 29, 1925, b e f o re th e F rench Assem bly he s a id : Europe i s h a r d ly more th a n a l i t t l e p ro v in c e o f th e w o rld . Would t h a t i t c o u ld r e s t r a i n i t s c o n c e it a l i t t l e ! . . . ^ T h e grow ing p o p u la r ity o f th e id e a o f a U nited S t a t e s o f Europe may be n o te d from th e f a c t t h a t e d i t o r i a l s and a r t i c l e s began t o a p p e ar in th e p r e s s as w e ll a s pam- p h e lts and m agazine a r t i c l e s on th e news s ta n d s and in th e book sh o p s. In f a c t , th e id e a was som etim es e x p lo ite d by groups w ith d i f f e r e n t m o tiv e s . See A ppendix C, p a r. 11. 57 Many th o u g h t t h a t V ienna m ight become th e c a p i t a l o f U .S .E . M oreover, C oudenhove-K alergi found l i t t l e o p p o s itio n a t f i r s t to th e movement and a t t r i b u t e d t h i s l a r g e ly to h is ind ep en d en ce o f p a r ty p o l i t i c s and b u s in e s s a f f a i r s , n o t t o m ention th e r e p u ta t i o n o f h is w if e , Ida R oland, V ienna s ta g e s t a r , who a s s i s t e d him in h is work and o f te n accom panied him on h is l e c t u r e to u r s and to co n f e re n c e s w ith im p o rta n t men o f a f f a i r s in v a rio u s cou n t r i e s . See h is C rusade f o r P an-E urope: A uto biograph y o f a Man and a Movement (New York: Putnam*s T c . 1 9 4 3 ]), pp. 88, 9 2 -3 , 96, 101-2 e t p a s sim . 169 M y g r e a te s t w ish is to see one day th e U nited S ta te s of Europe become a r e a l i t y . And I f I have been working w ith so much courage . . . f o r th e League o f N atio n s, 1 have done so because I con** sid e re d t h i s g re a t I n s t i t u t i o n a f i r s t d r a f t of th e U nited S ta te s o f Europe. German Foreign M in iste r Stresemann supported H e r r io t's appeal fo r a U nited S ta te s of Europe. But when a French in f la tio n a r y c r i s i s brought H e r r io t's replacem ent as head 59 of th e government by P oincard, th e su b je c t was dropped. From th e French government, Coudenhove-Kalergi tu rn ed to th e League of N ations S e c r e ta r ia t, headed by B r i t a i n 's S ir E ric Drummond. But S ir E ric was not too re c e p tiv e to th e id e a , fo r he ". . . knew only too w ell th a t th e B r itis h government d id not wish to support any th in g th a t might weaken B r i t a i n 's c o n tro l over th e C o n ti n e n t, anything th a t might promote a c o n tin e n ta l union of E urope," and so h is l a s t words were " 'P le a s e d o n 't go to o f a s t : * " 60 R ealizin g th a t th e S e c r e ta r ia t was simply th e L eague's ex ecu tiv e organ, " . . . w h ile i t s a c tu a l p o licy As quoted by Coudenhove-K alergi, in op. c i t .. p. 100; a ls o see p. 99. 59I b id . . p. 101. 6QI b id . . pp. 1 0 4 -5 . 170 was d eterm in ed in Downing S t r e e t and th e Quai d 'O r s a y , " ^ C oudenhove-K alergi tr a v e le d to B r ita in in th e s p rin g o f 1925 to t a l k w ith th e le a d in g B r i t i s h men o f a f f a i r s . A lthough n o t one o f them p u b lic ly opposed th e p r o j e c t , C oudenhove-K alergi w ro te: "The m a jo rity . . . ex p ressed a l l s o r t s of r e s e r v a tio n s " co n cern in g a European Union, and " I met no le a d in g Englishman who was p re p ared to ta k e th e i n i t i a t i v e in s e c u rin g B r i t a i n 's su p p o rt f o r P a n -E u ro p e ." ^ T h e re fo re , C oudenhove-K alergi gave up th e id e a o f in c lu d in g B r it a in d i r e c t l y in th e proposed European Union and " l e f t th e q u e s tio n o f B r i t i s h p a r t i c i p a tio n open."**3 In th e hope o f w inning American su p p o rt f o r th e id e a o f Pan-European Union, C oudenhove-K algeri and h is w ife jo u rn ey ed to America in th e f a l l o f 1925. For th r e e m onths, b o th le c tu r e d in v a rio u s c i t i e s o f th e U nited ^ C o u d e n h o v e -K a le rg i, An Idea Conquers th e W orld, op. c i t . . p. 114. F u rth e r s u b s t a n t ia t io n o f t h i s manner o f League d i r e c ti o n may be found in M orgenthau, op. c i t . , pp. 436-40. ( L J I b i d . . p. 115. A lso see C rusade f o r P an-E urope, pp. 107-9, f o r f u r t h e r comments on th e B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e toward C o n tin e n ta l u n io n . Only L. S. Amery was th en ready to su p p o rt a union w h o le h e a rte d ly (pp. 1 0 8-9 ). 6 3 I b i d . , pp. 1 0 7 -8 . 171 S ta te s under th e sp o n so rsh ip o f th e F o reig n P o lic y A sso c i a t i o n and won th e su p p o rt o f many prom inent A m e r i c a n s . On h is way home from A m erica, C oudenhove-K alergi stopped a t th e Quai d*Orsay to see F o reig n M in is te r B rian d , who gave th e im p ressio n of d e te rm in a tio n to crown h is Locarno trium ph by proposing an even b o ld e r s t e p , t h a t tow ard th e U nited S ta te s o f Europe. The f i r s t Congress o f Europe was h e ld in V ienna, O ctober 3 -6 , 1926. More th an two thousand d e le g a te s r e p r e s e n tin g tw e n ty -fo u r s t a t e s p a r t i c i p a t e d . Newspapers th ro u g h o u t Europe h e ra ld e d th e aims o f th e C o n g ress, and new a r t i c l e s and pam phlets on th e id ea of a U nited S ta te s o f Europe ap p eared . The sw e llin g Pan-Europe membership soon made i t a p p a re n t t h a t a p r i v a t e o rg a n iz a tio n could no lo n g er meet th e e x p e c ta tio n s o f ". . . m illio n s of people [who] had a lre a d y s e t t h e i r hopes on Pan-Europa and were convinced o f th e p o s s i b i l i t y o f i t s r e a l i z a t i o n . ” The n e x t s t e p , th e r e f o r e , seemed to r e q u ir e government sp o n so r s h ip , and F rance w ith B riand as F o reig n M in is te r was th e 64 An Idea Conquers th e W orld, pp. 116-21. 6 5I b i d . . p. 123. 172 l o g i c a l c h o i c e . ^ A lthough th e Pan-European movement was a t th e h e ig h t o f I t s p o p u la r ity between 1 9 2 6 -1 9 3 9 ,^ B rian d , I t s p r e s id e n t, had rem ained s i l e n t d u rin g th e s e s s io n s o f th e F rench Assembly and th o s e o f th e League o f N ations d u rin g 1927 and 1928. On th e s e v e r a l o c c a sio n s t h a t Coudenhove- K a le rg i met w ith him d u rin g t h i s p e r io d , B riand im plied t h a t he n ev e r q u ite found th e tim e " f u l l y r i p e , " and t h a t i t seemed "b e fo re he could p u b lic ly s e iz e th e i n i t i a t i v e f o r P an-E urope," one o r two ta s k s alw ays rem ained to be co m p leted , such as th e K ello g -B rian d Peace P act and th e Young [R e p a ra tio n s] Plan.**® C oudenhove-K alergi, op. c i t . . pp. 125-8. In Hay, 1927, B ria n d , E u ro p e 's most p o p u la r statesm an a t th e tim e , ". . . p u b lic ly and w ith o u t r e s e r v a tio n i d e n t i f i e d h im se lf w ith th e ca u se o f Pan-Europe" when he a c c e p te d th e hon orary p re sid e n c y o f th e Union (se e i b i d . , p. 128). **^At th e 1927 T rade Union C ongress in E dinburgh, E rn e st Bevln moved a r e s o l u t i o n , which was approved, to "a tte m p t to c r e a te a U nited S ta te s o f Europe . . . " See h is sta te m e n t in House o f Commons Deb. . 5 th s e r i e s , 1945- 56, v o l. 416 (23 November 1945), 781-2. In 1928, F r i t z T hyssen, German I n d u s t r i a l i s t "made what was pro b ab ly th e l a s t c o n c re te p ro p o sa l f o r an economic union in W estern E u ro p e," a c co rd in g to Mr. Boothby in House o f Commons Deb. . 5 th s e r i e s , 1945-46, v o l. 419 (20 F eb ru ary 1946), 1247. go C o u d en h o v e-K a lerg i, op . c i t .« p. 152. 173 In Ju n e, 1929, w h ile th e C ouncil o f th e League of N ations was m eetin g , B riand re c e iv e d from Stresem ann and o th e r F oreign M in is te rs t h e i r prom ise to su p p o rt a t th e n ex t Assembly s e s s io n h is i n i t i a t i v e f o r a European Union. A few weeks l a t e r , B riand confirm ed h is in te n tio n a t a p re ss c o n fe re n c e . Not only d id th e news o f th e U nited S ta te s o f Europe g e t w orld-w ide co v e rag e, b u t a ls o i t became th e to p ic of c o n v e rsa tio n throughou t Europe. A lthough o p p o sitio n to th e plan came m ainly from th e 69 extrem e n a t i o n a l i s t s and th e t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n i s t s , th e v a s t m a jo rity of th e people o f Europe were ready to back B riand. The B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e , however, was n e g a tiv e . The D aily T elegraph c a r r i e d Prime M in is te r M acdonald's d e c la r a tio n t h a t ". . . th e p lan f o r th e e sta b lish m e n t of th e U nited S ta te s o f Europe [was] prem ature . . . [and] should be postponed f o r a t l e a s t ten y e a r s ." T his s t a t e ment had i t s in ten d ed e f f e c t - - t o dampen p u b lic enthusiasm 69 C oudenhove-K alergi, op. c i t . . pp. 153-4. The " o ld e r" p a c i f i s t s were dubious about th e p la n , f o r they had always been s u s p ic io u s o f Pan-Europe as a scheme o f c o n tin e n ta l i m p e r i a li s t s w ith u l t e r i o r m otives to d e s tro y th e League o f N ations and u n i v e r s a l i t y (see i b i d . . pp. 105, 96, 100). R e p re s e n ta tiv e o f th e p a c i f i s t argum ents a g a in s t th e p lan a r e th e two a r t i c l e s of David MLtrany, "The Case A g ain st Pan-E urope," C u rren t H is to ry . XXXIII (O ctober, 1930), 65-9 and "Pan Europa: A Hope o r a Danger?" P o l i t i c a l Q u a r te r ly . I (Septem ber, 1930), 457-78. 174 fo r th e plan and to Impede i t . ^ In France, however, Foreign M in ister Briand was acclaim ed and a lso e le c te d Prime M in iste r. In f a c t , th e French Assembly gave him an overwhelming vote of confidence a f t e r he had to ld of h is in te n tio n to submit h is plan fo r Pan-Europe to th e League of N ations. T henceforth, B ria n d 's Pan-Europe e f f o r t became th a t of th e French Government. On September 5, 1929, Briand presen ted h is plan fo r Pan-Europe to th e League Assembly, and four days l a t e r Stresemann in support of Briand d eclared Pan-Europe a n e c e s s ity . But th e B r itis h Foreign S ecretary remained s i l e n t . Briand was then asked to submit a memorandum of h is plan to a l l European governments and to o ffe r s p e c ific proposals based on t h e i r response a t th e next y e a r 's se ssio n . Meanwhile two u n fo rtu n a te blows stru c k a t the h e a rt of B rian d 's e f f o r t: Stresem ann's sudden death on ^C oudenhove-K alergi, op. c i t . . p. 154. Cf. th e c la s h between th e adherents of European F ederation and of n a tio n a l sov ereig n ty in member n a tio n s of th e League of N ations, the B r itis h a t t i t u d e , and th e b e l i e f of no need of European Union because of th e League of N ations in Andrew and Frances Boyd, Western Union: A Study of th e Trend toward European Unity (Washington: Public A ffa irs Press [c . 1949]), pp. 38-40. ^C oudenhove-K alergi, op. c i t . . pp. 154-5. 175 72 O ctober 3, 1929, and th e U nited S t a t e s ' economic c r i s i s , which sp read to Europe. Because Pan-Europe was in je o p a rd y , Coudenhove- K a le rg i and H e rrlo t teamed up on a l e c tu r e to u r to V ienna, Prague, and B e rlin in su p p o rt o f B riand. L a te r, in th e hope o f o f f s e t t i n g th e mounting German n a tio n a lis m and clam or f o r r e v is io n o f th e V e r s a ille s T re a ty , th e Second C ongress of Pan-Europe was h eld in B e rlin on May 17, 1930. P ress coverage was e x c e lle n t, and B riand tim ed th e r e le a s e o f h is Memorandum to th e Twenty-Six G o v e r n m e n t s ^ Q n t h i s very day. But th e European s p i r i t o f th e Congress and th e 72 Now B riand had l o s t a European p a r tn e r , one who had e f f e c te d th e s e c u r ity p act w ith F ran ce, had secured Germany's e n try in to th e League of N ations on equal term s w ith th e o th e r members, and who to g e th e r w ith B riand had n e g o tia te d th e Locarno T reaty and had j o i n t l y won th e Nobel Peace P riz e in 1926. S tresem ann's d e a th a ls o proved a c a ta s tro p h e f o r Germany. There was no one who could keep th e extrem e German n a t i o n a l i s t s and r e v i s i o n i s t s m o llif ie d to re p la c e him. C oudenhove-K alergi b e lie v e d th a t H itle r might never have come to power and thrown Europe in to th e Second World War had he liv e d (op. c i t . . p. 158). A lso see however, i b i d . , pp. 142-3, f o r d i f f e r i n g m otives th a t may have guided Stresem ann and B riand toward Pan-Europe. 71 See M . B rian d , "Memorandum on th e O rg an izatio n o f a Regime o f European F e d e ra l Union: A ddressed to tw e n ty -s ix governments o f Europe . . . May 17, 1930," I n te r n a tio n a l C o n c ilia tio n : S p e c ia l B u l l e t i n . Ju ne, 1930, pp. 3 2 5 -5 3 . 176 hopes f o r B ria n d 's Memorandum were dampened d u rin g th e speech o f th e B r i t i s h d e le g a te , L. S. Amery, when he d e c la re d : " . . Our h e a r ts a re not in Europe; we could never sh a re th e t r u l y European p o in t of view nor become r e a l p a t r i o t s o f Europe. . . .'" 7 4 T h e r e a f te r , th e w orld p re ss and th e r e p l i e s o f th e tw e n ty -s ix governments were more c r i t i c a l . Most govern ments q u a l if i e d t h e i r p a r ti c i p a t i o n on t h a t of B r ita in . The B r i t is h " re p ly was e v a siv e . . . [ i t ] wanted n e ith e r to be excluded from Europe nor to be in clu d ed in i t . I t was anxious only to p rev en t a European f e d e r a l union from b ein g s e t up. I t th e r e f o r e proposed to l im it th e intended 75 organism to a European Committee of th e League o f Nations." ^ C h u r c h i l l , in h is op. c i t . . p. 51, a ls o p o rtra y ed th e B r i t i s h view toward European Union in a s im ila r v ein: "We a r e w ith Europe, b u t n o t of i t . W e a r e lin k e d , but n ot com prised. W e a r e i n t e r e s t e d and a s s o c ia te d , but not ab so rb ed . C oudenhove-K alergi, op. c i t . . pp. 161-2. ^ C o u d en h o v e -K alerg i, op. c i t . . p. 164. A lso see D espatch to His M a je s ty 's Ambassador in P a ris E nclosing th e Memorandum o f th e French Government on th e O rg a n isa tio n o f a System of European F e d e ra l Union . . . May 28. 1930. F oreign O ffic e (Misc. No. 10, 1930), Cmd. 3595 (London: H.M .S.O., 1930), pp. 1-25; and f o r s im ila r views o f Den mark, H olland, P o rtu g a l, Sweden, and S w itzerlan d as w e ll as th o s e o f th e o th e r governm ents, see "European F ed eral Union: R ep lies o f Twenty-Six Governments o f Europe to M. B riand*s Memorandum o f May 17, 1930," I n te r n a tio n a l Con c i l i a t i o n . No. 265 (December, 1930), 653-769. 177 A lthough th e tw e n ty -s ix governm ents agreed to c o o p e ra te w ith F rance on th e European q u e s tio n o f Union w ith in th e o rg a n iz a tio n o f th e League, th e s o l i d a r i t y fo r u n ity had changed by th e tim e t h e i r r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s met in Geneva in Septem ber, 1930. The w orld economic c r i s i s and unemployment had brought o ld n a t i o n a l i s t i c fe a rs to th e s u rfa c e . To c o u n te ra c t a l l t h i s , each n a tio n pursued a p o lic y o f economic entrenchm ent, which m erely i n t e n s i f i e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l f e e lin g s of i n s e c u r ity . Even th e attem p t o f B riand to win B r i t a i n 's su p p o rt by w a te rin g down th e f e d e r a l p r i n c i p l e ^ was o f l i t t l e a v a i l , f o r in th e m idst o f th e n e g o tia tio n s , H i t l e r 's N a tio n a l S o c i a l i s ts had made n o ta b le g ain s in th e German e le c tio n s - - a n omen th a t th e European s t a t u s quo o f 1919 was in d an g er. T h e r e a fte r , B ria n d 's p o lic y o f French-German r e c o n c i lia t io n d i s i n t e - 76 In t h i s m odified p la n , B riand suggested a l e g i s l a t i v e "European C o n feren ce," a S e c r e t a r i a t , and an Execu t i v e Committee w ith in th e framework o f th e League, b u t he emphasized th a t " 'i n no c a se and in no d eg ree may th e form ation of th e F e d e ra l Union . . . a f f e c t in any way any o f th e so v ere ig n r i g h t s o f th e s t a t e s . . . ' " (as quoted [ n .p .] in The European Movement, op. c i t . . p. 2 9 ). See Boyd, op. c i t . . pp. 95-108, fo r B riand s a c tu a l p la n ; and pp. 36-40 f o r m ajor c r it i c i s m s o f th e p lan and su g g estio n s o f o th e r governm ents. A lso see S ir A rth u r S a l t e r , The U nited S ta te s o f Europe and Other Papers (New York: Reynal and H itchcock, [1 9 3 3 ]), pp. 106-22, f o r a n a ly s is o f th e p lan and th e B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e . 178 g ra te d and h is European Union p ro p o sa l was d ip lo m a tic a lly s h e l v e d . ^7 B efore a n o th e r y e a r had p assed , B riand was out o f o f f i c e , and as a sad and f o rg o tte n statesm an he d ied on March 7, 1932. With H i t l e r 's r i s e to power In Germany, th e Pan- Europe movement th en t r i e d to go to th e people w ith I t s message In o rd e r to surmount th e T h ird R e ic h 's roadblocks to European u n i t y . 7® But th e Nazis gained m astery o f Germany and went to work on r e v is io n of th e s t a t u s quo. M ainly because they re v iv e d A u s t r i a 's ap p reh ension o f h er independence and F ra n c e ’s o ld German f e a r s was th e Pan- Europe movement a b le to s u rv iv e . W ith A u s tria n and French b a c k in g , i t c a r r ie d on in Vienna u n t i l th e N azis ra id e d ^ B r i t a i n now found i t e a s ie r to a s s e r t h e r s e l f on C o n tin e n ta l a f f a i r s . For th e p r o v e rb ia l B r i t i s h p ro p o sa l o f "a study group" on European Union and th e su g g e s tio n to avoid " th e danger o f d u p lic a tio n between th e League and th e European S e c r e ta r ia t . . (as c i t e d by Coudenhove-K alergi in op. c i t . , pp. 1 6 5 -6 ), see Appendix C, p a r s . 12-13. 78 The e f f o r t and lo g ic of th e argum ents of s t a t e s man H e rrlo t on b e h a lf of u n ity in h is book, The U nited S ta te s o f Europe (1930), was r e a l l y to o l a t e to c o u n te ra c t th e t i d e o f German n a tio n a lis m . In 1932, H e rrio t re sig n e d from Pan-Europe because o f d isagreem ent over i t s p o lic y on Germany's r i g h t to rearm , and many follow ed h is example. 179 P an -E urope's h e a d q u a rte rs and d estro y e d a l l i t s re c o rd s 79 a f t e r H i t l e r 's an n ex atio n of A u s tria . Supported by th e F rench, th e movement endeavored to c a rry on in P a ris and Berne a f t e r March, 1938. Then b eg in n in g in Ju n e, 1938, i n t e r e s t in Pan-European Union was aroused in London by antiappeasem ent le a d e rs : Amery, C h u rc h ill, and Cooper. The Royal I n s t i t u t e of In te r n a tio n a l A f f a ir s sponsored m eetings to examine th e f e a s i b i l i t y of th e id e a , and by l a t e 1938 an a s s o c ia tio n f o r F ed eral RO Union was e s ta b lis h e d . F in a lly in Ju n e, 1939, w ith 79 For P an-E urope's a c t i v i t i e s (a ls o i t s Third and F ourth C ongresses, 1932 and 1936) a f t e r H i t l e r 's a c c e ssio n to power and u n t i l th e f a l l o f A u s tria , see Coudenhove- K a le rg i, An Idea Conquers th e W orld, pp. 176-212. W ithin th e s e pages may be found a s t i r r i n g account o f ra p id changes from 1933 to 1938 in th e b alan c e o f power alignments, th e r e v is io n of th e s ta t u s quo, and reasons f o r th e p o l i t i c a l in e p titu d e o f th e League of N a tio n s --a m eeting p lace fo r governm ents' r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s to come to g e th e r in "a kind of clu b fo r statesm en and j o u r n a l i s t s " ( i b i d . , p. 141). A lso see i b i d . , pp. 69-72, 141-6; and A lfre d M. Bingham, The U nited S ta te s o f Europe (New York: D uell Sloan and P earce [ c . 1 9 4 0 ]), pp. 44-51, on c o n d itio n s con ducive to League w eaknesses. For perhaps th e b e s t a n a ly s is o f B r ita in v s. F rance and Europe in th e League, see Morgen- th a u , op. c i t . . pp. 435-46. An e x c e lle n t tre a tm e n t o f th e n a t i o n a l i s t i c fo rc e s t h a t doomed th e League to f a i l u r e may be found in Emery Reves, The Anatomy o f Peace (New York; London: Harper [c . 1 9 46]), pp. 182-224. ^ I m p e lle d by Nazi Germany’s p o lic y o f piecem eal aggrandizem ent, th e B r i t i s h a s s o c ia tio n o f F ed eral Union opened 225 b ra n c h e s, grew to some 12,000 members by 1940, 180 D uff Cooper as Chairman and MP's o f a l l th r e e p a r tie s p a r t i c i p a t i n g , a Pan-European Committee was s e t up and 81 began working w ith th e French Pan-European group. By th e n , however, B ritis h - F r e n c h u n ite d a c tio n to save Europe 82 was to o l a t e . W ithin th r e e m onths, H itle r and h is Nazis u n leash ed upon Europe th e h o lo c a u st o f World War I I . and co o p e rated w ith s im ila r o rg a n iz a tio n s in E ire , F rance, and S w itz e rla n d . A few of i t s b e t t e r known le a d e rs were B everidge, C u r tis , Je n n in g s , Law, L o th ian , Mackay, M artin, S teed , and W ootton. For f u r t h e r e f f o r t s , see Boyd, o p . c i t .> pp. 69-70; and W . Iv o r J e n n in g s, A F e d e ra tio n fo r W estern Europe (New York: M acmillan; Canforidge: U niver s i t y P re s s , 1940), pp. 1-32 f f . , and pp. 169-200 fo r h is proposed c o n s t i t u ti o n . ft 1 ° C oudenhove-K alergi, op. c i t . . 213-9; and h is Crusade f o r Pan-Europe, pp. 196-206. For a summary o f th e r e v iv a l o f i n t e r e s t in Pan-Europe in B r i t a i n , see Appendix C, p a r. 14. ®^For a lu c id p re s e n ta tio n o f th e economic and p o l i t i c a l c r o s s - c u r r e n ts between th e wars and t h e i r d iv e rs io n o f th e movement to u n ite Europe, see Bingham, op. c i t . . pp. 51-63. CHAPTER VI W O RLD W A R I I AND DISUNITED EUROPE IN SUSPENSE Mankind has a s h o rt memory and h is p o l i t i c a l b eh a v io r o fte n seems in c o n s is te n t and n e g a tiv e . D esp ite th e le sso n s o f h is to r y and th e re p rie v e s from war and b i t t e r s u f f e r in g , to g e t men to change t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l ways i s an alm ost insurm ountable s tr u g g le because of s e l f i s h i n t e r e s t s , f e a r s , o r ap ath y . The g e n e ra tio n d i r e c t l y a f f e c te d by World War I , f o r example, was in c lin e d to b e lie v e t h a t t h a t war had provided th e u ltim a te lesso n on th e a b s o lu te n e c e s s ity f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l u n d ersta n d in g and u n ity . Had n o t th e a l l i e s ' slogan been " th e War to end a l l w ars?" Was no t th e League of N ations c re a te d to keep th e peace and to promote i n t e r n a ti o n a l goodw ill and co o p e ratio n ? Because o f t h i s new e ra o f i n te r n a t io n a l r e l a t i o n s , th e peoples o f Europe re la x e d in t h e i r postw ar t r u s t o f th e League and th e s p i r i t o f p a c ifism only to f a l l prey to th e old tra p p in g s o f n a tio c e n tris m and 182 economic n a tio n a lis m . As a r e s u l t o f t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l p a s s i v i t y , th ey found them selves v ic tim s o f a second w orld war j u s t tw enty-one y e a rs l a t e r . E u ro p e's F a ilu r e to U n ite . Double Jeopardy W ithin a G en e ratio n , and B elated R eaction During and in in ed iately fo llo w in g World War I I , th e r e was an em otional b a s is f o r o v e r s im p lif ic a tio n of th e cause of t h i s w ar--blam ing H i t l e r , a "madman," and th e German N azis. I t i s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of in d iv id u a ls , a d d ic te d to extrem e n a tio n a lis m , to s h i f t th e blame fo r t h e i r n a t i o n 's n e g lig e n c e and m istak es to o th e r n a tio n s and to r a t i o n a l i z e t h e i r own n a t i o n 's f a i l u r e s . Even though h i s t o r i c a l f a c ts may g e t to th e s u rfa c e e v e n tu a lly , th e tim e lag makes i t more co n v en ien t and " r e a l i s t i c " fo r n a t i o n a l i s t s to o b scu re, i f n o t to f o r g e t, n e g a tiv e f a c t s . On th e o th e r hand, many who p ro fe s s o b j e c t i v i t y have r e tr a c e d th e events le a d in g up to World War I I and have v is u a liz e d how i t m ight have been p re v e n te d . Although t h e i r an a ly se s have been i n t e r e s t i n g , they remind one o f th e " e x p e rts " who re p la y a lo s t game and say: " I f t h i s and t h a t had or had not been done, th in g s would have been d i f f e r e n t . " 183 S im ila rly from th e vantage p o in t of h in d s ig h t, many w r ite r s have not h e s ita te d to p o in t out th e weaknesses in th e movement to u n ite Europe between th e wars and to ex p la in th e reasons fo r i t s f a i l u r e . At th e tim e th e movement was in p ro g re ss, however, th o se who opposed and th o se who n eg lec te d to support i t did not do so because they recognized th e se weaknesses but r a th e r because of th e c o n f lic t of t h e i r n a t i o n a l i s t i c i n t e r e s t s , or t h e i r w a it- an d -see a t t i t u d e , or sim ply t h e i r apathy. The f a i l u r e between th e wars of th e movement fo r European Union of course has been blamed on a v a r ie ty of cau ses. Some w r ite r s have been c r i t i c a l of i t s p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r a l w eaknesses,^ of th e s u p e r f i c i a l i t y of i t s For c o n tra s tin g views of th e se s t r u c t u r a l weak n e s se s, see A lfre d M . Bingham, The U nited S ta te s of Europe (New York: D uell Sloan and Pearce [c . 1940]), pp. 51-8, 91-107, 253-69; A lb ert G uerard, Europe F ree and U nited (S tanford U n iv e rsity : S tanford U n iv e rsity P ress [c . 1945]), pp. 107-25, 186-204; Emery R eves, The Anatomy of Peace (New York: Harper [c . 1946]), pp. 257-8. More s p e c if ic s t r u c t u r a l plans and d r a f t c o n s titu tio n s f o r a European F ed eratio n may be found in W . Ivor Jen n in g s, A F ed eratio n fo r W estern Europe (New York: M acmillan, 1940), pp. 15-34, 64-159, 169-200; Abraham W einfeld, Towards a U nited S ta te s o f Europe: P roposals f o r a B asic S tru c tu re (Washington: American Council on P ublic A ff a irs [c . 1942]), pp. 31-49; Arnold J . Z urcher, The S tru g g le to U nite Europe: 1940-1958 ([New York]: New York U n iv e rsity P re ss, 1958), pp. 213-23. 184 2 economic arrangem ents and e x p e c ta tio n s , o f i t s b ein g e i t h e r an i m p e r i a l i s t i c and r e a c tio n a r y program o r a s o c ia l” o i s t i c scheme o f i t s p ro m o ters, o f i t s prom otion by th e French f o r purposes of European hegemony,^ or o f i t s la c k o f su p p o rt from th e B r i t i s h . ^ O thers have blamed th e 2 See Bingham, op. c i t . . pp. 209-42; Je n n in g s , o p . c i t . . pp. 118-50; Hans F. S ennholz, How Can Europe S u rv iv e (New York: Van N ostrand [ c . 1 9 5 5 ]), pp. 5-3 1, 79, 130-5, 142-51, 292-306, 317-9. H jalm ar S ch ach t, "The Pan- European Problem ," Y ale Review. XX (December, 193 0),217-33. 3 The pros and cons o f th e s e views may be found in George C a tlin , The A tla n tic Community (W akefield [E n g la n d ]: Coram, 1959), pp. 39, 41; L. Dumont-Wilden, "Les E ta ts -U n is d 'E u r o p e ,1 1 Revue P o litiq u e e t L i t t d r a i r e (Revue B lu e ). LXVII (17 aoOt 1929), 508-12; fidouard H e r r io t, "Pan-Europe?" F o reig n A f f a ir s [New Y ork], V III (Ja n u a ry , 1930), 237-47; J e n n in g s , op. c i t . . pp. 18-28; S ch ach t, l o c . c i t .; Senn h o lz , op. c i t . , pp. 33-4 , 79-84, 146-51, 317-9; John B. W h itto n , "The B riand Plan f o r European U nion," C u rren t H is to r y . XXXII (Septem ber, 1930), 1176-86. ^Opposing views in t h i s d i r e c t i o n may be found in G u erard, op. c i t . . pp. 85-6; Edouard H e r r io t, The U nited S ta te s o f E urope, t r a n s l . R eginald J . D ingle (New York: V ik in g , 1930), pp. 312-6; S is le y H uddleston, "U nited S ta te s o f Europe and th e E n te n te ," New Statesm an and N a tio n . XXXIII (Septem ber 21, 1929), 701-2; David M itrany, "Pan- Europe: A Hope or a Danger?" P o l i t i c a l Q u a r te r ly . I (Septem ber, 1930), 457-78. ” *For th e b ases o f th e B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e see Andrew and F rances Boyd, W estern Union: A Study o f th e Trend Toward European U nity ([W ashington]: P u b lic A f f a ir s P re s s , [ c . 1 9 4 9 ]), pp. 38-9; C a t l in , op. c i t . . pp. 2 7 -8 , 56-7, 7 5 -6 , 125-9; [Count] R ichard N. C oudenhove-K alergi, 185 movement's f a il u r e on fe a r of i t s th r e a t to or d u p lic a tio n of th e e f f o r ts of th e League of Nations,** the world eco nomic c r i s i s , or th e resurgence of German n atio n alism , the r i s e of H itle r , th e spread of Fascism, and the coming of World War I I . A ll of th e se , of course, were n eg ativ e in flu en ces th a t helped thw art th e movement between th e wars to u n ite Europe. Yet, th e movement's f a il u r e was foredoomed from th e end of World War I. The above developments were merely symptomatic m a n ife sta tio n s of th e n a t io n a l is ti c postwar p o lic ie s of B rita in and France, whose European s e c u rity fe a rs and m isc a lc u la tio n s , i f not t h e i r vested Crusade fo r Pan-Europe: Autobiography of a Man and a Move ment (New York: Putnam s [c . 1943]), pp. 104-9; h e re in a f t e r c ite d as Crusade fo r Pan-Europe, and An Idea Conquers the World, P re f. . . . Winston S. C h u rch ill (London: Hutchinson [195 3]), pp. 93, 114-6, 124, 154-7, 161-2; Gu£rard, op. c i t .. pp. 122-34; Reves, op. c i t .. pp. 243-5, 272-5, 281; S ir A rthur S a lte r , The United S tates of Europe and Other Papers (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock [1933]), pp. 120-1, 123-4. 6 See Boyd, lo c. c i t .; Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade fo r Pan-Europe, pp. 135-7; J . H. B. Masterman, "United S ta te s of Europe," S p e c ta to r. CLI (November 24, 1933), 761- 2; David M itrany, "The Case A gainst Pan-Europe," C urrent H isto ry . XXXIII (October, 1930), 65-9; S a lte r , op. c i t .. pp. 109-20. For two g en eral sunm arizations of th e reasons fo r the f a il u r e of B ria n d 's plan to u n ite Europe, see Boyd, op. c i t .. p. 44; The European Movement, European Movement and th e Council of Europe (London: Hutchinson [1949]), p. 30. 186 I n t e r e s t s , p r e v a ile d . B r i ta i n and F rance began t h i s p o s t war p e rio d w ith t h e i r v in d ic tiv e p o lic y toward Germany as r e f l e c t e d in th e V e r s a ille s Peace T re a ty , and th ey con tin u e d t o pursue t h e i r n a tio n a l i n t e r e s t s by d iv e rg e n t in flu e n c e s on th e a d m in is tr a tio n o f th e League o f N a tio n s.^ F in a l ly , a f t e r jo c k e y in g th ro u g h s e c r e t d ip lo m a tic a r r a n g e m ents and s p e c ia l e n te n te s to r e a lig n th e European power b a la n c e under th e sc re e n o f " c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y ," t h e i r f o re ig n p o l i c i e s were la r g e ly r e s p o n s ib le fo r th e L eague's im potence and lo s s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e s p e c t. Under th o se c irc u m s ta n c e s , th e r e i s no evid en ce to in d ic a te th a t B ria n d 's p lan o r any o th e r p lan to u n ite Europe could have succeeded in t h i s p e r io d , no m a tte r how genuine and f r e e from u l t e r i o r p o l i t i c a l m o tiv e s. The people and th e govern ments o f E urope, n o tw ith s ta n d in g th e p o s s ib le r e p e t i t i o n o f th e d re a d fu l e x p e rie n c e s of World War I , "were p o l i t i c a l l y and p s y c h o lo g ic a lly n o t y e t ready s e r io u s ly to con- o s i d e r th e rem edies by which a lo n e Europe could be saved. ^Hans J . M orgenthau, P o l i t i c s Among N atio n s: The S tru g g le f o r Power and Peace (2d e d ., Rev. and E n l.; New York: Knopf, 1954), pp. 435-46. A lso see C laren ce K. S t r e i t , Union Now: A P ro p o sal f o r a F e d e ra l Union o f th e Dem ocracies o f th e N orth A tla n tic (New York: H arper, 1939), pp. 70-82. ®The European Movement, lo c . c i t . 187 Even H itle r reco g n ized th a t Europe was not w illin g to u n it f r e e ly and d e m o c ra tic a lly . In f a c t , he w rote th a t European u n ity " 'w i l l n o t be a t ta i n e d e i t h e r by p ra y e rs . . . nor by speeches n o r by n e g o tia tio n s a t Geneva, but by a bloody war won by f o rc e , th a t alo n e can b rin g u n i t y . '" Then in a R eichstag speech on March 23, 1933, H itle r showed an aw areness of th e weakness o f a d is u n ite d Europe when he emphasized t h a t " 't h e independence and p a r tic u la r is m of th e German s t a t e s had been p r e ju d ic i a l to th e g re a tn e s s of th e R eich. . . . E nvisaging th a t a m o rally and p o l i t i c a l l y en feeb led Europe could be u n ite d only through f o rc e , H itle r t h e r e fo re attem p ted to u n ite Europe by conquest as Napoleon had alm ost done in th e p rev io u s c e n tu ry . And f o r a tim e H itle r appeared c lo s e to su c c e e d in g . ^ q Adolph H i t l e r , as quoted by M . Aumeran in d ebate on " P o litiq u e k l'£ g a r d de l'A llem agn e: D iscussio n d ' i n t e r p e l l a t i o n s [S e c u rity o f F ra n c e ]," F rance, Annales de l'A ssem blde n a tio n a le , D & m ts. Vol. 30, V III (1949), p. 6160. ■^Harold B u tle r, The Lost Peace: A P erson al Im pression (New York: H arco u rt, Brace [c . 1942]), pp. 176, 188-92, 227; C oudenhove-K alergi, An Idea Conquers th e W orld, pp. 223, 227, 231, 233; G u^rard, op. c i t . . pp. 102- 3; Royal I n s t i t u t e o f I n te r n a tio n a l A f f a i r s , H i t l e r ' s Meanwhile, however, as th e war clouds had s ta r te d to g a th e r, a d is tin g u is h e d group of B r itis h p u b lic is ts and c iv ic le a d e rs i n i t i a t e d th e F ed eral Union movement in l a t e 1938. Foreseeing th e p o s s i b i l i t y of an o th er war which they b e lie v e d could be a v e rte d , they co n cen trated on winning pu b lic support in co o p eratio n w ith a s im ila r ly in te r e s te d group in France fo r t h e i r fe d e ra l program to 11 u n ite d Europe. D espite t h e i r e a rn e st e f f o r ts and i n i t i a l su c c e sse s, they had s ta r te d too l a t e . World War I I was 12 to d is ru p t th e fu rth e r growth of t h e i r movement. N ev e rth eless, lik e the peace s o c ie tie s organized in th e a l l i e d c o u n trie s during World War I to e lim in a te th e causes of war by in te r n a tio n a l o rg a n iz a tio n , law, and Europe [Vol. IV ]: Survey of In te r n a tio n a l A f f a i r s . 1939- 1946, ed. Arnold and Veronica M . Toynbee (London: Oxford U n iv e rsity P ress, 1958), pp. 47-58; h e r e in a f te r c ite d as H i t l e r ’s Europe . ^ I t should be n o ted , moreover, th a t e a rly in 1939 C larence S t r e i t 's proposal fo r a F ederal Union of th e le a d ing dem ocracies, appearing in h is op. c i t . . not only s t i r red w idespread i n t e r e s t in B rita in but a ls o proved a p o s i tiv e in flu e n c e on th e growth of th e B r it is h F ederal Union movement. 12 For f u r th e r d e t a i l s of th e F ed eral Union movement in B rita in and re fe re n c e s to th e work of i t s le a d e rs , see above, pp. 179-80, and C entre d 'A ctio n pour la F dd£ration europ£enne, L1Europe de Demain (Neuchdtel: Baconni^re [c . 1945]), pp. 111-4. 189 o rd e r ( r e s u l ti n g in th e League o f N a tio n s ) , th e F e d e ra l U n io n ists c o n tin u ed in th e postw ar p e rio d to work fo r European u n ity and peace th ro u g h f e d e r a tio n . To f a c i l i t a t e t h i s g o a l, th ey c r e a te d in London a European Committee of F e d e ra l Union, r e p r e s e n tin g e ig h te e n European n a tio n s which in clu d ed th e e x ile d Governments r e s id in g in B r i t a i n . T his com m ittee then s e t to work la y in g p lan s fo r a b ro a d ly - based d em o cratic European F e d e ra tio n fo llo w in g th e w ar. F urtherm ore, in March, 1940, a F e d e ra l Union R esearch I n s t i t u t e (FURI) was s e t up to pursue th e stu d y of v a rio u s problem s t h a t m ight c o n fro n t th e f e d e r a tio n o f Europe a f t e r th e w ar. Through th e p u b lic a tio n of th e stu d y and 13 The e x c e lle n c e of th e I n s t i t u t e 's re s e a rc h s t a f f , which was composed o f o u ts ta n d in g B r i t i s h eco n o m ists, j u r i s t s , p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s , s o c i o l o g i s t s , and o th e r p r o f e s s io n a l le a d e rs may be n o ted from t h i s p a r t i a l r o s t e r o f names: M essrs. B ev erid g e, B entw ich, C urry, C u r tis , Hayek, J e n n in g s , Jo a d , K eeton, L o th ian , MacKay, O rr, P r i e s t l y , Ransome, R obbins, S chw arzenberger, S teed , and Wheare. A lthough t h e i r a r t i c l e s , books, e s s a y s , and r e p o r ts a r e much to o numerous to l i s t h e re , a s u b s t a n t i a l number o f them a r e c l a s s i f i e d in C en tre d 'A c tio n pour la F ^ d ^ ra tio n europdenne, op. c i t . . pp. 112-4; a ls o see M. C haning-P earce ( e d .) , F e d e ra l Union: A Symposium [ o f A r t i c le s by Twenty-Two S t a f f Members 1 (London: Jo n ath an Cape, [1 9 4 0 ]), pp. 9-327, and th e v a rio u s a r t i c l e s on F e d e ra l Union in The New Commonwealth Q u a r te r ly . V (Septem ber and December, 1939; A p r il, 1940), 150-6, 230-6, 263-304; VI (1940-4 1), 3-24. For p re ss coverage and " L e tte r s to th e 190 fin d in g s o f i t s s t a f f o f e x p e rts and s p e c ia liz e d committees, th e FURI was a b le to keep th e id ea o f European F e d e ra tio n a liv e d u rin g th e w ar. B esid es, i t a ls o c o n trib u te d a body o f l i t e r a t u r e on th e s u b je c t th a t was to se rv e as a v a lu a b le base fo r th e advance of th e movement to u n ite Europe in th e postw ar p e r i o d . ^ The statem en t o f aims of th e F e d e ra l Union move ment read as f o llo w s : E d ito r ," see The Times (London), O ctober 28, 1939, p. 6; November 3 (p. 9 ), 13 (p. 12), 23 (p. 5 ), 24 (4 th e d ., p. 4 ); January 11 (p. 7 ), 13 (p. 11), 18 (p. 4 ) , 19 (pp. 9, 1 0), 26 (4 th e d ., pp. 2, 5 ), 1940; February 6 (p. 10); & th e d ., p. 5 ), 28 (p. 6 ) , 29 (p. 9 ); March 2 (p. 11), 11 (p. 7; 4 th e d ., p. 10), 29 (p. 11); A p ril 11 (p. 1 0), 20 (p. 5 ), 29 (p. 4 ); May 2 (p. 7 ), 4 (p. 7 ), 6 (p. 9 ), 1940. ^Tw o b a s ic works by em inent j u r i s t s and F e d e ra l Union members were J e n n in g s, op. c i t .; and Ronald W . G. Mackay, F e d e ra l Europe: Being th e Case fo r European F ed era tio n . T ogether w ith a D ra ft C o n s titu tio n of a U nited S ta te s o f Europe (London: Jo sep h , 1940), 196 pp. MacKay p u b lish ed a re v is e d v e rsio n o f t h i s book under th e t i t l e , Peace Aims and th e New Order: O u tlin in g th e Case fo r E uro pean F e d e ra tio n . T ogether w ith a D ra ft C o n s titu tio n o f a U nited S ta te s of Europe (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1941), pp. 23-284. These th r e e books c o n ta in e x c e lle n t d r a f t c o n s t i tu tio n s fo r a f u tu r e U nited S ta te s o f Europe. O ther s i g n i f i c a n t p u b lic a tio n s by F ed eral U n io n ists were S ir W illiam H. B everidge, Peace by F e d e ra tio n ? (London: F ed eral Union, 1940), pp. 3-35; Lord [David D avies] D avies, A F ederated Europe (London: G o llan cz, 1940), pp. 11-141; C. E. M . Jo ad , The Philosophy o f F e d e ra l Union (London: M acm illan, 1942), pp. 3-40; Lord [F re d e ric k J . D.] Lugard, F ed eral Union and th e C olonies (London: M acmillan, 1941), pp. 191 W e b e lie v e t h a t : I . N a tio n a l so v e re ig n ty le a d s to c o m p e titio n in arm am ents, economic s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y and i n t e r n a l re g im e n ta tio n , and th u s in e v ita b ly to w ar, im p e ria lism , p o v erty and lo s s o f in d iv id u a l l i b e r t y , b ecau se where so v ere ig n s t a t e s f a i l to a g re e t h e r e i s no remedy save r e s o r t to v io le n c e in th e form o f power p o l i t i c s o r w ar. I I . No i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rd e r based on c o -o p e ra tio n between so v e re ig n s t a t e s w i l l prove e i t h e r e f f i c i e n t o r d u ra b le s in c e a l l so v ere ig n s t a t e s in th e l a s t r e s o r t seek t h e i r own n a tio n a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t . N othing le s s than a union o f th e p eo p les can end t h i s anarchy and g iv e p eace, j u s t i c e and freedom to a l l . A ccordingly we ad v o cate: I . A F e d e ra l Union o f th o s e n a tio n s which hold t h a t th e s t a t e e x i s t s f o r th e freedom and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f man, and t h a t government must be conducted w ith th e co n sen t o f th e governed. I I . That t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l Union w i l l a s su re n a tio n a l se lf-g o v e rn m e n t to a l l u n its w ith in th e Union in th o s e a f f a i r s which a re s o le ly of n a tio n a l i n t e r e s t , and w i l l e s t a b l i s h l e g i s l a t i v e , e x e c u tiv e and j u d i c i a l organs r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f and r e s p o n s ib le to a l l th e c i t i z e n s o f th e Union f o r such common a f f a i r s as d efen ce and o rd e r, c u rre n c y , t r a d e , com m u n ic a tio n s, and m ig ra tio n , and w i l l p o ssess 3-32; L io n el R obbins, Economic A spects o f F e d e ra tio n (Lon don: M acm illan, 1941), pp. 3-32; B arbara W ootton, S o c ia l ism and F e d e ra tio n (London: M acm illan, 1941), pp. 3-32. For a good c r i t i c a l a n a ly s is o f th e o rg a n ic d i f f i c u l t i e s c o n fro n tin g i n t e r n a t i o n a l f e d e r a l u n io n s, see S ir J . A. R. M a r r io tt, F e d e ra lism and th e Problem of th e Small S ta te (London: A lle n and Unwin (1 9 4 3 ]), pp. 9-120. 192 th e ta x a tio n and borrow ing powers n e c e ssa ry to fin a n c e I t s own a c t i v i t i e s . I I I . As a f i r s t s te p a F e d e ra l Union o f th e e s ta b lis h e d dem ocracies to form a n u cleu s of th e f u tu r e w orld f e d e r a tio n ; such a n u cleu s to be open to a c c e ss io n by o th e r n a tio n s which a c c e p t i t s b a s ic p r i n c i p l e s ; and to a c t as a lo y a l member o f any la r g e r o rg a n iz a tio n s d esig n ed to promote i n t e r n a tio n a l c o - o p e r a tio n . ^ D uring th e f i r s t w in te r o f th e war (1939-1940), French proponents of th e id e a o f European F e d e ra tio n , in c lu d in g Prime M in is te r Reynaud, Georges S c e lle , Jacques M a rita in , and l i b e r a l econom ists and businessm en among o th e r s , a ls o saw in th e t r a g i c consequences o f th e war c o n c lu siv e evidence o f th e n e c e s s ity to u n ite Europe a t th e f i r s t o p p o rtu n ity . In o rd e r to improve th e p o s s i b i l i t i e s of t h i s co u rse o f a c tio n , an A nglo-French C onference of F e d e r a l is ts was h eld a t P a ris in e a r ly 1940. I t s m ajor d is c u s s io n s i g n i f i c a n t l y focused on A llie d war aims and how to t i e them in to th e postw ar u n i f i c a t i o n of E u r o p e .^ ^ " A u t h o r i t a t i v e p o lic y o f th e F e d e ra l Union move ment in E n g lan d ," as quoted by M . C haning-P earce, e d ., in h is In tro d u c tio n to op. c i t . . pp. 12-3. ^^See f o o tn o te , p. 177, in Royal I n s t i t u t e o f I n t e r n a t io n a l A f f a i r s , The I n i t i a l Triumph of th e Axis [V ol. X I ] : Survey o f I n t e r n a t io n a l A f f a i r s . 1939-1946. ed. A rnold and V eronica M. Toynbee (London: Oxford U n iv e rsity P re s s , 1958). For f u r t h e r developm ents and a t t i t u d e s on 193 The Impact of th e war o f co u rse serv ed to s o l i d i f y p a rty views in B r ita in on u n itin g Europe a f t e r th e w ar, and A nglo-French a c tio n f o r European F e d e ra tio n , see D av ies, op. c i t . . pp. 127-31; George W . K eeton, "A nglo-French Union: A S u g g e stio n ," The New Commonwealth Q u a r te r ly . V (December, 1939), 230-6; A. B. K e ith , A nglo-French Union: —C o n s titu tio n a l A spects . . ." ; W . Friedm ann, "Aims and Problems of A nglo-French Union"; 0. Go1la n e z , " P r a c tic a l S teps Towards A nglo-French U nion"; J . T. D elos, "L'Union F ra n c o -B rita n n iq u e . . . " The New Commonwealth Q u a r te r ly . V (A p r il, 1940), 263-71, 272-85, 286-95, 296-304; " P a r tn e r s h ip and F e d e r a tio n ," New Statesm an and N a tio n . XVIII (November 25, 1939), 748-9; L io n el R obbins, "An Anglo-French F e d e ra tio n ? " The S p e c ta to r . CLXIII (November 24, 1939), 739-40; " L e tte r s to th e E d ito r [on] 'An A nglo-French Fed e r a t i o n '" The S p e c ta to r . CLXIII (December 8, 15, 1939), 819-20; 866; "The Way to F e d e ra lis m ," The S p e c ta to r . CLXIII (November 3, 1939), 608-9; "W elding th e A llia n c e ," and " L e tte r s to th e E d ito r [on] 'The Way to F e d e r a lis m '," The S p e c ta to r . CLXIII (December 8, 1939), 820. For p re ss r e p o r t s , see K e e sin g 's Contem porary A rch iv es: Weekly D iary o f World E v en ts. 1937-1940 (London: Keesing s L im ited , Ju ly 1, 1937-June 30, 1940), I I I , 3925-6, 3954, 3983; h e r e i n a f t e r c i t e d as K e e sin g 's Contemporary A rc h iv e s : Le Temps ( P a r i s ) , 29 ja n v i e r 1940, p. 2; 30 ja n v ie r 1940, p. 1; 31 ja n v i e r 1940, p. 2; l e r f e v r i e r 1940, p. 2; 18 f e v r i e r 1940, pp. 1, 6; 24 f d v r i e r 1940, p. 3; The Times (London), F ebruary 6 (p. 10; 4 th e d ., p. 5 ), 8 (p. 5 ), 9 (p. 1 0), 28 (p. 6 ) , 29 (p. 9 ); March 2 (p. 11), 11 (p. 7; 4 th e d ., p. 1 0 ), 25 (p. 7 ) , 29 (p. 1 1), 1940. A lso see two books u rg in g European F e d e ra tio n a f t e r th e war t h a t were to ap p ear in n e u t r a l S w itz e rla n d : Hans B auer, Von d er E idgenB ssischen z u r europH ischen F e e d e ra tio n : von d e r sc h w e iz e risc h e n z u r europM ischen E idgenH ssenschaft (Z u rich : Europa V erlag [ c . 1 9 4 0 ]), pp. 15-157; R ichard N. C oudenhove-K alergi, Europe Must U nite (G la ru s : Pan- europa E d itio n s [1 9 4 0 ]), pp. 7-160. 194 a l l th re e B r itis h p a r tie s were re p re se n te d in th e member sh ip of F ederal Union. Moreover, th e N atio n al Executive of th e Labour P arty on February 9, 1940, re le a s e d i t s "D eclara tio n of P olicy on War and Peace Aims," th e te x t of which contain ed tw elve p o in ts and was e n t i t le d : "La bour, th e War and th e P eace." P o in ts s ix and seven a re e s p e c ia lly s ig n if ic a n t: (6) The Labour P arty demands th a t th e Peace S ettlem en t s h a ll e s ta b lis h a new A sso ciatio n or Commonwealth of S ta te s , th e c o lle c tiv e a u th o rity of which must tra n sc e n d , over a proper sphere, th e sovereign r ig h ts of s e p a ra te S ta te s . (7) This a u th o rity must c o n tro l such m ilita r y and economic power as w i l l enable i t to enforce p ea cefu l behaviour as between i t s members, and thus secu re th e a ll-ro u n d re d u c tio n of n a tio n a l armaments to th e le v e l re q u ire d fo r th e p re se rv a tio n of i n te r n a l o rd e r. A ll in te r n a tio n a l d isp u te s must be s e t t l e d by p eacefu l means, through a r b i t r a tio n and r e c o n c ilia tio n . The p re se n t c lo se c o -o p e ra tio n between the B r i tis h Commonwealth, F rance, and t h e i r A llie s should be th e nucleus of t h i s wider A sso ciatio n . A ll n a tio n s , g re a t and sm all, must have th e r ig h t to liv e t h e i r own l iv e s , fre e but c o -o p e ra tiv e w ith in th e framework of the new world o r d e r . ^ B rita in and France had y e t to experience th e c ru e l r e a l i t i e s of World War I I . Up to May, 1940, war on th e ^ K eesing’s Contemporary A rchives, 1937-1940. I l l , 3915 ( a l l tw elve p o in ts a re h e re in q u o te d ). 195 W estern f r o n t had been a pro b in g a c tio n . In th e weeks and months which fo llo w ed , however, th ey were to pay a t e r r i b l e p r ic e f o r t h e i r je a lo u s and s e l f i s h n a t i o c e n t r i c p a ro c h ia lis m , which had b lin d e d them to th e r e a l o ppor t u n i t i e s f o r u n itin g Europe a f t e r World War I . W ith f o r e s ig h t and European o b j e c t i v i t y th ey m ight w e ll have p rev en ted th e h o lo c a u st t h a t was to come. But on th e o th e r hand, perhaps t h i s was to o much to ex p ect from th e p eo p les o f th e l a i s s e z - f a i r e dem ocracies who, in t h e i r p a s s i v i t y , appeasem ent, or a p a th y , ’'s l e p t ” and th e re b y p e rm itte d th e p o l i t i c a l c o n d itio n s t h a t encouraged th e t o t a l i t a r i a n s t a t e s to develop t h e i r a g g re s s iv e n a t i o n a l ism. B r i t a i n 's O ffer o f A nglo-F rench Union R e je c te d H i t l e r had u n leash ed h is Nazi B l itz k r ie g on th e W estern f r o n t in May, 1940. By m id-June th e Germans had *®See W inston S. C h u r c h ill, W hile England S l e p t : A Survey o f World A f f a i r s . 1932-1938 (New York: Putnam s , 1938), pp. 195-9, 321-33, 369-404. [ H i s t o r i c a l eviden ce in d ic a te s t h a t o th e r c o u n tr ie s (in c lu d in g th e U nited S ta te s ) should have been in c lu d e d in t h i s t i t l e , had C h u rc h ill n o t r e s t r i c t e d h is stu d y to E n gland .] 196 fo rced th e B r i t is h E x p ed itio n ary Forces in France to ev acu ate,m iracu lo u sly , some 335,000 men, or fa ce c a p tu re . A few days a f t e r th e B r it is h escape a t D unkirk, th e Germans succeeded in overrunning th e French army. In a s t a t e of shock and bew ilderm ent, France was thus on th e verge of c o lla p s e and su rre n d e r to H itle r . De G au lle, then French U n d er-S ecretary fo r War in Reynaud's C ab in et, was flown to London on June 15, 1940, to inform th e B r i t is h of F ra n c e 's d ir e s i t u a t io n and to g et a l l p o s s ib le a s s is ta n c e . In th e ensuing d is c u s s io n s , De G aulle suggested th a t p e r haps some s p e c ta c u la r d e c la ra tio n by th e B r it is h Government on b e h a lf o f France might h elp to tu rn th e ti d e and p rev en t th e Nazi ta k e -o v e r. The idea o f a fe d e ra tio n of th e B r i t is h and French governm ents, which th e B r i t is h C abinet had p re v io u sly c o n sid e re d , was m entioned and was approved by e a rly a fte rn o o n th e follow ing day. On th e evening of June 17 i t was announced in London th a t th e B r i tis h Government, w ith th e o b je c t of su p p o rtin g France and encouraging h e r to co n tin u e re sista n c e to H i t l e r 's in v a d e rs, had "o ffe re d to conclude a solemn 19 See H i t l e r ' s Europe, p. 436. 197 Act of Union" w ith France, and th a t th e fo llow ing d r a f t d e c la ra tio n of an Act of Union between B rita in and France had been se n t to th e French Government on June 16: At t h i s roost f a t e f u l moment In th e h is to r y o f th e modem world th e Governments o f th e United Kingdom and th e French Republic make t h i s d e c la ra tio n of In d is s o lu b le union and u n y ield in g r e s o lu tio n In t h e i r common defence of j u s t i c e and freedom, a g a in s t su b je c tio n to a system which reduces mankind to a l i f e of ro b o ts and s la v e s . The two Governments d e c la re th a t France and G reat B rita in s h a l l no longer be two n a tio n s but one F ra n c o -B ritish Union. The c o n s titu tio n of th e Union w ill provide fo r j o i n t organs of d efen ce, fo re ig n , f in a n c ia l and economic p o lic ie s . Every c i t i z e n of France w i ll enjoy im m ediately c itiz e n s h ip of G reat B r ita in , every B r itis h su b je c t w ill become a c i t i z e n o f France. Both c o u n trie s w ill sh are r e s p o n s ib ility fo r th e r e p a ir o f th e d e v a s ta tio n o f war, wherever i t occurs in t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s , and th e re so u rces of both s h a ll be e q u a lly , and as one, ap p lie d to th a t p u rp o se. During th e war th e re s h a ll be a s in g le War C abinet, and a l l th e fo rc e s of B rita in and France, whether on lan d , se a , o r in th e a i r , w i l l be placed under i t s d ir e c tio n . I t w ill govern from wherever i t b e s t can. The two P arliam ents w ill be form ally a s s o c ia te d . The n a tio n s of the B r itis h Empire a re alre ad y forming new arm ies. France w i l l keep her a v a ila b le fo rc e s in th e f i e l d , on th e se a , and in the a i r . The Union appeals to th e U nited S ta te s to f o r t i f y 198 th e economic re so u rc e s of th e A llie s and to b rin g h er pow erful m a te r ia l a id to th e common cau se. The Union w i l l c o n c e n tra te i t s whole energy a g a in s t th e power o f th e enemy no m a tte r where th e b a t t l e may be. 90 And thus we s h a l l conquer. u C h u rc h ill has ex p lain ed th e b a s is fo r th e B r i tis h G overnm ent's o f f e r of Union w ith France and h is r e l a t i o n sh ip to th e p ro p o sal t h u s : The f a l l and th e f a te of F rance dom inated . . . [th e B r i t i s h War C a b in e t's ] m inds. . . . G rie f fo r our a l l y in h e r agony, and d e s ir e to do anything in human power to a id h e r, was th e p re v a ilin g mood. There was a ls o th e overpow ering im portance of making su re o f th e French F l e e t . I t was in t h i s s p i r i t th a t a p ro p o sal f o r "an in d is s o lu b le union" between France and B r ita in was conceived. I was n o t th e prime mover. I f i r s t heard of a d e f i n i t e plan . . . on th e 15th, . . . I t was e v id e n t t h a t th e r e had been c o n s id e ra b le d is c u s s io n befo reh an d . On th e 14th, V a n s itta r t and Desmond Morton had met M . Monnet and M . Pleven (members of th e French Economic M ission in London), and been 20 The Times (London), June 18, 1940, p. 6. A lso see K eesin g*s Contemporary A rc h iv e s. I l l , 1937-1940 (June 14-22, 1940), 4099-101; G reat B r i t a i n , "French R epublic (Proposed Union w ith G reat B r ita in ) [16 June 1 940 ]," House o f Commons Deb. . 5 th s e r i e s , 365, CCCLXV (1939-40), 701-2; W inston S. C h u rc h ill, The Second World War: T h eir F in e s t Hour (Boston: Houghton M if f lin , 1949), pp. 208-9; Paul Reynaud, U nite or P e ris h : A Dynamic Program f o r a U nited Europe ([New York]: Simon and S ch u ster [c . 1951]), pp. 3-4. 198 th e economic re so u rc e s o f th e A l li e s and t o b rin g h e r pow erful m a te r ia l a id to th e common c a u se . The Union w i l l c o n c e n tra te i t s whole energy a g a in s t th e power o f th e enemy no m a tte r where th e b a t t l e may b e. on And th u s we s h a l l c o n q u e r. C h u rc h ill has ex p la in e d th e b a s is f o r th e B r i t i s h G overnm ent's o f f e r o f Union w ith F rance and h is r e l a t i o n s h ip to th e p ro p o sa l t h u s : The f a l l and th e f a t e o f F rance dom inated . . . [ th e B r i t i s h War C a b in e t's ] m inds. . . . G rie f f o r our a l l y in h e r agony, and d e s i r e to do an y th in g in human power to a id h e r , was th e p r e v a ilin g mood. T here was a ls o th e overpow ering im portance o f making s u re o f th e French F l e e t . I t was in t h i s s p i r i t t h a t a p ro p o sa l f o r "an in d is s o lu b le union" between F rance and B r it a in was co n ceiv ed . I was n o t th e prim e mover. I f i r s t heard of a d e f i n i t e plan . . . on th e 1 5 th , . . . I t was e v id e n t t h a t th e r e had been c o n s id e ra b le d is c u s s io n b efo reh an d . On th e 1 4 th , V a n s i t t a r t and Desmond Morton had met M. Monnet and M. Pleven (members o f th e French Economic M ission in London), and been 20 The Times (London), June 18, 1940, p. 6. A lso see K e e sin g 's Contemporary A rc h iv e s. 1937-1940. I l l (June 14-22, 1940), 4099-101; G reat B r i t a i n , "French R epublic (Proposed Union w ith G reat B r ita in ) [16 June 1 9 4 0 ]," House o f Commons Deb. . 5 th s e r i e s , 365, CCCLXV (1939-40), 701-2; W inston S. C h u r c h ill, The Second World War: T h e ir F in e s t Hour (B oston: Houghton M if f lin , 1949), pp. 208-9; Paul Reynaud, U n ite o r P e ris h : A Dynamic Program f o r a U nited Europe ([New Y ork]: Simon and S c h u ste r [ c . 1 9 5 1 ]), pp. 3 -4 . 199 jo in e d by G eneral de G au lle, who had flown over to make arrangem ents fo r shipping to c a rry the French Government and as many French tro o p s as p o s s ib le to A fric a . These gentlemen had evolved th e o u tlin e of a d e c la ra tio n fo r a F ra n c o -B rltls h Union w ith th e o b je c t, a p a rt from I t s g e n e ra l m e rits , of giving M . Reynaud some new f a c t of a v iv id and s tim u la tin g n a tu re w ith which to c a rry a m a jo rity o f h is C abinet in to th e move to A fric a and th e continuance of th e war. M y f i r s t re a c tio n was u n fa v o rab le. I asked a number of q u estio n s of a c r i t i c a l c h a ra c te r , and was by no means con vinced. . . . 1 was somewhat s u rp ris e d to see th e s t a i d , s t o l i d , experienced p o l i ti c i a n s of a l l p a r tie s engage them selves so p a s s io n a te ly in an immense design whose im p lic a tio n s and con sequences were not in any way thought o u t. I did not r e s i s t , b u t y ie ld e d e a s ily to th e se generous surges which c a rrie d our re so lv e s to a very high le v e l o f u n s e lf is h and undaunted a c tio n . On th e morning of June 16, V a n s itta r t in c o n s u lta tio n w ith De G au lle, Monnet, Pleven, and Morton d ra fte d a B ritish -F re n c h Union proclam ation . De Gaulle urged th e p u b lic a tio n of th e document w ith out delay and v o lu n teered to tak e th e d r a f t d e c la ra tio n back to France th a t evening. 21 C h u rc h ill, op. c i t . . pp. 204-5. Also see C harles Morgan, "The End o f th e Tunnel: The U nited Pow ers," The S p e c ta to r. CLXIV (June 28, 1940), 862, fo r h is promotion of th e id ea o f a B ritis h -F re n c h Union in both c o u n trie s sin c e 1936; and A ltie r o S p in e lli , "The Growth of th e Euro pean Movement Since World War I I , " in C. Grove Haines (ed.), European In te g ra tio n (B altim ore: Johns Hopkins Press [c . 1957]X pp. 40-1, fo r th e a c tio n and in flu e n c e of the B r itis h F ed eral Union movement on th e B r itis h War C a b in e t's d e c isio n to o ffe r France union w ith B r ita in . 200 Meanwhile th e War C ab in et s tu d ie d th e d r a f t sta te m e n t c a r e f u l l y . A ccording to C h u rc h ill: A ll th e d i f f i c u l t i e s were im m ediately a p p a r e n t, b u t in th e end a D e c la ra tio n o f Union seemed to command g e n e ra l a s s e n t . I s t a t e d th a t my f i r s t i n s t i n c t had been a g a in s t th e id e a , b u t t h a t in t h i s c r i s i s we must n o t l e t o u rs e lv e s be accu sed of la c k o f im a g in a tio n . Some dram atic announcement was c l e a r l y n e c e ss a ry to keep th e F rench g o in g . The p ro p o sa l could not be l i g h t l y tu rn e d a s id e , and I was encouraged a t fin d in g so g r e a t a body o f o p in io n in th e War C abinet fa v o u ra b le to i t . 22 A fte r making h is own c o n tr ib u tio n to th e d r a f t s ta te m e n t, C h u rc h ill took i t in to th e n ex t room where De G au lle was w a itin g w ith V a n s i t t a r t , M orton, and C orbin. Having re a d i t w ith g r e a t en th u siasm , De G au lle th en t e l e phoned Reynaud in Bordeaux and re ad i t to him in th e hope t h a t t h i s solemn B r i t i s h "p led g e o f union and b ro th erh o o d between th e two n a tio n s and em pires would g iv e th e s t r u g g lin g French Prem ier th e means to c a rry h is Government to A f r i c a . A t th e c o n c lu sio n o f t h i s telep h o n e co n v e r s a tio n , G en eral De G au lle ad v ised th e B r i t i s h War C ab in et t h a t Reynaud was to meet w ith h is C abinet a t f iv e o 'c lo c k and t h a t i f he re c e iv e d a fa v o ra b le B r i t i s h answer 22C h u r c h ill, op. c i t . . pp. 207-8. 2 3I b i d . . p. 208. 201 on th e proposed union d e c la r a tio n by t h a t tim e , th e French Prime M in is te r b e lie v e d th a t he could g e t h is C abinet to keep France in th e war. On th e b a s is of t h i s r e p o r t, th e B r i t i s h War C abinet approved th e f i n a l d r a f t proclam ation o f an Anglo- French Union, a u th o riz e d De G au lle to ta k e in person an o f f i c i a l copy of i t to Reynaud th a t same evening, and agreed to h is confirm ing t h i s on th e telep h o n e to Reynaud im m ediately. F urtherm ore, th e War C abinet d ire c te d C h u rc h ill, A t tl e e , and S i n c l a i r , " re p re s e n tin g th e th re e B r i tis h p a r tie s [ in th e C a b in e t], to meet M. Reynaud a t th e e a r l i e s t moment [ in France] to d isc u ss th e d r a f t p ro clam atio n and r e la te d q u e stio n s . Plans were then made fo r C h u rc h ill and h is p a rty to leav e by c r u is e r th a t evening and to meet Reynaud o ff th e c o a s t of B ritta n y th e n ex t noon. While C h u rc h ill and h is p a rty were se a te d in t h e i r s p e c ia l t r a i n s h o rtly a f t e r s ix o 'c lo c k on th e evening of June 16 and w a itin g fo r i t to d e p a rt fo r Southampton, a s tra n g e d elay o cc u rred . The B r i t is h Ambassador a t Bordeaux had telephoned th a t a French C abinet c r i s i s had developed and th a t th e m eeting ^ C h u r c h i l l , op. c i t .. pp. 208-9. 202 w ith Reynaud was not p o s s ib le . "On t h i s [news] I re tu rn e d to Downing S t r e e t ," w rote C h u rc h ill, "w ith a heavy h e a r t. D esp ite Reynaud's arguments on b e h a lf o f the D e c la ra tio n of Union b efo re h is C abinet, th e m a jo rity of th e French C abinet were d e f e a t i s t s and co n sid ered F ra n c e 's cause as w ell as B r i t a i n 's h o p e le ss. Here is how C h u rc h ill d esc rib ed p a rt of th e f i n a l scene in Reynaud's c a b in e t: Paul Reynaud was q u ite unable to overcome th e unfavourable im pression which th e pro posal of A nglo-French Union c re a te d . The d e f e a t i s t s e c tio n , led by Marshal P d ta in , re fu se d even to examine i t . V io len t charges were made. " I t was a la s t-m in u te p la n ," "a s u r p r is e ," "a scheme to put France in tu te la g e , or to c a rry o ff h er c o lo n ia l em pire." I t re le g a te d F rance, so they s a id , to th e p o s itio n of a Dominion. Others complained th a t not even e q u a l i t y of s ta tu s was o ffe re d to th e French, because Frenchmen were to re c e iv e only th e c itiz e n s h ip of th e B r itis h Empire in s te a d of th a t of Great B r ita in , w h ile th e B r itis h were to be c itiz e n s of France. This suggestion is c o n tra d ic te d by th e t e x t . Beyond th e se came o th e r argum ents. Weygand had convinced P dtain w ithout much d i f f i c u l t y th a t England was l o s t . High French m ilita r y a u th o r i- tie s --p e rh a p s Weygand h im self--h a d advised: "In th re e weeks England w il l have h er neck wrung lik e a c h ic k e n ." To make a union w ith G reat B r ita in was, according to P d ta in , "fu sio n w ith a c o rp s e ." Ybarnegaray, who had been so s to u t in th e previous war, exclaim ed: " B e tte r be a Nazi p ro v in ce. At ^ C h u r c h i ll, op. c i t .. pp. 211-2. 203 l e a s t we know what t h a t m eans." S en ato r R e ib e l, a p e rso n a l f r ie n d o f G en eral W eygand's, d e c la re d t h a t t h i s scheme meant com plete d e s tr u c tio n f o r F ra n c e , and anyhow d e f i n i t e s u b o rd in a tio n to England. In v ain d id Reynaud r e p ly : " I p r e f e r t o c o lla b o r a te w ith my a l l i e s r a t h e r th an w ith my en e m ies." And Mandel [a s k e d ]: "Would you r a t h e r be a German d i s t r i c t th an a B r i t i s h Dominion?" But a l l was in v a i n . 26 The French C abinet focused a l l f u r th e r d is c u s s io n on how best to get out from under the war with Germany and under what term s. Reynaud*s p r e s e n ta tio n o f th e B r i t i s h - French Union p ro p o sa l n ev er came to a v o te ac co rd in g to 27 C h u r c h ill. In f a c t , th e two teleg ram s o f th e B r i t i s h Government to th e French Government on June 16, approving in q u iry o f term s of an a r m is tic e f o r F ran ce, "p ro v id e d . b u t only p ro v id e d , t h a t th e French F le e t is s a ile d f o r t h w ith f o r B r i t i s h h arb o u rs pending n e g o t i a t i o n s . . . ." and ^ C h u r c h i l l , op. c i t . . pp. 212-3. 27 D is c re p a n ic e s have appeared on t h i s p o in t. C a tlin in h is op. c i t . . p. 46, w rote t h a t th e B r i t i s h - F rench Union o f f e r was r e je c t e d by th e French C abinet "o n ly by t h i r t e e n to e ig h t v o te s ." C en tre d*A ction pour la F £ d £ ratio n europdenne in op. c i t . . p. 60, p o in te d o u t: "From th e a c tio n o f a sm all m a jo rity (13 v o tes a g a in s t 1 0 ), th e [Union] o f f e r was r e j e c t e d , b u t many men of th e French R e s ista n c e s t i l l c o n sid e re d i t v a lid and w aited f o r i t to be re v iv e d as soon as F ran ce, li b e r a t e d from th e Germans and th e Vichy Government, was in a p o s itio n to d em o n strate h e r w illin g n e s s ." 204 c o n s u lta tio n w ith B rita in "as soon as any a rm is tic e terms a re re c e iv e d ," 2® were never co nsidered by th e Reynaud C ab in et, which was in process of com plete d is in te g r a tio n . Reynaud, e n tir e ly exhausted by th e s tr e s s e s and s tr a in s of th e French Government's dilemma, tendered h is re s ig n a t io n , and P ^tain q u ick ly headed up a new French Government 29 which sought an immediate a rm is tic e from Germany. From th e French sid e Prime M in iste r Reynaud gave t h i s i n te r e s tin g account of th e ste p s lead in g up to th e B r i t is h o ffe r of Anglo-French Union: . . . During th e aftern o o n of June 16, 1940, 1 was tw ice c a lle d on th e teleph one by G eneral de G aulle in London. He to ld me of a s e n s a tio n a l o f f e r by th e B r itis h government which d e lig h te d me as one more argument fo r keeping France in th e war by E ngland's s id e . I urged him to secure a te x t o f th e o f f e r , which th e B r itis h government was s t i l l c o n sid e rin g , b efo re f iv e o 'c lo c k so th a t I could pass i t on to th e French C abinet. This o f f e r was a p ro je c t to u n ite th e two c o u n tr ie s . I t was an o f f e r I was ready to accept in p r in c ip le , fre e to d isc u ss i t s d e t a i l s , because my p o lic y has always been based on th e b e l i e f th a t only a c lo s e union w ith England could allow France to keep i t s in d e pendence on th e C o n tin en t. There would d o u b tless 2® C hurchill, pp. c i t . . pp. 206-7. 29I b i d . , pp. 213-5. C h u rc h ill a ls o d e sc rib e s on p. 218 how he agreed to a B r itis h plan fo r De G aulle to escape by a irp la n e on June 17 to England, where he was a b le to lead th e Free French on the s id e of the A llie s u n t i l v ic to ry over th e German N azis. 205 be p ro b le m s t o be s o lv e d . . . . In any c a s e , u n io n w ith E ngland w ould mean in d e p e n d e n c e f o r F r a n c e , u n io n w ith Germany w ould mean s l a v e r y . . . . G e n e ra l de G a u lle added t h a t . . . ( t h e t e x t o f t h e B r i t i s h - F r e n c h U nion o f f e r ] had b e e n a d o p te d by t h e [ B r i t i s h ] War C a b in e t, w ith th e r e s e r v a t i o n t h a t a few w ords m ig h t s t i l l be changed by t h e C a b in e t w hich was s t i l l in s e s s i o n . I w ould p ro b a b lv be t h e P rim e M i n i s t e r o f t h e j o i n t War C a b in e t. C h u r c h i l l te le p h o n e d Reynaud im m e d ia te ly a f t e r De G a u l l e 's te le p h o n e c o n v e r s a t i o n ; and a f t e r e x c h an g es o f en c o u rag em en t and c o n f id e n c e in e a c h o t h e r , th e two a g r e e d t o m eet in B r i t t a n y t h e f o llo w in g d a y . Reynaud th e n m et w ith h i s C a b in e t a t f i v e o 'c l o c k t h a t same d a y , and in h i s own w ords t h i s i s w hat o c c u r r e d : . . . F i r s t I d e l i v e r e d t h e an sw er P r e s i d e n t R o o s e v e lt had made t o my l a s t a p p e a l f o r h e l p . I t d id n o t m eet th e h o p es w h ich C h u r c h i l l and I had h e l d , b u t i t s t i l l had l a r g e p o l i t i c a l im p o r t a n c e . F o r A m erica co m m itted i t s e l f t o s u p p ly in g t h e enem ies o f Germany w ith o u t l i m i t . . . . Then I r e a d t h e o f f e r o f F r a n c o - B r i t i s h u n io n , w ith t h e a d d i t i o n a l in f o r m a tio n a b o u t i t w hich d e G a u lle had g iv e n me. I showed i t s trem en d o u s s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r th e f u t u r e , and I r e v e a l e d t h a t C h u r c h i l l was com ing t o F ra n c e th e n e x t day t o t a l k w ith me. One o f th e m i n i s t e r s , Y b a rn a g a ra y , d e c la r e d t h a t E ngland w an ted t o make u s a d o m in io n . C a m ille 30 Reynaud, op. c i t . . pp. 2 -4 . 206 Chautemps, second deputy Prime M in is te r, sid e d w ith t h i s c r it i c i s m . Most of th e m in is te r s were n o t equipped to comprehend t h i s g ig a n tic p r o je c t, and c e r t a i n o th e rs had been a lre a d y lin e d up a g a in s t i t because my opponents in th e C abinet had le a rn e d o f i t through w ire -ta p p in g and had ta lk e d a g a in s t i t b e fo re th e C abinet m et. I t is w orth n o tin g th a t a l l th o se m in is te r s who were to c a p i t u l a t e , t h a t very evening, and d e liv e r F rance h e lp le s s ly to Germany, were in d ig n a n tly a g a in s t any union w ith our E n g lish a l l i e s . I could now see th e p o s itio n of th e two deputy Prime M in is te rs , P d tain and Chautemps, and of numerous o th e r m in is te r s , and I concluded t h a t i t was im p o ssib le to go on governing w ith such a team. So I re sig n e d . . . [and] P e ta in took my p l a c e . Reynaud sp en t th e next f iv e war y e a rs in p r is o n -- " f i r s t in France thanks to Vichy and then in Germany by th e g ra ce o f H i t l e r ." During t h i s tim e he continued to b e lie v e th a t C h u r c h ill's p ro p o sal o f F ra n c o -B ritis h Union "could have served as th e b a s is f o r a u n i f i c a t io n of a l l Europe . . . [and] th a t a f t e r th e A llie d v ic to ry i t would be n e c e s sa ry , in o rd e r to win th e p eace, to ta k e up ag ain 32 th e o f f e r C h u rch il made. . . . " A fte r h is r e le a s e from 31 Reynaud, op. c i t . . pp. 4 -5 . C f. E rn est B e v in 's fa v o ra b le views in G reat B r ita in , House o f Commons Deb. . 5 th s e r i e s , 416 (1945-46), 785. 32I b id . . pp. 1, 6. 207 p riso n in 1945, Reynaud went to see Duff Cooper, then B r i t i s h Ambassador in P a ris , to d isc u ss r e v iv a l of th e id ea of a F ra n c o -B ritis h Union lead in g to a U nited Europe. But according to Reynaud, " . . . beyond any doubt, i t was e i t h e r too l a t e or to o e a rly to pick up th e co n v ersa tio n a t th e p o in t where Winston C h u rc h ill and 1 had dropped i t f iv e y ears b e f o r e . " ^ At th a t tim e Reynaud r e c a lle d : This bold and generous o f f e r brought Winston C h u rc h ill c r it i c is m in England. This was only n a tu r a l, co n sid e rin g th e pow erful n a tio n a l c h a r a c te r of th e B r i t is h p eo p le, t h e i r s p i r i t of independence, t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l re se rv e and th e is o la tio n is m which has always flowed from i t . And th e generous n a tu re of th e o f f e r was e n tir e ly m isunderstood and even v u lg a rly d e n ig ra te d . a f t e r th e a r m is tic e , by th e propaganda of Vichy. ^ Like o th e rs , C h u rc h ill has t r i e d to v is u a liz e what might have happened i f Reynaud had survived the French C abinet c r i s i s o f June 16, 1940. This is h is con je c tu r e : Reynaud, op. c i t . , p . 6. - ^ I b id . , p. 4. Also see Mr. Shaw cross's c r iti c is m of th e B r i tis h Government fo r not m ain tain in g th e idea in G reat B r ita in as a postwar p o lic y fo r u n itin g Europe, House of Commons Deb. . 5th s e r i e s , 416 (1947-48), 492. 208 I f Paul Reynaud had s u rv iv e d th e 1 6 th , I should have been w ith him a t noon on th e 17 th , accom panied by th e most pow erful d e le g a tio n t h a t has e v e r l e f t our s h o re s , armed w ith p le n a ry powers in th e name o f th e B r i t i s h n a tio n . C e r ta in ly we should have c o n fro n te d P e ta in , Weygand, Chautemps, and th e r e s t w ith our b lu n t p r o p o s itio n : "No r e le a s e from th e o b lig a tio n o f March 28 u n le s s th e French F le e t i s s a i l e d to B r i t i s h p o r t s . On th e o th e r hand, we o f f e r an in d is s o lu b le A nglo-French Union. Go to A fric a and l e t us f i g h t i t out t o g e t h e r ." S u rely we should have been aid ed by th e P re s id e n t o f th e R epublic [L e b ru n ], by th e P re s id e n ts o f th e two F rench Chambers [Jeanneney and H e r r i o t ] , and by a l l t h a t r e s o l u t e band who g a th e re d behind Reynaud, M andel, and de G a u lle . I t seems to me p ro b a b le t h a t we should have up- l i f t e d and c o n v e rte d th e d e f e a t i s t s round th e t a b l e , o r l e f t them in a m in o rity or even under a r r e s t . But l e t us p u rsu e t h i s g h o s tly s p e c u la tio n f u r t h e r . The French Government would have r e t i r e d t o N orth A f r ic a . The A nglo-F rench S u p e r-S ta te or Working Committee, to which i t would pro b ab ly in p r a c t ic e have reduced i t s e l f , would have faced H i t l e r . . . . F rance . . . would have been sp ared th e f e a r f u l schism which r e n t and s t i l l ren d s h er p eo p le. . . .35 Much more optimistic was Coudenhove-Kalergi's speculation of what might have resulted if Reynaud and his ^ ^ c h u r c h ill, op. c i t . . pp. 221-2. I t was some s ix te e n months a f t e r th e war had ended in E urope, however, b e fo re C h u rc h ill p u b lic ly ap p ealed (in h is Z u rich Speech) f o r a n o th e r U nion--one encom passing more than B r ita in and F ra n c e --a European Union. 209 su p p o rte rs had succeeded on th a t f a t e f u l n ig h t. He w rote: Had they succeeded, 16th June would have become th e an n iv e rsa ry of U nited Europe. For th e e x ile d Governments of Poland, C zechoslovakia, Belgium, th e N eth erlan d s, Luxembourg, and Norway [ s itu a te d in B rita in ] would c e r ta in ly have acceded to an A nglo-French Union. A s in g le European Nation would have emerged a t th e end of th e war, w ith one C ab in et, one army, one economy and one P arliam en t. The n e u tr a l and d efeated n a tio n s would subsequently have jo in e d t h i s Union and th e r e s u l t of th e Second World War would have been a Europe u n ite d in th e p o l i t i c a l as w ell as in th e economic f i e l d . [In ste a d ] . . . i t came about th a t in June 1940 th e second wave o f th e Pan-European movement reached both i t s clim ax and i t s end. By th e end of th e war, P ro fesso r Guerard expressed t h i s view toward th e B r itis h o f f e r of Union w ith France: W e may co n sid er as one of th e se lo c a l fe d e ra tio n s Mr. Winston C h u r c h ill's g re a t proposal to merge a lto g e th e r th e B r i t is h and th e French em p ires. I t was genuinely C h u rc h illia n , m a g n ific a n tly bold and d ram atic, . . . I am deeply so rry i t was not accep ted . C onsidering who P dtain and Laval were, i t could not have been accep ted . These men were " r e a l i s t s " and chose the "winning s i d e ." What degree of r e a l i t y th e re was behind C h u r c h ill's g e s tu re , we s h a ll never k n o w --firs t of a l l because, in a l l lik e lih o o d , Mr. C h u rc h ill h im self does not know. There is no in k lin g th a t i t remains a stan d in g o f f e r . 37 3& An Idea Conquers th e W orld« pp. 226-7. 370p. c i t . . p. 89. That th e B r i tis h o f f e r of Union w ith France no longer stood and would not be renewed was so d ec la red in th e House of Commons by Prime M in iste r C h u rc h ill on August 2, 1944 and A p ril 25, 1945, and by 210 At th e tim e o f th e A l l i e s ' a p p a re n t d e f e a t by H i t l e r 's in v a d in g h o rd es t h e r e was no c r i t i c i s m o f th e B r i t i s h War C a b in e t's o f f e r to u n i t e w ith F ra n c e . In f a c t , n o t u n t i l F r a n c e 's d e s i r e to s u rre n d e r to H i t l e r (consum mated on June 23) and h e r Vichy G overnm ent's c o o p e ra tio n w ith th e N azis became e v id e n t d id c r i t i c i s m s o f th e union o f f e r d e v e lo p . L a te r , th e o b je c tio n s to th e p ro p o sa l became more open when th e p e rio d o f g r e a t e s t Nazi p e r i l had p assed and B r i t a i n ap p eared a b le to c a r r y on a g a in s t H i t l e r w ith o u t F ra n c e . By and l a r g e , how ever, th e s e were n o t c o n s t r u c ti v e c r i t i c i s m s o f in h e re n t d e f e c ts in th e u n io n p ro p o s a l b u t r a t h e r a n e g a tiv e re sp o n se b ec au se o f d is d a in f o r F ra n c e 's a tte m p t to c u rry Nazi fa v o r o r b ecau se o f narrow n a tio n a lis m . On the other hand, the adherents of European Federation were naturally disappointed with the turn of events in France and the rejection of the Anglo-French Union, which they sincerely believed would have served as the nucleus of a federated Europe after the war. In view F o re ig n S e c r e ta r y Eden on F eb ru ary 21, 1945, se e G re at B r i t a i n , House o f Commons Deb. . 5 th s e r i e s , 402 (1 9 4 3 -4 4 ), 1415; 410 (1 9 4 4 -4 5 ), 840; and 408 (1 9 4 4 -4 5 ), 769. o f th e u n fa v o ra b le c o u rse o f th e war f o r th e dem ocracies and i t s p ro b ab le long d u ra tio n , however, many f e d e r a l i s t le a d e rs found i t n e c e ssa ry to re a s s e s s th e f u tu r e co u rse of w orld p o l i t i c s in term s o f th e s u rv iv a l o f dem ocratic n a t i o n s . Impact of T o t a l i t a r i a n Conquest and S u b o rd in atio n o f E f f o r t to U nite Europe to D rive f o r World F e d e ra tio n The u n c e rta in ty o f th e f u tu r e was made a l l th e more d em o ralizin g by th e ap p aren t speed and ease o f th e i n i t i a l co nquests of th e Nazis which seemed to f u l f i l l H i t l e r 's p rev io u s b o a s ts and h is plan s f o r th e t o t a l i t a r i a n c o n s o lid a tio n o f Europe—and perhaps of th e w o r l d . 38 See H i t l e r 's n o tio n s co n cern in g Germany's m il lennium in th e "New O rder" f o r Europe in H. R. T rev o r- R o p er's in tro d u c to ry e ssay on "The Mind o f A dolf H i t l e r , " in H i t l e r 's T able T alk . 1941-1944. t r a n s l . Norman Cameron and R. H. Stevens (London: W eidenfeld and N icolson [1953]), pp. x v i-x x v i. Here a r e H i t l e r 's sta te m e n ts on t h i s s u b je c t " . . . we a re going to have a c o n tin e n t to r u l e , " ( i b i d . , p. 19); "The s tr u g g le f o r th e hegemony o f th e w orld w i l l be decided in fav o u r o f Europe by th e p o sse ssio n of th e R ussian sp ace. Thus Europe w i l l be an im pregnable f o r t r e s s , s a fe from a l l t h r e a t o f blockade . . . " ( i b i d . , p. 32); ". . . a l l th e Germanics a re u n ite d . They must compose th e nucleus around which Europe w i l l f e d e r a te . On th e day when w e've s o l i d ly o rg a n ise d Europe, we s h a l l be In d e ed , a f t e r th e f a l l o f F ran ce t h e r e rem ained in Europe o n ly B r i t a i n a b le and w i l l i n g t o s ta n d up a g a in s t th e N azis and t h e i r A xis p a r tn e r s and t o oppose t h e i r t o t a l c o n q u e st o f W estern E urope. Should B r i t a i n go down t o d e f e a t , th e N azis would th a n have a f r e e hand t o tu r n a g a in s t R u s s ia , to co n q u er a l l o f E a s te rn E urope, and t h e r e a f t e r t o move a g a in s t th e n a tio n s o f o th e r c o n t i - 39 n e n t s . No doubt ab o u t i t , th e war o f th e a g g re s s o r a b le t o look tow ard A f r ic a . And who knows? p erh ap s one day we s h a l l b e a b le t o e n t e r t a i n o th e r a m b itio n s ." ( i b i d . p . 3 8 2 ); "The g e n e r a tio n s w hich fo llo w us w i l l no doubt a c c e p t w ith o u t comment th e u n i f i c a t i o n o f Europe w hich we a r e ab o u t t o a c c o m p lish , in th e same way a s th e m a jo r ity o f o u r c o n te m p o ra rie s re g a rd th e fo u n d a tio n o f th e B is - m arckian Em pire as a sim p le f a c t o f h i s t o r y . " ( i b i d . , p. 5 4 1 ); " I t i s t o be hoped t h a t one day we s h a l l a c h ie v e co m p lete hegemony in E u ro p e ." ( i b i d . , p. 6 6 1 ). A lso s e e " H i t l e r 's S p o r tp a la s t Speech [ i n B e r l i n , Ja n u a ry 30, 1939] in K e e sin g 1s C ontem porary A rc h iv e s . 1937-1940. I l l , 3902; and " T H i t l e r 's l U n ited S ta te s o f E u ro p e ." The E co n o m ist. CXL (June 14, 1941), 7 83-5. ■ ^ B u tle r, op. c i t . . pp. 176, 189-92; a l s o se e "H err H i t l e r 's Munich * B e e r -C e lla r' Speech [on F eb ru a ry 24, 1939, c e le b r a t i n g th e tw e n tie th a n n iv e r s a r y o f th e fo u n d in g o f th e N a t i o n a l - S o c i a l i s t P a r t y ] , " in Keeainsfc C ontem porary A rc h iv e s . 