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The Historical Background Relating To Access Rights To Berlin

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The Historical Background Relating To Access Rights To Berlin

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Content THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND RELATING TO
ACCESS RIGHTS TO BERLIN
by
Alan Donald Pauw
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(History)
January 1965
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY PARK
LOS ANGELES. CALIFORNIA 9 0 0 0 7
This dissertation, written by
. . . AMN.DONAI^..PAW...........
under the direction of A i . S L . .Dissertation Com
mittee, and approved by all its members, has
been presented to and accepted by the Graduate
School, in partial fulfillment of requirements
for the degree of
D O C T O R O F P H I L O S O P H Y
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
. C L . T K Q . c
PREFACE
This study is concerned with three main issues.
First of all, what were the historical circumstances which
led to the peculiar position of West Berlin, an area oc
cupied by the Western Powers, but completely surrounded by
territory controlled by the Soviet Union, and with only pre
carious access rights which could be either cut off or in
fringed upon by that state? Secondly, in the light of his
torical circumstances and relevant historical documents,
what arguments do the Western Powers make to support their
rights of access to Berlin? Thirdly, what arguments does
the Soviet Union make in an attempt to challenge the rights
of the Western Powers to access to Berlin?
In attempting to find source material and to as
semble data and information, the difficulties of doing
research and writing on what is really contemporary his
tory became very apparent. Although it appeared doubtful
that it would be possible to have original records relating
to the carving of the zones and the agreement pertaining
to Berlin made available, we corresponded with various
agencies of the United States, British, and French govern-
iments which probably have custody of pertinent and useful,
^records. A typical response was that from one of the
agencies of the British government which stated, in part,
as follows:
"Research among original records of the kind you
mention presents something of a problem. Much of
the material is highly confidential and is filed in
our Public Record Office where it is not normally
available for public inspection until fifty years
have elapsed."
The sources that are available to establish what
evidently transpired in the drawing the zones of Germany and
providing for quadripartite occupation of Berlin are, con
sequently, limited. These sources consist of certain U.S.
Army-originated documents and papers in U.S. Government
files, memoirs of the men who were to some degree con
cerned with the drawing of the zones and joint occupation
of Berlin or had knowledge of these matters, governmental
publications that divulge some details, the agreements
themselves between the Allied Powers relative to occupation ;
of Germany, including Berlin, and works of scholars who
have collected information from various sources.
The data in U.S. Government files that is available
to one doing unofficial research on the subject of this |
study consists of materials in the Office of the Military !
Government Historical Division, National Archives, World
|War II Records Division in Alexandria, Virginia and ma-
Iterlals In the Office of the Chief of Military History, j
j i
|United States Department of the Army, Washington, D. C.
Very valuable and Important records pertaining to the zones
of occupation in Germany, the sectors in Berlin, and transit
to Berlin are apparently in the files of the United States
Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. However,
their files are closed, and it is not possible to examine
them.
Difficult as it is to obtain access to Western
sources and materials, it is even more difficult to make
recourse to Soviet sources and documents. This is more un
fortunate than in the case of Western sources, since so
little is known of the changing Russian attitude on Berlin
and Germany. Due to the paucity of information available
from Soviet sources, this study concentrates on the Western
point of view and largely approaches the issues involved
from a Western perspective. However, some attention is
sought to be focused on the Soviet side in an attempt to
make the picture as complete as possible.
Certainly, the sources which are available leave
much to be desired, and the question necessarily remains
as to how accurate one's conclusions can be on the basis
of the materials that can be found and utilized-at the
present time.
In view of the limited materials that are available;
|with which to work, interpretations of historical events
: iv !
|that have a bearing upon the present Berlin situation can
be made to only a very limited extent. One's conclusions
must inevitably be largely tentative.
v
TABLE OP CONTENTS
Page
| PREFACE . ..................... ................. 'ii
Chapter
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND..................... 1
II. THE ZONES AND BERLINt. PRE-YALTA PLANNING . . 23
: III. THE ZONES AND BERLIN: DEVELOPMENTS PROM
YALTA TO THE REDEPLOYMENT OP TROOPS
WITHIN THE ZONES ................. 85
IV. DIRECT NEGOTIATE ONS RELATIVE TO ACCESS
RIGHTS TO BERLIN AND THE
POTSDAM CONFERENCE ........................ 149
V. THE SITUATION ON THE EVE OP DISAGREEMENT . . l8l
; VI. DEVELOPMENTS IN GERMANY AFTER THE WAR .... 193
VII. THE WESTERN ARGUMENT RELATING TO
ACCESS RIGHTS TO BERLIN .................... 227
VIII. THE SOVIET ARGUMENT RELATING TO
ACCESS RIGHTS TO BERLIN .................... 265
I BIBLIOGRAPHY.......................................... 291
vi
CHAPTER I
GENERAL BACKGROUND
In viewing present-day Berlin from a historical
point of view, it is important, first of all, to see it
against the background of American and British policy during
World War II relative to a postwar settlement of the German
problem. The touchstone of American and British policy
toward "the German problem" was that of reserving final and I
decisive commitment and trusting, or perhaps hoping, that j
l
eventually circumstances would produce the moment when the
problem of Germany could be decided In a manner more or :
less consistent with the vital national Interests of America
and Britain.^
This attitude upon which the top-ranking leaders of
the United States and Britain acted during the years of
World War II vis a vis a settlement of the issue of postwar
Germany has sometimes been characterized as no policy at
John L. Snell, The Meaning of Yalta (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1956), pp. 40-4l; Snell.
Dilemma Over Germany (New Orleans: The Hauser Press, 1959)>
pp. 14-39; Manuel Gottlieb, The German Peace Settlement and
the Berlin Crisis (New York: Paine-Whitman Publishers,
1960), pp. XVI, 16-21.
1
2
2
all. It was not a policy in the sense that it was known
in specific detail what was desired. It was rather a method
of adopting tentative and probing approaches, avoiding def
inite commitments, and not looking too far into the future.
The essence of this policy or attitude of America
and Britain has been recognized by many writers and histor
ians. Various terms have been employed to describe it.
Thus, Manuel Gottlieb, economist, historian, and
teacher, has borrowed a freudian term and called the for
eign policy of the Western powers pertaining to a German
Q
peace settlement one of "ambivalence. He says that "am
bivalence grows out of uncertainty and involves simultaneous
pursuit of irreconciliable objectives and the holding of
antithetical attitudes. Gottlieb has also referred to it ,
as a "course of drift.
Another writer, Fred Warner Neal, a former State
!
Department official and now a university teacher, also uses'
the term "ambivalent" to describe especially American pol
icy toward Germany. Neal sees ambivalence fluctuating be
tween two differing schools of thought. The one view was
1
“ TDeane and David Heller, The Berlin Crisis (Derby,
Conn.: Monarch Books, Inc., 1961), p. 395 Hanson W. Bald
win, Great Mistakes of the War (New York: Harper & Brothers^
19^9), PP. 3, 8.
^Gottlieb, op. cit., pp. XVI-XVII, 1-25.
\bid., p. XVI.
5Ibid.
3
exemplified by the Morgenthau Plan. The other, was advocated
mainly by Secretary of Navy Porrestal who even during the
heyday of United States-Soviet collaboration feared Russian
power and felt that Germany should be made strong and uni
fied as a military buffer against Moscow. Roosevelt was.
never in agreement with the Porrestal position. The war
ended without resolving the ambivalence and without an of
ficial American plan for the reorganization of Germany,
says Neal.^
John L. Snell, Professor at Tulane University,
coined the phrase "policy of postponement" to describe the
Anglo-American attitude.^ Hajo Holborn refers to the "un-
O
settled nature of American policy." Ernest P. Penrose
writes at length about the failure to obtain agreement in
Washington and between the Allies on fundamental issues
Q
concerning postwar Germany. Other writers have taken up
Pred Warner Neal, War and Peace in Germany (New
York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1962), p. 30*
^Snell, Dilemma Over Germany, passim.
^Ha.-Jo Holborn, The Political Collapse of Europe (New;
York: Knopf, 1951), pp. 175-176. Holborn mentions the fol-;
lowing factors aB accounting for the unsettled nature of
American policy toward postwar Germany: (l) military need
for cooperation with Russia; (2) Lack of a sure grasp of
European political conditions; (3) Popular American senti
ment relating to staying out of Europe and remaining aloof
from its problems; (4) The Pacific War still to be won and
the desire to obtain the help of Russia in defeating Japan.
q
^Penrose, op. cit., passim.
4
the theme that the Western Allies had war aims hut no peace
aims. Or., differently stated, that planning for the peace
was always submerged to plans for winning the war.1^
The approach of the top leaders of America and Brit
ain that matters bearing upon a settlement of the German
problem should be deferred and delayed was rooted in a very
valid realism. Maneuverability in dealing with the issue
was very necessary. It was required for reasons of the
most fundamental and farreaching type. Military coopera
tion between the Anglo-Americans and the Soviets to insure
victory against the Nazis was the first consideration. It
was felt that in a situation beset with all the hazards of
waging a war, the raising of controversial and divisive is
sues should be kept to a minimum."*''1 ' This was even more
true considering American and British involvement in a
Pacific war which would apparently remain to be won after
military success in Europe had been secured.
In addition, the unknowns of the future were many
and fundamental. No one in the West could foresee what
conditions would be in Germany and Central Europe when the
war ended. No one could really envisage the post-bellum
world. The attitude and willingness of Soviet Russia to
10Hanson W. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War (New
York: Harper & Brothers, 1949)> PP- 2-3, 10-11; James P.
Warburg, Germany-~Key to Peace (Cambridge: Harvard Univer
sity Press^ 1953) * P ♦ 19.
■^Holborn, op. cit., pp. 175-176.
;continue to cooperate with its Allies after the war was
t
necessarily an unknowable. Amidst all these uncertainties,
a policy of "ambivalence," a policy of postponement, a pol
icy of reserving decision was resorted to by Roosevelt and
Churchill.
The uncertainty as to postwar conditions in Germany;
was, of course, freely and openly discussed. It was fre
quently mentioned and pointed out by Allied leaders. The
second imponderable, that of the ability of the Western
Powers and the Soviet Union to work together in peace was
not usually discussed and evaluated openly due to the very
fact that cooperative efforts in the war against the Axis
was a prime necessity. Officially and publicly, it could
only be assumed that East-West cooperation would extend j
into the postwar period. However, it is undoubtedly true I
that the leaders of the West all during the war had grave I
doubts as to the degree of friendship that would exist with!
Soviet Russia after a cessation of hostilities. These
I
doubts were very telling factors in causing the policy of |
postponement and of reserving decision practiced by the j
United States and Britain. i
i
I
Kenneth Ingram, an English historian and writer,
j i
! for one, pointed out that during the war it was not naivelyj
accepted by Western leaders that relations with the Commu
nist East would necessarily be satisfactory and uncompli-
1 cated after hostilities ceased. He wrote as follows:
6
There is one fundamental mLsconception which we
should remove from.our minds at the outset. . . . It
is commonly assumed in the West that although the So
viet Union had been viewed with suspicion from the
1917 Revolution onwardB, a different attitude waB
adopted by the West once Russia had been forced into
the second world war. Western statesmen, it is sup
posed, were willing to let bygones be bygones and to
hold out the hand of friendship to the Soviet Union. . . .
. . .What needs at once to be emphasized is that
suspicion of Soviet intentions was a consistent under
lying factor in the minds of Western statesmen. . . .
The Soviet leaders were well aware of this attitude,
and reacted by remaining correspondingly suspicious
of the West. . . . This mutual distrust was dominant
throughout. . . .
. . .Once the war was at an end, the deep under
lying estrangement was bound to be revealed more
blatantly.12
Many events bear witness to the continued distrust
of Soviet Russia in the Western countries during the war.
In September, 19^1, Churchill wrote to President Roosevelt
stating his apprehension that Russia might attempt to ar-
l"a
range a separate peace with Germany. J Even on the very
day Russia was forced Into the war, Churchill said in a
message to the British people that "The Nazi regime is in
distinguishable from the worst features of communism."^
During the war those in the West who advocated a Second
Front in Central Europe did so in order to contain the Rus
sians and keep large areas of Central Europe from falling
12Hlstory of the Cold War (London: Darwin Findlayson
Ltd., 1955), PP. 9-11, 15.
■'■■^Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), p. 46b',
l4Ibid., p. 370.
7
into Communist hands. The secret of the atomic bomb was
carefully kept from the Russians.
The WeBtern Allies were fully aware of the wide dif
ferences in the social, economic, and political systems of
EaBt and West. The fact of such fundamental differences
strongly motivated a policy of postponement relative to
settlement of issues affecting postwar Germany. Manuel
Gottlieb has very expressively summed up the matter in the
following language:
The tendency to fumbling leadership and to drift
will be strongest when settlement is attempted between
Power areas cleft by a cultural gap. Of such nature
were the relationships of the Greco-Roman empire with
its surrounding peoples, of the medieval Christian and
the fluid Mongol and Moslem worlds, of the decaying j
Turkish realm and the advancing Western world. As the
cultural gap narrows and bonds of solidarity thicken,
relationships between states become civilizational in
character and become to a greater or lesser degree in
fused with responsibility. . . .
If these factors which condition the respective
working of. drift and of responsible action in complex
societies and civilizations are borne in mind, there
will be less tendency to complain at the outcome of the
German postwar peace settlement and there will be more
understanding of the forces which ran through it.15
The Strain of making a choice is greatest when there
are profound and deep seated Ideological differences be
tween the necessary parties to agreement. The tendency to- ;
ward drift or ambivalent courses is much less marked when
the parties concerned negotiate from more or less common
cultures. Rather than being ready to assess blame and re-
150p. cit., p. XIX.
8 '
sponsibility for the failure of'the world's leaders to
Bolve postwar issues, the conclusion to which one is led
is that essentially what was involved was tragedy.
The very character of all-out and world-wide war
made a policy of postponement and "drift" a largely inevit
able policy. Attempting to draft complete plans for a post
war world during a period of total war will seem visionary
and impracticable to anyone with a grain of realism. The
words of William L., Neumann in the following vein are
apropos:
The character of total war imposes . . . obstacles
to a sound peace. Traditionally, peace has meant the
restoration of the status quo ante bellum. But a re
turn to prewar condition's is impossible after a total i
war. . . . To calculate the achievements of military ^
victory becomes therefore in large measure impossible.
The policy of postponement was essentially a real
ization that it is not possible to foresee the results of
victory.
It can be argued that the policy of postponement
practiced by the principal Western countries was essentially
realistic. A policy of postponement had much more to recorrw
mend it than a program tied to a fixed formula as to a set
tlement for the postwar period preconceived in great detailj
There was merit in deferring issues pertaining to peace
until it was known what the circumstances in Europe and the
^ Making the Peace 1941-1945 (Washington: Foundation
for Foreign Affairs, 195l)s P* 5•
i 9
world generally were, rather than rigidly defining and re
volving basic questions, and, subsequently, to be committed
ito fixed arrangements that failed to fit the circumstances,
i As late in the war as January 4, 194-5j Churchill
wrote to the British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, in
anticipation of the Yalta Conference that,
It is a mistake to try to write out on paper what the
vast emotions of an outraged and quivering world will
be. . . . There is therefore wisdom in reserving one's
decisions as long as possible and until all the facts
and forces that will be potent at the moment are re-
: vealed.17
In the same memorandum, Churchill also wrote to
Eden, "Treatment of Germany after the war [sic ]. It is
l8
much too soon for us to decide these enormous questions."
Roosevelt's attitude was the same. In a conversa
tion on November 15, 1944, with respect to a memorandum con-i
jcerning Germany, Roosevelt said, "What he liked about it
particularly was that It did not dot all the i's or cross
: l^Triumph and Tragedy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin !
Company, 1951;, PP. 350-351.
18
; In the same connection, Churchill also went on to
I state that: "I shall prefer to concentrate upon the prac
tical issues which will occupy the next two or three years, j
rather than argue about the long-term relationship of Ger- '
many to Europe. I remember so well last time being shocked |
at the savage views of the House of Commons and of the con- j
stituencies, and being indignant with Poincare when he sent !
the French Into the Ruhr. In a few years however the mood !
of Parliament and the public changed entirely. Thousands j
of millions of money were lent to Germany by the United
States." :
jail the t's. There are many questions which must be left
I
for future determination, since we have no way of knowing
>hat we shall find in G e r m a n y . " ^
A sustained and purposeful effort to arrange a-com-
'mon Allied policy toward Germany and its occupation before
the end of the war was not made. Even at Yalta both Roose
velt and Churchill continued to adhere to their policy of
refraining from trying to devise'any comprehensive.program
'for Germany. It is true that the Yalta communique stated
i
;that agreement had been reached on common policies and on
I coordinated administration for Germany. These statements
'cannot be accepted at face value. They are not literally
accurate. At best, they are very misleading. The fact
!is that there was no common agreement between the major
i
:Allied powers during the war as to what was to be done in
i
! Germany when hostilities came to an end. The Western
I
:statesmen at Yalta discussed a number of important ques-
i tions pertaining to Germany with the Soviet leaders includ
ing dismemberment, terms of surrender, war crimes, repara-
j tions, and the granting of an occupation zone to France, as
I well as a seat on the Control Council. But irrevocable
I commitments were cautiously avoided on practically every
issue. The areas of agreement supposedly found when re-
■^United States Department of State, The Conference
at Malta and Yalta, 19^5 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1955) j PP." 171-172. (The so-called "Yalta Papers.")!
11
duced to writing were all couched In language Intentionally
vague. Even departments within the same government, as the
American State and War Departments, derived different mean
ings from the points allegedly agreed upon. Yalta was in
reality Just more of the same policy of tentativeness and
20
avoidance of clear-cut commitment.
A corollary of the policy of drift and deferment of
decision-making was that Germany would continue to be the
major danger to peace after the war. During World War II
Western statesmen acted on the assumption that the princi
pal postwar problem would be the prevention of further*
German aggression. When this premise soon proved entirely
j
incorrect, many of the plans and schemes for the postwar !
era went completely awry. |
President Roosevelt especially was very strongly
motivated in his planning for the peace by the idea that
i
Germany would remain as a threat and potential danger far
into the distant future. Roosevelt was decidedly anti-
21
German. Roosevelt, like many Englishmen, Frenchmen, and
PO
Walter L. Dorn, "The Debate Over American Foreign j
Policy in Germany 1944-45," Political Science Quarterly, !
LKXII (December, 1957), pp. 489-490.
21Eugene Davidson, The Death and Life of Germany (New:
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959). p p . 6-7:' Herbert Feis, Church
ill, Roosevelt and Stalin (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni
versity Press, 1957), PP. 272-273; Byrnes, op. clt., p. l82j
Yalta Papers, pp. 171-172.
■ . 12
Americans of his generation had taken an early dislike to
the Germansj to their "provinciality" and their "arrogance."
"If I had my way," Roosevelt was reported as saying, "I
would keep'Germany on a breadline for the next twenty-five••
22 ‘
years."
Although both Churchill and Stalin said that they
distinguished between the German people and their Fascist
leaders, Roosevelt blamed all Germans for the aggression
of the Nazis.
By contrast with Roosevelt, Churchill was probably
moved considerably less by personal antipathy toward the
German people. At a very early date, and perhaps almost
J
i
as soon as Russia became embroiled in the war, he attached j
importance to maintaining a reasonably strong Germany to |
oh
counter the growing Soviet colossus in the East. Church-;
ill was always more or less apprehensive of the purposes of.
Communist Russia. There is evidence that Roosevelt was
hoping for success with the Soviets by a demonstration of
22 i
Henry L. Stimson and George Bundy, On Active Serv
ice in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Brothers7-19^TT7 j
p. 573; Byrnes, op. cit., p. 182.
2^Cordell Hull, Memoirs (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1948), p. l602j Byrnes, op. cit., p. 182,
oh
Feis, op. cit., pp. 272-273; Heller, op. cit.,
P. 35.
13
personal friendship and a willingness to display good
faith.25 •
Thus, although both Roosevelt and Churchill wanted
to follow a policy of riding the current of. events, rdther
than adopting set formulas, Roosevelt was influenced'by a
strongly anti-German feeling and a compromising and mediat
ing attitude toward the Soviet Union. Churchill, on the
other hand, saw in Germany a counterweight to an imperialis
tic Russia.
Both Roosevelt and Churchill were urged by their
experts on foreign affairs to make plans for the peace and
26
not to be caught short at the end of the war. It was the :
[
experts and technicians who were advising that issues be
resolved. In this respect, there occurred an interplay of j
strategists versus technicians. Roosevelt and Churchill
were the strategists. Their experts and advisers were the !
technicians who strove for clear-cut formulas. In defense
of Roosevelt and Churchill, it is fair to state that they
understood the dynamics of world affairs better than the '
experts. They were willing to tolerate a condition that is |
mentally unsatisfying and disturbing, namely, that of an 1
unsettled and unresolved array of issues.
2R
Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the
Second World War (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office,
1962), Introduction, p. XXXVIIj Snell, Dilemma Over Germany,
pp. 29-30. ~~ '
26
Yalta Papers. pp. 130-133.
. .
During the last year or two of the war not only were
Roosevelt and Churchill being told by many of their advisers
and technical experts that planning for the period after
the war was necessary, but there were many proponents of
the view that comprehensive agreements should be negotiated
with the Russians during the war. According to this school
of thought, the Allies should work out detailed plans for
the peace while they were bound together by the need to
collaborate in achieving victory. The American representa
tive on the European Advisory Commission (EAC), John G.
Winant, and his advisers, Philip Mosely and Ernest P. Pen
rose, are usually regarded as adherents of this view. It
has also been asserted, although probably incorrectly,
that Secretary of State Hull and the State Department gen- j
erally subscribed to this view. The British Foreign Office;
undoubtedly strongly favored far-reaching agreements be
tween Britain, the United States, and Russia with respect
to Germany. It submitted to the EAC an entire handbook of
specific and detailed policy directives on every phase of
27
the occupation of Germany.
Those who advocated the approach of seeking compre-;
hensive agreements with Russia believed that it was of
greatest importance to enter into understandings with Rus- i
sia while agreement was possible. This attitude waB com-
^Dorn, op. cit., p. 486.
15
pletely contrary to that of Roosevelt and Churchill who
wanted to know more about the conditions that would exist
in the postwar world, before they became too deeply com
mitted.
It Is possible to speculate as to whether clear-cut
and detailed agreements with the Soviet Union negotiated
during the war-would have been effective in avoiding the
cold war. There are few today who would be inclined .to
believe that this is true. Efforts to work out wide-ranging
agreements during the war would very probably only have re
vealed at an earlier date the inability of East and West to ;
cooperate in peaceful pursuits. It is really too much to
believe that comprehensive agreements hammered out during '
i
the war would have made any important difference in assur- !
ing collaboration between the Soviets and the Western Allie^
since 1945. It is probably more realistic to conclude that
i
the vastly different philosophies and aims of East and West
made struggle between the two largely inevitable.
The unconditional surrender pronouncement was a
phase of the policy of postponement. It has been severely
pQ
attacked as a great mistake. As a wartime measure, its
advisability was apparently even questioned by Marshall
pO
Baldwin, op. cit., pp. 14-25; Penrose, op. cit.,
p. 229.
16
29
Stalin. ^ Ernest F. Penrose argues that if Stalin's demand
to clarify the unconditional surrender formula had been ful
filled, Roosevelt and Churchill would have been obliged to
give directives to civil servants at the end of 1943 to
-50
hasten the compilation of data for postwar Germany.
The significant matter is, in any event, that the
unconditional surrender formula was a result of the propen
sity to delay decision-making, and that it was adopted by
Roosevelt and Churchill early in the war.
The issue of permanent dismemberment of Germany,
as distinguished from its temporary division into zones of
occupation, provoked much confusion and uncertainty in the
thinking of all three of the major Allied powers. It shows I
the tendency to delay resolving problems concerning post- (
j
war Germany. When the isBue was discussed at the Moscow
Conference in October, 1943, the British Foreign Minister,
Anthony Eden, said that his country did not like to see an
united Germany after the war, but would prefer to see her
divided into separate states, especially a separate Prus
sian state.Cordell Hull, the American Secretary of
State, noted that his government was struck by the widely
divergent views held among the Allied Governments on the
2^Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (rev. ed.,
New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), pp.. 702-703-
3°Penrose, op. cit., p. 229.
^^Hu11, op. cit., II, p. 1287.
.17
subject of German dismemberment'. Hull remarked that in
American governmental circles there was originally a dis
position to advocate the breaking up of Germany into several
states, but he informed the conference that as the thinking
progressed there was greater inclination to keep open minds
on the issue. Hull said that personally he never favored
■^2
dismemberment of Germany.
At the Teheran Conference the subject was mentioned
only on a very exploratory and indefinite basis. Roosevelt
seemed to be inclined to.favor dismemberment, as did Stalin.
Churchill had questions as to whether this was advisable
and doubted that the division of Germany into small politi
cal units would establish units which would be economically!
viable, although he appeared to lean toward some type of i
i
oo !
permanent partition. J '
At Yalta Stalin reminded Roosevelt and Churchill ofi
|
the fact that at Teheran they all informally favored dis
memberment of Germany. Stalin suggested that the time had
come for a decision and proposed that the issue be resolved'
then and there. Churchill agreed "in principle" to dis
memberment but said he could not commit himself to a defin-j
ite plan until much additional study had been made of the
problem. Roosevelt endeavored to act as a moderator saying;
32Ibid.
33Woodward, op. cit., p. 447; Sherwood, op. cit.,
pp. 797-798. _.....
that, as at Teheran, he favored dismemberment, but asked
that the question be referred to a special commission for
study of the matter. This was as close as the Big Three
came to any agreement on the issue of dismemberment of
Germany. They agreed "in principle" and appointed a special
commission to study the question. The commission met once
in London but never really came to serious grips' with the
»
problem. The views of the Russians.on dismemberment ap
parently changed after Yalta for reasons which are obscure.
After Yalta when the West and the Soviets began to drift
apart, the British especially were fearful of breaking up j
Central Europe into small, weak political units which would
i
fall easy prey to Communist expansionist policy. '
Harry- Hopkins after visiting Stalin in Moscow in j
May, 19^5* said that it was apparent that Stalin had changeq
his mind about German dismemberment since Yalta. Stalin ;
i
i
had concluded that the United States and Britain were in
reality opposed to dismemberment. He said there had been
no agreement at Yalta, and that at the meeting of the com
mission appointed to study dismemberment held in London,
the British indicated that the Yalta discussions did not - j
represent a positive plan but something to hold over the
heads of the Germans in case of bad behavior. Stalin sug
gested that dismemberment be brought up again at the forth-
Snell, The Meaning of Yalta, pp. 53-55; Byrnes,
op. cit., pp. 25-26. ' ~ ~
19
coining Potsdam Conference. However, by that time the
thinking of all three, of the major Allied governments had
veered away from dismemberment, and the issue was dead.
The issue of dismemberment illustrates the lack of
a clear policy on the part of the British and American
Governments relative to postwar Germany. It also reveals
their efforts to be tentative and to put off decisions.
But the Soviets were also ambivalent and uncertain. At
Yalta and prior to Yalta, the Russians apparently favored
dismemberment of Germany into several small states. After
Yalta, Russian views changed for reasons that are largely
unknown. On May 8, 19^5* in his Proclamation to the German
People, Stalin declared that "the Soviet Union . . . does
not intend to dismember or destroy Germany."^
Evidence of adherence to the principle of postpon
ing commitment with respect to postwar settlements is even
inherent in the agreement pertaining to the zones. The
■ zones were not intended to be permanent, but solely provi-
37
sional and temporary. Acquiescence in the zonal agree-
was supposed to be only a stop-gap expedient. The Allied
^Byrnes, 0p. cit., p. 26.
^Philip E. Mosely, The Kremlin and World Politics
(New York: Vintage Books, I960), p. 153*
■^Norman J. G. Pound, Divided Germany and Berlin
(Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1962), p.
114; John Mander, Berlin: Hostage For the West (Baltimore:
Penguin Books, Inc” 1962), p. 43. ~
20
Statement on Zones of Occupation in Germany of June 5,
19^5j began as follows:
"1. Germany, within her frontiers as they were on
31st December 1937, will, for the purposes of occupa
tion, be divided into four zones, one to be allotted
to each Power as follows:
an eastern zone to the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics;
a north-western zone to the United Kingdom;
a south-western zone to the United States of America;
a western zone to France."38 [Emphasis supplied.]
This Statement used the limiting phrase "for the
purposes of occupation." It suggests that for other and
broader purposes, the zones would not be of prime signifi
cance .
The Allied Statement on Control Machinery in Germany
also dated June 5, 19^5> likewise suggests that the zones
were to be temporary and limited in purpose. It reads, in !
part; in the following manner: j
"1. In the period when Germany is carrying out the ,
basic requirements of unconditional surrender, supreme i
authority in Germany will be exercised, on instructions
from their Governments, by the Soviet, British, United
States, and French Commanders-in-Chief, each in his
own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters
affecting Germany as a whole. The four Commanders-in-
Chief will together constitute the Control Council. . . .
2. The Control Council, whose decisions shall
be unanimous, will ensure appropriate uniformity of
action by the Commanders-in-Chief in their respective
zones of occupation and will reach agreed decisions on
the chief questions affecting Germany as a whole. . . .j
^ U. S. Senate, 87th Congress, 1st Session, Committee
on Foreign Relations, Documents on Germany, 19^-4-1961
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 19&1)/ p. lB.
21
8. The arrangements outlined above will operate
during the period of occupation following German sur
render, when Germany is carrying out the basic require
ments of unconditional surrender. Arrangements for the
subsequent period will be the subject of a separate
agreement.i 5b) [EmphasiB added. J
The language cited indicates that it was anticipated
that the duration of the existence of the zones would be
limited. Specific mention is made that a further and more
far-reaching agreement would be entered into. The zones
were stated to conform in time to the period for carrying
out "the basic requirements of unconditional surrender.”
These requirements were primarily the demilitarization, de
nazification, and democratization of Germany.
The Potsdam Agreement enumerates the purposes of j
the occupation of Germany. It describes them essentially
i
as: |
1. The complete disarmament and demilitarization of
Germany.
2. To convince the German people that they ..jffered
a complete military defeat and that they cannot
escape responsibility for what they brought about.
3. To destroy the National Socialist Party and all its1
affiliated organizations.
4. To prepare for reconstruction of German political
life on a democratic ba s i s .40
j
The zones would remain no longer than necessary to
achieve these designated purposes.
39Ibid., pp. 19-20.
40
Ibid., p. 31.
.22
The Potsdam Agreement did not provide for the divi
sion of Germany into parts. It presupposed the zonal ar
rangement for an interim period. However, it looked for
ward to and anticipated that an unified Germany would sup
plant the zones ultimately. The Potsdam Agreement empha
sized the unity of Germany. It stated that, "During the
period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single
economic unit.”^1 It also provided that, "So far as is
practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the
42
German population throughout Germany."
The Potsdam Agreement also explained that it was
agreed that a Council of Foreign Ministers was to be estab- ;
llshed, and that one of its purposes would be "for the prep-i
, , 4-5
aration of a peace settlement for Germany. J j
It, thus, becomes apparent that the zones were not j
regarded as possessing any degree of finality. Rather,
they represent largely a dilatory approach to the problem
of a German settlement. They fit into the pattern of post
ponement and reserving decision. They were regarded as an
immediate and pressing necessity to avoid a wild scramble
for German territory on the part of the Allies, but they
!
were not intended to be tantamount to an irrevocable com
mitment relative to a permanent German settlement.
^1Ibid., p. 33. 4gIbid., p. 31. ^ Ibid., p. 30.
CHAPTER II
THE ZONES AND BERLIN: PRE-YALTA PLANNING
The original idea of the occupation of Berlin by
the three major Allied powers was advanced by the British.
It was a facet of the plan for a division of Germany into
zones for purposes of occupation. Very little is known
publicly at the present time as to how the zones of occupa
tion were drawn and just who the individuals were who ac
tually carved out the zones. The zones and the sectors in !
|
Berlin largely in their present form came as a suggestion j
from a committee of the British Cabinet.^ The chairman of ;
I
the committee was Deputy Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee.
The committee did its work during the late summer of 1943.
This committee was at first an ad hoc committee set
up to consider armistice terms for Italy and was known as
2
"Committee on Armistice Terms." In late July or early
_ :
Winston Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 507. !
Michael Balfour and John Muir, Pour Power Control in German^
and Austria (London: Oxford University Press, 195& ) / P« 30.!
Edgar Mclnnis, Richard HIscocks, and Robert Spencer, The
Shaping of Postwar Germany (London and Toronto: J. M. Dent
& Sons Ltd., I960), pp. 93-94.
2
Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the
Second World War, p. 445.
23
24
August, 1943, it was suggested by Anthony Eden, British
Foreign Minister, that a committee be set up to consider
postwar settlement problems. Eden's suggestion was ap
proved by Churchill. On AugUBt 4, 1943j Churchill circu
lated a memorandum within the War Cabinet to the effect
that the complexity of problems-pertaining to liberated
enemy territories required establishing a committee of
Cabinet members to resolve minor issues and to advise the
Cabinet on major issues. Therefore, Churchill appointed a
Committee on Armistice Terms and Civil Administration
headed by Attlee.3 The most immediate problem facing this
committee was the imminent surrender of Italy. However, it
was this committee which originated the proposal for the 1
zonal arrangement of Germany. It was In this committee ;
that the concrete recommendation that all Germany should
be occupied germinated, and that this was necessary if
Germany was to be disarmed and denazified.
The most complete account that Is known or available
today in regard to the drafting of the zones is contained
in Prime Minister Churchill's Triumph and Tragedy and con
sists of only a little more than a page of very general j
narrative.^ One prominent writer on the history of the
late World War II years, Herbert Feis, has called Church
3Ibid.
2 i
Churchill, op. cit., pp. 507-510.
25
ill's account "unusually vague.it might even be added
that Churchill's discussion is almost apologetic.
Churchill states simply that he had appointed a
Cabinet Committee under Attlee, and that this committee,
with the approval of the British Chiefs of Staff, proposed,
the zones and the joint occupation of Berlin. He says that
the recommendations of the Cabinet Committee were approved
and sent to the European Advisory Commission.^
Churchill also comments that the subject of zones
of occupation at that time (summer and fall of 19^3) seemed
"purely theoretical." He points out that the Germans still
held immense areas of European Russia, and that nearly a
i
!
year was to pass before British or American soldiers would
7
set foot on Western Europe.
Churchill notes also that at the time the cabinet
committee made its recommendation relative to the zones of ,
occupation the view was held in many quarters that when the
Russian armies had regained their frontiers they would not
press on, and that Russia would very likely discontinue the :
war. The feeling existed that once Russia had possession
of all her territory again, she would have to be prodded to j
^Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin (Princeton, N.J.:
Pr in c e t onTJnlver*sity-Pres¥ri95T)T_P^~3S’ l •
^Churchill, op. cit., pp. 507-508.
TIbid., p. 508.
2 6
carry on the fight. No one was concerned about the ques
tion of what portion of Germany she might occupy in the
8
postwar period. The great concern of the moment was how
the war could be won.
,r
Sir Frederick Morgan, who was the Chief of Staff.
to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC), an Anglo-American
planning group, describes how his agency considered the
q
matter of drawing Germany into zones of occupation. It is
very probable that the approach of Attlee's Committee to
setting the zonal boundaries was very similar to that of
COSSAC. General Morgan and his group were brought face to
face with the problem of zones of occupation as the result
of one of the'assignments which they were given in 19^3- j
COSSAC was ordered to prepare a plan for "a return to the ;
Continent in the event of German disintegration at any time |
from now onwards with whatever forces may be available at ,
\ I
10 '
the time." In the parlance of COSSAC, this was Operation'
Rankin, which was subdivided into cases A, B, and C. Ran
kin C assumed the possibility of a complete collapse of
Nazi power similar to the swift surrender of the Germans ;
during November, 1918. Such circumstances would require j
a plan for occupying Germany.
8Ibid.
^Frederick Morgan, Overture to Overlord (Garden City,
N. Y.s Doubleday, 1950), p. 104.
10Ibid.
. ■ • 27
General Morgan states that his group approached the
problem from first principles. It was obviou^ that the Rus-i.
slan armies would enter Germany from the east, and the Brlt^
ish and Americans from the west.- It was also apparent that
the Americans would move Into Europe and Germany on the
right of the English. 'The American and English troops would
both turn left In their swing through Prance and the low
countries Into Germany. This would put the Americans In
Southwestern Germany and the English 'in Northwestern Ger
many. It was further assumed that Germany would, be divided
into roughly equal thirds. Adopting these elementary prin-,
ciples, the actual setting of the boundaries of the zones
became relatively simple. The assumptions largely pro- '
vided the final result. j
!
General Morgan also discusses how it occurred that
the American army entered Europe on the right of the Eng- ;
i
lish. This was a factor that had very far-reaching conse
quences. It was one of the reasons why the United States
i
received the Southwestern zone of occupation. It was a i
natural, normal occurrence that the United States should
be assigned the area of Germany It would very probably cap-j
I
ture and occupy in the first instance. The big strategic
decision that the Americans should be on the right of the
British Army was very likely originally made by an official
in the quartering directorate of the British War Office,
28
evidently with the North African campaign in mind.1" ' ' The
.decision was in reality made when it was determined that
the first American troops to arrive in the British Isles
should be quartered in Ireland. No one at the time realized
or foresaw the eventual implications of this decision. As
greater numbers of American forces arrived, it was a natural
tendency for them to spread into the West of England, be
cause this was closer to both Ireland where American troops
were already stationed and to the United States than the
eastern part of England. In addition, the British were
busily preoccupied in fighting the war in the eastern part
of their country. The American command would want to keep
itself and its resources concentrated as much as possible.
Thus, it developed that the Americans should assail Europe -
on the right of the British.
General Morgan says that the zones contemplated by
12
COSSAC were very nearly the zones eventually agreed upon.
COSSAC also considered the question of occupying
Berlin. It was suggested that Berlin, or any other capi
tals, be occupied In equal tripartite force by a division
each of American, British, and Russian troops. The possi- :
bility was also carefully considered of placing a division
each of British and United States troops in the Russian
n ibid., pp. 113-114 .
12Ibld., pp. 113, 115.
29
zone, a division each of British and Russian soldiers in
the American zone, and a division each of United States and
Russian troops in the British zone. This prospect was
eliminated as impracticable.
The tentative plan of COSSAC for'Operation Rankin
C, including the matter of occupation zones, was presented
.to the Chiefs of Staff at the First Quebec Conference in
September, 19^3* The plan in its essential outlines was
approved at Quebec.
Operation Rankin C is significant in that it sheds
light on the theories used in carving Germany into zones.
It is very probable that the work of Attlee's Committee
paralleled very closely the ideas adopted by COSSAC in de- 1
vising zones of occupation for Germany. General Morgan
shows how uncomplicated the fixing of zonal boundaries be
came if a few, inevitable facts were accepted and applied.
The conclusion of Attlee’s Committee that all of
Germany should be occupied was due to the belief that Ger
many had evaded the provisions of Versailles relating to
disarmament during the years after 1918. It was proposed:
that this time the Allies be in a position to enforce di- !
rectly the demilitarization of Germany and forestall furthep
.aggressive propensities of the Germans.
1-^Balfour and Muir, op. cit., p. 30.
30
Apparently* the British Cabinet Committee had dis-
14
cussed a joint inter-allied occupation of all Germany.
Late in 19^3* the British Foreign Office tentatively sug
gested this idea in order to obtain an American reaction.
The plan was that troops of the major Allies would be dis
persed throughout Germany, and, thus, the creation of sepa
rate zones would be avoided. Military opinion was unani-
15
mously opposed to the idea. It was feared that conflicts
and misunderstandings would inevitably arise between troops
of different language and background thrown into close as
sociation with each other. Difficult problems of supply
and administration would exist due to the wide dispersal of
military forces of each of the separate Allied nations in
Germany. It was also supposed that the Soviet government
very probably would not desire free and easy contact be
tween its soldiers and those of the Western nations. At
any rate, because of the universally negative reaction of
the military to the plan, it was dropped completely.
The creation of national zones in Germany was in
evitable. The zonal system of occupation was never con
tested. A combined military government could not be
created on a tripartite basis. The language barrier and
^Philip E. Mosely, op. clt., p. 168; Balfour and
Muir, op. cit., p.3°«
■^Mosely, op. clt., p. 168; Balfour and Muir, op.
cit., p. 30.
31
the contrasts In legal and administrative practices were
insuperable. A fully unified Allied administration on a
i
three nation basis would also have required the establish
ment of a Combined Chiefs of Staff organization which was
without a doubt unattainable.1^
Sone thought was given to the scheme of a joint
Anglo-American occupation of part of Germany. Undoubtedly,
this would have been much more feasible than a joint .
occupation In which Russia was Included. The technical,
operational advantages of a two zone system made General
17
Eisenhower at times favor such a plan. However, an Anglot
American zone of occupation was rejected as a consequence
of the apprehension that this might appear to Russia as the !
1 Q
origin of a bloc against her. In addition, the view was
prevalent among American leaders that the United States
should not permit Itself to get too involved with Britain,
and that it was desirable to endeavor to occupy a mediating
19
role between the British and the Soviets.
Hajo Holborn, American Military Government; Its •
Organization and Policies (Washington: Infantry Journal
Press, 19^7), PP. 23-24.
^Harry N. Butcher, My Three Years with Elsenhower
(New York: Simon and Shuster, 19^6), p. 699- -
1 Q
Balfour and Muir, op. clt., p. 30»
19Ibid., pp. 17, 30j Penrose, Economic Planning for
the Peace, pp. 235-237.
32
After all possibilities for a joint Allied occupa
tion of Germany had been ruled out, what was left late in
19^3 and early in 1944 was the suggestion of Attlee's Com
mittee with respect to the zones.
The first actual steps by the three major Allied
Powers toward planning for the occupation of Germany were
taken at the.Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in
October, 1943* This conference was attended by Secretary
of State Cordell Hull, British Foreign Minister Anthony
Eden and the Russian Foreign Secretary V. Molotov. On
October 23, Cordell Hull presented a memorandum to the
conference on the subject of Germany. It had been evolved
1
by the United States Department of State after frequent
consultations with other departments of the American Govern-j
!
ment and after discussions with President Roosevelt. It
represented the first comprehensive views of the American .
j
Government on the subject of the postwar treatment of
20
Germany.
