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Value And Obligation: An Integration Of The Theories Of Ralph Barton Perry, C. I. Lewis, Dewitt Parker, And Charles L. Stevenson

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Value And Obligation: An Integration Of The Theories Of Ralph Barton Perry, C. I. Lewis, Dewitt Parker, And Charles L. Stevenson

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Content COPYRIGHT C 1960 BY JAMES BROOKS MAUE
VA LUE AND OBLIGATION
AN INTEGRATION OF THE THEORIES OF
R A LPH BARTO N PER R Y , C . I. LEWIS,
DEW ITT PARK ER, AND CHARLES L . STEVENSO N
By
Ja m es B r o o k s Maue
A D iss e r ta tio n P r e se n te d to the
FA C U LTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In P a r tia l F u lfillm en t of the
R eq u irem en ts for the D e g re e
DOCTOR O F PHILOSOPHY
(P h ilosop h y)
June I960
UNIVERSITY O F SO U TH ERN CALIFORNIA
GRADUATE SCHOO L
U NIVERSITY PARK
LOS A NGELES 7 . CA LIFO RN IA
This dissertation, written by
........................ Jaffle.s. B ro o k s. .M aue.......................
under the direction of h^...Dissertation Com-
mifiee, and approved by all its members, has
been presented to and accepted by the Graduate
School, in partial fulfillment of requirements
for the degree of
D O C T O R OF P H I L O S O P H Y
Date JUNE, I960
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
PREFACE
This study exam ines the c a u se s for the d isa g reem en ts b e
tw een value th eories with the sa m e e m p irica l orien tation . It adopts
two h y p o th eses. The fir s t h yp oth esis is that p h ilosop h ers so m e
tim es con sid er only a part of the p rob lem , and, in so doing, con
sid er only a part of the truth. The secon d h yp othesis is that they
so m etim es u se d ifferen t, but equivalent, lin g u istic fo rm u la tio n s.
T h ese two h yp otheses se rv e as guiding p r in cip les for an attem pt
to in tegrate the th eories of Ralph B arton P e r r y , C. I. L ew is,
DeW itt P a rk er , and C harles L . S teven son .
Steven son contributes to the a n a ly sis of in tr in sic value by
su ggestin g the term attitude for the su b ject's reaction in the value
situ ation . P e r r y and P ark er analyze the p sy ch o lo g ica l p r o c e s s e s
by which attitudes are form ed , P e r r y d isc u ssin g the su b ject's in
te r e s t judgm ents and P ark er indicating how such ex p erien ces range
from d e sir e s through sa tisfa c tio n s. M oreover, P a r k e r 's b io lo g ica l
an a ly sis of an a c tiv ity -goal com p lem en ts P e r r y 's p sy ch o lo g ica l
a n a ly sis of an o b je ct-g o a l.
L ew is supplem ents this d isc u ssio n of in tr in sic value with the
gen eral term e x trin sic v a lu e. He su g g ests in h eren t value to refer
ii
to ob jects w hich are a p oten tial so u rc e of in tr in sic valu e, and in
stru m en tal valu e to r e fe r to ob jects w hich are a means to inh eren t
v a lu e . But he is w rong con cern in g the certa in ty and the r eferen ce
of e x p r e ss iv e sta tem en ts: e x p r e ss iv e statem en ts and term in atin g
judgm ent form u lation s both are probable on ly and togeth er give
m eaning to 'good' as a d isp o sitio n ter m .
D isa g reem en ts betw een the four p h ilosop h ers occu r o v er the
com p u lsive fa cto r s in e th ic s. Y et on ce we r e a liz e that Steven son
and the other th ree p h ilo so p h ers a r e refer r in g to d ifferen t to p ic s,
then the d isa g reem en t is in p a rt reso lv ed ; for how one can be p e r
suaded that x is good (S teven son 's con cern w ith p sych ology of p e r
su asion ) does not d eterm in e the quite d ifferen t question of w hether
x a ctu ally is good (the P e r r y -.L e w is-P a r k e r concern with th eory of
v a lu e). M oreover, the com p u lsive fa cto r s in eth ical d isc o u r se are
p ro p erly the p rob lem of ob ligation th eo ry rath er than of value th eory.
The guiding p r in cip les con cern in g the p rob lem of obligation
are the su g g estio n s of W. H. W erk m eister and A lexander S eson sk e
that 'ought1 and 'obligation' have both a prudential and m oral m ean
in g. P e r r y , L e w is, P a r k e r , and S teven son , to g eth er, tre a t both
of th e se a s p e c ts . P e r r y an alyzes the prudential a sp e c t, and S teven -
!
}
so n — h ow ever u n w ittin g ly --a d v a n ces the a n a ly sis of the m oral a sp ect
by in d icatin g that th ere is a co m p u lsiv e fa cto r not explainable in
iii
iv
ter m s of prud en ce a lo n e. L ew is then attem p ts to supply this m is
sin g e le m en t b y appealing to c a te g o r ic a l im p e r a tiv e s. A lthough
th is p ro ced u re tends to b lock in q u iry, L ew is n e v e r th e le ss m akes
a con trib u tion b y pointing out the am b igu ity of 'ought1, and by su g
g e stin g that m o ra l ru les are e s s e n tia lly n e g a tiv e . F in a lly , P a rk er
tr a c e s the c o m p u lsiv e fa c to r s in the m o ra l a sp e c t of 'ought' to the
d em an d s, w illin g a ccep ta n ce, and id en tifica tio n of the individual
w ith a s o c ia l group.
The study then tr a c e s the rela tio n sh ip s of prud en tial 'ought'
to m o ra l 'ough t'. It adopts the rela tio n sh ip s as W erk m eister d e
v elo p s them and c o r r e la te s h is p ru d en tial 'ought' and m o ra l 'ought'
w ith H erb ert F e ig l's 'ju stifica tio n ' (the p ro ced u re of su pp orting a
p ro p o sitio n w ithin a s y s te m by d ed u ctive appeal to the p r e m is e s of
that sy ste m ) and 'vin d ication ' (the p roced u re of su pp orting the
p r e m is e s of a sy s te m w ith p ragm atic and em otive appeal for the
s y s te m its e lf) . The co n clu sio n s are (1) that the p rud en tial 'ought'
m u st be in p rin c ip le vin d icated ; (2) that both the le g a l and u n cr itic a l
'ought' in volve ju stifica tio n ; (3) that at the le v e l of c r itic a l eth ics
the m o ra l 'ought' m u st in clu d e r e fe r e n c e to both ju stific a tio n and
vind ication ; and (4) that the tec h n ica l 'ought' is a g e n e ra l ter m
under w hich the m o ra l 'ou gh t', the le g a l 'oughtj and the pru d en tial
'ought' can a ll be su b su m ed .
CONTENTS
Chapter * P age
I THE DIFFICULTIES OF CHARACTER
IZING THE IMMEDIATE VALUE
E X P E R IE N C E ........................................................ I
II COMMON GROUND FOR A DEFINITION . . 9
III THE PROBLEM OF THE FLEXIBILITY
AND PERSUASIVE FUNCTION OF
LA N G U A G E................................................................ 19
IV INTEREST JUDGMENTS AND INTRINSIC
V A L U E ........................................................................38
V THE VALUE JUDGMENT AND INHERENT
V A L U E ........................................................................58
VI THE PRUDENTIAL OUGHT...................................... 95
1. The F ir s t Im p licit A ssum ption in
the M eaning of the P rudential O u gh t.. 95
2. The Second Im p licit A ssum ption in
the M eaning of the P rudential Ought. .148
3. The Third Im p licit A ssum ption in
the M eaning of the P rudential Ought. .165
4. The Fourth Im p licit A ssum ption in
the M eaning of the P rudential Ought. . 186
Sum m ary and C o n c lu s io n s ............................... 189
v
Chapter P age
VII THE FA ILU R E OF THE PRUDENTIAL
OUGHT AND ITS REQUIRED
SU P P L E M E N T A T IO N ..................................... 192
VIII THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF
O B L IG A T IO N ...................................................... 225
A PPEN D IX
B ib liograp h y
B o o k s .......................................................... 258
P e r i o d i c a l s .............................................. 261
CHAPTER I
THE DIFFICULTIES OF CHARACTERIZING
THE IMMEDIATE VALUE EXPERIENCE
The task of ch aracterizin g the im m ed iate value exp erien ce is
a baffling one. Stevenson, P erry , P ark er and L ew is s tr e s s the fo l-
; low ing as som e of the reason s for this difficulty: ( a ) the flex ib ility
and vagu en ess of language m ay prohibit a d escrip tion of the good,
j ( b ) the im m ed iate value exp erien ce has se v e r a l dim ensions and is of
different typ es, and ( c ) th ere are extraneous factors which encroach
upon the im m ed iately given. T h ese reason s w ill now be explored.
Our aim w ill be to c la rify is s u e s in order to d isco v er, in the next
chapter, com m on ground for a definition of value.
( a ) The flex ib ility and vagu en ess of language m ay prohibit a
: d escrip tion of the good. One reason for the flex ib ility and vagueness
!
of language is that language m ay se r v e m ore than one purpose. Thus,
P ark er, in the P hilosophy of V alue, points to its d escrip tiv e u se as
j w ell as its u se in red irectin g attitudes. Stevenson a lso find s that
I
eth ica l d isco u rse has a m ultiple function which, he m aintains, is ,
fir s t, to e x p r e ss attitudes of the sp eak er (*1 approve1 ), and, second,
2
to in ten sify or to a lter other attitudes with an im p licit im perative
( do so as w ell! ). M oreover, Stevenson m aintains that words th em
s e lv e s have m ultiple m ean ings. He distin gu ish es betw een em otive,
d escrip tiv e, and su g g estiv e m eanings, and, sin ce th ese elem en ts
m ay vary with the context, he concludes that highly em otive words
such as ^ o o d 1 cannot have p r e c ise m eaning.
Since the em otive m eaning of a ter m is of a d isp osition al
nature, its p sych ological effect w ill vary with the attendant
c ir cu m sta n c es. This is m arkedly the c a se for " good .1 1 Very
often the term does no m ore than indicate agreem ent or d is
agreem en t in attitude, serv in g only to prepare the way for
relevan t d iscu ssio n , should d iscu ssio n prove n e c e ssa r y . At
other tim es its effect m ay be stron gly horatatory. T here are
even tim es when its usual em otive effect is r ev ersed , as when
it is used in irony, or when it is accom panied by the tone of
v o ice that su g g ests "goody-goody. " 1
In sum m ary of th is fir s t point, then, the flex ib ility and
vagueness of language m ay prohibit a d escrip tion of the good because
words th em selv es m ay have se v e r a l m eanings and because eth ical
d isco u rse se r v e s a m ultiple function.
( b ) The im m ediate value expe rien ce has se v e r a l dim ensions
and is of differen t ty p es. This secon d difficulty of ch aracterizin g
im m ed iate value exp erien ce con cerns its com p lexity. P ark er, for
exam p le, c a lls attention to su ch factors as in ten sity, duration,
volum e, quality, height, and harm ony. Even a su p erficia l exam in a-
* E th ics and Language (N ew Haven, 1944), pp. 82-83 .
3
tion of th e se term s w ill indicate the va riety and com plexity involved.
Thus, in ten sity is a sso cia ted with strong and weak d e sir e s, duration
with the m ore or le s s enduring. Volum e, on the other hand, is
a sso cia ted with the com p lexity of value exp erien ce, w hile height is a
function of activity or p a ssiv ity (a s , for exam ple, ath letic values
have a different height from a esth etic valu es ). F in ally, harm ony
r e fle c ts the value a sso cia ted with the integration of d e sir e s and s a t is
fa ctio n s. A ll th ese different d im en sion s of value add to the co m p lex
ity of the value ex p erien ce. Now one m ay question whether or not
the dim ension of harm ony is im m ed iately given; n on eth eless, it m ust
be acknow ledged that the tone of the im m ed iate exp erien ce w ill be in
fluenced by the factor of harm ony. Along th ese lin es, C. I. L ew is
su g g ests that the im m ed iate value exp erien ce is not so m uch one
quality as a d im ension like m ode which is p ervasive of a ll ex p erien ce.
Not only do value ex p erien ces have s e v e r a l d im en sion s, but
a lso , as P ark er points out, such exp erien ces are of different ty p es.
F or exam p le, th ere are the sen su a l d e sir e s a sso cia ted with p leasu re,
i
| the aesth etic d e sir e s for the enjoym ent of beauty, the b le sse d n e ss of
i
relig io n , the quiet sa tisfa ctio n s of m oral v a lu e—a ll of which are
r eflec ted in the tone of the im m ed iate ex p erien ce. Now sin ce any j
i
definition of value m ust en com p ass such a d iv ersity of ex p erien ce, j
i
j th ese fa cto rs, attestin g to the com p lexity of value ex p erien ce, su ggest|
another d ifficu lty of ch a ra cterizin g value.
( c ) The extran eou s fa cto r s w hich encroach upon the im
m ed ia tely given a lso tend to thw art efforts to c h a r a cter ize the
value e x p e r ie n c e . A ccording to L ew is, extraneous fa cto rs m ay
e a s ily en croach upon the im m ed iate value exp erien ce; and, sin ce
th e se elem en ts stem from p ast e x p erien ces and from p h ysiological
c a u se s, they differ according to the background and id io sy n c r a c ie s
2
of the individual. L ew is finds that th ere are at le a s t four fa cto rs
w hich tend to becom e a part of the im m ed iate exp erien ce: (1) sign
fu n ction s, (2) organic rea ctio n s w hich are independent of sign
fun ctions, (3) day d ream s or fre e a sso cia tio n , and (4) recogn ition
of ob jective rela tio n sh ip s.
(1) Sign functions tend to b ecom e in tegrated w ith im m ed iate
se n se p ercep tion s and, th erefo re, m ay ob scu re a ch a ra cteriza tio n
of im m ed iate value e x p e r ie n c e . How can th is situation occu r? A c
cording to L ew is, the ab ility to include sim u ltan eou sly a sign fu n c
tion w ith se n se p ercep tion is p ecu liar to m an: h is cap acity to lea rn
quickly and to d isc e r n rela tio n sh ip s sw iftly p e r m its him to im p o se a
sig n function w ithin the p resen tation of the im m ed ia tely given . In
2
P erh ap s it w ould be w e ll to point out here that L ew is u s e s
illu str a tio n s from both cogn itive and valu ation s! a r e a s, sin ce he
b e lie v e s that they are in p rin cip le sim ila r .
th is p r o c e s s a sig n fun ction m ay op erate upon the habitual le v e l a l
though, at other tim e s , it m ay be c o g n itiv e. The odor of c o ffe e , for
ex a m p le, a c ts a s a sig n fun ction of c o ffe e r e g a r d le s s of w hether
c o g n itiv e an ticip ation of drinking it is a ss o c ia te d w ith the sm e ll. ;
L e w is illu s tr a te s th is point by r e fe r r in g to the odor of co ffee fro m a
n e ig h b o r 's h o u se. The odor a c ts a s a sig n fun ction for the co ffee
ev en in the a b sen ce of drinking it; and the im m ed ia te value in th is
situ ation , a cco rd in g to L e w is, c le a r ly d iffe r s fro m the m o re p o s i
tiv e v alu e e x p e r ie n c e a s s o c ia te d w ith co ffee od ors fro m o n e's own
k itch en at b rea k fa st tim e .
(2) O rganic r e a c tio n s w h ich a r e independent of sig n fu n c
tio n s . O rganic r e a c tio n s w h ich a re independent of sig n fu n ctions
a ls o tend to in flu en ce the im m ed ia te ly given . Thus, a room te m
p era tu re of, say, sev en ty d e g r e e s w ould be p lea sa n t to an individu al
in n orm al h ealth , and w ould in flu en ce the tone of the im m ed ia te e x
p e r ie n c e . On the other hand, an o rgan ic r ea c tio n w h ich fin d s the
sa m e tem p era tu re e x tr e m e ly hot or e x tr e m e ly co ld (as w ith, say,
the ind ivid u al who h as a fe v e r ) w ould a d v e r se ly a ffec t the tone of
im m ed ia te e x p e r ie n c e . O ther f a c t o r s - - s u c h a s id io sy n c r a c ie s e x
e m p lifie d by, sa y , n e a r s ig h te d n e s s --m a y a ls o occu r w ithin the
im m ed ia te e x p e r ie n c e .
(3) The day d rea m or fr e e a ss o c ia tio n of thought. The th ird
so u r c e of fa c to r s ou tsid e im m ed ia te se n sa tio n yet in clu ded in the im^
m ed iately given is the d ay-d ream or fr e e a sso cia tio n of thought. T his
type of p resen tation a lso a ffects the value quality itse lf, and, through
su g g estio n , in flu en ces the tone of im m ed iate value ex p e rien ce . A s
an illu stra tio n , the p r e se n c e of a th irty ca lib er r ifle m ay crea te the
p leasan t value tones a s s o c ia te d with a le isu r e ly hunting expedition;
but, on the other hand, it could a lso c re a te the op p osite value tones
a sso c ia te d with a w a r-tim e ex p e rien ce .
( 4 ) R ecognition of objective r ela tio n sh ip s. F in a lly , the
fourth factor which tends to encroach upon the im m ed iate sen sa tio n
is the recogn ition of ob jective rela tio n sh ip s. F or exam p le, black
clouds m ay rep resen t a sto rm , but the actual d etection of this r e la
tion sh ip m ay be conditioned by cogn itive fa cto rs ( a s , for in stan ce,
the com p reh en sive a n a ly sis of the m e te o r o lo g ist), and by so c ia l
habit. The w ritten word is a good exam ple of conditioning prom oted
by so c ia l habit; for, on the le v e l of d irect se n se apprehension, the
w ritten word c o n sists m e r e ly of ink sp ots on paper, but, a s a product
of s o c ia l conditioning, it has definite m eaning.
T h ese fa c to r s, th e n --o r g a n ic rea c tio n s, sig n fun ctions, day
dream s or fr e e a ss o c ia tio n s, and recogn ition of ob jective r e la tio n
s h ip s — a ll m ay en croach upon the im m ed ia tely given . Under th ese
i
i
I con d ition s, a ch a ra cteriza tio n of the sp e c ific q u alities of the im -
! m ed iate ex p erien ce b eco m es a problem , fo r two rea so n s: fir s t,
sin c e the above fou r conditions s te m fro m p ast e x p e rien ce s as w ell
as fro m p h y sio lo g ic a l c a u se s, they d iffer accord in g to the background
and id io sy n c r a c ie s of the individu al so that the im m ed iate value e x
p e r ie n c e w ill tend to v a ry fro m individual to individual; secon d ,
sin c e th e se four fa c to r s m ay en cro a ch upon the im m ed ia tely given,
th ey m ay preven t an iso la tio n of the q u a lities p ecu lia r to the im m e d i
a tely g iv en valu e e x p e r ie n c e .
To su m m a rize th is en tire d isc u ssio n , the task of c h a r a c te r
izin g th e im m ed iate value e x p e rien ce is a baffling one b eca u se of the
follow in g r ea so n s; ( a ) the fle x ib ility and v a g u en ess of language m ay
prohib it a d escrip tio n of the good, ( b ) t h e im m ed iate valu e ex p erien ce
has s e v e r a l d im en sio n s and is of d ifferen t ty p e s, and, ( c ) th ere are
extran eou s fa c to r s w hich m ay en croach upon the im m ed ia te ly given .
A co n sid era tio n of th e se th r ee q u e stio n s--w ith the a im of
m odifying and sy n th e sizin g the P e r r y -P a r k e r -L e w is -S te v e n so n a p
p ro a ch es to value into one co m p reh en siv e th e o r y --w ill con stitu te the
program fo r P a rt I of th is stu dy. The f ir s t q u estion s e r v e s to in tr o -
I duce Stevenson*s contrib utions to the e ffe c tiv e n e ss of p e r su a siv e f a c -
I
! to r s in e th ica l d isp u tes; the secon d q u estion lea d s to a d isc u ssio n by
P e r r y and P a rk er of in te r e s t judgm ents; the third q u estion lead s to
: L e w is ^ co n sid era tio n of *good' as a d isp o sitio n ter m . T h ese points
! r e p r e se n t the to p ic s r e s p e c tiv e ly of Chapter III, "The P ro b lem of the
8
F le x ib ility and P e r s u a s iv e F u n ction of L anguage, " of C hapter IV,
" in te r e st Jud gm en ts and In tr in sic V alue, " and of C hapter V, "V alue
Jud gm en ts and Inherent V a lu e."
B e fo r e tu rnin g to th e se to p ic s, h ow ever, we s h a ll, in the
n ext ch ap ter, continue the p r e se n t d is c u s s io n of im m ed ia te value
e x p e r ie n c e in o rd er to d is c o v e r a com m on ground fo r d efin itio n s of
v a lu e .
CHAPTER H
COMMON GROUND FOR A DEFINITION
The m ultiple functions of language range from pure em otive
outbursts ( ’fie, 1 ’wow, * ’whew*) through interm ediate m eanings
(in volvin g cognition, su ggestive and em otive content) to direct co g
nitive a sser tio n s (su ch as ’x is round1). A d iscu ssio n of cognitive
statem en ts and th eir bearing upon value theory w ill be postponed un
til Chapter V. In the m eantim e, the problem before us is to d is
cover for the im m ediate value experien ce a term on which a ll four
philosophers can a g ree. Such a term m ust be su fficien tly gen eral to
encom pass the many dim ensions and the different types of im m ediate
value exp erien ce which w ere encountered in Chapter I.
In term s of the previous d iscu ssio n , the im m ed iately valuable
is b est e x p r essed by attitudes, e . g . , in form ulations such as ’ A is
in terested in x 1 (P e r r y ), ’ A lik es x 1 (L e w is ), "A approves of
x 1 (S tev en so n ), ’ A d e sir e s x 1 ( Lew is and P a r k e r ). In other
w ords, as P er ry su g g ests, attitudes rep resen t dispositions to be for
or against certain ob jects. *
* Thus attitudes th em selv es are positive and negative.
9
10
In p e r r y 's a n a ly sis of attitudes fo r and ag a in st, he d isco v e rs
that th ere is a continuity of a governing p rop en sity from the lo w est to
the h ig h est form s of life . The fa m ilia r d istin ction betw een habitual
b ehavior in human ex p erien ce and in stin ctiv e behavior in the low er
; anim als and in s e c ts , how ever, se e m s to r a is e d ifficu lties for this
I
view ; fo r if in stin ctiv e ( in s e c t) and habitual (h u m an ) behavior be
d istin ctly differen t, then the nature of an attitude would be fundam en
ta lly d ifferen t in each c a se . John B. W atson, how ever, in P sych ology
; fro m the Standpoint of a B eh avioriat, o ffer s a d efen se for P e r r y 's
! cla im ed continuity by indicating how 'attitude' is a ter m broad enough
l
! to en com p ass both in stin ctiv e and habitual fa c to r s --a s w ell as th ose
j
| of em otion;
i
O bservation se e m s to show that com binations occu r am ong
em otion al, in stin c tiv e and habit a c t iv it ie s .. . . A nger as we
s e e it exhibited in the in se c t w orld probably rem ain s on the
em o tio n -in stin ct le v e l (h e r e d ita r y ). Habit a c tiv itie s a r e at a
m inim um in th e se an im als (though not w holly la ck in g ). In the
hum an r a ce certa in ly the ex citin g stim u lu s is u su ally one which
h am p ers, jo s tle s , crow ds or co n stra in s the in d ivid u al--th e
stim u lu s to ra g e. The in stin ctiv e fa cto rs are strik in g out with
the a rm s and hands, grasp in g, running tow ard the object, probably
biting it, the w hile flash in g the teeth . D efen siv e m ovem ents a l
s o occu r of the in stin ctiv e kind. The habit fa cto rs e x p r e ss
th e m se lv e s in the sc ie n tific "form" of attack and d efen se: the
way the arm s a r e held to avoid givin g the enem y a vuln erable
sp ot, e tc . —and in the stan ce of the fee t. The w hole group is
in tegrated, the part rea ctio n s held togeth er. The individual
b ecom es a fig h tin g -d efen se unitary action m a ss. If the en v iro n
m en tal fa c to r s a r e su ch that actu al fighting cannot occu r, the
su b ject a ssu m e s the "defiant" attitude. Many of the em otion,
in stin ct and habit action ten d en cies a re con strain ed by so c ia l
11
fa c to r s. The em p h asis has then, of co u r se, to fa ll back on the
im p lic it em otion al com ponents of the action m a ss . 2
W atson's d e fe n se —w ritten in 1919—is pertinent b ecau se it
r e fle c ts the b eh a v io ristic orientation of P e r r y when he w rote G en eral
i
T h eory of V alu e. N o n eth eless, sin c e P e r r y la ter m odified h is p o si-
I
tion in p sych ology, an appeal to W atson on th is point can now perhaps
be co n sid ered only of h isto r ic a l in te r e st. M oreover, and perhaps
m ore to the point, in order to com p are P e r r y --e s p e c ia lly in his
i
la ter fo rm u la tio n s—with P ark er, L ew is, and Stevenson, a m ethod-
i
o lo g ic a lly neutral and m ore m odern form u lation of the m eaning of
| 'attitude' is req uired. H orace B. E n glish , in A C om prehensive
j
! D iction ary of P sy c h o lo g ic a l and P sych oan a ly tica l T erm s, fu rn ish es
! su ch an explication ; m o reo v er, b efore form u latin g a m odern d efin i
tion, he p la c es the use of 'attitude' in its h is to r ic a l settin g:
The term is . . . lo o se ly em ployed. C om ing from the sam e
root as 'aptitude, * it o rig in a lly m eant a p ostu re of the body
su itab le for a certa in action and, by exten sion , a "posture of
the m ind. " Thus it m eant a so r t of p reparatory or su spended
action, c o n sistin g at le a s t in part of p a rtia l or m inute sy m b o lic
(e s p . su b v erb a l) a c ts . T his notion is in fluential, if not nuclear,
in the evolu tion of the ter m 's m eaning. ®
The m odern form u lation fo llo w s:
attitude n. an enduring, learn ed p red isp o sitio n to b e
have in a c o n siste n t way tow ard a given c la s s of ob jects; a
2 ( P hilad elp hia and London, 1919 ), p. 248.
^ ( New York, T oronto, London, 1958 ), p. 50.
12
p e r s is te n t m en ta l a n d /o r n eu ral sta te of r e a d in e s s to r e a c t to
a c e r ta in ob ject or c la s s of o b je cts, not as th ey a re but a s
th ey a r e c o n c eiv ed to b e. It is by the c o n siste n c y of r e sp o n se
to a c la s s of o b je cts that an attitude i s id en tified . The r e a d i
n e s s sta te h as a d ir e c tiv e e ffe c t upon fe e lin g and a ctio n r ela ted
to the o b je cts (E n g lish , p. 50)
The sig n ifica n t point h ere is that th is d efin itio n is su ffi
c ie n tly broad to en c o m p a ss the in stin c tiv e , habitual and em otion al
fa c to r s w h ich W atson s t r e s s e s . Thus E n g lish , w ritin g in 1958,
su g g e s ts that attitu d es en co m p a ss s e ts , h ab its, se n tim e n ts, value
s y s te m s , and even b e lie fs :
Set e m p h a siz e s m otor r e a d in e s s and r e la tiv e ly r ig id r e
sp o n se . H abit u su a lly r e fe r s to a som ew h at m o re co m p lex
str u c tu r e and h a s a stro n g er a ffec tiv e com ponent (not alw ays e x
p lic it) than s e t . S en tim en ts a re co m p lex attitu d es in w h ich the
a ffe c tiv e a sp e c t p la y s a co n tro l r o le . V alue sy s te m s are of m uch
the sa m e c h a r a cter but w ith a m o re e x p lic it judgm ent fa cto r . At
one end, a ttitu d es a r e not w e ll d istin g u ish ed fro m em otion al te m -
p era m en ta l ten d e n c ies; at the other end from id eo lo g y or b e lie f.
(P- 50)
T hus, th is d efin itio n of 'a ttitu d e1 a s an in teg ra tio n of the
v a r io u s in stin c tiv e , em o tio n a l, and habitual r e a c tio n s m ay be u sed to
p r e s e r v e P e r r y 's c la im e d continu ity of a ll liv in g o r g a n ism s to r e a c t
for and a g a in st o b je c ts.
The m a in r e a so n for quoting W atson (1919) and E n g lish
(1958), h o w ev er, i s to su g g e st that the ter m 'attitude' is su ffic ie n tly
broad to in clu d e th e v a r io u s m ea n in g s s tr e s s e d by a ll four p h ilo so -
; p h e r s. T hus, upon the le v e l of im m ed ia te e x p e r ie n c e , 'attitude' m a y
en c o m p a ss P a r k e r 's d e s ir e , L e w is's p rizin g and sa tisfa c tio n ,
13
Stevenson’s approval, and P e r r y ’s m ost elem en tary s e t as w ell as
his in te r e st, a s the follow in g d iscu ssio n of th ese four p osition s w ill
indicate.
P ark er does not define 'd e sire , 1 but h is use of th is term
corresponds to the p sy ch o lo g ists' elem en t of sentim en t in an attitude
( s e e the quotation from E n glish above ). S p ecifically, he ch a r a cter
iz e s im m ed iate value exp erien ce as " vectoral currents of feelin g
which overflow into e x p r e ssiv e media" . Such an exp erien ce, a c
cording to this view , in volves at le a st an im p licit referen ce to the
assu agem en t of d e sir e through the rea liza tio n of an objective. Now
P ark er b e lie v es that 'd e sire ' is an elem en tary term and, th erefore,
cannot be d escrib ed adequately. He does find synonym s for i t - -
which, incidentally, are strik in gly sim ila r , as we sh a ll s e e , to
P e r r y 's form u lation s. A partial lis t would include 'in te r e s t,'
'w ill, 1 'purpose, 1 ’w ish, ’ 'in stinct, ’ 'd rive, 1 'habit, ' 'urge, '
'determ ining te n d e n c y ,' 'lib id o .1 But the difficulty of determ ining
the e sse n tia l featu res of d e s ir e —to continue P a rk er's a n a ly s is --c a n
not be so lv ed by com pounding a m ere lis t of syn on ym s; for the
problem rem ains: what is the gen eric sig n ifica n ce com m on to all
th ese ter m s? P ark er a n sw ers, fir s t, d e sir e is a v ecto ra l ex p e ri-
^ The P hilosophy of Value ( Ann A rbor, M ichigan, 1957 ), p. 68.
ence; it is a s s y m e tr ic a l and d irected - Second, d e s ir e has a t e n s e
n e s s about it w h ich can be com p ared to that of a c o ile d sp rin g.
F in a lly , d e s ir e in v o lv e s an e ffic a c io u s elem en t. T h ese c h a r a c te r
is t ic s se r v e to supplem ent L e w is's u se of 'good. * It is tru e that
L ew is is cau tiou s w h en ever he r e fe r s to im m ed ia te v a lu e e x p e rien ce
N o n e th e le ss, w h en ever he attem p ts to narrow the gap b etw een e x
p e r ie n c e and lan gu age, he u s e s w ords su ch a s 'lik in g, 1 'p rizin g , 1
and th e se m ay be sa id , upon the le v e l of im m ed ia te e x p e rien ce , to
r e fle c t a ttitu d es. Thus in sp ite of h is r e se r v a tio n s, L e w is's a n a ly
s is is sim ila r to P a r k e r 's in m aintaining that w ord s r efle c tin g the
m ean ing of d e s ir e b e st r e p r e se n t the im m ed ia te value e x p e rien ce .
In L e w is's w ords:
The im m ed ia te ly good is what you lik e and what you want
in the w ay of e x p e rien ce ; the im m ed ia tely bad is what you d is
lik e and do not want.
Such ap p ellation s a s t h e s e - - 'lik e d ’ or 'd islik ed , ' 'wanted'
or 'unwanted, 1 'good 1 or 'bad', as a d d re ssed to the d ir e c tly
p r e s e n te d --a r e b etter in d ic es of the im m ed ia te ly valuab le or
d isv a lu a b le than o th e r s. 5
A gain, in one of h is few c h a r a cter iza tio n s of the im m ed iate
valu e e x p e r ie n c e , L ew is c o m e s c lo s e to defining 'valu e' in P a r k e r 's
te r m s:
. . .th e ter m 'v a lu a b le1 is to be applied to o b jects and other
e x is te n ts s o le ly w ith the m ean ing 'capable of conducing to
sa tisfa c tio n in som e p o ssib le e x p e r ie n c e , (p. 414)
5
C . I. L e w is, An A n a ly sis of K nowledge and V aluation
(L a S a lle, Indiana, 1946), p. 404.
L ew is and P ark er, then, p resen t sim ila r an a ly ses of the im
m ediate value e x p erien ce. P e r r y 's con clu sion s, too, su ggest that
im m ed iate value exp erien ce is as P arker c h a r a cter ize s it. Indeed,
P a rk er's 'ten se, effica cio u s, v ecto ra l and d irected behavior1 c o r
resp ond s to P e r r y 's 'governing propensity, ' for th is is defined as a
"determ ining tendency, or general 'set' w hich is at any given tim e in
control of the organ ism as a w hole. In short, if w e add th ese con
clu sio n s to the p reviou s im p lication s regarding the nature of a tti
tud es, w e note that L ew is, P erry , and P arker can agree upon the
concept of attitudes as a fusing of in stin cts, em otion s, and habitual
behavior upon the le v e l of im m ediate value ex p erien ce. M oreover,
Steven son w ill d isco v er, as w e shall see in the next chapter, that
th ere are su g g estiv e, em otive, and d escrip tiv e m eanings which,
upon the lin g u istic le v e l, roughly corresp ond to the above th ree
a sp ec ts of an attitude. Stevenson a lso r e fe r s to attitudes as
"p urposes, asp iration s, w ants, p referen ces, d e s ir e s and so on"
(E th ic s, p. 3). T h ese d escrip tion s are sim ila r to the term s P ark er
and L ew is u se to d escrib e im m ed iate exp erien ce. F urtherm ore,
Stevenson ex p lic itly m aintains that he is using 'attitude' in a m anner
sim ila r to that in w hich P er ry u se s 'in terest':
G eneral Theory of Value (New York, e t c ., 1926), p. 183.
16
The term "attitude" is h ere u sed in m uch the sam e broad
sen se that R. B. P er ry g iv es to " in terest. " See h is G eneral
Theory of Value (Longm ans, G reen, 1926), p articu larly p. 115.
(Stevenson, p. 3)
S teven son 's referen ce h ere is to P e r r y 's ch aracterization of
the human m ind as "for som e things and against o th ers. " M oreover,
Stevenson would agree with P erry that
This duality appears in m any fo rm s, such as liking and d is
lik ing, d e sir e and aversion , w ill and refu sal, seeking and avoid
ing. It is th is a ll-p e r v a siv e ch a ra cteristic of the m o to r-a ffectiv e
life , this state, act, attitude or d isp osition of favor or d isfa v o r,
to which w e propose to give the nam e 'in ter est. ' (P erry ,
G en eral, p • 115)
A difficulty, how ever, a r is e s w ith th is interp retation of an
attitude as an in terest; for p reviou sly P er ry identified in te r e sts with
a governing propensity. There are now two equivalents of an attitude:
an in te r e st and a governing propensity. What is to be said co n cern
ing th is double identification ? Two resp o n ses can be m ade. F ir st,
no con flict need occur in identifying an attitude with eith er a govern
ing propensity or an in te re st b ecau se, according to P erry , the actual
le v e l at w hich in te re st m ay be said to occur is arb itrary.
There is an option as to the le v e l w here the ter m s 'in te r e st1
and 'value' are introduced. If one d e s ir e s to ca ll a tendency an
in te re st, and its equilibrium or culm inating phase an end, and
to give the nam e of 'value' to th is end, or to the reaction s of
the organism or m achine by which it is m aintained or attained,
th ere is nothing to prevent. It is a m atter of definition of
w ord s. . . . T here is nothing eith er illo g ic a l or contrary to
fact in speaking of " q u a si-in te r e sts," " su b -in te r e sts," "near
in terests" and " p roto-in terests" ; and valu es m ay be construed
17
accordingly^.
The fir s t rea so n that there need be no con flict in identifying
an attitude w ith a governing prop en sity or an in te r e st, then, is that
the ch oice is an arb itrary one. But secon d ly, and perhaps m ore
sig n ifican tly, no con flict o ccu rs b eca u se, as su ggested p rev io u sly ,
attitude in v o lv es in stin ct, em otion, and habit. Now the e sse n tia l
d ifferen ce betw een a governing p rop en sity and an in te r e st is that the
la tter in clu d es two fa cto rs: (a) the governing p rop en sity "... or
gen eral 'set' w hich is at any tim e in control of the organ ism as a
w h ole. . . , " and, (b) anticipation or exp ectation , w hich is a "set"
concerning future o c cu rr en ce s. In effect, P e r r y defin es 'in te r e s t1
as follow s:
An act is in te re sted in so far as its o ccu rren ce is due to
the agreem en t betw een its accom panying expectation and the
u n fulfilled p h ases of a governing p ro p en sity . (G eneral, p. 183)
In terest, then, is m ore com p reh en sive than governing
p rop en sity b eca u se the fo rm er a lso in v o lv es exp ectation . Thus,
sin ce attitude in clu d es fa cto r s of in stin ct, em otion, and habit, it can
en com p ass both governing p rop en sity and in stin ct; for if the em otive
a sp ect of an attitude is str e s se d , then p resu m ab ly the attitude would
^Ralph B arton P er ry , R ealm s of Value (C am bridge, M a ss. ,
1954), pp. 48-49-
18
corresp on d to a governing propensity, w h ereas, if the habitual factor
is em p h asized , the attitude would be an in te r e st. F in ally, an
em p h asis upon in stin ct would be am biguous, with the attitude flu ctu
ating betw een governing prop en sity and in te r e sts.
In su m m ary, then, Stevenson, L ew is, P e r r y , and P ark er
can a ll a g ree that ’attitude1 can be used to r e fle c t the nature of the
im m ed iate value ex p erien ce. M oreover, the p sy ch o lo g ists agree
with P e r r y that the term r e fe r s to a con solidation of em otion, in stin ct
and habit. P ark er em p hasizes' the fir s t a sp ect of the im m ed iate
value ex p erien ce by equating it with d e sir e as v e c to r a l, a sy m m e tr i
ca l, d irected and, e ffic a c io u s. P e r r y a lso d isc o v e r s th ese ch a ra c
te r is tic s , but, em p h asizin g evolutionary continuity in his 'governing
propensity* and his 'in terest, * he s t r e s s e s the in stin ctiv e elem en t.
In turn, Stevenson e x p licitly id en tifies ’attitude, 1 as he u ses it, with
P e r r y 's 'in t e r e s t .1 F in a lly , L ew is an alyzes the indubitable quality
of im m ed iate ex p erien ce, and a g r ee s with the other p h ilosop h ers that
th ere is an elem en t of d e sir e in the im m ediate value exp erien ce; and,
he su g g ests that su ch ex p erien ce, in so fa r as it r e p r e se n ts the in
dubitable sta rtin g point of on e's reason in g, is lik e an attitude in being
beyond im m ed iate c r itic is m or control. In sh ort, 'attitude, ' as a
con solid ation of in stin ct, em otion, and habit, is a te r m which, b e
cau se of its gen erality, a ll four ph ilosop h ers can in itia lly accep t.
CH APTER IH
THE PRO BLEM OF THE FL E X IB IL IT Y AND
PERSUASIVE FUNCTIO N OF LANGUAGE
S tev en so n 's ch a llen g e to the p o s sib ility of defining value
ter m s is e s s e n tia lly a double one: (a) the p e r su a s iv e fu n ction of
lan gu age, to g eth er w ith the fle x ib ility of e m o tiv e , su g g e s tiv e , and
d e sc r ip tiv e m ea n in g s, p rev en ts an adequate d efin ition of 'v a lu e, '
and, (b) the double m ean in g of e th ic a l w ords (ap p roval plus co m p u l
s io n ) thw arts attem p ts to se p a r a te value te r m s fro m im p e r a tiv e s .
T he la tter is s u e , co n cern in g the r ela tio n sh ip of v alu e to im p e ra tiv es,
m u st r em a in an open q u estio n u n til exam in ed in d e ta il in P a r ts II
and IH o f th is d isse r ta tio n . N o n e th e le ss, S tev en so n h im se lf has
se p a r a te d the two com p onents of an attitude ( 'I approve of th is' and
'do s o lik e w ise ' ). We sh a ll a cco rd in g ly em p loy th is m eth o d o lo g ica l
d e v ice by lim itin g d is c u s s io n in th is part to the 'I approve o f th is'
p a rt of an attitu d e, and postponing co n sid er a tio n of the 'do s o as
w ell' u n til P art II.
The fo r m e r q u estio n — con cern in g the fle x ib ility and p e r s u a
s iv e fu n ction o f la n g u a g e --w ill be the top ic of th is ch ap ter. And
h e r e in sp ite of S tev en so n 's in ten tio n s, the d is c u ssio n w ill w arran t
19
20
the fo llo w in g con clu sion s:
(1) S teven son 's a n a ly sis of the fle x ib ility and em otive content
of language is an aid rather than a d eterren t to value
th eory. Thus P e r r y can a g ree with S teven son that w ords
have em otive and d e sc r ip tiv e m ea n in g s, and a lso concur
that w o rd s--a n d th is in clu des m o st d is c o u r s e --h a v e a
double function (approval plus o b je ctiv e ly m eaningful co n
cep ts). And it is w ithin this e x p lic it fram ew ork (se e
R e a lm s, pp. 8 -9 ) that P e r r y d evelop s h is value th eory.
(2) S teven son 's m ethods for a lterin g attitudes r ep re sen t a
p sych ology of p er su a sio n as one approach to reco n cilin g
con flicts of v a lu e. But, as su ch , th ey m ay be included
within the P e r r y -P a r k e r -L e w is orien tation as su p p lem en tary
to the techniques w hich th e se p h ilosop h ers d isc u ss in
P a rt II (se e pp. 79 ff. ).
(3) S teven son 's d isc u ssio n of how one can be persu ad ed that
x is good (a p sy ch o lo g y of p ersu a sio n ) does not d eterm in e
what actu ally is good (value th eory). In other w ords
S teven son 's entire orien tation is lim ited to co n flicts of a t
titude rath er than to an exp lication of attitude its e lf.
We m ay now turn to evid en ce fo r th e se th ree con clu sion s:
(1) A ccording to S teven son 's th eory of m ean ing, em o tiv e,
su g g e stiv e , and d e sc rip tiv e fa cto rs u su a lly occu r to g eth er. T h ese
th ree com ponents cannot be sep arated b eca u se of the follow in g r e a
son s: (a) even if a w ord's denotative m eaning w ere constan t, it often
su g g ests m ore than it r e fe r s to, (b) w ord s, having an em otive e le
m en t, a lso evoke em otive resp o n ses in sp eak er and h e a r e r , (c) wards,
are often vague, and have m eanings w hich flu ctu ate. Any sa tisfa c to r y
th eory of m eaning m ust en com p ass th ese variou s a sp ec ts and r e la
tion sh ip s of m eaning: it m u st explain how a constant meaning can be
21
e sta b lish e d upon sh iftin g p sy c h o lo g ic a l r e sp o n s e s to a sh iftin g sig n .
A ccord in g to S tev en so n , su ch explanation is not forth com in g:
th e o r y of m ean in g cannot fix m ean in g in the fa c e of sh iftin g p sy c h o lo
g ic a l r e s p o n s e s . S tev en so n s u g g e s ts , th e r e fo r e , a p ra g m a tic th eo ry
of m ean in g to en com p ass a n teced en t con d ition s in a c a u sa l m ilie u of
stim u lu s and r e sp o n s e . S tev en so n u s e s the te r m 'd isp o sitio n , ' w hich
is s im ila r to 'p o w e r ,1 'te n d e n c y ,' 'p o te n tia lity ,' 'c a u sa l c h a r a c te r is
t ic . ' T h ere a r e , he a d m its, d iffic u ltie s in u sin g th e ter m 'd is p o s i
tion '; its m ean in g is a c o n tr o v e r s ia l is s u e in p h ilo so p h y . S ig n ifica n t
ly , S teven son does not even fo r m a lly d efin e the te r m . R a th er, by u s
ing e x a m p le s, he attem p ts to is o la te the c h a r a c te r is tic p r o p e r tie s in
v o lv e d . He doe3 this in a m ann er s im ila r to that u sed in the p h ilo s o
phy of s c ie n c e to an alyze su ch d isp o sitio n te r m s as 'so lu b le , '
'm a g n e tic ,' e tc . B r ie fly , ju st as an e x p lica tio n of 'so lu b le ' m u st
in clu d e a ll r elev a n t attendent or a n teced en t co n d itio n s, so an e x p lic a
tion of an e th ica l ter m m u st en co m p a ss c o rresp o n d in g fa c to r s in a
s tim u lu s -r e s p o n s e situ a tio n . T h ese e le m en ts in clu d e tone of v o ic e ,
g e s tu r e s , the em otion al situ a tio n , the p e r s o n a litie s of the sp ea k er
and h e a r e r . 'D isp o sitio n ' as a te r m in e th ic s , th en , is to r e fe r to a
c o m p lica ted m ilie u in w hich th ere a r e m any c a u se s for a given type
of ev en t. This ex p lica tio n of 'd isp o sitio n ' in te r m s of stim u lu s and
r e sp o n se h elp s to d istin g u ish d e sc r ip tiv e and e m o tiv e m ea n in g s.
22
D escrip tiv e m eaning occurs w henever lin gu istic ru les fix m eanings
to a consid erable degree:
The " d escrip tive meaning" of a sig n is its d isp osition to
affect cognition, provided that the d isp osition is caused by an
elaborate p r o c ess of conditioning that has attended the sig n 's
u se in com m unication, and provided that the d isp osition is
rendered fixed, at le a st to a con sid erab le d egree, by lin gu istic
r u le s. (E xception: a term without previous use in com m unica
tion m ay be a ssig n ed a d escrip tiv e m eaning if lin g u istic ru les
relate it to words that have had such a use ). ( Stevenson, p. 70 )
On the other hand:
E m otive m eaning is a m eaning in which the resp on se
(fro m the h ea rer’s point of v ie w ) or the stim u lu s (fr o m the
sp ea k er's point of v iew ) is a range of em otion s. (S teven son ,
p. 59)
W hereas th ese d escrip tiv e and em otive elem en ts m ay be thus
sep arated for a n a ly sis, the im portant point is that Stevenson a g rees
with P erry that they usually occur togeth er, shading in d egree, a c
cording to context. Indeed, such am bigu ities in m eaning su g g est that
an exam ination of the function and lim itation s of definitions in gen eral
is in ord er. Stevenson finds that there are four definite types of
definitions: (1) p ersu a siv e, (2) q u a si-p e rsu a siv e , (3) m ixed, and,
(4) detached. He b e lie v es that a d iscu ssio n of the nature and purposes
of th ese m ay prevent n eed less confusion as to why eth ica l term s can
not in princip le be adequately defined. Stevenson co n sid ers in turn
the four types of d efin ition s.
(1) P er su a siv e definition changes d escrip tive m eaning without
su b stan tially changing em otive m eaning. An exam ple is the Soviet
Union’s use of the word ’dem ocracy.* In context, the term r e fe r s
to C om m unist d ictatorsh ip s, but, it retain s m ost of the favorable
em otive tinge usually a sso c ia te d with the word in the W estern w orld.
(2) In q u a si-p e rsu a siv e definitions the em otive m eaning changes^w ith-
out su b stan tially changing d escrip tiv e m eaning. As an illu stra tio n ,
we have the w ell-know n saying: ” . . . .th e word firm can be declined
as follow s: I am firm , thou art obstinate, he is pigheaded". * A
sh ift is apparent in em otive m eaning from firm , obstinate, and p ig
headed^ but the d escrip tiv e m eaning, at the sam e tim e, rem ain s
constant (provided, of co u rse, that language - -and, unfortunately,
along with it, the hum or—of the p erson be appropriately r estr ic te d ).
(3) M ixed definitions are on es in which both em otive and d escrip tiv e
m eanings change. Nothing new is involved, excepting that the above
two changes occur sim u ltan eou sly. F or exam ple, the word
’Quisling* was once a resp ected nam e in Norway, but now is a word
of contem pt for any tra ito r . (4) D etached definitions are d escrip tive
m eanings devoid of an em otive elem ent; but whether or not they occur
is a debatable q u estion . Stevenson r e fe r s to a rem ark of B ertrand
* Robert H. T h o u less, How to Think Straight ( New York,
1939), p. 4.
R u ssell:
A definition u su a lly im p lie s[i. e. , lea d s one to suspect] that
the d efin ition is w orthy of carefu l con sid eration . H ence the
c o lle c tio n of d efin ition s em b od ies our ch oice of su b jects and our
judgm ent a s to what is m o st im portant. (E th ics, p. 282)
A s S teven son points out, a ch oice of what is im portant or w orthy of
attention i s not without a p er su a siv e elem en t. A re detached d e fin i
tio n s, then, a th eo retica l im p o ssib ility ? S teven son a n sw ers that, at
le a s t as an id eal form , detached d efinition s cannot occur:
We cannot sp ecify that n on p ersu asive d efin ition s be fre e
from . . . em otive r e p e r c u ssio n s, e ls e they w ill con stitu te a
tr iv ia l c la s s w ith v irtu a lly no m em b ers. We m u st sp ecify,
rath er, that em otive m eaning be '’p r a c tic a lly n egligib le" in
its r ea liza tio n , (pp. 282-283)
Though no c le a r -c u t d istin ction can be m ade betw een p e r
su a siv e and detached d efin ition s, a u sefu l d istin ctio n m ay se r v e to
d istin g u ish them , according to the nature of the attitu des w hich are
in fluenced . D etached d efin ition s lim it evaluational elem en ts to the
is s u e s w hich a r ise in ch oice of m ethodology. R eferen ce to th is
"narrow range" of detached d efinition s is at le a s t vagu ely u sefu l to
d istin g u ish detached and p e r su a siv e definition s:
. . . it can be said , an alytically, that detached d efin ition s are
lim ited , in th eir con trolled e ffe ct upon attitu d es, to a narrow
range of them , w h erea s the sam e cannot be said of p e r su a siv e
d efinition s; and th is rem a in s as a helpful, if p artial, w ay of
d istin gu ish in g them . (p. 284)
D efin ition s having a "narrow ra n g e" --d eta ch ed d e fin itio n s--
25
can be roughly d istin gu ish ed , then, in s c ie n c e . And, for p r a ctica l
p u rp oses, the d e sc rip tiv e ch a ra cter of a definition in sc ie n c e is
enough to e sta b lish its r esp ec ta b ility . Any ex ten sio n of th is approach,
h ow ever, to include the definitions of e th ic s, accord in g to Stevenson,
is doom ed to fa ilu re . E th ical d efin ition s, being by th eir nature
vague, cannot be m ade d e sc rip tiv e , and w henever a definition is
vague, it is su b ject to s e v e r a l in terp retation s without contrad iction.
A s an exam p le, one m ay define 'good' as conducive to "human s u r
v iv a l. " But one m ay a lso u se the ter m without v io len ce to language
by m aintaining that life under su ch and su ch conditions would be bad.
Thus the vagu en ess of eth ica l ter m s p erm its m any in terp retation s of
m eaning, and th is fact cannot be avoided without violation to language.
F or to in s is t upon one in terp retation of the m eaning of ’good1 is to
appeal to a p ersu a siv e definition; and the function of p e r su a siv e d efin i
tio n s, as we have se e n , is to r e d ir e c t attitu d es.
E th ical d efin ition s involve a wedding of d escrip tiv e and
em otive m eaning, and accord in gly have a freq u en t u se in r e
d irectin g and in ten sifyin g attitu d es. To ch oose a definition is
to plead a c a u se , s o long as the word defined is stro n g ly e m o tiv e.
( Steven son , p. 210 )
T hus, in o rd er to prevent ab u ses to language, one m u st, sa y s
Steven son , r ec o g n ize at a ll tin e s that w ords have an em otive, su g
g e stiv e , and d e sc rip tiv e m ean ing and that one cannot without violatin g
u sage be ab sorb ed into the oth er.
26
Now one need not dispute S teven son 's contention that
language h as se v e r a l functions. On th is point P e r r y would agree:
T here is no doubt of the fact that w ords are com m only u sed
w ith an e x p r e ssiv e , com m endatory, or disparaging intent. A
love poem or a p o litica l diatribe is not the sam e thing a s a
m ath em atical th eorem or sc ien tific statem ent- W ords such as
'fa sc ist' and 'red' lo s e their conceptual m eaning and d egenerate
into sm ear w ords; "the land of the fre e and the hom e of the
brave" m ay se r v e only to e x p r ess and arou se a love of country.
(R e a lm s, p . 8)
The purely d escrip tiv e function of language is perhaps b est
illu stra ted in its sc ien tific u sa g e. But, as P er ry points out, m ost
m eanings occur betw een the em otive and d escrip tiv e e x trem es.
A w ord having only an em otive m eaning lik e the word ' F ie !'
is the extrem e opposite of a w ord having only a conceptual
m eaning, lik e the word 'e llip se . ' The great body of human d is
co u rse, how ever, lie s betw een th ese e x tr e m e s. If verb al usage
w ere to be so am ended as to lea v e only exclam ation s, exh orta
tion s, com p lim en ts, and in su lts, on the one hand, and rigorou s
sc ien tific con cep ts, on the other hand, m o st p erson s a ll the
tim e, and a ll p erso n s, including sc ie n tis ts, m ost of the tim e,
would have to rem ain m ute. Statem ents w hich em ploy such
ter m s as 'good' and 'bad' m ay, and u su a lly do, convey ob jectively
m eaningful con cep ts, eith er e x p r e ssly or by im plication. Thus
when Saint F ra n cis is judged to be good, the fact that he fed the
b ird s, and thus m an ifested lovin g-k in d n ess to livin g things, is
taken as constituting h is good n ess. (R e a lm s, p. 8)
Thus, to conclude the fir s t point regarding S teven son 's e x
p lication of the flex ib ility and em otive content of language, P er ry in
d ica tes how S teven son 's th eory of m eaning can be en com p assed w ith
in a trad ition al value theory: m e r e ly b ecau se w ords have em otive and
d escrip tiv e ex tr em e s d oes not alter the fact that m o st w ords include
27
both fa cto r s (app roval plus o b je c tiv e ly m ean ingful co n cep ts). And
P e r r y and P ark er w ill p ro ceed to exp lain th e sig n ific a n c e of this
point in C hapter IV. T hus, by an alyzin g the m ean in g and fle x ib ility
of language, S teven son con trib u tes to an o v e r -a ll th eory.
(2) Our seco n d co n clu sio n w as that S teven son 's p sych ology
of p e r su a sio n m ay be c o n sid er ed su p p lem en tary to other m ethods for
r ec o n c ilin g the c o n flic ts of v a lu e w hich L e w is, P er ry , and P a rk er
w ill p r e sen t la ter (s e e P a rt II, p p j.6 9 ff.). Steven son su g g e sts th ree
typ es of p e r su a sio n for a lterin g attitu des: n o n -ra tio n a l, ration al, and
irr a tio n a l. In the n o n -ra tio n a l m ethod, attitu des alone influence
other attitu d es; on th e oth er hand, in ra tio n a l m eth od s, rea so n s w hich
support attitudes m ay in flu en ce other a ttitu d es. F in a lly , irr a tio n a l
m eth od s, like ration al m eth od s, m ake r e fe r e n c e s to r ea so n , but, un
lik e ra tio n a l m eth od s, defend the r e a so n s th e m se lv e s w ith in valid
ta c tic s . Irra tio n a l m ethods d iffer fro m n o n -ra tio n a l m ethods b eca u se
the la tter go beyond th e u se of r e a so n s a lto g eth er.
Since ra tio n a l, irr a tio n a l, and n o n -ra tio n a l m ethods m ay be
used fo r th e sa m e p u rp ose, the q u estion im m ed ia tely a r is e s , w hich
m ethod sh ou ld be u sed ? Should p e r su a sio n be rep udiated? The o c
c u rren ce in th e se q u estio n s of the w ord 'should' im m ed ia tely in d ica tes
that e th ic a l d e c isio n s are involved in any a n sw er. P e r su a sio n , for
exam p le, can be good or bad, depending upon con text. On the other
28
hand, a life in w h ich em o tiv e e le m e n ts of p e r su a sio n did not occu r
w ould be a life of un b earab le apathy. S teven son b e lie v e s that p e r
su a siv e m ethods have a fu n ction in exten d in g kn ow led ge. T hey m ay
do th is in any of the fo llo w in g w ays: (1) by e lim in a tin g la g s in ch an ges
b etw een attitu d es and b e lie fs , (2) by stim u la tin g new b e lie fs , and,
(3) by prom otin g an em p athic a tm o sp h ere con d u cive to u n derstand in g.
One way u su a lly o c c u r s in situ a tio n s in w h ich a ttitu d es, through c o n d i
tion in g, tend to con tin u e a fte r r e a so n s w h ich su p p orted th em have
b een rep u d iated . The se c o n d and th ird situ a tio n s are som ew h at
s im ila r . E ith er one m ay, through the p ro p er u se of p e r su a siv e
e le m e n ts of lan gu age, lead to a b e tter understand in g of b e lie fs through
em p ath ic d is c u s s io n . Our co n c lu sio n m u st be that the q u estio n of
w h eth er n o n -ra tio n a l or ra tio n a l m ethods should be vised can se ld o m
be a n sw ered out of co n tex t. The a n sw er depends upon the p e r s o n a li
tie s of the sp e a k e r and h e a r e r , the a im s of the sp e a k e r , the em o tio n a l
o rien ta tio n in v o lv ed . S teven son poin ts out that in c e r ta in situ a tio n s a
g e stu r e or ton e o f v o ic e m ay be a ll that is n eed ed to a lte r an attitu de.
M erely b e c a u se a ll th r ee m eth od s m ay be u sed in e th ic a l d is
pu tes in no w ay im p lie s that value a s s e r tio n s th e m se lv e s m u st be i r
ration al; in d eed , any good book on debating tech n iq u es w ill offer
s im ila r n o n -ra tio n a l and ra tio n a l d e v ic e s for a lte r in g attitu d es in
n o n -v a lu a tio n a l d isp u te s. In co n c lu sio n , then, P e r r y , P a rk er , and
29
L ew is can accep t the S teven son a n a ly sis of p ersu a sio n to support
th e ir a n a ly ses of r ec o n c ilin g co n flicts in valu e. In th is se n s e ,
S teven son 's psych ology of p ersu a sio n is an aid rath er than a d eterren t
to value th eory.
(3) Our third con clu sion was that how one can be persuad ed
that x is good (a p sych ology of p ersu a sio n ) does not d eterm ine the
quite d ifferent qu estion w hether or not x actu ally is good (value
th eory). The above d isc u ssio n su g g ested p e r su a siv e m ethods for
a lterin g attitu d es. Yet S teven son su pp lem en ts this d isc u ssio n with a
co n sid era tio n of the valid ity of e th ica l argum entation. His co n clu
sio n s are ten tative and r e st upon altern ative a ssu m p tio n s. The
fir s t one is as follow s: "if any eth ica l dispute is not rooted in d is
agreem en t in b e lie f, then no reason ed solu tion of any so r t is possib le"
(Steven son , p. 138).
The secon d assum p tion is an opposite o f the first; "if any
e th ica l dispute is rooted in b elief, it m ay be se ttle d by reason in g and
inquiry to w hatever extent the b eliefs m ay be so settled " (Stevenson,
p. 138).
On the b a sis of th e se assu m p tio n s, Stevenson offers a ch oice
betw een two p attern s of argum entation. In the fir s t pattern the
form u lation of the good m ay approach p e r su a siv e neutrality; nonethe
le s s , as a r eflec tio n of th e sp ea k er 's approval, a p e r su a siv e factor
30
m ay occu r (re g a rd less of the sp ea k er 's intention) b eca u se, in this
pattern, the sp ea k er judgm entally p red icates good of an object. But
th is factor m ay be overlooked b ecau se of the effort tow ard neutral
form u lation s. The sign ifican t a sp ect of the fir s t pattern is the
p sy ch o lo g ica l relation sh ip s betw een attitudes and b e lie fs, m aking
any m ethod of alterin g attitudes valid . T his con clu sion follow s
natu rally from accep tin g the assu m p tion that attitudes a re not rooted
in b e lie f s .
Yet even granting the altern ative secon d pattern, in which,
accord in g to the secon d assu m p tion , there is a lo g ica l relation sh ip
betw een attitudes and b e lie fs (provided that the definition of 'good'
be agreed upon), the sam e con clu sion of irra tio n a lity follow s; fo r, in
the secon d pattern, through a com bined use of both em otive and d e s
crip tiv e m ean in gs, the good is p e r su a siv e ly defined. Thus irra tio n a l
ta ctic s m ay now cen ter upon accep tan ce of the p e r su a siv e definition
itse lf; and, w hether the relation sh ip betw een attitudes and b e lie fs is
p sy ch o lo g ica l as in the fir s t pattern, or lo g ic a l, as in the seco n d
pattern, irr a tio n a l ta ctic s can occur:
The d ifferen ce betw een th e definitions that typify the two
p attern s, m ark ed though it is , has no bearing on the nature or
outcom e of e th ica l argu m en ts. . .fo r e v er y seco n d pattern
definition th ere is a fir s t p attern judgm ent, the la tter being the
p e r su a siv e counterpart of the fo rm e r. (Stevenson, p. 229)
What a r e we to conclude from S teven son 's a n a ly sis? The
31
fir s t point is to note that 'good' m ay be p e r su a siv e ly defined, and
that irra tio n a l m ethods m ay cen ter upon th is d efinition . Secondly,
w e have again se en how irra tio n a l ta c tic s m ay be u sed for o v e r c o m
ing em otion al d isa g re em e n ts. But from th ese fa cts concerning how
one m ay a lter attitu d es, it does not follow that value th eory its e lf
need be irration al; for a b su rd ities w ould follow from th is con clu sion .
L ew is is em phatic on th is point:
But th is is one of the stra n g est ab erration s ev er to v is it
the m ind of m an. The denial to va lu e-a p p reh en sio n s in gen eral
of the ch aracter of truth or fa lsity and of know ledge, w ould
im p ly both m oral and p ra ctica l cy n icism . It would invalidate
a ll action; b ecau se action b eco m es p o in tle ss u n less th ere can
be som e m ea su re of a ssu ra n ce of a valu ab le r e su lt w hich it m ay
r e a liz e . And th is negation, if it be c a rr ie d out c o n sisten tly ,
lik e w ise in valid ates a ll know ledge; both b eca u se b eliev in g is i t
s e lf an active attitude w hich would have no point if it w e re not
b etter to be right than w rong in what one b e lie v e s , and b ecau se
know ledge in gen eral is for the sake of action- If action in
gen eral is p o in tle ss, then know ledge a lso is fu tile, and one b e
lie f is as good as another. (A n a ly s is, p. 366)
The fir s t point to o b serv e in defending value th eory from
S tev en so n 's charge of irra tio n a lity , is that S teven son 's illu stra tio n s
form u lated as eth ical d isp u tes concerning what people think to be
valu ab le cannot prove the th e o re tica l m eaning of value; for, on the
p ra ctica l le v e l, confusion m ay a r is e over the ob servation of d ifferen t
ex a m p les of the good, such a s eating, le is u r e , health. M oreover,
the individuals cited m ay have the sam e c r ite r io n of the good, yet
m isap p ly it. Thus the fact that th ere are d iv e rg e n c ie s of attention is
not its e lf su ffic ien t to w arrant the assu m p tion that attitu des a r e not
b ased upon b e lie f s . P a ra d o x ica l im p lic a tio n s, m o re o v er , fo llo w fro m
a ccep tin g S teven son 's a n a ly s is . F ir s t, it would be im p o ssib le e v er
to be wrong con cern in g v a lu e s; but in d ivid u als do change th eir
op in ion s. And w hen they do, they c o n sid er th eir fo rm er opinion
w rong. T his p o ssib ility , a ttested by com m on s e n s e , h ow ever,
rem ain s c lo s e d to S tev en so n 's p o sitio n . He is fo rc ed into the
p arad oxical p o sitio n that both opinions con cern in g value are equally
c o r r e c t. Secondly, S tev en so n 's view , as P e r r y would m aintain,
lead s into an in fin ite r e g r e s s : for A a ctu a lly does not intend to think
about so m eth in g that he is thinking, but to sa y som eth in g about the
thing x . A s an exam p le, if x is the p r a c tic e of wabuwabu, the
Dobuan te r m fo r ex a lted tre a ch er y in exch an ge r itu a ls, then A is
not thinking about h is th ou gh ts; he thinks that x , th is p r a c tic e of
wabuwabu, is good. But the im p lica tio n of S tev en so n 's p o sitio n is
that when A thinks x is good, he m ean s only that he thinks that he
thinks x is good, e tc . Third, if S teven son is c o r r e c t, then e v er y
debate con cern in g v a lu es would be s e ttle d when it w as known what
people b e lie v e . To know what is ju st and good, a ll that is req u ired
is an in v estig a tio n of what peop le think. But would su ch an in v e stig a
tion be fin a l? A re th ere no fu rth er co n sid era tio n s beyond what
people think and sa y ? F in a lly , as L ew is points out, u n less v a lu es
33
a r e b a sed upon r e a so n , th e r e w ould be no p o s s ib ility fo r m an to
o
im p r o v e the con d ition s of h is life .
W hile S tev en so n m ay e le c t to a ccep t th e se p a r a d o x ic a l im p lic a
tio n s in an e ffo r t to r e ta in h is th e o ry , the aw k w ard n ess of su ch a
d e c is io n in d ic a te s that a r e -e x a m in a tio n of h is b a s ic p o sitio n is in
o r d e r . Upon th is le v e l, one cou ld ch a rg e S tev en so n w ith having
fa ile d to a ch iev e th e p u rp ose o f h is a n a ly s is . P r e su m a b ly h is ap
p ro a ch is to sh a rp en "the to o ls w hich o th e rs em ploy" (S teven son , p. 1)
by c la r ify in g th e m ean in gs o f te r m s . But th e f ir s t c r it ic is m of
S te v e n so n 's b a s ic p o sitio n is again that he c o n fu ses the is s u e about
th e n atu re of valu e (w h eth er or not e th ic a l sta te m e n ts can be e m p ir i
c a lly ju stifie d ) w ith the q u ite d iffe re n t q u estio n co n cern in g ta c tic s of
a rg u m en ta tio n (w h eth er e m p ir ic a l m eth od s can r e s o lv e a ll e th ic a l
c o n flic ts ). Indeed, S te v e n so n 's fo rm u la tio n of the p ro b lem s t r e s s e s
h is c o n c er n w ith th e la tte r p ro b lem : "... of c e n tr a l im p o r ta n c e. . is
th e n atu re of e th ic a l a g r ee m e n t and d isa g re em e n t" (S tev en so n , p. 2).
And, se c o n d ly , S tev en so n , by in itia lly d efin in g 'good' a s "I app rove;
do s o as w e ll, " fa ils to d e tec t th r e e d ifferen t ty p e s of e th ic a l d isp u tes
c e n te r in g around th e d iffe r e n c e s b etw een v a lu e d iffe r e n c e s th e m
s e lv e s , b etw een c o n flic tin g o b lig a tio n s, and b etw een v a lu e s and o b li-
^ See b elow pp. 105 f f .f o r ad d ition al a rg u m en ts a g a in st
S te v e n so n ’s p o sitio n c o n c er n in g the r o le of r e a so n and v a lu e .
34
g a tio n s. This point is S e so n sk e 's. He m akes it as follow s:
{1) T here are co n flicts betw een v a lu e s. What is good for
one individual m a y be bad for another; what is good fo r one com
m unity m ay be bad fo r another; what is good for an individual
m ay be bad for a com m unity, and v ic e v e r s a . (2) T here are
co n flicts betw een o b lig a tio n s. A p erso n m ay have an obligation
to p erfo rm act X and an obligation to p erfo rm act Y, in a
context in w hich it is im p o ssib le to do both. Or d ifferen t p erso n s
or groups m ay have ob ligation s to p erfo rm action s that bring
them into co n flict. (3) T here are co n flicts betw een valu e and
ob ligation . Som eone m ay find an action to be conducive to h is
good and yet be an action he has an obligation not to p erfo rm ,
or an o b lig a to ry act m a y b e conducive to e v il. It is p o ssib le ,
too, to have a situ ation involving a ll th ree types of con flict; one
m ay, for exam p le, have to ch oose betw een two a ctio n s, both
o b lig a to ry and both lead in g to good, but m utu ally e x c lu siv e . ^
In fa ir n e ss to S teven son , h ow ever, it m ust be acknow ledged
that S e so n sk e's th ree-fold c la ssific a tio n of co n flict r e sts upon the a s
sum ption that value and ob ligation are independent; and this is s u e
m u st rem ain an open qu estion until S teven son 's argum ents again st
4
su ch independence has been form u lated and exam ined. We m ay, how
e v e r , anticip ate la te r d evelop m en ts by indicating now that S teven son 's
p o sitio n on this point is untenable for the follow in g reason s:
(1) S teven son 's a n a ly sis r e sts upon the erron eou s assum p tion
that eth ics and value th eory cannot be d istin gu ish ed .
(2) In arguing again st the m ea n s-en d s relation sh ip to support
h is o v e r a ll p o sitio n , S teven son e rr o n e o u sly sh ifts fro m the
a n a ly sis of m eans and ends to the quite d ifferen t p rob lem of
A lexander S e so n sk e, V alue and O bligation (B erk eley and
L os A n g ele s, 1957), p. 98.
"^See pp. 148 ff.
35
determ ining why conflicts betw een individuals cannot always be
reduced to disagreem en ts in m eans and ends.
(3) Stevenson's an alysis is incom plete because it fa ils to explain
the com pulsive factor in the individual's use of 'ou gh t.1
(4) His d iscu ssio n of im p eratives fa ils to explain the difference
betw een m oral and non-m oral im p era tiv es.
(5) Stevenson fa ils to m ake h is point that sim p ly because conflicts
of in te re st are often settled by pu rely p ersu a siv e tactics ethical
d iscu ssio n is irration al; for the other philosophers can, as w ill
be shown, admit this fact without jeopardizing their position .
(6) Stevenson's an alysis m isse s altogether the im personal or
interp erson al authoritativeness in eth ical judgm ents.
(7) F in a lly , and in gen eral, contrary to Stevenson's intention,
his psychology of p ersu asion (how one can be persuaded that x
is valuable), cannot determ ine value theory (whether or not x
actu ally is valuable).
The p resen t form ulation of th ese seven issu e s m er ely outlines
a program ; how ever subsequent d iscu ssio n (see pp. 92-192 below)
w ill provide adequate reason s for rejecting Stevenson on each of th ese
is s u e s . F urtherm ore, even at this point, comm on sen se indicates
that con flicts of the type Sesonske enum erates do occur in ordinary
d isco u rse and this evidence ju stifies our provision al assum ption that
value theory and eth ics can for the purposes of a n a ly sis be d istin
guished.
Although the above issu e rem ains a genuine conflict betw een
Stevenson, on the one hand, and P e r r y and L ew is, on the other, on
other points the opposition betw een th ese two groups is not as fixed
36
as m ight fir s t appear; for S teven son 's 'I approve of x' m ay be
lik en ed to 'd e sir e , 1 'in te r e st, * ■ 'liking, 1 and sim ila r w ords, r e
flec tin g an im m ed iate reaction w hich is not am enable to con trol.
M oreover, he sp e c ific a lly sta te s that h is con clu sion s concerning a t
titu d es and b e lie fs a re m e r e ly p ro v isio n a l (se e Steven son , p. 138).
T hus, S teven son 's p o sition need not rem ain incom patible with that of
the other th ree p h ilo so p h ers, provided that they can explain why his
a ltern ative assu m p tion should be m ade. In this even t, S teven son 's
p r e sen t p osition could be view ed as m e r e ly an in com p lete a n a ly sis,
lim ited to the le v e l of im m ed iate value ex p erien ce and based upon an
erron eou s assu m p tion .
On the stren g th of this d iscu ssio n , we m ay now r e a s s e r t th ose
co n clu sio n s w hich w ere p resen ted in a p ro v isio n a l sp ir it at the b eg in
ning of this chapter:
(1) S teven son 's a n a ly sis of the fle x ib ility and em otive content of
language is an aid rath er than a d eterren t to value th eory. Thus
P e r r y can a g ree with Steven son that w ords have em otive and d e s
crip tiv e m ean in gs, and a lso a g ree that w o r d s—and th is in clu des
m o st d is c o u r s e --s e r v e a double function (approval plus o b jectiv ely
m eaningful co n cep ts). And it is w ithin this ex p licit fram ew ork that
P e r r y develops h is th eory.
(2) S teven son 's m ethods for alterin g attitudes r ep re sen t a
p sych ology of p e r su a sio n as one approach to reco n cilin g co n flicts
of valu e. But, it m ay be included w ithin the P e r r y -L e w is-P a r k e r
orien tation a s su p p lem en tary to the techn iqu es which th e se
p h ilosop h ers d is c u ss, (s e e pp. 170 ff. )
37
(3) S teven son 's d isc u ssio n of how one can be persuaded that x is
good (a p sych ology of p ersu asion ) does not d eterm ine what is
good (value th eory). In other w ord s, S teven son 's en tire o r ie n ta
tion is lim ited to co n flicts of attitude rath er than to an exp lication
of attitude its e lf.
CHAPTER IV
INTEREST JUDGM ENTS AND INTRINSIC VALUE
In the p reced in g chap ter, com m on ground fo r c h a r a c te r iz in g
the im m ed iate value ex p erien ce was found in the te r m attitude as a
con solid ation of em otion , in stin ct, and habit. But no attem pt w as
m ade at any e x te n siv e a n a ly sis of the te r m . S teven son , who u ses
attitude a s b a sic to h is th eory, e x p lic itly acknow ledges that he h im
s e lf le a v e s this ta sk undone:
A p r e c is e defin ition of "attitude" is too d ifficu lt a m a tter to
be attem p ted h e r e ; h en ce the te r m , cen tr a l though it is to the
p r e se n t w ork, m ust for the m ost part be un derstood fro m its
cu rren t u sa g e, and from the u sage of m any ter m s (" d e sir e , "
" w ish ," " d isap p roval," e t c .) w hich nam e sp e c ific a ttitu d es.
(E th ics, p. 60)
But P e r r y does fu rn ish su ch an a n a ly s is . T his a n a ly sis w ill
p rovide the p sy ch o lo g ica l b a sis for S teven son 's em o tiv e m eaning as
w e ll as for h is d e sc r ip tiv e m ean in g; m o re o v er , it will c la r ify the
r o le that cognition plays in the value situ a tio n . P e r r y d is c o v e r s that
th ere are two fa cto r s of the value situ ation : a govern in g p ro p en sity
and an ex p ecta tio n . The function of cogn ition is to m ed iate th e se two
fa c to r s . When judgm ents s e r v e th is p u rp ose, P e r r y c a lls th em
in te r e st ju d gm en ts.
38
The m ediating judgm ent w ill be any in te re st w h atsoever
w hich rep re sen ts the object to the in terest; as when a m an's love
of h is m other is m ediated by the judgm ent lth is is m y m other. '
The judgm ent is internal to h is in te re st, sin ce he would not love
h is m other u n less he judged som eone to be h is m other. (P erry,
R ealm s, p. 35)
P e r r y 's an alysis in d icates why and how cognition plays an
internal role in the form ation of attitudes. To explain th is he
develop s an analogy betw een cognitive and in te r e st judgm ents. But,
as w e shall se e , this analogy is a subtle one, and qualified in m any
w ays. The fir s t clue to a com p arison betw een cognition and in te re st
is that both involve expectation. A ccordingly, P er ry g iv es am a c
count of expectation, traceab le in b eh a v io ristic te r m s, according to
w hich expectation alw ays lead s to resp o n ses of certain ty or of doubt
and su rp rise . He b e lie v e s that it is in th ese fee lin g s the b asic
c h a r a c te r istic s of expectation m ay be found:
It would not be illeg itim a te to define expectation as a
lia b ility to such fee lin g s, or as the d isp osition which is the o r
ganic factor n e c e ssa r y for their o ccu rren ce. (G eneral, p- 317)
W hile it is true that expectation is a com m on ingredient of
both cognition and in te re st, th is com p arison should be qualified.
F ir st of a ll, cognition lack s the attitude of favor or disfavor so
n e c e ss a r y to any in te r e st. In other w ords, w e m u st m ake a d istin c
tion betw een d e sir e s (found in in terest phenom ena), and cognition (in
w hich no d e sir e o ccu rs). But even h e r e --in a com p arison betw een
40
d e sir e and co g n itio n -- we are not co m p letely without p a r a lle ls. In
each, w e m ay d istin g u ish the index and the p red ica te. In cognitive
judgm ents, the index is that w hich is judged, and the p red icate is
what is judged about the index. S im ila rly , in the c a se of d e sir e , the
index would be what I d e sir e , w h ereas the p red icate would be what I
d e sir e of it. A dm ittedly, th is analogy is not com p lete, but P er ry , by
follow in g M einong and oth ers, at le a s t has a lead for developing h is
com p arison . An additional advantage of em ploying th is analogy of
d e sir e and cognition is that index and p red icate w ill prove u sefu l in
com paring cogn itive judgm ents w ith in te r e st judgm ents; for, a c co r d
ing to P e r r y , an analogy m ay be drawn betw een th ese tw o ty p es.
P e r r y divid es cogn itive judgm ents into sim p le and com p lex.
H is in itia l ta sk is to explain the fo rm er. H ere we sh all u se P e r r y 's
exam ple concerning reaching for m oney in a p u rse. F ir st, then,
what is in volved in a sim p le cogn itive judgm ent in such a situation ?
The answ er is that I m ay co g n itiv ely judge w hether or not there is
m oney in m y p u rse w ithout d e sir in g the m oney; m y judgm ent can be
cold and calcu latin g. The rea so n is that in m er e exp ectation a
governing p rop en sity is not involved . T his point en ab les P er ry to
; state in m o re p r e c ise te r m s the conditions governing cogn itive
situ ation s:
In judgm ent the act of in d ication r e le a s e s the act of p r e d ica
tion, and in d u ces fu lfilm en t or su rp rise , according as the act
41 !
of predication is or is not executed. (G eneral, p. 344)
!
In the exam ple cited, the index would be m oney, the indica-
i
tion, the act of opening the purse (for this would be the way to b e
com e aw are of the m oney), and the predication, the act of eyeing or !
i
i
of handling the m oney (for th is is what is m eant in saying that there
is m oney in the pu rse). No governing propensity is involved. Thus,
an expectation without a governing propensity constitutes cognition.
On the other hand, to d e sir e m oney r e fle c ts, not only the
anticipation already d iscu ssed , but a lso a governing propensity.
Together, th ese factors give r is e to in terest.
In in terest the fact that the act of indication and the act of
predication are so connected is a condition of the occu rren ce of
the act of indication. The act of indication occu rs owing to the
p rosp ective occu rren ce of the act of pred ication , (pp. 344-5)
The predicate now b ecom es p ressu red by two factors: by the
indication of the cognitive judgm ent and by the governing propensity
of the d e sir e . In terest--th e totality or com bination of th ese two
fa c to r s--c a n now be sa tisfied only when the predication is brought
into harm ony with the governing propensity, i.e., the governing
propensity tends to prom ote the predication or to bring it into e x is t
ence. Of cou rse, P er ry does not m ean that there is any cau sal r e la
tionship in this tendency, but m erely that, if the act of indication does
not r esu lt in the expected predication, then the occu rren ce of a
42
governing p rop en sity w ill lead to disappointm ent. In the exam p le of
the p u rse, the index, m oney, is ind icated by the opening of the
p u rse, which in turn lead s to the p red ication of handling m oney (the
exp ected then occu rs and the judgm ent is tru e), or to the im pos -
sib ility of the p red ication (the exp ected does not occu r and the judg
m ent is fa lse ). A s w e have se e n , th is situ ation o ccu rs on the c o g
nitive le v e l. H ow ever, if the m oney w ere d esired , then the
governing p rop en sity would tend to p rom ote p red ication (the e x iste n c e
of the m oney) and the in te r e st would be sa tisfie d or not according to
w hether o r not the governing p rop en sity w ere in harm ony with the
p red ication . To d e sir e m oney m eans to c re a te the p red ication of
handling m oney.
The judgm ent that th ere is m oney in m y p u rse does not of
its e lf tend to cre a te the conditions of its own fu lfilm en t. It
sig n ifie s a d isp o sitio n to deal with m oney when I open m y p u rse,
but not a d isp o sitio n to open it. The d e sir e that there sh a ll be
m oney in m y p u rse, on the other hand, sig n ifie s that I am d is
p osed to do that of which dealin g w ith m oney is expected; and,
th e re fo re , that in so far as the exp ectation is tru e, the dealing
with m oney w ill o ccu r. In other w ord s, in te r e st has the e ffe ct,
s o far as the in terest-ju d g m en t is tru e, of tr a n sfe rr in g the ob
je c t of that judgm ent fro m a p rob lem atic into an e x isten t object;
w h ile m ere judgm ent unattended by in te r e st, has no su ch ftffect.
(G eneral, p. 346)
The problem rem ain s of explaining com p lexly m ediated
in te r e sts and in d evelop in g a com p arison betw een com p lex cogn itive
judgm ents and com p lexly m ed iated in te r e st jud gm en ts. In m aking
th is analogy, P e r r y m aintains that th ere are tw o typ es of com p lexly
43
m ed iated in te r e st judgm ents w hich corresp on d to the two typ es of
com p lex cognitive judgm ents alread y exam ined. T h ese two typ es of j
|
cogn itive judgm ents both involve prob lem atic o b jects. The d iffe r -
I
ence betw een the two kinds is that one type occu rs when the act of in-j
j
d ication is an act of p redication r e le a se d by an an terior act of in
d ication , w hile the secon d type o ccu rs when the act of p red ication is
the in d ication of an u lterio r p red icate. P e r r y 's ta sk is to develop
the analogy betw een th ese two types of cognitive judgm ents and the
corresp on d in g two typ es of com p lexly m ediated in te r e st judgm ents.
We sh all begin this task by d escrib in g the fir s t type of
com p lexly m ed iated in te r e st judgm ent. P erhap s an exam ple w ill
again help to explain what is m eant by th is type of in te r e st judgm ent.
We sh all u se P e r r y 's illu stra tio n of r esp o n ses to a fir e . In such a
situation, the m ed iated index of in te r e st, the judgm ent involving an
index of fir e --th e ind ication being the a w aren ess of the in d ex --th e
p red icate b eco m es r e d -fla m e s -th e r e . T his p red icate r e p r e se n ts a
p rob lem atic object b eca u se the fla m es m ay or m ay not ex ist; but
w hether or not they e x ist, they give r is e to a governing prop en sity
(m y d e sir e to bring into e x isten ce or to annihilate the r e d -fla m e s -
th ere). A ctually, how ever, a second judgm ent is involved; for I am
not afraid of the w ord 'fir e , 1 but of what 'fir e 1 m ea n s. T his in te r
p retation of the m eaning of 'fire' con stitu tes the second judgm ent in
44
volvin g the m eaning of the index, 'fir e , 1 in the m ain p rop osition . In I
such c a s e s I . r ea c t in te re sted ly to things a s I co n ceiv e them"
(G en eral, p. 350). T his type of com p lexly m ed iated in te r e st judg
m ent, then, in v o lv es an an ticip atory resp o n se concerning a future ;
o ccu rren ce of a p rob lem atic object. It a lso in clu d es the occu ren ce
of an act of ind ication a s an act of p red ication r e le a se d by an a n t e r i- ;
or act of ind ication . But th ese c h a r a c te r istic s a lso d istin gu ish h is
fir s t type of cogn itive judgm ents. P er ry , th erefo re, has m ade e x
p licit the p a r a lle l betw een the fir s t type of com p lex cogn itive judg
m en ts and the fir s t type of com p lexly m ed iated in te r e st judgm ents.
The secon d type of cognitive judgm ent has a lso a co rresp o n d
ing com p lexly m ed iated in te r e st judgm ent. F or, in in te r e st situ a
tio n s, when the judgm ent in v o lv es a p red icate, the second type of
com p lexly m ed iated in te r e st judgm ent o c c u r s. T his fact is ob scu red
by the u sage of language b ecau se e x p r e ssio n s of in te r e st u su a lly om it
the v erb w hich d en otes the r esp o n se. A ctually, "to d e sir e a, is to
d e sir e to do som ething with, to, or about a ." The com m on w ay of
e x p r essin g in te r e st in w ealth is to say, "I d e sir e w ea lth ." But
im p lic it in th is statem en t is the an ticip atory r esp o n se to do so m e
thing w ith, to, or about w ealth, such a s, say, to expend or to exhibit
it. Thus, the com p lete statem en t m ade ex p licit, is , e.g., "I d e sir e
to exhibit w e a lth ." A is the object of the an ticip atory resp o n se to
do som eth in g with, to, or about a —th is b ein g the m eaning of the
p red ica te of in te r e st. To d e sir e som eth in g, in other w ords, m eans
that the an ticip atory r e sp o n se co in cid es w ith a govern in g p rop en sity.
R eturning to the exam p le of "I d e sir e w ealth , " the index of this judg
m ent is w ealth, the p red ica te, the act of expending. The d e sir e is
r e p r e se n te d by the an ticip atory r e sp o n se (of expending w ealth) w hich
tr e a ts the p red ica te (expending) a s its an ticip ated o b ject. But w hat
e v e r can be an ticip ated can be the p red ica te of in te r e st. Thus the
d e sir e (sa y , the govern in g p ro p en sity of pride) m ay have a d e sir e
(the an ticip atory r e sp o n se of expending m oney) as the ob ject of its
a n ticip atory r e sp o n s e . T h ere are now tw o w ays in w hich the
an ticip atory r e sp o n se m ay be s a tis fie d . One way would be by m eans
of a sim p ly m ed iated in te r e st judgm ent (con su m m ated data) w hereby
the m oney is expended and the govern in g p ro p en sity of pride is eith er
s a tisfie d or not. A se co n d way, h ow ever, m ay s a tis fy the sam e p rid e.
T h is p r o c e ss in v o lv es a com p lex m ed iated in te r e st judgm ent about the
p red ica te. The govern in g p rop en sity m ay be sa tisfie d --w ith o u t the
con su m m atory d a te --b y the judgm ent that m y p o s s e s s io n s have been
augm ented. The p o s sib ility of expending m oney rem a in s a p ro b lem
a tic ob ject w hich, w hile not v e r ifie d , is s a tis fie d through th e judgm ent
that it can be v e r ifie d . T his seco n d type of c o m p lex ly m ed iated
in te r e st judgm ent, m o re o v er , p a r a lle ls P e r r y 's secon d type of
com p lex cognitive judgm ent. In both c a se s the judgm ent in volves an
anticipatory resp o n se concerning a future o ccu rren ce of a p rob lem
atic object; and the act of predication, in each c a se , in volves the
indication of an u lterio r p red ica te. Thus, types of com p lexly
m ediated in te r e st judgm ents—as in the c a se of the two types of
cognitive ju d g m e n ts--a r ise b ecau se the p redication of a judgm ent, or
its indication, or both, m ay th e m se lv e s be judgm ents. T his fact
m akes the analogy betw een com p lexly m ediated in te re st judgm ents
and com plex cognitive judgm ents com p lete. In terest judgm ents, then,
m ay be sim p le or com plex; and this d istin ction d irectly p a ra llels
the c la ssific a tio n of cognitive judgm ents.
P erry develops the above com p reh en sive d iscu ssio n of in terest
b ecau se he intends to define value in term s of in te r e st. A s part of
this p relim in ary ta sk he has, as we have seen , indicated the role of
cognition in in te re st by distinguishing betw een cognitive and in te re st
judgm ents.
P e r r y 's d iscu ssio n of the role of cognition in m ediating
in te r e st judgm ents does not, how ever, d iscred it S teven son 's claim
about the relation sh ip of attitudes to b eliefs; indeed, it follow s from
P e r r y 's position , that an in te re st based upon a true b e lie f is not
b etter per se than an in te r e st based upon a fa lse one. N on eth eless,
P er ry w ill supplem ent his theory to indicate that b e lie fs can and do
47
I
i
affect in te r e s ts in te r m s of sta b ility . Such a rela tio n sh ip of in te r e st j
to b e lie fs , h ow ever, m u st aw ait la te r d is c u ssio n in P a rt II. E ven at |
th is point, h ow ever, and d isreg a rd in g the factor of sta b ility , P e r r y 's
i
d is c u ssio n of the in tern a l r o le of cogn ition in m ed iatin g in te r e s t d oes j
I
su g g est, for r e a so n s w e have seen , that S tev en so n 's com p a rtm en ta l- ;
izin g of attitu d es and b e lie fs is an o v e r sim p lific a tio n .
A lthough P a rk er ack n ow led ges h is debt to P e r r y (s e e
P h ilosop h y, p. 44), he o b jects to P e r r y 's d efin ition of value
in te r m s of in te r e s t. M oreover, he m ain tain s that P e r r y is not
c le a r w hether valu e o c c u r s a s an ob ject or as a r ela tio n a l a ttrib u te:
F or exam p le, P e r r y d efin es valu e as "any object of any
in te r e st, " w h ich s e e m s to m ak e of v a lu e an object or a thing,
and yet in an exp lan atory sen ten ce he sa y s "that w hich is the
object of 'in te r e st' i s eo ip so in v e ste d w ith value, " w h ere value
s e e m s to be a rela tio n a l attrib u te. A gain he sa y s, "V alue is
but a sp e c ific r e la tio n into w h ich th in gs p o s s e s s in g any on tological
statu s w h a tso ev er, w hether r e a l or im agin ary, m ay en ter w ith
in te r e ste d subject"; h ere valu e s e e m s to be a rela tio n , and la te r
v alu e i s defined a s both r e la tio n and ch a ra cter a s fo llo w s: "We
have been led to define valu e a s the p ecu lia r r ela tio n betw een any
in te r e s t and its object; or that sp e c ia l ch a ra cter of an ob ject w h ich
c o n s is ts . . . in the fa ct that in te r e st i s taken in it. . . . " (p. 34)
M oreover, accord in g to P a rk er, w h ich ever a ltern a tiv e, r e la
tion or object, is ch o sen to r e p r e se n t P e r r y 's p osition , u n sa tisfa c to r y
co n c lu sio n s fo llo w . F ir s t, if in te r e st is to be co n sid er ed as a r isin g
fro m a rela tio n sh ip b etw een the su b ject and object, a ll that is n eed ed
to d isp ro v e th is c h a r a c te r iz a tio n of in te r e s t is to in d ica te how som e
48
in t e r e s ts can o ccu r w ithout o b je c ts . A cco rd in g to P a rk er , su ch o c
c u r r e n c e s a r e not d iffic u lt to d isc o v e r ; for ex a m p le, if m y in te r e s t
h ap pens to b e, sa y , pain tin g m y h ou se in N ew Y ork a s I en ter ta in th is
id e a w h ile in C a lifo rn ia , then c le a r ly m y p r e se n t in te r e s t h a s no
acco m p a n y in g e ffe c t upon the h o u se . Thus in te r e s t can occu r
in d ep en d en tly of th e o b ject, and to d efin e v a lu e a s an ob ject of
in te r e s t is m isle a d in g . Second, to continu e th is lin e of c r itic is m ,
th e r e can be v a lu e s w h ich a r e c o m p le te ly independent of o b jects;
P a r k e r r e f e r s to m o o d s in w h ich the in d ivid u al m a y be in te r e s te d in
so m eth in g w ithout know ing w hat it i s . P a rk er ad m its that the p s y
c h o lo g is t m a y d is c o v e r for any g iv en m ood a p a st and fo rg o tte n even t
w h ich i s its ''o b ject, " but he m a in ta in s that th is p r o v e s lit t le .
It is doubtful, h o w ev er, w h eth er the ev id en ce fro m o b je c t
l e s s v a lu e s can be d e str o y e d in th is w ay. A fter a ll, w hat p s y c h o
a n a ly s is r e v e a ls i s on ly th e ir h is to r y . It sh ow s that w ithout o b
j e c t s th ey n e v e r w ou ld have a r ise n ; it d o e s not p rove that a s th ey
now e x is t th ey h ave o b je c ts . (P h ilo so p h y , p. 42)
T h ese illu s tr a tio n s of a tra n sc en d e n t ob ject and of m ood s
in d ic a te , a cco r d in g to P a r k e r , that sin c e in te r e s ts can o ccu r in
d ep en d en tly of o b je c ts , P e r r y is w ron g in c h a r a c te r iz in g in te r e s t a s
r e la tio n a l. But to th is lin e of r ea so n in g P e r r y w ould r e p ly that
P a r k e r i s to o r e s t r ic t iv e in h is u se of 'o b je c t1; for P e r r y d e fin e s an
'o b ject of in te r e s t' in the m o st g e n e r a l te r m s: "... a thing i s an o b
je c t o f in te r e s t w hen it s b eing e x p e cted in d u ces a c tiv itie s look in g to
49
its r ea liz a tio n or n o n -re a liz a tio n ” (R e a lm s, p. 3). H ence, as P e r r y
em p loys the w ord 'object, 1 an object m ay have any con ceivab le
on tological sta tu s. P e r r y would adm it that m oods, to w hich P ark er
r e fe r s , a re not e a sy to explain even in te r m s of psychology:
It would be in the h igh est d eg ree presum ptuous in the p r e se n t
state of the su bject to c la im fin a lity for any theory of fee lin g .
N eith er the in tr o sp e c tiv e nor the b eh a v io ristic m ethod has
yield ed r e su lts w hich are g en era lly accep ted am ong p sy c h o lo g ists.
(G en eral, p. 276)
Thus P a rk er ’s r e fe r e n c e to m oods su g g ests d ifficu lties w hich P e r r y
w ould acknow ledge, at le a s t in te r m s of h is e a r lie r b eh a v io ristic
orientation; indeed, la te r , in R ealm s of Value, P e r r y m o d ifies h is
p o sitio n to include an in tegration of " in trosp ective, " " dynam ic, "
" b eh a v io r istic," and "psychological" sch o o ls (se e R e a lm s, p. 18).
And it is now to the in tro sp ectiv e sch ool that P e r r y w ould turn to
explain in te r e st in te r m s of m o o d s:
The rejectio n of in tro sp ectiv e em otion is p ecu lia rly wanton
in the c a se of m oods. W ords such as 'sa d n e ss, ' 'ch ee rfu ln ess, '
'lo n e lin e ss, ' 'h op efu ln ess, ' 'discon ten t, 1 are on e v er y m an's
lip s e v er y day of h is life . When he u s e s them he is understood
by h is fello w m an. They sign ify so m e th in g --o th er w ise a great
part of lite ra tu re w ould be n o n sen se. They are sta te s, a c tiv itie s,
q u a lities or ev en ts, and they have the ch aracter of being known
only to one who is sad, ch eerfu l, lo n ely , hopeful, or d iscou raged .
(R ea lm s, p. 32)
In ord er to m aintain h is p osition that in te r e st m u st have an object,
P e r r y su g g ests that joy and m is e r y have "everything" as th eir object:
It m ay be objected that th ere are in te r e sts w hich have no ob
je c ts; such a s the diffused sta te s of joy or m is e r y . But th ese
sta te s are m o re c o r r e c tly d e sc rib ed as having a m u ltip licity
rath er than an ab sen ce of o b je cts. Joy is a condition of enjoying
everything; m is e r y is a condition of finding everyth in g d is tr e s s in g .
(R ea lm s, p. 40)
P ark er w ould co n sid er th is a m islea d in g a n a ly sis of m oods
and an awkward con seq u en ce of defining value in te r m s of an ob ject.
The m ean ing of value is to be found, not in the object, but in the
a c tiv ity itse lf:
Not the object of d e s ir e , if by object be m eant a thing. If
I want a book, the book is the ob ject of m y w anting, but the o b je c
tiv e is the a c tiv ity of read in g the book. (P h ilo so p h y , p. 9)
A ccord in gly, P a rk er s t r e s s e s the b io lo g ica l a sp ect of attitu d es and
find s the key to valu e in the a ssu a g em en t of d e s ir e s . W ith th is idea
in m ind, he ap p eals to e x p erien ce and fin d s --P e r r y to the c o n tr a r y --
that th e re is no such thing a s an iso la te d in te r e st. In te r e sts are c o m
plex, and what lin g u istic u sa g e r e fe r s to, in the nam e of sim p lic ity
and econ om y, a s "an in te r e st, " is actu ally a co m p lex ity including
m any v a lu e s. Yet at the sam e tim e, th ere i s an elem en t of truth in
r e fe r r in g to a c o m p lex ity of in te r e s ts a s "an in te r e s t." F or "an
in te r e st, " say, in art, ten d s to id en tify value a s co m p a ra tiv ely
continu ous. T his co m p a riso n of " in terests" w ith "an in terest" m ay
be r e la tiv e , but, accord in g to P a rk er, it is a sig n ifica n t one. T urn
ing again to e x p e r ie n c e , P ark er fin d s that c er ta in d e s ir e s are tr a n
sie n t, o th ers m o re perm an en t. T h is d istin ctio n o ffer s him a b a sis
for d istin g u ish in g lo w er (or fir s t o rd er) from high er (or secon d ord er)
51 |
i
i
I
v a lu e s. In low er d e s ir e s , the goal in volved is obtained through a
sin g le a c tiv ity , and the a ssu a g em en t of such a d e s ir e o c cu rs as |
i
co m p lete in a sin g le act a s the a ssu a g em en t of th ir st m ay be j
I
a ch iev ed w ith a sin g le drink of w a ter. On the other hand, high er j
1
j
v a lu e s are of a d ifferen t so r t, in volvin g a plan a s a s e r ie s of
— ' i
a c tiv itie s w ith the a ssu a g em en t of d e sir e being in com p lete in te r m s
of a sin g le act. Thus, v a lu es occu r a s " s y s te m -d e v ic e s , " and,
being open, r e fle c t a r e s t le s s sa tisfa c tio n . T h ese fe a tu r e s, then,
of lo w er and high er v a lu e s, w h ile not c o m p lete ly sep arate, are
n o n eth ele ss o b je ctiv e ly d istin g u ish a b le. P a r k e r 's a n a ly sis h ere su p
p lem en ts P e r r y 's d efin ition of 'valu e, ' then, by tracin g the r e la tio n
sh ip s of d e sir e and sa tisfa c tio n to in te r e st and bringing the two
te r m s d e s ir e and sa tisfa c tio n into sh arp er fo cu s.
On the other hand, L ew is s t r e s s e s the continuity of d e s ir e s
and sa tisfa c tio n s. Yet th is view is com p atible w ith P a r k e r 's a n a ly sis.
Indeed, P ark er d ev elo p s the sam e point:
. . . even w hen sa tisfa c tio n d oes com e after d e s ir e , it is contiguous
w ith it; ow ing to the g en era l con tigu ity of the p r o c e ss of e x p e r i
e n c e , th ere i s no gap, no break betw een th em . The one fo llo w s on ;
the h e e ls of the oth er. In lettin g go of d e s ir e , w e k eep contact
w ith d e s ir e . The r e a lity is com p arab le to the e x p erien ce of lettin g
go of the hand of a friend; at the m om en t of r e le a s in g it, h is hand
i s s till in contact w ith o n e's own hand. So w hen sa tisfa c tio n
fo llo w s upon d e s ir e , d e sir e rem a in s at the h eart of sa tisfa c tio n .
M o reo v er, d e sir e is not sa tisfie d a ll at once or e n tir e ly in a
p u lse of e x p e r ie n c e , and th e re fo re rem a in s co p resen t w ith the co n
tinuing, la te r , and even fin al p h a ses of d e s ir e . (P h ilo so p h y , p. 92) ;
52
Thus P a rk er a g r ee s w ith L e w is's r e fe r e n c e to d e s ir e and s a tis fa c
tion as b eing continu ous.
This point is a lso b a sic to P e r r y 's p osition :
The ob ject of in te r e s t b elon gs n eith er to the beginning of
a c tiv ity , as when it is id en tified w ith a stim u lu s or sta te of
d e fic ie n c y , nor at the end, when it is id en tified with the
q u ie sc e n c e or a ch iev em en t. It is n e ith e r, and it is both. It
is e s s e n tia l to the ob ject of in te r e s t that it should p ervad e the
e n tire a c tiv ity fro m its in cip ien t to its culm in atin g p h a se .
(R e a lm s , p. 42)
W hereas P a r k e r 's a n a ly sis is on this point c o n siste n t w ith
P e r r y 's o rien ta tio n , it su p p lem en ts P e r r y 's p o sitio n by analyzin g
the d istin ctio n betw een P e r r y 's " stim u lu s or sta te of d eficien cy" and
" q u iescen ce or a c h iev e m en t." P a rk er d istin g u ish es them as fo llo w s:
With d e s ir e s , th ere is no ob ject in volved , but in stea d th ere is a
con cep t of an o b ject. As an ex a m p le, to U3e P a r k e r 's illu str a tio n ,
if 1 d e s ir e to build a h o u se, I d e s ir e the concep t of su ch a h ou se and
not the h ou se itse lf; fo r c le a r ly I cannot d e s ir e the h ou se it s e lf b e
c a u se it is not yet b u ilt. S a tis fa c tio n s , on the other hand, have to do
w ith the ob ject it s e lf and the p r o c e s s of m y rea ctin g to it. W hile
P a r k e r m akes this d istin ctio n b etw een d e s ir e s and sa tisfa c tio n s in
te r m s of concep tu al o b jects and actual o b je c ts, we m u st rem em b er
h is oth er point p r e v io u sly m ad e, that d e s ir e s and sa tisfa c tio n s are
continuous and that th ere can be no c le a r d em a rca tio n betw een th em .
P a r k e r 's d efin ition of valu e as the a ssu a g em en t of d e s ir e
53
req u ires an explanation of what is m eant by 'o b je c tiv e .1 This term
P arker equates w ith 'goad1, and, as such, it denotes an activity or
p a ssiv ity . Now for P ark er, there is no absolute differen ce betw een
p a ssiv ity and activity, but the distin ction is a u sefu l one: one need
only con sid er such a c tiv itie s as the m oth er's rocking the baby and
the baby's being rocked. Both m other and baby m ay attain value
from the exp erien ce in spite of the difference betw een the baby's
p a ssiv e and the m oth er's active exp erien ce. With th is d istin ction in
m ind, P ark er d efines a goal or objective as a prediction of som e
activity or p a ssiv ity to com e. T his definition in d irectly points to
what Parker m ean s by 'assu agem ent. ' Since the objective is an
activity or p a ssiv ity , the assuagem en t of d esire is the a ctiv ity or
p a ssiv ity itse lf.
There are now two goals, P a rk er's activity of assuaging
d e sir e , and P e r r y 's object of in terest. Can th is d ifferen ce of opinion
be reco n ciled ? We have seen P a rk er's objections to P e r r y 's u se of
•object. 1 We m ay now consid er P e r r y 's claim that P a rk er's definition
of 'value' as 'the assu agem en t of d esire' is untenable
. . .b e c a u se it cannot be stated without a circu la rity or en d less
r e g r e s s . Hunger is an in te re st in food, and not an in te r e st in
the appeasing of hunger; love of peace is an in te re st in the s a t is
faction of lo v e. F u lfillm en t in each c a se im p lie s a prior object
of in te r e st without w hich the fu lfillm en t its e lf cannot be explained.
If the in te re st is its own fulfillm en t, then it would be n e c e ss a r y to
introduce an in te re st in the fu lfillm en t of the in te re st in fulfillm en t
and so ad infinitum . (R ealm s, p. 41)
54
i
P e r r y 's co n c lu sio n fo llo w s from h is lim itin g the u s e of
'in te r e st' to th o se situ a tio n s in w h ich cogn ition fu r n ish e s an o b je c t-
g o a l. But th is v iew of an o b je c t-g o a l for an in te r e s t is com p atib le
w ith the v iew of an a c tiv ity -g o a l for a govern in g p r o p e n sity - Indeed, j
by fo llo w in g the su g g estio n s of Stephen C. P ep p er, in The S o u r c e s of j
_ T - |
V a lu e, w e sh a ll d is c o v e r that b efo re ex p ecta tio n a r is e s to fu rn ish
the sp e c ific o b je ct-g o a l of in te r e st, a govern in g p ro p en sity can
a r is e w ith a n o n -sp e c ifia b le a c tiv ity -g o a l of its own. P ep p er r e fe r s
to C. P . R ic h te r 's h u n g e r-e x p e rim e n ts w ith r a ts to in d ica te how th is
can o c c u r :
To quote (from R ich ter): Thus w e s e e that the sm a ll c o n tr a c
tio n s of the sto m a ch give r is e to d iffu se a c tiv ity in th e la r g e c a g e .
The an im al s e e m s at fir s t sim p ly to be annoyed and b e c o m e s m o re
and m o r e r e s t le s s a s the co n tra ctio n s grow str o n g e r, u n til the
'm a in 1 c o n tra ctio n s se t in and the g e n e ra l d isc o m fo r t b e c o m e s
c e n tr a liz e d in the hunger sen sa tio n . ^
On the le v e l of P e r r y 's govern in g p ro p en sity , b od ily need,
n eu ro m u scu la r te n sio n s and innate r e a d in e s s, a ll occu r a s an im p u lse
p attern and, at th is point, function w ithout any c le a r ly d eterm in ed
o b je c t-g o a l. The r a ts a r e " r e s tle s s " w ithout know ing w hat th ey w ant,
and b eco m e m o re r e s t le s s until the d riv e a ttain s its a c tiv ity -g o a l
(in th is c a s e , the d evouring of m ea t). Thus, P a r k e r 's a ssu a g e m e n t
of d e s ir e r e p r e s e n ts an a c tiv ity -g o a l for the govern in g p r o p e n sity ,
and o c c u r s p rior to co g n itiv e fa c to r s in the in te r e s t situ ation . On the
^ (B erk eley, C a lif., 1958), p. 47.
other hand, as the ra t's stom ach contractions "grow stronger" and j
j
the m ain "contractions set in and the gen eral d iscom fort b eco m es !
I
cen tra lized in the hunger sen sa tio n ," then, as P erry su g g ests,
i
cognition fu rn ish es an ob ject-goal (in this c a se , the p iece of m eat).
I
On th is cognitive le v e l, a m ediating judgm ent g iv es r is e to the ex p ec- j
j
tation that the drive w ill be assuaged provided that (1) it deem s that
a goal-ob ject e x is ts, and (2) it deem s that the object w ill lead to
sa tisfa ctio n . Thus, P e r r y 's object of in te re st rep resen ts an object-
goal for the in terest, and occu rs after the cognitive fa cto rs have
entered into the in te re st situ ation . An im portant point to note is that
the a c tiv ity -goal d oes not c e a se m er ely b ecau se at one point cognition
fu rn ish es an ob ject-goal. Indeed, for rea so n s we have seen , an
ob ject-g o a l need not occur, but an a c tiv ity -goal m ust occur as a
m inim um requirem ent for the in trin sic value situation. M oreover,
the two goals are d istin ct, and for any given a c tiv ity -goal there can be
only one objective (in th is c a se , the activity of eating) w h ereas for the
ob ject-goal there can be m any objectives (in th is c a se , objects of
beef, of pork, of c h e ese , etc. ). In b rief conclu sion of th is point,
P a rk er's b io lo g ica l an alysis of an a ctiv ity -goal com plem ents P e r r y 's
p sych ological a n a ly sis of an ob ject-g oal.
An im portant im p lication of this d iscu ssio n con cern s the fa c
tor of truth in value statem ents^ for, sin ce value statem en ts, according
56
to P a rk er, r e fle c t d e s ir e s , th ey a re n eith er true nor fa ls e . P erh ap s
other peop le w ill su pp ort, opp ose, or rem a in in d ifferen t to, sa y ,
A 's value statem en t; but, in any c a s e , to the extent that th e ir r e
action s a r e e x p r e ssio n s of valu e, th e ir own sta tem en ts w ill a lso
r e fle c t the fee lin g s of the sp e a k e r . One m ay qu estion , of c o u r se ,
w hether or not the sp e a k e r 's fe e lin g s a re c o r r e c tly r ep re sen ted . In
su ch a c a se , truth or fa lsity does en ter into co n sid era tio n , but,
again, not in ap p lication to the sta te m en t as an e x p r e ssio n of valu e,
but only in r e fe r e n c e to the sp e a k e r 's attitu d e. T his co n clu sio n is in
con form ity with P e r r y 's c h a r a cter iza tio n of in te r e st as an attitude
for or ag a in st som eth in g; and, again, fo r th is r ea so n , in te r e st
sta te m en ts, for P e r r y a s w e ll as for P a rk er, a re n eith er tru e nor
fa ls e .
In su m m ary of this d iscu ssio n : attitude is a ter m w hich can
en com p ass the em otive, in stin c tiv e , and habitual a sp e c ts of the im
m ed iate value e x p e r ie n c e . M oreover, as su g g ested in the p reviou s
chapter, it is a te r m w hich, b e c a u se of its g e n e ra lity , a ll four
p h ilosop h ers can a ccep t. S teven son u se s it to r e fle c t em o tiv e,
in stin ctiv e, and habitual m ean in gs a s th ey occu r in the form u lation s
of the im m ed iate v a lu e e x p e r ie n c e , e x p lic itly id en tifies h is 'attitude'
w ith P e r r y 's 'in te r e st, ' but ack n ow led ges that he has not ex p lica ted
its fu ll m eaning. T his ta sk fa lls to P e r r y who, through an a n a ly sis
57
of how em otive and cogn itive fa cto r s operate w ithin p sy ch o lo g ic a l
a sp e c ts of the valu e e x p erien ce as th ey occu r in in te r e st jud gm en ts,
in d ica tes why S tev en so n 's co m p a rtm en ta lizin g of attitu d es and b e
lie fs is m islea d in g . P a rk er, in turn, su b jects P e r r y 's g e n e r a l
orien ta tio n to co n stru ctiv e c r itic is m , refin in g it by in d icatin g how
d e s ir e s are r ela ted to sa tisfa c tio n s. M oreover, w ith P ep p er's help
we saw how P a r k e r 's b io lo g ica l a c tiv ity -g o a l of an a ssu a g em en t of
d e s ir e com p lem en ts P e r r y 's p sy ch o lo g ic a l o b je c t-g o a l of an in te r e st.
F in a lly , L ew is in a g e n e ra l m anner, con cu rs in c h a r a c te r iz in g the
im m ed ia te value e x p e rien ce in s im ila r term s - - e . g . , 'lik in g, '
'p rizin g, ' 'd esirin g , 1 and 's a tis fa c tio n .' T h ese d is c u s s io n s , taken
to g eth er, r e p r e se n t com p lem en tary a n a ly ses of the im m ed ia te value
e x p e rien ce and an explanation of the in te r e st judgm ent p r o c e s s .
On the other hand, L ew is su g g e sts a d ifferen t form u lation of
the im m ed iate valu e e x p e rien ce w hich he c a lls the e x p r e ss iv e s t a t e
m ent. W hether or not L ew is is c o r r e c t in s o c h a r a cter izin g the im
m ed iate value e x p e rien ce , and the q u estion of how e x p r e s s iv e s t a t e
m en ts m ay be in clu ded w ithin the P e r r y -P a r k e r in te r e st judgm ent
orien tation , w ill be the topic of the n ex t ch ap ter.
C H A PTER V
THE VALUE JUDGM ENT AND INHERENT VALUE
P e r r y , L e w is, P a r k e r , and S tev en so n can a g r e e that the im
m ed ia te valu e e x p e r ie n c e in v o lv es fa v o ra b le or u n favorab le attitu des
- - " lik in g ,” " p rizin g ," " d e sir in g ," " ach ievin g s a tis fa c tio n ," and th eir
o p p o site s . And P e r r y and P a r k e r a n a ly ze th e se fa c to r s as p sy c h o
lo g ic a l e x p e r ie n c e s of the su b je ct. But a p ro b lem a r is e s con cern in g
L e w is's p osition : fo r , in addition to the fo rm u la tio n 'I lik e x, 1 he
a lso c h a r a c te r iz e s the im m ed ia te v a lu e e x p e r ie n c e as 'x app ears
good. 1 What is to be sa id con cern in g th e se two fo r m u la tio n s? The
k ey to this p ro b lem is L e w is's con fu sion b etw een a valu e judgm ent
and an in te r e s t judgm ent; fo r , to u s e P e r r y 's te r m s , a va lu e judg
m en t r e fe r s to an o b ject, w h erea s in te r e s t judgm ents fo rm u la te the
sp e a k e r 's own e x p e r ie n c e of d e s ir e s (in te r e s ts ). A d is c u s s io n of
this is s u e Will e s ta b lis h the fo llo w in g p oin ts:
(1) In te r e st jud gm en ts m u st not be con fu sed w ith v a lu e ju d g m en ts.
(2) L e w is's th e o ry of v a lu e ju d gm en ts (ap p lication of a d isp o sitio n
te r m 'good' to an ob ject) su p p lem en ts the P e r r y -P a r k e r a n a ly sis
of in te r e s t judgm ents (the p sy c h o lo g ic a l fa c to r s of the su b je ct in
the valu e e x p e r ie n c e ).
(3) L e w is's e x p r e s s iv e sta te m en ts fo rm u la te judgm ents con cern in g
the o b ject, and, h e n c e , can on ly be p rob ab le, a cco rd in g to th is
59
r e v is io n of L e w is’s p o sitio n . The only d iffe r e n c e , in p r in c ip le,
b etw een L e w is ’s e x p r e s s iv e sta te m en ts ('th is a p p ea rs good1) and
n o n -term in a tin g judgm ent fo rm u la tio n s ('th is is good') i s a
tem p o ra l one: e x p r e s s iv e sta te m en ts r e fe r only to the im m ed ia te
p r e se n t, d isr e g a r d in g co n seq u en ces; but n o n -term in a tin g ju d g
m en ts e n c o m p a ss futu re c o n se q u en ce s and m ake im p lic it r e fe r e n c e
to stan dard te s t con d ition s.
(4) E x p r e s s iv e sta te m en ts and the fo rm u la tio n s of n o n -term in a tin g
ju d gm en ts c o lle c tiv e ly give m ean in g to 'good' a s a d isp o sitio n
te r m
T h ese four poin ts m e r e ly fo rm u la te a p ro g ra m . They m u st now be
exam in ed in d eta il •
(1) In te r e st ju d gm en ts and valu e ju d gm en ts m u st not be co n
fu sed . T h is point m a y be exp lain ed by r e c o n c ilin g op p osin g opin ion s
of the four p h ilo so p h e r s. A ccord in g to P e r r y ,
M uch of what g o e s by the nam e of 'th eory of valu e' is d evoted
to a d is c u s s io n of "judgm ents of v a lu e . " The d is c u s s io n abounds
in co n fu sio n and am b igu ity. The unfortunate v e rb 'to v a lu e 1
s e r v e s only to o b scu re the d iffe r e n c e b etw een judgm ent and
in te r e s t. (R e a lm s, p. 34)
F or th e se jud gm en ts P e r r y su g g e s ts a c la r ific a tio n in b e
h a v io r is tic te r m s . Now it is tru e that ju d gm en ts about valu e do not
v a r y fo r m a lly fro m oth er ju d gm en ts. F u r th e rm o re , com m on u sa g e
ten d s to o b scu re the d iffe r e n c e by con fu sin g an act of in te r e s t w ith
the ob ject of that in t e r e s t . Y et the d istin ctio n b etw een act of in te r e s t
and ob ject of that in te r e s t is an im p ortan t d istin ctio n w h ich funda
m e n ta lly d istin g u ish e s in te r e s t ju d gm en ts fro m valu e ju d gm en ts.
Thus, in P e r r y 's w o rd s, "The judgm ent of v alu e is the judgm ent
60
about anything to the effect that in te r e st is taken in it" {G eneral,
p. 3 6 6 )--e . g. , in the judgm ent of value " P eace is good, " peace is
the object w hich p o s s e s s e s value; p eace is the index of the judgment;
or, in other w ord s, in judgm ents of value the index is the object of
v a lu e . On the other hand, in the c a se of an in te r e st judgm ent,
" P eace is good" in v o lv es an e x isten tia l in te r e st. The pred icate
'is good' s e r v e s only to prolong the in te r e st of the subject in the
index. The act of in te r e s t, th erefo re, in volves the p red icate of a
judgm ent of valu e. In addition to th is d istin ction betw een an act of
in te r e st and the object of that in te re st, th ere is another d ifferen ce
betw een in te r e st judgm ents and judgm ents of value. In terest judg
m en ts are lo g ic a lly m ore p rim itive than in te r e sts; for, as w e have
seen , in te r e st judgm ents do not alone determ in e in te r e sts (a
governing p rop en sity is a lso req u ired ). In terest judgm ents, th e r e
fo re, are p relim in a ry to the in te r e st b ecau se the p red icate of the
in te r e st judgm ent d eterm in es the object of the governing propensity.
On the other hand, value judgm ents refer to the index of the judg
m ent of value, a n d --in con trad istin ction to in te r e st ju d g m en ts--o ccu r
lo g ic a lly after the in te re st-
To be valu ab le is to be object of in te r e st. To be judged
valuab le, as in the c a se of the judgm ent of valu e, is to be
judged to be object of in te r e st. (G en eral, p. 366)
A judgm ent of value depends upon an antecedent in te r e st-
61
j
judgm ent; m o r e o v e r , it could not e x is t until the in te r e s t had occurred,:
i
b e c a u se valu e i s a fun ction of in te r e s t. In su m m ary, ju d gm en ts of
I
v a lu e, a cco rd in g to P e r r y , co n cern in d ic e s a s the ob ject of v a lu e,
o ccu r lo g ic a lly after the in te r e s t, and a r e g e n e r a lly s im ila r in th eir
!
stru ctu re to other ju d gm en ts.
Now w h ile P e r r y 1 s d is c u s s io n poin ts to a v e r y sig n ifica n t
d iffe r e n c e b etw een v a lu e and in te r e st ju d gm en ts, h is own p o sitio n
ten d s to o b scu re the d istin ctio n . T his co n clu sio n fo llo w s fro m
P e r r y 's d efin ition of v a lu e !
a th in g - - any th in g - - h as v a lu e, or is v a lu a b le, in the
o rig in a l and g e n e r ic se n se w hen it is the object of an in t e r e s t - -
any in te r e s t. Or, w h atever i s ob ject of in te r e s t is ip so fa cto
v a lu a b le . (R e a lm s , p. 3)
The point to note h e r e is that P e r r y is r e fe r r in g to an o b je c t;
but su ch a fo rm u la tio n r a is e s d iffic u ltie s: f ir s t, to m ak e a d ir e c t
c o r r e la tio n b etw een in te r e s t and valu e of an ob ject c o n fu se s in te r e s t
w ith valu e ju d gm en ts, and, secon d , a d efin itio n a cco rd in g to w h ich
som eth in g m u st be an object of in te r e s t in ord er to be valu ab le is
m isle a d in g and aw kw ard. * The point is that w e now need a te r m to
r e fe r to an a sc r ip tio n of valu e to an ob ject. T hus, as L e w is su g g e s ts,
F or s im ila r r e a so n s ( i . e . , d efin in g valu e in te r m s of the
su b ject ra th er than the o b je c t), S tev en so n a lso c o n fu ses in te r e s t
jud gm en ts w ith v alu e judgm ents by d efining the good of an ob ject
in te r m s of the su b je c t's em otion al approval.
62
two term s a re needed: fir s t, a te r m to corresp on d to in te r e st judg
m ents (in trin sic valu e), and, secon d , a term to corresp on d to value
judgm ents (inherent valu e).
(2) L e w is's theory of value judgm ents (application of a d is
p osition ter m to an object) supplem ents the P e r r y -P a r k e r a n a ly sis of
in te r e st judgm ents (as an explanation of the su b ject's value e x p e r
ie n c e ). The above d isc u ssio n in d icates that any definition of value
in te r m s of an object (which, after a ll, is an a scrip tio n of value to
an object) req u ires a sh ift of em p h asis from the su b ject to the object.
In other w ords, to p r e se r v e P e r r y 's own d istin ctio n betw een value
judgm ents and in te r e st judgm ents, the value of an object m ust be
defined in ter m s of the ob ject's p oten tiality for evoking an in te r e s t-
rea ctio n . On this in terp retation 'good' would becom e a d isp o sitio n
te r m w hich r e fe r s to the object. R eferen ce to d isp o sitio n term s such
as this su pp lem en ts the p reviou s P e r r y -P a r k e r a n a ly sis of in te r e st
judgm ents as r e fe r r in g to the su b ject's valu e e x p e r ie n c e ; for to a s
crib e inherent value to an object as a p oten tiality to evoke p o ssib le
valu e ex p e rien ce s is in no way incom patible with th e view that the
2
ultim ate te s t of in tr in sic value m ust be e x p e rien ce its e lf. L ew is, as
o
Thus, L ew is c h a r a c te r iz e s in tr in sic value by r e fe r r in g to
the su b ject’s e x p e rien ce . On the other hand, he d efin es e x tr in sic
valu e in term s of the object; and he further d istin gu ish es the two
typ es of e x tr in sic value (inherent value and in stru m en tal value) as
63
an advocate of inh eren t v a lu e , m ak es this point ex p licit:
The v iew h e r e defended is that th ere can be no other kind of
value in an ob jectiv e e x isten t than one w hich c o n sists in a p o ten ti
a lity of it for so m e p o s sib le rea liz a tio n of im m ed ia te valu e in e x
p e r ie n c e . (A n a ly sis, p. 413)
The p ro b lem now becom es to exam in e the p o s s ib ility of a t
trib uting to 'good' a function sim ila r to that of cogn itive d isp o sitio n
te r m s . P a rk er q u estion s this p o s sib ility . H is f ir s t ob jection is that
if the ob ject is view ed as som eth in g with a p oten tial fo r evoking a t
titu d es of fa v o r or d isfa v o r, then valu e would not be an ob ject of an
actu al in te r e s t, but an ob ject of a p oten tial in te r e s t. In one such
ex a m p le, L e w is, r efer r in g to a nugget of gold w ith a sp e c ific gravity
of 19. 3, su g g e sts that d isp o sitio n ter m s in value e x p r e ssio n s p a r
a lle l sc ie n tific on es:
A sse r tio n that it has this o b jectiv e p ro p erty m ean s that if it
be w eighed in a ir and then in w a te r, and the w eight in the a ir be
divided by the d ifferen ce of th e se two w eig h ts, then the quotient will
be 19. 3. That nobody w ill e v er find this nugget and p erfo rm th e se
op eration s on it, m akes no d ifferen ce to the fa c t of the p rop erty; if
anyone sh ou ld , that would be the r e s u lt -- s o the sta tem en t of its
sp e c ific g ra v ity a ffir m s. If th ere can be gold w hich no one w ill
e v er find , s t ill in ord er to be gold it m u st have this p rop erty; and
fo llo w s :
T hose valu es w hich a re r e sid e n t in ob jects in su ch w ise that
th ey are r e a liz a b le in e x p e rien ce through p r e sen ta tio n of the ob
je c t its e lf to w hich they are attrib uted , we p ro p o se to ca ll inherent
v a lu e s. And th o se valu es of things w hich c o n sist in an in stru m en -
ta lity to so m e oth er o b je ct, in p resen ta tio n of w hich a valu e is
d ir e c tly r e a liz a b le in e x p e r ie n c e , w e p rop ose to c a ll in stru m en ta l
v a lu e . (A n a ly s is, p. 391)
64
th is h yp oth etical statem en t about it m u st be tru e, though the
h y p o th esis in it should be fo r e v e r fa ls e . Thus the attrib u tion
of any p ro p erty to an un exam in ed o b je c t--o r to an exam in ed one
for that m a t t e r - - a s s e r t s a r e a l co n n ectio n b etw een a h y p o th etica l
op eration or o b ser v a b le c ir c u m sta n c e s and a c e r ta in o b ser v a tio n
or e x p e rien ce in resu lt; and a s s e r t s the truth of th is if-th e n s ta t e
m en t of su ch r e a l con n ection in d ep en d en tly of the fa ctu a l tru th or
fa ls ity of eith er c la u se in it. (p. 514) !
R e fer rin g to the sa m e nugget of gold u n d isc o v e r e d deep in the earth ,
L ew is next p r o c e e d s to draw an an alogy b etw een s c ie n tific and
valu ation al c o n tr a r y -to -fa c t p ro p o sitio n s:
The attrib u tion of b eauty to th is p ie c e of gold h a s m ean in g
e x a c tly s im ila r in th e se r e s p e c ts . P r e su m a b ly no one w ill e v er
s e e it; but if it should be p r e se n te d to a c o n n o isse u r of b eau ty in
m e ta ls under a u sp ic io u s co n d itio n s, he w ould be p le a se d , (p. 514)
P ark er attack s L e w is's analogy b etw een s c ie n tific and
a e sth e tic (or v a lu e) sta te m en ts. In the fir s t p la c e , he c ite s a c o u n te r
exam p le in w h ich he co m p a re s the s c ie n tific sta tem en t, 'the ea rth is
round' w ith the valu ation al one, 'the earth is b ea u tifu l. ' Such valu e
and n o n -v a lu e sta te m en ts d iffer r a d ic a lly b e c a u se the la tte r -- 't h e
earth is b e a u tifu l'--n e e d s to be su p p lem en ted w ith 'to m e' in o rd er to
in clu d e the e le m e n t of fe e lin g p e c u lia r to a ll v a lu e e x p r e s s io n s . On
the other hand, the sc ie n tific sta te m e n t--'th e ea rth i s r o u n d '--is
c o m p le te . E ven to attem pt a su p p le m e n ta tio n --c o r r e sp o n d in g to the
r eq u ired addition 'to m e' in the oth er c a s e - - b y adding 'or s o it
a p p ea rs to m e' b reak s down a s an analogy b e c a u se th is p h ra se m e r e ly
r e p r e s e n ts a fra m e of r e fe r e n c e and is s t ill n o n -v a lu a tio n a l.
65
secondly, w h ereas scien tific proposition s are p redictab le, aesth etic
proposition s are not:
. . - there is a cru cial d ifference betw een "value properties'* and
the p rop erties studied in the ph ysical sc ie n c e s, nam ely, that
under standard te st conditions the form er are not alw ays o b se r v
able, w h ereas the latter are. G iven standard te st conditions
anyone w ill have the sp ecifiab le ex p erien ces of the ch em ical and
p h ysical p rop erties of the gem , but not everyone under th ose sam e
conditions w ill exp erien ce it as beautiful. (P h ilosoph y, p. 38)
To this L ew is would rep ly that the situation en visaged by
P arker applies to scien tific observation s as w ell as to a esth etic on es.
For exam ple, the n ea r-sig h ted sc ie n tist m ust m ake appropriate c o r
rectio n s of his observations; m oreover, the training and exp erien ce
of the sc ie n tist m ust be such that he is qualified to understand the
data of observation. In short, for both value and scien tific o b ser v a
tion, conditioning of the subject m ust be included w ithin the data of
p red iction s, and under optim um conditions the expert, in each c a se,
is sim ila r ly relia b le. L ew is, th erefore, em p h asizes h is analogy by
sp ecifyin g factors concerning the su b ject's conditioning:
. . .th is beauty of it is no m ore in the eye of the beholder than is
the sp ecific gravity of it. That the te s t of it is by referen ce to
the exp erien ce of som eone, does not m ake it rela tiv e to p erson s:
m y te st of any objective property in clu d es n e c e ssa r y referen ce
to particular r e su lts in e x p e r ie n c e --to som e te st-o b ser v a tio n .
Nor does it m atter that som e people who should ob serve th is ob
ject m ight be p leased and som e not, nor that if it w ere p resen ted
to a con n oisseu r when he w as trying to catch a train , he m ight not
be p leased . A confirm ation which is to be as n early d e c isiv e as
p o ssib le req u ires that the test-o b ser v a tio n should be m ade by an
expert and under optim um conditions of the te st-e x p e r ie n c e .
(A n alysis, p. 514)
66
A ccording to P ark er, L e w is's lin e of reason in g is m isle a d
ing; for L ew is co n fu ses p red iction s of value (which, for rea so n s
P arker w ill su ggest, cannot be m ade) w ith p red iction s about value
(which, P ark er a g r e e s, can be su c c e ssfu l). A s P ark er sa y s of
L ew is: ". . .h is w hole argum ent against the view I am supporting r e s ts
on the p o ssib ility of p red ictive judgm ents about v a lu e s, w hich, as far
as I know, no one ever d en ied ." (P h ilosop h y, p. 207). Indeed,
P ark er, w ithin h is th eory, in d icates how p red iction s about value can
o c c u r :
. . . le t us co n sid er the c a se of an in stru ctor in a c la s s in m u sic
ap p reciation . H is aim is to build up in h is pupils an app reciation
of what is c a lled "good" m u sic . Being an en th u siast, he w ish es
to give extra tim e and energy to p rom isin g students. T his im p lie s
that he m u st be able to m ake p red iction s as to w hether, as a
r e su lt of h is effo rts, any given student w ill enjoy som e te st
m u sic a l com p osition of fa ir in trica cy , say B ach 's T occata and
Fugue in B m in or. T h ese p red iction s would be in the form "A w ill
enjoy B ach 's T occata, " "B w ill enjoy B ach 's T occata, " and so on.
Since they are about so -c a lle d future even ts, th e se p rop osition s
w ill be only probable, yet, even so, they w ill be genuine p ro p o si
tio n s. T heir im p ortan ce w ill obviou sly be pragm atic; they w ill
se r v e to guide the in str u c to r 's e ffo r ts, (p. 204)
The rea so n , according to P ark er, that such p red iction s about value
can occu r, w h ereas statem en ts of value cannot, m ay be found in th eir
r e sp e c tiv e c h a r a c te r istic s; statem en ts about v alu es are true or fa lse ,
but statem en ts of value are neither:
V alue sta tem en ts, I sh all m aintain, are v e cto ra l cu rren ts of
feelin g w hich overflow into e x p r e ssiv e m ed ia and as such are
n eith er true nor fa lse - (p. 68)
How can th is con flict betw een L ew is and P ark er be r eso lv e d ?
67
P er ry , for reason s we have p reviou sly seen , would m aintain that the
con flict betw een them on this point again centers upon a b asic con
fu sion betw een in te re st judgm ents and value ju d gm en ts. Now we
have p rev io u sly exam ined this d istin ction , pointing out the basic dif
fe r e n c e s. Additional d iffic u ltie s, how ever, according to P er ry , tend
to obscu re the u se of the word 'subject' in value and in terest judg
m ents :
A judgment of value, in the se n se of a judgment which a ttri
butes value to an entity, em braces three elem en ts, a ll of which
are som etim es called the "subject." There is the p erson who
m akes the judgm ent—the judge, or the judging subject. There is
the in terested subject who im ports or gives the value. And there
is the gram m atical or logical subject to which the value is at
tributed. Thus if I judge that bread is good to or for a starving
m an, I am the judging su bject, the starving man is the in terested
subject, and the bread is the logical subject. The judging subject
and the in terested subject are different p erso n s, w hile the logical
subject is not a p erson at a ll. (R ealm s, p. 34)
In P a rk er's ter m s, to judge that bread, is good for a starving man is
to m ake a judgment about value; on the other hand, from the v iew
point of the starving m an, the a ssertio n that the bread is good
rep resen ts a statem ent of value (as a form ulation of an in terest judg
m ent). Concerning the word 'bread, ' how ever, (P erry's logical sub-
ject) d ifficu lties do occu r. A ccording to P ark er, one cannot properly
speaking, sa y that things p o s s e s s value; yet, in using a lo g ica l sub
jec t as that to which value is attributed, one violates this p rin cip le.
Indeed, " .. .th e prim ary insight into in trin sic values is that they
68
belong to a c tiv itie s or e x p e rien ce s. T hese alone a re, properly-
sp eak in g, values" (P h ilosop h y, p. 6). N o n eth eless, in speaking of
things as . .b ein g valuable or as having attributes of value" (p. 6),
P a rk er does at le a s t r e fe r to value; m o reo v er, he acknow ledges that
th ere is a se n se in w hich su bjects m a y b e said to be good: "Things
can be ca lled "good," but only b eca u se they contribute som ething to
exp erien ce" (p. 6). D esp ite th ese s im ila r itie s , he d ecid es to r estrict
value to ex p erien ces only:
. . .1 sh a ll try to be c o n sisten t and to U3e the term "value" or
"the good" only when r eferrin g to ex p erien ces having actual
or in trin sic valu e. . . (p. 7)
But w h ereas P ark er has optioned to u se 'value' to r efer to e x p e r i
en ces only, L ew is, w hile agreein g that such ex p erien ces r ep resen t
the only fo rm in w hich value can actu ally o ccu r, has decided to u se
value to apply to ob jects which have a p oten tiality to evoke such e x
p e r ie n c e s . But as he is ca refu l to note, this term in ology rep re sen ts
nothing m ore than a lin g u istic option:
F o r exam p le, we sa y that the unlocated nugget of gold is of
no u se to anybody. We do not in lik e m anner as s e t t that it has
no sp e c ific gravity to anybody: statem en ts of that fo rm would not
be id io m a tic. H ow ever, we do sa y that this beauty of it w ill do
nobody any good; and a lso that this nugget has no value to anybody.
That th e se la st-m en tio n ed statem en ts would be id io m a tic, does not,
h ow ever, r e fle c t an unobjective ch a ra cter of the u tility of in
stru m en tal value in question; it m e r e ly r e fle c ts a secon d m anner
in w hich th ese p ro p erties are often p red ica ted . The d ifferen ce is
one of lin g u istic u sage; not a d ifferen ce affectin g the ob ject, or
even our valuation of the o b je ct. (A n alysis, pp. 5 1 6 -5 1 7 --m y
ita lic s )
69
P a rk er and L e w is, then, a r e m e r e ly at odds o v er lin g u istic u sage;
the p roblem , th e re fo re , is that of d ecid in g w hich m anner of sp eak in g
sh a ll be em p loyed .
One way to d ecid e th is option is to c o n sid e r th e im p lica tio n s
of the ch oice; and the m o st sig n ifica n t in sig h t is that d iffe r e n c e s c o n
cern in g term in o lo g y am ong L e w is, P e r r y , and P a rk er m ay be a t
tributable m e r e ly to a lin g u istic ch oice w hich is a s in sig n ifica n t as it
is a rb itra ry . AH that is needed to support th is co n c lu sio n is to c o r
r e la te the d ifferen t te r m s. W ith th is approach, L e w is's 'in trin sic
v a lu e 1 may b e sa id to co rresp o n d to P a r k e r 's 'sta tem e n ts of valu e';
w h erea s, L e w is's 'inherent value' (co n cern in g valu e jud gm en ts) can
be equated to P a r k e r 's 'judgm ents about v a lu e. ' A L e w is-P a r k e r
c o rr ela tio n would occu r a s follow s:
In P e r r y 's term in o lo g y , the f ir s t- le v e l e x p r e ssio n s are to be r e fe r r e d
to a s in te r e s t ju d g m en ts; w h erea s the seco n d le v e l se n te n c e s , to the
exten t that th ey attribute value to an object, are to be ca lled valu e
jud gm en ts. P e r r y 's term in o lo g y in d ic a tes why L e w is's th eo ry co n -
LEWIS PARKER
'The w ine s e e m s good
(In trin sic value)
How good the wine is l
(Statem ent of value)
'T he w ine is good'
(Inherent value)
(V alue judgm ent)
I s h a ll enjoy the w in e1
(V alue p red iction )
(Judgm ent about valu e)
70
tains the concept of value judgm ent (inherent value as attributed to
the object); w h ereas, on the other hand, the notion of value judg
m ents is rejected by P ark er (within his theory one cannot sp eak of
the object in term s of inherent value). B ut, for reason s p reviou sly
su ggested , th ese term in o lo g ies are arbitrary c h o ic e s, and once con
fu sion s are elim inated, the contentions among L ew is, P erry , and
P arker m ay be reso lv ed into nothing m ore than lin g u istic options.
The d iscu ssio n , then, in d icates how, once th ese term in o lo g i
cal d ifficu lties are overcom e, L ew is's concept of inherent value (as
an ascrip tion of value to an object) supplem ents the P er ry -L e w is
theory of in terest judgm ents (as a p sych ological explanation of in
trin sic valu e). It rem ains for L ew is to p resen t a th eo retica l b asis
for 'good' as a d isp osition term ; but, b efore he can co n sisten tly do
so , we m ust m odify his p osition concerning the status of e x p r e ssiv e
sta te m en ts.
(3) E x p re ssiv e statem en ts and the form u lation s of non
term inating judgm ents c o lle c tiv e ly give m eaning to 'good' as a d is
p osition term . This se c tio n w ill indicate why 'good', even as this
word occu rs in L ew is's e x p r e ssiv e sta tem en ts, is a d isp osition term
in a value judgm ent. The d iscu ssio n , th erefo re, m ust m ake a b rief
ex cu rsion into ep istem ology in order to explain why 'x appears good'
is a probable value judgm ent rather than, as L ew is c la im s, a certain
71
form ulation of im m ediate exp erien ce.
A s one step toward cla rifica tio n of the issu e , we m ay sim p lify
the question concerning im m ediate ex p erien ce by in itia lly lim itin g it
to the non-valuational area. Statem ents which purport to form ulate
the im m ed iate exp erien ce L ew is ca lls e x p r essiv e sta te m e n ts. They
take the form 'this appears to be blue, 1 'that seem s to be sq uare. 1
A statem en t of this type does not claim an objective status fo r the
object in question. A ll it does is to form ulate an im p ressio n which
the ob server has. Thus, if one ign ores the irr elev a n t factor of the
accu racy of the report, then statem en ts of the im m ed iately given e x
p r e ss what appears to be and th erefore cannot be in erro r.
Since L ew is here en d orses a ph enom enalistic language of
'appears' and 'se e m s' for the form ulation of the im m ediate experience^
it appears that the sta tu s of im m ediate exp erien ce form ulation can
can be reduced to a lin gu istic problem by asking the follow ing
qu estions: (a) can a phenom enalistic language be constructed?
(b) if so , can its term s be reduced to p h y sic a listic term s? A ccording
to this approach, once th e se two questions are answ ered, an a p
propriate ch oice of language w ill determ ine w hether form ulations of
the im m ed iate ex p erien ce are certain (in a phenom enalistic language)
or probable only (in a p h y sic a listic language).
This form ulation of the problem su g g ests the type of solution
72
w hich m ight be attem pted in lin g u istic te r m s. Y et, w h atever an sw er
is given on th is lin g u istic le v e l, it cannot c o m p le te ly r e so lv e the
is s u e ; fo r L ew is can and does m aintain that su ch lin g u istic fo rm u la
tion s of im m ed ia te e x p e rien ce are u n n e c e ssa r y to h is p osition : "in
that sta tem en t or form u lation of what is given (if such form u lation be
attem p ted ), one u se s language to con vey this content, not the c o r r e c t
n e ss of the language used" (A n a ly sis, p. 183). L ew is e x p r e ss e s the
sa m e point m ore sim p ly by a ss e r tin g that "one does not have to know
E n g lish in ord er to s e e red" (p. 183). He thus evades the d ifficu lties
of lin g u istic form u lation s by m aintaining that the e x p erien ce it s e lf ,
not the language w hich fo rm u la tes it, is the sig n ifica n t datum for
a n a ly s is . A ccord in gly, if w e are to follow h is argum ent, our d is
c u ssio n m u st now be extended beyond p u rely lin g u istic co n sid era tio n s
to inclu de p sy ch o lo g ic a l fa cto r s as w e ll.
With this expanded approach, w e m ay r e -e x a m in e the q u e s
tion of w h eth er or not L ew is could co n stru ct even a lim ited language
of certa in ty on the b a sis of su ch term s as 'app ears' and 's e e m s . '
Now it is tru e that su ch sta tem en ts as 'x appears b lu e1 m ay w ell d is
regard judgm ents con cern in g fu tu re c ir cu m sta n c es; fo r no m ore is
intended than the sta tem en t that x -w h a te v e r -its -o b je c tiv e -s ta tu s -m e r
e ly - ap p ears -to -m e -th e -o b s e r v e r -b lu e -a t-th is-p a r tic u la r -m o m e n t.
N o n e th e le ss, as p rev io u s d is c u ssio n con cern in g the d ifferen ce between
73
in te re st judgm ents and value judgm ents has indicated, L ew is's
reason in g on this point is m islead in g. The ep istem o lo g ica l burden
accordingly becom es that of proving that his e x p r e ssiv e statem en ts
are true or fa lse and probable o n ly --r a th er than, as he c la im s, c e r
tain. To support this contention three argum ents w ill be advanced;
(a) an exp erien ce form ulated by an e x p r e ssiv e statem en t cannot be
iso la ted , but req u ires judgm ental factors to relate it td other e x
p e r ie n c es, (b) judgm ents are required even to form ulate the ap p ear
ance of an object, and (c) L ew is's theory of m eaning im p lies that
e x p r e ssiv e statem en ts a re probable only. T h ese argum ents w ill now
be exam ined.
(a) The fir s t argum ent against the certain ty of e x p r e ssiv e
statem en ts: e x p r e ssiv e statem en ts a re only probable because they
m ust be judgm entally rela ted to other e x p e r ie n c e s. L ew is claim s that
im m ediate exp erien ce ex p r essed by statem en ts such as 'this w afer
appears red* are intended m erely to form ulate the given and need not
include a judgm ental elem en t. H ow ever, so m e c r itic s m aintain that
'this appears red' im p licitly includes a judgm ental com p arison of the
im m ed iate exp erien ce with past red dish app earances. Lew ils's answ er
h ere would be to say that statem en ts such as 'this w afer looks red'
need not r e fe r to anything concerning the objective statu s of the w afer.
'This w afer looks red' m er ely form u lates the appearance of the w afer,
74
and that a lo n e. It sa y s no m o re than ’this w afer look s (app ears to
m e , the o b s e r v e r , r e g a r d le s s of the o b jectiv e fa c ts ) red (at th is
p a rticu la r m o m e n t).1 And, a cco rd in g to h im , th is fa c t in d ic a tes
that su ch e x p r e ssio n s do not in v o lv e b e lie fs . M o reo v er, he would
point out that the o b jection ig n o r es the indubitable q u ality of im
m ed ia te e x p e r ie n c e . F o r , c le a r ly , b e lie f is orien ted to the futu re
in te r m s of exp ectation ; and w h ere can any p o s sib le r e fe r e n c e to
the future or to exp ectation be found in su ch sta tem en ts as 'this
w afer ap p ears r e d ? ' E xp ectation is ruled out by the in d u b ita b le--
the "it s e e m s n o w " --q u a lity of the e x p e r ie n c e .
L e w is's c r it ic s , h o w ev er, are not w ithout an an sw er to this
lin e of reason in g; fo r th ey m ain tain that the d iffic u ltie s of ex p la in
ing the indubitable q u ality of an exp ectation a re not in su rm ou n tab le.
3
F or ex a m p le, in The P ra g m a tic P h ilo so p h y of C .S . P e ir c e , M anly
H . T hom pson d e sc r ib e s how P e ir c e handles a s im ila r d ifficu lty .
A ccord in g to P e ir c e , e v e r y p ro p o sitio n in clu d es a p r e d ica te (what
is b eliev ed ) and a su b ject (of what it is b e lie v e d ). P e ir c e m ain tain s
that p ro p o sitio n s sta tin g ap p earan ces of the s u b je c t--s u c h as 'this
w afer ap p ears r e d '- - a r e not d iffe re n t in kind fr o m sta tem en ts a s s e r t
ting w hat is b e lie v ed about the su b ject. T h er efo r e, P e ir c e m a in -
I
i tain s that e v e r y sin g le judgm ent m akes im p lic it r e fe r e n c e to a
i
!
i
I
’ 3(Chicago, 1953).
75
general law; and that a general law r efers to the future through which
it is confirm ed. The statem en t 'this w afer looks red 1 is a singular
statem ent which im p lic itly r efers to the general relation h avin g-th e-
s a m e -c o lo r -a s . This gen eral relationship refers to a general law:
any red object w ill appear to have the sam e color as this w afer ap
peared to h ave. The im p licit referen ce to the future is obvious. It
follow s that e x p r e ssiv e statem en ts can be linked to the general law
to which they im p lic itly r e fe r . And sin ce all laws are oriented to
ward the future, the paradox is resolved : despite their form , sta te
m ents involving appearances of the subject a s s e r t b eliefs im plicating
expectation. Thus, according to this line of reasoning, a judgmental
asp ect is reflected even in what Lew is ca lls e x p ressiv e language.
(b) The second argum ent against the certain ty of e x p ressiv e
statem ents: ex p r essiv e statem en ts are probable because judgm ents
are required to form ulate the appearance of an object. This argument
w ill challenge the p o ssib ility that th ere could be a m eaningful non-
judgm ental ex p erien ce. Suppose, for exam p le, that one w ere p resen
ted with a s e r ie s of blue co lo rs m inutely shading into green. Would
there not be a point at which one would h esita te to a ss e r t that x appears
blue now? And any h esitation here would strongly su g g est— Lew is to
the co n tra ry --th a t a judgm ental elem en t is involved. Lew is could
rep ly, how ever, that one need m erely expand one's concepts to en
com pass interm ediate m eanings; thus one could u se 'turqu oise1 for
such a b ord erlin e situation . This proced ure, how ever, d oes not
answ er the objection; for it m e r e ly sh ifts the problem from d is
tinguishing betw een blue and green to the even m o re d ifficu lt ta sk of
d eciding betw een blue and tu rq u oise. In short, th is exam ple su g g ests
the follow ing conclu sion: in order for the m eaning of the b lu en ess -
n ow -ex p erien ce to be su fficien tly sign ifican t for L e w is's p u r p o se --in
other w ord s, in order for the exp erien ce to be anything m ore than a
" u n iversal b la h " --o n e m u st at le a s t im p lic itly appeal to a judgm ent
that any other ex p e rien ce -o f-a p p a r e n t-b lu e n e ss w ill have the sam e
co lo r as th is-b lu e n e ss-n o w appears to have. And, for th e se r e a so n s,
e x p r e ssiv e statem en ts can be only probable.
(c) The third argum ent against the certain ty of e x p r e ssiv e
statem en ts: L e w is's th eory of m eaning im p lie s that e x p r e ssiv e s ta te
m en ts can be probable on ly . L ew is m akes a d istin ction betw een
; lin g u istic and se n se m ean in gs. The lin g u istic m eaning he c h a r a c te r
iz e s as follow s:
. . .th e in ten sion of it as that property w hich is com m on to a ll
e x p r e ssio n s w hich could be substituted for the one in question
without a lterin g the truth or fa lsity of any statem en t, or alterin g
the sig n ifica n ce of any other constituent. (A n a ly sis, p. 132)
, On the other hand, se n se m eaning o ccu rs b efore language and, as a
I c r ite r io n in m in d , d eterm in es how the lin g u istic m eaning is to be
applied:
What w e in d icate by th is ph rase se n se m eaning is in ten sion
77
as a c r ite r io n in m ind, by r efer e n c e to w hich one is able to apply
or refu se to apply the ex p r essio n in question in the c a se of
p resen ted , or im agined, things or situ ation s. . . One who should
be able to apply or refu se to apply an e x p r e ssio n c o r r e c tly under
all im agin able c ircu m sta n ces, would grasp its se n se m eaning
p e r fe ctly . But if, through faulty language se n se or poor analytic
pow ers, he could s till not offer any c o r r e c t definition, then he
would fa il to grasp (at le a s t to grasp e x p licitly ) its lin g u istic
m ean ing. (A n a ly sis, p. 133)
A ccordin g to L ew is, then, w e m ay be in itia lly a rb itra ry in our
ch oice of lin g u istic e x p r e ssio n s, but, once w e have esta b lish ed them ,
w e b ecom e r e str ic te d in th eir u se by the antecedent rela tio n sh ip s of
se n se m ean in gs. For exam p le, I m ay a rb itra rily stip u late that such
and such a figu re sh all be ca lled a sq u are; but once th is ch oice is
m ade, a square has sp ec ific rela tio n sh ip s (in te r m s of se n se m ea n
in g s) to other en titie s, such as r ec ta n g les, and th is se n se m eaning
e x is ts p rior to and independent of any lin g u istic form u lation . In
L e w is’ s w ord s,
To an extent at le a st, w e can set up an alytic r ela tio n s of
lin g u istic e x p r e ss io n s--m o r e a ccu ra tely of lin g u istic s y m b o ls --
by convention and a r b itra rily . But having set th em up, w e m u st
then r e sp e c t them in any in terp retation s or ap p lication s. If our
defin itive conventions and postulated lin g u istic r ela tio n s a re not
bound by antecedent fa c ts, at le a s t they are reso lu tio n s binding
on our further p ra ctice. They lim it our la ter freed o m to m ake
other and sim ila r conventions; and they lim it a lso our freed o m to
in terp ret and apply, (p. 146)
With L e w is's d istin ction in m ind betw een se n se m ean in gs and
lin g u istic m ean in gs, we m ay now return to our d isc u ssio n of e x
p r e ssiv e sta tem en ts. What d oes it m ean to say, 'x app ears to be
sq u a r e ? ' A ccord in g to L ew is, th is lin g u istic e x p r e ssio n is in its e lf
in itia lly a rb itra ry but, once fixed , it has sp e c ific an tecend en tly
d eterm in ed s e n s e m ean ing. T hus, when I sa y 'x is sq u a re, ' I m u st
have in m ind a c r ite r io n for the ap p lication of 'sq u are, 1 and th is
c r ite r io n , as we have se e n , is d eterm in ed by s e n s e m ean in gs in
dependently of any v olition on m y part. In other w ord s, ev en to sa y
'x appears to be sq u are' m eans that x --w h a te v e r e ls e its c h a r a c te r
is t ic s actu ally a r e --a t le a s t appears to have, sa y , sp e c ific s e n s e
m eaning rela tio n sh ip s to r e c ta n g le s. Now the im portant point h ere is
th at, s in c e th ese rela tio n sh ip s a r e not a rb itra ry , even to s a y that x
appears to be sq u are in v o lv es a judgm ental elem en t as a c r ite r io n in
m ind to the e ffe ct that x at le a s t appears to have sp e c ific r e la tio n
sh ip s to other s e n s e m ean in gs. In sh o rt, ev en upon the e x p r e s s iv e
le v e l, a judgm ental factor com p ares ap p earan ces with s e n s e m ea n
in g s. M oreover, accord in g to L ew is, u n less we have su ch se n se
m ean in gs as c r ite r ia in m ind, lin g u istic e x p r e ssio n s w ould be w ithout
m ean ing. We m ay now draw the con clu sion that if e x p r e s s iv e s ta te
m en ts a re to have any m eaning, then a judgm ental factor involving
the co m p a riso n of s e n s e rela tio n sh ip s m ust occu r; and th is im p lic a
tion is in c o n sisten t w ith L e w is's stand that e x p r e s s iv e sta tem en ts do
not in volve judgm ental f a c t o r s . Now sin c e L ew is r e je c ts the
sy n th etic a p r io r i, and b e lie v e s that a ll p rop osition s a re eith er
79
a n a ly tic and c e r ta in or e m p ir ic a l and p rob ab le only, he h as tw o a l
te r n a tiv e s open to him : eith er (1) e x p r e s s iv e sta te m e n ts in v o lv e no
ju d gm en tal e le m e n t and a r e th e r e fo r e c e r ta in , an a lter n a tiv e that
m ak es e x p r e s s iv e sta te m e n ts c o m p le te ly m e a n in g le s s, or e ls e (2)
e x p r e s s iv e sta te m e n ts a r e ju d gm en tal and a cco r d in g ly a r e probab le
on ly. Of th e se tw o a lte r n a tiv e s , the f ir s t one le a v e s L ew is w ithout
the req u ired m ean in gs n e c e s s a r y to tra c e th e r e la tio n sh ip s of e x
p r e s s iv e sta te m e n ts to term in a tin g and n o n -ter m in a tin g ju d gm en ts,
a point c r u c ia l to L e w is's o v e r -a ll p o sitio n . The only c h o ice , then,
fo r L e w is, is the seco n d one: e x p r e ss iv e sta te m e n ts in volve a
jud gm en tal a sp e c t, are e m p ir ic a l, and can be probable only.
D e sp ite the p la u sib ility of th is c o n c lu sio n , one m u st, in f a ir
n e ss to L e w is, ack n ow led ge that in one s e n s e at le a s t th ere is s o m e
thing about the "hard core" of the g iv en w h ich, unlike b e lie fs, is b e
yond doubt, and th is a sp e c t of the im m ed ia te e x p e r ie n c e r a is e s
d iffic u ltie s for the above a n a ly s is . F or how can the ind ivid u al be
aw are that im m ed ia te e x p e r ie n c e is ind ub itab le, yet at the sa m e tim e
ack n ow led ge that he is m e r e ly en ter ta in in g a probab le b e lie f? D oes
not th is situ a tio n c r e a te the co n tra d ictio n of an indubitable h y p o th esis
P e r r y su g g e s ts a way out of th is d ifficu lty? He con clu d es that
e le m e n ta r y p e r ce p tu a l e x p e r ie n c e s ap p ear to be fr e e fr o m e r r o r b e
c a u se p e r ce p tu a l ju d gm en ts are a lm o s t in fa llib le . In p ercep tio n ,
80
con firm ation is continuous betw een h yp oth esis and con firm ation and
a b sen ce of tem p o ra l d iscon tin u ity c r e a te s a condition in w hich the
p rob ab ility ap p roach es a m in im al lim it. In P e r r y 's w ords:
• . . se n so r y cogn ition . . . i s not in fa llib le in the se n se that it is
co n stitu tio n a lly in com p atib le w ith e r r o r , but only in the se n se
that lia b ility to erro r is red uced to a m inim um . It is the
th resh old of e r r o r , or the lim itin g c a se in the order of certain ty.
In se n so r y cognition th ere is a r e fe r e n c e to contingency, an
anticip ation of stim u lu s-to -c o m e , of m o r e -o f-th e -s a m e , of
stim u lu s-o u t-th e r e . T here i s , in sh ort, expectation; and e x
p ectation is alw ays at the m e r c y of ev en ts. But in the c a se of
se n so r y cognition the v e rd ic t of even ts is continuously p ro
nounced, w ithout in terval of su sp en se . V erifica tio n im m ed ia tely
p r e ce d e s and fo llo w s h y p o th esis. T here is room for doubt, but
th is room is in d iv isib le; b eing lik e the point and the instan t, a
lo cu s without ex ten sio n . The im p rob ab ility of a slip approaches
infin ity as the in terv a l betw een the cup and the lip approaches
z e r o . (G en eral, p. 323)
T h ese co n clu sio n s have con cern ed the cogn itive fa cto r s of
e x p e r ie n c e . Yet th ey are a lso intended to r e fe r to value phenom ena
a s w ell; for, in the c a se of L ew is, m uch of h is argum ent for the
c h a r a c te r istic s of im m ed iate value ex p erien ce is b ased upon p a r a lle ls
of value ex p erien ce to other a r e a s of e x p erien ce. F or exam p le, he
co m p a res 'th is app ears red* w ith 'th is app ears good, ' m aintaining
that each p rop osition has the sam e c h a r a c te r istic s:
. . . the p a r a lle l betw een im m ed ia tely apprehended value as co m
pared w ith valu e a s a p rop erty of an object, and se en r e d n e ss or
str a ig h tn e ss a s com p ared w ith the ob jective property of r ed n e ss
or str a ig h tn e ss in a th eory, is so obvious a s hardly to c a ll for
extended com m en t. . . (A n a ly sis, p. 411)
A lthough w e sh all q u estion th is com p arison on the b a s is of our
81
p rev io u s r e se r v a tio n s co n cern in g the c e r ta in ty of the 's e e n r e d n e ss'
p art of the an alogy, w e m a y s t ill a g r ee w ith L ew is that h is an alogy
has at le a s t an in itia l p la u sib ility . F u r th e r m o r e , as we sh a ll s e e
la te r , th is a n a lo g y w ill p rove u se fu l fo r com p arin g cogn itiv e and
v a lu e d isp o sitio n t e r m s . H o w ev er, a fu ll d is c u ssio n of this point
m u st be d ela y ed .
We m ay now su m m a r iz e our c o n clu sio n s and th eir im p lic a
tion s fo r the d is c u s s io n at hand. L ew is is c o r r e c t in in s is tin g that
im m ed ia te e x p e r ie n c e is beyond the co n tro l and the c r it ic is m of the
individual; and he is righ t in m ain tain in g that, in th is s e n s e at le a s t,
the im m e d ia te ly given is ind ub itab le. Y et, in ter m s of h is th e o ry of
m ean in g, L ew is m u st r e c o g n iz e that the c e r ta in ty of e x p r e s s iv e e x
p e r ie n c e is p s y c h o lo g ic a l on ly. L e w is's e r r o r , th e r e fo r e , o c c u r s in
h is erro n eo u s equation of p sy c h o lo g ic a l w ith lo g ic a l c er ta in ty and in
h is fa ilu r e to s e e that p e r ce p tu a l e x p e r ie n c e in v o lv es b e lie f no m a t
te r how au tom atic or h ab itu al. But th e se im p lic a tio n s are not c r u
c ia l to h is o v e r -a ll p o sitio n . Indeed, b y ad m ittin g that p e rcep tio n
in v o lv es b e lie f, h e can account fo r the m an n er in w hich sig n fu n c
tio n s , o rg a n ic r e a c tio n s, r eco g n itio n of o b je ctiv e r e la tio n s h ip s --in
fa c t, even d ay d rea m s and fr e e a ss o c ia tio n s can en cro a ch upon the
im m ed ia te e x p e r ie n c e b e c a u se th ey can now b e exp lain ed as no d ifferen t
in kind fr o m the p e rcep tu a l judgm ents th em s e lv e s . A nother advantage
82
fo r him in an ad m issio n that perception is judgm ental is that h is e x
p r e ssiv e language m ay be brought c lo s e r to ordinary usage by serv in g
two pu rp oses instead of one: it can continue to r e fle c t the indubitable
asp ect (p sych ological) of the im m ed iately given w hile indicating its
probable statu s (logical) as a b elief. F in ally, the learning p r o c ess
and changes in perceptual ab ility can be attributed to a judgm ental
factor, and, on the value plane, he can explain how tastes can be b e
yond dispute in th eir indubitable quality, yet, even in term s of im
m ed iate exp erien ce, be su bject to change as a resu lt of different e x
p e r ie n c e s. In short, the many factors which, given L ew is's in s is t
ence that im m ediate exp erien ce is certain , are unexplainable, can be
understood by con sid erin g perceptual exp erien ce judgm ental.
(4) E x p ressiv e statem en ts and the form u lation s of non
term inating judgm ents together give m eaning to 'good' as a d is
p osition ter m . We have p reviou sly se en how e x p r e ssiv e statem en ts
and form u lation s of non-term inating judgm ents a re, in p rin cip le,
sim ila r , differing only tem p orally in ter m s of con seq u en ces. But a
problem rem ains: sin ce L ew is has decided to include inherent value
w ithin h is sy stem , he m ust indicate how value judgm ents, as e s
tim ates of an object's potential value, can be form ulated in a m anner
co n sisten t with his o v e r -a ll system ; for inasm uch as he m aintains,
as we have se en , that "... the only ultim ately good thing. . . is r e a liz a -
83
tion of p o ssib le v a lu e-q u a lity in e x p e r ie n c e . . (A n a ly s is , p. 390),
he m u st co n stru e in h eren t value in a w ay w hich w ill p r e se r v e th is
conten tion. H is d efin ition of in h eren t v alu e is a s follow s:
T hose v a lu e s w hich a re r e sid e n t in o b jects in such w is e
that th ey a re r e a liz a b le in e x p erien ce through p resen ta tio n
of the object it s e lf to w hich they a re attributed, w e p rop ose
to c a ll in h eren t v a lu e s. (A n a ly s is, p. 391)
The p h rase 're sid e n t in o b jects' is , I b e lie v e , an unfortunate
one; for L ew is should be attem pting, on the b a s is of h is o v e ra ll
p o sitio n , to avoid any m isu n d erstan d in g that value is a quality of the
ob ject. T his point, h ow ever, L ew is d o es attem pt to m ake c le a r in
the follow in g quotation:
In th is se n se of ’in tr in sic v a lu e ’ as the valu e of that w hich is
valu ed for its own sak e, no ob jective ex isten t has str ic tly in tr in sic
value; a ll v a lu e s in o b jects are e x tr in sic o n ly . T his is so b eca u se
the end, by r ela tio n to w hich alone anything is u ltim a tely to be
judged gen u in ely valu ab le, is som e p o ssib le r e a liz a tio n of good n ess
in d ir ec t e x p e r ie n c e . The good n ess of good o b jects c o n s is ts in
the p o s sib ility of th eir lead in g to so m e r e a liz a tio n of d ir e c tly e x
p e r ie n c ed g o o d n e s s. What w ould by no p o s sib ility e v er be an
in stru m en t for brin gin g any sa tisfa c tio n to anybody, is a b so lu tely
w ithout v a lu e, or the value of it is n eg a tiv e. (A n a ly sis, p. 387)
A cco rd in g ly , the p h rase con cern in g valu e a s " resid en t in objects"
Im erely r e p r e se n ts a lin g u istic option to w r ite in the com m on id iom .
The a lter n a tiv e, for L e w is, w ould be to define ‘in h eren t valu e of the
o b je ct1 a s r ep re sen tin g a poten tial stim u lu s of valu e e x p e rien ce .
L ew is again s t r e s s e s th is point when he sa y s:
T here is at bottom only one kind of valu e in o b jects, sta te s
of a ffa irs and other e x isten ts; n am ely p oten tiality for r e a liz a tio n s
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of v alu e in d ir e c t e x p e r ie n c e . (A n a ly sis, p. 511)
That L ew is a ctu a lly intended th is p otential a ltern a tiv e a s the m ean ing
of in h e r e n t v a lu e 1 m ay be concluded on the b a s is of the p rev io u s d is
c u ssio n con cern in g h is lin g u istic option, togeth er w ith h is en tire
a n a ly sis of the m ean ing of ‘p o ten tia lity ’ in te r m s of ’’if-th e n ’' s ta te
m e n ts.
L e w is's d evelop m en t of the la tter point i s the top ic of th is
se ctio n . The d isc u ssio n m ay now cen ter upon h is c h a r a cter iza tio n
of 'good1 a s a d isp o sitio n te r m . H is fir s t step in th is approach i s to
view p oten tiality in te r m s of c o u n ter-fa ctu a l subjunctive p ro p o sitio n s:
F or exam p le, "If th is sa lt should be put in w a ter, it w ould
d is s o lv e , " sta te s the p rop erty of the sa lt c a lle d its so lu b ility .
The sa lt has th is p rop erty not only w hen or if it i s put in w ater;
it equally h as it w hen not put in w a te r, and if it i s n ev er put in
w a te r. The if-th e n sta tem en t is tru e w hether the h y p o th esis in
it is tru e or not. H ence th is p rop erty is a p o ten tia lity of the
sa lt. (A n a ly sis, p. 513)
On the b a s is of th is concep t of p oten tiality, L ew is d ev elo p s an|
analogy of cogn itive to valu e ju d gm en ts. Thus, for ex a m p le, 'th is is
a doorknob, 1 a s a cogn itive judgm ent c o rresp o n d s to su ch valu ation al
jud gm en ts a s "this is good ." In each c a s e , a cco rd in g to L e w is, a
i
| judgm ental p rop osition i s b a sed upon a th e o r e tic a lly in fin ite num ber of
| p o ten tia lity p ro p o sitio n s. L ew is c a lls su ch p o ten tia lity p ro p o sitio n s
i
j
jterm in atin g ju d gm en ts. T erm in atin g jud gm en ts th e m s e lv e s take a
I
h yp oth etical fo r m --" if I w e r e to turn th is ob ject w h ich ap p ears to be
85
a doorknob, tb en I w ould be able to open what ap p ears to be a d o o r."
But to r e p r e se n t sig n ific a n t fo r m s o f e m p ir ic a l k n ow led ge, su ch
sta tem en ts m u st not be con firm ed ; fo r in su ch a situ a tio n , " the
h y p o th etica l and p r e d ic tiv e ter m in a tin g jud gm en t as su ch , la p s e s
w hen v erified " (A n a ly s is , p. 257). On the o th er hand, su ch term in a t
ing jud gm en ts m u st be co n firm a b le in te r m s of futu re e m p ir ic a l
e v e n ts .
The p r o b le m of c h a r a c te r iz in g the m eaning of the "if-then"
r e la tio n in L e w is's ter m in a tin g jud gm en t r e m a in s . F ou r poin ts a r e
p ertin en t h e r e . F ir s t , the con seq u en t of su ch a judgm ent is not d e -
d u cib le fr o m the a n teced en t b e c a u se one can , w ithout co n tra d ictio n ,
a s s e r t the d en ial of a term in a tin g ju d gm en t. S econ d , the truth
v alu e of the judgm ent is independent o f th e truth value of its a n te
ced en t, and, th u s, th ird , a c o n tr a r y -to -fa c t term in a tin g judgm ent
r em a in s a sig n ific a n t o n e . F in a lly , ter m in a tin g judgm ents can in
p r in c ip le be p rob ab le o n ly . T h ese fa c t o r s , a cco rd in g to L e w is,
in d ica te that term in a tin g ju d gm en ts m u st take su ch fo r m a s "If su ch
and su ch o b ser v a tio n sh ou ld be m a d e, then so and so w ould be e x
p erien ced " (p. 226), in w h ich the 'if. . .th e n ' con n ection has th e sa m e
c h a r a c te r is tic s as the . .o n e connoted in any a s s e r tio n of
c a u sa l rela tio n sh ip s or of co n n ectio n a c co rd in g to n atu ral law"
(p. 227). T hus, fo r L e w is, the m ea n in g of c o n tr a r y -to -fa c t
86
co n d itio n a ls i s p r a g m a tic in the s e n s e of b ein g ro o te d in e x p e r ie n c e :
It i s the kind of co n n ectio n w e b e lie v e in w h en w e b e lie v e
that the c o n se q u e n c e s of any h y p o th e sis a r e su ch and su ch b e c a u se
of th e w ay r e a lity is or b e c a u se the fa c ts of n atu re a r e th u s and so .
It i s th e kind of co n n ectio n w h ich w e r e ly upon, and im p lic itly
a s s e r t , w hen w e a n ticip a te th at the c o n se q u e n c e s of a c e r ta in a c
tion under c e r ta in co n d itio n s w ould be so and so , and cannot
b e o th e r w is e . B e c a u se w h o ev er b e lie v e s in p r e d icta b le c o n
se q u e n c e s of a ctio n , b e lie v e s th at although w e m a k e our own
d e c is io n s , w hat i s to en su e once w e c o m m it o u r s e lv e s i s fix e d
and out of our h an d s. O nly by the 'r e a lity ’ of th is co n n ectio n ,
in d ep en d en tly of th e d e c is io n it s e lf , cou ld th e r e be any su ch
th in g a s 'fo r e s e e a b le c o n se q u e n c e s' of a ctio n . (A n a ly s is , p. 227)
In su m m a ry , L e w is 's ter m in a tin g ju d gm en ts take a h yp o
th e tic a l fo r m and e x p r e s s a co n n ectio n w h ich i s a n alogou s to that
e x p r e s s e d in fo r m u la tio n s of n atu ral law ; th e se ju d gm en ts a r e sta ted
in e x p r e s s iv e la n g u a g e, a r e p rob ab le only, a r e c o n fir m a b le but not
c o n firm e d , c o n stitu te genuine e m p ir ic a l k n ow led ge, and a r e p r e d ic
tio n s of futu re p a s s a g e s of e x p e r ie n c e .
On th e oth er hand, L e w is 's n o n -ter m in a tin g ju d gm en ts tak e
an o b je c tiv e fo r m , a s , fo r e x a m p le, 'th is is gold . ' The tru th v a lu e
of su ch n o n -ter m in a tin g ju d gm en ts is b a se d upon c o n fir m a tio n s of a
th e o r e tic a lly in fin ite s e r ie s of c o rr esp o n d in g te r m in a tin g ju d g m en ts.
| In the e x a m p le of the n o n -ter m in a tin g p r o p o sitio n 'th is i s gold, ' the
i co n firm in g ter m in a tin g ju d gm en ts w ou ld be: "If I w e r e to h ea t th is ,
| it w ou ld m e lt at su ch and su ch d e g r e e s , " "If I sh ould im m e r s e th is in
I
|
I su ch and su ch a cid , th en it w ou ld d is s o lv e , " e tc . T he n u m ber of c o n -
87
firm in g in sta n ces of a judgm ent is in fin ite b eca u se, not only can the
typ es of te s t be con tin u ally in c r e a se d , but each and e v e r y one m ay
a ls o be rep eated in ord er to ch eck the accu ra cy of the te s t con d ition s.
Thus n o n -term in a tin g judgm ents . .h a v e a p red ictiv e sig n ific a n c e
w hich is in exh au stib le and the v e r ific a tio n of them is n ev er c o m
p lete" (A n a ly sis, p. 257).
In su m m ary, L ew is m aintains that th ere are th ree types of
e m p ir ic a l statem en ts. (1) E x p r e ssiv e statem e nts fo rm u la te what is
p r e se n tly given in e x p e r ie n c e . B eca u se they are the con n ectin g link
w ith e x p e rien ce , su ch judgm ents are n e c e ss a r y to the e x is te n c e of
e m p ir ic a l know ledge. As p r e v io u sly am ended, the p o sitio n is now
that e x p r e s s iv e sta te m en ts are tru e or fa lse , are probably only, and
a re v a lid fo rm s of e m p ir ic a l know ledge. A s w e have se e n , e x p r e s
siv e sta te m en ts cannot, s tr ic tly sp eak in g, be form u lated; n e v e r th e
le s s , th eir s e n s e m ay be con veyed by a circu m lo cu tio n which
em p loys w ords su ch as ’s e e m s 1 and 'a p p e a r s .1 (2) The sta tem en ts of
term in a tin g judgm ents m ake p red ictio n s of future p o ssib le e x p e r i
e n c es in the fo rm of, 'If I should do A , then I w ould e x p e rien ce B . '
The p red ictio n in q u estion c a lls fo r v e rific a tio n , and, being su b ject to
p o s sib le e r r o r , is con firm ab le but not con firm ed . (3) The s t a t e
m en ts of n on -term in atin g ju d gm en ts a s s e r t ob jective sta tu s and are
testa b le in ter m s of an u n lim ited num ber of term in atin g ju d gm en ts.
88
L e w is d e v e lo p s th is a n a ly s is to in d ic a te, as a lin g u istic op tion , how
an o b je ct m ay be sp ok en of a s having a p o ten tia l fo r evok in g c e r ta in
typ es of e x p e r ie n c e s . And he m a in ta in s that th e r e is a d ir ec t
p a r a lle l b etw een , on th e one hand, th e e x p r e s s iv e sta te m e n ts, th e
te r m in a tin g ju d g m en ts, and the n o n -ter m in a tin g ju d gm en ts in the
c o g n itiv e a r e a and, on the o th er hand, the c o u n terp a rts o f th e s e in
the v a lu a tio n a l r e a lm .
The la s t poin t in d ic a tes that v alu e ju d gm en ts a r e not d if
fe r e n t in kind fro m c o g n itiv e ju d gm en ts in g e n e r a l. A cco rd in g to
L e w is, s e v e r a l fa c to r s often o b sc u r e th is p oin t. F ir s t, a p e r so n 's
b e lie fs c o n c er n in g v a lu e tend to flu ctu a te fr o m tim e to tim e , and
a r e p erh ap s m o re e a s ily a ffec ted by r e o r ie n ta tio n than oth er a s
p e c ts of e x p e r ie n c e . N o n th e le ss, th is d iffe r e n c e b etw een c o g n itiv e
and v a lu a tio n a l e x p e r ie n c e is m e r e ly of d e g r ee and not of kind.
S eco n d ly , th e r e is a m ore m ark ed v a r ia tio n in v a lu e b e lie fs than in
c o g n itiv e ones not s o m uch b e c a u se of th is d iffe r e n c e , but b e c a u se
su ch r e la tiv it ie s in v a lu es a r e m o re e a s ily d e tec ted than v a r ia tio n s
in oth er p h a se s of e x p e r ie n c e . An in d ivid u al who, in the c o g n itiv e
a r e a , s e e s g r e e n fo r blu e, fo r ex a m p le, is m o re lik e ly to ad ju st to
h is id io sy n c r a c y ; he m e r e ly a lte r s h is v o ca b u la ry to s a y *green' fo r
'b lu e '--a n d th is ad ju stm en t g o e s u n n oticed , often e v en by the in
d ivid u al h im s e lf. T h ird, oth er fa c to r s of v a r ia tio n m u st a ls o be
89
acknow ledged. When the individual is th irsty , he m ay d erive m ore
value from drinking w ater than at other tim e s. T his fact, how ever,
d oes not m ake the value of w ater su bjective: for such fluctuations of
v a lu e -r e a liz a tio n are com m on to all p eople.
Although the im m ed iate value w hich c h a r a c te r iz e s p r e se n ta
tion of w ater when w e are th irsty , is one in d isp en sib le factor of
an o b jectiv ely c o r r e c t valuation of a body of w ater near a city,
nobody is m isle d into supposing w ater a m ore valuable com m od ity
b ecau se he happens at the m om ent to be th ir sty . (L ew is,
A n a ly sis, p. 427)
Fourth, it is m ore im portant to agree or d isa g re e concerning m a t
te r s of valu e. V alues affect one*s life im m ed ia tely and to a g rea ter
extent than do other p h ases of ex p e rien ce s. In addition, there is a
c lo s e r connection betw een what is p rized and a p p ra ised , in what the
individual ch o o se s to do. F a ilu r es in non -value m od es of ap
p reh en sion m ay not a d v e r se ly affect judgm ents of the ob jective to as
great an extent as in the value rea lm of ex p erien ce. The individual
who is n e a r -sig h te d m ay so m etim es c o r r e c t th is su b jective trait:
he lea r n s to com p en sate for the d efect by a judgm ent involving in te r -
4
polation. Situations involving v a lu es, how ever, m ay not be so
e a sily adjusted unnoticed. Thus, L e w is's con clu sion follow s:
4
"The p erso n a l ch aracter of h is v isu a l data m ark s them as
su bjective; but th is co n stitu tes no bar to a c o rr ec ted in terp retation
of them a s c lu e s to ob jective fa c ts ." (A n a ly sis, p. 420)
90
No kind of datum of ap p reh en sion i s , by it s e lf and in its
own d ir e c tly found c h a r a c te r , e ith er m isle a d in g or rig h t-
lead in g; it b e c o m e s e ith er one or the other only w hen so m e
in te rp re ta tio n i s im p o se d upon it. (A n a ly sis, p. 421)
It is on th is v e r y point that S te v en so n 's th eo ry , a cco rd in g to
L e w is's p o sitio n , m u st be c o n sid e r e d in co m p lete; for it lim its c o n
sid e r a tio n s of v a lu e to the le v e l of the im m e d ia te ly apprehended.
M o reo v er, S tev en so n fa ils to r e a liz e that b etw een the v alu e of an
ob ject, and, say, its q u ality of c o lo r , a d ir e c t p a r a lle l can be
draw n fo r d isp o sitio n p r e d ic a te s; thu s it m ay v e r y w e ll be tru e that
valu e and n o n -v a lu e im m ed ia te e x p e r ie n c e is p sy c h o lo g ic a lly c e r
tain; yet, at th e sa m e tim e , to the exten t that th ere a r e a sc r ip tio n s
to the ob ject, the sta te m en ts w h ich fo rm u la te th is e x p e r ie n c e a re
p rob ab le on ly. In other w o r d s, to con clu d e the d is c u s s io n of th is
se c tio n , the a sc r ip tio n of v alu e to an ob ject m a y be fo rm u la ted w ith
'good' a s a d isp o sitio n te r m in w h ich e x p r e s s iv e and n o n -term in a tin g
judgm ent fo rm u la tio n s d iffer only te m p o ra lly .
T h is e n tir e d is c u s s io n , sta rtin g w ith S teven son , h as now
swung fu ll c o m p a ss . It is , th e r e fo r e , tim e again for stock taking;
for the c o n flic ts b etw een L e w is and S tev en so n , to g eth er w ith the
v ie w s of P a rk er and P e r r y , m u st again be brought in to p e r sp e c tiv e .
I B y w ay of su m m a ry , then, it w a s found that the d iffe r e n c e s in the
I four th e o r ie s m a y be r e s o lv e d by a c lo s e r sc r u tin y of the ap-
i p r o a c h e s and the te r m in o lo g ie s of each . We noted that S tev en so n 's
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'attitu d e' co rresp o n d s to P e r r y 's ter m in o lo g y of 'govern in g p r o
p e n s itie s ' and 'in t e r e s t s - 1 The e m o tiv e fa c to r s in a ttitu d es, fu r th e r
m o r e , co rr esp o n d to P a r k e r 's sta te m en ts of v a lu e , w h ich w e re
s im ila r to L e w is's le v e l of im m ed iate p r iz in g . P a r k e r c h a r a c te r
iz e d su ch e x p e r ie n c e s as the a ssu a g e m e n t of d e s ir e , a te r m w h ich,
h e ack n ow led ges (P h ilo so p h y , p . 44) to be s im ila r to P e r r y 's
in t e r e s t . S tev en so n , in turn, w ith h is em p h a sis upon lan gu age,
a n a ly z es attitude into e m o tiv e , s u g g e s tiv e , and d e sc r ip tiv e m e a n
in g s . T h ese m ea n in g s, in tu rn , w e r e found lin g u is tic a lly to r e fle c t
P e r r y 's e m o tiv e , in s tin c tiv e , and h ab itual com ponents of an in te r e s t.
In sh o rt, the te r m attitude w as found to broad enough to p r e s e r v e
the sig n ific a n t in sig h ts of a ll four p h ilo so p h ers in c h a r a c te r iz in g
the im m ed ia te valu e e x p e r ie n c e .
The ta sk of ex p lica tin g the p sy c h o lo g ic a l p r o c e s s e s of a t
titu d es f e ll to P e r r y and P a r k e r . P e r r y d is c u s s e d the su b je ct's
in te r e s t ju d gm en ts as th ey apply to in tr in sic v a lu e , and P a r k e r , in
turn, su g g e ste d how su ch e x p e r ie n c e s range fr o m d e s ir e s through
sa tis fa c tio n s . M o re o v er , w ith P e p p e r 's h elp we saw how P a r k e r 's
b io lo g ic a l a c tiv ity -g o a l of an a ssu a g e m e n t of d e s ir e co m p lem en ts
P e r r y 's p sy c h o lo g ic a l o b je ct-g o a l o f an in te r e s t.
At th is point a d ifficu lty a r o s e b etw een L ew is and P a r k e r as
to w h eth er or not one can sp ea k of v a lu e as in h erin g in o b je c ts . This
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con flict was reso lv ed as a lin gu istic option; and L ew is supplem ented
the P er r y -P a r k e r d iscu ssio n of in te re st judgm ents with an an alysis
of value judgm ents as ascrip tion s of (inherent) value to ob jects. A c
cord in gly, by rev isin g L ew is's p osition concerning the status of ex
p r e ssiv e statem en ts, we w ere able to d em onstrate how L ew is could
c h a ra cterize inherent value through a language of term inating and
non -term in ating p rop osition s. But it m ust be em phasized that L ew is
m aintains that his concept of "inherent value" r eflec ts a lin gu istic
option based upon com m on se n se and ordinary lin g u istic usage; and,
although L ew is speaks of "the value o b ject," h e, n o n e th e le s s --b e
cau se this term inology m e r e ly r eflec ts a way of sp ea k in g --a g re es
with P e r r y , P a rk er, and Stevenson that the generic m eaning of
value its e lf m ust u ltim ately r e st in exp erien ce alone.
At this point a d ifficu lty a r o se over S teven son 's ph rase "do
so as w e ll." Now w hereas this problem was con sid ered to be
p rop erly part of the topic of duty and obligation in P a rt II, we w ere
able, even at this point of the d isc u ssio n , to o b serv e that Stevensonfs
o v e r -a ll concern is in d isco v erin g how con flicts of value m ay be r e
solved and in estab lish in g the lim its of reason in such an e n ter p r ise .
Thus, w hile Steven son 's orientation is d ifferent fro m that of the
other four p h ilosop h ers, h is an alysis need not be con sid ered in
com patible on this count alon e. Indeed, by fram ing the prob lem in
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this m aim er, Stevenson lo g ic a lly lim its h im se lf to the le v e l of
attitudes and to factors which influence them . Thus, the con flicts
betw een Steven son , on the one hand, and P e r r y , L ew is, and
P a rk er, on the other, are m in im ized sim p ly b ecau se the two groups
are referrin g to different topics: Steven son 's concern with how one
can be persuaded that x is good does not determ ine the quite d if
feren t question of whether or not x actu ally is good. M oreover,
when the analyses of the four ph ilosophers do overlap, they are
com plem entary; for each philosopher is concerned, in varying
d egree, with the problem of p ersu a siv e factors of d isco u rse as w ell
as with that of ch aracterizin g the im m ed iate value exp erien ce.
In sh ort, the above d iscu ssio n supports the conclu sion that
the con flicts betw een the four philosophers m ay be reso lv ed , fo r
they are p artly due to term in ological d ifferen ces, partly to the
nature of th eir orientation, and, to a great extent, to alternative
lin gu istic op tion s.
One point, how ever, rem ains to be decided: our m ethodolo
gical approach has delayed d iscu ssio n of S tev en so n ’s in siste n c e that
'good' involves a com p ulsive factor tran slatab le only by im p e ra tiv es.
This "do so as w ell" part of Steven son 's definition of 'good' req u ires
additional d iscu ssio n which w ill concern the nature of the com p u lsive
factor in eth ical d isc o u r se . This p roblem , in turn, r a ise s the
qu estion of the m eaning of su ch w ords as 'duty, 1 'rig h t, ' and
'o u g h t.' But th e se q u estion s p r o p e r ly b elon g to a d is c u ssio n of
ob ligation to w hich w e m u st now turn.
CHAPTER VI
THE PRUDENTIAL OUGHT
At le a st four assu m p tion s underly the u se of the prudential
ought as a com m itm ent to m a x im ize the good. T h ese assum ptions
a re, fir s t, that a ranking of value is th eo retica lly p ossib le; second,
that value and eth ics can be separated; third, that values are
organizable into a com p reh en sive whole; and, fin ally, that, in sp ite
of the d istin ction betw een eth ics and value theory, there is an in
trica te relation sh ip betw een the right and the good. A ll th ese points
are im p licit in the m eaning of the prudential ought, and, accordingly,
each m ust be con sid ered in its turn.
1. The F ir st Im p licit A ssum ption in the
M eaning of the P rudential Ought
An exam ination of this fir s t assum ption finds that P erry,
P ark er, and L ew is, although em ploying different explanations and
term in o lo g ies, are^ nonetheless, in fundam ental agreem ent. A c
cording to th e se p h ilosop h ers, v alu es can be ranked into a h ierarch y
of ord er. A ll that is needed fo r this "ranking” is so m e so r t of
organizing p rin cip le.
A s an in itia l step tow ard the estab lish m en t of a value
h ierarch y, P arker helpfully d istin g u ish es two types of sta n d a rd s,
95
96
in tern a l and e x tern a l. The fun ction of the in tern al stan dard is to
provid e an id ea l for any one type of p reoccu p ation or a c tiv ity . T hus,
fo r in sta n ce, sty le s of w ritin g, of sk iin g , of painting can be ranked,
each accord in g to its own s p e c ific id ea l. But, as P ark er points out,
th is ord erin g of v a lu es is highly a r tific ia l; b ecau se of the lim ita tio n s
of tim e, sp a ce , and en ergy th ere w ill be a constant com p etition
am ong the variou s a c tiv itie s in any co n crete situ ation . F or exam p le,
the p erfectio n of ten n is m ay com p ete w ith the pu rsu it of b u sin ess
g o a ls .
But th is com p etition is not the only rea so n why the in tern al
standard r e fle c ts an a r tific ia l situ ation . T here is the additional
fa cto r that the con seq u en ces of e v er y su ch iso la te d a c tiv ity m u st be
c o n sid ered . Thus, if I devote a ll m y e n e r g ie s to b u sin ess p u rsu its
I m ay find m y se lf facin g a painful u lcer op eration . In sh o rt, for any
situ a tio n involving an in tern a l standard, th ere w ill a ls o be c o n s e
quences w hich, under n orm al c ir c u m sta n c e s, cannot be ign ored .
T h ese lim ita tio n s of the in tern a l stan dard, th erefo re, n e c e ss ita te
P a r k e r 's secon d p rin cip le, ca lled the ex tern a l standard. T his
stan dard p erm its a w eighing of the ev id en ce con cern in g not only the
co m p etitiv e d e sir e s of variou s a c tiv itie s but con cern in g the e ffe c ts
of su ch a c tiv itie s.
F rom th is b r ief d is c u ssio n it is apparent that, fo r the
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in d ivid u al who w ould o r d e r h is v alu es in to a h iera rch y , the s ig n ifi-
!
! can t c r ite r io n is the e x te rn a l stan d ard . The r e a so n for th is is
lo g ic a l: the in te rn a l stan d ard , being r e s tr ic te d to one type of a c tiv ity ,
can be su b su m ed under the e x te r n a l stan dard, w hich extend s to a ll
a c t iv it ie s .
W ithin th is g e n e r a l th e o r e tic a l fra m ew o rk , it is apparent that
| ad d ition al c r ite r ia w ill be req u ired for o rgan izin g com p etin g d e s ir e s
; into a h ie r a r c h y of o r d e r. A m ong su ch stan d ard s a re the follow in g:
| attain m en t (P a rk er ), p r e fe r e n c e , in ten sity , en ligh ten m en t, in c lu s iv e -
i
n e s s , d u ration , and num ber (P e r r y ).
|
1. A ttain m en t. T his c r ite r io n a p p lies to the in tern a l
I stan d ard as d is c u s s e d above, but it a lso has b earin g on e x te rn a l
; sta n d a rd s; for the d e g r ee to w hich I am able to attain an id e a l of the
in tern a l stan d ard in flu e n c es m y attitude tow ard com p etin g d e s ir e s .
T o u se P a r k e r 's illu str a tio n , if I am in cap ab le of w ritin g p oetry
w hich a p p ro a ch es an id e a l in tern a l stan dard, then I m ay abandon this
a c tiv ity in o rd er to p u rsu e oth er sa tisfa c tio n s; su ch c o m p etitiv e d e
s i r e s , in th e ir turn, w ill lead to the u se of an ex tern a l stan d ard . But
in sp ite of the im p o s s ib ility of iso la tin g in tern a l sta n d a rd s, P a rk er
fin d s the p rin c ip le of attain m en t u sefu l, fo r , w ith it, the individu al
can c r e a te id e a ls fo r ea ch type of a c tiv ity .
P e r r y , on the oth er hand, ap p aren tly d is a g r e e s w ith P a rk er
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concerning the u sefu ln ess of th is criterio n . He fra m es the problem
by asking w hether an object w hich lie s w ithin the range of the in
dividu al's capacity and is secu re from the v ic issitu d e s of fortune
i s better sim p ly b ecau se of th is fact. And, w ith P erry , for whom
value is equivalent to in te r e st alone, the answ er follow s logica lly:
attainability is not a factor in the m eaning of value.
The fact is that attainability and secu rity in and of th em
se lv e s have nothing to do w ith value. The g rea test goods m ay
be th ose which are m ost rem ote, m ost uncertain and m ost
p reca rio u s. (G eneral, p. 611)
T his repudiation of the standard of attainability apparently
" con trad icts P ark er, for, w h ereas P arker en d orses attainability as a
standard, P er ry fla tly r e je c ts it. But is th is a real contradiction?
The answ er m ust be "no"; for the d isagreem en t is apparent o n ly --
a fact w hich is supported by two rea so n s. F ir st, P er ry is concerned
w ith the extern al standard w h ereas P arker lim its h is d iscu ssio n of
attainability to the internal standard; and w h ereas P erry actually
d oes r ejec t attainability, he does so within a context w here it has a
sp ec ific m eaning, i. e. , within its h isto rica l fram e of referen ce,
jwhere attainability is u su ally advanced as the one and only external
I
standard of value:
The co n sisten t acceptance of th is principle would im ply the
suprem e value of such objects as are m o st e a sily and su rely at
tainable, w hich would im ply that reduction of life to its prim itive
ap p etites, --th a t scorn of culture and arrogant defiance of m an
kind, that earned the ancient cyn ics their evil reputation.
99
(G eneral, pp. 610-611)
T his quotation in d icates that, in context, P er ry is referrin g
to attainability not, as P arker d oes, as an intern al but as an e x te r
nal standard. In other w ords, w h ereas P erry r e je c ts attainability
as a c riter io n for deciding betw een a c tiv itie s --g o lf or p ain tin g--
P arker accep ts attainability as a guide for approaching an id eal in
one such a c tiv ity --a s , in golf. C learly both are using different
m ean ings when they refer to attainability. T his, then, is one reason
for the apparent d isagreem en t betw een them .
The second cau se for the apparent d ifferen ce betw een them
on attainability is that P er ry exam in es attainability as a standard for
gen eric value w h ereas P arker r e fe r s to it as a m ean s of evaluating
valu e. P e r r y 's usage is apparent in the follow ing quotation:
. . .d e g r e e s of hop efu lness bear no fixed relation to quantity of
in te r e st in any of the w ays in w hich th is can be m easured ; and
in any c a se attainability. . . is related to value only in d irectly
through the effects which a b e lie f in attainability have upon the
in ten sity, p referen ce, or in c lu siv en ess of an in te r e st. (G eneral,
p. 611)
But is this not the v ery way P arker is using the term ?
P ark er, furtherm ore, m akes P er ry 's point that one m ust be carefu l
i
i
| not to m ix the gen eric c r ite r ia of good w ith the p ra ctica l standards
j
jfor m easu rin g it-
I
|
I It is sign ifican t that a sa tisfa ctio n which, by definition, is
j good in the gen eric se n se, m ay be bad. . . and that fru stration ,
g en erica lly ev il, m ay becom e good in sofar as it p rom otes, as
100
it m ay, our other d e s ir e s . . . . It is e sse n tia l for c le a r n e s s in
the th eory of value that th e se tw o s e n s e s of good be d istin gu ish ed
. . . (P hilosophy, p. 160)
P e r r y w ould a g ree w ith P ark er h e r e . The lo g ic a l stru ctu re
of h is w r itin g s--fo r exam p le, the w ay in w hich the g en eric value in
G eneral T heory of V alue is sep arated from the m o ra l value of
R ealm s of V a lu e --a tte s ts to th is a g reem en t. F u rth erm ore, in sp ite
of h is e x p lic it repudiation of attain ab ility as having “nothing to do
w ith valu e, “ even he, in subsequent d is c u ssio n s, ad m its that a t
tain ab ility d oes in flu en ce the in d ivid u al's evalu ation s:
To be in te r e ste d in an object im p lie s the adoption of m ean s
and of subordinate in te r e sts w h ich are b e lie v e d to lead in its
d irectio n . H ence the b e lie f that an object is ab solu tely unattain
able w ill reduce the in te r e st in it to a pious w ish and even tu ally
to apathy. (G eneral, p. 611)
P a rk er 's w ay of ex p r essin g th is fa ct w ould be to say sim p ly
that, in te r m s of an in tern al standard, the individual placed h is goal
too high. But th is is P e r r y 's m eaning.
In sum m ary, then, they would concur that attain ab ility can
not stand a s a so le extern al standard, and they w ould a lso concur
in the a sse r tio n that attain ab ility is not a standard of gen eric value
but does play its r o le in the evaluating of v a lu e s.
Once th ese ter m in o lo g ic a l d iffic u ltie s are r e so lv e d , it is
c le a r that they are in su b stan tial a g reem en t both in the th eory and
u se of the standard of attain ab ility.
101
A new d ifficu lty now a r is e s , but one that w h ile it e v o lv e s
fr o m th e d is c u ssio n above, co n c er n s P a rk er a lo n e .
P arker, as w e have s e e n , m ain tain s that the p r in c ip le of a t
ta in a b ility is an in tern a l stan d ard . In oth er w ord s, in u sin g a t
ta in a b ility , one d isr e g a r d s p o s s ib le a lter n a tiv e a c tiv itie s and c o n
se q u e n c e s. B ut if the v e r y m ean in g of a stan d ard im p lie s --a n d
com m on s e n s e r e c o g n iz e s th is u s a g e --th a t one ought to fo llo w a
stan d ard , then h is p rin cip le of attain m en t co n tra d icts th is m eaning
by in ten tio n a lly d isre g a rd in g a lter n a tiv e c o u r s e s of a c tio n . What
co m p u lsio n can th e re be to fo llo w su ch a stan d ard , if prud en ce is
s o o b v io u sly v io la te d ?
T his d ifficu lty b eco m es e v en m o re acu te w hen it is noted
that P a rk er d oes not lim it the sc o p e of h is in tern a l stan d ard . C on
seq u en tly , w h atever h is intent, p resu m a b ly th e r e cou ld be an id e a l
fo r th e bank rob b er as w e ll a s for the h u m an itarian . P erh a p s he
had the la tte r in m ind, but, th e o r e tic a lly , attain m en t ap p lies
r e g a r d le s s of the m o ra l c o n se q u e n c e s. T his fo llo w s fr o m h is d e
fin itio n : the in tern a l stan d ard is a m eans of m ea su rin g e x c e lle n c e
w ithout r eg a rd to com p etin g d e s ir e s .
C on sid erin g th e se im p lic a tio n s, Pfcrkee m u st c h o o se b etw een
tw o a lte r n a tiv e s , n eith er of w hich is a ttr a c tiv e to h is p o sitio n . E ith e r
he m u st a d m it that a tta in a b ility is not a stan d ard , or he m u st hold
102
that som e sta n d a rd s--a tta in a b ility being o n e --d o not n e c e s s a r ily
im p ly the com p u lsion of an ought •
H ere L e w is's d istin ctio n betw een ju stic e , the prudential
ought, and the tech n ica l ought m ay prove u sefu l. A nticipating th is
fact, one m ay ask: what is the m eaning of an o b jectiv ely right act?
L ew is a n sw ers a s fo llo w s:
An act is . . . o b jectiv ely right to do ju st in c a se , on the
evid en ce availab le to the doer, it is that altern ative action
w hich affords the (c o r r e c tly judged) h igh est probab ility of
good r e s u lts . *
He adds that, in th is context, the term 'good' is am biguous
T hree in terp reta tio n s are p o ssib le : the prudential, the tech n ical,
and the m oral good.
The good n ess in qu estion w ill be good n ess for the doer
h im se lf if it is prudential rig h tn ess w hich is to be d eterm ined.
T ech n ically righ t action w ill be sim ila r ly d eterm in ed by r e fe r
en ce to tech n ica l e x c e lle n c e . And action w hich is right in the
se n se of m o ra l ju s tic e , w ill be sim ila r ly ju d g e d --le t us assu m e
for the m o m en t--b y r e fe r e n c e to the conjoint good of a ll whom
th is action in q u estion w ill affect, (pp. 5 6 -5 7 )
T his th reefold d istin ctio n --w h a tev e r its other m e r it s - -
r e sc u e s P ark er from h is d ilem m a con cerning the m eaning of
•ought'; for it h elp s to in d icate how the robber and the hum anitarian
ought each to se e k h is goal accord in g to P a r k e r 's p rin cip le of a t
tainm ent. The r e a so n is that th is c r ite r io n --b e in g an internal
p r in c ip le --e s ta b lis h e s , in L e w is's term in o lo g y , a tech n ical id ea l.
^The Ground and N ature of the R ight, (New York, 1955),
pp. 5 6 -5 7 .
103
L ew is and P a rk er, then, d esp ite d iffe r e n c e s in term in ology,
a re in fundam ental a g reem en t h e r e. E ven in applying th is p rin cip le
of attainm en t, both p h ilo so p h ers a re sayin g e s s e n tia lly the sam e
thin g. P a r k e r 's v in d ica tio n of th e standard of attainm ent i s that it
o ffe r s the individual a m ea n s tow ard m axim um ach ievem en t in any
a c tiv ity . And th is is s im ila r to L e w is's u se of the tech n ica l id ea l.
Both p h ilo so p h ers, then, vin d icate attainm ent as one m ea n s tow ard
m a x im izin g v a lu e. In app lication , accord in g to P a rk er, "Our
p rin cip le dem ands m axim u m effo rt w ithin the p o ssib le along w ith
ren u n ciation of the im p o ssib le" (p. 159).
H ow ever, the lim ita tio n s of su ch a p r in cip le, a s P ark er
p oin ts out, a re apparent. In the foregoin g d isc u ssio n , he a g r e e s
w ith P e r r y that attainm en t cannot be em p loyed as an extern al
standard. M oreover, even a s an in tern al standard, it r eq u ire s
q u alification s; for an id ea l m ay be placed too high in te r m s of o n e's
a b ilitie s . P sy c h o lo g ists a r e w e ll aw are of a rela tio n sh ip of this
Situation to c e r ta in p ath ological d is o r d e r s. On the other hand, the
p rin cip le of attainm en t is of little v a lu e if the in d ividu al, w ithout
jregard to h is a b ilitie s, p la c e s the standard too low .
I
1 In sp ite of th e se lim ita tio n s, P ark er m ain tain s that the
i
|
{principle of attainm ent is at le a s t th e o r e tic a lly sound. L ew is c o m es
:o the sa m e co n clu sio n w h ile pondering a d ifferen t problem :
104
How should w e d eterm in e o b jectiv e r ig h tn e ss w h ere c o n
je c tu r e d c o n se q u e n c e s of the act w ould b e good in h igh d e g r e e
but the p ro b a b ility of the being r e a liz e d i s not la r g e ? A d if
feren t a lter n a tiv e a ctio n w o u ld --le t u s sa y --a ffo r d a la r g e r
p rob ab ility of a l e s s e r g o o d n ess in the c o n se q u e n c e s. The
g e n e ra l p r in c ip le h e r e w ould, of c o u r se , be the ob viou s one;
a n ear c e r ta in ty of a h alf a lo a f is b etter than one chance out
of fiv e of gettin g a w h ole on e. . . . (pp. 5 6 -5 7 )
Of c o u r se , a s both w ould a g r e e , the p ro b a b ility ra tio is
se ld o m p red icta b le w ith any such p r e cisio n ; fo r, u su a lly , in
P a r k e r 's w o r d s, "What is p o s sib le and w hat im p o ss ib le a r e in
dividu al tru th s to be d is c o v e r e d for the m o st part only by tr ia l and
so m e tim e s a ls o by e r r o r . " (P h ilosop h y, p. 159)
In su m m ary, the p o sitio n s of th e se p h ilo so p h ers can p e r
haps be brought into sh arp er fo cu s by u sin g L e w is 's term in o lo g y .
t
In L e w is 's te r m s , P e r r y m a in ta in s that a tta in a b ility i s in a p p lica b le
to the m o ra l good, and y et he ack n ow led ges that a tta in a b ility d o es
apply to the te c h n ic a l good. P a rk er sa y s m uch the sa m e by ca u tio n
in g h is r ea d er not to con fu se m o ra l and te c h n ic a l good. F u r th e r
m o r e , in r e s tr ic tin g a tta in a b ility to the sta tu s of an in tern a l standard
h e, too, lim its it s ap p lication to the tec h n ica l situ ation .
T h ere i s , then, su b sta n tia l a g r ee m e n t on th is point. A s for
S tev en so n , it i s apparent, ev en at th is point, w hat h is p o sitio n w ill
b e. It r e s o lv e s it s e lf into a m a tter of in te r e st; for S tev en so n
fo c u s e s h is atten tion upon c o n flic ts b etw een in d iv id u a ls and e x a m in e s
how su ch disputes can be overcom e. On this point, his theory b e
com es a psychology of p ersu asion .
But the internal standard is not applicable to co n flicts b e-
i
| tw een individu als. It is true that Stevenson a g rees with P er ry that
| th ere is a direct analogy betw een the internal con flicts of one p erson
E
j and disputes betw een individuals. N ev erth eless, even w hile m aking
i
| this analogy, Stevenson im p licitly co n sid ers the extern al type of
; con flict. He sim p ly does not exam ine the internal standard, and his
| theory is thus incom plete in scop e.
I
To sum up the d iscu ssio n of attainability as a standard,
' Stevenson's opposition here is the resu lt of an in com p lete a n a ly sis,
w hereas P erry , P ark er, and L ew is extend the d iscu ssio n by a c
c ep tin g --a t le a st im p licitly --a tta in a b ility as a standard.
A ttainability, how ever, applies only to one type of activity.
F or a ch oice among different preoccupations, extern al standards
com e into play. One such standard is the criterio n of enlightenm ent.
2. E nlightenm ent. A ccording to P erry , the enlightenm ent
standard d iffers from the other external c r ite r ia , in two sign ifican t
w ays. F ir st, w hereas the other c r ite r ia offer a quantitative
; prin cip le e x p r e ssib le as "greater or le s s ," the c r ite r io n of e n
lightenm ent, being a function of truth, takes the form , "this value is
[
! founded on truth or e r r o r ." Why this should be so is evident when
106
one co n sid ers that attainm ent, in ten sity, and p referen ce, even at
the com m on se n se le v e l, occur in d e g r ee s, w h ereas truth does not.
The second way in which enlightenm ent d iffers from the
other c r ite r ia is c lo se ly related to the fir st, for, sin ce value is
determ ined by in te re st, how ever founded, a co rrect in te re st is no
better than an in co rrect one. Indeed, th is is m er ely another w ay of
saying that truth does not adm it of d eg rees and that value is d e te r
m ined by in te re st, no m atter how w ell founded.
Although enlightenm ent d iffers in th is m anner from the
other c r ite r ia , it is not without its role in the evaluation of valu es.
Its sign ifican ce lie s in its perm itting people to appraise the
stab ility of value, for, if the cognitive factor upon which the value is
based is fa lse , then the value w ill be unstable. In P e r r y 's w ords,
A value founded on truth is not only w ise ly and rightly
founded, as judged by cognitive standards, but is secu rely
founded. It w ill be unshaken by com p lete knowledge, w h ereas
a value founded on erro r is p recariou s and unstable, owing to
the danger of d etection. This in stab ility w ill vary w ith the
spread of enlightenm ent, and w ith the d egree to w hich the
m ediating judgm ent is v erifia b le in human ex p erien ce. (G eneral,
p. 615)
P er ry offers h is own evid en ce that b e lie fs influence v a lu e s.
I A s one illu stra tio n he c ite s the ch a n g e--co m in g w ith an advance of
i
| k n ow led ge--of attitudes toward the m en tally d efectiv e. The recen t
|
i
sc ien tific revolutions, furtherm ore, have played their ro le in
fo sterin g the m utability of m odern v a lu es. T hese facts indicate
107
that cogn ition , in illu m in atin g in te r e s ts , can and d oes at the sam e
tim e stim u la te or d e p r e ss th em .
A lthough b e lie fs in flu en ce in te r e s ts in th is m an n er, and
c o u n tle ss other w ays, the op p osite r ela tio n sh ip a lso o c c u r s.
In te r e sts, in th eir turn, in flu en ce b e lie fs- Thus, em otion al fa c to r s
a s w e ll as stereo ty p ed id e a s in flu en ce c o lle c tiv e opinion. In te r e st
d ir e c ts b e lie fs in c e r ta in d ir e c tio n s, w e ig h s the a v a ila b le ev id en ce,
and g e n e ra lly in flu e n c es b e lie f w ith ap p rop riate a ttitu d es. The
r ela tio n sh ip , then, w ork s both w ays - B e lie fs in flu en ce in te r e s ts
and in te r e s ts , b e lie fs .
E ven S teven son a g r e e s w ith th is:
Our attitu d es, as m any have pointed out, often a ffec t our
b e lie fs , not only by cau sin g u s to indulge in w ish fu l thinking,
but a lso by lead in g u s to d ev elo p and ch eck su ch b e lie fs as
point out the m ea n s of gettin g w hat w e want. And c o n v e r se ly ,
our b e lie fs often affect our attitu d es; for w e m ay a lter our form
of approved of som eth in g w hen w e change our b e lie fs about its
n atu re. The ca u sa l con n ection betw een b e lie fs and attitu d es is
u su a lly not only in tim a te but r e c ip r o c a l. (E th ic s, p. 5)
The point at is s u e b etw een S teven son and P e r r y is m e r e ly a
m atter of the d e g r ee to w h ich th is h old s tr u e . P e r r y w ould m ake
th is rela tio n sh ip a lo g ic a l one, w h er ea s S tev en so n in s is t s that it is
m e r e ly p sy ch o lo g ic a l.
It w ould be w e ll to o b se r v e , h ow ever, that S tev en so n 's
p o sitio n con cern in g th e standard of en ligh ten m en t i s not ir r e le v a n t
108
to his a n a ly sis of m ea n s-en d s, for to esta b lish standards one m ust
be able to distin guish ends from m ean s. This p o ssib ility Stevenson
d en ies. F urtherm ore, if b eliefs have no logical relation sh ip to a t
titudes, then sta n d a r d s--a s en vision ed by P erry , P ark er, and L ew is
--w ou ld lo se th eir sig n ifica n ce . W ithin Stevenson's theory, how
ev er, such denials occu r a s assu m p tion s, and if his objections to
making the suppositions are faulty, then his p osition concerning the
standards th em selv es is untenable.
B efore proceeding with the d iscu ssio n , how ever, we m ay
resta te b riefly the two c a u se s underlying the dispute between
Stevenson and P er ry . The fir s t cau se concerns the relation sh ip of
m eans to ends. L ew is, P erry , and P ark er oppose Stevenson here
by m aintaining that a sep aration of m eans and ends can be m ade.
Since their position req u ires an in tricate and lengthy a n a ly sis, we
m ust postpone until later a fu ll d iscu ssio n . The crux of the m atter
m ay be anticipated, how ever, by noting now that one of the funda
m ental rea so n s for Stevenson's repudiation of standards stem s from
his incom plete a n a ly sis of the m ean s-an d -en d s relation sh ip . The
other cau se for his p osition concerning standards is based on his
denial that attitudes are based on b e lie fs. Here he d irectly opposes
P erry .
Which p osition is c o r r e c t? One m eans of determ ining this is
109
to co n sid er the e m p ir ic a l ev id en ce. H ere anthropology s e r v e s a
1
! u sefu l function by exam in in g v a lu es in th e ir cu ltu ral context. It is
n e c e ss a r y , h ow ever, to note c er ta in w eak points w hich often a c
com pany this p ro ced u re.
i
The f ir s t point is sim p ly a m atter of the in v e stig a to r 's
i
p e r so n a l in te r e st. T his r e fle c ts a d ifferen ce in se le c tio n on the
part of the p h ilosop h er and the an th rop ologist. The p h ilosoph er is
i
in te r e ste d in g en eric m ean ings and in attem pting to e sta b lish the
norm ative r u les for e th ic s. The an th rop ologist co n sid er s valu es as
i
th ey occu r in th eir so c ia l con text. H is in te r e st, accord in gly, is to
exp lain e x istin g ru les and th eir rela tio n sh ip s to w orking cu ltu ral
in stitu tio n s. T his d iffe re n c e of s e le c tio n m ay, of c o u r se, be
vin d icated on m eth od ological ground s. T h ere is , h ow ever, a secon d
point which m ust be c a re fu lly o b serv ed . The an th rop ologist's ap
p r o a c h --to c ite one su ch fa c to r --te n d s to focu s atten tion on the
ou ter and v isib le form s of r u le s, p a ttern s, b eh avior. T h erefo re,
w ith th is em p h a sis, th e re can be little ground fo r d istin gu ish in g
betw een law s and m o ra lity . And if the r esu ltin g good is m ea su red
in te r m s of the inn er co h eren ce and in tegration of a s o c ie ty , then
pu rp osefu l dir ection -to w ard the evolu tion of higher v a lu es b eco m es
im p o ss ib le . T h ese im p lica tio n s m ust be kept in m ind w hen we
exam in e an th rop ological contrib utions to value th eory. That is not
110
to sa y , how ever, that the m ethod is without its u se . Indeed, all
four philosoph ers are dedicated to an em p irical approach, and as
w ill b ecom e apparent, anthropology can contribute im portant in
form ation to value theory, not only with confirm atory data but in
th eo ry -stru ctu re as w ell.
A c a se at p o in t--to resu m e the previous d is c u s s io n --is the
relation sh ip of truth to the sta b ility of valu e. If the way in which the
individual b ecom es enculturated could be d isco v ered --b o th in the
value and the cognitive a r e a s--th e n this fact should shed light on
the relation sh ip of truth to the sta b ility of value. To advance the
d isc u ssio n , it w ill prove helpful to exam ine how the individual's
valu es actu ally evolve within their cultural context. What has the
anthropologist to sa y on this topic ?
A ccording to h im , the individual is born into a p r e -e x istin g
so c ie ty pattern. In his ea rly life , b asic conditioning includes
habits of eating, sleep in g , speaking, and p erson al c le a n lin e s s . He
has little or no ch oice in how th ese needs are m et. The str e s s at
this tim e is upon conform ity to the existin g patterns of the culture.
As he b ecom es o ld er, he retains th ese habits of condition
ing, often below the le v e l of con sciou s thought. F urther encultur-
ation is lim ited to new situations which he m u st in term itten tly fa ce .
H is ch oice becom es greater; he is no longer exposed to fee continuous
I l l
p r o c e ss which m arked h is early enculturation.
j During this p r o c e ss, how ever, the individual is not in ert or
I
i ,
p a ssiv e . E sp ecia lly in his adult y ea rs, he often re-en cu ltu ra tes
h im se lf by alterin g his ea rly learning. Since culture is learned, it
| m ay be relearn ed at any tim e in a different m anner. It is , th erefor^
|
! by their la ter scope of crea tiv e ex p ressio n that individuals are able
to alter and to extend th eir culture. This p r o c ess explains cultural
change. And sin ce e a rly enculturation m aintains equilibrium w ith
in a culture, the stab ility of a culture is retained even as the in
dividual, in h is la ter y e a r s, extends it. P eople are thus able to
alter th eir culture without breaking down its b asic orientation.
During this continuonis in teraction betw een the individual and
h is culture, the needs of the p erson are being m et. T hese needs
are both p h y sica l and p sych ological. I mate ph ysical d riv es, such
as se x and hunger, lead to a reaffirm ation or alterin g of such
so c ia l stru ctu res a s the rearin g of the young and p o litica l organ iza
tions for m aintaining order and protection. P sy ch o lo g ica l r eq u ire
m en ts, as exem p lified by p restig e fa cto rs, a lso influence the
p r o c ess of in teraction betw een the individual and h is cu ltu re.
This d iscu ssio n of the evolution of values in a cultural con
text in d icates that a culture, according to the anthropologist, is
! actu ally an instrum ent w hereby the individual adjusts to his total
112
se ttin g and gains m eans for crea tiv e ex p ressio n . In such a context
it becom es evident why nonm oral b eliefs have a d irect bearing upon
]
| the individual's adjustm ents and his values which accom pany it; for
|
j what a person valu es is influenced by what he b e lie v e s.
|
T his fa ct--d isco v ered by the anthropologist in an e m p irica l
se ttin g —tends to support P e r r y 's contention concerning the in tricate
relation sh ip betw een attitudes and b e lie fs. On the other hand, this
evid en ce a lso supports Stevenson b ecau se, as indicated p reviou sly,
he would agree that there is a c lo se relation sh ip betw een attitudes
and b e lie fs. To understand, th erefore, why b eliefs d eterm ine a t
titudes in m ore than an arb itrary m anner additional evid en ce is
req uired. Thus the a n th ro p o lo g ist--if he is to support P e r r y --m u s t
indicate that there is a d irect relation sh ip betw een the truth of a
value and its stab ility; and this the anthropologist p roceeds to do.
Indeed, the anthropologist b e lie v es that even the individual's
m oral b eliefs are based upon cognitive factors; for in ter m s of
c u ltu r e s --a s d ev ices w hereby the individual adjusts to his total
settin g and gains m eans for creative e x p r e ssio n —it is ignorance
w hich thw arts the developm ent of e fficien t so c ia l in stitu tion s. P e r
haps, as A. M cBeath m aintains, valu es and m oral b e lie fs can be
understood only in th ese te r m s.
. . . the context of the w ay of life , in relation to which alone
m oral judgm ent can be under stood, inclu des not m erely the
113
w hole netw ork of in stitu tio n s, but a lso b e lie fs about n o n -eth ic a l
m a tte r s of fa ct. It in clu d es, in fa ct, a ll the b e lie fs , co n v ictio n s
and valu e-ju d gm en ts of the people con cern ed about th eir natural
and so c ia l and supernatural en viron m en t. ^
M cB eath r e fe r s to B ron islaw M alin ow sk i's point, cite d in
the A rgonauts of the W estern W orld, that the T robriand Isla n d ers'
ign oran ce of the fa th e r 's ro le in p ro crea tio n has led to the follow in g
sp e c ific m o ra l ru les:
The T rob rian d ers are m a tr ilin e a l, that i s , in tra cin g the
d escen t and settlin g in h eritan ce, they follow the m a tern a l lin e.
A ch ild b elon gs to the clan and v illa g e com m u nity of its m oth er,
and w ealth, as w e ll a s so c ia l p o sitio n , are in h erited , not from
fath er to son, but from m atern al uncle to nephew , (p. 71)
Thus a b e lie f of the T robriand Isla n d e rs has led to sp e c ific
v a lu e s a s w e ll as to c erta in d u ties w ithin th is cu ltu re.
P e r r y 's c r ite r io n of enlightenm ent is , of c o u r se , ap p licab le !
h ere; fo r, accord in g to anthrop ological ev id en ce, in stitu tio n s b ased
on such erro n eo u s nonm oral b e lie fs are u n sta b le. T hey often fu n c
tion sm ooth ly for a tim e , provided the peop le rem a in in ig n o ra n ce.
But, n o n eth ele ss, such cu ltu res contain a p o ten tia lly u n stab le elem ent
b e c a u se advan cem en ts in know ledge can alw ays o ccu r. j
i
i
One m ight object to th is lin e of rea so n in g by pointing out that
the T robriander m ay change h is opinion con cern in g non m oral b e lie fs
j
I and yet reta in h is m o ra l and value c o n v ictio n s. T h is, of c o u r se , is
i
j the point at is s u e . But the v a lu es and m o ra lity of a cu ltu re m u st
j
! I
O j
^E xp erim en ts in L iving, (London, 1952), p. 104. i
114
fu lfill the needs of the individual, or they becom e potentially un
stab le; indeed, anthropologic evidence ind icates that cu ltu res, for
rea so n s indicated, r e s t upon unstable foundations as soon as th ere
i
is an aw aren ess of the inadequacy of ex istin g in stitu tion s. A cultural
I
I
| lag m ay delay change, but evid en ce in d icates that such conditions
1
; rep resen t a potential so u rce of disin tegration .
Now, whether or not M alinowski is co rrect in his b e lie f that
the T robriander is ignorant of the fa th er's role in p rocreation is not
cru cial. This illu stration was chosen as one of many p o ssib le
exam ples: the p osition of m agic in m ed icine, the b eliefs in so r c e r y
and its relation to cu ltural in stitu tio n s--a s in the Dobuan cu ltu re- -
are but two of many additional e x a m p le s. The im portant point is
that in the non-value area retarded conditions of knowledge, of b elief
in what is inevitable, of lack of im agination, of su p erstition , are a ll
factors which affect v a lu es. And this anthropological ev id en ce--th a t
the stab ility of a value is a function of tru th --su p p orts P er ry 's
p osition and se r v e s to vindicate his c riter io n of c o r r e c tn e ss. That
this should be so is not su rp risin g when, lik e P erry , one co n sid ers
the intricate relation sh ip of in te re st and cognition. Indeed, P er ry
j co n sid ers a d iscu ssio n of the one im p o ssib le without referen ce to the
other.
As for L ew is, he has im p licitly included enlightenm ent as a
115
c r ite r io n in h is trea tm en t of p r e fe r e n c e . Indeed, the v e r y p o ssib ility
of arran gin g v a lu es into an o b jectiv e h ig h er and lo w er o r d e r is a
r e q u isite of ra tio n a l b eh a v io r. It sh ould be noted h e r e that by
'o b jectiv e' L ew is m ean s any data w hich have the c h a ra cter of c o m
m on hum an ap p reh en sion . D ata are sa id to be su b jectiv e to the e x
ten t, due to individual id io s y n c r a s ie s , that th ey d ev ia te fr o m a p e r
so n 's norm al ap p reh en sion .
A nother d istin c tio n --th a t b etw een the p rized and the ap-
p r a is e d --w ill p rove u sefu l in un derstanding how L ew is in co rp o ra tes
en ligh ten m en t w ithin this p rin cip le of p e r fe r e n c e .
The f ir s t te r m , the 'p r iz ed ', is em p loyed when som eth in g is
found to be d ir e c tly v a lu a b le. The ta ste of w ine, fo r exam p le, m ay
be d ir e c tly valu ed even though its e ffe c ts be to x ic . V alue thus found
is su b je ctiv e in the s e n s e that it is ap p aren t. Such d ir e c t valu e is
beyond control: the w ine m a y be p o iso n ed , yet th ere can be no doubt
con cern in g its im m ed ia te v a lu e.
The im m ed ia c y of the p r iz e d is not d ifferen t fr o m the im -
m ed ia cy of the fa ctu a l le v e l. This type of e x p e rien ce is n e c e s s a r y
fo r a ll e m p ir ic a l know ledge b eca u se e m p ir ic a l know ledge is founded
upon se n sa tio n . Y et se n sa tio n it s e lf in v o lv es no judgm ent and,
th e r e fo r e , fo r L e w is, is not k n ow led ge. N ow , adequate rea so n s fo r
d isa g r e e in g w ith h im on th is point h ave b een p r e sen ted in P a r t I. Yet,
116
even in recognizing this reserv a tio n , one may nonetheless grant
L ew is his point that th is type of im m ed iately given exp erien ce is
b est ex p ressib le in term s of the apparent. In prizing w ine, for in -
| stan ce, one sa y s, "the wine appears valuable, " or "the wine ta stes
i
]
good." As statem en ts, such exp ression s m erely form ulate what is
given in exp erien ce. In this se n se the im m ed iately given is prized .
J
To appraise som ething, how ever, is to make predictions of
i
future exp erien ce. A ppraisals co n sist of judgments which are su b -
; ject to e rro r. Thus, valuations,being judgm ents of this kind, are
: true or fa lse according to th eir consequ en ces.
Here it becom es apparent how L ew is has im p licitly included
the c o r r e c tn e ss-c r ite r io n in his value theory; for by considering
values a form of em p irical knowledge, he incorporates co rrectn ess
as a standard--enlightenm ent being the very m eaning of knowledge.
The reason for this im p licit appeal to enlightenm ent is sim ply
that it is the only way in which the individual can m axim ize his
sa tisfa ctio n s. To m axim ize one's sa tisfa ctio n s, one m ust be guided
by truth; and, as in a ll c a se s of em p irical knowledge, this p ro cess
is based upon the probability ratios of induction.
Values cannot be m easu red as m oney can be counted. But
the rule, "Act with resp ect to anything having the probability
m /n as you would if it w ere to occur in m in stan ces out of n
tr ia ls ," is one which applies alike to m easurable things which
are d esirab le and to things the value of which has degree but
no quantitative m easu re. And this rule, "Value any objective
117
ex isten t for w hich th ere is a probability m /n that it w ill afford
a certa in sa tisfa c tio n a s you would if that situation w e re actu ally
to a ccru e in in in sta n ce s out of n tr ia ls ," is the one w hich
we p ro p o se. (L ew is, A n a ly sis, p. 549)
L e w is's r e fer e n c e to ration ality, then, togeth er w ith h is
appeals to inductive evid en ce and pred ictab le co n seq u en ces, is , at
le a s t im p lic itly , a r e fe r e n c e to enlightenm ent as a c r ite r io n for
evaluating v a lu e s.
L ew is and P e r r y thus se e m to agree on the im portance of
the enlightenm ent c r ite r io n . N e v e r th e le ss, d iffe re n c es do occur
even h ere betw een them . T here is at le a s t a d ifferen ce of em p h asis
fo r, w h erea s P e r r y s t r e s s e s the functional relation sh ip betw een
truth and sta b ility , L ew is em p h a sizes the in tr ic a cy of truth and
v a lu e . This is not to sa y , how ever, that m o re than a shift in
em p h asis is involved . T hree te r m s are included h ere: truth,
sta b ility , and value; and both p h ilosop h ers develop the rela tio n sh ip s
of th ese th ree te r m s. The d ifferen ce in em p h asis can be tra ced
to the am biguous rela tio n sh ip of cred ib ility and truth.
L ew is sh arp en s the d isc u ssio n h ere by d istin gu ish in g b e
tw een v e r ific a tio n and ju stifica tio n . V erifica tio n r e fe r s to the
tru th -valu e of a b e lie f and accord in gly points to the future.
J u stifica tio n co n cern s the cre d ib ility of a b e lie f and is founded on
the evid en ce of p ast ex p erien ce. The tw o te r m s help to cla r ify
the relation sh ip of valu e, truth, and sta b ility . P e r r y s t r e s s e s the
118
con nection betw een truth and stab ility, w h ereas L ew is s t r e s s e s
truth and v a lu e. The k ey to th is d ifferen ce in a n a ly sis is the d if
fer en ce betw een ju stifica tio n and v erifica tio n .
P e r r y em p h a sizes ju stifica tio n . T his fo llo w s from h is d efin i
tion of value; for in te r e st is a governing prop en sity togeth er w ith an
exp ectation . But expectation, being a b e lie f b ased upon past
ex p erien ce, in v o lv es cre d ib ility . In other w ords, for P e r r y the
em p h a sis is not on v erific a tio n but on ju stifica tio n .
T his s tr e s s upon ju stifica tio n has im portant im p lica tio n s for
the rela tio n sh ip betw een truth and value, for, w ith P erry , it is the
b e lie f, not the tru th of an expectation, that c r e a te s value. In other
w ord s, value is determ in ed by in te re st, no m atter how w e ll founded.
Thus, if I am in te r e ste d in a certa in relig io n as a m ean s to sa lv a
tion, its d o ctrin es w ill have value to m e even though--unknow n to
m e --th e y happen to be fa lse .
T his is not to say, how ever - - t o continue P e r r y 's a rg u m en t--
that the tru th -valu e of an in te r e st is irrelev a n t to valu e. On the
con trary, if I d isc o v e r la ter that the relig io u s d octrin es are fa lse ,
then I sh a ll in a ll lik elih ood abandon them . In other w ord s, fa lse
b e lie fs are le s s lik e ly to be retained than tru e ones b ecau se the
e rr o r in volved m ay be d etected . In th is sen se P e r r y finds a c o r
rela tio n of truth w ith sta b ility ; and th is, of co u r se, is a consequ en ce
of his s t r e s s upon ju stifica tio n .
L e w is, on the other h a n d ,em p h a sizes v e r ific a tio n ra th er
than ju stific a tio n . He c h a r a c te r iz e s value as a fo rm of e m p ir ic a l
know ledge, and know ledge, in com m on s e n s e te r m s, is equivalen t
to what is tr u e . A nother rea so n fo r s tr e s s in g v e rific a tio n is that
he continu ally r e fe r s to value judgm ents as true or fa lse a ccord in g
to th eir c o n seq u en ces. T his ch a ra cteriza tio n of value judgm ents
sh ifts the em p h a sis away from m ere c r e d ib ility and fo c u se s it on
v e r ific a tio n . A s a r e su lt, th ere i s - - a t le a s t im p lic itly --in L e w is's
th eory a s t r e s s upon the c o rr ela tio n of truth and valu e.
L ew is s t r e s s e s v e rific a tio n , P e r r y ju stifica tio n . A s a
con seq u en ce, P e r r y c o r r e la te s truth with sta b ility , L ew is w ith
v a lu e . This ap p ears to be a lso the m ain d ifferen ce betw een P e r r y
and P a rk er on th is point.
But is this d istin ction , after a ll, as great as it s e e m s ? As
has been se e n alread y, the d ifferen ce is actu ally a m atter of
e m p h a sis. F u rth erm o re, perhaps the d istin ction is m agnified b e
cau se ju stific a tio n and v e rific a tio n a r e r e la tiv e te r m s; w h atever is
ju stifie d on one o c c a sio n is v e r ifie d on another. M oreover, ju s tifi
cation at any tim e u su ally app eals to p reviou s v e r ific a tio n s. F in a lly ,
w hile L ew is m aintains that evalu ation s a re a fo rm of e m p ir ic a l
know ledge, he, n o n eth eless --w ith P e r r y --a c tu a lly s t r e s s e s the
- 120
ro le of ju stification . T h is he does ex p licitly , for in stan ce, when
he says:
Our in te r e st in the w arrant of the b e lie f as cred ib le is a
so r t of in d irect in te r e st in the truth of it. S till, sin ce the truth
per se is not d isc lo se d to the judgm ent, we can only a s s e s s its
valid ity as cred ib le on the given grounds. (A n a ly sis, p. 258)
Thus, L ew is is carefu l to distin gu ish betw een the ro les of
ju stification and v erifica tio n . F or him , the d ifferen ce betw een them
m erely is a tem poral em phasis: w hatever is fir s t ju stified m ay
later be tested in term s of v e rific a tio n .
The point of this d iscu ssio n concerning Lew is and P e r r y is
that, for reason s p rev io u sly se en , both p h ilosop h ers retain a
sign ifican t p osition in their th eories for enlightenm ent as a
c riterio n for evaluating v a lu e s. L ew is's appeal to this standard m ay
be im p licit only, but the fa ct rem ain s that he and P e r r y agree on the
relation sh ip s betw een truth, sta b ility , and valu e, and, for this
reason , both appeal (at le a st im p licitly ) to enlightenm ent as a
criterio n .
P a rk er, too, agrees on enlightenm ent as a standard. And,
j lik e L ew is, h is appeal to enlightenm ent is im p licit to the extent that
| he does not actu ally sp ec ify it. Yet th ere can be little doubt that,
I for him , enlightenm ent plays a sign ifican t part in evaluating
| v a lu e s. P a rk er's p rin cip le of b en eficen ce, for in stan ce, is a func
tion of enlightenm ent; for th is p r in c ip le, being a m eans of e s
tim atin g the c o st upon one in te r e s t for pursuing other in te r e sts,
attem pts to ap p raise v a lu es (in L e w is’s te r m s) as tec h n ica lly good.
T hus, no ch oice betw een valu es is involved , for that is the function
of rank; but, n o n eth eless b en eficen ce en a b les the individu al to a p
p r a ise the p o ssib le e ffe cts cf one in te r e st upon another.
P ark er, in h is way, even c o n sid e r s, in d ir ec tly , L e w is's
d istin ctio n betw een ju stifica tio n and v e r ific a tio n . A t le a s t he
r e c o g n iz e s the need for em p h asizin g what co rresp o n d s to L e w is's
ju stifica tio n . H is te r m s are the a ctiv e and the p a s siv e p h ases of
ex p e rien ce . The fo rm e r r e p r e se n ts the p r e sen t valu e ex p erien ce;
the la tter r e fe r s eith er to the p a st or to the fu tu re. The p a ssiv e
phase thus in v o lv es, on the one hand, an ticip atin g sa tisfa c tio n s,
(an act in w hich the valuing agent a c h iev e s "a sa tisfa c tio n before
satisfaction " by p o sitin g d e sir e of the ob jective), and, on the other
hand, rem em b erin g sa tisfa c tio n s (w hich occu r as the " sa tisfa ctio n
a fter sa tisfa ctio n " of a p ast value e x p e rien ce ). But the im portant
point h e r e --a n d this tie s in with the L e w is -P e r r y em p h a sis on
ju stific a tio n — is that both p a ssiv e p h ases a ctu a lly o ccu r in the
p resen t; for if I am an ticip atin g a value situ a tio n in the future or am
rem em b erin g one in the p a st, it is s t ill the p r e s e n t--th e "here now"
— in which th is o c c u r s. P a rk er thus s t r e s s e s the a c tiv e p h ase as
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the sign ifican t one for evaluating v a lu es. In sh ort, the individual
is anchored to the p resen t and m ust be guided accordingly. T h is, of
co u rse, m eans that he m ust appeal to ju stifica tio n --to the active
phase of exp erien ce. P a rk er's d iscu ssio n , th erefore, supports the
L e w is-P e r r y em phasis upon ju stification . And it is h ere that en
lightenm ent se r v e s as a criterio n for evaluating va lu es.
The whole problem concerning the relationship of truth to
value statem en ts, P arker b e lie v e s, is rooted in a b asic confusion.
The error is the failu re to d istin guish betw een statem ents of value
and statem ents about value. As indicated p reviou sly, exp ression s
of value are, for P ark er, volitional; they are not b eliefs and, th ere
fo r e , are neither true nor fa ls e . E xp ression s about value, on the
other hand, are b eliefs which can be true or fa lse ; they differ from
exp ression s of value by being predictions about future value
r e a liz a tio n s . Thus, to say "I w ill enjoy this glass of wine" is not
to m ake a value statem en t, but to m ake a prediction about valu e,
nam ely, the value involving a future d esire or satisfaction . Only
when such a prediction is realized does the value situation actually
occu r.
Again there is a term in ological differen ce betw een P arker
and L ew is. But if one recogn izes that P a rk er's exp ression s of
value correspond to L ew is's e x p ressiv e le v e l, w hereas P ark er's
123
sta tem en ts about valu e are sim ila r to L e w is's judgm ental propo
s itio n s , then one should have no d ifficu lty in reco n cilin g th ese two
p o sitio n s. The point is that, in evaluating v a lu e s , P a r k e r 's s ta te
m en ts about valu e corresp on d to L e w is's judgm ental e x p r e ssio n s.
To su m up this d isc u ssio n con cern in g the agreem en t betw een
P e r r y , P a rk er , and L e w is, w e can a s s e r t that th ese three p h il
osop h ers a g ree that enlightenm ent is relevan t to the ranking of
v a lu e s. This is apparent in P a r k e r 's b en eficen ce standard and in
h is contention that p red iction s about value are true or fa ls e . L ew is
is in agreem en t with P a rk er when he m aintains that p r e fe re n c e , in
o rd er to be o b jectiv e, m u st appeal to enlightenm ent. And, P e r r y
e x p lic itly e sta b lish e s enlightenm ent as a c riter io n and c o r r e la te s it
w ith sta b ility . This le a v e s S teven son who, sin ce he refu ses to m ake
the assu m p tion that b e lie fs in flu en ce attitu d es, is in opposition to
the other th r e e . But even S teven son would a g ree that, once the
assu m p tion that attitudes are b ased upon b e lie f is taken, en ligh ten
m ent b eco m es a c r ite r io n . And th ere is adequate e m p irica l
e v id e n c e --a s docum ented a b o v e --th a t such an assu m p tion should be
m ad e.
With this q u alification , then, the four p h ilosop h ers agree
that enligh ten m en t s e r v e s as a c r ite r io n fo r evaluating valu es and
for p lacin g them into an o rd er of rank. But enlightenm ent, fo r
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r e a so n s a lr e a d y su g g e s te d , o ffe r s little guidance in ch o o sin g b e
tw een goods of equal sta b ility . Such p ro b lem s of c o n flic t m u st b e
r e s o lv e d upon d iffe re n t g ro u n d s. T his fa c t lea d s to the qu an titative
type o f sta n d a r d s, one of w h ich is the c r ite r io n of p r e fe r e n c e .
3. P r e fe r e n c e . W hereas en ligh ten m en t d e ter m in e s the
s ta b ility of v a lu e , p r e fe r e n c e s e r v e s rath er to arran ge v a rio u s
com p etin g d e s ir e s into a tr a n s itiv e , a sy m m e tr ic a l r e la tio n sh ip .
In h is b e lie f that v a lu es can be ranked, L ew is app eals to th is
sta n d ard . Y et, h e r e je c ts a ll attem p ts to m e a su r e v a lu e in n u m er ica l
te r m s . H ow , fo r in s ta n c e , h e a s k s , can one apply m ath em atical
p r e c is io n to the g e s ta lt q u ality so c h a r a c te r istic of v a lu e e x p e rien ce ?
The a n sw e r , fo r h im , is that v a lu e s m u st be judged as con trib u tin g
to life as a w h o le, and th at, th e r e fo r e , th ey sim p ly cannot be
m e a su r e d w ith any m a th e m a tic a l p r e c is io n . Y et th e r e is a sound
id e a behind th is B en th am ite approach to valu e; fo r L ew is a g r e e s that
v a lu e s m a y be g iv en an o r d e r of r a n k --a t le a s t in p r in c ip le . What
is n eed ed is a new c r ite r io n or p r in c ip le in p la c e of B eh th am 's un
p r o m isin g a r ith m e tic a l app roach .
L ew is fin d s su ch a c r ite r io n in the stan dard of p r e fe r e n c e . A
ranking of v a lu e s now b e c o m e s p o s s ib le - - a t le a s t in te r m s o f a
rough co m p a riso n . L ew is o ffe r s the fo llo w in g p r o c ed u r e. If v a lu e
A is p r e fe r r e d to v a lu e B , and B is p r e fe r r e d to C, then w e
125
i
f
m a y rank B so m ew h ere b etw een A and C- A ca re fu l a p p lica tio n
of th is p r o c e s s w ill r e su lt in a tr a n s itiv e , a sy m m e tr ic a l r e la tio n - S
sh ip am ong v a lu e s . That su ch a ranking of v a lu e s ap p ea ls to the |
stan dard of p r e fe r e n c e , L ew is a s s e r t s a s fo llo w s: j
■ . .th e con joint r esu lta n t of tw o v a lu e s can a lw a y s be a s s e s s e d , |
in one m an n er or an oth er, by r e fe r e n c e to the c r ite r io n of
d ir e c t p r e fe r r in g . The conjunction of th e se tw o v a lu e s in a
sin g le thing or situ ation can be d eterm in ed a s m o r e d e sir a b le
or l e s s d e sir a b le r e la tiv e ly to any th ird and com p arab le v a lu e.
(A n a ly sis, p. 543)
P e r r y adds to th is d is c u s s io n by su g g estin g that su ch an
o r d erin g can in c e r ta in c a s e s in clu d e an eq u ality on the s c a le of
p r e fe r e n c e . But th is point can be added w ithout le s s e n in g L e w is ’s
I
a g r ee m e n t w ith P e r r y . Indeed, P e r r y ’s point is m uch the sa m e as
L e w is ’s:
. . . the im p ortan t fea tu re of p r e fe r e n c e is that it a r ra n g es the
o b je cts of any g iv en in te r e s t in an o r d e r, r e la tiv e ly to one
an oth er, and in a m ann er that cannot be red u ced eith er to the
in te n sity or th e in c lu s iv e n e s s of the in te r e st- T his o rd er of
p r e fe r e n c e h a s it s own c h a r a c te r is tic m agn itu d es, w hich
d e ter m in e co m p a ra tiv e v a lu e s. (G en era l, p. 635)
P e r r y and L e w is, then, a g r ee that the p rin c ip le of p r e fe r
en ce p la y s a sig n ifica n t r o le in the ranking of v a lu e s. P e r r y , m o r e - \
o v e r , s e ts up d efin ite r u le s for its ap p lication . He r e s e r v e s p r e fe r -
i
en c e fo r com p arin g s e v e r a l am biguous o b je cts of one in te r e s t. F o r
in sta n c e , if m y one in te r e s t happens to be in sa tisfy in g hunger,
th en th e r e a r e m an y su ita b le o b j e c t s - - a s r e p r e se n te d , sa y , in a
126
m e n u --fr o m w hich to c h o o se . And it is in su ch a situ a tio n that I
w ould apply the stan dard of p r e fe r e n c e .
S tev en so n a lso ap p eals to th is c r ite r io n . Indeed, h is
p a ra d o x ica l co n c lu sio n s fo llo w fr o m ex a m p les in w hich p r e fe r e n c e
is s t r e s s e d to the e x c lu sio n of a ll oth er c r ite r ia . F o r ex a m p le,
in d is c u ssin g the r e a so n s fo r an e th ic a l d isa g r e e m e n t, he sa y s:
The d isa g r e e m e n t sp rin g s m o re fr o m d iv erg en t p r e fe r e n c e s
than fr o m d iv erg en t b e lie f s , and w ill end when th ey w ish to go
to the sa m e p la c e . It w ill be a m ild , tem p o ra r y d isa g r e e m e n t
fo r th is sim p le c a s e — a d isa g reem en t in m iiia tu r e , y e t it w i l l be
a d isa g r e e m e n t in a w h o lly fa m ilia r s e n s e . (E th ic s, p . 3
[my italics]) —
This " d isa g r e e m e n t in m iniature" is a m o d el for e th ica l
d isa g r e e m e n ts; and h e r e p r e fe r e n c e p lays a lead in g r o le . O ther
ex a m p les by S tev en so n a r e not hard to find (se e E th ic s , p . 3).
In deed , S tev en so n 's e n tir e con cep t of d isa g r e e m e n t in attitu des is
e x p r e s s ib le as a c o n flic t of p r e fe r e n c e s , fo r attitude is con cern ed
w ith how m a tte r s ". . .a r e to be fa v o re d or d isfa v o r e d , and h en ce
how th ey a re to be shaped b y hum an efforts" (p. 4 ). If this be the
c a s e , then h is c h a r a c te r iz a tio n of 'good, 1 'ought, ' - - in fa c t, a ll
h is e th ic a l t e r m s — can b e red u ced fr o m 'a p p ro v e1 to 'p r efe r'
w ithout a lter in g th eir m ea n in g s.
A d ifficu lty , of c o u r s e , o c c u r s h e r e . F o r how can one
tr a n sla te 'app rove' into 'p r efe r' w hen no ch o ice is in v o lv ed ? How,
fo r ex a m p le, m a y I s a y th at th is books is a good one w ithout c o m -
127
I
t
paring it to another? D oes not p referen ce always involve ch o ice?
And if it d oes, how can it m ake se n se to sa y that 'approve' is
tran slatab le into 'p refer'?
Two answ ers are p o ssib le . F ir st, one could sa y that a ll
evaluations involve choice and that choice alw ays en co m p a sses a c -
| tion. Thus, as P erry points out, to sa y 'x is g o o d ,' is in com -
i
p lete. What one r ea lly m eans when one sa y s 'x is good' is that
one wants to do som ething with or to x . To m aintain, for in stan ce,
i
that 'this is a good book' m ay m ean that the print is suitab le for
reading, that the ideas are stim u latin g to contem plate, that the
s iz e is convenient to handle. A ll evaluations can thus be tran slated
into ch oices involving an activity.
i
This would be so , furtherm ore, even in the m ost elem en tary
n egative c a s e s . F or exam ple, even to say 'se a w ater is bad1 is
tran slatab le into the ch oice, 'I p refer not to drink se a w ater. '
F ollow ing Brogan, then, 'x is good' would b ecom e 'the e x isten ce
of x is p referred to its n o n -ex isten ce. '
This approach, how ever, is obviou sly an a r tific ia l one. A
sim p le r way of d isp ellin g the objection that ’approve' differs from
'p r e fe r '--b e c a u se the latter alone involves c h o ic e --is to adm it the
! fact and then to point out that the d ifferen ce is nothing m ore than a
| g ram m atical accident. This altern ative is supported by the fact
128
that, in s tr e s s in g co n flic ts o f attitu d es, S teven son quite naturally
s e iz e s upon the com p arative d egree and, when he does so , 'approve'
au tom atically b ecom es 'p refer. ' In sh o rt, the only d ifferen ce b e
tw een 'approve' and 'p r e fe r 1 is that the la tter occu rs in the
com p arative d egree.
The fact r e m a in s--w h e th e r or not 'x is good' is red u cib le
to 'x is p r e fe r r e d '--th a t, in c a s e s of ch oice betw een A^Llues,
Steven son appeals to p r eferen ce as a c riter io n . Thus he join s P er ry
and L ew is in m aintaining that the standard of p re fe re n c e p lays an
im portant ro le in the evalu ation of v a lu e s.
P ark er, on the other hand, doubts its sig n ifica n ce . His
rea so n s for d issen t are rela ted to his v iew s on in ten sity.
4. In ten sity. P a rk er 's c r itic is m of p r eferen ce is that, as
a standard, it is in d istin gu ish ab le fro m in ten sity; for, according to
P ark er, if I p r e fe r x to y , then m y fe e lin g for x is m ore in ten se
than m y fee lin g for y ; and this w ill alw ays be the c a s e . In other
w ord s, if I p refer one thing to another, in ten sity is involved b e
ca u se I w an t--b y the v ery m eaning of p r e fe r e n c e --o n e thing m ore
stro n g ly than another. P r e fe r e n c e and in ten sity are interdependent
fo r P a rk er.
P e r r y would rep ly to th is c r itic is m along the follow ing
lin e s . He would point out that, in an analogous situ ation , co lo r can
129
be arranged in a sc a le of varying d iffe r e n c e s--sa y , fro m blue to
|
green. And just as this m ay be done with co lo r, r e g a r d less of any
other quantitative d iffe r e n c e s--su c h as th ose of brightn ess or
in te n sity --, so the act of p referrin g can be distin guish ed fro m the
quantitative m easu re of in ten sity. E ven com m on se n s e , to continue
j
I P er ry 's argum ent, backs this a n a ly sis with lin gu istic u sage. T hus,
| on the one hand, one exp erien ces inten sity in term s of stron ger
|
than, w hile, on the other hand, one u ses rather than in referrin g to
I
m atters of p referen ce. T h ese u ses further r e fle c t the independence
i of in tensity and p referen ce. P erry , th erefo re, in s is ts that in ten sity
1 and p referen ce are independent--the con clu sion P ark er d en ies. Is
this actu ally a contradiction? Not at a ll--th e answ er again is that
I
the opposition between P erry and P ark er is m er ely verb al. The
i
rea so n s why this is so hinge on D ew ey's d istin ction betw een
sa tisfy in g and sa tisfa cto ry . A d iscu ssio n of D ew ey’s term s w ill
req u ire a sh ort detour, but the cru cial d istin ction w ill m ore than
com pensate fo r the delay.
A ccording to Dewey, judgm ents about value are m ade to
regu late d e sir e s and enjoym ents. Enjoym ents th e m se lv e s are not
| v a lu es. Enjoym ents differ from valu es because valu es include a
referen ce to the total situ ation and to its con seq u en ces. This d is -
j
| tin ctio n --b etw een enjoym ents and v a lu e s--m a y be se e n in the d if-
130
fer en ce betw een sa tisfy in g and sa tisfa c to r y . D ew ey, th erefo re
i
s t r e s s e s su ch rela tio n sh ip s a s the sa tisfy in g and the sa tisfa c to ry ,
the d e sir e d and the d e sir a b le. And although he w ish es to em p h asize
the c lo se relation sh ip betw een th ese two s e ts of w ord s, he does not
rep eat M ill's fa lla c y of equating the d e sir e d w ith the d esira b le.
D ew ey circu m ven ts th is erro r by con sid erin g d esira b le as
j anything w hich is d esired under n orm al con d ition s. He m aintains
that, in this w ay, the d esira b le b eco m es ju st as sc ie n tific a lly ob
je c tiv e a s, sa y , the co lo r of y ello w . To m aintain, for in stan ce,
that an object has the ob jective color of yellow m eans that under
j n orm al conditions it w ill appear y ello w . L ik ew ise, to sta te that an
object is d e sir a b le is to say that under n orm al conditions, it w ill
be d e sir ed . A ccordin g to D ew ey, th erefo re, w h ereas the s a t is
fying^ ex p erien ce is a m ere e m p ir ic a l rep ort of enjoym ent, th e
sa tis fa c tory one d iffers fro m su ch enjoym ent by being m ore com plex;
fo r - - in addition to the e m p irica l r e p o r t--it a lso in clu d es p redictions
w hich an object actu ally w ill sa tisfy . Indeed, in sayin g that su ch
and su ch w ill be a sa tisfa c to r y e x p erien ce, one im p lic itly m akes
sc ie n tific a lly ob jective judgm ents con cern in g its antecedent and
i p red ictiv e con d ition s. T h ese a r e the r ea so n s, then, for d istin g u ish
ing the sa tisfy in g fro m the sa tisfa c to r y , the d e sired from the
d e sir a b le.
131
D ew ey 's a n a ly sis now h elp s to c la r ify the P a r k e r -P e r r y
d ispu te over the independence of p r e fe r e n c e and in ten sity; fo r, in
D ew ey 's te r m s , P e r r y 's "p referen ce" is sim ila r to " s a tis fa c to r y , "
w h ile h is "intensity" co rresp o n d s to " s a tis fying -1 1 P e r r y su g g e sts
su ch a d istin ctio n betw een p r e fe re n c e and in te n sity a s fo llo w s:
What is the se n se in w hich one of tw o o b jects is b etter
than the other w hen th ey a re object of the sam e in te r e st?
A ssu m in g that the in te r e s t is capable of being fu lly aro u sed
by eith er of the tw o, d oes it m ean anything to sa y that the
d ir e c tio n of the in te r e s t to another object w ould be b etter than
its d ir ec tio n to the p r e sen t ob ject? The fa cto r of in te n sity is
h e r e elim in a ted , and the answ er m u st be looked for in te r m s
of p r e fe r e n c e . (G en eral, p. 633) j
P erh ap s the an sw er to why th is is so is to be found in the
c o m p le te n e ss of sa tisfa c tio n . P e r r y is c lo s e to D ew ey h ere w hen
he m ain tain s that the d iffe re n c e betw een in ten sity and p r e fe re n c e
is that the fo rm er c o rresp o n d s to a su b jectiv e dem and w h er ea s the
la tter in v o lv es the fitn e s s of the object. To illu str a te both p o sitio n s ;
|
w ith a sim p le exam p le in volving th ir st: I m ay d e s ir e to drink ocean
w ater and, at the sa m e tim e, p refer not to drink it. A s th is e x - j
am ple sh ow s, in te n sity and p r e fe re n c e can v a ry se p a r a tely . They
a r e, th e r e fo r e , in d ep en d en t--fo r both D ew ey and P e r r y .
P a rk er, on the other hand, eq u ates both in te n sity and
p r e fe re n c e w ith D ew ey 's s a tis fying. A s p r e v io u sly in d icated , the
in ten se and the p r e fe r r e d a r e , for P a rk er, in d istin g u ish a b le. T his
fa ct is e x p r e ss ib le as:
132
M ore in te n se = P r e fe r r e d
B y a p ragm atic c r ite r io n , P a rk er m a y now c h o o se eith er
te r m . The oth er one w ill then b eco m e su p erflu o u s. In ch oosin g
in te n sity , P a rk er a u to m a tica lly e lim in a tes p r e fe r e n c e as an in
dependent con cep t. This is the root of h is q u arrel w ith P e r r y .
H ow ever, a d ifficu lty o ccu rs h e r e fo r P a rk er; fo r in
elim in a tin g p r e fe r e n c e , he is left w ithout a ter m to c o r r e la te w ith
D ew ey's s a tis fa c to r y . Y et, he n eed s su ch a te r m b e c a u se , fo r him,
va lu e e x p e rien ce s a r e p red icta b le and th e re fo re in v o lv e a p o s sib le
sa tisfa c to r y situ a tio n .
P a r k e r 's d ifficu lty is a d ir ec t r e su lt of h is r e fu sa l to r e c o g
n iz e the indep en dence of in te n sity and p r e fe r e n c e .
P a r k e r 's approach to the d ifficu lty is that, w h ile he r e fu se s
to c o r r e la te " p referen ce" w ith " sa tisfa c to r y ," h e m e r e ly sh ifts the
d istin ctio n b etw een " satisfyin g" and " satisfactory" by crea tin g two
c a te g o r ie s of in te n sity . He c a lls them p r im a ry and seco n d a ry in
te n s itie s . T his p roced u re p erm its h im to retain P e r r y 's distinction
betw een in te n sity and p r e fe r e n c e and s t ill to m aintain that th e se two
ter m s are not independent; in denying the statu s of p r e fe r e n c e as used
by P e r r y , h e sim p ly su b stitu tes se co n d a r y in te n sity fo r P e r r y 's
p r e fe r e n c e . He m ak es th is Nrftrifch apparent when he sa y s
. . .w e c o m e . . .to in te n sity , w hich w e le ft to la s t b eca u se of its
d e c is iv e , y et p u zzlin g r o le in p r e fe r e n c e . The fir s t step to -
133
ward c le a r n e ss w ith regard to it is to m ake a distinction,
seldom m ade betw een prim ary intensity, which every d esire
has when it em erg es into co n scio u sn ess, and secondary in
ten sity, the inten sity of a d e sir e after reflection on consequ en ces
and after com petition with other d e s ir e s . (Philosophy, p. 168
([my ita lic s ])
In view of this explicit identification of prim ary intensity
with u n critical d esire and of secondary intensity with d e sir e after
consid erin g consequences and the com petition of other d e sir e s , the
dispute betw een P arker and P erry becom es a verbal one; for
P ark er's prim ary in tensity corresponds to P er ry 's intensity, and
P a rk er's secondard intensity, to P er ry 's p referen ce. D espite d if
fer en ce s in term inology, each philosopher thus retains the funda
m ental and im portant distinction m ade by Dewey betw een the sa tisfy
ing exp erien ce and the satisfactory one.
Now it is true that P ark er's secondary in tensity is a
dim ension of value w h ereas P er ry 's p referen ce is a standard. But
this is not im portant here. At th is point th is issu e is whether or
not in ten sity is distinguishable from preference; and sin ce P arker
| req u ires a new term , secondary intensity, to take the place of
p referen ce, the independence of th ese two exp erien ces can no
longer be an issu e .
P erhaps, how ever, I have not done com plete ju stice to
P a rk er's position; for at tim es h is prim ary and secondary in ten sity
seem to be distinguishable only in term s of tim e. Thus, prim ary
134
I
in ten sity pops into the m ind at tim e t , and secondary inten sity |
|
su p ersed es it at tim e t 1 . The v ery fact that the d e sir e at t 1 is
j
chosen over the d e sir e at t is proof enough that the d e sir e at t* j
■
m ust have been m ore in ten se. Parker seem s to be saying th is here:
. . .th e choice of b is p o ssib le only after reflection , for only
then does the im agination of the fru stration s or joys caused
by a create the pull that y ield s the choice of b. (Philosophy,
p. 169)
A ccording to th is interpretation, then, the d e sir e at t and
j
t ‘ m ay be opp osites, and the in ten sities of the d e sir e s m ay be dif
feren t at t and t 1 , yet inten sity itse lf, although varying, rem ains |
e sse n tia lly one kind of category.
P erhaps it is worth noting here that, in the quotation just
given, P arker u se s m etaphorical lan gu age--in which pull is strongly 1
su ggestive of in ten sity. I m erely m ention this point, how ever, and
j
proceed to answ er P arker along the follow ing lin e s. j
I
I shall agree w ith L ew is that all cognitive statem ents are
!
either analytic or em p iric. Now, if Parker is using intensity in
the analytic m ea n in g --i. e . , in the sen se that the v ery fact that one
d e sir e is chosen over another m eans that som ehow it is m ore in
te n se --th e n he m ay do so. But such a characterization of in tensity
red u ces to a triv ia l tautology. As such, it m ay be d ism issed as
arb itrary and insign ificant. If, on the other hand, Parker w ish es h is
135
seco n d a ry in te n sity to be an e m p ir ic a lly m ean ingful ter m , then it
is c le a r ly fa lse ; for it is sim p ly a m atter of e m p ir ic a l fa ct that the
le s s in te n se d e sir e is often p r e fe r r e d to the m ore in te n se one. F o r
exam p le, th ere is the ocean w ater illu str a tio n . I m ay indeed be
dying of th ir st--h a v in g an unbearable d e s ir e to drink s e a w a te r --a n d
y et p r e fe r not to drink it. T hus, sin c e in te n sity and p r e fe r e n c e can
va ry se p a r a te ly , th ey are independent.
R e g a rd less of how am biguous P a rk er m ay be on th is point,
the fa ct rem ain s that he r e c o g n iz e s D ey*y's d istin ctio n betw een
sa tisfa c to r y and sa tisfy in g . And th is is the sig n ifica n t point, not
to be o b scu red by term in o lo g y . The only w ay to in terp ret him , then
--a n d th is s e e m s m o st p la u sib le in read in g P a r k e r --is to sa y , f o l
low ing the fir s t su g g estio n , that in sp ite of h is den ial, he im p lic itly
a c c e p ts --w ith P e r r y --th e independence of p r e fe r e n c e and m e r e ly
a lte r s its nam e to seco n d a ry in ten sity .
L ew is a g r e e s with P e r r y , even in term in o lo g y , by r e c o g
n izin g a d ifferen ce betw een p r e fe r e n c e and in ten sity ; fo r in te n sity ,
in L e w is's th eory, a p p lies to the e x p r e s s iv e le v e l. T his is s im ila r
to Dewey*s sa tisfy in g e x p e r ie n c e . L e w is's in te n sity , th e r e fo r e ,
c o rr esp o n d s to P e r r y 's in te n sity , to P a r k e r 's p rim a ry in ten sity ,
and to S tev en so n 's p r e fe r e n c e . L ew is a d m its, h ow ever, that in -
te n s it y - -lik e p r e fe r e n c e --c a n n o t be m ea su red w ith m a th em a tica l
136
p r e c is io n , but he in s is t s th at th is n eed not be a d e te r r e n t to
r e c o g n iz in g in te n sity a s a d im e n sio n w ith in th e v a lu e e x p e r ie n c e .
That, fo r L e w is, p r e fe r e n c e and in te n sity are independent
'V
m a y b e s e e n w hen w e r e m e m b e r that p r e fe r e n c e in c lu d e s a ju d g
m en ta l e le m e n t. In ten sity , on the o th er h a n d --b e in g a p p lica b le to
the e x p r e s s iv e le v e l- - in v o lv e s fo r L e w is, no jud gm en t and is a c
c o rd in g ly independent of in te n sity . L e w is is thus in su b sta n tia l
a g r e e m e n t w ith P e r r y and P a r k e r in r e c o g n iz in g the d iffe r e n c e b e
tw een p r e fe r e n c e and in te n sity .
E v en as far as S te v en so n is c o n c er n e d , th e r e a r e sh a d e s of
a d istin c tio n b etw een in te n sity and p r e fe r e n c e ; fo r , a c c o r d in g to h is |
th eo ry , one m u st m ake one of tw o a ssu m p tio n s p r io r to d is c u s s in g
e th ic a l d isp u tes: one m u st a ssu m e e ith e r that a ttitu d es a r e b a sed
on b e lie fs , or that th ey a r e not b a sed on b e lie fs . If one c h o o s e s the
f ir s t of th e s e a ssu m p tio n s, th en p r e fe r e n c e c o r r e sp o n d s to D e w e y 's
s a tis fa c to r y , and in th is s e n s e S te v e n so n 's " p r e fe r e n c e '’ h as the
sa m e m ea n in g as h as P e r r y 's . W ithin S te v e n so n 's th e o ry , then, if
one m a k e s the a ssu m p tio n that attitu d es are b a sed upon b e lie fs , th en
" p referen ce" has P e r r y 's m ea n in g . On th e o th er hand, if one r e
fu s e s to m ake th is a ssu m p tio n , th en p r e fe r e n c e b e c o m e s in d is
tin g u ish a b le fr o m in te n sity ; and th is of c o u r s e is th e m an n er in w h ich
t
I
S tev en so n u s e s th e te r m .
137
F or Stevenson, then, p referen ce is equivalent to P e r r y 's
in ten sity; and sin ce he r e fu se s to m ake the assu m p tion that a t
titu d es are b ased upon b e lie fs, he d oes not have a term to c o r r e la te
w ith P e r r y 's p r e fe re n c e . T here a re, h ow ever, adequate rea so n s
(as has been shown) that attitudes a re based upon b e lie fs; and sin ce
Steven son d en ies th is, h is a n a ly sis of p referen ce i s in com p lete and
is founded upon fa lse su p p osition s.
In sp ite of S teven son 's ob jection s, th e re fo re , the d istin ction
b etw een p r eferen ce and in ten sity can be m aintained w ithin the
L e w is -P a r k e r -P e r r y fram ew ork; and, once ter m in o lo g ic a l d if
fic u ltie s have been reso lv ed , p referen ce is an independent d im en
sion for P ark er and b eco m es an e x p licit standard for evaluating
v a lu es w ithin the L e w is-P e r r y th e o r ie s.
5. In c lu siv e n e s s. In clu siv en ess is one of P e r r y 's
quantitative standards.
The standard of in c lu siv e n e ss m ay a lso be e x p r e sse d as
fo llo w s. If an in te r e st M co n fers value on an object a , and
if a secon d in te r e st N_ co n fers value on the sa m e object, the
in te r e st M p e r sistin g , it follow s that a d e r iv e s augm ented
value from th is fact. (G en eral, p. 647)
In other w ord s, the ju stifica tio n for the c r ite r io n of in
c lu siv e n e s s is a m ath em atical one: if a and b a r e both p o sitiv e
in te r e sts, a w orld w hich in clu d es a plus b w ill contain m ore
in te r e st than a w orld in w hich a or b o c cu rs alon e.
138
P a r k e r , on the oth er hand, w h ile e x p lic itly e n d o rsin g th is
c r ite r io n , fin d s that in c lu s iv e n e s s , as P e r r y u s e s it , is n ot in
d epend en t of P e r r y 's o th er two c r it e r ia . H e su p p orts h is con ten tion
b y r e fe r r in g to P e r r y 's illu str a tio n in w h ich the in d ivid u al c h o o se s
cold ra th er than tep id w a te r. H e in s is t s that in c lu s iv e n e s s - - not
p r e fe r e n c e as P e r r y m a in ta in s --d e te r m in e s th is ch oice:
. . . w hy should I p r e fe r the cold w a ter to the tepid w ater ? The
a n sw er is in te r m s o f in c lu s iv e n e s s . . .: the cold w a ter s a tis fie s
n ot o n ly th ir s t, as d oes the tep id w a te r , but a lso m y d e s ir e fo r
so m eth in g to c o o l m e o ff. (P h ilo so p h y , p. 172)
If P a r k e r is c o r r e c t in h is con ten tion that P e r r y h as e m p lo y
ed p r e fe r e n c e w h ere in c lu s iv e n e s s sh ou ld h ave b een u se d , then the
in d ep en d en ce of P e r r y 's p r e fe r e n c e and in c lu s iv e n e s s is in d eed in
doubt.
As a p r e lim in a r y poin t h e r e , h o w ev e r, it is a m a tte r of
r e c o r d that P a r k e r a lso a c c u se s P e r r y of con fu sin g in te n sity and
p r e fe r e n c e . H is c la im then w as that p r e fe r e n c e and in te n sity a r e
in d istin g u ish a b le . But w e could sh ow that h e a c tu a lly su b stitu ted a
n ew te r m , se c o n d a r y in te n sity , fo r P e r r y 's p r e fe r e n c e . In sh o rt,
o n ce te r m in o lo g ic a l d iffic u ltie s w e r e r e s o lv e d , P e r r y and P a r k e r
w e r e in su b sta n tia l a g r e e m e n t co n cern in g the in d ep en d en ce of
p r e fe r e n c e and in te n sity .
T h is d is c u s s io n , e lim in a tin g as it d o es the P e r r y -P a r k e r
d isp u te c o n cern in g p r e fe r e n c e and in te n sity , a ls o v o id s P a r k e r 's
139
ob jectio n to P e r r y 's u s e of in c lu s iv e n e s s - The r e a s o n s a r e a s
f o llo w s .
In h is own th eo ry , P a rk er r e ta in s in c lu s iv e n e s s (he c a lls it
v o lu m e) along w ith both in te n sity and seco n d a ry in te n sity - The fa ct
that he fin d s it n e c e s s a r y to r e fe r to th e se th r ee m ea n in g s in d ic a te s
that he h im s e lf c o n sid e r s th em independent- But, a cco rd in g to our
p r e v io u s d is c u s s io n s , h is seco n d a ry in te n sity is eq u ivalen t to
P e r r y 's p r e fe r e n c e , and it fo llo w s fro m th is e q u iv a le n c e --u n le s s
he a d m its that he h im s e lf is in c o n s is te n t--th a t, sin c e (in h is
sy s te m ) in c lu s iv e n e s s i s independent, it m u st be independent in
P e r r y 's th e o r y a s w e ll.
T h is i s r e a so n enough to support P e r r y a g a in st P a rk er h ere-
But P a r k e r , b e s id e s b ein g in c o n siste n t, a ls o m is in te r p r e ts P e r r y .
H is e r r o r c o n c e r n s the m eth od of applying P e r r y 's c r ite r ia ; for
P e r r y m a in ta in s that the ap p licatio n of in c lu s iv e n e s s d iffe r s fro m
that of p r e fe r e n c e . In P e r r y 's w ord s:
- - .p r e fe r e n c e m a k e s p o s sib le the c o m p a riso n of the se v e r a l
o b je c ts of the sa m e in te r e s t w h ile , in co n tra d istin c tio n , . . -
in c lu s iv e n e s s m a k e s p o s sib le the c o m p a r iso n of the o b je c ts of
one in te r e s t w ith th e o b jects of an oth er. . . (G en era l, p. 658)
Now , a cco rd in g to th is qu otation, P a rk er , in the exam p le
r e fe r r e d to e a r lie r , h a s sim p ly m isa p p lie d P e r r y 's c r ite r ia . In
d eed , P e r r y sta te s h e r e that in o rd er to co m p a re tw o o b je c ts of the
sa m e in te r e st, one m ust use the standard of p referen ce. C learly,
I
this is a lso indicated in P a rk er's exam ple, w here two objects
(tepid and cpld w ater) are the objects of the sam e in te r e st (th irst
quenching). But P ark er, instead of co rr ec tly using p referen ce,
in s is ts on em ploying in c lu siv en ess and th erefore m isap p lies this
c riterio n .
P arker thus overlooks P e r r y ’s defining c h a r a c te r istic --th a t
j which lo g ic a lly d istin gu ish es p referen ce from in c lu siv e n e ss--a n d in
I
I so doing fa ils to find any d ifference betw een P erry 's p referen ce and
i
j in c lu siv e n e ss. Under the circu m sta n ces, is the fact su rp risin g?
I
But the e r r o r is due, not to P erry , but to P a rk er's m isin terp reta
tion of P er ry .
P a rk er's m istake w as caused by his erroneous substitution
!
| of consequ en ces for a c tiv itie s. S p ecifica lly , he w as m isled into
using p referen ce instead of in c lu siv en ess by con sid erin g two con
seq u en ces (coolin g effects and r e lie f from th irst) of the one in terest,
th irst quenching. A ctually, as explained abovei p referen ce is to be
r e se r v e d for situ ation s w hich involve not one (as in P ark er's
illu stration ) but m ore than one in te re st. This is how P erry em ploys
in c lu siv e n e ss, and, when illu stra tin g its u se, he r efer s to two dif-
| feren t a c tiv itie s, drinking and bathing. Now, presum ably, as in the
| c a se of P ark er's exam p le, th ere would be con sequ en ces for each of
the two a lter n a tiv es; but th is is not im portant. T he sig n ifica n t
point is that in c lu siv e n e ss ap p lies b eca u se m ore than one in te r e st
is in volved . P a rk er co n fu ses co n seq u en ces with a c tiv itie s and
th e r e fo r e m isa p p lie s P e r r y 's c r ite r ia . D esp ite P a r k e r 's cla im s to
I
the con trary, th e r e fo r e , once m isu n d erstan d in gs a re r e so lv e d , the
th e o r ie s under d isc u ssio n are com p atib le.
i
i
! Since s o m uch confusion has a r is e n over the ap p lication of
P e r r y 's standard of p r e fe r e n c e , an exam in ation of its im p lication s
is in o rd er. P e r r y m aintains that th ere are five typ es of c o n
se q u e n c e s.
F ir s t, it fo llo w s fro m the p rin cip le of in c lu siv e n e ss that a
j u n iv erse with in te r e st contains m ore value than a u n iv erse devoid
i
of in te r e st. T his is apparent. But P e r r y fo llo w s out the point by
acknow ledging a c o rr ela tio n of valu e w ith life . A u n iv erse devoid
of life would be a v a lu e le ss entity.
The secon d fa ct w hich in c lu siv e n e ss brings to light is that
an overlap p in g of in te r e sts in c r e a s e s valu e. An a e sth e tic in te r e st
added to a u tilita ria n one thus in c r e a s e s the value of the object.
F o r exam p le, if the canopener is p lea sin g to the e y e , this a e sth e tic
| in te r e st, added to the u tilita ria n valu e, in c r e a se s the to ta l value of
j th is in stru m en t.
J T hird, this overlapping o c cu rs not only in the c a se of d if
142
feren t typ es of in te re st, but a lso w ith any in c re a se in the num ber of
valuing su b jects. A s an illu stra tio n of th is point, P er ry explains
that when the sam e m u sic is enjoyed by two p erso n s rather than by
one, the m u sic has greater value on that account.
Fourth, the princip le of in c lu siv en ess app lies to situation s
involving d ifferent o b jects. Thus, ”... pushpin and poetry are m ore
I
i
valuable than pushpin or poetry. . ." (G eneral, p. 648). This is J
sim p ly becau se the two ob jects together are m ore in clu siv e than one j
of them alone.
j
And, fin ally, in c lu siv en ess holds concerning the duration of '
an in te r e st. P er ry is cautious to point out that a sim p le quantitative
evaluation cannot be u n iv ersa lly applied. Indeed, one m ust r em em - |
i
ber that in te r e sts m ay be ca n celled by other fa c to r s --s u c h a s in
ten sity and p r e fe re n c e --a n d that, accordingly, the other c r ite r ia
m ust alw ays be con sid ered . But, gen erally speaking, an hour of !
in te r e s t--b y the princip le of in c lu s iv e n e s s --is m ore valuable than a i
m inute of the sam e in te re st.
• T hese fiv e im p lication s of the princip le of in c lu siv en ess
P e r r y ex p lic itly en d o rses. And th is fact is a b a sis for additional
a greem en ts betw een P e r ty and P ark er.
6. D uration. In connection w ith P e r r y 's la st im p lic a tio n --
that of duration—w e m ust ob serve that P arker a lso co n sid ers
143
duration a factor in the valu e e x p e r ie n c e . Indeed, he e sta b lish e s
duration a s a sep a ra te standard.
T his a g reem en t betw een P e r r y and P a rk er fo llo w s from
P e r r y ’s p o sitio n in G en eral T h eory of V alue, to g eth er w ith v ie w s
e x p r e sse d in e a r lie r w o rk s. But P e r r y m o v es ev en c lo s e r to j
1
P a rk er in h is la te r book, R ea lm s of V alue, w h ere he jo in s P a rk er
in esta b lish in g duration a s a sep a ra te and independent standard.
It is tru e that, in R ea lm s of V alue, P e r r y d oes c a ll th is
c r ite r io n the tim e standard; but th is te r m is m e r e ly a d ifferen t j
nam e for P a r k e r 's duration. In fa ct, the eq u ivalen ce of P e r r y 's
tim e c r ite r io n w ith P a r k e r 's duration is p lain ly evid en t w hen P e r r y
r e fe r s to h is tim e c r ite r io n as fo llo w s:
!
Any two in te r e s ts m ay be com p ared a s r eg a r d s th eir
duration, or freq u en cy of m a n ife sta tio n s, if it be a ssu m e d that |
the tim e in w h ich th ey occu r i s the sa m e , or public tim e . It is
p e r m is sib le to say that one in te r e st, or one type of in te r e st,
la s t s lon ger than another, and that its object th e r e fo r e p o s s e s s e s
a valu e that is "m ore la s t in g " - - le s s ep h em era l and tr a n sito ry .
(R e a lm s, p. 57)
T im e and duration then a re eq u ivalen t. H ere P e r r y and
P ark er are in agreem en t, only the ter m in o lo g y is d ifferen t.
7. N u m b er. P e r r y 's num ber c r ite r io n co n c er n s the
co m p lex ity of the valu e e x p e r ie n c e . He la te r adds th is c r it e r io n - -
a s he d o es the standard of t im e - - t o h is o rig in a l four standards
su g g ested in G en eral T h eory of V alue.
144
But a g a in --a s in the c a s e of tim e --th e fa c to r s in the
standard of n u m b ers a r e at le a s t im p lic it in in c lu s iv e n e s s ; fo r,
a cco rd in g to th e im p lic a tio n s of in c lu s iv e n e s s , an overlap p in g of
in te r e s ts in c r e a s e s v a lu e . T h is fa c t, d e tec ted in G en era l T h eory of i
i
V a lu e , s e r v e s a s a b a s is fo r the c r ite r io n of num ber in P e r r y 's
R e a lm s of V alue. N othing i s new h e r e , a s w ill be apparent; for
i
P e r r y , r e fe r r in g to the num ber c r ite r io n , sa y s: j
I
Two or m o re a g g r e g a te s of in te r e s ts can be com p ared
n u m e r ic a lly for the sim p le r e a so n that th ey h ave th e a b stra c t
num ber in com m on . . . . F our in te r e s ts a r e g r e a te r than th r e e
in te r e s ts n u m e r ic a lly b e c a u se the n u m er ica l fa cto r i s p r e se n t
in both c a s e s . (R ea lm s, p. 58)
I
T his quotation, co n cern in g the num ber standard, thus
r e a c h e s the sa m e c o n c lu sio n s w h ich w e r e at le a s t im p lic it in
P e r r y 's in c lu s iv e n e s s c r ite r io n in G en eral T h eory of V alu e.
P er ry * 8 standard of nu m ber, m o r e o v e r , h a s its cou n terp art
in P a r k e r 's th e o ry . It is tru e that th e n a m e s of th e r e s p e c tiv e
te r m s d iffe r . T hus, w h e r e a s P e r r y c a lls th e c r ite r io n nu m ber, j
j
P a rk er r e fe r s to it a s v o lu m e or sc o p e . N o n e th e le ss, the te r m s
m ea n the s a m e - - a fa ct w h ich b e c o m e s evid en t w hen P a rk er w r ite s:
That th e g r e a te r volu m e or sco p e of a d e s ir e the h ig h er its
r a n k --o th e r th in gs b ein g e q u a l--w o u ld be d isp u ted by few .
V olum e d epend s, roughly, a s w e have se e n , upon the num ber
of su b in te r e sts under th e co n tro l of the s e lf a s a w h o le.
(P h ilo so p h y , p. 164)
P a r k e r s sco p e or v o lu m e, thus c o r r e sp o n d s to P e r r y 's
145
num ber.
T here is , how ever, one m ore d ifficu lty in equating th ese
te r m s, for P arker adds that the aggregate of value is not better
per se b ecau se it is la r g e r . In con trad istinction , how ever, in the
quotation above, P er ry se e m s to be saying exactly th is. P arker
and P erry , th erefo re, again appear to be at odds. N on eth eless, in
sp ite of th is apparent d ifferen ce, P er ry actu ally w ould agree w ith
P ark er on th is point; for P e r r y 's num ber c riter io n does not operate
in a vacuum : th ere are other c r ite r ia w hich a lso m u st alw ays be
em ployed. In P e r r y 's w ords:
The n u m erical com p arison le a v e s other standards of
com p arison ind eterm in ate, and th erefo re p roves nothing as
to the total m agnitude of in te re st. (R ealm s, p. 59)
Other things being equal, then, P a rk er 's scop e or volum e
j
is equivalent to P e r r y 's n u m ber. And th is stan d ard --in both
th e o r ie s--o p e r a te s in conjunction w ith other c r ite r ia . T hese other
c r ite r ia , b y w a y of sum m ary, a re P a rk er's attainm ent and P e r r y 's j
i
j p referen ce, in ten sity, enlightenm ent, ca n clu siv en ess, duration, and
i
num ber. On the w h o le--a n d d esp ite S teven son 's erron eou s o b jec
tio n s --th e s e c r ite r ia , as standards, p erm it value to be ranked into
a h ierarch y of ord er. And, as a fin al point in th is sum m ary, the
vind ication of such a procedure of ranking is , according to L ew is,
a req u isite of rational behavior itse lf; for to deny the p o ssib ility of
146
evalu atin g v a lu e s is to rea ch the u ltim a te p r e m is e s of ir r a tio n a lity .
T his con clu d es the d is c u ssio n of the m ean ing and scop e of
stan d ard s w ithin the th e o r ie s of P e r r y , P a rk er, L e w is, and S tev en
son . What can be sa id con cern in g the c o n clu sio n s rea ch ed ? j
A s a p r e lim in a ry point, it is apparent that c er ta in difficultiecj
i
w ill occu r in con n ection w ith any attem pt to e sta b lish ju st one se t of |
j
stan d ard s. In R ea lm s of V alue, P e r r y su g g ests that th is p roblem
a r is e s b eca u se the C h ristian trad ition m ain tain s that a ll standards
*
•*.
* J *
le a d to one c o n c lu sio n --th e " su p rem e good” --a lr e a d y e sta b lish ed
upon authority; and th is in s is te n c e , P e r r y poin ts out, o b sc u r e s the
issu e :
A s a m a tter of fa ct. . . in te r e s ts can be ranked by m any
stan d ard s. T his d o es not m ean that in te r e s ts have no rank, or
that th ey do not r e a lly and o b je ctiv e ly p o s s e s s the ranks im puted
to them ; nor d o es it im p ly that one or m o re of th eir rankings j
m ay not have c er ta in p e c u lia r itie s w hich q u alify them to be
sin g led out for sp e c ia l em p h a sis. (R e a lm s, p. 84) j
: f
P e r r y 's stand h e r e --th a t in te r e s ts can be ranked by m any
sta n d a r d s --is docum ented by an th rop ological ev id en ce. E m p irica l [
1 I
| fa c ts in d ica te that each cu ltu re d oes ev o lv e stan dards in te r m s of its
! n e e d s. H ow ever, it should be noted that on th is point P e r r y 's
p o sitio n i s m is le a d in g --a t le a s t in h is e a r lie r w ritin g s; fo r, in itia lly ,
P e r r y 's four c r it e r ia - - c o r r e c t n e s s , in te n sity , p r e fe r e n c e , and
in c lu s iv e n e s s -- a r e advanced a s the c r ite r ia for evalu atin g v a lu e s.
Y et, P e r r y 's la te r w o rk s, in w h ich the o rig in a l four stan dards a re
in c r e a s e d to six , in d ic a te that P e r r y h a s r e tr e a te d fro m h is o r ig in a l ;
d ogm atic p o sitio n .
P a r k e r , on the other hand, is in itia lly m o r e cau tiou s
and e x p lic itly c o n sid e r s the c r ite r ia e x p e rim en ts in e m p ir ic a l
g e n e r a liz a tio n . A cco rd in g ly , ea ch p e r so n m u st c h o o se fo r h im se lf:
Y et, u n le s s our w h ole th e o ry is m ista k e n , the c la im for
su p e r io r ity in rank, for a ll p e r so n s , cannot be su sta in e d . F or
rank i s a p e r so n a l a ffa ir, a d e c is io n of the in d ivid u al, not a
p r o p e r ty of o b je ctiv e r e a lit ie s . (P h ilo so p h y , p. 217)
T his c h a r a c te r iz a tio n of stan d ard s a ls o sq u a r es w ith
a n th ro p o lo g ica l ev id en ce to the e ffe c t that the in d ivid u al le a r n s
v a lu e s a s a m ea n s of cu ltu ra l ad ju stm en t and of c r e a tiv ity ; fo r , in
the p r o c e s s of en cu ltu ratin g h im se lf, the ind ivid u al e s ta b lis h e s sta n - ;
i
d a rd s, in itia lly in h er itin g th em fro m h is cu ltu re, but la te r expanding !
i
1
and a lte r in g th em on a tr ia l and e r r o r b a s is . T hus, e a ch in d ivid u al |
--w ith in itia l cu ltu ra l g u id a n c e --m u st u ltim a tely c h o o se h is own j
I
c r ite r ia for evalu atin g h is own v a lu e s.
But be th is a s it m ay, the im p ortan t r e a so n for su pp orting
P a r k e r 's c o n c lu sio n l ie s in a d ifferen t d ir e c tio n . It i s the fa c t that
so m e se t of stan d ard s i s n e c e s s a r y - - in te r m s of lo g ic and of
lin g u istic u s a g e - - if th e r e is to be any m ean in g to prudence; fo r,
p rio r to b ein g prudent, one m u st know in w hat d ir e c tio n prudence
l ie s , and th is n e c e s s ity im p lie s so m e m ea n s of ranking v a lu e . T hus,
in o rd er that p ru d en ce have m ean in g, not a ll in d iv id u a ls n eed fo llo w
; any one p articu lar s e t of stan dards, but, b ecau se of the v ery
m eaning of prudence, the individual m ust follow som e s e t of
stan d ard s. The logic of language and e m p irica l evid en ce, thus
support the con clu sion that standards are a r eq u isite of prudential
j behavior; and it is in th is se n se that I accep t the P e r r y -L e w is -
i
i
i
St even s o n -P a rk er sy n th esis of standards as at lea st one p la u sib le
exp erim en t in g en era liza tio n .
j
2. The Second Im p licit A ssum ption in the
I ■ " 1 " 1
M eaning of the P ru dential Ought
; Our en tire d iscu ssio n of standards has been an exam ination
' of one su p p osition inh eren t in the m eaning of the prudential ought.
Our fin a l co n clu sio n is that the v ery p o ssib ility of ranking v a lu e —a
situ ation n e c e ssita tin g the u se of som e s e t of s ta n d a r d s --is a funda
m en tal assu m p tion underlying the use of the prudential ought.
A secon d assu m p tion underlying the prudential ought is that
value th eory can be sep arated from e th ic s. T his topic, of co u rse,
: en co m p a sses the m ean s-en d relation sh ip and is in trica tely r ela ted to
the p reviou s d isc u ssio n of standards; for the u se of sta n d a r d s--a s
id eal e n d s--p r e su p p o se s that su ch ends can be sep arated fro m m eans
i
! S teven son ch allen ges th is p o ssib ility ; and if h is objection s can
|
| be su stain ed , then the v a lid ity of sta n d a rd s—as concluded in the
149
p r e ced in g d is c u s s io n -- m u s t again be c o n sid e r e d an open q u estion .
P r io r to any su ch co n c lu sio n , h o w ev er, a p r e c is e statem en t of
S te v e n so n 's p o sitio n is n eed ed . A fo rm u la tio n of S te v en so n 's c la im
i
that e th ic s and v a lu e th e o ry cannot be se p a r a ted is , th e r e fo r e , in
o r d e r. j
I
A cco rd in g to S teven son , a p rev a len t e r r o r in v alu e th eo ry is;
t
the b e lie f that v a lu e th e o ry and e th ic s can be sep a ra ted . T h is i s the I
e r r o r of attem p tin g to c o m p a rtm en ta lize v a lu e s. In th is fau lty
app roach a d istin c tio n is draw n b etw een in tr in sic and e x tr in s ic valu e-j
!
In trin sic v a lu e is d efin ed a s good for its own sake; w h e r e a s e x
tr in s ic v a lu e b e c o m e s good a s a m ea n s to in tr in sic v a lu e . W ith th is
c la s s ific a tio n in m ind, c e r ta in p h ilo so p h er s attem pt to an alyze in
tr in s ic v a lu e , lea v in g s c ie n tis ts to study the c a u s e -e ffe c t p attern s
of e x tr in s ic v a lu e . S tev en so n c a lls th is approach the s p e c ia lis t
con cep tion of e th ic s . U n derlying su ch rea so n in g , he b e lie v e s , is
th is im p lic it argum ent: j
O bjects of so r t M a re the only o n es in tr in s ic a lly good,
and th o se of so r t N a r e the only o n es in tr in s ic a lly bad
X le a d s to a p rep on d eran ce of M 's o v er N 's
T h er efo r e, X i s on the w h ole good. (E th ic s, p. 176)
G iven p r e m is e num ber one (w hich the p h ilosop h er w ill
fu r n ish a s an in tr in s ic v a lu e ), the seco n d p r e m is e b e c o m e s a s c ie n t i
fic p ro b lem w h ich can b e stu d ied in a factu al m an n er. The c o n c lu sio n
150
then follow s fro m the p r e m ise s by the m ethods of lo g ic alone. The
sp e c ia list, th erefo re, would sep arate the sp e c ific a lly eth ical
problem , lab el it " in trin sic v a lu e ,1 1 and study it in ph ilosoph ical
iso la tio n . G ranted th is fir s t p r e m ise , a ll e ls e would follow by the
m ethods of sc ie n c e and of lo g ic.
Stevenson claim s that this approach r e sts upon two a ssu m p
tions:
A ssum ption 1: agreem ent in in trin sic value is presupposed by
any other type of eth ical agreem en t.
A ssum ption 2: agreem ent in in trin sic value does not its e lf p r e
suppose any other type of eth ical agreem en t.
He defines in trin sic value as ends, ex trin sic value as m ean s,
and attacks A ssum ption 1 with the claim that m ean s-en d s cannot be
sep arated . Any attem pt to sep arate them w ill leave im portant
gaps in value th eory unattended by eith er the ph ilosoph er or the
sc ie n tist.
In analyzing th is situation, Stevenson c la s s ifie s four b asic
types of eth ica l agreem ent in attitude:
Type I. A greem ent on the in trin sic value of X.
Type H. A greem ent on e x tr in sic value of X , a r isin g from
agreem ent on in trin sic value of Y .
Type HI. D iv erse agreem en ts on value of X .
Type IV. A greem en t on ex tr in sic value of X , independent
of in trin sic value.
I sh a ll adapt S tev en so n 's e x a m p les and a lte r h is d ia g ra m s to
illu str a te th e se fou r typ es of a g r ee m e n t. B rok en lin es w ill r e p
r e s e n t e x tr in s ic value; unbroken lin e s w ill in d ica te in tr in sic v a lu e .
A and B a re v a lu e r s , w h erea s X and Y r e p r e se n t e ith e r m ea n s
( or en d s, as exp lain ed fo r e a c h typ e.
I
! T Y PE I
X
A and B a g r e e in attitu de on X w ithout c o n sid e r in g c o n
se q u en ce s of X . T his ex a m p le, S teven son a d m its, is a r tific ia l
but, n o n e th e le ss, illu s tr a te s a point.
T Y P E II
152
A and B agree in attitude that Y is a m eans to X .
TYPE in
Y
s
N .
A B
A and B approve each of his own survival; but B approves
a lso of A 's su rvival, (X ,) as a m eans to B's su rv iv a l( Y .)
A and B approve of X as a m eans; but., for A, (X) is a
m eans to ( Y ,) w hereas for B , ( X) is a m eans to ( Z .)
The acceptance of Types III and IV --in which there m ay be
eth ical agreem ent without agreem ent on ends - -repudiates A ssu m p
tion 1; for A ssum ption 1 stipu lates that agreem ent on ends is p r e -
TYPE IV
k B
Z
153
su p p osed by e v e r y other so r t of e th ica l a g r ee m e n t. T h ere i s ,
th e r e fo r e , a danger in the " s p e c ia lis t approach" that e th ica l is s u e s
of type III and type IV m a y be overlook ed :
The pure p h ilo so p h er, lim itin g h is judgm ent to en d s, w ill
se c u r e only a g r ee m e n t of Type I, to the lim ite d exten t that that
is p o ssib le ; and should he turn h is e sta b lish e d en d s o v er to the
pu re s c ie n tis t, w ho is to d is c o v e r the m ea n s of obtaining th em ,
th is w ill lea d , in d ir e c tly , on ly to a g r e e m e n t of Type II. Who,
then, is to d eal w ith th e is s u e s w h ere T ype I and h en ce Type II,
a r e unobtainable, and w h ere T yp es III and IV are alone the
p r a c tic a b le o n e s? T h ese w ill be shunned by the pure
p h ilo so p h ica l m o r a lis t a s tain ted by s c ie n c e , and by the pure
s c ie n tis t a s tain ted by m o r a lity . Y et th ey m a y be is s u e s that are
not beyond so lu tio n . The p e c u lia r ly ev a lu a tiv e a sp e c ts of e th ics
are not exh au sted by an effo rt to e s ta b lis h com m on en d s, h ow ever
co n so lin g it m ay be to the "pure" p h ilo so p h er to b e lie v e to the
c o n tra ry . (E th ic s, p. 185)
In th is m an n er, S tev en so n r e je c ts A ssu m p tio n 1 of the
" s p e c ia lis t ap p roach ." A ssu m p tio n l - - t h e a ssu m p tio n that a g r e e
m en t in in tr in sic v a lu e is p resu p p o sed by any other type of e th ica l
a g r e e m e n t--ig n o r e s e th ic a l situ a tio n s of ty p e s III and IV, and in so
doing le a v e s im p ortan t gaps in v a lu e th eo ry .
He now tu rn s to A ssu m p tio n 2 - -t h e a ssu m p tio n that a g r e e
m en t in in tr in sic v a lu e d o e s not it s e lf p r e su p p o se any oth er type of
e th ica l a g r e e m e n t. He r e je c ts th is a ssu m p tio n , appealing to
p sy c h o lo g ic a l la w s: that w h ich is often fa v o re d at f ir s t a s a m ea n s,
m ay, in tim e , b eco m e fa v o red a s an end. T h is situ a tio n o c c u r s b e
c a u se in tr in sic a ttitu d es a r e le a r n e d and b eco m e fix ed through habit.
S tev en so n ap p eals to com m on s e n s e e x a m p le s a s w e ll a s to in tr o -
sp ectio n and p sych ology to support his contention. An exam ple
illu stra tin g th is p sy ch o lo g ica l p rin cip le is the fa ct that an individual
who stu d ies, sa y , m ath em atics as a m ean s to ch em ica l r e se a r c h ,
I
m ay, in tim e, value m ath em atics as an e n d -in -itse lf. Such o c
cu rren ces illu str a te the fa ct that th ere a re agreem en ts in in trin sic
value w hich p resu p p ose oth er typ es of eth ica l agreem en t. This
!
j con clu sion , how ever, con trad icts A ssu m ption 2.
j
Steven son b e lie v e s, by r e je c tin g A ssu m ption 2 as w e ll as
A ssu m p tion 1, that he has repudiated the " sp e c ia list conception" of
j
value th eory. A ccord in g to him , how ever, there are additional
I rea so n s for elim in atin g this m ethod. They cen ter around the r e -
i lation sh ip of m eans and ends; for im p lic it in th^ underlying reason in g
of the " sp e c ia list conception" is the assum p tion that one m ay
sep a ra te m ean s and en d s. The s p e c ia lis t would iso la te in tr in sic
i
value (as the p h ilosop h er's problem ) fro m e x tr in sic value (as a
sc ie n tific su b ject). Such an attem pt, accord in g to Stevenson, is un
w arranted.
S teven son 's p reviou s argum ents offer a clue to h is lin e of
rea so n in g on th is issu e ; for he m aintains that what is favored at fir s t
a s a m eans m ay even tu ally b eco m e favored as an end. A sp e c ia l
I
i
! c a se of th is situ ation is the o ccu rren ce of ends and m eans at the
i
! sa m e tim e . To r e fe r again to the illu stra tio n of som eon e studying
155
m a th e m a tic s, a lter in g it slig h tly , w e find that one w ho stu d ies
m a th e m a tic s a s a m ea n s to c h e m ic a l r e s e a r c h , m a y , at the sa m e
tim e , v a lu e m a th e m a tic s a s an e n d - in - it s e lf . He c a lls th is a c a s e
o f ’’r e in fo r c e m e n t. ” j
In g en era l, r ein fo r c e m e n t o c c u r s sim p ly w hen the sa m e !
m an ap p ro v es of som eth in g both a s an end in it s e lf and a s a
m ea n s to so m e fu rth er end. . . (E th ic s , p. 188)
A gain, S tev en so n su pp orts th is id e a w ith c o m m o n -se n s e e x
p e r ie n c e . F or ex a m p le, one m a y go w alk in g (a s a m e a n s) for the
sake of h ealth (a s an end). In su ch situ a tio n s m ea n s and ends b e
co m e so in tr ic a te that it i s im p o ss ib le to untangle th em . In addition,
any attem p t to sep a ra te m ea n s and ends le a d s to other c o m p lic a tio n s. '
A ccord in g to the r e in fo r c e m e n t p r in c ip le , w h a tev er is f ir s t fa v o re d
a s an end m ay, in tim e , b eco m e a m e a n s. When one c o n sid e r s that
any num ber of m ea n s m a y su p p lem en t a g iv en end, th is situ a tio n b e
c o m e s e x c e e d in g ly c o m p lex . In lig h t of th is situ ation , the " s p e c ia lis t1
app roach” b e c o m e s a fu tile one: in co n cen tra tin g upon m ea n s and
ends a s sep a ra te e n titie s , th is m eth od o v e rlo o k s th eir n e c e s s a r ily
| in tr ic a te r e la tio n sh ip s.
i
In su m m a ry , then, S tev en so n r e j e c t s th e " s p e c ia lis t
ap p roach” b e c a u se , sin c e it i s b a sed upon fa ls e a ssu m p tio n s, it
m a k e s an un w arranted sep a ra tio n of m ea n s and en d s and, in so doing,
e r r o n e o u sly c o m p a r tm e n ta liz e s v a lu e th e o ry and e th ic s .
156 ;
S tev en so n 's a n a ly sis h ere has certa in m e r its w hich m u st not
be p erm itted , h ow ever, to o b scu re a fundam entally m islea d in g and
erro n eo u s co n clu sio n . One such contribution of h is d isc u ssio n co n
c er n s the r e la tiv ity of m ean s and ends. H is con clu sion , of co u rse, j
is not new . D ew ey, for exam p le, long ago pointed out that to attem pt !
to fix m ea n s and ends m ay r esu lt in ruinous co n seq u en ces. He an ti- |
cipated S teven son , fu rth erm ore, by in sistin g that, in order to avoid
th is e r r o r , one m u st con stan tly reco g n ize the rela tiv ity of m ean s and
ends. N o n eth eless, in sp ite of its lack of o rig in a lity , S teven son 's
a n a ly sis on th is point i s u sefu l and sign ifican t.
U nfortunately for h is p o sitio n s, how ever, the r ela tiv ity of
the m ea n s-e n d rela tio n sh ip and its ap p licab ility of rein fo rcem en t to
value th eory do not constitute a repudiation of the m ea n s-en d r e la tio n
ship. Q uite to the con trary, S tev en so n 's a n a ly sis actu ally p resu p
p o se s it. T his supp osition o c cu rs, for in stan ce, when he r e fe r s to j
the rein fo rcem en t p rin cip le. A ctually, th is c o n c e p t--to w hich he
I
j
app eals in order to d isc r e d it the m ea n s-e n d s r ela tio n sh ip --w o u ld it - !
i
; s e lf b ecom e m ea n in g less in the ab sen ce of a m ea n s-e n d dichotom y;
; i
| for m ean s and ends are its k ey te r m s . S tev en so n 's appeal to r e
in forcem en t in ord er to repudiate m ea n s-e n d s is , then, c le a r ly in
v a lid , b eca u se th is p rin cip le p resu p p o ses the v e r y relation sh ip w hich
S teven son w ould d isc r e d it.
But th is is not the only p aradoxical im p lica tio n of
157
S tev en so n fs appeal to rein fo r ce m en t. A ctu ally, d e sp ite h is c la im
to the con trary, rein fo rcem en t in c r e a s e s the u s e fu ln e s s of the
i
m e a n s-e n d s d istin ction ; fo r, once the individual u n d erstand s it, the
r ein fo r ce m en t p rin cip le can now be u sed a s a d e v ic e for in tegratin g
j
v a lu e s w ithin th e P e r r y -P a r k e r -L e w is fram ew ork .
A nother w ay in w h ich S teven son stren gth en s the u tility of
the m e a n s-e n d rela tio n sh ip is that, by r eco g n izin g its r e la tiv ity , he
d e te c ts a genuine n eed for p erio d ica l r ea p p r a isa ls of both m ea n s and
ends; fo r, a s he h elp fu lly in d ic a tes, it is sh eer fo lly to attem pt to fix
m ea n s w ithout co n sid erin g end s, or ends w ithout reg a rd to m ea n s.
F in a lly , S teven son stren gth en s the u se fu ln e ss of the m e a n s-
ends r ela tio n sh ip by bringing to ligh t, through the r ein fo rcem en t
p r in cip le, the fa ct that m ea n s and ends m u st be rein te rp re ted from
tim e to tim e in ord er to m ake su re that rein fo rcem en t fa c to r s have
not a lter ed the o rig in a l r e la tio n sh ip s.
A ll th e se p oin ts, then, in stea d of repudiating the m e a n s-e n d s
d istin ctio n , a ctu a lly p resu p p o se, support, and ev en extend its u s e
fu ln e ss --a n d do so d esp ite S tev en so n 's intention. A s a co n seq u en ce, i
the other p h ilo so p h ers can lo g ic a lly r ec o g n iz e the r e la tiv ity of
m ea n s and ends w ithout in any w a y w eakening th eir p o sitio n s. A s
a m a tter of fa ct, h ow ever, th is d o es o ccu r, b e c a u se the other th ree
p h ilo so p h ers an ticip ate S tev en so n on the r e la tiv ity of m ea n s and
en d s. P a rk er and P e r r y , for exam p le, e x p lic itly w arn that m ea n s
158
and ends a r e n ot o n ly r e la tiv e t e r m s , but that th e y a r e a lso in tr ic a te
ly r e la te d to the in d iv id u a l's a b ilitie s . F o r P a r k e r th is fo llo w s fr o m
the atta in m en t p r in c ip le , a c co rd in g to w h ich m ea n s and en d s, fa r
fr o m b ein g fix e d , m u st b e c o n sta n tly r e a p p r a ise d in te r m s of the
i
p e r s o n 's p o te n tia litie s . P e r r y , to o , as p r e v io u s ly in d ica ted ,
c o m e s to m u ch the sa m e c o n c lu sio n in h is a n a ly sis of the c o r r e c t
n e s s stan d ard ; fo r h e m a in ta in s that u n r e a lis tic r e la tio n sh ip s b e
tw een m ea n s and ends can , and often do, lea d to in d iffe r e n c e and to
apathy.
S te v e n so n 's relativity of the m e a n s-e n d s r e la tio n sh ip can ,
th e r e fo r e , be su b su m ed under the P e r r y -P a r k e r -L e w is th e o r ie s .
S in ce th is im p lic a tio n is the d ir e c t o p p o site of S te v en so n 's in ten tio n ,
h is a n a ly s is f a ils in its a im to d is c r e d it the m e a n s-e n d d istin c tio n .
S te v e n so n 's o th er d is c u s s io n c o n cern in g th e im p o s s ib ility of
se p a r a tin g v a lu e th e o r y and e th ics fa r e s no b e tter ; fo r h e r e a lso h is
a n a ly s is is a c tu a lly co m p a tib le w ith the tra d itio n a l p oin t of v ie w
: r e p r e se n te d b y P e r r y , P a r k e r and L e w is , The r e a so n fo r th is fa c t
|m a y p erh a p s again be attrib u ted to the b a sic o r ie n ta tio n of th e s e
ip h ilo so p h e r s; w h er ea s P e r r y , P a r k e r , and L e w is , on th eir p a rt,
; s ta r t b y a n a ly zin g 'good' and then attem p t to d is c o v e r its r e la tio n
s h i p to the 'r ig h t, ' S te v en so n is co n cern ed w ith a d iffe re n t q u e stio n .
I
H is p r o b le m is the n a tu re of c o n flic ts am ong in d iv id u a ls, and the
159
extent to which th ese con flicts can be reso lv ed .
This d ifferen ce of orientation is reflected in Stevenson's
a n alysis of the four types of eth ical disagreem en t. It is only for
th ose types in which conflict betw een individuals is an e sse n tia l
j part that Stevenson parts company with P erry , P ark er, and L ew is.
|
j As for types I and II, Stevenson is in com p lete agreem ent with the
j other ph ilosophers because in th ese c a se s the orientation is the
sa m e . The problem here is not one involving con flicts betw een
i
| individuals but, rather, a n a n a ly sis of the way in which m eans and
I
i
| ends are related .
That no conflict is involved in c a se s I and II becom es
apparent when one con sid ers that any p o ssib le allu sion to con flict
can be avoided in both types by tran slatin g them into illu stra tio n s
w here con flict becom es im p o ssib le. This tran sition is e a sily a c
com p lished for Type I, origin ally diagram ed as follow s:
TYPE I
X
A B
Since in this ca se A and B agree in attitude, the fact that
th e re are two in d ivid u als, A and B , is not relev a n t to the m e a n s-
end situation - Type I m ay th erefo re be a lte r e d a s fo llo w s to b eco m e
Type I' :
TYPE I1
X
A
Both Type I and Type I1 now illu str a te the sam e fact:
C ertain thin gs (X) can se r v e a s e n d s -in -th e m s e lv e s w ithout any a t
tending co n seq u en ces of( X); and sin ce only one individual is in volved
in Type I1 , a ll p o ssib le co n flict b etw een p eop le is elim in a ted .
A sim ila r a n a ly sis a lte r s Type II to Type II1 :
TYPE II
TY PE II1
X
Y
»
I
*
(
i
1
t
A
The sp e c ific fa ct, illu str a te d in Type 11, that A and B
a g ree in attitude tow ard a Y w hich can be a m ea n s to X can be
subsum ed under the m ore g en era l statem en t in Type II1, that c e r
tain th in gs (Y) can be a m ea n s to other thin gs (X).
In both Type I and Type II, then, a ll r e fe r e n c e s to co n flict
b etw een ind ivid u als can be elim in a ted by m ea n s of sim p le tr a n s la
tio n s into other situ ation s; and sin c e the p rob lem d o es th e r e fo r e not
co n cern co n flict but p erta in s to an a n a ly sis of the r ela tio n sh ip b e
tw een m ea n s and ends, S teven son m u st a g r e e that in c a s e s I and
II m ea n s and ends can be d istin g u ish ed . T h is he grudgin gly a d m its, i
at le a s t im p lic itly , w hen he says:
The pure p h ilosop h er, lim itin g h is jud gm en ts to end s, w ill
se c u r e only a g reem en t of Type I, to the lim ite d exten t that that J
is p o ssib le ; and should he turn h is e sta b lish e d ends over to the
pure sc ie n tis t, who is to d isc o v e r the m ea n s of obtaining th em ,
th is w ill lead , in d ir e c tly to a g reem en t of Type E L . (E th ic s, p. 185!).
But is not th is, after a ll, the con clu sion arrived at by the
i
|
other three ph ilosop h ers, who, instead of phrasing the problem as
!
one of co n flicts, take the different approach of analyzing 'good' and
its relation sh ip to 'ought1 and 'righ t'? In other w ords, w h erever
I '
! Stevenson's orientation can be brought into line with the view s of
i
i
the other philosophers by elim in ating the problem of con flict b e
tw een individuals, the con clu sion s, as S teven son 's ad m ission in
d ica tes, are much the sa m e. Up to this point, then, and concerning
Types I and II , a ll four philosophers are in su b stan tial a g r e e
m ent.
In types III and IV , how ever, Stevenson's p osition differs
from that of the other p h ilosop h ers. But the reason for this fact is ,
not that Stevenson has pushed the a n a ly sis of m eans and ends b e
yond the situations covered by types I and II , but, rather, that
with types III and IV , he has sh ifted the a n a ly sis of the r ela tio n
ship of m eans and ends to the quite different problem of determ ining
why co n flicts betw een individuals cannot alw ays be reduced to dis -
agreem en ts in m eans or ends. If this contention is c o rr ec t, then
types I and n are fundam entally different from types III and IV.
The burden, th erefo re, becom es one of illu stra tin g this d ifferen ce.
I
The d iscrep an cy betw een types I and n , on the one hand,
and types HI and IV , on the other, o ccu rs, as has been suggested.
163
b ecau se e th ica l co n flic ts can be elim in a ted in the f ir s t tw o c a s e s
i
I w h erea s they cannot be elim in a ted in typ es III and IV . Indeed,
co n flict is an e s s e n tia l elem en t in both types III and IV . T his
co n flict is c le a r ly apparent in Type III :
TY PE i n
It is true that A and B both a g ree that, for each of them ,
h is own su rv iv a l is good; but S teven son 's p h rasin g is m islea d in g .
A ctu ally, Type III is not a c a s e of a g reem en t on ends b e c a u se the
su r v iv a l of ea ch is c le a r ly a sep a ra te end. In fact, Type III can
be ch a r a cter ize d , in g e n e ra l, as an an sw er to the q u estion of how
co n flicts involving se p a r a te aim s can be r e so lv e d .
S im ila r ly , Type IV is a lso a p rob lem involving c o n flic ts
j betw een individuals:
164
TYPE IV
H ere the p ro b lem o c cu rs b e c a u se (Y) and (Z ) r e p r e se n t d if
fe r e n t ends; and w h erev er d ifferen t ends in v o lv e lim ite d m ea n s, as
in th is c a s e , th ere e x is ts a p oten tial so u r c e of d isa g re em e n t.
T ypes HI and IV thus d iffer fr o m typ es I and II by in
clu d in g an e le m e n t of c o n flic t.
It sh ould be noted h ere, in cid en ta lly , that, in h is attem p t to
d is c r e d it the d istin ctio n b etw een m ean s and ends in c a s e s III and
IV, S teven son has again a ssu m e d the v e r y d istin ctio n w hich he would
rep u d ia te. In any ev en t, he is able to m ain tain a rem ark ab le ad ep t-
n e s s fo r d istin g u ish in g m ea n s fr o m ends throughout an a n a ly sis
w h ich w ould d is c r e d it su ch a d istin ctio n . H ow ever, S teven son ,
r a th e r than rep u d iatin g the m ean s -en d rela tio n sh ip , has m e r e ly
sh ifte d the a n a ly s is of that r ela tio n sh ip to th e qu ite d ifferen t p rob lem
of d ecid in g why c o n flic ts b etw een in d ivid u als cannot alw ays be
red u ced to d isa g r e e m e n ts in m ean s or in en d s.
165
Steven son thus fa ils in his attem pt to d iscr ed it the m ea n s-
end relation sh ip ; and sin c e his assu m ed d isproof is the erron eou s
b a sis for his repudiation of a sep aration o f value theory and e th ic s,
it fo llo w s that h is w hole p o sitio n on the im p o ssib ility of sep aratin g
j valu e theory and eth ics is untenable. A ll of S teven son 's argu m en ts,
I
j
th erefo re, cannot underm ine the secon d assum p tion underlying the
|
| use of the prudential ou gh t--th e assu m p tion , nam ely, that value and
eth ics can be sep a ra ted . And s o w e m ay rea ffirm that the secon d
assu m p tion underlying the use of the prudential ought is ju stified
and that value and eth ics can be sep a ra ted .
3. The Third Im p licit A ssu m ption in the
M eaning of the P ru dential Ought
The third assu m p tion im p licit in the usage of the prudential
ought is that valu es can be organ ized into a com p reh en sive w hole.
T h is, of c o u r se, is sim ila r to th e fir s t assu m p tion con cern in g the
ranking of valu e, but it d iffers fro m the la tter by being m ore
g en era l. Indeed, su ch is its g en era lity that it p resu p p oses a m ean
ing of h ap p in ess, e n c o m p a sses a life plan, and in volves the nature
of the s e lf . In other w ords, the third a ssu m p tio n —that v alu es can
be organ ized into a com p reh en sive w h ole—follow s from the fa ct
that the s e lf, as a valuing agent, se e k s hap pin ess by com m itting
166
its e lf to a life plan.
The fir s t task in analyzing th is com p lex situation is to
d efine the p erson as a valuing agent. T his problem , of c o u r se ,
r a is e s m any m eta p h y sica l q u estion s. But, for our im m ed iate
purpose, P ark er h elpfu lly d istin g u ish es the 'focal s e l f from the
‘m a trix se lf. 1 By 'focal se lf, ' P ark er m ea n s, "The total ongoing
p u lse of ex p erien ce, w hich is alw ays cen tered in so m e d e s ir e or
appetition, som e a ctiv ity or p a ssiv ity seek in g assuagem ent"
(P hilosoph y, p. 125). P ark er accep ts th is Humean d efin ition of the
se lf b eca u se ex p erien ce does r e fle c t a s e r ie s of such a c tiv itie s .
But such a definition is not com p lete. M ore is needed to unify the
v a rio u s e x p e rien ce s and to give m eaning to p erso n a l id entity. T his
m ore in c lu siv e se lf P ark er c a lls the 'm atrix se lf. ‘ S in ce it is a
unifying elem en t as w e ll as the b a sis of p erson al id en tity, the
'm a trix self' is com p lex. P ark er id en tifies it - - a t le a s t as an
ap p roxim ation --w ith A r isto tle 's 'e sse n c e ' or w ith R o y ce's 'life
plan. ' The m a trix se lf, accord in gly, is the m ore sign ifican t
d efin ition of the s e lf b eca u se it u n ifies and, at the sam e tim e,
e m p irica lly tran scen d s the fo ca l self.
The m a trix s e lf is rep resen ta tiv e of the su bject a s a valuing
agent. Since th is ter m is com p lex, P ark er d istin g u ish es--a lth o u g h
he h a sten s to add that they cannot be sep arated - -th e in tellectu a l
167
fro m the v o litio n a l com ponent. The fo r m e r P a rk er c o n sid e r s the
I
su b je ct’s con cep tu al orien tation . It can be divided into fou r e l e
m en ts: The f ir s t of th e se , the sp a tia l, he co m p a res to a map in
w hich th e "here" is cen tra l for a ll p e r so n s. The "there" is
rep re sen ted by the nam es of the other p o sitio n s. Such a sp a tia l
orien tation p erm its one to m ove about w ithout con fu sion . The
seco n d e le m en t of con cep tu al o r ie n ta tio n --c o r r e sp o n d in g to the
"here" of th e sp a tia l e le m e n t--is the "now" of the p e r so n 's on ru sh -
|
I ing a c tiv ity . But it is apparent from P a r k e r 's d is c u ssio n of the
| m atrix s e lf that su ch a tem p o ra l id en tifica tio n is not com p lete: the
unity and p e r so n a l identity of the m atrix s e lf r eq u ire s that the p e r
so n 's a c tiv ity en com p ass the p a st and the future a s w e ll as the
: p r e se n t. T h ese e le m e n ts --s im ila r to the "there" in sp a tia l
o r ie n ta tio n --c o n sis t of rem em b ered and an ticip ated e v e n ts . T hus,
r
the p e r so n 's tem p oral orien tation sta r ts w ith the "now" of e x p e r
ie n c e s and extends to the "has been" o f the p a st (through m em ory)
and to th e "to be" of the future (through a n ticip a tio n ). The tem p o ra l
a sp e c t of the s e lf is a part of the m atrix s e lf b e c a u se , w ithout it,
the individual could do no planning. The th ird a sp e c t of the c o n -
I
| cep tu al orien tation is the p sy ch o so m a tic elem en t. The c e n te r of
i
I
th is is "m e" and is vagu ely id en tified w ith the p e r so n 's body or its
! p a r ts. The p sy ch o so m a tic e le m en t is s im ila r to th e sp a tia l c o m -
168
ponent of o rien ta tio n but d iffe r s in te r m s of b o d ily c o n tr o l. "T he |
i
p sy c h o so m a tic m ap en a b le s u s to find our w ay about in space"
I
(P h ilo so p h y , p. 128). The lim its a r e d eterm in ed by l o s s of co n tro l.
F in a lly , a s a fourth com p onent of con cep tu al o rien ta tio n , the so c ia l j
|
e le m e n t a ls o h as h a s its cen ter the " m e1 * of e x p e r ie n c e . D is tin
g u ish ed fro m "m e" is the grid r e p r e se n tin g " th ey ." The la tte r
j
in c lu d e s fa m ily r e la tio n sh ip s, fr ie n d sh ip s, and other p h a se s of
i
s o c ia l r e la tio n sh ip s.
T h ese four com p on en ts of con cep tu al o r ie n ta tio n --th e
sp a tia l, the tem p o ra l, the p sy c h o so m a tic , the s o c ia l- - a ll c en ter upon
the " h ere-n ow " e x p e r ie n c e of the p e r so n and g ra v ita te out to e n c o m
p a ss th e m o re r em o te e x p e r ie n c e s of the s e lf . But th e se four c o m
p on en ts of con cep tu al o rien ta tio n a r e not se p a r a te . F o r ex a m p le,
the tem p o ra l r e fe r e n c e of 1950 can be b e fo re w e w e r e m a r r ie d or
w hen 1 w a s s in g le . And th is sa m e tem p o ra l o rien ta tio n , of c o u r se ,
can be fra m ed in sp a tia l, p sy c h o so m a tic , or so c ia l te r m s . The
com p on en ts of con cep tu al orien tation , then, w h ile th ey are d efin ite
!
I c o n c ep ts of in te lle c tu a l o rien ta tio n , a r e , n o n e th e le ss, fu n ctio n a lly
i
r e la tiv e . S till, a s P a rk er in d ic a te s, the o r ie n ta tio n of the s e lf
o c c u r s upon a con cep tu al le v e l.
But th e r e i s m o r e to the m a tr ix s e lf than m e r e con cep tu al
o rien ta tio n . A ctu a lly , the in te lle c tu a l e le m e n ts a r e m e r e ly the
169 |
m ean s w hereby certa in m ovem en ts can be follow ed to ach ieve som e s
j
i d e s ir e . Thus, in addition to the conceptual orientation, the m atrix i
! i
: j
' se lf req u ires a volition al com ponent through w hich the ob jects of !
j
the in tellectu a l grid m ay be acted upon: "The m atrix se lf is thus
seen to be e sse n tia lly a plan of action e x p r e ssiv e of fundam ental j
: I
d e sir e s" (P ark er, p. 129)- Or, "It is a selecto r of p o ssib le
in te r e sts and a cts, initiating and cultivating som e and forbidding
oth ers according as they do or do not further it" (p. 129).
W hile th ese statem en ts appear to lim it the m atrix se lf to
d e s ir e s , the se lf, n o n eth eless, can ach ieve a certain independence
of som e d e sir e s; for the m atrix se lf is the life plan; and such a con
ception of the s e lf req u ires that at le a s t som e of the com peting
! d e s ir e s be subordinated to oth ers. The m atrix self, th erefore,
I
cannot be understood a s a se lec to r of d e s ir e s without consid erin g
the m anner in w hich the ch oice is m ade.
P er ry inadvertently contributes to P a rk er’s d iscu ssio n h ere
by m aintaining that the s e lf m ak es ch o ices in order to avoid co n flicts
! of in te r e st. P erso n a l integration, in P e r r y 's u se of the term , there-;
| fo re, m ean s harm ony w ithin the individual; and th is harm ony, for
!
P er ry , rep re sen ts the p erso n a lity of the individual:
. . . each intent of a given p erson is a function of h is other
I in te r e sts. T his equilibrium of in te r e sts, such that each is a
170
m odifying condition of the e x e r c is e of the r e s t, and such that a
change anyw here in d u ces co m p en sa to ry ch an ges throughout, is ,
in fa ct, what w e have m ean t by p e r so n a lity . (G en eral, p. 570)
The aim of the individu al in develop in g th is in teg ra tio n is to
p erm it h im se lf "... to do w ith an e a sy m ind or a w h ole h eart each
thing that he is independently d isp o se d to do" (G en era l, p. 580).
Nothing h e r e i s new; fo r, at such a le v e l of in te r e s t o r ie n ta
tion , the individual can apply the c r ite r ia p r e v io u sly d is c u s s e d w ith
the aim of attaining m axim um in te r e s ts . But the harm ony of a
w e ll-in te g r a te d ind ividu al, accord in g to P e r r y , m u st not happen by
chance; to be e ffe c tiv e it m u st be guaranteed. T his r a is e s the
p rob lem of ap p lication . G ranted that c r ite r ia of in te r e s ts m a y be
u sed to in d icate w h ere the m axim um in te r e st w ould occu r, th ere
s t ill rem a in s the p rob lem of how the individual can in teg ra te th e se
in te r e s ts into a harm on iou s p e r so n a lity . Such an in teg ra tio n m ay
be brought about through tw o m od es of m ed iation : (1) in te r e st
m ed ia ted by another in te r e st, and (2) in te r e st m ed ia ted by in te r e s t-
ju d gm en ts (w hereby lo v e or b en ev o len ce a re o p era tiv e).
The f ir s t m eth od for the in teg ra tio n of in te r e s ts is for one
in te r e s t to m ed ia te another in te r e s t. T h is in v o lv es su bordination
of the co n flictin g in te r e s t. The subordination m ay be of tw o typ es:
p o sitiv e or n e g a tiv e . In the p o sitiv e typ e, the subordinate in te r e s t
171
|
is p erm itted to e x ist because it furthers the u lterio r in terest. As
an exam p le, the subordinate p ositive in te re st, say, in arrivin g at
Chicago from New York would be fo ste re d by the u lterio r in te re st
of eventually reaching L os A n g eles. Thus, the e x isten ce of the
j p o sitiv e subordinate in terest (arrivin g in Chicago) e x ists b ecau se it
i
p r o m ise s fu lfillm en t of the u lterior in te re st (getting to L os A n geles).
] On the other hand, in the secon d type of su bord in ation --n egative
| su b ord in ation --th e subordinate in terest e x ists independently of the
j
! u lterio r in te r e st and occu rs only if it does not threaten the la tter .
j
j If a con flict occu rs betw een the negative subordinated in terest and
the u lterior in terest, the negative subordinated in te re st w ill be
i cen so red . Thus, in the sam e exam ple, the individual m ay be
; in terested in arrivin g in C hicago quite independently of its being a
I step in reaching the u lterior in te re st of Los A n geles. But in this
; c a se , sin ce C hicago is a negative subordinate in te re st, going there
would be checked if it threatened the u lterior in te r e st of L os A ngeles
(as when, sa y , storm s in C hicago might prevent the individual from
continuing to L os A n geles).
T here are, then, two m ethods by w hich one in te r e st m ed iates
j another in te re st. One approach is through p o sitiv e subordination;
i
| th e other is by negative subordination. But in each c a se , harm ony
j
j r e su lts b ecau se con flict c e a se s w here one in terest is subordinated
172
to anoth er. In tegration is a ch iev ed by one d e s ir e ab sorb in g the
co n flictin g d e s ir e . In th is m an n er, in tegration of in te r e s ts can
o ccu r w h en ever one in te r e s t m ediates another in te r e s t.
A nother w ay in w hich one m a y attain an in teg ra tio n of
in te r e sts is through the m ed iation of in te r e s t ju d gm en ts. T his is
m o re in te llec tu a l and se lf-r e g u la tin g than the p r o c e s s of m ed iatin g
one in te r e s t w ith anoth er, as d e sc r ib e d ab ove. In th is new approach,
the individual in te lle c tu a lly p a s s e s h is in te r e s ts in r ev iew in o rd er
to d eterm in e what th ey a r e . O nce he knows th is, h e m ay attain
p er so n a l harm ony through se lf-r e g u la tio n .
This m ethod of in teg ra tin g in te r e sts is b a sed upon s e lf-lo v e .
S e lf-lo v e , h ow ever, is not the sa m e as s e lfis h n e s s . S e lf-lo v e r e p
r e se n ts a p o sitiv e in te r e s t in o n e se lf. S e lfis h n e s s , in c o n tr a d istin c
tio n , b eing a la ck of in te r e st in o th e r s, is a n eg a tiv e q u ality. S e lf-
love and a ltr u ism , th e r e fo r e , a r e not m u tu ally e x c lu s iv e .
F o r P e r r y , s e lf-lo v e as a p o sitiv e in te r e s t--a n d th is is the
im portant point h e r e --im p lie s a c ir c u m sp e c t s e lf-r e g u la tio n of the
in d iv id u a l.
. . .s e l f lo v e , in. . .a co m p lete s e n s e , m a y m ean the e m e rg e n c e
w ithin a s e lf of an in te r e st w hich p a s s e s in r e v ie w the en tire
a g g reg a te of the s e lf 's in te r e sts and tak es su ch m e a su r e s as
m ay in su r e th eir join t s u c c e s s . (G en era l, p. 666)
Through th is p r o c e s s , s e lf-lo v e p ro m o tes an in teg ra tio n of in te r e s ts
b eca u se
173
. . .w h er e such an in te r e st b e c o m e s a dom inant in te r e st it
even tu ally e lim in a te s co n flict, sin c e each in te r e s t is then
subordinated to a ll in te r e s ts , or c e a s e s to a s s e r t it s e lf at
the point w h ere it v io la te s another* (G en era l, p. 666)
In both m o d es of p erso n a l in te g ra tio n --w h en in te r e st is
m ed ia ted by another in te r e st, and w hen in te r e st i s m ed iated by
in te r e s t ju d g m en ts--h a rm o n y m ay be a ch iev ed through subordination
of so m e in te r e s ts to oth ers; and th is p r o c e s s d efin es the in d iv id u a l's
p erso n a lity :
The o rg a n ism of a harm onious p e r so n a lity m ay be said to
defin e a sy s te m of o b jects w hich a r e b etter than the aggregate
of the o b jects of the co n flictin g in te r e s ts w hich it su p ersed ed ,
sin ce the fo rm er enjoy the favor of a ll the g iv en group of in
t e r e s t s , w h erea s the la tter a re fa v o red only by a fra ctio n of
th is group. It a lso d efin es a sy ste m of o b jects w h ich a r e c o m
m en su ra b le one w ith another in r e sp e c t both of p r e fe re n c e and
in c lu s iv e n e s s . (G en era l, p. 668)
In e sta b lish in g th is sy ste m of in te r e s ts , the individual m u st
u se c r ite r ia in ord er to d eterm in e what h is in te r e s ts a ctu a lly a re.
T h ese c r ite r ia , th e r e fo r e , help him to attain an in teg ra ted p e r so n
a lity .
P e r r y h as exp lain ed h ere only how in tern a l c o n flict m ay be
avoided. U nfortunately, h ow ever, the in d iv id u a l's in te r e s ts , w h ile
in te rn a lly h arm on iou s, m ay co n flict w ith the in te r e s ts of other
p eo p le. T his r a is e s the p rob lem of in tegratin g the in te r e s ts of one
individual w ith the in te r e s ts of o th e rs. The d ifficu lty h ere is that
the p rin cip le of subordination, by w hich individu al c o n flic ts are
174
in te g r a te d , d oes not app ly to th e in te r e s ts of d ifferen t p e o p le . What
is r eq u ired is a m ean s of m ed ia tin g in te r e s ts by in te r e s t jud gm en ts
s o that in te r e s ts of d iffe re n t in d iv id u a ls and of s o c ie tie s can be
brough t into h arm on y.
P e r r y fin d s su ch a p r in c ip le b y extending h is con cep t of
s e lf - lo v e . At the le v e l of s o c ie ty , s e lf -lo v e turns into w hat is
eq u iv a len t to the com m on u sa g e of th e te r m s lo v e or b e n e v o len ce .
What w e n eed is a p e r so n a l in teg ra tio n that sh a ll be
s o c ia lly q u a lified , or th at sh a ll gu aran tee a h arm on iou s fu l
fillm e n t o f a ll in t e r e s t s . (G en era l, p . 676)
A t the s o c ia l le v e l, th e r e fo r e , lo v e o r b en ev o len ce r eq u ire s
a su b ord in ation of the in te r e s ts of th e s e lf to th e to ta l in te r e st:
The o n ly w a y in w h ich s e lf - in t e r e s t and s o c ia l in te r e s t can
b e m ad e to a g r e e in p r in c ip le , or n e c e s s a r ily , is to su b su m e
the in te r e s ts of the s e lf under an in te r e s t in s o c ie ty . (G en eral,
p . 680)
T h is, of c o u r s e , r e q u ir e s c o o p era tio n am ong p e o p le . In
ste a d o f an o v e r -r u lin g m a jo r ity , it p r e su p p o ses the c o n sen t o f the
m in o r ity .
In te r m s of the in d iv id u a l, P e r r y , th e r e fo r e , am ends K ant's
c a te g o r ic a l im p e r a tiv e to rea d as fo llo w s: "C u ltivate that kind of
w ill that is q u a lified to b rin g h arm on y through its u n iv e r sa l adop
tion" (G en era l, p . 6 8 2 ).
175
A w ill m eetin g th is req u irem en t w ill be fir s t of a ll a
benevolen t w ill; and beyond that a c o n cilia to ry w ill, d isp o sed
by ex p erien ce and d isc u ssio n to the adoption of a com m on plan.
(G en era l, p. 682)
Thus, the aim , on the so c ia l le v e l, by analogy, is the sam e
a s on the individual plane: the m axim ation of in te r e st through an
in tegration of con flictin g in te r e sts. T his con clu sion , in cid en tally,
fo llo w s from the c r ite r io n of in c lu siv e n e ss.
Such a p rin cip le of individual and so c ia l integration , P er ry
ad m its, r e p r e se n ts an id ea l. It is p o ssib le that the id ea l has never
been rea lized ; perhaps it n ever w ill be. But th is fa ct need not
d im in ish its value a s an idea; for unattainability is a c h a r a c te r istic
of any id eal.
A s in d icated a m om ent ago, the p rin cip le of b en evolen ce is
not a m e r e stipu lation but follow s from P e r r y 's d efinition of value
by the in c lu siv e n e ss c r ite r io n , the u ltim ate aim being a m axim um
r ea liz a tio n of in te r e st. The im portant point is , how ever, that,
accord in g to P e r r y , th is approach tow ard m axim izin g in te r e sts can
i be ach ieved through p erso n a l and so c ia l in tegration by the com bined
j
fo r c e s of reason , lo v e , and benevolen ce; and that for P er ry , th is
statu s of p erson al and so c ia l in tegration r e p r e se n ts the h igh est form
of h ap p in ess. P e r r y 's view of the w ay in w hich the s e lf in teg ra tes
I
con flictin g in te r e sts in order to ach ieve h ap p in ess thus supports the
| third assu m p tion of the prudential ought, according to w hich v a lu es
176
can be o rg a n ized into a co m p reh en siv e w h ole.
P a rk er su g g e s ts sim ila r m ethods by w h ich tha harm ony of
v a lu es can b e ach ieved ; fo r, a cco rd in g to him , the s e lf, u sing
harm ony as a standard, in te g ra te s com peting d e sir e s by e ith e r a
n egative or a p o sitiv e m e a n s. In the n egative approach to harm ony,
th ere are s e v e r a l m ethods by w h ich the s e lf su b ord in ates c erta in
d e s ir e s to o th e rs. P a rk er su g g e sts the follow ing: a. ren unciation
of one of the com p etin g d e sir e s (th is is perhaps the m o st d r a stic
m ethod); b. su b stitu tio n (in which a new d e sir e is found fo r an old
one, a s , fo r exam p le, the su b stitu tion of g o lf for tennis);
c . su b lim a tio n (su b stitu tio n of higher for low er v a lu es); d. c o m
p r o m ise ("half a loaf is b etter than none"); and e. in tegration
(in w hich so m e new in te r e st e v o lv e s from the coop eration of tw o
d e s ir e s , a s , for exam p le, when an id e a list ph ilosoph y s e r v e s to
in te g ra te the c o n flic ts of r e lig io n and s c ie n c e ). T h e se fiv e a p
p ro a ch es to harm ony a re a ll n egative b ecau se each in v o lv es the
d en ial of an o rig in a l d e s ir e . In th is se n s e , th ey a re s im ila r to
P e r r y 's m ethod w h ereb y in te r e sts a re m ed iated by other in te r e s ts .
But ju st as P e r r y has a secon d m ethod fo r in tegratin g
v a lu e s, P a rk er, too, has another approach. P a rk er c a lls it the
p o sitiv e m ethod. To illu str a te what he has in m ind, he com p ares
th e p o sitiv e m ethod to th em es of m u sic w hich com b in e to fo rm a
j 177
w hole. This m ethod m akes use of various "laws of satisfaction "
su ch as: a. the law of theme (w here there is a unifying elem en t
as exem p lified , sa y , by a c a r e e r in which certain d e sir e s dom inate
and others are subordinated in a p o sitiv e m an n er--m u ch in the
m anner of a them e in a m u sical com position); b. the law of
variation of a them e (in which there is variation to attain m axim um
i
I in ten sity, as in the m anipulation of a them e in m usic); c. con trast
(this d iffers from variation only to the extent that ex trem e variation
is contrast); d. con flict (in which an apparent e v il in ten sifies
ex p erien ce a s, say.in.. tragic art); e . evolution (which rep resen ts
continuity toward in te n sity --a s, for exam p le, the evolution of a
; project toward su c c e ssfu l com pletion); f. a h ierarch y principle
(in which the stratification of valu es found in exp erien ce p erm its
one to put "first things first" ); g. tem p oral elem en ts (found in the
rew ards peculiar to in itial, cen tral, and fin al elem en ts of an e x
p erien ce); and h. uniqueness (for in the unique situ ation th ere are
no com peting d e sir e s and no dim inishing retu rn s). To th ese law s
P arker adds th ree "alleged laws" which have only lim ited a p p lica
tion or sign ifican ce: a. the law of dim inishing returns (accord ing
j to which fatigue occu rs if the d e sir e rem ain s unvaried); b. the law
of com plem entary value (in which an object may acq u ire value in a
g esta lt or H egelian syn th esis with other objects); and c. the law
178
j
!
of m argin al valu e (accord in g to w hich, in a g iv en s e r ie s , a s a
i
I
j p rin c ip le of evalu ation , the valu e of any one elem en t equals the
|
valu e of the la s t elem en t).
A ll of th e se p o sitiv e and n eg a tiv e law s taken togeth er r e
fle c t v a rio u s a sp e c ts of harm ony. H ow ever, th is a sp ec t of the
evalu ation about valu es can in no w ay be co n sid er ed a standard of
[
v a lu e w hich is u n iv er sa lly binding. A s fa r as P a rk er is con cern ed ,
j th e r e is no c a te g o r ic a l im p erative: the fre ed o m of the individual
i
| im p lie s that ea ch p e rso n m u st e sta b lish h is own rank of v a lu e s. The
!
i
l
! stan d ard of harm ony, th e r e fo r e , r e p r e se n ts but a m eans w hereby the
| s e lf can in tegrate its own d e s ir e s .
H ere, P a rk er, as does P e r r y , poin ts out that, unfortunately,
| the s e lf 's v a lu es often co n flict w ith the v a lu es of o th e r s. But h is
I em p h a sis is differen t fro m P e r r y 's; fo r w h ereas P e r r y r e s o lv e s the
co n flict through lo v e, b en ev o len ce, and rea so n , P a rk er s e e s the
p rob lem as a co n flict of^value in w hich the s e lf m ust r e so r t to the
i m ethods of p e r su a sio n . P a rk er d is c u s s e s su ch m eth ods of p e r su a sio n
as ap p licab le to two co n tra stin g situ ation s: (1) the situ ation in which
: the in d ivid u al's own v a lu es a r e not threaten ed by c o n flic ts w ith other
j p e r so n s; and (2) the situ a tio n in w hich the in d ivid u al's own v a lu es
t
i a r e a ctu a lly at sta k e .
• (1) M ethods of p e r su a sio n w h en ever the in d ivid u al's own
179
i
valu es are not threatened include the c a se in which the individual
m ay eith er agree to d isa g ree (as in tr iv ia l situations involving, for
exam ple, such values as the sen su ou s, or the recreation al) or
r e so r t to educational ta c tic s. He m ay, for in stan ce, make use of
the educational approach and m ay attem pt to provide exp erien ces
sim ila r to his own in order to prom ote the other p erso n ’s approval
|
! of his values; or he m ay s tr e s s the higher over the low er values
; as pu rer, le s s dependent upon the p h ysical, or as the road to
seren ity in which virtue is its own rew ard. Anbther approach in
educating the individual to approve on e’s own value is through r e
in forcem en t w hereby a sp e c ific d e sir e is used as a sp rin g-b oard to
(
stim u late an in te r e st in a broader field , sa y , in engineerin g.
F in ally, one m ay attem pt to educate the p erson to accept one's own
! valu es by appealing to the con seq u en ces of accepting them . In this
la tter procedure one m ay, of co u rse, m u ster rea so n s to support
the cau se, but, sin ce valu es are volition al, these reason s by th em
s e lv e s cannot be expected to ca rry fin a l authority.
T here a re, then, m ethods of a g reein g to d isa g ree and of
education w hereby the individual m ay attem pt to harm onize h is own
values with those of o th ers. T h ese m ethods are em ployed w hen
ever one's own v a lu es are not threatened.
T here are other m ethods, how ever, which m a y b e em ployed
180 !
I
w henever on e's own valu es are at stake. The m ost obvious approach!
; t
is by m eans of fo rc e. This m ethod, P arker b e lie v es, is ju stified j
! !
w henever valu es are im portant and all other attem pts have failed . Inj
such circu m stan ces, how ever, peace between individuals is sa c r i-
: |
i
ficed . On the other hand, w henever peaceful m eans are p ossib le,
: i
the individual m ay r eso rt to com prom ise (in which "half a loaf is
better than none"). But this m ethod has its lim itation s because no
rational form ula m ay be follow ed rigidly: there w ill alw ays be
v ariab les involving such factors as the relative strengths of the
p arties as w ell as the extent of their d esire for peace. The m ain
defect of com p rom ise, m oreover, is that, u n less integration occu rs,
it is all too tem porary.
In tegration --as the second m ethod of resolvin g conflicts of
valu es in which one's own values are at s ta k e --is usually a m ore
; prom ising approach because it occu rs in an atm osphere of em pathy.
The problem s of the other person are considered in such a manner
; that the integration m ay be satisfactory to all p ersons involved.
Integration, how ever, is no c u r e -a ll b ecau se, unfortunately,
: r iv a lr ie s can s till occur even when love e x is ts. j
| S till other m ethods, th erefore, are required. One of th ese
I ' *
is renunciation. Renunciation, how ever, has obvious lim itation s and 1
! ;
| disadvantages. A som ewhat related and la st approach to resolvin g
181 j
l
I
c o n f lic t s w ith o t h e r s in w h ic h o n e 's ow n v a lu e s a r e at s ta k e i s th e i
a g r e e m e n t to s e l f - l i m it a t i o n o f s p h e r e s o f p o w e r . T h is i s a f o r m j
I
of c o m p r o m is e w h ic h , th o u g h o fte n u s e d in in te r n a tio n a l p o l i c i e s ,
i
u n fo r tu n a te ly h a s th e s a m e lim it a t io n s a s a n y o th e r fo r m o f
!
c o m p r o m is e .
T h e s e a p p r o a c h e s - - c o m p r o m is e , in te g r a tio n , r e n u n c ia tio n ,
lim it a t io n s o f s p h e r e s of in flu e n c e , and, in c e r t a in c a s e s , e v e n
f o r c e i t s e l f - - a r e a ll u s e f u l m e th o d s fo r a c h ie v in g h a r m o n y w ith
o th e r p e o p le . T h e y a r e u s e fu l w h e n e v e r o n e 's ow n v a lu e s a r e at
s ta k e . In o th e r s it u a t io n s , h o w e v e r , o n e m a y u s e e d u c a tio n a l
a p p r o a c h e s , o r , in t r iv ia l s it u a tio n s , s im p ly a g r e e to d is a g r e e . A ll
o f t h e s e m e th o d s , b e th e y p o s it iv e o r n e g a t iv e , fu n c tio n to h a r m o n iz e
c o n flic tin g v a lu e s . P a r k e r 's d is c u s s io n , m o r e o v e r , s e r v e s a s a
s u p p le m e n t to P e r r y ' s m e th o d s fo r o r g a n iz in g v a lu e s in to a c o m
p r e h e n s iv e w h o le . T r a n s la te d in to P e r r y ' s t e r m s , o n e c o u ld c o n
s id e r P a r k e r 's s u b s titu tio n , s u b lim a tio n , an d in te g r a tio n a s
p o s it iv e m e th o d s w h e r e b y on e i n t e r e s t i s m e d ia te d b y a n o th e r . In
a lik e m a n n e r , P a r k e r 's r e n u n c ia tio n and c o m p r o m is e c a n b e s u b
s u m e d u n d e r P e r r y ' s n e g a t iv e a p p r o a c h fo r m e d ia tin g i n t e r e s t s .
A c c o r d in g to s u c h an in te r p r e t a tio n , fu r t h e r m o r e , P e r r y ' s
v ie w s o f in te g r a tio n w o u ld b e s u p p le m e n te d b y P a r k e r 's l a w s - - t h e
la w s o f th e m e , o f c o n tr a c t, o f c o n f lic t , o f a h ie r a r c h y p r in c ip le , o f
182
tem p o ra l e le m e n ts, and of u n iq u en ess. And, in addition, P a rk er's
r e fe r e n c e s to the law s of d im in ish in g retu rn s, a com p lem en tary
v a lu e, and of m argin al value would a lso apply to P e r r y 's in tegration .
P a r k e r 's a n a ly sis thus supplem ents P e r r y 's d isc u ssio n , and, to
g eth er, P e r r y and P a rk er in d icate how in te r e sts m ay be m ediated by
oth er in te r e s ts .
Such a sy n th esis of the view of P ark er and P e r r y , h ow ever,
cannot be extended to inclu de P e r r y 's second m ethod of integrating
in te r e sts by m eans of in te r e st judgm ents; fo r h ere P e r r y and
P a rk er have fun dam entally d ifferen t o rien ta tio n s. That is to sa y ,
w h ereas P e r r y attem pts to o v erco m e co n flicts betw een peop le in
term s of lo v e, b en ev o len ce, and rea so n , P a rk er co n sid ers this type
of co n flict a p ro b lem of p e r su a sio n alon e. In fa ct, P a rk er even
fra m es the p rob lem by asking w hether or not such d isa g reem en ts are
a th reat to on e's own v a lu e s, and then p roceed s to su g g est appro
p ria te m ethods fo r overcom in g them as such.
The rea so n fo r this d ifferen ce in orien tation is that P a rk er
is talking about opinions of^ valu e w h ereas P e r r y is concerned w ith
p rob lem s about v a lu e. This d ifferen ce is accentuated when one con
sid e r s that P e r r y lim its h is d isc u ssio n to ration al m ethods, w h ereas
P a r k e r , in addition to ration al m eth od s, indudes irra tio n a l ones as
w e ll. In this s e n s e , th e re fo re , P a r k e r 's d isc u ssio n is perhaps the
183 |
j
m o r e c o m p r e h e n s iv e --e s p e c ia lly so sin c e , in addition to P e r r y 's j
b en ev o len t app roach, it a ls o e n c o m p a ss e s m a le v o le n t m eth o d s. And
y e t, in anoth er s e n s e , P e r r y 's v iew cou ld be c o n sid e r e d the m o r e
I
c o m p re h e n siv e; fo r P e r r y , in ste a d of being lim ite d , a s is P a rk er ,
to L e w is 's e x p r e s s iv e le v e l, i s co n cern ed w ith th e m o r e co m p lex
ju d gm en tal p lan e. A nother r e a so n w hy P e r r y 's d is c u s s io n m a y be
v iew ed a s m o r e c o m p r e h e n siv e than P a r k e r 's is that, w h er ea s
P a rk er is co n cern ed m e r e ly w ith the p rob lem of how to m a x im iz e
the in d iv id u a l's v a lu e s, P e r r y exten d s the ran ge to a c o n sid e r a tio n
of how s o c ia l v alu e m a y be m a x im iz e d a s w e ll. But r e g a r d le s s of
w h ich p e r s p e c tiv e i s taken, a co n seq u en ce of su ch a d iffe r e n c e in
o r ie n ta tio n i s the fa c t that the p o s s ib ilitie s of a P e r r y -P a r k e r in
co m p a tib ility a r e m in im iz e d sim p ly b e c a u se ea ch p h ilosop h er is
c o n sid e r in g a d ifferen t p rob lem . A nother w ay of sayin g th is is that,
in p r e se n tin g the m eth od of m ed ia tin g in te r e s ts by m ea n s of in te r e s t
ju d g m en ts, P e r r y is co n cern ed w ith what he c a lls m o r a l good a s a
m a x im a tio n of in te r e s t, w h e r e a s in h is d is c u s s io n s of p e r su a sio n ,
P a rk er is su g g estin g m ea n s of m a x im iz in g th e te c h n ic a l good.
That P e r r y is co n cern ed w ith m o r a l good w h en he d is c u s s e s
I
in te r e s t ju d gm en ts is c le a r ly apparent w hen he sa y s:
j
The fu lfillm e n t of a sim p le is o la te d in te r e s t i s good, but j
on ly the fu lfillm en t of an o rg a n iza tio n of in te r e s ts i s m o r a lly
good. Such g o o d n ess a p p ea rs in the r e a liz a tio n of an in
d iv id u a l's s y s te m a tic p u rp ose or in the w e ll b ein g of a
184
i
com m unity. j
And just as th is quotation in d icates that P e r r y 's m ethods of j
in tegration rep resen t a m ean s of m axim izin g m oral valu e, so do the
follow ing w ords of P ark er point to the quite different problem of
p rotecting the tech n ical good; for P arker acknow ledges h ere that h is
concern is sim p ly to d isco v er ". . .w hat can be done when th ere is
opposition betw een m y valu es and the valu es of other persons"
(P hilosophy, p. 210). And h ere, unlike P erry , P arker co n sid ers
sh eer p ersu asion and even fo rce leg itim a te m ethods for overcom ing
such c o n flicts.
T his d ifferen ce in orientation betw een P erry and P a r k e r --
reflectin g m oral and tech n ical good, r e sp e c tiv e ly --p r e s e n ts the key
to S teven son 's p osition on th is point; for Stevenson, lik e P ark er, is
concerned, not w ith P e r r y 's problem of lo g ic a lly m axim izin g value
in ter m s of a given definition, but with the quite different problem of
how to r eso lv e con flicts; and th is problem , for rea so n s alread y su g
gested , req u ires m ethods of p ersu asion in order to p rotect the
tech n ical good chosen by the individual. At this point at le a st
I
Steven son and P arker are concerned w ith m uch the sam e problem .
A s for L ew is, he tends to em p hasize the P er ry approach;
for L ew is a lso s t r e s s e s the m oral good as far a s co n flicts are con
cern ed . A ccording to him , each individual ranks h is own valu es in
^The M oral E conom y, (New York, 1909), p. 15^
185 j
!
te r m s of p r e fe re n c e a s judgm ental evalu ation s. But he d efin es
s o c ia l valu e to in clu d e ". • aU the v a lu e -p r o p e r tie s of the thing in
q u estion " He, th e r e fo r e , o ffer s h is own m ethod for ranking s o c ia l
j
v a lu e, w h ere h is em pathy is som ew hat sim ila r to P e r r y 's benevolencti
T h is ranking in L e w is's sy ste m b eco m es p o ssib le by a c o lla tio n of
o n e's own v a lu e s w ith the v a lu es of other p erso n s: that is , by an e m -
pathic ex ten sio n of o n e's own fe e lin g s to inclu de v a lu e s of o th ers a s
though they w e re o n e 's own. The individual m ay thus a r r iv e at so c ia l
va lu e " . - .b y r e fe r e n c e not to o n e se lf but to a ll the p e r so n s who are
or w ould be a ffected by the e x iste n c e of it" (A n a ly s is , p. 550). W ith
th is m ethod the em p h a sis is p laced upon the m o ra l good^ w h ich in
P e r r y 's te r m s is an "organ ization of in te r e s ts . " So d efin ed the
m o ra l good i s fr e e d fro m the irr a tio n a l P a rk er -S tev e n so n m eth od s
of p e r su a sio n and fo r c e . But again th ere is h ere no b a sic in c o m
p a tib ility betw een the tw o groups of p h ilo so p h ers. What is in volved
h e r e is but the r e su lt of a d ifferen t orien tation . S teven son and
P a rk er a r e co n sid erin g c o n flic ts of tech n ica l good, w h er ea s P e r r y
i
and L ew is a re con cern ed w ith m a x im izin g m o ra l good. The tw o
p oin ts of v iew , th e re fo re , supplem ent each other by offerin g m eth od s
w h ereb y v a lu e s can be organ ized into a co m p reh en siv e w h ole.
But the d eterm in ation of su ch m eth od s h as b een the p u rp ose
of th is e n tire d is c u ssio n con cern in g the third a ssu m p tio n w hich
i
u n d e r lie s th e u se of th e p ru d en tial ought. It m ay th e r e fo r e be sa id ,
in su m m a ry , that the th ird a ssu m p tio n of the p ru d en tia l ought f o l
lo w s fr o m the fa c t that th e s e lf , a s a valu in g a g en t, s e e k s h a p p in ess
by co m m ittin g it s e lf to a life plan. And th is fa c t, in turn, su g g e s ts
a s e l f as th e c h o o s e r of a life p lan in w hich h a p p in ess fo llo w s the
in te g r a tio n of v a lu e s in to a c o m p r e h e n siv e w h ole. A s fo r the m a n -
j
j n e r in w h ich th is m ay be a c c o m p lish e d , P e r r y , P a tk e r , S tev en so n ,
and L e w is, a ll o ffer su p p lem en ta ry m eth o d s. In b rief, th e r e fo r e ,
i th e th ird a ssu m p tio n im p lic it in the m ea n in g of th e p ru d en tia l ought
is th a t v a lu e can be o rg a n ize d into a c o m p r e h e n siv e w h ole.
4. The F ou rth Im p lic it A ssu m p tio n in the
M eaning of th e P ru d e n tia l Ought
The fou rth and fin al a ssu m p tio n im p lic it in th e u se of the
p ru d en tial ought is the su p p o sitio n that th e r e is an in tr ic a te r e la tio n
sh ip b etw een th e r ig h t and th e good. That th e r e is su c h a co n n e c tio n
s e e m s in itia lly p la u sib le . L e w is, fo r in sta n c e , p oin ts out that a
d is tin c tio n b etw een r ig h t and w ron g w ou ld d isa p p ea r if good and bad
c o n se q u e n c e s w e re im p o s s ib le . L ik e w ise , th e r ig h t w ould be in d is -
j
i
; tin g u ish a b le fr o m the w ron g if life w e r e not su b je c t to su ffe r in g s and
i
! en jo y m en t. T h u s, a c co rd in g to L ew is:
f
i
A n tecen d en tly to any in q u iry, it is ob viou s that th e r e m u st
187
be som e e sse n tia l connection betw een the right and the good.
No act would be ca lled right if nothing but bad r e su lts could be
expected from it; and to condem n as w rong an act w hich could
not p o ssib ly lead to anything but good would su rely be a puritan
ica l conception w hich w e should r ejec t. (Ground, p. 58)
T here is , then,apparently som e connection betw een the good
and the right. T his point, how ever, has been q u estio n ed --a s has the
assum ption concerning the separation of value theory and e th ic s --b y
Stevenson. Inasm uch, how ever, a s S teven son 's argum ents co n cern
ing the separation of valu e theory and eth ics have alread y been
exam ined (se e above, pp. 148 f f . ), th ere is no need to rep eat them
h ere. But in order to determ ine exactly what, if any, relation sh ip
there is betw een the good and the right, req u ires an explanation in
the light of the other assum p tion s concerning the prudential ought;
fo r, as w e sh all d isc o v e r , if Stevenson w ere c o rr ec t in m aintaining
that th ere is no connection betw een the right and the good, then
prudence would be u tterly d iv e ste d of m eaning.
A ccording to the fir s t assum ption, v a lu es can be ranked, at
le a s t in p rin cip le. But once it is agreed that a ranking of valu es
w ithin value theory it s e lf is p o ssib le , then it m ak es se n se to sa y that
the individual, having accepted th is ranking, ought to pursue the
higher rather than the low er valu e. Thus, underlying the concept
of the prudential ought is the assum p tion that, in order to be
reason ab le, one m ust fir s t ca refu lly con sid er a ll the evid en ce in
188
te r m s, not only of the past, but of the future a s w e ll, and that,
having m ade such a d e c isio n , one ought to be guided by it. Indeed,
th is is the v e r y m ean ing of prudence.
P erh ap s th is rela tio n sh ip can be e x p r e sse d in m o re form al
!
te r m s by saying that value th eory i s n e c e s s a r y and p rior to any J
i
m ean ing of the righ t and of the prudential ought. L ew is m a k es
th is point a s follow s: I
Any eth ica l th eory, though its m ain b u sin e ss is d elim itation
of the m o ra lly righ t, m u st a lso d eal w ith the subject of the g o o d -- :
perhaps under the title of sum m um bonum --a n d w ith th is
q u estion the m anner in w hich what is right depends upon what is |
good. (Ground, p. 58)
T his ch a ra cteriza tio n of the prudential ought is not a i
m e r e ly a rb itra ry stipu lation . P e r r y and P ark er for in stan ce
find such prudential com p u lsion to be a c h a r a c te r istic of man;
i
and L e w is--w ith h is s t r e s s upon the r o le of ration al b e h a v io r --
a lso in s is ts that th is p r o c e ss of evaluating is a p e c u lia r ly hum an traitj
A ccordin g to th e se p h ilo so p h ers, th erefo re, the rela tio n sh ip betw een
i
the righ t and the good not only c o n stitu tes an e sse n tia l human w ay of
thinking, but is n e c e s s a r y to the v e r y m eaning of prudence its e lf. j
And it is in th is se n s e --S te v e n so n to the c o n tra r y --th a t the fourth
assu m p tion im p lic it in the m eaning of the prudential ought im p lie s
that th e re is an in trica te rela tio n sh ip betw een the good and the righ t.
189
Sum m ary and C on clu sion s
T his con clu d es the d is c u ssio n of the four assu m p tion s of the
p ru d en tial ought. The fir s t a ssu m p tio n is that a ranking of value is
th e o r e tic a lly p o s s ib le . T h is a ssu m p tion , in turn, im p lie s that
so m e s e t o f c r ite r ia m ust be used , although the ex a ct s e t need not be
stip u lated for every p erso n . On th is point P er ry , P a rk er, L ew is,
and,to a lim ite d extent, Steven son , to g eth er o ffer what co n stitu tes
at le a s t a p la u sib le explanation of one group erf sta n d a rd s. The
se co n d a ssu m p tio n is that, d esp ite S tev en so n ’s opp osition, valu e and
eth ics can be sep a ra ted . T h is point in v o lv es m ainly a d efen se of the
tra d itio n a l point of view a g a in st S tev en so n 's erron eou s c h a r g es. The
th ird su p p osition is that v a lu e s a r e o rg a n iza b le into a co m p reh en siv e
w h ole. T h is a ssu m p tio n fo llo w s fro m the fa c t that, in seek in g
i
i
i
| h ap p in ess, th e s e lf c h o o se s a life plan. The fourth a ssu m p tio n is
that th e re e x is ts an in tr ic a te rela tio n sh ip betw een the good and the
|
; righ t. T his a ssu m p tio n m ust b e m ade if eith er te r m —the good and
the r ig h t—is to have m ean ing w ithout p a ra d o x ica l im p lic a tio n s. T h ese
I fo u r a ssu m p tio n s, taken to g eth er, a r e im p lic it in the v e ry m eaning
of th e pru d en tial ought.
A lthough th e fo u r a ssu m p tio n s help to explain th e m eaning of
the prud en tial ought, one p ro b lem r e m a in s. T his co n c er n s the
! ' .
j 190
| extent to which it ia leg itim a te to speak of prudence in a so c ia l
sen se; fo r, in one se n se at le a st, so c ie ty as an entity is equivalent
m er ely to the su m of itd m em b ers. How, then, can s o c ia l prudence
in any way be co rrela ted with p erso n a l prudence? In what se n s e can
it be said that it m ay be prudent to lay down one's life for one's
country ?
The key to th is p r o b le m --if, indeed, it can be solved at a ll in
term s of the prudential ou gh t--m ay be found in an analogy of the
p erson to the p articu lar so c ie ty involved. A ccording to such an
!
analogy, just as the individual can m axim ize h is good by elim inating
| co n flicts through the p r o c e ss of organizing them into a com prehen-
i
i s iv e w hole, s o so c ie ty can m axim ize its good by elim ating con flicts
! betw een individuals by su bstitu tin g in the p lace of individual con flicts
|
a m ore com p reh en sive sy ste m w herein individual con flicts are
r eso lv e d . It is in th is se n s e , for instan ce, that a c itizen of the
United States m ay d ecid e that the prudent act for his country in a
sp ec ific situation is to go to w ar and, at the sam e tim e, recogn ize
h is com m itm en ts, even though the con sequ en ces m ay actually co st
him his life . The stren gth of th is so c ia l com m itm ent r e sts upon the
|
analogy of co n flicts within a p erson to co n flicts involving d isa g r e e
m ents betw een individuals in a so c ie ty . Stevenson, P erry , L ew is,
and even P a r k e r --th e la tter at lea st as an in itia l ste p —a ll eith er
191
point out th is analogy or a ssu m e it in th e ir d isc u ssio n s of s o c ia l
v a lu e. In each c a s e - - t h e p erso n a l and th e s o c ia l--th e com p u lsion of
j
the p rud en tial ought fo llo w s fro m the com m itm ent to m a x im ize the
good, w hich, in its turn, is supported by the d icta tes of love,
b en evolen ce, and ra tion ality it s e lf . Such a concept of so c ia l and
p e r so n a l prudence m e r e ly su p p lem en ts the p reviou s d isc u ssio n s
con cern in g the four assu m p tion s of the prudential ought; fo r it is
apparent that, as p r e v io u sly su g g ested , th e se su p p osition s a r e *
b a sic to the m eaning of prud en ce, and perhaps even to that of love,
b en evolen ce, and ra tio n a lity .
Our d is c u ssio n of the prud en tial ought is now com p lete.
B e sid e s bringing to light the n atu re of the four assu m p tion s u n d er
ly in g the u se of the prudential ought, our a n a ly sis a lso su g g e sts the
b a sis fo r the com p u lsion in the natu re o f both the p er so n a l and
so c ia l p rud en tial ought. W hether or not su ch a ch a ra cteriza tio n of
the prud en tial ought is adequate as a co m p reh en siv e explanation of
th e e m p ir ic a l fa c ts can be d eterm in ed only in the ligh t of further
c o n sid e r a tio n s.
CH APTER VH
THE FA ILU R E OF THE PRUD ENTIA L OUGHT AND ITS
REQUIRED SU PPLEM EN TA TIO N
Two of th e p r e c e e d in g c o n c lu sio n s are: (1) that th ere m u st
j be so m e r ela tio n sh ip b etw een th e right and the good in ord er for
j
| "prudence" to have m eaning; and (2) that the fo r c e s of lo v e, of
i
i b en ev o len ce, or of r e a so n su pp ly th e co m p u lsiv e fa c to r of the
i '
| p ru d en tial ought a s a com m itm en t to m a x im iz e the good. T h ese
i
j
| p oin ts can perhaps be a ccep ted by a ll fou r p h ilo so p h ers w ithout in
|
| any w ay jeo p a rd izin g th e ir p o sitio n s. D iffe r e n c e s of opinion that
i
j
I m igh t a r is e would ste m fro m the q u estio n of w hether or not su ch a
| c h a r a c te r iz a tio n of ’ought* is su ffic ie n t to c o v er a ll its m ea n in g s.
O nce again , th e r e fo r e , the d is c u ssio n m u st c e n te r upon the
way in w hich each p h ilosop h er v ie w s the r ela tio n sh ip betw een the
1 righ t and the good. B ut th e p ro b lem now b e c o m e s: What is th e r e in
| th e nature of th is rela tio n sh ip that su p p lie s the co m p u lsiv e fa c to r of
; an ought ? And th is p ro b lem , in tu rn , lea d s to a co m p lem en ta ry
| q u estion : Is su ch a c h a r a c te r iz a tio n of the o u g h t--w h a te v er it m ay
! b e --s u ffic ie n t to c o v e r a ll its m any m ea n in g s? T h ese q u estio n s m u st
I |
I 192
193
find an an sw er a s ea ch p h ilosop h er ex p la in s m o re c a r e fu lly the
e x a ct r e la tio n sh ip b etw een the good and the righ t.
P e r r y ap p ro a ch es the p ro b lem by red u cin g one te r m to the
: o th er, m ain tain in g that th e m ean in g of 'r ig h t1 i s both d e r iv a tiv e fro m
and dependent upon the m ean in g of 'good. ' P e r r y , it w ill be r e
m em b er ed , h as d efin ed 'good' in te r m s of in te r e s t and a c co r d in g ly
m u st m ain tain that any r e fe r e n c e to *good' m u st a lw ays in c lu d e --a t
le a s t im p lic it ly - - a r e fe r e n c e to the su b ject. C om m on u sa g e o fte n --
in d eed u s u a lly --o m its th is r e fe r e n c e . But it i s s p e c ific a lly in th is
s e n s e that the v alu e sta te m en ts of com m on u sa g e are in c o m p le te .
T hus, for in sta n c e , 'x is good' i s in co m p lete a s a sta tem en t and
m u st be expanded to m ake e x p lic it its im p lic it r e fe r e n c e to the
su b ject. Upon p rop er tra n sla tio n , 'x is good' b e c o m e s som eth in g
lik e 'I d e s ir e to do som eth in g to, w ith, or about x . ' In th is m a n
n e r , P e r r y e s ta b lis h e s th e r ela tio n sh ip b etw een the righ t and the
good by m aking the fo r m e r d e r iv a tiv e fro m the la tte r . "So co n stru ed
rig h t and w rong a r e dependent and in stru m en ta l value" (R e a lm s ,
p. 106). 'R ight, ' a cco rd in g ly , b e c o m e s ". . .c o n d u c iv e n e ss to m o r a l
good, and 'w rong' m ea n s c o n d u civ e n e ss to m o r a l ev il: the one to
h arm ony, the other to con flict" (p. 106).
S in ce , for P e r r y , the rig h t is d e r iv a tiv e and dependent upon
j the good, the u ltim a te p ro b lem for m o r a lity is th e m a x im iz a tio n of
i
i
i
194
the good; and, according to P er ry , th is can be accom p lish ed only
through the p r o c e ss of harm onizing conflictin g in te r e sts:
M orality is m an 's endeavor to harm onize conflicting
in te r e sts: to prevent con flict when it th reaten s, to rem ove
con flict when it o ccu rs, and to advance from the negative
harm ony of n on -con flict to the p o sitiv e harm ony of cooperation.
(R e a lm s, p. 90)
The concept of duty is explained in th is orientation through
an analogy of co n flicts w ithin an individual to th ose betw een individ
u als in a society; for ju st as individual prudence often req u ires that
one in te re st be subordinated to another, so so c ia l prudence req u ires
that in te r e sts of one individual be subordinated to th ose of other
individuals in order that a m axim um of good be achieved. Duty,
th erefo re, a r is e s b ecau se, in the nam e of m axim um so cia l good,
the ind ividu al's in te r e sts m ust at tim e s be subordinated to the
gen eral good. Thus ” . . .duty is conditioned on the purpose of
harm onious hap pin ess, not on m y purpose" (R ealm s, p. 112).
It is in th is se n se that duty a ch iev es its com p u lsive status:
When so construed, duty p o s s e s s e s a certa in unconditional
ch aracter r e la tiv e ly to any given p erson . It cannot be escap ed
by h is ignorance, inattention, in d ifferen ce, or se lfish n e ss.
(R ealm s, p. 112)
F urtherm ore:
It is b ecau se of the fa ct that the c a ll of the greater good
o v erru les the c a ll of the le s s e r good, and often has to a s s e r t
its m a stery , that duty acq u ires its forbidding a sp ect. Duty
is independent of p resen t inclination, and, if n eed s be, stands
against it. (p. 112)
195
The c o m p u lsiv e fa cto r in the ought is h e r e accounted for by-
P e r r y 's red u ction of the righ t to the good. And P e r r y 's p o sitio n b e
c o m e s an e x tr e m e exam p le of the prud en tial ought, a s d is c u sse d in
the p rev io u s chapter; and the prudential ought, w hen co n ceiv ed from
the point of v iew of a w e ll in teg ra ted individual in the id ea l com m u n
ity , is w id e enough to en co m p a ss the m any u s e s of the ought.
But at th is point w e m ay ask w hether or not P e r r y 's
c h a r a c te r iz a tio n of th e ought is^ su fficien t, a fter a ll, to co v er its
c o m p u lsiv e factor and its m any m ean in gs; for th e re a re m any
p h ilo so p h ers who opp ose P e r r y 's c la im , and th ey advance nu m erous
argu m en ts to d is c r e d it h is p o sitio n .
The fir s t argum en t, a s W. D. R o ss and o th ers point out,
ste m s fro m the fa ct that equating duty and th e act of m axim izin g
good le a d s to p arad oxical im p lic a tio n s. F or in sta n ce , take the c a se
of tw o m en dying to g eth er in an iso la te d situ ation w h ere no harm
could p o ssib ly com e to a so c ie ty through the fa ilu r e of one to keep
a p r o m ise to the o th er. D o es the fa ct that no h arm w ill com e to
anyone ex tin g u ish the one p e r so n 's duty to k eep h is p r o m ise to the
o th er? R o s s 's an sw er i s , rig h tfu lly , n eg a tiv e w hen he sa y s,
". . . anyone who holds th is m a y be su sp ec ted of not having r e fle c te d
on what a p r o m ise i s .
* The Right and the Good, (London, 1939), p. 39-
196
The u su a l r e s p o n s e g iv en to th is p r o b le m by th o se su p p ortin g
th e p ru d en tia l ought is that the a c t of k eep in g the p r o m is e it s e lf
m a k es the w o rld a b e tte r p la c e s im p ly b e c a u se it is d o n e. But th is
a n sw e r is d en ied to P e r r y as lon g a s the h a rm o n y of th e s o c ie ty and
the in te g r a tio n o f th e p e r s o n a lity of in d iv id u a ls a r e u n a ffected .
S im ila r d iffic u ltie s a r e e a s ily found in p h ilo so p h ic a l lit e r
a tu r e . F o r e x a m p le , th e d e o n to lo g ists poin t out th at, a cco rd in g to
th e d ic ta te s of m a x im iz in g the good, one sh ould t e ll lie s in ste a d of
the tru th w h en ev er su ch d ecep tio n can b e s t p ro m o te the s o c ia l h a r
m o n y . B ut, c le a r ly , th is g o e s a g a in st o n e 's m o r a l c o n v ic tio n s .
The p r o b le m s in v o lv in g te llin g lie s and k eep in g p r o m is e s cannot
b e a d eq u a tely a n sw e r e d w ith in P e r r y 's co n cep tio n of the ought as
c o m p u lsiv e p r u d en ce .
O ther c r it ic s o f P e r r y take d iffe r e n t c o u r s e s . G ordon W.
A llp o r t, in a r e v ie w of P e r r y 's R e a lm s of V a lu e , q u estio n s the
h ed on ic o v e r to n e s in P e r r y 's a n a ly s is of m o r a lity , p oin tin g out that
P e r r y m a y h a v e too h a s tily equated h arm on y w ith h a p p in e ss. M o re
o v e r , even if h is s t r e s s is upon h a rm o n y , the p r o b le m of w h eth er
s o c ia l s o lid a r ity can b e c h a lle n g e d b y the p r iv a te c o n s c ie n c e is
s t ill an open m o r a l q u e stio n . A llp o r t's con ten tion is su p p orted by
3
H . N . W iem an , w h en h e m a in ta in s th at w ithout an u n d e rly -
2
Jou rn al of A b n orm al and S o c ia l P s y c h o lo g y , L { Jan u ary
1 9 5 5). ---------
3
(r e v . of R e a lm s ), Jou rn al of R e lig io n , XXXV (Janu ary
1 9 5 5). -------------------------- ------
197
ing m etap h ysics involving som e p r o c e ss tow ard unifying human
life , the p rob lem s of "C om m unists and sin n ers" a r is e . W hich s y s
tem of se v e r a l harm onious ones w ill b est prom ote h ap pin ess now
b e c o m e s a m atter of arb itrary choice; fo r, as L ew is sa y s, w h ile
m aking m uch the sam e point without appealing to m eta p h y sics:
Any attem pt to determ in e right action d ir e c tly and sim p ly
in ter m s of good n ess of r e su lts. . . obviou sly r a is e s the q u estion ,
" P erso n a l goodn ess to the doer h im self, or so c ia l good to a ll
who are affected ?" . . . The e g o ist a n sw ers that qu estion one
w ay, the u tilita ria n another; and w h ich ever of them is r ig h t--
if e ith e r --th is is s u e it s e lf cannot be settled by appeal to the
c r ite r io n of m axim um goodn ess to be ach ieved . (Ground, p. 72)
L ew is h ere has r a ise d another objection against P e r r y 's
appeal to a m axim um of good as the so le c riter io n of the ought.
T his in v o lv es the m atter of a point of view . A s A lb ert LeR oy
4
H illiard points out, the question alw ays a r is e s w hether, say, the
slau ghter of a lam b can be co n sid ered a good. The answ er depends,
he m ain tain s, upon w hether one co n sid er s the question from the point
of view of the butcher (as a good) or from the point of view of the
lam b (as a bad). In an analogous situation on the human le v e l,
L ew is r a is e s the often propounded q u estion w hether or not it is ju st
to sa c r ific e an unw illing v ic tim in ord er to save a nation from chaos;
and the answ er to th is qu estion is s till a m oral issu e not to be
a n sw ered in te r m s of harm ony a lo n e -
4
S ee F o rm s of V alue, (New York, 1950), p. 262,
P e r r y a ttem p ts to d eal w ith su ch p ro b lem s by h is analogy
i b etw een the in te g ra tio n of p e r so n a l c o n flic ts and the h a rm o n iza tio n
i
of so c ia l d is a g r e e m e n ts. But th is analogy b r ea k s down w hen one
c o n s id e r s that h arm on y in the c a s e of the in d ivid u al, unlike that of
s o c ia l in teg ra tio n , is a ctu a lly a d e s ir e con cern in g d e s ir e s . A s
P a rk er p oin ts out, "H arm ony is thus o b v io u sly a d e s ir e of the
seco n d o r d e r - - a d e s ir e regard in g d e sir e s " (p. 175). P e r r y 's
an alogy i s c le a r ly in c o m p lete b e c a u se so c ie ty cannot e x p e rien ce a
seco n d o rd er d e s ir e - - o r any d e s ir e s , for that m a tte r . O nce again,
h o w ev er, P e r r y h as at le a s t a p a r tia l a n sw e r. Through the fo r c e s of
lo v e , b e n e v o len ce , and r e a so n one can id en tify the in te r e s ts of
o th e r s a s o n e 's own. The an alogy is then tigh ten ed and, ju st as one
a s s u m e s a duty tow ard o n e's own life plan, so one can a ssu m e a
duty tow ard the fu rth era n ce of the lif e p lan s of o n e's fello w m en .
A lthough th is lin e of rea so n in g m ay se r v e a s a ju stific a tio n
of the so c ia l 'ought' w ith in P e r r y 's sy ste m , th e r e s till r em a in s —
a s lon g a s th e r e is a c o n flic t b etw een th e p e r so n a l and the so c ia l
p o in ts of v ie w --th e p rob lem of v in d ica tin g th e co m p u lsio n to
! m a x im iz e the good; for one m a y a lw ays ask , "Why am 1 c o m p e lle d
: to m a x im iz e the good?" In sp ite of h is e ffo r ts, P e r r y thus fa ils
i
i
i to accou n t fo r the co m p u lsio n found in c e r ta in m ea n in g s of the
! ought.
199
O ur arg u m en ts, taken to g eth er, in d icate that the prudential
ought, as c h a ra cterized by P e r r y , although helpful in esqplaining the
m any sh ad es of m eaning in the ought, cannot explain them a ll. The
attem pt to red u ce the righ t to the good fa ils as an adequate e x p lic a
tion of the com p u lsive factor in the 'o u g h t.'
L ew is a g rees w ith P e r r y that th ere is a com p u lsive fa cto r
in the prudential ought; but L ew is finds the factor in m an's co m m it
m ent to the p r o c e ss of liv in g . T im e ru sh es on, the future w ill soon
be the p r e se n t, and, w hether m an lik es it or not, h e, a livin g being,
is com m itted to the situ ation . The prudential ought a r is e s , th e r e
fo re , as a u n iv er sa l im p era tiv e, "Be c o n siste n t in valuation and in
thought and action"; "Be concerned about y o u r se lf in future and on
the whole" (A n a ly sis, p . 481).
To the extent that this d ictate can often go again st p r e sen t
in clin ation s and d e s ir e s , it i s , as an im p era tiv e, sim ila r to P e r r y 's
prudential ought. Indeed, underlying the assu m p tion fo r both P e r r y
and L ew is h ere is the fa ct that to m a x im ize on e's sa tisfa ctio n s
rep resen ts the v e r y m eaning of rational b eh avior. L e w is, thus,
a g rees w ith P e r r y th a t-at le a s t as it app lies to the individual's
p r u d en ce --th e co m p u lsiv e fa cto r of the prud en tial ought is to be
found in the m eaning of rationality:
. . .to respond in th is m an n er— d irectin g o u r se lv e s to what is not
im m ed iate but with the sa m e con cern w hich we should have if
200
we w ere im m ed ia tely affected by it--r e q u ir e s on o c c a sio n so m e
o verrid in g of our a n im a lish fe e lin g w hich in c ite s us to respond
accord in g to sen su ou s im p act or em otive d r iv e . That is the
root of our se n se of req u ired r e str a in t and of the im p e r a tiv e .
(G round, pp. 8 7 -8 8 [m y (Ita lic s))
L e w is's concept of so c ia l v a lu e , fu r th e rm o r e, is a lso
s im ila r to P e r r y 's so c ia l prudential ought. Indeed, P e r r y 's
d em ocratic and com p u lsive overton es can be d etected in L e w is's
view as he w rites:
What is u sefu l or g r a tifies any m em b er of so c ie ty and
brings no harm or d is tr e s s to any o th er, has b y that fa c t so m e
m ea su re of im p erson al and s o c ia l v a lu e . This is the root o f. . .
W estern c iv iliz a tio n .. . r e sp e c t fo r each . . .in d ivid u al and h is
. . . good l i f e . . .no m e r e ly em o tiv e in clin ation to b en ev o len ce. . .
but r e fle c ts a ca te g o ric a l im p e ra tiv e. (Ground, p. 71)
P e r r y lim its h im se lf to the two fo rm s of the prudential
ought. L e w is, h ow ever, parts com pany h e r e with P e r r y b e c a u se ,
unlike P e r r y , he b e lie v e s that th ese two fa cto r s of prudence do not
cov er a ll a sp ec ts of the com p u lsive ought. L e w is, a cco rd in g ly ,
stren gth en s the com p u lsive fa cto r of the ought. He does so by
refu sin g to follow P e r r y in reducing the right to the good. In fa ct,
unlike P e r r y , he m akes a defin ite clea v a g e betw een th ese two
te r m s :
The ach ievem en t of the good is d e sir a b le but con form ity to
the right is im p era tiv e. And. . .n oth in g is 'S trictly righ t or
wrong excep t so m e p o s sib le a c tiv ity o r th e m anner of it,
w h ereas in an equally s tr ic t s e n s e anything under the sun m ay
be good or bad. (Ground, p. 59)
201 j
The righ t d iffe r s e s s e n tia lly fro m the good by r e fe r r in g to
a ctio n s and in b ein g im p e r a tiv e in n atu re. In add ition to th e s e
fa c to r s of righ t, L ew is c h a r a c te r iz e s the righ t a s e s s e n tia lly
\
n e g a tiv e in the s e n s e that ". . . any d icta te of the righ t fo rb id s
som eth in g'1 (G round, p. 37). T h ese fa c ts , tak en to g e th e r , im p ly
that in add ition to a r e fe r e n c e in volvin g g o o d n ess of c o n se q u e n c e s,
the n otion of righ t in c lu d e s a ru le w h ich cannot be e sta b lish e d by
an appeal to e m p ir ic a l fa c ts alon e. And L ew is b e lie v e s that in th is
fa c t he h a s found a b a s is for the co m p u lsiv e fa cto r in th e ought: the
ought p o s s e s s e s th e im p e ra tiv e of a ru le.
The m ain m o d es of th is ru le a r e the pru d en tial, the te c h n ic a l, j
and that in volvin g ju s tic e . The te c h n ic a l m ode i s s im ila r to the
p ru d en tial but is sim p le r , b e c a u se it p r e su m e s a n teced en tly d e
te r m in e d en d s. It fu n ction s in conjunction w ith te c h n ic a l id e a ls .
The m ode in volvin g ju s tic e is m o r e com p lex; for any d is
c u ss io n of ju s tic e r a is e s the p rob lem of the r e la tio n sh ip of ju s tic e
to p ru d en ce. L ew is e s ta b lis h e s th is c o r r e la tio n by givin g ju s tic e
| I
p r io r ity ov er prud en ce (". . . the aim of pru d en ce can be and should
! be o v e rr u led by that of ju s tic e w hen the tw o d ic ta te s a r e in c o m -
! I
patible" fG round, p. 82} ). But at the sa m e tim e L ew is r e c o g n iz e s
!
| that w ithout any r e fe r e n c e to p rud en ce, ju s tic e w ould be a h ollow
te r m . It i s in th is s e n s e that ju s tic e p r e su p p o se s p ru d en ce. A l- j
202
though in tr ic a te ly r e la te d in th is m a n n er, p ru d en ce and ju s tic e
a r e n o n e th e le ss ind ep en dent t e r m s . L ew is is h e r e p erh a p s a t
tem p tin g to avoid P e r r y 's c o r r e la tio n of ju s tic e w ith a ltr u is m a lo n e .
In su m m a ry , th en , th e p ru d en tia l, th e te c h n ic a l, and the
ju d ic ia l c r itiq u e s , althou gh se p a r a te m o d e s, a r e a ll in tr ic a te ly
r e la te d . T h is fa c t sh ou ld not be s u r p r is in g w hen o n eco n sid ers
th at th ey a r e a ll m o d es of th e one u ltim a te ground fo r the right;
and th is im p e r a tiv e r e q u ir e s no ju stific a tio n , a c co r d in g to L e w is,
; 1 1 . . . b ein g it s e lf the e x p r e s s io n of that w h ich is th e root of a ll
rea so n ; that in the a b se n c e of w hich th e r e cou ld be no r e a so n of any
s o r t o r for anything" (A n a ly s is , p. 4 8 1 ). Its c h a r a c te r is tic thus
lie s in th e b a se s of d e c is io n s th e m s e lv e s and, fo r th is r e a so n is
u ltim a te: for the m eth od s of hum an r a tio n a lity cannot be lo g ic a lly
ju s tifie d by any a p p ea l to hum an thought it s e lf . But s in c e hum an
d e c is io n s a r e o r ie n te d tow ard th e fu tu re, L e w is b e lie v e s that he can
at le a s t d eterm in e what th e s e u ltim a te r u le s a re; for it is a p art of
hum an r a tio n a lity to w eig h and to c o n s id e r goods of the fu tu re as
w e ll a s o f the p r e s e n t. T h is fa c t, L e w is b e lie v e s , i s th e root of a ll
ou r thin k in g. It i s , th e r e fo r e , the b a s is of m a n 's u ltim a te r u le - -
| th e L aw of O b jectiv ity . L e w is p h r a se s th is r u le a s fo llo w s:
|
l So condu ct and d e ter m in e y o u r a c tiv itie s of th in k in g and of
doing, a s to c o n fo rm any d e c is io n o f th em to th e o b je c tiv e
a c tu a litie s , a s c o g n itiv e ly s ig n ifie d to you in you r r e p r e s e n ta
tio n a l a p p reh en sio n of th em , and not a c c o r d in g to any im p u lsio n
203
or so lic ita tio n e x e r c ise d by the a ffectiv e quality of your p resen t
ex p erien ce a s im m ed iate fee lin g only. (Ground, p. 89)
To w hich L ew is adds a co ro lla ry :
i
Conduct y o u r se lf w ith r e fe r e n c e to th o se future eventualities:
w h ich cognition a d v ise s that your a ctiv ity m ay affect, a s you
w ould if th e se p red ictab le e ffe c ts of it w e re to be r ea liz ed , at
th is m om ent of d e c isio n , w ith the poignancy of the h ere and
now, in stea d of the l e s s poignant fee lin g w hich rep resen ta tio n
of the future and p o ssib le m ay au tom atically a ro u se, (p. 89)
The Law of O bjectivity, then, is a ru le b a sic to the in
d ivid u al's natu re. But m an is a lso e sse n tia lly so c ia l, a fact
w hich lea d s L ew is to h is secon d r u le --th e Law of M oral E q u ality.
T his ru le, h ow ever, he d iv id es into two p r in cip les w hich he c a lls
the Law of C om p assion and E quality b efore the M oral L aw . The
fo rm er he in fo rm a lly e x p r e s s e s a s follow s:
R eco g n ize, in your action affectin g any sen tien t being,
that c la im on your com p assion w hich co m fo rts w ith its cap acity
to enjoy and su ffer. (G round, p. 92)
T his ru le ap p lies not only to human b eings but to a ll b ein gs—
to the extent at le a s t that th ey can ex p erien ce sa tisfa c tio n s or fe e l
pain.
The other p r in c ip le --E q u a lity b efore the M oral L a w --
L ew is fo rm u la tes and exp lain s a s below :
Take no d e c isio n of action w hich is m em b er of any c la s s of
d e c isio n s of doing a ll m em b er s of w hich you would c a ll upon
o th e rs to avoid. That is , 1 think, the intent of reco g n izin g our
own a c ts a s righ t to do tow ard o th ers only if w e lik e w ise acknow l
edge them as right when done to u s . The p articu lar points h ere
£ 0 4
j a r e two: f ir s t , that r ig h tn e ss under ru le is a m a tter
of the c la s s ific a tio n or m o d es of a c ts; and se co n d , that an
act is righ t o n ly if it fa lls in no c la s s in terd icted b y r u le .
(G round, p. 93)
T h ese two fo r m s of the Law of M oral E q u ality,tak en togeth er,
i
: stip u la te that one is to do nothing w hich h e w ould c a ll upon o th ers to
! avoid u n iv e r sa lly .
|
| The p u rp ose of th e se r u le s , a cco rd in g to L e w is, is to
d e ter m in e w hat is p e r m is s ib le and what is n ot. In th is s e n s e ,
th ey a r e in d isp e n sa b le to e th ic s . B ut, as r u le s , th ey do not fu r n ish
the con ten t n e c e s s a r y fo r d eterm in in g what is rig h t. Two fa c to r s
a r e th e r e fo r e n e c e s s a r y fo r d eterm in in g what is right: The f ir s t
is a r u le - -fu r n ish e d b y the Law of O b jectiv ity to g eth er w ith the Law
o f M oral E quality; the seco n d in v o lv es so m e r e fe r e n c e to good n ess
in te r m s of c o n se q u e n c e s. The fo r m e r su p p lies the d ir e c tiv e , the
|
| co m p u lsio n of the e th ic a l situ ation ; the la tter b rin gs in the req u ired
; e m p ir ic a l data.
L ew is c h a r a c te r iz e s the fu n ction in g of th e se two e le m e n ts of
righ t thinking as s y llo g is t ic . In s y llo g is tic r ea so n in g th e m ajor
p r e m is e is a ru le; the m in o r p r e m is e is a g e n e r a liz a tio n c o v er in g
the fa c ts o f hum an n a tu re, to g eth er w ith oth er p ertin en t e m p ir ic a l
data; and the c o n c lu sio n is an e th ic a l im p e r a tiv e . A rough illu s t r a
tion of su ch a s y llo g is m w ould be the follow in g:
205
M ajor p rem ise: E quality b efore the M oral Law
("Do unto o t h e r s .. .
(D irective)
M inor p rem ise: Stealin g leads to bad consequences
(E m p irical fa ct b ased upon gen eralization
of human nature)
C onclusion: I ought not to stea l
(An eth ical im p erative)
Although L e w is's ch aracterization of the right includes
r eferen ce to the good, he does n o t--a s P e r r y d id --b a se the com pul-
| siv e elem en t in the ought upon this fact alone; for the com p u lsive
factor in the eth ical im p era tiv e, for L ew is, com es from the co m -
I
j bined fo r c e s of em p irica l facts and ca teg o rica l d irectiv es of right
| thinking. L ew is, th erefo re, would strengthen the com p u lsive factor
of the ought.
I
Yet, even if L ew is w ere su c c e ssfu l h e r e --a point su b se
quently to be qu estion ed—it m ay s till be asked whether or not
L ew is has paid too heavy a p rice: Has his ch aracterization of the
righ t threatened his ep iste m o lo g ica l d istin ction betw een em p irica l
and analytic knowledge ?
This is a question which som e c r itic s of L ew is's view s r a is e .
M orton W hite, for in sta n ce, in "Valuation and O bligation in D ew ey
and L e w i s , a f t e r callin g the rea d er's attention to L ew is's
statem en t, "... what is righ t and j u s t .. . can never be d eterm ined by
e m p irica l fa ct alone" (A n a ly sis, p . 554), ask s w hether or not L ew is
5
| P h ilo so p h ica l R eview , LVIH (July 1949).
206
m ean s that a ll e th ica l sta tem en ts a r e tru e or fa ls e a n a ly tica lly . If
| _ j
i th ey a r e , p ro b lem s im m ed iately a r is e . To sa y , fo r in sta n c e , that j
i I
| !
| 'tru th tellin g is r ig h t1 or that 'it w as righ t fo r Brutus to stab C a e sa r 1
!
| a r e both a n a ly tica lly tru e is p a ra d o x ica l to sa y the le a s t. B u t--to
j continue W hite's c r it ic is m - - t h e y m u st be a n a ly tic, L ew is having
j
i
! m ain tain ed that su ch sta tem en ts cannot be d eterm in ed by e m p ir ic a l
m ean s a lo n e.
As W hite s e e s the p ro b lem , what s u c c e s s L ew is has attained
by b rin gin g in a co m p u lsiv e fa cto r of the ought, he has sa c r ific e d
I ;
| I
! to h is a n a ly tic -e m p ir ic a l d istin ctio n . In con seq u en ce L ew is now h as,;
I
| in ste a d of h is p r o fe sse d two ty p e s, th ree types of know ledge:
: (1) an alytic kn ow led ge, (2) e m p ir ic a l kn ow led ge, and (3) know ledge
i of what is righ t, wh&t is ju st, and what ought to b e . L e w is's su c -
i c e s s in e th ic s , th e r e fo r e , a cco rd in g to W hite, is bought at the p r ic e ;
j of h is ep iste m o lo g y .
In a rev iew of L e w is's An A n a ly sis of K nowledge and V a l
u a tio n W. F ran kena r a is e s m uch the sa m e q u estio n .^ F o r L ew is
a ll know ledge is an alytic and a p r io r i or syn th etic and e m p ir ic a l. |
T h eory of v a lu e , in L e w is's p r e sen ta tio n , is a sp e c ie s of e m p ir ic a l j
i
I
k n ow led ge. But co m p la in s F ran k en a, L ew is does not reg a rd eth ica l
sta te m en ts as a s p e c ie s of e m p ir ic a l know ledge; and sin c e th ere is !
I
^ P h ilo so p h ica l R ev iew , LXVI (July 1957),
207
no in d ication that su ch sta tem en ts a re a n a ly tic, L e w is's p o sitio n
b eco m es o b scu re .
1 b e lie v e that th e se c r itic s have b een m is le d by an a ccid en t
of gra m m a r. F o r in sta n ce , com m on lin g u istic u sage d oes r e fe r to
e th ica l sta tem en ts as tru e or f a ls e . But L ew is s p e c ific a lly restricts;
I
'r ig h t1 and 'w rong' to action s and to d e c isio n s in volvin g a ction s:
"The fie ld of judgm ent of righ t and w rong extends to w h atever is
su b ject to hum an d elib era tio n or c a lls fo r d ecision " (G round, p . 9).
S in ce on ly p ro p o sitio n s are tru e or fa ls e , F rankena and W hite are
in e r r o r in attem pting to fo r c e L ew is into c h a r a cter izin g eth ica l
sta tem en ts as true or fa lse ; fo r truth and fa ls ity do not apply to
action s or to d e c isio n s in volvin g su ch a c tio n s. T hus, 'tru th tellin g
is right' is n eith er tru e nor fa ls e but is rath er the v e rb a lizin g of an
eth ica l d e c isio n . W hether or not the d e c isio n is c o r r e c t, is not a
q u estion of truth or fa ls ity but of righ t and w rong. S in ce the q u e s-
I
1
; tion r a ise d by the statem en t 'tru th tellin g is right' is one of d e c isio n ,
|
| the an sw er to the sta tem en t can be sta ted as 'y es' or 'no' w ithout
any r e fe r e n c e to truth fu n ctio n s.
A lik e a n a ly sis ap p lies to W hite's other ex a m p le, 'It w as
righ t fo r B rutus to stab C a e s a r .' The a n sw er, sin c e it again in
v o lv es a d e c isio n , is sim p ly 'y e s' or 'n o .'
T his co n clu sio n is not su r p r isin g , when one c o n sid e r s that
e th ica l sta tem en ts are r u le s - - a s L ew is is so ca refu l to in d ic a te --
208
fo r reg u la tin g b e h a v io r . A s d ir e c tiv e s , th ey c le a r ly cannot b e tru e
o r f a ls e . In e th ic a l te r m s W hite's m isle a d in g illu str a tio n , 'tru th
te llin g is r ig h t ,' w ould be b e tte r sta te d as 'do not t e ll l i e s !' In
th is tr a n sla tio n , the r e fe r e n c e to d e c isio n m aking and to a ctio n s b e
c o m e s c le a r ly ev id en t. The c r it ic is m s , th e r e fo r e , that L ew is
a c h iev e s the e th ic a lly c o m p u lsiv e fa c to r at the ex p e n se of h is e p is -
te m o lo g y a r e u n w arran ted .
M ore to the p oin t, h o w ev e r, is the ch a rg e that L e w is's
c h a r a c te r iz a tio n of c o m p u lsio n is p sy c h o lo g ic a l rath er than m o r a l.
It in v o lv es an id en tific a tio n of w hat is m o ra l w ith w hat is ration al;
j ^
| and, as L u ciu s G arvin poin ts out in "The N ew R ation alism in E thics,"
su ch a c h a r a c te r iz a tio n of m o r a lity is lim ite d to th o se who r e c o g n iz e
the o b lig a tio n to be r a tio n a l.
In fa ir n e s s to L ew is it sh ould p erh ap s b e acknow ledged that
any explanation of v a lu e and m o r a lity m u st in e v ita b ly in v o lv e c ir c u
la r reason in g: m an v a lu e s and has o b lig a tio n s b e c a u se it is the n at
u re of m an to v a lu e and to h ave o b lig a tio n s. Indeed, it w ould be s u r
p r isin g if su ch a c ir c le did n ot o c c u r . N o n e th e le s s, b y its in e v ita
b ility th is c ir c le d oes in v ite the p h ilo so p h er to c lo s e it p r e m a tu r e ly .
T hus, L e w is, fo r in s ta n c e , eq u ates m o r a lity w ith r a tio n a lity and
^Journal of P h ilo so p h y , XLVHI (M ay 1951)
then con ven ien tly d isc o v e r s that it is the nature of m an to be
ra tio n a l. F rankena points to two d ifficu lties w ith L e w is's argum ent
h e r e . The fir s t argum ent is that L e w is, in m aintaining that the
v a lid ity of p rin cip les cannot be valid ated , find th eir grounds in
hum an n atu re. Now, as above, L ew is equates ration ality with
m o ra lity , but, as Frankena points out, L ew is can do so only to the
extent that m an is actu ally ration al and o b jectiv e. But this m erely
sh ifts the problem : why should m an be m ore ration al than he is ?
L ew is se e m s to find the rea so n in ra tion ality as "d istinctive" of
hum an n atu re. But this argum ent cannot elim in a te the d ifficu lty
so long as su ch a ch a ra cteriza tio n of hum an nature can be questioned.
Why, fo r in sta n ce, ask s F ran kena, cannot the defining c h a r a c te r istic
of m an be h is laughing tendency? A s long as L ew is does not an sw er
th is qu estion , he fa ils to in d icate why m an should be m o re rational
(m oral) than he i s .
This p rob lem lea d s to F ran kena's secon d c r itic is m . If
L ew is can so lv e the p rob lem of m o ra lity by appealing to hum an
natu re, why cannot, sa y , the u tilita ria n s do the sa m e ? The M oral
p rob lem , after a ll, is one of explaining why one should ch o o se the
gen eral good over e g o istic a im s. This b ein g so , an appeal to human
nature on this point cannot be channeled and lim ited to any one
s y s te m of e th ic s.
210
E ven w ith h is ap p eal to hum an n a tu re , fu r th e r m o r e , L ew is
has not so lv e d the p r o b le m . A fter a ll i s s a id and don e, L e w is's
Law o f O b jectiv ity , in sp ite of its v in d ica tio n b y hum an n a tu re,
a c tu a lly ap p eals to the in d iv id u a l's e g o is m in te r m s of fu tu re r eg r et:
"you w ill be s o r r y if you d o n 't." And if th is is the c o r n e r sto n e of
a ll rig h t thin king, then it is b a s ic a lly e g o is tic . L e w is w ould r ep ly ,
h o w ev e r, that th is is not the o n ly la w of righ t thin king. Such e g o is
tic e m p h a sis is avoid ed b e c a u se the L aw of M oral E q u a lity a lso is
o p e r a tiv e and m u st be c o n sid e r e d in any c o n c r e te situ a tio n .
T h ree r e sp o n s e s to L ew is a r e h e r e p e r tin en t. F ir s t , the
L aw of O b jectiv ity is lo g ic a lly m o r e p r im itiv e than the Law of E q ual
ity , b ein g " .. .th e ro o t o f a ll the im p e r a tiv e s of our thinking and
doing" (G round, p . 89). In th is s e n s e , th e ch a rg e of e g o is m r eta in s
so m e m e r it as lo n g as th e r e a r e c o n flic ts b etw een the ind ivid u al
and the s o c ia l good. S eco n d ly , on e cou ld su p p ort the ch a rg e of
e g o ism b y c a llin g in q u estio n L e w is's "Law of M orality" its e lf; and
fin a lly , on # cou ld p oin t out th a t, ev en if v in d ic a ted , the Law of
M o ra lity m e r e ly sta te s w hat L ew is is attem p tin g to e s ta b lis h in
the f ir s t p la c e : th e fa c t, n a m e ly , th at th e r e is a c o m p u lsiv e f a c
to r in in te r p e r so n a l m o r a l r e la tio n s h ip s . A ll th at L ew is d oes is to
tr a n sla te th is fa c t in to a c a te g o r ic a l im p e r a tiv e . Adding L e w is's
211
other law s of the right to the "Law of O bjectivity" i s , th erefo re, not
su fficien t to avoid a charge of e g o ism so long as the "vindicating
p rin cip les" a re to be found in human nature; fo r, as G arvin su g g ests:
. . .if we accep t the definition of the rational as the se n sib le ,
n ea rly everyone would agree that the "sensible" p erson is the
p erso n who conducts h is life according to a plan which he w ill
be "perm anently b e st sa tisfie d to have adopted (548)." And
such a plan need not, of c o u r se , be an eg o istic on e. But the
chances are that if the plan adopted w ere e g o istic , few of those
who accepted L e w is’ definition of "sensible" would be inclined
to withdraw this tag so long as this egoiBtic plan gave p rom ise
of prom oting the value econom y of the agent. (324)
The prob lem of in terp retin g ration ality as im p artiality now
b ecom es acute:
We m ay indeed ca ll an e g o ist who happens not to be in te r
ested in the in te re sts of oth ers in the sam e m easu re that he is in
h is own, an "irrational" p erso n . C ertainly he would not be trea t
ing oth ers im p a rtia lly . But sin c e he se e s no value in te r e sts as
su ch , he would be v e r y lik ely to regard the im partial treatm ent
of in te re sts as not at a ll rea so n a b le. (324)
T hese com bined argum ents tend to underm ine the su c c e ss of
L ew is's appeals to ca teg o rica l im p eratives as the law s of right think
in g. But the m ain argum ent against Lew is is not that h is appeal to
human nature as a vindication of m a ra lity is an illg e itim a te s te p --
such an u ltim ate appeal is a lo g ica l n e c e s s ity --b u t that it tends to
lim it a n a ly sis. In other w ord s, m y objection again st L ew is is not
that L ew is becom es involved in a c ir c le , but, rath er, that by
212
appealing to hum an nature p rem a tu rely , he narrow s the c ir c le un
n e c e s s a r ily .
On th is point, L e w is 's p o sitio n is s im ila r to S teven son 's in
b locking inquiry; fo r in both th e o r ie s th ere is an ap p eal to im p e r a
tiv e fa c to r s. Iro n ica lly , L ew is fin d s the co m p u lsiv e elem en t in th e
n atd re of ra tio n a l thought, w h ereas Steven son a ttrib u tes it to the
irr a tio n a lity of em o tio n s. B e th is as it m ay, the r e su lts of the
tw o stan ds are sim ila r , fo r, in both c a s e s , the con firm ation of
e th ica l sta tem en ts extends beyond the range of v a lu e th eory its e lf.
F o r Steven son th is in v o lv es a stu d y of em o tio n s. F o r L ew is it
co n stitu tes a study of the nature of m an. But, in each c a se , the
im portant point is that fu rth er d is c u ssio n m ust m ove fro m value
th eo ry into p sych olog y.
It is leg itim a te , th e r e fo r e , at th is point to se a r c h for m ean s
of broadening the range of value th eo ry . T h e p rob lem m ay be
form u lated a s fo llo w s: in e sta b lish in g a c le a v a g e betw een the righ t
and the good, L ew is lim its inquiry in v a lu e th eo ry by appealing b e
yond it to th e p sych ology of hum an natu re. What valu ation al ap
proach can be u sed to d isc o v e r add ition al fa c to r s in the m oral
situ ation ? Iro n ica lly , it is S teven son who m ay help h e r e to extend
the range of valu e th eo ry . A t le a s t h e su g g e sts a d ifferen t approach
fro m that of L ew is; for, in stea d of sep a ra tin g the good and the righ t,
213 !
he, unlike L ew is, m aintains that they cannot be separated. Steven
son thereupon red u ces the good to the right, and, for Stevenson,
Value theory turns into eth ics.
Steven son 's elevation of 'right' is the opposite of P er ry 's
consid erin g 'good' the prim itive term . Stevenson vin d icates this
step on the b a sis of the im p o ssib ility of adequately defining 'good1; I
for, according to Stevenson, a c lo se r scrutiny of P er ry 's raisin g
'good' to the key position w ill reveal that P e r r y 's 'm oral goodness'
is nothing m ore than a p ersu a siv e definition. Thus, in term s of
the standard of in c lu siv en ess, 'm oral goodness' b ecom es a thinly
d isgu ised m eans for supporting m ajority ru le. P er ry 's 'm oral
goodness' is , th erefore, p ersu a siv ely defined and m ay be considered:
the term of a m o ra list vindicating the dem ocratic way of life .
A ccording to Stevenson, th erefore, P e r r y 's th e o ry --a t le a st
to the extent that it is a value theory, and not one of p sy ch o lo g y --
rep resen ts one additional exam ple of why definitions of good usually
obscure an im p erative factor p ersu a siv ely defined. Yet, even if one i
j
w ere to avoid such a p ersu a siv e definition, the im perative elem ent j
would, n on eth eless, reappear in ordinary eth ical d iscou rse; for,
|
in reducing the good to the right, Stevenson finds a com pulsive
factor in each ethical u tteran ce. Even to say, 'Crying is b a d ,' is , |
according to Stevenson, im p licitly to utter the im p erative not to cry. |
And th is tran slation of 'crying is bad1 su g g ests p a ra llel im p lication s
for such eth ical te r m s as 'right, 1 'ought, ' ‘d u ty ,' 'o b lig a tio n .'
L in gu istic a n a ly sis, a lso , h elp s to d isco v er that 'right' has
a m eaning sim ila r to 'g o o d .' The d iffe r e n c e --if one ig n o res slight
v ariation s in am biguity and em otive tin g e - -is one of gram m ar.
'Good' and 'right' both r e fle c t a favorable attitude and an effort to
r ed ir ec t or r e -e n fo r c e attitudes, although 'good' r e fe r s to things
and people, w h ereas 'right' usu ally m od ifies a ctio n s. Thus, one
d e c la r es 'He is a good m an, ' but, in referrin g to an action, one
sa y s, 'H is action w as right. ' The approval and p ersu a siv e a sp ects
are apparent in each c a se .
'O bligation, ' 'd u ty ,' and 'ought' are sim ila r to 'right' in
referrin g to a ctio n s. Yet th ere are subtle d istin ction s involved.
'Right' p r a ise s for a p ositive action, w h ereas 'duty, ' 'o b lig a tio n ,'
and 'ought' blam e for an o m issio n . To u se S teven son 's illu stra tio n
(in w hich w rong is opposite of right, and o m issio n i s indicated by
u se of a negated in fin itive clau se):
It would be (m orally) wrong for him not to be charitable,
but being charitab le is not h is duty or ob ligation --n oth in g that
he p o sitiv e ly ought to do. (E th ics, p. 99)
One of S teven son 's contributions h e r e--w h a tev e r its other
m e r it s - - is the d isco v ery of a d istin ction betw een 'right' and 'ought. '
In ch aracterizin g 'right' a s reflectin g p r a ise for p o sitiv e action
215
c o r r e c tly done, and in pointing out that 'ought' u su a lly in volves
b lam e fo r o m issio n , Steven son im p lic itly supports L ew is's con ten
tion that eth ica l thinking is a sp e c ie s of righ t thinking in g en era l,
and that m o ra l ru les are e s s e n tia lly n egative in natu re. But it is
to S teven son 's c re d it that, unlike L ew is, he finds the com p u lsive
factor w ithin an eth ica l orien tation , m aking u n n e ce ssa ry appeals to
the nature of m an, which is a d istin ct im p rovem ent over L e w is's
n o n -em p irica l co n sid er a tio n s. But S teven son 's ch a ra cteriza tio n of
the com p u lsive elem en t in eth ical d isc o u r se is also an advance over
P e r r y 's idea of a com p u lsion of m ere prudence and, in being stronger
than P e r r y 's conception, rin gs tru e to the actual m oral situ ation .
Although in d isco v e rin g a d istin ction betw een 'right' and
'ought' and by m aintaining that the 'ought' c a r r ie s a fo rc e stro n g er
than m er e prud en ce, S teven son c la r ifie s the is s u e , se rio u s d efects
w eaken h is own o v e r a ll th eory. The fir s t d ifficu lty is that S teven son
fa ils to e sta b lish that eth ica l d isc u ssio n is irra tio n a l sim p ly b eca u se
co n flicts of in te r e sts a re often se ttle d by p u rely p e r su a siv e ta c tic s .
The other th ree p h ilosop h ers can adm it this fact without jeop ard izin g
th eir p o sitio n s. Indeed, P e r r y points to the u sefu ln ess of p ersu asion
as a factor in in tegratin g value:
A p ologetic reason in g, w hether p erso n a l or s o c ia l, is too
fundam ental and sig n ifica n t a thing to be d is m is se d eith er as
gratu itous, or as se lf-d e c e p tiv e and m en d a cio u s. The root of
this thing is not to be d isco v e re d in "an overw h elm ing need to
216
b e lie v e that w e a r e a ctin g ratio n a lly " or in any other queer
hum an id io s y n c r a s y . The fu n ction of a p o lo g etic r ea so n in g is
to en ab le a m an or a nation or m ankind, d e sp ite th e w ide
v a r ie ty of op in ion s and in te r e s ts that m u st d iv id e th em , to find
so m e com m on ground fo r h arm on iou s and u n ited a c tio n s. If
a p o lo g e tic rea so n in g w hen so in te rp re ted i s to be c a lle d by the
n am e of 'r a tio n a liz a tio n , 1 then that n am e m u st a cq u ire new
a s s o c ia tio n s and com e to m ean the u se ra th er than the a b u se.
F or th e thin g it s e lf i s a n orm al and e ffe c tiv e con d ition of a ll
p e r so n a l and so c ia l life , and in the e x e r c is e of its tru e fun ction
i s a s m u ch bound to h o n esty and tru th a s i s any other m od e of
r ea so n in g . (G e n e r a l, pp. 3 9 8 -3 9 9 )
L e w is and P a rk er a ls o can a g r e e w ith S tev en so n that
p e r s u a s iv e ta c tic s often a r e fin a l in e th ica l d isp u te s, and can y et
m a in ta in th e ir p o s itio n s . L e w is, fo r ex a m p le, fu lly r e c o g n iz e s
th e fu n ction in g of p e r s u a s iv e fa c to r s , and ev en ack n ow led ges a
fun dam ental r e la tiv ity of c e r ta in v a lu e s , su ch a s th o se of ta s te .
P a r k e r , m o r e o v e r , in c lu d e s in h is th eo ry a p sy ch o lo g y of p e r s u a
sio n and r e c o g n iz e s its le g itim a te em p loym en t w ithin h is g en era l
th e o r e tic a l fra m ew o rk .
S te v e n so n 's p sy ch o lo g y of p e r su a sio n , th e r e fo r e , cannot in
it s e lf d is c r e d it th e lo g ic a l sig n ific a n c e of th e o u g h t--d e sp ite
S te v en so n 's in ten tion to do so . T h erefo re, w h ile S tev en so n d o es
r en d er a s e r v ic e by d em o n stra tin g that th e re i s a stron g c o m p u lsiv e
fa cto r in th e ought, he fa ils to give lo g ic a l r e a so n s w hy th is
co m p u lsio n sh ould be th e r e .
P er h a p s one r e a s o n for S te v e n so n 's fa ilu r e h e r e i s that h is
217
a n a ly sis m in im izes the sig n ifica n ce of the com p u lsive factor in the
prudential ought. It is tru e, of c o u r se , that in S teven son 's theory,
the ind ividu al, in so fa r as he is ration al at a ll, appeals to prudence
when he is u sin g the w ord 'o u g h t.' P resu m a b ly this does o ccu r
w henever the individual can m u ster 'rea so n s' fo r h is 'attitu de. ' But,
unfortunately, S teven son underm in es even this com p ulsion of the
ought by attem pting to d isc r e d it the v e r y m ea n s-en d relation sh ip up
on w hich its sig n ifica n ce r e s ts . The r esu lt of S teven son 's an alysis
is that, at le a s t im p lic itly , the eth ica l com p ulsion s of all m eanings
of the ought are reduced to the in d ividu al's sh ee r ob stin acy. And in
this se n se S teven son 's an alysis is in co m p lete. It fa ils to exp licate
adequately the com p u lsive factor for the ind ividu al's u se of 'o u g h t.'
As S teven son 's theory is in com p lete for the individual co m
p u lsiv e fa c to r , so it fa ils a lso on the le v e l of the so c ia l ought. As
H enry D . Aiken in d ic a tes, Steven son " .. .m is s e s altogeth er the
im p erso n a l or in terp erso n a l au th oritativen ess which is at once v o iced
in the judgm ent and n o rm a lly claim ed for i t . " ^ It is not enough that
S teven son d isc o v e r a com p u lsive fa cto r in the m oral situation; he
m u st a lso e x p la in --if this be p o s s ib le --th e rea so n s for it.
*^"A P lu r a listic A n alysis of the E th ical Ought," Journal of
P h ilosop h y, XLVHI (August 1951), 4 9 9 -5 0 0 .
218
P erh a p s the u n d erlyin g r e a so n for the d iffic u ltie s h e r e
in d ica ted is th at, in em p h a sizin g the s im ila r itie s of a ll im p e r a
tiv e s as fu n ction in g to r e d ir e c t a ttitu d e s, S tev en so n h as fa ile d to d is
c o v e r any d iffe r e n c e s b etw een m o r a l and n o n -m o r a l im p e r a tiv e s .
T his fa ilu r e in v o lv es the p r o b le m of m ark ing off the d istin c tiv e
fe a tu r e s of the im p e r a tiv e s of m o r a l judgm ent fr o m w hat A iken
c a lls the sim p le "gard en v a r ie ty fir s t-p e r s o n a l dem ands and e x
p r e s s io n s of attitude" (4 9 9 -5 0 0 ).
If the n o n -m o r a l im p e r a tiv e s a r e in itia lly id en tified w ith
p ru d en ce a lo n e , th en , as A lexan d er S e so n sk e poin ts out, eth ica l co n -
i flic ts can often be r e so lv e d w ithout a g r ee m e n t in e ith er attitu d es or
b e lie f s . The p r o c e s s e s of c o m p r o m isin g , illu str a te d by P e r r y and
! P a r k e r , a r e c a s e s in p o in t. To u se S e so n sk e 's illu stra tio n : m anage-
| m en t and la b o r m a y a g r e e on a c o m p r o m ise fifte e n cen t an hour pay
r a is e even w h ile m a n a g em en t's attitu de is that fiv e cen ts would be
su ffic ie n t, and the e m p lo y e e s' attitude is that anything le s s than
tw e n ty -fiv e cen ts is u n fa ir. T h ese a ttitu d es, in turn, m a y b e b ased
upon c o n flic tin g b e lie fs co n cern in g th e p ro p er p r o fit le v e l fo r
c o r p o r a tio n s, the a ctu a l liv in g c o s t s , e tc . The c o n c lu sio n is that
. . . r a tio n a l se ttle m e n t of a d isa g r e e m e n t is p o s s ib le even
w hen the d isa g r e e m e n t in attitu de is n ot rooted in d is a g r e e
m en t in b e l ie f ; .. . even m o r e .. . ra tio n a l se ttle m e n t is p o s s ib le
ev en w ithout r e so lu tio n of the d is a g r e e m e n t in a ttitu d e. 1^
^ " O n the S k e p tic ism o f E th ics and L an gu age," Journal of
P h ilo so p h y , L (S ep tem b er 1953), 6 1 1 . ___
219
This p o ssib ility is even m ore apparent when one con sid ers
that, as P ark er in d ica tes, fo r c e alone is one m ethod for settlin g
c o n flic ts. And c le a r ly , if two individuals are fo rced , by a third
party or by c ir cu m sta n c es, to se ttle a con flict, the agreem ent can
be attained without regard to attitudes or b e lie fs. This fa ct, of
c o u r se, r a ise s the p rob lem of w hether or not su ch actions are
m oral m e r e ly b ecau se they achieve agreem en t. The answ er, ob
v io u sly , m ust be "no." In its v e r y e sse n c e m o ra lity involves so m e
thing m ore than, m ere a g reem en t--a g reem en t without rec o u r se to
attitudes or to b e lie fs.
One way of distin guish in g betw een m oral and nonm oral
im p e r a tiv e s--u sin g S teven son 's te r m in o lo g y --is to a s s e r t that
co n flicts betw een nonm oral im p eratives m ay be se ttle d , in p rin cip le,
without rec o u r se to attitudes or b e lie fs, w h erea s, at le a s t intui
tiv ely , m oral con flicts of im p eratives can be decided only when
attitudes and b eliefs are taken into con sid eration .
At this point it m ay be asked, what is the reason for this
d ifferen ce betw een nonm oral and m oral im p e ra tiv es. Stevenson
h im se lf unw ittingly stu m b les upon the key to the answ er by d is
coverin g that, in any con czet* situation , th ere can be se v e r a l right
action s but only one 'ought1 involving m oral obligation. T here i s ,
220
th e r e fo r e , one s e n s e of 'ought1 w hich d iffers fr o m , and is com p u l
s iv e ly str o n g e r than, the prud en tial and nonm oral u se s of the ought.
S teven son d is c o v e r s this m ean ing w hen he sa y s:
The shade o f m en a ce that often attends "duty" and "ought"
is the e m o tiv e , q u a si-im p e r a tiv e cou n terp art of th e ir u se in
in d icatin g stron g d isa p p ro v a l of o m issio n . We u su a lly do not
bother to te ll a p e r so n that he ought to do som eth in g u n less we
su sp e c t that the fr e e run of h is im p u lses w ill o th e rw ise lead
h im to n e g le c t it. "Ought" and "duty" com e as r e s tr a in ts ,
seek in g to r e p r e ss the h e a r e r 's fr e e im p u lses by building up
any c o u n te r-im p u lse s that m a y be laten t in h im . (E th ic s, p. 100)
The q u estion , of c o u r se , rem ain s: what a r e the so u r c e s of
th e se " laten t. . . counter im p u lses" ? At th is point S tev en so n 's
a n a ly sis goes a str a y . But by linking 'duty' and a c e r ta in m ean ing
of 'o u g h t,' he has at le a s t stu m bled upon a p o s sib le k ey to the
a n sw er. It rem ain s fo r P a r k e r , h ow ever, to d isc o v e r what this
m issin g fa cto r a ctu a lly i s .
To b egin w ith , P a rk er su g g e sts an apparent d ifficu lty in
linking 'duty' w ith 'ought' in v alu e th e o r ie s w hich s t r e s s sa tisfa c tio n ;
fo r the 'ought,1 a cco rd in g to P a r k e r , r a is e s the paradox of duty: to
do o n e's duty often op p oses o n e's own s a tisfa c tio n s. How can th is
b e ? P e r r y and L e w is, and even S tev en so n , attem pt to an sw er this
q u estion , but, as p r e v io u sly in d icated , fo r fundam ental rea so n s
th eir a n a ly ses a r e in c o m p lete . Why have th e se p h ilo so p h ers fa ile d
to r e s o lv e the p arad ox?
221
P a rk er a n sw e rs that the paradox a r is e s from a m isu n d e r -
i
i
standing of what 'duty* m e a n s. A ctu ally, in an ord in ary se n se ,
'duty' r e p r e se n ts a dem and. A s su ch , it could w e ll be in op p osition !
i
i
to sa tisfa c tio n . But th is dem and i s of a sp e c ia l k in d --a fa ct w hich, j
w hen reco g n ized , w ill p erm it P a rk er to r e s o lv e the paradox; for !
r
i
|
the nature of duty, in its fu ll sig n ifica n ce , in v o lv es not only a d e
m and but a dem and w ille d and accep ted by the individual h im se lf.
Seen in th is lig h t, the paradox in volvin g duty and sa tisfa c tio n d is
a p p ea rs. Duty and the ought offer no o b sta c le s to a valu e th eo ry
b a sed upon d e s ir e and, accord in g to P a rk er , find th eir lo g ic a l
p o sitio n s w ithin the o v e r a ll fra m e w ork. In fa ct, such con cep ts a s
•duty1 and 'ought* give m ean ing to P a r k e r 's id ea l m orality; for
id e a l m o ra lity , a s r e fle c te d in th e slogan , " lib erty , fra tern ity ,
eq u ality, " e n c o m p a sse s duty (fra tern ity as the duty of lo v e to help
one another), r ig h ts (lib er ty a s the freed o m to r e a liz e o n e 's life
plan), and the r e c o n c ilia tio n of duty and rig h ts (w hich, a s eq u ality,
is the adjustm ent of o n e's own w ill-to -p o w e r accom p an ied by
em pathy for the d e s ir e s of other p eop le). It i s apparent that in th e se j
|
te r m s P a rk er h as d isc o v e r e d the d iffe re n c e b etw een m o ra l and n on - j
m o ra l im p e r a tiv e s; for m o r a l im p e r a tiv e s, unlike nonm oral o n es,
in v o lv e a com m itm en t and w illin g acknow ledgem en t of the dem ands of |
j
a group. A ccord in g to P a rk er , therefore* the d u ty -situ a tio n c o n s is ts
222
of dem ands and se lf-w ille d r e sp o n se s to such dem ands.
M orality, in th is se n se, is fundam entally so c ia l. T his fact
in its e lf su g g ests what th ere is in the nature of such dem ands that
m ake them e sse n tia lly m oral dem ands:
The ob jective of m o ra lity m ay b est be d escrib ed as the
p reserv a tio n and fo sterin g of a d e sired w ay of life for a ll the
m em b ers of the group w ith whom id en tification is p o ssib le .
(P hilosophy, p. 249)
T his ch aracterization of the m oral ought as a com m itm ent
to a culture su p p lies the factor m issin g in the other th e o r ie s. It
fu rn ish es the m issin g c riter io n for determ ining the d ifferen ces b e
tw een m oral and nonm oral im p era tiv es in S teven son 's theory, and
it o v erco m es the insurm ountable d ifficu lties w hich " p rom ises" and
"truth-telling" p resen ted to P e r r y 's presen tation of the ought.
F in ally, it extends the range of em p irical inquiry for value theory
beyond that of L e w is's position; for P ark er, w h ile m aking a d is -
tin c tio n --a s does L e w is--b e tw e en eth ics and value theory, need s
neither L e w is's ca teg o rica l im p era tiv es nor h is appeals to the
p sych ology of m an's nature in order to explain the m eaning of the
m oral ought. In short, the com p u lsive factor of the m oral ought,
according to P ark er, can be accounted for w ithin the lim its of
em p irical value th eory its e lf.
In sum m ary, then, the four ph ilosop h ers have each con-
trib uted to the m ean in g of the 'ought. ' P e r r y p r e se n ts a ca refu l
a n a ly sis of what is e s s e n tia lly the p rud en tial ought. B y an analogy
of individu al c o n flic ts of in te r e sts w ith co n flicts occu rrin g betw een
in d ivid u als w ithin a cu ltu re, P e r r y extends the m ean ing of p e r so n a l
prudence to in clu de so c ia l p ru d en ce. L e w is, on the other hand,
h e lp fu lly poin ts to the am bigu ity of the ought; fo r , in addition to
p ru d en ce, th e r e is the tech n ica l m eaning of ought, stem m in g fr o m
the fa c t that w h atever end be ch o sen , th ere a re e ffic ie n t m ean s of
attaining it; th e re is a lso the leg a l m ean ing of ought to be c o r r e la te d
w ith the law s of the com m unity; and, fin a lly , th ere is the am bigu ity
of 'ought1 as em p loyed in con n ection w ith 'ju stic e . ' This am bigu ity
of the 'ought' lead s L ew is to exam in e, in p a rticu la r, the r e la tio n
sh ip of prudence and ju s tic e . H e finds that although prudence and
ju s tic e are independent c o n c ep ts, th ey a r e , as we have se e n , in
tr ic a te ly r ela ted . S teven son , fo r h is p art, how ever unw ittingly,
goes on h e r e to contrib ute to the form ation of an e m p irica l th eo ry
of ob liga tion b y in d icatin g that th ere is a co m p u lsiv e fa cto r not
exp lain ab le in ter m s of pru d en ce alon e. And P a rk er fu rn ish es this
e le m en t of com p u lsion by ch a r a cter izin g the m o ra l ought in te r m s
of the d em an d s, the w illin g r e sp o n se , and the id en tification of the
individual w ith a so c ia l group.
T h e v ie w s of the fo u r p h ilo so p h e r s, tak en to g e th e r , thus
round out th e fu ll m ea n in g o f th e 'o u g h t* --in clu d in g the p ru d en tial,
th e te c h n ic a l, th e le g a l, and th e m o ra l sig n ific a n c e of the te r m . Any
fu tu re d is c u s s io n , th e r e fo r e , in o r d e r to a v o id a m b igu ity, m u st
c le a r ly d efin e in any p a r tic u la r c o n tex t w hich u se o f th e fo u r
m ea n in g s of 'ought' is in ten d ed .
CHAPTER VHI
THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF OBLIGATION
If the p reced in g d ism issio n con cerning the relation sh ip of the
righ t and the good w ere to be reform u lated in term s of m o tiv e s and
of a c ts , then the resu ltin g dispute would be a fo rm of the trad ition al
tele o lo g ic a l-d e o n to lo g ic a l c o n tro v e rsy . Stated b r iefly , te le o lo g ic a l
th eo ries . .h old that the righ tn ess or w ron gn ess of an action is a l
w ays d eterm ined by its ten dency to produce certa in con seq u en ces
w hich are in tr in sic a lly good or bad, w h ereas d eon tological th e o r
ie s maintain that . .e th ic a l p rop osition s take the form : "Such and
such a kind of action would be righ t (or wrong) in su ch and su ch c ir
c u m sta n ce s, no m atter what its con seq u en ces m ight be" (p. 206).
F o r the te le o lo g ist the right is determ in ed by r efer e n c e to the future
with an em p h asis upon m o tiv es for m a x im izin g the good, w h ereas in
the p osition of the d eon tologists su ch duty is d eterm in ed by r e fer e n c e
to the p ast and in term s of the act it s e lf .
The te le o lo g ic a l sta n d --r e fle c tin g , as it d o e s, the prudential
ought—has been exam ined in d e ta il. The d eon tological p o sitio n is
rep resen ted in P a r k e r 's conception of the m o ra l ought but m u st be
supplem ented by further argu m en ts.
* C .D . B road, F iv e T ypes of E th ical T h eory (London, 1930),
p. 207.
225
226
W. D. R o s s, a d is c ip le of H. A . P rich a rd , su p p lie s m u ch
su p p lem en tation in The R ight and the G ood. He u s e s both n eg a tiv e
i and p o sitiv e a rg u m en ts. The n eg a tiv e a r g p m e n ts --d ir e c te d a g a in st
i i
I th e p ru d en tial ought of the u tilita r ia n s - - show that the p ru d en tial ought
I is to o r e s tr ic tiv e in its c h a r a c te r iz a tio n o f so c ia l r e la tio n sh ip s.
! I
; f
' S p e c ific a lly , a cco rd in g to R o ss, the exp on en ts of prud en ce a lo n e - - a s I
a con cep t su ffic ien t to c o v er a ll m ea n in g s of the o u g h t--w o u ld red u ce |
so c ia l r e la tio n sh ip s to th o se of b en efa cto r and b e n e fic ia r y . But,
i
R o ss m a in ta in s, th is is to o lim ite d a v iew of so c ia l r e la tio n s; fo r,
|
w ithin any c o n c r e te s o c ia l situ ation , th e re a r e, in addition to b e n e -
I fic ia r y -b e n e fa c to r r e la tio n sh ip s, a ls o the r e la tio n sh ip s of hu sb and -
^ |
w ife, c r e d ito r -d e b to r , c h ild -p a r en t, p r o m is e r -p r o m is e e , and by r e - |
str ic tin g r ec o g n itio n to r e la tio n sh ip s of b en efa cto r -b e n e fic ia r y , the
te le o lo g is t m i s s e s the d u ties im p lie d in th e se m an y other im p ortan t
j s o c ia l r e la tio n sh ip s.
T h is n eg a tiv e argum en t le a d s R o ss quite n a tu ra lly to the
! p o s itiv e con trib u tion that so c ia l r e la tio n s a r e th e b a s is for p rim a
I
| fa c ie d u ties. Now, R o ss d oes not fo r m a lly d efin e ’p r im a fa c ie duty, 1
i b e lie v in g th at no w ord can con vey it s e x a c t m ea n in g . W hat he h a s in
m in d , h o w ev er, i s the v ie w that p rim a fa c ie d u ties a r is e a s im p lic a
tio n s of tw o -w a y c la im s .
i
i I
Two p o in ts a r e p ertin en t h e r e . F ir s t, th e tw o -w a y c la im
d o es not n e c e s s a r ily have to be b etw een tw o p eo p le b e c a u se ,
[ 227
! according to R o ss, one m ay have a cla im against o n eself, a s, say
i
| in the c a se of the individual who m akes a com m itm ent to better h im - !
I
!
| se lf. And, second, w hether or not a prim a fa cie duty is indeed an
i
! actual duty depends upon con sid eration of a ll m o ra lly sign ifican t
: i
> data. In th is se n se , prim a fa cie du ties are actu ally conditioned |
; j
; du ties, depending upon the o v era ll situation in each c a se .
With th e se q u alification s, R oss p roceed s to catalogue prim a j
I fa cie duties a s follow s:
1. F id elity and R eparation d u tie s--(R e stin g on
p reviou s a cts of one'a own)
a. F id elity duty im p lied by im p licit
p r o m ise s
b- R eparation duty im plied by p reviou s !
| w rong acts
1
I
2. G ratitude d u ty --(R estin g upon a cts of oth ers)
(S e rv ic es)
|
3. Duty of ju stic e --(R e stin g upon distribu tion in
ter m s of m erit)
I
i
4. B en eficen ce d u ty --(R estin g on p o ssib ility of im
proving the v irtu es of oth ers)
5. S elf-im p rovem en t d u ty--(R estin g on the p o ssib ility
of im proving on e's condition) i
| 6. N o n -m a leficen ce d u ty --(R estin g upon grounds
sim ila r to, but independent of, the B en eficen ce
duty— a com m itm ent to prevent human suffering)
T his lis t of prim a fa cie du ties, according to R oss, m ay not
| be ultim ate; further r eflec tio n m ay indeed uncover a better c la s s i
fication . Any such lis t , how ever, m ust square w ith em p irical fact
228
; and be vin d icated by se lf-e v id e n c e :
l
| I should m ake it p lain . . .th a t I am assu m in g the
| c o r r e c tn e ss of so m e of our m ain con viction s a s prim a
fa c ie d u ties, or, m o re str ic tly , am cla im in g that w e
I know them to be tru e. To m e it se e m s a s se lf-e v id e n t
a s anything could be, that to m ake a p r o m ise , for in
sta n ce, is to c re a te a m o ra l c la im on us in som eon e
e ls e . Many rea d ers w ill perhaps say that w e do not
know th is to be tru e. If so , 1 cer ta in ly cannot prove
it to them ; 1 can only ask them to r e fle c t again, in
the hope that they w ill u ltim a tely a g ree that they a lso
know it to be true- (The R ight, pp. 2 0 -2 1 )
Thus, R o s s 's underlying argum ent again st the prudential ought is
j that, sin ce th is ought r e s t s upon the rela tio n sh ip of ben efactor and
i
b en eficia ry , it cannot en com p ass the m any other so c ia l rela tio n sh ip s
j w hich e x is t in any so c ie ty and m ust th erefo re be supplem ented w ith
j
j
i other com m itm en ts.
i
i
|
A question now a r is e s : is each duty on R o s s 's l i s t - - a s a
b a s is for the m o ra l ought--independent of the prudential ought?
i
J P erhap s h ere the statu s of R o s s 's 'se lf-im p r o v e m e n t duty' is open
| to qu estion b ecau se it d iffers fundam entally from h is other d u ties,
for self-im p ro v em en t i s the only duty lim ite d to one p e r so n 's
p articip ation . The question is : is th is d ifferen ce tr iv ia l or
sign ifican t ?
The fir s t objection w hich P ark er w ould r a is e h ere is that
obligation and duty, in the fu ll m eaning of th e se te r m s , in volve a
com p u lsion from w hich the individual is-n o t fr e e to d isen gage
229
h im s e lf. The p r o m ise , th e r e fo r e , m u st be m ade to another
individual or group o f in d ividu als who have it w ithin th eir pow er to
hold the individual to h is com m itm en t. It is in th is , accord in g to
P a r k e r , that m o ra lity r e c e iv e s its co m p u lsiv e e le m e n t.
Now it is tru e, as show n in the d is c u s s io n of the p rud en tial
ought, that th ere is a com p u lsion in prud en ce w hich its e lf is a
d icta te of ra tio n a lity . But it is a lso tru e that, of h is ow n fr e e w ill,
the individual is capable of repudiating th is im p era tiv e as long as
he can a sk the q u estion , "But w hy a m 1 co m p elled to be ration al?"
And h e r e , as p r e v io u sly show n, we have reach ed an appeal w hich,
b arrin g sh e e r em otive exh ortation s or even fo r c e , can be u ltim a tely
a n sw ered on ly in ter m s of p ru d en ce. A ccord in g to th is argum ent,
therefore, the co m p u lsiv e elem en t in R o s s's 'duty of s e lf-im p r o v e
m en t1 la ck s the type of ob ligation w hich can be im p osed on ly b y one
individual upon another and, a cco rd in g ly , m u st be red uced to
prudence alon e.
S eso n sk e su pp orts P a r k e r on th is p oin t, com in g to m uch
the sa m e con clu sion :
An e s s e n tia l e le m en t of our ord in a ry notion of
ob ligation is that on ce the co m m itm en t is m ade and the
ob ligation in cu rred , it cannot b e n u llified or abrogated
m e r e ly by having the p e r so n who m ade the com m itm en t
and has the ob ligation d ecid e that h e is no lo n g er bound
b y it. But w e can alw ays do th is w ith com m itm en ts
and ob ligation s to ou rs e lv e s - - w e a r e bound b y th em
on ly a s long a s w e c h o o se to b e bound. H en ce I am in
230
clin ed to think that the p h r a se "ob ligation to o n eself" is
m o re m eta p h o rica l than lit e r a l. (V alu e, p . 86)
If th is be tru e, then the sa m e a n a ly sis is a p p lica b le to
R o s s 's 'duty o f se lf-im p r o v e m e n t1; fo r even R o ss ad m its that the
'duty of se lf-im p r o v e m e n t' and the 'duty of ben eficen ce* r e s t upon
fu n d am en tally the sa m e grounds: ". . .w h a t w e h ave c a lle d the duty of
b e n e fic e n c e and th e duty of se lf-im p r o v e m e n t r e s ts on the sa m e
ground. No d ifferen t p r in c ip le s of duty a r e in volved in the two casesP'
(T he R igh t, p . 26). H en ce, s in c e the duty o f s e lf-im p r o v e m e n t can
be red u ced to prud en ce; the duty of b e n e fic e n c e , r e stin g on the sa m e
grounds as s e lf-im p r o v e m e n t, can a lso be red u ced to p ru d en ce.
It m a y b e o b jected , h o w ev er, that th e re is a d iffe re n c e
b etw een the 'duty of s e lf-im p r o v e m e n t1 and the 'duty of b e n e fic e n c e 1
b e c a u se the la tte r , un lik e the fo r m e r , alw ays in v o lv es m o re than
one p e r so n . But is th is a v a lid o b je ctio n ? D o es the 'duty of
b e n e fice n c e' a c tu a lly alw ays in v o lv e ev en a ta c it a g r ee m e n t b e
tw een in d ivid u als of a co m m u n ity? S om e p e r so n s c la im that th e r e
is no su ch a g r ee m e n t, and w ould co u n terch a rg e th at, at b e s t su ch
a ctio n in v o lv e s "m edd ling in oth er p e o p le 's b u s in e s s ." T hey w ould
rep u d iate th is s o - c a lle d duty on the b a s is that tru e m o r a lity r e q u ir e s
fr e e d o m fo r ea ch individu al to s e e k h is own g o a ls, un ham pered by
in te r fe r e n c e , b en ev o len t o r o th e r w is e .
S e so n sk e and P a r k e r , h o w ev e r, un d erm in e th e ir o r ig in a l
231
argum ent a g a in st the p o s sib ility of in cu rrin g a duty to o n e se lf when
th ey m aintain that one can com m it o n e se lf to an id ea l com m unity.
This p o s s ib ility S eso n sk e m akes c le a r as follow s:
. . .o u r a scrip tio n s of ob ligation often have r e
fe r e n c e to id ea l com m u n ities as w e ll-- m o s t often to
the id eal com m unity of m an. A ll th&t w e can ju stifia b ly
do in th is regard is to a sse n t that what an agent's obligation
w ould be if the id ea l com m unity w ere actual and ad d ress
the agent as a p oten tial m em b er of a p otential com m unity
w h ose accep tan ce of th is obligation is a step in the
p r o c e ss of tran sform in g the id eal com m unity into an
actu al on e. If the individual does regard h im se lf as a
m em b er o f this com m unity, h is ob ligation m ay be as
r e a l as any tether. . . (V alue, p. 89)
The qu estion now a r is e s : if one can com m it o n e se lf by
p o sitin g an id eal com m unity, then why can one not com m it o n e se lf
by p ositin g an id ea l s e lf? The o rig in a l ob jection a g a in st s e lf -
im p osed ob ligation s - -th a t "we are bound by them on ly as long as
w e ch o o se to b e bound"--no longer can be m aintained in a th eory
w hich p e r m its the p o sitin g of an id ea l com m unity, fo r , c le a r ly ,
in both c a s e s , the ob ligation , being one to an id eal entity, is
e s s e n tia lly the sa m e .
W. H. W erk m eister avoids th is d ifficu lty b y recogn izin g
that the situ ation is indeed s im ila r , thus m aking it p o s sib le fo r one
to com m it o n e se lf to an id ea l s e lf as w ell as to an id e a l com m unity;
fo r , a ccord in g to W erk m eister, as the p o sitin g of an id eal
232
com m u n ity m ak es id e n tific a tio n w ith , and co m m itm en ts to, th is
id e a l p o s s ib le , so the p o sitin g o f an id e a l s e lf w ithin an id ea l
co m m u n ity m a k es p o s s ib le a co m m itm en t of the actu al s e lf to its
id e a l s e lf . W e r k m e iste r 's v ie w , th e r e fo r e , lead s out of the
in c o n s is te n c ie s im p lie d in the S e s o n s k e -P a r k e r -contention that
o b lig a tio n alw ays in v o lv e s m o r e than one p e r so n . It in d ic a tes
a lso w hy R o s s's 'duty of s e lf ^ im provem ent' m u st be c o n sid e r e d a
p ru d en tial o b lig a tio n as lon g as the in d ivid u al d oes not p o s it an
id e a l s e lf; fo r the v e r y m ean in g of m o r a l o b lig a tio n , a cco rd in g to
W e rk m e ister , fo llo w s as the in d iv id u a l's co m m itm en t to a p r o m is e .
R o s s 's 'duty of s e lf-im p r o v e m e n t,' sin c e it im p lie s no r e q u ir e
m en t that one n eed co m m it o n e s e lf to an id ea l s « lf in an id ea l
com m u n ity, fa lls sh o r t o f b ein g a c o m m itm en t. T his fa c t, in turn,
in d ic a te s why R o ss cannot s tip u la te --a n d w hy th e re m a y a lw ays be
o b jectio n s a g a in st su ch stip u la tio n s— that th e 'duty of s e lf-im p r o v e
m e n t1 is a p r im a fa c ie duty b in ding upon a ll p e o p le.
T his sa m e a n a ly sis is a p p lica b le to R o s s 's 'duty of
b e n e fic e n c e '--s o lon g as so m e typ e of co m m itm en t is not m ad e to
the com m u n ity in v o lv ed .
T his le a v e s fiv e m o r a l d u ties on R o s s 's lis t: fid e lity ,
rep a ra tio n , g ra titu d e, ju s tic e , and n o n -m a le fic e n c e --e a c h im p ly in g
a c o m p u lsiv e fa c to r m is s in g in th e d u ties o f b e n e fic e n c e and s e l f -
233
Im provem ent. T his com p ulsive factor occu rs h ere b ecau se, un
like s e lf im provem ent and b en eficen ce, th e se five duties
im p lic itly , if not ex p lic itly , com m it the individual to a p ro m ise.
Indeed, as W erk m eister points out, the v e ry fact that one is
liv in g in a com m unity in volves an im p licit com m itm ent to its
cod es as long as one has not repudiated them . Thus, H o ss1s five
rem ain in g prim a fa cie duties can be accep ted as genuine du ties.
But again st B o s s 's appeal to the se lf-e v id e n c e of th ese
d u ties, the sam e objection m ust be r a ised which, in a different
context, was p r e sse d again st Stevenson and L ew is: su ch appeals
tend to block inquiry. E fforts m ust th erefore be made to extend
the a n a ly sis a s far as p o ssib le before givin g in to this ultim ate
appeal.
What, then, it m ay be asked, is com m on to a ll four s e ts
of prim a fa cie duties on B o ss 's lis t? In itially, it is evident that
a ll su ch duties depend upon a com pact. Th its fu ll m eaning the
idea of a com pact c a r r ie s with it two im p lication s: (a) a p ro m ise,
at le a st im p licitly .m a d e, and (b) fu ll consent of the p arties
(as s tr e s s e d by P a rk er). T h ese fa c to r s, at lea st intu itively,
appear app licable to each of B o ss 's four prim a fa cie d u ties. But
additional questions a r ise : what is the nature of this com pact?
And to what extent does the p ro m ise com m it the individual to it?
234
To understand th is point, it m u st be r e c o g n ize d that
a g r ee m e n ts of the ty p es in q u estion r a r e ly occu r in iso la tio n . They
a re m ade - -w h eth er or not th is be e x p lic itly a ck n ow led ged --w ith in a
I
cu ltu ra l con figu ration . T h is d o es not m ean that th ey are m ade !
w ithin ju st any group. In p r im itiv e s o c ie tie s , for in sta n ce , in - |
d ivid u als are n o to rio u sly quick to in d icate that th ey do not co n sid er j
m o ra l co m m itm en ts w ithin th eir in -g ro u p a s binding upon th em - j
s e lv e s tow ard o u tsid e r s. The id ea of an in -g ro u p is a u sefu l co n - j
i
!
cep t b e c a u se it su g g e sts two other in g red ien ts in p rim a fa c ie d u ties: j
I
(a) the id en tifica tio n w ith a group, and (b) a com m itm en t to a
I
cu ltu re. 'In -grou p 1 is a lso a fortunate te r m b e c a u se , a s far as both !
I
(a) and (b) a r e con cern ed , the id en tifica tio n and com m itm en t m ay, |
th e o r e tic a lly , extend a c r o s s natural b ou n d aries, h is to r ic a l lin e s ,
fa c to r s of r a c e , and even beyond what an th rop ologists r e fe r to
a s cu ltu ra l co n fig u ra tio n s. A ll that i s req u ired to lim it an in - |
group is a c o m m itm e n t--im p lie d or o th e r w is e --to a group. And th is ;
co m m itm en t, in turn, w hen w illin g ly m ad e, en ta ils c e r ta in ob ligation s
a cco rd ed to an id en tifica tio n w ith a group. T his i s W. H- W erk
m e is te r 's point w hen he m a in ta in s that the m o ra l ought in v o lv e s a
com m itm en t to, and an id en tifica tio n w ith, an actu al or id ea l
com m unity; fo r, accord in g to W e rk m e ister , sin c e the v e r y m eaning
of m o ra l ob ligation d e r iv e s fro m a com m itm en t, m o ra l ob ligation
235
is binding on the in d iv id u a l--its v io la tio n , b ein g a b rea ch of the
co m m itm en t, en ta ils the h azard of r e je c tio n fr o m hum an so c ie ty .
Such a c h a r a cter iza tio n of the m o ra l ought, I b e lie v e , fu r n ish es the
analytic and e m p ir ic a l b a sis fo r th e com p u lsion com m on to a ll
fiv e of R o s s 's p rim a fa c ie d u ties.
But h e r e a fu rth er d ifficu lty s e e m s to a r is e , fo r this
a n a ly sis now in d ica tes that th ere are p r o m ise s in volvin g two
co m m itm en ts: one is R o ss's c h a r a cter iza tio n of p r o m ise s as
o c cu rr in g betw een in d iv id u a ls, the oth er o c c u r s in W erk m eister's
a n a ly sis w h ereb y p r o m ise s a r e m ade to the in stitu tion s of a c u ltu r e .
In o rd er to avoid p o s sib le con fu sion , the f ir s t point to note
is that th ere is nothing su p e r-o r g a n ic about cu ltu res: cu ltu res a r e
nothing m o re than con figu ration s of the individu al m em b ers th em
s e lv e s , and the id ea of a con figu ration , in tu rn , is m e r e ly a con
cep tu al d e v ic e , a tool for in terp reta tio n . T his fa c t alone should
help to avoid m uch of the apparent conten tion b etw een R oss and
W erk m eister on th is p oin t. Be th is as it m a y , W erk m eister d oes
r e c o g n iz e the d istin ctio n of p r o m ise s b etw een in d iv id u a ls, and c o m
m itm en ts to a com m u nity as su ch . In fa c t, W erk m eister r e c o g n iz e s
fiv e d ifferen t m ean in gs o f ’p r o m ise ':
(1) A p r o m ise b etw een (or am ong) in d iv id u a ls.
(2) A p r o m ise of an ind ivid u al (or in d ivid u als) to a
so c ia l group a s an a ctu a lly e x istin g en tity. Such
236
P r o m ise s can be enforced by group action.
(3) A p ro m ise of an individual o r individuals in
a situation in which the id eal and the actual
tend to o v e r la p --a s in the m arriage contract.
(4) A p ro m ise of an individual to h im se lf. This
alw ays involves the p ositin g of an id eal s e lf.
But h ere an am biguity can occur: the co m m it
m ent can be that of an actual s e lf to an id eal
s e lf, or that of an actual se lf to som e m ore
r e str ic te d id eal or ca u se.
(5) A p ro m ise betw een an individual (or in d iv i
duals) to an id eal com m unity. As in all
c a se s involving id e a ls, there is no agency to
enforce this com pact: th ere is only the m oral
fo rc e of the com m itm ent its e lf.
When fr e e ly m ade and when identification with a group (be it
actual or ideal) is involved, any p ro m ise in this lis t b ecom es the
b a sis for a m oral obligation by the v e ry m eaning of a p r o m ise .
B y w ay of sum m ary, we m ay d erive th ree conclu sions from
this d iscu ssio n : (1) m oral obligations are im plied by p r o m ise s
w hether im p lic itly or ex p licitly m ade; (2) such p r o m ise s involve
fr e e consent and u ltim ately an identification with a group; and
(3) m o ra l obligation and prudential obligation, stem m in g as they
do from d ifferen t grounds, are actu ally independent con cep ts.
T h ese th ree conclu sions rep resen t the th e se s of W erkm eister
and S eso n sk e, and ind icate why the prudential ought as an id en tifica t
ion w ith what is rational m u st be c le a r ly d istin guish ed fro m the
m oral ought as an id en tification and com m itm ent to a group.
237
But another p ro b lem at th is point a r is e s : is th e re u ltim a t
e ly a rela tio n sh ip b etw een the p ru d en tial and the m o ra l ought? The
an sw er to th is q u estion b eco m es apparent o n ly through co n sid erin g
d u ties as th ey a ctu a lly o ccu r w ithin a c o n c re te situation ; fo r
W erk m eister's c h a r a cter iza tio n s of p o s sib le co m m itm en ts, lik e
R o s s 's l is t of p rim a fa c ie d u ties, r e p r e se n t on ly the fo rm a l
requirem ents of an ob ligation . Both th e se p h ilo so p h ers m aintain
the actu al ob ligation m ay be d eterm in ed on ly in ter m s of the con
c r e te situ ation it s e lf . But these req u irem en t r a is e s an a g e -o ld
p roblem ; fo r in su ch c o n c re te situ a tio n s, c o n flic ts b etw een d u ties
often o c c u r . F o r in sta n c e , should the d octor lie in o rd er to sa v e
the life of h is p atien t? H ere the c o n flic t b etw een the d o cto r's
com m itm en t not to te ll lie s co n flic ts w ith h is H ip p ocratic oath.
How m ay su ch a co n flic t be r e so lv e d ?
The a n sw er to W erk m eister is that in any c o n c r e te situ a
tion th ere can be extenuating c ir c u m s ta n c e s . But the ob ligation ,
n o n e th e le ss, s t ill rem a in s w ithin the con text of the so c ia l group in
w hich it o c c u r r e d . T his fa c t, fo r r e a so n s su g g ested p r e v io u sly ,
fo llo w s fr o m the v e r y m eaning of an o b lig a tio n . In su ch a situ a tio n ,
th e r e fo r e , the o n ly r e c o u r se is to an app eal in volvin g a h igh er
com m u n ity. Such a p ro ced u re can continue upw ard in ter m s of
actu al co m m u n ities until the u ltim a te of an id ea l com m u nity is
238
r e a c h e d . C o n sid er, fo r ex a m p le, the c itiz e n of A lab am a who m ay
d is a g r e e , sa y , w ith the s t a t e ’s law of o ff-s h o r e m in e r a l r ig h ts.
In v io la tin g th is sta te law , he m ay ap p eal to the S u p rem e C ourt fo r
an in te rp re ta tio n of F e d e r a l law . H ere, in c a s e of d isa g r e e m e n t,
th e in d ivid u al could s e e k au th ority in the U nited N a tio n s. F in a lly ,
in the even t that th is prooed u re fa ile d , he cou ld e v en th en m ake
the u ltim a te ap p eal to an id e a l com m u n ity. In e a ch c a s e , the
p r o je c tio n is to a h ig h er com m u n ity u n til an u ltim ate id e a l
com m u n ity is r ea c h e d .
Such a p p e a ls, h o w ev er, a cco rd in g to W e r k m e iste r , m u st
u ltim a te ly be b ased upon an evalu ation : the h igh er com m u n ity is a
p r o jec tio n of the in d ivid u al’s v a lu e s . But th is p r o jec tio n n eed not
be a r b itra r y , a cco rd in g to W erk m eister; in fa ct, it m u st be
d eterm in ed by an ex a m in a tio n of hum an n atu re. M orality, on the
oth er hand, r e fle c ts m an ’s s o c ia l nature and— in te r m s of p r o m is e s
a s co m m itm en ts and id e n tific a tio n w ith a g r o u p --u ltim a te ly m u st
e n su r e the fu lle s t p o s sib le p o te n tia litie s of th is s o c ia l n a tu re. On
the o th er hand, p ru d en ce p e r m its a p r o jec tio n of v a lu e s as id e a ls .
Such p r o je c tio n s, h o w ev er, m u st b e m ade by a good w ill in te r m s
of a ll a v a ila b le know ledge at the tim e; and th e se p r o je c tio n s th e m
s e lv e s a re but m ean s tow ard d evelop in g the g r e a te s t p o te n tia litie s
of hum an n a tu re. T h is, then, r e p r e s e n ts , fo r W e r k m e iste r , the
relation sh ip of the prudential ought to the m oral ought in a th eory
w hich p r e se r v e s the e sse n tia l d ifferen ce of each .
Stephen E . Toulxnin, in An E xam ination of the P la c e of
2
R eason in E th ic s, attem pts to fu rnish the bridge betw een the
m o ra l ought and the prudential ought with the appeal that p r e v en -
| j
j tab le su fferin g is to be avoided w henever p o s sib le . This approach
is su bsum able under W erk m eister's th eory at le a s t to the exten t
that su ch a p rin cip le r e p r e se n ts, even for T oulm in, a m eans w h ere
by m an's g r e a te st p o ten tia lities can be ach ieved . At the sa m e tim e
h ow ever, th ere are e sse n tia l d ifferen ces betw een Toulm in and
W erk m eister, w hich subsequent d isc u ssio n w ill d is c lo s e .
Like W erk m eister, h ow ever, Toulm in a lso s e e s the p rob lem
of obligation in term s of com m itm ents to a com m unity. He e x -
i plains that d issa tisfa c tio n of individuals in their culture appears
I
|
| to a r is e as a r e su lt of co n flicts of duty, for the individual g e n e ra lly
1
i
accep ts u n c r itic a lly as h is m o ra l standards th ose m axim s w hich
i
are dictated by so c ie ty . As long as th e se ru les c le a r ly define the
ind ividu al's duty, th ey are retain ed . H ow ever, if the individual
find s h im se lf in a situation in which the standards b ecom e in ad e
quate, he m u st eith er rea ffirm the absolute righ tn ess of th ese
standards or exam ine the m axim s th e m se lv e s. T his exam in ation ,
2
(Cambridge, England, 1950).
240
sin c e it co n cern s a m o ra l p ro b lem , m u st, im p lic itly o r e x p lic itly ,
app eal to duty.
D uty, thus c o n sid e r e d in its s o c ia l co n tex t, r e p r e se n ts to
the in d ivid u al a ren ou n cin g of h is c la im s and the a lter in g of h is
a im s as th ey c o n flic t w ith o th e r s . It r e f e r s , th e r e fo r e , to the type
of b eh avior w hich, if given up g e n e r a lly , w ould lead tow ard the
b reak -d ow n of h is s o c ie ty . This fa c t, su g g ested by T ou lm in,
su pp orts the W e r k m e iste r -S e so n sk e p o sitio n that m o r a lity e s s e n t i
a lly in v o lv es an id e n tific a tio n and co m m itm en t to a sp e c ific c o m
m u n ity.
Y et, in the a b sen ce of an adequate s o c ia l m a x im , to what
m a y duty a p p eal? T oulm in m ain tain s that it m u st be to c o n sid e r
ation s of co n se q u en ce s b a sed upon e x p e r ie n c e . This poin t again is
in a g r ee m e n t w ith the W e rk m e iste r -S e so n sk e th e o r ie s . But it is
h e r e that T oulm in p a rts com pany w ith W erk m eister and S e so n sk e
b y conclu ding that the p r in c ip le in te r m s of w h ich the co n seq u en ces
are to be judged is that p rev en ta b le su fferin g is to be avoided
w h er ev e r p o s s ib le .
T h ere a re now two m a x im s in T ou lm in 's th eo ry to w h ich an
app eal on b eh alf of duty m a y be m ade: that of the e sta b lish e d e th ic a l
stan d ard s of the com m u n ity, and T ou lm in 's sp e c ific p o stu la te
that a ll p rev en ta b le su ffer in g is to be a void ed . It b e c o m e s n e c e s -
241
s a r y , th e r e fo r e , to ex a m in e the r ela tio n sh ip b etw een th e s e two
sta n d a r d s.
A ccord in g to T ou lm in , the k ey to the r ela tio n sh ip is to be
found in eth ics as an e v o lv in g p r o c e s s . P s y c h o lo g ic a lly and
h is to r ic a lly eth ics m a y be o b se r v e d as a tra n sitio n fr o m a d eon
to lo g ic a l b a s is tow ard a te le o lo g ic a l b a s is . This change m a y be
tra ced fro m the p r im itiv e sta g e of s o c ie ty w h ere m o r a l co d es are
fix e d , to the m o re c o m p lex s o c ie tie s w h ere m o tiv e s and r e su lts of
s o c ia l p r a c tic e s a re e m p h a siz e d . In the la tte r situ a tio n , a cco rd in g
to T oulm in, the appeal rs alw ays to the p r in c ip le that hum an
su fferin g is to be avoid ed .
It m u st be noted h e r e that at the point w h ere fix ed stan dards
im p o sed by au th ority a r e q u estio n ed in te r m s of the m a x im that
avoid ab le su fferin g be e lim in a te d , two a lte r n a tiv e s a r e p o ssib le :
(1) the r ea ffirm in g of the a b so lu te rig h tn e ss by the p ow ers en forcin g
the co d e, o r (2) a g r ee m e n t to the c r itic is m w ith even tu al m o d ifi
ca tio n of the co d e. The f ir s t a lter n a tiv e tends on ly to aggravate
the con d ition , w h erea s the seco n d r e p r e se n ts the p r o c e s s w h ereb y
m o r a l co d es th e m se lv e s grow out of c o n flic ts of in te r e s t.
Although th is d iffe r e n c e b etw een d e o n to lo g ica l and
te le o lo g ic a l th e o r ie s is r e a l, at n e ith e r sta g e is th e re an ab solu te
d istin c tio n . The r e a liz a tio n that th e re is a com b in ation of
242
deontological m axim s with standards of the teleo lo g ica l kind is
e sp e cia lly pertinent in any consideration of the advanced stage of a
given culture, for h ere the fixed standards, without which any
so c ie ty would d isin tegrate, rem ain. In all unambiguous c a se s ,
duty req uires adherence to the accepted m axim s of the com m unity.
In a com plex so c iety , how ever, the teleo lo g ica l asp ect rem ains as
a constant c r ite r io n --to which one m ay appeal in the c a se of a
cla sh of duties or when the righ tn ess or w rongness of the m axim s
them selyeB is questioned. In challenging accepted standards, the
appeal m ay be m ade to the m axim that action required by those
standards w ill cause other m em b ers of the com m unity som e incon
ven ien ces annoyance, or su fferin g. In Toulm in's words:
Ethics is concerned with the harm onious sa tisfa c
tion of d e sir es and in te r e sts. On m ost occa sio n s it is a
good reason for choosing or approving of an action that
is in accordance with an estab lish ed m axim of conduct,
for the existin g m oral code, and the current institutions
and la w s, provide the m ost reliab le guide as to which
d ecision s w ill be h ap p y--in the sam e kind of way as
standard p ra ctice in engineering.
At the sam e tim e, it is not right to accept the p r e
sent institutions u n c r itic a lly --th e y m ust evolve, along
with the situations to which they apply. There is , th e re
fo re , alw ays a p lace in so c ie ty for the 'm o ra list', the
man who c r itic iz e s the current m orality and in stitu tion s,
and advocates p ra ctices n earer to an id eal. And the ideal
he m ust keep before him is that of a so c ie ty in which no
m ise r y or fru stration is tolerated within the existin g
reso u rces and state of know ledge. ^
*3
•'Reason, p. 223.
243
A ccording to T oulm in, then, the accepted m axim s of a
com m unity b ecom e tem p orary r u le s , im p o rta n t--in d eed v ita l--to the
so c ie ty . Yet th ere m ay be at a ll tim es the p o s sib ility of appeals to
the p rin cip le that p reven tab le su fferin g be avoided. And to the
extent that the p r o c e ss e v o lv es fro m d eon tological to te le o lo g ic a l
e m p h a sis, eth ics m ay be co n sid ered as the h is to r ic a l developm ent
of a m oral cod e.
Although T oulm in's a n a ly sis helps to e sta b lish a relation sh ip
betw een m oral and prud en tial ob ligation , and does su g g est a w ay in
w hich d eon tological and te le o lo g ic a l in sigh ts can both operate within
one gen eral th eory, the sh ortcom in gs of his th eory are that he tends
to blur the lo g ic a l d istin ctio n so ca refu lly esta b lish ed by W erk-
m e is te r and S eso n sk e betw een m oral and prudential obligation; for
although, as e m p irica l co n cep ts, the prudential and the m oral
ought both to occu r togeth er as in d isp en sab le to the functioning of a
cu ltu re, T oulm in's u ltim ate appeal is to so c ia l prudence in term s of
a h arm on iou sly in tegrated com m unity; and this fa ct burdens Toulm in
with the d ifficu lties p r e v io u sly encountered in a ll attem pts to reduce
the m oral ought to the prud en tial o n e.
A nother d ifficu lty w ith T oulm in's a n a ly sis is that, u n less
h is p rin cip le (preventab le su fferin g is to be avoided w h erev er p ossible)
is a ccep ted , the lo g ic a l n e c e s s ity of m oral reason in g is left in doubt;
244
fo r th is p r in c ip le r e p r e se n ts the u ltim a te p r e m is e fr o m w hich h is
th e o r y fo llo w s . It m u st th e r e fo r e be accep ted w ithout q u a lifica tio n
or r e s e r v a tio n . B ut, u n fortu n ately, tr a d itio n a lly (and e s p e c ia lly
in the c a s e of p r im itiv e s o c ie t ie s , as T oulm in so h elp fu lly points
out) th is co m m itm en t is often lack in g; and w h ere it d oes o c cu r su ch
an en d o rsem en t often r e fle c ts m e r e ly an e th n o c en trism . The
en su in g p r o b le m thus b e c o m e s: why is it that the com p u lsion to
co m m it o n e se lf to th is p r in c ip le can v a r y to su ch an exten t, if it
a c tu a lly fu n ction s as T oulm in c la im s that it d oes ?
The a n sw er cannot be b a sed , as T oulm in m a in ta in s, upon
the d e g r e e of c r itic a l exam in ation of the n orm s th e m se lv e s; if this
w ere p o s s ib le , th e p ro b lem s of eth ics would be fa r sim p le r than
th ey a c tu a lly a r e . The d iffic u lty in e th ic a l d isp u tes c e n te rs on the
fa c t that m an y p a r tie s , even a fter r e fle c tio n , do not fe e l lo g ic a lly
co m p elled to a ccep t T ou lm in 's p r in c ip le as u ltim a te . The h is to r y
of w ars and th rea ts of w ars to the p r e se n t m om en t a tte sts to th is
fa c t. And, what is m o r e , th e r e n eed be no co n tra d ictio n in m a in
ta in in g that life under su ch and su ch con d ition s of co n flic t is
p r e fe r a b le to an e x is te n c e in w hich life is a lte r e d in o rd er to
m in im iz e su ffe r in g . What is n eed ed , th e r e fo r e , is fu rth er a n a ly sis
of the r e la tio n sh ip b etw een the m o r a l and the p ru d en tial o u g h t--a n
a n a ly sis w h ich , w ithout T o u lm in ’s appeal to e m p ir ic a l g e n e r a l
245
iza tio n s, w ill p r e se r v e the in trica te relation sh ip betw een the two
te r m s without in any w ay d iscred itin g the e sse n tia l d ifferen ce e sta b - i
lish e d by S eso n sk e and W erk m eister.
The su c c e s s of such a venture depends upon returning from j
!
T ou lm in's a n a ly sis of the e m p irica l situation to a reco n sid era tio n of
the b a sic lo g ic a l rela tio n sh ip s occu rrin g betw een the d eon tological
and the te le o lo g ic a l concep ts as W erk m eister d evelop s them . Now
W erkm eister* s 'm oral ought1 p rev io u sly w as c h a ra cterized as being
a n a ly tica lly im p lied by the m eaning of a p r o m ise . W erk m eister
d oes not m ean, how ever, that sim p ly b ecau se p r o m ise s are analytic,
the notion of a n alyticity m ust b ecom e, on th is account, r ela tiv e to
the p articu lar code in w hich the p ro m ise happened to be m ade; for
such a r ela tiv e ch a ra cteriza tio n of an a ly ticity --a lth o u g h it could
perhaps be stip u lated --w ou ld be in tu itively awkward. Nor does
W erkm eister* s p o sitio n involve him in the contrad iction that
p r o m ise s, b ecau se th ey entail an obligation to a cu ltu re, m u st be
m o ra lly binding even when m ade w ithin im m oral sy ste m s of e th ic s.
On the other hand, th ese is s u e s do req u ire further explanation of the
se n se in w hich p r o m ise s m u st be co n sid ered m o ra lly binding.
One w ay of e x p r e ssin g what is in volved h ere w ould be to
co n sid er the obligation en tailed by a p ro m ise a s genuine but a s of a
sp e c ific k in d --o n e w hich le a v e s open its m oral statu s. T his m ight
246
be r e fe r r e d to as a tech n ica l ob ligation . Such a ter m m a y be u sed
to p r e s e r v e the g en era l m eaning of a p r o m ise as en tailin g an o b li
gation. But w e m u st a lso d istin g u ish betw een m o ra l and le g a l p r o
m is e s , and th e ir en tailed o b lig a tio n s.
It is h e r e that a d istin ctio n betw een ju stific a tio n and v in d i
cation w hich H erb ert F e ig l m akes in "V alidation and V indication" ^
w ill p rove u se fu l. B a sic a lly , what F e ig l has in m ind is that,
in ration al argum en tation , one u su a lly argu es w ithin the u ltim ate
p r in c ip les of a given s y s te m . So long as the argum ent appeals
to su ch p r in c ip le s or any of th eir im p lica tio n s w ithin the sy s te m ,
one m ay be sa id to be ju stify in g o n e's stan d. If, h o w ev er, the
b a sic p r in c ip les th e m se lv e s are brought into q u estion , then the
argum ent m o v es fro m ju stific a tio n in ter m s of u ltim ate p r in c ip les
to vin d ication of p r in c ip le s th e m se lv e s; and vin d ication , a cco rd in g
to F e ig l, can appeal on ly to p ragm atic or em otion al fa c to r s .
This p r o c e ss of ju stific a tio n and vin d ication ap p lies to a ll
fo rm s of ration al argum en t and c r itic is m -e v e n to the m o st b a sic
fo rm s of rea so n in g . F o r ex a m p le, the ju stify in g p r in c ip le s of d e
du ctive lo g ic a re the r u les of substitution and of in fe r e n c e . The
ju stific a tio n of induction, h ow ever, is an appeal to the ru les of
m a x im a l p ro b a b ility . The u ltim ate p r in c ip les a r e , th u s, the fin al
ap p eals in any d isp u te. F u rth er d isa g re em e n t m a y be rem oved only
by one of the follow in g m ean s:
^R eadings in E th ical T h eory, e d s. W ilfrid S e lla r s and John
H o sp ers (New York" , 1952).------------
247
(1) D isc lo su r e of a hitherto unacknowledged com m on
se t of standards which are s till m ore fundam ental
validating p rin cip les and to which im p licit appeal
is m ade in argum ent, or
(2) P ragm atic appeals for the adoption of an a ltern a
tiv e fra m e , or
(3) Sheer p ersu asion by means of em otional ap p eals.
Point num ber one, for reason s d isc lo se d , in volves justifying
p ro ced u res. Nothing new is included h ere except the fa ct that
u ltim ate p rin cip les m ay often be im p licit only. P oints num ber two
and th ree, how ever, sin ce they question the ultim ate p rin cip les
th e m se lv e s, sh ift the appeal from ju stification to vind ication .
The p r o c e ss of vindication, like that of ju stifica tio n , applies
to all form s of rational reason ing and, th erefo re, can again be
illu stra ted in term s of deductive and inductive lo g ic . In the c a se of
deductive lo g ic , a vindication of its substitution and in feren ce ru les
involves either pragm atic or sh eer em otional p ersu a sio n . F e ig l
m akes a pragm atic one: deductive logic m ay be vindicated on the
grounds that, at p resen t, this sy ste m offers the only m anner in vhidi
reasoning m ay ensu re tran sition from one true prop osition to other
true p ro p o sitio n s. In a lik e m anner, the vindication of inductive
logic m ay be m ade because: (1) if th ere be any ord er in nature,
then it can (but need not) su cceed in d isclo sin g that o rd er, and
(2) induction, as a sy ste m , is s e lf-c o r r e c tiv e . T h ese p oin ts, F e ig l
248
rep ea ts, are m atters of vind ication , sin ce they appeal to the p ra g
m atic con sid eration s for accepting the u ltim ate p rin cip les them
se lv e s .
The term s ju stifica tio n and vindication m ay be u sefu lly
em ployed to indicate the in tricate relation sh ip of deontological and
tele o lo g ic a l con cep ts. Ju stification can be identified with deonto
lo g ica l argum en ts, w hereas vindication r efer s to tele o lo g ic a l
argu m en ts. T hese two applications w ill now be con sid ered in turn.
D eo n to lo g ica l th eo ries can be identified with th eo ries of ju s
tification b eca u se, as previous a n a ly sis in d ica tes, the cru cia l fa c
to rs with th ese th eories are acts determ ined by p a st com m itm en ts.
The d eon tological ought thus involves an iden tification w ith, and a
com m itm ent to, a sp e c ific code which rep resen ts the ultim ate p rin
cip les w ithin w hich ju stification can take p la c e . As W erk m eister
points out, such a code e x ists for a ll p eop le, to the extent that, as
in d ivid u als, they are born into, and au tom atically becom e m em b ers
of, existin g so c ia l rela tio n sh ip s. F u rth erm ore, as M elv ille J.Heisko-
vitz® and others point out, individuals have little ch oice in refu sin g to
accept su ch a code in e a rly life . Since argum ents against the existing
o r d e r ,1 if they do o ccu r, m u st appeal to the ultim ate p rin cip les of a
sy ste m , they w ill alw ays in volve ju stifica tio n . The appeal can con
tinue to higher and higher justifying p r in c ip le s--in d e e d , even to those
^See Man and Hi» Works (New York, 1950).
249
com m unity, as W erk m eister and S eso n sk e in d ic a te--b u t in each c a se
the ind ividu al, through h is id en tification w ith the p a r tic u la r group,
m akes at le a s t im p lic itly an appeal to a sp e c ific cod e. This cod e, in
turn, r ep resen ts the u ltim ate p rin cip les by w hich ju s tific a tio n --a s
h ere u n d ersto o d --ca n alone be forth com in g. And if this is so , then
the r e str ic tin g fa cto r of the d eon tological ought is the com p u lsion of
c o n siste n c y . J u stifica tio n , by its v e r y n atu re, req u ires co n sisten t
p roced u res in term s of the h ig h est p rin cip les to w hich the appeal is
m ad e. And, as W erk m eister and S eso n sk e point out, this factor
r ep r e se n ts a com p u lsion w hich is lacking in m e r e p rud en ce.
T h e rea so n fo r this lack of com p u lsion in the prudential
ought is the fa c t that, unlike the d eon tological ought w hich is id e n ti
fied with ju stific a tio n , the prudential ought m u st be esta b lish ed in
ter m s of vindication; and this p r o c e s s , as su bsequent d isc u ssio n s
w ill d is c lo s e , lack s the lo g ic a l com p ulsion in h eren t in ju stifica tio n .
The accep tan ce of the prudential ought is b ased upon pursuing action s
w hich w ill m a x im ize the good. But the v e r y m eaning of prudence
in clu des r e fe r e n c e s to the w hole net w ork of in te rr ela ted fa cto rs and
extends beyond the p r e m is e s of any one s y s te m to include all
p o ssib le con seq u en ces . It is in this s e n s e , that the v e r y m eaning of
the prud en tial o u g h t--a s a com m itm en t to m a x im ize the good— im
p lie s an id ea l w hich tran scen d s a ll p a rticu la r m o ra l co d e s. But,
250
as F e ig l1 s a n a ly sis in d ic a te s, the only w ay in w hich one can support
p articu lar p r e m is e s w ith a p p e a ls--w h ic h , in p rin cip le, tran scen d
the u ltim a te p r e m is e s of any given s y s t e m - - is through the p r o c e s s
of vin d ication . Thus it is that the prudential ought m u st be id e n ti
fied w ith vin d ication .
T his id en tifica tio n of the prudential ought w ith vin d ication ,
fu rth erm o re, sq u a res w ith the p rev io u s a n a ly sis of the m eaning of
prudence; for the sig n ifica n ce of prudence u ltim a tely c o m e s to r e s t
upon the concep t of r e a so n a b le n e ss as the p r o c e s s of c a r e fu lly co n
sid erin g the future a s w e ll a s the p resen t, and by the v e r y m eaning
of prudence, such c o n sid er a tio n s lo g ic a lly tra n scen d any one given
code of e th ic s . It i s for th is r e a so n that, w ith the prudential ought,
one sta r ts fro m the con cep t of an id ea l as a m axim ation of v a lu e.
The d eterm in ation of su ch an id e a l is the function of valu e th eo ry .
V alue th eory, th e r e fo r e , in clu d es, as part of the m ean ing of prud
ence^ an im p lic it appeal to the un derlying a ssu m p tio n s of the p rud en
tia l ought.
Now the c r u c ia l point h ere is that th e se a ssu m p tio n s can be
d eterm in ed lo g ic a lly p rio r to any co n sid era tio n of com m ittin g o n e
s e lf to a sp e c ific e th ica l co d e. To the extent to w hich th is is p o s s i
b le, the lo g ic a l stru ctu re is such that, w ith the prudential ought, one
m u st argue from an id e a l to the a ccep ta n ce of a p a rticu la r m o ra l
code a s the one b e st r e p r e se n tin g that id e a l. T h is p r o c e s s h e r e in -
volved rep resen ts an appeal for accepting som e particular system
on the b a sis of pragm atic con sid eration s. In the actual practical 1
i
situation, there is no lo g ica l r estrictio n upon using any type of p er- I
su asive m eth od s--in clu d in g the pragm atic and the em otional. How- I
|
ever, reco u rse to pragm atic and em otional exhortations as a m eans !
of establish in g acceptance of a system is the v ery m eaning of
vindication. In short, th erefore, the prudential ought, and te le o
lo g ica l th eories in general, m ust be establish ed by the p r o c ess of
vindication w h ereas the deontological ought m ust involve justification,.
In the la st few pages we have called the deontological ought
what w as p reviou sly referred to as the m oral ought. The reason
for th is sw itch in term inology is that F e ig l1 s term s w ill perm it
further an alysis of the concepts under consideration. With th is in
terpretation, any obligation which can be ju stified b e c o m e s--b y the
v ery m eaning of ju stific a tio n --a leg a l obligation.
But even on the intuitive le v e l it is apparent that m ore than
m ere conform ity to a given code of law is required in order for an
obligation to be a m oral one; for, b esid es the accidental situation
that leg a l obligations usually im pose m eans of enforcem ent, there
is a far m ore significant difference between leg a l and m oral o b li
gations. An an alysis of this distinction, m oreover, w ill clarify
the in tricate relation sh ip s of the prudential as w ell as the m oral
and the leg a l ought. The key to such a d iscu ssio n of W erk m eister1 s
p osition again m ay be found in F e ig l1 s con cep tion s of ju stifica tio n
and vin d ication .
D iagram s m ay help to illu str a te th ese rela tio n sh ip s; for in any
co n crete situation th ree p o s sib ilitie s can o ccu r. F ir st, a code m ay
be vindicated; secon d , a code m ay be ju stified ; and, third, a code
m ay be both vin d icated and ju stified . In each c a se , the d irectio n of
the appeal w ill be sch em atized w ith a rro w s. The fir s t situ a tio n --th e
c a se in w hich one code is v in d ic a ted --m a y be illu str a te d a s follow s:
CASE I
V indication
!!________ Code
T his r e p r e se n ts the prudential ought.
CASE II
2 ------------- Code
Ju stifica tio n
C ase II illu str a te s the le g a l ought. But sin c e , by definition,
'unr effe ctiv e m orality ' c o n sists in follow in g a code w ithout v in d i
cation , C ase II a lso r e p r e se n ts, w ithin c erta in lim ite d situ ation s,
the m oral ought. Such c ir cu m sta n c es are illu str a te d in the c a se of
253
c h ild ren who resp on d u n c r itic a lly to th e ir p a ren ts' lo v e , o r in
situ a tio n s in volvin g p r im itiv e c u ltu r es w h ere cod es have b een un
c r it ic a lly a c ce p ted fo r g e n e r a tio n s.
T h ese ex cep tio n s r a is e the q u estion of e sta b lish in g adequate
c r ite r ia fo r th em . H ow, s p e c ific a lly , can an act w h ich w ould be
m o ra l w ithin one situ a tio n be d eem ed im m o r a l in an oth er?
The a n sw er to this q u estio n , as advanced in W e rk m e ister 's
th eo ry , is that su ch d e c isio n s m u st be view ed in te r m s of th e b e st
p o s s ib le in form ation co n cern in g the fa c ts a v a ila b le . T his c r ite r io n
fu r n ish es the m ean s fo r d istin g u ish in g b etw een c r itic a l and T in -
c r itic a l m o ra lity ; fo r if, on the b a s is of the b e st p o s s ib le in fo r m a
tion a v a ila b le , th e re is no r e a so n to c a ll into q u estio n the n orm s
th e m s e lv e s , then the m o r a l and th e le g a l o b lig a tio n w ill c o in c id e .
T his c r ite r io n , th e r e fo r e , exp lain s w hy sm a ll c h ild ren and p r im itiv e
p eo p le w ho, when actin g on the b a s is of the b e st p o s s ib le in form ation
a v a ila b le to th em , m u st be r ec o g n ize d as m o ra l" b ein g s.
If one w e re to com p lain h e r e that th is c r ite r io n co n fu ses
m o r a l with ev a lu a tio n a l g o o d n e ss, the a n sw er is that th e se two p r o
c e s s e s a r e both in tr ic a te ly in v o lv ed in the to ta l m o r a l s itu a tio n --a s
w ill be illu str a te d in C a se III. On the o th er hand, if one w ere to
q u estion the grounds fo r th is c r ite r io n --th a t the b ea t p o s s ib le in
fo rm a tio n co n cern in g the fa c ts be a v a ila b le - - , then the a n sw er m u st
be that th is factor is ultim ate: such a standard r e fle c ts the very
m eaning of human nature as indicated in m oral and rational ex p er
ien ce . C ase II, th erefo re, ex em p lifies the leg a l ought generally,
and the u n reflectiv e type of m oral ought.
C ase III con cern s ju stification within, and vind ication of, one
code.
CASE III
V indication
! _____ Code
i >
J u stification
For rea so n s p reviou sly d iscu sse d , th is type illu str a te s the
m oral ought-
The th ree illu stra tio n s thus indicate the way in which ju s tifi
cation and vindication m ay be em ployed to cla r ify the m eaning and
the status of the prudential ought, of the leg a l ought, of the un
c r itic a l and of the c r itic a l m oral ought. But th is approach m ay
a lso se rv e to illu stra te certain m iscon cep tion s p rev io u sly encounter
ed. In order to m ake th is clear w e m ust con sid er a fourth type of
situ a tio n --a ctu a lly a h yb rid ty p e --in which one code is ju stified
w h ile, at the sam e tim e, another code is being vindicated.
CASE IV
255
V indication Code B
Code A Ju stification
A s an illu stra tio n of the confusion caused by th is type of
situation one m ay reco g n ize, for in stan ce, how Toulm in m ay vin d i
cate Code A, a s, say, the princip le that preventable suffering is to
be avoided. But to accu se a p erson of being im m oral b ecau se he
ju stified h is a cts in ter m s of a com m itm ent to Code B, in which such
a princip le does not occu r, would be c le a r ly fu tile as long as the
individual does in fact identify h im se lf w ith Code B. Thus, in order
for T oulm in’s p rin cip le to becom e a m oral one, it m ust a lso be
endorsed as a ju stifyin g p rin cip le--w h ich m ean s that it be accep ted
as a com m itm ent to a particular culture. It is now clea r why
Toulm in cannot e sta b lish h is princip le of preventable suffering as
m orally binding u n less it is fir s t actu ally accepted as such.
For som ew hat sim ila r rea so n s, R o s s's d u ties of 's e lf - im
provem ent' and of 'ben eficen ce' m ay be said to rep resen t Code A in
the diagram . But a s long as an individual is com m ited to Code B, in
w hich th ese duties do not occur, he is not m o ra lly com m itted to
self-im p ro v em en t or to b en eficen ce a s d u ties. T his is why R oss
cannot e sta b lish th ese duties as he attem pts to do, and it in d icates,
256
m o re o v er , why vind ication and ju stifica tio n are both key term s in the
m eaning of m o ra lity . Our a n a ly sis and exten sion of the m eaning of
ought, in d ic a tes, fu rth erm o re, why the th eo ries of P e r r y , P a rk er,
L e w is, and S teven son are a ll in co m p lete. But it a lso show s as
p r e v io u sly pointed out that each of th ese th eo ries m ake a sig n ifica n t
contribution to the meaning of the ought; for we now s e e how P e r r y
can in terp ret the m eaning of the prudential ought in term s of in
dividual prudence and of so c ia l prudence as a m axim ation of the
good; how Steven son can su g g est that th ere is a com p u lsive fa cto r
in the ought w hich cannot be reduced to prudence; how P a rk er can
in terp ret this com p ulsion of a m oral ought as im p lied by an ob lig a
tion in ter m s of dem ands, w illin g r esp o n se, and the iden tification
of the individual with a so c ia l group; and fin a lly , how L ew is is right
in su g g estin g that th ere m u st be som e relation sh ip betw een the
r ig h t--a s a d ic ta te--a n d prudence as the m eans for m axim izin g
the good. But it is in the th eo ries of W erk m eister and S eson sk e that
the k ey to this relation sh ip is to be found. T h ese two p h ilosop h ers
a g ree that the m oral ought m u st be c le a r ly distin gu ish ed fro m the
prudential ought. W erk m eister d evelop s the relation sh ip s of th ese
\
concepts w hich, when in terp reted in term s of F e ig l's vind ication
and ju stifica tio n , se r v e to e sta b lish the lo g ica l foundations for the
in trica te m eanings of the ought.
257
To sum up th is fin a l in terp reta tio n : (1) the p ru d en tial ought
m u st be id en tified w ith the v in d ica tio n of a code; (2) both the le g a l
land the u n c r itic a l m o r a l ought in volve ju stific a tio n ; (3) at the le v e l
of c r itic a l e th ic s , the m o r a l ought m u st in clu d e both ju stific a tio n
and vin d ication ; and (4) the te c h n ic a l ought- - i . e . an ob ligation a s a
co m m itm en t im p lied by a p r o m is e - - is the g e n e ra l te r m under w h ich
the m o ra l ought, the le g a l ought, and th e p rud en tial ought can a ll be
su bsum ed.
Such a c h a r a c te r iz a tio n of the v a r io u s m ea n in g s of th e ought,
su g g e s ts a lso w hy the p o sitio n s of P e r r y , P a r k e r , L e w is, and
IStevenson, r e s p e c tiv e ly a r e in c o m p le te . But sin c e a ll of th e se
th e o r ie s con tain p a rtia l tru th s, th ey m a y be in teg ra ted into one
c o m p re h e n siv e th e o ry . And a s in d ica ted in the p reced in g d is c u s s
io n s, such an in teg ra ted th eo ry can account for the m any m ea n in g s
and the am bigu ous sta tu s of the te c h n ic a l, the le g a l, the p ru d en tial,
and the m o ra l o u g h t--a n d do so w ithin the fra m ew o rk of an e m p ir ic a lly
o r ie n te d p h ilosop h y.
258
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Creator Maue, James Brooks (author)

Core Title Value And Obligation: An Integration Of The Theories Of Ralph Barton Perry, C. I. Lewis, Dewitt Parker, And Charles L. Stevenson

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Philosophy

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,Philosophy

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Werkmeister, William H. (committee chair), Christensen, Francis (committee member), Long, Wilbur H. (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-81402

Unique identifier UC11358145

Identifier 6005482.pdf (filename),usctheses-c18-81402 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 6005482.pdf

Dmrecord 81402

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Maue, James Brooks

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

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