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Educational Theories In The Works Of Georg Christoph Lichtenberg

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Educational Theories In The Works Of Georg Christoph Lichtenberg

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Content EDUCATIONAL THEORIES IN THE WORKS OF
GEORG CHRISTOPH LICHTENBERG
fcy
Svein 0ksenholt
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF GERMAN
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(German)
August 1959
UNIVERSITY O F S O U T H E R N C A L IFO R N IA
GRADUATE SC H O O L
U NIVERSITY PARK
LO S A N G E LE S 7, CA LIFO R N IA
This dissertation, written by
........Sve in ..J^ksenholt............
under the direction of hX.S...Dissertation Com
mittee, and approved by all its members, has
been presented to and accepted by the Graduate
School, in partial fulfillment of requirements
for the degree of
D O C T O R OF P H I L O S O P H Y
DISSERTATION, COMMITTE
-VY?U A//
....^ — i V
Chairman
PREFACE
Das Buch, das In der
Welt am ersten verboten
zu werden verdiente,
ware ein Katalogus yon
verbotenen Btlchern.
The philosophical ideas of several seventeenth
century thinkers, as well as the core of their philosophi
cal systems, were absorbed and became, in time, part of the
intellectual fabric of the eighteenth century. Hobbes'
materialism, Descartes' dualism, Spinoza's pantheism,
Leibnitz's idealism, and Locke's empiricism, in one way or
another, left their imprints on the minds of the intellec
tuals in the Age of Enlightenment, an era in the history of
European thought when reason and the empirical spirit were
the gods of many a prominent philosopher. Appellations
characterizing this period are many; it has been called the
Age of Reason, the Age of Criticism, the Philosophical
2
Century, and the Age of Voltaire. Wolf suggests that the
most appropriate term would be "The Age of Humanism".^
^Georg Christoph Lichtenberg's Vermischte Schriften
(Gottingen, 18o7), 11, p. 69. This edition of his works
will henceforth be referred to as VS.
o
^Cf. A. Wolf, A History of Science. Technology, and
Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century (New York. 193931 for
a discussion of this period.
^A. Wolf, A History of Science. Technology, and
Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century, p. 27.
The eighteenth century benefited from important
discoveries made in the sixteenth and the seventeenth cen
turies. Since Lichtenberg was a professor of mathematics
and physics at the University of Gottingen for more than
twenty-five years, some of these discoveries and consequen
tial elements in the advancement of learning, as the
improvements of mathematical notations, mechanical discov
eries of Galileo and Newton, the heliocentric theory,
optical discoveries of Kepler and Snell, chemical discover
ies of Boyle and others, were all of immediate interest to
L l
him. It is imperative to keep in mind, as we proceed in
analyzing Lichtenberg1s thoughts on education, that
Lichtenberg was (by profession) a physicist and a teacher
of the natural and mathematical sciences.
Lichtenberg had studied and was especially impressed
with several British philosophers of the eighteenth century,
among whom were Berkeley, Hume, and Reid. To conclude that
they influenced him profoundly would be to paralogize; to
assume that no influence did occur would be equally para
logizing. However, many of the thoughts that are charac
teristic of the intellectual climate of the eighteenth
century were common to several thinkers; thus, the problem
of influence will not be discussed in this dissertation.
L.
For a comprehensive and documented evaluation of
Lichtenberg's scientific contributions to the natural
sciences, see P. Hahn, Georg Christoph Lichtenberg und die
exakten Wissenschaften (Gottingen, 1927).
iii
Theories of modern education are unthinkable without
psychology, a science— viewed from a pedagogical point of
view— that is less than two hundred years old. In spite of
;the fact that psychology was not taught at a German univer-
j
i
|sity until the eighteenth century, Lichtenberg has never-
I
Itheless been praised by historians of psychology for his
|writings that dealt a death blow to the pseudo-scientific
data on psychology as propagated (or even preached 1) by
Lavater and his followers. It is a major thesis of this
dissertation that Lichtenberg’s ideas concerning education,
ideas that were perhaps stimulated by reading the works of
Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, warrant a place not
inferior to the one given by the historians of education
to the ideas of several eighteenth-century educators—
notably Basedow and Rousseau.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE.................................... ii
| INTRODUCTION .................................. 1
i
| Chapter
I. GEORG CHRISTOPH LICHTENBERG: BIOGRAPHY. . . *+
i
: Lichtenberg: The Teacher
■ Lichtenberg: The Faculty Member
Lichtenberg: The Colleague
Lichtenberg: The Man
| Women
i II. LICHTENBERG'S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION . . . 17
! Definitions
Existence
Nonexistence
Dreams
Weltanschauung
Pessimism
Scepticism
Superstition
Happiness
Epistemology
Immanuel Kant
III. PEDAGOGY AND CURRICULUM..................... 51
Religion
Methodology
Status Quo
Reading: A National Disease
Lichtenberg: An Intuitive Pedagogue
The Natural Sciences
The Modern Curriculum
Theological Evolution
Astronomy
The Modern Languages
History Versus Historicism
The Classical Writers
v
Chapter
IV. RELIGION ............................
Definition
Religion Versus Religiosity
Teleological Religion
Reason
God
The Bible
Doctrines
Morality
V. PSYCHOLOGY APPLIED TO EDUCATION . .
Introduction
Physiognomy
Theories of Learning
Observation: Introspection
Teacher Training
Psychological-Physiological
Learning Factors
Health
Formal Discipline
Discipline
Visual Aids
The Foreign Language
VI. BRITISH EDUCATIONALISM.............
England: 1776
Lichtenberg: A True Friend
British Writers
British Character
Germanic-English Education
VII. SCHOPENHAUER AND EDUCATION.........
Schopenhauer's Lichtenberg
Philosophy
Curriculum and Pedagogy
•Religion
Psychology Applied to Education
VIII. LICHTENBERG'S THOUGHTS CONCERNING
EDUCATION: AN EVALUATION .........
Lichtenberg's Philosophy Applied
to Education
Lichtenberg1s Curriculum
Chapter Page
l Religious Instruction
Psychology Applied to
| Education: The Soul
| Empirical Psychology
William James
Truth
| John Dewey
Final Summary
! BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................... 160
i
vii
INTRODUCTION
The whole man must
move together.?
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate
Georg Christoph Lichtenberg1s (17*+2-99) thoughts concerning
education. I shall attempt:
1. To give a biographical sketch of Lichtenberg.
2. To present an analysis of his philosophy of
education.
3. To discuss thoughts on pedagogy and curriculum
— although I am aware, of course, of the foetal
status of these two Important disciplines
before and during his time.
*+. To analyze Lichtenberg's thoughts on morals
and religion to the extent that these ideas
are related to education.
5. To present as comprehensive a view as possible
of his thoughts dealing with psychology applied
(directly or indirectly) to education.
6. To discuss Lichtenberg1s views on British
education.
?VS., I, p. I*f0.
1
7. To compare these thoughts with thoughts on
education found in the works of Schopenhauer.
8. To trace some of his thoughts on education in
the works of several contemporary representa
tive educators, and to show that Lichtenberg1s
thoughts on education (some of them can be
found in the works of other educators before
and contemporary with Lichtenberg) are not
outdated, but that they possess a basic
nucleus that has found acceptance by modern
philosophers and educators.
It should be stressed that a dissertation dealing
with a subjective writer like Lichtenberg will reveal a
certain amount of subjectivity on the part of the
researcher. Lichtenberg himself informs us that , 5 Alles
wird subjectiv bei mir und zwar bezieht sich Alles auf
6
meine Empfindlichkeit und Krankheit." As Ahlberg, the
Swedish Schopenhauer interpreter, says in his lucid
presentation of Schopenhauer, so will "varje framstalling
av en subjektiv tankare" force the investigator to "en
viss grad av subjektivitet.
6VS., I, p. 16.
?A. Ahlberg, Arthur Schopenhauer. Hans Llv och
Filosofl (Stockholm, 1924), p. J>.
Elimination of this approach to literary research
would— it seems— impair the creativity so necessary in
Q
literary investigations.
A work illustrating a scholarly hut subjective
attitude is Rippmannfs doctoral dissertation: Werk und
Fragment Georg Christoph Lichtenberg als Schriftsteller.
written in Switzerland in 1953? under the supervision of
Muschg. F. H. Mautner, reviewing this dissertation in
J .E.G. Fh.. 1955» l1 *-! ff.j accuses P. Rippmann of "scram
bling evidence to make it fit into a rigid form." (p. 1^3)
Mautner continues: "Futile attempts at synthesis of dis
parate elements in Lichtenberg1s mind are a structural
fault of the entire book." (p. 1^3). It appears from this
review that Mautner, recognized as one of the experts on
Lichtenberg in the United States, misunderstood what
Rippmann set out to do in his dissertation, viz., to
interpret the antinomies inherent in the works of a
religious sceptic.
CHAPTER I
GEORG CHRISTOPH LICHTENBERG: BIOGRAPHY
Konnte ich das Alles, was ich
zusammen gedacht habe, so
sagen, wie es mir 1st, nicht
getrennt, so wtfrde es gewiss q
den Beifall der Welt erhalten.^
Georg Christoph Lichtenberg was born, as the
eighteenth child, in Ober-Ramstadt, a small village not
far from Darmstadt, in 17*+2. His father, a Lutheran
clergyman, died when Lichtenberg was only nine years of
age. Although none of the children— several of them died
at birth or during early infancy— suffered any physical
wants, to finance their education must have been a depres
sive task for the bereaved mother, whose only source of
income was a small pension and a few savings.
His first instruction was given to him by his own
father. Lichtenberg then attended the State pedagogium in
Darmstadt, and he finished the prescribed curriculum in
1761. Following tradition, the graduates of this school
9
VS., I, p. 22. For a scholarly biography about
Lichtenberg, see Otto Deneke: Lichtenberes Leben. I,
Munchen, 19*+*+. The second volume has never been published.
Another useful biography is Carl Brinitzer's: Lichtenberg:
Die Geschichte eines gescheiten Marines (Tubingen, 1956).
if
5
usually went on to study at the various universities.
Lichtenberg, however, was an exception. Because of finan
cial difficulties, he was forced to remain almost another
i
two years in Darmstadt— years that apparently were used
well.10 In 1763, the Duke of Hessen provided him with
enough money to live on while studying, and Lichtenberg,
now almost twenty-two years of age, left Darmstadt and set
out for the University of G5ttingen, where he studied—
primarily the natural sciences— until 1767. It was during
this period that he first began to write down his daily
11
thoughts or "Einfalle." Deneke suggests that these be
called “Gedanken-Merkbttcher" rather than aphorisms, since
the former would be a more descriptive term.
From 1767 to 1770, Lichtenberg spent most of his
time as a private tutor. He had no official title and had
no academic degree. Not until almost ten years after his
appointment as a regular professor did he receive a regular
degree— but even this was only an honorary one.
Our chief interest is to find out what kind of
teacher (he was a professor at the University of Gottingen
from 1771 to 1799* leaving there only for a few short trips
to England and to neighboring German states) and what kind
10Deneke, ojd. cit.. pp. SS-S1 *.
i:LIbid.. p. 60.
of a man Lichtenberg actually was— in his own judgment and
in the judgment of his students. A professor, teaching
for over twenty-five years, would of necessity learn to
know many students and their problems.
Lichtenberg: The Teacher
Someone has defined a teacher as a person who
swears that he would rather starve than teach and ends up
doing both. Lichtenberg never starved during his long and
strenuous teaching career, but that was primarily due to
his extracurricular activities and income. He informs us
that he was overloaded with work— extra work that he was
doing for no reason other than to care for the physical
needs of his wife and children. There were times when he
did not even know \/here "his own head was" nor the where-
12
abouts of his wife or children. He worked, for example,
as co-editor of a literary journal so that he did not have
to pay any rent for his apartment; in fact, he wanted to
give up this job years before, but the condition of his
13
finances prevented it. J
Lichtenberg took his teaching very seriously; to
take a professor’s oath^ meant that from then on, his life
was dedicated to aid and support the intellectual growth of
12VS., VIII, p. 11.
13Ibid., VII, p. 172.
llfIbid.. VIII, p. 1*3.
7
all students— poor or rich. He worked long hours to fulfill
the moral obligation that he felt was his. When coming
home at night, he was so dead tired at times that he could
not perceive anything; his senses were numb from overwork.
Educators have been notoriously underpaid, and
Lichtenberg was no exception. He drew, sarcastically, a
parallel between his own times and that of ancient Rome.
There was a time, he said, when fish were getting a better
education than our own children. Isn't it peculiar, he
continued, that a man who is breaking in the royal horses
receives thousands of dollars for his Job, and the men who
are doing the same to his majesty's loyal subjects have to
1^
starve. J
Lichtenberg was not immune to praise— especially if
the praise would come from a nobleman. In his correspon
dence, he seemed to be very happy telling the various
recipients of his letters about the number of students in
his classes, the kind of students he was teaching, and he
usually added a line or two if a nobleman happened to be in
the class. We find expressions like "ich habe . . . 3
kongl. Prinzen und Ritter des blauen Hosenbandes, . . .
ich habe . . . 112 Zuhorer und darunter 5 Grafen. ..."
It is safe to assume, then, that Lichtenberg must have been
a teacher who attracted students to his classes— he had up
15VS., II, pp. 166-67
to a hundred and thirty of them at one time— and we may
also assume that Lichtenberg's popularity as a teacher must
have been based upon his originality and not upon any
special competence as a scholar— of which Gottingen had
several famous ones, such as Kastner and Blumenbach, for
example.
There were semesters when it was necessary for
16
Lichtenberg to teach up to seven hours a day; no wonder,
then, that everybody hastened to assure him that at no
other German university was physics being taught as in his
17
classes in Gottingen. His success as a teacher resulted,
perhaps, from hard and pensive hours of preparation for the
lectures as well as careful planning and pre-experimentation
18
of all the experiments to be done in the various lectures.
The demonstration aspect of his teaching needs some
amplification. He did not complain about a seven-hour
teaching load— at least, no complaint can be found in his
works. On the other hand, he did complain rather vocifer
ously over having to teach three hours a day, because these
three lectures required "muhsame und verdriessliche
19
Zubereitung."
l6VS., VII, p. 252.
17
Ibid., VIII, p. 163.
18
To the best of my knowledge, Lichtenberg was the
first German professor teaching physics who made regular
class demonstrations an integral part of his lecture.
19VS., VIII, p. 25.
Lichtenberg1s popularity as a teacher— but not
necessarily as a colleague--was also based upon genuine
concern for his students. He became extremely bitter about
the antidemocratic and fraudulent use (misuseI) of the
various "Freitische1 1 at the disposal of poor students. He
even threatened to make a public issue of their scandalous
misuse. The free tables were intended by the founder to
aid poor students, Lichtenberg argued, and what had happened
to the criteria for the selection of the students? Rich
20
people— due to their better connections — prevented any
and all fairness in the choice of student selection.
Lichtenberg; The Faculty Member
His student-centeredness did not prevent the
participation— or, at least, active concern— on his behalf
in certain administrative aspects of the university plan
ning and of the handling of funds. He points out, for
example, that Bern— at that time, not even a university but
just a higher school— had received five hundred caroluses
for equipment, while Gottingen's university had not, thus
far (1786), made any such large sums of money available for
purchasing teaching (demonstration) equipment. Why waste
21
large sums of money on "Preisschriften,1 1 he maintains—
20
VS., VIII, p. ^3.
21Ibid.. VIII, p. 153
the content of which does not at all justify the outlay of
money, "because these publications have been written by
students who still have a lot to learn— when the money
could be better used to help poor students complete their
studies at the University of GSttingen.
He was aware that the University of GOttingen did
do a lot of buying, of course, but these purchases were not
planned well enough, were not purchases that resulted from
a faculty discussion concerning the needs in question.
Lichtenberg felt, therefore, that one ought to make a
definite list of purchases that are necessary for the opera
tion of any department (Fakultat), work . ■ _ -efinite plans,
plans that may provide more and better equipment for the
22
same amount of money.
Lichtenberg: The Colleague
A careful analysis of Lichtenberg's works reveals
that he made no special effort (with a few but notable
exceptions) to associate with his colleagues on a strictly
social basis. The reason for this may never be fully known,
although one may conjecture as to the possible reasons
behind his apparent aloofness. Very little is known about
his life as a private citizen in the City of Gottingen.
That he had the greatest respect for his professional
22
vs., viii, p. 155.
colleagues, some of whom were famous all over Europe, can
hardly be disputed. One is inclined to believe, however,
on the basis of Lichtenberg's own assertions about teaching
and about education, that he was not entirely satisfied
with the general caliber of all of the faculty members.
23
The sarcasm that lies behind ndu kennst die Professoren’ 1
indicates that Lichtenberg expected a professor to be more
than just a scholar. It is not enough to be a scholar,
Lichtenberg seems to imply; one must be a teacher, too, if
one expects to remain a respected professor. Their jealousy
and conceitedness (as, for example, Kastner's) was a
constant problem to Lichtenberg. Subtle people are seldom
great people, he says, and the investigations carried out
by these scholars are usually as useless as they are
delicate.. These learned men are removing themselves more
and more from real life, a life that they (more than anyone
Oh.
else) ought to get closer and closer to.
Interdepartmental quarrels were not unknown to the
students at the University of Gottingen. The members of
the medical department seemed especially prone to air their
2C >
differences in the open, y although Lichtenberg1s own
department— due, perhaps, to Kastner's professional as well
23
vs., VIII, p. 17.
2*f
Ibid.T I, p. 62.
25
Ibid.. VIII, p. 72.
12
as personal jealousy of Lichtenberg1s success as a teacher
--had its difficulties as well. His correspondence reveals
| on this point, a significant aspect of Lichtenberg1s char-
i
! acter; his diction in each letter seems carefully chosen
to fit the temperament of each recipient. He never under
estimated the gravity of such public "debates”— as he knew
from his close contacts with students what disastrous
effect these public quarrels might have on the students.
Although a quarreling professor might be useless as a
teacher, Lichtenberg, nevertheless, insisted that every
department must have at least one outstanding scholar^ in
order to keep up the reputation of the department.
Lichtenberg: The Man
Many are the words that have been written concern
ing Lichtenberg as a person; all of these words, however,
have not completed the picture that would be necessary in
order to understand him fully. An attempt is, therefore,
made in this introduction to sift some of the personal
utterances that Lichtenberg himself made, so that a fuller
picture of him— viewed as a teacher— may be possible.
One feature that is directly related to his phenom
enal success as a teacher was his almost chronic desire to
laugh at all times and at the slightest provocation.
26
VS., II, p. Ilf5.
27
Ibid.. VII, p. 325.
One should keep In mind that Lichtenberg was a diathetic
person by birth; his health— especially his lungs and eyes
— was never very good. His physique caused him to "Be
28
extremely sensitive to noises, although even noise was
bearable, if it really was necessary. He described one
aspect of his "sickness" as pusillanimity— a condition that
apparently did not hurt his reputation among the students.
He wanted, perhaps, to become robust, to toughen himself.
On a trip to the North Sea, for example, when the weather
was especially rough, Lichtenberg climbed out on the deck
and roped himself securely around the mast so that he could
feel the force and the power of the waves. "Etwas
29
Grosseres habe ich nie gesehen," says Lichtenberg.
He was superstitious— and never blushed when con
fronted with this fact. He even considered superstition
to be the very core of his philosophy.Music never
appealed to him, and he never learned to play any musical
instrument, but he did consider himself a pretty good
whistler.31
28
VS., I, p. 23.
2Q
"Georg Christoph Lichtenberg Brlefe an die Freunde.
selected by W. Spohr, Berlin, 193&, p. 212. This work will
henceforth be referred to as B. an die F.
3°VS., I, p. 29.
31Ibid.. I, p. 6.
lb
His greatest shortcoming--by his own confessions—
was an almost pathological tendency toward procrastination.
But such a "shortcoming"^ should not be interpreted to
mean that he was intellectually irresolute--something that
the word pusillanimity might imply : far from it I His head
was overflowing with original ideas, with provocative
thoughts. A description of the characteristic features of
an active mind better than that which Lichtenberg gave of
his own mental status is hard to find in any literary work.
"V/enn ich Canale in meinem Kopfe ziehen konnte, urn den
inlandischen Handel zwischen meinem Gedankenvorrathe zu
befordern.' Aber da liegen sie zu Hunderten, ohne einander
31
zu nutzen."
Periods of gloominess did color his attitude towards
life and existence in general. The thoughts of death, of
suicide, occupied his mind on many an occasion-made him
feel like a little boy. He was a religious man, although'
his religion was one based upon reason and not upon the
3 5
"revealed" word.
32
VS., I, p. 20.
33
Ibid.. I, pp. 22-23.
3MIbid.. VIII, p. 2b9.
35„ ,
Ibid., I, p. b.
15
Women
Lichtenberg1s attitude towards women^ also warrants
I consideration. He knew what it meant to be a married man
i
| who could look forward with anticipation and joy to the
night— and be taken care ofHis love for children
apparently knew no bounds.
Ehe ich eine Frau haben wollte, die mir keine
Kinder brachte, lieber wollte ich mir eine malen lassen
oder mich in die Mutter Gottes verlieben. 0, es liegt
in der MSnnerphantasie eine SchSpferkraft, in der
weiblichen Seele alsdann Dinge zu finden Coder wenn
Sie wollen) hineinzudenken und zu dichten, die dieser
Rasse einen Wert geben, wovon Ihr Ledigen keinen
Begriff habt.— Also, Liebster Sommering, geheiratet,
geheiratet. . . .38
Lichtenberg considered marriage the acme of life,
an institution that represented a sacred core of the social
fabric. In another letter to his friend SSmmering,
Lichtenberg wrote: "0! da thun Sie recht. Heirathen,
heirathen is the thing (sic} Ich mochte fast sagen, wer
nicht heirathet soli auch nicht essen. Es ist der Himmel
selbst."39
See Herbert Schoffler, Lichtenberg Studlen zu
seinem Wesen und Geist. edited by G8tz von Selle, Gottingen,
1956, pp. 3-1 +3j for a fuller discussion of Lichtenberg1 s
attitude towards women.
37B, an d. F.. p. 180.
38
Ibid.. p. 2*f2.
^VS.. VIII, p. 308. The following quotation eluci
dates his personality (at the age of 29). "Heute habe ich
mit einem englischen Tubus, der 120 Reichsthaler kostet in
16
The remaining part of this dissertation will
analyze Lichtenbergfs thoughts on education. It is sig-
I nifleant that no work on Lichtenberg has, to the best of
! my knowledge, furnished any interpretation of the factors
I that made Lichtenberg one of the most successful teachers
at the University of Gottingen. The interpretation of his
1+0
remarks from only an aphoristic point of view — as most
of Lichtenberg's interpreters have done (and important as
this approach obviously is)— has not provided an evaluation
of Lichtenberg as an educator, nor has it furnished us with
consequential data about him as a teacher.
einem entlegenen Haus die Zartlichkeit eines Cammermadchens
und eines Bedienten beobachtet, der Auftritt schien dem
Akteur mehr als 120 Thaler werth zu seyn. Der Kerl lag
wahrlich einmal auf den Knien ich konte ihn gantz ubersehen
aber seine Hand konte ich nicht finden, glaube ich, und
wenn mein Tubus 500 gekostet hStte. Die Scene war
sehenswerth.", G. C. Lichtenberg1s Briefe an Dietrich.
1770-1798, ed. by Eduard Grisebach, Leipzig, 169S, p. 3*+.
*f0
See Paul Requadt, Lichtenberg: Zum Problem des
deutschen Aphoristik (HameIn, 19*+$), fora scholarly work
of the aphoristic-interpretative approach.
CHAPTER II
LICHTENBERG'S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION
Was bin ich? Was soil ich thun?
Was kann ich glauben und hoffen?
Hierauf reducirt sich Alles In
der Philosophic.*+1
A discussion of Lichtenberg1s thoughts on
i i p
education introduces a problem of meaning: What is
philosophy? What is education? What is a philosophy of
education?*4^ Lichtenberg says:
Die Erfindung der Sprache ist vor der Philosophie
hergegangen, und das ist es, was die Philosophie
erschwert, zumal wenn man sie Andern verstandlich
^VS., I, p. 81.
1+2
To the best of my knowledge, only three treatments
that shed any light on Lichtenberg's thoughts on education
have been published thus far. Chronologically they are: H.
Kluge: "Die padagogischen Gedanken Lichtenbergs," IV Jahr-
buch des Vereins fiir wissenschaftliche Padagogik. 1912,
pp. M-9-9*+: V. Boulller: Georg Christoph Lichtenberg. 191*+*
pp. 20-30; and A. Schneider: Georg Christoph Lichtenberg:
Penseur, 1953* PP- ll +5”1 +8.
“That the problem of definitions is not only an
international one in scope but almost defies a satisfactory
solution as well, may be surmised by the nature of W.
Reyer's "solution": "Der praktische Erzieher braucht sich
um Definitionen nicht bemuhmen. Er verfolgt bestimmte
Absichten und greift seln Werk in der Tat an. Die
Erziehungspraxis Ist alter als die Erziehungslehre. Bevor
man anfing, uber die Erziehung nachzudenken, erzog man;
aber indem man erzog, dachte man nach," Allgemeine
Erzlehungs und Unterrichtslehre (Berlin, 195*+), P* 10.
It is this very "Nachdenken" that warrants a special inves
tigation in the case of Lichtenberg, however.
18
machen will, die nicht viel selbst denken. Die
Philosophie ist, wenn sie spricht, limner nothigt,
die Sprache der Unphilosophie zu reden.^+
Unamuno's assertion that "all philosophy is . . . at bottom
b^
philology" J is, in one sense, obviously true.
We still teach true philosophy through the medium
of the language of a false one, Lichtenberg says. To
explain words or to give definitions does not clarify a
single concept. V/e may explain words, but we still do not
change the pronouns nor their declensions; a definitional
approach (necessary as definitions may be), then, does not
give us all the required keys for understanding the various
concepts of education as found in Lichtenberg's writings.
Before attempting to clarify these concepts, a
fundamental aspect of Lichtenberg's originality should be
mentioned. First of all, few of Lichtenberg's thoughts on
education can be traced back to any one specific thinker or
educator before him--although Lichtenberg1s thoughts have
much in common with Kent's thoughts on education, for exam-
*f6
pie. As Kluge points out, Lichtenberg was too much of an
independent thinker and observer to have to borrow pedagog
ical ideas. It is noteworthy that Lichtenberg never
formulated his thoughts on education as systematically as
— -
VS., I, p. 8b.
*+5
M. de Unamuno, The Tragic Sense of Life, trans. by
J. E. Crawford Flitch (London, 1921), p. 311.
1*6
Kluge, op. ait., p. 6b.
19
Rousseau, Kant, and Pestalozzij it is equally noteworthy
that the nucleus of many a modern educational construct
can be found in the works of Lichtenberg. Lichtenberg,
like Samuel Johnson, never found it necessary to clarify
notions by filtrating them through other people's minds.
Although Lichtenberg misinterpreted certain aspects of the
psychology of learning— he, as did Locke, considered mathe
matics, for example, as an ideal tool by which one could
sharpen the intellect**?— such an interpretation does not
detract from the over-all quality of Lichtenberg1s thoughts.
Says J. Laurup-Fogt: "Lichtenberg war voll von Ideen und
bQ
deshalb - ohne Idee."
Lichtenberg1s misinterpretation of his favorite
subject is understandable in the light of the embryonic
development of educational psychology in the eighteenth
century. That educators in the twentieth century can make
a similar^mistake is, ho\\rever, harder to overlook. Says
Kluge: "Wahrend gewohnlich bei ausgesprochener mathematischer
Begabung eine Abneigung gegen die Sprachen vorhanden zu
sein pflegt, wie es auch umgekehrt der Fall ist, spricht
Lichtenberg den Sprachen grosses Lob.," on. cit.. p. 73.
Since Kluge's article represents the only comprehensive
essay on Lichtenberg's thoughts on education that I am
aware of, and since Kluge is the only professional educator
who has attempted to evaluate Lichtenberg1s pedagogical and
educational-psychological ideas, it is clear that a fuller
and broader study is desirable.
3+8
Laurup-Fogt, J., "Georg Christoph Lichtenberg,"
Orbis Literrarum. 19^3 9 p. 238.
20
Lichtenberg never wrote a single article treating
any aspect of education proper. Any grouping of aphorisms
:or remarks on education under this heading is, therefore,
an arbitrary arrangement, a grouping that depends upon what
|the compiler means by "Erziehung," "Bildung," and
I "Lehrplan."
Definitions
Plato differentiated between the ’'sophists's," the
L^ q
"philosophos," and the "sophos." 7 The philosophos, in
which sense the word philosopher (and the noun philosophy)
50
or thinker is being used in this dissertation, referred
originally to an erudite person who knew that he did not
know much in terms of what there is to know, whose reserved
ness of judgment was esteemed by scholars and laymen, a
person who was imbued with an insatiable desire for know
ledge, but who also realized that the goal could never be
reached. Lichtenberg, fitting these categories, will,
L lO
-'For a historical treatment of these words, see:
J. Hoffmeister: WSrterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe
(Hamburg, 1955), pp. *+67-69.
50
In his efforts to interpret the paradoxical
nature of Lichtenberg's aphorisms, R. Trachsler leaves us—
it seems— with an impossible choice. Says Trachsler:
"Lichtenberg ist weder Dichter noch Philosoph." Lichtenberg
Urpsrung und GrSsse wirklicher Frelheit (Zurich, 1956), p.
31. On page 37, however, Trachsler seems to reverse himself
because here he admits: "Wir kommen aber keinen Schritt
weiter, wenn wir nicht einsehen, dass Lichtenberg dennoch
Philosoph ist, und dass ihm hohe denkerische Qualitaten
eigen sind;— freilich Qualitaten ganz besonderer Art."
21
henceforth, in this dissertation, be referred to as a
philosopher or a thinker.
I It would be futile to attempt a definition of
l
I philosophy valid for all intellectual inquiries, because
| one can hardly define the substance of that which repre-
i sents a search for the indefinable. To have a philosophy
of life, of education, means that one philosophizes about
these problems, that one exhibits the basic, previously
; mentioned criteria.
Some of the criticism that has been leveled against
the use (or misuse) of the word philosophy may, perhaps,
also be directed against the word education. There may,
however, be a more consequential reason for criticism
against a particular philosophy of education. From the
beginning of history, when it dawned upon the human animal
that knowledge could and, perhaps, ought to be handed down
to the children, a conflict was likely to arise. Any man
who reflected upon human existence, upon the destiny of man,
might want to propagate what he considered to be the
essence of any body of knowledge or tradition that was
worth transmitting.
It is generally agreed that the purpose of any
education is to transmit our cultural heritage; to improve
it as it is passed along; and to secure optimum development
of every boy and girl. What constitutes optimum develop
ment, however? What should the curriculum be? Who should
22
select the subject matter? The inclusion of these various
introductory thoughts on education seems essential for a
proper evaluation of Lichtenberg’s ideas. It is important
!
I not to overlook that a diversity of opinion is an intrinsic
: aspect of the entire process dealing with education. Words
alone, by their very nature, cannot fully convey, as Lich
tenberg said, the essence of a transcendent longing for the
unknown world— for the possession of ultimate knowledge.
An attempt will now be made to define the word
education— or, at least Indicate its purport as used in
this dissertation. It may be advisable to point out a few
misconceptions about the nature of education. Education
does not mean a temporal effort that is limited to children
or to youth, for example; education should be viewed as a
process that goes on throughout one's whole life. If a
man’s education Is finished, he is finished.
One etymological meaning of the word education is
to draw out; however, no device can ever draw anything out
of a student (as Lichtenberg found out on so many an occa
sion during his long and strenuous teaching career), if the
student does not already possess the innate intelligence
necessary for this process of extraction.
Smith, Stanley, and Shores conceive of education as
51
"the formation of character and personality. Whitehead
51
Smith, Stanley, and Shores, Fundamentals of
Curriculum Development (New York, 1950), pp. 217-18.
23
defines education as the "acquisition of the art of the
utilization of knowledge," and then adds that "this is an
tip
art very difficult to impart."-' Webster defines education
as "the process of training and developing the knowledge,
skill, mind, character, etc., especially by formal school
ing; systematic study of the problems, methods, and theories
of learning; the impartation or acquisition of skill, know
ledge, or discipline of character." No single definition
will suffice; it is clear that one should include all of
these concepts when attempting to establish what Lichtenberg
thought about education in its fullest meaning; viz., the
harmonious development of all the spiritual, physical, and
mental powers of man.
Although the word philosophy almost defies formal
definition, Lichtenberg himself supplies us with a defini
tion which may be useful. He maintains that philosophy is
nothing but the art of drawing distinctions— no matter what
else we may mean by the word philosophy. The peasant uses
all of the propositions found in the most abstract philoso
phy, he says, but wrapped up, embedded, tangled, latent, as
physicists and chemists say; the philosopher gives us the
propositions in their pure state,^ The main law of
^A. N. Whitehead, The Aims of Education and Other
Essays (New York, 1929), p.“n
%S., I, p. 85.
2b
philosophy thus becomes a matter of being attentive, of
being sensitive; to take nothing for granted, to weigh
r t i .
everything very carefully, and to compare all data.
Nothing can be more commendable than being philosophically
i
i reserved, being careful in passing judgment.
Although a philosophy of education may be difficult
to define and to discuss, a philosophy of education should
certainly attempt to analyze the essence of existence and
to inquire into the purpose of life. The expression,
philosophy of education, will, in this dissertation, mean
the application of philosophy to the problems of education.
Henderson cites some of the questions a student
wants to have answered or clarified through a philosophical
study of education:
How does it happen that mankind is here? What is
life for? What is right for man to do? What is wrong?
How can man live a life that is worthwhile and satisfy
ing? Is there any intelligent purpose back of the fact
of this world and its phenomena? What can man hope for
after this life? What sort of world is this in its
essence? Is there any one substance out of which
everything is composed? Or, are there two or more
substances? What is the nature of the substance or
substances? What does it mean "to ben? Is man's mind
capable of answering these and many other questions?
How do we get the knowledge we think we have? How valid
is this knowledge or supposed knowledge?55
VS., I, pp. 98-99.
55
S. V. Henderson, Introduction to the Philosophy
of Education (Chicago, 19h- 7), p.
25
Since the nature of man and education is such that
a philosophical reflection is an important aspect of our
1
analysis, we shall trace certain concepts found in the
i
! works of Lichtenberg as they apply to education.
Existence
Lichtenberg informs us— although he admits that he
|does not understand the psychological reason for it at all—
i that man is an animal that must be "massaged" on the rear
until the age of ten and must have his head worked on after
that time if he is to arrive at his destination in this
life.
Is man a free moral agent? Lichtenberg is doubtful.
He says that we know with much greater certainty that man's
will is free than that everything which occurs must neces
sarily have a cause. This view does not entirely satisfy
him either. Couldn't we just turn the argument around, he
suggests, and say that our concepts of cause and effect
must be incorrect, because our will could not be free if
these were to be correct?^ Life represents— it seems—
only a play of shadows, but what else is life anyway?
56
B. an d. F.. p. 208.
?7VS., I, p. 70.
^8Ibid.. VIII, p. b5.
26
Dass zuweilen eine falsche Hypothese der richtigen
vorzuziehen sei, sieht man ans der Lehre von der
Freiheit des Menschen. Der Mensch ist gewiss nicht
frei, allein es geh'drt sehr tiefes Studium der Philoso-
phie dazu, sich durch diese Vorstellung nicht irre
fuhren zu lassen - ein Studium, zu welchem unter
Tausenden nicht Einer die Zeit und Geduld, und unter
Hunderten, die sie haben, kaum Einer den Geist hat.
Freiheit ist daher eigentlich die bequemste FormA sich
die Sache zu denken, und wird auch allezeit die ubliche
bleiben, da sie so sehr den Schein fur sich hat.59
To be really free means to be constantly cogitating,
reflecting, because nothing is more unexplainable, more
unsolvable than the nature of the mechanism that operates
the spring of our actions, of our volition.^0
Lichtenberg followed the political events of his
time with interest. During the American War of Independence
for example, he put up a large map of the battlefield on
the wall and stuck needles at the various points of battles,
and he then connected these needles with a long thread—
having thus an up-to-date picture of the progress or defeats
of the British (German) forces at all times. He was, how
ever, primarily interested in the inner conflicts of the
human hearts triggering the wars, because the outcome of
the various wars always had far-reaching effects upon the
freedom of man. When Lichtenberg discusses "freedom," then,
he is analyzing a dual concept: moral freedom that permits
man to choose according to his conscience or reason, and
59VS., I, p. 66.
6°Ibid.. I, p. 158
political freedom of the individual and of society. It
does not make much difference whether the sun will rise or
set within a given empire (as Spain boasted of once upon a
time), Lichtenberg wrote, but rather what the sun sees
during its path every day over this empire. The concept
of political freedom is thus a relative concept. The high
est degree of political freedom, he maintained, lies
directly on the threshold of despotism. Absolute political
freedom is an impossibility; to establish absolute freedom
and equality would necessitate an eleventh commandment that,
in turn, would abrogate the other ten.
The greatest obstacles to freedom— intellectual and
moral— are, according to Lichtenberg, man-made institutions.
Man looks for freedom in a realm where he will never find
it, namely, in political life; and the same man disregards
freedom and throws it away where it would make him happy.
A person's blind faith in the opinions of other men and of
(well) established institutions is a basic cause for his
present intellectual servitude and of his vegetative
existence. The very opposite of the essence of freedom is
found especially within religious despotism, within any
system that attempts to control the thinking of man.
To view man as the acme of God's creation repre
sented, to Lichtenberg, a puerile cosmic outlook. It was
impossible for him to believe that mankind was a creation
of a higher intelligence; it was more reasonable to assume
that man was a by-product, a creature that was brought into
existence while an imperfect higher being was just passing
his time— or just experimenting. How can anyone be so
naive as to believe that man was created in the image of
God, when one sees how war, hunger, poverty, and disease
1
plague the human race? It is futile to think that one
knows the answer to this riddle of human existence; life is
too unstable: morals change from decade to decade, from one
generation to another. The result is "man muss seine
Philosophie alle 10 Jahre neu bewerfen lassen."^
An objective investigation--to the extent that this
is possible— about the nature of human existence, reveals
that few, if any, answers represent a totality of informa
tion or possess full validity. Although Lichtenberg sug
gests that the concepts of existence and nonexistence may
be impenetrable, he adds to this that we do not even know
what Mto be” means.
Die beiden Begriffe von Sein und Nichtsein sind
bloss undurchdringlich in unsern Geistesanlagen. Denn
eigentlich wissen wir nicht einmal, was sein ist, und
sobald wir uns ins Definieren einlassen, so milssen wir
zugeben, dass etwas existIren kann, was nirgends ist.
Kant sagt auch so etwas irgendwo.63
61VS., I, p. 90.
62Ibid.. I, p. 22k.
63IM4., I, p. 71.
29
This uncertainty lies at the base of so many a
dispute, especially religious ones. Lichtenberg recommends
that the discussions of existence be taken out of the field
of theology; the place to discuss the problem of existence
!is within the field of philosophy. He stresses that the
question of "meaning" and ’ ’ existence" almost defies satis
factory interpretation. A primary source of much of man’s
unhappiness, as he strives to find meaning in life, may be
traced to a common denominator: man erroneously believes
that things (objects) actually are only what they mean.^
What would happen to our minds, he asks, if all objects
65
were that which we consider them to be? The result might
be universal insanity.
Nichts schmerzt mich mehr, bei allem meinem Thun
und Lassen, als dass ich die Welt so ansehen muss, wie
der gemeine Mann, da ich doch scientifisch weiss, dass
er sie falsch ansieht.66
Nonexistence
Lichtenberg was just as concerned about the essence
of nonexistence as he was about the question of existence.
This concern was perhaps an outcome of his twenty-five years
of teaching young people not only how to think but also of
presenting them with a large body of facts. Why educate?
6lfvs., ii, p. 15*+.
6^Ibid.. I, p. 52.
I, P. 31.
30
Why have a personal philosophy of life? Why have a philo
sophy of education? Henderson asserts that "an adequate
philosophy of life is a prerequisite for a sound philosophy
67
of education." Lichtenberg's thoughts on education, thus,
include thoughts on life after death (or before birthJ) as
well, even though he favored an education that prepared for
68
living in this world rather than the next one, a view
that was diametrically opposite to that of Kant.
Lichtenberg insists that man has not reflected
enough upon the real nature of nonexistence. He imagines
nonexistence as being of the same fabric as that of a
creature that has never been born. This condition should
not be confused with apathy, he argues, because that can be
felt— a capacity that nonexistence does not possess. It is
inappropriate to use words like "I" and "condition" as they
symbolize an objective world. Existence and nonexistence
are not in an antithetical relationship (if one is discuss
ing sentient beings, he adds)— the antithesis of nonexis
tence is supreme happiness and not existence. He, like
Plato, believes, therefore, that the condition that a person
finds himself in when he is sublimely happy is comparable
to that of the state of nonexistence. Thus, it becomes a
6 7
Henderson, S. V., op. cit.. p. 12.
68
VS., I, p. 29.
31
man's duty just to "be" and to w a i t , -to act according to
the dictates of one's own reason, since we cannot have a
comprehensive view of the entire field of intellectual
70
inquiry into the nature of man and of existence.
Realizing the danger of being ridiculed, of
excoriation by his colleagues, he nevertheless dared to
state his convictions about this acataleptic problem. He
wrote:
Mir kommt es immer vor, als wenn der Begriff sein
etwas von unserm Denken Erborgtes ware, und wenn es
keine empfindenden und denkenden GeschBpfe mehr gibt,
so ist auch nichts mehr. So einfaltig dieses klingt,
und so sehr ich verlacht werden wftrde, wenn ich so
etwas Sffentlich sagte, so halte ich doch so etwas
muthmassen zu k8nnen fttr einen der grftssten Vorzttge,
eigentlich fur eine der sonderbarsten Einrichtungen des
menschlichen Geistes. Dieses h*angt wieder mit meiner
Seelenwanderung zusammen. Ich denke, oder eigentlich,
ich empfinde hierbei sehr viel, das ich nicht aus-
zudrucken im Stande bin, well es nicht gewohnlich
menschlich ist, und daher unsere Sprache nicht dafur
gemacht ist. Gott gebe5 dass es mich nicht einmal
verrGckt macht.71
As soon as he attempted to write anything about
this question, Lichtenberg sensed that he would become a
laughing stock--so he ceased, eventually, to cogitate on
the problem, or, more correctly, he did not publish his
innermost thoughts on this subject anymore.
69
'k philosophy of life that Raabe, for example,
treated in Abu Telfan.
7°VS., I, p. 88.
71Ibid., I, pp. 30-31.
32
That life may be eternal— at least, in a certain
sense— is not impossible, according to Lichtenberg, because
i (in spite of his Thanatistic religious views) the concept
|
j of bodily reduction or disintegration does not at all
I 72
! include the concept of total cessation of life.
Dreams
Another problem related to the essence of existence
is the nature of dreams. Although Lichtenberg never wrote
any essay on psychology, he was interested in the workings
of the human mind, the causes of dreams, and related
73
ideas. He asked seriously:
Was ist der Mensch im Schlaf: Er ist eine blosse
Pflanze; und also muss das Meisterstiick der Schopfung
zuweilen eine Pflanze werden, im einige Stunden am Tage
das Keisterstuck der Schopfung reprasentiren zu
k*onnen. . .
He complains that history contains only narrations
of people that have been awake. Why not write a history of
people who were asleep? Such an account would be just as
important— perhaps more important— as any other historical
accounts. To be sure, man does not do much when he is
72
VS., II, p. 171
73“
For a short analysis of this important aspect
of human nature, see S. Freud: Abrlss der Psychoanalyse
(Hamburg, 1956), Chapter V.
71+
VS., I, p. 123. One is also reminded here of
Nietzsche's Zarathustra: "Wer aber der Weiseste von euch ist
der ist auch nur ein Zwiespalt und Zwitter von Pflanze und
von Gespenst. Aber heisse ich euch zu Gespenstern oder
Pflanzen zu werden?" (Leipzig, 190*+), p. 13.
33
asleep, but it is this very condition that ought to become
the object of a thorough analysis by a psychologist, who
himself is very much awake.
Lichtenberg does not exclude the possibility that
man (Lichtenberg leaned here, perhaps, toward a philosophy
75
of neutral monism) might be a hybrid of spirit and matter;
76
similar in nature, perhaps, to that of a zoophyte. No
wonder, then, that the mental picture that man can acquire
about the nature of any dream must of necessity, be complex
and incomplete. "Es geht uns Allen so, wenn wir traumen,
und wer will die Grenze zwischen Wachen und Traumen angeben;
so wie nicht jeder traumt, der schlaft, so schlaft, auch
nicht jeder, der traumt. "77
Weltanschauung
The next problem to be investigated is Lichtenberg's
Weltanschauung. the importance of which, within the educa
tional process, has rarely been questioned. Lichtenberg
set out to investigate the nature of nature; any method
that would reveal its nature was worth investigation and
"^Schiller, in his essay, "The Esthetic Education
of Man," was more categorical about his knowledge about the
nature of man. Says he: "Der Mensch, wissen wir, ist weder
ausschliessend Materie, noch ist er ausschliessend Geist,"
Schillers Werke. II, ed. by P. Stapf (Berlin, 1956),
p. 610.
76VS., I, p. 56.
77Ibid.. IV, p. 56.
should be given consideration. Although Lichtenberg did
not care much for the "school" philosophies of his own time,
he, nevertheless, had respect for the philosophical systems
of his contemporaries, Nicolai and Kant. (Lichtenberg—
like Schopenhauer— detested Fichte's philosophy.) That
Lichtenberg never wrote on philosophy does not mean that
he did not philosophize--his aphorisms are the product of
many years of perspicacious reflections and meditation.
Since he wanted to know the fabric of the human soul (a
mortal one I according to Lichtenberg) and did not find the
answer, he turned toward a philosophy of life that was not
popular among the other representatives of the German
Enlightenment. This personal philosophy of life was the
philosophy of pessimism.
Pessimism
78
The philosophy of pessimism may be said— in a
limited sense— to have had a partial rebirth in the writings
of Lichtenberg, as the word "pessimism" has not been traced
back beyond its occurrence in his writings. The origin of
Lichtenberg's pessimism may be difficult to trace; one may
assume, perhaps, that Kant's works contributed in bringing
about this change in Lichtenberg1s thinking. Kant's philos
ophy dealt— as is well known— a death-blow to metaphysics,
78por a thorough philosophical interpretation of
the philosophy of pessimism, see L. Marcuse: Pesslmismus:
Ein Stadium der Reife (Hamburg, 1953)•
a blow that Lichtenberg supported. Thus, a sarcastic
Lichtenberg wrote that he had learned to play a few tunes
|on metaphysics.79 He shared Kant's views on the philosophy
;of idealism (critical philosophy as Kant preferred to call
i
it), a dominant philosophy in Germany at the end of the
eighteenth century and at the beginning of the nineteenth
century. Lichtenberg maintained, for example, that we can
never disprove the philosophy of idealism, that we would
remain idealists even if there were objects that our senses
could not differentiate between or evaluate, because we
80
cannot know anything about these objects. The search for
knowledge (including the desire for transcendent knowledge)
in every sphere of human life became part of Lichtenberg's
daily routine. That people could think themselves in pos-
O n
session of "truth," that even some of the thinkers or
theologians of his time preached subjective thoughts under
the guise of verifiable facts, as Lavater and Fichte did,
bothered him immensely and made him bitter. He even
accused some of these philosophers and writers of being
blind— mentally, as well as spiritually. One talks so much
about enlightenment, Lichtenberg commented, and one is so
79VS., II, p. 113.
8°Ibid.. I, p. 82.
81
K. Jaspers is convinced, as Lichtenberg was con
vinced, that "within the human predicament the quest for
truth presents an impossible task." Tragedy Is Hot Enough,
tr. by II, A. T. Reiche, H. T. Moore, and K. ¥. Deutsch
(Boston, 1952), p. 70.
36
desirous of obtaining more light. ’ ’ Mein Gott, was hilft
aber alles Licht, wenn die Leute entweder keine Augen haben
82
oder die, welche sie haben, vorsatzlich verschliesseni"
Philosophical inquiries, thus, have their limits;
i they ought to be applied to the proper areas of human
inquiry, and one should never attempt to make philosophy
a science, because, to the extent that philosophy becomes
’ ’scientific,1 1 to that extent does it cease to be
philosophy .8^
Lichtenberg was especially vociferous against all
forms of religiosity— although one of his closest friends
(Gottfriend Hieronymus Amelung) was a Lutheran clergyman.
Human conjectures would always be better than "revealed”
knowledge, since a conjecture at least represents a creative
effort to know the meaning of existence, an attempt to
solve the puzzle of life. Lichtenberg believed that his
concepts of cosmos— primitive as they might be— were
infinitely better than that of any salvation guild of the
Holy Ghost.8**
82IS., I, p. 201.
83Jaspers says: "Es ist nicht zu leugnen: in der
Philosophie gibt es keine Einmutigjkeit des endgiiltig
Erkannten. Was aus zwingenden Grfinden von jedermann
anerkannt wird, das ist damit eine wissenschaftliche
Erkenntnis geworden, ist nicht mehr Philosophie, sondern
bezieht sich auf ein besonderes Gebiet des Erkennbaren,"
Einfuhrune in die Philosophie (Miinchen, 1955)> p. 9*
8h
VS.. VIII, p. 165.
37
What was the fabric of his pessimism? One aspect
of the philosophy of pessimism— the result of which, on
Lichtenberg's thoughts concerning education, may be deduced
by even a tyro in the field of philosophical inquiry—
represents an attitude that views life in terms of what man
(or God?) has actually done toward man. ' With 323 years
of war out of the last 500 years of human history, many a
thinker and educator will tend to become discouraged in
regard to progress. The word “progress" itself is
saturated with multifarious connotations; Lichtenberg had—
as will be pointed out— actually little or only a perfunc
tory faith in the philosophy of progress so characteristic
of his age— departing radically from his highly esteemed
friend and intellectual compatriot, Lessing.
Although Kant was not a pessimist, a reading of
his thoughts on the philosophy of history will reveal that
his conviction about mankind as a whole contains basic
elements characteristic of the philosophy of pessimism.
He wrote (178*+); "One cannot avoid a certain feeling of dis
gust, when one observes the actions of man displayed on the
great stage of the world. Wisdom is manifested by individ
uals here and there; but the web of human history as a
whole appears to be woven from folly and childish vanity,
often, too, from puerile wickedness and love of destruction:
with the result that at the end one is puzzled to know what
idea to form of our species, which prides itself so much on
its advantages." (tr. my own), Kant's Werke (Berlin, 1912),
VIII, pp. 17-18.
R. Niebuhr argues the case for the philosophy of
pessimism in the following manner: "The pessimists rightly
declare that the optimists do not understand the misery of
man in the ambiguity of his subordination to and transcend
ence over nature; that they hide or willfully deny the
38
Lichtenberg was frequently displeased with his
existence and with man in general. Some of his remarks
about man may— to some Christians— sound blasphemous. He
felt confident, for example, that if heaven would ever find
; it necessary to re-edit him or his life, then he would be
happy to put some pertinent ideas regarding improvement at
the disposal of the Creator— "professional" suggestions
that would deal mainly with the blueprints of the portrait
Qrp
and of the human being as a whole.
Since man behaves as a degenerate creature, true
friendship is almost nonexistent. Friends are seldom what
they would like one to think they are, because how many
would remain friends if one could see through their basic
QO
intentions or basic thoughts? Lichtenberg did not blame
mankind, however, for its defect in character5 man, at
least to a large extent, is only the product of natural
laws. His view of cosmos, then, reflected a mechanistic
philosophy of life. The world is only a machine, he says,
which exists for no other purpose than to make him unhappy,
elements of dishonesty and pretension in human culture,
which are the consequences of man's effort to obscure his
true situation; and that they give a false estimate of the
stability of culture and civilizations because they do not
understand the destructive character of human pretentions,"
Faith and History (New York, 19^9), P- 186.
87VS., I, pp. 17-18.
88Ibid.t I, p. 173.
39
to plague him, to make him feel every pain that a human
being could possibly experience. The (often quoted) des
cription of himself— as he is forced to experience the
misery of existence— is illuminating: "a pathological
go
egotist.'1 1 7 And then he adds: "It is an extremely sad
condition."9°
Because of Lichtenberg's conviction about the
nature of man and of man's relative helplessness in improv
ing himself (improvement could take place, according to
Lichtenberg, through education), the problem of progress
warrants a closer inquiry. He thought that the progress
of mankind toward fuller development of the faculties was
almost impossible, because man's history thus far showed
91
that little progress had taken place. And if progress
actually could take place, the nature of the (previously)
discussed human will is such that no choice seems possible.
This is clear when one considers the problem of death. Man
has absolutely no choice to make in this matter. Says
Lichtenberg: "Ich glaube, da wo der Mensch sich an die
grosse Kette anschliesst, ist er nicht frei; er weiss wohl
gar nicht einmal, dass er wirkt."92
Q9vs., I, p. 16.
9°Ibid., I, p. 16.
91Ibid.. I, p. 108.
92Ibid., I, p. lMf.
^0
Since man Is not free to live on forever, why could
he not at least be free from sickness and physical wants?
Why must the world have to be a vale of tears?9^ Life is
Q k
only a nest of misery,-7 and the earth is nothing but a
95
putrid abode for man. 7
Death becomes a welcome relief under these cir
cumstances; to be dead is almost the same as experiencing
divine bliss. Lichtenberg often thought about suicide and
death— even in his boyhood. He frequently looked forward
to the day when he could die. "My God.1 How intensely I
long for the period when time is no more." If life in this
world was distressing most of the time, the life hereafter
might be different, because Lichtenberg (like Lessing) did
not discount the possibility of metempsychosis. He imagined
himself, for example, as having lived or as having been
"asleep" at the time of Epicurus and Caesar, as well as
having lived at the time of Spinoza— the latter having had
the greatest thoughts that were ever conceived by mortal
96
man. The threshold leading into the "other" world must
97
be crossed— laboriously. Man is destined to suffer by
9^
7 B. an D. F.. p. 235.
9lfIbid. . p. 235.
9%3., VI, pp. ^-8-^-9.
96Ibid.. I, pp. 28-29.
97Ibid.. VIII, p. 5^.
h i
ofl
virtue of the fact that he is born;7 the cause of all
human misery is thus attributable to the "sin" committed
when man was c o n c e i v e d .^9 If one were never born, then
one would be free from all suffering
Lichtenberg's pessimism should not be interpreted
to mean that he was necessarily a confirmed pessimist. He
even refers to himself— at least, on one occasion— as an
optimist. It seems, however, from the study of Lichten
berg 's works, that he, as he became more and more familiar
and informed about human nature, was one of the first
thinkers of the enlightenment to accept— if only in part—
a philosophy that Schopenhauer gave a great impetus to
later on.
The determination of man’s place in the universe
was the goal of his intellectual, philosophical, and
spiritual inquiries. He would sacrifice a part of his life
98
It is noteworthy that even Rousseau, this
pedagogical genius, was fully as pessimistic in regard to
certain fundamental aspects of human existence. Says he:
"Man is born to suffer; pain is the means of his preserva
tion," J. J. Rousseau: Emile, tr. by B. Foxley (New York,
1938), p. 15.
99
0. Hentzschel, in his doctoral dissertation on
Lichtenberg*s Lebensanschauung. sums up his evaluation of
Lichtenberg's pessimistic philosophy as follows: "Lichten-
bergs Charakter ist von ergreifender Tragik: Ein Leidender,
der sich das Recht auf Pessimismus nicht zugestehen will—
und unterliegt. Wenn er eine grosse Aufgabe gehabt hatte.1"
Lichtenbergs Lebensanschauung (Leipzig, 1910), p. 3*+.
100vs., I, P. 93.
if he only could find out ahout the average temperature and
101
barometric pressure in paradise.' Lichtenberg' s diction
reveals an important aspect of his scholarly attitude;
when he commented on nonverifiable subjects, he almost
always introduced these subjects with "I believe" rather
than with "I am convinced"— the latter term being used
exclusively about empirical subjects. His beliefs, then,
about the many facets of human existence were beliefs
102
arrived at after a systematic study.
Lichtenberg was not always consistent in his points
of view. In his own defense, he informs us that there is a
great difference between believing something and not being
able to believe the opposite. "Die Seite, die ich nehme,
wird nicht durch stricten Beweiss, sondern durch das
Ubergewicht bestimmt."^^ Consistency is an absolute
requirement within any philosophical inquiry. Kant, for
example, stressed this, but he also admitted that "This is
IqU-
most rarely found." Lichtenberg was not an exception.
101
VS., I, p. *4-2.
102
Says Kluge: "Die Halbheit war ftlr Lichtenberg
der argste Stein des Anstosses. 'Alles oder Nichts,1
diese Fichtische Losung, die Ibsens Brand so machtvoll
durchbraust, war Lichtenberg ureigen." Op. cit.. p. 67.
103vs., I, p. 73.
I. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, tr. by L.
White Beach (New York, 1956), p. 23.
^3
Scepticism
Pessimism may beget philosophical scepticism, and
105
j Lichtenberg was a sceptic. Brlnitzer asserts that this
| penetrating scepticism of Lichtenberg was "eine Vorstufe
j * 1
I der Erkenntnis" for Lichtenberg. Lichtenberg did not
hesitate to formulate a dictum in regard to the entire
realm of intellection.” ^^ "Doubt everything at least once-
even the axion that two times two is four." He lashed
out against warped traditions and customs, against unveri
fied "data" that in the course of human history had been
fraudulently included under the label of "truth." There
is nothing, according to Lichtenberg, that one must be more
suspicious of than tenets of' faith that have become
fashionable
105
'F. M. Mautner says: "Mit dem Grunthema seines
Lebens, Menschenkenntnis, offenbart sich auch seine Grund-
haltung: Skepsis gegenuber allem Wissen, eine Skepsis aber,
die nicht die Hande in den Schoss sinken lasst, sondern die
zu immer neu tatigem und rucksichtslosem Forschen, Denken,
Uberprufen, antreibt." "Lichtenbergs Vortrag uber die
Characters in der Geschichte," MLN. Vol. 55? 19*+0? P» 125.
^°^V. Brinitzer, on. clt.. p. 307.
107
Hermann Wessel, the famous Dano-Norwegian drama
tist and contemporary of Lichtenberg, and who probably more
than any other Scandinavian, helped in the propagation of
the spirit of Enlightenment in the Scandinavian countries,
voiced the same sceptical philosophy in a line of one of
his few, but provocative, poems: "Jeg sielden noget troer,
som troes af for mange." Digte (Oslo, 1952), p. 31^.
108VS., II, p. 136.
10?B. an d. F.T p. 192.
Superstition
Elements of superstition— surprisingly enough— were
not only a part of Lichtenberg; they constituted the essence
of his daily conduct. He admitted that he was superstitious
but he was not ashamed of this.110 He was concerned about
this Mnon-academicM habit, and although he was never able
to change it, he did keep it under rigid control. Pew
statements about himself in all his works reveal more of
Lichtenberg, the teacher and the thinker, than the follow
ing 'Jadmission":
Einer der merkwHrdigsten Zuge in meinem Charakter
ist gewiss der seltsame Aberglaube, womit ich aus jeder
Sache eine Vorbedeutung ziehe, und in Einem Tage hundert
Dinge zum Orakel mache. Ich brauche es hier nicht zu
beschreiben, indem ich mich hier nur allzuwohl verstehe.
Jedes Kriechen eines Insects dient mir zur Antwort auf
eine Frage uber mein Schicksal. Ist das nicht sonderbar
von einem Professor der Physik? Ist es aber nicht in
der menschlichen Natur gegrttndet, und nur bei mir
monstr5s geworden, ausgedehnt uber die Proportion
natErlicher Mischung, die an sich heilsam ist?111
Happiness
The impact on thoughts concerning education, from
Lichtenberg1s scepticism, is self-evident. Is happiness
possible? Can education increase the happiness that man
has longed for through eons and found only in part? Lich
tenberg believed that a basic element of true happiness may
110Lichtenberg reminds us that Hobbes, for example,
was afraid of ghosts during nights (VS., V, p. 25).
m vs., I, pp. 1^-15.
**5
112
be found In being sincere and straightforward. A genuine
concern about the mundane affairs of our times constitutes
i another component in the anatomy of happiness. One is
I
! seldom more happy than when a powerful feeling induces him
11^
to live only in this world.
Lichtenberg was almost envious of a certain group
of people— the believers in everything. Since these people
are able to believe— without much reflection— almost every-
no
thing, they are indeed happy creatures.
Happiness does not possess permanency within
itself, however, because a sustained happiness will tend
115
to lose in intensity merely through its duration.
Lichtenberg was inclined to believe that happiness was
possible only for those who would be willing to pay the
price— the acceptance of an attitude that does not allow
for full happiness in life. A first step toward the road
to happiness thus involves the realization that no human
being is completely happy.
112IS., I, p. 8.
1 Ibid., I, p. 29.
ll*f
Ibid., I, p. 171.
115
Ibid., II, p. 155.
116
Ibid.. I, p. lM-l.
Epistemology
Knowledge may lead toward more knowledge, but what
| is the essence of "knowledge”? How do we know that we
I "know"? These thoughts were in Lichtenberg's mind for
I
i years, although few answers were ever given. He was con
vinced that the nearer we come to an object in nature, the
more incomprehensible that object would become to us. A
grain of sand, for example, is not that which we consider
it to be.^'7 The intellect must be taxed to its maximum
capacity in order to enucleate life in its complexity.
Human intellect and human reason alone, however, do not
suffice in a realm where man wants most to know: the real
structure of the transcendent world. The psychic apparatus
of man must be called upon to inform us about that "world"
— although the "knowledge" obtained will not be verifiable.
It is yet much too early for man to make any final state
ment about life, about nature, and about knowledge per se,
because man's own senses are unable to perceive anything.
It is, according to Lichtenberg, much more likely that
there are a lot of appearances in nature that are dependent
*1 - i O
upon things, the nature of which are extrasensory.
To learn, to become wiser, then, means to find out
more and more about the mistakes which the instrument of
117vs., i, p. 59.
1 Ibid.. VIII, p. 159.
our sensations and of our perception is subjected to.
Carefulness in passing judgment becomes imperative under
these circumstances— a carefulness that everyone should
120
: exhibit. When human intelligence fails in man's effort
! to arrive at truth, intuition should be given due consider-
I ation. Understanding is a wonderful thing; but it is also
the most useless, the most clumsy thing in the world on
121
such occasions where one just does not need it. Thus,
intuition became a decisive factor in Lichtenberg1s theory
of knowledge.
Immanuel Kant
Lichtenberg1s philosophy has been analyzed with a
single purpose in mind: To assist in a critical analysis
of his thoughts on education— thoughts that are reflected
in his aphorisms, essays, and numerous letters. No study
of Lichtenberg's philosophy as related to education would
122
be complete, however, without reference to Immanuel Kant.
119VS., I, p. 138.
120
Says I ..‘ Marcuse: "Es geht vieles in der
menschlichen Seele zusammen, was in der Logik einander
beisst." Die Philosophie des GIMcks (Zurich, 19^9),
p. 16W.
121VS., II, p. 57.
122
See A. Neumann's article, "Lichtenberg als
Philosoph und seine Beziehungen zu Kant," ICantstudlen. IV,
190^, pp. 68-93» for a thorough analysis of Kant's
Influence on Lichtenberg.
Lichtenberg read Kant's works as early as 1767; he analyzed
them, and he commented on them in his letters to his few—
123
but close— friends.
One should not— according to Lichtenberg— confuse
true philosophy with a mere contemplation about man, the
soul, or the nature of existence, although all of these
matters are inherent in inquiries of any philosophy. He
even became sarcastic in his denunciation of certain kinds
of philosophers. "They can all philosophize," Lichtenberg
12^+
writes, "but not one can see." The kind of philosophy
that was taught in his time would consume itself (sich
125"
selbst fressen). His colleagues were not spared his
diatribes either. One philosopher, for example, was des
cribed as follows: "He operated with the opinions of other
• I
people; i.e. he was a professor of philosophy." He also
felt that there were too many philosophers who were just
"Titularphilosophen" rather than real philosophers.'*'2' 7
123
Hentzschel maintains that Lichtenberg was not
necessarily a Kantian. Says Hentzschel: "Griesebach und
Neumann wissen viel von seiner Geistesverwandtschaft mit
Kant zu reden: ich glaube, der Nachweis, dass die beiden
Antipoden sind, liesse sich ebenso leicht ftthren— wo nicht
leichter." Op. cit.. pp. 39-1 +0. This conviction can, how
ever, hardly be accepted in its entirety, because Lichten
berg himself seems to contradict such a claim.
12*+
VS., II, p. 230.
12^Ibid.. II, p. 89.
126Ibld.. II, p. 112.
127Ibid., II, p. 105.
if9
In discussing Kant, however, Lichtenberg becomes
the humble student, although this attitude did not exclude
objective criticism of the Kantian philosophy. Lichten
berg believed that many people thought Kant was correct in
! his philosophy because they understood what Kant had
written. To understand what Kant has written does not
make his philosophy a true one, Lichtenberg points out.
Seine Vorstellungsart ist neu, und weicht von der
gewBhnlichen sehr ab; und wenn man nun auf einmal
Einsicht in dieselbe erlangt, so ist man auch sehr
geneigt, sie fur wahr zu halten. zumal da er so viele
eifrige AnhSnger hat. Man sollte aber dabei immer
bedenken, dass dieses Verstehen noch kein Grund ist,
es selbst fur wahr zu halten.129
In a letter to his brother, Lichtenberg reminded
him of the following facts: Kant is a great man, a just and
- well-meaning man. His Critique of Pure Reason is the work
of a thirty-year study.This, of course, had its
pedagogical advantages as well as disadvantages.1^^
1 oft
Kant's appreciation of Lichtenberg's criticism
needs, perhaps, to be stressed at this point, because Kant
especially thought of Lichtenberg as a teacher— and not
(necessarily) as a philosopher. Kant recommended, on one
occasion, a son of a friend of his to Lichtenberg so that
this son could get a "thorough education." Wrote Kant:"Wer
aber k'dnnte dieses wohl sonst sein, als der verdienstvolle,
mir besonders wohlwollende, offentlich mich mit seinem
Beifall beehrende und durch Beschenkung mit seinen beleh-
renden sowohl als ergCtzenden Schriften zur Dankbarkeit und
Hochachtung verpflichtende Herr Hofrat Lichtenberg in
GBttingen." Immanuel Kants Werke. ed. by E. Cassierer
(Berlin, 1923), X, p. 3V7.
129
VS., I, p. 69.
13Qaid., vin, pA.
13lKant omitted, perhaps, some very important
clarifications of terms or of philosophical theory; he may
50
Lichtenberg became irritable at times when Kantian
philosophy was discussed and— misinterpreted. Fichte,
I among many others, became a special target of his wrath.
i
I A dogmatic "Kantian” is not a true Kantian. Even Fichte
! ". . . hat mehr wider die Klugheit verstossen, als wider
die Philosophie. "May Kant be whatever he is; he
certainly will always know much more (Lichtenberg believed)
133
than our present day metaphysicians all put together."
also have taken too much for granted, believing that
people (including his own university colleagues) might
have understood more than they actually did of his writ
ings. This is a point that Lichtenberg, the teacher,
felt it necessary to stress if one wants to interpret
any of Kant’s many works.
132VS., VIII, p. 5.
133
Lichtenbergs Brlefe. ed. by A. Leitzmann and
C. Schtiddekopf (Leipzig, 1902), II, p. 335.
CHAPTER III
PEDAGOGY AND CURRICULUM
Das Brauchbarste in unserm
Leben hat uns gemeiniglich
' niemand gelehrt.131 *
j In attempting to evaluate the limited number of
references to curricular problems and pedagogy in Lichten-
berg's works, we should not forget to view these in terms
of the state of pedagogy of his own time. It is imperative
that we refrain from insisting that our curriculum and
pedagogy should determine the historical perspective.^3^
13l+VS., I, p. 2lh.
135
For a survey of pedagogy and of the curriculum
in the 16-l8th centuries, see L. Cole: A.History of Educa
tion (New York, 1956), pp. 328-1 +31 +*
■I n £L
3 F. Hilker writes even critically about the
curriculum and pedagogy in the German Federal Republic in
1953- Says Hilker: "Aber Autoritat und Gehorsam sind noch
immer als starke beherrschende Faktoren der Erziehung
wirksam und lassen fur selbstandiges Denken, Selbstbestim-
mung und Selbstverantwortung nicht genttgend Raum . . .Das
Hauptgewicht der Schule liegt auf der Entwicklung der
intellektuellen KrSfte, . . . Das Lernen geschieht vorwie-
gend aus dem Buch und Lehrervortrag. . . . Noch ist das
"Fach" mit seiner theoretischen Systematik vichtiger als
das Kind mit seinen naturlichen Interessen." Die Schulen
in Westeuropa, ed. by Hylla Wrinkle, (Bad N auhe im, 1953)>
p. 305.
51
The word curriculum meant originally a course, a
race, or a running; only much later did it get its present
meaning of a specified course of study or all of the
courses of study in a school. There seems to he no German
word that has the same meaning as this English word. The
Germans use words like "Bildungsplan," "Lehrplan," and
similar terms. Pedagogy will here mean the science of
instruction.
This chapter on Lichtenberg's suggestions of
changes in and criticism of pedagogy and of the curriculum
must, then, be viewed in a historical setting. The three
great educators before Lichtenberg— Comenius, Francke, and
De la Salle— had contributed a significant share to changes
in the curriculum of European education. Another contem
porary of Lichtenberg was Basedow, whose Philanthropinum
was a favorite target of many a Lichtenbergian salvo, the
justice of which, perhaps, may be questioned. The ideas
of Pestalozzi need not be stressed here, since his experi
ments and his many humanitarian undertakings in education
did not become well-known until after Lichtenberg's death
in 1799.
Religion
One of the outstanding features of the curriculum
of Lichtenberg*s acquaintance was the fanatic-dogmatic
stress on religion. It should be kept in mind that in
Francke's Padogogium up to six and one-half hours of the
regular eight hours of instruction might deal with religion.
Of the seven hours of instruction in De la Salle’s schools,
50 per cent of the time was taken up with religious indoc
trination. Strangely enough, it was only Basedow who
insisted that religious indoctrination must be kept out
1*37
of the school— but not the discussion of religion. J In
view of these basic philosophies of education, as reflected
in the religious stress of the curriculum, and in view of
Lichtenberg1s religious controversies (like Lessing) and
the many references in his works to religion, a separate
chapter in this dissertation will deal with Lichtenberg1s
thoughts on religion as well as religious instruction.
Methodology
Another important educational point to be kept in
mind is the emphasis laid on memory work before and during
Lichtenberg's own academic career. Poor as the choice of
subjects may have been, whatever the students studied had
to be memorized. To read, to memorize, to acquire an
encyclopedic knowledge, was the educational course of the
time— a course that was given momentum by one of the
greatest educators of all times, Comenius.
107
^'Kant says: ’ ’Can anything be more perverted than
to talk about the other world to children who have hardly
begun life in this?" The Educational Theory of Immanuel
Kant, tr. and ed. by E.F. Buchner, Philadelphia, 1918>
P« 233 •
5*f
Status Quo
What were the schools like in the eighteenth
l^o
! century? Their quality, apparently, left much to be
! iso
desired. Lichtenberg considered them only as places
where silly talk was fashionable.^*^ The city of Gottingen
was no exception. Lichtenberg tells us that the school is
not too bad, although it does not have much distinction.
Many of the professors' own children were, therefore, sent
to other cities to get a better education than Gbttingen
could offer. However, the University of Gottingen will
forever be the finest place a student could desire to
1^1
study.
Laukhard, a contemporary student of Lichtenberg,
wrote: "Kurz, die Schulstunden waren allemal wie ein Fege-
feuer, und doch durften wir sie bei schwerer Strafe nicht
versaumen.1 1 Magister Laukhard Sein Leben und seine Schick-
sale von ihm selbst beschrieben. ed. by H. Schnabel,
Munchen, 1912, p. 21. This work will henceforth be
referred to as Magister Laukhard.
^ - ^ L i c h t e n b e r g was only one of many leading Germans
who, during the last part of the eighteenth century,
thought, wrote, and propagandized his thoughts on matters
dealing, with the education of youth. Goethe, for example,
more than a quarter of century after Lichtenberg, was still
equally concerned and dissatisfied with the unrealistic
curriculum in the schools of his own state. He tells Ecker-
mann: "So z. B. kann ich nicht billigen, dass man von den
studierenden kttnftigen Staatsdienern gar zu viele theoretis-
chgelehrte Kenntnisse verlangt, wodurch die Jungen vor der
Zeit geistig wie korperlich ruiniert werden. ..." Then
he asked Eckermann: "Bedarf es denn im Leben eines Staats-
dieners, in Behandlung der Menschen, nicht auch der Liebe
und des Wohlwollens?" Goethes Gesurache mit Eckermann
(Leipzig, n.d.), pp. 393-9^
1^-Uiro tt i r\n lhl .
VS., II, p. 107. B. an d. F.. p. 17h
55
The very core of educational philosophy seemed to
he involved in this precarious— or rather involuted— aspect
! of the school system. To follow professional advice in
I improving the school— Basedow was a famous professional
| educator— might not be the best thing to do either,
I because professional people are not always the most
lb2
practical people.
1^0
Tradition and faulty teacher training (to teach
poor children in the seventeenth and the first half of the
eighteenth centuries was considered beneath the dignity of
an ’ 'educated'’ person) were to blame for many of the unreal
istic curricular concoctions of his time. Lichtenberg
believes that there are very few teachers who teach so as
to avoid teaching that which they themselves would not
have learned if they, with their present intelligence, were
ihh
young again.
Reading: A National Disease
Lichtenberg, as already mentioned, read a great
deal. He says about himself, that reading and writing are
just as important to him as food and water, and that he
lk2
VS., I, p. 169.
l*+3
Formal teacher training began with De la Salle.
Ibh
VS., I, pp. 218-19.
Ik5
hopes never to be without books. It is, therefore,
astonishing to find that Lichtenberg wrote so profusely
against much reading. A basic reason of Lichtenberg1s
remarks about the evils of too much reading is, perhaps,
his concern about the potential intellectual weakening
that could result from superficial and careless reading.
He thinks that it is certainly much better not to have
studied a subject at all, than to have studied it only
ll+6
superficially. Pure reason (common sense) never mis
judges as seriously as superficial acquaintance with a
field might do.^lf' 7
Lichtenberg does not hesitate to use strong language
in his defense of his philosophy of the curriculum and the
concomitant stress on thorough rather than extensive read
ing. Much reading is damaging to the intellect, he says.
The greatest thinkers that he knew had never been great
readers; in fact, Lichtenberg is sure that they had read
lk 5
See S. Schneider: Georg Christoph Lichtenberg:
Penseur (Paris, 195k), pp. 90-91 for an excellent summary
(with page references to Lichtenberg1s works) of the
classical works that Lichtenberg had read.
lh6is., I, p. 135.
Ik7
'The similarity to Kant's conviction on the same
point is more than just interesting; "it is better to know
little, but to know this little well, than to know much and
to know it superficially." The Educational Theory of
Immanuel Kant, p. 201. See also VS.. I. mu 50-51.
very little. Sarcasm is also part of his total strategy.
A certain boy is lauded for his ability to read the Lord's
iLg
Prayer backwards: Such an excellent child!
His strong criticism is not limited to the schools
!alone; the word education includes all of the elements of
ilife that form a child, a student, an adult. The whole
i German nation was suffering from this reading malady.
i
!Indeed, the reading mania is so innate with the Germans
that it does not leave them even when they lose their
l*+9
sanity! ' Thus, there is a real danger in too much read
ing; it becomes as dangerous as any form of self-abuse.
It might be pleasant, but as injurious as any degree of
alcoholism.
Lichtenberg: An Intuitive Pedagogue
What does Lichtenberg mean by the word "read"?
Why read? How much should one read? What should one read?
Lichtenberg is aware that a certain group of students read
for no good reason at all— for even an objectionalle one:
1^1
so that they do not have to think. y And such reading, of
course, serves no purpose, because to read is to "borgen,
1^8
x °VS.. I, p. 219.
llf9lbid.. I, p. 219.
1^°Ibid.. I, p. 221.
1^1Ibid.. I, p. 171.
58
152
daraus erfinden, abtragen." There are times when
nothing less than a "chemical" analysis of the content of
a book will do; such reading necessitates concentration,
reflection, and integration of the ideas obtained from the
15^
book. He is convinced that his advice is based upon
empirical data, although the world may not comprehend the
utility of his advice just by observing him. Lichtenberg
adds that he is not writing his thoughts just because he
himself has found them useful, but because he realizes
(although too late for personal benefit) that he himself
ought to have followed the suggestions that he is now
giving to mankind. This point of view is the only rational
one to take when one attempts to give instruction to other
people concerning the things they ought to do, Lichtenberg
concludes.
Why should a student interested in natural science,
for example, not immediately start reading in the field?
The answer given is one based upon the most modern concepts
of the learning process. One should not look too much in
books dealing with a science that one still has to learn,
because the experience that a student might have as a result
of doing this might depress him and thus discourage further
study in that field. The first thing to do is, therefore,
152VS., II, p. 155.
1^3Ibid.. VI, p. 55.
to learn the fundamentals of any science— after that, one
l^L
may look around as much as one cares to. J
It would he incorrect to interpret Lichtenberg's
thoughts to mean that he is against reading— he himself
demanded a continuous supply of books. He even says that
it is very good to read a lot as long as one's senses do
not become dull, and as long as we do not neglect to find
new answers to our problems— answers that must be obtained
through our own experimentations rather than through read-
ing. The outcome of careless reading often leads to
pride and pedantry. Only the person who thinks more than
he reads is the person who, in time, will become a
1^6
responsible citizen. '
There is a profound philosophical-pedagogical
reason for exercising care in reading; a student might
mistake the thoughts expressed to be the truth rather than
just what these thoughts actually might be— the (confused)
thoughts of the writers in question. We do not only
accustom ourselves to consider falsehood as truth when we
read a lot, but our way of handling evidence is (uncon
sciously, perhaps) colored by the fashions of the time in
which we live and, as a result, useless.
i^vs. II, p. 129.
^ I b i d ., I, p. 128.
1^6Ibid.. I, p. 120.
60
One aspect of reading, however, should never be
neglected; vis., the development of a sound habit of look-
| ing up the answers to unsolved problems. Whenever one does
; not have the answer to a question, one should immediately
look it up. This habit is so important to Lichtenberg
that he almost becomes categorical about its place in edu
cation. If this is not the tool whereby one may be made a
useful man, Lichtenberg says, then there is no other way
157
of bringing this about.
The Natural Sciences
What did Lichtenberg then consider to be the
essential courses of any good curriculum? Of any educative
endeavor? As v/as pointed out earlier, Lichtenberg was a
mathematician and a physicist of sagacity and reputation.
His almost intuitive insight into the psychology of learn
ing is especially evinced in his insistence upon a slacken
ing in the rigid requirements of the schools. He is, for
example, convinced that one goes much too far in the study
of the natural sciences. Most students learn only what
other people already know, and they very seldom— if ever—
learn anything new. Although the study of natural science
is important, the content of the courses as taught is
unrealistic and needs a radical change. A student may be
^ v s . , ii, p. 130.
61
forced to reproduce a detailed outline of the history of a
particular insect, for example, hut at the same time, is
: completely ignorant of the anatomy and physiology of his
j own body. When this is the case, Lichtenberg argues, the
j curricular aspect of the natural science courses must be
: revised. The substance of any curricular revision must,
then, include the study of man from an antomical and phy-
l^S
siological point of view. y
Such a criticism, of course, may be understood in
terms of the (obligatory.1) reading habits of the students
in the eighteenth century. Learning readiness, for example,
was (indirectly) stressed by Lichtenberg more than a
hundred years before John Dewey,and Lichtenberg also
pointed out that the study of science might not at all be
good for every student— if the particular student wanted
to develop a normal mental acumen. Lichtenberg felt that
it was a basic fault of the educational system that the
study of certain sciences was begun too early. Their study
might cripple the intellect in a sense; and the path to new
discoveries is blocked as a result. It is not impossible
that intellection may improve if one never started the
study of any natural science. As Huxley, in Ape and
Essence, excoriated mankind for its deification of the
1^8VS-5 I* P* 216.
Dewey, The Child and the Curriculum (Chicago,
1902), pp. 25-26.
62
scientist, so Lichtenberg pointed out that the great
16 0
Newton considered the achromatic telescope to be an
| impossibility and that he "proved" this impossibility by
!
| means of laboratory experiments. That he still was in
! error— in spite of his "proof"— is a fact that ought to
be written on the door of every physical science
laboratory.
The Modern Curriculum
The study that was uppermost in the minds of the
educators of the eighteenth century was man himself.
Lichtenberg was, however, too much of a scientist to be
satisfied with just studying "topographic" psychology as
medical students studied topographic anatomy. He wanted
the study of the human body and its processes to become an
integral part of the curriculum. It is, in fact, an
embarrassing situation, he says, that geography and Homan
history are studied, rather than physiology and anatomy.
l60
A cursory reading of Sir W. C. Dampier's A
History of Science and Its Relation with Philosophy and
Religion (New York. l W f ). Chap. IV, p p. l60-216, will
enable one to appreciate more fully the true stature of
Lichtenberg in terms of courage to speak against one of the
greatest men in the eighteenth century. See also E.Kasner
and J. R. Newman, as they paraphrase a conviction that
Lichtenberg had almost two hundred years before them— at
least in its essence: "Indeed, the testament of science is
so continuously in a flux that the heresy of yesterday is
the gospel of today and the fundamentalism of tomorrow."
The World of Mathematics (New York, 1956), III, p. 1936.
161B. an d. F.. p. 191.
63
It is even more deplorable that one wastes time learning
heathen fables rather than learning one of the most
| important (next to religion!) of all sciences— anatomy and
] - | C p
iphysiology. But here again, Lichtenberg warns against
I the attempt of trying to know everything there is to know
iabout the subject. Psychology, anthropology (Lichtenberg
; is a co-founder of German anthropology), and sociology—
sciences that were in their infancy at this time— must
become part of the curriculum that Lichtenberg would wel
come. He recommends that a student should study his own
body and whatever he could learn about the mind; one must,
first of all, accustom oneself to doubt everything, to
learn to know human beings as they really are. However, a
student must flee the human encyclopedist, because no living
being will ever know all there io to know about a subject.
To know that one does not know everything is thus the
beginning of knowledge.
Theological Evolution
Theology ought to be abolished since its usefulness
has never been established; the proof of this is the irre
concilable elements of all of the major religions. He
suggests that it might be advisable to consider theological
studies as terminated around 1800; one should prohibit the
publication of any new theological "discoveries” after that
162
VS., II, pp. 151-52.
6b
time. 3 This does not mean that Lichtenberg was against
the study of religion, however. He always strove for full
i intellectual development of all of the human powers. But
! it serves no purpose to have just theological data in his
head; the only thing that could be done with these data
would be to pass them on to students. It is, therefore,
not at all impossible to be a famous theologian without
possessing even the slightest amount of "Menschenkenntnis"
161+
or of "bon sens."
Astronomy
P. Hahn gives an interesting account of Lichten-
^berg’s activities as an astronomer and as a natural
165
scientist. No analysis is attempted of any of Lichten-
berg's writings on astronomy, however, as the nature of
their content is far too complex for anyone but a specialist.
In view of this, only a few references will be made to this
science. Lichtenberg was aware of the potentialities
inherent in the study of astronomy and space, and of the
scientific exactness required in all astronomical calcula
tions. He says that astronomy is the science in which a
human being recognizes the limits of his own intelligence,
163VS., II, p. 101
16b
B . an d. F.. p. m- 6.
■^^P. Hahn, op. cit.
65
and where man may learn about his own importance (or
1 ££
non-importance) within the larger cosmos.
Another point made by Lichtenberg may elucidate an
| important aspect of his thinking on problems of education
|
| as a whole. Lichtenberg, as Hahn pointed out, was a pro-
| fessional astronomer and mathematician whose professional
! services in these fields even earned him a royal comnenda-
i tion. Lichtenberg suggested (here again, showing insight
and professional competence) that the observatories should
be built high up in the mountains; why not build an
observatory on top of Mont Blanc, for example?
He realized, however, that many other sciences are
more useful within the overall curricular program than the
study of astronomy was. The excessive amount of money used
in the building of many an observatory, he says, could be
much better used if put into the regular budget of the
already established institutions of learning.
j
The Modern Languages
The study of classical languages was part of the
curriculum of the eighteenth century. Francke taught his
students of the French language in a rather unique (but,
perhaps, efficient) way: the only textbook used was the
Bible. In Basedow's Philantropinum, an instructor might
teach a foreign language in a manner that was as startling
166VS., I, p. 273.
66
as it was unorthodox. A student might have to learn
history, for example, in a class where no other language
i
; than Latin or French was spoken. Lichtenberg was one of
|
i the first teachers to stress the study of modern languages,
although Basedow is usually given the most credit for this
; innovation. Lichtenberg was once asked by Arnelung for
1 advice concerning the education of his son, and Lichtenberg
i answered:
Ich gebe die Parole: Sprachen und Medizin;
hochstens JurisprudenzI - Ja, ja keine Theologiel
Leidet aber die Anlage nichts anderes, alsdann in
Gottes Namen auch TheologieJ . . .167
Lichtenberg advocated a trilingual language program
! and he was aware of the utility of the classical languages
as well— as Hebrew. Without a knowledge of Hebrew, this
world would become very dull to him. He insists that any
translation of his works in this language would have to be
done by no one else but himself.
The philosophy behind a language p r o g r a m 1 ^ — a n ( j
with the stress on the modern languages as advocated by
Lichtenberg— may be justified in several ways. Says Kluge:
an d. F ., p. 203.
168 .
VS., I, p. 3lf.
169
Herder asked: "Ist die lateinische Sprache
Hauptwerk der Schule? NeinJ Die wenigsten haben sie notig;
die meisten lernen sie, um sie zunvergessen." French was
the language to be learned, because it was the most indis
pensable language in Europe. Herder had very good reasons
67
The modern languages constitute the breath of life
of any nation. If a nation neglects the study of
modern languages, the disadvantage that results.from
this neglect will be similar to that which takes place
when a single individual refuses to have contact with
his fellow-men; i.e. the result would be one of limita
tion and of narrow-mindedness.170
j
We are learning foreign languages, Lichtenberg
writes, as If we planned to continue studying them into
j all eternity. A foreign language study must, above all
else, be practical in its approach and must be of use to
the student. The Greeks did not squander the precious
years of their youth learning dead languages, he continues.
If the Greeks did learn a foreign language, however, it
would be studied by means of objects and not through words
— the latter being a common method of language teaching In
171
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
for his convictions about learning French; in spite of his
language studying, he still could not communicate with one
single individual when he got to France— not even with old
women. See Sturm und Drang; Kritlsche Schriften (Heidel
berg, 19^9)j PP« 289-396, ^or an account of Herder’s
travels and criticism of the (language) curriculum of his
own day. This work will henceforth be referred to as
Sturm und Drang: Kritische Schriften.
170
Kluge, op. cit.. p. 75.
171
There are, of course, notable exceptions to this.
Laukhard wrote: "Dagegen wurde schon in meinen frttheren
Jahren das Latein mit mir angefangen, und zwar aus Amos
Comenius’ bekanntem Buche, dem Orbis Pictus. Ich muss
gestehen, dass ich diesem Buche vieles verdanke: es ist das
beste Buch, welches ich kenne, um Kindern eine Menge Voka-
beln und lateinische Redensarten spielend und ohne alien
Ekel beizubringen." Magister Laukhard. op. cit.. p. 19.
68
He was also against requiring thorough reading
knowledge of Greek and Hebrew for students of theology— a
| requirement that was made mandatory for holding a clergical
!
| office in some German states. As long as some people are
'admitted to the highest governmental offices, he argues,
j people who do not even know their mother tongue well enough
■ to execute efficiently the duties of these high offices, it
is unrealistic to make such a requirement of all students
of theology.
The stress on only three languages by Lichtenberg
i is of a relative nature; he was a polyglot whose knowledge
i
of languages was well known among the scholars with whom he
associated. He would criticize translations from French or
English, for example, and was frequently consulted on mat
ters of intricate idioms that arose when works were
translated into the German language by his friends or
colleagues. In a letter dated 1773> to his brother Ludwig,
Lichtenberg1s view is explicitly stated: When one under
stands Latin, French, and one's mother tongue, one can
easily learn the other languages— especially if one has a
philosophical mind— ; there is no necessity at all to waste
time on the conjugation of the irregular verbs, for example.
It is self-evident, however, that the learning of a foreign
language might be somewhat more difficult than that which
Lichtenberg is here proclaiming.
69
Certain pedagogical (or rather educational-
psychological) observations that Lichtenberg made concern-
I ing foreign language study are of the most modern tenor.
I
; He is certain that few— if any— students will ever become
i
thoroughly bilingual. To know a language implies a know-
; ledge of the people that speak it. The suggestions, then,
concerning the study of languages are realistic. The
student must start foreign language study at an early age;
old men can never learn a foreign language to perfection,
because, Lichtenberg maintains, fluency in a foreign
language is something instinctive, something that cannot
be acquired through reasoning.
History Versus Historicism
It was characteristic— as Goethe pointed out in his
Maximen— of Lichtenberg to write a terse and witty state
ment about many a problem that interested him, as, for
instance, that of historical accuracy and history as a
subject-matter field proper. It used to be fashionable,
and perhaps, it is still in vogue, Lichtenberg writes, to
write the subtitle "A True Story" below the title of many
a novel. This deception can be overlooked; but that one
does not put "A Novel" as the subtitle below the title of
some recent history texts, is a serious omission.^ 2 He
172
VS., I, p. 312.
70
also compares the repetitious nature of history to the
re-winding of a clock— the only difference being that the
re-winding of history is done by a creature of a higher
! kind.173
Lichtenberg reveals an aspect of a true historian
; whose task is almost insurmountable. Why study history
when it is unreasonable to expect accuracy? He was dis
satisfied with the teaching of history as well as the
content of history texts in the eighteenth century. His
dissatisfaction was especially due to the unwarranted
attempt of the historian of his time to find and interpret
the purpose of historical happenings. What he dislikes
more than anything is the attempt to see a purpose in
everything, to extract intentions behind all occurrences.
There is no intention behind occurrences. The most impor
tant happenings take place without any purpose. Coinci
dences nullify the effect of our errors, and coincidences
enlarge the most brilliant undertakings of man. The more
significant events in this world have no cause— they only
17*+
take place. ' The purpose of any systematic study of
"higher" history is thus to clarify the data at hand.'*'7^
173VS., II, p. 192.
17l *Ibid.. I, p. 283.
175
'This view is in complete agreement with that of
modern historians. L. Reis and P. 0. Kristeller, for
example, wrote: "There seem to be two chief tasks for the
71
Lichtenberg attributes, however, the writing of history to
a historical Muse that favors scandals. Germany has never
had any great historians, according to Lichtenberg, and it
176
will probably not get any for some time to come. '
A hypothetical question is raised by Lichtenberg;
perhaps, it would be better to dismiss the study of history
(at least, political history) altogether, because "der
Mensch wilrde mehr nach den jedesmaligen Kraften handeln,
die er hat; da jetzt hier und da das Exempel, gegen einen,
177
den es bessert, Tausende schlimmer macht."
The Classical Writers
The last topic to be analyzed deals with the study
of the classical writers. Lichtenberg is very frank about
his predilection for foreign writers; in fact, as early as
1785? he informs us that he does not read German novels
philosophical treatment of history: The one is the task of
the logician who has to study the historical method, its
specific modes of inferences and verification, and the
relation of this method to cognate scientific procedures.
The other task is the main business of the philosopher of
history, that is, to clarify the place history holds within
the great scheme of knowledge and reality as a \\rhole.1 1
"Some Remarks on the Method of History," Journal of
Philosophy (April, 19*+3)? p. 2*+0.
176That he was mistaken in this, however, may be
seen from the enlightening summary of German contributors
to historical interpretation as presented in R. G. Colling-
wood's The Idea of History (New York, 1956), pp. 165-182.
177VS., I, p. 285.
72
anymore. All books represent a highly complex body of
thoughts. A more peculiar product than books can hardly
be found in this world, he writes. They are printed by
people who do not understand them; they are sold by people
who do not understand them; they are bound and reviewed by
people who do not understand them— and they are written by
178
people who do not understand them. Selectivity is thus
of the greatest importance, because one should read only
the best; and even among the best, only those that almost
179
nobody knows, but whose authors are men of intelligence.
The Bible occupies a central position within the
classics— as it did for De la Salle and Francke. Lichten
berg 's reasons for including it, however, are entirely
different from that of his famous pedagogical predecessors.
There are a lot of excellent thoughts in King Solomon,
Lichtenberg says, thoughts that probably were not written
by King Solomon at all but, perhaps, dictated to him by his
teachers. What really fascinates the reader of biblical
books is the flair that these old sages had of talking
directly to the heart of their readers. Their sayings
represent the basic substance of cosmic knowledge, of a
philosophy of life. Even the finest thoughts of the modern
writers are usually nothing but individualized comments on
178VS., I, p. 283.
179Ibid.. II, p. 131.
73
l8o
these old biblical writers. He continues: The New
Testament is a classic; it is the best handbook that has
ever been written. That there are many professors who do
not understand it, is a fate which it shares with other
works. But this classical work is especially different
from all of the others in that mankind has even sanctified
blunders in its explanation.
Cogitating on the content of the curricular offer
ings of his own time, Lichtenberg did not hesitate to
express his wholehearted disapproval. Being forced to
observe the gigantic quantities of useless subject matter
that students were forced to assimilate (or at least
memorize.’), Lichtenberg became depressed and disgusted.
The only reason for certain curricular offerings is found
in the fact that it in turn enables the students to teach
the same useless subject matter to a new generation of
students. The study of Greek, for example, belongs in this
category.When subject matter becomes traditional
rather than serving a vital part in the education of man,
Lichtenberg warned his fellow-men, scholarly bookworms may
be produced— but never a true scholar.
180VS., I, pp. 27^-75.
l8lIbld.■ I, pp. 277-78.
CHAPTER IV
RELIGION
Ein grosser Herr sollte nur
eine allgemeine Religion
haben. In den Schulen mussten
alle Religonen Erlaubnis haben,
ihren Glauben und Aberglauben
zu lehren.182
"Man sollte das Wort Religion gar nicht haben.
Wann und wie ist es entstanden?"^3 The exact derivation
of the word religion is uncertain. It may be derived from
the Latin word religere or religare— more probably from the
185-
former. The early Christians were unacquainted with the
185
word, y but it was adopted into the German language more
than two hundred years before the birth of Lichtenberg.
Lichtenberg's philosophy of religion as it relates
to education is important, because elementary and secondary
education in the eighteenth century meant, to a large
extent, instruction in and memorization of, religious data.
182
G. Chr. Lichtenberg Gesammelte Werke. edited and
introduced by Wilhelm Grenzmann, Frankfurt am Main, I, p.
5-5-9. This edition of his works will henceforth be referred
to as Werke.
l83ibld.. I, p. 5-53.
l8h „ ^
See Hoffmeister, on. cit.. p. 525.
185
-'Auguste Sabatier, Outlines of a Philosophy of
Religion (New York, 1957), p. 2.
7^
In Francke's Padagogium, for example, from six to six and
one-half hours of the regular eight hours of instruction
frequently dealt with religion. A similar ratio— at the
expense of the other subjects— might be observed in the
school of De la Salle. The remarks that Lichtenberg made
about religion should, therefore, be viewed in their
historical setting.
Definition
What does the word religion mean? The Catholic
Encyclopedia Dictionary defines the word religion as "the
ozr
union of man with God." An investigation of this union
constitutes an essential part of our analysis of Lichten
berg 1 s thoughts on education. Whether or not such an
inquiry provides answers that give us a better understanding
of the totality of his works must, it seems, be judged by
i ftp
later researchers /— investigators who should, perhaps, be
primarily concerned with Lichtenberg's philosophy of
religion.
Lichtenberg supplies us with a definition of
religion which, in comparison with the theological defini
tion just given, elucidates what Lichtenberg meant when he
_ New York, 19*+1» p. 818.
187 ’
Freud asserts: "Where questions of religion are
concerned, people are guilty of every possible kind of
insincerity and intellectual misdemeanor." The Future of
an Illusion (New York, 1957), p. 56.
76
used the word: "Sie ist eigentlich die Kunst, sich durch
den Gedanken an Gott, ohne andere weitere Mittel, Trost
und Muth im Leiden zu verschaffen, und Kraft, demselben
. , „188
entgegen zu arbeiten."
We shall now determine the place that religion,
according to Lichtenberg, ought to have in education.
Lichtenberg was explicit in his discussion of religion,
and he gave us answers, the nucleus of which may open a ne\^
vista for a better understanding and evaluation of the
writings of Lichtenberg--a teacher who attracted more
students to his lectures than any professor of religion
189
did to his lectures at the University of Gottingen.
Religion Versus Religiosity
1
It is generally agreed that religion, in its widest
sense and as defined above, is an esential element of
190
modern societies. The question of a religion's intrinsic
~^^Werke, I, p. l*+6.
189
Says R. M. Meyer: "War er auch fur aussere
Anerkennung nicht unempfanglich, so scheint doch in noch
hoherem Grade der Lehrberuf selbst ihn befriedigt zu
jhaben; ..." Jonathan Swift und G. Chr. Lichtenberg
! (Berlin, 1886), p. 60. ~~
190
E. Friedell maintains: "Die Spitze und Kronung
der menschlichen Kulturpyramide wird von der Religion
gebildet. Alles andere ist nur der massive Unterbau, auf
dem sie selbst thront, hat keinen anderen Zweck, als zu ihr
hinanzufuhren. In ihr vollenden sich die Sitte, die Kunst,
die Philosophie." Kulturgeschichte der Neuzeit (Munchen,
195*0, I, pp. 2^-25.
77
191
value, however, must be left unsettled, because this
investigation deals only with Lichtenberg1s attitude
towards religion and religious instruction as taught in
the schools of his own generation.
| When Lichtenberg used the word religion, he usually
i meant the religion professed by Christians. The distinc-
; tion between the Christian religion and the persons pro
fessing that faith, is a distinction that permeates all of
Lichtenberg1s writings on religion. Wrote Lichtenberg:
"Mit der christlichen Religion lasst sich Staat machen,
192
: aber wahrlich mit den Christen sehr wenig." 7
Christians in Lichtenberg1s time did not follow the
: teachings of their leader, Lichtenberg maintained. The
fanaticism and dogmatism of the religious groups placed
them outside of and separated them from true Christianity.
Lichtenberg sarcastically evaluated and "re-baptized" these
groups as follows:
Sie sprachen fiir ihre Religion nicht mir der
Massigung und Vertraglichkeit, die ihnen ihr grosser
Lehrer mit That und Worten predigte, sondern mit dem
191
B. Russel, for example, professes: MI do not
believe that, on the balance, religious beliefs have been
a force for good." The Will to Doubt (New York, 1958),
p. 17.
192
VS., II, p. 98. Lessing made a similar
differentiation.
Zweckwidrigen Eifer philosophischer Sectirer, und mit
einer Hitze, als wenn sie Unrecht hatten. Es sind
keine Christen, sondern Christianer.193
The following question clarifies Lichtenberg1s
attitude towards religion as practiced by believers through
out the ages: "1st es nicht sonderbar, dass die Menschen
so gern fiir die Religion fechten, und so ungern nach ihren
Vorschriften leben?"^^^
Teleological Religion
Since Lichtenberg felt it desirable to have
religious instruction in the schools, what kind of instruc
tion did he suggest? One thing is clear: Lichtenberg did
not advocate the religious indoctrination prevalent in the
schools of his own day because he felt that this type of
IQS
religious instruction was suited only for the masses. 77
Nor was he primarily concerned with which church should
give religious instruction; the important thing was that
196
a person would be led "zum Guten."
Lichtenberg disagreed with the theologians of his
time as to the expected outcomes that religious instruction
was supposed to produce in the human heart. That a religion
193vs.? II, p. 16b.
1^ lbid.. I, p. 182.
195ibid.. I, p. 199.
19^ibid., I, p. 76.
could ennoble a person's character and help an individual
to become a useful citizen, Lichtenberg might admit. That
man's character could be "changed” in the manner hoped for
by the professors of religion, Lichtenberg considered as
erroneous— in fact, an impossibility. Said Lichtenberg:
"Die Menschen so zu machen, wie ihn die Religion haben will
gleicht dem Unternehmen der Stoiker; es ist nur eine andere
Stufe des Unmoglichen.
Lichtenberg epitomizes his own philosophy of
religion as follows:
Ich g^aube von Grund meiner Seele und nach der
reifsten Uberlegung, dass die Lehre Christi, gesaubert
von Pfaffengeschmiere, und gehorig nach unserer Art
sich auszudrucken verstanden, das vollkommenste System
ist, das ich mir wenigstens denken kann, Ruhe und
Gluckseligkeit in der WeIt am schnellsten, kraftigsten,
sichersten und allgemeinsten zu befordern.-^o
The remainder of this chapter will deal with other
pertinent specifics of Lichtenberg's thoughts on religion:
his thoughts on reason, God, the Bible, Protestantism,
Catholicism, dogmas, and morality.
Reason
Lichtenberg is frequently referred to as a ration
alist. He continually stressed the importance of reason
and independent intellection. Bertram asserts that
197VS., I, p. 167.
198Ull1 A I, p. 67.
Lichtenberg1s philosophy of religion belongs halfway
between that of deistic Enlightenment and the philosophy
of Spinoza.***^
There is no other way through which man can honor
God, Lichtenberg says,^1 ^ than the one which stresses the
fulfillment of one's duties and requires action that is in
perfect agreement with the laws that reason has given. It
should be pointed out that Lichtenberg, like so many an
intellectual before and after him, was not always consistent
in his stress on reason alone within the larger realm of
religious beliefs. He says:
Uberhaupt erkennt unser Herz einen Gott; und dieses
nur der Vernunft begreiflich zu machen2 ist freilich
schwer, wo nicht gar unm’ dglich. - Es ware eine Frage,
ob die blosse Vernunft, ohne das Herz, je auf einen
Gott gefallen ware. Nachdem ihn das Herz erkannt hatte,
suchte ihn die Vernunft auch.201
No greater inconsistency can be entertained, how
ever, according to Lichtenberg, than what man has already
done; namely, he has permitted his reason to become sub
servient to the assertions of a printed book--the Bible.
199
"Ernest Bertram, Georg Christoph Lichtenberg:
Adalbert Stifter (Bonn, 1919), P« 22.
200VS., I, p. 95.
2°llbid., I, p. 95* This sounds, it seems, more
Quakeristic than Spinozistic. Rufus Jones wrote: "We are
what we are as much because we feel as because we think,
and when we dap down the lid on our feelings we have wrecked
our capabilities as men." Rufus Jones Speaks to Our Times
(New York, 195*0, p. 177.
Walter A. Berendsohn asserts: "L. steht hber den
Aufklarern, die alles erklaren, weil sie alles zu wissen
81
;Since we shall deal more with this aspect of his attitudes
later on in the chapter, only an introductory reference
iwill be given here. Maintains Lichtenberg:
1
! Dass in einem Buche steht, es sei von Gott, ist
I noch kein Beweis, dass es von Gott sei; dass aber
| unsere Vernunft von Gott sei, ist gewiss, man mag nun
! das Wort Gott nehmen, wie man will.202
| The mere change of opinion, the forced memorization
j
|of religious propositions, and catechetical indoctrination,
were equally useless to Lichtenberg. He ridiculed these
methods when he referred to the conditions in France, where
the government arrived at more "efficient" results by more
i "direct" methods. "Sonst sucht man bei Bekehrungen die
Meinung wegzuschaffen, ohne den Kopf anzutasten; in Frank-
reich verf§hrt man jetzt kurzer: man nimmt die Meinung mit
sammt dem Kopf weg."^^^
The results, then, of these methods amounted to the
same thing, because whatever faith a person professed had
meinen. Er sieht uberall ungeloste Fragen und Schwierig-
keiten, er forscht und versucht und vermutet und ahnt,
rastlos bemfthmt, 'Wahrheiten' zu entdecken." Stil und Form
der Aphorismen Lichtenbergs (Kiel. 1912), p. This work
is, in my opinion, one of the best documented works on
Lichtenberg. Berendsohn gives ample references to Lichten
berg 's works whenever he attempted an interpretation of
Lichtenberg1s aphorisms.
202
VS., I, p. 80.
203
Ibid.. I, p. 2k2.
82
to be in conformity with reason. He maintained that the
religion which was to be taught, which was to guide an
i
| individual, had to be absolutely true— but it also had to
1 201 +
| be one that everyone could understand.
j
A religion or a religious institution that is not
I reasonable is, therefore, unfit for educational purposes.
; Lichtenberg seemed to invite the core of organized Chris-
| tianity— the Church— to prove otherwise. That sermonizing
takes place in our churches, he wittily observed, certainly
does not make the lightning rod unnecessary on these
churches. 2(^
It becomes imperative to search for some of the
causes that have led to the belief in a God who is a mere
concept based upon human superstition. Superstition may be,
according to Lichtenberg, traced back directly to the
206
unpsychological practices of religious instruction.
Lichtenberg, like Kant, spoke out sharply against religious
instruction to a child that was not yet able to think for
207
itself. Too many people, he continues, have forgotten
20V , I, PP. 67-68.
20^Ibid.. II, p. 96.
206
See Deneke, op. cit.. pp. 18-35, for an analysis
of Lichtenberg's elementary and secondary school instruction
in religion.
207
'VS., H, P. 15*+.
to acquire an education that is useful in this life—
because these people have spent all their time acquiring
an "education" that would prepare them only for a
celestial existence.2^
God
The concept of God delineated in Lichtenberg's
works contains elements that are revolutionary from a
theological as well.as a curricular point of view. Is it
not fantastic, he asked, that man has built his entire
pistological edifice on the basis of a dim comprehension of
ultimate causes. We do not know anything about God— and we
cannot ever know anything about him.2<^ All reference to a
creator of the world is, therefore, just a form of
210
anthropomorphism.
Lichtenberg1s concept of God is one in which God is
benevolent and omnipotent— but also a God that will remain
211
completely incomprehensible. Our entire idea of a God,
Lichtenberg declared, is nothing but "personificierte
212
Unbegreiflichkeit." Man's belief in God is not a result
21^
of ratiocination but is rather a result of an instinct.
208 '
vs., i, p . i * t 5 .
209The epistomological proof for this view was
given by Kant.
210VS., I, p. 71. 212Ibid.. I, p. 102.
211Ibid. . V, p. 150. 213Ibid. . I, p. l*+5.
The God of the universe will always act wisely and
2lb
will always be just; to lose faith in this God represents
a profound loss to man. Loss of faith, however, is almost
inevitable if a student delves deeply into the study of
215
philosophy and nature.
Lichtenberg was not concerned with complete loss of
216
faith in a God — that does not occur too often, he com
ments— but rather with the radical change of faith that
results from many a philosophic inquiry. The God that
emerges is no longer the helpful God of our childhood;2^7
God has been transformed into a being that is unable to
help the helpless. The day will, therefore, come when a
belief in a God will be just as ridiculous as a belief in
on ft
a ghost is ridiculous nowadays. L That God created man in
his own image means, apparently, Lichtenberg reflected,
219
only that "der Mensch schuf Gott nach dem seinigen."
He pitied the person who had lost faith in a
personal God. A reasonable balance between a rationalist's
21h B. an d. F.. pp. 9*+-95.
215VS., I, p. Ih6.
PI A
^-^Lichtenberg amused himself on certain occasions
by playing the role of an atheist (Werke, I, p. *+58).
217VS., I, p. 1M-6.
2l8Ibid.. I, p. 58.
219
Ibid.. I, p. 56.
naturalism and the form of Christianity as exemplified in
the life of Jesus Christ seems to he Lichtenberg1s goal for
man’s religious instruction. The country in which the
churches are beautiful but the houses are neglected, he
says, is just as much lost as the country wherein the
220
churches are neglected but the houses are castles.
A fusion of primitive Christianity with Lichten
berg 's concept of religion may be perceived throughout his
works— a fusion the essence of which is expressed in the
following quotation: "Wenn doch nur der zehnte Theil der
Religion und Moral, die in Bftchern steht, in den Herzen
stande I1,221
The Bible
Lichtenberg, son of a Lutheran clergyman, became
familiar with the Bible early. He considered the New
Testament a classic. Unfortunately, not every professor of
222
religion understands the Bible. Lichtenberg always
22^
enjoyed reading the Scriptures. J The Bible, according to
220
VS., I, p. 253.
221
Ibid., I, pp. lI f8-Lt-9. Even the word "Gottes-
dienst1 1 is misused, according to Lichtenberg. That a person
attends church does not mean that this person is serving
God. The word "Gottesdienst” ought to be used only for
people who believe in and practice the Golden Rule.
(VS., I, p. l¥t).
222Ibid.. I, p. 289.
223
Ibid.. I, pp. 27^-275.
86
Lichtenberg, provides insight into the structure of the
cosmos and the Bible also supplies man with a useful
philosophy of life. The fact that the Bible is misunder
stood does not detract from its inherent qualities. The
basic reason for misunderstanding the Bible is found in the
22b
fact that man has neglected to study himself.
The Psalms impressed Lichtenberg for many years.
The reading of David's life history, for example, invariably
225
resulted in an inner satisfaction. y However, although
Lichtenberg found aid and comfort in reading Biblical pas
sages, he was nevertheless unorthodox in his interpretation
of the Bible. He refused to believe in the historicity,
227
inspiration, and revelations of the Bible.
He was especially vociferous in his denunciation of
the many (alleged) miracles described in the Bible.
229
Lichtenberg takes the position of Hume, that a miracle
22^f
VS., V, p. 338.
22^Ibid.. I, p. 20.
226J. S. Semler (1725-1791) was one of the first
Lutheran clergymen to begin historical criticism of the
Bible (Spinoza was the originator of the idea of the his
toricity of the Bible).
22 7
Lichtenberg1s rejection of the validity of
revelations was in the spirit of VI. R. Inge, who maintains
"A revelation absolutely transcending reason is an absurd
ity; no such revelation could ever be made." Christian
Mysticism (New York, 1956), p. 20.
2 2 8 - r r o x n~>
VS., I, p. 73.
2 p Q 7
7David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Under
standing (Los Angeles, 1956), p. 12*+.
87
is a violation of the laws of nature Lichtenberg also
231
considers all types of revelation as "betrligerisch."
; The Word of God must not be confused with a fictitious
i revelation2^2 entitled the Bible, because the Word of God
233
i is merely another expression for the word ''reason."
Doctrines
Lichtenberg remained a Protestant throughout his
whole life. It was indeed a shameful thing to be a Catholic,
23*+
he said, when Protestantism was already in existence.
Papistry is nothing but a contagious disease of the soul
(Lichtenberg is here making fun of the Christians), and the
230
J Blaise Pascal, whom Lichtenberg liked to read,
asserted: "Had it not been for miracles, there would have
been no sin in not believing in Jesus Christ." Pascal1s
Pensees (New York, 1958), p. 240. Lichtenberg refused, as
is well known, to believe in the divinity of Christ and in
every type of miracle.
231
Werke. I, p. 4-52. Thomas Paine echoes the iden
tical conviction in The Age of Reason. Says Paine: "It is
a contradiction in terms and ideas, to call anything a
revelation that comes to us at second-hand, either verbally
or in writing." New York, n.d., p. 8.
^Arthur Schopenhauer, a Lichtenberg admirer,
wrote: "Es gibt keine andere Offenbarung, als die Gedanken
der Weisen; wenn andere diese, dem Loose alles Menschlichen
gemass, dem Irrthum unterworfen, auch oft in wunderliehe
Allegorien und Mythen eingekleidet sind, wo sie dann
Religionen heissen." Sammtliche Werke (Leipzig, 1891), V,
p. 379-
233Werke. I, p. if61.
234-
Ibid., I, pp. 4-65-4-66.
88
same thing may be said about Judaism— the latter possessing
even a wicked character. Lichtenberg did not seem to be
biased in his judgment of the J e w s , 2 3 6 although he did
!ironically assert that the soul of a Jew should not be
i 287
:confused with that of a Christian's.
His anti-Catholic remarks reveal unexpected charac
ter traits--traits that do not enhance Lichtenberg's status
as an objective judge and formulator of religious instruc
tion. The people who have invented the forgiveness of
sins— referring, of course, to Catholic confessions— by
means of Latin formulae, says Lichtenberg, are directly
p p O
responsible for all the misery in this world. In spite
289
of his bigotry in regard to Catholicism, ' however, one
should not overlook the insight that Lichtenberg had of the
evolutionary dogmatic pattern within the Catholic Church.
Writes Lichtenberg:
235VS-, HI, P. 190.
23£>Lichtenberg unequivocally praised both Nicolai
and Mendelssohn.
237vs., hi, p. 125.
238ibid.. I, p. Ik5.
239Friedrich Schleiermacher, Lichtenberg's contem
porary, was equally denunciatory in his discussion of the
Catholic Church. Says Schleiermacher: "Consider this purely
historically, that the papacy is in no way the essence of
the Catholic Church, but its corruption." On Religion:
Speeches to its Cultured Despisers (New York, 1953), p. 269.
He continues: "Further progress of Papistical Catholicism
in Germany on many grounds necessarily involves a return to
every kind of barbarity." Ibid.. p. 27k.
Ein Pabst (Zacharias, glaube ich) that die Leute in
den Bann, die an Antipoden glaubten; und jetzt kSnnte
der Fall leicht kommen, dass einer seiner Nachfolger
die Antipoden in den Bann th&te, wenn sie nicht an die
Infallibilitat des romischen Stuhls glauben wollten.24-0
Lichtenberg1s skeptical attitude towards
pl+i
theological-biblical dogmatism is, in part, a direct
result of his early religious indoctrination in Lutheranism,
an instruction which, according to his own admission, was
given ten years too early; i.e., before he was fifteen
years old. His disbelief in the value of theological
inquiries made him wonder if it would not be desirable to
prohibit, around the year 1800, the theologians from
2b2
"inventing" and publishing any additional interpretations.
The soul or the spirit remains undefined in
2b3
Lichtenberg1s thoughts on religion. It is, perhaps,
impossible to ascertain the exact nature of these concepts,
2h0V S., II, pp. 171-172. (The dogma of infallibil
ity was pronounced a century later.)
2bl
Ernst Cassirer, like Bayle before him, asserts:
"Not doubt, but dogma, is the most dreaded foe of know
ledge." The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (Boston, 1955 )>
p. 161.
pl+2
VS., II, p. 10.
P a u l Requadt states, surprisingly enough, that
Lichtenberg believed in the transmigration of the soul, op.
cit.. p. 85. Requadt "proves" this by referring to VS., I,
p. 32, where Lichtenberg says: "Ich kann den Gedanken nicht
los werden, dass ich gestorben war, ehe ich geboren wurde,
und durch den Tod wieder in jenen Zustand zurftckkehre."
because, according to Lichtenberg, man becomes a sophist
and supersubtie in a realm where his mental faculties no
longer suffice. Everyone becomes a sophist when he dis
cusses the immortality of the soul and a life after
death.2l+Lf That the soul remains alive after death was
2 1+R
originally assumed on the basis of faith--then ' ’proved."
The existence of a God and the immortality of the soul are
21+6
"bloss gedenkbare, aber nicht erkennbare Dinge."
One of the strongest desires that Lichtenberg ever
had was the desire to learn to know the essence of the
2I +7
spirit or the soul; ' This desire was, apparently, never
fulfilled.2^8
2l+lf
VS., I, p. 56. Wrote Unamuno: "There is no way
of proving the immortality of the soul rationally. There
are, on the other hand, ways of proving rationally, its
mortality." Op. cit.. p. 79«
2^5
Ibid., I, p. 57.
oh 6
Ibid., I, P. 8.
2^7Ibid., I, p. 12.
pLQ
The point of view of Voltaire, whom Lichtenberg
ridiculed for double baptism— "es hat aber nicht viel
gefrttchtet," VS., II, p. 98— seems more convincing to me
than the view advanced by Lichtenberg. Said Voltaire: "The
words matter and spirit are mere words. We have no complete
idea of these two things." Collected Works of Voltaire
(New York, n.d.), p. M+3. Voltaire also wrote: "The trans
migration of souls is a system so simple and even so proba
ble to the eyes of ignorant people." Ibid., p. 395. If
Voltaire’s pronouncement is valid and if Requadt’s inter
pretation of VS., I, p. 32, is correct, we are forced to
put Lichtenberg into the category of "ignorant" people.
"Ignorant" Lichtenberg was--but not because of possessing
more ignorance than any other scholar who had pondered the
subject, but because Lichtenberg suspended judgment in this
gedenkbare" but not "erkennbare" realm.
91
Morality
21 +9
The pertinence of a section on ethics or morality
in a chapter dealing with religion as an integral part of
education becomes obvious when one considers the fact that
Herbart, Lichtenberg's junior by thirty-four years, made
ethics a fundamental concept of his theory of education.
Lichtenberg realized that unreflective, self-
satisfied skepticism— and a skeptic he was throughout his
whole life— always means mental death; but that in "self-
critical skepticism, observant of it as of everything else,
250
moves the very life-blood of philosophy." Since he not
only doubted the validity of the doctrines of established
Christendom, but also refused to accept the exegesis
employed by the "geistliche Taschenspieler" of his time,
the significance of Lichtenberg as an advocate of religious
instruction in the schools must be judged by standards
2M-9
7I have been unable to find a significant differ
ence in meaning between the word morality and ethics, and
I treat them, therefore, as being synonymous.
For a short analysis of the part that ethics
played in the history of ideas during the period of the
Enlightenment, see Wilhelm Windelband, A History of
Philosophy; Renaissance Enlightenment Modern (New York.
1958"), II, PP. 500-518.
250
Josiah Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy
(New York, 1958), p. 133. This book was first published
in 1885.
92
291
which are not necessarily of a Judeo-Christian character. y
He asks, for example, the following question: "Sollte
vielleicht unsere christliche Moral ihren Grund in einer
252
gev/issen Schwachheit haben, in einer judischen Feigheit."
The principle of ethics was, perhaps, first pro
pounded by Heraclitus. The question of whether or not the
morality of the age iri which Lichtenberg lived was any
"better" or "worse" than that of the other centuries will
be left unsettled.
Lichtenberg maintained that every individual
possesses something unbreakable, namely, a "character-
skeleton"; to change or break this skeleton is just as
25k
futile as the attempt to teach a sheep "das Apportieren."
No human being is morally perfect, because everyone has a
moral "backside," a side -which he tries to hide under the
255
"trousers" of propriety as long as possible.
_
Says Heinrich Heine: "Unsere Moralbegriffe
schweben keineswegs in der Luft: die Veredlung des Menschen,
Recht und Unsterblichkeit haben Realitat in der Iiatur. Was
wir Heiliges denken, hat Realitat, ist kein Hirngespinst."
Heinrich Heines Samtliche Werke. ed. by Gustav Karpeles,
Leipzig, n.d., XII, p. 155.
252 ^
vs.. i , p. 151.
; 253 I
| It is interesting that Lester S. King devotes a
!whole chapter (thirty-six pages) to medical ethics (or lack
!thereof) in his book: The Medical World of the 18th
j Century (Chicago, 19581~.
! 25k
j VS., I, p. 166.
I 255
J Ibid., I, p. 165.
93
The ethical education of man consists in part,
then, in teaching him how to live properly in this life so
256
| that he may be able to enjoy the next life as well. The
I
| Church is not qualified to carry out this task, however,
i
| because its pulpit is frequently a place of "clergical
257
; jugglery.”
There are, according to Lichtenberg, a (large)
number of moral duplicities which are committed without
258
believing that these are damaging to men, and,
i curiously enough, Lichtenberg added that the same careless
attitude is shown in regard to the health-destroying
properties of tobacco.
What does the concept of "good” or ”bad” mean?2^
This problem defies a solution that is satisfactory to
everyone. Lichtenberg had observed, though, that the
so-called "bad” people frequently turned out to be the
"good" people— after he had learned to know them more
intimately.2^
256vs., I, P- 29.
257ibid.. I, p. 73.
258rbid., I, p. 1^8.
259The definition of morality in the Catholic
Encyclopedia Dictionary hinges on these words. The defini
tion is as follows: "Human conduct in so far as it is
freely subordinated to the ideal of what is right and
fitting," op. cit.. p. 657.
260VS., I, p. 167.
9*+
One should never confuse a person's sense of moral
rectitude with that of particular offenses against an
j established code of ethics. Lichtenberg himself had often
i
! been criticized for his countless mistakes— mistakes that
his critics did not possess intelligence enough to
commit. Lichtenberg comments, wittily, that to err is
| indeed human in that animals do not err-and if animals
j could err, only the most intelligent among them would be
262
: able to do so.
A focal point of Lichtenberg's theory of morality
is reflected in his emphasis on the sacredness of law. He
said: "Du sollst nicht toten; Du soilst nicht stehlen, das
ist recht gut geboten; das sollte man nachahmen.
Most of the publications dealing with morality, he
said, are actually only attractive frames around the ten
26b
commandments. No law will ever be "loved"; a person
26lVS., I, pp. 2b-2?.
262Ibid .. I, p. 191.
2^3rbid., I, p. 23b. Friedrich Schaefer said:"Der
ethische Gesichtspunkt der p'ddagogischen Ratschlage Lich-
tenbergs hat seine Wurzel in der hSchsten Wertschatzung der
V/ahrhaftigkeit und einem tiefen Abscheu von jeder Ltige,
Heuchelei und Scheinheiligkeit, die Lichtenberg uberall, wd
er sie antrifft, mit Ernst oder Spott geisselt." Georg
Christoph Lichtenberg als Psychologe und Menschenkenner.
Eine kritische Untersuchung und ein Versuch zur Grundlegung
einer "Empirischen Charakterpsychologie" (Jena, I898),
p. 5^.
26b
Ibid., I, p. 311.
95
26
will only be able to respect or to fear a law. J Love and
faithfulness for a just man is more intelligible than love
266
; and faithfulness for even the best law.
Lichtenberg's theory of education as related to
i
the problem of ethics may be summarized in his own words,
as follows:
S
Wenn ich je eine Predigt drucken lassen sollte, so
ware es gewiss uber das grosse Vermogen, das jeder
Mensch, er sei wer er wolle, besitzt, Gutes zu tun,
ohne etwas wegzuwerfen. Alle Stande in der Welt
verkennen hierin ihre Wichtigkeit. Ein jeder, er sei
wer er wolle, ist ein Prinz in diesem Stuck seiner Lage.
Der Henker hole unser Dasein hiernieden, wenn nur
allein der Kaiser wohltun konnte. Das ist das Gesetz
und die Propheten. Mich dunkt, in jede Predigt mttsse
hiervon etwas hinein.267
26% . , I, p. 23k.
266Ibid.. I, p. 230.
267b,_ an d. F.. pp. 209-210.
CHAPTER V
PSYCHOLOGY APPLIED TO EDUCATION
Ein Lehrer auf Schulen und
Universitaten kann keine
Individuen erziehen, er
erzieht bloss Gattungen.
Ein Gedanke, der sehr viel
Beherzigung und Auseinan-
dersetzung verdient.268
Introduction
The status of psychology in the eighteenth century
has not been fully determined; however, the beginning of
psychology as applied to education probably goes back to
Locke or Basedow2^--or perhaps, more precisely, to the
works of Pestalozzi before and after the turn of the
eighteenth century.
268VS., I, pp. 220-221.
269
The works of Comenius and Rousseau are, of
course, important in determining the roots of educational
psychology. Herbart (1776-18*+!) is usually considered
the "father of educational psychology."
See H. Spencer: The Principles of Psychology
(New York, 1895), I, Third Edition,' pp. 129-1^2» for one
of the earliest (1855) American presentations of
psychology.
96
The term "psychology," as used tn this chapter,
refers to a body of data and theories regarding the mental
phases of organic life. Educational psychology, or better,
psychology applied to education, deals especially with
principles and factors related to learning, motivation,
270
instruction, intelligence, and the like.
Modern education is unthinkable without psychology,
and yet few successful efforts of applying the principles
of psychology to education were made until after Lichten
berg 's death. The philosophies underlying the methods of
education employed up to his time varied with the country
and with the philosopher or educator; the British, for
example, emphasized empiricism (Locke, Berkeley, Hume);
the Germans stressed primarily rationalism (Leibnitz, Wolff}
Kant); and the French (Voltaire, Lamettrie, Rousseau)
tended to emphasize naturalism and rationalism— philosophies
that perhaps had their roots in the works of Descartes.
Locke--in contrast to Descartes--maintained that
there were no innate ideas, and Berkeley argued that ideas
are and must be specific; the concept of abstract ideas was
a self-contradictory concept. Hume, on the other hand,
insisted that impressions and ideas alone were real; know
ledge, according to him, was a product resulting from the
proper association and integration of these impressions and
270P. L. Harriman, Dictionary of Psychology (New
York. 19l +7), p. 116.
ideas. Reid, a Scottish philosopher, was convinced that
whatever knowledge man was ahle to acquire would always
be based upon self-evident principles.
This chapter will now deal with Lichtenberg's
theories and suggestions concerning psychological princi
ples to the extent that these theories or "Bemerkungen" are
271
pertinent to education. A student, by the time he is
eighteen, Lichtenberg mused, is theoretically able to have
assimilated the wisdom of long ages— and man, during his
life-span of sixty or more years, is able to acquire a
272
culture that it took five thousand years to produce.
Lichtenberg's suggestions that might facilitate the acqui
sition of this culture and enable a student to acquire more
knowledge and new skills become, therefore, of paramount
importance in this chapter.
Physiognomy
Since one of the most vitriolic psychological con
troversies in the eighteenth century was precipitated by
271
Herbert Schoffler thought that it would not be
unwarranted to put Lichtenberg in the category of one of the
greatest German educators of the eighteenth centuryJ See
Deutscher Geist im 18. Jahrhundert (Gottingen, 1956), p. 279.
272
VS., I, p. 223. One may— from a negative point
of view— partly deduce the eighteenth-century teacher's
knowledge of psychology as applied to education by pointing
out that some of the greatest men of the century were
characterized by their teachers as dull or unimaginative
students. Hegel, for example, was considered especially
dull in philosophy.
Lavater's works on physiogonomy, and since Lichtenberg was
271
one of the chief antagonists in the controversy, a brief
synopsis of the postulates of physiognomic "science" seems
necessary. Lichtenberg defined and clarified the term as
follows:
. . . Die Fertigkeit . . ., aus der Form und
Beschaffenheit der Susseren Theile des menschlichen
Korpers, hauptsachlich des Gesichts, ausschliesslich
aller vortibergehenden Zeichen der Gemuthsbewegungen,
die Beschaffenheit des Geistes und Herzens zu
finden; . . .27*+
Although some of Lavater's pronouncements on phy
siognomy may sound fantastic and pretentious at the present
time, one should not overlook the influence that he exerted
27H
throughout his life. The following quotation reflects
the tenor of many a physiognomic postulation. Lavater
wrote:
Ich werde meine Prufungen mit den eurigen fortset-
zen, und in den physiognomischen Zttgen will ich's
wagen, Linien und KBpfen hinzuzeichnen, die Dichter
sein mflssen, und von Kopfen, die nicht Dichter sein
konnen.276
271
Max Dessoir, Geschichte der neueren deutschen
Psychologie (Berlin, 1902), p. *+8 5, gives Lichtenberg due
credit for having successfully opposed this semi-psychological
trend. See also Richard Kleinebst, G. Chr. Lichtenberg in
seiner Stellung zu der deutschen Literatur (Strassburg,
1915), Chap. Ill, for an introductory treatment of the
"Physiognomiestreit" in the eighteenth-century German lands.
27hV S., IV, p. 20.
27 5
Lavater was, for example, a close friend of
Herder and Goethe.
Sturm und Drang: Kritische Schriften. p. 825.
100
It is ironical that Lichtenberg--probably the most
scholarly opponent of the "Lieblingswissenschaft der
277
Zeit" — a person who sarcastically termed physiognomy
278
"transcendente Ventriloquenz," actually laid the founda
tion for a positive application of the principles that
could be verified within the physiognomy— thus antedating
the works of Kretschmer as well as the works of Hellpach
279
by more than one hundred and fifty years.
If one may assume physiognomy to be a proto-stage
of the psychology of character, a resume of Lichtenberg1s
observations will show that these are important principles
in educational psychology. Lichtenberg confessed: "Von
meiner ersten Jugend an waren Gesichter und ihre Deutung
eine meiner Lieblingswissenschaften. Ich habe mich und
Andere gezeichnet, ehe ich die geringste Absicht sah."28°
2771S., V, p. 272.
278Ibid.. IV, p. 8.
279
''Hermann Hettner wrote: "Den Ubertreibungen der
Lavater1schen Physiognomik stellte Lichtenberg sich urn so
heftiger entgegen, je weniger er sich den unumstosslichen
physiognomischen Wahrheiten verschloss, ja dieselben schon
vor Lavater und unabhangig von diesem gefunden und aus-
gesprochen hatte." Literaturgeschichte des achtzehnten
Jahrhunderts (Braunschweig, 1869), III? p. ^12. It is
noteworthy that the word aphorism is not to be found in
Hettner's discussion of Lichtenberg1s significance in
German literature.
280
VS., IV, p. 13.
101
He continued: "Die Gesichter der gemeinen Leute auf
der Strasse zu sehen, ist jederzeit eines meiner gr'cSssten
;Vergnugen gewesen. Keine Zauberlaterne kommt diesem
Schauspiel bei."*^^
j
Lavater's book on physiognomy was— interestingly
enough-brought to Lichtenberg1 s attention by the Queen of
England! After having studied the book carefully, Lichten
berg wrote in a letter to Schernhagen, his close friend:
Sonst sieht man wieder, wie in alien Schriften
dieses Schwarmers, den entsetzlichen Aufwand von Worten,
Beschreibungen, und Empfindungen, die sich nicht
beschreiben lassen, und die gewiss oft guten Beobaeh-
tungen in eine in Deutschland, unter den sogenannten
webenden Genies in den Wolken, Mode werdende
Adeptensprache gehullt, dass jedem, der Sachen sucht
und keine Redensart, die Gedult hundertmal abl‘ duft.282
Lichtenberg pointed out that physiognomy could
never be taught to anyone arLCj that Lavater's theories
281 _
VS., I, p. 1lk
282
B. an d. F.. p. 122. One's historical perspec
tive in regard to the status of psychology in the eighteenth
century may be refreshed by reference to one of the writers
of that time. Says Gerstenberg: "Was ist denn Genie? . . .
warum verlangen Sie von mir zu wissen, was ich und niemand
Ihnen sagen kann, solange unsere Psychologie sich noch mit
der Oberflache der Seele beschaftigen muss? Derjenige ist
gemeiniglich am bereitwilligsten, Erklarungen und deutliche
Begriffe darzubieten, der die Schranken seiner Einsicht am
wenigstens fiihlt; und wir sind voreilig genug, aus den
Phanomenen auf die Ursachen und Triebfedern zu schliessen,
da wir doch iiber den innern Mechanismus der Seele, wenn ich
mich so ausdrucken darf, in der blindesten Unwissenheit
tappen; ..." Sturm und Drang: Kritische Schriften. p.l +5*
283
VS., IV, p. 67.
102
28b
were nothing but a cleverly-designed deception — a
nebulous construct.^85 ,
The ethical aspect of the controversy may be
| plumbed by an analysis of one of the lines in Lichtenberg1s
works where he is a vehement champion of cosmic justice.
Lichtenberg rhetorically asked:
Bist, du, Elender, denn der Richter von Gottes
V/erken? Sage mir erst, warum der Tugendhafter so oft
sein ganzes Leben in elnem sichen KOrper jammert, oder
ist immerwahrendes Krankeln vielleicht ertraglicher als
gesunde Hasslichkeit? Willst du entscheiden, ob nicht
ein verzerter KSrper, so gut als ein kranklicher (und
was ist Kranklichkeit ander ais innere Verzerrung) mit
unter den Leiden geh*c5rt, denen der Gerechte hier, der
blossen Vernunft unerklarlich, ausgesetzt ist.' Sage
mir, warum Tausende mit Gebrechen geboran werden,
einige Jahre durchwinseln und dann wegsterben? . . .
Lose du mir diese Aufgaben. so will ich dir die
deinigen auslosen. . . . 2o6
Theories of Learning
Lichtenberg never passed judgment upon the results
of any investigation, the subject matter of which was of a
transcendent, that is, non-empirical nature.287 He fre
quently ventured an opinion, however. Since psychology
interested him throughout his entire life, it would not be
28b
VS., IV, p. 17.
28^B. an d. F.. p. 215.
286VS., IV, p. 3*f.
287Ibid.. VIII, p. 7b.
103
incorrect, I believe, to consider his interest in
psychology as being in the nature of an intellectual
hobby with him.^^
! At least three fundamental theories of learning,
|
| viz., the behavioristic theory, Thorndike's theory, and
j the Gestalt theory, are at the present time of special
importance. Although Lichtenberg did not advance any
specific learning theory (neither did Comenius, Francke,
or Basedow), he did give his opinion about what he thought
real learning ought to mean.
Nein, was ich unter Dem Lernen verstehe,ist
Fortriicken der Grenzen unserer wissenschaftlichen oder
sonst ntttzlichen Erkenntniss; Verbesserung eines
Irrthums, in dem wir uns lange Befunden haben;
Gewissheit in manchen Dingen, worftber wir ungewiss
waren; deutlich Begriffe von dem, was uns undeutlich
war; Erkenntniss von Wahrheiten, die sich weit
erstrecken u.s.w.290
A better clarification and definition of learning
than the one Lichtenberg here gave can hardly be found
anywhere.
pOO
Neumann, op. cit.« p. 91, maintains that
psychology was Lichtenberg1s "Spezialgebiet."
289
See Boyd Henry Bode, Conflicting Psychologies
of Learning (Boston, 1929). Cf. also American Journal of
Psychology. XXV, October, 1933, pp. 663-667.
290
vs., 11, pp. 132-133.
Observation: Introspection
The logical but difficult starting point of (pure
or applied) psychology is, according to Lichtenberg, inside
man himself. Actually, we cannot know anything about the
world at all except ourselves and the changes that take
291 292
place within us. 7 With the pathos of Rousseau,
Lichtenberg pondered:
Das Wesen, das wir am reinsten aus den Handen der
Natur empfangen, und was uns zugleich am nachsten
gelegt wird, sind wir selbst; und doch wie schwer ist
das Alles und verwickelt? Es scheint fast, wir sollen
bloss wirken, ohne uns selbst zum Gegenstande der
Beobachtung zu machen.293
By his stress on introspection, Lichtenberg made a
significant contribution to our present knowledge of educa
tional psychology. However, introspection alone could not
produce the key that would unlock the mysteries of the humaa
mind. General observation and reflection about one's
immediate environment constitute another essential avenue
of attack. Lichtenberg had noticed on many occasions that
most people were much better observers than they believed
VS.. I, p. 83. Wrote Hermann Hesse: "Wir konnen
einander verstehen; aber deuten kann jeder nur sich selbst."
Demian (Berlin, 1955'), P* 13. Lichtenberg could hardly
have agreed with Hesse on this point, because psychology
is, it seems, useful (and Lichtenberg always— in pedagogical
matters--stressed utility) only to the extent that
"Deutung" is possible.
292
Lichtenberg referred to Rousseau as a genuis
(VS., VII, p. 183).
105
29h
themselves to be. Consequently, psychological insight
was theoretically available for every person who would be
willing to observe his fellow-men.
It was pointed out that Lichtenberg never wrote an
essay on education. However, he did summarily stress
several basic elements of the learning process. Any per
son, Lichtenberg maintained, who desired to write for
posterity, would have to study "Philosophie, Beobachtung
seiner selbst, und zwar genauere Naturlehre des Herzens und
der Seele uberhaupt, allein, und in alien ihren Verbin-
dungen."^5 It would be difficult, it seems, to carry on
any intelligent discussion on education without taking
these concepts of education into consideration.
Teacher Training
Lichtenberg was often concerned about teacher
training throughout his teaching career at the University
of Gottingen. He maintained that all teachers should be
thoroughly familiar with the subject they planned to teach.
2Q!+
^ Ibid. . IV, p. 195. One of the most prominent
introspectionists in the U. S. was Titchener. See E.
Heibreder, Seven Psychologies (New York, 1933), PP* 113-
j 151, for a brief, but pointed, resume of Titchener's basic
! structuralistic theories.
295
'Ibid., II, p. 23. The complexity of this point
is well expressed by Kant. "Education, therefore, is the
greatest and hardest problem that can be proposed to man,
for insight depends upon education, and education, again,
depends upon insight." The Educational Theory of Immanuel
Kant, p. 11!+.
Any teacher who could not discuss his own specialty without
first consulting his notes, or who had to visit the library
before any intelligent discussion could take place, was
certainly nothing but an "Artifact. "^96 Qn 0ther hand,
one should never equate a person's mastery of a subject
vith that person's ability to teach the same subject.
Lichtenberg was convinced that too much attention to
details when teaching the introductory aspects of a subject,
for example, was undesirable. A good teacher not only
masters his subject but is also able to simplify it so that
297
the neophytes may be able to learn the subject as well. '
That Lichtenberg encouraged and stimulated indepen
dent thinking in his own classes may be assumed on the
basis of the extraordinarily large enrollment in many of
298
his classes. x To teach how to think— and not what to
think— was, according to Lichtenberg, the (moral) duty of
every teacher. May heaven forbid, Lichtenberg sarcastically
wrote, that man, the teacher of whom is none less than
nature itself, should become a lump of wax in which a
299
professor imprints his sublime portrait.
296VS., I, p. 289.
297Ibid.. I, p. 221.
298
His classroom was frequently so overcrowded that
many students had to be turned away— this, in spite of the
fact that Lichtenberg's lecture and demonstration hall
could accommodate over a hundred students! See VS., VIII,
p. 11.
107
Psychological-Physiological Learning Factors
j Motivation is one of the most essential factors in
any learning process, and Lichtenberg utilized both
j intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. "Eine desultorische
| Lecture ist jederzeit mein grSsstes VergnUgen gewesen.
i
| The world would come to an end, he conjectured, if the
: "reward of the moment" would no longer exist.He was
; certain that everyone was a genius at least once every
year. The basic difference between a "genius" and a "non
genius" is, according to Lichtenberg, that the so-called
: geniuses have their good ideas more frequently— and that
302
: they write down these ideas.
Academic success was not necessarily attributable
to talents or a special endowment at all. Lichtenberg
said: "Nicht alle Reichen sind es durch Gl*uck geworden,
sondern viele durch Sparsamkeit. So kann Aufmerksamkeit.
Skonomie der Gedanken und Ubung den Mangel an Genie
i f 3C»3
ersetzen."
Since even a dull learner learns something by
imitation and repetition, the learner should try to
300VS., I, p. 27.
3Q1Ibid.. VI, p. 161.
3(^ Ibid.. IT, p. 168. On another occasion, he
asserted cryptically: "Jeder Mensch ist des Tages einmal
ein Prophet." VS, III, p. 52.
3°3Ibid.. II, p. 130.
108
30*+
associate with sensible people. Much careful reading
305
is also essential to mental growth.
Health
Lichtenberg was, as was pointed out in the bio
graphy, a diathetic person. This does not mean, however,
that he did not care about his health. On the contrary--
Lichtenberg put the importance of health above that of all
other things in life.’ To eat a good nourishing diet,
307
for example, was especially important to him. ' He was
convinced that man ate too much— particularly those who did
not eat their bread "im Schweiss ihres Angesichts" but
rather ate it in "den a’ therischen Verdampfungen ihres
Nervensafts."308
Lichtenberg warned against the (mis) use of
tobacco. No savant, he said, whom he had learned to know,
had ever smoked— at least not the geniuses among his
Ibid., I, p. 157*
305
Ibid., I, p. 128. Said Lichtenberg: "Ich
vergesse das Meiste was ich gelesen habe; nichts desto
weniger aber tragt es zur Erhaltung meines Geistes bei."
VS., I, p. 5-1.
The negative effect of too much reading was
discussed in the chapter on curriculum and pedagogy.
306VS., VIII, p. 51.
3°7Ibid.. VII, p. 260.
3°8Ibid.. VII, p. 221.
109
acquaintances.3^9 Lichtenberg himself enjoyed smoking,3"^
but he smoked with moderation. Too much smoking, he main-
| tained, is damaging not only to the lungs but to the teeth
n 311
as well.
! Lichtenberg1s broad interest in psychological-
; educational matters is shown especially in his genuine
: concern for proper care of the eyes. For example, he
stressed, even pleaded for, the importance of having the
312
light source come from the side, and he also warned
313
against writing in poor light or in twilight. ^ He warned
against any misuse or over-exertion of the eyes. If neces
sity required a long period of reading, then one should try
to neutralize the bad effects upon the eyes by frequent
31J +
change of work.
Formal Discipline
A problem frequently discussed in journals of
education is formal discipline and transfer of training.
Formal discipline refers, of course, to the theory that
309
VS., I, p. 176. He was uncertain as to whether
or not Lessing had ever smoked.
310Ibid.. II, p. 169-
311Ibid.. VIII, p. 77. Goethe was, as is well
known, against smoking in any form whatsoever.
312Ibid., V., p. 3^6.
313Ibid.. V, p. 3^8.
3lLfIbid. . I, p. 352.
certain subjects possess mind-training values--and thus do
not require any other justification for being included in
■51^
the curriculum. 7 Lichtenberg never refuted the theory of
formal discipline. He advocated, for example: "Scharfe
deinen Verstand durch Mathematik, wenn du sonst keinen
n*| /
Gegenstand findest . . . , but this statement alone is
obviously not sufficient to establish his belief in the
principle of formal discipline.
Whether or not Lichtenberg thought it was possible
to deduce a priori the existence of transfer, the proof of
317
which would lend support to his stress on mathematics,
from the fact of the awareness of sensory stimulation
(perception), remains uncertain because of the scarcity of
material on this topic in his works.
Discipline
Orderliness, according to Lichtenberg, is a factor
318
that ought to be stressed from early childhood. Children
should be taught to love, or at least respect, tidiness,
:>iq
and they must also learn to become obedient. 7 Too much
317
7P. L. Harriman, op. cit.. p. 1*+1.
■}-i f
VS., I, p. 272. Plato and Bacon were firm
believers in formal discipline, and mathematics seemed to
them to be especially suited for this purpose.
317
0 Ibid.., V, p. 91+.
318
Ibid.. I, p. 36.
319
Ibid., V, p. 106.
Ill
stress on play and fun In the learning process, as for
example in Basedow's Philantropinum, was detrimental in
Lichtenberg's opinion.
Er denkt nicht, dass man den Kindern Alles so sehr
spielend beibringen musse, well in ihrem folgenden
Leben das Schicksal ihnen allerlei Wahreit nichts
weniger als spielend beibringt und uberhaupt eine
Abneigung gegen alle schwere Arbeit daraus entsteht.
Sie mussen gehorchen l e r n e n . 3 2 0
There were times, Lichtenberg felt, when one had
to paint a child's "posterior" red by means of the
321
"Birkenpinsel."
Visual Aids
A professional educator may, perhaps, question
many a statement that Lichtenberg made about education.
However, few, if any, educators have denied Lichtenberg's
educational wisdom in regard to visual aids— instruction
which (at the present time) is an integral part of the
training program for most elementary and secondary school
122
teachers in the United States. In a letter to Dieterich
his close friend and publisher, Lichtenberg revealed an
astounding, almost intuitive, knowledge of the learning
process-especially as it concerned very young children.
320VS., V, p. 106.
321Ibid.. II, p. 105.
122
See, for example. E. Dale: Audio-Visual Methods
in Teaching (New York, 1956), for a typical textbook in
this field.
112
Since his suggestions represent a contribution to
educational psychology his letter is quoted at length.
Guten Morgen I Ich habe die Nacht Tiber an Deinen
Raff gedacht, und folgendes ist das Resultat. Lasse
urns Himmelswillen die Bilder nicht hinten anhb'ngen, das
ganze Buch verliert dadurch eingen grossen Theil von
seinem Werth und wird ein gemeines Buch, degleichen
alle Messe 10 herauskomtnen. Eben diese Neuheit wird
gefallen, dass die Bilder im Text stehen, und werden
es zura angenehmen Bilderbuche machen. Das macht den
Kindern Freude, die gantzlich unterbleibt, wenn sie
hinten auf einem gebrochenen Blatt die ganze bunte
Menagerie zusammen sehen. Ferner wird man ihm wieder
den Vorwurf machen, den man dem Raff gemacht hat, es
wtirde der Affe wieder so gross da stehen wie der
Elephant u.s.w. Stehen aber die Bilder einzeln im
Text, so geht der Maastab des einen den von einem
andern nichts mehr an und das weiss das Kind sehr wohl
zu fassen, und nun die Hauptsache: Feine, ausgearbeitete
Bilderchen sind hier ganz wider die Absicht, glaube
mir auf mein Wort: wenige, selbst grobe, aber RICHTIGE
Striche machen hier ganz allein die Sache aus: 0, es
ist eine wahre Lust einen groben Zinnstich zu sehen,
wo aber die Zeichnung den Meister verrSth. Die feinen
Stricheleyen verderben die Sache sehr, und gehftren
hief gar nicht zur Hauptabsicht. Blosse Umrisse, aber
freylich in hohem Grad richtige, sind hier alles was
verlangt wird.32*+
The Foreign Language
Lichtenberg, like Herder and Goethe, emphasized
the constructive influence that the learning of a foreign
language might have in clearing up difficult concepts in
325
one's own language. The theory of associationism is
323
stressed the
started this
Lichtenberg was, of course, not the only one who
proper use of visual aids. Comenius probably
stress in his Orbis Sensualium Pictus.
32k
325
Briefe. Ill, pp,
VS., I, p. 316.
Hartley's ideas concerning
257-258.
Lichtenberg praised, especially
value of foreign language study.
also discernible328 in Lichtenberg1s thoughts on language
learning. He was convinced that there was a real "iron-
curtain" language barrier; to translate Shakespeare's works
satisfactorily into German, for example, is (contrary to
327
popular opinion) almost an impossibility because of
Shakespeare's frequent use of metaphors and because of his
curses 1 Even a competent translator could not, according
to Lichtenberg, reproduce all of these metaphors correctly
in the German language.
Why was it, Lichtenberg asked, that a literal
translation is almost always a bad one? The reason is that
the mastery of a foreign language means more than merely
being able to talk or write the language: the mastery of a
foreign language is an impossibility until one has also
learned to know the people who are talking the language in
question.328 Lichtenberg, one of the very few eighteenth
century German scholars who mastered the English language,
voiced, for example, his opinion as to why "lehren" and
"lernen" were "misused" in German. These words sounded
much alike and were, therefore, frequently used inter
changeably. Similarity in sound alone, however, could not
be the whole reason, because a Scotchman, for example,
328I.e., as expressed in the lav/ of contiguity.
32?VS., I, p. 320.
328Ibid.. I, p. 32^.
makes a similar "mistake" in his incorrect use of "teach"
and "learn." There is no similarity in sound in these two
cases, so why would a Scotchman make these errors?
Englishmen, he said, frequently misuse the words "lie" and
"lay." All of these mistakes, according to Lichtenberg,
were easily corrected, because "wer liegt, der hat sich
gelegt; und wer sich lehrt, der lernt; oder, wer gelegt
wird, liegt, und wer gelehrt wird, lernt."329
He also questioned the soundness in attempting to
"purify" a language; a language might even profit by the
inclusion and assimilation of Latin and Greek words. The
use of certain Latinisms and Greekisms in the German
language might even contribute to a better understanding
of the classics.^30
How does one learn to speak a foreign language
fluently and correctly? A good ear and memorization of
vocabulary (important as these two factors are) were not
329
vs., i, p. 325.
330
Ibid.. I, p. 327.
115
enough, Lichtenberg said, because a person who was not
also a "kleiner Geck"^^^ would never be able to learn
| and to master any foreign language.
331
Ibid., I, p. 318. A. Schneider, op. cit..
affirms that Lichtenberg "condamne l’etude des langues
vivantes," and that "II faut done sacrifice les langues
aux sciences et a la philosophie." P. 139* Schneider
refers to Briefe. I, pp. 175? 271, in support of his
fantastic claim. A careful reading of these pages,
however, reveals that Lichtenberg expected every student
to learn German real well, then Latin, French, and
English. Parenthetically, it may be added that not a
small number of Lichtenberg scholars have made unwarranted
(certainly unsubstantiated) claims about what Lichtenberg
said or did not say. Even Schopenhauer, a great Lichten
berg admirer, erred in this respect.
CHAPTER VI
BRITISH EDUCATIONALISM
Tiber die Erziehung soli man
nicht raisonniren, sondern erst
Erfahrungen sammeln, welche
Nation die grossten, activsten
Leute hervorgebracht hat, nicht
die grossten Compilatoren und
Bucherschreiber, sondern die
standhaftesten, die grossmuthig-
sten, in Kiinsten geschicktesten
u.s.w. - Das mochte doch wohl
die englische sein.332
Lichtenberg admired the British, their country, and
King George III. England was a "gluckliche^"333
"kluges, "weisses" land. In fact, he was so fond
of the British that he did not hesitate to express his
emphatic disapproval of the republican "rascals" in America
332
VS., I, p. 217. If Kant's principle of the
primacy of practical reason is (as is generally acknow
ledged) an anticipation of pragmatism, it seems that
Lichtenberg1s Baconian method (and pragmatism is, in addi
tion to being a doctrine of meaning or a definition of
truth, "warranted assertibility," a method) is pragmatic.
333Ibid.. VIII, p. 3-
33L fIbid.. Ill, p.
335Ibid., Ill, p. 93.
336Ibid.. VIII, p. 1%.
116
117
in 1776. However, he did not ignore the ugly aspects of a
degenerated British society either. Important for our
; consideration here is his concern over the fact that so
|
! large a number of Londoners could neither read nor write.
1
j Sie wachsen auf, ohne lesen und schreiben zu
lernen und ohne nur das Wort Religion oder Glauben
zu horen, selbst das Wort: Gott nicht anders als in
der Phrase: God damn it.337
The roads leading to London "werden immer breiter
■30 O
und schoner, je naher man dieser Holle kommt." His
Anglophilic bent of mind, however, remained throughout his
life. More than a decade after his departure from England,
Lichtenberg wrote to his friend Girtanner, a medical
doctor, who was visiting England.
Heil Ihnen, dass Sie in England sindl - Wahrhaftig
mein Herz blutet mir, wenn ich bedenke, dass England
noch steht und ich nicht darin sein kann. - Ich habe,
337
B. an d. F.. p. 120. See E. P. Cubberley, The
History of Education (Boston, 1920), Chapters XVIII * XIX,
XXIV, for a general account of British education in the
eighteenth century.
Wrote Schopenhauer: "Die Wurzel des Ubels ist, dass
es in England kein Ministerium des offentlichen Unterrichts
giebt, daher dieser bisher ganz in den Ilanden der Pfaffens-
chaft geblieben ist, welche daflir gesorgt hat, dass 2/3 der
Nation nicht lesen und schreiben konnen ..." Gesammelte
Werke, IV, 1891, p. 28. (Schopenhauer wrote this in 18^1.)
338
Werke, I, p. 2*+0. "Ich mochte einmal wissen was
geschehen wurde, wenn man in London die zehn Gebote so
lange aufhobe, als es 12 schlagt." VS., II, p. 121.
As late as 1820, there was only one in twenty-
four who received an education in London--and most of the
children who did go to school attended for only one and
one-half to two years.
118
Gott verzeih mir meine schweren Sunden, schon manchmal
im Sinne gehabt, aufzupacken und deutscher Sprachmeister
zu werden. Wer weiss was noch geschieht, denn Ihnen
kann ich es gestehen, meine Entfernung von England wird
mir zuweilen unertraglich.339
| England: 1776
|
1 Eighteenth-century England did not possess any
i
| fixed, well-formulated national system or uniform philosophy
: of education. Educational philosophies differed as much as
3k0
dress, language, and customs from college to college.
Eton, Cambridge, and Westminister, however, enjoyed, at
this time, a reputation perhaps 'unequaled by any other
European university. Lichtenberg was especially interested
: and impressed with the educational philosophy of Eton and
of Westminster.
Aus den Schulen von Eton and Westminster kommen
Leute, die, was es auch sein mag, immer lieber tun als
schwatzen. Wenn ich mir ein Vergntigen machen will, so
denke ich mir einen von unsern 15 jahrigen gelehrten
Knaben in die Gesellschaft eines 15 jahrigen Engl&nders,
der aus der Schule von Eton zuruckommt. Den ersten in
Haarbeutel, gepudert, demutig und gespannt, auf den
mindesten Druck mit einer Menge Gelehrsamkeit loszugehen
in seinen Meinungen schlechterdings nichts anderes als
der im kleinen schlecht kopierte Papa oder Prazeptor,
ein blosser Widerschein, bewundert bis ins l6te Jahr,
im 17ten, l8ten, 19ten, 20ten mit Erwartung und Stille
angesehen, da indessen das auf hohlem Grund aufgefuhrte
Gebaude zu sinken anfangt. Im 22ten, 23ten u.s.w. ein
339
VS., VII, p. 22k.
IkO
The letters of Thomas Gray to his friend, Horace
Walpole, are a good source of meticulous description of
Cambridge in the eighteenth century. The "masters" of the
colleges were "mad with pride," Gray wrote, and the fellows
were either sleepy, drunk, dull, illiterate, or all of
these combined.
119
mittelmassiger Kopf und so bis ans Ende. Den Englander
sein reines lockiges Ilaar um die Ohren und die Stirn
hangen, die Miene bluhend, die Hande zerkrlltzt, und auf
jedem Knochel eine Wunde. Horaz, Homer und Virgil
immer gegenwartig, in seinen Meinungen bestimmt und
eigen, irrt sich tausendmal, aber verbessert sich
selbst. . . . 3*+l
There were perhaps several reasons for Lichtenberg's
fondness for the British; the British philosophy of educa
tion (to the extent that a dominant one existed) as
formulated by Locke stressed health education, formation
of habits rather than extensive knowledge, trade education
(like Herder), a faculty psychology, and this philosophy
was thus not only new and invigorating from a German
educator’s point of view, but Lichtenberg viewed these
3k2
Lockean theories favorably. John Locke, the main
3 ~¥erke. I, pp. 301 +-305- See Goethes Gesprache
mit Eckermann. op. cit.. p. 3915 for an almost identical
point of view.
^LlO
J The Lockean influence was also felt in the
nineteenth century. L. Wiese, writing fifty years after
Lichtenberg's death, echoes Lichtenbergian sentiments and
reactions. Wrote Wiese: "Ich finde in der Erziehungsweise
der Englander Vieles so durchaus^vortrefflich. ..."
(p. 7): "Im Wissen sind unsere hoheren Schulen den
englischen weit voran, aber die dortige Erziehung ist
wirksamer, weil sie eine bessere Ausriistung in das Leben
mitgiebst." (p. 12): "Auf den englischen Schulen wird das
schon durch die Beschrankung auf sehr Weniges vermieden.
Die Schuler lernen bei weitem nicht so viel wie die unseri- ;
;gen, aber eins besser, das Lernen." (p. 75)? Deutsche j
iBriefe uber englische Erziehung (Berlin, 1850), I. This I
:work— covering the first part of the nineteenth century—
reports, in detail, the basic structure of education in
iBritain.
i
I It is noteworthy that the skeleton of the
(British philosophy of education apparently remained
|unchanged until The Elementary Education Act of 1870.
120
founder of the philosophy of empiricism, was one of the
greatest, if not the greatest, educator of liberalism.
: Like Locke, Lichtenberg stressed the necessity of learning
! 3I +3
\ something useful; an education that results only in the
! accumulation of mere encyclopedic data produces only
oil).
: "Zwergobst. "Der Zweck aller Erziehung ist tugendhafte
i verstandige, und gesunde Kinder zu ziehen." ' Subject
1
| matter thus became subordinated to learning; i.e., to
learn how to study rather than what to study should be the
goal of any sound, elementary (beginning) learning
situation. "Wer nichts als Chemie versteht, versteht
3^-7
auch die nicht recht."
Lichtenberg’s antipathy toward the pedagogical
theories of the Philanthropinen did not abate during his
travels in England.
3^3
Werke, I, p. 263.
VS., I, p. 22*+. My chapter dealing with
religion shows that Lichtenberg did not subscribe to
Locke's ideas concerning the religion and religious
instruction, and Lichtenberg did not adopt the Lockean
concept of a tabula rasa. Werke. I, P. h-35*
3*+5
Ibid.. I, pp. 217-218.
3 *+6
Werke. I, p. 265.
3>+7
Tbid., I, p. 272.
121
Auf den englischen Philanthropinen erstreckt sich
die Philanthropie nur auf die Kopfe. Wer den Menschen
von der andern Seite ansieht, sollte sie ftlr Misanthro-
pie halten. Sitten und Gelehrsamkeit werden da
I beigebracht wie die Clystire.3^8
In spite of the existence of such schools, however,
i
I Lichtenberg \\ras convinced that the British had the best
: educational institutions in Europe. He was certain (in
1776) that, had he the money and children, he would have
sent his children to England "bis ihnen das Selbstdenken
habituell wurde und ihr naturlicher Verstand gesichert
ware, und durch unsere polyhistorischen Schwatzmethoden
3^9
nicht mehr veraorben werden k$nnte." The condemnation
of many a German school was particularly severe. He
reported, for example, that "Ich habe Kinder von 6 Jahren
Dinge in England machen sehen, womit unsere von 15 hernach
■ 3 t^Q
noch spielen. " J
The British students, according to Lichtenberg,
did not acquire extensive kno\\rledge--but what they did
3l+8VS. , V, p. 277.
3Lf9Ibid.. VIII, p. 231.
3^Werke, I. p. 305- In a letter to his friend,
Schernhagen, Lichtenberg said: "Wenn ich einmal bei Laune
bin, so will ich Ew. Wohlgebor einmal eine Vergleichung
zwischen einem jungen Deutschen, gelehrten Primaner im
Haarbeutel, und einem jungen Engl*dnder mit dem reinen Haar
in natttrlichen Locken urn den Kopf, machen. Ich habe beide
zo ziemlich kennen gelernt, seitdem ich die Ehre nicht
hatte, Ew. Wohlgeborenen zu sprechen." VS., VIII, p. 231.
This letter is dated August 12, 1776.
122
learn was intensive and useful. "Sie sind nicht so leicht
351
befriedigt und dringen mehr auf klare Ideen."
I Lichtenberg: A True Friend
! Garrick, the actor and dramatist, once said to
; Lichtenberg, that he (Garrick) had Mnie einen Auslander
; so englisch sprechen horen, wie mich, und sollte mich kaum
: ftlr einen halten." No wonder, then, that Lichtenberg
was flattered and, in turn, referred to the British
3 53
students in G'dttingen as "meine Studenten. Unfor
tunately, not all of the British students in Gottingen
during Lichtenberg1s years of teaching at the university
351
VS., I, p. 217. Goethe's view was almost iden
tical with that of Lichtenberg. Wrote Goethe: "KSnnte man
nur den Deutschen, nach dem Vorbilde der Engl’ a’ nder, weniger
Philosophie und mehr Tatkraft, weniger Theorie und mehr
Praxis beibringen, so wurde uns schon ein gutes StUck
Erlosung^zuteil werden, ohne dass wir auf das Erscheinen
der personlichen Hoheit eines zweiten Christus zu warten
brauchten." Goethes Gesprache mit Eckermann, op. cit. ,
p. 393* See also pp'. 391-39^' for a fuller point of view.
Herder, of whom Lichtenberg wrote: "so zu
schreiben wie Herder ist unchristlich gegen die Nachwelt."
Werke, I, p. 385, also lauded the "englischen Geist der
RealitSt und Freiheit"--two fundamental traits of the
British-educated society in the eighteenth century.
3 52
G. Chr. Lichtenbergs Briefe an Dieterich. op.
jcit., p. 95* The scarcity of Germans mastering the English
language at this time is indicated by the confession of
Baron de Harold, a Colonel stationed in DUsseldorf in 1783,
that he was unable to find "one person in this country who
could write English." Briefe aus G. Chr. Lichtenbergs
englischem Freundekreis. von Hans Hecht, GCttingen, 1925,
p. 5-1.
353
Briefe, III, p. 236.
123
were studious. Lichtenberg, at one time, regretted that
he had lost the ten best years of his life with "der
: 3
Zahmung von Englandern.
The Lockean philosophy of education, I think, is
|
! well reflected in a letter that Planta wrote to Lichten-
; berg. Planta, writing on behalf of a young friend,
; informed Lichtenberg as follows:
My young friend Mr. William Eardley is between 16
& 17 years of age, he is of a most docile gentle dis
position, but withall very indolent. He was at a
private school till about 15? and then thought he had
a liking to the Sea Service, and was accordingly sent
out to Newfoundland. He has since found that he was
not at all cut out for a Sailor, and quitted. Having
thus lost two years of his Education, and not only lost
those years, but also in some measure the knowledge he
had acquired at School (nam non progredi est regredi)
he is now to retrieve & to add all he can. You may
guess that Gentlemen-like qualifications & not deep
learning are the principle objects in view, and you
will hence conclude that a man of very good sense would
be preferable as a Tutor to one of profound erudition.
Good morals, Good temper, & Steadiness are the other
requisites he ought to possess. - Prof. Heyne may have
a protege but yet he will probably give me a choice,
and if so, you would make me very happy by giving me
what hints you may think useful on the occasion.355
Apparently, both the British students and their
parents had complete confidence in Lichtenberg--a confidence
permeating the various letters written to Lichtenberg on
behalf of many a British student. One parent, for example,
35*+
Briefe, III, p. 176.
355
Ilans Hecht, op. cit. . p. 30.
referred to Lichtenberg as a person "with very great
character." Lichtenberg did everything in his power
to help "his" students. He spoke with them in German as
much as possible— so that they would be given a maximum
^57
chance to learn the language. Lichtenberg ' s help was
hot limited to linguistic problems alone, however; it also
included financial and social assistance. A . frequent
request of British parents was to help them straighten out
their children's grossly over-charged checking accounts—
requests that Lichtenberg apparently fulfilled, if not with
pleasure, at least with care. Other requests proved more
difficult, however. Charles Adams, an ex-student at
Gottingen, had, during his study at the University of
Gottingen, fathered a son, who years later wanted to go to
England to stay with his own father. Adams, greatly upset
on learning of this unexpected development, did not find it
rude or tactless to solicit Lichtenberg's immediate assist
ance in preventing, at all costs, this child's visit to his
own father. J
British Writers
Lichtenberg was familiar with the works of Shakes
peare, Pope, Hartley, Hume, Priestley, Hobbes, Milton,
356 : ’
Hans Hecht, op. cit.. p. 25.
357VS., VIII, p. 20b-.
358
Hans Hecht, op. cit. , p. 58.
125
Fielding, Sterne, and several other less well-known
359
British writers. He considered Milton, for example,
one of the most sublime writers of European literature,^60
although he disapproved of Milton's treatment of his own
family. It probably distressed him to read about Milton's
3^1
notorious mistreatment of his children, because Lichten
berg himself gave his own children the best education
possible.
It is enlightening to read about Lichtenberg1s
evaluation of the merits (or lack thereof) of some of the
contemporary British scientists. Lichtenberg, as is well
known, knew, personally, many of the scientists and other
learned men of his time; he even corresponded with some of
the most prominent scientists of the century. Volta,
Herrschel, and others visited him G6*ttingen--and so did
Lavater and Karl August. Lichtenberg corresponded with
Lessing, Kant, Nocolai, and Goethe, and with several other
literary geniuses of the century.
15Q
“’•"See A. Schneider, op. cit. . p. 9 7> for a
critical listing of the works of European writers that
Lichtenberg had read, and, in part, commented on.
360
VS., VI, p. 297.
361
Ibid.. I, p. 2^-8.
126
Lichtenberg considered Watt an "admirable"
362
person, a scientist who possessed even more genius than
: Priestley. The latter, however, he praised for his
! heterodox attitude towards religion. Priestley's preface
i
; in Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind is especially famous
for the confession that the human soul no longer exists
after a person's death. Dr. Kenrick, in London Review.
Lichtenberg reported, thanked Priestley publicly for having
^Li
ma de "eine so wichtige Wahrheit"J known to the world.
After being informed of Sterne's unsympathetic
personality, Lichtenberg re-evaluated his opinion of that
86^
author. Fielding, however, remained a noble person.
"Swift mochte ich zum Barbier, Sterne zum Friseur, Nev/ton
beim Fruhstiick, Hume beim Kaffee gehabt haben."^^
That Lichtenberg especially lauded Beattiefe
philosophy rather than the philosophical theories of Locke
or Hume is perhaps an indication of Lichtenberg1s own
metaphysical views. It is said of George III, for example,
that the only book he ever stole was Beattie's Essay on the
362VS., VII, p. 226.
^ / a
Priestley declined the offer of presidency of the
(to be.') University of Pennsylvania.
36IfVS., VIII, pp. 227-228.
36 5
Ibid.. II, p. 12.
366
Werke. I, p. 338.
Nature and Immutability of the Truth! Beattie's philosophy
according to Lichtenberg, deserves attention. This philos
ophy did not pretend to be a new one, Lichtenberg argued,
and neither did it attempt to penetrate the very core of
things (and was thus useless for philosophy professors])--
but this philosophy, he maintained, was nevertheless the
philosophy Mdes Menschen.”367
British Character
Lichtenberg, who did not forget that he was, above
~}f.Q
everything else, an "Universitatslehrer," was not blind
to the deficiencies inherent in a society which provided
education only for the privileged few. He recalls, for
instance, that (in 177*+) he had read one of Hume's books
in which the author had asserted that the British did not
possess any character. At the time, this utterance dis
turbed Lichtenberg; he thought it incorrect and unjust.
After living in England over four months, however, he was
convinced of the appropriateness (but not necessarily the
truthfulness) of Hume's penetrating observation.38^
367VS., I, p. 63.
368Ibid.. VIII, p. 93.
38^Ibid., II, p. 118. I interpret the term
"Charakter1 ' as used by Lichtenberg, to mean morals.
128
Germanic-English Education
Since the duty towards oneself is a supreme duty of
|mankind, according to Lichtenberg, the success or failure
;of our best systems of morality depends on the faithfulness
of obedience to this duty— the fulfillment of which ought
171
to bring out the finest in man. In spite of Lichten-
berg's love for England, he was not blind to the greatness
of German educational institutions, as, for example, the
towering importance of Gottingen University. He would be
willing to swear to the truth of the assertion that "Einen
gro’ sseren Patrioten fUr Gottingen wird es auch nicht leicht
372
geben." The validity of this statement has never been
challenged or refuted.
It is important, for an evaluation of Lichtenberg's
thoughts on education, to analyze his criticism or praise
of representative British writers. Much has been written
concerning Lichtenberg’s criticism of Goethe, Werther, et
al; too little attention, it seems, has been given to
Lichtenberg1s praise of German writers and thinkers. The
following quotation reveals that Germany, like other
European countries, had produced great men and great
370
A philosophy that was the very essence of Ibsenfe
philosophy of life.
371VS., III, p. 9*+.
372B. an d. F.. p. 179-
literary works as well. "Welche Nation und welches
Zeitalter, nfdchte man fragen, haben etwas den Stanzen im
••
Oberon Ahnliches aufzuweisen, zumal den Schildrungen
weiblicher Schonheit in denselben."
One may assume that Lichtenberg's passionate
interest in British culture was precipitated by the pre
sence of British students in Gottingen and that his
interests were later nurtured by his travels in England
from 177*+ to 1775* He never recorded his basic reason for
wanting to visit England--nor did he elaborate on his
insatiable desire to live in Britain. Is it really possible
as Lichtenberg himself maintained, that he went to England
37*+
only to learn— German?
373
VS., V, p. 9*f.
37^
Werkn. I, p. 25*
CHAPTER VII
SCHOPENHAUER AND EDUCATION
Die Weissheit, welche in einem
Menschen hloss theoretisch da
ist, ohne praktisch zu werden,
gleicht der gefullten Rose,
welche, durch Farbe und Geruch,
Andere ergotzt, aber abfallt,
ohne Frucht zu haben.375
Schopenhauer's Parerga und Paraliuomena reveals a
distinct similarity with the content of Lichtenberg's first
and second volumes of the Vermischte Schriften. the various
editions of which Schopenhauer referred to in his discus-
S76
sion of Lichtenberg. It is the function of this transi
tional chapter to point out some of the ideas concerning
education that Schopenhauer shared--if only in part--with
Lichtenberg.
Schopenhauer's Lichtenberg
Schopenhauer, in his philosophical treatment of the
great intellects in the past and up to his own time,
375
Schopenhauer, on. cit.. V, p. 685*
376Ibld.. V, p. 595.
130
131
~>nrp
pointed to Lichtenberg as a "bevorzugter Geist."^'' He
paid tribute to Lichtenberg as a "Selbstdenker," a real
•^nO
philosopher, c a person whose literary-critical ability
■570 ..
was of a superior nature. ' Lichtenberg was also com
mended for his incisive criticism of the current view held
in his day that the mathematicians possessed a special
"mathematischen Tiefsinn."^^
Philosophy
Schopenhauer, unlike Lichtenberg, emphas. d that
l8l
philosophy is a science, but--like Lichtenberg--he also
stressed that philosophy must not be confused with
religion.
One salient aspect of Schopenhauer's philosophy—
from the point of view of education and as related to
377
Schopenhauer, op. cit.« .V. p. 27.
Ibid.. V, pp. 527-728. Herder is, parenthe
tically, referred to as a sophist.'
379
Ibid.. V, p. 595. Cf. Trachsler's categoriza
tion: "Lichtenberg ist weder Dichter noch Philosoph." Op.
cit.. p. 31.
~^°Ibid.. V, pp. 6, +3-6Lt-h. B. Russell, almost a
century later, wrote: "One result of the work i^e have been
considering is to dethrone mathematics from the lofty place
that it has occupied since Pythagoras and Plato. ..."
A History of Western Philosophy (New York, 19Li-53, p. 831.
381
Schopenhauer, op. cit., IV. p. 128. Cf. VS. I.
PP. 93, 55, 8k, 85. ’
382
Ibid.. IV, p. 221. Cf. VS., I, pp. 56, 57.
132
Lichtenberg--is his insistance on clarity in terminology.
One of his anti-Hegelian tirades (whether warranted or not
is not important in this connection) illustrates this point
well, I think. Wrote Schopenhauer: "Geist? wer ist denn
‘der Bursche? und woher kennt ihr ihn?"383
Schopenhauer, like Lichtenberg, regarded the
mystery of human existence as one of the greatest problems
38k
of mankind, a problem that is related to a philosophy of
education. He believed that man does not have a free will;
■ 3 Per
the belief in a free will was even absurd.y Real happi
ness is impossible in this world, except perhaps, he added,
he would admit that a drunk person might "feel" happy.38^
There is, I think, no necessity to introduce Schopenhauer's
well-known pessimism, except to stress that his diction is
almost identical with that of Lichtenberg1s terminology.
The world was, to Schopenhauer, only a "HSlle," and "die
Menschen sind einerseits die gequalten Seelen und
qp7
andererseits die Teufel darin."^ '
^^Ibid. , IV, p. 200. The acme of terminological
confusion is reached, according to Schopenhauer, in Hegel's
infamous definition of "Natur"--which he defined as "die
Idee in ihrem Andersein." Ibid.. IV, p. 203-
38l+Ibid., V, p. 528. Cf. VS., I, p. 81.
3®5lbid., V, p. 386; See also IV, p. 213. OF. VS.,
I, P- 70.
3 86
Schopenhauer, op. cit.. V, p. 302. Professor
Marcuse points out that the word pessimism has not been
found prior to Lichtenberg’s use of that word. Pessimismus.
p. 13.
387ibid.. V, p. 303. Cf. VS., VI, pp. k8-k9;
B . an d. F. . p. 235-
133
Dreams were also given special attention, as was
the case with Lichtenberg. Schopenhauer went so far as to
! maintain that dreams were much more than mere play of . .
i
1 thoughts or phantasy-pictures; a person who would give
dreams this interpretation, according to Schopenhauer, lacked
TOO
either reason or honesty.
! Schopenhauer described Kant as probably the most
1 389
original intellect that nature has ever produced; in
fact, his admiration for Kant is well known and thus, does
not need further consideration. The important point to
keep in mind, however, is that Lichtenberg, although less
dogmatic about Kant's philosophical accomplishments, was
also, as I pointed out in the second chapter, an ardent
admirer of Kant.
Curriculum and Pedagogy
No other aspect of education was shared more fully
by Schopenhauer and Lichtenberg than the necessity of a
n OQ
Ibid.. IV, p. 262. Cf. VS., I, p. 123: VS.,
IV, p. 56.
~^^Ibid.. IV, p. 198. Other "real" philosophers
were, according to Schopenhauer: Plato, Descartes, Hume,
Locke, Spinoza, Ibid., IV, p. 191.
Said Josef Rattner: "Immanuel Kants Ausserung
jedoch, dass er eine "kopernikanische Vendung" in der
Philosophie veranlasst habe, eine vollige Neuorientierung,
deren hohe Bedeutung seiner Meinung nach erst hundert Jahre
nach ihm gebuhrend gewurdigt werden konne, wird man riick-
haltlos beipflichten kflnnen." Grosse Pgdagogen (Munchen,
1956), p. 75.
13*+
radical change in the curriculum.39^ Schopenhauer, like
Lichtenberg, tiraded against the excessive amount of read
ing done by the students. Reading was nothing but a
! 391
| substitute, he maintained, for independent thinking.
i
! While Lichtenberg considered excessive reading as bad as
392
i any form of self-abuse, Schopenhauer characterized this
"intellectual" reading habit as a "sin against the Holy
39a
Ghost," ' He defined reading as doing one's thinking with
3 9 I +
another person's head. There was even many a learned
man who had read himself stupid a book, if worth read
ing at all, should be read at least twice.396
Although Schopenhauer believed, primarily, in a
397
humanistic curriculum, y he believed also in a dynamic and
3°8
differentiated curriculum. ' In fact, and in this respect
390
Schopenhauer's stress on the necessity of learn
ing the classical languages, especially Greek, was not
shared, however, (as I pointed out in the chapter on
Curriculum) by Lichtenberg.
3 ^Schopenhauer, op. cit. „ V. , p. 521. See also
Schopenhauer, op. cit.. V, pp. 507, 512, 520, IV, p. 165.
392V3., I, p. 221.
393
Schopenhauer, op. cit.. V, p. 521.
^^'Schopenhauer, op. cit. . V, p. 522. Cf. VS., I,
pp. 155, 171, 219, 221.
39^Ibid.. V, p. 585. Cf. VS., I, p. 120.
396Ibid., v, p. 591- Cf. VS., I, p. 55.
397ibid.. v, p. 5i*f.
398
Ibid.. V, p. 666.
he is probably using a Lichtenbergian expression, one's
philosophy of education should be reviewed at least once
399
every decade.
Schopenhauer, like Basedow, was against the teach
ing of any dogmatic religion, including the teaching of
Christianity. A child should not begin the study of
religion or philosophy until it is at least sixteen years
*+00
of age. Up to this age, a child ought to study mathe
matics, foreign languages (this would, include a thorough
knowledge of Latin and Greek), and natural sciences
The successful study of mathematics, according to Schopen
hauer, required a special talent on the part of the student,
however; thus, any mathematics class would necessitate a
1+02
special segregated group of students.
Religion
Since Schopenhauer's views— better: fanaticism--in
regard to religion are well known, only those views that
are similar to those of Lichtenberg's will be discussed.
399
Schopenhauer, op. cit.. V, p. 667. Cf. VS., I,
p. 22*+; Werke, I, p. *+20.
1+Q°Ibid., V, p. 667. Cf. VS., II, p. 15*+. The
teaching of Christianity at university level would mean,
Schopenhauer maintained, the "editing of Jewish mythology
as philosophy." Ibid., IV, p. 168.
^^Schopenhauer, op. cit. . V, p. 665. Cf. VS.,
I, P. 9^.
^ , ^Lbid., V, p. 517* This is another instance
where Schopenhauer stressed the importance of a differen
tiated curriculum. Cf. VS., T> PP* *+6-*+7.
136
This does not mean, of course, that if we discussed
Schopenhauer by himself, the dissimilar views would not
;be of equal importance.
Schopenhauer referred to religion as "die Metaphy-
l sik des Volkes"; religion must, therefore, be paid attention
^-03
to in at least an external manner. As already mentioned,
so was he, like Lichtenberg, principally against religious
knL.
indoctrination to children. A discussion of religion
among adults was not necessarily out of place— or useless.
He was more revolutionary than Lichtenberg, it seems, in
the denunciation of Christianity. Lichtenberg believed
that the day would come when a belief in a Cod would be
ho 5
just as silly as a belief in a ghost, and Lichtenberg,
unlike Schopenhauer, did not overlook the literary merit of
the Bible— nor the moral significance of the content--
especially the decalogueSchopenhauer's anti-Jewish
^^Schopenhauer, op. cit. . V, p. 339- Cf. VS., I,
p. 199.
Ibid. . V, p. 3*+0. Lichtenberg observed that,
when metaphysics or religion was taught to young students,
the outcome of such instruction inevitably led the students
to believe in the immortality of the soul. VS., I,, p. 59*
^ vs., I, p. 58.
^ ^ Ibid. . I, p. 23*+. Schopenhauer's revelation in
regard to a masterpiece of a "Christian" fraud is here, it
seems, pertinent. Wrote Schopenhauer: "Sieh1 z.B. nach
England, wo dreister Pfaffentrug den, von Konstantin dem
Grossen, in Opposition zum Judensabbath, eingesetzten
Christlichen Sonntag dennoch lilgenhafterweise mit jenem,
sogar dem Namen nach, identifizirt, urn Jehovah's Satzungen
attitude is well shown in his evaluation of Lessing's
Education of the Human Race: it ought to he called
1+07
Education of the Jewish Race.
The doctrine of the immortality of the soul was
also castigated by Schopenhauer. The cardinal mistake, he
says, in discussing the nature of the soul, is "dass man
von einer immateriellen Substanz redet und dann die Gesetze
der materiellen unterschiebt, urn sie auf jene
anzuwenden.
Psychology Applied to Education
Schopenhauer drew a sharp distinction between true
psychology, i.e., empirical psychology and alleged psy
chology, i.e., rational psychology.^9 Experience alone,
fiir^den Sabbath, d.h. den Tag, da die sechstagiger Arbeit
ermudete Allmacht sich ausruhen musste^ weshalb er wesent-
lich der letzte Tag der ifoche ist, zu ubertragen auf den
Sonntag der Christen, den diem solis, diesen ersten, die
Woche glorreich eroffnenden Tag, diesen Tag der Andacht und
Freude." Op. cit.. V, p. 371- It is obvious that, when a
community or society cannot even agree as to which day one
should observe as a day of rest, the entire problem of
religious instruction becomes too explosive, i.e., a per
manent separation of religion from the public school
curriculum becomes, apparently, a necessity.
^^Schopenhauer, op. cit.. IV, p. 152.
^°8Ibid., IV, p. 123. Cf. VS., I, pp. 12, 57, 81,
and Voltaire, op. cit.. p. *+*+3. Cf. also VS., I, 5*+, 57-
*+09
Ibid.. V, pp. 27-28. It is noteworthy that the
basic purpose of Gottingisches Magazine and Litteratur. as
announced by Dietrich, was to promote "knowledge of nature
and of man, physics, natural history and philosophy,
physiognomy— pro and con— , history, ..." F. Lauchert,
138
however, would never he ahle to take the place of reflective
li-1 /-s
thinking. Man is ahle to understand only himself fully.
; One's fellow-men are understood only to a limited degree,
because "man kann hochsten zur Gemeinschaft die Begriffe
hringen, nicht aher zur der diesen zum Grunde liegenden
1 + 1 1
;anschaulichen Auffassung." Language itself is thus
limited in its function as a tool of communication: the
difficulty involved in communication is, according to
Schopenhauer, especially noticeable in translating into a
foreign language, because there are frequently no exact
foreign equivalents for certain expressions in one's native
*+12
tongue.
All references to Schopenhauer's works have shown,
I think, beyond reasonable doubt, that he was more than a
mere admirer of Lichtenberg. The concluding chapter will
now deal with an evaluation--from the point of view of
contemporary American philosophy of education--of
Lichtenberg1s thoughts on education in their entirety.
G. Chr. Lichtenberg:'s schriftstellerische Thatiakeit in
chronoloaischer TJebersicht daraestellt. Mit Nachtragen zu
Lichtenberg:'s "Vermischten Schriften" und textkritischen
^erichtigungen CGo'ttineen. 1891). n. *+M-.
Schopenhauer had no use for Herbart's philosophical
writings either, op. cit.. V, p. 209.
J+1°IMd., p. 525.
1 + 1 1
Ibid.. V, p. 13.
Ifl2Ibid., V, p. 598.
CHAPTER VIII
LICHTENBERG'S THOUGHTS CONCERNING
EDUCATION: AN EVALUATION
Der Mensch lebt aliein urn sein und
seiner Mitmenschen Wohl so sehr zu
befordern, als es seine Krafte und
! seine Lage erlauben. Hierin kurzer
! zu seinem Endzweck zu gelangen,
| nutzt er die Versuche seiner Vorfah-
j ren. Er studiert . . . Nicht bloss
wissen, sondern auch fur die Nachwelt
thun, was die Vorwelt fiir uns gethan
■ hat, heisst ein Mensch sein.*+13
It is the purpose of this final chapter to interpret
land to clarify the various thoughts concerning education,
that Lichtenberg deemed important enough to record in his
"Suddelbdcher" and in his many letters. The inquiry thus
far pursued has followed the intrinsic method of literary
research.
The natural and sensible starting point for work in
literary scholarship is the interpretation and analysis
of the works of literature themselves. After all, only
the works themselves justify all our interests in the
life of an author, in his social environment and the
whole process of literature AlM-
Ifl3VS., I, pp. 256-257•
LlL
R. Wellek and A. Warren, Theory of Literature
(New York, 1956), p. 127.
139
I*f0
1+15
I have, therefore, followed Hamann's advice,
viz., in this case, letting Lichtenberg "speak" for him
self. Since the greatest number of references to Lichten
berg do refer to disconnected "Bemerkungen," it is obvious
that more than one interpretation would be possible. Heine
stressed the pertinence of this point as follows: "Wie
uberhaupt jeder einen bestimmten Gegenstand in der Sinnen-
welt auf eine andere Weise sieht, so sieht auch jeder in
1+16
einem bestimmten Buche etwas anderes, als der andere."
The intrinsic approach alone, however, will not
necessarily lead to a correct understanding of an author's
thoughts. Wrote Kant:
Despite the great wealth of our languages, the
thinker often finds himself at a loss for the expres
sion which fits his concept, and for want of which he
is unable to be really intelligible to others or even
to himself.^17
Lichtenberg's Philosophy Applied to Education
No strict classification— philosophical, literary,
or religious--is possible in the case of Lichtenberg. He
^'^Sturm und Drang: Kritische Schriften. pp. 128-29.
i+16
Heinrich Heine, op. cit.. p. 160. J. P. Stern,
: in his dissertation on Lichtenberg, summarized his impres-
! sion of Lichtenberg as follows: "It is a central contention!
; of the present examination that he was both a scientist and
! an artist at the same time, that his work is, above all
things, a synthesis of both art and science." An Essay on
| the Aphorism in the Writings of G. C. Lichtenberg.
j Cambridge, 19^+9} p. 93.
I ! + • ] n
1 'Kant Critique of Pure Reason. Abridged and
j translated by Norman Kemp Smith, New York, 1978, p. 166.
was, in my opinion, a teacher whose ideas concerning educa
tion have been overlooked--or at least underestimated.
Although he did not produce any Orbis Pictus or any essay
concerning education, the content of his remarks on educa
tion are as valid today as when they were written, almost
L-1 Q
two hundred years ago. w
This investigation has shown, I think, that,
epistemologically, Lichtenberg was partly an intuitive
1+19
rationalist: metaphysically, however, he may perhaps
be best described as a pessimistic idealist— a la
Strindberg
Lichtenberg's Curriculum
Perhaps no other problem facing the American
educator is more acute, more consequential in nature, than
the one dealing with the curriculum. Lichtenberg frequently
discussed what he felt to be the essentials of any pre
paratory education. How valid, then, are his suggestions,
Wrote A. ^chneider: "Comme Jean-Paul, il est
inclassable, tiraille entre <^es tendances divergentes.
C'est une de ces personnalites qui, par leur originalite
et leur complexite, entrent difficilement dans les
categories courantes." Op. cit ■ , p. 12.
bl9
VS., I, pp. 56-57.
1+20
Wrote L. Marcuse: "Es gibt drei TJrgestalten der
Seele: die glaubige, die unglaubige und die tragische Seele
. . j . Der tragische Mensch, der den Glaubigen^und den
Unglaubigen zugleich in sich birgt, ist die Hohe und die
Aufgabe unserer Zeit." Strindberg: Das Leben der tragischen
l*+2
and to what extent are his thoughts on education shared by
h-21
contemporary American educational philosophers.
Lichtenberg emphasised the importance of a varied
b22
and useful curriculum. The study of foreign languages,
especially French, German, and English, constituted an
L23
essential part of his curricular views. Philosophy,
provided it was "zweckmassig," was also a curricular
)| O) 1
necessity. Lichtenberg wanted instruction given, then,
in practical courses— a view that was shared fully by
Jefferson, for example. Even physics would have to be
taught and learned so that a practical benefit could be
derived from this study--or else physics was also
n ^25
useless.
Instruction in morals, of which instruction in
religion may be (or should be) a part, is an essential
Seele (Berli, 1922), p. 15. Lichtenberg, like Strindberg,
was also an "experimenter"--"and therefore a good
psychologist." (p. 72).
Lj-2l
This question, of course, can never be answered
to the satisfaction of everyone. Wrote A. Keiklejohn:
"The moral individualism of England and America during the
last three centuries is a mental aberration which is near
to madness." Education Between Two Worlds (New York, 19*+2)
p. 235- If this view is accepted, one is forced to put
Lichtenberg in the category of "mental aberrationists"—
as a semi-mad university teacher.
1+22
F. Lauchert, op. cit. . p. lhl.
h23VS., VIII, p. 258.
1+21+
Werke, I, p. *+22. Schopenhauer, on the other
hand, suggested that only one semester in the history of
philosophy (for university students even!) would suffice.
]+2*
^Werke. I, p. M+0.
core of any philosophy of education. B. Idding Bell, for
example, is convinced that moral philosophy should even be
1+26
made "the central consideration in education." Lichten-
berg had, as pointed out, specific ideas on morality. His
. 1 - 1 - 2 7
admonition to cultivate a student’s "character-skeleton"
to teach a student to do "good" ^ has not been improved
on since his death.
The fabric of a curriculum is, of course, dependent
upon what a society wants to transmit in terms of cultural
values. Lichtenberg, like Jefferson, James, and Dewey,
stressed that "Realien"**^ should come first in the
curriculum. "Man sollte zwar immer bei der Erziehung auf
die conventionellen Schonheit des Geistes RUcksicht nehman,
aber as sind doch die letzten."^^ What he wanted, then,
was a gradual change, a change that was necessitated by an
increasingly larger number of discoveries in the natural
sciences, psychology, and all the other social sciences.
Lf26
Crisis in Education (New York, 19*+9), P* 229.
\+on
'Vo, I, p. 166.
^28
B . an d. F.. pp. 209-210.
i+29
This does not mean that Lichtenberg wanted to do
away with the "Humaniora studia."
*+30
VS., I, p. 218. Said Kluge: "Darauf kam es
ihm schliesslich in seiner Padagogik an, fur das Leben
brauchbare Menschen zu erziehen." Op. cit.. p. 93*
Religious Instruction
A fundamental characteristic of the American public
school is adherence to a philosophy that advocates complete
separation between Church and State. That this question or
problem is one of the most vital questions facing the
American educator can hardly be argued any more.
Lichtenberg, like William James, viewed religion
If31
from a pragmatic point of view. Several cardinal ques
tions concerning the anatomy of a religion suited for
adoption in the public school curriculum must, however, be
agreed on before any religious instruction would be per
mitted. The soundness of Lichtenberg's attitude is, I
feel, especially commendable in this respect.
As pointed out, Lichtenberg favored religious
instruction, although its content^2 had to be clearly
defined; it must, for example, be divorced from doctrinal
theology. An identical point of view is shared by V.
T. Thayer.This is also the view of the National
Education Association.
^31 ^ T .
VS., I, p. 76.
If32Ibid., I, p. 67.
1+33
J->J. Maritain, on the other hand, took the opposite
point of view. Said he: "Nobody can do without theology. . .
And liberal education cannot complete its task without the
knowledge of the specific realm and concern of theological
wisdom." Education at the Crossroad (New Haven, 19^3), p. 7*+*
^ ^Religion in Public Education (New York, 19*+7).
1^5
The public school can teach objectively about
religion without advocating or teaching any religious
creed. To omit from the classroom all references to
; religion and the institutions of religion is to
neglect an important part of American life.*+35
Thomas Jefferson fully shared Lichtenberg's faith
I in the curricular usefulness (and Jefferson detested every-
; thing that was, curricularly speaking, not useful) of
unadulterated Christianity. Said Jefferson:
. . . and when what is really his [Christ’s}
doctrine is abstracted from the rubbish in which it
is buried . . . we have the outline of a system of
the most sublime morality which has ever fallen upon
the life of a manA36
*+37
Adherence to the moral code of Lichtenberg's
*+38
anthropomorphic God might produce a more happy society.
The sacredness of the decalogic code is acknowledged by
most contemporary American educators. To do good, then,
represented, to Lichtenberg, the nucleus of any
*+3 5
-^Moral and Spiritual Values in the Public Schools.
Educational Policies Commission, NEA, Washington, D. C.,
1951, P. 77.
^^Quoted in N. Schachner's Thomas Jefferson: A
Biography, New York, 1951, II, pp. 270-271. Cf. VS., I,
p. 67.
The passionate convictions of educators dis
cussing religious instruction is perhaps climaxed in the
person of H. P. Van Dusen, who even accuses the United
States Supreme Court of falsifying history! God in
Education (New York, 1951), p. 117.
^vs., VI? P- 277•
^ ^ Ibid. , I, p. 23*+. Rousseau believed, on the
contrary, that "the wise man requires no laws." Emile.
translated by E. Worthington, Boston, 1888, p. Jb,
Ik6
1+-5Q
religion. Although Lichtenberg discouraged over-
ij-ho
contemplation on eschatological events, he did not
! underestimate the moral value inherent in the study of
1 LLl
;religion--of a "non-rubbish" Christianity.
i
Psychology Applied To Education: The Soul
The science of psychology in the twentieth century
does not yet claim to be fully established by fact. While
one aspect of psychology of a by-gone era~-physiognomy
(in the Lavaterian sense)--is no longer popular, the
problem of dualism (that man consists of soul and body),
L_ ho
is still not settled among all educational psychologists.
Lichtenberg's intrinsic theories of psychology are
as modern as many a contemporary theory. This is especially
the case when the psychological theorists attempt to explain
the nature of the "soul." Lichtenberg, like William James,
refused to acknowledge the existence of a "soul." This
belief, alone, sets him apart from several of his better
known contemporaries, as for example, Lessing and Kant.
"Die trSge Basis sei bloss Hirngespinst. Daher riihre
*+39
B . an d. F., pp. 209-210.
LL-0
VS., I, p. 29.
) i) i1
Ibid.. I, p. Ih6.
M+2
This in spite of the monumental work done bv
William James. J
das infame Zwei in der Welt. I.eib und Seele, Gott und
Welt. Das sei aber nicht nothig.
Our entire system of body and soul, Lichtenberg
said,can be viewed as an instrument which has been given
into our hands for the purpose of cleverly finding our way
bkb
through this "Jammerthal." The anomaly is well pointed
out, I think, in this contrasting thought of Lichtenberg’s,
viz.: "Leib und Seele ein Fferd, neben einen Ochsen
gespannt. ,|l+Lf5
These and the previously cited references infuse a
new significance into Lichtenberg1s pioneering remarks
about the concept of the soul. Lichtenberg, like James,
desired to put this kind of discussion in the proper
category— namely, in a metaphysical (theological) one;
his advocacy of the prohibition of theological inventions
If 1+3
VS., VIII, p. 1^1. Even Schopenhauer, whose
praise of Lichtenberg has already been analyzed, apparently
misunderstood Lichtenberg1s method of solving this question.
Schneider, op. cit.. asserted: "Schopenhauer le lui a
reproche; mais il s’est trompe en croyant que c'etait la
sa veritable pensee. Pour combattre les erreurs des
physiognomonistes, Lichtenberg a ete oblige d’adopter le
point de vue de la majorite. Comme Spinoza, il estimait
d'ailleurs qu'il faut laisser aux braves gens leurs idees,
leurs croyances, la pensee n'etant faite que pour le petit
nombre." Pp. 132-133.
bbb
Ibid.. Ill, p. 13.
1+1+k
Werke. I, p. 160. Wrote W. H. Kilpatrick: "In
other words, we must reject the separation of mind and body
as an artificial assumption, not valid in practice."
Philosophy of Education (New York, 1951), p.l8*+.
Ib8
or discoveries ("truths") after the year eighteen
1+1+6
hundred is thus a logical one from the point of view
of educational psychology.
Empirical Psychology
Throughout his long teaching career, Lichtenberg
learned a great deal about problems facing his students.
Alexander von Humboldt, an ex-student of Lichtenberg,
1+1+7
referred to him as a "gtltigen, jugendfreundlichen" man. '
Lichtenberg's love and genuine concern for his students
resulted, it seems, in an intuitive-empirical accumulation
of educational-psychological knowledge.
Several thoughts concerning psychology applied to
education--thoughts as valid today as in his own time— have
been investigated in this dissertation, A resume of a few
representative ideas reveals the following educational-
psychological facts:
1. One ought to begin the study of foreign
languages at an early age.^^
2. One should enforce a reasonable discipline;
he jokingly stated, for example, that he had
personally established a little Siberia for
J+go
some of his "Untertanen."
VS., II, p. 101.
^Werke, I, p. 1053.
hh8VS., VI, p. 208.
^ 9 .
Wer&&, I, p. *+9.
1^9
3. It is impossible to educate fully a person of
low mental ability
b. Observation and experimentation are the basic
b^l
keys to unlock the mysteries of nature. ^
1+52
5. Pure research is an absolute necessity.
6. The recruiting of teachers should be on an
academic-selective basis. But, he sarcasti
cally added, who is competent enough to carry
out this selection? Would "Der Schulmeister
mit 30 Thlr Besoldung und Kartoffeln-Zehnten"
be qualified?
b5b
7- Introspective analysis is desirable.
8. Visual aids are useful, if not absolutely
essential.
9. Motivation is basic in a teaching-learning
!+56
process. J
^ °Ibid. . I, pp. 157, 170; VS., II, p. 130. A
view that has been verified psychologically by Thorndike,
Spearman, and Binet. Cf., Werke, I, p. 305.
^VS., V, p. 15.
^ 2Ibid. . I, p. 286.
'-'Lauchert, op. cit.. p. 122; see also VS., I,
p. 289.
^ V S . . I, pp. 70, 83; and VS., II, p. 23.
^Briefe, III, pp. 257-258,
^VS., I, p. 27; VS-j P- 161.
150
10. The aims of education should be clearly
if 57
defined.
i William James
i
{
I Any general reference to William James is destined
to do him injustice. However, his philosophy applied to
I education is sufficiently similar to that of Lichtenberg's
i
! philosophy of education to warrant the present comparison.
The first obstacle to a comparative discussion of
Lichtenberg and James is, of course, found in the (mis)use
of the term "pragmatism." James himself did not like the
name, because it was too often (deliberately) misunder-
L.^8
: stood. ■ ' II. Briggs, an ardent pragmatist, maintains, for
example, that a philosophy of education that is not prag-
l+ifo
matic is even useless. ^ Pragmatism, according to James,
is "primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes
^ f 6 0
that otherwise might be interminable."
H57
Ibid., II, pp. 132-133.
H58
William James, Pragmatism and Four Essays from
the Meaning of Truth (New York, 1955), p. 13- This work
will henceforth be referred to as Pragmatism.
^ Pragmatism and Pedagogy (New York, 19*+0),
p. 25.
i f 60
Pragmatism. p. H-2. I personally think that it
has raised (metaphysically) as many disputes as it has
"settled," if not more.
151
Truth
A fundamental question that has defied a satisfac
tory solution revolves around the nature of "truth." That
truth is beauty and beauty truth does no longer suffice--
if it ever sufficed. Said Lichtenberg: "Schwatzt doch
nicht! wenn die Fixsterne nicht einmal fix sind, wie
konnt ihr denn sagen, dass alles Wahre vahr ist?" It
is this pivotal term that especially warrants a comparison
between Lichtenberg and James.
A true idea, according to James, is an idea that
! +62
can be verified, validated, assimilated, or corroborated.
However, James reassuringly added that "in the end it is
,,*+63
our faith and not our logic that decides such questions.
Therefore, verification is not synonymous with "laboratory"
identification. This would be a typical Lichtenberg point
of view, because he, too, asserted: "Die Seite, die ich
nehme, wird nicht durch stricten Beweiss, sondern durch
. . L j -
das Ubergewicht bestimmt." Elsewhere, he stated: "Ich
1+6]
Werke« I, p. 5-26.
1+62
Pragmatism, p. 133-
^ Pragmatism. p. 190. Cf. this with VS., I, p.95,
where Lichtenberg, like John Dewey, stressed feeling
rather than reason in thoughts on religion.
Lj-6h
VS., I, p. 73. James gave much consideration to
the role of temperament and preference in intellectual
activities. Said Whitehead: "There are no whole truths; all
truths are half-truths. It is trying to treat them as whole
truths that plays the devil." Dialogues of Alfred North
Whitehead. as recorded by Lucien Price, Boston, 195^, P.16.
152
kann sehr oft etwas glauben, ohne es beweisen zu kSnnen,
so wie ich etwas nicht glaube, ohne es wiederlegen zu
i . . . „ h 6 5
konnen."
: James even conceded that pragmatism might be called
I
I religious— provided "that religion can be pluralistic or
I
I merely melioristic in.type." Since Lichtenberg and
James both agreed that truth is a relative concept, what
; place does religion occupy in James’ philosophy?. His
; confession is indeed Lichtenbergian. Wrote James:
In spite of its being so shocking to the reigning
intellectual tastes, I believe that a candid consider
ation of piecemeal supernaturalism and a complete
discussion of all its metaphysical bearings will show
it to be the hypothesis by which the largest number
of legitimate requirements are met. That of course
would be a program for other books than this; what I
now say sufficiently indicates to the philosophic
reader the place where I belong.k-67
James considered a person's ideals and his "over-
beliefs"^^ the most valuable things about a person. Such
a view obviously raises a question as to the ultimate
meaning of pragmatism. His view of a non-theological
46^Ibid., I, p. 73.
^ ^ Pragmatism. - p. 123.
^ ^ The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study
in Human Nature (New York. 1915). p. 523•
* + 6 , ° ,
The Philosophy of William James« Selected from
his Chief Works, with an Introduction by Horace M. Kallen,
New York, n.d., p. 225. James preferred to be called a
"radical empiricist" (thus rejecting rationalism).
153
religion (whether taught in school or at home is not
important in this connection) is clearly stated:
Religious fermentation is always a symptom of the
intellectual vigor of a society; and it is only when
they forget that they are hypotheses and put on
rationalistic and authoritative pretensions, that
our faiths do harm.*+69
I have purposely omitted references concerning
pragmatism's intrinsic soundness (or lack thereof). How
ever, no less thinker than Bertrand Russell conceded that
the pragmatic point of view had the following merit:
"First, it realizes that the truth that we can attain to
is merely human truth, fallible and changeable like
everything else."^0
Thus James, like Lichtenberg a century before him,
was (in a Peircean sense) a true fallibilist.
John Dewey
A comparative study of a few representative works
by John Dewey with the works of Lichtenberg in the field
of education reveals that many an idea advocated by Dewey
has frequently been expressed and advanced in the works of
*+69
Ibid.. p. 225. Cf. VS., I, p. 95.
^70
Twentieth Century Philosophy Living Schools of
Thought. Edited by D. D. Runes, New York, 19^7, p. 23^. •
Lichtenberg.^71 I will, therefore, review several basic
features of Lichtenberg's thoughts on education and single
out similar ideas that were also entertained by Dewey.
A frequently quoted statement of Dewey is as
follows:
Here it is enough to note that notions, theories,
systems, . . . must be regarded as hypotheses. . . .
They are to be accepted as bases of actions which test
them, not as finalities. To perceive this fact is to
abolish rigid dogmas from the world. . . . As in the
case of all tools, their value resides not in them
selves but in their capacity to work in the consequences
of their use.*+72
Lichtenberg maintained the identical view. He
wrote:
Da wir nicht sehr weit liber unsern Standpunkt
hinaussehen konnen, so kann der beste Weg nicht anders
als durch Versuche gefunden werden, bei welchen denn
mancher freilich im Morast untergeht, den aber eben
deswegen sein Nachfolger vermeidet.1 +73
John Dewey identified education with a "continuous
reconstruction of experience," and philosophy, he said,
may be defined as "the general theory of education."
1+71
I do not imply, of course, that Lichtenberg
should be viewed as a precursor of Dewey; I have only been
struck by the similarity between these men in regard to
their philosophical thoughts concerning education.
*+72
John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York,
1926), p. Ik-5.
an d. F.. p. 209.
^^John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 93-
^75
Ibid.. p. 383.
As is well known, he labeled his own kind of pragmatism
experimentalism. Dewey's view differed primarily from
James' in that little, if any, attention was given to the
emotional aspect of the identification of "truths."
Dewey, like Lichtenberg, maintained that the real facts
of the world are not found in the realm of philosophy but
rather in mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, and
anthropology.
John Dewey's experimentalism has a melioristic
structure and foundation,^?? an(j his philosophy of educa-
1+78
tion has pessimistic-idealistic traits. Lichtenberg
wrote: "Es wird am Ende alles klar werden und gut sein,
wenn wir nur einander lieben und jeder mit gettbter
i f 7 9
Verstand so viel Gutes zu tun sucht, als er vermag."
Dewey, a logician, pointed out that even in this
speciality (logic) a judgment will not necessarily be a
valid one, because a judgment "is not logical at all, but
personal and psychological. ,,1+80
John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 379*
1+77
John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy
(Boston, 1957), p. 178.
^ 78
Ibid., pp. 188; 129-130.
k79
B . an d. F.. p. 209.
^80
John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy,
p. 133. Cf. VS., I, p. 73.
Lichtenberg defined philosophy as the art of
drawing distinctions— no matter what else we may mean by
l+8i
the word philosophy. Now, Dewey's definition of educa
tion seems to me to be nothing more than a paraphrase (not
conscious of course I) of Lichtenberg's definition of
philosophy. Wrote Dewey: "Education is the laboratory
in which philosophic distinctions become concrete and are
! +82
tested." His definition of philosophy, then, is only
an extension of his definition of education. The most
penetrating definition of philosophy which can be given,
he said, is that "it is the theory of education in its
most general forms." °
Final Summary
Kant confessed that he had been awakened from his
dogmatic slumber by Hume's works. Lichtenberg, like Kant,
was also an admirer of Hume's philosophical scepticism.
There is, however, a basic difference between Kant and
^81
VS., I, p. 85-
h-82
John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 386.
^83Ibid.. p. 386. Cf. VS., II, pp. 132-133.
It is noteworthy that A. Lynd, in his indictment
of the American Public School, refers to Dewey as the "cen
tury's most consistent enemy of dogmatism" (p. 183), as
"one of the most unconfused persons in America" (pp. 18*+-
185), and as "America's most distinguished philosopher"
(p. 187), and that the key doctrine of Deweyism, according
to Mr. Lynd, is that "there is no mind or soul m the tra
ditional (p. 195-). Quackery in the Public School
157
Lichtenberg in that the latter did not invent a soporific, |
as Bertrand Russell so wittily observed, which enabled him
to sleep again. Many a Lichtenbergian aphorism and remark ;
may be confusing, but their totality has, I believe,
brought out that Lichtenberg, above everything else, was
an intellectual whose primary interest in life was his
university work as a teacher of experimental physics,
giving every student the opportunity of maximum development,
whether physical, mental, or spiritual. Wrote A. Schneider:
Doch jeder scheinbare Widerspruch lost sich auf,
wenn man^den wesentlichen Zug seiner Personlichkeit
herauschalt; seine Grundhaitung im Leben ist eine
existentielle Haltung; er war weder rationalistisch
noch mystisch; in sich selbst wie in den anderen, in
der Innen-wie in der Ausserwelt, in der Wissenschaft
wie im Leben suchte er leidenschaftlich das Konkrete,
das Wahre, das Wirkliche, das Echte, das
Urspriingliche .^8*+
Lichtenberg1s philosophy of life is well expressed
in these words: "Wer seine Talente nicht zur Belehrung and
Besserung anderer anwendet, ist entweder ein schlechter
Mann Oder ausserst eingeschrankter Kopf.,,l+8^ Unlike
Rousseau, Lichtenberg was convinced that the school could
be improved and that education is the only activity that
may provide for a better world.
I i
i
I____________________
j ) | f f i ,
I "Was bedeutet uns Lichtenberg," Freude an
I Buchern. Heft 8 1953, P* 17*+.
I
! Werke. I, p. 386 (This was directed against
!Goethe 1).
Lf86Ibid.. p. 306; VS., VIII, p. 33^. Pestalozzi
|viewed the school as a necessary evil— and proceeded to
jmake school a paradise for children.
The sound and modern curriculum that Lichtenberg
advocated was ahead of that of both of his educational
colleagues, Basedow and Rousseau. Lichtenberg1s philosophy
of history, for example, illustrates this convincingly.
Basedow failed, as is well known, to see any use for the
study of history. His prohibitions against memorization
have not found acceptance by any contemporary educator.
The lack of appreciation of classical studies is another
Ll P 7
deficiency of Basedow's philosophy of education '— but
here Lichtenberg again showed a balanced and mature
judgment.
Comenius did not appreciably influence the
eighteenth century to any extent, but Lichtenberg, never
theless, recognized, at an early age, the genius of
Comenius1 pedagogical resourcefulness and inventiveness
in visual aids.
Any specific philosophical influence, direct or
indirect, of Lichtenberg upon Schopenhauer, James, and
Dewey, of course, has not been establishedNc> such
L-87
'It would not be incorrect, I think, to regard
Basedow's Philantropinum as a forerunner of the activity
curriculum.
^^"Influence" would again depend upon agreement to
definitions; wrote A. N. Whitehead: "If we are willing to
conceive of education as the process of forming fundamental
dispositions, intellectual and emotional, towards nature
and fellow-men, philosophy may be defined as the general
theory of education," Science and the Modern World (New
York, 1926), p. 383.
159
reservation would "be possible in the case of Kierkegaard,
however.
Thanks, Lichtenberg, thanks.' for having said that
there is nothing so feeble as the conversation of
learned men who have never thought for themselves but
who know a thousand historical facts.*+89
I With characteristic pessimism, Lichtenberg com-
I
|mented on the futility of writing a work which would
j
command the approval of all specialists in a given field.
i
! "Es ist gewiss sehr schwer, ein Werk zu schreiben, das den
Beifall derer erhalt, die bei Genie die Materie, worein
die Sache einschlagt, zum Studio ihres ganzes Lebens
; gemacht haben., , 1 + ^
This is especially true, I think, in a work which
investigates the thoughts concerning a type of education
which is to provide a person only with wisdom useful on
this side of heaven.
if89
The Journal of Se^ren Kierkegaard. A Selection,
edited and translated by A. Dru, New York, 1951? P- *+9*
A. Vetlesen, in the vein of A. Schneider, drew
the following comparison between Lichtenberg and Kierke
gaard: "Besides the urge to meditate, towards melancholy,
to build peculiar 'air-castlesf— as peculiar as the leaning
tower in Pisa— there is, nevertheless, one trait that
Kierkegaard and Lichtenberg had in common: the sense for
that which is genuine, the evaluation of that which is
pure," (Translation my own). Edda. XXXIV, 193^> p. 238.
^90
VS., I, p. 297.
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161
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i
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Core Title Educational Theories In The Works Of Georg Christoph Lichtenberg

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