Hull's memorandum was the result of a long discus
sion which Hull had with President Roosevelt about March
20, 1943 concerning the postwar treatment of Germany. Ac- j
cording to Hull, both he and Roosevelt felt that it was not;
Hull, Memoirs, II, 1284; Mosely, op. cit., p. 157;
Feis, op. cit., p. 220; United States Department of State,
Foreign Relations of the United StateB. The Conferences
at Cairo and Teheran, 1943 (Washington: Government Printing
Office"] 195TJ7~pp"i 182-iBo . •
33
pi
too early to .begin a serious study of the question. As
far as is known, the development of American policy with
respect to postwar Germany commenced with the conference of
Roosevelt and Hull in March, 19^3*
On March 23,. 1943 Roosevelt sent a note to Hull re
ferring to their discusBion of a few days before, and
Roosevelt said that he wished Hull would explore the ques
tion with the British as to what the plan should be for
Germany after its collapse. Roosevelt also said in his
note that if there was substantial agreement with the Brit
ish, then the matter should be taken, up with the Russians.
As a consequence of Hull's conversation with Roosevelt
about March 20, 19^3 and Roosevelt's note to Hull a few |
days later, Hull prepared the memorandum which he took with
22
him to the Moscow Conference in October, 19^3* |
Hull's memorandum included the principle of the
total occupation of Germany by American, British, and Rus
sian military forces. This memorandum also called for an
Inter-Allied Control Commission to carry out the terms of
surrender of Germany during the armistice period. Although
the work of Attlee's committee in drawing zones for Germany!
I
had apparently not yet been submitted to Hull, in principle
Hull's memorandum and the proposals of Attlee's committee
21Hull, op. cit., pp. 1284-1285.
22
Ibid.
3 4
were In agreement. Both assumed the occupation of all Ger
many, and that the occupation would be shared by the three
major Allies. Hull's memorandum, however, Included no
specific suggestions as to how this occupation would be
implemented. It evidently also did not contain any mention
of Berlin as such.
Hull's proposal, in addition to advocating occupa
tion of all Germany, set forth other recommendations relat
ing to unconditional surrender, signing of a surrender
document, denazification, demilitarization, and reparations.
Hull states that he gave a copy of the memorandum
to Molotov with the comment,
"This is not a formal United States proposal but some- :
thing to show a slant of mind. It is just a personal
suggestion you and I can talk about, Then, if you j
like it, we can talk to Eden about it and see what he j
thinks. I can make the proposal mine, or you can make :
it yours."23
Molotov indicated that he would like to take the j
document and have an opportunity to study it. Hull remarks
that the next day Molotov Indicated he was completely sat
isfied with it. Molotov told Hull that he had shown the
memorandum to Stalin, and that Stalin was "enthusiastic"
i
about it. Molotov said of Hull's memorandum, "It expresses!
Russia's thoughts about Germany exactly as if we had ex
pressed them. We have had those thoughts but have not been
able to express them. Stalin would like to make this a
23Ibid., p. 1285.*.
35
24
Russian suggestion."
Thus, the Soviets demonstrated their full agreement
with the principle of occupation of all Germany by contin
gents of American, British, and Russian forces, as well as
their complete accord with the other ideas incorporated into
Hull's memorandum.
It was very apparent at the Moscow Conference that
working out the details of Allied policy for Germany would
require considerable discussion and negotiation on the part
PR
of the three nations. The Foreign Ministers, conse
quently, agreed that a special commission should-be estab-
I
lished to plan for immediate problems which would arise at
!
the end of the war. The organization which the Foreign
Ministers decided to set up was to be called the European ;
Advisory Commission (EAC) and was to meet in London. Ques-j
tions were to be referred to this group upon unanimous
consent of the three powers. Hull's memorandum was to be
forwarded to the commission as a basis for discussion. The
European Advisory Commission was assigned two immediate
tasks, namely, (l) to draft the terms of surrender which
would be imposed upon Germany and (2) to propose machinery j
necessary to assure the fulfillment of these terms.
24
Ibid.
25Ibid., pp. 1287-1288; Feis, op. cit., p. 221.
36
Philip E. Mosely has written that there was a great
difference of opinion between the British and American view
with respect to the role to be played by the European Ad
visory Commission. The British Foreign Office wanted the
Commission to receive a broad mandate to resolve all the
main Issues concerning the enemy countries as soon as pos
sible. The American attitude favored limiting the function
of the Commission primarily to making arrangements pertain-
26
Ing to the surrender of Germany.
Slightly more than a month after the Moscow Confer
ence of Foreign Ministers, the problem of the postwar treat-*
ment of Germany was discussed rather generally by the Big
Three themselves at Teheran during the latter part of No- ■
vember, 1943. Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin agreed in j
principle that there should be three zones of occupation
27 :
and an inter-allied zone In Berlin. , The precise plans
1
in regard to the zones were left to the European Advisory
Commission to work out.
By the time of the Teheran Conference, President
Roosevelt had been presented with the plan of the British
Cabinet Committee for the division of Germany into zones.
of
Mosely, op. clt., pp. 158-159. ,
27
‘Snell, Dilemma Over Germany, p. 46; Mclnnls, His--,
cocks, and Spencer, The Shaping of Postwar Germany, p. 94;
Hajo Holborn, American Military Government: Its Organiza
tion and Policies (Washington: Infantry Journal 'Press',
1947), PP• 22-23; Heller, The Berlin Crisis, p. 35.
37
On the plane en route to the conferences at Cairo and Tehe
ran, Roosevelt sketched out an alternative plan for split
ting Germany Into zones. Roosevelt's carving up of Ger
many was done on the back of an old envelope. It differed
from the British proposal In two Important respects. First,
It reversed the British and American locations, giving the
United States the northern zone rather than the southern
zone. In addition, it fixed the boundary between the West
ern and the Soviet.zones much farther to the east. Roose
velt's version apparently had a number of curious zigzags
and left the boundary between the British zone in the southt
pO
west and the Russian zone unfinished, Roosevelt's divi
sion of Germany was obviously only very tentative, and,
quite possibly, very little more than an effort to crystal-j
lize his own thinking. However, it did show his strong |
desire to obtain the northwestern zone for the United
States, a position upon which he long insisted until the
matter was finally resolved at the Second Quebec Conference
' t !
in September, 19^4, at which time Roosevelt finally ac
quiesced in accepting the southwestern zone, but with a
great deal of reluctance.
At Teheran the Big Three did no more than agree
"in principle" to occupying all Germany on the basis of
dividing it into three zones. From all that is known at
pQ
Feis, op. clt., p. 360; Heller, op. clt., p. 35.
38
the present time, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin did not
discuss .any specific zones of occupation, but simply left
this issue for the European Advisory Commission.
Apart from the matter of the occupation of Germany,
there was an extensive, discussion of the possible dismember
ment of Germany. This subject- was much more long range In
Its Implications than that of occupation. Stalin evidently
stated quite firmly and categorically that he favored di-
29
vl.ding Germany Into several states. Roosevelt then sug
gested a plan which had been running through his mind for
some time. His plan was to create five autonomous states
In Germany, namely, (l) Prussia, (2) Hanover and the North-;
west, (3) Saxony and the Leipzig area, (4) Hesse-Darmstadt, !
Hesse-Kassel and the area south of the Rhine, and (5) j
%
Bavaria, Baden, and Wurtemberg. *In addition, Roosevelt's i
scheme envisaged placing the Kiel Canal and Hamburg, as
well as the Ruhr and the Saar under United Nations con
trol.30
Churchill is described as reacting to Roosevelt's
o i
proposal by saying, "The President has said a mouthful."
29Ibld., p. 274.
3°Sherwood, op. cit., p. 797; William D. Leahy, I Was1
There (New Yorkt McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950);
Winston Churchill, Closing the Ring (Boston: Houghton Mif
flin Company, 1951)j P* 401.
^Sherwood, op. cit., p. 798; Churchill, op. clt.,
p. 401.
39
Churchill, however, in turn, made a counter-suggestion
which provided for tearing Prussia from the rest of Germany.
Churchill would have had a Danubian confederation of South
ern German states.
Stalin indicated that he was not satisfied with
either proposal.- He found more he agreed with in Roose
velt’s plan than in Churchill's. Stalin said that dis
memberment should mean just that. He wanted the Prussian
military caste eliminated. Beyond that he saw little
difference in types of Germans, whether they lived in
32
Northern or Southern Germany.
Stalin amply demonstrated at Teheran that he wanted
a harsh peace for the Germans. J He was full of anger to- i
. ward Germany for the miseries it had brought upon his |
countrymen and determined to keep Germany servile and su
pine. Roosevelt's attitude at Teheran was much akin to
that of Stalin. He, too, gave went to his bitterness to-
34
ward the Germans. Roosevelt said there was no difference
between Germans. It might be conceded that the Bavarians
had no officer class, but otherwise they were exactly like
i
-------------: ----------------------------------------------------j
32Ibid. !
•^Ernst Deuerlein, Die Elnheit Deutschlands (Frank
furt Am Main: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1957)* PP. 42-43;
United States Department of State, op. clt., p. 882, Brit
ish Foreign Minister Anthony Eden said that Stalin was de
termined to smash Germany so that it would never again be
able to make war.
^Churchill, op. cit., p. 402; Feis, op. cit., pp.
272-275, - ........... -
the Prussians, as the American soldiers had already dis
covered. Churchill, on the other hand, saw the obvious
ramifications of a collection of weak states in Central
■25
Europe. ^ He was frankly worried, although his feelings
were camouflaged. He was not inclined to trust a Soviet
Russia in a position of supremacy on the continent of
Europe.
The discussion at Teheran relating to dismembering
Germany ended nowhere. It was an exchange of views and a
process useful to the Big Three in learning the trend of
thought of each other. It was nothing more than that.^
The next stage in 'the matter of planning zones of
occupation for Germany was the consideration of the prob
lem by the EAC. It was established in London pursuant to
35Ibid. .
^Sir Llewellyn Woodward, an author of official his
tories of World War II, who had had access to official
documents of the British Government, makes the following
very interesting appraisal of the conclusions which were
probably made by the Soviets as a result of the Teheran
Conference:
"The Russians were able to draw from the conference
two political conclusions, firstly, that, in the case
of Anglo-American differences of view, the Prime Minis-I
ter had ultimately to give way to the President, and, i
secondly, that the President was closer to his military!
than to his diplomatic advisers, and that the former j
did not take much account of, or always understand the j
political consequences of their own decisions. Fur
thermore, the Russians could notice that the Americans
were inclined to regard Stalin as a useful counter
weight to the Prime Minister."
(British Foreign Policy in the Second World War,
P. 249.)-------; ------ ;
41
the agreement of the Foreign Ministers reached at Moscow in
October, 1943* The EAC consisted at first of representa
tives of Britain, the United States, and Russia. Even
tually, in December, 1944, it was enlarged to include rep
resentatives of the Provisional French Government. Initi
ally, the EAC was composed of Sir William Strang for Brit
ain, Ambassador John Winant for the United States, and Am
bassador Feodor Gusev for Russia. When France obtained
membership on the Commission, she was represented by Rene
Massigli.
The work assigned to EAC consisted of drafting
three specific documents, namely, (l) an unconditional
surrender instrument, (2) a control machinery agreement,
and (3) a protocol on occupation of zones.
At the first formal meeting of the EAC on January
14, 1944, the British member of the group submitted the
proposal for zones of occupation which had been formulated
by Attlee's Committee and approved by the British War
Cabinet.This proposal drew the zones in substantially
the form in which they were finally adopted.
The question may be asked Why the United States did
not have a plan pertaining to dividing Germany into zones.
The fact is that at least three proposals were advanced
within branches of the American Government, but it was not
^FeiB, op. cit., pp. 360-361.
42
possible to obtain common agreement on the part of the
Americans themselves. In December, 1943* a member of the
State Department, Philip E. Mosely, devised a plan which
provided for linking anticipated Western areas of occupa
tion with Berlin by adding the intervening districts of
Saxony-Anhalt and Brandenburg to the Western zones.
Mosely1s idea violated the principle of retaining the
boundaries of existing Lander and provinces. However, it
applied the view of breaking up Prussia. Mosely expected
that the presentation of his plan would meet Russian ob
jections, but he thought there would be some possibility of
finally getting Russian acquiesence. Mosely's proposal was
never brought before the EAC. This was because it ran into
the strong opposition of the Civil Affairs Division of the
War Department. Civil Affairs, according to Mosely, took
the attitude that zones of occupation were solely a mili
tary matter, and that framing of zones by the State Depart
ment was an intrusion upon the domain of the Civil Affairs
Division.
Late in February, 19^-4, the Civil Affairs Division
came up with a proposed division of Germany. It arranged
zones radiating north, west, and south from Berlin. It
was Inferred by the Civil Affairs Division that its version
39
represented President Roosevelt's instructions. The ad
3®Mosely, op. cit., p. 166. -^Ibid.t p. 171.
^3
vantage of this proposal was that it placed Berlin at the
meeting place of the three zones. Its great defect was
that the suggested Soviet zone included only about twenty-
two per cent of the area, population, and productive re
sources of Germany. Mosely felt that it was certain to be
rejected by both Russia and Britain if sent on to the EAC.
The Civil Affairs Division insisted that its proposal’be
submitted to the EAC, and that the American representative,
John G. Winant, press for its acceptance. The Civil Af
fairs Division was asked to prepare a memorandum to guide
the American negotiators in presenting the plan. However,
it declined to furnish such a memorandum. It was finally
agreed to forward the proposal of the Civil Affairs Divi
sion to the American representatives on the EAC in London.
Upon receiving the proposal, the American representatives
Immediately said that fuller instructions were an absolute
necessity both In putting forth the plan and also with re
spect to the attitude which should be adopted If the Brit
ish and Russian delegations rejected It. But the Civil
Affairs Division refused to further elucidate the matter,
and a stalemate existed insofar as the question of what to
40
do with the suggestion was concerned.
The matter of the Civil Affairs Division plan for
carving up Germany into zones showed that the State De
Ibid., p. 172.
partment and War Department were having difficulties in
working together constructively with respect to postwar
planning for Germany. The failure of these two departments
to cooperate was due to basically different philosophies
and views pertaining to the nature of the problem at hand.
Mosely, as a representative of the State Department, fixes
the blame for a lack of cooperation upon the Civil Affairs
lil
Division. Walter L. Dorn, Professor of History at Colum
bia University, tries to explain that the disharmony be
tween the two branches of the United States Government was
due to more than just a recalcitrant attitude on the part
42
of the Civil Affairs Division.
To coordinate the views of the different depart
ments of the American Government, an interdepartmental
committee, named the Working Security Committee (WSC),
was established in December, 1943. It consisted of of
ficers of the State, War, and Navy Departments. One of its
purposes was to send instructions to Winant in London for
his guidance as a member of the EAC. The State Department :
was represented on the WSC by officers of the Division of i
European Affairs and the Division of Political Studies.
;Members of the Civil Affairs Division represented the War
^Ibid., pp. 161-168, 171-172.
4 9
"The Debate Over American Occupation Policy in Ger-j
many, 1944-4-5," Political Science Quarterly, LXXII (l957)j
483-501.
45
Department. Philip E. Mosely who has written in consider
able detail on the functioning of the WSC, or lack thereof,
was one of the members of this committee for the State De
partment .
Mosely states that initially the Civil Affairs Di
vision refused to even take part in WSC deliberations
arguing that the surrender and occupation of Germany were
solely and strictly military matters. It was contended
that WSC was not required, and that when the time came the
issues of occupation would be routinely resolved on the
military level. J Mosely says that,
"It should be pointed out that the Civil Affairs .
Division was staffed largely with civilians who had
recently gone into uniform. Some of them who had
been lawyers in civilian life seemed to regard the
jurisdiction and prestige of the military service as
they might the interests of a client, to be defended
by every device of argument, delay, obstruction, and
veto• against an 'adversary,' in this case the State
Department."44
Upon orders from above, the Civil Affairs Division
finally agreed to participate in the work of WSC. But very
little was accomplished. The Civil Affairs delegates had
been instructed to go along with very little, if anything.
All they did was to report the discussions back to their
superiors. The result of this state of affairs was.that
Winant in London was left without instructions and was un-
^3Ibid.
46
able to function in any responsible manner. It meant that
the United States had no well thought out zonal version of
Its own.
Mosely portrays the Civil Affairs Division and the
War Department officials as the villains who did so much
to hamper the effective functioning of the EAC. Professor
Walter L. Dorn, Professor of History at Columbia University
and an adviser to the Military Governor of the United States
zone in Germany from 194-5 to 1947 and also in 1949* explains
some of the reasons why the State Department and War Depart-
45 •
ment were at odds.
There was a wide difference of opinion pertaining
to both the possibility and advisability of negotiating
comprehensive agreements with Great Britain and the Soviet
Union relative to the postwar treatment of Germany. The
War Department was skeptical as to whether it was possible
to work out agreements with Russia in any great detail with
respect to Germany. On the other hand, the State Depart
ment, and especially Winant and Mosely, held to the view
that the only chance of continued cooperation between the
Western Allies and Russia after the war was to negotiate
detailed agreements during the war, while the Allies were
strongly motivated to compose their differences and work
together. There was, thus, at the outset a fundamental
45
Dorn, pp. cit., pp. 486-489.
47
difference on the issue of striving for comprehensive agree
ments with Russia concerning-postwar problems. The War
Department was apprehensive that discussing such matters
46
could precipitate clashes and damage the war effort.
On this issue the War Department had the support
of President Roosevelt. As we have noted, he had many
doubts about the wisdom of binding agreements arrived at
too early. He was distrustful, perhaps even disturbed,
about the EAC. He never gave it his unqualified blessing.
However, Professor Dorn says that the core issue
between the State and War Departments is found in radically
different conceptions as to the nature and duration of the
contemplated military government for Germany. The War
Department conceived of military government as existing for
only a short period with only limited tasks. It expected
that within a few months military government would be re
placed by a civilian High Commission. The War Department
wanted a maximum of freedom for the zone commander and only
general and short-range directives to him. In contrast to
this attitude, the State Department wanted to formulate
both a short range and long range program for Germany and
desired to issue detailed and specific directives to the
zone commander. As viewed by the War Department, the State:
Department was seeking to saddle the army of occupation
46Ibid., p. 487.
48
with a host of political assignments which it was not
equipped to handle. In addition, the State Department was
impinging upon a principle cherished by the military,
namely, that of freedom of action by the zone commander.
In the eyes of the officials of the War Department, the
EAC and its American representatives were in disfavor for
47
these reasons.
In the language of Professor Dorn, the real argu
ment between the State and War Departments was on the ques
tion of the "limited liability" theory. The War Department
was insisting upon military government confined to certain
minimum, essential tasks directly related to the war and
its aftermath. It wanted to avoid long-term political ob
jectives .
According to Dorn, the British took the same point
of view as was represented by Winant and Mosely. They also
contended that it was of great importance that the three
Allies provide their military commanders with specific and
detailed directives in regard to the occupation of Germany,
They believed that only wide-ranging agreement negotiated
during the war on matters of substantive policy could pre
vent disharmony among the Allies in administering the sep
arate zones. Dorn states that the British Foreign Office
submitted to the EAC an entire handbook of detailed policy
^7Ibld.
49
directives touching upon every phase of the occupation of
Germany. He also says that the British Foreign Office was
supported by both Churchill and Eden in seeking comprehen
sive wartime agreement among the three Allies as to the oc-
48
cupation of Germany.
A third suggestion was made by General Eisenhower.
In a communication to General Marshall on February 15,
1944, Elsenhower proposed that the United States refuse to
4q
accept any specific area in Europe. He wanted the United
States to be able to participate in the whole controlling
system, and he believed that this could be achieved by
having orders and policies issued through the Combined
Chiefs of Staff. Elsenhower pointed out that the United
States would find itself required to furnish the largest
share o.f the relief for the occupied areas. Therefore, in
his opinion, the United States should have an effective
voice with respect to the entire area controlled by the
Western Powers.
In the latter part of March, 1944 Eisenhower reit
erated his point of view. He said that it was practical
and possible to have British troops In one area and Ameri
can troops in another section with a combined administra-
2|8Ibid., p. 456.
^Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washington:
U. S. Government Printing Office, 195^0 > P* 349.
50
so
tive body functioning for both. However, Eisenhower’s
view did not find favor in Washington. Both President
Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the
United States- should occupy the northern zone of Germany.
Many fe.lt that it would be unwise to give the Russians the ■
impression that the United States and Britain were working
SI
out joint plans for Germany’s occupation.
Eisenhower stated his position again in a memorandum
to General Marshall written May 27, 19kb.^ He indicated
that, in his opinion, President Roosevelt and the War De
partment were not distinguishing between a complete divi
sion of zones and a complete amalgamation of American and
British forces of occupation. Eisenhower said that un
doubtedly the American and British soldiers would be in
separate units and occupy different areas because of opera
tional convenience and to simplify supply and adminiatra-: -
tion. The important issue, Eisenhower contended, was
whether overall combined Anglo-American control would con
tinue, or whether a sharp line would be drawn between the
two. Eisenhower argued that it would be easier for the
Combined Chiefs of Staff to function if there were a single
Allied commander rather than separate American and British
commanders. He also suggested that if the United States
and Britain had completely separate zones, issues would
50Ibid. 51Ibid. 52Ibid., p. 350.
51
I -
lend to be resolved on a basis of United States versus
Britain. This situation would give Russia an opportunity,
to play the two off against each other, siding with one or
the other as served Russia's purposes. However, Eisen-
jhower's memorandum of May 27 . > 19^ .did not. convince anyone
in Washington and did not lay the foundation for any basic
policy pertaining to the occupation of Germany.
Returning to the deliberations of the EAC, it
'should be noted that the British-proposed zones were ac
cepted by the EAC quite smoothly and readily. The U.S.S.R.
^indicated its general acceptance of the zonal arrangement
on February 18, 19^j including the joint occupation of
Berlin. There was persistent argument by Russia for the
small Baltic island of Fehmarn as part of the Soviet
zone.-^3 The British representative on the EAC maintained
that Fehrman was really a part of Schleswig-Holstein and
; finally had his way. ■
The question of the Western boundary of the Russian
zone apparently evoked a minimum of discussion and no sig- i
i nificant controversy. The British member of the EAC, Lord :
I Strang, remarked that early agreement on the western bound-;
| cjk
iary of Russia's zone was obtained. Evidently, there was ,
^^Snell, op. clt., p. 55.
-^William Strang, Home and Abroad (London: Deutsch,
1956), p. 213.
, ' " ' 52
jno effort by either Winant or Strang to have the boundary
of the U.S.S.R. zone run through Berlin, and, thus, make
55
the Western zones contiguous with Berlin. ^ The desirabil
ity of having the Western zones adjoin Berlin does not ap
pear to have been recognized by either the Americans or
British working at the EAC level.
Lord -Strang discusses in some detail the circum
stances and point of view that caused the Soviet zone to
|be brought so far to the West. He points out that the west^
ern boundary of the Soviet zone was set where it was in the
I original plan a*considerable time in advance of D-day.
iWhen the discussion of the matter of the zones was concluded
at the EAC level in mid-September, 1944, Western troops were
still a long way from being established in the Rhine. No
one could have the vision to see how far the Western Allies
would eventually penetrate into Germany and Central.Europe.
! Strang mentions the same point.made by Churchill that in
;1944 the fear still persisted in Western quarters that when '
jSoviet troops had forced the Germans out of Russia and
jreached the borders of Germany they would not fight any
i . ;
ifurther and leave Britain and America to finish off the war |
Jwith Germany. This was a disturbing thought among Western |
i i
I
i
55Ibid.
53
leaders. Even as late as October, 1944, Churchill spoke
with great relief that during his conference with Stalin in
Moscow he had been assured that the Russians would continue
to press the war against the Germans as vigorously as pos
sible, and that the Western Allies did not need to fear that
large number of German soldiers would be transferred from
the eastern front to the West because Russia was easing up
in its efforts. At this time the attitude that prevailed
was that the Russians should be encouraged to seize as much
of Germany as they could, and, thus, help to minimize losses
and casualties on the part of Western military units. The
psychology that existed was still very much that of how
Germany could be defeated without staggering and shocking
57 f
losses to.the West.
Lord Strang says that once total occupation of Ger
many and zonal occupation had been decided upon, wfyich de
cisions Strang even later believed to be entirely correct,
then there had to be broad equality between Britain, the
United States, and Russia trying to take into account area,
population, and resources. In addition, administrative
convenience required the maintenance of existing boundaries
between Lender, at least insofar as possible. According
importance to these factors, Strang notes that the zonal
•^Churchill, op. cit., p. 204.
-^Strang, op. cit., pp. 213-214.
54
boundaries adopted seem as fair and reasonable as any. He
states that if an argument had been made to move the bound
aries of the Soviet zone much farther east than those ac
cepted, undoubtedly, the possibility of obtaining Russian
agreement on the zones would have been eliminated.
Strang further speculates as to what the situation
would have been if no zonal agreement had been negotiated
by the EAO. In this event, in Strang's opinion it would
have been possible, and the very probable result, that in
1945 the Soviets would have had little choice but to accept
a western boundary to its zone further east, very likely on
the Elbe River. However, Russia being in occupation of
Berlin would have continued to hold it, and joint adminis
tration of Berlin would not have become a reality. Strang
mentions that it is not easy to assess the consequences of
occupation of Berlin solely by the Russians, but he does
■think that it would have had a very adverse moral effect
on the Germans. Strang believes that the joint administra
tion of Berlin, in spite of the problems it precipitated,
was an asset to the West--an oasis of freedom in the Soviet
58
zone. ^
Another possibility suggested by Strang, if the
zonal protocol worked out by the EAC had not been accepted, 1
was that of arranging the zones so that they would meet at
58Ibid., pp. 214-215.
some large city such as Leipzig. This would have achieved
convenience as far as transportation is concerned. Joint
control of Germany then would have been established at a
site in physical contiguity with all the zones. But this
would have been an essentially undesirable solution for
the Western Allies because again Berlin would have been
subjected to the sole occupation of the Soviets.
Strang also mentions the fact that when the EAC was
considering the occupation zones the attitude of the mili
tary authorities was that a larger zone of occupation should
not be accepted than was absolutely necessary. There was
concern about shortages of manpower after the war and also
the need of military forces for the Pacific War.
When the British draft of the zones was sent back
to Washington it was turned down by Roosevelt and his mili
tary advisers. One objection to the proposal appeared to
be that it gave the U.S.S.R. too much.^9 But another major
point of dissatisfaction was that it gave the United States
the Southwestern zone, whereas Roosevelt was very adamant
and determined about acquiring the Northwestern zone.
The issue of the Western boundary of the Soviet
zone was resolved in Washington insofar as American mis
givings were concerned without any great difficulty. .
"ibid., p. 215.
^°Snell, op. cit., p. 56.
56
George Kerman* Winant's political adviser, consulted with
President Roosevelt on April 3* 19^. Kennan explained
that the Civil Affairs zonal plan placed the Soviet bound
ary much farther east than the Russians desired to have it.
Roosevelt said that he did not object to the Western border
of the U.S.S.R., zone on which the other members of the EAC
had agreed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the bound
ary of the Soviet zone on April 28. Hull also gave it his
approval. On May 1, Winant was so instructed. He conveyed
the consent of the American Government relative to the
boundaries of the Soviet zone to the EAC on June 1,^
It is interesting to note what was apparently the
view of the Soviet Government in the spring of rela
tive to the postwar status of Berlin. On February 18, 19^ *
Gusev, the Soviet member of the EAC, submitted a document
entitled "Conditions of Surrender of Germany" for considera
tion by the EAC. Article 15, Paragraph (d) of the document
proposed that the following provision be included in the
surrender instrument being drafted for Germany:
"There shall be established around Berlin a 10/15
kilometer zone which shall be occupied jointly by the
armed forces of the U.S.S.R., the U.K., and the
U.S.A."62
Hie inclusion of such language in the surrender
instrument was discussed by the EAC. At a meeting on Feb-
6lFeis, oh. cit.-* PP* 362-363.
62HeHer, oh. cit,., P, 56,
57
ruary 18, 1944, the British representative stated that he
doubted whether it was appropriate or desirable to embody
such a provision in the terms of surrender, since it ap
peared to him that the boundaries of the zones and of the
Berlin area were matters inter vivos the Three Allied
Powers and not something for Germany to agree with or ac
cept.
On March 17, 1944, at the fifth meeting Of the EAC,
Gusev stated that he would not insist upon the inclusion
of the matter pertaining to the delimitation of the Berlin
area in the surrender instrument. He agreed that it could
be set forth in a separate document which would concern
only the Three Allied Powers. This separate document was
worked out in a series of subsequent discussions and even
tually became the Protocol on zones signed by the members
of the EAC on September 12, 1944.
Gusev's suggestion indicates that at least in Feb
ruary, 1944, Russia was in complete accord with the idea of
a joint occupation of Berlin. It advanced this principle
as its own proposal.
The greatest difference of opinion between the
three great Allied Powers about the occupation zones was
between the United States and Britain over which power
would occupy the northwestern zone and which the south
western zone. In retrospect, this difference was magnified
very much beyond its real importance. It shows how com
58
pletely the statesmen of America and Britain failed to fore
see the impending developments during the years immediately
after the war.
The Attlee Committee which formulated the zonal pro
posal intended that Britain would occupy the northwestern
zone. Just what the considerations were which induced the
committee to recommend the northwestern zone for Britain
are unknown. However,, in practically every respect the
suggestion was a logical and natural one. It would be the
British troops which would fight across this area and wrest
it from the enemy. It has been suggested that a very ob
vious and prime reason Britain wanted to occupy northwestern
Germany was because it contained the area which was Brit-
ain's greatest economic competitor., the Ruhr. ^ Churchill
advanced other reasons to President Roosevelt in a deter
mined effort to convince him that the British should get
the Northwest. He explained that Britain already had very
close liaison with the Dutch and Norwegian forces, that the
naval disarmament of Germany would be facilitated and in
sured, that the Americans would be working more closely
with the French.^' Churchill argued also that the plans
for the invasion of Normandy had all been agreed upon, with
American troops on the right flank with bases In the Brit-
63Ibid.
6J+Feis, op. cit., pp. 361-362; Hull, op. cit.,
p. 164. — ....
59
tany ports and British forces on the left flank with princi
pal bases in Le Havre area. A reversal of these areas
would entail re-planning the invasion and involve a crossing
of lines of communication.
As soon as Operation Rankin C prepared by COSSAC
came to the attention of President Roosevelt he stated that
he did not agree with the aspect of it that provided for
American occupation of the southwestern part of Germany.
This is evidenced by minutes of the President’s meeting
with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on November 19, 19^-3 on his
65
way to the Teheran Conference. v Roosevelt said that polit
ical motives were behind Operation Rankin C as devised by
COSSAC.
Churchill and Roosevelt discussed the allocation
of zones in Germany at a dinner meeting of the two at
f i f i
Cairo on December 3, 1963. Harry Hopkins, Admiral Leahy,
and Anthony Eden were also present.. Churchill tried to per
suade Roosevelt to allow Britain the northwestern zone.
But Ro’ osevelt was not moved by Churchill's arguments.
Roosevelt insisted that the matter of transferring
British troops to the south and Americans to the north
would not be especially difficult. Roosevelt was also in
sistent on the point of not having American transportation
^United States Department of State, op. cit., pp.
253-256.
66Ibid., p. 674.
i 60;
|facilities cross Prance. Roosevelt was very much dis
pleased with De Gaulle and feared finding America in a
position in which it was dependent upon French cooperation
after the war. Roosevelt felt that the future of Prance
I was uncertain, and that a revolution among the French was
|in the offing.67
On December 4, 1943 the United States Joint Chiefs
of Staff prepared a memorandum in which it was proposed
!that the Rankin C proposal of COSSAC be changed so as to
i
give the United States the northern part of Germany and
■ 68
also that the zone be greatly enlarged. This memorandum
:suggested that the United States occupy Germany as far east
, as a line drawn from Berlin to Stettin. It also provided
!-that the American zone run from Berlin to Leipzig to Bay
reuth, and, then, to Mainz on the Rhine. The obvious dif-
. ficulty with the proposal as to increasing the size of the
! zone is that in all probability it would not have been pos-:
; sible to obtain Russia's agreement with respect to it.
Roosevelt sent a memorandum to the United States
| Under Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. on Feb-?
I ruary 21, 1944, in which he stated his views very strongly.:
7Peis, op. cit., p. 364] Albert L. Warner, "Our Se- |
cret Deal Over Germany," Saturday Evening Post, CCV 1
(August 2, 1952), p. 66.
United States Department of State, op. cit.,
pp. 786-787> :
61
He wrote,
"I do not want the United States to have the post
war burden of reconstituting Prance, Italy, and the
Balkans. This is not our natural task at a distance
of 3,500 miles or more. It Is definitely a British
task in which the British are far more vitally inter
ested than we are."69
Roosevelt's memorandum to Stettinius went on to
say that,
"I have had to consider also the ease of maintain
ing American troops in some parts of Germany. All
things considered, and remembering that all supplies
have to come 3*500 miles or more by sea, the United
States should use the ports of northern Germany—
Hamburg and Bremen— and the ports of the Netherlands
for this long-range operation."70
Further comments by Roosevelt indicate that, in any
event, he regarded the significance of the occupation zones
as only temporary. Roosevelt expected only a short term
occupation of Germany, at least by United States forces.
RooBevelt said that insofar as the security of Britain
against Germany was concerned for an extended period of
time that the British would have plenty of time to work that
out including Helgoland, airfields, and the like. "Ameri
cans will be only too glad to retire all their military
71
forces from Europe," he said.
Finally Roosevelt concluded, "If anything further
is needed to Justify this disagreement with the British
^Hull, pp. cit., p. 1612; United States Department
of State, op. cit., pp. 255-265.
7°Ibld. 71Ibid.
62
lines of demarcation, I can only add that political consid-
72
erationB in the United States make my decision conclusive.'
The political considerations apparently referred to by
Roosevelt were the opposition of many groups in the United
States to long term involvement in an occupation of Central
Europe with all the problems incident thereto.
The President's strong views and determined position
were communicated to Churchill. However, Churchill did
not budge from his opinion by the impact of Roosevelt1b re
action .
Roosevelt instructed Winant to press the American
demand for the northwestern zone at the EAC. This Winant
continued to do from March to September.
During the late summer of Roosevelt was being
strqngly urged to get the question resolved as to which
zone the United States would occupy. With American troops
ready to enter Germany, it was felt that a decision was
long overdue on this matter. In early August, Stettinius
recommended to the President that the United States accept
the southern section, provided Britain set at rest American
concern by (l) allowing United States military forceB use
of the ports of North Germany and the Low Countries and
(2) promising to take over the occupation of Prance, Italy,
and the Balkans if that should become a necessity.
72Ibid.
63
The President, who was in the Pacific at the time
Stettinius made his suggestion, wired back,
"It is essential that American troops of occupation
will have no responsibility in southern Europe and will
be withdrawn from there at the earliest practicable
date. , . . No possible difficulty with England is fore
seeable in regard to her naval problems in northwestern
Germany. They can march hand in hand with the supply
of our troops; but in -consideration of our 3*000 miles
of transport I want to be.able to carry this out through
Holland and Hamburg and Bremen."73
The State Department cabled Winant of Roosevelt's
continuing point of view.
Stimson, Stettinius,: and McCloy all believed that
Roosevelt's strong stand was a mistake. These three' in
dividuals discussed the.matter at a dinner. Stimson wrote-
with respect to this meeting that,
i
"The most pressing thing is to get the President to
decide on which part.of Germany will be occupied by
American troops. -He is hell-bent to occupy the north
ern portion. We'all think that this is a mistake--
that it will only get us into a head-on collision with
the British."7^
General Eisenhower was also advising Roosevelt to
get the matter of occupation zones settled.. The President
was, thus, being subjected to strong suggestions, even heavy
pressure, during the late summer of 19^* to do something
definitive relative to the zones.
The issue of what zone would be assigned to the
United States and what zone to Britain was finally resolved
73Hull, op. cit., p. 1613.
74
Stimson, op. cit.. pp. 568-569.
at the Second Quebec Conference during September, 19^.
Roosevelt relented and agreed that the United States should
accept the southwestern zone. Churchill writes very briefly
about the settling of this problem. He said that the Brit
ish military leaders felt that if Britain were obliged to
take the southwestern zones that this constituted a change
and a switching of plans which would produce inconveniences
and complications. He had the impression that the American
Chiefs of Staff were of the same opinion.
When Churchill indicates that he thought the United
States military chiefs were evidently also of the opinion
that it was advisable that America should have the south
western zone, he is very probably thinking of the views ex
pressed by Admiral King. King took the position that it
would be easier for the United States to occupy the south
west, if arrangements could be assured for using the North
German ports. Admiral Leahy, on the other hand, apparently
presented the military reasons why the United States should
75
have the northwestern zone. -
Churchill states that the time Roosevelt indicated
acceptance of the southwestern zoneB he had a large map un
folded on his knees, and that he was ultimately convinced
by the military point of view. Churchill said, "He agreed
^Pogue, op. cit., p. 350.
65
verbally with me that the .existing arrangement should
stand.
Churchill's terminology "the existing arrangement"
is probably a clue to the reason Roosevelt was eventually
compelled to concede that the United States should have
the southwestern zone. The British doubtless used a de
facto argument, that Roosevelt was really contending for a
change in the assumptions and plans that had theretofore
been adopted.
Herbert Peis speculates as to the reasons Roosevelt
was compelled to give way. He says it was probably just
the mere weight of advice. He suggests that an influencing
factor may have been the conduct of the French people and
their reception of De Gaulle caused Roosevelt's fear of
civil war in Prance to fade. Peis also says that the reason
may have been, at least in part, that which Secretary of
the Treasury Morgenthau referred to, namely, "The President
had wanted the British to be in charge of the Ruhr and Saar
so that they would have to implement the industrial destruc
tion policy which was outlined in the memorandum initialed
by Churchill and himself.
When Roosevelt at last accepted the southwestern
zone for the United States he did so on two conditions.
^Churchill, op. cit., p. 510.
^ Yalta Papers, p. 3^4,
66;
They were (l) that the Americans would be given control of
the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven and adjacent staging
areas and (2) that the Americans would have control of
routes of transportation across the British zone to the
American zone in the southwest. These conditions were
accepted by the British.
When the decision taken at Quebec was referred to
the EAC for incorporation into the protocol on zones, it
was discovered that American and British military views
were still far apart. The issue as to which country should
have what- part of Germany was replaced by a new issue as to
what "control" meant when the term was used with reference
to Bremen and Bremerhaven and lines of transportation across
the British zone. The Americans quite naturally insisted
upon a very broad interpretation of what was contemplated,
while the British argued for a narrow and limited definition
of the term "control."
The American point of view was transmitted to Winant
by the State Department for presentation to the EAC. "Con
trol" was to mean that the Land Bremen was to form a special
enclave under American administration. The assurance of
transportation across the British zone was to consist of
certain highways and railroads controlled and occupied by
the Americans. The British attitude, on the other hand,
"^Mosely, op. cit., p. 178.
6?
was that the control of the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven
was one thing, but that the military government of these
cities was something else. It was contended that the ad
ministration of these cities and adjoining area by the
United States would disrupt the cohesion of the British
zone. With respect to highways and railroads across the
British zone, it was maintained that only "access" to the
American zone was promised. Facilities for transportation
and communication would be provided, but this did not mean
that the United States would actually run the railroads or
79
have exclusive use of certain highways.
The United States approval of the protocol on zones
was long held up due to this new point of difference. Ul
timately, the United States position was largely accepted
insofar as the Bremen-Bremerhaven enclave was concerned,
but a middle-of-the-road compromise was struck relative to
trans-zonal traffic. The formula arrived at for disposing
of the question was substantially formulated at a conference
held January l4, 19^5* between Lord Halifax representing
the British and General Mac.ready representing State and War
Department officials.
It was agreed that the Bremen and Bremerhaven en
clave would be completely under American control including
military government, but that it would be generally adminis
tered as a subdistrict of the British zone. It was mutually
79Ibld., p.. 179.
68
understood that the American military government would con
form to the general policies applied in the British zone.
However, it was also agreed that the American military com
mander would have the right, in any event, to vary from the
prevailing policies in effect in the British zone if this
should be found necessary upon military grounds.
The dominant interest of the United States to trans
port military forces and supplies through the British zone
was recognized, and, likewise, the compelling interest of
the British to carry men and material across the American
zone to the British area of occupation in Austria. Each
military commander was to accept a deputy controller of
movement and transport from the other to coordinate es
sential military traffic.®0
On January 5* 19^5> Secretary of State Stettinius
sent a telegram to Winant summarizing the results of the
conference of the previous day. Stettinius indicated in
his telegram that he regarded the understanding reached as
the equivalent of granting the United States full control
of the Enclave. He mentioned that it included full use of
the port and authority over labor, utilities, and all com
munications within the area. "There is no half way point
of control that can be worked out, certainly not at high
Q “ 1
level," said Stettinius.
®°The Yalta Papers, p. 198. ^ Ibld.
69:
The British Chiefs of Staff for the most part ac
cepted the formula worked out on January 4, 1945* but they
82
still had a few further reservations. The matter was not
finally put at rest until immediately prior to the Yalta
Conference. On February 1, 19^5* Secretary of State Stet-
tinius and British Foreign Minister Eden met at Malta on
their way to Yalta on H.M.S. "Sirius." Among other sub
jects discussed, it was agreed that only a few minor points
remained unsettled with regard to Bremen and Bremerhaven.
It was felt that it should be possible for the military
authorities to clear up these points forthwith.
The outstanding issues pertaining to the zonal pro
tocol were cleared up at a luncheon between General of the
Army Marshall and Field Marshall Brooke on February 1,
1945. Telegrams were immediately dispatched to the United
States Embassy in London and the British Foreign Office in
order that the EAC might be informed of the approval of the
proposed zones by the American and British governments.
However, even after final approval of the protocol
by the American and British Governments, there was still
further consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in
regard to having a comprehensive, detailed agreement on the
Bremen-Bremerhaven Enclave. General Marshall stated at a
meeting of the Combined Chiefs held on February 6, 1945*
82Ibid., p. 199.
that he saw no need for a detailed agreement. There were
a few small changes in the wording of the agreement on Feb-
Oo
ruary 6, 19^5* and that finally concluded the matter.
Thus, when the Yalta Conference took place the pro
tocol on zones had already been adopted. British approval
had been given on December 5* 1944. Mr. Winant informed the
EAC of the approval of the American government on February
2, 19^5^ after receiving the telegram from Malta on the
previous day. Soviet approval came on February 6, 19^5>
84
after both the Western Powers had accepted the protocol.
As of that date, the protocol became .a binding agreement.
The big issue remaining relative to the zones, which came
up for discussion at Yalta, was as to what role, if any,
France would play in- the occupation of Germany.
The determination of the British that they should
have the Northwestern zone of occupation in Germany and the
prolonged negotiations between Britain and the United States
on thiB subject had some bearing upon the failure of the
Western Allies to negotiate with the Soviet Union on access
rights to Berlin. The minds of the British authorities
were captivated by the idea that everything possible should
be done to obtain the Northwestern zone.
i 83Ibid., pp. 635-639.
Oh
Mosely, op. cit., p.,181; Stettinius, op. cit.,
ipp. 63, 69.
71
After the Second Quebec Conference the Combined
Administrative Committee made a study of the logistical im
plications of the Quebec Agreement giving Britain the North
western zone and the United States the Southwestern zone of
88
occupation. ^ This study contained a paragraph to the ef
fect that the United States and the United Kingdom should
have equal access to the tripartite zone in Berlin. When
the recommendation of the Combined Administrative Committee
(CAC) was circulated, the Civil Affairs Division pointed
out to the United States Chiefs of Staff that the paragraph
relative to transit to Berlin in the CAC proposal was use
less without Russian agreement. It was a subject requiring
tripartite agreement and not merely bipartite agreement
that was possible in the United Kingdom-United States Com
bined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) . The U. S. Chiefs proposed
that CCS approve the recommendations of CAC with the incor
poration of the suggestions of the Civil Affairs Division
(CAD).86
The recommendations of the U.S. Chiefs, if approved
by the Russians in EAC would have expressly established the
principles of freedom of transit by the two Western Powers
through the Soviet zone to Berlin. However, there was no
8^History of the Civil Affairs Division, World War II
to March. 1946. Chapter 8, pp. 1-2, Historical Manuscript
Pile, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department
of the Army, Washington.
86Ibid. ........
72
response from the British until a month later. They were
anxious that the Quebec agreements of the United States and
United Kingdom representatives be included in the amended
EAC zone protocol, and the amendments approved by the three
governments. At the same time the three governments were
eager to conclude the EAC zone protocol prior to the arrival
of the French representatives in the EAC. It was not until
the amended protocol relating to zones had been agreed upon
by the EAC on November l4, 1944 and the protocol ratified
by the British Government on December 5, that the British
members of CCS saw fit to respond to the proposal of the
United States Chiefs pertaining to freedom of transit.
When the amended EAC protocol on zones was submitted
for comment, CAD pointed out that notwithstanding the recom
mendations of CAC and of the United States Chiefs to CCS on
the principle of freedom of transit of one power over the
zone of another, including access of American and British
forces to Berlin, the EAC agreement was silent on the sub
ject.
When the British finally responded,-on December 21,
1944 to the suggestions of the U. S. Chiefs relative to the
conclusions of CAC, they avoided every statement pertaining ]
to the principle of freedom of transit. The American reply ;
ito this British paper dropped the provision relative to ;
87Ibid., p. 3.
73
freedom of transit. This subject was reserved for another
paper to be presented at the Yalta Conference, for which
preparations were then being made. The American study
limited itself to negotiations with the British on the sub
jects of the Bremen Enclave and United States transit
88
through the British zone to the Enclave.
Much has been made of the fact that the American
representative on the EAC, John G. Winant, was left without
instructions and occupied a very difficult and unfortunate
position.8^ it is undoubtedly true that it was very dif
ficult for Winant to function effectively on the EAC* Both
President Roosevelt and the War Department had very little
interest in the negotiations which were supposed to take
place at the EAC and were fearful of the consequences that
might flow from them. The British member of the EAC, Sir
William Strang, pointed out in a memorandum to Anthony Eden
for use in his discussions with Stettinius that the deci
sion to set up the EAC, though supported at the Moscow Con
ference in October, 1943, hy the American Delegation, re
ceived very little, if any, support by top Americans in
90
Washington. He stated that from the outset the Americans
endeavored to limit the province of the EAC.
88Ibld., pp. 4-5. '
8^Peis, op. cit., p. 358.
90
Woodward, op. cit., p. 477.
i .' " _ ■ . 74
The Russians also caused delay and difficulty that
hampered the EAC. They refused to discuBS any other ques- '
tion until the terms of surrender for Germany were settled,
Strang tried to arrange a meeting of Stettinius, Winant,,
and Gusev, the Russian member of the EAC, to consider the
position of the EAC and to enable It to achieve more pro
gress in postwar planning. Stettinius was apparently very
sympathetic to Strang's proposal. On April 24, 1944, Stet-
itinius received a letter from Hull to the effect that the
!
EAC already had enough work and ample duties, and that he
Idid not believe it should take on further responsibilities.
Mr. Eden pressed the point with Stettinius that the
American Government was not fulfilling its obligation to
the EAC, and that it was violating the directives given to
It at the time of the Moscow Conference. Eden argued that
: as a result the Russians were also downgrading.the EAC and
regarding it as less authoritative than originally planned.
‘Stettinius told Eden that It was the fault of the United
States War Department. Stettinius indicated that he would
'exert his good offices to straighten this matter out.
Later, on May 23, 1944, Stettinius told Lord Hall-
' fax that in his opinion the United States had failed to
I honor the arrangements made at the Moscow Conference. He
remarked to Halifax that, since the EAC was sitting in j
| London, Roosevelt was fearful that the United Kingdom
! might take too much of a lead In dictating policy. Roose-
f
75:
velt was apprehensive that the EAC under the aegis of Brit
ain would adopt solutions he would not find palatable, and
that the United Kingdom might organize Europe pursuant to
its own policies. Stettinius thought also that Roosevelt's
attitude waB that Britain would appear, in the eyes of the
Europeans as the leader in Europe of the Anglo-Saxon na
tions. This was repugnant to Roosevelt. The British For
eign Office believed that the explanation of Stettinius was
91
in all probability correct.
Apparently, the question of access rights to Berlin
was not raised at the EAC. According to the account of
Philip E. Mosely, the American representative on the EAC,
John G. Winant, was well aware of the matter and had sought
to have it .discussed by the EAC.^2 During May, 19^> Winant'
was in Washington to review various questions with President
Roosevelt pertaining to his negotiations at the EAC. While
in Washington Winant talked with members of the War Depart
ment and made a special point of asking the Civil Affairs
Division whether access routes from the Western zones to
Berlin ought not be worked out. He made a positive sug
gestion that detailed understandings be entered into rela
tive to access routes by rail, highway, and air. Winant
was very much of the opinion that concrete arrangements
could be made without any great difficulty. He stated that
^1Ibid. 9 2 M o s e l y , pp. cit., pp. 173-17^.
76
the Soviet representative on the EAC had repeatedly said
that there.would be no difficulty whatsoever in agreeing
with respect to transit routes across the Soviet zone to
Berlin. -The Soviet representative’s attitude was that cer
tainly the presence of American and.British military forces
in Berlin would necessarily carry with it' facilities of
access. Winant assumed that the"United States would want
a clear-cut arrangement pertaining to access to Berlin.
However, if Mosely’s statements are accurate, when
Winant broached the subject with the Civil Affairs Division,
it strongly opposed the insertion of a specific provision
on any details as to access to Berlin. Its reaction was
that in May, 1944, before the Western Allies were even on
the continent of Europe, it was impossible to foresee what
routes would be needed by Western forces and what routes
would be available. If specific railroads or highways were
agreed upon, they might be destroyed or otherwise impossible
to use when the time came that they were needed. The Civil
Affairs Division took the position that access routes to
Berlin were a military matter, and at the appropriate time
would be resolved at the military level. Winant concluded
that since this was the authoritative, military point of
view, he had to acquiesce In it, and that he could not
94
challenge it.
93Ibid.
77
The argument of the Civil Affairs Division might
have been met and satisfied by taking the position that
any written agreement or binding commitment as to access
routes to Berlin would not necessarily provide for specific
routes which might later prove to be unusable. Rather, the
agreement could provide for a Soviet promise in principle,
and, perhaps, contain a formula geared to circumstances at
the end of the war which would determine and assure the
Western Allies reasonable access to the German Capital.
However, if one accepts Mosely's account, this would evi
dently still not have been acceptable to representatives of
the War Department who were contending many issues were
"military matters" in order to restrict the authority of
the EAC and to retain jurisdiction unto themselves.
When Winant brought up the matter of access routes
to Berlin, everyone concerned was thinking only in terms of
personnel and materiel for military forces. Planning was
proceeding on the assumption that Germany would be dealt
with as an economic and political unit. No one had in mind
that some day routes would be required to supply the Ger
man people living in the sectors of Berlin occupied by the
West. Viewed in this light, the attitude of the War De
partment is understandable. It was considering access
rights for military units. That it Bhould deem such a sub
ject a matter of a military nature is entirely reasonable
and understandable. Neither Winant nor the War Department
T8
were contemplating that the zones and the sectors of Berlin
would become permanent divisions for the indefinite future.
It scarcely seems fair to criticize them in this respect.
Considerable foresight and vision would have been required
to perceive the importance access rights to Berlin would
later assume.
The British view of the subject of transit 'rights
to Berlin paralleled closely that of the American attitude.
Lord Strang says that the.. EAC was assuming that upon the
surrender of Germany there would be a central German govern
ment which would accept the surrender terms and remain to
exercise jurisdiction over the country subject to the over
riding control of the Allied commanders. The British dele
gation to the EAC acted on the assumption that there would
be at least a considerable degree of free movement for the
German people from one place to another in Germany. It
also supposed that freedom of movement would exist for Al
lied military and civilian staffs. It was not anticipated
that the zones would be sealed off from each other. Strang
says that a Germany split into separate zones with no com
munication and traffic among them resulted from Soviet pol
icy, and that it did not become apparent until the late sum
mer of 1945 that this was what Russia wanted. The British
Government subscribed to the view In 1944, and at least
until early in 1945, that the subject of access routes to
79;
QE5
Berlin was a military matter. ^
Strang states that neither the British nor the
American representatives on the EAC received instructions
to bring up the question of access rights to Berlin.
Strang strongly defends Winant and his advisers on the ques
tion of access rights. He points out that Winant person
ally advocated a specific agreement on the subject* but
that by decision of the American military staff it was left
for direct negotiation by the Allied military commander in
Germany.9^
It is interesting also to note Strang's views as to
whether the issue of access rights should have been raised
at the EAC. He states that in his opinion it would not
have been possible to obtain Gusev's acceptance of written
guarantees on this subject. He believes that the reaction
of Gusev would have been to indicate that such rights were .
self evident* that they were indeed military problems to
be left for the commanders to settle on the basis of cir
cumstances prevailing when the time arrived to resolve the
question.
At the Quebec Conference in September* 19^^, Church
ill* Roosevelt* and the Combined Chiefs of Staff reviewed
the proposed protocol on zones of occupation ‘ and joint oc
cupation of Berlin. There is no indication that anyone
95Strang* op. cit., p. 215. 96Ibid.* pp. 215-216.
80
suggested the need for definitive access routes to Berlin.
Apparently the subject of access rights to Berlin was not
97
so much as mentioned.
At the Quebec Conference in 1944 Roosevelt and
Churchill considered the question of postwar Germany. It
was at this meeting that the two initiated the memorandum
which set forth the so-called Morgenthau Plan for reducing
Germany to an agrarian nation. It is generally agreed to
day that the apparent acceptance of the Morgenthau Plan by
98 '
Roosevelt and Churchill was unfortunate. However, it ap
parently had no direct bearing upon the zones of occupation
and the sectors in Berlin.
General Lucius D. Clay has blamed Winant for omis
sion of the protocol on zones to provide for clearly de
fined access rights to Berlin.^ Clay points out that the
three main documents negotiated by the EAC all accepted a
joint occupation of Berlin, but yet did not guarantee access
rights to the United States and Britain. Clay states that
the omission of such guarantee was not accidental, but that
the subject had been discussed with Winant by Mr. Murphy,
^Feis, op. cit., p. 365.
98 1
^ Heller, op. cit., p. 40; Penrose, op. cit., pp.
243-258; Hajo Holborn, Political Collapse of Europe, p.
188; Dorn, op. cit., pp. 484-485, 491.
99 /
Decision In Germany (Garden City, N.Y,: Doubleday,
1950), p. 15.
81
General Elsenhower's political advlBer. According to
Clay's report, Winant was of the opinion that the right to
be in Berlin implied and carried with it the right of ac
cess, and that it would only confuse the issue to bring it
up in connection with the zonal agreement. Clay's account
is that Winant believed that it would arouse Soviet suspi
cion and hinder achievement of mutual understanding to
inject the problems of access rights. By this interpreta
tion, Winant was expecting to circumvent the question by
bringing about complete understanding between the Soviets
and the West as a consequence of which access rights would
be entirely academic.
General Clay's attempt to place responsibility on
Winant for the failure to include a guarantee of access
rights in the documents negotiated by the EAC is in con
flict with Philip E. Mosely's portrayal of Winant's role. " 300
In addition,,it is clear that the Joint Chiefs of
Staff approved the agreement pertaining to the zones of
occupation without raising the Issue of the guarantee of
specific access routes to Berlin. The following message
was sent by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of
War and to the Secretary of Navy:
"The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you ad
vise Secretary of State that there are no reasons from
a military viewpoint why the draft Protocol of the EAC ;
100Mosely, op. cit., pp. 162-177.
“ ~ 82
I ' l
I . relative to Zones of Occupation in Germany and Adminis- ;
tration of Greater Berlin Bhould not be approved.101
Thus., General Clay's conclusion is dubious and very
probably not essentially accurate and fair.
Placing primary responsibility on Winant, or more
! *
i ' :
'generally on the EAC, for failure to provide for access
routes to Berlin is also questionable in view of the at
titude toward the EAC of President Roosevelt and other
«
leaders in the American government. Once the European Ad-
ivisory Commission was established, its representatives fre
quently worked under the exasperating difficulty of being
unable to obtain instructions from their governments.
Ernest P. Penrose, who served as an economic adviser to
■John G. Winant, the American representative on the Commis-
sion, has complained bitterly about this situation. He
!said:
The future historian will look back in wonder on
those times during which an outstanding American rep
resentative was appointed to an important post abroad
on a commission which the United StateB had taken a
leading part in establishing, and was left stranded '
without instructions on the policy he should follow,
without freedom to propose a policy of his own, and
without a mandate to comment on the policies proposed
| by other member countries.102
Penrose blamed Roosevelt for refusing to adopt a
| definite program.10- ^ Penrose was a member of the group of ;
| 101Yalta Papers, p. 118, footnote 1. 1
| 102Penrose, op. cit., p. 233, 1
I 103Ibid., p p . 262-263. _ ... |
. 83
experts and advisers in the American and British Governments
who believed that it was of the greatest urgency to have
comprehensive plans prepared and ready to put into operation
once Germany was defeated. It is possible that he did not
properly appreciate the difficulties in negotiating compre
hensive agreements and the dangers in being committed to
arrangements which embodied too much detail. However, Pen
rose does point out the limitations under which at least the
American representative on the EAC was obliged to work.
After the EAC was in existence, Roosevelt was not
pleased with it. He downgraded it. He feared that it might
very possibly produce over-commitment in binding obligation.
In October, 1944, Roosevelt wrote to Secretary of State Hull
as follows in response to a memorandum from Hull:
We must emphasize the fact that the EAC is "advi
sory" and that you and I are not bound by this advice.
This is something which is sometimes overlooked and
if we do not remember that word "advisory" they may go
ahead and execute Borne of the advice, which, when the
time comes, we may not like at all.104
Roosevelt also wrote the following comments to Hull:
I do not think that in the present stage any good
purpose would be served by having the State Department
or any other department sound out the British and Rus
sian views on the treatment of German industry. Most
certainly it should not be taken up with the EAC which,
in a case like this, is on a tertiary level and not
.even a secondary level.
It is evident that in the eyes of Roosevelt the EAC :
was a complicating factor, and he was distrustful of it.
10\alta Papers, p. 158, 105Yalta Papers, p . , 155.
84
What Roosevelt did not like about it was that it tended to
interfere with and upset his policy of postponement., and
also that it threatened to make London the site of postwar
•planning. Penrose has criticized in strong terms the re
marks of Roosevelt relative to the EAC.'1 ' 0^
■^^Penrose, op. cit., pp. 262-263.
CHAPTER III
THE ZONES AND BERLIN:
DEVELOPMENTS FROM YALTA TO THE
REDEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS WITHIN THE ZONES
At the Yalta Conference in February, 19^5 the dis
cussion of occupation plans for Germany related primarily
to the question of whether France would be assigned a zone
and permitted representation on the Control Council. Ap
proval of the zones of occupation as worked out by the EAC
was a foregone conclusion. The three great Allies had al
ready indicated their agreement with the proposed zones.
The communique at the end of the conference summed up the
arrangement made between the United States, Britain, and
Russia relative to the zones of occupation as follows:
"Under the agreed plan the forces of the Three
Powers will each occupy a separate zone of Germany,
co-ordinated administration and control has been pro
vided for under the plan through a central Control
Commission consisting of the Supreme Commanders of the
Three Powers with headquarters in Berlin.'1!
The conferees at Yalta merely placed their stamp of
approval on the work of the EAC with respect to the zones.
" Sfalta Papers, p . 970.
85
Apparently, the matter of access routes to Berlin from the
Western zones was not discussed at Yalta by the leaders of
the governments represented there. However, the Joint Staff
Planners (JSP) of the United States while at Yalta wrote a
memorandum to the British and Soviet General Staffs on the
subject of access to Berlin. This memorandum pointed out
that American military forces in Berlin would be isolated
from the main areas of territory occupied by the United
States. It stated that there would be need for regular
transit by road, rail, and air across territory intervening
between the main American zone of occupation and Berlin.
It was, suggested that the principle be accepted of freedom
of transit by each occupying power between its primary
zone and forces in Berlin and any other similar isolated
areas. The memorandum further proposed that the details of
2
free transit be worked out by the local commanders.
The recommendation of JSP was discussed by the U.S.
Joint Chiefs at Yalta.^ Admiral Leahy questioned whether
President Roosevelt would have an interest in the subject
inasmuch as it was of a purely military character. He
stated, however, that he would advise the President to give:
the memorandum his approval. General Kuter, representing
________________________________________________________________________I
2
Peis, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin, p. 533* !
•^History of the Civil Affairs Division, World War III
to March, 19^6. Chapter I, pp. 6-7. Historical Manuscript!
Pile, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department
of the Army. i
. „ _ - .........
!
the United States Army Air Forces* felt that the proposal of
JSP was too restrictive. As the result of General Kuter's
' • 4
reaction* JSP reconsidered its proposal.
JSP* then* subsequently recommended that the transit
rights of one power across the zones of another be un
limited. It was suggested that the principle and details
of transit would serve as an interim military measure pend
ing general agreement on the subject in the EAC. This pro
posal was approved by JSP and dispatched to the commanding
general* United States Military Mission to the U.S.S.R, for
presentation to the Soviet General Staff. It was also sub
mitted to CCS for British acceptance. This particular pro
posal for freedom of transit was accepted by the British
on March 9, 1945. But It was not accepted by the Russians,
evidently because It was too liberal. It would have granted
unlimited rights of transit without restriction of time*
5
place* or use.
The main Issue in regard to the zones considered at
Yalta was whether France should be given a zone* and* fur
ther* whether France should occupy a seat on the Control
Council. The strong proponents for granting France both a :
zone and a place on the Control Council were Churchill and
Eden. What they were worried about was that Roosevelt had j
i ;
|Indicated that American troops would remain in Europe for j
5Ibid.* pp. 7-8.
88
only a relatively short time. In a tele'gram dispatched to
Roosevelt on November 16, 1944, Churchill gave an account
of his meeting with General De Gaulle. In this telegram
Churchill mentioned that De Gaulle pre'ssed, him for a share
in the occupation of Germany and not just as a subparticipa
tion under a British or American command, but as a French
command. Churchill told De Gaulle he would certainly favor
France taking, over as large a part of the occupation of
Germany as its capacity would permit, but that this matter
would have to be settled at an inter-allied conference
table.^
In his telegram of November 16, 1944, Churchill
suggested to Roosevelt that the United States aid in equip
ping French divisions for occupation duty. In a telegram
on November 18, 1944* Roosevelt told Churchill he sympath
ized with the French point of view, but that he had no
7
authority to equip a postwar French army. In this tele
gram Roosevelt also said that, of course, he would be
obliged' to bring the American Army home from Europe as soon
after the war as transportation problems would allow..
The next day Churchill sent another telegram to
Roosevelt and said that the remark about bringing American
forces home as soon as transportation would permit caused
him great alarm. Churchill said Britain certainly could
^Yalta Papers, pp. 284-285. ^Ibid., p. 286.
! ' " 89i
i ' * ' ' . * i
'not hold down all of Germany west of the area assigned to !
! 8
Russia without American and French aid.
At the first day of the Yalta Conference Roosevelt
made additional comments which disturbed. Churchill and con
vinced him that it was imperative that France have a zone
of occupation. Roosevelt made what Churchill called a
"momentous statement." He' said that the United States
would take all reasonable steps to preserve peace* but not
at the expense of keeping a large army in Europe. He re
marked that the American occupation would be limited to
'two years. Churchill said that "formidable questions"
a
arose in his mind.
In a meeting with Stalin and Molotov before the
opening of the Yalta Conference* Roosevelt briefly dis
cussed the matter of allowing France a zone of occupation.
The President indicated that he was more or less inclined
to give France a zone. But he evidently tried to convey
the impression that he was nonchalant about the subject.
He mentioned that he would prefer for the United States to
■have the northwestern part of Germany* so that it would not
be necessary to rely upon transportation facilities through'
| France. But Roosevelt admitted he finally sided with the
! British and agreed to the southwestern zone for the United ,
8Ibid.* p. 287.
9Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy* p. 303*
' ".............. ■' ' 90
i .
iStates. He added that what the British seemed to want was
for the United States to restore order in Prance and then
'turn political authority over to Britain.1* 1
At the second plenary session of the Yalta Confer
ence on February 5* 19^5 the subject of allocating a zone
to Prance came up for formal discussion. Churchill argued
very strongly for giving Prance a zone. He contended that
ithis was of much importance to Great Britain'. He noted
ithat Prance was Germany's closest neighbor. He referred
also to the fact that President Roosevelt had said that
'American forces would remain in Europe for only a very
:limited time. Roosevelt supported Churchill's argument
mildly.1' 1 ' Stalin at first opposed granting Prance an area
; to occupy.
In resisting a zone of occupation for France,
i
Stalin argued that Prance had not fought well in the war.
She had "opened the gates to the enemy." Russia and Brit-
:ain would not have suffered such great losses if Prance
had put up a determined fight. Churchill agreed that
!France had not been much help in the war, but he maintained
;that she should nonetheless take her place again in world
i i
i 12
;affairs.
1( 1Peis, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin, p. 531* j
11Yalta Papers, pp. 571-573; Peis, op. cit., pp. 531- ;
532; Deuerleln, op. cit., pp. 69-70.
12
| Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, pp. 127-
I 128; Byrnes, Speaking' Frankly, pp. '24-25. j
91
Stalin finally agreed to give Prance a zone of oc
cupation., but on the understanding that it would come from
territory previously assigned to Britain and the United
States.^ However, the further issue remained as to whether
Prance should also be a member of the Control Council.
Stalin said that it would bring up many complica
tions if there were four nations rather than three partici
pating in the determination of German affairs. He thought
that some method could be found whereby England might let
Prance, Holland, and Belgium assist in the occupation with
out the right to be participants in the Three Power deci-
14
sions for Germany.
At the session on February 5* 19^5 Roosevelt finally
suggested-that it be agreed to give Prance a zone, but
that discussion of her participation in the Control Council .
be deferred.1^ Stalin consistently opposed granting Prance
membership on the Control Council. Stettinius said that
all through the discussion with respect to Prance, Stalin
showed an obvious desire to reach agreement with Roosevelt,
but that this was not so true of Stalin's attitude toward
Churchill. ^
"^Leahy, I Was There, p. 3°lj Snell, The Meaning of
Yalta, p. 68j Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. '838.
l4 /-
Yalta Papers, p. 611.
■^Stettinius, op. cit., p. 129. ~^Ibld.
92
At a meeting of the Foreign Ministers attended by
Eden, Molotov,- and Stettinius on February 7, 19^5, there
was farther discussion.about giving France a seat on the
Control Commission. Eden pressed for this result. But
Molotov was not willing. Eden stated that if France were
admitted it should be agreed that no other power would be
17
given a zone of occupation. 1
At this meeting Molotov submitted a proposal that
the Foreign Ministers agree that it had been found desirable
to allot France a zone of occupation, but that it had been
decided that the French occupational authorities should
exercise control in their zone under the general guidance
-i Q
of the Control Council. But Eden would not acquiesce in
this suggestion.
Thus, at the fourth and final plenary session at
Yalta beginning in the late afternoon of February 7, 19^5,
the matter of French membership in the Control Council was
brought up again. Churchill said that the British Govern
ment was unconvinced by the assertion that it would be pos
sible to accord France a zone without participation in the
Control Council. He said that such a situation would cause
endless trouble. He felt that it was of utmost importance
that there be uniformity in the treatment of Germany by the
“ ^Yalta Papers, pp. 699-702.
l8Ibid., p. 707.
93
three or four Allies. Churchill stated that It would do no
good to refer the question to the EAC which was a weaker
body and especially since France was represented on the
Commission. Sending the matter to the EAC would only pro
duce a deadlock with Britain and France on one side and
19
Russia and the United States on the other side. ^
At this point Roosevelt stated that he had changed
his mind., and that he now’ agreed with the Prime Minister
that it would be impossible to give France an area to ad
minister in Germany unless it were a member of the Control
Council. He said it would be easier to deal with the
20
French if they were on the Council than if they were not.
Stalin then said that he had no objections., and
21
that he agreed. Stalin had apparently been induced to
consent by Roosevelt, although it is not known how Roose-
22
velt persuaded Stalin. The Prime Minister suggested that
there shouldbe a joint telegram dispatched to De Gaulle
informing him of the decisions pertaining to France. This
2R
was generally agreed upon.
^Yalta Papers, pp. 710, 718. (The minutes of Bohlen
and Matthews are essentially the same in their account of
Churchill's arguments.)
2QIbid., pp. 908, 913.
2~ * Tbid; Stettinius, op. cit., p. 263.
22Stettinius, op. cit., p. 263. •
23Ibid.
9^
According to James P. Byrnes, Roosevelt was con
vinced by himself, Harry Hopkins, and Averill Harriman, the
American Ambassador to Moscow, that Prance should be repre
sented on the Control Council, and that any other action
24
would greatly humiliate her.
The fact that Prance was granted a zone of occupa
tion and a place on the Control Council is an important
part of the history behind the problem of Berlin. At least
one writer has concluded that it was Prance which prevented
agreement among the wartime Allies just at the time agree
ment was possible. In his view it was Prance that first
25
stood in the way of a genuine unification of Germany. ^ It
was possible late in the summer of 1945 for Prance to des
troy cooperation among the Allies due to her participation
in the occupation and in the control machinery. Thus,
whether rightly or wrongly, the action taken at Yalta can
be and has been construed as leading directly to the sub
sequent impasse relative to Berlin.
24
Byrnes, op. cit., p. 25. There can be no doubt
that Churchill fought very vigorously for Prance at Yalta.
Harry Hopkins is reported as saying that "Winston and
Anthony fought like tigers for France." And apparently
Hopkins worked from his sick bed to support them (Sherwood,
Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 858).
H. Stuart Hughes in Contemporary Europe; A History l
says that, "It was Churchill who fought the battle for both!
Prance and Germany— for the preservation of both as future
bulwarks for the West against Soviet power. Roosevelt,
on the other hand, seemed hesitant and unsure, siding now
with Churchill, and now with Stalin." (p. 357.).
^Basil Davidson, Germany; What Now? (London; Freder
ick Mueller, Ltd., 1950), p. 64.
The Yalta Conference has been called the hlghwater 1
26
mark In Western-Soviet cooperation. Immediately after
Yalta there was a great wave of optimism and enthusiasm, a
!tremendous feeling that there would be understanding and an;
■ability to work together between the Western PowerB and the:
j •
Soviet Union.
Harry Hopkins said:
"We really believed in our hearts that this was the
dawn of the new day we had all been praying for. . . .
We were certain that we had won the first great victory
of the peace. . . . The Russians had proved that they
could be reasonable and foreseeing. . . . We felt Bure
that we could count on him [Stalin] to be reasonable
and sensible and understanding."27
But the great expectations were very short-lived.
James P. Byrnes believed upon the conclusion of the Yalta
;Conference that the tide of Anglo-Soviet-American friend-
ship had reached a new high. But he said also that Presi
dent Roosevelt had barely returned to American soil when the
tide began to ebb. In retrospect it is very clear that
the ultimate complete break in Western-Soviet comradeship
and cooperation began within a very few short weeks after
26
Byrnes, op. cit., p. 45.
2^Sherwood, op. cit., p. 870.
pQ
Byrnes, op. cit., p. 45.
96
Yalta. It was very soon after Yalta that signs began to
appear that Russia was disenchanted with her partnership
with the West.
Stettlnlus wrote about the basic change of heart
and policy on the part of Soviet Russia very soon after
Yalta, and he speculated about the reasons accounting for
the change. Some of the reasons suggested by Stettlnlus
were the following:
1. That Stalin had difficulties with the Politburo
upon his return to Moscow for having been too friendly with
the two capitalist countries. The Politburo quite possibly
took the line that Stalin had virtually sold out the Soviet
Union at Yalta. This was a view current in the American
State Department and especially among those from this
agency who were on Roosevelt's staff at Yalta.
2. That Stalin's advisers told him that free elections
in Europe would destroy Communist control of these nations.
3. That the Soviets decided that the United States
was going to withdraw from Europe very soon. President
Roosevelt had stated at Yalta that the maximum period the
United States would keep troops in Europe would be two
29
years.
In London at the EAC the Russian shift in policy
became apparent two or three weeks after Yalta. One week
^stettlnlus, op. cit., p p . 309-312.
97;
after Yalta that Soviet member of the EAC announced that
representatives were -coming from Moscow to form, along with
American and British delegates, a nucleus of the Control Com
mission for Germany. Two weeks after this statement the
Soviet member stated with embarrassment that Russia was not
sending a group to London after all. His manner and atti
tude led the American representatives to believe that a
•50
change was occurring in Soviet foreign policy.
Shortly after Yalta, Churchill became very disturbed
about the actions and intentions of the Soviets. He wrote
that the two months after Yalta saw tremendous changes, and
that the whole relationship of Russia with the Western
allies was in a state of flux. Churchill regarded every
question about the future as unsettled. He felt that the
agreements and understandings at Yalta had been broken or
vi
brushed aside by the Kremlin.
On April 5, 19^5 Churchill wrote to Roosevelt say
ing that there was no doubt in his mind that the Soviet
leaders were surprised and disconcerted at the very rapid
advance of the Allied armies in the West and the almost
complete disintegration of German resistance on the Western
front. In this message Churchill showed his very deep worry
about the Russian attitude, and he said that it was of great
importance that the Anglo-American forces should meet the
^ Ibid. • ^ ■ ' ‘Churchill, op. cit., p. 511.
98;
Russian armies as far to the east as possible, and that,
if possible, enter Berlin.
Churchill reminded Roosevelt of the fact that they
thought that the matter of zones of occupation in Austria
had been worked out six weeks before at Yalta. But since
then Russia had sent no confirmation of the proposed zones.
In the meantime they were about to take Vienna and, it ap-
•^2
peared, all of Austria.
During the months immediately after Yalta the West
ern Allies faced a most critical juncture in history.
Churchill and the British leaders believed that the events
which were developing were of the greatest importance.
They felt that political issues were inherent in military
decisions and military maneuvers during the spring of
1945.33 American leaders, and especially the American
military leaders, on the other hand, tried to keep political
^4
issues from being considered in making military decisions.
President Roosevelt was largely relying upon military ad
visers during the last months of his life. Roosevelt's
death occurred just at the moment when a number of momentous
political issues had to be resolved. Harry Truman succeeded
32lbid.
33pogue, op. cit., p. 441; Churchill, Triumph and
Tragedy, pp. 5H - 516.
3 ^ P o g u e , op. cit., passim; Truman, op. cit., Vol. I,
pp. 210-212.
99
to the presidency largely unbriefed and unfamiliar with the
immediate issues. Truman, consequently, had little choice
but to rely upon the advice proffered to him by his mili
tary men, at least until he could acquire the background
and information to evaluate issues for himself. However,
even if Roosevelt had survived it is likely he would have
decided the issues that arose much the same as Truman did.
Roosevelt would have received the same advice as that given
Truman by the American military leaders, and there is every
indication that he would have accepted it and acted upon it
as did Truman.
The American military leaders analyzed and inter
preted the military situation in Europe during the last
few months of the war solely according to the military
dimension. It can be argued that they lacked political
insight and understanding.
The British, and especially Churchill, insisted
upon two things. First, they wanted an all-out Western
drive for Berlin. Second, they greatly desired that West
ern troops not withdraw from portions of Germany within the;
Russian zone until Britain and America had assurances and
were convinced that Russia would fulfill her promises.
It was the American position that thwarted the British de
mands. The American opposition to the British attitude !
ultimately prevailed. The American Government and American;
military leaders did not want the closing phases of the war'
100
In Europe complicated by interjecting political considera
tions, No doubt, an elaborate argument could be made that
this factor had a definite bearing upon the difficult and
perplexing circumstances in which the West later found it
self.35
The striking difference in American and British
views was very clearly shown in regard to Berlin. Origi
nally, it had been the intention of the Western Allies and
of General Eisenhower to drive to Berlin and eventually
take the city. However, during March, 19^5 General, Eisen- "
hower decided that it was not militarily advisable to make
an all-out effort to take Berlin, but instead he determined
that the main Allied thrust should be toward Leipzig. This
decision by Eisenhower was opposed by the British who felt ■
that strictly military considerations should not dictate •
what should be done. The British point of view was that
political matters were controlling. The British strenuously
sought to retain Berlin as a military objective.5 The
British also believed that the projected push in the di
rection of Leipzig minimized the role of their Twenty-First
Army Group which was operating in Northern Germany.
The United States Chiefs of Staff maintained that
the commander in the field was the best judge of the mili
tary measures which should be pursued and of the most ef-
35Pogue, op. cit., p. 44l. 3^Ibid.
' ■ " ' ■ . 101
fective way of destroying the German armies. They also. ■ ;
pointed to General Elsenhower's success to date and the
accuracy of his judgment. They viewed the question of
whether the Western armies should strive to capture Berlin
as solely a military matter.
However, Churchill pressed the point of the rele
vancy and utmost importance of recognizing the political
issues that originated from the military strategy of the
West. In a message to Roosevelt on April 1, 19^5> Church- ;
ill argued that the Russians would without a doubt enter
Vienna and take all of Austria. He asserted that if they
also captured Berlin they would be left with the impression
that they were the main contributors to the Allied victory
in Europe. He said that this could very readily lead to
great difficulties in dealing with them in the future. '
Churchill, then, very bluntly told Roosevelt that from a
political viewpoint he believed the armies of the West i
should march as far to the east as possible, and, if pos
sible, seize Berlin. Churchill also contended that this
'KJ '
course appeared sound on military grounds.
t
What Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff
i
wanted was for Field Marshal Montgomery to drive to the
Elbe.River, and, then, push on toward Berlin. General i
Eisenhower, supported by the top American leaders, turned j
!
down this suggestion. j
37Ibld.. * p p. 442-443.
In addition, the British disliked and opposed
General Eisenhower's informing the Russians directly of his
decision to swing toward Leipzig with his major push rather1
than in the direction of Berlin. The British were of the
opinion that Eisenhower had exceeded his powers and had
oO
made a very grave political mistake.
The British misgivings were further fed hy Russia's,
quick agreement with Eisenhower's change in plans and his
foregoing of a big push to Berlin. The British Chiefs of
Staff asked that the combined Chiefs remind Eisenhower of
the advisability of taking Berlin.- The British regarded
the political considerations as far outweighing momentary
military factors. The British also wanted a procedure set
up for communications between SHAEP and the Russian Govern-;
ment. They believed that the proper manner of dealing with*
the Russians was from heads of state to heads of state not i
from high command to high command.
The United States Chiefs of Staff refused to accept1
the British view. They felt that it was of greatest impor-j
tance for Eisenhower to be able to make basic decisions !
i
with utmost haste, because the military situation was in
constant flux and could change greatly within a few hours. :
Going through customary governmental channels in communi- |
eating with the Russians could mean loss of golden opportu
nities to the military in destroying enemy strength. The ;
t
38lhld., p . * . 4.39.__________ I
103
United States Chiefs of Staff justified Eisenhower in com- ;
rnunicating directly with Stalin on the ground that Stalin
was the head of the Soviet armed forces. Experience had
•shown that trying to deal with Russian military leaders
under Stalin inevitably meant delay.
On the political issue of getting to Berlin ahead
of the Russians, the American Chiefs of Staff had a blind
SO
spot. Political issues made no impression upon them. v
Their reaction Was that the business of the military was to
get the war over with at the earliest possible moment.
They felt that it was not a relevant factor to consider the
prestige or political advantages accruing grom taking Ber
lin or any other particular prize. In any event, it was
highly dubious whether the British and American forces
could beat the Russians to Berlin. The United States !
Chiefs of Staff maintained that any psychological or politi
cal advantages that would be achieved by capturing Berlin
should not be permitted to override the imperative military
consideration which was the destruction of the German armed*
I
forces. !
It is not known whether the question of competing
political and military issueB relating to Eisenhower's
decision not to make an all-out push was presented to !
40 !
President Roosevelt. His death occurred very shortly j
|
after Eisenhower resolved the matter. It has been con- j
i
--- 39Ib±d. . , „pp_ 441, .444-445. ^°Ibld., p. 445. J
jectured that very likely if the matter has been referred
to Roosevelt he would have upheld the United States Chiefs
4l
of Staff.
At this time Eisenhower had knowledge of the oc
cupation zones which had been provided for by the Allied
protocol. It is possible that the fact that he knew that
if the Allied armies drove across Germany to Berlin they
would very shortly be obliged to evacuate the extensive
areas they would have taken was an important reason Eisen
hower decided against this course. However., it appears
that this factor was not one considered by Eisenhower in
making his decision. The push toward Leipzig involved the
same consequence of later delivering over to the Russians
large areas captured by Western armies. Eisenhower himself
has said that the sole factor on which he acted was his
military judgment as to what would speed ultimate victory.
He said the future division of Germany did not influence
42
his military plans.
General Eisenhower had also discussed the military
aspects of a drive to Berlin with General Omar N. Bradley
after the Western armies had crossed the Rhine. It was
Eisenhower's opinion that a strong push from the Elbe to
4l
Ibid.
lip .
Dwight D. Elsenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden
City. N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1948), PP* 376,
105
Berlin might entail 100,000 casualties. Eisenhower and
Bradley saw Berlin as only a political prize and not, par
ticularly, a militarily desirable conquest. Eisenhower re
garded potentially 100,000 casualties as a heavy price to
pay for a "prestige objective." 0
Bradley concurred wholeheartedly in Eisenhower’s
attitude. He could see no political advantage from the
capture of Berlin which would outweigh the need for quick
annihilation of the German army. He said that as soldiers
he and Eisenhower looked disapprovingly on the British de
sire to complicate the war with political perspective and
44
non-military objectives.
Bradley also said, however, that if the occupation
zones had not been established, he might have agreed that
an all-out onslaught upon Berlin might be politically
worthwhile. But he could see no justification for bearing
heavy casualties in the capture of a city which it would
be necessary to promptly hand over to the Russians. In
Bradley's opinion, even prestige could not compensate for
45
the additional casualties he thought would result.
On April 7, 1945 General Eisenhower informed the
Combined Chiefs of Staff that he deemed it unwise from a
^Omar n . Bradley, A Soldier's Story (New York: Henryj
Holt and Company, 1951J* PP. 535-536".
44Ibid. 45Ibid., p. 537.
lo6j
“ military viewpoint to endeavor to take Berlin. In Eisen-
hower's judgment it was much more important to make a
thrust toward Leipzig and divide the enemy west of the
Elbe. Eisenhower also said that he regarded it as very
advisable that the Allied left flank in Northern Germany
establish itself on the Baltic coast near Lubeck and thereby
prevent the Russians from spilling over into Schleswig-
Holstein. Eisenhower indicated that if after Leipzig was
taken it appeared possible to capture Berlin without un
duly heavy costs, he would certainly do so. However,
Eisenhower noted that at that time the Soviet forces were
only thirty-five miles from Berlin.
Admiral Leahy wrote that according to his notes
there was no evidence that the Combined Chiefs ever took up
the question of whether to try to outrace the Russians to
46
Berlin. Every indication is that the matter was left to
the judgment of Eisenhower, and by April 8 it was appar
ent what his decision was. On that date Eisenhower told
Montgomery that it was his duty to protect Bradley's north-
47
ern flank during Bradley's advance upon Leipzig. :
After the possibility of driving toward Berlin was,;
in effect, decided contrary to the desires of the British, :
! t
; Churchill took a different tack. He then strongly advocated
i
I
1
i ^ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ;
! 46
Leahy, op. cit., p. 351.
l l r 7
'Pogue, op. cit., p. 446. ;
......... 107
|a settling of political Issues before Western armies should
[give up German areas within the zone assigned to Russia.
(On April 7, 1945 Churchill sent the British Chiefs of Staff
instructions and ordered that upon contact with the Russian
:troops the forces of the two countries should rest opposite
ieach other. He specifically directed that if the British
took territory within'the Russian zone that it should not
;be given up on military grounds. Churchill said that this
[was a political issue to be taken up between the govern-
j
ments and was to be considered in the light of what the
[Russians did in other areas. He insisted that a matter of
i 48
[this kind be referred to him and to Roosevelt.
Immediately after the death of President Roosevelt*
which occurred on April 12, 194-5* Churchill sought to ap-
!praise the matter of occupation zones anew. On April 14
'he raised this question in a message to the Chiefs of Staff
and informed them that in his opinion Western troops should
;not retire from any territory occupied by them within the
;Russian zone until existing political issues were resolved.
jHe stated that it was necessary that the British and Ameri-
|can Governments make sure that there was in fact a friendly
!and fair execution of the zones previously agreed upon.
Churchill said that the question-was above the sphere of
49
purely military decision by a commander in the field.
^Churchill, op. cit., pp. 512-513- ^ Ibid.
io8;
At this point another sharp difference of point of
view was precipitated between the British and Americans.
The underlying Issue was again that of whether political
considerations were at all pertinent in determining how
the closing phases of the war Bhould be fought. General
Eisenhower said that the war should be conducted without
considering the zonal boundaries that had been agreed upon
previously. He regarded it as entirely impractical for
either the Western armies or the Russian forces to restrict
their operations to areas drawn for purposes of occupation.
He felt that both the Eastern and Western armies should be
free to advance until they contacted each other. When this
occurred either the Red Army or SHAEF should be authorized
to request the other to withdraw into the boundaries pro-
50
vided for by the zonal protocol.
The BritiBh Chiefs of Staff took a very different
attitude. They held not only that while hostilities were
in progress the zonal boundaries should be entirely ig
nored, but also that the military forces once they had oc
cupied any area should remain there until ordered by their
government to draw back into the borders agreed upon. The
British Chiefs posited their conclusions on both military
51
and political grounds.
^°Pogue, op. cit., p. 465. ^1Ibid.
109!
The British attitude elicited objections from the
United States War Department and also the State Department.
Officials of the European and Russian Affairs Divisions of
the State Department declared that for governments to di
rect maneuvers of troops implied political action and that
the tactics and actions of Western troops should remain
solely a military matter. These officials were apprehensive
that following the British suggestion would probably moti
vate the Russians to hasten to seize as much German terri
tory as they possibly could before the end of the war came.
The War Department concluded that the State Department
wanted the last dayB of the war fought on strictly military
considerations. The War Department also was strongly of
the opinion that only military factors should be taken
52
into account.
Although the view of Churchill and the British mil
itary chieftains relative to making a drive for Berlin and
injecting political purposes into military operations did
not prevail, Churchill continued to contend vigorously for
refraining from a speedy withdrawal of Allied troops within !
their zonal borders. President Roosevelt died on April 12,
1945. Within a few days of Roosevelt's death, on April 18,
Churchill wrote a message to President Truman on the subject
of the occupation zones. Churchill told Truman that in his
52Ibid.
! • 110
1 • I
I |
jopinion that were two zones, the tactical zones and the
occupation zones. The tactical zones Churchill considered
'as military zones of operation. The zones of occupation,.
i ' '
Isald Churchill, he had agreed upon with Roosevelt upon ad- '
ivice of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Churchill Informed
;Truman that in his opinion the zones of occupation should
;be occupied within a certain time of Victory in Europe Day,
whenever the time should be declared.
; Churchill stated that he was willing to adhere to
i
the occupation zones, but he did not want British or Ameri
can troops "hustled back at any point by some crude asser
tion of a local Russian general." Churchill wanted this <
issue settled by an agreement between the governments of
;
I the three powers.
i ,
In the same message Churchill remarked that the
I :
; zones were decided "rather hastily" at Quebec in September,
j
| 19^* when it was not yet foreseen that the Western armies ;
: would make such inroads into Germany and Central Europe.
I Churchill said that the zones could not be changed without <
i :
I agreement with the Russians. Churchill advised Truman that!
' just as soon as VE Day came, they should try to establish, j
| !
I the Allied Control Commission in Berlin and arrange for a :
|
division of the food produced in Germany among all the
1
zones. He pointed out that the main food producing sec- j
-^Churchill, op. cit., p. -^Ibid.
Ill;
tions of Germany would be In the Russian zone. Churchill
wanted the question of distribution of food resolved before
the British and American troops were redeployed within
their zones.
Churchill's message of April 18 to Truman revealed
a number of significant points as follows: (l) Churchill's
words indicated a clear element of dissatisfaction with the
zones as agreed upon. He said they were decided "rather
hastily." He stated that they were accepted before it was
realized that Eisenhower's armies would move so far into
Germany. (2) Churchill was pushing for a new settlement
between governments. He wanted an opportunity for a dis
cussion of political questions at the top level. (3)
Churchill was sparring for a way to delay redeployment of
Allied troops within their respective zones. (4) Churchill
wanted the Allied Control Commission set up and the matter
of food distribution resolved before withdrawal of troops
within the zones.
Although Churchill did not say so, a reading be
tween the lines of his words reveals that he felt the
zones as arranged were a mistake. He was worried and was
striving to salvage the situation as best he could.
Truman has written in his Memoirs about Churchill's
message. Truman makes mention of Churchill's statement
that the occupation zones were decided upon at the Quebec
Conference in September, 1944 in haste. Truman's reaction
!~ ' ' ' 112
I
i
!was that this state of affairs showed conclusively that
!
heads of state should be very careful about "horseback
agreements,1 1 because it is not possible to foresee their
ultimate result.^
Truman said he took his time in answering Churchill I
and that before he replied to Churchill he made a careful
study of the occupation zones. Truman remarked that he was
fully aware of what was troubling Churchill, for he already
jrealized how difficult and annoying it was to deal with the
Russians.
Truman said that upon inquiring into the matter he
found that the United States and Britain were clearly com-
;mitted to the zones in Germany. Truman concluded that he
i
could see no valid reason for reneging on an agreement to
I
iWhich the United States was definitely committed. He also '
l
|felt that he could see no purpose in interfering with mili
tary operations which were successful. In Truman's opinion
the only practical course of action was for the Western
Allies to honor their agreement and to do everything in
! 56
their power to make the Russians do the same. ;
| On April 23 Truman replied to Churchill's message
j :
!in this vein and also suggested that a draft proposal be
i |
sent to Stalin suggesting that the troops be drawn back j
- . - i
-^Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, I (Garden City, N, Y,:
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955),
56Ibid., p. 214.
J
113
.into their zones as soon as the military situation per
mitted and outlining the procedure to be followed in oc-
57
cupying the respective zones.
According to Admiral.Leahy, Truman pointed out to
Churchill that the zones of occupation were the subject of
long and careful negotiation. The area allotted to Russia*
said Truman* was not in dispute and was on the lines ad
vanced by the British as early as 19^3* These comments
were apparently to tell Churchill that his representation '
that the zones were "rather hastily" drawn at Quebec in
O
September* 19^4 was not accepted by Truman.
Truman also said in his message to Churchill that
the fact that the Russian zone contained the greater por
tion of the food producing' areas of Germany was known all
the while the negotiations relative to the zones were car
ried on. Acceptance of the zones was in no way tied to
satisfactory arrangements in regard to distribution of
German food. Truman said that a demand for modification
of zones or for an agreement as to equitable distribution
of food could very well have serious consequences. He
said the Russians could very well treat this as a repudia-
59
tion of the formal agreement on the zones.
Leahy remarked with respect to Truman’s message*
"Thus* the British Prime Minister got a sample of the frank
^Ibid. ^^Leahy* op. cit., p. 350. ^^Ibid.
and direct manner in which the new American President would '
approach their joint problems
It should be noted in regard to Truman's message
that it is possible that he was mistaking the point Church
ill was trying to make. Truman was inferring that Churchill
•was asking for a modification of the zonal agreement. Per
haps Churchill was only suggesting a delay in redeploying
of troops withi.n the zonal boundaries. Churchill was
pointing out that it would be very unfortunate if the
Western Powers fulfilled their obligations while RusBia
violated its agreements.
Both the State Department and American military
leaders believed that Churchill was suggesting the possi
bility of renegotiating and perhaps altering the occupation
zones.^ When the State Department informed the War De
partment of Churchill's message it stressed the nature of
the international contract with respect to the zones and
the necessity to adhere to it. The course of action being
suggested by the British was viewed by the Americans as a
breach and repudiation of the EAC agreements. The United
States believed that if any such proposal, as it under
stood the Prime Minister to be making, should become known
6ot, .
Ibid.
6lHlstory of the Civil Affairs Division, World War II
to March,' 194b, Chapter 8, pp. 13-14. Historical Manu-
script File, Office of the Chief of Military History,
Department of the Army.
115,
to the Russians and was coupled with delay or refusal on
General Eisenhower's part to accede to a militarily justi
fied request for withdrawal of American troops, actual
clashes between Soviet and American forces might be pre
cipitated.
Churchill was largely dissatisfied with Truman's
reply. Churchill wrote back to Truman immediately pointing
out that the later paragraphs of Truman's message simply
would allow the Russians to order, the American and British
forces back within their occupation zones at any point they
might decide. This would affect the Americans primarily,
and it would entail yielding up an enormous territory to
the Russians while the question of Western spheres in Vienna
and arrangements for a triple occupation of Berlin remained
i j 62
unresolved.
On April 26, Truman cabled Churchill that of course
any agreement relative to withdrawal of troops within the
zones would have to be by all three powers. Truman and
Churchill also agreed on a final version of a message to
Stalin. Churchill'b influence is readily apparent in this ■
message. It stated that the immediate task of the Allied
armies was the final defeat of the German Army, and that
until that was accomplished the boundaries between the
military units should be determined by the commanders in
Churchill, op. cit., p. 516.
the field. The communication to Stalin said that orders
had already been issued to Eisenhower that, to avoid con
fusion between military forces of the Western and Soviet
armies, as soon as they met both sides should halt, and only
readjust their positions to the degree deemed necessary by
the field commanders to deal with any remaining enemy hos
tilities.^
Stalin was informed that Eisenhower had been in
structed that after the cessation of hostilities, his
troops should be moved about only in accordance with mili
tary requirements regardless of the boundaries of the
zones. Eisenhower was not to make any major adjustments
except upon the orders of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Churchill's message asked Stalin that he issue
similar instructions to his commanders in the field.
What Churchill's message achieved, and what Church
ill was very obviously after, was to avoid a hurried and
automatic withdrawal of troopB within their zones. At
least Churchill achieved a temporary delay. This left the ;
door open to raise political issues before the redeployment!
of troops occurred. Churchill knew what he wanted and
achieved it in a limited way for the moment.
Stalin replied to Churchill's message on May 2,
1945. Truman has written that Stalin said he would proceed)
63Ibld., pp. 517-518.
11.71
64
along the lines set forth In Churchill's message to him.
This would seem to be an overstatement. Churchill more ac-
6 6
curately describes Stalin’s reply as "guarded." Stalin
merely stated very laconically that the Soviet High Command
had Issued instructions that when the Soviet and Allied
forces met the Soviet Command should immediately establish
contact with the Command of the American and English forces*
and that they should in agreement together define a provi
sional tactical demarcation boundary line and take measures
to suppress any opposition by the German forces within such
provisional boundary line.
Stalin said nothing about the redeployment of
troops within the zones. He agreed to the minimum of what
was absolutely necessary. •
Near the end of April* 1945 Eisenhower was seeking
to stop the military momentum of his forces on a well-de
fined geographical line in Germany. At this time again an
issue of political versus military considerations arose.
The British Chiefs of Staff contended that very important
political advantages could be easily won by liberating
Prague* the capital of Czechoslovakia. The British said
that an effort to speed into Czechoslovakia should not de
tract from the Allied offensives in the direction of the
Baltic or towards Austria. However* they wanted a military
^ Ibid. * p. 216. ^Churchill* op. cit., p. 518.
jspurt Into Czechoslovakia also. General Marshall sent
these views of the British on to Eisenhower and commented
|
with respect to them'that he would be very loathe to hazard :
'American lives for purely political purposes.^
Truman writes in his Memoirs that on April 23, 19^5
the American Embassy in London received a message from the j
British Foreign Office in which Anthony Eden suggested that :
it was highly advisable politically to have American forces
liberate Prague. On April 30 Truman received a note from
1
Churchill saying that capture of Prague and as much of !
Czechoslovakia as possible would have a very beneficial ;
effect in achieving a satisfactory post-war situation in j
Central Europe. He recommended that this be brought to ;
6*7 ’
Eisenhower's attention.
It is significant to note that Truman records that
68
the State Department had the same idea as Churchill.
This is revealing in that it shows that the State Depart- j
ment had at least some receptivity to political factors.
It, too, favored Integrating political and military con- |
siderations in fighting the last stages of the war.
Joseph C. Grew, Acting Secretary of State, sent a
j .
memorandum to Truman asking that the Joint Chiefs of Staff j
i
consider liberating Prague for the political advantages to j
66
Pogue, op. cit.. p. 468.
Truman, op. cit.. pp. 216-217. 6®Ibid.
be derived. Grew advised Truman that Western liberation !
!
of Prague would strengthen the bargaining positions of the
United States vis a vis the Soviets. At this time the Amer-j
lean Third Army was already deep in Austria, Grew pointed j
out, in territory which might be claimed by Russia. Grew
believed that if the Americans could also take a consider- ;
able part of Czechoslovakia, including Prague, this would
put the United States in a strong position in negotiating
with the Soviet Government on both Austria and Czechoslo
vakia.^
However, the prospect of a drive toward Prague was
left to General Eisenhower to decide on military grounds.
This was another instance of simply refusing to recognize '
the relevancy of political issues late in the war and re-
j
solving Important matters solely on the basis of military j
I
considerations. I
General Eisenhower decided that the primary Allied j
thrusts would be to the north in the direction of Lubeck ;
and Kiel and to the south toward Linz and the Austrian Re- j
l
doubt. He assured General Marshall that he would not underf
;
take a move merely to gain a political prize, unless he re-j
70!
ceived orders from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to do so. j
69Ibid., p. 216.
Pogue, op. cit., p. 468.
120
I
On May 4 Elsenhower Informed the Russians of his
willingness to move from Pllzen and Karlsbad in Northwestern
Czechoslovakia deeper Into that country up to the western
banks of the Elbe and Moldau Rivers. The Soviet General
Antonov expressed dissent and asked Eisenhower not tQ ad
vance beyond his present position to avoid "a confusion of
forces.1 1 Eisenhower assured General Antonov that he would
71 •
abide by his wishes. By this action, the Russians were
left to seize Prague and most of Czechoslovakia.
After the war ended in Europe, Churchill returned
to advocating his plan of not redeploying Western troops
within their zones until Russia gave satisfaction that she
would fulfill her promises. On May 6 Churchill in a mes
sage to Truman renewed his plea that America and Britain
hold their lines which extended into Austria, Czechoslo
vakia, and Yugoslovia on the American front and to Lubeck
and Denmark on the British frpnt. Then, Churchill told
Truman that they should reconsider their attitude toward
the Soviets and show them what they could offer or with
hold.^ In this same message Churchill suggested a meeting;
between the heads of government of the three countries.
71Ibid., p. 469.
72Truman, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 218; Herbert Feis,
Between War and Peace (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Univer-
sity frees, I960), p. 75.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " . . . . . . . . . . . . . " . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ■ “ i2ii
Truman said that he knew what was troubling Church-j
I
ill, and he could share his views with respect to the prob-;
lems that lay ahead. But Truman said that he could not ac-;
cept Churchill's method. Truman wrote back to Churchill
that he was also of the opinion that a meeting of the heads j
of government was desirable. However, he told Churchill
that for the present it was his intention to adhere to the ;
7-3
Yalta agreements.1- ^
In another communication to Truman on May 11,
Churchill again reiterated his strong desire that American
74
forces should not draw back from their tactical lines.
Churchill also suggested that he and Truman either sever
ally or jointly invite Stalin to a Tripartite meeting in
July. Churchill wanted Truman to come to Britain and pro- j
posed that they then leave together to meet Stalin. This J
i
proposal waB rejected by Truman because he wanted to avoid !
!
giving Stalin the feeling that Britain and America were I
"ganging up" on him. D
On May 12 Churchill sent his "Iron Curtain" tele- j
gram to Truman. Churchill said he was "profoundly con- j
ly/T j
cerned about the European situation." He cautioned Tru- j
I
■ ■ - '.I ■ ». ■ - . ■ - I I ' ■ - !
i
7o !
-^Truman, op. cit., p, 219. j
^Churchill, op. cit., p. 571. j
T5Ibld., p. 577. |
76Ibid., p. 572. i
; ' ~ .."" ' 122j
! |
jman that it was vital to come to an understanding with the
iRussians, or ascertain where they were with them, before
;
'weakening Western armies or retiring within the zones.
jChurchill believed that things could only be worked out at |
ja personal meeting with Stalin. Churchill also advised - I
|
'Truman that in his opinion the issue of a settlement with
,Russia before Western military strength in Europe melted
77
iaway dwarfed all other issues.
i
j Churchill was urging not only deferring the with- I
|drawal of troops within the zones, but he was also pressing
j
■for maintaining the largest possible military strength in
i
'Europe.7® But Truman was concerned that the war with Japan;
,was still in progress. Truman's approach to the problem
jof difficulties with Russia was for Britain and the United j
i I
[States to stick to their agreements and to keep insisting
• 79
I that Russia do likewise. ^
Churchill was unhappy with‘Truman's expression of
! "ganging.up" on Russia. He felt that the use of such a
;disparaging term was unwarranted. He also disliked what |
j I
!he deemed to be implied by this kind of terminology--that j
j
the chasm opening up was only between Britain and Russia. |
Churchill believed that in any impending differences with ;
77Ibld., pp. 572-574.
7®Truman, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 217.
79Ibid. j
----------------- J
123
Russia the United States was equally as concerned as was
1 , 4 • 4. 80
his country.
The British Prime Minister was very actively pur
suing every avenue open to him to get a settlement with
Russia before the West lost Its bargaining position, as he
viewed the situation. Churchill was now seeking to obtain
a meeting of the Big Three at the earliest possible date.
What Churchill wanted to forestall was a withdrawal of
troops within the zones before a personal meeting of heads
of state. One way of forestalling this eventuality was to
advance the meeting to an early date, Churchill now took
O * j
thiB approach.
Churchill was convinced that there was a great
change in the Russian demeanor towards the West. He was
deeply disturbed by what he regarded as breaches of the
Yalta agreements, the dart toward Denmark, Marshall Tito's
aggressive conduct in Yugoslavia* and Russian recalcitrance
in Austria and Poland. Churchill now felt that a funda
mental change in circumstances and in Soviet behavior had
occurred since the time two years prior when the zones
•were first carved. Churchill wanted a general settlement
of issues immediately, before Russia should take over the
82;
heart of Germany and Central Europe from American troops.
80„.
Churchill, op. cit.. p. 577.
8lj£ld., p. 601. 82Ibid.. pp. 601-602.
124;
On June 1 the Prime Minister received a note from
Truman saying that Stalin was agreeable to a meeting on
July 15. Churchill replied-at once saying that the July 15
date was much too late in view of the extremely grave ques
tions requiring attention. He said June 15 would be de
sirable , but that if this date was not possible, why hot
July 1, 2, or 3? The President replied informing Churchill
that July 15 was the earliest, feasible date for him.
Churchill concluded that he could presB the matter ho
further.83
On June 4 Churchill cabled Truman that he hoped
Truman understood his anxiousness for an early meeting
with Stalin. He said he viewed with "profound misgivings"
a retreat of United States forces from Central Europe. He >
told Truman that nothing really important had yet been
settled with Russia, and that the two of them would bear
great responsibility for the future. Churchill referred
to the high-handed behavior of the Russians in Vienna which;
84 ' '
was supposed to be a jointly-occupied city.
During late May and early June, 1945 the problem of!
endeavoring to get the Allied Control Commission estab
lished and functioning was considered of great importance
in the United States and Britain, but especially in the
83Ibid., p. 599.
Q J j
Ibid., p. 603j Truman, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 301-
125!
United States, Truman's opinion was that it was imperative!
to set up the Allied Control Commission at the earliest pos-
sible moment. ^ He believed that there was danger of com-,
plete economic and social collapse in Germany. It is in
teresting to note that Churchill although desirous of hav- :
ing the Allied Control Commission established at an early
.date was not nearly as concerned with this problem as with
that' of forestalling a withdrawal of troops within the
prescribed zones. At this period while Truman was empha-
sizing the Control Commission, the big issue to Churchill
was that of troop redeployment.
What Churchill feared most was being precipitated
by the inevitable chain of events. General Eisenhower was
informing the American Government that a program was neededi
at once to prevent the development of dire economic and
» social conditions in Germany. On May 26, 19^5 Winant was
instructed by Joseph Grew, United States Acting Secretary
of State, to suggest to the EAC that the Commanders in
Chief of the four zones meet in Berlin not later than June '
1 to sign and promulgate the declaration on the defeat of
Germany and the assumption of authority over the country.
The additional proposal of the United States was that im
mediately after the announcement of the declaration of the ;
defeat of Germany and the formal statement of taking over !
85Ibid., p. 300.
126!
I
all political power In Germany the Allied Control Council j
should begin to function. The organization of the Control
Council was to be effectuated by the Commanders-in-Chief.
The Soviets accepted the idea, and Eisenhower lost no time
In telling the British and French of Russian assent. How- • :
ever, Eisenhower wanted a few days' delay beyond June 1 in
order to get prepared.
On June 2 Eisenhower, as head of SHAEF, cabled the
Combined Chiefs of Staff for instructions in regard to the
date of redeployment of Allied troops within their, zones.
Eisenhower anticipated that this question would be raised
by the Russians in Berlin on June 5* Eisenhower'S telegram;
pointed out that it was very possible that the Russians
would take the position that a withdrawal of Western troops:
should be a condition precedent to the establishment of the|
Control Council. He said that any delay in the setting up j
of the Control Council would then be attributed to America
and Britain. Eisenhower said that he deemed it advisable
to issue separate instructions to him as the United States j
Commander and to the British commander before the Berlin ■
meeting as to how they were to reply if the issue was put
forth by the Russians.
On June 3 the United StateB Chiefs of Staff, with j
President Truman's assent, instructed Eisenhower that the j
■ . . . ■ - . i . . . i - . ■ . ■ . . . . . . . i . . ■ . . . . . . . . . . , - , ■ . . , . — , , ■ - . . }
o^r !
Truman, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 301; Feis, Between War
and Peace, p. l4l.
question of withdrawal into the zones should not be a pre
requisite to the establishment of the Control Council and
the turning over of the respective zones in Berlin. Eisen
hower was told that in the event the Russians brought up :
the matter he should state that this was an issue to be !
worked out by the Control Council. With respect to the
timing and the actual mechanics of troop withdrawal, it was
to be stated that this was a military matter. It would
take place as soon as the United States forces were able to
move back within the American zone., and the British and
Oiy
Russian military units were prepared to take over.
On June 5 the four Commanders-in-Chief met in Ber
lin to sign the declaration of the defeat of Germany and
the assumption of supreme authority. There was consider
able dissatisfaction on the part of Generals Eisenhower and '
Montgomery due to the fact that they were kept waiting be
fore they were able to meet the Russian General Zhukov.
Both grew impatient and felt that a breach of official
courtesy was occurring, and each threatened to leave Berlin
and return to his headquarters.
Prior to the signing of the declaration, Montgomery;
had a meeting with Zhukov at his residence. Montgomery com-f
menced to discuss the establishment of the Control Council j
j
and suggested that subordinates of the four commanders be- j
^Truman, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 301j Feis, Between
War- and Peace, p ♦ 1^1 ~ _____
'" ■ ' ■ 128]
gin to discuss the various pressing problems which the j
Control Council would have to face. Zhukov disagreed with j
Montgomery. He said categorically that no work could be
gin until the Western Allies handed over to Russia the pop- j
tions of the Russian zones they occupied. Zhukov stated J
that this withdrawal should take place at once. Montgomery j
replied to Zhukov by telling him that there were problems I
of disentanglement which would have to be disposed of be
fore a withdrawal could be made, and that, in any event,
the date of withdrawal must necessarily be determined by
the governments of the three powers. Zhukov accepted this
point of view. However, he said that Berlin would not be 1
I
in condition to receive any part of the Control Council i
for several weeks. Montgomery said that this sounded j
"ominous" to him.®® J
i
When Montgomery left Zhukov he went to visit Eisen-!
I
i
hower at his villa. Montgomery discussed his conversation j
I
with Zhukov and the trouble that seemed to be brewing. !
After his brief visit with Zhukov, Montgomery was convinced
:that it would be impossible to achieve any cooperation with
the Russians until Western troops were removed from the
Russian zone, ! ■
OO
Field Marshal Montgomery, Memoirs (New York: The
jNew American Library of World Literature, 1958)y P* 3^1*
Eisenhower and Montgomery were both aware of the
divergent views of their governments as to troop withdraw-
I
!
als. Montgomery had been told by his government the day
before he went to Berlin that it attached the greatest im
portance to British and American armies standing firm on
j
their existing tactical lines. Montgomery had been in- j
formed very explicitly that the de facto occupation of
large portions of the Russian zone was an important bargain-*
ing factor for getting satisfaction on a number of out
standing issues. However* the United States Government
was not willing to commit itself to delaying the with- j
drawal until the Big Three conferred. In the final analy- '
i
sis* if the Russians were insistent* the Americans were j
willing to concede that the zonal agreement should be put j
into effect. j
j
When Eisenhower and Montgomery discussed the situa
tion they felt that the differing points of view of their |
governments put them in a somewhat awkward position in |
sparring with Zhukov. Eisenhower did not see how the two j
of them could backtrack on the solemn agreements of the j
United States and Britain. He believed that this would j
wreck forthwith any prospect of getting along with the
Russians.
Montgomery said that he shared Eisenhower's view
but was* of course* bound by the orders of his government.
! ’ ’ ~ ............ "130
I
'The two generals decided to handle the question of with-
j
drawal within the zones by saying that this was something ;
\
that required inter-governmental decision. j
The declaration of the defeat of Germany was signed j
by the four generals late in the afternoon. After the sign-j
1
ing, the four with their adviserB held a private meeting.
This meeting was apparently of short duration. Zhukov acted
as chairman of the session. Eisenhower suggested that the
installing of the Control Council in Berlin be discussed.
Zhukov abruptly and directly said that this subject could i
not be discussed until Western troops were evacuated from
the areas in the Soviet zone which they were occupying il- '
legally. The term "illegally" was used by Zhukov according I
Q 0 i
to Eisenhower’s account of the meeting. The use of this-■
1
term indicated how the Russians felt about the presence of !
Western forces in areas within the zone assigned to the j
Soviet Union.
Eisenhower then suggested that both questions— that
of the Control Council and evacuation of troops— be dis-
; cussed. But Zhukov again said "No," that he could not dis
cuss the first question until the second was settled. He
; said he could not discuss the establishment of the Control i
I Council until the Western troops were all within their own
|
! zones, or at least until a date was set for the withdrawal.
! 9
1
i - - ■ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — — - ■ ■ — . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
^ Ibid., p. 342. 9°Eisenhower, oPt cit., p.474.
131 .
!
Zhukov also added that the boundaries of the French zone
would have to be definitely determined before he would be
able to talk about the Control Council.
Montgomery explained to Zhukov that it would require
some time to get the troops back into the zones. Zhukov
wanted to know how long, and Montgomery said at least three
weeks. Zhukov found this entirely satisfactory and added
that during this time the Commanders-in-Chief could assemble
their staffs for the Control Council.
Eisenhower made a few remarks which closed the meet
ing. He stated that he had come to Berlin believing that
it would be possible to consider the setting up of the Con
trol Council and the troop withdrawal simultaneously, but
that from Zhukov’s statements it was apparent that this was
not true. Eisenhower then stated that there was nothing
further that could be done at the moment, that each of them
would necessarily be required to report to his respective
91
government and request further instructions.
After this conversation with Zhukov, both Eisen
hower and Montgomery were very much convinced that no pro- j
gress could be made with the Russians in getting the Con
trol Council in operation until Western troops were removed
from the Soviet zone. It was crystal clear that the Rus- j
sians were reacting very strongly about the presence of
-^Montgomery, op. cit., p. 3^3*
132
Western troops In the zone intended for them.
Eisenhower advised the Chiefs of Staff that there
was little to gain and much to lose by keeping American
troops in the Russian zone. His political adviser, Robert
D. Murphy, informed the State Department of Eisenhower’s
view.^2
General Eisenhower himself has provided to the
world no direct account of his conversation of June 5 in
Berlin with Zhukov in regard to the evacuation of Western
troops. In his book Crusade in Europe Eisenhower describes
his meeting with Zhukov but touches only upon the superfi-
QQ
cialities of the meeting. J However,. Eisenhower did say in
Crusade in Europe that he supported a policy of firm ad
herence to the pledged word of the American Government.
Eisenhower comments that some of his associates advised
him to refuse to withdraw American troops from the Soviet
zone, reasoning that this would induce the Russians to keep
their word. Eisenhower said flatly that in his opinion
this attitude was "indefensible." He was convinced that 1
to commence associations with the Soviets on the basis of
refusing to carry out a prior agreement would wreck any
chances of cooperation from the beginning. Eisenhower also
^2Peis, Between War and Peace, p. 142.
^Eisenhower, op. cit., pp. 435-437.
133
stated that he was fully supported by the War Department
Q4
In this view.
On his way from Moscow to Washington, Harry Hopkins
stopped off in Frankfurt to see General Eisenhower and
Robert D. Murphy. Eisenhower evidently presented his |
thoughts to Hopkins very unequivocally and strongly. On
June 8, upon his return to Washington, Hopkins reported to
President Truman and General Marshall that Eisenhower was
convinced that uncertainty about troop removal from the
Soviet zone was sure to be misunderstood by Russia and very
probably also in the United States. It would serve only to
delay and render impossible the activation of the Control
Council.^
Hopkins also advised, very probably upon the sug
gestion of Eisenhower and Murphy, that as an incident of
working out the details of the troop withdrawal, the Western
Allies should obtain firm commitments from the Soviets on
various related problems. These matters included that
Western troops enter Berlin, and that free access to Berlin)
on specified routes from Bremen and Frankfurt be guaranteed]
Hopkins also counseled President Truman that very poBSibly '
the unresolved differences over zones in Austria and Vienna'
j
should be worked out as a matter concomitant with the evac-!
^ Ibid., p. 474.
^Feis, Between War and Peace, p. 142.
134
96 i
uation of Western forces from the Soviet zone. ■
General Montgomery saw the issue of realignment of
Western troops the same as did Eisenhower. After the June
5 meeting with Zhukov., Montgomery advised the British
Government that he thought the only thing to do was for the
troops to get back into their zones at the earliest pos
sible date. He felt, however, that if British and American
troops had actually captured Berlin, Prague, and Vienna,
he would view the question in a different light. The Brit
ish General felt that the capture of these capitals by the
West would have" been possible. But facing the realities
that existed in June, 1945* Montgomery believed that there
were no military reasons for keeping Western troops where
they were. He was of the opinion that the political fac
tors were all weighed in the direction of withdrawal. On
the appraisal of the political considerations, Montgomery
was diametrically opposed to the attitude of Churchill and
the British Government. Churchill wanted the troops to
remain for political reasons. Montgomery favored with
drawing them because he deemed this politically desirable, i
The underlying consideration in Montgomery's mind appears
to have been that without the troop evacuation, the Control;
97
Council would not become a reality.
96Ibid., pp. 14 2-14-3.
^Montgomery, op. cit., p. 344. .
135'
In his Memoirs Montgomery says that a year later—
:in 1946--when he visited Eisenhower in Washington, the two
i ■ :
;discussed and reminiBced about the troop realignment issue.
!At that time Eisenhower was of the opinion that if the I
!Western Allies had stood firm, Russia would have given in, |
j |
I and that if, in the unlikely circumstance that Russia had
I used force to clear Western troops from its zone, the West !
iwould have fought back. At the time of this discussion,
!Montgomery, however, was apparently even more strongly of
I . :
the view that it was the right thing to do to withdraw the
!troops. He said he could not agree with the comments
;Eisenhower made in 1946. The British were thoroughly weary:
i with war and would never have accepted the prospect of
|fighting Russia. Any British Government that undertook to ;
i
I use military measures against Russia would have been repud-
i
!
! iated by the people. In addition, Britain was at the end
| of the line as far as her resources of manpower were con- |
j j
I cerned. Thus, Montgomery later believed that the action
; q8 i
; taken was proper. j
j I
| Another of Britain's military leaders, Field Mar- I
shall Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the British Imperial Staff,
also believed that it would be a serious mistake to refuse j
I
I
to withdraw Allied troops from the Russian zone as a means
of exerting political pressure upon the Soviet Government.
98Ibid.
Alanbrooke wrote in his dairy under date of May 23, 19^+5
that Churchill was insisting that portions of the Russian
Zone occupied by the Western Allies in their advance be re
tained aB a bargaining factor with the Russians. Alanbrooke
commented that taking into account the fact that the United
States and Britain had already agreed with the Russians as
to the.occupation zones, he considered Churchill as funda
mentally wrong in uBing the continued holding of areas as-
99
signed to Russia for bargaining purposes.
President Truman accepted the advice of Hopkins and
the conclusion of Eisenhower derived from his talk with
Zhukov. On June 12 Truman cabled Churchill of his decision
to withdraw American troops from the Soviet zone beginning
June 21. He told Churchill that because of the zonal agree-*
ment accepted by President Roosevelt after "long consider
ation and detailed discussion with you," he felt unable to
justify any further delay in withdrawing troops in order
to use pressure to settle other problems. Truman also said!
that he was informed that the Control Council could not be-i
gin to function until the troops were withdrawn, and that '
it would be "highly disadvantageous" to postpone action
i
until the forthcoming meeting with Stalin. Truman then
set forth a message he proposed to dispatch to Stalin. I
This message stated that Truman was ready to issue instruc-j
^Arthur Bryant, Triumph In the West (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1959)> P* 357*
........... 137
tions to American troops to begin removal into their zone
i l
I
on June 21 in accordance with arrangements between the mili-j
tary commanders. These arrangements were to include simul- t
.taneous movement of Western troops into their zones in
Berlin and provision of free access to Berlin for United
States forces by air., road, and rail from Frankfurt and j
Bremen. ' ;
Truman’s proposed message to Stalin also mentioned
that with respect to Austria the military commanders should j .
|
be responsible for determining the zones in Austria and in j
Vienna and the redeployment of forces. Only those matters I
which the commanders found themselves unable to ; resolve
should be. referred to the respective governments. Truman j
i
said that he considered the Austrian problem of equal ur- j
gency with the German one. |
!
Truman's suggestion that the commanders in the j
field establish the zones in Austria and the sectors in j
Vienna can be argued as showing how far American opinion j
!
had gone in placing matters of great political importance
I in the hands of the military. Problems pertaining to Aus-
; tria at this stage were well beyond the point of merely
! being military affairs. j
| Truman suggested to Churchill that if he agreed
I with the proposed message to Stalin, then appropriate in- j
138
structions ought to he issued immediately to the com- !
100
manders.
Ohurchill recorded his reaction to Truman'c cable
as follows: "This struck a knell in my breast. But I had
no choice but to submit."101
On June 14 Churchill sent his reply to Truman and
told him that, "We are obliged to conform to your decision."
However, Churchill took issue with Truman's statement that
the agreement concerning the zones was the subject of "long
i
consideration and detailed discussion" between himself and
President Roosevelt. He said references made to the agree-
102
ment at Quebec were brief.
In his message of April 18, 19^5 to Truman, Church
ill also tried to make the point that the zones of occupa- ;
tion were given cursory and hurried treatment at Quebec.
There can be no doubt that by the late spring of 19^5
Churchill regarded the zonal boundaries as a mistake. He
was certainly embarrassed and handicapped by the fact that
the Russian zone was drawn so far to the west in Germany.
He endeavored to dissociate himself from the zonal agree- I
ment, but he could do so only to the extent that limited
attention was given to the question of the zones by himself
- - - - - - - - - - - - - — - - - - - - - - - :- - - - - - - - - - - - j
10°Truman, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 303* j
101Churchill, op. cit., p. 605. i
10^Truman, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 30^ J Churchill, ojo. !
cit., p. 605,
139
and President Roosevelt at Quebec in September., 19^.
Churchill was obviously trying to downgrade the zonal pro
tocol.
But Churchill's statement to Truman that referencesi
to the zones of occupation at Quebec were brief is mis
leading. It overlooks the fact that it was a British Cab
inet Committee which first proposed the zones in largely
the form in which they were finally agreed to by the three
Great Powers. It conveniently bypasses the fact that the
EAC gave long consideration to the matter of the zones.
In his message of June l4, Churchill informed Tru
man that he did hot think that the commanders could be made
responsible for settling the outstanding questions pertain-;
ing to Austria. Consequently, Churchill asked Truman to
revise somewhat his proposed message to Stalin. He asked ;
Truman to alter his message so as to state that the rede
ployment of troops in Germany should occur at the same time^
as the movement of occupation forces into Vienna and the
establishment of the Allied Control Commission for Austria.|
Stalin should be informed that occupation policies for G e r - j
many and Austria should be put into operation simultan
eously.
Churchill told Truman very clearly and forthrightly]
that he attached great importance to the Russians moving j
out of the part of the British zone in Austria at the same ;
140;
f
time as Western soldiers left the Russian zone in Ger- j
103
many J
■ ' Truman accepted all of Churchill's proposals rela
tive to revising the message to Stalin. The message as
changed was sent by Truman to Stalin on June l4.
William D. Leahy* United StateB Chief of Staff*
said that Churchill's action in agreeing to the troop with
drawal was entirely unexpected. Churchill's acceptance of
President Truman's decision* in Leahy's words* "indicated
to me a possibility that the great Englishman was not in
vigorous health." "It was not*" said Leahy* "in Church
ill's nature or in accord with his past performance to give
up so easily, even when he was plainly wrong— as he was in
this matter,'^0^
On June 15 Churchill dispatched a message to Sta
lin. Churchill’s missive stated that Churchill had seen a
copy of President Truman's message. It also Informed Sta-
lin that Churchill* too* was ready to Issue Instructions to;
Montgomery to withdraw British troops within their zone in
conjunction with the movement of Western troops Into Ber
lin* and for provision for the free movement of British
forces by air, rail, and road to and from the British zone ;
to Berlin.
i
i
_____ = -----1
■^^Truman* op. cit., Vol. I* p. 30^j Churchill* 0£. !
cit.* pp. 605-600. ;
^^Leahy, op. cit.* p. 382,
Churchill also told Stalin that he endorsed what
Truman said about Austria. Churchill said that he expected;
that Stalin would issue instructions that Soviet troops
would leave the portion of Austria which it was agreed in
principle by the EAC that Britain should occupy at the sarne^
105
time as movements of troops began in Germany. ^
On June 17 Truman and Churchill both received a
message from Stalin which surprised them. He accepted the
plan proposed and stated that Russia would take all meas
ures necessary on its part in accordance therewith. How-
everj he said that there were difficulties involved in be
ginning the troop rearrangement on June 21 and asked that
it be delayed for a short period. Prom June 19 on Marshall
Zhukov and all other field commanders would be in Moscow
for the session of the Supreme Soviet and to participate
in a parade on June 24. Stalin also said that the work of ;
clearing Berlin of land mines was still not finished and
would not be completed until near the end of June. Conse-
quently, Stalin suggested that the withdrawal of troops
within their zones in both Germany and Austria be delayed ;
until July 1.1(^
On June 18 Truman replied to Stalin and told him
that he had issued orders to the American commanders to j
I
---------------- j
10^Churchill, op. cit., p. 6o6. !
T C \ f c \
Truman, op. cit., p. 3^5; Churchill, op. cit.,
p. 608.
begin the troop redeployment on July 1. The troop move-- '
ments were commenced on that date, and American and British
military forces were within their zones and their garrisons
were in their sectors of Berlin by July 4.
Although Churchill was very strongly against draw
ing Western troops back from the Soviet zone until a general
settlement of outstanding issues was made with Russia, in
his writings Churchill has not been critical of Truman's
position with respect to this matter. Churchill pointed
out that Truman had not been concerned or in any way con
sulted in the original fixing of the zones. The situation
as he faced it was whether or not to make a departure from
a commitment of his predecessor and to repudiate what had
been adopted as the policy of both the American and British,
Governments. Truman was faced with the matter within one
to two months after he assumed the Presidential office.
In addition, the advice of his civil and military advisers
was apparently unanimous in recommending that the zonal
protocol be put into operation. Truman's responsibility
was to decide whether such a fundamental change had occur- ;
red in relations with Russia that.an entirely new policy, ■
%
a completely different approach, should be adopted with the!
practical certainty of having charges of breach of faith |
leveled at him. Churchill summed up his attitude pertain- j
ing to Truman's stand by saying, "Those who are only wise
after the event should hold their peace.
A circumstance which played an important part in
the decision of the United States to withdraw its troops
from the Soviet zone was the belief in American quarters
that Churchill was primarily motivated by British imperial
istic interests. A British historian and military strate
gist, Sir Arthur Bryant, who has written a history of World
War II based on Field Marshal Alanbrooke's personal diaries,
has made much of this factor. He pictures President Truman
during the first few months of his presidency as being
Churchill, op. cit., p. 608.
One writer, Professor Denna F. Fleming, states that
in actuality President Truman reversed Roosevelt's policy
of trying to work with the Russians within a few weeks of
his accession to the presidency. Fleming says that it was
Roosevelt who fused the wartime coalition together. Roose
velt and Hull had convinced Russia that they meant to give ;
her a square deal. However, Fleming refers to Truman's I
sharp and blunt talk to Molotov at a meeting on April 23,
19^5, before Truman had been in office two weeks, and says j
that Truman was ready to begin the Cold War at that time.
Fleming contends that the years of labor by Roosevelt and -
Hull to build a basis of understanding with the Soviet leadr
ers was canceled out by Truman in a single, undiplomatic j
encounter with Molotov on April 23, 19^5. In Fleming's S
opinion, Truman waB not a cautious negotiator or mediator,
but a straightforward man of action. This is described as j
one of the important factors in causing the rapid deterior-;
ation in Western relations with the Soviet Union.
Fleming attributes Truman's strong stand toward
Russia to Admiral Leahy's influence. He says that after
Truman became President, Leahy briefed him each morning j
about the state of the world. According to Fleming, Leahy I
had a long-time aversion to the Russians. He coached Tru- j
man, supposedly, on the significance of Russia's emergence j
as a major power at the end of the war. In effect, these
tutoring sessions made Leahy one of the principal archi- j
tects of the tough policy toward Russia. (The Cold War and1
Its Origins, Vol. I, pp. 217-218, 266-269, 2 9 2 . ) ;
M ]
surrounded by both civilian and military advisers who were !
extremely suspicious of Churchill’s desire to hold back
territory from Russia until there was assurance that they
• I r\ Q
would live up to their agreements.
Sir Bryant referB to the attitude of Harry Hopkins,
Hopkins was very apprehensive that if Churchill were per
mitted to take the initiative in Allied dealings with Rus
sia, relations would deterioriate even more. An account of
Hopkins' views in Porrestal’s Dairy after a conversation
between Forrestal and Hopkins on May 23, 19^5 describes
Hopkins as being very skeptical of Churchill's motives and
purposes, especially in the matter of relations between the
Western Allies and the Soviets. Hopkins believed that it
was of utmost importance that the United States not permit
itself to be maneuvered into a position where Britain had i
America lined up with itself in a block against Russia to
achieve Britain's European policy.10^
The skepticism of the American leaders about Church
ill's proposals is further apparent from the comments of
others. Late in May, 19^5 Truman sent Joseph C. Davies,
former Ambassador to Moscow, to confer with Churchill and
explain the viewB of the leaderB in Washington relative to
the withdrawal of troops. When Davies reported back to the;
108Bryant, op. cit., pp. 355-356,
10^PeiB, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, p. 650.
x^z>
American Government he stated that he found Churchill
Igreatly disturbed. Churchill spoke vehemently against the
Russians. Davies said that he wondered whether Churchill
was not now ready to declare that Britain had made a mis
take in not supporting Hitler. Davies felt that Churchill
was now expressing the doctrine which Hitler and Goebbels
|had been proclaiming for the past several years. Churchill
jwas insistent and extreme in his statements in demanding
i
that the United States refrain from drawing back its mili
tary units. Churchill explained that "conditions had
i
I g r e a t l y c h a n g e d . " 1 1 ^
| However, Davies merely concluded that Churchill was
;"first, last, and all the time" a great Englishman, and
i
I that he was more concerned about preserving England's
j
|place in Europe than in preserving peace,111
j
| Admiral Leahy states that the report made by Davies
I when he returned to Washington after seeing Churchill was
1/
|consistent with the estimate of the military staff of
i
I
iChurchill's inclinations throughout the war. Leahy was
certain that Churchill was sincere in the belief that in
serving England's interests he was serving the cause of
112
peace.
It was also Davies' opinion that the British lead
er's bitter hostility toward the Soviets was known or at
11( 1Leahy, op. clt., p. 379.
211Ibld. . p. 380. ______________ 112Ibid.
least strongly suspected In Moscow. Davies placed a large
share of the blame for Russia's aggressiveness and pushing
aside of the Yalta agreements upon Its awareness of
Churchill's attitude.
Leahy remarked that It was apparent from Davies' '
report that Churchill was steadfastly refusing to accept
the fact that England no longer occupied its former posi
tion of dominance and power In Europe, and that he saw In
the presence of the American Army In force on the Continent
a hope of preserving Britain's otherwise vanishing position!
114
in European affairs.
It is adequately apparent from the views of Hopkins,-
Davies, and Leahy that there was a considerable amount of
distrust of Churchill's overriding purpose. He was seen as
a great English imperialist, and it was felt that the ;
United States should not be drawn into any schemes for
fulfilling British desires to maintain its hegemony in
Europe, and, thereby, spoil prospects of cooperating effec
tively with Russia. This was undoubtedly a weighty factor !
I
iin the American decision to redeploy United States military!
|
forces and endeavor to execute scrupulously all understand-j
ings with the Soviets.
To return to the matter of redeployment of troops j
' i
1 i
I within the zones, Stalin'b message of June 17 did not j
113Ibicl.
Il4Ibid.
specifically mention the matter of access rights to Berlin. - |
Truman’s message of June 14, to which Stalin was replying, !
did include a clear-cut mention of free access to Berlin
for U. S. forces. Stalin’s June 17 message said that "On
our part all necessary measures will be taken in Germany !
and Austria in accordance with the above-stated plan."1'^ <
The plan stated in Stalin's message was an acceptance of
Truman's proposal to withdraw American troops within their
zone and for the entry of American troopB into Berlin as
Well as a request for postponement of the placing of troops;
in the zones of Austria until July 1. There is no commit
ment in Stalin's message relative to access routes to
Berlin.
Stalin's message is general in terms. There is,
of course, no way of knowing whether Stalin omitted a referf
ence to access rights to Berlin intentionally or not. It
is entirely possible that Stalin regarded this as a more
or less incidental item brought up by Truman, and that >
Stalin just replied to the major over-all subjects dis- j
cussed by Truman in his missive of June l4. This would |
appear to be a natural and reasonable interpretation of ;
Stalin's cable of June 17. However, it is true that .
j
Stalin's message lends itself to being construed as a j
^■^Trniman, pp. cjt., p. 305,* Churchill, op. clt., '
p. 6o8. !
tricky maneuver to limit Western access rights to Berlin or
to place them on a very tenuous basis. It is entirely pos
sible that Stalin intentionally made no mention of access
rights to Berlin and neatly avoided making any overt and
specific commitment.
Herbert Peis, historian of modern diplomacy, sug
gests that the lack of reference by Stalin to the stipula
tions of Truman as to free access to Berlin and Vienna was
purposeful in order to allow the belief to thrive that,
of course, the right of access was taken for granted.
Peis, Between War and Peace, p. 146.
CHAPTER IV
DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS RELATIVE TO ACCESS RIGHTS
TO BERLIN AND THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE
There remained the matter of the actual negotiating
of access routes to Berlin from the West by the military
commanders.
On June 25 General Marshall advised Eisenhower of
the views of the American Government about access rights.
Marshall's cable stated that in accordance with President
Truman's message of June 14 to Stalin the question of tran
sit rights to Berlin and Vienna should be arranged with the
Russian commanders by Elsenhower for Berlin and Clark for
Vienna. Marshall's cable said that it was assumed that
the Russian commanders had been instructed accordingly and
asked that General Deane confirm this.'*' General Deane was
the head of the United States military mission to Russia.
The next day General Deane cabled back to Marshall
that he had tried to get confirmation that the Russian com
manders had been given instructions in regard to conferring
with the Western commanders concerning transit rights to
^Truman, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 306,
149
Berlin. He said that while Lieutenant General Slavin was 1
unable to give an immediate reply he inferred that there
would be no difficulty with respect to this matter.
On June 27 Deane informed Marshall that Zhukov had ’
been instructed to negotiate relative to the issue of ac
cess rights to Berlin. On June 28 in a cable to Marshall,
Deane told Marshall that it was his opinion that when
United States representatives met Zhukov there would be
little difficulty in agreeing as to free transit rights
to Berlin for American troops, and that he thought the
2
same was true for Vienna.
On June 28 General Eisenhower, through Air Marshall
Tedder, sent to American military headquarters in Berlin a
statement of Allied desires relative to access routes to
Berlin. This statement included the following provisions:
j
1. Unrestricted rights to use several highways from
the American and British sectors of Berlin west to the
American and British zones. The rights included would be
i
those of repairing and constructing the surfaces and bridge^
of the highways designated. I
2. Right to use several railroads, including the right,
of maintenance of the roadbed and right of way. Also in
cluded was the right of control of the rolling Btock ope- j
i
f
rated by the Americans and British. In addition, the West-j
2Ibid., p. 307.
ern countries were to have authority to. utilize American
and British-trained rail crews and American and British-
supervised German civilian employees.
3. Unrestricted right to air travel between the West
ern zones and Templehof, Staaken, and Gatow airfields in
Berlin. Included in the unrestricted right was that of
using fighter escorts. It was suggested that the Western
Powers have exclusive use of the Templehof and Staaken air
ports.
4. All traffic on the authorized highway, rail, and
air routes was to be free from border search or control by
custom or military guards.
What the United States and Britain wanted was the
right to cross the Soviet zone to Berlin with complete
freedom and to use whatever form of transport appeared to
I
be most feasible at the moment. Several routes were de
sired with the right to use them at will free of any kind
of restriction. Very broad and absolute rights were de- i
S !
sired and requested. i
'!
Eisenhower gave instructions that his statement be !
delivered to Zhukov at once. Presumably, thiB was done,
so that Zhukov knew before he met with General Clay what
i
the Western Allies wanted and expected insofar as transit
rights to Berlin were concerned.
^Peis, Be twe en War and Peace, p. 147.
i
152
It is also apparent from the diaries of General
Parks, Commanding General, Berlin District, and General
Ransom, Chief of Staff, U. S. Headquarters, Berlin District
that the matter of routes to Berlin was given consideration
by top ranking military leaders prior to both the June 5
4
meeting with Zhukov and the June 29 meeting. A notation
in the diary of General Parks under date of May 28 refers
to a conference with his Deputy Chief of Staff, General
Morgan. It states that the importance of settling with the
Russians in a high level conference, the issue of access
to Berlin, was discussed. General Parks wanted two roads
into Berlin, one from the British area and one from the
United States zone. He also deBired two railroads, one
from British supply depots and one from American depots.
In addition, there should be provision for use of airfields
General Ransom’s dairy of May 31, 19^5 states that
he discussed with General Clay the necessity of having a
firm agreement with the Russians on roads and railroads to
both United States and British zones with free use thereof
without customs or traffic control restrictions. General
Ransom also mentioned the need for telephone and telegraph
lines, as well as airports. General Clay stated that the
general provision for these transportation and communica-
^Extracts from General Parks' and General Ransom's
Diaries. Office of Military Government, Historical Divi
sion, Department of the Army. National Archives, World
War II, Records Division, Alexandria, Virginia.
tion facilities was in the original agreement with the Rus
sians, but the exact implementation of it would be worked
out later. General Ransom was eager to have a reconnais
sance made of the Berlin District at the earliest possible
time.
It appears that it was expected that the question
of transit to Berlin would come up at the meeting scheduled
for June 5 with Marshall Zhukov. General Ransom's dairy
contains an entry on June. 2 describing a military confer
ence on that date concerning arrangements for the meeting -
in Berlin of the representatives of the four Allied Powers.
According to General Ransom's statement in his diary, Gen
eral Clay Joined the meeting and emphatically stated that
he would advise the Supreme Commander not to sign an agree
ment with the Russians unless it provided without equivoca
tion for unrestricted use of roads, railroads, and lines
of communication by the Western countries. General Ransom
states that he emphasized the fact that he should be given
authority to deal directly with the Berlin military com
mander to arrange the details.
As matters developed at the June 5 meeting with
Zhukov, he refused to discuss movement of Western forces
into Berlin and establishment of the Control Council until
the Western Allies withdrew their troops within their
5Ibid.
154
zones, as we have noted. Hence, access routes to Berlin
were not discussed at the June 5 meeting. General Parks'
dairy on June 5 states that General Bull, who had attended
the meeting with Zhukov stated that although the announce
ment had been signed proclaiming the assumption of govern
ment by the four powers, the Russians had declined to con
fer on the matter of setting up the Berlin District, stat
ing that their government had only authorized them to dis-
g
cuss the proclamation.
It can be seen from the diaries of General Parks
and General Ransom that well in advance of his meeting with
Zhukov Clay apparently felt strongly about obtaining defi
nite concomitments from the Russians as to freedom of
transit to Berlin, Clay had had discussions of the matter
with his advisers and military associates.
On June 29 General Lucius D. Clay, representing
General Eisenhower, and General Sir Ronald Weeks, represen
tative of Britain, met with Marshall Zhukov at his head
quarters in Berlin for the purpose of arranging the details1 ;
i
pertaining to the joint occupation of Berlin. Clay was !
accompanied by Murphy, Eisenhower's political adviser, and I
Major General Floyd Parks, who had been assigned to command;
i
the American garrison in Berlin. General Weeks was joined !
I
by Sir William Strang and the commander of the British con-j
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - — „ - - - - - - - - - - - j
6Ibid.
155;
tingent of troops which was to occupy Berlin. No French !
representatives attended the June 29 meeting with Zhukov,
because Zhukov was unwilling to meet them until the French
sector of Berlin had been agreed upon.
The discussions at this meeting revolved mainly
around the taking over of Berlin and the removal of Allied
troops to their zones. It was agreed that each power would
have 25,000 troops in Berlin. Arrangements were made for
a four-day period beginning July 1 in which Western troops ;
would pull back into their zones. Western forces would oc
cupy their sectors in Berlin on July 4. Other subjects
concerning German prisoners and displaced persons were also;
considered. Then, the matter of access routes to Berlin
from the Western zones was given attention. This question,;
Clay says, was not easy to resolve. Clay and Weeks told 1
Zhukov that they desired three rail lines, two highways, '
and such air space as was needed to move into Berlin.
Zhukov countered by pointing out that existing facilities
were heavily taxed due to the demobilization of Soviet j
troops, and he would not recognize that the transit routes :
requested were essential. General Clay told Zhukov that
what was being asked for was not exclusive uBe of these
i
routes, but only access over them free of restrictions
other than normal traffic control and regulations which the;
[Russians would institute for their own use. General Weeks
i
[supported this statement."^
Zhukov told Clay and Weeks that one highway and
one railway should be sufficient for both American and
British use, since the number of troops involved was rela
tively small in view of the fact that the garrison of each j
' ' I
in Berlin was expected to be only about 25,000 men. Zhukovj
[suggested that one highway and one railroad from Berlin |
through Magdeburg would very likely be the most convenient, i
that it would be a centrally located route. But Zhukov j
remarked that if these routes were not satisfactory, they ;
could be changed later. General Clay tried to explain to ;
Zhukov that considering that the American zone was south- j
j
west from Berlin, but that the port which would be util
ized, namely Bremen, was in the north, several routes were
; required by American forces. Zhukov, then, indicated that |
he was under orders, and that he could not elaborate upon j
[ them.® |
Finally, Generals Clay and Weeks acquiesced in the
I arrangement of obtaining one railway route from Berlin to
[ Magdeburg to Goslar for use by both Britain and the United
: States. According to a memorandum sent by Murphy,
7
'Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City,
N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc'., 1950) * PP• 25-26.
' 8
I Pels, Between War and Peace, p. 148.
157
United States Political Adviser in Germany, to the State
Department on June 20, 194-5, the Berlin-Magdeburg-Goslar
route was obtained for "unrestricted" use.^
Clay and Weeks also accepted one Autobahn running
from Berlin to Magdeburg to Hanau. This route was to be
used "unrestrictedly" by Britain and the United States.111
The Russians did not agree to the use by the Western coun
tries of the Autobahn running from Berlin to Halle to
Frankfurt. This was a more direct route to the American
zone. General Parks, the head of the American advance
party in Berlin, had advised Clay to insist upon the Ber-
lin-Halle-Frankfurt Autobahn. But Clay acted against the
opinion of General Parks.1' 1 ' However, Clay had reserved
the right to reopen the question of transit rights in the
Control Council.
Herbert Feis concluded that the reason why Generals;
Clay and Weeks did not arrange to have the understandings
relative to access rights in a written document was because
they thought that if this were done it would be more diffi-i
cult to obtain changes later on. Another reason cited by
Feis is that an' effort to reduce the agreement to writing
would probably have required several sessions and several
o j
^Potsdam Papers, Vol. I, p. 136. ,
10-, . . i
Ibid.
“ r • 1 1
11Feis, Between War and Peace, p. 148.
158
days’ time. Movement of troops into the zones and into !
Berlin was to begin within two days. Peis says that since ;
the Western countries had waited that long, and that over-
long, to secure a definitive statement of their access . i
rights to Berlin, the military representatives concerned
now had no choice other than to trust in the accommodating ;
spirits of the commanders who were to join in controlling
12
Germany and Berlin.
With respect to airlines, Clay and Weeks finally
agreed to one main route from Berlin to Magdeburg with a
branch northwest to Hanover. The Tempelhof airport in the
United States sector of Berlin would be available to the
United States. The Gatow Airfield waB to be used by the
1-3
British, since it was In their sector. J
Murphy’s memorandum of June 20, summarizing the
conference of the prior day, states very explicitly that
it was agreed that all road, rail, and air traffic on the
routes authorized was to be free from border search or
control by customB or military authorities. However, !
traffic would conform to Russian police control in the i
14
normal way. '
12Ibid., p. 149.
l3Ibid., p. 148.
* i 2i
Potsdam Papers, Vol. I, p. 13°.
159i
i
In addition, it was clear that the Americans and !
British should have unrestricted use of the airlanes and
airfields assigned to them. They were not to be subject
to regulations imposed by the Soviets. The only obligation;
i
placed upon the Western Allies was to give one-hour advance;
notice of their flights, but acknowledgment of notification
15
before the actual flight was not required.
Clay states in his account of the conference with
Zhukov that both he and Weeks did not want to accept spe
cific routes to Berlin, because this might be considered
as an acceptance of the idea that right of access to Berlin
by all other routes was thereby denied. Both.Clay and
Weeks were fully aware of the fact that there was no pro
vision in the zonal protocol worked out by the EAC for
freedom of access to Berlin. They felt, however, that
there was real substance to Zhukov's argument that existing^
routes were badly needed by the Soviets for demobilization.
Hence, according to Clay, he and Weeks finally accepted as
a temporary arrangement the allocation of a main highway
and rail line and two air corridors to Berlin. But they
reserved the right to reopen the question in the Allied
Control Council.1^ j
No written record was kept of the Clay-Weeks- ;
Zhukov meeting of June 29. However, Clay stated that he ;
!
15Ibld., pp. 136-137. l6Clay, op. clt., p. 26.
dictated notes that evening and they included the following|
statement: "It was agreed that all traffic--air, road,
and rail . . , would he free from border search or control
17
by customs or military authorities."
It is very doubtful that there was a clear under
standing among Zhukov, Clay, and Weeks as to the degree of ;
freedom of transit to Berlin permitted to the Western
Powers, According to one account, apparently based on the
notes of General Parks, Clay stated that it was necessary
for the Americans to have freedom of access on roads and
lanes to Berlin, but that he was not asking for exclusive
use. He said that what was requested was the right to use
18
the roads and lanes as "United States need required."
According to this source, Zhukov replied to Clay’s
comments by saying that he did not understand just what
the British and Americans desired. Zhukov stated that it
would be necessary for vehicles to be governed by Russian
road signs, military police, document checking, but that
there would be no inspection of cargoes. He stated that
the Russians would not be Interested in what was being j
hauled, how much, or how many trucks were moving. This was;
1TIbid. !
^ History of the Civil Affairs Division, World War III
to March, 194b“ Chapter 8, pp. 34-3b. Historical' Manu- j
script IPile, Office of the Chief of Military History, De
partment of the Army, Washington.
! 19
,agreeable to the representatives present at the meeting.
I
At the conclusions of these discussions and oral
agreements, Zhukov is supposed to have commented that any
additional reasonable requests from the forces of the
United States or Great Britain would be granted by the
90 1
Soviets. |
I
Clay stated in 1950 when his book Decision in Ger- j
many was written that he made- a mistake in not making free
access to Berlin a condition to evacuation of American
troops from the Soviet zone. He said that the significance
|
of the matter was recognized, but that he did not desire
an agreement in writing which provided for anything less s
than the right to unrestricted access. Clay admitted that
he did not fully realize that the requirement of unanimous
consent would permit a Russian veto in the Control Council
to block all future efforts to pin down the question of
access rights. He said, also, that he had no way of know
ing that Russian insistence on border and customs control |
i
would serve as the excuse for the initial imposition of
21
I the Berlin blockade.
Clay also points out that at the time of the Zhukov
meeting the United States had a large combat-experienced
l .
; army in Germany which prevented any concern about being
subjected to a blockade,
I
j - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - — - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
! 19Ibid. 2QIbid., p. 37- 21Clay, op. cit., p. 26,
162
Clay doubts that a written agreement spelling out
access rights to Berlin would have been effective In pre
venting the chain of events which subsequently occurred.
In this opinion., Clay is no doubt correct. In blockading
Berlin, Russia was undoubtedly weighing practical consider
ations, and not technical, legal rights. Clay noted that
the Soviet Government seems to be able to advance
reasons very readily to justify violations of understand
ings previously made.
The meeting of June 29 was the only occasion of a
direct discussion between the Western Powers and Russia on
the subject of access rights to Berlin. It will be remem
bered that the United Sta'tes War Department consistently
took the view that this subject was solely a military mat
ter. The American Government adopted and acted upon this
position. When the issue finally came to a head on June 29
the handling of it as a purely military matter produced a
bad result. It is difficult to understand why the United
States Government would negotiate for many monthB and at
tach great weight to relatively minor points bearing upon
the right of the United States to have and use transit
routes aeros b the British zone, and, then, resolve, even
if supposedly on a temporary basis, access rights to Berlin
across the Soviet zone in a matter of a few minutes. The
underlying factor that produced this incongruous situation
is primarily the concept which so dominated the minds ^of
American leaders that all features of fighting the war and
occupation of Europe by United States troops were solely
military matters without political significance. This ap
proach produced unfortunate consequences. American mili
tary leaders proved that they were inclined.to dispose of \
issues without weighing political factors. It was general
knowledge in June, 19^5 that the Western Powers were facing
a very uncertain future in their relations with Russia.
It is difficult to believe that General Clay, Gen
eral Weeks, and their advisers had adequately prepared for
their June 29 meeting with Zhukov. Even if one accepts
the view that no one could foresee the importance the issue
of access routes to Berlin would take on later, it still
appears that considering the circumstances existing at the
time the Western representatives had not thought through
the questions that would inevitably arise for discussion
with the Russians at the June 29 meeting. Ordinary prudence
at the time would seem to require that the Allied military
chiefs would know with some precision and In some detail
i
what they deemed necessary in regard to access routes. It ;
did not require unusual foresight to realize that Zhukov
and the Russian representatives might not readily accept
all that the Western Powers hoped for relative to access ;
routes. It might even have been anticipated that the Rus
sians would be difficult. Ordinary preparations for the
June 29 meeting should have included at least some planningj
jas to alternative suggestions to be made to the Russians
in an effort to find an area of agreement that provided the | .
Western Allies more or less what they desired and felt they ;
needed. Clay's account of the conversation that occurred j
|with Zhukov on June 29 demonstrates a lack of imaginative j
approach to the issues. A flexible approach likely to get
something of what the Allied military chiefs felt neces
sary is missing. The meeting of June 29 rather gives every
Indication of being a rigid affair between dogmatically- ;
minded and authority-oriented military minds. A pragmatic
attitude in negotiating for what was wanted and possible
seems to have been lacking.
Clay assumes full responsibility for his decision
in regard to access rights. He admits that General Eisen- j
:hower had delegated full authority to him to negotiate with
22
Zhukov.
|
It is a fair conclusion that whatever adverse con- !
sequences resulted from the failure of the West to secure
I
i
positive commitments from Russia as to access rights to j
iBerlin, some part of the fault, if there was such, must be j
j
Iplaced on General Clay, General Weeks, and the military j
! . j
jleaders of the United States and Britain. However, General ]
i.Clay has expressed the view that the reason access rights
j f
Jto Berlin were not clearly defined rests with John G. Wi- j
1 i
; oo
jnant* America!s representative on the EAC* J Attributing j
; i
| - - - - - - - - - - — - - - - - - — - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - j
I 22Ibid. 23Ibid., p. 15'.- !
: ' ~ ' ’ 165
|the failure to Winant is quite questionable and debatable
as discussed above.
i f
It will be recalled that in the spring of 1944 :
•Winant desired to bring up the matter of access rights to j
! |
Berlin at the EAC level, but the War Department opposed j
this proposal. According to Winant1s adviser, Philip E.
'Mosely, this matter continued to be a concern of Winant.
,In the spring of 1945 at Winant's suggestion Mosely pre
pared a memorandum concerning transit rights to Berlin. j
A week or so after VE Day an American representative of
SHAEF came to London, and Mosely discussed the content,
background, and implications of the EAC agreements with
this representative for two days. This discussion em- !
braced the issue of access rights to Berlin, and Mosely J
; |
'states that he explained why a guarantee of access to Ber- j
I ' j
'lin had not been negotiated by the EAC. Mosely gave a j
copy of his memorandum to the SHAEF representative. It !
included a proposal that the American Commander-in-Chief
. I
should choose any two railroads and any two highways for j
I ' j
juse of his military forces, one each from Berlin westward j
to the British zone and one each southwestward to the |
( i
i !
’American zone. It authorized the Commander to make any
|repairs required and to maintain gasoline pumps, repair
I
!stations, and communication installations along the routes 1
selected. Mosely's memorandum also provided that if any
|of the railways or highways chosen were or became unusable
166
for any reason, the Soviet Commander was obligated to make |
alternative, equivalent facilities available immediately.
Mosely also emphasized the point that withdrawal of troops
within their zones and the occupation of the sectors of
Berlin assigned to the Western countries should take place |
jointly. The memorandum also asserted that the Western
position for positive guarantees of access to Berlin was
very strong, since Russia was very desirous of obtaining
industrial plants in Thuringia and Saxony, Mosely said
that the representative of SHAEF took hiB advice and drafts
24
of his documents with them.
On June 13 Winant cabled President Truman, the
Secretary of State, and the Secretary of War that Churchill ;
had accepted Truman's decision to withdraw Allied troopB atj
I
an early date from the Soviet zone. Winant stressed that
withdrawal of troops and movement of military forces into
Berlin should be tied together and occur simultaneously,
and he also mentioned the need for provision of free access ;
25
to the former German capital.
Mosely said that so far as he knew, Winant never
received any information relating to the exchange of tele
grams between Truman and Stalin.
oh
Mosely, op. clt., pp. 186-187.
2^Ibid; Leahy, op. clt., p. 382.
Mosely makes a strong defense of Winant's efforts
pertaining to getting unequivocal written guarantees of •
transit rights to Berlin. Mosely states that the American
military authorities did not show any particular interest
2 6
in the subject. It was the insistence of the War Depart
ment that caused the duty of reaching agreements as to ac
cess rights to Berlin to be left to the military commanders
in Germany. The failure to obtain clear-cut guarantees was
due to actions and decisions of the military staff in Ger
many, according to Mosely.
President Truman explained his attitude toward Ger
many and Berlin in his Memoirs. He said that, first of all,
it was always his intention to see that the agreements
entered into by Roosevelt were carried out. It was his
purpose to establish a joint government of Germany consist
ing of the three great wartime Allies and France. His de
sire was a unified Germany with a centralized government
functioning in Berlin. He hoped for the same thing for
Austria with Vienna as its capital. Then, Truman makeB a
statement which is difficult to interpret, saying that,
"It was my opinion that it would be silly if these arrange
ments were to lead to an isolated Berlin and Vienna to
which we would have no access,"^ This remark, construed
Mosely, op. cit., p. 188.
^Truman, op. clt., Vol. I, pp. 305-306,
literally, could infer that the possibility of an isolated
jBerlin occurred to Truman. Just what Truman meant by
characterizing such a situation as "silly" is very diffi
cult to know. At any rate Truman did bring up the point
iof free access to .Berlin and Vienna in his cable of June 14 j
| . !
jto Stalin. It is very probable that he was alerted to the
jproblem by Winant and also by Hopkins. But Truman went ;
lalong with the view that this was a military matter to be
handled by the military commanders in Europe. i
It scarcely seems fair to criticize Truman for the
I ' ;
|failure to obtain iron-clad guarantees relating to Berlin
i
|access routes. Churchill's statement in reaction to Tru- !
I j
man's refusal to maintain American troops in the Soviet
zone until there was a settlement of outstanding issues is I
I
apropos: Those who are only wise after the event should j
hold their peace." , Truman was still in the process of
I
learning the true nature of United States' relationship i
i i
with Russia and endeavoring to determine the validity and
insight of the advice he was receiving from his political
and military advisers. He had been in office for only a
i
month or two when these problems had to be resolved. He
followed the basic course of policy left by Roosevelt, and
there was little else that he could do.
President Truman also indicated that at his forth
coming meeting with Churchill and Stalin he intended to
arrange for a centralized German government. He said that
'............. 169;
he was opposed to breaking up Germany into several parts j
controlled by.the various Allied nations. He did not be
lieve Germany should be split Into rival territorial divi
sions, or that its capital should become an island Bhut off;
28 '
from the rest of the country.
When the meeting of June 29 with Zhukov took place,
it was not yet apparent or known that the Western Allies
would be required to use their access routes to furnish
food, coal, and other supplies for their sectors of Berlin.
A second meeting attended by Clay, Weeks, and Zhukov oc
curred on July 7, 19^5« This meeting was devoted mainly
to discussing the problem of furnishing food and fuel for
Berlin. According to Clay's account of the meeting, Zhukov!
insisted that the United States and Britain supply food fori
the German population in their sectors. Zhukov maintained ;
that there was a shortage of food both in Eastern Germany
and also in Russia. He contended that it was impossible
for the Russian Government to assume the responsibility for
feeding all the people in Berlin. General Weeks and Gener-;
al Clay argued that food for Berlin should come from the i
areas of Germany adjoining the city, that in the past Ber- ■
lin's food supply had come from the neighboring region. j
Zhukov said in reply that the agricultural sections of
eastern Germany had been considerably reduced by ceding j
170
:territory to Poland. Zhukov also made the point that the
Russian peoples were already on a minimum food ration, and
that it was' simply beyond the ability of Russia to assure
food for the entire, city of Berlin. Clay and Weeks appar
ently felt themselves compelled to concede that there was a
shortage of food in eastern Germany and the Soviet Union.
Clay, therefore, accepted the obligation for bringing in
food to feed the people in the American section of Berlin
on two conditions. The first condition was that a common
food ration be established for the entire city, and the
second was that when the Control Council was set up it
would arrange for the exchange of food between all the
zones of Germany in order to equalize the food ration
29
throughout the country. y
On Britain's behalf, General Weeks agreed on a
tentative basis that his country should similarly assume
the obligation for feeding the people in its sector, but
he deferred making a final commitment by saying he wished
,to consult his government first.
I Clay stated that when he finally agreed to bringing
;in food for his sector of Berlin he did not foresee how
ifutile it would later be to arrange for an exchange of food
throughout Germany on an equal baBis.
30
29
_ Clay, op. cit., pp. 27-28.
30
Ibid., p. 28.
171!
At the same meeting the subject of supplying coal !
for Berlin was also considered. Zhukov demanded that coal
be shipped in from the Ruhr. This issue was. primarily be
tween Zhukov and Weeks, since there was very little coal in >
the American zone. Weeks asked that coal for Berlin come
from Silesia. Zhukov turned down this idea arguing that
all Silesian production of coal was in the territory given
to Poland, and that the Soviet Government had no right to
say how coal in Silesia was to be used. On the question
of coal also Zhukov largely had his way. It was agreed
that a fair share of the coal needed for Berlin should come
from the Ruhr, and that at least some coal would be trans-
81
ported to Berlin from eastern Germany.
Clay stated that at the two meetings he and Weeks
had with Zhukov it was demonstrated how difficult negotiat-;
I
ing with the Russians was. He said that it became apparent;
at once. They were facing the prospect of the functioning ,
of the Control Council with no illusions and knew full well;
02 i
that the path ahead was strewn with many obstacles.
One question that inevitably arises with respect to
the July 7 meeting with Zhukov Is why Clay and Weeks did
not reopen and further discuss the matter of transit rights.
i
I
to Berlin. At this time, Clay and Weeks were accepting on-,
erous obligations as to bringing in food and coal to Ber- ]
31Ibid., pp. 28-29.
32Ibid., p. 29.
172
lin. It would certainly seem that this should have moved !
capable negotiators to point out the necessity of more ade- :
quate and certain access rights to Berlin. It was a natural
opportunity to bargain. Furthermore, If it is true, as Clay ;
states, that the difficulties in negotiating with the Rus- |
sians were already becoming evident, this would seem to
constitute additional reason for being careful and circum
spect in accepting commitments without clearly defined pro
visions.
The handling of the question of providing food and
coal for Berlin is further evidence of the fact that the
formula adopted of treating issues as purely military items
and leaving them to commanders on the spot to resolve did
not work out well in actual practice. j
It is enigmatic that the Western Allies did only ’
a very minimum amount of negotiating with the Russians as
to the boundaries of the Soviet zone in Germany and as to
access routes to Berlin. The negotiations that did occur
j
with the Russians were not extended in scope or duration ;
and produced no major disagreements. This is especially !
noteworthy in view of the fact that the Western Allies had j
considerable difficulty among themselves agreeing with re
spect to the zones. The differences between the United ;
States and Britain have already been noted. There waB alsoj
i
a considerable problem between the United States and France!
in determining the borders of the French Zone. In dealing I
173!
f
with each other* the Western Allies were jealous of their ;
interests and needs. They did not show the same penchant
for hard bargaining In negotiating with Russia about the
zones of occupation and Berlin.
At Yalta it was agreed that France should have a
zone of occupation in Germany. During the spring and early
summer of 19^5* the Western Allies were trying to resolve
the issue as to what the French Zone should include. The
actual decision of this matter was left to the EAC to work ;
out. A certain amount of haggling and argument occurred
between the British and the French delegations on the EAC*
but it was finally agreed without too much difficulty that
the British would turn over the Saar* the Pfalz* and a
large part of the Rheinprovinz to France.
However* agreement between the United States and
i
France was long delayed. The final agreement providing for;
the French Zone was not signed until June 22* 19^5. The
resulting delay was due to General De Gaulle's position ;
that the boundaries proposed by the United States were un- j
satisfactory. De Gaulle had originally asked for all of
Baden* Wflrttemberg* Hessen-Nassau* and Hessen. Included (
in the area demanded by De Gaulle were the cities of Stut- ;
I
tgart, Ulm* Karlsruhe* Frankfurt* and Wiesbaden. The j
i
■ : -------— ■ |
^ M o s e l y * pp. clt,* p. l82j F. Roy Willis, The Frenchj
in Germany 1945-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, :
1962), p. 20.
■ ....... 174'
United States War Department wanted to retain the Autobahn
and railroad running from Karlsruhe to Stuttgart, Ulm, and
Munich. It insisted that the boundary of the French zone j
i
!be just south of these transportation facilities. Fixing
the border in this way involved dividing the Lender of Bader,
[
iand Wflrttemberg into two parts. . . !
! The American delegation on the EAC objected to the
'division of Baden and Wflrttemberg. However, the United !
i |
States War Department which was moved by considerations of J
'logistics was adamant, and its view ultimately prevailed as'
j far as the position of the American government was con- j
' b4 " i
icerned. ;
; ' j
i The inability of the American and French represen- ;
I ;
jtatives on the EAC to agree had a series of unfortunate j
| ' i
consequences. French military policy during the final ■ |
I
stages of the war was based on the premise that the amount j
i
iof territory seized by the First French Army in Germany ;
|would have great influence in determining the size of the j
zone allocated to France.^5 pe Gaulle, therefore, pushed
the French forces into a wild scramble for German territory,,
A serious crisis arose on April 22, 1945* General
Devers of the American Seventh Army sought to lay down the
^Mosely, op. cit., p. 183; Willis, op. cit., p. 19.
^Charles Gaulle, Memoires de Guerre (Paris:
Librairle Plon, 1954-59), III, 131-132, 152-153,
175!
I
i
boundary between his army and the First French Army. A j
part of the boundary suggested by General Devers ran just
south of the city of Stuttgart along the Autobahn. But the
French forces had just seized Stuttgart the day before., and I
■it represented a great prestige symbol to them. General |
Devers asked the French to turn the city over to American
forces. This the French refused to do. General Eisenhower
intervened and threatened De Gaulle with possible cutting
off supplies of equipment for the French troops. But the1
French held Stuttgart until the French zone was finally
agreed upon.
Another incident occurred on May 1, 1945 when the
American l4th Army asked the French to hand over the Kreisei
of Landau and Speyer on the Rhine. The French military
!
commander under direct orders from De Gaulle refused to I
I
"3 7
evacuate these places also. s
The French finally accepted the zone proposed by
the United States and an agreement was signed on June 22,
194-5. However, the French acquiescence was granted with j
only the greatest reluctance and under pressure. Delivery j
I
of coal to France waB being held up pending the settlement ;
— 1
^Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 412j De Gaulle, op. cit., j
Vol. Ill, pp. 491-494; Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, The His-j
tory of the First French Army (London: George Allen & 1
Unwin Ltd., 1952), P. 490. !
I
~^De Lattre, op. cit., p. 492; Willis, op. cit., 1
p. 19.
176'
qQ
of the zonal borders. But even after Prance had signed
the agreement with respect to its zone, it was dissatisfied;
and sought to acquire additional German territory, although 1
without avail.
Thus, the real controversy and hard negotiating j
about the boundaries of the zones occurred between the
United States and Prance and between the United States and
Britain. The points that produced arguments at the time
seemed of minor importance subsequently.
The subject of access rights to Berlin was evidently
not discussed at the Potsdam Conference. However, the
understandings reached at Potsdam as set forth in the com
munique issued at the end of the conference have a definite !
bearing upon the question. The agreements reached at Pots-,
dam reflect a certain conception of how Germany would be i
organized and administered. They also envisioned a period i
of unspecified duration, but apparently intended to be
limited in time, during which they would be effective. The;
text of the communique set forth political and economic
principles which would be applied "in the initial control ;
period." The term "during the period of occupation" was j
also employed in the communique. In addition, under the
i
heading of Political Principles, direct reference was made !
iin the communique to the Agreement on Control Machinery in j
38Willis, op. cit., p. 20.
ITT
Germany worked out by the EAC. Article’ 10 of this agree- j
!
ment read as follows: |
"The Allied organs for the control and adminis- !
tration of Germany outlined above will operate, during
the initial period of the occupation of Germany im- i
mediately following surrender, that is, the period j
when Germany is carrying out the basic requirements j
of unconditional surrender."
The Allied organs referred to in Article 10 were j
I
the Control Council, the Co-ordinating Committee, the Con- ■
trol Staff, and the Kommandatura. It is apparent from Ar- |
tide 10 that the Agreement was intended to provide only I
i
for a limited period of time right after the surrender of |
i
G ermany.
i
Article 11 of the Agreement stated that: j
i
"The question of the Allied organs required for
carrying out the functions of control and administra
tion in Germany in a later period will be the subject
. of a separate agreement between the Governments of
the United States of America, the United Kingdom,
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."
Article 11 specifically refers to "a later period,"
a span of time beyond the initial period of occupation.
Thus, the Agreement on Control Machinery and the Agree
ment on the Occupation Zones were intended to apply for
only a limited period, a relatively brief period.
The Potsdam communique identified itself with the
Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany.
Paragraph 1 under the title "Political Principles"
embodied in the Potsdam communique stated, in part, that,
! .' . ~~~ . ' ” , '.....178
i ,,
I Supreme authority In Germany Is exercised . . .
j by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the
United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Union
i of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the French Republic,
i each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly,
in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their ca- j
pacity as members of the Control Council."
This language is general and very difficult to
interpret. However, a reasonable reading and understanding
of it would be that the supreme authority, the political
■ i
I ,
sovereignty, was to be split between zonal areas where the f
i ' ;
;Commander-In-Chief concerned would be supreme, and the Con-
!trol Council which would be the governing authority in na-
itional affairs or matters affecting Germany as a whole. I
This would entail a division or splitting up of supreme or
ultimate authority. It was inevitable and inherent in the
;situation that the actual working out of the occupation
|and the cooperative efforts between the Occupying Powers
would be developed.on an ad hoc basis. This would have
| been true if all the Allied countries had been able to
i work together effectively. Details could not be spelled j
; out by the conference members in a space of a week or two,
| and, especially, when the problem of post-war Germany was
j only one of many weighty items on the agenda.
I
I Paragraph 14 under the heading "Economic Principles'
I
included in the Potsdam communique also assumes a certain
conception of Germany. It states,
! 179
i
; "During the period of occupation Germany shall be
L treated as a single economic unit. To this, end com
mon policies Bhall be established in regard to: i
a. mining and industrial production and
allocation
' b. agriculture, forestry and fishing j
1 c. wages, prices and rationing |
i
d. import and export programs for Germany as j
a whole I
e. currency and banking, central taxation and . !
customs j
■ f. reparation and removal of industrial war
potential
j g. transportation and communications." I
The description of the principles that were to pre- !
j
'vail in occupied Germany set forth in Paragraphs 1 and 14 j
I i
;indicate a Germany largely unified and divided into zones j
I
| only for a prescribed purpose and for a limited time. Ger-
|many was to be treated as a "single economic unit." Trans-
i
!portation and communications were specifically enumerated
|as fields in which common policies were to be established.
j
jIt is, consequently, not surprising that Western statesmen
did not attach great importance to clearly defined access
routes to Berlin. They thought that they were providing
for a Germany to a great extent unified, and they appar-
ently thought that the Russians were agreeing to this
conception.
; Thus, at Potsdam the three major Allies did not !
! i
discuss access to Berlin as such. This is understandable
j _ !
because the conversations at Potsdam, insofar as they |
I
^touched upon Germany, assumed a unified Germany. In a j
i
iunified Germany, the question of access rights to Berlin j
would not be a problem. It would not be an issue at all. |
It was only a fragmented Germany that made access rights j
a bone of contention. It was only after Potsdam, when a
! i
division of Germany became a reality, that the great impor-j
■ i
tance of access rights to Berlin became obvious to everyone j
In the Western countries. '
CHAPTER V
THE SITUATION ON THE EVE OF DISAGREEMENT
By way of summary, a number of factors can be seen
as having had influence in bringing about the problem of
Berlin to the West. These factors would include the
ifollowing: the fact that the zones of occupation in Germany
Were drawn before anyone had the slightest notion as to how
far the Western Powers would penetrate into Germany; that
President Roosevelt wanted and expected American troops to
!be in Europe for only a short occupation; the conception of
iWestern statesmen that Germany was to be administered as a
junit, not as fragmented parts; that in 1944 and early 1945
i
the West was dealing with a wartime ally; the concern of
American leaders that Japan still remained to be defeated;
^American distrust for what were supposed to be Churchill’s
^imperialistic purposes; and the view that the question of
I
jaccess routes to Berlin was solely, or at least primarily,
|a military matter.
* The circumstances that prevailed when the EAC nego-
l
tiations on zones and Berlin took place led American and
British leaders to believe that the zones as carved were
I ' 181
182
satisfactory. It Is possible that the Western Powers might
have foregone the right to share In the occupation of Ber
lin with Russia. But Berlin was regarded as holding too
much symbolic importance and prestige to let it fall solely'
to the Russians. Once joint occupation of Berlin was ac- i
cepted, together with the zones as drawn, the question of
access routes from the West was precipitated.
If the occupation zones had not been worked out
by the EAC but left to be decided until the end of the war,:
i
chances are strong that Britain and America would have fi- ;
nally held more of Germany than they do today. Lord Strang:
has stated this to be his opinion."*" However, on the basis !
of this supposition, It would be very doubtful whether the
Soviets would have accepted a joint occupation* of Berlin.
But there Is some possibility that Western troopB would
have taken Berlin. One of the strong reasons given by
General Eisenhower for refusing to make a push toward Ber
lin in the spring of 1945 was that the issue of driving to j
take Berlin was solely a military matter. Its eventual j
i
fate had been previously decided upon by the Allied Govern-I
ments. It did not make sense to Eisenhower to sustain j
casualties he thought might be heavy in order to capture j
Berlin when Western troops would be present there In any |
event pursuant to existing agreements with Russia. j
■ i ■ i . I. i . . . - .............................. ■ ■ — -.............. ■■ ■ ■ - < — - - \
"*"Strang, op. cit., pp. 213-214.
183
It Is quite likely that if the occupation of Ger-
jmany and the matter as to what to do about Berlin had been
!
I
I
left to be resolved at the end of the war the West would I
have occupied more territory in Germany, but there is a
strong possibility Berlin would be held only by the Rus
sians. Whether sole occupation of Berlin by Russia would j
I ‘
|have been better than the difficult situation that existed
i
!during the postwar years is arguable. If Berlin were in :
Jthe hands of the Russians alone, this would have avoided
f
jone large point of tension. On the other hand, Western 1
I ’
(prestige would likely have suffered. I
A factor that had some effect upon the American j
jattitude toward the occupation of Germany was that Presi- ;
jdent Roosevelt was taking political considerations in the
i
(United States into account. It was his view that the Ameri-
2
can people would not tolerate a long period of occupation.
Roosevelt felt that it was important to keep the occupation
to a brief period, and that the United States should not j
jcommit itself to occupying more of Germany than was abso
lutely necessary. Roosevelt was not seeking to occupy aB
much of Germany as possible to thwart Russian designs.
Rather, the emphasis in his mind was to occupy as little
as possible for a short period to minimize political repur-
cussions in the United States. Roosevelt was not thinking
2Hull,- op. cit,, Vol. II, p. 1612; Churchill, Tri
umph and Tragedy, p. 353.________ ___
184
In terms of making secure access routes to Berlin for an |
extended Joint occupation. He was looking for a way of
getting American troops out of Europe at an early date.
The conception of the zones and occupied Germany
that existed In the minds of Western statesmen also had a |
very Important hearing upon bringing about a beleagured
Berlin. The zones were considered temporary, for a limited
period. As Lord Strang pointed out, it was not expected
• 3
that the zones would be sealed off from one another. Nor-j
mal transportation and communication throughout Germany
was anticipated. It was not foreseen that the Western
countries would be obliged to supply food and coal for
their sectors of Berlin from their own zones. Transporta
tion to Berlin by the occupying Powers was thought of in
terms only of personnel and materiel for relatively small
military units. There is no way of determining whether the1
Soviet leaders ever really believed in or wanted anything ' ■
but a Russian zone completely segregated from the Western ;
I
zones with a minimum of intercommunication. It is entirelyj
j
possible that all along the Soviets lacked sincerity and |
misled the Western leaders. But the fact is that the j
j
United States and Britain were not reckoning with a Germany!
j
broken into tightly knit compartments. The very conceptionj
j
of Germany which they formulated largely eliminated the I
1
^Strang, op. cit., p. 214. j
possibility of their anticipating a blockaded Berlin and
the significance of lack of assured access routes to the
city.
That Truman succeeded to the American Presidency at
a crucial time also bad some effect in the drift of affairs
toward an isolated Berlin. For the first several months
after becoming President, the controlling attitude of Tru
man with respect to dealing with the Russians as to Germany
was that there should be adherence to previously existing
agreements. Truman was loathe to depart from Roosevelt's
commitment as to the zones of occupation. Truman resisted
Churchill's insistence upon keeping Allied troops in the
Soviet zone until outstanding problems had been settled.
If Truman had had greater experience in working with the
Russians and had been able to evaluate conditions in Europe
in the spring of 19^5 from personal knowledge, rather than
relying on the views of his advisers, there is a definite
possibility that he would have been persuaded by Churchill.
As soon as Truman felt that he understood Russian purposes
and designs, he did not hesitate to take strong action.
Perhaps all one can really say about the matter is
that it was still too early in the development of Western-
Soviet postwar relations for it to be clear that coopera
tion with Russia was not to become a reality. If the Issue
of withdrawal of Allied troops from the Soviet Zone had
arisen six months later, it Is entirely possible that the
American Government would have had a different attitude.
The factor of time was an important facet of the historical i
i
circumstances producing an isolated Berlin. |
j In May and June of 19^5* in resolving international
issues, the United States and Britain were dealing with
their wartime ally. Although difficulties were arising, thej
momentum of comradeship and cooperation over the past sev- !
eral years still largely influenced the views of Western,
and especially American, statesmen. To have negotiated withj
i
|the Soviets in the spring and summer of 19^5 as a hostile j
Ipower, or one of whom the Western countries were suspicious,j
Iwould have been asking for trouble. It would have consti
tuted a radical break from the association which had just
occurred in fighting the war. The maturing of this break
required time. It did not and could not transpire within a
I
i
jmatter of a few weeks. A strong and determined attitude on
!the part of the Western Allies pertaining to withdrawal of
i
troops within their zones, as desired by Churchill, would
have meant a completely different approach in Western rela
tions with Russia. It would have revealed an attitude of
looking upon Russia as a potentially hostile and dangerous
power, rather than as a friend and ally. The transition
from Yalta in February, characterized as the highwater mark
In Soviet-Western wartime friendship, to a showdown with
Russia resulting from suspicion and distrust In the spring
and summer of 19^-5 was too great a swing of the pendulum.
187
American leaders/ in particular, could not see their way j
clear to accepting such a great change. It is probably
true also that the peoples of the Western Countries were
not ready or mentally conditioned to the view that such a
reversal of form in relations with Russia was necessary or :
inevitable.
Another item that played a part in the spring of
*
19.45 in leading to the Western position in Germany was the
fact that American military leaders made an error in judg
ment in evaluating the war in the Pacific and in overesti
mating Japanese resistance. The American military was eager
to obtain Russian entry into the war and was loathe to get
embroiled in difficulties with Russia. If the military
chieftains of the United States had anticipated the immi
nent collapse of Japan, America may have tended to take a |
stronger course of action in Central Europe in the spring
of 1945. It is hardly fair, however, to criticize the 1
United States military staff for according great weight to
the problems remaining in achieving victory in the Pacific,!
One should only recognize that the continuing war against
Japan was a factor that added impetus to the American de-
sure to cooperate with Russia and to avoid actions which
would antagonize her. I
Still another circumstance that had its effect in |
|
1945 was American distrust of what was regarded as Church- j
ill’s imperialistic purposes. Undoubtedly, Churchill was
188
doing all In his power to preserve England's position In
Europe. American statesmen did not want England's ambitions
to get In the way of American-Soviet cooperation and friend
ship. Many American diplomats saw the United States as oc-;
cupying a middle position between Russia and Britain.
Whether this .view was realistic and sound is not for the
moment an issue to evaluate. The existence of this attitude
made the United States wary of falling in with Churchill's
proposals. It waB a prominent factor in resisting Church
ill's suggestions of driving for Berlin and of delaying thei
withdrawal of Western troops from the Soviet zone.
A further factor that was involved in producing
tenuous and limited access routes to Berlin was the ap
proach that was deeply entrenched in the minds of the Amer-;
lean leaders that so many issues were merely "military mat-;
ters." The fact of a Berlin locked in a communist area
more than a hundred miles from the Western zones resulted
largely from the idea of dividing Germany, including its
i
capital, into three equal parts to be occupied by the three!
major allies. This fact must be attributed to the deliber-i
ations of the EAC. But the fact of no clear-cut guarantees;
as to access rights to Berlin, and the fact of limited ac- ;
' cesB rights to Berlin by the Western countries, must be at-'
i
! tributed at least to some extent to Western military lead- j
ers. The resolving of problems classified as "military j
|
matters" proved to be a determination of issues without
189
political insight and without the perspective of weighing j
associated., relevant considerations. .
The closest that the West came to bona fide, genuine
negotiations as to access rights to Berlin was at the meet- j
j
ing of June 29, 1945, among General Clay, General Weeks,
and Marshal Zhukov. At this meeting the resolving of the
issue of access rights to Berlin was solely in the hands
of the military.
President Truman discussed the subject of the in
terplay of political aims and military aims during a war
4
in his Memoirs. He referred to the famous remark by Von
Clausewitz, Prussian military author, that "war is a con
tinuation of diplomacy by other means.Truman pointed
out that many generals have incorrectly concluded from this;
remark that once war has begun all decisions become military
decisions. But Truman says that what Von Clausewitz really;
Vol. I. pp. 210-211.
^The actual remark of Clausewitz was as follows: j
"War is not merely a political act but a real political j
instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, a i
carrying out of the same by other means. What now still
remains peculiar to war relates merely to the peculiar j
character of the means it uses. The art of war in general !
; and the commander in each particular case can demand that
i the tendencies and designs of policy shall be not incompat-l
j ible with these means, and the claim is certainly no trif- i
I ling one. But however powerful it may react on political . j
i designs in particular cases, still it must always be re- j
! garded as only a modification of them; for the political j
' design is the object, while war is the means, and the means!
can never be thought of apart from the object." On War. '
i Translated from the German by 0. J. Matthijs Jolles. j
, (Washington: Combat^ Forces Press, 19^3), p. 16. j
1901
■ i
i
meant, and what Is the truth of the matter, Is that both :
diplomacy and war are merely means to an end, that the end
Itself is not a military matter, but rather an Issue for
political determination.
Truman states that he had many interesting and in- ;
formative meetings with the Chiefs of Staff. Many diffi
cult and complex problems were discussed, and among these
waB the provocative question of whether political factors
or military considerations take priority during a war. Trur
!
man said that military authority is always subordinate to
the political authority. But, he said, In a situation
where the military leadership advises that certain aims,
very desirable for political purposes, are too much of a
gamble or impracticable from a strictly military point of
i
view, the government necessarily must take into account the;
advice being given by the military authorities.
Truman believed that essentially this type of
situation existed during -the closing phases of World War II
In Europe. Due to the very rapid advance of the Western
armies their operational lines were extended far beyond the;
i
borders of the zones of occupation agreed upon with Russia.!
The question was, consequently, precipitated as to how far
to the east Western troops should endeavor to push, what
lines they should hope to hold when the fighting ceased,
and the relation of these questions to the zonal protocol. ;
Truman points out that American military leaders had con-
191
eluded that It was advisable to try to push as far as pos
sible to the eaBt, and that their conclusions were based
solely on military grounds.
Another reason suggested for failure to obtain well
defined access rights to Berlin is that Western leaders ;
wanted to display faith in Russia's good intentions and
did not want to be in the position of appearing to question
Russia's reliability. General Clay, as we noted, states
that this was Winant's attitude, and that this view of
Winant accounts for the failure of the EAC to negotiate
clear-cut guarantees as to access rights.^ However, Clay's
7
comments have been strongly challenged.
Trust in Russia's good faith has also been attrib
uted to Western military leadership as a reason why it did ;
8 ■
not press for definite access rights. j
Undoubtedly, during the war the desire to display !
faith in Russia was popular. However, it is very dubious
that it was a major factor affecting dealing with the Rus- ;
sians as to access rights to Berlin. The explanation of
the failure to obtain agreement in regard to well specified!
accesB rights is probably attributable more to not recognizf
ing the importance of the matter and permitting the ques-
I
. !
6
Clay, op. cit., p. 15.
^Mosely, op. cit., p. 188.
^Harold Zink, The United States in Germany 19^4-19551
(Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., j
■ 1957) , P. 3^1. .... i
' ' 192
tion to drift along without really ever coming to serious
I
I grips with it. I
I An attempt to note important factors which were a
i
part of the historical circumstances that led to the Berlinj
I
as it is known today is probably as far as one can go in j
! ;
|trying to account for it. To try to attribute responsibil-j
I ;
jity directly to certain individuals is to over-simplify the
I
matter and is essentially unfair. Singling out individuals,
i
or groups for blame has been a tendency especially with
Preference to the question of why the West did not get a !
written agreement from the. Soviet Union pertaining to ac-
!cess rights to Berlin. However, the comment of John J. ;
I |
jMcCloy in regard to why written guarantees as to access |
jrights were not ootained largely sums up the truth. He
I
I
j remarked that,
I
| "Any number of people should have thought of this j
1 situation irrespective of their particular responsi- j
bility. It is inexplicable that no one did. If any-
| one did think of it, he certainly held his peace. . . .j
| I certainly wish I had thought of it. I think the j
I same thing can be said of all those who were in any I
I way involved with the situation of our troops in |
j Europe, or our over-all European policy, and I include
j the President, the Chief of Staff, Eisenhower, Clay,
j Somervell,’the Secretary of State, the'Secretary of
! War, as well as lesser fry."9
I . !
What McCloy says of a long list of American offi
cials could also be said of all their British counterparts.
9"Our Secret Deal Over Germany," Saturday Evening
Post, CCY (August 2, 1952), 68.
CHAPTER VI
j j
I I
DEVELOPMENTS IN GERMANY AFTER THE WAR |
I Quadripartite control of Germany was inaugurated (
j
(during the summer of 19^5- On July 7* 1945 the Berlin
t •
Kommandatura (Inter-Allied Governing Authority) was for- j
i
mally organized. In accordance with the previous agree
ment between the four occupying powers as to the control
[machinery■to be employed in Berlin* it consisted of one
i :
;commandant from each of the four countries responsible for :
i ;
I 1
!his government’s sector. The four commandants were j
1
jointly responsible for administration of Berlin as a j
i
I
whole. |
1
The first formal meeting of the Allied Control j
(Council occurred on July 30* 1945. A second meeting was j
(held on August 10* 1945. At this time a plan was approved |
that established the machinery through which the Control
Council would operate. It provided* in particular* for a
U.S. Senate* 87th Cong.* 1st Sess.* Committee on
Foreign Relations* Documents on Germany* 1944-1961 (Wash
ington: Government Printing Office* 19ol), pp. 5~Bj Secre
tary of State for Foreign Affairs* Selected Documents on
Germany and the Question of Berlin* 1944-1981 (London:
His~Majesty1s Stationery Office* 198l)* pp. 45-48.
193
1 9 4 j
Coordinating Committee, where most legislation would be ;
i
| formulated, arid for Beveral directorates with specific
i functions in the government of Germany, such as transport
| O i
|and finances. j
i ■ |
j On August 30, 1945 the commanders-in-chief of the I
| occupying forces in Germany of the United States, the Unitecjl
1 j
!Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and Prance, acting together as
j :
members of the Control Council, issued Proclamation No. 1
announcing that the Control Council had been established j
in virtue of the supreme authority and powers assumed by
i
jthe four governments in their Declaration of June 5* 1945* ;
J They declared that supreme authority in matters affecting
iGermany as a whole had been conferred upon the Control
■ ' s !
!Council.D I
| Thus, the governmental machinery contemplated by |
the Agreement of November 14, 1944 among the United ;
States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, subsequently j
amended to include France, began to function. In September.
1946, the Kommandatura approved a temporary constitution
for Berlin under which it could operate its own city govern-
' 4
ment, subject to overall Allied control. The Western
j
2Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 108-109] U.S. Sen
ate, Committee on Foreign Relations, op. cit., pp. 5-8:
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, op. cit., pp. 45-48.
^U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
op. cit., pp. 23-29.
4
_________ Mclnnis, op. cit., p. 111.
195
Powers insisted upon the holding of an election in which
jthe people of Berlin would elect their own government.
Such an election took place on October 20, 19^6 and con
stitutes the only election held in Berlin on a citywide j
( ■ |
basis, since the end of World War II. The result of the i
* i
election was a heavy defeat for the Communists who re-
iceived less than one-fifth of the votes cast and elected
I i
6
jonly one-fifth of the members of the Berlin Parliament.
j
l The Control Council achieved a limited measure of
j
success at the outset. It adopted uniform plans for all
Germany providing for the liquidation of Nazi laws and
'Nazi organizations. It also enacted legislation to de- j
i i
(militarize Germany, to reorganize the German judicial sys-
! r j \
Item, and to establish a system of taxation. j
I ’ |
| The first obstructive tactics within the Control j
j
Council did not result from Soviet recalcitrance, but from
ithe strong views of the French on various matters.^ On j
I i
September 22 the French representative in the Coordinating j
i
Committee vetoed a proposal for a Central German transport
agency. On October 1 France vetoed a similar measure
before the Control Council. On November 23 France vetoed
^U.S. Department of State, Background: Berlin— 196l,
Publication 7257, European and British Commonwealth Series
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 5«
Ibid.; James P. Warburg, Germany— Bridge or Battle-
ground (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 19^7)> P • 57•
7 R
'Willis, op. cit., p. 28. Ibid., p. 27.
the establishment of a central agency to control rail traf-
Q ' !
fic. The French were opposed to the creation of any cen-
I
tral German administration until such time as there was
accord in setting the Western boundary of Germany on the
Rhine.
The French held consistently to their position.
j
(They rejected a plan which would have allowed the federa-
i
jtion of trade unions throughout Germany. France also re
fused to agree to a proposal for opening the zonal bound- i
jaries in order to permit the passage of the German people !
Jfrom one zone to another. The French representatives j
jfurther vetoed a suggestion favored by the United States, j
i
Great Britain, and Russia which would have enabled-political
parties to function on a national basis.^ j
i
During the latter part of 19^5 and the early months |
jof 19^+6 it was France more than any other Power which made j
I
it impossible to create central German administrative j
I !
jagencies and which forestalled economic planning for all j
of Germany. France was blocking the implementation of the
principles agreed upon at Potsdam."*''1 '
However, strife and misunderstanding between the
Western Powers and the Soviet Union soon supplanted the
lack of agreement with France as the paramount problem in
9Ibid. 1QIbid.
•^Ibid.; Warburg, op. cit., p. 51.
197
Germany. In Berlin, the Kommandatura and the city adminis
tration were soon caught up in the overriding difficulties !
I , j
jof the developing cold war. The Western Powers accused
iRussia of intentionally frustrating the efforts of the city j
!
government to function effectively. The West asserted that |
Soviet officials controlled the police in the Soviet sector !
jand refused to make it possible for the legally elected
Berlin government to supervise and direct the police force
citywlde.1^ j
i In addition, the United States and Great Britain
1
soon concluded that the Soviet Government was riveting :
Communist control on all levels of government in East Ger- j
t '
many and refusing to permit the reconstruction of political ;
j :
I life In the Soviet zone on the democratic basis of free j
! 1^ !
!choice. J Allegedly, the Soviets were appointing all ;
|
seasoned German Communists to key posts. Many of them had j
jspent the Nazi era In Russia where they were educated and
! . !
jindoctrinated and now returned to East Germany with the
!Soviet armies. Among these was Walter Ulbricht.
i
It was, however, in the broad area of economic
reconstruction that the sharp rupture between the Western
Powers and the Soviet Union first occurred. The West, and
especially the United States, developed what one author
12u.s. Department of State, Background: Berlin— 1961,
p. 6 .
has called "the doctrine of concurrency."^ The main tenet
of this doctrine was that If the Western Powers were to j
j
supply reparations to the Soviet Union from their zones, !
then, while such reparations were being delivered, It was
Imperative that all the zones be unified economically.
Otherwise, the Western Powers would find themselves in a ' !
situation of stripping their zones in order to finance
jreparations to the Soviet Union without deriving the bene
fits of an economically unified Germany. The West would j
be forced into the position of underwriting reparations.to j
J i
Russia, and, in addition, be obliged to supply aid to the j
15
faltering economies in their zones. Both General Glay j
land General Marshall1^ stated the doctrine of concurrency. |
I ' :
The issue of inability to agree on economic policy
for Germany occurred first in the Control Council. Dead
lock there threw the matter into the hands of the Council
of Foreign Ministers in Paris where it was considered
| 1 7 j
iduring the period from April to June, 1946. By this time
^Gottlieb, op. cit., p. 123; Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, op. cit., p. 3»
^Clay, op. cit., p. 121.
■^U.S. Department of State, Germany, 1947-1949, The
Story in Documents, Department of State Publication 355°,
European and British Commonwealth Series 9 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 4ll.
■^Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, op. cit.,
PP. 65-66,
199
there was already a de facto division of Germany, economic
ally. Each zone was commencing development of its re- !
sources independently of the other zones. ;
At the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers, the
West and the Soviet Union were unable to resolve their
jdiffering points of view and to work out a mutually satis- !
I
jfactory plan for the economic unity of Germany. This led
James F. Byrnes, the American Secretary of State, to an
nounce that in view of the failure to obtain agreement on j
I ' :
jthe unification of the German economy, the United States
i •
(was agreeable to the economic fusion of its zone with any or
! iO 1
jail of the other zones. This offer was made by Byrnes on !
'July 11, 1946 at the second session of the Council of For
eign Ministers. The American representative also sub
mitted the proposal to the Control Council on July 20, 1946.
; On September 6, 1946 Byrnes made an important speech
at Stuttgart.1^ He said that the Control Council was j
neither governing Germany nor permitting Germany to govern i
itself. He advocated farreaching fiscal reform to avoid
ruinous inflation and a central agricultural agency to
improve production and distribution of food. He also pro
posed the organization of transportation, communication, j
l8Ibid., p. 3; Willis, op. cit., p. 28.
■^U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
op. cit., pp. 55-62.
and postal service throughout Germany without regard to
; zonal boundaries. The speech of Byrnes is considered as
I
marking a fundamental turning point in Allied administra
tion of Germany.
The offer of the United States to merge its zone
with any or all of the other zones was accepted by the
! 20
IBritish Government. As a consequence, Bizonia was
|established on December 2, 1946 representing a merger of'
i 21
I the American and British zones. The Fusion Agreement
'took effect on January 1, 19^-7. Its avowed purpose was
i
I
!to achieve a self-sustaining economy for the two zones
jwithin a three-year period, namely, by the end of 19^-9.
: The formation of Bizonia was an admission that
!
jthe Control Council was not able to function effectively.
After March, 1946 the Control Council was able to accom
plish very little. Its-achievements after this date con
sisted, in the main, of the establishment of a system of
administrative courts, a population census, and further
measures relating to denazification and demilitarization.
Efforts continued to obtain Pour Power agreement
on the economic and political unity of Germany. During
20
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, op. cit.,
P* 3.
21
U.S. Senate, 8lst Cong., 1st Sess., Committee on
Foreign Relations, A Decade of American Foreign Policy:
Basic Documents, 1941-1949 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, l£W), p. 528.
March and April* 19^7 a new meeting of the Foreign Minis
ters was held* this time in Moscow. At this conference*
i i
'Great Britain submitted a proposal in the form of a memor-
jandum for a future German constitution and system of i
l
22 1
government. This memorandum suggested that central j
i
'governmental agencies should be established in accordance ’
'with the Potsdam Agreement until a permanent constitution
jcould be adopted and a permanent German government set up.
i !
i !
|The British proposal also advocated the drafting of a pro-
] ' !
!visional constitution for Germany and the holding of elec-
i
Itions for a provisional government. Many functions re-
!lating to demilitarization* denazification* and reparations!
i i
'were to be reserved for management by the Control Council.
j . ;
| It was apparent at the Moscow Conference that the I
! !
Western Powers and the Soviet Union had widely different i
views as to the future governmental organization of Ger- j
j • j
'many. In general* the Western countries favored a federal ;
' !
|government* while Russia wanted a centralized government. j
jThe United States was apprehensive of a powerful* central
ized government in Germany. It favored a new Germany with
political authority to a large extent inhering in the
Lender, or in provincial organizations. The French wished
to go even further in this direction and give the Lender
power to deal with such matters as diplomatic relations
22Ibid.* pp. 73-81.
and nationality. The British sought to combine the ele-
' *
Aments of federalization and centralization influenced to a
[
jconsiderable degree by British constitutional experience in
i
'Canada, Australia, and other parts of the Commonwealth,
(The Soviet Union, on the other hand, advocated a highly
!
! 2S
(centralized German government.
| * However, the ultimate stumbling block at the Moscow
(Conference was the issue of reparations. Molotov insisted
j
jupon implementation of the consistent Soviet demand that
jRussia be paid twenty billion dollars in reparations over
ja twenty-year period. He wanted to make the resolving of
jthe reparation question a condition to agreement on politi-
; 24
jcal and economic unity of Germany.
| The Moscow Conference marked the point at which
Prance began to realize that it was unrealistic for it to
endeavor to occupy a mediating role between the West and
(the Soviet Union, Prance had gone to Moscow hopeful of
|obtaining acceptance of at least a substantial part of its
|program for Germany. The French plans, labeled the French
"thesis," by one writer,2^ was designed to provide security
for Prance against the possibility of future German aggres
sion. It proposed that the Rhineland be detached from
23Ibid,, pp. 86-87j Willis, op. cit., p. 43.
oh
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, op. cit.,
pp. 83-86.
2^Wlllis, op. cit., p. 4l.
' ‘ '203'
Germany, that the Ruhr be separated from Germany and placed
! ’ • - !
junder International control, that the Saar be joined with
I i
I ■
jFrance, that Germany pay substantial reparations and be
j
exploited economically for the benefit of the countries j
that had suffered from German war-making propensities, and j
f
! that Germany be reorganized governmentally along federal
jlines and be educated into democratic traditions.
I
France expected support from the Soviet Union for
its proposals. It believed that it was entitled to Soviet j
1 support. France had refused to join with the United States1
I
*and Great Britain in combining its zone with Bizonia. It
! 1
ihad indicated it was willing to accept the frontiers in
|Eastern Germany as final. It had advocated an interna- ;
|tional control of the Ruhr in which Russia would partici- j
|pate. However, at the Moscow Conference, in spite of French
i
j attempts to remain aloof from the other Western Powers in |
I 1
I Germany, France found that the tenets of her thesis were !
|opposed by the Soviet Union. After the Moscow Conference i
j the French plan for Germany broke down and France threw in j
( • 1
| her lot with America and Britain. The Moscow Conference j
marks the final rupture between France and Russia. !
' i
. i
Still another meeting of the Foreign Ministers was !
held in London during November and December, 19^7. Again
the Western Powers and the Soviet Union found it impossible
to agree among themselves as to a common policy for Ger- j
many. By this time the Western Powers and the Soviet j
Union were making strong accusations against each other.
,The West was charging that the Soviet Union was responsible ;
1 ' ' !
i ' ‘
|for the disunity in Germany. The Western Powers were con- |
!tending the Soviet Union was obstructing every effort to S
! 2 6 '
achieve the economic unification of Germany. The Soviet
j
(Union, on the other hand, blamed the West. It maintained ,
(that the Western countries were showing bad faith on the
!question of reparations, that they were grossly violating
the Potsdam Agreement, and that they were encouraging |
27 !
(separatist movements in Germany. j
After failure to make any progress at the London j
(Conference, the United States, Britain, and Prance con- !
j ;
I eluded that they could tolerate no further delay in uniting!
I I
|their zones in Germany economically and politically. In
|February, 1948 they convened a Six-Power Conference which
jmet in London to which the Benelux countries were invited. !
I i
]At this Conference agreement was reached on plans relating
i
! to the form of government Germany should have until full i
! • ' ■ !
| German unity could be achieved. Necessary measures were j
I
also arranged in order to enable Western Germany to coope
rate in working toward economic recovery in Europe. These
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, op. cit.,
PP- 93-96; U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations
Documents on Germany, 1944-1961, pp. 82-86.
^The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.,
The Soviet Union and the Berlin Question (Documents)
(Moscow, 1948), pp. 5-17. ~
j 205
'measures were announced in a communique issued at the end
' 28 '
|of the London Six-Power Conference on March 6, 19^8.
I " :
| While the Six-Power Conference was in session the
jSoviet Union sent strong notes of protest to the Western j
! 2q
jcountries. ^ The Soviet Union contended that the convening
I of the Conference constituted a direct and flagrant viola
tion of the Potsdam Agreement and all existing four-power '
agreements in effect among the Occupying Powers in Germany..
1
It was pointed out by the Soviet Union that matters of I
!German political and economic unification were peculiarly
Iwithin the competence of the Control Council and the
|Foreign Ministers of the Occupying Forces. i
The Western nations replied to the Soviet note by
j I
|maintaining that the discussions taking place in London j
(
!looking toward the establishment of a unified West Germany
j
;did not preclude eventual agreement on the unification of
; all Germany by the four Powers.^ j
The Six-Power Conference in London led to the j
j breakdown of the Control Council. On March 20, 19^-8 the
Soviet military governor, Marshal Sokolovsky, withdrew
pQ
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, op. cit.,
PP. 97-98.
^The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., •
op. cit., pp. 5-17.
3°U.S. Department of State, Germany, 19^7-19^9: The
Story in Documents (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1950h P. bfr.
_ _.. . ■ 2b6
from the Control Council. It never again met on a quadri
partite basis.
j
Upon departing from the Control Council., Marshal 1
Sokolovsky Issued a statement In which he said that the
American and British representatives were refusing to In
form the Control Council as to the discussions taking place
I
jat the London Conference. He stated that the Western j
jPowers were violating the Potsdam Agreement and tearing
j I
I
up the quadripartite agreement on the control machinery for
Germany. He condemned the decisions being made at London
as unilateral and unlawful.
| The course of the West in undertaking to unify j
! j
•Western Germany is a significant factor touching upon the |
I
rights of access of the West to Berlin. The Soviet Union
has always contended that by embarking upon a policy of
endeavoring to unify Germany without Soviet agreement, the
West in reality precipitated a permanent division of Ger
many. The Soviet Union argues that this was in direct vio
lation of the Potsdam Agreement and all the Pour Powers
agreements relative to Germany and Berlin. By such viola
tion, according to the Soviet view, the West lost its
^2
rights in Germany including its access rights to Berlin.
^Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, op. cit.,
P. 99.
32R. Legien, The'Four Power Agreements on Berlin:
Alternative Solutions to the Status Quo? trans. Trevor
Davies (Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag, I9 6 1 ), pp. 11-12.
I ---- - - 207
The West has always taken the position that it was
compelled to take measures to reorganize the German economy ;
and government without Russian cooperation because the j
Soviets made mutual agreement and joint efforts impossible, j
Thus, Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Minister, so argued
when he reported to the House of Commons in June, 1948 on ,
the London Conference. He asserted that the Western Gov
ernments made every possible effort to give effect to the
33 ;
Potsdam Agreement. J j
On June 16, 1948 the Soviet representative on the
Kommandatura withdrew from any further participation on
i ' |
|this agency. The reason given for the withdrawal was that I
|the American Commandant, Colonel Howley, at the June 16
I i
meeting of the Kommandatura refused to discuss Soviet
proposals for improving the economic and legal position of
workers and office employees in Berlin industry and trans- j
portation services. Colonel Howley was also accused of
| 34 j
jmaking a series of insulting and intemperate remarks.J ;
During June, 1948 the issue of currency reform
i
assumed paramount importance in Germany. The problem of
currency reform had been considered by the Control Council
35
for more than- a year without any common agreement. ^ After
-^Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, op. cit.,
pp. 103, 105.
^Ibld., p. 114.
_______3-^Clay, op. cit., pp. 208-211, 362. |
208
the Soviet delegate withdrew from the Control Council, the
Western nations proceeded to agree among themselves on a >
!
new currency for their zones. This currency was adopted in {
i t
{the Western zones on June 18, 19^8. However, it was not |
!
extended to Berlin, since the city was still under Pour- j
Power control.3^ j
The currency reform put into effect by the Western
!
Powers consisted of the invalidation of the inflated cur
rency (the Reichsmark) then in circulation in their zones j
and the introduction of a completely new currency (the
deutschemark or D-Mark) at a value of one-tenth of the old I
I ]
(currency. This reform was deemed to be an absolute neces
sity to the economic recovery of Germany. A new currency
with a real value undermined the black market, enabled com
modities to reappear in the stores and shops, provided an
I
{incentive for work, and generally revitalized the whole ;
!economy. 1
! ;
i The Soviet military governor immediately denounced ■
!
the Western currency reform as a violation of existing |
07 !
agreements between the West and the Soviet Union. He |
made the assertion that Berlin was a part of the Soviet !
i
zone economically as well as territorially. Henceforth,
he said that the Soviet Military Government, and not the
36Ibid., p. 363.
3^The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.,
pp.. cit., pp. 23-31._________________________
. ~ 209
Kommandatura had the right to enact currency reform for
Berlin as a whole. On June 22, 1948 the Soviet authorities ;
i 1
j ;
jissued orders for a new currency for both the Soviet Zone 1
I
iand all of Berlin. The Western Powers, then, told the i
I
Soviet Government that a new currency tied to that of the j
Western Zones would be introduced into the Western sectors j
i
jof Berlin. This was done on June 25, 1948. j
i The Western Powers felt that they could not permit ;
Berlin to be integrated monetarily with the Soviet Zone.
jSuch a situation would have facilitated trading and dealing j
j
'between Berlin and the Eastern zone hinterland, but it
iwould have required special arrangements and inconvenience
| i
i qo |
'in trade between Berlin and the Western Zones. ^ In addi-
i ' !
I
ition, Western prestige was at stake. Issuance of a currency
!
is a decisive exercise of sovereignty. Use of Soviet cur
rency in all of Berlin would entail Western acquiescence in|
Ian act of Soviet authority. The mood in the Western coun- j
1 i
J ]
|tries was not one of submission to or accommodation with
I
what was regarded as a Soviet claim to special prerogative.
The conflict over currency reform led the Soviet
\
Government to halt all land and water traffic to Berlin !
i
from the Western Zones. This action was taken by the Soviet
3®U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Docu-
ments on Germany, 1944-1959 (Washington: Government Print-
ing Office, 1959J / p. 446.
•^Gottlieb, op. cit., p. 193.
210
military governor on June 24, 1948. The ensuing total
jblockade of Berlin was stated by the Soviet Union to have
^been compelled to protect the interests of the German
!people in Berlin and in the Soviet Zone from the dangers
' 40
jcaused by the currency reform measures of the West. The
I
;cessation of land traffic between the Western Zones and
iBerlin necessitated the Western effort to supply the needs ■
jof the Allied troops in Berlin and of the German people of
I the city by air. The result was the dramatic and famous
:Berlin air lift.
I
S Negotiations between the West and the Soviet Union
'with respect to - the Berlin blockade were carried on during
ithe summer of 1948.^ These negotiations were entirely
! ■ !
|ineffectual, and in September, 1948 the Western nations ;
i |
'referred the matter of the blockade to the Security CouncilJ
of the United Nations as a threat to peace under Chapter j
'VII of the United Nations Charter. No progress was made j
’ i
I at the United Nations in solving the Berlin blockade ,
j |
iImpasse. j
i i
j )
j At the time of the Berlin blockade the Western j
! Powers insisted that the Soviet Union was violating Westernj
j
rights of access to Berlin. The Soviet Union contended
that the Western Powers had destroyed the basis of their
^The Ministry, of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.,
op. cit., pp. 30-31.
_______^Clay, op. cit,, pp. 369-371.
211]
rights of access to Berlin and their rights to participate
|In the joint administration of Berlin by breaking their
i ;
|promises in creating Bizonia, in refusing to perform the
i
|agreement on reparations, and by introducing a separate j
currency in the Western Zones. )
; By the spring of 1949 it was becoming apparent that;
i the Berlin airlift was a success, and that, the Western i
i ■
|countries would continue it indefinitely rather than aban-
|don West Berlin. The stoppage of trade between the Western!
! • • ' !
Zones and Eastern Germany was having a more serious impact I
i 4 2
I on Eastern Germany than on the Western Zones. The Soviet ;
| Union and the Western Powers finally agreed to an ending I
: of the blockade. On May 4, 1 9 4 9 the Four Powers agreed j
i ' !
! ' • . j
| that all restrictions on traffic to Berlin would be lifted j
on May 12, 1949.^3 It was also agreed that the Council of
Foreign Ministers would meet again in Paris during May and
June, 1949 in order to try to find a basis for common |
j agreement on quadripartite government of all Germany. The i
! ' i
i Paris meeting of the Foreign Ministers was still unable to j
i
1
make progress on major issues relating to Germany. It j
represents the final, unsuccessful attempt of the four !
ho
J. P. Nettl, The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy
in Eastern Germany, 1945-1950 (London: Oxford University
PresB, 1951)j pp. 276-277.
^U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, A
Decade of Foreign Policy, Basic Documents, 1941-1949j
pp. 90-91.
major powerB to reach agreement on the resumption of quadri-
i
'partite government of Germany. After this the de facto
division of Germany was accepted by the Four Powers as a
practical reality with which none of them' were actually
satisfied.
During November, 1948 while the blockade was in
effect the city government of Berlin was split in two. The
City Assembly (Magistrat) had its headquarters in the Soviet
sector of the city. The majority of the City Assembly were
expelled by the Soviet authorities. A separate City As
sembly was established in the Soviet sector, and municipal
administrative agencies rivaling those already existing
were organized. The city, government which thus began to
function in the Soviet sector claimed to comprise the only
44
legal organs of municipal government in Berlin.
The expelled majority of the City Assembly moved
to the Western sectors and set up an independent city gov
ernment which also alleged city-wide authority and claimed
to be the only de Jure government of Berlin.
During December, 1948 the Kommandatura, from which
the Soviet representative had withdrawn, resumed its work.
It issued an announcement on December 21, 1948 stating that
4c
it would continue to function, ^ This statement declared
44u.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Documents on Germany, 1944-1959* PP* 451-457, passim.
^Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, op. cit.,
p. 114.
that if the Soviet authorities decided to abide by the
agreements to which the Pour Powers were committed, quadri
partite administration of Berlin could be reinstituted at
any time. However, if the Soviet Government refused to
participate in the Kommandatura, the Western Allies would
!exercise the powers of the Kommandatura even if its deci-
isions could only be applied in the Western sectors. When
i the blockade of Berlin ended in May, 19^9^ Four-Power con
trol of the city was also, as a matter of fact, at an end.
;Thereafter, the eastern and western sectors of Berlin were
i
|administered separately and as independent units of govern-
I
jment.
I At the London Conference in February and March of
j1948, the decision was made to form a separate, independent
state in West Germany. In June, 1948 the three Western
i
Zones were merged into Trizonia by the addition of the
French zone to what was already Bizonia. A Parliamentary
i
Council was elected in the Western Zones to draw up a pro
visional constitution. On September 1, 1948 this Parlia
mentary Council convened in Bonn under the chairmanship of
i Dr. Konrad Adenauer to draft the constitution. Pursuant
to Article l46 of the constitution (Basic Law, as it is
called), the government established thereunder, and the
^
capital at Bonn were all decreed to-be provisional pending
1 46
.the reunification of Germany. •
i
| On May 12, 1949 the provisional constitution waB
japproved hy the three Western Military Governors, with
certain exceptionsOn August 14, 1949 the German people j
lin the Western Zones went to the polls and overwhelmingly
japproved the provisional constitution.
j Military government in Western Germany ended on
September 21, 1949. On that date the Federal Republic
48
came into existerice. However, the occupation regime con
tinued. Those functions of government which it was still
j |
[considered necessary for the Occupying Powers to retain j
jwere enumerated in an Occupation Statute which also became j
|effective on September 21, 1949 j simultaneously with the !
j !
jestablishment of the Federal Republic. The United States, j
j i
the United Kingdom, and France declared that they retained j
supreme authority in Germany assumed by them under the !
I i 4q 5
jDeclaration of June 5* 1945* They established an Allied
I l f )
John Ford Golay, The Founding of the Federal Re
public of Germany (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
1958), Appendix A, p. 254.
^Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, op. cit.,
p. 117.
40
Golay, op. cit., Appendix A, p. 217.
^U.S. Department of State, Germany 1947-1949* The
Story in Documents, p. 89j Golay, op. cit., pp. 22-26.
!" . . “ ' ” ~...." ; 2i5|
i i
jHigh Commission for the exercise of supreme authority in j
! 50 ' •
ithe Federal Republic.
i I
The Occupation Statute defined the division of
jpowers between the Allied High Commission and the Federal j
Republic.^'1 ' . The Intention of the Occupation Statute was to
[give the German people the maximum degree of self govern- :
jment consistent with a continuing occupation of the country^
1
j Full legislative, executive, and Judicial powers were given
!
I • :
Ito the Federal Republic and the Lender within it, subject j
! :
|only to general limitations. The powers reserved by the :
1
!Occupation Statute to the Allied High Commission were only :
!those regarded as necessary to insure the accomplishment
i
|of the basic purposes of the occupation. The Occupation !
Statute also reserved to the Western Powers the right to j
I
|resume the exercise of full authority In Western Germany j
I if thiB should become necessary to preserve democratic j
j I
I government in Germany or to enable the Western Powers to j
!fulfill their international obligations under agreements i
i . i
! 52 i
in force. j
t
Somewhat similar developments had been occurring j
in the Soviet Zone. A Peoples' Council was formed to draw j
t
up a constitution. It was adopted in March, 19^9. On ■
^U.S. Department of State, Germany 19^-7-1959! The
Story in Documents, p. 89.
-^Golay, op. cit., pp. 22-26. i
i -
________52Ibid.. pp. 22-23. ___________
216
October 7, 19^9 the Peoples' Council was transformed into a
provisional parliament. On that date the establishment
of the German Democratic Republic was proclaimed. The next ;
jday it was announced that the Soviet Military Administra- |
j 54
jtion would be replaced by a Soviet Control Commission.
[General Chuikov explained that the purpose of the Soviet
i
jControl Commission would be to control the implementation
of the Potsdam Agreement and other joint decisions taken
c c ■
|by the Pour Powers relative to Germany.
1
I When the German Democratic Republic came into exis-
itence the United States Secretary of State, Dean Acheson,
1
|said that it was without any legal validity or foundation
in the popular will. He stated that it was created by
Communist Fiat and did not originate in free, popular elec
tions. He went on to say also that the Democratic Republic
in Eastern Germany stood in sharp contrast to the Federal j
1
Republic at Bonn in that the government at Bonn had a
66
thoroughly constitutional and popular basis.-'
In the light of these developments outlined above,
it is appropriate to ask: What is now the status of Berlin?
The Basic Law of the Federal Republic declares that
-^Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, op. cit.,
pp. 125-126.
5Vbid., p. 124.
55Ibidi, p. 127.
56Ibid., p. 126. J
217
67
Berlin Is a state In the Federal Republic. 1 The Basic
l I
jLaw also says that Its provisions shall apply in the states|
i |
|(Lender), and it names Greater Berlin as one of the states. !
; . i
iWhen the Basic Law was drafted by the Parliamentary Council^
!the representatives from Berlin were not allowed full par- I
| |
|ticipation, but only an advisory vote, due to limitations
(set down by the occupying authorities. However, on May 19, ■
|
\1949 the City Assembly in West Berlin accepted the Basic
Law.by a unanimous vote. Hence, the Basic Law is regarded |
i 58 ■
ias binding for West Berlin. ;
i :
! In a letter dated May 12, 1949 the Western Military:
' 1
;Governors gave their approval to the Basic Law. However,;
ithey did state a reservation relating to Berlin. This
i ■
I ;
|reservation is worded as follows: i
! !
! "A third reservation concerns the participation j
| of Greater Berlin in the Federation, We interpret - j
s the effect of Articles 23 and 144(2) of the Basic j
| Law as constituting acceptance of our previous re- j
quest that while Berlin may not be accorded voting
membership in the Bundestag or Bundesrat nor be
| governed by the Federation she may, nevertheless, !
i designate a small number of representatives to at-
j tend the meetings of those legislative-bodies." |
i • >
i This language states that Berlin may not be gov- !
i
erned by the Federation. There has been a difference of j
-^Golay, op. cit., Appendix A, p. 222. j
i
-^Charles B. Robeson (ed.), Berlin--Plvot of German
Destiny (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina
Press-, I960), p. 90. j
-^Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, op. cit., j
111.. . 1 1 7 ^ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ : _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _J
r ■ - ■ ■ _ _ ■ ■ 2 1 8
opinion between the Allied occupying authorities and the
!German authorities also to what this limitation really !
| i
means. According to the Western Allies, Berlin is not a
j g Q
|part of the Federal Republic juristically. It is recog-
Inized, however, by the occupying authorities that for many
|
|purposes Berlin is treated as if she were a state of the i
i :
{Federation. But the view of the Allied officials is that
!
the membership of Berlin in the Federal Republic is in a
state of suspension, legally, but that as a practical mat- j
iter West Berlin and the Federal Republic act and operate
! .
j as if West Berlin were a full-fledged state.
! , i
The German view appears to be that the exercise ;
i of the power of the governmental organs of the Federal !
I ;
|Republic is excluded in Berlin, but that in all other re
spects the Basic Law applies in Berlin.^ Thus, the funda
mental rights guaranteed by the Basic Law are supposedly
valid and operative in Berlin. The West Germans argue both
!
! the de jure and de facto membership of Berlin in the Fed-
j i
i eral Republic. The Allied officials have done everything
possible to achieve the de facto participation of Berlin
in the Federation, but refrain from conceding a de Jure . !
participation.
However, in substance, the gap of Berlin's not being;
governed by the Federal Republic has for most intents and
^°Robeson, op. cit., p. 92. ^ Ibid.
219
purposes been filled. Thus, Berlin has been drawn Into
! 62 1
|financial unity with West Germany. The Federation's • ;
j
power of taxation extends over West Berlin. Also, West
i ;
jBerlln, like all the Lender In West Germany, receives j
1 i
public funds from the treasury of the Federal Republic. j
i
i
| Furthermore, legislation of the Federal Republic i
jbecomes law in Berlin. This is achieved by final, formal
I approval of Federal statutes by the Berlin House of Repre- :
sentatives. The laws of the Bonn Government become Federal;
I
jlaw in Berlin and take precedence over all Berlin law, '
!which is relegated to the position of local law. In addi- ;
ition, once laws of the Bonn Government have become effec- i
I
!tive in Berlin, they cannot be annulled or changed by the ;
j !
Berlin House of Representatives without the approval of the!
Bonn legislature. As a consequence, executive orders and
| administrative decrees promulgated by the government in ;
| Bonn and the Federal ministries there have exactly the same
!
! effect and authority in Berlin as they have in the Lender
j
jof West Germany. For almost all practical purposes, polit-
| ical unity between West Berlin and West Germany has been
achieved. The only exceptions would be a few instances in
i
I
which the occupying authorities prevented the application ;
l
of certain Federal laws in- Berlin. j
62Ibid., p. 94.
I 220!
' I
; The reasons the Western Powers have insisted that- • '
I f
I |
jWest Berlin not be a part of the Federal Republic legally
| |
(and juristically are to afford a legal basis for maintaining
|troops there and because they deem it necessary not to !
! 1
|jeopardize the theoretical* quadripartite status of the j
! j
jcity. Quadripartite government of Berlin has not existed
jin actuality since 19^8* but officially the Western Allies
have always taken the position that they are ready to re-
! sume Four-Power control of the entire city. The Western
| • '
;Powers have also maintained West Berlin is not a part of
i
I the Federal Republic realizing full well that West Berlin
!is a point of strife and danger* and recognizing that they ;
!must be able to have a free.hand in West Berlin in event ■
■of an emergency. i
| ■ i
! Subsequently to the establishment of the Federal '
!Republic* the Western Allies have consistently and from
! ■
; time to time taken the position that Berlin is not a part <
I of the Federal Republic. In 1952 the Bonn Conventions
provided for military contributions by West Germany to the
European Defense CommunityAt this time the Federal
Republic also made a Declaration on aid to Berlin In which
it undertook responsibility for rendering economic assis-
6b
tance to Berlin. At the time of this Declaration* May
6^
-"Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs* op. clt.*
pp. 165-166.
^Ibid.* p. 158; U.S. Senate* Committee on Foreign
Relations. Documents on Germany* 19^-1961* p. 131*
j~ " ' " ' 221
S
!26, 1952, the three Western High Commissioners sent a
jletter to Chancellor Adenauer stating that the original
jreservation against Berlin1s being fully incorporated into
i 69 ;
the Federal Republic still stood. j
| In October, 1954 a Nine-Power Conference was con- j
jvened in London. At this Conference the United States,
'the United Kingdom, and France stated that it was their
jpurpose to end the occupation regime in West Germany as
soon as possible. At this Conference Chancellor Adenauer
ideclared that the Federal Republic would agree not to
I
j ;
jmanufacture atomic, biological, or chemical weapons on its
!territory.66 The Federal Republic also committed itself
;to conducting its foreign policy in accordance with
1 . j
I the principles of the United Nations Charter and, In par- j
I |
Iticular, never to have recourse to force to achieve the ;
! ■ I
I reunification of Germany or the modification of its exist- |
| gy j
iing boundaries. ;
! The decisions of the London Nine-Power Conference i
| i
|were embodied in a series of appropriate agreements which i
were signed in Paris on October 23, 1954. By virtue of j
these agreements, the occupation of West Germany was ter- j
' . _ )
6^Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, op. cit.,
p. 157; U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, op.
cit., p. 132,
66Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, op. cit.,
P. 199. |
67Ibid., p. 188. !
222
minated. The Western Allies retained only limited responsi-
I
; . !
jbilities relating to Berlin and Germany as a whole, includ- ;
i 68 •
ling the reunification of Germany and a peace settlement.
The Paris Agreements were ratified on May 3, 1955* !
i
On that day, West Germany became a full member of the j
j j
’Western European Union and on the succeeding day of the
I North Atlantic Treaty Organization. On May 5* 1955 the
I
|Allied (Western) Kommandatura issued a Declaration which
"endeavored to grant to the Berlin government "the maximum !
|liberty compatible with the special situation of Berlin.
I '
'However, again in this Declaration the Western Allies were ;
i !
I careful to reserve -to themselves the right to take such :
j ' !
imeasures as they might deem necessary to fulfill their in- ;
i i
j ternational obligations, to keep public order, and to as- j
I !
j sure the status and security of Berlin. j
i j
| With respect to Berlin itself, its ultimate author-j
i ' I
j ity of government is a Constitution adopted for the city I
| under the control of the Kommandatura. A Temporary Con- j
!
| stitution of Greater Berlin was issued by the occupying
i
powers in August, 1 9 4 6 . This was the only constitution
instituted by the occupying powers in Germany by a direct
exercise of their supreme authority. The Temporary Con
68Ibid., pp. 208-209.
8%.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Docu- ,
ments on Germany, 1944-1959., P* 100. |
^°McInnis, op. cit., p. Ill, J
stitution provided for the status of a state for Berlin.
|The permanent Constitution of Berlin was adopted on Septem-i
I 71 i
|ber 1, 1950 and is still in effect. It defines the city'3
| ;
I double status and says briefly, "Berlin is a German state ; ■
and at the same time a city."
Constitutional development in East Germany closely!
{paralleled that of West Germany. As we have noted, in
J
October, 19^9 an East German government called the German
7 2
Democratic Republic came into being. On October 10, !
19^9 a Soviet Control Commission superseded the Soviet ;
Military Administration in East Germany. J j
I ;
! On September 20, 1955.» rather shortly after the :
{ j
i termination of the occupation regime in West Germany, a
j ;
i treaty was signed between the Soviet Union and the German I
j
Democratic Republic. This treaty stated that the rela- !
|tions between the parties thereto were based upon complete j
! j
|equality of rights, mutual respect of sovereignty, and non-;
interference into domestic affairs, but that it also took ;
1
into consideration the obligations of both parties under
international agreements pertaining to Germany as a
7I 1 I
whole. !
--------------------------------------------------------— — — i
71Ibid., pp. 130-131. I
72Nettl, op. cit., pp. HI-113.
73Ibid., p. 112.
7^U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Documents on Germany, 1944-1961, pp. 187-189. I
224
Contemporaneously, with the signing of the treaty
between the Soviet Union and the East German Government.
i i
i {
there was an exchange of letters between the two. These
letters provided that the German Democratic Republic was to j
exercise control over East German borders with the Federal j
Republic and Berlin and over the lines of communication j
between the Federal Republic and West Berlin, except that
the movement of Western military personnel and materiel to
West Berlin would continue to be controlled by the command
of the Soviet troops in Germany, pending conclusion of an
75
appropriate agreement.
I On September 20, 1955 there was also issued a |
jSoviet statement announcing the dissolution of the Soviet
j rjg |
jControl Commission in Germany. The Soviet Ambassador to
I I
i
the German Democratic Republic was to maintain., together j
with diplomatic representatives of the three Western Powers j
'in the Federal Republic, relations involving Germany as a
! ■ j
|who le. J
i t
i I
! The German Democratic Republic is a signatory to j
77 |
the Warsaw Security Pact promulgated on May l4, 1955* It !
maintains diplomatic relations with members of that pact. |
I
However, the Western Powers have consistently refused to
i
recognize the sovereignty of the German Democratic Re- j
75Ibid., p. 189. 76Ibid., p. 159. j
77U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, j
Documents on Germany, 1944-1961, P« 175. J
. 225
public.^8 They contend that the Federal Republic is the
only legitimate government in Germany. They assert that
only the Bonn Government was freely elected* and that it
alone has a mandate of the German people to speak for |
j t h e m . ^ j
! ;
I The Western Powers have also stated that in their
f ;
Iview the establishment of the German Democratic Republic
in no way affects any of the quadripartite agreements per
taining to Germany. They argue that the U.S.S.R. continues !
i ■ !
jto be responsible for its commitments relative to trans- ■
iportation and communication between the different parts of ;
I 80 ■
iGermany* including Berlin.
1 1
Insofar as East Germany is concerned* it has been
1 .
I i
(declared by Article 2 of the Constitution of the German
! ■ |
Democratic Republic that Berlin is its capital. It states |
1
also that Berlin is a part of the German Democratic Re- j
I i
(public. The President and all the major governmental de- !
partments of the Democratic Republic are installed in East ;
Berlin. It is largely integrated into the Democratic Re- j
public* just as West Berlin is substantially united with
the Federal Republic.
^8U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign
Documents on Germany* 1944-1959* PP. 123*
Relations*
156.
79U.S. Senate* Committee on Foreign
Documents on Germany* 1944-1961* p. 190.
Relations*
80Ibid.
Thus, the city of Berlin is not only divided, but
jWest Berlin and East Berlin are caught up in a maze of
complex and perplexing Juristic and constitutional re
lationships.
CHAPTER VII
THE WESTERN ARGUMENT RELATING
TO ACCESS RIGHTS TO BERLIN
The Western Powers maintain, first of all, that the
zonal agreements assume the right of "free” access to Ber
lin. Thus, in one of its publications the United States
Department of State has said that:
"The Western Powers obviously could not perform
their duties and exercise their rights in Berlin with
out the right to transport troops and supplies from
their own zones of occupation. Their right of free
access to Berlin was thus plainly inherent in their
right to be in Berlin."!
Assuming the validity of the contention that the
agreements between the three major Allied Powers inherently
assumed a right of access to Berlin, the question still re
mains what type of access, and subject to what conditions,
if any? The issue remains as to what access, what routes,
what restrictions? The term frequently used by the Western
Powers is that of "free access." But the word "free" in
this connection is patently ambiguous. The proposition
^U.S. Department of State, Background: Berlin— 1961,
Publication 7257, Europe and British Commonwealth Series
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 3*
228 j
that the zonal agreements assume free access to Berlin Is !
very much subject to challenge.
’ ’Free access" could mean one of any number of
things. It could conceivably imply use of all routes to
Berlin from the Western Zones. It might mean freedom to
select any route to Berlin depending upon the convenience
of the moment. Or* perhaps* it could mean being limited to
specified routes* but having complete freedom to use the
designated routes with no control or regulation by Soviet
authorities. Use of such specified routes might be exclu
sive or non-exclusive. Or* again* the enumerated routes
might be subject to a certain degree of regulation and
supervision by the Soviets.
In spite of the indiscriminate use of the term
"free access*" it is clear that the United States and Brit-'
ain accepted limited access routes and restricted rights
to access routes to Berlin.
Military traffic of the Western Powers to Berlin
is limited to one rail line from Helmstedt* one highway ;
from Marienburg* and three air corridors from Hamburg*
2 i
Buckeburg* and Frankfurt. It has been conceded from the
days of the original entry of Western troops Into Berlin
that the Soviet authorities have the right to organize
|
traffic and to exercise normal regulation of movement on
p
A. G. Mazerik* op. cit., p. 11.
229
both the rail lire and the highway used by the Western !
Powers. The West does not have the exclusive right to use
the routes of transportation affording it access to Berlin.
Its rights are those of non-exclusive use. Other traffic,
both military and civilian, also utilizes the routes of the j
Western Powers. Thus, it is apparent that the access
rights of the Western nations are very decidedly of a
limited nature. They are not literally rights of "free
access."
Limitations upon the Western access routes to Ber
lin, and at least considerable regulation and supervision
by the Russians, have existed from the time of the first
use by the United States and Britain of the routes to Ber
lin. A memorandum between military officials in Germany
dated as early as September, 194-5 points this out.^ Dis
cussing the matter of identification and check points, it
states that at the Wannsee Station in Berlin all trains
are required to stop for proper identification of their
nationality, for car check by number and class of supply,
and for dispatch to the proper rail head in the United j
■^Documents and Background Material entitled, "Quadric-
partite Access to and Control of Berlin," Vol. 5* Tab. No.
109. Memorandum dated September 9> 1945 from R. S. Demltz,
Lt, Col. GSC, Exec. G-4 to Chief of Staff. Subject: Resume
of Operational Procedures and Working Agreements on Rail
roads in Effect Between the United States transportation
Corps, the British,' and the Russians. Historical Manu-
script Pile, Office of the Chief of Military History,
Department of the Army, Washington.
States or British sector. The Americans and British were
maintaining a joint office at Wannsee Station on a twenty-
four hour basis. The Russians were also maintaining mili
tary personnel at this Station for purpose of identifying
I
the traffic coming into Berlin and operating the check j
point. j
The Russians, supervising German personnel, were
responsible for maintenance of the rail line and all facil
ities along the Berlin-Magdeburg-Goslar route and likewise
the maintenance of yards and facilities in the United
States sector. Coal and water were supplied by Germans at
the Tempelhof repair shop yards, under Russian supervision.
After describing in detail the conditions that i
: existed, the memorandum concluded that the Russians played ■
la dominant role in the rail operation from the Western
4
Zones to Berlin and also in the United States sector.
They maintained the full control of all operations and dis- !
patching, and, it was stated, they had made practically all ;
"the rules of the game." They did not allow the American j
i t
Iforces to deal directly in any respect with the Germans, j
land there were instances where the Russians forbad the ;
IGermans to impart any information to the Americans or
British. The United States and British. Transportation j
Corps Sections had held at least a dozen meetings with the ;
4
Ibid.
231!
|
Russians in an effort to speed up the trains and to allow
greater responsibility in their operation. It was com
plained that agreements with respect to operational pro
cedure which were made by the Russians were not carried out,
i
Also, it was mentioned that it was the custom of the Rus
sians to refer to "higher authority" any question on which
they wanted to postpone a decision or avoid one. Further
more, the Americans were greatly Inconvenienced inasmuch
as the office hours of the Russians were irregular, and it
was necessary to conform to their pleasure and convenience
as to time and place of meeting.
This same memorandum finally recommended that in
order to achieve the efficiency that the United States army
expected in operating the rail line to Berlin, it would be j
i
necessary to eliminate the bottleneck of Russian operations^
supervision, interference, and control in effect at the
time and since the first American train rolled into Ber
lin.^ It was said that this, in substance, would require
an agreement with the Russians giving the United States and;
i
I
Britain a "rail corridor" through the Soviet Zone. Since j
the Russians were operating a limited number of trains over;
the line, it was pointed out that if the route became an
Anglo-American corridor, provision should be made for re- ;
quiring that the Russians should obtain clearance to run j
5Ibid.
i
their trains and to be ’ ’ phased in." Since the procedure in j
effect at the time was for United States trains to be
turned over to the British at Hanover for dispatch to
Helmstedt, and since the British were deeper into the mat- ,
ter of rail operations to Berlin than were the Americans, ;
it was felt that if the Russians granted the Western Powers;
a "rail corridor" through the Soviet Zone, a satisfactory
and workable arrangement could be made with the British
whereby they would bring United States trains into Berlin :
with their rail operating people superimposed upon the
German railway personnel. The United States forces would,
of course, maintain close liaison with the British on
operating procedure. *
Although in retrospect.it can be seen that the sug
gestion of obtaining a "rail corridor" from the Russians j
was never a realistic possibility, it is apparent that from;
the time the first trains were sent into Berlin from the
Western Zones, the Western Allies did not have anything
approaching "free transit." As mentioned in the memorandumj
the "rules of the game" were largely set by the Russians. i
However, at least as far as the position of the
Western Powers is concerned, their use of the routes to
Berlin is free from border check. The West maintains thatj
i .
the Soviet authorities have no right to board the trains j
which the Western countries send from Helmstedt to Berlin, j
The Soviets have no right to check identity of passengers
2331
i
either on the trains or in Western military vehicles on
the highway from Marienburg to Berlin. The Soviets have no
right to require passenger lists or freight manifests.^
The Berlin blockade occurred, because the Soviet Union en
deavored to assert rights to enforce border checks, to
7
board trains, to identify passengers, and examine freight.
It is an unresolved question as to what normal
regulation of traffic on Western access routes includes.
In this respect also the understanding between the Western
nations and the Soviet Union was indefinite and uncertain.
The fact that Western access to Berlin rests on a
tenuous and uncertain basis is also underscored by the
situation that developed as- soon as actual use was made
of the transit routes to the former German capital. The
Report of Operations of the Transportation Section, Berlin
District, U. S. Army for the period May 8 to September 30,
8
1945 summarizes the unsatisfactory state of affairs. At
first truck convoys were sent into Berlin, because the rail:
. — - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . — ■ . ■ ■ ■ — . — - — ■ ■ . — p . — - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - i
Documents and Background Material entitled, "Quad- J
ripartite Access to and Control of Berlin." Vol. 5* Tab.
No. 113. Letter from General C. K. Gailey to General M.
Dratvin dated March 31, 1948. Historical Manuscript Pile, ;
: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the ,
1 Army. . i
T '
Max Charles, Berlin Blockade (London: Allen Win- i
gate, 1949), PP. 24-32. I
ft
Office of Military Government Historical Division, ;
Department of the Army. National Archives, World War II
Records Division, Alexandria.*,..Virginia.
23'
jline was not in operation. Helmstedt was used as a trans
fer point from rail to truck. From that point all supplies
came into Berlin by truck over the Autobahn. Convoys, both
American and British, were subject to innumerable delays
at Soviet check points.
The first British and American convoy to attempt
entry into Berlin was delayed for 48 hours at the Friend
ship Bridge at Magdeburg. To alleviate the annoying de
lays, the Transportation Corps representatives, together
with Russian-speaking interpreters preceded the convoys to
|the check points. These efforts were only partially suc
cessful. In late July the situation was more or less
remedied by the repeated efforts of the Commanding General
of the Berlin District.
During the early period of use of the Autobahn by
i
'the Western Powers another problem arose. Allied vehicles
were stopped, and the occupants robbed of personal property
;and army supplies. In August armored cars were assigned
■ to accompany all United States supply convoys into Berlin.
! By the end of September, 1945 the burden of move-
jment of supplies into Berlin became almost exclusively a
|
|rail function. However, a large number of individual
truck dispatches were made for priority cargoes. In addi
tion, rail facilities were not desirable for transporta
tion of personnel because of the length of time involved
in moving trains between Berlin and the Western Zones.
Hence, personnel were carried largely by truck.
The rail line granted to the Western Powers was
not usable until July 27 due to a damaged bridge over the
Elbe at Magdeburg. On that date the first United States
supply train entered Berlin. The rail line was run with
German civilian employees under Russian supervision. Brit
ish locomotives were used to haul both American and British
trains. The Report of the Transportation Section called
this a very "complex operating procedure."^
.The Russians had told the Americans that they could,
depend upon 9-hour service from Helmstedt to Berlin, and
that the Americans and British could each have l6 train
paths each way per day. In actual practice, however, the
service was very unsatisfactory. Trains operated between
Helmstedt and Berlin required 40 to 70 hours per train. !
This situation made it impossible to set up passenger train!
service. No passenger service was available after 60 days
of rail operation by the Germans, supervised by the Rus- I
sians. j
.British and American rail officers asked the Rus- |
sians for permission to install military rail dispatch of- '
fices at Magdeburg and other points in the Russian Zone j
I
along the train route. This request was made at four dif- j
%bid.
236
ferent times up to September 30, 1945 and always denied by !
the Russians. Dispatch offices were necessary in order to
know where the trains were at various times. The Trans
portation Section of the American Army had no knowledge of i
where the trains were until they actually arrived at the
Wannsee Bahnhof in Berlin.
The first supply trains into Berlin showed evidence
of pilferage. Consequently, the normal guard complement
of two men was increased to six or eight men. Because of
the excessive delays of the trains, they were especially
vulnerable to pilferage.
After September, 1945 the same problems continued
to plague the Americans and British, although some progress'
was made.1^ However, by the end of the year the running
time of trains into Berlin had been cut to an average of
17 hours. The rail line continued under Russian super-*
vision with more and more responsibilities delegated to
German civilian employees.
The fact that the Western countries have accepted ;
|
and concede a certain amount of supervision by the Russiansj
and regulation of traffic on their access routes to Berlin !
(whatever "normal regulation" implies) is indicative of
i
i
■ — 1 " " j
^ Report of Operations dated January 29, 1946 for j
period October 1 to December 31, 1945 by Transportation
Section, Headquarters Berlin District and Quarterly G-4 j
Periodic Report dated January 4, 1946 by Transportation
Section, Headquarters Berlin District, Office of Military j.
Government Historical Division, Department of the Army. j
2371
something less than "free" access. It can he argued also !
by the Soviets that since they are vested with the right of
normal regulation this assumes a priority of right, or a
superior right, as compared with the Western nations, to
the access routes to Berlin.
Thus, the broad assertions of the Western Govern
ments as to their right of free access to Berlin must be
greatly discounted. As a matter of actual use and ac
cepted practice, the Western Governments have acquiesced in;
very limited rights of access subject to restrictions.
A further question of much significance is whether
the Allied transit rights to Berlin are limited to military1
traffic and official governmental use, or whether ordinary :
commercial use may be made of the routes to Berlin. This
issue was argued at the time of the Berlin blockade, and it!
is still a matter of difference of opinion between the West!
and the Soviets. In 19^-8 a Soviet writer contended that
the corridors across the Russian zone were Intended to be !
used only for the needs of the occupation troops.11 This ‘
writer contended that the Western Powers by unilateral ac- '
tion and without the knowledge or consent of the Soviet
Military Authorities began using the air corridors to Ber- ,
lin on a large scale for commercial purposes. It was
|
11M, Sobinow, "Berlin Air Corridors"in Taegliche
Rundschau. May 8, 19^8, p. 1. !
238
alleged that this situation disorganized air traffic,
created disorder, and constituted a threat to navigational
safety.
The American Government has taken the position that;
in endeavoring to limit use of the Western access routes
to Berlin to military and governmental traffic the Soviets :
12
are seeking to amend the Air Corridor Agreements. The
United States maintains that it is only required that air
craft using the corridors to Berlin be of American national^
ity. However, the ownership of the aircraft used to meet
the needs of each occupying power, whether commercial or
government-owned, is an Internal matter and determined by
the economic systems of the occupying powers. In the
Soviet Union a privately owned airline is inconceivable.
But the Soviets cannot expect the United States in its i
choice of air transport facilities to comply with Soviet-
Communistic concepts of state ownership. The Air Corridor
Agreements contain no limitation as to types of aircraft ;
of the Western countries which may use the air lanes to |
Berlin. So runs the argument made by the American Govern- j
ment.^ i
■ ^rief for Chief of Staff, Office of Military Gov- j
ernment (US) dated May 14, 1948. Office of Military Gov- !
ernment Historical Division, Department of the Army. Na
tional Archives, World War II Records Division.
1^Ibid.
239
Much has been made of the fact that the Western j
Powers never obtained a written agreement pertaining to
their rights of access to Berlin. General Clay has said,
however, that he did not want an agreement in writing that
established anything less than the right of unrestricted
access. He also stated that he doubted very much if any
thing in writing would have been effective to prevent the
events which took place subsequently any more so than a
lii
verbal agreement.
Certainly, the matter of not having a written
agreement as to access rights does not affect the legality
of the agreement made. It is universally recognized that
parole agreements are generally valid. This is undoubtedly
true in the area of international law as well as in Soviet ;
law.1^ What is required is that there be mutual assent.
But it can be manifested in a number of ways, and not
merely by affixing signatures to a written document.
Although any parol agreements made by Western
military authorities as to access rights to Berlin would i
be valid as resting on the sanctity of mutual promises, it |
was very risky, perhaps even foolhardy, to have nothing in ;
1
I
writing on the subject. The omission of a written document;
i
-■ — - 1
ill - !
Clay, op. cit., p. 26. ;
"^William Edward Hall, International Law (Oxford: The;
Clarendon Press, 1880), pp. 272-276. '
24oj
I
of some kind created a situation in which it is difficult i
to show the details, the precise provisions, as to what was
agreed upon. Evidence that is not the subject of at least
some dispute is unavailable and lacking.
Clay contends that he did not want an agreement in ;
writing that established anything other than unrestricted
access to Berlin. The equating of a written agreement with
an acceptance of less than "unrestricted access" would seem
to be fallacious. If Clay was unable to obtain from Zhukov;
what he really wanted, it would have been entirely possible :
to reduce to writing what was agreed upon for the moment,
with the proviso that neither side was prejudiced by the
writing to maintain later that its rights were greater than;
those described in the written document, and that the West-I
j
ern Powers reserved their rights to reopen and renegotiate j
I
the issue in various respects later on. A written state-
!
ment as to what was accepted by Clay, Weeks, and Zhukov 1
certainly did not necessarily have to have an unfavorable
effect upon what was left for further discussion. |
The legal status of Berlin and the access rights of;
the Western Powers to this city have been the subject of j
great difference of opinion between the Western Powers and ;
the Soviet Union. ^ This difference merits an analysis of !
■*"^U.S, Department of State, op. cit., Annex I (Soviet;
Aide Memoire of June 4, 1961) and Annex II (U.S. Note of . !
July 17, 1961).
241
the relevant events and documents touching upon the Issue
of access rights.
As we have noted, the rights of the Western Allies
in Berlin and transit routes to it are rooted in a series
of agreements and declarations of the Allied Powers during
the years 1944 and 1945- The first and probably most im
portant agreement is the Protocol on Zones of Occupation
and Administration of the "Greater Berlin" area entered
into September 12, 1944. It described the zoneB into which
Germany was to be divided for purposes of occupation. It
assigned the eastern zone to Russia. It defined the
boundaries of a Northwestern and a Southwestern zone, but
it did not provide which country, as between Britain and
the United States, would occupy which zone. The Protocol
also provided that, "The Berlin area will be jointly oc
cupied by the armed forces of the U.S.A., U.K., and
U.S.S.R., assigned by the respective Commander-in-Chief."
It defined three sectors In Berlin and stated that the
Northeastern section would be occupied by the Soviet Union.
Assigning of the Northwestern and Southern sectors of Ber
lin was left open as between Britain and the United States.
The Protocol, of September 12, 1944 also contained
! the following provisions which have a bearing upon access
| rights to Berlin:
j ”1. The occupying forces In each of the three j
! zones would he under a Commander-In-Chief designated i
1 by the Government of the country whose forces occupy |
the zone.
2. Each Power was authorized to include in the i
forceB assigned to occupation duties under its Com-
mander-in-Chief contingents from any other Allied
. Power which participated in military operations
against Germany. j
i
j
3. An Inter-Allied Governing Authority (Komman- j
datura) consisting of the three Commanders was to be |
established to direct jointly the administration of
the Berlin area."
The Protocol of September 12, 1944 was amended on j
; j
November l4, 1944 to provide for the assignment of the j
i i
; Northwestern zone to the United Kingdom and the South- j
: western zone to the United States, and to give the United !
! i
|States control of the ports of Bremen and Bremerhanen and '
, ■ |
! transit rightB across the Northwestern zone.
The protocol made no mention whatsoever of access
rights to Berlin. It did not touch upon the subjects of
I transportation and communication within Germany. However,
| no one can really question the fact that access rights to
: Berlin from the Western zones Is inherent in the agree-
I ment. This Is certainly the position of the United States
Sand the United Kingdom.^' The Soviet Union has not ques-
! tioned this view.
^U. S. Department of State, op. cit., p. 3'
The agreement of the Three Powers to the presence
iof military forces of the three in Berlin obviously pre
supposes reasonable transit rights to the city on the part
iof all three.The principle involved is well recognized i
In law. Essentially* in the case of the zonal protocol
and rights of transit to Berlin what is involved is a con- ;
: i
dition implied in fact. j
The Western right of access to Berlin is also a
condition implied in fact in the Agreement on Control Ma- j
|
chinery in Germany adopted by the EAC on November 14* 1944* I
j i
lin the Declaration of June 5> 1945 on the zones of occupa- ;
tion* and in the Declaration of June 5* 1945 on control j
machinery in Germany. j
Article 1 of the November 14, 1944 Agreement on j
; I
;Control Machinery states* among other things* that supreme
authority in Germany will be exercised by the Commanders-
in-Chief jointly in matters affecting Germany as a whole in
|their capacity as members of the supreme organ of control ,
[provided for by the Agreement. Article 3 then goes on to
I say that the three Commanders-in-Chief acting together will
|constitute a supreme organ of authority called the Control
! For a statement of this view see Charles B. Robson*
Berlin; Pivot of German Destiny (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press* I960)* PP* 72-73*
(Council. Paragraph (h) of Article 3 enumerates the func
tions of the Control Council. The third function specified
is to control the German central administration. The fourth
function described is to direct the administration of
("Greater Berlin" through appropriate organs.
j
Article 4 of the Agreement on Control Machinery
: > '
makes provision for a co-ordinating Committee to be es- 1
tablished under the Control Council. One of its duties
; i
iprescribed in Article 5 is the "day-to-day supervision and (
; j
control of the activities of the German central adminis- !
i tration and institutions." j
i
Article 7 of the Agreement states that an Inter- j
i
: Allied Governing Authority (Kommandatura) consisting of
three Commandants will be established to direct jointly the
j administration of the "Greater Berlin" area.
The Agreement of November l4, 1944 waB amended by
1 a supplemental Agreement on May 1, 1945 so as to provide
! for the participation of Prance in the control machinery.
( The Agreement on Control Machinery does not state
j in so many words that the Control Council, the Co-ordinat-
I ing Committee, and the Kommandatura will Bit in Berlin.
i
! But no one can reasonably deny that this is intended. The
provisions in the Agreement referred to above all make it
clear that the presence of Western representations and
~ 245'
Western military forces In Berlin is assumed* and conse-
jquently* reasonable access to Berlin are conditions implied
l
in fact.
On June 5* 1945 the four Allied Powers to which all
Iwere signatory parties promulgated a series of Declarations
j
to the German people. One of the Declarations related to
; the zones of occupation. The second paragraph of this
Declaration is as follows:
i
: "The area of 'Greater Berlin' will be occupied by j
forces of each of the four Powers. An Inter-Allied j
Governing Authority (in Russia* Kommandatura) con- j
sisting of four Commandants, appointed by their re- j
spective Commanders-ln-Chief* will be established j
to direct jointly its administration." , !
This language stated unequivocally that military j
! forces of the four Powers will occupy Berlin. It indicates
jan implied condition that the occupying forces will have
i ■
reasonable access to Berlin.
On June 5j 1945 the four Allied Powers also an
nounced to the German people a Declaration pertaining to
i
! the Control Machinery In Germany. The language of this
| Declaration is in all material respects the same as that
| In the Agreement on Control Machinery dated November l4*
1944* although It varies somewhat in incidental detail.
Paragraph 7 of this Declaration says that the administra
tion of "Greater Berlin" will be directed by an Inter-
Allied Governing Authority. This Declaration also presup
poses the presence of the Western Allies in Berlin and
i ■ !
normal access thereto,
I
An additional, important agreement that has a bear-
i
ling on the question of access rights is the Allied Agree
ment on the Quadripartite Administration of Berlin dated
July 7, 19^5 signed by Marshal Zhukov, General Clay, and i
j
1 I
General Weeks. This agreement states that in accordance |
iwith Article 7 of the Agreement on Control Machinery an
i i
Inter-Allied Military Kommandatura is to be established I
! ' !
junder a Chief Military Commandant. The position of Chief j
1 • |
'Military Commandant was to be rotated every 15 days among j
the four Occupying Powers. j
1
I
The July 7, 19^5 Agreement provided that the Chief
Military Commandant will exercise the administration of
i
all Berlin zones, utilizing conferences of the Allied Mil-
i
Iitary Commandants to solve questions of principle and prob-
;lems common to all zones. The resolutions of such confer-
: ences were to be passed unanimously.
The second paragraph of the Agreement of July 7,
| 19^5 said that for the purpose of insuring the supervision
1 of Berlin and the co-ordination of the administration among
| the zones, a Headquarters of the Chief Military Commandant
i
j of Berlin consisting of Allied Representatives Is to be
| established.
Thus, this Agreement also implies a condition of !
Western access to Berlin. It probably goes as far as any
of the relevant agreements that relate to the presence of
Western Allied forces in Berlin in that it specifically ;
states that a headquarters of the Chief Military Comman- ‘
dant of Berlin "consisting of Allied representatives" is
to be established. One of the named purposes of the Head
quarters is to insure coordination of the administration
among the zones.
Thus, in the first instance, the right of Western
access to Berlin rests upon a condition implied in fact in
at least five Agreements and Declarations, namely,
1. The Agreement on the Zones of Occupation
signed by the EAC on September 12, 1944.
2. The Agreement on Control Machinery in i
Germany signed by the EAC on November l4, 1944.
3. The Declaration to the German people on
zones of occupation issued on June 5> 1945*
4. The Declaration to the German people on
control machinery in Germany isBued on June 5* 1945* j
5. The Agreement on Quadripartite Administra- j
tion of Berlin signed on July 7 > 1945 by Marshal
Zhukov, General Clay, and General Weeks.
The terms of the German Act of Surrender of May 8,
1945 and the Declaration of June 5* 1945 bo the German j
people regarding the defeat of Germany and the assumption j
of supreme authority by the Allies are also relevant. By
the provisions of the German Act of Surrender, representa
tives of the German High Command surrendered uncondition
ally to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force ;
and to the Supreme High Command of the Red Army. Thus, the
Western Allies acquired whatever rights derive from mili
tary conquest. Undoubtedly, a very considerable argument
can be made that the German Act of Surrender, and the fact ;
of military victory over Germany shared in by the Western
Powers, gave the Western Allies rights to share in the oc
cupation of Berlin together with reasonable rights to
access to the city.
. The Declaration regarding the defeat of Germany
and the assumption of supreme authority by the Allied
Powers recites the fact that the German armed forces were
completely defeated, and that they surrendered uncondition
ally. Then, the document states, among other matters,
"The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United
States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Re
publics, and the Provisional Government of the French |
Republich hereby assume supreme authority with respect i
to Germany, including all the powerB possessed by the
German Government and High Command and any state,
municipal, or local government in authority."19
This Declaration proclaims the fact that the four
Allied Governments assume "supreme authority" in Germany, j
^U. S. Department of State, op. cit., Annex II,
p. 33, and Annex V, p. 38.
It indicates a joint assumption of authority. It does not !
refer in any way to an assumption of authority by each
Government only within the zone of occupation assigned to
it. It rather evidences a sharing equally in ultimate
authority in Germany. Logically, this joint authority and ;
equal share in governing Germany would presuppose equality ;
of rights to be present in the German capital and in means
of transportation to it. In final analysis, this line of
reasoning bases the rights of the Western Allies in Berlin
on military conquest. It Is precisely on this basis that
the Western Governments have alleged that their rights
20
rest. The validity of the argument of the West in rest
ing Its case on military conquest is discussed infra at
greater length.
The Agreements and Declarations referred to con
stitute one basis upon which the Western Powers seek to
rest their rights of access to Berlin. However, apart
from written documents as such, there are a number of other;
very important negotiations that Occurred between the West-j
|
ern countries and the Soviet Union that further buttress j
the legal rights of transit to Berlin on the part of the
West.
There are strong Indications that President Roose- j
velt communicated with Stalin on the subject of transit j
— — -----------------------1
20Ibid.
rights to Berlin. The details of such correspondence, if
it occurred,' are not known. However, The fforrestal Diaries
record a few of the details of the conversation that took
place between certain high-ranking leaders in the United
StateB Government on June 25, 1948 at the time of the
crisis caused by the Berlin blockade. On .that date Secre
tary of Defense James Eorrestal, Secretary of the Army
Kenneth E. Royall, and Under-Secretary of State Robert A.
Lovett met with President Truman. At this meeting Royall
is supposed to have said that in the records of the War
Department there were certain messages which had been ex
changed between President Roosevelt and Stalin relating
to the subject of four-power occupation of Berlin. Royall
informed the others that were present at the conference
that it appeared that Hopkins had given Roosevelt a memor
andum advising him to agree to Russian occupation of Berlin
provided that the United States had free access to the
area. This memorandum was supposedly given to Roosevelt
sometime in 1944, which would have been an early date for
Roosevelt to be considering the issue of rights of access,
to Berlin. According to Royall, following Hopkins' memor
andum, a series of messages passed between the President
and Stalin, In these messages Stalin committed himself in
principle to the understanding that.the United States
should have full right of entry of persons and goods into
the Berlin area. However, according to Royall's account,
Stalin suggested that the actual terms should be worked out)
by the Russian., American, and British commanders in the
field. Royall's opinion was that this was never done.
Royall had apparently heard comments on the subject by j
Major General Floyd L. Parks, Chief of the Public Informa- ;
tion Division of the Army Special Staff, who in 19^5 had
been the commander of the American military sector in
Berlin. The recollection of General Parks was that in
conversations between Eisenhower and the Russian military
leaders there had been a clear verbal agreement on the
21
terms of rights of entry of Western forces to Berlin.
What General Parks very probably had in mind was
the agreement reached between Clay, Weeks, and Zhukov at
their meeting of June 29., 19^5*
At the meeting when Royall made hiB remarks,
Lovett commented that the entire casualness of the proce
dure in handling the matter of access to Berlin was at
tributable to the attitude of Roosevelt, Hopkins, Stimson, ■
Eisenhower, and others that there would be no real diffi-
22 '
culty in working and co-operating with the Russians. |
Although the possibility existB that at a later datej
it will be revealed by opening of files or records at
|
present closed, that there was a clear-cut commitment by
I
■ . ............. ■ — .................................. — ■ P..-P, — ■ ■■ y
21Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New
York: The Viking Press, 1951), PP* M-^l-4^2. r
22. , , , „ !
Stalin to Roosevelt on the matter of access to Berlin, at
the moment one can only conclude that this point is largely
obscure. It cannot be used at this time to shed light on
the legal rights of the Western Powers to entry to Berlin.
It is to be noted that neither at the various ses
sions of EAC nor at the Yalta Conference was the issue of
access to Berlin discussed or negotiated. This was due, at
least partly, to the fact, as we have observed, that the
United States and British Governments were proceeding on
the principle that this question was solely "a military
matter" to be resolved by the commanders in the field when
the appropriate time arrived.
The first direct mention of access to Berlin per
se, of which we are aware, was raised by President Truman
in his cable to Stalin on June 14, 19^5. Prior to trans
mitting his message of June 14 to Stalin, Truman had sent
a copy of it to Churchill for his review. Churchill sug
gested certain changes in Truman's message pertaining to
settling Austrian problems as an incident of withdrawal of
WeBtern troops from the Soviet zones. Truman accepted all
of Churchill's suggestions and after altering his cable to
Stalin so as to embody Churchill's proposals, he sent it
on to Stalin. The next day, on June 15, 19^5, Churchill
wrote to Stalin informing him that he had seen Truman's
message and that he concurred in it.
253
On June 17, 19^5 Stalin replied to the communica
tions from Truman and Churchill. Stalin dispatched separate
replies to each. Their content in all material respects is
Identical, although the actual words used vary somewhat.
In an attempt to ascertain what, If anything, Tru- j
man, Churchill, and Stalin consented to relative to access
to Berlin as the result of the exchange of their messages,
it is necessary to take careful note of the exact language
used by the three. Analysis of the content of the messages
raises a number of technical points that have a bearing on
the question of the legal rights of the Western Powers to
access to Berlin.
i
The actual words used by President Truman in: his
June 14 message to Stalin, insofar as It touched upon right|
of entry to Berlin, reads as follows: |
, T As to Germany, I am ready to have instructions
issued to all American troops to begin withdrawal
into their own zone on 21 June in accordance with
arrangements between the respective commanders, in- ,
eluding in these arrangements simultaneous movement ;
of the national garrison into Greater Berlin and '
provision of free access by air, road, and rail from ;
Frankfurt and Bremen to Berlin for U.S. forces."23
!
Churchill's message to Stalin June 15, 19^5 stated,;
j
in part, that, ;
"I also am ready to issue Instructions to Field j
Marshal Montgomery to make the necessary arrangements j
in conjunction with his colleagues for the similar j
withdrawal of British troops into their zone In Ger
many, for the simultaneous movement of Allied garrisons
^Truman, op. clt., Vol. I, p. 303.
Into Greater Berlin, and for the provision of free
movement for British forces by air, rail,and road
to and from the British zone to Berlin."24
Churchill suggested a broader right of access than
Truman did, Churchill mentioned movement "to and from the ;
British zone to Berlin." Truman's language is somewhat
more restrictive in that -it stated "from Frankfurt and
Bremen to Berlin."
Stalin's reply to both Truman and Churchill was
largely taken up with explaining that the withdrawal of
troops should be delayed until July 1, since the Russian
troop commanders would be in Moscow from June 19 to June
28 or 30 attending the session of the supreme Soviet and
for a parade. Stalin's message said that the same situa
tion existed as to Austria. Then, Stalin's message In
cluded the following sentence, frequently quoted by the
Western Governments to show supposedly that Stalin accepted;
the proposals of Truman and Churchill, including that of
access to Berlin: "On our part all necessary measures will
be taken In Germany and Austria in accordance with the
above-stated plan."2^
Stalin's reply was concerned only with the with
drawal of troops into the agreed zones in Germany and the
^Churchill, op. cit., p. 6o6.
•^Truman, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 305*
allocation of troops to their zones in Austria. It did not;
directly mention the occupation of Berlin or the subject
of access to Berlin. Thus, Stalin's statement that, "All
necessary measures will be taken in Germany and Austria in j
accordance with the above-stated plan," has obvious refer- !
ence to Stalin's own plan described in his reply proposing
a July 1 date for troop redeployment. The "above-stated
plan" cannot be construed as referring to Truman and Churchr
ill's proposal.
If one seeks to determine whether there was a meet—
i
ing of the minds on the matter of access to Berlin, one
must conclude that Stalin did not assent to the proposals
of Truman and Churchill. If the messages of Truman and
Churchill contained an offer, as.obviously they did, there i
i
was no unqualified acceptance of it by Stalin. It must j
!
be concluded that the minds of the three did not meet on i
the same matter, because the acceptance is wanting. Stalin!
(
did not say, "I accept your proposition" or anything sub- j
stantially to that effect.
Stalin's reply on June 17 was essentially a counter-f
I
offer with terms and conditions materially different from
those stated by Truman and Churchill.
j
On June 18 Truman replied to Stalin, stating, "I i
have issued instructions to the American Commanders to be- j
gin the movement on July 1 as requested by you."
' . 2561
Thus, Truman did indicate an unequivocal acceptance |
of Stalin's counter-offer. There was a meeting of the
minds, insofar as Truman and Stalin were concerned, rela
tive to the troop realignment on July 1. But the matters
with respect to which the two agreed included nothing per- j
taining to Berlin or transit rights thereto. ;
Consequently, it is very much subject to question
whether the Western Governments are essentially correct
when they endeavor to argue that the legal basis of access
rights to Berlin derive, at least in part, from Truman's
and Churchill's messages of June 14 and 15, respectively,
to Stalin. The subject was mentioned by Truman and Church-I
ill, but Stalin made no commitment on his part.
It is possible that Stalin was very purposefully i
misleading the Western leaders. He may have been playing j
a game with considerable craftiness. He quite possibly did;
not want to be pinned down on the issue of transit routes
to Berlin. Or at least he may have been trying to avoid
committing himself on the question if at all possible. It
Is very easy to derive this conclusion from the exchange of!
messages. This view Is In all likelihood correct, espe
cially in the light of subsequent difficulties with the
Russians. But, in final analysis, it must be admitted
that it is conjecture. There is no way of knowing the j
true construction to be placed upon Stalin's maneuvering.
n~ ’ ’ .. .... ." ’ ......'..257
| It is worthy of note, however, that one of the j
(Legal Advisers to the State Department stated it to be his
Opinion that the exchange of correspondence between Truman
i ;
fend Churchill did constitute a definite agreement as to j
! !
'free transit from the Western Zones to Berlin. In the sum- j
j I
fner of 19^8 at the time of the Berlin blockade, a State
Department Legal Advisor informed Under Secretary of State I
[Lovett as follows:
In my opinion, the exchange of messages between J
! the President and Marshal Stalin constitutes an agree
ment on free access to Berlin for United States j
forces. . . . I am of the opinion that the Government j
of the U.S.S.R, agreed to a right of full access to j
Berlin and that the present and past action which
interfered with this right is in direct violation of |
an international a g r e em ent .26 |
Although it is doubtful whether the correspondence j
|of mid-June, 19^-5 among Truman, Churchill, and Stalin gave j
!rise to any agreement as to access routes to Berlin, the j
! !
|june 29 meeting among Clay, Weeks, and Zhukov did produce j
ia clear-cut understanding. j
! A parol agreement was arrived at among the parties, j
it constitutes an important part of the basis of the legal
|
rights of access on the part of the Western Powers to
Berlin. Whereas the prior Agreements and Declarations j
discussed supra contained a condition implied in fact that
History of the Civil Affairs Division. World War II
to March, 194b. Chapter 8, p. 27, footnote 4Ba. Histori-
ical Manuscript Pile, Office of the Chief of Military His
tory, Department of the Army, Washington.
the Western Allies would be permitted reasonable access to
i
Berlin, at the June 29 meeting there was specific agreement j
on the subject of access rights. There was mutual assent !
i
to a verbal agreement which assured the United States and j
Britain transit to Berlin by way of one railroad, one high
way, and two air corridors. In addition, it was agreed
that the subject might be reopened for further negotiation
in the Control Council.
i
Another aspect of the legal case of the West rela
tive to access to Berlin relates to the specific agreement i
i
of the Control Council on the matter of air corridors. On
i
I i
|November 30, 1945 at its thirteenth meeting the Control i
i
Council approved establishment of three air corridors from
Berlin to the Western zone. The three corridors were from
Berlin to Hamburg, Berlin to Buckeburg, and Berlin to
Frankfurt-on-Main. Each corridor was to be twenty English
|miles wide. Plight over these corridors was, permitted ;
without previous notices being given by aircraft of the J
py I
nations governing Germany. j
The three air corridors were approved by the Con
trol Council after prior negotiation and consideration by
the Coordinating Committee and the Air Directorate, a body
inferior to the Coordinating Committee.
^U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Docu
ments on Germany, 1944-1961, pp. 48-49.
259
The Aviation Committee of the Air Directorate had
also proposed air routes available to all the Governing
Powers from Berlin to Warsaw, Berlin to Copenhagen, and
Berlin to Prague. However, the Soviet representative of
the Air Directorate stated that since these routes were
for usual inter-state traffic, and not related to securing :
the needs of the occupying forces in Berlin, they could not
be discussed by the Air Directorate except upon decision of:
Higher Authority.28
The Control Council and Coordinating Committee in
structed the Air Directorate to compile rules of flight
and means of safeguarding flights along the approved cor-
29
ridors..
Flight rules were drafted by the Aviation Committeei
50 '
of the Air Directorate and approved. These rules are :
entirely technical and do not touch upon political or dip-
I
lomatic issues.
After the approval of the air corridors from Ber
lin to Hamburg, Berlin to Buckeburg, and Berlin to Frank
furt, the representatives of the Western countries sought '
to have additional corridors prescribed for free use be- <
tween German cities and other European cities by the- na-
i
tions governing Germany. Thus, on March 6, 1946 the United!
t
— — — 1
28Ibid., pp. 41-43. 29Ibid., p. 47.
30Ibid., pp. 51-53, 63-72.
States member of the Coordinating Committee presented a
memorandum suggesting agreement upon air corridors be
tween Berlin and Prague, Berlin and Warsaw, Berlin and
Copenhagen, Frankfurt and Vienna, Frankfurt and Prague,
Frankfurt, and Buckeburg, Frankfurt and Paris, Frankfurt
and Brussels, Buckeburg and Amsterdam, Buckeburg and Bremen)
Buckeburg and Brussels, Hamburg and Copenhagen, and Hamburg
and Bremen and Amsterdam. The Soviet delegations on the
Allied Control Agencies rejected this suggestion contending;
that the existing air routes through the Soviet zone were
fully sufficient not only to meet the requirements of the
Allied military forces in Berlin, but also for the trans
portation of all commercial cargoes regardless of their
-51
volume.
The agreement between the Soviet Union and the ;
Western countries relative to air corridors is an agreement'
in writing. It states in literal language that all the
countries participating in governing Germany were to have
free use of the specified air routes. The routes were not ;
as many as desired by the Western nations, but those ac- :
cepted by the 'Soviet Union were included in the form of a
Written document (known as C&RC/P [46] 170). Thus, at
least the air corridors were free from the weakness of the j
understandings aB to rail and highway routes. The decision
31Ibid., pp. 54-55.
261
of the Control Council as to the air corridors Is a full j
admission of the right of the Western Allies to reasonable
access to Berlin. By conceding the principle, It also sup
ports the position of the West as to reasonable use of
railroads and highways.
A somewhat analogous historical situation relating
to access rights across the territory of another power
pointed to by the Western nations is that of the rights of
Germany to cross the Polish corridor to East Prussia. The
German rights of transit across the Polish corridor have
been cited not as a measure of the United States and Allied
rights- of access to Berlin, but as an example of a minimum
standard for rights of access granted to a nation, even
though a defeated enemy, which has an outlying territory
separated from its principal domain by an area controlled
by another power. The German rightB of access to East
Prussia were provided for in Articles 89 and 98 of the
Treaty of Versailles and in the German-Polish Convention
of Paris of 1921. The Convention prohibited the Poles from;
imposing permits or embargoes on German freight traversing '
the Polish c o r r i d o r , |
^^Brief for Chief of Staff, Office of Military Gov- i
ernment (US) dated May 14, 1948. Office of Military Gov
ernment, Department of the Army. Also Documents and Back
ground Material entitled "Quadripartite Access to and Con- ;
trol of ^Berlin, " Vo 1. 5* Tab. No. 10b. Historical Analogy: j
German Rights of Transit Across the Policy Corridor to East!
Prussia 1919-193W Historical Manuscript File, Office of j
the Chief of Military History. Department of the Army.
262':
I
i
Although this study is not directly concerned with 1
the historical events and circumstances pertaining to the
so-called Jessup-Malik Agreement of May 4, 194-9* its pro
visions further strongly buttress the legal rights of the
Western countries to transit to Berlin. This Agreement has I
been pointed to and relied upon by the United States, Brit- ;
ain, and Prance in arguing their case as to access to Ber
lin.33
The Jessup-Malik Agreement was signed in New York
and provided for the lifting of the Berlin blockade. The
portion of the Agreement relative to access to Berlin reads
as follows:
"The Governments of Prance, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the
United States have reached the following agreement:
1. All restrictions imposed since March 1, 1948 j
by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on communications, transportation, and trade
between Berlin and the Western zones of Germany be
tween the Eastern zone and the Western.zones will be
removed on May 12, 1949."34
The Jessup-Malik Agreement commits the Soviet Union;
to permit use of the routes to Berlin from the Western
f
zones as they were utilized before the blockade. It re
affirms the right of access to Berlin from the various
zones of occupation.
33U. S. Department of State, Background-Berlin— 1961,I
p. 12.
3\j. S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, Docu
ments on Germany, 1944-1961, p. 90.
263
The Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, United
States, Britain, and France meeting in Paris pledged their
adherence to the Jessup-Malik Agreement. On June 20, 1949
the Foreign Ministers issued a communique at the end of
their sixth Bession. This document related to the question
of Germany and the Austrian treaty. Paragraph 5 read, in
part, as follows:
"The Governments of France, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the
United States agree that the New York Agreement of
May 4, 1949 shall be maintained."35
Thus, there can be no doubt that subsequent to the
Berlin blockade, Russia specifically agreed to and com
mitted itself to the principle of access to Berlin from the
Western zones. A meeting of the minds and unequivocal,
solemn promises took place. Written documents evidence the
agreement.3^
35Ibld., p. 95.
3^The communique issued by the Foreign Ministers at
the end of their sixth session on June 20, 1949 also con
tains the following statement immediately after the sen
tence just quoted:
"Moreover, in order to promote further the aims set
forth in the preceding paragraph and in order to im
prove and supplement this and other arrangements and
agreements a.B regards the movement of persons and goods
and communications between the eastern zone and the
western zones and between the zones and Berlin, and
also in regard to transit, the occupation authorities
each, each in his own zone, will have an obligation to
take the measures necessary to ensure the normal func
tioning and utilization of rail, water, and road trans
port for such movement of persons and goods and such
communications by post, telephone, and telegraph."
I " ""........... ' ' '... 264
! Thus, in the light of history from 19^4 to 1949,
relevant events, and various written instruments, the West
ern Powers endeavor to argue their case for rights of
reasonable access to Berlin.
CHAPTER VIII
THE SOVIET ARGUMENT RELATING TO
ACCESS RIGHTS TO BERLIN
i What arguments does the Soviet Union advance to
i
challenge the rights of the Western nations to he present j
in Berlin and to exercise reasonable rights of transit !
i
thereto?
The main argument made by the Soviet Union is that |
jthe right of the United States, Britain, and Prance to be j
present in Berlin stems from the Potsdam Agreement, and j
that the Western Allies have grossly violated this Agree
ment thereby destroying whatever rights they derived from
T i
it. The Soviet Union argues that the Western countries
A. G. Mezerik (ed.), "Berlin and Germany,” Inter
national Review Service, VIII (1962), Appendix P (USSlR iNote
on Berlin to trs, UK and Prance, November 27, 1958), p. 8lj
Nikita S. Khrushchev, The Soviet Stand on Germany: A Com
pilation of Nine Key Documents Including Diplomatic Papers
and Major Speeches (New York; Crosscurrents Press, line,,
1961) , pp. 9'4, 95, 119, Eugene Korovin, "The Berlin Issue
and International Law, New Times, II (January, 195^),
15-17; L. B. [sic], "The Status of Berlin," New Times, XLVT
(November, 1958), 29, G. Tunkin, "The Berlin Problem and
International Law," International Affairs, II (February,
1959), 38-4-3; M. Vasilyev, "The German Question in the Light
of Historical Truth," International Affairs, VI (June,
1959), 111-113.
265
266;
breached the Potsdam Agreement by failing to effect a de
militarization and a denazification of Germany as they were
committed to do. In fact, Russia contends that the Western
Allies did just the opposite, that they re-armed Western
Germany and retained Nazi leaders in positions of authority.
Thus, Nikita Khrushchev in a radio and television
speech in Moscow after his meeting with President Kennedy
in June, 1961 said,
"They [the Western Powers] turned West Germany into
a militarist state, founded a military bloc directed
against us, and in this bloc Federal Germany plays a
primary part. The generals who commanded Hitler's
troops, who committed atrocities in the Soviet Union,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Yugoslavia, France,
Greece, Belgium, Norway and other countries now hold
a commanding position in NATO."2
Khrushchev has stated the same point of view on
-3
many occasions.
In its note of November 27, 1958 the Soviet Union
served official notice on the United States, Britain, and
France that it regards the Protocol of September 12, 19^
relating to the zones of occupation and all the associated !
supplementary agreements as null and void. :
The contention advanced by Russia raises a series
of interesting, but difficult, questions. Is It true that j
the rights of the Western nations to be present In Berlin i
originate with the Potsdam Agreement? Did the Western
_________________________________________________________________________________________ __________ — — -— ............. ................ t
2
Khrushchev, op. cit., p. 32.
3Ibid., pp. 19, 94-95, 119. I
267
countries, in fact, breach the Potsdam Agreement? If so,
would such a breach affect their rights to Berlin? Are the
provisions of the Potsdam Agreement, and the other agree
ments pertaining to Berlin, several and independent, or
would a breach of one provision concerning unrelated sub
ject matter invalidate the commitments applying to Berlin?
The Western Powers vehemently deny that their
rights to Berlin flow from the Potsdam Agreement. Rather
they insist that their rights with respect to Berlin flow
4
from their military victory and conquest of Germany. The
United States and Britain have told Russia flatly that,
"insofar as the Potsdam Agreement is concerned, the status
of Berlin does not depend upon that agreement."^
The argument that the rights of the United States,
Britain, and Prance to be present in Berlin derive from the
Potsdam Agreement would seem to be of doubtful validity.
The Protocol of the Proceedings of the Potsdam Conference
state nothing directly about Berlin. Under the section
pertaining to political principles, the Protocol does say
that the four Powers will exercise supreme authority :
jointly in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their
4
Ibid., Appendix G (U.S. Reply to Soviet Proposal oh
Berlin, December 31* 1958), p. 87.
5Ibid.
268;
capacity as members of the Control Council,^ The section
relating to economic principles provides that Germany shall
7
be treated as a single economic unit. These provisions
are as close as the Potsdam Protocol comes to referring to ;
Berlin. The Agreements and Declarations that bear directly
on Berlin per se antedated Potsdam. Thus, the Soviet argu
ment relative to Western rights to Berlin deriving from
agreements made at Potsdam is questionable.
It is worthy of note, however, that at least one
Soviet writer contends that the agreement relating to
zones of occupation and Berlin is really incorporated into
the Potsdam Agreement, at least in legal theory. He argues
that either the agreements on Berlin do not conform to the
Potsdam decisions and should therefore in the parts con
cerned be regarded as null and void (on the principle lex
posterior derogat priori), or the Potsdam decisions gener
alize and extend earlier agreements. The first supposition;
iB obviously wrong. Hence, one must accept the second sup
position, namely, that Potsdam generalized and elaborated
upon the principles of Allied policy in Germany. Thus, on
this reasoning, in reality, the protocol of September 12,
; 8
1944 is part and parcel of the Potsdam Agreement.
- _ _ r r- r r _ . — - - - ■ - - ■ ■ ‘
6 i
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the ;
United States Diplomatic Papers— The Conference of Berlin
(1945') (Washingtons U.S. Government Printing Office, r 19'6o), ;
Vol. II, p. 1502.
7Ibidt, o. 1804. ^Korovin, op. cit., p. 16.
269;
Apparently, both the Soviet Government and the
Western Governments believe that the Potsdam Agreement pro
vides the most tenuous and uncertain basis for Western
rights to Berlin. The Soviets believe that a strong case
can be made out to demonstrate violation of the Potsdam
Agreement by the West. In advancing this view the Soviets
are on reasonable ground, and it must be admitted that an
argument that carries considerable weight can be asserted
that the Western Powers have indeed violated the Potsdam
Agreement.^ There is essential truth in the contention
that the Western Powers have supported German rearmament
and inaugurated policies which were only consistent with
the economic and political bifurcation of Germany, and, at
least to this extent, can be made to appear as having
broken the Potsdam Agreement. Of course, the Western
Governments are quick to maintain that the breaking of the
Q
^Fred Warner Neal in War and Peace and Germany main-;
tains that certain acts of the Western Powers were undoubt-:
edly violations of the Potsdam Agreement. He discusses the;
economic fusion of the British and American zones, the cre-j
ation of a West German Government* and the institution of a
common currency for the Western zones. Neal wrote as fol- |
lows about these measures on the part of the WeBtern coun- !
triesj
"No matter how economically necessary these actions ;
were to the WeBt, all of them were in clear violation i
of the agreements on Germany, which, If they were clear!
about anything, were clear about the fact that Germany i
had to be treated as a whole for economic matters and j
these had to be resolved by quadripartite decision."
(P. 34.)
270;
Potsdam and other Agreements first occurred by Russian
intransigence and aggressive purposes, leaving the West no
choice other than to contain Russia by whatever means that
were available.
The contention of the Western Governments that
their rights to Berlin result from military conquest are
also subject to challenge. The fact is the Western nations
did not capture Berlin. They are in Berlin, not by virtue
of conquest, but pursuant to agreements with Russia.
A Soviet writer, Eugene Korovin, has argued that
the Western Allies are not in Berlin by right of conquest,
because, in fact, they did not capture Berlin. He stateB:
", . . it is generally known that the Soviet Army
captured Berlin on May 2, 19^-5^ and that the Western
Powers entered the city only on July 5* after the end
of the war and by special agreement with the XJ.S.S.R.
The Western armies, therefore, did not enter Berlin
as 1 conquerors.1”10
Korovin also challenges the "right of conquest"
•theory by maintaining that modern international law, con
curred in by American jurists, rejects this theory. Thus,
he refers to the Charter of the Organization of American
States adopted in 1948 which does not recognize "the right
of conquest."11
^Korovin, op. cit., p. 15...
11Ibid., pp. 15-16. The same argument is made by the
Soviet writer G. Tunkin. (See Tunkin, op. cit., p. 36.)
271 ]
The Western Governments have sought to help their
argument by noting that they gave sizeable portions of Ger
many, seized by their troops, to Russia In exchange for
jointly occupying Berlin. The Western nations have pointed
out to Russia that the arrangement constituted a quid pro
But the burden of this argument adds up to a sharing
in the occupation of Berlin as the consequence of an agree
ment with Russia. It is true that in the background of the,
agreement was military victory over Germany. However,
whatever status existed at the end of military operations
against Germany was superseded by agreements between the
wartime Allies. Consequently, it would appear correct to
conclude that the right of the West to be present in Berlin,
t i
originates in a series of international agreements to which
the four principal Allies were signatories.
The question of breach of the Potsdam Agreement
and other agreements between the wartime Allies and who
first committed the breaches is very knotty. Undoubtedly,
both the Western Allies and the Soviet Union have violated !
the agreements to a greater or lesser extent. Such viola
tions were inevitable as the result of the great cleavage
between Russia and the West. It is very difficult to as
sess blame and delineate the extent of the breaches that i
12Mezerik, op. cit., Appendix G (U.S. Reply to Soviet
Proposal on Berlin, December 31> 1958), p. 87.
272!
occurred. The relevant question for our purpose really Is
whether violations of the Potsdam Agreement and other
agreements relating to Germany, even If admittedly made by
the Western Powers, affect their legal rights to Berlin and
access to It. The argument appears to be strong, that the i
protocol of September 12, 1944 pertaining to the occupation
zones and Berlin was a completely Independent, Interna
tional agreement. If the Western nations breached the Pots
dam Agreement, as the Soviet Union contends they did, It
Is doubtful that this In Itself should negate or render
void the zonal protocol. It was a separate, distinct agrees
ment. The various parties bargained and made concessions
and received advantages. The zonal protocol was in no way
made contingent upon mutually agreeing on other subjects
or other issues relative to Germany. The zonal arrange
ment was not referred to at Potsdam as an understanding
Incorporated into the Potsdam Agreement or in any way
superseded by It.
The Soviet leaders have done what parties normally j
do in an effort to find a legal*basis for relieving them
selves of a promissory commitment that they would like to
get out from under, namely to find a breach by the other
party that would free one from his obligation to fulfill. !
the agreement. There Is nothing In the zonal protocol of ;
l
September 12, 1944 or the Declarations to the German people!
that would afford a basis for finding a breach. But the
273
Soviet Government has ample argument for alleging a breach
in the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement.
One of the difficulties the Russian argument rela
tive to violations of the Potsdam Agreement faces is that
the zonal protocol, including the part of it pertaining to ■
Berlin, has been executed by all the parties to it. Noth- i
ing provided for in the protocol remains to be performed.
The four Powers have been in actual occupation of the zones;
and sectors of Berlin assigned to each.. Russia really
wants to undo a portion of the zonal protocol which was
put into effect many years.ago. And, furthermore, it de
sires to do this on the ground of violations of the Potsdam!
J
Agreement and other agreements. It is very dubious that ‘
the breach of one independent agreement can be a reason forj
undoing another agreement between the same parties which isj
fully performed. Apart from the practical problem of re- j
turning to the individual countries the' consideration and
advantages given up by each, there is an inherently il
logical and unreasonable result which is sought to be j
achieved if such a course is suggested. '
Another argument made by the Soviet Union is that j
; i
the zones of occupation and sectors in Berlin were in- |
i
! tended to be only temporary and of limited duration, and !
I that this was explicitly stated in the quadripartite I
I ............ "" ~~ ' .......... .' 27^
j IQ
iagreements. J An additional and vital part of the argu-
i
iment is that Berlin is part and parcel of the zone assigned
to the Soviet Union/ now the German Democratic Republic.
;The sectors in Berlin were granted to the Western Powers j
solely for a temporary occupation period. The period of
i
occupation originally contemplated has long since passed. j
j
;Hence, in reality, all of Berlin is a part of the territoryj
lof the German Democratic Republic.
: That Berlin is a part of the Soviet Zone was first
;contended by Russia in its statement at the time of the
I withdrawal of the U.S.S.R. from the Berlin Kommandatura on
'July 1, 1948. Russia has made the same argument at many
: times since. In the Soviet Aide Memoire of June 4, 1961
; delivered b'y Premier Khrushchev to President Kennedy at j
! Vienna this contention is asserted.
The Western countries strongly deny that West Ber-
; lin is in any sense, or was ever intended to be, either
' j
;part of the Russian zone or the German Democratic Re-
. 14
I public.
! _____________________________________________
j
13Ibid. Appendix F (USSR Note on Berlin to US, UK,
and Prance, November 27* 1958), p. 81.
14
U.S. Department of State, Background: Berlin— 1961,
Annex II (U.S. Note of July 17, 1961), p. 34. In its' note
to Russia of July 17, 19&1, the United States stated:
The United States wishes particularly to reiterate,
in discussing the legal aspects of Berlin's status,
that Soviet references to Berlin &s being situated on
| the territory of the so-called 'German Democratic
j Republic' are entirely without foundation. This can
Undoubtedly, the Soviet Union' Is entirely correct
in alleging that the sectors in Berlin were planned to
exist only for occupation purposes for a relatively limited
period. However, the Soviet Government is advancing an
argument that is challengeable when it contends that West
Berlin is a part of the Soviet zone or of East Germany. j
I
The language of the protocol of September 12, 1944, as wellj
as the maps attached to it, demonstrate clearly that Berlin
is an area apart from the zones. The Greater Berlin area
to be jointly occupied was created by international agree-
i
men.t. The ensuing impasse and the denouement of the cold
war do not alter that fact. The inability of East and West
to agree with respect to a German treaty does not make Ber
lin a part territorially either of the Soviet zone or
present-day Eastern Germany. Certainly, the zonal protocol
contained no such implied condition or understanding.
be readily and clearly established by reference to the
attached copy of the Protocol of September 14,
1944. ..."
The note of the United Kingdom to the Soviet Gov
ernment dated July 17, 1961 contains the following state
ments:
As the Soviet Government must be aware, the City of
Berlin does not belong to Soviet Union nor to the so-
called 'German Democratic Republic.' It is not sit
uated, as the Soviet Government asserts, on the terri
tory of the 'German Democratic Republic.' . . . The
Protocol of September 12, 1944 Is perfectly clear on
this point. (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Selected Documents on Germany and the Question of
Berlin, 1944-1961 [London: His Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1961J, PP. 450-452 at 451.)
276'
The Soviet Government also contends that in the
i
* i
future the Western Powers will be obliged to obtain the
1
i
consent of the German Democratic Republic as a condition j
to the use of access routes to Berlin. In a letter written
in 1961 for American readers, Khrushchev said
"The access to West Berlin has been and will be i
free, but it should not be forgotten that West Berlin • !
communications pass through the territory of another :
sovereign state, the German Democratic Republic.
All sovereign countries abide by the generally
accepted rule: if their communications with other
countries pass through the territory of a third state, !
the consent of this third state to use these communi- i
cations is always required, no matter whether they pass j
over land, through the air or over water. . . ."15 j
j
Khrushchev has repeated this argument on many oc- j
16
casions.
"^Khrushchev, op. cit., p. 13.
■^In Khrushchev's radio and television talk in Moscow
after his Vienna meeting with President Kennedy, he said:
"... Why should it be considered abnormal to ask
the consent of the German Democratic Republic to pass
through its territory to West Berlin? After all, the
ground routes to West Berlin pass through its terri
tory, the waterways also run through its territory, as
well as the air routes." (Ibid., p. 35.)
At a Soviet-Vietnamese friendship meeting in Moscow
in June, 1961, Khrushchev spoke as follows:
"Since the communication lanes to West Berlin pass
through the territory of the German Democratic Re
public, agreement with the government of this state
should be reached, consequently, on their use, as
existing international traditions and laws require,
(Ibid., pp. 69-70.)
Khrushchev has also stated,
". . . If we sign a peace treaty, the right to oc
cupation flowing from the victory over Germany will be
abolished. Peace will be established throughout the
German Democratic Republic. Access to Berlin by air,
water, and land without permission of the Government
277
The Russian contention raises the question how the
right of the Western Allies of access to Berlin can be ab- ;
j
rogated unilaterally. Can whatever rights the West may
have to access in Berlin be destroyed by unilateral action J
on the part of the Soviet Government in making a treaty j
with the East German Government? Khrushchev claims that j
they can be. j
I
I Khrushchev rests his argument on the ground that
the Western Powers frequently acted unilaterally in making j
i
postwar settlements. He maintains that if the West was I
justified in proceeding unilaterally, so is the Soviet j
I *
i Union. He describes as unilateral action on the part of j
S !
the West the merger of the United States and British.zones
in Germany, the currency reform in Germany, the creation
17
of West Germany, and the peace treaty with Japan.
Still another line of argument advanced by the
Soviet Government is that such a change of circumstances j
i
has occurred in Europe that the agreements regarding Ger
many are no longer valid. ThuB, the Soviet Aide Memoire of
of the German Democratic Republic will discontinue.
Access will be for those who obtain the consent of the
Government of the German Democratic Republic. (N. H.
Mager and Jacques Katel [eds.], Conquest Without War
[Analytical anthology of speeches, interviews, and re
marks of Khrushchev] (New Yorkt Simon and Schuster,
1961), p. 101.
^Khrushchev, op. cit., p. 103. In the Soviet Gov
ernment’s Reply to the tj.S. Government Note of July 17 on a
Peace Treaty with Germany and the situation in West Berlin,
August 3, 196l, the following contention is made:
278
June 4, 1961 handed to President Kennedy by Premier Khru-'
schev contains the following languages
1
"The implementation of the proposal to turn West
Berlin into a free city, with the interests of all j
parties duly taken into consideration, would normalize j
the situation in West Berlin. The occupation regime j
now being maintained has already outlived itself and i
has lost all connection with the purposes for which it i
was established, as well as with the Allied agreements
covering Germany that established the basis for its :
existence." j
What the Soviets are saying is that the zones of ■
occupation and sectors in Berlin were established to j
achieve certain purposes, in particular, demilitarization I
and denazification of Germany. However, today, and for j
many years now, the Western Powers have used West Germany |
I
and West Berlin as military and propaganda bases against
Russia. The changed circumstances have allegedly rendered
the agreements on Germany null and"void.
One flaw in the Russian position as to changed
circumstances is that insofar as the zonal protocol and j
agreements as to Berlin are concerned, they have been exe-
"The American Government is trying to interpret the
conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany as a ’uni
lateral act*.... But who, if not the United States
together with its partners in military blocs, has built
its entire policy in Germany on unilateral, separate
actions and deprived the Soviet Union of its legitimate
right to participate in settling the questions affect
ing a greater part of Germany’s present territory? . . ,
Besides, it is known that the United States took
to the road of unilateral decisions not only on the
German question. What about the conclusion of a peace
treaty with Japan without the Soviet Union’s partici
pation?
279
cuted, as was noted supra. The Western countries performed
their end of the bargain, and the Soviet Union reaped the
advantage it sought. This fact is pointed out by the Amer- ;
ican and British Governments in their replies of December !
31, 1958 to the Soviet proposal on Berlin. They said: j
i "The three Western powers are there (in Berlin) j
i as occupying powers and they are not prepared to re-
I linquish the rights they acquired through victory ;
j just as they assume the Soviet Union is not willing !
now to restore to the occupancy of the Western powers j
the position which they had won in Mecklenberg, Saxony, j
Thuringia, and Anhalt and whiehy under the agreements j
of 1944 and 1945* they turned over for occupation by j
the Soviet Union. '
The. agreements made by the four powers cannot be
■ considered obsolete because the Soviet Union haB al- j
j ready obtained the full advantage therefrom and now j
| wishes to deprive the other parties of their compensat- j
ing advantages18 j
I This language points out a weakness in Russia's
argument relative to the existence of a changed situation.
The agreements between the Western Powers and the Soviet
Union with respect to the zones of occupation and Berlin
were acted upon and performed. It would seem to be con
trary to fairness and justice, and highly unrealistic, for
Russia to demand the West to move out of Berlin, but for her
to make no suggestion of restoring to the West the advan
tages she derived.
The Soviet Union also argues that it is necessary
to do something about the status of West Berlin, because it
poses a danger to the Soviet Union and nations friendly to j
1 ft
Mezerik. o p . cit., Appendix G, p. 87.
her. This is a political argument, not a legal argument. !
Russia says simply: "... The Soviet Union cannot main- ;
i
tain a situation in Western Berlin which is detrimental to
its lawful interests, its security and to the security of j
other Socialist countries,"'1 '^ j
In the document in which this statement is con- 1
jtained the Soviet Government emphasizes that the Western
[Powers have rearmed West Germany and asserts that they have,
| !
turned West Germany into an instrument of policy spear
headed against the Soviet Union.
A question that inevitably arises in evaluating the I
i I
!legal rights of the United States, Britain, and Prance to j
I be in Berlin and to exercise rights of access to it is
whether the Soviet Union can cancel the agreements relative
to Berlin. International law recognizes that treaties may
i
terminate in at least four ways. They are by expiration,- j
dissolution by mutual consent, by becoming void, and by !
i
cancellation. The Soviet Government has sought to term
inate the agreements on Berlin. It specifically informed
the three Western Powers occupying Berlin in its note of
1
f
November 27, 1958 that the agreements were terminated.
The pertinent language in the note is as follows:
^ Ibid., Appendix P, pp. 82-83.
^Lassa Francis Lawrence Oppenheim (ed. H. Lauter-
pacht, International Law, I (7th ed.; London: Longmans,
Green and Co., 1948), 8^3. ___________ _
281
"The Government of the USSR hereby notifies the
Government of the United States that the Soviet Union
regards as null and void the 'Protocol of theAgree-
j ment between the Governments of the Union of Soviet ;
j Socialist Republics, the United States of America,.and
i the United Kingdom on the occupation zones of Germany |
| and on the administration of Greater Berlin' dated j
September 12, 19bk, and the associated supplementary j
agreements, including the agreement on the control i
mechanism in Germany concluded between the Governments
| of the USSR, the United States, Great Britain, and \
! Prance on May 1, 19^5* that is the agreements which
j were to be effective during the first years after the !
! surrender of Germany."21
Of the four grounds known to international law for j
i
termination of a treaty, the Soviet Government appears to ;
be endeavoring to bring itself within two of the grounds, j
jnamely, expiration and cancellation. The last phrase j
i . j
quoted above suggests that Russia is trying to assert ex-
jpiration of the agreements by lapse Of time. The difficul
ties the Russian case encounters, however, in asserting
j
expiration is that (l) the time the agreements were in-
* i
tended to remain operative was until a peace treaty was
|concluded with Germany, which event has not occurred, and I
1(2) if the agreements do expire, the resulting situation is
subject to further negotiation between the parties con
cerned as to what the status of Berlin and Germany is to
I
be. Expiration of the agreements does not permit Russia |
to effectuate a unilateral solution to the problem that
arises. The unfortunate fact is that termination of the
agreements on Berlin does not permit conditions to revert
pi
Mezerik, op. cit., p. 83.
~ 282
automatically to a prior status that does not significantly
affect the rights of the nations concerned.
An international obligation may also lose its bind- !
ing force by cancellation. The grounds giving rise to can
cellation by one party are (l) inconsistency with inter-
i
national law created subsequently to the conclusion of the j
treaty, (2) violation or breach by one of the contracting j
parties, (3) subsequent change of status of one of them,
?? !
and (4) war. {
The ground upon which the Soviet Government en- j
i
deavors to rely in cancelling the agreements relative to
i 2 ^
Berlin is that of violation by the Western Powers. J Ac
cording to the leading writers, in the field of international
law the violation of a treaty by one of the parties does
24
not ipso facto cancel the treaty. It merely allows the
other party the discretion to cancel. A further point has
been much debated by authorities on international law, and
that is whether a distinction should be drawn between es
sential and non-essential provisions of a treaty. Some
writers maintain that only violation of essential pro
visions in an international agreement creates a right in
PP
Oppenheim, op. cit., pp. 850-852.
2S
^Korovin, op. cit., p. 17.
oh
Oppenheim, op. cit., p. 8535 Charles G. Fenwick,
International Law (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc,,|
.1-9-48 -),. 3rd_ed.., p. 452._________________ j
r ' 283
the other party to cancel. Others contend that It is very
difficult in any case to distinguish essential from non- i
j
essential stipulations in a treaty, and that the binding
I 25 *
■force of a treaty protects all provisions embodied in it.
Insofar as the Soviet attempt to cancel the Berlin
agreements is at issue, the distinction between essential s
and non-essential provision in a treaty is irrelevant. The;
violations which the Soviet Union alleges, if, in fact,
they are violations of the Berlin agreements, are certainly
1
essential and very material. j
i
The attempt of the Soviet Union to cancel the agree-j
ments pertaining to Berlin runs into at least four legal j
i
difficulties which are very tangled.
First of all, it. is a well accepted principle of
international law that the right to cancel a treaty on the
ground of its violation must be exercised within a reason
able time after the violation has been known. If the coun-
try possessing the right to cancel does not do so within a
reasonable time, it will be considered that the right to
cancel has been waived. A mere protest of the violation
26
is not sufficient to effect cancellation. This doctrine
of waiver is very valid. The idea of waiver runs through
many fields of law and rests on very strong grounds.
2^Oppenheim, op. cit,, p. 8535 Fenwick, op. cit.,
p. 432,
26 i
______ Oppenheim, op. cit., 834. _ J
There is a very serious question as to whether the
doctrine of waiver would not apply against Russia to deny
it the right to cancel the Berlin agreements. The viola
tions which Russia alleges go back at least to the late
1940' s. Russia's notice of cancellation was hot given
until November, 1958. Thus, it must be questioned whether
Russia did not fail to exercise her right to cancel within
a reasonable period of time, assuming for the sake of argu
ment that she acquired such a right. The Russians would
in all likelihood argue, as they state in their communi
cations to the Western Governments, that there is a con
tinuing violation of the Berlin agreements, that the West
27
jviolates the agreements anew every day. '
Secondly, the Russian attempt to cancel the agree
ments pertaining to Berlin faces the fact that the agree
ments have been executed and performed, as noted supra,
It would be manifestly contrary to justice if one party
could cancel and retain the consideration or advantages
it received.
A third legal problem entailed in the Soviet effort
to cancel is that any violations on the part of the Western
occupying powers of international agreements relating to
Berlin and Germany were not strictly violations of the
protocol of September 12, 1944. If it be conceded that the
^Mezerik, op. cit., Appendix F (USSR Note on Berlin
to UK. US and Prance November 27, 1958), p. 8l.
West has violated the Potsdam Agreements, this of itself j
should not give Russia the right to cancel the protocol on
the zones and joint occupation of Berlin. In final analy
sis, this protocol was very probably a separate, indepen- j
i
dent agreement. Its legal validity would not be affected !
i
by violation of another agreement between the contracting :
parties.
i
Still a fourth difficulty posed by the Russian
endeavor to cancel is the issue who first breached the j
agreements concerning Germany. There have been mutual
recriminations between the West and the Soviet Union. j
1
iThose who have sought to evaluate the matter objectively !
I
| j
have generally come to the conclusion that both sides have
violated the agreements.2^ Trying to resolve the question
of who breached them first is a hopeless task. Much of the
|
Yalta and Potsdam Agreements was so general, and probably
intentionally so, that each nation could interpret the
provisions its own way. Considering the widely divergent |
points of view represented by East and West, the Agreements
even initially meant radically different things to the two
groups.
It can be seriously questioned whether there was an
actual meeting of the minds on many points discussed in the
Yalta and Potsdam Agreements. Much contained In them Is
2®Neal, op. cit., pp. 29, 34.
too general and indefinite to determine what was meant and i
intended. It can be argued quite convincingly that what
jthe allies sought to agree upon at Yalta and Potsdam was
i :
too vague or uncertain to constitute a binding commitment.
The agreement on the zones of occupation and the
Control Council are specific and definite. There can be
no doubt that there was a meeting of the minds on the mat
ters embodied in these agreements. But much of the Yalta
and Potsdam Agreements lacked definiteness and is suscep
tible of many interpretations. Numerous examples of lan
guage in these agreements lacking clarity and specificity
|
can be cited. For instance, what does it mean to state ;
| |
that, "During the period of occupation Germany shall be ;
treated as a single economic unit?" Or, "So far as is J
practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the j
German population throughout Germany?" j
i
i Much of the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements were in :
generalities to furnish a facade of unity when in actuality j
the High Contracting Parties could not push attempts to
agree too far without provoking far-reaching disagreement.
|
Both the Soviet note of November 27* 1958 and the j
Aide Memoire delivered to President Kennedy at Vienna on
June 4, 1961 suggest that Russia is probably also trying
to rest its case for abrogating the Berlin agreements on
i
the ground of dissolution due to vital change of circum- j
stances. In appropriate cases, international law recog- j
28?
nizes this as a legitimate basis for doing away with a
the doctrine of dissolution of a treaty by profound change
of circumstances. However, the principle has also been
criticized, because it is vulnerable to abuse. There is
danger in applying the rule. It has been asserted in the j
!
past for the purpose of shedding binding obligations and !
for covering patently unjustifiable conduct. The general
view, however, is that there is an implied condition in
every treaty that, if, due to an unanticipated change in I
circumstances, the provisions of the treaty should imperil
the existence or vital development of one of the parties,
a right will arise to dissolve the treaty. This view ap- !
pears reasonable and sound and is probably in accord with
modern trends in most areas of law, including Soviet law,
i
to look to the substance of matters and not to be narrow
or technical in applying rules of law.
Professor L. Oppenheim, at one time Professor of
International Law at Cambridge University, states that the
doctrine of changed circumstances (doctrine of rebus sic
stantibus, to use the Latin phrase) came into international
OQ i
law by way of municipal law. By municipal law, Profes
sor Oppenheim means contract law in the parlance of Ameri-
29
treaty. ^ The majority of writers on the subject accept
yOppenheim, op. cit., p. 843; Fenwick, op. cit.,
3-454.
^Oppenheim, op. cit., p. 843,
' ‘ 288
can lawyers. The doctrine has had a long history. How
ever, there are only a few cases where It has actually j
been applied in International law.
i
Applying well settled principles In the general
field of law the doctrine would not be applicable in a case
where the agreement involved has been performed or per- j
formed to a considerable degree. Professor Oppenheim says j
the same of international law.3" * - He indicates that the i
!
doctrine can only be asserted if the treaty is executory.
Executed treaties are beyond the reach of the principle.3^ i
Consequently, the Soviet Union is on dubious ground if it
seeks to argue that the Berlin agreements may be dissolved
idue to changed circumstances. !
i
Soviet writers and authorities accept the validity
of the existing body of international law. At least in
theory, they concede the application and relevance of the
rules and practices adopted by nations .as a matter of usage
in dealing with each other. A Soviet publication contains
the following statements:
"The Soviet doctrine proceeds from the principle
of stability of international relations freely incurred
by Btates, regarding this as the basis of democratic
legality and peaceful law and order in international
relations. . . .
Soviet scientists consider the rules of modern,
generally admitted International Law to be equally
binding upon all states, irrespective of their sys
tem. . , .
31Ibid., p. 844, Footnote 21.
_______ 32Ibld., p. 844, Footnote 1. _ _ _
■ ...... 289'
In Soviet doctrine, International Law is regarded !
as the most important means of ensuring international i
co-operation of states having different systems, as ' !
a weapon in the struggle for peace and general Be- :
curity. . . ."33 ' :
There does not appear to be a great difference of
opinion between the Soviet and the Western Powers as to the
ultimate principles of the law of obligation and interna-
oil
tional practice that are to be acknowledged. The great !
differences that arise result from the dynamics of rivalry j
between the great power areas that are mutually suspicious
df each other and thoroughly distrust each other's purpose j
i
and motives. j
Finally, whatever the historical circumstances that
led to Berlin as it exists today, and whatever arguments
the Western Powers and the Soviet Union can and do make to
justify their positions relative to the former German cap
ital, there can be no doubt that the inevitable law of
change will in time, perhaps sooner, perhaps later, alter
the present-day enigma of Berlin and Germany, provided man
kind will exercise sufficient discretion to forestall re
solving the issue by a contest of military might. Both
sides would do well to consider the words of George F.
•^The USSR Academy in Science, Literature on Soviet
Law (Moscow: The Publishing House of the tJSSR Academy of
Science, i960), pp. 210-211,
•ok
D Timothy A. Taracouzio, The Soviet Union and Inter- |
national Law (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1935)> PP.
12-25.___________________________ • •
Kennam "When the ambivalence of one's virtue is recog
nized, the total iniquity of one's opponent is also ir
reparably impaired."
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Creator Pauw, Alan Donald (author)

Core Title The Historical Background Relating To Access Rights To Berlin

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program History

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag History, modern,OAI-PMH Harvest

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Lovell, Colin R. (committee chair), Moote, A. Lloyd (committee member), Rodee, Carlton C. (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-156670

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Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

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