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The Effects Of Social Security Programs On Fertility Levels

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The Effects Of Social Security Programs On Fertility Levels

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Content EFFECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS
ON FERTILITY LEVELS
by-
C harles F re d e ric k Hohm
A D i s s e r t a t i o n P re se n te d to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In P a r t i a l F u lf illm e n t of the
Requirem ents fo r the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(Sociology)
June 1973
INFORMATION TO USERS
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University Microfilms
300 N orth Z e e b R oad
Ann A rbor, M ichigan 48106
A X erox E d u catio n C om pany
73-31,649
H D H M , Charles Frederick, 1947-
THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY PR O G R A M S
O N FERTILITY LEVELS.
University of Southern California,
Ph.D., 1973
Sociology, demography
University Microfilms, A X E R O X Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan
© C opyright by
C h a rle s F re d e ric k Hohm
1973
THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED.
UNIVERSITY O F SOU TH ERN CALIFORNIA
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY PARK
LOS ANGELES. CALIFORNIA 9 0 0 0 7
This dissertation, written by
C li a. 1 e s_ „ F.x ® X.i S c J l ? . ._li9 .ll??.
under the direction of /Li.?... Dissertation Com
mittee, and approved by all its members, has
been presented to and accepted by The Graduate
School, in partial fulfillment of requirements of
the degree of
D O C TO R OF P H IL O S O P H Y
Dtan
Date.. . C „ z . s „ '2 L 3
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
_______ % & Q . .
Chairman
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would lik e to ex p ress my a p p r e c ia tio n to
Dr. David M. Heer, Chairman of my d i s s e r t a t i o n com m ittee,
fo r h is in v a lu a b le comments and s u g g e stio n s on v a rio u s
d r a f t s of th e d i s s e r t a t i o n . In a d d it i o n , D r.s Maurice
D. Van A rsd o l, J r . ; Rodger R. R ice; and Jon P. M ille r
were e s p e c i a l l y h e lp f u l and i n s t r u c t i v e d u rin g my four
y e a rs of g rad u a te stu d y a t USC.
Family members can be e i t h e r an a s s e t or a l i a b i l i t y
to a s tr u g g lin g g rad u a te s tu d e n t. In my case they were
d e f i n i t e l y an a s s e t . S p e c ia l thanks to both s e t s of
p a r e n t s ; Jim and Ida Hohm and Robert and Van C arlson.
The p e rso n I am most in d eb ted to is my w ife , Lindy. Her
c o n s ta n t encouragem ent, lo v e , and u n d e rsta n d in g were i n
d is p e n s a b le .
L ast b u t not l e a s t , thanks to our m enagerie of
c anines and f e l i n e s , e s p e c i a l l y Timmy, who in t h e i r own
d i s t i n c t ways were of h e lp .
ABSTRACT
S o c ia l s e c u r i t y programs are viewed in t h i s
d i s s e r t a t i o n as i n d i r e c t e f f e c t s o f economic development
on subsequent n a ti o n a l f e r t i l i t y l e v e l s . Two types o f
s o c i a l s e c u r i t y programs were d e a l t w ith , due t o t h e i r
t h e o r e t i c a l im portance w ith re g a rd s to f e r t i l i t y ; the
"lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs (o ld -a g e , i n v a l i d i t y , and
s u r v iv o rs h ip p rog ram s), and fam ily allow ance program s.
The former s e t of programs were h y p o th e s iz e d as having
an i n h i b i t i n g e f f e c t on f e r t i l i t y . The r a t i o n a l e fo r
t h i s h y p o th e sis is based on the changing n a tu re o f th e s e
"lo n g -te rm " r i s k s as s o c i e t i e s become i n d u s t r i a l i z e d and
u rb a n iz e d . In an a g r a r i a n , u n i n d u s t r i a l i z e d s e t t i n g ,
c h ild r e n are th e main so u rces of " s e c u r i t y " w ith r e s p e c t
to old age, permanent d isa b le m e n t, and death o f the
fam ily breadw inn er. A n tic ip a tio n o f such c o n tin g e n c ie s
have been thought to encourage f e r t i l i t y . As s o c i e t i e s
become u rb a n iz e d and i n d u s t r i a l i z e d and as th is fu n c tio n
o f the fam ily is preem pted by the " lo n g -te rm " r i s k p r o
grams, p a re n ts a re l e s s dependent on t h e i r c h ild re n f o r
" s e c u r i t y " and are s u b s e q u e n tly l e s s m otivated to b e ar
c h ild r e n fo r " s o c i a l s e c u r i t y " re a s o n s .
The e f f e c t s o f fam ily allow ance programs on su b s e
quent n a tio n a l f e r t i l i t y l e v e ls a r e , in l i g h t o f the
l i t e r a t u r e , q u ite ambiguous. I t was h y p o th e s iz e d t h a t
the z e ro -o rd e r c o r r e l a t i o n between fam ily allow ance p r o
grams and subsequent n a ti o n a l f e r t i l i t y le v e ls would be
h ig h ly n e g a tiv e . However, i t was f u r t h e r h y p o th esiz ed
t h a t when th e e f f e c t s o f o th e r r e l e v a n t v a r i a b le s were
c o n tr o l le d ( s p e c i f i c a l l y those v a r i a b le s a s s o c ia te d w ith
economic d evelo pm ent), the independent e f f e c t o f fam ily
allowance programs on subsequent f e r t i l i t y would be
weakly n e g a tiv e or p o s s ib ly p o s i t i v e .
The sample c o n s is te d o f 67 c o u n tr ie s v a ry in g on
le v e ls of economic developm ent. Both th e "lo n g -term "
r i s k and fam ily allow ance programs were thought to have
two im p ortant dim ensions; coverage and b e n e f i t l e v e l .
Coverage r e f e r s to the degree to which th e p o p u la tio n
" a t r i s k " is covered by the program s. B e n e fit l e v e l r e
f e rs to the r e l a t i v e s i z e o f payments. For the " lo n g
term" r i s k program s, the p o p u la tio n " a t r i s k " is the
econom ically a c tiv e p o p u la tio n , f o r i t is th is group t h a t
must make fam ily s i z e d e c is io n s . Coverage was th en o p e ra
t i o n a l i z e d by d iv id in g the a b s o lu te number of p a r t i c i p a n t s
in th e s e programs by th e s iz e of the econom ically a c tiv e
p o p u la tio n . The b e n e f i t le v e l o f the " lo n g -te rm " r i s k
programs was measured by d iv id in g the average annual
iv
"lo n g -te rm " r i s k b e n e f i t by the average annual wage in
m anu facturing .
Coverage f o r fam ily allow ance programs was o p e ra
t i o n a l i z e d by d iv id in g the number of c h ild r e n in r e s p e c t
of whom allow ances were made by the p o p u la tio n under 15
y ears of age. The b e n e f i t le v e l index f o r fam ily a llo w
ance programs was measured by d iv id in g the average annual
fam ily allow ance b e n e f i t by the average annual wage in
m anu factu ring. As in the "lo n g -te rm " r i s k program s, the
p o p u la tio n which is "as r i s k " w ith r e s p e c t to f e r t i l i t y
is th e p ro d u c tiv e age segment of the p o p u la tio n . Thus,
the s i z e of c h ild payments a re only m eaningful i f they
are viewed r e l a t i v e to the average wage.
Three c o n tr o l v a r i a b le s were a ls o u t i l i z e d ; the
in f a n t m o r ta li t y r a t e , newspaper c i r c u l a t i o n p er 1,000
aged 15 and o v e r, and the p er c a p ita gross dom estic p r o
duct in terms of the econom ically a c tiv e p o p u la tio n .
These v a r i a b le s have t r a d i t i o n a l l y been h ig h ly c o r r e l a t e d
w ith f e r t i l i t y and should thus be c o n tr o lle d when
a n a ly z in g the e f f e c t s o f s o c i a l s e c u r i t y on f e r t i l i t y
l e v e l s . F e r t i l i t y was o p e r a t io n a l iz e d by usin g the t o t a l
f e r t i l i t y r a t e . The s o c i a l s e c u r i t y in d ic e s and c o n tro l
v a r ia b le s are c i r c a 1960 w hile the t o t a l f e r t i l i t y r a t e is
c i r c a 1965.
The most im p o rta n t, unexp ected , and i n t e r e s t i n g
fin d in g was the tendency fo r the a s s o c i a t io n between
coverage of fam ily allow ance programs and subsequent
f e r t i l i t y to rem ain s i g n i f i c a n t l y n e g a tiv e , even w ith
the e f f e c t s o f the o th e r s o c i a l s e c u r i t y in d ic e s and the
c o n tro l v a r i a b l e s h e ld c o n s ta n t. A number of p o s s ib l e
e x p la n a tio n s were advanced to account fo r t h i s unexpected
fin d in g . However, r e g a r d le s s of why th ese two v a r i a b le s
are n e g a t iv e l y a s s o c i a t e d , i t seems sa fe to a s s e r t t h a t
in c re a s e d coverage of fam ily allow ance can be shown to
lead to h ig h e r f e r t i l i t y . The independent e f f e c t of
the b e n e f i t l e v e l o f fam ily allow ance programs on f e r
t i l i t y le v e ls was s t a t i s t i c a l l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t b u t n e g a tiv e
in d i r e c t i o n .
The h y p o th e s is a s s e r t i n g t h a t th e "lo n g -te rm " r i s k
programs would have an i n h i b i t i n g e f f e c t on subsequent
f e r t i l i t y l e v e l s was p a r t i a l l y confirm ed. While the in d e
pendent e f f e c t of the b e n e f i t le v e l index o f th e " lo n g
term " r i s k programs on f e r t i l i t y was c o n s i s t e n t l y i n s i g n i
f i c a n t , th e independent e f f e c t of the coverage index f o r
th e s e programs was, in c e r t a i n in s ta n c e s , s t a t i s t i c a l l y
s i g n i f i c a n t . Furtherm ore, the z e ro -o rd e r c o r r e l a t i o n b e
tween th e m easures of "lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs and f e r
t i l i t y were s t r o n g l y n e g a tiv e . I t was su g g ested t h a t by
c o n s id e rin g th e "lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs as one, we may
be redu cin g th e a c tu a l independent e f f e c t of o ld -ag e
programs on sub sequent f e r t i l i t y .
F i n a l l y , the d a ta sug gest t h a t the r e l a t i v e power of
th e s o c i a l s e c u r i t y in d ic e s in in d ep e n d en tly p r e d i c t i n g
f e r t i l i t y seems to be g r e a t e r than t h a t of the t r a d i t i o n a l
c o r r e l a t e s of f e r t i l i t y ( i n f a n t m o r t a l i t y , newspaper
c i r c u l a t i o n [or l i t e r a c y ] , and p e r c a p i ta p r o d u c t ) .
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS........................................................................................ i i
ABSTRACT....................................................................................................... i i i
LIST OF TABLES.............................................................................................. x
Chapter
I THE THEORETICAL FRAMEW ORK ............................................ 1
I n t r o d u c t i o n ............................................................................... 1
S o c ia l S e c u rity Programs D e fin e d .............................. 3
Economic Development and S o c ia l S e c u r ity . . . 6
S o c ia l S e c u rity Programs and F e r t i l i t y . . . . 8
"Long-Term” Risk Programs and F e r t i l i t y . . 9
Family Allowance Programs and F e r t i l i t y . . 19
B e n e fit Level o f S o c ia l S e c u rity and
F e r t i l i t y ..................................................................... 24
II THE STUDY DESIGN.................................................................... 26
M ethodological C o n sid e ra tio n s ................................... 35
F o o t n o t e s .................................................................................... 42
I I I ANALYSIS OF RESULTS.......................................................... 45
Support of the H y p o t h e s e s ............................................. 52
The Coverage of "Long-Term" Risk
Programs and F e r t i l i t y ........................................ 57
The Coverage of Family Allowance
Programs and F e r t i l i t y ........................................ 61
The B e n e fit Level of "Long-Term"
Risk Programs and F e r t i l i t y ......................... 68
The B e n e fit Level of Family Allowance
Programs and F e r t i l i t y ........................................ 70
T o ta l V ariance E xplained in Subsequent
F e r t i l i t y by th e Independent V a ria b le s . . 76
v i i i
TABLE O F CONTENTS - continued
Page
The R e la tiv e Power o f the S o c ia l S e c u rity
V a ria b le s and C ontrol V a ria b le s in
P r e d ic tin g Subsequent F e r t i l i t y ......................... 77
IV SUM M ARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS .............................. 84
Sum m ary......................................................................................... 84
P o lic y Im p lic a tio n s ........................................................... 86
F uture Research on S o c ia l S e c u rity
and F e r t i l i t y ..................................................................... 89
REFERENCES.................................................................................................. 92
APPENDIX I - The Econom ically A ctiv e P o p u la tio n . . 97
APPENDIX II - The Size of the P o p u la tio n Below
Age 15. ................................................................ 99
APPENDIX I I I - The T o ta l F e r t i l i t y R a t e ............................. 101
APPENDIX IV - The In fa n t M o r ta lity R a t e ............................. 104
APPENDIX V - Newspaper C i r c u l a t i o n ............................................. 106
ix
LIST O F TABLES
Table Page
1 V alues fo r Each V a ria b le , Each N ation ,
X1-X7 C irca 1960, Xg Circa 1965 .............................. 36
2 M atrix of Z ero-O rder C o rre la tio n Coef
f i c i e n t s , Using Pair-W ise Option ......................... 46
3 R e su lts of the M u ltip le R egressio n A nalysis
w ith the T o ta l F e r t i l i t y Rate as the De
pend en t V a r ia b le , Using Pair-W ise Option . . 47
4 M atrix of Z ero-O rder C o rre la tio n Coef
f i c i e n t s , Using Both Real and P re d ic te d
Values (N=6 7 ) ....................................................................... 48
5 R e s u lts of th e M u ltip le R egressio n A nalysis
w ith th e T o ta l F e r t i l i t y Rate as the
Dependent V a r ia b le , Using Both Real and
P r e d ic te d Values (N=67)............................................... 49
6 R e s u lts of the M u ltip le R egression A nalysis
vrith the T o ta l F e r t i l i t y Rate as the De
pend en t V a r ia b le , f o r Five Subsamples of
N=50, Using Both Real and P re d ic te d Values . 50
7 R e su lts of the M u ltip le R egression A naly sis
w ith the T o ta l F e r t i l i t y Rate as the
Dependent V a r ia b le , Using Both Real and
P r e d ic te d V a lu e s , by Development Level
of C o u n t r y ............................................................................... 51
8 R e su lts o f the M u ltip le R egression A n alysis
w ith the T o tal F e r t i l i t y Rate as the Depend
en t V a r ia b le , Using Both Real and P re d ic te d
V a lu e s, w ith the B e n e fit Level In d ic e s
Being Omitted ( N = 6 7 ) .................................................... 53
9 R e su lts of the M u ltip le R egression A nalysis
w ith th e T o ta l F e r t i l i t y Rate as th e De
pend en t V a r ia b le , Using Both Real and P r e
d i c t e d V alu es, w ith the Coverage Ind ices
Being Omitted ( N = 6 7 ) .................................................... 54
x
Table
10
11
LIST O F TABLES - continu ed
Page
R e su lts o f the M u ltip le R egression A n aly sis
w ith the T o ta l F e r t i l i t y Rate as the
Dependent V a r ia b le , Using Both Real and
P r e d ic te d V a lu e s , w ith the Coverage and
B e n e fit In d ic e s f o r Family Allowance
Programs Being Omitted (N=67).................................. 55
R e su lts o f the M u ltip le R egression A nalysis
w ith the T o ta l F e r t i l i t y Rate as the
Dependent V a r ia b le , Using Both Real and
P r e d ic te d V alu es, w ith the Coverage and
B e n e fit In d ic e s f o r th e Long-Term Risk
Programs Being Omitted (N=67)................................... 56
x i
CHAPTER I
THE THEORETICAL FRAM EW ORK
I n tr o d u c tio n
Economic development is viewed by some p o p u la tio n
t h e o r i s t s as i n h i b i t i n g f e r t i l i t y , w hile o th e rs see eco
nomic development as a prom oter of f e r t i l i t y . The th eo ry
o f demographic t r a n s i t i o n (c f. Thompson, 1946:22-25;
D avis, 1949:603-08; N o te s te in , 1953:15-31) r e p r e s e n ts
the f i r s t view. According to t h i s th e o ry , s o c i e t i e s p r o
ceed through sta g e s in c o r p o r a tin g v a rio u s com binations
of economic and demographic f a c t o r s . N ations t h a t have
n o t y e t e n te r e d the t r a n s i t i o n are c h a r a c t e r i z e d by an
absence of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and hence a low le v e l of
economic developm ent, as w e ll as high m o r t a l i t y and f e r
t i l i t y . As n a tio n s e n te r the " t r a n s i t i o n , " they s t a r t
to i n d u s t r i a l i z e and develop eco n o m ically , and ex p erien ce
a drop in m o r ta li t y w hile t h e i r f e r t i l i t y rem ains high.
The c u lm in a tio n of the t r a n s i t i o n p ro c e ss is a s s o c ia te d
w ith high l e v e l s of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and economic d e
velopment as w e ll as low l e v e ls of m o r ta li t y and f e r t i l i t y .
The demographic t r a n s i t i o n th e o ry s t a t e s t h a t as a
1
co u n try develops e co n o m ically , f e r t i l i t y l e v e ls d e c lin e
in an attem p t to a li g n w ith d e c re a se d m o r t a l i t y .
Thomas Malthus (1914:27-28, 132, 140, 230-31) is
p ro b ab ly the forem ost r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f the second group
of t h e o r i s t s . A ccording to M althus, the demand f o r la b o r
(which i s i n d i c a t i v e o f economic development) r e s u l t s in
in c re a s e d p r o p o r tio n s o f th e p o p u la tio n m arrying and in
a re d u c tio n o f the average age a t m arriag e . These
changes in m a r i ta l p a t t e r n s a re then r e s p o n s ib le , a c
co rd in g to M althus, f o r an in c r e a s e in f e r t i l i t y . A l
though much c r i t i c i s m has been le v e le d a g a in s t th e Mal
th u s ia n th e o r y , some h i s t o r i c a l s tu d ie s ( c f . Krause,
1953; P e te r s e n , 1966) have shown d i r e c t a s s o c a tio n s b e
tween economic development and tre n d s in f e r t i l i t y .
Moreover, s tu d i e s d e a lin g w ith the tw e n tie th c e n tu ry
(c f. G a lb ra ith and Thomas, 1941; K irk, 1942; E a s t e r l i n ,
1962; W eintraub, 1962; Adelman, 1963; De Jong, 1965) have
a ls o shown a d i r e c t a s s o c i a t i o n between economic d e v e lo p
ment o r w e ll-b e in g and f e r t i l i t y .
The p o in t o f the m a tte r i s t h a t both scho ols of
thought have ad equate t h e o r i e s and e m p iric a l evidence to
su p p o rt t h e i r t h e o r i e s . In an a ttem p t to re s o lv e the
above c o n tro v e rs y , David M. Heer (1966) has broken the
e f f e c t s of economic development in to d i r e c t e f f e c t s and
i n d i r e c t e f f e c t s and then a n aly zed t h e i r a s s o c i a t i o n w ith
f e r t i l i t y . His a n a ly s is o f 41 c o u n tr ie s show the d i r e c t
e f f e c t s o f economic development to be p o s i t i v e l y a s s o c i
a te d w ith f e r t i l i t y w hile the two i n d i r e c t e f f e c t s of
economic developm ent, in c re a s e s in l e v e ls o f ed ucatio n
and d e c re a se s in i n f a n t and c h il d m o r ta li t y r a t e s , were
found to be i n v e r s e ly c o r r e l a t e d w ith f e r t i l i t y . A
sta te m e n t from Heer and Turner (1965:290) summarizes the
lo g ic of the above f i n d i n g s :
An in c r e a s e in the le v e l of economic d e v elo p
ment lea d s to an in c re a s e in f e r t i l i t y as
m arried couples become more o p t im i s t ic con
c e rn in g t h e i r f u tu r e economic s t a t u s . On
the o th e r hand, the in c re a s e in the le v e l
of economic development then s e ts in motion
o th e r fo rc e s such as in c re a s e d knowledge
and use of b i r t h c o n tro l and in c r e a s e s in
n e t economic c o s t of c h il d r e n , which tend
to reduce f e r t i l i t y . In the long ru n , the
fo rc e s d e p re s s in g f e r t i l i t y tend to be
s tr o n g e r than th e fo rc e s in c r e a s in g f e r
t i l i t y u n le s s the in c re a s e in p er c a p ita
income c o n tin u e s a t a high r a t e .
The purpose of t h i s d i s s e r a t i o n w i l l be to analyze
the a s s o c i a t io n between an a d d itio n a l i n d i r e c t e f f e c t of
economic developm ent, the emergence o f s o c i a l s e c u r i t y
program s, and l e v e ls of f e r t i l i t y .
S o c ia l S e c u rity Programs Defined
According to Myers (1 9 6 5 :2 -3 ),
The p h rase " s o c i a l s e c u r i t y , " when co n sid ere d
as to i t s b a s ic co m po sition, is so broad as
to be v i r t u a l l y m ean ingless. The " s e c u r i t y
of the whole s o c ie ty " would encompass a l l
a c t i v i t i e s of m ankind--not only p h y s ic a l
and m e n ta l, b u t even s p i r i t u a l . As " s o c ia l
s e c u r i t y " is commonly used, however, i t con
n o te s measures fo r economic s e c u r i t y under
governm ental a u s p i c e s .
4
Edwin E. W itte (1962:61) a s s e r t s t h a t the g e n e ra l meaning
o f " s o c i a l s e c u r i t y " is o u t li n e d in th e A r t i c l e o f the
s u b je c t from the D e c la ra tio n o f Human R ights o f the
U nited N ations in 1948. According to W itte (196 2:6 1),
This A r t i c l e speaks of "The r i g h t to s e c u r i t y
in th e e v en t o f unemployment, s ic k n e s s , d i s
a b i l i t y , widowhood, o ld age, o r o th e r la c k o f
l iv e l i h o o d in c irc u m sta n ce s beyond h is (the
i n d i v i d u a l ’s) c o n t r o l , " a ls o o f "a s ta n d a rd
o f l i v i n g adequate f o r th e h e a l th and w e ll
b e in g of h im s e lf and h is fam ily , in c lu d in g
food, c lo th in g , h o u sin g , m edical c a r e , and
n e c e s s a ry s o c i a l s e r v i c e s . " S o c ia l s e c u r i t y
is concerned w ith a minimum income adequate
f o r a d ecen t l i v i n g f o r th e in d iv id u a l and
h is fam ily on th e o ccurrence of th e g r e a t
p e rs o n a l c o n tin g e n c ie s o f l i f e , th e most
im p o rtan t o f which are th o se enum erated in
the D e c la ra tio n o f Human R ig h ts, "unemploy
ment, s ic k n e s s , d i s a b i l i t y , widowhood, and
o ld a g e." I m p lic it is th e assum ption t h a t
i t is the duty o f th e government of a n a tio n
to see to i t t h a t a l l i t s people have a m in i
mum income adequate f o r a d ecent l i v i n g in
a l l c irc u m stan ces beyond t h e i r c o n tr o l .
The meaning of s o c i a l s e c u r i t y v a r i e s among n a tio n s
and w orld re g io n s . In th e U nited S ta te s s o c i a l s e c u r i t y
programs a re o f te n viewed as coterm inous w ith o ld -a g e ,
s u r v i v o r s , and d i s a b i l i t y in su ra n c e system s, w h ile in
o th e r c o u n tr ie s and re g io n s o f th e w o rld , the concept
has b ro a d e r g e n e r a l i t y (c f. Myers, 165:3, A ltm eyer, 1966:
5; Cohen, 1968:215), The U.S. S o c ia l S e c u rity Adminis
t r a t i o n (U.S. Department o f H e a lth , E d u ca tio n , and Wel
f a r e ; S o c ia l S e c u rity A d m in is tra tio n , 1961:v i i - v i i i ) , in
i t s w orld-w ide study of s o c i a l s e c u r i t y programs d e fin e s
" s o c i a l s e c u r i t y program" in a manner t h a t in c o rp o ra te s
5
the common elem ents found in v a rio u s types of s o c i a l
s e c u r i t y systems found th ro u g h o u t th e world;
The term " s o c i a l s e c u r i t y program" is u s u a lly
re s e rv e d , in the f i r s t p la c e , f o r programs
e s t a b l is h e d by p u b lic law, alth o u g h a d m in is
t r a t i o n of such programs may or may n o t be
w holly in p u b lic hands. In th e second p la c e ,
i t is u s u a lly c o n sid e re d to in c lu d e programs
t h a t p ro v id e some form o f cash payment to
i n d iv id u a ls to make up a lo s s o f or d e f i c i
ency in e a rn in g s o c c a sio n e d by such " lo n g
term" r i s k s o f o ld age o r r e t i r e m e n t , perman
ent d isa b le m e n t (or i n v a l i d i t y ) of nonoccu-
p a tio n a l or o c c u p a tio n a l o r i g i n , and death
o f th e fam ily breadw inner; and by such
" s h o r t-te r m " r i s k s as tem porary in c a p a c ity
of n o n o c cu p a tio n al or o c c u p a tio n a l o r i g in ,
m a te rn ity , and unemployment. I t is a ls o
commonly reg a rd ed as in c lu d in g programs t h a t
p ro v id e r e g u l a r cash payments to fa m ilie s
w ith c h il d r e n . F i n a l l y , p u b lic programs
p ro v id in g c u r a tiv e m edical s e r v ic e to i n d i
v id u a ls (o th e r than o r d in a r y p u b lic h e a lth
s e r v i c e s ) , o r t h a t a re concerned w ith th e
fin a n c in g o f such s e r v i c e s , are a ls o u s u a lly
reg ard ed as a type o f s o c i a l s e c u r i t y program
in c o u n tr ie s where th ey e x i s t .
V arious s c h o la rs d e a lin g w ith s o c i a l s e c u r i t y in an i n
t e r n a t i o n a l p e r s p e c tiv e have adopted th e above d e f i n i t i o n
by the U.S. S o c ia l S e c u rity A d m in is tra tio n (c f. R im linger,
1971:3) or have d e fin e d s o c i a l s e c u r i t y in a s i m il a r
manner (c f. W itte , 1962:61; Myers, 1 9 6 5 :1 -6 ). I t seems
to t h i s a u th o r th e n , t h a t in th e b ro a d e s t se n se, the
afo rem entio ned d e f i n i t i o n o f " s o c i a l s e c u r i t y program"
by the U.S. S o c ia l S e c u rity A d m in is tra tio n is q u ite
a c c e p ta b le .
Economic Development and S o c ia l S e c u rity
As s o c i e t i e s become i n d u s t r i a l i z e d and u rb a n iz e d ,
many fu n ctio n s of th e fa m ily such as p ro d u c tio n , consump
t i o n , l e i s u r e a c t i v i t y , and a s s i s t a n c e in i l l n e s s and
o ld age a re assumed by new i n s t i t u t i o n s (cf. Freedman,
1971:22; W estoff, 1964:111). The essence of s e c u r i t y
assumes a whole new dim ension as s o c i e t i e s move from
a g r a r ia n to i n d u s t r i a l . As Myers (1965:3) and R im linger
(1968:130) p o in t o u t , i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and u r b a n i z a t i o n
b r i n g a g r e a t improvement in th e m a te r ia l w e ll-b e in g o f
p o p u la tio n s , but a t the same tim e b rin g new r i s k s t h a t
were not a s s o c ia te d w ith a g ra ria n ism . In the a g ra ria n
s e t t i n g , th e fam ily (in many case s extended) was the
u n i t of p ro d u c tio n . The economic w e ll-b e in g o f the
fa m ily did not h in g e on th e employment o f any one member
as i s o f te n the case in an i n d u s t r i a l s e t t i n g where th e
fa m ily (u su a lly o f th e c o n ju g al type) o fte n r e l i e s on
th e income o f one member. Thus, the fam ily in th e i n
d u s t r i a l s e t t i n g i s fac ed w ith th e " r i s k " of income lo s s
due to sick n ess or d i s a b i l i t y . This r i s k becomes even
more im portant when one r e a l i z e s t h a t th e i n d u s t r i a l or
u rb an fam ily , in m ost c a s e s , does not even own i t s home,
w h ile in th e a g r a r ia n s e t t i n g th e home is l i k e l y to be
owned by th e fam ily . In a d d it i o n , th e r is k o f o ld age
becomes an acute problem as s o c i e t i e s become u rb a n iz e d
and developed. According to R im linger (196 8:13 0),
One o f th e most s e r io u s problems became the
economic i n s e c u r i t y of old age. With u rb a n
i z a t i o n and the in c re a s e in g eo grap hic m obi
l i t y , aged p a re n ts became a burden and were
l e s s l i k e l y to l i v e w ith c h il d r e n . Since
th e r e was l i t t l e room f o r employment o f the
aged in i n d u s t r y , o ld age soon became the
most im p o rtan t cause of c h ro n ic p o v e rty in
the i n d u s t r i a l s e t t i n g .
As the dim ensions o f " s e c u r i t y " change from a g r a r ia n
to i n d u s t r i a l s e t t i n g s , so does th e manner in which th e
p o p u la tio n a t t a i n s in su ra n ce of " s e c u r i t y . " The r i s k s
a s s o c i a t e d w ith the a g r a r ia n l i f e , such as p e s t i l e n c e and
d ro u g h t, were taken as "G od-given," and problem s r e s u l t i n g
from such r i s k s were u s u a l ly handled by th e p e a sa n ts
them selves (c f. R im linger, 1968:131). On th e o th e r hand,
the r i s k s a s s o c ia te d w ith the urban and i n d u s t r i a l s e t
t i n g , because th ey are g e n e ra te d by a new economic and
s o c i a l system and are thus "man-made," a re more l i k e l y to
r e s u l t in economic and p o l i t i c a l d is c o n te n t and e v e n tu a l
i n t e r v e n t i o n by the s t a t e ( c f. R im lin g er, 1968:131).
The evidence seems to s u b s t a n t i a t e the n o tio n t h a t
s o c i a l s e c u r i t y programs are a s s o c i a t e d w ith economic and
i n d u s t r i a l developm ent. For example, Galenson (1968:568-
569), in h is a n a ly s is of some 1963 I n t e r n a t i o n a l Labour
O rg a n iz a tio n s d a ta , found t h a t of th e c o u n tr ie s spending
more than fiv e p e r cen t o f t h e i r gross n a t i o n a l p ro d u ct
on s o c i a l s e c u r i t y program s, only one (P o rtu g a l) co uld
be c o n sid ere d as underdeveloped (based on p e r c a p i t a
incom e). F urtherm ore, s o c i a l s e c u r i t y system s have d e
velop ed in a l l modern i n d u s t r i a l i z e d n a t i o n s , r e g a r d l e s s
o f t h e i r p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e and o r g a n i z a t i o n . R im linger
(1971), in h is a n a ly s is of s o c i a l s e c u r i t y in Europe,
America, and R u ssia , found t h a t th e s e c o u n tr ie s and
r e g io n s d i f f e r as to the p h ilo so p h y and o r g a n iz a tio n of
s o c i a l s e c u r i t y programs b u t t h a t a l l o f them a re c h a r a c
t e r i z e d by e x te n siv e s o c i a l s e c u r i t y system s.
S o c ia l S e c u rity Programs and F e r t i l i t y
In r e f e re n c e to the a s s o c i a t i o n between s o c i a l
s e c u r i t y and f e r t i l i t y , c e r t a i n s o c i a l s e c u r i t y programs
may be more im p o rtan t than o t h e r s . I t is h e re advanced
t h a t the ’'long -term '' r i s k programs (tho se d e a lin g w ith
o ld age or r e t i r e m e n t , perm anent d i s a b i l i t y , and the
d eath of the fam ily breadw inner) and fam ily allow ance
programs are more t h e o r e t i c a l l y r e l a t e d to f e r t i l i t y than
are the o th e r types of s o c i a l s e c u r i t y program s. As
s o c i e t i e s become d evelo ped, th e f u n c tio n o f p ro v id in g
s e c u r i t y in the l a t t e r y e a rs i s i n c r e a s i n g l y f u l f i l l e d by
the "lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs i n s te a d o f th e fa m ily . The
im portance t h a t t h i s change has w ith r e s p e c t to f e r t i l i t y
w i l l be shown in th e fo llo w in g p ag es. The " s h o r t- te r m "
r i s k programs are d esigned to d e al w ith c o n tin g e n c ie s o f
a more tem porary b a s is (such as unemployment, tem porary
s ic k n e s s , e t c . ) and are tho ugh t to be l e s s l i k e l y to
9
in flu e n c e f e r t i l i t y . That fam ily allow ance programs are
t h e o r e t i c a l l y r e l e v a n t to f e r t i l i t y is ob viou s, sin c e
encouragem ent o f f e r t i l i t y has been one o f th e main p u r
poses f o r i t s im plem entation. Thus, in t h i s stu d y , we
w i l l l i m i t our a n a ly s is o f s o c i a l s e c u r i t y to th e " lo n g
term " r i s k and fam ily allow ance program s. As b r i e f l y
s t a t e d above and as w i l l be borne out in th e fo llo w in g
pages, th ese programs are tho ugh t to be t h e o r e t i c a l l y im
p o r t a n t w ith r e s p e c t to f e r t i l i t y . In a d d i t i o n , o th e r
typ es of s o c i a l s e c u r i t y programs sh o u ld be d e a l t w ith
in r e s p e c t to f e r t i l i t y , b u t tim e and expense d i c t a t e s
t h a t the scope of " s o c i a l s e c u r i t y " be narrow ed fo r the
purposes of t h i s stu dy.
"Long-Term" Risk Programs and F e r t i l i t y
With r e s p e c t to the a s s o c i a t i o n between th e " lo n g
term " r i s k programs and f e r t i l i t y , p o p u la tio n s c h o la r s
have d e a l t mainly w ith o ld -ag e and r e tir e m e n t program s.
While some p o p u la tio n t h e o r i s t s view a d i r e c t r e l a t i o n
between o ld -ag e s o c i a l s e c u r i t y programs and f e r t i l i t y
(c f. W estoff, 1964:115-116), most m a in ta in an in v e rs e
r e l a t i o n s h i p between th ese two f a c t o r s . Thompson and
Lewis (1965:325), N o te s te in , e t a l . (1 9 6 9 ):1 4 3 ), K e y fitz
(196 4:163), and P e te rs e n (1969:620) a s s e r t t h a t in
s o c i e t i e s la c k in g o ld -ag e s o c i a l s e c u r i t y b e n e f i t s ,
p a r e n ts view la r g e numbers of c h ild r e n as a form of
" s e c u r i t y " in o ld age. A ccording to t h i s r a t i o n a l e , many
10
c h il d r e n , and e s p e c i a l l y so n s, w i l l p ro v id e economic
s e c u r i t y in o n e ’s old age.
In r e f e r e n c e to the A sh an ti t r i b e o f sub saharan
A f r i c a , Lorimer (1971:76) a s s e r t s t h a t a man's m o tiv a tio n
in having c h ild r e n re v o lv e s around the f a c t t h a t c h ild r e n
are viewed as " h im s e lf reb o rn " and as p r o v id e r s o f care
fo r him in old a g e , and as p e r p e tu a to r s o f h is name.
Yaukey (1 9 6 1 :9 -1 1 ), in h i s a n a ly s is o f th e t r a d i t i o n a l
fam ily system in Lebanon, a ls o found t h a t one o f the
fu n c tio n s o f c h ild r e n is to supply com fort fo r th e p a re n ts
in t h e i r o ld age.
In R id k e r's (1969:12) o p in io n , economic fo rc e s
a f f e c t i n g d e s ir e d fam ily s i z e are perhaps "th e l e a s t
obscure and most e a s i l y and q u ic k ly in flu e n c e d " o f a l l
f a c t o r s in f lu e n c in g d e s ir e d fam ily s i z e . F urth erm o re,
R idker (1969:12) p o s i t s t h a t ,
To a la rg e e x te n t th e s e economic fo rc e s ap-
appear to be a s s o c i a t e d w ith o ld age s e c u r i t y .
In poor c o u n t r i e s , where the common man has
v i r t u a l l y no p o s s i b i l i t y of sav in g f o r h is
old ag e, and where modern s o c i a l s e c u r i t y
schemes a re n o t p r e s e n t and g e n e r a lly n ot
f e a s i b l e given th e c o s t and a d m i n i s t r a t iv e
c o m p le x itie s th ey e n t a i l , the only defense
an in d iv id u a l has a g a in s t p o v e rty in old
age i s the su p p o rt h is c h ild r e n can p ro v id e
him. The p a t h e t i c examples o f e l d e r l y men
and women who have no c h ild r e n or whose
c h ild r e n have f a i l e d in t h i s duty a re d a il y
rem inders o f the need f o r c h ild r e n - - a n d
enough c h i l d r e n , e s p e c i a l l y so n s, so t h a t a t
l e a s t one o f them w i l l tu r n out w e ll from
t h i s p o in t o f view. The whole extended
fam ily system , p lu s many ch ildho od t r a i n i n g
p a t t e r n s and m arriag e custom s, can be
11
i n t e r p r e t e d as means of coping w ith t h i s most
h e lp l e s s p e rio d in an a d u l t ’s l i f e .
In 1951, when s o c i a l s e c u r i t y was not y e t i n s t i t u
t i o n a l i z e d in Japan, Dore (1967) conducted a study of a
Tokyo ward and found t h a t the m a jo rity of the resp o n d en ts
tended to r e l y on t h e i r c h il d r e n (in most c a s e s , t h e i r
e l d e s t son) f o r su p p o rt in old age. Tw enty-six per cen t
i n d ic a te d t h a t they in te n d e d to be s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t in
t h e i r o ld age b u t would r e l y on t h e i r c h ild r e n (again ,
in most c a s e s , t h e i r e l d e s t son) i f n e c e ssa ry . P a ren ts
in d ic a t e d t h a t they d id n o t want to be dependent on t h e i r
c h ild r e n in t h e i r old age, b u t t h a t th e r e were no o th e r
a l t e r n a t i v e s s in c e p e n sio n s were r a r e and savings sm a ll.
Most of the above a u th o rs su g g est t h a t sons are
e s p e c i a l l y im p o rtan t w ith reg a rd to a s s i s t a n c e in old age.
In her r e s e a r c h d e a lin g d i r e c t l y w ith son p r e fe r e n c e ,
Nancy W illiam son (1972) d is c u s s e s son p re fe re n c e systems
of v a rio u s s o c i e t i e s and focuses s p e c i f i c a l l y on Taiwan.
She r e p o r ts t h a t concern f o r su p p o rt in old age appears
to be one of th e most c o n s i s t e n t reaso n s given fo r son
p r e f e r e n c e . In a d d i t i o n , G a l l i n ’s (1966:144-45) study
o f a Taiwanese V i l la g e , O r le a n ’s (1971:12) a n a ly s is of
pre-com m unistic China, Sam uel's (1965:12) study of In d ia ,
and K ir k ’s (1966) a n a ly s is o f Moslem s o c i e t i e s a l l p o in t
to the s i g n i f ic a n c e of su p p o rt in old age as a d e t e r
m inant of son p r e f e r e n c e . Moreover, most of the
12
afo rem en tio n ed a u th o rs a l s o see son p re fe re n c e as b ein g
p o s i t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d w ith f e r t i l i t y .
The Taiwan d a ta ( c f . W illiam son, 1972:238; H eer,
1972:39-40) shows t h a t re sp o n d e n ts expect sons to su p p o rt
them in t h e i r o ld age more fr e q u e n tly th an d aug hters or
any o th e r type of su p p o rt (such as government p e n sio n s,
s a v in g s , non-governm ent p e n s io n s , and r e l a t i v e s and
f r i e n d s ) . F u rth erm o re, most p a re n ts ex pected to l iv e
w ith c h ild r e n or g ra n d c h ild re n in t h e i r old age and e x
p e c t su p p o rt from them in t h e i r o ld age even i f they do
not l i v e w ith them.
The n e x t obvious q u e s tio n t h a t comes to mind is
w hether or n o t son p r e f e r e n c e in f lu e n c e s f e r t i l i t y . In
his d is c u s s io n o f th e m ajor fin d in g s o f the Taiwan stu d y ,
Heer (1972:162) a s s e r t s t h a t ,
An a t t i t u d i n a l p re fe re n c e f o r sons was shown
to have a sm all b u t c o n s i s t e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p
w ith f e r t i l i t y b e h a v io r and a t t i t u d e s . Com
p a rin g re sp o n d en ts w ith no son p re fe re n c e to
th o se w ith h ig h p r e f e r e n c e , the form er had:
(1) l e s s su bsequen t f e r t i l i t y , (2) a h ig h e r
p r o p o r tio n who had ev er u sed c o n tr a c e p tio n ,
(3) a s m a lle r number o f a d d i t i o n a l c h ild r e n
d e s i r e d , (4) a s m a lle r i d e a l fam ily s iz e fo r
t h e i r d a u g h te r, and (5) a s m a lle r d e s ir e d
number o f c h ild r e n i f l i f e could be liv e d
over.
Bumpass and W e s th o ff's (1970:93-94) U nited S ta te s
d a ta te n d to con firm the above a n a l y s i s o f the Taiwan
data s u g g e s tin g t h a t son p r e f e r e n c e lea d s to h ig h e r f e r
t i l i t y . They found t h a t f a m ilie s w ith only two g i r l s ,
fo r example, were more l i k e l y to have more c h ild r e n th an
13
f a m ilie s w ith only two boys. Yet a n o th e r c o n firm a tio n of
t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i s B e re ls o n 's (1964:2) T urkish d a ta
showing a s l i g h t tendency f o r p a re n ts w ith sons to be l e s s
l i k e l y to d e s i r e a d d i t i o n a l o f f s p r in g than those of
s i m i l a r p a r i t y w ith o u t son s.
The above s tu d i e s d em o n strate the im portance th a t
p a r e n t s in d e v elo p in g s o c i e t i e s p la c e on c h ild r e n (and
e s p e c i a l l y sons) f o r ''s e c u r i t y 1 ' in old age. However,
as s o c i e t i e s become i n d u s t r i a l i z e d , u rb a n iz e d , and de
v e lo p e d , and as t h i s " o ld -a g e s e c u r i t y " fu n c tio n o f the
fa m ily is assumed by new s o c i e t a l i n s t i t u t i o n s (o ld-age
and r e tir e m e n t program s), th e " u t i l i t y " o f c h ild r e n
( e s p e c i a l l y sons) as " o ld -a g e s e c u r i t y " p r o v id e rs d e
c l i n e s . F u rth e rm o re , as c h ild r e n f u l f i l l the " s e c u r i t y "
r o l e to a l e s s e r d e g re e , p a r e n ts a re le s s l i k e l y to have
c h il d r e n f o r "o ld -ag e s e c u r i t y " re a so n s . According to
the Study Committee of the O ffice o f the Foreign S e c re
t a r y , N a tio n a l Academy of S cien ces (1971:86).
I f o ld p eop le are su p p o rte d by the S ta te
or th ro u g h in su ra n ce o r pension schemes,
p a re n ts do n o t have t o a n t i c i p a t e depend
ing on t h e i r c h ild r e n fo r income in t h e i r
old ag e. The economic in c e n tiv e f o r
having c h il d r e n is m arkedly le s s e n e d .
A fter rev iew in g the l i t e r a t u r e on son p re f e r e n c e ,
W illiam son (1972:293) su g g e sts t h a t in c e r t a i n A sian
s o c i e t i e s (such as Japan and The Peoples Republic of
China) th e re i s evidence t h a t new so u rces o f o ld -ag e
14
su p p o rt are developing t h a t may be red u cin g the need
fo r so n s. In p a r t i c u l a r , th e communist government in
China has become involved in w e lfa re m a tte rs and as a
r e s u l t p eople can p la n to r e l y on governm ental o ld -a g e
s e c u r i t y programs in s te a d o f t h e i r sons.
The "lo n g -te rm " r i s k s of b ein g perm anently d is a b le d
and th e d eath of the fam ily breadw inner a re a ls o p ro b ab le
m o tiv a tin g f a c t o r s le a d in g to high f e r t i l i t y . In the
t r a d i t i o n a l , a g r a r ia n s e t t i n g , a la r g e number o f c h ild r e n
would a ls o p ro v id e su ste n a n ce and s e c u r i t y fo r th e
perm anently d is a b le d . For example, many c h ild r e n would
in s u r e t h a t , in the case o f permanent d isa b le m e n t, the
fam ily farm could c o n tin u e and t h a t the e n t i r e fam ily
(in c lu d in g th e head and h is spouse) would be p ro vided
fo r . L ikew ise, in r e f e r e n c e to h is u n tim ely d e a th , the
breadw inner o f the t r a d i t i o n a l fam ily can " p r o t e c t " h is
spouse by having a la rg e number of c h il d r e n . The o ld e r
c h ild r e n could in such a s i t u a t i o n take c a re of b o th
the young ones and t h e i r m other.
However, as was p re v io u s ly s u g g e ste d , i n d u s t r i a l i
z a tio n and u r b a n iz a tio n b r in g s o c i a l and economic change
in which th e fam ily is no long er th e a ll-en c o m p assin g
s o c i a l and economic i n s t i t u t i o n . I t w i l l be remembered
t h a t , acco rd in g to R im linger (1968:130), th e economic
i n s e c u r i t y of o ld age is one of the most s e r io u s problems
a s s o c ia te d w ith development and u r b a n i z a t i o n . Because o f
15
in c r e a s e d geographic m o b ility and the demise of the ex
tended fa m ily , p a re n ts are le s s l i k e l y to l i v e w ith t h e i r
c h il d r e n . The development of o ld -ag e or r e tir e m e n t p r o
grams remove, in p a r t , the r i s k of o ld -ag e economic i n
s e c u r i t y . L ikew ise, permanent d i s a b i l i t y (or i n v a l i d i t y )
and s u r v iv o r s h ip programs reduce the economic r i s k a s s o c
i a t e d w ith perm anent d i s a b i l i t y and the d eath of the
fam ily b readw inner in an urban and i n d u s t r i a l s e t t i n g .
As was e a r l i e r su g g e ste d , the i n a b i l i t y to work tak e s on
extreme s i g n i f ic a n c e in an urban s e t t i n g , where the fam ily
income is o f te n earned by one member and where th e re is
u n l ik e l y to be an extended fam ily to r e l y on. Permanent
d i s a b i l i t y ta k e s on even g r e a t e r s i g n i f ic a n c e as the
economic r a m if ic a tio n s are even more se v e re . Permanent
d i s a b i l i t y programs reduce t h i s r i s k of i n v a l i d i t y and
in s u re the urban fam ily of a t l e a s t minimal s u b s is te n c e .
The d e ath of th e fam ily b rea d w in n er, l ik e permanent
d isa b le m e n t, o fte n has s e rio u s consequences f o r the w e l
f a r e of the fam ily . The development of s u rv iv o r s h ip
programs in s u re s the widow and orphans of a t l e a s t m in i
mal su ste n a n c e in the case of such d e ath .
Permanent d i s a b i l i t y and s u rv iv o rs h ip programs are
a ls o c lo s e ly c o n c e p tu a lly a lig n e d w ith o ld -ag e or r e t i r e
ment program s. A perm anently d is a b le d p erso n would be
unable to work and would thus be unable to c o n tr i b u te to
an o ld -a g e or re tir e m e n t program. Since most c o u n tr ie s
16
o f f e r in g o ld -ag e and re tire m e n t programs r e q u ir e v a ry in g
degrees of employment or c o n t r i b u t i o n , such a p e rso n may
not r e c e iv e o ld -ag e or r e tir e m e n t b e n e f i t s . I n v a l i d i t y
programs remove t h i s r i s k as they in su re b e n e f i t s in old
age to the perm anently d is a b le d . In the same v e in , a
s u rv iv in g spouse t h a t has n o t been employed o r has worked
only a s h o r t p e rio d w i l l n o t have accum ulated much in
the way of o ld -a g e or r e tir e m e n t b e n e f i t s . S u rv iv o rsh ip
b e n e f i t s would, in p a r t , pro v id e su ste n a n ce in o ld age
fo r the s u rv iv in g spouse.
The r a t i o n a l e acco unting f o r an e x p ected in v e rs e
r e l a t i o n between o ld -ag e programs and f e r t i l i t y a ls o
o p e ra te s w ith r e s p e c t to i n v a l i d i t y and s u rv iv o r s h ip
program s. As s o c i e t i e s become i n d u s t r i a l i z e d , u rb a n iz e d ,
and developed, th e " s e c u r i t y " fu n c tio n s of th e fam ily are
assumed by new s o c i e t a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , i . e . , perm anent
d i s a b i l i t y and s u r v iv o rs h ip program s. The " u t i l i t y " of
c h ild r e n as p ro v id e rs of s e c u r i t y in the event of perman
ent d isab lem en t or d eath o f the fam ily breadw inner d e
c l i n e s . As t h i s " u t i l i t y " of c h ild r e n d e c l i n e s , we would
ex p ect the s iz e o f f a m ilie s to d e c lin e as w e ll.
An a s p e c t of s o c i a l s e c u r i t y t h a t i s most im p o rtan t
w ith r e s p e c t to f e r t i l i t y i s co verage. The coverage of
a program r e f e r s to the degree t h a t a program covers the
p o p u la tio n a t r i s k . The p o p u la tio n " a t r i s k , " in re g a rd
to f e r t i l i t y , is the p ro d u c tiv e (both b i o l o g i c a l l y and
17
econom ically) age segment o f th e p o p u la tio n , sin c e th is
i s the p o p u la tio n t h a t must d eterm ine i t s f e r t i l i t y with
r e s p e c t to f u tu r e e x p e c ta tio n s o f s o c i a l s e c u r i t y bene
f i t s . For example, two c o u n tr ie s may b oth have old-age
o r r e tir e m e n t program s. A ccording to our p rev io u s d i s
c u s s io n , we might expect b oth c o u n tr ie s to have low f e r
t i l i t y . However, i t is im p o rta n t to no te t h a t the mere
e x is te n c e o f an o ld -ag e or r e tir e m e n t program does not
i n d i c a t e the in flu e n c e or e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the program.
Country "xfl may have a v e ry e x te n s iv e o ld -ag e or r e t i r e
ment program to which the whole working p o p u la tio n is
c o n t r i b u t i n g , w hile c o u n try "y" may have a very narrow
program cov erin g only p u b lic em ployees. I t should be
obvious t h a t the o ld -ag e program w ith e x te n s iv e coverage
w i l l have more o f an impact on f e r t i l i t y th an the program
w ith l im i te d coverage.
The problem o f coverage is most n o tic e a b le in the
dev elo p in g c o u n t r i e s , many o f which have adopted e x c e lle n t
s o c i a l s e c u r i t y l e g i s l a t i o n b u t have found i t extrem ely
d i f f i c u l t to c a rry the l e g i s l a t i o n to f u l f i l l m e n t (cf.
W itte , 1962:60-63). Robert Myers (1965:223) d is c u s s e s
the coverage program in h is a n a ly s is o f fo re ig n s o c ia l
s e c u r i t y system s.
In econom ically d evelop ing c o u n t r i e s , coverage
i s u s u a lly l im i te d in one or more o f s e v e ra l
ways. R e s t r i c t i o n s a re based on f a c t o r s such
as o c c u p a tio n , s iz e of firm , permanency o f
18
employment, geographic l o c a t i o n , e tc . F re
q u e n tly , the law p ro v id e s f o r e x te n siv e
coverage b u t p e rm its th e a d m in is tr a tiv e agency
to p u t i t in to e f f e c t g ra d u a lly by r e g u la tio n .
Moreover, in many i n s t a n c e s , a c t u a l e f f e c t i v e
coverage i s w ell below what is c a l l e d fo r by
the l e g i s l a t i o n . . . .This in com pleten ess of
coverage a r i s e s because o f lack o f knowledge
of the req u ire m e n t on the p a r t o f the employers
and w o rk e rs, and because o f inadeq uate e n fo rc e
ment e f f o r t s by th e a u t h o r i t i e s .
In a d d it i o n , the adequacy and coverage of s o c ia l
s e c u r i t y programs is d eterm ined by th e amount of c a p i t a l
t h a t a country can i n v e s t in such program s. According
to S inger (1 968 :35 ), u nderdeveloped c o u n tr ie s simply c an
not a ff o r d to spend as much on s o c i a l s e c u r i t y as de
veloped c o u n trie s can. F i n a l l y , underdeveloped c o u n trie s
o fte n fin d i t d i f f i c u l t to expand t h e i r s o c ia l s e c u r i t y
programs in r u r a l a re as (c f. F is h e r , 1968). According to
the U.S. Department of H e a lth , E d u ca tio n , and W elfare,
S o c ia l S e c u rity A d m in is tra tio n (1961: x i ) , one source of
l i m i t a t i o n on cov erag e, which is found " p r i n c i p a l l y but
not e x c lu s iv e ly in L a tin A m erica," is based on a p o lic y
of g radual geographic i n tr o d u c ti o n of s o c i a l s e c u r i t y
p rog ram s. Programs a re in tro d u c e d in only a few d i s t r i c t s
and a re expanded to o th e r d i s t r i c t s in l a t t e r y e a rs.
Since many c o u n tr ie s have only r e c e n t l y adopted
s o c i a l s e c u r i t y , we would ex pect t h a t th e coverage of
v a rio u s n a ti o n a l s o c i a l s e c u r i t y system s would, because
of the aforem entioned r e a s o n s , be extrem ely lim ite d in
many c a s e s .
19
In sum, the in f lu e n c e of o ld -ag e or r e tir e m e n t,
i n v a l i d i t y , and s u r v iv o r s h ip programs on f e r t i l i t y l e v e l s
should vary d i r e c t l y w ith th e coverage o f th e se program s.
Thus, we might h y p o th e siz e t h a t th e coverage o f a
c o u n tr y 's o ld -ag e or r e t i r e m e n t , i n v a l i d i t y , and s u r v i v o r
sh ip programs w i l l vary i n v e r s e l y w ith t h a t c o u n tr y ’s
subsequent f e r t i l i t y .
Family Allowance Programs and F e r t i l i t y
Family allow ance program s may p ro v id e b e n e f i ts
e i t h e r d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y . D ire c t programs g ran t
r e g u l a r cash payments to f a m ilie s w ith c h ild r e n . I n d i r e c t
programs c o n s i s t o f v a rio u s types of a s s i s t a n c e to fa m i
l i e s w ith c h ild r e n such as ta x exem ptions or r e d u c t io n s ,
e d u c a tio n a l a s s i s t a n c e , r e n t allo w a n ce s, e tc .
A c o n s id e ra b le amount of i n t e r e s t has been g e n e r
a te d , e s p e c i a l l y sin c e World War I I , as to the e f f e c t s of
fam ily allow ance programs on f e r t i l i t y . L o g ic a lly , i t
seems t h a t of a l l types of s o c i a l s e c u r i t y programs,
fam ily allow ance programs should have the most p o s i t i v e
im pact on f e r t i l i t y , sin c e such programs p r e s e n t d i r e c t
or i n d i r e c t b e n e f i ts to p a r e n ts w ith c h ild re n .
The ev id e n ce , however, on th e e f f e c t s of fam ily
allow ance programs on f e r t i l i t y is not c l e a r . Nazi G er
many was one of th e f i r s t c o u n tr ie s to o f f e r fam ily
allow ance program s. From 1933 to 1945, in an attem p t to
20
r a i s e th e f e r t i l i t y l e v e l , the German government made
loans to m arrying c o u p le s, awarded f i n a n c i a l g r a n ts f o r
b i r t h s , and gave a s s i s t a n c e to la rg e fa m ilie s (S chulz,
1 9 7 1 a :207). Although Nazi Germany exp erien ced a r i s e in
i t s b i r t h r a t e , i t i s n o t c l e a r as to what e x te n t the
in c re a s e was due to th e governm ent’s p r o - n a t a l i s t p o lic y
( c f . S chulz, 1972a:207). The U nited N ations (1953:84)
a s s e r t s t h a t Nazi Germany’s p r o - n a t a l i s t p o lic y is not
g e n e r a l l y viewed by s c h o la r s as an im po rtan t c o n tr i b u ti n g
f a c t o r in the in c re a s e of Germany's b i r t h r a t e . R ath er,
o th e r f a c t o r s , such as the rec o v ery from the G reat De
p r e s s i o n , are deemed th e im p o rtan t in f lu e n c in g e lem en ts.
Another example of a cou ntry t h a t e x e rte d a p ro -
n a t a l i s t p o lic y i s p o s t World War II R ussia. In an a t
tem pt to deal w ith the problems o f an immense lo s s of
manpower and th e high number o f unwed m others, the S oviet
Union i n s t i t u t e d a number o f r a d i c a l programs to s tim u la te
b i r t h s (such as g r a n t s - i n - a i d , monthly s tip e n d s fo r la rg e
f a m i l i e s , monthly s tip e n d s f o r unwed m others, ta x b reak s
f o r f a m ilie s w ith c h il d r e n , m a te r n ity le a v e s , e t c . ) (c f.
Grzybowski, 1 9 7 1 a :274-75). The number o f la rg e f a m ilie s
d id i n c r e a s e , b u t a g a in , the e x te n t to which t h i s i n
c re a s e was due to the fam ily allow ance programs is q u e s
t i o n a b l e . The sudden in c re a s e in the number o f f a m ilie s
w ith many c h ild r e n in the 1945-1950 time p e rio d was no
doubt a ls o due to the g e n e ra l recov ery o f the n a t u r a l
21
re p ro d u c tio n r a t e in the p o s t war e ra (c f. Grzybowski,
1971a:276).
Although h i s t o r i c a l l y , fam ily allowance and a s s i s
tance programs have been p r o - n a t a l i s t in c o n ce p tio n , many
c o u n trie s today employ such programs not fo r p r o - n a t a l i s t
re a so n s , but f o r '’s o c i a l " re a so n s . Examples of c o u n tr ie s
o f f e r in g v a rio u s typ es o f fam ily allowance programs on a
s o c i a l j u s t i c e or w e lfa re r a t i o n a l e are the Federal
Republic of Germany (c f. S ch u lz, 1971a:208), T hailand
(c f. F aw cett, 1 9 7 1 :8 7 -8 8 ), and Sweden (c f. Swedish Assoc
i a t i o n fo r Sex E d u ca tio n , 1971:177-201). Other c o u n tr ie s
such as Belgium (c f. La F am ille Heureuse, 19 71:172),
C zechoslovakia (c f. Grzybowski, 1971b : 248-53), and the
German Dem ocratic Republic (c f. S c h u ltz , 1971b:223)
r a t i o n a l i z e t h e i r fam ily allow ance programs in b oth a
p r o - n a t a l i s t and s o c i a l se n se . The e f f e c t of fam ily a l
lowance programs on f e r t i l i t y , i f th e re is an e f f e c t ,
should be the same r e g a r d l e s s of the p h ilo s o p h ic a l reason
fo r i t s im plem entation .
In sum, the evidence does not suggest any c l e a r ,
u n q u e stio n a b le r e l a t i o n s h i p between fam ily allowance
programs and f e r t i l i t y . A rth u r Larson (19 71:450) gives
a summary sta te m e n t on the a s s o c i a t io n between th e se
two f a c t o r s :
22
. . . a s to m a te r n ity b e n e f i t s and c h il d a llo w
a n c e s, i t is a h ig h ly d e b a ta b le and extrem ely
complex q u e s tio n how im portant a p r o - n a t a l i s t
f o rc e th ey are in any given s e t of circu m
s t a n c e s . T h e o r e t i c a l l y , i t might seem ob
vious t h a t a co u n try bent on r e s t r a i n i n g
p o p u la tio n growth should avoid such s u b s id i e s ,
and i t may be s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t many of the
c o u n t r i e s , l ik e Japan Korea, I n d ia , P a k ista n
and Egypt, w ith the most a g g re ss iv e p o p u la tio n
c o n tr o l program s, do not have c h il d allow ances
and a re n o t n o ta b ly generous w ith m a te rn ity
b e n e f i t s , and t h a t T u n sia, alth o u g h i t has
c h il d a llo w a n c e s, p e rm its them only f o r the
f i r s t fo u r c h ild r e n . On the o th e r hand,
th e r e is no lac k of c o u n tr i e s , l ik e Sweden,
w ith high c h il d and m a te rn ity b e n e f i t s and
low b i r t h r a t e s .
What can we say th e n , about the fam ily a llo w a n ce -
f e r t i l i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p ? I t is very d i f f i c u l t to th in k
of a rea so n why fam ily allow ance programs would cause a
re d u c tio n in f e r t i l i t y . R a th e r, such programs a r e , in
a l o g i c a l s e n s e , p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d to f e r t i l i t y . Of a l l
th e s o c i a l s e c u r i t y program s, fam ily allow ance programs
should have the g r e a t e s t p o s i t i v e impact on f e r t i l i t y ,
sim ply because they p ro v id e b e n e f i ts to p a re n ts w ith
c h il d r e n . However, as p re v io u s ly d em o n strated , the e v i
dence does n o t show allow ance programs to be c l e a r l y r e
l a t e d to f e r t i l i t y . The f a c t t h a t fam ily allow ance p r o
grams a re j u s t one element of s o c ie ty a f f e c t i n g f e r t i l i t y ,
in a d d itio n to the m u l t i p l i c a t i v e n a tu re in which fam ily
allow ance programs a re o f te n a s s o c ia te d w ith the s o c i a l
and economic s t r u c t u r e of s o c i e t y , makes i t very d i f f i c u l t
to h y p o th e siz e a r e l a t i o n s h i p between fam ily allow ance
programs and f e r t i l i t y .
23
I t i s p o s s i b l e , however, t h a t i f a la r g e number of
c o u n tr ie s were a n aly ze d , we might fin d a n e g a tiv e r e l a
tio n s h ip between fam ily allow ance programs and subsequent
f e r t i l i t y l e v e l s . Such an expected r e l a t i o n s h i p , however,
should n ot be i n t e r p r e t e d as c a u s a l b u t sp u rio u s . The
v a r i a b le acco u n tin g f o r such a sp u rio u s r e l a t i o n s h i p would
be th e le v e l of s o c ia l and economic developm ent. In o th e r
words, fam ily allow ance coverage and subsequent f e r t i l i t y
are exp ected to vary i n v e r s e l y because the le v e l o f s o c i a l
and economic development is p o s i t i v e l y a s s o c ia te d w ith
fam ily allow ance coverage and n e g a tiv e ly a s s o c ia te d w ith
f e r t i l i t y . Since developed c o u n tr ie s have more funds and
have been c h a r a c te r iz e d by s o c i a l s e c u r i t y programs lo n g er
than the le s s developed c o u n tr i e s , we should expect them
(the developed c o u n tr ie s ) to have fam ily allow ance p r o
grams t h a t are more e x te n s iv e in cov erage. S i m i la r ly ,
developed c o u n tr ie s c o n s i s t e n t l y r e p o r t lower f e r t i l i t y
r a t e s than the l e s s developed c o u n tr i e s . Thus, we might
h y p o th e s iz e t h a t the z e r o - o r d e r c o r r e l a t i o n between c o v e r
age o f fam ily allow ance programs and subsequent f e r t i l i t y
w i l l be n e g a tiv e . However, we might f u r t h e r h y p o th e sis
t h a t when we c o n tr o l f o r the e f f e c t s of o th e r v a r ia b le s
(in p a r t i c u l a r , v a r i a b le s which a re i n d i c a t i v e of economic
development and a re c o r r e l a t e d w ith f e r t i l i t y ) the in d e
pendent e f f e c t o f coverage f o r fam ily allow ance programs
24
on subsequent f e r t i l i t y l e v e ls w i l l become m arkedly le s s
n e g a tiv e or p o s s ib ly p o s i t i v e .
B e n e fit Level o f S o c ia l
S e c u r ity and F e r t i l i t y
Yet an o th er a s p e c t of s o c i a l s e c u r i t y programs t h a t
becomes im p o rtan t w ith r e s p e c t to su bseq uent f e r t i l i t y is
th e le v e l or s i z e of s o c i a l s e c u r i t y b e n e f i t s . For
example, i f a working in d iv id u a l does n o t view th e o ld-age
or r e tir e m e n t b e n i f i t s in h is c o u n try as b e in g s u f f i c i e n t
f o r him when he r e t i r e s , the in c e n tiv e to have c h ild r e n
f o r " s o c i a l s e c u r i t y " reaso ns w i l l remain h ig h e r than
when the b e n e f i t s a re viewed as s u f f i c i e n t . The same
r a t i o n a l e a p p lie s to th e o th e r "lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs
d e a lin g w ith permanent d i s a b i l i t y and th e d e ath o f a
fam ily breadw inner. Thus, we might h y p o th e siz e t h a t the
b e n e f i t le v e l of o ld -a g e , i n v a l i d i t y , and s u r v iv o r s h ip
programs w i l l vary in v e r s e ly w ith sub seq uent l e v e ls of
f e r t i l i t y .
The b e n e f i t le v e l of fam ily allow ance programs can
be expected to be a s s o c ia te d w ith f e r t i l i t y in the same
manner as was coverage o f allow ance program s. That i s ,
the b e n e f i t le v e l of fam ily allow ance programs can be
expected to vary in v e r s e ly w ith f e r t i l i t y , not fo r any
c a u sa l c o n n e c tio n s, but because the le v e l of s o c i a l and
economic development i s a s s o c ia te d w ith b o th th e b e n e f i t
25
w ith th e b e n e f i t le v e l and n e g a t iv e l y w ith f e r t i l i t y .
Thus, as in the in s ta n c e of c o v erag e , the z e ro -o rd e r
c o r r e l a t i o n between th e b e n e f i t le v e l of fam ily allow ance
and subsequent f e r t i l i t y is exp ected to be n e g a tiv e . How
e v er, when we c o n tro l fo r the e f f e c t s o f o th e r v a r ia b le s
(a g a in , e s p e c i a l l y tho se v a r i a b le s which are i n d i c a t i v e
of economic development and a re a s s o c ia te d w ith f e r t i l i t y )
the independent e f f e c t of the b e n e f i t le v e l of fam ily
allow ance programs on subsequent f e r t i l i t y l e v e ls w i l l
become m arkedly le s s n e g a tiv e or p o s s ib ly p o s i t i v e .
CHAPTER I I
THE STUDY DESIGN
This d i s s e r t a t i o n i s based on an a n a ly s is o f s ix ty -
seven c o u n tr ie s fo r which minimum d a ta are a v a i l a b l e .
’’Minimum" i s h e re d e fin e d as th e p resen ce o f f e r t i l i t y
d a ta and a t l e a s t one of the s o c i a l s e c u r i t y in d ic e s (to
be d isc u sse d s h o r t l y ) . The d a ta on the independent
v a r i a b le s (coverage and b e n e f i t l e v e ls of th e "long-term "
r i s k and fam ily allow ance program s) and the c o n tr o l
v a r i a b le s ( in f a n t m o r t a l i t y r a t e , newspaper c i r c u l a t i o n
per 1000 p o p u la tio n aged 15 and o v e r, and p e r c a p i ta
gro ss dom estic pro d u ct o f the econom ically a c t iv e popu
l a t i o n ) a re c i r c a 1960 w h ile the d a ta on the dependent
v a r i a b le o f f e r t i l i t y a re c ir c a 1965. A lag of about
f iv e y e a rs is allow ed so t h a t th e independent v a r ia b le s
can a f f e c t f e r t i l i t y . The choice of the fiv e year lag
i s somewhat a r b i t r a r y . However, a minimum l a g , whatever
i t s s i z e i s n e c e ssa ry in t h i s a n a l y s i s which a tte m p ts to
show the e f f e c t of s o c i a l s e c u r i t y programs on subsequent
f e r t i l i t y l e v e l s . Most o f the d a ta are taken from
o f f i c i a l p u b l ic a t i o n s o f the U nited Nations and I n t e r
n a ti o n a l Labour O rg a n iz a tio n . In a d d itio n to these
s o u rc e s , d a ta a re taken from the U nited S ta te s Department
26
of H e a lth , E d u catio n , and W elfare; S o c ia l S e c u rity Admin
i s t r a t i o n ’s p u b l i c a t i o n , S o c ia l S e c u rity Programs th ro u g h
out the W orld-19 6 1 . T his p u b l ic a t i o n in d ic a te s the
p resen ce or absence o f v a rio u s s o c ia l s e c u r i t y programs
in v a rio u s c o u n tr i e s . This in fo rm a tio n , to g e th e r w ith
the U nited N atio ns and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Labour O rg a n iz a tio n
d a ta , was used t o c o n s tr u c t th e s o c i a l s e c u r i t y in d ic e s
(to be d i s c u s s e d ) .
In r e f e r e n c e to co v erag e, i t w i l l be remembered
t h a t th e term r e f e r s t o the degree t h a t a program covers
th e p o p u la tio n a t r i s k . Although the p o p u la tio n a t r i s k
w ith re g a rd s to o ld age or r e t i r e m e n t , i n v a l i d i t y , and
s u r v iv o rs h ip is d i s p r o p o r t io n a te l y found in the o ld e r
segment o f the p o p u la tio n , th e p o p u la tio n at^ r i s k w ith
r e s p e c t to f e r t i l i t y i s the working age segment of the
p o p u la tio n . I n d i v id u a ls c o n tr ib u tin g to "lo n g -te rm "
r i s k programs d u rin g th e p ro d u ctiv e years o f l i f e (both
b i o l o g i c a l and economic) are p ro bably assu red of a t
l e a s t minimal governm ental a s s i s t a n c e (fo r t h e i r spouses
as w e ll) when p a r t i c u l a r c o n tin g e n c ie s occur (old age,
i n v a l i d i t y , or d e a th o f the fam ily b re a d w in n e r), thus
le s s e n in g the need of b e a r c h ild r e n f o r " s e c u r i t y " r e a
son s. Thus, a measure i n d ic a t i n g the number of perso n s
" p a r t i c i p a t i n g " i n the "lo n g -term " r i s k programs w i l l be
u t i l i z e d . " P a r t i c i p a t i o n " r e f e r s to both c o n tr i b u to r s and
tho se covered d i r e c t l y in cases where the schemes are
28
not o rg a n iz e d on a c o n tr ib u to r y b a s i s . 1 However, the
’’number of p a r t i c i p a n t s " i s an a b so lu te i n d i c a t o r and
does n o t tak e the r e l a t i v e a sp e c t of coverage i n to a c
count. By d iv id in g the a b so lu te number o f p a r t i c i p a n t s
in a co u n try (over a y e a r 's tim e) by the number o f p eo ple
in th e econo m ically a c tiv e p o p u l a t i o n , 2 we achieve such
a r e l a t i v e m easure. This r a t i o sho uld, in most c a s e s ,
be lower th an 1 .0 . However, i f a p a r t i c u l a r co u n try has
a s i z a b l e p e r cen t o f the lab o r fo rc e h o ld in g more th an one
job d u rin g th e co urse of a year (and su b se q u e n tly being
counted as a ’’p a r t i c i p a n t ’’ more th an once) , the s t a t i s t i c s
on number o f " p a r t i c i p a n t s " w ill be i n f l a t e d and may r e
s u l t in a r a t i o l a r g e r than one. U n fo rtu n a te ly , th is
problem cannot be rem edied since the d a ta do n o t i n d ic a t e
the p e r cen t of the lab o r fo rce h o ld in g more th an one
job and w hether or n o t th e s e employees a re c o n tr i b u ti n g
to the "lo n g -te rm " r i s k program s.
The coverage o f fa m ily allowance programs can be
b e s t measured by fo cu sin g on the number o f c h ild r e n in
r e s p e c t o f whom allow ances are in f o r c e . 3 As in the case
of " lo n g -te rm " r i s k program s, such an i n d i c a t o r i s ab so
l u t e and must be viewed r e l a t i v e to the number o f c h ild r e n
in th e p o p u la tio n . The d a ta on th e number of c h ild r e n
in r e s p e c t of whom allow ances are made does not i n d i c a t e
what c o n s t i t u t e s ch ild h o o d . The age below which an i n
d iv id u a l is c o n sid e re d a c h i l d , w ith r e s p e c t to fam ily
29
allow ance b e n e f i t s , v a rie s c o n sid e ra b ly ( c f . U.S. Dept, of
HEW, S o c ia l S e c u rity A d m in is tra tio n , 1961). Thus i t b e
comes d i f f i c u l t to choose an age c a te g o ry to r e p r e s e n t
the t o t a l " c h ild " p o p u la tio n . In t h i s c a s e , in d iv id u a ls
under 15 y e a rs of age were c o n sid e re d an approxim ate i n
d i c a t i o n o f th e p o p u la tio n a t r i s k . 1 * In sum, the numer
a t o r f o r the coverage index o f fam ily allow ance programs
c o n s i s t s of th e number of c h ild r e n in r e s p e c t of whom
allow ances were made w hile the denom inator is the popu
l a t i o n below 15 y e ars of age. Due to the "proxy" n a tu re
of m easuring the t o t a l c h il d p o p u la tio n , th e r e w i l l very
l i k e l y be some cases in which the coverage index fo r
fa m ily allow ance programs w i l l be la r g e r th an 1 .0 . For
example, i f a co u n try c o n sid e rs a l l those below the age
of 18 as " c h ild r e n " and d isp e n se s c h il d allow ances a c
c o rd in g ly , the coverage index fo r fam ily allow ance may
very w e ll be g r e a t e r than 1.0 due to the 15 y e ars of age
d e f i n i t i o n of " c h ild " t h a t we a re u sin g in the denomin
a t o r . U n fo rtu n a te ly , we cannot a d ju s t f o r t h i s type of
d isc re p a n c y sin c e th e d e f i n i t i o n of what c o n s t i t u t e s
ch ild h o o d i s not prov ided by the v a rio u s c o u n tr i e s .
As in the case of c o v erag e , the b e n e f i t le v e l of
the "lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs are d i s p r o p o r t io n a te l y
aimed a t th e o ld e r age g ro u p s, sin c e most o f the b e n e f i ts
from such programs a re p re s e n te d to the o ld e r segment of
the p o p u la tio n . However, as in the case of co v erage, the
30
p o p u la tio n w ith which we are concerned in r e s p e c t to
f e r t i l i t y are those in d iv id u a ls in t h e i r p ro d u c tiv e
y e a rs . As was in d ic a t e d in the f i r s t c h a p te r , the
average le v e l of b e n e f i t s (w ith re s p e c t to th e " lo n g
term" r i s k program s) r e c e iv e d by the o ld , perm anently
d is a b le d , and s u r v iv o r s w i l l no doubt be n o tic e d by i n
d iv id u a ls in t h e i r p ro d u c tiv e y e a rs and w i l l very l i k e l y
in flu e n c e t h e i r f e r t i l i t y . Thus, a measure in d ic a tin g
average "lo n g -te rm " r i s k b e n e f i t s is needed. To achieve
such a m easure, th e annual n a t i o n a l e x p e n d itu re on b en e
f i t s in cash and kind f o r th e "lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs
(old age, i n v a l i d i t y , and s u r v i v o r s h i p ) 5 was d iv id e d by
the number of p erso n s r e c e iv in g "lo n g -te rm " r i s k
b e n e f i t s . 5
The average "lo n g -te rm " r i s k b e n e f i t le v e l per
y e ar i s an a b s o lu te i n d i c a t o r of the le v e l of b e n e f i ts
and must be viewed in terms of what the working man
"b rin g s home." The e f f e c t i v e n e s s of "lo n g -term " r i s k
programs in m o tiv a tin g lower f e r t i l i t y w i l l very l i k e l y
be based on the s iz e of expected b e n e f i t s r e l a t i v e to
what a producing in d iv id u a l e a r n s . The adequacy of
the average le v e l of b e n e f i t s (from the "lo n g -term " r i s k
programs) in red u cin g f e r t i l i t y only makes t h e o r e t i c a l
sense when judged w ith r e s p e c t to the average income of
the p ro d u c tiv e age p o p u la tio n . I d e a l l y , the average
le v e l o f b e n e f i t s should be viewed r e l a t i v e to the
31
average wage o f th o se who a re c o n tr i b u ti n g , e i t h e r in a
d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t se n s e , to "lon g -term " r i s k program s.
The d a ta fo r such a denom inator a r e , to t h i s a u t h o r 's
knowledge, n o t a v a i l a b l e . An a l t e r n a t i v e denom inator
might be the average annual wage of the p r o d u c tiv e pop
u l a t i o n . However, i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d from Chapter I
t h a t s o c i a l s e c u r i t y programs in g e n eral a re i n s t i t u t i o n
a li z e d when a co u n try becomes urban and the economic
r i s k s (w hether they be of old age, i n v a l i d i t y , r a i s i n g a
fa m ily , e t c . ) loo se t h e i r f a m i li a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and
become s e c u l a r . I t was a ls o noted t h a t underdeveloped
and dev elo p in g c o u n tr ie s may have e la b o r a te s o c i a l
s e c u r i t y programs "on the books" but t h a t in r e a l i t y
th e s e programs are o f te n n e a r ly n o n e x is te n t. In such
cases the p o p u la tio n c o n tr i b u ti n g to such system s ( i f
indeed any p o p u la tio n i s c o n tr ib u tin g ) w i l l most c e r
t a i n l y be urban and n o t r u r a l . In sum, i f th e average
income of the t o t a l p ro d u c tiv e p o p u la tio n is tak en as a
denom inator f o r the average le v e l of b e n e f i t s , the
r e s u l t i n g b e n e f i t index would c e r t a i n l y be too high w ith
re g a rd s to our t h e o r e t i c a l argument, due to the lower
average income of th e a g r i c u l t u r a l segment (which is
much le s s a f f e c t e d by the change in type of r i s k s a s s o c i
a te d w ith o ld age, i n v a l i d i t y , e tc . and the p re se n c e of
programs d e a lin g w ith th e s e r i s k s ) . This m eth o d o lo g ic al
problem i s o b v io u sly more r e l a t e d to underdeveloped
32
n a tio n s th a n to developed n a ti o n s , s in c e th e per cen t of
the p o p u la tio n invo lved in a g r i c u l t u r e is much g r e a t e r
in underdeveloped c o u n tr i e s , and s in c e the underdeveloped
c o u n tr ie s a re l i k e l y to have "du al" s e c t o r s (the t r a d i
t i o n a l a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r and the modern i n d u s t r i a l
s e c to r ) ( c f . Chapter I I I , " D u a lis tic Development" in
M eier, 1970) in which th e a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r is i s o l a t e d
from the new r i s k s a s s o c ia te d w ith u r b a n ity and the
s o c i a l s e c u r i t y programs th a t are found in the i n d u s t r i a l
s e c t o r .
In o rd e r to deal w ith t h i s m eth o d o lo g ical problem ,
i t was d ecid ed to u t i l i z e the average annual wage o f em
p loyees in m an u factu rin g as th e denom inator. This f a c t o r
was computed by d iv id in g the t o t a l annual amount o f wages
and s a l a r i e s in m anufacturing by the t o t a l number of em
p loyees in m a n u f a c tu r in g .7 Thus we have a " b e n e f it
l e v e l" index f o r the "lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs in which
th e average annual "lo n g -te rm " r i s k payment is d iv id e d
by th e average annual wage of employees in m an u factu rin g .
The b e n e f i t le v e l of fam ily allow ance programs
should a ls o be measured by ta k in g th e y e a r ly average
b e n e f i t p a id in re s p e c t to a c h il d and d iv id in g i t by a
measure o f th e y e a rly income a v erag e. The num erator is
computed by ta k in g the t o t a l y e a r ly n a t i o n a l e x p en d itu re
on fam ily allow ance pro gram s8 and d iv id in g i t by the
number of c h ild r e n in r e s p e c t o f whom allow ances were
33
made. The r a t i o n a l e fo r chpice o f an a p p ro p ria te denom
i n a t o r is i d e n t i c a l to t h a t of th e b e n e f it l e v e l index
fo r "lo n g -te rm " r i s k program s. T h e re fo re , we choose as
denominator the average annual wage in m an u factu rin g .
Subsequent f e r t i l i t y w i l l be measured by u t i l i z i n g
the t o t a l f e r t i l i t y r a t e c i r c a 1965. The t o t a l f e r t i l i t y
r a t e i s u s u a lly d e fin e d as "an e stim a te of the number of
c h ild r e n a c o h o rt o f 1000 women would bear i f they a l l
went through t h e i r re p ro d u c tiv e y e a rs exposed to th e age-
s p e c i f i c f e r t i l i t y r a t e s in e f f e c t a t a p a r t i c u l a r tim e"
(c f. Bogue, 1969:659). The t o t a l f e r t i l i t y r a t e is a lso
d e fin e d in terms o f t o t a l b i r t h s p er woman which i s an
in d ic a t i o n o f rep lacem en t. I f th e t o t a l f e r t i l i t y r a t e
fo r a p a r t i c u l a r co u n try is tw o, we can say t h a t on the
av erag e , any one couple i s r e p la c in g them selves b u t are
no t c o n tr i b u ti n g to p o p u la tio n growth. The l a t t e r i n t e r
p r e t a t i o n o f the t o t a l f e r t i l i t y r a t e w i l l be u t i l i z e d
h e r e . 9 According to Bogue (1969:659), the t o t a l f e r
t i l i t y r a t e ,
. . . i s g e n e r a lly reg arded as the b e st s in g le
c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l measure of f e r t i l i t y because
i t i s r a t h e r c lo s e l y r e s t r i c t e d to the c h i l d
b e a rin g p o p u la tio n and is n o t in flu e n ce d by
d if f e r e n c e s in the age com position between
c h ild b e a rin g p o p u la tio n s .
The a u th o r decided to in c lu d e th ree c o n tr o l v a r
i a b l e s . F i r s t of a l l , the in f a n t m o r ta lity r a t e p e r 1000
p o p u la tio n 10 was c o n sid e re d as a c o n tr o l because of i t s
tendency to vary p o s i t i v e l y w ith f e r t i l i t y l e v e l s . 11
34
The second c o n tr o l v a r i a b le is newspaper c i r c u l a
t i o n p e r 1000 a d u lt p o p u la tio n (aged 15 and over) c ir c a
I 9 6 0 . 12 E d ucation has t r a d i t i o n a l l y v a rie d i n v e r s e ly
w ith f e r t i l i t y and should thu s be c o n tr o l le d when a n a
ly z in g e f f e c t s of o th e r v a r i a b l e s on f e r t i l i t y . News
p ap er c i r c u l a t i o n was d iv id e d by the p o p u la tio n 15 years
o f age and over r a t h e r than by the t o t a l p o p u la tio n of
a l l ages because i t is most prob ab le t h a t people under
the age o f 15 a r e n 't newspaper s u b s c r ib e rs and t h a t
" . . . o n l y communication flow in the group 15 y e a rs old and
over would have any e f f e c t on f e r t i l i t y " ( c f . Heer,
1966:432).
The t h i r d c o n tr o l v a r i a b l e , per c a p i t a gross
dom estic p ro d u ct o f the econom ically a c tiv e p o p u la tio n
( c i r c a 1960 and in terms o f U.S. d o l l a r s ) , 13 is an i n
d i c a to r of n a t i o n a l economic w e ll-b e in g and developm ent.
M easures of economic developm ent, as i n d ic a te d by such
m easures as p e r c a p i t a gross dom estic p ro d u c t, have a lso
been shown to be a s s o c i a t e d w ith lower l e v e ls of f e r t i l
i t y and should th u s be c o n t r o l l e d when a n a ly z in g th e
e f f e c t s o f s o c i a l s e c u r i t y programs on subsequent l e v e ls
of f e r t i l i t y .
35
M ethodological C o n sid e ra tio n s
Table 1 shows the valu es fo r each v a r i a b l e fo r
every n a ti o n . As in d ic a te d in the fo o tn o te to Table 1,
u n d e rlin e d num erals are n o t r e a l but a re p r e d ic te d
(th e s e v a lu e s were p r e d ic te d on the b a s i s of r e g r e s s io n
eq u atio n s and w i l l be d is c u s s e d s h o r t l y ) . Out of 544
c e l l s in T able 1, r e a l v a lu e s a re la c k in g fo r 87 c e l l s
(ap p ro x im ately 16% of t a b l e ) . With an endeavor such as
the p r e s e n t one, th e re s e a r c h e r is o fte n faced w ith a
lac k o f s u f f i c i e n t amounts of d a ta . The problem becomes
even more a c u te when in d ic e s a re used. Both coverage
in d ic e s in c lu d e two f a c to r s and both b e n e f i t le v e l i n
d ic e s in c lu d e four f a c t o r s . Thus, fo r example, the p r o b
a b i l i t y of not b e in g able to achieve a v alu e on " b e n e f it
l e v e l of lo n g -term r i s k program s" for any one co u n try
becomes fo u r times g r e a t e r than not b e in g ab le to f in d
one f a c t o r (such as t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n ) . Table 1 i n d ic a t e s
t h a t only 20 c o u n tr ie s have r e a l values on a l l the v a r i
a b le s . Thus, i f one u t i l i z e s th e o rd in a ry m u ltip le r e
g re s s io n te c h n iq u e , the N would be 20, which i s too sm all
for s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s .
A computer o p tio n c a l l e d " p a ir-w is e d e le tio n "
(c f. N ie, e t a l . , 1970:186) computes z e r o -o r d e r c o r r e l a
t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s based on a v a ila b le d a ta and does n o t
d is c a r d a case because t h a t case has a m issin g v alue on
36
Values for Bach Variable. Bach Nation Xj-X7 Circa I960, Xg Circa 1965*
Gross Domes -
Benefit Benefit Infant tic Product
Coverage Coverage Level Level Mortality Newspaper In Terms of
Index Index for Index for Index for Rate (in* Circulation of the Eco- Total
for Long- Family Long Term Family fant deaths per 1,000 nomically Fertility
Term Risk Allowance Risk Allowance per 1,000 aged 15 active pop* Rate (per
Programs Programs Programs Programs deathsi and over ulation woman'
Nation ~ T J --------------- J“------ rA---------- JCJ“ * -------*1------------Tj---------- T f*—
Australia 1.076 0.629 0.229 0.030 20.2 541.4 4,017 2.97
Austria 0.564 0.315 0.381 0.018 37.5 266.2 1,764 2.69
Belgium 0.608 0.907 0.391 0.087 31.2 357.5 3,117 2.60
Burma 0,000 0.000 0.000 0.000 148.6 21.4 125 5.93
Cambodia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 127.0 10.7 205 7.00
Cameroon 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.002 94.1 4.4 298 5.07
Canada 0.193 1.039 0.147 0.019 27.3 348.8 6,149 3.18
Ceylon 0.176 0.000 0,073 0,000 56.8 61.8 423 4.84
Chad 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.002 95.2 .7 150 4.92
China (Taiwan) 0.274 0.000 0.104 0.000 30.S B9.2 468 4.82
Colombia 0.000 0.088 0.000 0.004 99.8 101.0 822 5.56
Costa Rica 0.069 0.000 0.165 0.000 71.6 180.8 1,143 6.68
Cyprus 0.569 0.000 0.132 0.000 29.9 194.3 1,220 3.30
Czechoslovakia 0.92S 0.617 0.171 0.011 23.S 323.3 2,886 2.36
Denmark 1.578 0.51S 0.270 0.026 21.5 462,3 2,806 2.60
Dominican Republic 0.195 0.000 0.030 0.000 100.6 47.8 621 7.15
Ethiopia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 95.1 3,5 115 6.05
Finland 1.498 1.070 0.100 0.020 21.0 511.9 2,433 2.42
France 0.472 0.617 0.173 0.001 27.4 342.7 3,100 2.83
Germany, Federal
Republic of* 0.825 0.146 0.441 0.089 34.4 389.9 2,717 2.50
Guatemala 0.100 0.000 0.041 0.000 91.9 57.7 847 6.19
Honduras 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 52.0 45.5 717 6.40
Hungary 0,389 0.556 0.112 0.013 47.6 176.9 1,656 1.80
Iceland 1.272 0.271 0.271 0,036 13.0 670.1 3,S18 3.63
Indonesia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.C0O 125.0 19.1 224 6.04
Iran 0.149 0.021 0.035 0,004 89.8 27.6 607 6,35
Iraq 0.SQ4 0.000 0.140 0.000 27.2 214.5 739 7,13
Ireland 0.740 0.945 0.173 0.021 29.3 351.4 1,549 4.06
Israel. 0.897 0.119 0.171 0.020 31.0 327.6 2,695 3.92
Italy 0.765 0.534 0.195 0.100 43.9 139.1 1,612 2.62
Japan 0.243 0.000 0.086 0.000 30.7 571.7 929 2.13
Jordan 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 53,5 32.9 710 7.05
Korea, Republic of 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000' 32.6 122.1 500 5,29
Liberia 0.000 0 *000 0.000 0,00^0 93.7 1.6 - 462 6.18
Libya 0.014 0.000 0.027 0.000 93,7 12.2 897 6.76
Malaya 0.509 0.000 0.267 0.000 68.9 51.3 157 5.41
37
TABLE 1 ■ continued
Coverage
Index
for Long-
Term Risk
Programs
Coverage
Index for
family
Allowance
Programs
Benefit
Level
Index for
Long Term
Risk
Proarams
Benefit
Level
Index for
family
Allowance
Programs
Infant
Mortality
Rate (in
fant deaths
per 1,000
deaths)
Newspaper
Circulation
per 1,000
aged IS
and over
Per daplta
Cross Domes
tic Product
In Terms of
of the Eco
nomically
active pop
ulation
Total
Fertility
Rate (per
woman)
Nation
®1 *2 ®3 ®4
y
5 *6 *7 *8 '
Mexico 0,052 0.000 0.079 0.000 74.2 144.6 1,035 6.54
Morocco 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.010 149,0 38.9 538 6.46
Netherlands 1.691 0.616 ‘ 0.197 0.041 17.9 396.1 2,670 3.01
New Zealand 1.127 1.081 0.237 0.031 22.6 572.S 4,131 3.32
Nicaragua 0,059 0.000 0.217 0.000 70.2 123.4 851 5.99
Nigeria 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 62.9 14.0 195 9.35
Norway 1.027 0.545 0.159 0.028 18.9 509.0 3,231 2.89
Pakistan 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 93.2 12.7 260 7.67
Panama 0.220 0.000 0.103 0.000 56.9 176.8 1,235 5.49
Paraguay 0.115 0.000 0.046 0.000 86.6 SB. S 460 6.52
Peru 0.148 0.000 0.047 0.000 92.1 84.1 668 6.36
Phi 1ippines 0.084 0.000 0.051 0.000 73.1 32.9 786 3,72
Poland 0.543 0.618 0.114 0.014 56.8 217.S 1,532 2.SO
Portugal 0.269 0.281 0,072 0,009 77.5 128.7 732 3.01
Sierra Leone 0.000 0.000 0,000 0,000 126.2 9.5 20S 6.15
South Africa 0.195 O.OOB 0.068 0.018 70.5 89.1 1 ,253 4.37
Spain 0.259 0.451 0.132 0.017 43,7 96.6 890 2.87
Sudan 0.000 0.000 0.000 0,000 94.2 7.6 199 6.91
Sweden 1.487 0.667 0.232 0.032 16.6 591.4 4,029 2.40
Swlttorlund 1.056 0.513 0.149 0.025 21.1 420.5 3,305 2.52
Tha Hand 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 48.9 25.3 173 6.56
Togo 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 121.0 3.8 182 7.69
Tunslfl 0.000 0.096 0.000 0.005 74.3 29.6 576 7.01
Turkey 0.202 0.000 0.000 0.000 165.0 86.7 443 6.04
United Arab Republic 0.041 0.000 0.011 0.000 109.3 35.0 428 6.54
United Kingdom 0.884 0.566 0.25S 0.040 22.5 642.5 2,917 2.83
United States 0.861 0.000 0.175 0.000 26.0 466.2 7,296 2.79
Upper Volta q. ooo 0.009 0.000 0.000 174.3 48.2 127 7.42
Venezuela
Viet Nam,
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 53.1 174.7 3,390 6.23
Republic of 0.000 0,013 0.000 '0.063 86.7 64.8 287 4.77
Yugoslavia 0.420 0.399 0.051 0.006 87.7 81.2 952 2.71
Y- .379 K*.217 T-.101 3T-.013 7-65.8 7-166.0 7-1,453 X-4,8 5
SO-.467 SD-.326 SD-.109 SD-,022 SP-39.9 SD-194.1 SD-1.498 SD-1.68
'Underlined numerals are not real but predicted values.
"West Berlin also included.
38
any one v a r i a b l e . A case (in t h i s i n s t a n c e , a co u n try )
obv iou sly cannot be u t i l i z e d to compute a z e ro -o rd e r
c o r r e l a t i o n when t h a t case f a i l s to have a value f o r any
one o f the two v a r i a b l e s in v o lv ed in the z e r o - o r d e r c o r
r e l a t i o n . However, b e in g exempted from one z e ro -o rd e r
c o r r e l a t i o n does not n e c e s s a r i l y exempt t h a t case from
the r e s t of the z e r o - o rd e r c o r r e l a t i o n s .
I t follow s then t h a t th e v a rio u s z e ro - o r d e r c o r
r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s in the m a trix w i l l be based on d i f
f e r e n t Nfs . F u rth erm ore, th e degrees of freedom fo r the
e n t i r e m atrix a re based on th e minimum number of cases
involved in any one z e r o - o r d e r c o r r e l a t i o n . In sum,
w hile the " p a ir-w is e d e l e t i o n " o p tio n u t i l i z e s a l l of the
r e a l values in Table 1, i t i s p ro b le m a tic due to the
v a ry in g N’s used in th e z e ro -o rd e r m a trix .
In order to so lv e the " d i f f e r e n t N’s " problem , and
y e t u t i l i z e a l l the r e a l v a lu e s in Table 1, an a d d it i o n a l
m ethodological te c h n iq u e was employed; the replacem ent of
m issing v alues w ith p r e d i c te d v a lu es (the u n d e rlin e d
num erals in Table 1). As can be seen from Table 1, th e re
are no c o u n trie s la c k in g r e a l values fo r e i t h e r th e
" t o t a l f e r t i l i t y r a t e " or the "per c a p i ta gross dom estic
p ro d u ct of th e econom ically a c t i v e p o p u l a t i o n ." However,
th re e c o u n tr ie s lac k r e a l v a lu e s on "newspaper c i r c u l a
tio n p e r 1000 a d u lt p o p u l a t i o n ." P r e d ic te d v a lu e s fo r
th ese cases were based on a r e g r e s s io n e q u atio n where
"newspaper c i r c u l a t i o n " was the dependent v a r i a b le and
"p er c a p i t a g ro ss dom estic p ro d u c t" was the independent
v a r i a b l e . P re d ic te d " i n f a n t m o r t a l i t y r a t e " v a lu e s were
based on a r e g r e s s io n e q u a tio n where " i n f a n t m o r t a l i t y
r a t e " was the dependent v a r ia b le and where "newspaper
c i r c u l a t i o n " and "per c a p i ta dom estic p ro d u ct" were th e
ind ep en dent v a r i a b l e s . P r e d ic te d v a lu e s fo r th e fo ur
s o c i a l s e c u r i t y in d ic e s were based on r e g r e s s io n equa
t io n s where " i n f a n t m o r t a l i t y r a t e , " "newspaper c i r c u l a
t i o n , "and "per c a p i ta gross dom estic p ro d u ct" were th e
ind ep en dent v a r i a b l e s .
A l e g i t im a t e r e a c t i o n to t h i s procedure m ight focus
on the " b u i l t - i n " n a tu r e of z e ro - o r d e r c o r r e l a t i o n s t h a t
are based on p r e d i c te d as w e ll as r e a l v a lu e s . To r e
p h r a s e , th e m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y t h a t r e s u l t s when u sin g
bo th r e a l and p r e d i c t e d values w i l l be even h ig h e r th an
the m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y one ach iev es by u sin g only r e a l
v a lu e s . However, s i g n i f i c a n t s ta n d a r d iz e d r e g r e s s io n c o
e f f i c i e n t s (which measure the e f f e c t of an independent
v a r i a b l e on a dependent v a r ia b le w ith th e e f f e c t s of a l l
o th e r independ en t v a r i a b le s c o n tr o l le d ) should be even
more m eaningful when th e problem of m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y
i n c r e a s e s , due to the f a c t t h a t m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y d e
c re a s e s th e v a lu e s o f the s ta n d a r d iz e d r e g r e s s io n
c o e f f i c i e n t s .
40
Both th e " p a ir -w is e " and p r e d i c te d value te c h n iq u e s
were u t i l i z e d in an attem pt to d e al w ith the sm all N
which was c r e a te d by the absence of v a lu e s on a l l v a r i
a b le s . However, even the p r e d ic te d v a lu e tec h n iq u e does
not r e a l l y g iv e us a larg e sample. The N of 67 is some
what a r t i f i c i a l s in c e the use of p r e d i c te d v a lu e s was
used to a t t a i n i t . T h ere fo re , i t is incumbent on us to
e v a lu a te the c o n s is te n c y and r e l i a b i l i t y o f the p r o s
p e c t iv e r e s u l t s . The technique t h a t w i l l be used to
accom plish t h i s t a s k is random subsample r e p l i c a t i o n ( c f .
F i n i f t e r , 1972), According to F i n i f t e r (1972:124), r a n
dom subsample r e p l i c a t i o n can be looked a t as a type o f
" p s e u d o r e p lic a tio n " where c e r t a i n s u b s e ts of a t o t a l body
of d a ta are u t i l i z e d to a s c e r t a i n the r e l i a b i l i t y of th e
o r i g i n a l t o t a l body of d a ta . Random subsample r e p l i c a
t i o n , u n lik e r e a l r e p l i c a t i o n , can be c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a
lo ss o f independence due to the p o s s ib le p resen c e of
c o n s ta n t b i a s e s . However, u n lik e r e a l r e p l i c a t i o n s , th e
use o f random subsamples i s not c h a r a c t e r i z e d by d r a s t i c
changes in method p a ra m e te rs , sin c e th e r e is a common
a l i t y o f methods t h a t are b u i l t in to th e o r i g i n a l study
d e s ig n . T h e re fo re , since the random subsam ples are
b ased on the same methods, the r e s u l t s should be the
same, except f o r random e r r o r s . A ccording to F i n i f t e r
(1972:126), th e l a t t e r f a c t o r (random e r r o r s ) i s the
" c r i t i c a l p o i n t " o f the m a tte r , and the stu d y o f the
e f f e c t s of th e s e random e r r o r s i s M .. . o n e o f the prim ary
o b je c tiv e s o f p s e u d o r e p l i c a ti o n ." F i n i f t e r (1972:116-17)
a ls o su g g e sts t h a t random subsample r e p l i c a t i o n can be
u s e f u l when one i s u sin g new in d ic e s or c o e f f i c i e n t s t h a t
have been d e v ised fo r s p e c i a l p u rp o se s. This is e s p e
c i a l l y a p p ro p r ia te to t h i s stu d y , sin c e a l l o f the s o c i a l
s e c u r i t y in d ic e s a re "newly i n s t i t u t e d . " F i n a l l y , random
subsample r e p l i c a t i o n can be viewed as a supplem ent to
s i g n i f i c a n c e t e s t s " . . . b y p ro v id in g a d d i t i o n a l kinds of
e v a lu a tiv e in fo rm a tio n " ( c f . F i n i f t e r , 1972:164). The
random subsample r e p l i c a t i o n procedure in t h i s stu dy w i l l
c o n s i s t of f i v e subsam ples of N=50, A ll o f th e s e sub-
samples were drawn a t random w ith th e use o f a random
ta b le of numbers.
FOOTNOTES
1This in fo rm a tio n was taken from Table 27 of the 1961
e d i t i o n o f the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Labour O f f i c e 's Yearbook of
Labour S t a t i s t i c s . " P a r t i c i p a n t s " r e f e r to c o n tr i b u to r s
(where th e schemes are based on a c o n tr i b u to r y b a s is ) and
d i r e c t p a r t i c i p a n t s (where schemes a re not o rg an iz ed on
a c o n tr ib u to r y b a s i s ) . In the l a t t e r c a se , " d i r e c t p a r
t i c i p a n t s " r e f e r to the " ...n u m b e r o f p ersons who are
covered d i r e c t l y and who, when the p a r t i c u l a r co ntingency
o c c u rs, a re e l i g i b l e in t h e i r own r i g h t fo r b e n e f i t s .
The s t a t i s t i c s o f p a r t i c i p a n t s t h e r e f o r e do n o t in clu d e
dependents having a r i g h t to b e n e f i t s s o l e ly by v i r t u e
o f t h e i r co n n ec tio n w ith a d i r e c t p a r t i c i p a n t " (c f. I n t e r
n a ti o n a l Labour O ff ic e , 1961:467).
F urtherm ore, the d a ta u s u a l ly r e f e r to June of 1959
or 1960, b u t in some case s the in fo rm a tio n r e f e r s to
months o th e r th an June. The d a ta f o r Costa Rica and
Panama a re y e a r ly averages in s te a d o f monthly f i g u r e s .
Alaska and Hawaii were n o t in clu d ed in the d a ta fo r the
U nited S t a t e s . A lso, the " g e n e ra l scheme" and "railw a y
scheme" d a ta f o r the U nited S ta te s were combined. The
p a r t i c i p a n t d a ta f o r Belgium, F rance, and the Federal
R epublic of Germany.
2Data on the s iz e of the econ om ically a c t i v e p o p u la
tio n f o r v a rio u s c o u n tr ie s were taken from th e 1970 U nited
N ations Demographic Yearbook and the 1961, 1966, and 1970
e d it i o n s of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Labour O f f i c e 's Yearbook
of Labour S t a t i s t i c s . For f u r t h e r in fo rm a tio n see Appen
dix I.
3Data fo r t h i s measure were taken from th e 1961 I n
t e r n a t i o n a l Labour O f f i c e 's Yearbook o f Labour S t a t i s t i c s .
As is th e case o f " p a r t i c i p a n t " d a ta , the "number of
c h ild r e n in r e s p e c t of whom allow ances were made" u s u a lly
r e f e r s to June of a given y e a r , but in some case s r e f e r s
to months o th e r than June or to y e a r ly a v e r a g e s . The
d a ta fo r Poland i s an e s tim a te .
* * In fo rm a tio n on the s iz e o f the p o p u la tio n below age
15 was tak e n from the 1960, 1962, 1964, and 1970 e d it i o n s
of the U nited N ations Demographic Yearbook and the 1961,
1966, and 1970 e d it i o n s of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Labour
42
43
O f f i c e 's Yearbook of Labour S t a t i s t i c s . For f u r t h e r i n
form ation see Appendix I I .
sThe annual n a ti o n a l e x p e n d itu re on b e n e f i t s (in
cash and kind) f o r the " lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs was
found in th e 1961 and 1965 e d it i o n s of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Labour O f f i c e 's Yearbook o f Labour S t a t i s t i c s . B e n e fits
in cash in c lu d e b o th p e r i o d i c a l payments and " o th e r"
paym ents.
6Data on number of i n d iv i d u a ls r e c e iv in g o ld -a g e ,
i n v a l i d i t y , and s u r v iv o rs h ip b e n e f i t s were found in the
1961 I n t e r n a t i o n a l Labour O f f i c e 's Yearbook of Labour
S t a t i s t i c s . For Sweden, p e n sio n s p ay ab le to one couple
are counted as p a id to one b e n e f i c i a r y . In the case of
S w itz e rla n d , the scheme does not cover i n v a l i d i t y b en e
f i t s . For most c o u n trie s the d a ta r e f e r to June of 1959
or 1960. However, in some cases the d a ta r e f e r to months
o th e r than June and in the case o f S p ain , a y e a rly
average i s u t i l i z e d .
7Both the t o t a l annual amount of wages and s a l a r i e s
in m anufacturing and the t o t a l number o f employees in
m anufacturing were taken from th e 1965 U nited N ations
S t a t i s t i c a l Yearbook.
8The annual n a ti o n a l e x p e n d itu re on b e n e f i t s fo r
fam ily allow ance programs was tak en from the 1961 I n t e r
n a ti o n a l Labour O f f i c e 's Yearbook of Labour S t a t i s t i c s .
B e n e fits in cash in clu d e b oth p e r i o d i c a l payments and
" o th e r " payments. The d a ta fo r I s r a e l r e f e r r e d to only
fiv e months. This f ig u r e was a d ju s te d in terms of annual
e x p e n d itu re . In the case o f F in la n d , th e 1960 f ig u r e was
e x tr a p o la te d from the 1958 and 1959 f i g u r e s .
9For complete in fo rm a tio n on m eth o d o lo g ic al procedures
used in computing the t o t a l f e r t i l i t y r a t e , see Appendix
I I I .
10 I n f a n t m o r ta li t y ( m o r ta lity o f i n f a n t s under age
one) r a t e s p er 1000 p o p u la tio n ( c i r c a 1960) were taken
from the 1963 U nited N ations Demographic Yearbook. For
f u r t h e r in fo rm a tio n see Appendix IV.
11See f o r example Table 2 of Heer (1966:434),
12Newspaper c i r c u l a t i o n d a ta were found in the 1961,
1962, 1963, 1965, and 1967 e d it i o n s o f the U nited N ations
S t a t i s t i c a l Yearbook. For f u r t h e r in fo rm a tio n see
Appendix V.
44
13Per c a p i ta gross dom estic p ro d u c t d a ta were found
in th e 1970 U nited N ations Yearbook of N a tio n a l Accounts
S t a t i s t i c s , Vol. I I . In th e cases o f Cambodia, Chad,
E th io p ia , L ib e r ia , L ibya, S i e r r a Leone, and Upper V o lta ,
i n t e r p o l a t i o n was employed to compute 19 60 f ig u r e s by
u t i l i z i n g 1958 and 1963 d a ta taken from th e 1967 United
N ations Yearbook of N a tio n a l Accounts S t a t i s t i c s .
CHAPTER I I I
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
Table 2 giv es the z e ro - o r d e r c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i
c i e n t s u sin g the " p a ir - w is e d e le tio n " o p tio n and Table 3
p r e s e n ts the r e s u l t s of the m u ltip le r e g r e s s io n and c o r
r e l a t i o n a n a ly s is w ith t o t a l f e r t i l i t y as the dependent
v a r i a b l e , based on the z e r o - o r d e r c o r r e l a t i o n s in
Table 2.
Table 4 p r e s e n ts th e m a trix of z e r o -o r d e r c o r r e l a
t io n c o e f f i c i e n t s and Table 5 p r e s e n ts the r e s u l t s of the
m u ltip le r e g r e s s io n and c o r r e l a t i o n a n a ly s is w ith the
" t o t a l f e r t i l i t y r a t e " as the dependent v a r i a b l e , based
on b oth the r e a l and p r e d i c te d valu es in Table 1.
Table 6 p r e s e n ts th e r e s u l t s of the m u ltip le r e
g re s s io n a n a ly s is where the t o t a l f e r t i l i t y r a t e i s
viewed as th e dependent v a r i a b l e and where the a n a ly s is
is based on f iv e subsam ples of f i f t y cases each. Table
6 a ls o u t i l i z e s both r e a l and p r e d i c te d v a lu e s . Table 7,
l ik e Table 5 views the t o t a l f e r t i l i t y r a t e as th e d e
pendent v a r i a b le and uses both r e a l and p r e d ic te d v a lu e s.
In a d d it i o n , however, Table 7 b reaks down the o r i g i n a l
sample by "development l e v e l " o f co u n try .
45
TABLE 2
46
M atrix of Z ero-O rder C o rr e la tio n C o e f f i c i e n t s
u sin g P airw ise Option
X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8
X1
0.632 0 643 0.485 -0.651 0.822 0.630 -0 .741
X2
0 457 0.517 -0.485 0.625 0.586 -0.671
X3
• • 0.642 -0.540 0.681 0.532 -0.691
X4
1 « 1 -0.355 0.441 0.309 -0 .566
X5
• « • • • • • -0.727 -0.624 0.638
X6
» • .111 « • • • • ♦ 0.794 -0.719
X? • * • • * • t 1 1 1 • 1 1 -0.631
X^ = Coverage index fo r lo n g -term r i s k program s.
X2 = Coverage index fo r fam ily allow ance program s.
X3 = B e n e fit l e v e l index f o r lo n g -term r i s k program s.
X^ = B e n e fit le v e l index f o r fam ily allow ance program s.
X5 = In f a n t m o r t a l i t y ( i n f a n t d e ath s p e r 1,000 b i r t h s ) .
Xg = Newspaper c i r c u l a t i o n per 1,000 aged 15 and over.
X_ = P er c a p i t a g ro ss dom estic pro d u ct in terms o f
e cono m ically a c tiv e p o p u la tio n .
Xg = T o ta l f e r t i l i t y r a t e (per women).
TABLE 3
Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis with the Total Fertility
Rate as the Dependent Variable; using Pairwise Option
Variable
X,
Regression
Coefficient
(B Coefficient)
-0.979
-1.364
-3.704
-6.713
0.007
0.001
- 0.000
Standardized
Regression
Coefficient
(Beta Coefficient)
-0.257
-0.240
-0.254
-0.090
0.157
0.063
-0.119
F Ratio for
Standardized
Regression
Coefficient
(7,20)
1.265
1.834
1.636
0.275
0.761
0.045 .
0.324
R8.1234567 -707* (7,20)
= 6.903
* s significant at .01 level.
Xj = Coverage index for long-term risk programs.
X£ = Coverage imlex for family allowance programs.
Xj = Benefit level index for long-term risk programs.
X4 = Benefit level index for family allowance programs.
X,. = Infant mortality (infant deaths per 1,000 births).
Xg = Newspaper circulation per 1,000 age 15 and over.
Xy = Per capita gross domestic product in terms of economically active population.
48
TABLE 4
M atrix of Zero-O rder C o r r e la tio n C o e f f ic ie n ts
u sin g Both Real and P r e d ic te d Values (N=6 7)
X2
..
X3 X4 X5 *6 X7 X8
X1
0.698 0.711 0.528 -0.690 0.848 0.678 -0.711
X2
• • • 0.552 0.516 -0.574 0.677 0.634 -0.699
X3
• • • 0.636 -0,662 0.716 0.605 -0.659
X4
• • • • • • -0.399 0.471 0.398 -0.536
X5
• • • • • • • • -0.739 -0.654 0.656
X6
• • « • * • • • 1 • • • 0.799 -0.718
X, • • • • • * • • • » • 1 1 * 1 • • • -0.631
X^ = Coverage index f o r long -term r i s k program s.
X2 = Coverage index f o r fam ily allow ance program s.
X^ = B e n e fit l e v e l index f o r lo n g -te rm r i s k program s.
X^ = B e n e fit l e v e l index f o r fam ily allow ance program s.
Xg = I n f a n t m o r t a l i t y ( i n f a n t d eath s p e r 1,000 b i r t h s ) .
Xg = Newspaper c i r c u l a t i o n p e r 1,000 aged 15 and over.
X7 = Per c a p i ta gross dom estic p ro d u ct in term s of
econo m ically a c tiv e p o p u la tio n .
Xg = T o ta l f e r t i l i t y r a t e (per women).
TABLE S
Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis with the Total Fertility
Rate as the Dependent Variable, using Both
• Real and Predicted Values (N=67)
Variable
Regression
Coefficient
(B Coefficient)
Standardized
Regression
Coefficient
(Beta Coefficient)
F Ratio for
Standardized
Regression
Coefficient
(7,59)
X1
-0.434 -0.108 0.450
X2
-1.649 -0.286* 5.929
X3
-2.104 -0.122 0.842
X4
-9.032 -0.105 0.999
X5
0.008 0.161 1.735
X6
-0.001 -0.146 0.607
x7 -0.000 -0.039 0.087
R2
K8.1234567
= 649* • F.
,04J * (7,59)
= 15.560
* = significant at .01 level.
X^ = Coverage index for long-term risk programs.
X7 = Coverage index for family allowance programs.
X3 = Benefit level index for long-term risk programs.
= Benefit level index for family allowance programs.
Xg = Infant mortality (infant deaths per 1,000 births).
Xg = Newspaper circulation per 1,000 aged 15 and over.
X7 = Per capita gross domestic product in terms of economically active population.
TABLE 6
Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis with the Total Fertility
Rate as the Dependent Variable, for Five Sub-Samples of N=50,
Using Both Real and Predicted Values
Variable #1
Sub-Samples
#2
and Their Beta
#3
Coefficients
#4 #5
X1
-0.390** -0.124 -0.121 -0.094 -0.150
X2
-0.266** -0.269** -0.252** -0.321** -0.251**
*3
-0.260* -0.088 0.012 -0.119 -0.082
*4
-0.035 -0.131 -0.157 -0.050 -0.107
*5
0.087 0.097 0.230* 0.139 0.111
X6
0.274* -0.217 -0.171 -0.187 -0.284
x7 -0.260* -0.033 -0.056 -0.046 0.006
R2
K8.1234567
.692** =.638** =:644** =. 614** =.630**
F(7,42) =
13.508 = 10.575 = 10.836 .
f t
= 9.536 = 10.221
* = significant at .05 level.
** = significant at .01 level.
X^ = Coverage index for long-term risk programs.
X2 = Coverage index for family allowance programs.
Xg = Benefit level index for long-term risk programs.
= Benefit level index for family allowance programs.
Xg = Infant mortality (infant deaths per 1,000 births).
Xg = Newspaper circulation per 1,000 aged 15 and over.
= Per capita gross domestic product in terms of economically active population.
51
TABLE 7
R e s u l t s o f . t h e M u l t i p l e R e g r e s s i o n A n a l y s i s w i t h t h e T o t a l F e r t i l i t y
R a t e a s t h e D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e , u s i n g B o t h R e a l a n d P r e d i c t e d
V a l u e s , b y D e v e l o p m e n t L e v e l o f C o u n t r y 1
D e v e l o p e d C o u n t r i e s ( N ° 3 3 )
V a r i a b l e
R e g r e s s i o n
C o e f f i c i e n t
( B C o e f f i c i e n t )
S t a n d a r d i z e d
R e g r e s s s i o n
C o e f f i c i e n t
( B e t a C o e f f i c i e n t )
F R a t i o f o r
S t a n d a r d i z e d
R e g r e s s i o n
C o e f f i c i e n t
( 7 . 2 5 )
X 1
- 0 . 2 6 S - 0 . 0 9 0 0 . 1 4 9
X 2
- 0 . 9 6 6 - 0 . 2 4 2 1 . 9 6 1
X 3
0 . 3 6 5 0 . 0 2 5 0 . 0 1 6
X 4
- 8 . 2 0 4 - 0 . 1 4 7 0 . 5 5 1
X S
0 . 0 3 9 . 0 . 5 8 9 * 3 . 8 3 2
X 6
0 . 0 0 1 0 . 1 2 6 0 . 2 1 0
X 7
0.000 0 . 1 0 7 0 . 3 5 6
n 2
K 8 . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 • S Z 6 * F C 7 , 2 S ) ‘
3 , 9 6 9
U n d e r d e v e l o p e d C o u n t r i e s ( N ° 3 4 ) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
F R a t i o f o r
S t a n d a r d i z e d S t a n d a r d i z e d
R e g r e s s i o n R e g T c s s s i o n R e g r e s s i o n
C o e f f i c i e n t C o e f f i c i e n t C o e f f i c i e n t
V a r i a b l e ( B C o e f f i c i e n t ) ( B e t a C o e f f i c i e n t ) ( 7 , 2 6 )
X 1
3 . 6 5 5 0 . 4 1 8 0 . 5 9 7
X 2
- 8 . 4 5 8 - 0 . 3 6 7 * 4 . 3 0 8
X 3
- 1 3 . 5 0 2 - 0 . 6 1 4 1 . 6 9 6
X 4
- 2 1 . 7 5 1 - 0 . 1 9 8 1 . 3 4 6
X 5
- 0 . 0 0 0 - 0 . 0 0 6 0 . 0 0 1
X 6
- 0 . 0 0 1 - 0 . 0 5 1 0 . 0 3 2
X 7
- 0 . 0 0 1 - 0 . 1 4 0 0 . 4 3 7
. R 8 . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 " , 3 Z 5 F ( 7 , 2 6 ) " i ’ 7 6 8
' T h e 6 7 c o u n t r i e s w e r e r a n k e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r p e r c a p i t a g r o s s d o m e s t i c p r o d u c t
i n t e r m s o f t h e i r e c o n o m i c a l l y a c t i v e p o p u l a t i o n . T h e t o p r a n k i n g 3 3 c o u n t r i e s
w e r e c o n s i d e r e d d e v e l o p e d w h i l e t h e o t h e r 3 4 c o u n t r i e s w e r e c o n s i d e r e d u n d e r d e
v e l o p e d .
* = s i g n i f i c a n t a t t h e . 0 1 l e v e l .
X ^ = C o v e r a g e i n d e x f o r l o n g - t e r m r i s k p r o g r a m s .
X £ « C o v e r a g e i n d e x f o r f a m i l y a l l o w a n c e p r o g r a m s .
X j = B e n e f i t l e v e l i n d e x f o r l o n g - t e r m r i s k p r o g r a m s .
X ^ = B e n e f i t l e v e l i n d e x f o r f a m i l y a l l o w a n c e p r o g r a m s ,
X j <= I n f a n t m o r t a l i t y ( i n f a n t d e a t h s p e r 1 , 0 0 0 b i r t h s ) .
X g = N e w s p a p e r c i r c u l a t i o n p e r 1 , 0 0 0 a g e d 1 5 a n d o v e r .
X y = P e r c a p i t a g r o s s d o m e s t i c p r o d u c t i n t e r m s o f e c o n o m i c a l l y a c t i v e p o p u l a t i o n .
Table 8, 9, 10, and 11 a l l view the t o t a l f e r t i l i t y
r a t e as the dependent v a r i a b l e and use b o th r e a l and p r e
d ic te d v a lu e s . However, each of th e s e t a b l e s om its two
o f the fo u r s o c i a l s e c u r i t y in d ic e s ; Table 8 omits both
b e n e f i t le v e l in d ic e s ; Table 9 omits both coverage le v e l
in d ic e s ; Table 10 omits the coverage index and b e n e f i t
le v e l index fo r fam ily allow ance p ro g ram s; and T able 11
om its th e coverage index and b e n e f i t le v e l index fo r the
" lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs.
Support of the Hypotheses
Although no h y p o th e sis was s e t f o r t h re g a rd in g the
a s s o c i a t i o n between economic development and s o c i a l se c u
r i t y program s, i t was a s s e r t e d th a t s o c i a l s e c u r i t y p r o
grams a re a s s o c ia te d w ith u r b a n iz a tio n and economic de
velopm ent. The z e ro -o rd e r c o r r e l a t i o n s in Table 2 and
Table 4 ten d to su ppo rt t h i s a s s e r t i o n . Our th re e i n
d i c a to r s of economic development (th e i n f a n t m o r ta lity
r a t e , newspaper c i r c u l a t i o n p er 1000 aged 15 and ov er,
and the p e r c a p i t a gross dom estic p ro d u ct o f the eco n
o m ic ally a c tiv e p o p u la tio n ) a re a l l h ig h ly c o r r e l a t e d
w ith th e four s o c i a l s e c u r i t y in d ic e s . Most of th e c o r
r e l a t i o n s are over .5 and many of them a re in the .6 to
.8 rang e. The only p o s s ib le e x ce p tio n is the c o r r e l a t i o n
between th e b e n e f i t le v e l index fo r fam ily allow ance p r o
grams and the i n d ic a t o r s of economic development.
TABLE 8
R e su lts of th e M u ltip le R eg ressio n A n a ly sis w ith th e T o ta l F e r t i l i t y
Rate as th e Dependent V a r ia b le , u sin g Both Real and P r e d ic te d
V a lu es, w ith th e B e n e f it Level In d ic e s Being O m itted (N=67)
V a ria b le
R eg ressio n
C o e f f i c ie n t
(B C o e f f i c ie n t )
S ta n d a rd iz e d
R e g ressio n
C o e f f i c ie n t
(Beta C o e f f ic ie n t)
F R a tio f o r
S ta n d a rd iz e d
R eg ressio n
C o e f f i c ie n t
(5,61)
X1
-0 .724 -0.180 1.304
x 2 -1.835 -0.318** 7.673
X5
0.009 0.193* 2.598
X6
-0.002 -0.174 0.874
X7
-0.000 -0.042 0.099
R2
K8 . 12567
.629** F r r = 20
(5,61)
.648
* = s i g n i f i c a n t a t .05 l e v e l . ** = s i g n i f i c a n t a t .0 1 l e v e l .
= Coverage index f o r lo n g -te rm r i s k program s.
X2 = Coverage index f o r fa m ily allow ance program s.
Xj. = I n f a n t m o r t a l i t y ( i n f a n t d e a th s p e r 1,000 b i r t h s ) .
Xg = Newspaper c i r c u l a t i o n p e r 1,000 aged 15 and o ver.
X^ = Per c a p i t a g ro ss dom estic p ro d u c t in term s o f eco n o m ic ally a c t i v e p o p u la tio n .
TABLE 9
R e su lts o f th e M u ltip le R eg ressio n A n a ly sis w ith th e T o ta l F e r t i l i t y
Rate as th e Dependent V a r ia b le , u sin g Both Real and P r e d ic te d
V a lu es, w ith th e Coverage In d ic e s Being O m itted (N=67)
V a ria b le
R e g ressio n
C o e f f i c ie n t
(B C o e f f i c ie n t )
S ta n d a rd iz e d
R e g ressio n
C o e f f i c ie n t
(Beta C o e f f i c ie n t )
F R a tio fo r
S ta n d a rd iz e d
R eg ressio n
C o e f f i c ie n t
(5,61)
X3
-1.966 -0.114 0.692
*4
-16.663 -0 .194** 3.422
*5
0.010 0.206* 2.658
-0 .003 -0.312** 3.657
X
-'J <
1
-0 .000 -0.10 1 0.545
= 602**
K8 . 34567 ,DUZ F ( 5 ,61) = 18
.477
* = s i g n i f i c a n t a t .05 l e v e l . ** = s i g n i f i c a n t a t .01 l e v e l .
X3 = B e n e f it l e v e l index fo r lo n g -te rm r i s k program s.
= B e n e f it l e v e l index f o r fam ily allow ance program s.
X,- = I n f a n t m o r t a l i t y ( i n f a n t d e a th s p e r 1,000 b i r t h s ) .
Xg = Newspaper c i r c u l a t i o n p e r 1,000 aged 15 and o v e r.
Xy = Per c a p i t a gro ss do m estic p ro d u c t in term s o f eco n o m ically a c t i v e p o p u la tio n .
TABLE 10
R e su lts o f th e M u ltip le R eg ressio n A n a ly sis w ith th e T o ta l F e r t i l i t y
Rate as th e Dependent V a r ia b le , u sin g Both Real and P r e d ic te d
V a lu es, w ith th e Coverage and B e n e fit In d ic e s f o r Family
Allowance Programs Being O m itted (N=67)
V a ria b le
R egressio n
C o e f f i c ie n t
(B C o e f f i c ie n t )
S ta n d a rd iz e d
R e g ressio n
C o e f f ic ie n t
(Beta C o e f f ic ie n t)
F R a tio of
S ta n d a rd iz e d
R e g ressio n
C o e f f ic ie n t
(5,61)
X1
-1,031 -0.256* 2.534
X3
-3.228 -0.188 2.249
X5
0,008 0.169 1.742
X6
-0.002 -0.153 0.608
X7
-0.000 -0.111 0.656
R2
8.13567 • 597“ F C5,61) ■ 18
.054
* = s i g n i f i c a n t a t .05 le v e l ** = s i g n i f i c a n t a t .01 l e v e l .
X .^ = Coverage index f o r lo n g -te rm r i s k program s.
Xj = B e n e f it le v e l index f o r lo n g -te rm r i s k program s.
X,- = I n f a n t m o r t a l i t y ( i n f a n t d e a th s p e r 1,000 b i r t h s ) .
Xg = Newspaper c i r c u l a t i o n p e r 1,000 aged 15 and o v e r.
X j = Per c a p i t a gro ss dom estic p ro d u c t in term s o f eco n o m ic ally a c t iv e p o p u la tio n .
TABLE 11
R e su lts o f th e M u ltip le R eg ressio n A n a ly sis w ith th e T o ta l F e r t i l i t y
Rate as th e Dependent V a r ia b le , u sin g Both Real and P r e d ic te d
V a lu e s , w ith th e Coverage and B e n e f it In d ic e s f o r th e
Long-Term Risk Programs b e in g Om itted (N=6 7)
V a ria b le
R e g ressio n
C o e f f ic ie n t
(B C o e f f ic ie n t)
S ta n d a rd iz e d
R e g ressio n
C o e f f i c ie n t
(Beta C o e f f i c ie n t )
F R a tio f o r
S ta n d a rd iz e d
R e g ressio n
C o e f f i c ie n t
(5,61)
X2 -1.726 -0.299** 7.065
*4
-14.073 -0.164* 3.196
*5
0.010 0.204* 3.055
*6
-0 .002 -0.259* 2.873
X7
-0 .000 -0.036 0.075
R2
8.24567 •640*‘ F C5,61) -
21.646
X£ = Coverage index f o r fam ily allow ance program s.
= B e n e fit l e v e l index f o r fa m ily allow ance program s.
X,- = I n f a n t m o r t a l i t y ( i n f a n t d e a th s p e r 1,000 b i r t h s ) .
Xg = Newspaper c i r c u l a t i o n p e r 1,000 aged 15 and o v e r.
Xrj = P er c a p i t a g ro ss dom estic p ro d u c t in term s o f e co n o m ically a c t i v e p o p u la tio n .
57
The Coverage of "Long-Term1 * Risk
Programs and F e r t i l i t y '
The f i r s t h y p o th e sis s e t f o r t h a s s e r te d t h a t cov
erage of the lo n g -te rm r i s k programs (o ld -a g e , i n v a l
i d i t y , and s u r v iv o r s h ip ) would vary n e g a tiv e ly w ith sub
seq uent f e r t i l i t y . This h y p o th e sis appears to be su p
p o rte d by the h ig h n e g a tiv e z e ro -o rd e r c o r r e l a t i o n s in
T ables 2 and 4 (-.7 4 1 and -.711 r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . However,
when th e e f f e c t s (both independent and combined) o f the
o th e r in d ep en d en t v a r i a b le s are c o n t r o l l e d , the in depen d
e n t e f f e c t of coverage of "lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs on su b
sequ en t t o t a l f e r t i l i t y r a t e s becomes q u ite n e g l i g i b l e .
The s t a t i s t i c a l l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t s ta n d a rd iz e d r e g r e s s io n
c o e f f i c i e n t s of -.257 (Table 3) and -.108 (Table 5) bear
t h i s o u t. Furth erm ore, the Beta c o e f f i c i e n t s ( s t a n
d a rd iz e d r e g r e s s io n c o e f f i c i e n t s ) fo r the coverage index
o f "lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs in Table 6 show t h a t in only
one of th e fiv e subsam ples does t h i s s o c i a l s e c u r i t y
v a r i a b le have a s i g n i f i c a n t independent e f f e c t on the
t o t a l f e r t i l i t y r a t e . Table 7, which breaks down the
a n a ly s is in term s of the le v e l of economic developm ent,
a ls o shows t h a t f o r both developed and underdeveloped
c o u n t r i e s , the B eta c o e f f i c i e n t s fo r th e coverage index
f o r "lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs are not s i g n i f i c a n t l y r e
l a t e d to f e r t i l i t y . However, even though th e s e B eta
c o e f f i c i e n t s in Table 7 are n o t s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f
i c a n t , th e d i r e c t i o n of th ese c o e f f i c i e n t s should be
58
n o te d . While th e in depend en t e f f e c t of th e coverage
f o r " lo n g -te rm ” r i s k programs on th e t o t a l f e r t i l i t y r a t e
is in the p r e d i c te d d i r e c t i o n (B eta=-.090) fo r the de
v eloped c o u n t r i e s , i t is n o t in th e p r e d i c te d d i r e c t i o n
(B eta= -.418) f o r the underdeveloped c o u n tr i e s . Thus,
w hile coverage of " lo n g -te rm ” r i s k programs has the p r e
d i c te d i n h i b i t i n g e f f e c t on subsequent f e r t i l i t y in de
veloped c o u n t r i e s , i t has a prom oting e f f e c t on f e r t i l i t y
in th e underdeveloped c o u n tr i e s . The f a i t h t h a t we can
have in t h i s fin d in g is o b v io u sly d i l u t e d by the s t a t i s
t i c a l i n s i g n if i c a n c e of both of th e Beta c o e f f i c i e n t s and
the m u ltip le c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t fo r th e u n d e rd e
veloped c o u n tr i e s . Furtherm ore, th e sm all sample s iz e
(N=33 f o r developed c o u n tr ie s and N=34 fo r the u n d e rd e
veloped c o u n tr ie s ) s e v e re ly l im i ts th e t r u s t w o r t h in e s s of
t h i s t a b l e . I f th e r e i s however, any t r u t h in th e s e
f i n d i n g s , what e x p la n a tio n can we g iv e? One p o s s ib le
r a t i o n a l e m ight focus on th e r e l a t i v e recency of " lo n g
term ” r i s k programs in the underdeveloped c o u n tr i e s and
the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t th e se programs have n o t had time to
have an i n h i b i t i n g e f f e c t on f e r t i l i t y . This would not
e x p la in th e h igh p o s i t i v e Beta of .418, b u t sin c e i t is
n o t s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t we sh ould n o t p la c e much
f a i t h in i t to begin w ith .
One m ight c o n sid e r why the z e ro - o r d e r c o r r e l a t i o n
between coverage of " lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs and
f e r t i l i t y is h ig h ly n e g a tiv e w hile a t the same tim e the
s ta n d a r d iz e d r e g r e s s io n c o e f f i c i e n t s i n d ic a t e t h a t the
independent e f f e c t o f coverage of " lo n g -te rm " r i s k p r o
grams on subsequent f e r t i l i t y is q u i t e weak. A l i k e l y
e x p la n a tio n is th a t a l l th e s o c ia l s e c u r i t y in d ic e s are
h ig h ly c o r r e l a t e d w ith each o th e r. Table 4 in d ic a te s
t h a t no one c o r r e l a t i o n between any two s o c i a l s e c u r i t y
in d ic e s is l e s s than .516. A lso, as was p o in te d out p r e
v i o u s l y , the s o c ia l s e c u r i t y in d ic e s are h ig h ly c o r r e
la t e d w ith the c o n tr o l v a r i a b l e s . When a l l the in d ep en d
e n t v a r i a b l e s a re h ig h ly c o r r e l a t e d in the z e ro -o rd e r
m a tr ix , the r e g r e s s io n a n a ly s is w i l l re v e a l a h ig h degree
o f m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y . As T ables 3, 5, 6, and 7 i l l u s
t r a t e , m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y r e s u l t s in low s ta n d a r d iz e d r e
g r e s s io n c o e f f i c i e n t s (even though th e m u ltip le r e g r e s
sio n c o e f f i c i e n t s a re h ig h ) . Thus, one reaso n why the
Beta c o e f f i c i e n t between th e coverage index fo r " lo n g -te rm "
r i s k programs and th e subsequ en t t o t a l f e r t i l i t y r a t e is
c o n s i s t e n t l y low and s t a t i s t i c a l l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t may be
th e h ig h le v e l of m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y in the r e g r e s s io n
a n a l y s i s .
Tables 8 and 10 show th e m u ltip le r e g r e s s io n a n a l
y s i s w ith the b e n e f i t le v e l in d ic e s being o m itted in
Table 8 and th e coverage index and b e n e f i t le v e l index
f o r fam ily allowance program s being o m itted in Table 10.
O m itting the b e n e f i t le v e l in d ic e s from th e r e g r e s s io n
60
a n a ly s is (Table 8) does not appear to improve the in d e
pendent n e g a tiv e e f f e c t of coverage o f " lo n g -te rm 1 ' r is k
programs on subsequent f e r t i l i t y . However, Table 10
su g g ests t h a t when fam ily allow ance programs are removed
from th e r e g r e s s io n e q u a tio n , the Beta c o e f f i c i e n t for
the coverage of "lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs becomes s t a t i s
t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t ( a t the .05 l e v e l ) . In o th e r words,
when we do not c o n sid e r fam ily allow ance program s, the
n e g a tiv e independent e f f e c t of coverage of " lo n g -te rm "
r i s k programs (o ld -a g e , i n v a l i d i t y , and s u r v iv o r s h ip ) on
subsequent f e r t i l i t y becomes s i g n i f i c a n t .
What co n clu sio n can we reach th e n , on the e f f e c t of
coverage of "lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs on su bseq uent n a
t i o n a l f e r t i l i t y l e v e ls ? The d a ta appears to su g g est
t h a t w hile the z e r o -o r d e r c o r r e l a t i o n between the two
v a r i a b le s is v e ry s tro n g (in a n e g a tiv e sen se) , th e in de
pendent e f f e c t o f coverage of "lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs on
f e r t i l i t y (as i n d ic a te d by the Beta c o e f f i c i e n t s ) i s
u s u a lly s t a t i s t i c a l l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t when we c o n tr o l for
a l l of th e o th e r independent v a r i a b l e s . On the o th e r
hand i t should be n oted t h a t , except f o r one case (under
developed c o u n tr ie s in Table 7 ) , a l l o f the d i f f e r e n t
r e g r e s s io n a n aly se s show coverage of "lo n g -te rm " r i s k p r o
grams having the p r e d i c te d n e g a tiv e e f f e c t on subsequent
f e r t i l i t y (as in d ic a te d by n e g a tiv e B e ta s ) , Furtherm ore,
when fam ily allowance programs a re o m itted from th e
61
a n a l y s i s , the independent e f f e c t o f coverage of " lo n g
term" r i s k program s on f e r t i l i t y becomes s t a t i s t i c a l l y
s i g n i f i c a n t (in a n e g a tiv e d i r e c t i o n ) . M oreover, cov
erage o f " lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs i s the only v a r i a b le
th a t i s s i g n i f i c a n t in t h i s p a r t i c u l a r m u ltip le r e g r e s
sion a n a ly s is (Table 10). Thus, alth o u g h the evidence
is n o t overwhelming, the e x te n t to which th e econom ically
a c tiv e p o p u la tio n c o n tr i b u te s ( d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y ) to
o ld -a g e , i n v a l i d i t y , and s u r v iv o r s h ip programs seems to
be a s s o c ia te d w ith lower l e v e l s of c h ild b e a r in g . In sum,
our h y p o th e s is t h a t the coverage o f "lo n g -te rm " r i s k p r o
grams w i l l be n e g a tiv e ly a s s o c i a t e d w ith subsequent f e r
t i l i t y l e v e ls i s t e n t a t i v e l y su p p o rte d .
The Coverage o f Family Allowance
Programs and F e r t i l i t y
I t was a ls o h y p o th e siz e d t h a t the z e ro - o r d e r c o r
r e l a t i o n between coverage o f fam ily allow ance programs
and th e t o t a l f e r t i l i t y r a t e would be h ig h ly n e g a tiv e ,
but t h a t the independent e f f e c t of coverage of fam ily
allow ance programs on subsequent f e r t i l i t y would be
e i t h e r weakly n e g a tiv e or p o s s ib ly p o s i t i v e . The r a t i o
n ale f o r the above c e n te re d on what the a u th o r b e lie v e d
to be a sp u rio u s r e l a t i o n between th e s e two v a r ia b le s ( i t
was su g g e ste d t h a t economic development i s p o s i t i v e l y r e
la te d t o coverage o f fam ily allow ance programs and nega
t i v e l y r e l a t e d to f e r t i l i t y ) . To r e p h r a s e , when the
62
e f f e c t s of th e o th er independent v a r ia b le s ( e s p e c i a l l y
th o se i n d i c a t i v e of economic development) a re c o n t r o l l e d ,
th e in d ep en d en t e f f e c t of coverage of fam ily allow ance
programs on f e r t i l i t y (as in d ic a te d by a Beta c o e f f i
c ie n t) would n o t resem ble th e o r i g i n a l high n e g a tiv e
z e r o - o rd e r c o r r e l a t i o n between th e se two f a c t o r s .
Table 2 and 4 show s tro n g n e g a tiv e z e r o - o r d e r c o r
r e l a t i o n s (-.6 7 1 and -.699 r e s p e c t iv e ly ) between th e cov
erage index f o r fam ily allowance programs and the t o t a l
f e r t i l i t y r a t e . However, u n lik e we h y p o th e s iz e d , the i n
dependent e f f e c t of coverage o f fam ily allow ance programs
on subsequent f e r t i l i t y le v e ls is s t i l l s tr o n g , even
a f t e r th e e f f e c t s (both independent and combined) o f the
o th e r ind ep en d en t v a r i a b le s a re c o n tr o l le d . This fin d in g
i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the Beta c o e f f i c i e n t showing the in d e
pendent e f f e c t o f coverage o f fam ily allow ance programs
on f e r t i l i t y . Table 5 dem onstrates t h a t th e n e g a tiv e
Beta c o e f f i c i e n t fo r th e coverage of fam ily allow ance
programs is th e only s i g n i f i c a n t Beta in t h a t t a b l e .
F urth erm o re, th e Betas for t h i s s o c ia l s e c u r i t y v a r i a b le
are c o n s i s t e n t and s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t in each of
the f i v e subsamples ( c f . Table 6). When th e b e n e f i t
le v e l in d ic e s a re o m itted from the m u ltip le r e g r e s s io n
a n a l y s i s , the in depend en t n e g a tiv e e f f e c t of coverage of
fam ily allow ance programs on subsequent f e r t i l i t y l e v e ls
becomes even more pronounced (B eta=-.318 which is
63
s i g n i f i c a n t a t the .01 l e v e l ) . The Beta c o e f f i c i e n t f o r
the coverage of fa m ily allow ance programs r e t a i n s i t s
s i g n i f i c a n c e when th e "lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs are r e
moved from th e r e g r e s s io n e q u atio n (c f. Table 11).
There a r e , however, two e x c e p tio n s to th e c o n s i s
t e n t n e g a tiv e independent impact of coverage o f fam ily
allow ance programs on subsequent f e r t i l i t y . F i r s t , Table
3 shows the Beta c o e f f i c i e n t of t h i s s o c i a l s e c u r i t y
index to be s t a t i s t i c a l l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t . However, i t
sh ould be n o ted t h a t none of the independent v a r i a b l e s in
t h i s r e g r e s s io n a n a ly s is proved to be s i g n i f i c a n t . The
second e x c e p tio n can be found in Table 7 where th e a n a l
y s i s i s broken down in terms of le v e l o f n a t i o n a l d e v e lo p
ment. While the B eta c o e f f i c i e n t fo r coverage o f fam ily
allow ance programs i s -.367 and s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t
in th e un derdeveloped group of n a ti o n s , i t is -.2 42 and
i n s i g n i f i c a n t in th e developed group of n a ti o n s . Thus,
w h ile coverage of fam ily allow ance seems to have a s i g
n i f i c a n t n e g a tiv e impact on f e r t i l i t y in underdeveloped
c o u n tr i e s , i t does n o t seem to have the same e f f e c t f o r
developed c o u n t r i e s .
In sum th e n , the e f f e c t o f the coverage o f fam ily
allow ance programs on subsequent n a ti o n a l f e r t i l i t y
l e v e ls is n o t what t h i s author ex p ected . I t was h y p o th
e s iz e d t h a t when th e e f f e c t s of o th e r in dependent v a r i
a b le s were c o n t r o l l e d (n o ta b ly , th e i n d ic a t o r s of
64
economic d evelopm ent), th e independent e f f e c t of coverage
o f fam ily allow ance programs on sub sequent f e r t i l i t y (as
i n d ic a te d by th e Beta c o e f f i c i e n t ) would be n o n - s i g n i f
i c a n t and p o s s ib ly change from n e g a tiv e to p o s i t i v e .
However, as th e fin d in g s i n d i c a t e , the n e g a tiv e a s s o c i a
t i o n between fam ily allow ance programs and subsequent
f e r t i l i t y rem ains s i g n i f i c a n t , even w ith a l l o th e r in d e
pendent v a r i a b l e s c o n t r o l l e d . F u rth erm o re, i f one
s tu d ie s th e r e l a t i v e in dependent s t r e n g th s of a l l the i n
dependent v a r i a b le s ( a l l the s o c i a l s e c u r i t y in d ic e s as
w e ll as the c o n tr o l v a r i a b le s ) in p r e d i c t i n g subsequent
f e r t i l i t y , i t becomes obvious t h a t the coverage index f o r
fam ily allow ance programs is the most im p o rtan t in depend
e n t v a r i a b le in t h i s stu d y . The evidence su g g e sts th e n ,
t h a t even w ith the independent and combined e f f e c t s of
th e o th e r v a r i a b l e s removed, th e degree to which a
n a t i o n ’s c h ild r e n a re covered by c h il d allow ances is
s t i l l n e g a tiv e ly a s s o c ia te d w ith f e r t i l i t y , i . e . the
h ig h e r th e p r o p o r tio n o f c h ild r e n covered th e lower the
n a ti o n a l f e r t i l i t y . What r a t i o n a l e can we give t h i s
seem ingly p a ra d o x ic a l fin d in g ? A p o s s ib le e x p la n a tio n
m ight be t h a t n a tio n s w ith low l e v e ls of f e r t i l i t y i n
s t i t u t i o n a l i z e and implement e x te n s iv e fam ily allow ance
programs in e f f o r t s to r a i s e t h e i r f e r t i l i t y r a t e s . One
m ight argue t h a t t h i s i s not a l i k e l y e x p la n a tio n sin c e
our measure of f e r t i l i t y is c i r c a 1965 w h ile the coverage
index f o r fam ily allow ance is c i r c a 1960. A response to
t h i s sta te m e n t might be t h a t even though we attem pted to
e s t a b l i s h time p r i o r i t y by u sin g 1960 fam ily allow ance
d a ta and 1965 f e r t i l i t y d a ta , we could in f a c t be m easur
ing 1960 f e r t i l i t y , s in c e the n a t i o n a l f e r t i l i t y rankings
are p ro b ab ly q u ite s i m i l a r in 1960 and 1965. I f t h i s is
in f a c t t r u e , f e r t i l i t y l e v e ls could be the f a c t o r a f
f e c t in g coverage o f fam ily allow ance program s. There are
p ro b ab ly two m ajor rea so n s why c o u n tr ie s expand or a t
tempt to expand coverage o f fam ily allow ance program s;
to s tim u la te or encourage c h ild b e a r in g and to e n ric h the
li v e s o f the c h il d p o p u la tio n . The f i r s t f a c t o r would
apply to those c o u n tr ie s t h a t might be a tte m p tin g to
r a i s e t h e i r f e r t i l i t y l e v e l s , i . e . m oderately or h ig h ly
developed c o u n tr ie s w ith m oderate or low le v e ls of f e r
t i l i t y . The second f a c t o r could apply to a l l types of
c o u n tr ie s as the d e s i r e to e n ric h the l i v e s of c h ild r e n
(both s o c i a l l y and econom ically) is n o t lim ite d to any
type of c o u n try . However, r e g a r d le s s o f the motive fo r
d e s i r in g in c re a s e d coverage of fam ily a llo w an ce, the
a b i l i t y to fin a n c e and i n s t i t u t e coverage of the c h ild
p o p u la tio n p ro b ab ly v a r i e s in v e r s e ly w ith the f e r t i l i t y
l e v e l . C ou ntries w ith th e low est l e v e ls of f e r t i l i t y
would f in d i t the l e a s t expensive and d i f f i c u l t to adopt
such programs due to the sm a lle r number o f c h ild r e n t h a t
must be covered. As f e r t i l i t y l e v e ls r i s e , so does the
66
number of c h ild r e n and one might expect t h a t the expense
and d i f f i c u l t y o f c o v erin g the c h i l d p o p u la tio n in c r e a s e s
p r o p o r t io n a te l y . Furtherm ore, i t w ill be remembered t h a t
th e l i t e r a t u r e su g g e sts t h a t underdev elo ped c o u n trie s
(which t r a d i t i o n a l l y have the h i g h e s t f e r t i l i t y ) o fte n
have e la b o r a te s o c i a l s e c u r i t y schemes "on the books" b ut
f i n d i t most d i f f i c u l t to implement programs due to f i
n a n c ia l and /or a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i f f i c u l t i e s .
Table 7, which b re a k s down th e a n a ly s is in terms of
l e v e l of developm ent, su g g e sts what might be i n t e r p r e t e d
as c o n tr a d ic to r y ev id e n ce . While the B eta c o e f f i c i e n t
fo r coverage of fam ily allow ance programs (where the
t o t a l f e r t i l i t y r a t e is th e dependent v a r i a b le ) i s -.367
and s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t f o r the underdeveloped
c o u n tr ie s i t is -.2 4 2 and n o t s i g n i f i c a n t f o r the d e v e l
oped c o u n tr ie s . However, th e c on fidence t h a t we p la c e
in t h i s t a b l e (T able 7) should be minimal due to th e s t a
t i s t i c a l i n s i g n if i c a n c e o f R2 f o r the u nderdeveloped
group of c o u n tr ie s and th e r e l a t i v e sm all s iz e o f the two
N's (N=33 f o r the developed c o u n tr ie s and N=34 f o r the
underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s ) .
There is y e t a n o th e r p o s s ib l e but p ro b ab ly tenuous
e x p la n a tio n fo r t h i s unexpected f in d in g . The c h i l d a l
lowances p re s e n te d to f a m ilie s may d isc o u ra g e f u r t h e r
c h ild b e a rin g by s h i f t i n g th e p a r e n t s ' focus from a non
m a te r ia l s t a t u s o r i e n t a t i o n to a m a t e r i a l s t a t u s
67
o r i e n t a t i o n . A ccording to t h i s r a t i o n a l e , th e p a re n ts
would spend some (or a l l ) o f the c h ild allow an ce payments,
not on t h e i r c h ild (or c h ild r e n ) b u t on m a t e r i a l s t a t u s
o b j e c ts . As p a re n ts r e a l i z e t h a t m a te r ia l s t a t u s o b je c ts
a re more im p o rtan t in an urban s e t t i n g th a n a re non
m a t e r i a l s t a t u s o b je c ts (such as c h i l d r e n ) , and th a t th e s e
two typ es of s t a t u s o b je c ts compete w ith each o th e r e c o
n o m ic a lly , they may opt fo r the m a te r ia l s t a t u s o b je c ts .
In sum, c h il d allow ance payments may be u t i l i z e d to p u r
chase m a t e r i a l s t a t u s o b je c ts and given th e in tr o d u c tio n
to such o b j e c t s , the p a re n ts may c u r t a i l f u r t h e r c h i l d
b e a rin g to achieve even more m a te r ia l s t a t u s o b je c ts .
This r a t i o n a l e would a lso e x p la in why coverage o f fam ily
allow ance programs have a s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t i n d e
pendent e f f e c t on f e r t i l i t y in underdeveloped c o u n trie s
b u t not in developed c o u n tr i e s . Since th e p o p u la tio n s in
underdeveloped c o u n tr ie s a re j u s t s t a r t i n g to change t h e i r
s t a t u s o r i e n t a t i o n from a n o n -m a te ria l to a m a te ria l p e r
s p e c t i v e , one might expect e x tr a income to have c o n s id e r
a b le im pact on the p o p u l a t i o n 's co n ce p tio n of s t a tu s and
t h e i r knowledge of how c h ild r e n and m a te r ia l o b je c ts "com
p e te " w ith each o th e r in an i n d u s t r i a l i z e d and urban
s e t t i n g . The p o p u la tio n s o f developed c o u n tr i e s are a l
ready w e ll aware of th e d e s i r a b i l i t y of m a t e r i a l goods as
o b je c ts of s t a t u s and are a ls o aware of how c h ild r e n and
m a te r ia l goods "compete" a g a in s t each o t h e r . T h e re fo re ,
68
we would n o t expect a d d it i o n a l sources o f income ( c h ild
allow ance payments) to have the same " i l l u m i n a t i n g ” e f
f e c t on the p o p u la tio n s o f developed c o u n tr i e s .
The B e n e fit Level o f "Long-Term"
Risk Programs and F e r t i l i t y
The t h i r d m ajor h y p o th e s is s t a te d t h a t the b e n e f i t
le v e l of the "lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs (o ld -a g e , i n
v a l i d i t y , and s u r v iv o r s h ip ) would be in v e r s e ly a s s o c ia te d
w ith su b seq u en t f e r t i l i t y l e v e l s . The z e ro -o rd e r c o r r e
l a t i o n s between th e s e two f a c t o r s of -.6 9 1 (c f. Table 2)
and -.659 ( c f . Table 4) ten d to sup port th e h y p o th e s is .
However, as in the case of coverage of th e "lo n g -term "
r i s k p ro g ra m s, the independent e f f e c t o f the b e n e f i t le v e l
of " lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs on subsequent f e r t i l i t y
appears to be i n s i g n i f i c a n t . The Beta c o e f f i c i e n t s of
-.25 4 in Table 3 and -.122 in Table 5 a re in the p r e d ic te d
d i r e c t i o n b u t prove to be s t a t i s t i c a l l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t .
A lso, as in th e case of the coverage index for "lo n g -te rm "
r i s k p ro gram s, the b e n e f i t le v e l index f o r "long -term "
r i s k programs has a s i g n i f i c a n t n e g a tiv e impact on f e r t i
l i t y i n only one o f the f i v e subsamples (th e s i g n i f i c a n t
Beta o f -.2 60 in Subsample #1 of Table 6) and does n o t
have a s i g n i f i c a n t im pact on subsequent f e r t i l i t y when
the a n a ly s is i s broken down in terms of le v e l o f d e v elo p
ment ( c f . i n s i g n i f i c a n t B eta c o e f f i c i e n t s in Table 7 ).
O m itting the coverage in d ic e s does not appear to in c r e a s e
69
the s i g n i f i c a n c e of th e b e n e f i t le v e l of ’’lo n g -te rm " r i s k
programs on subsequen t f e r t i l i t y . The s t a t i s t i c a l l y
i n s i g n i f i c a n t Beta of -.114 in Table 9 i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s .
I t w i l l be remembered t h a t o m ittin g the fam ily
allow ance program s from the r e g r e s s io n a n a ly s is r e s u l t e d
in a s i g n i f i c a n t n e g a tiv e B eta c o e f f i c i e n t fo r the
coverage index o f the "lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs. This
is n o t th e case f o r th e b e n e f i t le v e l index of "lo n g -te rm "
r i s k program s. The independent e f f e c t of the b e n e f i t
l e v e l index of " lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs on f e r t i l i t y is
not enhanced or made s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t by o m ittin g
fam ily allow ance programs from the r e g r e s s io n e q u a tio n .
The h y p o th e s is t h a t th e b e n e f i t le v e l of "lo n g -te rm "
r i s k programs would have an i n h i b i t i n g e f f e c t on f e r t i l i t y
does n o t th en appear to have been su p p o rted by the d a ta .
In o th e r w ords, an in c r e a s e in the r e l a t i v e value of
"lo n g -te rm " r i s k payments ( r e l a t i v e to what the economi
c a l l y and b i o l o g i c a l l y p ro d u c tiv e person "b rin g s home")
does n o t appear to have much of an i n h i b i t i n g e f f e c t on
c h ild b e a r in g . While th e z e ro -o rd e r c o r r e l a t i o n between
th e se two f a c t o r s i s s tro n g (in a n e g a tiv e d i r e c t i o n ) ,
the indep endent e f f e c t o f th e b e n e f i t le v e l of " lo n g -te rm "
r i s k programs on sub sequent f e r t i l i t y is m inim al.
The Beta c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r our two measures o f " lo n g
term" r i s k programs in Table 10 (the s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i
f i c a n t -.25 6 Beta fo r coverage and th e s t a t i s t i c a l l y
i n s i g n i f i c a n t -.1 8 8 Beta fo r b e n e f i t le v e l) su g g e st t h a t
th e p er c en t of th e econom ically a c tiv e p o p u la tio n con
t r i b u t i n g to th e s e "long -term " r i s k programs ( i . e . , c o v e r
age) is more im p o rtan t in d e c re a sin g f e r t i l i t y than i s
the r e l a t i v e v a lu e ( i . e . , b e n e f i t le v e l) of " lo n g -te rm "
r i s k b e n e f i t s . To p hrase the same thought d i f f e r e n t l y ,
th e degree to which econom ically and b i o l o g i c a l l y p ro d u c
t i v e p e o p le are covered by "lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs (w ith
th e l i k e l y knowledge t h a t they w i l l be ab le to be r e c i p i
e n ts of o ld -a g e , i n v a l i d i t y , and s u rv iv o rs h ip payments
when " t h e i r time comes") has more of an i n h i b i t i n g e f f e c t
on c h ild b e a r in g th a n does the r e l a t i v e s iz e o f th e se
"lo n g -te rm " r i s k b e n e f i t s ( r e l a t i v e to what th e producing
perso n i s making, on the a v erag e , a t th e p r e s e n t tim e ).
The B e n e fit Level of Family Allowance
Programs and F e r t i l i t y
We a ls o h y p o th e s iz e d a r e l a t i o n s h i p between the
b e n e f i t le v e l of fam ily allow ance programs and n a ti o n a l
f e r t i l i t y l e v e l s . As in th e case of coverage o f fam ily
allow ance program s, i t was h y p o th esiz ed th a t th e zero-
o rd e r c o r r e l a t i o n between the b e n e f i t le v e l index for
fam ily allow ance programs and subsequent n a tio n a l f e r t i
l i t y l e v e ls would be h ig h ly n e g a tiv e b u t th a t when the
e f f e c t s o f o th e r v a r i a b l e s are c o n t r o l l e d ( e s p e c i a l ly
th o se v a r i a b le s i n d i c a t i v e o f economic d e v elo p m en t), th e
in dependent e f f e c t of the b e n e f i t le v e l o f fam ily
71
allow ance programs on f e r t i l i t y would be weakly n e g a tiv e
or p o s s ib ly p o s i t i v e .
The f i r s t p a r t of t h i s h y p o th e sis i s su p p o rted by
th e s tro n g n e g a tiv e z e ro -o rd e r c o r r e l a t i o n s between th ese
two v a r i a b le s (-.5 6 6 in Table 2 and -.5 3 6 in Table 4).
The second segment of th e h y p o th e sis is a ls o su p p o rte d ,
in p a r t , by th e d a ta . The Beta c o e f f i c i e n t s of -.090
in Table 3 and -.105 in Table 5 i n d ic a t e t h a t the in d e
pendent e f f e c t o f the b e n e f i t le v e l index of fam ily a l
lowance programs on the subsequent t o t a l f e r t i l i t y r a te
is n o t s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t . Furtherm o re, the Beta
c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the b e n e f i t le v e l index of fam ily a llo w
ance programs in the f iv e subsamples (Table 6) and in
th e a n a ly s is where le v e l o f development is c o n sid e re d
(Table 7) are a l l n e g a tiv e but s t a t i s t i c a l l y i n s i g n i f i
c a n t .
T ables 9 and 11 o f f e r ex ce p tio n s to the su p p o rt of
t h i s segment of the h y p o th e s is . When the coverage in d ic e s
a re excluded from the r e g r e s s io n e q u a tio n (Table 9 ) , the
e f f e c t o f the b e n e f i t le v e l index o f fam ily allow ance
programs on the t o t a l f e r t i l i t y r a t e rem ains n e g a tiv e and
is s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t , even w ith th e e f f e c t s of
th e b e n e f i t l e v e l of "lo n g -term " r i s k programs and the
c o n tr o l v a r i a b l e s removed. Table 11 i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t
when the "lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs a re o m itted from the
r e g r e s s io n e q u a tio n , the independent e f f e c t of the
72
b e n e f i t l e v e l index of fam ily allow ance programs on
sub sequent t o t a l f e r t i l i t y is n e g a tiv e (B eta= -.164) and
s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t ( s i g n i f i c a n t a t .05 l e v e l ) .
What can we say th e n , concerning th e e f f e c t o f the
b e n e f i t le v e l of fam ily allow ance programs on subsequent
f e r t i l i t y le v e ls ? The d a ta s u p p o r ts , f o r the most p a r t ,
th e h y p o th e s is t h a t when the e f f e c t s (both independent
and combined) of o th e r v a r ia b le s on f e r t i l i t y are con
t r o l l e d , th e independent e f f e c t o f the b e n e f i t le v e l of
fam ily allow ances w i l l be m inim al. While the z e r o - o rd e r
c o r r e l a t i o n between th e s e two f a c t o r s was f a i r l y s tro n g
and n e g a tiv e in d i r e c t i o n , the Beta c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the
0
b e n e f i t l e v e l of fam ily allow ance programs are u s u a lly
s t a t i s t i c a l l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t . Thus, we might s t a t e t h a t
when the e f f e c t s o f o th e r r e le v a n t v a r i a b le s a re con
t r o l l e d , th e r e l a t i v e annual v a lu e of a c h ild payment
( r e l a t i v e to what the producing in d iv id u a l " b rin g s home")
h a s , on th e a v erag e, a s l i g h t n e g a tiv e b u t s t a t i s t i c a l l y
i n s i g n i f i c a n t independent e f f e c t on subsequent c h i l d b e a r
in g . In o th e r words, the r e l a t i v e s iz e o f a c h il d payment
does not seem to have an im portant independent e f f e c t on
f e r t i l i t y , e i t h e r in a prom oting or i n h i b i t i n g manner.
W e should ask o u rse lv e s how the r a t i o n a l e s proposed
f o r the coverage of fam ily a l l o w a n c e - f e r t i l i t y r e l a t i o n
sh ip apply to the b e n e f i t le v e l of fam ily allow ance-
f e r t i l i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p . I t w i l l be remembered t h a t a
73
r a t i o n a l e (which was viewed as tenuous) was s e t f o r t h to
e x p la in the p o s s ib l e e f f e c t s of coverage o f fam ily a llo w
ance on subsequent f e r t i l i t y ; t h a t fam ily allow an ces may
not be sp e n t s o l e ly on c h ild r e n but may be used to p u r
chase m a t e r i a l s t a t u s o b je c ts and t h a t th e in tr o d u c ti o n
to such s t a t u s o b je c ts may su b seq u e n tly le a d to c u r t a i l
ment o f f e r t i l i t y . The u s u a lly i n s i g n i f i c a n t Beta c o e f
f i c i e n t s of th e b e n e f i t le v e l o f fam ily allow ance programs
(where th e t o t a l f e r t i l i t y r a te i s the dependent v a r ia b le )
su g g e sts t h a t t h i s r a t i o n a l e is indeed ten u o u s. I f th e
r a t i o n a l e were c o r r e c t , we should expect the b e n e f i t le v e l
o f fa m ily allow ance to have a c o n s i s t e n t , s t a t i s t i c a l l y
s i g n i f i c a n t , independent n e g a tiv e e f f e c t on subsequen t
f e r t i l i t y , because the b e n e f i t le v e l i n d i c a t e s the amount
o f money re c e iv e d p er c h i l d much more a c c u r a t e l y than
does th e coverage index.
An a d d it i o n a l r a t i o n a l e , which su g g e sts t h a t f e r t i
l i t y l e v e l s may be a f f e c t i n g coverage o f fa m ily allowance
program s, was a ls o proposed . This e x p la n a tio n a s s e r te d
t h a t r e g a r d l e s s of th e motive fo r d e s i r i n g in c re a s e d
coverage o f th e c h il d p o p u la tio n ( e i t h e r to encourage
f e r t i l i t y , enhance the l i v e s of c h i l d r e n , or b o t h ) , th e
a b i l i t y to fin a n c e and i n s t i t u t e coverage o f th e c h i l d
p o p u la tio n prob ab ly v a r i e s in v e r s e ly w ith the f e r t i l i t y
l e v e l . How w e ll then does t h i s r a t i o n a l e apply to th e
b e n e f i t le v e l o f fam ily a l l o w a n c e - f e r t i l i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p ?
74
S in c e , in most c a s e s , th e Beta c o e f f i c i e n t o f the b e n e f i t
le v e l o f fam ily allow ance (where the t o t a l f e r t i l i t y r a t e
is the dependent v a r i a b l e ) is low and s t a t i s t i c a l l y i n
s i g n i f i c a n t , i t seems t h a t the r a t i o n a l e i s le s s p rom ising
f o r th e b e n e f i t le v e l o f fam ily allow ance th an fo r c o v e r
age. However, i t w i l l a ls o be remembered t h a t th e r e were
two e x c e p tio n s where th e b e n e f i t l e v e l of fam ily a llo w
ance programs had a s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t and n e g a tiv e
independent a s s o c i a t i o n w ith f e r t i l i t y (Table 9, where
the coverage in d ic e s a re excluded from the r e g r e s s io n
e q u a tio n and Table 11, where th e '’lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs
are o m itted from the r e g r e s s io n e q u a t i o n ) .
In sum, two models were c o n sid e re d w ith r e s p e c t to
the fam ily a l l o w a n c e - f e r t i l i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p . The f i r s t
model viewed fam ily allow ance as a f f e c t i n g subsequent
f e r t i l i t y . We i n i t i a l l y h y p o th esiz ed t h a t when th e e f
f e c t s o f o th e r independent v a r i a b le s ( s p e c i f i c a l l y those
v a r i a b l e s i n d i c a t i v e o f economic developm ent) were r e
moved, the e f f e c t of fa m ily allow ance program s on s u b s e
quent f e r t i l i t y would become m arkedly l e s s n e g a tiv e or
p o s s ib l y p o s i t i v e . This h y p o th e s is was su p p o rted by the
b e n e f i t le v e l o f fam ily allow an ce but n o t by the co verag e.
A "ten u o u s" e x p la n a tio n was proposed to e x p la in our i n
a b i l i t y to " e x p la in away” the in d ep e n d en t, n e g a tiv e a s
s o c i a t i o n between the coverage of fam ily allow ance and
f e r t i l i t y . This e x p la n a tio n a s s e r te d t h a t fam ily
75
allow ances may not be sp e n t s o l e l y on c h ild r e n b u t may
be used to purchase m a te r ia l s t a t u s o b j e c ts and th a t
th e in tr o d u c tio n to such s t a t u s o b je c ts may su b se q u e n tly
le a d to c u rta ilm e n t o f f e r t i l i t y . W e concluded t h a t t h i s
r a t i o n a l e was indeed tenuous as i t f a i l s to account fo r
the u s u a lly i n s i g n i f i c a n t in dependent a s s o c i a t i o n between
th e b e n e f i t le v e l of fam ily allow ance and f e r t i l i t y . I f
fam ily allow ance programs do have an i n h i b i t i n g e f f e c t on
f e r t i l i t y , a novel r a t i o n a l e must be fo rm u la te d .
The second model viewed f e r t i l i t y as a f f e c t i n g
fam ily allow ance program s. W e su g g e ste d t h a t th e a b i l i t y
of a co u n try to fin a n c e and i n s t i t u t e fam ily allowance
programs may vary in v e r s e l y w ith the f e r t i l i t y (due to th e
in c re a s e d d i f f i c u l t y of p ro v id in g fo r l a r g e r c h il d popu
l a t i o n s ) . This r a t i o n a l e appears to be more l o g i c a l and
'’b e lie v a b le " than the form er. W e sh o u ld , however, a t
tempt to e x p la in why the independ en t n e g a tiv e a s s o c i a t io n
between coverage of fam ily allow ance and f e r t i l i t y was
more o fte n g r e a t e r and s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t than th e
independent n e g a tiv e a s s o c i a t io n between the b e n e f i t le v e l
of fam ily allowance and f e r t i l i t y . I t may be t h a t the
f e r t i l i t y le v e l has a g r e a t e r e f f e c t on the s e t t i n g up and
running o f a fam ily allow ance program (which in c lu d e s
paying the a d m in is tr a to r s and c le r k s ) th an the a c tu a l
s i z e of payments a l l o t t e d on the b e h a lf o f c h ild r e n .
Since the im plem entation and o r g a n iz a tio n o f fam ily
76
allow ance program preced es the a l l o c a t i o n o f b e n e f i t s , we
m ight expect t h a t th e b re a d th and coverage o f a fam ily
allow ance program would be th e f i r s t a s p e c t of fam ily
allow ance programs t h a t would be n e g a t iv e l y a f f e c t e d by
a high f e r t i l i t y r a t e and su b seq u en t la rg e c h il d p o p u la
t i o n .
T o ta l V ariance E xplained in Subsequent F e r t i l i t y
by the Independent V a ria b le s
A word i s in o rd e r w ith r e s p e c t to th e combined
power o f a l l the independent v a r i a b l e s (both s o c i a l
s e c u r i t y in d ic e s and c o n tro l v a r i a b l e s ) in e x p la in in g
f e r t i l i t y . In most in s ta n c e s the amount o f v a ria n c e ex-
?
p la in e d (R ) in subsequent f e r t i l i t y by th e independent
and combined e f f e c t s of the independent v a r i a b l e s was
over 60 p er c e n t. A look a t the v a rio u s t a b l e s w i l l show
t h i s to be the case . Only in Table 7 does the v a ria n c e
e x p la in e d drop below 60 p er c e n t. I t should be n o te d ,
however, t h a t a la r g e segment o f th e t o t a l v a ria n c e e x
p la in e d i s due to th e combined e f f e c t s of the independent
v a r i a b l e s on subsequent f e r t i l i t y . Much e f f o r t has been
expended in a n a ly z in g the indepen dent or d i r e c t e f f e c t s
o f our s o c i a l s e c u r i t y and c o n tr o l v a r i a b l e s on f e r t i l i t y .
However, our r e l a t i v e l y sm all Beta c o e f f i c i e n t s and yet
la r g e amount o f t o t a l v a ria n c e e x p la in e d d e m o n stra te s th e
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tendency o f independent v a r i a b le s to a f f e c t f e r t i l i t y in
j o i n t fa s h io n .
The R e la tiv e Power of the S o c ia l S e c u rity
V a ria b le s and C ontrol V a ria b le s in
P r e d i c t in g Subsequent F e r t i l i t y
The r e l a t i v e power of the s o c i a l s e c u r i t y in d ic e s
and c o n tr o l v a r i a b l e s in p r e d i c t i n g f e r t i l i t y should a ls o
be n o ted . I t w i l l be remembered t h a t the r a t i o n a l e fo r
in c lu d in g the c o n tr o l v a r i a b l e s in th e a n a ly s is re v o lv e s
around the h i s t o r i c a l tendency fo r i n f a n t m o r t a l i t y ,
e d u c a tio n (or l i t e r a c y ) , and p e r c a p i t a p ro d u c t to be
h ig h ly a s s o c ia te d w ith n a t i o n a l f e r t i l i t y l e v e l s . I f
th e s e c o n tr o l v a r i a b l e s had n o t been in c lu d e d in the
m u ltip le r e g r e s s io n a n a l y s i s , the independent e f f e c t s of
th e s o c i a l s e c u r i t y in d ic e s would have no doubt been much
s tr o n g e r . However, t h i s is p r e c i s e l y why th e c o n tr o l
v a r i a b le s were c o n s id e re d . F e r t i l i t y r e s e a r c h (and
e s p e c i a l l y i n t e r n a t i o n a l f e r t i l i t y r e s e a r c h ) is plagued
w ith the problem of v a r i a b l e s (both in dependent and
dependent) being h ig h ly c o r r e l a t e d and in many i n s t a n c e s ,
m easuring "the same t h i n g . " Thus, i t was our d e s i r e to
dem on strate t h a t any in depend ent e f f e c t of th e s o c i a l
s e c u r i t y in d ic e s on f e r t i l i t y l e v e ls was n o t due to the
f a c t t h a t we were m easuring the le v e l o f economic d e v e l
opment, b u t t h a t we were indeed m easuring th e coverage
and b e n e f i t l e v e ls of "lo n g -te rm " r i s k and fam ily
78
allow ance program s. G ranted, the s o c i a l s e c u r i t y in d ic e s
a re q u i te h ig h ly c o r r e l a t e d , in a p o s i t i v e d i r e c t i o n ,
w ith our i n d i c a t o r s o f economic developm ent. This is not
a s u r p r i s i n g f i n d in g , as i t was p o in te d out in the f i r s t
c h a p te r t h a t , in d ee d , developed c o u n tr ie s have more e f f e c
t i v e s o c i a l s e c u r i t y programs than the underdeveloped
c o u n tr ie s due to t h e i r g r e a t e r a d m i n i s t r a t iv e and
f i n a n c i a l a s s e t s . Again, by in c lu d in g the i n d ic a t o r s of
economic development in the m u ltip le r e g r e s s io n a n a l y s i s ,
i t was p o s s ib l e to a s c e r t a i n the independent e f f e c t s of
"lo n g -te rm " r i s k and fam ily allow ance programs on su b se
quent l e v e ls of f e r t i l i t y . Table 3, which shows the
r e s u l t s o f the m u ltip le r e g r e s s io n a n a ly s is u sing the
p a ir - w is e o p tio n , su g g e sts t h a t none of th e independent
v a r i a b le s s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t subsequent f e r t i l i t y
l e v e l s . However, w ith the e x c e p tio n of the b e n e f i t
le v e l index fo r fam ily allow ance program s, the s o c ia l
s e c u r i t y in d ic e s have c o n s id e r a b ly h ig h e r Beta c o e f f i
c ie n ts th an th e c o n tro l v a r i a b l e s . This may i n d ic a te
t h a t the s o c i a l s e c u r i t y programs have s tr o n g e r independ
ent e f f e c t s on f e r t i l i t y th an do th e c o n tr o l v a r i a b le s .
The r e g r e s s io n a n a l y s i s u t i l i z i n g b oth r e a l and
p r e d i c te d value (Table 5) p r e s e n ts a somewhat more am
biguous p a t t e r n . The most im p o rtan t fin d in g in t h i s
ta b l e is th e h igh s i g n i f ic a n c e of the coverage index fo r
fam ily allow ance program s. This s o c i a l s e c u r i t y index
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has b y 'f a r the l a r g e s t Beta c o e f f i c i e n t in the a n a ly s is
(B eta® -.286) and is th e only independent v a r i a b l e w ith
a s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t independ en t e f f e c t on subs-
quent f e r t i l i t y . Although none of th e o th e r independent
v a r i a b le s have a s i g n i f i c a n t independent e f f e c t on s u b s e
quent f e r t i l i t y , the second and t h i r d g r e a t e s t Beta co
e f f i c i e n t s are those o f two c o n tr o l v a r i a b l e s ; in f a n t
m o r ta li t y (Beta=.161) and newspaper c i r c u l a t i o n (Beta=
- .1 4 6 ) . The f o u rth and f i f t h l a r g e s t Betas are th o se of
t-he b e n e f i t le v e l index fo r "lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs
(B eta=-.122) and the coverage index fo r "lo n g -te rm " r i s k
programs (B e ta = -.1 0 8 ). F i n a l l y , th e b e n e f i t le v e l index
fo r fam ily allowance programs has th e s i x t h l a r g e s t Beta
c o e f f i c i e n t (Beta® -.105) and the p e r c a p i ta gross dom estic
p ro d u ct has the s m a lle s t indepen dent e f f e c t on f e r t i l i t y
(Beta®-.039 ). In sum, i t becomes somewhat a r b i t r a r y to
s t a t e w hether the s o c i a l s e c u r i t y v a r i a b l e s or the c o n tr o l
v a r ia b le s dominate in t h i s a n a l y s i s . While the only
s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t and l a r g e s t independent e f f e c t
on f e r t i l i t y i s a s s o c ia te d w ith a s o c i a l s e c u r i t y index,
the second and t h i r d l a r g e s t Beta c o e f f i c i e n t s are those
o f two c o n tro l v a r i a b l e s . In t h i s a u t h o r 's o p in io n , more
emphasis should be p la c e d on th e f a c t th a t th e only
s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t indep en d en t e f f e c t on s u b s e
quent f e r t i l i t y i s t h a t of a s o c i a l s e c u r i t y index.
F u rth e r evidence o f th e r e l a t i v e power of the s o c ia l
s e c u r i t y v e rsu s the c o n tr o l v a r i a b l e s in p r e d i c t i n g su b
sequ en t f e r t i l i t y can be found in Table 6, which p r e s e n ts
the r e s u l t s of the m u ltip le r e g r e s s io n a n a ly s is fo r fiv e
subsamples of N=50. In only th re e case s do the c o n tr o l
v a r i a b le s dem onstrate s i g n i f i c a n t in depend en t e f f e c t s on
f e r t i l i t y . Two of th e se c a se s are found in the f i r s t
subsample where newspaper c i r c u l a t i o n and p e r c a p i ta
gross dom estic p ro d u ct have s i g n i f i c a n t independent e f
f e c t s on subsequent f e r t i l i t y (Betas of .274 and -.2 6 0
r e s p e c t i v e l y ) , The t h i r d case can be found in the t h i r d
subsample where the Beta c o e f f i c i e n t fo r i n f a n t mor
t a l i t y i s .230 and s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t . The s o c i a l
i n d i c e s , on the o th e r hand, have seven s i g n i f i c a n t Beta
c o e f f i c i e n t s . Three of th e s e Betas a re found in the
f i r s t subsam ple. Both coverage in d ic e s show h ig h ly s i g
n i f i c a n t independent e f f e c t s on f e r t i l i t y (B eta=-.390
fo r coverage o f "lo n g -term " r i s k program s; B eta= -,266 fo r
coverage o f fam ily allow ance program s) and th e b e n e f i t
le v e l o f fam ily allow ance shows a s i g n i f i c a n t independent
e f f e c t on f e r t i l i t y (B e ta = -.2 6 0 ). The fo u r o th er s i g n i
f i c a n t Beta c o e f f i c i e n t s fo r s o c ia l s e c u r i t y programs are
found in the fo u r rem aining subsam ples. Each of th e s e
c o e f f i c i e n t s a re h ig h ly s i g n i f i c a n t and a l l are a s s o c i
ated w ith coverage of fam ily allow ance programs. The
ta b l e o f subsam ples, th e n , seems to su g g e st th a t the
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s o c i a l s e c u r i t y v a r i b l e s as a whole are more pow erful
p r e d i c t o r s of subsequent f e r t i l i t y than a re the c o n tro l
v a r i a b l e s .
When th e a n a ly s is is done in terms of le v e l of
development (Table 7 ) , the r e l a t i v e power of the s o c ia l
s e c u r i t y v e rsu s the c o n tr o l v a r i a b le s in p r e d i c t i n g
f e r t i l i t y seems to be in fa v o r o f th e s o c i a l s e c u r i t y
v a r i a b l e s . G ranted, the o nly s i g n i f i c a n t and th e l a r g e s t
Beta c o e f f i c i e n t fo r the developed c o u n tr ie s is t h a t of
in f a n t m o r t a l i t y . However, the second and t h i r d l a r g e s t
Beta c o e f f i c i e n t s in t h i s group of c o u n tr ie s are for
the fa m ily allow ance in d ic e s (B eta=-.242 fo r coverage of
fam ily allow an ce; B eta= -.14 7 fo r th e b e n e f i t le v e l of
fam ily allow ance p ro g ra m s). The a n a ly s is fo r th e u nder
developed group of c o u n tr ie s shows coverage of fam ily
allow ance programs to have the only s i g n i f i c a n t and the
l a r g e s t Beta c o e f f i c i e n t . Again, the second, t h i r d ,
and f o u r t h l a r g e s t Beta c o e f f i c i e n t s are those a s s o c ia te d
w ith th e s o c i a l s e c u r i t y in d ic e s (Beta=.418 fo r coverage
o f " lo n g -te rm " r i s k program s; B eta=-.614 f o r the b e n e fit
le v e l index fo r "lo n g -te rm " r i s k program s; and Beta=-.198
f o r the b e n e f i t le v e l index fo r fam ily allow ance p ro
grams) .
I t w i l l be remembered t h a t Tables 8, 9, 10, and 11
each om it two s o c ia l s e c u r i t y in d ic e s from the m u ltip le
r e g r e s s io n e q u atio n . Since each of th ese ta b le s deals
w ith only two of the fo u r s o c i a l s e c u r i t y i n d i c e s , one
might expect the th re e c o n tr o l v a r i a b le s to dem onstrate
more r e l a t i v e p r e d i c t i n g power than the s o c i a l s e c u r i t y
in d ic e s . This i s what we f in d in T able 9 where the
h ig h e s t Beta i s t h a t o f newspaper c i r c u l a t i o n (B eta=-.312)
and where two of the t h r e e s i g n i f i c a n t B etas are those of
c o n tr o l v a r i a b l e s . However, Tables 8 and 10 show the
s o c i a l s e c u r i t y in d ic e s having the edge. A ccording to
Table 8 th e most s i g n i f i c a n t and h ig h e s t B eta c o e f f i c i e n t
is t h a t o f a s o c i a l s e c u r i t y v a r i a b l e , the coverage index
fo r fam ily allowance programs (B e ta = -.3 1 8 ). While the
Beta fo r in f a n t m o r ta li t y is th e second h ig h e s t (Beta=
.193) and i s s i g n i f i c a n t , the t h i r d g r e a t e s t Beta c o e f f i
c i e n t i s f o r coverage o f ’'lo n g -term " r i s k program s. In
Table 10, the only s i g n i f i c a n t and th e l a r g e s t c o e f f i c i e n t
is a s s o c ia te d w ith the coverage index for "lo n g -te rm " r i s k
programs (B e ta = -.256). F urtherm ore, the second g r e a t e s t
Beta c o e f f i c i e n t is a ls o a s s o c ia te d w ith a s o c i a l s e c u r i t y
index (B eta=-.188 fo r b e n e f i t le v e l index o f "lo n g -term "
r i s k program s). The r e s u l t s of the r e g r e s s io n a n a ly s is
in Table 11 a ls o show th e most s i g n i f i c a n t and h ig h e s t
Beta c o e f f i c i e n t to be a s s o c ia te d w ith a s o c i a l s e c u r i t y
in d ex , th e coverage index fo r fam ily allow ance programs
(B e ta = -.2 9 9 ). However, the second and t h i r d g r e a t e s t
Betas belong to in f a n t m o r t a l i t y (Be'ta=.204) and news
paper c i r c u l a t i o n (B eta=-.259) and a re s t a t i s t i c a l l y
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s i g n i f i c a n t . Thus the r e l a t i v e p r e d i c t i n g power of the
s o c i a l s e c u r i t y v a r i a b l e s v ersu s the c o n tr o l v a r i a b l e s is
somewhat s i m il a r in Table 11.
What then can we conclude in r e f e r e n c e to the
r e l a t i v e power of the s o c i a l s e c u r i t y in d ic e s v e rsu s the
c o n tr o l v a r i a b le s in p r e d i c t i n g subsequent f e r t i l i t y ?
The above d is c u s s io n of the t a b l e s su g g e sts t h a t th e
independ en t e f f e c t s (as in d ic a t e d by Beta c o e f f i c i e n t s )
of the s o c i a l s e c u r i t y in d ic e s on subsequent t o t a l f e r
t i l i t y r a t e s are more o f te n g r e a t e r and s t a t i s t i c a l l y
s i g n i f i c a n t than th e independent e f f e c t s o f the c o n tr o l
v a r i a b l e s . Thus, even though measures o f i n f a n t mor
t a l i t y , e d u c a tio n (or l i t e r a c y ) and per c a p i ta p ro d u ct
have been i d e n t i f i e d in th e l i t e r a t u r e as being i n f l u e n
t i a l f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g f e r t i l i t y , our a n a ly s is shows
coverage and b e n e f i t le v e l in d ic e s o f ’’lo n g -te rm " r i s k
and fam ily allow ance programs to be even s tr o n g e r i n f l u
e n t i a l f a c t o r s .
CHAPTER IV
SUM M ARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Summary
The d a ta a n a ly s is su g g e sts t h a t s o c i a l s e c u r i t y
programs can, a t l e a s t to a minimal d e g re e , a f f e c t sub
se q u en t n a tio n a l f e r t i l i t y l e v e l s . As was i l l u s t r a t e d
p r e v io u s ly , the r e l a t i v e power of the s o c i a l s e c u r i t y
in d ic e s in indepen dently p r e d i c ti n g f e r t i l i t y is even
g r e a t e r th an t h a t o f the t r a d i t i o n a l c o r r e l a t e s of f e r
t i l i t y ( in f a n t m o r t a l i t y , ed u ca tio n (or l i t e r a c y ) , and
per c a p i t a p r o d u c t ) .
I t a ls o appears t h a t the coverage a sp e c t o f the
" lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs i s more pow erful th an i t s bene
f i t l e v e l c o u n te r p a r t. The per cent of the econom ically
a c t iv e p o p u la tio n c o n tr i b u ti n g ( e i t h e r d i r e c t l y or i n
d i r e c t l y ) to "lo n g -term " r i s k programs seems to have a
g r e a t e r i n h i b i t i n g e f f e c t on f e r t i l i t y than does the
average b e n e f i t of th e s e programs viewed r e l a t i v e to
average wage.
The r e l a t i v e independent s t r e n g t h of coverage and
b e n e f i t le v e l of fam ily allow ance programs in p r e d i c t i n g
f e r t i l i t y is somewhat ambiguous. I t was h y p o th e siz e d
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85
t h a t when the e f f e c t s of th e o th e r independent v a r i a b l e s
were c o n tr o l le d f o r , the independent a s s o c i a t i o n between
fam ily allow ance programs and subsequent f e r t i l i t y would
be weakly n e g a tiv e or p o s s ib ly p o s i t i v e . This was su p
p o rte d in terms of the b e n e f i t le v e l of fam ily allow ance
programs (as the Beta c o e f f i c i e n t was n e g a tiv e b u t
s t a t i s t i c a l l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t ) . This was n ot tru e how
e v e r, f o r th e coverage of fam ily allow ance program s.
Indeed, the most s u r p r i s i n g f in d in g in t h i s stud y was
the s i z e , d i r e c t i o n (which was n e g a t i v e ) , and s t a t i s
t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of the Beta c o e f f i c i e n t s of coverage
o f fa m ily allow ance programs (where th e t o t a l f e r t i l i t y
r a t e was th e dependent v a r i a b l e ) . We found i t d i f f i c u l t
to e x p la in how in c re a s e s in coverage of fam ily allow ance
programs could cause a d e crea se in f e r t i l i t y . One
p o s s i b l e , but tenuous r a t i o n a l e a s s e r te d t h a t fam ily
allow ances may n o t be spen t s o l e l y on c h ild r e n b u t may
be used to p urch ase m a te r ia l s t a t u s o b je c ts and t h a t the
in tr o d u c ti o n ( e s p e c i a l ly in underdeveloped c o u n tr ie s ) to
such s t a t u s o b je c ts may su b se q u e n tly lea d to c u rta ilm e n t
o f f e r t i l i t y . However, i f t h i s "ten uou s" r a t i o n a l were
c o r r e c t , we should expect the b e n e f i t l e v e l of fam ily
allow ance to have a c o n s i s t e n t , s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t ,
n e g a tiv e independent e f f e c t on subsequent f e r t i l i t y ,
because the b e n e f i t le v e l i n d ic a t e s the amount of money
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r e c e iv e d on th e b e h a lf of c h ild r e n much more a c c u r a t e l y
than does th e coverage index,
A more l o g i c a l model was proposed to e x p la in th e
independent a s s o c i a t io n s between the fam ily allow ance
i n d ic e s and f e r t i l i t y l e v e l s ; a model t h a t r e v e r s e s th e
c a u sa l o rd e r. I t was su g gested t h a t r e g a r d le s s of why
c o u n tr ie s m ight d e s i r e fam ily allow ance programs ( e i t h e r
to encourage f e r t i l i t y , to enhance the l i v e s o f c h il d r e n ,
or b o th ) t h e r e is prob ably a tendency fo r f e r t i l i t y
l e v e ls to be n e g a t iv e l y a s s o c ia te d w ith th e expense and
d i f f i c u l t y o f implementing and expanding fam ily allow ance
program s. We attem p ted to e x p la in why, i f t h i s r a t i o n a l e
i s c o r r e c t , th e independent n e g a tiv e a s s o c i a t i o n between
the b e n e f i t l e v e l o f fam ily allow ance programs and
f e r t i l i t y i s s i g n i f i c a n t in only two i n s ta n c e s . I t was
su g g e ste d t h a t the a d m i n i s t r a t iv e and o r g a n iz a tio n a l
a sp e c ts of im plem enting or expanding fam ily allow ances
(which i s v e ry r e l e v a n t to coverage) would be n e g a t iv e l y
a f f e c t e d by h ig h f e r t i l i t y r a t e s b e fo re the b e n e f i t l e v e l
a sp e c t of fam ily allow ance programs would be a f f e c t e d .
P o lic y Im p lic a tio n s
The f in d in g w ith the most im p lic a tio n s f o r p o lic y
i s t h a t which was j u s t d is c u s s e d , i . e . , th e tendency o f
the B eta c o e f f i c i e n t fo r coverage of fam ily allow ance
programs to be the s t r o n g e s t and most c o n s i s t e n t Beta
87
in t h i s stu d y . Many demographers and p o p u la tio n s c h o la r s
( e s p e c i a l l y th e n eo -M alth u sian s) a re of th e o p in io n th a t
c o u n tr ie s a tte m p tin g to lower t h e i r f e r t i l i t y should not
implement fam ily allow ance program s. The re a so n in g
behind t h i s mode of th in k in g i s based on th e assum ption
t h a t fam ily allow ance programs encourage f e r t i l i t y . The
f in d in g s in t h i s stu d y i n d ic a t e o th e rw is e . F i r s t o f a l l ,
the h ig h n e g a tiv e z e r o -o r d e r c o r r e l a t i o n between th e
coverage index of fam ily allow ance programs and th e t o t a l
f e r t i l i t y r a t e su g g e sts t h a t in c r e a s e s in coverage of
fam ily allow ances a re a s s o c ia te d w ith d e c re a se s in
f e r t i l i t y . Secondly, the s tro n g n e g a tiv e and s t a t i s
t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t Beta c o e f f i c i e n t s fo r coverage o f
fam ily allow ance programs i n d i c a t e t h a t th e a s s o c i a t io n
between in c re a s e d coverage o f fam ily allow ance programs
and d ecrea se d f e r t i l i t y can n o t be " e x p la in e d away" by
o th e r in depend en t v a r i a b le s such as i n d i c a t o r s of e c o
nomic developm ent. F urth erm o re, the r e l a t i o n s h i p between
th e s e two f a c t o r s can not be " e x p la in e d away" by b rea k in g
the a n a l y s i s down in terms o f le v e l of developm ent. In
f a c t , th e r e l a t i o n s h i p i s s t r o n g e s t fo r u n derdev elo ped
c o u n t r i e s . The c a u sa l d i r e c t i o n between th e s e two v a r i
a b le s i s d i f f i c u l t to d e term in e. However, r e g a r d l e s s of
cause and c a u s a l d i r e c t i o n , th e d a ta s tr o n g ly s u g g e sts
t h a t in c re a s e d coverage of fam ily allow ance programs
does n o t lead to in c re a s e s in f e r t i l i t y . T h e re fo re , i f
88
a c o u n try d e s i r e s to implement or expand the coverage of
a fa m ily allow ance program in o rd e r to r a i s e th e l i v i n g
sta n d a rd o f i t s c h il d r e n , the d a ta in t h i s stu d y su g g est
th a t such an im plem entation or expansion can be done
w ith o u t f e a r of r a i s i n g the f e r t i l i t y l e v e l .
The d a ta on b e n e f i t le v e l of fam ily allow ance
programs and f e r t i l i t y are le s s c o n s i s t e n t . While th e
n e g a tiv e z e ro -o rd e r c o r r e l a t i o n between th e s e two f a c t o r s
is q u i t e s tr o n g , the Beta c o e f f i c i e n t s of the b e n e f i t
le v e l of fam ily allow ance programs (where th e t o t a l
f e r t i l i t y r a t e is the dependent v a r i a b le ) a re u s u a lly
s t a t i s t i c a l l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t . However, even though they
are n o t s i g n i f i c a n t , they are n e g a tiv e in d i r e c t i o n .
Thus, we can say t h a t the b e n e f i t le v e l o f fam ily a llo w
ance programs are n o t a s s o c ia te d in any way w ith i n
c re a s e s in f e r t i l i t y l e v e l s .
The p o lic y im p lic a tio n s emanating from the r e l a t i o n
ship between the "lo n g -term " r i s k programs and su b sequent
f e r t i l i t y a re le s s pronounced. The stro n g n e g a tiv e zero -
order c o r r e l a t i o n s between our in d ic e s of th e " lo n g -te rm "
r is k programs and subsequent f e r t i l i t y might lea d a
p o lic y - d e c i s i o n maker to view the "lo n g -te rm " r i s k p r o
grams as a means o f reducing f e r t i l i t y . The indep en dent
e f f e c t (as i n d ic a te d by Beta c o e f f i c i e n t s ) i s , however,
q u ite q u e s tio n a b le . While coverage of the "lo n g -te rm "
r is k programs h a s, in some in s t a n c e s , a s t a t i s t i c a l l y
89
s i g n i f i c a n t n e g a tiv e independent e f f e c t on f e r t i l i t y ,
th e b e n e f i t l e v e l o f th e se programs f a i l s to e x e r t a
s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on su b seq u en t f e r t i l i t y .
In t h i s w r i t e r ’s o p in io n , o ld -ag e or r e tir e m e n t programs
p ro b ab ly e x e r t a g r e a t e r n e g a tiv e e f f e c t on f e r t i l i t y
than do i n v a l i d i t y a n d /o r s u rv iv o rs h ip program s. However,
due t o the f a c t t h a t d ata so urces u s u a lly d e a l w ith the
above "lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs t o g e t h e r , i t i s d i f f i c u l t
to measure th e independent e f f e c t of o ld -a g e o r r e t i r e
ment programs on f e r t i l i t y . In sum, by c o n sid e rin g a l l
of th e "lo n g -te rm " r i s k programs t o g e t h e r , we may be
f a i l i n g to a d e q u a te ly measure the independent e f f e c t o f
o ld -a g e or r e t i r e m e n t programs on subsequent f e r t i l i t y .
F uture R esearch on S o c ia l S e c u rity and F e r t i l i t y
F i r s t and forem ost, f u tu r e re s e a r c h in t h i s a re a
sh o u ld employ a l a r g e r sample o f n a tio n s fo r which d a ta
on a l l r e l e v a n t v a r i a b le s a re p r e s e n t . In th e p re s e n t
stu d y the use of a number of tec h n iq u e s (such as the
" p a ir -w is e d e l e t i o n " o p tio n , th e p r e d i c t i o n o f m issing
v a lu e s , and th e u t i l i z a t i o n of subsam ples) was n e c e s s i
t a t e d by the in ad e q u ate supply o f d a ta on a l l v a r i a b l e s .
I t i s thought t h a t th e s e tec h n iq u e s improved th e q u a l i t y
and r e l i a b i l i t y of th e d a ta . However, a c tu a l d a ta on
a l l v a r i a b l e s is o b v io u sly more d e s i r a b l e . H o p e fu lly ,
the e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g body o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l in fo rm a tio n on
90
s o c i a l s e c u r i t y w i l l make a l a r g e r and more com plete s e t
of d a ta a v a i l a b l e .
A lso, in t h i s w r i t e r ' s o pinion i t would be b e n e
f i c i a l to s e p a r a t e l y c o n s id e r the e f f e c t s of o ld -a g e or
r e tir e m e n t programs on f e r t i l i t y . As was j u s t su g g e ste d ,
c o n s id e r in g o ld - a g e , i n v a l i d i t y , and s u rv iv o r s h ip programs
as one may be redu cing the s t a t i s t i c a l in dependent e f f e c t
o f o ld -ag e or r e tir e m e n t programs on f e r t i l i t y .
In a d d i t i o n , th e r e i s an a sp e c t of coverage t h a t
was n o t d e a l t w ith in t h i s stu d y t h a t may prove to be
f r u i t f u l f o r f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h . This a sp e c t o f coverage
d e a ls w ith the s tr in g e n c y of c r i t e r i a t h a t a p r o s p e c tiv e
r e c i p i e n t must meet b e fo re q u a lif y in g f o r b e n e f i t s . Con
s i d e r , f o r example, the c r i t e r i a fo r o ld -ag e or r e tir e m e n t
b e n e f i t s . C o u n trie s vary c o n s id e ra b ly on two im portant
q u a li f y in g c o n d itio n s fo r o ld -ag e or r e tir e m e n t b e n e f i t s ;
age a t which o ld -a g e pensio n s are f i r s t payable and the
minimum p e rio d of employment a n d /o r c o n tr i b u ti o n re q u ir e d
( c f . U.S. Department of HEW, S o c ia l S e c u rity A d m in is tra
t i o n , 1961 : x i i - x i i i ) . The r e q u ir e d age a t which pen sio n s
are f i r s t p ayable vary from 50 to 70 y e a rs of age. A lso,
th e minimum p e rio d of employment a n d /o r c o n tr i b u ti o n r e
q u ire d f o r o ld -ag e or r e tir e m e n t pensio n s v a r i e s from
none (as in a c o u n try employing a u n iv e r s a l system , which
covers everyone a t r i s k , r e g a r d le s s o f employment or
c o n tr i b u ti o n ) to 45 y e a r s . W e should expect s tr in g e n c y
91
of c r i t e r i a to vary d i r e c t l y w ith subsequent f e r t i l i t y ,
based on the f a c t t h a t a h ig h e r p r o p o r tio n of i n d iv i d u a ls
w i l l be covered by an o ld -ag e or r e tir e m e n t program i f
the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s fo r b e n e f i ts a re l i b e r a l .
F i n a l l y , f u tu re re s e a r c h in t h i s a re a should d e fin e
s o c i a l s e c u r i t y in an even b ro ad e r sense than we have in
t h i s stu d y . For example, Ridker (1969) prop oses a fam ily
p la n n in g bond which, in h is o p in io n , would reduce depend
ence on c h ild r e n fo r su p p o rt in o ld age. The m echanics
of t h i s scheme are d isc u sse d by Ridker (1969:12):
The b a s ic id ea of th e bond i s q u i te sim ple.
Young couples would be o f fe r e d a bond t h a t
m atures a t ap pro xim ately th e time th e couple
r e t i r e s from the a c tiv e la b o r f o r c e ; t h a t i s ,
when they must begin r e ly in g upon the su p p o rt
of t h e i r c h ild r e n . The bond would be p ro v id ed
only on the c o n d itio n t h a t they a cc ep t a
s p e c i f i e d l i m i t on t h e i r fam ily s i z e .
A ccording to Ridker (19 69:14-15 ), such a scheme has a
number o f advantages over the t r a d i t i o n a l pensio n or
in su ra n c e program s; a) le s s c o n ta c t between a d m i n i s t r a t o r s
and i n d iv i d u a ls is r e q u ir e d , b) l e s s re c o rd -k e e p in g ,
v a l i d a t i o n , and m a ilin g expense, and c) a g r e a t e r f i n a n
c i a l f e a s i b i l i t y due to the d e fe r r e d n a tu r e of paym ents.
In t h i s a u th o r 's o p in io n , schemes such as t h i s
d e f i n i t e l y q u a li f y as " s o c i a l s e c u r i t y " programs t h a t a f
f e c t f e r t i l i t y and should thus be given s e r io u s r e s e a r c h
c o n s i d e r a ti o n .
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1962 S o c ia l S e c u rity P e r s p e c t i v e . Madison: The
U n iv e rs ity of W isconsin P re s s .
Yaukey, David
1961 F e r t i l i t y D i f f e r e n t i a l s in a M odernizing Country.
P rin c e to n , N .J .: P rin c e to n U n iv e rs ity P re ss .
APPENDIX I
THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION
In some c a s e s , th e d ata on s i z e of econo m ically
a c t i v e p o p u la tio n were n o t a v a i la b l e f o r th e same y e ar
as the " p a r t i c i p a n t " d a ta . In such c a s e s , i n t e r p o l a t i o n
was u t i l i z e d to compute f ig u r e s fo r th e a p p ro p r ia te time
p e rio d s . The c o u n tr ie s fo r which i n t e r p o l a t i o n were
used a re A u s tr ia , Belgium, Cameroon, Ceylon, China
(Taiw an), Columbia, Costa R ica, C z ec h o slo v ak ia, Dominican
R e p u b lic, F rance, Guatemala, Ic e la n d , I r a n , L ibya, Malaya,
Mexico, N e th e rla n d s , New Z ealand, N ic arag u a , Norway,
South A f r ic a , S w itz e rla n d , T u n is ia , U nited Kingdom, Upper
V o lta , Republic of Vietnam, and Y ugoslav ia. E x tr a p o la tio n
was used in the case o f A u s t r a l i a . The a p p r o p r ia te d a ta
fo r i n t e r p o l a t i o n or e x tr a p o la t io n were not a v a i la b l e fo r
e i t h e r Morocco, Peru, o r the U nited Arab R epu blic. Thus,
1960 d a ta were assumed as 1959 f o r b o th Morocco and the
U nited Arab R epublic and in the case o f P e ru , 1961 d a ta
were assumed as 1960,
The econom ically a c tiv e p o p u la tio n d a ta fo r Denmark,
F ran ce, Guatemala, and th e R epublic o f Korea are based on
sample t a b u l a t i o n s of census r e t u r n s ; the d a ta fo r Aus
t r i a , Belgium, Cameroon (fo r th e A fric a n p o p u l a t i o n ) ,
98
99
China (Taiw an), the Dominican R e p u b lic , F ra n ce , I r e l a n d ,
I t a l y , T u n is ia , Upper V o lta , and the R epublic of Vietnam
a re o f f i c i a l e s tim a te s and a re not based on c e n su se s.
The d a ta fo r A u s t r a l i a excludes f u ll- b l o o d e d a b o r i g
in a l s .
A djustm ents were made where p o s s i b l e . O r ig in a l ad
ju stm e n ts fo r underenum eration of cen suses were excluded
in the o f f i c i a l p u b l ic a t i o n s f o r Columbia, Mexico, and
T u n is ia . R eadjustm ents in term s of th e econo m ically
a c tiv e p o p u la tio n were made in th ese c a s e s . A lso, d ata
a d ju stm en ts f o r Ira n (which in c lu d e s only th e s e t t l e d
p o p u l a t i o n ) , Peru (which excluded a known number of
ju n g le I n d i a n s ) , South A fric a (which excluded Walvis B ay),
and Y ugoslavia (which excluded Koper and Baje) were made
w ith r e s p e c t to the eco n o m ically a c t i v e p o p u la tio n .
\
APPENDIX II
THE SIZE OF THE POPULATION BELOW AGE 15
As in th e case of th e coverage form ula fo r the
"lo n g -te rm '1 r i s k program s, th e r e a re a number of case s in
which th e d a ta fo r th e denom inator of the coverage form ula
f o r fam ily allow ance programs were not a v a i la b l e fo r the
same y e a r as th e num erato r. When d a ta on s i z e of p o p u la
t i o n under age 15 were not a v a i la b l e fo r the same y e a r
as the "number of c h ild r e n in r e s p e c t of whom allow ances
were made," i n t e r p o l a t i o n o r e x tr a p o la t io n was employed.
The c o u n tr ie s fo r which i n t e r p o l a t i o n were used a re Aus
t r i a , Ceylon, Columbia, C zech o slo v ak ia, Denmark, the
Dominican R e p u b lic, Guatemala, I r a n , Ir a q , I r e l a n d , Libya,
Malaya, Mexico, South A f r ic a , S pain, T u n is ia , and Yugo
s l a v i a . E x tr a p o la tio n was employed in the cases of
A u s t r i a , Belgium, Cameroon, Costa R ica, and Morocco. For
the U nited Arab R e p u b lic, th e d a ta needed f o r e i t h e r
i n t e r p o l a t i o n or e x t r a p o l a t i o n were n o t a v a i l a b l e , so 1960
d a ta were assumed as 1959.
The " s i z e of p o p u la tio n under age 15" d a ta fo r the
Dominican R e p u b lic , Guatem ala, and the R epublic of Korea
are based on e s tim a te s of q u e s tio n a b le r e l i a b i l i t y ; th e
d a ta f o r Belgium, Burma, Chad, China (Taiwan), Costa R ica,
100
1 0 1
th e F e d e ra l R epublic o f Germany, Ic e la n d , I s r a e l , I t a l y ,
Ja p a n , M alaya, th e N e th e rla n d s, New Z ealand, Norway,
P o r tu g a l, S w itz e rla n d , Upper V o lta , and Y ugoslavia a re
e s t im a t e s ; and th e f ig u r e for Ira n i s an e s tim a te based
on a n a tio n -w id e survey.
The d a ta f o r Panama excludes the In d ia n ju n g le pop
u l a t i o n , and the d a ta f o r Poland excludes an enum eration
o f 369,779 p e rs o n s .
Whenever p o s s i b l e , adjustm ents were made. O r ig in a l
a d ju s tm e n ts fo r underenum eration of censuses were excluded
in th e o f f i c i a l p u b lic a tio n s fo r Columbia, Guatem ala,
Mexico, and T u n is ia . R eadjustm ents in terms of the s iz e
o f the p o p u la tio n under 15 years o f age were made in the
above c a s e s . F urth erm o re, a d ju stm en ts fo r Ira n (fo r
which the survey covered only the s e t t l e d p o p u la tio n ) and
South A f r ic a (where Wavis Bay was excluded in the enum er
a ti o n ) were made w ith r e s p e c t to the s iz e o f the p o p u la
t i o n under age 15.
APPENDIX III
THE TOTAL FERTILITY RATE
In f i f t y - o n e c a s e s , the gro ss re p ro d u c tio n r a t e ,
which i s l i k e the t o t a l f e r t i l i t y r a t e b u t r e s t r i c t e d to
fem ale b i r t h s o n ly , was c o n v erted to a t o t a l f e r t i l i t y
r a t e . This was accom plished by m u ltip ly in g the GRR by
2.0 5 (th e f a c t o r one achieves when d iv id in g the U nited
S t a t e s ' t o t a l f e r t i l i t y r a t e by i t s gross re p ro d u c tio n
r a t e . Since the sex r a t i o is q u i te s i m i l a r from cou ntry
to c o u n try , the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the t o t a l f e r t i l i t y
r a t e and the gross re p ro d u c tio n r a t e in th e U nited S ta te s
was assumed as b eing r e p r e s e n ta t iv e o f th e r e l a t i o n s h i p
between th e s e two f a c t o r s in o th e r c o u n tr ie s as w e l l . ) .
In t h ir t y - t w o of the above f i f t y - o n e c a s e s , the gross
r e p r o d u c tio n r a t e s were taken from P o p u la tio n Index
( A p ril-J u n e , 1972; Vol. 38, No. 2 ). In the cases of
Panama and V enezuela, the gross r e p r o d u c tio n r a t e s do
n o t in c lu d e the ju n g le In d ian p o p u la tio n and in New
Z ealand, the Maoris a re n ever in clu d ed in the gross r e
p ro d u c tio n r a t e s . The gross r e p r o d u c tio n r a t e fo r South
A f ric a was computed by w eig htin g th e r a t e s fo r the
c o lo re d and w hite p o p u la tio n s on th e b a s is of t h e i r
1 0 2
103
p e rc e n ta g e of th e t o t a l p o p u la tio n (no r a t e s were given
f o r the Asian and A fric a n p o p u l a t i o n s ) .
In n in e te e n of the above f i f t y - o n e c a s e s , the gro ss
r e p ro d u c tio n r a t e s were tak e n from the 1969 U nited N ations
Demographic Yearbook. The g ro ss re p ro d u c tio n r a t e s found
in the above volume f o r Columbia, the Dominican R ep u b lic,
Honduras, I r a q , Jo rd a n , the R epublic of Korea, Libya,
Malaya, Mexico, N icaragu a, P a k is ta n , Paraguay, S pain,
Sudan, T h a ila n d , T u n is ia , and the U nited Arab Republic
are e s tim a te d r a t e s p re p a re d by the U nited N a tio n s.
For Chad, the gro ss re p ro d u c tio n r a t e is p r o v i s i o n a l
and i s an e s tim a te d annual average fo r th e A fric a n p o p u la
t i o n based on r e s u l t s of th e 1963-64 sample su rv ey . For
Cyprus, the g ro ss re p ro d u c tio n r a t e is computed on e s t i
mated b i r t h s based on c u r r e n t recorded d a ta a d ju s te d
upwards a c c o rd in g to the e x p e rie n c e of 1952-54. The
gro ss r e p ro d u c tio n r a t e fo r P a k is ta n is an e s tim a te based
on d a ta c o l l e c t e d by P a k i s t a n ’s P o p u la tio n Growth E s t i
m ation P r o j e c t .
The g e n e ra l f e r t i l i t y r a t e s (which i s a s in g le
r a t i o of a l l b i r t h s to the number of women of c h i l d
b e a rin g age) f o r I r a n , the P h i l i p p i n e s , and South A fric a
were computed by u sin g t o t a l l i v e b i r t h s and age s t r u c
tu r e d a ta from th e 1965 and 1969 e d itio n s o f th e U nited
N ations Demographic Yearbook. These r a t e s were then
tran sfo rm e d to t o t a l f e r t i l i t y r a t e s v ia Bogue's (1969:
104
661) form ula ( t o t a l f e r t i l i t y rate= 30.1 95 g e n e ra l f e r
t i l i t y r a t e + 3 4 3 .2 8 ).
For th e rem aining t h i r t e e n c o u n tr ie s on which d a ta
were a v a i l a b l e , crude b i r t h r a t e s were tran sfo rm ed to
t o t a l f e r t i l i t y r a t e s v ia Bogue’s (1969:661) form ula
( t o t a l f e r t i l i t y rate= 1 3 7 .9 4 crude b i r t h r a t e + 1 0 6 .1 6 ).
Crude r a t e s b ased on d a ta from c i v i l r e g i s t e r s which are
incom plete o r of unknown r e l i a b i l i t y a re a s s o c i a t e d w ith
Burma, Cameroon, N ig e r ia , and S i e r r a Leone. The crude
b i r t h r a t e o f N ig e ria i s based s o l e ly on Lagos; t h a t of
S i e r r a Leone i s based on the Western re g io n ; and t h a t o f
Burma i s based on th e towns. F urtherm ore, th e crude b i r t h
r a t e s f o r Cameroon, E th io p ia , Morocco, Togo, and Upper
V olta a re e s tim a te s based on sample s u r v e y s . The r a t e
f o r L ib e r ia i s an e s tim a te based on an a n a ly s is of the
se x -ag e s t r u c t u r e o f the p o p u la tio n acc o rd in g to th e 1962
c e n su s. The crude b i r t h r a t e fo r Cambodia was o b ta in e d
by a p p l i c a t i o n of th e " re v e rs e s u r v i v a l" method to r e
s u l t s o f the 1962 p o p u la tio n cen su s. T u rk ey 's crude
b i r t h r a t e i s an e s tim a te based on incom plete r e t u r n s of
th e T urkish Demographic Survey and the r a te f o r the
R epublic o f Vietnam i s based on d a ta fo r changing t e r r i
to ry r e p r e s e n ti n g about 70 per cen t of the p o p u la tio n
in 1965.
APPENDIX IV
THE INFANT MORTALITY RATE
C o u n trie s th a t r e p o r t in f a n t m o r t a l i t y r a t e s based
on incom plete o r u n r e l i a b l e d a ta and on sample surveys
in c lu d e Cambodia, In d o n e s ia , Morocco, Togo, and Upper
V o lta . Those c o u n tr ie s r e p o r tin g i n f a n t m o r t a l i t y r a t e s
based on incom plete or u n r e l i a b l e d a ta b u t based on po p
u l a t i o n censu ses in clu d e Ceylon, Cyprus, the Dominican
R e p u b lic , Honduras, I r a q , I s r a e l , Jo rd o n , the R epublic
o f Korea, N icaragua, N ig e r ia , Panama, P eru, th e P h i l i p
p i n e s , S i e r r a Leone, T h a ila n d , T u n is ia , the U nited Arab
R e p u b lic , and V enezuela.
P eru and V enezuela’s d a ta exclude the In d ia n ju n g le
p o p u la tio n and A u s t r a l i a 's d a ta exclude f u ll- b lo o d e d ab
o r i g i n a l s .
The in f a n t m o r ta li t y r a t e fo r N ig e ria i s only f o r
th e c a p i t a l c i t y of Lagos and the r a t e fo r S i e r r a Leone
i s fo r Freetown only. For Columbia, i n f a n t d e ath s a re
th e number of b u r i a l p e rm its but r a t e s a re computed on
th e number of bap tism s rec o rd ed in Roman C a th o lic Church
r e g i s t e r s . The data f o r China (Taiwan) exclude liv e - b o r n
i n f a n t s dying b e fo re r e g i s t r a t i o n of b i r t h . In the case
o f Cyprus, b eginning in 1955, data a re e s tim a te s based
105
106
on e x p erien ce of 1952-54, The in f a n t m o r t a l i t y r a t e fo r
Turkey i s an e s tim a te , the b a s i s fo r which is unknown.
APPENDIX V
NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION
A ccording to th e U nited N ations (1961 S t a t i s t i c a l
Yearbook, p . 638),
A d a i l y newspaper is d e f i n e d . . . a s a p u b l i c a
tio n c o n ta in in g g e n e ra l news and a p p earin g a t
l e a s t fo u r tim es a week. T o ta l c i r c u l a t i o n
is reg a rd ed as more s i g n i f i c a n t than the
number o f newspapers s in c e the l a t t e r is
s u b je c t to d i f f e r e n t methods o f enum eration.
The f i g u r e s f o r t o t a l c i r c u l a t i o n r e p re s e n t
the t o t a l d a il y c i r c u l a t i o n and r e f e r to the
number o f c o p ies sold b oth i n s id e and o u tsid e
the c o u n try . For a few c o u n tr ie s the t o t a l
c i r c u l a t i o n f i g u r e s r e p r e s e n t n e t p a id c ir c u -
. l a t i o n , but f o r most c o u n tr ie s th ey are only
e s t im a te s , g e n e r a lly o f f i c i a l , of vary in g
a ccu racy . No a d ju stm en t fo r c o p ies so ld o u t
sid e th e co u n try has been made in computing
the c i r c u l a t i o n per 1000 i n h a b i t a n t s , b u t
t h i s i s not b e lie v e d to a f f e c t m a t e r i a l l y
the r e s u l t s .
In i n t e r p r e t i n g the d a ta , i t should be borne
in mind th a t in d i f f e r e n t c o u n tr ie s the s iz e
o f a d a i l y newspaper may range from a s in g le
sh e et t o 50 or even more pages.
The c i r c u l a t i o n f ig u r e s fo r Canada r e f e r to E n g lish
and French language d a i l i e s o n ly and the f ig u r e s fo r the
U nited S ta te s r e f e r to E n g lish d a i l i e s only. The d a ta
for th e F e d e ra l R epublic of Germany in c lu d e s the c i r c u l a
tio n o f r e g io n a l e d i t i o n s . The c i r c u l a t i o n f ig u re fo r
Morocco r e f e r to the former French Zone only. F i n a ll y ,
107
108
the f ig u r e f o r Ir a q was i n t e r p o l a t e d fo r 1960 by u sin g
1°57 and 1963 d a ta .
The p r o p o r tio n of the p o p u la tio n 15 y e a rs of age
and o ver, which i s not always fo r th e same year as news
p ap er c i r c u l a t i o n p er c a p i t a , was computed by s u b t r a c t in g
the p e r c e n t of th e p o p u la tio n under 15 y e a rs of age
(see fo o tn o te number 4 and Appendix I I ) from 100 p er c e n t.
E stim ates o f m idyear p o p u la tio n ( c ir c a 1960) were tak en
from the 1965 U nited N ations Demographic Yearbook. The
midyear p o p u la tio n e s tim a te s fo r Peru and Venezuela ex
clude In d ian ju n g le p o p u la tio n s , but o f f i c i a l e s tim a te s
of underenum eration a re known (100,830 fo r Peru in 1961
and 31,800 f o r V enezuela in 1961) so adju stm en ts were
made by th e a u th o r. A lso, f u ll- b lo o d e d a b o r ig in a ls e s t i
mated a t 40,081 in June o f 1961, were excluded in th e
case of A u s t r a l i a . This e x c lu s io n was a ls o a d ju s te d f o r .
C o u n trie s f o r which e s tim a te s o f m idyear p o p u la tio n
are of q u e s tio n a b le r e l i a b i l i t y in c lu d e Burma, Ceylon,
Chad, China (T aiw an), Columbia, Cyprus, E th io p ia , G uate
m ala, In d o n e s ia , I r a n , I r a q , P a k is ta n , Paraguay, Peru,
the P h i l i p p i n e s , S i e r r a Leone, S pain, T h a ila n d , the U nited
Arab R ep u b lic, V enezuela, and the R epublic o f Vietnam.

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Creator Hohm, Charles Frederick (author)

Core Title The Effects Of Social Security Programs On Fertility Levels

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Sociology

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,sociology, demography

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Heer, David M. (committee chair), Miller, Jon P. (committee member), Morgner, Aurelius (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-864269

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