1937-1940. I l l , 3941, in w hich H i t l e r a tta c k e d th e e l d e r l y , d r ie d - u p n o n e n t i t i e s '" o f B r i t a i n and F ran ce t h a t t a lk e d "ab o u t Eruopean re c o n s t r u c t i o n . . . The r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f th e w orld w i l l come, b u t w ith o u t th e s o - c a l l e d d e m o c ra tic s ta te s m e n . . . And he prom ised t h a t "Germany would d e s tr o y 't h e o rg a n is e d t e r r o r o f an Infamous p l u t o c r a t i c w orld c l i q u e . '" 213 t o t a l i t a r i a n powers seemed c e r t a in to th re a te n th e demo c r a t i c w orld. This grave p o s s i b i l i t y aroused c e r t a i n f e d e r a l i s t s and o th e r in te rn a tio n a lly -m in d e d p u b l i c i s ts to ap p eal f o r a union o f dem ocratic n a tio n s n o t r e s t r i c t e d to a p o rtio n o f Europe but to in c lu d e a ls o th e im portant dem ocracies of th e w orld. They reasoned t h a t only such a union would have th e p o t e n ti a l re so u rc e s and power to oppose e f f e c t i v e l y th e t o t a l i t a r i a n powers or any fu tu re v io la to r s of th e peace. They were not d issu ad ed by th e f a c t th a t th e f i r s t experim ent in " u n iv e rs a l" in t e r n a t io n a l o rg a n iz a tio n to m ain tain w orld peace and o rd e r (v ia th e League of N ations) had f a il e d in i t s prim ary m issio n . On th e c o n tra ry , c a r e f u l study and a p p r a is a l of th e L eague's o p e ra tio n , convinced them th a t a more o b je c tiv e and e f f e c t i v e arrangem ent fo r in te r n a tio n a l o rg a n iz a tio n was n e c e ssa ry . To secu re t h i s arrangem ent they envisaged an e v o lu tio n a ry r a ti o n a l i z a ti o n o f in t e r n a ti o n a l p o l i t i c s in h a r mony w ith th e p ro g ress of a te c h n o lo g ic a l age. R ather than re v iv e a f t e r th e war th e o ld , in e f f e c t iv e League of N a tio n s--sim p ly a lo o se a s s o c ia tio n or c o n fe d e ra tio n of s t a t e s - - t h e y urged a genuine union or f e d e ra tio n of 214 s ta te s - - o n e w ith r e a l a u th o r ity and power. In e v ita b ly th ey b e lie v e d t h a t th e tre n d s in th e machine age and th e anachronism o f p e tty h av e-n o t n a tio n s re q u ire d th e e x te n sio n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rg a n iz a tio n from re g io n a l to i n t e r c o n tin e n ta l fe d e ra tio n s and u ltim a te ly to a w orld f e d e r a tio n o f s t a t e s . Only th u s , th ey m a in ta in e d , could i n t e r n a tio n a l p o l i t i c s r e a l i s t i c a l l y a s s u re w orld peace and o rd e r, w h ich --lo n g overdue--m ankind c e r t a i n ly had every r i g h t to expect from an age b o a s tin g o f i t s tremendous m a te r ia l p ro g ress and e v e r-e x te n d in g knowledge.^® 40 A number o f p u b l i c i s ts and c iv ic le a d e rs d e d i c a te d t h e i r tim e and energy in t h i s d i r e c tio n and e x e rte d s u b s t a n t i a l in flu e n c e d u rin g th e war y e a rs upon p r o f e s s io n a l g ro u p s, p o l i t i c i a n s , and g re a t numbers of laymen in th e dem ocratic n a tio n s . The most i n f l u e n t i a l and i n i t i a l p u b lic a tio n o f t h i s group was C larence S t r e i t 's Union Now, th e p o p u la rity of which may be judged by th e f a c t t h a t , d u rin g i t s f i r s t y e a r o f p u b lic a tio n in 1939, i t commanded f i f t e e n s e p a ra te p r in t i n g s . O thers were W . B. C u rry 's The Case fo r F e d e ra l Union (London: Penquin, 1939); George C a tlin g s Anglo-American Union as a Nucleus o f World F e d e ra tio n (London: M acm illan, 1942) [a s w e ll as o th e r p u b lic a tio n s ] ; W alter Lippmann's v a rio u s a r t i c l e s su g g e s tin g a u n ite d A tla n tic World [ I t was Lippmann who popu la r iz e d th e p h rase "th e A tla n tic Community."] ; and W endell W illk ie 's One World (New York: Simon and S c h u ste r, 1943), which was w idely read and acclaim ed. A lso see th re e g e n e ra l re fe re n c e volumes which have brought to g e th e r th e p la n s , a r t i c l e s , and th in k in g o f le a d in g s c h o la r s , p ro fe s - sio n a l-g ro u p le a d e r s , and statesm en in su p p o rt o f i n t e r c o n tin e n ta l fe d e ra tio n s and a fe d e ra te d World Government: Howard 0. Eaton e t a l . , F e d e ra tio n : The Coming S tru c tu re 215 The lo g ic and b ro ad er ap p eal o f th e s e w r i t e r s , c a l l i n g f o r f e d e r a tio n o f th e w o rld 's le a d in g dem ocracies and then a World F e d e ra tio n , a t t r a c t e d la rg e fo llo w in g s in th e c o u n trie s o f th e W estern A l l i e s . As a r e s u l t , th e European F e d e ra l Union movement l o s t most of i t s momentum and s u p p o rt, e s p e c ia lly a f t e r th e e n u n c ia tio n o f th e " D e c la ra tio n by [tw e n ty -six ] U nited N ations" (Jan u ary , 1942) then w arrin g a g a in s t th e Axis Powers. Because of th e w artim e u n ity and c o o p e ra tio n of th e s e tw e n ty -six n a tio n s , evidence o f v ic to r y appeared. F urtherm ore, th e a l l i e d le a d e rs and populace were f i l l e d w ith optim ism and p sy c h o lo g ic a l fe rv o r over th e new e ra of w orld u n ity and peace t h a t would s u re ly emerge a f t e r th e war. I t was th e momentum o f t h i s s p i r i t t h a t led th e Big Four A llie d le a d e rs to is s u e t h e i r "Moscow D e c la ra tio n " (O ctober 30, 1942). T his was a form al prom ise to keep world peace and s e c u r ity a f t e r th e war through t h e i r continued u n ite d of World Government (Norman: U n iv e rs ity o f Oklahoma P re s s , 1944); World C itiz e n s A s s o c ia tio n , The W orld's D estiny and th e U nited S t a t e s : A C onference o f E xperts in I n t e r n a tio n a l R e la tio n s (Chicago: World C itiz e n s A sso c ia tio n [c . 1941 ]); E d ith Wynner and G eorgia Lloyd, S e a rc h lig h t on Peace P lan s: Choose Your Road to World Government (New e n la rg e d e d . ; New York: D utton, 1949), pp. 116-85, and pp. 197-226 f o r seven w orld c o n fe d e ra tio n plan s proposed d u rin g th e w ar. 216 a c tio n and to work f o r c r e a tio n o f a w orld o rg a n iz a tio n d e d ic a te d to t h a t o b je c tiv e . M oreover, b e fo re th e war had ended, th e A llie s endeavored to s u b s ta n t ia t e t h e i r u n ity and good f a i t h by e s ta b lis h in g th e U nited N ations O rganiza t io n . In view of th e p sy c h o lo g ic a l e f f e c t o f th e s e developm ents, many form er ad h e ren ts of European F e d e ra l Union came to b e lie v e t h a t th e fe d e ra tio n o f Europe a f t e r th e war m ight not be n e c e ssa ry . Hence, th ey d ir e c te d t h e i r a t t e n t i o n to th e more u n iv e r s a l movement f o r a World F e d e ra tio n v ia th e A tla n tic Union or th e U nited N a t i o n s .^ 41 . R. W . G. Mackay, You Can t Turn th e Clock Back (Chicago: Z iff-D a v is [c . 1 948 ]), p. 317. For j u s t i f i c a tio n of th e g lo b a l o u tlo o k and approach to a World Govern m ent, see Ely C u lb e rtso n , Summary o f th e World F e d e ra tio n Plan . . . (Garden C ity : Garden C ity P u b lish in g C o., 1943), pp. 3-64; Ely C u lb e rtso n , T o ta l Peace: What Makes Wars and How to O rganize Peace (Garden C ity : Doubleday, Doran, 1943), pp. 117-29, 239-339; Emery Reves, op. c i t . . pp. 1-29, 155-71, 175-293; Wynner and Lloyd, op. c i t .. pp. 120-85, 263-6, 340-6 (fo r s t r u c t u r a l c h a r ts o f w orld government p l a n s ) , and pp. 544-6 f o r a h i s t o r i c a l resume o f th e w orld government movement. For s c h o la r ly argum ents f o r a fe d e r a tio n o f th e le a d in g dem ocracies o f th e w orld or B ritish -A m erican Union, see C a tlin , op. c i t . . pp. 15-7, 127-9; L io n el C u r tis , World War: I t s Cause and Cure (2d e d .; New York: Putnam 's [c . 1 9 46]), pp. 154-66, 205-12, 224-5, 261 [A French t r a n s l a t i o n o f t h i s 2d ed. has appeared under th e t i t l e o f F e d e ra tio n ou G uerre (Neuch&tel: E d itio n s de la Baconni&re [ c . 1945])}; S t r e i t , 217 These g r e a t postw ar e x p e c ta tio n s n o tw ith s ta n d in g , th e id ea of European F e d e ra tio n was n o t e n t i r e l y fo rsa k e n . A lthough in a s t a t e of dormancy, i t was k ep t a l i v e by a few Euro pean -minded f e d e r a l i s t s as w e ll as by le a d e rs o f v a rio u s R e s ista n c e groups emerging in th e occupied c o u n trie s a f t e r th e t i d e o f war began to tu rn a g a in s t th e t o t a l i t a r i a n conq uerors in 1 9 4 2 .^ op. c i t . . pp. 86-115. For argum ents a g a in s t th e n e c e s s ity of a European F e d e ra tio n and a su g g ested a l t e r n a t i v e , see David M itrany, A Working Peace System: An Argument f o r th e F u n c tio n a l Development of I n te r n a tio n a l O rg a n izatio n (London: Royal I n s t i t u t e of I n t e r n a t io n a l A f f a ir s [1 9 4 4 ]), pp. 10-60. / o A few of th e s e European f e d e r a l i s t s devoted t h e i r e f f o r t s to l i t e r a r y w orks, such as C oudenhove-K alergi, who f le d w ith h is fam ily on June 17, 1940, thro ugh F rance to P o rtu g a l and th en to th e U nited S t a t e s , where he w rote h is C rusade f o r P an-E urope, see pp. 213-9 and pp. 223-68, c o v e rin g h is endeavors in America to advance th e cause o f a U nited S ta te s o f Europe a f t e r th e w ar. A lso se e h is An Idea Conquers th e W orld, pp. 233-61, which r e - a f f ir m s th e s e same e f f o r t s . Then th e r e were Mackay, op. c i t . . pp. 4 -7 , 15, 17, 325-7, 335-6; H ilda Monte, The U nity o f Europe (London: G o lla n c z , 1943); and G u^rard, op. c i t .: M arsh all Sm uts' Empire P a rlia m e n ta ry A sso c ia tio n speech (November 25, 1943) u rg in g B r ita in to u n ite w ith th e W estern European dem ocracies in The New York Tim es. December 3, 1943, pp. 1, 8 . Z u rc h er, in o p . c i t . . pp. 10- 9, a ls o s u b s ta n t i a t e s C oudenhove-K alergi' s work in America f o r European F e d e ra tio n . For evidence o f th e f e d e r a tio n e f f o r t s of th e le a d e rs of th e R e sis ta n c e g ro u p s, see C en tre d*A ction pour l a F e d e ra tio n europeenne, op. c i t . . pp. 67-107 [Many R e s ista n c e g ro u p s' documents c a ll i n g f o r postw ar European F e d e ra tio n a r e quoted on th e s e p a g e s .] ; and Boyd, op. c i t . . pp. 70-1 [A w idely c i r c u la te d 218 The t i d e co m p letely tu rn e d in 1944, swept M u sso lin i and h is F a s c is ts out o f th e w ar, fo rc e d H i t l e r and h is N azis back i n to t h e i r d i s i n t e g r a t i n g German " m ille n n ia l" R eich, and o b l i t e r a t e d th em --th an k s to th e t h r e e - f r o n t i o o ffe n s iv e o f th e B r i t i s h , R u ssia n , and American fo r c e s . Only a f t e r th e w o rld 's most d e v a s ta tin g and c o s tly w ar, however, was i t p o s s ib le to l i b e r a t e Europe from an en fo rced t o t a l i t a r i a n u n io n . And th e f o r tu n a te Europeans who su rv iv e d th e chaos and economic d e p r iv a tio n s of th e w o rld 's w orst war th en had a second chance w ith in a g e n e ra tio n to c o n s id e r re o rg a n iz in g t h e i r o b so le sc e n t n a tio n s t a t e system in to a more e f f e c t i v e and harmonious p o l i t i c a l 44 o rd e r. R e s is ta n c e g ro u p s' m a n ife s to , "alm ost i d e n t i c a l w ith t h a t o f c u r r e n t sta te m e n ts iss u e d from B r it a in by F e d e ra l Union" and c a l l i n g f o r a p e o p le 's dem o cratic European F e d e ra tio n , i s quoted h e r e . ] . ^ T h e w r i t e r has many v iv id and d ir e memories o f t h i s l i b e r a t i n g t i d e . He p a r ti c i p a te d in i t as one i n f a n tr y s o l d i e r (in th e U nited S ta te s 79th D iv is io n ) among th o u sa n d s--fro m Normandie on June 12, 1944, a c ro s s W estern E urope, and in to th e Ruhr D i s t r i c t o f Germany by th e w a r's end in Europe on May 7, 1945; and t h e r e a f t e r as an occupa t i o n s o l d i e r in v a rio u s p a r ts o f c e n t r a l and so u th ern Germany and C zeckoslovakia u n t i l F ebruary 11, 1946. ^ T h a t th e dem ocracies " s l e p t " in th e 1930's has a lre a d y been n o ted ; see above, fo o tn o te 18. Yet i t does seem c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f man in a l a i s s e z - f a i r e or f r e e s o c ie ty to d r i f t along in th e d i r e c ti o n o f h is own s e l f - 219 Before turning to the perspective for European unification after World War II, perhaps It would be well to note the striking historical parallel between the tendencies of the people of Europe to achieve European political stability and unity before and after World Wars I and II. In Western Europe during the nineteenth century, for example, there had been an extended people's movement for a United States of Europe (even though isolated for lack of government support).^ Then, owing to the abundant evidence of the world's increasing scientific and techno logical progress near the turn of the century, the leaders of the people were able to convince the majority that a switch from the idea of continental to universal political organization was more logical. A universal organization therefore seemed to them the most appropriate institution to resolve once and for all Europe's international problem of war and peace. During World War I, moreover, the idea satisfactions and to flout less immediate dangers; then, when these potential dangers do occur and he is in peril, to decide to mend the ways of his folly and to adhere to those things offering rescue from his predicament and greater security for his future. But again, after his peril has ended and times have returned to normal, man un fortunately too easily forgets the lesson, slips back into his old habits, and thereby lets societal inadequacies be repeated to his detriment. 45 See Chapter V, pp. 142-58. 220 o f a u n iv e r s a l o rg a n iz a tio n g ain ed s tro n g e r ac cep tan ce and fo llo w in g th e war le d to th e c r e a tio n o f th e League o f N a tio n s. T h e r e a f te r , th e League was expected to f u l f i l l no t only i t s w orld r o l e b u t a ls o t h a t of keeping th e European n a t i o n - s t a t e system in harmony and o rd e r. Con s e q u e n tly , th e id e a o f u n itin g Europe was b e lie v e d u n n eces s a ry , and th e r e f o r e lay dormant f o r alm ost fo u r y e a rs a f t e r th e w a r . ^ S im ila r ly , a p o p u la rly -s u p p o rte d movement f o r a European F e d e ra l Union p r i o r to and c o n tin u in g th roug h th e f i r s t two y e a rs of World War I I gave w ay --in a more s o p h is tic a te d te c h n o lo g ic a l age demanding th e g lo b a l approach to problem s o f war and p e a c e -- to th e b ro a d e r ap p e al of an A tla n tic Union or a World Government. Although th e more re c e n t movement f o r a European Union had gained g r e a t e r p u b lic r e c o g n itio n and r e s p e c t a b i l i t y than th e movement in th e n in e te e n th c e n tu r y , ^ th e p sy c h o lo g ic a l 46 I t was C oudenhove-K alergi who re v iv e d th e id ea in 1922 and th en campaigned f o r a Pan-European Union u n t i l World War I I e ru p te d to b lo ck h is program ; see above C hapter V, pp. 166-80. 47 The movement fo llo w in g World War I had achieved two im p o rtan t d i s t i n c t i o n s over th e movement in th e n in e te e n th c e n tu ry : (1) government le a d e rs became a c ti v e in th e movement f o r th e f i r s t tim e and were a b le to persuade 221 sweep o f th e one-w orld concept co m p letely overshadowed t h a t o f a r e g io n a l union f o r W estern Europe. In f a c t , b e fo re World War I I had ended, th e momentum o f th e one-w orld id e a induced th e o rg a n iz a tio n o f th e U nited N ation s (su c c e sso r to th e League o f N a tio n s ) , which was w idely h e ra ld e d as th e b eg in n in g o f World G o v er n m en t A nd ag a in th e id e a of u n itin g Europe y ie ld e d to th e more dynamic g lo b a l a p p r o a c h -- th is tim e to th e U nited N a tio n s. th e European governm ents to c o n s id e r th e p o s s i b i l i t y of European Union (B riand p ro p o s a l, see C hapter V, pp. 173-78); and (2) one government a c tu a ll y o ffe re d to u n ite w ith a n o th e r ( B ritis h -F re n c h Union o f f e r by B r i t a i n ) . A Q A lthough a few p io n e e rs c a lle d fo r a u n iv e r s a l f e d e r a l union as e a r ly as 1915 and i n t e r m i t t e n t l y t h e r e a f t e r , i t was th e g lo b a l p e r i l o f World War I I t h a t p r i m a rily s tim u la te d th e p u b lic a tio n o f numerous w orld f e d e r a tio n p la n s a f t e r 1939. For a summary c h a r t o f th e s t r u c tu r e o f some tw e n ty -fiv e (n in e te e n s in c e 1939) o f th e s e p la n s , see Wynner and L loyd, op. c i t . , pp. 89-185; f o r th e s t r u c t u r a l c h a r ts on n in e (seven s in c e 1939) w orld co n f e d e r a tio n p la n s d u rin g t h i s same p e rio d , see i b i d . , pp. 189-226; and f o r th e f i v e U nited N atio n s p lan s in 1943, se e i b i d . , pp. 257-74. CHAPTER V II THE RATIONALE FOR EUROPEAN FEDERATION AFTER W ORLD W AR I I C ircu m stan ces d u rin g th e c o u rs e o f th e war h elp ed shape th e p o stw ar o u tlo o k o f th e le a d e rs o f th e A llie d Big T h ree. C h u r c h ill, f o r o n e, had su p p o rte d th e B r i t i s h - F rench Union o f f e r in Ju n e , 1940. In a r a d io a d d re ss on March 21, 1943, he a p p e a le d f o r a U nited Europe as a m ajor g o a l o f B r i t i s h p o lic y , b u t what he a c t u a l l y su g g e ste d was a "C o u n cil o f E u ro p e ," o r r e g io n a l c o n f e d e r a tio n o f s t a t e s , a f f i l i a t e d w ith a w orld o r g a n iz a tio n such as th e U nited N a tio n s.* - R o o s e v e lt, on th e o th e r hand, d id n o t su p p o rt th e id e a o f European Union a p p a re n tly b ec au se o f S t a l i n 's o p p o s itio n to i t , h i s u n i l a t e r a l c o n c e s sio n s a t Y a lta , and h i s d e s i r e to prom ote c o n tin u e d R ussian-A m erican f r ie n d s h ip a f t e r th e w ar. And S t a l i n , e x p lo i t in g Roose v e l t ' s good f a i t h , succeeded n o t o n ly " in d e ta c h in g . . . *"Count [R ich ard N.] C ou d en h o v e-K alerg i, An Idea Conquers th e World (London: H utchinson [1 9 5 3 ]), pp. 245-6. 223 [him] from the idea" but also in getting him to support a Soviet-American compromise in the settlement of Europe's 2 postwar problems. 2 C oudenhove-K alergi, op. c i t . . pp. 250-1. C oudenhove-K alergi a l s o p o in ts o u t on p . 251 t h a t th e s e in f lu e n c e s on R o o sev elt e x p la in th e c o ld r e c e p tio n by th e U n ited S ta te s S t a t e D epartm ent and th e W hite House to C h u r c h i l l 's March, 1943 r a d io a d d re ss and h is May, 1944 sp eech in P a rlia m e n t on th e c r e a ti o n o f a U n ited E urope. F u rth e rm o re , a s th e war drew to i t s c l o s e , th e "w hole o f American p u b lic o p in io n had been h y p n o tiz e d i n t o b e lie v in g t h a t o u t o f th e war th e r e would emerge one s i n g l e w o rld -- le d by a c o n so rtiu m o f th e Big Four: A m erica, R u s s ia , B r i t a i n , and C h in a ." ( I b i d . , p . 2 5 7 .) Hans A. S c h m itt, in h is The P ath t o European Union: From th e M a rsh a ll Plan to th e Common M arket (Baton Rouge: L o u isia n a S t a te U niver s i t y P re ss [ c . 1 9 6 2 ]), pp. 1 3 -5 , c i t e s from v a rio u s unpub lis h e d " . . . M inutes" o f th e U. S. D epartm ent o f S t a t e , Subcom m ittee on European O rg a n iz a tio n in 1943 and 1944 as e v id e n c e t h a t th e r e was l i t t l e i n d ic a ti o n o f a s tro n g d e s i r e among European le a d e rs f o r p o stw ar u n io n , t h a t i t m ight n o t be eco n o m ically good f o r th e U .S ., and t h a t i t m ight im p a ir th e new U n ited N atio n s O rg a n iz a tio n . And a lth o u g h some members o f th e subcom m ittee le a n e d tow ard European Union as an economic n e c e s s i t y , th e subcom m ittee ag reed t h a t each European s t a t e should r e t a i n i t s s o v e r eig n i d e n t i t y in th e new w orld o r g a n iz a tio n . For f u r t h e r s u b s t a n t i a t i o n o f th e in f lu e n c e o f th e id e a o f a p o stw a r, one-w orld U nited N atio n s O rg a n iz a tio n and i t s d i v e r t i n g Europeans from th e id e a o f a U n ited E urope, s e e Andrew and F ran c es Boyd, W estern Union: A Study o f th e Trend Toward European U nity (W ashington: P u b lic A f f a i r s P re s s , [ c . 1 9 4 9 ]), pp. 9 1 -4 ; L io n e l C u r t i s , World War: I t s Cause and Cure (2d e d .; New York: P utnam 's [ c . 1 9 4 6 ]), pp. 203- 21, 2 2 4 -6 , 234-45; R. W. G. Mackay, You C a n 't Turn th e C lock Back (C hicago: Z iff- D a v is [ c . 1 9 4 8 ]), pp. 142-3, 147, 149-50, 265-9, 317, 319-20; Emery R eves, The Anatomy o f Peace (New York: H arper [ c . 1 9 4 6 ]), pp. 247-51, 2 73 -4, 281-3. 224 Europe in the Aftermath and International Organization Resumed With the collapse and total defeat of the Axis Powers, the victorious Allies were confronted with greater postwar complexities than had been foreseen. The bitter experiences and terrible costs of World War II of course had stirred the Allied leaders to re-assess the inter national mistakes made by their governments following World War I and to take steps to avoid their repetition after World War II. Encouraged by the spirit of soli darity and cooperation of their wartime alliance, these leaders leaned heavily on the postwar reorganization of world politics and society under the leadership of their triumphant and united nations. Before the close of the war, however, it was already evident that only the Soviet Union and the United States, the world's two most powerful nations, and pos sibly Britain with her Empire and Commonwealth members would be capable of controlling international conflict and maintaining order in the future. With the continued friendship and cooperation of the Allies' Big Three--which Roosevelt and many individuals in the Allied countries 225 s i n c e r e l y b e lie v e d p o s s ib le and w hich th ey made every e f f o r t to a c h ie v e —i t was co n tem p lated t h a t th e second a tte m p t o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rg a n iz a tio n th ro u g h th e U nited N atio n s would be a p o s i t iv e fo rc e f o r w orld peace and s e c u r i t y . In d eed , th e e x p e c ta tio n s f o r th e new w orld o r g a n iz a tio n w ere e x c e p tio n a lly o p t i m i s t i c , e s p e c ia l ly u n d er th e p r o t e c t i v e d i r e c t i o n o f th e Big T hree ( l a t e r expanded t o th e Big F i v e ) . The a n t i c i p a t i o n o f a g lo b a l s o c ie ty w ith genuine i n t e r n a t i o n a l u n d e rsta n d in g and g o o d w ill a f t e r th e w o rld 's most d e v a s ta tin g w ar, how ever, was f a r g r e a t e r th an th e r e a l i z a t i o n . The w ar, in f a c t , had n o t c lo s e d b e fo re th e c o u rs e o f human e v e n ts began to ta k e i t s t o l l on th e p rom ising p ro s p e c ts f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l harmony in th e p o l i t i c a l and s e c u r i t y sp h e re s o f n a t i o n a l e x is te n c e . And b a r e ly had th e h a z a rd s o f war ended when th e tim e seemed most o p p o rtu n e to c a p i t a l i z e on th e p o l i t i c a l d is o r g a n iz a t i o n and economic d e s p a ir o f th e w ar-w eary p eo p les of Europe in o rd e r to c o n v e rt them to t o t a l i t a r i a n communism. A breakup in th e w artim e le a d e r s h ip o f th e Big T hree began, in e f f e c t , w ith th e d e a th o f R o o sev elt tw en ty - f i v e days b e fo re th e war ended in E urope. S c a rc e ly th r e e 226 months a f t e r th e w ar, on J u ly 26, 1945,th e v o te rs of B r ita in chose a Labor Government; and C h u r c h ill, B r i t a i n 's g r e a t e s t w artim e le a d e r and s ta te sm a n , had to be re p la c e d as Prime M in is te r - - a p a ra d o x ic a l p o l i t i c a l f a t e f o r an acclaim ed i n t e r n a t i o n a l h ero who had guided B r it a in th ro u g h t o t a l war and s u r v iv a l. T h e r e a f te r , S t a l in had a psycho l o g ic a l ad vantage over th e B r i t i s h and American r e p la c e ments (Prim e M in is te r A tt l e e and P re s id e n t Trum an), and he o p p o r t u n i s t ic a l l y pursued h is id e o lo g ic a l g o als by devious m eans. A fte r th e w ar, m oreover, th e W estern A llie s could n o t send t h e i r m i l i t a r y fo rc e s home and d em o b ilize them soon enough. Not b ein g b o th ere d w ith th e em otional ap p eal o f " b rin g th e boys home," S t a l in k e p t h is armed fo rc e s i n t a c t in th e occupied c o u n trie s and was th e re b y a b le in th e cause of communism to e x p lo it th e postw ar vacuum in Europe d u rin g th e t r a n s i t i o n to peacetim e p u r s u i t s . There i s a ten d en cy , o f c o u rs e , f o r peoples r e le a s e d from re g im e n ta tio n to l e t down and to seek r e la x a tio n a f t e r rig o ro u s y e a rs of war d i s c i p l i n e , to want t o p au se , and to l e t tim e h e a l th e m is e rie s o f war b e fo re a r e tu r n to th e peacetim e r o u t i n e s . B e sid e s, th e Ill v a s t m a jo rity o f th e p eo p le in th e dem ocracies were l u l l e d by th e th oug ht t h a t r e l a t i o n s among th e U nited N ations would s u re ly be on a more i n t e l l i g e n t and harmonious p la n e a f t e r World War I I than h e r e t o f o r e , because o f th e t e r r i b l e p r ic e p aid f o r n a t i o n a l i s t i c b ig o tr y and c o n te n tio n between th e w ars. The A llie d le a d e rs a ls o h elp ed to f o s t e r t h i s i n t e r n a t i o n a l o u tlo o k by wide p u b l i c i ty of t h e i r p o s it iv e p la n s to p re v en t f u tu r e wars and to m a in ta in th e p eace. The A l l i e s 1 m ajor war aims th e r e f o r e c a lle d f o r th e u n c o n d itio n a l s u rre n d e r o f th e enemy and h is permanent disarm am ent. The l a t t e r was to be en fo rced by th e long* term o cc u p atio n o f enemy t e r r i t o r y , d u rin g which tim e re -e d u c a tio n in th e ways o f democracy was to tra n sfo rm th e enemy n a tio n s in to p e a c e fu l, d em o cratic s o c i e t i e s . And f i n a l l y , w ith th e c r e a tio n o f th e new w orld o rg a n iz a t io n by th e U nited N a tio n s -- th e most pow erful o f w hich, th e Big F iv e , were pledged to g u a ra n te e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e a c e - - i t was g e n e ra lly b e lie v e d t h a t th e a g e -o ld problem o f m i l i t a r y a g g re ss io n in Europe and elsew h ere would h e n c e fo rth be so lv e d . In o rd e r to a s s u re th e su c c e ss of t h i s program f o r e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rg a n iz a tio n as w e ll as to e x p e d ite 228 th e r e s t o r a t i o n of w a r-to rn E urope, th e p o l i t i c a l le a d e rs o f th e W estern dem ocracies e a r n e s tly endeavored to promote i n t e r n a t i o n a l goodw ill and c o o p e ra tio n im m ediately f o l lowing th e w ar. F o reig n S e c re ta ry Bevin d e c la re d on November 7, 1945, b e fo re th e House of Commons: . . . we w i l l ta k e no s te p s , we w i l l do n o th in g n o r allo w any o f our ag e n ts or d ip lo m ats to do a n y th in g which w i l l s t i r up h a tre d o r provoke o r c r e a t e a s i t u a t i o n d e trim e n ta l to R u ssia in th e E a ste rn c o u n tr ie s . Y et, w h ile th e W estern Governments t r i e d to m a in ta in th e f r ie n d s h ip and t r u s t o f th e S o v iet Union by c o o p e ra tin g on European problem s and a v o id in g a c tio n t h a t m ight be c o n stru e d as a t h r e a t to R ussian s e c u r i t y , th e R ussian Government re fu s e d to r e c ip r o c a te . In s te a d , i t rem ained 3 House o f Commons Deb. . 5 th s e r i e s , 415 (194 5-46 ), 1337. The Labor Government o f B r i t a i n , f o r in s ta n c e , p u r sued a p o lic y of i n t e r n a t i o n a l n e u t r a l i t y im m ediately f o l lowing th e war and made every e f f o r t to av oid c o n f l i c t w ith th e S o v ie t Union (as w e ll as th e U nited S ta te s ) over C o n tin e n ta l problem s. In f a c t , F o reig n S e c re ta ry Bevin f e l t w ith a Labor Government in power in B r ita in th a t M 'L e f t would u n d ersta n d L e f t '; t h a t B r i ta i n would a c t as a b rid g e between th e S o v ie t Union and th e U nited S ta te s ; and t h a t such a lin k would be m a in ta in e d ." (As quoted by R. W. G. Mackay [no c i t a t i o n given] in Towards a U nited St a t e s of Europe: An A n aly sis o f B r i t a i n 's Role in European Union (London: H utchinson [c . 1 9 6 1 ]), p. 2 0 .) ; c f . House o f Commons Deb. . 5 th s e r i e s , 446 (1947-48), 410. A lso see Mackay, You C a n 't Turn th e Clock Back, pp. 142-5; 229 i n t r a n s i g e n t on p r a c t i c a l l y every e f f o r t o f th e West to r e s o lv e th e i n t e r n a t i o n a l problem s o f Europe w h ile a t th e same tim e i n d i r e c t l y p u rsu in g i t s g o al o f communist con q u e s t and w orld co n v e rsio n t o th e M arxist id e o lo g y .^ Meanw*1 ' e , th e ap p eal o f C h u rc h ill and th e f e d e r a l u n io n is ts ^ Ing th e war had reach ed th e le a d e rs of R e s ista n c e groups in v a rio u s c o u n tr ie s on th e C o n tin en t and moved them to su p p o rt a U nited Europe as a m ajor Boyd, op. c i t . . pp. 6 0 -1 , 63; C oudenhove-K alergi, op. c i t . . pp. 261, 264-5. The Labor Government a l s o opposed any W estern European arrangem ent t h a t m ight be c o n sid e re d as a "W estern b lo c " by R u ssia and a t h r e a t to th e u n ity of th e whole o f Europe; se e House o f Commons Deb. . 5 th s e r i e s , 419 (1 9 45-46), 1247-53, 1349-51; 423 (1 94 5-46), 1946-52; 446 (1 9 4 7 -4 8 ), 387, 390-1, 410, 433, 518-26, 565-6; 450 (1 9 4 7 -4 8 ), 1358, 1364. For f u l l e r tre a tm e n t o f R ussian p o lic y fo llo w in g th e w ar, see M . J . Bonn, W hither Europe--U nion or P a r tn e r sh ip ? ([New Y ork]: P h ilo s o p h ic a l L ib ra ry [1 9 5 2 ]), pp. 33, 38-9, 4 4 -6 , 54; C oudenhove-K alergi, op. c i t . . p. 265; A l t i e r o S p i n e l l i , "The Growth o f th e European Movement S ince World War I I , " in C. Grove Haines ( e d .) , European I n te g r a tio n (B altim o re: Johns Hopkins P ress [ c . 1 9 5 7 ]), pp. 4 9 -5 0 . E. N. van K ie ffe n s in "The Case f o r European I n te g r a tio n : P o l i t i c a l C o n s id e ra tio n s ," in Haines ( e d .) , op. c i t . . pp. 8 6 -7 , in d ic a te s how p re s e n t R ussian expan s i o n i s t p o lic y ad h e res to th e h i s t o r i c a l R ussian n a tio n a l i n t e r e s t s . And f o r an e y e -w itn e ss and o b je c tiv e account o f S o v ie t t a c t i c s and in tr a n s ig e n c e in th e a tte m p t to s e t t l e European problem s in th e postw ar p e rio d u n t i l Ja n u a ry , 1948, see F o reig n S e c re ta ry B e v in 's "W estern Union" Speech in House o f Commons Deb. , 5 th s e r i e s , 446 (1 9 4 7 -4 8 ), 387-99. 230 5 postwar g o al. Having lo s t f a it h In th e economic and p o l i t i c a l c a p a c ity of the p e tty sovereign n a tio n - s ta te , and being unattached to any prewar vested i n t e r e s t s , the R esistan ce groups--em erging from th e rank and f i l e of th e populace, from la b o r, p ro fe s s io n a l, and various p o l i t i c a l groups--opposed r e s to r a tio n of th e sovereign s ta tu s quo of E urope's c r a z y -q u ilt of n a tio n - s ta te s . In t h e i r view a re tu rn of Europe to i t s former fragmented so v ereig n -n atio n system would simply mean the re s u rre c tio n of p o l i t i c a l and economic n atio n alism leading again to In te rn a tio n a l r e t a l i a - 6 tio n and ev e n tu a lly to a th ir d world war. At the c lo se of World War I I , however, the t r a n s i tio n a l governments s e t up by th e R esistance groups in the lib e ra te d c o u n trie s were replaced by the re tu rn of prewar governments from e x ile or by newly e le c te d governments. Then w ith r e s to r a tio n of th e p ro fe ssio n a l a d m in istra tiv e s t a f f s - _most of whom had n a t io n a li s ti c vested i n t e r e s t s - - n a tio n a l sovereignty was soon rev iv ed . Consequently, th e postwar plans of th e R esistance groups were passed over ^See evidence from Boyd, op. c i t . . pp. 70-1, and above in fo o tn o te 42, Chapter VI. ^ S p in e lli, in Haines ( e d .) , op. c i t . . pp. 49-50; Schm itt, op. c i t . . pp. 15-6. 231 f o r Che more p re ssin g b u sin ess of r e - e s ta b lis h in g th e n a tio n a l I n s t i t u t i o n s and th e n a tio n 's economy.^ But even though th e o ld - lin e p o li ti c i a n s and a d m in is tra tiv e o f f ic ia ls managed to r e s to r e th e t r a d i t i o n a l I n s t i t u t i o n s , t h e i r governments were to flo u n d er In th e ensuing months because o f th e enorm ity and s e v e rity of th e socioeconomic d is lo c a tio n s o f n a tio n a l e x is te n c e . D esp ite th e h e ro ic s and th e p o p u la rity of th e R esistan ce groups as th e war drew to a c lo s e , t h e i r I n i t i a t i v e f o r a U nited Europe Im m ediately follow ing th e war was l o s t In th e many p erso n al and p u b lic concerns of th e day. F i r s t , came th e fe e d in g , s h e lte r in g , r e p a t r i a t io n , or r e lo c a tio n of thousands of war refu g ees or d isp la c e d p erso n s. N ext, th e g en e ral d em o ra liza tio n of th e people had to be overcome In o rd er to gain t h e i r confidence and h elp In re v iv in g th e paralyzed n a tio n a l economies. Then th e time-consuming and f r u s t r a t in g problems of Big-Four co o p eratio n in th e occupation of Germany, i t s punishm ent, and th e re -e d u c a tio n of th e Germans to more dem ocratic and p ea cefu l ways demanded c lo s e a tte n tio n in o rd er not to lo se th e peace. And f i n a l l y th e r e - e s ta b lis h e d governments ^Schmitt, op. c i t .„ p. 33; Boyd, lo c . c i t . 232 and t h e i r c o n s e rv a tiv e su p p o rte rs ignored th e fe d e ra tio n su g g e stio n s o f th e R e sista n c e groups on th e grounds t h a t t h e i r u ltim a te o b je c tiv e was b e lie v e d to be a U nited S o c i a l i s t Europe, i f not a Communist Europe under S o v iet g Union d i r e c ti o n . The n e g a tiv e a t t i t u d e of th e European governments and o th e r c o n s e rv a tiv e groups n o tw ith s ta n d in g , th e R e s is t ance groups made a s u b s t a n t ia l c o n trib u tio n to th e h i s t o r i c a l e f f o r t s to u n ite Europe. I t was t h e i r European f e d e ra tio n o u tlo o k and i n i t i a t i v e th a t led to th e e s ta b lishm ent of " th e f e d e r a l i s t movement in a l l dem ocratic c o u n trie s [o f Europe] and e v e n tu a lly t h e i r common Q A lthough th e R e sista n c e groups were made up of d a rin g in d iv id u a ls o f a l l shades o f p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f (except N azis or F a s c i s t s ) , p rim a rily th ey were a c r o s s - s e c tio n o f people who had th e courage to r i s k t h e i r liv e s in s e c r e tly h e lp in g th e A llie s d e fe a t H i t l e r and M ussolini and t h e i r m i li t a r y m achines. For f u r t h e r s u b s ta n tia tio n o f t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s and co m p osition, see Coudenhove- K a le rg i, o p. c i t . . p. 261; Paul Reynaud, U n ite or P e r is h : A Dynamic Program f o r a U nited Europe ([New Y ork]: Simon S ch u ster [ c . 1 9 51]), pp. 46-8; A rnold J . Z u rch er, The S tru g g le to U nite Europe: 1940-1958 (Washington Square: New York U n iv e rsity P re s s , 1958), pp. 18-9. For a c r i t i c a l a n a ly s is of th e aims and s o c i a l i s t le a n in g s o f th e European F e d e r a l is t Union e s ta b lis h e d by th e R e sista n c e g roups, see Hans F. Sennholz, How Can Europe S urvive (New York: Van N ostrand [ c . 1 9 55]), pp. 107-13. The B r i t i s h C o n serv ativ e P a rty re fu s e d to c o o p e ra te w ith th e R e sista n c e Movement fo r a U nited Europe a f t e r th e war because o f th e s e f e a r s ; see House o f Commons D eb.. 5th s e r i e s , 413 (1945-46), 344-5. 233 a s s o c ia tio n in June, 1947, a t Montreux. . . . " a s th e 9 European Union of F e d e r a lis ts , sometimes r e f e r r e d to as th e European F e d e r a lis t Union. Turning to B r ita in and h er postw ar r e la tio n s w ith Europe, one fin d s a r a th e r abrupt change from h er u n s e lf is h wartime p a r tic ip a tio n and le a d e rsh ip . For alm ost f iv e y ears B rita in had dem onstrated th e roost courageous and s e l f - s a c r i f i c i n g ex p en d itu re of h er n a tio n a l re so u rces (human and m a te ria l) in th e l i f e and d eath s tru g g le fo r th e s u rv iv a l of dem ocratic Europe. In f a c t , i t was B r ita in , th e s o le rem aining European democracy, th a t had th e w ill and d eterm in atio n to c a rry on alone a g a in s t th e Axis powers, not only fo r her own s u rv iv a l but a ls o fo r th e lib e r a tio n of th e C o n tin e n ta l c o u n trie s and th e These R esistan ce groups o p e ra tin g in a l l Western occupied c o u n trie s se n t d e le g a te s to a s e c re t m eeting a t Geneva in May, 1944, and to an open m eeting in March, 1945, a t P a ris . For f u l l e r d e t a i l s of th e se a c t i v i t i e s , see S p in e lli in Haines ( e d .) , op. c i t . . p. 50. For documenta tio n of th e work of th e R esistan ce groups in Belgium, France, H olland, I t a l y , Norway, and Poland on b e h a lf o f a fe d e ra te d Europe a f t e r th e war, see C entre d 'A ctio n pour la F dddration europ^enne, L1Europe de Demain (Neuch&tel: B aconniere [c . 1945]), pp. 67-107. Documentation o f th e aims and re s o lu tio n s of th e European Union of F e d e r a lis ts , d e c la re d a t t h e i r Montreux C onference, August, 1947, may be found in f u l l te x t in Boyd, op. c i t . . Appendix F, pp. 141-8. 234 p re v e n tio n o f th e fo rm a tio n o f a u n ite d t o t a l i t a r i a n E urope. As th e war ended in a sw eeping A llie d v i c t o r y , B r i t a i n had a t t a i n e d , m o reo ver, th e h ig h e s t p in n a c le o f European p o p u la r ity and r e s p e c t in a l l h i s t o r y . At th e tim e sh e c o u ld v ery w e ll have assumed f u l l le a d e r s h ip w ith th e w h o le -h e a rte d s u p p o rt o f th e p eo p les of W estern Europe in c r e a t in g a u n ite d d e m o c ra tic E urope. But i n s t e a d , B r i t a i n l i t e r a l l y tu rn e d h e r back on Europe and r e v e r te d to h e r t r a d i t i o n a l i n s u l a r p a ro c h ia lis m w ith r e s p e c t to th e C o n t i n e n t , ^ i f n o t to h e r form er o b s o le s c e n t p o lic y o f fa v o rin g a d iv id e d E urope. I f one were to look f o r th e re a s o n s b eh in d B r i t a i n 's postw ar w ith d ra w a l from C o n tin e n ta l E urope, one would have t o re c o g n iz e th e alm o st i r r e s i s t i b l e tu g and p u l l o f an i s la n d environm ent and n a ti o n a l t r a d i t i o n on th e B r i t i s h c o n s c ie n c e . N ext, one would have to a p p r e c ia te th e economic and p s y c h o lo g ic a l t i e s o f th e "g o o d -o ld " B r i t i s h Em pire and Commonwealth and th en a llo w f o r th e ^ T h e w r i t e r found e v id en c e o f t h i s w h ile in B r i t a i n in 1944 and 1945 and as l a t e as 1954 and 1955 (first, d u rin g h is w artim e s e r v i c e , and l a t e r , d u rin g a S a b b a tic a l v i s i t to E u ro p e ). For comments and o b s e rv a tio n s d u rin g th e s e p e r io d s , se e Appendix D. A lso c f . G udrard, op. c i t . . pp. 122, 125-8, 131-2. 235 n a t i o n a l i s t i c im pact of " T h e r e 'l l alw ays be an England [o r a G reat B r i t a i n ] S t i l l a n o th e r e x p la n a tio n fo r B r i t a i n 's n e g a tiv e p o lic y toward postw ar Europe may be found in th e p sy c h o -p h y sic a l r e a c tio n to w earin ess and f a tig u e from a h a rd ,lo n g w ar. When th e war f i n a l l y ended in E urope, th e r e was a g e n e ra l f e e lin g o f need f o r an extended r e s t , to perm it B r ita in to re c u p e ra te w ith o u t becoming d i r e c t l y in v o lv ed in th e dom estic a f f a i r s of th e C o n tin e n t. F u rth erm o re, th e a t t i t u d e o f th e B r i t i s h people more o r le s s confirm ed an in s u l a r p re o c c u p a tio n . Only two and one h a l f months a f t e r th e war in Europe had su c c e s s f u l ly ended under th e o u ts ta n d in g le a d e rs h ip of C h u r c h ill, th e peo ple o f B r ita in re p la c e d him and h is c o a l i t i o n Government w ith a Labor Government. The m a jo rity wanted th e b e t t e r economic l i f e a f t e r th e war, and th e s o c i a l i s t p la tfo rm seemed to o f f e r th e g r e a te r a s s u ra n c e s . In th e y e a rs to fo llo w , th e Labor Government became p reo ccu p ied in i t s s o c i a l i s t ex p erim en t. At th e same tim e , e f f o r t was made to r e h a b i l i t a t e B r i t a i n ’s d e p le te d economy which u n f o r tu n a te ly saddled th e people w ith r a tio n in g and an economy o f a u s t e r i t y . The Government 236 t h e r e f o r e , devoted no more tim e to fo re ig n a f f a i r s than was re q u ir e d to ad h ere to a p o lic y o f n e u t r a l i t y tow ard th e n a tio n s o f E u r o p e ,^ and to c o o p e ra te w ith th e work o f th e U nited N a tio n s. F i n a l ly , w ith th e U nited N ations O rg a n iz a tio n a c t u a ll y in o p e r a tio n , th e B r i t i s h by and la r g e were hope f u l and o p tim is tic t h a t t h i s second a tte m p t a t u n iv e r s a l o rg a n iz a tio n would be th e answer f o r th e r e f e r r a l and s e ttle m e n t o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l problem s. I n t e r e s t in a sm all S p i n e l l i in Haines ( e d .) , op. c i t . . pp. 4 1 -2 , in d ic a te s a d e c lin e in B r ita in in su p p o rt o f European f e d e r a tio n and a s p u rt tow ard n a tio n a lis m in th e months fo llo w in g th e w ar. He based h is c o n c lu sio n s on th e con s o l i d a t io n o f th e B r i t i s h p u b lic c o n sc ie n c e a f t e r B r i t a i n 's su c c e ss in th e war th u s : (1) The B r i t i s h n a tio n proved ca p a b le o f o rg a n iz in g th e whole n a tio n to w ith sta n d th e o n sla u g h t o f t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m e f f e c t i v e l y and t h e r e f o re was th e s u r e s t bulw ark f o r th e f u tu r e s a f e ty o f th e peo p le o f B r i t a i n , and (2) th e B r i t i s h co m p letely l o s t f a i t h in Europe when i t proved to be an easy v ic tim o f H i t l e r , and th e e a r l i e r "se n tim e n t f o r u n i f i c a t i o n w ith Europe was re p la c e d by th e firm c o n v ic tio n th a t no con fid e n c e co u ld be p laced in th e European s t a t e s . " A ccording to S p i n e l l i , th e s e a t t i t u d e s h e lp to e x p la in th e Labor G overnm ent's postw ar c o n c e n tra tio n on dom estic s o c ia lis m , i t s la c k o f a f o re ig n p o lic y , and B r i t a i n 's tendency toward is o la tio n is m from th e C o n tin e n t. For f u r t h e r s u b s t a n t i a ti o n o f th e Labor G overnm ent's n e g a tiv e fo re ig n p o lic y , see Mackay, You C a n 't Turn th e Clock Back, pp. 147-50; House o f Commons Deb. . 5 th s e r i e s , 459 (1947-48), 780; 473 (1950), 282-3. 237 re g io n a l union lik e W estern Europe th e re fo re waned f o l lowing th e war as such an undertak in g appeared su p e r f l u o u s . ^ Moreover, th e re was a w idespread sentim ent in B r ita in of being p a tie n t w ith th e U nited N ations in order to g iv e i t an o p p o rtu n ity to prove i t s e l f . In view of t h i s g e n e ra l a t t i t u d e toward th e U nited N atio n s, th e fo re ig n p o lic y of th e Labor Government was grounded on doing n o th in g to weaken or to d u p lic a te th e work of th e 13 United N ation s. But th e postwar e x p e c ta tio n s of in te r n a tio n a l goodw ill and genuine co o p eratio n among th e v ic to rio u s A llie d n a tio n s--e v e n though signed and se a le d by a solemn 12 House of Coupons Deb.. 5th s e r i e s , 427 (1945-46), 1576, 1708-9, 1788; Boyd, op. c i t . . pp. 65-8. 13 House of Commons Deb. . 5th s e r i e s , 446 (1947-48), 410. Boyd in op. c i t . . pp. 92-4 quotes v ario u s d e c la r a tio n s of th e United N ations A sso ciatio n in B rita in (having some 800 lo c a l branches throughout G reat B rita in ) on European u n ity and th e U nited N ations covering th e p erio d from December, 1946 to March, 1948. P oint ( i i i ) of i t s d e c la r a tio n , "What S o rt of a Union?" ex p resses th e te n o r o f i t s l a t e r views in t h i s manner: "Whether European Union ta k e s th e form of a loose a s s o c ia tio n of n a tio n s or a stro n g fe d e ra tio n , i t must adhere s e v e ra lly and c o r p o ra te ly to th e d e c isio n s of th e U nited N ations and s e t an o u tsta n d in g example in implementing th e recommendations of i t s Committees, Commissions and A gencies," p. 94. Also see Mackay, Towards a United S ta te s o f Europe, p. 20. 238 tr e a ty e s ta b lis h in g th e United N ations O rg an izatio n --p ro v ed to be w ish fu l a n tic ip a tio n and u n r e a l i s t i c . For in r e a l i t y , th e U nited N ations was j u s t "anoth er League of [independ ent, n a tio c e n tr ic ] Sovereign S ta te s , each looking o u t, always f i r s t , f o r "number one."*^ How could i t be o th erw ise , when European r e h a b i l i t a t i o n was th e bone of co n ten tio n between th e United S ta te s , B r ita in , and t h e i r Western European a l l i e s on th e one hand, and R ussia and h er E astern European a f f i l i a t e s on th e o th e r; when E ast and West were d iv id ed in to two id e o lo g ic a l b lo c s , th e aims 1 5 of which d e fie d harm onization. J The ir r e c o n c ila b le breach between East and West in Europe came out in to th e open over (1) th e trea tm en t of postwar Germany and (2) th e economic r e s to r a tio n of th e c o u n trie s o f Europe. Having a n tic ip a te d th e economic and p o l i t i c a l breakdown o f th e European dem ocracies, th e ^ C u r t i s , op. c i t . . pp. 235-7; a ls o see h is pp. 224-6, 238-45, 268-9, f o r a c r i t i c a l a n a ly s is of a league of sovereign n a tio n s such as th e United N ations. *^Boyd, op. c i t . . pp. 60-1, 63; Coudenhove-Kalergi, op. c i t . . pp. 264-5; Mackay, Towards a United S ta te s of Europe. pp. 20-1, 28, and You Can t Turn th e Clock Back, pp. 141-7; S p in e lli in Haines ( e d .) , op. c i t .. pp. 46-7, 51-2; van K le ffin s in Haines ( e d .) , op. c i t .. pp. 86-7. 239 R ussian Communist Government envisaged a communist v ic to ry th rougho ut E u ro p e --e s p e c ia lly s in c e F rance and I t a l y , in which th e communist p a r ti e s were a lre a d y commanding th e l a r g e s t p a rty v o te s , seemed to be s e t t i n g th e postw ar tr e n d . By th e end o f 1947, th e r e f o r e , th e S o v iet Union in s u c c e s siv e co n feren ces o f th e B ig-Four F oreign M in iste rs had re fu s e d to c o o p e rate on a C e n tra l European s e ttle m e n t, had v ig o ro u sly opposed th e U nited S t a t e s ' promotion of th e European Recovery Program, and had e s ta b lis h e d th e Cominform as a c o o rd in a tin g agency fo r th e v a rio u s com m unist p a r ti e s in E u r o p e .^ L i t t l e more than two y e a rs from w a r's end, th e in tra n s ig e n c e of th e S o v iet Union, m otivated by her u l t e r i o r id e o lo g ic a l d e s ig n s , was much in evidence and g e n e ra lly reco g n ized by th e le a d e rs o f th e West. But u n f o r tu n a te ly , B r i t a i n 's Labor Government had n e g le c te d *^Boyd, op. c i t . . pp. 4 7 -8 , 53, 60-4. For a very i n t e r e s t i n g and re v e a lin g speech on th e re co rd o f R ussian Communist a t t i t u d e s , p o l i c i e s , and t a c t i c s concerning Europe, see F oreign S e c re ta ry B e v in 's ad d ress on "W estern Union" in House o f Commons Deb. . 5 th s e r i e s , 446 (1947-48), 384-94; and f o r two d a y s' d eb a te on t h i s s u b je c t and Rus s ia n b e h a v io r, see i b i d . . 406, 409-19, 413-7, 419-25, 427, 429, 439-41, 447-9, 450-1, 459-60, 463, 466-72, 477-8, 511-5, 558-61, 569, 583-9, 597-600, 611-2, 614-5, 617-22. 240 o r f a i l e d to a p p r e c ia te th e p o l i t i c a l im p lic a tio n s to th e West o f th e m u ltin a tio n a l economic c r i s i s on th e C o n tin e n t. N ext, B r ita in had m is c a lc u la te d th e p o l i t i c a l te n d e n c ie s in postw ar Europe and th e r e f o r e was slow in re c o g n iz in g and a d ju s tin g to S o v iet Union t a c t i c s . And th e n , to o , because o f dom estic economic f r u s t r a t i o n s , B r ita in was in no mood to lead W estern Europe out o f i t s postw ar d ile m m a .^ Thus, B r i t a i n , b o a s tin g th e most e n lig h te n e d democracy in th e W est, avoided any p o l i t i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r h e r l i b e r a t e d s i s t e r dem ocracies in postw ar d i s t r e s s . M oreover, she l e t pass a most a p p r o p ria te tim e to t r y to u n i t e W estern Europe and th e re b y l o s t a golden o p p o rtu n ity f o r s ta te s m a n lik e le a d e rs h ip and l a s t i n g re s p e c t in Reasons f o r B r i t a i n 's e a r ly postw ar i n s u la r con fin e m e n t, " d i t h e r i n g ," and "a im le ss d r i f t " may be found in Bonn, op. c i t . . pp. 106, 125; Mackay, Towards a U nited S ta te s o f E urope, pp. 24, 29-33, and You Can*t Turn th e C lock Back, pp. 147-50; S p i n e l l i in Haines ( e d .) , op. c i t . . pp. 45, 53; and Leonard W oolf, F o reig n P o lic y : The Labour P a r t y 's Dilemma (w ith a C r i t i c a l Comment by W . N. Ewer; London: Fabian P u b lic a tio n s and G o lla n c z , 1947), pp. 3-34. A lso c f . House o f Commons Deb. . 5 th s e r i e s , 423 (1945-46), 1946-52; 427 (1945-46), 1523, 1577, 1591; 446 (1947-48), 410, 520-6 e t passim in th e tw o-day d e b a te on " [ B r ita i n and W estern U n io n ]," 383-622. 241 1 O f u tu r e Europe. ° The Logic of a U nited S ta te s o f Europe The s h a tt e r i n g a f t e r m a t h ^ o f World War I I s u re ly pro v id ed th e p eo p les o f Europe a most s u i t a b l e psycho** *®Cf. House o f Commons Deb. . 5 th s e r i e s , 427 (1945- 4 6 ), 1577, 1951; 473 (1950), 299, 301. T here i s evidence t h a t th e Labor P a rty had been a s u p p o rte r o f th e id e a o f a u n ite d Europe s in c e th e 1 9 2 0 's; see fo o tn o te 67, C hapter V above; a ls o see A t t l e e 's d e c la r a tio n : " ' . . . Europe must f e d e r a te o r p e r i s h , '" in a pam phlet, L a b o u r's Peace Aims, 1939, as quoted [no page c ite d ] by Mackay in Towards a U nited S ta te s o f E urope, p. x ; and F o reig n S e c re ta ry B e v in 's review o f th e Labor P a r t y 's long su p p o rt o f a Fed e r a t io n o f Europe in House of Commons Deb. . 5 th s e r i e s , 416 (1945-46), 781-2, 785. Once th e Labor P a rty assumed th e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r d ir e c tin g th e government of B r ita in a f t e r th e w ar, however, i t made no r e a l e f f o r t to pursue such an o b je c tiv e . Many c r i t i c s o f th e Labor Government have p o in te d out t h a t i t d e s ire d a U nited S o c i a l i s t S ta te s o f E urope, t h a t i t aw aited th e com plete v ic to r y o f s o c i a l ism on th e C o n tin e n t b e fo re pushing f o r European Union, and t h a t th e r e f o r e i t co u ld " a ffo rd to w a it" u n t i l th e tim e was r i p e ; see House o f Commons Deb. . 5 th s e r i e s , 413 (1945-46), 88-9; 446 (1947-48), 284-90, 4 1 0-2, 414, 522-3; 456 (1948), 920-3, 926; 459 (1948-49), 723-34, 777-9. A lso c f . C h u r c h i l l 's ap p e al in th e House o f Commons to th e Labor Government n o t to d i v e r t European Union i n t o a U nited S o c i a l i s t Europe: 446 (1 947 -48), 555. C e r ta in ly p a r tis a n p o l i t i c s must s h a re p a r t o f th e blame f o r B r i t i s h lack o f i n i t i a t i v e in a tte m p tin g to u n it e Europe r i g h t a f t e r th e w ar, f o r th e postw ar communist and s o c i a l i s t p o l i t i c a l g a in s in Europe a ls o r e s t r a i n e d th e B r i t i s h C o n se rv a tiv e P a rty (as th e lo y a l o p p o sitio n ) from cham pioning th e cau se o f a U nited Europe a t th e tim e; see 427 (1 9 4 5 -4 6 ), 1715-7; a ls o see fo o tn o te 8 above. 19 C f. A lb e rt G uerard, Europe F ree and U nited (S ta n fo rd U n iv e rs ity : S ta n fo rd U n iv e rs ity P ress [ c . 1 9 4 5 ]), pp. 106-7. 242 lo g ic a l climate^O in which to overcome t h e i r m u ltin a tio - c e n tr ic p aro ch ialism and to achieve a p o l i t i c a l union fo r th e more e f f e c tiv e d ir e c tio n o f t h e i r comnon economic and s e c u r ity problem s. Three re v e la tio n s of th e inadequacy o f E urope's contending n a t i o n - s t a t e system so soon a f t e r th e war began to arouse th e conscience of th e people and t h e i r d e s ir e fo r a c tio n : (1) th e h o p elessn ess of t h e i r socioeconomic e x is te n c e , s h a tte re d in economic ru in s of t o t a l war and thw arted in i t s p ro g re ssiv e improvement by th e re so u rc e lim ita tio n s of some twenty r i v a l systems of n a tio n a l au tark y ; (2) th e th r e a t to t h e i r Western way of l i f e by th e encroachments of a r e l e n t l e s s Russian Com munism and i t s " F if th C olum ns"--local communist p a r t i e s , gnawing away from w ith in ; and (3) th e fe a r and an x iety of a n u c le a r war and th e p o s s i b i l i t y of e x tin c tio n of e n t i r e n a tio n s in view of th e arms ra c e and th e i n a b i l i t y of th e U nited N ations to re so lv e th e "Cold War" between E ast and West. That th e se c o n tin e n t-sh a k in g events could n o t be re so lv e d independently by th e h av e-n o t, y e t so v e re ig n . 20 See S p i n e l l i in Haines ( e d .) , op. c i t . . pp. 4 2 -6 . 243 21 n a t i o n - s t a t e s o f E u ro p e, s t r u c k a l l E uropeans more o r l e s s In common. In f a c t , th e y w ere t h e c o m p e llin g f o r c e s t h a t awakened p e o p le t o th e I n s u f f i c i e n c y and o b s o le s c e n c e o f E u ro p e 's e i g h t e e n t h - n i n e te e n t h - c e n t u r y sy stem o f n a t i o n s t a t e s in a t e c h n o lo g ic a l ag e o f l a r g e r and more e f f i c i e n t w orking u n i t s . F u rth e rm o re , th e im pact o f th e s e h a rd r e a l i t i e s moved c o u n tle s s i n d i v id u a ls in W estern Europe from 1946 onward t o d i r e c t t h e i r pens and v o ic e s tow ard t h e movement f o r a U n ite d E u r o p e .^ 21 Many o f t h e s e n a t i o n - s t a t e s w ere n o t so la r g e in p o p u la tio n o r r e s o u r c e s as a number o f th e s e p a r a t e s t a t e s , and even v a r io u s c o u n t i e s , in th e U n ited S t a t e s o f A m erica (o r as num erous l a r g e c i t i e s o f th e w o rld ); y e t , by th e j e a lo u s ly - g u a r d e d d o c t r i n e o f n a t i o n a l s o v e r e ig n ty backed up by i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d i t i o n , th e y c la im and th e y g e t p o l i t i c a l and l e g a l e q u a l i t y w ith th e l a r g e s t o f n a tio n s d e s p i t e t h e i r d e f i c i e n c i e s in econom ic and s e c u r i t y re s p o n s i b i l i t y . C o n ceiv ab ly by n u m e ric a l m a jo r ity th e y c o u ld outm aneuver th e m in o r ity la r g e n a tio n s in any i n t e r n a t i o n a l agency a d h e rin g t o th e d e m o c ra tic p r o c e s s . 22 One need m e re ly su rv e y th e sp e e c h e s and w r i t in g s o f th e many, many p e rs o n s a p p e a rin g in b o o k s, p a m p h le ts, p e r i o d i c a l s , and th e p r e s s th ro u g h o u t E urope d u rin g t h i s p e r io d t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e i n c r e a s i n g i n t e r e s t in th e p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f u n i t i n g E u ro p e. See B ib lio g ra p h y , S e c tio n IX, f o r an id e a o f th e e x te n t o f th e l i t e r a r y e f f o r t s (w hich does n o t even ta k e i n t o a c c o u n t th e e x te n s iv e p r e s s c o v e ra g e r e a c h in g i n t o e v e ry W estern European com m u n ity ) d u rin g t h i s tim e . 244 N o n eth e le ss, In exam ining th e lo g ic o f u n itin g Europe a f t e r World War I I , one must weigh th e p ro sp e c ts a g a in s t th e te n a c io u sn e ss o f n a tio n a l t r a d i t i o n and th e alm ost insu rm o untab le ro a d b lo c k s. The g r e a t m a te ria l advancement o f man in th e p a s t c e n tu ry d e riv e s from h is w illin g n e s s to apply genuine e f f o r t and c o o p e ra tio n in sc ie n c e and technology as w e ll as from h is re a d in e s s to adopt changes in o rd e r to improve h is economic w e ll-b e in g . On th e o th e r hand, t h i s has n o t been c o rre sp o n d in g ly tr u e o f m an's p o l i t i c a l advancem ent. Not th a t h is same s c i e n t i f ic and o rg a n iz a tio n s k i l l s have n o t been a v a ila b le fo r th e b e tte rm e n t of p u b lic r e l a t i o n s and i n te r n a t io n a l u n d e r sta n d in g . But r a th e r have th ey been d iv e rte d by th e p sy c h o lo g ic a l b a r r i e r s o f n a t i o n a l i s t i c em otionalism , p a ro c h ia l b ig o tr y , and " s e l f i s h s t u p i d it y " - - n o t to mention "an alm ost id o la tr o u s w orship of . . . t r a d i t i o n a l p a r t i c u la rism s [by th e p e o p le ] , t h e i r d i s t r u s t and je a lo u s ie s ag g rav ated by th e economic b a r r i e r s and f e a r s they them- 23 s e lv e s have c r e a te d . . . . " These th en a re th e 23 C h u rc h ill used t h i s l i n e of re aso n in g and th e s e very words in arg u in g th e cause f o r a U nited Europe some s ix te e n y e a rs e a r l i e r in h is "The U nited S ta te s of E urope," Saturday Evening P o s t. CCII (F ebruary 15, 1930), 25, 48, 51. 245 in e x o ra b le b a r r i e r s ‘ “re s p o n s ib le f o r th e c o s tly lag of roan in w orld p o l i t i c s and i n t e r n a ti o n a l u n i t y - - t h a t roust be tran scen d ed b e fo re th e n a t i o n - s t a t e s o f Europe can be u n ite d . With re s p e c t to th e f e a s i b i l i t y o f E u ro p e's u n itin g , th e r e were two sch ools o f th o u g h t. In th e one school were to be found th e s e l f - s t y l e d r e a l i s t s , th e "d ie h a rd " n a t i o n a l i s t s , th e s k e p tic s , and th e c y n ic s. They m aintained th a t th e peoples of Europe cannot or w ill not r e lin q u is h th e v ested p r iv ile g e s or n a tio n a l advantages th a t they have under t h e i r p re se n t n a t i o n - s t a t e governments in o rd e r to c r e a te a U nited S ta te s o f Europe. Nor would th e y , even i f t h i s were th e m o rally p ro p er th in g to do or i t were to lead to th e b e tte rm e n t of th e l i f e , s e c u r ity , and g e n e ra l w e lfa re of th e v a st m a jo rity in th e new U nited S ta te s of Europe. F o r, t h i s group d e c la re d : "Human n a tu re 2 A i s to blam e, and one cannot change human n a tu r e ." 9 A Because n e g a tiv e t r a i t s in man have p e r s is te d down th e ages and th e re appears to be no means or hope fo r t h e i r e r a d ic a tio n on t h i s e a r th , th e s e l f - s t y l e d r e a l i s t s p ro claim t h a t th e id ea to u n ite Europe goes a g a in s t m an's n a t u r a l i n s t i n c t s of greed and s e lf is h n e s s and i s t h e r e f o re v is io n a ry and u n r e a l i s t i c . In o th e r words, i t i s not t h a t a U nited S ta te s of Europe i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y bad, unworkable and th e r e f o r e u n r e a l i s t i c and im p ra c tic a l, b u t 246 On th e o th e r hand, th e r e was th e school of in te r * n a t i o n a l i s t s , f e d e r a l i s t s , and o p tim is ts , who b e lie v e d in th e e v o lu tio n a ry h i s t o r i c a l p ro c e ss, who supported th e u n itin g o f Europe as an economic and p o l i t i c a l n e c e s s ity , and who in a te c h n o lo g ic a l age foresaw a U nited Europe as in e v ita b le . To su p p o rt t h e i r p o s itio n they tra c e d th e p o l i t i c a l advances of th e people in th e dem ocracies sin c e World War I . They n ex t c i te d th e ra p id s t r i d e s in educa t io n , com m unication, and tr a n s p o r ta tio n , a l l of which made p o s s ib le th e removal of th e geographic b a r r i e r s of tim e and sp ace. And th e s e advances, they p o in ted o u t, f a c i l i t a t e d w ider p u b lic c o n ta c t, enabled th e a p p re c ia tio n o f th e s i m i l a r i t y o f i n t e r e s t s and problems o f peoples in o th e r c o u n tr ie s , and s u b s ta n tia te d th e o u td ated d iv is io n o f a c o n tin e n t in to so many contending n a tio n s . Then, th ey m entioned th e tre n d in b u sin e ss and in d u s try to com b in e in to la r g e r u n i t s , as w ell as th e c o n s o lid a tio n of innum erable governm ental fu n c tio n s --fo rm e rly ad m in iste red in sc o re s o f s c a tte r e d communities by r u l e o f thumb and r a th e r t h a t i t i s h eld to be u n r e a l i s t i c and u to p ian because o f m an's weak or n e g a tiv e n a tu re which w i l l not perm it him to work f o r i t s f u l f i l l m e n t . Cf. Reves, op. c i t . . pp. 257-9, 261-75. 247 perhaps s a t i s f a c t o r y f o r th e horse-and-buggy d a y s— in to s ta te w id e a d m in is tr a tiv e s e r v ic e s f o r g r e a te r e f f ic ie n c y and economy. In th e view o f t h i s sc h o o l, th e s e h i s t o r i c a l developm ents in d ic a te d grow ing ev id en ce and r e c o g n itio n t h a t W estern Europe must c o n s o lid a te to safe g u ard i t s f u t u r e . F u rth erm o re , w ith th e growing p u b lic encouragem ent and b a c k in g , th e p ro p o n en ts o f a U nited Europe d id n o t h e s i t a t e to em phasize t h a t what was fo rm erly an a g e -o ld a s p i r a t i o n , espoused on a l i t e r a r y and t h e o r e t i c a l le v e l by an o c c a s io n a l w r i t e r , had become a r e a l and p re se n t c h a lle n g e a c c e p te d by many European statesm en and prom inent p e rso n s . And to th e o p tim is ts , th e id e a o f Europe u n ite d , once c o n sid e re d im p r a c tic a l and u to p ia n , began to appear r e a l i s t i c and f e a s i b l e as i t won th e a c tiv e su p p o rt o f many o f th e b e s t minds and most re s p e c te d le a d e rs in W estern Europe. T urning n ex t to a c o n s id e r a tio n o f th e m ajor argum ents f o r European u n i f i c a t i o n , th e f a c t should n o t be overlo o k ed t h a t much has been s a id and w i l l c o n tin u e to be s a id in su p p o rt o f th e m oral b a s is f o r a U nited 248 25 Europe. Who i s th e r e to argue a g a in s t v i r t u e and an ap p eal to th e h ig h e s t e th ic in th e i n t e r r e la t i o n s h i p s o f men? I f no one, then a t l e a s t th e s e l f - s t y l e d r e a l i s t s , th e s k e p tic s , and th e c y n ics w i l l argue t h a t th e m oral approach i s to o i d e a l i s t i c and v is io n a ry because i t p r e sumes th e p e r f e c t a b i l i t y o f human n a tu re which cannot be achieved h e re on e a r th . A lthough of p h ilo s o p h ic a l i n t e r e s t , th e m oral approach i s to o a b s tr a c t and v a r ia b le a means to be tr e a te d o b je c tiv e ly as one of th e lo g ic a l s te p s toward a U nited Europe. S u ffic e i t to say , m o r a lis ts , h u m a n ita ria n s, and p h ilo so p h e rs cannot ag ree on th e pros and cons o f th e m oral argum ents f o r a c h ie v in g in t e r n a t i o n a l u n ity . This is la r g e ly so because p o l i t i c a l views and m oral judgm ents a re i n ta n g ib le s , a f f e c te d by m an's v ary in g 9 c Most o f th e e a r l i e r p lan s to u n ite Europe were based on m oral ap p eals to so v ereig n monarchs and were in v a in . (See M a c h ia v e lli's sta te m e n t above, p. 69; th e f a i l u r e o f th e Holy A llia n c e , pp. 136-9, above; R ousseau's c r i t i c i s m , pp. 121-2, 124-5, and K a n t's a n a ly s i s , pp. 132- 4 , above and p a rs . 27-8 in Appendix B. A lso n o te th e m oral approach of th e P a c i f i s t and r e li g i o u s g ro u p s, based p rim a rily on " re a s o n ," " j u s t i c e , " " g o o d w ill," and " d i s armament" s in c e 1815 and t h e i r lack o f s u c c e s s , pp. 145-50, 155-6, 159-61, ab ove.) For th e "m agical" m oral e f f e c t o f European Union, see G uerard, op. c i t . . pp. 122-4, and p. 157 f o r th e tech n iq u e of n am e-callin g to b e l i t t l e th e m oral approach by i t s s c o f f e r s . 249 h e r ita g e and environm ent. In tu rn , they i n t e r a c t on each o th e r according to tim e and p la c e , and they d i f f e r w idely among in d iv id u a ls w ith in n a tio n s as w ell as between n a ti o n s . ^ Furtherm ore, n a tio n s a re independent t e r r i t o r i a l ag g reg ates of p eo p le--im p erso n al p o l i t i c a l c o l l e c t i v e - b o d ie s - - th a t claim a b so lu te so v ere ig n ty and reco g n ize no s u p e rio r a u th o r ity . In substance then they a re inanim ate and amoral e n t i t i e s , guided s o le ly by n a tio n a l in t e r e s t s and th e sa n c tio n of M a c h ia v e lli' s dictum : "Law and m o ra lity a re but reasons of s t a t e . "^7 As a r e s u l t , th e ^Hans J . Morgenthau, P o l iti c s among N ations: The S tru g g le fo r Power and Peace (2d e d ., Rev. and E n l.; New York: Knopf, 1954), p. 238. For an e x c e lle n t a n a ly s is of m o ra lity and in te r n a tio n a l p o l i t i c s , see i b i d .. pp. 6-13 [co v erin g p o l i t i c a l re a lism and m o r a lity ] ; Ch. XV, "M oral i t y , Mores, and Law . . ." ; Ch. XVI, " in te r n a tio n a l M o rality "; and Ch. XVII, "World Public O pinion." 27 Y et, m o r a lis ts , h u m an itarian s, and o th e rs say t h a t m oral r e s p o n s i b il i ty fo r a n a tio n 's behavior should be placed on th e p e o p le 's r e p re s e n ta tiv e s who d ir e c t and c o n tro l th e n a tio n 's a c tio n s . They urge th a t o f f i c i a l s of government should follow moral p r in c ip le s in t h e i r d ir e c tio n of p u b lic a f f a i r s and must be punished fo r u n e th ic a l a c t i v i t i e s (The Nuremberg War G u ilt T r ia ls of 1945-46 may have s e t th e precedent in t h i s d i r e c t i o n .) . Morgenthau in op. c i t . . pp. 3-15, 224-8, p re se n ts a n o te worthy a n a ly s is of th e le g a l and moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of government o f f i c i a l s and why they a c t as they do. 250 conscience of each n a tio n is governed by i t s own n a tio n a l m o ra lity , or i n t e r e s t ; and in ste a d of a u n iv e rs a l m o ra lity , th e re a re as many in te r n a tio n a l moral stan d ard s as th e re a re independent sovereign n a tio n s in th e w o r l d . T h u s , m u ltin a tio n a l m o ra lity has been th e crux of E urope's f r a g m entation and d is u n ity . And whether t h i s c e n tu r ie s -o ld stum bling block to European u n ity can be e lim in a te d , only h is to r y w ill t e l l . The school of " r e a l i s t s " and t h e i r p a r tis a n s th in k n o t; w hereas, th e school of f e d e r a tio n is ts b e lie v e th a t th e r e a l i t i e s of n e c e s s ity in th e economic, p o l i t i c a l , and s e c u r ity spheres w i ll enable Europeans to surmount th is most d i f f i c u l t roadblock in th e d riv e toward a U nited S ta te s of E u r o p e .^ ^M orgenthau, op. c i t .. p. 230. 29 C f. R ousseau's a s tu te e v a lu a tio n (and a propos today) of th e reasons fo r th e lack of in te r n a tio n a l m oral i t y , th e f a lla c y of expecting th e F ed eratio n of Europe from appeals in th e name of hum anity, moral r e s t r a i n t , and j u s t i c e , and th e g r e a te r lo g ic o f basing th e union of Europe on expediency, u t i l i t y , and s u p e rio r in te r n a tio n a l fo rc e i f reason would n o t p r e v a il, pp. 121-5 above. The g re a t s ig n ific a n c e of R ousseau's lin e of reaso ning was in h is c a u se -a n d -e ffe c t fin d in g s : S e l f - i n t e r e s ts too o fte n preclude th e p u b lic i n t e r e s t , and th ereb y in c lin e sovereigns to place t h e i r p r iv a te in t e r e s t s above the g en e ral w elfare (p. 122). 251 Not long a f t e r th e w ar, t h e r e f o r e , th e l a t t e r sc h o o l began to em phasize th e dangerous r e a l i t i e s o f a Europe d iv id e d i n t o more th a n a s c o re o f c o n te n d in g ec o nomic and m i l i t a r y sy stem s. S tatesm en and o th e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y e n lig h te n e d Europeans in a p p e a ls to th e p u b lic d e c la re d t h a t th e n a t i o n - s t a t e s o f Europe co u ld n ev e r become s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t and v ia b le economic and p o l i t i c a l e n t i t i e s , n o r co u ld th e y e x i s t in th e f u t u r e te c h n o lo g ic a l n u c le a r w orld w h ile th e y a tte m p te d to o p e ra te as in d e pen dent s t a t e s . And such p u b lic u tte r a n c e s s tr u c k home when th e n a t i o n - s t a t e s o f Europe w ere ran ked a lo n g s id e th e S o v ie t Union and th e U nited S t a t e s , two g i a n t n a tio n s t h a t w ere a b le to s u rv iv e th e war and to r e h a b i l i t a t e th em selv es b ec au se o f t h e i r economic and m i l i t a r y s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y . ^ in The in s u f f i c i e n c y and d i r e f u t u r e o f th e n a t i o n s t a t e s o f W estern Europe became a l l th e more a p p a re n t w ith th e aw akening o f th e c o l o n i a l p e o p le s and t h e i r growing demands f o r com plete in dependence from th e European p o s- s e s s i n g - c o u n t r ie s . Subsequent ind ependence o f E u ro p e 's o v e r -s e a s t e r r i t o r i e s th r e a te n e d th e lo s s o f s u b s t a n t i a l economic r e s o u r c e s and m a rk e ts , w ith o u t which th e c o lo n y - h o ld in g c o u n tr ie s o f Europe would have to r e v e r t to h av e- n o t n a tio n s l i k e th e r e s t . W ith r e s p e c t to B r i t a i n 's d e c lin e in power, h e r c r i s i s and need to merge w ith W estern E urope, and th e c a s e f o r European F e d e r a tio n , se e Mackay, You C a n 't Turn th e Clock B ack. C h ap ters 3, 4 and 7. 252 An a p p r a i s a l o f t h e c r i t i c a l o u tlo o k f o r W estern E urope by m id-1946 c o n fro n te d th e le a d e r s o f th e v a r io u s E uropean c o u n t r i e s w ith c e r t a i n a l t e r n a t i v e s and c o n s e q uences . In th e economic f i e l d , th e y c o u ld (1) keep t h e i r n a t i o n - s t a t e s o p e r a tin g a s weak, h a v e -n o t, in d e p e n d e n t e n t i t i e s u n d er th e o ld s t a t u s quo and c o u ld e n t r u s t t h e i r f a t e t o th e b e n e v o le n c e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s ; (2) a l i g n w ith th e Communist b lo c n a t i o n s , v o l u n t a r i l y o r by c o e r c io n , and lo s e in d i v id u a l freedom o f a c ti o n and human d i g n i t y ; o r (3) u n if y th e s m a ll, m u l t i n a t i o n a l econom ies i n t o a s i n g l e , s tr o n g , and more s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t sy stem and become im p erv io u s t o Communist s u b v e rs io n o r ta k e - O 1 J Inasmuch a s many s p e a k e rs and w r i t e r s have c a l l e d a t t e n t i o n t o th e economic d e f i c i e n c i e s and i l l o g i c o f an a n tiq u a te d European system o f h e te ro g e n e o u s n a t i o n s , w ith i n s u f f i c i e n t r e s o u r c e s and p o p u la tio n t o m a in ta in t h e i r econom ies e f f e c t i v e l y in t o d a y 's w o rld , th e economic a d v a n ta g e s o f a European u n i f i e d economy a r e g e n e r a ll y known. A u n i f i e d European economy, how ever, h as i t s o p p o s i t i o n . T h is i s t o be found p r i n c i p a l l y among v e s te d n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t g ro u p s, c o n s i s t i n g o f th e s t r o n g e s t n a t i o n a l i s t s who a r e u n w illin g t o make s u f f i c i e n t p e r s o n a l s a c r i f i c e s in t h e i r more p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n s o r b e t t e r l i v i n g c o n d itio n s in o r d e r t o im prove th e g e n e r a l l o t o f a l l o th e r E u ro p ean s. (F arm e rs, i n d u s t r i a l i s t s , and l a b o r - - p a r t i s a n s o f t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n - - a r e q u i t e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h i s o p p o s i t io n .) I d e o lo g ic a l d i f f e r e n c e s betw een s o c i a l i s t s and l i b e r a l and c o n s e r v a tiv e d em o crats have 253 In th e a re a of n a tio n a l defense and s e c u r ity , they could (1) co n tin u e t h e i r se p a ra te m ilita r y e sta b lish m e n ts, t i e d to a t r a d i t i o n a l a llia n c e system based upon an u n c e r ta in b alance of power arrangem ent, and run th e r i s k of a re su rg e n t u n ite d Germany becoming dominant and a t h r e a t ag a in ; (2) d r i f t along and do n o th in g , tr u s tin g to th e U nited N ations O rganization to p ro te c t them in case of an emergency, and r i s k becoming i n f i l t r a t e d , outmaneuvered, and subjugated by th e communists; (3) tu rn to a p o lic y of m ilita r y n e u t r a l i t y , tr y to appease or to be im p a rtia l to t h e i r in te r n a tio n a l n eig h b o rs, and become th e b u ffe r o r p o te n tia l pawns of E ast and West; or (4) merge t h e i r n a tio n a l armed fo rc es through p o l i t i c a l union in to a s in g le , more e f f e c tiv e defense fo rc e , and thus provide th e produced c o n sid e ra b le co n tro v ersy over th e m e rits of a c a p i t a l i s t or a s o c i a l i s t u n ite d Europe v s. th e s ta tu s quo. For economic an aly ses by econom ists and government p ra c t i t i o n e r s of economics of th e pros and cons of a u n ifie d European economy and th e subsequent e f f o r t s , cf.. Ugo La M alfa, "The Case f o r European In te g ra tio n : Economic Con s id e r a tio n s ," in Haines ( e d .) , op. c i t . . pp. 64-7, 73-9; Paul D e lo u v rie r, Michael H e ilp e rin , Giuseppe P e lla , and Giovanni Demaria, "Economic In te g ra tio n : . . . " i n Haines ( e d .) , op. c i t . . pp. 114-58; Reynaud, op. c i t .. pp. 74-80, 153-62; and Sennholz, op. c i t . , pp. 55-7, 89-106, 109-13, 116-23, 130-5, 285-306, 312-9. For f u r th e r economic bene f i t s of European fe d e ra tio n (pointed out two decades earlier) see Edouard H e rrio t, The United S ta te s of Europe (New York: Viking P re ss, 1930), pp. 299-313. 254 peoples of W estern Europe w ith an e f f e c t i v e s h ie ld a g a in s t th e p o s s ib le encroachm ents of th e s u p e rio r fo rc e s of Com m unist R ussia or th e dom ination o f a r e s to r e d Germany. In th e p o l i t i c a l realm , th ey could (1) p re se rv e t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l system o f s t a t e c r a f t and a c cep t th e r i s k s of a d e b i l i t a t i n g i n te r n a t io n a l anarchy; (2) c o n tin u e to champion economic n a tio n a lis m and n a t i o n a l i s t i c p a r tic u la r is m and rem ain p e tty , im potent n a t i o n - s t a t e s , in c a p a b le o f p lay in g a p o s itiv e r o le in a w orld dominated by g re a t c o n tin e n ta l powers; (3) r e ly on g o o d w ill, i n t e r n a tio n a l o rg a n iz a tio n , and an e v e n tu a l world government and in th e in te rim e n t r u s t each n a t i o n 's s e c u r ity and w e lfa re to th e g u a rd ia n sh ip o f th e U nited N a tio n s --p re occupied w ith th e id e o lo g ic a l tug of war between th e S o v iet Union and th e U nited S t a t e s o r (4) e s t a b l i s h a W estern European p o l i t i c a l union iran ed iately and be a b le to meet th e w o rld 's two g r e a te s t powers more or le s s 32 For one of th e b e s t a n a ly se s of th e form idable b a r r i e r s to be surmounted b e fo re genuine in te r n a tio n a l c o o p e ra tio n and world government may be a tt a i n e d , see M orgenthau, op. c i t . . C hapter XXVIII, " I n te r n a tio n a l Government: th e U nited N a tio n s ," and C hapter XXIX, "The World S t a t e ." 255 33 on a p a r . In b r i e f , th e n a t i o n - s t a t e s of W estern Europe were co n fro n ted w ith a s e rio u s dilemma l i t t l e more than one y e a r a f t e r World War I I : Should they r e s to r e t h e i r m u ltin a tio n a l s ta tu s quo and run th e r i s k of p e ris h in g by a b so rp tio n in to th e R ussian Communist o r b i t , o r should th ey c r e a te a p o l i t i c a l union and su rre n d e r th e r e to t h e i r n a tio n a l so v e re ig n ty w ith i t s a tte n d a n t p re ro g a tiv e s ? 33 A p o l i t i c a l union o f W estern Europe would com p r is e a dom estic m arket of from 165,000,000 in h a b ita n ts ( f o r th e s ix c o u n trie s th a t l a t e r c re a te d th e European Coal and S te e l Community) to upwards o f 289,000,000 p o p u la tio n (w ell su rp a ssin g e i t h e r th e S o v iet Union o r th e U nited S ta te s ) i f a l l seventeen W estern European c o u n trie s u n ite d . The huge economic p o t e n t i a l o f a s in g le m arket o f t h i s s iz e - - a lr e a d y endowed w ith h ig h ly i n d u s t r i a l and te c h n o lo g ic a l c e n te rs and an abundance o f s k i l le d c r a f t s - m en--not only would in c re a s e th e E uropeans' stan d ard of liv in g but a ls o would compare q u ite fa v o ra b ly w ith e i t h e r th e S o v iet Union or th e U nited S ta te s (exceeding t h e i r combined tr a d e , s u rp a ssin g e i t h e r in c o a l, and th e S o v iet Union in s t e e l , e l e c t r i c i t y , and autom otive p ro d u c tio n , to m ention but a few com m odities. Only in crude o i l would th e S o v iet Union and th e U nited S ta te s show a v a s t s u p e r io r ity in p ro d u c tio n .); see s t a t i s t i c a l c h a rt in "S p e c ia l I n t e r n a tio n a l R eport: The New Europe: A 'S i l e n t R e v o lu tio n '— A Golden Age?" Newsweek. November 4, 1957, pp. 51-4, 56, 58. How B r ita in would b e n e f it as w e ll as W estern Europe from a European Union i s analyzed by Gu£rard in h is op. c i t . . pp. 133-4. 34 That s u rv iv a l of W estern Europe and i t s way of l i f e was a d e f i n i t e concern a t t h i s tim e may be g a th e re d from some o f th e sp eech es, t i t l e s of books, and p e r io d ic a l a r t i c l e s ; f o r example, A t t l e e 's o r ig in a tio n of th e id ea 256 I n i t i a t i v e of Western Statesmen and In d iv id u als fo r a United S ta te s of Europe The day-to-day evidence of th e economic and m ilita r y impotence of Western Europe f in a ll y moved leading Western statesm en by th e summer of 1946 to proclaim th e lo g ic of u n itin g Europe. W itnessing the postwar Russian change from cooperation to o b stru c tio n in th e Big Four m eetings and her repeated use of the veto in th e United Nations S ecu rity C ouncil, Western lead ers lo s t f a i t h in th e cap acity of th e United Nations to m aintain in te rn a tio n a l u n ity . Furtherm ore, in ap p raisin g the p o l i t i c a l fu tu re of Western Europe under th ese circum stances, they envisaged a r e a l th re a t to t h e i r dem ocratic way of l i f e . From the East came the r e le n tle s s th r u s t of the Russian Communists, bent upon im planting th e i r dogmatic ideology in 1939 th a t Europe must " fe d e ra te or p e rish " (see fo o tn o te 16, above), and B evin's re p e a tin g of th is a t t i tu d e in speeches a f t e r the war; then Reynaud's book, U nite or P erish and Sennholz' How Can Europe S urvive. among o th e rs . Also c£. Bonn, op. c i t .. pp. 121-4. Cf. F e lic e B a tta g lia , " In tro d u c tio n ," in Haines (ed.) op. c i t .. pp. 4-7; and Henri Brugmans, "The Dynamics of European I n te g r a tio n ," in Haines ( e d .) , op. c i t . . pp. 165-6, 169-70, 175-6. 257 by f o r c e , i f n o t by s u b v e r s io n , th ro u g h o u t E urope. In th e West flo u n d e re d a d is o r g a n iz e d group o f in d ep en d e n t co u n t r i e s , to o sm a ll and to o weak t o c o u n te r t h e m a c h in a tio n s o f th e R u ssia n g i a n t , n o t to m ention i t s communist c o n s p ir a c y from w ith in . To W estern l e a d e r s , t h e r e f o r e , th e f u l l e s t c o o p e ra tio n o f a l l W estern d em o cracies was needed t o p re v e n t any a g g r e s s iv e moves on th e p a r t o f th e S o v ie t U nion. And in t h e i r ju d g m en t, a p o l i t i c a l u n io n o f th e s e d em o cracies seemed th e m ost e f f e c t i v e means to stem th e com munist t i d e s p re a d in g o v er Europe and e n g u lfin g what rem ained o f h e r f r e e s o c i e t y . In view o f W estern E u ro p e 's b le a k p o l i t i c a l o u t lo o k , many th o u g h tf u l E uropeans t h e r e f o r e c o n s id e re d i t v i t a l l y n e c e s s a ry as w e ll as r e a l i s t i c to r e v iv e th e id e a o f u n i t i n g E urope. As e a r l y as F e b ru a ry , 1946, Mr. Boothby in th e House o f Commons "D ebate on F o re ig n A f f a i r s " had a n t i c i p a t e d R u s s ia ’s e x p l o i t a t i o n o f th e w eakened, d iv id e d W estern European n a tio n s and su g g e ste d th e f e d e r a t i o n o f W estern Europe as a c o u n te rm e a su re , and a l s o f o r 35 v a r io u s econom ic a d v a n ta g e s . Four months l a t e r , Mr. 35 House o f Commons Deb. . 5 th s e r i e s , 419 (1945- 4 6 ) , 1247-50, 1252-3. 258 Boothby a g a in in th e House o f Commons d e c la re d th e n e c e s s i t y o f a W estern European f e d e r a tio n o r u n io n . And in th e same d e b a te , Mr. B u tle r su p p o rted a European f e d e r a l u n io n . ^ A fte r having sp en t th e war y e a rs in th e U nited S t a t e s , where he co n tin u ed to work and to g ain American 07 su p p o rt f o r a U nited S ta te s o f Europe, ' Coudenhove- K a le rg i re tu rn e d to Europe in Ju n e, 1946, and re co rd ed th e s e o b s e rv a tio n s : I began to ask ev eryo ne, p o l i t i c i a n s and j o u r n a l i s t s , c h a u ffe u rs and w a i te r s , what th ey th oug ht o f th e id e a o f a U nited S ta te s o f Europe. The r e p ly I re c e iv e d was alw ays th e same: " I f only i t were p o s s ib le ! I t seems th e only chance we have o f e x t r i c a t i n g o u rs e lv e s from our p re se n t p l i g h t . " . . . I had th e d e f i n i t e f e e lin g th a t th e id e a o f a U nited Europe began to be u n iv e r s a lly accep ted as a p r a c t i c a l s o lu t io n , b u t t h a t no one dared to make a c o n c re te s u g g e stio n f o r f e a r o f b ein g looked upon as a dream er--an d fo r even g r e a t e r f e a r o f how R u ssia m ight r e a c t to such a su g g e s tio n . 36 House of Commons Deb. . 5th s e r i e s , 423 (1945- 4 6 ), 1859-60, 1948-52. 37 For an i n t e r e s t i n g account o f Coudenhove- K a le r g i's work in th e U nited S t a te s , see h is An Idea Conquers th e W orld. C hap ters XXIV, XXV, XXVI; and Z u rc h er, op. c i t . , C hapter 2. 259 . . . There were c e r ta in ly many people who re fu se d to b e lie v e in th e p r a c t ic a l p o s s i b i l i t y of a European fe d e ra tio n , but th e re were few who opposed i t on p r in c ip le . At th e end of th e Second World War, Europe was d iv id ed le s s in to n a tio n a l camps than in to camps of d i f f e r e n t id e o lo g ie s . Communist p a r tie s a l l over Europe formed one stro n g camp, w h ils t anti-C om m unists, . . . were now beginning to d i s play a s im ila r s o l i d a r i t y . . . . . . . Our main d i f f i c u l t y was t h a t , w h ils t th e people of Europe were c le a r ly ready fo r fe d e r a tio n , t h e i r Governments, s t i l l ta in te d by p re war u ltr a n a tio n a lis m , took a d if f e r e n t view. Our ta s k was th e re fo re to b rin g p re ssu re to b ear on Governments and thus induce them to tak e th e i n i t i a t i v e towards Pan-European fe d e ra tio n . E x te rn a lly , such p re ssu re could be ap p lied by th e U nited S ta te s ; i n t e r n a l l y , i t would have to emanate from th e v ario u s n a tio n a l P arliam en ts. These thoughts led me to th e follow ing p lan : to stre n g th e n our p u b lic ity campaign in th e U nited S ta te s and to m o b ilize a t th e same tim e as much p arliam en tary support as p o s s ib le w ith E urope.38 But i t was C h u r c h ill's p u b lic appeal th a t gave th e idea of a U nited Europe r e a l momentum. C h u rch ill f i r s t p u b lic ly p o inted out th e th r e a t of Russian Communism and advanced th e idea of European u n ity in h is address a t W estm inster C ollege, F u lto n , M isso u ri, on March 5, 1946. Among o th e r th in g s , he d ec la red : oo Coudenhove-Kalgeri, op. c i t . , pp. 263-6. 260 . . . an iro n c u r ta in has descended ac ro ss th e C o n tin e n t. . . [behind which] P o lic e govern ments a re p re v a ilin g in n e a rly every case [ c o u n tr y ] , and . . . th e r e i s no tr u e democracy. . . . . . . t h i s i s c e r t a i n ly not th e L ib era te d Europe we fought to b u ild up. . . . The s a f e ty o f th e w orld re q u ir e s a new u n ity in Europe, from which no n a tio n should be perma n e n tly o u tc a s t. . . .39 In a speech on Ju ly 14, 1946, a t Metz, C h u rc h ill in d is c u s s in g "What w i l l be th e f a te o f Europe?" again emphasized th e need o f a U nited Europe to p re se rv e world p e a c e . ^ I t was h is famous Z urich U n iv e rsity Speech of September 19, 1946, however, th a t provided th e spark to move th e id ea of a U nited Europe o f f th e l i t e r a r y and academic s h e lf and down to th e po p u lar and p r a c t ic a l le v e l. Speaking about "th e trag e d y of Europe," C h u rc h ill pointed o u t : . . . th e re i s a remedy w hich, i f i t were g e n e ra lly and spontan eously adopted, would as i f by a m ira c le tra n sfo rm th e whole scen e, and would in a few y e a rs make a l l Europe, or th e g r e a te r p a r t of i t , as f r e e and as happy as 39 Winston S. C h u rc h ill, The Sinews of Peace: P o s t war S peeches. e d ite d by Randolph S. C h u rc h ill (Boston: Houghton M if f lin , 1949), pp. 100-1[C h u rc h ill o rig in a te d th e p h ra se , " iro n c u r t a i n " ] . 4 0 I b id . . p. 174. 261 S w itzerlan d i s to -d a y . What Is t h i s so v ere ig n remedy? I t i s to r e - c r e a t e th e European fa m ily , o r as much o f i t as we ca n , . . . We must b u ild a k in d o f U nited S ta te s o f Europe. In t h i s way only w i l l hundreds of m illio n s o f t o i l e r s be a b le to re g a in th e sim ple jo y s and hopes which make l i f e w orth l i v i n g . . . . Much work has been done upon t h i s ta s k by th e e x e rtio n s o f th e Pan-European Union which owes so much to Count C oudenhove-K algerl and which com manded th e s e r v ic e s o f th e famous F rench p a t r i o t and sta te sm a n , A r i s t i d e B rian d . . . . The f i r s t s te p in th e r e - c r e a t i o n of th e European fam ily must be a p a r tn e r s h ip between F rance and Germany. . . . The s t r u c t u r e o f th e U nited S ta te s o f E urope, i f w e ll and t r u l y b u i l t , w i l l be such as to make th e m a te r ia l s tr e n g th of a s in g le s t a t e le s s im p o rta n t. Sm all n a tio n s w i l l count as much as la r g e ones and g a in t h e i r honour by t h e i r c o n tr ib u tio n to th e common ca u se. . . . . . . I f we a r e to form th e U nited S ta te s o f Europe o r w hatever name or form i t may ta k e , we must begin now. . . . Our c o n s ta n t aim must be to b u ild and f o r t i f y th e s tr e n g th o f U.N.O. Under and w ith in t h a t w orld concept we must r e - c r e a t e th e European fa m ily in a r e g io n a l s t r u c t u r e c a l l e d , i t may b e, th e U nited S ta te s o f Europe. The f i r s t s te p i s to form a C ouncil o f Europe. I f a t f i r s t a l l th e S ta te s of Europe a r e n o t w i l l in g or a b le to jo in th e Union, we must n e v e rth e le s s proceed to assem ble and combine th o se who w i l l and th o s e who can .^1 C h u r c h ill's sp eech , n e e d le s s to sa y , "had an e l e c t r i f y i n g e f f e c t th ro u g h o u t E u ro p e," and th e r e v iv a l ^ C h u r c h i l l , op. c i t . . pp. 199-202. 262 of the idea of a United States of Europe "suddenly reap peared in all leading articles and in every conversa tion."^ In fact, the popularity of Churchill, known as no visionary or Utopian, gave respectability and sub stance to this age-old ideal, and his timely pronouncement proved a psychological turning point for the peoples of Western Europe and their leaders. Discouraged up to then by the uncertain economic and political outlook for the Western democracies, they were now inspired to take united action in order to assure their economic and political well-being.^ Western business, political, and professional leaders joined in the chorus calling for a United Europe. Field Marshall Smuts publicly supported Churchill's appeal but went further and urged Britain to take the initiative C o u d e n h o v e -K a lg e ri, op. c i t . . p. 268. For n e g a tiv e r e a c t i o n t o C h u r c h ill s sp e e c h , se e Boyd, op. c i t . . p. 72 and House o f Commons Deb. . 5 th s e r i e s , 427 (1 9 4 5 -4 6 ), 1591, 1788. 43 F u l l e r a n a ly s i s o f th e e f f e c t o f C h u r c h i l l ’s sp ee ch may be found in Z u rc h e r, op. c i t . . p. 201. 263 44 in u n itin g Europe. Mr. B u tle r in th e House of Commons "Debate on Foreign A ffa irs " of October 22, 1946, supported C h u r c h ill's appeal th u s: We should aim not only a t th e f e d e r a lis a tio n o f Germany, but towards an u ltim a te fe d e ra l s y s tem of Europe as a whole. 1 hope to show th a t we should approach th e se id e a ls f i r s t l y by eco nomic s te p s , sin c e economics appear today to be th e key to t h i s peacemaking p e rio d , in ex a c tly th e same way as s e lf-d e te rm in a tio n was th e cry a t th e end of World War No. l r ”i n 1815 th e c a l l was f o r th e Balance o f Power. ^ In th e same Debate on th e follow ing day, Mr. Gammons urged th e B r itis h Government to give European le a d e rs h ip and then asked: "Is i t r e a lis e d th a t we s h a ll never g et European fe d e ra tio n w ithout B r itis h le a d e rs h ip , and what is more, th a t th e whole of Europe is looking fo r th a t le a d e r s h ip ? " ^ In an address to th e N etherlands S tates-G e n eral a t th e Hague, October 11, 1946; see K eesing's Contemporary A rchives: Weekly D iary of Im portant World Events ( B r is to l, E ngland), VI (1946-1948), 8206. ^ House of Commons Deb.. 5th s e r i e s , 427 (1945-46), 1523. In th e same D ebate, however, Foreign S ecretary Bevin suggested among o th e r p o in ts th a t th e "u n ited e f f o r t by th e fo u r Powers w ith th e co o p eratio n of t h e i r sm aller A llie s . . .[was] the most lik e ly to produce th e g r e a te s t s t a b i l i t y . . . and lead to a g e n e ra l u n ity in Europe. . ." ( i b i d . . 1510). ^ House of Commons Deb.. 5th s e r ie s , 427 (1945- 4 6 ), 1709. 264 Meanwhile, Coudenhove-Kalgeri met w ith C h u rch ill in October to d isc u ss re o rg a n iz in g th e old Pan-European Movement under t h e i r j o i n t le a d e rs h ip and changing i t s name to th e U nited Europe Movement. Coudenhove-Kalgeri suggested th a t C h u rc h ill, a s s is te d by two v ic e -p re s id e n ts "chosen from th e ranks of th e S o c ia lis t and C ath o lic p a r tie s on th e C o n tin e n t," become i t s P re sid e n t. Couden- hove-K alergi agreed to serv e as S ecretary -G en eral w ith Sandys as h is d e p u t y . A p p r o v i n g th e se p ro p o sa ls, C h u rc h ill informed Coudenhove-Kalergi as th e l a t t e r d ep arted fo r France: You may be su re th a t a man lik e me, upon whom l i f e has bestowed an abundance of su ccess, does not wish to use th e U nited Europe movement to f u r th e r any p erso n al am b itio n s. You have c re a te d t h i s movement. I t could th e re fo re be conducted w ithout my a s s is ta n c e - - b u t h ard ly w ithout yours! You may r e s t assu red th a t I w i l l always d ea l f a i r l y w ith y o u . ^8 In France Coudenhove-Kalergi in v ite d P ro fesso r Rene C o u rtin , Economic E d ito r of th e P a ris newspaper, Le Monde, to h elp form a n o n p a rtisa n French committee fo r 49 a United Europe. B eliev in g i t n ecessary to win 47 Coudenhove-K alergi, op. c i t . . p. 269. 48I b i d . . p. 271. 49 Loc. c i t . 265 p a rlia m e n ta ry su p p o rt b e f o re th e f e d e r a tio n o f Europe co u ld be r e a l i z e d , C oudenhove-K alergi th en w ro te to 4 ,2 5 6 European p a rlia m e n ta ry r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s in November, 1946, and ask ed : "Are you in fa v o r o f th e e s ta b lis h m e n t o f a European f e d e r a tio n w ith in th e framework o f th e U nited N a tio n s? " Of th e 1,818 who r e p l i e d , 1,766 answ ered in th e a f f i r m a t i v e and o n ly 52 in th e n e g a tiv e - - a r a t i o o f 97.2 to 2 .8 p e r c e n t in fa v o r o f European f e d e r a t i o n . The m a jo r ity o f th e p a rlia m e n ta ry members from B elgium , F ra n c e , G reece, I t a l y , Luxembourg, th e N e th e rla n d s , and S w itz e r lan d re sp o n d e d , and t h e i r r e p l i e s in d ic a te d an a f f ir m a t iv e m a jo r ity o f 91.2 to 100 p e r c e n t. Of th e 606 members o f th e B r i t i s h House o f Commons p o lle d , o n ly 173, o r 28 p e r c e n t r e p l i e d ; b u t o f th e s e , 170 answ ered in th e a f f i r m a t i v e . ^ Convinced t h a t " th e overwhelm ing m a jo r ity o f th e e l e c to r s o f Europe fav o u red th e c r e a t i o n o f a U nited S ta te s o f Europe . . ." and t h a t th e tim e was most s u i t a b l e , C oudenhove-K alergi a rra n g e d f o r th e f u l l e s t p o s s ib le ^ F o r th e s t a t i s t i c a l t a b l e showing th e f i n a l r e s u l t s o f t h i s p a rlia m e n ta ry p o l l , s e e C oudenhove-K alergi, op. c i t . . p. 275. A copy o f t h i s p o l l may a ls o be found in A ppendix E. 266 p u b li c i ty in Europe and in A m erica. T h e n c e fo rth , he devoted h is energy tow ard w inning th e b ro a d e s t p u b lic su p p o rt f o r a U nited S ta te s o f E u r o p e .^ F o rtu n a te ly f o r C oudenhove-K alergi, h is e f f o r t s t h i s tim e no lo n g er needed to be a one-man c ru sa d e , f o r th e movement to unite Europe a t t r a c t e d th e b e s t minds and most re s p e c te d le a d e rs o f th e W estern dem ocracies to i t s ra n k s . In f a c t , by J a n u a ry , 1947, C h u rc h ill as Chairman and Lord Layton as D ire c to r help ed o rg a n iz e in B r ita in a U nited Europe Movement. O ther w ell-know n W estern European le a d e rs who h elp ed sp earhead th e d riv e fo r a U nited Europe were Boothby, L indsay, Mackay, and Sandys o f B r i t a i n ; Bohy, Spaak, and van Z eeland o f Belgium; Blum, Coty, de Menthon, M o lle t, Monnet, P f lim lin , P h ilip , Rama- d i e r , Reynaud, and Schuman o f F ran c e; C roce, de G a sp e ri, and S fo rza o f I t a l y ; von Beyen, Brugmans, and Nord o f th e N e th e rla n d s; de M adariaga o f S pain; Rasquin of Luxembourg; de Rougemont and O precht o f S w itz e rla n d ; and A denauer, Kogon, and Schmid o f [West] Germ any.^2 51C oudenhove-K alergi, o p. c i t . . pp. 273, 275-9. 52 A long l i s t o f o th e r le a d e rs in th e movement to u n it e Europe may be found in The European Movement's pub l i c a t i o n , European Movement and th e C ouncil o f Europe (London: H utchinson [1 9 4 9 ]), pp. 13-21. CHAPTER V III THE ORGANIZED M OVEM ENT TO UNITE EUROPE Dwarfed by th e emergence from World War I I of two g ia n t w orld pow ers, th e L i l l i p u t i a n , im potent n a t i o n - s t a t e s of Europe soon came to r e a l i z e th e b r u t a l r e a l i t y o f th e p o s s ib le e x tin c tio n of t h e i r economic and p o l i t i c a l e x i s t en ce. W estern dem ocracy, b o a s tin g th e ideo lo g y of human d ig n ity and e n lig h te n e d l i b e r t y , was on th e b rin k o f lo s in g i t s prim acy among th e peop les o f Europe. Having n e g le c te d d u rin g th e p a s t c e n tu ry o f l ib e r a lis m to f o s t e r th e t r a n s cendence o f economic n a tio n a lis m and i n t e r n a t i o n a l an arch y , W estern democracy was b ein g v ig o ro u s ly c h a lle n g e d by th e more re c e n t id eo lo g y o f R ussian communism. In f a c t , t h i s s e lf-p ro c la im e d economic s a v io r and i n t e r n a t i o n a l u n i f i e r o f mankind was d e d ic a te d to th e d e s tr u c tio n o f i t s o ld e r r i v a l . A d is u n ite d d em o cratic Europe t h a t endeavored to c a r r y on under an a n a c h r o n is tic n a t i o n - s t a t e system of th e n in e te e n th c e n tu ry , th e r e f o r e , d id so a t a tremendous d isa d v a n ta g e and under c o n s ta n t t h r e a t of communist su b ju g a tio n . So g r e a t w ere th e postw ar odds a g a in s t 268 independent survival of Europe's democratic states that Western Europe's only apparent salvation then was to "unite or perish." Action of Nongovernmental Organizations By 1947, th e economic and p o l i t i c a l o u tlo o k f o r th e w a r-ra v a g e d d em o cracies o f W estern Europe was e x tre m e ly d a r k . The f i r s t y e a r o f p o stw ar r e c o n s t r u c t i o n was sp e n t l a r g e l y in c le a n in g up th e c o u n tle s s to n s o f war r u in s and in m a k e s h ift a d a p ta tio n s to th e c a r e s o f d a y -to -d a y l i v i n g , a s s i s t e d o f c o u rs e by A m erican lo a n s , a i d , and UNRRA r e l i e f . M other N a tu re , u n f o r t u n a te l y , seemed b e n t on f u r t h e r punishm ent o f W estern E urope, f o r a s e v e re w in te r fo llo w e d by d e s t r u c t i v e flo o d s s e t back th e hopes o f e a r l y economic re c o v e ry . Then w ith th e te r m in a tio n o f UNRRA in e a r ly 1947, i t became s e l f - e v i d e n t t h a t th e f r a g m ented, h a v e -n o t n a tio n s o f E u ro p e --in d i r e need o f fo o d , h o u s in g , and employment f o r t h e i r p e o p le s --w e re to o im p o te n t to r e s o lv e t h e i r economic dilemma in d e p e n d e n tly . T h e ir p r e c a r io u s economic f u t u r e , in f a c t , demanded c o n c e r t e d a c t i o n , o th e rw is e t h e i r way o f l i f e was in 269 p e r i l . * As e a r l y as th e s p rin g o f 1946 C h u r c h ill, in f a c t , had fo re s e e n th e t h r e a t to th e s t a b i l i t y and s u r v iv a l o f th e European d e m o c ra c ie s. His su b seq u en t Z u ric h sp eech on Septem ber 19, 1946, a n t i c i p a t e d th e n e c e s s i ty o f t h e i r c o o rd in a te d and c o n c e rte d a c tio n when he ap p e aled f o r a U n ited S ta te s o f E urope. Coming from E u ro p e 's le a d in g s ta te s m a n -- a r e a l i s t and no v is io n a r y d re a m e r-- t h i s speech p ro v id ed th e p r e c is e momentum to r e v iv e th e l a t e n t id e a o f u n i t in g E urope. In t r u t h , h is p u b lic a p p e a l f o r Europeans to u n i t e so s t i r r e d th e minds o f men 2 and women from many w alks o f l i f e t h a t c i t i z e n s formed Jo sep h M. J o n e s , The F i f t e e n Weeks (F eb ru ary 21- Ju n e 5. 1947) (New York: V iking P r e s s , 1955), pp. 7 8 -8 5 , s u b s t a n t i a t e s th e c h a in o f u n f o r tu n a te c irc u m sta n c e s im ped in g th e p ostw ar re c o v e ry o f Europe d u rin g t h i s p e r io d . 2 A lthough C h u r c h i l l 's sp eech re c e iv e d a p re p o n d e r ance o f fa v o ra b le p re s s co v e rag e and p u b lic a c c e p ta n c e , R u ssian r e a c t i o n was b i t t e r l y h o s t i l e a s w ere i t s puppet n a t i o n a l communist p a r t i e s in W estern E urope. M oreover, c o n s id e r a b le o p in io n in F ran ce opposed C h u r c h i l l 's re c o n - c ilia tio n -w ith -G e rm a n y s u g g e s tio n , and many f r i e n d l y c r i t i c s w ere s k e p t i c a l c o n c e rn in g th e f e a s i b i l i t y o f a U n ited S ta te s o f E urope. See Andrew and F ran c es Boyd, W estern Union: A Study o f th e Trend Toward European U nity (W ashington: P u b lic A f f a i r s P re ss [ c . 1 9 4 9 ]), p . 74. 270 p ro v is io n a l com m ittees which were then expanded in to more perm anent c i t i z e n s ' o rg a n iz a tio n s in p r a c t i c a l l y every c o u n try o f W estern Europe. W ithin s ix months a m u l ti p l i c i t y o f nongovernm ental o rg a n iz a tio n s had sprung up w ith b ranch o f f ic e s or m eeting p la c e s in numerous c i t i e s and w ith n a tio n a l a f f i l i a t e s in n eig h b o rin g c o u n tr ie s . T h e ir im m ediate o b je c tiv e s were to re a c h th e European peoples and t h e i r e le c te d r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s and to win t h e i r su p p o rt in th e campaign to u n ite Europe. Through e d u c a tio n a l l i t e r a t u r e and p u b lic g a th e r in g s , i t was hoped t h a t a s u c c e s s f u l p o p u lar movement in th e European dem ocracies would induce t h e i r p e o p le 's governm ents to u n i te in o rd e r to c r e a t e a s tro n g e r and more v ia b le U nited European g o v ern ment . In O ctober, 1946, F e d e r a l is t a d h e re n ts from a l l p a r ts of th e w orld met in t h e i r f i r s t postw ar i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n fe re n c e a t Luxembourg. A lthough t h e i r im mediate aim was to u n i te a l l groups seek in g th e e sta b lis h m e n t of a World F e d e ra l Government, t h e i r c o n fe re n c e , among o th e r th in g s, dec l a r e d : ^Except P o rtu g a l, S pain, F in la n d , Norway, Sweden, and th o se c o u n tr ie s behind th e " Iro n C u r ta in ." 271 . . . Many o f us a d v o c a te , as a s te p tow ards t h i s end [a World F e d e ra l Governm ent], th e form a tio n o f R egional F e d e ra l U nions, and in p a r t i c u l a r th e U nited S ta te s o f Europe. C onscious o f th e in c re a s in g p e r i l s which th r e a te n mankind and o f th e f u n c tio n a l incom p eten c e o f th e S overeign S ta te t o so lv e our d i f f i c u l t i e s , we ap p e al to men and women e v e ry where t o j o i n w ith us in t h i s g r e a t campaign f o r th e c r e a tio n of a World F e d e ra l Governm ent.^ T here was r e a l l y no c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t between t h e i r u ltim a te u n iv e r s a l g o al and a European F e d e ra tio n as a f i r s t s te p . C onsequently, a t a P a ris m eeting on December 15, 1946, th e European members o f th e Movement f o r World F e d e ra l Government e s ta b lis h e d th e European Union o f F e d e r a l i s t s (EUF). At th e same tim e th e F e d e ra l Union A sso c ia tio n s ^ in A u s tr ia , Belgium, B r i t a i n , Denmark, F ran ce, Germany, I t a l y , Luxembourg, th e N e th e rla n d s, and S w itzerlan d became th e EUF bran ches as w e ll as those of th e World F ed er a l i s t Movement. In tim e , EUF grew to over 150,000 members and claim ed some o f th e b e s t minds and o u ts ta n d in g c iv ic le a d e rs in W estern Europe. At i t s f i r s t annual C ongress, ^As quoted [no c i t a t i o n given] by Boyd, op. c i t .. p. 71. ^ O rig in a tin g in B r i ta i n in 1938. For th e su b se q u en t work and c o n tr ib u tio n s o f F e d e ra l Union, see above, C hapter V, fo o tn o te 80, and C hapter VI, pp. 188-94, and F o o tn o te 21. 272 held a t Montreux, S w itzerland, in August, 1947, more than 200 d eleg ates and observers from six te e n European co u n trie s assembled and in a s ig n if ic a n t g eneral p o licy re s o lu tio n d e c la re d : European fe d eralism , . . . alone can provide our peoples w ith the prospect of s a lv a tio n , . . . W e advocate, . . . the a p p lic a tio n to Germany of measures which would permit the u t i l i z a t i o n of h er in d u s tr ia l p o te n tia l and h er n a tu ra l ric h e s fo r th e b e n e fit of Europe as a whole, of which th e Germans a re a p a r t. . . . . . . f e d e r a li s t s must d e c la re firm ly and w ithout compromise th a t i t is ab so lu te n a tio n a l so v ereig n ty th a t must be abated, th a t a p a rt of th a t sov ereig n ty must be e n tru ste d to a fe d e ra l a u th o rity . . . th is a u th o rity must possess: (a) a government re sp o n sib le to th e peoples and groups and not to the fed erated s t a t e s ; (b) a Supreme Court capable of re so lv in g p o ssib le d isp u tes between s t a t e members of th e F ed eratio n ; (c) an armed p o lic e fo rce under i t s own con t r o l , . . . to uphold fe d e ra l d e c isio n s. . . . we no more want a h erm e tica lly sealed Europe than a divided Europe. Our motto is and rem ains: One Europe in one World. . . . I t is fu rth e r e s s e n tia l th a t we should tak e along w ith us a l l the popular fo rc e s , a l l th e h ea lth y fo rc es which a re a c tiv e in th e d i f f e re n t c o u n trie s , . . . tra d e unions, p ro fe ssio n a l o rg a n iz a tio n s , i n t e l le c t u a l s , p o l i t i c a l a sso c ia tio n s 273 and p a r t i e s which a r e w orking f o r a b e t t e r s o c ie ty , u n i v e r s i t i e s and ch u rc h e s. . . . M eanwhile, C h u r c h ill, Lord L ayton, and o th e rs had i n i t i a t e d th e U nited Europe Movement (UEM) o f B r ita in in Ja n u a ry , 1947. A lthough i t a t t r a c t e d l i t t l e Labor P a rty su p p o rt because o f i t s C o n se rv a tiv e P a rty le a d e rs h ip and a lth o u g h no a tte m p t was made to b u ild a mass member s h ip , i t claim ed many le a d in g B rito n s among i t s 2,500 members.^ The concern o f t h a t day in re g a rd to E urope’s c r i t i c a l p o l i t i c a l o u tlo o k and th e s te p s t h a t needed to be taken to overcome E u ro p e 's p lig h t were r e f l e c t e d in th e For th e com plete G en eral P o lic y and Economic P o lic y R e so lu tio n s o f th e EUF Montreux C onference, A ugust, 1947, see U.E.F.--M ouvement F d d d r a lls te Europden l r e Rap p o rt du Congrbs Annuel (Gendve: 1947), or a r e p r i n t of them in Boyd, o p . c i t . . pp. 141-8. Boyd a ls o q u o tes U.E. F . 's Amsterdam sta te m e n t of aims (A p ril, 1947), in i b i d . . pp. 71-2. ^Arnold J . Z u rc h er, The S tru g g le to U n ite E urope. 1940-1958 (W ashington S quare, New York: New York U n iv er s i t y P re s s , 1958), p. 21. A lso see C oudenhove-K alergi, op. c i t . , pp. 270 and 278, f o r s u b s t a n t i a t io n o f Labor P a rty r e s i s t a n c e to a movement headed by C h u rc h ill. At th e form al in a u g u ra tio n o f th e UEM o f B r i t a i n on May 14, 1947, C h u rc h ill s tr e s s e d : " I f European u n ity i s to be made an e f f e c t i v e r e a l i t y b e fo re i t i s to o l a t e , th e whole h e a rte d e f f o r t s b o th o f F ran ce and B r i t a i n w i l l be needed from th e o u t s e t . . . . They must be fo u n d e r-p a rtn e rs in t h i s movement." (See h is Europe U n ite : Speeches T ofl 1947 and 1948, ed. by Randolph S. C h u rc h ill [London: C a s s e ll (1 9 5 0 )], p. 8 0 .) 274 M ovement's S tatem en t o f P o lic y as fo llo w s : The an arch y o f Europe has a lre a d y b ro u g h t ab o u t two w orld w ars in our tim e . I f allow ed to c o n tin u e , i t m ust s u r e ly le a d t o an even more t e r r i b l e c a ta s tr o p h e . . . . The f i n a l e lim in a tio n o f war can be a s s u re d o n ly by th e e v e n tu a l c r e a t i o n o f a system o f World Governm ent. As a p r a c t i c a l s te p tow ards t h i s u l t im a t e i d e a l , a p p r o p r ia te n a tio n s should be encouraged t o group th em selv es to g e th e r in l a r g e r u n i t s . . . . Our c o n t in e n t , how ever, s t i l l rem ains in a c h a o tic c o n d itio n . I f Europe i s to s u r v iv e , i t must u n i t e . . . . The aim must be to u n i t e a l l th e p eo p les o f Europe and g iv e e x p re s s io n to t h e i r se n se o f b e in g E uropeans, w h ile p re s e rv in g t h e i r own t r a d i t i o n s and i d e n t i t y . Some c o u n tr ie s may f o r th e p r e s e n t f e e l u n ab le t o ta k e a c tio n ; b u t th o s e t h a t can sh o u ld make a s t a r t . Othexs w i l l j o i n w ith them l a t e r . B r i t a i n has s p e c ia l o b lig a tio n s and s p i r i t u a l t i e s which lin k h e r w ith th e o th e r n a tio n s o f th e B r i t i s h Commonwealth. N e v e rth e le s s , B r i ta i n i s p a r t o f Europe and must be p re p a re d to make h er f u l l c o n t r i b u t io n to European u n it y . The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f a l l s upon in d iv id u a l c i t i z e n s . The ta s k i s u r g e n t. . . . ® In F ran ce a p a r a l l e l o r g a n iz a tio n to th e B r i t i s h U nited Europe Movement was formed in J u l y , 1947, under th e c h a irm a n sh ip o f H e r r i o t . Known as th e F rench C o u n cil f o r 8 As q u oted by Boyd [no c i t a t i o n g iv en ] in op. c i t . . pp. 7 4 - 5 , 275 United Europe, it enlisted most of the European Union supporters in the French Assembly and other government offices, as well as individuals from all parties except the Communist. It also maintained close relations with 9 its British counterpart. A nother o rg a n iz a tio n c r e a te d in F rance in Ju n e , 1947, to e n l i s t th e C a th o lic p a r t i e s in th e campaign to u n i t e Europe had th e uniqu e name o f Les N ouvelles £quipes I n te r n a tio n a le s (N E I). A lthough i t e s ta b lis h e d branch es in n in e c o u n trie s in c lu d in g B r i t a i n , i t s m ajor a c t i v i t y found e x p re ssio n throu gh th e M RP p a rty in F ran ce. L a te r, i t s European u n i f i c a t i o n a c t i v i t i e s were c o o rd in a te d w ith th o se o f th e C h ristia n -D e m o c ra tic p a r ti e s in o th e r European c o u n tr ie s thro u g h i n t e r n a t i o n a l com m issions, annual co n g r e s s e s , and stu d y s e s s io n s . 9 Z u rc h er, op. c i t . . pp. 21-2. ^ T h e background, s t r u c t u r e , p u rp o se, and p u b lic a tio n s o f Les N ouvelles £quipes I n t e r n a t i o n a l e s , as w e ll as f i f t e e n o th e r nongovernm ental o rg a n iz a tio n s c r e a te d to a s s i s t in u n itin g E urope, may be found in "Mdthodes e t Mouvements pour U nir 1 'E u ro p e," B u lle tin du C entre Europeen de l a C u ltu r e . 6me Annde, No. 2 (Genfeve: mai 1958), pp. 44-74. 276 On th e o th e r hand, th e I n t e r n a t io n a l Committee f o r a S o c i a l i s t U nited S ta te s o f Europe was c r e a te d a t London in F eb ru a ry , 1947, in o rd e r t o r a l l y th e n a tio n a l S o c i a l i s t p a r t i e s to th e cause of a U nited Europe. I t s g r e a t e s t in flu e n c e was in Belgium , B r i t a i n , F ran c e, and Luxembourg among th e more m i l i t a n t s o c i a l i s t s , f o r th e more m oderate were working in th e a l l - p a r t y o r g a n iz a tio n , L*Union Europdenne des F e d d r a lis te s (UEF), or th e European Union o f F e d e r a l is t s (EUF). By November, 1948, how ever, th e I n t e r n a t io n a l Committee had m odified i t s aim s, changed i t s name to th e S o c i a l i s t Movement f o r th e U nited S ta te s of Europe (SMUSE), and had jo in e d The European M ovem ent.^ S t i l l a n o th e r o r g a n iz a tio n , La Ligue Europeenne de C ooperation Economique (LECE), was founded e a r l i e r in May, 1946, th rou gh th e i n i t i a t i v e of Paul van Z eelan d , H arold B u tle r , and o th e r s . A lthough i t s prim ary purpose was to b rin g about th e f u l l e s t economic c o o p e ra tio n among th e W estern European c o u n tr ie s , i t su b se q u e n tly jo in e d th e o th e r o rg a n iz a tio n s in th e campaign f o r a u n if ie d European ■^For a more d e t a i l e d a n a ly s is of th e m o tiv a tio n , p o l i t i c a l aim s, and d if f e r e n c e s in approach o f th e S o c ia l i s t Movement f o r th e U nited S ta te s o f Europe and th e E uro pean Union o f F e d e r a l is t s ( L1Union Europeenne des F e d e r a l i s t s ) , see [P ro fe s s o r of Economics] Hans F. Sennholz, 277 economic and p o l i t i c a l system . In o rd e r to ac h ie v e th e s e aims and to win p r iv a t e and p u b lic su p p o rt f o r i t s p ro gram, i t c r e a te d n a tio n a l a f f i l i a t e s in Belgium, B r i t a i n , F ran c e, th e N e th e rla n d s, and Luxembourg. L a te r , i t s e t up n a tio n a l com m ittees to work fo r th e same o b je c tiv e s in A u s tr ia , Germany, and I t a l y and m ain tain ed c o rre sp o n d - 12 e n ts in S w itz e rla n d . M eanwhile, C oudenhove-K alergi had been c a r e f u l l y su rv ey in g th e economic and p o l i t i c a l p ro sp e c ts in W estern Europe s in c e h is r e tu r n from th e U nited S ta te s in Ju n e, 1 3 1946. On th e b a s is of h is d a y -to -d a y c o n ta c ts w ith How Can Europe S u rv iv e (New York: Van N ostrand [c . 1 9 5 5 ]), C hapters I I I and IV. A lso see fo o tn o te 47 below. 12 A d d itio n a l evidence on th e developm ent and work of th e s e nongovernm ental o rg a n iz a tio n s d e d ic a te d to u n itin g Europe d u rin g t h i s p e rio d may be found in O liv ie r P h ilip , Le Problfeme de 1*Union europeenne ([N e u c h fite l]: Bacon- ni& re [ c . 1 9 5 0 ]), pp. 178-95, and in Lucien de S a in te - L o r e tte . L1Idee d*Union f e d e r a le europeenne (P a ris : L ib r a r ie C o lin , 1955), pp. 113-27. 13 For th e a c t i v i t i e s o f C oudenhove-K alergi, w h ile a re fu g e e d u rin g th e war in th e U nited S t a t e s , in keeping a l i v e th e id e a o f a U nited S ta te s o f Europe and th e g e n e r ous r o l e played by New York U n iv e rs ity and members o f i t s f a c u l ty in p ro v id in g him a sem inar and employment w ith which to c a r r y on h is c ru sa d e , see Count [R ichard N.] C oudenhove-K alergi, An Idea Conquers th e World (With a P re fa c e by . . . W inston S. C h u rc h ill; London: H utchinson, 278 in d iv id u a ls and government o f f i c i a l s , he concluded th a t " th e people o f Europe were c l e a r l y ready fo r fe d e ra tio n [b u t th a t] t h e i r Governments, s t i l l ta in te d by pre-w ar u ltr a n a tio n a lis m , took a d i f f e r e n t v i e w ." ^ As Coudenhove K ale rg i a sse sse d t h i s s i t u a t i o n , he decided th a t p re ssu re would have to be brought " to b ea r on Governments and thus induce them to ta k e th e i n i t i a t i v e towards Pan-European f e d e r a tio n ." To succeed in t h i s e f f o r t , however, he envisaged th e need f o r e x te r n a l p re ss u re from th e U nited S ta te s and i n t e r n a l p re ss u re from th e p e o p le s' n a tio n a l P a rlia m e n ts. D e sirin g to implement h is plan as soon as p o s s ib le , Coudenhove-K alergi d ir e c te d h is e n e rg ie s f o r t h w ith to s tre n g th e n in g th e " p u b lic ity campaign [ f o r a U nited Europe] in th e U nited S ta te s and to . . . [1 9 5 3 ]), pp. 237-8, 240-9. Cf. Z u rch er, op. c i t . , pp. 10-4. For Coudenhove-KalergT7^ c o n ta c ts w ith lead in g c i t i z e n s of th e U nited S ta te s and government o f f i c i a l s and h is success in se c u rin g t h e i r su p p o rt fo r r e v iv a l o f th e campaign to u n ite Europe fo llo w in g World War I I (w ith th e ex cep tio n o f P re s id e n t R o o sev elt, who "had f l a t l y tu rn ed down th e p ro p o sals . . . of European Union, . . . " [and reasons why], pp. 249-51), a su ccess which undoubtedly in flu e n c e d th e U nited S ta te s in g ra n tin g M arshall Plan a id as w ell as m ilita r y a s s i s t a n c e , see i b i d . , pp. 249-61, 284-7, 289, 291. C f. Z u rch er, op. c i t . . pp. 14-8. ^ C f . C oudenhove-K alergi's sta te m e n ts above, pp. 258”9. 279 [m o b iliz in g ] a t th e same tim e as much p a rlia m e n ta ry su p p o rt as p o s s ib le w ith in Europe."*-^ "Unanimous supp ort by p a rlia m e n ta ria n s of th e id ea of European f e d e r a tio n ," Coudenhove-K alergi reaso n ed , "would th e r e f o r e compel Governments more e f f e c ti v e l y than any o th e r move to g iv e se rio u s thought to th e U nited S ta te s of E u r o p e ." ^ A fte r C h u r c h ill's momentous speech a Z urich had s e t th e s ta g e fo r th e r e v iv a l and pop ular supp ort of th e id ea to u n ite Europe,*^ Coudenhove-K alergi concen t r a t e d h is a tt e n ti o n on o rg a n iz in g a European P arliam en tary Union to f a c i l i t a t e th e union of Europe. N ext, o v e r whelming fa v o ra b le resp o n se to h is p r iv a te p o ll of over 18 4,200 P arliam en tary r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s , convinced -^C oudenhove-K alergi, op. c i t . , p. 226. ^ Loc. c i t . ^ T h e e f f e c t o f Hr. Sandys' v i s i t w ith Coudenhove- K ale rg i in G staad, S w itz e rla n d , and th e l a t t e r ' s v i s i t in Z urich w ith C h u rc h ill (fiv e days b e fo re h is famous speech) con cerning plans fo r a U nited Europe i n i t i a t i v e , and C oudenhove-K alergi's in flu e n c e on C h u rc h ill, as w e ll as on F ie ld M arshall Smuts (C f. Sm ut's statem en t above in C hapter V II, pp. 262-3, and fo o tn o te 4 4 .) to su p p o rt th e id e a may be found in i b i d . , pp. 267-71. 18 See Coudenhove-K alergi, op. c i t . , pp. 272-5 and Appendix E, fo r a copy o f th e r e s u l t s of t h i s p o ll. 280 C oudenhove-K alergi t h a t "only an i n s i g n i f i c a n t m in o rity [o f th e e l e c to r s o f Europe] was opposed to . . . c r e a tio n o f a U nited S ta te s o f E u ro p e." With renewed in s p i r a t i o n he th en sp en t th e n ex t f i v e months in th e U nited S ta te s to e n l i s t th e s tr o n g e s t p u b lic su p p o rt f o r th e movement to u n it e Europe. A fte r a very s u c c e s s fu l postw ar m issio n 19 to th e U nited S t a t e s , C oudenhove-K alergi re tu rn e d to Europe and made p re p a ra tio n s to hold th e f i r s t C onference o f th e European P a rlia m e n ta ry Union a t G staad , S w itz e rla n d , on J u ly 4 -5 , 1947. T his C onference r e s u lt e d in th e form a t io n of a p r o v is io n a l com m ittee of r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s from 19 To e n l i s t th e m oral and m a te r ia l su p p o rt of th e American Government as w e ll as i t s le a d in g c i t i z e n s by p e rso n a l c o n ta c t. As ev id en ce of t h i s , C oudenhove-K alergi c i t e s John F o s te r D u lle s ' speech on Jan u a ry 19, 1947, con c e rn in g th e i n t e r e s t of th e U nited S ta te s in th e u n i f i c a tio n o f Europe; th e a p p ro v al o f S en ato rs T a ft and Vanden- b e rg , alon g w ith Governor Dewey; S en ato r F u l b r i g h t 's and R e p re s e n ta tiv e Boggs' ta b lin g in id e n tic a l term s in t h e i r r e s p e c tiv e houses o f Congress th e fo llo w in g m otion: '"C o n g re s s approves th e c r e a tio n o f th e U nited S ta te s o f Europe w ith in th e framework o f th e U nited N a t i o n s ." ' This a c tio n , a c co rd in g to C oudenhove-K alergi, led alm ost th e e n t i r e U nited S ta te s Congress to d e c la r e them selves in fa v o r o f a U nited S ta te s o f E urope, "a lead which p u b lic o p in io n follow ed w ith o u t h e s i t a t i o n , " and which prompted Harold Ickes to w r ite in th e New York P ost t h a t , " w ith in h is memory, no id e a had ever been so unanim ously acclaim ed by th e American p u b lic ." Even P re s id e n t Truman and S e c re ta ry of S ta te M arsh all l e t i t be known t h a t th ey su p p o rted S en ato r F u l b r i g h t 's i n i t i a t i v e , se e i b i d . . pp. 276-8. 281 te n n a tio n a l P arliam en ts and th e convening o f th e f i r s t European P arliam en tary Congress in G staad on September 20 8-10, 1947. The Congress reco g n ized t h a t "some m easure of n a tio n a l so v e re ig n ty must be renounced in favour of Euro pean f e d e r a tio n ." A lthough d if f e r e n c e s of o p in io n were ex p re sse d , they were not grounded in n a tio n a l b ia s . The most s i g n i f i c a n t r e s u l t , however, was th e c a l l fo r "a European P arliam en t to be e le c te d by th e P arliam en ts of member s t a t e s and to a c t as th e c h ie f d e l i b e r a ti v e organ of United E urope." R eturning to t h e i r n a tio n a l 20 A few days a f t e r t h i s C onference, r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s of s ix te e n European s t a t e s g a th e re d in P a ris to fo rm u late th e ste p s fo r a European economic u n io n . As Coudenhove- K ale rg i p o in ted out in op. c i t . . pp. 281-2: "The i n i t i a t i v e fo r t h i s had come from . . . S e c re ta ry o f S ta te , Gen e r a l M arsh a ll, who promised generous American a s s is ta n c e fo r European reco v ery p lan s on c o n d itio n t h a t th e r e c ip ie n t c o u n trie s agreed beforehand on a c o n c e rte d programme of a c ti o n ." As a consequence, t h i s P a ris m eeting culm inated in th e Committee fo r European Economic C oop eration . Coudenhove-K alergi g iv es a f u l l e r account o f th e aims and e f f e c t o f t h i s f i r s t C onference and a n t i c i p a t e s t h a t th e e f f o r t s to c o o rd in a te European economic a f f a i r s would s u b s ta n tia te th e n e c e s s ity f o r p o l i t i c a l u n io n . 21 I b id . . pp. 282-3. 282 Parliaments, the Parliamentary Congress delegates had resolutions "tabled ceaselessly so as to compel Governments to act in the spirit of our Gstaad programme," according to Coudenhove-Kalergi. From then on, it appeared that the leadership of the movement for European Union had passed for all practical purposes "into the hands of the parlia mentarians themselves"--into stronger hands than those 22 of a group of p o w erless, p r iv a te in d iv id u a ls . Role of American Assistance In th e meantime, d u rin g th e sp rin g of 1947, th e U nited S ta te s had f i n a l l y come to th e r e a l iz a t i o n th a t th e econom ically p r o s tr a te European dem ocracies re q u ire d more than sto p -g a p m easures of h e lp . U nless co o rd in a te d m u ltin a tio n a l plan n in g and long-term investm ent were p ro vided to r e s t o r e t h e i r economies to v ia b le system s, t h e i r r a p id ly d e t e r io r a tin g n a tio n a l economies seemed on the b rin k of f a l l i n g v ic tim , one by one, to communist C oudenhove-K alergi, op. c i t . . p. 283. For th e e f f o r t s o f Mackay, C h u rc h ill, and Eden to in tro d u c e in to th e House o f Commons f o r d eb a te th e European Union R esolu tio n of th e B r i t is h A ll-P a rty Group o f th e European P a r l i a m entary Union (sig n ed by some 120 MP*s), see House of Com mons Deb. . 5th s e r i e s , 1947-48, 448 (18 March, 1948), 2302- 4-; 449 (8 A p ril 1948), 362-4; and f i n a l l y i t s d e b a te , 450 (5 May 1948), 1270-1392. 283 t a k e - o v e r .23 As ev id e n c e , th e communists a lre a d y h eld th e l a r g e s t p a r ty r e p r e s e n ta tio n in th e n a tio n a l P a r lia m ents o f F rance and I t a l y , and th e s e n o t i n s i g n i f i c a n t 23 A s e r i e s o f European developm ents in flu e n c e d th e U nited S t a t e s ' r e a c tio n in t h i s d ir e c ti o n : (1) Coudenhove- K a le r g i' s postw ar m issio n to th e U nited S ta te s o f America between November, 1946 and A p ril 1947 on b e h a lf o f a U nited S ta te s o f Europe (see above, p. 280 and fo o tn o te 19); (2) B r i t a i n 's n o t i f i c a t i o n on F ebruary 21, 1947, t h a t she would be u n a b le to c o n tin u e h e r economic a s s is ta n c e t o G reece and Turkey in o rd e r to keep them in th e dem o cratic fo ld ; (3) U nited S t a t e s ' assum ption o f economic and m i li t a r y a s s i s t a n c e to G reece and Turkey under th e Truman D o c trin e to p re v e n t t h e i r communist su b v ersio n (an e x c e lle n t h i s t o r i c a l accou nt o f th e arents le a d in g up to th e Truman D o c trin e i s p re se n te d by J o n e s , in op. c i t . , pp. 3-13, 17-23, 129- 47. For th e d r a f t in g o f th e Truman D o c trin e and th e t e x t o f P re s id e n t Trum an's a d d re ss o f March 12, 1947, see i b i d . . pp. 148-70, 269-7 4); and (4) f a i l u r e o f th e Moscow C o n fer ence (March 1 0 -A p ril 24, 1947), which a l e r te d S e c re ta ry o f S ta te George M arsh all to R u s s ia 's i n te n t and t a c t i c s - - to aw a it th e economic c o lla p s e o f th e W estern dem ocracies and th en to d i r e c t t h e i r communization (se e i b i d . . pp. 39- 77, 214 -24). The im pact o f t h i s e v e n tu a lity , to g e th e r w ith th e p ro g re ss in th e movement to u n ite Europe and American p u b lic su p p o rt (th rough C oudenhove-K alergi' s m is sio n ; see ab o v e), led M arsh all to th e e n u n c ia tio n o f a p ro p o sa l f o r European economic re c o v e ry on June 5, 1947. For f u r t h e r ev id en ce o f th e s e developm ents, see Hans A. S c h m itt, The P ath to European Union: From th e M arshall Plan to th e Comnon Market (Baton Rouge: L o u isian a S ta te U n iv e r s ity P ress [ c . 1 9 6 2 ]), pp. 19-20. How th e R ussian b e h a v io r in flu e n c e d th e U nited S ta te s to come to lo n g -term a s s i s t a n c e o f W estern Europe w ith M arshall Plan a id may a ls o be found in A l tie r o S p i n e l l i , "The Growth o f th e E uro pean Movement s in c e World War I I , " in C. Grove Haines ( e d .) , European I n te g r a tio n (B altim o re: John Hopkins P re s s , [ c . 1 9 5 7 ]), pp. 51-3. 284 Western European countries might very well become the f i r s t v ictim s of communism. From the palliative of stop-gap aid, the United S ta te s tu rn ed to a more p o s itiv e program of co o rd in a te d , long-range economic planning in order to rescue Western Europe from i t s dilemma. A fte r weeks of c a r e f u l study and d is c u s s io n , th e United S ta te s government launched i t s policy looking toward European recovery through Secretary 24 of S ta te M arshall. In h is commencement address a t Harvard U n iv e rsity on June 5, 1947, G eneral M arshall extended an in v ita tio n to a l l European n a tio n s which were w illin g to u nd ertake c o o p e rativ e a c tio n , to p a r ti c i p a t e in th e economic r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of Europe. More than an o f f e r of continued h e lp , h is address in essence was an appeal to a l l Europeans to tran scen d t h e i r p e tty n a tio n a l 2^For an e x c e lle n t account of th e e f f o r ts of th e U nited S ta te s Government in p re p a ra tio n fo r launching the European Recovery Program and p u b lic p re ssu re s fo r a c tio n , see Jo n es, op. c i t . . pp. 26-30, 214-38. For th e work of George Kennan, h is P olicy Planning S ta f f , C harles Bohlen, W illiam C layton, and o th e r Department of S ta te s t a f f in h elp in g S e c re ta ry M arshall d r a f t th e ERP, or M arshall P lan, see i b i d . . pp. 239-56. Also see th e New York Times. May 4 , 1947, se c . I l l , p. 1, c o l. 3; May 15, p. 11, c o l. 1; May 25, p. 20, c o l. 1; and June 1, 1947, p. 1, c o l. 2, co n cern ing ERP developm ents. 285 25 p a r tic u la r is m s and to u n ite fo r t h e i r own good. A u n iv e r s ity commencement was an unusual occasion fo r a speech on fo re ig n p o lic y , but th e S e c re ta ry o f S ta te d e c la re d w ith g re a t e a rn e s tn e s s : . . . Our p o lic y is d ir e c te d not a g a in s t any co u n try or d o c trin e but a g a in s t hunger, p o v erty , d e s p e ra tio n , and chaos. I t s purpose should be th e r e v iv a l of a working economy in th e world so as to perm it th e emergence of p o l i t i c a l and s o c ia l c o n d itio n s in which f r e e i n s t i t u t i o n s can e x i s t . Such a s s is ta n c e , I am convinced, must not be on a piecem eal b a s is as v ario u s c r is e s develop. Any a s s is ta n c e th a t t h i s government may re n d er should p ro v id e a cu re r a th e r than a p a l l i a t i v e . Any government th a t i s w illin g to a s s i s t in th e ta s k of reco v ery w i l l fin d f u l l c o o p e ra tio n , I am s u re , on th e p a r t of th e U nited S ta te s government. Any government which maneuvers to block reco v ery of o th e r c o u n trie s cannot expect h e lp from u s. Furtherm ore governm ents, p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , or groups which seek to p e rp e tu a te human m isery in o rd e r to p r o f i t th erefro m p o l i t i c a l l y w ill encounter th e o p p o sitio n of th e U nited S ta te s . . . . I t would be n e ith e r f i t t i n g nor e f f i c a cio u s fo r t h i s government to u n d ertak e to draw up u n i l a t e r a l l y a program designed to p lace Europe on i t s f e e t econom ically. This is th e b u sin ess of Europeans. The i n i t i a t i v e , I th in k , must come from Europe. The r o le o f t h i s co u n try should con s i s t of f r ie n d ly a id in th e d r a f tin g of a European program and o f l a t e r support of such a program so f a r as i t may be p r a c t i c a l fo r us to do so. The program should be a j o i n t one. agreed to by a number, i f not a l l , European n a tio n s . ” 25 Boyd, op. c i t .. p. 46. 26 For th e f u l l te x t o f th e Harvard Commencement Address of S e c re ta ry of S ta te M arsh all, see th e New York 286 The response from th e B r i t is h F oreign S e c re ta ry was im m ediate. L a te r, Bevin and French Foreign M in iste r B id a u lt in v ite d R ussian F oreign M in iste r Molotov to a m eeting in P a ris on June 27 to c o n sid e r th e M arshall o f f e r . The R ussian p re s s , however, had a lre a d y d erid ed th e Mar s h a ll o f f e r as "connected w ith th e 'r e c k le s s aim s' of Mr. C h u r c h ill's U nited Europe Movement," and emphasized " th e t h r e a t to th e independence of any European country which might accep t M arshall a id , and 'im p o rt an economic c r i s i s ' w ith i t . " Follow ing th e P a ris m eeting, Molotov announced th a t R ussia would n ot p a r ti c i p a t e in th e Euro- 27 pean Recovery Program. On Ju ly 12, however, r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s of s ix te e n 28 European n a tio n s g ath ered in P a ris and a f t e r fo u r days Tim es. June 6, 1947, p. 2; fo r th e p re ss cov erage, see p. 1; and fo r th e e d i t o r i a l on "Economic Aid to E urope," see p. 22. ^ B o y d , op. c i t . , pp. 46-7. 28 I n v ita tio n s had been se n t to a l l c o u n trie s ex cep tin g R ussia and Spain. The i n v i ta tio n was d e c lin e d by th e e ig h t c o u n trie s behind th e " iro n C u rta in ," alth o u g h Poland, F in la n d , and C zechoslovakia had in d ic a te d in te n tio n s o f a c c e p tin g (th e l a s t had even announced acceptance only to r e j e c t th e o f f e r a f t e r R ussia had made known h er r e a c tio n to th e program ). (See Boyd, op. c i t . . p. 47, and S ch m itt, op. c i t .. pp. 2 1 -3 .) 287 o f d is c u s s io n s e t up a Committee o f European Economic C ooperation (CEEC). T ech n ical com m ittees were a ls o c re a te d fo r s p e c if ic segments of th e European economy such as food and a g r ic u lt u r e , f u e l and power, iro n and s t e e l , and o th e r s . The CEEC was then given th e ta s k o f p re p arin g a fo u r-y e a r (1948-51) program of a c tio n . I t s fo u r-y e a r- program R epo rt, which in cluded th e W estern occupation zones o f Germany, was signed by th e F oreign M in iste rs o f th e s ix te e n p a r ti c i p a t in g c o u n trie s and on September 22 was se n t to S e c re ta ry of S ta te M a r s h a l l .^ P re sid e n t Truman n ext a u th o riz e d th re e com m ittees to c o n sid e r th e CEEC re p o rt and to p ro je c t how i t might b e s t be im p le m e n te d .^ A fte r prolonged study and d eb ate in and out of C ongress, P re sid e n t Truman signed th e Euro pean C ooperation Act on A p ril 3, 1948. D esp ite th e advan ta g e of a fa v o ra b le p re ss coverage and p u b lic re c e p tio n in W estern Europe, th e Communists and t h e i r fo llo w e rs were quick to spread re p o rts about Europe th a t th e U nited S ta te s 29 For th e p ro je c te d work and p ro duction t a r g e ts of th e CEEC, see Boyd, op. c i t . . pp. 48-52. 30 The development of th e ERP Plan in th e U nited S ta te s d u rin g t h i s p erio d may be found in Boyd, op. c i t . , pp. 47-50. 288 was only prom oting th e European Recovery Program to save h e rs e l£ from economic c o lla p s e . To s tre n g th e n th e Com m unist propaganda l i n e , i t was m aintained th a t th e im p e ria l i s t U nited S ta te s was e x p lo itin g th e European n a tio n s as dumping grounds fo r American o v e r-p ro d u c tio n s u rp lu s e s . D esp ite th e specious n a tu re o f th e s e a c c u s a tio n s , the Communist claim s of U nited S ta te s e x p lo ita tio n of Europe were r e a d ily accep ted and propagated by a vocal m in o rity of anti-A m erican Europeans, b ia se d on account of id eo lo g y , envy, or je a lo u s y o f th e postw ar a fflu e n c e of an "immature and u n c u ltu re d ," y e t pow erful, young n a tio n lik e th e U nited S ta te s . R egardless of th e a b s u rd ity of th e s t a t e ment th a t th e U nited S ta te s sought " to make h e r s e lf m aster of th e [European] C o n tin en t" through promotion of ERP and th a t C h u rc h ill had a re a c tio n a ry scheme to r e s to r e Germany in a re c k le s s fe d e ra tio n plan f o r Europe, th e Communist l in e had i t s in ten d ed e f f e c t . I t c re a te d d i s t r u s t and aroused d is s e n s io n in th e West; i t helped to d is r u p t, i f not b lo c k , th e program to u n ite th e W estern European c o u n t r i e s .31 31 For evidence o f th e French Communist P a r ty 's t a c t i c s in th e French N atio n al Assembly, see Annales de l'A ssem blee n a tio n a le . D eb ats. Vol. 17, VI (2-7 J u i l l e t 289 The American en th u siasm f o r European Union, as w e ll as i t s r a t i o n a l e , on th e o th e r hand, should have unmasked th e communist myth o f American i n t e n t to dom inate 1948), [M essrs. V iard , B onte, Chamburn, and Cot in o p p o si tio n to M arsh all Plan as a scheme to h e lp th e U nited S ta te s g e t r i d o f i t s s u r p lu s e s , m a in ta in i t s booming p ro d u c tio n , advance i t s i m p e r i a l is t d e s ig n s , " s a t e l l i z e " and " v a s s a l- iz e " F ra n c e , e t c e t e r a ] , pp. 3583-8 f f . , 4308-13, 4313-5, 4360-70; V ol. 21 (16 Novembre - 22 Ddcembre 1948), [M essrs. R o llin , G raves, L egendre, Moch, L ecoeur, M u tter, D uclos, e t a l . . co n cern in g T h o re z' sta te m e n t on r o l e o f F rench Communists in c a s e o f war w ith R u ssia , communist t a c t i c s of sab o tag e and s t r i k e s , e t c . , to d e f e a t M arshall P lan , and r e s t o r a t i o n o f th e N a z is ], pp. 6991-5, 6995-6, 6996-7007, 7094-7, 7097-101, 7124-35, 7138-40, 7156 f f . , 7198-9, 7226-7; House o f Commons Deb. . 5 th s e r i e s , 446 (19 47-48), [F o re ig n M in is te r B e v in 's r e v e la tio n o f R ussian Communist t a c t i c s a g a in s t th e M arsh all Plan and W estern U n io n ], 392-4 ( f o r f u r t h e r B r i t i s h ev id en c e, see fo o tn o te 16, p. 239 above); 457 (1947-48) [ S i r S ta ffo r d C ripps' c i t a tio n of s p e c i f ic examples o f R ussian Communist t a c t i c s a g a in s t European R ecovery, th e M arsh all P la n , and Economic C o o p eratio n in o rd e r to d i s i n t e g r a t e W estern E u ro p e ], 525- 7. A lso see K e e sin g 's Contemporary A rc h iv e s : Weekly D iary o f World E vents ( B r i s t o l , E n g lan d ), V II (1948-1950), 9361, 9387; h e r e i n a f t e r c i t e d as K ee sin g ' s . For an o b je c t i v e a n a ly s is o f R u s s ia 's a t t i t u d e s and re a c tio n to th e European Recovery Program, U nited S t a t e s ' a s s is t a n c e , and th e u n i f i c a t i o n o f Europe, see Max B e lo ff, "The R ussian View o f European I n t e g r a t i o n ," in European Y earbook. I I (1956), pp. 241-55. For th e R ussian p o in t o f view on U nited S ta te s a s s is t a n c e to th e European n a tio n s by means o f th e M arsh all P lan , see in New Times [Moscow], th e f o l lowing a r t i c l e s (in c h ro n o lo g ic a l o r d e r ) : A. Leontyev, "Economic F oundations o f American Expansion (C o n c lu sio n )," No. 30 (J u ly 23, 1947), 3 -9 ; E. V arga, "The M arsh all Plan and th e A pproaching Economic C r i s i s in A m erica," No. 39 (Septem ber 24, 1947), 5 -7 ; "The M arsh all Plan and th e B r i t i s h Economic C r i s i s , " No. 42 (O ctober 15, 1947), 3-7 ; 290 Europe, fo r as was pointed out: "A u n ited Western Europe, w ith a p o p u latio n g re a te r than th a t of th e USA, is f a r le s s lik e ly to become a v a ssa l of America than a re s i x te e n , flo u n d erin g n a t i o n s . " ^ For f u r th e r evidence of American o b je c tiv e s toward Europe, one had only to read th e Preamble of th e European C ooperation A ct, s p e llin g out c le a r ly th e connection between European u n ity and United S ta te s a id , or th e Senate debates which s tre s s e d th a t th e United S ta te s would a s s i s t a United Europe, but not a divided one.^^ Moreover, the weight of h i s t o r i c a l evidence in th e in te rv e n in g years has re fu te d th e communist claim s and s u b s ta n tia te d th e d eclared purpose and the i n t e g r ity of American in te n tio n s on b eh a lf of Europe from th e very f i r s t . "American Plan of the E nthrallm ent of E urope," No. 48 (November 26, 1947), 4 -8 ; A. Leontyev, "The M arshall Plan in the Light of R e a l i t ie s ," No. 26 (June 23, 1948), 3-9; No. 27 (June 30, 1948), 9-14; No. 29 (July 14, 1948), 3-10; No. 30 (Ju ly 21, 1948), 5-12; R. Lapov, "The M arshall Plan in P r a c tic e ," No. 36 (September 1, 1948), 17-20; A. Kash- karov, "The M arshall Plan Unadorned," No. 41 (October 6, 1948), 3-9. "The M arshall Plan--Som ething New or Something Old?" S oviet R ussia Today. XVI (August, 1947), 4 -6 , 19. ■^Boyd, op. c i t . . p. 51. 33 See Coudenhove-Kalergi, op. c i t . . p. 285. Also see S chm itt, op. c i t . . pp. 20-5, 30. 291 The unprecedented I n te r n a tio n a l a s s is ta n c e of th e U nited S ta te s to th e n a tio n s of E u ro p e ^ provided a dram atic impetus to th e movement f o r European u n ity , n o tw ith sta n d in g communist t a c t i c s . Not only was th e p u b lic i n t e r e s t w idely awakened, th e n a tio n a l governments of Europe were a ls o induced to ta k e a more fa v o ra b le p o s itio n on th e p o s s i b i l i t i e s of u n itin g Europe. As th e h is to r y o f The European Movement has a lre a d y recorded: ". . . th e American p o lic y of economic a id , coupled w ith th e p re ssu re of th e Communist dan ger, c re a te d c o n d itio n s in which, f o r th e f i r s t tim e, th e u n if ic a tio n of Europe O C became a p r a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y And to o th e r n a tio n s throughout th e world in th e ensuing y e a rs . Yet com nunists, t h e i r fo llo w e rs , and o th e r a n ti-A m e ric a n s, have in s is te d th a t th e U nited S ta te s has done so only to f u r th e r i t s im p e r i a l i s t ic am bitions o f dom ination; w hereas, c e r ta in cy n ics m ain tain i t has done thus only from s e l f - i n t e r e s t - - t o c r e a te bulwarks a g a in s t communist grow th, in flu e n c e , and expansion, and to keep communism a t a d is ta n c e from i t s own homeland-** and not from a l t r u i s t i c or noble pu rposes. 35 The European Movement, European Movement and th e C ouncil of Europe (London: Hutchinson [1 9 4 9 ]), p. 35. 292 Impact o f th e C ongress o f Europe and th e European Movement In view o f th e most p rom ising p ro s p e c ts f o r a U nited Europe in th e long h i s t o r y o f th e id e a , and in o rd e r t o p re v e n t d u p lic a tio n and d i f f u s i o n o f th e e n e rg ie s o f th e v a rio u s nongovernm ental o r g a n iz a tio n s s t r i v i n g to u n i t e E urope, th e B r i t i s h and F rench o r g a n iz a tio n s of UEM alo n g w ith th o s e o f EUF and L E C 1& a g reed to c o o r d in a te t h e i r work th ro u g h o u t W estern Europe by e s t a b l i s h i n g th e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Committee o f th e Movements f o r European U n ity (ICMEU).36 With the growing public interest in a European Union as a result of the implementation of the Marshall Plan, the leaders of the ICMEU felt that the time was ripe to sponsor a peoples' Congress of Europe at the Hague. R ath er th a n w a it u n t i l th e n a t i o n a l governm ents of Europe A / Boyd, op. c i t . , p. 77. The N^I a ls o ag reed to be r e p r e s e n te d on th e ICMEU, as d id th e SMUSE about a y e a r l a t e r . These s i x o r g a n iz a tio n s w ere founding members o f th e su b seq u en t [ I n t e r n a t io n a l] European Movement Organ i z a t i o n (The European Movement, op. c i t . . p. 3 4 ). The Euro pean P a rlia m e n ta ry Union a l s o c o o p e ra te d w ith th e ICMEU in p r e p a r a tio n f o r th e C ongress o f Europe and many o f i t s members a tte n d e d . 293 decid ed to a c t , i t was c o n sid e re d b e t t e r s t r a t e g y to r a l l y th e p eoples o f Europe in su p p o rt o f th e u n i f i c a t i o n move ment and th u s to dev elo p a s tro n g p o p u lar w i l l t h a t would induce in d iv id u a l governm ents to ta k e more im m ediate a c tio n . W ith t h i s in m ind, th e program o f th e Congress o f Europe was b u i l t around th e s e o b je c tiv e s : To inform and le a d p u b lic o p in io n ; to stu d y th e p o l i t i c a l , economic and te c h n ic a l problem s o f European Union and to su g g e st how th ey could be so lv e d ; t o promote a se n se o f European con s c io u s n e ss and a comnon lo y a lty to Europe; by every a v a il a b le m eans, to m o b ilis e p u b lic o p in io n behind th e p o lic y o f European u n ity and to p ro v id e a medium through which s u p p o rte rs o f t h i s cau se co u ld make t h e i r in flu e n c e f e l t . . . .37 M eeting from May 8 -1 0 , 1948, th e Congress proved a trem endous s u c c e s s —"beyond a l l e x p e c ta tio n s . . . th e most rem arkable and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e g a th e rin g o f prom inent i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e r s o n a l i t i e s t h a t has ev e r assem bled to d is c u s s th e f a t e o f E urope." In f a c t , some 800 persons 3ft a tte n d e d from s ix te e n c o u n tr ie s and in c lu d e d : 3?The European Movement, o p. c i t . . pp. 35-6. P e r haps th e b e s t re c o rd o f th e campaign f o r European U nity and th e r a t i o n a l e le a d in g to th e Hague Congress o f Europe in May, 1948, i s th e o f f i c i a l re c o rd o f The European Movement, Europe U n ites (London: H o llis and C a rte r [1 9 4 9 ]), pp. 2- 12; h e r e i n a f t e r c i t e d a s Europe U n ite s . 38 I b i d . . p. 36. These c o u n tr ie s w ere A u s tr ia , B elgium , B r i t a i n , Denmark, E ir e , F ra n c e , Germany, G reece, I t a l y , L ic h te n s te in , Luxembourg, N e th e rla n d s, Norway, 294 . . . w ell-know n s ta te s m e n , among them s e v e r a l form er prim e m in is te r s and f o re ig n m i n is t e r s and a number o f m in is te r s in o f f i c e ; Members of P a rlia m e n t o f a l l shades o f d em o cratic o p in io n ; b ish o p s and prom inent churchmen o f a l l denom ina t i o n s ; le a d in g i n d u s t r i a l i s t s and t r a d e u n i o n i s t s ; em inent la w y e rs, e c o n o m ists, u n i v e r s i t y p r o f e s s o r s , s c i e n t i s t s , a r t i s t s , p o e ts and a u th o r s ; and members o f a w ide v a r i e t y o f w om en's, y o u th and o th e r o r g a n iz a tio n s . W h ilst a l l were i n v i te d in t h e i r in d iv id u a l c a p a c ity th e y c o u ld , as a w hole, c la im to r e p r e s e n t w ith a u t h o r i t y ev e ry im p o rta n t a s p e c t in th e l i f e and o p in io n s o f E urope. The seven p o l i t i c a l r e s o l u t i o n s ad o p ted unanim ously by th e C ongress o f Europe a r e h i s t o r i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t and w orthy o f su m m arization: 1. No a tte m p t to r e c o n s tr u c t Europe upon th e b a s i s o f r i g i d l y d iv id e d n a t i o n a l s o v e re ig n ty can prove s u c c e s s f u l. 2. The n a tio n s o f Europe m ust c r e a t e an economic and p o l i t i c a l union in o rd e r to a s s u r e s e c u r i t y , economic independence and s o c i a l p r o g re s s ; and f o r t h i s purpose th e y must a g re e t o merge c e r t a i n o f t h e i r so v e re ig n r i g h t s . S a a r, Sweden, and S w itz e rla n d . O bservers (some were re fu g e e s ) from B u lg a ria , Canada, C z e c h o slo v a k ia , F in la n d , Hungary, P oland, Romania, S p ain , U nited S t a t e s , and Yugo s l a v i a a ls o a tte n d e d , a c c o rd in g t o Boyd, op. c i t . . p. 78. Boyd a ls o c l a s s i f i e d th e B r i t i s h d e le g a tio n , w hich in c lu d e d 24 C o n s e rv a tiv e s , 23 L a b o r ite s , and 4 L ib e r a ls among o t h e r s , on p. 77. ^ T h e European Movement, lo c . c i t . A lso s e e i b i d . , pp. 13-21, f o r a l i s t o f perhaps th e most o u ts ta n d in g l e a d e r s and p e r s o n a l i t i e s in W estern Europe a t t h a t tim e ; and Europe U n ite s . pp. 14-22, f o r th e s ta te m e n ts o f some a t th e opening s e s s io n . 295 3. A European C o n s u lta tiv e Assem bly, whose members sh ould be nom inated by th e P a rlia m e n ts o f th e p a r t i c i p a t i n g n a t i o n s , must be convened f o r t h w ith . 4 . The European Union o r F e d e ra tio n should be open to a l l d em o cratic European n a tio n s which u n d e rta k e to r e s p e c t fundam ental human r i g h t s . 5. A European C ourt o f Human R ig h ts backed w ith a d e q u ate s a n c tio n should be e s t a b l is h e d to a d ju d ic a te in c a se s o f a lle g e d v i o l a t i o n o f th e s e r i g h t s . 6 . The s p e c ia l t i e s which a t p re s e n t lin k th e c o u n tr ie s o f Europe w ith o th e r s t a t e s and dependent t e r r i t o r i e s o v e rse a s must be p r e s e r v e d . 7. The c r e a t i o n o f a U nited Europe must be re g a rd e d as an e s s e n t i a l s te p tow ards th e c r e a tio n o f a U nited W o r ld .^ At i t s c lo s in g s e s s io n th e C ongress adopted by a c c la m a tio n a "Message t o E u ro p ean s." which appeared in th e p re s s th ro u g h o u t W estern E urope. The fo llo w in g s t a t e m ents from t h i s m essage r e f l e c t th e s p i r i t and a s p i r a ti o n s o f th e Hague C ongress o f Europe: Europe i s th r e a te n e d , Europe i s d iv id e d , and th e g r e a t e s t danger comes from h e r d i v i s i o n s . . . . W ithout a f r e e l y ag reed u n io n , our p r e s e n t an arch y w i l l expose us tomorrow to f o r c i b l e u n i f i c a t i o n , w heth er by th e in t e r v e n t i o n o f a f o re ig n em pire o r u s u rp a tio n by a p o l i t i c a l p a r ty . The European Movement, op. c i t . . pp. 4 7 -8 . C f. Europe U n ite s , pp. 23-39, f o r th e b a s is o f th e s e r e s o l u t io n s . 296 . . . we E uropeans, assem bled to e x p re ss th e w i l l o f a l l th e p eo p les o f E urope, solem nly d e c la r e our common aims in th e fo llo w in g f i v e a r t i c l e s , w hich sum m arise th e R e s o lu tio n s adopted by th e C o n g re ss: We d e s i r e a u n ite d E urope, th ro u g h o u t whose a r e a th e f r e e movement o f p e rs o n s , id e a s and goods i s r e s t o r e d ; We d e s i r e a C h a rte r o f Human R ig h ts g u a ra n te e in g l i b e r t y o f th o u g h t, assem bly and e x p re s s io n as w e ll as th e r i g h t to form a p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t io n ; We d e s i r e a C ourt o f J u s t i c e w ith ad e q u a te s a n c tio n s f o r th e im p lem en tatio n o f t h i s C h a rte r; We d e s i r e a European Assembly w here th e l i v e fo rc e s o f a l l our n a tio n s s h a l l be r e p r e s e n te d ; And p led g e o u rs e lv e s in ou r home and in p u b lic , in our p o l i t i c a l and r e l i g i o u s l i f e , in our p ro f e s s i o n a l and tr a d e union c i r c l e s , to g iv e our f u l l e s t su p p o rt to a l l p erso n s and governm ents w orking f o r t h i s l o f t y c a u s e , which o f f e r s th e l a s t chance o f peace and th e one prom ise of a g r e a t f u tu r e f o r t h i s g e n e ra tio n and th o s e t h a t w i l l succeed i t . F ollow ing th e Hague C o n g ress, i t s le a d e r s co n cen t r a t e d on th e e s ta b lis h m e n t o f a European P a rlia m e n ta ry Assem bly. Encouraged by B elg ian Prime M in is te r Spaaks a p p ro v a l o f t h i s id e a and o f f e r " to approach o th e r G overn m ents w ith a view to s e c u rin g t h e i r a g re e m e n t," th ey The European Movement, op. c i t . . pp. 37 -8; Europe U n ite s , pp. 9 4 -5 . Many e x c e lle n t p h otographs o f th e le a d in g p a r t i c i p a n t s and o f th e p ro c eed in g s o f th e C ongress may be found in th e f r o n t i s p i e c e e t passim in each o f th e s e b o o k s. 297 ad d re sse d to th e f iv e governm ents o f th e B ru sse ls T re aty P act on August 18 a Memorandum su g g e stin g an in te rg o v e r n m ental c o n fe re n c e to c o n s id e r c r e a tio n o f a European Assembly. F i r s t th e French and th en th e B elgian Government responded fa v o ra b ly , follow ed by th e N eth erlan d s and Luxembourg G o v e r n m e n t s . ^ Only th e B r i t is h Government re a c te d n e g a tiv e ly , f o r in Prime M in is te r A t t l e e 's l e t t e r to C h u r c h ill, a key le a d e r in th e C ongress' movement, he a d v is e d : I f an Assembly is to be convened t h i s must in view of th e v i t a l im portance of th e m a tte r, be done by governm ents. On th e o th e r hand 1 th in k t h a t t h i s i s not th e r i g h t tim e f o r g o vern ments to ta k e t h i s m ajor i n i t i a t i v e , when t h e i r hands a r e so f u l l a lre a d y w ith u rg e n t and d i f f i c u l t problem s. . . .^3 M oreover, speaking in c r i t i c i s m of th e su g g e stio n fo r a c o n s t i t u t i o n f o r European Union by th e In te rla k e n C onference o f th e European P a rlia m e n ta ry Union, September 4 -8 , 1 9 4 8 ,^ F o reig n M in is te r Bevin echoed a s im ila r 4 0 ^The European Movement, op. c i t . . pp. 51-2. ^ T h i s l e t t e r , p u b lish ed in A ugust, 1948, was quoted [no c i t a t i o n given] in i b i d . . p. 53. ^ A tte n d e d by hundreds o f European p a r lia m e n ta r i a n s , th e m ajor i n t e r e s t and d is c u s s io n s focused on th e q u e s tio n : "Should Europe be o rg an ized as a Union of so v e re ig n s t a t e s - - o r on th e f e d e r a l p r in c ip le ? " More than 298 r e a c t i o n : . . . When we have s e t t l e d th e m a tte r of d efen ce, economic c o -o p e ra tio n and th e n ec essary p o l i t i c a l developm ents which must fo llo w , i t may be p o s s ib le , and I th in k i t w i l l b e, to e s t a b l is h among us some kind of assem bly to d e a l w ith p ra c t i c a l th in g s we have accom plished as Governments, but I do not th in k i t w il l work i f we t r y to put th e ro o f on b e fo re we have b u i l t th e b u ild in g . 5 D esp ite th e f a l s e lo g ic o f B ev in 's in fe re n c e and th e n e g a tiv e r e a c tio n of th e B r i t is h Labor Government, th e im pact o f th e Congress of Europe on th e s p i r i t of European s o l i d a r i t y and th e primacy of th e cause fo r u n itin g led to c r e a tio n of a permanent in te r n a tio n a l o rg a n iz a tio n under th e very name of The European Movement. E s ta b lish e d on O ctober 25, 1948, w ith h e a d q u a rte rs in B ru s se ls , i t served as th e in te r n a tio n a l organ to m o b iliz e European p u b lic opinion and to d i r e c t th e work of i t s N atio n al C o u n cils. 500 members of European p arliam en ts favored a fe d e ra l u n io n , la r g e ly th e work of th e B r i t is h f e d e r a l i s t , R. W . G. MacKay [a Labor P arty MP], w ith a F ed eral E x ecu tiv e, P a rlia m e n t, and Supreme C ourt, "fo llo w in g th e main o u tlin e s o f th e F ed eral C o n s titu tio n of S w itz e rla n d ." Known as th e In te rla k e n P lan, i t was adopted unanim ously, w ith only one a b s te n tio n (see C oudenhove-K alergi, op. c i t . . pp. 290- 1, and Z u rch er, op. c i t . . pp. 25-6, fo r f u r th e r d e t a i l s of th e In te rla k e n C o n feren ce). ^ House of Commons Deb. , 5th s e r i e s , 456 (1947 4 8 ), p. 106. 299 These had been s e t up a f t e r th e Congress o f Europe by th e le a d e rs o f th e p a r t i c i p a t i n g o rg a n iz a tio n s in each country to c o o rd in a te th e e f f o r t s of a l l groups su p p o rtin g th e movement to u n ite E u r o p e .^ The momentum o f th e work of The European Movement- - composed o f in d iv id u a ls and groups re p re s e n tin g every p o l i t i c a l p a rty in Europe except th e C onm unist--and th e in c re a s in g p o p u la rity of th e id ea of u n itin g Europe fo rced th e B r i t i s h Labor Government to modify i t s t a c t i c s . ^ The European Movement, op. c i t .» p. 39. M essrs. Blum, C h u rc h ill, de G asp e ri, Spaak, and l a t e r Coudenhove- K a le rg i became P re sid e n ts of Honor of The European Movement. 47 The o f f i c i a l Labor P arty p o lic y toward a U nited Europe follow ed more or le s s t h a t o f th e I n te r n a tio n a l Com m itte e fo r a S o c ia l i s t U nited S ta te s o f Europe, formed a t London in F eb ru ary , 1947, and re -a ffirm e d a t i t s Montrouge Congress in Ju n e, 1947. I t opposed th e movement to u n ite Europe by o th e r groups as " c a p i t a l i s t i c , " " r e a c tio n a r y ," " m i l i t a r i s t i c , " and "to o subm issive to American in flu e n c e " and th e r e f o r e d e d ic a te d i t s e f f o r t s to c r e a tin g a S o c ia li s t U nited S ta te s of Europe. In f a c t , i t r e je c te d th e i n v i t a tio n to a tte n d th e Congress of Europe because C h u rc h ill, th e " r e a c t i o n i s t and la b o r b a i t e r " was to p lay th e lead in g r o l e . A c o n f l i c t over p o lic y , however, had a lre a d y d e v e l oped between th e m i l i t a n t and th e more m oderate s o c i a l i s t s , many o f whom (such as Blum, H e r rio t, M o llet, P h ilip , Spaak, and o th e rs ) occupied re s p o n s ib le p o s itio n s in n a tio n a l governm ents and v o lu n ta r ily p a r tic ip a te d in th e Congress o f Europe and The European Movement. By th e summer of 1948, however, S o c i a l i s t p a rty le a d e rs came to r e a l i z e th a t W estern Europe was in grave danger of communist 300 T h e r e f o r e , a t th e F o re ig n M i n i s t e r s ' m eetin g o f th e B ru s s e l s T re a ty Powers on O ctober 2 5 -2 6 , 1948, B r i t a i n su g g e s te d a European Com m ittee o f M in is te r s a s a c o u n te r p ro p o s a l t o The European M ovem ent's European A ssem bly. The r e s u l t o f t h i s m e e tin g was th e fo rm a tio n o f a F iv e - Power Study Com mission, p r e s id e d o v er by M. H e r r i o t , to c o n s id e r th e p ro p e r a c ti o n on t h e two p r o p o s a l s .^8 en cro ach m en t—e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r t h e C zec h o slo v a k ia n c o u p -- and t h a t p u b lic o p in io n overw helm ingly fa v o re d a U n ited E urope. C o n se q u e n tly , in November, 1948, t h e i r new p o s i t i o n was p u b l i c ly announced and t h e i r I n t e r n a t i o n a l Com m i tte e f o r a S o c i a l i s t U n ited S t a te s o f Europe was renamed th e S o c i a l i s t Movement f o r th e U n ite d S ta t e s o f E urope. T h e r e a f t e r , th e y jo in e d in th e movement t o u n i t e Europe f i r s t and t o make i t s o c i a l i s t i c l a t e r . F or f u r t h e r e v id e n c e o f t h i s p o lic y o f th e ICSUSE and SMUSE and i t s su b se q u e n t ch an g e, s e e Boyd, op. c i t . . pp. 7 8-82; P h i l i p , op. c i t . . pp. 189-93; S en n h o lz, op. c i t . . pp. 8 5 -9 ; Z u rc h e r, o p . c i t . . pp. 3 5 -6 ; and House o f Commons Deb. . 5 th s e r i e s , 1947-48, v o l. 446 (2 2 , 23 J a n u a ry 1 9 4 8 ), 4 1 0 -2 , 4 1 4 -7 , 4 2 4 -5 , 493, 4 9 9 -5 0 1 , 5 2 2 -3 , 5 25-6 , 555; v o l. 450 (5 May 1 9 4 8 ), 1274-5, 1295-9, 1319, 1342, 1354-9, 1366-7, 1381; 1948, v o l. 456 (1 5 -1 7 , 22 Septem ber 1 9 4 8 ), 1 0 4 -6 , 1 5 5 -6 , 232, 2 8 4 -9 , 4 3 5 -9 , 4 4 5 -9 , 9 2 1 -3 , 9 2 9 -3 0 , 1014-5; 1948-49, v o l. 458 (18 November 1 9 4 8 ), 565-9; 1948-49, v o l. 459 (10 December 1948), 7 2 3 -3 4 , 7 7 7 -9 , 7 8 1 -2 , 784-5; 1950, v o l. 473 (28 March 1 9 5 9 ), 2 8 2 -3 . 48 °The European Movement, o p. c i t . . pp. 5 3 -4 . For e v id e n c e o f th e B r i t i s h F o re ig n O f f i c e 's d ip lo m a tic t e c h n iq u e t o p re v e n t o r r e n d e r h a rm le ss th e e s ta b lis h m e n t o f some new agency o r i n s t i t u t i o n t h a t m ight p re c lu d e B r i t a i n 's t r a d i t i o n a l C o n tin e n ta l r o l e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l M p la y -m a k e rM — in o th e r w ords, h e r t a c t i c s o f com prom ise v ia c o u n t e r p r o p o s a ls , "ad hoc com m ittees t o s tu d y th e m a tte r f u r t h e r , " 301 A fte r s u b m ittin g to th e Five-P ow er Study Commission on November 23 a f u r t h e r Memorandum on th e c a se f o r a p p e a ls to b ein g e m p ir ic a l, p r a c t i c a l , and r e a l i s t i c [n o t to m ention th e fre q u e n t em phasis o f h e r a b id in g f a i t h in " th e a r t o f m uddling th ro u g h " to s u c c e s s ] , e .g . h e r p ro p o s a ls o f a Committee o f M in is te rs [ t o o f f s e t a P a rlia m e n t a r y Assembly in th e C ouncil o f Europe] and a Study Com m issio n to examine th e s u b j e c t , see House o f Commons Deb. . 5 th s e r i e s , 1947-48, v o l. 450 (5 May 1948), 1306, 1318; v o l. 456 (15, 16 Septem ber 1948), 104-6, 284-5; v o l. 459 (9 December 1948), 585; 1948-49, v o l. 469 (17 November 1949), 2222-5; se e The (London) T im es. December 9, 1948, p. 5, c o l . 2, re g a rd in g th e a r t i c l e on "F o reig n P o lic y " and th e s ta te m e n t t h a t i f th e B e lg ia n s and th e F rench a re so d eterm in ed to e s t a b l i s h a European Assembly " th e b e s t c o u rse may be f o r th e [ B r i t i s h ] Government to endeavor to see t h a t a t l e a s t th e assem bly be formed on th e most u s e f u l and l e a s t harm ful l i n e s " ; a l s o se e C o u d en h o v e-K alerg i, op. c i t . . pp. 292-3; A lb e rt G udrard , Europe F ree and U n ited (S ta n fo rd U n iv e r s ity , C a li f o r n i a : S ta n fo rd U n iv e r s ity P ress [ c . 1 9 4 5 ]), pp. 122-34; Hans Joachim H e is e r, B r i t i s h P o lic y w ith Regard to th e U n if ic a tio n E f f o r ts on th e E u ro pean C o n tin e n t (Leyden: S y th o ff, 1959), pp. 35-8; Kenneth L in d say , Towards a European P a rlia m e n t (S tra s b o u rg : [C o u n cil o f Europe S e c r e t a r i a t ] , 1958), pp. i x - x i i i , 3 5 -7 , 107-25; Ronald W. G. Mackay, Towards a U nited S ta te s o f Europe: An A n a ly sis o f B r i t a i n s R ole in European Union (London: H utchinson [ c . 1 9 6 1 ]), pp. 107-10. [In f a c t , Labor M P Mackay w ro te : " I t i s d i f f i c u l t to a c q u it th e B r i t i s h Government of th e ch a rg es o f h y p o c ris y and p e r f id y t h a t have been l a i d a g a in s t them (th e Government) in re g a rd to t h e i r p o lic y in Europe o v er th e p o st-w a r y e a r s ; . . ." i b i d . , pp. 1 0 9 -1 0 .]; and Z u rc h e r, op. c i t . . pp. 28- 32, 4 0 -3 . On th e o th e r hand, cf_. S p i n e l l i s d is c u s s io n o f C h u r c h i l l 's m otives f o r hav ing B r i t a i n ta k e over th e " g u a rd ia n s h ip " o f th e movement to u n i t e Europe "so as to make s u re t h a t a r e a l union n ev e r would be a c h ie v e d . . . . [In e f f e c t , ] th e most prom inent European s ta te s m a n , C hurch i l l , and th e most pow erful European S t a t e , E ngland, were sa b o ta g in g th e p ro c e ss o f u n i f i c a t i o n . . . " i n H aines ( e d .) , op. c i t . . pp. 53-4. 302 AQ e s ta b lis h m e n t o f a European A ssem bly, 7 The European Move ment was i n v i t e d to p re s e n t i t s view s on th e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f th e proposed European Assembly b e f o re th e Commission on December 9, 1948. The su b s ta n c e o f The European Move m e n t's recom m endations on t h i s d a te was th e e s ta b lis h m e n t o f a European Assembly and th e B r itis h - p r o p o s e d Committee o f M in is te r s . M eeting n e x t in London on Ja n u a ry 27-28, 1949, t o c o n s id e r th e Study C om m ission's r e p o r t , th e f i v e F o reig n M in is te rs is s u e d a communique a g re e in g t h a t " th e r e sh o u ld be e s ta b li s h e d a C o u n cil o f E urope, c o n s i s t i n g o f a m i n i s t e r i a l com m ittee m eetin g in p r i v a t e and a c o n s u l t a t i v e body m eetin g in p u b lic . 49 One o f th e key q u e s tio n s o f t h i s Memorandum was "w hether th e achievem ent o f t h i s aim [European u n ity ] sh o u ld be l e f t e n t i r e l y t o g o v ernm ental a c t i o n , o r w heth er th e p e o p le s s h o u ld , th ro u g h some form o f d em o cratic assem b l y , be a s s o c ia te d w ith t h i s w o rk ." F or th e o th e r s u g g e s tio n s o f th e s ix -p a r a g ra p h Memorandum, see The European Movement, op. c l t . t pp. 5 4 -5 . T h is q u e s tio n o f p e o p le 's p a r t i c i p a t i o n h as c o n tin u e d i n t o th e n e x t decade w ith v a rio u s c o n t i n e n t a l groups u rg in g a European P a rlia m e n t, e le c te d d i r e c t l y by and r e s p o n s ib le to th e p e o p le s o f Europe to su p e rse d e th e p r e s e n t C o n s u lta tiv e Assembly and th e EEC Common A ssem bly, b o th o f w hich c o n tin u e to be s e l e c te d by and an sw e rab le on ly to th e p a r t i c i p a t i n g g o v ern m e n ts. ^ T h e E uropean M ovem ent, o p . c i t .. p p . 5 5 - 6 . 303 At th e C onference o f Ambassadors o f th e B ru s s e ls Powers and f i v e o th e r c o u n t r i e s ^ a t London in A p r i l, 1949, The European Movement was ag a in i n v i te d to p re s e n t i t s views on th e fu n c tio n s and o r g a n iz a tio n o f th e new European in s tit u t io n .- * ^ F i n a l l y , on May 5, 1949, th e F o reig n M in is te rs o f th e te n p a r t i c i p a t i n g governm ents a g a in m eet ing in London concluded a form al A greem ent, e n t i t l e d "The S t a t u t e o f th e C o u n cil o f E u ro p e ." In a communiqud t h a t same day th e F o reig n M in is te r announ ced: The main f e a t u r e o f th e S t a t u t e is th e e s t a b lish m e n t o f a Committee o f M in is te rs and o f a C o n s u lta tiv e A ssem bly, which to g e th e r w i l l form th e C o u n cil o f E urope. Of th e s e two b o d ie s , th e Committee o f M in is te rs w i l l p ro v id e f o r th e developm ent o f c o - o p e ra tio n betw een governm ents, w h ile th e C o n s u lta tiv e Assembly w i l l p ro v id e a means th ro u g h w hich th e a s p i r a t i o n s o f th e E uro pean p e o p le s may be fo rm u la te d and e x p re s s e d , th e governm ents th u s b ein g k e p t c o n tin u a lly in to u ch w ith European p u b lic o p i n i o n . 5 3 -^Denmark, E i r e , I t a l y , Norway, and Sweden, whose governm ents had e x p re sse d a d e s i r e to p a r t i c i p a t e . 52por a d i g e s t o f The European Movement's Memoranda su b m itte d to th e B ru s s e ls T re a ty Powers on November 23, and December 9, 1948, and A p r il 6 , 1949, s e e The European Movement, op. c i t . . pp. 57-61. 53I b i d . . p p # 6 1 -2 . For th e European Movement's o b s e rv a tio n s and comments on th e S t a t u t e , s e e pp. 62-3 and pp. 169-83 f o r th e f u l l t e x t o f th e S t a t u te o f E urope. A lso see C o u n cil o f E urope, The S t a t u t e o f th e C ouncil o f E urope. London. 5 th May 1949. European T re a ty S e r ie s , No. 1 ( P a r is : 1949), pp. 1-15. 304 In th e in te r im , The European Movement had h e ld a European Economic C onference a t W estm in ster, England, d u rin g A p ril 20-25, to work out recom nendations fo r im plem enting th e economic union o f Europe as urged by Economic Study groups in th e p a r t i c i p a t i n g c o u n tr ie s . The r e s o lu tio n s f i n a l l y adopted by th e W estm inster Economic C onference took in to c a r e f u l c o n s id e r a tio n th e lo g ic of European economic union and s e t f o r t h recom mendations f o r i t s f u l f i l l m e n t in th e s e a r e a s : (1) Removal o f Economic B a r r ie r s , (2) Purpose and Scope o f Union, (3) The Steps Towards Union, (4) P eriod o f T r a n s itio n , (5) M o b ility o f Labour, (6) P ro ced u re, (7) F ree C o n v e r t i b ilit y o f European C u rre n c ie s , (8) B asic I n d u s t r i e s , (9) A g r ic u ltu r e , (10) T o u ris t T r a f f i c , (11) D isp laced P erso n s, (12) Com p a r a tiv e Study o f P r o d u c tiv ity , L iving S tan d ard s and Real Wages, (13) European Economic Union and A sso c ia te d O ver seas C o u n trie s , (14) P r e f e r e n t i a l System s, and (15) Euro pean Economic and S o c ia l C o u n cil. A ssessin g th e work o f The European Movement f o l lowing th e Hague Congress o f Europe, one n o te s a h i s t o r i c a l ^ T h e European Movement, op. c i t . . pp. 97-110. For th e Economic Study G roups' p re p a ra to ry r e p o r ts on th e case f o r European economic u n io n , see i b i d . . C hapter V. 305 tu r n in g p o in t in th e long s t r u g g l e to u n i t e E urope. For th e f i r s t tim e in th e h i s t o r y o f th e id e a th e b e s t minds and p o l i t i c a l le a d e r s o f W estern Europe had been in th e vanguard o f th e cam paign to r a l l y a l l E uropeans t o th e c a u se o f U nion. F u rth e rm o re , th ro u g h i n i t i a t i v e , p o p u la r s u p p o r t, and p e r s i s t e n t a c tio n The European Movement had a c t u a l l y p r e v a ile d upon te n governm ents to im plem ent by solem n t r e a t y th e C o u n c il o f Europe and i t s C o n s u lta tiv e A ssem bly. T h is th e n was th e f i r s t p o l i t i c a l s t e p o f Euro pean governm ents tow ard th e u l t im a t e g o a l o f a U nited E urope. B e s id e s , i t was th e achievem ent o f th e f i r s t m ajo r o b j e c t i v e o f The European Movement in t h e i r d r iv e t o u n i t e E u r o p e - - c e r ta in ly a landm ark in th e h i s t o r y o f European u n i t . '"When th e im p a r t i a l h i s t o r y o f th e s e e f f o r t s t o u n i t e Europe comes t o be w r i t t e n , " ' exclaim ed B e lg ia n Prim e M in is te r Spaak in t r i b u t e t o th e work o f The European Movement, " ' i t w i l l be re c o g n is e d t h a t i t i s th a n k s to th e Hague C ongress and th e su b se q u e n t campaign o f th e European Movement t h a t th e C o u n cil o f Europe has been e s t a b l i s h e d . ^ A s q u o ted [no c i t a t i o n g iv en ] by The European Movement, op. c i t . , p. 63. 306 E ffo rts of Western Governments Toward Unity and R e a litie s of Intergovernm ental Cooperation The breakdown of Big Four understanding and coopera- tio n so soon a f t e r th e d e fe a t of th e common enemy c a lle d fo r abrupt changes in Western fo reig n p o licy and alignm ents. The n e c e s s ity fo r th e changed European outlook was esp e c i a l l y marked a f t e r Russian Communist moves in 1946 a g a in st Iran and Greece, Soviet in tra n sig e n c e over manage ment of occupied Germany, and B r i t a i n 's announcement in February, 1947, of her i n a b i l i t y to continue aid to Greece and Turkey. But i t was th e r e la tio n s h ip w ith Germany th a t was to plague th e Big Four v ic to rs w ith the continuing dilemma of co o p eratio n . C h u rch ill had s e t o ff the alarm over Germany when he declared in h is Z urich Speech th a t th e re could be no recovery of Europe w ithout the re s to r a tio n of Germany and her p a rtn e rsh ip w ith F r a n c e .^ The im p lica tio n s of C h u rc h ill’s words caused co n sid erab le co n ste rn a tio n in ^ F o r Foreign M in ister B evin's views on Germany, the key to European u n ity , as w ell as Messrs. B u tle r, McNeil, R oberts, e t a l . . on a fe d e ra l system fo r Europe in "Foreign A ffa irs D ebate," see House of Commons Deb. . 5th s e r i e s , 1946-47, v o l. 427 (22, 23 October 1946), 1510, 1516-23, 1576, 1591-2, 1708-9, 1788. 307 F ran ce and induced th e F rench Government to make th e f i r s t move tow ard W estern c o o p e ra tio n to c o u n te r th e p o s s ib le m i l i t a r y re su rg e n c e o f Germany. As a r e s u l t , F ran ce and B r i t a i n on March 4 , 1947, sig n e d a 5 0 -y e a r A nglo-F rench A llia n c e o f M utual A s s is ta n c e - - g e n e r a lly known as th e T re a ty o f D u n k irk --a s t r i c t l y d e f e n s iv e m easure in c a se o f f u tu r e a g g re s s io n by Germany. ^ On th e i n i t i a t i v e o f B r i t i s h F o reig n M in is te r 58 B evin, a more e x te n s iv e s e c u r i t y a l l i a n c e was b ro u g h t For th e t e x t o f t h i s t r e a t y , see T re a ty o f A llia n c e and M utual A s s is ta n c e Between . . . th e U nited Kingdom . . . and . . . th e F rench R e p u b lic . . . . 4 th March. 1947. . . . P a r i. P u b s., 1946-47, Vol. XXVI (Accounts and P a p e rs, v o l. 1 3 ), F ran ce No. 1 (1 9 4 7 ), Cmd. 7058; T re a ty S e r i e s , No. 73 (1 947), Cmd. 7217 (London: H .M .S .O ., [1 9 4 7 ]), 4 p p .; 7 pp. F u r th e r background to t h i s a l l i a n c e may be found in Boyd, op. c i t . . pp. 59-60; f o r docum enta t io n o f th e a t t i t u d e s o f th e B r i t i s h Labor and C o n se rv a tiv e P a r t ie s tow ard th e a l l i a n c e as a s te p in th e d i r e c t i o n o f European p ea ce, and n o t a g a in s t th e S o v ie t U nion, se e H e is e r, op. c i t . . pp. 27-30. 58 U nited S t a t e s 1 a s s u ra n c e s o f s u b s t a n t i a l economic a id f o r th e European R ecovery Program th ro u g h th e M arsh a ll Plan encouraged th e B r i t i s h Government to ta k e th e le a d tow ard European u n ity (se e U rsu la B ra n sto n , B r i t a i n and European U n ity ([L o n d o n ]: C o n se rv a tiv e P o l i t i c a l C e n tre , [1 9 5 3 ]), pp. 1 3 -5 , 1 8 -2 0 ). A lso se e F o re ig n M in is te r B e v in 's key sp eech on "'W e ste rn U nion' [and European Con s o l i d a t i o n : F e d e ra tio n o r Union; M a rsh a ll Plan and E uro pean R e c o n s tru c tio n ; and R u s s ia 's r e a c tio n ] in F o re ig n A f f a ir s D ebate" in House o f Commons Deb. . 5 th s e r i e s , 1947-48, v o l. 446 (22 Ja n u a ry 1948), 387-99. I t was Bevin 308 i n t o b e in g a y e a r l a t e r betw een B r i ta i n and F rance and th e t h r e e B enelux c o u n tr ie s u n d er th e name o f th e B ru s s e ls T re a ty A greem ent. S igned on March 17, 1948, i t d id n o t come i n t o f u l l fo rc e u n t i l August 25, 1948, fo llo w in g much p a rlia m e n ta ry d is c u s s io n and r a t i f i c a t i o n by th e f iv e CQ n a t i o n s . A lthough p o p u la r ly , b u t in a c c u r a t e l y , c a l l e d th e ’’ W estern U n io n ," i t sh o u ld n o t be co n fu sed w ith i t s s u c c e s s o r , th e W estern European Union (WEU) formed in 1954. The B ru s s e ls T re a ty was in r e a l i t y th e A nglo-F rench 5 0 -y e ar m i l i t a r y - a s s i s t a n c e a l l i a n c e o f th e T re a ty o f D unkirk who co in ed th e p h ra s e , "W estern U nion," used i t s e v e r a l tim e s in t h i s sp e e c h , and p ro claim ed : " I b e lie v e th e tim e i s r i p e f o r th e c o n s o lid a tio n o f W estern E u ro p e." Cf_. Mr. C ra w le y 's r e p ly and c r i t i c i s m o f Bevin*s speech th e f o l low ing day, e s p e c i a l l y B e v in 's s ta te m e n t o f h aving to a c h ie v e c o n s o lid a tio n " s te p by s te p " and th en o f n o t s p e l lin g o u t a more d e f i n i t e program f o r th e f i r s t s te p in view o f th e urgency o f th e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n in Europe ( i b i d . , c . 5 9 3 ). C£. B e v in 's l a t e r views c o n c e rn in g th e g r e a t s i g n i f i c a n c e o f th e B ru s s e ls T re a ty and im p o s s ib i l i t y o f a c h ie v in g a European Union im m ediately o r a t a " f a s t pace" in House o f Commons Deb. . 5 th s e r i e s , 1947-48, v o l. 450 (4 May 1948), 1107-8, 1110-2. 59 A good c r o s s - s e c t i o n o f th e view s o f C o n se rv a tiv e and Labor P a rty MP's re g a rd in g B r i t a i n and th e B ru s s e ls T re a ty a r e c i t e d by H e is e r, in op. c i t . . pp. 3 1 -4 . Con c e rn in g th e group o f B r i t i s h MP's c a l l i n g on March 12, 1948, 309 extended to th e th r e e Benelux n a tio n s along w ith added economic and s o c i a l c o o p e ra tio n p r o v is io n s . In e f f e c t , i t sim ply in a u g u ra te d a r e tu r n to th e o ld b alan c e-o f-p o w er s tr a te g y in European i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s as a p re c a u tio n a r y m easure a g a in s t th e w orsening b e h a v io r o f Com m unist R u ssia as in d ic a te d by h e r p r o h ib itio n o f p a r t i c i p a tio n in th e ERP to a l l h e r s a t e l l i t e s as w ell as th e Communist Coup d u rin g F eb ru a ry , 1948, in C zech o slo v ak ia. The l a t t e r a c tio n , in f a c t , was th e tu rn in g p o in t in i n t e r n a tio n a l c o o p e ra tio n between E ast and West in Europe and u sh e re d in th e "Cold W ar." N e v e rth e le s s , th e Five-Pow er B ru sse ls T re aty Pact c o n ta in e d c e r t a i n n o v el f e a tu r e s : (1) a permanent m i li t a r y o rg a n iz a tio n under a common command, a C hiefs of S ta f f Com mittee, and th e f iv e D efense M in is te rs m eeting r e g u la r ly in London; (2) a perm anent c o n s u lta tiv e C ouncil o f th e f i v e F o reig n M in is te r s , m eeting q u a r te r ly In London to e lim in a te economic c o n f l i c t s and to f o s t e r c lo s e r co o p e ra ti o n on economic, s o c i a l , and c u l t u r a l l e v e l s ; (3) a S e c r e t a r i a t and a perm anent com m ittee o f d ip lo m a tic r e p r e - f o r a d d itio n a l s te p s to a s s u re th e p o l i t i c a l union of W estern E urope, see K e e s in g 's . V II (1948-1950), 1418; and 1389, 1407, and 1417 f o r e a r l i e r developm ents le a d in g to th e t r e a t y . 310 s e n ta tlv e s lo c a te d In London; and (4) a b in d in g and e n fo rc e a b le European c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r ity arran g em en t--an armed a t ta c k in Europe a g a in s t any member would b rin g a l l o th e r p a r tn e r s to i t s a i d ^ - - i n which B r i t a i n ag reed to p a r t i c i p a t e as an eq u al f o r f i f t y y e a r s . In a d d i t i o n , th e t r e a t y in flu e n c e d th e more d e d ic a te d le a d e rs o f The E uro pean Movement to s t r i k e w h ile th e iro n was hot and g e t a European P arliam en t e s ta b lis h e d in o rd e r to ac h ie v e a U nited Europe as soon as p o s s ib le . D e sp ite th e i n te n t o f th e B ru sse ls T re a ty , "eco nomic, s o c i a l , and c u l t u r a l c o lla b o r a tio n " was s h o rt on A r t i c l e 4. For th e t e x t o f th e B ru sse ls T re aty O rg a n iz a tio n , as w e ll as i t s s t r u c t u r e , econom ic, s o c i a l , and c u l t u r a l p r o v is io n s , see T re a ty o f Economic. S o c ia l and C u ltu r a l C o lla b o ra tio n and C o lle c tiv e S elf-D efen ce between th e U nited Kingdom . . . Belgium. . . . French R e p u b lic . . . . Luxembourg, and . . . th e N e th e rla n d s . B ru s s e ls . 17th March. 1948. . . . P a r i. P u b s., 1948-49, V ol. XXXV (Accounts and P ap ers, v o l. 1 4), T re a ty S e rie s No. 1 (1949), and Cmd. 7599 (London: H.M.S.O. [1 9 4 9 ]), pp. 4-9 o f 10 p p .; and th e Document S e c tio n o f th e European Y earbook. I (The Hague: N ijh o f f , 1955), pp. 207-13. For a c r i t i c a l a p p r a is a l o f th e t r e a t y 's w eaknesses, compro m ise s, and re a so n s f o r i n e f f e c tiv e n e s s v i s - a - v i s a g enuine W estern Union, c f . M. J . Bonn, W hither Europe—Union or P a rtn e rs h ip ? ([New Y ork]: P h ilo s o p h ic a l L ib ra ry , [1 9 5 2 ]), pp. 132-4; C u rre n t Notes on I n t e r n a t io n a l A f f a i r s . XIX (Ju n e, 1948), 306-13; Aldo G a ro s c i, "N eu tralism " and L. D. W ilg re ss , "The N orth A t la n tic Community," in Haines ( e d .) , op. c i t . . pp. 208-9, 252. 311 a c ti o n , ex c ep t f o r c e r t a i n c u l t u r a l ex ch an g es, and long on e x p e c ta tio n s . One p lu s f a c t o r , how ever, was th e in a u g u ra tio n o f th e S o c ia l S e c u r ity C onvention o f 1949, whereby any member n a t i o n a l l i v in g in th e t e r r i t o r y o f a n o th e r re c e iv e d e q u a l b e n e f i t s . T his socioeconom ic in n o v a tio n s e t th e p re c e d e n t f o r su b seq u en t u n ite d E uro pean a c tio n and proved to be th e most s i g n i f i c a n t a c h ie v e ment o f th e B ru s s e ls T re a ty O rg a n iz a tio n in th e d i r e c t i o n o f European U n i o n .^ But in th e i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic s p h e re , th e B ru s s e ls N atio n s were n o t a b le to f u l f i l l t h e i r prom ise to e lim in a te n a ti o n a l economic d if f e r e n c e s and to a t t a i n an economic u n i o n . ^ M oreover, d iv e r s e n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s made i t im p o s s ib le f o r them to u n ify t h e i r f o r e ig n p o l i c i e s o r to u n i t e t h e i r n a t i o n a l arm ies For ev id en c e of i t s in f lu e n c e on th e " I n te rim Agreem ents on S o c ia l S e c u r it y ," and th e p r o v is io n s t h e r e o f , p assed by th e C o u n cil o f Europe in 1953, and coming in t o fo r c e on J u ly 1, 1954, se e European C onventions ( S t r a s b o u rg : D i r e c t o r a te o f In fo rm a tio n , C o u n cil o f E urope, 1956), pp. 15-45. 62 The co m p lex ity o f c o o r d in a tio n o f in te r g o v e r n m en tal economic problem s was soon re c o g n iz e d a s an e x t r a o rd in a r y im pediment in a "U nion" p r im a r ily m i l i t a r y , and th e dilemma was e lim in a te d by t r a n s f e r to th e newly e s t a b lis h e d O rg a n iz a tio n f o r European Economic C o o p e ra tio n . See Bonn, l o c . c i t . . and S c h m itt, op. c i t . . pp. 3 5 -6 , f o r f u l l e r tre a tm e n t o f th e work o f th e B ru s s e ls T re a ty O rg a n iz a tio n . 312 I n t o a s i n g l e W estern Union m i l i t a r y e s ta b lis h m e n t. The B ru s s e ls T re a ty had been s ig n e d o n ly t h r e e days when th e R u ssia n s w alked o u t o f th e A l l ie d C o n tro l C o u n c il f o r Germany. R e f le c tin g on th e r e c e n t R u ssia n Communist m oves—r e s u r r e c t i o n o f th e Cominform, th e Com m u n ist ta k e - o v e r in C z e c h o slo v a k ia , th e t r a g i c d e a th o f Jan M azaryk, among o th e r e v e n ts , and a U n ited N a tio n s made im p o te n t by R u s s ia 's re p e a te d u s e o f th e v e t o — th e W estern a l l i e s a t l a s t came to re c o g n iz e t h a t R u s s ia , n o t Germany, was th e r e a l t h r e a t to t h e i r s u r v i v a l . F ra n c e , t h e r e f o r e , a g re e d w ith B r i t a i n and th e U n ited S t a t e s to u n i t e t h e i r o c c u p a tio n zones in Germany. The s i t u a t i o n c o n tin u e d to grow more tro u b le so m e when th e R u s s ia n s , an g ered by th e German c u rre n c y re fo rm in th e W estern z o n e , im posed th e B e r lin la n d b lo c k a d e on Ju n e 19, 1948. T h e n c e fo rth , Germany was d iv id e d i n t o two n a t i o n s , o n ly t o rem ain i n d e f i n i t e l y th e bone o f c o n te n tio n betw een R u ssia and th e W est. Any i l l u s i o n s t h a t many in th e West may s t i l l have had as t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o o p e ra tio n w ith th e Com m u n ists f i n a l l y ended when th e R u ssia n Government w ithdrew b e h in d i t s Iro n C u rta in to r e b u il d i t s f o r c e s f o r th e n e x t 313 t h r u s t a t th e W e s t . * *3 In view o f th e c o n tin u in g i n a b i l i t y o f th e U nited N ations to f u l f i l l i t s in ten d ed fu n c tio n o f a s s u rin g i n t e r n a tio n a l u n d e rsta n d in g and c o o p e ra tio n , W estern le a d e rs a t l a s t tu rn e d to A r t i c l e s 51 and 52 of th e UN C h a rte r as t h e i r only a l t e r n a t i v e f o r th e s e c u r i ty and s u r v iv a l of W estern E u r o p e .^ A month b e fo re th e R ussians ended t h e i r B e rlin B lockade, th e U nited S ta te s and Canada jo in e d th e f iv e B ru ss e ls T re a ty N ations to form on A p ril 9, 1949, th e For f u r t h e r s u b s t a n t i a tio n o f th e s e developm ents, see M . M argaret B a ll, NATO and th e European Union Movement (New York: P raeg er [1 9 f ~ ] ) , pp. 12-4; NATO. N orth A tl a n t ic T re a ty O rg a n iz a tio n : I t s Developm ent and S ig n if ic a n c e . U nited S ta te s D epartm ent o f < a te P u b lic a tio n 4630. Gen e r a l F o reig n P o lic y S e rie s 7/ (W ashington: 1952), p. 25; P au l-H en ri Spaak, S e c re ta ry -G e n e ra l o f NATO, Why. Nato? ([A y lesb u ry , E ngland]: Penguin Books [c . 1 9 5 9 ]), pp. 9-15. 64 The U nited S ta te s S enate adopted th e Vandenberg R e so lu tio n (S en ate R e so lu tio n 239) in Ju n e , 1948, c a l l i n g f o r th e " 'a s s o c i a t i o n o f th e U nited S t a t e s , . . . w ith such r e g io n a l and o th e r c o l l e c t i v e arrangem ents [ A r ti c le 52] as a r e based on co n tin u o u s and e f f e c t i v e s e l f - h e l p and m utual a i d , and as a f f e c t i t s n a tio n a l s e c u r i t y . " 1 (As quoted in U nited S ta te s D epartm ent o f S ta te P u b lic a tio n 4630, op. c i t . . pp. 8 -9 .) A lso se e S c h m itt, op. c i t . pp. 3 6 -7 , f o r a c tio n o f th e Canadian Government. 314 N orth A tla n tic T reaty O rganization (NATO).*’'* Thus, the B ru ssels "Western Union" O rg an ization was superseded by a North A tla n tic "Union" O rganization s im ila r in purpose and s t r u c t u r e , but to become more comprehensive in i t s o p era t io n a l s ta ff s - -C o u n c il of M in is te rs , Defense Committee, C hiefs of S ta f f , and o th e r planning groups. R u s s ia 's exploding of th e A-bomb and th e Korean War in 1950, how e v e r, exposed c e r ta in NATO o rg a n iz a tio n a l w eaknesses, and t h e i r c o rre c tio n led in 1952 to a permanent S e c r e ta r ia t and a p o l i t i c a l organ, known as th e Council D ep u ties, to re p la c e th e Defense Committee but to r e ta in i t s powers of d e c isio n .* * * * Like th e B russels T reaty O rg an izatio n , however, NATO was unable to work out an e f f e c tiv e u n ifie d fo re ig n p o lic y , l e t alone p o l i t i c a l c o o p e ra tio n , because of the Denmark, Ic elan d , I t a l y , Norway, and P ortugal jo in e d during th e d r a f tin g of th e t r e a ty ; Greece and Turkey jo in e d in 1952; and th e F ed eral Republic of Germany, to th e shock of many, became a member on May 5, 1955. ^ S c h m itt, o p. c i t . . p. 38; Spaak, op. c i t . . p. 37. For th e te x t of th e T re a ty , see i b i d . . pp. 41-62; and The North A tla n tic T reaty O rg an izatio n ; The NATO Handbook (7 th e d .; P a ris : North A tla n tic T reaty O rg an izatio n , 1959), pp. 11-9; h e r e in a f te r c ite d as NATO Handbook (1959). [This 93-page Handbook is an e x c e lle n t source fo r th e background, s t r u c tu r e , chronology of developm ent, and docum entation of NATO a c t i v i t i e s from 1949-1959.] 315 c o n f l i c t of members1 n a tio n a l i n t e r e s t s la r g e ly beyond Europe. In f a c t , t h i s was p a te n tly re v e a le d in th e s p l i t between NATO members over p o lic y and a c tio n in th e s t r u g g le o f A fric an c o lo n ie s f o r independence and during th e Suez d eb acle in 1956,*^ which n e a rly d estro y ed The d iv e rg e n t i n t e r e s t s of th e European p a rtn e rs in A fr ic a , th e Middle E a s t, and th e F ar E ast did not always c o in c id e w ith th e views of th e U nited S ta te s . B r ita in and F rance, e . g . , t r a d i t i o n a l l y had d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s in t h e i r c o lo n ia l and Commonwealth or Union o v ersea-co n n ec tio n s ; Canada was to m between h e r B r i t i s h , Commonwealth, and American t i e s ; and th e U nited S ta te s was involved in h e r in ter-A m erican and A s ia -P a c ific (Japan, Formosa, ANZUS, and SEATO) arrang em ents. B esid es, alth o u g h A r tic le 1 of th e NATO T reaty provided th a t th e members u n d ertak e " . . . to r e f r a i n in t h e i r in t e r n a t io n a l r e la tio n s from th e th r e a t or use of fo rc e in any manner in c o n s is te n t w ith th e p u r poses of th e U nited N a tio n s ," B r ita in and France launched a m i li t a r y in v asio n of Egypt w ith o u t c o n s u ltin g t h e i r NATO p a rtn e rs to b rin g about th e Suez c r i s i s . On th e o th e r hand, A r tic le s 4 and 5 o f th e B ru ssels T reaty served as th e su b stan ce f o r A r t i c l e 5 of th e NATO T reaty and i t s j u s t i f i c a t i o n , f o r namely: ". . . a n armed a tta c k a g a in s t one or more of them in Europe or N orth America s h a l l be co n sid ered an a tta c k a g a in s t them a l l , and co n seq uently they ag ree t h a t , . . . each o f them . . . w i l l a s s i s t th e P arty or P a r tie s so a tta c k e d . . . . " This o b lig a tio n , to a s s i s t an a l l y , however, d id not p e r ta in to m ilita r y engagements o u ts id e th e North A tlan tic-E u ro p e an t r e a ty a r e a , nor to i n t e r n a l r e v o lts u n le s s supported by o u ts id e armed f o rc e s . An e x c e lle n t p re s e n ta tio n o f th e s e t r e a t y o b lig a tio n s and subsequent developm ents may be found in B a ll, op. c i t . . pp. 34-9 e t p assim . A lso see Ben T. Moore, NATO and th e F u tu re o f Europe (New York: H arper, 1958), pp. 25-8, 34, 192-206, and C hapter VI, f o r perhaps th e b e s t a n a ly s is of NATO as a m ili ta r y a l l i a n c e vs. p o l i t i c a l community. 316 go NATO, which had re la x e d c a u tio n and dropped i t s guard as th e R ussians tu rn ed on t h e i r "sm iles" and assu ran ces of "peaceful coexistence" after the death of Stalin. The ex ten sio n o f th e East-W est c o n f li c t beyond Europe by R ussian p e n e tra tio n in to th e Middle E a st, A fric a , and A sia as w ell as th e te c h n o lo g ic a l advances of th e R ussians in n u c le a r energy, m is s ile s , and o u te r-s p a c e n e c e s s ita te d a t r a n s i t i o n in NATO th in k in g and purpose from m i li t a r y c o lla b o ra tio n r e s t r i c t e d to Europe and th e North A tla n tic a re a to th a t on a w orld-w ide s c a le . Since th e common i n t e r e s t s of th e NATO c o u n trie s were ch allen g ed o u ts id e th e t r e a ty a re a by th e Communist (Warsaw Pact) b lo c , a s p e c ia l NATO study com mittee of "Three Wisemen" was c re a te d in 1956 to e v a lu a te th e s i t u a t i o n . I t was t h e i r recommendation t h a t g r e a te r n o n m ilita ry (e s p e c ia lly p o l i t i c a l ) co o p e ratio n which had been r e g r e t f u l l y lack in g was a b s o lu te ly n ec essary to m ain tain a common fo re ig n p o lic y a g a in s t th e m o n o lith ic a c tio n o f g lo b a l ag g ressio n 69 or subversion by the Moscow-directed Communists. 68 S chm itt, pp. c i t . . pp. 38-9; Spaak, o p . c i t .. pp. 31-2. ^ " T h e Three Wisemen" were F oreign M in iste rs P ear son, M artino, and Dr. Lange of Canada, I t a l y , and 317 A lthough th e NATO C o u n cil o f M in is te rs approved t h i s r e p o r t , i t had n o t been c a r r i e d out by th e end o f 1939. Old p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t s o f B r i t a i n , G reece, and Turkey o v er C ypress and betw een B r i t a i n and Ic e la n d co n c e rn in g f is h i n g r i g h t s cropped up d u rin g 1957-1959. F u rth e rm o re , th e F rench Government und er P re s id e n t De G a u lle demanded co m p lete knowledge o f n u c le a r s e c r e t s , a v o ic e in th e c o n tr o l and u se o f n u c le a r w eapons, and eq u a l s t a t u s w ith B r i t a i n and th e U nited S ta te s in a proposed T r i p a r t i t e D ir e c t o r a t e to d e c id e NATO's p o lic y f o r th e t r e a t y a re a and e lsew h ere in th e w o rld . But a more s e r io u s c o n f l i c t developed o v er F r a n c e 's u n i l a t e r a l a c tio n s in th e m i l i t a r y s p h e re . F rance re s o lv e d to w ithdraw i t s M ed iterran ean f l e e t from NATO in tim e o f w ar, re fu s e d to a llo w th e U nited S ta te s to s t o c k - p i l e n u c le a r bombs on h e r s o i l , and s e t o u t to d ev elo p and explode h e r own n u c le a r bombs. As NATO commenced i t s second decade of e x is te n c e in 1960, th e b re a c h in i t s m i l i t a r y u n ity Norway. For a d d i t i o n a l d e t a i l s and recom m endations o f t h e i r r e p o r t , se e Spaak, o p . c i t . . pp. 32-3; NATO Handbook (1 9 5 9 ), pp. 7 2 -4 ; R eport o f th e Committee o f th e T hree on N o n -M ilita ry C o o p eratio n in NATO ( P a r i s : NATO, In fo rm a t i o n D iv is io n , December 14, 1956), pp. 1-11 ; Massimo S a l v a d o r !, NATO: A T w e n tieth C entury Community o f N atio n s ( P r in c e to n , New J e r s e y : Van N ostrand [ c . 1 9 5 7 ]), pp. 181- 3. 318 c o n tin u e d to widen and th e p o s s i b i l i t y o f g en u in e p o l i t i c a l c o o p e ra tio n seemed more rem ote th an ev er in view of P r e s id e n t De G a u lle 's adamant a t t i t u d e and d e te rm in a tio n t o r e s t o r e th e g ra n d e u r t h a t F ran ce once p o s s e ss e d . Judgment on th e su c c e ss o f NATO and i t s c o n t r ib u ti o n to th e cau se o f European u n ity v a r i e s . ^ Most W estern c r i t i c s a g re e t h a t NATO has had l i t t l e su c c e ss beyond i t s m i l i t a r y r o l e o f f o r e s t a l l i n g f u r t h e r R ussian expansion in Europe and k ee p in g th e peace in th e t r e a t y a r e a f o r th e p a s t d ecad e. N e v e rth e le s s , th e developm ent o f i t s in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l i n s t i t u t i o n s and p e rso n n e l to a more s o p h i s tic a t e d and m i l i t a r i l y f u n c tio n a l l e v e l should a f f o r d C f. B a ll, op. c i t . . pp. 4 0 2 -4 , 411-26; L incoln Gordon, "NATO and European I n t e g r a t i o n ," World P o l i t i c s . X (Ja n u a ry , 1958), 219-31, and " P o l i t i c a l I n t e g r a tio n in th e F ree World Community" in H. F ie ld H av ilan d , J r . , e d . , The U n ited S ta te s and th e W estern Community (H av erfo rd , P e n n sy lv a n ia : H averford C o lle g e P re ss [ c . 1 9 5 7 ]), pp. 6 8 -7 1 , 73, 76-9; Moore, op. c i t . . pp. 6 -1 2 , 2 4 -8 , 34, and C h ap ters I I I , IV, and X; Hans Kohn, "The D i f f i c u l t Road t o W estern U n ity ," O r b is . I l l (O cto b er, 1959), 297-312; NATO Handbook (1959 ), pp. 53-80; L e s te r [B .] P earso n , " N A T O :R e tro s p e c t and P r o s p e c ts ," I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l . XIV (S p rin g , 1959), pp. 79-84; S a lv a d o r!, op. c i t . . pp. 8 9 -9 9 , 178-80; Spaak, op. c i t . . pp. 2 0-9; Summary o f th e F in d in g s o f th e C onference on N orth A t l a n t i c Community and C lo sin g Speech . . . by P a u l-H e n ri Spaak. S e c re ta ry -G e n e ra l o f N .A .T .O .. B ruges, 8 th -1 4 th Septem ber, 1957. [B ruges and P h ila d e lp h ia : C o lle g e o f Europe and U n iv e r s ity o f Pen n s y lv a n ia , 1957], pp. 3 -1 1 , 16-9; h e r e i n a f t e r c i t e d as C onference on N orth A t l a n t i c Community (1957 ). 319 v a lu a b le s e c u r ity d a ta and le s s o n s in th e e v o lu tio n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n iz a tio n . The hope of expanding NATO in to a t r u l y u n ite d c u l t u r a l , economic, and p o l i t i c a l community o f dem ocratic n a tio n s , however, was n ev er r e a l i z e d d u rin g th e f i r s t ten y e a rs o f i t s e x is te n c e . Nor was t h i s f a i l u r e f u l l y a p p r e c ia te d , ex cep t among a very sm all m in o rity in each NATO co u n try who have t r i e d to m a in ta in t h e i r sense o f W estern Community a g a in s t th e trem endous odds of economic n a tio n a lis m , n a t i o n a l i s t i c em o tio n alism , je a lo u s y , and p r e ju d ic e . The C onference on N orth A tla n tic Community in 1957, f o r in s ta n c e , provid ed t h i s summary l i s t o f th e d is c o rd a n t fo rc e s p re c lu d in g th e w ho leh earted su p p o rt of a more genuine NATO Community: Most common c r i t i c i s m s [a re ] of th e USA (th e c u l t o f e f f i c i e n c y , " m a s s if ic a tio n ," de-hum anizing, e tc ) [and] a re in r e a l i t y d ir e c te d tow ards u n p le a s a n t a s p e c ts o f h ig h ly -d e v e lo p e d i n d u s t r i a l s o c ie ty , w herever i t i s found. The f a c t t h a t American s o c ie ty i s in th e f o r e f r o n t o f te c h n ic a l d ev e lo p ment i n v i t e s c r i t i c i s m o f som ething which i s a g e n e ra l W estern phenomenon. O ther f a u l t - f i n d i n g may be tr a c e d to European a tte m p ts to com pensate f o r an i n f e r i o r i t y com plex, which sp read when Europe had t o adm it t h a t i t no lo n g er p o ssessed th e m oral and s p i r i t u a l le a d e rs h ip o f th e w orld. T h is h e lp s t o e x p la in why te n s io n s have appeared p a r t i c u l a r l y in th o se c o u n trie s which fo rm erly could a s p i r e to supremacy in Europe, and among th e i n t e l l e c t u a l s , who b e lie v e d th ey had a s u p e r v is o ry m andate over th e c r e a tio n and enjoyment 320 o f W estern s p i r i t u a l v a lu e s. The h o s t i l i t y o f c e r ta in l e f t i s t i n t e l l e c t u a l s may be f u r th e r ex p lain ed by t h e i r i r r i t a t i o n a t th e success which a f r e e m arket economy has had in a tt a i n i n g economic and s o c ia l g o a ls . R ig h tis t i n t e l l e c t u a l s may be estra n g ed by t h e i r n a t i o n a l ism , t h e i r lo y a lty to c o lo n ia l i n t e r e s t s , or a d i s t r u s t engendered by US p o lic y toward th e S o viet Union, 1941-45. Europeans a r e fre q u e n tly i r r i t a t e d by a t t i t u d e s or d e c is io n s o f th e American government d ic ta te d e i t h e r by m isguided p u b lic o p inion o r by th e very d i v e r s i t y and scope o f American i n t e r e s t s as th e r e lu c ta n t le a d e r o f th e f r e e w orld. On th e o th e r hand, p u b lic opin ion in th e US i s c r i t i c a l of what i t p re s e n tly re g a rd s as th e in g r a titu d e o f i t s a l l i e s . In th e fa c e o f such te n s io n s , i t i s r e g r e ta b le t h a t th e id ea o f A tla n tic Community i s so l i t t l e known or un derstood among th e le a d e rs and peoples o f Europe and N orth America. The sense o f com m unity must be stre n g th e n e d i f dangerous te n s io n s , m isco n cep tio n s, and p re ju d ic e s a r e to be red u ced .?1 On th e o th e r hand, th e e x is te n c e of NATO as a m i li ta r y a ll i a n c e d e d ic a te d to p r o te c t W estern E uro pe's s e c u r ity was d e s tin e d to thw art th e movement toward a European Union. H is to r ic a l evidence s u b s ta n tia te s t h i s , f o r NATO had removed th e danger o f R ussian ag g ressio n and C onference on North A tla n tic Community (1957), pp. 7 -8 . For o th e r co n c lu sio n s and recommendations o f th e C onference, see pp. 3 -7 , 8-11; and fo r M . Spaakb e x c e lle n t exposd o f Communist t a c t i c s , su ccesses and f a i l u r e s o f NATO s in c e 1949, and what needs to be done, see i b i d . , pp. 13-23. 321 th e re b y p ro v id ed W estern Europeans a b e t t e r p s y c h o lo g ic a l c lim a te in which to r e h a b i l i t a t e t h e i r n a t i o n a l economies and to en jo y p re-w ar norms o f l i v in g ( o r , in many in s ta n c e s , b e t t e r ) . As a con seq u en ce, th e id e a o f W estern E u ro p e 's own u n ite d m i l i t a r y e s ta b lis h m e n t was c o n s id e re d u n r e a l i s t i c and u n n e c e ssa ry . B r i t a i n and h e r S can d in av ian s u p p o r te r s , f o r exam ple, fa v o re d th e commitment o f Canada and th e U n ited S ta te s to European d e fe n s e and t h e r e f o r e p r e f e r r e d an A t l a n ti c m i l i t a r y a s s o c i a ti o n such as NATO to a u n if ie d European f o r c e , such as EDC, f o r th ey saw in th e form er a f a r s tr o n g e r g u a ra n te e o f t h e i r n a t i o n a l s u r v iv a l th a n in th e l a t t e r . B e s id e s, th e B r i t i s h and S can d in av ian s "were in c lin e d to be s u s p ic io u s o f p lan s c a l l i n g f o r th e s u b o rd in a tio n o f n a t io n a l i n t e r e s t and 72 n a tio n a l p o lic y - d e te r m in a tio n to s u p r a n a tio n a l c o n t r o l . " A ccording to th e B r i t i s h , t h e i r Commonwealth t i e s r e q u ir e d g r e a t e r freedom o r f l e x i b i l i t y o f a c t i o n , which NATO's in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l arrangem ent p e rm itte d b u t which a more r e s t r i c t i v e C o n tin e n ta l f e d e r a tio n o r EDC would p re v e n t. M oreover, NATO a ffo rd e d F rance th e o p p o rtu n ity to r e b u ild B a ll, op. c i t . , p. 401. A lso c£. Moore, o p . c i t . , pp. 59-63. 322 h er n a tio n a l s tre n g th and to reco v er her former g re a t power s t a t u s ; w hereas, EDC would n o t only deny her th e se p re ro g a tiv e s but a ls o would submerge her n a tio n a l id e n tity Furtherm ore, co n sid er B r i t a i n 's b e la te d a c tio n to jo in in c re a tin g a Western European Union (W EU) follow ing F ra n c e 's r e je c tio n of EDC, and a f t e r re fu s in g to p a r t i c i p ate in i t h e r s e l f . ^ B rita in of course was faced w ith th e dilemma of e ith e r a d iv id e d , weaker Western Europe th re a te n e d by a re su rg e n t Germany or a fe d e ra te d Western Europe w ithout B rita in but dominated by Germany. Appre c ia tin g th e p o te n tia l of a re-arm ed Germany on th e sid e o f Western Europe, B rita in re c o n c ile d her c o n tin e n ta l commitment to an intergovernm ental m ilita r y o rg a n iz a tio n 73 Moore, op. c i t . . pp. 61-2. For th e f ig h t a g a in s t EDC by th e n a t i o n a l i s t s , n e u t r a l i s t s , p a c i f i s t s , and Communists, see Aldo G aro sci, "N eutralism " in Haines ( e d .) , op. c i t . . p. 211. 74 For th e o rig in and h is to ry of EDC and W EU, see A. H. R obertson, European I n s t i t u t i o n s —C o -o p e ra tio n : I n te g r a tio n : U n ific a tio n (London: S tevens, 1959), 19-23, 129-30; 126-47; Handbook of European O rgan izations ( S tr a s bourg, S e c re ta ria t-G e n e ra l, C ouncil of Europe, 1956), 117- 8; 7-23; K eesin g 's V III-X II (1950-1952—1959-1960), 10985- 6, 16238-41 e t passim . Also see below, C hapter X, fo r f u r th e r p o l i t i c a l im p lic a tio n s of EDC and W EU. 323 su ch as WEU. W ith a re -arm ed Germany as a member and w ith in th e fram ework o f NATO, W EU m em bership was a l e s s e r r i s k t o h e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s and l e s s r e s t r i c t i v e o f h e r f o r e ig n p o lic y th a n EDC. E s p e c ia lly was t h i s co n firm ed by WEU's su b se q u e n t o p e r a tio n , f o r i t has proved to be sim p ly a n o th e r European in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l o r g a n iz a tio n r a t h e r th a n a Union o f s t a t e s . More s i g n i f i c a n t in name th a n in a c t i o n , i t h as se rv e d as a symbol o f th e m oral j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r W estern E u ro p e 's s e l f - d e f e n s e , arms c o n t r o l , and a s p i r a t i o n f o r u n i t y . In th e l a s t a n a l y s i s , how ever, th e know ledge o f th e f i n a n c i a l and m i l i t a r y commitment o f th e U n ited S ta t e s th ro u g h NATO t o th e d e fe n s e o f W estern Europe has removed t h e u rg e n cy f o r a U n ite d Europe t o s a fe g u a rd th e s e c u r i t y o f a frag m en ted E urope. In e f f e c t , NATO has ten d ed to d iv id e th e e a r l i e r a d h e re n ts o f a European U nion. W hile some s t i l l u rg e a European F e d e r a tio n as th e b e s t s o l u t io n f o r E u ro p e 's d i v i s i o n , a n ta g o n ism s, and im p o ten ce, o th e r s c a l l f o r an A t l a n t i c Community, o r Union o f th e W estern 7 S d em o cracies as t h e i r g r e a t e s t s a l v a t i o n . J NATO h as in d eed ^ S e e G eorge C a t l i n , The A t l a n t i c Community ([W ake f i e l d , E n g la n d ]: Coram, 1 9 5 9 ), pp. 5-28 e t p a s s im ; C o n fe r ence on N orth A t l a n t i c Community (1 9 5 7 ). pp. 3 -1 1 ; B a l l.o p . c i t . .p p . 40 7 -2 7 ; Moore, op. c i t . .p p . 1 0 -1 ,2 4 -8 ,6 1 e t p assim . 324 overshadowed th e id e a o f European Union by i t s p r o te c tiv e s h ie ld and th e re b y has enabled B r ita in to rem ain on th e p e rip h e ry o f th e movement to u n ify Europe, and thus to w a it and see which co u rse may be fo r h er b e s t i n t e r e s t . In th e meantime, B r ita in has been a b le to r e ly more and more on th e U nited S ta te s and th e Commonwealth^ and, in so d o in g , has f r u s t r a t e d th e postw ar a ttem p ts to u n ite W estern Europe. Turning n ex t to an assessm ent of th e r o le th a t th e O rg a n izatio n f o r European Economic C ooperation (OEEC) played in th e movement to u n ite Europe, one must of course weigh th e changing ti d e s of th e Communist t h r e a t . Like* w ise, th e r e s u l t s of American M arshall Plan a id on European economic reco v ery as w ell as th e m i lit a r y s e c u r ity which th e U nited S ta te s and NATO provided W estern Europe, must be co n sid ered f o r t h e i r e f f e c t on th e urgency of u n itin g as a g a in s t European d if f u s io n w ith each n a tio n going i t s 77 own way. ^ B o n n , op. c i t .. p. 169. ^ S e e above under s e c tio n on th e "Role of American A s s is ta n c e ." Also see Bonn, op. c i t . . pp. 156-8, 167-9; C oudenhove-K alergi, op. c i t . . pp. 285-92; Moore, op. c i t . . pp. 16-22; S p in e lli in Haines ( e d .) , op. c i t . . pp. 51-61. 325 By th e tim e th e s ix t e e n E uropean Governm ents had e s t a b l i s h e d th e OEEC on A p r il 16, 1948,^® th e re v iv e d id e a o f a U n ited E urope had g a in e d c o n s id e r a b le momentum, had a t t r a c t e d th e s u p p o rt o f many W estern le a d e r s and p a r l i a m e n ta r ia n s , and had won th e o f f i c i a l b ac k in g o f th e U n ited 7 0 S ta t e s G overnm ent. 7 As th e OEEC began o p e r a tio n , 78 A u s t r i a , B elgium , Denmark, F ra n c e , G re ece , I c e la n d , I r e l a n d , I t a l y , Luxembourg, t h e N e th e rla n d s , Norway, P o r tu g a l, Sweden, S w itz e rla n d , T u rk ey , and th e U n ited K ing dom. W estern Germany ( r e p r e s e n te d by o c c u p a tio n powers from O cto b er 31, 1949) became a f u l l member in May, 1955. S pain p a r t i c i p a t e d p a r t i a l l y from J a n u a ry , 1955, and became a f u l l member in 1959. Canada and th e U n ited S t a t e s , a f t e r in fo rm a l a s s o c i a t i o n w ith OEEC from J u n e , 1950, became fo rm a lly a s s o c i a te d in 1951. F or th e t e x t o f th e OEEC Con v e n tio n , s e e P a r i . P u b s ., 1948-49, V ol. XXXIV (A ccounts and P a p e rs, v o l. 1 3 ), Cmd. 7796 (London: H.M.S.O. [ 1 9 4 9 ]) , pp. 1 -3 4 ; Boyd, op. c i t . . pp. 149-58. 79 A cco rd in g to th e Economic C o o p e ra tio n Act o f 1948, th e U n ited S t a te s en co u rag ed " j o i n t o r g a n iz a tio n " and "common e f f o r t s " t o a t t a i n econom ic c o o p e r a tio n ; and in an amendment t o t h i s A ct on A p r il 19, 1949, C ongress d e c la r e d : " I t . . . t o be th e p o lic y o f th e p e o p le o f th e U nited S t a te s t o en c o u rag e th e u n i f i c a t i o n o f E urope, . . (as c i t e d in The E uropean Movement, o p . c i t . . pp. 1 6 0 -1 ). S e n a to r G reen s u b s t a n t i a t e d t h i s p o lic y when he d e c la r e d b e f o r e th e C o n s u lta tiv e Assem bly o f th e C o u n c il o f Europe t h a t A m erican a i d t o Europe i s " . . . t o e n c o u r ag e th e economic u n i f i c a t i o n and p o l i t i c a l f e d e r a ti o n of E u ro p e. . . . " (O f f i c i a l R ecord o f D e b a te s. November 19- 23. 1951: C o n feren ce o f S tr a s b o u r e Between D e le g a tio n s o f th e C ongress o f th e U n ited S t a t e s o f A m erica and o f th e C o n s u lta tiv e Assem bly o f th e C o u n c il o f Europe ( S t r a s b o u rg : 4.951), p . 9. Congressman K e a tin g in th e same 326 w idespread enthusiasm and optimism fo r a European Union was in th e a i r . In f a c t , Europeans in a l l W estern coun t r i e s and many Americans b e lie v e d th a t they were about to w itn e ss th e f i r s t a c tu a l s te p s o f European Governments toward u n i f i c a t i o n and th a t t h e i r hope of a U nited Europe Q A was a t l a s t "a p r a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y . " From th e sta n d p o in t of th e European economic and p o l i t i c a l dilemma and th e tremendous f in a n c ia l and moral suppo rt o f th e U nited S ta te s , i t was lo g ic a l a t th e tim e to a n t i c i p a t e a genuine e f f o r t toward th e a tta in m e n t of economic u n ity in W estern Europe. Moreover, th e c a lib e r and s i n c e r it y of th e f i r s t government re p r e s e n ta tiv e s to Debate a ls o s ta te d : . . i n th e i n t e r e s t of making t h i s e x te n siv e a id f u ll y e f f e c t i v e , th e re should be a g r e a te r economic and p o l i t i c a l in te g r a tio n in Europe. . . . That i s th e p o lic y announced by our Governm ent." ( i b i d . , p. 196); and Congressman Howard Smith r e i t e r a t e d : " . . . [ ECA] was done to encourage th e economic u n if ic a tio n and th e p o l i t i c a l fe d e ra tio n of Europe. That was one of th e main p u rp o ses, . . . " (i b i d . . p. 200). A very good a n a ly s is o f U nited S ta te s a t t i t u d e and p o lic y concerning European F e d e ra tio n may be found in Vera M icheles Dean, "American P o licy on European I n te g r a tio n ," in European Yearbook. I I (1956), 223-40. 80 The European Movement, op. c i t . , p. 35. For th e b a s is of and com prehensive recommendations on th e economic union of Europe, see i b i d . , C hapters V and VI, and Europe U n ite s . op. c i t .. C hapter I I I . 327 OEEC and th e fa v o ra b le p u b l i c i ty re c e iv e d in d ic a te d p o s i t i v e a c tio n toward t h i s g o a l. "But th e s u p p o rte rs of European u n ity b o th in Europe and in America deluded th em selv es; th e tim e was n o t r i p e fo r f e d e r a t i o n / 1 a c c o rd ing to one OEEC r e p r e s e n ta ti v e , who added: Europeans p r e f e r r e d to c o n c e n tra te t h e i r e f f o r t s on n a tio n a l r e c o n s tr u c tio n , made p o s s ib le by American a i d , w h ile paying l i p s e r v ic e to th e e v e n tu a l n e c e s s ity o f c r e a tin g a la r g e r a re a of c o - o p e ra tio n . So i t happened t h a t th e European c o u n tr ie s p u lle d them selves out o f th e ru in s and m is e rie s in to which th e war had plunged them, w h ile Europe sto o d w a itin g to be u n ite d . Some c o n c e ssio n s to th e p r e v a ilin g f e e lin g s of c o -o p e ra tio n were made, however, and so we had th e f i r s t forms o f p o l i t i c a l and economic c o lla b o r a tio n among n a tio n a l governm ents in th e shape of th e OEEC and th e C ouncil o f Europe. These two i n s t i t u t i o n s have dem onstrated th a t i t i s im p o ssib le to ta k e p o s i tiv e s te p s toward European u n i f i c a t i o n w ith o u t e f f e c t i v e l y d e l e g a tin g so v e re ig n ty o r w ith o u t e s ta b l is h in g f e d e r a l or s u p ra n a tio n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . . . th e OEEC, in whose a c t i v i t i e s I p e rs o n a lly have tak en p a r t , s u ffe re d from th e g r e a t li m i ta t io n s i n t r i n s i c to i t s j u r i d i c a l s t r u c t u r e , m ainly th e la c k o f r e a l power to have i t s d e c is io n s re sp e c te d by th e member c o u n tr ie s . . . The lo g ic o f W estern Europe moving toward economic u n ity fo llo w in g r e c e i p t o f M arshall Plan a id has been 81 Ugo La M alfa [Former I t a l i a n M in is te r o f F oreign T ra d e ], "The Case f o r European I n te g r a tio n : Economic C o n s id e r a tio n s," in Haines ( e d . ) , op. c i t . . pp. 6 7 -8 . 328 s u b s ta n tia te d by a n o th e r European p u b l i c i s t . Emphasizing t h a t th e n e c e s s ity f o r economic c o o p e ra tio n had been assum ed, he p o in te d o ut t h a t " th e obvious p re s s u re which could be e x e rte d by th e U nited S t a t e s , would p er se be s u f f i c i e n t to ch an nel th e e f f o r t s of th e re c e iv in g coun t r i e s , in th e n a t u r a l developm ent o f e v e n ts , toward a r e c o n s tr u c tio n above n a tio n a l le v e ls."® ^ But th e d ie h a rd fo rc e s o f n a tio n a lis m had been overlooked along w ith th e t h r e a t o f a n o th e r w ar, and th e r e f o r e th e OEEC approach to th e economic r e h a b i l i t a t i o n o f W estern Europe developed th u s : American a id . . .[w as] given to re c o n s tr u c t a u n ite d w estern European economy, and n o t to r e s u r r e c t th e old a n a c h r o n is tic and r e s t r i c t e d s t r u c t u r e s . At l e a s t t h i s was th e hope. In s te a d , h a rd ly had th e organs f o r economic c o -o p e ra tio n as envisaged by th e p lan come in to o p e r a tio n , than a l l th e o ld fo rc e s o f n a tio n a l egoism and p r o te c tio n ism a ro se in t h e i r m id st, and i t became obvious t h a t th e American " e x p e rts " could do no more than w r ite th r e a te n in g r e p o r ts and warn t h a t u n le s s th e s i t u a t i o n changed, American a id would be te rm in a te d . These t h r e a ts were c l e a r l y in v a in , because th e same p o l i t i c a l n e c e s s ity which had led th e U nited S ta te s to propose th e M arsh all Plan co n tin u ed to e x i s t and, in f a c t , was even more u rg e n t a f t e r th e c o n c lu sio n o f th e agreem ent. M oreover, r e c o n s tr u c tio n o f w estern Europe in any form seemed p r e f e r a b le , ®^Garosci, in Haines ( e d . ) , op. c i t . . p. 209. 329 once th e plan had been in a u g u ra te d , to th e abandon ment o f th e i n i t i a t i v e . With th e e v e r-in c re a s in g tempo of R ussian a g g re s s iv e n e s s , p lan s and hopes a ll i a n c e gave added s ig n if ic a n c e Movement, however, was more s p e c if ic and blamed B r ita in , as w e ll as C h u rc h ill, fo r "sab o tag in g th e p rocess of u n i f i c a t i o n which was about to ta k e th e f i r s t s t e p s ." A ccording to t h i s le a d e r of European u n i f i c a t i o n , th e B r i t i s h Government, p a r a l le li n g th e propaganda a c t i v i t i e s of C h u rc h ill and of The European Movement, o f f i c i a l l y assumed th e le a d e rs h ip fo r government a c tio n in European u n ity . I t then sup ported th e c r e a tio n o f in t e r n a ti o n a l o rg a n iz a tio n s , such as OEEC and th e C ouncil o f Europe, "w hich, w hile g iv in g th e im pression of u n ity , were only c o n s u lta tiv e o rg an s, and thus by-passed com pletely th e problem of n a tio n a l so v ereig n ty ."® ^ With utm ost r e g r e t , he co n tin u ed : The M arshall Flan re p re s e n te d th e one chance f o r Europe to u n i te . I f th e American government had seen through th e f a l s e European s p i r i t of th e B r i t i s h and had g ra n te d th e a id s c o n tin g e n t on The S e c re ta ry G eneral o f th e European F e d e r a lis t G a ro sc i, in Haines ( e d .) , op. c i t . , pp. 209-10. QA S p i n e l l i , in Haines ( e d . ) , op. c i t . . pp. 53-4. 330 th e c r e a tio n o f p o l i t i c a l f e d e r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s on th e C o n tin e n t, we would now have European u n io n , sin c e no s e rio u s o p p o sitio n could have been given by th e fo rc e s fa v o rin g m aintenance o f so v e re ig n ty , e x c e p t, o f c o u rse , by G reat B r i t a i n . I t i s to be r e g r e tte d th a t th e Ameri c a n s, on t h i s s c o re , were duped by G reat B r ita in in one of th e g r e a te s t d e c e p tio n s in modem European h i s t o r y , and so in s te a d of a p o l i t i c a l union we have w itn essed th e m aintenance and th e s tre n g th e n in g of th e n a tio n a l p a r tic u la r is m s , vaguely d isg u ise d in European term s, which f o r some tim e have deceiv ed bo th American and Euro pean p u b lic o p in io n . The money which th e Americans thought they were g iv in g to h e lp th e Europeans to overcome economic n a tio n a lis m served only to r e c o n s tit u t e th e old n a tio n a l econom ies, in s te a d o f c r e a tin g one m arket and one European e c o n o m y . 85 F u rth e r a tta c k s on th e n e g a tiv e r o le of OEEC toward th e e f f o r t to u n ite Europe have been v o iced , fo r example, in th e French and B r i t is h P a rlia m e n ts. M . Palew ski c it e d th e p e tty n a t i o n a l i s t i c causes of d i f f i c u l t i e s and antagonism s in W estern Europe t h a t p revent th e OEEC from succeeding in ach iev in g European u n if ic a tio n and then emphasized th e n e c e s s ity o f p o l i t i c a l u n io n . M . C h ev alier p o in ted out th e n e g a tiv e n a t i o n a l i s t i c economic arrangem ents by th e member n a tio n s o f OEEC and e s p e c ia lly a tta c k e d th e B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e fo r r e t i r i n g from th e W estern community because of th e d e s ir e to m ain tain h er own 83 S p i n e l l i , in Haines ( e d . ) . op. c i t . . p. 54. 331 s e p a r a te r e l a t i o n s w ith Europe, th e Commonwealth, and th e U nited States.®** On th e o th e r hand, Mr. Usborne asked F oreign S ecre t a r y Bevin w hether i t was t r u e t h a t "a m a jo rity o f th e 16 c o u n tr ie s were anxious to see a f u lly - f le d g e d custom s union c r e a te d , and . . .[w h e th er i t was] a ls o t r u e th a t th e B r i t i s h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e opposed th a t ? " The r e p ly o f F o reig n S e c re ta ry Bevin c o n tra d ic te d t h i s . He d e c la re d t h a t what th ey d id was to p o in t out t h a t " : B r ita in cannot be e x c lu s iv e ly a member o f a custom s union o f Europe . . . [a s] th e g r e a t b u lk o f our tr a d e and commerce i s w ith th e Commonwealth and w ith o u ts id e c o u n tr ie s . T h e re fo re , our endeavor i s to do what we can to a s s i s t a European custom s u n io n , and a t th e same tim e to do what we can to m a in ta in th e e x te r n a l tr a d e o f t h i s c o u n try , in o rd e r t h a t our p r o s p e r ity may be s e c u re d .87 86 A nnales de l'A ssetnblee n a t io n a l e . D e b a ts. V o l. 28, VI (9 J u i l l e t 1949), 4457-8; V ol. 30, V III (24 Novembre 1949), 6218-24. A lso see M. R eynaud's speech in i b i d . , pp. 6247-8, ^^House o f Commons Deb. . 5 th s e r i e s , 1947-48, 445 (17 December 1947), 1686-7. For f u r t h e r q u e s tio n s to th e F o reig n S e c re ta ry co n cern in g th e B r i t i s h G overnm ent's plan o f A ction co n cern in g M arsh all Plan a i d , se e i b i d . . 446 (28 Jan u a ry 1948), 981-2. But c f . Bonn, op. c i t . . pp. 103- 7 , w herein he e x p la in s t h a t B r ita in could jo in a European custom s union w ith o u t having to le a v e th e Commonwealth o r je o p a r d iz in g i t . P a r tis a n and economic i n t e r e s t s , how e v e r, c r e a t e th e r e a l d i f f i c u l t y . 332 Later, while assessing the British efforts toward European Union, Hr. Mackay cited Foreign Secretary Bevin as declaring: We are struggling to establish Western Union on a sound edifice through O.E.E.C. and the Brussels Pact, and . . . we do not want to put the building up in the wrong manner--in other words, we do not want a European Assembly, because that would distract our attention from the work we are doing in this other practical form. . . . ® On the other hand, Mr. Edelman in discussion of British-French relations and a federal settlement for Western Europe stated: However desirable that may be--and I agree that it is desirable--it remains something remote. It is not something which can be done now to deal with our immediate problems and difficulties. The other attempted solution, now being applied, is to set up various committees such as O.E.E.C. . . . but . . . [they] have no executive power; . . . [and can only issue] instructions which will smooth out the contradictions which exist in the Western European economy. . . . 88 House o f Commons Deb. . 5 th s e r i e s , 1947-48, 456 (17 September 1948), 437. 89I b i d . . 1948-49, 459 (10 December 1948), 743. On pp. 745-6 Mr. Edelman a ls o su g g ested a fu n c tio n a l approach to W estern European in te g r a tio n as th e most p r a c t i c a l approach a t th e tim e. In f a c t , he a n tic ip a te d ECSC and Euratom by s e v e ra l y e a r s , f o r he suggested c r e a tio n o f "an Iro n and S te e l A u th o rity n o t m erely f o r th e Ruhr b u t f o r W estern Europe" as w e ll as a "F uel and Power" A u th o rity . 333 M in is te r o f S ta te McNeil su b se q u e n tly r e p li e d to Mr. M acm illan’s c r i t i c i s m o f th e Labor G overnm ent's nega t i v e p o lic y tow ard th e movement to u n ite Europe t h u s : W e have . . . an alm ost o v e r - r id in g o b lig a tio n as a member o f O.E.E. C. The r i g h t h o n o rab le Gentleman [M acmillan] has d isp la y e d h is concern f o r th e redevelopm ent, i n t e g r a t i o n and u n i f i c a t i o n o f Europe. Here i s one in stru m e n t t h a t i s r e a l l y a t work which does a l i t t l e more than speeches about redevelopm ent and u n ity of E u r o p e . 90 R e p re s e n ta tiv e o f th e argum ents in su p p o rt o f th e OEEC a r e th o se t h a t l i s t i t s accom plishm ents as an economic a d v iso ry and in fo rm a tio n -g a th e rin g agency of European governm ents to improve i n t e r s t a t e economic c o n d itio n s . In a d d itio n , th e r e a re th o se t h a t em phasize i t s a s s o c ia tio n w ith th e C ouncil o f Europe s in c e 1951 and i t s c o o p e ra tio n 91 92 w ith NATO, ECSC, EEC, and EFTA through exchange of 90House o f Commons Deb. , 5th s e r i e s , 1948-49, 463 (23 March 1949), 398. 91 I t a c tu a ll y serv ed as NATO's economic arm, f o r a l l th e member n a tio n s of OEEC were a ls o members of NATO, ex c e p tin g th e n e u t r a l i s t c o u n tr ie s o f A u s tr ia , I r e la n d , Sweden, and S w itzerlan d (and a ls o Spain a f t e r 1959). 9^see Paul D e lo u v rie r, "Economic I n te g r a tio n : Problems and P o s s i b i l i t i e s , " in Haines ( e d .) , op. c i t . . p. 117, f o r th e m utual h e lp o f ECSC and OEEC. Yet t h i s a u th o r, F in a n c ia l D ire c to r o f ECSC a t th e tim e , p o in te d o u t : "A ll th o s e who do n o t l i k e th e s ix -c o u n try i n t e g r a tio n t r a n s f e r t h e i r e f f o r t s to th e OEEC, so t h a t , whenever 334 in fo rm a tio n on economic developm ents, p r o d u c tiv ity , and s t a t i s t i c s . One p u b l i c i s t w rote t h a t OEEC "has no i n t e n t io n o f d is s o lv in g i t s e l f " when th e M arsh all Plan a id ends, " f o r i t i s no lo n g er a mere d i s t r i b u t i n g agency o f American la rg e s s b u t co n ceiv es i t s e l f as a c lo s e ly k n it community."93 To th e q u e s tio n : " I s f e d e r a tio n in f a c t n e c e ssa ry fo r th e achievem ent o f th e economic b e n e f its a s s o c ia te d w ith th e n o tio n o f European i n t e g r a t i o n ? " ^ a P ro fe sso r th e s ix -c o u n try in t e g r a t io n makes any p ro g re s s , th e OEEC can im m ediately be seen b e s t i r r i n g i t s e l f to make f r e s h p ro g re ss to o . There i s a s p i r i t o f em ulation and r i v a l r y and, l e t us fa c e i t , th e U nited Kingdom i s only a tta c h e d to th e OEEC because she d e t e s t s th e s ix -c o u n try o rg a n iz a t i o n s . And when th e six-member o rg a n iz a tio n s seem a l i t t l e out o f lu ck . . . th e U nited Kingdom moves away from th e OEEC. As soon as th e r e is t a l k o f a European ren ew al, how e v e r, th e OEEC g e ts back to work and th e U nited Kingdom c le a v e s to th e C o n tin en t once more . . ." ( i b i d . , pp. 117*6). 91 Bonn, o p . c i t . , p. 166. For o th e r achievem ents and p ro sp e c ts of OEEC, see h is pp. 167-9. However, cf,. h is p. 159, w herein he m entions t h a t a f t e r th e U nited S ta te s and Canada became a s s o c ia te members of OEEC, i t ceased being "a p u re ly European i n s t i t u t i o n . . .[an d ] became alm ost a companion to th e N orth A tla n tic Defence U nion." 94 Paul Hoffman, ECA o r M arsh all Plan Aid A dm inis t r a t o r , i s g e n e r a lly c r e d ite d w ith p o p u la riz in g i f n o t in a u g u ra tin g th e term " in t e g r a ti o n " as a p p lie d to European economic union in a speech b e fo re th e C ouncil o f OEEC on O ctober 31, 1949, in which he urged th e OEEC n a tio n s to move more p o s i t iv e ly toward th e "economic in te g r a tio n " of W estern Europe. (See B a ll, op. c i t . . p. 223; Moore, 335 of International Economics pointed out: On purist economic reasoning it can be estab lished that full and effective economic union requires federation. Against all this, neverthe less, it is clear from the record that in practice a pretty good result is attainable and, within the ambit of the OEEC for example, has been attained without formal federation. 95 The first Secretary-General of OEEC, and later Vice President of the EEC Commission, wrote in praise of the men who worked arduously in OEEC to reconcile the national interests of each member state. These men had "the two-fold function of defending the particular inter ests of their countries within the Organisation, while trying to secure from their Governments the utmost co operation compatible with these interests. op. cit. . pp. 30-31; also cf_. , John A. Loftus, "An Inquiry into Feasible Forms of European Integration," in Haines (ed.), op. cit.. p. 98. 95Ibid.. p. 109. Professor Loftus presents a fuller critical analysis of the concept and feasibility of European integration on pp. 97-111. An excellent analysis of the justification for European integration from the political standpoint, however, is E. N. Van Kleffen's [Ambassador of the Netherlands to Portugal], "The Case for European Integration: Political Considerations," in Haines (ed.), op. cit.. pp. 80-96. 96Robert Marjolin, "L'O.E.C.^. et le Ddveloppement de la Cooperation economique europdenne," in European Yearbook. I (1955), 58-61. 336 N e v e rth e le s s , most c r i t i c s o f OEEC's work a g re e t h a t i t s m ajor achievem ents were th e e s ta b lis h m e n t o f th e European Payments Union (EPU) on September 19, 1950, and th e European P ro d u c tiv ity Agency (EPA) on May 1, 1 9 5 3 .^ The purpose o f th e EPA was to improve th e economic p ro d u c t iv i ty o f member c o u n tr ie s ; w hereas, EPU serv ed alm ost n in e y e a rs as th e W estern European c le a r in g house, on a m u l t i l a t e r a l r a t h e r th an on a b i l a t e r a l b a s is o f s e t t l e ment between each p a ir o f c o u n tr ie s , f o r th e tr a d e b a la n c e s o f member n a tio n s . EPU came to an end, however, in Ja n u a ry , 1959, w ith th e e s ta b lish m e n t o f th e European Economic Community (EEC), more p o p u la rly known as th e Common M arket; and i t was su p ersed ed by an agreem ent o f th e te n European s t a t e s n o t 97 i The in flu e n c e o f Paul Hoffman s speech in s p u r r in g OEEC to e s t a b l i s h EPU may be found in Moore, op. c i t . . pp. 30-1; and f o r i t s sp o n so rsh ip and endowment in th e amount o f $350,000,000, from M arsh all Aid fu n d s, see Bonn, op. c i t . . p. 160. For good c r i t i c a l e v a lu a tio n s o f th e work o f OEEC, se e B a ll, op. c i t . . C hapter 7, "OEEC: E x er c i s e in Economic C o -o p e ra tio n " ; Bonn, o p. c i t . . C hapter XI, "Union o r League"; Edouard B onnefous, L Europe en fa c e de son D e stin ( P a r is : P re sse s U n iv e r s ita ir e s de F rance [1952]), pp. 73-87. L in coln Gordon, "Jtyth and R e a lity in European I n t e g r a t i o n ," Y ale Review. XLV (Septem ber, 1955), 80-103, and "The O rg a n iz a tio n f o r European Economic C o o p e ra tio n ," I n te r n a tio n a l O rg a n iz a tio n . X (F eb ru a ry , 1956), 1-11; Mocre, op. c i t . . pp. 2 -3 , 16-22, 124-36, 169-73, 218-20; Paul Reynaud, U n ite o r P e ris h ([New Y o rk ]: Simon and S ch u ster [ c . 1 9 5 1 ]), pp. 78-87, 1 6 1 -7 ;R obertson , op. c i t . .p p .5 -9 .5 5 . 337 jo in in g th e EEC^® fo r th e f r e e c o n v e r t i b i l i t y o f t h e i r n a tio n a l c u r r e n c ie s . A fte r th e emergence of th e two r i v a l economic o r g a n iz a tio n s , th e EEC and th e European F ree Trade A s s o c ia tio n (EFTA), in 1959, th e r e rem ained l i t t l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r th e OEEC. E v e n tu a lly i t was supersed ed by th e fo rm atio n o f th e O rg a n iz a tio n f o r Economic C ooperation and Development (OECD) on September 30, 1961. Com prising 20 n a t i o n s , ^9 i t s s t r u c t u r e and mem bership, ex cep t f o r th e fo u r n e u t r a l i s t c o u n trie s and S pain, c o in c id e d w ith th o se of NATO. W hatever hopes th e many a d h e re n ts o f European u n i f i c a t i o n may have had in th e OEEC to ta k e th e f i r s t s te p s in u n itin g E urope, th ey were d e s tin e d to l a s t i n g d is a p p o in tm en t. The n a tio n s o f W estern Europe had sim ply e s ta b lis h e d an orthodox in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l agency th a t o rg a n ic a lly re p re s e n te d th e n a tio n a l i n t e r e s t s and p o li c ie s of each member s t a t e r a t h e r th an th e common i n t e r e s t s of W estern Europe as a whole. ^ A c c o rd in g t o Mr. Mackay (Labor MP) in h is op. cit.. p. 143, th e EPU was "brought to an end more by th e a c tio n s o f G reat B r i ta i n than by th o s e o f any o th e r c o u n tr y ,. . ." 99 The s ix c o u n trie s in EEC, th e seven in EFTA, p lu s Ic e la n d , I r e la n d , G reece, Turkey, S p ain , Canada, and th e U nited S t a t e s . t 338 Directed and controlled by a Council of Ministers (the members of which belonged to national cabinets, which in turn controlled each of them), their decisions com mitting national governments had to be unanimous. Thus, OEEC's primary aim to coordinate national policies had to originate in the national capitals, and in practice eco nomic cooperation among the member nations was worked out in a series of bilateral treaties rather than under a single united program. Furthermore whatever early ideas may have been held by representatives of the Continental members to try to initiate a European economic union were An E x ecu tiv e Committee o f seven c a r r ie d on w h ile th e C ouncil o f M in is te rs were back a t t h e i r n a tio n a l c a p i t a l s . In a d d itio n , th e r e were T ec h n ic al Committees of e x p e rts and a permanent S e c r e t a r i a t , b u t th e r e was no Assembly. F o u rteen o f th e European m in is te r s o f th e OEEC C ouncil of M in is te rs a ls o serv ed each as h is n a t i o n 's m in is te r on th e C ouncil o f E u ro p e 's Committee of M in is te rs and t h i r t e e n serv ed on th e NATO C o u n cil, a l l o f which a ffo rd e d c o n s id e ra b le i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s and c o lla b o r a tio n among th e s e th r e e m ajor i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rg a n iz a tio n s . For a com prehensive a n a ly s is o f th e i n s t i t u t i o n s and fu n c tio n s o f th e OEEC from th e p o in t o f view o f in t e r n a t i o n a l law and i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rg a n iz a tio n by a le g a l a d v is e r to OEEC, see A lexander E lk in , "The O rg a n isa tio n fo r European Eco nomic C o -o p e ra tio n : I t s S tru c tu re and Pow ers," in European Y earbook, IV (1958), 96-149. A lso se e O rg a n isa tio n fo r European C o -o p e ra tio n : H isto ry and S tr u c tu r e . . . (7 th e d .; P a r is : 1958), pp. 10-59; " . . . [OEEC]: O u tstanding Events in Ten Years o f European Economic C o -o p e ra tio n -- B asic T e x ts , P u b lic a tio n s , B ib lio g ra p h y ," in European Y earbook. VI (1959), 197-223. 339 f r u s t r a t e d from th e very f i r s t by th e postw ar r e s u r r e c tio n of B r i t i s h in s u la ris m , extra-E uropean t i e s , and economic n a tio n a lis m . Hence, by m id-1950, i t was ev id en t t h a t OEEC never had h eld any genuine f e d e r a l i s t aim s. Nor did i t endeavor to do more than pay l i p - s e r v i c e to th e id ea of th e economic in te g r a tio n of W estern Europe so long as th e id ea was popular and s tro n g ly supported in both Europe and Am erica. By mid-1950 American aid had enabled OEEC to re sc u e and r e s t o r e W estern E urope's m u ltin a tio n a l econom ies, to improve h er p e o p le s' liv in g sta n d a rd s and p sy c h o lo g ic a l o u tlo o k , and to re v iv e th e old f a i t h in t h e i r n a tio n , a l l of which fo s te re d a new s p i r i t of n a tio n a lis m . Moreover, two of th e main reasons fo r u n itin g th e n a tio n s of W estern Europe--economic and m ilita r y in s e c u r ity - - h a d been more or le s s re so lv e d by th a t tim e; th e r e f o r e , n a tio n a l governments could once again a ffo rd th e luxury of re tu r n in g to th e pre-w ar p r a c tic e of economic n a tio n a lis m and th e re v e re d t r a d i t i o n s and p ro to c o l of i n te r n a t io n a l diplom acy. CHAPTER IX THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE IN OPERATION Never in a l l h is to r y had economic and s e c u r ity c o n d itio n s been more opportune fo r th e u n if ic a tio n of W estern Europe than between 1948 and 1950. Indeed th e European p o l i t i c a l c lim a te prompted th e popular accep tance of th e idea throughout th e W estern dem ocracies. At no previous p erio d had th e idea of a U nited Europe been championed by so many of th e b e s t minds and le a d e rs of W estern Europe, nor by so many c iv ic o rg a n iz a tio n s , along w ith m ajor church b o d ie s, b u s in e s s , la b o r, and p ro fe s s io n a l groups, not to m ention th e m a jo rity of th e p a rlia m e n ta r ian s of W estern Europe. The peoples of Europe a t th e tim e, in f a c t , were more ready than ever to u n ite but u n fo rtu n a te ly a f t e r t h e i r Congress of Europe and European Movement campaign had p re v a ile d upon th e ten W estern Govern ments to e s t a b l i s h the Council of Europe, they a p p a re n tly b e lie v e d th a t t h e i r o b je c tiv e had been accom plished. T h e re a fte r, they were sim ply to be p a tie n t and to leave th e r e s p o n s i b i l i ty fo r ach iev in g European u n ity to t h e i r n a tio n a l governments working through th e C ouncil of Europe Thanks, however, to th e t r a d i t i o n of n a tio n a lism and th e myth of popular so v ereign ty, th e p e o p le 's voices and a c tio n were tr a n q u iliz e d by th e m oral a llu s io n s and p la titu d e s of government spokesmen to t h e i r a s p ir a tio n s o f Europe u n ite d . Meanwhile, during th e ensuing decade, t h e i r e x p e c ta tio n s of u n itin g Europe ro se and f e l l w ith th e opposing tid e s of th e in te r n a t i o n a l a s s o c i a ti o n i s t s (or "e m p iric a l f u n c ti o n a l i s t s " ) and th e European fe d e ra - t i o n i s t s (or " c o n s ti tu ti o n a l s u p r a n a t i o n a l i s t s " ) , a lte r e d of course by th e c r o s s c u rre n ts of American " in te rv e n tio n " and R ussian o n -a g a in -o ff-a g a in th r e a ts of a g g ressio n and ap peals fo r p e a c e fu l c o e x is te n c e . In a u g u ratio n of th e C o n su lta tiv e Assembly: "High Hopes" The program of a c tio n to u n ite Europe, s e t in motion by th e P e o p le 's Congress of Europe^ and c a r r ie d on ■^Meeting a t The Hague, May 8-10, 1948, t h i s o u t sta n d in g g a th e rin g of over 800 persons of alm ost every European n a t i o n a l i t y bore marked resem blances to the famous F ra n k fu rt Assembly of 1848. Though h is to r y may y et s u b s ta n tia te o th e r s i m i l a r i t i e s , th o se th a t come to mind a re th e co in cid en ce of t h e i r d e m o c r a tic - lib e r a l re p re s e n ta tio n of peoples r a th e r than th e e s ta b lis h e d governm ents, 342 in th e c o u n trie s of W estern Europe by p e o p le 's o rg a n iz a tio n s making up The ( I n te rn a tio n a l) European Movement, e v e n tu a lly succeeded in in flu e n c in g ten W estern European 2 3 Governments to e s ta b li s h th e C ouncil o f Europe. But th e t h e i r a lt r u i s t ic - h u m a n i s tic aim s, t h e i r d iv e rs e European " g r a s s - r o o ts " su p p o rt, and th e u n in h ib ite d s p i r i t of exuberance and co n fid en ce in th e p ro p o sals to re sc u e t h e i r s h a tte r e d environm ent (E u ro p e). Documentary evidence of th e aims and a c tio n of t h i s Congress o f Europe, as w ell as e x c e lle n t photographs of p ro c eed in g s, may be found in The European Movement, Europe U n ites: The S tory of th e Cam paign fo r European U nity, In clu d in g a F u ll Report of th e Congress of Europe Held a t The Hague . . . (London: H o llis and C a rte r [1 9 4 9 ]), pp. 2-120, h e r e in a f te r c ite d as Europe U n ite s ; and i t s European Movement and th e C ouncil of Europe (London: H utchinson [1 9 4 9 ]), pp. 11-167 [ a ls o c o n ta in in g e x c e lle n t photographs o f p ro c e e d in g s], h e r e i n a f t e r c ite d as European Movement. The f iv e B ru ssels T reaty n a tio n s of Belgium, B r i t a i n , F rance, Luxembourg, and th e N etherlands plus Den mark, E ire , I t a l y , Norway, and Sweden. 3 How C h u rc h ill and o th e r members of th e B r i t is h d e le g a tio n to The Hague Congress of Europe re tu rn e d to t h e i r co untry and proceeded to implement th e C ongress' plan of in flu e n c in g n a tio n a l governments to i n i t i a t e ste p s to u n ite Europe i s in d ic a tiv e o f th e mood of The European Movement of th a t day. C h u rc h ill a t th e head o f t h i s d e le g a tio n , which in clu d ed among o th e rs M essrs. Boothby, Mackay, S a l t e r , and Lady Bonham-Carter, marched ac ro ss W h iteh all to Downing S tr e e t , p re se n te d t h e i r case to M essrs. A ttle e and Bevin, and encouraged them to p a r t i c i p a t e w ith th e o th e r B ru ssels T re aty n a tio n s in fo rm u latin g a Council of Europe. See Kenneth L indsay, Towards a European P arliam en t (S trasb o u rg : [ S e c r e t a r ia t o f th e Council of E urope], 1958), pp. 6-7. 343 C ouncil o f Europe t h a t came in to being on May 5 , 1949, a c tu a lly re p re s e n te d a compromise between th e nongovern m ental European Movement g ro u p s--su p p o rte d by th e B e lg ia n , F ren ch , Luxembourg, and N eth erlands G overnm ents--and th e B r i t i s h Government. The C o n s u lta tiv e Assembly o f th e C ouncil o f E urope, f o r exam ple, r e f le c te d th e o r ig in a l p ro p o sal o f th e form er group; w hereas, i t s Committee o f M in iste rs re p re s e n te d th e co n cessio n to th e B r i t i s h Govern ment in o rd e r to se c u re th e l a t t e r ' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n .^ A lthough " th e r e is n o th in g in th e S ta tu te [of th e C ouncil o f Europe] which does not o r ig in a te in some way in th e p ro p o sals o f The European Movement," n o t a l l o f The Movement’s recommendations were follow ed l i t e r a l l y , nor were a l l in clu d ed . Vague g e n e r a l i t i e s , such as aims in th e d ir e c tio n o f European u n i t y , m oral and s p i r i t u a l v alu es , dem ocratic p r in c ip le s , th e fundam ental r ig h ts o f man, and o th e r s im ila r ex p ressio n s found a p la c e o f co u rse in th e S ta tu te w ith o u t q u e s tio n .^ ^See above, C hapter V I I I , pp. 299 f f . ^ D ire c to ra te o f In fo rm a tio n , The F i r s t F ive Y e a rs , 5 .V. 1949-5.V. 1954 (S trasb o u rg : C ouncil o f E urope, 1954) , pp. 55-6; h e r e in a f t e r c ite d as C /E , The F i r s t F ive Y e a rs. For an e x c e lle n t d ig e s t o f p re ss coverage o f th e n e g o tia - tio n s and agreem ent o f te n governments on th e S ta tu te e s ta b lis h in g th e C ouncil o f Europe on May 5, 1949, along w ith a c o n c ise breakdown o f th e aims and fu n c tio n s o f th e C ouncil o f E u ro p e, see K e e sin g 's Contemporary A rc h iv e s: Weekly D iary o f Im portant World Events ( B r i s t o l , England) , VTl ~n 9 4 8 - r P50) , 9 9 /3 -b , 10149-bl; h e re i n a f t e r c ite d as K eesin g1s . The com plete S ta tu te may be found in th e 344 A part from th e s i m il a r i t y o f term s u se d , however, th e S ta tu te re v e a le d a marked d if f e r e n c e o f in te n t con ce rn in g European u n ity between th e ten governments and The European Movement. The Hague Congress o f Europe had unanim ously approved i t s P o l i t i c a l C om m ittee's Report d e c la rin g t h a t " th e tim e has come when th e European n a tio n s must t r a n s f e r some p o rtio n o f t h e i r so v ere ig n r ig h ts so as to se c u re common p o l i t i c a l and economic a c tio n . . and t h a t plans must be made fo r " th e permanent and org an ic u n i f i c a t i o n o f E urope," which was to in c lu d e "common c i t i z e n s h i p , a u n if ie d economic system , a s in g le European Defence F o rc e , a European D e lib e r a tiv e A ssem bly." A lthough t h i s Assembly i n i t i a l l y was to be n o n le g is la tiv e and chosen by n a tio n a l P a rlia m e n ts , l a t e r i t was to be e le c te d by and r e p r e s e n ta tiv e o f th e peoples o f Europe and empowered to l e g i s l a t e fo r "a com plete F e d e ra tio n [of E u ro p e]."^ On th e o th e r hand, a c lo s e r exam ination o f th e Pream ble o f th e S ta tu te shows a wide d iv erg en ce between The European Movement and th e ten governments in th e means European T re a ty S e rie s , No. 1 , The S ta tu te o f th e C ouncil o f E u ro p e, London. 5 th May 1949 (P a ris : C ouncil o f E u ro p e. 195977'PP. 1-15. A lso see European Movement, pp. 169-98; A. H. R o b ertso n , The Counc i l oi: feurope ( 2d ~ed.; London: S tevens , 1961) , pp. 257-69, and h is European I n s t i t u t i o n s : C o -o p eratio n : I n te g r a tio n : U n ific a tio n (London: Stevens , 1959) , pp. 256-67; h e r e i n a f t e r c ite d as C ouncil o f Europe and as European I n s t i t u t i o n s . ^Europe U n ites « pp. 2 3 -6 , 138-9; European Movement, pp. 42 -5 0 . 345 to a t t a i n European u n ity v ia th e C ouncil o f Europe. For exam ple, th e te n governments s tr e s s e d th e "need o f a c lo s e r u n ity between a l l like-m inded c o u n trie s o f Europe" in o rd e r to m ain tain and f u r th e r r e a l i z e "peace based upon j u s t i c e and i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o -o p e ra tio n ." Then, in response " to t h i s need and to th e expressed a s p ir a tio n s o f t h e i r peoples in t h i s re g a rd ," they co n sid ered t h a t i t was "n e cessary fo rth w ith to c r e a te an o rg a n iz a tio n which w i l l b rin g E uro pean S ta te s in to c lo s e r a s s o c ia tio n ." T his was n ex t id e n t i f i e d in th e l a s t paragraph o f th e Pream ble as "a C ouncil o f Europe c o n s is tin g o f a Committee o f r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s [M in iste rs] o f Governments and o f a C o n s u lta tiv e Assembly."^ "C lo se r u n ity . . . c lo s e r a s s o c ia tio n " o f th e te n governments v ersu s " t r a n s f e r [of] some p o rtio n o f t h e i r so v e re ig n r ig h t s so as to se c u re . . . th e permanent and o rg a n ic u n i f i c a t i o n o f Europe" as urged by th e Hague Congress and The European Movement o s te n s ib ly to a t t a i n s im ila r g o a ls - - th e u n ity o f E urope--proved th e ^For th e S ta tu te o f th e C ouncil o f Europe and i t s P ream ble, see above, fo o tn o te 5. Beyond th e vague, non ob je c tio n a b le re fe re n c e s to c lo s e r a s s o c ia tio n and g r e a te r c o o p e ra tio n and u n ity among th e member n a t i o n s , th e C ouncil o f Europe was l i t t l e more than th e orthodox in te r n a tio n a l o rg a n iz a tio n . I t was and rem ains an i n s t i t u t i o n o f th e r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s o f n a tio n a l governments , not o f peoples , p a tte rn e d a f t e r th e League o f N ations and th e UN. 346 insurmountable roadblock to European unification during g the next decade. Even so, as the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe was about to open its first session on 9 August 10, 1949, an exuberance of optimism prevailed throughout Western Europe. Many leading Europeans believed that through the Council of Europe, they were on their way at last to the unification of Western Europe. Press coverage was completely favorable, and extended to every town and village publication.^ In fact, a search of the publications of that particular period did not reveal a single skeptic or cynic who was willing to come forward g Fuller analysis of the differences of intent between the ten governments and the Hague Congress and The European Movement in their use of the expressions "unity" and "union" as applied to Europe may be found in Robertson, European Institutions, , pp. 57-9, and The Council of Europe, p. 15. It was this divergence of views that consumed much of the time of the Council of Europe during its first two years and eventually altered the course to uniting Europe in the years to follow. Q At Strasbourg, which Britain first suggested as the capital of the new "European Union," according to M. Rosenblatt in France, Annales de l'Assemblee nationale. Debats, Vol. 28, VI (9 Juillet 1949), 4485. Of course, the only unfavorable reaction at the time was that of the Communists, 347 and predict the failure of the Council of Europe's mission. Either these characters were biding their time with a wait-and-see policy or none felt so inclined in view of the overwhelming logic of uniting Europe and the tremendous popularity of the idea at the time. Indeed, one British writer has substantiated the mood of that period thus: Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive. . . . In 1949, faith--and public pressure--seemed to have moved mountains: an official Assembly of parliamentarians from ten countries had been established: excitement was in the air: the possibilities seemed boundless. And, indeed, the Council of Europe marked an important advance. It was a distinctly political body which sought to make a break with purely inter-governmental tradi tions. The members of its Assembly, elected by their national parliaments from among the political parties, took their seats in alphabetical order, not in national delegations, and were able to develop something approaching a European point of view. . . . H As The Council of Europe was about to go into action, a veteran champion of European Federation voiced HRichard Mayne, The Community of Europe (New York: Norton [c. 1962]), pp. 81-2. For further substantiation of the "optimistic and zealous European spirit" of that time, but with a more critical analysis of the make-up, functioning, and defects of the Consultative Assembly, see Hans A. Schmitt, The Path to European Union: From the Marshall Plan to the Common Market (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press [c. 1962]), pp. 40-3. 348 the great expectations throughout Western Europe in these words: "What a wonderful day it will be for the whole world--but one which must come if we wish to remain free men--when we proclaim at Strasbourg 'We, the people of Europe! ' As European attention focused on Strasbourg, the 101 representatives^ of the twelve member-nations of the Council of Europe,^ gathering for their first session, 12 Count Carlo Sforza, as quoted in C/E, The First Five Years, p. 21. 13 Appointed by the Parliaments of their own coun tries, they represented three major political-party group ings --conservative, liberal, and socialist--as well as some of the most respected minds, parliamentarians, and civic leaders of their nations. ^From the original ten member-nations of Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, plus Greece and Turkey, subsequently admitted to membership in 1949. (Britain, France, and Italy were allotted 18 seats each; Turkey, 8; Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, and Sweden, 6 each; Denmark, Ireland, and Norway 4 each; Luxembourg, 3. With the admission of Iceland [3 seats] in 1950; the German Federal Republic [18 seats] in 1951; [an amendment to the Council of Europe Statute in 1951 giving Belgium, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, and Norway an additional seat each and Turkey an additional two]; and the admission of Austria [6 seats] in 1956, the total membership of the Council of Europe grew to 15 nations with 135 representa tives in the Consultative Assembly.) A thorough treatment of the Consultative Assembly: Its Composition, Powers, and Procedure may be found in Robertson, Council of Europe. Chapter 4. 349 August 10 to September 8, 1949, were deeply imbued with the unique honor that was bestowed upon them as the charter participants in this historic, initial European Assembly. That they sensed the eyes and ears of Western Europe, along with the rest of the world, turned toward them and truly appreciated their mission is evidenced by the tone and caliber of their speeches in the first major debate of the Council of Europe Assembly. This was the title of that great debate: C onsideration of any necessary changes in the p o l i t i c a l s tr u c tu r e of Europe to achieve a g re a te r u n ity between the Members of the Council of Europe and to make an e f f e c tiv e European co-operation in the various spheres sp e c ifie d in A r tic le I of the S ta tu te . It was Andrd Philip (France), the very first speaker in this debate, who spelled out the necessity for a federal structure in Europe and urged immediate action in this direction. Among other things, he emphasized the extreme urgency that brought the Council of Europe Assembly Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly, Reports rOfficial Report of Debats 1, First Session, 10th August- 8th September 1949 (Strasbourg: 1949), Part I, p. 75; hereinafter cited as C/E C.A. Debates. For the complete debate on this subject of changes in the political struc ture of Europe, see ibid., pp. 75-168. 350 into being at Strasbourg. "It is the fact that public opinion in all our countries now realises that the economic and political unification of Europe has become a matter of life and death for us all," M. Philip declared, "and that unless we make rapid progress towards that unifica tion we shall very soon find ourselves in what may become a tragic situation. A little later, in the Assembly M. Philip made this general declaration concerning the immediate action necessary: It is true that we are here as members of national delegations, in the sense that we are members of national Parliaments, . . . For my part, however, as Member for Lyon, while I am in the French Parliament I speak as a French deputy, representing and defending the general will of the French people and not the limited interests of my constituency. Here, although we come from national constituencies, when we address the Assembly we do not speak for French, Italian and British delegations but as representatives of Europe, who are discussing problems in the general interest of and in the name of all the peoples of Europe. . . . if we are to accomplish this task, we must rapidly increase to some extent the powers of our Assembly. We must without delay let the Committee of Ministers know that we do not consider ■^C/E C.A. D eb a tes. op. c i t .. p. 78. 351 It proper that an Assembly such as this should be put In the position of a schoolboy raising his hand in class, and be obliged to ask for permission before discussing a subject. It is essential that there shall be some modification of the Statute, which will enable the Assembly itself to decide on the questions it wishes to discuss. The Assembly should also be able to establish its Committees so that they are not necessarily limited to the duration of a Session, but can continue their work in the period between Sessions, . . . 1? As to economic and technical problems like European electricity, ports, and transports, M. Philip advised the formation of "European supranational organisms and institu tions, . . . [which] must be directed by a political authority." Continuing, he pointed out that if Europe was IQ to be created and unified "as a common market," it would be necessary to move as quickly as possible toward "the creation of a European political authority of a supra national character. 17 C/E C.A. Debates, op. cit. . pp. 79-80. Ibid., p. 80. Here M. Philip anticipates and uses for the first time (at least publicly in a formal debate) the term "common market," which was to become the popular name for the European Economic Community (EEC), not established until almost eight years later in 1957. l^Loc. c i t . 352 Turning to the role of the Committee of Ministers in the Council of Europe, M. Philip ventured to say: It is imperative that the Committee of Ministers shall not be merely an assembly of diplomats, using that rightof veto which has already done too much harm in international assemblies for any of us to wish to introduce it on a permanent basis here, but [that] it shall become a real political authority ruling by a majority, taking decisions and effectively responsible to the political Assembly which we form and which is, after all, the nucleus, we 2 0 hope, of what will become a European Parliament. The representatives whose names follow supported M. Philip's supranational or federal approach and high lighted among other points these essentials: M. van der Goes van Naters (Netherlands) declared that a "closer union can only be achieved by federal methods, because they recognise the interdependence and the autonomy of the Member States." Then, after quoting from Briand's statement to the League of Nations on September 5, 1929, in these words: "'I think that between peoples who are * geographically grouped as are the people of Europe, there must exist some federal bond. . . he concluded: 21 "It is this bond, Gentlemen, that I am trying to create." ^®C/E C.A. Debates, op. cit.. p. 80. 21Ibid.. pp. 91, 93. 353 M. Scherer (France) stressed that without a politi cal authority above the European national Governments they "cannot do anything else than try to win acceptance in their conferences for the views of their own respective countries." He attacked the old doctrine of the national sovereignty of the state as "a pernicious doctrine" and agreed with a previous speaker, Lord Layton, that it had "not yet exhausted its prestige" as public opinion in the nations of Europe was not "equally prepared for the transfer of certain attributes of sovereignty to a supra national or international authority." On this very point, however, M. Scherer called the Assembly's attention to the fact that the French people had "written into their Constitution their willingness to renounce, subject to reciprocity, certain prerogatives of sovereignty, at any time when this may be required in the interests of inter- 2 2 national co-operation, or of peace." 22 C/E C.A. Debates, op. cit., p. 105. It is sig nificant from the standpoint of international politics that the peoples of Italy and the German Federal Republic have followed the French people's example and have placed in their Constitutions almost an identical clause transfer ring certain prerogatives of their national sovereignty to a higher authority. 354 M. Jakobsen (Denmark) pointed out that, if Euro peans were not willing to surrender part of their sover eignty, they would Mall run the risk of losing not only parts of but the last bit of sovereignty." He then con tinued : When the term "union is used to-day, there is often a lack of precision. However, we receive nothing for nothing. The new things, which will be to the advantage of all of us, will also demand sacrifices. . . . If we want a Union of Europe, but at the same time oppose such an authority, we are beyond the realms of reality. The subject for discussion is rather how quickly this goal can be reached. We have the tradition of centuries, and the prejudice of millions against us. It is important that we who agree should not create unnecessary dissension among ourselves. . . . . . . the comparison between the Committee of Ministers and a European Government is false. The Committee of Ministers is not responsible to this Assembly. The Committee of Ministers has no power in itself. ... It is more accurate to compare the Committee of Ministers to a Senate safeguarding a sort of equal representation from each Member State, so that the small nations also have an opportunity of taking part. . . . I have been chosen as a Representative to this Assembly as a Socialist. The question of the con stitution of Europe is not one of Socialism or non-Socialism. Our aim must be to build up a democratic Europe. . . in which Socialist and non- Socialist views are given the place due to them according to the support they can gain among the people of Europe. . . . 355 We Socialists should not forget that it is we who are traditionally internationally-minded. It is important that to-day, when the possibility exists, that we do not come to stand as the most Conservative and the most narrowly nationally- minded. There is a fear of what a United Europe may bring to the working classes, in those coun tries which are most favourably placed to-day. J M. Le Bail (France) mentioned that all of the Assembly speeches thus far revealed "one common factor . . . the feeling of deep responsibility which weighs on Representatives, and the anxiety not to disappoint public opinion in a world where our Assembly has given rise to such high hopes. Realities of Unity: the Political Debate Continues M. Le Bail (France) indicated that the Assembly was divided into "those who favour caution and those who favour boldness." "In fact," he declared, "the motto common to everyone in the Assembly is: Beware!" Then he emphasized that he was "on the side of the bold and opposed to the cautious." Next, he referred to the tend ency of previous speakers to divide the Assembly over two ^C/E C.A., Debates. op. cit., pp. 109-10. 24 Ib id ., p. 119. 356 economic conceptions: (1) conservative laissez-faire and (2) socialist planning. Although as a Socialist M. Le Bail had his own predilection on this subject, he declared: I believe in the first place, that there must be spiritual rapprochement in the field of economic conceptions. We must not, right at the beginning of our Assembly, present to Europe the spectacle of a discussion which I might almost describe as "theological," on the value of laissez- faire or planning. . . . I should not dream of making this con ception a condition for making a start on the construction of Europe. Let us accept the fact that there are differ ences between us; let experience decide if laissez- faire or planning is the right method. Let us simply start this experiment in all good faith, as Europeans who are determined to succeed, and who are prepared, if necessary, to admit their mistakes. I believe that we shall all be agreed that the new Europe must, in fact, be the result of a com promise between the two tendencies which are opposed to each other at the present time.^ M. Gulek (Turkey) in support of the union of Europe pointed out that because of the centuries of tradition and prejudice of the peoples of Europe the task was "far more difficult and complex than the one which faced America." Yet, as the first speaker during two days of debate to suggest (in these exact words) "a United States of Europe," 25 C/E C.A. Debates % op. c i t . , pp. 119-20. 357 he urged: Our aim is, and must be, a United States of Europe. That seems a long way ahead, and a very difficult task; but with determination and good will we shall reach that goal. The great task of this Assembly is to form a Constituent Assembly of the United States of Europe. It will one day become the Parliament of Europe, . . . A United States of Europe will naturally entail difficulties and sacrifices as well as advantages. . . . ^6 Referring to the present session of the Assembly as the "running in" period (a British term used similarly to the American "breaking in" term for a new automobile engine), M. Bastid (France) called attention to the fact that this Assembly had been "convened by Governments who were pressed by an urgent need and by the force of public opinion, since the Council of Europe originated in the private organisation called the ’European Movement,' of which Mr. Winston Chruchill was the illustrious promoter." Later he drew this parallel: All discussion turns upon this archaic con ception of the absolute sovereignty of States, a conception which the jurists of the whole world condemn, but which Governments continue to 26 C/E C.A. Debates, op. cit.. p. 129. Subsequent speakers thereafter used the expression "United States of Europe" in their arguments for a European Federation. 358 defend on principle, and which only a movement, such as we here represent, can succeed in destroying. . . . In presenting the Statute of Europe to their respective Parliaments, Governments have cited as its chief merit what, in my view, is its main defect: that no sacrifice of sovereignty is involved. Worse still, clinging to their tradi tional prerogatives, they have multiplied precau tions so that our Assembly--supposed to be so audacious--may not pass the borderline which separates simple co-operation from real union. Mr. Mackay (Britain) stressed as his first point: "the economic integration of Europe,'1 and as his second: "the solution of the economic problems of Europe involves a political decision." To drive his points home, he emphasized that "unless, by political action we create the necessary political authority or political machinery, we are not able*"to deal with economic problems to any extent." Critical of his British colleagues, he then declared: We have heard a lot of talk about paper constitutions and things of that kind. I wish that my friends who use those phrases would face reality a little more than they do. The Statute of the Council of Europe which brings us here is [a] paper constitution. The Convention which created O.E.E.C. is a paper constitution. In international affairs no decision can be recorded 27 C/E C.A. D eb ates. op. c i t . , pp. 134-5. 359 without having a paper constitution. The argument is not over whether we should have a paper consti tution for the political union of Europe or not. The real argument is about the real decisions to be made. If we are to work out any kind of politi cal organisation for Europe, it will still require a paper constitution. ... I should appreciate much more the sincerity and seriousness of my colleagues in this Assembly if they did not hide bad and loose thoughts behind the words "paper constitution" and phrases of that kind. For they cannot avoid their responsibility of coming to a political decision here.^8 Returning to Europe's economic dilemma, Mr. Mackay pointed out that not one of the twelve member-nations of the Council of Europe could solve its economic problems on its own. Each can solve them "only by creating a large area within which to trade, by getting a common coinage for Western Europe as a whole, and creating the political conditions which exist in the economic sense in the Soviet 29 Union or in the United States of America." Finally, acknowledging Mr. Churchill, seated in the Assembly, as the Leader of the Opposition in the British Parliament and the one who had played the leading role in the movement to unite Europe, Mr. Mackay revealed how the negative side of our national politics can block the way ^®C/E C.A. Debates. op. cit.. pp. 137-9. 29 I b i d ., p. 139. 360 to a United States of Europe: In a very important speech in Britain a few weeks ago, he [Churchill] said that the economic policy of his party was that the home market should be first, the Commonwealth second and the foreigners third. That is no basis for any con ception of a European union. I come to this Assembly as a European first and as a British person second. I ask Representatives to realise that they will resolve the problems which con front them in their own countries only if they resolve them for Europe as a whole. Unemployment in Rouen is as important to me as unemployment in ray town of Hull, which I represent in the House of Commons. We must face the fact that we are Europeans. Until we get this fact into our heads and are prepared to think not of what we intend to do in our little parts of the world but of what we intend to do in Europe as a whole, we shall not succeed. ... I hope that the contacts which I am making in this Assembly will make me a better European, so that I shall think in European terms to a greater degree than before. I hope that will apply to everyone who is here. I appeal to my friends from Scandinavia, from the Benelux countries, from Italy, and France not to approach the problems of this Assembly from their own narrow local point of view. I ask my col leagues to do the same. We are here in a great experiment. The future of Europe will be determined by the actions which we take. ... I ask this Assembly to turn its back on the old conceptions of politi cal sovereignty, on the old conceptions of anarchy between independent States of Europe, . . . Taking our courage in our hands, I ask that we should, at the same time, declare that we shall secure a 361 United States of Europe and the merging of the individual [State] sovereignties. . . .30 Expressing agreement with the speeches of Messrs. Philip, Le Bail, and Mackay, M. Bohy (Belgium) recalled that he and the Assembly President, M. Spaak, had met two years ago at Interlaken, Switzerland, with some 300 of their colleagues from the national Parliaments of Europe--many of whom were in this very Assembly today--and had drawn the plan for an Assembly such as this. After reminding the Representatives that he had heard some of them compare this "... Assembly to a Parliament--which I willingly accept--and the Committee of Ministers to an executive authority," he declared: A smile, a trifle sad, came to my lips. What an executive authority! In fact it can only receive our Recommendations, and per haps add some of their own and ask the Parlia ments, the true executive authority, dispersed between nations, to be good enough to receive them. If the Committee of Ministers is the embryo of an executive authority, it must have power, and this power can only be born from the abandon ment of part of national sovereignty.31 ^®C/E C.A. Debates, op. cit., pp. 140-1. 31Ibid.. pp. 144-5. 362 M. Bidault (France) emphasized that this was the first time in the history of Europe that "the responsible statesmen of twelve countries" had met in an assembly like this. Then he added: The reason why this fundamental innovation has almost escaped notice is that public opinion has adopted it, and entirely accepts its aim, methods and, in the long run, the views of those assembled here. . . . I publicly avow, the responsibility which 1 undertook, when, hardly a year ago, . . . I proposed to the Committee of Ministers, which was then in session and comprised the Representa tives of the countries of Western Europe whom the Brussels Pact had brought together at that time, to take a further step towards economic unity and the constitution of a European Parliament. I may, perhaps, be allowed to say that under such conditions, I feel a greater measure of responsibility to this Assembly than any one else here. At the time, certain apprehensions were felt; later others became apparent. There is no question of creating a Europe which is "right," "left" or "centre." For a long time now--since the Holy Alliance--the ball goes back and forth and each nation makes use of Europe in turn. It is high time that this ended. . . . We must create a Europe which has not borrowed colour, but which has a character of its own. We all agree that politics is the art of the possible, and not that of dominating the impos sible; but possibilities must be boldly appraised. 363 How shall we proceed? There are two terms which recur in our Debates, union and federation; at least that is what an indifferent jurist like myself has understood. . . . we are at the beginning of a great undertaking. It cannot be achieve[d] by half- measures. We must go forward, prudently but with firm resolve. It is always tempting to do nothing. That is an old, well known form of tactics, which only results in ruining countries which give in to it. . . . We must create Europe. That is why we are assembled here, ... Speaking on behalf of the point of view of the Socialists of Europe (insofar as principles are concerned), M. Mollet reminded the Assembly that Mr. Dalton (Britain) and he chaired the International Socialist Conference, held at Paris, April 24-25, 1948, and "attended by repre sentatives of fifteen European Socialist Parties, including those of the ten countries represented here." At this conference it was unanimously agreed that it was "within the framework of a free United States of Europe, conceived ^ C/E C.A. Debates, op. cit.. pp. 153-6. Bidault also mentioned that it was he who promulgated the clause in the French Constitution to surrender certain portions of national sovereignty to a higher authority if other countries do likewise. Moreover, he indicated that France realizes that Germany is a part of Europe and once she "is restored to the paths of democracy," she must share in the creation of Europe and be given a place in this Assembly (p. 155). 364 as one stage towards the unification of the world, that the economic, social, political and cultural aims of the workers of all countries may best be attained." He then pointed out: For the first time, this idea, which is not specifically Socialist and which might seem Utopian, was adopted by our respective Parties, which undertook to lift it out of the stage of mere speculation, and to make a reality of it. . . . the urgent reasons, common to us all, which are working in favour of the European Feder ation are . . . briefly: the countries of Europe cannot preserve their independence against inter nal or external danger if they continue to claim a separate existence, one from the other. . . . [and] the unity of Europe is an urgent economic necessity to us all. All the statesmen without exception have affirmed their conviction on this point and it was indeed Mr. Bevin who last year stated that for the countries of Europe the problem was either to save themselves together, or to perish together. One speaker has talked about the possibility of creating a United States of Europe without some of us. As far as we are concerned, we say: there can be no question of excluding Great Britain. . . . What is it that we want? ... as far as the Committee of Ministers is concerned, we do not 365 want to diminish its authority, but ... to increase it. . . . I hope Recommendations will be soon made and agreed for the renunciation in Europe of the unanimity rule, that is this right of veto which is fundamentally anti-democratic and which has already done so much harm to the world.^3 Turning next to the Assembly speakers who took a different approach to the goal of European unity, Lord Layton (Britain) led off by saying that it was not possible or wise to avoid the two distinct views or opinions as to the future political structure of Europe, both of which "will certainly be disclosed in the course of this Debate." The two views he reiterated thus: One is that we should now go forward boldly towards federation. The other is that we should be content, for the present at all events, with the evolutionary method, and proceed step by step to build upon the forms of co-operation which have already been called into being. The case for the first of these courses is a strong one, . . . . . . but here in Strasbourg we have to recognise that such a Proposal will encounter serious resistance. We must also realise that in creating such an institution of Europe, we have no precedent to guide us. . . . 33 C/E C.A. D ebates. op. c i t . . pp. 158-60. 366 There are other features, too, which make the task of federating Europe unlike anything which has preceded it. We are debarred by the Statute from discussing the subject of defence . . . comon defence has been a basic function of practically every federation which has ever existed. Yet most of the nations represented here are part of a larger defence group [NATO] . . . . the larger the number of nations in a federation the fewer are the functions that can be federalised, and vice versa. The other major problem ... is the compli cation created by the special association between several of the countries of Western Europe, . . . with other overseas territories. The form which European unity will ultimately take must inevitably follow an entirely new pattern, and not just be copied from the pattern that has developed elsewhere in quite other cir cumstances. ... On the other hand, Mr. Ungoed-Thomas lived up to the British genius for proposing a committee to study the various suggestions for closer political union and to report back to the Assembly its findings as soon as a / C/E C.A. Debates, op. cit., pp. 83-4. Lord Layton, it should be mentioned, was first to urge in his Assembly speech a Charter of Human Rights[and Fundamental Freedoms], with a definite method of enforcement. And his untiring initiative culminated in its achievement on November 4, 1950, considered one of the greatest accom plishments of the Council of Europe to date (see C/E European Treaty Series, No. 5, The Convention for the Pro tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4th November 1950 [Strasbourg: 1950]), pp 1-25. 367 possible. In fact, he read a Motion to this effect; and at the end of the Debate the following day, it was passed 3 S and referred to the Committee on General Affairs. J Mr. Boothby (Britain) next indicated that the exercise of national sovereignty was the difficult issue that demanded a decision. Then he added: . . . I am convinced that the doctrine of the sovereign equality of nations is not only nonsense but a mathematical formula for war . . . the only solution of this problem lies in some merging or pooling of national sovereignty--not so much the surrender as the joint exercise by common agree ment of certain defined sovereign powers. There is no reason for a quarrel at this juncture between so-called federalists and so- called unionists. The difference between us, in so far as it exists, is a difference of approach and of words. . . . a few words of warning. We must beware of rigidity and also of the tyranny which is inher ent in over-centralisation. One of the gravest threats to human liberty to-day is the growing power of centralised executive Governments everywhere. . . . . . . I feel most strongly that in this Assembly and in the Committee of Ministers we have the instruments with which an organic Euro pean Union can be forged. Why should we seek to replace them? . . . ... do not let us delude ourselves that union can be achieved by a paper constitution. ^ C /E C.A. D ebates, op. c i t . , pp. 88, 168-9. 368 Union can be achieved only by the will to succeed, by determination, and by practical action. . . . ° Calling the Assembly's attention to the fact that in "the minds of most men's eyes [there] is the prospect that out of our deliberations some ideal constitutional settlement will emerge," Mr. Edelman (Britain) suggested that this idea be approached "in a pragmatic manner" thus: . . . if we were merely to draft pretentious paper constitutions which would not command the adherence of either our Governments or our parties, then, indeed, it would have excited among vast numbers of peoples hopes which would be dashed to the ground ... we must serve an apprentice ship of practical co-operation before we can advance to a real European unity. In fact, it has already become clear that there are two main approaches to the question of European unity. . . . the constitutional . . . the functional . . . I believe that we in this Assembly can make the most practical contribution to European unity if we propose a system of functional and working co-operation between our various countries, rather than by attempting to draft an ideal constitution to which in practice the Governments may not adhere. After all, we must acknowledge that there are in Europe interests which I might properly call "legitimate vested interests." Surely, the worker has a vested interest in his place of work, and the factory owner a vested interest in the location of his factory? . . . ■^C/E C.A. D ebates, op. c i t .. pp. 93-4. 369 ... I deplore the hypocrisy of anyone who while paying lip-service to the cause of European unity at Strasbourg is none the less prepared to make economic nationalism and imperial exclusive ness the keystone of an election manifesto at home. I cannot help thinking that of all demagogues there is none worse than that which simultaneously appeals to the ideal and to the most selfish in men. ^ ' Next, Mr. Crawley (Britain) stressed that many powerful voices were still raised against European unity and that on a number of occasions various governments of Europe, when "faced by some practical consequences of unity, have in fact refused to face them." Later, Mr. Crawley revealed that it would be misleading to suggest a majority of opinion in Britain "actively in favour of European unity." This was his explanation: The Commonwealth is a part of us. . . . Again, the people of the United States speak the same language as we do, and there are very many people in England who, quite naturally and openly, feel that the first line of development which our country should pursue is that of close union of the English-speaking peoples. I sometimes feel that even those who are most rhetorical in support of the idea of European unity, when it comes to the practical difficul ties, instinctively fall back on the idea rather of an English-speaking union. ... In my country if one were to take the majority view it would be that although we must collaborate as far as ^ C /E C.A. D ebates. op. c i t .. pp. 97-8. 370 possible with Europe, nothing must be done which would in any way prejudice our relations with the Commonwealth or which could in any way hamper our relationship with the United States. Toward the end of his speech, Mr. Morrison (Britain) mentioned that there were two alternative approaches to the closer political union of Europe, the "functional and what I may call the federalist or institutional." Enlarg ing upon the former, he continued: Up to date the approach has been functional in character, and let us not underestimate the remarkable advances that have been made under this mechanism of the functional approach. But I would not be dogmatic; I do not say that the functional approach is necessarily the solution for all time, . . .^ Mr. Macmillan (Britain) followed and appealed to the Assembly to strengthen and build upon the organs of the Council of Europe and to "achieve our purpose by prac tical experience." Meanwhile, among other things, he urged: ^®C/E C.A. Debates. op. cit.. p. 106. Mr. Crawley, however, stated that he did "not entirely share that view," for he was "a European," who believed that unless Europe ultimately federated it would disintegrate. Moreover, he pointed out that he and all those who hold these views are "in a minority in nearly all Member countries" loc. cit. 39I b i d . , p. 124. 371 By all means, let us have continuing study by some continuing body, chosen from the Council of Europe, to discuss and devise a plan and report to the next Session of the Assembly. But 1 hope that we shall not be content to wait a whole year without any positive action. Above all, let us avoid the type of enquiry with which most of us are familiar in our parliamentary experience, in which the object is not so much to produce a useful result as to postpone an awkward question. We have become very accustomed to that in our own country, and it has become something of a joke there.^- ® Finally, Mr. Churchill addressed the Assembly, and as a matter of tact took this position: I am not myself committed to a federal or any other particular solution at this stage. We must thoroughly explore all the various pos sibilities, and a Committee, working coolly and without haste, should, in a few months, be able to show the practical steps which would be most helpful to us. I will not prejudge the work of the Committee, but I hope they will remember Napoleon’s saying, "A constitution must be short and obscure." Until that Committee reports, I think we should be well advised to reserve our judgment. C/E C.A. Debates. op. cit.. pp. 126-7. Mr. Mac millan also submitted a list of twelve recommendations to strengthen the Council of Europe. The 5th called for two meetings of the Consultative Assembly every year; the 10th urged development of a public opinion in Europe to make it impossible for a member Government to "stand against the general wish" (p. 127). 372 I now come to the question of the empty seats which was put before us by M. Andrd Philip. Ten ancient capitals of Europe are behind the iron curtain. A large part of this Continent is held in bondage. They have escaped from Nazism only to fall into the other extreme of Communism. . . . I agree with all those, . . . who have spoken in favour of setting aside some seats in the Assembly as a symbol of proof of our intention that the Assembly shall some day represent all Europe, or all Europe west of the Curzon Line. I now come, Sir, to the greatest and most important of all the questions that are before us. A united Europe cannot live without the help and strength of Germany. This has always been fore seen by the European Movement, to whose exertions our presence here is due. . . . We cannot part at the end of this month on the basis that we do nothing more to bring Germany into our circle until a year has passed. That year is too precious to lose. . . At the close of the two-day debate on August 17, / 2 1949, the question of "any necessary changes in the political structure of Europe" was referred to the C/E C.A. Debates, op. cit. . pp. 148-9. 42 At the risk of belaboring the numerous speeches above of the better-known representatives of the first Council of Europe Assembly, the writer has tried to capture the mood of this Assembly as well as the issues that emerged and crystalized into two different approaches to European unity during the ensuing decade. 373 / O Assembly's Committee on General Affairs for study and recommendation. But because of the complexity of the problem, its study and report were extended until the Assembly's Second Session in 1950.^ Meanwhile, Messrs. Mackay, Philip, and others succeeded in getting the Assembly to table unanimously a motion recommending the "creation of a European political authority with limited functions but real powers.This of course was referred for study to the General Affairs Committee, where later the British and Scandinavian members said: "No, we will have no such authority; we do not want any constitution, however flexible and adaptable, which would set up an authority higher than that of the individual nation. Actually its political committee, but not until 1957 did the Assembly rename it the Political Committee. See Robertson, Council of Europe, p. 81, for the history of this committee. For the subsequent debate and action on the General Affairs Committee Report on the "political structure of Europe, see C/E C.A. Debates, op. cit., pp. 475-522, 562. 44 See Robertson, op. cit. , pp. 83-7, for a progress report on the committee's subsequent work and other Assembly action. 45 The little-known history of events leading to this motion is given by Robertson in ibid.., p. 85, footnote 11. ^As quoted by Paul Reynaud in Official Record of Debates. November 19-23. 1951: Conference of Strasbourg 374 The Split Road to European Unity Although the many supporters of The European Movement's efforts to unite Europe had looked upon the actual start of the Council of Europe Assembly in Stras bourg with great expectations, the experienced parliamen tarians who participated in the Assembly more or less viewed the First Session as a warm-up, exploratory sitting. Consequently, many dusted off their parliamentary skills and rhetoric in order to impress their international col- 47 leagues, along with Europe s interested public. Dis counting their best efforts of oratory, as well as their platitudes and statements for public effect, the stresses and strains of economic self-interest, political party bias, and national traditions could be seen emerging. Unfortunately, so soon after the first days of this unpre cedented Assembly, disharmony set in over economic and political differences as to the future political structure of Western Europe. Between D elegations of the Congress of the United S tates of America and of the C o n su lta tiv e Assembly of th e Council of Europe (Strasbourg: 1951), p. 191. ^A list of forty-five Representatives from eleven member-nations who desired to speak in the General Politi cal Debate were given that opportunity. None of 375 Reviewing the above speeches of the Assembly’s first General Debate, undoubtedly its most optimistic and 48 anticipatory as the two-day debate started, two major political tendencies or approaches to European unity can be identified: (1) the French-led, Continental federalists or supranationalists, who desired to establish by written constitution a United States of Europe forthwith and to make federal adjustments as changing times or situations demanded; (2) the British-led, Insular confederalists or associationists, who did not wish to be bound to a federa tion having a "rigid, paper constitution" but preferred to move cautiously, only taking a "pragmatic step at a time" to reach European unity by means of goodwill, cooper ation, and empiricism via functional, intergovernmental Luxembourg's Representatives participated. Britain and France,of course, provided the two highest proportions of speakers. 48 A subsequent two-day economic debate was held August 23-24, 1949, as a result of which the Assembly adopted several recoimnendations of a general economic nature (see C/E C.A. Debates. op. cit., pp. 251-333, 399- 433, 437-72, 522-8). These were referred to the Committee of Ministers, which in turn referred them to the OEEC, which had jurisdiction over these economic matters (see C/E, The First Five Years, pp. 68-9). Also see Robertson, Council of Europe, pp. 117-9. 376 49 organizations. In turn, the Assembly was further divided over two economic conceptions for the future economy of Western Europe: (1) socialistic (government- planned and operated); (2) democratic (private enterprise with government regulation and certain public ownership), i.e., a mixed economy. Even though it was not opposed to the idea of European unity in principle, the Assembly's divergence over the semantics of European unity helped to widen the cleavage between opposing sides as to the best means to reach it. With the die thus cast and destined to remain so more or less throughout the first decade of the Council of Europe's existence, it was a period of rival views and groping for position along the bifurcated road to European unity, and along which the Council of Europe tried to straddle. To the adherents of European Federation, however, what was thought to be the beginning of a European Parlia ment at Strasbourg in 1949 proved a bitter disappointment. 49 Although the Continental Socialists were in the vanguard of the federalist group in the above debate, as time passed the two schools of approach to European unity were divided not so much on party as on nationalist lines. See below, pp. 378 ff. and in Chapter X, pp. 392 ff. 377 50 Not u n t i l a f t e r th e f i r s t se ssio n of th e Assembly d eb ates and th e Committee of M i n i s t e r s ^ was th e C ouncil of Europe ^^The Assembly of the Council of Europe is cer tainly a unique European institution and has little or no parallel. Although its delegates are selected by the member-nations 1 parliaments (and need not be members of parliament), they do not represent their national parlia ments nor their Governments. [See Prime Minister Attlee's statements on this in House of Commons Deb.. 5th series, 1948-59, vol. 468 (18 October 1949), 4751.] In this respect, they are on their own and have complete freedom to express their views, make proposals, and pass resolu tions, committing no one but themselves. Hence, the Assembly has no powers of decision or legislation, nor can it impose its views directly on the Council of Europe members. At best it may make recommendations to the Coun cil of Ministers, which, if the latter chooses, may in turn pass them on to their national Governments for deci sion. Since its first session then, the primary function of the C.A. has been to provide a forum for European public opinion in the hope thereby of indirectly reaching and influencing the C/M and the national Governments. Fuller details and excellent analyses of the work, of the C.A. in the C/E may be found in M. Margaret Ball, NATO and the European Union Movement (London: Stevens, 1959), Ch. 6, and in Robertson, Council of Europe. Chapter 4. Also see C/E, The First Five Years, pp. 58-60; Council of Europe, Ten Years of the Council of Europe (Strasbourg: I960), pp. 1-83; and Arnold J. Zurcher, The Struggle to Unite Europe, 1940-1958 (Washington Square, New York: New York University Press, 1958), pp. 49-56. ” ^T he Committee of M in iste rs o f th e C ouncil of Europe [ th e r e i s a ls o a Committee of M in iste rs o f th e OEEC ( p r a c t i c a l l y th e same men) and o th e r European organ iz a tio n s ] i s composed of th e F oreign M in iste rs o f each m em ber-nation and is q u ite s im ila r to a d ip lo m a tic c o n f e r ence, except th a t i t o rig in a te d by a s p e c ia l mandate (C/E S ta tu te ) and is a permanent body. I t s v o tin g on p ro c e d u ra l m a tte rs re q u ir e s m erely a sim ple m a jo rity , more im p ortant 378 52 seen in its true perspective. Furthermore, two contra dictions emerged during the first year in the effective matters a two-thirds majority, and on six specified matters a unanimous vote (voting procedures, somewhat involved, may be found in Article 20 of the C/E Statute). Because of the desire to reach unanimity among the member-govern ments rather than impose "the will of the majority on a reluctant minority" the C/M has preferred to follow the unanimous vote in most decisions except minor matters of procedure. As a result, decisions that do not appear to have a chance of unanimity are avoided. In other words, they are not acted upon, thereby giving the impression of inaction on C.A. recommendations. Those decisions that are passed are referred to the member-governments in the form of resolutions on which the governments need not necessarily act. Those that the governments act upon are usually in the form of a convention or agreement, are negotiated, and then ratified in the same way as inter national treaties. Furthermore, Article 21 provided that the meetings of the C/M shall be held in private and that the Committee decides what information is to be made public. The C/M met twice in the last half of 1949, four times in 1950, three times in 1951, and twice each year since. Much of the work of the C/M has been delegated to Deputies sub stituting for them because of the increased demands of their governmental responsibilities and the necessity of attend ing the proliferated international organizations in Europe and elsewhere, e.g., NATO, OEEC, UN, WEU, etc. For more minute details and developments in the C/M membership, functions, subordinate bodies, procedure, and other pro visions of the C/M, see Robertson's excellent volume, Council of Europe, pp. 24-40. Also see C/E, The First Five Years, loc. cit., Ten Years of the Council of Europe, loc. cit.. and the European Yearbook. Vols. I-VII, 1955-1960, for the best documented annual chronology of C/E Conventions publications, and other developments to be found within a single volume for each particular year. 52 Paul Reynaud reflected rather succinctly the attitude of the European federalists toward the Council of Europe after its first session when he wrote: "The Council 379 operation of the Council of Europe: (1) although the con sensus of the Assembly representatives, from every member- nation and every political party, had been "Western Europe's plight is urgent; it is necessary to act quickly," nothing 53 seemed to be urgent to the Committee of Ministers; and of Europe consists of two bodies, one of them for Europe, the other against it." See his Unite or Perish ([New York]: Simon and Schuster [c. 1951]), p. 199. Also cf. Ibid., pp. 194-206, wherein Reynaud gave the background of the Council of Europe to 1950 and stressed that the C. A. and the C/M both owe their existence to the intergovern mental compromises between Britain and the Continental Governments of the Brussels Treaty Organization. Moreover, it was Britain that saw to it that the C.A. would be rendered as harmless as possible and that there would be no sacrifice of member-nation's sovereignty--they could belong to the Council of Europe and need have no fear of losing their national prerogatives (cf. Britain in Western Europe: WEU and the Atlantic Alliance. Report by a Chatham House Study Group (London and New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs [1956]), pp. 13-14; hereinafter cited as Britain in Western Europe).Cf. further Reynaud's criticism of the C/M for burying the recommenda tions of the Consultative Assembly . . . [their blocking] by obstacles set up in bad faith . . . [and because of whose negative action] "there is no European federation, . . ." in France, Annales de l'Assemblee Nationale. Debats. Vol. 30, VIII (24 Novembre 1949), 6246-8. 53 "Not a single recommendation proposed by the Assembly . . . received a satisfactory reply [from the Committee of Ministers following the First Session of the Assembly], because all the decisions had been deferred," declared M. Mollet in criticism of the Committee of Minis ters in France, Annales de l'Assemblee nationale. Debats. Vol. 30, VIII (25 Novembre 1949), 6333-4. 380 (2) according to the Council of Europe Statute (Article 1), in an omnibus clause, the Assembly might debate problems of common concern Min economic, social, cultural, scien tific, legal, and administrative matters" but not matters of national defense. Nor could it deal with economic problems that fell within the jurisdiction of the OEEC. As a result, European federalists soon came to realize that the Council of Europe was powerless and ineffective as an institutional means to European Union. Especially did this become evident in 1950, when it was learned that the majority of the Council of Europe member- nations and their Assembly representatives were unwilling to make federalist "changes in the political structure of Europe." Instead, they preferred to go along with the British suggestion of a "functionalist, intergovern mental approach--a more gradual course entailing little ^Mr. Edelman, British Representative to the Con sultative Assembly, first used the expression "functional" in the Assembly; see his speech cited above, p. 368. How ever, he also used this term earlier in House of Commons Deb.. 5th series, 1948-49, 459 (10 December 1948), 745-6, see above, footnote 91, Chapter VIII. The word "func tional" became quite popular thereafter and was even adopted by the European federalists and supranationalists to refer to their sector method of uniting Europe, e.g., ECSC, EDC, EEC. Cf. Zurcher, op. cit.. pp. 51, 58-62. 381 or no sacrifice of national sovereignty and individual prerogatives. Consequently, the more realistic European federalists^^ lowered their sights in preparation for 56 the Second Session of the Council of Europe Assembly. Rather than hold out for the full federation of Western Europe and reach a stalemate, they chose to move forward with those nations willing to merge their sovereignties on a ’ ’functionalsector-at-a-time basis, and to leave the door open in the hope that other European nations would join them later. After careful consideration, the supranationalists selected the coal and steel industries as the most logical Besides the two major divisions in the Council of Europe (the intergovernmental associationists and the Continental federationists), there was a further division. The Continental federationists divided into (1) those who wanted to pursue the full or complete federation of Western Europe rather than make a piecemeal attempt and (2) those who were more moderate or realistic and who, although they wanted a total federation of Western Europe ultimately, rather than wait Indefinitely for the proper federation, chose to attain the possible by taking a sector at a time, starting in the economic field. Fuller treatment of the two schools of thought among the European federationists may be found in Britain in Western Europe, p. 17, and in Zurcher, op. cit., pp. 51-3. 56 R o b ertso n , C o u n cil o f E urope, pp. 8 7 -8 . 382 sector to begin to federate. Then on May 9, 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman announced the plan that at first was popularly called the Schuman Plan^ but which officially was named the European Coal and Steel Community, or ECSC. France and Germany (other nations were invited to join) were to combine their entire coal and steel pro duction into a single community operation under a joint executive, known as the High Authority, the decisions of CO which would be binding on the member-nations. M. Jean Monnet, High Commissioner for the modern ization of French industry was the actual developer of the plan. CjE. Schmitt, op. cit. . pp. 49-62, for the "genesis" of the ECSC plan. 58 The six nations of Belgium, France, the German Federal Republic, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands negotiated a draft treaty on the basis of the Schuman proposals beginning on June 20, 1950, at Paris. Britain, unwilling to pool her coal and steel industries with the ECSC, for in effect this would mean transferring her national sovereignty over these sectors to a supranational authority (and Britain claimed that she could not do this because of trade agreements with Commonwealth nations and other countries outside Europe). Thus, Britain did not join (cf. J. H. Huizinga, "Why Britain Says 'No' to Schuman: It Still Hopes to Stay Half in and Half Out of a United Europe," Reporter. August 15, 1950, pp. 15-7). In Sep tember, 1952, however, Britain sent observer missions to the ECSC, and on December 21, 1954, she signed a special agreement of Association with the ECSC (which did not require diehard nationalist Britain to delegate any of her sovereignty over coal and steel to the ECSC). Signed on April 18, 1951, the treaty went into effect on June 25, 383 The Schuman Plan won fa v o ra b le re c e p tio n imme- d i a t e l y on th e C ontinent and seemed th e answer to th e s n a r l in th e C ouncil of Europe over th e r i g h t approach to European u n ity . I t q u a lif ie d fo r th e pragm atic and popular 59 la b e l of " f u n c tio n a l1 s in c e i t focused s i g n i f i c a n t l y on 1952, and was to c o n tin u e f o r 50 y e a rs . Conceived on th e b a s is o f th e s e p a ra tio n of powers o f fo u r community i n s t i t u t io n s : (1) High. A u th o rity o f N ine, (2) Common Assembly of 78 R e p re s e n ta tiv e s , (3) Court o f J u s t i c e o f seven ju d g e s , and (4) C ouncil o f M in iste rs of s ix (one C abinet M in iste r from each of th e s ix community n a tio n s ) , a l l of which in th e s e c to r s o f c o a l and s t e e l provide a c o o r d i n ated f e d e r a l a u th o r ity w ith i t s s e a t in Luxembourg C ity . A more com prehensive coverage o f th e ECSC, i t s fo u r i n s t i tu t i o n s , and an e v a lu a tio n o f i t s re c o rd may be found in B a ll, op. c i t . . pp. 283-321; Louis L i s t e r , E urope's Coal and S te e l Community: An Experiment in Economic Union (New York: T w entieth C entury Fund, 1960), 494 p p .; Jean Monnet, Les ^ ta ts -U n is d 1Europe ont commence: la Com- munaute europdene e s t n d c e s s a ire (ed. par la Commission d 'a p p lic a t io n du Marche Commun du Mouvement Europeetme [ P a r is : 1959]), Europeenne du Charbon e t de I 'A c i e r : d is c o u rs e t a llo c u tio n s . 1952-1954 (P a ris : L affo n t [1955]), 171 p p .; S ch m itt, op. c i t . . pp. 87-204. ^H ope t h a t th e " f u n c tio n a l" a sp e c t o f th e ECSC m ight win B r i t is h p a r tic ip a ti o n as a f u l l p a r tn e r was s h o r t- li v e d . Z urcher in op. c i t . . p. 62, put B r i t a i n 's r e a c tio n th u s: "To be s u re , i t [fu n c tio n a lis m o f th e Con t i n e n t a l f e d e r a l i s t s ] su ggested only piecem eal lim ita tio n o f n a tio n a l s o v e re ig n ty , b ut B r i t a in , and th o se s t a t e s t h a t supported h e r p o s itio n , would have no more of p ie c e meal lim ita tio n o f so v e re ig n ty than o f th e g e n e ra l l i m i t a tio n on so v e re ig n ty im plied by broad f e d e r a tio n . In o th e r w ords, when 'fu n c tio n a lism ' was f i n a l l y d e fin e d and ceased to belong to th e realm of vague g e n e r a l i t i e s , d ear to th e 384 the two basic, yet complementary industries, most essential to the economic stability and growth of Western Europe, and certainly in need of closer European coordination. On the other hand, the ECSC provided a common institution to absorb and control the German potential for future armaments and thereby could conceivably resolve the bitter political issue of past and future French-German relations.^ Furthermore, it appealed to the European federalists because it was based on federalist principles and was promoted by its sponsors as a first step toward European Federation. Finally, it was a boost to the morale of the ’ ’ Europeans" in the Assembly of the Council of Europe as their enthusiasm for European Union had been at a rather low level resulting from the rebuffs of the Com mittee of Ministers and from their own lack of success. At its Second Session in 1950, the Consultative Assembly therefore supported the Schuman Plan, encouraged orator, it quite plainly became a sort of bit by bit approach to federation, and though this new approach might be more pragmatic than the broad 'paper' schemes of federa tion, it meant the same thing to the British. They would have none of it. . ." 60 The Present State of Economic Integration in Western Europe (Report by the Research Directorate of Secretariat-General of the Council of Europe; Strasbourg: 1955), p. 68. 385 other nations to join it, and suggested that other European sectors, such as agriculture and transport, be similarly considered. This more hopeful moment in the short but disappointing life of the Council of Europe was then sparked by Churchill and Reynaud, who, because of the Communist instigation of war in Korea and the implications to the fragmented national defenses of Western Europe, urged the immediate creation of a "unified European Army." Their logical arguments induced the Assembly to adopt such a motion on August 11, 1950--despite Article 1 of the Statute of the Council of Europe denying the Assembly competence in this area. The hopes of the Assembly that Churchill's action would bring Britain around to the Continental federal- sector approach, however, were ill-founded. The Committee of Ministers negated the Assembly's "united European Army" plan on the ground that the matter of defense was outside its statutory competence. This action finally convinced the more realistic Continental federalists that if Europe were to be federated it would have to be done, at least for the time being, without Britain, Ireland, and the Scandinavian countries supporting them, and that the full 386 61 federation of Western Europe was not immediately possible. The green light to proceed without waiting on Britain and her supporting countries had really been flashed, however, at the Assembly's First Session in 1949, when Mr. De Valera (Ireland) suggested: ", . .if the nations of the Continent . . . cannot wait for us, perhaps they should consider going on without us by an agreement 6 2 among themselves for a closer union.’ * In the Assembly's Second Session in 1950, Mr. Mackay (Britain) confirmed the feasibility of this course when he assured France and others that Britain could not be persuaded to accept supranational authority at Strasbourg and that they might 61 just as well proceed without Britain. Even the Committee of Ministers announced that those states wishing to par ticipate in the proposed ECSC might do so.^ ft 1 Cf_. M. Bastid's statements in . . . Summary of the Debates in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. Second Ordinary Session (August 7-November 24, 1950) . I, 1 (London: Hansard Society, 1951), p. 291; here inafter cited as C/E Summary of Debates. Second Session. ^C/E c. A. Debates, First Session, p. 142. C/E C.A. Debates. Second Session. 7th-28th August, 1950, IV (26 August 1950), 1024-8. C/E Summary of Debates. Second Session. I, 5, p. 239. Cf. in ibid.. I, 5, pp. 293-5, M. Bidault's state ments on November 23, 1950, concerning Britain and the 387 By May, 1951, however, th e Committee of M in iste rs had approved c e r ta in minor amendments to th e S ta tu te and a few o th e r m a tte rs recommended by th e C o n s u lta tiv e Assem b ly , b u t n o t th e Mackay P ro to co l o f A ugust, 1950, "to R evise th e S ta tu te " so as to make th e C ouncil o f Europe a European p o l i t i c a l a u th o r ity . Mackay's P ro to c o l, p ro v id in g fo r a stro n g e x e c u tiv e and a genuine l e g i s l a t u r e w ith powers to pass European A cts b in d in g on a l l member- s t a t e s , and a watered-down r e v is io n o f t h i s p ro to c o l in December, 1951,in f a c t , met w ith th e Committee of M in is te r s ' co n tin u ed r e f u s a l . This n e g a tiv e a c tio n made i t c o n c lu s iv e ly c le a r th a t B r ita in and th e S candinavian members would have no p a r t o f a C ouncil o f Europe i f given s u p ra n a tio n a l a u th o r ity . December, 1951, th e r e f o r e , marked th e end o f th e A ssem bly's e f f o r t to endow th e Coun c i l of Europe w ith an e f f e c t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s tr u c tu r e and p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y . ^ I t a ls o w itn essed th e re s ig n a tio n o f M . Spaak, P re sid e n t of th e C ouncil of Europe Assembly, n e c e s s ity of proceeding w ith o u t B r ita in . At th e c o n c lu sio n of M . B a s tid 's speech, th e C.A. passed by 83-9 votes a motion to d r a f t a r e s o lu tio n approving th e c r e a tio n of " s p e c ia l fu n c tio n a l a u t h o r i t i e s or com m unities" lik e th e ECSC. ^ R o b e r ts o n , C ou n cil o f E urope, pp. 8 9 -9 3 . 388 "in protest against what he considered its excessive timidity"^ and "because the [Committee of] Ministers would not listen to him^^ and partly because Foreign Secre tary Eden on November 28, 1951 "casually announced at a press conference in Rome that we (the British) would take no part in it [the 'unified European Army1 or EDC]."^® Henceforth, the hope for European Union or unity via the Council of Europe faded along with its political momentum. It is true, of course, that the Assembly won a number of minor concessions from the Committee of Ministers. Among these were the "power" to compose its own agenda, appoint its own Clerk--who rated the status of a Deputy Secretary-General--and to submit to the ^Robertson, Council of Europe, p. 93. ^Lindsay, op. cit. . p. 60. ft ft Sir Robert Boothby's Introduction to Lindsay, op. cit., pp. ix-xii. Mr. Boothby also pointed out (p. xi) that Eden's statement not only "led to the immediate resig nation of M. Spaak . . . [but also to] the launching of a formidable campaign, under his leadership and that of M. Jean Monnet, for the 'Little Federation.'" Then he added: "In a sense, therefore, Britain was primarily responsible for the creation of 'the Six' and of the Com mon Market by which she is now so frightened." For one of the best literary sources of insight into the British mentality toward the Council of Europe and European Federation, see ibid., pp. 33-7, 107-25. 389 Committee of Ministers written questions.^ And although the Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly continues to debate important issues, its main raison d'etre has been to serve as an international forum to discuss Euro pean problems. Besides this, however, it serves as a clearing house between the parliaments of member-nations and other European international organizations. Whatever the future of the Council of Europe, historians must surely acknowledge its excellent documentation center. Thanks to its expert and efficient Secretariat staff-- beyond the tug and pull of national politics--a rich legacy of the work of the various international institu tions of Western Europe since World War II has been left for scholars and statesmen to study and to evaluate. Unquestionably, the study of the record of the Council of Europe and related international organizations of ^See Lindsay, op. cit., pp. 61-2, for other concessions. Lindsay also pointed out, however, a diminution in the quality and character of the Assembly of the Council of Europe in later years; e.g., he mentioned: "The recent record of absenteeism in the Consultative Assembly has been the subject of internal discussions" (p. 62). Also cf. ibid., pp. 34-5. 390 Western Europe since 1949 should shed rewarding light on the future course of European unity. For an excellent analysis of the "Council of Europe in Perspective" and "Some Positive Achievements [of the Council of Europe]," see Lindsay, op. cit.. Chapters I and IV. Also cf_. Volney D. Hurd, The Council of Europe: Design for a United States of Europe (New York: Manhattan [c. 1958]), pp. 8-50, for the achieve ments of the Council of Europe. CHAPTER X DIVERGENT APPROACHES AND DETERRENTS TO EUROPEAN UNIFICATION The road to European unity after December, 1951, had narrowed considerably from the one on which the Council of Europe's Fifteen had started in 1949. Since the ini- tiative to continue the movement to unite Europe after 1951 had to come from outside the Council of Europe by six of the Council members--Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany--these Six found it necessary to leave the Nine on the old inter national road while they proceeded on the uncharted supra national road. This new supranational road, of course, contained rough stretches and various national roadblocks, but the Six believed that it was the only practical way to reach their goal of European unification. The first sector approached, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), was successfully negotiated and seemed to indicate that the supranational route was the correct one. The second and third sectors approached, 392 th e European D efense Community (EDC) and th e European P o l i t i c a l Community (EPC), however, p re se n te d insu rm o u n t a b le ro ad b lo ck s which n e c e s s ita te d long d e la y and e v e n tu a l d e to u r. In th e m eantim e, th e ch an geable p o s itio n o f th e B r i t i s h , who a p p a re n tly wanted " to e a t t h e i r cake and have i t t o o ," f u r t h e r o b s tru c te d th e way. C onsider t h e i r i n i t i a l a t t i t u d e tow ard ECSC, EDC, and EPC and t h e i r sub seq u en t re q u e s t f o r th e s p e c ia l p o s itio n o f " A sso c ia tio n " w ith o u t s a c r i f i c i n g any o f t h e i r so v e re ig n ty to th e s e com m u n itie s . Note th e B r i t i s h r o l e in sp o n so rin g th e W estern European Union (WEU) a f t e r th e F rench had r e je c te d th e EDC; and th en w ith th e fu n c tio n in g o f th e W EU under t h e i r a e g is , look a t i t s slow s ta g n a tio n in s te a d o f p ro g re ss tow ard European u n ity . A gain, o b serv e B r i t a i n 's r e f u s a l to j o i n th e s u p ra n a tio n a l European Economic Community (EEC, Common M arket, o r th e " In n e r S ix ") and Euratom, but th en n o te h e r prom otion o f th e in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l European F ree T rade A s s o c ia tio n (EFTA o r th e "O uter S even "). Thus, by 1960, in s te a d o f a U nited Europe, which one m ight re a so n a b ly ex pect a f t e r eleven y e a rs of s u b s t a n t i a l e f f o r t and wide p u b li c i ty as to i t s l o g ic , Europe rem ained d iv id e d in to r i v a l economic b lo c s : th e " In n e r S ix" and th e "O uter S even." 393 The " L i t t l e Europe" Approach S k ep tics and a n t i f e d e r a t i o n i s t s n o tw ith sta n d in g , th e ECSC o f th e C o n tin e n ta l Six* became firm ly e s ta b lis h e d , proved s u c c e s s fu l, and was to sym bolize th e new approach to a f e a s i b l e , fu n c tio n a l European Community of su p ra n a tio n a l a u th o r ity . I t is i n t e r e s t i n g to n o te , however, t h a t a f t e r th e ECSC came in to e x is te n c e w ith th e b le s s in g s o f th e U nited S ta te s and appeared "w ell on th e road to European in te g r a tio n or u n ity which was b e lie v e d to lead to European f e d e r a tio n ," th e B r i t is h Government through 1 These s ix c o u n trie s have o fte n been r e f e r r e d to as th e " L i t t l e Six" o r " L i t t l e E urope," term s fre q u e n tly used as a mark of scorn by cy n ics and c e r t a i n opponents. On th e o th e r hand, th e o th e r m em ber-nations o f th e C ouncil of Europe a re sometimes r e f e r r e d to as th e "Big Nine" or sim ply th e Nine; w hereas, th e e n t i r e membership o f th e C ouncil o f Europe is o fte n c a lle d th e F ifte e n o r "Big E urope." 2 T his in clu d ed economic and m oral su p p o rt as w e ll as p u b lic sta te m e n ts o f Government le a d e rs and prom pting through d ip lo m a tic ch a n n els. Cf. O f f ic i a l Record o f D ebates. November 1923. 1951: C onference o f S trasb o u rg between D ele g atio n s o f th e Congress o f th e U nited S ta te s o f America and o f th e C o n s u lta tiv e Assembly o f th e C ouncil o f Europe (S trasb o u rg : 1951), 248 pp. 394 i t F oreign S e c re ta ry Eden co n sid ered i t n e c e ssa ry to " b re a th e some new l i f e in to th e w iltin g p la n t o f S t r a s b o u rg ." 3 The th in k in g o f th e B r i t is h F oreign O ffic e went more o r le s s in t h i s v e in : i f th e ECSC were f i t t e d in to th e C ouncil o f Europe, " B r ita in might keep some c o n tro l over th e a c t i v i t i e s o f th e S ix ." 4 Developments in E ast and West Germany stre n g th e n e d t h i s re a so n in g , fo r th e p os s i b i l i t i e s o f having to rearm West Germany grew because o f th e Korean War and a s im ila r danger to Germany in view o f R u s s ia 's arming o f E ast Germany. On th e o th e r hand, s in c e B r ita in had n ot jo in e d th e C o n tin e n ta l S ix , France fe a re d t h a t a rearm ed West Germany m ight mean th e l a t t e r ' s e v e n tu a l dom ination o f th e S ix. As a r e s u l t , she was a t f i r s t q u ite r e c e p tiv e to E den's Plan of lin k in g th e C ouncil o f Europe " o rg a n ic a lly w ith th e 'r e s t r i c t e d com m unities' 3B r ita in in W estern Europe: W EU and th e A tla n tic A llia n c e . Report by a Chatham House Study Group (London and New York: Royal I n s t i t u t e of I n te r n a tio n a l A f f a ir s [1 9 5 6 ]), pp. 23-4; h e r e in a f t e r c i t e d as B r ita in in W estern E urope. C f. L in d sa y 's s u b s ta n tia tio n o f B r i t a i n 's d u p lic - i t y con cern in g h e r r e l a t i o n s h i p w ith W estern Europe in fo o tn o te 104 below. 4 I b id . . p. 24. 395 of th e S ix ." But th e f e d e r a l i s t sponsors of th e ECSC r e je c te d th e Eden Plan "w ith some su sp ic io n . . . [a s they] saw in i t a r e v iv a l of C o n serv ativ e [ B r i t a i n 's ] attem p ts to weaken t h e i r own s u p ra n a tio n a l s t r u c t u r e ." ^ In r e tr o s p e c t, i t w i l l be r e c a lle d th a t C h u rc h ill had proposed in A ugust, 1950, a European Army as a more r e a l i s t i c answer to th e fragm ented n a tio n a l d efen ses of W estern Europe, j u s t in ca se th e Communists t r i e d to d u p li c a te th e Korean War in Germany. B esid es, M . P h ilip had p re v io u sly suggested a s im ila r id e a to c o u n te ra c t French fe a rs over th e i n e v i t a b i l i t y of th e r e v iv a l and rearm ing o f Germany,^ which th e U nited S ta te s was u rg in g because o f th e Korean War and th e changed East-W est s i t u a t i o n . In view o f th e lo g ic of th e su g g estio n s of th e se two statesm en , French Prime M in iste r Pleven and h is ^B r ita in in W estern Europe, lo c . c i t . A d d itio n a l reasons fo r th e "Eden P ro p o sals' may be found in A. H. R obertson, The C ouncil o f Europe (2d e d .; London: S tev en s, 1961), pp. 94-6; h e r e in a f te r c it e d as C ouncil o f Europe. 6 . . . Summary o f th e Debates in th e C o n s u lta tiv e Assembly o f th e C ouncil o f Europe. Second O rdinary S ession (August 7-November 24. 1950). I , 1 (London: Hansard S o c ie ty , 1951), p. 15; h e r e in a f t e r c i te d as C/E Summary o f D eb a tes. Second S e ssio n , I , 1, p. 15. 396 Foreign Minister Schuman, assisted by their expert adviser, Jean Monnet, revived the European Army plan in virtual defiance of the Council of Europe's Committee of Minis ters.^ Originally called the Pleven Plan, it was officially named the European Defense Community (EDC). In brief, the plan called for a unified Western European Army under g a supranational political and military authority. Again Britain--this time under Prime Minister Churchill whose party had been returned to power--advised that it would not join any Continental plan, such as the proposed EDC, yet declared that it "favored . . . [EDC] wholeheartedly, . . . [and] that when the moment became opportune it might be 'associated' with . . . [EDC] as ^See A rnold J. Z u rc h e r, The S tru g g le to U nite E urope. 1940-1958 (W ashington S quare, New York: New York U n iv e rs ity P re s s , 1958), pp. 8 1-94, f o r th e h i s t o r y o f d ip lo m a tic developm ents, v ia NATO, U nited S t a t e s , and West Germany, le a d in g to th e EDC P lan . o For th e o r ig in and s te p s le a d in g to th e EDC T re a ty as w e ll as th e o p p o s itio n o f th e I r i s h d e le g a te s and th e German S o c ia l Democrats in th e C o n s u lta tiv e Assembly, see R ichard E. Owen, "The European D efense Comnunity T re a ty : A Study o f I t s D efeat and th e W estern D em ocracies' A l t e r n a tiv e S o lu tio n : th e W estern European Union" (u n p u b lish ed re s e a r c h r e p o r t [o f a Study Conducted in E urope, J u ly 1, 1954-Jan u a ry 23, 1955] f o r P o l i t i c a l S cien ce 790a, U n iv er s i t y o f S outhern C a l i f o r n i a , 1955), pp. 4 -9 . 397 c lo s e ly as p o s s ib le a t a l l s ta g e s o f i t s p o l i t i c a l and Q m i l i t a r y d ev elo p m en t." D e sp ite C h u r c h i l l's w ithdraw al a f t e r he had h elp ed I n s t i g a t e th e id e a in th e Assembly o f th e C ou ncil o f Europe a y e a r e a r l i e r and h is provoking c e r t a i n F rench m isg iv in g s th e re b y , th e EDC T re a ty was sig n ed by th e S ix ECSC n a tio n s on May 27, 1952.*® The y e a r 1952-53, fo llo w in g th e sig n in g o f t h i s t r e a t y proved t o be th e second h ig h -w a te r mark o f hope and e x p e c ta tio n s f o r u n itin g W estern Europe (th e in a u g u ra t io n o f th e C ouncil o f Europe in 1949 was th e f i r s t ) . * * I t was a p e rio d in which th e European f e d e r a l i s t s were q u it e o p t i m i s t i c , f o r th ey b e lie v e d t h a t th ey were see in g w ith t h e i r own eyes th e liv in g p ro o f o f E u ro p e's fe d e ra tio n , g Z u rc h e r, op. c i t . . pp. 86-7. *®The B r i t i s h , F rench, and German views and th e c o n c e ssio n s made d u rin g th e p e rio d le a d in g to th e f i n a l n e g o tia tio n s and s ig n a tu r e o f th e EDC T re a ty may be found in M. M argaret B a ll, NATO and th e European Union Movement (London: S te v e n s, 1959), pp. 24-6; B r i t a i n in W estern E urope, pp. 27-36; Ben T. Moore, NATO and th e F u tu re o f Europe (New York: H arp er, 1958), pp. 35-54; Owen, op. c i t . . pp. 7 -9 ; R o b ertso n , op. c i t . , pp. 96-7; Hans A. S ch m itt, The P ath t o European Union: From th e M arsh all Plan to th e Common M arket (Baton Rouge: L o u isia n a S ta te U n iv e rs ity P ress [ c . 1 9 6 2 ]), pp. 206-8; Z u rc h e r, op. c i t . . pp. 87-94. ^ I b i d . . p. 88. C f. R obertso n, C ouncil o f E urope, pp. 98-9. 398 n o t on ly on a s e c t o r i a l and f u n c tio n a l approach b u t a ls o on an e m p iric a l and pragm atic b a s i s . In due c o u rse th e f e d e r a l i s t s hoped t h a t B r i t a i n and th e S candinavian coun t r i e s would a p p r e c ia te th e s u c c e s s fu l a p p lic a tio n o f t h e i r own " e m p iric a l pragm atism " and th e u t i l i t a r i a n ad v an tag es o f C o n tin e n ta l a c tio n , th en would jo i n them to extend and s tre n g th e n th e European F e d e ra tio n . The n e x t l o g i c a l move o f th e " s e c to r " f e d e r a l i s t s , t h e r e f o r e , was to c o n s o lid a te and c o o rd in a te th e i n s t i t u tio n s and t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s in th e ECSC and th e EDC. To do so c a lle d f o r a s u p ra n a tio n a l p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i ty . B e sid e s, A r t i c l e 38 o f th e EDC T r e a t y ^ I n s tr u c te d th e Assembly o f th e EDC a c c o rd in g ly : . . . to examine w ith in s ix months from i t s in a u g u ra tio n " th e c o n s t i t u ti o n o f an Assembly of th e European D efence Community, e le c te d on a dem ocratic b a s is " which m ight " c o n s t i t u t e one o f 12 See C ouncil o f E urope, T re a ty E s ta b lis h in g th e European D efence Community and R elated P r o to c o ls . . . . ( P a r is : 1952); o r Ad Hoc Assembly I n s tr u c te d t o Work Out a D ra ft T re a ty S e ttin g up a European P o l i t i c a l Community, D ra ft T re a ty Embodying th e S t a tu te o f th e European Com m unity: In fo rm atio n and O f f i c i a l Documents o f th e C o n s ti t u t i o n a l Committee. O ctober 1952-A pril 1953 ( P a r is : S e c r e t a r i a t o f th e C o n s titu tio n a l Committee [1 9 5 3 ]), Docu ment 1, pp. 21-2; h e r e i n a f t e r c i t e d as EPC D ra ft T re aty and O ther Documents. 399 Che elem ents in a subsequent f e d e r a l o r c o n fe d e ra l s t r u c t u r e , based on th e p r in c ip le o f th e s e p a ra tio n o f powers and h aving, in p a r t i c u l a r , a two- chamber system o f r e p r e s e n t a ti o n ."13 The s ix M in is te rs fo r Foreign A f f a ir s o f th e BCSC c o u n trie s a u th o riz e d th e ECSC Assembly on September 10, 1952, th e r e f o r e , to work out b e fo re March 10, 1953, a D ra ft T reaty to e s t a b li s h a European P o l i t i c a l C om m unity.^ The ECSC Assembly then s e t i t s e l f up as th e Ad Hoc Assembly to accom plish t h i s g o a l. With M. Spaak as i t s P re s id e n t, i t im m ediately e s ta b lis h e d a C o n s titu tio n a l Committee of 2 6 ,^ “ * in v ite d o b serv e rs from th e Assembly of th e C ouncil o f E u r o p e ,^ and met d a ily . F in a lly , th e Ad Hoc Assembly ^EPC D ra ft T re aty and O ther Documents, p. 9. 14 For th e documentary developm ents and a c tio n c u l m inating in th e D ra ft T re a ty , see i b i d . . pp. 9-19, 23-53. ^ F o r th e names of t h i s Committee, under th e le a d e r sh ip o f Mr. von B rentano (West Germany), and o th e r p a r t i c i p a n t s o f th e Ad Hoc Assembly, see Document 14, i b i d . , pp. 167-79. ^ O n e o f th e s e o b serv ers was th e B r i t is h d e le g a te to th e C/E C .A ., Lord John Hope, who d e liv e re d a speech e u lo g iz in g th e work o f th e Ad Hoc Assembly a t th e form al m eeting w ith th e M in iste rs o f Foreign A f f a ir s o f th e s ix ECSC c o u n trie s to a c cep t th e com pleted D ra ft T re a ty . The h i s t o r i c a l s ig n if ic a n c e o f h is words i s h is re sta te m e n t f o r th e re c o rd of th e B r i t is h p o s itio n : ". . . I t would n ot be as beggars th a t we would ask fo r th e r i g h t s o f a s s o c ia tio n . . . " i n th e ECSC, EDC, and now th e EPC. " I can see en d less p o s s i b i l i t i e s w ith re g ard to a s s o c ia tio n , 400 ( j u s t one day b e fo re i t s d e a d lin e ) , p re se n te d th e D ra ft T re a ty to th e s ix F oreign M i n i s te r s .17 A few s i g n i f i c a n t fe a tu r e s o f th e D ra ft T reaty p ro v id ed : "a EUROPEAN COM M UNITY o f a s u p ra -n a tio n a l c h a r a c te r . . . [which] s h a l l be in d is s o lu b le " ( A r tic le 1). "The Community, to g e th e r w ith th e European Coal and S te e l Comnunity and th e European Defence Community, s h a l l con s t i t u t e a s in g le le g a l e n t i t y , . . ( A r tic le 5). Eco nomic p ro v is io n s a n t i c i p a t e th e p ro g re ss iv e c r e a tio n of a s in g le European economic o r common m arket (A r tic le 82). . . ." Then he s tru c k a t th e k e rn e l o f th e B r i t is h p o s i tio n toward European F e d e ra tio n (even a f t e r th e re tu r n o f C h u rc h ill as head of th e B r i t i s h Government) when he s a id i n t e r a l i a : "The peace o f Europe, and th e r e f o r e of th e w orld, must r e s t upon th e broad fo u n d atio n of A tla n tic u n ity . . . . " A u n ite d Europe would not be stro n g enough w ith o u t th e U nited S ta te s ; an A tla n tic Union is th e only r e a l safeg u ard fo r Europe. Thus, B r ita in is b etw ixt and between a s s o c ia tio n w ith W estern Europe and p a rtn e rs h ip in a s tro n g e r A tla n tic Union w ith th e U nited S ta te s . See i b i d .. pp. 161-4. ^ T h e e x c e lle n t speech o f P re sid e n t Spaak in p re se n tin g th e fin is h e d D ra ft T reaty to th e ECSC Foreign M in iste rs and th a t of M. B id a u lt, P re sid e n t of th e S p ecial C ouncil o f F oreign M in is te rs o f ECSC in a c c e p tin g i t may be found in EPC D ra ft T re aty and Other Documents. pp. 147-54; 155-9. 401 A b icam eral l e g i s l a t u r e . . . [ s h a l l c o n s is t of] a Senate r e p re s e n tin g th e m em ber-states and a "P e o p le s' Chamber, . . . re p re s e n tin g th e peoples u n ite d in th e Connunity . . . [and] e le c te d by u n iv e r s a l, equal and d i r e c t s u f f r a g e , . . (A r tic le s 1 0 -1 7 ).18 Though th e D ra ft T reaty had c e r t a in l im i ta ti o n s , one w r i t e r concluded: . . . th e t r e a ty was a g r e a t s te p forw ard in th e developm ent of th e p u b lic law o f a fu tu r e f e d e r a l Europe. . . . P r a c tic a l p o l i t i c i a n s had form ulated i t , endorsed i t , and recommended th a t i t become a p a r t o f th e p o l i t i c a l s tr u c t u r e of Europe. . . . Whatever th e u ltim a te f a t e o f th e t r e a t y and o f th e f e d e r a l plan of government th a t i t fo rm u lated , th e mere f a c t th a t re s p o n s ib le p o l i t i c a l le a d e rs and e x p e rts in p u b lic law could have conceived o f such a p la n , worked out th e com prom ises n e c e ssa ry to e la b o r a te i t , and p re se n ted i t to th e w orld as a p o t e n t i a l ly v ia b le system of government c o n s ti t u te s an enduring achievem ent in th e a r t of s t a t e c r a f t . ’ The h i s t o r i c a l s ig n if ic a n c e o f th e D ra ft T reaty n o tw ith s ta n d in g , i t was n o t d e s tin e d to g e t beyond th e b lu e p r in t s ta g e , not fo r any in h e re n t d e fe c ts but because o f changes in F ra n c e 's p o l i t i c a l p e rs p e c tiv e --b o th 18 For th e com plete D ra ft T re a ty , see Document 10 in D ra ft T re a ty and O ther Documents, pp. 55-1 4[3]. 19Z u rch er, op. c i t .. p. 106. 402 90 i n t e r n a l l y and e x te r n a lly . F urtherm ore, F ra n c e 's s e n s i t i v i t y to h er dom estic i n s t a b i l i t y roused lin g e r in g German f e a r s and never q u ite p e rm itte d th e old Saar wound to h e a l 21 i t s e l f . Waving a l l th e above impediments a s id e , however, th e D ra ft T re aty alo n e could never have given b i r t h to th e European P o l i t i c a l Community. I t s very e x is te n c e depended upon th a t o f th e EDC T re a ty , w hich, a f t e r seventeen long months of la n g u ish in g a t th e expense o f French m isg iving s and v a c i l l a t i o n , was f i n a l l y r e je c te d by th e French Assem b ly . The EPC, th e r e f o r e , must go down in th e h is to r y of th e movement to u n ite Europe as s t i l l b o r n . The lo n g -d elay ed in a c tio n to b rin g th e EDC T re aty in to fo rc e r e s te d , o f c o u rse , w ith F rance. French f e a r s , h e s ita n c y , and e v e n tu a l r e f u s a l of accep tan ce of th e EDC were compounded from th e in te r p la y o f dom estic and i n t e r n a t io n a l p o l i t i c s a c c e n tu a te d by o vertones o f C f. B r ita in in W estern E urope, pp. 41-2; S ch m itt, op. c i t . . pp. 213-4; Z u rc h er, op. c i t . . pp. 107-10. 91 French fe a rs grew out o f (1) th e " u n p re d ic ta b le s " o f a rearm ed Germany in or out o f th e EDC w ith o u t B r i t a i n 's p a r tic i p a t io n and (2) th e f u tu r e d is p o s itio n of th e S aar, which see below in fo o tn o te 25. 403 22 n a tio n a l i n f e r i o r i t y f r u s t r a t i o n s . C onsider th e e f f e c t , f o r exam ple, of th e s e ra p id ly -d e v e lo p in g in te r n a ti o n a l ev en ts on a n a tio n n o t su re of i t s e l f lik e F rance: NATO co n tin u ed to p rov id e an e f f e c ti v e p r o te c tiv e s h ie ld . The ap p a ren t thawing o f th e Cold War sin c e th e d e a th of S t a l i n , was follow ed by th e ea sin g o f v ario u s East-W est te n s io n s . C h u rc h ill, m o tiv ated by th e changing c irc u m sta n c e s, in a speech on May 11, 1953, c a lle d f o r a m eeting of th e Big 23 Four heads o f s t a t e to improve i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . The Korean A rm istice was signed on Ju ly 27, 1953, and S t a l i n 's su c c e sso rs su b seq u en tly made h e a d lin e s w ith t h e i r A / new co n feren ce p ro p o sa ls. This s h i f t in th e in te r n a tio n a l w eather a p p a re n tly lessen e d th e urgency fo r th e EDC. On th e o th e r hand, th e p o s s i b i l i t y o f German so v e re ig n ty , ^ A ls o cf.. Owen, op. c i t . , pp. 14-6, 19-23. One o f th e b e s t a n a ly se s o f "th e f a c to r s a t s ta k e " : i n t e r e s t , p o l i t i c s , p a s s io n s , and d i s t r u s t in France concerning EDC may be found in D aniel L em er and Raymond Aron (e d s .) , France D efeats EDC (New York: P raeger [c . 1957], pp. v i i i - i x , 10-21, 24-70 f f . See a ls o Z u rch er, op. c i t . . pp. 112-7. ^ S e e B r ita in in W estern E urope, p. 42. 24 S c h m itt, op. c i t .. p. 214. 