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An Exploration Of Interpersonal Behavioral Possibilities And Probabilities

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An Exploration Of Interpersonal Behavioral Possibilities And Probabilities

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Content EXPLORATION OF INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIORAL
POSSIBILITIES AND PROBABILITIES
by
Ronald Dean Dudick
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(Education)
February 1973
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University Microfilms
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DUDICK, Ronald Dean, 1936-
AN EXPLORATION OF INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIORAL
POSSIBILITIES AND PROBABILITIES.
University of Southern California, Ph.D., 1973
Education, psychology
University Microfilms. A X E R O X Company. Ann Arbor, Michigan
© Copyright by
RONAID DEAN DUDICK
1973
THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED
U N IVERSITY O F S O U T H E R N C A LIFO RN IA
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This dissertation, written by
Ronald Dean Dudick
under the direction of h.Xs... Dissertation Com
mittee, and approved by all its members, has
been presented to and accepted by The Graduate
School, in partial fulfillment of requirements of
the degree of
D O C T O R OF P H IL O S O P H Y
D i m
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
PLEASE NOTE:
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DEDICATION
With the sincere hope that this disser
tation may contribute something to man's
understanding of himself and his fellow man,
this dissertation is dedicated to anyone who
finds it worth reading and considers it worth
thinking about.
ii
CONTENTS
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION ..............................
II. THE PROBLEM AND RELATED HYPOTHESES ........
The Problem
Central Question
Central Hypotheses
Subhypotheses
Essential Definitions:
Categorization of Responses
III. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ..................
Studies Related to LNP Hypothesis
Other Related Points of View
Evidence from Studies Concerned with
Psychological Response Sets
Other Studies
Alternative Approaches
Summary
IV. METHODOLOGY ..............................
Subjects
Instrumentation
Testing Procedure
Tabulation
Statistical Analyses
V. ANALYSES AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS ........
Analysis of Results
Discussion of Findings
VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS. .
Summary
Conclusions
Recommendations
REFERENCES ........................................
Page
1
14
30
45
52
73
85
ill
Page
APPENDICES........................................ 90
APPENDIX A. Overt Behaviors ................... 92
B. Verbal Responses ................. 99
C. States (Peel or Be)............... 109
D. Abstract or Indefinite Responses. . 114
iv
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The goal of psychology and the other social sciences
is to understand, define, and present effective solutions
to those social and psychological problems that have plagued
mankind throughout history. For centuries theologians,
philosophers, and scientists have observed and attempted to
understand and explain man's inward nature as well as the
dynamics of those myriad transactions existing between him
and those external events that both mold and control his
life. And yet in spite of the millions of books and arti
cles that have been written, indeterminable numbers of re
search studies that have been carried out and the wealth of
statistics that have been compiled, we still seem to be a
long way from this goal of fully understanding and explain
ing the human experience. Neither do we yet seem to possess
the knowledge and skills that are necessary to assist man
kind in remedying the all too frequent and numerous de
structive and dehumanizing conditions of the human predica
ment .
Ample evidence of the above is provided by the per
vasive symptoms of social unrest and discontent: the in
1
creasing incidence of crime, delinquency, and mental ill
ness; numerous, vociferous, and often vitriolic criticisms
of economic, social, and political policies; as well as the
inhumanities that men everywhere continue to exhibit to
wards each other by exploitations, deceptions, prejudices,
wars, and all other forms of human denigration and destruc
tion. All facets of human existence, both lofty and ig
noble, are the subject matter of the social sciences and so
numerous are the questions that can be asked about human
motives and behaviors that one.can quite easily be over
whelmed by man's complexity and diversity and perhaps even
pale before the tasks that the social sciences have set
for themselves.
A review of books and Journal articles makes it
quite apparent that psychology and the other social sci
ences are not lacking for critics. However, while criti
cisms are plentiful the same cannot be said about poten
tially productive methodological and theoretical alterna
tives that currently occupy the interests and efforts of
social scientists today. To suggest that they may be
asking irrelevant or meaningless questions, attempting to
answer them with inadequate or inappropriate methods, and
providing few genuinely effective solutions to pressing
human problems does have some validity if one observes the
state of the world around them, but criticism alone is not
3
enough. A more difficult and demanding task is that of
pointing out new directions and equipping researchers with
more productive theories and tools. However, even while
many writers may be adept at diagnosing the maladies cur
rently afflicting psychology and the other social sciences
their prescriptive and curative skills often leaves a
great deal to be desired. To state glibly that both the
ories and methods are inadequate without suggesting alter
natives is to let the pendulum of criticism swing too far
in an aimless direction.
Of methods Deese stated:
One gets the impression that these particular meas
ures are choosen because we never really have thought
of any good experimental method for studying what is
really interesting. ... We end up with the old tried
and true measures that make nice graphs and upon which
we can perform various model analyses of variances.
In short we have been badly oversold on the clas
sical experimental model. . . . Too much evidence—
obvious and available evidence— is ignored because it
fails to conform to our prejudices about how empirical
information arises. We have insisted upon measurement
of behavior to the extent that most of the things we
observe in experiments have no relevance for the proc
ess of thinking, other than the empty observation that
thinking, like most processes, takes a measurable pe
riod of time [1969* P* 518].
In a similar vein, Engle (1969) asserted that "Thus
the typical student in search of a thesis is not out of
place if he begins with a test— a statistical or clinical
test— at any event he begins with a tool— then scouts for
a question that can be asked with that tool [p. 231]."
While it is true that if research and statistical
methods too rigidly dictate the direction of research and
the meaningfulness of scientific truths they run the risk
of becoming a Procrustean bed, criticisms like the above
often ignore or overlook the fact that the fault may not
lie with methods but with the types of questions that are
being asked. Indicative of the past wastefulness of intel
lect and energy was Benjamin Bloom’s statement (1967) that
of "70,000 studies listed in the Review of Educational Re
search over the past 25 years . . . about 1 out of 1000
reported studies seems to me to be crucial and significant,
approximately 3 studies per year [p. 233]." The applica
tion, and misapplication, of research and statistical meth
ods takes on increasing importance as these methods become
more sophisticated and widely used. It may be that, as is
feared of technology in general, the tools may be danger
ously close to becoming the master. With increasing fre
quency people are diagnosed, evaluated, classified, and the
directions of their lives affected by instruments whose
value and appropriateness have been questioned by many.
The possible misapplication of the techniques of the social
sciences takes on increasing Importance for the future for
according to Quarton (1967) by the year 2000 the techniques
for modifying and controlling personality, and therefore
behavior, will grow more efficient employing a wide range
of medical, biochemical, and environmental techniques.
There is little doubt that this will require the develop-
5
ment of even more sophisticated and effective instruments
and techniques and that research and statistical methods
will play an increasing role in the determination of what
will be done to whom and why.
To many people, Walden Two (1967) and Beyond Free
dom and Dignity (1971) by B. P. Skinner have the distinct
flavor of a dehumanizing Orwellian 1984 (1949). Others
view such proposals as the only possible salvation of man
kind. On one side are those who seem to have an abiding
and unfaultering faith in the efficacy of the self-correct
ing nature of science. On the other are those who are fear
ful that even if science can come to a complete understand
ing of man the eventual price may be the loss of individ
uality and freedom. Although it is undoubtedly too late
to turn back the tide of scientism with its increasing re
liance on evaluations and classifications and its seemingly
growing number of advocates of behavior modification, man
ipulation, and control, the concerns for the future of hu
man individuality and freedom seem well founded and the
fears genuine and sincere.
If the technological potential of the social sci
ences does hold these inherent dangers, then what about
the existing theories of human needs, motives, and be
haviors? That is, how adequate are our present theories,
those that generate research hypotheses and studies and
from which the techniques and their rationales develop?
6
Of theories Deese stated:
The traditional physical sciences, chemistry and
physics, are preeminent in experimentation because of
well developed theory, not the other way around. No
new series of experiments should be given the task of
testing a very large and poorly specified series of
intervening links, as were the learning-behavior the
ories of the 1940s and 1950s. . . . However, we still
find experimental psychologists performing experiments
to test theories of this sort as a kind of magical
rite. The tedium of these experiments is only relieved
by the surprise value. Observations so seldom seem to
be repeatable. . . . There are very few psychological
variables that are linked together by a well-articu
lated theory, formal or Informal, and most of them
were discovered by the early experimentalists in the
investigation of perception and senses [19b9, P* 517]
(underlining added).
This raises an important and fundamental question:
namely, whether psychology has as yet sufficiently done its
basic research. The physical sciences are preeminent be
cause they have acquired a body of basic knowledge and es
tablished principles and laws upon which their scientists
can agree. At the present time there are few principles,
laws, and theories in psychology and the other social sci
ences that enjoy universal acceptance or do not raise a
spate of controversies or criticisms.
Perhaps one of the reasons behind this is that psy
chology has not yet sufficiently divorced itself from
philosophy. While all of the sciences may have had their
origins in philosophy as each grew it did so by developing
its own body of knowledge which succeeded in moving it
further and further away from philosophic speculations and
more in the direction of empirically testable and verifi-
7
able statements. While the questions philosophers ask and
attempt to answer may never fully lose their place of In
terest In the minds of men there Is less of a need for
mere Intellectual speculations as facts begin to supplant
beliefs and opinions. However, today we still find a large
number of social scientists devoting vast amounts of their
intellectual time and energies to attempting to answer
what are essentially philosophic questions. Examples are
questions such as whether man is "rational or nonrational,"
"free or determined," "predictable or unpredictable,"
whether "nature or nurture" is of greater importance, and
a wealth of similar problems. The vast extent to which
these and similar controversies are debated in books and
articles, with or without empirical documentation, provides
some indication of the extent to which the social sciences
are still within the bosom of philosophy.
Whether men are rational or nonrational does not
eliminate the obvious fact that they behave in both ways
at some times and under some circumstances. To establish
philosophically once and for all and to everyone's satis
faction that men are this, that, or whatever, will not
likely change their behaviors one whit. In this same sense
determining once and for all that men are free or deter
mined, predictable or unpredictable, or that nature or
nurture is indeed of prime importance tells us neither
what men will or should do nor does it satisfactorily
8
explain why they do the things they do. The most fre
quently heard answer to controversies like these is that
men are both, but this is hardly an acceptable answer for
such a reply does little to increase man's knowledge of
himself and others. Undoubtedly questions like these are
ones that men feel compelled to attempt to answer. Were
this not the case they would have probably abandoned their
attempts to do so centuries ago for in one form or another
such questions have been asked by men throughout recorded
history. However, while philosophic questions may be the
beginnings of a science, purely intellectual answers may
also be a refuge when other more relevant answers cannot be
provided. In the absence of empirical knowledge philosoph
ical speculations, beliefs, and opinions should be called
by their proper names and not sent out in the guise of
science or truths.
Indicative of the philosophical and methodological
polarization that exists in contemporary psychology is the
schism that presently exist between the academician/re
searcher and the clinician. Exemplifying this is the
existence of three main forces which are currently vying
for prominence, and converts. The first two of these
forces are "Psychoanalysis and Behaviorism," and their neo
offshoots. Psychoanalysis seems to have been most strongly
influenced by philosophy, neurology, mythology, and a be
9
lief in hypothetical intrapsychical forces supported by a
crude form of empiricism, that is, rather unsystematic and
often highly subjective observations and methods of gather
ing and interpreting data. Behaviorism on the other hand
seems to have taken its direction by following the lead of
the natural sciences and relying on rather rigid experi
mental methods and eschewing all that is not empirical.
The third force or "Humanistic" movement seems to have
grown essentially as a reaction against the quasi-mysticism
of Psychoanalysis and the methodological and reductionistic
rigidity of Behaviorism. For while the tenets of Psycho
analysis never truly lent themselves to empirical verifica
tion, Behaviorism tended to be so rigidly empirical and
scientific that all too often its findings seemed to bare
little resemblance to the world outside the laboratory.
This third force attempted to fill this breach by
attending to the whole of man's existence. Its appeal has
been largely due to the fact that it assumes an essentially
positive or constructive view of man. It does not attempt
to explain men from the essentially negative viewpoint of
neurotic defenses, complexes, or processes nor in reduc
tionistic terms that ignores the fact that men are more
than the mere sum of prior experiences or bundles of stimu
lus response connections. But the third force theorists
also rely heavily on essentially philosophic abstractions
and concepts such as being, existential choices, identity,
responsibility, consequences, self-actualizing needs and
potentials and an abundance of others. While their con
cepts may be pleasing to hear because they assert and af
firm man's freedom and dignity and give him a sense of
power and purpose over his life they too have failed to
provide satisfactory and universally acceptable answers to
fundamental questions about human motives and behaviors.
Thus in the search for its own Identity contemporary psy
chology currently seems to span philosophy and science and
now in its desperation it turns once again to theology.
Perhaps nothing is more indicative of this methodo
logical and theoretical schism than the controversy as to
whether clinical or statistical descriptions, judgments,
or prescriptions are more accurate and/or useful (e.g.,
Meehl, 195*^ 1965; Holt, 1958, 1961, 1970). Such arguments
seem, however, to beg the question that our present ap
proaches to the study of man, systems of classifications
and diagnosis, and our underlying conceptions of man are
in the main adequate, or even pragmatically useful. Con
troversies such as these seem to principally revolve
around the question of who is more accurate. It seems more
appropriate to ask whether it is possible to develop a
system or theory of man that can resolve such controversies,
one that is compatible with what is already known about
man, and one that can easily incorporate and employ the
11
methodological and theoretical advances that do indeed
constitute genuine contributions.
To date the most comprehensive theories of human
motives and behaviors are either too vague, abstract, al
legorical, mystical, or mythological to generate testable
hypotheses and submit themselves to the crucible of empiri
cal validation or else they are so rigorously scientific
that they are of little use to the worker in the field. The
former tends to give rise to the sorts of literary descrip
tions and explanations of motives and behaviors that have
resulted in the all too often legitimate criticisms leveled
by the academician/researcher against the clinician. The
legitimacy of these criticisms stems from the fact that too
often the descriptions and prescriptions of clinicians are
couched into the same vague and abstract terms of the the
ories upon which they base their interpretations. The cli
nician's rejoinder is that while the researcher/academi-
cian's findings may be based upon rigorous methods of
gathering and analyzing data it generally lacks the appro
priateness and comprehensiveness to be of much value in the
world outside the laboratory where the clinician and his
clients work and live. Such controversies continue to sur
vive and haunt the Journals because the positions of the
antagonists generally contain substantial elements of
truth. The search is therefore for that elusive thread of
12
truth that runs through these many seemingly diverse and
sometimes Incompatible beliefs and opinions.
Whether or not we willingly accept the statement
that we may never be able to truly know the minds of others,
except by Inference, It Is a possibility that cannot be Ig
nored. For the present at least all that we can really
know of the thoughts and motives of others Is that which
they let us know by what they say and do. Behaviors alone
seem to provide us with the only direct knowledge that we
have of and about others, and while unobservables such as
thoughts and motives are of no less Importance In under
standing man's behaviors they are In the final analysis
always abstracted from behaviors. It seems, therefore,
reasonable to assume that the basic elements with which
psychologists must deal are behaviors, overt physical and
verbal acts, and It Is to such acts that we must first
turn our full attention. This Is neither a plea for nor
a thesis In support of a rigid behavioralistic approach to
the study of man for unobservables are also real and Im
portant but simply to contend that behaviors are the point
at which we must begin.
Aside from the egocentric predicament in which men
find themselves what also seems to stand between them and
an understanding of others Is their strong desire to main
tain their individuality or uniqueness. Probably all men
will willingly accept the proposition that there are many
similarities between themselves and others but at the same
time they will also staunchly maintain that each and every
one of us are in some ways unique. In the course of our
lives we come into contact with many people none of whom
are the mirror image of us, neither physically except in
cases of identical twins, nor to the best of our knowledge,
psychologically. This provides us with ample evidence that
humans are diverse and our attempts to understand behaviors,
and the elusiveness of such understanding, convinces us
that they are also quite complex. However, such conclu
sions about the complexity and diversity of human behaviors
may be both true and false and the truth or falsity of such
conclusions is the principal concern of this study.
CHAPTER II
THE PROBLEM AND RELATED HYPOTHESES
The Problem
The central problem to which this study is addressed
is that of attempting to explore the extent to which human
complexity and diversity is a behavioral fact or verbal
illusion.
What tempts us to look at all philosophers half sus
piciously and half mockingly is not so much that we
recognize again and again how innocent they are, how
often and how easily they make mistakes and lose their
way, in short their childishness and childlike-ness—
but rather they are not sufficiently candid, though
they make a great virtuous noisy to-do as soon as the
problem of truthfulness is even remotely touched upon.
Everyone of them pretends that he has discovered and
reached his opinions through the self-development of
cold, pure, divinely untroubled dialectic . . . ,
whereas, at bottom a preconceived dogma, a notion, an
"institution," or mostly a hearts desire, made abstract
and refined, is defended by them with arguments sought
after the fact. They are all of them lawyers (though
wanting to be called anything but that), and for the
most part quite sly defenders of their prejudices
which they christen "truths" [Nietzsche, 1965* p. 5l.
Although the above quote was first published in
1885 it rings a sound similar to that which has been called
the "psychocentric error" (Tedeschi & Malagodi, 1964; Ted-
eschi, 1966). The psychocentric error is defined "as the
belief that psychological principles can be invoked in
vacuo, i.e., apart from their economic, political, or
14
15
sociological contexts [Tedeschi, 1966, p. 4093*" In order
to gain a complete understanding of man he must be studied
not merely as a passive observer or pawn of social Institu
tions but as one who is at their very center, one who cre
ates and directs both their construction and destruction.
It may be asking a great deal of the social scientist to
expect him to look beyond his dogmas and prejudices and to
temporarily abandon his commitment to his favorite concep
tions) of man but this may be what is necessary in order
to answer the many important questions still unanswered.
Perhaps one of the most pressing problems that
needs to be discussed first is that of language and the
behaviors that it purportedly describes. Language is un
deniably one of man's most useful tools but "when we mix
up this world of symbols with the world of things as though
the symbols existed 'in themselves,' then we are merely
doing once more what we have always done: we are creating
myths [Nietzsche, 1955, p. 25]." Similarly Luchins and
Luchins stated:
Despite the popularity of the verbal appeal to the
individual and the study of the individual case, both
the older and the newer approaches to personality may
be regarded as not focusing on or being concerned
with the individual qua individual. Both may be con
sidered to subordinate the individual to abstractions,
generalizations, or generalities of some kind, whether
they be from statistics or from theories of personal
ity, motivation, perception, etc......... There is es
sentially nothing wrong in dealing with the behavior
of an individual (a) in terms of abstractions or (b)
in terms of the individual qua individual. There is
16
something wrong, however, when one says he is doing
(b) and yet actually doing (a) or vice versa [1965*
pp. 83-84] (underlining added).
That psychology, and all of the social sciences,
are not wanting for terms with which to describe human mo
tives and actions is evident from a study done by Allport
and Odbert (1936). Searching through a standard dictionary
they found almost 18,000 terms concerned with personality,
most of which originated centuries ago. Obviously the vo
cabulary of the social sciences is full and rich, but such
"richness" leads to two important questions. The first is
whether much of the productivity in the social sciences
leads merely to a proliferation of terms, and the second
is whether these terms have in fact objective and/or be
havioral referents or merely represent literary devices and
conveniences. If the answer is "yes" to these two ques
tions, then the distinct possibility exists that a great
deal of man's alleged complexity is merely verbal and
therefore more conceptual than factual.
Chomsky (1968) draws a distinction between the
"surface structure" and "deep structure" of language. Sur
face structure consists of the symbols, words, phrases, and
sentences that are combined in definite ways that are de
fined by the rules of grammar. The deep structure is the
actual meaning of these symbols, words, phrases, and sen
tences. For example the word "water’ ’is not identical with
the substance water any more than the word "aggression" is
17
identical with aggressive acts, "love" with loving acts or
"abnormality" with abnormal behaviors. A distinction such
as that made between surface and deep structures may be a
useful one to pursue further in an attempt to remove some
of the fogginess and myths from psychology.
It is possible for someone to say the same thing
in a variety of ways and still have his intended meaning
understood; for example, synonyms and paraphrasing. Thus
one can use the terms "man," "homme," or "hombre" in a
sentence and be universally understood to be referring to
a "male homo sapien," a natural phenomenon having definable
qualities and characteristics that remain constant across
cultures. In a similar manner one can describe men In a
wide variety of situations as being "angry" and will be
understood, because underlying the use of this term is a
definable class or range of behaviors that constitute the
deep structure and remains constant across both situations
and persons. It appears that whenever terms like anger,
loving, aggressive, or abnormal are predicated of persons
they ultimately refer to observable or overt acts of one
sort or another. Also, whether these terms are predicated
on the basis of direct observation, verbal reports, or in
ference they always appear to refer to a class or range of
overt acts rather than a singular entity. For example,
when one speaks of another as being "aggressive" he is not
18
understood as meaning a singular act for there are a wide
variety of ways In which one can be aggressive. Without
such classes or ranges of behaviors about which people can
agree, the terms become vague and Imprecise and their mean
ings ambiguous. It seems, however, that too often the
social scientist, researcher and clinician alike;, do not go
beyond the surface level of language and are content to
describe persons with terms like "aggressiveness" without
spelling out In what ways they are aggressive. While there
does exist a relationship between behavior and language
this relationship Is not one of identity. To confuse the
surface and deep structures of language is to mislead in
the name of literary convenience and richness, and this may
be the present state of affairs In the social sciences to
day.
Language forms the basis of those categories we
employ to both describe and explain behavior. When we say
that a person is angry, loving, or indifferent we are lump
ing together a class or series of behaviors, and when we
make such assertions their accuracy depends upon the ac
curacy of our observations and the underlying definitions
of these terms. One of the greatest dangers confronting
the social scientist is his assuming that he understands
or is explaining behavior when in fact he is merely reify
ing predicates. On this point Harding asserted that "we
19
must try to get behind the symbols to the phenomena under
lying [behavior]," for:
The traditional techniques of psychology and psychia
try for assessing and describing personality seem in
adequate because: (l) they assume the existence of an
undemonstrable and unlikely systematic relationship
between symbols and behavior; (2) they are concerned
with material that is entirely derivative, rather than
with a direct sampling and examination of the phenom
ena which they attempt to predict; (3) they are con
cerned directly with a level of abstraction that makes
them inapplicable to cross-cultural situations, and
this casts further doubt on their utility in our own
culture [1953* p. I2 *-].
Perhaps this is one of the principal reasons behind
the social scientist’s limited ability to adequately ex
plain and predict behavior. It is quite possible that too
often he begins with a priori conceptions of man and pro
ceeds onward never questioning whether his original point
of departure was the correct one. He may be confusing
levels of explanation, that is confusing the verbal and
the behavioral and not recognizing that language only mir
rors and is not identical with behavior.
Another problem that the social scientist has yet
to come to grips with is that of normalcy. Social scien
tists, and especially the clinical specialities, have yet
to provide an adequate and acceptable definition and de
scription of what is normal. However, they continue to
speak glibly and authoritatively of deviations from this
still ill-defined standard. To speak glibly of deviations
or to label something pathological assumes knowledge of
standards by which such states can be gauged or judged.
Where, however, is the line between neatness and compulsiv-
ity, solitude and withdrawal, spontaneity and impulsivity,
creativity and madness, and all of the other distinctions
that are made by clinicians, teachers, personnel managers,
courts, mental hospitals, and all other persons and insti
tutions charged with the responsibility of making such
differentiations? The far extremes are fairly easy to dif
ferentiate, even to the layman, but what makes these ex
tremes "pathological" or "dangerous" to society? Statis
tics shows us that few of us can be described by those
qualities or characteristics that are defined by the ex
tremes of a normal statistical distribution. For better
or worse most of us have to accept the fact that we will
live all our lives in that area defined as plus or minus
one standard deviation from the mean. But what exactly are
those qualities and behaviors contained within this range
and labeled average or normal? This is an extremely impor
tant question to ask not only to better understand "devia
tion" or "pathology" but also to gain greater insights
into the psychological character of the whole of mankind.
Central Question
The central question of this study is whether it is
possible to develop a psycho/sociological theory that:
21
1. Makes minimal a priori assumptions about the
nature of man;
2. Employs minimal use of abstractions, concepts,
or constructs to avoid the danger of reifying
predicates;
3. Adequately defines normalcy and non-normalcy;
4. Provides an approach to the study of man that
Is useful to the researcher/clinician;
5. Can generate effective prescriptive techniques;
6. Can yield more accurate and acceptable descrip
tions of behaviors and motivations;
7. Is consistent and compatible with contributions
from all of the social sciences, both theoreti
cal and methodological;
8. Is applicable across cultures; and
9. Does not do an Injustice to man's complexity
and diversity but rather accepts and attempts
to preserve his Individuality and freedom.
All of this might be possible If Instead of begin
ning with a preconceived notion of man the social scientist
first turns his attention to what is In fact possible
rather than beginning with what Is Intellectually or con
ceptually imaginable. The central thesis of this paper is
that social scientists have been premature In their at
tempts to explain and categorize man's behaviors and motl-
vations and have done so before having paid sufficient at
tention to the content of his complexity and diversity.
If, however, the social scientist would first attend to
those things that people can actually do, that is the ways
in which people can behave or react in various situations,
he will probably find an amazing consistency among people,
and perhaps even across cultures, and may find a more
stable foundation upon which to base his explanations.
Use has been made above of the terms class or
range of behaviors. What is implied by the use of these
terms is simply to point out that the labels used to de
scribe human characteristics, qualities, attributes or be
haviors do not refer to singular acts or states but rather
to a range or class of possible behaviors. The necessity
of pointing this out stems from the fact that all too often
researchers and clinicians are content with abstract and
nonspecific explanations of behaviors or states. Many are
content with knowing, and pronouncing, that someone is
aggressive, delinquent, insecure, lonely, or psychotic and
letting things stop there, but this falls far short of
understanding. To ascribe insecurities to a poor self-
concept, aggression to an underdeveloped super-ego, or
delinquency to a deprived childhood is also far from ade
quate or acceptable. Prerequisite to understanding is the
exploration and enumeration of possibilities, but possi
bilities that are real and not abstract.
23
While conceptually acts and their underlying states
may be infinite, their possible infinitude may largely be
a function of language and not a behavioral reality. It
may be that overt interpersonal behaviors, as well as those
internal states inferred from behaviors, are limited and
not nearly as varied or numerous as language leads us to
believe.
Central Hypotheses
The possible finite nature of human interpersonal
behaviors is one central hypothesis of this paper. This is
stated, at the present time, as the limited number of pos
sibilities (LNP) hypothesis. In its simplest form the LNP
hypothesis asserts that although the totality of human be
havior is varied and complex when it is viewed in terms of
behavioral possibilities or alternatives, the number and
variety of overt responses that people can make, both in
dividually and collectively, are limited. While this hy
pothesis denies neither the complexity, diversity, nor
richness of human behavior it does attempt to point out an
underlying structure by drawing attention to the similari
ties of behaviors among individuals and across situations.
24
Subhypotheses
The principal task to which the LNP hypothesis ad
dresses itself was that of attempting to define the range
of interpersonal behavioral possibilities. Such an under
taking may be a necessary prerequisite to a more complete
understanding of human behaviors. It seems reasonable to
assume that before normative statements and prescriptive
pronouncements be made about social behaviors, one ought
to first explore and attempt to define what Is in fact, as
opposed to conceptually, possible. This study is an Ini
tial attempt to set forth a rationale and outline a proce
dure for investigating and better understanding interper
sonal behavior. The principal focus of the LNP hypothesis
is interpersonal behaviors, that is, a description of the
overt responses that people can actually make in Interper
sonal situations.
The purpose of the present study was to test two
subhypotheses concerning whether:
1. Social or interpersonal behaviors have a de
finable limit; that is, whether the overt
responses that people can make towards each
other do In fact approach a behavioral limit, and
2. Whether these behavioral possibilities tend to
remain constant across both persons and situa
tion. It is expected, however, that the range,
25
order, and frequencies of these responses will
change contextually, that is, across differing
situations, but that the possibilities will
remain unchanged.
Verbal behaviors cannot be ignored by any theory
that attempts to fully understand and explain social inter
actions. It is undeniable that words play an extremely
Important role in social transactions. The distinction be
tween verbal and other forms of overt behaviors is at times
a difficult one to make but a distinction between what one
says and what one does appears necessary.
The meaning and acceptance of all terms employed
by the social sciences ultimately rely upon some form of
empirical validation. Terms like love, happiness, depres
sion, anxiety, or anger derive both their meaning and ac
ceptance from the fact that they fairly accurately describe
classes of observable behaviors. However, terms like
these are in essence only verbal symbols which stand for
those classes of behaviors to which the terms refer. This
Is obvious from the fact that "zunk" could be substituted
for "anger" without confusion resulting if all people
agreed to use the term in a like manner. This Is possible
because what remains constant, whether one uses anger or
zunk, are the behaviors. Thus a term like anger ultimately
refers to a class of overt acts, and in the case of anger
such acts may run the gamut from subtlety caustic remarks
to physical attacks. It is to this range of possible be
haviors to which the LNP hypothesis ultimately addresses
Itself and attempts to define.
Continuing with anger as an example there are two
aspects that need to be considered: (l) the behaviors that
constitute the class of angry actions, and (2) the situa
tion^) precipitating the behaviors. However, although a
wide variety of situations may precipitate angry responses,
the behavioral manifestations of anger may remain the same
across both persons and situations. If this were not the
case, such terms would cease to have stable meaning and
an unimaginable number of different terms would need to be
coined whose referents were not only the specific behaviors
but also those behaviors in relation to specific situa
tions. One can easily be misled into the belief that there
exists a greater complexity to human social behavior than
actually exists in fact by being distracted by and citing
the multiplicity of social situations, but if one attends
to the behavioral possibilities available to the partici
pants it will be seen that much of this complexity is il
lusion. Such terms do, however, have meaning but not
merely because people agree to use them in a particular
manner, but, according to the LNP hypothesis, because the
range of possible behaviors to which such terms refer re
main constant across persons and situations.
27
This does not imply that all people will behave in
exactly the same way in identical situations. That range
of behaviors of which an individual is aware as possible
responses to a given situation constitutes their behavioral
repertoire. That range of behaviors of which all people
are aware collectively are the limited number of possibili
ties. An individual's behavioral repertoire consists of
only a portion of the total number of possibilities, and of
those possibilities of which an individual is aware only a
portion of them will actually be expressed behaviorally.
For example, a person criticized by his superior could con
sider the possibility of "telling him off" or "murdering
him" but it is highly improbable that he will actually do
so. It is, however, more probable that he will "tell him
off" than it is that he will "murder him" but both of these
responses could be in his behavioral repertoire and cer
tainly many more. An individual's behavioral repertoire
and the probabilities of his making any particular re
sponse^) across a wide range of social situations seems
to be what social scientists are referring to when they
speak about "personality." Maybe one reason why there Is
so much controversy in areas like personality is that suf
ficient attention has not been paid to exploring behavioral
possibilities. According to the LNP hypothesis, personality
consists of that range of responses, from the total range
of possible responses, that constitutes an individual's
28
behavioral repertorie in combination with their individual
istic probabilities of occurrence across situations.
Essential Definitions:
Categorization of Responses
It is necessary at this point to differentiate re
sponses into the following categories:
1. Responses having specific behavioral referents
whose occurrences among the general population
are statistically frequent;
1.1 Things that people can do, for example:
leave, ignore, kiss, hug.
1.2 Things that people can say.
2. Responses having specific behavioral referents
whose occurrences among the general population
are statistically infrequent;
2.1 Things that people can do, for example:
rob, kill, beat, commit suicide, burn.
2.2 Things that people can say.
3. Responses describing states rather than be
haviors, for example: be happy, angry, anxious,
depressed, psychotic, neurotic. While the
terms used to describe such states are useful,
to be meaningful scientifically they must be
describable in terms of categories 1 or 2.
4. Responses that refer to processes, for example:
motivate, cure, teach, learn, discipline. These
too are capable of being describable In terms of
categories 1 or 2.
5. Responses having only conceptual or abstract re
ferents. Although such responses do have meaning
linguistically they are not describable In terms
of categories 1 or 2.
The purpose of these categories is to aid in the
differentiation between what Is in fact behaviorally pos
sible and what Is merely literary or linguistic fiction.
It may be that in the attempt to be comprehensive, profound,
and methodologically sophisticated, the social scientist
has overlooked the obvious.
CHAPTER III
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The LNP is an ambitious hypothesis for it is in
tended to serve as the cornerstone in an attempt to formu
late a comprehensive theory of human behavior and to bring
about a psycho/sociological synthesis. Because of this
synthesizing intent any review of the literature must nec
essarily be broad in scope. The review that was undertaken
for this study extended into many areas of psychological
and sociological theory and research. However, while much
that has been written appears to support and be consistent
with the central theme of this paper it only tangentially
supports the hypothesis set forth in the preceding chapter.
Studies Related to LNP Hypothesis
There does in fact appear to be only one reference
that makes both theoretical and methodological statements
similar to those of the LNP hypothesis. In a paper on
"Behavioristics" Miller and Frick (19^9) stated that "The
psychologist's problem is to describe the relative frequen
cies of occurrence of responses In each of the categories
he has set up [p. 3 1 1 ] and that "Predictability depends
upon (l) the range of alternatives the subject can make,
30
31
and (2) the relative frequencies with which these alterna
tives occur [p. 3173*" They continued by stating that:
To define a course of action it is necessary to con
sider all the alternative courses of action that might
occur. It is with this set of alternatives— this
classification— that the behavior analyst must work.
He is faced, not with individual responses, but rather
with a matrix of alternatives. His Job is to decide
which ones of this large setof alternatives are most
frequent, then to discover the rules for manipulating
these frequencies. The problem is, therefore, to
analyze the statistical structure of the set of all
possible courses of action [p. 323] (underlining added).
Furthermore:
If Interest is confined to individual responses and no
attempt is made to describe and discuss sequences of
responses, experimental psychology may have difficulty
in meeting many problems posed In the clinical and
social areas [p. 322],
Antecedent to any attempt to "discuss and describe
sequences of responses" or a statistical analysis of "all
possible courses of action" is the necessity of defining
those possible courses of action or alternatives. This,
quite simply, is the fundamental intent of the LNP hypothe
sis. While such an undertaking may seem formidable, im
plicit in all social science research and theory is the
underlying assumption that men are not as different as they
appear to be. On this point Leeper stated that:
The fundamental trouble is that every field of psychol
ogy, because of the basic nature of the scientific
method, has to deal with both differences and with com
mon features. . . . All fields have to deal with dif
ferences between individuals. In the other direction,
we must recognize too that personality is Just as truly
a matter of those respects in which organisms are simi
lar as of* those in which they differ [1963* PP.
397] (underlining added).
32
The LNP hypothesis attempts to explore and define
the nature of behavioral similarities across persons and
situations and contends that this is an important aspect
of "basic research" that for too long has been overlooked
or ignored by the social scientist. To the question: Why
have psychologists, in their many research efforts, been
unable to display the presumed harmonies in individual
behaviors? Block (1968) answered that they "have not given
the notion of bounds or limits sufficient attention [pp.
210-212]
Other Related Points of View
While the social scientist does attempt to explore
and define similarities he may be too impetuous in labeling
them before fully defining their nature and limits. In
A Behavioral Theory of Traits, Oppenheimer (1957) stated
that "In our attempts to establish a science of man we are
greatly hampered by the fogginess which surrounds the mean
ing of key concepts [p. 112]." What he said about traits
seems equally appropriate to the whole of psychology and
is especially relevant to the LNP hypothesis. He defined
a trait as "any recurrent aspect of the external behavior
of the individual [p. 112]." He continued by stating:
First, a trait is present in the external behavior
of the individual. This excludes any suggestion of
putting all or part of a trait among the phenomena
which are not a part of external behavior, although
they may determine It. My theory also asserts that
33
traits are present in our experience, not inferred
from it. . . .If they are present [in behavior], we'
are certain of their existence. ... If they are in
ferred, they are hypothetical and uncertain, no matter
what degree of uncertainty they may have [pp. 112-113].
The position taken in this study is that the social
scientist must first examine, define, and attempt to cate
gorize what is behaviorally possible before attempting to
draw inferences about unobservables such as motives. This
he has not yet sufficiently done. As Oppenheimer (1957)
stated: "The exclusive emphasis on etiology keeps the ob
server from examining external behavior, and obscures the
varied relationships existing between traits and external
behavior and motives [p. 118]."
Recognition of the Identity of traits also elucidates
many of the relationships between traits and motives.
We can observe how varigated the relationships are,
how the same trait can be based on different motives
with different people, or with the same person In dif
ferent stages of his life, or how people differ be-
cause one individual has more traits with lnchanglng
motivation than another has, or how the same motive
leads to different traits Lp. 119J (underlining added).
Trait names, like many of the terms employed in
the social sciences, simply refer to clusters of similar
behaviors and are only verbal conveniences which stand for
such clusters. "We perceive how behavior recurs and we
think about this recurrence, and form a logical construct
that we call trait. But this is not the end of the same
process [Oppenheimer, 1957* p. 114]." A great deal of in
definiteness and subsequent confusion can result when one
34
substitutes names or symbols for the behaviors themselves,
for too often precision is lost in the transformation.
This loss usually results from premature attempts to prove
the pervasiveness of some human quality or characteristic
before sufficient attention has been given to first defin
ing its behavioral limits. Prom a vast variety of situa
tional and behavioral possibilities, the researcher selects
those that he believes to be "typical" of whatever charac
teristic he is attempting to study. Armed with an instru
ment purportedly designed to measure this characteristic,
he sets out to establish the extent of its existence among
people. From this vast variety of situational and behav
ioral possibilities comes a singular entity such as "a
trait" or "a factor." While such approaches do make it
easier to comprehend human complexity premature reduction-
ism overlooks and excludes far too much.
Because human beings are complex it is admittedly
not enough to concentrate on singular psychological quali
ties or characteristics. Endler and Hunt concluded that:
The question of whether individual differences or
situations are the major source of behavioral vari
ance, like many issues in the history of science,
turns out to be a pseudo issue. In effect there is
no single source of behavioral variance, at least not
so far as the trait of anxiousness is concerned. Human
behavior is complex. In order to describe it, one must
take into account not only the main sources of vari
ance . . . but also the various simple interactions
. . . and, where feasible, the triple interaction.. . .
Behavior is a function of these factors in combination
[1966, pp. 344-345].
However, while acknowledging that studying interaction is
important, the current procedures do not yet seem applic
able in the area of social or interpersonal behaviors.
If we agree that the psychology of personality must
deal in terms of generalized factors and generalized
principles, rather than in terms of unique character
istics, we must face the question of when, in general,
the psychological research on personality should focus
on trying to classify what it studies (the "taxonomic"
problem) and when on trying to determine the relation
ship between different factors [Leeper, 1963* p. 398].
The LNP hypothesis asserts that the solution of the taxo
nomic problem must be undertaken before attempts to under
stand and explain social interactions can begin to be
fruitful.
It is not "stimulation" that motivates students
but those specific things that one does or says to stimu
late or motivate another that are of primary importance.
The pedagogue who glibly tosses such terms around without
specifying those things that one can do is really saying
little of importance. The therapist who sets out to
"treat" or "cure" is in no better position unless he too
can define specific courses of action. It is not merely
the "interaction" between teacher and student, therapist
and client, or factors A, B, and D that produces results
but describable behaviors within the context of definable
situations. What are those things that one can do to
stimulate, motivate, treat, cure, etc.? These are the ap
propriate questions to ask about the nature of social
36
interactions for such interactions do not exist between
abstract entities like gregariousness, passivity, disci
pline, understanding, aggressiveness, etc., but derives its
meaning from the behaviors between persons.
McGee contended:
Seldom does one find studies wherein the stylistic
variable is correlated with methodologically inde
pendent observations. The typical procedure has been
to employ as criteria, other psychometric instruments
containing possible strong methodological contamina
tion [1962, p. 286],
Furthermore, there is a "remarkable dearth of studies" that
have made any attempt to "study the relationship between
response style measures and behavior measures [p. 292]."
The importance of studying such relationships are empha
sized by his statement that:
The point to be made here is based upon the assumption
that the previously gathered descriptive data do rep
resent a valuable contribution to the area of person
ality assessment. But, it is now time to shift into
low gear and change course so as to proceed down the
abstraction ladder in the direction of observable be-
havior. A question of major importance for future
research is one stated in predictive form: What will
the acquiescent person do? [p. 292] (underlining added).
The LNP hypothesis descends one more rung down this
ladder of abstractions by asking what appears to be an even
more fundamental question: What can the acquiescent (pas
sive, aggressive, gregarious, etc.) person do?
The above references have pointed out the need to
explore human alternatives, similarities, and limits and
to do so within the realm of what is behaviorally, as op
posed to abstractly or conceptually, possible. The Intent
of the central hypothesis (p. 23) Is to attempt to provide
some definite answers to those questions about alternatives
and limits. The second hypothesis addresses itself to the
question of the similarities of behaviors across persons
and situations. While such a notion is both implicit and
explicit in many areas of psychology the specific nature
of these similarities are once again often obfuscated by
abstractions and ill-defined terms. However, the phenome
non of psychological sets does seem to lend some support to
this next hypothesis.
Evidence from Studies Concerned with
Psychological Response Sets
A psychological set is simply a predisposition to
respond in consistent way(s) to a given set of circum
stances or stimuli. In an early review of the literature,
Gibson stated that "The concept of set or attitude is a
nearly universal one in psychological thinking despite the
fact that the underlying meaning is indefinite, the ter
minology chaotic, and the usage by psychologists highly
individualistic [1941, p. 781]." In a more recent review,
Rorer stated that "in recent years the psychological liter
ature dealing with response sets, response biases, or re
sponse styles has grown so large and have been reviewed so
many times that the reviews have themselves been reviewed
[1965, p. 129]." He pointed out, however, that in most of
38
the literature there appears to he a unanimity of opinion
not only about the existence of response sets or styles but
also about their pervasiveness as determinates of human be
havior. A review of the Psychological Abstracts reveals,
however, that, due principally to the influence of Cronbach
(1941, 1942), most of the research on sets has been limited
to studying the effects of this phenomenon on test taking
behavior. However, Stagner (1937, p. 117) had earlier sug
gested that personality traits were a form of set and in a
later article Cronbach (1950, p. 18) considered response
sets to be "first cousins" of personality variables.
Studies that have explored psychological sets in
areas other than that of test taking behavior are those of
Berg and Rapaport (1954), Goodfellow (1940), Robinson (1933),
and Wallen (1945). All of the more recent research in this
area relevant to this study appears to have been done, or
is currently being done in the U.S.S.R. Unfortunately,
very little is available in translation. However, the work
of Uznadze (1966) and his colleagues seems to be consistent
with what is already known about the phenomenon of psycho
logical sets. Not only the existence but also the stabil
ity of response sets among individuals and across situa
tions have been reported by Berg (1953); Berg and Rapaport
(1954); Gaier, Lee, and McQuitty (1953); Mathews (1929);
and Uznadze (1966).
39
In a series of writings Berg (1953> 1955> 1957>
1961) pursued the notion of deviant response sets. Of
deviant responses Berg (1955) stated:
Deviant response patterns tend to be general: hence
those deviant behavior patterns which are significant
for abnormality and thus regarded as symptoms, are
associated with other deviant response patterns which
are in noncritical areas of behavior and which are not
regarded as symptoms of personality aberration [p. 62].
However:
All this is not to say that deviant responses are
never found in normals, nor does this mean that such
responses are limited to neurotic or psychotic states
exclusively. All normal persons reveal some deviance
when responding to a series of stimulus patterns; how
ever the number of such responses is considerably
smaller when compared to groups of maladjusted per
sons [pp. 66-67].
The relationship between psychological sets and the
LNP hypothesis is simply that the LNP hypothesis also as
sumes a commonality of repetitive behavioral responses
among individuals and across a wide variety of social situ
ations. Common sense tells us that people do not learn
entirely new sets of responses towards every person and
every social situation they will encounter in the courses
of their lives. What enables one to function as a social
being is having learned a range of acceptable responses
applicable to a wide variety of persons and situations.
How does one know what behaviors are appropriate or ac
ceptable in certain situations unless there are also com
mon features in the situations themselves. One does not
40
acquire an entirely different set of responses towards
every loved one, every person in authority, or every sub
ordinate, nor for that matter towards every person they
dislike. How one "typically" behaves in similar situations
and towards similar people seems to be what is meant by a
"trait" and the predisposition towards such repetitive
"typical" behaviors seems to be adequately explained by the
phenomenon of set.
Berg stated:
To test the hypothesis [of deviance] . . . , it is
necessary only to identify the common or modal pat
terns and predict that those subjects whose responses
rather consistently go against modal preferences will
be deviant in the sense of exhibiting symptom patterns
associated with abnormal states [1955* P. 63].
If this is true of deviant states, why them should it not
also be true of all states and behaviors? Berg's methodo
logical statements about the investigation and identifica
tion of deviant response sets seems to be useful to employ
in testing the LNP hypothesis. However, while the LNP hy
pothesis also attempts to identify common or modal re
sponses it also goes beyond this and attempts to follow
Miller and Prick's advice to first "consider all alternative
courses of action that might occur [1949* P* 21]."
Other Studies
There are a few studies whose purposes have been
similar to those proposed in this study. Indicative of
these is the study by Lorr, Suziedalis, and Kinnane (1969)
who sought to "(a) identify some of the more prominent in
terpersonal situation-dimensions that evoke interpersonal
responses; (b) to identify the main manifest reaction di
mensions in the interpersonal domain [p. 446]." Although
the results of their study lends support to the LNP hypoth
esis by showing that interpersonal responses are similar
across persons, like all similar studies reported in the
Journals, the responses they report tend to be too vague or
abstract. "Humor him," "let him have a piece of my mind,"
"try and be helpful," "get angry and tell him off," etc.
are typical of the types of responses reported. The LNP
hypothesis asks what is it that one does "to humor" or "be
helpful" and what does one say when they are "letting him
have a piece of my mind" or "telling him off?" That is,
what does this mean in terms of specific behaviors? Essen
tially this same criticism can be leveled against similar
studies by Katz, 1968; Rausch, Ditman, and Taylor, 1959;
Wysocki and Wysocki, 1970; Dreger, et al., 1964; Chappie,
Chappie, and Repp, 1955; Mascaro, 1969; Catterall, 1970;
and Bijou, 1968. While all of these writers address them
selves to the task of "behavioral" analyses or classifica
tions all seem to fall short of this goal principally be
cause of their lack of specificity.
42
Alternative Approaches
A potentially more productive approach to the In
vestigation of behavioral possibilities seems to be one
analogous to that employed by Bousfield and Barclay (1950).
What they simply did was to ask their subjects to list as
many birds, carpenter tools, and celestial bodies as they
could think of in three separate trials. In this manner
they were able to establish the range, order, and frequen
cies of associative responses and they simply reported them
In this manner. Although such an approach seems to lack
"methodological sophistication" In light of what has been
already written by many, the question of whether such so
phistication may not often blind researchers to the reali
ties of behaviors does seem appropriate. As Deese has
stated, "We have been badly oversold on the classical ex
perimental model. ... To much evidence— obvious and
available evidence— is ignored because it fails to conform
to our prejudices about how empirical information arises
[1969> P. 3]."
The necessity of providing some justification for
the legitimacy of an investigative procedure like the
above stems from the fact that many researchers are of the
opinion that direct reports from subjects are an unreliable
source of data. This attitude has been quite well de
scribed by Oseas who wrote:
43
Consider, for example, the usual instructions on a
personality questionnaire. Almost invariably they
include an appeal to the examinee to give honest an
swers to test questions. At the same time, the in
genuity with which the test-maker provides against
lapses from truthfulness, e.g., by presenting the
examinee with questions whose intentions are artfully
oblique and by building into his instrument subtlety
contrived (but cynically labeled) "lie" scales, in
dicates that the test-maker's faith in the efficacy
of appeals to reason and fair play is not boundless
[1968, p. 179].
However, Allman and Rokeach stated that:
Such phrases "I think that...," "I believe that...,"
or "I feel that...," do not seem to elicit differen
tial responses when associated with opinion statements
in paper and pencil questionnaires. A comparison of
means, ranges, and correlations of both the test and
condition items indicate no effect from such varia
tion [1967, P. 132].
They continued: "If the use of such phrases in opinion
tests do not elicit differential responses then there is
some evidence to suggest that the underlying processes
which these phrases represent may also be interchangeably
rather than functionally independent [pp. 132-133J." If
such techniques do not elicit differential responses and
this "suggests" that the underlying processes are not func
tionally independent, cannot this be carried one step fur
ther and "suggest" that the overt behaviors are also inter-
changeaably rather than functionally independent?
Perhaps one of the principal reasons behind the so
cial scientist's predictive and curative failings is that
they have not paid sufficient attention to what is in fact
behaviorally possible and instead have been content to work
44
in a world of words rather than confront the complexities
of external behavioral realities. It may be that too often
the social scientist fails to recognize that there are
times when "a cigar is only a cigar" and need not always
represent some esoteric displacement of unconscious needs
and desires.
Summary
In summary, the LNP hypothesis contends that under
standing of human behavior begins with the exploration and
enumeration of overt behavioral possibilities and that such
an exploration and enumeration must necessarily precede
classification. Once this is accomplished it then proceeds
to explore the extent to which these possibilities occur
across situations. It attempts to accomplish this by the
straightforward procedure of going directly to the source
of these possibilities— the people whose behaviors psychol
ogists have been unsuccessfully attempting to understand
and predict for far too long.
CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY
This study was a preliminary exploration of the LNP
hypothesis. Because it is an initial attempt to explore
behavioral possibilities and probabilities of necessity it
lacked a certain amount of specificity. Its primary pur
pose was to attempt to determine whether behavioral possi
bilities do in fact approach a limit across both persons
and situations as well as providing some insights into
what these possibilities might be. Secondly, it attempted
to explore behavioral probabilities, that is determine the
range of behaviors that have higher probabilities of occur
rence across persons and situations.
Subjects
All of the subjects employed in this study were
high school students In the ninth, tenth, eleventh, and
twelfth grades and ranged in age from 14 to 18 years of age.
The largest group, 150 males and 149 females, were from a
predominately middle class area. A second group consisting
of 35 females were, at the time of testing, residing in a
county probation department 90 day placement facility where
they had been placed by court order for the purposes of
45
46
individual and family counseling. Although it would have
been possible to differentiate subjects according to grade
levels, ethnic or cultural backgrounds, IQ's, etc., it was
not deemed necessary for the purposes of this study.
Instrumentation
The procedure employed in this study simply re
quested all subjects to write on a blank piece of paper
that was provided them "All of the things that you can
think of that you or anyone might conceivably say or do in
response to the following situation":
1. An embarrassing situation: A teacher embarrasses
you in front of the class by calling you dumb or
stupid for not understanding the lesson currently
being taught. (Number of subjects, 53 males and
59 females.)
2. A general hate situation, Hate (G): Someone
whom you love tells you that they hate you.
(Number of subjects, 51 males and 47 females.)
3. A general love situation, Love (G): Someone
whom you love tells you that they love you.
(Number of subjects, 46 males and 33 females.)
Among the 35 females from the probation department
facility, an attempt was made to make the situation more
specific:
47
4. A specific love situation, Love (S): Your mother
tells you that she loves you.
Testing Procedure
The instrument was administered to intact classroom
groups as they were available. The instructions were not
rigidly followed because many of the subjects were ini
tially reluctant to write "anything that they or anyone
might conceivably say or do" and had to be assured that
what they wrote would remain the sole possession of the
examiner and that their individual responses would not be
identified or made available to any members of the staff or
faculty. Also, to assure anonymity the only information
that they were requested to provide about themselves was
age, sex, and racial or cultural background. This informa
tion was requested for use in a future study of the LNP
hypothesis. It was emphasized that names should not be
written on their test papers. It was assumed that because
anonymity was assured, the subjects would feel freer to
write "anything" that occurred to them as a possibility.
In several instances subjects came from bilingual back
grounds or for other reasons had difficulty writing their
responses. In these instances the examiner offered to
write their responses for them if they were willing. None
of these subjects refused nor from the nature of their re
sponses did they seem reluctant to respond with as wide a
range of responses as the rest of the group(s). All sub
jects were given as much time as they needed to write as
many responses as they could think of and this took on an
average of 30 to 40 minutes. The range of responses was
from 2 to 3^. After all of the subjects had written all
of the responses that they could think of they were then
requested to go over them and list them in the order of
the first, second, and third things that they thought that
they would do in such a situation.
Tabulation
An attempt was made to organize these responses in
a manner that would not require the use of any abstract
a priori categories. The intention was to let the re
sponses dictate whatever possible categories might arise
from the data itself. This was accomplished by simply
writing down all of the responses and making a tabulation
of those responses that occurred more than once. In this
manner frequencies were determined for the ranges of both
possible and probable responses. (No differentiations
were made among the order of either possible or probable
responses. Sequences of responses are, of course, also of
great importance for behaviors are sequential or dynamic
rather than static. However, sequential behaviors extend
beyond the purposes of the present paper.)
Based upon the findings of an earlier pilot study
49
four general categories or responses emerged and were only-
employed to aid In the organization and presentation of
the present findings. These categories were dictated by
the data itself and are used simply to provide organization
and are meant to be neither exhaustive nor final. These
categories are:
1. Overt behaviors, physical things that one might
do as opposed to
2. Verbal responses, things that one might say;
3. States, the usual descriptive categories gen
erally employed by social scientists and
clinicians;
4. Abstract or indefinite responses, those that
might have been included in one of the first
three categories but doing so might have
required interpretations that may have ex
tended beyond the data.
The responses written by the subjects often con
tained several responses in one sentence, for example,
"I'd get angry and stare at them then hit them." In such
Instances each of these responses— be angry, stare, and
hit— were regarded as separate for the purposes of tabula
tion. Also, many times an individual would repeat a
response using synonyms; for example, "hit them in the
face" or "punch them in the mouth." In these instances
V .
50
such responses were tabulated only once for each Individ
ual, for in the opinion of the examiner they represented
the same behaviors.
Appendices A through D contain all of the responses
given by the 33^- subjects across all situations. Appendix
A, "Overt Behaviors," does contain categories. However,
these categories were dictated by the data and are meant
to be neither exhaustive nor final. With only one excep
tion, beneath all of the headings in Appendix A are in
cluded all of the overt behavioral possibilities reported
by the subjects themselves. This one exception is the
first category labeled "Remarks." All of the remarks that
were written by the subjects are listed alphabetically and
tabulated in Appendix B labeled "Verbal Responses."
Statistical Analyses
While many conventional statistical analyses could
be made of the data in Appendices A through D, this ap
proach would not be consistent with the purposes of this
study. Such analyses would require transforming behaviors
into numbers and as was said earlier such transformations
often drastically change the nature and meaning of the data.
The principal interest of this study was to define possible
and probable behaviors across persons and situations. The
rationale for presenting the findings in this manner was
derived in part from Bayesian statistics, for which two
principal sources were Savage (195*0 and Edwards, Lindman
and Savage (1963).
CHAPTER V
ANALYSES AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Analysis of Results
This study's principal Interest was In possible and
probable behaviors. For a behavior to be possible In any
situation all It need do Is occur to anyone as something
that they or anyone could possibly say or do. Probable be
haviors are those that are among the first three things
that the subjects believed they would in fact say or do in
response to a particular situation. The necessity for mak
ing this distinction stems from the fact that our experi
ences have shown us that there are many more things that
people can say or do in interpersonal situations than they
will in fact say or do in an actual situation. "Responses"
and "behaviors" are used synonymously in this study for the
subjects were instructed to write what they thought anyone
might say or do, and both physical and verbal acts are
behaviors. Because this study was concerned with overt
behaviors rather than with states or abstractions, its
principal focus was on the findings which are presented in
Appendix A, and secondarily on those found in Appendix B.
Summaries of possible and probable behaviors from Appendix
A are presented in the following pages.
52
53
TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF POSSIBLE RESPONSES FROM APPENDIX A
Situations:
Sex:
Number of Subjects (Ss):
Embarass
M / F
53 59
Hate(G)
M / F
51 47
Love(G)
M / F
46 33
Iove(S)
F
35
Total number of different
possible responses across
all Ss and situations:
201a
Total number of different
possible responses to
each situation:
121 88 80 28
Total number of different
possible responses in
the first 18 categories:
80 62
38 19
Percent of possible responses
in the first 18 categories: 66.1
72.9 47-7 67.9
TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF PROBABLE RESPONSES FROM APPENDIX A
Situations:
Sex:
Number of Subjects (Ss)
Embarass
M / F
53 59
Hate(G)
M / F
51 47
Love(G)
M / F
46 33
Love(S)
F
35
Total number of different
probable responses across
all Ss and situations:
83
Total number of different
probable responses to
each situation:
55 43 23 15
Total number of different
probable responses in
the first 18 categories:
50 37
14 12
Percent of probable responses
in the first 18 categories: 90.9
86.0 63.4 80.0
St
The total number of ind.ivid.vial responses across all subjects and
situations was 2874: Embarass = 884, Hate(G) = 807, Love(G) = 848,
and Love(S) = 264.
54
The number of different possible responses, both
physical and verbal, across all four test situations and
all of the 334 subjects totaled 201. It is doubtful that
this number represents all of the possible responses that
anyone might make to these situations. However, even if
this number is multiplied by five or ten it still implies
the existence of behavioral limits. Also, when these dif
ferent possible responses are tabulated separately for each
situation, the number of responses decreases sharply. The
degree of behavioral overlapping across situations becomes
apparent when the percentages of responses in the first 18
categories are computed. These percentages were: Embarass-
ing, 66.1 percent; Hate (G), 72.9 percent; Love (G) 47.7
percent; and Love (S), 67.9 percent. It is possible that
the lower percentage in the Love (G) situation is a re
flection of the fact that the subjects seemed to be most
uneasy with this type of situation. They tended to make
more casual, off-hand, or Joking remarks as responses and
it is questionable whether they would make such responses
in actual love situations. It is, however, apparent from
the Love (S) category that when the situation is made
more specific the percentage of responses increases and is
comparable to those in the Embarass and Hate (G) category.
The important points are: (l) that across all four test
situations and all subjects a relatively small number of
55
different possible responses occurred, (2) markedly fewer
responses occurred In responses to particular situations,
and (3) In three of the four situations the first 18 re
sponse categories accounted for at least two-thirds of the
possible responses.
Even more striking is the summary of different
probable responses. While there was a total of 201 differ
ent possible responses across all situations and subjects,
only 83 of these were reported as being probable. That is,
the subjects thought they would make only 41.3 percent of
the possible responses to situations such as those used
in this study. This reduction was even greater when the
separate percentages were computed for each situation.
The percentages of probable responses from the total of
possible responses by situations were: Embarass, 27.6 per
cent; Hate (G), 22.7 percent; Love (G), 11.8 percent; and
Love (S), 7.8 percent. The most striking results were the
percentages of probable responses that occurred in the
first 18 categories. These percentages were: Embarass,
90.9 percent; Hate (G), 86.0 percent; Love (G), 63.4 per
cent; and Love (S), 80.9 percent. It again appears pos
sible that the percentage drop of probable responses in
the Love (G) situation is a reflection of the same factors
that affected a similar drop in this situation among pos
sible responses.
These findings lend support to the two postulates
to which this study addressed itself, which are:
1. Social or interpersonal behaviors have a de
finable limit, and
2. The range of these behaviors, both possible and
probable, tend to remain constant across persons
and situations.
A second part of this hypothesis asserted that al
though behavioral possibilities and probabilities remain
constant their range, order, and frequencies can, and do,
vary contextually. Support for the assertion that the
range of responses varies across persons was evidenced by
the fact that the range of individual responses was from
approximately 2 to 3^* and similar ranges occurred across
all situations. That the order of possible and probable
responses changes contextually is apparent from the data
in Table 1. For example, "leaving" was a possibility
that occurred across all situations but the probabilities
changed markedly across these situations. Again using
"leaving" as an example, it is also apparent from the data
in Table 1 that the frequencies of both possible and prob
able responses differ across situations. Similar examples
can be obtained from all of the following tables. However,
the principal interest of this study was in attempting to
explore and identify the nature and range of specific phys
ical and verbal behavioral possibilities and probabilities.
57
For this reason emphasis was placed on the findings con
tained in Appendices A and B.
With regard to the results reported in Table 2,
it is necessary to point out that one cannot infer from
the wealth of language alone a similar wealth of behaviors.
Take as an example a situation in which one person is
angry and swearing at another person. The first person
can swear at the second using a wide range of terms and
phrases but what can the second person cto in response to
such a verbal onslaught? Similarly, what can a person do
in response to being told that their "services are no
longer needed," "you're fired," or "you are dismissed?"
The LNP hypothesis attempts to get behind the surface
structure of language to the deep structure of interper
sonal behavioral realities.
Discussion of Findings
In Chapter II, the question was asked whether it
was possible to develop a psycho/sociological theory that
met nine listed criteria. The following discussion is ad
dressed to each of these criteria from the standpoint of
the LNP hypothesis. However, because the present investi
gation was only a preliminary exploration of this hypothe
sis, this discussion can only address itself to how it
relates to these criteria. Further research will hopefully
58
permit more definitive and conclusive statements at a later
time.
1. Makes minimal a priori assumptions about the
nature of man. No such assumptions need be made by the LNP
hypothesis. By exploring and defining what is behaviorally
possible it is likely that definitions of man's nature will
arise. Such definitions will, however, arise from behav
ioral facts rather than intellectual or philosophic conjec
tures or beliefs. The LNP hypothesis attempts to define
man's behavioral natures. To assume, assert, or argue
that men are by nature one thing or another, or both, fails
to adequately describe and define their complete nature(s)
or limits. The latter is one of the principal purposes of
the LNP hypothesis.
2. Employes minimal use of abstractions, concepts,
or constructs to avoid the danger of reifying predicates.
The LNP hypothesis attempts to accomplish this by paying
primary attention to those things that people can say and
do. By so doing it attempts to give behavioral, and there
fore objective, meaning to the many abstractions, concepts,
and constructs that presently plague and mislead the so
cial sciences. Many social scientists are quite adept at
discussing and offering explanations of human behaviors.
However, there seems to be something lost between such
discussions and explanations and the changes that they
59
affect for mental hospitals, clinics, prisons, Juvenile de
tention facilities, courts, and the offices of therapists
continue to remain full.
Take as an example the term or concept of "aggres
sion." According to the dictionary its synonyms are:
militant, self-assertive, and pushing. Its definitions, on
the one hand, include the "disposition to dominate, some
times by indifference to other peoples rights," "disposi
tion to attack or encroach," "a fighting disposition,"
and, on the other hand, "self-confidence," "boldness in
action and expressing oneself," or even "officiousness" or
"offensive intrusiveness." A vast array of actions,
physical and/or verbal, could thus be included under each
of these definitions of aggressive. Aggression runs a
behavioral gamut from social acceptability or indifference
to legally criminal, so what in fact are we saying when we
label someone "aggressive?"
The jargon of the social scientist, be he academ
ician, researcher, or clinician, is replete with such
terms which because of their frequent lack of behavioral
specificity makes communication vague, imprecise, and
personalistic. The LNP hypothesis seems to provide a way
of studying man that has the potential of eliminating some
of these qualities from the language of the social scien
tist. A person is "aggressive" because of the things that
they say and do and the same applies to one who is
60
"anxious," "depressed," "ambitious," "loving," "friendly,"
"schizophrenic" or whatever. It seems that too often such
terms are regarded as being descriptive of singular enti
ties rather than being recognized as being linguistic or
symbolic conveniences standing for a range or class of
behaviors across a range or class of situations.
It is important to maintain this distinction be
tween the behavioral and the conceptual. What is meant
by conceptual is man’s ability to create and manipulate
symbols and what is meant by behavioral is physical and
verbal acts. The importance of maintaining this distinc
tion stems from the fact that what is conceptually possible
is undeniably more numerous than what is behaviorally pos
sible. Men can swear at each other employing a wide vari
ety of terms, phrases, and languages but what can one do
when sworn at? Similarly, one can express love with a
wide variety of terms, phrases, and languages but what can
one do when told by someone that they are loved? An at
tempt to point out the necessity of maintaining this con
ceptual and behavioral distinction is what is intended by
differentiating between physical and verbal acts and states
and abstractions in the present study. What is it that
makes labels appropriate if it is not the class or range
of behaviors that give them their meaning? There may be
just too many unicorns, solid gold mountains, chimeras,
and demons in the contemporary social sciences.
61
3. Adequately defines normalcy and non-normalcy.
When one speaks of normalcy they again are not speaking of
a singular entlty(s) but rather of a range of socially
acceptable or tolerated behaviors within a situational
context. Non-normalcy comprises those behaviors that lie
outside of this range of social acceptability or Indiffer
ence. The distinction made by the LNP hypothesis between
possible and probable behaviors is an attempt to derive
behavioral definitions of normalcy and non-normalcy. Be
havioral probabilities seem to provide a more adequate
definition(s) of what is normal and non-normal than do pre
conceived notions or beliefs. That the range of probable
behaviors in this study seems to remain fairly constant
across a range of different social situations appears to
add credence to this notion. If there are in fact a
limited number of interpersonal behavioral possibilities
across a range of different, but equally limited, social
situations then what we mean when we speak of normal and
non-normal may simply be the range and order of these
limited possibilities in relation to specific types of
situations. For example, kissing and hugging a teacher
who embarasses you in front of the class is possible but
not probable. However, these same behaviors in a love
situation are not only possible but also more probable.
In the first situation such behaviors could be "inappropri
ate" but in the second situation they would be perfectly
"normal.” Similarly, it is possible that one would swear
at a loved one in a love situation but not very probable
and by the same token it is not only possible but also
more probable that one swear at another in an embarassing
situation. And yet the range of possible behaviors could
be the same in each situation but only their probabilities
would change, and "appropriateness" or "inappropriateness"
is usually determined or evaluated within the context of
specific situations. But in all situations "normal" con
sists of a range of behaviors and what we mean when we
speak of someone as being "normal" is that these socially
acceptable or indifferent behaviors have the highest prob
abilities of occurrence. The LNP hypothesis maintains
that exploring what is behaviorally possible and probable
across a wide range of situations will provide a more ade
quate and accurate definitions) of "normal" and "non
normal" than do most of our present vague and essentially
abstract definitions. It will also avoid the problems in
herent in the tendency to regard "normalcy" and "non
normalcy" as an "it" rather than a range of behaviors.
4. Provides an approach to the study of man that
is useful to the researcher/clinician. The LNP hypothesis
simply asks (a) what are the possible situations or condi
tions that lead one to seek or need clinical assistance,
(b) what are the behavioral possibilities available to
the client to ameliorate these situations or conditions,
and (c) what are the possibilities available to the clin
ician to provide such assistance? If the behavioral and
situational possibilities are limited and defined then the
researcher/clinician's task is to determine what behaviors
in relation to what situations have the highest probabil
ities of producing the desired results. If there are a
limited range of situational and behavioral possibilities
such an exploration might enable us to develop more effec
tive prescriptive techniques than presently exist.
The LNP hypothesis attempts to provide preliminary
answers to questions such as whether the sources of Job
dissatisfaction are in kind any different for the salesman
than they are for the warehouseman, auto mechanic, teacher,
secretary, broker, physician, psychologist or carpenter,
and what can each of these persons do_ to alleviate the dis
satisfying conditions. The LNP hypothesis questions
whether actions such as dropping out of school, divorcing
one's spouse, or quitting a job are truly different be
haviors or whether they are merely different terms that
we ascribe to the same behaviors in response to different
situations. It does seem that we often confuse behavioral
possibilities with individual and situational possibilities
and assume that because the individuals and situations
differ so must the behavioral possibilities be different.
64
5. Generate effective prescriptive techniques.
When a client seeks out a clinician, whether for treatment
or consultation, they are ultimately asking "what can I
do?" Once the problem is defined, that is, diagnosed, the
clinician should be able to prescribe effective alterna
tives that affect the necessary or desired changes. To
diagnose someone as being "anxious," "insecure," "de
pressed," "lonely," or "frustrated" is only the initial
step in the clinical process, but too often the process
seems to stop there. An undeniably more difficult and de
manding task is that of prescribing effective remedies.
Most of our current prescriptive techniques are too often
no more effective than that of telling a depressed person
to "cheer up," an angry person to "calm down," a criminal
that he is the "product of a deprived environment," a school
dropout that "someday you will regret this decision," or
dealing with social and emotional problems by narcotizing
patients or locking them up for "their own good" or "the
safety and well being of society." But what can a parent
effectively do whose child is using drugs, what can a
teacher effectively do with a failing student or a behav
ioral problem in class, and what can one effectively do
when they are unhappy with their job, marriage, etc.?
Discussing it may be a necessary preliminary step but by
itself it is not the final answer nor solution. An explor
ation of what is in fact behaviorally possible may provide
us with more effective prescriptions that work in fact
rather than merely in principle or theory. Our reluctance
to make definitive prescriptions stems simply from our
present ignorance of what works and while the LNP hypothe
sis offers no final answers it may provide a more fruitful
beginning. It may accomplish this by simply drawing at
tention to human interpersonal limits and by so doing mak
ing human realities more manageable. A finite behavioral
universe should be much easier to study and understand
than an infinite number of linguistic and conceptual pos
sibilities.
6. Can yield more accurate and acceptable descrip
tions of behaviors and motives. Least anyone get the im
pression that this paper is a plea for a rigid behavioralis-
tic approach to the study of man it is important to point
out that motives and other unobservables such as feelings,
attitudes, and perceptions are also recognized as being of
vast importance by the LNP hypothesis. And yet, it also
seems obvious that such unobservables are always inferred
from behaviors. However, the fact that they are always
inferred from behaviors does not make them any the less
real. The terms that we currently employ to describe un
observables also stand for a class or range of behaviors.
They are derived or inferred from the things that one says
and does and therefore do have an objective basis, but it
does need to be recognized that this basis is behavioral.
The LNP hypothesis merely asks what are the possible ways
of perceiving others and what is it about these others that
makes them appear friendly, indifferent, or threatening?
That is, what is it that they do or say that makes them
appear to us as being one thing or another? What are the
possible motives behind ambition, aggression, or manipula
tions? All of these terms that we employ to describe such
unobservables are not unique to each person nor are the
situations that promote them. Appendix C lists the states
that the present study elicited in response to the test
situations but Appendices A and B seem to more adequately
define what we mean when such states are discussed or
predicated of persons. To continue to use such terms as
those contained in Appendix C without adequately defining
their behavioral and situational dimensions may force us
to continue to play in a world of abstractions rather than
paying sufficient attention to the world of behavioral
realities.
7. Is consistent and compatible with contributions
from all of the social sciences, both theoretical and
methodological. There seems to be nothing about the LNP
hypothesis that is inconsistent with what has been accom
plished by the social sciences to date. The essence of any
science is to discover similarities and identities among
the various phenomena under its investigation and to un
derstand and explain the relationships and interactions
existing between them. If these similarities and identi
ties do not exist and every phenomena is indeed unique,
then the task of science is futile. Many of the terms
employed by social scientists have legitimate meaning be
cause the underlying behaviors that they imply are similar
or identical. The LNP hypothesis simply asks of the exis
tentialist: what are the possible "choices" that one can
make under what conditions, and what are the "conse
quences"; of the psychoanalysist: what does one do to over
come "oral," "anal," or "pregenital" fixations; of the
behaviorist: what behaviors do you want to "reinforce" or
"extinguish"? Of the child psychologist, whatever his par
ticular theoretical persuasion, it asks what are the pos
sible things that a parent can do to make his child eat,
pick up his clothes, stop stealing, talking, back, picking
on younger brother or sister? Of the educational psycholo
gist it asks what can a teacher do to "motivate" and "stim
ulate" students, keep Johnnie interested and prevent him
from dropping out of school, stop Jimmie from being such a
bully and a disruption in class? These are the types of
questions to which we are attempting to provide answers
and perhaps we are just not asking them right. The range
of behaviors with which parents must cope are no different
across homes any more than those of teacher across class-
68
roomsj therapists across offices, consulting rooms, clinics,
prisons, hospitals, etc.; or counselors across schools, in
dustries, etc. It may be that we have simply overlooked or
ignored what is behaviorally obvious, namely that the same
behaviors recur across persons and situations.
Similarly, two of the most fundamental statistical
concepts are those of central tendency and variability.
But statistically average when we are speaking of people is
not a singular behavioral entity and variability is not a
mere number when it is used to describe people. These too
are only descriptive terms and instead of words like the
philosopher, the statistician uses numbers that can be
equally vague and indefinite. In the interpersonal realm,
what is the exact nature of variability other than behav
ioral possibilities and what is the nature of central
tendency other than behavioral probabilities? To note
that persons are on the average aware of X number of be
havioral possibilities in response to a given situation,
and that the range is from Y to Z does not adequately de
fine the nature of these possibilities and probabilities.
In the interpersonal realm interaction is not between fac
tors but how and in what manner(s) they behave towards each
other— a fact that is often overlooked by those too deeply
immersed in methods. This is not to deny the usefulness
of experimental and statistical methods but simply to
69
caution the experimentalist and statistician not to fall
into the same trap as the philosopher and theorists and
reify numerical concepts in the same manner that the others
reify verbal concepts. It is useful to know that there are
X number of behavioral possibilities and of those Y are
more probable, but it is even more essential that the
exact nature of X and Y be known. Human interaction is
not between factors A, B, C, etc. but consists of the ways
in which people behave towards each other. If such factors
have any validity it is because these behaviors are simi
lar or identical. It seems reasonable, therefore, to first
fully explore and define the range of possible and prob
able behaviors across persons and situations. This in es
sence seems to be the nature of basic research in the area
of social or interpersonal behaviors and what the social
sciences have been attempting to do but it has never been
said this way before. That the LNP hypothesis is by no
means simplistic is evidenced by the fact that probably
all of our behaviors and the unobservables underlying them
are a function of our relationships with others. What they
say and do to what we say and do molds us and makes us
what we are and even if the possibilities are limited and
definable the possible interactions are staggering. How
ever, the probabilities may be more manageable.
70
8. Is applicable across cultures. It Is highly
presumptuous on the part of any group or nation to assume
that they are unique in all ways. If, as the present study
suggests, behavioral possibilities remain constant across
persons and situations there is no reason for assuming
that these possibilities must conform to geographical or
national boundaries. What, for example, are the possibili
ties available to any person in an embarassing, love, or
hate situation? The behavioral possibilities may remain
essentially the same and the differing probabilities across
cultures may be what we are referring to when we speak of
"national character." It seems unlikely that interpersonal
possibilities differ simply because of dress or language
or that situations differ because of location.
If the LNP hypothesis is correct then there should
be a considerable degree of behavioral overlap across cul
tures. There will, of course, also be cultural differences
for some cultures favor, promote, and encourage some be
haviors over others. When exploring the LNP hypothesis
across cultures one must bear in mind (l) the awareness of
behavioral alternatives within a culture, that is the range
of possibilities to which the people have been exposed, and
(2) the probabilities of particular behaviors to particular
types of situations. An exploration of what is possible
71
across cultures may provide a better basis for human under
standing, especially If the LNP hypothesis is correct.
Some support for the similarity of behaviors across
cultures came from the present study. Approximately 40 of
the subjects used in the present study had spent most of
their years in foreign countries and did not appear to have
yet become acculturated to the United States. Most of
these subjects were from Mexico and South American coun
tries. They were all enrolled in English as a Second
Language (ESL). classes and were tested with the assistance
of the bilingual ESL teacher who served as an interpreter.
The responses of these subjects did not differ from those
of the other subjects except that they were more limited in
range. One interesting observation was, however, made with
respect to probabilities. That was that the ESL students
seemed more reluctant to say or do anything offensive in
response to the test situations than the other students and
had a difficult time even imagining that anyone would be
have in such a manner. While the range and probabilities
of their responses did seem to differ from those of the
other students, all of the possibilities that they listed
were also among those of the larger group. This does seem
to lend support to what has been said about the applicabil
ity of the LNP hypothesis across cultures.
72
9. Does not do an Injustice to man's complexity
and diversity but rather accepts and attempts to preserve
his individuality and freedom. Individuality can still be
maintained and preserved within the framework of the LNP
hypothesis while continuing to hold to the notion of inter
personal behavioral limits. The key to this is the fact
that we are not dealing with behaviors singularly, as many
of our present terms seem to Imply, but with behaviors
plural and with a range of possible and probable behaviors
across a similar broad range of situations. This may, per
haps, be seen easier by the fact that if there are, for
example, a limited number of 1000 different possible inter
personal behaviors across an equally limited number of 200
different generic interpersonal situations and one takes
into account the possible sequential order of these be
haviors across persons and situations, the permutations and
combinations still leave a great deal of opportunity for
human individuality. Even if one only attends to the
probable behaviors this still does not do an injustice to
individuality, it hopefully only serves to make interper
sonal behaviors more manageable and understandable.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary
The Problem
It may well be that a greal deal of the alleged
diversity of human behaviors is more a function of the mis
leading and imprecise use of language than it is a behav
ioral fact. Oppenheimer (1957) stated that we are hampered
in our attempts to establish a science of man because many
of our key concepts are vague and ill defined. Similarly,
Harding (1953) contended that if we are to understand be
havior we must look beyond language and attend more to the
behaviors for which the linguistic symbols stand. He fur
ther maintained that the relationship between the symbols
that we currently employ in our attempt to understand and
explain human behaviors and the behaviors themselves is
questionable. McGee (1962) asserted that it is now time
to "proceed down the abstraction ladder In the direction
of observable behavior [p. 292J" in an attempt to answer
the many remaining unanswered questions about human be
haviors. It seems, therefore, that one of the principal
problems currently confronting contemporary psychology is
73
that of not only more adequately defining Its terms but
perhaps also separating behavioral facts from verbal fic
tions .
Miller and Frick (19^9) stated that antecedent to
attempting to define a course of action is an exploration
of all alternative courses of action that might occur.
While such an exploration might appear to be a formidable
task it may perhaps be formidable only if there are an in
finite number of alternative courses of action. If, how
ever, human behaviors are not infinite but in fact approach
a definable limit, then it seems likely that an exploration
and enumeration of these alternatives may make human reali
ties easier to understand and explain.
While human behaviors are indeed numerous and
varied, if there are no similarities among these behaviors
then the task of the social scientist is futile, for funda
mental to any science is the discovery of such similarities
among the diverse phenomena under its investigation. As
Leeper (1963) pointed out, it is necessary that we recog
nize that the study of the ways in which organisms are
similar is equally as important as the study of the ways
in which they differ. While the social scientists attempt
to study the ways in which organisms are both similar and
different it may be that sufficient attention has not yet
been paid to attempting to define the range of behavioral,
as opposed to verbal or conceptual, similarities and
differences. If human interpersonal behaviors are not
infinite then Block's (1968) assertion that we have not
paid sufficient attention to the notion of bounds or
limits seems worth considering further in an attempt to
remove some of the fogginess from our existing explanations
of human behaviors. It appears worthwhile to attempt to
define the nature and extent of these possible limits and
to do so from a behavioral standpoint. By attempting to
explore and define behavioral limits it might be possible
to gain some insights into the extent to which human diver
sity is fact and illusion.
The central problem to which this study was ad
dressed was that of attempting to determine whether it is
possible to define interpersonal behavioral limits. This
study was a preliminary investigation of the limited number
of possibilities (LNP) hypothesis. In its simplest form
the LNP hypothesis asserts that although the totality of
human interpersonal behavior is varied and complex when
it is viewed from the standpoint of behavioral possibili
ties, that is overt behaviors, the number of responses
that people can make in interpersonal situations approaches
a definable limit. This hypothesis contends that much of
man's believed complexity and diversity is more of a lin
guistic fiction than a behavioral fact and that an explor
ation of overt behaviors across persons and situations will
76
show a large degree of overlapping of behaviors. It was
also believed that an exploration and enumeration of be
havioral possibilities may provide a useful empirical
foundation upon which to build a universally acceptable
psycho/sociological theory. The purpose of this study was
to test whether: (l) overt interpersonal possibilities have
a definable limit, and (2) whether these behavioral possi
bilities tend to remain constant across both persons and
situations. While the LNP hypothesis denies neither the
complexity, diversity, nor richness of human behaviors, it
does attempt to point out an underlying structure by draw
ing attention to the similarities of interpersonal behav
iors among individuals and across situations.
Procedure
This investigation was a preliminary exploration
of the LNP hypothesis. Four groups from a total sample of
334 high school students in grades nine through twelve and
ranging in age from 14 to 18 years were requested to write
"All of the things that you can think of that you or any
one might conceivably say or do in response to (one of) the
following situation(s)." The four test situations were:
(l) embarassing: A teacher embarasses you in front of the
class by calling you dumb or stupid for not understanding
the lesson currently being taught; (2) nonspecific hate:
Someone whom you love tells you that they hate you; (3)
nonspecific love: Someone whom you love tells you that they
love you; and (4) specific love: Your mother tells you that
she loves you. After the subjects had exhausted their list
of all the responses that they could think of, that is, all
possible responses, they were then requested to review
their responses and rank them in order of the first three
things that they would do in response to such a situation,
that is, list their probable responses. These responses
were then tabulated by first assigning them to one of four
categories. These categories were: (a) "overt behaviors,"
physical acts; (b) "verbal responses," things that they
could say; (c) "states," responses that represented states
of being rather than overt physical or verbal acts; and
(d) "abstract or indefinite responses," those responses
that might possibly have been included in one of the first
three categories but their vagueness would have required
interpretations that may have extended beyond the data.
Every individual response was recorded and a tally was
made of those responses that occurred more than once. In
this manner a comparison could be made of the range of
both possible and probable responses across all subjects
and situations. Because the sole concern of this study
was in enumerating the nature and range of behavioral pos
sibilities and probabilities and in defining their possible
limits, traditional statistical methods were not employed
in analyzing the data. It was felt that such analyses
would require transforming behaviors into numbers and that
such a transformation would be inimical to the purposes of
this study. A Bayesian statistical rationale was therefore
employed and the data was presented In essentially the same
manner in which it was obtained from the subjects.
Results
Of principal interest in this study was the limit
and range of possible and probable things that the subjects
could say or do in response to the types of interpersonal
situations represented by the test situations. Therefore,
interest was primarily in those responses occurring in the
"overt behaviors" and "verbal response" categories. The
tabulation of responses indicated that there was a total of
2874 responses given by all subjects across all situations.
However, there were only 201 different possible responses
given by all 334 subjects that could be entered in the
table of "overt behaviors." This number decreased consid
erably when the number of different possible responses were
tabulated separately for each situation. These numbers
were: embarass, 121; nonspecific hate, 88; nonspecific love,
80; and specific love, 28. That there were only 201 dif
ferent possible overt behavioral responses from a total of
2874 responses across all subjects and situations adds some
support to the notion of limits or bounds as well as also
providing some indication of the extent to which these pos
sible behaviors overlapped across both person and situa
tions. The extent of this overlapping of behaviors is
made more apparent by the finding that in all except one
instance more than two-thirds of these different possible
responses occurred in the first 18 categories in the table
of "overt behaviors." The percentages of different pos
sible responses occurring in the first 18 categories were:
embarass, 66.1 percent; nonspecific hate, 72.9 percent;
nonspecific love, 47.7 percent; and specific love, 67.9
percent. Even more striking was the finding that of these
201 different possible responses only 84 of them were re
ported by the subjects as being among the first three that
they would probably make in response to such situations.
And again this number decreased considerably when these
different probable responses were tallied separately for
each situation. These numbers were: embarass, 55j non
specific hate, 43; nonspecific love, 23; and specific love,
15. Also, except in one instance, 80 percent or more of
these different probable responses occurred in the first
18 categories in the table of "overt behaviors." The num
bers and percentages of different probable responses oc
curring in these first 18 categories were: embarass, 50 or
90.9 percent; nonspecific hate, 37 or 86.0 percent; non
specific love, 14 or 63.4 percent; and specific love, 12 or
80
80.0 percent. Thus of a total of 2874 responses only 201,
or approximately 7 percent, represented different possible
overt behaviors and only 84, or approximately 3 percent,
represented different probable overt behaviors that these
334 subjects thought they could or would make In response
to four types of Interpersonal situations. In an effort
to avoid the possibility of being misled by linguistic di
versity verbal responses were categorized In the table of
"overt responses" by what was considered to be their in
tention, that Is by the type of response that It appeared
to represent rather than considering each different verbal
response as being a separate behavior. The rationale for
this was that It was felt that a wide range of different
verbal responses will only elicit a limited number of dif
ferent behavioral responses and that this number of behav
ioral possibilities is far fewer than the number of verbal
possibilities. This stems from the fact that the same in
tention can be expressed linguistically in a wide variety
of ways. This was done in an attempt to follow Harding's
(1953) suggestion that we attempt to get to the behavioral
meaning underlying our use of symbols and the further sug
gestion of Luchins and Luchins (1965) that we do not
confuse abstractions and behaviors.
Coneluslons
While the present study was an initial exploration
of the LNP hypothesis, the findings of this research sug
gests that:
1. Interpersonal behavioral possibilities do seem
to approach a definable limit across persons
and situations;
2. These limits begin to become apparent when
human diversity is viewed from the standpoint
of behavioral possibilities and probabilities.
That is, what a person can or will say or do
in response to interpersonal situations, as
opposed to attempting to understand and ex
plain human behaviors employing an excessive
reliance on concepts or abstractions;
3. These behavior possibilities and probabilities
tend to remain constant across both persons
and situations; and
4. The descriptive method employed in this study
is a useful means of exploring and enumerating
behavioral possibilities and probabilities and
their limits across both persons and situations.
Recommendations
Because the present study is only an initial ex
ploration of the LNP hypothesis and makes no attempt to
provide final, definitive, nor exhaustive answers, the
following recommendations seem warranted:
That this study be replicated across a wider
variety of persons, social classes, situations,
and settings;
That such replications make the situations more
specific than those employed in the present study
That future attention be paid to the sequential
order of behaviors by having subjects rank order
all of their responses rather than only the first
three;
That the range and order of behaviors be explored
in actual life situations rather than limiting
future studies of the LNP hypothesis to artifi
cially contrived test situations alone;
That attention be paid to discrepancies between
the order of spontaneous responses and the order
of responses when rank ordered by subjects in
an effort to explore individual behavioral prob
abilities as a basis for studies of individual
differences and personality and/or diagnostic
classifications;
That attention be paid not only to defining
behavioral possibilities and probabilities but
also to defining situational possibilities;
That studies of social interaction take into
account not only the range and order of individ
ual behavioral possibilities and probabilities
but also the range and order of these behaviors
between persons; and
That this hypothesis be tested across cultures
attending to behavioral possibilities and prob
abilities and guarding against being distracted
by secondary characteristics such as differing
languages, customs, and dress.
R E F E R E N C E S
84
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A P P E N D I C E S
90
APPENDIX A
OVERT BEHAVIORS
91
92
OVERT BEHAVIORS
Situations: EMBARRASS HATE(G) love(g) LOVE(S)
Sex:
M / F M / F m / f F
Number:
53 59 51 ^7
46 55 35
REMARKS:
behind back l-O/l-l - - -
to others 1-0/ - 1-0/ - - -
to their face:
agree}
nicely - /l-0 - - -
sarcastically 4-0/3-2 - - -
apologize 3-0/1 -1
5-1/3-1
- -
casual or off-hand comment
-
3-0/ -
-
criticize them (knowledge,
abilities, etc.) 5-0/12-5
- - -
deny it
i-i/3-3 3-2/5-1
5-0/2-0 1-0
disagree or argue
3-3/8-5
l-l/l-O - /l-0 -
express disbelief
- - - 1-0
insult them 5-0/1-0
- - -
Joke 1-1/2 -0 - /l-0 1-0/5-0 -
mumble under breath 1-0/5-0
- - -
same to them 4-2/7-2 19-6/16-6 52-25/27-22 26-20
sarcastic comment 11-11/15-8 11-10/8-1 15-2/4 -1 6-0
swear 22-12/15-7 9-3/5-O 5-0/1-0 3-1
tell them how I feel
-
1-0/ -
- -
tell them off 7-3/5-2 5-3/2-1
1-0/5-0 -
threaten 2-1A -1
- - -
69-3V82-36 52-26/59-10 60-25/41-25 37-21
LEAVE:
leave 15-10/18-8 8-5/3-2
2-0/ - l-l
walk out or away 15-4/19-8 15-8/11-5
3-0/5-0 -
transfer 2-0/4-0 - - -
absent (e.g., ditch) l-l/l-O - -
-
never return (e.g., drop
out, quit) 3-1/3-0 5-1/1-1
- -
runaway
- 5-0/4-2 1-0/4-0 -
ask to leave 1-0/ -
- - -
55-16/45-16 29-14/19-10 6-0/9 -0 l-l
Note: (G) = General situation (S) = Specific situation
0-0 = First digit indicates the number of times a response
(R) occurs, the second digit indicates the number of
times R occurs among subjects (S) first three choice%
i.e., those Rs that Ss think that they vould make in
response to situations like those described in the
test.
/ = Separates males (m ) on the left from females (F) on
the right. The dash (-) by itself indicates no resp.
OVERT BEHAVIORS— Continued
93
Situations:
Sex:
Number:
EMBARRASS
M / F
53 59
HAIE(G)
M / F
51 47
LOVE(G)
M / F
46 33
LOVE(S)
F
35
DISCUSS:
Indefinite - /l-0
3-3/4-3
1-0/ - 2-0
question them 5-2/6-2 31-30/28-19 11-5/11-5
10-2
ask for help - /3-0 - - -
ask for better explanation - /3-2 - - -
ask friend to ask why -
- /1-0
- -
5-2/13-4 34-33/33-22
12-5/11-5
12-2
discuss with friends 1-0/ -
- — —
discuss with them:
then
i-i/i-o 31-30/28-19 11-5/11-5
10-2
later
3-3/8-5
1-1/3-2 - -
NOTHING:
say nothing 8-3/7-4 5-3/ -
6-2/2-0 -
do nothing 5-5/8-6 1-1/3-2 - 2-0
shine it on - /4-2 - - 2-1
forget it 4-1/2-1 1-1/ - - -
laugh it off 4-3/2-2 3-0/1-I - -
shrug it off
-
- /l-l - /l-0 -
act natural (or normal) - /4-1 6-4/ - 1-0/ - -
just sit (or stand) there 2-0/6-5 1-0/1-0 - /l-0 -
just accept it - - /1-0 - -
withdraw (psychologically) - /3-1 1-1/- ..
1-0/1-0 -
23-12/56-22 18-10/7-4 8-2/5 -0 4-1
IGNORE:
ignore them 10-7/9-4 4-0/4-3 4-0/5 -1 1-0
pretend not to hear 2-1/ - - 1-0/1-0 -
pretend not to care
-
2-0/1-0 - -
avoid them (or stay away) - 3-2/4-2 1-0/1-0 -
never speak to them again - - /2-1 - -
forget them - - /l-0 - -
leave them alone - - - 1 -1
12-8/9-4 9-2/12-6 6-0/7-I 2-1
ASSAULT PHYSICALLY:
indefinite {e.g., attack
them, beat them up.
pick a fight, etc.) 3-0/2-1 9-2/2-1
hit 5-O/6-O 7-2/9-1
4-2/3-0 -
kick - /2-0 2-1/ -
- /l-0 -
spit 1-0/2-0 1-0/ - -
slap
- A-o
l-O/l-O 2-0/2-1 -
shoot l-O/l-O 1-0/ - - -
94
OVERT BEHAVIORS— Continued
Situations:
Sex:
Number:
EMBARRASS
M / F
53 59
HATE(G)
M / F
51 47
LOVE(G)
M / F
46 33
LOVE(S)
F
35
ASSAULT PHYSICALLY: (cont.)
stab l-O/l-O
- - -
push 1-0/ - - - -
pinch - /1-0
- - -
bite - /l-0 - /2-0 - -
spank 1-0/ - - -
burn
1-0/ - 1-0/ - - -
scratch
- - /l-O - -
poke their eyes out
- 1-0/ - - -
Jump them later 1-1/ -
1-0/ -
- -
14-1/17 -1 25-5/15-2 6-2/6-1 -
CRY: 5-0/16-9 9-1/28-18 9-1/11-2
13-5
LAUGH: 12-4/19-6 6-1/8-2 ll-l/12-l 8-1
GESTURES:
"peace” sign 1-0/ -
1-0/ -
- -
obscene (e.g., "finger") 4-2/4-1 - -
clench fists l-o/l-l - - -
shrug shoulders - /l-O - - -
sigh - /l-l - - -
6-2/7-3
1-0/ - - -
FACIAL GESTURES:
frown
—
1-1/ - 1-0/ -
-
make faces 2-0/1-0 - /l-O
-
glare (or stare) k-2/6-k - /3 -1 7-0/3-0 -
stick out tongue - /2-0
- - -
dirty looks
2-0/3 -3
- - -
blank - /2-0 l-l/l-l - -
bored - /l-l - - -
clench teeth - /l-O
- - -
smug 1-1/ - - - -
flare nostrils - 1-0/ - - -
roll eyes - - 1-0/ - -
wink
- -
1-0/ - -
look (or turn) away
3-l/3-l
1-1/ - 3-0/1-0 -
mouth agape - - /l-l - -
yawn - - /l-O - -
12-4/19 -9 4-3/6-j 13-0/5-0 -
EMBRACE (hug): 1-0/ - - /2-0 12-11/13-7
12-11
SMILE: 1-1/5 -4 l-l/- 11-7/14-11 11-6
KISS: - -
25-16/18-5 8-5
95
OVERT BEHAVIORS— Continued
Situations: EMBARRASS HATE(G) LOVE(G) LOVE(S)
Sex: M / F M / F M / F F
_________ Number: _____________ 53 59 51 47 b6 55 35
BLUSH: 6-2/21-15 1-0/2-0 6-3/2-2 1-1
YELL (shout, scream, etc.): 3_0/14-5 4-2/3-O I-O/5-O
COMPLAIN (tell, report to,
etc.):
indefinite - /l-O - - -
to parent (or relative) 4-1/5-1 - - -
to their superior 8-O/15-I - - -
to counselor 2-1/2-0 - -
to your peers 2-0/6-2 - - -
to police -_______1—0/ -__________^_________-
16-2/29-4 1-0/ -
THROW, HIT, KICK, BREAK,
OR BITE SOMETHING (e.g.,
book, pencil, etc.): 13-5/17-1 1-0/2-0
VANDALIZE (or deface room,
shop, office, bldg., etc.): 1-0/2-0 -
their automobile 2-1/2-0
other property (e.g., home) - /2-0 2-0/ -
3-1/6-0 2-0/ -
acrobatics 1-0 / - - 3-l/l-0
ask for date - - 1-0/ -
blood pressure rise - - /l-O
break up vith them - - /l-l 1-0/ -
bring parents back with me 1-0/ - - - -
bake them a cake - 1-0
blame on someone else - /l-O - -
burp 1-0/ - - - -
be alone - - /l-O
change the subject
compliment them
chew fingernails
change seats 1-0/ -
chronic runny nose
clean room - 1-0
die
divorce them
eat chair leg
fidgit
faint 1-0/ -
fetal position 1-0/ -
go out with them
go steady
—
- /2-0
-
1-0/ -
- l-O/l-O
1-0/ - -
- /l-O
1-0/ -
1-0/ - -
- /2-0
- 2-1/1-0
2-0/ -
- 2-0/ -
OVERT BEHAVIORS— Continued
EMBARRASS HATE(g) LOVe (g) LOVe(s)
M / F M / F M / F F
53 59 51 ^7 ^ ___%>_____21—
Situations:
Sex:
Number:
go to movies
go to Disneyland and
punch Mickey Mouse
go to mountains
go to friend's house
go to room
get sick (vomit, throw up,
etc.)
go to sleep
go for walk
give them (or do) what
they want
go to their house
hide
have heart attack
hum
hijack plane
hold hands
hesitate
have nightmares
hold breath
hit person next to you
intoxicated (drunk,
"stoned," etc.)
Jump out window
Jump up and down
kick them out
kidnap relative
kick small dog
leave poison apple
listen to music
make animal (or rude) noises
marry
masturbate
make them something
make dinner
murder
open book (and pretend
to read)
pout
put head on desk
paint poster
push them out window
pick your nose
pray
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
2-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/
- /l-O
- /l-O
- /l-O
2-1/ -
2-0/ -
l-O/l-O
- /l-O
- /l-O
1-0/ -
2-1/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
- /l-O
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
4-5/ -
- /l-O
1-1/ -
1-0/ -
2-0/ -
1-0/ -
- /l-l
l-O/l-O
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
- /l-O
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
2-2/ -
2-0/ -
- /l-O
6-1/ -
2-0/ -
2-1/ -
1-0/ -
2-0/ -
1-0
1-1
1-0
2-0
97
OVERT BEHAVIORS— Continued
Situations:
Sex:
Number:
EMBARRASS
M / F
53 59
HATE(G) L0VE(g)
M / F M / F
51 kl k6 33-
LOVE(S)
F
35
roll on ground 1-1/ -
—
run around room 1-0/ - - 1-0/ - -
read l-O/l-O - -
rape them - 1-0/ - - /l-O -
swallow broken glass - /l-O - - -
suicide 1-0/ - 8-0/5-1 - /l-O -
stand on head - 2-0/ - - -
scratch chin
-
1-0/ - - -
slam hand on desk 1-0/ - - -
staple cups of water to desk 1-0/ - - - -
sit silently on desk 1-0/ - - - -
send card
- - -
1-0
sing 1-0/ - - /l-O - -
shove boulder In their mouth
-
1-0/ -
- -
stutter
- - /l-O -
send nice letter (card, etc.)
send message (obscene, harass
ing, threatening, etc.):
1-1/ -
letter l-O/l-O - - -
phone 1-0/2-0 - - -
sexual intercourse
- -
9-1/ - -
squeeze their hand - - - /l-O -
turn round and round
- - - /l-O -
try harder 3-1/1-0 - - -
try less 2-1/ - - - -
throw something at them 2-0/2-0 1-0/ - - -
touch them - -
1-0/3-3
-
turn out lights - - 1-1/ - -
throw paper in trash 1-0/ - - - -
talk to self 1-0/ - - - -
take behind nearest bush - - 1-0/ - -
take to mountains - - 1-0/ - -
thank god - - - 1-0
toilet paper their house - /l-O - - -
think they're intoxicated - - - 1-0
unbutton collar button
- - 1-0/ - -
undress self (expose self) 3-0 / -
- -
undress them - - 1-0/ - —
APPENDIX B
VERBAL RESPONSES
98
99
VERBAL RESPONSES
Situations:
Sex:
Number:
EMBARRASS HATE(G)LOVE(G) LOVE(S)
M / F M / F M / F F
33 59 Si !tl M 23____ 3 1 _
1-0/ -
2-1/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/-
1-0/ -
- /l-l
aren't you lucky
are you sure
are you kidding (joking, etc.) - /l-O
are you serious
are there snakes in Hawaii
are you talking to me
are you stupid
are you smart
asshole
anis brain
are you feeling alright
apologize (i.e., I apologize)
are you proud
B
boy are we in trouble
big tweet
beat it
big pussy
bitch
big deal
baby huey
bite me
bite my dick
bastard
be serious
big fucking deal
bull shit
C
can I leave
can I help it
cocksucker
cram it
come off it
1-0/ -
2-0/1-1
1-1/ -
1-0/ -
2-2 / -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/
2-0/
- /l-l
1-0/ -
2-1/ -
1-0/ -
- /l-O
1-0
1-l/l-O 1-0
2-2/ -
1-0/ -
- /l-O
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
2-0/1-0
1-0/ -
2-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0
1-0
1-0
doesn't everybody
don't tell me your troubles
do you really
dumb shit
did I hear you right
don't take it out on me
1-0/ -
l-l/l-O
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
-/l-l
100
VERBAL RESPONSES— Continued
Situations:
Sex:
Number:
EMBARRASS
M / F
22_
HATE(Q)
M / F
51 ^7
LOVE(G) LOVE(s)
M / F F
22____ 22__
don't bother me l-l/ -
don't call me names - /l-l
do you mean it
don't give me that
don't feed me that -
do I have to -
don't -
don't do it again
don't say that again - /l-l
drop dead
dirty dog
E
eat it -
eat my shorts 1-0/ -
explain it again (or better) - />-0
everybody hates somebody
F
fuck it
for how long
forget it
fuck off
fuck you (or yourself)
fine
fucking pussy
far out
feelings mutual
feelings not mutual
1-0/ -
3-0/ -
k-2/l-0
1-0/ -
F
go suck
geshundheit -
god bless you
go to hell 6-1/4—3
good for you -
got a light 1—o/ -
great, I need new friends
anyway
goodbye 1-0/ -
get lost
get out of here
go away -
good, when can I leave
- A"0
- /l-l
- /l-O
1-0/ -
1-1/-
2-0/1-1
- /l-O
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
2-0/1-0
-/l-l
1-0/ -
2-0/1-0
1-0/ -
2-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-1/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
3-1/1-0
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
- /l-O
2-0/ -
- /l-O
2-0
1-1
1-0
1-0
VERBAL RESPONSES— Continued
Situations:
Sex:
Number:
EMBARRASS
M / F
J2 £2-
HATE(G)
M / F
itl_
LOVE(G)
M / F
21
LOVE(S)
F
___
good for your mother
good
go back to sleep
get away
good, I never liked arguments
anyway
H
heifer
heavy
honkey
how do you know
have you seen yourself
lately
horse's ass
how
horse shit
hmmm
honest
huh
hell with it
how can I understand better
have you had a bad day
how come
how sweet you are to say that
I
I bet
I think I hear the phone
I couldn't understand you
I don't understand
if you say so
I didn't care for that
remark
I don't care what you think
I can't help it
I don't need this (class)
I don't have to take that
it's none of your business
I'd like to kick your ass
I wish I was as smart as you
I'd like to break your neck
I can tell that
I hate your ass
1-1/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
- /l-O
2-1/1-0
- /l-O
1-0/ -
1-1/ -
l-O/l-O
1-0/ -
1-0/-
- /l-l
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
2-1/1-0
1-1/ -
1-0/ -
-/l-l
- /l-l
- /l-O
- /l-O
2-1/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
2-0/ -
>1/ -
1-0/ -
- /l-l
- /l-O
1-1/ -
/l-O
2-0/1-0
- /l-O
1-0
3-0
1-1
1-1
102
VERBAL RESPONSES— Continued
Situations:
Sex:
Number:
EMBARRASS HATE(G) LOVE(G) LOVE(S)
M / F M / F M / F F
_22__ 22___ 5i__ it!____ ^ ___22_____22__
I hate you (too)
I'm sorry to hear that
I don't care
really don't give a damn
like you too
love you (too)
don't feel the same way
couldn't care less
I'm glad
I'm glad to hear that
I don't love you
I knew (or know) that (or it)
if you did you wouldn't
have remarried
I'm impressed
I don't give a damn
thought so
stopped loving you long ago
really appreciate that
don't believe you (or it)
can dig it
wish you hadn't said that
love me too
I'm pregnant
I'm leaving
I disagree
I protest your criticism
I have witnesses
I think you are cute
I'm already taken
- /l-O
-/l-l
- /l-l
- /l-O
J
jump in the lake
just my mind or body too
K
kiss my ass
keep it to yourself
keep cool
L
lay off
let me out of here
let's live together
1-0/ -
l-l/
1-0/
1-0/
12-5/13-1*
1-1/ -
l-O/l-O
1-1/ -
1-0/7-5
1-l/l-O
2-0/ -
2-0/ -
1-0/5-0 1-0
- /l-O 2-0
1-0
52-28/22-19 26-20
k-2/ -
k-2/l-0
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-1/ -
1-1/ -
1-1/ -
- /l-O
- /l-l
- /l-O
1-0/
1-0/
2-0/ -
1-1
1-1
1-0
1-0/
1-0/
1-1
103
VERBAL RESPONSES— Continued
Situations:
Sex:
Number:
EMBARRASS HATE(G) LOVE(G) LOVE(S)
M / F M / F M / F F
22_______ ^7 46 33 32 .
leave me alone
lick my ass
let's go to bed (make love,
have sex, etc.)
liar
M
me and you later
mother fucker
me too
N
no
no you don't
not me, it's everyone else
not me
0
O.K., what do you want
me to do
oh, really
O.K., but if you ever need
me I'm here
oh, I'm so happy
O.K.
out of sight
Oh
oh yeah
oh dear, I was afraid of that
oh, I'm embarrassed
oh yeah, since when
O.K. mom
P
porker
prick
prove it
please be careful what
you say
1-0/
1-0/
1-0/
2-0/
1-1/ -
- /l-O
- 12.-0
- /l-O
1-1/ -
1-0/ -
- /l-O
1-0/ -
- /l-O
- /l-O 1-1
5-0/ -
- /l-O
1-O/l-O
1-0/ -
2-1/1-0
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
-/l-l
1-0/ -
2-1
l-O/l-l 1-1
1-0/ -
- /l-O
1-1
1-0
1-0
a
VERBAL RESPONSES— Continued
Situations:
Sex:
Number:
EMBARRASS HATE(G) LOVE(G) LOVe (s)
M / F M / F M / F F
JL2 0>2____I?1 ^7 ^6 33 >
repeat that
really
right on
1-0/ -
3-1/1-1
1-0/ -
1-0
so you love me, ha
solid
square business
sure mom
see you around
sure
shit, that's wonderful
sure you do
shall we terminate our
relationship then
stick it up your butt
sorry
same to you
shove it (stick it)
shut up
slip is showing
so what
sonofabitch
suck my dick
see you later cause its
a farce
suck my nut
say that again
screw it
sit on it and rotate
show it
sorry you feel that way
so
so tell me what's new, this
information really
enlightens me
sorry, I don't love you back
so does everyone else
stay away from me then
T
1-0/ -
2-0/2-0
4-1/ -
l-l/l-O
l-O/l-l
1-0/ -
l-O/l-O
1-0/ -
- /l-O
- /l-l
1-0/ -
2-0/2-1
1-0/ -
5-k/k-l
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
tell the truth
that's cool
that's sweet
- /l-l
- /l-O
- /l-O
- /l-O
- /l-O
-/l-l
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
^-0/ 1-0
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
> 0/ 2-0
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
- /l-l
- /l-O
1-0
2-2
1-0
2-1
1-0
1-0
105
VERBAL RESPONSES— Continued
Situations: EMBARRASS HATE(G) LOVE(G) LOVE(S)
Sex: M / F M / F M / F F
__________Number: 53 59 51 47 ^6 53 55
that was uncalled for - /l-O - -
take me In your aims - - 1-0/ -
thanks (thank you, etc.) 1-0 / - $-1/2-0 8-3/7“^
that's not true l-l/ - - 1-0
turkey 1-1/ - - -
that's life - l-O/l-O
that's O.K. - 1-1/ -
that makes me happy - 2-0
1-1/-
that makes me (feel) sad
(unhappy, etc.)
that's good because you
look like a wart on a pig's - 1-0/ -
ass
that made my day - 1-0/ - -
thanks for the compliment - 1-0/ -
that's a bunch of shit - - 1-0/ -
that's great, how about a
piece of ass
that's nice - - 1-0/2-0 $-$
1-0/ -
1-0/2-C
1-0/ -
then why do you treat me
like hell
that's a switch - - 1-0/ -
that's to be expected - - 1-0/ -
that's really nice - 1-0
takes one to know one - /l-O - - -
that's nice of you - 1-0
that's mean - /l-O - -
tell your problems to some
white bitch, I don't want - - /l-O
to hear them
that's your business - - /l-O
that's your problem - - /2-1
too bad - - - /l-O
that's good - - - /l-O
U
up your ass 1-0/ - - -
up yours - - 1-0/ -
V
va-va-voom - - 1-0/ -
106
VERBAL RESPONSES— Continued
EMBARRASS HATE(G) LOVE(G) LOVE^s)
M / F M / F M / F F
33 59___51 47 46 33 33
Situations:
Sex:
Number:
W
what the fuck do I care
whoops
what1s wrong with that
wow, I wish dad would say
that too
what suddenly made you hate me
why are you picking on me - /l-O
what do you mean - /l-l
what do you mean by love
what difference does it _ A n
make to you '
well - /l-O
what a piece of ass
what is hate
whatever turns you on 1-0/ -
win some lose some -
why 3-2/3-1
what did I do l-l/ “
who are you calling 1-0 / -
why did you say that
whore 1-0/ -
why do you keep associat
ing with me
what did you say you are 1-0/ -
why don't you shut up 1-0/ -
well shut my mouth
what else is new
well kiss me then
who gives a damn (or cares)
when did you start
well pardon me for living
what do you do for an encore
what do you want me to do
about it
why S.O.B. do you love me
what do you want me to do
for you
what
what do you want
watch out now
what's up your sleeve -
want to have a beer (coke, etc.) -
what are you going to do
about it
- /l-O
- /l-O
- /l-O
- /l-O
- /l-O
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
- /l-O
28-28/28-21
2-0/2-1
- /l-O
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
l-l/l-O
1-0/ -
- /l-O
1-0/ -
10-0/6-3
-/l-O
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
- /l-O
1-0/ -
- /l-O
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-1/-
1-0
4-0
1-1
1-0
1-1
1-1
1-0
2-0
1-0
107
VERBAL RESPONSES— Continued
Situations:
Sex:
Number:
EMBARRASS
M / F
- ft 5? ■
HATE(G)
M / F
LOVE(G)
M / F
2L
LOVE(S)
F
.
what do I do now
why do you punish me
when are we getting married
will you love me tomorrow
will you marry me
whatever you say
wow
what business is it of yours
why don't you explain
it right
X-Y-Z
you (damn) liar
your not so bright yourself
you think your so damn smart
yes
you hurt me too much to
love you in return
yes I am, grade me easier
you look like you kissed
a train that was going
kO mph
you goddam S.O.B.
you don't have to make a
big deal out of it
you are crazy (insane, etc.)
your fly is open
your supposed to teach
not preach
your right I am
you don't have to tell
me I know
you prick
your full of shit
you can kick me out
your on my dick
you old bag
you don't know anything
you are really important
in your eyes
you are finally getting smart
you should talk to Freud
your kidding (me)
your not one of the most
liked people I know
you do not, you love me
- /l-l
-/l-l
1-0/
1-0/
1-1/
1-0/
1-1/
1-0/
1-0/
1-0/
1-0/
1-0/
1-0/
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/-
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-1/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/2-2
1-0/ -
1-1/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
l-O/l-O
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
l-O/l-O
1-1/ -
- /l-O
2-0/1-0
- /l-O
1-1
1-0
VERBAL RESPONSES— Continued
Situations:
Sex:
Number:
EMBARRASS
M / P
22—
HATE(G)
M / F
51 ^7
LOVE(G)
M / F
46 55
L0VE(SJ
F
J2.
you will get over it
your sweet
you don't know what your
saying
you what
yeah, sure
yeah, O.K.
you'll be sorry
you are pretty funny
you only think you do
yeah
yes, they all do
you are weird
you are wrong
you have no grounds on which
to base your charges
you should talk
you should be doing your
work and stop trying
to be funny
you are dumb (ignorant,
stupid, etc.)
you are prejudiced
you don’t have the right
to say that
you used bad psychology
you love me
you can get off your knees,
I know when I’m licked
you know what they do with
opinions
you don't hate me
you make me sick
you do
you make me happy when you
say that
you've got to be kidding
- /l-O
/l-O
/l-O
/l-l
/l-l
/ll-l
/l—0
/l-l
/l-O
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-1/ -
- /l-O
1-0/ -
- /l-O
- /l-O
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
- /l-O
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
A-1
/l-O
1-1
1-0
1-1
1-1
APPENDIX C
STATES (FEEL OR BE)
109
110
STATES (FEEL OR EE)
EMBARRASS HATe (g)
M / F M / F
? ? 5. 1__! t L
LOVE(G) LOVE(S)
M / F F
^ 33 35
Situations:
Sex:
Number:
angry
amused
alienated
affectionate
accepted
annoyed
afraid
amazed
awkward
apathetic
aggressive
B
5-2 A —2
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
- /l-O
4-5/5-2 l-O/l-O 1-0
1-1/3-5
1-1/ -
l-O/l-O
- /l-O
- /l-O
- /l-l
- /l-l
c
crushed
contemptuous
calm
cold
cool
choked up
compassionate
complimentary
content
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
l-l/
1-1/
1-0/ -
- /l-O
- / 2-1
1-0/ -
1-0
1-0
disgusted
defensive
distrustful
depressed
docile
dejected
disbelief
E
estatic
embarrassed
excited
enemies
emotional
emotionless
2-1/4-1
5-2/10-4
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
2-2/2-0
1-0/-
- /l-O
/1-1
/1-1
- /1-0
1-0/ -
- /l-O
- /l-O
5-0/5-0 1-0
l-O/l-O 1-0
- /l-O
Ill
STATES (FEEL OR BE)— Continued
LOVE(O) LOVE(s)
M / F F
^ 33 35
Situations:
Sex:
Number:
EMBARRASSHATE(G)
M / F M / F
53 59 51 V7
fearful of hurting them
forgiving
friendly-
frustrated
flattered
feel closer
feel bad
flabbergasted
G
good
guilty
glad
H
honest
happy
hateful
hurt
high spirited
humiliated
hostile
l-l/l-O
1-1/ - - 12 . - 2 .
1-0/ -
-/l-l
1-1/2-0
- /3-0
- /l-O
- /1-0
- /l-O
- /l-l
- /l-O
7-2/7-k
/l-O
-/l-l
1-1/-
- /2-1
- /l-O
5-2/3-2
1-0/-
- /l-O
1-0/ -
1-0
1-0
1-0
>2
1-0
10-2
involved
impressed
infuriated
indifferent
inconvenienced
intimate
indignant
insecure
immature
J
joyous
K
hind
1-1/-
1-1/ - 2-1/2-1
- 12-2
- /2-1
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
-/l-l
- /l-O
- /l-O
L
low 1-0/ -
112
STATES (FEEL OR BE)— Continued
EMBARRASS HATE(g) LOVE(G) LOVe (s)
M / F M / F M / F F
53 59 51 kl 46 33_____25___
Situations:
Sex:
Number:
M
mad
martyr
N
nervous
nice
ob st ruct ioni st ic
obedient
P
pleased
polite
passionate
panicky
proud
2
R
respectful
remorseful
reassuring
rationalize
rejected
resentful
5-2/3-O
- /l-l
- /2-1
1-0/ -
- /l-O
- /l-O
2-0 A-2
- /l-l
1-0/ -
l-l/l-l
- /l-O
2-0
3-0/3-2
- /l-O 2-2
1-1
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
1-1/ -
- /2-1
1-1/-
3-2
standoffish
shy
speechless
surprised
shocked
sad
sympathetic
serious
strange
sarcastic
secure
silly
shame
l-O/l-O
-/l-l
2-1/1-1
1-0/2-2
1-0/ -
- /l-O
- /2-1
- /l-O
2-1/1-0
^-3/5-0
3-2/ -
1-1/ -
- /2-1
- /2-1
- /l-O
1-1
113
STATES (FEEL-OR £E )-^CS&tlnue5~
EMBARRASS HATE(G) LOVE(G) LOVE^s)
m / f m / f m / f F
53 59 51 Vf 46 33 35
Situations:
Sex:
Number:
turned off
thoughtful (think about it)
taken aback
troubled
tongue tied
tense
U
upset
unbelieving
unfriendly
V
vengeful
W
wonder why (or about)
warm
worried
withdrawn
1-0/
>1/
1-1/ -
- /l-O
1-0/2-0
2-0/3-2
2-0/ -
1-0/ -
l-l/l-O
- /l-O
l-o/l-l
3-0/3-1
3-2/ -
- /l-l
- /l-O
1-0/ -
1-0/2-0
1-0/ -
1-1/2-0
2-0/ -
- /l-O
X-Y-Z
APPENDIX D
ABSTRACT OR INDEFINITE RESPONSES
114
ABSTRACT OR INDEFINITE RESPONSES
EMBARRASS HATE(G) LOVE(G) LOVE(S)
M / F M / F M / F F
J.2___^ ^ ^ 33 35
Situation:
Sex:
Number:
act nervous - -
amuse self 1-0/ -
aggitate them 1-0/ -
act pleased - 1-0/ -
act happy - 1-0/ -
act crazy (insane, etc.) - 1-0/ -
act dumb (stupid, etc.) - 1-0/ -
act screwy
act annoyed
B
become involved - -
become catatonic - 1-0/ -
be violent l-O/j-O - /2-0
butterflies in stomach - -
- /l-O
- A - o
- /l-O
1-0/ -
- /l-O
- /l-l
cut then down (verbally) l-l/l-O
change their mind
clam them down
confront them - /l-O
correct it
cringe
5-yi-o
1-1/ -
- /l-O
- /l-O
do things for them
do something to take mind off it -
do something drastic
dance for joy
don't do anything to
upset them
E
embarrass them
eat better
ego would be built up
1+-1/5-1
- /l-O
- /l-O
- /l-O
- /l-l
-/l-O
- /l-l
2-0
1-0
feel like walking on air
form club against them
feel with them
feel weird (or strange)
- /l-O
- /l-l
2-1/ -
1-0
116
ABSTRACT OR INDEFINITE RESPONSES— Continued
Situation: EMBARRASS HATE(G) DOVE(G) LOVE
Sex: M / F M / F m / F F
__________Number:______________ 55 59 51 ^7 k6 35 35
feel beautiful feelings - - l-l/ -
feel dumb - - 1-0 / -
freak-out - - 1-0/ -
find out why - h~0/ - - -
G
get others to do something - /l-l - -
go on mind trip - - 1-0/ -
give up - 1-0/ - - -
get them fired (or removed) l-O/l-O - -
go into state of shock 1-0/ - - - -
go crazy (insane, etc.) 1-0/ - - /l-O
give them a hard time l-l/ - -
get back at them later 1-0/ - - - -
get as much as possible - - 1-0/ -
-/l-l
get involved with something
else
get back at them - /l-l
get others sympathy - /l-O
get others to hate them - - /l-O
H
harass them 1-0/ - - - -
hate everybody - 1-0/ -
help them to understand - - l-l/ -
have them prove it - - 1-1
have a good relationship - 1-0
J
jump for joy - - - /2-0
K
keep cool - - /l-O - -
L
look stupid 1-0/ - /l-O
love them (back) - 1-0/ - 2-2./l-O 2-2
let feelings out - - - 1-0
M
make them happy - 1-0
make than love you - - - /l-l
make them regret it - /l-O - - -
117
ABSTRACT OR INDEFINITE RESPONSES— Continued
Situation:
Sex:
Number:
EMBARRASS
M / F
- ?? . ft ,
HATE(g! )
m / f
-£1- JtL
LOVE(G)
M / F
21
LOVE(S)
F
1__
make them feel bad
make them chase you
make amends
make a mess of it
make them apologize
N
not care
not let them down
- /l-O
1-0/ -
- /l-O
1-0/ -
- /l-O
1-0/ -
1-0
patch things up
plot revenge - /l-O
panic
play dumb l**l/ “
play dead 1-0/ -
put them down 1-0/ -
pretend not to understand
put them off
- /l-O
1-1/ -
- /l-O
1-1/ -
- /l-O
remedy (or fix) the situation
rationalize
return the feeling
reason with them
regard as Joke
S
sulk
show them they are wrong
straighten it out
sleep well
sit in shock for awhile
show them in some way
- /l-l
- /l-O
- /l-O
- /2-1
1-1/ -
-/l-l
1-0/ -
1-0/ -
- /l-O
- /l-O
3-1
turn purple
treat with love
take it seriously
turn cold
-/l-l
1-0/
l-l/
1-0/
118
ABSTRACT OR INDEFINITE RESPONSES— Continued
Situation: EMBARRASS HATE(G) IOVE(G) IOVE(S)
Sex: M / F M / F M / F F
__________Number: 55 59 51 VT_____^6 35_____35
temper tantrum 1-0/l-Q - /l-0
trap them 1-0/ - -
talk slick - - - /l-0
talk way out of it - - /1-0

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Asset Metadata

Creator Dudick, Ronald Dean (author)

Core Title An Exploration Of Interpersonal Behavioral Possibilities And Probabilities

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Education

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag education, educational psychology,OAI-PMH Harvest

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Fox, Frank H. (committee chair), Brackenbury, Robert L. (committee member), Cliff, Norman (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-792755

Unique identifier UC11363353

Identifier 7314400.pdf (filename),usctheses-c18-792755 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 7314400

Dmrecord 792755

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Dudick, Ronald Dean

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA