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An Examination Of Economic Expectations As A Determinant Of Political Behavior

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An Examination Of Economic Expectations As A Determinant Of Political Behavior

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Content EXAMINATION OF ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS AS DETERMINANT OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR by Ruth Kay Scott A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Political Science) February 1973 INFORMATION TO USERS This material was producad from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph end reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted. The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction. 1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Pags(s)". If it wes possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pegei. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity. 2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame. 3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., wes part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand comer of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first raw end continuing on until complete. 4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may bo ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pegas you wish reproduced. 5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received. Xsrox Unlvsrstty Microfilms 300 North ZMb Road Ann Arbor, MJcMoan 43108 74-11,707 SCOTT, Ruth Kay, 1945- AN EXAMINATION OF BCCNCMIC EXPECTATIONS AS A DETERMINANT OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR. University of Southern California, Ph.D., 1973 Political Science, general University Microfilms, A X E R O X Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED. UNIVERSITY O F SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA THE GRADUATE SCH OOL UNIVERSITY PARK LO S ANGELES. C A LIFO R N IA * 0 0 0 7 This dissertation, w ritten by under the direction of h.tUd.. Dissertation Com m ittee, and approved by all its m em bers, has been presented to and accepted by T he Graduate School, in partial fulfillm ent of requirements of the degree of Rutb.JtAy...jS.catt. D O C T O R O F P H I L O S O P H Y Dm * DISSERTATION COMMITTEE .......... ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Above all, I wish to thank my parents whose thoughtfulness and selflessness are a rarity. Kenneth H. Thompson served as major professor for this dissertation project and, as such, read and made critical comments on each successive draft. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS li LIST OF TABLES Chapter I. INTRODUCTION 1 Significance of the Problem . 1 Delineation of Research Objectives . . . 6 The Literature on the T o p i c ...............10 Lipset Analyses Leggett Analyses Zietlin Study Hamilton Study Trow Study Lindenfeld Study Summary of Economic Insecurity Literature and Some Additional Research .... 52 Expectations Literature Conclusions..................................61 II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 10 III. METHODOLOGY 63 Data Source ...................... Characteristics of the 1968 Data Sample: Is It Representative? 63 iii Chapter Page Measurement of Variables................ 68 Financial Expectations Dependent Variables . . . . . . . 70 Political Participation Personal Attitudes Political Attitudes Analytical Procedures . . . . . . . 90 Percentage Analysis Chi-Square TV. A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS................... 93 Introduction.................. 93 Characteristics of Those with Differing Financial Expectations . . . . . . 95 Conclusion................................109 V. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND FINANCIAL EXPECTATIONS ............................ 112 Introduction ............................ 112 Passive Participation ................... 112 Party Identification Vote Intention Attention to National and Public Affairs Following Political Campaigns Active Participation ................... 126 Voting Regularity Attempt to Influence Another Voter Campaign Buttons and Bumper Stickers Conclusion..................... 132 VI. PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTRIBUTES ASSOCIATED WITH FINANCIAL EXPECTATIONS ................ 135 Introduction ............................ 135 iv Chapter Personal Attitudes . ................... Economic Expectations As Related to Past and Present Economic Perceptions Personal Versus General Economic Pessimism Personal Efficacy ...................... Can Run Own Life Life Can Be planned Life Hill Work Out Trust in People Satisfaction with Life Conclusion ............................ VII. POLITICAL ATTITUDES ASSOCIATED WITH FINANCIAL EXPECTATIONS ................... Introduction ............................ Political Attitudes ................... Attitudes Toward Government Officials Attitudes Toward Political Parties Feelings of Political Efficacy Attitudes Toward Governmental Power Conclusion ............................ VIII. CONCLUSIONS ............................... Summary of Findings ................... Implications of Findings for Under standing Electoral Behavior .... Implications of Findings for Further Research ............................ BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................... Page 136 147 158 162 162 163 181 185 185 189 190 196 v LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Financial Expectation*: 1968 U.S. National Sample ......................... 96 2. Economic Expectations by Education: 1968 U.S. National Sample.................. 98 3. Economic Expectations by Income: 1968 U.S. National Sample................. 101 4. Economic Expectations by Occupation: 1968 U.S. National Sample . . .103 5. Economic Expectations by Self-Employment: 1968 U.S. National Sample . . . . . 106 6. Economic Expectations by Class Identification: 1968 U.S. National Sample.....................................107 7. Party Identification by Economic Expectations: 1968 U.S. National Sample 113 8. Strength of Party Identification by Economic Expectations: 1968 U.S. National Sample ......................... 117 9. Vote Intention by Economic Expectations: 1968 U.S. National S a m p l e ...............119 10. Attention to Public Affairs by Economic Expectations: 1968 U.S. National Sample......................... 122 vi Table Page 11. Attention to National Affairs by Economic Expectations: 1968 U.S. National Sample........................... 124 12. Follow Political Campaign Through Newspaper by Economic Expectations: 1968 U.S. National S a m p l e ...............125 13. Voting Regularity in Presidential Elections by Economic Expectations: 1968 U.S. National Sample............... 127 14. Attempt to Influence Another Voter by Economic Expectations: 1968 U.S. National Sample .......................... 129 15. Use of Bumper Sticker or Campaign Button by Economic Expectations: 1968 U.S. National Sample .......................... 131 16. Perception of Current Financial Situation in Comparison of Economic Expectations: 1968 U.S. National Sample . . . . . 137 17. Future Economic Expectations by Present Economic Situation Relative to Past: 1968 U.S. National S a m p l e ...............140 18. Projection of Future National Conditions by Financial Expectations: 1968 U.S. National Sample ......................... 142 19. Projection of Business Conditions in the Coming Year by Economic Expectations: 1968 U.S. National S a m p l e ...............145 20. Feeling that One Can Run Own Life by Financial Expectations: 1968 U.S. National Sample ..................149 vii Table Page 21. Attitude That Life Can be Planned Ahead by Economic Expectations: 1968 U.S. National Sample....................... . 151 22. Attitude That Life Hill Work Out As Respondent Would Like by Economic Expectations: 1968 U.S. National Sample ..................................152 23. Trust in People by Economic Expectations: 1968 U.S. National S a m p l e ............... 155 24. Life Satisfying by Financial Expectations: 1968 U.S. National S a m p l e ............... 157 25. Confidence in Knowledgeability of Governmental Officials by Economic Expectations: 1968 U.S. National Sample.....................................164 26. Dishonesty of Government Officials by Economic Expectations: 1968 U.S. National Sample ......................... 166 27. Attitudes Toward Political Parties by Economic Expectations: 1968 U.S. National Sample........................... 170 28. Attitudes Toward Political Parties As Pressure Groups by Economic Expectations: 1968 U.S. National S a m p l e ...............171 29. Parties Keep Promises by Economic Expectations: 1968 U.S. National Sample.....................................173 30. Attitude That Public Officials Care by Economic Expectations: 1968 U.S. National Sample........................... 175 viii Table Page 31. Respondent Can Influence Government Action by Economic Expectations: 1968 U.S. National Sample ........................... 177 32. Politics Too Complicated by Economic Expectations: 1968 U.S. National Sample......................................178 33. Attitude That Government is Too Powerful by Economic Expectations: 1968 U.S. National Sample............................ 180 ix CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Significance of the Problem Explanation of political behavior has centered basically around two main criteria: (1) the objective characteristics of the participant, and (2) the subjective criteria of perception. Empirical research has demon strated the importance of the numerous variables of social class, education, occupation, income, and many more "fixed" indicators of the characteristics of an individual as they are related to his subsequent political behavior. It has been found that objective criteria play a key part in explaining and predicting political party identifica tion, liberal-conservative ideology and general attitudes on governmental action. In addition to the importance of objective cri teria in understanding political behavior has come the more recent focus on the important psychological factor of perception. Various forms of research have demonstrated the influential role of one's perception of himself and others which goes beyond objective criteria in coloring behavior.* Perception in terms of evaluation of self and others has been found to be related to a wide variety of behavior and attitudes, including participation in social disturbances, violence, and feelings of alienation and authoritarianism. An integral part of the individual's perception construct is expectations. The importance of expectation as an influential variable has been well established in several areas of research. In the social-psychology area expectations have been explored as a key variable in generating motiva tion for different types of behavior. In the political science literature expectations have been found to be an important variable related to riot participation, voting intentions, and many other facets of political behavior. Evidence accumulated by a number of scholars has shown Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in Ideology and Discontent, ed. by David Apter (New York: Free Press, 1964) , pp. 206-261. Murray Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1971). 3 that through expectations about the future man creates his world and that these expectations influence attitude formation. In a discussion of aggressive behavior Leonard Berkowitz notes the importance of expectations when he states: Contrary to traditional motivational thinking and motivational concepts of Freud and Lorenz, many psychologists now insist that deprivations alone are inadequate to account for most motivated behavior. According to this newer theorizing, much greater might must be given to anticipations of the goal theui merely to the duration or magnitude of deprivation per se. The stimulus arising from these anticipations— from anticipatory goal responses "is now held to be a major determinant of the vigor and persistence of goal-seeking activity.3 A review of the literature relating economic insecurity as an independent variable to political behav ior and attitudes makes it obvious that the relationship of the two variables needs further clarification. Eco nomic insecurity has been found to lead to several differ ent political consequences which are often contradictory. There is a need for systematic clarification of the Leonard Berkowitz, "Seme Implications of Labora tory Studies of Frustration and Aggression for the Study of Political Violence1 * (Paper delivered at 1967 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 5-9, 1967), p. 7. 4 "effect” of economic insecurity on political attitudes and behavior. An example of the contradictory findings which indicate that the same set of expectations lead to differ ent political results are those made manifest in a com parison of the three studies conducted by Zietlin, Hamilton, and Trow. ^ Zietlin finds that economic insecur ity leads to a leftist political orientation, Hamilton finds that economic insecurity has no apparent role as an influential variable for either a left or right political position, and yet Martin Trow finds that those who are economically insecure are also political conservatives. In addition to these contradictory findings, economic insecurity has been generally associated with a wide range of political reactions which have not been clearly documented empirically. Different studies have Maurice zietlin, "Economic Insecurity and the Political Attitudes of Cuban Workers," American Sociolog ical Review, XXXI (February, 1966), 35-53; Richard P. Hamilton, "The Marginal Middle Class: A Reconsideration," American Sociological Review, XXIX (April, 1964), 76-91; Martin Trow, "Small Businessmen, Political Tolerance, and McCarthy," American Journal of Sociology. LXIV (November, 1958), 270-281. 5 linked economic insecurity to nonvoting, class conscious ness , and authoritarianism.5 Thus, while the literature does agree on the importance of the variable of economic insecurity in influencing political behavior, it does not agree as to the degree or type of influence this variable has upon the direction of the vote, its relationship to the attitude of authoritarianism or political Intolerance and its impetus to support radical politics. One of the noted researchers in political science has suggested that expectations may even be irrelevant to the act of politi cal participation when he states: Political participation may be inhibited by fatalis tic attitudes or by specific expectations of the course of history (war, depression, electoral out come) making the proposed participant acts seem useless or irrelevant for the society or the individ ual; but bandwagon appeal may make participation in a sure victory an inducement to engage in politics, and group loyalties, sense of duty, support of a well-loved candidate, and so forth, may make expec tations of future events irrelevant to the act of participation.6 Seymour H. Lipset, "Three Decades of the Radical Right: Coughlinites, McCarthyitea, and Birchers," in The Radical Right, ed. by Daniel Bell (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1963). * * Robert Lane, Political Life (New York: Collier McMillan Ltd., 1964), p. 93. 6 A review of the literature leaves the reader still asking the questions: What is the behavior of the finan cially dissatisfied and insecure? Do they attempt to change things politically or do they sulk on the sidelines and only complain? Because these questions remain open it then seems reasonable to focus upon the relationship of expectation and political behavior in this research effort. Delineation of Research Objectives This study has two objectives. First, it attempts to determine which of the many conjectures as to the relationship of economic expectations and political behav ior is correct by setting forth the empirical relationship derived from a 1968 nationally-representative sample in a precise manner. An attempt will be made to answer the questions that remain open. Do those who feel economi cally insecure participate to a lesser degree in the electoral process? Are the insecure more susceptible to political radicalism? And because they do feel economi cally threatened, are the insecure less likely to be trustful of government officials? 7 Secondly, an attempt will be made to determine whether economic pessimism and optimism Is accompanied by a congruent attltudlnal syndrome. Do those who anticipate financial deterioration in the coming year also feel that they have no control over their lives and that it is use less to plan ahead because life is largely a matter of chance? Is the economic pessimist generally dissatisfied with life, and distrustful of others, feeling that if they get the chance they will take advantage of him? These are the types of questions which will be considered in an effort to characterize the psychological attributes that accompany economic expectations. Although the variables under investigation in this study will be precisely defined in detail in Chapter III, several preliminary comments specifying the major depend ent and independent variables to be analyzed will aid in understanding the research objective of this dissertation. First, the particular form of political behavior on the part of the general electorate which has been selected as the focus of analytical attention consists of the three basic categories of (1) active political participation— voting for a third party candidate, voting regularity, and attempting to influence another voter; (2) passive 8 political participation— following political campaigns in newspapers, following public affairs, and attention to national affairs; (3) political attitudes— trust of government officials, feelings of political efficacy and confidence in political parties. The independent variable of this study, financial expectations, is the individual's projection of his future financial condition. It is the respondent's perception of how he and his family will be doing in one year in comparison to how he is doing financially at the present time. In connection with this zero-order percentage analysis of the relationship of economic expectations and political behavior is the concern for the political impli cations of expectations. Several research projects have pointed to the importance of domestic events in influenc- •J ing American politics. If economic expectations are related to a congruent attitudinal syndrome they may have a definite influence on the type of man and platform 7 William A. Scott, "Attitudes Toward Participation in Civil Defense: An Analysis via Psychological Con structs," Public Opinion Quarterly, XVII (1953), 377. 9 chosen for political leadership by the electorate. If those who are pessimistic about their financial future also feel relatively powerless in their own personal lives and in the political process, it may be that they would support political leadership that promises "their group" a voice in government. The presence of an attitu- dinal syndrome as it is linked to financial expectations will be a concern of this study. This study is not primarily concerned with the question of why one formulates a pessimistic or optimis tic expectation. The analysis does not attempt to account for the possible causes of expectations. Nor does the analysis attempt to evaluate the "validity" of the expectation by analyzing income, education, occupa tion, or economic opportunity. In Chapter II a detailed discussion of the literature will be presented to illuminate the signifi cance of the independent variable and its current hypoth esized relationship to political behavior. CHAPTER II REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE The Literature on the Topic The literature linking economic insecurity to political behavior is contradictory and at times lacks adequate empirical evidence. Different studies have linked economic insecurity to political radicalism, non voting, increased participation, both left and right voting, class consciousness, authoritarianism, and it has even been suggested that economic insecurity has no "effect" on political attitudes. Lipset*s statement regarding the numerous possible types of political behav ior which are associated with economic insecurity is a fitting summary of the conflicting findings. He states: Isolation, a punishing childhood, economic and occu pational insecurities, and a lack of sophistication are conducive to withdrawal, or even apathy, and to strong mobilization of hostility. The same under lying factors which predispose individuals toward support of extremist movements under certain condi tions may result in total withdrawal from political activity and concern under other conditions. In 10 11 "normal1 * periods, apathy is most frequent among such Individuals, but they can be activated by a crisis, especially if it is accompanied by strong millennial appeals.* - Lipaet Analyses Lipset, in Political Man, examines the social and economic characteristics of a nation as they correlate with the type of political system or political processes found therein. The author sketches an outline of the variables which encourage participation in politics and influence the behavior of the voter. Having noted such variables as income, education, occupation, and social class, Lipset then begins an exploration of the sources of support for the values and movements which sustain or threaten democratic institutions. Drawing upon history and national public opinion surveys, Lipset relates man and his social environment to his political behavior. Of particular importance to this research project is Lipset*s analysis of the factors which may influence those variables which (1) serve as an impetus to partici pate in the electoral process, (2) influence one's pre ^Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1963). 12 disposition toward political authoritarianism, and (3) influence the direction of the individual's vote, i.e., right or left. In regard to these three aspects of polit ical behavior Lipset posits the proposition that economic security is an important independent variable. For exam ple, regarding the development of authoritarianism Lipset states, "A second and no less important factor predispos ing the lower classes toward authoritarianism is a relative lack of economic and psychological security.• From an analysis of the public opinion data gathered by Samuel 3 Stoffer on attitudes toward civil liberties, Lipset notes that there is a strong relationship between occupation and political tolerance. Those in the higher occupations, non- manual workers, were more likely than manual workers to be politically tolerant. In an attempt to explain this relationship, Lipset points to the characteristics of people in manual occupations and notes the presence of the variables of isolation, economic insecurity and low educa tional attainment. Lipset then settles on these variables as an explanation of the relationship of manual occupation 2Ibid., p. 106. 3Ibid., pp. 114-126 13 and political intolerance and reinforces his explanation with citations of empirical studies which find that (1) fanners are most likely to suffer from economic insecurity and that they also tend to oppose civil liberties; and (2) the unemployed tend to be less tolerant of minority A groups than the employed. In summary, for Lipset, economic insecurity is a variable which links the lower economic classes to author itarianism and he suggests that as one moves down the socioeconomic ladder one will find greater economic insecurity.5 Continuing with the importance of the independent variable of economic insecurity, Lipset proposes that it is also related to the individual's decision as to which political party to support in an election. Lipset suggests the proposition that a high degree of economic insecurity may predispose an individual to support left or right extremist political groups. Lipset states. High states of tension require immediate alleviation, and this is frequently found in the venting of hos- 4Ibid. 5Ibid. 14 tility against a scapegoat and the search for a short term solution by support of extremist groups.® Lipset cites several national studies which operationalize economic insecurity as unemployment rate and demonstrate a high correlation between working class unemployment and support of the Communist party, and middle class unemploy- 7 raent and support for the Nazis movement. In discussing the social base of the Nazis move ment, Lipset alludes to the appeal of such a movement to the small businessman because of its promise of restoring economic security. He explains the appeal of fascism by noting, . . . fascism and populism propose to solve the problems by taking over the state and running it in a way which will restore the old middle classes' economic security and high standing in society, and at the same time reduce the power and status of big capital and big labor.® Lipset sees the feeling of economic insecurity, the fear of being economically displaced or dispossessed, as an important independent variable related to support of an 6Ibid., p. 106. 7Ibid., pp. 131-136. 8Ibid., p. 134. 15 extremist group. When conducting multi-nation analysis of voter social characteristics as they are correlated with support of left political parties , Lipset finds that manual worker groups with high unemployment, and individuals in the specific occupations of mining, fishing and less skilled occupation categories are more likely to vote for leftist political parties.9 In am attempt to explain leftist voting Lipset notes that it has been generally interpreted as an expression of discontent and as an indication that specific needs of the individual are not being met. Lipset lists the need for security of income at the top of a list of human basic needs which includes the need for satisfying work and the need for status. He explains the influence of economic insecurity by saying, "Certain occupational groups in the lower-income category suffer from extreme insecurity . . . these groups have histories of high rates of leftist voting."*'® And in connection with data indicating that low-income groups of several nations do vote for leftist political parties 9Ibid., p. 104. 16 Lipset cites survey data shewing that during the United States depression when economic insecurity became wide spread in the 1936 and 1940 period, the nation swung strongly pro-Roosevelt. Lipset then hypothesises that the relative conservatism of white collar workers in the United States may be due to their greater job security during the depression.11 While Lipset does relate economic insecurity and voting for leftist and extremist groups, he is quick to point out that economic insecurity does not always lead to participation in the electoral process. The same underlying factors which predispose individuals toward support of the extremist movements may, under certain conditions, result in total withdrawal from political 12 activity. Lipset cites a study conducted in the United Ibid., p. 247. See also, p. 92, where he states that "the poorer strata everywhere are more liberal or leftist on economic issues; they favor more welfare state measures, higher wages, graduated income taxes, support of trade-unions, and so forth. But when liberalism is de fined in noneconomic terms— as support of civil liberties, internationalism, etc.— the correlation is reversed. The more well-to-do are more liberal, the poorer are more intolerant." 12 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 17 States which finds that apathy is the characteristic 13 response of the unemployed, and later suggests that anticipatory socialization, a belief in the possibility of future upward mobility or improvement of one's economic position may also decrease participation due to increased cross-pressures. For Lipset then, in Political Man,14 economic insecurity is related to several different types of polit ical behavior. Again, in The Politics of Unreason,^5 the author continues to view economic insecurity as an impor tant independent variable influencing political behavior. In The Politics of Unreason, Lipset continues his profile and exploration of those who vote for and belong to extremist political groups. In a deeper and more specific examination of these groups he turns to a historical and sociological context and discusses extremism as the 13 E. Wight Bakke, Citizens Without Work (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), p. 46. ^^Lipset, loc. cit. 15 Seymour H. Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason (New York: Harper and Row, 1970). 18 "politics of despair." Lipset feels that American society has put a premium on achievement and that extremism draws its strength and substance from the anxiety created by a fear of losing one's status. For Lipset the politics of extremism is a reaction to a state of strain and he states, Extremist movements are not primarily the product of extremists. The critical ranks in extremist move ments are not composed of evil-structured types called "extremists" but rather of ordinary people caught in certain kinds of stress. For Lipset it is stress and anxiety brought about by the fear of losing one's status, social or economic, resulting in political dislocation which leaves the door open for the arrival of extremist political groups. The author specifically points to the variable of economic insecurity as a part of the phenomenon of anxiety. Anxiety, as Lipset discusses it, is a fear of loss of power or status and it is those who feel anxious about their position of power or social status who are most likely to be discontent with the existing political 16Ibid., p. 15. 19 order and thus likely to support extremist movements. Lipset discusses two major groups which may £all Into the category of discontent, the upper Income and socially privileged and the working class. In a time of prosperity and economic development the upper class fears that the laboring class is making such economic gains that they may, as individuals, no longer enjoy a position of status. At the other end of the spectrum is the period of economic depression, in which, as Lipset points out, the expecta tions of the working class are disrupted, thus leaving them in a state of discontent. For Lipset it is these periods of discontent among these two groups which provide fertile grounds for extremist movements. Turning to history and public opinion data for an evaluation of the proposition that extremist political movements enjoy the support of these two discontented classes, Lipset finds some interesting relationships. From an analysis of the 1930's, a decade of the great depression, the data indicate a considerable increase in support for left-wing factions and also considerable 17 success of right-wing extremist movements. In an ^Ibid., p. 151. Lipset notes the increase of 20 explanation of the rise of these groups Lipset portrays the voter as one who reacts to economic problems by supporting groups which promise to alleviate the situa tion. Lipset states, But, the whole periods of depressions have witnessed the emergence of interest and/or economic class- related politics during which diverse strata, includ ing the lower, have sought above all, economic reme dies for their distress.18 Continuing with the possible linkage between economic dissatisfaction and support for extremist groups, Lipset probes deeper into the social basis of the right- wing movement of the 1930*s. From an analysis of those who supported Father Charles Coughlin through opinion poll data on attitudes on domestic issues Lipset finds that Coughlin support was a result partially of economic dis satisfaction. The Coughlin backers at every economic level were much more discontented with (1) their financial situation, (2) the economic state of the country, and (3) the prospect of the future than were those opposed to the Coughlin movement. Two thirds of the Coughlin the Communist and Socialist vote from 300,000 in 1928 to almost one million in 19 32. 18Ibid., p. 153 21 supporters felt that their personal economic situation had been declining. Those who felt that there had been a decline in their personal economic situation were more likely to support the Coughlin movement.19 Also significant in light of Lipset's earlier proposition that economic insecurity may lead to leftist voting is his findings in the opinion poll data during the Coughlin era which shows that those who approved of Coughlin in 1938 were more likely to support the Republican Party rather than the Democratic Party. The party pref erences of the Coughlin supporters are inferred from the response to the question, "If you were voting for a con gressman today would you be most likely to vote for the Republican, Democratic or third party candidate?" In all income levels those who approved of Coughlin were more likely to vote Republican than Democrat except for those 19 Ibid., p. 177. One of the first movements for which there is reliable data concerning the supporters. The Gallup surveys indicate that Coughlin supporters at every economic level were dissatisfied with their eco nomic condition. 22 20 on relief. It is significant that Lipset earlier had proposed that the economically lower strata vote for the leftist party, especially during a time of economic depression, and yet here is empirical evidence that regardless of economic class those supporting the right- wing movement are more likely to vote Republican. Turning to the 1950's, a period of economic pros perity and of McCarthyism, Lipset cites Edward Shils's comment that increased prosperity, like the depression, still contains room for insecurity. Shils states. The increased prosperity, elevating people into new standards of living and into new perception of new possibilities, also led some of them to become more anxious about the future, to be troubled about a depression and about the precariousness of their possessions.21 Lipset describes the era of the 1950's as one of increased prosperity but also increased fear of dispossession, increased threat of loss of new economic position and 20 Question taken from 1938 Gallup Survey. See Table 14 in Lipset and Raab, op. cit., p. 179. In every economic category the Republican Party identifiers were more likely than the Democratic Party identifiers to support the Coughlin movement. 21 Edward A. Shils, The Torment of Secrecy (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956), p. 92. 23 increased tension. The survey data collected during the era of McCarthy suggest that economic security may have been an important variable influencing his supporters. In a summary of the data Lipset points out that when viewed in occupational categories, McCarthy's main opponents were to be found among professional, managerial, and clerical personnel, while his support was disproportionately located among self- employed businessmen, farmers and manual workers.^2 It is those groups which Lipset suggested are most likely to suffer from economic insecurity which supported McCarthy. Looking at the most recent extremist political movement, Lipset examines the Wallace movement to again find a possible relationship between economic insecurity and third party support. The findings of the Riley- 2 1 Pettigrew survey in Indiana of white males J indicate a 22 Lipset and Raab, op. cit., p. 224. The authors state, "A number of quantitative analyses of the sources of McCarthy's support indicate that it came dispropor tionately from Catholics, New Englanders, Republicans, the less educated, the lower class, manual workers, farmers, older people, and the Irish." 23 Robert T. Riley and Thomas P. Pettigrew, "Rela tive Deprivation and Wallace's Northern Support," as cited in Lipset and Raab, op. cit., p. 363. 24 relationship between belief that the condition of the average man is getting worse and a vote preference for Wallace* Those who were agreed with the statement and felt that man's condition was getting worse were much more likely (41.5 percent) to support Wallace than those who disagreed (18.0 percent) with the statement. Lipset notes, "The Gary survey inquired also as to attitudes on various issues and found evidence which suggests that economic 24 concerns may have underlain much of the Wallace support." Regardless of class identification, be it working or middle class, those who felt that the condition of the average man was getting worse were more likely to prefer Wallace. This empirical evidence supports Lipset*s position that economic insecurity is an important independent variable and again the variable becomes important when Lipset attempts to explain the rationale behind labor's pre-election support of Wallace. Lipset cites A. H. Raskin, who alludes to the element of a feeling of threat on the part of the worker when he says, "The worker, as the most recent arrival at a secure handhold on middle Lipset and Raab, op. cit., p. 363. 25 25 class status, feels the most threatened." Lipset again in his analysis of the Wallace movement as in the period of depression and in the period of prosperity of the 1950*s sees economic insecurity as a major variable. Generally, in a review of extremist groups that have been active in United States history, Lipset has found some empirical basis to support his proposition that economic insecurity is related to political behavior. Yet a problem with the Lipset analysis is that numerous vari ables are given superficial examination. Lipset has approached the study of the variables linked to support for extremist groups in a rather broad scope and although his analysis is inclusive of many variables none of the variables receive the necessary depth of evaluation. Essentially, what Lipset has done is to begin the actual pioneering aspect of research by specifying a general area and then suggesting which variables seem to be important and thus need further analysis. The selection of one of 25 A. H. Raskin, "And the Pro-Humphrey Labor Chiefs Are Worried," New York Times, September 15, 1968, p. 20. 26 these variables for further analysis, that of economic insecurity as an independent variable as it relates to political behavior, is the focus of this research project. And thus, it now becomes essential to narrow the litera ture review to those studies which specifically deal with the variable of economic insecurity. Leggett Analyses John Leggett sets out to test the hypothesis that 26 economic insecurity increases class consciousness. Beginning with the assumption that unemployed workers are Insecure in the economic realm, Leggett interviewed blue collar Detroit workers in the summer of 1960. His random sample was drawn from a population which has faced con siderable economic distress during the late 1950's and who are predominantly members of a labor union, fforking class consciousness is defined as a mental state varying in intensity from class verbalization through skepticism and militancy to egalitarianism. Unemployment in the working class is the independent variable which the 26 John C. Leggett, 'Economic Insecurity and Work ing-Class Consciousness," American Sociological Review, XXIX (April, 1964), 226-234. author relates to the dependent variable of the attitudes of (1) class verbalization— the tendency of the individual to discuss topics in class terms; (2) skepticism— a belief that wealth is allocated within the community so as to benefit primarily the middle class; (3) militancy— a predisposition to behave aggressively for the purpose of advancing the interest of one's class; and (4) egali tarianism-meaning an attitude favoring an equal distri bution of wealth. The data indicate that those who are unemployed are more likely to be class conscious than the employed. Of the unemployed 46 percent were either militant and for favoring egalitarianism or only militant, while only 31 percent of the employed sample fell into the same cate- 28 gory. Dividing the sample into Negro and White respond ents, both employed and unemployed, the author finds, somewhat unexpectedly, that unemployed Blacks are slightly less likely to be class conscious than White unemployed 27Ibid., p. 230. 28 Ibid., pp. 226-234. 28 29 respondents. Leggett suggests that the question of unemployment status is unrelated to the militance of all Negro workers but he has no data to substantiate his posi tion and thus it is only a tentative proposition. A third aspect of the Leggett article is the relationship of employment status, class consciousness and membership in a labor union. The data indicate that 80 percent of the unionized unemployed as opposed to 27 percent of the unemployed nonunion workers are class militants. Membership in a labor union seems to be strongly related to a feeling of class consciousness and Leggett attempts to explain a feeling of class conscious ness as not only a result of economic insecurity but also a product of one's environment. Leggett suggests that the individuals of the unemployed and employed reside in relatively small, culturally homogeneous areas and "their neighborhood organizations often deal with class and race questions, such as unemployment, educational facilities, and similar matters.**30 29Ibid., p. 231. 29 While Leggett finds that those who are unemployed are more likely to be class conscious, the entire study lacks adequate empirical support. One of the major prob lems with the Leggett article is that the sample is very small and thus any generalizations made are very tentative. Of the 375 workers interviewed, 49 are retired workers and, as suggested by Lipset in Political Man, the retired worker must be differentiated as being militant due to age alone.^ The number for the unemployed is only 50 respond ents and when broken down to racial groups it contains only 25 White and Black respondents, respectively. A second important problem with the Leggett research is that to relate class consciousness and un employment, one must be sure that he is measuring class consciousness and not authoriatrianism. Leggett defines 31 Lipset, Political Man, p. 285. Lipset notes that there are two processes which may affect the political behavior of the aged. He states, "On one hand, as we indi cated earlier, people are likely to retain the perspec tives and loyalties of their youth. Thus, in the present day, an older population will probably slow down political changes. On the other hand, the aged in modem industrial society are largely an underprivileged group; they have no useful role to perform as they had in rural societies, nor are they well supported by, or integrated into, families. As a group, therefore, they are especially dependent on the state." 30 class consciousness by the same indicators as other authors measure authoritarianism. The Leggett article needs to clearly differentiate between these two concepts. Leggett's research is valuable in that it suggests various areas of exploration such as what effect does membership in local organizations have upon the relation ship of the variable economic insecurity as it is related to class consciousness? And he raises the question in this researcher's mind as to how best to measure economic insecurity. Is economic insecurity synonymous with un employment or might economic expectations of one's future financial situation be a better indicator of economic insecurity? In a second article investigating economic 32 deprivation as it is related to political extremism, Leggett also uses unemployment as an indicator of depri vation and the reader is left wondering if unemployment is a correct indicator of both concepts. Beginning with the general hypothesis that un employment in a community leads to expectations of David S. Street and John C. Leggett, "Economic Deprivation and Extremism: A Study of Unemployed Negroes," American Journal of Sociology, LXVII (July, 1961), 53-57. 31 violence and is correlated with liberal or radical polit ical views regarding governmental intervention in the economy, authors Street and Leggett gather interview data in two blue collar Negro neighborhoods and generally the data support the above propositions. In a neighborhood of those suffering from unemployment, expectations of violence were more frequent and thus Leggett and Street find that unemployment increases the likelihood of indi viduals expecting violence. In regard to the proposition that unemployment is correlated with liberal political views regarding governmental intervention in the economy the data also support this hypothesis. Those facing eco nomic distress supported governmental intervention in the 33 economy. But again Leggett in his second article is plagued with a small number, a total of 92 respondents, definitely too small a sample upon which to base substantial general izations. Also, the reader is left uninformed as to the wording of the questions asked, particularly when one is trying to understand how the authors define extremism. 33Ibid. 32 Over-all, Leggett and Street present a very weak research design and a small nonrandom sample which means that any generalizations made must be tentative. Zietlin Study After a brief review of the literature relating economic insecurity and political radicalism, discontent with the existing order and a tendency to conceive of oneself as an 'exploited victim,' Zietlin posits the hypothesis that the greater the economic insecurity the greater the support for the Cuban revolution.Zietlin defines the independent variable of economic insecurity as unemployment or underemployment, and his indicator of degree of economic insecurity is the length of unemploy ment an individual has experienced. The data collection consists of interviews of 210 Cuban workers in the summer of 1962, a random sample, from which Zietlin finds: (1) The workers with the most economic insecurity, the longest period of unemployment, were more likely to support the revolution. Of those who worked six months Maurice Zietlin, "Economic Insecurity and the Political Attitudes of Cuban Workers," American Sociologi cal Review, XXXI (February, 1966). 33 or less before the revolution, 63 percent were very favor* able to the revolution, while of those who worked ten months or more only 40 percent were very favorable toward the revolution. (2) Economic Insecurity also affected the workers' pre-revolutionary political orientations, in measuring the attitudes of the workers toward the Comaunists before the revolution Zietlin finds that workers who experienced the most unemployment before the revolution were more likely to be sympathetic to the Communists than those who had experienced little unemployment prior to the revolu tion. Of those who worked nine months or less per year before the revolution 40 percent supported the revolution while only 27 percent of those who worked ten months or more felt favorable toward the revolution. An interesting item in the data analysis that Zietlin does not comment on is that those suffering from economic insecurity are more likely to be either favorable or hostile to the revolution than those who were securely employed. The economically insecure tended to either favor (40 percent) or be hostile toward (29 percent) the revolution, whereas the economically secure predominantly indicated (46 percent) an attitude of indifference with 34 only 27 percent Indicating a feeling of hostility. It is interesting that those plagued by economic insecurity fell under the extreme categories in terms of attitudes toward the Cuban revolution. (3) Increased economic security yielded increased support for the revolution. Those workers whose economic security was greater after the revolution than it was prior to the revolution were more likely to support the revolution than those who were employed prior to and who continued to be employed. In summarizing the importance of the independent variable of economic security Zietlin states. From knowledge of a significant fact of their lives before the revolution, namely, their relative eco nomic security, it was possible to predict more or less accurately the workers* differential responses to the ideological and social content of the revolu tion. 35 The Zietlin article is significant in that it allows a testing of the independent variable in an envir onment which has been continually plagued by economic fluctuations and that its findings parallel many of the findings regarding the role of the independent variable 35Ibid., p. 51. in a generally stable society. But the major problem with the Zietlin study is that the author is relying on hindsight on the part of the respondent and hindsight in the area of sympathies may be distorted evidence. Various follow-up electoral studies have shown that respondents 36 tend to remember supporting the winner. This tendency might also play an influential role in the minds of the previous economically insecure who now have jobs and are remembering feelings of sympathy toward the Communist movement• Another problem is that in the data source no presently insecure workers were interviewed. Those who worked less than six months after the revolution were not included in the interview sample. Thus, the hypothesis is not evaluated in the area of decreased economic secur ity or among those who have maintained the same level of security following the revolution. Of the sample no worker has decreased in economic security, while only one respondent has not experienced increased economic 36 Robert E. Lane, Political Lifes Why People Get Involved in Politics (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1959) , p. 181. 36 security. The question of a decline in economic security as it relates to political attitudes is left unanswered by the Zietlin study. Yet, over all, the Zietlin study is a research project well done. The variables are clearly identified, the tables are clearly labeled and the reader is adequately informed as to the questions which appeared on the interview schedule. Hamilton Study Richard Hamilton briefly reviews the literature concerning the values of the lower middle class worker and then proceeds to carry out his own research on the attitude of this occupational group. Hamilton records that previous research has found that the white collar worker, as distinguished from the blue collar worker, has middle class values, thinks of himself as a member of the middle class and not the working class, and tends to feel that the groups of big business, labor, socialists, com munist and upwardly mobile minority groups are threatening to his well-being. Hamilton then sets out to examine 37 Richard F. Hamilton, "The Marginal Middle Class: A Reconsideration," American Sociological Review, XXIX (August, 1964), 576-579. 37 these propositions with occupation being the independent variable which determines class identification. Specifi cally, the author identifies the occupational categories of clerical and sales personnel as constituting the lower middle class or "the marginal middle class.This group is to be compared with the upper working class, the skilled workers. The source of data is the Survey Research Center, 1956 Election Study. From analysis of these data Hamilton finds a surprising pattern. A majority (52 percent) of the mar ginal middle class identify with the working class rather than with the middle class. Hamilton has found that the previous literature may be in error in assuming that the white collar worker would like to distinguish himself from the blue collar worker. From this finding Hamilton reasons that the group of lower middle class personnel which identify with the middle class are those most likely Ibid. Hamilton utilizes occupation as an indi cator of economic insecurity and identifies the categories of clerical and sales personnel as those classes which make up the "marginal middle class." 39 National data sample collected by University of Michigan Survey Research Center on the 1956 American elec torate . 38 to be troubled by a feeling of threat of other groups * catching up.* The author then turns to focus on the attitudes of the white collar working-class identifiers as compared with white collar middle-class identifiers. Class identification, along with occupation, has now become a major independent variable in the Hamilton analysis. From a division of the sample into class identi fication as it is related to policy questions while con trolling for occupation, Hamilton finds that: (1) Contrary to what other authors have suggested as to the tendency of the marginal middle class to support conservative politics, the data only modestly support this assumption. More than half of the marginal middle class agreed that the government should help provide low cost medical care and jobs. (2) Those of middle class occupation who identi fied with the middle class were less likely to support a program of government action. Only 44 percent agreed that government should help provide low cost medical care, while 63 percent of the middle class workers who identi fied with the working class agreed to a necessary govern- 39 ment role in this area. Exploring further into the thesis of "status panic," the assumption that the marginal middle class suffers from the anxiety of losing their positions and thus are more likely to be discontent or hostile, Hamilton related occupation and class identification to expecta tions about future earnings, satisfaction with present financial situation and attitudes on Negro housing and school integration. The findings were: (1) A significant distinction exists between the two groups of middle-class and working-class identifiers as related to expectations of future financial improve ment. The middle-class identifiers of the sales and clerical occupations are more likely to report a greater income in recent years (47 percent) and to expect future financial improvement (54 percent) than those of the same occupation who identified with the working class. (2) An exception to the trend of the middle-class identifiers to be more optimistic was found in response to the question of satisfaction with present financial situation. Those who were clerical and sales personnel and who identified with the middle class were slightly 40 more likely to indicate a lover level of satisfaction than the working-class identifiers. Hamilton interprets this outcome not as a result of anxiety but rather as being due higher expectations which this group may have set for themselves.40 To test the assumption that the marginal middle class will tend to be authoritarian, Hamilton selects two questions to use as indicators of authoritarianism. They are (1) whether or not the government should guarantee fair treatment in jobs and housing for Negroes, and (2) the government's role in aiding school integration. Hamilton finds that the 1956 election data indicate, con trary to the previous propositions in literature, that it is the working class identifying clerical and sales group, the marginal group, which is more favorably disposed toward government action in these areas. Of the clerical and sales occupation respondents who identified with the All analyses are based upon percentage analysis of the independent variables of subjective class identifi cation and occupation as they are related to the dependent variables of (1) government aid to medical care, (2) Negro housing and school integration, (3) future financial expectations, and (4) general life satisfaction. 41 working class, 74 percent: agreed that the government should help Negroes in securing jobs and housing while only 64 percent of those in the same occupations but who identi fied with the middle class agreed, a difference of 10 per cent. Those identifying with the working class were less likely to disapprove of governmental help to Blacks in securing jobs and housing. Those least favorable toward government aid to Blacks were the skilled workers who identified with the middle class. In regard to the second question on governmental aid in bringing about integration, no significant differ ence was found between those identifying with the middle or working class. Membership in the marginal middle class appears to have no effect on this attitude and thus a tendency toward authoritarianism does not appear supported. In summation, Hamilton states, *We find virtually no basis for the acceptance of the thesis that those on the margins of the middle class provide some peculiar center of 1 reaction * and intolerance.■* * Exploring the relationship of occupation and class 41Hamilton, op. cit., p. 579. 41 working class, 74 percent agreed that the government should help Negroes in securing jobs and housing while only 64 percent of those in the same occupations but who identi fied with the middle class agreed, a difference of 10 per cent. Those identifying with the working class were less likely to disapprove of governmental help to Blacks in securing jobs and housing. Those least favorable toward government aid to Blacks were the skilled workers who identified with the middle class. In regard to the second question on governmental aid in bringing about integration, no significant differ ence was found between those identifying with the middle or working class. Membership in the marginal middle class appears to have no effect on this attitude and thus a tendency toward authoritarianism does not appear supported. In summation, Hamilton states, “We find virtually no basis for the acceptance of the thesis that those on the margins of the middle class provide some peculiar center of 'reaction' and intolerance."** Exploring the relationship of occupation and class **Hamilton, op. cit., p. 579. 42 identification to the variables of authoritarianism, con servatism, and expectation, Hamilton's findings are some what contradictory to previous research. Several authors have suggested that those on the economic margins are intolerant and lean toward class consciousness and author itarianism, yet Hamilton has found that these assumptions are not empirically supported by the 1956 election data and suggests that the major attitudinal cleavage is not to be found between the working and middle class but rather between the lower and upper middle classes. But before accepting this generalization that the marginal middle class does not demonstrate the characteristics previous authors have assumed, it is important to note that Hamilton's marginal middle class is marginal only because it is listed at the bottom of the professional occupation scale and has a somewhat less income than the "upper middle class." This marginal middle class does earn less money than the upper middle class but we have no indication that it is marginal in terms of economic security. So Hamilton has not actually evaluated the influence of the variable of economic security as it is related to these types of attitudes, and disagreement in 43 42 literature continues as another author, Martin Trow, finds that small businessmen both supported McCarthy and espoused politically conservative attitudes. Trow Study 43 Researchers such as Daniel Bell have assumed that political intolerance and status anxieties are closely connected with support for the radical right movements and particularly with McCarthyism. Yet, Martin 44 Trow, finds that McCarthy supporters were not more politically intolerant than those who were opposed to the movement and that an important variable influencing McCarthy supporters was that of economic insecurity. In a study of the social and psychological charac teristics of the Joseph McCarthy supporters, Trow finds that McCarthy received disproportionate support from small businessmen and relatively little support from salaried 42 Martin Trow, "Small Businessmen, Political Tolerance, and McCarthy," American Journal of Sociology, LXIV (November, 1958), 270-281. 43Daniel Bell, "The Dispossessed— 1962,” in The Radical Right (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1963). Trow, loc. cit 44 employees with the same educational level. Beginning with support for McCarthy as the independent variable. Trow examines its relationship to the four variables of political tolerance, education, occupation, and presence of discontent or dissatisfaction with aspects of the social, economic and political orders. From an analysis 45 of the 1954 survey data from Bennington, Vermont, the author finds that: (1) There is a strong relationship between McCarthy support and a low level of political tolerance, yet when holding educational level constant the relation ship disappears. On every educational level McCarthy supporters were as likely as his opponents to be polit ically tolerant. (2) The highest level of support for McCarthy was found among the discontented, yet level of discontent 45The Trow analysis attempted to locate McCarthy's social support by dividing respondents from a small New England city into four political categories: "(1) labor- libera Is— those who were favorable to trade-unions and hostile to large corporations; (2) nineteenth-century liberals— those who were opposed to trade-unions and to large corporations; (3) moderate conservatives— those who supported trade-unions and were also favorable to large business; and (4) right-wing conservatives— those who were hostile to unions and favorable to big business.1 1 45 does not: seem to be related to level of political toler ance. Trow explains McCarthy support by stating, "Popular support for McCarthy can best be understood as the chan neling of certain dissatisfactions with aspects of the social, political and economic orders."4€ (3) When examining the relationship of McCarthy support and occupation and dividing the respondents in manual and nonmanual categories, no major differences in attitudes toward McCarthy within educational categories exist. But when separating the middle class into cate gories of salaried and self-employed, there is a signifi cant difference in the level of McCarthy support. The small businessman in every educational category indicated a higher proportion of support than did the salaried personnel of similar education. The small businessman indicated a higher proportion of support for McCarthy 4fi Trow points out that the small businessman con tinually expresses paranoia. He states: "The tendencies which small businessmen fear--of concentration and cen tralization— proceed without interruption in depression, war and prosperity, and irrespective of what party is in power; thus they are always disaffected" (pp. 279-280). 46 than even the manual worker. In the category of high school graduates, 58 percent of the small businessmen favored McCarthy's position, while 49 percent of the manual workers favored this position. Among the poorly educated small businessmen, solid support (67 percent) for McCarthy was found. Trow interprets these findings as evidence that economic insecurity as experienced by the small businessman brings about a reactionary political stance and hostility toward big business and labor unions. (4) The salaried employees gave McCarthy con siderably lower support than did the small businessman. Less than 30 percent of the salaried employees gave their approval of McCarthy in both the less educated and low income groups. Although the Trow analysis is quite extensive, to the reader it is somewhat confusing. First, the author fails to define his indicators of discontent, dissatis faction or political tolerance. Second, Trow fails to establish any empirical evidence for assuming that the self-employed are more insecure than the salaried employee. It seems that insecurity is a concept which must be meas ured by a subjective response on the part of the 47 respondent rather than an objective income measure. Third, and most important, Trow attempts to generalize to a national level from data gathered in Bennington, Vermont, and to compare the results to national findings on occu pational groups which supported the Nazis movement. Definitely, Trow has attempted to cover too much data and as a result fails to explain explicitly to the reader his complete research design. The reader is not privy to the data analysis and is only informed in footnotes as to some of the general findings. Lindenfeld Study Previous authors have assumed that the "marginal," those most likely to suffer from economic insecurity, would vote for the party or candidate offering a rapid solution to end their anxiety. Lipset,*^ as noted earlier, indicates that an individual confronted with a state of tension will opt for the easiest solution. Lindenfeld*® sets out to test this assumption that an individual will ^Lipset, Political Man, p. 106. A Q Frank Lindenfeld, "Economic Interests and Polit ical Involvement,” Public Opinion Quarterly, I (Spring, 1964), 104-111. 46 act politically in terms of self-interest. Lindenfeld attempts to evaluate the idea that behavior is based upon "rational self-interest" and begins with a basic hypoth esis that an individual becomes politically involved in an effort to further or maintain his financial position. The author posits two hypotheses which he examines by a 1956 national sample survey conducted before and after the presidential election. Lindenfeld begins with two hypotheses: (1) the greater the dissatisfaction with personal or family eco nomic position the greater the political involvement, and (2) the greater the perception of a connection between political events and personal economic status the greater the political involvement. Using percentage analysis the author finds that contrary to his first hypothesis the data indicate that financial dissatisfaction is some what negatively related to political involvement. Those who were satisfied with the economic condition of their family indicated a higher level of political involvement than those who were dissatisfied. Controlling for socio economic status the relationship between financial satis faction becomes weaker in that among those of higher 49 status who have a higher level of political involvement the degree of satisfaction with finances does not seem to be related to involvement. Yet among those of lower status, financial dissatisfaction is linked to a greater degree with political apathy. In evaluating the second hypothesis, that differ ences in perception of the relevance of politics to own or family finances would be associated with differences in political involvement, Lindenfeld finds that regardless of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with one's economic condition, those who felt that the election outcome would make a difference to their economic position had a higher level of involvement. Those who did not feel that the election results would make a significant difference had a lower level of involvement. The important limitation which must be noted is that this relationship holds true only among those who also had a high level of involvement in the pre-election survey. Among those who had a medium or low level of involvement at the time of the pre election interview, no relationship between perception of the election as influencing finances and level of political involvement is found. 50 The author's analysis leads him to conclude that there is no simple connection between one's financial situation and involvement in politics. He states. It would be reasonable to suppose that those dis satisfied with their economic status might attempt to change their situation in some manner but it does not necessarily follow that political avenues will be chosen in preference to others. ® Lindenfeld also finds that there may be a relationship between dissatisfaction with economic situation and polit ical apathy. Preliminary analysis of the 1956 data indi cates that economic satisfaction is related to strength of feelings of political efficacy. In light of this information Lindenfeld suggests an alternative hypothesis that those who are both objectively underprivileged and dissatisfied with their economic status may develop feelings of alienation. In summary, Lindenfeld has found that the view of self-interest as the basis of political involvement has not been supported. Dissatisfaction with one's economic position does not seem to be related to increased politi cal involvement and the data indicate that among those of 49Ibid., p. 108. 51 low socioeconomic status economic dissatisfaction may be related to political apathy. From a review of the Lindenfeld article it is obvious that much more research needs to be done in the area of economic dissatisfaction and political involve ment. A major question which the research raises asks: Is alienation from political activity largely a result of economic dissatisfaction and low expectations of future financial improvement? It may be that those who expect future financial improvement do feel at the present time that they have enough "stake in the system" to merit participation in the electoral process. This question points up the major problem with the Lindenfeld analysis. The author does not define for his reader the specific indicator of political involvement. The reader does not know exactly what constitutes political involvement, whether it is voting, monetary contribution, volunteer work, or attempting to persuade an individual to vote for a specific candidate. This certainly proposes a major problem for replication and depth understanding of the Lindenfeld analysis. 52 Summary of Economic Insecurity Literature and Some Additional Research A review of the literature relating economic insecurity as an independent variable to political behav ior and attitudes points up the need for specific clari fication of the relationship of the variables, Lipset holds that economic insecurity predisposes one to author itarianism, leftist voting, support for extremist polit ical groups and possibly nonvoting, Leggett finds that survey data indicate economic insecurity increases class consciousness and Zietlin suggests that economic insecur ity affects the individual's ideological position. Hamilton finds that the marginal, those in the middle class which are members of the middle class in occupa tional name only, do not support conservative politics and favor governmental action in aid to Negroes in secur ing jobs and housing. Trow finds that the small business men who supported the right-wing movement of McCarthy were not any more politically intolerant than those opposed to the McCarthy movement, and that the variable of economic insecurity was a major characteristic of the McCarthy supporters. Lindenfeld in his analysis of economic 53 satisfaction as related to political involvement suggests a possible relationship between dissatisfaction and i political alienation and declares that the individual does not seem to respond to politics in a rational self- interest manner. Yet, in additional research, author James Davies investigates the relationship between events and attitudes and finds that regardless of income, educa tion or occupation, there is a shift in individual expec tations following an economic slump. Davies concludes that the general public does respond to events in forming their attitudes and he holds that expectations are related to events. While Davies does relate expectations to events, he has failed to investigate the relation of 50 expectation to behavior. From a summation of the research it is obvious that many of the conclusions are contradictory and in many of the articles empirical analysis has been incomplete or superficial. While the literature does agree as to the importance of the variable of economic insecurity in 50James C. Davies, "Some Relations Between Events and Attitudes," American Political Science Review, XXVI (September, 1952), 777-789. influencing political behavior, it does not agree as to the degree or type of influence this variable has upon the direction of the vote, its relationship to the atti tude of authoritarianism or political intolerance and its impetus to support radical politics. After a general review of the literature we are still asking the question What is the behavior of the dissatisfied and insecure? Do they attempt to change things or do they sulk on the sidelines and only complain? Milbrath, after citing that Robert Lane found no relationship between economic depres sion and voter turnout and then that nonvoters are less likely to be dissatisfied than voters, adds a fitting summary of the literature in this area when he states, "Each hypothesis . . . has some evidence to support it; more is needed, however, to provide a satisfactory level of confidence."51 Expectations Literature The literature relating economic insecurity and political behavior tends either to measure economic 51 Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1965) , p. 56. insecurity by an objective standard of employment status, income level, or merely assumes the presence of "insecur ity" because one is self-employed. Several authors, such 52 as Gurin, in the social psychology area have noted the importance of not only objective circumstances but also of perceived circumstances as influencing behavior. In an article on the influence of expectations on motivation among the poverty stricken, Gurin points out that it is imperative to clarify the relationship of expectations and feelings of powerlessness because it may be that perceived subjective opportunities determine motivation rather than actual objective opportunities. Thus, an assumption which is being made continually in an analysis of the democratic political process, namely, that motiva tional problems in voting behavior would disappear if basic changes in our institutions and opportunity struc tures were brought about, may well be fallacious. It seems likely that a psychological perception of reward may be a stronger impetus to political participation them Gerald Gurin and Patricia Gurin, "Expectancy Theory in the Study of Poverty," Journal of Sociological Issues, XXVI (Spring, 1970), 83-104. 56 merely a guaranteed right to participate. In addition, Rohter has also noted that behavior Is largely affected by one's perception of the situation and the expected rewards which follow from a specific type of behavior. The author states. Motivation of behavior depends not only on a gen eralized disposition but also on the expectancy or estimate of the probability that the behavior will lead to the goal.53 It seems reasonable, then, to utilize expectations of future financial conditions as a measure of economic insecurity. Political science literature regarding expecta tions, although quite fragmented, mainly theoretical and very limited, does acknowledge the importance of expecta tions as a variable influencing political behavior. For example, Robert Lane, in Political Life, focuses on the link between expectations and motivation. Lane states, "What a person expects from future events has a bearing 53 Ira S. Rohter, "Social and Psychological Deter minants of Radical Rightism," in The American Right Wing; Readings in Political Behavior, ed. by Robert A. Schoen- berger (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), p. 308. 57 54 on what he is willing to be today." The author contends that two attitudinal patterns of expectations play a major role in motivating the individual to act. These are (1) Fatalism— the belief that future events are pre determined beyond the control of the individual (this type of expectation leads to political apathy)j and (2) Expectations as to future events (an individual will be more likely to be psychologically involved in an issue if he perceives an event in the future which relates to the issue). In other words, an individual will be more likely to be involved in the issue of unemployment relief if he anticipates a depression. For Lane, expectations become actual future events to the individual and are linked to participant and nonparticipant motivations. Unfortunately, Lane's propositions, however insightful, are not supported by any empirical data directly testing his contentions. Thus, his propositions remain in the speculative stage. Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee do offer empirical evidence on this topic. However, they find that a common Lane, op. cit., p. 180 58 body of expectations about major events is shared equally by both Republicans and Democrats. They note, Republicans and Democrats do not differ in their anticipation of war and depression; equal propor tions are pessimistic and optimistic about the broadest events on which their votes might have some effect.55 On the other hand, the authors do find that it is likely that an individual will vote in line with his expecta tions as to who will win the election. Additional empirical evidence as to the importance of expectations is provided by Lazarsfeld55 who demon strates the influence of expectations on direction of vote and notes that individuals want to vote for the winner. He finds a close relationship between the candi date one expects to vote for and the candidate one expects to win. Expectations as an independent variable have also been evaluated as to their influence on riot particxpa- 55 Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. HcPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 187. 56 Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The Peoples * Choice (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1944) . 59 tion. Murphy and Watson57 set out to test the hypothesis that those who participate in riots are not predominantly the "riff-raff" who have little or no stake in the commu nity, but rather are those who are experiencing a high level of frustration due to the gap between wants and expectations of actually fulfilling these desires. Their results indicate that those who have low aspirations and a low level of discontent are least likely to participate in riots. The extent of subjectively experienced dis content was found to be strongly related to riot partici pation. It is those who have high aspirations but do not expect the political, social or economic system to enable them to achieve these aspirations who are most discontent and, therefore, favorable toward riots. Although the Murphy and Watson study consists of a small number and definitely needs to be compared to a larger sample of respondents to further substantiate the role of expectations, the data indicate that expectations Raymond J. Murphy and James M. Watson, "Level of Aspiration, Discontent, and Support for Violence: A Test of the Expectation Hypothesis," in The Black Revolt, ed. by James A. Geschwenger (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971). 60 are an important variable in determining attitudes toward riots. Political science literature concerning expecta tions is quite limited and shallow. What has been written remains mainly in the stage of proposition and that which is subjected to empirical examination only relates the expectations of (1) voting intentions and expected winner, and (2) expectations regarding the future events of war and depression. Yet, it does appear that a vast potential of resourceful information regarding (1) expectations of one's financial future, and (2) the financial future of the nation as they relate to attitudes and political behavior may answer some significant questions. Do those who expect to do financially better in the coming year feel that politics are increasingly important in their lives? Does the expectation that one will do worse finan cially in the coming year cause one to become more con cerned about news events and more likely to be involved in the issues? These are the type of questions which the literature has failed to adequately answer and yet it may be that expectations play a vital role in influencing man's political behavior. 61 Conclusions From this discussion of the literature on economic insecurity and expectations, it is apparent that much additional research is needed to clarify the relationship of these variables to political behavior* The literature on economic insecurity contains many suggestions as to the influence of this variable. Some have been substantiated with percentage analysis of empirical data and others are only generalizations based upon trends of various other authors' work.. There is a tendency for the literature to be focused on small single independent studies rather than on a nationally representative sample. It is not sur prising that studies of Bennington, Vermont,58 and a small sample of Black Detroit residents58 yield different find ings. There is a definite need to examine economic insecurity as an independent variable as it relates to attitudes and political behavior through a standardized data sample. 5®Trow, loc. cit. eg Leggett, loc. cit. 62 The expectations literature in political science is somewhat embarrassing, for while the disciplines of sociology and psychology are well grounded in their anal ysis of this variable the political science literature is quite unintegrated and narrow. Very few researchers have examined this area, none extensively, and yet we as political scientists hold to the generalization that political participation is the result of both psychologi cal and institutional circumstances. In light of this perspective it appears substantially important to examine a psychological aspect of the participant, namely, his feelings of economic insecurity as measured by his expec tations of future financial success. CHAPTER III METHODOLOGY Data Source The data upon which this study is based were collected by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center for the 1968 national election in the United States.1 The tape containing the required data was obtained through the facilities of the Inter-University 2 Consortium for Political Research. The data sample con sists of 1,557 persons interviewed between September 6 and November 4, 1968. The sample was selected by the probability method known as "area sampling," so that every member of the population has a known chance of being ^United States Nationally Representative Data Sample of the 1968 electorate. The data utilized in this study were made avail able through the University of Southern California's mem bership in the Inter-University Consortium. 63 64 selected. To obtain a close fit between the sample and the general population the population was stratified by population density, geographic location and several other variables. To check on the quality of "representativeness" of the data sample as being reflective of the 196 8 popula tion same initial comparison work was done. The over-all characteristics of the 1968 data sample were compared with those same characteristics of the 1968 population released by the Labor Bureau of Statistics.3 Characteristics of the 1968 Data Samplet Is It Representative? From a breakdown of the total sample into groups according to occupation, income and education, a profile of those in the sample becomes evident. With regard to income, 48 percent of the sample have yearly incomes below $7,000 and 70 percent of the respondents earn a yearly income of less than $10,000. One third of the Labor Bureau Statistics are reported as cited in U.S. Bureau of Census Statistical Abstract: 1970, 91st ed. (Washington, D.C., 1970), pp. 213-243. 65 respondents, 30 percent, have a yearly Income of more than $10,000. One fifth of this income group of over $10,000 a year received between $12,000 and $25,000 as a yearly income. The upper income groups are not over-represented in the data sample. No one particular income group is disproportionately represented. There is an over-all balance of respondents from all income groups.* Another type of a profile develops of the sample when dividing the sample into occupation groups which have been coded according to the Duncan SES scale of occupation codes. Forty-two percent of the sample were classified in the white collar occupational category, while 58 per cent of the sample were classified in the blue collar occupational category. This percentage breakdown of the sample is interesting when compared to the percentage occupational breakdown of the total nation in 1968 using 4Ibid., p. 216. 5Question 169, SRC S523. The Duncan SES scale of occupation codes are (1) professional, technical and kin dred workers; (2) managers, officials, and proprietors, except farm; (3) clerical and kindred workers; (4) sales workers; (5) draftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers; (6) operative and kindred workers; (7) laborers, non-farm; and (8) farm laborers. the same occupational categories. The Labor Bureau of Statistics indicates that nation-wide 49 percent of the workers are classified as belonging to the white collar occupation group, while 50 percent of the nation's workers are classified as blue collar.€ In comparison to these figures the data sample is somewhat skewed toward the blue collar occupational group. The largest single occupational group represented in the sample is 7 that of "craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers” which make up 19 percent of the sample. From an analysis of the sample as it is divided into levels of education it becomes apparent that the data are not weighted in favor of the college educated when compared with national census data.** Twenty-seven percent of the sample indicated at least some college experience. The source for data comparison is the information presented in the "Digest of Education Statistics" as cited in U.S. Bureau of Census Statistical Abstract; 1970, 91st ed. (Washington, D.C., 1970), pp. 213-243. ^Question 169, SRC S523. 8 U.S. Bureau of Census, p. 216. 67 while a majority of the sample have completed a high school education. Almost one fourth of the sample have completed only eight years of formal education. This profile of the 1968 data sample is important because it answers the criticism that national survey samples represent only the middle class, upper-income, upper-educated groups. The profile presented indicates that in terms of occupation, income level and educational background the 1968 data sample adequately reflects the characteristics of the 1968 American voting population. The only major limitations faced in this research effort are those presented by the use of secondary anal ysis. Using data collected on a much more general basis than a focus upon the role of economic expectations presents the problem of precluding a detailed depth study of the causes of pessimistic expectations and the sequences of development. Because secondary analysis is used here only speculative generalizations will be made as to the primary causes of optimistic or pessimistic expectations and their general potential political con sequences. Although presenting such a limitation second ary analysis yields several benefits. First, it allows this research project to be undertaken by curtailing the 68 barrier of time and funds and, secondly, secondary anal ysis reduces the risk of distortion of data for the pur poses of the current research effort. The use of secondary analysis, while presenting a problem in the understanding of the "why” of economic expectations, assures one that the findings are not the results of an anxious analyst. Measurement of Variables Financial Expectations As was indicated earlier in the delineation of research objectives, the variable selected as the focus of analytical attention in this dissertation is financial expectations as they are associated with specific politi cal attitudes and behaviors of those of the general electorate. A review of the literature focusing on economic insecurity as an independent variable indicates that previous research has utilized the objective measure of unemployment as an operational definition of economic A insecurity. In this analysis, economic insecurity is not ^See especially the studies by Maurice Zietlin and John Leggett which were discussed in Chapter II. 69 assumed to be synonymous with unemployment10 or a specific occupational category,.11 or one's perception of his social class.^ Here, economic insecurity is measured by the respondent's financial expectations and is operational ized as the respondent's answer to the question: "Looking ahead— do you think a year from now you people will be better off financially, or worse off, or just about the -13 same as now?" From the national sample, a total of 1,230 respond ents answered the question of whether they thought their financial expectations for the coming year would be better, the same, or worse. Of this group, roughly a third, or 34 percent, indicated that they thought they would be better off financially in twelve months. Over half, 56 percent, indicated that they thought that their financial 10 U.S. Bureau of Census. *^Martin Trow, "Small Businessmen, Political Tolerance, and McCarthy," American Journal of Sociology, LXIV (November, 1958), 270-281. ^Hamilton, loc. cit. 13 Question 277, SRC S523. 70 situation would be approximately the same. One tenth of the sample indicated that, in their opinion, they would be worse off a year from the time the question was posed to them. The analysis will concentrate on the two groups who indicated a change in expectations, that is, the third who thought they would be better off financially in con trast with the tenth of the sample who expected to be worse off. Dependent Variables Because the literature linking economic insecurity and political attitudes finds that the same set of expec tations under different conditions or settings leads to different political consequences it becomes necessary to clearly examine the political attitudes and behavior that are associated with both pessimistic and optimistic eco nomic expectations. The three major areas of attitudes- behavior selected as dependent variables for this analysis are (1) political participation, (2) personal attitudes, and (3) political attitudes. 71 Political Part.icipat.lon The relationship of economic expectations and political participation will be examined through the two basic categories of passive and active participation. Attempting to decipher levels of political par ticipation presents a problem in that the line drawn between the levels may be drawn only in the researcher's mind. Following a political campaign through newspaper coverage can be argued to indicate a greater degree of involvement for one individual than voting regularity because it may be that voting is only a response behavior based upon a sense of civic duty rather than self-concern. Yet, traditionally, those engaged in analyzing behavior point to overt behavior as an indicator that the individ ual attaches strong importance to the act, that it is strong involvement which motivates the action. Continuing in this line of reasoning active political participation is differentiated from passive political behavior in that active participation is overt involvement in the political arena. Robert Lane has drawn this distinction between levels of political participation when he states: . . . "passive" exposure to political material forms a kind of "spectator" syndrome which is somehow 72 different from the more active forms of behavior. Evidently there are those who are content to follow the news and, indeed, may be "interested” in politics and public affairs but have no inclina' tion or capacity to do anything about it. Passive political participation is operationalized as: 1. Party identification 2. Strength of party identification 3. Vote intention 4. Attention to national and public affairs 5. Following political campaigns through news paper, television, and radio coverage P arty identi fication. One of the most important facts affecting voting behavior is the attachment of the American electorate to a political party. Several authors, including Campbell, have noted that this identification is often a psychological one which persists without any 15 formal membership activity on the part of the identifier. It is classified here as passive political participation and is measured by the respondent's answer to the following 14 Robert Lane, Political Life (New York: Collier- McMillan, 1964), p. 94. Angus Campbell et al. , The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960), p. 344. 73 question: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, independent, or what?"*- ® The replies were coded into the basic categories of (1) "Republican," (2) "Democrat," (3) "Independent," and several others including "Liberal,” "Conservative,” 17 and "other minor parties," but for the purpose of this analysis only the categories of Republican, Democrat, and Independent are included. Strength of party identification will also be examined as a dependent variable and is operationalized as the respondent's answer to the question: "Would you call yourself a strong (R) (D) or not a very strong (R) (D)? (If independent or other) do you think of yourself 18 as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party?" The replies were coded as follows: (0) strong Democrat (1) Not very strong Democrat (2) independent closer to Democrats ^Question 119, SRC S523. 17lbid. 18Question 120, SRC S523. 74 (3) Independent (4) Independent closer to Republicans (5) Not very strong Republican (6) Strong Republican (7) Other (8) Apolitical (9) NA*9 Vote intentions. One of the problems in the use of secondary analysis is that the area of current inquiry may have been ignored or discussed only in part in the original survey and it then becomes necessary to utilize indicators somewhat less specifically appropriate to the current analysis. This is one of the problems which con fronts this research effort in exploring the relationship of financial expectations and support for a third party candidate. In the 1968 national election data sample, the most appropriate measure of an individual's possible support for a third party candidate is the respondent* s answer to the question: "How do you think you will vote 20 for President in this election?" The responses were 20Question 133, SRC S523. 75 21 coded as follows: (1) Humphrey, (2) Nixon, (3) Wallace. Those who indicated "other party or candidate" or who were "undecided" were eliminated from this data analysis. Attention to public and national affairs. To clearly analyze the link between expectations and politi cal motivation economic expectations will be examined in relationship to attention to national and public affairs. Robert Lane suggests that there is a definite connection between anticipation of future events and psychological involvement. He states: A second manner in which expectations enter into participant motivation turns on the particular inter pretation of the probable course of history. For example, a person will not be psychologically in volved in the question of government policy on atomic civil defense if he does not expect another war: he will not be involved in issues of unemployment relief if he does not anticipate another depression. Similarly, and quite logically, people will be less likely to be concerned about or participate in civil defense activities if they do not believe there will be an atomic attack on their country. . . . Projections of history into the future and the expected relation of future events to the indi vidual enter into participant and nonparticipant motivations.22 21Ibid. 22 Lane, op. cit., p. 181. 76 To test the psychological involvement in the public sphere two indicators of involvement have been chosen. The first indicator is attention to public affairs which is operationalized as the respondent's answer to the question: “Some people seem to follow what is going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there is an election or not. Would you say that you follow public affairs most of the time, some of 2 3 the time, only now and then, or hardly at all?“ For purpose of this analysis the responses were dichotomized into the two categories of “Most or some of the time" and “Now and then or hardly at all."24 A second measure of an individual's passive involvement is his attention to national affairs. The literature suggests that one's view of the future affects his level of participation, particularly his awareness of 5 c national events. Authors Lane, Edelman, and Lasswell 23Question 430, SRC S523. 24Ibid. Lane, loc. cit.% Murray Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1971}; and Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and 77 discuss the relationship of expectations and political arousal. To test the assumption that expectations are related to involvement, involvement in national affairs is operationalized as the respondent's answer to the question: "What about national affairs; do you pay a great deal, some or not much attention to national 2fi affairs?" The replies are coded into the three cate- 27 gories of "A great deal," "Some," "Not much." Follow political campaigns. Moving from a more general level of involvement in a broad sphere, pointed psychological involvement in the political area is meas ured by one's interest in (1) following political cam paigns through newspaper coverage, (2) following political campaigns through radio coverage, and (3) following political campaigns through television coverage. The individual's involvement in the political campaign through these media is operationalized as the Society, A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 21. 2Question 432, SRC S523. 27Ibid. 78 respondent's answer to the following three questions: (1) "We're interested in this interview in finding out whether people paid much attention to the election cam paign this year. Take newspapers for instance— did you 28 read about the campaign in any newspaper?" (2) "How about radio— did you listen to any programs about the cam paign on the radio? (If YES) how many programs about the campaign did you listen to on the radio— a good many, 20 several, or just one or two?" (3) "How about television — did you watch any programs about the campaign on tele vision? (If YES) how many television programs about the campaign would you say you watched— a good many, several, or just one or two?"**® Active political participation is operationalized as: 1. Voting regularity in presidential elections 2. The attempt to influence another voter 3. Wearing a campaign button or attaching a bumper sticker to one's car 28Question 292, SRC S523. 29Question 296, SRC SS23. 30Question 303, SRC S523. 79 Voting regularity in presidential elections, Harold Lasswell points out that there may exist an expec tation pattern of fatalism which is associated with low political participation.3* to measure the link between expectations and active political participation, three types of active political involvement have been selected. The first is voting regularity in presidential elections which is measured by the respondent's answer to the ques tion: "In the elections for President since you have been old enough to vote, would you say that you have voted in all of them, most of them, some of them, or none of them?"32 Attempt to influence another voter, A second indicator of active political participation to be examined here in relation to economic expectations is whether or not the individual attempted to influence another voter. Several sources point to the "persuader" as the one deeply involved in politics. In examining the constellations of political activity by patterns of associated activity, it 31 Lasswell and Kaplan, loc. cit. 32Question 388, SRC S523. 80 has been found that the persuader is also quite involved in party activity. Based upon the literature it then seems appro priate to utilize this factor as one indicator of active political participation. The "persuader” phenomenon is operationalized as the respondent's answer to the ques tion: "During the campaign did you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for one of the parties or candidates?" The replies were coded "Yes," "No," "Don't know," and "NA."33 Bumper stickers and campaign buttons. A third indicator of active political participation is the respond ent's use of political materials to support his candidate or party. In examining patterns of political activity, 34 Frederick Harris has found that if an individual attempts to persuade another individual to vote for a specific candidate he is also likely to be one who attends party meetings, contacts public officials and is generally a 3^Question 348, SRC S523. 34Frederick H. Harris, Jr., "A Study of Political Participation in Two North Carolina Counties," Research Previews, III (1955), 1-7. 81 political activist. In analyzing the relationship of economic expectations and political behavior in connection with voting regularity and the attempt to influence another voter a further measure of active political participation will be whether or not the individual wears a campaign button or puts a bumper sticker on his automobile. This measure of political activity is operational* ized as the respondent's answer to the question: "Did you wear a campaign button or put a bumper sticker on your 35 car?" The replies are coded "Yes" or "No" and the findings are presented in Chapter V. Personal Attitudes The area of citizen participation has long been one of concern to political scientists. The question of "why," the explanation for both participation and non participation has been the focus of numerous major research efforts. One of the key concepts which has had explanatory value in the political behavior-motivation question is that of efficacy which is defined as ^Question 399, SRC S523. 82 the evaluation which the individual makes and cus tomarily maintains with regard to himself; it expresses an attitude of approval or disapproval and indicates the extent to which the Individual believes himself to be capable, significant, suc cessful and worthy.36 The literature has linked both personal and polit ical efficacy with apathy, nonvoting and participation in political demonstrations.37 There is general agreement with Almond and Verba*s statement that "if any individual believes that he has influence, he is likely to use it.”38 In this dissertation, analysis of the efficacy- participation link will be divided into the two areas of (1) personal efficacy, and (2) political efficacy. Per sonal efficacy, the self-evaluation wherein one believes ^**S. Coopersmith, The Antecedents of Self-Esteem (Sam Francisco: Freeman, 1967), pp. 4-5. 3 7 Studies which point to this relationship between feelings of efficacy and attitudes include C. Merriam and H. Gosnell, Non-Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924), chap. vi; and Morris Rosenberg, “Some Deter minants of Political Apathy,” Public Opinion Quarterly, VIII (Fall, 1954), 349. 38 G. A. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Prince ton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 139. 83 himself to be capable of controlling his own life, will be examined in relationship to economic expectation through the five variables of: 1. Evaluation of ability to run his own life. This attitude is operationalized as the respondent's answer to the question: "Some people feel that they can run their lives pretty much the way they want to* others feel the problems of life are sometimes too big for them. Which one are you most like?"^ 2. Attitude that life can be planned and that it is not just a matter of luck. This attitude is operation alized as the respondent's answer to the question: "Do you think it's better to plan your life a good way ahead, or would you say life is too much a matter of luck to 40 pi am ahead very far?" 3. Satisfaction with life. This general feeling of satisfaction is operationalized as the respondent's 39 Question 498, SRC S523. 40Question 495, SRC S523. 85 answer to the question: "In general, how satisfying do you find the way you are spending your life these days? Would you call it completely satisfying, or not very satisfying?1 ,41 4. Feeling of control over own life. This atti tude of power over the outcome of one's own life is examined through two separate questions regarding (a) the outcome of life and (b) the ability to run one's own life. These questions are "Have you usually felt pretty sure your life would work out the way you want it to, or have 11 there been times when you haven't been sure about it?" And "Some people feel they can run their lives pretty much the way they want to; others feel the problems of life are sometimes too big for them. Which one are you most like? ,43 5, Trust in people. The attitude of trust or distrust of people is measured by the respondent's answer 41 'Question 499, SRC S523, 42 'Question 49?, SRC S523. 43, Question 499, SRC S523, to the question: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too care- 44 ful in dealing with people?" Political Attitudes Political efficacy has been defined as "a disposi tion toward politics, a feeling of effectiveness and 45 capacity in the political sphere." Several authors, including both Easton*® and Campbell,*^ have found evi dence that feelings of political efficacy have important consequences for political attitudes and behavior. Begin ning with the previously substantiated relationship between efficacy and political attitudes, an effort will be made to identify the relationship of economic expecta tions as it is related to feelings of political efficacy. The question being raised is whether a feeling of economic insecurity is related to a feeling of powerless- 44, Question 500, SRC S523. * W d Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy," Ameri can Political Science Review, LXIV (1961), 25, 46 Ibid, 4?, Campbell et al., op. cit., p. 104. 86 ness. Do those who are insecure about their financial future also feel that they are relatively powerless in the political sphere? To examine this linkage three basic areas of political attitudes will be analyzed in relation* ship to economic expectations. They are: 1. Feelings of political efficacy 2. Confidence in government 3. Attitude toward political parties Political efficacy. Because of the noted impor tance of feelings of political efficacy, it appears valu able to focus on the variable of economic expectation as it is related to the belief that one can have an impact on the political process. The relationship of economic expectation and feelings of political efficacy will be operationalized as respondent attitude in the three following areas: 1. Feeling that public officials are concerned. This attitude is operationalized as the respondent's answer to the question: "Would you say that most public officials care auite a lot about what people like you think, or that they don't care much at all?"*** *®Question 141, SRC S523. 87 2. Feeling that politics and government are too complicated for personal comprehension. This aspect of political efficacy is operationalized as the respondent's answer to the question: "Would you say that politics and government are so complicated that people like you can't really understand what's going on, or that you can under- 49 stand what's going on pretty well? 3. Feeling that one can influence government action. This feeling is operationalized as the respond ent's answer to the question: "Would you say that people like you have quite a lot to say about what the government 50 does, or that you don't have much to say at all?" Confidence in government. To ascertain whether those who are pessimistic about their financial future are also skeptical about the capability of and distrust ful of those in governmental positions, two questions and a data sample will be analyzed in relationship to economic expectations. The individual's confidence in government 49 Question 143, SRC S523. 50Question 144, SRC S523. 88 will be operationalized as his answer to the questions: (1) "Do you feel that almost all the people running the government are smart people who usually know what they are doing, or do you think that quite a lot of them don*t seem to know what they are doing?*51 (2) "Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are a little crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly 52 any of them are crooked at all?" Attitudes toward political parties. In their analysis of the American electorate through data sampling, 53 Free and Cantril find that 75 percent of the sample of respondents psychologically identify with one of the major political parties and that this party allegiance tends to remain relatively stable and enduring. Additional research has further established the importance of polit ical party identification as it is related to political 51 Question 506, SRC S523. 5^Question 507, SRC S523. 5^Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril, The Political Beliefs of Americans (Hew York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), p. 134. 89 attitudes. In connection with this previous research which establishes the importance of political party in the mind of the electorate, economic expectations will be examined in relationship to attitudes toward political parties. The analysis will focus on the three aspects of: 1. The belief that parties are only interested in votes and not opinions which is operationalized as the respondent's agreement or disagreement with the statement, "Parties are only interested in people's votes but not in 54 their opinions.* 2. Feelings that parties are not effective as a pressure group. This attitude is operationalized as the respondent's answer to the question: "How much do you feel that political parties help to make the government pay attention to what people think; a good deal, some or not much?"^ 3. Belief that parties are generally honest and reliable. This feeling is operationalized as the respond- 54 Question 253, SRC S523. 5^Question 40, SRC S523. 90 ent's answer to the question: "Do you think that parties pretty much keep their promises or do they usually do what 56 they want after the election is over?" Analytical Procedures Percentage Analysis The basic analytical method used here in the study of the relationship between economic expectations and political attitudes consists of percentage analysis. There will be a percentaging of each category of financial anticipations with regard to the respective measures of (1) political participation; (2) personal efficacy; (3) political attitudes, and then a comparison of per centages for a given category of political attitudes between the "better" or "worse" financial anticipators. Each dependent variable will be cross-tabulated with financial expectations so that the variable of economic expectations can thus be examined for the "effect" on variation in the attitudinal categories. 56Question 494, SRC S523. 91 This basic method of analysis will be employed In Chapter XV with regard to the variables of education, occupation and Income. The purpose of the percentage analysis In this chapter Is to present a general profile of those In the two categories of financial expectations. In Chapters V, VI and VII, percentage analysis Is used In examining the relationship of economic expecta tions in several aspects of political attitudes. Through out the dissertation only the two categories of "better” and "worse” financial expectations are used and generally there Is a dichotomlzatlon of the dependent variables. Rather than present a broad array of response categories which often consist of a small number, in many instances the replies have been collapsed into two dichotomous categories allowing for a clear examination of the rela tionship of the independent variable to the dependent variables. Chi-Square The statistical technique used in this disserta tion is Chi-square. A level of .05 has been adopted here as a criterion of statistical significance. Whenever a set of differences 92 could have occurred five times out of 100 or more by chance, the finding is not considered to be statistically significant. All statistical findings reported here are significant above the .05 level. CHAPTER IV A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS Introduction From the review of the literature in Chapter IIf it is clear that a wide variety of political consequences have been attributed to financial optimism and pessimism by both speculation and empirical findings of scholars dealing with the topic. Thus, it seems appropriate to begin this empirical analysis of the problem by describing first, the economic situation prevailing in 1968 when the sample was drawn, and second, to present seme of the characteristics of those who foresee a "better" financial future as compared with those individuals who foresee a "worse" financial future for themselves. Economically, 1968 was marked by the problem of accelerating inflation and expectations of continuing inflation. In his 1968 article, "After the New Economics," Milton Freedman stated. 93 94 The consumer-price index is currently rising at a rate of 5 percent per year. The creeping inflation that started in 1964 has turned into a trot. Expec tations of substantial further inflation are nearly universal.1 This economic situation was directly affecting the citizen through his pocketbook. Figures released by the Bureau 2 of Labor Statistics showed that consumer prices for October, 1968, indicated the steepest one-month rise recorded since September, 1962, and economists at this time were predicting that the cost-of-living increase for all of 1968 "will probably hit 4.5 percent— the largest such twelve-month surge since the Korean War in the year of 1951.*3 Along with the rise of the cost of living, un employment hovered around the 3.6 percent level for all workers, with the heaviest unemployment occurring within the ranks of the blue collar worker who experienced a 4.1 percent level of unemployment as opposed to a 2 percent Milton Freedman, "After the New Economics," Newsweek, December 9, 1968, pp. 31-32. ^Labor Bureau statistics are reported as cited in U.S. Bureau of Census Statistical Abstract; 1970, 91st ed. (Washington, D.C., 1970), pp. 213-243. ^Freedman, loc. cit. 95 4 level In the ranks of the white collar worker. Because numerous suggestions have been made regarding the rela tionship of unemployment and political participation, it is noteworthy that in a historical perspective the un employment rate both in 1967 and 1968 was below 4 percent.5 From an overview of the 1968 economic trends the focus turns to the financial expectations of those in the 1968 data sample. Characteristics of Those with Differing Financial Expectations In aui auialysis of the differences between those who foresee a "worse" finemcial future and those who fore see a "better" finemcial future. Table 1 presents a break down of the sample according to the independent variable of financial expectations. 4 U.S. Bureau of Census. 5 A general assumption constantly being made by political scientists is that an unemployment rate of 6% constitutes a crisis. Whether or not it does haw to my knowledge never been substantiated, but it is important to note here that the unemployment rate for the nation was not unusually high. 96 TABLE 1 FINANCIAL EXPECTATIONS: 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Financial Expectations Absolute Frequency Percent Better 417 33.9 Same 686 55.8 Worse 127 10.3 Total 1,230 100.0 An examination of Table 1 Indicates that a large population of the respondents in the sample are optimistic about their own financial future. Thirty-four percent of the sample foresee a better financial future while 56 per cent foresee one which would continue much like that of the present situation. Only 10 percent of the sample foresee an economic future worse than that of the present. Several questions arise In the researcher's mind concerning the differences between the financial optimist and the financial pessimist. What type of education, Income and occupational groups tend to make up these two groups? Does the financial pessimist generally have a 97 low level of education, a low annual income, or a low occupation status? Lipset has suggested that a type of tension syndrome exists for the lower-class individual of which economic anxiety is an integral part.** To evaluate the proposition that economic insecur ity is linked with level of education, income and occupa tion, the variable of financial expectations is examined in relationship to these independent variables. In Table 2 the electorate in the data sample are classified by their level of education and the two groups are examined in relationship to their financial expecta tions of "better" or "worse." From this examination, it is apparent that the two variables of economic expecta tions and level of education are related at the high school and above levels of educational attainment. First, contrary to what the literature suggests, those who have completed only eight years of formal educa tion are equally likely to have optimistic or pessimistic financial expectations. Fifty percent of those "0 grades" education category express pessimistic financial expecta- 6 Seymour Lipset, Political Man (New York: Double day and Co., 1963), p. 106. 98 TABLE 2 ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS BY EDUCATION: 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Economic 8 Grades High Sch. College Graduate Deg Expectations N % N % N « N % Better-off 39 50.0 221 78.0 77 80.2 77 92.8 Worse-off 39 50.0 62 22.0 19 19.8 6 7.2 Total 78 100.0 283 100.0 96 100.0 83 100.0 tions and 50 percent: of this same educational subdivision express optimistic expectations. Second, the picture changes quite drastically in the high school subdivision. Those who have completed high school are much more likely to express optimism about their financial future than to express pessimism. Seventy-eight percent, over two thirds of those who have completed high school anticipate financial improvement in the coming year. Only 22 percent of those with a high school education indicate that they anticipate financial deterioration. 99 At the college and graduate degree level the positive relationship between higher education and the likelihood of expressing financial optimism continues* Eighty percent of those who have some previous college experience express financial optimism, while 20 percent of those who have some college experience state that they expect to be worse off financially in the upcoming year. Four fifths, four out of every five persons interviewed of the "some college” educational subdivision indicate that they anticipate financial improvement. In the *college graduate” category 93 percent, more than nine tenths of those interviewed express finan cial optimism. Only 7 percent of those in the college graduate category express anticipations of fineuicial deterioration. The data indicate that there is an association between economic optimistic expectations and educational attainment. Those who express optimistic anticipations generally tend to be those individuals who have a high school or above level of educational attainment. One of the surprising oversights of the literature analyzing the relationship of economic insecurity to 100 subsequent political behavior is the neglect to consider the variable of income, and yet it is well documented that income, as one indicator of socioeconomic status, is related to political participation and subjective class identification which may include the acceptance of the values and norms of that class. The literature has either ignored the variable of income or assumed that economic insecurity is largely associated with those in the lower income brackets. It may be that income is directly related to a sense of security regardless of occupation level. It may be that there is a "plateau of income" which may lead to economic security by giving to the individual a sense of well-being. The data in Table 3 indicate that (1) in all income brackets those interviewed are more likely to express financial optimism than financial pessimism; and (2) those in the $9,000 to $14,999 and the $15,000 to $25,000 and over categories are more likely to express financial optimism than those in the $1,000 to $8,999. Eighty-six percent of those in the $9,000 to $14,999 7Ibid. 101 income bracket anticipate that they will be better off in the upcoming year while 13 percent of those in the same category express financial pessimism. Eighty-six percent of those in the $15,000 to $25,000 and over income cate gory express financial optimism, while 15 percent of those in the same category express financial pessimism. TABLE 3 ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS BY INCOMES 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Economic Under $1,000 $ 9,000 $15,000 Expectations 8,999 14,999 25,000 ov. N % N « N « Better-off 221 70.4 136 86.6 55 85.9 Worse-off 93 29.6 21 13.4 9 15.1 Total 314 100.0 157 100.0 64 100.0 In comparison to this strong tendency of those in the two higher income categories to express financial optimism, those in the under $1,000 to $8,999 income category, although more likely to express optimism than 102 pessimism, the likelihood of expressing optimism is not as great. Seventy percent of those in the under $1,000 to $8,999 income category anticipate finemcial optimism, while 30 percent of those in the same income category express pessimism regarding their financial future. Surprisingly, the data in Table 3 indicate that those of the lower income bracket do not overwhelmingly or even distinctly express pessimistic economic expecta tions . Along with income, another common measure of socioeconomic status is that of occupation. Studies cited in Chapter II indicate that low occupation status is asso ciated with economic insecurity, and in turn, economic Insecurity is found to be related to political intolerance and support for extremist political movements. The expla nation for the relationship of economic insecurity to occupation category is the thesis of status panic, which is defined as a fear of losing one's social position and which causes individuals to maintain a defensive attitude toward other individuals. Table 4 permits an evaluation of the proposition that economic insecurity is a factor associated predomi nantly with the lower occupational classes. Total 7 5 100.0 4 1 100.0 78 100.0 6 3 100.0 6 4 100.0 48 100.0 1 1 100.0 1 0 100.0 as S? 0 C P H f t 0 > f t » 1 h O i Ht 0 hh Ht Ht O V ov V O 55 V O 00 to dP • . o o U) V D to 55 to -o to 00 dP * . o o p O V 4k P C O *o to dP s . > D p P <u in C O 55 to - j L O ov dP • . C O to to u> O V C O 55 4k tn O V O dP . . o \ 4k oo o 55 p 00 o> u> dP * . o u> - j 4k as C T i tjj l* » ov dP • * O V * Ifl Ul 55 cn W o o dP • . o o Economic Expectations Professionals Managers, Officials Clerical, Sales Craftsmen, Skilled Operatives Household, Services Laborers, Non-Farm ID C T > C O a 01 ► 3 H s s OT Farm Laborers TABLE 1 04 In Table 4 the data indicate that those in all occupational categories except those classified as "laborers," both farm and nonfarm, are more likely to express financial optimism than to express financial pessimism. Even those individuals who are classified in the ■managerial-officials" classification are more likely to be optimistic about their financial future. Seventy- eight percent of those in the "managerial-officials" classification express economic optimism, while 22 percent express economic pessimism. The "household and services" group, those jobs including waiters, barbers and attend ants, the types of jobs which seem to be open to economic fluctuation, are also more likely to be optimistic rather than pessimistic about their financial future. This optimism on the part of those holding jobs which appear to be economically vulnerable is particularly interesting in light of previous literature which discusses the economic insecurity of the small businessman and the self-employed. These findings are contrary to the assump tions made in the literature. Previous literature has assumed (1) that the occupational categories of clerical and sales personnel constitute the marginal middle class 105 and, therefore, these individuals are the most likely to be economically insecure or to have feelings of status anxiety; and (2) that the self-employed, unlike the salaried employee, is more likely to suffer from economic insecurity and to support extremist political movements. The data in Table 4 indicate that these assumptions may be erroneous. In a further follow-up of the assumption that self-employment is necessarily associated with economic insecurity. Table 5 indicates that those who classify themselves as self-employed are more likely to be optimis tic than pessimistic about their financial future. Those who state that they are not self-employed are also more likely to be optimistic rather than pessimistic about their financial future. Therefore, there seems to be no great differentiation in the economic expectations of those who are self-employed and those who are not. The "same” category under financial expectations is included here because of the close parallel of expec tations between the self-employed and the nonself-employed individual. Neither group demonstrates any major differ ence in the tendency to express either pessimistic or 106 TABLE 5 ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS BY SELF EMPLOYMENT: 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Respondents Who Are Self-Employed Financial Yes NO Expectations N % N « Better 38 28.7 264 38.9 Same 68 59.1 351 51.8 Worse 14 12.2 63 9.3 Total 115 100.0 678 100.0 optimistic financial expectations. Continuing the analysis of the characteristics of those with "better" and "worse" financial expectations, the literature in suggesting that as one moves down the socioeconomic ladder one finds greater economic insecurity has hypothesized that identification with the working class is accompanied by economic insecurity. To evaluate this association, subjective class identification is related to financial expectations. In Table 6 , class TABLE 6 ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS BY CLASS IDENTIFICATION: 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE a c 0 •H +> 0 « + J u s 0 w w a 3 i-H u 4 ) N % N tn e ■H h a 0 a a u S' u 1 % O B O B « H U S' G •H M U £ N % O' g •H D B M O B U « O H * O & N % N 0 ) H * 0 t o to a a s a f4 r l U « U tr a a r-t u 'O 0 ) T J > < x % N N a < - t a a •O a a <0 a a ■H H i —i 2 o u M 0 u 9 fr & ft p p % N % Better-off 1 100.0 151 68.3 4 50.0 34 72.3 162 84.4 4 80.0 47 87.0 1 100 Worse-off 0 0 70 31.7 4 50.0 13 27.7 30 15.6 1 20.0 7 13.0 0 0 Total 1 100.0 221 100.0 8 100.0 47 100.0 192 100.0 5 100.0 54 100.0 1 100 108 identification is measured by the respondent's answer to the question, "If you had to make a choice, would you call yourself middle class or working class? (If MIDDLE CLASS) Would you say you are about average middle class, or that you are in the upper part of the middle class? (If WORKING CLASS) Would you say that you are about average working class, or that you are in the upper part Q of the working class?" In Table 6 the data indicate that (1) those who identify with the "average working class" and the "upper working class" are more likely to express optimism regard ing their financial future than to express pessimism; (2) even those in the "working class" are equally as likely to express optimistic economic expectations as pessimistic economic expectations; and (3) in every category of class identification except for the category of "working class" the respondents were distinctly more likely to express optimistic expectations than pessimistic expectations. From an examination of Table 6, it is apparent that the assumption made by the literature that working ^Question 209, SRC S523. 109 class Identification necessarily indicates the presence of economic insecurity may be in error. Sixty-eight per cent of those in the "average working class" express optimism while 32 percent express pessimism. Of those in the "working class" 50 percent express optimism while 50 percent of those in the same class express pessimism. Seventy-three percent of those in the "upper working class" express economic optimism, while 28 percent of those in the same class express economic pessimism. A point made in the data breakdown in Table 6 is that those groups which one would assume would feel some anxiety as possible social "border-lines" do not express a disproportionate amount of pessimism. The data in Table 6 indicate that the "upper working class," the group which seem to be the most likely to have anxiety regarding moving into the middle clems and would seem to be most anxious about its financial future, are more likely to express optimism than to express pessimism. Conclusion In this chapter the independent variables of education, income, and occupation have been analysed in 110 relation to expectations of a "better" or a "worse" finan cial future. When the relationship of the independent variables to expectations is investigated the existing literature is only partially supported. First, while higher education is linked to optimis tic financial expectations, those with only eight years of formal education are equally likely to have optimistic or pessimistic financial expectations. Second, those inter viewed from all income brackets are more likely to express financial optimism than financial pessimism. Third, those in all occupational categories except for those classified as "laborers" are more likely to express financial optimism than to express financial pessimism. Fourth, those who classify themselves as self-employed are more likely to be optimistic than pessimistic about their financial future, and finally, those who identify with the working class are not decidedly economic pessimists. Analysis of the 1968 election data puts a question mark after the propositions of several authors. First, contrary to what was expected, those who are self-employed do not overwhelmingly indicate that they anticipate finan cial deterioration. Second, those who appear to be 1X1 marginal class identifiers do not disproportionately manifest feelings of fineuicial insecurity. TOiird, those individuals in the occupational categories which are subject to frequent fluctuation also do not particularly indicate a pessimistic attitude regarding their financial future. Having identified some of the characteristics of the two groups of financial anticipators, the following chapter will study these two groups as they differ in levels of political participation. CHAPTER V POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND FINANCIAL EXPECTATIONS Introduction This chapter will investigate systematically the relationship between financial expectations and the dependent variable of political participation. Political participation is divided into the two categories of passive and active political participation. In this chapter the relationship of financial expectations to passive political participation and then the relationship of expectations to active political participation will be analyzed. Passive Participation Party Identification The literature relates economic insecurity to support for leftist political parties. Table 7 divides the United States national sample of respondents into 112 113 their respective political party identification according to future financial expectations. TABLE 7 PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS: 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Party Identi fication Respondents Who Expect Better-off Worse to Be -off N « N « Republican 97 24.0 30 25.0 Independent 133 33.0 26 21.0 Democrat 173 42.0 66 54.0 403 100.0 122 100.0 From an examination of the data in Table 7, we find that financial expectations have some interesting effects. First, the data in Table 7 demonstrate that the respondents anticipating financial improvement versus those anticipating financial deterioration do not differ in proportions identifying with the Republican Party. The percentage difference between those who see a better 114 financial future and who identify with the Republican Party as opposed to those who are pessimistic about their financial future and who identify with the Republican Party is only 1 percent, a very minor percentage differ ence. Twenty-four percent of those who see a better financial future claim the Republican Party as their political party and 25 percent of those who foresee a dim future economic situation also identify with the Republican Party. Second, the picture changes somewhat interest ingly, when examining the relationship of expectations and party identification in regard to claiming either Democratic or Independent Party identification. Those that are anticipating a better financial situation in the coining year are more likely than those anticipating finan cial deterioration to identify themselves as "Independ ents." Those who anticipate a worse financial future are more likely than those who anticipate a better financial future to be Democratic Party identifiers. Forty-three percent of those who are optimistic about their financial future identify with the Democratic Party while 52 percent of those anticipating economic deterioration claim 115 Democratic Party affiliation. Although a majority of the sample of respondents, those of both better and worse financial expectations identify with the Democratic Party, a greater percentage difference exists between the two groups of financial anticipators and identification with the Democratic Party. A difference of 10 percent can be seen between the two groups of better and worse financial anticipators in their identification with the Democratic Party. Surprisingly, and contrary to the belief that economic well-being may make one a solid supporter of the political party currently holding the reins of government, the data indicate that those anticipating that they will be better off in the future are more likely to claim "Independent" political status. Almost one-third, 32 per cent, of those who are economic optimists selected "Inde pendent1 * Party identification. Economic expectations demonstrated a difference of 12 percent in the likelihood that those who perceive a better financial future will claim "Independent" political party status. It is interesting that those individuals who anticipate a pessimistic financial future do not over- 116 whelmingly or even distinctly select an "Independent" or no party identification classification, for there might be speculation that as one perceives his own financial situa tion deteriorating, his loyalty to a political party would lessen. But astonishingly, this trend seems to work the other way. Of those who anticipate financial deteriora tion more than half chose to identify with the Democratic Party while only 21 percent selected an "Independent" party status. It is those who anticipate financial appre ciation who tend to claim independence from political party identification, and it is those who perceive a dim ming personal economic future who cling to the Democratic Party. Speculation as to why expectations of financial deterioration lead to Democratic Party identification should include the idea that economic insecurity may give the individual a defensive attitude which results in a tendency to view both politics and personal relationships in black and white terms and to see oneself as an under dog contending with the wealthy. The Democratic Party has personified itself as the party of the "little man." In a further follow-up of this tendency of the 117 pessimist to claim Democratic Party identification and for the optimist to claim "Independent” status, in Table 8 financial expectations have been examined as they relate to strength of party identification. The data indicate that the respondents who anticipate financial deprivation tend to be strong Democrats or "Independents" leaning toward the Democratic Party. This is contrary to the tendency of those anticipating financial appreciation, for among the Democrats in this group a larger portion tends to identify itself as weak Democrats. TABLE 8 STRENGTH OP PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY ECONOMIC EXPECTATION: 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Strength of Party Respondents Who Expect to Be Identification Better*-off Worse-off N % N % Strong Democrat 74 17.8 35 28.0 Weak Democrat 100 24.1 31 24.8 Independent Democrat 52 12.5 6 4.8 Independent 44 10.6 15 12.0 Independent Republican 50 12.0 8 6.4 Weak Republican 54 13.0 18 14.4 Strong Republican 41 9.9 12 9.6 Total 415 100.0 125 100.0 118 Vote Intention. The literature on extremist politics relates economic Insecurity to support for & third party candidate and the psychology literature suggests that there Is a link between feelings of relative deprivation, a sense of frustration and a desire for change. These generaliza tions raise the question. Do personal financial expecta tions, be they optimistic or pessimistic, have an influ ence on whom the individual supports in a Presidential campaign? Is either group more likely to support a third party candidate? In answer to this question dealing with the relationship of financial expectations to voting inten tions, Table 9 presents the sample of respondents divided according to the candidate they name in response to the question, "How do you think you will vote for president in this election?"^ Table 9 is surprising more for its lack of any significant differences between the respondents antici pating financial improvement versus those who anticipate ^Question 133, SRC S523. 119 TABLE 9 VOTE INTENTION BY ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONSi 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Respondents Who Expect to Be Better--off Worsel-Off N % N % Humphrey 130 42.0 41 46.0 Nixon 145 47.0 35 39.0 Wallace 33 11.0 13 15.0 Total 308 100.0 89 100.0 financial disadvantage than for any striking distinction between the two groups in their candidate support. It is true that Humphrey picked up a slightly greater proportion of support among those anticipating that they will be worse-off than he did among those anticipating that they would be better-off. On the other hand, Nixon received 8 percent greater support among those anticipating finan cial advancement than among those anticipating financial deprivation. Particularly surprising is the fact that 120 George Wallace received only 4 percent greater support among the economic pessimists than among the economic optimists. While Table 9 indicates that financial expecta tions did not play a major role in influencing respondent intent to vote for the third party candidate, George Wallace, further analysis indicates also that pessimistic financial expectations are not associated with a tendency for the individual to remain undecided as to how he will vote. Eight percent of those who anticipate a worse financial future state that they are undecided as to which candidate they will support in the upcoming Presi dential election. A close 10 percent of those who antici pate a better financial future also state that they are undecided as to which candidate they will support. Having found that, contrary to what the literature suggests, those in the sample who anticipate a worse financial future do not indicate support for the Wallace candidacy nor do they remain uncommitted to a particular candidate, attention is now turned to the two other cate gories of passive participation. 121 Attention to National and Public Affairs Empirical analysis has in the past found a rela tionship between expectations about a future event and psychological involvement in the decision-making process which appears to influence that event. In Table 10 the relationship of expectations and involvement is examined as financial expectations are related to one's attention to public affairs. Attention to public affairs is operationalized as the respondent's answer to the ques tion; "Some people seem to follow what is going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there is an election or not. Would you say that you follow public affairs most of the time, some of the time, 2 only now and then or hardly at all? Table 10 indicates that a large majority, seven out of ten, of those who feel that they will be financially better-off state that they follow public affairs "most" or "some" of the time. Among those anticipating that they will be worse-off financially a slight majority, 51 per cent, follow public affairs only "now and then" or "hardly 2 Question 430, SRC S523. 122 TABLE 10 ATTENTION TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS BY ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS: 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Respondents Follow Public Affairs Respondents Who Expect to Be Better-off Worse-off N % N % Most or Some of Time 293 70.0 62 49.0 Now and Then or Hardly At All 123 30.0 64 51.0 Total 416 100.0 126 100.0 at all." The data in Table 10 substantiate the previous empirical findings which hold that there is a relationship between expectations and involvement. There is a tendency for those who see a better financial future to follow public affairs, *nd this same relationship of positive financial expectations and a tendency to be “involved* 1 is found with regard to following national affairs. Those who anticipate financial prosperity are more likely to follow national events than are those who anticipate 122 TABLE 10 ATTENTION TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS BY ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS! 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Respondents Follow Public Affairs Respondents Who Expect to Be Better-off Norse-off N % N % Most or Some of Time 293 70.0 62 49.0 Now and Then or Hardly At All 123 30.0 64 51.0 Total 416 100.0 126 100.0 at all." The data in Table 10 substantiate the previous empirical findings which hold that there is a relationship between expectations and involvement. There is a tendency for those who see a better financial future to follow public affairs, and this same relationship of positive financial expectations and a tendency to be "involved" is found with regard to following national affairs. Those who anticipate financial prosperity are more likely to follow national events than are those who anticipate 123 financial deterioration. Table 11 again shows the relationship of expecta tions and a passive type of political involvement. As before, those with economic optimistic expectations are more likely to be politically involved. Utilizing the question, "What about national affairs; do you pay a great 3 deal, some or not much attention to national affairs?" as a measure of passive political involvement, the data indicate that there is a greater tendency for those who foresee a better financial future to follow national affairs a "great deal" than those who foresee a worse financial future. Economic expectations result in a difference of 12 percent in the proportion indicating that they follow national affairs a "great deal." Following Political Campaigns This same relationship of positive financial expectations and a passive type of political participation is found with regard to following political campaigns through newspapers. Table 12 again demonstrates that 3 Question 432, SRC S523. 124 TABLE 11 ATTENTION TO NATIONAL AFFAIRS BY ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS: 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Respondents Follow National Affairs Respondents Better-off N « Who Expect to Be Worse-off N % A Great Deal 149 41.4 29 29.6 Some 191 53.0 56 57.1 Not Much 20 5.6 13 13.3 Total 360 100.0 98 100.0 125 TABLE 12 FOLLOW POLITICAL CAMPAIGN THROUGH NEWSPAPER BY ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS: 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Respondents Follow Campaigns in Newspapers Respondents Who Expect Bet ter-of f Worse- N % N to Be -off % Regularly and Often 206 65.0 43 42.2 Once in a While and Never 111 35.0 59 57.8 Total 317 100.0 102 LOO. 0 126 there is a tendency on the part of the economic pessimist to follow campaigns less regularly than does the optimist. Interestingly enough, further analysis shows that there is no significant difference between the two eco nomic categories in the proportions of those who follow political campaigns with a great deal of interest on television or radio. An explanation as to why there is no major difference between the two groups of "better1 1 and "worse" financial anticipators and their attention to the campaign through the media of television and radio may be simply reflective of the quality of political programs. Rather than being marketed as "politics" they appear to be sold as a public relations package without political strings. Active Participation Voting Regularity Table 13 demonstrates that there is a slight ten dency for those expecting to do "better" financially in the future to vote somewhat more regularly than those anticipating doing "worse." In Table 13 the respondent is asked to indicate in how many presidential elections 127 TABLE 13 VOTING REGULARITY IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS BY ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS: 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Voted in Presidential Elections Respondents Who Better-off N % Expect Worse N to Be -off % All 215 57.9 55 46.2 Most, Some 100 27.0 48 40.3 None 56 15.1 16 13.5 Total 371 100.0 119 100.0 he or she has voted since becoming eligible to vote. Fifty-one percent of the total sample indicate that they have voted in all presidential elections while 12 percent state that they have voted in no previous presidential election. Fifty-eight percent of those who anticipate a better financial future indicate that they have voted in all previous presidential elections while 46 percent of those who anticipate financial deterioration state that 128 they have voted In all previous presidential elections. Those who anticipate a "better1 * financial future are some what more likely than the pessimists to be regular par ticipants in all presidential elections. Additional analysis of the relationship between financial expectations and voting regularity through a comparison of the two groups of "better” and "worse" financial anticipators as they are divided according to the categories of (1) voter and (2) nonvoter demonstrates that neither pessimistic or optimistic expectations is a distinguishing characteristic of the nonvoter. Seventy- five percent of those who vote express optimistic expecta tions while a close 78 percent of the nonvoters also 4 express optimistic expectations. Attempt to Influence Another Voter In an examination of the relationship of financial expectation and active political participation, it is 4 Dividing the 1968 U.S. national sample into "better" and "worse" financial anticipants by the cate gories of voter and nonvoter, the data indicate that there is no general tendency for either group to be predominantly either pessimists or optimists. 129 found that those who predict financial deterioration are not as likely to engage in political participation as are those who predict financial improvement. Table 14 demon strates this tendency of the economic pessimist to par ticipate less than the optimist by relating whether or not an individual attempts to influence another voter to his financial expectations. TABLE 14 ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE ANOTHER VOTER BY ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS: 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Respondent Tries to Influence Another Voter Respondents Who Better-off N % Expect to Be Worse-off N % Yes 156 37.5 33 26.2 NO 260 62.5 93 73.8 Total 416 100.0 126 100.0 130 While a majority of both groups do not attempt to influence another voter to support a particular candi date, one third of those who anticipate financial appre ciation in the coming year do attempt to influence another voter. Those who anticipate a worse financial future for themselves attempt to influence others in significantly smaller proportions than do those who are optimistic about their future. Campaign Buttons and Bumper Stickers This same general tendency for the financial optimist to be more active politically than the economic pessimist continues with regard to attaching bumper stickers or wearing a campaign button. Analysis of the data indicates that there is a tendency for those who anticipate a "worse" economic future for themselves to avoid direct participation in politics. Twenty percent of the sample who project a better financial future for themselves indicate that they have either worn a campaign button or have attached a bumper sticker to their car. Only & percent of those who antici pate a "worse” financial future have been involved in either avenue of direct participation. Table 15 demon 131 strates that there Is a greater tendency for those expect' Ing to do "better" financially in the future than for the pessimist to be involved in direct political participa tion through the use of a bumper sticker or the wearing of a campaign button. TABLE 15 USE OF BUMPER STICKER OR CAMPAIGN BUTTON BY ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS: 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Respondents Who Expect to Be Use Sticker or Better-off Worse-off Button N « N % Yes 85 20.5 10 8.1 NO 329 79.5 113 91.9 Total 414 100.0 123 100.0 132 Conelugion It is clear from the data presented in this chapter that financial expectations do influence political participation. Several significant points arex 1. There is no general tendency for those antici pating either financial appreciation or deterioration in the coming year to support a third party candidate, George Wallace, the third party candidate in 1968, re ceived only 4 percent greater support among the economic pessimists than among the economic optimists. 2. There is a general tendency for the economic pessimist to be a Democratic Party identifier and those who anticipate that they will be "better-off" in the future are more likely to identify themselves as "Inde pendents ." 3. The economic pessimists tend to consider themselves as "strong” identifiers of the Democratic Party while those who anticipate financial appreciation, within the Democratic Party, tend to identify themselves as "weak” party identifiers. Mo major tendency on the part of either group of financial anticipants is found within the ranks of the Republican Party. 133 4. Those anticipating a ■better" financial future are more likely to be involved in both passive and active political participation. Generally, it has been found that economic pessi mists do not seem to be more susceptible to political radicalism or nonvoting but they are more apt to become less active and to sit on the political sidelines. Yet to adequately clarify the relationship of financial expectations to political behavior a deeper probe is necessary. While the economic pessimists do not over whelmingly support third party candidates, yet are they more likely than the optimists to feel politically in efficacious? Do the economic pessimists distrust politi cal parties? Are they more likely than the optimists to be suspicious of an expansion of government power? The broader question of the relationship between financial expectations and political behavior is that regarding a general attitudinal syndrome. Do those who are financially insecure generally feel a dissatisfaction with life, a distrust of people; and then, is this pessimism projected to the political sphere? The question we are really asking is: Is there a pessimistic syndrome 134 associated with personal economic pessimism wherein one sees himself as "going down-hill" financially, has a despairing feeling of personal inefficacy which then becomes projected to the nation and political arena and leads one to a general distrust and lack of interest in political participation? An attempt to conduct a more thorough examination of the link between economic expectations and political attitudes through an analysis of these questions is the focus of the subsequent chapters. CHAPTER VI PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTRIBUTES ASSOCIATED WITH FINANCIAL EXPECTATIONS Introduction Chapter VI will explore the relationship of financial expectations to personal attitudes. The begin ning point of the analysis is the examination of the basis of economic expectations. Are future economic expecta tions linked to one's perception of his present and past economic condition? Secondly, the analysis will focus upon the relationship of economic expectations about one's personal economic situation as it effects one's projection of the future economic condition of the nation. Thirdly, the analysis will identify feelings of personal inefficacy which are characteristic of the eco nomic pessimist. Lastly, an attempt will be made to assess whether or not there iB a pessimistic syndrome of personal attitudes that is associated with pessimistic economic expectations. 135 136 Personal Attitudes Economic Expectations As Related to Past and Present Economic Perceptions Table 16 sets forth the relationship of the respondent's expectations of his future financial condi tion and his perception of his present economic condition. The individual's perception of his present financial con dition is operationalized as the respondent's answer to the question: "He are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. Would you say that you and your family are better-off or worse-off financially than you were a year ago?*^ Table 16 is of particular interest because one of the major ideas found in the literature on the social- psychology of poverty is that of changing expectations. The literature raises the question of whether or not a change in the objective financial situation will change the expectations of a poverty group for a continuing rise 2 in the standard of living. This speculated relationship ^Question 277, SRC S523. ^Thomas R. Dye and L. Harmon Ziegler, The Irony of Democracy (Belmont: Duxbury Press, 1971). 137 TABLE 16 PERCEPTION OF CURRENT FINANCIAL SITUATION IN COMPARISON OF ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONSt 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Future Financial Expectati ons Respondents Who Better Now N % Feel They Are Horse Now N % Better 336 94.0 71 56.0 Horse 21 6.0 56 44.0 Total 356 100.0 127 100.0 of change in the objective condition accompanied by a corresponding increase in expectations and behavior which achieves the desired rewards has also been applied to the idea of political participation. The assumption has been made regarding political participation that as legal barriers are removed, thereby enabling a particular group to participate, they will take an active part in the political process. Table 16 is significant in that it shows the importance of perceptions in influencing 138 expectations and points to the need to consider not only the objective situation but also the Individual's evalua tion of the situation. As Table 16 Indicates, those who are optimistic about their financial future are generally those who feel that they are doing better financially at the present time; and those who feel they are doing worse at the present time are more likely to predict a deteriorating financial future. Yet there is another important trend which appears in this relationship between expectations and the individual's assessment of his current economic situation. Focusing on those who feel they are finan cially worse-off these days than they were a year ago, there is still a substantial number who predict a better financial future for themselves in the coming year. This is an important psychological factor of hope and a some what counter-trend to the relationship of deteriorating current financial situations and expectations of a deteriorating future financial situation. Over one-half of those in the sample who describe their current finan cial situation as "worse-now" look forward to an econom ically profitable year. 139 Examining this factor of optimism despite a cur rently deteriorated financial condition, through a more concrete indicator, that of monetary income. Table 17 sets forth the relationship of monetary income as com pared to previous years and anticipation of personal economic future. Monetary income was measured by the respondent's answer to the question: "Are you people making as much money now as you were a year ago, or more, or less?” Table 17 reinforces the generalization that there is a psychological factor other than just one's assessment of present and past economic conditions which determines one's economic expectations. Again, Table 17 demonstrates the relationship between expectations and current situations. Those who were making "more" money in 1968 generally were likely to feel that they would be even better off financially in 1969. Yet of those who indicated that they were cur rently making ”less” money in 1968, 68 percent stated that they expected to do better financially in the coming year. Here we see some evidence of a trace of optimistic 3 Question 278, SRC S523. 140 TABLE 17 FUTURE ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS BY PRESENT ECONOMIC SITUATION RELATIVE TO FAST: 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Financial Expectations Respondent's Income Compared to Previous Year More Less N % N % Better 275 84.9 44 67.7 Norse 49 15.1 21 32.3 Total 324 100.0 65 100.0 economic expectations which seem to have no established economic basis. Several authors, in discussing American society, refer to threads of pragmatism and idealism which permeate the society.* Table 17 indicates that some of the individuals in the 1968 national data sample who are making leas money in 1968 than in the previous *Dye and Ziegler, loc. cit. 141 year still anticipate financial appreciation in the coming year. It may be that these expectations of a "better tomorrow" despite present difficulties had a 5 part in the turn-out vote of 64 percent in 1968. Personal Versus General Economic Pessimism Having examined the relationship of present financial condition and the respondent's projection of his future financial condition, the next step in the analysis is to determine whether or not a personal atti tude of pessimism or optimism is projected to the national economic scene. Does one who sees his own financial situation declining also feel that the national financial situation is going to get worse and that there may be a recession? To answer this question the respondent's projection of the national financial condition is opera tionalized as his response to the question, "Looking ahead, which would you say is more likely— that the coun try as a whole will have continuous good times during the coming year or that we will have periods of widespread 5World Almanac, 1971 (New York; Doubleday and Co., 1971), p. 703. 142 unemployment or depression or what?"* Table 18 presents the responses to this question as they are related to financial expectation. TABLE 18 PROJECTION OF FUTURE NATIONAL CONDITIONS BY FINANCIAL EXPECTATIONS: 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Nation's Future Financial Condition Respondents Who Expect Better-off Worse N « N to Be -off « Good 187 57.7 25 29.9 Middle 48 14.8 15 16.7 Bad 89 27.5 50 55.6 Total 324 100.0 90 100.0 Table 18 indicates that there is a relationship between expectations about one*s own financial future and his perception of the nation's financial future. Those who see a better financial future for themselves are more ^Question 281, SRC SS23. 143 likely to feel that the nation will have a prosperous year them, those who euiticipate financial deterioration. Fiftyseven percent of those who see themselves as doing Mbetter” financially in the future also see a "good” financial future for the nation. Over one-half, 55 per cent, of those who anticipate a deteriorating financial condition also anticipate the same type of economic condition for the nation. Only 28 percent of those who anticipate a decreasing financial situation for them selves anticipate that the nation as a whole will have a financially *good” year in the coming twelve months. Financial expectations result in a difference of 29 per cent in the proportion of respondents predicting financial well-being for the nation. This connection of attitude between one's percep tion of his own financial future declining and at the same time viewing the future financial condition of the nation also declining may be an important psychological defense mechanism which allows the individual to ignore or bypass feelings of alienation. If the individual feels that his own economic future is bleak but that the nation is suffering along with him, it may be that he 144 then avoids feelings of personal or relative deprivation. It may be that this generalising tendency of the economic pessimist from a personal to a national level allows him to accept a “worse" financial future more easily by believing that he is not alone with the problem or that it is not a reflection in some way upon his own capabil ities . Continuing to examine the relationship between personal economic assessment and a tendency to generalize to the nation, Table 19 presents the relationship between the respondent's economic expectations and his anticipa tion of business conditions in the coming year. The perception of business conditions in the coming year is operationalized as the respondent's answer to the ques tion: "Now turning to business conditions in the country as a whole— do you think that during the next twelve months we will have good times financially, or bad times, or what?"7 Table 19 indicates that there is a tendency for those who think that they are personally going to do 7 Question 282, SRC S523. 145 TABLE 19 PROJECTION OF BUSINESS CONDITIONS IN THE COMING YEAR BY ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS: 1968 U.S.NATIONAL SAMPLE Business Conditions in the Coming Year Respondents Who Better-off N % Expect Worse> N to Be -off % Good and Good Qualified 262 to * CO 39 30.7 Middle and Bad 66 15.8 50 39.3 Don't Know and Not Appropriate 89 21.4 38 29.9 Total 417 100.0 127 100.0 "better" to generalize that economically the nation is going to do better. Two thirds of those who anticipate a better financial future for themselves also state that in the coming months business conditions on the whole will be "good times." While 63 percent of those who feel that they personally will prosper in the coming year view the nation as also prospering, 39 percent of those who anticipate a declining personal economic future indicate 146 a "middle" or "bad times" future for business conditions. What is even more interesting, as indicated in Table 19,is that there is a greater tendency for those who anticipate financial deterioration than those who antici pate personal financial improvement to state that they "don't know" what the business conditions will be in the nation in the coming year. This may be due to a tendency among the economic pessimists to believe that they have little control over life and that life is largely con trolled by chance. Before turning to an examination of the relation ship of economic pessimism and feelings of personal inefficacy it should be noted that further data analysis of personal economic pessimism and the belief that the nation's economic future is bleak reinforces the demon strated relationship between personal and general economic pessimism, with regard to anticipating a coming economic recession those who are optimistic about their own finan cial future do not think that a recession is likely to occur again. Fifty-five percent of those who are per sonally looking forward to a prosperous year state an unqualified "no” to the question, "How about a recession 147 and unemployment like we had in 1958 and in winter 1960- 61; do you think this will happen again?” In contrast, 45 percent of those who anticipate a deteriorating finan cial future state that they believe a recession is likely to happen. Having found that personal pessimistic expecta tions are related to pessimistic generalisations about the nation, the question that now arises is: Is there a general psychological-attitudinal syndrome of inefficacy, helplessness, or general insecurity to be found among the economic pessimists? Do those who anticipate a deterio rating financial future also feel that they have no con trol over their own destiny, that life is governed by fate? Does this pessimism lead them to be generally suspicious of others and are they generally dissatisfied with life? Personal Efficacy The relationship between economic expectations and feelings of personal efficacy will be examined through 8 Question 301, SRC S523. five variables: (1) respondent's evaluation of his own ability to run his life, (2) respondent's feeling that life can be planned and that it is not a matter of luck, (3) respondent's general satisfaction with life, (4) re spondent's feeling of security that life will generally work out the way he wants it to, and (5) respondent's trust or distrust of people. Cam Run Own Life One's feelings as to his capability to hemdle life is operationalized as the answer to the following question "Some people feel they can run their lives pretty much the way they want to, others feel the problems of life are sometimes too big for them. Which one are you most like?" Table 20 presents the relationship between economic expectations and a feeling of control over one's own life. Significamtly, Table 20 demonstrates that there is a strong relationship between expectations and this aspect of feelings of personal efficacy. Those who anticipate a prosperous economic year tend to feel that they can run their own lives. Eighty-three percent, over 9 Question 49 8, SRC S523. 149 TABLE 20 FEELING THAT ONE GAN BUN OWN LIFE BY FINANCIAL EXPECTATIONS: 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Can Run Own Life Respondents Who Expect to Be Better-off Worse-off N % N « Can 330 82.7 67 58.8 Problem is too Big 69 17.3 47 41.2 Total 399 100.0 114 100.0 three-fourths of the sample who predict financial well being also state that they can run their own lives, that the problems of life are not too big for them. Only 17 percent of the economic optimists state that the problems are sometimes too big for them. Economic expectations result in a difference of 24 percent of the proportion of the respondents indicating that they can run their own lives. However, a surprising factor is found within the ranks of the economic pessimists in terms of feeling that they are in control of their own lives. Here again, as 150 was previously found in the relationship of optimistic economic expectations and current monetary income, we see a trace of personal optimism despite anticipations of economic deterioration. Those who anticipate a "worse" financial future, like those who anticipate an appreciat ing financial future, are also more likely to state that they can handle life. Over one half of the respondents in the sample who express pessimism with regard to their financial future also express a confidence in their own capability to handle life. Life Can Be Planned Continuing the exploration of an attitudinal syndrome of helplessness or frustration as it is related to economic expectations, Table 21 relates expectations and the respondent's feeling that life can be planned and it is not a matter of luck. The table measures this feel ing by utilizing the respondent's answer to the question: "Do you think it's better to plan your life a good way ahead, or would you say life is too much a matter of luck to plan ahead very far?"^® 10Question 495, SRC S523. 151 TABLE 21 ATTITUDE THAT LIFE CAM BE PLANNED AHEAD BY ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS: 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Respondents Who Expect to Be Better-off Norse-off Life Can Be Planned Ahead N N % Plan Ahead Too Much Luck 285 70.0 122 30.0 66 55.5 53 44.5 Total 407 100.0 119 100.0 From an examination of Table 21 it is again evident that people who anticipate economic deterioration are less likely to feel that they can effectively handle their lives. People who anticipate a "worse" financial future are more likely to feel that life is so governed by chance forces that they do not try to plan ahead. Two thirds of those who anticipate an economically pros perous coming year state that it is better to plan ahead while only one third of this group believe that life is a matter of luck. Forty-five percent, almost half of 152 those who project a deteriorating future feel that life is much a matter of chance. Life Will Work Out Carrying the analysis of expectations as it is related to a general feeling of efficacy in influencing one's own life to one other variable, that of a sense of security that life will generally work out the way one wants it to, Table 22 indicates that economic expectations and security of life are related. TABLE 22 ATTITUDE THAT LIFE HILL WORK OUT AS RESPONDENT WOULD LIKE BY ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS: 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Respondents Who Expect to Be Certain that Life Will Better-off Worse-off Work Out N % N % Pretty Sure 169 41.4 32 26.7 Not Sure 239 58.6 88 73.3 Total 408 100.0 120 100.0 153 Pessimism regarding one's economic circumstances is related to a general pessimism about life working out the way the individual would like. Over two thirds, 73 percent, of those who anticipate a deteriorating financial future state that they are uncertain that life will work out the way they would like it; 59 percent of those who anticipate a better financial future indicate that they are not sure about life's outcome. Table 22 is signifi cant in that it demonstrates that a general feeling of uncertainty as to the expectations of life "working out" pervades the total sample. Sixty percent of the total sample of respondents state that they are not sure about the outcome of life. With pessimistic economic expectations being related to a general attitude of pessimism about life, feelings that problems are too big, that life is so governed by chance forces that it is useless to plan ahead, and that life probably will not work out the way one would like it to, it is evident that a general atti tude of pessimism accompanies expectations of financial deterioration. A very important question then becomes. Does this general attitude of pessimism color one's atti- 154 t.ude toward other people? Do those who are Insecure financially become skeptical or suspicious of other people? If those who are skeptical about their financial future are also distrustful of other people, this may have extremely important political implications. If one is uncertain about his future and he is distrustful of people and generally dissatisfied with life, it may be that the stage is set for leadership that carefully promises economic prosperity and clearly identifies those who are to be distrusted. Trust in People Table 23 relates economic expectations and respondent's attitude of trust or distrust of people by utilizing the question: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?In regard to the attitude of trust of people the data indicate that eco nomic anticipation is related to a generalized trust or lack of it. A majority of those anticipating a financial ^Question 500, SRC 8523. 155 future feel that most people can be trusted. A majority of those anticipating a "worse" financial future feel that one can't be "too careful," that people generally cannot be trusted. Economic expectations result in a difference of 17 percent in the proportions of respondents who indi cate that people can be trusted. TABLE 23 TRUST IN PEOPLE BY ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS: 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Respondents Who Expect to Be Better--off Worse-‘ Off People Can Be Trusted N % N « Yes 245 59.9 53 42.7 NO 164 40.1 71 57.3 Total 409 100.0 124 100.0 156 In a further analysis of expectations as they are related to attitudes toward people, the sample of respond ents was examined on their perception of the motive for human behavior. The motive for human behavior is opera tionalized as the respondent's answer to the question: "Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance or would they try to be fair?" The data indicate that economic expectations is related to attitudes toward the motives of others. Those who anticipate a better financial future tend to feel that people generally try to be fair. Over two thirds of those who anticipate an economically prosperous year state that even if most people have a chance to take advantage of them people will still be fair. Forty-two percent of those who anticipate deteriorating financial conditions state that if people have a chance they will try to take advantage. Those who are pessimistic about their financial future also tend to be more distrustful, skeptical and suspicious of others than those who are optimistic about their financial future. 12 Question 502, SRC S523. 157 Satisfaction with Life One other factor connected with this pessimistic attitudinal syndrome is that of general dissatisfaction with life. Table 24 distinctly demonstrates that those who expect to be financially better off in the future are more likely to be satisfied with life than those who anticipate a "worse" financial future. Almost three fourths, 72 percent, of those who anticipate economic prosperity in the coming year indicate that they are generally satisfied with life. Only 46 percent of those TABLE 24 LIFE SATISFYING BY FINANCIAL EXPECTATIONS: 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Respondents Who Expect to Be Better-off Worse*-off Life Satisfying N « N % Satisfied 100 72.5 21 46.7 Not Satisfied 38 27.5 24 53.3 Total 138 100.0 45 100.0 158 who anticipate a "worse" financial future find life satis fying. Economic expectations result in a difference of 25 percent in the proportions indicating that they are generally satisfied with life. In Table 24 satisfaction with life is measured by the respondent's answer to the question: "In general, how satisfying do you find the way you are spending your life these days? Would you 13 call it completely satisfying, or not very satisfying?" Conclusion This chapter deals with two basic questions: Cl) What factors influence economic expectations? and (2) What psychological attributes are associated with financial expectations? In regard to the first question, it has been found that those who are optimistic about their own financial future are generally those who are doing better financially at the present time. Generally, those who are experiencing a financial recession are more likely than those experiencing financial prosperity to predict a deteriorating future for themselves. Those who 13Question 499, SRC S523. 159 are making more money in 1968 tended to predict financial prosperity in 1969. However, among those who were doing "worse* 1 at the present time there were some who indicated that they expected a "better" financial future. This important factor of "hope for a better tomorrow" was a thin thread that appeared continually through the analysis of expectations and feelings of personal efficacy. Despite a projection of a deteriorating financial picture a substantial portion of the economic pessimists did feel that they could handle life, that life was not governed entirely by chance, and that people will not use every chance to take advantage of others. In regard to the second question, that of expec tations as related to the psychological attributes of distrust of others, general dissatisfaction with life, and a feeling of relative powerlessness, the data indi cate that those who are pessimistic or optimistic about their own financial future generalize this attitude to the nation and that there is a pessimistic-optimistic attitudinal syndrome which accompanies financial antici pations. Those who feel optimistic about their own financial future feel that the nation will have a pros- 160 peroua year. Those who feel optimistic about their financial future axe generally more confident than the pessimists that they can handle their own life, that life will probably work out the way they would like, and that people can be trusted. Those who are pessimistic about their own financial future tend to feel that the problems of life are too big for them to handle, that people try to take advantage of them, and they tend to be more dis satisfied with life than the optimist. Those who express economic optimism are more likely than the pessimist to express a sense of personal efficacy. Those who express economic pessimism are more likely than the optimist to express a feeling of insecurity and a sense of personal inefficacy. These findings raise the question. Does this anticipation of financial deterioration which is linked to a general pessimism also "spill” over into the politi cal arena? Do those who feel economically insecure also have skeptical attitudes toward government officials and distrust governmental power? Do the economic pessimists find politics too complicated or feel that they are political ineffective? These are the types of questions 161 that need to be answered If we are to understand the political Implications of subjective expectations. CHAPTER VII POLITICAL ATTITUDES ASSOCIATED WITH FINANCIAL EXPECTATIONS Introduction In the previous chapter personal attitudes were found to be associated with financial expectations. It was found that there tends to be a general pessimistic or optimistic outlook which accompanies the congruent attitude of financial anticipations. The question that now arises is one regarding the political attitudes of both the economic pessimists and the optimists. Is there a relationship between economic expectations and political attitudes? In an examination of the relationship between economic expectations and political attitudes, this chapter will focus upon the following: (1) attitudes toward government officials, (2) attitudes on political parties, (3) feelings of political efficacy, and (4) atti tudes toward governmental power. 162 163 Political Attitudes Attltudea Toward Government Officials Of major concern to students of politics and voting behavior is the question of whether anticipated financial deprivation results in lack of confidence in individuals and institutions of government. To measure this relationship, confidence in government is operation alised as the respondent's answer to the question, "Do you feel that almost all of the people running the govern ment are smart people who usually know what they are doing, or do you think that quite a lot of them don't seem to know what they are doing?"^ The results of the cross-tabulation of the two variables is presented in Table 25. Table 25 presents evidence indicating that for this nationally representative sample anticipated finan cial deprivation does indeed result in a tendency toward skepticism with respect to the ability of people in government to have the knowledge necessary to perform ^Question 506, SRC S523. 164 TABLE 25 CONFIDENCE IN KNOWLEDGEABILITY OF GOVERNMENTAL OFFICIALS BY ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS: 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Government Officials Respondents Who Expect Better-off Worse- N « N to Be -off « Know What They're Doing 253 62.8 57 48.7 Don't Know What They're Doing 150 37.2 60 51.3 Total 403 100.0 117 100.0 their jobs. As Table 25 indicates, a majority of those with high economic expectations believe that people in government know what they are doing, while a majority of those with low expectations indicate that they feel that people in government do not know what they are doing. Nearly two thirds, 63 percent, of those anticipating that they will be better off in the coming year indicate con fidence in the knowledgeability of people in government, while those anticipating that they will be worse off financially are split almost half and half on this point 165 with a slight majority indicating pessimism* This difference between the two groups of optimis tic/pessimistic anticipants in confidence is also found when tapped by other questions concerning the general competence and trustworthiness of government officials. For instance, further analysis shows that people with low economic expectations are most skeptical about the honesty of people in government. In response to the question, "Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are a little crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked at all?" Over one third of those who anticipate financial deterio ration state that quite a few of the government officials are dishonest. One fourth of those who anticipate finan cial prosperity also state that quite a few of the govern ment officials are dishonest. In Table 26 economic expectations result in a difference of 14 percent in the proportions of persons indicating that quite a few people in government are crooked. This finding extends the previously found relationship between financial expecta 2 Question 507, SRC S523. 166 tions and trust In people. Those who anticipate finan cial deterioration are skeptical of the motives of others and here we find that this same group is somewhat more skeptical about the honesty of people in government. TABLE 26 DISHONESTY OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS BY ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS; 1968 U.S.NATIONAL SAMPLE People in Government Respondents Better-off Who Expect to Be Worse—off Crooked N « N % Some 309 75.8 74 61.7 Quite a Lot 99 24.3 46 38.3 Total 408 100.0 120 100.0 This same note of skepticism is seen when respondents are asked whether an individual can trust the government in Washington to do what is right. Two thirds of those anticipating a better financial future indicate that they could trust government always or most of the time while a bare majority of those anticipating 167 financial deprivation Indicate a trust in government. Interestingly, in addition to the relationship between economic pessimism and skepticism toward govern ment and government officials is the finding that this pessimism shows the least effect with regard to attitudes toward Congressmen. In response to the statement, "Generally speaking, those we elect to Congress lose 3 touch with the people pretty quickly," there is no sig nificant difference in attitude between those who antici pate being better off and those who anticipate being worse off financially in the future. This same lack of difference between the two groups of financial expecta tions is true when the respondents are asked to indicate how much attention Congressmen pay to the views of the people who elect them. Economic expectations result in a difference of less than 1 percent in the proportions indicating that Congressmen pay a good deal of attention to the people who elect them when they decide what to do in Congress. ^Question 521, SRC S523. 168 The line of analysis leads one to realize the necessity to exercise caution in drawing conclusions about the relationship between expectations and a general dis trust of government officials or institutions. It appears that there are two levels of subjective perception of government: (1) the general level, and (2) the more specific personalistic level. On the general level the economic pessimists tend to lack, confidence in the knowl edgeability of people in government and are skeptical about their honesty, but on a more specific level, a specific office, those same pessimists were just as likely as the optimists to feel that Congressmen do pay attention to the people who elect them. This difference in findings raises the question of trust of institutional vehicles of power. What is the attitude of the pessimist or optimist with regard to political parties? Are they viewed by the pessimist as dishonest institutions or does the pessimist see them, like he does a Congressman, as a personalistic vehicle concerned about him? Three measures of attitudes toward political parties will be used to analyze this relation ship. They are (1) respondent's feelings that parties 169 are Interested In votes and not opinions; (2) respondent's feelings that parties do not help make the government pay attention to what the people think; (3) respondent's feelings that parties usually keep their promises and do not do what they want after the election is over. Attitudes Toward Political Parties Utilizing the respondent's agreement or disagree ment with the statement, "Parties are only interested in people's votes but not in their opinions,"4 Table 27 indicates that a rather striking difference is found in the proportions of those indicating agreement or disagree ment with the statement when the respondents are cate gorized by financial anticipation. Almost two thirds of those expecting financial deprivation are skeptical as to whether parties are really interested in the opinions of voters, while an almost equal proportion of those antici pating financial well-being disagree with the statement. A difference of almost 25 percent can be seen in the level of confidence in political parties when respondents are categorized by economic expectations. Question 253, SRC S523. 170 TABLE 27 ATTITUDES TOWARD POLITICAL PARTIES BY ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS: 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Parties Only Respondents Who Expect to Be Better-off Worse-off N % N % Interested in Votes, Not Opinions 155 39.0 75 63.6 People's Opinions 242 61.0 43 36.4 Total 397 100.0 118 100.0 A second measure of attitudes toward political parties is the degree to which an individual feels that political parties are an effective pressure group which aids them in encouraging the government to consider their opinions. This attitude is operationalized as the respondent's answer to the question: "How much do you feel that political parties help to make the government pay attention to what the people think: a good deal. 171 sane, or not much? anti-party attitude among the pessimists. Almost two thirds of those anticipating a "worse" financial future indicated that political parties only help "seme" or "not much" in making the government pay attention to what the people think, while only a slight majority of those anticipating a "better" financial future manifested an TABLE 28 ATTITUDES TOWARD POLITICAL PARTIES AS PRESSURE GROUPS BY ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS: 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Respondents Who Expect to Be Parties Help Government Care What People Think Better-off N « Worse-off N « A Good Deal 176 44.0 30 27.0 Some or Not Much 224 56.0 81 72.9 Total 400 100.0 111 100.0 5 Question 40, SRC S523 172 anti-party attitude. The economic pessimists in this sample are more likely than the optimists to view politi cal parties as only marginally useful as a pressure group in helping them make government concerned about their opinions. The third measure of attitudes toward political parties is the respondent's evaluation as to whether the party is responsible in keeping its election promises. Again, a similar anti-party attitude on the part of the economic pessimist is indicated by his response to the question, "Do you think that parties pretty much keep their promises or do they usually do what they want after the election is over?"® As Table 29 indicates over three fourths of those anticipating economic deprivation feel that parties irresponsibly do what they want rather than keep the promises they have made while less than two thirds of those anticipating financial gain take this same view. Those who anticipate being "worse" off finan cially during the coming year view parties in a more 6 Question 522, SRC S523. 173 skeptical light regarding their following through with pre-election promises than those who anticipate financial improvement. TABLE 29 PARTIES KEEP PROMISES BY ECONOMIC EXPECTATION! 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Parties Keep Promises Respondents Who Expect to Be Better-off Worse-off N % N % Keep Promises 138 36.5 27 23.5 Do What They Want 240 63.5 88 76.5 Total 378 100.0 115 100.0 The question that now arises in a follow-through of this examination of political attitudes is whether those who distrust parties and government feel a general sense of personal political inefficacy. Do those who anticipate financial deterioration feel that public offi cials do not care what they think? Does the economic pessimist feel that politics is too complicated for him 174 -to understand? Feelings of Political Efficacy Analyzing respondent feelings of political effi cacy as they are related to financial expectations reveals that the pessimist feels politically unimportant. An examination of three measures of political efficacy indi cates that those who anticipate financial deprivation are much more likely to feel ineffective and ignored. The three different attitudes measuring political efficacy are (1) respondent's feelings that public officials are concerned about his opinions; (2) respondent's feelings that politics and government are too complicated for personal comprehension; and (3) respondent's feelings that he does have a say about government actions. Table 30 indicates that a rather striking differ ence is found in the proportions of those stating that officials care what they think when financial expectations are related in response to the question, "Would you say that most public officials care quite a lot about what people like you think, or that they don't care much 175 TABLE 30 ATTITUDE THAT PUBLIC OFFICIALS CAKE B Y ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS: 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Public Officials Respondents Mho Expect Better-off Worse N % N to Be -off « Care 267 66.9 57 47.1 Do Not Care 132 33.1 64 52.9 Total 399 100.0 121 100.0 7 at all?" Two thirds of those anticipating financial well-being feel that public officials do care, while less than a majority of those expecting financial deterioration feel that public officials do care what they think. A difference of 20 percent can be seen in the proportions indicating that public officials do care when respondents are divided by economic expectations. Over one half of those anticipating financial deterioration felt that 7 Question 141, SRC S523. 176 public officials did not care about the opinions of people like themselves. A second measure of political efficacy Is the feeling that one can influence government actions, a belief that one can have an effective input into the polit ical process. This feeling is operationalized as the respondent's answer to the question: "Would you say that people like you have quite a lot to say about what the government does, or that you don't have much to say at Q all?" Table 31 indicates that those who anticipate financial deterioration are more likely than the optimist to feel that they have a small voice in the governmental process. Over three fourths, 85 percent, of the economic pessimists stated that they did not have much of a say in determining what government does while 67 percent of the economic optimists also felt the same way. Economic expectations result in a difference of 18 percent in the proportions indicating that they do not have much to say about what the government does. 8 Question 144, SRC S523. 177 TABLE 31 RESPONDENT CAN INFLUENCE GOVERNMENT ACTION BY ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS: 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Have Say About What Government Does Respondents Better-off N % Who Expect Worse N to Be -off % Quite a Lot 133 33.5 19 15.1 Not Much 270 67.5 107 84.9 Total 403 100.0 126 100.0 The third dimension of feeling of political effi cacy to be examined is the respondent's feeling that he cannot understand what really is going on in politics, a sense of confusion regarding the political process. Table 32 indicates that the economic pessimists are more likely than the optimists to feel that politics are too complicated for them to understand when it operationalizes this attitude as the respondent's answer to the question: "Would you say that politics and government are so com plicated that people like you can't really understand 178 TABLE 32 POLITICS TOO COMPLICATED BY ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS: 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Understand Politics Respondents Mho Expect to Be Better-off Norse-off N % N % Can 267 65.3 64 51.2 Cannot 142 34.7 61 48.8 Total 409 100.0 125 100.0 what's going on, or that you can understand what's going on pretty well?"® Forty-nine percent, almost half, of those who anticipate financial deprivation also feel that they cannot understand politics, while 35 percent, one third, of those who anticipate financial prosperity feel that they cannot understand politics. Economic expectations result in a difference of 14 percent in the proportions indicating that politics are too complicated ^Question 143, SRC S523. 179 for people like themselves. Attitudes Toward Governmental Power He have seen that economic pessimists tend to be relatively more distrustful of people and government, particularly distrustful of political parties and to feel politically nonefficacious. Further research shows that those with pessimistic expectations are more likely to believe that government wastes money, that government is run for the benefit of a few big interests, and that government can generally be trusted only some or none of the time.*0 Logical consistency would then seem to dictate that these individuals who express the skepticism would also desire to have the power of government curbed. How ever, as Table 33 indicates, these individuals do not translate this distrust into a belief that the government 10 The data analysis of financial expectations and the attitude that government is run for a few big inter ests demonstrate that those who anticipate a worse finan cial future are more likely to believe that government benefits only a few rather than benefitting all. 180 is too powerful. Surprisingly, it is the respondents who anticipate financial advantage who do tend to feel that the government is too powerful. TABLE 33 ATTITUDE THAT GOVERNMENT IS TOO POWERFUL BY ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS: 1968 U.S. NATIONAL SAMPLE Government Power Respondents Who Expect to Be Better-off Worse-off N % N % Government Too Powerful 176 51.9 37 38.5 Depends, and Government Not Too Powerful 163 48.1 59 61.5 Total 339 100.0 96 100.0 Here we have a rather interesting situation. Individuals with expectations that they will be worse-off in the coming year tend to feel relatively powerless, unable to control their own destinies, and yet they feel that government is not too powerful. An explanation for this phenomenon may be that since the economic pessimists do trust their Congressional representative, although not 181 the parties, they would like to have the power of govern ment used in a personalistic way to advance their own interests. Support for this explanation is developed as one further examines expectations as they are related to various governmental action, such as governmental aid to hospital care.1^ Those with low expectations for their economic future are more likely to desire governmental aid to hospital care than are those who anticipate being better-off financially. Almost two thirds of those with low expectations stated that government should help people get hospital care. Conclusion In this analysis of political attitudes as they are associated with financial expectations, an interesting profile has come into focus. He have seen that economic In an analysis of the relationship of economic expectations and support for government aid to hospital care the data indicate that those with pessimistic expec tations are more likely than those with optimistic expec tations to desire government aid. Sixty-two percent of those who predict financial deterioration state that they believe that the government should help people get hospi tal care while only 54 percent of those who anticipate a better financial future feel that government should aid in hospital care. 182 pessimism is related to political skepticism and cynicism. Those who anticipate that their financial situation will be worse in the future are more likely than the optimists to feel that governmental officials lack the knowledge to act sensibly, to have greater doubts about the honesty of government and yet to feel that government is not too powerful. By far the greatest difference between the pessi mists and optimists in terms of the political attitudes examined here has been the significantly greater distrust of political parties exhibited by those who feel that they will be worse-off financially in the future. This group has strikingly indicated that they feel that polit ical parties fail to keep their promises once the elec tions are over, that parties are actually interested only in votes, winning, and not the opinions of those who go to the ballot box, and lastly, that political parties are only moderately effective as a pressure group in encourag ing the government to be concerned with what people think. This expressed cynicism toward government and parties is also carried over into the area of feelings of political efficacy. Those who anticipate a declining 183 financial situation in the coming year tend to feel that they do not have an effective voice in influencing government actions and they are more likely than the optimist to feel that public officials really do not care about their opinions. Generally, the pessimists also feel that politics and government are so complicated that people such as themselves cannot actually comprehend the political process. This distrust of government officials, of polit ical parties and feelings of political inefficacy would seem to lead one to feel that government is too powerful, but surprisingly, the economic pessimists, having identi fied themselves as being skeptical, tend to be the ones who feel that government is not too powerful. It is the economic optimists who tend to feel that government is too powerful. This inconsistency in attitudes leads to the speculation that since the pessimists tend to feel relatively powerless and distrustful, and yet do trust their Congressional representatives, it may be that they would like to have the power of government used in a per sonalistic way. Additional analysis regarding such an interest, government aid to hospital cue, demonstrates 184 that, those of pessimistic economic expectations support a larger role for the government in these areas. The cumulative impact of the findings in Chapter V and this chapter lead to the conclusion that there is a syndrome of attitudinal characteristics that are asso ciated with pessimistic and optimistic financial expecta tions. Economic pessimism as measured by financial expectations for the coming year has been found to be related to both a general pessimism about the outcome of life and distrust of people. Economic pessimism also has been found to be related to attitudes of political skepticism and cynicism. CHAPTER VXII CONCLUSIONS Summary of Findings This study of the relationship between economic expectations and political attitudes has four main empir ical sections. First, an effort is made in a preliminary analysis to describe some of the characteristics of those with differing financial expectations, Including level of education, occupation and income. Second, the two groups of "better" and "worse" financial anticipants are identi fied in terms of their respective level of political par ticipation, and whether or not they supported the third party candidate, George Wallace, in 1968. Third, an effort is made to discern the personal attitudes that are associated with pessimistic and opti mistic financial expectations; and finally, economic expectations are examined as related to an individual's political attitudes. 185 186 In brief, the analysis of economic pessimism versus optimism has indicated that pessimism about finan cial expectations is related to (1) a pessimistic attitu dinal syndrome of personal attitudes; (2) a tendency to avoid direct political participation; and (3) feelings of political inefficacy. People who anticipate that their financial situation will be worse in the future are more likely than others to express a general pessimism about the nation's financial future, to feel that they cannot run their own lives, to feel that life is so governed by chance forces that they do not try to plan ahead. As individuals the pessimists tend to feel relatively power less, unable to control their own destinies and to be suspicious and distrustful of others. We have also seen that economic pessimism is related to political participation and attitudes. The financial pessimists are likely to identify with the Democratic Party and they tend to be strong Democrats or "Independents" leaning toward the Democratic Party. Those who anticipate a "better" financial future are more likely to follow public affairs and newspaper coverage of the political campaigns. The financial optimists are more 187 likely than are the pessimists to attempt to influence another voter, to wear a campaign button, to put a bumper sticker on their car and to vote regularly in presidential elections. In addition, it is found that financial expecta tions are related to the political attitudes of cynicism and skepticism. The financial pessimists tend to feel that government officials lack the knowledge to act sensibly, they have greater doubts about the honesty of government officials, and they feel relatively politically powerless. They tend to feel that public officials really do not care what their opinion is and that they have an ineffective voice in the governmental process. This political distrust of government in general is coupled with a tendency to be distrustful of political parties. The financial pessimists tend to feel that parties are only interested in their votes and not their opinions. A substantial difference in attitude was found between the optimists and the pessimists in their distrust of political parties. The economic pessimists exhibited a significantly greater distrust of political parties. Based upon the data analyzed here, three general!- 188 zations can be made regarding the economic pessimist. First, the pessimist generally Is not a political activist. Contrary to the suggestion made by the literature that economic Insecurity may lead to political arousal, the findings here Indicate that the pessimist is not highly politicized. Second, the pessimist is generally less likely than the optimist to have a great deal of Informa tion to evaluate candidates and political Information due to the fact that he is less likely to follow either political campaigns or public affairs. Third, the economic pessimist represents a pool of potential political support available through voting mobilization. The pessimist does not remain unconmitted to supporting a particular candidate, pessimism is not a distinct characteristic of the nonvoter and the pessimists do vote almost as regularly in presidential elections as the optimist. Due to these empirically substantiated generaliza tions it appears that economic pessimism may have implica tions for understanding electoral behavior. 189 Implication* of Finding* for Understanding Electoral Behavior Focusing on the economic pessimists as a potential source for political support and in evaluating the possi ble implications for electoral voting behavior the ques tion arises: For what type of candidate would the eco nomically insecure cast his ballot? Looking back to the data analysis, we found that within the attitudinal syndrome accompanying economic pessimism was a general distrust of people, distrust of government, distrust of political parties, and yet support for powerful government. These facts, coupled with the information that in terms of a specific office, i.e., a Congressman, the economic pessimist did feel that this political person was concerned about his opinion led to several basic conclusions. They are: 1. It appears that those who anticipate financial deprivation in the coming year would be likely to support a candidate who describes himself as being "above party," who carries the banner for the "little men" who is pushed around by powerful groups, and who attacks the political expediency of the traditional political party. 190 2. That the economic pessimists are more suscep tible to political radicalism if one defines radicalism as working outside of the traditional political parties in terms of supporting a presidential candidate. 3. That the economic pessimist appears to be a potential supporter for the "man—on—horseback" who rallies the cause of the "forgotten ran” and has a personalistic type of appeal. Those persons anticipating financial deprivation are more likely to feel politically alienated and to feel that public officials do not care. The implication of these findings for under standing the electoral process of decision-making is quite evident. Those who anticipate a "worse" financial year also predict a "worse" year for the nation and become suspicious of personal contacts and governmental people. It appears that these economic pessimists then begin to look for someone, not an organization or insti tution, to rescue them from their financial situation. Implications of Findings for Further Research Even though the findings of this study point in the direction of personalistic politics, the relationship 191 of expectations and political attitudes has not been fully charted by any means. Several questions still remain unanswered. Why is it that Wallace in 1968 was unable to attract a significantly greater share of the voting support of the economic pessimists? Especially in light of his campaign strategy of working outside the traditional party framework and his advocacy of the "little man" who is pushed around by powerful groups, it appears that Wallace should have drawn more support. It may be hypothesized that the pull of party identification in 1968 was great enough among the economic pessimists that it nullified what would otherwise have been Wallace's prime source of electoral support. The fact that a majority of those anticipating economic deprivation were Democratic Party identifiers who also tended to be strong Democrats seems to have been a barrier which effectively countered Wallace's appeal. Another question is that regarding the trace of hope despite objective conditions which many of the respondents expressed. Why do those who are experiencing a personal economic recession hang on to the anticipation of a "better tomorrow"? Many of the individuals in the 1 92 sample who Indicated that, they were making "less money" now than in the previous year still indicated that they expected to be better-off financially in the coming year. What are the factors that shape expectations? Is American society unique in that those in this culture are permeated with the idea that despite present conditions things are going to get better? Additional research needs to be done in the area of cross-cultural examination of the role of expectations. Political theoreticians have long discussed the pragmatic philosophy that pervades American societyIs this pragmatism connected to optimistic expectations even though the objective circumstances do not lend themselves to optimism? It may be that this pragmatic outlook is connected to a sense of optimism and the feeling of being politically efficacious. An overall conclusion drawn from this research is that, first, the variable of pessimism just of itself is not an adequate explanatory variable for radical political behavior. It appears that it is pessimism in conjunction with other factors that leads to dramatic ^Thomas R. Dye and L. Harmon Ziegler, The Irony of Democracy (Belmont: Duxbury Press, 1971). 193 political behavior. Further research which combines several other factors with pessimism in relationship to political behavior needs to be done. Second, there may be "thresholds'* of pessimism. In this research project and in the previous literature there has been no adequate measure of the intensity, or extensiveness of economic insecurity. It may be that after a certain period of time or when a combination of factors occur at one period of time, there may be a degree of insecurity reached which does lead to radical behavior. These are the types of factors which must be considered in a further evaluation of the "effect” of economic insecurity on political behavior. One of the most important issues that this dissertation has touched upon is that of objective condi tions versus subjective perceptions as they influence political behavior. Several authors, including Saul 2 Alinsky, have suggested that participation is the heart 2 Saul D. Alinsky, "Reveille for Radicals," in The Politics of the Powerless, ed. by Robert H. Binstock and Katherine Ely (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Pub lishers, Inc., 1971), pp. 332-340. 194 of democracy and that: we must eliminate the objective or legal barriers to participation if our democratic system is to survive. Alinsky points to the need to remove the barriers to participation when he states. The past, the glorious past with all of its com fortable familiarity, was rooted in a general sur render of everyday democratic rights and responsi bilities of the people. It was founded on masses of the people who were and still are denied the opportunity to participate.3 But this study has suggested an alternative per spective of barriers to participation, that of subjective perception of one's economic future, and what has been found is that subjective perception of one's economic future is linked to active political participation. It has been found that subjective perceptions are not neces sarily reflective of the objective circumstances. Respondents who felt that they were making "less money" at the present time stated that they expected to be better-off financially in the coining year. This differ entiation and its implications need to be further explored. Which factor, objective conditions or subjective 3 Ibid., p. 333. 195 perceptions, is most influential on issues of political efficacy? Which of the two factors influence strength of party identification, and which factor determines the optimistic or pessimistic attitudinal syndrome? These are important questions. The answers would enhance our understanding of the electoral decision making process. BIBLIOGRAPHY 196 BIBLIOGRAPHY 196 BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Alinsky, Saul D. "Reveille for Radicals." The Politics of the Powerless. Ed. by Robert H. Binstock and Katherine Ely. Cambridge, Mass.: winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1971. Bell, Daniel. "The Dispossessed— 1962." 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"America's Radical Right: Politics and Ideology." Political Opinion and Electoral Behavior. Ed. by Edward C. Dreyer and Walter A. Rosenbaum. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1966. Young, Alfred F., ed. Dissent: Explorations in the History of American Radicalism. De Kalb, 111.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1968. Zietlin, Maurice. American Society, Inc. Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1970. Periodicals Davies, James C. "Some Relations Between Events and Attitudes." American Political Science Review, XXVI (September, 1952), 777-789. 200 Freedman, Milton. "After the New Economics." Newsweek, December 9, 1968. Pp. 31-32. Gurin, Gerald, and Patricia Gurin. "Expectancy Theory in the Study of Poverty." Journal of Sociological Issues, XXVI (Spring, 1970), 83-104. Hamilton, Richard F. "The Marginal Middle Class: A Reconsideration." American Sociological Review, XXIX (August, 1964), 576-579. Leggett, John C. "Economic Insecurity and Working-Class Consciousness." 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Creator Scott, Ruth Kay (author)

Core Title An Examination Of Economic Expectations As A Determinant Of Political Behavior

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Political Science

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

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Advisor Thompson, Kenneth H. (committee chair), Anderson, Totton J. (committee member), Berkes, Rose N. (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-830144

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