404 r e u n i f i c a t i o n , and dom ination o f Europe w o rrie d F ran ce, n o t to m ention h e r d e s i r e to r e s o lv e th e o ld S aar problem b e fo re i t was to o l a t e . 25 Beyond t h i s , th e r e was th e dilemma o f having th e EDC w ith o u t B r i t a i n , o r d e la y in g u n t i l B r i t a i n m ight be persuaded to become a member in o rd e r t o o f f s e t th e danger of German hegemony on th e Con- 26 t i n e n t a g a in . Meanwhile, in o rd e r to p la c a te c e r t a i n o p p o s itio n in th e F rench Assembly d u rin g th e w in te r o f 1952-53, some 2 S C f. F .S .C . N o rth ro p , European Union and U nited S ta te s F o reig n P o lic y : A Study in S o c io lo g ic a l J u r i s prudence (New York: Macmillan 1954), pp. 136-7 and C hapter 9, f o r im p lic a tio n s o f French f e a r and d i s t r u s t o f Ameri can fo re ig n p o lic y w ith re g a rd to r e s t o r in g German s o v e r e ig n ty and rearm in g h e r . For subsequent S aar developm ents, e . g . , th e S aar referendum on O ctober 23, 1955, r e j e c t io n o f th e S ta t u te o f i t s "E u ro p e a n isa tio n " w ith in th e s t r u c t u r e o f th e W estern European Union, and th e e v e n tu a l a g r e e ment on Jan u a ry 1, 1957, between th e Adenauer and th e M o llet Governm ents, fo rm a lly t r a n s f e r r i n g th e S aar to Germany, se e B a ll, op. c i t . . pp. 381-2; B r ita in in W estern E urope. pp. 4 2 -3 ; A lfre d G ro s se r, "Germany and F rance: A C o n fro n ta tio n ," in L e m e r and Aron ( e d s .) , o p. c i t . . Chap t e r 4 ; K ee sin g ’s Contem porary A rch iv es: Weekly D iary o f Im p o rtan t World E vents ( B r i s t o l . E n g lan d ), IX (1952-1954), 13674-5; h e r e i n a f t e r c i t e d as K e e s in g 's . For h i s t o r i c a l developm ents o f th e S aar c o n tro v e rs y to 1955, see M. van d e r Goes van N a te rs , "L’H is to ir e de l a S a rre en Docum ents," in European Y earbook. I I (1956), 139-50; Z u rc h er, op. c i t . . pp. 121-2, 130. 26 B r i t a i n in W estern E urope, pp. 4 3 -7 ; Owen, o p . c i t . , pp. 23-30; Z u rc h e r, op. c i t . . pp. 117-7. 405 French Government ad h e ren ts o f EDC c o n sid e re d i t n ec essary f o r France to o b ta in v a rio u s co n cessio n s from Germany, as w e ll as from o th e r members o f EDC, B r i t a i n , and th e U nited S ta te s b e fo re p re se n tin g th e T re aty f o r r a t i f i c a t i o n . Six o f th e s e c o n c e ssio n s, i d e n t i f i e d as " p ro to c o ls " to th e EDC T re a ty , proposed m odifying th e t r e a t y so as to g iv e France a s ta tu s s u p e rio r to th a t o f th e o th e r member* n a tio n s , e s p e c ia lly in th e independent deployment o f h er tro o p s fo r o v e r s e a - t e r r i to r y req u irem en ts o r em ergencies. Because th e o th e r EDC c o u n trie s opposed th e s e p ro to c o ls , they d id not se c u re th e s ig n a tu re or f i n a l ap p ro v al of th e s ix EDC c o u n t r i e s . ^ Y et, as th e months p assed , France co n tin u ed to id e n tif y h er p o s itio n toward EDC w ith th e accep tan ce o f th e s e p r o to c o ls . On th e o th e r hand, France did g ain a p a r t i a l con c e ssio n from B r ita in when th e l a t t e r signed an agreem ent on A p ril 13, 1954, w ith th e EDC c o u n tr ie s , p ledging B ritainb m i li t a r y a s s is ta n c e to and c lo s e r a s s o c ia tio n w ith EDC.^8 27 C f. Z u rch er, op. c i t . . pp. 115-7. 2®See Memorandum Regarding U nited Kingdom A sso c ia tio n w ith th e European D efense Community. A p ril 13, 1954, P a ri. P u b s., 1953-54, Vol. XXXI (Accounts and P ap ers, v o l. 1 2), Cmd. 9126 (London: H.M.S.O. [1 9 5 4 ]), pp. 1-15. Com p le te p re ss coverage o f th e s te p s lead in g up to B r i t a i n 's a c tio n may be found in K e e s in g 's . IX (A p ril 10-14, 1954), 13509-10. 406 B r i t is h n o n p a r tic ip a tio n in th e EDC, which then m ight be dom inated by Germany, was r e a l l y th e crux o f F ra n c e 's doubts about r a t i f y i n g th e EDC T re a ty . On t h i s p o in t P ro fe sso r Z urcher d e c la re d : The n a t i o n a l i s t i c argum ents of de G a u lle 's fo llo w e rs in th e Assembly could probably be d e fie d s u c c e s s f u lly , and th e Communists' devious and h y p o c r itic a l o b je c tio n s to th e t r e a t y could be d is re g a rd e d . But a f t e r F eb ru ary , 1953, no French prime m in is te r who e n te r ta in e d any hope o f c a rry in g th e m oderate p a r ti e s in th e Assembly w ith him on EDC f e l t he could d is re g a rd th e a rg u ment o f many o f th e members o f th o se p a r t i e s t h a t , w ith o u t v i r t u a l B r i t i s h membership, EDC m ight one day become a German tr a p f o r F rance. From t h i s tim e forw ard, th e r e f o r e , t h e French governm ent, in i t s e f f o r t to secu re p a rlia m e n ta ry r a t i f i c a t i o n f o r EDC, in a d d itio n to i t s in s is te n c e on th e sub sta n c e o f th e " p r o to c o ls ," c o n s ta n tly emphasized th e n e c e s s ity o f sec u rin g a more re a s s u rin g EDC t i e t o B r i t a i n . 2 9 P re s id e n t Eisenhower n ex t came through to re a s s u re . F rance [on A p ril 16, 1954] th a t th e U nited S ta te s armed fo rc e s w i l l s ta y in Europe as long as a th r e a t to Z u rch er, op. c i t . . p. 118. A lso see i b i d . . pp. 118-20, f o r th e French e f f o r t to g e t B r ita in to accep t g r e a te r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y toward European d efen se and th e B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e . Cf,. B r ita in in W estern Europe, pp. 44-5. 407 30 th e a re a e x i s t s . " B ut, d e s p ite B r i t i s h and U nited S ta te s re a s s u ra n c e s of EDC b a c k in g , th e d eb a cle in Indo-C hina s id e tra c k e d French a t t e n t i o n from EDC. M oreover, w ith th e p ro s p e c ts o f an E ast-W est C onference a t Geneva, France f u r t h e r d elayed a c tio n on EDC in th e hope o f se c u rin g g r e a t e r fa v o r from R u ssia in s e ttle m e n t o f th e war in 31 Indo-C hina w ith th e Communist r e b e l s . In th e in te r im , fo u r c o u n tr ie s had a lre a d y r a t i f i e d th e EDC T re a ty by A p ril 7, 1 9 5 4 .^ I t a l y had been ready to do so b u t became p reo ccu p ied over th e T r ie s te S e ttle m e n t w ith J u g o s la v ia and never g o t around to r a t i f y i n g th e T re a ty b e fo re i t s dem ise. F e e lin g s tow ard EDC among n a tio n a l p o l i t i c a l f ig u r e s in F ran c e, however, became in c r e a s in g ly s k e p t i c a l , e s p e c ia lly a f t e r th e f a l l of Dien Bien Fhu in May and French w ith d raw al from Indo-C hina seemed e v id e n t. In Ju n e , French n a tio n a l p o l i t i c a l l i f e appeared in a s t a t e o f shock and co n fu sio n over F ra n c e 's ^ K eesin g 1 s IX (A p ril 17-24, 1954), 13530; The New York T im es. A p ril 17, 1954, p. 1. 31 Z uroher, op. c i t . . p. 123. Cf,. B r ita in in W estern E urope, p. 47. ^ K eesin g 1 s , IX (May 15-22, 1954), 13569-71, g iv e s a com plete coverage o f ev en ts le a d in g up to th e s e r a t i f i c a t i o n s . 408 inm ediate o u tlo o k . In view of th e se c irc u m sta n c e s, th e in - a g a in , o u t-a g a in French Government made an o th e r attem p t to e s t a b l i s h a s ta b le government on June 17, 1954, under th e M end^s-France R a d ic a l-G a u llis t c o a l i t i o n . ^ At th e same tim e , B r ita in and th e U nited S ta te s were becoming q u ite concerned over th e d e te r io r a tio n of French p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s and th e changing mood in West G erm any--the Germans by then were becoming irk e d and im p a tie n t from th e co n tin u ed d elay o f t h e i r c o u n try 's 34 accep tan ce in to th e fam ily o f W estern n a tio n s . Conse q u e n tly , in a j o i n t communique on June 28, Prime M in iste r C h u rc h ill and P re sid e n t Eisenhower agreed: . . . th a t th e German F e d e ra l R epublic should ta k e i t s p la c e as an equal p a r tn e r in th e com m unity of W estern n a tio n s , where i t can make i t s p ro p er c o n trib u tio n to th e d efen se of th e f r e e w orld. . . . I t is our c o n v ic tio n th a t f u r th e r delay . . . in th e e n try in to fo rc e of th e EDC and Bonn 33 The n a t i o n a l i s t i c G a u llis t group was opposed to EDC. F u rth e r p o l i t i c a l developm ents in France r e l a t i v e to th e EDC T reaty may be found in K e e s in g 's . IX (Ju ly 3-10, 1954), 13654-5. A lso see L em er and Aron ( e d s .) , op. c i t . . pp. 72-125, fo r th e most com plete a n a ly t i c a l surveys o f French p u b lic opinion p o lls and p re ss views from 1944-54 on European u n i f i c a t io n and on German r e l a t i o n s . ■^For A denauer's views on French h e s ita n c e , see Owen, o p . c i t . . pp. 23-6. 409 T r e a tie s would damage th e s o l i d a r i t y o f th e A tla n tic n a tio n s . W e w ish to r e a f f ir m th a t th e program f o r European u n ity in s p ire d by F ran ce, o f which th e EDC is only one elem en t, so prom ising to peace and p r o s p e r ity in Europe, c o n tin u e s to have our f i r m s u p p o r t . 3 5 Then in J u ly , S e c re ta ry o f S ta te D ulles t r i e d to g e t th e French to a c t fa v o ra b ly on EDC by a d v isin g Congress th a t B r ita in and th e U nited S ta te s would recommend immediate s o v e re ig n ty f o r th e West German F e d e ra l R epublic, w ithout rearm am ent, should F rance f a i l to r a t i f y th e EDC T reaty by August 1 5 . ^ Faced w ith th e s e added p re ss u re s from F ra n c e 's most pow erful a l l i e s , M. Mendds-France attem p ted to g et th e f iv e o th e r EDC c o u n trie s to a c cep t new amendments to th e EDC T re aty a t a m eeting in B ru sse ls on August 19. The r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s o f th e s e f iv e n a tio n s , however, o ffe re d th r e e c o u n te r-p ro p o s a ls on th e grounds th a t they could ^^"Anglo-American D iscu ssio n s on I n te r n a tio n a l S itu a tio n : S tatem ents by th e P re s id e n t and S ir Winston C h u r c h ill," The Departm ent of S ta te B u l l e t i n . XXXI (Ju ly 12, 1954), 49-50 (4 9). ^^C f. B r ita in in W estern Europe, p. 48, fo r a d d itio n a l a c tio n o f D u lles in an e f f o r t to g e t France to r a t i f y th e EDC T re a ty . 4X0 not ac cep t th e French amendments, w hich, lik e th e p rev io u s p ro to c o ls , would in essen ce e ra s e th e s u p ra n a tio n a l c h a r a c te r o f th e EDC and leav e i t l i t t l e more th an a s h e l l of th e o r i g i n a l l y in ten d ed o rg a n iz a tio n . F a ilin g to o b ta in a m eeting o f m inds, M . Mendds-France re tu rn e d to P a ris amid very u n fa v o rab le W estern r e a c t i o n . ^ Remaining n e u tr a l (ta k in g no p o s itio n fo r o r a g a in s t th e EDC T re a ty , and no member o f h is Government p a r tic i p a t in g in th e v o te ) , Mend&s-France p re se n te d th e T reaty to th e French Assembly fo r d eb a te on August 28. But th e r e was no d e b a te . Through th e p a rlia m e n ta ry maneuver o f G eneral Aumeran, th e "ques- tio n p r 6 a la b le M (prev io u s q u e stio n ) was m o v e d , a n d sub se q u e n tly M . H e r rio t, Honorary P re sid e n t o f th e Assembly, jo in in g in su p p o rt of G eneral Aumeran's m otion, d e c la re d : 37 For th e te x t o f th e s e new French amendments and th e c o u n te r-p ro p o sa ls of th e f i v e , see B r ita in in E urope, pp. 48-9; Owen, op. c i t . . pp. 30-43; The New York Tim es. August 23, 1954, p. 6. A f u l l e r coverage o f developm ents d u rin g t h i s p e rio d , may be found in K e e s in g 's . IX (August 28-Septem ber 4 , 1954), 13749-51. ^®Under French p a rlia m e n ta ry procedure such a motion c a r r i e s a b s o lu te precedence. I f ad o p ted , i t ends d e b a te on th e s u b je c t. Thus, th e subsequent passage o f t h i s m otion by th e French Assembly amounted to r e je c t io n o f th e EDC T re a ty . See fo o tn o te 40 below. 411 I have re ad th e (E.D .C .) te x ts w ith an g u ish . There is n o th in g in them to show th a t B r ita in would be a t our s id e t o r e s i s t th e s tr e n g th and any e v e n tu a l manoeuvres o f Germany. B r ita in must be a t th e s id e o f France in t h i s m a tte r to a c t w ith eq u al r e s p o n s i b i l i ty in fa c e o f a new German t h r e a t , should i t a r i s e . The absence o f s o l i d a r i t y between B r ita in and France i s , in i t s e l f , s u f f i c ie n t to make me r e j e c t th e E.D.C. But we have o th e r reaso n s fo r opposing th e t r e a t y , th e c h ie f o f which i s th e lo s s of our c o u n try 's so v e re ig n ty and independence. The E. D.C. t r e a t y aims a t r e s to r in g Germany's so v e r e ig n ty b u t re p re s e n ts a s te p backward fo r France w ith re g a rd to h er own so v e re ig n ty . . . . The touching speech o f 8 2 -y e a r-o ld M . H e rrio t, "Dean o f th e A ssem bly," helped to r a i s e th e t i d e o f French Germanophobia a g a in s t th e T re a ty . As a r e s u l t th e Assembly voted on August 30, 1954, 319 to 264 (w ith 34 a b s te n tio n s and 17 Government r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s n o t p a r tic ip a tin g ) fo r th e p ro c ed u ral m otion which postponed d eb ate on th e EDC T reaty w ith o u t sp e c ify in g any l a t e r d a te to re c o n sid e r i t . 40 xhus, France disp o sed of th e EDC, and according to •^ K e e s in g 's . IX (August 28-September 4 , 1954), 13754-5. 40 I b i d ., p. 13755. For th e f u l l s to ry of th e f a t e o f th e EDC T reaty in th e hands o f France from August 19-30, 1954, see i b i d . , pp. 13749-55. Cf.. Owen, op. c i t . . pp. 44-57, f o r r e p o r ts o f P a ris p re ss r e a c tio n . 412 Reynaud, "For th e f i r s t tim e in th e h is to r y o f th e French P arliam ent a t r e a t y has been r e je c te d w ith o u t a word in i t s d efen se being spoken by i t s a u th o r o r i t s s ig n e r . The v o te ta b u la tio n showed a deep p a rty s p l i t , except fo r th e Communist P a rty , which c a s t a l l of i t s 99 Assembly v o te s in sup port o f th e m o t io n .^ One P a ris newspaper c a lle d th e French r e je c t io n o f th e EDC T re aty "a Communist v i c t o r y . W estern European Union: S tag n atio n The French r e je c tio n o f th e EDC was a rude shock to th e W estern a l l i e s as w e ll as an unexpected blow to W estern u n ity . More or le s s r e p r e s e n ta tiv e of th e g e n e ra l f e e lin g s of o th e r W estern Europeans toward th e French f o r " k il l in g " th e EDC were th o se o f a B elgian te a c h e r, ex pressed in th e s e w ords: 41 The New York Tim es. August 31, 1954, pp. 1, 8. ^ Kees in g 1 s . lo c . c i t . See L erner and Aron (e d s .) , op. c i t . . pp. 128-96, f o r an e x c e lle n t assessm ent o f "The [French] P arliam en tary Game," and pp. 198-225, f o r an a n a ly s is o f th e in te r p la y o f i n t e r n a l and e x te r n a l p o l i t i c a l fo rc e s a f f e c tin g F ra n c e 's d is p o s itio n toward EDC. ^3lo F ig aro ( P a r i s ) , 31 aoQt 1954, p. 1. 413 The m a jo rity o f th e French a r e p o l i t i c a l l y f r u s t r a t e d because th ey do n o t know from one month to th e n ex t which p o l i t i c a l program to fo llo w . This p o l i t i c a l dilemma has helped to weaken th e c o u n try , has made h e r dom estic economy bad, and has ag g rav ated h e r in d e c is io n . . . . F rance i s n o t th e France she was b e fo re th e w ar; she i s s ic k and lack s th e w i l l to g e t s tro n g . She re fu s e s to ta k e th e d o c t o r 's p r e s c r ip tio n o f g r e a te r i n i t i a t i v e , hard work, economic r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y , and m oral p r in c ip le s . She i s f e a r f u l o f t h i s hard and b i t t e r p r e s c r ip tio n and i s d e c e iv in g h e r s e lf in to b e lie v in g th a t n a tu re w i l l ta k e i t s co u rse and c u re h e r i l l s . 44 In th e U nited S ta te s view acco rd in g to S e c re ta ry o f S ta te D u lle s , "The French r e je c t io n o f th e European D efense Community . . . was a 'sad d en in g e v e n t' . . . [because] France tu rn ed h e r back on h e r own 'h i s t o r i c p ro p o s a l' fo r European s tr e n g th and U n ity ."45 A lthough Mr. D u lles added th a t he did not b e lie v e th e cause of European u n ity was co m p letely lo s t sim ply because "in one co u n try n a tio n a lis m , a b e tte d by communism has a s s e r te d i t s e l f so as to endanger th e whole o f E urope," he s tr e s s e d : 44 As to ld to th e w r i t e r by M. Joseph B a re t, p u b lic - school te a c h e r (met in World War I I ) , d u rin g a r e v i s i t w ith him and h is fam ily in S t. T ru id en , Belgium, on October 11, 1954. 45 The New York Tim es. September 1, 1954, p. 1. 414 "That tra g e d y would be compounded i f th e U nited S ta te s was th e re b y led to co n clu d e t h a t I t [sh o u ld ] tu rn to a co u rse o f narrow n a tio n a lis m ." Then s u g g e s tin g th e with** draw al o f U nited S ta te s d ip lo m a tic su p p o rt from W estern Europe, S e c re ta ry D u lles re p e a te d h is w arning o f December, 1953, t h a t th e U nited S ta te s would have to re-exam ine i t s m i li t a r y d e fe n se s in Europe in l i g h t o f th e vacuum l e f t by F ra n c e ' s i n a c t i o n . ^ The p u b lic pronouncem ents o f o th e r W estern le a d e rs n o t only ex p ressed s i m il a r r e a c tio n b u t a ls o roused them to im m ediate a c tio n in o rd e r to p re v e n t d is u n ity in th e West and f u r t h e r advances o f th e C om nunists. T h e n c e fo rth , U nited S ta te s and B r i t i s h fo re ig n p o lic y tow ard W estern Europe was p rim a r ily concerned w ith m i l i t a r y s e c u r i t y , th e su ccess of which re q u ire d th e im m ediate rearmament and m i li t a r y p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f West Germany along w ith t h a t o f F ran ce. But th e q u e s tio n was how to b rin g F rance back in to th e W estern European d e fe n s iv e fa m ily . The g r a v ity o f th e s i t u a t i o n was such as to induce th e B r i t i s h C abinet to meet on Septem ber 1 and to su g g est 46 The New York T im es. Septem ber 1 , 1954, pp. 1 , 8 , 9 . 415 convening in London a co n feren ce of th e s ig n a to ry powers o f th e EDC T re aty and th e Bonn C onventions p lu s Canada to c o n sid e r th e q u e stio n o f a German c o n tr ib u tio n to W estern d e fe n se . Then as a fo llo w -u p , Foreign S e c re ta ry Eden v i s i t e d B ru s s e ls , Bonn, Rome, and P a ris between September 11-16 to c o n fe r w ith th e F oreign M in iste rs o f th e member- c o u n trie s of th e d efu n ct EDC concern in g th e forthcom ing 47 London C onference. In a ra d io b ro a d c a st on September 14, C h an cello r Adenauer spoke concerning "a German c o n trib u tio n to th e d efen se o f th e W est." B e lie v in g t h a t f u r th e r n e g o tia tio n s w ith F rance would fo llo w , he d e c la re d : . . . th e European D efense Community w i l l come in one form o r a n o th e r. . . . I am convinced th a t an u n d ersta n d in g between France and Germany i s th e fo u n d a tio n , th e n e c e ssa ry p r e r e q u is i te , o f any European i n t e g r a t i o n .^8 Mr. D ulles h u rrie d by plane from W ashington on September 15 to c o n fe r w ith Dr. Adenauer and Mr. Eden. They "agreed t h a t German so v e re ig n ty should be r e s to r e d and 47 Owen, op. c i t . . pp. 58-9. ^®As quoted from th e F ra n k fu rte r A llgem eine. 16. September 1954, p. 1, in Owen, op. c i t . , p. 59. 416 t h a t Germany should p a r t i c i p a t e in f u l l e q u a lity in a system o f European c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r ity . Then on September 16, Mr. Eden met w ith M. Mend&s-France and persuaded him t h a t i t was "no lo n g er p o s s ib le , a f t e r th e [ e le c tio n ] re v e rs e s u ffe re d by Dr. Adenauer through F ra n c e 's r e je c t io n o f h is in te g r a tio n p o lic y , to exclude th e F e d e ra l Republic ..49 from f u l l p a r ti c ip a ti o n in th e co u n sels of th e West. Meanwhile, th e French r e je c t io n of EDC had aroused th e German m a jo rity in th e Saar s u f f i c i e n t l y to d is tu r b France and to cause M . Mendes-France to i n s i s t on ty in g a f i n a l s e ttle m e n t o f th e Saar is s u e , which both B r ita in and th e U nited S ta te s approved, in to th e f u tu r e framework o f W estern European peace and s e c u r ity . Moreover, on Sep** tem ber 20 b e fo re th e C o n s u lta tiv e Assembly of th e C ouncil of Europe, M . Mend^s-France ex p lain ed why France had r e je c te d EDC, and then made th e s e p ro p o sa ls: (1) c lo s e r B r i t is h p a r ti c i p a t i o n in European d e fe n se ; (2) expansion of th e B ru ssels T re aty of 1948 to in c lu d e th e German F e d e ra l R epublic and I t a l y ; (3) amendment of th e T re aty to provide fo r in s p e c tio n and c o n tro l o f th e armaments o f each 49 ^B r ita in in W estern E urope, p. 52. For an e x c e l le n t a n a ly s is o f th e B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e toward W estern Euro pean u n ity between 1950 and 1954 and reasons f o r i t s change, see i b i d . , pp. 52-8. 417 m em ber-country; (4) f u l l re c o g n itio n o f German so v e re ig n ty w ith o u t any d is c rim in a tio n ; and (5) th e s u ffic ie n c y o f th e N.A.T.O. as a m ilita r y framework, in which . . . th e r e would be no o b s ta c le to German membership in th e A tla n tic A llia n c e provided th e above-m entioned p r in c ip le s were a c cep ted . 0 Thus, d uring th e ensuing week th e p o l i t i c o - p sy c h o lo g ic a l sta g e was being s e t fo r th e London Nine- Power C onference--and q u ic k ly , fo r tim e seemed th e essen ce. The heavy p o l i t i c a l w eather enveloping th e W estern European c a p it a l s appeared somewhat u n s e ttle d and u n c e rta in , y e t th e h o p ed -fo r outlo ok absorbed o n e 's c lo s e a t t e n t i o n . ^ On th e w estern f r o n t , th e ray s of B r i t i s h i n i t i a t i v e and French r e c o n c ilia tio n to th e urgency of a W estern European d efen se union were try in g to break through th e e a s te rn f r o n t of storm -clouds b u ild in g up from th e Communists' ^ A s quoted from Le Monde (P a ris), 22 septem bre 1953, p. 2, in Owen, op. c i t .. pp. 60-1. ^ F o r an in te r e s te d fo re ig n v i s i t o r t h i s was a c h a lle n g in g , n e v e r-to -b e - fo rg o tte n h i s t o r i c a l p e rio d , j u s t p r io r to and fo llo w in g th e French d e fe a t of EDC. The w r i t e r was m otoring w ith h is w ife and son in B r i t a i n , then a f t e r c ro s s in g th e Channel on August 29, he m otored from Dunkerque to Normandie and back a c ro ss N orthern France through Belgium, H olland, and Germany to r e v i s i t wartim e acq u ain tan ces and to r e - t r a c e h is m ilita r y s te p s . Con v e rs a tio n s on every s i d e - - i n shops and on th e s t r e e t s in v illa g e s or in towns--cam e fo r th e asking as most persons seemed to r e a l i z e , even i f w ith m isg iv in g s, th e a l t e r n a tiv e s - - a so v e re ig n , in d ep en d en t, rearmed Germany in th e W estern camp or f u r th e r Communist encroachm ent. 418 d ir e propaganda and e x p lo ita tio n o f W estern u n ity . A ll th e w h ile , th e W estern a l l i e s had to fa c e th e co ld b l a s t s o f th e o p p o sitio n p a r ti e s a t home tr y in g to block W estern m i li ta r y union because o f m isguided o r u n r e a l i s t i c p o l i t i c a l judgm ents v i s - a - v i s th e E astern Communist b lo c . Espe c i a l l y was t h i s ev id en t in th e German F ed eral R ep ublic, th e c o rn e rsto n e of W estern u n ity . Herr O llen h au er, le a d e r o f th e S o c ia l Dem ocratic o p p o sitio n in th e West German B undestag, fo r in s ta n c e , proclaim ed in a speech on th e eve of th e London Nine-Power Conference th e fo llo w in g as th e b a s is o f h is p a r ty 's fo re ig n p o lic y : . . . a renewed a l l - o u t e f f o r t by th e Four Occupying Powers ( B r ita in , F rance, th e S oviet Union, and th e U nited S ta te s ) to re ach agreement on th e e s s e n t i a l s o f a European s e c u r ity system , and o f th e p la c e th e r e in of a u n ite d Germany, . . . [and] subsequent form ation o f an all-G erm an Government.^2 The Nine-Power C onference opened, n e v e r th e le s s , on schedule (September 28, 1954) in London, and a f t e r six days reached com plete agreem ent th a t (1) th e German F ed eral R epublic and I t a l y should e n te r an expanded B ru ssels T reaty O rg a n izatio n ; (2) th e German F e d e ra l R epublic, 52 As c ite d from th e F ra n k fu rte r A llgem eine. 28. September 1954, p. 1, in Owen, op. c i t . . p. 62. 419 fre e d of th e occupation regime and w ith h er so v ere ig n ty 53 com pletely re s to r e d , should e n te r NATO. R eturning to Washington on October 4 , S e cretary of S ta te D ulles commended th e achievem ents of th e London Conference th u s : . . . [ t h i s Nine-Power m eeting] has worked out a system in p lace of th e E.D.C. which can p reserv e and stre n g th e n th e A tla n tic Community by g iv in g i t a hard co re of European u n ity . The London d e c isio n s preserved many of th e values of th e E.D.C. plan . . . th e fa c t t h a t a l l t h i s was done w ith in t h i r t y - t h r e e days of th e r e je c tio n of th e E.D.C. shows the v i t a l i t y of th e A tla n tic Com m unity. The United S ta te s w i l l , I hope, co o p erate w ith th e r e s u l t s of th e London Conference because to do so w i l l be very much in our n a tio n a l i n t e r e s t s . . . . [ I t was] w ithout a doubt one o f th e g r e a te s t conferences o f a l l tim e. The Foreign M in iste rs of th e Nine Powers met in P a ris on October 21-23, and reached a number of agreem ents w ith th e Foreign and Defense M in iste rs of th e NATO C ouncil, a l l of which confirmed th e d e c isio n s reached a t th e London CO JOwen, on. c i t . . pp. 62-3. For th e te x t of the s ix m ajor documents of th e C onference, see F in a l Act o f th e Nine-Power Conference Held in London September 28-October 3. 1954. . . . P a ri. P ubs., 1953-54, Vol. XXXI (Accounts and P apers, v o l. 12), Cmd. 9289 (London: H.M.S.O. [1 9 5 4 ]), pp. 1-21. ^ T h e (London) Times October 5, 1954, p. 6. Also see p. 8 fo r C hancellor A denauer's e stim a te of th e London C onference. CjE. M anchester G uardian. October 6, 1954, p. 1. 420 C o n fe r e n c e .^ During th e s e P a ris m eetin g s, m oreover, Dr. Adenauer and M . Mendds-France agreed to a s e ttle m e n t o f th e Saar is s u e on th e b a s is o f a "European S ta tu te w ith in th e framework of th e W estern European U nion," which was to rem ain in fo rc e pending th e c o n c lu sio n o f a peace t r e a t y w ith G erm an y .^ A fterw ard s, M . Mendds-France d e c la re d t h a t F rance and Germany had liq u id a te d a l l t h e i r o u ts ta n d ing d is p u te s w ith th e s e ttle m e n t of th e Saar problem , an is s u e which fo r y e a rs had "poisoned Franco-German r e l a t i o n s . " F urtherm ore, Saar " M in is te r-P re s id e n t" Hoffman acclaim ed th e Franco-German Saar agreem ent as " th e s o lu tio n fo r which we have been w a itin g fo r many y e a r s . T h e For a com plete te x t o f th e documents signed a t th e s e P a ris m eetin g s, see Documents Agreed on by th e Con fe re n c e o f H in is te r s Held in P a r is . O ctober 20-23. 1954. P a ri. P u b s., 1953-54, Vol. XXXI (Accounts and P ap ers, v o l. 12), Cmd. 9304 (London: H.M.S.O. [1 9 5 4 ]), pp. l - [ 6 0 ] . For a p ro g re ss r e p o r t o f th e s e m eetin g s, see Le Monde ( P a r i s ) , 21-26 o c to b re 1954, pp. 1 f f , and f o r th e te x t o f th e P a ris A greem ents, see i b i d . , 26 o cto b re 1954, pp. 5-6. ^ F o r th e te x t o f t h i s agreem ent as w e ll as o th e r economic and c u l t u r a l agreem ents reached between France and Germany, see Le Monde (P a ris ), 26 o c to b re 1954, pp. 1 ,4 ,6 ; Le F ig aro ( P a r i s ) , pp. 1 f f . The su b stan ce o f th e Saar agreem ent provided fo r i t s p o l i t i c a l detachm ent from Germany, i t s "E u ro p ean izatio n " as a t e r r i t o r y o f W EU, i t s rem aining econom ically a tta c h e d to France u n t i l a subsequent popular referendum decided w hether or not to approve th e W EU p la n . ~ *^Le Monde ( P a r is ) , 26 o cto b re 1954, p. 3. 421 Franco-German Saar s e ttle m e n t, u n f o r tu n a te ly , was d e s tin e d to endure b u t one year.^® F i n a l ly , only one d i v i s i v e fo rc e rem ained to be fa c e d ; t h i s was th e Communist propaganda m achine. When th e London and P a ris Agreements appeared on th e v erg e o f s u c c e e d in g , th e S o v iet Union, in a Note to B r i t a i n , F ran ce, and th e U nited S ta te s on O ctober 23, went i n t o i t s "p eace- lo v in g " a c t and c r i t i c i z e d th e W estern Powers f o r p lan n in g to rearm West Germany, to r e s t o r e h e r N az is, to adm it h e r in to NATO, and to expand and tra n sfo rm th e B ru sse ls T re a ty O rg a n iz a tio n in to th e W estern European Union. In a d d itio n , she "accused th e W estern Powers o f fo llo w in g a p o lic y o f d iv id in g Europe in to m i l i t a r y groups . . . [and o f en c o u r aging] th e re -e s ta b lis h m e n t o f German M ilita r is m . . . ."59 5®0n O ctober 23, 1955, th e S aar e l e c to r a t e r e je c te d th e W EU p la n , and a f t e r a b i t t e r and prolonged p o l i t i c a l b a t t l e th e "German" S a a rla n d e rs succeeded in becoming r e u n ite d w ith Germany on Jan u ary 1, 1957. For th e fa v o ra b le r e a c tio n s in F rance over th e P a ris "S aa r" Agreements o f O ctober 23, 1954, and th e very b i t t e r German r e a c t i o n , see Owen, op. c i t . . pp. 67-71. For th e p o l i t i c a l developm ents in th e S aar under W EU a d m in is tr a tio n , th e d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n o f th e pro-German e le m e n ts, and th e e l e c tio n campaign to r e j e c t th e W EU "E u ro p e a n iz a tio n " S t a t u t e , see B r i t a i n in W estern E urope, pp. 75 -7. ^ T h e (London) T im es. O ctober 25, 1954, p. 5; c f . p . 6. 422 P receding th e s e a c c u s a tio n s , how ever, th e S o v ie t Union proposed t h a t th e Big Four meet in November t o c o n s id e r th e fo llo w in g : (1) The re -e s ta b lis h m e n t o f German u n ity on a p e a c e -lo v in g , d em o cratic b a s i s , in c lu d in g th e q u e s tio n o f h o ld in g f r e e all-G erm an e l e c t i o n s . (2) W ithdraw al o f o ccu p atio n fo rc e s from w est and e a s t Germany. (3) The q u e s tio n o f c a l l i n g an a l l - European c o n fe re n c e to examine th e fo rm a tio n o f a system o f c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i ty in E urope. (4) B r i t i s h , F ren ch , and U nited S ta te s . . . Ambassadors in Vienna to meet th e S o v iet Ambassador to d i s cu ss " q u e s tio n s co n cern in g th e c o n c lu sio n o f an A u s tria n t r e a t y . "60 A second S o v iet Note was s e n t to th e W estern c a p i t a l s on November 13 ag ain denouncing th e London and P a ris Agreements and p roposing a P a ris o r Moscow co n fe re n c e o f tw e n ty -fo u r c o u n tr ie s to c o n s id e r " th e q u e s tio n o f c r e a tin g a system o f c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i ty in Europe."**^ F o r tu n a te ly , th e W estern Government le a d e rs re co g n ized th e p o o rly -tim e d S o v ie t Notes to p re v en t th e e s ta b lis h m e n t o f th e W EU and 62 were not s id e tr a c k e d . The S o v iet N otes, t h e r e f o r e , had ^ T h e (London) T im es. O ctober 25, 1954, p. 5. ^ Le Monde ( P a r i s ) , 14 novembre 1954, p. 1; The (London) T im es. November 14, 1954, p. 7; M anchester Guard i a n . Novebmer 15, 1954, p. 1. 62 The (London) Tim es, November 23, 1954, p. 8. For M . M end&s-France1s summation o f th e o f f i c i a l a t t i t u d e of th e W estern A llie s tow ard th e s e S o v iet Notes b e fo re th e 423 l i t t l e o r no e f f e c t on B r ita in and F rance. A fte r th e unanimous re b u ff then o f th e W estern Governments to th e 63 S o v iet N otes, th e S o v iet Union and i t s seven E astern s a t e l l i t e s h eld th e sug g ested European c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r ity co n feren ce in th e Kremlin on November 29. In a signed m utual s e c u r ity d e c la r a tio n , th ey pledged, among o th e r th in g s , to u n ify t h e i r armed fo rc e s i f th e West r a t i f i e d th e London and P a ris Agreements and rearmed W estern Germany. ^ December, 1934, was th e c r u c i a l month f o r th e W EU. The B r i t i s h P arliam en t had a lre a d y approved th e London and P a ris Agreements in mid-November; th e P arliam en ts of F ran ce, I t a l y , and W estern Germany were to begin t h e i r r a t i f i c a t i o n d eb ates a f t e r mid-December; and th e S oviet Union ag ain was to t r y to p rev en t r a t i f i c a t i o n o f th e W estern Agreem ents. F i r s t , on th e p o l i t i c a l fro n t they UN G eneral Assembly, see Le Monde and Le F ig aro ( P a r is ) , 23 novembre 1954, pp. 1 f f . C O See Owen, op. c i t . , pp. 77-9, fo r th e form al r e p l i e s o f B r i t a in , F ran ce, and th e U nited S ta te s to th e two S o v iet N o te s. 6 4 I b i d . . pp. 7 9 -8 0 . 424 c o n f id e n tly counted on " t h e i r " Communist members in th e P a rlia m e n ts o f F rance and I t a l y and t h e i r sy m p ath izers e lse w h e re to oppose th e L ondon-Paris A greem ents. S econdly, on th e d ip lo m a tic f r o n t R u ssia s e n t a Note on December 16 t o th e French Government a d v is in g t h a t she would annul th e F ra n c o -S o v ie t T re a ty o f A llia n c e and F rie n d s h ip i f 65 F rance r a t i f i e d th e A greem ents. B e la te d ly , R ussia se n t a s im ila r Note t o B r i t a i n on December 20 inform ing t h a t she would c a n c e l th e A n g lo -S o v iet T re a ty o f C o operation 66 and M utual A s s is ta n c e under l i k e c irc u m sta n c e s. The r e j e c t i o n o f th e S o v ie t Notes by B r ita in and F rance proved " t h a t even p o l i t i c a l b la c k m a il [by th e S o v ie ts] could not s p l i t th e u n ity o f th e West nor p re v en t im plem entation of th e W estern European Union. . . . ^^Le Monde ( P a r i s ) , 18 ddcembre 1954, p. 1. 66 Le Monde ( P a r i s ) , 21 ddcembre 1954, p. 1; The (London) Tim es. December 21, 1954, pp. 4 ,6 ; M anchester G u ard ian . December 21, 1954, p. 1. ^O w en, op. c i t . . p. 85. The c o n te x t o f th e s e Notes and th e B r i t i s h re p ly may be found in i b i d . , pp. 83- 5. A lso see Le Monde ( P a r i s ) , 22 ddcembre 1954, p. 1. For th e fa v o ra b le a c tio n o f th e S o c i a l i s t I n te r n a tio n a l C ouncil and i t s in flu e n c e on th e S o c i a l i s t p a r t i e s o f th e West to su p p o rt th e A greem ents, seeOwen, op. c i t . . pp. 8 5 -7 . (The S o c i a l i s t p a r ti e s had been stum bling blocks to th e EDC and 425 D e sp ite Communist P a rty o p p o s itio n and m aneuvering d u rin g th e r a t i f i c a t i o n d e b a te s , th e French Assembly in a d ram atic f i n a l fo u r days o f d e b a te approved th e London and P a ris Agreements on December 30.**® Then fo llo w in g t h e i r r a t i f i c a t i o n by th e upper houses o f th e seven s t a t e s , th e o ccu p atio n regim e in West Germany came to an end on May 5, 1955, and on th e n ex t day th e W estern European Union was e s ta b lis h e d .^ ^ In e f f e c t , th e W EU was an e x te n sio n of th e B ru s se ls T re a ty O rg a n iz a tio n ( to in c lu d e West Germany), had been s p l i t over th e problem o f German rearmament because of t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l p o lic y of disarm am ent and peac e .) 68 By December 30, F ran c e, I t a l y , and W estern Germany had r a t i f i e d th e London and P a ris A greem ents. The d e t a i l s o f th e s e th r e e P a rlia m e n ta ry d eb a te s may be found in Owen, op. c i t .. pp. 80-100. For th e drama o f th e f i n a l fo u r days o f th e French Assembly d e b a te , se e The (London) T im es. December 31, 1954, p. 6; Le Monde and Le F ig aro ( P a r i s ) , 27-31 ddcembre 1954, pp. 1 f f . 69 The com pletion o f th e r a t i f i c a t i o n and th e e n try i n to fo rc e o f th e L ondon-Paris Agreements may be found in K ee sin g 1s . X (1955-1956), 14227-30, 14237-9. On May 7, 1955, th e S o v ie t Union ab ro g ated th e above F ran c o -S o v ie t and A n g lo -S o v iet T r e a tie s (se e i b i d . . p. 14239); and on May 14, alo n g w ith i t s s a t e l l i t e s , th e S o v ie t Union e s t a b lis h e d a u n if ie d m i l i t a r y o rg a n iz a tio n (th e Warsaw P act) in re sp o n se to th e c r e a tio n o f W EU and th e rearmament o f West Germany ( f o r f u l l e r d e t a i l s , see i b i d .. pp. 14249-51). 426 was to run u n t i l 1998, b u t was n o t in ten d ed to be a f e d e r a l o r s u p ra n a tio n a l arran gem ent. Nor could i t have been o th e rw ise b ecause o f th e d iv e rg e n t views o f th e C o n tin e n ta l f e d e r a t i o n i s t s and th e B r i t i s h a s s o c i a t i o n i s t s d u rin g th e p a s t f iv e y e a r s . F rance would have no p a r t o f a European d e fe n se community w ith o u t g u a ra n te e s o f B r i t a i n 's f u l l membership and p a r t i c i p a t i o n . B r ita in would have no p a r t o f such a community i f i t were o rg an ized on a f e d e r a l or s u p ra n a tio n a l b a s i s . T h e re fo re , i f European f e d e r a t i o n i s t s o r s u p r a n a t io n a li s t s wanted a European d e fe n se arrangem ent w ith b o th F rance and B r i ta i n in i t , they had to ac cep t W EU as a compromise to th e r e je c te d s u p ra n a tio n a l EDC, and t r u s t t h a t i t m ight l a t e r develop in to a f e d e r a l o r g a n iz a tio n . N o tw ith stan d in g i t s im posing name of W estern Euro pean Union, th e W EU was n o t a u n io n . On th e c o n tr a r y , i t was sim ply an e x p e d ie n t in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l agency, th e prim ary purpose o f which was to group th e armed fo rc e s o f th e European m em ber-nations in to a d e fe n siv e a l l i a n c e as a p re c a u tio n a g a in s t p o s s ib le R ussian a g g re s s io n . I t i s t r u e t h a t a j o i n t m i l i t a r y command under NATO was p ro v id e d , b u t no u n i f i c a t i o n o f n a tio n a l armed f o r c e s , as th e EDC had s t i p u la t e d and as th e name "European Army" 427 im plied, was in ten d ed . In s te a d , n a tio n a l arm ies were to co n tin u e as b e fo re ; a Western German army of tw elve d i v i sio n s was to be c o n s titu te d ; th e W EU n a tio n s were to p lace an agreed number of t h e i r u n its under th e command of NATO.^ The b a sic d iffe re n c e then between EDC and W EU was th a t under th e former a su p ra n a tio n a l Board of Com m issio n ers had f u l l j u r is d ic tio n over armed fo rc e s , fin a n c e s, and armed production in th e community; under th e l a t t e r , n a tio n a l p arliam en ts re ta in e d t h i s a u th o rity , lim ite d only by c e r ta in s tip u la tio n s of th e W EU T reaty . The key organ of W EU, however, is th e C o n su lta tiv e Council (form erly th e C o n su lta tiv e C ouncil of th e B russels T reaty O rg anization) c o n s is tin g of th e Foreign M in isters of th e m em ber-nations. Having ad v iso ry and reconsnendatory powers only , i t meets re g u la rly every th re e months a t th e W EU h ead q u arters in London. As d ire c te d by th e London P a ris Agreements, th e C ouncil e s ta b lis h e d a W EU Assembly, c o n s is tin g of th e seven m em ber-nations' re p re s e n ta tiv e s to th e C o n su lta tiv e Assembly of th e Council of Europe and ^ Z u r c h e r , op. c i t ., pp. 129-30. ^ B r ita in in Western Europe, p. 73. 428 m eeting in S tra sb o u rg sim u lta n e o u sly w ith th e l a t t e r body. I t s main e f f o r t s toward " th e prom otion o f u n i t y ," as su g g e ste d in th e T re a ty , has been in c u l t u r a l and s o c ia l s p h e r e s .^2 The W EU C ouncil a ls o a p p o in ted in accordance w ith th e T re a ty an Agency f o r th e C o n tro l (o f th e manu f a c tu r e and p o sse ssio n ) o f Armaments o f i t s C o n tin e n ta l members ( e s p e c ia lly o f West Gexmany). Except f o r i t s fo u r d iv is io n s and t a c t i c a l a i r fo rc e which i t g u aran teed to keep on th e C o n tin en t f o r th e d u ra tio n o f th e W EU T re a ty , B r i t a i n was excluded from th e W EU armaments con- Thus, in s te a d o f b ein g a genuine union of W estern European s t a t e s , v o lu n ta r ily m erging t h e i r s o v e re ig n ty , th e W EU was a c r e a tu r e o f c r i s i s - - o f what seemed an u rg e n t 72 For docum entary r e p o r ts o f th e work o f th e WEU, see W estern European Union, Survey o f C u ltu r a l A c t i v i t i e s (March 1948-March 1959) (London: 1959), 17 pp. (Mime o g ra p h e d .); and Survey o f S o c ia l C ooperation (March 1948- August 1948) ([London]: 1958), 25 pp. (M imeographed.) 73 An a n a ly s is of th e scope and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f th e s e v a rio u s a g e n c ie s o f W EU and t h e i r l i a i s o n w ith o th e r o rg a n iz a tio n s in W estern Europe may be found in B r ita in in W estern E urope, pp. 60-85. A lso see "W estern European Union: A Chronology o f P r in c ip a l E v en ts, A c t i v i t i e s , B asic T e x ts , and O f f i c i a l s , " in European Y earbook, V ol. IV (The Hague: N ijh o ff, 1958), pp. 250-87. 429 n e c e s s ity in th e eyes o f th e U nited S ta te s and B r ita in . I t would h a rd ly have been brought in to e x is te n c e , had i t n o t been r a tio n a liz e d on th e fo llo w in g grounds: (1) German s o v e re ig n ty , independence, and rearmament sooner o r l a t e r was in e v ita b le ; th e r e f o r e , b e t t e r th a t Germany be on th e s id e o f th e West than o th e rw ise , in view of th e t h r e a t and u n p r e d ic ta b il i t y of th e S oviet Union. (2) I f Germany is to be rearm ed, l e t i t be rearm ed under th e eyes and c o n tro l of a d efen se a l l ia n c e l i k e WEU, which in case o f n e c e s s ity can r e ly upon th e b u i l t - i n s a f e ty s h ie ld of NATO. (3) th e quid pro quo f o r German rearm a ment and French p a r ti c ip a t i o n in a C o n tin e n ta l d e fe n siv e arrangem ent would be th e p a r tic i p a t io n o f B r ita in and th e s o lu tio n of th e Franco-German Saar c o n tro v e rsy w ith in th e framework o f th e W EU. The anomoly o f th e W estern European Union l i e s , however, in th e f a c t t h a t one of i t s seven members i s th e lead in g proponent of European u n ity by in terg o v ern m en tal c o o p e ra tio n and th e most a c tiv e opponent o f th e fe d e ra l o r s u p ra n a tio n a l approach. N otw ithstanding th e Preamble o f th e W EU T re a ty , which s tr e s s e d t h a t th e avowed purpose of th e W EU i s "prom oting th e u n ity and encouraging th e 430 p ro g re s s iv e in te g r a tio n o f E urope," i t i s in c o n ce iv a b le t h a t W EU by th e Seven would have become an in te g ra te d s u p ra n a tio n a l union. Nor i s i t pro b ab le t h a t i t would have been a b le to develop a p o lic y o f " fu n c tio n a l-fe d e ra lis m " lik e th e ECSC. As ev id en ce, one has only to c o n sid e r th e developm ent o f th e European Economic Community (EEC or th e Common M arket) by th e s ix ECSC members o f th e W EU. These s ix c o u n trie s in v ite d B r ita in to j o i n them a t M essina, S i c i ly , on June 2, 1955, to e s ta b l i s h a Common M arket, b u t she did not b e lie v e anything w orthw hile would m a te r ia liz e from i t and ignored th e m eeting. L a te r, B r i t a i n d id a tte n d th e o r g a n iz a tio n a l m eetings o f th e Spaak Committee a t B ru s s e ls , b u t, o f c o u rse , made i t c le a r th a t she "would not be bound in advance by an agreem ent in p r in c ip le on th e p a rt o f th e S i x . " ^ In th e W EU, th e r e f o r e , th e o r ig in a l in te n t of th e T re aty : " [ t o promote] th e u n ity and [ t o encourage] th e p ro g re s s iv e in te g r a tio n o f Europe" has been d is s ip a te d along d iv e rg e n t ro a d s, running w e ll in to th e second decade / B r ita in in W estern Europe, p. 84; M ichael Shanks and John Lambert, The Common Market Today--and Tomorrow (New York: P raeger [c . 1962]), p. 21. 431 s in c e World War XX. In f a c t , th e W EU has had d i f f i c u l t y j u s t i f y i n g i t s e x is te n c e a f t e r having f u l f i l l e d i t s f i r s t m issio n o f c o n tr o l li n g a rearm ed West Germany u n t i l she and th e W EU were in te g r a te d w ith NATO and a f t e r having had i t s second m issio n c u t from under i t when th e S aar chose to fo re g o "E u ro p e a n iz a tio n " w ith in th e W EU and to r e u n it e w ith West Germany on Jan u ary 1, 1957. E s p e c ia lly has t h i s been a l l th e more t r u e s in c e th e emergence o f th e EEC and EFTA,^~* which have ten d ed to f o s t e r g r e a t e r economic r i v a l r y and d iv is iv e n e s s between two m ajor groupings in W estern Europe. Under th e p r o te c tio n o f NATO and overshadowed by th e C ouncil o f Europe, OEEC, and EEC, l i t t l e wonder t h a t W EU has s ta g n a te d from la c k o f European r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and a c tio n . As one c lo s e o b se rv e r o f th e European co n tem porary scene has w r i t t e n : . . . some C o n tin e n ta l spokesmen re g a rd th e conduct and p ro ced u re o f th e assem bly as B r i t i s h , o th e rs make th e somewhat u n r e a l i s t i c j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r i t s e x is te n c e t h a t i t i s th e only body in w hich B r i t a i n m eets w ith th e S ix a lo n e . . . . 5For f u l l e r tre a tm e n t, see below , pp. 433 f f . Also c f . R. W . G. Mackay, Towards a U nited S ta te s o f Europe: An A n a ly sis o f B r i t a i n 's Role in European Union (London: H utchinson [ c . 1 9 6 1 ]), pp. 110-1, 118, 143-4, f o r evid en ce o f B r i t a i n 's n e g a tiv e r o l e tow ard European u n ity and th e c h a lle n g e t h a t th e B r i t i s h have n e g le c te d to a c c e p t. 432 . . . nobody foresaw in th o se days [when W EU was e sta b lis h e d ] th a t NATO would develop i t s p re se n t p o l i t i c a l r o le . . . . The b r u ta l f a c t is th a t th e seven governments have not made use o f th e instrum ent of W estern European Union fo r the c o -o rd in a tio n of t h e i r p o l i c i e s , not even defence. . . . But why have governments been in a c tiv e ? . . . th e re a re deep n a tio n a l d iffe re n c e s : . . . some of them a r i s e from th e d if f e r in g o b lig a tio n s of C o n tin e n ta l W EU members and th o se o f B r ita in ; . . . . . . In f iv e years events them selves have by-passed Western European Union; . . .76 Furtherm ore, th e W E U Assembly, product of th e p r o l i f e r a tio n of European in te r n a tio n a l assem b lies, has proved su p e rflu o u s. In e f f e c t , th e re was very l i t t l e th a t i t could do i f i t were not to d u p lic a te th e work of r e la te d European o rg a n iz a tio n s . This became evident from i t s l a t e r e f f o r t s to sponsor p ro je c ts in th e c u l t u r a l and s o c ia l s p h e r e s ^ in order to promote g re a te r u n ity among Kenneth L indsay, European A ssem blies: The Experi m ental P erio d . 1949-1959 (London: S tevens, I9 6 0 ), pp. 28- 31; h e r e in a f te r c ite d as European A ssem blies. For f u r th e r assessm ents of W EU, see B rita in in Western Europe, pp. 69- 73, 81-9; M ichael T. F lo rin sk y , In te g ra te d Europe? (New York: Macmillan, 1955), pp. 136-41; S chm itt, op. c i t .. pp. 227-31; Z urcher, op. c i t .. pp. 129-31. ^ T h e C o n su lta tiv e Assembly of th e Council of Europe has ch allen ged th e competence of th e W EU C o n su lta t i v e Assembly in th e s o c ia l f i e l d ; see Lindsay, European A ssem blies. p. 28. 433 i t s seven members--and q u ite p o s s ib ly to j u s t i f y i t s co n tin u ed e x is te n c e . R evival o f th e Movement f o r a U nited S ta te s o f Europe U su ally , 1955 is c ite d as th e y ea r of th e re la n c e auropeenne. or European r e v iv a l, o f th e movement to u n ite Europe. A c tu a lly th e spark th a t touched i t o f f began on November 9, 1954, when Jean Monnet announced h is re s ig n a - 70 tio n as P re sid e n t of th e High A u th o rity of th e ECSC to ta k e e f f e c t a t th e end of h is term o f o f f ic e on February 70 10, 1955. As h is re a so n , M . Monnet ex p lain ed th a t he wanted "com plete freedom o f a c tio n and o f sp ee ch ," f r e e from governm ental attach m en ts to promote p r iv a te i n i t i a t i v e and popular support fo r "th e c r e a tio n of 'a U nited S ta te s of E u ro p e ,' which was 'n o t only th e g re a t hope but th e 78Shades of M. Spaak, who p re v io u sly had re sig n e d as P re sid e n t o f th e C o n s u lta tiv e Assembly o f th e C ouncil o f Europe to devote h is f u l l tim e to th e p o l i t i c a l u n i f i c a tio n o f W estern Europe v ia EPC. See above, C hapter IX, fo o tn o te s 65, 66, and 67. 79K e e s in g 's . X (1955-1956), 15029-30. M . Monnet ag reed , however, to rem ain in o f f ic e u n t i l a su c c e sso r was a p p o in te d . M . Mayer was f i n a l l y s e le c te d a t th e M essina C onference on June 2 -4 , 1955, to succeed M. Monnet, i b i d . , p. 15-30. 434 D Q u rg e n t n e c e s s ity of our tim e*. . ." M . Monnet belonged to t h a t hard co re o f European f e d e r a l i s t s who had looked upon th e d e fe a t o f EDC and EPC, not as th e o b l i t e r a t i o n o f European Union b u t as an u n fo rtu n a te setb ac k to th e movement. Indeed, M . Monnet had been a stau n ch su p p o rte r of European F e d e ra tio n p r io r 81 to World War I I and needed no convincing as to th e lo g ic and th e economic advantages o f u n i f i c a t i o n . B esid es, as th e h ig h e st o f f i c i a l o f th e ECSC he had a t h is f in g e r tip s overwhelming s t a t i s t i c a l proof of th e growing success of th e Coal and S te e l Community®^ and he b e lie v e d th a t th e 80 K eesing*s. op. c i t .. p. 15029. o I oxM . Monnet, along w ith De G a u lle , had p a r tic ip a te d in m eetings w ith th e B r i t i s h in London p re p a ra to ry to th e B r i t i s h o f f e r of A nglo-French Union in Ju n e, 1940; see above in C hapter VI. He a ls o was an a c tiv e su p p o rte r of The European Movement fo llo w in g World War I I , was th e b ra in s behind th e Schuman Plan (ECSC) (see above in C hapter IX fo o tn o te 5 7 ), and helped develop th e Pleven Plan (EDC). 82 See Communaut^ Europdenne du Charbon e t de l'Acier; A llo c u tio n de M onsieur Jean Monnet, . . . devant de i ■■ ■ ■ ■ ■ " ■ i 1 Assemblde Commune. S ession o r d in a ir e mai 1955, S t r a s bourg ([Luxembourg: 19 55]), pp. 1-16; Address d e liv e re d by Mr. Jean Monnet, . . . b e fo re th e Common Assembly a t th e opening o f th e e x tra o rd in a ry s e s sio n o f January 1954 (S trasb o u rg : 14 January 1954), pp. 1-18; Un tem oignage su r la Communaute des S ix , par P ie r r e Wigny, Membre de l*Assembl£e Commune ([Luxembourg: 1957]), pp. 3-121; and Assemblee Commune, Le d6veloppement de 1 1 in te g r a tio n 435 tim e was now r i p e to e n la rg e th e economic sp h ere of th e QO ECSC. He f e l t c e r t a i n t h a t by u n itin g th e e n t i r e eco nomies o f th e S ix Community c o u n tr ie s th e in e v ita b le b en e f i t s w hich would a c c ru e to th e people o f th e Community of th e S ix n o t only would induce o th e r European n a tio n s to jo in b u t a ls o would lead to an expanding U nited S ta te s o f Europe. M. Monnet, o f c o u rse was n o t unm indful o f th e v a rio u s fo rc e s t h a t has been working a g a in s t th e ad vance ment o f European u n ity . D uring th e decade s in c e th e war had ended, war damages had been p r a c t i c a l l y re p a ire d and n a tio n a l economies had n o t only been b a le d out o f bank ru p tc y by American a s s i s ta n c e but had moved ahead o f p r e war norms to near-boom p r o p o rtio n s . Hence, th e economic argum ents fo r European u n i f i c a t i o n no lo n g er seemed v i t a l . On th e o th e r hand, th e new " s o f t" li n e o f th e S o v iet U n io n 's " p e a c e fu l" c o e x is te n c e a f t e r S t a l i n 's d e a th , i t s program o f a n t i - S t a l in i s m , and i t s prom otion o f a European economique de 1*E urope, p a r M . van d e r Goes van N aters (2d ed. [S tra s b o u rg ]: 1955), pp. 3-88 e t Annexes. Q O For o th e r fo rc e s in s id e and o u ts id e Europe s u p p o rtin g M . M onnet's p o s itio n , see B a ll, op. c i t ., pp. 322-3. 436 c lim a te o f n u c le a r d e fe a tis m and C e n tra l European n e u t r a l ism tended to remove n o t only th e f e a r o f S o v iet a g g re ssio n b u t a ls o th e need o f European Union f o r s tro n g e r m i l i t a r y o r d e fe n s iv e purposes.® ^ F u rth erm o re, n a tio n a lis m was b eg in n in g to emerge a g a in in F rance and West Germany over th e g ra n tin g o f n a tio n a l s o v e re ig n ty to West Germany, i t s rearm am ent, and th e c o n tr o l o f th e S aar. What most peo p le in W estern Europe had f a i l e d to p e rc e iv e d u rin g t h i s m ild thaw in th e Cold War was t h a t S o v iet p o lic y and s t r a t e g y , advanced by th e Communist p a r t i e s , t h e i r 84 The s o fte n in g o f S o v iet g e s tu re s was f i r s t w i t n essed in occupied A u s tria as e a r ly as Ju n e, 1953, when th e S o v ie t Union re p la c e d i t s m i l i t a r y h ig h com m issioner w ith a c i v i l i a n . L a te r , i t assumed i t s sh a re of o ccu p atio n c o s t s , ended c e n s o rs h ip , gave up i t s c o n tr o l over p o lic e ap p o in tm en ts, removed z o n a l f r o n t i e r c o n t r o l s , and agreed w ith B r i t a i n , F ran ce, and th e U nited S ta te s t h a t A u s tria should p a r t i c i p a t e in n e g o tia tio n s f o r a peace t r e a t y . A lthough th e A u s tria n T re a ty was n o t f i n a l l y consumated u n t i l May 15, 1955, th e S o v ie t Union g ained th e tim e and purpose i t in te n d e d d u rin g th e p re c e d in g two y e a rs by h o ld in g out th e c a r o t o f ’’n e u t r a l i t y " f o r C e n tra l Europe. A u s tr ia , l i k e i t s n e ig h b o r S w itz e rla n d , became a n a tio n whose n e u t r a l i t y was g u a ra n te e d by th e g r e a t powers. Meanwhile, th e id e a o f n e u t r a l i t y f o r a r e - u n ite d Germany, w ith i t s disarm am ent and w ith d raw al from NATO--not to m ention th e Rapacke P lan , which proposed a n u c le a r - f r e e zone won fa v o r in th e W est, e s p e c ia l ly among th e S o c i a l i s t o p p o s itio n p a r t i e s and broad segm ents o f th e p eo p le. 437 sy m p ath izers, and dupes throughout Europe, was r e a l l y aimed a t p re c lu d in g th e co o p e ra tio n and u n if i c a t i o n of th e West ern dem ocracies. To th e c r e d i t o f S o v iet s t r a t e g y , th e Communists succeeded in l u l l i n g W estern Europeans and in suspending t h e i r d riv e toward European u n ity much more than has been g e n e ra lly reco g n ized or p u b lic ly acknowl edged even to t h i s day. In e f f e c t , i t can be s a id th a t th e "p e a c e -lo v in g " g e s tu re s o f th e S o v iet Union were induced by th e p ro g ress toward European F e d e ra tio n , a p ro g re s s --s a d as i t i s to re la te --p ro m p te d more by th e th r e a t o f Communist ag g re ssio n sin c e World War I I than by m oral and economic c o n s id e r a tio n s . In view of th e many roadblocks impeding th e p ro g re ss of th e C ouncil of Europe, OEEC, EDC, and W EU toward European u n ity , M. Monnet decided to ta k e th e b u ll by th e h o rn s, re s ig n from ECSC, and devote h is f u l l tim e to im proving th e ways and means o f p u b lic r e la t i o n s and popular su p p o rt in th e new d riv e f o r a U nited S ta te s of Europe. That an e f f e c t i v e , c o o rd in a te d W estern Europe p u b lic r e l a ti o n s program had never been pursued by th e 85 Governments o f W estern Europe was f a i r l y obvious; 85 A lthough p re ss coverage o f th e movement to u n ite Europe had been fa v o ra b le and s u f f i c i e n t l y e x te n s iv e sin c e 438 th e r e f o r e , d u rin g th e ensuing months M . Monnet s e t out to r e c t i f y t h i s s i t u a t io n b e fo re launching h is new o ffe n s iv e f o r a USE. 1948, p u b lic opinion had been taken f o r g ra n te d . Imme d i a t e l y fo llo w in g th e w ar, th e people were in a re c e p tiv e mood, p o l i t i c a l l y and p s y c h o lo g ic a lly , to a c cep t com plete changes in government and break w ith t r a d i t i o n and h a b it, b u t u n fo rtu n a te ly th e r e was a lack o f European-w ide, con c e r te d d ir e c tio n and o rg a n iz a tio n o f p u b lic ity from th e governments th em selv es. In s te a d , w hatever p u b lic r e l a ti o n s e x is te d depended on th e many g r a s s - r o o ts o rg a n iz a tio n s and o th e rs a f f i l i a t e d w ith The European Movement. L e ft to th e p a r ti c i p a t i n g governm ents, i t r e f l e c t e d l i t t l e more than what th e re-aw akening n a tio n a l c o n sc io u sn e ss, aided and a b e tte d by com peting p a r tis a n p o l i t i c a l le a d e rs e i t h e r s t r i v i n g to g e t r e - e le c te d o r r e s t r i c t e d by n a t i o n a l i s t i c v ested i n t e r e s t s , would to le r a te - - a n d t h i s was s c a rc e ly more th an l i p - s e r v i c e o r p la titu d in o u s words in p r a is e of th e vague and e u p h e m istic a lly -u se d ex p ressio n s European u n ity and European in te g r a tio n . Thus, in s te a d o f s t r i k i n g w h ile th e iro n was h o t, th e governments allow ed p u b lic opinion and i n t e r e s t to d r i f t in th e c ro ss c u r re n ts of p o l i t i c a l and n a t i o n a l i s t o p p o sitio n and d elay by govern ment le a d e rs d u rin g th e most u rg en t and re c e p tiv e y ears a f t e r th e w ar. As a r e s u l t , th e c i t i z e n r y were allow ed t o develop pessim ism and cynicism over th e p ro sp ec ts of ac h ie v in g a U nited Europe w h ile th e economic urgency and th e t h r e a t o f Communist encroachment tended to d isa p p e a r. Hence, th e program of a c tio n to u n ite Europe was preempted by th e p o l i t i c a l and a d m in is tr a tiv e le a d e rs o f governments who were more in te r e s te d in p re se rv in g t h e i r jo b s along w ith th e t r a d i t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and p re ro g a tiv e s of t h e i r n a tio n s than in a c tiv a tin g o r in v o lv in g th e masses o f o rd in a ry c i t i z e n s in th e e f f o r t to u n ite Europe. (Ghosts o f th e se v e n te e n th to n in e te e n th c e n tu r ie s when p o l i t i c s was th e s o le domain o f th e r u l e r s and i n t e r n a tio n a l a f f a i r s th e game p re se rv e o f th e p ro fe s s io n a l d ip lo m a tis ts ! ) In t h i s a r e a , to o l i t t l e and to o l a t e m ight w e ll summarize th e e f f o r t of communication and 439 In th e in te rim , H. M onnet's momentum began to re v iv e th e l a t e n t i n t e r e s t o f o th e r f e d e r a l i s t s a l l th e way up to th e governm ental le v e l. As a consequence, th e Benelux governments su g g ested a co n feren ce o f th e Foreign M in is te rs o f th e ECSC Six to c o n s id e r f u r t h e r economic in t e g r a ti o n . M eeting a t M essina, S i c i l y , June 2 to 4, 1955, t h i s co n feren ce of th e Six F oreign M in iste rs adopted a r e s o lu tio n e n la rg in g upon th e o b je c tiv e s o f th e Benelux s u g g e s tio n s . In esse n c e , th e r e s o lu tio n c a lle d fo r th e " j o i n t developm ent o f atom ic energy fo r p e a c e fu l purposes . . . [and] th e c r e a tio n of a common European m arket f r e e from a l l customs b a r r i e r s and q u a n titie s re stric tio n s."® * * A nother confirm ed "E uropean," M . Spaak, was chosen to head an in terg o v ern m e n ta l comm ission, f i r s t c a lle d th e a c ti v i z a t i o n among c iv ic and church groups and th e youth o f Europe. In f a c t , th e e f f o r t came too l a t e to e x p lo it to th e f u l l e s t a l l communication media through schools and in to homes down to v i l la g e and farm l e v e ls . F in a lly , th e r e was a d e f i n i t e lack o f a p p re c ia tio n or re c o g n itio n o f Communist t a c t i c s and s tr a te g y which were synchronized w ith th e forw ard and backward p ro g re ss toward W estern u n ity . T h e re fo re , th e Communists have to be c r e d ite d w ith c o n fu sin g th e W estern Europeans and w ith keeping them undecided and d is u n ite d . 86 For th e e n t i r e r e s o lu tio n and o th e r d e t a i l s of th e M essina C onference, see K eesing' s . X (1955-1956), 15030. 440 "New S t a r t" C om nittee and su b seq u en tly r e f e r r e d to as th e "B ru sse ls" Committee. I t was a u th o riz e d to study thoroughly th e m e rits of re la u n c h in g th e movement to u n ify Europe and to d r a f t a t r e a t y in c o rp o ra tin g th e aims of th e M essina Conference.® ^ Backing up th e i n i t i a t i v e o f M . Monnet, M . Guy Miollet in an ad d ress in New York C ity on September 6, 1955, d id n o t h e s i t a t e to p o in t out th e v a rio u s d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t had blocked and would c o n tin u e to block th e road to European u n i f ic a tio n as fo llo w s: . . . D iffe re n c e s of language, c o n f lic t in g economic i n t e r e s t s , d if f e r e n c e s o f s o c ia l system , h i s t o r i c m e m o rie s--a ll c o n s t i t u t e o b s ta c le s th a t must be surm ounted. And beyond th e s e l i e s a funda m ental d if f e r e n c e o f co n c ep t, in which th e p a r tis a n s of mere in terg o v ern m e n ta l c o o p e ra tio n a re p i t te d a g a in s t th e advocates of a new f e d e r a l o rd e r fo r W estern Europe. Those who a tta c k th e y ie ld in g of n a tio n a l so v e re ig n ty o fte n do so in th e name of n a tio n a l 87 B r ita in had been in v ite d to a tte n d th e Messina C onference bu t f a i l e d to do so , as she d id not expect any s i g n i f i c a n t r e s u l t s to develop from i t . An e x c e lle n t a n a ly s is o f B r i t a i n 's t r a d i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e toward C o n ti n e n ta l Europe and th e impact o f B r i t a i n 's changing eco nomic circu m stan ces in fo re ig n tr a d e [ f o r th e worse and fo rc in g h e r to modify h e r custom ary views toward E u ro p e], may be found in Shanks and Lambert, op. c i t . . pp. 11-39. A lso c f . Mackay, o p . c i t . . pp. 102, 110-1, and Hans Joachim H e ise r, B r i t i s h P o licy w ith Regard to th e U n ific a tio n E f f o r ts on th e European C o n tin en t (Leyden: S y th o ff, 1959), C hapters V II and IX, f o r th e b ases o f B r i t is h r e a c tio n . 441 Independence. Y et, In th e l i f e o f o rganized s o c i e t i e s , we know th a t th e Independence o f each in d iv id u a l i s g u aran teed p r e c is e ly by h is g iv in g up some o f h is " s o v e re ig n ty " ; in d iv id u a l freedom i s lim ite d by th e freedom o f o t h e r s . The evolving r e la t i o n s among in d iv id u a ls in s o c ie ty appear to go through th r e e s ta g e s : c o e x is te n c e , co o p e ra tio n and f i n a l l y in te g r a tio n w ith in a community th a t a s s u re s u n ity through d i v e r s i t y . T his has been tr u e of th e c i t y , th e p ro v in ce and th e s t a t e . The tim e has come to advance t h i s p ro cess among n a tio n s --to d a v in Europe, tomorrow perhaps among c o n t i n e n ts . 8 Commenting l a t e r on th e p ro sp e c ts of th e new d riv e toward a U nited S ta te s o f Europe and how i t can be ac h ie v ed , M . M ollet emphasized: Let me make one th in g c l e a r . The s ix c o u n trie s of th e Coal and S te e l Community re p re s e n t th e hard c o re of European u n ity a c tio n . I am th e f i r s t to hope t h a t t h e i r c i r c l e w i l l be e n la rg e d , b u t i t must be understood th a t u n le ss t h e i r p ro g re ss toward in te g r a tio n is resum ed, th e u n ity movement would soon be h a lte d by th e dow nfall o f a l l th a t has a lre a d y been ach iev ed . How do we s t a r t ? . . . A ll economic i n te g r a tio n n e c e s s a r ily e n t a i l s p o l i t i c a l tig h te n in g up. Given th e p re se n t unpreparedness o f p u b lic o p in io n , we should begin w ith economic and s o c ia l u n d e r ta k in g s , an approach t h a t would allo w us to ®®American Committee on U nited Europe, The New D rive f o r European Union. Address by Guy M o lle t, P re s id e n t, C o n s u lta tiv e Assembly o f th e C ouncil of Europe ([New York: 1 9 55]), p. 4. 442 em phasize th e im mediate p e rso n a l b e n e f its o f European u n i t y . In c lo s in g h is a d d re s s , M. M ollet in d ic a te d th a t th e German, F rench, and o th e r S o c i a l i s t P a r t i e s a l o n g w ith th e f r e e la b o r o f th e European Community n a tio n s "have solem nly adhered to th e A ction Committee f o r th e U nited S ta te s o f Europe which M . Jean Monnet has j u s t s e t up . . . [and have] su b sc rib e d to th e two o b je c tiv e s o f t h i s Committee: a fe d e r a l A u th o rity fo r n u c le a r energy, and th e g e n e ra l common m a rk e t." When th e se immediate o b je c tiv e s were ach iev ed , he a s s e r te d : . . . th e tim e w i l l have come to ta k e an o th e r s te p toward p o l i t i c a l in t e g r a ti o n , nam ely, th e p o p u lar e le c tio n o f a European Assembly which w ill a s s u re dem ocratic c o n tr o l o f th e C o a l-S te e l Com munity and o f th e new Communities to be c r e a te d . 89 American Committee on U nited Europe, op. c i t . , pp. 8 -9. Bn C f. th e change o f h e a r t o f E rich O llenhauer and h is German S o c i a l i s t P arty (S o c ia l D e m o c ra ts)--p re v io u sly " h o s t il e to a l l p o lic ie s o f European i n t e g r a t i o n ," and e s p e c ia lly to EDC (see fo o tn o te s 8 and 52 a b o v e ). A lso n o te th e v a rio u s European p re ss accounts on th e " 'm i r a c l e 1 o f r e c o n c i l ia t io n between th e a n t i - and pro-EDC p a r ti e s in th e A ction Committee" in [ECSC] In fo rm atio n S e rv ic e , High A u th o rity , B u lle tin from th e European Community f o r c o a l and s t e e l . No. 11 (December, 1955), 3-5; h e r e in a f t e r c i t e d as ECSC, B u lle tin . 443 The "new d riv e " to u n ite Europe has begun. . . . we s h a ll move ahead toward a U nited S ta te s o f Europe.^-*- P a r a lle lin g th e work of th e Spaak Committee on th e governm ental l e v e l , M . Monnet in a p re ss r e le a s e on October 13, 1955, announced th e c re a tio n [on th e non governm ental le v e l] of th e "A ction Committee fo r a U nited S ta te s of E urope." This com m ittee com prised key le a d e rs o f th e noncommunist tra d e unions and p o l i t i c a l p a r tie s go in th e Six Community c o u n tr ie s . In th e l e t t e r ad dressed to th e t h i r t y - t h r e e le a d e rs , M . Monnet asked them to jo in th e A ction Committee, which " w ill a s s u re th e u n ifie d a c tio n of th e member o rg a n iz a tio n s in o rd e r to a r r i v e by c o n c re te accom plishm ents a t a U nited S ta te s of E urope." The purpose of th e com m ittee was to dem onstrate " to governm ents, p a rlia m e n ts and p u b lic opinion t h i e r [ s i c ] d e te rm in a tio n to see th e Messina r e s o lu tio n of June 2nd become a v e r it a b l e s te p towards a U nited S ta te s of E urope. " American C om nittee on U nited Europe, op. c i t . , pp. 10-1. Cf. below, fo o tn o te 113. 92 S e c r e ta r ia t of M. Jean Monnet, P ress R e le a s e : C re a tio n o f A ction Committee fo r a U nited S ta te s o f Europe (P a ris : [1 9 5 5 ]), pp. 2 -3 , Mimeographed copy of o r i g i n a l docum ent. 444 To ac h ie v e th e s e o b je c tiv e s th e l e t t e r c o n tin u e d , " i t i s n e c e ssa ry to put a s id e a l l specious s o lu tio n s . Mere c o o p e ra tio n between governments w i l l n o t s u f f i c e . I t is in d is p e n s a b le fo r S ta te s to d e le g a te c e r ta i n of t h e i r powers to European fe d e r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s re s p o n s ib le to . . . a l l th e p a r tic i p a t i n g c o u n trie s taken as a whole. .,93 ♦ • • The A ction Committee fo r a U nited S ta te s o f Europe (ACUSE) h e ld seven form al s e s s io n s between January 17-18, 1956 and November 19-20, 1959, a t which unanimous r e s o l u tio n s were passed u rg in g th e Six Community n a tio n s to tak e more p o s itiv e ste p s toward f e d e r a tio n . At th e ACUSE's F i r s t S e ssio n , e . g . , i t c a lle d fo r c r e a tio n of a European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC o r Euratom) along fe d e r a l l i n e s . At subsequent se ssio n s i t c a lle d fo r improvements in common energy and f in a n c ia l p o l i c i e s , as w ell as c lo s e r lin k s w ith B r ita in and o th e r European c o u n t r i e s ; and a t ^M o n n et, P ress R e le a s e , op. c i t . . p. 2. (The u n d e rlin e d words follow th e o r i g i n a l document in t h i s man n e r. C£. A ction Committee f o r a U nited S ta te s of Europe, JOINT RESOLUTION to Be Subm itted f o r P arliam en tary Ap p ro v a l in Belgium. F ran ce. Germany. I t a l y . Luxemboure and th e N e th e rla n d s . F i r s t S e ssio n , M eetings o f Jan u ary 17-18, 1956 (P a ris : 1956), pp. 3-5; Committee a u th o rs h ip and m eetings h e r e i n a f t e r c ite d as ACUSE, . . . F i r s t to Seventh S essio n . 445 i t s Seventh S e s s io n , i t urged th e m erging o f th e th re e e x is tin g e x e c u tiv e s o f ECSC, EAEC, and EEC in to a s in g le European economic e x e c u t i v e . ^ The a c t i v i t i e s o f th e ACUSE d u rin g t h i s p e rio d re c e iv e d extrem ely fa v o ra b le p re ss coverage thro ughout W estern Europe, r e - a c tiv a te d th e more a r t i c u l a t e and b e t t e r org an ized c i t i z e n r y , and th e re b y played a r e a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t r o le in shaping p u b lic op in io n and in in flu e n c in g th e p a rlia m e n ts and c a b in e ts o f th e ECSC n a t i o n s . ^ In th e m eantime, v a rio u s m eetings of th e F oreign M in iste rs o f th e S ix were h eld to c o n sid e r th e r e p o r ts of S paak's Committee. In March, 1956, a t a s p e c ia l se s sio n o f th e ECSC Common Assembly h eld in B ru s s e ls , th e r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s endorsed (78-1) an a l l - p a r t y r e s o lu tio n u rg in g t h e i r Governments to p re p a re a t r e a ty e s ta b lis h in g a common m arket. A fte r a g re e in g upon some 150 amendments to th e f i n a l re p o r t of S p aak 's Committee, th e Foreign M in iste rs ^ F o r th e documentary re c o rd of th e work o f th e A ction Committee, see ACUSE, . . . F irs t-S e v e n th S e ssio n s, Jan u ary 17-18, 1956-Novender 19-20, 1959 (tw elve s e p a ra te docum ents). ^ S e e ECSC, B u l l e t i n . No. 9 (J u ly , 1955), 4 -6 ; No. 11 (December, 1955), 1-6; No. 18 (S eptem ber-O ctober, 1956), 5-7. 446 met in V enice l a t e in May and again in B ru sse ls on June 96 26 to implement th e Euratom and Common Market p ro p o s a ls . D elays, however, were d e s tin e d to drag out t r e a ty n e g o tia tio n s because o f m ajor d isagreem en ts between France and West Germany over th e s u p ra n a tio n a l e x e c u tiv e a u th o r ity o f Euratom, over safe g u ard s on a g r ic u lt u r e , common t a r i f f s o u ts id e th e EEC, and harm onization o f s o c ia l c o n d itio n s and tr a n s p o r ta tio n p o l i c y . ^ B esid es, French "enthusiasm f o r f u r th e r economic u n ity . . . [had] been tempered by th e f e a r t h a t w ith o u t B r i t i s h p a r t i c i p a t i o n ," West Germany would emerge econom ically s tro n g e r than France and dom inate th e Comnon M arket. Hence, F rance was h e s it a n t about t u r n ing over f e d e r a l a u th o r ity in economic m a tte rs to th e EEC--as she had done v i s - a - v i s EDC--and dragged h er f e e t ag ain in th e hope th a t B r ita in would jo in or a s s o c ia te 98 w ith th e new com m unities. The march o f ev en ts o u ts id e Europe, n e v e r th e le s s , were to compel th e S ix to more im nediate a c tio n . Two 96ECSC B u l l e t i n . No. 16 (June, 1956), 1. 9^ I b i d . . No. 20 (December, 1956), 3; No. 22 (Febru- ary-M arch, 1957), 1-2. 9^ I b i d . . No. 18 (S eptem ber-O ctober, 1956), 5. Cf. H e ise r, op. c i t . . pp. 102-13 and 114-21. 447 o v erlap p in g events d u rin g October-November, 1 9 5 6 --th e S oviet trag ed y of Hungary and th e B ritis h -F re n c h f ia s c o w ith Egypt over th e Suez C a n a l--" d ra m a tic a lly s tr e s s e d th e need f o r th e f r e e n a tio n s of Europe to c lo s e rank and u n i t e . F a c e d w ith such alarm ing developm ents th a t exposed th e u t t e r weakness of th e l i t t l e independents of W estern Europe, th e Six Governments signed a t Rome on March 25, 1957, th e European Atomic Energy Community and th e European Economic Community T r e a tie s . Between J u ly and December th e two t r e a t i e s were r a t i f i e d and came In to fo rc e on January 1, 1958. The b a sic purpose of th e form er, p o p u larly c a lle d Euratom, was th e c r e a tio n of a s u p ra n a tio n a l a u th o r ity to promote nuclear-pow er development by pooling European re so u rc e s of th e Six in atom ic re s e a rc h and in th e u t i l i z a tio n of n u c le a r energy fo r i n d u s t r i a l uses and p u b lic u t i l i t i e s . For s e le c te d p u b lic and e d i t o r i a l comment on th e re p e rc u ssio n s of th e trag ed y o f Hungary and th e Suez C r i s i s , see ECSC B u l le t i n , No. 20 (December 20, 1956), 2-3. 10°See K e e s in g 's . XI (1957-1958), 15927-30, fo r th e t r e a ty p ro v is io n s , i n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e i r fu n c tio n s . 448 The prim ary aim o f th e l a t t e r , b e t t e r known as th e Common Market b u t which might w e ll be c a lle d th e Eurm art, was th e form ation of a com pletely in te g ra te d economy of 165 m illio n consumers by th e g ra d u al e lim in a tio n w ith in tw elve to f i f t e e n y e a rs o f a l l n a tio n a l customs b a r r i e r s . The f i r s t s te p in t h i s d ir e c tio n was a t a r i f f re d u c tio n o f 10 per c e n t e f f e c ti v e January 1, 1959; a t th e same tim e im port quotas w ith in th e m arket were ra is e d 20 p er c e n t. Other o b je c tiv e s of Eurmart were th e su c c e s s iv e harm onization of s o c ia l and ta x l e g i s l a t i o n , a g r i c u l t u r a l and tr a n s p o r ta tio n p o l i c i e s . The m ajor i n s t i t u t i o n s of Euratom and Eurmart were (1) th e C ouncil o f M in is te rs , c o n s is tin g of th e F oreign M in iste r of each o f th e m em ber-nations, which d ec id e s m ajor iss u e s by u nanim ity; (2) th e Assembly, com posed of 142 members e le c te d by th e n a tio n a l P arliam ents (36 each from F rance, I t a l y , and West Germany; 14 each from Belgium and th e N e th e rla n d s ; and 6 from Luxembourg), which d is c u s s e s and may amend th e Community b u d g et, con s id e r s th e Commission's re p o rt and may en fo rce th e ^ ^ F o r a c o n c is e , y e t e x c e lle n t, coverage of th e t r e a t y , i t s p ro v is io n s , th e i n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e i r fu n c t i o n , see K eesing1s . XI (1957-1958), pp. 15951-9. 449 r e s ig n a tio n o f th e Commission, among o th e r powers. The EEC Assembly was to sup ersed e theECSC Assembly and was to se rv e as th e common Assembly o f a l l th r e e com m unities, EAEC, ECSC, and EEC; (3) th e nine-member Commission, se rv in g fo u r-y e a r term s and a c tin g as th e e x e c u tiv e body, whose d e c is io n in c e r t a i n ca ses was s u b je c t to th e C o u n c il's v e to ; (4) th e Court of J u s t i c e , composed o f seven judges se rv in g s ix - y e a r term s, which was empowered to determ ine v io la tio n s o f th e t r e a t i e s and th e l e g a l i t y o f C ouncil o r Commission d e c is io n s . Like th e Assembly, t h i s body would se rv e a l l th re e Communities and would su persede th e e x is tin g Court of th e ECSC; and (5) th e Economic and S o c ia l Committee, common to Euratom and to Eurm art, plus o th e r com m ittees in accordance w ith th e t r e a t i e s . The a c tio n o f th e ECSC n a tio n s to form a Common Market r a is e d problem s, o f c o u rse , in th e OEEC, which had been d r i f t i n g along w ith l i t t l e p ro g re ss toward European u n ity s in c e i t had concluded th e bulk o f i t s European Recovery work between 1948-52. The c r e a tio n o f th e Common ^ ^ F u l l e r d e t a i l s concern in g th e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s may be found in K eesing1s . XI (1957-1958), 15951-2. A more com prehensive p re s e n ta tio n o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of EAEC and EEC may be found in A. H. R obertson, European I n s t i t u t i o n s : C o -o p e ra tio n . I n te g r a tio n , U n ific a tio n (London: S tev en s, 1959), C hapter 7. Cf. Moore, op. c i t . . C hapter V III. 450 Market by s ix members of th e OEEC in d ic a te d th a t th e eco nomic co o p e ratio n and u n ity of th e r e s t of W estern Europe would be p laced a t a g re a t d isa d v a n ta g e , i f n o t je o p a rd - 1 go iz e d . This danger s t i r r e d B r ita in J and h e r S candinavian a l l i e s to seek a more com prehensive European program of economic c o o p e ra tio n , such as a f r e e tra d e a re a c o n s is tin g o f a l l seventeen OEEC n a tio n s w ith a t o t a l p o p u la tio n of n e a rly 250 m illio n people. D eveloping a more fa v o ra b le a t t i t u d e toward Euro pean economic in te g r a tio n , B r i t a in , d u rin g 1957, pursued th e id ea o f a f r e e - tr a d e a re a encompassing th e OEEC c o u n t r i e s . B u t , because of B r i t a i n 's Commonwealth 103Cf. ECSC B u l l e t i n . No. 15 (May, 1956), 9-10; No. 18 (Septem ber-O ctober, 1956), 5-6; No. 19 (November, 1956), 1-6; No. 21 (Jan u ary , 1957), 5-6; No. 24 (Ju n e -Ju ly , 1957), 4. Also see K eesing' s , X (1955-1956), 15141-2 fo r B r i t is h p o s itio n and a c tio n in 1956 re g a rd in g EEC and a more com p reh en siv e f r e e tra d e area than in th e " L i t t l e S ix ." 104 For e x c e lle n t c r i t i c a l an a ly se s o f B r i t is h a t t i t u d e s and re a c tio n to th e movement o f th e Six toward European u n if ic a tio n - - a n d by B r i t is h p u b l i c i s ts a t t h a t - - see Kenneth L indsay, Towards a European P arliam ent ( S tr a s bourg: [ S e c r e t a r ia t of th e C ouncil o f E urope], 1958), pp. 107-25. A ccording to Lindsay, B r i t a i n 's p o s itio n has not changed fundam entally in th e decade s in c e 1948 because her fo re ig n p o lic y "sp rin g s from B r i t a i n 's attem p t to hold a b alan c e between th re e p o l i c i e s , one w ith th e Commonwealth and th e s t e r l i n g a r e a , one w ith th e U nited S ta te s and one w ith Europe" (p. 110). On th e o th e r hand, Lindsay p o in ted 451 tr a d e p re fe re n c e s , she was u n w illin g to su p p o rt a f r e e - tr a d e a re a in which a g r i c u l t u r a l p ro d u c ts were in c lu d e d , b ecau se o f h e r Commonwealth p r e r o g a tiv e s . C o n seq u en tly , o u t t h a t "At each s u c c e s s iv e s te p [o f th e Six t o c l o s e r u n io n ], w hether in th e c a se o f th e . . . [ECSC, EDC, EPC, EEC, o r EAEC] th e B r i t i s h have done two th in g s . They have welcomed th e s te p s ta k e n and th en have put forw ard a s u c c e s s io n o f p ro p o s a ls t o c o u n te rb a la n c e them. The Eden P ro p o sals o f 1952, th e Eden in v e n tio n o f W estern European Union, th e s o - c a lle d Grand D esign of Selwyn Lloyd, th e F ree T rade A rea w ere a l l r e a c tio n s to c o n ta in , n o t Com munism, b u t th e movement o f th e S ix" (p. 113). A lso see Mackay, o p . c i t . . pp. 104-11, 125-35. Mackay w r ite s : " I t i s d i f f i c u l t to a c q u it th e B r i t i s h Government o f th e ch a rg es o f h y p o c risy and p e rfid y t h a t have been la id a g a in s t them in re g a rd to t h e i r p o lic y in Europe over th e postw ar y e a r s ; f o r , d e s p ite a l l t h e i r p r o t e s t s about t h e i r i n t e r e s t in Europe, in f a c t th ey have re fu s e d t o ta k e ad vantage o f any o p p o rtu n ity o ffe re d f o r any r e a l and e f f e c t i v e i n t e g r a t i o n o f W estern Europe" (pp. 109-10). C f. R ichard Mayne, The Community o f Europe (New York: N orton [ c . 1 9 6 2 ]), pp. 140-2; R o b ertso n , o p . c i t . . p. 51. ^~*For an e x p la n a tio n o f B r i t a i n 's Commonwealth tr a d e p re fe re n c e s and a g r i c u l t u r a l c o n c e ssio n s in a Euro pean f r e e - t r a d e a r e a , s e e Mackay, op. c i t . . pp. 110-1, 131- 7. A ccording to Mackay, " B r ita in wanted th e b e s t o f b o th w o rld s . She wanted h er Commonwealth p r e f e r e n c e s ; she w anted to keep an open m arket f o r a g r i c u l t u r e ; and y e t she wanted to have th e b e n e f i ts o f s e l l i n g h er m anufactured goods in th e a re a o f th e Common M arket . . ." (p. 111). F u rth erm o re, Mackay d e c la re d t h a t "As we s h a l l see in th e n e x t C hap ter [ 6 ] , th e Commonwealth has been used as an argum ent a g a in s t B r ita in p la y in g h e r p ro p e r p a r t in E urope, when in r e a l i t y th e Commonwealth does n o t sta n d in th e way a t a l l " (p. 111). A lso see Mayne, op. c i t . . pp. 141- 452 f r e e - t r a d e d is c u s s io n s among th e OEEC members dragged on th rou ghout 1957 and in to 1 9 5 8 ,^ ^ as France seemed to play th e v i l l a i n 's r o l e (in B r i t i s h eyes)^®^ in p re v e n tin g p ro g re ss toward th e w ider economic " in te g r a tio n " plan s o f B r ita in f o r W estern Europe. Even w ith th e EAEC and EEC T re a tie s going in to e f f e c t on Jan uary 1, 1958, th e "high hopes" o f economic su ccess in th e harm onization o f th e EEC m arket f a ile d to m a te r ia liz e d u rin g th e y e a r, fo r France was to become th e stum bling b lo ck . The heavy economic d ra in o f sh o rin g up a c o lla p s in g c o lo n ia l em pire, e . g . , th e c o s t ly , long- l a s ti n g war a g a in s t A lg eria n independence, proved f r u s t r a t i n g and e x a sp e ra tin g to th e French e le c to r a t e and was 10R to b rin g an end to th e F o u rth R epublic on May 13, 1958. 5, 149-53; Shanks and Lambert, op. c i t . . pp. 189-4. F lo rin s k y , op. c i t . . pp. 159-66. 106 Mayne, op. c i t .. pp. 141-3; R obertson, op. c i t .. p. 53. 107 Mayne, op. c i t . . pp. 141-2. In f a c t , The (London) Tim es. November 18, 1958, c a r r ie d th e h e a d lin e banner o f "France th e W recker." I r o n i c a l l y , th e F o u rth R epublic had o r i g i n a l l y sponsored th e s e v e ra l plans to u n ite W estern Europe. 453 N ext, De G au lle emerged as P rem ier, and th en as P re sid e n t on Jan u ary 8, 1959, a f t e r th e ad o p tio n o f a new c o n s t i t u t i o n e s ta b lis h in g th e F i f t h R ep u b lic. In tr y in g to b rin g s t a b i l i t y to French p o l i t i c s once a g a in , De G au lle became to o p reo ccu p ied f o r a tim e to be concerned about th e w h o leh earted im plem entation o f th e EAEC and th e EEC T r e a t i e s , which had come in to fo rc e on Jan u ary 1, 1958. In th e in te rim , th e n e g o tia tio n s led by B r ita in f o r a European f r e e - t r a d e a re a com prising th e OEEC coun t r i e s broke down by th e f a l l o f 1958. A deadlock had developed between B r ita in and F rance over d if f e r e n c e s between Commonwealth a g r i c u l t u r a l p re fe re n c e s and th e EEC's uniform t a r i f f on e x te r n a l tr a d e . And a lth o u g h th e EEC in th e i n t e r e s t o f harmony extended th e r e c ip r o c a l 10 per c e n t t a r i f f c u t ( i n i t i a t e d on Jan u ary 1, 1959) to a l l members o f GATT, e x c e p tin g th o se whose t a r i f f s were a lre a d y below th e proposed common t a r i f f , t h i s d id not r e s o lv e th e s p l i t . Nor did th e 20 p er c e n t im port quota in c re a s e extended to a l l n a tio n s o f th e OEEC. L a te r , when an EEC Commission r e je c t e d B r i t a i n 's p ro p o sa l t h a t th e Eurmart extend to o th e r OEEC members i t s f u tu r e t a r i f f c u ts and im port quota in c r e a s e s , B r ita in 454 had play ed h e r l a s t hand. Unable to g ain any co n c essio n s from th e EEC, B r ita in decided to meet w ith A u s tr ia , Den mark, Norway, P o rtu g a l, Sweden, and S w itzerlan d a t Stockholm in Ju n e, 1959, and to g e th e r th ey formed th e 109 European F ree Trade[A rea] A sso c ia tio n (EFTA). Sometimes c a ll e d th e "O uter Seven" in c o n t r a d is t i n c t i o n to th e " In n e r S ix" of th e EEC,'*’^ t h e i r aim was to s e t up a tr a d in g m arket w ith no q u o tas o r i n t e r n a l t a r i f f s but w ith each member keeping i t s own s e p a ra te e x te r n a l t a r i f f s c h e d u le . T urning to a c o n s id e r a tio n o f th e achievem ents o f Euratom and Eurm art d u rin g 1959, th e y e a r w ith which t h i s stu d y c l o s e s , th e b a la n c e sh e e t shows t h a t th e id ea o f a U nited S ta te s of Europe made l i t t l e r e a l headway and th a t 109 See fo o tn o te 104 above. ^ ^ B e c a u se th e s e seven n a tio n s [e x cep t f o r S w itz e r land] l i e beyond th e o u te r b o u n d arie s o f th e EEC c o u n tr ie s . ^ ^ T h is was th e fundam ental d if f e r e n c e between a f r e e - t r a d e a re a and a custom s union l i k e EEC. The l a t t e r does n o t g iv e each member th e freedom to determ in e i t s own e x te r n a l t a r i f f ; in s te a d , a uniform r a t e i s extended to a l l e x te r n a l t a r i f f . For a c h ro n o lo g ic a l re c o rd o f B r i t a i n 's EFTA e f f o r t s which cu lm in ated in th e e s t a b l i s h ment o f th e EFTA, see K e e sin g 's XI (1957-1958), 15393-5, 15693; X II (1959-1960), 17613-23, 17661. 455 th e hopes o f th e European f e d e r a l i s t s were not f u l f i l l e d . A v a r ie ty o f causes f o r t h i s may be c i t e d : (1) th e slow s t a r t in b rin g in g th e t r e a t i e s in to fo rc e because of F ra n c e ’s dom estic and o v erseas problems and th e d elay over n e g o tia tio n s w ith B r ita in and h e r su p p o rte rs fo r a European f r e e - t r a d e a r e a ; (2) th e economic recovery of th e European n a tio n s rev iv e d in them (e s p e c ia lly France under i t s new and th en c o n s titu tio n a lly - p o w e r f u l P re sid e n t De G au lle) a new s p i r i t o f n a tio c e n tris m th a t overshadowed th e id ea o f European u n ity ; and (3) th e e a r l i e r enthusiasm f o r Euratom subsided as economic c o n d itio n s improved w ith th e in c re a se d p ro d u c tio n of c o a l and th e French d isco v ery o f new o i l and gas re s e rv e s in th e S ahara, and th e need fo r atom ic energy became le s s u rg e n t. F urtherm ore, France became d i s i n t e r e s t e d in th e s u p ra n a tio n a l c o n tro l of atom ic energy by Euratom as she co n tin u ed th e s u c c e s s fu l developm ent o f h er own n u c le a r re s o u rc e s , which in tu rn were to en ab le h e r to be more independent of th e U nited S ta te s and B r ita in ; (4) th e r e f u s a l of B r ita in and her EFTA a l l i e s to jo in EEC p revented th e maximum p o te n tia l o f a W estern European economic union from being r e a liz e d . The r i v a l r y between th e s e two W estern g ro u p in g s, u n fo r tu n a te ly , must go down in h is to r y as an ex trav ag an ce th a t 456 th e cau se o f W estern European u n ity could i l l a f f o r d . In f a c t , th e r e v iv a l of th e movement fo r a U nited S ta te s of Europe, i f n o t com pletely s id e tra c k e d , has been s e t back i n d e f i n i t e l y because of th e d iv e rs io n a ry and o b s tr u c tiv e EFTA. U n fo rtu n a te ly , o b s tr u c tiv e t a c t i c s and piqued 112 fe e lin g s n u rtu re d on bad f a i t h a re not q u ic k ly overcome. 112 C f. e . g . , in h is op. c i t . . Mackay*s sta te m e n ts of "th e ch arg es o f h y p o crisy and p e rfid y . . .[ a g a in s t] th e B r i t i s h Government" (p. 109); " th e Commonwealth has been used as an argument [a smokescreen] a g a in s t B r ita in p lay in g h er pro per p a r t in Europe, when in r e a l i t y th e Commonwealth does not stand in th e way a t a l l . The r e a l reaso n l i e s in B r i t a i n 's d e te rm in a tio n not to g iv e up any p a r t of h er so v e re ig n ty and to a s s o c ia te not w ith th e c o u n trie s of W estern Europe b u t w ith th e U nited S ta te s " (p. 111). A lso c f . L in d sa y 's s ta te m e n ts , as w e ll as th e re fe re n c e s to o th e r s , in fo o tn o te s 104 and 105 above. De G aulle had a f a i r knowledge o f American and B r i t i s h European p o lic y d u rin g and s in c e World War I I [c£ . h is r o l e in th e Anglo- French Union o f f e r by B r ita in in Ju n e, 1940 (se e above, pp. 199-205), h is le a d e rs h ip o f th e F ree French Forces d u rin g th e war but h is ex c lu sio n from a l l th e planning o f th e Normandie in v a sio n , and o th e r m a tte rs . D oubtless th e s e ex p erien ces l e f t th e G eneral w ith an u n f o r g e tta b le , i f n o t u n fo rg iv a b le , pique toward B r ita in and th e U nited S ta te s , not to m ention h is subsequent m ystique or i l l u sio n s o f F ra n c e 's n a tio n a l g ra n d e u r]. De G au lle was "on" to B r i t a i n 's p o lic y o f "w anting h e r cake and e a tin g i t too " w ith reg ard to Europe. L i t t l e wonder t h a t he vetoed B r i t a i n 's re q u e s t to come in to EEC on January 29, 1963. N otw ithstanding th e flo o d o f s p e c u la tiv e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s as to why De G au lle r e je c te d B r i t a i n 's b id ( c f . Los Angeles Tim es. January 30-F ebruary 6, 1963, p t . I , p. 1 and p t . I I , p. 5; and "W estern Europe: Round I to th e G e n e ra l," Time. February 15, 1963, pp. 3 0 -1 ), De G aulle has ex p lain ed 457 D e sp ite th e d e la y in g e ttin g in to f u l l o p e r a tio n , th e i n s t i t u t i o n s o f th e new com m unities, o f c o u rs e , had been formed in 1958; y e t , no d e c is io n as to where th e permanent h e a d q u a rte rs o f th e th r e e com m unities should be lo c a te d had been reach ed by 1960. B r u s s e ls , Luxembourg, and S tra sb o u rg co n tin u ed to v ie f o r th e honor, as each houses c e r t a i n o f th e i n s t i t u t i o n s o f th e th r e e communi t i e s . N o n e th e le ss, one h i s t o r i c a l and s i g n i f i c a n t s te p had been taken in th e c r e a tio n o f a s in g le European P a r lia m e n ta ry Assembly to h e lp d eterm ine p o lic y , g iv e d i r e c t i o n , and to se rv e as th e common Assembly of th e th r e e com m unities, ECSC, EAEC, and EEC. H olding i t s f i r s t s e s s io n in S tra sb o u rg on March 19 to 21, 1958, th e common Assembly voted unanim ously to d iv id e i t s chamber s e a ts ac co rd in g to a p o l i t i c a l p a rty r a t h e r than on a n a tio n a l b a s is and adopted th e new name o f European P a r lia m e n ta ry Assembly. F urtherm ore, i t proposed t h a t in t h a t "F rance would welcome B r ita in in to th e Common Market on term s of e q u a lity , but n o t as a s p e c ia l p a r tn e r w ith t r a d e co n c e ssio n s f o r th e b e n e f it o f i t s home a g r ic u lt u r e and i t s Commonwealth a s s o c ia te s " (David L aw rence's column in Los A ngeles Tim es. F ebruary 1, 1963, p t . I I , p. 5 ). For an e x c e lle n t stu d y o f De G a u lle 's kin d o f Europe v e rsu s M onnet's in a Europe ev o lv in g toward a f e d e r a l Europe and w orld o r d e r , see John P in d e r, Europe A g ain st 458 th e f u tu r e p a rlia m e n ta ry d e le g a te s should be e le c te d by th e peo ple o f th e European Community r a th e r than as now n o by n a tio n a l p a rlia m e n ts . In summary, as th e EEC faced th e 1 9 6 0 's , i t s p ro s p e c ts were much b r i g h t e r than th o se of i t s r i v a l EFTA. The EEC, o r " In n e r S ix ," embraced a co n tig u o u s t e r r i t o r y w ith tw ice th e p o p u la tio n ; i t s Gross N a tio n a l P roduct and r a t e o f grow th was n e a r ly tw ice t h a t o f th e EFTA "O uter S even." In f a c t , one London o b se rv e r more o r le s s confirm ed th e b r ig h te r p ro sp e c ts of th e EEC in t h i s v e i n : EFTA has n o t proved one of th e h a p p ie s t i n s p i r a t i o n s o f B r i t i s h postw ar diplom acy. I f i t was in ten d ed as a r i v a l to th e S ix , th e c o n te s t De G au lle (New York: P raeg er [c . 1 9 6 3 ]), pp. 1-160. I 1 o Assemblde P a rle m e n ta ire Europeenne. D e b a ts : Compte Rendu in Extenso des Seances: S essio n C o n s titu tiv e [del Mars 1958, No. 1 ([S tra s b o u r g ]: Mars 1958), pp. 13, 21-3, 3 0 -1 , 106-7. A lso see Keesing* s , XI (1957-1958), 16092. To b rin g to f r u i t i o n a genuine European p e o p le s' P a rlia m e n t, th e Congress o f th e European people (Congres du Peuple Europden) was c r e a te d to r a l l y th e people in th e s ix n a tio n s o f EEC to t h i s c a u se . See i t s D ra ft T re a ty to Summon a European C o n s titu e n t Assembly (approved by th e Congress o f th e European p eop le a t i t s second s e ss io n a t Lyon [F rance] on Jan u a ry 25, 1959; [Lyon]: Congres du P euple Europeen, 1959) [7] p p ., Mimeographed. A lso see i t s m onthly new spaper, Peuple Europeen: Le prem ier jo u rn a l EuropdenI Annde 1. No. 1 — (Lyon), septem bre 1957 —f o r a re c o rd o f i t s a c t i v i t i e s . 459 was unequal from th e s t a r t . The Seven lacked th e g e o g ra p h ic a l and p o l i t i c a l u n ity o f th e S ix . . . . Though i t worked sm oothly enough in a modest way, th e EFTA never began to f i r e th e im ag in atio n or aro u se th e enthusiasm o f i t s peoples as th e more am bitious Community o f th e Six d id . Nobody could f e e l a p a s s io n a te sense o f lo y a lty to " E f ta ." B r i t is h e x p o rte rs con sid e re d i t from th e s t a r t a poor exchange fo r th e th re a te n e d lo ss of tra d e in th e Common M arket. . . . P a ra d o x ic a lly , in f a c t , th e c h ie f achievem ent o f th e EFTA was to dem onstrate th e s tr e n g th and v i t a l i t y of th e Common M arket. When th e B r i t i s h Government f i n a l l y decided to ta k e th e plunge and apply f o r membership of th e EEC, "E fta " was to prove an em barrassing com p l i c a t i o n , lik e th e Commonwealth but le s s im p o rta n t--a secondary a lb a tr o s s which th e A ncient M ariner had fa ste n e d round h is own neck in a f i t o f pique. ^ The g r e a t e r e f f e c tiv e n e s s o f th e EEC might be g ath ered from th e f a c t th a t only F in lan d became an a s s o c i a t e member of th e EFTA. On th e o th e r hand, Greece and l a t e r A u s tria , P o rtu g a l, Sweden, and S w itzerlan d of EFTA, along w ith S pain, sought a s s o c ia tio n w ith EEC; w hile B r ita in , Denmark, and Norway of EFTA, as w ell as Ire la n d , a p p lie d fo r membership. What b e t t e r prom ise o f EEC's r o s i e r fu tu re than a l l seven members o f EFTA seeking to t r a n s f e r to th e more s u c c e s s fu l E urm art! ^■^Michael Shanks in Shanks and Lambert, op. c i t . . p. 33. Mackay, in op. c i t . % p. 134, m aintained th a t "The F ree Trade Area is dead, . . . and any development of th e Seven can only serv e to d iv id e Europe even m ore." 460 A fte r th e slow s t a r t which la s te d fo r two y e a r s , c e r t a i n c o n c re te achievem ents began to ta k e e f f e c t in th e e a r ly 1 9 6 0 's, and th e s e portend w e ll f o r th e fu tu r e p ro g re ss o f a U nited Europe. Among th e s e a re (1) th e s u c c e s s fu l move on Jan u ary 14, 1962, in to " s ta g e two" of th e tw elve to f i f t e e n y e a r s ' t r a n s i t i o n p erio d to th e f u l l Common M arket; (2) th e "rem oval of a f i r s t s e r ie s o f r e s t r i c t i o n s on th e f r e e movement of c a p i t a l " ; (3) th e fo rm u latio n o f " i t s f i r s t tim e ta b le fo r removing r e s t r i c tio n s on th e movement of la b o u r"; (4) th e approval of a tw ofold program to en ab le "any c i t i z e n o f th e Community, and any firm e s ta b lis h e d w ith in i t , to do b u s in e s s , e x e r c i s e a p ro fe s s io n , o r supply s e r v ic e s , anywhere throughout th e a re a " ; (5) th e ado p tio n o f a " jo in t system o f s o c ia l s e c u r ity fo r m igrant w orkers"; and (6) th e e sta b lish m e n t by law o f "equal pay f o r men and women . . . in a l l Com m unity c o u n tr ie s ," to become e f f e c t iv e January 1, 1 9 6 5 .^ ^ H ^ F o r f u r th e r d e t a i l s o f th e s e and o th e r a c h ie v e ments of th e European Economic Community, see Mayne, op. c i t . . pp. 130-1. A lso see C harles A. Cerami. A llia n c e Born o f Danger: Am erica, th e Common M arket, and th e A tla n tic P a rtn e rs h ip (New York: H arco u rt, B race, and World [c . 1 9 6 3 ]), pp. 29-33, 155-61; P in d er, op. c i t . . pp. 24-30, 113-25, 159-60; Shanks and Lanibert, op. c i t . . pp. 133-83, f o r ey e-w itn ess a p p r a is a ls of th e accom plishm ents and o u tlook o f an expanding European Economic Community. CHAPTER XI UNITED STATES OF EUROPE: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT This study of c e n tu r ie s -lo n g e f f o r t s to r e u n ite Europe re v e a ls a long s tru g g le between opposing f o r c e s -- th e fo rc e s of in d iv id u a l greed a g a in s t th e g e n e ra l w e lfa re , o f v ested p r iv ile g e a g a in s t th e p u b lic i n t e r e s t , of th e r u l e r s , or t h e i r ag en ts o f governm ent, a g a in s t th e governed. C a ll i t what one w i l l , th e n e g a tiv e fo rc e s a g a in s t European u n ity have outweighed and s t i l l outweigh th e p o s itiv e fo rc e s to t h i s day. For evidence of th e se opposing f o rc e s , l e t us review th e h i s t o r i c a l re co rd of th e e f f o r t to u n ite Europe. W e may c o n sid e r f i r s t th a t th e ro o ts of European u n ity extend back to th e tim e of th e S to ic s and th e e a rly C h r is tia n s . Since then they have been n u rtu re d by a few h u m an itarian s and p h ilo so p h ers who have sought some form o f o rg a n iz a tio n th a t would b e s t promote th e m oral and p o l i t i c a l u n ity of th e peoples o f Europe. For c e n tu r ie s , some p e rso n s, longing fo r a r e tu r n o f th e peace and u n ity o f pax Romana. looked in vain to th e Roman Empire as 462 th e id e a l p o l i t i c a l o rg a n iz a tio n o f European s o c ie ty , w h ile o th e rs looked to th e Church o f Rome. The dream of European u n ity through pax e c c l e s i a s t i c a was n ever d e s tin e d to be r e a liz e d in th e c e n tu r ie s to fo llo w . R iv a lr ie s and c o n f l i c t s between th e Church and th e monarchs o f emerging independent s t a t e s , each p roclaim ing preem inence over th e minds of men, p revented th e e c c l e s i a s t i c a l e f f o r t from m a in ta in in g a harmonious community. The next exponent of th e Roman id e a l of u n iv e rs a l community was looked fo r in th e r e s t o r a t io n of th e Empire of th e w est w ith th e papal c o ro n a tio n of th a t f a i t h f u l fr ie n d of th e Church, Charlem agne, as Emperor of th e Romans. But in tim e, th e E m peror's d u al r o le as tem poral and s p i r i t u a l le a d e r of th e realm was to b rin g d is u n ity to th e dream of a r e s to r e d u n iv e r s a l em pire and was to reduce i t to r i v a l kingdoms. In 962, King O tto I of Germany rev iv e d th e id ea of u n iv e r s a l em pire a f t e r h is papal c o ro n a tio n , and l a t e r h is realm became known as th e Holy Roman Empire. But he and h is su c c e sso rs came in to prolonged d is p u te w ith th e Church, and th e "Holy Roman Emperors" never succeeded 463 d u rin g th e 1,006 y e a rs o f t h e i r rule.'*' In r e a l i t y , they were never a b le to e x e rc is e com plete s o v e re ig n ty , nor had th ey a u n iv e r s a l em pire, fo r t h e i r im p e ria l a u th o r ity was n o t reco g n ized beyond Germany and I t a l y . A fte r th e r i s e o f th e independent n a t i o n - s t a t e s , th e Holy Roman Empire continued in name d e s p ite i t s growing o b so lescen ce; and, i f f o r n o th in g more than th e power of t r a d i t i o n , i t served as a h i s t o r i c a l lin k between th e em pire of Rome and subsequent attem p ts to u n ite Europe. Weakened f u r th e r by th e R eform ation and th e r e lig io u s w ars, th e Holy Roman Empire rem ained l i t t l e more than a symbol o f th e m edieval q u e st fo r u n iv e rs a l empire u n t i l i t s d is s o lu tio n in 1806, when Napoleon, th e "New C h arle- m agne," f a il e d in h is e f f o r t s to r e s t o r e i t . ^The Holy Roman Empire is sometimes regarded as o r ig in a tin g w ith Charlemagne, who was crowned Roman Emperor in 800 A.D. I t is s i g n i f i c a n t th a t on May 18, 1950, th e c i t y o f Aachen, Germany, one-tim e c a p i t a l of C harlem agne's Empire and c o ro n a tio n s e a t o f t h i r t y - f o u r emperors o f th e Holy Roman Empire, c o n fe rre d i t s f i r s t annual Charlemagne P riz e upon Count R ichard N. C oudenhove-K alergi, "as an award f o r h is lifew o rk f o r th e esta b lish m e n t o f a U nited S ta te s o f Europe" (see Count Coudenhove-K alergi. An Idea Conquers th e World (London: Hutchinson [1 9 5 3 ]), pp. 303- 9 ). Each y e a r t h i s p riz e i s c o n fe rre d upon th e person who has done most to u n ite Europe. O thers among i t s fo u rte e n r e c ip ie n ts to d a te have been Winston C h u rc h ill, Robert Schuman, Jean Mbnnet. 2 And 139 y e a rs l a t e r in 1945, H it l e r , a "Second N apoleon," had t r i e d by fo rc e of arm s, came c lo s e , but a ls o f a i l e d . 464 The end o f a l l hopes f o r th e r e s t o r a t i o n o f th e European u n iv e r s a l em pire f i n a l l y came from th e im pact o f a s e r i e s of e v e n ts . The more im p o rtan t among th e s e were th e R en aissan ce, th e in v e n tio n o f p r i n t i n g , th e d i s covery o f th e New W orld, th e ra c e f o r c o lo n ie s , th e r e l i g i o u s and th e i n d u s t r i a l r e v o lu tio n s , th e ra p id grow th in commerce and in w e a lth , th e r i s e of a m iddle c l a s s , th e sp read o f n a tio n a lis m , th e s a n c tio n of th e d o c trin e o f s o v e re ig n ty o f th e t e r r i t o r i a l n a t i o n - s t a t e , and th e prom otion o f a u ta rk y . These e v e n ts , however; f o s te r e d th e p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l advances o f man and h asten e d th e t r a n s i t i o n from a b s o lu te to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l m onarchies, and from m onarchic to d em o cratic governm ents a f t e r th e American and French R e v o lu tio n s. But th e d o c trin e o f th e supremacy of n a tio n a l s o v e re ig n ty s t i l l co n tin u ed in to th e l a t t e r h a l f o f th e tw e n tie th c e n tu ry , thanks to th e r i v a l r y o f an economic and a c h a u v in is tic n a tio n a lis m , f o s te r e d by an a n a c h r o n is tic p e tty n a t i o n - s t a t e system . In t h i s i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e t t i n g of th e supremacy o f n a tio n a l s o v e re ig n ty , law and m o ra lity in th e hands o f th e n a t i o n - s t a t e were b u t "reaso n s o f s t a t e , " or what serv ed th e s t a t e ' s " b e s t" i n t e r e s t s . Since so v e re ig n s 465 owed to o u ts id e r s no a c c o u n ta b ility f o r t h e i r t e r r i t o r i a l r u l e , w ar, or th e t h r e a t o f w ar, became th e f i n a l a r b i t e r in c o n f l i c t s o f n a tio n a l i n t e r e s t and "h o n o r." As a r e s u l t , su c c e s siv e wars and in te r m itt e n t tru c e s c re a te d c o n d itio n s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l anarchy which k ep t Europeans d iv id e d and which r e s t r i c t e d them to r e l a t i v e l y sm all s e c tio n s o f Europe. M oreover, c o n f l i c t s of n a tio n a l i n t e r e s t have f o s te r e d p a ro c h ia l te n d e n c ie s , lead in g to p ro longed m isu n d erstan d in g and d i s t r u s t o f n eig h b o rin g p eo p les. In tu r n , th e i n t e r n a ti o n a l anarchy of Europe has i n t e n s i f i e d antagonism s, led to r e c u rrin g w ars, and o b s tru c te d economic, p o l i t i c a l , and s o c ia l advancement. I t was th e rav ages and heavy c o s ts o f war th a t led th e e a r l i e r h u m an itarian s and p u b l ic i s ts to fo rm u late plans or p r o je c ts o f European u n ity looking toward th e e sta b lish m e n t o f permanent peace. The n e g a tiv e fo rc e s th a t opposed th e s e w r ite r s and t h e i r p la n s - - le d by monarchs and t h e i r a d m in is tr a to rs w ith v ested i n t e r e s t s in t h e i r j o b s - - u t i l i z e d t a c t i c s of r i d i c u l e , la b e lin g , and name- c a l l i n g ; e . g . , such a w r ite r was c a lle d an i d e a l i s t , a dream er, and a v is io n a ry ; h is plan a u to p ia n , u n r e a l i s t i c peace p ro je c t or scheme. O rig in a to rs of th e se plans were 466 more o fte n r e f e r r e d to in a b e l i t t l i n g manner as "th o se im p r a c tic a l peace p r o je c t" w r i t e r s . Cynicism and s k e p t i cism were th e re b y f o s te r e d , sometimes d e l i b e r a t e l y . As a consequence, some o f th e s e w r i t e r s , a p p a re n tly to avoid d e r is i o n , w rote anonymously, o th e rs w rote in c o g n ito ; e . g . , P ie r r e Dubois was n o t i d e n t i f i e d as th e a u th o r o f De re c u p e ra tio n e . . . (1305-07) u n t i l 1862. S t i l l a n o th e r, th e Duke o f S u lly , c r e d ite d th e a u th o rs h ip o f h is G reat D esign to th e p o p u lar b u t deceased King Henry IV of F ran c e, to g ain b e t t e r r e c e p tio n f o r i t . As th e e ig h te e n th c e n tu ry u sh ered in th e Age o f E nlightenm ent and a p e rio d o f g r e a t i n t e l l e c t u a l awakening spread th ro u g h o u t Europe, th e le a d e rs o f th o u g h t, a lth o u g h a g re e in g on th e need to e lim in a te th e inhuman i n s t i t u t i o n of w ar, c o n sid e re d i t more r e a l i s t i c to ed u c ate th e people f i r s t . Then when th e people were c a p a b le o f becoming more a c ti v e in im proving s o c ie ty and p o l i t i c s , th ey would be b e t t e r a b le to r e s o lv e th e problem o f u n ity and peace. A lso , monarchs and t h e i r a d m in is tr a to r s found i t re sp e c ta b le to g iv e l i p s e rv ic e to th e te a c h in g s o f th e le a d e rs o f th e en lig h ten m en t and to b o a st o f th e p ro g re s s iv e w e ll-b e in g o f t h e i r s u b je c ts th ro u g h newly adopted p a t e r n a l i s t i c 467 re fo rm s. The e v o lu tio n o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s by t h i s tim e re v e a le d th e developm ent o f a d e f i n i t e system o f so v ere ig n n a t i o n - s t a t e s . Problems o f p e rio d ic war were b e lie v e d b e s t re so lv e d th ro u g h diplom acy and th e a d j u s t ment o f th e b a la n c e o f power, w ith o c c a s io n a l e f f o r t s to a p p ly , where p r a c t i c a l , p r in c ip le s o f th e Law o f N a tio n s. Not u n t i l th e l a t t e r p a r t o f th e e ig h te e n th c e n tu ry , however, w e ll in to th e Age o f E n lig h ten m en t, was a p o l i t i c a l , m o ral, and le g a l p h ilo s o p h ic a l base fo r th e cau se o f European u n ity provided by Rousseau, K ant, and Bentham. P re v io u s ly , proponents of th e cau se of u n ity had ap p ealed to th e r i g h t re aso n and g o o d w ill o f European m onarchs. The p o s i tiv e su p p o rt o f th e s e th r e e w r i t e r s , and o th e rs who follow ed them, n o t only le n t g r e a t e r r e s p e c t a b i l i t y to th e id e a of u n itin g Europe but a t t r a c t e d an in c re a se d p u b lic fo llo w in g to t h a t e f f o r t . Indeed, R ousseau, K ant, and Bentham m ight w e ll r e p r e s e n t th e dem arcation l in e between th e e a r ly u n ity p io n e e rs and th e n in e te e n th -c e n tu ry ran k s o f f e d e r a l i s t a d h e re n ts . Perhaps th e more s i g n i f i c a n t c o n tr ib u tio n s o f th e p io n e e rs in th e e f f o r t to u n ite Europe d e se rv e sum m arizin g a t t h i s p o in t. 468 Dubois (1305-7) was th e p io n e e r p u b l i c i s t on i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l o r g a n iz a tio n , th e f i r s t to propose fo rm a lly a leag ue o f n a tio n s , th e f i r s t to s e t f o r t h a d e f i n i t e plan f o r an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o u rt o f a r b i t r a t i o n f o r th e s e ttle m e n t o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l d is p u te s , and th e f i r s t to urge i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic and m i li t a r y s a n c tio n s a g a in s t a g g re s s o r n a tio n s . P ie r r e D ubois, th e e a r ly p ro p h et o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , has f a i l e d to re c e iv e th e re c o g n itio n t h a t he d e s e rv e s . Dante (1310) was one o f th e f i r s t to re c o g n iz e lo c a l s e l f - r u l e and to s e p a ra te th e is s u e o f s u p ra n a tio n a l a u t h o r i t y in i n t e r n a t i o n a l government from th a t o f th e s o v e re ig n ty o f th e in d iv id u a l n a t i o n - s t a t e . King Podebr&d o f Bohemia (1464) was th e f i r s t to re c o g n iz e n a t i o n - s t a t e s as i n t e r n a t i o n a l e n t i t i e s in h is p lan and th e f i r s t head of s t a t e to propose to o th e r s o v e r e ig n s in t r e a t y form th e id ea of i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rg a n iz a tio n as an a c t o f s t a t e . PodebrSd' s Union p lan c a lle d f o r th e a b s o lu te re n u n c ia tio n of a g g re s s io n , p rovided fo r m utual 3 The d a te s fo llo w in g th e names o f th e s e e a r ly p io n e e rs r e p r e s e n t th e p u b lic a tio n d a te o f th e p lan o f each f o r European u n ity . D ubois' p lan was p u b lish e d , e . g . , between 1305-7; th e e x a c t y e a r has n o t been e s ta b lis h e d . 469 a s s i s t a n c e , p re v e n tiv e w ar, and f o r th e punishm ent o f i n s t i g a t o r s o f war and war c r im in a ls . Note th e s i m i l a r i t i e s a f t e r World War I I in th e Nuremberg T r i a l s and in NATO p o l i c i e s . Crucd (1623) was th e f i r s t to re c o g n iz e th e o b s tru c tiv e n e s s o f economic n a tio n a lis m to i n t e r n a t i o n a l u n ity and p eace. In h is Union p la n , t h e r e f o r e , he su g g e s te d freedom and p r o te c tio n o f tr a d e on an e q u ita b le b a s is in each m em ber-nation, r e g u la tio n o f th e p r ic e , w e ig h t, and law o f moneys in th e d i f f e r e n t c o u n trie s to one common s ta n d a rd , and th e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s ta n d a r d iz a t io n o f w eig h ts and m easures. S u lly (1638) was th e f i r s t to t o l e r a t e r e li g i o u s d if f e r e n c e s (no lo n g er to be a cau se o f war) w ith in C hristendom and w ith in h is R epublic o f f i f t e e n s t a t e s having "eq u al r i g h t s and pow er." His p lan to u n ite Europe was th e f i r s t suggested by an a b le m in is te r o f government and statesm an who foresaw t h a t s t a t e s m ight be persuaded to u n it e f o r p o l i t i c a l and economic advantages even i f th ey could no lo n g er be persuaded by m oral a p p e a l. Penn (1693), a r e t i r e d so v e re ig n in h is own r i g h t , and an ex p erien ced l e g i s l a t o r and a d m in is tr a to r from th e 470 New W orld, was one o f th e f i r s t p u b l i c i s ts on European u n ity to re c o g n iz e th e anarchy o f n a tio n a l so v e re ig n ty and to p la c e i t in p ro p er p e rsp e c tiv e --w h e re th e i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of each s t a t e were not to be i n te r f e r e d w ith but where t h e i r e x te r n a l r e l a t i o n s were to be harmonized in a European P arliam en t. A lthough he suggested a C onfedera tio n of Europe, h is p ro p o sals fo r a " S ta te of Europe" 4 more c lo s e ly approxim ated a fe d e r a tio n . B e lle rs (1710) d iv id e d h is s in g le European S ta te in to about one hundred equal p ro v in ces or d i s t r i c t s , con t r o l l e d by a "sta n d in g European law ," or C o n s titu tio n . He a ls o s e t f o r t h c o n c re te su g g e stio n s fo r a u n ite d European army, which was to be attem p ted in th e 1950's through th e EDC and W EU. S a in t- P ie r r e (1713) made a s ig n i f i c a n t advancement in th e s t r u c t u r i z a ti o n and o p e ra tio n a l-p ro c e d u re p ro v isio n s f o r th e fu tu r e European Union through a w r itte n C o n s titu ti o n . M oreover, h is system was, "more o r le s s co m p letely , ^The word "c o n fe d e ra tio n " in Penn's day was gen e r a l l y used to in d ic a te th e union of s t a t e s much as th e word " f e d e ra tio n " i s used to d ay . Since th e n , however, many w r ite r s have used th e term "c o n fe d e ra tio n " r a th e r lo o se ly when they meant a f e d e r a tio n . 471 th e b a s is of th e Covenant" o f th e League o f N atio n s, which everyone b e lie v e d t h a t G eneral Smuts and P re s id e n t Wilson had c r e a te d , when in f a c t "th ey were m erely unconscious i m it a t o r s ," according to th e French j u r i s t , Paul C o llin e t. Beginning w ith th e modern p e rio d , Rousseau (1761) was to provide th e cause of European u n ity w ith a p o l i t i c a l p h ilosop hy. In so doing he was a b le to b rin g o ut in to th e open th e n e g a tiv e p o l i t i c a l p r a c tic e s th a t su b o rd in a te th e p u b lic i n t e r e s t to p r iv a te or v ested i n t e r e s t s and th ere b y o b s tru c t socioeconom ic advances f o r th e b e n e f it of s o c ie ty . Rousseau a ls o p re se n te d one of th e f i r s t r a t i o n a l approaches to th e achievem ent o f i n t e r n a t io n a l o rg a n iz a tio n and peace in fa c e o f th e am oral p r a c tic e of p o l i t i c s o f h is p e rio d . In t h i s r e s p e c t, he made i t c le a r th a t i t was u to p ia n to t r u s t s o le ly to argum ents in th e name of hum anity, j u s t i c e , m oral r e s t r a i n t , and re a so n . On th e c o n tra ry , he openly appealed to expediency, u t i l i t y , and s u p e rio r i n t e r n a ti o n a l fo rc e . Turning to prophecy, Rousseau p re d ic te d th a t th e u n ity and la s tin g peace of Europe would some day be re so lv e d by a European P arliam en t, d ire c te d by c e n t r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . He d e c la re d t h a t b e fo re t h i s could ta k e p la c e , m onarchies would have 472 to be re p la c e d by a dem ocratic form o f government w herein th e people were so v e re ig n . A lthough th e l a t t e r p a r t of h is prophecy of p o p u lar so v e re ig n ty has come to p a s s, th e form er has n o t. N atio n al so v e re ig n ty under p e o p le 's r u le has been l i t t l e more d isp o sed to t r a n s f e r p a rt of t h e i r so v e re ig n ty ( p a r t ic u la r w i l ls ) to th e "g e n e ra l w i l l " of a European p o l i t i c a l community. Bentham (1786-89), th e g re a t le g a l reform er who f i r s t co ined th e p h ra se , " I n te r n a tio n a l Law," c a lle d fo r an I n te r n a tio n a l Court of J u s t i c e , and a European Congress c o n s is tin g of two r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s from each s t a t e of Europe. Bentham was one of th e f i r s t to c a l l fo r th e end of s e c r e t diplom acy and th e p u b lic a tio n o f a l l proceedings o f th e P arliam en t by a f r e e p r e s s , f o r he firm ly b e lie v e d th a t an e n lig h te n e d p u b lic opinion to g e th e r w ith m o ra lity was th e b e s t fo rc e fo r backing up th e d e c is io n s of th e Court and th e C ongress. In a n t ic ip a tio n of o p p o sitio n to h is plan on th e ground th a t i t was prem ature, Bentham d e c la re d : "Let i t not be o b je c te d th a t th e age i s no t r ip e f o r such a p ro p o sa l. The more i t wants o f being r ip e th e sooner we should begin to do what can be done to rip e n i t ; th e more we should do to rip e n i t . . . ." 473 Kant (1795) p ro v id ed more o f a c r i t i c a l a n a ly s is o f th e r o l e o f p o l i t i c s and m o ra lity in h is day than a p la n . I t was h is c o n c lu sio n t h a t th e peace and u n ity o f Europe was a m oral p r i n c i p l e t h a t ought to and co u ld be r e a l iz e d i f s t a t e s , l i k e in d iv id u a ls , gave up t h e i r law le s s anarchy f o r peace and s e c u r i ty , and banded to g e th e r in to a f e d e r a tio n o f n a tio n s , and u ltim a te ly in to a s in g le w orld s t a t e of n a tio n s . K a n t's p ro p o sa ls however, were l i t t l e heeded in th e y e a rs to fo llo w . I t was to th e id e a s o f Hegel and th e e x a lte r s of th e n a t i o n - s t a t e , from Napoleon down to H i t l e r , t h a t th e m a jo rity o f men tu rn e d . F ollow ing th e f a i l u r e o f Napoleon to u n ite Europe under F rench hegemony by m i l i t a r y f o r c e , Czar A lexander I endeavored to re s o lv e E u ro p e 's dilemma o f war and peace by th e T re a ty o f th e Holy A llia n c e (181 5), sim ply a lo o se league o f s o v e re ig n s , founded on th e C h r is tia n p r in c ip le s o f b r o th e r ly lo v e , g o o d w ill, and j u s t i c e . D esp ite th e i n e f f e c tiv e n e s s and dem ise o f th e Holy A llia n c e , i t serv e d as th e id e o lo g ic a l lin k f o r th e m oral u n ity o f a p o l i t i c a l l y fragm ented Europe in th e s tr u g g le f o r peace, between th e tim e of Kant and N ich o las I I ' s co n v o catio n o f th e f i r s t i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace c o n fe re n c e in 1899 a t th e Hague. 474 The b ig f o u r, A u s tr ia , B r i t a i n , P ru s s ia , and R u ssia , c a r r ie d on th e name "Holy A llia n c e " a f t e r th e Quadruple A llia n c e ,^ b u t t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y had n o th in g in common w ith th e o r i g in a l aims of th e o r ig in a l Holy A llia n c e . In s te a d , they endeavored to m ain tain th e p o l i t i c a l u n ity o f Europe through a system of co n g resses o r am b assad o rial c o n fe re n c e s. A lthough t h i s "Holy A llia n c e " was th e f i r s t h i s t o r i c a l attem p t by th e heads of s t a t e s to form a u n ite d European o rg a n iz a tio n to d e a l w ith th e p o l i t i c a l problem s o f Europe, i t ceased to have any r e a l im portance because i t was thw arted from th e f i r s t by (1) th e diverg en cy of n a tio n a l i n t e r e s t s between B rita in and R ussia and (2) th e c o n f li c t between v ested i n t e r e s t s and th e r i s i n g m iddle c la s s over th e p r in c ip le s of " le g itim a te " government and th e p r in c ip le s of dem ocratic lib e r a lis m and n a tio n a l s e lf- d e te r m in a tio n . Follow ing th e breakup o f th e Q uintuple A llia n c e and th e end in 1822 o f i n te r n a t io n a l government by con g re s s e s , th e g re a t powers co n tin u ed to assume th e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r p o l i t i c a l u n ity through "co n certed a c tio n ." ^ I t became th e Q uintuple A llia n c e , or th e Big F iv e, a f t e r France was ad m itted in 1818. 475 T h eir p r a c tic e o f m eeting in ad hoc co n feren ces o f d i p l o macy whenever th e peace o f Europe was th re a te n e d became known as th e C oncert o f Europe. Lacking i n s t i t u t i o n a l s tr u c t u r e and p ro ced u re, th e C oncert o f Europe was never a genuine i n te r n a t io n a l governm ent, nor did i t t r y to c o n s o lid a te w hatever m oral and p o l i t i c a l u n ity may have e x is te d in Europe, because i t re p re s e n te d p rim a rily th e n a tio n a l aims and i n t e r e s t s o f th e b ig powers. Europe, n e v e r th e le s s , was to pass through a p erio d of some n in e ty y e a rs in which th e C oncert of Europe was h eld to g e th e r by th e b e l i e f th a t peace and u n ity depended upon t r a d i t i o n a l p o lic ie s o f diplom acy, a l l i a n c e s , and b alan c e of power. During th e n in e te e n th c e n tu ry , however, th e con t i n u i t y and fu rth e ra n c e of th e id ea of a European Union was to be found p rim a rily among fo u r c iv ic groups: (1) th e French S o c i a l i s t s , (2) th e M azzinian re p u b lic a n demo c r a t s , (3) th e peace s o c i e t i e s , and (4) th e f r e e - t r a d e ec o n o m ists. Each o f th e s e groups sponsored i t s own p e o p le 's movement fo r a u n ite d Europe and reached high t id e s o f popular enthusiasm and su p p o rt around th e y ea rs 1815, 1840, 1848, 1866, and 1871, fo llo w in g wars or 476 p e rio d s o f po p u lar a c tio n fo r p o l i t i c a l and s o c ia l refo rm s. The p ro g re ss o f th e young U nited S ta te s o f America was fre q u e n tly c ite d in th e u n ity l i t e r a t u r e of th e c e n tu ry and was o fte n r e f e r r e d to as a model f o r Europe. In f a c t , th e e x p re ssio n s "European F e d e ra tio n "^ and "U nited S ta te s of Europe"^ became p o p u la rly accep ted g o a ls . The number of w r ite r s su p p o rtin g a U nited Europe in c re a se d g r e a t ly , and p e o p le s' c o n g resses were h eld i n t e r m i t t e n t l y , ex ten d in g alm ost throughout th e c e n tu ry in v a rio u s c i t i e s , such as B ru s s e ls , Geneva, P a r i s , and Rome. The n in e te e n th -c e n tu ry c o n tr ib u tio n to th e id ea o f a U nited Europe m ight be l i s t e d as (1) th e c e n tu ry in which th e u ltim a te p o l i t i c a l g o al f o r Europe had been e s ta b lis h e d as t h a t o f a f e d e r a tio n , such as a U nited S ta te s o f Europe, and (2) th e c e n tu ry in which th e idea had ac q u ired a base o f p o pular le a d e rs h ip and mass su p p o rt. ^ S ain t-S im o n 's plan (1814) was th e f i r s t to propose a European F e d e ra tio n , re p re s e n tin g th e people o f each s t a t e through th e lower house. Pecqueur, M azzini, and most u n ity w r ite r s t h e r e a f t e r c a lle d f o r a f e d e ra tio n . ^The e d ito r o f th e J o u rn a l de Rouen, a f r e e - t r a d e r , was one o f th e very f i r s t to use th e term "U nited S ta te s o f Europe" a t a campaign banquet in P a ris on December 25, 1847; t h e r e a f t e r th e e x p re ssio n became w idely used. 477 Except f o r l i t e r a r y exposure and th e o c c a s io n a l l i p s e r v ic e o f men in p u b lic a f f a i r s (because th e id e a was p o p u lar a t th e tim e) th e c r e a tio n o f a European F e d e ra tio n rem ained o u ts id e t h e i r c o n s id e r a tio n . With th e ex c e p tio n o f Lorim er (1877) and h is a s s o c i a te s , p ro fe s s o rs o f law and p o l i t i c a l s c ie n c e who were to produce th e f i r s t c o n c re te a tte m p t to p ro v id e a le g a l framework f o r a European F e d e ra tio n , o th e r w r i t e r s added few new c o n tr ib u tio n s to th e id ea o f a European governm ent. I n s te a d , t h e i r w r itin g s were aimed p rim a rily a t an en lig h ten m en t o f p u b lic o p in io n and w ider p u b lic su p p o rt f o r th e ca u se . On th e o th e r hand, th e n e g a tiv e s id e of th e p e o p le 's hopes and e f f o r t s f o r European u n ity produced a m ajor d i s r u p tio n . T his was th e d if f u s io n o f a c tio n among th e fo u r m ajor c iv ic g ro u p s, w hich, w h ile o s te n s ib ly s t r i v i n g to a c h ie v e th e u n ity o f Europe, were them selves d is u n ite d co n c ern in g th e b e s t means to a t t a i n t h a t g o a l. The members o f th e s e fo u r groups ranged p o l i t i c a l l y from th e most extrem e r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s , th ro u g h shades o f l i b e r a l "dem ocrats" and f r e e - t r a d e eco n o m ists, to th e most c o n s e rv a tiv e p a c i f i s t s . U n fo rtu n a te ly , th e grow th of p lu ra lis m which led to fa c tio n a lis m and p o l i t i c a l 478 p a r tie s n ot only d iv e rte d pop ular sup port from a c o n c erted d riv e to u n ite Europe in th e n in e te e n th c e n tu ry but a ls o s p l i t and weakened p u b lic su pport fo r th e movement in th e tw e n tie th c e n tu ry . Toward th e end of th e n in e te e n th c e n tu ry and d u rin g th e begin ning o f th e tw e n tie th , te c h n o lo g ic a l advances in communication and tr a n s p o r ta tio n tu rn ed a t t e n tio n away from u n itin g Europe. In s te a d , men became absorbed in th e movement toward a more u n iv e rs a l or w o rld wide a s s o c ia tio n o f n a tio n s . In d ic a tiv e o f t h i s tendency was th e Hague I n te r n a tio n a l Peace C onference in 1899. A fte r i t had succeeded in e s ta b lis h in g th e f i r s t Permanent [World] Court o f A r b itr a tio n , th e aim of which was to s e t t l e d is p u te s between n a tio n s and th e re b y preven t w ar, th e masses became imbued w ith th e thought of no more w ars. F urtherm ore, w ith th e oversea c o lo n ia l o u t le t s f o r eco nomic and p o l i t i c a l te n s io n s , and th e r e l a t i v e peace and m a te ria l p ro g ress d u rin g th e t r a n s i t i o n to th e tw e n tie th c e n tu ry , a growing sense of u n iv e rs a lis m and p o l i t i c a l optim ism p re v a ile d . Under such c irc u m sta n c e s, th e a rg u ments f o r a U nited S ta te s o f Europe were l o s t in th e g re a t e x p e c ta tio n s of in te r n a tio n a l c o o p e ratio n and a s s o c i a ti o n . 479 When war erupted in 1914, i t s rude awakening proved th e inadequacy and undoing of th e Concert of Europe system of a ll i a n c e s , balance of power, and diplomacy through ad hoc co n feren c es. During th e war, th e peace s o c ie tie s became a c tiv e again and a f t e r th e war were in stru m e n ta l through th e le a d e rs h ip of P resid en t Wilson in having e s ta b lis h e d th e f i r s t w orld-w ide a s s o c ia tio n o f n a tio n s , th e League o f N ations, to m aintain th e peace. A fte r World War 1, optimism flo u ris h e d ; th e peoples of Europe re la x ed and r e li e d on th e League to be t h e i r guardian angel of in te r n a tio n a l s e c u rity . Meanwhile, B rita in re tu rn e d to her p o licy of "sp len d id is o la tio n " from C o n tin e n ta l a f f a i r s , w hile France, hu m iliated by th e lo ss of le a d e rsh ip in Europe, stro v e to reg ain her former p r e s tig e . The " in to x ic a tin g illu s i o n s " of th e T reaty of V e rs a ille s soon wore o ff when Europeans began to co n fro n t c e r ta in hard socioeconomic f a c t s . Europe was fin d in g i t in c re a s in g ly d i f f i c u l t to repay her c o lo s s a l war debt to th e prosperous c r e d ito r n a tio n , th e United S ta te s of America. A fte r weighing th e dead-end economic fu tu re of Europe, fragm ented by so many p e tty have-not s t a t e s , 480 C oudenhove-K alergi was led to r e v iv e th e id e a o f u n itin g Europe p rim a rily on th e b a s is o f econom ics. B eginning in th e sunmer o f 1922, C oudenhove-K alergi th e r e f o r e d ir e c te d h is e n e rg ie s to w r itin g and speech-m aking in o rd e r to re v iv e th e id e a o f u n itin g Europe. His i n i t i a l c ru sa d e f o r Pan-Europe was dynam ically s u c c e s s fu l and soon e n l i s t e d th e su p p o rt of thousands from a l l w alks o f l i f e in ev ery s t a t e o f Europe (ex cep t R u s s ia ), from o rd in a ry c i t i z e n s to le a d e rs in b u sin e ss and in d u s try and men in th e h ig h e s t o f f ic e s o f governm ent. E v e n tu a lly French F oreign M in is te r B rian d , w ith th e backing o f Stresem ann and o th e r fo re ig n m in is te r s , p re se n te d th e p lan fo r Pan-Europe to th e League Assembly in Septem ber, 1929. At th e re q u e s t o f th e Assembly, B riand su b m itted a Memorandum o f h is p lan to th e tw en ty - s ix governm ents o f Europe f o r t h e i r re sp o n se . But th e n e g a tiv e r e p ly o f B r ita in in d ic a te d th a t she wanted n e i t h e r to be excluded nor to be in c lu d e d , b u t was eag er on ly to p re v en t a European f e d e r a l union from b ein g e s ta b lis h e d . A ccording to C oudenhove-K alergi, B r ita in proposed lim itin g th e in ten d ed organism to a European Committee o f th e League o f N a tio n s. 481 T h e r e a f te r , th e w orld p re ss and th e r e p l i e s o f th e tw e n ty -s ix governm ents w ere more c r i t i c a l . Most governm ents q u a l i f i e d t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n on t h a t of B r i t a i n . The s o l i d a r i t y f o r u n ity soon c o lla p s e d when th e w orld economic c r i s i s developed and drove each n a tio n to a p o lic y o f retren ch m en t and a u ta rk y . With th e r i s e o f H i t l e r and h is Nazi le g io n s , th e cau se o f Pan-European Union p r a c t i c a l l y d i s i n te g r a te d ex cep t f o r a few f a i t h f u l le a d e rs who attem p ted to keep th e id e a a l i v e in F rance and S w itz e rla n d . In ste a d o f w inning th e peace by c lo s in g ra n k s , th e two key c o u n tr ie s , B r ita in and F ran ce, l e t peace and th e u n ity o f Europe s l i p from t h e i r hands because o f d iv e rg e n t and a n ta g o n is tic p o l i c i e s . The r e v iv a l o f th e movement f o r a Pan-European Union in London was a tte m p te d in Ju n e, 1938, by A very, C h u r c h ill, Cooper and o th e r s . The fo rm atio n of th e a s s o c ia tio n o f F e d e ra l Union in B r ita in in th e f a l l of 1938 to h e lp in th e campaign to u n ite Europe came to o l a t e . The h e a rta c h e s and tra g e d y o f World War I I need n o t be r e c i t e d h e r e , o th e r th an to say t h a t th e people and t h e i r le a d e rs have s h o rt memories and t h e i r p o l i t i c a l b e h a v io r o f te n seems in c o n s is te n t and n e g a tiv e . Because 482 o f t h e i r la c k o f p o s itiv e a c tio n d u rin g tw enty-one y e a rs of " p e a c e E u r o p e a n s brought upon them selves a second h o lo c a u s t. I t i s r e a l l y u n fo rtu n a te t h a t man seems to r e q u ir e a d i s a s t e r , o r th e t h r e a t o f one, b e fo re ta k in g a p p ro p ria te a c tio n . R e fle c t on th e b e la te d B r i t is h o f f e r to France o f A nglo-French Union in June 1940, a t th e " e le v e n th h o u r," when France was on th e verge o f c o lla p s e and su rre n d e r to th e Nazi in v ad ers! Again too l i t t l e , to o l a t e , in c o n tr a s t to th e c a lc u la tin g a t t i t u d e of B r ita in toward Europe between th e w a rs . A fte r th e re p rie v e from an o th e r world war w ith in a g e n e ra tio n , what does th e h i s t o r i c a l re c o rd have to show fo r th e p o l i t i c a l b eh av io r o f Europeans toward th e u n ity o f t h e i r s o c ie ty , toward th e u n if ic a tio n o f t h e i r o b so le sc e n t s ta te -s y s te m ? A pparently th e le sso n s o f h is to r y a re learn ed slo w ly , i f a t a l l . H isto ry seems to have re p e a te d i t s e l f in th e s tru g g le f o r European u n ity b efo re and a f t e r World Wars I and IX. I t should be noted th a t p a r a l l e l popular movements f o r a U nited S ta te s o f Europe e x is te d p r io r to bo th wars even though th e two movements d if f e r e d in d u ra tio n and sequence, and th e l a t t e r secured government 483 su pport which th e form er did n o t. Also a f t e r bo th w ars, emphasis s h if te d from th e idea of European u n i f i c a t io n to a more u n iv e rs a l or w orld-w ide p o l i t i c a l a s s o c ia tio n of n a tio n s , as r e f l e c t e d in th e League o f N ations and th e U nited N atio n s. Moreover, th e arguments re g a rd in g th e g r e a te r lo g ic o f a w orld-w ide a s s o c ia tio n o f n a tio n s as opposed to a sm aller European a s s o c ia tio n in view of a w orld " sh rin k in g " in s o c ia l and s p a t i a l r e la tio n s h ip s because o f s c i e n t i f i c and te c h n o lo g ic a l advances were s im ila r in both c a s e s. In bo th p erio d s th e need fo r th e f e d e ra tio n of Europe was lo s t in th e t i d e toward "one- w orld" m indedness. The r e v iv a l of th e id ea of European union a f t e r both wars was th e lo g ic a l answer to E urope's d epressed economic c o n d itio n s . So was th e correspon ding tu rn toward a U nited Europe when th e League o f N ations and l a t e r th e U nited N ations f a il e d to m easure up to w o rld -u n ity e x p e c ta tio n s . B r ita in adopted a p a r a l l e l and p e r s i s t e n t p o s itio n a g a in s t th e u n i f i c a t io n o f Europe a f t e r bo th w ars. There were s i m i l a r i t i e s in th e re v iv a l o f th e movement to u n ite Europe when th e danger or th r e a t of a g g re ssio n appeared; e . g . , in B r ita in th e F e d e ra l Union and o th e r groups to u n ite Europe made t h e i r appearance 484 when H i t le r th re a te n e d w ar. L ikew ise, th e moves fo r EDC and W EU o ccu rred when th e S o v iet Union th re a te n e d . A gain, th e d ie was c a s t; B r ita in could n o t have "th e b e s t o f two w o rld s ." When H i t le r was about to e lim in a te F rance from th e w ar, and leav e B r ita in a l l alo n e to fa c e h is Wehrmacht. B r ita in o ffe re d A nglo-French Union to F rance. L a te r, when EFTA d id n o t f u l f i l l B r i t a i n 's economic needs or measure up to th e p ro g re ss and p o t e n t i a l of th e EEC, B rita in came knocking on th e door of th e Common Market to seek ad m issio n . The ebb and flow of th e s tru g g le to u n it Europe through th e c e n tu r ie s has made s i g n i f i c a n t p ro g re ss none t h e l e s s , e s p e c ia lly a f t e r World Wars 1 and I I . Some o f th e b e s t minds of Europe as w e ll as some governments n o t only supported th e id ea b u t viewed i t no longer as u to p ian o r u n r e a l i s t i c . Even though th e id ea has been placed in p r a c t i c a l and lo g ic a l p e rs p e c tiv e s in c e World War I I , and s ix European n a tio n s have moved c lo s e r to union ( a lb e it slow er th an th e European f e d e r a l i s t s have lik e d ) through s te p - a t- a - tim e im plem entations of t h e i r economy, B r ita in rem ains th e m ajor roadblock to a more com plete European U nion. 485 Since 1948, however, th e co u rse o f European Union has ag ain been s p l i t by th e same two n a tio n s , B r ita in and F rance. The B r i t i s h , w ith t h e i r extra-E u ro p ean i n t e r e s t s , have been h i s t o r i c a l l y opposed to th e p o l i t i c a l c o n s o lid a tio n of Europe. Since World War XI, th e change in th e w orld power s t r u c tu r e has induced th e B r i t is h to t r y to keep one fo o t in th e Commonwealth, th e o th e r in th e A tla n tic Community w ith th e U nited S ta te s , and t h e i r hands on th e C o n tin e n t. C onsequently, th e B r i t i s h approach to European u n ity has been c r e d e n tia le d w ith th e proper words b u t c o u n te ra c te d by sa fe g u a rd s, such as "not so f a e t , " " l e t us r e f e r th e m a tte r to a study com m ittee," or "only a p r a c t ic a l s te p a t a tim e should be taken now," and so f o r th . Backing up t h i s approach, th e r e f o r e , th e B r i t is h have s tr e s s e d in terg o v ern m en tal a s s o c ia tio n , v o lu n ta ry c o o p e ra tio n , re a so n , and goodw ill as th e slow- b u t-s u re -ro a d to European u n ity . On th e o th e r hand, th e French have h i s t o r i c a l l y been in th e vanguard o f European Union, but when i t appeared th a t s ix C o n tin e n ta l c o u n trie s m ight have to u n ite w ith o u t B r i t a i n , e . g . , in th e EDC, th ey h eld back fo r f e a r a re su rg e n t Germany m ight su rp ass F ra n c e 's 486 le a d e rs h ip and thus dom inate th e union. With th e r e tu r n of G eneral De G aulle to th e p resid en cy of F rance, th e road to f u l l e r European u n ity may r e q u ir e c e r ta in d elay s and d e to u rs as th e G eneral t r i e s to en v isag e th e b e s t c o u rse fo r advancement o f h is n a t i o n 's i n t e r e s t s . The B r i t is h approach to European u n ity is p re s e n tly sym bolized by th e C ouncil of Europe, th e OEEC, th e WEU, and th e European F ree Trade A s s o c ia tio n . The French approach is r e f l e c t e d in th e C o n tin e n ta l " L i t t l e Six" of th e ECSC, th e EEC (Common M arket), and in Euratom. Because of d ieh ard n a t i o n a l i s t i c p a r tic u la r is m and economic n a tio n a lis m , th e case fo r th e U nited S ta te s of Europe must be argued on u t i l i t a r i a n r a th e r than on m oral grounds. Unless th e u t i l i t a r i a n advantages o f membership in th e Conmon Market become so obvious as to su rp ass th e advantages o f rem aining o u ts id e , i t i s d i f f i c u l t to v i s u a liz e i t s development in to a genuine U nited S ta te s o f Europe. Europe 1964 i s not America 1789. I t is co n ceiv ab le, th e r e f o r e , th a t an e m p iric a l and novel form o f European Union may develop; o th e rw ise , as th e danger o f war and economic in s e c u r ity r i s e s or su b sid e s , so w i l l th e tid e s of th e movement to u n ite Europe. A P P E N D I C E S APPENDIX A SUPPLEMENTARY DATA TO CHAPTER I I I ANTECEDENTS OF THE EFFORTS TO UNITE EUROPE: 800-1700 P ie r r e D u b o is1 De re c u p e ra tlo n e T e rre S an cte was n ev er p u b lish e d u n t i l 1611, when i t ap peared in B o n g ar's G esta Dei p er F ra n c o s . I I , 316-61; i t s second p u b lic a t io n was n o t u n t i l 1891 by C h arles L an g lo is a c c o rd in g to E liz a b e th V. Souleytnan in The V ision o f World Peace in S ev en teen th and E ig h te e n th -C e n tu rv F rance (New York: Putnam 's [ c . 1 9 4 1 ]), pp. 2 -3 . A p p aren tly i t s m isle a d in g t i t l e , C oncerning th e Holy Land Recovery ( l i t e r a l E n g lish t r a n s l a t i o n ) , which r e a l l y had no co n n e ctio n w ith th e purpose o r o b je c tiv e s o f D ubois' p la n , was m ainly r e s p o n s ib le f o r t h i s w o rk 's rem aining in o b s c u r ity . Not u n t i l th e r e li g i o u s wars in th e S ev en teen th C entury made th e problem o f European u n ity and peace o f g r e a te r urgency and induced s c h o la rs to se a rc h more e x te n s iv e ly f o r h i s t o r i c a l d a ta on t h i s q u e s tio n was De re c u p e ra tio n e . . . uncovered. But b ecau se Dubois w rote anonym ously, he was n o t i d e n t i f i e d as i t s a u th o r u n t i l about 1862 as C h [a rle s] V. L an g lo is m entions in h is In tro d u c tio n to D ubois, P i e r r e , De re c u p e ra tio n e T e rre S a n c te . t r a i t e de p o l i ti q u e g d n d ra le . . . ( P a r is : P ic a rd , 1891), p. v i. An e a r l i e r t r e a t i s e of Dubois i s Summaria b r e v is e t com pendiosa D o c trin a f e l i c i s E x p e d itio n is e t A b b rev ia- t i o n i s Guerrarum ac L itium Regni Francorum . b e t t e r known as De A b b re v ia tio n e and w r itte n about 1300. In i t Dubois su g g e sts much o f h is p lan f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rg a n iz a tio n and peace, b u t h is De re c u p e ra tio n e . . . e n la rg e s upon t h i s p lan and co v e rs a l l o f h is p ro p o sa ls more a d e q u a te ly ac co rd in g to E ile e n E. Power in " P ie r r e Du Bois and th e Dom ination o f F ra n c e ," in F. J . C. Hearnshaw, e d . , The S o c ia l and P o l i t i c a l Ideas o f Some G reat M ediaeval T h in k ers (London: Harrap, [1 9 2 3 ]), p. 147. For a b r i e f com parison o f D ubois' two w orks, h is m otives f o r w r itin g them, and th e re a so n s he s e le c te d th e m isle a d in g t i t l e o f De r e c u p e r a tio n e T e rre S ancte f o r h is p lan o f European u n ity 490 and peace, see [V. J . ] Lewis, "The P io n e e rs ," The New Commonwealth. I , No. 12 (Septem ber, 1933), 10; and Souleyman, op. c i t ., pp. 3-*5. 3. D ubois' c r e d e n tia ls c o n s is te d o f study a t th e U niver s i t y o f P a r is , c o n ta c t w ith th e lead in g s c h o la rs of h is day, p r a c tic e o f law, p ro c u ra to r of th e U n iv e rsity o f C outance, Normandie, Royal ad v o cate, and a member o f th e E s ta te s-G e n e ra l fo r two term s. Dubois a ls o sp ent some f i f t e e n y e a rs o f h is l e is u r e w ritin g anonymously numerous p o l i t i c a l reform pam phlets. A ccording to V. J . Lewis, l o c . c i t ., Dubois was an "e n lig h te n e d th in k e r , a refo rm er su rp a ssin g in z e a l f o r p ro g re ss and b re a d th o f view even [Roger] Bacon h im se lf . . . [b u t] he f a i l e d to convince h is own g e n e ra tio n by reason of th e r a d ic a ln e s s of h is view s." 4. D an te' s De m o n arch ia. I f one were to look f o r th e in c e n tiv e s f o r D a n te 's t r e a t i s e , he m ight fin d much of i t d e riv e d from h is u n fo rtu n a te p o l i t i c a l ex p e rien ce. Involved in th e dom estic s t r i f e o f F lo re n c e , he was fo rc ed in to e x ile to escape a d ea th sen ten ce from which he was never fre e d ; and as a consequence, he was d riv en to a l i f e o f w andering. A pparently t i r i n g o f t h i s way o f liv in g and unhappy w ith w idespread lo c a l d i s se n s io n s , r i v a l r i e s , and w ars, a l l o f which kept th e people o f I t a l y and elsew here d is u n ite d , Dante yearned f o r E u rope's r e tu r n to a more harmonious l i f e through r e s t o r a t io n o f th e Empire. And in Henry V II, crowned Emperor in 1308, he b e lie v e d th a t he saw th e f u l f illm e n t o f h is hopes. 5. F e a rfu l o f th e dangerous id eas p re se n te d in De monar c h ia ( c a llin g fo r r e s to r a t io n of th e u n iv e rs a l tem poral e m p ire ), Pope John XXII o rd ered i t burned as h e r e t ic a l in 1329. In 1554 th e Church had i t p laced on th e Index o f Forbidden Books, f iv e y e a rs b e fo re i t was f i r s t p r in te d in B asle; and n o t u n t i l around th e b e g in n ing of th e T w entieth Century was i t removed from th e Index as no lo nger d an g ero u s. 6. For an i n t e r e s t i n g e v a lu a tio n o f D a n te 's m edievalism and th e in flu e n c e of h is id e a s , see E. Sharwood Sm ith, "Dante and W orld -em pire," in Heamshaw, e d ., op. c i t . . 491 pp. 107-37. For a c o n c ise p re s e n ta tio n o f D a n te 's ou tlook and a n a ly s is of h is peace aims and th e u n ity of Europe through a u n iv e r s a l monarchy, see V. J . L [e w is], "The P io n eers: V II .--D a n te ," The New Common w e a lth , I I , No. 1 (O ctober, 1933), 8. 7. "The Peace League o f George PodSbrad, King of Bohemia." A lthough D ubois' p lan f o r a European " C h ris tia n R epublic" was n ev er p u b lish ed u n t i l 1611, Souleyman in op. c i t . . pp. 8 -9 , as w e ll as John Kapras in h is t r a n s l a t i o n o f "The Peace League of George PodSbrad, King o f Bohemia," The Czecho-Slovak R e p u b lic . I I , P a rt 5 (P rague, 1919), p. 3, b e lie v e s th e r e is evidence t h a t i t may have come to th e a t t e n t i o n of King George through h is F rench A d v ise r, A ntoine M arin i, who was commissioned by him to h e lp d r a f t th e Bohemian K in g 's p la n . S y lv e s te r John Hemleben in h is Plans fo r World Peace throu gh Six C e n tu rie s (Chicago: U niver s i t y P ress [c . 1 9 4 3 ]), p. 14, c i t e s s e v e ra l sources in p o in tin g out t h a t th e p la n , " c a lle d a f t e r PodSbrad, was not so much th e k in g 's work as th a t o f h is chan c e l l o r and a d v is e r , A ntoine M arini . . . " On th e o th e r hand, V. J . Lewis in h is "The P io n eers: V III. --The Bohemian P ro je c t o f 1464," The New Commonwealth, I I , No. 3 (December, 1933), 10, does n o t q u e stio n th e a u th o rs h ip o f t h i s plan but r e f e r s to i t as " th e g re a t P ro je c t o f George PodSbrad, King o f Bohemia, a man of o u tsta n d in g a b i l i t y and c h a r a c te r , reg ard ed by h is contem poraries as th e w is e s t statesm an in Europe. . . " 8. I t is o f h i s t o r i c a l s ig n if ic a n c e to n o te c e r t a i n s i m i l a r i t i e s o f p o lic y re g a rd in g m i l i t a r y a g g re ssio n and m utual a s s is ta n c e in P odSbrad's p lan and p re s e n t- day i n t e r n a t i o n a l d efen se o rg a n iz a tio n s l ik e N .A .T.O ., S .E .A .T .O ., W .E.U., and o th e r s . This was th e p o lic y s e t f o r th in P odSbrad's p lan : The members o f th e leag u e e n t i r e l y g iv e up t h e i r r i g h t to wage war in d e p e n d e n tly , and th e r i g h t to d ec id e f o r o r a g a in s t war or peace i s c o n fe rre d upon th e c o n fe d e ra tio n . A ll members o f th e league u n c o n d itio n a lly ta k e th e o b lig a tio n n o t to wage war amongst them selves w hatever t h e i r c o n f l i c t s . . . may b e, th e 492 d e c is io n only and s o le ly r e s t s w ith th e organs o f th e league. But, on th e o th e r hand, th e c o n fe d e ra tio n p r o te c ts i t s members a g a in s t a tta c k s on th e p a r t o f s t a t e s not being members o f th e league . . . i t p r o te c ts i t s members w ith a l l m ight. 9. F urtherm ore, th e p r in c ip le of p re v e n tiv e war (th e f i r s t tim e su g g ested fo r an in t e r n a ti o n a l o rg a n iz a tio n o f n a tio n s ) was embodied in PodSbrad's p lan th u s: F in a lly th e fe d e ra tio n endeavors to p r e vent a ls o wars between s t a t e s n o t being members o f th e leag u e , even w ith o u t being in v ite d to do s o , and in ca se t h i s in te r v e n tio n does no t su cceed , th e c o n fe d e ra tio n p a r t i c i p a t e s in th e war f o r th e sake of th e opponents who showed h im se lf [ s ic ] w illin g to d e s i s t from waging war and to subm it to th e leag u e. 10. A nother novel p ro v isio n o f PodSbrad's p la n , which a n t ic i p a t e s th e p reced en t la id down by th e A llie s fo llo w in g World War I I a t th e Nuremberg T r i a l s , was th e punishment o f in d iv id u a ls who v i o l a te th e p u b lic peace [o r commit crim es of war] as fo llo w s: . . . th e fe d e ra tio n a ls o a c ts as a kind o f P ublic Peace A sso c ia tio n . . . a l l i t s members a re bound to punish w ith th e utm ost s e v e r ity a l l th o se who tr e s p a s s on p u b lic o rd e r and p u b lic peace, and tr e s p a s s e r s , whoever they may b e, a re not to fin d p ro te c tio n anywhere, n e ith e r from t h e i r p rin c e s no r from t h e i r s u b je c ts . And th o se [in c lu d in g th e p rin c e s] K apras, op. c i t .. p. 14. 2 Loc. c i t . (In r e f e r r in g to PodSbrad's Union, Kapras u ses b o th " c o n fe d e ra tio n " and " f e d e r a tio n ." See w r i t e r 's d i s t i n c t i o n between th e s e term s above, pp. 22-3, 26-8 in C hapter I I above. 493 who would p r o te c t and s h ie ld such tr e s p a s s e r s would Incur th e s^me punishment as they th e m se lv e s. . . . 11. V oting In PodSbrad's C o n g reg a tio . or Assembly o f th e League, was to be acco rd in g to n a t i o n a l i t i e s , w ith a l l p rin c e s o f F ran ce, Germany, I t a l y , and e v e n tu a lly Spain and o th e r C h ris tia n m em ber-states each form ing one group w ith only one v o te . W ithin each n a tio n a l group a l l p rin c e s were to be equal and were to have one v o te ; th e m a jo rity o f th e v o tes w ith in each n a tio n a l group was to d ecid e th e one vote of each m em ber-state (K apras, op. c i t . , pp. 14-5). 12. O pposition o f King Louis* e c c l e s i a s t i c a l a d v is e rs to PodSbrad*s p l a i n K apras. o p. c i t . . p. 12. p o in ted out t h a t th e s e a d v is e rs based t h e i r o p p o sitio n to th e p lan on grounds t h a t PodSbrad was an obnoxious h e r e tic who ru le d according to th e H u ssite d o c trin e in th e Czech s t a t e . T his d o c trin e allow ed a f r e e i n t e r p r e t a tio n o f C h r i s t i a n i t y , d id away w ith th e supremacy and s p e c ia l p r iv ile g e s o f th e C a th o lic c le rg y , d ep riv ed them o f t h e i r la rg e p ro p e rty h o ld in g s , and put them on an eq u al fo o tin g w ith a l l o th e r s e c u la r elem en ts. F urtherm ore, PodSbrad d id not re s e rv e a p a r t i c u l a r p la c e in h is Union f o r e i t h e r th e Pope or th e Roman Emperor. The form er could n o t even become a member, and th e l a t t e r only "in h is q u a lity as a German k in g ," and then only on th e same le v e l and e q u a lity w ith a l l o th e r German p rin c e s . 13. The fo llo w in g statem en t o f one of th e e c c l e s i a s t i c a l a d v is e r s , taken from th e d e ta ile d d ia ry k ep t of PodSbrad*s s p e c ia l m ission to th e French C o urt, i s in d ic a tiv e o f i n f l u e n t i a l o p p o sitio n to PodSbrad's p lan and a s u f f i c i e n t reason a t th e tim e to have i t r e j e c t e d : I t is n o t f i t t i n g f o r th e Czech king to fo rm u late such a re q u e s t, e s p e c ia lly n o t w ith o u t th e a u th o riz a tio n of His H oliness th e Pope and 3 Kapras, l o c . c i t . 494 th e C h ris tia n Emperor; and th a t i t would be more f i t t i n g to leav e i t to th e Holy F ath er and th e Emperor to d ec id e in t h i s m a tte r and^ t h a t t h i s was no b u sin e ss o f th e Czech k in g . 14. V. J . Lewis sums up th e h i s t o r i c a l s ig n if ic a n c e o f P odSbrad's p lan to u n ite Europe in t h i s way: . . . th e g re a t P ro je c t f a i l e d , no t because i t was im p ra c tic a l o r prem ature, but because o f th e r e lig io u s view o f i t s a u th o r. But th e g re a tn e s s of th e scheme could not be im p aired . For th e f i r s t tim e th e new p o l i t i c a l c o n d itio n s had been tak en in to c o n s id e ra tio n : f o r th e f i r s t tim e d e f i n i t e organs of i n t e r n a t i o n a l government had been su g g ested . In th e P ro je c t a r e th e p r in c ip le s o f organ- i s a t i o n - - t h e in t e r n a ti o n a l assem bly, th e j u d i c i a l body, and th e i n t e r n a t i o n a l [p o lic e ] fo rc e --o n which l a t e r schemes have been b u i l t and which rem ain th e ir r e d u c ib le minimum o f i n t e r n a ti o n a l o r g a n is a tio n .^ 15. S ix te e n th -c e n tu ry plan s f o r p e a c e . Hemleben, op. c i t . , pp. 17-8, c i t e s an obscure peace plan o f W illiam of C ie rv ia and John S y lv ag iu s, C h an cello r of Burgandy, p re se n te d in 1513 and c a ll i n g f o r a Congress o f Euro pean Kings to pledge to keep th e peace. But Erasmus i s re p o rte d to have s a id : '" C e r ta in p e rso n s ' who p r o f i t by war made th e r e a l i z a t i o n o f th e plan impos s i b l e . " And h is g re a t disappo in tm ent in th e f a i l u r e o f t h i s plan to b rin g an end to th e wars in Europe led him to w r ite Q uerela p a c i s * or The Complaint o f Peace (1517). Hemleben then goes on (pp. 18-20) to summarize t h i s work and i t s c o n trib u tio n in th e i n t e r e s t o f peace. K apras, l o c ♦ c i t . 5 L ew is, lo c . c i t . 495 16. In 1518, th e e a r l i e s t European t r e a t y of n u tu a l a s s is ta n c e came in to o p e ra tio n through "W olsey's League of U n iv ersa l Peace. I t only la s te d a y e a r, however, sin c e F rance and Spain plunged Europe in to a n o th e r w ar. For a ^ b r ie f summary o f W olsey's League, see Hemleben, op. c i t . . pp. 20-1; and f o r a f u l l e r background and a n a ly s is o f th e e f f o r t s o f Pope Leo X, C a rd in a l W olsey, and o th e rs in g e ttin g t h i s leagu e o f m utual a s s is ta n c e in to o p e ra tio n f o r one y e a r, see V. J . Lewis, "The P io n e e rs- - IX .," The New Commonwealth. I I , No. 5 (F ebruary, 1934), 56. 17. For an o th er obscure plan to u n ite th e m i li t a r y fo rc e s o f th e C h ris tia n s t a t e s of Europe in o rd e r to d riv e th e Turks from Europe and in th e hope t h a t t h i s c ru sa d e would b rin g c o o p e ra tio n , m oral u n ity , and "Concord" t h e r e a f t e r among th e p rin c e s o f Europe (p u b lish ed in 1587), see V. L.Lew is, "The P io n eers: X .--F ra n c o is de la Noue," The New Comnonwealth. I I , No. 6 (March, 1934), 82. 18. C ru c ^ 's Le Nouveau Cynde. Answering th e doubts of s k e p tic s who would q u e stio n th e a d v i s a b i l i ty of b rin g in g a v a r ie ty of n a tio n s w ith d i f f e r e n t la n g u a g e s, custom s, and r e lig io n s in to h is u n io n , Crucd d i s played an advanced in t e r n a ti o n a l o u tlo o k fo r h is d a y : For how is i t p o s s ib le , some one w i l l say , to b rin g in accord peoples who a re so d i f f e r e n t in w ishes and a f f e c t i o n s , as th e Turk and th e P e rs ia n , th e Frenchman and th e S paniard . . . th e C h r is tia n and th e Jew o r th e Mohammetan? I say th a t such h o s t i l i t i e s a r e only p o l i t i c a l , and cannot ta k e away th e co n n ectio n t h a t is and must be between men. The d is ta n c e of p la c e s , th e s e p a ra tio n o f d o m iciles does not le sse n th e r e la tio n s h i p o f blood. I t cannot e i t h e r tak e away th e s i m i l a r i t y o f n a tu r e s , tr u e base o f am ity and human s o c ie ty . Why should I a Frenchman w ish harm to an E n g lish man, a S p an iard , o r a Hindoo? I cannot wish i t when I c o n sid e r th a t they a re men lik e me, th a t I am s u b je c t li k e them to e r r o r and sin and th a t a l l n a tio n s a re bound to g e th e r by a 496 n a tu r a l and co n seq u en tly I n d e s tr u c tib le t i e , which en su re s t h a t a man cannot c o n sid e r a n o th e r a s tr a n g e r . . . . W e on th e c o n tra ry w ish th a t a l l th e w orld s h a l l embrace our p e rsu a sio n s l i k e an i n f a l l i b l e r u l e . T his v ic e i s f a m ilia r to th e common p eo p le, who have never passed beyond th e suburbs o f t h e i r town. He th in k s a l l a r e held to liv e lik e him, and only p riz e s h is custom s, acco rd in g to th e way o f th o se sim p letons of A thens, who thoug ht th e moon of t h e i r co u n try b e t t e r th an t h a t o f others. . . . What a p le a s u re i t would b e, to see men go h e re and th e r e f r e e l y , and mix to g e th e r w ith o u t any h in d ran ce of c o u n try , cerem onies, or o th e r such l i k e d if f e r e n c e s , as i f th e e a r th were as i t r e a l l y i s , a c i t y common to a l l . 19. A ccording to Hr. B alch, C ru c e 's modern e d i t o r and E n g lish t r a n s l a t o r , th e r e a re only th r e e known copies o f t h i s essay in French: two in th e B iblioth& que N a tio n a l a t P a ris and one in th e Harvard U n iv e rsity L ib ra ry . For th e only com plete E n g lish t r a n s l a t i o n o f t h i s work, see Emeric C ruce, Le Nouveau Cynee. ed. w ith an In tro d u c tio n and t r a n s l . by Thomas W illin g Balch (P h ila d e lp h ia : A lle n , Lane, and S c o tt, 1909). To show how C ru c£ 's t i t l e i s d e riv e d , Balch c i t e s from P lu ta r c h 's Lives o f I l l u s t r i o u s Men, in which an "o ld Cyneas" t r i e d in vain to a d v ise h is monarch a g a in s t th e s e n s e le s s values o f war. C ruce, however, may have chosen a "new Cyneas" in th e b e l i e f th a t h is ad v ice might be b e t t e r reg ard ed i f a f e a s i b le plan f o r a r b i t r a t i n g d if f e r e n c e s between s t a t e s were d ev ised to m ain tain u n iv e r s a l peace. See fo o tn o te in Balch*s 6 x ^ , Emeric C ruce, Le Nouveau Cynee, ed. w ith an I n t r o d u c tio n and t r a n s l . by Thomas W illin g Balch (P h ila d e lp h ia : A lle n , Lane, and S c o tt, 1909), pp. 84, 86, 90, 92, and 66. 497 In tro d u c tio n to Le Nouveau Cvnee. pp. x x i i - x x i v . 20. Mr. B alch a ls o p o in ts o u t in h is I n tr o d u c tio n , pp. v - v i i , how i t was n o t u n t i l 1890 t h a t th e e x a c t name o f th e a u th o r o f Le Nouveau Cvnde (Emeric Crucd) was re d is c o v e re d by th e em inent B elg ian i n t e r n a t i o n a l j u r i s t and p u b l i c i s t , E rn e st Nys. 21. For a we11-documented stu d y o f C ru c d 's p la n , see Hemleben, op. c i t . . pp. 21-31. 22. S u l ly 's G reat D esign o f Henry IV. Not u n t i l th e e x te n s iv e re s e a rc h and d isc o v e ry o f C h r is tia n P f i s t e r in th e e a r ly 1 890 's was i t known t h a t S u lly r a th e r th an King Henry IV was th e t r u e a u th o r o f th e G reat D esign. S u lly had p re se n te d t h i s p lan as th e g u id in g p r i n c i p l e o f Henry IV s in c e 1596 and a t t r i b u t e d i t s a u th o rs h ip to h is p o p u lar monarch in o rd e r to save h im s e lf from th e ch arg e o f b ein g a v is io n a r y w ith an im p r a c tic a l scheme, to g iv e i t g r e a t e r p r e s t i g e , and to improve i t s chances o f a c c e p ta n c e . Only th e l a s t o f th e s e th r e e o b je c tiv e s d id n o t su cc eed , f o r th e G reat D esign rem ained as th e most famous and i n f l u e n t i a l o f th e e a r ly p r o je c ts to u n i t e Europe and serv e d as th e b a s is o f a l l subsequent p ro p o sa ls to u n i t e Europe u n t i l th e d isc o v e ry o f P f i s t e r . For th e s to r y o f t h i s d is c o v e ry , see C h [ r is tia n ] P f i s t e r , "Les 'Economies R o y ales' de S u lly e t le Grand D essein de H enri IV ," Revue H is to r iq u e , LVI (Septem bre- Decembre, 1894), 328-9. 23. To redraw th e t e r r i t o r i a l b o u n d arie s o f th e f i f t e e n s t a t e s in th e f e d e r a tio n of Europe so t h a t each would be ap p ro x im ately eq u a l in s i z e and power would r e q u ir e p u ttin g an end to th e dominance o f th e House o f Haps- burg and th e Im p e ria l a u th o r ity o f th e Holy Roman Empire in E urope. A n tic ip a tin g a war o f r e s i s t a n c e t o h is p la n , S u lly f e l t i t e s s e n t i a l to lay ou t in g r e a t d e t a i l th e m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y and l o g i s t i c s n e c e ss a ry f o r h is f e d e r a tio n to employ in o rd e r 498 to b rin g th e Hapsburgs in to l i n e .^ 24. A fte r th e subm ission o f th e Hapsburgs, S u lly b e lie v e d th a t th e re would be l a s ti n g European peace because th e map o f Europe would be redraw n, and th e su rp lu s t e r r i t o r y taken from th e Hapsburg realm would be a ssig n e d to th e f i f t e e n s t a t e s in an e q u ita b le manner, th ere b y e lim in a tin g any p o s s ib le excuse f o r fu tu re war. 25. S u lly p r a c t i c a l l y excluded R ussia from h is European fe d e ra tio n on th e grounds th a t i t was in g re a t p a r t a b arbarous co u n try and in th e same c la s s as Turkey, t h a t i t belonged to A sia as much as to Europe and might more le g itim a te ly develop th e re th an in Europe, and t h a t i n f i d e l p rin c e s o f Europe should be excluded u n t i l th ey agreed to conform to C h ris tia n d o c trin e s ; see h is op. c i t . t pp. 31-3, fo r f u r th e r tre a tm e n t of t h i s m a tte r. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to compare S u lly 's assessm ent o f R ussia in r e l a t i o n to a u n ite d Europe some th re e c e n tu r ie s ago w ith h er p o s itio n today toward th e movement to u n ite Europe. 26. A pparently S u lly f a il e d to see th e in c o n s iste n c y between h is su g g e stio n of e q u a lity of s iz e and power of each o f th e f i f t e e n s t a t e s in h is fe d e ra tio n and t h e i r having w eighted r e p r e s e n ta tio n in th e C ouncil. A fte r proposing a more " n e a rly p e r f e c t" e q u ilib riu m in t h e i r p h y sic a l make-up, he l a t e r su g g e sts th a t th e G reat Powers were to have fo u r p l e n ip o te n tia r ie s each and th e l e s s e r Power two each, making up a d e l i b e r a t i v e C ouncil o f about s i x t y - s i x r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s to be "re-ch o se n every th re e y e a rs " (S u lly , op. c i t . , pp. 4 1 -2 ). M axim ilien de Bethune S u lly [Due d e ] , . . . Grand Design of Henry IV. . . . With an In tro d u c tio n by David Ogg, in The G ro tiu s S o ciety P u b lic a tio n s : Texts f o r S tu d e n ts o f I n te r n a tio n a l R e la tio n s . No. 2 (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1921), pp. 43-56. 8 I b id . . pp. 3 5 -4 1 . 4 9 9 27. A ccording to S u lly ( i b i d . , p. 4 2 ), he borrowed h is id ea of a d e l i b e r a t i v e , permanent c o u n c il f o r h is f e d e r a tio n o f Europe from t h a t o f th e a n c ie n t Amphi- cty o n s o f G reece. C e rta in m o d ific a tio n s , however, were made in h is c o u n c il to allo w f o r d if f e r e n c e s in "custom s, c lim a te , and p o l i c y ." 28. In su g g e stin g a c i t y o f C e n tra l Europe as th e perm anent s e a t o f th e C ouncil and th e c a p i t a l o f h is F e d e ra tio n o f Europe, S u lly su g g ested ( lo c . c i t .) t h a t every m em ber-state was to choose in tu rn from th e fo llo w in g c i t i e s : P a r is , Metz, Nancy, C ologne, Mayence, T re v es, F ra n k fu r t, Wurzburg, H e id e lb e rg , S p ire , Worms, S t r a s b o u rg , B a s le , Besanpon, and Luxembourg ( i b i d . » p. 4 3 ). Perhaps i t i s a c o in c id e n c e t h a t some th r e e hundred y e a rs l a t e r th e perm anent, d e l i b e r a t i v e C o n s u lta tiv e Assembly o f th e C ouncil o f Europe has i t s h e a d q u a rte rs s e a t in S tra sb o u rg , one o f th e c i t i e s sug g ested fo r S u l l y 's C ouncil o f Europe s e a t. 29. In th e o p e ra tio n o f h is C o u n cil, S u lly was in advance o f h is p re d e c e s s o rs , f o r in th e i n t e r e s t o f g r e a te r a d m in is tr a tiv e f l e x i b i l i t y , he a n tic ip a te d th e p o s s i b i l i t y o f d e c e n tr a liz in g th e C ouncil in to two o r th r e e e q u a lly d iv id e d b o d ie s , m eeting sim u lta n e o u sly in th e roost p r a c t i c a l c i t i e s . In a d d itio n , he sug g e s te d th e c r e a tio n o f s ix d i s t r i c t c o u n c ils to a s s i s t th e g e n e ra l c o u n c il and any o th e r i n f e r i o r s u b d iv i sio n s t h a t g eographic c o n d itio n s m ight w arran t ( l oc. c i t . ) . 30. W illiam P en n 's An Essay tow ards th e P re se n t and F u tu re Peace o f Europe . . . Penn a ls o b e lie v e d t h a t h is te n y e a rs in America n o t only a ffo rd e d him a n e u tr a l p o s itio n from which to e v a lu a te E u ro p e's p o l i t i c a l u pheavals b u t a ls o q u a l i f i e d him to o f f e r p r a c t i c a l su g g e stio n s th a t would u n ite th e p eo p les o f Europe. As ev id en c e, Penn could p o in t to h is b ein g a so v e r eig n in h is own r i g h t and to th e e x p e rie n c e he had had in l e g i s l a t i o n and a d m in is tr a tio n under a l i b e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n which he had d r a f t e d , and under which he had s u c c e s s f u lly governed th e Colony o f P en n sy l v a n ia , s e t t l e d by peop les o f a l l c re e d s and n a ti o n a l i t i e s from Europe. M oreover, he had re c e iv e d 500 re c o g n itio n f o r h is famous T re a ty o f F rie n d sh ip w ith th e American I n d ia n s , w hich, acco rd in g to S ir John A. R. M a rrio tt in h is Commonwealth or Anarchy? . . . (London: A llan [1 9 3 7 ]), pp. 72-3, V o lta ir e had c a lle d "unique in d ip lo m a tic h is to r y " because i t was ,Mle s e u l e n tr e le s peuples e t le s C h rd tien s q u i n ' a i t p o in t d te j u r e , e t q u l n 'e s t p o in t e td rom pu.'" 31. I t is i n t e r e s t i n g to n o te th a t P ro fe sso r M a rrio tt ( o p. c i t . . p. 67) c a lle d P enn's p r o je c t "th e most s i g n i f i c a n t c o n trib u tio n ev er made by any Englishmen to th e l i t e r a t u r e " o f European peace p r o je c ts . 32. Should any so v ereig n re fu s e to subm it h is d is p u te to P enn's P arliam en t s i t t i n g as a "S overeign C ourt" or to comply w ith i t s d e c is io n and attem p ted to s e t t l e h is own d is p u te by fo rc e o f arm s, Penn s t i p u la te d t h a t " a l l o th e r S o v e re ig n tie s , U nited as One S tre n g th , s h a l l compel th e Subm ission and Perform ance o f th e S entence, w ith Damages to th e S u ffe rin g P a r ty ," as w e ll as payment o f c o s ts to th e C onfederacy. For f u r th e r p ro v is io n s , see h is An Essay towards th e P resen t and F u tu re Peace o f Europe ( F i r s t p u b lish ed in 1693-94. W ashington, D. C .: American Peace S o c ie ty , 1912), p. 6. 33. Penn ( i b i d . , pp. 12-3) a ls o was one o f th e f i r s t to p ro v id e fo r enforced disarm am ent. He emphasized t h a t th e m e m b e r-sta te s' armaments were to be reduced to i n t e r n a l needs only or lim ite d , i f n e c e ssa ry to a s iz e determ ined p r a c t i c a l by th e P arliam en t. 34. To th e p o s s ib le o b je c tio n th a t th e s tro n g e s t and r i c h e s t s t a t e m ight not ag ree to jo in h is C onfedera t i o n , o r i f i t d id , i t m ight c o rru p t th e o th e r d e l e g a te s to g ain i t s e n d s, Penn answered t h a t such a power would be com pelled to jo in because th e o th e r s t a t e s would be u n ite d and th e re b y so much more power f u l as to make i t c o o p e ra te . To p rev en t c o rru p tio n of th e d e le g a te s , he r e f e r r e d to h is method o f v o tin g in th e P arliam en t: B a llo tin g was to be s e c r e t to p rev en t b rib e ry o f th e v o te , and a th r e e - f o u r th s m a jo rity v o te was to be re q u ire d to pass a d e c is io n 501 as t h i s would h e lp d isco u ra g e c o rru p tin g th e v o te . Penn reasoned t h a t i t would ta k e to o much money to buy o f f th e v o tes o f so la rg e a number. But Penn a p p a re n tly overlooked th e p o s s i b i l i t y o f in flu e n c in g a sm a lle r number o f v o tes to p rev en t a th r e e - f o u r th s m a jo rity d e c is io n i f t h i s were th e aim of a would-be c o r r u p te r . Penn d e c la re d , however, t h a t " i f Men o f Sense and Honour, and S ubstance, a re ch o se n ," c o rru p tio n would be l i t t l e o r no problem ( i b i d ., pp. 1 0 -1 ). APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENTARY DATA TO CHAPTER IV ANTECEDENTS OF THE EFFORTS TO UNITE EUROPE: 1700-1815 The f i r s t d r a f t was p u b lish ed in 1712 under th e t i t l e o f Mdmoire pour re n d re la p aix p e r p d tu e lle en Europe (Cologne: Chez Jaques le P a c if iq u e ) ; in 1717, th e t h i r d volume, e n t i t l e d P ro ie t de t r a i t s pour re n d re la paix p e r p ^ tu e lle e n tr e le s so u v era in s c h r e - t i e n s . pour m a in te n ir to u jo u rs l e commerce l i b r e e n tre le s n a tio n s . . . (Lyon: D e v i l l e ) , was added as a summation o f th e f i r s t two. Because of th e cumbersome n ess o f th e s e th r e e volumes, S a in t- P ie r r e f e l t i t n e c e ssa ry to condense and re w r ite h is plan in o rd e r to make i t e a s ie r re a d in g and to g iv e i t w ider c i r c u l a t i o n . In 1729, th e r e f o r e , an abridgm ent o f h is th re e volumes was p u b lish ed under th e t i t l e Abr£g^ du p r o ie t de p aix p e r p e tu e lle . . . (Rotterdam : Beman), f o l lowed by a 2nd e d itio n in 1738. In th e ab rid g ed e d i t i o n s , S a i n t - P i e r r e 's plan was n o t e s s e n t i a l l y a l t e r e d , except t h a t th e o r ig in a l tw elve Fundamental A r tic le s were reduced to f iv e ; and th e e ig h t Im portant A r tic le s and e ig h t U seful A r t i c l e s , in ten d ed as o p e r a tio n a l and p ro c ed u ral guides or by-law s to th e C o n s titu tio n o f th e European Union, were o m itte d . Along w ith a s e r i e s o f p o s s ib le o b je c tio n s to h is p ro p o sals and t h e i r r e f u t a t i o n , some new c o n s id e ra tio n s were added to th e ab rid g ed e d itio n s . The w r ite r lo c a te d what may be th e f i r s t Proof-copy [ n .p .: E. P. G oldschm idt, n .d .] of th e 1713 e d itio n in th e Rare Book C o lle c tio n o f th e World A f f a ir s L ib ra ry , U n iv e rsity of Southern C a lif o r n ia . This c o n s is ts o f two volumes w ith c h a p te r headings and b eginnings and in s e r te d c o r r e c tio n s in S a i n t - P i e r r e 's h an d w ritin g . There is no t i t l e page in e i t h e r volume; however, th e t i t l e of Paix p e r p ^ tu e l- le is p r in te d on th e cover o f each. On th e f i r s t unnumbered page of volume I i s w r itte n : "Ce l i v r e e s t de l'A bb£ de S t. P ie rre de l'A cadem ie fra n p a is e 1712," and on th e fo u rth unnumbered page in volume I I , one may fin d t h i s w r itte n d e d ic a tio n : "Je d e s tin e c e t Exem plaire pour La B ibliothfeque de M . L'Abbd Bignon 504 31 j u i l l 1712." Signed: "L ’Abbd de S a in t p i e r r e . " 2. For th e E n g lish t r a n s l a t i o n of th e o r i g i n a l tw elve Fundam ental A r t i c l e s , th e e ig h t Im portant A r t i c l e s , and th e e ig h t U sefu l A r t i c l e s , see S a i n t - P i e r r e , C h arles Ir£n£e C a s te l, Abbd d e, A P ro je c t f o r S e t t li n g an E v e r la s tin g Peace . . . (London: W a tts, [1 7 1 4 ], [no pages g iv e n ] , as quoted by E liz a b e th V. Souleyman in The V ision o f World Peace in S ev en teen th and E ig h te e n th -C e n tu ry F rance (New York: Putnam s [ c . 1941], pp. 81-90. 3. An E n g lish abridgm ent of th e o r i g i n a l tw elv e Funda m ental A r t i c l e s to F iv e fundam ental A r t i c l e s may be found in S a i n t - P ie r r e , C [h a rle s] I[r6 n e e ] C a s te l, Abbot o f T iro n , S e le c tio n s from th e second e d itio n o f th e Abrege du P ro ie t de Paix P e r p d tu e lle . T ra n s la te d by H. Hale B e l l o t, w ith an In tro d u c tio n by Paul C ol- l i n e t . In The G ro tiu s S o c ie ty P u b lic a tio n s : T exts f o r S tu d en ts o f I n te r n a tio n a l R e la tio n s , No. 5 (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1927), pp. 24-31; and a very good c o n c ise summary o f th e s e f iv e a r t i c l e s a r e to be found on pp. 4-6 o f th e In tro d u c tio n to t h i s work. 4 . A ccording to C o llin e t in h is In tro d u c tio n to S a in t- P ie r r e , op. c i t . , pp. 3 -4 , S a in t P ie r r e had a lre a d y fo rm u lated h is id e a s fo r se c u rin g e v e r l a s t in g peace by 1707 and began " to e la b o r a te them b e fo re 1711." V. J . Lewis in h is "The P io n e e rs: X V .- - S a in t- P ie r r e ," The New Commonwealth. I l l , No. 3 (December, 1934), 234-5, p o in te d o u t t h a t S t. P ie r r e was a man of in te n s e p u b lic s p i r i t and one o f th e forem ost th in k e r s o f h is age. "He proposed freedom o f th e P re s s , th e i n s t i t u t i o n o f a c e n su s, th e e q u a lis a tio n o f ta x a t io n , and th e r e l i e f o f p o v erty [and s e v e ra l e d u c a tio n a l r e fo rm s ]." In f a c t , a l l o f h is p r o je c ts were " d ir e c te d to th e improvement o f s o c ie ty . . . ." 5. S a i n t- P ie r r e foresaw t h a t disarm am ent was paramount to h is p lan o f l a s t i n g peace f o r Europe and su g g ested a more r i g i d li m i ta t io n o f n a tio n a l armaments than most n a tio n s o f today could be persuaded to a c c e p t. In h is Im portant A r t i c l e I I I o f h is o r i g i n a l work, 505 fo r in s ta n c e , he proposed th a t in tim e o f peace no S ta te , la rg e or sm all, should keep more than s ix thousand s o ld ie r s of i t s own n a tio n , except th a t i t may m ain tain a d d itio n a l fo re ig n s o ld ie rs w ith th e consent of th e G eneral Assembly of th e Union (S a in t- P i e r r e 's P roof-copy, op. c i t . . I , 350). 6. I t i s a ls o in te r e s tin g to n o te S a i n t- P ie r r e 's ca u tio n and fo re s ig h t w ith re sp e c t to th e p ro v isio n fo r in sp e c tio n and c o n tro l of each m e m b e r-s ta te 's--a stum bling block in th e tw e n tie th -c e n tu ry attem p ts to reach in te r n a tio n a l disarmament agreem ents. For proper in sp e c tio n and c o n tr o l, S a in t- P ie r r e simply proposed in Im portant A r tic le I I o f h is o r ig in a l work th a t th e Union s h a ll always m aintain an Ambassador in each m em ber-state and a R esident in each Province of two or more m illio n in h a b ita n ts to see th a t th e i n t e r e s t s of th e Union a re m aintained. In a d d itio n , Com nissloners might be se n t in to th e S ta te s to survey th e f a c ts whenever th e s i tu a tio n w arranted t h i s a c tio n . To in su re t h e i r n e u t r a l i t y , th e s e in sp e c to rs were to be s e le c te d from among th e c itiz e n s of th e "C ity of P eace," or U tre c h t. By t h e i r re p o rts to th e Union, th e G eneral Assembly would then be a b le to review th e m ilita r y fo rc es of each S ta te tw ice a y ear and th ereb y prevent a l l new armaments not a u th o riz e d . F in a lly , in th e event th a t th e Union had to go to w ar, no m em ber-state could fu rn is h a la r g e r c o n tin g e n t of tro o p s than an o th e r. To th e o b je c tio n th a t i t would be too g re a t a burden fo r th e sm aller s t a t e s to send th e same number o f troops as th e la rg e r ones to th e in te r n a tio n a l army, S a in t- P ie rre d e c la re d th a t th e la rg e r and w e a lth ie r S ta te s would be re q u ire d to c o n trib u te more f in a n c ia lly to th e m aintenance o f th e Union army, and th a t t h i s would h elp to e q u a liz e th e c o n trib u tio n of a l l . (See S a i n t - P ie r r e 's Proof-copy, op. c i t . . I , 342-3, and h is E xplanation of Fundamental A r tic le X, i b i d . , 326-8, fo r f u l l e r d e t a i l s . ) 7. V. J . Lewis, "The P ioneers: X V I.--L e ib n itz , 1 1 The New Commonwealth. I l l , No. 5 (F eb ., 1935), r e f e r s to th e same opinion of L e ib n itz concerning permanent peace in Europe b u t c i t e s i t a l i t t l e d if f e r e n tly - - f r o m a 506 copy of t h i s l e t t e r of June 4, 1712, to S a in t- P ie r r e as found in L e ib n itz ' correspondence f i l e . Lewis goes on to say t h a t t h i s passage has o fte n been t o m from i t s c o n te x t to prove t h a t L e ib n itz was opposed to S a i n t - P i e r r e 's p r o j e c t , when, in f a c t , L e ib n itz f o l lowed t h i s o p in io n in th e same l e t t e r w ith h is sug g e s tio n t h a t , " to o b v ia te th e d i f f i c u l t y th u s i n d i c a te d , th e S ta te s should d e p o s it sums of money. I f th ey then prove r e f r a c to r y th e judgment of th e Court may be made e f f e c t i v e out of t h e i r d e p o site d moneys." In l a t e r correspondence w ith S a in t- P ie r r e , as Lewis p o in ted o u t, L e ib n itz d e sc rib e d th e p ro je c t as "sound and d ese rv in g o f s u c c e s s ," and d e c la re d " i t s r e a l i z a tio n would be one o f th e most u s e f u l th in g s in th e w orld, b u t f i r s t some g r e a t p rin c e must i n t e r e s t him s e l f in i t . . . and th e l e s s e r w i l l fo llo w ." U n til t h a t tim e , however, L e ib n itz b e lie v e d i t w ise "to ed u cate p u b lic o p in io n ." 8. Lorimer b e lie v e d t h a t S t. P i e r r e 's use of th e word " p e rp e tu a l" in h is peace plan f o r Europe was an u n fo r tu n a te ch o ice "as i t d id much . . . to p re ju d ic e o th erw ise w e ll-d isp o se d r e a d e r s , who thereupon con cluded th a t th e aim o f th e p r o je c t was i r r a t i o n a l . " (James Lorim er, The I n s t i t u t e s o f th e Law o f N ations: A T r e a tis e of th e J u r a l R e la tio n s o f S ep arate P o l i t i c a l Communities [Edinburgh and London: Blackwood, 1884] I I , 220. 9. With re s p e c t to th e problem o f th e s ta tu s quo, th e re is an e s s e n t i a l d if f e r e n c e between th e p lan s of S a in t- P ie r r e and S u lly . The l a t t e r proposed, in th e c r e a tio n o f h is European F e d e ra tio n , to change th e s ta tu s quo--by war i f n e c e s s a ry --s o th a t each member- s t a t e would be approxim ately equal in s iz e and power, and to m ain tain th e new s t a tu s quo through th e power of th e F e d e ra tio n . On th e o th e r hand, th e form er wished to avoid war and m ain tain th e peace th a t had j u s t been e s ta b lis h e d ; c o n se q u e n tly , he b e lie v e d i t most re a so n a b le and j u s t to base h is Union upon th e t e r r i t o r i a l s e ttle m e n ts of th e T reaty o f U tre c h t, w hich, i f m ain tain ed and l a s t i n g peace could be assured, th e advantages a c c ru in g th ere fro m would o f f s e t th e c o s ts o f war to s e t t l e any p a st o r fu tu re t e r r i t o r i a l 507 c la im s . I t should perhaps a ls o be p o in te d out t h a t S a i n t - P ie r r e d id re c o g n iz e th e r i g h t to n e g o tia te new t r e a t i e s b u t d e s ir e d to e lim in a te s e c r e t diplom acy, a f a c t which i s g e n e r a lly overlooked by h is c r i t i c s . In h is Fundam ental A r t i c l e IV, member- s t a t e s were p r o h ib ite d from n e g o tia tin g t r e a t i e s con t r a r y t o , o r w ith o u t th e co n se n t and g u a ra n te e o f , th e Union. See h is P ro o f-co p y , op. c i t . . I , 282-301, and h is 1738 e d i t i o n , B e llo t t r a n s l a t i o n , op. c i t . . pp. 28-9 and 55-6. 10. Not only d id S a in t - P ie r r e propose t h a t th e U nion's u n ite d fo rc e was to be used to m ain tain th e s t a t u s quo, b u t he a ls o su g g ested t h a t i t was to in te rv e n e in th e i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s o f m em b er-states to put down any " c o n s p ira c y , s e d itio n and r e v o l t s o f t h e i r S u b je c ts" in o rd e r th a t th e so v e re ig n s m ight be se c u re in t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s and p o s s e s s io n s . As S a i n t - P ie r r e re a so n e d , th e u se o f u n ite d tro o p s to put down i n t e r n a l r e v o lts o f m em ber-states was to p re v e n t c i v i l wars which would endanger th e l a s t i n g peace and s e c u r i ty o f th e Euro pean Union (Fundam ental A r t i c l e IV and E x p lan atio n in h is P ro o f-co p y , op. c i t . . I , 282-301, and Funda m ental A r t i c l e I and E x p lan atio n in h is 1738 e d i t i o n , B e llo t t r a n s l a t i o n , op. c i t . . pp. 24-6 and 5 3 -4 ). 11. D e sp ite S a i n t - P i e r r e 's re a so n in g he was to be s tro n g ly c r i t i c i z e d by subsequent lib e ra ls -- R o u s s e a u was to a t t a c k him on t h i s very p o in t (See Souleyman, op. c i t . , pp. 1 4 2 -6 .)- - f o r t h i s p ro p o s a l, even though i t was a p p a re n t t h a t S a in t- P ie r r e had no concept o f th e d o c tr in e o f p o p u lar s o v e re ig n ty which was to develop l a t e r in th e E ig h te e n th C en tu ry . Product o f h is tim e , and l i k e h is p re d e c e s s o rs , he could only co n ceiv e o f th e f u tu r e s e c u r i ty o f Europe th ro u g h th e f e d e r a tin g o f so v e re ig n roonarchs and t h e i r s t a t e g o v ern m ents, n o t th ro u g h t h a t o f th e p eo p le and t h e i r g o v ern m ents, f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s then was c o n sid e re d s c a r c e ly any o f t h e i r b u s in e s s . 12. L ew is, in lo c . c i t . , a ls o a n a ly z e s L e i b n i t z ' id e a s f o r th e peace and u n ity o f Europe, g a th e re d from h is co rresp o n d en ce between 1712-16 w ith S a i n t - P ie r r e . I t seems L e ib n itz looked f o r European peace and u n ity 508 in th e r e s t o r a t io n o f th e Church of Rome " to som ething o f i t s form er g lo ry " as w e ll as th e Holy Roman Empire, which he b e lie v e d t h a t S a in t- P ie r r e could w e ll c o n s id e r as "a model f o r th e C h ris tia n S o c ie ty ." 13. V. J . Lewis in "The P io n eers: X V II.--A lb e ro n i," The New Commonwealth. I l l , No. 7 (A p ril, 1935), 320, examines C ard in al A lb e ro n i's Scheme f o r Reducing th e T u rk ish Empire to th e Obedience o f C h ris tia n P r in c e s : And f o r a P a r t i t i o n o f th e C onquests: T ogether w ith a Scheme o f a P e rp e tu a l D iet f o r E s ta b lis h in g th e P ublic T ra n q u ility (London, 1736). A ccording to Lewis, A l b e r o n i 's p l a n is th e l a s t o f th e p ro p o sals f o r E u ro p e '8 "common defence which owe t h e i r i n s p i r a tio n p a r tl y to th e T u rk ish m enace." Lewis then an aly zes th e l a t t e r p a rt o f A lb e ro n i's work, which i s th e Scheme f o r a P e rp e tu a l D ie t, and which was to be "a European v e rsio n of th e Im p eria l D ie t." Like L e ib n itz , th e Holy Roman Empire was "th e model f o r th e new [ p o l i t i c a l ] o rg a n is a tio n " o f Europe. One a ls o re c o g n iz e s th e in flu e n c e of S a in t- P ie r r e in A lb e ro n i's su g g e stio n o f a c o n s ti t u ti o n f o r th e European D ie t, to be e s ta b lis h e d a t R atisbon [R egensburg, B av aria, o r Southern Germany]. "The European p rin c e s and s t a t e s would merge t h e i r s o v e re ig n tie s " in t h i s c e n t r a l ly lo c a te d European o rg a n iz a tio n , "po ssessed o f a l e g i s l a t u r e which e x e rc is e d j u d i c i a l fu n c tio n s and executed i t s d e c re e s , i f n e c e ssa ry by fo rc e , a g a in s t a r e c a l c i t r a n t s t a t e . " 14. R ousseau's e d itio n of S t. P i e r r e 's Peace P ro je c t is more g e n e ra lly known by th e a b b re v ia te d t i t l e of P ro ie t de p aix p e r p e t u e l l e . See A P ro je c t o f P e rp e tu a l Peace. Rousseau s E ssay , t r a n s l a te d by E d ith M . Nut- t a l l and p rin te d in French and E n g lish w ith an I n t r o d u c tio n by G. Lowes D ickinson (London: Cobden- Sanderson [1 9 2 7 ]); Jean Jacques Rousseau, L '^ ta t de G uerre and P ro ie t de Paix P e r p e tu e lle . w ith an In tro d u c tio n and Notes by S h irle y G. P a tte rso n and a Foreword by George Haven Putnam (New York and London: P utnam 's, 1920); a ls o see C. E. Vaughan, e d i t o r o f The P o l i t i c a l W ritin g s o f J . J . R ousseau, and th e lead in g E n g lish a u th o r ity on Rousseau, who has t r a n s l a t e d R ousseau's e d itio n of S t. P i e r r e 's 509 P ro ie t de p aix p e r p e tu e lle as A L astin g Peace through th e F e d e ra tio n o f Europe . . . w ith an In tro d u c tio n (London: C o n stab le, 1917). In h is In tro d u c tio n , p. 7, Vaughan p o in ted out t h a t "Rousseau has tr e a te d h is o r ig in a l w ith th e utm ost freedom ." And a f t e r adding a long in tro d u c tio n which was "a b r i l l i a n t h i s t o r i c a l essay " o f th e p o l i t i c a l and s o c ia l c o n d i tio n s o f Europe, Rousseau took th e involved d e t a i l s and fre q u e n t r e p e t i t i o n s of S t. P ie rre and tr a n s la te d them " in to broad p r in c ip le s o f p o l i t i c a l p ru d en ce." As a r e s u l t , one fin d s "much more of Rousseau than o f S a in t- P ie r r e in th e whole perform ance" o f th e E x t r a i t . 15. In su pp ort o f S a i n t - P ie r r e 's plan to fe d e r a te th e s t a t e s o f Europe, Rousseau d e c la re d : I f th e s o c ia l o rd e r were r e a l l y , as is p re te n d e d , th e work not o f p assio n but of re a so n , should wc have been so slow to see t h a t , in th e shaping of i t , e i t h e r too much, o r too l i t t l e , has been done f o r our happiness? th a t each one of us being in th e c i v i l s t a t e as re g a rd s our fe llo w c i t i z e n s , but in th e s t a t e of n a tu re as re g a rd s th e r e s t of th e w orld, we have taken a l l kinds of p re c a u tio n s a g a in s t p r iv a te wars only to k in d le n a tio n a l wars a thousand tim es more t e r r i b l e ? and t h a t , in jo in in g a p a r t i c u l a r group of men, we have r e a l l y d e c la re d o u rse lv e s th e enemies of th e whole race? I f th e re i s any way of re c o n c ilin g th e se dangerous c o n tr a d ic tio n s , i t i s to be found only in such a form of fe d e r a l Government as s h a l l u n ite n a tio n s by bonds s im ila r to th o se which a lre a d y u n ite t h e i r in d iv id u a l members, and p la c e th e one no le s s than th e o th e r under th e a u th o r ity o f th e Law. Even a p a rt from t h i s , such a form o f Government seems to c a rry th e 510 day over a l l o t h e r s . . . . ^ 16. Rousseau commented on th e a c t i v i t i e s of p a st European C ongresses or g e n e ra l D ie ts t h u s : From tim e to tim e th e r e a re convoked in Europe c e r t a i n g e n e ra l assem b lies c a lle d Con g re s s e s , to which d e p u tie s from every S ta te r e p a i r solem nly, to r e tu r n in th e same way; where men assem ble to say n o th in g ; where a l l th e a f f a i r s of Europe a re o v er-h au led in d e t a i l ; where men lay t h e i r heads to g e th e r to d e li b e r a te w hether th e ta b le th ey s i t a t s h a l l be square or round . . . w hether one p le n ip o te n tia r y s h a l l s i t w ith h is fa c e o r h is back to th e window any s e ttle m e n t f o r th e l a s t th re e c e n tu r ie s and a re a s s u re d ly very f i t to engross th e statesm en of our own. 17. A s s a ilin g th e r o le played by m in is te r s in s t a t e d e c is io n s as a d e te r r e n t to S a i n t - P ie r r e 's P r o je c t, Rousseau d e c la re d : Rousseau, Vaughan t r a n s l . , op. c i t . . pp. 38-9. For com parative p u rp o ses, see Rousseau (N u tta ll t r a n s l . ) , op. c i t . . pp. 5-7. N u t t a l l 's e d itio n may be o f g r e a te r i n t e r e s t to th e re a d e r in t h a t i t c o n ta in s both French and E n g lish v e rsio n s on o p p o site pages; whereas Vaughan's e d itio n o f f e r s only th e E n g lish . I t should a ls o be p o in ted out th a t a d if f e r e n c e in th e use of th e words "c o n fe d e ra tio n " and " fe d e ra tio n " occurs between th e s e t r a n s l a t i o n s because N u tta ll t r a n s l a t e s R ousseau's u se of th e word C onfederat ion l i t e r a l l y , w h ile Vaughan t r a n s l a t e s i t as fe d e r a tio n . (See w r i t e r 's d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of meaning of th e s e two words above, pp. 22-8 in C hapter 1L) Subsequent q u o ta tio n s from R ousseau's work w il l be from V aughan's t r a n s l a t i o n . N u t t a l l 's t r a n s l a t i o n w i l l be given as a second so u rce . O Rousseau, Vaughan t r a n s l . , o p . c i t . . p p . 60-1; a ls o c f . N u tta ll t r a n s l . , op. c i t .. p p . 43-5. 9 511 M in iste rs a re in p e rp e tu a l need o f w ar, as a means of making them selves in d is p e n s a b le to t h e i r m a ste r, o f throw ing him in to d i f f i c u l t i e s from which he cannot escape w ith o u t t h e i r a i d , o f ru in in g th e S ta te , i f th in g s come to th e w o rs t, as th e p r ic e o f keeping t h e i r own o f f i c e . . . . They a re in need o f i t , as a means o f c o n tr o llin g th e p rin c e and w ith drawing him from c o u rt whenever a dangerous p lo t is formed a g a in s t t h e i r power. With a l a s t i n g p eace, a l l th e s e re so u rc e s would be gone. . . . Is i t n o t obvious t h a t th e re is n o th in g im p ra c tic a b le about i t [th e l a s t in g peace p l a n ] , except i t s ad o p tio n by th e s e men? What then w i l l th e m in is te r s do to oppose i t ? What they have always done; they w i l l tu rn i t in to r i d i c u l e . ^ 18. Gargaz (sometimes G arg a), a form er schoolm aster in Theze, Provence, F ran ce, w rote h is p ro je c t toward th e end o f a 20-year p riso n sen ten c e fo r an a s s a s s in a tio n c o n v ic tio n , o f which he was in n o c e n t. In h is b e l i e f th a t h is innocence was w ell-know n, he n e g le c te d to o b ta in adequate co u n sel or f u r n is h s a t i s f a c t o r y d e fe n se . He was s e n t to p ris o n , was fo r g o tte n , and served h is f u l l term t a c i t u r n l y and b ra v e ly . During h is sp a re hours in p ris o n , he became ac q u ain te d w ith th e peace p r o je c ts o f S u lly , S a in t - P ie r r e , and perhaps o th e r s , as w e ll as th e works o f some of th e p h ilo so p h e rs of E nlightenm ent. Taking h e a rt th ere fro m , he w rote h is p ro je c t in th e hope t h a t i t m ight h elp to . keep th e peace and f u r th e r th e h appiness of mankind. 3 Rousseau, Vaughan t r a n s l . , op. c i t . . pp. 100-1; a ls o o f . N u tta ll t r a n s l . , op. c i t . . p. 111. P ierre-A n d re G argaz, A P ro je c t o f U n iv ersa l and P e rp e tu a l Peace . . . 1782, . . . R ep rin ted w ith an E n g lish V ersio n , In tro d u c tio n , and T y p o -g rap h ical Note by George Simpson Eddy (New York: Eddy, 1922), pp. 1-5 of In tro d u c tio n . 512 19. In 1779 Gargaz w rote to Benjamin F ra n k lin , U.S. Ambassador to Louis XVI, and sought h is h e lp in having h is m anuscript p u b lish e d . Upon h is r e le a s e from p ris o n in 1781, Gargaz walked some 520 m iles to P a ris to see F ra n k lin about h is p r o je c t. F ra n k lin "found i t to c o n ta in much g o o d-sense. . . . [and] p rin te d i t f o r him [ a t h is Passy p r e s s ] . 20. Gargaz in tro d u ced h is p ro je c t w ith a P e ti ti o n , ad d ressed to Louis XVI, and im ploring him to adopt th e plan and s e t th e example which a l l th e o th e r "S over eig n s of Europe w i l l make i t t h e i r p le a s u re to walk in . . . [h is ] f o o ts te p s . . . . 21. On th e q u e stio n o f precedence in h is European Union, Gargaz co n sid ered s e n io r ity to be th e e a s ie s t and f a i r e s t method: "A ll Sovereigns s h a l l y ie ld p re c e dence to th e e ld e s t o f t h e i r C o n fre re s ," he a s s e r te d , "and th e l a t t e r s h a l l accep t i t w ith a l l th e p o l i t e ness a p p ro p ria te between tr u e f r ie n d s , w ith o u t reg ard to t h e i r power or to th e a n tiq u ity o f t h e i r . . . S o v e r e ig n tie s . ' 22. In h is j u s t i f i c a t i o n fo r t h i s method, Gargaz reasoned: One o f th e most a n c ie n t, w idespread and re s p e c ta b le customs o f today among w e ll edu c a te d people o f th e same c o n d itio n , is t h a t of y ie ld in g to e ld e r s ; c o n se q u e n tly , th e Sovereigns being a l l o f th e same c o n d itio n . . . I d are f l a t t e r m yself t h a t they w i l l a l l make i t a duty and even a p le a s u re to conform them selves to th e same custom , because i t always betokens a re s p e c t r e a l l y due to s e n io r i ty o f age. ^Gargaz, op. c i t .. p. 6. 6 I b i d . . pp. 7-8. ^ lb i d . , p. 14 . 513 I f one proposed to g iv e th e precedence to th e w is e s t, or to th e most pow erful, or to th e most e q u ita b le , e t c . , I t Is c e r ta in th a t s e v e ra l would b e lie v e them selves in ju re d , and th a t th ey would n o t a c q u ie sc e th e r e in ; b u t as i t is only a q u e stio n of a convention of sim ple p o lite n e s s , where each one keeps th e rank th a t th e noble s im p lic ity o f n a tu re has given him, and as i t d ero g ates n o th in g from e i t h e r h is power or h is wisdom, e t c . , th e Sovereigns a re to o ben ev o len t not to su b sc rib e to i t , con s id e rin g th e i n f i n i t e good th a t w i l l come from i t to a l l th e N atio n s. . . . 23. A r ti c l e V III of G argaz' C o n s titu tio n was r a th e r novel because i t re q u ire d th e N o b ility in tim e of peace to be occupied in u s e fu l and hono rable p u rs u its in th e f i e l d s of A g ric u ltu re , th e A rts , Commerce, or Trade so th a t th ey would be more in c lin e d to p ro te c t peace than to fin d excitem ent in f o s te r in g war as th ey have done in th e p a st (Gargaz, op. c i t .. pp. 3 7 -8 ). 24. Most o f G argaz' answers to p o s s ib le O b jectio n s to h is p ro je c t concerned th e p r a c t i c a b i l i t y of s u b s t i tu t in g th e id e a l of p e rp e tu a l peace f o r war ( i b i d . , pp. 38- 4 6 ). His r e p ly , however, to th e E ighth O b je c tio n , which claim ed th a t h is plan would remain w ith o u t e f f e c t because th e plans o f Henry IV and S a in t- P ie r r e were not ac c e p te d , d is p la y s an egoism as w ell as an o p tim is tic r a tio n a lis m in th e in c re a sin g enlightenm ent of h is tim e. A greeing th a t th e former peace plans were not adopted d e s p ite t h e i r good m e r its , and p o in t ing out th a t S a i n t - P i e r r e 's plan was b e t t e r because i t g G argaz, op. c i t . . pp. 14-5 and 36. Gargaz a ls o d e c la re s th a t th e P residency o f h is C ongress, s e le c te d on th e b a s is o f th e s e n io r ity of h is Sovereign would be f a i r e s t and b e s t fo r s im ila r re a so n s, and adds an in te r e s t i n g o b se rv a tio n : "A Sovereign of an advanced age i s , o r d i n a r i l y , more p a c if ic than a young one, s in c e , having more ex p e rie n c e , he has more discernm ent and knows b e t t e r th e in e stim a b le value of Peace . . ." ( i b i d .. pp. 4 4 -6 ). 514 was th e q u in te sse n c e o f Henry th e IV 's and was aug mented by s e v e ra l new means, Gargaz d e c la re d : . . . one must be convinced t h a t t h i s t h i r d Is s t i l l b e t t e r than th e o th e r two, and th a t I t can n o t f a l l of being adopted; f i r s t l y , because I t Is th e q u in te sse n c e of th e f i r s t and of th e second; seco n d ly , because I t a ls o Is augmented by s e v e ra l new means inven ted by i t s A uthor; and t h i r d l y , because th e S overeigns of to d ay , as w ell as t h e i r c h ie f M in is te rs , a re more e n lig h te n e d and more ju d ic io u s than th e Sovereigns and c h ie f M in iste rs of th o se tim es and a re th e r e f o r e more humane, more benevolent and more in c lin e d to Peace. 25. Like S a in t- P ie r r e who was s t i r r e d by th e War of S panish S uccession and th e Peace T reaty of U tre c h t, Kant was moved to w rite h is t r e a t i s e by a war a g a in s t France by th e C o a litio n of A llie s (1793-95), in which P ru ssia d e s e rte d h er A llie s and made a s e p a ra te peace w ith France through th e T reaty of B asel, 1795. In t h i s t r e a t y , P ru ssia recognized th e p r in c ip le of n a tu r a l b o u n d a rie s, gave France a fre e hand on th e w est bank o f th e Rhine, and tu rn ed h er a t te n t i o n to th e t h ir d p a r t i t i o n and e x tin c tio n of Poland (1795). Also l ik e S a i n t - P i e r r e 's , K a n t's plan was in th e form of a t r e a ty and m erely aw aited th e acceptance and s i g n a tu re of so v ereig n s to be put in to e f f e c t (S y lv e s te r John Hemleben, Plans f o r World Peace through Six C e n tu rie s [C hicago: U n iv e rsity o f Chicago P re ss, c . 1943], p. 87). 26. K a n t's t r e a t i s e aroused so much i n t e r e s t th a t f i f t e e n hundred co p ies were so ld th e f i r s t few weeks. In f a c t , a f t e r 1795, " 'E d itio n follow ed e d itio n , and c r i t i c a l comment p ile d up a voluminous l i t e r a t u r e . . . from a b ib lio g ra p h ic a l s ta n d p o in t, K an t's l i t t l e work holds p lace along w ith S u lly 's Memoirs and g G argaz, op. c i t . . pp. 3 8 -4 0 . S a i n t - P i e r r e 's P ro je c t 515 27. Since Kant b e lie v e d th a t i t was th e m oral duty of every man to p a r t i c i p a t e in th e e sta b lish m e n t o f th e u ltim a te fe d e ra tio n of f r e e s t a t e s fo r la s t i n g peace, he c r i t i c a l l y d isc u sse d th e contem porary c o n f l i c t between th e m oral law and p o l i t i c s th a t d e te rre d t h i s o b je c tiv e in t h i s manner: The m oral law is in i t s e l f p r a c tic a b le in th e o b je c tiv e sense as th e summary of unco ndi t i o n a l o b lig a tio n s which should r u le our a c tio n s ; and i t is o b v io u sly i l l o g i c a l . . . to add th a t we cannot liv e in accordance w ith i t . . . . C onsequently, th e r e can be no c o n f l i c t between p o l i t i c s as th e e x e c u tiv e o f e th ic s and t h e o r e t i c a l m o ra lity as such ( i . e . , no c o n f l i c t between th eo ry and p r a c t ic e ) , u n le s s , o f c o u rse , one re g a rd s th e l a t t e r as a g e n e ra l sc ie n c e of prudence, i . e . , a system of maxims te a c h in g how to choose th e most s u i t a b l e means to s a t i s f y o n e 's greed of g a in , th us w holly denying th e e x iste n c e o f m o r a l i t y . ^ The man of a f f a i r s to whom th e moral law is mere th eo ry r e a l l y bases h is d e s p a irin g con t r a d i c t i o n of our encouraging hope, even w hile a d m ittin g b o th th e o b lig a tio n and th e c a p a c ity to conform to th e m oral law on t h i s : he claim s F re d e ric k C harles H icks, The New World Order: . . . (New York: Doubleday Page, 1920), p. 73, as quoted by Hemleben in op. c i t .. p. 87. Immanuel K ant], K a n t's P e rp e tu a l Peace [1795]. T ra n s l. by Helen O 'B rien; w ith an In tro d u c tio n by J e s s ie H. Buckland in The G ro tiu s S o ciety P u b lic a tio n s : T exts fo r S tu d en ts of I n te r n a tio n a l R e la tio n s » No. 7 (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1927), p. 43. Cf. F r i e d r i c h 's t r a n s l . of "Immanuel K a n t's Essay on E te rn a l P eace," in C arl Joachim F r ie d r ic h , In e v ita b le Peace (Cambridge: Harvard U n iv e rsity P re ss, 1948), p. 266. to be a b le to fo re s e e , t h a t man by h is very n a tu re w i l l never d e s ir e to do what Is demanded o f him, In o rd e r to b rin g about th e c o n d itio n s e s s e n t i a l f o r p e rp e tu a l p e a c e .*2 Now 1 can Indeed Imagine an e t h i c a l p o l i t i c i a n , I . e . , one who so con ceiv es th e p r i n c ip le s o f s t a t e c r a f t t h a t th ey can c o - e x ls t w ith th e m oral law, b u t n o t a p o l i t i c a l m o r a lis t, who so fo rg e s th e m oral law as to adapt I t to th e p r o f i t o f th e p o l i t i c i a n . . . . m o ra lisin g p o l i t i c i a n s so f a r as In them l i e s make improvement im p o ssib le, and p e r p e tu a te th e v io la tio n o f j u s t i c e by w hitew ashing p r in c ip le s o f s t a t e c r a f t , which a re c o n tra ry to th e m oral law, on th e p r e te x t th a t human n a tu re Is in c a p a b le o f th e good p re sc rib e d by re a so n . 3 In ste a d o f th e p r a c t i c a l purpose of which th e s e men v ersed in s t a t e c r a f t b o a s t, they in d u lg e in sharp p r a c t ic e s , s in c e t h e i r one c a re is to f l a t t e r th e e x is tin g powers f o r th e sake o f t h e i r own p r iv a te i n t e r e s t s , a t th e expense o f th e people and p o s s ib ly of th e whole w orld. . . . But i f t h i s knack o f being com f o r t a b le in any sa d d le in s p ir e s them w ith th e i l l u s i o n th a t th ey a re ca p ab le o f ju d g in g th e p r in c ip le s o f a c o n s titu tio n m o rally ( i . e . , a p r i o r i , not e m p ir ic a lly ) ; I f th ey b o ast o f knowing men . . . w ith o u t knowing man and . . . attem p t to meddle w ith n a tio n a l and i n t e r n a tio n a l law by a p r i o r i re a so n in g , they can only make th e t r a n s i t i o n in th e s p i r i t o f c h ic a n e ry . . . . These craftsm en b e lie v e they can so lv e t h i s problem [o f a good c o n s titu tio n ] e m p iric a lly w ith o u t re fe re n c e to th e m oral 12 Kant, G ro tiu s S o ciety e d ., o p . c i t . . p. 44. C f. F r i e d r i c h 's t r a n s l . op. c i t . . p. 267. l 3 I b i d . . pp. 4 5 - 6 . C f. i b i d . , pp. 2 6 8 -9 . 517 law. . . . The maxims t h a t se rv e them, alth o u g h never p u b lic ly acknowledged, may be summed up as fo llo w s: 1. . . . S eize any fa v o u ra b le o p p o rtu n ity fo r a p p ro p ria tio n of power fo r th e S ta te . . . th e j u s t i f i c a t i o n and w hitew ashing w i l l be much e a s ie r and more seemly a f t e r th e accom plished a c t o f v io le n c e than th e previous se a rc h f o r convincing re aso n s fo r and . . . a g a in s t a c tio n . . . th e very boldness of th e deed g iv es an appearance of in n e r con v ic tio n o f i t s rig h te o u s n e s s and th e God of Success . . . i s th e b e s t advocate a f t e r th e e v e n t. 2. . . . I f you have done wrong . . . deny th a t i t was your f a u l t ; blam e, on th e c o n tra ry , th e o b stin a c y of your s u b je c ts , o r , i f you have taken p o ssessio n of a neig hbouring S ta te , d e c la re th a t human n a tu re is re sp o n s i b l e , sin c e i f a man does not tak e th e lead in v io le n c e , he may c o n fid e n tly expect to become i t s v ic tim . 3. . . . [D ivide and r u le ] . . . i f th e re a re c e r t a i n p riv ile g e d le a d e rs among your people who have m erely chosen you as t h e i r head . . . sow d is s e n s io n among them and s t r i f e between them and th e people: a t th e same tim e su p p o rt th e l a t t e r w ith prom ises of g r e a te r freedom and a l l w i l l come to depend u n c o n d itio n a lly on you. . . .14 28. On th e law o f n a tio n s , Kant f u r th e r observed: . . . [men] pay i t a l l s u ita b le a lle g ia n c e , though th ey a re com pelled to seek a hundred sub te rfu g e s and p r e te x ts f o r evading i t in p r a c tic e 14 Kant, G ro tiu s S o ciety e d . , op. c i t . , pp. 46-8. Cf. F r i e d r i c h 's t r a n s l . , op. c i t . . pp. 269-71. 518 and f o r endowing fo rc e w ith th e a u th o r ity of being th e o r ig in and su p p o rt o f a l l j u s t i c e [N ight makes R ig h t] . . . . S t i l l more u n c e rta in is a law of n a tio n s , o s te n s ib ly based on s t a t u t e s , d e riv e d from m i n i s t e r i a l d e l ib e r a ti o n s . Indeed, i t i s m erely an empty word, r e s t i n g as i t does on t r e a t i e s which a r e accompanied a t th e very moment o f t h e i r co n c lu sio n s by m ental re s e r v a - tio n s to break t h e m . *5 29. C o n fed eratio n o f Europe as a "n e g a tiv e e x p e d ie n t.1 ' Because o f Kant s s tro n g b e l i e f in l i b e r t y and i t s c lo s e r e l a t i o n s h i p w ith m o ra lity in th e r i g h t s o f each in d iv id u a l w ith in a s t a t e , he was c a r e f u l to safeg u ard th e "co rresp o n d in g r ig h ts " o f sovereign s t a t e s th a t would v o lu n ta r ily fo rsa k e t h e i r n a tu r a l s t a t e o f i n t e r n a ti o n a l anarchy and band to g e th e r fo r peace and s e c u r ity to form a la r g e r s t a t e , o r " f e d e r a tio n o f f r e e s t a t e s " as he p re fe rre d to c a l l i t . In so d o in g , he p ro je c te d fo r th e immediate peace and u n ity o f Europe a c o n fe d e ra tio n o f Europe, a league o r an a l l i a n c e o f independent European s t a t e s , u n t i l h is id e a l f e d e r a l s t a t e could be r e a l iz e d . His a rg u ments in t h i s d ir e c tio n in d ic a te t h a t he was more of a r e a l i s t and proph et con cerning in te r n a t io n a l p o l i t i c s th an h is p re d e c e s so rs. In th e ensuing decades, Europe was to employ th e a l l i a n c e system through th e C oncert of Europe (which some p u b l ic i s ts have r e f e r re d to as "th e C o n fed eratio n o f Europe") in th e hopes o f a v e rtin g war; bu t as Kant p re d ic te d , t h i s was a "n e g a tiv e ex p ed ien t . . . proving in effectiv e."* * * 30. Hemleben in h is o p. c i t . . pp. 93-5, c i t e s s e v e ra l so u rce s to s u b s t a n ti a te K a n t's depth of in flu e n c e on subsequent in te r n a t io n a l p o l i t i c a l th o u g h t. For 15 K ant, G ro tiu s S o c ie ty e d ., op. c i t . . pp. 49, 50. C f. F r i e d r i c h 's t r a n s l . o p. c i t . . pp. 272, 273. 1 6 I b id . . p. 32. C f. i b i d . . p. 257. 519 example, h is id eas h elped in flu e n c e th e e f f o r t to m ain tain in te r n a tio n a l peace through th e Holy A llia n c e and th e C oncert of Europe, and h is p ro p o sals on arma m ents, war lo a n s, in te r v e n tio n , s e lf - d e te r m in a tio n , s e c r e t diplom acy, and a league o f n a tio n s found t h e i r way in to th e F ourteen P o in ts o f th e League o f N a tio n s ' Covenant. For f u r th e r a n a ly s is of K an t's id eas and c o n trib u tio n s to subsequent p o l i t i c a l th o u g h t, see F r ie d r ic h t r a n s l . , op. c i t .. pp. 11-23 and [h is T r a n s la to r 's P re fa c e , pp. (2 4 3 )-4 ]; McLachlan, op . c i t . . No. 1 (O ctober, 1936), 4; J . 0. M [cLachlan], "The P io n e e rs- -XX II: A lexander I and th e Holy A l l ia n c e ,” The New Commonwealth. V, No. 4 (Jan u ary , 1937), 58-9; and S ta w e ll, op. c i t . . pp. 188-209. 31. From th e T reaty o f W estphalia to th e French R ev o lu tio n , th e so v ereig n s had taken European m oral and p o l i t i c a l u n ity (based on th e p o lic y o f b alan ce o f power) " fo r g ra n te d and r e f e r r e d as a m a tte r of co u rse to th e 'r e p u b lic of Europe, ' 't h e community of C h ris tia n p r i n c e s ,' or 'th e p o l i t i c a l system of E u ro p e ." ' The c h a lle n g e of N apoleon's i m p e r i a l i s t ic e f f o r t to u n ite Europe, however, fo rc ed them to re - e v a lu a te th e p o l i t i c a l fo u n d atio n s upon which Europe had r e s te d ; and as a r e s u l t , th e Holy A llia n c e and th e Concert of Europe were e f f o r t s to meet th e c h a lle n g e to t h e i r v ested i n t e r e s t s , or th e s t a t u s quo. See Hans J . Morgenthau, P o l i t i c s Among N atio n s: The S tru g g le fo r Power and Peace (2nd e d ., re v . and e n l . ; New York: Knopf, 1954), pp. 196-7. For th e r e lig io u s and s o c ia l in flu e n c e s m o tiv a tin g Czar A lexander to i n i t i a t e h is T reaty o f Holy A llia n c e , see Hemleben's docum entation in h is op. c i t . . pp. 97-9; J . 0. M [cLachlan], "The P ioneers--X X II: A lexander I and th e Holy A l li a n c e ,” The New Commonwealth. V, No. 4 (Jan u ary , 1937), 58-9; and W alter A lison P h i l l i p s , The C o n fed eratio n of Europe: A Study o f th e European A llia n c e . 1813-1823 as an Experim ent in I n te r n a tio n a l O rg a n isa tio n o f Peace (2nd e d .; London: Longmans, G reen, 1920), pp. 33-4, and pp. 305-6 f o r th e T reaty t e x t . 32. A ll th e so v ereig n s of Europe except th e so v ereig n of B rita in , th e Pope, and th e S u lta n of Turkey signed 520 th e Holy A llia n c e T re a ty . For F oreign S e c re ta ry C a s tle re a g h 's c o n s t i t u ti o n a l "lo o p h o le" to keep B r ita in from sig n in g th e T re a ty , see Hemleben, op. c i t . . p. 99. A lso see McLachlan, op. c i t . . p. 59, f o r C a s tle re a g h 's r e je c t io n o f th e b enign, s p i r i t u a l m ysticism o f A le x a n d e r's approach to European i n t e r n a tio n a l r e l a ti o n s through th e Holy A llia n c e T reaty (even though C a stle re a g h s rem arks may have been meant as sarcasm and a t tim es as s a t i r i c a l ; e . g . , h is rem ark: "The so u l o f th e Holy A llia n c e might be s u ffe re d to hover over th e c o u n c ils of Europe; but in th o se c o u n c ils th e t r e a t i e s , and th e t r e a t i e s a lo n e , were to be th e d eterm in in g f a c t o r ." As quoted by McLachlan in l o c . c i t . ) . APPENDIX C SUPPLEMENTARY DATA TO CHAPTER V EFFORTS TO UNITE EUROPE BY INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS: 1815-1940 David Low Dodge was th e f a th e r o f th e movement to advance peace in th e U nited S ta te s of A m erica, b e g in ning in 1809, and one of th e founders of th e New York Peace S o ciety in 1815, "th e f i r s t in th e w orld f o r th e s p e c if ic o b je c t of prom oting p e a c e ," acco rd in g to James Brown S c o tt in h is In tro d u c tio n to W illiam Ladd, An Essay on a Congress o f N ations fo r th e A djustm ent of I n te r n a tio n a l D isputes w ith o u t R esort to Arms (R eprin ted from th e o r ig in a l e d itio n of 1840 . . . by James Brown S c o tt . . . New York: Oxford U n iv e rsity P re ss, 1916), p. v i . From 1819 u n t i l h is d e a th in 1841, W illiam Ladd devoted h is l i f e to th e cause o f peace as an u n tir in g le c tu r e r and w r ite r upon h is chosen s u b je c t. Through h is many le c tu r e s b e fo re th e peace s o c i e t i e s o f a t l e a s t a dozen s t a t e s , Ladd f i n a l l y " f e l t th e need to g a th e r th e v ario u s peace s o c i e t ie s of th e U nited S ta te s . . . in to a la r g e r and n a tio n a l o rg a n iz a tio n to be known as th e American Peace S o c ie ty ," w hich, w ith th e a s s is ta n c e of Dodge, Ladd succeeded in e s ta b lis h in g in May, 1828. U n til 1837, Ladd served as th e e x e c u tiv e o f f i c e r o f t h i s s o c ie ty and f o r th e n ex t fo u r y e a rs of h is l i f e as i t s p re s id e n t [The American Peace S o ciety has c a r r ie d on down to th e p re se n t day, and i t s o f f i c i a l p u b lic a tio n , form erly c a lle d th e Advocate of P eace, i s th e monthly jo u r n a l, World A f f a ir s (W ashington).] ( i b i d . , pp. v - v i i ) . L add's Essay on a Congress o f N ations . . ♦ was one of s ix p riz e w inners in a c o n te s t on th e s u b je c t of peace o ffe re d by th e American Peace S o ciety in 1840. In h is e ssa y , Ladd p re se n te d th e argum ents fo r and a g a in s t th e e sta b lish m e n t of two i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t io n s : (1) A Congress of Ambassadors of a l l c i v i l i z e d n a tio n s and (2) a Court of N ations; th e one to fo rm u late i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, th e o th e r to i n t e r p r e t 523 and a d ju d ic a te v io la tio n s in o rd e r to m ain tain world peace (f o r f u l l e r tre a tm e n t, see S c o t t 's In tro d u c tio n to Ladd, op. c i t . , pp. x x x v i i i - x lv ) . Ladd was r e a l i s t enough to know t h a t , b efo re h is plan could be adopted, i t would be n ecessary to educate and to a c ti v a t e in th e cause of peace both governments and th e "so vereign people" through a fre e and open pub l i c i t y and an e n lig h ten ed p u b lic opinion. 3. L add's essay as w e ll as h is le a d e rsh ip in th e peace movement had s u b s ta n tia l in flu e n c e in th e United S ta te s , in G reat B r ita in , and on th e c o n tin e n t of Europe. Copies o f h is essay were sen t to "th e crowned heads and lead in g men of Christendom " by Ladd h im se lf ( i b i d . , p. i i i ) . E lihu B u r r i t t , Ladd's a b le s t d is c ip le and su c c e sso r, a c tiv e ly promoted h is m a s te r's p ro p o sals in Europe, and e s p e c ia lly a t th e g re a t Peace Congresses a t B ru ssels (1848), P a ris (1849) [se e above, pp. 148-9], F ran k fu rt (1850), and London (1851) (S c o tt, i b i d . , pp. x l i i i - x l i v ) . S co tt has emphasized f u r th e r Ladd's in flu e n c e on th e Hague C onferences and th e in te r n a tio n a l Permanent Court of A r b itr a tio n in 1899 as fo llo w s: "The resem blance between Ladd's p ro je c t and th e Hague C onferences is so p a te n t as to need no comment . . . " ( i b i d . , p. x l i i i ) . And th e b e s t t r i b u t e to h is l i f e ' s work o c c u rre d : . . . se v e n ty -fo u r y ea rs a f t e r th e death of W illiam Ladd, when th e Congress which he proposed, to agree upon th e p r in c ip le s of i n t e r n a tio n a l law, had been c a lle d in 1898 by a 'r e s p e c ta b le s t a t e , ' [R ussia] to use th e words o f th e E ssay, and when th e Court of N ations [Permanent Court of A rb itra tio n ] which he advo ca te d was approved, in 1907, in th e second Conference o f th e N atio n s, lik ew ise c a lle d by th e same re s p e c ta b le s t a t e , and when th e Court i t s e l f can be s a id to be in th e process of forma tio n ( i b i d . , p. i v ) . 4. W [illiam ] T[homas] S tead , The U nited S ta te s o f Europe on th e Eve o f th e P arliam ent of Peace ([London]: "Review of Reviews" O ffic e , 1899). S te a d 's optimism 524 over th e "approach o f a U nited S ta te s o f Europe" may be seen from th e s e e x c e rp ts from h is book: C hapter I , U.S.A. and U.S.E. "The U nited S ta te s o f Europe is a p h rase n a t u r a ll y suggested by U nited S ta te s of America" (p. 9 ). " . . . th e summoning o f th e P a r l i a ment o f Peace [ in 1898 by th e R ussian Czar] b rin g s us w ith in s i g h t, i f n o t w ith in h a ilin g d is ta n c e , of th e re c o g n itio n o f th e U nited S ta te s o f Europe" (p. 10). 5. Stead to u red Europe throughout and in terv iew e d govern ment o f f i c i a l s , d ip lo m a ts, and j o u r n a l i s t s to guage p u b lic op inion in 1898 and to le a rn how f a r th e n a tio n s o f Europe were a lre a d y , to a l l p r a c t i c a l p u r p o ses, welded in to one. "The U nited S ta te s of Europe . . . however rem ote i t may appear to th o se who look m erely a t th e s u rfa c e of th in g s , may be much n e a re r than even th e most sanguine amongst us v en tu re to hope" (p. 12). But "two r e l i c s of barb arism " s t i l l remain to be e lim in a te d : (1) th e custom house and (2) th e system of th e p a s s p o rt. C irc u la r Notes [ l i k e t r a v e l e r s ' checks] know no customs or duty c o n tro l l ik e (money put in jew els which would be taxed a t th e customs o f f ic e ) (p. 14). Royal fa m ilie s a re i n t e r r e la te d and t i e d to g e th e r and b o rd e rs a re no a r t i f i c i a l b a r r i e r to them. Some day th e peoples of Europe w i l l be s im ila r ly u n ite d in to one fa m ily . T eleg rap h ic ag en cies and th e p re s s d i s t r i b u t e s p o l i t i c a l and s o c ia l g o ssip throughout Europe w ith no b o rd er i n t e r fe re n c e . A lthough th e re i s no u n ity in European coinage y e t , th e re w i l l be "sooner o r l a t e r a common cu rren cy " (p. 17). T r a f f ic on in te r n a ti o n a l r iv e r s (Rhine, Danube, and o th e rs ) has long been s u b je c t to in te r n a tio n a l c o n tro l and re g u la tio n (pp. 18-9). The Danube I n te r n a tio n a l Commission o f fiv e - -o n e from each R iv erain S ta te --a lth o u g h they re p re s e n t t h e i r own S ta te s , a re "in r e a l i t y th e r e p r e s e n ta tiv e [ s ] of th e U nited S ta te s Europe, and in th a t c a p a c ity defend th e g e n e ra l i n t e r e s t , in case i t should be a tta c k e d , on b e h a lf of th e R iv erain S ta te s " (p. 19). From th e re g u la tio n of in te r n a t i o n a l r i v e r s on th e C ontinent i t is b u t a sh o rt s te p to th e European C oncert . . . " (p. 19). 525 6. L a te r , Stead tr a c e s th e n a t u r a l developm ent o f a b s o lu te so v e re ig n ty o r i g i n a l l y in th e in d iv id u a l in a s t a t e o f n a tu r e , then p a r t i a l l y su rre n d e re d to th e fa m ily , th en th e t r i b e , th en a fe d e r a tio n o r n a tio n o f t r i b e s , th en to tow ns, and f i n a l l y to th e modern n a t i o n - s t a t e in exchange f o r p r o te c tio n and s e c u r i ty . By analogy he draws a p a r a l l e l to th e a b s o lu te s o v e re ig n ty o f s t a t e s c r e a tin g i n t e r n a t i o n a l anarchy in h is day w ith th a t o f th e p r im itiv e in d iv id u a l in a s t a t e o f n a tu re and e n v isag e s an e v o lu tio n a ry p ro c ess whereby n a t i o n - s t a t e s lik e w is e w i l l have to s u rre n d e r p a r t o f t h e i r so v e re ig n ty to a fe d e r a tio n o f s t a t e s - - f i r s t c o v e rin g Europe and u ltim a te ly th e e n t i r e w orld (pp. 3 1 -2 ). On pp. 32 -3, Stead r e l a t e s how th e U nited S ta te s o f Europe has been h is id e a l " in f a i r w eather and in f o u l s in c e 1880." 7. Stead b e lie v e s t h a t u ltim a te ly th e two key s t a t e s t h a t w i l l form th e European Union w i l l be England and Germany because " . . . t h e i r tem peram ents and am b itio n s a re so much a l i k e ; [th e y ] a re th e Powers n a t u r a l l y marked out fo r prom oting th e com plete r e a l i s a t i o n o f th e id e a l of th e U nited S ta te s o f Europe" (p. 4 0 ). And ". . . i f Europe w ith o u t F rance would be u n th in k a b le , and i f Europe w ith o u t Germany would be Europe w ith o u t th e r e f l e c t i v e b ra in and th e m ailed hand, what could we th in k o f Europe w ith o u t England? . . . But t h i s I may say , t h a t Europe w ith out England would be Europe w ith o u t th e one Power . . . w ith o u t h e r wings . . . w ith o u t . . . [th e ] undying flam e of Freedom" (pp. 4 0 -1 ). 8. Stead conclud es by d e c la rin g : "The F e d e ra tio n of Europe a t th e p re s e n t moment i s l i k e an embryo in th e l a t e r s ta g e s o f g e s t a t i o n . I t is n o t y e t ready to be b o rn . But i t has quickened th e con scio u s l i f e , and a lre a d y th e C o n tin e n t f e e l s th e approaching t r a v a i l " (p. 4 1 ). "The F e d e ra tio n o f Europe i s a tem ple f a r v a s te r th an any p i l e of masonry put to g e th e r by th e hands o f man . . ." (p. 4 1 ). 9. B erne, S w itz e rla n d , i s th e n e a r e s t approxim ation to a common European c a p i t a l as i t i s a lre a d y th e H eadquarters fo r th e I n te r n a t io n a l T eleg rap h , e s t a b lis h e d in 1865; th e U n iv e rsa l P o s ta l Union, e s ta b lis h e d 526 in 1874; th e I n te r n a tio n a l Bureau o f T rade-m arks, P a te n ts , and C o p y rig h ts, e s ta b lis h e d in 1886; and th e I n te r n a tio n a l Railway Bureau, e s ta b lis h e d in 1890 . . . (S tead , op. c i t ., pp. 2 0 -2 ). 10. B esides th e f a i t h in th e m ission o f th e League of N atio n s, th e g ra n d io se f e e lin g s o f la s tin g w orld peace in th e 1920's may be found in th e in te r p la y o f th e s e developm ents: th e war g e n e ra tio n not only had f i r s t hand ex p erien ce o f th e f u t i l i t y o f war but a ls o were exposed to o ra l and l i t e r a r y r e v e la tio n s o f th e " in te r n a tio n a l m unitions c o n sp ira c y " in war p r o f i t e e r ing and o f th e common people being used as dupes and "cannon fo d d e r." P a c ific ism had gained many new c o n v e rts and f r ie n d s , and th e K ellogg-B riand Pact f o r th e R enunciation of War (1928) had induced th e w ish fu l thought th a t war was h e r e a f t e r outlaw ed. According to P ro fe sso r H arley, i t was "one o f th e most w idely r a t i f i e d t r e a t i e s (more than s ix ty n a tio n s ) " up to th a t tim e. For background and t r e a t y te x t of th e K ellogg-B riand P act, see J . Eugene H arley, Documentary Textbook on th e U nited N ations: H um anity's March Towards Peace . . . (2nd e d ., Rev. and E n l.; Los A ngeles: C enter fo r I n te r n a tio n a l U nderstanding [c . 1 9 5 0]), pp. 165-8. A lso see i b i d . , pp. 29-54, fo r a c o n c ise background, W ilso n 's F ourteen P o in ts , th e League Covenant, and th e l i s t o f o r i g i n a l s i g n a to r ie s and subsequent members o f th e League of N a tio n s . 11. An example of th e p o p u la rity o f th e id ea o f a U nited S ta te s o f Europe may be d isc e rn e d from i t s e x p l o i t a tio n by Edo Fitmnen in h is pam phlet, L ab o u r's A lte r n a t i v e : The U nited S ta te s o f Europe or Europe Lim ited (London: Labour P u b lish in g Company, 1924). This work was in t r u t h an appeal to la b o r throughout Europe to u n ite as th e b o u rg o is ie c a p i t a l i s t s had a lre a d y u n ite d i n t e r n a ti o n a ll y . In f a c t , Fimmen j u s t i f i e d use o f th e t i t l e only tw ice in h is pamphlet th u s: " I t looks as i f th e f in e dream of th e U nited S ta te s of Europe were li k e l y f o r many y e a rs to come to be r e a lis e d only in th e form o f an a tro c io u s c a r i c a tu r e [o f in t e r n a t i o n a l c a p i t a l i s t s ] , as 'Europe L im ite d '" (p. 10). And " . . . not 'Europe L im ite d ,' but a f r e e union of f r e e p r o le ta r ia n 527 r e p u b lic s " (p. 125). 12. In ste a d of B ria n d 's "F ed eral Union" being im m ediately c o n sid e re d , B r i t a i n 's d e le g a te s to th e f i r s t o f f i c i a l co n feren ce on Europe in Septem ber, 1930, a t Geneva, proposed a study group on European Union. Meeting l a t e r as th e Commission o f Enquiry on European Union, i t became m ired in th e s e rio u s problems o f th e economic d e p re ssio n , worked on economic plan s and o th e r m a tte rs between m eetin g s, subm itted economic p ro g re ss r e p o rts a t each of i t s s ix s e s s io n s , and h eld i t s l a s t m eeting of re c o rd on October 1, 1932. See League o f N atio n s, Commission o f Enquiry on European Union, . . . Minutes o f th e F i r s t Session . . . Geneva. September 23. 1930 - - M inutes of th e S ix th S essio n . . . Geneva on September 30 - October 1, 1932 (Geneva: September 29, 1930 --O ctober 15, 1932), V II. 5. - - V II. 13. A lso see a d d itio n a l League o f N ations R eports on th e work o f t h i s Conmission in B ib lio g ra p h y , pp. 103-4. 13. To B ria n d 's p ro p o sal th a t a sta n d in g European [Union] S e c r e t a r i a t s im ila r to t h a t of th e League o f N ations be e s ta b lis h e d in th e in te rim , B r ita in s d e le g a te s suggested th a t " th e danger o f d u p lic a tio n between th e League and th e European S e c r e ta r ia t might be avoided by ask in g S ir E ric Drummond," League S ecre ta ry -G e n e ra l, to d i r e c t both o f f i c e s . A cceptance of t h i s su g g estio n marked th e end indeed of th e European S e c r e t a r i a t . See C oudenhove-K alergi, An Idea Conquers th e World (w ith a P reface by . . . Winston C h u rc h ill; London: Hutchinson [1 9 5 3 ]), pp. 165-6. For f u r th e r s u b s ta n tia tio n of th e B r i t is h a t t i t u d e th a t s e p a ra te European Union o rg a n s, o f f i c e s , and o f f i c i a l s would cause unnecessary o v erlap p in g o r d u p lic a tio n w ith th o se o f th e League of N atio n s, and would a ls o be a t h r e a t to th e League, see S ir A rth u r S a l t e r , The U nited S ta te s of Europe and Other Papers (New York: Reynal and H itchcock [1 9 3 3 ]), pp. 113-20. 14. Coudenhove-K alergi found fre s h i n t e r e s t in Pan-Europe during h is v i s i t to B r ita in in Ju n e, 1938. The impact o f H i t l e r 's maneuvers and campaign a g a in s t Czecho slo v a k ia began to aro u se c e r ta in B rito n s who envisaged 528 th e r e a l dangers o f German Nazism and sought more p o s itiv e m easures w ith which to co n fro n t i t . C hief among th e s e a n ti-a p p e a s e rs were Amery and C h u rc h ill, who began to in flu e n c e o th e r s . When Coudenhove~ K a le rg i re tu rn e d to B r ita in in November, C h u rc h ill had won new ad h e ren ts fo r European Union, e s p e c ia lly a f t e r C ham berlain's Munich co n feren ce w ith H i t l e r . Among th e s e were Duff Cooper and Anthony Eden and a number of M .P .'s of a l l th r e e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . The Royal I n s t i t u t e of I n te r n a tio n a l A f f a ir s had been sponsoring m eetings on th e need to u n ite Europe. An a s s o c ia tio n c a lle d F ed eral Union was formed in th e f a l l of 1938. And by Ju n e, 1939, a B r i tis h Pan- European Committee was in a u g u ra te d , w ith Duff Cooper as i t s Chairman. B r i t i s h le a d e rs began making c o n ta c ts w ith th e French members o f Pan-European Union in an e f f o r t to t r y to u n ite Europe a g a in s t th e dangers of H itle ris m . On May 17, 1939, Cooper had a lre a d y spoken a t a Pan-Europe m eeting in P a ris and p resen ted "reasons why Europe must u n it around a c lo s e ly k n it A nglo-French a l l i a n c e ." But th e re co rd of B r i t a i n 's u n ity e f f o r t s was one of s a c r i f i c i n g too l i t t l e and b eing too l a t e . See C oudenhove-K alergi, op. c i t . . pp. 217-8, and 215-6 fo r C ooper's o th e r statem en ts on Pan-Europe; h is Crusade f o r Pan-Europe, pp. 196- 206; and Andrew and Frances Boyd, W estern Union: A Study of th e Trend Toward European U nity ([W ashington]: P ublic A f f a ir s Press [c . 1949]), pp. 43, 69-70, APPENDIX D SUPPLEMENTARY DATA TO CHAPTER VII RATIONALE FOR EUROPEAN FEDERATION AFTER W O RLD W A R I I Comments and O bservations Concerning B r i t is h In s u la r P aro ch ialism w ith Respect to C o n tin e n ta l Europe Many c o n v e rsa tio n s were h eld by th e re s e a rc h e r in 1944-1945 and again d uring 1954-1955 w ith r e l a t i v e s and acq u ain tan ces (a re aso n ab ly good c ro ss s e c tio n of some t h i r t y fa m ilie s of i n d u s t r i a l w orkers, shopkeepers, c le r g y , te a c h e rs , and c i v i l s e rv ic e em ployees, s c a tte r e d about England, Ire la n d , S cotland and W ales). A fte r th e span of a decade in th e m id -tw e n tie th c e n tu ry , i t was amazing to le a rn of th e e x te n t to which th e v a st m a jo rity o f B rito n s a re s t i l l in s u la te d and isolated^- from d ir e c t C o n tin e n ta l in flu e n c e s and r e a l l y do not know o r c a re much about see in g Europe. Indeed many appeared r a th e r touchy about pursuing th e s u b je c t f u r t h e r . A lthough i t may s u r p r is e A m ericans, i t i s no s t r e t c h o f th e im agina tio n to say th a t 90 per c e n t or more of th e B r i t is h p r io r to 1955 (ex cluding th e p erio d s o f w ar, when m ilita r y s e rv ic e re q u ire d t h e i r going to th e C o n tin en t) have never tra v e le d th e tw enty-odd m iles (or more acco rd in g to th e b o at ro u te ) ac ro ss th e Channel to see what th e C ontinent i s l i k e . Here a re some o f th e d e c la re d re a so n s: " I t would c o s t to o much." " I have never had any d e s ir e , thank God, to go 'a b r o a d .'" "We have enough to see Cf. George C a tlin , The A tla n tic Community ([W akefield , England]: Coram, 1959), pp. 70, 75-6; A lb e rt G uerard, Europe F ree and U nited (S tan fo rd U n iv e rs ity , C a lif o r n ia : S tan fo rd U n iv e rsity P ress [c . 1945]), pp. 126-7. 531 h e re in G reat B r i t a i n ." "We d o n 't have long enough h o lid a y s [ v a c a tio n --o n e week a n n u a lly was then custom ary f o r r e g u la r employees o f going concerns and lo cal govern m ental o f f ic e s ] to go t h a t f a r . " Only fo u r persons o f a l l th e s e fa m ilie s had been to th e C ontinent and then only once in t h e i r l i f e tim e. To one i l l u s t r a t i v e q u e s tio n , "Why have n o t th e B r i tis h over th e y e a rs adopted more o f th e C o n tin e n ta l im ag in atio n and v a r ie ty in th e p re p a ra tio n o f t h e i r m eals?" th e re a c tio n was, "The Europeans use too much im ag in atio n in cooking t h e i r m eals; we d o n 't c a re fo r t h e i r h ig h ly seasoned fo o d s." Among th o se fa m ilie s v i s i te d in C heshire and L a n c a sh ire , most o f them who had tra v e le d on t h e i r w eek's v a c a tio n went to B lackpool (a t most t h i r t y - f i v e m iles d is ta n c e ) y ea r in and y e a r o u t. In f a c t , one fam ily m entioned, "B lackpool was as f a r as we got on our h o lid ay s in some t h i r t y y e a rs o f m arried l i f e . " In a l l f a ir n e s s to th e B r i t is h , i t should be p o in ted out th a t th e more adventuresom e, " f o o tlo o s e ," and f i n a n c ia ll y a b le B rito n s have tra v e le d about th e C ontinent and elsew here. Yet i t is custom ary f o r a l l B rito n s , when tr a v e lin g to th e C o n tin e n t, to speak o f "going a b ro a d ," as one would say when c ro s s in g th e e n t i r e b re a d th o f an ocean. P erso nal correspondence sin c e 1955 has in d ic a te d th a t th e average B rito n has broadened h is t r a v e l h o riz o n s : more fa m ilie s and in d iv id u a ls in B r ita in now own a u to m obiles or a re s t r i v i n g to p o ssess them, and th ey a re 2 While a summer stu d e n t a t Oxford U n iv e rsity in 1954, th e w r ite r noted a s tra n g e tw is t to a c o n v e rsa tio n w ith an Oxford U n iv e rsity A s s is ta n t d u rin g a v i s i t to th e Clarendon P r e s s . Since i t may shed some l i g h t on th e in flu e n c e o f environm ent and custom on o n e 's p a ro c h ia l o u tlo o k and is o la tio n is m --th o u g h n o t ty p ic a l o f th e m a jo rity o f B r i t o n s - - i t d eserv es s u in n a riz a tio n : In a n ti c ip a t io n of th e end o f th e summer s e ssio n and a s ix m onths' to u r o f G reat B r ita in and Europe in h is own a u to m obile and h o u s e - t r a i l e r , th e w r it e r t r i e d to in d ic a te to t h i s i n s t r u c t o r th e many advantages t h a t th e autom obile 532 q u ic k ly a c q u irin g and en jo y in g th e h a b it of m otor t r i p s away from home througho ut th e y e a r. M oreover, th e Govern ment has a c te d to encourage t r a v e l by e a sin g m onetary c o n tr o ls on B rito n s t r a v e li n g o u ts id e B r i t a i n , by l i f t i n g p a s s p o rt r e s t r i c t i o n s on t o u r i s t t r a v e l between B r ita in and th e C o n tin e n t, and by prom oting econom ical t r a v e l ex c u rsio n s so th a t more B rito n s may v i s i t Europe. S im ila rly on th e C o n tin en t more persons a re tr a v e lin g in t h e i r own autom obiles to and from o th e r c o u n trie s in Europe, and th e " a u to - tr a v e l jo y ," as th e Germans say , i s becoming more and more e x te n s iv e and p o p u la r. The w r it e r has been encouraged by th e se tre n d s and b e lie v e s t h a t freedom of in d iv id u a l t r a v e l in o n e 's own v e h ic le to th e many coun t r i e s o f Europe w i l l become a s i g n i f i c a n t means, educa t i o n a l l y and s o c i a l l y , f o r b e t t e r u n d e rsta n d in g and m utual re g a rd among th e v a rio u s peoples o f Europe. I t i s a ls o c o n c e iv a b le t h a t as autom obile t r a v e l becomes more w ide spread in Europe, th e movement to u n ite Europe w i ll g ain a s tro n g e r pop ular b ase and s u p p o rt.^ o ffe re d over r a i l o r a i r tr a v e l in v i s i t i n g and stu d y in g peoples in v a rio u s la n d s . T his was h is r e a c tio n : "From what I 'v e re a d , you Americans a r e q u ite s p o ile d and a re g e ttin g s o f t p h y s ic a lly . You d o n 't walk much any more, do you? I have heard th a t you have to ta k e your autom obile everywhere you g o - - i f i t i s only to a shop a s t r e e t or two away. . . . I am happy to know t h a t I d o n 't need an a u to m obile. I lik e to w alk. On Sundays I o fte n ta k e long walks in th e park o r c o u n try s id e o r v i s i t a museum. . . . I u n d ersta n d you d o n 't l i k e to walk or v i s i t museums? . . . Thank goodness, I s h a l l never have to own an autom obile and have a l l i t s expense. . . . No, i t ' s no t a d isa d v a n ta g e f o r me to be w ith o u t an au to m o b ile. A ll I want o r need to see can be found in th e museum or l i b r a r y , and I never g e t t i r e d o f v i s i t i n g them ." [Shades o f K arl Marx!] ~*Cf. G udrard, op. c i t . . pp. 127-8. 4 E u ro v isio n , or European te le v i s io n programs in th e v a rio u s n a tio n s o f W estern E urope--w hich knows no n a tio n a l b o u n d a rie s--sh o u ld a ls o c o n tr ib u te s i g n i f i c a n t l y in th e f u tu r e to g r e a te r European u n d e rsta n d in g and th e cause of European u n ity . APPENDIX E SUPPLEMENTARY DATA TO CHAPTER V III 534 Results of the Poll of the Parliamentary Repre sentatives in Thirteen European Countries to the Question: "Are you in favour of a European federation within the frame work of the United Nations?"1 % of N o. of Persons % of Persons N o. of Q uestioned R epl:Les Country T y p e of P a rlia m e n t O uestioned R ep lies Yes No Yes No Yes No A ustria N a tio n a l A ssem bly 165 40 38 2 23 1 .2 95 5 F ed eral A ssem bly 48 10 9 1 19 1.0 90 10 B elgium C ham ber 202 111 110 1 54 0 .5 99 1 S enate 167 45 45 0 27 0 100 0 Second C h am b er 150 22 18 4 12 2 .7 82 18 D enm ark First C h am b er 77 14 13 1 17 1 .3 93 7 N a tio n a l A ssem bly 610 332 326 6 5 3 .5 1 9 8 .2 1 .8 F rance C o u n cil of th e R e p u b lic 310 124 124 0 40 0 100 0 U n ite d K ingdom House of C om m ons 606 173 170 3 28 0 .5 9 8 .3 1 .7 G reece N a tio n a l A ssem bly 354 211 210 1 59 0 .3 9 9 .5 0 .5 C ham ber 138 40 34 6 25 4 .4 85 15 Ic e la n d S enate 59 18 16 2 27 3 .4 89 11 Italy C o n stituent A ssem bly 554 357 357 0 6 4 .5 0 100 0 Luxem bourg C ham ber 51 33 32 1 63 2 97 3 Second C ham ber 99 58 53 5 5 3 .5 5 91.3 8 .7 N eth erlan d s First C h am b er 49 26 25 1 51 2 96 4 Norw ay P arliam ent ISO 16 13 3 8 .7 2 81 19 Second C ham ber 230 33 28 5 12.2 2 .2 85 IS Sw eden First C ham ber 30 26 4 87 13 N a tio n a l C ouncil 193 104 99 5 51 2 .6 95 5 Sw itzerland C iv ic C ouncil 44 21 20 1 45 2 .3 95 5 T o ta l 4 ,2 5 6 1 ,8 1 8 1 ,7 6 6 52 4 1 .5 1 .2 9 7 .2 2 .8 -'-This poll was conducted "by Count Coudenhove-Kalergi during November and December, I9I+ 6. See his An Idea Conquers the World (London: Hutchinson, IP-953]), PP- 272-5. APPENDIX F MEMBERSHIP IN WESTERN EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS MEMBERSHIP IN WESTERN EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS (M--full Member; A--Associate Member) Country Council of Europe Euratom ECSC Conmon Market EFTA N A TO O EEC2 O EC D W E I A ustria M — — M M M Belgium M M M M - M M M M Canada - - - - - M A M - Cyprus M - - - - - - - - Denmark M - - - M M M M - Finland - - - - A - - - - France M M M M - M M M M Germany, West M M M M - M M M M Greece M - - A - M M M - Iceland M - - - - M M M - Ireland M - - - - - M M - Ita ly M M M M - M M M M Luxembourg M M M M - M M M M Netherlands M M M M - M M M M Norway M - - - M M M M - Portugal - - - - M M M M - Spain - - - - - - M M - Sweden M - - - M - M M - Sw itzerland M - - - M - M M - Turkey M - - - - M M M - United Kingdom M - - - M M M M M United S tates - - - - - M A M - To June I, 1964. Replaced by OECD on September 30, 1961 Tn w O ' B I B L I O G R A P H Y BIBLIOGRAPHY SECTION PAGE I . COUNCIL OF EUROPE ..................................................... 540 I I . EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COM M UNITY (EURATOM) AND EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CO M MUNITY (EEC OR C O M M O N M ARKET) EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION (EFTA) ................................................................. 563 I I I . EUROPEAN COAL A N D STEEL COM M UNITY (EC SC) ................................................................. 592 IV. EUROPEAN DEFENSE COM M UNITY (EDC) A N D WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION (WEU) ................... 610 V. EUROPEAN POLITICAL COM M UNITY (PROPOSED) A N D EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY (POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS)............................ 629 VI. ORGANIZATION FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION (OEEC) A N D EUROPEAN PAYM ENTS UNION (EPT J ) ..................................... 643 V II. PUBLICATIONS O N UNITING EUROPE PRIOR TO 1918 657 V III. PUBLICATIONS O N UNITING EUROPE BETW EEN 1918-1945 668 IX. GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICATIONS O N UNITING EUROPE FROM 1945-1960 . . . 688 A. Governmental Sources 688 B. Nongovernmental Groups 700 1. B usiness and In d u stry 700 2. Church O rg an izatio n s 701 539 SECTION 3. E d u c a tio n a l I n s t i t u t i o n s and Learned S o c ie tie s 4. O rg a n iz a tio n s Devoted to U n itin g Europe 5. P o l i t i c a l P a r tie s and S upporting Bodies 6. Trade Unions 7. In d iv id u a l and O ther P u b lic a tio n s 8. Newspapers, R adio, T e le v is io n and P erso n al In te rv ie w PAGE 702 710 730 735 736 760 BIBLIOGRAPHY I . COUNCIL OF EUROPE A. Prim ary Sources 1. Public Documents C ouncil of Europe. Amendment to th e S ta tu te o f th e Coun c i l o f Europe: C e r t i f i c a t e of th e S ecre ta ry -G e n e ra l ( A r tic le 41, Paragraph "d" of th e S t a tu te ) . S trasb o u rg : 1958. 2 pp. Committees of th e C o n su lta tiv e Assem bly. S trasb o u rg : 1959. 60 pp. Committee o f M in is te rs . Report on th e Proceedings of th e Second S essio n of th e Committee o f M in iste rs and o f th e Second M eeting o f th e S tanding Committee of th e C ouncil of E urope. P a r is , 3 rd -5 th and 7 th -9 th November 1949. Misc. No. 16 [1949]. Cmd. 7838. London: H.M .S.O., 1949. 7 pp. C o n s u lta tiv e Assembly. Committee P ra c tic e and P ro cedure (A C hairm an's Handbook). S trasb o u rg : D ire c t o r a t e of Assembly S e rv ic e s, 1954. 60 pp. T ab les. ------ The C ouncil of Europe and th e European U niver s i t i e s . S trasb o u rg : 1957. 26 pp. ------ Documents. Working P a p e rs. F i r s t S essio n , 10 A ugust-8 September 1949 (1 v o l.) to E leventh S essio n , 21 A p ril 1959-22 January 1960 (P a rts 1-3, 7 v o l s . ) . S trasb o u rg : 1949-1960. ------ European C onference of Local A u t h o r i t i e s : Documents and T exts A dopted. 1 st y ea r - - . [S tra s b o u rg ]: 1957-- 541 C ouncil of Europe. C o n s u lta tiv e Assembly. Focus on E a s t- West R e la tio n s : A P o licy f o r E urope. S tra s b o u rg : Jan u a ry , 1956. 252 pp. ------ "The F u tu re P o s itio n o f th e S a a r ,” in Documents. Working P a p e rs. S ix th O rdinary S essio n . F i r s t P a rt, May, 1954. S trasb o u rg : 1954. 96 pp. ------ j o i n t M eeting of th e Members of th e C o n su lta tiv e Assembly of th e C ouncil o f Europe and th e Members of th e Common Assembly of th e European Community of Coal and S te e l: O f f ic ia l R eport o f th e D ebate. 1 st y e a r - - . S trasb o u rg : 1953-- ------ R eports f O f f ic ia l Report of D ebates1 . F i r s t S essio n , 10 August - 8 September 1949 (4 v o ls .) to E leven th S essio n , 21 A p ril 1959 - 22 January 1960 (P a rts 1-3, 3 v o l s . ) . S trasb o u rg : 1949-1960. ------ Orders of th e Day. Minutes of P ro ce ed in g s. F i r s t S essio n , 10 August - 8 September 1949 (1 v o l.) to E leventh S essio n , 21 A p ril 1959 - 22 January 1960 (P a rts 1 -3, 1 v o l . ) . S trasb o u rg : 1949-1960. ------ A P o licy fo r Europe To-day: Debate a t th e Con s u l t a t i v e Assem bly. Septem ber, 1953 [5 th S e ssio n ]. S trasb o u rg : 1953. 247 pp. ------ Procedure o f th e C o n s u lta tiv e Assembly. 3d e d . S trasb o u rg : 1956. 318 pp. ------ A Record of Proceedings [ in Jan u ary . A p ril and May 19531 in R e la tio n to th e D ra ft T reaty Embodying th e S ta tu te o f th e European Community. S trasb o u rg : 1953. 306 pp. Texts Adopted: Recommendations and R e s o lu tio n s . F i r s t S e ssio n , 10 August - 8 September 1949 (1 v o l.) to E leventh S essio n , 21 A p ril 1959 - 22 January 1960 (P a rts 1-3, 1 v o l . ) . S trasb o u rg : 1949-1960. D ir e c to r a te of In fo rm atio n . The European Convention on Human R ig h ts . S trasb o u rg : 1952. 65 pp. C h a rts, p h o to g rap h s. 542 C ouncil o f Europe. D ire c to ra te o f In fo rm atio n . European C o n v en tio n s: S trasb o u rg : 1956. 136 pp. C h a rts. ------ Five European Conventions ( ll- X I I - 1 9 5 3 ) . S trasb o u rg : 1954. 80 pp. I l l u s . Documents o f th e C o n s u lta tiv e Assembly R elatin g to th e European Community. S trasb o u rg : 1953. 306 pp. The European Commission o f Human R ig h ts. S trasb o u rg : 1958. 41 pp. European T re aty S e r ie s , No. 1. The S ta tu te of th e C ouncil o f Europe. London, 5th May 1949. P a r i s : 1949. 15 pp. No. 2. The G eneral Agreement on P riv ile g e s and Im m unities. P a ris : 2nd September 1949. 13 pp. No. 3. The S p e c ia l Agreement R e la tin g to th e Seat of th e C ouncil of Europe. P a ris : 2nd Septem ber, 1949. 5 pp. No. 4. The Supplem entary Agreement Amending C e rta in P ro v isio n s o f th e G eneral Agreement on P riv ile g e s and Im m unities of th e C ouncil o f Europe o f 18th March 1950. P a ris : 1950. 3 pp. No. 5. The Convention fo r th e P ro te c tio n of Human R ights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 th November 1950. [S tra sb o u rg : 1950]. 25 pp. No. 6. Amendments to th e S ta tu te [ of th e C ouncil of Europe] of 15th May 1951. S trasb o u rg : 1951. 5 pp. No. 7. Amendment to th e S ta tu te of 18th December 1951. S trasb o u rg : 1952. 4 pp. No. 8. The S ta tu te o f th e C ouncil of Europe (w ith Amendments) adopted in May, 1951, and A ugust, 1951). [O rig in a l te x t of th e S ta tu te , and subsequent amendments t h e r e to , European T reaty S e r ie s , Nos. 1, 6, 7, and 11, a re issu e d to g e th e r in No. 8 .] S trasb o u rg : Septem ber, 1952. 33 pp. 543 C ouncil of Europe. European T reaty S e r ie s , No. 9. The P ro to c o l to th e Convention on Human R ights and Fundamental Freedoms o f 20th March 1952. [ The te x t o f th e C onvention, European T re aty S e r ie s , No. 5 i s issu e d to g e th e r in No. 9 .] S trasb o u rg : 1952. 3 pp. ------- No. 10. The P ro to co l to th e G eneral Agreement on P riv ile g e s and Im m unities of th e C ouncil o f Europe of 6 th November 1952. S trasb o u rg : [1952], 7 pp. ------- No. 11. Amendment to th e S ta tu te of th e Council o f Europe of 4 th May 1953. S trasb o u rg : 1953. 4 pp. ------- No. 12. European In te rim Agreement on S o c ia l S e c u rity Schemes R e la tin g to Old Age. I n v a lid ity and S u rv iv o rs and P ro to co l T h e re to . S trasb o u rg : 11 December 1953. 33 pp. ------- No. 13. European In te rim Agreement on S o cial S e c u rity Other Than Schemes fo r Old Age, I n v a lid ity and S u rv iv o rs and P ro to c o l T h e re to . S trasb o u rg : 11 December 1953. 37 pp. ------ No. 14. European Convention on S o c ia l and M edical A s sista n c e and P ro to c o l. S trasb o u rg : 11 December 1953. 33 pp. ------ No. 15. European C onvention on th e E quivalence of Diplomas Leading to Admission to U n i v e r s i t i e s . S trasb o u rg : 11 December 1953. 11 p p .; 18 February 1954. 2 pp. ------ No. 16. European C onvention R e la tin g to th e F o rm a litie s R equired f o r P a te n t A p p lic a tio n s . S trasb o u rg : 11 December 1953. 17 pp. ------ No. 17. European C onvention on th e I n te r n a tio n a l C l a s s if i c a t i o n of P a te n ts f o r In v e n tio n . S trasb o u rg : 19 December 1954. 56 pp. ------ No. 18. European C u ltu ra l C onvention. S trasb o u rg : 19 December 1954. 10 pp. ------ No. 19. European Convention on E s ta b lis h m e n t. S trasb o u rg : 13 December 1955. 24 pp. 544 C ouncil of Europe. European T reaty S e rie s , No. 20. European Agreement on th e Exchange of War C rip p les between Member C o u n tries of th e C ouncil o f Europe w ith a View to M edical T reatm en t. S trasb o u rg : 13 December 1955. 8 pp. ------- No. 21. European Convention on th e E quivalence o f P eriods o f U n iv e rsity S tu dy. S trasb o u rg : 15 December 1956. 10 pp. ------- No. 22. European Second P ro to co l to th e G eneral Agreement on P riv ile g e s and Immunities of th e C ouncil of Europe: P ro v isio n s in Respect of th e Members of th e European Commission of Human R ig h ts . S trasb o u rg : 15 December 1956. 8 pp. ------- No. 23. European Convention fo r th e P eaceful S ettlem en t o f D is p u te s . S trasb o u rg : 29 A p ril 1957. 16 pp. ------- No. 24. European Convention on E x tr a d itio n . S trasb o u rg : 13 December 1957. 18 pp. ------- No. 25. European Agreement on R egulations Governing th e Movement of Persons Between Member S ta te s of th e C ouncil of Europe. S trasb o u rg : 13 December 1957. 9 pp. ------- No. 26. European Agreement on th e Exchange of T h erap eu tic S ubstances of Human O rig in . S trasb o u rg : 15 December 1958. 47 pp. ------- No. 27. European Agreement Concerning Programme Exchanges by Means of T e le v isio n F ilm s. S trasb o u rg : 15 December 1958. 8 pp. ------- No. 28. T hird P ro to co l to th e G eneral Agreement on P riv ile g e s and Immunities o f th e C ouncil o f E urope. S trasb o u rg : 6 March 1959. 20 pp. ------- No. 29. European Convention on Compulsory Insurance A gainst C iv il L i a b i l i t y in Respect o f Motor V e h ic le s . S trasb o u rg : 20 A p ril 1959. 23 pp. 545 Council of Europe. European T reaty S e r ie s , No. 30. European Convention on Mutual A ssista n c e in C rim inal M a tte rs . S trasb o u rg : 20 A p ril 1959. 19 pp. ------- No. 3 i . European Agreement on th e A b o litio n of V isas fo r R efu gees. S trasb o u rg : 20 A p ril 1959. 8 pp. No. 32. 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Creator Owen, Richard Ewan (author)

Core Title United States Of Europe: A Twentieth-Century Challenge To Nationalism

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Political Science

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,political science, international law and relations

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Rodee, Carlton C. (committee chair), Christol, Carl Q. (committee member), Lovell, Colin R. (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-362097

Unique identifier UC11358972

Identifier 6503114.pdf (filename),usctheses-c18-362097 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 6503114.pdf

Dmrecord 362097

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Owen, Richard Ewan

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA