University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

A Philosophical Critique Of F. R. Tennant'S Empirical Approach To Theism In The Light Of Current Science

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A Philosophical Critique Of F. R. Tennant'S Empirical Approach To Theism In The Light Of Current Science

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Content Copyright by Lawrence Harry Starkey I960 © A PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OP P. R. TENNANT*S EMPIRICAL APPROACH TO THEISM IN THE LIGHT OP CURRENT SCIENCE by Lawrence Harry Starkey A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OP THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OP SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OP PHILOSOPHY (Philosophy) June I960 UNIVERSITY O F SO U TH ERN CALIFORNIA GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY PARK LOS ANGELES 7, CALIFORNIA This dissertation, written by ..................... .LA W R E N C E_ _ _ _ HARRY _ _ _ _ ST AR KEY........ under the direction of h-i-3..Dissertation Com mittee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by the Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of D O C T O R OF P H IL O S O P H Y .. ' Dean Date ............... DISSERTATION COM M ITTEE / X / / /A y , /^ 0 > ^ «—-"C / Chairman PREFACE The general field of philosophy is commonly divided into two chief spheres of endeavor: the spheres of analy tic and synthetic philosophy. Philosophers of the former school have made major contributions to the work of lin guistic analysis and the clarification of meaning. Their efforts in this direction have helped to correct the care less types of thinking which have been a source of great confusion in the history of philosophy. Their work, how ever, has in recent years tended to dominate the scene. It is thus important for philosophers to remind themselves that analysis is essentially a propaedeutic discipline and must not be allowed to usurp the place of the traditional branches of philosophy. There is reason to believe that the time is drawing near when many thinkers will return to the task of syn thetic philosophy, of searching for wisdom, for a synoptic Weltanschauung in terms of which to formulate the impor tant decisions of life. The clarion call for such a shift of concern has already been given by Dr. Paul A. Schilpp in his presidential address before the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association, which met at the University of Wisconsin in the spring of 1959. Directed ii against the dominating position which is occupied by the * analytic movement today* the address was suggestively entitled* "The Abdication of Philosophy."^ Dr. Schilpp expressed a deep concern over the tragic paradox that, in an age when the very existence of the human race is in jeopardy, the philosophers of the West are preoccupied with semantic problems that are largely irrelevant to the urgent need of the hour. The "lovers of wisdom" he said, are more concerned today with lan guage than with truth. A deep concern for truth will be found to permeate the present work, which is frankly offered as a treatise in synthetic philosophy. As such* it draws heavily upon empirical data or experience in three major areas: in science* in philosophy, and, to some extent, in religion. It bases itself particularly upon the work of the Cam- bridge philosopher and theologian, Frederick R. Tennant, who displays an impressive mastery of each of these three fields and who uses this knowledge to construct (in ordine cognoscendi) a thoroughly empirical synthetic philosophy, which, through discoveries that it makes along the way, turns out to be ultimately a natural theology as well. *-In Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philo sophical Association: 32:19-39, October 1^5$. ^For a biographical sketch of Tennant, see below, pp. 41-42, n. 11. iii However, Tennant’s work was completed thirty years ago. During this interim many new developments have occurred, particularly in the sciences, which are pertinent to the thinking that Tennant has done, and which call for a thorough reworking of his thought and a new evaluation of it in the light of contemporary knowledge. The present study is offered as an attempt in this direction. Inasmuch as Tennant's empirical approach fre quently involved him in problems in the philosophy of science for which the science of his day was inadequate, it was felt that a much more thorough scientific documen tation of his position than any that could have been made in his day would be a primary desideratum in a study such as this. The first such science to be drawn upon for this purpose is that of psychology. Since nearly two-thirds of Tennant's principal work is devoted to epistemological propaedeutic, the present study begins with a presenta tion of this epistemology as it is affected by current developments in neurology and in the psychology of per ception. When, at the end of his first volume, the con clusion is finally drawn that all possible knowledge, including religious knowledge, is discursive in nature and is based without exception upon brute sensatio (pro cesses of sensation), Tennant proceeds to construct a carefully empirical approach to religion, which, similarly is based entirely on sensatio. A long chapter on ''Cosmic iv Teleology" finally climaxes his metaphysical quest. This chapter becomes the springboard from which the present study launches into its more critical and constructive phases. Adopting Tennant's personalistic theism and his concept of the "determinate world-plan" as a synoptic hypothesis, our study then turns to the fields of astro- physical cosmology and theoretical biology in order to muster the relevant facts in terms of which the synoptic hypothesis can be tested and the alogical probability of it8 truth assayed. Several criteria are used by which to judge the validity of our imputation of purposefulness into the reading of nature's significance. In particular, these criteria are applied at several of the crucial points in cosmic development at which there emerged the various physical and chemical requisites for the rise of organic life. It is shown that, when such testing is conducted at points up to and including the actual origin of life, but not beyond, the alogical probability in favor of Tennant's synoptic hypothesis turns out to be much poorer than he had supposed. The imputation of purposefulness at most of these points is rendered dubious by its failure to meet the third criterion, which states that the given event must have been a selection from among an adequate number of real alternatives. The "possible worlds" are apparently fewer than one would expect. There is hope, however, that v what was thus lost in the analysis of the cosmic setting of life will be more than regained by the study of the evolution of life as such. But this is a study in itself, a fitting subject for a companion volume to supplement the present critique. Several pages, however, will be devoted to a discussion of the reason for believing that popula tion genetics, which has detailed the principles of evolution as they operate on the levels of species and genera, can throw little light on the evolution of the higher categories, and that the work of the future will have to follow in the direction that Otto Schindewolf has laid out in his Grundfragen der Palaontologie. The rare but crucial changes which have occurred in the development of life by which new Bauplane (structural-plans) have emerged will be seen to follow laws that are utterly dif ferent from those of population genetics; and there will then be reason to invoke Tennant’s synoptic hypothesis at these very significant points, while acknowledging that randomness and natural law reign supreme in the realm of traditional Darwinian variation. I should like to acknowledge the courtesies which have been extended to me by the Princeton University Press in granting permission to quote a long section from Merle Lawrence, Studies in Human Behavior; by Paul B. Hoeber, Inc., in permitting quotations from Arnold Gesell and others, Vision: Its Development in Infant and Child; and vi by the Cambridge University Press in allowing extensive quotations from Tennant's Philosophical Theology. St. Paul, Minnesota May, 1960 Lawrence H. Starkey vii CONTENTS Page PREFACE ...................................... ii i S INTRODUCTION ........................................ 1 The Mid-Twentieth Century Ideological Conflict 1 The Role of Explanation-Potency in Ideological Conflict ................................ 9 The Dialectic of Prophetic Movements in History 17 Chapter PART I. METHODOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 32 I. THE PROCEDURE: ADOPTION OF TENNANT*S SYNOPTIC HYPOTHESIS FOR CRITICAL EVALUATION . . . 33 The Hints of a Synoptic Hypothesis in Historic Prophetism.............. 33 The Place of Tennant*s Work in the Total Methodology.............................. 41 The Empirical Spirit and Broad Scope of Tennant*s Study ....................... 49 II. THE GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY OF TENNANT: FROM PRE SUMPTIVE r'KNOWLEDGE" TO VERIDICAL SOCIALIZED PERCEPTION ................. 55 The Genetic Psychology as Pursued in Ordine Cognoscendi ............................ 55 The Crucial ftoie of Self-Knowledge and Anthropic Faith in Bipolar Philosophy . 62 III. THE ANTHROPIC ROOTS OF INCIPIENT PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE.............................. 72 The Biological Factors that Condition Sense-Perception . . ................. 72 The Primitive Sensory Continuum and the Differentiation of Objects ............. 88 The Anthropic Decision in Favor of Veridical Sense-Perception ....................... 97 viii Chapter Page IV. THE COGNITIVE CONSTRUCTION OF SELF AND OF WORLD IN THE LIGHT OF CURRENT PSYCHOLOGY........................... Ill The Knowledge of Self and of Other Selves as the Basis of World-Knowledge .... Ill The Objectification of Experience on the Second Bipolar Level ................... 124 The Infant's Construction of a Spatial World and of the Categories ............. 128 The Processes of Mature Perception in Experimental Psychology ............... 138 The Epistemological Significance of the Transactional Viewpoint in Psychology . 152 PART I I. RELIGIOUS EPISTEMOLOGY AND SYNOPTIC HYPOTHESIS ........... 156 V. THE RENUNCIATION OF ALL ONTOLOGICAL, COSMO LOGICAL, AND MYSTICAL APPROACHES TO THEISM ................................ 157 The Results of Our Critique of Tennant's Philosophical Epistemology ............. 157 The Repudiation of A Priori and Rational istic Theology............................ 161 The Disallowal of the Noetic Claims of Religious Experience ................... 169 VI. THE EMPIRICAL APPROACH TO THEISM: COSMIC TELEOLOGY ....................... 182 The Task of Explaining the W o r l d ............. 182 The Argument from Cosmic Teleology...........192 VII. THE HYPOTHESIS OF THEISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ............................ 205 The Theology Emerging from Tennant's Quest .............................. 205 The Determinate World-Plan....................215 The Evolutionary Theism of Tennant and Its Testable Implications ................. 222 ix Chapter Page PART III. CRITICAL EXAMINATION: IN THE LIGHT OF COSMIC AND ORGANIC DEVELOPMENT 227 VIII. THE ONTAL STARTING-POINT AND THE THEORIES OF ASTROPHYSICAL COSMOLOGY ............. 228 The Genetic Outline of Cosmic Development in Ordine Essendi....................228 The Ontal Starting-Point and the Status of the Cosmological Argument . . 235 The Possible Worlds Depicted in Astrophysical Cosmology ............... 244 The Dynamic and Steady-State Models of the Universe.......................... 254 The Evidence in Favor of a Finite Universe . 264 IX. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PHILOSOPHICAL COSMOGONY . 277 The Cosmogonic Dilemma of the Cyclical Models ...................................277 The Physical Interpretation of the First Antinomy of Kant ........................ 287 The Cosmological Argument for God in the Light of Cosmology.................297 The Fact of Existence and the Emergence of Physical Reality ................... 305 The Need for Physical Multiplicity as the Setting for a Moral World-Drama .... 313 X. THE COSMIC ENVIRONMENT OF LIFE AND ITS BIOLOGICAL FITNESS ...................... 323 The Basic World-Properties and their Possible Combinations ................. 323 The Consistencies and Inconsistencies of Possible and Impossible Worlds .... 328 The Fitness of the Possible Cosmic Environments .......................... 341 The Origin and Fitness of the Chemical Elements........................... 347 XI. THE NARROWING BASE OF A PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY 364 The Restriction to Biology and to the Problem of Organization.......... 364 The Philosophical Theology Emerging from the Critique of Tennant..........378 x INTRODUCTION The Mid-Twentieth Century Ideological Conflict Many of the tragic conflicts that have victimized the human race during its short history on this globe have ultimately stemmed from basic ideological differences. These differences, which generate cultural barriers between the various segments of the race, can only be resolved by the slow interfusion of philosophical insights among the thinkers and leaders of the world. Whenever such insights are developed, as we trust is the case in the present study, it is natural for them to be offered against the background of the ideological conflict in which they are intended to participate. This study will therefore begin by anticipating, for the moment, certain topics which are covered in the latter half of our work in order to relate them at once to the ideological con flict. Two of these topics, which will particularly engage our attention, are (1) astrophysical cosmology, and (2) the origin and development of life. The striking incon sistency manifested in the attitudes which the officials of the Soviet Union have adopted toward these two scientific problems reveals how keenly conscious they are of the strategic ideological significance of the work which is being done in these areas. The Soviets are evidently afraid of cosmology; for their astronomers, who are among the best in the world, do not concern themselves with ’'the ultimate cosmological problem of the expansion and origin of the universe," and their leaders have placed a ban upon the translation of such works into Russian. The development of chemical theories, on the other hand, by which to explain the origin of life on a materialistic basis has been officially encouraged and, in fact, under written by the Soviet government. In 1957 the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. invited a group of outstanding scientists from all over the world to convene in Moscow in August of that year for an international symposium on the origin of life. The published Reports of the symposium contain twenty-five papers by authors from the communist bloc and eighteen by Western scholars. Nearly all of the papers from the Soviet bloc were prepared by scientists from Moscow itself. This fact suggests that perhaps there exists in the Academy *A. C. B. Lovell, The Individual and the Universe, The BBC Reith Lectures: 1958 (New York, 19^9), p. . 2U.S.S.R., Academy of Sciences, The Origin of Life on the Earth: Reports on the International Symposium: August, 1957, Moscow, ed. A. Oparin and others (Moscow, TT93TJT: Hereafter cited as Moscow Symposium. of Sciences a lively and practical interest in the task of providing a scientific explanation for the primeval origin of life out of matter. Apparently the Russians are expecting results in this area that will count in their favor in the ideological warfare of our times. It is conceivable that these Soviet chemists will soon learn to mix together some such simple compounds as methane, ammonia, hydrogen, and water, and to treat them in such a way as to produce a molecule of nucleic acid that is not only capable of reproducing itself, but of synthesizing a functional protein as well.3 If and when this is done it may be hailed as a greater victory for the dialectical materialism of the East than the launch ing of the Sputniks; for it will be claimed that life itself has been created in the test tube. At the present stage of development in this field, such a creation seems to depend upon the prior existence and use of molecules made by nature which are of greater complexity than the molecules synthesized. A template molecule of naturally- formed nucleic acid, for example, is required to prime 3Nearly all such products of random artificial syn theses are expected to be incoherent or biologically insignificant and useless. The imposing problems in chemistry and physics which are encountered in any attempt to synthesize life-like substances are referred to again in Ch. xi, pp. 366-370. the mixture and to lend it specificity;^ and several specific enzymes are needed to catalyze the processes of phosphorylation^ and polymerization.6 It is not unlikely that these limitations are intrin sically insuperable. But if they are not and if the Soviet biochemists do finally succeed in their efforts to synthesize life in vitro, they will undoubtedly capitalize on the ideological implications of their achievement. In the flush of this triumph they will probably claim that life is matter and nothing more, glossing over the embar rassing fact that the most expensive ingredient was not the physical materials--the carbon and nitrogen that was G. Schramm, "Die Bedeutung der Virusforschung fur die Erkenntnis biologischer VermehrungsvorgSnge," in Moscow Symposium, pp. 216-217; and R. Mantsavinos and &. S. Canellakis, "The Incorporation of l^C-deoxynucleo- tides into Deoxyribonucleic Acid by Soluble Mammalian Enzymes," Biochimica et Biophysica Acta, 27:661-662, March 1958. 5E. S. Canellakis and R. Mantsavinos, "The Conversion of ^C-deoxynucleoside-51-monophosphates to the Corres ponding Di- and Triphosphates by Soluble Mammalian En zymes," Biochimica et Biophysica Acta, 27:643-645, March 1958. Marianne Grunberg-Manago, Priscilla J. Ortiz, and Severo Ochoa, "Enzymatic Synthesis of Polynucleotides: I. Polynucleotide Fhysphorylase of Azotobacter vi*te- landii," Biochimica et Biophysica Acta, 20:269-^5, April 1956;and “Enzymatic Synthesis of Nucleic Acidlike Poly nucleotides ," Science, 122:907-910, November 11, 1955; Arthur Komberg, 1. R. Leyman, and E. S. Simms, "Poly- desoxyribonucleotide Synthesis by Enzymes from Escherichia Coli," Federation Proceedings, 15:291-292, March 1956; and Komberg and others, "Enzymatic Synthesis of Deoxyribonu cleic Acid," Biochimica et Biophysica Acta, 21:197-198, 1956. used, or the adenosine triphosphate, which, because of its energy-rich chemical bonds, provided the ideal "fuel" n for the chemical reactions of the synthesis. The most expensive item on the budget will, instead, have been the payroll of the Academy of Sciences, the brains, or rather, the minds that were involved, the many man-hours of organ ized thought and purposive manipulation by which the purine and pyrimidine bases of the geneticist’s alphabet were arranged in perfect order to form the hereditary code O for producing a functional protein. The case will be 7H. A. Krebs, "Some Aspects of the Metabolism of Adenosine Phosphates," Bulletin of the Johns Hopkins Hospital, July 1954, pp. 34-44; J. fe. S. tealdane, ''The 6rigins of Life," in New Biology, ed. M. L. Johnson and others, No. 16, pp. 18-36, April 1954; and Harold F. Blum, Time's Arrow and Evolution, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N. J., 195517pp.' TM-W7.------ 8 This code apparently utilizes a four-letter alpha bet, as it were, composed of the chemical bases, adenine, guanine, cytocine, and thymine; and the message is writ ten in the sequence that these bases form as they arrange themselves along the linear backbone of the nucleic acid molecule (see below, pp. 367-368); and Homer Jacobson, "Information, Reproduction and the Origin of Life," Ameri can Scientist, 43:119-127, January 1955 ; J. D. Watson and F. H. C. Crick, "Genetical Implications of the Struc ture of Deoxyribonucleic Acid," Nature, 171:964-167, May 30, 1953 ; W. G. Overend and A. ft. Peacocke, "The Molecular Basis of Heredity," Endeavor, 16:90-98, April 1957 ; F. H. C. Crick, J. S. Griffith, and L. E. Orgel, "Codes without Commas," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 43:416-431, May ; and Herman S. Shapiro and Erwin Chargaff, "Studies on the Nucleotide Arrangement in Deoxyribonucleic Acids," Biochimica et Biophysica Acta, 26:596-623, December 1^5T"T~. similar to that which arose when Wohler synthesized urea.9 This was widely hailed as discrediting the dictum that organic compounds can be made only by living organisms. But, as Wald has indicated, it showed nothing of the kind. Organic chemists are alive Che explained]) ; WShler merely showed that they can make organic compounds externally as well as inter nally.^-0 Similarly, the synthesis of life, if it ever occurs in vitro, will be the achievement of living minds, with their unique ability to sort and organize. Materialistic com munism, however, tacitly denying that life is a function of mind, will find in this achievement an opportunity to focus the attention of the world dramatically upon those aspects of life that make it also a function of matter. By means of this spurious stratagem she can be expected to reenforce her bid for the minds of men. It is important to stress the fact that this ideo logical struggle, which seems to be one of East vs. West, is potentially as crucial on the home front as it is in Central Europe. As David Elton Trueblood remarks, Marx-Leninism provides an objective revelation of . . . many features of our own civilization. The really 9F. Wbhler, in Poggendorfs Annual. 12:253-256, 1828, cited by Henry M. Leicester, The Historical Background of Chemistry (New York, 1956) , pp. i.73 and 179. ^°George Wald, ”The Origin of Life,” Scientific American, August 1954, p. 48. 7 frightening thought is not . . . that we have two worlds on the planet, but rather that we have come so close to having one. . . . We of the Western world are more similar to the Communists than we like to admit. . . . Certainly we have a vast amount of scientism in the West, since every great university harbors many expo nents of the first item of the Leninist creed. . . . We, too, believe in our hearts that economic goods are the very substance of life. The Communist system is of great value to the rest of the world if it shows, in time, the damaging nature of some of the features of which we tend to be toler ant, but which we are now privileged to see, in the Communist experiment, in their naked ugliness. It is a help to see our own materialism in large letters, as it were, and without the softening effect of the various combinations into which it normally enters in the life of the West. Reinhold Niebuhr puts this with his usual vividness when he says, "The fact that Communists should adorn their more explicit dogma with the prestige of science provides modem liberal culture with a cari cature of its own beliefs.H^ The philosophy of biology is important to communism because it finds that its ideology makes a strong appeal-- not only to the malcontent and disillusioned masses, but also to those bourgeois intelligentsia whose disillusion ment takes the more sophisticated form of a pessimistic philosophy of nature. Though these intelligentsia deny the existence of any cosmic support for the higher aspirations of man and disavow the transcendent sanctions of Christian morality, they are nevertheless suffused, perhaps uncon sciously, with the cultural heritage of Hebrew-Christian ^-Philosophy of Religion (New York, 1957), pp. 172- 173. ----------------------- 8 altruism and social concern.1 Thus, defecting from the bourgeois class, these intelligentsia have become the leaders of Communism; and while the impetus of their Hebrew-Christian heritage lasts, they are able to impart a religious quality to a movement whose aims are purely j secular. Trueblood continues by noting that what we observe, therefore, is a civil war within religion, and this is a partial explanation of the ferocity of the conflict. Marxist or Leninist leaders oppose, and believe they are able to expose, all theistic religion, in spite of the fact or because of the fact that they have another commitment which is itself qualitatively religious. Instead of the Living God, they have the Dialectic of History and as a spur to endeavor, instead of the Kingdom of God, they have the classless society. . . . Dialectical material ism . . . represents a mass defection from the classic faith of the West in favor of an alternative religion, one which is without God but not at all lacking in evangelistic zeal. It is the sense of a mental movement in history, working out a necessary logic of events, that gives the dedicated Communist a surrogate for religious faith. There is a wave of the future and he is on it! The decay of capitalist enemies . . . is as sure as any thing can be. Thus historical determinism brings real peace of mind and a sense of participation in something far bigger than the individual. (Pages 162-163 and 170- 171. Quoted by permission of Harper & Brothers Publishers) If communism, then, is a religious movement which flourishes on the disillusionment of a pessimistic philo sophy of nature, the strongest weapon against it would seem to be a religious philosophy that is rooted in the It is perhaps significant that Marx was raised in a Jewish-Christian home, that Trotsky was also of Hebrew lineage, and that Stalin had studied for the priesthood. I explanation-potency of an optimistic interpretation of i nature. The question whether such a meaningful optimism, i I either proximate or ultimate, can reasonably be espoused i j in an age of scientism after a frank appraisal of empiri- ; cal fact will constitute the chief consideration of the I present study. i ; The Role of Explanation-Potency : in Ideological Conflict In anticipation of our later preoccupation with the work of F. R. Tennant, it is well to note in this con nection Tennant*s insistence that nothing other than fruitfulness in explanation-potency be adopted as the criterion of such "truth*' as it lies within the power of philosophy to attain.” Such explanation-potency is effective in direct propor tion to the richness of authentic interpretation and meaning that is readable in the warp and woof of rela tionships that exist between the various areas of thought and knowledge. The importance of the demand for explana tion-potency in the East-West ideological conflict can be seen by considering the role that it plays in achieving what we shall define as a dynamic or prophetic type of permanence or stability. Both parties to the conflict ^Philosophical Theology, Vol. II: The World, the Soul, and 5od [Cambridge. Eng!. 1337). p. 254. For--- Tennant’s biography see below, pp. 41-42n. I are anxious to develop a permanent or stable social order. ! But the type of stability in which Tennant's "fruitful- I [ | ness of explanation-potency" is a crucial factor is only ! I one of the two or more possibilities that can be con- i j ; sidered; and 1 hope to show that this one is the most | promising type because it taps the deepest springs of i ! human motivation. The two types of permanence in question | are the dynamic and the static. The static type of per manence may be defined in general terms as that in which forms crystallize, as it were, out of the flux and then remain adamant in the face of all change. The dynamic i type is that in vrtiich a form arises and develops in the : midst of a constant flow of matter. Clearly, the dynamic type of permanence is richest in potentiality. Hence an optimistic philosophy of nature, if such were warranted, would be rooted in the dynamic type, the only one in which explanation-potency can play its crucial role. The distinction between the static and dynamic types of permanence is valid on all the levels of reality. The distinction will be illustrated first, however, by examples from several fields at the lower levels. On the quantum level, for instance, the flux of physical reality attains stability either as matter or as radiation. In matter a static permanence emerges from the flux of yr-waves at the two points where the frequency distributions for the single and the double "existence symbols" are in phase; and we 11 I ! 14 | call these stable emergents the electron and the proton. i In radiation the wave8 emerging from the atom possess a dynamic permanence which lasts till they strike an ! excited atom, perhaps in some galaxy millions of light- years away. On the molar level there is the static per- | manence of the rocks and the dynamic durability of life.*-5 | ! The former is an expression of forces in equilibrium, i I subject to the law of entropy; and the latter is a vital i ! process which builds up negative entropy by maintaining a dynamic "steady-state," as it is called, above the level i of equilibrium.*-5 Life itself evinces these same two : modes of permanence in the contrast between the static : sessile plants and the dynamic motile members of the animal kingdom; and among the latter the same contrast appears between the stereotyped patterns of instinctive 1 7 behavior and the adaptive creativity of intelligence.L On all the molar levels of existence, the contrast is between the security of bondage, as it were, and the sur- *-^Arthur CSO Eddington, New Pathways in Science, Messenger Lectures: 1934 (New York, 193^5, pp. £43-247; and Fundamental Theory (Cambridge, Eng., 1949), pp. 32-35. * - 5Henri Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. T. E. Hulme (London, 19l3), pp. 8-20. *-6Ludwig von Bertalanffy, "Das Fliessgleichgewicht des Organismus," Kolloid-Zeitschrift, 139Vi: 86-91, 1954; and Biophysik des fliessgleichgewicht, trans. W. H. West- phal (BraunscT^j ;' T§53r.----------- *-7Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. A. Mitchell (New York, 1944), pp. 120-127 and 145-194. 12 vival value of adaptability and freedom. Sometimes it approaches the contrast between death and life, both of which are forms of permanence. As I shall try to show, it is chiefly in relation to the dynamic type of per manence that the need for explanation-potency arises, | although such potency is, of course, irrelevant at the impersonal levels that have so far been considered. In order to appreciate the importance of explanation-potency | in an optimistic philosophy of nature, we must therefore extend our analysis to the personal and social levels. If the distinction between static and dynamic per- | manence is found at all of the major bifurcations on the j lower levels of classification, it is not surprising that it appears also on the level of self-conscious intelli gence. Here this distinction can be seen in the contrast existing between those men of custom and tradition, on the one hand, who are held in the clutch of habit or mimesis, and on the other hand, those venturesome, resourceful, and creative personalities who spearhead 1 f t the advance of a culture. On the social and cultural levels, permanence is measured in terms of the capacities of groups and institutions to maintain their integrity as *-8Amold J. Toynbee, A Study of History; Abridgement of Volumes I-VI, ed. D. C. Somervell (New York, 1947^, ; p-pT '21T-2T5-.--- 13 I t j groups and to perpetuate themselves as they pass through | the consuming fires of time and of history.^ Here the I I terms "static" and "dynamic" are again appropriate so that j ! these two contrasting types of permanence have been vari ously described in terms of the Yin and the Yang, the | traditional and the creative, the priestly and the pro- i j phetic (Toynbee, pp. 49-51). Static groups or cultures i i are therefore notable for the reverence which they display I S toward the rituals and traditions that they share with each other and, symbolically, with their ancestors. They are concerned with preserving the forms of craftsmanship, ! art, and social structure which have enriched the lives of so many generations. Because they are suspicious of any and all innovations, they are likely to brand as heretical any really creative efforts arising among them which endeavor to achieve a broader outlook or a more pro gressive policy. Within religion the two types of permanence, as Henri Bergson has shown, are represented by priest and ■^The concept of the consuming fires of history, which is strikingly portrayed in the thirty-third chapter of Isaiah, is exegctically developed by George Adam Smith (The Book of Isaiah. Vol. I: Isaiah I.--XXXIX, 15th ed., ;The Expositor*s Bible, ed. W. R. Nicoli, 2nd Ser.: 1888- 89 CLondon, 1903J , pp. 334-337). i '2 0 | prophet. As used in their broader sense by Edgar Shef- i field Brightman, these two terms comprehend between them the total gamut of religious expression above the purely 21 primitive level. This implies, for instance, that the priestly factor in history appears not merely in the I superstitious taboos and prescriptions of shamanism, but also in the homage paid to the ancestors of the clan in i • | China, in the respect in which the five social relations | are held, and in the social solidarity which these insti- ; tutions foster; in the stratifications of the system of i caste in India; in the cultic traditions of the Hebrew l * | priesthood; and in the ecclesiasticism of the Roman Church i Through these institutions a static permanence was achieved, for better or for worse, which persisted for ages to circumscribe the human spirit. But the prophetic movements, which liberate the souls of men, evince an even greater resistance to the attrition of time. The system of rigid caste distinctions begins to break down under the dynamic impact of Western culture; and under that of pro- ^®This contrast is developed in detail in two key chapters which Bergson has aptly entitled "Static Religion and "Dynamic Religion" (see his Two Sources of Morality and Religion, trans. R. A. Audra and C. ferereton tNew York I 19^5u7 Snaps, ii and iii). ^Thus in his section on the "History of Religion," he has sub-sections entitled "National (Priestly)" and | "Universal (Prophetic)" (A Philosophy of Religion CNew ! York, 1940J, pp. 46-63). 15 I phetic Marxism the static institutions of China totter. ! In G. W. F. Hegel's philosophy of history those movements which we have called prophetic are portrayed as steps in the realization of Self-Conscious Spirit.22 It is sig nificant, however, that Hegel dismisses Africa, China, and India as outside the current of authentic spiritual history (pp. 99 and 173-174), because, as we would say, their stability was only of the static or priestly type. I In our own day, the genius of the prophetic factor in his- | tory has been skillfully depicted in Karl R. Popper's 23 I analysis of the open society; and, in his own way, by i I | Toynbee, who traces its origin and impetus to the reli- i | gious motivation of a "creative minority" within what he | calls the "internal proletariat."^ The most noteworthy of the dynamic or prophetic move ments that have appeared in history are those of (1) Heb rew prophecy, (2) Platonic realism, (3) Augustinian 22The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (London, 1900). 23The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. I: The Spell of Plato. ani Hftr. ' XT: TKe~ HfgF TiSe'of EfropViecy: KtegSl: — Marx, and the Aftermath CLondon, 1945). ^History, pp. 12-13. Toynbee uses the word "pro- | letariat" to mean "any social element or group which in ! some way is in but not of any given society at any period ! of that society's history" (p. 11). The proletariat is j described as "internal" when it occupies the same geo- ( graphical area as that of the given culture. i i 16 I existentialism, and (4) Newtonian science. Each of these has contributed its own dynamic strands to the warp and woof of history. In the ideological warfare of our i generation, the ultimate victor is likely to be that cul ture which succeeds in weaving these strands of prophetic j insight into the most richly meaningful fabric of truth. i | For in the long run that culture whose Weltanschauung j possesses the greatest explanation-potency will most ; readily enlist the loyalties of men. If then the opti mist's hopes are identified with the dynamic type of ! stability which is expressed on the social and religious ; levels in the prophetic movements, he should be concerned i j ; to examine the essential genius of these movements. It is my basic contention that the dynamic of a prophetic movement, like that of an individual person, gains power and momentum in proportion to its capacity to find mean- ; ing, significance, or rationality— in short, "explanation- potency"--in nature; to reinterpret life in the light of 25 In applying the current term "existentialism” retro actively to the philosophy of St. Augustine, we are follow- ; ing J. V. Langmead Casserley, who presents a good defense of this usage by tracing modern theistic existentialism back to the subjectivism of St. Augustine as its source (The Christian in Philosophy CNew York, 1951^, Part I: | "The fast Record of the (inristian in Philosophy," pp. 17- :162). 26The name of Newton is used, of course, without j intending to imply that he himself held to the material istic outlook with which science has come to be associated. these insights; and to align itself with nature as so apprehended. The Dialectic of Prophetic Movements in history When "nature” is placed under survey, as is done in i I the present study, in order to test the explanation- potency of an ideology or Weltanschauung, it is important that the term "nature” is understood in a sense which is | broad enough to include the history of mankind as well as | that of the physical cosmos; for Tennant's emphasis on I "fruitfulness in explanation-potency" (Philos. Theol., II, | 254) can then be justified by specific cases taken from I the histories of the four great prophetic movements. 1 In Hebrew history, for example, survival may be traced 27 to the finding of meaning in suffering. Of all the 27Referring to Deutero-Isaiah, the great prophet of the Exile, Harry Emerson Fosdick says that in his writings "appalling disaster was transmuted into spiritual tri umph because it was seen as redemptive. . . . What this reinterpretation of Israel's tragedy did for those who understood and believed it is plain. Their minds had faced backward toward preceding sin as their disaster's cause. The Great Isaiah turned their faces forward toward redemption as their disaster's purpose" (A Guide to Understanding the Bible CNew York, 19383, p. 174). | Similarly Herbert Butterfield speaks of this achievement I in prophetic interpretation as one in which the concepts | of vicariousness and of promise were superimposed upon I that of judgment (Christianity and History CNew York, ; 19503, pp. 78 and ST-SZ). ------------ 18 tribes that the Chaldeans took East into exile, only the Hebrews resisted amalgamation and finally returned to their homeland. Their survival as a people was largely due to the meaning which the prophets of the Exile read into this national tragedy, interpreting their suffering and bondage not merely as punitive, but as vicariously redemptive as well. Because of the explanation-potency of this concept of redemptive suffering, der ewige Jude is with us even to this day. Further illustrations are afforded by Platonic realism, the second of the prophetic movements, which stresses the reality of order and form. It owes its genius to the interpretation of nature as poisie or as yUlfVLKtj. To the cultured Greek even science was aesthetic and sacramental.^ The culture into which Plato was born had regarded the very elements of chemistry as divine;30 and the human body, so depreciated in the This proverbial figure of the European scene makes a brief appearance in one of Franz Werfel's dramas and poses the pithy question, "Bin ich nicht die Weltgeschichte des menschiichen Verkehrs persdnlich?” (Jacobowskv und der Oberst, ed. G. 0. Arlt CNew York, 1945J, pp. 66-91). 20 Allen John Workman, "An Inquiry into Sources of Aesthetic in Pre-Socratic Philosophy," unpub. doctor*s diss. (School of Philosophy, University of Southern Cali fornia, 1951). 30The views of the major pre-Socratics regarding the nature of substance, are expounded by Roy Kenneth Hack (God in Greek Philosophy to the Time of Socrates CPrince- ton. N. J.. i^Sll. and by Werner Jaeger (The yheology of the Early Greek Philosophers, trans. E. S. Robinson7 The Gifford Lectures: 1936 CGxford, 1947D). 19 East, was glorified in Greek art and poetry, and extolled in the games as the symbol of <kp€Tp and /COcXov.^ Because of the explanation-potency of these idealistic concepts as applied to the interpretation of nature, Greek culture was able to triumph while under the very heel of Rome. Newtonian science actually antedates Newton; for Archimedes was a scientist of the modem temper. It will serve no purpose at this point, however, to linger over the history of Greek science. Instead, we shall trace the interplay of scientific philosophy with the other three prophetic movements as each of them advanced through , ^In the Greek To Kec\ov means *'the morally beautiful*' and OLp€Tt57 , which is often misleadingly rendered "vir tue, * ' means "excellence" in some specific area (W. K. C. Guthrie, The Greek Philosophers from Shales to Aristotle. Home Study Books, ed. B. I.tfcvans CNew ¥ork, 1950J, pp. 8- 10). As defined by Jaeger ciperpie "a combination of proud and courtly morality with warlike valour . . . the quintessence of early Greek aristocratic education" (Pai- deia;the Ideals of Greek Culture, Vol. I; Archaic Greece: The Mind of? Athens, trans. G. Highet, 2nd ed. CNew York, I44^J, Book 1: '^Archaic Greece," p. 5). In the poet Pindar these higher qualities of the athlete were inti mately associated with the physical capacities of his body, which were, of course, the immediate occasion of the Odes. But Pindar "thinks far more of the spiritual difficulty of the games," writes Jaeger, "than of their physical appearance" (p. 211). Far from being monkish in outlook, Pindar was, according to James Adam, "keenly alive to the joyous things in life: the praises of youth and manly prowess, . . . of all that is sublime and beau tiful in nature and in art, are continually on his lips" (The Religious Teachers of Greece. The Gifford Lectures: 1&)4-1906 ^Edinburgh, 1909J, p. 129). the course of the Christian era. **Newtonian, f science owes its initial prophetic impetus to its origin in the dynamic interweaving of the Hebrew and Greek strands, under the aegis of Roman practicality.32 But unfortunately this dynamic balance (to alter the figure) was so deli cately poised that it soon fell out of equilibrium, giving rise in the medieval period to the excesses of Hebrew- Christian asceticism. This was due to the appearance of the fourth prophetic strand, that of Augustinian existen tialism, and particularly to the fact that this new strand failed to interweave with its predecessors. Being more akin to the Hebrew than to the Greek, it tipped the scales, as it were, in the direction of subjectivity. This crip pled the capacity which it otherwise would have had to temper the Greek disdain for manual labor and craftsman ship. This disdain, as Philipp Frank has shown, impeded the cooperation between thinker and artisan, between drafting-room and shop, which was essential for the rise of science.33 Thus Augustinian existentialism was respon sible by default for postponing the flowering of Newtonian 32The manner in which these strands were interwoven in the early modern revival of science is detailed below (pp. 21-24). 33Philosophy of Science, Prentice-Hall Philosophy Series, ed. A. E. Murphy (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.,‘ 1957), pp. 25-28. For the essence of this insight, Frank is indebted to Alfred North Whitehead (Science and the Modern World, Lowell Lectures: 1925 CNew York, 21 science for over a thousand years. During this period the prophetic force of existentialism expressed itself exclusively on the level of self-consciousness; and the social structure of the West succumbed to the stagnation of a static type of permanence. Consequently, the Thomistic synthesis (in which this period culminated) must be regarded as aberrant, inasmuch as it was excessively rationalistic and based itself on a metaphysically defective Aristotelian science.As J. V. Langmead Casserley has noted, the work of Aquinas was hotly contested by the Augustinians of his own day and the later mediaeval philosophers, like Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, returned, with important modi fications, to the Augustinian tradition (Christ, in Philos., p. 85). These modifications were apparently of crucial importance; for under the new Augustinianism science was no longer inhibited, and its dormant seeds soon began to sprout. When Duns Scotus made his “formal distinction,“ by which an essence could be granted to each and every “particu lar,” he created the philosophical basis for the scien tist's interest in individual things; and, inasmuch as his work undermined the imposing structure of Aristotelian scholasticism, it prepared the ground for the rise of 34R. C. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics. Philo sophical Essays, II (Oxford, 1940;, 214-218. 22 modern science.35 With the rediscovery of Greek culture in the Renaissance, man's attention was aroused from its subjectivity and redirected outward; and there arose a renewed interest in nature.36 When this was then combined with the medieval doctrine of the rationality of God, the Author of nature, the long-disturbed balance of the Greek and Hebrew spirits was finally restored and science again blossomed forth as in the days of Archimedes. Alfred North Whitehead has argued that The greatest contribution of medievalism to the forma tion of the scientific movement was the inexpugnable belief that every detailed occurrence can be correlated with its antecedents in a perfectly definite manner, exemplifying general principles. Without this belief the incredible labours of scientists would be without hope. It is this instinctive conviction, vividly poised before the imagination, which is the motive power of research: --that there is a secret, a secret which can be unveiled. How has this conviction been so vividly implanted on the European mind? . . . It must come from the medieval insistence on the ration ality of God, conceived as with the personal energy of Jehovah and with the rationality of a Greek philoso pher. Every detail was supervised and ordered: the search into nature could only result in the vindica tion of the faith in rationality. Faith in reason is the trust that the ultimate natures of things lie together in a harmony which excludes mere arbitrariness. It is the faith that at the base of things we shall not find mere arbitrary mystery.3 35 W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy (New York, 1952), pp. 505-^06 and 511-312. 36For this renewed interest in nature in its incipi ent form, see Petrarea, "The Ascent of Mont Ventoux," in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, ed. E. Cassirer and others (dhicago, 194$), p. 44. 37Science and Modern World, pp. 17-18 and 26. 23 This £aith in the rationality of the physical world could never have been achieved by Greek science left to its own resources because, as Collingwood has shown, the Aristotelians erroneously regarded the world's existence and its motion as being revealed to us in naive sense perception alone. But such ordinary observation yields the general illusion that the world operates by caprice. The most apt analogy by which to describe the workings of nature would then be that of the motions of animals. This "organismic" physics, as Frank has called it, pre- vailed until the end of the sixteenth century. The metaphysical error upon which it is based derives, as Collingwood argues, from Aristotle's failure to note that the use of our senses can never inform us that what we perceive by using them is a world of things that happen of themselves as science avows and are not subject to control by our own art or by any one else's. Instead, Collingwood insists that the existence of such a world is a presupposition, the first and fundamental presupposition, on which alone any science of nature can arise; and that this is another way of saying (as against the teachings of Aristotle) that God created the world (pp. 214-215, italics ours). Aristotle's ''metaphysical 38Pages 93-104. Frank claims that "if we look into Copernicus' writings, we find that even he was still deeply imbued with the ideas of organismic physics" (p. 101). 24 error,” he frankly states, ”was corrected by Christian ity”— by Augustinian Christianity, we might add. Simi larly, the Aristotelian view that God is not the source of the movements of things is refuted by Christianity. For according to Collingwood, Aristotle did not think that movement, as such, in the natural world arose out of anything in God's nature; he thought it happened of itself. He regards these movements as "only secondly acquiring their orderliness through imitating God” (p. 218, italics ours). By the time of the Reformation, Augustinian Christianity had finally begun to come to terms with the natural world of the Greeks. By depicting God as the cre ator of the world and the source of its motion as well, she eventually reversed her role and became a major fac tor in the origin of modern science, giving rise, for example, to Kepler's confident expectation that a life time of searching would reveal to him the mathematical rationalities of the heavens. Once Newtonian science was established, it added to its heritage a prophetic genius of its own— a genius which lies in its interpretation of nature in terms of such basic generalities as "space,” "time," and "gravitation."39 39The ultimacy of these three concepts in science is reflected in a book of that title written by Arthur S. Eddington (Cambridge, Eng., 1921), and also in the devel opment of the e.g.s. system of measurement, which includes a basic unit in each of these dimensions. The explanation-potency of such scientific concepts as the theory of relativity in physics, of natural selection in biology, and the subconscious in psychology is impres sive. In particular, the capacity of the tensor calculus to express in one formula the flux of energy, momentum, and density through space and time (and perhaps of elec tric fields as well) affords but one example of the tools that lie at the disposal of science to strengthen its explanation-potency. So rich is the fabric of meaning that can be woven out of ordinary natural events when these are interpreted in materialistic terms that the scientific society (as epitomized in the Soviet Union) must be frankly acknowledged as possessing an effective type of dynamic or prophetic permanence. Of the four prophetic movements, that of Augustinian existentialism remains to be considered. Though many philosophers of history have claimed that Western civili zation is in decline,^0 it is also possible that the West is just now coming into its own; for it may turn out that Augustinian existentialism, which has only in recent decades begun to come into proper relationship with the other prophetic strands in the cultural fabric, will pro vide the West with its ultimate prophetic genius. This ^Cf. Burckhardt, Spengler, and T o y n b e e . 26 genius has always been its interpretation of experience 41 as an I-Thou relationship. Existentialism could never worship the Greek virtues in abstracts, but only as incar nate in a Person. Thus the philosophic reflections of St. Augustine are written in the second person, as though addressed to God. A whole new realm of meaning is revealed in existentialism. By the use of such terms as "involve ment," "freedom," "responsibility," "concern," "anguish," "forgiveness," and "commitment," a new and higher level of interpretation is reached; for these categories tran scend those of "the true," "the good," and "the beautiful" in about the same measure, as the latter, in turn, tran scend the categories of "space," "time," and "gravitation." Because existentialism tries to understand the human situ ation in its fullest dimensions, with its paradox and tragedy as well as its loftier hopes, it is richer in explanation-potency than any of the other movements. We are indebted to the prophetic genius of Augustinian exis tentialism for much of our devotional literature and for ^-See Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. R. G. Smith (New York, 1937). Although Buber is a Jew it is signifi cant that the Christian theologian Herbert H. Fanner wrote in 1942 regarding this book: "I regard this as the most important contribution that has been given to us of recent years towards the reflec tive grasp of our faith. It has already entered deeply into the theological thought of our time, and is, 1 believe, destined to enter still more deeply" (The Ser vant of the Word CNew York, 1942D, p. 26). 27 the insights of the Western mystics. Unfortunately, this movement was largely lost during the middle ages, however, in the maze of ecclesiasticism and scholasticism. Never theless, it remained as an undercurrent and reappeared at times as in St. Anselm, in St. Bonaventura, and in Duns Scotus, and later in the Cartesian cogito and in PascalTs raisons du coeur.^2 Thus Casserley is justified in his claim that If any philosophical tradition, therefore, can rightly claim to be regarded as the "perennial philosophy" of Western Europe, it is the Christian, Platonic, Augus tinian tradition rather than fthatj of St. Thomas. (Page 50) The last two decades have witnessed a renascence of Augustinian existentialism in America. By emphasizing the metaphysical significance of the unique and personal, existentialism has undercut the traditional distinction between the particular and the universal, and this has led to a revival of interest in philosophical anthropology and in the philosophy of history as sources of metaphysical insight.^ in theology this has led in turn to a shift ^2See Casserley, Christian, Part I, passim. ^Symbolic of the role played by existentialism in this revival is the painting which Hans Meyerhoff (who teaches a course in "Existentialist Philosophies") has selected for the cover of his recent anthology on the philosophy of history, viz., Pablo Picasso*s Guernica, which depicts an existentialist mood (The Philosophy of History in Our Time CGarden City, N. Y., away from the concept of religion as a body of teachings to that of religion as Heilsgeschichte.^ The European source of this concept serves as a reminder of the fact that the resurgence of existentialism in our own disillu sioned age ultimately stems from the troubled soul of the nineteenth-century Dane, SSren Kierkegaard. Originally a reaction against Hegelian rationalism, Kierkegaardian existentialism finds a deeper order of truth in the para doxes of life as it must be lived within an ailing culture. If the twentieth century has dealt a crushing blow to Hegelian optimism (as is now generally recognized), it is possible that existentialism is justified in claiming to proffer a more realistic and illuminating evaluation of man and society. If so, we face the strange paradox that an ultimate optimism must pin its hopes upon a pessimistic philosophy because of the "fruitfulness of explanation- potency" that pessimism alone can display. The philosophical problem of our century should now be clear: apparently it will be our task to test the validity of Augustinian existentialism, to examine its implications, and to bring it into proper perspective in the total tapestry of prophetic developments. Such an effort at syncretism cannot succeed if it is conducted ^Will Herberg, "Biblical Faith as Heilsgeschichte," The Christian Scholar, 39:25-31, March 1956. 29 in a merely polemical spirit, for it is only too likely to call for concessions which a pure Augustinianism or a pure science would be reluctant to grant. The synthe sis of life in a test-tube, for example, if and when accomplished, might call upon Augustinianism to concede that a living organism, once it is formed, can maintain itself on physico-chemical principles alone. Similarly, a pure science may be required to acknowledge the existen tialist implications of St. Paul's observation that "the whole creative-process groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now" (Rom. viii. 22, trans. mine), or to concede the impingement of a supernatural factor, on rare occasions, upon the natural order at some of the crucial points in the cosmic process: at the origin of the uni verse, for instance; at the origin of life; and perhaps at the origin of each distinctive biological Bauplan; and finally, of reflective self-consciousness. The Russians, as we have previously noted in connection with the prob lem of the origin of life (above, pp. 3-7), are engaged in a concerted effort to make such problems explicable within the pattern of a pure Newtonian science. If Western phi losophy can display a superior explanation-potency by pro viding a richer interpretation of these same facts within the pattern of a total tapestry woven out of all four prophetic traditions, its bid for the minds and loyalties of men should eventually prove to be the stronger of the two. In the East-West ideological conflict, however, there is danger of overconfidence. Western philosophy must never forget that the explanation-potency of Soviet philosophy rests not only upon the explanatory insights j of its philosophy of science, but upon the meaningful | fabric of its philosophy of history as well. The seriouB- | ness of the ideological conflict of the mid-twentieth century arises from the fact that it is not a contest j between a dynamic and a static culture, but between two l | prophetic and religious cultures, both of which enjoy ! richly meaningful outlooks. Trueblood has even suggested i that Marxism possesses in its Communist Manifesto and in j ; Capital its own special sacred writ (Philos. Rel., p. 162), while Karl Lowith points out that the Manifesto breathes ’’ the religious spirit of prophetism** and that Marx him self manifests a transparent messianism which has its unconscious root in Marx*8 own being, even in his race. He was a Jew of Old Testament stature. . . . It is the old Jewish messianism and prophetism . . . which explain the idealistic basis of Marx's materialism.45 In the opinion of W. T. Jones, Marxism has developed into that new religion the need | of which Comte foresaw and tried to inculcate--with ! 4^Meaning in History (Chicago, 1949), pp. 43-44. 31 authoritarian dogmas, a new revelation, exegetical writings, a cult of saints, and all the familiar appa- i ratus of worship. (History of Philos., p. 916) In short, as Herbert H. Gowen says, Communism already possesses the emotion of a religion, the faith of a religion, the philosophy of a religion, and some of the institutions of a religion. 6 If then the dialectic of history hangs in the balance ! between two prophetic cultures, it is "fruitfulness in explanation-potency" that we trust will tip the scales. We repeat: The ultimate victor will likely be that cul ture which invokes the most powerful principles of philo- I sophical explanation and thus succeeds in weaving the i j four strands of prophetic insight into the most richly : meaningful fabric of authentic truth. 46A History of Religion (New York, 1934), p. 15. PART I METHODOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHICAL EPISTEMOLOGY CHAPTER I THE PROCEDURE: ADOPTION OF TENNANT’S SYNOPTIC HYPOTHESIS FOR CRITICAL EVALUATION r- - - - - • e Hypothesis In the Introduction it was proposed that the philos opher who wishes to participate in the Mid-Twentieth Century ideological conflict must occupy the position of a synthetic thinker seeking to weave a fabric of authentic truth from the various strands of prophetic insight that are available to him. Success in this endeavor is likely to be achieved, if at all, in terms of some single, all- embracing world-hypothesis. The Argonaut who launches out in the quest for such a synoptic hypothesis will immedi ately find himself at the crossroads from which the objec tive and the subjective quests diverge. The objective quest leads the seeker to direct his attention outwards toward the things and events that occupy both space and time, to the study of science and the history of the cosmos. The pilgrims of this way are concerned, in the last analysis, not with the reception of sense data as such, but with their projection as veridical perceptions, i.e., with their interpretation (in combination with other 33 34 forms of knowledge) as conveyors of knowledge about objec tive events in an external world that is amenable to natu ral law. As we shall see, this is the way which Tennant follows, after exposing the subjective quest to an arduous critique (see below, pp. 170-lflC!). The subjective quest, on the other hand, is subjec tive not in the sense that it is of the person; for the objective quest is also of the person as seeker. It is, instead, subjective in the sense that it seeks its object within the person and not in the external world.'*’ In the direction of subjectivity, then, the quest for a deeply meaningful world outlook involves a more direct apprehen sion of reality than does the objective quest, an immedi acy that is richer than logic, an Erlebnis in which brute fact is grasped more by feeling than by conceptualization. This is the type of approach that has been extolled by such Romanticists as Goethe, Wordsworth, Shelley, and Keats, by the religious mystics, and by those sensitive souls who have sought the meaning of life on a deeper level than that of conceptual and verbalized thought. In short, the dis tinction between the objective and the subjective quests is some^diat similar to that which Henri Bergson was making *In another sense (which we shall not use) this quest might also have been called objective, inasmuch as its objects, if any, are regardeT- as interfused directly into the subject's consciousness though by the act of another. 35 between "analysis" and "intuition" when he wrote that Philosophers, in spite of their apparent divergencies, agree in distinguishing two profoundly different ways of knowing a thing. The first implies that we move round the object; the second that we enter into it. The first depends on the point of view at which we are placed and on the symbols by which we express ourselves. The second neither depends on a point of view nor relies on any symbol. The first kind of knowledge may be said to stop at the relative; the second, in those cases where it is possible, to attain the absolute.2 Before entering into the detailed study of Tennant*s pilgrimage along the way of the objective quest, it is appropriate first to briefly examine our heritage of insight from the subjective quest as it has been pursued within the prophetic movements of history. The subjective quest seeks a metaphysical reality which will lend to life a mysterious dynamic impetus and thereby unleash the bonds of human aspiration. This was the mood of Goethe, whose deep desire for reality was expressed poetically- in the words of Faust, That I may detect the inmost force Which binds the world, and guides its course; Its germs, productive powers explore, And rummage in empty words no morel3 Faust sought to attain a significant rapport with the Real through the power of Mephistopheles. But the quest can be divine as well as diabolical; and, in fact, it can follow 2An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. T. E. Hulme (London, 19li), p. 1. 3Faust: A Tragedy, trans. B. Taylor (New York, 1950), p. 16 (tart i. sc.I). 36 several diverse paths.^ In order to display from the standpoint of methodology, however, its relationships to the objective quest, we shall arbitrarily select that sub jective path which parallels the direction that Tennant felt constrained to take in his objective quest for a synoptic world-hypothesis. Along this path the subjective quest can hardly be regarded as philosophical, for it finds its fruition not in monolithic systems of thought, but in those great rev elations and intuitions which have come to religiously sensitive souls in the course of history. The synoptic hypothesis of personalistic theism, for example, is one which has developed, as David Elton Trueblood puts it, through long years of experience, as men have struggled up through the darkness of spiritism and polytheism to what has appeared to most men to be a more advanced position. The hypothesis most worth examining is not one which has been put together by philosophical glue, but one which has already had severe testing by persons more concerned with doing than with thinking.5 Trueblood reveals his respect, however, for the more philo sophical objective quest when he goes on to say that The fact that our thesis appears to be the end product of a long spiritual development in many races and peoples ^Since the present work is particularly concerned with religious philosophy, we would hardly advance our line of thought appreciably if, for the sake of completeness, we digressed into the details of the subjective quest as pur sued along the several other paths that are open to it, such as those of Freud aTO. Jung, or Ames and Leuba, or Heidegger and Sartre. 5Philosophy of Religion (New York, 1957), p. 84. 37 does not prove that our thesis is correct, though it undoubtedly makes any honest thinker approach the sub ject with unusual respect and actually tips the logical scales somewhat in favor of the hypothesis. It is not enough that our hypothesis appears at the end of a line of manifest progress; we are not satisfied until it is verified by a method harmonious with the method of science. (Pages 88-89) In short, the verification should be attempted, as we would say, by an objective quest running parallel to that of our spiritual heritage. Specifically, the subjective quest includes the view point of intuitionism, which was championed by Henri Berg son. Bergson climaxed his work in the philosophy of biology with a final study of The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, carrying the distinction between the static and the dynamic beyond the social level to that of reli gion. After giving an account of "static religion," he shows how "dynamic religion" transcends it, rising to a realm of experience of an entirely different order. He writes, We may therefore conclude that neither in Greece nor in ancient India was there complete mysticism, in the one case because the impetus was not strong enough, in the other case because it was thwarted by material condi tions or by too narrow an intellectual frame. . . . For the complete mysticism is that of the great Christian mystics. If the intuitions of mysticism find their champion in Bergson, however, the insights of revelation are championed 6Trans. R. A. Audra and C. Brereton (New York, 1935), p. 216. by such men as Reinhold Niebuhr. Criticizing the mystic for seeking the eternal within himself, Niebuhr defends an apocalyptic religion, in which the eternal reveals itself in history through the prophets and apos tles of God, and in which these insights are handed down to posterity in written form in the Sacred Scriptures.7 To the extraordinary experiences of the mystics and pro phets, finally, must be added the many "normative" reli gious experiences of the common well-balanced worshipper, which Trueblood stresses because they are nearly univer sal (pp. 148-149). The sum-total of these experiences, whether mystical, prophetic, or normative, constitutes the data of the subjective quest for a meaningful synoptic world-view as conducted along one of its alternative paths. The purpose in considering the subjective quest was to display its relation to the objective quest, since that relationship is relevant to the methodology of this study. Although we all prefer to think that philosophic method ology can be systematized like the steps in a proof from Euclid, it is actually more like the gropings of a student for the proof of a theorum not worked out in the book. In practice the process is desultory and hit-or-miss. John Herman Randall is merely expressing a truth which any 7The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. I: Human Nature, Gifford lectures: CI9^]'Ww York', ISA'S), pp. 125-127. philosopher must admit, when he frankly defines philosophy as the critical reorganization and reinterpretation of beliefs which we already possess.8 Depending upon our cultural heritage, the beliefs or prejudices to which we find ourselves clinging at first will be the preanalytic conclusions of one or another of the pathways of the sub jective quest, a "vulgate" version, perhaps, of the prej udices that are systematized in the works of Bergson or Niebuhr, of Freud and Jung, Heidegger and Sartre, or some other school of thought. William Ernest Hocking displays his respect for the subjective quest by actually speaking out guardedly in defense of prejudice, since, as he says, "the reasons for our beliefs are commonly weaker, and less important, than the beliefs themselves."9 Whatever methodological scheme one claims to have followed, it is likely then that his actual philosophic biography has involved taking the results of the subjec tive quest as a curve, so to speak, which he tries to fit, in scientific fashion, to the raw data of the objective quest.These data, coming in the form of sensa and 8Philosophyi An Introduction, College Outline Series, ed. A. W. Littlefield (New York, 1942), pp. 27-30. ^William Ernest Hocking, Types of Philosophy, 3rd ed., (New York, 1959), p. 5. l°lt is of interest to note that F. R. Tennant himself uses the mathematical analogy of curve-fitting in the last 40 percepts, present, as it were, an intricate and bewilder ing array when figuratively plotted as though on a graph. To some thinkers, indeed, this chaotic material of exper ience seems not to lend itself to any rational synoptic interpretation; despairing of success in the infinitely tedious task of finding a curve to fit, they reject the subjective quest in toto. But the scientist objects that the task need not be as tedious as this; that in cases of this sort there is a strong presumption in favor of the existence of a simple curve which will fit the data. He finds his task as a scientist facilitated by the fact that the number of general types of curves that commonly occur is relatively small. If the data fail to show a linear relationship, he will try a logarithmic or conic curve, or perhaps a sinusoidal, normal, or curve. In short, the scientist's alogical faith in the rationality of the world supplies some general hints of what he may expect to find. Similarly, it would indeed be a tedious task, as tedious, perhaps, as that of Frances Bacon's experi mental method, to find a richly meaningful interpretation sentence of his first volume, where he announces that 4ln a future volume it shall be inquired, whether the- istic theology be not a reasonable continuation, by extrapolation or through points representing new obser vations, of the curve of 'knowledge' that science has constructed:" (Philosophical Theology, Vol. I: The Soul & Its Faculties ^Cambridge, Eng., 19353, p. $65) 41 of the world if we had no hint of what pattern it might display. The tentative findings of the subjective quest, however, can be regarded as affording hints of the alter native types of "curves'* which are likely to possess the required "fruitfulness in explanation-potency*'; and per- sonalistic theism is one such "curve," as it were, which is worthy of careful consideration. The Place of Tennant's Work in the Total Methodology Because of the valuable contribution that F. R. Ten nant has already made to the field of philosophical the ology, it would seem somewhat superfluous for a writer in this area to adopt a de novo approach to his task; if he is a good empiricist, it would, perhaps, be wiser for him to build upon the foundation laid by Tennant.^ In doing *-^The late Frederick Robert Tennant (1866-1957) was, in his youth, a clergyman of the Church of England and, since 1913, a Fellow of Trinity College and Lecturer in the University of Cambridge. He held the Bachelor of Science degree from London, an earned Doctor of Divinity degree from Cambridge, and an honorary doctorate from Oxford. As a Fellow of the British Academy, the member ship of which is limited to 150, he found himself in the exclusive society of Britain's greatest scholars. With the publication of his Philosophical Theology in 1928-30 (2 vols., Cambridge, Eng.) he achieved distinction as per haps the foremost contemporary thinker in this field. Tennant's undergraduate studies had been in the gen eral field of natural science with later specialization in chemistry (and physics). He commenced his academic career with an appointment as Senior Science Master at his home town high school. But gradually the results of Huxley's attacks on religion, to which Tennant had been exposed dur ing the year he graduated from Cambridge, took hold and, 42 so, however, it is important to note how this will affect his methodology. Normally, in a de novo approach, the returning to the University, he began a period of graduate studies in science, philosophy, and theology in a search (as Bertocci puts it) ,ffor a rationale of religion which could profit from all legitimate scientific conclusions as well as withstand criticism from all avenues of learning** (Peter Anthony Bertocci, The Empirical Argument for God in Late British Thought, with a Foreword by F. k. Tennant (^Cambridge, Mass., 1938J, p. 192). During this period Tennant, having been ordained as an An glican clergyman, served the church as curate, college chaplain, and finally as rector and vicar. In 1907 he accepted appointment as University Lecturer in the Philos ophy of Religion at Cambridge, where he remained for the duration of his long life. In pursuit of his primary goal as a philosophical theologian, he somewhat incidentally attained full recognition as an eminent philosopher of sci ence as well. This is indicated not only by the fact that most of the articles which he contributed to Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics are on this subject, but particularly by tne Invitation which he received to deliver the Tarner Lectures at Cambridge in 1931, an honor which has been bestowed only upon outstanding thinkers in the philosophy of science such as Whitehead, Broad, Rus sell, Moore, and others. As Bernard Ramm points out in a chapter devoted to the exposition of Tennant's views, "Tennant'8 teachers were also men of great erudition and scholarship--James Ward, W. Johnson, the famous logician, McTaggart, and Sidgwick. Among his fellow teachers were such academic greats as Russell, Hobson, Barnes, and Broad." (Types of Apologetic Systems CWheaton, 111., 19533, p. 134) Tennant belongs to the British school of empirical philo sophical theology, which includes James Martineau, James Ward, Andrew Pringle-Pattison, and William R. Sorley (see Bertocci, Empirical Argument). His approach is that of a natural theology in the general tradition of William Paley and the Bridgewater Treatises (see below, p. 192, n. 7), although he differs sharply from these authors in the more critical temper which he displays and in his insistence on a broader teleology of cosmic scope which minimizes the significance of specific individual adaptations. 43 curve-fitting procedure described above would be used, in which the results of the subjective quest for a meaning ful Weltanschauung would be taken as a tentative solution and subjected to critical examination in terms of the cri- 12 terion of empirical coherence. In the pari passu inter play of methodology and results, one would then hope to gradually close in on the truth. This procedure would lend itself to elaboration in terms of the five distinct stages proposed by Edgar Sheffield Brightman as the "method of philosophical interpretation." These comprise "(1) preliminary synopsis, (2) scientific analyses and syn theses, (3) synoptic hypotheses, (4) verification, and (5) reinterpretation."*•"* Within the framework of this methodology, the subjective quest described above would mainly occupy the stage of "preliminary synopsis," the pre- analytic stage which "consists of a tentative intuition of the general field of facts to be studied" (ibid.). The subjective quest would not be involved in the second stage, which is scientific; but at the third stage, that of syn optic hypotheses, it would enter again, this time as an aid to the achievement of post-analytic insight. The *2The methodology of empirical coherence is discussed below (pp. 229-231) . 13A Philosophy of Religion, Prentice-Hall Philosophy Series," ed. "A. E. Murphy (Mew York, 1954), p. 117. 44 objective quest, however, would dominate the last four stages of the inquiry. It bears repeating that not every author needs to pursue this de novo approach. Whether he systematically carries his inquiry through these five stages or not, how ever, it is important for an author to recognize at which of the stages he takes his departure. The present study does not begin at the first stage ("preliminary synop sis") ; and it does not make overt use of the results of the subjective quest. Instead of using these results as a curve to fit the data of experience, as one would do at a lower level of sophistication, the present study adopts, in lieu of these results, those which F. R. Tennant has achieved in his Philosophical Theology.^ Here Tennant has already covered the first three stages (through "syn optic hypotheses") and has subjected his hypothesis to the processes of verification of the fourth stage. But Brightman's method does not stop here. Instead, he raises the question, When thought has reached the stage of verification, is it then at the end of its journey? May it finally rest? No Cbays BrightmanJ; neither in science nor in religion is there an end. No verification is completely inclu sive. There is no test that does not need retesting. Nothing is absolute short of The Absolute— the all- inclusive whole of being. Every stage of insight may l^This work includes, besides the volume on The Soul & Its Faculties, a second volume sub-titled The World, the soul, and God Tsee above, note 11, for Tennant's biography). 45 lead to deeper Insight. Every Interpretation requires reinterpretation, (pp. 121-122) Hence the present study will carry Tennant's work on through the fifth stage of Brightman's method of philo sophic interpretation, through the stage of "reinterpreta tion," and will therefore consist in a reexamination of Tennant's synoptic hypothesis in the light of current sci entific theory. Such a reworking will necessarily throw the synoptic hypothesis into the melting-pot again for further verification. Much of the fourth step will there fore be repeated again on a higher level of integration as the wealth of new data acquired since the time of Tennant is taken into consideration. Moreover, a scholar of integrity must always remain intellectually open to the posaibility that the synoptic hypothesis will fail to be verified, and that a new hypothesis will be required. At first sight it may seem rash to substitute the work of just one contemporary scholar for the accumulated insights of the centuries which comprise the results of the subjective quest. It may be said in reply, however, that in spite of Tennant's rejection of the noetic claims of a priorism and mysticism (see below, pp. 161-180), and consequently his supposed intellectual isolation from the results that have emerged from the subjective quest, it is likely that his thinking was more profoundly influenced by this heritage than he is prone to admit; for Tennant wore 46 the cloak of the cleric before he donned the academic gown. If then, as we have claimed (above, p. 39), the philosophic biography of a scholar necessarily consists in the reexamination of his prejudices, it is safe to assume that, in using Tennant*s synoptic hypothesis in lieu of the results of the subjective quest, we are far from cutting ourselves off from the heritage of explana- tion-potency that has come to us through that quest. In any case, the synoptic hypothesis at which Tennant arrives differs more from traditional theism in the cautious man ner in which it is affirmed than it does in the content of the doctrine as such. The use of Tennant may also be justified by virtue of his stature as a scholar, for which there is ample testi mony in the writings of his philosophical colleagues. Douglas Clyde Macintosh has written, for example, that Probably as good a job of reconstruction of the teleo- logical argument as has been done in recent years from the point of view of a dualistic epistemology is.to be found in F. R. Tennant*s Philosophical Theology.15 Similarly, Brightman characterizes Tennant*s work unequi vocally as **the greatest product of recent British philos ophy of religion" (p. 28). Even C. D. Broad, at the close of his extensive review of Tennant*s second volume, has expressed his candid opinion of the author by writing: ^The Problem of Religious Knowledge (New York, 1940), p. 223. 47 I must end by congratulating Dr. Tennant on the comple tion of a solid and valuable treatise on a subject of a solid and valuable treatise on a subject of perennial interest. . . . Considering how heavily Dr. Tennant has felt obliged to handicap theism by limiting religious knowledge to sensatio, he has certainly given it a very good run for its money. If a system of speculative phil osophy cannot be established by Dr. Tennant's method, I agree that it is still less likely to be established by any other. Dr. Tennant's method at least ensures those who use it against nonsense, enthusiasm, and credulity; it leads to a form of theism which is intellectually and morally respectable and in practice inoffensive; and, if one must try to explain the ultimate and formulate the ineffable, Dr. Tennant's type of conclusion is perhaps the least unintelligible explanation and the least mis leading formulation available to us here and now.*-6 Similar commendations by D. Scudder, Rufus Jones, Brand Blanshard, 6. Dawes Hicks, William De Burgh, and Peter Bertocci are cited in Raton's exposition of Tennant (Types, pp. 134-135). In spite of the thorough work which Tennant has done, however, the developments of three decades of scholarship and research separate us from it at present, developments in the light of which his study now seems to some degree outmoded. Our use of Tennant must therefore include, of course, a sympathetic exposition; but also a critical evaluation, which will utilize the large stores of objec tive knowledge (chiefly from the sciences) which have accumulated during this interim. Our topic will be devel oped, then, according to the following outline: l^Rev. of F. R. Tennant. Philosophical Theology. Vol. II in Mind. 39:476-484 (esp. 463-553) ,"6c'tober 1930 48 1. A brief description of the empirical spirit and broad scope of Tennant*s Philosophical Theology. 2. A detailed treatment of his epistemology in the light of current psychological theory. 3. A discussion of the reasoning by which he narrows down the objective quest for a meaningful Weltanschauung to the problem of cosmic teleology. 4. An exposition of his chapter on "The Empirical Approach to Theism: Cosmic Teleology." 3. A presentation of the theology that arises as a synoptic hypothesis from his consideration of teleology. 6. A formulation of the important deductions that follow from the full development of his hypothesis. 7. An enumeration of the crucial historical points in cosmic development at which these deductions are testable. 8. A detailed consideration of each of these crucial points in order to check how well the synoptic hypothesis acts as a "curve” reducing the data to a coherent and meaningful pattern. In the total methodology of the present study, Tennant’s work will therefore function, in brief, 1. To uphold the status of anthropic faith and alogical probability in the epistemology of both science and religion, and 49 2. To provide, within the framework of such an epis~ temology, a challenging synoptic hypothesis for critical evaluation. The Empirical Spirit and Broad Scope of Tennant1a study The chief aspect of our total methodology remaining to be discussed is that which the present author shares in common with Tennant, viz., his empirical spirit and the broadness of the sweep of experience to which he appeals. Henceforth our methodology will therefore be developed in terms of Tennantfs treatment of these issues. Tennant calls his work a theology; but it is such (as far as the objective quest is concerned) only ex post facto: for he sets out merely to examine forthcoming fact and, disregarding all presuppositions, to find whatever synoptic outlook may commend itself to him as the quest proceeds. As a matter of fact, however, it is a type of theism which eventually emerges as the governing principle of the quest. But Tennant claims in retrospect at the end of Volume II that the theories which emerged were, as he says, dictated by nothing but the relevant facts. That these empirically reached conclusions admit of being turned to account for the construction of an argument for the ism; that they imply certain consequences determinative of our knowledge about the world and man, and that such knowledge finds its most natural and reasonable explana tion in the idea of God: these are posterior disclosures or inferences (p. 249, italics ours). 50 Thus, however haphazardly Tennant's ideas may have organ ized themselves in the course of his intellectual biog raphy, his epistemology is formally presented in strict adherence to the psychological ordo cognoscendi. This means, conversely, that Tennant deliberately avoids devel- 17 oping his subject according to the ordo essendi, for this would commit him to the use of generalizations and meta physical assumptions before they have been established. He prefers the more cautious though arduous policy of building precept upon precept, line upon line, as it actually occurs in the knowing process. *-7This distinction goes back at least to St. Bonaven- ture (1221-1274), who used it as the differentia between philosophy and theology, and who, according to Etienne Gilson's exposition, taught that "Since philosophy starts from reason and sense exper ience, the loftiest goal to which it can aim can be no other than God; since on the other hand, theology starts from Divine Revelation, it begins with the first cause as if the order of knowledge were the same as the order of beings and it descends from the first principle to its effects." (The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure, trans. Dorn Trethowan & F. J1. SheedcNew Vork, i93bj, p. 92, citing St. Bonaventure, Breviloquium, I.i.4; ed. min., p. 35, italics ours) The ordo cognoscendi is then the "order of knowing," i.e., a philosophical approach which describes the know- ledge of reality in the order in which its elements have unfolded in the incipient stages of our experience; where as the ordo essendi is the "order of being," i.e., a phil osophical (or theological) approach which describes our knowledge in the order in which its objects have come into existence in the external world as such. 51 Tennant*8 objective quest is animated by a deep con cern for the same richly spiritual verities that many devout souls have sought in religion throughout the course of history. These simpler pilgrims have received this spiritual succour, convinced that it is not a spurious grace tfiich they enjoy; and that, instead, it affords the richest fruits that life can hope to award the seeker. But Tennant is not as easily satisfied; for he is an hon est skeptic, in a sense, and is determined to examine in his own way the reports of the subjective quest in order to learn whether, indeed, it is forbidden fruit from which these souls are nourished— forbidden, perhaps, by the canons of epistemology to which the cautious thinker must adhere. It is conceivable that the gains of theism and the noetic claims of mysticism are like the ill-gotten gold of the early conquistadors, tfiich so inflated the currency of the homeland that it brought them to the brink of disaster. If so, these pious claims will similarly meet their nemesis in the fires of history. In order to test the fibre of these claims under proper critical controls, Tennant adopts an essentially de novo approach. In a volume of over four-hundred pages he prepares, with almost infinite patience and caution, the epistemological equipment for his critique. He draws heavily upon the resources of analytic and genetic psy chology, as he has learned them from his beloved teacher, James Ward. This enables him to approach experience (and in due time the cosmos at large) under the constant con trol of the Actual, and thus to justify the claim that his quest is conducted according to the most thorough-going canons of British empiricism. Arbitrary a priori starting- points are therefore meticulously avoided, and all mysti cal experiences and ontological and cosmological arguments are soon discarded. Eventually, at the end of his first volume, Tennant concludes that Erlebnis events or brute sensa are the only data that are valid for the religious consciousness. Even under this serious restriction, how ever, he nurses no preconceived illusions about the supe rior reliability of the data which remain, much less about the adequacy of sensa alone for the validation of reli gious faith. Only after his quest is well under way does he hazard a presumptive guess about its ultimate success; and his confidence grows only in proportion to the multi plicity of interrelated events in the actual history of the quest itself which suggest that the way which he has taken will not lead him into a cul-de-sac. Finally, toward the middle of the second volume his quest arrives at its climax. If brute sense-data have up to this point survived his exacting epistemological cri tique, as he believes that they have, then the argument from design, which is necessarily derived from an objective quest and thus based on sensatio,^8 will spearhead his further advance. With all propaedeutic finally accom plished Tennant now produces the definitive expression of the grounds for his belief in a personal God. In a forty- three page chapter on "Cosmic Teleology," Tennant pursues what he calls "the empirical approach to theism" (II, Ch. iv, 78-120). Here he involves himself in an exercise in synthetic philosophy that encompasses the full sweep of the cosmos, and particularly of the cosmic background and history of life. Tennant critically evaluates the objection that man lives in a cosmic comer of chaos, he discusses "the mutual adaptation of thought and things," the adaptiveness of organic to inorganic nature, the "fit ness of the environment," the saturation of nature with beauty, and the moral and anthropological arguments. Though the knowledge yielded in such an approach can only be alogical and presumptive, and of greater or lesser degrees of probability, the quest nevertheless creates in Tennant * a thinking a presumption in favor of a theistic Weltanschauung. ^8In the absence of a distinction in English parallel to that represented in thetGreek by the suffixes, -q and -Mol (e.g.. KTi&t^ and KTtcryuoi, meaning, respectively, "the process of creating" and "the thing created"), Ten nant coins the word aenaatio to aignify "the act of aen- sing" as distinguished from senaum, "the object sensed" (I, 16n). 54 This empirical result turns his work at this point into a philosophical theology, which he then develops and tests for internal consistency and for coherence with the various other areas of experience. In later chapters he develops the implications involved in the type of limited theism which thus emerges, frankly faces its difficulties (and, in particular, those of the problem of evil), and endeavors to build a reasonable, though alogical, religi ous faith upon this basis. Tennant's work itself must be read in order to fully appreciate the spirit and scope of his objective quest. This brief review, however, will serve at least as a background for the study of his philo sophical and religious epistemology as these are presented in the following chapters. CHAPTER II THE GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY OF TENNANT: FROM PRESUMPTIVE "KNOWLEDGE" TO VERIDICAL SOCIALIZED PERCEPTION The Genetic Psychology as Pur- sued in "Ordine Cognoscendi" As the preparations are made for following Tennant in his objective quest, it is first of all important to recall what is the ultimate purpose of his quest. This purpose, as already noted, is to find a synoptic hypothesis by which to reduce the forthcoming facts* of experience to a coherent pattern of meaningful insights, and, in turn, to appropriate the emerging hypothesis for critical examina tion in terms of current scientific theory, whether psycho logical, neurological, biochemical, or physical. Before this can be done, however, it is necessary to follow Ten nant through the intricate maze of his epistemological propaedeutic and to compare his analyses with those of some theories of perception which have been developed in contemporary psychology. *The expressions, "forthcoming fact" and "forthcomang- ness," are barbarisms which appear occasionally in the following pages, since they are borrowed directly from Tennant, who often used them to express his concern for empirical data. 55 56 Tennant’s epistemology arises out of the methodology of the last chapter, which was provisionally skeptical in that it did not appeal to the results of the subjective quest for a "curve," as it were, ready at hand to fit the data. Instead, Tennant, fearing that such a short-cut would covertly import misleading metaphysical postulates, starts out de novo from the "presumptive" knowledge of everyday life and subjects this datum to a penetrating psychological analysis. Thus Tennant writes that The one fact which every school of philosophy can accept as common ground, is the existence of so-called know ledge of so-called actuality by so-called persons: what ever knowledge, actuality and persons may turn out to be. . . . There is no escape from what these prima facie facts dictate, translate them how we may. Without them, as foundation, all building is in the air. They are the sole external control. . . . Common-sense knowledge, then, shall here be used as datum and as touchstone. The deliverances of conunon-sense are called "presumptive" by Tennant in deference to their uncritical but powerful nature. He believes, however, that a critical philosophy can be soundly built even on the basis of such presumptive knowledge, although this cannot be done by means of the traditional epistemological method. This method is re garded as inadequate because it tends toward the logical more than to the psychological. Tennant objects that It concerns itself with thinking and knowing, only as perfected arts; with knowledge, as an actually or 2Philosophical Theology, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Eng., 1935- 377; t; s. ----- 57 ideally finished product; with reason, as a developed faculty.”"! I . It deems insignificant the possibility that the nature of our reason is contingent on mankind’s evolution, conditioned by relations with environment or by the fact that human selves are embodied. It is indif ferent to the individual experiences by which common or universal knowledge is actually determined. (I, 9, ital ics ours) Tennant, on the contrary, is “chary of supposing that we understand . . . knowledge--until we have learned how it came to be what it is" (ibid.). He therefore adopts the genetic psychology of his teacher, James Ward. By this approach he avoids the common error of taking "the analy- sandum as a sacrosanct infallibility" (I, lln); instead, by meticulously following the ordo cognoscendi in all its stages, he finds in the beginnings of knowledge much that illumines its later steps. "Use of this method," he writes, "will be found to reveal metaphysical assumptions lurking unsuspected in what are taken for data" (ibid.). At the same time, while utilizing the method of genetic psychol ogy, he carefully avoids committing the genetic fallacy by coupling with it the method of analytic psychology and acknowledging the epigenetic character of the fully devel oped concept. The first step in the development of a genetic psy chology is the recognition that "self-consciousness" is "the primary crude datum" of presumptive knowledge, and in this respect, at least, Tennant belongs to the Augus- tinian tradition (I, 13). He explicitly accepts the 58 Cartesian cogito, interpreted not as consciousness alone, but as awareness of consciousness, as the ultimate con cept that furnishes philosophy with its starting-point. Consciousness as such is not pure datum, but the first analyticum. In introspection consciousness is revealed as that species of Erlebnis (*lived-through event*) denoted by such gerunds as "perceiving," "enjoying," "thinking," or "sensatio." all of which have in common a characteris tic quale. But consciousness is not pure awareness; for there are various modes of experience vrtiich can be dis tinguished within it: the affective, the conative, and the attentive. According to Tennant Feeling and conation may be regarded, respectively, as the passive and the active side of interest: i.e. of the fact that the subject's states have a difference made to them by its interaction with objects. Such interest will be found to prompt and direct cognition, at all stages after approximately bare sensatio, and to become increasingly evident as cognition advances to the intellectual level.(I, 26) This "interest" soon becomes distinguishable as "attention," which Tennant regards as "the source of all cognition" Cl, 28). But attention is erlebt as activity, as process. When the higher stages of the knowledge-process are studied, analytically and genetically . . . it becomes evident that knowledge cannot be accounted for, save in terms of selective and synthetic operation. Psy chologically regarded, experience is rapport. not time less or static logical relation, between subject and objects; experience is not only change, but also inter action. (I, 29) 59 Thus the barest percept is in part a creation of the active mind. The psychological evidences suggest that sense and understanding have a common root, and that even in the most primitive stages of sensatio, there is incipi ent active thought; or that there is no such process as pure sensatio, nor such a thing as a pure sensum or a pure Humean impression. From the very first sensatio is ger minal perceptio, i.e., ’’ the actual process commonly called sense, is from the first possessed of the promise and potency of thought” (I, 37). Thus the knowledge process forms an unbroken continuum from the simplest sensum to the boldest concept of all--the synoptic hypothesis of God. As the impression is the kernel of the developed per cept, as there are no images not derived from percepts, and as it is through images that ideas are mediated, we can now see the truth in the assertion that there is nothing in the understanding that was not previously in the senses . . . save the mind itself. (Ibid.) If, then, this union of sense and active thought should persist and form a continuum without an hiatus through all of the stages in the genesis of knowledge, Tennant's conclusions can, perhaps, be anticipated: he will have to concede that only one mode of knowing is vouchsafed to man. All forms of noetic immediacy will then be suspect, and only the discursive knowledge of the objective quest will survive. In particular, rationalism and mysticism will wither away in the heat of his critical insight; and active sensatio alone will remain to bear the 60 full burden of his theistic argument. If God is a Mind, as the subjective quest has avowed, and if sensatio turns out to be the only basis for knowledge of other minds, whether human or divine, as it is for knowledge of the world, it follows, then, that an empirical theology will be concerned to examine the active nature of sensatio, to carefully trace from it the genesis of knowledge, and to evaluate the role of anthropic interest within the know- ing process. What then is sensatio; or better, what are sensa, the objects of sensatio? Tennant replies that The only connotational statement that can be made from the standpoint of psychology, is that the sensum is that element in the objective irtiich may be said first to break in upon the experient. (I, 36) Denotatively, sensa of several kinds may be enumerated (I, 35-36): 1. Sensa elicited by stimulation of the visual, auditory, and other special sense-organs. 2. Sensa elicited by the physiological condition of the body, such as aches, fatigue, and nausea. 3. Sensa of motor presentations. 4. Sensa of a spurious nature, such as the retina1s own light, or that of a bump on the head. Sensa have form and character in and of themselves. In particular, they have quale and intensity, protensity and extensity (if the latter two are defined as incipient foxms 61 of the temporal and spatial extension of public or "social ized” conception). Sensa are not discrete, for as Tennant rightly suggests, The distinctness, which mature experience can attribute to its impressional elements, is due to acquired pro ficiency in differentiating what is first given as a continuum. Developed perception is a complex act, conditioned by previous experience and involving synthetic operations, of which, in the act of perceiving, the percipient is unaware. . . . We are told that a man bom blind, but later becoming possessed of sight, needs to learn to perceive "things" visually. We are also told that the capacity to form a complete percept lapses in certain diseases, when auditory or visual memory is lost, al though the sense-organs remain sound.Cl, 38 and 46-47) Just as sensatio involves incipient perceptio, so also the latter, which generally occurs only in the here and now, involves some incipient interpretation. In this way there develops a third process, that of imaging, which rises in part to the level of "a psychologically condi tioned function: it is dependent on attention as well as on previous impressional presentation" (I, 57). In this respect it transcends the here and now. The next stage in the development of cpnscious content is the transforma tion of the sense-bound memory-image into the generic image, which possesses a salient core, corresponding to the common character istics of a class, together with a vague and inconstant margin, corresponding to the specific features of indi viduals (ibid.). Then through a process of "illusion or error," of "trial and failure," the sense-free idea is bom (I, 62). 62 Finally, by the "mediation cf intersubjective intercourse and language" (I, 67), these ideas, which at first belong to subjective, individual experience, are "socialized” and thereby projected to refer to the Objective World.^ Ten nant sums up his psychological argument for the genetic continuity of the knowledge process as follows: It is no question of which came first, perception of bodies or self-consciousness, in finished form like hen and egg; but of pari passu development. The distin guishable factors of sense and understanding were there from the first. Thus was provided the basis from which individual experience may rise to the ejective stage, and so to social intercourse. Knowledge of the self, of other selves, and of the world, advance together from a vague and humble first stage, by reacting each on the other. (1, 69) The Crucial Role of Self-Knowledge and Anthropic Faith in Bipolar Philosophy If, as Tennant believes, the development of each fun damental type of knowledge, whether of self, of other selves, or of the physical world, occurs in a pari-passu advance, it follows that an incipient knowledge of self is relevant to that of the world, so that the objective quest should begin, paradoxically, with an introspective study of the self, or person. From the standpoint of genetic psychology, knowledge of the self begin? with that type of coenaesthetic sensatio by which one's body is dis tinguished as being uniquely his own. "The first crude ^Tennant uses the small and capital initials to refer, respectively, to the private and to the Common worlds. 63 notion of the self," writes Tennant, "is that of the bodily self" (I, 71). Self-consciousness must then be regarded as a second stage, arising out of consciousness. As this development continues we also find that Our first crude notions of permanence, unity and indi viduality, implicit in the synthesis of the complex per cept , were derived from early experience of our bodily selves, [jand, as Tennant adds^ , so too is that of force or activity. (I, 49) These epistemological relationships can best be under stood within the framework of the bipolar theory of the person, which Tennant inherited from Fichte by way of his teacher, Ward. This theory has been more explicitly devel oped and expounded by Paul R. Helsel, an American person- alist who is also an authority on Tennant. Bipolar philosophy recognizes, as the name suggests, a polarity of subject-object relationships on various levels in nature and within the person. Thus Helsel regards the self, for instance, as a dual-unity, a concept to be sharply dis tinguished from that of a simple dualism. As empirical "Process and Person," unpub. MS (Los Angeles, 1934). Paul R. Helsel (1893- ) was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southern California. Originally a mem ber of the clergy in the Free Methodist Church, Dr. Helsel later served in the educational program of the church and eventually became the president of the Los Angeles Pacific College. Turning to the study of philosophy in later life, he retained a strong interest in the philosophy of religion while becoming an authority in Greek philosophy as well. He is author of the chapter on "Early Greek Moralists" in A History of Philosophical Systems. ed. Vergilius Ferm (New York, i$5b), pp. 8^-92, and of several articles in 64 evidence for this paradoxical distinction he notes that in human experience a type of ambivalence is often found, which has frequently come to expression in literature. In Plato this ambivalence occurs in the story of Leontius, who came one day upon some corpses of men recently executed. Leon tius was torn between a morbid curiosity which encouraged him to run and gaze upon the corpses and, on the other hand, a dread and abhorrence which tended to draw him away (Rep, iv. 439E). In the Hebrew-Christian prophetic tradition the classic example is that of St. Paul, who finds within him self both a spiritual and a libido (<T ctp K (~ K oq ') mind or disposition (<p p o V Jp / 4o i ). "For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do" (Rom. vii. 19, R.S.V.). In Shakespeare this ambivalence is drama tized in the King’s lament over his murderous act: "Pray can I not, though inclination be as sharp as will" (Ham. III. iii) ; and in Goethe it appears in Faust, who cries, Two souls, alas! reside within my breast And each withdraws from, and repels, its brother. (I.ii) The Personalist. His most notable contribution, however, is a book entitled "Process and Person," an important manu script still unpublished, which traces the rise of bipolar philosophy from the Greeks to the present day and develops its insights further in the direction laid out by Tennant. Although Helsel's work falls within the general tradition of Bowne, Brightman, and Flewelling, his interest in Ten nant has led him to a position that is critical of the rem nants of rationalistic theology lingering still in the orthodox expressions of personalism. Because the present author was a student under Helsel, this work will be devel oped, especially in its critical phases, in terms of an ascending sequence of bipolar levels of reality (see below, p. 233, Fig. 2). Helsel is particularly impressed by the fact that it is always two souls, as it were, in conflict, and not a Manichaean struggle of the soul against the body. Such a traditional dualism would misrepresent the empirical situation by opposing two incoordinate factors to each other. A theory which regards the self as a dual-unity, with subject-object relationships on two, or even three, distinct levels corrects this error by referring the given ambivalence entirely to the second bipolar level, where the factors involved are coordinate. The levels in ques tion then become 1. The first bipolar level of subject-1 and object- world (with the body part-and-parcel of the latter); 2. A second bipolarity in which the subject itself appears as a dual-unity of Subject-I and Object-Me on the noumenal level; and 3. A third bipolar level, that of the Divine, whose consideration is premature at the present stage of the ordo cognoscendi. In terms of the levels of this bipolar schema, Ten nants contention that Our first crude notions of permanence, unity and individ uality, . . . force or activity . . . were derived from early experience of our bodily selves (I, 49) implies that the subject-object, or rather, the subject- body relationship on the first bipolar level conditions the development of the second bipolar level, that of Sub ject- I and Object-Me. Moreover, our knowledge of the Objective world, which is only achieved at an advanced stage in the ordo cognoscendi. is strongly conditioned in turn by the nature of the Subject-I and Object-Me. This follows necessarily from the fact that sensatio— the basic source of knowledge— occurs within the dual-unity of the self by virtue of the Subject-Object relation at the second bipolar level. This fact is underscored by Tennant when he quotes from Kant (Tennant, I, 93-94), who, in his first Critique, refers to Mthe thinking 'I* (the soul) . . . from which all other existence must be inferred” and who, regarding this Ego, asserts that It does not know itself through the categories, but knows the categories, and through them all objects . . . and so through itself.5 In thus declaring that f,the thinking I" knows all objects through itself, Kant is anticipating the work of Fichte. As Tennant and Helsel both admit, however, this is but a passing insight which Kant deserts later, omitting it, for example, from his second edition of the Critique. On the other hand, Fichte's commitment to this principle is unequivocal. He boldly asserts "the identity of the 5Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman kemp Smith (London, 1958), p. 365- 67 r conscious subject with that of which it is conscious." Fichte develops what he calls the procedure of WLssenschaftslehre ftrtiiclO requires each one to note what he necessarily does when he calls himself, I. It assumes that everyone who really per forms the required act, will find that he affirms him self, or, which may be clearer to many, that he is at the same time subject and object. In this absolute identity of subject and object consists the very nature of the Ego. In the terminology of Helsel, both Fichte and Kant (in his first edition) may be regarded as here referring to the principle of dual-unity as it is manifested on the second bipolar level, i.e., on the level of the spiritual self. Tennant feels that this insight is profoundly signifi cant, for, as he says, It means that the world is intelligible only when it is interpreted, and interpreted in terms of what the human ego, at its level of self-consciousnesf, knows itself to be— not phenomenally but noumenally Csecond bipolar leveX) : that all other knowledge is mediated by cate gories that are not thrust upon us ab extra but emanate from us, their source and their paradigm: that these categories are not endowed with necessity absolute and a priori, but with expediency dictated by empirical or Actual conditionings. . . . There can be no knowledge that is not derived from the interpretative faith of homo mensura in commerce with his world-environment: theestablishment of the Actuality of the perduring sub ject of personal experience . . . is the laying of the foundation of the philosophy concerning the self, the world and God, in which our pursuit of the ordo cognoscen- di, and its empirical method, will issue.(I, *13-94; 6Werke, ed. I. H. Fichte (1845-46), II, 382, quoted in English trans. in Robert Adamson, Fichte. Philosophical Classics for English Readers, ed. W. Rnight (Edinburgh, 1901), p. 149. 7II, 441-442, in Adamson, pp. 156-157. In this quotation there are several significant expres sions: "the human ego [ [ a s ) ] paradigm,” "expediency C°^3 empirical . . . conditionings,” and "the interpretative faith of homo mensura." Each of these serves to emphasize the fact that our knowledge of the world is mediated to us through the "spiritual" self as though through a glass. Obviously, then, our knowledge is conditioned by the Kantian categories; but whereas according to Kant's rationalism the categories are merely given in the intel lect or "understanding" as though they had no history, it was Tennant's genius to regard them as creations of the self within itself, and to trace their historical genesis in individual experience. In Tennant's words, It is from our knowledge of self that our fundamental categories of identity, continuance, substance, causal activity, end, in terms of which we "know"--i.e., inter pret— the world are derived. (I, 127) The anthropic origination of the "real" categories, is fact” That they involve analogy, bespeak precipitancy and venture at the first, express belief rather than knowledge coming up to the formal standard, reflect man as well as the non-ego over against him, is also fact, from which neither logic nor science nor intellectual- istic philosophy can get away. (I, 176, italics ours) If Tennant is right in stressing the fact that our understanding of space, time, and the "real" categories is dependent upon the earliest development of the self, and in particular, of the self on the second bipolar level as it advances from bare selfhood towards richness of person ality, it is then of utmost importance to understand not 69 only the role of our bodily selves in conditioning this development, but also the role of our concourse with other selves. For Tennant observes that the development of per sonality proceeds by the process of "observing, imitating and understanding (i.e., establishing sympathetic rela tions with) other selves" (I, 74). It follows then that our knowledge of the external world, since it is mediated by the categories, is also tied in with the pari passu development of our knowledge of self and of other selves. For prior to intercourse with other selves, our concepts of space, time, and the categories can only give rise to a subjective world of objects (spelled with lower-case "o"). An Objective (capital "0") world is known only as our experience is compared with that of others by means of gestures, or language, or shared activity. The Objects of such knowledge Tennant distinguishes as "epistemological," and not "psychological," as common or "socialized," rather * ft than private. They alone refer to the Actual world. Hence, to the lover of Truth, socialized Objects are of supreme concern; and, because of their dependence upon human fellowship, such a concern leads in turn to an inter est in the problem of "neighbor knowledge." Tennant1s brief discussion of the epistemology of neighbor knowledge is critically examined elsewhere (below, 8I, 20-21, 33-35, and 163-166. 70 pp. 117-123). At present it is sufficient to indicate that he holds to the analogical theory. Just as we come to know our own self at first through our bodily self, so also we see the bodies of other persons acting as our own bodies act. The analogical inference by which we read in, so to speak, another self into each extraneous body is at first implicit and rudimentary. But so is the ejection involved in incipient perception; in this respect the two are on equal footing. In the words of Tennant, All presumptive knowledge, common sense and science, rest on an assumption tfiich each of us has to make, but for which no strictly and coercively logical proof is forthcoming. It is the assumption that ejection of that subjectivity erlebt by one*s self, into bodies behaving like our own, yields knowledge, and knowledge such as we do not attain, in the first instance, by any other way. (I, 74) Such analogical ejection is pragmatically verified beyond measure in actual experience. The chief point, however, is that there are two profoundly significant facts implied in these considerations, via., 1. That if socialized Objects presuppose, as they do, dialogue with other selves, then all developed know ledge is conditioned, or as Tennant says, "infected" (I, 164n), by the selfsame principles that condition our neighbor knowledge, and that a fortiori our knowledge of a Cosmic Mind is likewise conditioned; and 9The application of this important principle in religious epistemology is, of course, the chief reason 71 2. That these principles for knowing other minds, like those presupposed by the categories, involve "postulation or faith-venture" (I, 298), and are therefore alogical, probabilistic, and teleological. or in sum, anthropic. Never again can these principles be justly scorned, far The rationalism or intellectualism that would oust the teleological from knowledge, and contrast its own "know ledge" with such "mere belief," subsists, (a8 Tennant put8 it) , only by gnawing its own vitals. (I, 74) What applies to the teleological also applies, in this case, to the analogical, alogical, and probabilistic (which for convenience, will be collectively referred to in the following pages as the principle of anthropic faith). This faith is basic not only to religious knowledge, but to all knowledge whatsoever (except that of the mind itself). To demonstrate this one proposition is Tennant*s chief aim in the bulky first volume of the Philosophical Theology; and it is to the principles involved in anthropic faith that he appeals in his second volume as he develops his empirical approach to theism (II, Ch. iv). If such interpretation promises anthropomorphism, CTen- nant suggests}, it need be but in the sense in which anthropomorphism has already been represented to be the inevitable mould in which all human thought is cast, and by which it is shaped from first to last.(I, 127) for its establishment in the first place; and accordingly, it will be invoked and discussed at appropriate places in the remainder of this study. CHAPTER III THE ANTHROPIC ROOTS OF INCIPIENT PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE The Biological Factors that Condition sense-Perception The previous chapter was devoted exclusively to the exposition of Tennant*s psychological approach to episte- mology. In line with the primary purpose of this study, which is to document Tennant*s position and subject it to critical evaluation in terms of current scientific theory, it is appropriate at this point to turn from the task of simple exposition to that of critical examination. In par ticular, the next two chapters will be devoted to an exam ination of the epistemology of Tennant*s first volume (and its emphasis upon anthropic faith) in the light of current knowledge in the fields of physiology, neurology, and psy chology. Tennant is concerned to show that the intuitions of space, time, and the categories of the understanding are not innate, but that they originate in sensatio. In other words, they develop on the second bipolar level under the conditioning influence of the body on the first bipolar level, i.e., of its physiology and anatomy. Probably the 72 73 most obvious anatomical feature of an organism that could influence the growth of the mind is its size. Tennant dis cusses the effect which distinctions of size exert upon the delineation of the rather arbitrary category of "thing- hood." He repeats the common observation that what would be a formidable thing to a gnat would hardly be a thing at all to someone the size of a man. It would either appear as but a part of some more imposing thing, or else it would escape his notice altogether.^ Pierre Lecomte du Nouy offers a fresh illustration of spatial relativity by supposing a mixture of black and white powders. On our scale of observation the mixture is perceived as a fine gray powder; but to a small insect it can only be perceived 2 as a conglomeration of black and white boulders. Besides the relativity of size there is also that of time-tempo, which conditions the development of the mind. "An explosion, e.g. is one event for a man; though, for a tiny gnat, it may be a series of intermittent breezes," writes Tennant, who then concludes that "Possession of one natural tempo restricts us to one mode of viewing the course of Nature” Cl, 48). The primary problem in swatting ^Philosophical Theology. 2 vols. (Cambridge, Eng., 1935), I, 4^-48. This same point is made by Brand Blan- shard (The Nature of Thought. Library of Philosophy, ed. J. H. Muirhea'd' [London, 1535J, I, 131-132). 2Human Destiny (New York, 1947), pp. 10-11. a fly Is the difference in time-tempo between the two antagonists. At the other extreme are the movements of plant8, which were scarcely noticed at all before the tempo discrepancy was corrected by the advent of time- lapse photography.^ Lecomte du Nouy again offers a fresh approach by correlating the tempo of time as our conscious ness perceives it with the MageingM of the processes of metabolism.^ In particular, he has established by means of studies of the rate of cicatrization of wounds that "biological time,” as he calls it, follows a hyperbolic and not a linear law, which means that for a child of ten whose parents are forty years old "one year will represent for the child about the same length of time as three or four years for the parents" (Biological Time, p. 168). Lecomte du Nouy is thus proposing that the general proc esses of metabolism be regarded as a version of Arthur S. Eddington's "entropy-clock."^ The biochemistry of this "clock" can be altered artificially by the use of halluci nogenic drugs (see below, pp. 99-102), which interfere with ■^Whether plants are conscious of their own movements is a controversial issue which we by-pass here. ^Biological Time (London, 1936). This work is briefly summarized In H. ft. Hk*ay and K. White, "Organisms as Phy sico-chemical Machines," New Biology, ed. M. L. Johnson and M. Abercrombie, No. 16, pp. fcl-83, April 1954. sThe Nature of the Physical World, The Gifford Lec tures ; T g T TTNew " V o r k ,1 9 2 7 ) , p. 1 0 1 . 75 the oxidative processes in the brain and, among other things, cause the experience of time to lose its signifi cance. In his review of mescal intoxication Heinrich Kluver writes There may be e.g. "no time1* or "eternity1* or "a large, empty hole." A given period may appear infinitely long or short. The time for answering a simple question may appear to extend over hours.6 The research psychiatrist, Keith S. Ditman, of the Univer sity of California at Los Angeles, reports that while lis tening to Bach under the influence of the drug lysergic acid, he could always find time to follow its every nuance and to think as much as he wished about each phrase before it was gone. Several cases of the attenuation of time Q are also cited by Paul Schilder. The time-tempo is conditioned not only by biochemical factors, however, but by electrical factors as well. According to a cybernetic theory of Warren S. McCulloch, the tempo is closely correlated with the OC-rhythm, a peri odicity of ten waves per second that is regularly picked Q up by the electroencephalograph. He believes that this Mescal, Psyche Miniatures, G.S., No. 22 (London, 1928) ,-prrw. 7 Interview with the author, Spring, 1957. ®Minds Perception and Thought in Their Constructive Aspects ’(Mew VorV . 13427; pp. 3 2 1 -2 2 2 .------------------------------------ 9»*Why the Mind Is in the Head," in Cerebral Mechan- isms in Behavior, ed. L. A. Jeffress (New York, 1951), pp.' w -st :------ rhythm reflects the existence of a scanning device similar to that of television, in which many banks of relays in the brain are successively activated. The stroboscopic lamp, which illuminates a screen in a series of flickers at rates that are nearly the same as that of the Ct-rhythm, yields evidence in support of the scanning theory in that it breaks up perception into a maze of patterns and colors that are different for each observer.^0 Presumably these are artefacts caused by the fact that each flash of illu mination occurs at nearly the same phase of the scanning cycle and the mind is thus deprived of the sensory data of the other phases. The image which it builds is conse quently a fragmentary one. If further research should substantiate this theory, it would serve to show how thor oughly the apperception of time is conditioned by the ct- rhythm that a given organism possesses by chance as a heritage from the past. If size and time-tempo are among the factors which “anthropically” condition the structure of an organism*s mind and the categories that develop within it, it is true a fortiori that these are conditioned by its sensory appa ratus as well. Referring to this apparatus Tennant points out that *"°J. R. Smythies, Analysis of Perception, International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method (New York, 1956), pp. 68-74. 77 In different creatures this . . . depends, perhaps, on reliance upon one sense, rather than another, as pri mary. . . . In canine metaphysics doubtless the sub stantial is that which smells. (I, 48 and 49n) Ideally, a genetic study of the factors which have condi tioned sensation and the development of mind should go back beyond psychology to its phylogenetic roots and trace the beginnings of the knowledge process through all the stages in the history of life. Since the history of life, or phylogeny, however, is often studied indirectly through the science of systematics,^ it is necessary to cite, in lieu of a detailed phylogenetic study, only a few sugges tive cases from contemporary zoology to show how the incip ient mind, in its diverse manifestations, is conditioned by specific features of the organismTs anatomy. The development of the eye from the primitive non- 1 2 directional pigment spot of Euglena' 1 ' to the wide-angled fovea of the hawk is an interesting illustrative case. The "television" eye of Copilia. for example, lacks a two- IVrhe most notable case in point is that of Rensch, whose peerless effort to explain the evolution of the higher categories on a scientific basis is documented largely from the field of systematics (Bernhard Rensch, Neuere Problem® der Abstammungslehre, 2. stark veranderte Auf 1. CStu't't gart, 195'4y).---- ------ ^2Ralph Buchsbaum, Animals without Backbones (Chicago, 1938), pp. 39-40. 1 78 1_3 dimensional retina. Through its single pigmented recep tor cone, it constructs a perceptual field from the im pulses that are focused upon it by a lens which rapidly scans the field of view. The simple directional eye of Planaria constrains its owner to interpret differences in intensity as the confusing product of distance and angle (Buchsbaum, pp. 118-119). The compound eye of the insect affords a clear perception of very little, if anything, that lies in its field of view except those parts which are moving. Thus the chief visual relations which it knows are dynamic (ibid., p. 247). On the other hand, the sensi tivity of the bee to the polarization of sunlight adds a 14 new dimension to the visual sense. The Anablep fish, with its double eyes, learns to fit together somehow the 15 above- and below-water visual spaces; and the Archer fish develops a space apprehension which spreads out or dilates the space above the water to compensate for refrac tion and relegates to a secondary status the segment of 13S. Exner, Die Physiologie der facettirten Augen von Krebsen und Insecten (Leipzig und Wien, 163l). quoted in J. S. Wilkie. *rtie Science of Mind and Brain. Hutchinson's University Library: Psychology, ed. J. C. Flugel (New York, 1953), pp. 30-32. ^Karl v. Frisch, Aus dem Leben der Bienen. 5. Aufl., VerstSndliche Wisaenschaft, Band 1 (Berlin, 1953), S. 85- 86, und 98-101. *-5C. W. Coates, "Anableps,” Encyclopedia Americana, 1955 ed., s.v.; and G. K*. Noble, 'The Tow-eyed Fish," Natural History, June 1935, pp. 34-36. 79 small-angle surface reflections that intervenes between the two hemispheres of its veridical perceptual world. The blind cave bat has a keenly developed auditory space, perceived through sounds of such high frequency as to pro- 1 7 vide, conceivably, the analogue of color. In man the problem of constructing a visual space from the impressions received in the brain may at first seem deceptively simple. It is fortunately true, according to Charles Herbert Best and Norman Burke Taylor, that There is a point to point projection of the retina onto the striate area. The cortical cells, for example, are conceived as receiving individually impulses from single cones to form a pattern corresponding to that of retinal organization.•*-8 But problems begin to appear when it is discovered that the striate area itself is of distorted shape, folding over the lip of the occipital lobe and down into the cal carine fissure, and that the area which maps the macula occupies, as Gordon Holmes puts it, "a relatively very ^ T. Gill, "The Archer-Fish and Its-Feats," Smithso nian Miscellaneous Collections, Vol. LII; Quarterly Issue, 5^:277-286, March 25, 1909; and H. M. Smith, "The Archer Fish," Natural History, June 1936, pp. 2-11. 17D. R. Griffin and R. Galambos, "The Sensory Basis of Obstacle Avoidance by Flying Bats," The Journal of Experimental Zoology* 86:481-506, April 1941; and k. Galam- bos and D. R. Griffin, "Obstacle Avoidance by Flying Bats: The Cries of Bats." ibid.. 89:475-490, April 1942. l®The Physiological Basis of Medical Practice, 6th ed. (Baltimore, f e , p. 1 1 7 1 . -------------------------------------- BO much greater portion of the striate area than peripheral parts” of the field of vision occupy.*9 According to Wilkie ”it is as if a powerful lens of five or six diam eters magnification were placed over this part of the retinal image.”20 Moreover, McCulloch points out that, as regards the field of vision of the retina, ”its cor tical replica is bisected by a line down the middle of the field and the halves mapped far asunder” (Cerebral Mechanisms, p. 53). Obviously, the mind has an elaborate series of corrections to make in building up an Euclidean space from this data. The problem is further complicated by the fact that sensa of other modalities than the visual are also present; and that the actual nerve impulses arriving at the brain are practically identical in nature regardless of their modality, consisting of rapid volleys of equal pulses, frequency-modulated according to inten- 21 sity. Their modality seems to depend not upon the qual ity of the impulses as such, but upon the locus at which they terminate in the cortex. Tennant believes that *9,Terrier Lecture: the Organization of the Visual Cortex in Man,” Proceedings of the Royal Society.Series B; Biological Sciences. 152:353, April 10, l$45. Cr. best anffTfrlwTTriTO, Fig. 76.6. ~ 20Mind and Brain, p. 63. Wilkie devotes an entire chapter to the problems of this paragraph (Chap. iii). 21L. J. and M. J. Milne, "Electrical Events in Vision,” Scientific American, December 1956, pp. 115-118. 81 There is no ground known to empirical psychology for assuming sensa to be discrete, or that experience begins with separate, discriminated, presentations. (I, 37) This suggests that perhaps individual sensa, as both Ten nant and Blanshard have insisted, can only be distinguished at first by implicit judgments based upon their relations to the other members of the system, and that these rela tions must be learned. The physiological basis for such learning is discern ible in the wealth of neural interconnections afforded by the large new association areas of the brain which have insinuated themselves, according to Wilder Penfield and Theodore Rasmussen, '’ between the various sensory and motor projection centers in the cerebral cortex” in the course 22 of recent phylogeny; and in the relations which subsist between the primary and secondary areas that are distin guishable in each case within the general somatosensory, 23 visual, and auditory regions of the cortex. These specific interconnections within the brain cannot be innate, since the genes which bear the heredity of the individual could not possibly carry enough information to structure it in such detail.2^ This inference receives 22The Cerebral Cortex of Man (New York, 1950), p. 3. 23Ibid., Chap. vi; and Best and Taylor, p. 1042. 2^McCulloch refers to the work of Wiener, who ”has calculated that the maximum amount of information 82 tentative confirmation from the laboratory in the work of McCulloch, who claims to have shown that the connections between primary and secondary cortex are random. By strychninizing a pin-head spot on the striate area, he was able to trace the projections of this spot on the secondary visual cortex. These projections showed up as strychnine ’ 'spikes,” sharp changes in the voltage of the cortex. According to McCulloch these spikes appeared at many points in the secondary area as if the output from each spot in the area striata were scattered at random in the secondary visual area. Hence, from any particular set of spots in the primary area there will arise by chance some spot of maximum excitation in the secondary area. Activity at this spot implies activity in some figure of spots output by the primary; hence some shape regardless of size. . . . Excitation of the spot in the secondary area is reported as a form. More over, this form, while it has a position in space, in the sense that he can point at it, has none in the visual field nor does it seem to have size there. (Page 52) It would seem, then, that any structuring of experience which occurs in the secondary cortex is specific to the individual and must be built up by the mind itself in its commerce with the world. If this is true, it is likely, then, that the machinery of thought is strongly conditioned in its development by anthropic factors; and in particular, our chromosomes can convey would fill one volume of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, which could specify all the connections of ten thousand neurons if that was all it had to do. As we have 10*-® neurons, we can inherit only the general scheme of the structure of our brains. The rest must be left to chancei' (Cerebral Mechanisms, p. 55) 83 that the basic judgments involved in learning to distin guish sensa from one another are anthropically conditioned from the very beginning. This conclusion is true not only with respect to the structuring of visual and auditory sense data, which medi ate knowledge of the external world, but also with regard to somato-sensory data, which mediate knowledge of the bodily self. It is now known that all proprioceptive impulses and data transmitting tactual, thermal, and pain sensations project themselves upon the post-central gyrus of the cortex in such a manner as to map the whole body across the top of each hemisphere of the brain (see Fig.l). This ”body-image,” or "sensory homunculus,” as it is some times called, must be distinguished from the body as such. The physical body can be perceived from the outside, like any other object, but only by such advanced processes as touching with the hands, or seeing; whereas the body-image develops from internal sensa and presumably exists, at least in rudimentary form, even in the fetus. This dis tinction is especially conspicuous when, through the influ ence of drugs or psychotic states of mind, the person feels that he has two overlapping bodies, or when the body-image is so distorted that certain members are felt to be of dis proportionate size, or located in a position different from that in which the eye sees them, or even on occasion 84 being totally detached from the rest of the body.2^ Feel ings of eerie unreality, or of being someplace else, and states in which the body seems to be an alien thing are not uncommon to psychiatry, and they serve to highlight the distinction between body-image and body as such.26 When Tennant asserts, therefore, that "the first crude notion of self is that of the bodily self" (I, 71), his Fifti It. The Sensory Homunculus — as depic ted by Mrs. Cantlie. (From Penfield and Rasmussen, p. 44, by permission of The Mac millan Company.) 25W. H. Bexton, W. Heron, and T. H. Scott, "Effects of Decreased Variation in the Sensory Environment," Cana dian Journal of Psychology, 8:75-76, June 1954; Kluver, Mescal, pp. 92-95; SmytM.es, Perception, pp. 77-78 and 90; and 6. Bychows lei, "Disorders in the Body-image in the Clinical Pictures of Psychoses," Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 97:310-335, March 1943. 26D. J. Watterson, "Chlorpromazine, Depersonalization, and Visual Hallucinosis," Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 20:20-24, January 1956; Penfield and kasmussen, pp. 173- 179; and Aldous Huxley, The Doors of Perception (New York. 1954), p. 52. rptssya* I AHOJAW -T#M6UE taS ^ Y 8-5 words must be accommodated to our present knowledge of this homunculus. It would seem at first that the body-image is largely determined by the cortical loci at which the various soma- to-sensory nerve fibres terminate, i.e., the fibres medi ating sensitivities to touch and pressure, hot and cold, pain, and muscle-sense. But the degree to which these are amenable to hypnotic suggestion would imply that the devel opment of this image is subject to conditioning by such anthropic factors as attention and concern operating through autosuggestion. A thoughtful study of Mrs. Cant- lie's drawing of the sensory homunculus (see Fig. 1) rein forces the impression that the body-image is a fossilization of the anthropic interests of infancy. The area of cortex devoted to the representation of the mouth, from lips to pharynx, for example, is twice as large as that represen ting the total body, from heel to scalp. In particular, the lips, which are significant to the infant not only from the standpoint of nourishment, but are also impor tant in that they form the centrum, as Gesell has shown, 27 for his correlation of tactual and visual space, are by far the most prominent features of the figure. The hand 27Arnold Gesell, Frances L. Ilg, and Glenna E. Bullis, Vision: Its Development in Infant and Child (New York, 1949), p. $6. The work of Gesell is treated in some detail below (pp. 130-138). 86 and fingers are also grossly exaggerated in size, and, to some extent, the foot. It is possible that these distor tions are to be interpreted as reflecting the genetic development of the infant with his shifts of anthropic interest and attention from suckling, to handling objects, and finally to walking and running (see below, pp. 114-116); and that this development is documented in chronological order in a clockwise direction around the periphery of Mrs. Cantlie's drawing. The research of H. W. Magoun on the arousal center in the thalamus reveals some of the neural patterns through which these anthropic interests condition primitive exper- 28 ience. He has shown that the '’ normal'* condition of the undisturbed brain is to be asleep, and that wakeful con sciousness arises only \rtien the cortex is primed by a diffuse volley of impulses from the arousal center. This volley, and in turn the cerebral consciousness induced by it, depend for their continuance upon a constant stream of collateral impulses branching off from the various sensory tracts. These collateral neurons are influenced by a caudally directed tonic inhibition from the cerebral cortex 28"An Ascending Reticular Activating System in the Brain Stem," A.M.A. Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, 67:145-154, February 1952. This paper is but one of sev- eral significant studies on the brain and the mind which were presented at a symposium of that title held at the Seventy-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Neurological Association in 1951 (ibid., pp. 135-198). 87 which impinges upon specific sensory synaptic relays at the root entry zone of afferent impulses from the spinal cord. This means that wakefulness itself is conditioned by such anthropic factors as interest and attention, which originate in cortical or sub-cortical centers and exert a descending influence on the arousal center. These facts are of interest to the philosopher who seeks to understand the modus operandi of the anthropic conditioning to which primitive experience is subject, since there is presented here, according to the neurologists J. D. French, R. Her- nandez-Peon, and R. B. Livingston, the possibility that these cortico-sub-cortical mechan isms might participate in such aspects of consciousness as voluntary alerting, maintenance of the aroused state, focusing of attention, vigilance or perhaps "set," and meditation or introspection.29 This cortifugal influence could then determine which sense modalities will stimulate the arousal center most intensely and alert the cortex most vigorously. In its developed form this selectiveness is exemplified in the experience of the mother who will sleep through the deafening roar of a passing locomotive and yet awaken at the faint cry of her child; while in its incipient form in the budding experience of the neonate, alertness presumably waxes and 29t»projections from Cortex to Cephalic Brain Stem (Reticular Formation) in Monkey," Journal of Neurophysi ology, 18:74-95, esp. 90, January 1955. 88 wanes in accordance with anthropic interests which affect the arousal center and thereby condition the fund of exper ience that is accumulated during the fleeting moments of wakefulness of these formative days. Thus experience, from its earliest beginnings, is anthropic, or (in the words of Tennant) "relative to homo mensura" (X, 48 and 176). The Primitive Sensory Continuum and the Differentiation of Objects The physiological and neurological factors \rtiich con dition sense-experience have been discussed, and it remains to evaluate Tennant*s epistemology in the light of current knowledge in the field of psychology, and in particular, in the psychology of perception. Taken in its broadest sense, perception may be regarded as the ultimate source of all non-formal knowledge. To this even the mystic will probably agree (as against the pure a priorist); at least this is true if the meaning of the term is extended to denote intuition or primary direct apprehension, which includes whatever extrasensory perception there may be in addition to the sensory. Sensory perception may be defined, with Brand Blanshard, as that experience in which, on the warrant of something given in sensation at the time, we unreflectingly take some object to be before us.3® 30The Nature of Thought, Library of Philosophy, ed. J. H. tfuirhead (London, 1939), I, 52. 89 Sense-perceptions are, consequently, to be classified as hallucinatory or veridical, and among veridical perceptions are to be distinguished the internal and external, or the somatic and environmental.3* Such analytical distinctions apply, however, only to developed experience, whose f,im- pressional elements," as Tennant says, are "due to acquired proficiency in differentiating what is first given as a TO continuum." It is with this continuum, then, that Ten nant, pursuing the ordo cognoscendi, begins his quest for a synoptic world-hypothesis. The value of an approach to epistemology which begins with this primitive continuum and which, in tracing the development of the mind, endeavors to remain at all times under the control of forthcoming psychological fact is now widely recognized. It is to the credit of Tennant, how ever, that in the pioneer days of this approach, some of his results were tentatively confirmed by a thinker of the stature of Brand Blanshard, who, like him, had noticed that Between the account of ideas and inference supplied by the psychologists, eager to construe their study as a natural science, and that of the epistemologist and logician, there has gradually appeared a chasm that is now all but impassable. (Blanshard, I, 13) 3*These distinctions are ably formulated and defended by Smythies, Perception, Chap. iv. 32I, 38, italics ours. Some suggestive indications of such a primitive undifferentiated continuum are pre sented above (p.80f»). 90 Blanshard then boldly adds that he has, nevertheless, set himself to bridge thief chasm. In a spirit akin to that of Tennant he writes in his Preface, I have sought to show that for any adequate theory of ideas and the thought process, psychology and philosophy must supplement each other. . . . I have tried to study the facts about ideas and reflective processes without forgetting that by far the most significant of these facts is that they are means to the end of knowledge. (Ibid.) The result is a two-volume work on The Nature of Thought, which Ledger Wood characterizes as ”a truly monumental con tribution to idealistic epistemology.”33 Because Blanshard shares with Tennant this appeal to the findings of psychol ogy, his work will be regarded as a significant source of insight to compare, at times, with that of Tennant. It is interesting to note, for example, that both of these scholars agree on the importance of the study of the infant*s sensory continuum, for Blanshard claims that any thinker who wishes to exclude all elements of judgment from his analysis of experience will have to discipline 33,fRecent Epistemological Schools,” in A History of Philosophical Systems, ed. Vergilius Perm (New Vork, 1950), p. 535. Wood continues his evaluation of The Nature of Thought by pointing out that ”Blanshardts discussion of perception is no mere reiter ation of familiar idealistic arguments; it is a vigor ous treatment of the problem of perception which takes full cognizance of realistic contributions to the epis- temology of perception . . . with full knowledge of the current pragmatic and behavioristic interpretations of ideational thought.” (p. 536) 91 himself to "inspect" only his primitive experience (Blan shard, I, 53-54). But this would require the impossible task of regressing to his infancy, to the experience that was so graphically described in the famous words of William James: The baby, [[said James), assailed by eyes, ears, nose, skin, and entrails at once, feels it all as one great blooming, buzzing confusion. Although this description is sometimes criticized as being overwrought, its exaggeration does not seem excessive in the light of the facts of anatomy and neurology which were reviewed above.33 Originally, Blanshard points out, sounds are not experienced as sounds, nor are degrees of loudness perceived as loudness. To expedience as involves a com parison, and comparisons are a species of judgment. Per haps we may add that even the experience of self is embryonic and the body-image probably consists of little more than that of the lips and some ill-defined feelings of the associated mouth and viscera (see above, pp. 83-86). Although this jumbled continuum receives nerve impul ses of several different sense modalities, it is neverthe less a scene devoid of distinguished parts. In terms of Gestalt psychology, all is ground, for no figures have 3^The Principles of Psychology, American Science Series--Advanced Course (New York7 1890), I, 488. 35Pages 78 -80 and, in general, pp. 72-88. 92 yet emerged.36 His sensory organs are equipped to receive most types of sensation from the very first; but the new born infant has yet to learn how to use them. Stimuli coming from a distance, such as light and sound, are much too difficult to interpret at this stage. Consequently, his attention is at first absorbed in the task of inter preting the stimuli which do not require projection, those which impinge directly on his body, and arouse the chemical and tactile senses. These are felt as pleasant or unpleas ant; but it is doubtful whether any distinction is made at first between the inside (organic) and outside (extra- organic) worlds. Escape from the confusion of James's primitive contin uum involves from the first, as Tennant points out, the anthropic factors of feeling, conation, and attention, 37 which condition sensatio. According to Gestalt psychol ogy the powers of perception do not emerge by the accumula tion of knowledge in atomic bits, but rather as a progres sive discrimination of particulars, or ''figures,*' from out of the original unitary apperceptive mass. It is origi nally areas of unusually intense stimulation that catch 36Emest R. Hilgard, Introduction to Psychology (New York, 1953), pp. 559-561; and Wolfgang Kohler, Gestalt Psychology. Black and Gold Library (New York, 194*7), passim. 37Tennant, I, 24-32, 164n, 175-177, and 298-299. 93 the attention and tend to be differentiated as distinct perceptual figures (Blanshard, I, 68-69). Moreover, Their conatitutivenesa of object or thing perceived, Cwrites Tennant}, is confined to the interest-determined choice that often decides which groups of conjoined qual ities shall be regarded as one individual thing* (Ten nant, I, 47) The lower animals, Blanshard notes, are endowed at birth with the capacity to discriminate objects that are of unusual importance for their survival. The baby chick instinctively discriminates tiny objects at which to peck, while the kitten similarly identifies the furry coat of the mother. The same situation holds throughout the scale of life, and he even cites some examples of primitive an thropic interests in man himself, which he ventures to call "instinctive" (Blanshard, I, 68-71). If it is true that anthropic interests condition the earliest differentiation of sensa from the chaotic con tinuum of primitive experience, it remains to determine how pure these sensa are--whether Tennant’s contention is also true which asserts that these brute sensa are in turn pervaded from the first with the anthropic limitations intrinsic to the process of perception. Clearly, when he says that the simplest sensatio is already incipient per- ceptio, he is, conversely, denying the existence of a pure sensum (Tennant, I, 36-37). In Blanshard's discus sion of the relation subsisting between the given datum 94 and the belief to which it gives rise, he agrees with Tennant that any line drawn between the two would be arbi trary, since in practice we can never arrive at a pure sensum devoid of interpretation. One does not precede the other; the given datum, or "ground,1 1 as he calls it, "comes clothed or invested with belief" (Blanshard, I, 118). What is more, as he points out, that which we sense invariably comes to us as belonging to a wider order; it carries in its nature a reference beyond itself; and this holds from the very beginning. (ibid., p. 76). Such a wider reference is present even in the purest sensum that is imaginable, viz., a pin-point of light in a pitch-dark room, which one would normally suppose to be unrelated to anything beyond itself. Yet even this is not a pure sensation; for incipient perception also occurs, as Gordon and others have shown in experiments with the auto- 58 kinetic effect. This effect reveals an element of inter pretation which soon causes the observer to perceive the pin-point as moving in a direction which is different for different observers. Moreover, if the point is extin guished for a moment and the observer is told to remember 38Leonard V. Gordon, Instructor1s Manual for the Visual Demonstration Center (Columbus, Ohio, 1950), pp. 4- Tl The autokinetic effect as it relates to personality differences is briefly discussed in H. J. Eysenck, G. W. Granger, and J. C. Brengelmann, Perceptual Processes and Mental Illness, Maudsley Monographs, No. 5 (London, 1957), pp. 42-43'. §ee also L. L. Thurstone, A Factorial Study of Perception (Chicago, 1944), pp. 23-25. 95 where it was, he will report (when it is turned on again) that it is now in a different spot. Such perceptions, though illusory, are not mere abstractions; they are seen with positions, distances, and movements that are as defi nite as those of any other object. Although these sensa are very responsive to suggestion, they have, nonetheless, as Tennant claimed, a "form and character quite independent of our subjective activity" (Tennant, I, 38). In order to explain the presence of an element of interpretation in sensations that are as simple as this, Blanshard reviews several theories and finally defends a viewpoint similar to that of Tennant, which he calls the inference theory (Blanshard, I, 86-112). It is true, of course, that the process of inference would seem to require an interval of time, whereas perception is instan taneous. But Blanshard maintains, on the contrary, that the inference neecfnot be explicitly syllogistic; it is quite conceivable that implicit inference can occur with instantaneous passage from ground to consequent and with implicit judgments at levels falling short of fully rational insight. Tennant’s words, which were quoted before, are relevant again: Developed perception, Che writes}, is a complex act, conditioned by previous experience and involving syn thetic operations, of which, in the act of perceiving, the percipient is unaware. (Tennant, I, 46) 96 The typical product of perceptio on all the levels of its development is the belief that some object is before the observer. According to Tennant such belief is intimately related to anthropic faith; for "Belief" serves to emphasize the cognitive, Che write sj, and "faith" to lay stress on the conative, side of expe rience involving venture. (Tennant, I, 297) Blanshard*s detailed discussion of belief is therefore relevant at this point (Blanshard, I, 112-120), inasmuch as it illuminates the concept of faith which Tennant is trying to develop. When he notes, for example, that belief is involved even in such a primitive perception as the taking of something to be a colored patch (Blan shard, I, 116), he is underscoring again Tennant’s denial of the pure sensum. Such incipient belief is variously referred to by Blanshard as "being under an impression," "accepting," or "taking for granted." It differs from the mature experience of belief chiefly in that there is no "consciousness that belief must go back to evidence" (ibid.). Indeed, at the stage of incipient perception, the possibility of error has not yet come into awareness. Such belief is seldom explicit, and it varies in definite ness. But it cannot exist in degrees. As Blanshard explains, probabilities can exist in degrees; but once the probability is determined, the mind makes the very anthropic decision to believe or to disbelieve (I, 117-118), 97 to perceive an ambiguous sensum as either one specific object or the other, and not as a cross between them , .. 39 both. The Anthropic Decision in Favor of Veridical Sense-Perception* Before discussing developed perception as it occurs in adult experience, there is much that remains to be said about the primitive sensory continuum and the principle of anthropic selectivity. Reinterpreting, with Bergson, these principles, C. D. Broad endeavors to make them the basis of one possible theory about the essential function of the brain. He writes that We should do well to consider much more seriously . . . the suggestion of Bergson that the function of the brain and nervous system and sense organs is in the main eliminative and not productive. Each person is at each moment capable of remembering all that has ever happened to him and of perceiving everything that is happening everywhere in the universe. The function of the brain and nervous system is to protect us from being overtfielmed and confused by this mass of largely useless and irrelevant knowledge by shutting out most of what we should otherwise perceive or remember at any moment and leaving only that very small and special selection which is likely to be practically useful. In its extreme form this view regards the mind as poten tially capable of perceiving every event in the universe 3*Cf. below, p. 149, where the mailing-tube is per ceived eTther as cutting through the trapezoidal window or as bending around, according to the decision which is finally made. ^Cited by Aldous Huxley in The Doors of Perception (New York, 1954), p. 22. 98 41 by clairvoyance. In the adult (at least if he is sane), however, the biochemical and metabolic processes within the brain are regulated in such a way that they drastically narrow down the range of perception in order to focus it upon objects that are of practical concern. But during the earliest weeks of infancy, before these processes are stabilized,^ the shut-off activity of the brain pre sumably exercises its selectivity over a much wider field of data than that of veridical sense perception alone. It is difficult to say whether or not the processes by which objects are differentiated out of this wider primi tive continuum can yield extra-sensory perceptions (by clairvoyance); it is, nevertheless, an indisputable fact that there yet remains a large realm of non-veridical per ceptual data of an hallucinatory nature which is probably 4*-The extra-sensory perception (ESP) which this inter pretation entails is taken seriously by Broad, but dis allowed by Tennant, who charges that ESP is at best a capacity "once possessed by mankind but now atrophied, as it were, . . . through disuse since the acquisition of language" (I, 73n) . It remains, in other words, merely a remote possibility. Nevertheless, when Tennant concedes the possibility that ESP may have operated during a pre linguist ic stage of human evolution, he is tacitly acknow ledging its possibility during the pre-linguistic stages of infancy as well, which is all that concerns us here. ^For a fuller discussion of the biochemical or phy siological instability of the neonatal infant and its effect upon the development of his perceptual capacities, see below, p. 103. 99 more readily available to the infant than to the adult. This theory, which Broad has borrowed from Bergson, would thus enlarge the possibilities for selection that are implicit in Tennant*s anthropic interpretation of the early development of perception out of the continuum. This effort to interpret the brain as a selective shut-off valve becomes more plausible when we consider specifically the types of non-veridical sensa which pre sumably occupy the primitive continuum of the neonate along with the veridical, and try to reconstruct the anthropic decisions that are involved in his attempts to sort them out. Since it is obviously impossible for the investigator to become a neonate himself or to obtain a report of neonatal experience, the best he can do, per haps, is to approach the problem indirectly through the study of certain perceptual disorders which arise in cases of schizophrenia and of the so-called "experimental" schizophrenias that are induced by such drugs as mescaline, lysergic acid, and adrenochrome, which serve to release the shut-off valve to an aperture as wide, perhaps, as that enjoyed by the neonate. These hallucinogenic drugs, by inhibiting the normal oxidative mechanisms of the brain, broaden and intensify the field of perceptual awareness. Natural objects take on a preternatural color, and in general there are opened up to the senses great vistas of rapturous beauty, partly 100 veridical and partly hallucinatory.^3 Aldous Huxley writes in detail of the fields of indescribable beauty which were revealed to him when he took the drug mescaline. He de scribes many classical works of art which became meaning ful to him through this experience and for which he acquired an enhanced appreciation. The intoxication pro duced by mescaline, he claims, enabled him to see the same transcendental or preternatural qualities which the artist had seen and tried to depict on canvas,^ Others who have taken this drug report that, when auditory stimuli such as music are presented to them, the phenomena of synaesthesia ^3The most common of these vision-inducing drugs are mescaline and lysergic acid. The older literature on this subject is reviewed in Kliiver, Mescal, (1928). For a brief but up-to-date review, see J. Pearson and K. Dew- hurst, "Mescaline: Apotheosis of *the Devil*s Root,*" Irish Journal of Medical Science, 6th Ser., No. 363, pp. 139-143, March 1956. Several artistic reproductions of mescal-visions are given in full color in J. Delay, H.-P. G&rard, and D. Allaix, "Illusions et Hallucinations de la Mescaline," La Presse Medicale, No. 81, pp. 1210- 1211, 25 Decembre 1949. A comprehensive monograph on this topic is currently in preparation by Gordon Alles. In a documentary 16 mm. film, Mind and Medicine (sponsored by the American Medical Association and American Psychiatric Association [State College, Pa., 1955], Part I), there is presented an actual conversation conducted with a patient who is under the influence of mescaline. The effects of mescal-intoxication on the perception of space and of time are summarized in Paul Schilder, Mind: Perception and Thought (New York, 1942), pp. 189-190, and 221-222. ^Aldous Huxley, The Doors of Perception (New York, 1954), passim. 101 may arise, in which all movements in the visual field, whether veridical or hallucinatory, appear to occur under the controlling influence of the music; or in which the / c subject may claim to see sounds or to taste colors, etc. Besides the fascination which these experiences induce there is also a sense of profound significance which they lend not only to works of art, but to many of the details of ordinary things as well. The philosophical insights which are yielded often prove to be of such lasting value that Sir Russell Brain, for instance, advises every philos opher interested in perception to take an hallucinogenic drug sometime and experience these effects for himself (Smythies, Perception, p. vii). The transformations that are produced in the body-image and in the sense of time have already been described (above, pp. 83-84). The visual field is similarly transfigured, usually in the direction of enhanced aesthetic value. This space dis tortion also affects the judgment of distances in depth which is so altered that a subject taken for an auto ride is unable to evaluate the danger from an oncoming car. Consequently, anyone who subjects himself to this type of ^Personal conversation with Keith S. Ditman, research psychiatrist, Univ. of Calif, at Los Angeles, Spring, 1957. Brief discussions of synaesthesia may be found in Kliiver, pp. 95-96; in J. R. Smythies, Analysis of Perception, In ternational Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method (New York, 1956), pp. 90-91; and in S. Howard Bart ley, Principles of Perception, ed. Gardner Murphy (New York, 1958), pp.6U and fe-6’ 3. 102 intoxication requires constant supervision in order to escape the simplest hazards of life.*-6 It is clear, then, that although this state of consciousness is spiritually enrichening, it is nonetheless dangerous from the prac tical standpoint. This fact suggests that the function of the undrugged brain may be, as Bergson and Broad have supposed, to narrow down the field of awareness in the interest of practical living, a process which, as shown above, is under the control of anthropic interests from the beginning. The experience of mescal intoxication serves to stress, as never before, the distinction between veridical and hallucinatory perception. In the words of Smythies, Sense-experience exhibits two great systems of order: that is to say it can be classified significantly in the following ways. In one the sense data are so ordered as to represent as constantly as possible, parts of the physical world. In the other, sense-data are ordered so as to construct patterns, designs, scenes and panoramic vistas of the greatest possible beauty, poetical integrity and aesthetic charm. (Perception, p. 95) Abram Hoffer, Humphrey Osmond, and John Smythies, "Schizophrenia: a New Approach. II. Result of a Year's Research," Journal of Mental Science, 100:39 and 41, January 1954; and KlUver, p. 94. 4?The experience is usually enrichening; however, it can manifest a diabolical phase as well, that simulates the hell in which the schizophrenic often lives (Aldous Huxley, Heaven and Hell [New York, 1955J, pp. 51 ff., and 100-101). 103 What experience of the latter, halluncinatory, sort the infant has can only be guessed. It is known, however, that the chemical preconditions for such experience are definitely present. For Gesell calls attention to the fact that The period of postnatal transition . . . is characterized by many physiological instabilities. The infant is sub ject to oscillations in temperature level; to wavering biochemical levels such as that of blood glucose; to reversals of peristalsis; to irregularities in vaso motor tension and in rhythms of breathing, swallowing, etc.48 These biochemical instabilities of the neonate very likely give rise to incipient forms of hallucinations, for it is known that in later years hallucinatory experience is induced not only by artificial drugs, but also by bio chemical abnormalities produced by the body itself, and particularly by excessive concentrations of carbon dioxide and of certain alteration products of adrenaline.4^ It is therefore probable that, besides the problem of correlating the sense-worlds of sight and touch (and, indeed, prior to this problem), the neonate must learn to distinguish veridical sensations from hallucinatory sensa, to recognize 48Amold Gesell. The Embryology of Behavior (New York, 1945), p. 134. 4^L. J. Meduna, ’ ’ The Effect of Carbon Dioxide upon the Function of the Human Brain,1' in Carbon Dioxide Therapy, ed. L. J. Meduna, 2nd ed. (Springfield, 111., 1958), pp. 40- 56; and Huxley, Heaven, pp. 61-74, and Doors, pp. 10-11. 104 the superior practical value of the former, and to make an anthropic choice in favor of the veridical data. As Smythies indicates, the task of distinguishing these two kinds of sensa is more difficult than a person would normally suppose: Hallucinatory experience is qualitatively indistinguish able, in many cases, from veridical sense-experience. Hallucinations are spatial and coloured entities and may possess not only a high degree of internal organisation, but may also be closely integrated into the "veridical” remainder of the visual field in which they occur. (Page 81) Furthermore, since the hallucinatory data are commonly far superior in aesthetic value, it is reasonable to presume that, if the infant has such experiences, the anthropic decision to abandon them in favor of the veridical data would be a bold one, perhaps encouraged chiefly by the attractions of the social environment (see below, pp. 117- 121). As a matter of fact, however, practically every neonate does elect to live in the world of veridical per ception. It remains true, nonetheless, that in so doing he is making an anthropic decision, one sometimes revoked in later life, as in cases of insanity. Thus at this point it is inappropriate to regard the decision as one of logical or rationalistic necessity. The far-reaching implications of this first great decision of life are hardly appreciated in the well-fed West of modern times, where the biochemical conditions for 105 hallucinatory experience are seldom realized.50 But in other cultures the issue as to which order of perception shall be taken as the Real remains a live one at all the levels in the development of thought, and particularly on the philosophical level. In this connection Smythies observes that In our culture an hallucinatory experience is usually something shameful. People who have them usually keep quiet about them for fear that they be considered mad. People in other cultures attach very great importance to hallucinatory experiences. For instance, it was the belief of the Plains Indians that a man's success in life was obtained in a dream or vision. . . . Western people in the early Christian era pursued hallucinatory experiences with an equally passionate intensity believing them to provide a direct method of communication with the supernatural world. The hallu cinatory world to these people was at least as real as the ordinary world. The traditional Hindu culture, on the other hand, regarded neither orders of experience to be real. They classed ordinary and hallucinatory experience together as "maya" or illusion. The term "real” was reserved for the immanent Godhead. . . . Thus the decision to call only ordinary sense-experience real is a local phenomenon of Western European culture. It is also contingent upon the biochemical accident that our adrenal glands happen to produce adrenaline and not adrenochrome or mescaline. (Smythies, pp. 94-95, Quoted by permission of the author.) 50 These conditions were commonly fulfilled, as Huxley points out, in most of the cultures of human history. In Europe, for example, "every medieval winter was a long involuntary fast, and this involuntary fast was followed, during Lent, by forty days of voluntary abstinence. . . . At this sea son of the highest religious excitement and the lowest vitamin intake, ecstasies and visions were almost a commonplace" (Heaven, p. 70). 106 These facts serve to suggest how profoundly the gene sis and essential structure of thought are conditioned from the very beginning not only by anatomy and neurology, but by the biochemical condition of the body as well. Thus Paul R. Helsel's frequent reiteration of the fact that the body should be acknowledged as an integral part of the per son is justified, in that its sensa, emerging from their special biophysical and biochemical environment on the first bipolar level, condition the perceptual "machinery" as it develops on the second level.On the same prin ciple Tennant’s appeal to homo mensura and to anthropic faith is sustained (I, 176); for the escape of the neonate from the bewilderment of the primitive continuum is gov erned throughout, as shown above, by feeling, conation, and special interests which direct his attention to spe cific objects within the field of awareness. Indeed, any grave distortion of these interests or bankruptcy of this faith occurring in later life becomes in due time . . . insanity. In such cases the psychiatrist will try by shock therapy to break up the abnormal stereotyped pat terns of interest and preoccupation; and if this fails, as a last resort, he will physically separate the centers ^"Process and Person," unpub. MS (Los Angeles, 1954), pp. 107 of cognition from those of affect by frontal lobotomy.52 Our emphasis on the role of special interests receives corroboration from the psycho-surgeon, Leo Alexander, who claims that such surgery facilitates the dynamic processes of denial and isolation, which he defines as Mthe removal from attention or concern of a painful or harassing prob lem. ”55 Here again the loss of creativity which follows the operation bears witness to the importance of the role which these anthropic factors had been playing in the gene sis of constructive thought. Finally, for the sake of completeness, we shall anti cipate for the moment a later stage in the ordo cognoscendi by considering the importance of interest and attention in the process of making selections from a fully developed perceptual field. The visual field, for example, includes many double images of objects located either far beyond 52This type of radical brain surgery and its effects upon the Ego are described in detail in Walter Freeman and James W. Watts, Psychosurgery, 2nd ed. (Springfield, 111., 1950); and in Leo Alexander, Treatment of Mental Disorder (Philadelphia, 1953), passim. ‘ The fact that the effective ness of this type of surgery depends not upon the inactiva tion of the frontal lobes, but upon their severance from all connections with the centers of affect and emotion is underscored by the work of E. A. Spiegel, H. T. Wycis, and H. Freed, who have produced results which are equivalent to lobotomy by making ten lesions, each 3 mm. in diameter, in the dorsomedial nuclei of the thalamus (’'Thalamotomy in Mental Disorders,” A.M.A. Archives of Neurology and Psy chiatry, 64:595-598^ [October 1950J). 5^Treatment, p. 265, italics ours. 108 the converging point of the eyes or else much closer to the eyes. Since these are only confusing, the mind finds it advantageous to ignore them so that they are scarcely perceived at all.5^ Moreover, the visual field is commonly regarded as extending over an arc of nearly 180°. Within this arc, however, the macular area of distinct vision is so small that the eye must build up a mosaic image by 55 rapidly scanning the field. Optical studies have shown that the scanning is not systematic, but is rather a sequence of fixations governed by interest; and that these fixations tend to pile up on those objects in the field that are evidently of greatest concern.56 In sum, it appears that there is much in the psychology of incipient perceptual experience vrtiich sustains Tennant in his con tention that the knowledge process is governed from begin ning to end by the anthropic factors of feeling, conation, attention, and concern. 54pritz Kahn, Man in Structure & Function, trans. and ed. G. Rosen (New York, 1^43), it, 680-682, and Figs. 406-408. 55Kahn, II, 665-666, and Fig. 395; and James J. Gib son, The Perception of the Visual World, ed. L. Carmichael (Boston, 1450), p. 16. 56Gibson, Fig. 66, and pp. 155-158. See also J. S. Wilkie, The Science of Mind and Brain, Hutchinson's Uni versity Library: Psychology, ed. J. C. Flugel (New York, 1953), pp. 28-29. 109 In stressing these alogical factors, however, Tennant lays himself open, as did Kant, to the charge that he undermines the foundations of all our ontological confi dences and plays into the hands of the skeptic. Nothing, however, could be further from his intentions; for Ten nant Ts purpose is to allay the fears of those who are pursuing the golden pot of certainty that lies at the end of the rainbow, by showing that probabilistic knowledge is all the knowledge of fact that we have; but that it is, nonetheless, good knowledge. His work thus resembles that of Immanuel Kant, who in the Preface to the Second Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason explains: I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith . . . so that all objections to morality and religion will be for ever silenced.57 In implementing this purpose, however, Kant and Tennant pursue the metaphysical quest along divergent paths; for while Kant made room for anthropic faith only in conjunc tion with the moral imperative, Tennant regards it as the very foundation of the entire edifice of human thought. Instead of exalting faith by depreciating knowledge, Ten nant discredits the ideal of certainty in both areas by showing that science, too, is rooted in faith. Having reduced both science and faith to the same "dead" level 57Trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London, 1958), pp. 29-30. 110 (as some might choose to regard it), he then proceeds to show that the level involved is epistemologically quite respectable. It is not the level of skepticism at all; but rather it is the level of the best fact-knowledge that we can possibly have. If scientific knowledge, then, is good knowledge, so may be the case, Tennant argues, with our knowledge of God as well. CHAPTER IV THE COGNITIVE CONSTRUCTION OF SELF AND OF WORLD IN THE LIGHT OF CURRENT PSYCHOLOGY The Knowledge of Self and of Other Selves as the Basis of World-Knowledge It has been clearly shown in previous chapters that Tennant’s approach to epistemology is dominated by a con cern to maintain throughout his study a close contact with the touchstone of forthcoming psychological fact. His genetic psychology in general was therefore reviewed (uncritically) in Chapter ii and his account of the incipi ent stages of perceptual experience was more critically examined in Chapter iii. Its anthropic roots were revealed in a survey of the biological factors which condition per ception and of the interest-directed processes by which objects (little "o") are differentiated out of the primi tive sensory continuum which confronts the infant as he makes his debut in the world. The neonate’s first great anthropic decision was discussed, in which he chooses to favor veridical sense data in preference to the aesthe tically superior sensa of incipient hallucinosis. Since the very distinction between the veridical and non- veridical depends, however, upon the processes of Objec- 111 112 tification (capital ”0”), which Tennant has briefly dis cussed these processes should now be examined more closely. Tennant's account of Objectification was reviewed above (pp. 62-71) in terms of bipolar philosophy. Now that the sensory experience of the neonate has been traced up to the point of Objectification, however, it is appro priate in the present chapter to subject Tennant's account of these later perceptual processes to a critical examina tion as well, and to do this in the light of contemporary knowledge in psychology. The present chapter will there fore conclude our critique of Tennant's philosophical epistemology and prepare the way for the critique of his religious epistemology. According to modern psychology the earliest days of life, before Objectification is achieved, are lived, just as Tennant maintains, in a private world filled with sensa of all sorts. At first the objects which are differenti ated out of this continuum are still private. In due time, however, Objectification occurs, i.e., the private world of objects is ejected and interpreted as pertaining to a world of Objects common to all perceivers. This process is regarded by Tennant as governed throughout by anthropic ^•Philosophical Theology, Vol. I: The Soul & Its Faculties (Oambridge, Eng., 1935), pp. 20-2l, 33-35, and ld3-l<5d. 113 purpose or teleology. Moreover, the psychological machin ery of the mind, and in particular, that by which Objecti fication is accomplished, is regarded as improvised by the mind itself through its social intercourse with other selves, which, in turn presupposes a knowledge of the sub ject^ own inner self (Tennant, I, 67-69). In the spirit of Tennant it was suggested above that the infant*s deci sion to turn away from hallucinatory sensa and to embrace the veridical was elicited by the superior attractiveness of the social environment with the loving attention that it has to offer. But according to Tennant other social selves can be known as selves only by analogy with one's own eelf (I, 72). This is the reason why, in his genetic psychology, he adopts self-knowledge as his starting point in rendering an account of the process of Objectification (I, 13 and 70). It will be recalled that Tennant's theory of the self is conveniently interpreted in terms of Helsel's schema of bipolar philosophy, in which the presence of a fundamental ambivalence within the person leads to the distinguishing of three levels of subject-object relationships, viz., the subject-I and object-world (and body) on the first bipolar level, the Subject-I and Object-Me on the second level, and the SUBJECT-OBJECT on the level of the Divine (see above, pp. 64-67). The way in which the mind on the second bipolar level is conditioned in its development by 114 biophysical, biochemical, and neurological factors has been reviewed and the role that is played in these pro cesses by anthropic interests has been indicated (above, Chap. iii) . It remains to determine, however, whether there is any warrant in contemporary psychology for such a view of the genesis of the self. It is likely that Tennant is correct in his suggestion that "the first crude notion of the self is that of the bodily self" (I, 71). Whether this primal self-conscious ness is social in nature from the very first will presently be discussed. In either case any knowledge of the bodily self must be considered in terms of the body-image which is mapped across the top of the brain along the post central gyrus (see above, p. 84, Fig. 1). The nature of this sensory homunculus, as it is sometimes called, was discussed above (pp. 83-86). Its topography is very sug gestive when examined from the standpoint of Tennant*s genetic psychology; for the geometrical sequence of the representations of the various parts of the body (as traced from the fissure of Sylvius, upward along the gyrus to the top, and down the mesial surface of the hemisphere) pre sents at the same time a reasonable temporal sequence for the order in which the parts of the body-image presumably developed in the early life of the infant. We may suppose, for example, that the chief sensa which the fetus expe riences within the womb are those arising from the viscera; 115 hence these are mapped at the beginning of the sequence within the fissure of Sylvius. The pharynx, tongue, and mouth are next in sequence, developing, perhaps, as the time approaches for receiving nourishment by mouth. The extraordinary extent of the area devoted to the lips, which follows the mouth in the sequence, will then represent the long period of infancy during which the baby is preoccu- pied with sucking. At this stage the neonate presumably feels himself to be little more than a mouth with vaguely located viscera. The prominence of the lips in the body- image is but one of the features which count against any interpretation which would allocate these sensory areas to the various parts in proportion to their importance in adult life. The genitalia, for example, which are repre sented near the toes at the end of the sequence, cover (in spite of Freud) an almost negligible area. Although indi vidual differences exist, it is nevertheless true, accord ing to Wilder Penfield and Theodore Rasmussen, that in the relative length of the central cortex devoted to any one structure, . . . the sequence of sensory responses is almost invariable.3 It is tempting to interpret this invariable sequence in terms of Tennant*s genetic psychology as reflecting the ^The sequence can be followed, with similar inter pretation, all along the rest of the gyrus. 3The Cerebral Cortex of Man (New York, 1950), pp. 24- 25. 116 invariable order in which the several parts of the body command the attention of the infant in the normal processes of maturation, and the individual differences as reflecting the special anthropic interests of the particular person. Besides the development of the body-image across the cerebral cortex, there are several other features of the brain which serve to mediate the awareness of self. As previously noted (above, p. 81), the human brain exhibits a striking contrast with all other primate brains in that it possesses several unusually large new tracts of associ ation fibres (Penfield, p. 3), so that among other things, the various sensa of different modalities may be brought more directly into relation with the sensory homunculus, and finally with the self. Moreover, the extraordinary development of the frontal-lobes, as the psychosurgeons, Walter Freeman and James W. Watts, have maintained, pro vides a unique basis for the "recognition of the self by the self'1; for lobotomy results, as they point out, in an "inability of the individual to view himself in the light of what he should be."^ Clearly, then, the neonate is well equipped for the early development of self-knowledge, since an incipient body-image, association areas, and frontal lobes are present from the beginning. Indeed, if ^Psychosurgery, 2nd ed. (Springfield, 111., 1950), pp. 505-506. 117 visceral, proprioceptive, tactual, and chemical impulses arising within the fetus are strong enough to momentarily activate the arousal center even within the womb, it is likely that the neonate has been already conscious of self for some time before his arrival through birth into the social environment. It is probable, however, that the neonate is not yet aware of the world as such, for the objects which he dis tinguishes are subjective until, as Tennant maintains, they are shared in some way with other selves. On this view, then, the understanding of the processes of ejection or Objectification is dependent upon the analysis of how we know our neighbor as a self. This problem has only recently begun to receive the attention which it deserves.5 The analogical theory of neighbor knowledge, which received 5The problem of how we know other minds was discussed in detail by William Ernest Hocking in 1912 as an approach to religious epistemology (The Meaning of God in Human Experience [New Haven, 1912J, Chaps, xvii— xxi), and in 1925 by (5. D. Broad (The Mind and Its Place in Nature. 4th Impression, International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method, ed. C. K. Ogden [London, 1947J, Chap. vii). See also the excellent treatment by H. H. Price (f , Our Evidence for the Existence of Other Minds," Philosophy, 13:425-456, October 1938), which was later critically examined by H. Dingle ("The Existence of Other Minds," Philosophy. 14:457-467, October 1939 ). This issue has finally received adequate textbook coverage by Philip Wheelwright (The Way of Philosophy [ N e w York, 1954J, Chap. xi), who appends a helpful bibliography (pp. 341- 342). 118 its classic defense in the writings of John Stuart Mill,** was rather uncritically accepted for many years; indeed, this is the theory which Tennant defends, viz., that the infant assumes from the analogy which exists between the body which he knows as his own and the bodies of other people that the others also contain private centers of consciousness with feelings and thoughts similar to those which he himself entertains. In recent years the analogical theory has been widely regarded as outmoded and in its place have been substituted the lingual and the intuitional theories of Price and of Hocking, respectively. According to Price's lingual theory (Philosophy, 13:425 f.), other minds are distinguished by an inference from language rather than from bodily behav ior. He interprets language, of course, in a broad sense to include symbolic actions as well as symbolic sounds or marks; he would probably admit, for example, the symbolic dances of the bees as valid specimens of language.7 But Price explicitly excludes mere teleological behavior (as occurs, for example, even in plants) as evidence for other minds (pp. 449-450). He failed to note, however, that the 6An Examination of Sir Wta. Hamilton's Philosophy, 6th ed. (London, \8fi9), pp. 242-245 and £5$-26ln.. 7Karl v. Frisch, Aus dem Leben der Bienen, 5. Aufl., Verstandliche WissenscKaft, Band I (fcerlin, 1953). lingual theory suffers from the same defect which mars the work of Kant, viz., that it considers only the developed mind; for Price scarcely mentions infant experience in his analysis. His theory would seem to imply that during the first year of life, the pre-lingual infant has little, if any knowledge of other minds--a proposition which most parents will deny. By acknowledging that the earliest verbal meanings are conveyed by speech intonations and not by specific sounds, the theory can be made more plausible; and this plausibility is enhanced by tracing symbolic behavior further back into infancy through the recognition of gestures and bodily movements as symbols. But in spite of this it remains quite likely that social experience antedates the recognition of symbols as such. The infant betrays his awareness that people are different from other objects at a very early age by the uncanny facility for fixing his gaze upon the eyes of his nurse, which, apart from their social aspect, are an inconspicuous part of the total physique of a person regarded as mere object. The deaf-mute and blind woman, Helen Keller, describes the occasion when, three months before the age of seven, the idea of symbolization first dawned upon her through the teaching efforts of her nurse. Yet her account clearly 8hows that she did not view people as mere things; it thus 120 reveals that social experience was already well developed by that time.8 If the lingual theory is in difficulty because social experience seems to develop earlier than the theory will allow, the intuitional theory of Hocking (Meaning, Chaps, xvii-xxi) is in difficulty because social experience, as Tennant believes, develops distinctly later than it allows, later than the awareness of self upon which neighbor know ledge depends. In answer to the question of how the infant first finds his social environment, William Ernest Hocking suggests that he is an animist from the very beginning, that his earliest sense experience is already essentially social. In the words of Hocking, The infant’s social awareness is contemporary with his recognition of sensation as the inner aspect of an outer action, addressed to him. Later he adds, "I conclude that our experience of nature is, at its foundation, an experience of the world mind."9 For the moment we shall pass by this leap to a theological conclusion, which Tennant would, of course, regard as pre mature at the current stage in the ordo cognoscendi. The ®Helen Keller, The Story of My Life (New York, 1905), pp. 22-24. The significance of Miss teller's experience depends, of course, upon how one evaluates the fact that she enjoyed a period of normal sensory experience in early infancy before her tragic illness. 9 T y p e s o f Philosophy, 3rd ed. (New York, 1959), p. 192. 121 crucial point at present is that Hocking has invoked an intuitive faculty such as that defended by Bergson (cf. above, pp. 97 - 99) which is fundamentally social in nature, and that this is offered in lieu of the two types of inference (bodily and lingual) involved in the theories discussed above. Whether such an intuitive faculty exists is hard to say, since relevant evidence is lacking; and for this reason Tennant is unwilling to build upon such a founda tion. In any case it would seem that Hocking (apart from the desire to construct an ontological argument for the ism) adopts this theory chiefly because of the alleged inadequacy of the analogical theory, according to which, as he says, the infant argues "from the analogy between his own body and that of others." There is little reason, of course, to deny the truth of what Hocking offers in defense of his position, viz., that "the infant is a social animal long before he has seen his own body" (Types, pp. 189-190); there ia reason, however, to question the belief in a special intuitive faculty which he derives from this fact; for Hocking confuses the body as such with the body-image. The body as such is not perceived from the outside, either by seeing or touching, until an advanced stage in the development of experience. But the body-image (see above, pp. 83 - 86), and with it the know ledge of self, is presumably present, in incipient form 122 even within the womb. Tennant is hardly amiss, then, when he assumes that the neonate is equipped to draw subconscious inferences by analogy with his bodily self at his earliest encounters with other human bodies. The evidence for other minds will then consist in the interpretation of their bodily behavior as purposive. It matters little whether or not the neonate feels his body to be similar in form to that of his neigh bor; such discrimination is not to be expected so early in life. Indeed, even an adult has no trouble imputing minds to organisms unlike his own, to a porpoise, an octopus, or an elephant; he is even prone to impute purposiveness to two simple squares, as Michotte has shown, when their movements simulate those of a social situation.*-0 In his reluctance to admit this teleological view point, however, Price maneuvers himself into the position of admitting that, in contrast to the case of human minds, if the lower animals do not use symbols--symbols which we can understand and which convey information to us-- then our evidence for the existence of animal minds is different in kind, and not merely in degree, from our evidence for the existence of human minds. It can only be evidence of a teleological sort, derived from obser vation of their bodily behaviour. (Page 449) His rejection of the teleological evidence, however, is based upon an argument which fails to distinguish the *-°Albert Edouard Michotte, La Perception de la Cau- salite, 2 . ed., Studia Psychologies (Louvain, 1954). 123 teleology of the creature’s own intelligence from that of his anatomical structure and instinct, which is due either to evolution, or to the intelligence of the Creator, or to both, but is certainly not due to the mind of the creature himselfIf, then, as Tennant is concerned to show, the mind creates its own categories in the process of its com merce with the world, it is also likely that it achieves its own social experience by an alogical, analogical, and pragmatic process on a par with that of perception, and similarly based on sensatio. If we may be permitted to conclude this section by anticipating a later stage in the ordo cognoscendi, we would like to point out that these three theories regarding our knowledge of other selves run parallel to the three chief viewpoints in religious epistemology. The intu itional theory corresponds to the position of mysticism, the lingual theory to that of revelation, and the ana logical theory to natural theology. It is therefore clear that the decision which is made at this crossroads in philosophical epistemology is of supreme importance in 11-In an educational film produced by the Moody Insti tute of Science, entitled HLind as a Bat (Los Angeles, 1954), this point is dramatized when, after several scenes portraying the highly ingenious instinctive behavior of the bat, the narrator raises the question of whose intelli gence is responsible for these adaptations. "Is it the bat's?” he asks, as the ungainly figure of this unlikely candidate appears upon the screen. 124 determining Tennant's position on the side of natural the ology in his religious epistemology. The Objectification of Experience on the Second Bipolar Level It is important to emphasize at this point that the self which is known through the body-image is indeed, as Tennant says, a ' ’ first crude notion" (Philosophical The ology, I, 71), and that social experience does not occur between two body-images any more than it does between the bodies themselves. Instead, self-knowledge, and with it the knowledge of other selves, rises in its development to a higher bipolar level. Thus homo mensura ascends through homunculus mensura to anima mensura. This interpretation receives some support from studies which have been made of the conscious reactions to elec trical stimulation of the cerebral cortex. Such stimula tion involves the homunculus, but seems not to implicate anima on the second bipolar level. Penfield and Ras mussen have compiled the results of four-hundred crani otomies performed during nineteen years of brain surgery under local anaesthesia, during which the patients remained conscious and reported their experiences. The surgeons' summary of the patients' reactions is as follows: What each one of them thinks about his seizure, his dis ability, or the effect of electrical stimulation of his own cortex constitutes important source material. . . . What he feels may be a tingling sensation in his thumb* 125 but he never seems to believe that something has actually touched his thumb. He is aware that he moved his hand when the electrode was applied to the proper motor area, but he is never deluded into the belief that he willed the action. . . . A neurosurgeon very soon gains the impression that in dealing with the cerebral cortex he is still, at a distance from the 'highest level of inte gration.1^ These authors point out that electrical stimulation of either primary or secondary visual cortex produces, not finished perceptions, but lights, stars, balls, colored spots, etc., in motion (p. 143). In short, only the con stituent fragments of perceptions appear; any shapes which appear are simple and unrecognizable. According to the authors, These visual phenomena suggest that, from a functional point of view, there is represented in the occipital cortex no more than elements that go to make up the final image that reaches consciousness during normal vision. The occipital cortex is obviously involved in the complicated elaboration of visual pictures that eventually present themselves at some higher level of nervous integration. But stimulation here is incapable of conjuring up such a picture. (Page 146) After a similar discussion of the auditory areas, they conclude that the responses to electrical stimulation all seem to be elementary: It is fair to say that within the sensorimotor, the visual, and the auditory areas stimulation is unable to reveal mechanisms other than those which might be called inborn. (Page 159) For the frontal, parietal, and temporal areas it seems that acquired mechanisms (if such they be) are present, but that *-2The Cerebral Cortex of Man. pp. ix-x, italics ours. 126 stimulation does not activate them, except in the case of the temporal cortex, where stimulation can elicit elab orate psychical processes, provided that the area has been conditioned by epileptic discharges. But even here the patterns at first are primitive; new memory patterns or those that reflect more recent experience can be elicited by electrical stimulation only after repeated epileptic seizures have more and more conditioned the lobes. If then the neurosurgeon, by his own admission, is operating at a level still distant from that of the highest self, there remains, of course, the possibility that the higher self could be touched by broad stimulation over large fields of cortical neurons, instead of at selected pin-points. But there is also a possibility that these facts are to be interpreted in terms of Helsel's distinc tion between the first and second bipolar levels of the self. The failure to elicit complete perceptual objects vohen operating on the lower level would then be taken as a suggestion that such Objects may exist on a level coor dinate with the Subject-I, i.e., on the second, or "spir- itual" level, of Helsel's bipolar schema. On this point, Tennant is worth repeating: The conclusion reached is fraught with philosophical import. It means that the world is intelligible only vrtien it is interpreted, and interpreted in terms of 13Penfield, pp. 157-158, 160, 164, 178, and 224 127 what the human ego, at its level of self-consciousness, knows itself to be--not phenomenally but noumenally Csecond bipolar levelj : that all other knowledge is mediated by categories that are not thrust upon us ab extra but emanate from us, their source and their para- digm. (I, 93) If Kant in his handling of the categories and (prior to them) of the intuitions of space and time, treats them as born like Athena full-grown from the forehead of Zeus, he thus becomes subject to the charge that his thinking has never transcended the Hegelian level of "Essence,*' which distinguishes between appearance and reality, but does not inquire more deeply into the genetic origin and validity of the categories of thought.^ Tennant, on the other hand, may be regarded as rising in his critique to the Hegelian level of "Notion," in that he endeavors to show how our knowledge of the world (which, of course, is conditioned by biological factors), is further conditioned not only by what the ego knows itself to be, but also by what the mind, on the second bipolar level, has made itself to be. But the making of the Subject-I is largely social in nature and depends upon the sharing of meanings with other selves. As has been shown (above, p. 121), such a socialization of experience and the Objectification of ^The Hegelian triad of Being, Essence, and Notion is interpreted in the above manner by W. T. Jones (A His tory of Western Philosophy Qfew York, 1952^ , pp. 873-876). 128 the world to which it leads can occur at a pre-linguistic stage of infancy, but not at a stage prior to that of purposive (or meaningful) actions. It must be admitted, then, that the knowledge of self and, later, the acquisi tion in some way of a knowledge of other selves are both prerequisite to the process of Objectification by which the neonate ejects his private experience and constructs his knowledge of the outer world. In sum, the escape from solipsism derives from the intercourse with other minds as they communicate to each other the momentous fact that an object perceived by one is also perceived by the other and must therefore exist in a World which is common to both. The Infant's Construction of a Spatial World and of the Categories The process by which the infant elaborates his visual world is so long and tedious that one hesitates to inter pret it as being primarily innate. Some of the signifi cant stages of the process can be conveniently studied by viewing a 16 mm. educational film entitled Chimpanzees Raised in Darkness.'*-5 These infant chimpanzees were raised 15A. h. Riesen and G. Clark (producers), State Col lege, Pa., 1947. See also A. H. Riesen, "Arrested Vision," Scientific American, July 1950, pp. 16-19; and "The Development of Visual Perception in Man and Chimpan zee," Science, 106:107-108, August 1, 1947. 129 with blind-folds over their eyes for the first few months of their lives. Their eyes remained relatively normal in their physiological features; but when the blind-folds were finally removed, their eyeballs showed an aimless rhythmical type of oscillation which is characteristic of the blind and is technically known as nystagmus. They paid no attention whatsoever to the waving of a bottle directly in front of their faces, though they grabbed it excitedly the minute it touched their lips. Even when, after a long period of learning, they were able to identify the visual bottle, they still did not know irtiere to grab for it. Later they learned to make a broad 180° sweep of the arm, obviously not knowing even then at what part of the arc they might expect to contact the bottle. The experience of these chimpanzees is similar to that of the cases on record of congenitally blind persons who have recovered their sight in later years.Such patients require months of assiduous effort in order to learn to see. At first they do not have the slightest appreciation of the distinction between the horizontal and the vertical in the visual field. Corners are not recognized as such until James J. Gibson, The Perception of the Visual World, ed. L. Carmichael (Boston, 1956), pp. 216-220. 6ibson presents a brief but skillful review and an expert's up- to-date evaluation of the classical monograph on this topic by M. von Senden, Raum- und Gestaltauffassung bei operier- ten Blindgeborenen vor und nach der Operation (Leipzig, vrsrr .— ----------------- --------------------- ------------- 130 the hand is run over them. Not even the simplest shapes can be identified without much practice. One patient finally gave up the effort to use her newly gained capac ities and reverted to her former dependence upon tactual and auditory cues. While there is some evidence that a retardation in the physical development of the eyes occurs because of disuse, it is doubtful that this accounts for a major part of the problem involved in constructing a visual world. These results lend weight to Tennant's frank charge that Kant was in error in regarding these forms C’intuitions" of space and timep as "pure” and (in his sense of the phrase) a priori: i.e., as independent of sense-data, and as bespeaking, in their finished build, activities original to the subject and brought by it to the mani fold of sense. (Philosophical Theology, I, 166) Rather, it is Tennant's conviction regarding these forms that They have a genesis and a history. Localisation in public space and time, Che adds], are no more original activities, than space and time are innate ideas. (1, 167) Whether the intuitions of space and time are innate or not should be determinable by clinical observations of their "genesis and history" in the earliest stages of infancy. Arnold Gesell and his collaborators (Frances L. IIg and Glenna E. Bullis) at the Yale Clinic of Child Development have used cinemanalysis to carefully document 131 the early development of space apperception.*7 The clinical data which seem potentially significant for Tennant’s epistemology may be summarized by age level, and thus classified into three groups: 1. The period of fetal-infancy: remaining weeks of "fetal” life after a premature birth. 2. The period of neonatal adjustment: first month after a full-term birth. 3. The period of normal infancy: second to twelfth lunar months. At the fetal age of 24 weeks, the eye is less than half the weight that it would be at a full-term birth. It is significant, however, that the distance from fovea to nerve-head is already established at its adult dimen sion. Gesell remarks on this point that This certifies to the profound importance of vision in the organization of human behavior. The macula, in a sense, becomes a fixed pivot in the process of morpho genesis.*8 *7Vision: Its Development in Infant and Child (New York, 1$4£), pp. 67-106. These researches in develop- mental optics have been generously supported by the Bureau of Visual Science of the American Optical Company. The work of Jean !Piaget, which has only recently come to our attention, should also be consulted. *8Page 67. Cf. the fact that the mouth becomes a similar pivot in the development of tactual space (below, p. 134). ------- 132 Thus even the fetal-infant is "bom with a pair of eyes, but not with a visual world" (p. 156). In the middle stage of fetal-infancy (32-36 weeks) faint signs of vision appear. The baby does not fixate the dangling ring, but his eyes do "move eaccadically in momentary after pursuit" (p. 75). In the late fetal stage he can follow the ring through an arc of 45°• Awareness, writes Gesell, is beginning to show a faint aspect of interest and attention . . . and, faintly, even a seeking kind of inspection (p. 76, italics ours). These are recognizable as among the chief anthropic fac tors that are stressed repeatedly by Tennant. Likewise in the neonate, these anthropic factors con dition the earliest stages of vision. This is suggested in Gesell*s evaluation of the great individual differences that appear in the course of development: They are so distinctive that they cannot be ascribed to environmental factors. Even the amount of visual expe rience and the degree of excitement and interest in the experience vary from child to child. . . . The early visual experiences of the infant soon become vivid and consuming. . . . Vision ranks as his supreme psycho logical achievement. (Page 81) One aspect of this achievement has been studied by Ling in a series of observations on fixation. He has shown that "fixation appears in a rudimentary form a few hours after birth.At first the neonate fixates a two-inch ^Bing-Chung Ling, "I. A Genetic Study of Sustained Visual Fixation and Associated Behavior in the Human Infant from Birth to Six Months," Journal of Genetic Psychology. 6l2S227-277, December 1942. 133 disk only if it is held within a few inches of his eyes; a day or two later he fixates it through a range extending several inches further away; and at four or five weeks he fixates it up to a range of thirty-six inches from the eyes. The data available in this field of inquiry have been summarized by Gesell, who, referring to the neonate, writes that His visual world grows in an outward direction, and his perceptual space is built up by a thatchlike series of extensions which emanate from a near region of organiza tion. (Page 192) Although the infant early stares into far away space, his structured visual world begins close to his eyes, and derives its psychic essence from bodily needs and satisfactions. (Page 157) His visual world does not expand symmetrically like an inflating balloon. (Page 158) The organism moves forward by rhythmic thrusts and apparent retreats, invading the unknown in a complicated series of overlapping panels. . . . These projections are not whimsical, but are governed by a developmental, dynamic, morphology, which stakes out and organizes various sectors of space, more or less simultaneously. (Pages 158-159) He describes the process as one of ’'reciprocal inter weaving,” in which the members of various pairs of bipolar opposites (near vs. far, monocular vs. binocular) alter nately gain the ascendency (p. 160) . In the first two months of normal infancy (following the neonatal period), the baby often shifts his gaze and he learns to follow the dangling ring through a 90° arc. Bright objects and stationary lights are sought out and 134 enjoyed, particularly If they display a rhythmic nodding. The fifth month marks the beginning of his correlation of the visual and tactual worlds, which Gesell describes as follows: Should he seize an object of interest, it goes avidly to his mouth and he tries to regard it even while he mouths it. The whole eye-hand-mouth episode is sur charged with optical implications. This mouthing may be interpreted as a form of tactual-spatial exploita tion, which contributes a nucleus to the visual per ception of form and substance. G2Qi The infant seems impelled by a sensory-motor appetite. He definitely exploits the objects in a manner which indicates that he is seriously engaged in the developmental organiza tion of visual-tactual behavior. (Page 90) The same month which marks the beginning of the proc esses by which the infant learns to correlate his visual with his tactual world also marks the beginning of social discrimination. This fact is of utmost importance in appraising Tennant's contention that social experience plays a crucial role in the process of Objectification (Gesell: "Projection"); for it is easy to assume, on the contrary, that visuo-tactual correlation suffices for such projection. This social discrimination involves the remem bering of faces. Even at 20 weeks (writes GesellU, the infant shows signs of increasing visual sophistication based on remembered experience. He is becoming perceptually aware, and a little shy, of strangers. He cries when he is too sud denly left alone by his mother. (Page 90) 20cf. the similar visual nucleus provided by the standarcITzed distance from fovea to nerve-head (above, p. 131). 135 The role of social experience in Objectification is so foundational to Tennant’s treatment of the anthropic roots of all knowledge that we may well cite Gesell at length on this topic: A spirited 28-week-old infant . . . presents an amiable union of self-containedness and sociality. . . . At 32 weeks of age he is not so self-contained. His reactTons are less forthright and his face often wears a question ing t half-confused expression. He shows a greater sensi tiveness in new situations and he needs more time to adjust to them. Even a familiar environment fatigues the child more readily, because he has a deepening awareness of himself in relation to the environment. Such sensitiveness . . . involves his visual functions which are developing in close correlation with his social attitudes. He watches with new penetration the actions and move ments of people around him. He is more conscious of sounds in the next room, and betrays a dawning awareness of distance and location . . . a heightened, even if dif fuse, appreciation of the spatial intervals which sepa rate him from an object of regard, or which separate two such objects * . . . The infant senses in a new way his own personal status in a world of space. . . . Coincidentally, his auditory awareness takes on a pro jective character. He localizes sights and sounds well beyond the reach of his arms. . . . Language and social relationships play a part in the building up o£ his visualized space world"! Folkways also “ help. It is al most a nursery game at this age to ask the baby: Where is the kitty? Where is Jimmy? Where is Granny? Mis response is more than a mere conditioned reflex. Visual memory causes him to look in an accustomed place. He shows a rather remarkable ability to detect facial expressions. . . . The delicate reconfigurations of physiognomy . . . are readily sensed because they have great importance for the economy of the organism. . . . It is literally true that a baby can read visible signs which are more subtle than those of the printed page.2* - 2^Vision: Its Development in Infant and Child (New York, 194$), pp. 93-93 ana 19d, lengthy italics ours. Quoted by permission of Paul B. Hoeher, Inc. 136 It would hardly contribute to our purpose to linger further over the anthropic factors that condition the struc tural development of the mind on the second bipolar level. Having dealt at length with the genesis of the Kantian forms of intuition, it would be tedious to deal similarly with the processes by which the infant builds up the cate gories of the understanding. It will suffice to indicate that a genetic origin of several of the categories is sug gested in Gesell*s observation that, at 36 weeks, the infant takes a cube and pushes another cube with the one in hand; or he brings one cube against the side of another cube. . . . By such tokens he shows a recognition of the posture and the relationship of two objects in space. He is just beginning to see them as solids and envelopes. (Page 96) At ^0 weeks . . . he segregates a single detail for attention, and he reacts in a successive and combining way to two details or to two objects. In the presence of more than one object, he manifests an awareness of more than one: a dim sense of two-ness, of container and contained, of solid and hollow, of top and bottom, of one side and the other side. (Page 97) At one year, he lifts the formboard bodily and peers through the round hole. . . . It indicates a certain awareness of the emptiness, as well as the contents, of space. (Page 100) The a posteriori origins of several of the categories— such as unity, plurality, reality, substance, and causality--are suggested in these lines. Among the formal categories, which Tennant distinguishes from the dynamic, that of one^ ness cannot be apprehended by the infant at a time "when spontaneous attention is at its minimum" (Philosophical 137 Theology, I, 171) and all is still ground, as the Gestalt psychologist would say. This apprehension does not begin, then, until the infant*s first act of differentiating a "thing” from its ground. Moreover, such a differentiation is the psychological prerequisite for the apprehension of another categorial distinction, that between numerical identity and difference (Tennant, I, 173). It is only by comparison of sensa that it first occurs to the infant to expect identities within the flux of sensatio. This does not mean that identity and difference are improvisations of the mind and nothing more; for there is also that in nature which lends itself to such interpretation. To call the categories anthropic, as Tennant does, is not to insinuate that they are not suggested by rela tions— spatial and temporal, as they come to be known— between the objective presentations themselves, in which actuality primarily consists. These relations are the occasions, though not the source, of our ejectiveness and analogising; the external control \rtiich, though not coercion, is prompting or eliciting. (I, 176-177) Tennant therefore claims that Psychology can shew that the "real" categories originate in action, not in logic. They are not purely subjective furniture, but analogical ejects objectively prompted and, consequently, derived from commerce of subjects with objective environment. (I, 174) In the light of the above reports from Gesell, it seems fair to say that the careful observations of infant behavior which have been conducted at the Yale Clinic of Child Development substantiate Tennant's position at two points: 138 1. That the "intuitions" of space and the categories of the mind are not innate, but are acquired, not in the Lockean sense of impressions made upon a tabula rasa, but rather in the sense of a pari passu development of sensatio and perceptio throughout a long process of interaction between the growing mind and its sensa. 2. That in this development, as in that of incipient perception (above, Chap. iii), anthropic factors, in particular those of social experience, play a major con ditioning role. Summarizing the situation in general, Gesell makes the following observations: Thus the child steadily builds his spatial world through progressive elaborations of his action system. . . . For him the space world is not a fixed and static absolute. It is a plastic domain, which he manipulates in terms of his nascent powers. (Page 99) Newtonian physics and geometric optics can not describe the relativities of the space world of the growing child. This world is his own private possession. He carves and constructs it out of a tenacious enveloping cosmos. He appropriates it by positive acts, reflexive, subconscious, autonomic, wished and willed. The space world thus becomes part of him. To no small degree, he is it. . . . It is part of the "make-up" of his person ality. The make-up changes with the developmental trans formations of his total action system. (Page 156) The Processes of Mature Perception in Experimental PsycKology Within certain limits established in infancy, the plasticity of the spatial world, i.e., its amenability to reconstruction, continues into adult experience. The 139 static geometry of the visual field, for example, can be rendered dynamic (either expanding or contracting) by means of a simple demonstration with Archimedes' spiral,22 a fig ure which is painted with a circling line that is narrow for the first few turns, bur widens gradually with increas ing circumference. The spiral is then mounted on a revolv ing wheel and the observer fixes his gaze upon it as it rotates. At first he reports that his field of vision is expanding in all directions. If this were not an illusion and he actually were living in an expanding world, one would normally expect that it would necessarily be per ceived as expanding for as long as the real expansion con tinues. But in fact, as the present experiment shows, the expansion would soon be normalized in perception. As the observer continues to gaze at the spiral, his mind becomes habituated to this type of field and soon perceives the spiral as a series of concentric circles defining a static field. The aftereffects of the experiment are astonishing. For when the observer now turns from the spiral and gazes at some stationary object, he perceives that object as strangely contracting in size, or receding, or both; yet after a moment he realizes that it has actually not become 22M. Luckiesh, Visual Illusions (New York, 1922), p. 90; and L. L. Thurstone. A Factorial Study of Percep tion (Chicago, 1944), p. 56. 140 smaller at all even though it still appears to contract.25 If the spiral is rotated in the opposite direction, habitu ating the mind to a contracting field of view, any object which is then viewed appears to expand, yet without becom ing bigger. It would seem that the mind is capable of constructing a static Euclidean space out of whatever pre sentations it receives, however erratic they may be; or that for extreme cases this is possible at least in infancy. The case of Archimedes * spiral is similar to that of the well-known colored after-images in that the condition ing is immediate and the results ephemeral. The effects of long-continued or oft-repeated conditionings, on the other hand, permanently influence the processes of percep tion. The conditioning which has been received through past experiences with illumination or lighting has created, for example, a strong presumption in favor of the view that the illumination always slants downward from above. Con sequently, we interpret our sensa as though this were the case. In an aerial photograph viewed upside down, for instance, Quonset huts seem to turn into towers; and, simi larly, the rows of bulges on a boiler are perceived as 23Several cases in which this paradox occurred in connection with a macropsia or micropsia induced by the drug mescaline are cited by Heinrich Kluver (Mescal, Psyche Miniatures, G.S., No. 22 [London, 1928J, pp. 70- 73). 141 hollows.2^ Moreover, if lines are drawn in receding per spective to suggest a long corridor and posts of equal height are shown along the hall, these are erroneously per ceived as being of increasing size when taken from fore to rear (Luckiesch, pp. 60 and 70). If instead of posts, human figures are used, the effect is accentuated (Metzger, S. 313, Fig. 360), and this is particularly true if the figures chosen are a tiny tot, a boy, and a man. The anthropic conditioning of the total personality through the course of past experience is the theoretical basis of the Rorschach Test, in which the subject views a series of ink-blots, whose forms are, of course, intrin sically fortuitous and meaningless. With the external con trol so limited, the subject*s responses can be taken as largely imposed upon the figure by the anthropic interests which have directed the life of the individual.2^ In simi lar manner the findings of Gestalt psychology have shown, Gibson, Perception of the Visual World, p. 97, Fig. 45; and Wolfgang Metzger, Gesetze des gehens (Frank furt am Main, 1953), S. 383. A cross which is similarly perceived is shown in Fritz Kahn, Man in Structure & Func tion, trans. and ed. G. Rosen (New York, 1943), 11, 693, Fig. 431. Metzger also illustrates the same effect in an interesting abstract design (Gesetze, S. 379). Cf. also Metzger*s Fig. 438, in which "the law of symmetry” is shown to operate in opposition to that of illumination (S. 384- 385) . 25Hermann Rorschach, Psychodiagnostics, publ. E. Ober- holzer, trans. and Eng. ed. P. Lemkau and b. Kronenberg, ed. W. Morgenthaler, 4th ed. with new bibliog. (Berne, Switzerland, 1949). 142 for example, that in a figure sketched out with only a few bold suggestive strokes, past experience serves to fill in the details and the resulting perception is thus richer than the given datum.In Gestalt psychology there is also the "law of Pragnanz,"27 according to which sense qualities tend to become organized in terms of presupposed patterns, which, in turn, are determined by several primary preferences: 1. When sensations are presented they tend to be interpreted in a simple pattern in preference to a com plex one. A hemianopic will see partial figures as complete, for example, only when they are simple; and, according to the law of continuation, a curved line will tend to be completed in a continuing curve. 2. There is also a preference for regularity. A slightly irregular dodecagon will at first be interpreted as a circle, and then, upon closer discrimination, as a regular figure. The bias for regularity prevails even when opposed to simplicity. 26Roy F. Street, A Gestalt Completion Test. Teachers College, Columbia University: Contributions to Education, No. 481 (New York, 1931), pp. 37-65. 27K. Koffka, Principles of Gestalt Psychology. Inter national Library of Psychology, Philosophy, and Scientific Method (New York, 1935), pp. 140, 146-147, 153, and 195. 143 3. There is finally a bias in favor of symmetry, as for example, in judging which is the background and which the figure in an ambiguous field. It is clear that these preferences, which operate in mature perceptual experience, are just as anthropic and pragmatic in nature as those which were studied in the above review of neonatal experience, since they are based upon the faith that the world, or rather, any specific aspect of it, is more likely to be orderly than chaotic. The plasticity of the spatial world even in adult experience and its amenability to anthropic bias has prob ably never been more graphically presented than in the Ames Demonstrations in Perception, which have been per fected in recent years at the Institute for Associated Research, Hanover, N.H., and at Princeton University; and which show how the anthropic bias of the observer is injected into his actual perception of shapes, sizes, dis tances, and motions.In the Star-Point Demonstration, for example, two star-points of unequal brightness are presented side by side in a dark room and viewed monocularly, 28William H. Ittelson, The Ames Demonstrations in Per ception (Princeton, N.J., 19^2); Franklin P. Kilpatrick (ea.), Human Behavior from the Transactional Point of View (Hanover, N.H., 1953); Merle Lawrence, Studies in Human Behavior (Princeton, N.J., 1949); and U.S. Department of the Wavy, Demonstrations in Perception, 16 nan. Film (New York, 19517: In accordance with Tennant*s denial of the pure sensum, each is perceived as localized at a fairly definite dis- tance. But the fainter of the two is perceived as farther away because past experience has taught us to expect that two objects presented together which look roughly alike actually are the same; hence their difference in bright ness is presumed to be chiefly a function of distance. Now if a third star-point that is half way between the other two in brightness is interposed between them, the distance effect is accentuated because the probability that three similar-looking objects are identical seems much greater than for only two. In short, the disparity in distance that is perceived is proportional to the strength of the presumption that the objects are all of the same intrinsic brightness.29 Such presumptive infer ence is also basic to the perception of two lines of dif ferent length. Here the shorter line is perceived as further away, and again the effect is accentuated by interposing lines of intermediate length.30 The strength of these anthropic presumptions is evi dently increased by the number of dimensions of the objects studied. It is greater, for example, with diamond shapes 2^xttelson, pp. 3-4; Kilpatrick, pp. 4-5; and Lawrence, pp. 72-74. 30Ittelson, pp. 5-7; Kilpatrick, pp. 5-6; and Lawrence, pp. 74-75. 145 of varying size in two dimensions and still greater yet with balloons, because they are three dimensional. When both size and brightness are varied with time, as with the three balloons, the illusion that the balloons are advancing and receding is very vivid and striking.The implicit subconscious calculations involved in these per ceptions yield interesting results when the distance cues are in conflict.^ When the size of one balloon increases, for instance, while its illumination wanes, most observers see it as approaching, though more slowly than before. Sometimes, however, an observer, whose experience has endowed him with a marked responsiveness to changes in brightness, sees the balloon as receding. Here again individual differences are evident and the anthropic fac tor of past experience is decisive. Conflicting cues also give rise to an odd perception in the Overlay Demonstration.33 Three cards are mounted on posts and aligned in depth so as to partly overlap as seen from the viewing point. The closest two cards, how ever, have a corner cut out just enough to expose the JJ-Ittelson, pp. 8-12; Kilpatrick, pp. 6-8 ; Lawrence, pp. 75-80; and U.S. Navy, Demonstrations. 32Ittelson, p. 9; Kilpatrick, p. 8; and Lawrence, p. 79. 33Ittelson, pp. 13-15; and Kilpatrick, pp. 9-10. 146 complete card behind. The illusion is thereby created that the cards are in an order opposite to that in which they are actually arranged. Their sizes are chosen to encourage this illusion and to suggest that they are far apart in depth. When the shield is lowered that has been hiding the posts holding the cards, the true order of the posts can be seen binocularly. With the cards seemingly in one order and the posts in another, the mind creates a makeshift resolution of these conflicting cues: it per ceives the foreward post as bending backward from its point of attachment to the supposed far-distant locus of the card (Ittelson, p. 13). Such phenomena are reminis cent of Brand Blanshard's observation that Those solid everyday things which seem constructed in a fashion so firm and so inevitable are really thrown together in a most hit-or-miss way, and if thought comes for a time to rest among them, this is only because it has ceased to press its own interests and has surren dered to the competing claims of convenience and practi cal necessity.34 This conclusion is illustrated by what are probably the most striking of the Ames Demonstrations, those which involve the use of the trapezoidal window. 35 These depend for their effectiveness on the fact that our previous 3^The Nature of Thought, Library of Philosophy, ed. J. H. l^uirhead (London, 193$), I, 121. 35Ittelson, pp. 67-81; Kilpatrick, pp. 61-86. and 153-173; Lawrence, pp. 97-103; and U.S. Navy, Demonstra- tions. 147 experience with windows has created a strong presumption that they are rectangular in shape. Consequently, when a trapezoidal-shaped window is seen, the mind postulates that it is an ordinary window that is being viewed at an angle, with the perceptually wide edge toward the observer and slanting off with the opposing shorter end further away. This presumption is reinforced by designing the window with sills and sashes similarly widened at the sup posedly closer end. Several uses are made of this fundamental shape, each depending upon the illusion that, with the window in a vertical plane but oriented at an angle to the line of sight, the nearer edge appears to be the further, and vice versa. When the demonstrator grasps these edge-sashes from behind, for example, one with each hand, the hands are perceived as strikingly different in size. If a string is run horizontally through the window at 90° to the line of sight and a card hung from it and slowly pulled along, the card first passes behind the sash-bar which is pre sumably the furthest away, and it is naturally supposed that the card will pass by entirely to the rear. When suddenly it is noticed that the card passes, instead, in front of the succeeding sash-bars, the mind struggles to interpret this anomaly and causes the motion to be per ceived as non-rectilinear--as an S-shaped pathway--and 148 the card as diminishing in size at the closer part of the S.36 If the observer moves his head from one side to the other, back-and-forth, as he views the window, he expects to perceive a certain parallax effect. The parallax observed, however, is just the opposite from that expected. Since the mind can achieve no static interpretation of the cues received, it perceives the window as weaving crazily back-and-forth in phase with the movements of the observer^ head.37 Probably the most striking of all these illusions is that in which the trapezoid is mounted on a rod and rotated slowly round-and-round through 360° and on.3® On the strength of past experience, the mind will not accept the possibility that the shorter edge can be passing round toward the front, as it actually does during half of the cycle. Consequently, the window is perceived as oscilla ting from one side to the other or back-and-forth. When a paper drinking cup (or a playing card or cube) is then wired to the shorter edge, it, of course, does not share in the window*s "oscillation," but is correctly perceived as continuing to revolve through 360° and on. As the 36Ittelson, pp. 67-71; and Kilpatrick, pp. 61-62. 37Ittelson, pp. 76-81; and Lawrence, pp. 97-103. 3®Ittelson, pp. 72-75; Kilpatrick, pp. 65-86 and 153- 173; and U.S. Navy, Demonstrations. 149 shorter edge of the trapezoid now begins to pass round toward the front it seems to slow down and stop and reverse its rotation. But the cup continues around. Hence the mind perceives it as detaching itself and taking off from the window to float around through the air alone. If the cup is replaced by a handkerchief draped over the edge of the trapezoid, it gives rise to the ’’Princeton Ghost Effect," in which the handkerchief seems to float through the air. Another illusion is created by inserting a long mailing-tube through the window between the sashes. During the phase of the cycle when the tube and window seem to circle in opposite directions, there comes a time when the tube seems to cut directly through the window sash— at least this is what those perceive to whom the suggestion is given that the tube is made of metal and is strong and rigid. All other observers, however, perceive a far more striking phenomenon: As the window revolves, its two side-edges seem to bear against the tube toward both ends at once, and the tube is actually perceived as plastically yielding and bending sharply at the two points of contact into the shape of an ogee curve. The Distorted Room Demonstration utilizes a room whose left wall is twice as large as the right and whose back wall is trapezoidal in shape, receding sharply from 150 right to left.3^ From a special viewing point a monocular observer perceives this room as rectangular, since the size of every part is adjusted to compensate exactly for its distance. Faces appearing in the two back windows are per ceived as ridiculously disparate in size. Objects placed within the room are perceived as distorted, and occasion ally these in turn induce a local distortion in the floor. The observer is asked to take a long stick and touch the ’•mouse’' in the far left-hand corner, and then to quickly strike the ’ ’ mouse" in the other corner. Though he knows abstractly that the right-hand mouse is much closer, it takes many trials to keep from striking the back wall long before the mouse is reached. In a variation of the experi ment the mouse is made to move from left to right and the observer is to strike him on the run as many times as pos sible. As he learns to strike the mouse and the various parts of the room accurately, the observer finds that his perception gradually changes so that he sees the room more as it actually is. In this way it is demonstrated that anthropic purposive action, operating by a process of trial and error, is the midwife of perception (Lawrence, pp. 147-153). ^Ittelson, pp. 40-52; Kilpatrick, pp. 41-55 and 246-254; Lawrence, pp. 89-95; and U.S. Navy, Demonstra tions. 151 In the Projected Cube Demonstration a projector throws an image of a cube diagonally downward on a nearly horizon tal screen. The cube is viewed monocularly in order to eliminate the binocular cues for depth perception. When an actual spool is now placed on the screen and gently rolled across the top of the imaged cube, the mind per sists in the assumption, which has been strongly built up by experience, that what looks like a cube really ij3 a cube; consequently, since the cube is still perceived as an undistorted three-dimensional figure, the spool, as reported by Lawrence, is seen to roll across the top and slowly down the side contrary to the behavior one would expect from a spool reaching the edge of a real physical cube. Similarly, if a glass of water is placed as though sitting upon the cube, "the water crowds up one side so the sur face is slanted as the screen is tilted . . . a most unusual experience."^® A similar three-dimensional effect is created by the Oscillating trV" (which, however, is not one of the Ames Demonstrations) A wide shape is thrown on a screen by a moving-picture projector. It ^®In a personal letter to me from Merle Lawrence, Physiological Acoustics Laboratory, University of Michigan, July 20, 1959; see also Lawrence, Studies, pp. 67-69. ^K. Koffka, Principles of Gestalt Psychology, Inter national Library of Psychology, Philosophy, and Scientific Method (New York, 1935), p. 301; and M. D. Vernon, Visual Perception (Cambridge, Eng., 1937), pp. 172-173. 152 alternates rapidly with an identical figure which, in this case, is upside down, located as though clasping hands with the former "V." At a certain speed of alternation the mind assumes that the two "V’s" are the same object swinging back and forth from the one position to the other. Since this can only be done by swinging through two right angles outside the plane of the screen, the mind actually perceives such a three-dimensional stunt even when the two "V* s" are viewed monocularly. The Epistemological Significance of the Transactional Viewpoint in Psychology The Ames Demonstrations in Perception form the basis of a large body of psychological literature defending what is called the "transactional" point of view.^ In Merle Lawrence’s laboratory manual (compiled at Princeton Univer sity), this viewpoint is effectively summarized, and such anthropic factors as the statistical weighing of past expe rience, action for a purpose, etc., are stressed: The phenomena you experienced in connection with the star points, lines, balloons, playing cards, [andj pro jected cube . . . showed you that your sensations of "thereness" (absolute distance) and "thatness" were 42A succinct statement of this viewpoint with a brief bibliography is given by William H. Ittelson and Hadley Cantril (Perception: A Transactional Approach, Doubleday Papers in Psychology, ed. E. t,. Hartley [.Garden City, N.Y., 1954J). For more extensive bibliography see Kilpatrick, pp. 255-259; Ittelson, pp. 85-88; or write to Dr. Hadley Cantril, Princeton University, for a mimeographed list of references. 153 based on statistical averages you had built up from past experience; . . . Q:hat thesej were based on many more factors from past experience that Csic, * than'J you could take into account intellectually in any concrete perceptual situation. That is, you saw . . . a certain shape and size at a certain distance from you, etc. in a fraction of a second and were entirely unconscious of the elaborate process your mind went through in weighing past experiences to bring them to bear on the particular stim ulus you were looking at so it made sense to you. You saw in the star points, balloons, small and large playing cards, [ancQ projected cube . . . that your per ception, rather than your knowledge, determined your experience of what you were looking at; . . . Cbut thaO your sense of what things probably were did increase the accuracy of your perceptions in some cases. That is, when you looked at something you thought was a playing card, your sense of the size of playing cards helped you locate the standard playing card at approximately its true distance. . . . Still, however, your perception was based on probability. You observed from the . . . demonstrations that the statistical averages you used as presumptions in judging the characteristics of the things you were looking at, were built up from past experience— that is, concrete experiences involving some action on your part with respect to objects of a similar nature . . . objects of different lengths or sizes, i.e. the distance you had to throw, to walk, to drive, to act purposefully with respect to the objects. Your past experiences, then, which you have used as the basis of the presumptions you have formed and that you use for prognosis, were experiences that involved action. And it is only by action for a purpose that we can find out that the thing we are looking at is the thing we think it is. Hence we are forced to include action as a factor in order to understand how and why we see things.43 This summary from Merle Lawrence serves to reemphasize the epistemologically significant fact that every man’s cognitive construction of the world is his and his alone; ^ Studies in Human Behavior (Princeton, N.J., 1949), pp. 93-VT. Quoted by permission of Princeton University Press. 154 for the "subconscious" statistical or probabilistic weigh ing of perceptual cues is conducted on the basis of a fund of past experience which is uniquely his own. The Ames Demonstrations in Perception show that even the simplest perception involves, as Blanshard supposed, an implicit element of inference (see above, p. 95); or, as Tennant would say, understanding has a common root with nascent 44 sensatio. The presence of implicit cogito in every feeling- experience has led intuitionists and romanticists to regard feeling as a special kind of knowledge. Thus Bergson dis cusses the wholistic intuition of ”Paris,” for example, as something that cannot possibly be conveyed by pictures.^5 Cinematographers, on the contrary, believe that, by the selection of typical scenes, by the skillful framing of pictures to direct the attention to points of particular significance, and by the use of carefully composed and informative dialogue or narration with appropriate back ground music, a richer and more valid intuition can be achieved than that which a casual visitor to the actual Soul & Its Faculties ( _ >7. ^Henri Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. T. E. Hulme (London, 1^15), pp. 22-24. ^F. R. Tennant, I: The 155 site would experience.^® If such analytic methods are successful in cinematography, perhaps this is also true in ordinary perception. It is likely, then, that Tennant would regard Bergsonian intuitionism as, at best, a capa city which, like ESP, may have been active during the earliest stages of phylogeny or ontogeny, but is now atrophied. It is more likely, however, that he would con cur with the theory defended by Lawrence which traces the instantaneity and directness of perception to the fact that The human mind is extremely complicated and intricate and capable of taking more factors into account and of much faster calculations than the most modern lightning computer (Lawrence, p. 71), and which therefore views intuition as an unusually rapid and subconscious form of the same inductive and probabilis tic reasoning that science uses in its conscious appraisal of the world. The Demonstrations thus lend weight to Tennant’s psychological epistemology in that they tend to sustain, on the level of mature perception, the same suggestions which arose from our critique of incipient perception on the level of the neonate, viz., that such anthropic factors as analogical judgment and purposive action lie at the roots of all knowledge. ^This statement is made on the strength of our sev eral years of experience in the production of documentary films. PART II RELIGIOUS EPISTEMOLOGY AND SYNOPTIC HYPOTHESIS CHAPTER V THE RENUNCIATION OF ALL ONTOLOGICAL, COSMOLOGICAL, AND MYSTICAL APPROACHES TO THEISM The Results of Our Critique of Ten nant *8 Philosophical fcpistemology" The basic task of philosophical epistemology is to develop a sound critique of our knowledge of the world, while that of religious epistemology is to engage in a critique of our knowledge of God. In Tennant, however, philosophical epistemology preempts the province of reli gious epistemology; for the philosophical critique dis allows the claim of religion to any special sources of knowledge other than sensatio.^ The charge can therefore be made that Tennant’s religious epistemology is chiefly iconoclastic and that in his hands the religious critique reduces to the philosophical. The arguments of the pre vious chapters, hovgever, which have made much use of the science of psychology, have tended to support Tennant’s fundamental presupposition, according to which all of our knowledge of Actuality is of one and only one sort, viz., Vrhis was the conclusion of the first volume of the Philosophical Theology (2 vols. CCambridge, Eng., 1935- 1937U). 157 158 discursive and inductive, problematic and anthropic know ledge based upon sensatio. Any Kantian intuition or cate gory, any Gattungsvemunft, which may seem to be innate is regarded by Tennant as the product of Erlebnis events which occurred in the experience of the infant during his earli est and most formative weeks, and is therefore classed as a posteriori. There is much in modern psychology, then, which seems to uphold the conclusion which Tennant has repeatedly drawn in the course of his first volume: Reason is made, not bom: an outgrowth of the under standing which has a common root with sense. (I, 193) Psychology can shew that the "real" categories originate in action, not in logic. They are not purely subjective furniture, but analogical ejects objectively prompted and, consequently, derived from commerce of subjects with objective environment. . . . The dynamical cate gories, like that of end, must be asserted to be due to what shall be called the anthropic . . . tendencies and inevitabilities of human thought (I, 174-175), categories which bespeak analogical symbolism, reading in rather than reading-off. (I, 188) Without more venturesome response from human subjects than is involved in infallible reading off of the self- evident , there would have emerged neither religion nor science. The fundamental belief in which knowledge or science indulges, is a following of an end and a satis faction of a human need, as much as is the fundamental belief which issues in theology. . . . Science postulates what is requisite to make the world amenable to the kind of thought that conceives of the structure of the uni verse, and its orderedness according to quantitative law; theology, and sciences of valuation, postulate what is requisite to make the world amenable to the kind of thought that conceives of the why and wherefore, the meaning or purpose of the universe, and its orderedness according to teleological principles. Both are 159 necessarily interpretative, anthropic, interested, selective. . . . We now see that the category of end enters into the very foundations of the ediface of "know ledge," as much as do the mathematical and the dynamic categories of Kant. Cl, 299) Thinking is more than perception of formal agreement, etc., between ideas; it is intentional and teleological as well as intuitively cognitive. (I, 188) In short, it is evident that Tennant, by building on the analytic and genetic psychology of James Ward and follow ing the ordo cognoscendi in a thoroughly empirical manner, has proposed an epistemological basis which both science and theology share in common, viz., that of brute sensa- tio— sensatio 'vrtiich is interpreted, to be sure, in terms of the categories, but by categories which themselves originated in earlier sensatio. The psychological machin ery of the mind must be viewed, then, as something impro vised by the mind itself. Pragmatic "verification" of logically indemonstrable . . . assumption, CTennant maintainsis the Actual basis and "justification" of all our science and "knowledge" of any kind. (I, 284) If this thesis stands it will but have established, in the case of science, what was long ago discerned within the sphere of religion and theology: that faith and hope are more fundamental than the knowledge which is to "vanish away" and which indeed, in a very real sense, has already vanished away. Whether as scientific "knowers" or as religious believers, we must be content to "feel that we are greater than we know": to recognize that it is trust of some such feel ing as this, that, in all our knowledge (such as it is) and in all our reason (xrtiatever that be), has prompted and guided our intellectual search. (I, 285) 160 It bears repeating, then, that if the Objective quest, which is destined in Tennant to culminate in the theistic hypothesis, invokes (as it does) such anthropic principles as analogy, teleology, and faith, this must not be regarded, however, as a defect peculiar to theology, but rather as a fundamental characteristic of the very best knowledge that we have. Indeed, such anthropic principles impressed into the service of an empiricism which remains close to the touchstone of forthcoming Fact are much more trustworthy, as Tennant believes, than the allegedly necessary and uni versal principles of rationalism, with its unrooted a priori starting points, or than the supposedly noetic immediacies of mysticism, with its ineffable or ambiguous deliverances. To Tennant, on the other hand, Erlebnis events or raw sense data are established as being the only epistemological basis that is ultimately valid for the religious consciousness.^ If the findings of experimental psychology that we have reviewed are at all convincing as substantiation of Tennant's epistemology, then, for reasons set forth below, all rationalistic theories which stress the concept of innate ideas will have suffered a damaging blow, and with them all a priori methods of proving the existence of God ^The significant point will be made in our evaluation of mysticism that the limitation to sensatio does not dis allow visionary experience (see below, pp. 178-181). 161 will have become suspect (see below, pp. 161-169). More over, Bergsonian intuitionism as a theory of perception will be repudiated (see above, pp. 154-155). With sensatio alone surviving as the only certified datum of knowledge, the noetic claims of religious experience and of mysticism will finally fail to qualify as evidence in Tennant*s epistemological court of appeal. It may seem at this point that in his effort to be thoroughly empirical, Tennant has handicapped his case so severely that he is plunged into skepticism. He escapes from this fate, however, by making the best of the one noetic source which survives his critique. By discursive and probabilistic reasoning based on sensatio, he presents his evidence and rests his case on the only argument which remains, the argument from cosmic teleology. The Repudiation of *A Priori*and Rationalistic Theology Before examining Tennant*s case for cosmic teleology, it is important to note that the restrictive results of his philosophical epistemology which we have just reviewed have profoundly significant implications for his evalua tion of each of the traditional ’’ proofs*’ of the existence of God, for the ontological and the cosmological, as well as the teleological. Indeed, Tennant’s methodology alone, apart from its consequences, dictates a very different approach to these proofs: 162 The classical proofs of the being of God sought to demonstrate that there is a Real counterpart to a pre conceived idea of God, such as was moulded in the course of the development of religion, or constructed by specu lative philosophy aloof from religious experience and from avowedly anthropic interpretation. . . . The empir ically-minded theologian adopts a different procedure. He asks how the world, inclusive of man, is to be explained. He would let the Actual world tell its own story and offer its own suggestions. . . . The expli- canda which he investigates, and the results of his investigation, alone will determine the content or essence of the explicative idea of God to which he is led, as well as the grounds for belief that such an essence exists. (II, 78) With sensa the only touchstone of the Actual, Tennant explicitly rejects the ontological argument and ignores or transmutes the cosmological. The ontological argument is totally inconsistent with the empirical spirit of Ten nant's epistemology. It commits the "ontological fallacy," which, in general, involves the hypostatizing of abstrac tions (of the idea of "perfection," for example), or is due "to confounding psychology of individual experience with metaphysics" (I, 254). Several philosophers are accused by Tennant of committing this fallacy. Berkeley committed it, for example, when he passed from an idealism represented by esse est percipi to one expressible as esse est intelligi (I, 353)1 Kant, who made the "objects of higher order" (relations) purely a priori, is accused of committing this fallacy and thus paving the way for the rationalistic identifica tion of the valid with the Real (I, 254); and the deists, who considered that ethical and physical laws "constitute 163 an eternal prius . . . into which being had to fit," are similarly charged with interpreting the relation "valid of" in terms of "existence before" the Actual, or "independently of" it (II, 19). The confusion which is thus involved in the ontologi cal fallacy may perhaps be dissipated by tracing it back to what Hermann Lotze feels is a misinterpretation of Plato.5 Lotze calls attention to the fact that there was no word in the Greek for expressing validity as distinct from reality. Hence the word 0\ / < r t o c was employed for both. Thus when Plato raised the question, "Is there a form for 'bed'? or for ’shuttle’? or ’the Good*?" he was asking whether these universals were valid modes of classifying particulars; whether the nature of "things" was such as to lend itself to such groupings. If it can be assumed, with Harold Cherniss, that Aristotle’s knowledge of Plato’s philosophy was derived almost in toto from the Dialogues alone,^ it is then easy to understand how his realistic misinterpretation of the theory of forms could have become the official version of Platonism that passed down to posterity. Tacitly accepting the "official" version, 5Logic, ed. B. Bosanquet, 2nd ed., Lotze’s System of Philosopny, Part I, Clarendon Press Series (Oxford, 1888), Vol. II, Book in, 206-222, esp. 210 f. ^The Riddle of the Early Academy (Berkeley, Califor nia, 1945), pp. 3l, 47, S9, 60, 65, 72, and 81. 164 Tennant is critical of Plato: The ideal or pure science of mathematics, Che explains^, was taken by Plato to be the ideal or paradigm of know ledge of actuality. And this, it must be affirmed, was philosophy’s catastrophic fall from pristine innocence: its original sin which infected modem philosophy also from its birth. (I, 6). Inasmuch, then, as the ontological argument for the exist ence of God is valid only within the framework of a tradi tional Platonic realism, it is discarded in principle with Tennant’s repudiation of the Platonic universale ante rem (I, 63-64, 197-198, and 211-212). To clarify the issues involved in ontologism, Tennant distinguishes between the ambiguous usages of the word ’’object.’' 1. object (o): "The impressional or perceptual datum apprehended in the sense-knowledge of private or individual experience." 2. Object (0): "The conceptual ’thing* of collec tive or common Experience." 3. object (6J): "The noumenal or ontal Reality behind either." Cl, 220) The ontological fallacy then consists in identifying the socialized and conceptual Object (0) with the ontal (60) , thus rendering it timeless or eternal and independent of minds. On the contrary, as Tennant says, The "logical existence" Cor subsistence^ of mathematical and similar concepts, need mean no more than their con- structibility, compatibly with the conventions which generate them, and their Objectivity vrtien abstracted and attended to. (I, 210) 165 The ontological proof of God commits the above fallacy by developing the implications of the idea of Perfection on the level of the Object (0) and illicitly passing by infer ence to the ontal object (CO). It bears repeating that Tennant's stand on this issue profoundly affects his approach to theology. "Rational and a priori theology," he says (which includes nearly all theology), stands or falls with the ontological argument; and if that argument still seems self-evidently cogent to a philosopher here and there, its fallaciousness is self- evident to all the rest. (II, 79) This sweeping repudiation of all rationalistic the ology as being overly "pretentious" (II, 120) strikes hard at the roots of the cosmological argument as well; for, as Kant has shown, this proof, in its traditional form, takes its rise in experience only to depart from it with out deriving any specific data about the nature of neces sary Being from its deliverances. Henceforth the argument is rationalistic and essentially equivalent to the onto logical proof.5 Consequently, Tennant hardly mentions the cosmological argument as a proof of the existence of God, though he uses the concept of a World-Ground at a devel oped stage of his work (II, 121 ff.). The closest Tennant ever comes to the argument for a First Cause is probably in a discussion of scientific causation, where he says, 5Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith CLondon, 1958), pp. 5G9-511. 166 Inasmuch as all such causes are proximate causes, abso lute beginnings being beyond science's ken, causal explanation is always relative and bounded by mystery. (II, 55) Moreover, in its temporal form, the argument for a First Cause seems rationalistic to Tennant by virtue of the supposition that, as Hume makes Philo say, To ascertain this reasoning, it were requisite, that we had experience of the origin of worlds. . . . And what new and unknown principles would actuate CnatureJ in so new and unknown a situation as that of the formation of a universe, we cannot, without the utmost temerity, pretend to determine. . . Have you ever seen nature in any such situation as resembles the first arrangement of the elements? Have worlds ever been formed under your eye?6 But lacking such experience, any cosmological proofs of the temporal sort must be purely rationalistic. Even in Tennant's day, recent though it is as compared with that of Hume, there was little indication as yet of the strides that were soon to be made in astrophysics toward "expe rience," so to speak, "of the origin of worlds." It is therefore not surprising that Tennant preferred to avoid the temporal interpretation of world dependency. Tennant's position on this point is divulged only at an advanced stage in the ordo cognoscendi, which for our present pur poses we may anticipate: Creation can be conceived as idea and deed together, Che explains]], and the divine transcendence as not tem poral priority, but as consisting in the difference ^Hume's Dialogues concerning Religion, ed. Norman Kemp Smith, 2nd ed. (London, 1^4?), pp. 149-151. 167 between God and His utterance— which pantheism identi fies. Thus conceived, the theistic idea of creation is free from the old puzzles concerning temporal relations. If God be a world-ground, there never could have been no world . . . CforD the world is coeval with God. (II, 129) In entertaining the view that the cosmic order is eter- nal, however, Tennant exposes himself to the perplexities of Kant’s antinomies and passes premature judgment on a line of thought which has since become empirical and fruit ful, viz., scientific cosmogony.8 Though Tennant does not endeavor to penetrate the mystery of the boundary conditions of the universe by thrusting backward in time to the origin of matter, he does feel constrained to seek out the origin of adaptive form wherever and whenever it may arise. To the extent that this leads him to infer a Beyond at the roots of our present cosmos, Tennant may be said to employ the cosmo logical argument in a non-temporal and non-ontological form. In the ordo cognoscendi the first suggestion of a 7In referring to the material cosmos, we shall use the word, "eternal,” to mean "temporally infinite." As applied to God, however, this word is more properly classed with Kant’s "purely transcendental predicates" and con ceived as an "eternity . . . free from conditions of time" (Kant, p. 531). Thus an eternal God is not limited in his apprehension of reality to organizing it in terms of the pure forms of intuition. ®For consideration of the age of the universe and the cosmological theories of modern astrophysics, see below, pp. 241-263. 168 Beyond arises not from the bare fact of indefinite con ditioned being, for this is the inadequate datum of the traditional cosmological proof which, as we have seen, reduces to the ontological. Rather, it arises from the peculiar nature of the world, which casts doubt upon its own self-subsistence: viz., its order and rationality or conformity to law.9 Thus when Tennant diverts his inter est away from the origin of matter to that of adaptive form, he is led to accept the great nineteenth-century concept of the general "order of nature" as involving form and as being, perhaps, teleological.^® The order and rationality of the world, Tennant feels, suggest a WorId- Ground beyond the world itself, in that they are the qualities of a cosmos rather than of the chaos which would be expected from a blind concourse of atoms. This conclusion will be critically examined at the appropriate place (see below, Chaps, viii ff.). At present it is sufficient to note that this is a form of the cosmo logical argument, inasmuch as it argues from a gradation of dependencies to an ultimate World-Ground, but that it is a form of the teleological argument in its surmise that "the general order of nature" bespeaks a purposing Mind 9Tennant, I, 361-365; II, 22-23, and Chap. iii, passim. 10cf. Kant, pp. 504-505; and Lawrence J. Henderson, The Order of Nature (Cambridge, Mass., 1917). 169 beyond. In due time Tennant’s transition from epistemo- logical prolegomenon to natural theology will be dealt with (see below, pp. 182-191). The crucial point at present, however, is that Tennant*s epistemology con strains him to reject the ontological and cosmological arguments, at least in their classical forms, and to rest the entire burden of his search for a synoptic hypothesis upon the empirical approach of a cosmic teleology, and upon this alone. The Disallowal of the Noetic Claims of Religious Experience If Tennant’s repudiation of the a priori claims of rationalism discredits all "pretentious theology" which- rests upon the scholastic "proofs," then his quest for a meaningful Weltanschauung narrows down, as we have seen, to such knowledge as derives from the deliverances of sen- satio. Rationalism had challenged this conclusion by asserting the validity of "thought-given data, independent of sense, and equally original as the impressional. But another challenge," Tennant goes on to say, to official psychology, and its epistemological outcome, is delivered from the quarter of religious experience: and this it is necessary to consider. . I I It is alleged that in religious experience a genus of the objective, other than the sensory and the sense- derived, is apprehended with immediacy. . . . This objec tive realm is held to be . . . the basis of knowledge as to ultimate Reality, such as is not otherwise mediated: 170 the forthcomingness of which knowledge, renders that derived from sense inexhaustive or partial.H Such ''short cuts of ’immediacy,* often pursued since the downfall of rationalistic proofs" (I, 311), are a chal lenge to Tennant in that they affirm the existence of "a distinct faculty, not included in such as are contemplated in the psychology of natural knowledge" (I, 309) and, in their extremer, mystical forms, represent "the limit of abhorrence of the anthropic element in knowledge" (I, 320). Though Tennant is definitely more tenderly disposed toward mysticism than toward rationalism, however, he finds that its claims are so dubious as to be worthless as evi dence , at least at this stage of the ordo cognoscendi. But he is quick to add reassuringly that This is not to deny that the mystic’s claim is valid, but that he has no means of knowing it to be, any more than have we non-mystics. (l“ 325) He does not, of course, deny the subjective experience of the mystic nor its actuality qua experience; but he finds good reason to doubt the significance and meaning read into it by the subject. The mystic’s claims must be evaluated in terms of a distinction that Tennant often appeals to in the course of his analysis: that between the "psychic" ( ' \ f r ) and the "psychological" (ps) standpoints. I, 306-307, italics ours. Tennant devotes an entire chapter to a consideration of the noetic claims of reli gious experience (I, Chap. xii). 171 The standpoint of the mystic is "psychic" C^O , as is that of the naive perceiver: At the moment of perceiving a thing, ^writes TennantJ, we are unaware of performing synthetic activities: from the standpoint of our experience at that moment, the perception is immediate; and the percept has the unity, simplicity and instantaneousness of a flash- photograph. The whole act does not seem other than unanalysable, and unconditioned by previous experience. From the standpoint of the psychologist, however, whether another person or oneself, afterwards reflecting on that experience, the perception is neither simple nor immedi ate. (I, 46) In evaluating the mystic, the latter, or "psychologi cal" (£s) standpoint must be taken. From this perspective the mystic's certainty appears as mere psychological certi tude, and the certainty of the experience taken as mere datum is seen to have transmuted illicitly into a cer tainty with respect to its meaning and significance as well. Moreover, the sense of immediacy of its deliver ances is seen to be no more veridical than that of the immediacy of perception, which the Ames Demonstrations have exposed and shown to involve processes of such com plexity that they put the best modern electronic computers to shame (see above, pp. 143-154). Tennant concludes that, Its immediacy is not necessarily more than unawareness, at the moment, as to the dependence of one's experience on previous conditionings, familiar suppositions, infer ential complements. . . . We have become adepts at reading-in so that it appears to be done by us, so to speak, "at sight." (I, 318) This "reading-in" can hardly be dependable inasmuch as it is always done "by aid of a concept already to hand" (1,318). 172 The numinous Real, [writes TennantJ, is indeterminate enough to enter equally well into a multitude of diverse mythologies and religions. (I, 309) The various kinds of oriental mystic, the neoplatonic Christian, the anthropomorphically-minded Spanish saint, when severally expounding their mystic revelations, do so exclusively in terms of the doctrinal or metaphysical system in which they have respectively been brought up. (I, 319-320) Indeed such cognitive systems, at least in their incipient form, are the precondition for the rise of those overtones of normal experience that render it essentially religious (I, 331). Historically it has proven true that "He that would come to God must first believe that He is" (I, 327); i.e., he must have some theology. But if "cognitive pre supposition" and "affective response" develop pari passu, it is vain to take the one as evidence of the other. In any case, these cognitive systems are so mutually contra dictory as to render the noetic elements of mysticism too confusing to serve as evidence. On the other hand, when religious experiences are isolated from the accidents of interpretation and are con sidered by themselves, it is just those types of experience which claim to be the most revelatory that then become the most ineffable. Such experiences, devoid of their form, can hardly be regarded as truth; they just are, as datum. In Tennant*s opinion "the experiences vouch nothing beyond their own occurrence; they are devoid of significance for * knowledge*" (I, 317). For truth is not mere datum, but 173 rather it is by definition a relation of which one of the relata is a cognitive proposition, hardly to be regarded as ineffable. If nascent mystical experience were a revelation of any truths at all, it would be those of monism and opti mism (I, 320). Any other "truths," though knowable, perhaps, to the mystic himself, can be vouched for by no one else, being essentially incommunicable. With refer ence to monism, Tennant declares that we would do well to call nonsense by its name . . .for the awareness of this "oneness" is attributed to what cannot have awareness, if no longer an ego, even if it be other than a nonentity; and the awareness is the Absolute’s, not the mystic’s, if he has to become the Absolute, in order to acquire it. (I, 320) But optimism is equally ambiguous, for it can be as easily elicited by the imaginal or the ideal, as by the Real, provided only that the former are believed to be real (I, 310 and 330). Here again Tennant is presumably aware of the danger (which was also in rationalism) of committing the ontological fallacy, which, in this case, would iden tify either the imaginal object (o), or the ideal Object (O) with the real or ontal object (W); or of committing the semantic fallacy by taking these as vouchers for a Beyond. Such vouchers may be honored in due time; but Tennant feels that at this stage in the ordo cognoscendi, the evidence for judging that they are veridical is definitely inconclusive. 174 If mystical experience is to bear any burden of proof, its Cps) quale should differ significantly from that of states inducible by purely psychological methods. But actually mystical experience, as Tennant points out, has much in common with "anaesthetic revelation," crystal- gazing, and the effects of hypnosis and of drugs such as hashish and nitrous oxide (I, 322-324). These not only induce auditory and visual hallucinations, but they also produce feelings of enhanced significance and alleged insights of "the deepest cosmic truth" (I, 322). Other clinical phenomena, less widely known in Tennant*s day, can now be cited in support of his thesis that psycholog ical methods can closely duplicate the quale of the mysti cal state. The psychic effects of mescaline and lysergic acid have already been dealt with (above, pp. 75 and 99-101). To these may be added those types of anaesthesia which obliterate the body-image and thus give rise to feelings that parallel the mystical experiences of loss of individ uality and absorption into the All (see above, pp. 83-8 4 ). Distortions of the perceptive process are also known in which all colors are separated from their forms and the latter are seen as though through a colored mist.12 12A. Gelb and K. Goldstein, "Ueber den Wegfall der Wahrnehmung von *0berflachenfarben,1" Zeitschrift fur Psychologie, 84:193-257, 1920. One of Gelb's two patients reported that everything looked "fuzzy and soft," and that 175 This is but one instance in a class of disorders that give rise to feelings of unreality or depersonalization. It is not surprising, then, that the doctrine of Maya, or illu sion, is widely entertained among the half-starved mystics of the East, whose bodies and minds are biochemically and psychologically predisposed to experiences of this kind. These psychological simulations of mystical experience expose it to the charge that it is purely subjective and, in fact, pathological. These charges are squarely faced, however, by the most honored champion of mysticism in the West, Professor Rufus M. Jones: But here we are confronted with the caveat of the psychologist that these experiences of the mystics are only subjective phenomena, lacking objective reference, and that they, further, are dubious because they are in many cases pathological phenomena and heavily weighted with illusion, hallucination, wishful thinking and auto suggestion. . . . It is true that there is a serious pathological fac tor to be faced in the biographies and the autobiogra phies of many of the mystics of history. . . . Mystics are, like most persons of genius, not tightly organized and they are inclined to be influenced by the fringe and marginal consciousness . . . to veer away from the habitual and to have novelty and freshness. This would mean that they might well be more subject to trance and ecstasy and hypnoidal conditions than are normal persons, but it might also mean that they would be more likely, when at their best, to be sensitive to an Over-World of Reality and more likely to be the organs of fresh revela tions of it. It is a notable fact that their experiences . . . usually, result in a unification of personality, he "had to reach into the colour in order to touch the sur face of a coloured object" (David Katz, The World of Colour, trans* R. B. MacLeod and C. W. Fox tLondon, T935]], P- 14;. 176 in a great increase of dynamic quality--a power to stand the"- universe— and in a recovery of health and normality.*-^ With regard to "this charge of subjectivity," Prof. Jones observes that The purely empirical, or phenomenalist, psychologist . . . finds himself admittedly, in his psychological method, shut up to a study of mental phenomena. . . . He has no legitimate way, with his basic theory, of getting out of this "ego-centric predicament" and of establishing the validity of any objects beyond the "spectator mind.” He lacks a sound philosophical basis for the objective validity of any kind of experience, even of the world of sense-experience. (Jones, p. 262, last italics ours) Veridical experiences of reasoning, perceiving, and evalu ating are probably approximated by counterfeit and illu sion as often as are those of mysticism. Yet we do not reject them on this account, for there still exists an alogical presumption in favor of the faith which we exer cise in the validity of knowledge in general. The problem is more serious in the case of mystical experiences, for simulations of these states by chemical or psychological means are harder to distinguish from whatever genuine mysticism may exist than are, for example, simulations of veridical perception; but the problem is not different in kind. The existence of these simulations is definitely significant; but they must not be allowed to weigh too heavily against the validity of mysticism, for otherwise we are plunged into total skepticism. l^The Flowering of Mysticism (New York, 1939), pp. 260- 261. Quoted by permission of The Macmillan Company. 177 At this juncture, however, Tennant tries to make the further point that the objective fundaments of mysticism are not of the same epistemological nature or status as sensa. . . . Sensa can be conceptualised into common Objects, while the mystical fundamenta, of the kind now under con sideration, cannot. (Tennant, I, 316) Students of mysticism agree with Tennant that its prime fundamenta cannot be conceptualized, that they are indeed ineffable; but so are some types of sensa. In asserting that all "sensa can be conceptualised into common Objects," Tennant unduly circumscribes the denotation of "sensa." He seems to overlook the vaguer types of sensibility, such as hunger, fatigue, nausea and dizziness, and the various affective states, as depression and euphoria, not to men tion the weirder forms of awareness induced by the hal lucinogenic drugs. Being non-visual and formless, these experiences are all ineffable in varying degrees; yet all are sensate in nature, or sense-derived. Indeed, the fact that some experiences, although reducible to psychology, are nonetheless ineffable is implied in Russell Brain's suggestion that every scholar working on the philosophy of perception should at some time in his life have taken an hallucinogenic drug in order to obtain a first-hand acquaintance with the ineffable quale of schizophrenic 178 states of awareness.^ If the acknowledged types of sensatio are thus expanded to include these more subtle modes of awareness, it would seem that most, if not all, types of mystical experience qualify as data even under the restrictions imposed by Tennant’s epistemology. In any case, the noetic values of religion are scarcely impoverished by confining our attention to the more "beggarly” elements of mysticism, which Tennant classes as "psychic phenomena": visions, auditions, etc. . . . As a matter of history, Che writes], it is from such phenomena that the main contribution of mystical and prophetic insight to religion and theology, is derived. The higher raptness, apart from what is really brought to it from the sphere of ordinary knowledge, as inter pretative means, has yielded little illumination or none; though its affective factor has done much to promote personal sanctity and practical devotion. (I, 323) In this connection Smythies observes in his Analysis of Perception that the person who experiences an hallucina tion seldom says, "I thought," or "I imagined"; instead he says "I saw"; and he means this quite literally (p. 98). If Tennant is subject to criticism in contending that the epistemological quality of the mystical fundamenta is different from that of sensa, his doubts, on the other hand, about the ontal reference of hallucinatory sensa are 14»tpreface," in J. R. Smythies, Analysis of Percep tion, International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method (New York, 1956), p. vii. 179 quite justifiable. It is clear that these sensa are only loosely controlled, if at all, by present physical stimuli. Indeed, there are cases on record (for what they are worth) where sensa are apparently controlled by the physical con ditions of the distant past.-*-5 In the phenomenon of syn- aesthesia, as described from first-hand experience by the psychiatrist Keith S. Ditman, aesthetic visual hallucina tions are kaleidoscopically variegated under the control of the cadences of a musical score heard as the visions develop.Heinrich Klviver reports that apparent movements induced in the visual field by mescaline depend on the type of object: Small objects are more easily displaced than large ones; objects which together with their surroundings form an optical "whole" . . . are less likely to move; . . . objects the appearance of which gives the impression of weight are less likely to be displaced than those which appear light. 7 See, for example, the case of J. S. Spence, who reports that on March, 1938, he had an hallucination of a fresh-appearing wall extending out toward the sea, but that as he followed beside it he slipped down a cliff which he had not perceived and found that the wall now appeared very old and overgrown with vegetation and that the cliff was eroded much further into the headland than the position at which it had been hallucinated ("A Case of Apparent Retro- cognition," Journal of the Society for Psychical Research, _ . ^ 7 „■»■■■ ■ mi m n\ ....- ' * ■■■—■ i ■ ■ ■ 7 34:74-80, June-July, 194? ). ■^Interview with the author, Spring, 1957. Cf. also several references above (p. lOln. • * - 7Mescal, Psyche Miniatures, G.S., No. 22 (London, 1928), p. 86. 180 These sensa are so amenable to suggestion that they can hardly be regarded as dependable revelations of physical reality. Indeed, to expect this of them is to miss the point entirely. The mystic himself does not regard them as veridical in that sense, but only in the sense that they are the semantic media through which a message is conveyed from other minds; in particular he regards them as vehicles for the symbolic self-revelation of the Divine Mind. On the contrary, Tennant objects with his usual sober reserve that if these visions and auditions are image-representations of intelligible or supra-intelligible truth. . . . there seems to be no ground, in these experiences themselves and the methods pursued to induce them. . . .for the belief that the mystic’s visions are veridical. (I, 324) If then we cannot, without begging the question at issue, positively repudiate the mystic's claim, and so must leave him invulnerable as to his private convic tion, we can also leave him powerless to substantiate his claim. And we can indulge reasonable doubt as to his own interpretation of his experience, because another, a sufficient and a natural, explanation of it lies to hand. (I, 318-319) If Tennant’s skepticism is justifiable in principle, as it evidently is, it is nonetheless true that, with our improved knowledge of psychology, we are in a better posi tion today than ever before to appreciate how well these sensa are adapted to be the media of Divine communication, if such should prove to exist. For as we have seen, these sensa are readily amenable to control by music, or by 181 hypnosis and autosuggestion; and this fact would seem to create at least a presumption in favor of a similar plas ticity to whatever impressions there may be from God him self, a presumption which Tennant has overlooked. Such a presumption, however, must be classed as merely circum stantial, and Tennant is rightfully wary of using it as evidence at the present stage in the ordo cognoscendi. In condemning such "short cuts of ’immediacy,'" Tennant avoids misunderstanding by clearly defining his position: We may believe in the Beyond, or in God, on less direct grounds reached by more circuitous paths; and then reasonably interpret numinous or religious experi ence in terms of the theistic concept and world-view: on the way back, so to say, as distinguished from the way out. (I, 311) If "the validity of religious experience" . . . is to be established, it must be as reasonable inference from discursive "knowledge" about the world, human history, the soul with its faculties and capacities; and above all, from knowledge of the interconnexions between such items of knowledge. Thence alone are derived the notions of the numinous, the supersensible, the supernatural, and the theistic idea of God. (I, 325) Thus the subtitle of Tennant's second volume is "The World, the Soul, and God"; and its climax, as has been repeatedly stressed above, is the chapter on cosmic tele ology, "The Empirical Approach to Theism" (II, Chap. iv). CHAPTER VI THE EMPIRICAL APPROACH TO THEISM: COSMIC TELEOLOGY The Task of Explaining the World At the present stage in the ordo cognoscendi, Tennant's strict empiricism leaves him deprived of all the arguments of rationalistic theology (the ontological and cosmological proofs) and of all the evidence of religious experience, both normative and mystical. His first volume has led to the conclusion that brute sensatio is the exclusive source of the data that can be viewed as valid in building a reli gious Weltanschauung. Thus the final result of the restric tions that Tennant imposes upon himself is that the full burden of his quest is placed upon the only approach which he regards as adequately empirical, viz., that of the teleo- logical proof. In order to formulate a synoptic hypothesis that will reduce experience to a coherent and meaningful pattern, Tennant’s first and principal task is then, as he says, to address himself, without any presuppositions, to the question of "how the world, including man, is to be explained."^ The purpose of the present chapter is to ^Philosophical Theology, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Eng., 1935-1937), II, 76. 182 provide a brief exposition of Tennant’s effort to answer this question. The critical examination of his position in the light of recent scientific developments will be O reserved for later chapters. At present it is necessary merely to outline the train of thought that prompts him to appeal to teleological categories of explanation and even tually to adopt the synoptic hypothesis of theism. The first significant generalization that arises from Tennant’s effort to explain the world is its striking con formity to law. Presumably the world could just as well have been an utter chaos in which any conceivable event might follow upon any other and all relations would be external and ephemeral. But instead, the world is a cosmos and is quite amenable to scientific inquiry (Tennant, II, 82 and 104). This law-abidingness is not prescriptive, as it is in man-made laws; nor is it entirely imposed upon the world by the a priori forms of the understanding, or by the selectivity of the mind. According to Tennant, The truth, then, would seem to be that the laws of Nature are Subjective or anthropic in so far as their imagery and their conceptual formulation are concerned, but no further. Our time-span and tempo, the range of our senses, our choice of space-metric, our ’’ real" cate gories and stock of previous ideas, are involved in all such formulation. . . . Nevertheless, phenomenal Nature is so constituted as to admit oi routine-formulae and physical constants being applied to some of her processes and that fact . . , could not be forthcoming if in the ontal realm there were not at least as much of regularity nexus as science will ever discover in the phenomenal ^See below, Part III, pp. 239-378. world. (II, 12-13, italics ours) If things per se of some kind must be invoked to account for tne emergence of perceptual objects, it seems arbitrary to deny the need to invoke them for explaining the equally objective relations that subsist between per cepts, and to refuse to things per se the conformity to law that our conceptualised percepts evince. (II, 11) The type of law that nature manifests is not that envisioned by the rationalist or by the fatalist, in which necessity and universality subsist. Such a viewpoint "involves a form of the ontological fallacy" (II, 19). The reign of law as such is not in dispute; but its uni versality must, at best, be regarded only as "a teleologi- cal device" or regulative principle, "a methodological postulate" (II, 21-22). Tennant admits that Within limits the device has been highly successful; but there is no a priori necessity that it should be. The only necessity . . . is its needfulness for the persis tent— and quixotic--endeavor of theoretical science to rationalise completely a world that obviously and admit tedly is irrational enough to reveal its secrets only to experimental, as contrasted with synthetic and deductive inquiry. (II, 21) In denying the a priori universality of law, Tennant, as mentioned above, is far from denying the brute fact of "regularity evocative of law" (II, 22). Indeed, he takes this fact as "science's first indication of a call for theistic interpretation" (II, vii). In the relatively settled order of Nature, Che writesj, we may see the first link of the chain of facts which, while they do not logically demand, nevertheless 185 cumulatively suggest as reasonable, the teleological interpretation in which theism essentially consists.3 Tennant himself discusses at length what seems to him ! jto be the chief alternative to the theistic interpretation of order, viz., that of mechanical science. In a chapter on 1 , Law and Mechanism," he raises the question whether the method of theoretical physics, pursued with the strict exclusiveness that is essential for science, is capable of leading to ontology of any kind, and in particular, whether it can lead to a mechanistic ontology (II, 25). He accuses Cartesian rationalism of defeating itself by leading to a pure or a priori kinemat ics , "to absorbing mechanics and physics into the pure sciences"; whereas Newtonian empiricism, with its appeal to force and inertia, leads to the more defensible view point of an applied dynamics (II, 27). Yet Newtonian mechanics in turn falls short of the empirical ideal in that it formulates pure and precise laws where only approximate formulae are actually admissible; consequently, it becomes timeless and abstract, soaring "on wings of extrapolation and idealisation far above our empirical ken" (II, 33). Newton*s first hope was that it should ultimately become possible ■*11, 23. It is doubtful whether this appeal to the nineteenth-century concept of "the order of nature" will withstand a more up-to-date criticism. At present, how ever, our concern is purely expository. 186 to replace all physical properties by their mechanical equivalents, i.e., by masses, velocities, and geometrical configurations (II, 32). But this is utterly impossible; for, as Tennant points out, The complexity of the calculations, not to speak of the analysis of a molar body into Actual particles equivalent to ideal mass-points, would surpass human powers. We cannot proceed synthetically, by compounding the motions of microscopic elements, to physics of molar phenomena. (II, 36) The alternative is to dispense with microscopic par ticles and to treat molar bodies as continuous. The attempt of d'Alembert to formulate a dynamics of this sort led to ’’ the analytic method, which sets out from empirical data to discover their analytical conditions" (II, 36). In the hands of Lagrange and Hamilton this analytical dynamics was presented in the form of differential equa tions. These equations express relations that are rigidly mechanical on the molar level. But C. D. Broad has shown, in an article that is cited approvingly by Tennant, that on the microscopic level they can still remain valid even when they are not interpreted in the stricter sense (II, 41). This means that even within the framework of the Lagrangean equations it is quite possible to repudiate the only form of mechanism that conflicts with teleological explanation. For such a mechanism must be so thoroughgoing as to apply also to "the hypothetical atomic and sub-atomic entities of which theoretical physics treats" (II, 40). 187 But this, which was Newton's first hope, is regarded by Tennant as vain. It suffices to affirm, Che writes^ , that the relations, expressed in the equations of science, subsist between the unknown outa of nature as they do between our imag ined or conceived mikra . . . ; but it is gratuitous to cherish the further belief that the mikra are identical with the onta. The mikra of theoretical physics are ideal constructions; and such theories of matter as that of Lord Kelvin, which defines it as a type of motion within a perfect fluid, are indeterminate abstractions (II, 46). ■Whether the envisioned mikra, and the mechanical rela tions that are assumed to obtain between them, have onto logical counterparts is not for science to say (II, 43). As a metaphysician, however, Tennant ventures to assert rather firmly that such abstractions} _ being ultimately analyzable into space, time, and mass, with which alone rigid mechanism should work, cannot yield the Actual, the ontal, or the substantial. . . . Without the substantial we may have II, 45. Sir Arthur S. Eddington, in his discussion of the special kind of higher algebra that is used in quan tum mechanics ("theory of groups"), explains that "Out of the unknown activities of unknown agents mathe matical numbers emerge. . . . How in these conditions," he asks, "can we arrive at any knowledge at all? We must seek a knowledge which is neither of actors nor of actions, but of which the actors and actions are a vehicle. The knowledge we can acquire is knowledge of a structure or pattern contained in the actions." (New Pathways in Science, Messenger Lectures: 1934 CNew Yorlc, 1455J / pp. 255-557) 183 rigid mechanism and kinematics; with it we may have physics that is not mechanics, and metaphysics that is not physics. (II, 46) In short, "the only science that can be rigidly mechanical is a pure science, not physics or science of Nature"; yet the latter is the only discipline that could possibly point to the Real (II, 49-50). Newtonian science has thus been disappointed in its first hope, the expectation of deriving all phenomena from purely mechanical principles; for our only sure knowledge of these principles pertains to their operation on the molar scale alone. But Newton also expressed the alterna tive hope that his Principia might lead to "some truer C method of philosophy." Believing that this, which was Newton’s second hope, may yet be fulfilled, in default of his former hope, Tennant extends his quest beyond the pat tern of meaningful explanation provided by the prophetic insights of science; for, in the words of James Ward, "Science might have finished its work and yet be a fool."6 A more penetrating mode of explanation must therefore be employed. Tennant considers various types of explana tion: assimilability to an apperceptive system, reduction to the familiar or causal derivation from it, amenability 5Sir Isaac Newton’s Mathematical Principles, trans. A. Motte and rev. F. Cajori (Berkeley, 1934), p. xviii. 6Quoted in Tennant, II, 53. 189 to logical or mathematical description, or transparency in terms of the formal categories of the understanding. But these rationalistic modes of explanation are inadequate i until they are supplemented by an appeal to the "real" categories, such as those of substance or permanence (II, 58). But then the problem arises of choosing the ulti- mates that will function as explicans. If the criteria of choice should be simplicity and clearness and immutability, these are obviously anthropic categories which are drafted into use not from the disinterested desire to transcribe Nature as she Really is, but from the desire to satisfy a par ticular, and a specifically human, need. We wish so to be able to regard the world, or so to make it intelli gible, that we shall not feel "intellectually" lost, but at home, in it. . . . The philosophy to which we betake ourselves is not an explanation of the world, but a satisfaction of our wishes and predilections. (II, 62) That mode of explanation which consists in the "sub stitution of ultimate or metaphysical truth for phenomenal symbolism" (II, 63), however, is in a different class. But, as shown above, science as such is incapable of yielding this desideratum. By limiting itself to pure description, in terms of an elaborate system of symbols, science effects an economy of thought; but such a descriptionism is super ficial from the standpoint of philosophy and cannot vouch for the continued validity of these system-relations when transposed from the phenomenal to the ontal (II, 65). Any such voucher must derive from an appeal to the "real" 190 categories, and not to such principles as Ockham’s razor, which Tennant disparages as a case of "setting up conceits in Nature's stead" (II, 68). In the sciences of biology, psychology, and history, categories of a higher order are required in order to banish the area of inexplicability that remains when nature is treated merely as naturata. For in these fields, as Tennant says, the explicanda are not quantitative . . . but qualita tive*; and they can only be made "intelligible" by means of analogical assimilation with the more familiar. (II, 68) At this stage in the process of explanation, the categories which suggest themselves are those, such as "conation," "formative principle," and "teleology" or "purposiveness," which derive from analogy with our own subjective states (II, 68; cjf. also p. viii) . If, as Tennant believes, an empirical explanation of the world is inadequate except by appealing to such anthropic categories as these, this creates a presumption in favor of personalistic theism as a synoptic hypothesis worthy of serious consideration. A complete explanation of the world should include an interpretation of the "rationality," that both scientists and theologians have commonly attributed to it. The Pla tonic and formalistic interpretations of this phrase are summarily rejected by Tennant, for in each of these there remains an alogical residue that is needed to render its 191 ideas and relations specific or determinate. Alogical "terms** must be invoked, for example, to function as relata, and these call for interpretation by the dynamic categories of "substance" and of "cause," which Kant derives from the material and efficient causes of Aristotle (Tennant, II, 73-74). If now the rationality of the world be conceived as causal explicability, it is important to observe again, with Tennant, that The causal category is not logomorphic but anthropic in origin. . . . For causal explanation depends on pragmatic verification, not on logical certification, and so far is in the same case with teleological explanation. (II, 75) Moreover, it should be noted that both types of explana tion are imputed and not read-off. If the world is to be regarded as rational, then, it is only so in the broader sense of alogical reasonableness (II, 75). Within the pattern of this type of rationality, there is place for appeal to such anthropic and personal- istic categories as those referred to above. Thus Tennant, appealing in particular to the teleological mode of expla nation, sets out to fulfill Newton*s second hope of "some truer method of philosophy." If Newton was obscure as to what such a method might be, Tennant believes that it must involve an empirical approach which "relies on the inter connexion and cumulativeness of the facts which suggest cosmic design" (II, 45). Accordingly, the most significant chapter in the writings of Tennant is that which he 192 appropriately entitled ’’ The Empirical Approach to Theism: Cosmic Teleology"(II, Chap. iv, pp. 78-120). It is with a deep sense of respect, which we feel is due to a scholar of the stature of Tennant, that we devote the rest of this work to the critical evaluation of this one most crucial chapter. The Argument from Cosmic Teleology One can hardly read the works of F. R. Tennant with out admiring the breadth of the scholarly resources which he holds at his command. He gives the impression of being as thoroughly at home in theoretical physics as in philos ophy and theology. It is significant, then, that after devoting his life to diligent study in these various dis ciplines, he arrives at the mature conclusion that the most satisfying explanation of the universe at large lies in ”a wider teleology," to which the lcnowable world bears witness and which lends itself to interpretation in terms of a Divine Designer (II, 79). In contrast to the type of teleology that is represented by William Paley and the Bridgewater Treatises, Tennant asserts that The forcibleness of Nature’s suggestion that she is the outcome of intelligent design lies not in particular cases of adaptedness in the world, nor even in the multi plicity of them. It . . . consists rather in the *7 "Natural Theology," in Paley*s Natural Theology and Horae Paulinae (New York, n.d.); and Davies Gilbert (ed.), Bridgewater treatises, 12 vols. (London, 1833-1836). 193 conspiration of innumerable causes to produce, by their united and reciprocal action, and to maintain, a general order of Nature. (II, 79) The fields of empirical fact that are amenable to interpretation in terms of intelligent design are literally cosmic in scope. For the cosmic teleologist, however, the particular facts and specific laws which they suggest are not as significant as the mutual adaptations which these broader fields of data exhibit toward one another. Within each general field there is a specific teleology of restric ted scope and limited (or even spurious) validity; but taken collectively in their interconnectedness, these fields as such provide "a forcible cumulative theistic argument" (II, ix). The first such fields to be considered as displaying an adaptive interrelationship are those of thought and of things (II, 81). Tennant is here concerned not with the marvelous capacities of mind, but with those of nature by which she comprises an intelligible cosmos that lends itself to systematic classification in terms of ideas that thought can manage. Conceivably the universe might have been a self-subsistent and determinate ’•chaos” in which simi lar events never occurred, none recurred, universals had no place, relations no fixity, things no nexus of deter mination, and "real" categories no foothold (II, 82; of. also p. 104). But instead our world is a cosmos. In itself this orderli ness, or adaptiveness to thought, could be conceived as 194 fortuitous, and the universe as a profusion of inexplica bilities. But such a pluralism is shrouded in mysteries (II, 82-83 and 104), of which perhaps the greatest is that anything exists at all (II, 104). This by itself conveys, at best, only a vague hint of theism: an economy of thought is effected when a multitude of inexplicabilities is reduced to one alone, i.e., to God, whom Whitehead has Q called "the last irrationality"; but this economy alone bears little weight. The hint of theism becomes less vague when the intelligibility of a cosmos, rather than the mere existence of a world of any sort, is the fact to be considered. . . . For over and above the forthcomingness, conceived as self-subsistence, of the many existents, is their adaptiveness. . . . This further particularises their determinateness and so bespeaks more of coincidence in the "fortuitous." (II, 105) For Tennant, however, the teleological suggestiveness evinced in the relation of thought to things lies not in the fact that phenomena readily lend themselves to formula tion into scientific knowledge, but in the more striking fact that "Nature evokes thought of a richer kind"--of beauty, of value, of goodness, of love--"thus suggesting a Beyond" (II, 83). If, as Tennant concludes, this be due to an intelligent Creator designing the world to be a theatre for rational life, mystery is minimized, and a possible and sufficient reason is assigned (II, 105) . 8Tennant, II, 74 and 104-105. 195 It is in the biological realm, however, that the con cept of "adaptation” comes into its own and the notion of "orderliness" blossoms into that of organization and whole ness. While these organismic conceptions are largely explainable on the higher levels of life in terms of mind, this type of explanation is, to say the least, less obvious ion the lower levels. The individual adaptations of plant- life, for instance, can hardly be regarded as the artifacts of any mind external to them, nor of designing minds transcending those of human engineers, yet lodged in the organisms themselves. . . . This adaptiveness . . . is Zweckmassigkeit ohne Zweck, and therefore not teleologi- cal at all. (II, 69-70) Thus the existence of organic wholes in Nature does not of itself directly imply that Nature is an organic whole, and has no relevance to world-teleology or design unless some further bond of connexion is found. (II, 71) It is the considered opinion of Tennant that the concept of teleology should be confined entirely to cases involving agents or souls, in which the end achieved is not merely a temporally last stage of a series but an end that was preconceived, and whose actualisation was inten ded (II, 72) . This means that all "teleological mechanisms," such as those of Rosenblueth, Frank, and their associates,^ are ruled out of court, except in the sense that the teleology ^A. Rosenblueth, N. Wiener, and J. Bigelow, "Behavior, Purpose and Teleology," Philosophy of Science, 10:18-24, January 1943; and L. K. Frank and others, "Teleological Mechanisms," Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 504:187-278, October 13, 1948. 196 I jor purposiveness is attributed to their human artificers, for these gadgets by themselves have no foresight nor inten- i i jtion. If the same can be said of living organisms with i regard to their own evolution, i.e., that they possess no i jforesight nor intention of the direction in which they shall evolve, it can then be maintained (rather prematurely, j as Tennant believes) that their teleological adaptiveness is the work of a super-human artificer (II, 70-73). As a matter of historical fact the principal argument for theistic design has rested largely upon this same type of reasoning, based upon the host of specific instances of intricate adaptation in particular organs or organisms in nature; and the adaptiveness of the eye was the most notable example cited. In the eighteenth century, when these adaptations were regarded as ready-made at creation, the argument leading to a wise and resourceful Creator seemed forceful indeed, so that Paley's formulation of these proofs became classic.^-0 It is Tennant's conviction, on the other hand, that Darwin cut the nerve of Paley's teleology by showing that proximate mechanical causes and natural selection are adequate to account for particular *-°"Natural Theology." See above, p. I92n, where the SBridgewater Treatises are also cited. I 197 adaptations.*'1 - His doctrine of organic evolution seemed to i I have subdued the last strongholds of the teleologist, the realms of life and of mind. In the wake of this disillusionment, however, there i i arose a school of theists who began to see in evolution itself a teleology of a grander sort which does not set out from the particular adaptations in indi vidual organisms or species so much as from considera tions as to the progressiveness of the evolutionary process and as to the organic realm as a whole (II, 84). ‘This new viewpoint, instead of undermining theism, now became the stimulus for a revival of belief in the imma nence of God, and instead of discomfiting the teleologist, i I lit merely caused him to shift his ground from special design in the products to directivity in the process, and plan in the primary collocations (II, 85). Although each evolutionary change, taken singillatim, like a throw of seven-eleven, can perhaps be referred to natural causes, such explanation becomes much more dubious when organic nature, like a long run of seven-elevens, "secures not only self-conservation but also progress . . . that admits of valuation" (II, 106-107). In his stress on the steady advance discernible in cosmic development, Ten nant discloses his heritage of Hebrew concern for the j 1*-This issue calls for the discrimination of two dis tinctly different modes of evolution. Thus Tennant*s icapitulation to Darwinism was premature, as is shown below ■(pp. 372-376). 1 198 [temporal, as compared with the Greek love of the timeless and formal. Thus Tennant, in the spirit of Archibald I Allan Bowman’s Sacramental Universe. reads his teleology t jnot in the universal and the formal, but in the alogical i |determinateness of the concrete and historical (II, 111). |The overall fact that life is plastic and progressive sug- jgests that external design may need to be invoked, particu- i jlarly when the essential role of the environment is fairly assessed. For such overall purposiveness can hardly be referred to natural causes, nor to internal or unconscious purpose, as Tennant concludes after careful discussion of these possibilities. Emergents ’'here," points outj seem to ’’take note of," or be relevant to, causally unconnected emergents "there," in both space and time, since an elaborate interlacing of contingencies is requisite to secure inor ganic Nature’s adaptedness to be a theatre of life. . . . It is not so much the progressiveness displayed in the world-process as the intricate and harmonious intercon nexion, rendering progress, intelligibility and intelli gence, etc., possible, that in its marvelousness suggests intelligent art. (II, 110-111) If former teleologies may be likened to a chain, which is as weak as its weakest link, Tennant claims that cosmic teleology is more fittingly compared to a coat of armor, whose strength consists in the wealth of interconnections l^Ed. J. W. Scott, Vanuxem Lectures (Princeton, 1939). Bowman’s viewpoint is summarized on his pages 9-10, and the relation which exists between God and the universe is dis cussed on pages 368-372. 199 ibetween its elements, which link with their neighbors in all directions (II, 104). Much of the strength of the modern teleologist’s armor ;lies in the interadaptiveness of organic and inorganic inature. So far, only the Darwinian fitness of the organic i to the inorganic has been discussed. But Tennant calls ! (attention to the fact, so richly documented by Professor iLawrence J. Henderson,^ that ’’ the inorganic environment is as plainly adapted to life as living creatures -are to their environment," and that this makes the relation recip rocal (Tennant, II, 86-87). There is one unique advantage that can be gained from a study of the reverse relation ship, i.e., of the fitness of the environment for life, or its biocentricity. The advantage is that such a study iso lates the problem of cosmic teleology from its confusing association with the formative principles of organisms, which he thinks are non-teleological. The striking fact is that although the environment long antedates the appear ance of life, it displays a remarkable coincidence of prop erties, astronomical, thermal, and chemical, which suggest that the universe has been intentionally prepared to be a theatre for the drama of life. Tennant refers to Hender son’s charts, which compare water, carbon dioxide, and ^-3The Fitness of the Environment (New York, 1913). A critique of Henderson*s work is given below (Chap. x, pp. 347-362). 200 i i jother biologically important substances with all likely (substitutes (to the immense advantage of the former), and I !concludes that Unique assemblages of unique properties on so vast a scale being thus essential to the maintenance of life, their forthcomingness makes the inorganic world seem in some respects comparable with an organism. (II, 86) i | William Ernest Hocking similarly comments on Hender- |son's work, and goes so far as to add that I | It is easy to imagine universes with slightly different proportions of these same materials--let us say a little more nitrogen and a little less carbon or oxygen--which would have rendered not only such organisms as we know but any organisms at all impossible.*^ |Scientists have long speculated that types of life undreamed of may exist in other worlds. A whole new organic chemis- ) try that is based upon silicon instead of on carbon, for example, is conceivable; or a world in which ammonia plays the part of water. But according to Tennant, these thinkers are evading the issue. The point is, Che writes}, that, for the existence of any forms of life that we may conceive, the necessary environ ment, whatever its nature, must be complex and dependent on a multiplicity of conditions, such as are not reason ably attributable to blind forces or to pure mechanism. (II, 87) It is therefore reasonable to claim that the physical uni verse is biocentric; and Tennant is willing, then, to indulge in the anthropic faith that this biocentricity is evidence of a cosmic purpose. l^Types of Philosophy, 3rd ed. (New York, 1959), p. 64. | 201 Besides her intelligibility and adaptedness, nature also evinces teleology, as Tennant now moves on to show, i |in that she is literally saturated with beauty. It matters 'little how beauty is conditioned or constructed by the sub- | I j e c t i v e , f o r i n a n y c a s e i t a r i s e s Mo u t o f r a p p o r t w i t h t h e ; O n t a l " (II, 89). If t h e o n t a l i s t h e n of s u c h n a t u r e t h a t j jminds can read in it an aesthetic, as well as a nomic, jorder, this fact is significant for cosmic teleology (II, 90). Tennant admits the precariousness of an argument that reads design, after the manner of Paley, in every specific ^instance of beauty; but he appeals here again to alogical probability (as he did in discussing adaptation) in order to evaluate the fact that nature not only possesses beauty, but that she is veritably saturated with it. The more fas tidious our aesthetic taste becomes, f,the more poignantly and the more lavishly does she gratify it" (II, 91). If we contrast the artefacts made by "human agency, seeking any end save beauty" with those of nature, "we might almost say the one never achieves, while the other never misses, the beautiful" (II, 91). As J. B. Mozley has written regarding nature, "in the very act of labouring as a machine, she also sleeps as a picture.Yet beauty is of no mechan ical use and has little survival value. Perhaps its great ^Sermons Preached before the University of Oxford . . . (New York, 1900), p. 123. j 202 f lvalue is revelational; for, as Tennant points out, "some men enter His Temple by the Gate Beautiful," where they learn that God is mindful of man (II, 93). | j If the human experience of beauty can enter into the i jfabric of a cosmic teleology, it is likewise probable that i moral experience has a similar significance to the tele- i jologist. But Tennant is critical of attempts "to extract iexistential truth from ethical principles" (II, 95). Moral aspirations can hardly avouch their own fulfillment. To be sure, if the universe coldly quenched every moral aspira tion, it would outrage our deepest sense of propriety. But whether nature is actually as decorous as this is the I very issue at point; for We can only argue from needs and aspirations to their fulfillment when we have established as a major premise, that the world is reasonable or . . . teleologically ordered. (II, 94) It follows that when Kant makes the claim that "oughtness- to-be" implies "can-be," and, in time, by God's help, implies "will-be," he "in principle employs the ontological argument in ethics after demolishing it in theology" (II, 97) . In order to avoid the ontological fallacy, Tennant appeals to the ethics of Professor Sorley, according to i whom, as Tennant says, Moral values subsist ultimately only in persons. . . . They hold of what persons are free to do and ought to do, £he adds]), of the ideal that it is possible for them ! 203 i j to actualise, of human potentialities. It is in this sense that . . . they supply the coping-stone of a cumu lative teleological argument for theism. (II, 100) This argument rests solidly upon the fact which Professor Pringle-Pattison has stressed, that ! , man is organic to the world'* (II, 100); and if man, with his moral sensitivities and values, is nature’s child, then nature must be, as Tennant puts it, ’’ the wonderful mother of such a child'*; |and he adds that ’’ any account of her which ignores the fact j jof her maternity is scientifically partial and philosophic- j ially insignificant** (II, 101). Though the world is, as |Huxley remarked, "no school of virtue," it is true, none theless, that the uniformity of natural law has maintained i a stable arena in which the moral drama can unfold, that "the non-moral cosmos . . . has . . . subserved the moral- isation of human souls, even when soliciting to carnality," and that in this respect nature reveals her Divine intent (II, 102-103). In brief, the five chief areas of "forthcoming fact" upon which Tennant draws in his empirical approach to the ism may be termed the epistemological, the organic, the inorganic, the aesthetic, and the moral. If one’s craving for explanation is satisfied by treating these areas merely las aggregates of facts, the data will prove logically inconclusive. But the Argonaut will press on in the quest land will view them synoptically in their concrete and j 204 i I ! I historical interrelatedness; and by this means he will i jachieve, as Tennant believes, a satisfying, though alogi- jcal, assurance that a personal God exists. i CHAPTER VII THE HYPOTHESIS OF THEISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS The Theology Emerging from Tennantfs Quest The empirical quest of Tennant began as a search for an adequate explanation of the world, of man, and of his- tory. Pursued through one-and-a-half volumes, always in strict adherence to the ordo cognoscendi, this religious I quest has now arrived at a synoptic hypothesis in which anthropic faith may reasonably rest. If Tennant*s quest had yielded atheistic results akin to those of one or janother of the pathways of the subjective quest, such as jthose of Freud, of Sartre, or of Ames and Leuba, his work would have remained philosophical to the end. As a matter of fact, however, his quest has issued in a theistic result ivery much akin to the results of the subjective quest as pursued by the mystics and intuitionists. For this reason his work now becomes, in part, a theology in the sense that a framework of tentatively accepted doctrine about God and his purposes now exists, which provides extensive scope for the testing of the system in terms of its internal logical I consistency. Moreover, since the system is similar to that qf historic Christianity, Tennant can now be more theologi- i leal in method in the sense that he can use more freely the 1 205 206 hints of truth which derive from the traditional literature I and can now appeal to a broader epistemological ideal— to that of coherence instead of mere sensatio. The methodol ogy of the present work necessarily shifts, then, from its inductive to its deductive phase. The reasoning by which i !Tennant arrived at the synoptic hypothesis of theism was t | jpurposely presented above in a purely expository manner, I jsince our critical evaluation is more appropriately reserved Ifor the stages of verification and reinterpretation.^ Before entering these final stages, however, it is iessential to develop the synoptic hypothesis in more detail land to draw whatever deductions logically follow if it is !assumed to be true. Many of the details of theology, ! though hotly debated by sectarians, are incidental to these purposes and will therefore be ignored; but certain car dinal points of theism, as such, are relevant and signifi cant. At the present point in the argument, any effort to trace through the thinking that lies behind Tennant’s per sonal credo is premature, since most of these issues will arise again in the process of verification. It is more appropriate at this stage merely to take over Tennant’s theology in toto and treat it as a plausible "curve” to ^See below, Part III. It should be recalled that the argument is intentionally following the "method of philo- sophical interpretation" as outlined by Brightman (see labove, p. 43). ' 207 apply to the empirical data and to test for goodness of ■f it -2 In expounding the theology of Tennant, it is important first of all to note that Tennant has rejected the concept j |of an unconscious cosmic purpose, because such an elan i |which possesses no intended cosmic goal, though seeming to t Jaim at one, would involve an incredible coincidence of I jevents yielding the illusion of concerted action where as i ia matter of fact there are no agents capable of collusion or of envisioning the steps in a cosmic plan.3 On the contrary, Tennant insists (as argued above) that his cos mic teleology shall imply, as G. Lloyd Morgan would have it,^ a cosmic goal and a cosmic Mind with foresight and intent. This immediately distinguishes Tennant's theology from all impersonalistic systems, in which God is regarded as the All, or as a principle, a force, or a collective unconsciousness; and from most systems which assert that God is "supra-personal." For if the latter concept con notes, as in actual usage it too often does, something essentially different from all that we mean by human personality, such as agency that is non-volitional, ^The use of this metaphor has been explained above (pp. 39-41). 3Philosophical Theology, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Eng., i935-i$37), if, w - n . ---- ^Emergent Evolution, The Gifford Lectures: 1922 (New York, 1527?, ppVT2-3-4'."- ! 208 1 ) j non-purposive, and non-ethical, the expression becomes a synonym for "impersonal," and must be rejected (Ten nant, II, 166). i jIf the term, "supra-personal," is used, however, without implying these negations, then God is indeed supra-personal inasmuch as He presumably possesses many predicates that i !transcend those of human personhood. I ! To Tennant, however, it is proper in spite of these I predicates to conceive of God in frankly anthropomorphic ■terms as a determinate, conscious Being possessing intel lect, emotion, and will; and to call him a Person, since He shares at least this much of His essence in common with man. His determinateness distinguishes him from the Abso lute and implies a certain degree of limitation, so that He is at least "restricted to consistency and compatibility in His action"; for if He possesses "a definite nature and mode of activity, other modes of being and conceivable or possible activities are ipso facto precluded" (II, 188). Though God has traditionally been regarded as infinite, Tennant views infinitude as "but an honorific epithet in theology," a concept that "is useless save in mathematics" (II, xi). The same is true of the concepts of metaphysical perfection and immutability, which were spawned by a pre tentious and rationalistic theology; since an empirical theology, in Tennant’s opinion, makes it quite clear that ethical perfectness is the only kind of perfection, and invariableness of purpose is the only kind of immutability, that can significantly be predicated of God (II, xi). : 209 i (Even the concept of eternity as applied to God is subject to criticism by an empirical psychology which cannot envision a non-temporal mode of experiencing. Indeed, if |God experiences no temporal flow of consciousness, Ke can hardly be conceived any longer as a person and certainly not as one who engages in a give and take of fellowship jwith man. In contrast to this improbable view of the eter- I i Inal, Tennant suggests that perhaps | duration and succession are unique modes of ontal as well as of phenomenal being . . . that becoming, not static perfection, is the fundamental nature of ail created Reality, and also of the life, as distinct from the "sub stance," of the Creator (II, 139). If God is a person it would seem inevitable that His I quiddity would be chiefly distinguished by moral qualities, either good or bad. These qualities are likely to be reflected in the nature of His handiwork, which should be acknowledged to include man and the whole realm of human values, both actual and (in a sense) potential, as well as i the physical and biological realms. If "Nature is the wonderful mother of such a child," or of such children, as Tennant supposes, Her character and purposes must be adjudged as good.^ Indeed, Tennant’s faith in the good ness of God has emboldened him to argue, with Leibniz, 5II, 101. This judgment is particularly sound if it is also supported by an adequate theodicy, such as Tennant ihas provided in his chapter on "The Problem of Evil” (II, jchap. vii, pp. 180-208). 210 that God has created for us ’ ’the best of all possible worlds” (II, 186-188). On the human level, love is rightly regarded as the ne plus ultra of ethical quality. It is not surprising, then, that empirical theology concurs with the Christian view that ”God is love” (I John iv.8); indeed, as Tennant puts it, "God is love which seeks reciprocation” (II, 185). I (Whether before the advent of man this love received expres- i i jsion within a "social” Godhead, as the Trinitarians have | maintained, or whether it remained potential--fact- jcontrolled theology cannot decide, nor does she deeply (care; for if, as Tennant holds, man possesses "the potency I (of indefinite advance in fellowship and communion with ;Him” (II, 166), this alone will provide the reciprocation that God seeks for His love. The creation of man will then appear, as Henri Bergson has so strikingly phrased it, "as God undertaking to create creators that He may have beside Himself beings worthy of His love.”6 It is signifi cant that in the final sentence of his Philosophical Theol ogy. Tennant asserts that "the cosmos is no logico- j geometrical scheme, but an adventure of divine love” (II, 259). The view that God is essentially lovingness; that (the cosmic process has as its goal the creation of personal 6The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, trans. jR. A. Audra and 6 . Brereton (New York, 1935),p. 243. Cf. (also Tennant, II, 189. 211 beings upon which to bestow, or with which to share, His |love; and that He is now in the process of uniting these ) *7 # beings into a "Beloved Community" 7 and making them truly lovable--this view of the meaning of the cosmic drama com mends itself to Tennant's judgment as a synoptic hypothesis that reduces the empirical data in their full inter- jrelatedness to a richer and more meaningful fabric of truth I than that provided by any rival view. t | ! This interpretation of the world is admittedly anthro- pocentric; for love, as Tennant understands it, "must !everywhere and always involve self-imparting and seeking ithe highest welfare of the beings on whom it is bestowed" (II, 185). It is to be expected, then, that a loving Creator will exert His utmost power to arrange His world iso that it will foster, the development of its own highest j values, which, as far as we know, are those potential in man. Tennant’s anthropocentricism does not assert that man . . . is the highest being under God, or the final stage of progressive cosmic evolution, or the end and the whole end of the divine design. It . . . rather means that, whereas in the realm of Nature beneath man no final purpose can be discerned, such pur pose may be discerned in beings possessed of rational ity, appreciation, self-determination, and morality. . . . In its essence, intelligence may be common to a hierar chy of beings; and it is in virtue of his membership in that hierarchy, if such there be, . . • that man shares the privilege of being . . . bound up with the otherwise ineffable divine purpose. (II, 113-114) 7 This expression is borrowed from Josiah Royce (Stuart IGerrv Brown, The Social Philosophy of Josiah Royce C(Syra cuse, N.Y.) 1950J, pp. 26-28). ! ' I 212 i j The fact that Tennant regards "the world-purpose of God to be a reign of love” (II, 205) that fosters the devel opment of moral intelligence suggests that the raison d’etre of the world is the production of a , f Beloved Community," |though he does not explicitly say this. J. W. Buckham was |in the spirit of Tennant, however, when he wrote that "per- i isonality is an essentially social entity and . . . cannot jbe attained save in a social order." As a matter of fact, Tennant tacitly recognizes the supreme ethical worth of a society when he seriously considers the possibility that I the Godhead Itself may be a society and not an individual Iperson (II, 168-172). How utopian the future life will be |can hardly be determined by an empirical theology, for there is little data from which to speculate; but Tennant feels that it is not inconsistent with the goodness of God to admit an asymptotically diminishing residue of evil as a permanent feature of the society of love (II, 195-196). It is relevant to add, however, that such a society must be more utopian than the Age of Pericles, for even this memorable society contained within itself the seeds of its own destruction, as Arnold J. Toynbee maintains when he dates the breakdown of Graeco-Roman culture in 431 B.C. at ^"Creating Creators: a Christian Theodicy," The Per- isonalist, 24:196, April 1943. 213 the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.9 Another debatable question arises from the distinction between the static and the dynamic views of the Good, to which Kelvin Van Nuys has called attention, viz.. the question whether the purpose of God lies in some "far off divine event,” or rather in the process itself by which man strives toward that goal.*-0 Again Tennant suspends his judgment (II, 118). But what ever the answers to these questions may be, it is true in any case that in Tennant1s theology, God's chief concern is for the hierarchy of moral intelligence, which is tacitly |assumed to reach its fruition in a comparatively utopian jsociety. I | Though Tennant declines to elaborate a theory of the i nature of this society, it is perhaps allowable to fill out i the synoptic hypothesis with data from religious tradition, I according to which the society would consist of a galaxy of noble personalities who have voluntarily yielded their wills to God and are therefore in harmonious fellowship with one another and with God by virtue of their common love for Him. These personalities would be working together with God as co-creators, evermore raising his creation to greater 9A Study of History: Abridgement of Volumes I-VI, jed. D. C. Somervell' TTtew York, 1 9 4 7 pp." 261-261. -------- l°Science and Cosmic Purpose (New York, 1949), jChap. iii, and pp. 195-197. 214 heights of glory and producing within its citizens quali ties of a higher order, perhaps, than the human mind can conceive, qualities such as Samuel Alexander would regard I as pertaining to Deity.^ j As a picture of the consummation of the purposes of i jGod, this description is admittedly highly speculative, |but it is not inconsistent with the potentialities empir ically discernible in religious personality as known to psychology. The picture has been presented chiefly as a means of stressing the fact that, if God has actually ienvisioned a goal which would be of such transcendent jvalue as that depicted above, it would seem to be worth | |almost any price that is required to bring it to fruition. I As we shall see, the price has been dear; and the cosmic development (of several billion years) that has occurred therefore lends itself to an interpretation which views it as a tragic drama of travail and vicarious suffering that ministers in part to such an end (see below, pp. 388- 389); for many of the processes involved in evolutionary progress have as their by-products bizarre forms of life which either suffer themselves and finally become extinct, or, through their parasitism, cause suffering in other ■^Space *Time • and Deity, The Gifford Lectures: 1916- 1918 (New York, 1$20) , II, 3^5-347. 215 12 living beings. The Determinate World-Plan Tennant explicitly adopts from Leibniz the bold sug gestion that God is creating "the best of all possible worlds," by which he means best in respect of moral worth, or of instrumentality thereto. . . . Certainly our world is not . . . the . . . happiest, or sensuously pleasantest. . . . Equally cer tainly, the theist maintains, it was not meant to be. If it were, it would not be truly the best; for . . . the world that is worthiest of God and man, must be a moral order, a theatre of moral life and love. Moral S character and moral progress must be its purpose, as | the best things which any world can realize. To dis- | pense with them would be, for the Creator, to prefer a j worse world. (II, 186) j I By supposing that such a moral order is God's chief con- | Icern, however, it is possible to argue further, as Tennant |does, that | To will a moral order . . . involves adoption of . . . a determinate world-plan . . . which secures that the world be a suitable stage for intelligent and ethical life. (II, 200-201) In such a cosmic plan, "this enigmatic world of ours" can be appropriately called "the vale of Soul-making," as the ^Tennant explicitly states, however, that anthro- ipocentrieism does not imply | "that lower creatures evolved in the world-process are necessarily of but instrumental value as stages or means to ends, and, when not figuring in man's geneological tree, are mere by-products in the making of humanity" (II, 114). I I It would be monstrous to assume that the lower animals are jnot also, in some degree, ends unto themselves as well. 216 poet Keats has so aptly expressed it.^ In the process of the plan as well as in its consummation, it seems that God has allowed the creature to be a co-creator with Him, not only in the development of his own personality, but also as an influence on the development of the personalities of others. This implies that a degree of autonomy would be delegated to the creature; and this expected autonomy is actually discernible, as a matter of fact, in the natural order, as well as in the social. In endeavoring to develop Tennant's concept of a determinate world-plan for realizing the Beloved Community,, it is perhaps allowable to go freely beyond his limited treatment (as indeed we already have in referring to such {a society), in order to lend body to the synoptic hypothesis |that will later be subjected to critical examination.^ It |is possible, therefore, to distinguish four essential steps that are requisite in order to realize this society. These I steps are, in chronological order: 1. The creation of a stable world order. 2. The development of complex organic systems. t 3. The growth of genuine personalities. ^The Complete Poetical Works of Keats, ed. H. E. Scudder, The Cambridge Poets (Boston, 1899), pp. 369-370. ] | l^The rationale and justification of this kind of speculative filling-in of details at the more advanced stages of Brightman's methodology are presented below (p. 229). 217 4. The forging of a bond of love to unite them into an harmonious society. The interpretation of the cosmic process in existentialist terms as a tragic drama will stem from the fact that each of these steps involves, in its own way, certain inescapable! evils which are attributed to the agents or processes (or their by-products) that are necessary in order that these steps of cosmic development can be achieved. Each step is the occasion for its own special quota of vicarious suffer ing, which has thus far been considered (in the Christian tradition of the West) as having reached its quintessence in the fourth step, where the necessary suffering is that of the Son of God Himself. The first step toward the production of a better I jsocial order is the creation of a stable world order in i jwhich the moral drama can be enacted. For man cannot exer- jcise his powers of moral decision unless he lives in an I jenvironment containing concrete alternatives from which to | {choose. Furthermore, given a concrete environment, he can- jnot make intelligent choices if that environment is of such nature that anything is as likely as not to follow {upon anything else. In short, man's environment must be a realm of order in which laws of nature are operative. Without such regularity in physical phenomena, CTennant explains^, there could be no probability to guide us: no prediction, no prudence, no accumulation of ordered experience, no pursuit of premeditated ends, no forma tion of habit, no possibility of character or of culture. 218 Our intellectual faculties could not have developed . . . and our active powers would have abandoned themselves to purposeless agitation. . . . No man could employ his rea son in the conduct of his life. And without rationality, morality is impossible. (II, 199) Besides creating the preconditions for moral action, the stable world order provides a medium of communication: the air, which, by means of the gas laws, faithfully transmits a man's voice; or the written page, which preserves his thoughts by virtue of its physical durability. Such a medium is essential to a nioral order, since a large part of morality involves social relationships, and these in turn depend upon communication between selves. Nothing short of an environment governed by law, a stable world order, could be depended upon to mediate these communica tions faithfully. ! | It is obvious that the good society must have citi- jzens. It is less obvious that these must be embodied, j jthat finite personhood can only develop in intimate associ- jation with complex organic systems. Yet this is implied in i jTennant's epistemological conclusion that all knowledge jstems from sensa and in Paul R. Helsel’s contention that i jthe person on the second bipolar level (which is essenti ally non-physical), is constructed and conditioned by expe rience on the first bipolar level.^ For personhood and i 1 5 | "Process and Person," unpub. MS (Los Angeles, 1954), IP- knowledge are preconditions for the rise of social morality and if these depend upon developments on the second bipolar level, which in turn derive ultimately from physiological sensa, it is clear that morality requires the body for its development and expression. If the experience of disem bodied spirits is temporal, or conscious, or rational, or moral, the empirical evidence, at least, does not suggest this view; but rather it suggests that complex organic systems are essential to the experience of consciousness or temporality and the rise of social personality. The statement made in the third step (above, p. 216), that the Beloved Community presupposes the growth of genu- I ine personalities, is not a truism if the full signifi cances of the terms "grotfth” and ’•genuine” are appreciated. In order to be a genuine personality, the individual must (possess the power to make free choices or unconstrained 1 . . (volitions. ° Any creatures lacking this power would, of course, be mere robots and could hardly be co-creators with I j God, and surely not objects of his love. At least, any jlove which God may have for a fellowship of robots would I 'be in a different class from the of family life. In such a society there would be no moral values, since any i ^6The question of freedom is, of course, a more sub tile problem than this discussion of the issue would sug gest. At this point, however, the purposes are purely expository and a detailed discussion of this problem is (inappropriate. 220 so-called noble deeds that are performed would arise from mechanical or divine compulsion and could not be regarded as an expression of moral responsibility. The citizens of the Beloved Community must thus be free moral agents. If the society is to be at all utopian, however, its citizens must be not only free, but virtuous as well. It is very significant to note at this point that virtuous personality is an order of reality that can hardly be con ceived as created all at once on the spur of the moment, since it must be the product of a temporally extended process that involves reactions between a free will and its environment, both natural and personal. All genuine personality must be self-developed; it must involve the accumulation of experiences and choices; and pseudo experiences built into the nervous system de novo like the instincts of insects will not suffice. Tennant therefore finds it impossible to imagine i i a living world, in which truly ethical values will be actualized, save as an evolutionary cosmos where free I agents live and learn, make choices and build characters | (II, 185). | Such an evolutionary cosmos, in short, is as necessary for the growth of personality, as it is for the prior develop- i ment of organisms as such. | The last step or steps that remain to be taken to | realize the utopian society lie largely in the future and are matters for political and theological speculation, 221 rather than for empirical induction. In order to unite the genuine personalities into an harmonious society, for example, there must be forces fostering the development of socialized wills, for "if a kingdom be divided against itself, that kingdom cannot stand" (Mark iii.24). Through all the ages governments have attempted to forge a social bond without first creating a citizenry of thoroughly socialized wills. But their success has been mediocre, iand certainly not utopian; for the veneer with which civil- I jization has covered barbpvism is thin indeed. It would ! seem that the bond must be one of love or brotherliness, rather than of force; and that the citizenry adequate for this purpose must be a religious one. Whether this citizen ry exists (or can exist), either in this world or the next, jis a matter for theology and religious anthropology to | jdecide and involves questions of redemption, theories of atonement, etc., which it is not important to discuss at !this time. An empirical evaluation of human nature in the imanner of Reinhold Niebuhr- * - 7 would suggest, however, that i even a moderately utopian society would demand loyalties jof a higher moral order than most potential citizens would dedicate to it, and that apocalyptic measures (the separa tion of the cooperative from the recalcitrant) are a neces- isary finale, though for some a tragic one, to the present | ,»Jv ; • * - 7The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. I: Human Nature. Gifford Lectures: 193$ (New York, 1943). . 222 act of the cosmic drama. The Evolutionary Theism of Tennant and Its testable Implications The synoptic hypothesis which is to be subjected to critical examination (see below, Part III) may now be regarded as including not only the proposition that a personal God exists, but also that He has adopted a deter minate world-plan more or less similar to that which was outlined in the four steps just elucidated, and that He has been patiently and persistently realizing this plan through out the development of the cosmos. In order to determine jwhether there is, indeed, such a guiding Hand discernible i I |in cosmic evolution, it is necessary first to locate the jcrucial points in cosmic history at which the deductions i from Tennant's synoptic hypothesis can conceivably be i tested and verified. These crucial points are in general ! those at which a determination occurred which actualized one among several potentialities; and which, in so doing, relegated to the realm of the impossible all the unique conditions which logically follow from each of the other j 18 potential worlds that were left unrealized. If each j ^-8The argument assumes, of course, that many such junrealized possible worlds subsist, i.e., that the overall jfeatures of the universe are contingent. This assumption, however, will prove to be the Achilles*1 heel of Tennant's jposition (see below, pp. 345-347). stage in this step-by-step determination of the world can jbe shown to have actualized the one potentiality that is imost favorable to the development of complex organic i systems, then an alogical, though reasonable, presumption shall have been created in favor of the hypothesis that a biocentric world-plan is in operation, guided by an intel ligent and goal-seeking Mind. The crucial points at which this hypothesis appears to be testable are those at: 1. The origin of physical existence; 2. The origin of multiplicity and of space; 3. The origin of t ime; 4. The origin of the world geometry; 5. The origin of the physical elements; 6. The origin of habitable worlds; 7. The origin of organic compounds; 8. The origin of living organisms; 9. The origin of the basic BauplSne of living forms 10. The origin of the Hominidae; and 11. The origin of spiritual man. The problem is then to exercise discriminative judgment in jallocating the processes or events occurring at these crucial points to either mechanistic or teleological 224 causes;*-^ and finally, to aacertain whether the teleo- logical element ie of auch impoaing proportions that it justifies Tennant's synoptic hypothesis of theism. With this hypothesis now before us in its totality, it is finally possible to narrow down the field of inquiry without running the danger of losing perspective. The following discussion will therefore be concerned with only the first two steps of the determinate world-plan (above, p. 216), i.e., with: 1. The creation of a stable world order; and 2. The development of complex organic systems. In other words, the quest will now be confined to the first nine points in the longer outline above. There are several reasons for this restriction. In the first place, the data in these two areas is more empir ical than in the others, since it comprises the physical and biological sciences, which are highly developed at the present time. In contrast to this, the other two steps in ^Since the issue has been traditionally stated in terms of these two alternatives, this usage ia followed here. There are also nan-mechanistic though naturalistic alternatives, however, as formulated, for example, by Lud wig yon Bertalanffy in his theory of open systems (see above, p. 11, n.16; and also his "Theory of Open Systems in Physics and Biology," Science. 111:23-29, January 13, 1950; "Theoretical Models in biology and Psychology," Journal of Personality, September 1951, pp. 24-38; and "BiophysIVc aut neuen batmen," Naturwissenschaftliche Rundschau. No. 10, S. 418-420, Oktober 1954. 225 the determinate world-plan involve highly speculative con siderations arrived at by precarious deductions, which would hardly satisfy the exacting epistemological standards of Tennant. The last two areas are not difficult to inter pret in theistic terms, because, as soon as the existence of finite persons is achieved, as in the third step, it is easy to understand how an "infinite" Person, if such existed, could exert a guiding influence upon other persons in this, the human, stage of history. But the problem of ! (interpreting the first two areas in terms of the synoptic hypothesis is more difficult and more crucial or signifi cant than in the case of the other two. Such an interpreta tion of the pre-human stages of development is more jsignif icant, because, if successful, it provides an empir- ! ! iical theology that is relatively free from the vagaries of i (rationalism and subjectivism; and at the same time it is {more difficult, since it involves the mind-body problem in {its acutest form, in the problem of the perplexing rela tionship which subsists between the mind of God and the matter of the cosmos (see below, pp. 383-385). f l The severity of this problem depends, of course, upon whether it is dealt with from the standpoint of an idealis- i I jtic or a dualistic metaphysics. Within the framework of a 'dualistic metaphysics, the disparity in nature between mind t jand matter makes it difficult to understand how God could {insinuate his guidance into the course of cosmic development. 226 Although the idealistic system evades this problem, it too is difficult to accept, since it offers no explanation of the lack of control over development which prevails in some areas of biology, nor of the irrational or surd evils which result and take a heavy toll in suffering and death. In the evaluation of the dysteleological element in nature (see below, p. 388), we shall feel constrained to adopt a Bergsonian type of derived dualism in order to face squarely the evidence which suggests that much of the cos mos is so firmly in the grip of mechanism that those rare areas which are still amenable to divine influence must be of a highly specialized nature. In particular, it will seem necessary to leaven our thinking with just enough of deism to maintain that the only way by which God's mind j jean exert an influence upon matter is through such "high- I 1 jgain" processes as the synthesis of proteins by nucleic jacids, and the triggering of brain impulses; for all of i these are processes by which patterns existing in atomic Istructure are magnified into molar proportions (see below, p. 383). If the gap between the micro- and the molar (or phenomenal) realm can be bridged only through such rare and "snow-balling" processes as these, it is easier to under- f 1stand why even the divine Creator would find that a long Revolutionary process of several billion years' duration is i the only method by which His determinate world-plan can be realized. PART III CRITICAL EXAMINATION (IN THE LIGHT OF COSMIC AND ORGANIC DEVELOPMENT) CHAPTER VIII THE ONTAL STARTING-POINT AND THE THEORIES OF ASTROPHYSICAL COSMOLOGY The Genetic Outline of Cosmic Development "in Or dine Essencli" In establishing grounds for a reasonable anthropic faith in the synoptic hypothesis of theism, Tennant, as shown above, adheres faithfully to a methodology that fol lows the ordo cognoscendi, which he defines as "not the order of logical priority but of actual knowledge-process ."!• Prior to the establishment of a synoptic hypothesis, it is premature to assume ! that the ratio essendi is known, as does all procedure according to the ordo~essendi, adopted by common sense and science (I, A). No less is meant than that the ordo cognoscendi is the | sole route that possibly may lead to a known ordo essendi: that psychology is the fundamental science, the first propaedeutic to philosophy. (I, 11) "Resort beforehand to the ordo essendi," he adds, "would 'involve the psychologist’s fallacy" (I, 331). "In ordine i cognoscendi the first things of Plato or Spinoza are last 'things" (I, 8). ^Philosophical Theology, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Eng., jl935-37)',"T, 8. 229 Now that the hypothesis is tentatively established, however, there is no longer an obligation to hold to the ordo cognoscendi, and the first things of Plato and Spinoza can again be regarded as first. For the purposes of veri fication an exposition according to the ordo essendi is particularly advantageous by virtue of the fact that it displays all aspects of reality, as best it can, in their actual objective relationships, instead of in the biased perspective of their relations to the knower. An exposi tion that exhibits the objective interrelationships of the t jdata is therefore especially suitable for treatment in terms of the epistemological ideal of overall empirical coherence, which we shall adopt from Edgar Sheffield Bright I 5 jman and from William H. Werkmeister.-1 i i The ideal of coherence as a criterion of truth is j appealed to by Tennant in discussing the reality of the hypothetical constructs of physics: Convincedness, as to the Reality of the mikra, Che I writesj, is not due so much to the satisfactoriness of ! a particular mikron for explanation of a particular restricted sphere of phenomena, as to the inter relatedness and inter-dependence of several hypotheses which conspire to furnish a coherent science. The . . . instances of one microscopic hypothesis playing into the hand of another certainly justify, as reasonable, the 2 i An Introduction to Philosophy (New York, 1925), bp. 61-66; and The Basis and Structure of Knowledge (New fork, 1948), passim. Cf. also Alfred toorth Whitenead, Process and Reality, GTFford Lectures: 1927-28 (New York, L941), pp; 5 and 9-10. 230 conviction that such scientific theory is in touch with Reality. (II, 44) Tennant then makes the very significant comparison, that The realist's apologia is akin to that of the theist who relies on the interconnexion and cumulativeness of the facts which suggest cosmic design (II, 44-45); and he finally concludes, as we have seen, that if "the truth of religion" or "the validity of religious experience" . . . is to be established, it must be as reasonable inference from discursive "knowledge" about the world, human history, the soul with its faculties and capacities; and above all, from knowledge of the interconnexions between such items of knowledge. Thence j alone are derived the notions of the numinous, the super- 1 sensible, the supernatural, and the theistic idea of God. | (I, 325) j | Coherence must be sharply distinguished, however, from mere consistency, on the one hand, and from the positivist's ideal of scientific verifiability, on the other. It must |be distinguished from consistency, according to Edgar Shef field Brightman, by the additional requirements that the given proposition shall establish "explanatory and inter- jpretative relations between various parts of experience" t iand that these relations must "include all known aspects iof experience and all known problems about experience in its details and as a w h o l e ."3 When this comprehensive | appeal to experience is interpreted as including value experiences, or moral, aesthetic, and religious experiences, j icritically examined to extract any evidential value that 3A Philosophy of Religion (New York, 1940), p. 128. 231 they may possess, It becomes a broader criterion o£ truth than that of scientific verifiability, which arbitrarily limits the realm of meaningful discourse to phenomena that are definable in terms of operations in space and time. Consequently, Tennant urges that fruitfulness in explanation-potency be adopted as the criterion of such "truth” as it lies within the power of philosophy to attain (II, 254). in order to display the rich pattern of meaningful interrelations that must be manifest if the ideal of empir ical coherence is to be applied, a genetic outline of cos mic development in ordine essendi has been constructed, which is shown in Figure 2 (below, p. 233). This outline, which will form the framework of all subsequent considera tions in the present study, portrays a reinterpretation of bipolar philosophy that elucidates this development in terms of the basic formula of dual-unity (see above, pp. 231-235). It is hoped that this genetic approach to the cosmos will correct a deficiency from which the work of Tennant suffers and which can best be understood in terms of a criticism that Tennant himself levels against Kant (see above, p. 127). He charges that Kant studies experience only at the adult level, where its structure appears as a finished product, and that he pays little or no regard to genetic psychology and to the ontogeny of experience. It 232 would seem that Tennant, after correcting this error in Kant's epistemology, falls subject, in turn to the charge of committing a similar error in his own metaphysics, i.e., of studying reality chiefly as it exists today, with little or no reference to cosmogony or to the history of life. In order to make good this deficiency in Tennant's approach, the present critical evaluation gives careful consideration to the facts that are known today about cosmic evolution. I In the genetic outline of Figure 2, the width of the i diagram represents the full extent of reality. Vertically, i {the figure may be interpreted | 1. In a temporal sense, as representing, from bottom to top, the stages in the genetic development of reality; and 2. In a qualitative sense, as depicting seven levels of reality (instead of Helsel's three), on each of which the bipolar formula of dual-unity is exhibited. At each level the dual elements in the formula are indica ted at the left- and right-hand extremes in an elevated position, and their unity is represented below in the middle. When the genetic development is followed chrono logically from bottom to top, it comprises six successive isteps in the differentiation of reality. Within the frame- jwork of Tennant's synoptic hypothesis the emergence of each 233 of these new orders of reality may be regarded as a crea tive act of God, of which one "antedates” time itself, so K0lV6)V(tt REFLECTION BEHAVIOR EXPERIENCE PROCESS R E A L IT Y EXISTENCE PERSON £ 8 < “ ME SELF 15 2 h i n 2 ANIMAL VEGETATIVE SOUL SOUL INDIVIDUAL LIFE Ll> >0. L° LlZ 2 L I ENERGY ORGANISM ACTION u s “ i fe § u » s 2 j 0 < § • £ > 1 i 5 a. ORDER SPACE-TIME K § -1 < 0 ? 2 01 MANY ONE MATTER z > Q Ul X h Aoyos SPIRIT GOD t Ul 2 Fiffuge^ The Genetic Outline of Cosmic Development Exhibiting the Dual-Unity Formula of feipolar Philosophy, |to speak, and the rest occur at very definite points in ;the history of the cosmos. At each stage God fulgurates ;something other than Himself so that the Not-Self becomes increasingly autonomous as time goes on. Moreover, each stage involves a differentiation of the left-hand factor of the previous dual-unity so that it in turn becomes a idual-unity in its own right. The right-hand factor of the I I previous dual-unity then remains forever as a crystalliza- jtion of transcendence in immanence, a fixation of the i |divine creativity as in Bergsonian dualism, exhibiting the 234 fact that at each stage of Tennant’s determinate world- plan, the differentiation that God enacts channels the possibilities of the future on the level in question. These manifestations of transcendence in immanence are shown in vertical lettering. They are: (1) the physical world; (2) the laws of nature and the primary collocations of matter; (3) negative entropy; (4) instinct; and (5) the categories of the understanding. This schema avoids the charge of deism by exhibiting the Divine Spirit himself i |as one of these continuing manifestations. The Spirit is jhere conceived as being of determinate nature like Bright- man's "Given,but as permanently sharing the realm of existence along with His creation and able to overrule its mechanizations to a limited extent in a manner analogous i |to the overruling of habit by the human will. In general, these mechanizations may be regarded as constituting the jrealm of efficient causation, whereas the left-hand factors of the successive dual-unities comprise the "growing edge" of reality, in which God operates teleologically as Final Cause. Moreover, each level, before its actualization, is potential in the level below and, being discerned as such by God, functions as formal cause, while the lower level jacts as material cause of the next higher level above. The idynamic qualities of reality are suggested by the terms ! ^Philosophy of Religion, pp. 336-340. 23 5 along the left-hand margin, which represent the emergence of a new order of activity with each successive differen tiation within the Not-Self. It is presumed that God Him- I self engages in all of these activities from the beginning, but that at these successive points in history He grants such capacities to portions of the Not-Self, as well. The Ontal Starting-Point and the Status of the Cosmological Argument The first major problem that arises in the critical jexamination of the genetic outline presented in Figure 2 i jis that of the ontal starting-point. In following the j I ordo cognoscendi, the starting-point was necessarily "self- consciousness,11 which Tennant adopted as "the primary crude Idatum" of presumptive knowledge (I, 13). In the ordo lessendi, however, the starting-point antedates the appear- i I jance of life and of consciousness and must therefore be some primordial reality. Clearly, the problem reduces, then, to that of determining the interrelationship that obtains between the first two levels of reality, between ;God and nascent matter. The starting-point must therefore i i be either God, or the physical world, or both; and, if both, then the two must be conceived in either an idealistic or ja dualistic sense. These four alternatives may be thought iof as finding their champions, respectively, in Augustine, jDemocritus, Averroes, and Plato. In the philosophy of Plato the At}/JH0\spy6$ and physical reality are co-eternal and 236 independent, and matter is uncreated and passive;5 in that of Averroes the two are also co-eternal, but matter is dependent and continuously created by God; in Democritus the physical world per se is eternal and self-subsistent;6 while in Augustine only God is eternal, and the world is created ex nihilo by an act of God’s free will. In settling this point the status of the cosmological argument for the existence of God is at issue. It is there fore important to make sure that the issue is clearly drawn John Stuart Mill has done this for us by distinguishing between (1) events or changes (which derive from causes), i |on the one hand, and (2) the permanent existences, which, | so far as we know, are not effects at all, CsinceD the specific elementary substance or substances . . . are not known to us as beginning to exist. . . . As a fact of experience, then, Che continues^, causation cannot legiti j mately be extended to the material universe itself, but only to its changeable phenomena. . . . It would seem, | therefore, that . . . the very essence of causation as The ’'creation" described in the Timaeus is not ex nihilo. At creation the AffjUiOUpY’ ds "found" the four elements already I "moving in an irregular and disorderly fashion Can<Q out of disorder he brought order. . . . He looks to the unchangeable and fashions the form and nature of his work after an unchangeable pattern" (Timaeus 28-32, italics ours). 6Cf. Fragment #9: "Atoms and Void (alone) exist in Reality17 (Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic iFhilosophers [Cambridge, Mass., 1948J, p. 93). | ! 7St. Augustine. De Civitate Dei xii. 16. 237 it exists within the limits of our knowledge is incom patible with a First Cause.8 Mill's adverse conclusion is based on the premise (presently to be examined) that matter has existed forever. If this assumption is true, then Mill is justified in contending, as he does, that the material "cause" of Aristotle is not an event and is therefore not a cause at all. Tennant feels, however, that these considerations are hardly fatal to theism, for if God is not the First Cause he can still be regarded as World Ground and Designer, and creation can be eternal and continuous. The crucial issue as Tennant sees it is that which is drawn between the views of Democritus, on the one hand, and those of Plato, Aver roes, and Augustine, on the other. For the Democritean I : iview of the self-subsistence of matter and the fortuitous | I origin of its forms renders theism superfluous, while the other viewpoints are consistent with Tennant's synoptic i jhypothesis. The criterion of coherence must therefore be invoked to decide between them. Since this hypothesis is now tentatively established, Tennant's choice of a starting- point for his exposition in ordine essendi narrows down, then, to either the Platonic or the Augustinian position, or to that of Averroes. In deference to the scientific i I 8Three Essays on Religion, Uniform Library Edition of jthe Miscellaneous Works of J. S. Mill (New York, 1874), jpp. 142-144. i 238 opinion of his day, which, like that of Mill, could envi sion no beginning to the physical universe, and in line with his dualistic metaphysics, he adopts the Platonic view point. In discussing this issue Tennant concedes that The human imagination most forcibly represents to itself the dependence of the world on the will of God by sup posing God and time to precede creation. . . . Neither of these doctrines gets rid of temporality; and that of Augustine suggests that creation was somehow comparable with an event, and that eternity preceded time. (II, 128) But in contrast to the views of Augustine, Tennant maintains that "God without the world is not God." . . . It is super fluous to entertain the idea of a prior will to create, a posterior selection of a best possible plan, and a final creative fiat. . . . Creation can be conceived as idea and deed together, and the divine transcendence as not temporal priority, but as consisting in the differ- ! ence between God and His utterance--which pantheism i identifies. (II, 128-129) | God, as a determinate being, implies a world. . . . ! If we are to speak in terms of time, the theistic doctrine I may be summed up in the statement that the world is coeval with God and is contingent on His determinate nature, inclusive of will. (II, 129) j In a former chapter the effect that this Platonic view has had upon the cosmological argument was discussed (above, pp. 165-168), and it was shown that, in the absence of data bn origins, this argument commits the ontological fallacy jwhen applied in a temporal sense (as by Mill) and tends to i reduce to the teleological argument \rtien applied in the sense of a World Ground; for this World Ground is suggested jto Tennant not by the mere existence of the world, but by Lts rationality and order, by its form and not its matter. 239 Thus, Tennant deprives himself of the cosmological proof, by adopting the Platonic viewpoint instead of the Augustin- ian; and only the teleological remains to bear the full burden of the empirical approach to theism. Tennant*s thinking on this issue was dominated by the spirit that Hume displayed vrtien he despaired of man*s ability to discover what new and unknown principles would actuate £naturej in so new and unknown a situation as that of the forma tion of a universe." A generation ago it was possible for him truthfully to say that "science knows nothing as to absolute beginnings--she jhas a cosmology, but no cosmogony" (I, 365). Since then, |however, an "experience of the origin of worlds" (Hume, i ■p. 150) has, in a sense, been obtained in the mid-twentieth- j jcentury discoveries of a s t r o p h y s i c s .10 These remarkable t jcosmological observations provide empirical data relevant to cosmogonic speculation. They do not, of course, illumi nate the ultimate mystery, the modus operandi of the crea tive act itself, if such occurred, but they do take us back, nonetheless, to the first few minutes of "creation," i ^Hume*s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, ed. (Norman Kemp Smith, 2nd ed. (London, 1947), pi 149. | l°These discoveries are skillfully reviewed in an jessentially new book by G. J. Whitrow (The Structure and Evolution of the Universe CNew York, 1959U). In Chap, viii jof the present study these theories are discussed at length. 240 according to one likely theory,^ and reveal the bankruptcy of natural law when pressed any further into the recesses of the past. In view of the fact that these theories could, perhaps, afford a means of testing Mill's assumption that matter is eternal, they absolve the cosmological argument from the charge that it commits the ontological fallacy; and, since an actual numerical value for the age of the material universe figures prominently in some of these theories, they can be regarded as making Augustinian crea- tionism a live issue once more. If the theories which support the Augustinian view should prove to be true, these would supplement the evidence from cosmic teleology and thus provide a stronger total argument for theism than that !of Tennant; for the Deity would then be invoked not only as j I an explanation of the rise of order and rationality, as in ! !Tennant's teleology, but also as an explanation of the jorigin of physical reality as such. Ultimately, the question of the origin of physical i !reality must be discussed within the framework of certain 1 |specific cosmological theories that have been developed in i jmodem astrophysics. These theories are therefore briefly j (reviewed in the two sections which follow (below, pp. 244- 264). Before entering into these technicalities, however, H-We refer to the views of Gamow which can be found in The Universe; a Scientific American book (New York, 1956), pp. 2i-24 and 74-7<5” . 241 it is well to approach the subject in more general terms. In recent decades many lines of scientific evidence have accumulated vrtiich concur in suggesting that the material universe actually has had a temporal origin. Much of this evidence arises from the consideration of three of the most pervasive processes of nature: 1. The second law of thermodynamics; 2. The decay of radioactive substances; and 3. The expansion of the universe. According to the first of these, the second law of thermo dynamics, a quantity called "entropy" increases with every physical change in nature. This quantity can best be con ceived as a measure of "randomness," or of negative order- 1 2 liness. Every physical or chemical process thus feeds, las it were, upon the orderliness of the universe and leaves j the particles of its environment in a more random or hap- I hazard array than that which they exhibited before the ! jreaction began. The proportion of useless heat energy to |useful mechanical or chemical energy in the universe thus ^increases as time flows onward. This "law of entropy," as I lit is called, presages an ultimate result in which all the ienergy differentials of the universe are reduced to a dead ! l^For the interpretation of the difficult concept of "entropy" in terms of randomness, we are indebted to a semi- popular work of Arthur CSJ Eddington, New Pathways in Sci- lence, Messenger Lectures: 1934 (New York, 19351 ) , pp. 54-6'1. 242 level, an eventless equilibrium in which all of space is filled with an homogeneous mixture of matter at a constant basic temperature. In short, the universe is imagined as running down like a clock; and unless there also exists some unknown winding-up process, the conclusion is ines capable that the degradation of energy cannot have been going on forever, for the universe is still far from having arrived at the predicted equilibrium. Thus, a beginning of the natural order is indicated at a point in the past that is not infinitely remote. The processes of decay which radioactive substances undergo also suggest a beginning.13 In this case, however, the evidence is not only qualitative; it is quantitative as well, inasmuch as the rates of decay can be determined jand are found to be constant and unaffected by any known | physical or chemical conditions. It is commonly known that |in fresh samples of rock it is possible to measure the pro portions of decayed and of undecayed uranium, for example, and thus to determine the amount of decay that has occurred since the rock was formed. Knowing the rate of decay, the | jscientist is then able to calculate the age of the rock. Moreover, by considering the evidence that the universe is expanding, it is possible to extrapolate backward to times | 13Chester R. Longwell, Adolph Knopf, and Richard F. Flint, Physical Geology, 3rd ed. (New York, 1948), p. 26. 243 when it was smaller than it is at present and, ultimately, to the time when the \rtiole universe was, as it were, a mere point.^ Here again a tentative calculation of age can be made by dating the beginning of the expansion. The age of the universe as estimated by its rate of decay of radioactive substances is also confirmed by numerous other methods, which hardly need to be discussed here. If these scientific results do actually imply, as they seem to at first sight, that matter itself is only ! jabout six billion years old, then the Democritean view is faced with the serious problem of the origin of matter. Moreover, this problem is not simplified by asserting that Jmatter arose from preexistent energy, for neither matter ' nor energy (which Einstein has shown to be interchangeable) | jean now be regarded as self-subsistent. In this case, the I icosmological argument would appear more convincing than jTennant has supposed, since the natural order would then I seem to point beyond itself to a supernatural source of its existence.*-5 The starting point in ordine essendi 1 ■ I I ■ llll I I « I I Iwould then be God, and Him alone, as Augustine maintained. t *-^Paul Couderc, The Expansion of the Universe, trans. j j . B. Sidgwick (London, 1£*>2) , pp. 186-187. I ] *-5In the philosophy of Averroes, which defends contin- luous creation, the natural order can also point beyond itself. But in this case the dependency is much more dif ficult to demonstrate than it is in the case where an actual beginning of time is indicated. 244 The problem is not as simple as this, however, since most of the age determinations, with the notable exception of that which derives from the expansion of the universe, are based upon phenomena within our own galaxy. It is possible then, that these ages refer to a very local event, like the rise of a supernova, in which a local field of matter is all placed again, as it were, into the melting pot. It should therefore be urged that specific figures for the age of the universe must still be cited with caution, for they are valid only within the framework of certain dynamic cosmological models that have been mathematically devised to represent the structure and evolution of the universe as a whole. The Possible Worlds Depicted in Astrophysicai Cosmology I The cosmological theories of modern astrophysics can jbe grouped into three major classes:*"6 those comprising One of the best non-mathematical presentations of ithe cosmological problem is that of Paul Couderc, which |was cited in note 14 above. Another is H. Bondi, Cosmol ogy. Cambridge Monographs on Physics, ed. N. Feather and others (Cambridge, Eng., 1952). The most up-to-date treat- jment is that of G. J. Whitrow (The Structure and Evolution of the Universe). See also The tJniverse: a Scientific American bookr~E. Finlay-Freundlich, Cosmology, in fnter- national Encyclopedia of Unified Science, ed. 0. Neurath and others, Vois. I and 'IfI: foundations of the Unity of Science. VolT I, No. f e (Chicago, 195l); Canon tieorges iemaltre, The Primeval Atom, trans. B. H. and S. A. Korff (New York, I93o); and George Gamow, The Creation of the Universe (New York, 1952). One of the best mathematical treatments is G. C. McVittie, General Relativity and 245 (1) the steady-state models, (2) the oscillating models, and (3) the monotonically expanding models. The steady- state models are those which envision an eternal universe whose large-scale features remain invariant because its expansion or dilation is offset by the continuous creation of new matter.*-7 The oscillating models also picture an eternal universe, but in these cases the universe is either 1 . alternately expanding and contracting and passing | through a singularity at one point within each cycle, at j which all its matter is concentrated into one small super-dense mass, or 2 . contracting from an infinite empty space-time to a super-dense mass-point and back toward the infinite void | again, thus experiencing only two half-cycles from infin- j ity to infinity.*-8 i |Cosmology, in The International Astrophysics Series, ed. |M. A . Ellison and others, Vol. IV (tiew York, 1956). See jalso Pascual Jordan, Schwerkraft und Weltall, 2. erweiterte jAuf 1., bearb. unter Mitwirk. E. SchGcking, in Die Wissen- jschaft, hrsg. W. Westphal, CVII (Braunschweig, 1955); and jD. ter Haar, ”Cosmogonical Problems and Stellar Energy,” Reviews of Modern Physics, 22:119-152, April 1950. Arthur iS. Eddlngton, fundamental Theory (Cambridge, Eng., 1949), which deals in part with cosmology, is in a class by itself |it is probably the most technical work in existence on math iematical physics and the most ambitious effort yet made to (develop a joint relativity-quantum theory. ^7Fred Hoyle,’ ^The Steady-State Universe,” in The Uni verse , Part IV, Chap. ii (see below, pp. 260-261). l-®George Gamow, ”The Evolutionary Universe,” in The Universe, Part IV, Chap. i. 246 The monotonic expanding models, on the other hand, describe i a universe of finite age which began either (1) as an equi librium or static Einstein universe, or (2) as an expansion i from a primordial super-dense point-source.In either case they have a temporal origin from which they expand forever; i.e., they never reverse themselves to return to a former state. It is evident that the oscillating models provide for eternal matter and, if true to the actual world, would support the Platonic or Democritean view of the starting-point in ordine essendi, while the expanding Imodels would suggest either an Augustinian creationism, or jthe philosophically difficult view that matter can come j : jinto existence ex nihilo of its own accord. The steady- Istate models, however, are ambiguous in significance inas much as they depict a universe jyhich, as such, is infinitely | old but whose matter is of varying antiquity. It presumably ! contains some matter that is infinitely old, but by the laws of probability any such matter would have little |chance of being within observable range; it would have either receded long ago into infinitely distant realms or j else have reappeared as the "new" matter that forms in the 20 intergalactic void. It would seem, then, that the i ! ^Couderc, pp. 174, and 176-177; and Gerard de Vau- icouleurs, Discovery of the Universe (New York, 1957), jpp. 228-22” 5T: 20Hoyle, in The Universe, pp. 80-81. 247 monotonically expanding models, which imply an origin of matter-energy at the beginning, are the only ones that clearly afford an escape from Mill1s critique of the cos mological proof of the existence of a Creator God; and that an oscillating model could do so only if a single cycle is regarded as the whole. The results that have so far been achieved in astro- physical cosmology are rather tentative. For several rea sons, however, the newer concepts in cosmology are important enough to this study to justify a review of the present knowledge in this field. Such a survey will aid, for exam ple, in estimating the logical force of the cosmological argument, in particularizing Leibniz' concept of "possible worlds," in analyzing the nature of multiplicity, in pic turing the primordial conditions from which the elements congealed, and in circumscribing the temporal and spatial limits within which the processes were confined that led to the origin of life. These in turn will then assist in applying Hocking's criteria of purposefulness. As the problem of selecting a cosmos from among all possible worlds is discussed in the following chapters, the basis will be laid for an evaluation of the alogical probability that a 2^This paragraph, of course, merely states the prob lem, and its conclusion anticipates the results of the analysis which follows. 248 teleological factor which selects and organizes is dis cernible in cosmic development, i.e., that the primordial selection of a world to be created was made by a Cosmic Mind motivated by the biocentric demands of a determinate world-plan. The supreme objective in the science of cosmology is to settle the question of the geometrical structure and dynamics of the total universe. In its theoretical aspect the cosmological problem is an extremely technical one that immediately involves the use of concepts that are taken from tensor calculus, the theory of relativity, and the non-Euclidean geometries. Since ample reviews of these areas of mathematics and theoretical physics are readily accessible, however, it should not be necessary to outline their technicalities here. In any case, it is probable that theory alone cannot establish the mathematical values 'of the parameters that determine which of the cosmological models describes the actual universe in which we live, and that an appeal must be made to observational astronomy. Thus, the Two-hundred-inch Telescope of Mt. Palomar was built chiefly for the purpose of studying the nature and distribution of the extragalactic nebulae in the hope of detecting toward the limits of observable space any depar tures from homogeneity which might furnish the key to the jgeometry of the total cosmos. 249 When the possible geometries of cosmic space are limited to those which are homogeneous and isotropic, they reduce to three basic types: 1. Euclidean space, which is infinite and flat; 2. Lobatchewskian space, which is infinite and hyper bolic, with an excess of volume (as compared with Eucli dean space) at astronomical distances; and 3. Riemannian space, which is finite and hyperspheri- cal, with a deficiency of volume at great distances. I i The problem of determining the overall structure of the universe then reduces, essentially, to that of formulating all possible dynamic models for each of these three geome tries in terms of certain basic parameters and then narrow ing down the field of choice by rejecting any models that embody mathematical or physical inconsistencies or that i |fail to check against the values for these parameters iderived from astronomical observation. In constructing :these models the theorist assumes certain simplifying con- i iditions. He envisions an ideal universe with all irregular- jities smoothed out, with all discrete masses dispersed. | jMcVittie writes that in this idealization, ! a continuous distribution of matter is substituted for | the system of galaxies. The gravitational field, and | the motion, of this continuous matter are to be selected 1 so as to mimic as closely as possible the observed facts. The material will be envisaged as a perfect j fluid . . . and the fluid should exhibit spherical sym- ! metry about the point of observation, the Earth. (Rela- i tivity, p. 137) 250 The geometrical and physical properties which this "ura- 22 noid," as Arthur S. Eddington calls it, would have under certain postulated conditions are then deduced. Among the many parameters of cosmological theory, the following are those appealed to in the present discussion 1. the average density of matter in the universe; \ 2. h, Hubble's parameter, which expresses the rate of recession of the galaxies as a function of their dis tances ; j | 3. k, which is equal to +1, 0, or -1, according to i ; whether the basic geometry of the universe is hyperspheri- cal, Euclidean, or hyperbolic; ! ! 4. K, the gravitational constant, in relativistic i units. ! 5. X , the cosmical constant, a constant of integra tion which is, in effect, a spurious density contributing geometrically to the closure of space and dynamically to ! | its expansion; 6. R, the scale-factor or directed radius of space; I 7. A, the so-called age of the universe; and 8. c, the velocity of light. j I ^ The Philosophy of Physical Science, Tarner Lectures: {1938 (Cambridge, Eng., 1949), p. 166; and Fundamental The- j ory, PP- 13-14. j 23McVittie, pp. 138, 140, 157-158, 164, and 175. 251 Within the past decade the margin of error in the empirical values that have been obtained for several of these parameters has been greatly reduced so that the the orist is at last in a favorable position to speculate intel ligently about the overall structure of the universe. Historically, the first model universes to receive mathe matical formulation were those which exhibit a density ■ that is constant, or independent of time. There are two of these: (1) the Einstein universe, which is filled to capacity with matter; and (2) the de Sitter universe, which is empty. The Einstein universe represents the condition which obtains when the force of gravity that tends to draw its substance together is exactly counteracted by the cos- I : imic repulsion, due to the factor which tends to dis- | jperse the field of the galaxies. It follows that this is |a static universe in unstable equilibrium, and that conse quently it is not likely that it lasted very long. As Lema^tre has suggested, it is possible that such groups of I galaxies as the Virgo cluster are vestiges of an Einstein universe of long ago, for their estimated densities are j ithe same as that of the latter, viz., /5=10"27 gm cm”3. jSince this model is filled with matter, it is closed, hyper- | (spherical, and finite. Its directed radius of curvature, I lRn, acts as a restraint on the maximum distances that can 1" exist within its space, limiting them to ^ - enSth* The parameters that define this universe are M (the total 252 mass), _Rq (the directed radius of curvature), y9(the den sity of matter), and X(the cosmical constant). In the Einstein universe these parameters are mathematically inter-; related so that a knowledge of any one of them will yield the values of the other three. Although none of these values is very accurately known by direct observation, Eddington has obtained values for them from theory, which usually agree with the observational values, such as they are.^ If his values could be substantiated, we would then know a great deal about the nature of the universe as it was at a time_t , which in Eddington’s theory is the begin- i ning. Although this would be quite interesting, it can not settle the choice of models, however; for the Einstein uni verse is a stage in the history of several models. I | The other universe of constant density, that of de ’ Sitter, achieves this constancy in the opposite manner, i.e., by being empty instead of full of matter: for this 'is a universe in which all matter and radiation have passed ;away. It is, in a sense, the Einstein universe deprived of its matter and therefore deprived of all gravitation as jwell. Since the field is consequently turned over entirely to the forces of cosmic repulsion, this universe is an I expanding model, in the sense that any particles introduced would naturally repel one another. Although it has no ^Fundamental Theory, pp. 66, 105, and 283. 253 matter, its space is nonetheless hyperspherical. It pos sesses enough residual curvature for closure, since the cosmical constant X. serves in lieu of gravitation to curve back its empty space. In the de Sitter universe this constant bears the value, x = & (Couderc, pp. 158-159), as compared with Einstein's value, Xo= C2> A local void in the Einstein universe would thus have a t residual curvature, Rs = t / T . Rc , (3) due to this "pseudo-density." It follows that in this jfamily of models, space can never be Euclidean even in its i | |empty regions. The de Sitter models could only pertain to ! |the actual universe if the matter which we know exists were |only a local phenomenon of negligible proportions as com- !pared with the rest of space. Hence the discovery of vast i ;fields of matter in Hubble's "realm of the nebulae" effec it ively excluded this model. It continues to be of inter est, however, as a limiting case toward which many of the jother models tend asymptotically as time advances. If the ! Einstein universe is therefore a thing of the past, with I matter but without any motion of recession, then the de Sitter universe is perhaps for the future, a much larger 254 universe with "recession" but without an appreciable amount of matter to recede. These facts suggest that the real universe, which contains matter in recession, calls for a composite model which combines features that are taken from both the Einstein and the de Sitter models. The Dynamic and Steady-State Models of the tJniverse In constructing composite models, the postulate that the density of the universe is constant must be discarded and the dynamic possibilities considered. The first such models which exhibit expanding fields of matter were those developed by Friedmann, who showed that could be deleted entirely by introducing a time-related metric, and that this could be done without eliminating matter and without producing a negative pressure (Gouderc, p. 161). These universes all exhibit a singularity at a definite time in jthe past-~a time not infinitely remote--when their matter I jwas concentrated into a small super-dense mass-point. From this point they expand, and since the second derivative of the directed radius of curvature R is (for the Friedmann universes) always negative, the rate of expansion must con- jtinually decrease. This means that a universe which deletes jthe cosmical constant can never be strictly static. These ! jmodels range from the spherical model (k = +1), which I i expands to a radius R0, and then passes over into contrac tion, through the Euclidean case (k = 0), whose expansion 255 asymptotically approaches a static state, to hyperbolic spaces (k = -1), which expand forever, and which, in the limiting case when the density is zero, expand in strictly linear fashion. When the inquisitive mind in its purview of these expanding universes presses backwards in time beyond their so-called ’ ’ beginnings," it tends to suppose (with George Gamow)^ that the primordial singularity, which included all the matter of the universe within a super-dense mass- ipoint, was preceded by a contracting universe, i.e., by a 'pre-primordial’ phase or phases reaching back into an infinite past. The Euclidean and hyperbolic cases envision only two such cycles which together endure from infinity to infinity. The first cycle originates in an empty de Sitter I jphase and contracts from an infinite past until all of its j (matter is concentrated in a point, from which the second |cycle rebounds with atomic explosiveness. The new cycle !is that of our present expanding universe, which retraces its former steps and is destined to "end” as the other I |cycle "began" by approaching an empty de Sitter state. The ! spherical multicyclic models depict an oscillating or pul- i I (sating universe, which exhibits an infinite number of jcycles of alternating contraction and expansion extending i i ! p c "The Evolutionary Universe," in The Universe, Part IV, Chap. i, pp. 68-70. 256 through all of infinite time. If the present universe is in an expanding phase of such an oscillating model, it must be destined eventually to reach a state of maximum expan sion and then to contract back again into a point, and to repeat this process over and over again forever. Before the revision of the distance scale of the uni verse in 1952, Gouderc was convinced that the oscillating models were necessarily too youthful to qualify as valid representations of the real world (Expansion, pp. 165, 168, and 194-196). This conclusion stemmed from the fact jthat none of the cycles seemed at that time to be long enough to account for the antiquity of the rocks of the earth*s crust, some of which were estimated to be about O OA 4.5 x 10y years old. On the other hand, the oldest pos sible Friedmann universe (the empty hyperbolic model) could not at that time be adapted to exceed an age of 1.9 x 10^ |years, a figure derived from Hubble’s parameter (see ! i below, p. 264) by taking in this case (with expansion |linear) its simple reciprocal. The improved observational i refinements which have recently led to the extension of the \ j 2®D. ter Haar, "The Age of the Universe,” The Scien tific Monthly , 77:173-181, October 1953; and C. fcatterson, G. Tilton, and M. Inghram, "Age of the Earth,” Science, 121:69-75, January 21, 1955. | 27Couderc, p. 168; and Pascual Jordan, Schwerkraft und Weltall, in Die Wissenschaft. hrsg. W. Westphal, CVII (Braunschweig, 1952), 104. 257 JO astronomical distance scale, however, have decreased Hubble's parameter to about one-seventh of its former value. Since h is the reciprocal of a time, its decrease has the effect of increasing the age of the universe as represented in the cosmological models. An age in excess of 13 x 10^ years is now permitted for the limiting case, which exhibits a hyperbolic space. Of the three types of Friedmann models, however, the limiting case (k = -1) contains no matter and is therefore of less importance than the Euclidean case, whose age defines the upper limit for any closed universe that does not incorporate the cosmical constant. The Euclidean universe, which was formerly accorded the impos- Isible age of only 1.3 x 10^ years, is now calculated to be j jabout 9 x 10^ years old.2^ The closed oscillating uni verses must be even younger (in their present phase) than this. These could be as much as one-third younger, how- ! jever, than the age of the limiting Euclidean case and still | jprovide adequate time to include the total life-span of the learth. It must therefore be admitted that, if universes ! which delete the cosmical constant are possible at all, i i 28See Allan Sandage, "Current Problems in the Extra- galactic Distance Scale," Astrophysical Journal, 127:513- 526, May 1958. 20 ^The Euclidean universe exhibits a non-linear expan sion which is being retarded at a rate that yields an age equal to 2/3 of the reciprocal of Hubble's parameter (Jor dan, S. 105; and Couderc, p. 165). 258 then the spherical and oscillating universes envisioned by Friedmann are possible candidates for the representation of the real world. equations, a family of models results which was originally championed by Lemattre (Primeval Atom) . Like the Friedmann universes, most of these models originate in a hyper-dense mass-point, or at least pass through such a singularity in the course of their evolution. Since X introduces a force of cosmic repulsion, however, these models expand more rapidly than their counterparts in the Friedmann family of models. At first the expansion is retarded by the forces of gravitation until the radius JR.Q, of the static Einstein universe is reached. After resting in this state of equi librium (or passing through it), these universes, in con trast to those of Friedmann, exhibit an expansion that becomes accelerated from that time on and which transforms | them finally into the de Sitter state. The hyperbolic and I jEuclidean cases, for which k = -1 and k = 0, respectively, j expand more rapidly than any of the other cosmological I * . models. Some scholars defend the hyperbolic Lemaitre uni- |verse, rather than the Euclidean or spherical, because observational estimates of the average density of matter jin the universe--symbolized by the parameter p — seem to 259 be too low to suggest that space closes in on itself."^® Eddington and Lemaitre, however, believe that the mass of the universe is finite and the cosmical constant positive; consequently they defend the spherical or elliptical models.- These models depend upon the value that is assigned to "X..^ If Xlies between zero and X Q (its value in the static Einstein universe), then our universe must be an oscillating one quite similar to those of the Friedmann type, but with shorter cycles. These models expand to a radius approaching but never quite reaching that of the Einstein universe and ultimately fall back into contraction again toward a second super-dense singularity. If x= xc, the universe may originate in the Einstein condition, as Eddington maintained, and sooner or later fall out of equi librium and. expand toward the de Sitter state; or, as Lemaltre came to believe, it may originate in a super-dense state, expand to the Einstein condition, and then pass on along the curve of the Eddington model. The solutions for which * > \ > are similar to those for which X= X Qexcept that 30George Gamow, Matter, Earth, and Sky (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1958), pp. 550-552. ^^Eddington, New Pathways, pp. 217-218, and Funda mental Theory, pp. 10-11 and 98; and Lemaitre, pp. 4^-48. ^The possible models are diagramed and discussed for various values of X in Couderc (pp. 193-195). 260 they pass by the Einstein condition with a residual veloc ity. In addition to the traditional theories, several "steady-state" theories have recently been proposed, which are regarded as heterodox because they imply that new mat ter is being created continuously throughout the history of the cosmos. The most popular of these is that of Fred _ Hoyle,which expands the postulate of invariance into the "perfect cosmological principle." This principle, which was originally introduced by Bondi and Gold,-5^ states [that "apart from local irregularities the universe presents 35 the same aspect from any place at any time." This means that the hyper-dense singularities of the preceding models are denied and, indeed, all temporal changes in density, entropy, and radius of curvature are regarded as fictitious inferences. To be sure, it is readily admitted that the [universe is expanding; but Hoyle maintains that as the dis- j itant galaxies pass over the "horizon" of our local frame of i reference with velocities exceeding that of light, new 33iiThe Steady-State Universe," in The Universe, Part IV, Chap. ii. 3^H. Bondi and T. Gold, "The Steady-state Theory of the Expanding Universe," Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society, 108^:252-270, 1948. 35H. Bondi, Cosmology, Cambridge Monographs on Physics ed. N. Feather and others (Cambridge, Eng., 1952), p. 12, italics ours. 261 galaxies are created in the broadening interstices between the remaining nebulae, and that these exactly compensate for the loss of the others from our local frame (Universe, p. 81). Thus the steady-state models are homogeneous and infinite in both space and time, though individual galaxies are bom, evolve, and die. A model which combines Hoyle’s doctrine of continuous creation with many features of the older cosmologies has been developed by the German cosmologist Pascual Jordan.56 The Jordan universe arose ex nihilo several billion years ago. Beginning with a negligible mass, it has since con tinually grown by the creation of new matter, which is introduced into the cosmos in the form of supemovae. As the mass of the universe increases with the square of its i age, the constant of gravitation changes in inverse propor tion to the age. This universe is closed and spherical j(k = +1) and expanding at such a rate that its directed jradius of space-curvature R steadily increases at the (velocity of light. Its total energy is nil, since the i jnegative gravitational or potential energy of the heavenly jbodies exactly counterbalances the positive energy of i composition of matter. These various conclusions are, in part, derived from the striking coincidence that the three 56Schwerkraft und Weltall, 2. Aufl. (1955). Jordan’s cosmology is briefly reviewed by Couderc (pp. 223-224). 262 dimensionless quotients that can be formed from the funda mental parameters of cosmology all yield pure numbers of the order of unity, while similar combinations involving both cosmic and microphysical constants yield numbers of jthe order of 10^ or its square. The three quotients jformed from cosmological parameters alone are: -1 * a, > R cm ^ • A son f hi _________------ • A sec (4) (a) h see" • A sec (b) --------- .— c cm sec"1* A sec (c) K cm gm”* - *p gm cm-^ • (£ cm sec“^)2(A sec)^ where £ = the velocity of light; h = Hubble’s constant; K = the gravitational constant, ft- the density of mat in relativistic units; ter; and A = the age of the universe; R = the directed radius of space-curvature. As originally conceived by Jordan on the basis of the data available to him at that time, these dimensionless quo tients yielded the values (a) hA = 1.7, (b) = 1.0, (c) K/»c2A2= 1.8. (5) (Couderc, p. 223). The product, hA, implies that the uni verse has been expanding in roughly linear fashion since R the beginning of time. The quotient _r- represents the sup- cA position that the average increase in the length of R occurs at the velocity of light. The expression (c) can 263 best be interpreted by showing that, when set equal to unity, it transforms into the equation, GM2 _ ., 2 ✓ \ —g— - Me , (6) in which the left-hand member is the potential energy of gravitation and the right-hand member as Einstein's famed expression for the energy-equivalent of matter.37 It is this equality which leads Jordan to make the intriguing assumption that the total energy of the universe is nil. These numerical coincidences and the simple explana tions which Jordan supplies are intuitively felt to be pregnant with significance, but it is not yet clear (in the last case, at least), just what that significance may be. Meanwhile, however, it is well to consider that any cosmo logical model whose parameters exhibit these coincidences has an alogical presumption in its favor; and, indeed, in the following section I shall make use of this presumption If K= -Sj. , , and cAsiR (where G is the gravi- ^ R tational constant in appropriate units and M is the total mass of the universe), then K pC2A2d . 2L . R2. 1 c2 r3 Setting this equal to unity, c2R M “ L GM2 o or —g'— csMc^ . In order to obtain equation (6) with exactness, the approx imation cA^R is taken as cA = V375 - R (G. J. Whitrow, The Structure and Evolution of the Universe, Harper Torch- books/Science Library [[New York, 1959^1, pp. 125-126). 264 in defense of my own cosmology by adopting the newer values for the parameters h and p and showing that these are co herent with Jordan’s assumption that the expanding universe is finite and that its total energy is nil. The Evidence in Favor of a Finite Universe In recent years the pioneer work of Edwin P. Hubble on ,Tthe observational approach to cosmology" has been dili gently pursued by his successors so that the reliability of the values assigned to the basic empirical parameters of cosmology has distinctly improved. There still remains, however, the task of applying these results toward the determination of the more theoretical parameters k, R, and (see above, p. 250), and of ultimately choosing a suit able model for the representation of the total universe. In particular, the improved values for Hubble’s parameter h, and for the density of the universe />■ finally enable us to make an educated guess about the fundamental geometrj* of space. Hubble's parameter is based upon the redshifts observed, in the spectra of the extragalactic nebulae, which are usually interpreted as velocities of recession in ac cordance with the well-known Doppler effect. These veloci ties are found to be proportional, in each case, to the distance of the given galaxy from the earth. Hubble’s parameter is then a function which applies to the total population of galaxies and expresses the rate of change of 265 recessional velocity with distance. The quantity h is thus the slope of the curve which plots distances of galaxies as abscissae and their velocities as ordinates. The parameter p expresses the average smoothed-out density of matter in the total universe. Since this para meter, taken in conjunction with Hubble’s parameter h, determines whether or not the universe is curved enough to close in on itself and to form a finite hypersphere, its importance can hardly be exaggerated. For universes which delete the cosmical constant (i.e., in which ” X = 0), the ^ closure of space is determined by the sign of the expres sion (Couderc, p. 170). For models which incorporate a posi tive cosmical constant corresponding expression (in simplified form) is approximately, (KcVittie, p. 176).^® If this difference is positive, it follows that the parameter k is equal to +1 and that space is finite and hyperspherical; if the difference is zero or negative, then k = 0 or -1, and space is infinite, and either Euclidean or Lobatchewskian, respectively. 1 h^ ±-*P-*s (7) (8) 38The factor ^ represents a conservative correction for evolutionary effects in the galaxies themselves. 266 j | In performing the calculation which determines the i |parameter k, the following values for the quantities jinvolved will be used, since these reflect the latest ! jempirical results of astrophysical research: I K = 1.86 x 10“27cm gm-- * - p = 8.6 x 10"30gm cm-3 h = 2.4 x 10"18 sec _1 c = 3.00 x 10 ^-8cm sec,“^ - (9) where K is the relativistic constant of gravitation and £ jis the velocity of light. By substitution, the empirical quantities are obtained which determine the sign of k and |the geometry of the universe: (1.86x10"2^ (8.6xl0"30) cm~2 c* 0.8xl0"56cm"2 (10) and a. — (2 •Ax^-Q. ■ cm’^- 1.6xl0“56cm"^. (11) TZ2 2 \3.0xl0l0 J It is quite remarkable that these two quantities are both of the same order of magnitude, viz., 10“3®. Indeed, the difference between 0.8 and 1.6 is well within the limits of error of the rough observational data upon which the cal- culation is based and is therefore effectively zero. It follows that, as far as the latest values of h and p can indicate, k is equally likely to be +1, 0 , or -1 ; and the geometry of the universe is as likely to be finite and spherical as it is to be flat or hyperbolic. 267 Such an inconclusive result may at first seem dis appointing to one who has patiently followed the discussion I 'through the technicalities of relativity and cosmological |theory. Nevertheless, to the philosopher who has struggled i iwith the dubious concept of "the actual infinite," this ; result is very significant in that it brings the closed and finite models for the first time into reasonable con formity with observation, and it thus provides a new ap proach to the cosmological antinomies propounded by Kant (see below, pp. 287-297). It is therefore particularly interesting to note that the finite models are not only consistent with the current empirical values of h and p , as shown above, but that, in addition, these models tend to be favored by several other approaches to the problem. The first of these has thus far yielded ambiguous results. It is the search for second-order departures from linearity in the rate of recession of the galaxies. Allan R. Sandage, assistant astronomer at the Mt. Wilson and Palomar Observatories, has plotted several theoretical curves for the distance-velocity relation which exhibit the departures to be expected in a Friedmann universe for the finite, Euclidean, hyperbolic, and steady-state models (Fig. 3, curves A through D, respectively), and has entered the empirical data for clusters of galaxies in the form of dots--one for each cluster--scattered along these a to 1 2 14 1 6 16 20 BOL0METR1C M AGNITUDE Red-shifts of 18 faintest measured clusters of galaxies showing alleged second-order departures Trom jlinearity (from bandage'). curves.^ Although the data are admittedly crude, as judged by scientific standards, the plots for the six most distant clusters at least suggest (on the assumptions of Sandage) that the true curve lies to the left of the Eucli dean solution and that the universe thus forms a finite hypersphere. It is probably premature, however, to draw conclusions from such data. The theorist is in the embar rassing position of having to evaluate any evolutionary effects on the brightness, color, and size of the individual ^^"The Red Shift," in The Universe, Part V, Chap. i, pp. 96-97. 269 i I galaxies in order to test the assumption that the universe ; as such, is evolving. Moreover, according to Sandage, no I j |one working in this field (including himself) has been ^correcting their data for the dilatation of time which ! Eddington predicted would apply for the remotest regions ;of space.^ According to accepted relativity theory this would involve, for galaxies receding at one-fifth of the velocity of light, a factor of 1.02. Moreover, it should be noted that Sandage’s curves (A to D), which faintly sug gest that the expansion of the universe is slowing down, were drawn on the assumption that ours is a Friedmann uni verse with X= 0. But for a Lemaxtre universe, in which one expects the expansion to accelerate after the Einstein state, the plotted curves should all be shifted to the right. The observed results would then suggest more strongly than ever that the universe is closed or finite. Since these second-order effects in h are also func tions of the density of matter in the universe, they afford (for what they are worth) an independent estimate of the value of P i which can be compared with our earlier estimate of lO-2^ gm cm"^. On the basis of the deviations from linearity which Sandage depicted in his chart, he concludes that ^®In a personal letter to me, February 23, 1959. 270 The amount of departure from linearity indicated by the measurements thus far calls for a mean density of about 3 x 10"2S grams of matter per cubic centimeter. (Universe, ; p. 95) Further refinements in the distance scale of the universe reduce this figure by a factor of seven-halves.41 It fol lows that the density as derived from the second-order effects in the distance-velocity relation is 10“^8, as compared with the figure of 10“29 gm cm“^ that was used above. Although this is denser by a factor of ten than the observational data allow, it should be recalled that Sandage took X as equal to zero. In a Lemaltre universe, on the other hand, the presence of a positive X introduces the equivalent of a positive density even in empty space. -This spurious density can account for some of the tenfold excess of density implied in the work of Sandage. Another approach to this problem is that of William A. Baum, who used a photon counter to construct six-color energy curves for the light received from the g a l a x i e s . 42 The resulting data for the remotest cluster of galaxies studied (No. 1448) show a red-shift of two-fifths the velocity of light. This red-shift suggests that the curve Sandage assumed at the time that the old distance scale should be doubled, as compared with the sevenfold increase required by his current refinements (see his paper, "Current Problems in the Extragalactic Distance Scale," Astrophysical Journal, 127:513-526, May 1958). 42RQbert h . Baker, Astronomy, 7th ed. (Princeton, N.J., 1959), pp. 530-531. 271 I I jlies further to the right in Figure 3 than that implied jin the data used by Sandage. Summarizing these findings, i I jRobert H. Baker points out that the line | shows no indication of bending appreciably in either ; direction. This result, Cbe concludes^!, implies a uni verse that is either Euclidean, where the expansion con tinues indefinitely, or a moderately closed model in which the expansion eventually halts at a finite radius. (Baker, p. 531) Here again, however, the conclusion is subject to the ambi- Iguities involved in time dilatation and in the use of These developments in the distance-velocity relation ship are, by Hoyle’s own admission (Universe, p. 85), par ticularly disquieting to advocates of the steady-state Itheory, since this theory is represented by the curve at the extreme right in Figure 3, the curve which lies fur thest from the trend that is set by the current data, and which lies still further yet from where it would be in a Lemaltre model. It will be recalled that the steady-state theory seemed questionable also in the light of the evi dences, such as they are, which imply that the universe is evolving toward a more and more attenuated condition; for the steady-state models, as we have seen, involve (in addi tion to their expansion) the continuous creation of matter and the gradual formation of new galaxies, so that the crowding of galaxies in space would remain the same through out the infinite extent of time (see above, pp. 260-261). The concurrence of evidence thus seems to enhance the 272 i I jprestige of the evolutionary Lemaltre models that envision I a universe of changing density which at a date as late as that of the Einstein phase exhibited a crowded plenum of |galaxies that was then as dense as only the clusters of I galaxies are today. Since these Lemaltre models are hyper- spherical, their favorable status in the opinion of ranking icontemporary cosmologists implies that the universe may Iwell be a closed and finite type. Further coherence is lent to this hypothesis by check ing the observational value of p against its theoretical value in a universe whose total matter-energy is nil. This very striking contention has been rendered plausible, as we have seen (above, pp. 261-263), by the cosmologist Pascual Jordan, who has called attention to the fact that the dimensionless quotients (a) hA, (b) and (c) Ky^c2A2 turn out to be of the order of unity; and that, in the case of (c), this means that the potential energy of gravitation in the universe is equal to the energy-equivalent of matter Mc^ and presumably opposite in sign. Although the implications of this equivalence are not yet clear, it is reasonable to assume that it is significant rather than coincidental. In this case it would be justifiable to adopt the hypothesis that the equivalence is exact. Let us ! 273 I therefore set expression (c) equal to unity and reason (backwards, as it were, by substituting into this equation i !the best current value for y?, viz., yP = 8.6xl0"30 gm cm"3, and solving the equation for the age of the universe A. Thus if Kp c A2 = 1, then A = — 1--• (12) c*fKp~ The values of c and of Kare accurately known to be c = 3.0X10-*-® cm sec"l and K = 1.86xl0"27 cm gm-i. The substitution of these values into (12) then yields for the age of the universe: A = 2.6xl0^7 sec, or 3.3x10)9 years. (13) This result may seem surprisingly large as compared with the figure of 5 or 6 x 10^ years which is yielded by the concurring lines of evidence that are mentioned in Chapter viii (pp. 242-243). It should be borne in mind, however, that those evidences were derived from the study of gross material bodies composed of elements of high atomic weight. It is now regarded as likely that these elements can only be formed in the hot interiors of ! 274 | stars,^ and that the stars, in turn, were not born until an advanced stage in the evolution of the cosmos, perhaps during its passage through the Einstein phase. Consequent- i |ly, it is to be expected that any age which is derived from i (cosmological considerations (instead of from studies of jmatter) will include the several billions of years which (must have elapsed before the heavier elements were formed, iand during which the universe was apparently composed entirely of radiation and of hydrogen gas.^ Moreover, an antiquity in excess of eight billion years is likewise implied by expression (a) (above, p. 272), which would be exactly equal to unity in a uniformly expanding model, but would be somewhat less than this in a universe whose expan sion has been gradually retarded since the explosive origin of the cosmos. Gouderc states specifically that the prod uct, hA, should equal j (or 0.67) in a Euclidean Friedmann universe (Expansion, p. 165). A spherical Lemaltre universe ^Fred Hoyle, "Ultrahot Stars," in The New Astronomy: a Scientific American book (New York, 1955), Part IV, Chap. iii, pp. 147-146; William A. Fowler, "The Origin of the Elements," in The Universe, Part II, pp. 24 f. and 30-31; and E. Margaret Burbidge and others, "Sjmthesis of the Elements in Stars," Reviews of Modern Physics, 29:547-650, October 1957. ^George Gamow, "The Evolutionary Universe," in The bniverse, Part IV, Chap. i, pp. 73-75. Gamow*s chief adversary, Fred Hoyle, agrees with him at this point. "Nowadays," he writes, "we are coming more and more to realize that hydrogen is the original material." ("The Steady-State Universe," in The Universe, Part IV, Chap. ii, p. 80) 275 | « jshould exhibit a slightly smaller fraction because of the jclosure of its space. "The time since the ’beginning’ of j jthe expansion," writes Sandage, "will be smaller than jdepending on the value of the radius of curvature" (Astro- i physical Journal, 127:525). As it turns out, the substi- I jtution of the latest empirical values for h and for A i yields the pure number hA = (2.44 x 10"18) (2.63 x 1017) = 0.64, (14) a result in striking accord with the expectation developed above. The evidence in favor of an evolutionary finite uni verse may now be summarized. Essentially, the procedure has been to adopt the current observational value for Hubble’s parameter h, and then to consider what must be the value of the density p, which is required for closure in such a universe. The value obtained in this manner, f> — 10-29 g m cm~3, is found to provide a coherent account of the universe in several respects: 1. It is identical with the value of p which is yielded by Jan H. Oort’s derivation of the mass of the Virgo Cluster by means of the virial theorem;^ i ^"Distribution of Galaxies and their Density in the iUniverse," unpubl. MS in possession of the Department of Astronomy, University of California at Los Angeles (Gronin gen, 1958). 276 2. It agrees within less than one order of magnitude with the value of which is indicated by Sandage*s study of the second-order effects in the distance-velocity relation (above, pp. 267-270); 3. It is identical with the value of which is required in a cosmology whose total cosmic matter-energy is nil (above, pp. 272-274); 4. It yields, in such a cosmology, an age (8.3 x 109 years) and an expansion factor (0.64) which are both coherent with current astrophysical theory (above, pp. 273-275); 5. And, generally speaking, it is a reasonable value in the light of the total body of current knowledge on interstellar matter. We can safely conclude from these studies that, al though the field of astrophysical cosmology must still be regarded as a highly speculative discipline, which has not yet found a definitive solution to the problem of the over all structure and dynamics of the universe, there remains, nonetheless, a fair presumption in favor of the spherical models of Lemaitre which embody a Riemannian geometry of positive curvature and exhibit a finite volume. CHAPTER IX ; THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PHILOSOPHICAL COSMOGONY The Cosmogonic Dilemma of The Cyclical Models The question now arises whether the various finite - models of the universe, which have so happily afforded an escape from the philosophical difficulties of infinite space, can likewise provide an escape from the perplexities of infinite time. This problem reduces to that of the eternity or temporal finiteness of the matter and energy of the total universe. Since Einstein (and the atomic bomb) have shown that matter and energy can be physically converted into one another in accordance with the formula, E = Mc^, the term "matter" will normally be used in the following pages to designate that which may be more strictly expressed as "matter-energy.” The scientific evidence which suggests that the universe, or at least its heavier forms of matter, may not have come down to us from a strictly infinite past has become rather impressive in recent years, and the origin of heavy matter has been pro visionally dated rather accurately at five to six billion 277 ; 278 iyears ago.^ It cannot be too strongly stressed, however, that this j !in itself cannot be validly cited as proof that matter as | jsuch (including hydrogen) is of finite age. The generally jaccepted "age of the universe” is not necessarily identical I iwith that of material substance itself. With only one i exception, all of these age determinations were made on ^material objects which (1) are composed of the heavier elements, and (2) are situated in a very special region of the universe, i.e., in one spiral arm of our own local galaxy. The substances that were thus locally available for study might all have originated in a very provincial event, perhaps in the explosion of a supernova, or even in the ordinary nuclear reactions in the interior of an ultra- hot star, or stars. Consequently, these determinations can tell us little about the age of matter in other parts of our galaxy or in other galaxies, nor about that ninety- three percent of the atoms of the universe which are esti mated to be hydrogen alone (Universe, p. 19), nor about the age of the hydrogen out of which the heavier elements were most likely formed in the beginning. Moreover, if these considerations should seem to renew the possibility of ■1-See above, pp. 240-244; and £f. C. Patterson, G. Til ton, and M. Inghram, "Age of the Earth," Science, 121:69-75, January 21, 1955; and Hans E. Suess and Harold C. Urey, "Abundances of the Elements," Reviews of Modem Physics, 28:53-73, January 1956. I 279 j ieternal matter, the steady-state theory, which has arisen in recent years, may similarly be viewed as championing the conception of an eternal universe, in which, however, the oldest matter would have receded by now to regions i jbeyond our ken (see above, p. 246). The renewed possibility of eternal matter or of an eternal universe, on the other hand, provides no grounds for asserting its actuality. The fact that the hydrogen of the universe must antedate the origin of the heavy elements obviously does not imply that the hydrogen is ieternal. If the origin of heavy matter is a local phenom enon, it is still a striking coincidence that its age— five or six billion years--is of the same order of magnitude as that of the total universe--eight or nine billion years (see above, p. 273), as derived from the cosmological the ory which we have found reason tentatively to adopt (see above, pp. 275-276). It is likely, then, that hydrogen arose with the origin of the universe over eight billion years ago and that all of physical reality is finite not only in space, but finite in time as well. This conclusion rests, however, upon the one and only type of age determination which does not depend upon studies of local matter, viz., upon determinations that are made on the basis of the overall expansion of the universe and the sequence of phases through which it has passed in the course of time. Any defense of the past eternity of matter 280 Ifrom this direction must then involve the adoption of one |of the oscillating or multicyclic models (see above, i jpp. 255-258), and the assumption that there is a transfer- ral of matter-energy from each major phase to the next and ‘so on ad infinitum. It will be recalled that these multi cyclic models are of two general types, 1. Those which exhibit two monotonic phases extending from infinity to infinity, the first a phase of contrac tion and the second one of expansion; and 2. Those which comprise an infinite number of self- contained cosmic cycles separated by singularities in which all the matter of the universe is concentrated in a small super-dense mass-point. Both of these models are consistent with the latest empiri cal data and are therefore good candidates for the task of representing the real world. It is true, of course, that before the revision of the distance-scale the oscillating models were usually discounted because of the supposed fact that none of the cycles was long enough to account for the known antiquity of the rocks of the earth's crust. But the establishment of the new distance-scale has altered the value of h enough to provide adequate ages for these cycles. 2 Paul Couderc, The Expansion of the Universe, trans. J. B. Sidgwick (London, 1952), pp. 165, l6fe, and 194-196. 281 1 The oscillating models are therefore again worthy of serious regard. I In other respects, however, the evidence in their favor is conflicting. The work reported by Sandage on the dis- tance-velocity relation has already been discussed (above, p. 268, Fig. 3). His conclusion that the expansion of the universe seems to be slowing down was not confirmed by Baum's work with the photon-counter. Moreover, such a deceleration could occur, in any case, only in a universe that has not yet passed through the Einstein state. On the other hand, there is considerable evidence (Couderc, p. 182) pointing to the Einstein state as a phase already deep in the past and to the clusters of galaxies as remnants of that episode in cosmic history. The oscillating models, however, are consistent only with the view that this phase is theoretically impossible or that, if possible, it can not in actuality quite be reached. For these reasons the oscillating models still seem rather unlikely as descrip tions of the real world in spite of the adequate time- scale which they now provide. In any case, it is important to note that, although they permit the eternal existence of matter, they in no way demand it; for the present cycle can always be interpreted as the only one that has ever existed, or can exist. Moreover, the same can be said regarding Gamow*s model, which, as he writes, 282 j ! suggests that from an infinitely thin state an eternity ago the universe contracted until it reached the maximum density, from which it rebounded to an unlimited expan sion which will go on indefinitely in the future (Uni verse , pp. 69-70). !The possibility of a contracting phase prior to the so- jcalled "beginning” shows that matter can be eternal even in ■a non-oscillating model, though again this is not demanded. 'Thus the issue is basically the same with regard to all ^appeals to such "pre-primordial" phases, whether these ^comprise monotonic contractions or cycles. In view of the fact that the super-dense point-like singularities which intervene between all such phases involve conditions of such intensity that all vestiges of structure, both molar and atomic, from the earlier phase are completely obliter ated, the positing of such earlier phases is speculative in the extreme even when compared with the positing of the models themselves. We may therefore be permitted to deal with these "pre-primordial" phases on an intermediate level of speculativeness, which centers upon the problem of the exact relation which may exist between the adjacent cycles, and, in particular, upon the question whether there can be a carry-over of matter-energy from one such phase, through the intervening singularity, to the next phase; or whether indeed there can be any temporal or causal relationship whatsoever between one phase and its "neighbor." If such a relationship should prove to be unlikely, this would ! 283 j jweaken the case for the Democritean doctrine of the eter- jnity of the physical world. ! It should be immediately evident that any cosmology I jwhich incorporates more than one cosmic phase is invoking i (the dubious concept of a transcendent temporal order within i 1 which each cosmic cycle, with its own self-contained phy- Isical time, sweeps out, so to speak, one stroke of the trans-cosmic pendulum, and the next cycle a second stroke, and so on. Such a concept of "super-time," however ignores the most essential point of the theory of relativity, which in Einstein's own words is as follows: If we assume that all matter would disappear from the world, then, before relativity, one believed that space and time would continue existing in an empty world. But according to the theory of relativity, if matter and its motion disappeared there would no longer be any space or t ime.3 But both matter and motion do disappear, as we hope to show (below, pp. 284-286), at each point-like transition from cycle to cycle so that space and time cannot pertain to a universe of this sort which displays no molar features. It is likely, then, that each cycle generates its own space and time and that it is metaphysically meaningless to order the cycles themselves in any relationship of beforeness or afterness. As a corollary to this it would seem to follow ^ C i t e d b y philipp Frank in Philosophy of Science, ;Prentice-Hall Philosophy Series, ed. A. E. MurpTiy (fengle- toood Cliffs, N. J., 1958), p. 123. 284 ; » that there could be no causal relationship whatsoever between any two such phases, nor any transferral of sub stance, since there is no temporal order by which to distin- iguish cause from effect and nothing is known that determines jwhich cycles are contiguous with one another and which are t not. As has been pointed out, these conclusions depend upon the striking suggestion that the initial condition of each cycle or phase is matterless and motionless. In support of this speculation the work of Pascual Jordan is cited, who contends that the total matter-energy of the universe is nil, since the gravitational or potential energy of the galaxies, — , exactly counterbalances the energy- ^ A equivalent of matter, Mc^ (see above, pp. 261-263). The equality of these two quantities impressed Jordan so deeply that he felt constrained to seek some meaning in the coin cidence. By the simple expedient of regarding either the gravitational constant. G, or the directed radius of curva ture. R, as a negative quantity, these two energies are made to appear as complementary aspects of the same basic entity, which is then represented in its negative perspec tive as matter, and in its positive aspect as the energy of ^It will be recalled that Jordan^ contention is based in turn not upon his dubious cosmology as such, but upon an interpretation of the remarkable numerical coincidences which arise when the basic constants of cosmological and mi crophysical theory are combined into dimensionless quotients. 285 jgravitation (or vice versa). The over-all sum of the imatter-energy in such a universe is therefore always zero; I land, in particular, during the "big squeeze," as the point- |like melting-pot transition between cycles is often called, when the matter of the universe is no longer a far-flung molar phenomenon, both matter and its correlates, motion and gravitation, and with them space and time, are in effect completely obliterated. But if matter and motion vanish into utter nothingness at each singularity in the sequence of cosmic cycles, the positing of s ’ .ch cycles lends little if any support to the doctrine of eternal matter. If there exists no carry-over of substance, nor of causal or temporal relationship from one cycle to the next, such appeals to a "pre-primordial" physical order seem superfluous. Since the present cycle, however, is temporally finite in every cosmological model (except in the steady- state model), it can hardly be regarded as self-subsis'tent. It may therefore be claimed that Jordan’s theory throws serious doubt upon the ontological ultimacy of the entire physical order as such. To be sure, a carry-over of proc ess (or its analogue) can be supposed in place of that of physical substance. But a carry-over of process can as easily be conceived as occurring from Life to cosmos, or from Mind to cosmos, as it can from cosmos to cosmos. It is thus indeed a small additional step by which one advances from the speculations of modern cosmology to the Augustinian 286 proposition that the universe is not made out of any physi- eal thing at all. In the light of Jordan’s suggestion, ex fiihilo creationism then becomes a plausible and satisfying, if alogical, alternative to the Platonic and Democritean views. In calling these considerations alogical, we are frankly acknowledging, in the spirit of Tennant, that nothing has been strictly proven; for the subject is specu lative at best so that a Humean skepticism is a live option, and there always remains the possibility of an infinite past and of eternal matter for those who are phil osophically disposed to discount the arguments above. For the advocate of the doctrine of eternal matter, however, there are serious philosophical difficulties in the view that anything real can be literally infinite in a strictly mathematical sense. If infinity is not even a definite number, it can hardly represent the spatial or temporal extent of any definite entity. Hence, when a universe that is finite in volume has finally become empirically probable, it seems paradoxical that the concept of infinite time should still be championed by careful scholars. To those who are philosophically predisposed to prefer the Greek ideal of TT€/2<k^ , however, the single-phase monotonically expanding models are appealing in that they avoid the prob lem of infinity by resorting to an Augustinian creationism. But this, in turn, is subject to the perplexities that are 287 i involved in the origin of physical substance. Apparently, those scholars who advocate the multiphase models are i i ! chiefly concerned about avoiding the problem of the origin I of substance, whereas the champions of the single-phase j models are more anxious to avoid the problem of the actual infinite. The Physical Interpretation of the ffirst Antinomy of Kant: Although the cosmological problem has not yet received a scientific solution, the considerations of this chapter have, nevertheless, pointed to a tentative solution which, for philosophical purposes, we are free to adopt as the hypothetical basis for further metaphysical investigation. If we are to select a cosmos from among the possible worlds, then, we can probably do no better in the present state of our knowledge than to choose a strictly finite universe which was created ex nihilo about eight or nine billion years ago "by continual fulgurations of the divinity," as Leibniz expressed it,5 a cosmos which originated in a burst of radiation that gradually condensed into hydrogen gas and continued in this mixed state for the next three billion years, during which time it steadily expanded at a slowly retarding rate. We may then suppose that, as it passed 5Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "The Monadology," in Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters, trans. and ed. L. E. Loemker (Chicago, 1956), II, 1052. 288 through the Einstein condition, its substance further con densed into galaxies of stars.6 In the fiery depths of ! |these stars the heavier elements were formed. Today, five |or six billion years after the Einstein phase, the universe |is still expanding at such a rate that its directed radius ;of curvature increases at the velocity of light. This uni verse is envisioned as embodying a closed Riemannian geom etry of positive curvature. Although its volume is finite and equal to 2TT R , it has no "jumping-off" place, for it is curved just enough to close back in on itself and to form a hypersphere (Couderc, pp. 149-150). Since it has already passed through the Einstein state, it may be expected to continue expanding forever, as the force of cosmic repulsion (due to ” X) gains headway over gravitation. This cosmology is worthy of serious regard not only from the standpoint of theoretical and observational astron omy, but also from that of philosophy, since it affords a physical interpretation of the first antinomy of Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic. According to Weldon, the purpose of the Dialectic was to investigate the question, "How is metaphysics possible as a natural disposition . . . and . . . as a science?"7 The antinomies were posed as part 6Jan H. Oort, "The Evolution of Galaxies," in The Universe, Part III, Chap. ii, p. 47. 7T. D. Weldon, Introduction to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Oxford, 1945), p. 111. 289 iof a "general attack on rationalist methods in metaphysics" i |(Weldon, p. 114). Kant states that J i The antinomy of pure reason will exhibit to us the tran scendental principles of a pretended pure rational cos- | mology. But it will not do so in order to show this science to be valid. . . . This pretended science can ! be exhibited only in its bedazzling but false illusori- ness;8 and he later adds regarding the antinomies that Each of them is not only in itself free from contradic tion, but finds conditions of its necessity in the very nature of reason--only that, unfortunately, -the assertion of the opposite has on its side, grounds that are just as valid and necessary. (Kant, p. 394) The first antinomy of Kant comprises the following pair of propositions: Thesis: The world has a beginning in time, and is also limited as regards space. . . . Antithesis: The world has no beginning, and no limits in space; it is infinite as regards both time and space. (Page 396) In each of Kantrs antinomies the antithesis reflects the utter failure of all efforts to apprehend a breaking- off point in the intuitions of space and time, of composi tion, of causality, and of dependency; and the thesis represents the rationalistic demand for such limits. The arguments given by Kant in support of both positions are, as Smith observes, 8Immanuel Kantfs Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London, 1958)," pp. 385-386. ; 290 i j of a non-empirical a priori character. They are formu lated, Che adds^] , in terms of the dogmatic rationalism ; of the Leibnizian position, with a constant appeal to abstract principles.9 jThus, Kant has a tendency to follow the Parmenidean dictum [according to which ,Tthat which it is possible to think is identical with that which can Be."^ That the world has a beginning follows on the one hand from the contradiction 'inherent in the idea that an infinite series (of moments, in this case) can at any point have actually been completed. :On the other hand, a world which has a beginning is incon ceivable because it would then have been preceded by an empty time within which no favored starting-point can be distinguished. The same contradictions appear in the realist's conception of space. Here again, as Smith remarks, Kant infers "from a subjective impossibility of * apprehension . . . an objective impossibility of existence" (p. 485). If time is finite, then space cannot be infinite since "an infinite time must be viewed as having elapsed, in the enumeration of all co-existing things" (Kant, p. 398). But the three-dimensional Euclidean continuum ^Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason,' 2nd ed. rev. and enlarged (London, 1923), p. 4 si. ■^Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Cambridge, Mass., 1348), p. 42, n. 2 ' (Frag. 291 i(which Kant took for granted),^ and. with it the real world, jis necessarily infinite in extent, for otherwise the world i jwould be limited by a relation to empty space, a relation i .which is meaningless. These mathematical antinomies were already perplexing Kant early in his career; they are recognized, for instance, in his Dissertation of 1770. The existence of these contradictions, Cwrites WeldonJ, had seemed to Kant a scandal to philosophy, and was largely responsible for turning his thoughts into speculative channels (Weldon, pp. 117-118), and, we may add, for evoking his challenging epistemological conclusions. As summarized by Weldon, the solution which Kant offered to the world asserted that Space and time and the substances in them which causally determine one another are all alike to be regarded as appearances and not as things existing independently of all experience, and the empirical system which they con stitute is to be regarded as a representation of things in themselves, which has no existence except for con sciousness. (Weldon, p. 120) It was not merely the existence of the antinomies which led Kant to take this radical step, but it was rather the certainty and logical necessity which they seemed to entail. To Kant, in his mature period, the Euclidean prop osition which asserts that two parallel lines never meet ■^In the opinion of Norman Kemp Smith, '‘ Kant is convinced that space is given to us in intuition as being definitely and irrevocably Euclidean in charac ter” (p. 118; c£. also p. 117). 292 jseemed to be self-evident and impossible to question, even 'though no one could ever hope to trace the lines to infinity !in order to test the axiom. But how can the mind know with i 'certainty anything about the beginning of time or the space 'beyond the stars? Obviously, no empirical experience could be imagined to yield such sweeping and certain conclusions. Hence, these antitheses must be regarded as regulative principles and must be interpreted in terms of the distinc tion between phenomenon and thing-in-itself (Weldon, pp. 121-123). Since the time of Kant, however, the way has been pre pared for physical solutions to the antinomies, in which space and time are regarded as thoroughly objective and in some sense constitutive of reality. These solutions depend upon such relativistic concepts as that which maintains that time can flow or elapse at different rates in differ ent parts of the universe, and that space and time are integral to one another, being arbitrary components of a more ultimate and absolute space-time vector, and that space can be physically curved in accordance with the for mal non-Euclidean geometries. The Euclidean geometry of Kant's day could envision no end to extension except by interposing a border. In answer to the inevitable ques tion, "What lies beyond this border?” one could only reply, "More space!” and so on ad infinitum. Today the advocates of a finite universe avoid this infinite regress by 293 jrepudiating the concept of a border. In a curved space there is no more need for a boundary than there is in the I ! two-dimensional continuum which forms the surface of the I j iearth. It is true, of course, that the direction "north” iterminates at the North Pole; but no one therefore supposes that a "jumping-off place" or edge of the world exists at Latitude 90° N. In contemporary cosmol ogy space itself, the properties of which are formulated in terms of physical geodesics, is envisioned as flexed and contorted or "drawn- up," as it were, into puckers by every particle of gravi tating matter and by the metrical fields which pervade it. Each such pucker limits the amount of space that can exist and contributes its iota to the closure of the total uni verse . ^ Is space then finite or infinite? The most probable answer which is afforded by modern cosmology is that the universe is finite in volume, but infinite in the sense that it is boundless, i.e., that no given path within it can ever encounter a border. Indeed, from the empirical standpoint it is probable that no real object, even if it travelled at the velocity of light, could possibly circumnavigate the •^These concepts were developed in a particularly lucid manner by Arthur S. Eddington in his Space, Time and Gravitation (Cambridge, Eng., 1921), pp. 85 and 148; New Pathways in Science, Messenger Lectures: 1934 (New York, 1935), p. 194; and The Philosophy of Physical Science, Tarner Lectures: 1938 (Cambridge, Eng., 1949), pp. 79-83. ; 294 i juniverse unless it had started its journey before the begin ning of time. Inasmuch as the curvature of space, the velocity of light, and the beginning of time may be regarded ias interposing limits that are physical rather than merely j ^epistemological, it is fair to conclude that modern cosmol ogy provides us with an interpretation of this antinomy which is more objective than that proposed by Kant. The same conclusion may be drawn regarding the problem of infinite time. The evidence which suggests that the universe had its beginning about eight billion years ago has been reviewed above (pp. 241-244 and pp. 273-275), and it appeared that three of the most persistent processes of nature pointed inevitably to an absolute beginning, viz., the expansion of the universe, the decay of radioactive elements, and the increase of entropy. In deference to this evidence, we have defended the Augustinian doctrine of ex nihilo creation, which accords with the thesis of Kant's first antinomy (above, p. 289). The antithesis, however, which denies a beginning, is also amenable to interpretation in terms of purely physical concepts. For, as Eddington points out, in current rela tivity theory time is a property which a given region of the universe may, or may not, exhibit, depending upon one's frame of reference (Space, p. 160). If, then, the concept of timeless reality is meaningful on the local level, it is conceivable that time may be traced in regress back to a ; 295 i i jcondition in which all of the matter in the universe exhib- jits a timeless mode of existence. Such a regress would ibring us to the super-dense mass-point, which Lemaitre ) 'called the "primeval atom," and which was probably not only timeless but, strictly, spaceless as well;^5 for both time and space are here interpreted as statistical emergents iarising from the random behavior of atoms, which must there fore exist in sufficient numbers to allow the law of aver ages to apply.Eddington has made this clear, on the one hand, with regard to space in his theory of the "sigma- metric," which defines the centimeter in terms of the sta tistical concept of particle density,-*-5 and, on the other hand, with regard to time, in his theory of entropy, which is also a statistical concept, and which serves as the physical measure of time.-*-6 For if time has an arrow, it is only because randomness invariably increases in every physical process; and similarly, the extension of space is ■ * - 5Since the resources of quantum mechanics and of the non-Euclidean geometries were not available to Kant, he was unable, in his consideration of the second antinomy to consider the possibility that fundamental particles could exist in a non-spatial mode and could generate space themselves. l^ACrthur] S. Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World, The Gifford Lectures: 1927 (N e w York, , pp. 195- 196. ^Fundamental Theory (Cambridge, Eng., 1949), pp. 6-9. ^ Physical World, pp. 87 f. and 101. : 296 isustained only through the inertial field produced by its jfar-flung matter.'*-7 In Lemaitre's cosmogony, however, mat ter is originally not far-flung and molar physical processes do not occur,since the one primeval atom is all that lexists.^ In a world of one atom, even though it be a jsuper-atom, a statistics of atoms is meaningless, natural law does not apply, and space and time are irrelevant.20 ;Thus, Kant’s apprehensions about the beginning were point less; for the regress reaches back not to a time preceded by a temporal nothingness, as the thesis of the antinomy seemed to imply; but it leads back instead, perhaps, to a 17E. Finlay-Freundlich, Cosmology, in Internationa1 Encyclopedia of Unified Science, ed. 0. Neurath and others, Vols. I and II: Foundations o£ the Unity of Science, Vol. I, No. § (Chicago, 1951") , pT 5 2 . l°We shall have occasion to define the physical world as that realm in which natural law obtains. But all natu ral laws are statistical in nature, i.e., they-are special cases of the law of averages (see Erwin Schrddinger, What Is Life? Lectures at Trinity College, Dublin: 1943 LCam- bridge, Eng., 19443, pp. 2, 8-17, and 82-04). Since the law of averages holds onlj* for large aggregates of atoms, however, it follows that natural law cannot pertain to a single isolated atom or nucleus, even though that atom may implicitly contain all of the matter in the universe. i^Or, perhaps, only one quantum. Thus Canon Georges Lemaitre ventures to raise the question, "Who knows if the evolution of theories of the nucleus will not, some day, permit the consideration of the pri meval atom as a single quantum?" (The Primeval Atom, trans. B. H. and S. A. Korff CNew York, 19503, pi ITT2) 20Eddington, Physical World, pp. 197-199; and Couderc, Expansion of the Universel p. 178. jtimeless something;.^ Since time is a property of physical reality, there is no justification for appealing to a "meta-temporal" realm transcending our present universe, I I in which the origin of the universe appears as a datable jevent and the course of its cosmic development as one epi- |sod.e among many. Since "the beginning" can now be inter- ipreted as that of time, and not as the origin of reality as [such, there is a sense in which modern cosmology depicts a universe which both has and has not a beginning and which therefore affords an interpretation of the First Antinomy of Kant which is physical in nature and not epistemological. iThe Cosmological Argument for God lin the Light of Cosmology. In Chapter v it was pointed out that Tennant ignored the cosmological argument for the existence of God, at least in its temporal form, on Kantian grounds, viz., on the grounds that it ultimately reduced to the ontological proof (above, pp. 165-168). In the absence of any "experience of the origin of worlds," as Hume had expressed it,^2 Tennant could only regard this argument as purely rationalistic. He had accommodated his thinking to the scientific belief ^Whether this something is physical or not can be judged in the light of Pascual Jordan’s contentions (see above, pp. 284-286). on Hume’s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, ed. Norman N!emp Smith, 2nd ed. (London, 1<)4^) , p. l5'0 (see above, p. 239). 298 that was current in his day which contended that matter as such has come down to us from an infinite past and that the ! !total cosmos is eternal. From this position it naturally followed, as John Stuart Mill had shown, that the ultimate material cause cannot be regarded as an event and is there fore not a cause at all, much less an evidence of a First Cause.23 For this reason Tennant expressly repudiated Augustinian creationism (see above, p. 238). If Tennant iwere to survey the development of the cosmos, then, in ordine essendi, there would remain for him as a theist (and as a metaphysical dualist) only the Platonic viewpoint, viz., that the ultimate primordial reality which is to be taken as the starting point is an eternal duality, "God and His utterance," as Tennant expressed it; for "if God be a world-ground, there never could have been no world . . . [[sine the world is coeval with God."2^ In the several decades that have elapsed, however, since Tennant wrote his Philosophical Theology, the facts and theories reviewed in these chapters have attained a scientific status and have cast considerable doubt upon Mill’s two basic assumptions, (1) that matter is eternal, ^3John Stuart Mill, Three Essays on Religion, Uniform Library Ed. of the Miscellaneous Works of J. S. Mill (New York, 1874), pp. 142-144 (see above, p. 236). 2^F. R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Eng., 1935 ^ 7 7 7 ^ 7 ^ ^ and (2) that it therefore has little in common with physi cal events. The so-called "age of the universe" was soon evaluated by radioactive methods and found to measure several billion years. Moreover, as scientific cosmology developed under the impetus of the theory of relativity, it finally became possible to formulate empirically test able theories about the origin, structure, and evolution of the universe as a whole (see above, pp. 245-263); and the empirical data which astronomers accumulated yielded better and better values for the relevant parameters (see above, pp. 250-252 and 266) so that the process of sifting through the various theories began to make headway. It was later realized, however, that the cosmogonic signifi cance of these findings had been exaggerated; for the age determinations did not give the age of hydrogen, and the cosmological models, which offered the only remaining approach to the age of matter as such, nearly all allowed for "pre-primordial" cycles extending into an infinite past (see above, pp. 280-282). On the other hand, the work of Jordan seemed to discredit the concept of a trans- ferral of physical reality from one cycle to another so that the positing of earlier cycles was viewed as a highly speculative response to a spurious demand.25 it was felt 25see above, pp. 261-263 and 283-285, where it is evident that Jordan's work on the numerical coincidences in the fundamental constants of nature does not stand or fall with the fortunes of his cosmology as such. 300 that the doctrine of eternal matter could hardly be signif icant if this matter vanished into utter nothingness, as bordan had shown that it might, at each singularity in the sequence of cosmic cycles. Speculation was therefore con fined to one such cycle, regarded as the only one. Such a universe, originating in a primeval nucleus devoid of matter-energy (as known on the molar level), appeared to 1 consist of "events" whose mathematical group-structure gave jrise to the phenomena of molar physics. Little was known about the "operators" whose activity was reflected in the events; but it seemed quite safe to assume that they were nothing at all like matter. If we may venture, then, to draw a conservative conclu sion from the pros and cons of modern cosmological theory, it would perhaps be that the doctrine of eternal matter, which John Stuart Ilill invoked as a definitive refutation of the cosmological argument and which Tennant acknowledged to the point of tacitly rejecting this approach to theism, is now considerably weakened, though it still remains a physical possibility for any thinker who is relatively insensitive to the philosophical problem of the actual infi nite. But as the likelihood of eternal matter declines and it becomes increasingly clear that physical reality is not self-subsistent, there arises a proportionately urgent demand for an ultimately supernatural explanation of the origin of the cosmos, for an origin in terms of creation. 301 The second noteworthy philosophical issue affected by cosmological theory is the problem of the actual infinite. The latest refinements in the empirical values of the basic parameters of cosmology have finally brought the doctrine a ^inite universe into accord with observation (see above, pp. 264-272), and have lent their factual support to a model which points suggestively toward an ex nihilo beginning by affirming that the matter-energy of the uni verse is nil (see above, pp. 272-275). In modern cosmo logical theory the first antinomy of Kant is dealt with by showing that physical time and space can both be intrin sically finite (see above, pp. 283-297). This new science may therefore be regarded as having provided a reasonable and satisfying theory of the universe without recourse to the dubious concept of infinity. The fact that a universe which is finite both in volume and in mass is now quite conceivable, and, indeed, quite probable, removes the main cause for vrtiich infinity was invoiced in the first place. It therefore seems pointless to reactivate this superannu ated concept in order to support the doctrine of eternal matter- ; It is better to admit frankly that matter-ene rgy is not the ultimate reality, that the physical world is not self-subsistent, and that the universe itself points to a Beyond as the source of its existence. In the light of the developments which have taken place in cosmology since the time of Tennant, it is hardly extravagant, then, to claim that the prestige of the cosmo logical argument for the existence of God is considerably enhanced. This argument can no longer be ignored, for whether we seek the source of the primeval nucleus or that of the metaphysical "operators” which underlie "events," the suggestion arises that it is the Divine which lies beyond. In assessing the alogical probability in favor of Tennant's synoptic hypothesis, the cosmological argument must henceforth be regarded as worthy of serious considera tion, commensurate, at least, Tvdth that which Tennant accorded to the argument from teleology. It is true, of course, that a theology built upon the cosmological argu ment alone can hardly be personalistic. Indeed, it yields little more than Wieman's "Divine Creativity."^® But the cosmological argument is, nonetheless, deeply significant in the weight which it wields against all Democritean materialisms and in the auxiliary support that it lends to the argument from cosmic teleology. In the preceding exposition of the cosmological prob lem one of the primary purposes was to provide an authentic back-drop against which to portray the drama of life's his tory on this planet. It soon became clear, however, that a ^Henry Nelson Wieman, "Personalism versus Naturalism: With a Reply by Peter A. Bertocci," unpubl. paper read at the Personalist Discussion Group convened at the American Philosophical Association meetings at Madison, Wisconsin, May 1, 1959. more ultimate issue must be dealt with first, viz., that of the genetic outline of cosmic development. In considering the nature of this primordial starting-point, it is well to note that, as the history of philosophy has unfolded, var ious suggestions have been made by thinkers of diverse points of view. As we have seen, these suggestions reduce to four basically distinct solutions, those of Augustine, of Democritus, of Averroes, and of Plato, who held that the primordial reality is, respectively, God, or matter, or both (see above, p. 235). In common with Tennant I have opposed Democritean materialism; but, in opposition to him, I have presented rather cogent reasons for defending an Augustinian creationism in preference to Tennant's Pla tonic dualism. It will be recalled that in the chart which depicted the course of cosmic development in ord.ine essendi (see above, p. 233, Fig. 2), these results were anticipated when I entered "GOD” along the base of the chart on the level labeled "REALITY." This entry must be regarded as tentative, of course, as long as it remains probandum and not credendum. Indeed, the total schema of Figure 2 was originally presented as merely an hypothetical framework of thought intended to display whatever meaningful inter relationships might appear in the course of further discus sion so that Tennant's synoptic hypothesis could become more readily testable in terms of the ideal of empirical coherence. 304 In keeping with the architectonic of bipolar philos- | ophy, xchich has proven its fruitfulness already, God is ! I depicted in Fig. 2 as a dual-unity comprising both A o jfO S ; and Spirit. This is the point of view expressed in the 1 philosophical prologue to the Gospel of St. John, which opens with the words, irIn the beginning the A o y t > $ existed, ■and the A dyo$ consorted with ^od, and the A oyo$ was sheer i Deity" (John i. 1, my translation). Inasmuch as the Aoyo<z had been conceived in Greek philosophical tradition as the manifestation of reason in the world, or as the all- pervasive ordering principle, this pole of the Primordial i Reality is appealed to in bipolar philosophy as the source r ; of the earliest crystallization of objective existence. It is my contention that the growing edge of reality belongs to the Ao f o c ; and manifests itself in the Augustin- ian creation of matter ex nihilo. As the Given of God, the Spirit remains, however, as that self-identity which escapes differentiation and by virtue of which all subse quent stages display a derivative cosmic dualism. Such a dualism remains ambiguous, of course, until the precise relations xvrhich obtain betx^een God and His world are expli cated as being naturalistic, perhaps, or deistic, or the- i istic (in one form or another). It x^ould be premature, however, to develop a particular theology here. The cos mological argument and the doctrine of creation imply very ;little about the nature of God. At the present stage in 305 the ordo essendi there is little need to consider any of the Divine attributes other than those of eternal reality, self-subsistence, and creative might. It is doubtful, indeed, whether the quality of temporality can be imputed to God in His original state, since even the primeval atom is timeless; and if God be a consciousness, all human anal ogies suggest that consciousness achieves its temporality 97 only through its contact with matter. ' The Fact of Existence and the Emergence of Physical Reality In Tennant’s opinion ’’ the mystery of mysteries is that something exists," that there is an^r reality at all.2^ If he had pressed this point further, it is likely that Ten nant would have admitted that there is at least enough validity in the ontological argument to imply that the bare "forthcomingness" of existence vaguely suggests the pres ence of purpose somewhere behind the scenes. This, of course, is the basic assumption of his synoptic hypothesis since it involves, essentially, a Hind pursuing a goal. It follows that any indications (however small they may be) 2Phe cerebral cortex, for example, cannot achieve liaison with mind until it is peppered with volleys of impulses from the arousal center (see above, pp. 86 - 87), which in turn are released by physical stimuli from the material world. 2Philosophical Theology, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Eng., 1935-37), II, 164. 306 that there is purposiveness in the cosmos will be relevant to the present study and should be ferreted out and sub jected to appropriate tests. This is particularly true if these purposes appear to be directed toward the fulfillment of the determinate world-plan that was outlined above (pp. 215-221). William Ernest Hocking names three conditions which evers? situation must fulfill before purpose may confidently be imputed to it: In the first place, Che writes], the result must have some assignable value. . . . In the second place, there must be some evidence that the process tends to preserve what it has produced. . . . But even yet, we would hardly have enough ground to assert purpose unless we could see that the means by which the result was brought about were somehow selected from many other possible sets of causes, and not merely random combinations of events.29 These three criteria of purposefulness will prove useful in most of the following discussions of the critical points in the development of the universe. In the present case these three criteria are to be applied to the brute fact of nascent existence. If exist ence is said to be good for nothing, the question arises, "Why is it actually here?M But if, on the other hand, the dominant tendency of the West is correct which asserts, as against the tendency of the East, that existence ijs good for something and that life is ultimately worth-while, it ^ Types 0f philosophy, 3rd ed. (New York, 1959) , p. 62. 307 i i j follows that the forthcomingness of existence satisfies ; Point (1) above, since life cannot occur in a non-existent | j realm, and existence has then the assignable value of mak- ; ing life really possible. Moreover, the conservation laws !are witness to the fact that existence preserves itself as j jPoint (2) requires. As respects Point (3), it is hardly i | obvious that existence is necessary. Hon-existence or jnothingness is, therefore, a live alternative. Indeed, if :a distinction is made between physical and spiritual exist ence, the alternatives are three in number; and to those who can fathom the neo-Platonic "degrees of reality," the alternatives become virtually legion. If existence is ;better than its alternatives, a case can then be made in favor of purposive selection as demanded in Point (3). The case is seriously weakened, however, from another standpoint; for the fact that the alternatives are so few, perhaps only two or three, makes chance as likely an expla nation as purposive selection would be. It thus appears that, although Points (1) and (2) are obviously satisfied, the evidence for Point (3) is very poor, and we must con clude that any form of the ontological proof which argues that the fact of nascent existence implies a Purposer can be valuable only if other types of evidence create a pre sumption in favor of cosmic purposefulness. In such a case the above considerations regarding existence could then be used to add their small weight to the total alogical 308 I i jprobability in favor of Tennant’s hypothesis. The second stage in the study of cosmic development in ordine essendi is that which considers the probable j nature of the primordial physical reality which the A 6yo<± |produced, according to the schema of Figure 2 (above, |p. 233), in the initial act of creation. It is true, of j |course,that any effort to envision primordial reality is j inevitably highlj^ speculative; but perhaps enough can be :said to indicate whether its nature is likely to be con tingent or necessary. If it proves to be contingent, then Tennant’s theistic hypothesis can be invoked to explain :the fact that reality has produced and sustained living values. If the nature of reality is necessary, however, there is then no basis, at this stage in the ordo essendi, for the contention that God has made reality to be what it is in order to provide a suitable cosmic setting for the drama of life. The fact that this drama has occurred serves to indicate that primordial reality satisfies the first two criteria of purposefulness; for values have arisen within it and these values have been preserved. If the nature of reality proves to be necessary, however, this will mean that there is no assortment of possible worlds from which our particular world could have been selected, and that Hocking’s third requirement for imputing purposefulness has not been fulfilled. 309 The argument of this study has led to a position which makes it seem likely that the nature of the primordial physical reality was not contingent. Within the framework of a finite cosmology, for example, it is possible to describe a geometry of cosmic space which posits a type of radical identity or connectivity between each particle of the universe and the universe as a whole--a feature which Eddington believed to be necessary for any conceivable real world. This joint relativity-quantum relationship distinguishes what I shall call a '’bipolar" physics from a pluralistic physics. Technically, the distinction can be viewed as that of a simply-connected versus a multiply- connected topology.-50 In a pluralistic universe any spher ical surface must form a boundary so that any given point (not within the surface) is either inside or outside of the sphere. The connectivity in a bipolar universe, on the other hand, is somewhat like that of an annular torus (or "doughnut"), whose surface is multiply-connected in the sense that an ellipse drawn around it does not divide it into two separate parts. There is, as it were, a re entrant feature which, in four dimensions, is analogous to ^°For a brief discussion of connectivity, see G. J. Whitrow, The Structure and Evolution of the Universe, Harper Torchbooks/Science Library (New York, 1959) , pp. 72- 74. | 310 ' T1 i that of a circle in two dimensions. In a bipolar world the re-entrant feature is that by which, in the space-time | of relativity theory (as formulated by Schwarzschild), | there is an extremely small singularity of finite radius i I which forms an unbroken geometrical continuum with the I universe at large. | ! This singularity is a consequence of the metrical I properties displayed by space in the vicinity of a par ticle, which are expressed in the equation dr = cds^lli: -1 , (15) where r is the radial distance to the particle, m is a i function of its mass, and £ is the space-time interval. Inspection of Equation (15) reveals that as r decreases and approaches the value of 2m, dr approaches zero. Any attempt to lay out differentials any closer to the particle than r = 2m is hopeless, for, as Eddington writes, It is as though the differentials were now being laid out in a direction normal to the three dimensions of space--up a fourth-dimensional chimney, so to speak. ^One can try to imagine, perhaps, a four-dimensional snake in the process of swallowing (or regurgitating) its tail. ^G. c . McVittie, General Relativity and Cosmology, The International Astrophysics Series, IX (New York, 1956), p. 33. -^Space, Time and Gravitation (Cambridge, Eng., 1921), pp. 96-98. 311 i jIn sum, the effort to map such a region in a Euclidean ;space produces a hole of radius 2m, which it is natural I ! to think of as the radius of the particle itself. McVittie i specifically states that ’’ the singular region, 0^r^2m, is of finite size for M / 0" (p. 83). The interpretation ;which identifies this singularity with matter as such thus 'makes matter a function of the total universe. ! Such a bipolar philosophy of nature is implicit in | lEddington’s joint relativity-quantum theory and, particu larly, in his concept of the "uranoid." By an extension of the concept of a "geoid," he coins the term "uranoid" |to refer to the idealized total universe, which he charac- ! terizes as that structure which is contemplated as continually existing. . . . Each inde pendent particle Che adds]] is independent only because it has contributed half its "existence" to the uranoid.34 The particle could not exist, he claims, if the universe were an infinite Euclidean plenum because it would then have no space-curvature against which to take on a determi nate size. The infinity of such a universe would literally "knock the bottom out of space" by its very indefinite ness. A finite universe, on the other hand, in which ^The Philosophy of Physical Science, Tarner Lectures: 1938 (Cambridge, Eng., T9%9)7~p*"’ Tf>fn ^ The Expanding Universe (New York, 1933), p. 148. It is worth noting that l?aul Couderc quotes this passage with approval (The Expansion of the Universe, trans. J. B. Sidgwick CLondon, 1$£2J, p. li^). 312 |the cosmical constant X serves to suppress this infinity, has a residual curvature even in its empty regions. This curvature is a simple function of the cosmical constant, and as such it affords an absolute standard of size for particles inserted into the void. Such a particle is what I jit is, says Eddington in effect, only by virtue of what the {uranoid is. i i In philosophical terminology, the particles in a bi- ipolar universe are said to display an internal relationship to one another by virtue of their geometrical connectivity jwith the total uranoid. Pluralistic worlds, on the other jhand, whose particles are merely in external relationship, are apparently inconsistent with modern theories of gravi tation and inertia.3® Moreover, it is likely that this inconsistency poses a necessary limitation on the kinds of Worlds which can exist and that pluralistic worlds in gene- jral must therefore be impossible. Bipolar worlds, however, ;are internally consistent, as Schwarzschild’s mathematical formulation of them shows,37 and are coherent with the jgeneral body of physical knowledge. Perhaps bipolarity is a necessary property of any world which is to be real at all in a physical sense. If further work in this field, “*6For the distinction between internal and external relations, clE. Hocking, pp. 222-223. 37See McVittie’s chapter on "The Schwarzschild Space- [time" (General Relativity, Chap. v) . 313 Ifor example, should show that a space-time similar to that ;of Schwarzschild is the only conceivable type of geometry i |which can display the connectivity between particles and 1 ! I uranoid that a real finite world requires, it would seem to follow, then, that the particle which we know as a hydrogen ion is, perhaps, in turn, a necessary consequence ;of the intrinsic requirements of any finite geometry, and that Hocking1s third criterion of purposefulness is not satisfied on the level of primordial physical reality, since there is no scope for selection. The Need for Physical Multiplicity as 'the Setting for a Moral WorjLd-Drama If our present universe is considered to have arisen from a primeval atom, as Lemaitre and Gamow suppose, it is likely that this super-atom was nuclear in nature and lack ing in all molar features.Perhaps its matter (if any) was in a degenerate state like that of an electron gas, whose particles are notorious for their indistinguishability and, indeed, for their lack of individuality or of any spe cific properties apart from their relations to the universe ^Canon Georges Lemaitre himself ventures to raise the question "Who knows if the evolution of theories of the nucleus will not, some day, permit the consideration of the primeval atom as a single quantum?" (The Primeval Atom, trans. B. H. and S. A. Korff QNew York" 195CQ, p. 142) 314 |at large.^ At this point, however, there was no universe at large and thus, perhaps, no internal physical distinc- ! itions whatsoever. It is reasonable to suppose, then, with i i |the senior astronomer, A. G. B. Lovell, that When the primeval atom disintegrated the state of multi plicity set in and the universe became determinate in a macroscopic sense. In brief, it is suggested that a speculative philosophy, I which, in its ordo essendi phase, expresses Helsel’s dual unity formula first on the level of nascent existence (see above, p. 233, Fig. 2), can express this formula also on the level of physical reality as the rise of multiplicity from the primeval nucleus in a universe of joint relativity- quantum physics. In order to test the synoptic hypothesis of Tennant at this crucial point in cosmic development, it is neces sary to refer once again to Hocking’s three criteria for Arthur CS.D Eddington, New Pathways in Science, Mes senger Lectures: 1934 (New YorTcJ 1935) , pp. 225-22d and 267. According to Hermann Weyl, ’’ The upshot of it all is that the electrons satisfy Leib niz’s principium identitatis indiscernibilium, or that the electronic gas is a 'monomial aggregate’ (Fermi-Dirac statistics) . In a profound and precise sense physics corroborates the MutakallimOn CMuslim schoolmen^]; neither to the photon nor to the (positive and negative) electron can one ascribe individuality.” (Philosophy of Mathe matics and Natural Science, rev. and augmented trans. based on 0. Helmer ^Princeton, N. J., 1949H, p. 247) ^°The Individual and the Universe, The BBC Reith Lectures: 195F (New York, 1959), p. 95, italics mine. 315 :the detection of purposefulness in the universe.^ Apply ing the first criterion, it can confidently be claimed that i I physical multiplicity is of value to organic life; for, : whereas a unal monad would provide no ground for physical relationships and processes, nor for the laws of nature, the bipolarity of the universe lends to matter its molar properties, which Tennant regards as biocentric. Inasmuch as the electron or proton introduces sharp curvatures, or electrostatic accelerations, in the surrounding space, it can enter into relationship with other particles to form a web of firm enough structure to produce on the molar level substances that are solid, such as are required for the formation of physical bodies. Thus the world becomes an arena not only for the occurrence of physical events, but potentially for the performance of moral, drama as well. The bipolarity of the physical world furnishes the exter nality and multiplicity that are needed in order to escape from solipsism, i.e., to distinguish the objective from the purely subjective realm. Bipolar philosophy thus provides the self with a realm of ’’otherness’' with which to contrast itself. ^It will be recalled that Hocking's criteria were that the result must 1. Have some assignable value; 2. Tend to preserve itself; and 3. Show evidence of having been selected from a set of possible alternatxves. Clearly, physical multiplicity is the sine qua non for several of the essential features of reality which make it a suitable setting in which the moral drama of history can transpire. In a "world1 1 devoid of physical multiplicity, any psychic creatures which may exist would, of course, be disincarnate; and any philosophers among them would likely be solipsists, since there would be no medium for social intercourse. As a matter of fact, however, it is doubtful whether such unal monads could even experience a flow of consciousness, much less an awareness of self, of other selves, or of philosophical nuances. Such a disincarnate spirit, devoid of any relation to a realm of otherness, would presumably exist not only apart from the world of space, but also from that of time, which, according to relativity theory is integrally intertwined with space;42 and it is difficult to believe that a timeless monad can have a flow of consciousness. To be sure, the monads of Leibniz, whose self-activity occurs on the ontal level, are 42The experience of sleep is the best available evi dence of such a state, for its soundness is inversely pro portional to the intensity of the sensa, or rather, of the collateral impulses reaching the brain through the arousal center (see above, pp. 86-87). This may be viewed as another way of saying that the experience of time during sleep depends upon the degree of contact with the world of space as represented in the sensa. It could even be argued that sanity is similarly dependent upon "otherness"; for when tke sensory level is low, as in a dream, or when sensa are ignored, as in the catatonic state, the residual con sciousness is irrational. 317 i isupposed to have enjoyed a sense of time that is different from the flow of time on the phenomenal level in the world I !of clocks and Geiger Counters. But his viewpoint is diffi le ult to verify, since the only such ontal monad which we really know is that of our own consciousness, which lapses into timelessness whenever the volley of physical impulses from the arousal-center ceases to prime the brain (see iabove, pp. 86-87). The popular writer, C. S. Lewis, is particularly lucid in his contention that self-consciousness, social inter course, and freedom (all of which are prerequisite to the moral life), are intrinsically dependent upon "otherness." In his opinion, There is no reason to suppose that self-consciousness . . . can exist except in contrast with an "other," a something which is not the self. It is against an environment, and preferably a social environment . . . that the awareness of Myself stands out. It is likely, however, that the awareness of a social envi ronment depends upon the physical, i.e., upon physical multiplicity. Lewis is again worth quoting on this point: People often talk as if nothing were easier than for two naked minds to "meet" or become aware of each other. But I see no possibility of their doing so except in a common medium which forms their "external world" or envi ronment. . . . If your thoughts and passions were directly present to me, like my own, without any mark of external ity or otherness, how should I distinguish them from ^3The Problem of Pain (New York, 1944), p. 17. Cf. my treatment of the genesis of self-consciousness (above, pp. 111-124). mine? . . . It would be harder for me to know my neigh bor under such conditions than it now is for me to know God. . . . What we need for human society is exactly what we have— a neutral something, neither you nor I, which we can both manipulate so as to make signs to each other. (Pages 18 and 19) Such a "neutral" environment, susceptible to manipulation, is also a fundamental requisite for the exercise of moral freedom. Lewis contends that The freedom of a creature must mean freedom to choose: and choice implies the existence of things to choose between. A creature with no environment, Che continues^, would have no choices to make: so that freedom, like self-consciousness . . . again demands the presence to the self of something other than the self. (Page 17) This realm of otherness can be interpreted not only in terms of a dualistic metaphysics, but also in terms of an idealism; but the latter must be an objective idealism with a multiplicitjr of some kind--of interacting psychads, for instance--manifesting itself a_s physical nature. The idealist, William Ernest Hocking, for example (who has given us the three criteria of purposefulness) argues, in a chapter^completely devoted to that purpose, that physical nature has a definite^ assignable value. In answer to the question, "Why does nature exist?" he concludes that "Nature is necessary in order that mind may qualify as will, i.e., as free moral agency. It is therefore safe to conclude that the rise of multiplicity (and of materi ality) satisfies the first of Hocking*s three criteria for ^Types of Philosophy, 3rd ed. (New York, 1939), Chap. xxv, esp. p. 187. 319 ;imputing purposefulness; for it has now been shown that jthree properties, which characterise the level of reality I j(see above, p. 233, Fig. 2) , possess a definite and assign- !able value for organic life, and a fortiori for human life :and for the moral drama of history. The second of Hocking's criteria, which states that ’these values must tend to be preserved, is also clearly satisfied, since multiplicity and materiality are obviously preserved throughout the history of the cosmos, or (in the case of an oscillating universe) are preserved at least .throughout the billions of years which elapse between suc cessive singularities. The third criterion, however, is poorly satisfied; for the possible alternatives to the kind of multiplicity described above are hardly numerous enough to imply that Divine selectivity was exercised in its actualization. If pure multiplicity as such is the only point at issue, there is then only one alternative— the Parmenidean One. If qualitative distinctions are considered, however, then multiplicity can exist (or not) in at least two basic forms, the physical and the psychic;^"5 and each of these, in turn, can exist as unal, bipolar, or pluralistic. 45 If there are still philosophers who suppose, with Spinoza and Samual Alexander, that, besides the attributes of extension and thought, reality may possess other attri butes intrinsically inconceivable, the alternatives to the kind of multiplicity described above are more numerous. 320 By taking these factors in their various combinations, some of the possible worlds can be displayed which (as Leibniz supposed) God must have surveyed as He weighed the pros and cons of creation. One alternative, of course, would have been not to create at all. In this case reality would consist exclusively of God Himself, Who would then comprise an idealistic or dualistic Monad. Several different the ologies are possible on this basisbut since God can hardly be supposed to have selected himself from an array of possible gods, these distinctions are not involved in the present assessment of probabilities. Atheistic worlds are likewise irrelevant at this point, since they are con tradictory to the hypothesis being tested. ^ Moreover, all physical pluralisms, whether psychic or not, are almost surely outlawed, because they imply (in contrast to bipolar theories) that the particles of the universe stand in purely external relation to one another. But this view ^6In an idealistic theology, for example, the Monad could be either unal (Sabellianism) or bipolar (Royce’s Absolute). In a non-creationist theology that is dualis tic, the physical aspect of God would have to be unal (since a bipolar or pluralistic physics would nearly always be spatio-temporal, and hence creationist); it would be the Parmenidean One. The psychic aspect of the dualism would then be either unal (Kantianism) or bipolar (Helsel’s "Object Center"). 47purely materialistic monistic worlds which are unal (the Parmenidean One), bipolar (the Schwarzschild continu um), or pluralistic (Democritean atomism) are thus excluded from consideration at present; and atheistic personalistic pluralism (McTaggart) is likewise irrelevant. 321 I i is contrary to joint relativity-quantum theory and to cur rent theories of gravitation and inertia, according to which each particle is what it is only by virtue of what the uranoid (or universe at large) is (see above, pp. 309- i | 312). The possible worlds which remain for God’s selection i |are then (1) the Parmenidean One; (2-4) the three types of j jtheistic dualisms in which a bipolar Schwarzschild space- t itime is combined with a unal, bipolar, or pluralistic AO psyche; and (5) the monistic psychic pluralism of Berkeley. Because these alternatives are so few, however; and since, ; in any case, only the first of these worlds is clearly :unfit to provide a setting for the biological and spiritual world-drama envisioned by Tennant, it must be concluded again, as it was when nascent existence was being consid ered (above, p. 306), that chance is as likely an explana tion of the rise of multiplicity as is purposive selection. Clearly, then, multiplicity is a valuable and, indeed, an indispensible feature of any world where moral drama is to occur. But it would be premature to argue from this alone that multiplicity exists by Divine intent. As was men tioned before, this kind of reasoning ^‘ -'The philosophy of Berkeley is monistic as respects the number of types of substance that exist and pluralistic in the sense that each individual psyche is a separate ‘entity. 322 can be valuable only if other types of evidences create a presumption in favor of cosmic purposefulness. In ; such a case these considerations . . . could then be used to add their iota of weight to the total alogical probability in favor of Tennant’s hypothesis. (Above, P. ! The investigations of this chapter, like the discus- I Isions of cosmology, may seem to have yielded paltry returns I for the effort. But negative results are nonetheless i results; and, in any case, they provide a background for ithe testing of Tennant’s synoptic hypothesis at further i points in the history of cosmic development. In particular, they form the basis for a consideration of the possible combinations of basic world-properties and for a critique j of any purposefulness which may seem to reside in the ulti mate geometry and dynamics of the universe or in the struc ture of its elements. CHAPTER X THE COSMIC ENVIRONMENT OF LIFE AND ITS BIOLOGICAL FITNESS The Basic World-Properties and their Possible Combinations In testing the synoptic hypothesis of theism, which achieved new stature as a philosophically respectable view point through the work of F. R. Tennant,^- the first step has been to examine the implications which follow from Tennant’s hypothesis, and particularly those which show promise of being testable at various crucial points in cosmic development. Thus far, the levels of "existence1* and of "physical reality" have been probed and the points of origin of matter and of multiplicity have been singled out as being of crucial significance. If the level of "existence" (prior to the origin of matter) is taken as the starting-point, it will be recalled that, in the gene tic outline of cosmic development presented in Fig. 2 (above, p. 233), the first distinction drawn is that between Spirit and A d jtO S as these exist within the bipolar nature of God. The A o jfO£ is viewed as Creator of Lemaltre’s Philosophical Theology, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Eng., 1935-19.37) . 323 ! 324 i I jprimeval nucleus, which at first is spaceless and timeless, as matter must be when it exists at quantum levels too low to generate statistical emergents and regularities. The rise of molar reality then occurs when this super-atom explodes like an atomic bomb and the state of multiplicity arises. With this explosion the bipolar level of nascent "physical reality" passes into that of "process" (see Fig. |2); and as hydrogen nuclei condense out of the initial j"fulguration" in quantities that are amenable to statisti cal treatment, the space-time continuum then appears. The geometrical properties of this continuum are of :interest at this point as they were in our cosmogony, in ithat the several possible geometries serve to further delineate the Leibnizian concept of "possible worlds." Moreover, they help to display the factors that need to be considered in testing Tennant’s contention that there is evidence of a divine "plan in the primary collocations" of particles in the universe (II, 85). In any consideration of world geometries, it should be recalled that ever since the year 1908, when Minkowski combined "the local spaces and times of Einstein into an absolute space-time of four dimensions,"^ time has played an essential role in much of :the thinking that has been done about the geometry of the ^AfrthurJ S. Eddington, Space, Time and Gravitation (Cambridge, Eng., 1921), p. 212. ! world. For this reason the study of world-geometry neces- j sarily passes over into that of kinematics and the various cosmological models, both static and evolutionary, again become significant. From a more philosophical standpoint, moreover, the question whether space and time are objective i 1 properties of the physical world or not is also relevant in any delineation of possible worlds. From these considera tions, together with those of the previous chapter, it fol- i |lows that at least twenty possible world-properties can be 'distinguished, i.e., that the external world to which our |sensa refer can be either 1. non-being or 11. physically spatial; 2. being 12. transcendentally temporal, 3. non-physical or or 13. physically temporal; 4. physical; 14. Riemannian, 5. unal, 15. Euclidean, 6 . pluralistic, or or 16. Lobatchewskian; 7. bipolar; 17. Einsteinian 8. nuclear or or 18. de Sitteran; 9. molar; 19. steady-state 10. transcendentally or spatial, 20. evolutionary. or By forming all the combinations of these world- properties, a list of theoretical universes can be compiled which would have intrigued the speculative mind of Leibniz 326 if he had lived to see it. Some of the combinations, to be sure, embody certain irreducible inconsistencies which would seem to disqualify them. When these are taken into account, however, there are still one or two dozen dis tinct combinations of world-properties which, in the pres- ient state of our knowledge, seem to remain as abstract i Jpossibilities. The following list is therefore offered as j |being at least a preliminary effort to deal with Leibniz' I 'vague concept of "possible worlds," to which Tennant I frankly appeals in his chapter on "The Problem of Evil" I(II, 183-188), and to render it more specific. The various ipossible worlds that are distinguishable in terms of the iabove world-properties can best be exhibited, then, in out line form, with the possible worlds as such enumerated in parentheses at the right: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) I. non-being II. being A. non-physical (monistic) 1. ineffable or unimaginable 2. personal, psychic, or spiritual a. unal b. pluralistic c. bipolar B. physical (monistic or dualistic) 1. unal (transcendentally spatial and transcendentally temporal) 327 2. pluralistic a. nuclear (1) transcendentally spatial (a) transcendentally temporal (b) physically temporal b. molar (physically spatial) (1) transcendentally temporal (a) Riemannian (b) Euclidean (c) Lobatchewskian (2) physically temporal (a) R.iemannian (CC) de Sitteran C/3 ) evolutionary (b) Euclidean (OC) steady-state (/ 3) evolutionary (c) Lobatchewshian (CC) steady-state ) evolutionary 3. bipolar a. nuclear (1) transcendentally spatial (a) transcendentally temporal (b) physically temporal b. molar (physical^ spatial) (1) transcendentally temporal (a) R.iemannian (Einsteinian) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (2) physically temporal (a) Riemannian (oO de Sitteran ( ) evolutionary (b) Lobatchewslcian (21) (22) (oO steady-state ) evolutionary (23) (24) The Consistencies and Inconsistencies of: Possible and Impossible Worlds This list of possible worlds calls for two kinds of comments, viz., 1. General remarks on the nature of the various worlds that are included; and 2. Explanations of why certain combinations are omitted as being impossible. In the previous chapter several of the earlier possibili ties on this list were amply discussed (above, pp.305-322). Non-being or nothingness, for example, is a live option since presumably any serious consideration of ontology should reveal how really surprising it is that anything at all exists. Indeed, this is the problem which lies at the heart of llartin Heidegger’s recent work in metaphysics.3 3An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. R. Manheim (New Haven, Conn., 1959). 329 In order to understand the real worlds, however, it i necessary first to review several of the distinctions that are made in bipolar philosophy. The gravest source of con fusion lies in the tendency to misinterpret Helsel’s predicate, "unal," as a synonym for "monistic," and "bi polar" as a synonym for "dualistic." It will be recalled that Helsel distinguishes three bipolar levels (see above, pp. 63-65): on the first bipolar level are the subject-I and object-world; on the second level there appears the dual-unity of Subject-1 and Object-I:e; and the third level is that of the Divine. In terms of this schema a purely dualistic philosophy is defective in that its duality is that of the Subject-I and object-world which are on differ ent levels, i.e. , they are incoordinate and metaphysically distinct. T7ithi.n this framework a monistic philosophy is one which affirms either one or the other horn of this dualism as ultimate. A unal philosophy, however, can appear within the context of either a monistic or a dual istic metaphysics; and involves essentially a repudiation of bipolarity, or dual-unity. Bipolarity, on the other hand, comprises a multiplicity within a comprehensive unity. Although Helsel’s schema was originally developed in terms of the "knowing-situation," I have extended it into the realm of cosmology and applied the term, "unal," for example, to any cosmos which lacks multiplicity. Of those which do display multiplicity, then, I distinguish 330 I ’'pluralistic” from "bipolar” universes on the basis of the I difference between external and internal relations. A j | pluralistic universe is therefore one whose particles are i !independent of one another so that any number of particles ! could be removed from the universe without affecting the i I inner nature of the remaining particles. The bipolar uni- ;verses, on the other hand, are those of joint relativity- ■ quantum theory, in which each particle, as Arthur S. Edding- ton puts it, owes "half its 'existence1 to the uranoid"^ and must form, then, a dual-unity with the universe at large. The first of the real worlds to be considered, then, are those which are virtually "undreamed-of.” As Spinoza notes, our finite minds are familiar with only two kinds (or "attributes") of reality, viz., extension and thought. But we may presume that any number of others may exist which are totally incomprehensible to us. In the present study, however (which has already reached a highly specu lative level), such possibilities can merely be acknowl edged and then passed by. If worlds undreamed of can exist, this only makes more striking the fact that our value-sustaining world is the kind which actually does exist. ^The Philosophy of Physical Science, Tarner Lectures: 1938 (Cambridge, Eng., 1949), p. 166. 331 In the West, purely personal monistic worlds have been most adequately described by religious thinkers who were interested in knowing what the standards of living will be in hades or in heaven, where it is presumed that no bodies exist. Such a world, if unal, is purely solipsistic. A pluralistic personalism, however, can be either atheistic, as in the philosophy of McTaggart, or theistic as in that of the personal idealists. In the latter case one Divine Person and a plurality of finite persons comprise reality. A bipolar personalism can be pantheistic, as in the philos ophy of Josiah Pvoyce, who supposed that all finite persons are integral parts of the personhood of God; or it can be theistic, as in the philosophy of Helsel, who acknowledges the independent existence of finite persons while attribu ting a bipolar structure to the personhood of each. Dual istic personalisms are also possible as combinations of the above with the physical worlds listed below them. The first of these physical worlds is unal in that it lacks multiplicity. Since there can be no physical rela tionships in such a Parmenidean One, no statistical emer- gents can possibly arise within it. Eddington has argued that one such outlawed statistical emergent would be time as such, since the only known physical process which could lend it directionality is a statistical one, the second 332 ! 5 | law of thermodynamics. If space is similarly a statisti cal emergent, then all unal worlds must be regarded as |devoid of spatial and temporal properties unless these are ; transcendental. The distinction which exists between tran- |scendental and physical space and time can best be dis cussed, however, as it applies within pluralistic worlds ; in which there are particles enough to exist in physical relationships with one another. At present the expression ; ’’ transcendentally spatial and temporal” may be regarded as approximately equivalent to "non-spatial” and ’’ non-tempor al.” Worlds of this kind must be regarded as live options, if only because Kant’s transcendental aesthetic has some times been misinterpreted in this sense. This view must therefore be included in the list of possibilities. Within the framework of such a transcendental philosophy, however, it is meaningless to make the further cosmological distinc tions of Items #14-20 in the list of single world-properties (above, p. 325), since these are intended to apply to a world that is physically spatio-temporal. ’’ Possible” worlds combining these properties with ’’ transcendentally spatial" or "transcendentally temporal” are therefore to be omitted.^ ^The Nature of the Physical World, The Gifford Lec tures :"T^T7^NevTTorE^_T9?9T7—PP^~~6^T~i00, and 101. ^Possible exceptions to this generalization are the Einstein universe, which is tentatively interpreted below 333 i It is important to recall that the entire list of I pluralistic worlds Ccombinations (7)-(17); above, p. 327^J j jwas tentatively outlawed (above, p. 312) and the corres- :ponding bipolar worlds [/numbers (18)-(24)H were offered in their place. Since the reasons for their rejection are not very obvious to-many scholars, however, it is probably pre mature to completely exclude these worlds from the list of i possibilities. A nuclear world (property #8 above) is one composed of ylem, as George Gamow terms a mass of degenerate matter whose atoms are stripped of all their electrons. Lemaltre’s primeval nucleus is such a world. It is particularly important to note that the laws of nature which apply in molar physics do not apply to a world composed of ylem, for such a world is strictly the province of nuclear physics; and, in fact, these worlds, which appear at the singulari ties in the cosmological histories of the oscillating uni verses, should probably be regarded as inconsistent with the eleventh and thirteenth world-properties listed above (p. 338) as being non-temporal, but physically spatial; and nuclear worlds interpreted as non-spatial, but physically temporal. Gamow has recently reinstated this obsolete English word by using it extensively in his book, The Birth and Death of the Sun (New York, 1940), to refer to the degener ate matter of Lemaltre's primeval nucleus. Its original meaning, according to "Webster'’ is: "The first substance from which the elements were supposed to be formed." 334 I ("physically spatial" and "physically temporal"), since ithey are very likely devoid of all extension and duration. If either of these could possibly be present in a world of jylem, it would be duration, since such a world does possess jmultiplicity, though not in its molar mode; and such multi plicity could conceivably have a statistics by which to jdistinguish time’s arrow. Hence a nuclear world that is physically temporal is tentatively listed as possibility inumber ( 8) . Molar worlds, on the other hand, are physicallj' spatial and usually temporal as well. These are the worlds above the atomic level, which are known to ordinary human expe rience. They also extend, however, into realms of cosmic proportions where relativistic corrections are applicable. Molar worlds are conceivable in which the temporal dimension is lacking. In an aged universe, for example, which has reached its "heat death," i.e., in which the second law of thermodynamics has operated long enough to bring it to a perfect thermodynamic equilibrium, time would by this means lose its arrow and cease to exist. This may also be true of an Einstein universe, but only if it is bipolar (see below, p. 338), since in this case the timelessness is a joint relativity-quantum effect. In pluralistic universes, 8Eddington, Physical World, pp. 78-79; and his New Pathways in Science, Messenger Lectures: 1934 (New York, T§137,p.%:---- 335 |on the other hand, local space-time conditions are indepen dent of cosmology; hence there is no restriction on the !type of geometry that a non-temporal pluralistic universe I may have, and Riemannian, Euclidean, and Lobatchewskian |forms are listed. Euclidean and Lobatchewskian worlds, however, are sus- ipect on another account, viz., because of their infinity i las such; for it is likely that in principle no physical or actual ’'infinite” can exist. In order to ease the problem of infinity, Gamow cites an illustration from the mathema tician, David Hilbert, who imagines a hotel with an infi- ;nite number of rooms. Even if all the rooms are occupied, £he saysj, the room clerk can accomodate [a] new customer by shifting the occupant of No. 1 to No. 2 . . . No. 2 to No. 3 . . . and so on.9 Hilbert, however, was trying to clarify the mathematical concept of infinity and could hardly have intended to imply that any series of physical entities can actually be mapped in one-to-one correspondence with a strictly infinite series of numbers.*-0 Infinity itself is, in fact, not a 9George Gamow, Matter, Earth, and Sky (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1958), pp. 552-553. *-°It is rather ironical that Gamow should have cited Hilbert in this connection, for Hilbert was keenly aware of the difference between the formal and the real and was, in fact, the first to develop a purely formal or logical geometry, free from physical, operational concepts such as that of congruence (see his Grundlagen der Geometrie TLeip zig, 1899J). -------- ------------------ 336 number at all; it is neither even nor odd, neither prime nor factorable. It can never be any definite or specific quantity. But reality, on the contrary, can never as such be indefinite nor unspecific. Hence the two concepts are incommensurable and Gamow's argument is spurious. For these reasons I am philosophically disposed to rule out the Euclidean and Lobatchewskian worlds as being physically impossible. It is true, nonetheless, that most cosmolo- gists regard them as live options. They are therefore included in the listing, though they must be regarded with suspicion. When worlds which are not only physically spatial, but physically temporal as well, are examined, these will nearly always be kinetic. The steady-state exhibited by the infinite universes of Bondi and Gold and Hoyle, for instance, is not to be interpreted as that of a static con dition, for these worlds are still kinetic in that their galaxies display the recessions observed by Hubble. The steady-state is maintained not by the lack of cosmic change, but by the compensation afforded through the continual cre ation of new matter. Even the universe of de Sitter is kinetic although it contains no matter, for its structure is such that any two particles inserted into it immediately repel one another. Its geometry can only be Riemannian, since it necessarily involves a positive X, which lends a residual curvature even to its empty expanse. 337 j The evolutionary universes, on the other hand, can !display any one of the three geometries and are kinetic in !the fullest sense of the word. Although these worlds ;include in their histories phases which are nuclear or Ein- !steinian (or both) and may under certain conditions approach the universe of de Sitter asymptotically in their old age, I they must nonetheless be regarded as distinct from these ;worlds. Indeed, in the listing of possible worlds, the last four world-properties or types (#17-20, above, p. 325) must be treated as mutually exclusive alternatives. The bipolar universes in general duplicate those of pluralism except that by definition their particles stand in internal relationship to one another and to the universe at large (see above, pp. 309-312). This means that bipolar universes are subject to joint relativity-quantum effects and that cosmological and microphysical constants and para meters will occur together in the same equations. In such a world the expansion of the universe, for example, may be expected to affect the metrical properties (both temporal and spatial) in any local region. In particular, the temporal properties of the Einstein universe, Number (20) in the list of possible worlds, may be expected to reflect the fact that it is not expanding. This universe is static because its forces of cosmic repulsion and of gravitation are in equilibrium so that no expansion or contraction can occur. Oscillating universes also pass through such a 338 I phase momentarily at the transition from expansion to con traction. These cyclical universes are also static at each j super-dense singularity, since at these points their condi- 1 jtion is that of Lemaitre's primeval nucleus. Because time !apparently does not exist within the primeval nucleus, the question arises whether all static universes, including ithat of Einstein, are devoid of time. The answer to this ;question is elusive because our knowledge of the relation ship that obtains between time and the expansion of the universe is at present rather meagre. But Pascual Jordan calls attention to the fact that the quotient, (in which cA R is the directed radius of space-curvature, and A is the age of the universe), is a number of the order of unity, which means that R increases at the velocity of light. This strongly suggests that it is the expansion of the uni verse which generates time. If this is true, then the Ein stein universe, in common with the primal nucleus of Lemaltre and with nuclei in general, must be regarded as timeless, or transcendentally temporal. For this reason we should tentatively regard with strong suspicion any worlds which combine these properties with that of being "physi cally temporal," though we must, on the other hand, regard the Einstein universe as nonetheless physically spatial. The joint relativity-quantum relationship which distin guishes a bipolar from a pluralistic physics is most obvi ously exhibited in the re-entrant connectivity of a 339 |Riemannian space-time (see above, pp. 309-310). Hence it iis tempting to suppose that such a finite geometry as that |of Riemann must necessarily characterize all bipolar worlds. j lit is possible, on the other hand, that the negative curva- i !tures of an infinite Lobatchewskian world can be multiply- jconnected, though I cannot imagine how. Until this I possibility is ruled out by further knowledge, however, bipolar worlds of Lobatchewskian form will be listed as live possibilities. Euclidean worlds, on the other hand, are obviously incapable of displaying any re-entrant fea tures, since they have no curvature whatsoever. Hence bipolar worlds cannot be Euclidean. This conclusion is further substantiated by the fact that matter as we know it introduces curvatures into the continuum. This seems to imply that there can be no appreciable amount of matter in a flat Euclidean space. But a bipolar world must neces sarily possess a specific and appreciable density of mat ter,^ as a foothold for its metrology; hence it cannot be Euclidean. This conclusion seems to follow from the metrol ogy of relativity theory, according to which the meter is operationally defined as a fixed fraction of the directed radius of world-curvature. If space is flat (as in a Euclidean world) then there is no such curvature; and the •^Or a pseudo-density, such as that afforded by the cosmical constant X. directed radius, and with it the meter, is therefore infi nite in length. Such a meter cannot measure anything; and a space that cannot be measured is not a real space at all . The possible geometries of space in a bipolar world are also limited by the temporal dimension. In a static or non-temporal universe, for example, such as that of Ein stein, the only possible geometry is that of Riemann. This follows from the fact that the other two alternatives, the worlds of Euclid and of Lobatchewski, are infinite and hence contain no determinate number of particles. c:ut the cosmical constant X is a function of the total number of particles in the universe and must therefore vanish in an infinite world. Such worlds are therefore Friedmann uni verses C ~ 0), which are necessarily kinetic. By process of elimination, static worlds must therefore be Riemannian. On the other hand, kinetic or physically temporal bipolar universes of Lobatchewskian form are possible, unless these are outlawed for other reasons— for being infinite, per haps, or for being simply-connected (see above, pp. 309- 310). Physically temporal universes that are evolutionary can be either Riemannian or Lobatchewskian. The universe of de Sitter, however, because it is finite, can only be Riemannian; and the steady-state universe, being infinite, must therefore be Lobatchewskian. Each of these three types is similar to its pluralistic counterpart and thus calls for no further comment. 341 I I The Fitness of the Possible 1 Cosmic Environments | The twenty-four possible worlds delineated above j(pp. 326-328) may now be tested for purposefulness by means |of the three criteria proposed by Hocking. The first step, then, is to inquire which of these cosmic environments are biocentric and subserve the rise of values. Of these uni- ■ verses- — identified in the list by the numbers in paren theses at the right--the first (non-heing) cannot give rise to anything, much less to a realm of values. Those listed second, on the other hand (non-phj^sical worlds of ineffable nature) are impossible to evaluate. These may, for all •that we know, be the most important possibilities of all. But they must, nonetheless, be by-passed, since no one can understand them. Monistic and unal personalisms, number (3), have already been criticized (above, p. 331), and shown to be, in all likelihood, somnolent and irrational solipsisms, incapable of giving rise to values, unless they can somehow create for themselves a realm of otherness. The aloneness and meaninglessness which haunt some forms of existentialism are reflections of this axiological impo- tency. Pluralistic or bipolar personalisms, however, are more hopeful. But these, too, are subject to the criti cisms of the previous chapter, which suggest that the values of social intercourse are probably impossible in a world devoid of matter (above, pp. 315-318). If such a ; 342 i jpanpsychism can form a "matter” out of its lesser psychads, 'however, this objection is obviated; but this would, in i ;effect, call for the reclassification of such personalisms j |as physical instead of non-physical. Of the worlds criti- jcized in Chapter ix, there is, finally, the unal physical I world of Parmenides, number (6) above, which allows little i 'foothold for the rise of values, since values depend upon sthe presence of otherness and of multiplicity. The requisite otherness and multiplicity are obviously provided by the pluralistic worlds. If these are nuclear, they possess a physical multiplicity which is nevertheless Inon-spatial. Such a condition would either have to be one that is totally unknown to science or else it would be a multiplicity of electromagnetic quanta, i.e., of radiation. If this is the world of number (7), which is temporally (as well as spatially) transcendental, it is then essentially the primeval nucleus of Lemaitre. If it is number (8), it has at least the advantage of possessing a flow of physical time. Since moral drama develops through the give and take of personal concourse and fellowship, which necessarily occurs within a temporal framework, this universe is more likely to generate values than universe number (7). In either case, however, it is as difficult to imagine that a nuclear world could provide the setting for living drama as it is to suppose that such drama can occur in the midst of an atomic explosion, and for much the same reasons. 343 : If ethical spirits, once they are forced., can flourish in such weird environments (which is very doubtful), it I j would seem, on the other hand, that Mthe vale of Soul- ! making"^ in which such spirits are nurtured must be a j molar world in which the presence of a neutral and objec tive "stuff" provides a medium for communication and action ; (see above, pp. 317-318). It is difficult to conceive of the rise of moral personhood apart from a long history of ethical choices which mold the character. Personal confi- I dences, affections, and attitudes cannot be created de novo, but must be slowly developed; and this, of course, requires !time. Hence transcendental!y temporal or non-temporal jworlds, even though they are molar, can hardly provide a suitable setting for values. It is apparently necessary, then, that a universe which incorporates values must pos sess a physically temporal dimension. If pluralistic worlds are at all possible, then sev eral kinds of temporal worlds can be distinguished, and these are enumerated above, numbers (12) through (17). The distinctions between them, however, are purely cosmo logical, and make no difference whatever in the conditions that exist on the local level, since pluralistic worlds in .general, as has been noted, display no joint relativity- ■^An expression coined by the poet Keats (see The Complete Poetical Works of Keats, ed. Horace E. Scudder, The Cambridge Poets CBoston, 1&9S0, pp. 369-370). quantum effects. The only exception to this generalization is the universe of de Sitter, which is axiologically impo tent because it contains no matter. The five pluralistic universes which remain, however, are equal in their capa city for producing stars and planets in profusion and are therefore the only "possible" worlds thus far considered (except for ineffable worlds) which clearly provide envi ronments where values can arise and flourish. It should be recalled, however, that pluralistic worlds in general are very likely impossible (see above, pp. 309-313). If this is true, then the worlds of numbers (7) through (17) should be disregarded and bipolar worlds considered in their places. Among the bipolar worlds, those which are nuclear or transcendentally temporal, including tentatively the Einstein universe, are axiologi cally impotent by virtue of the reasons that were given above for the impotence of their pluralistic counterparts. Likewise, the bipolar de Sitter universe is impotent because of its emptiness. Only three universes then remain which are bipolar and which could provide for the rise of values: the Riemannian and Lobatchewskian evolutionary universes and the steady-state universe of Hoyle. If infi nite universes are impossible, however, as I have tried to show (see above, pp. 335-336), then only the Riemannian evolutionary universe can be axiogenic. Any conclusions which may be drawn from the consider ations of the present chapter can only be stated in general terms, since many uncertainties are involved. Probably the most serious uncertainty is a limitation which insinuates itself into and throughout the fabric of this study, viz., the finitude of the human mind, which makes it quite likely that any effort to imagine and evaluate possible worlds will overlook many important points. The study of mescal intoxication (above, pp. 99-102), for instance, should serve as a warning of the fact that ineffable type's of value experience can exist. I loreover, the difficulty of detecting inconsistencies in the various combinations of world-properties and, on the other hand, of making sure that these limitations are real, is keenly felt. In par ticular, the uncertainties involved in the suggestion that pluralistic and infinite universes are impossible and that values cannot arise in a purely psychical world make it very difficult to assess the significance of these consider ations and to come to any firm conclusions. Nevertheless, we may, perhaps, conclude in general that Leibniz’ conception of possible worlds is valid. It is surprising, of course, to find that a scanty two dozen possible worlds result from all the combinations of twenty basic world-properties; and it is more surprising yet to find that these can quickly be reduced to ten or less when the arguments against pluralistic and infinite worlds are taken seriously. It is significant, however, that only one or two of the worlds which are clearly possible can be imagined as providing an environment in which life, mind, and values could flourish. It is safe to conclude, then, that several--perhaps even as many as a dozen (or more)— possible worlds can be described which could have existed but do not exist; and that the world which does exist is almost (if not strictly) the only one which can generate a realm of values. William Ernest Hocking*s crucial third criterion for the imputation of purposefulness is therefore satisfied, at least to a limited degree: There is_ evidence that our world is a happy "selection" from among several theoretical possibilities. Moreover, the number of axio- logically impotent alternatives is in this case appreciable. It is not, however, nearly as appreciable as Hocking*s words, "selected from MANY other possible sets," require,^ nor is the number as appreciable as Tennant supposes when he censures the logician for likening our world to a single lucky throw of the dice (II, 88). We cannot speak, as Ten nant does, of "coincidence on the vast scale," when there are evidently less than a dozen imaginable alternatives. Tennant is correct in supposing that the situation should be weighed in terms of alogical probabilities; but when the ^ Types of Philosophy, 3rd ed. (New York, 1959), p. 62, capitalization ours. weighing is done, the probabilities in favor of theism in this direction, at least, turn out to be rather poor. Per haps there is another direction, however, in which they will be somewhat better. The Origin and Fitness of the Chemical Elements In seeking for another direction in which to pursue the objective quest for a meaningful Weltanschauung, it is likely that further guidance may be obtained by referring again to the genetic outline of cosmic development given in Chapter viii (above, p. 233, Fig. 2). In this outline at the level entitled "process,'' the matter of the cosmos is envisioned as operating within its own space-time frame work to generate the higher bipolarity of "action" and "order." Among the potentialities that are actualized as "order" are those which Tennant referred to as "the primary collocations" (II, 85), which may be interpreted as the originally given conditions or relationships of the parti cles— their quantum occupancies or eigenvalues, perhaps, their atomic structure, or their locations and momenta. The investigations of this section will therefore be direc ted toward the atomic structure of matter in order to assess its biocentricity and to test the propriety of reading teleology in its structure. It will be recalled that Tennant discusses the struc ture of the chemical elements as reflected in their molar 348 properties and stresses the fact that "the inorganic envi ronment is as plainly adapted to life as living creatures are to their environment" (II, 8 6; and see above, pp. 199- 200). Hie argument is based upon Lawrence J. Henderson’s 14 striking work entitled, The Fitness of the Environment. This book soon became quite famous in certain circles, and sixteen years after its publication it was still regarded by the biochemist Joseph Needham as "the most important contribution to the philosophy of biology since Wilhelm Roux’s Programm." In 1936 he again characterized it in glowing terms, this time as "that golden book."^*5 Others 16 have referred to it as "singularly suggestive" (Barnes), 17 ein "grossartig angelegte Versuch" (Driesch), and a "very 18 able treatise" (Rddl), which, according to Whitehead, must be taken as "fundamental for any discussion of this subject."^9 Most of those appealing to Henderson’s work 14New York, 1913. *- 5The Sceptical Biologist (London, 1929), p. and Order and Life, The Terry Lectures (New Haven, Conn., 1936), pp. 14-15. ^E. W. Barnes, Scientific Theory and Religion, Gifford Lectures: 1927-29 (Cambridge, Eng., 1933), p. 418. 17 Hans Driesch, Philosophic des Organischen, 2. verb, und umgearb. Aufl., Gifford-Vorlesungen: l£6?-08 (Leipzig, 1921), S. 56. 18 Emanuel R&dl, The History of Biological Theories, trans. and adapted E. J. Hatfield (New Vorlc, 1930), p. 384. ^Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, Gifford Lectures: 1927-28 (New York, 1941), p. 1^6. 349 (have been hopeful teleologists, such as Royce, Hocking, and iNorthrop, and men who were concerned with religious apolo- ■ 20 igetics. Yet David Elton Trueblood, who himself ranks j among the more fair-minded apologists, notes approvingly i Ithat Henderson approaches his subject "in a mood quite unlike that of orthodox teleology, and with no theological 21 presuppositions." The book has been generally ignored, however, by secular philosophers, except that the material ist, Roy Wood Sellars, and the realist, William Pepperell Montague, have taken occasion to criticize its logic. Henderson's book, of course, is old; but in order to fore stall the charge that it is out-of-date, it should be noted that the book has recently inspired a Princeton biophysi cist, Harold F. Blum, to pursue the subj'ect further under a Guggenheim fellowship. The result is a book entitled, 2®Josiah Royce, The Problem of Christianity, Vol. II: The Real World and the Christian Ideas, Lectures at Lowell Institute, Boston, and Manchester College, Oxford (New York, 1913), pp. 420-422; Hocking, Types, pp. 64-65; and F. S. C. Northrop, Science and First Principles, Deems Lectures, New York University: 1929 (New York, 1931) , pp. 194 and 213. See also Harris Franklin Rail, Christianity (New York, 1947), pp. 107-109; John Elof Boodin, Cosmic Evolution (New York, 1925), pp. 19-22; Edwin Grant Conklin, Man: Real and Ideal (New York, 1943), pp. 115-116; and C. Lloyd Morgan, fVte Animal Mind (New York, 1930) , p. 67. 2- * - The Logic of Belief (New York, 1942), pp. 152-153. 22Evolutionary Naturalism (Chicago, 1921), pp. 268- 269; and Great Visions of Philosophy (LaSalle, 111., 1950), pp. 219-2"5o"I 350 frime’s Arrow and Evolution, which includes a chapter on ’’ The Fitness of the Environment." In this chapter 31um presents the most thorough and competent reworking of Hen- jderson’s data that I have been able to find. I Before Blum’s critique is examined, however, let us turn to Henderson himself. Though his book is not large, [it is almost encyclopedic in its wealth of quantitative data jabout the physical and chemical properties of certain cru cial elements and compounds and their fitness to serve as the basis of life. In scores of tables he lists the proper ties of such substances as water, carbon dioxide, sodium bicarbonate, and various organic compounds and compares them with other chemically analogous substances. In this way he shows that, when these substances are evaluated in terms of the properties that are essential to life, they are invariably found at or near the top of list after list. As a result, Henderson finds that in one and the same sub stance, in water for example, an incredible series of maxima (with respect to fitness) are combined. In the words of Ten nant , Unique assemblages of unique properties on so vast a scale being thus essential to the maintenance of life, their forthcomingness makes the inorganic world seem, in some respects comparable with an organism. (II, 86) ^-’Time’s Arrow and Evolution, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N. J., 1955). In the first paragraph of his Preface, Blum spe cifically acknowledges that the original inspiration for his book derives from Henderson. Blum’s work will be refer red to again (below, pp. 357-358). 351 (Moreover, as Hocking writes, Universes with slightly different proportions of these | same materials--let us say a little more nitrogen and a ! little less carbon or oxygen-- . . . would have rendered ! not only such organisms as we know but any organisms at I all impossible. (Types, p. 64) Henderson's argument can best be elucidated by examin- jing briefly some representative samples of the kind of data which he uses. The most striking example is ordinars*1 water (All organisms depend upon the action of water as a solvent in order to effect their exchange of substances with the environment and from organ to organ. According to Hender son , No other chemically inert solvent can compare with water in the number of things which it can dissolve, nor in the amounts of them which it can hold in solution. Moreover, he proves that this is true by actually citing comparative figures. Such figures are also given for several other properties regarded as biologically important In Table I five of these physical properties are selected and the substances ranking highest in Henderson's charts are listed with the numerical values which characterize them. It is a remarkable fact that, with the exception of ammonia, the given values fall into proper numerical order from bottom to top in every column; and it is particularly remarkable that water is at (or next to) the top in each case. 2^Fitness of the Environmentp. 115. TABLE I SUBSTANCES FAKING HIGHEST IN SEVERAL PHYSICAL PROPERTIES REGARDED AS BIOLOGICALLY IMPORTANT2 Substance or Substances Dielectric Surface Absolute Latent Heat Latent Heat of 1st 2nd Constant Tension Conductivity of Fusion Evaporation Mercury Ammonia 436 108 VJater 81.7 75 0.154 80 536 Sulphuric Sulphur 76.7 362 Oxide Glycerine Sodium Nitrate 65 63 Hydrofluoric Acid 360 Ammonia (below) 41.8 (above) 295 Formic Acid 57.0 37.1 0.065 57.4 Methyl Alcohol 32.5 23 0.050 289.2 Acetic Acid Potassium Nitrate 0.047 47.4 Ethyl Alcohol 21.7 22 0.042 236.5 Acetone Hydrocyanic Acid 20.7 21lt> Ammonia Acetonitrite 16.0 170.6 aAdapted from Lawrence J. Henderson, The Fitness of the Environment (New York, 1913), Chap. iii. ^Total heat of vaporization. 352 353 | In its capacity for i onization, for example, as 'expressed in terms of the dielectric constant, water is |listed at the top. Of the sixteen substances which Hender son tabulates (p. 125), the top six are given in Table I. Two others are in the tens, and the rest are lower yet. Another biologically important property is surface tension. Because of its high surface tension water is able to convey itself from four to five feet upwards through the soil to feed the thirsty roots of plants, and then on through the roots and trunks to the tops of the highest trees. Here the comparisons (of thirteen liquids) which I-Ienderscn tabu lates (p. 126) are equally striking. Besides the five that are given in Table I there are four others in the twenties, including benzene (28.8). As regards its absolute conduc tivity of heat, which is important to organisms in main taining an even body temperature, the Table shows that water is almost twenty times as effective as the best of the other liquids. Indeed, it ranks almost with the metals in this respect (p. 106). Moreover, the latent heat of water is an important means by which the temperatures on earth are prevented from going to such wild extremes that all life would be wiped out at frequent intervals. Hender son lists the latent heat of fusion of 47 substances (pp. 95-96), of which the topmost are given in Table I. Five others are in the forties, and the rest are lower yet. The heat of evaporation regulates the opposite end of the 354 i |temperature scale by cooling the air*, and also (through the mechanism of sweating), by cooling individual organisms. f Itiere, too, in a list of 55 substances (pp. 99-100), water i is at the top. Fifteen other substances are in the one- ihundreds, and the rest are below one-hundred. In specific heat, T^ater is exceeded only by hydrogen and ammonia, whose specific heats are respectively 3.4 and 1.2, as compared iwith 1.0, the specific heat of water (p. 81). All but three of the other substances listed have specific heats that are less than one quarter of that of water. In this respect carbon, one of the other major elements in the body, is also abnormally high, so that the body has an unusual capacity to absorb heat without raising its temper ature excessively. There are, finally, two properties of water which are very irregular-violating all rules, so to speak. The freezing point of water, for instance, is about 100° above the average for other similar substances (p. 93). Conse quently, the coldness of winter goes chiefly into the for mation of ice instead of into the refrigeration of the air. Probably the oddest property of water, however, is its unorthodox behavior near the freezing point. Like other substances, water suffers an increase in density as it cools. But, unlike the others, as it passes the 4° C. mark, at which its density is 1.00000, it reverses itself, decreasing its density again until at 0° C. it is 355 0.99987 gm cm"^. Then as it freezes the density goes all the way down to .91674. Because of this curious action, all water freezes from top to bottom, and a fish-sanctuary is preserved at 4° G. at the bottom of the lake until it is frozen solid (pp. 106-109). These remarkable facts tend to deeply impress the teleologist because, like a run of a dozen or more per fectly lucky throws of the dice, they display an alogical |probability that seems close to zero; and when, in addi- | Ition, the same remarkable fitness is observed in carbon t ' dioxide and, to a slightly lesser extent, in the organic compounds and in certain minerals, as Henderson also shows, |one tends to conclude, with Hocking, that our universe must j |therefore be of such nature that it is "reasonable to call | it biocentric" (Types, p. 64). It is difficult to explain ! 'the data without imputing deliberate design, the selective |action of a Mind; and this is, of course, the synoptic i hypothesis which Tennant has proposed and which we are . endeavoring to test. Henderson, however, leaves it to others to formulate the philosophical or theological implications of his work. As far as the limited conclusions which he does express are concerned, however, he undoubtedly proves his point. The physico-chemical environment provided by our universe i j does display a fitness for life which seems remarkable, jit is easy to reply, "Of course it does, for otherwise we 356 would not be here to say so." But this would be to dismiss the issue with a jest. To the sober philosopher this fit ness requires an explanation. An explanation in terms of theistic design, however, can only be rendered by appealing again to Hocking's three criteria of purposefulness. Clearly, the chemical elements and compounds that Henderson discusses have an "assignable value" which is preserved, jHocking's third criterion, however, is again the stumbling |block, for it asks how improbable is the combination of properties, and how urgent, then, is the demand for an jappeal to intelligent selection and combination. | | If this involves essentially, as it did before, the (weighing of probabilities, however, it is important to note (that probabilities can only be weighed in terms of a given population from which the selection is made. Such a popu lation must therefore be clearly defined. Unfortunately, those who have used Henderson's work as the basis for a teleological argument tacitly assume that the population in question is that of all the mathematical combinations of all relevant physical properties; and they are therefore extremely impressed at the fact that water, for example, is at the top of the list in a dozen or more separate tabula tions of properties. While it is, of course, true that the probability that such a configuration could arise by pure chance appears at first to be very small, it is also true that when the theory of probability is applied to reality 357 there is always a danger that the factors involved are not mutually exclusive. Subtle interdependencies are often present which, in effect, reduce the population from which the selection is made and thus falsify the results. Henderson realizes that such interdependencies exist. Listing the dielectric constants, the heats of vaporiza tion, and the conductivities of sixteen substances in a single chart, he writes: It is to be observed that on the whole all three quanti ties decrease simultaneously. . . . Such evidence clearly | suggests that some of the manifold fitnesses of water proceed from a single cause or group of causes. For the present, however, these relationships are obscure. (Page 125) But he was evidently not aware of the seriousness of the threat which these interdependencies pose for his entire jargument. Harold F. Blum shows, however (in his chapter jon "The Fitness of the Environment”), that in the case of iwater such interdependencies exist between nearly all of Ithe properties that are responsible for its fitness.^ In particular, the presence of a unique type of chemical bond, which hydrogen alone possesses, is the common under lying cause of many of its anomalies. Generally speaking, most of the chemical forces which hold groups of atoms together are due to the presence of covalent or ionic bonds. i i jln addition to these, however, the hydrogen of the water J ^Time * s. Arrow and Evolution, 1955, Chap. vi. 358 molecule forms a special low energy bond which holds the separate molecules loosely together and which must be broken in order to free them to form water from ice or steam from water. This one factor alone is responsible for the high melting and boiling points, for the high latent heats of fusion and of vaporization, and for the high sur face tension. Moreover, according to Blum, The anomalous behavior of water in the neighborhood of 4° C. is also associated with hydrogen bonds; and the great solvent power of water and its ability to produce ions are associated with an abnormally high dielectric constant resulting largely from the formation of these bonds. (Page 76) If each of these properties is therefore a manifesta tion of the same underlying cause, the formation and rup ture of a hydrogen bond, their concurrence in one substance (in this case in water) no longer seems remarkable. As I |seen in this light, the alogical probability of such a con- t ;currence is by no means infinitesimal, since the population :with reference to which the probability is to be reckoned ■is no longer the sum of all the mathematically possible combinations of these properties (taken in their various degrees). The appropriate population is, instead, a much smaller one composed of the various types of chemical bonds that could conceivably exist, types which probably total |less than half a dozen. If we wish to envision, with Leib- hiz, a primeval array of possible material properties and i ] jna'ively conceive the reality existing in primordial times 359 as though it were a substance waiting to be imbued with an appropriate selection from among these properties, it will soon become clear that the properties are all strung together into several long chains. The selection of any one of these properties (e.g., the specific heat of water) then necessarily becomes at the same time a selection of all the other properties which likewise depend (in this case) upon the presence of hydrogen bonds and are therefore linked together with it. In fairness to Tennant it should be noted that he is not only aware of the possibility of such interdependencies i but also of the devastating effect which they could have jupon Henderson's argument. Nevertheless, he lightly side- j |steps this issue with a passing reference to "the coinci dence of qualities apparently not causally connected with i ;one another” (II, 86). Clearly, Tennant's allusion to the "multiplicity of coincident conditions, such as are not reasonably attributable to blind forces or to pure mechan ism" (II, 87) now reduces to an evaluation of whatever alogical probability or improbability can be attributed to the occurrence of hydrogen bonds. Their occurrence is admittedly interesting because of the contribution which they make to the cosmic setting of life; but their forth comingness is ultimately no more remarkable than that of any other brute fact of the natural order and can hardly be itermed_improbable. It must therefore be concluded that, 360 although "the fitness of the environment” is a valid and fruitful concept, it does not fulfill the requirements of Hocking's third criterion of purposefulness. Henderson's work, or rather, the teleological argument which has been read into it by philosophers and theologians must there- I fore be regarded as spurious. It may be objected, of course, that this conclusion is based primarily upon the case of water alone and, in par ticular, upon the properties of only one element, hydrogen; 'and that water (or hydrogen) is onlx? one out of many ele- jments and compounds to which Henderson attributes fitness. This objection is invalidated, however, by the fact that j all of the elements of the periodic table and all of their physical properties are ultimately manifestations of the essential properties of hydrogen atoms in aggregate. This conclusion follows directly from recent indications that, for several billions of years, the primordial universe was probably composed exclusively of hydrogen (and of radia tion) and that the heavier elements are the products of nuclear reactions which originally occurred within the hot interiors of hydrogen stars. These reactions have been systematically worked out by E. Margaret Burbidge, William |A. Fowler, and others on the basis of accepted principles ! . 25 I of nuclear physics. Previously, when the processes by "Synthesis of the Elements in Stars,” Reviews of IModern Physics. 29:547-650, October 1957. 361 which the elements were formed were shrouded in mystery, it was easy to regard their properties as contingent, and to imagine, with Leibniz, that God had purposely combined into the various elements just those properties which would make them biologically useful. Today, however, the material elements must be viewed as inevitably possessing the particular properties which they display on earth. It is clear at last that wherever in the entire universe there are stars composed of hydrogen gases which reach suitable conditions of temperature and pressure, there a series of nuclear reactions will occur which will always and necessarily yield the same elements that are known to modern chemists. The properties of all the elements have thus been compounded, in a very real sense, from those of primal hydrogen. Since hydrogen is the lightest and simplest of the elements, however, its properties are comparatively few in number and the scope for a Leibnizian selection is sharply restricted. Indeed, it is likely that, as Arthur S. Eddington claims, the properties of its proton nucleus arise, in turn, from those of the electron--or rather, that both of these are alternative roots of a common set of equations. If this is true, then the scope for ^6New Pathways in Science, Messenger Lectures: 1934 (New York, 1^35), pp. 243-^47; and Fundamental Theory (Cambridge, Eng., 1949), pp. 32-35. 362 selection is narrower yet and it is only a short step by xrtiich the conclusion is reached that the properties of mat ter must ultimately arise by mathematical necessity from the essential structure of the Schwarzschild space-time (see above, pp. 310-311). There exists, apparently, within the deepest recesses of physical reality an inherent neces sity according to which its matter must have a given deter minate structure, if there is to be a molar world at all; and that no other atomic structures are possible even in 97 theory. Such a rigid necessity affords little, if any, foot hold for the teleologist in the realm of the physical sci ences, and it seems at first that Tennant's worst fears are realized--that the world is, indeed, "an oasis in a desert of 'chaos'" (II, 80). The oasis has, of course, been maternal: it has admitted the warmth of the sun, but excluded the deadly rays from outer space; it has provided a nutritive environment of water, oxygen, and compounds of carbon and nitrogen. But this should not be surprising. Given several billions of stars, almost anything can hap pen, even the appearance somewhere of a world such as ours! If nature scatters pollen in profusion upon the winds in the hope, as it were, that a few grains will land upon the 27I do not, of course, intend to exclude the possi bility of elements of greater atomic weight than those that are presently known. 363 appropriate flower, perhaps she scatters stars and planets in similar profusion in the hope that a few will be habit able. If there exists, then, as Tennant*s hypothesis pro poses, a Divine Selector of worlds, it would seem that, although He appears in the role of Creator at the very beginning of time, His first appearance in the role of Selector occurs at a much later date when He appears as the Selector of "homesteads,M of specific planets or worlds from among the starry hosts that exist, and not as a selec tor of cosmic world-properties from the abstract realm of subsistent possibilities. Our knowledge of such homesteads, however, receives little, if any, augmentation from astron omy or cosmology, and is largely confined to that which OR derives from the study of our own planet.'40 In the objec tive quest for a meaningful faith, cosmic considerations are much more significant than Tennant will allow, in their impact upon the problem of creation; but their significance for a natural teleology is probably inconsequential. The demise of TennantTs cosmic teleology thus brings the tele- ologist back to earth again in a very literal sense and bids him re-examine the history of life on this planet. 28 The very existence of planetary systems other than that of our sun can only be inferred indirectly, since none can be located closely enough to be ever actually seen (cf. Robert H. Baker, Astronomy, 7th ed. DPrinceton, N. J.,”T959ZI, p. 429). CHAPTER XI THE NARROWING BASE OF A PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY The Restriction to Biology and to the Problem of Organization This critique of Tennant's cosmic teleology has led so far to a sequence of negative conclusions. It has been admitted that nascent existence as such is, to be sure, of definite value for conscious beings. But its alternatives (if more than one) are in any case so few in number that there is little evidence of its having been chosen by a purposing Mind from among an array of other possibilities. The rise of bipolar physical reality and the origin of mul tiplicity have been considered in a similar manner. These are obviously foundational to the existence of organic life, but again it is probable that they were necessary emergents and that intelligent choice could not have been involved. The same conclusion holds true of the possible combinations of basic world-properties, most of which were shown to involve mathematical or physical inconsistencies. The remaining "possible worlds" were therefore too few to satisfy Hocking's third criterion, which must be met in order to impute purposefulness to the rise of our biocen- tric cosmos. When the properties of the chemical elements were similarly traced to causes which are too few in number to satisfy this criterion, it finally became necessary to restrict the principle of teleology to the phenomena of organic evolution as these have arisen in the history of the earth. The extension of this type of critique from the physical sciences into the fields of biology cannot be ade quately accomplished within the scope of the present study.-*- In order to forestall the impression, however^ that such an extension is likewise expected to yield negative results, I shall outline, in brief, the direction in which I feel that such future work should proceed. The critique of Tennantfs synoptic hypothesis loses its cosmic dimensions when it begins to explore the possi bility that we live in a blindly churning cosmos which was visited by its Creator only at those rare oases which, at various times and in various parts of the cosmos, held forth the promise of maintaining a protective environment suitable for the long-drawn-out processes of evolution. Among such oases was the earth. Since any planetary envi ronment is largely conditioned by the nature of its atmos phere, it is important to note that according to A. I. Oparin and Harold C. Urey (the leading thinkers in this ^As originally envisioned, the study was expected to include a more thorough consideration of the origin of life and of the rise of new Bauplane in the history of organic development than that which is given below. 366 field) the original atmosphere of the earth, instead of being chemically oxidizing as it is at present, afforded in its earlier ages a reducing environment, which was, of course, biologically sterile. By simulating such an atmosphere in the laboratory and subjecting it to repeated electrical discharges, Stanley L. Hiller has produced sev eral of the amino acids, the building blocks of proteins.3 This success has led the specialists in this field to the conclusion that the primitive earth, in the course of time, accumulated in its waters a rich store of the chemical pre cursors of the complex organic molecules from which living organisms are built. Presumably these included the nucleotides as well as the amino acids,^ since nucleic acids necessarily comprise the templates upon which proteins are built. The processes by which the ; ; first nucleotides were polymerized into nucleic acids are totally unknown, since nucleic acids can be synthesized in the laboratory only with the help of 2 The Origin of Life on the Earth, trans. A. Synge, 3rd rev. and enlarged ed. (Edinburgh, 1^57); and "On the Early Chemical History of the Earth and the Origin of Life," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 38:351-363, April 1952. 3"A Production of Amino Acids under Possible Primitive Earth Conditions," Science, 117:528-529, May 15, 1953. Though nucleic acids did not arise in Miller's experiment. 367 natural enzymes. Since all enzymes are proteins, however, these cannot be supposed to have existed at the beginning of life. Nevertheless, the key to the origin of life lies within the structure of the nucleic acids, which compose the material basis of heredity. It is in these substances then (if in any at all) that teleology is to be read, if Tennant*s synoptic hypothesis is to survive the demise of his cosmic teleology. The nucleic acids are very long chain-like molecules, each link of which is composed of three radicals: a sugar, a base, and a phosphate group.5 The sugars form the back bone of the polynucleotide chain, and the bases and phos phates form side-groups. Only four specific bases commonly enter into the composition of deoxyribonucleic acid (the type of acid which composes the genome--abbreviated *'DNAM). These bases are: adenine, guanine, cytosine, and thymine. As Erwin Schrodinger predicted, these differ from ordinary crystalline substances in that their radicals are arranged in an aperiodic order throughout the length of the mole cule.6 Since the time of the brilliant formulation of the 5The following discussion of the nucleic acids is based on the literature cited at the beginning of my first chapter. 6What Is Life? Lectures at Trinity College, Dublin: 1943 ((Jambridge, Elng., 1944), pp. 60-61. 368 Watson and Crick model of DNA in 1953,7 biochemists and geneticists have come to believe that the order in which these bases are arranged along the chain of the molecule forms a type of four-letter code in which the genetic information is written. These are the IBM cards, as it were, which completely program the development of the organism. With the discovery of these facts, it now becomes possible to think more specifically about the problem of whether or not the chance shuffling of atoms within the primordial universe could have produced molecules as com plex as the proteins; for it is now clear that the "atoms" to be shuffled are pools of these four bases, and that these bases must be arranged in almost perfect order along 0 4 p a molecule that extends to 1000 A or more m length. Assuming the molecular weight of DNA to be of the order of 5 x 106, Cwrites Stephen ZamenhofJ, the number of possible combinations of sequence of different nucleo tides for the DNA molecules of just one composition is of the order of 10^000„9 7J. D. Watson and F. H. G. Crick, "Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids," Nature. 171:737-738, April 25, 1953; and "Genetical Implications of the Structure of Deoxyribonu cleic Acid," Nature. 171:964-967, May 30, 1953. 8J. Bernal, "The Scale of Structural Units in Bio- poesis," in U.S.S.R., Academy of Sciences, The Origin of Life on the Earth: Reports on the International Symposium: August". 1$57. ijoscow, ed. A. Oparin and others (Moscow, T O s^TT; pi 145. Hereafter cited as Moscow Symposium. ^"The Chemical Basis of Heredity Determinants," in Essays in Biochemistry, ed. S. Graff (New York. 1956). p. 324n. 369 If each such molecule comprises a single gene (which is probably a conservative estimate) and there are 50,000 genes in the human genome,it is obvious that the number of permutations of the bases involved is astronomical in the extreme. By comparison, the number of electrons in the entire universe is, according to Eddington,-^ merely 1079; and when this is multiplied by the number of millionths-of- a-second that are supposed to have elapsed (in an evolu tionary universe), since the beginning of time the result for the total universe is still less than 10^-03 electron- microseconds.^ If this type of reasoning is valid, it would seem that the limited number of particles existing in the universe and the limited number of microseconds in its history are utterly negligible when compared with the number of differ ent arrangements of bases which are theoretically possible within an average sample of DNA. Moreover, the number of ■^Interview with V. Elving Anderson, Professor of Zoology, Bethel College, a specialist in genetics, winter of 1958-59. 1^-The Philosophy of Physical Science, Tamer Lectures: 1938 (Cambridge, Eng., 1949), p. 170. 1 9 Cf. a similar calculation by Walter M. Elsasser (The Physical Foundation of Biology CNew York, 1958J, pp. 86-87), wbo, referring to the belief that negative entropy (or "information") can arise spontaneously by chance, con cludes by affirming "the complete irrationality of any such proposition" (p. 87). 370 these possible DNA*s which are capable of synthesizing biologically significant proteins is such a negligible fraction of the total that the theory which claims that life originated by a process of aimless shuffling would seem to be effectively excluded. The argument becomes still more forceful when, in place of microseconds, a more realistic figure is inserted from known mutation rates, which are normally of the order of one mutation in 10^ or 10^ generations.From this point of view it is not a surprising fact that the only kind of nucleic acid which the biochemist can synthesize and which can in turn synthe size a coherent protein is one which has been supplied with the requisite "code" by adding to the solution some mole cules of "primer" taken from a naturally occurring nucleic acid, which acts then as a template in the synthesis of new DNA. The problem of chance vs. purpose, however, is not this simple; and the above calculation, like that conducted long ago by Ouye,^ is too gross in its method of approach to be appropriate. The scholar pursuing these methods ignores the fact that the information content of a given ^George Gaylord Simpson, The Major Features of Evolu- tion, Columbia Biological Series, No. xVit (New ” ^ork, T533), p. 112. Incited by Pierre Lecomte du Noliy in Human Destiny (New York, 1947), pp. 33-35. 371 molecule may involve a great amount of redundancy origi nally produced by repeated production of parts from the same template; he makes no allowance for the influence of natural selection, which can perhaps be conceived as oper- 15 ating on the level of biochemical evolution; and he fails to consider the fact that on any level of chemical evolu tion, as soon as a stable configuration is achieved (and particularly a pattern which is capable of reproduction), such groups of atoms now become the units which, instead of mere atoms, are subsequently shuffled together in all of the following stages, i.e., until some higher-order con figuration similarly reaches stability and in turn becomes the unit to be shuffled.^ Moreover', such a calculation makes no correction for the possibility that the biologi cally active portions of the structure of a nucleic acid or of a protein may compose a very small fraction of the total molecule and that many alternative structures may suffice for the remaining portion. It would hardly be logical, however, to conclude that these considerations completely invalidate the essential 1 5 There is some reason to doubt, however, that natural selection could have acted before the origin of reproduc tion (see 0. Hoffman-Ostenhof, "Der Ursprung der Enzyme," in the Moscow Symposium, pp. 129-130. ^6This point is effectively stressed in a paper by J. Bernal ("The Scale of Structural Units in Biopoesis," Moscow Symposium, p. 133). 372 principles upon which such calculations of probability rest; instead, they should be taken as a warning to the investigator urging him to proceed with caution and to properly evaluate these factors in terms of the actual processes involved and in terms of the accepted principles of probability and of information theory.It is my con sidered opinion that when all of these cautions are heeded and the resulting probabilities are compared with the best current estimates of mutation rates, the results will still be so incommensurable with one another as to rule out the theory that the higher taxonomic categories (above the level of a genus) have evolved through the accumulation of random mutations. This opinion, however, is premature and must await confirmation through further studies. Clearly, the problem of teleology now reduces to that of explaining the origin of the information content of the genome and, in particular, to that of explaining the evo lutionary transitions from one Bauplan (’structural-plan') to another in the history of life. The efforts of Sewall Wright and others to explain these transitions in terms of the Darwinian principles of population genetics are highly 1 7 , See Henry Quastler, ed., Essays on the Use of Infor mation Theory in Biology (Urbana, 111., 1^3); and kubert P. Vockey, ed., Symposium on Information Theory in Biology; Gat1inburg, Tennessee, October 2^-31, 1956 (New York. r a w . — ---------- *----- 373 1 Q mathematical. These principles, however, are based upon studies of evolutionary changes within a given species, and their application to the origin of the higher cate gories has been questioned by Richard Goldschmidt^ and, in particular, by the ranking paleontologist Otto H. Schindewolf.20 Although English-speaking scholars are inclined to dismiss the work of Schindewolf lightly, con tinental scholars , on the other hand, are keenly aware of the challenge which Schindewolf poses to this application of population genetics and they acknowledge the necessity of dealing with his arguments. I feel that he is a pio neer whose work will eventually revolutionize evolutionary thought. 1 8 Long Island Biological Association, Inc., ed. Popu lation Genetics: The Nature and Causes of Genetic Varia bility in Populations, Cold Spring Harbor Symposia on Quantitative Biology, XX (Cold Spring Harbor, L. I., New York, 1955). i^The Material Basis of Evolution, Mrs. Hepsa Ely Silliman Memorial Lectures, Yale University (New Haven, Conn., 1940). OA Grundfragen der Palaontologie (Stuttgart, 1950). See also Henri Bergsonfs discriminating comparison of the eye of a mollusk with that of a vertebrate and the tele- ological reasoning into which this example leads him (Cre ative Evolution, trans. A. Mitchell, The Modern Library { “New York, 1^4411, pp. 70-85). 2*-See, for example, Gerhard Heberer,"Theorie der additiven Typogenese," in Die Evolution der Organismen, 5. Lfg.: Ergebnisseund_Probleme der Abstammungslehre, ed. G. tieberer und bearb. ft. bingler and others, 2. erwei- terte Aufl. (Stuttgart, 1957), S. 857-914. 374 It is Schindewolf's conviction that Das eigentliche Problem der Stammesentwicklung verschiebt sich damit von der bisher in den Vordergrund geriickten nEntstehung der Arten" auf die Herausgestaltung der durchgreifenden, unvermittelten Typen-Unterschiede. (Seite 239, italics Schindewolf*s) Such basic type-distinctions are displayed by Schindewolf in profusion as he thoroughly documents his case with pale ontological data. The septa of the Heterokorallen, for example, are built on a bifurcating plan, whereas those of Figj_4. The Distinctive Bauplane of the Septa in the okorailen and the PterokorallenI (From 0. Schindewolf) the Pterokorallen are built by the separation of mesenter ies from one another in sequence, thus preserving an essen tially radial pattern (see Fig. 4). Piece grundsatzlichen, qualitativen Merkmalsunterschiede zwiscnen den beiderlei Baupl&ien, the writes!), lassen es . . . vollig ausgeschlossen erscheinen, dass der Sep- talapparat der Heterokorallen etwa durch allmShliche Umbildung aus dem ausdifferenzierten Septalapparat der Pterokorallen hervorgegangen sein kdnnte. (Seite 245, italics his) Similarly, definitive cases are cited from the well docu mented development of the septa in the ammonites. Schinde wolf finally proposes that a totally different type of 375 evolution from that of Darwinian theory is responsible for the origins of such new Baupl&ne. He therefore concludes that Alle entscheidenden Umgestaltungen des Grundgefuges der tfypen hbKerer Rangstufen in grossen. durctigreifenden Einzelsc'hritten, ohne vermittelnde tfoerggnge, in frlihon- togenetischen Stadlen hervorgebracht werden. (Seite ^50, italics his) In contrast to the "biogenetic law" of Haeckel, \diich supposes that, in the course of phylogeny, new stages are added onto the end of former adult stages, Schindewolf con tends that all new Bauplane are added "nicht durch Anbau, sondern durch einen Umbau von Grund auf" (S. 268, italics his), which takes hold at an early stage in ontogeny. In the cephalopoda, where the ontogeny of the individual is preserved in the sequence of chambers successively occupied by the organism, these relationships between ontogeny and phylogeny are clearly documented. In particular, these studies show that in older specimens a new Bauplan first appears in the earlier chambers and then gives way to the ancestral Bauplan as the organism builds the later chambers. In later specimens the new Bauplan survives also in a suc cession of later chambers before it reverts in the adult to the old Bauplan. Finally, in specimens that are phylogenet- ically most recent, the old Bauplan is completely sloughed, as it were, off the end of the ontogeny, and the adult fol lows the new Bauplan (S. 255 u. ff.). 376 These Herausgestaltungen are of such radical nature that biologists have generally been disposed to deny them, merely on the grounds that such large mutations could not possibly have occurred. George Gaylord Simpson, for example, states categorically that Known sorts of mutations, whether acting early or late, produce no taxonomic differences above the level of spe cies and seldom that high. (Major Features, p. 98) Schindewolf*s "sprunghaft Umpragungen" are therefore either of a type unknown to population genetics or else they are combinations of mutations. But Simpson rightfully suggests that The chances of multiple, simultaneous mutation seem . . . negligible. . . . Under . . . extremely favorable postulates, such an event would be expected only once in 274 billion years. (Page 96) Moreover, even if there did occur an unusually large and revolutionary key mutation, such a radical reorganization of the biological pattern would require a host of support ing mutations too numerous to occur by chance in order for the organism to be viable. The solution which is suggested by Tennant's synoptic hypothesis is, of course, that these new designs are the handiwork of God. Actually, however, Tennant shies away from this type of teleological thinking. Under the influ ence of Darwinian thought, he supposes that specific adap tations of the kind which Paley stressed are simply due to natural selection. Moreover, this solution is subject to 377 the common charge that the theologian is placing his God in the narrowing gaps which science has not yet filled up. As shown above, Tennant evades these charges by developing a cosmic teleology. This approach, however, has suffered severely in the present critique and the argument has thus gone full turn. I agree, of course, that the stop-gap theology is gen erally invalid, and that any exception which proves (or tests) the rule must display some unusual distinctives. The Umpragungen of Schindewolf do display such distinc- tives, however. They involve, for example, the sudden appearance of order, not merely from chaos, but from, or in place of, an alternative pattern. This order originates on the molecular or atomic level and therefore transcends, in a sense, the molar realm in which the laws of nature prevail. Moreover, the type of order arising in Schinde- wolf's corals and cephalopoda is not that of natural selec tion; it is not the type of order expressed in the laws of nature, which are ultimately statistical in characterit is not that of a periodic crystal, which merely gives molar expression to a pattern already present in the structure of the atom; it is not the order of ordinary ontogeny and metabolism, which, by intake and excretion of materials, accumulates negative entropy while operating in harmony ^ S c h r o d i n g e r , What Is Life? pp. 2, 8-17, and 82-84. 378 with the second law of thermodynamics. On the contrary, this is a type of order which is fundamentally unique and originative; it is the only type of order which in its origin violates the law of entropy and leaves its environ ment in possession of more bits of information than existed 23 there before. In the language of modern automation, it involves essentially the punching, as it were, of the IBM cards which program the work of the biological factory; and this can only be done by the selective activity of a Mind. The Philosophical Theology Emerging from the Critique of Pennant The above critique of Tennant’s work has led to the belief that there is a modest alogical probability in favor of personalistic theism, although this belief is based upon different grounds than those which Tennant held to be sig nificant. Until I have found opportunity, however, to develop a philosophy of biologjr, as I have of cosmology, it is premature to draw any definitive conclusions. At present I can merely indulge in the anthropic faith that the philosophy of biology which is outlined above will ^Thermodynamically, however, the effect is utterly negligible. Since such an event occurs only once at the origin of each Bauplan, it is probable that all of the mat ter involved in this process since the origin of life would still be, in the aggregate, of almost microscopic propor tions. Once the first template is formed, the processes of its reduplication conform to the second law. 379 eventually be confirmed. Meanwhile I shall feel free to present a tentative outline of the synthetic philosophy to which this study has led. Probably the outstanding feature of the methodology of this study has been its shift from a careful pursuit of the ordo cognoscendi to a more speculative critique conducted in ordine essendi. The ordo cognoscendi was pursued because of my desire to build upon the epistemological foundations laid dow by Tennant. I was much in agreement with his concern to be thoroughly empirical and to approach theology by simply asking "how the world, inclusive of man, O / is to be explained." Hence I followed him sympatheti cally throughout his first volume. I agreed with his decision to exclude (at least tentatively) all rationalis tic and mystical approaches to theism and to rest his case upon our presumptive knowledge of the self and discursive knowledge of the world. When Tennant finally propounded his synoptic hypothesis, however, in the form of an empiri cal theism, I promptly shifted tactics and devised a gene tic outline of cosmic development (see above, p. 233, Fig. 2) which displayed the basic features of the universe in ordine essendi. Following this outline, I endeavored to test the implications which Tennant’s synoptic hypothesis A / F. R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Eng., 1935-37), II, 78. involved at each of the crucial steps depicted in the out line. In accordance with the epistemological results of Tennant’s first volume, I expected to arrive ultimately at an evaluation of the alogical probability that can reason ably be attributed to the theistic hypothesis and to exer cise the appropriate anthropic faith in these results. As the ordo cognoscendi phase of the study developed, I found myself agreeing with the epistemological dualism of Tennant. It became increasingly clear that in earliest infancy our minds have actively developed a capacity to rework the brute data of sensatio and to form socialized Objects (0) which represent, at least in a pragmatic sense, the ontal objects (66). Consequently, our escape from the egocentric predicament does not depend upon a direct intui tive outreach, but instead it rests upon the anthropic processes of a transactional theory of perception. Inas much as these processes involve the implicit weighing of alogical probabilities, the immediate object of perception (o0 can hardly be considered objective (or ’•other*'), as it would be in an epistemological monism. In a chapter which reflects much careful thought, Tennant criticizes episte mological realism for assuming that the immediate object (o) is idential with the ontal (63). This could hardly be true in cases where, as Tennant says, the effective intensity of a sensum is partly conditioned by degree of attention. . . . Thus fact utters warning, 381 Che addsj, to the realism which presupposes sensibles, exactly like sensa save that they are unsensed. (I, 222) Epistemological idealism is also criticized by Tennant inasmuch as it "cancels as superfluous" (I, 223). He finally argues in favor of a "phenomenalism" (to be dis tinguished, however, from that of Mach and his followers), which has seemed quite convincing to me, which takes sen- satio to be comparable, not to exact colour-photography, CbutJ to vision through irre movable and undetectable coloured spectacles; so that o is an appearance of 60, and 60 has a nature about which we can speculate but cannot know (I, 223). Although my epistemology is far removed from the intu- itionism of Henri Bergson, my metaphysical viewpoint is essentially a Bergsonian dualism, which is ultimately idealistic, however, inasmuch as matter itself, as I believe, arose in the beginning from God. On this point I differed somewhat from Tennant, who believes that matter is coeval with God, but who, nevertheless, speaks of God as being the World-Ground. I did not accept the view of Aver- roes, however, who, under the pressure of Aristotelian thought, maintained that the World Ground recreates the universe moment by moment. Since I was unable to validate Tennant’s cosmic teleology, but found, instead, that the physical sciences in general were devoid of all valid sug gestions of purposefulness, I avoided a prevasive material ism only by virtue of the cosmological evidences, such as they are, which weighed against the doctrine of "eternal" 382 matter. The cosmic dualism which resulted was therefore at first completely deistic and I pictured the Creator as an absentee Deity, Whose original work was in the field of "ylemic" matter, but Who now "moved upon the face of the waters" (Gen. 1.2), above the molar realm, seeking entrance as into an alien world. This deism passed over into theism, however, when I found that life afforded a medium in which the Divine Art ist could work. Partly because of the negative results of the search for purpose on the cosmic scale, the evidence of design which I found in the origin of the Bauplane did not suggest to me, as it has to metaphysical idealists, that life and mind are a key to the ontology of matter. The uniqueness of living substance consists in the fact that it contains a programming code within its aperiodic molecules; it does not consist in any basic ontological distinction. I have therefore continued to avoid a pan- psychistic ontology and retained a Cartesian view of mat ter. Moreover, the long and tragic^5 history of life upon this planet suggested to me that matter has proven to be 25in spite of the fact that his thinking is based upon premises contrary to those of Schindewolf, Joseph Harold Rush describes one very real facet of the history of life when he writes that "Evolution has proceeded by uncertain selection from a mass of indiscriminate variations in the constitution of organisms, and every creature bears the wound scars of this process" (The bawn off i.i^e ^Garden City, N. Y., l95t], p. 244, italics mine). 383 an exceedingly refractory medium in which to work; for otherwise we should expect that progress would have been more rapid. This refractoriness is due, perhaps, to the likelihood that aperiodic crjrstals such as the nucleic acids are the only type of matter that is amenable to Divine control and whose products can control events in the molar world. It is a noteworthy fact that (unless the brain is an Exception to the rule), the nucleic acids are the only known substances that are capable of transferring encoded information from the atomic to the molar realm; and they accomplish this by serving as templates upon which thousands of identical molecules of enzyme substance are synthesized one after another. These enzymes then accumu late in sufficient bulk to act as physiological regula tors.26 It is perhaps a debatable question whether these facts will help at all to alleviate the difficult problem of interactionism, which every dualism must face. As Tennant frankly states, however, we can hardly avoid the fact that Without some interaction between spirit and matter--or rather, between spirit and the ontal counterpart to 2^This is perhaps the "different type of macro-law" that Hermann Weyl presumed to exist in contrast to that of entropy. While the latter derives order from molecular disorder, the former accounts "for the production of large- scale order from small-scale order in an organism" (Philos ophy of Mathematics and Natural Science CPrinceton, N. J., lUii; prsBn. — ------------------ 384 phenomenal and conceptual matter--perception, etc., become unthinkable. (II, 42) In any case, it is not unreasonable to argue that much of the difficulty which thinkers have encountered in supposing that the Mind of God can act upon the physical world stems from the fact that the molar realm is subject to natural or statistical law, and that this objection bears no weight against a view which confines this action to the atomic realm, where such statistics gains no foothold. This, how ever, is the realm of sporadic mutations. According to N. W. Timef6eff-Ressovsky, mutations occur by the process of dehydrogenation, which essentially involves nothing more than the addition of a single electron.27 When the intrin sic haziness of the spatial and physical properties of the electron is considered, it would seem that such particles afford a point of contact between mind and matter that is O Q as good as any yet proposed. The eminent experimental psychologist, Edwin G. Boring, reveals his preference for interactionism when he criticizes nineteenth-century paral lelism. MIf the new theory of conservation of energy had not loomed so large then,'* he charges, ’’ there might have 27h e , Mgcanisme des Mutations et la Structure du G&ne (Paris, 1939). 28Por an ingenious and philosophically respectable discussion of interactionism on the level of the finite person, cf. the work of the neurophysiologist, J. C. Eccles ("Hypotheses Relating to the Brain-Mind Problem," Nature, 168:53-57, July 14, 1951). 385 been more rigorous thinking.” His defense of this prefer ence is in line with my own emphasis on the transfer of information as this term is used in communication theory: A Cartesian interactionism consistent with the conserva tion of energy is possible, Che continues^J, just as there can be interaction between two systems, each of which is self-contained except as energy in it is released or directed by signals which the other system provides. In such a case, it is the transfer of communication which is important, not the transfer of energy. The systems may be regarded as self-contained yet intercommunicating.2^ In conclusion it should be pointed out that my inter est in the natural sciences has led me to take matter and its mechanizations very seriously, while my religious ori entation has led me to take the realm of the spirit with equal gravity. A philosophy formulated under such condi tions might, of course, be expected to reveal a schizoid tendency. I feel, however, that a network of interrela tionships can be discerned extending between the poles of my philosophy and creating there a richly meaningful pat tern of truth as I trust it actually exists in all its many-sided complexity. I am therefore content to live with the difficulties of an interactionist viewpoint, believing that these problems have been appreciably mitigated by the considerations outlined above, and that the balance of evi dence as I have evaluated it definitely inclines in the direction of a metaphysical dualism. 2^A History of Experimental Psychology, 2nd ed., The Century Psychology Series, ed. k. M. Elliott (New York, 1950), p. 667. 386 Although my work is in general a project in synthetic philosophy and for this reason has dealt at length with epistemological and metaphysical issues, it should never theless be regarded primarily as a study in the philosophy of religion. The objective quest for a meaningful Weltan schauung, which began with a broad and general effort to explain the world, was finally narrowed down to a critique of the concept of "teleology" as applied at the crucial points in cosmic development. I concluded, chiefly on the basis of Schindewolf*s convincing interpretation of the history of life, that there is a definite teleology in the biological realm, if not in that of the physical sciences; and that this teleolog}^ is of a higher order than that of a goal-seeking mechanism, since it pertains to the original design of the mechanism and not to the pseudo-intentions or purposes which the mechanism as such displays. At first sight it is not unreasonable to suppose, with Nicolai Hart mann, that the latter, lower-order teleology can arise out of the purposeless.^0 But when an alogical estimate is made of the probabilities involved, Hartmann's position becomes outlandishly improbable, though not strictly impos sible. Under these conditions it would seem that the logi cal alternative is to apply Hartmann's "Kategorialanalyse" of teleology to the higher-order teleology and conclude 30Teleologisches Denken (Berlin, 1951), S. 94-97. 387 that this type of purposiveness necessarily involves a consciousnessSince such a consciousness cannot be that of the creature itself, I have modestly concluded that the higher-order teleology is a manifestation of the intentions of a Divine Intelligence. The resulting theology is a personalistic theism, which is considerably more alloyed with deism, however, than I had originally anticipated. On the other hand, this theology is much less deistic than that of the prevailing Barthian theology, which refuses to make any empirical statements whatsoever in the field of natural theology and which bases its case entirely upon the revelation of the Word. I am far from minimizing the importance of the Word; but I feel, nonetheless, that the testimony of the Word alone is inadequate if there is not at the same time some evidence of Divine action in the world at large as well. As soon as such evidences are found, however, it then becomes reasonable to expect that God will be immanent 3^The "Kategorialanalyse des Finalnexus" is outlined by Hartmann in three acts: Ml. Akt: Setzung des Zweckes im Bewusstsein mit Uber- springung des Zeitflusses, als Antizipation des Kunftigen; 2. Akt: Selektion der Mittel vom gesetzten Zweck aus im Bewusstsein (riicklaufige Determination); 3. Akt: Realisation durch die Reihe der seligierten Mittel; rechtlaufiger Realprozess ausserhalb des Bewusstseins" (S. 69). 388 chiefly within that portion of His creation which is pre eminently personal. The theology emerging from the present study is sorae- $ what deistic and finitistic in the sense that God finds Himself effectively excluded from most of the material uni verse and that even the biological realm has proven to be such a refractory medium that nearly a billion years of "research and development" have been required in order to produce the higher hominoids. As sensitivities have devel oped in the course of these years, tragedy and suffering have prevailed. Lines of orthogenetic development, caught in the grip of certain mutagenic tendencies, have overshot their goals and passed on into grotesque forms ultimately becoming extinct. Other phylogenetic lines have furnished protective organic environments in which offensive para sites could develop; and these lines, too, have become extinct through the hideous processes by which the para sites have sapped away the lives of their hosts. But the same biological processes xdiich have led to these distortions have also provided the mechanisms for adaptive change; and, indeed, this seems to be the price by which such plasticity is bought. In this way, later organisms, including man, have benefited by the suffering of their ancestors. When Albert Schweitzer enunciated his pervasive principle of "reverence for life," he was acknowl edging a debt of long standing. It is not only by virtue of the vivisection of animals for medical research that our indebtedness to the animal kingdom has accrued; this indebtedness reaches back to the humblest origins of life. Clearly, then, if my study has led to a disturbing theo logical finitism, it has also served to root the principle of vicarious suffering firmly into the structure of bio logical thought; and, in so doing, it has written the symbol of The Cross in figures of cosmic proportions. BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY Th^Work^o^Frederic^Rober^Termant "The Being of God, in the Light of Physical Science." Unpublished graduate thesis. The Concept of Sin. Cambridge, 1912. Miracle and Its Philosophical Presuppositions. Cambridge, 1*>25. CThree Lectures, University of London: 1924•) Philosophical Theology. Vol. I: The Soul & Its Faculties. Cambri d g e J ------------------------------------------------------ Philosophical Theology. Vol. II: The World, the Soul, and cSdaT Cambridge, 19^6. Philosophy of the Sciences: or the Relations between the Departments ofe knowledge. Cambridge, 19^2. (The Tarner Lectures: 1931-32.) The Nature of Belief. London, 1943. (The Christian Chal- lenge Series, ed. 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Creator Starkey, Lawrence Harry (author)

Core Title A Philosophical Critique Of F. R. Tennant'S Empirical Approach To Theism In The Light Of Current Science

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Philosophy

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,Philosophy

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Long, Wilbur H. (committee chair), Robb, J. Wesley (committee member), Werkmeister, William H. (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-86872

Unique identifier UC11358101

Identifier 6004488.pdf (filename),usctheses-c18-86872 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 6004488.pdf

Dmrecord 86872

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Starkey, Lawrence Harry

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA