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The World Outlook Of India And Japan As Reflected In Their Participation In The United Nations, 1957-1966

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The World Outlook Of India And Japan As Reflected In Their Participation In The United Nations, 1957-1966

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Content THE WORLD OUTLOOK OF INDIA AND JAPAN AS REFLECTED
IN THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS,
1957-1966
by
Richard John Brynlldsen
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(Political Science)
June 1973
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Xsrox University Microfilms
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I
73-31,329
BKYNILDSEN, Richard John, 1928-
THE WORLD OUTLOOK OF DDIA AND JAPAN AS
REFLECTED IN THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE
UNITED NATIONS, 1957-1966.
University of Southern California, Ph.D.,
1973
Political Science, international law and
relations
University Microfilms, A X ER O X Company , Ann Arbor, Michigan
<§> Copyright by
Richard John Irynildsen
1973
THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED.
UNIVERSITY O F SO U TH ER N CALIFORNIA
THK GRADUATE SC H O O L
U N IVERSITY PARK
LO S A N G ELES, C A L IFO R N IA SOOOT
This dissertation, written by
Ittchard John Bryni1ds en
under the direction of Dissertation Com
mittee, and approved by alt its members, has
been presented to and accepted by The Graduate
School, in partial fulfillment of requirements of
the degree of
D O C T O R O F P H I L O S O P H Y
.................................................{/ ........... Dm*
n«t. Jun« 1973
TrON COM M ITTEE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page
I. INTRODUCTION............................... 1
II. BACKGROUND...............................21
III. THE RECURRING ISSUES--THIRD WORLD . . . 56
The Issue of Southwest Africa .... 58
South Africa— Apartheid...............75
The Issue of West I r i a n ...............95
The Question of A l g e r i a ..............104
United Nations Capital Development Fund . 113
Southern Arabia--Adent Oman, and Yemen . 122
Rhodesia..............................131
The Issue of the Portuguese Empire . . 143
IV. THE RECURRING ISSUES--COLD WAR AND
INTRINSIC..............................165
The Issue of the Representation of China . 167
The Issue of K o r e a .................... 190
The Hungarian Issue.................... 208
The Issue of Tibet 217
The Question of the Palestine Refugees . 224
Cyprus.................................. 231
V. THE AD HOC AND SPECIAL ISSUES........... 248
The Lebanon Crisis .............. 251
The Tunisian Complaint--Bizerte .... 257
The Cuban Complaint--1961-62 ......... 262
The Congo Crisis....................... 267
The Financial Crisis ................... 290
ii
Chapter Page
VI. THE ATOM, ARMS CONTROL, AND OUTER SPACE . . 305
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space...........337
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND INDICATIONS ................ 355
APPENDICES............................................415
I. Votes Recorded in Each Category .... 416
II. Votes Recorded on Recurring Issues . 417
III. Votes Recorded on the Atom and Arms
Control................................. 422
IV. Recurring Issues by Year and Categories . 425
BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................ 427
iii
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Devotion to political democracy, desire for an
international role transcending existing conflicts, con
victions of unique endowment for interpreting east to west,
and a tempering though still extant belief in a messianic
role as world peacemaker are descriptive phrases a student
of international relations might recognize as character
istic of not one but two Asian nations. The general
public, however, whose attention span has been monopolized
by the frustrations of Southeast Asia and a fascination
with the People's Republic of China, has not been aware
of the less dramatic roles being played by other giants
on the scene--India whose 550 million population is second
only to China, and Japan whose attainment of the position
of the world's third greatest economic power is still
deemed miraculous. In assessing the future direction of
international relations in Asia the importance of these
powers, the most successful Asian democracies, ought not
1
2
to be overlooked. Not only are the attitudes of these
nations toward China and the other giants important, but
also their attitudes toward other lesser nations. Indeed
their unique relationships to the superpowers and the
Third World seem worthy of very careful scrutiny. At face
value it would appear the two share much in common and it
might be assumed that they would develop areas of mutual
interest and cooperation. Yet the record to date shows
little meaningful exploration In this area with little to
note in the minor efforts that have been made, and whether
a shifting balance of power will change this condition is
open to speculation. Surely the increasing attention given
to the People's Republic of China, the discernible shifting
of commitments and influence in Asia on the part of the
United States, and the military and economic reappraisals
stemming from these changes, must be recognized as factors
profoundly affecting the course of international policies
for Japan and India in the coming years. An examination,
then, of each nation's role on the international scene,
especially in the spheres where goals and policies are
tested on identical issues, will perhaps prove a useful
guide in assessing the possible directions of the two.
3
Whatever the future of the political relationship
between India and Japan, an economic relationship seems
assured. Japan is one of India's most significant cus
tomers as well as being one of its primary suppliers, and
their trade is in commodities of major importance to both.
There can be little doubt that an enlargement of this
economic significance into areas of increased political
and economic cooperation would importantly change Asia's
international relations and significantly reduce or sup
plant apprehensions about Chinese hegemony over Asia.
Whether or not such an enlargement is likely in the future
or, indeed, even possible, is dependent upon a number of
questions and factors which are almost entirely unanswered
and in most cases unexamined even superficially since the
goals, aspirations and attitudes of the two have not been
juxtaposed.
The relationship existing today between Japan and
India is relatively new, dating from the end of World War
II. It has had to be created without the traditions which
mark most bilateral relations and it is not surprising,
therefore, that the relationship has often appeared forced
and awkward. On the surface the two nations share impor-
4
tant similarities, yet examination shows these superficial
similarities to be fragile. While it is significant that
political democracy can take root in Asia, the forms it
has taken in these two nations are unique and, in any
event, the belief that shared democracy is a catalyst for
cooperation is long dead. The idea of each that it can
act as a bridge of understanding explaining east to west
remains unproven, and even if true might still be divi
sive. Moreover, it is clear that neither has been wholly
successful in filling that "transcendent" role.
Differences appear as obvious as the superficial
similarities. Japan, in its quest for an Independent role
in international relations, has been largely a theoretical
search, while its political behavior has been based on
cooperation with the so-called "Free World." India, on
the other hand, has repeatedly sought independence from
the great power struggles through neutralism and identifi
cation with that group of nations styled the "Third World."
Another area of contrast that one might instinctively
point to are the problems inherent in the basic economic
nature of each nation. In India poverty is both grinding
and endemic, and Industrial development, though extensive,
5
is chronically inadequate to the nation's soaring popula
tion and basic needs. In Japan a soaring GNF has brought
both national prestige and increasing material well-being
to a stable population. While Japan's negative image
inherited from World War II combined with its increasingly
aggressive economic policies has hindered the Inter
national exploitation of this position, it remains one
of the very few Aslan nations in a position to offer the
good life to its own people and concrete help to others.
India has not only been unable to do this, but has been
a constant recipient of outside aid from a variety of
sources, including Japan.
As if such fundamental contrast were not enough,
there is also the strong suspicion that on the whole
Indians and Japanese find each other difficult to like,
and one another's cultural values and national character
difficult to appreciate. If the worst assumptions are
made from such contrast one should expect little to arise
from this relationship, and yet there has been no notice
able hostility to date. Whether this means these con
trasts are not as real as they seem, or that they simply
do not matter that much may be one question worth attempt-
ing to answer.
Given the magnitude of the two nations, the dearth
of material which treats the countries together is diffi
cult to understand. There has been a substantial foreign
affairs literature written regarding Indian attitudes,
problems and policies, but the amount on Japan by Western
scholars has been modest. While India's impact on world
affairs was being made by its government officials, Japan’s
most dramatic moments were caused by its internal dis
senters while its formal foreign policy proceeded at a
more pedestrian pace. Probably owing more to the prosaic
nature of Japan's foreign policy than to anything else,
studies in which the two nations are compared are lacking.
In trying to discover a reasonable if not truly
representative body of issues on which to answer some of
the questions regarding Indian and Japanese attitudes,
there are a number of sources to choose from, including
newspaper reports, foreign office records, foreign policy
statements by government officials and the like. Each
has its advantages and disadvantages, and among the dis
advantages perhaps the greatest is that it is difficult
to obtain a consistent or symmetrical result. For this
7
reason, among others, this study has turned to the verba
tim records of the United Nations General Assembly where
a certain uniformity of treatment occurs and each actor
is most likely to make a stand on a broad range of con
tentious issues. In order to reduce the obligations of
this search to a reasonable size, it seems both prudent
and convenient to limit the period of concern to the first
decade of Japan's participation in the organization, which
began December 18, 1956.
While the idea that being put through the United
Nations process imposes some kind of uniform pattern on
issues dies with increasing familiarization with the
Assembly records, several factors combine to make them the
best single primary source of data. Though governments
can on occasion choose not to react, or may equivocate on
given issues, if the issue is placed on the agenda of an
arm of the United Nations, nations are more typically
moved to render an opinion on it or at the least be
counted. The United Nations also serves as a unique forum
for the expression of opinion should a nation feel moved
to use it. If these statements are not always entirely
candid, they do offer clues to the motivation behind a
8
nation's attitudes, and often fascinating Insight into
the emotions behind the intellectual justification used.
In using United Nations material as a base for
establishing the broad attitudes of nations the researcher
is compelled to concentrate on the General Assembly and
its committee system since the other United Nations com
ponents are either too specialized or too limited in
membership. It was not, for instance, until India's
election to the Security Council on November 11, 1960 that
India and Japan were simultaneously on that body. More
over, the General Assembly during Japan's first decade of
membership was in a particularly ascendant period regard
ing the range and number of issues it considered as the
Security Council had demonstrated repeatedly its Inability
to act as a concert system, given the contentious rela
tionship which developed between the permanent members.
The use of the General Assembly as focus of atten
tion carries with It further difficulties since one must
not only cope with the problems iaposed by the fluid pro
cedural practices of the institution, but also the fact
that all issues are not alike in value, impact, and sig
nificance regarding important attitudes. These clrcum-
9
stances force the researcher to make choices, the rules
of which are difficult to codify simply. It Is often
significant, for Instance, that a proposed draft resolu
tion was defeated rather than adopted, yet the adoption
of a resolution may be of little or no consequence If the
subject Is Intrinsically Inconsequential. The scene of
action for a "significant rejection," moreover, is likely
to be one of the elaborate "consult tees of the whole" which
make it possible for the Assembly to operate at all.*1 The
more deeply immersed one becomes in the workings of the
Assembly, the more plausible seems the proposition that
any committee could be the stage for dramatic action.
When, of course, an issue has been dealt with in both
committee and by Assembly in plenary session, it seems
necessary to accept the statistical evidence of the latter
as final although the most significant argumentation may
have occurred in one of the conmittees.
In addition to the Special Political Conmittee
there are six numbered standing committees. They are:
The First— Political and Security Committee
The Second— Economic and Financial Committee
The Third--Socia1, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee
The Fourth— Trusteeship Committee
The Fifth--Administrative and Budgetary Committee
The Sixth— Legal Committee
10
There is another reality of the stylized world of
the General Assembly which is important, and this is that
relatively little of the organization's time is taken up
with issues occurring in dramatic episodes which might be
called ad hoc Issues. More important are the contentious
political issues which tend to recur over some years and
occasionally span the decade covered by this study. While
it is possible to intrude on these issues, it is almost
as if these are the issues the Assembly is most concerned
with and to which it will return as soon as possible when
the accustomed course of events is disturbed. During the
ten-year period of this study there are fourteen such
"recurring Issues" that seem worthy of notice, and will
Indeed constitute the bulk of the material presented.
Concentration on the recurring Issues rather than on the
dramatic episodes does no violence to the real world of
the United Nations, but on the contrary reflects that
reality faithfully.^ The recurring issues considered
essential to this study are those which may be labeled in
In the United Nations Yearbook for 1966, for in
stance, about 857. of the pages in the chapter on Political
and Security questions is devoted to clearly recurring
issues.
11
shorthand position as follows:
Algeria
Cyprus
Hungary
Korea
Palestine Refugees
Portuguese Colonial Territories
Representation of China
Rhodesia
South Africa--Apartheid
South Arabia
Southwest Africa
Tibet
United Nations Capital Development Fund
West Irian
There are factors which make these issues partic
ularly important both to the organization and to this
study. For the organization they are often its institu
tionalized failures, only rarely resolved as in the case
of China's representation, but more typically those irri
tants most resistant to solution. They represent what has
been long Insoluble but too important or emotionally com
pelling to drop. As such they indicate something of the
organization's priorities of concern and its assessment
of what it can accomplish, as well as the general trends
its solutions have sought. The twists and turns and the
straight lines these issues have followed are at times
the only evidence of what the organization sees as its
major preoccupation, and indicate over an extended period
12
how the membership through the organization has sought to
resolve these Issues.
The evolution of these recurring issues is also
of importance in assessing the attitudes of the main sub
jects of this study, not only at a particular time, but
also as those attitudes may have changed. This progres
sive quality is of special Importance during the period
of this study since the composition of the organization
Itself substantially changed between 1956 and 1966. The
"nation explosion" which began so obviously in 1960 could
scarcely have left the character of the organization
unchanged, and also called for either a change or a
solidification of the attitudes of nations. To a less
obvious extent this was also a period of change regarding
the "Cold War." While the loosening of that hard knot
was not marked then by specific incidents of obvious note,
it was nonetheless under way, and change or constancy on
related issues is worth noting.
There are other Issues which cannot be classified
as either ad hoc or recurring, but which are still of
great significance and of special importance regarding
the attitudes of the subjects of this study. At least
13
two of these special cases during the study's period were
perhaps of watershed importance to the organization as
well as being of importance in assessing the attitudes of
the subjects of this study. There can be no question that
the events surrounding the Congo crisis were among the
most complex problems to confront the organization, and
came, eventually, to symbolize attitudes and emotions far
beyond the specific circumstances. Congo related issues
were viewed as especially significant by the emerging
nations, and the positions taken by member nations were
taken as representing a basic sympathy for the cause of
the new nations. Whether this assessment was objectively
true or not, it did seem to influence the attitude of
many new nations toward some established members, and,
with the addition of over forty new and largely African
nations during the 1960's, the tone of the organization
itself.
Another special issue during this period was the
financial crisis which dominated the organization's atten
tion during 1964. While financial difficulty is the
organization's major endemic disease, the 1964 crisis--a
direct outgrowth of its military activities--defined as
14
never before legalities of the problem, and tragically
marked its essential insolubility within existing circum
stances. While few realistic students of international
organization had questioned the capacity of nations to
ignore the legally arrived at recommendations of the
organization, never before had the binding nature of the
Chapter itself been so obviously Ignored. In both of the
above special issues the positions of Japan and India are
of interest not only per se, but as they relate to other
detectable trends in the other classes of issues.
Yet another set of issues which merits special
consideration are those involving nuclear energy, arms
control, and outer space where impact of technology is
particularly noticeable. While the treatment of these
issues in special conferences and committees has often
been more Important than its treatment in the General
Assembly, there has been, nonetheless, a virtually unbroken
history of consideration of these issues by that body.
Even though much of that consideration has been of a
routine nature, there have been a number of votes of
special interest on Issues of sweeping importance, and
this category of issues provides still another context in
15
which to compare the attitudes of the subjects of this
study and their relationship to nations and blocs.
As suggested the decade of this study was not
notable for activism in the actual settlement of Issues.
There were, however, certain ad hoc Issues which demanded
attention. Though too few In number and too diverse In
nature to warrant broad conclusions regarding these Issues
as a category, each was Individually significant, and can
be related to the broader base of evidence provided by the
recurring and special issues. In this category must be
included the Lebanon Crisis of 1950, the Blzerte Incident
of 1961, and the Cuban complaints of 1961-62 (as distin
guished from the 1962 Missile Crisis).
The kinds of information which can be obtained
from a study such as this are limited yet can be sur
prisingly diverse. In setting out to compare the attitudes
of two nations one already suspects are quite different,
it may seem that one is trying to demonstrate the obvious.
There are, however, in addition to confirming or disprov
ing presuppositions, unexpectedly enlightening benefits
which are of more than secondary importance. In the
process of achieving a certain intimacy with United
16
Nations documents, whatever the subject one gains a partic
ularly valuable grasp of how the United Nations works and
how Its members work within it. If the verbatim records
of the organization demonstrate nothing else, they show
the variety of characters and moods the nations of the
world display, and that most have an inimitable "style."
A similarly revealing impression is that those styles are
sometimes compatible and incompatible in very human ways,
suggesting that emotion is a factor which cannot be ignored
in international relations. While statistically undemon-
strable, the presence of emotion in the cold printed words
of certain speeches is clear, and it is also evident that
the levels of emotional involvement vary substantially
from issue to issue.
One may well develop as well an intuitive ability
to predict how many nations will react to certain issues
even though the specific issue has not been previously
treated. This capacity becomes especially marked in the
instances of the principals of this study whose style and
quality of performance begin to emerge with considerable
clarity and whose likely reaction can be predicted with
great accuracy. Even more extraordinary, however, is the
17
capacity to acquire Incidentally a similar feeling for
many other actors on the United Nations stage. To be
sure, part of this capacity is unalloyed common sense
based on known patterns of international reality, but
even within the most established and predictable behavior
patterns there can be foibles which resist and nearly defy
conventional explanation.
A byproduct of examining the subjects' attitudes
toward the world in general is that it becomes impossible
not to compare their relationships with other single
important actors or groups of actors on the international
scene. Each of these nations has created a self-image
which it conceives as real, and sees itself in a certain
perspective vis a vis other nations, groups of nations,
and international institutions. While the self-image of
each may or may not verge on reality, there is likely to
emerge from comparing their attitudes on some basic issues
some feeling for what reality really exists beneath the
Images. Both the image and the reality are important, of
course. In trying to determine how effective each nation
is in its international relationships, for too great a
disparity between the two cannot be helpful to a nation's
18
efforts to be effective on the international scene. The
degree of consistency or variance between self-image and
reality may be significant.
It is possible to categorize the issues discussed
as essentially of one type or another. There are Issues
which have tended to divide the loyalties of nations
along Cold War lines and along Third World lines, and a
few which would have continued to exist independent of
any outside influence. Into the Cold War category of
recurring issues one might place, in order of occurrence,
the representation of China, Tibet, Korea, and Hungary.
Into the Third World category of recurring issues one
might similarly place Southwest Africa, South Africa--
Apartheid, West Irian, Algeria, United Nations Capital
Development Fund, Portuguese Colonial Territories, South
Arabia, and Rhodesia. While the issues of Cyprus and
Palestine Refugees obviously can be permeated by the above
preoccupations, they would continue to exist as problem
areas even if all other considerations were removed.
Though easily penetrated by outside influences, they are
so essentially self-contained that they might be described
as "intrinsic." Differences between specific issues
19
within these broad categories may also be revealing not
only of consistencies, but also of cases in which the
specific priorities of a nation's foreign policy may warp
its moral or intellectual consistency.
These and other facets may provide insights and
partial answers to many questions regarding the position
of the two nations in the real world with regard to them*
selves and others as well. These inquiries too may
provide some notion as to whether on the basis of this
decade of United Nations activity one might have foreseen
some subsequent events, directions, and attitudes, perhaps
even events to come.
It would be foolish to assert that the predictive
value of the information generated is truly scientific.
However, in examining in some detail the attitudes of
these nations regarding some important issues there should
emerge some clues regarding their basic directions, and
if these clues translate into even a modest degree of
predictive ability it should not be disdained.
As this is being written the uncertainties and
complexities of Asian relationships are being multiplied.
The uncertain air of detente between the United States and
20
both China and Russia, the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 and
its consequences, Japan's current uncertainty regarding
the United States and its search for a dynamic Independent
role, the obscurity of America's future role in Asia are
but some of the more salient circumstances likely to cause
Asia's future power configurations to be far different
from those of the 1950's or I960’s. The once "unshakable"
configurations of Aslan power relationships have been
shaken to an extent once deemed by many aB unthinkable.
Some of these changes involve the subjects of this study
directly, while others involve the other main actors in
Asia. None of these changes can help but affect all in
rearranging the reality of the scene. In this new inter
play of dynamic forces the roles of India and Japan must
be of immense importance. A study of their past attitudes
remains essential for a true understanding of their
present actions.
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND
While a detailed history of Indian-Japanese
relations would not be appropriate here, neither would it
be appropriate to ignore the context in which they must be
viewed. In truth their bilateral relationship has been
so overshadowed by pre-occupations of greater urgency that
trying to describe it means beginning de novo. In the
exhaustive annotated bibliography of doctoral disserta~
tlons on Japan and Korea in Western languages between 1877
and 1969 compiled by Frank J. Shulman, for instance, there
are but three references linking these two nations, and
they are all of economic or agricultural focus.^ Another
search was made in the appropriate sections of the four -
volume survey of literature on Asia called simply the
Bibliography of Asian Studies. This massive work revealed
Frank J. Shulman, ed., Japan and Korea--An Anno
tated Bibliography of Doctoral Dissertations in Western
Languages. 1877-1949 (Chicago: American Library Associa
tion. 1970), passim.
21
22
that In the period from 1941 to 1965 there were two
periodical articles and one brief pamphlet In which the
relations of the two nations were examined.^ This lack,
in part, may be owing also to the fact that they had no
real diplomatic relationship before April 28, 1952. On
formal occasions there are references to mutual awareness
dating back to the sixth century as well as ritual expres
sions of the importance of Indian-Japanese cooperation to
the peace, security, and economic well-being of Asia. On
such occasions, however, politeness prevents the expres
sion of the corollary truth that the awareness has been
vague and the cooperation modest.
Perhaps the most influential realities for the
two nations in modem times were India's colonial status
as contrasted to Japan's rise from isolation to great
power status. While Japan's isolation was singular, it
was never completely unaware of the outside world, and
eventually it made a prodigious effort to avoid the fate
which had befallen China and other parts of Asia. Among
^Association for Asian Studies, Cumulative Blbliog
raphy of Asian Studies. 1941-1965 (Boston: G. K. Hall,
1969).
23
the evidences of that effort were its victory over China
in 1894-95, the abrogation of its unequal treaties with
the West around the turn of the century, and the conclu
sion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902--which was
later expanded to include concern for the status quo of
the entire area including India. The coincidence of this
treaty and Japan’s success in the Russo-Japanese War is
not without irony, for as Japan joined the ranks of the
Great Powers it became an ideal and example to the colo
nial peoples of Asia. Indeed, following its smashing
victory at the Battle of Tsushima at the end of Hay 1905,
Japan occupied center stage in Asia, and had, by virtue
of its military prowess, become its revolutionary center.
Even the South African newspaper of Mohandas Gandhi, who
came to personify pacificism and nonviolence editorially
supported Japan against what it Interpreted as Russian
aggression, and expressed its admiration for the Japanese
force of character which had brought it to the forefront
of the nations of the world. To Gandhi the Japanese
victory seemed to symbolize a new Asia confronting the
24
West.^
In India Itself nationalists had looked toward
Japan with considerable envy for some years, and Japan's
emergence as a modem nation was important in stimulating
that nationalism. Even before the turn of the century
visiting Indians had contrasted Japan's progress with
their own relative backwardness, and had come away simul
taneously chagrined and strengthened in their nationalis
tic drive. After 1905 Indian and other Asian nationalists
bathed in the reflected glory of Japan's triumph, and it
was some time before that sentimentalized image of Japan
tarnished.^
In the years that followed, the cities and uni
versities of Japan became the haven and training ground
for revolutionary figures such as Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who
seemingly overlooked the fact that many of Japan's gains
had been made at the expense of Asians, and, indeed, the
Japanese themselves seemed unaware of the incongruous
^Paul F. Power, Gandhi on World Affairs (Washing
ton, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960), p. 36.
Sferaer Levi, Free India in Asia (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1952), pp. 22-23.
position they achieved. In 1915 and 1916, for instance,
while Japan sought a bigger piece of the Chinese melon,
there were also expressions in the nation's press of
sympathy for the nationalistic aspirations of India, and
an examination of Japan's obligations under the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance which concluded that it was in no way
obliged to come to the aid of Great Britain in putting
5
down civil disturbances in India.
The conclusion of World War I found Japan frus
trated in her hopes of obtaining a greater sphere of
influence at little cost, and Indian nationalists frus
trated in their hopes that cooperation with Great Britain
during the war would result in a liberalization of the
country's condition. In those post-war years India con
tinued to smolder, while Japan subsided into the period
known as the Liberal Decade during which its International
activities were conventional and cooperative, and during
which there is little to note aside from the continuance
of trade between the two areas. In the pre-World War II
pattern of Japan's trade, incidentally, British India
^Thomas F. Millard, Our Eastern Question (New York
The Century Company, 1916), pp. 247-249.
26
ranked third in both exports and Imports, and from the
time that reasonably accurate records are available
(around 1870) Indo-Japanese trade had Increased steadily.
With the increasing Industrialization of Japan
prior to World War 1 the nature of trade changed, and
Japan (once the buyer) became the seller of textiles and
light consumer goods to India, and a prime customer for
India's short staple, cotton. Over the years the pattern
of Indo-Japanese trade was to change even more radically,
but only during World War II did it temporarily disappear.
When Japan resumed its activist approach to for
eign policy in 1931, Indian nationalists were alternately
apprehensive and Inspired by its activities, and there
developed a feeling of ambivalence which defies real
measurement. Even though Indian troops fought the Japanese
valiantly during World War II, the Indian army was a pro
fessional one, and one will never know how, for instance,
victorious Japanese troops might have been received in a
major Indian city. There was, however, a vast difference
in the way Chandra Bose was viewed by the West and by
India where he was by no means the Quisling he was to
27
British and American minds.6
Japan, though finally defeated, had remained In
several conquered areas to the end, and though its vic
tories had been temporary, they had been victories none
theless. Even in defeat the Japanese left a legacy of
pride and nationalism which was soon to revolutionize
Asia's position in the world. Yet ironically, Japan, which
had unwittingly fought major battles for the rest of Asia,
had earned, in the process, its suspicion and hatred. It
is ironic too that when India achieved its independence
in 1947 it was maintaining its first post-war contacts
with Japan in the form of an army of occupation--termi
nated, of course, shortly after independence.^
India's immediate post-war concerns were the prob
lems of newly found independence and the wrenching ordeal
of partition, and little special notice was taken of
Japan. Japan, in turn, was too involved in the survival
6Levi, op. cit., p. 26.
7 The Indian contingent, which Included the 1st
Punjab Regiment, the Maharatta Light Infantry, the 5th
Royal Ghurka Rifles, and the 7th Light Cavalry was head
quartered in Hiroshima where anti-American feelings were
feared high.
28
of its people and in learning to endure the occupation to
be vitally concerned with the tribulations of India.
However, political disruption and chaos notwithstanding,
people must eat and be clothed, and people will trade,
and by 1947 trade was re-established through some of the
pioneer Indian firms in Japan (e.g., W. Assomul1 and Com
pany and K. A. J. Chotirmal and Company, both dating back
to 1895). By 1949 the Indian Chamber of Commerce in
Japan, suspended in 1939, had been re-established, and
while trade in 1948 was only on the order of $2 million
per month as compared to $17 million per month on the eve
of the war, this exchange steadily grew. By 1956 the
monetary value of this trade had regained its pre-war
level.
During the period between the independence of
India and the end of 1950, however, there was little if
any political cognition between the two areas. In a
700-page volume on India's external affairs published in
1959 treating this period, for Instance, there are but
two passing references to Japan,8 and not until negotia-
8S. L. Paplai, ed., India 1947-50, External
Affairs. Vol. II (London: Oxford University Press, 1959),
p. 20 and p. 85.
29
tlon of the peace treaty with Japan did this change.
That task began in May 1950 when Special Advisor to the
Department of State John Foster Dulles undertook a series
of trips and consultations which resulted in a predrafted
Treaty of Peace which the nations attending the peace
conference in San Francisco in September 1951 could accept
or not accept as they chose.
Three preliminary drafts of the treaty were cir
culated among the powers likely to be interested, and the
parties concerned were given the opportunity to suggest
changes. The changes actually made between May 1950 and
August 1951, however, did not satisfy India. India's
specific recommendations had been spelled out in a note
to the United States dated July 28, 1951, and when it
was learned they had not been incorporated in the final
draft, India announced on August 27 its intention to boy
cott the San Francisco conference. At the same time India
announced it would negotiate a bilateral peace treaty as
soon as possible after Japan regained its independence.
It is clear that India felt strongly on this matter, and
on August 30 it issued a White Paper reviewing its
exchange of notes with the United States on the issue.
30
Basic to India's objections to the treaty was the
Implication that its terms were being imposed by the
United States on an Asian people, and that in refusing to
participate India was simply exercising its inherent
rights as a nation. India's specific objections centered
on the status provided for the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands,
the status of Formosa, and Japan's security treaty with
the United States. American military presence, it was
held, should end with Japanese independence, and Japan
should not be obliged to observe any period of defense
lessness .
India's concern regarding the treaty, as mirrored
in its press, seems to have been with the American origins
of the document. The August 28, 1951 Statesman (New Delhi)
viewed it as another example of the American view that the
end justifies the means; the Free Press Journal (Bombay)
of August 29, 1951 saw it as an example of American might
being mistaken for right and an American imposition on
Asia. These citations are not exceptional in their focus
on the role of America rather than on its meaning for the
welfare of Japan, although in the opinion of Werner Levi,
there was at that time "... in India a considerable
31
q
fund of good will toward Japan ..."
While evidence for so positive an assertion is
sparse, the peace which India eventually signed with Japan
was in no way a punitive one, and indeed did not differ
substantially with that signed earlier in San Francisco.
Its negotiation was undertaken shortly after Japan
regained formal independence on April 28, 1932, and the
treaty itself was signed on June 29, 1932, in Tokyo. The
ratifications of the treaty were exchanged in New Delhi
on August 29, 1932, and for the first time full diplomatic
relations were established between the two nations. This
treaty contained three distinguishing provisions: India's
waiver of all rights to reparations, the return of all
confiscated Japanese property, and the commitment to
negotiate a treaty of trade and commerce during the ensu
ing four years while, in the interim, a mutual "most
favored nation" clause would be binding.
India's renunciation of reparations and the return
of Japanese property set an amicable tone for the new
relationship. This was appreciated by the Japanese, and
9
Levi, op. cit., p. 119.
32
has often been cited as evidence of India's essential good
will.
Although the peace treaty called for the negotia
tion of a treaty of trade and commerce within a four-year
period, it was not completed by the deadline, and an
exchange of letters, dated October 6, 1956, was necessary
to reaffirm the reciprocal "most favored nation" provi
sions of the peace treaty until the end of March 1957.
During this time it was agreed that Secretary K. B. Lall
of India's Ministry of Commerce and Consumer Industries
and Japanese Charge d*Affaires Kijiro Miyake would con
tinue negotiation toward a more permanent agreement.
The negotiations proceeded slowly, however, and a second
exchange of letters between Secretary Lall and Japanese
Ambassador Sujiro Yoshizawa on September 28, 1957 was
needed to again extend reciprocity to December 31, 1957.^
Still another extension was required before the final
agreement was signed, and without the stimulus of visits
*°India (Republic), Ministry of External Affairs,
Foreign Affairs Record. II, No. 10 (October 1956), 156.
U Ibid.. Ill, No. 9 (September 1957), 181-182.
33
between the Prime Ministers these negotiations might have
continued for some time. The exchange of visits, however,
seemed to give rise to a general feeling of good will in
the midst of which the anticipated agreement was signed.
Concluded in March 1958 the Trade Treaty contained
those provisions common to such agreements, and its
effects were not profound. For Japan, however, it had
special significance as its first post-war bilateral
treaty with an Asian nation (other than the peace treaty
Itself). To India, however, its significance was far
more modest. This is not to say that India was deliberate
ly slighting Japan, but rather that India often does not
seem to see itself as an Asian power in the usual sense.
It is perhaps more accurate to suggest that India's
awareness of and appreciation of the importance of Japan
and many other Asian nations seemed to be at a rather low
I O
level. An apparent by-product of this has been the con
tinuation of political relationships at a low key. Japan
was a contributor to the Colombo Plan beginning in 1954
12India (Republic), India Foreign Policy (Bombay:
Publications Division, Ministry of Information, 1961),
passim.
34
however modest a donor. Since then, however, its con
tributions to the programs of the plan have grown, and in
the year following the end of the period of this study
(1967) amounted to $729 million.
If political relations were stagnant, economic
relations between the nations continued to be brisk. In
pre-war years some 8 percent of Japan's exports were to
what was then defined as India, and by 1957 the same
general area (India, Burma, and Pakistan)had reached
a similar level of trade although the nature of the trade
had altered substantially. As post-war trade developed,
Japan found itself supplying India with hard goods such
as steel, railway equipment, and textile machinery rather
than light consumer goods. Japan's purchases from India,
on the other hand, remained largely in the area of raw
materials vital to Japan's industrial growth. India,
once the supplier of cotton and jute, was now the supplier
13
The Colombo Plan, Eighteenth Annual Report of
the Consultative Committee (Manila: Republic of the
Philippines, 1971), p. 476.
^Shlgeo Horle, "Economic Relations between India
and Japan," India Quarterly, XV (January-March 1959), 54.
35
of iron ore end manganese. Japan had particular signlfi-
cance too to the former Portuguese colony of Goa as its
best customer for iron ore. In 1961, for instance,
Japan's purchase of 3,476,332,502 kilograms of Goan ore
was nearly twice as much as to any other customer.^
Probably the most significant political event of
this period was the exchange of visits between the Prime
Ministers in 1957, the most spectacular of which was
Nehru's visit to Japan. The first was that of Prime
Minister Nobutsuke Kishi to India in May 1957 as part of
a more extensive tour. Kishi's exposure to India was
brief (May 23*25) and confined to New Delhi but did allow
for discussions on subjects of mutual interest and the
ritual exchange of pleasantries. Nehru expressed satis
faction over Japan's admission to the United Nations, and
Kishi his nation's congratulations on India's first five-
year plan and interest in its second five-year plan. In
a joint declaration the two Prime Ministers expressed
Goa, Daman, and Dio, Directorate of Economic
Services, Statistical Office, Foreign Trade Yearbook
(Panjim: Government Printing PressT 1962), p. 266.
36
their conviction that there were no international disputes
which could not be peacefully settled in accordance with
the United Nations Charter and the ten principles of the
Bandung Resolution of 1956. They reaffirmed their nations'
dedication to the cause of peace and a common faith in the
democratic way of life, and they also issued a Joint
appeal for the immediate suspension of thermonuclear
tests, adding the hope that the major powers would reach
agreement on the complete abandonment of such tests as
well as the eventual prohibition of all kinds of nuclear
and thermonuclear weapons.^
Such meetings are, of course, largely ritual, but
this one did provide the opportunity to exchange ratifica
tions of a cultural agreement, and occasioned Nehru's
pledge to reciprocate the visit. Of importance too was
Kishi's recognition of India's five-year plans and his
promise to cooperate in the second five-year plan. Since
then Japan has been a constant, if modest, member of the
informal "aid India consortium," and has tried not only
to develop trade, but to find ways to aid India in
16Indla News, II, No. 11 (June 15, 1957), 1-4.
37
developing her own resources for mutually beneficial
reasons. While not always successful, these efforts have
produced agricultural demonstration stations and technical
exchange arrangements, as well as the development of India
into a long term supplier of iron ore for Japan.
Nehru's reciprocal visit (October 4-14, 1957)
seems to have been of great importance to Japan. While
given but modest attention in the Indian press, it occa
sioned in Japan a remarkable outpouring of respect and
good will toward the leader of India. Wherever Nehru
went in Japan during the tour, he was welcomed by un
precedented crowds which turned out in an apparently
spontaneous expression of respect and affection made even
more notable by Japan's usual coolness toward political
figures. It is doubtful that anyone else, Japanese or
foreign, could have aroused such a demonstration at the
time. And, aside from its protocol importance, it pro
vided the Prime Ministers an opportunity to discuss sub
jects as diverse as the Southeast Asian Development Fund,
Aslan common market possibilities, disarmament, and cur
rent problems in the United Nations.
Prime Minister Nehru initiated the visit by
38
speaking of the areas of disagreement such as Japan's ties
with the United States, divergence on nuclear test matters,
and approaches to Asian development, and while he often
seemed oblivious to Japanese sensitivities nothing seemed
to diminish the people's enthusiasm for the legendary
Indian leader. While he began by saying he had come to
Japan to learn and not to preach, there were times he
seemed less than perfectly diplomatic. Praising Japan's
inspiration to Asia at the turn of the century, he also
spoke to the "pride of power" which had brought Japan to
defeat and made Asia suspicious of Japan. While welcoming
the idea of Indo*Japanese economic cooperation, he pub-
lically expressed doubts about Japan's real interest in
an Aslan Development Fund, and on another occasion implied
a comparison between the presence of Russian troops in
the Hungarian revolt and the continuing presence of
American troops in Japan.
Despite these probes into Japan's most vulnerable
nerves, the visit was a singular success and personal
triumph for Nehru. His reception everywhere was enthusi
astic, spontaneous, and sustained, and even the launching
of Sputnik I only momentarily deflected public attention
39
from his visit. When the time came to issue a joint
communique, moreover, disagreement was submerged and areas
of general and specific agreement emphasized.
As a statement of general policy the Prime Minis
ters agreed that there were no problems of great diffi
culty between the two nations, and reaffirmed the desir
ability of increasing understanding and cooperation. In
such cooperations, they concluded, lay mutual benefits
which would contribute not only to the peace and prosperity
of Asia but to the world as well. Items of more specific
agreement were found in disarmament, cooperation in atomic
research, economic cooperation, cultural exchange and the
like. Specific mention was also made to areas which were
to assume substantial importance in future relations, and
among these were cooperation in the development of Indian
iron ore resources, the establishment of technical train
ing centers in India for the development of medium and
small scale industries, agreement in principle on the
desirability of yen credits for capital goods to be used
in connection with India's second five-year plan, as well
as agreement that the pending trade treaty should be
40
concluded as quickly as possible.^
While of uncertain political significance, the
Nehru visit was unquestionably emotionally moving to the
Japanese, and provided a positive stimulus to economic
activity. The visit seems also to have supplied a needed
inspiration for the conclusion of the Indo-Japanese trade
agreement.
While not so designated this agreement was regarded
by Japan as equivalent to a treaty of friendship and com
merce, and, as suggested, given particular importance.
Concluded simultaneously, moreover, was an agreement to
extend to India the yen credits approved in principle in
October 1957. This loan amounted to 18 billion yen (the
equivalent of some 50.40 million dollars) to be used over
a three-year period for the purchase of Japanese railway
and mining equipment, hydroelectric and thermal power
generating facilities, ships and port equipment, and mis
cellaneous capital goods for the production of rayon,
pulp, fertilizer, caustic soda, and machine tools. The
loan was to be repaid over a ten-year period at Inter-
^Ibid. , II, No. 19 (November 1, 1957).
41
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
rates. The Japanese Ministry of Finance took exception
to the loan in view of Japan's foreign exchange problems
and the possibility that other Aslan nations would request
similar treatment.
The sacrifice involved, however, was overmatched
by Japan's desire to re-enter the Aslan scene as an
independent actor, and to expand its relations with an
important Asian power beyond routine representation.
While this yen credit was a modest sum to the Japanese it
represented a new departure. It signaled too the entry
of Japan into that informal group of powers dedicated to
the long term assistance of India--a consortium recom
mended at the time by Senator John Sherman Cooper and
then Senator John F. Kennedy. It is also Interesting
that Kennedy foresaw the role Japan might play in develop
ing Indian iron ore resources as a long term source of
supply, for within the year steps were being taken to
develop the Rourkela area for this purpose.
18
Lawrence Olson, Japan's Interest in India (New
York: American Universities Field Staff), VI, No. 4
(March 31, 1958), 7.
42
There had been already some modest private
attempts to promote cooperative Industrial ventures, but
instances were few and the number of Japanese involved
were limited. Significantly, however, even in these few
attempts the problems of Japanese working with Indians in
India were apparent. Assertions of Asian brotherhood
aside, the Japanese technicians in India underwent culture
shock, and even careful indoctrination did not prepare
them for the depths of Indian poverty, the backwardness
of India's cottage industry, and the handicapping effect
of Ignorance and the caste system. The diffident Japanese
felt sophisticated by comparison, and found little to
admire or emulate. The image of India was no longer that
of Nehru, but of the real India of overpopulation, poverty,
and seemingly insoluble problems. While official policy
optimistically spoke of expanding Indo-Japanese relation
ships, Japanese business people with experience in India
have seemed more acutely aware of India's endemic handi
caps and limitations. This realism is reflected in
Lawrence Olson's report of the opinions of an Osaka
businessman to the effect that India in Asia was fated to
be a poor third in any struggle for economic supremacy--
43
dismissing them with the statement, "The Indians haven't
IQ
got what it takes to catch up with us.
India, for its part, seemed unaware of any
special Importance being attached to the relationship for
Japan was but one of many Asian nations and by no means
the most Important in the Indian view. Exemplifying this
attitude was the October 15, 1957 Times of India editorial
entitled, "A Great Promise," in which both the positive
and negative aspects of the relationship were given equal
emphasis. While expressing hope that cooperation between
the two nations could provide a stabilizing influence in
Asia, it expressed no illusions regarding the differences
in approach to international relations between the two.
While recognizing the good will apparent during Nehru's
visit to Japan and the potential for greater cooperation,
it did not expect overnight these potentials would become
realities of overriding importance.
The Indian attitude was more realistic than that
of Japan to the degree that its expectations were modest.
19
Lawrence Olson, In Ten Years. In Fifty Years:
Comments on China Trade (New York: American Universities
Field Staff), VI, No. 15 (October 30, 1958), 10.
44
For India this was only another concern among many. While
it might have been better had India been more sensitive to
the special importance Japan attached to these events, it
might also have been better if Japan had been more realis
tic in its assessment of Its importance to India.
The events of 1957 and 1958 were, of course, only
the first steps or episodes in a continuing relationship.
The extending of yen credit, for instance, was but Japan's
opening economic gesture of a series of moves in which
Japan has been the initiator. The most significant area
of cooperation has been the development of Indian iron ore
resources which, since 1958, has required a sustained
effort in the development not only of the mines but of rail
and port facilities as well.
Japan has also continued to assist India in other
technical ways, and while most of these efforts have been
modest, they have been persistent and for the most part
realistic. For Instance, When India's third five-year
plan was announced, Japan again was among those extending
credit, and on August 18, 1961 the yen equivalent of
$80 million was made available over a fifty-year period
after a five-year grace period. This loan was later
45
expanded Co over $105 million. In addition, following an
agreement signed April 23, 1962, Japan initiated programs
in India to operate model agricultural farms and food
processing demonstration centers. The model farm projects
in particular were felt to be of unique value to chron
ically food deficient India given the Japanese farmer's
ability to produce high yields per acre. The first series
of these model farms were located at Nadia in West Bengal,
at Sambolpur in Orissa, at Sahabad in Bihar, and at Surag
in Gujarat, and were to be staffed by a total of sixteen
Japanese agricultural technicians. The experiment was, in
fact, an extension of an earlier project launched in 1958
at Saharanpur in Uttar Pradesh where four Japanese farmers
had, in the first year, coaxed two crops of paddy rice
and one of wheat from a three and a half acre plot at
yields far above the local average. While the Saharanpur
project had begun almost by accident and had operated on
a meager budget, when it quadrupled the average rice
output for the area, its fame spread, and visitors began
to come from all over India to view this marvel of pro
ductivity .
In addition to government sponsored and supported
46
technical aid projects, privately owned Japanese companies
have also been willing to Invest time, knowledge, and
skill In India. It would be impossible to list all of
the Japanese firms with special technical, licensing, and
manufacturing relations with Indian counterparts, but the
extent of these arrangements can be suggested by a few
examples. In 1960, for Instance, the Citizen Watch Com
pany agreed to establish a factory in India for the pro
duction of low and medium priced watches, and Initially
to provide Japanese technicians to train their Indian
counterparts. In the same year Nippon Kogaku concluded
a similar agreement with a Calcutta firm for the produc
tion of medium priced cameras. In 1961 there was a com
mitment on the part of Nippon Electric Company to Bharat
Electronics, Limited, for the production of high quality
tape recorders. Many similar private arrangements have
been concluded for the production of cable, meters, ther
mometers, and myriad other items. While this kind of
investment represents a very small part of foreign invest
ment in India, it is still noteworthy coming from Japan
during a capital deficient period. In such circumstances
one might not expect a firm of the stature of Mitsubishi
47
negotiating the construction of a shipyard in the polit
ically uneasy province of Kerala, and yet such negotia
tions were underway during 1964 and 1965.
Many low-key gestures of friendship have continued
over the years in the form of exchanges of rare animals
for national zoos, the Indian presentation of a Fifth
Century Buddha to the People of Japan, and the presenta
tion by Japan of a leprosarium at Agra. Protocol visits
have continued, too, though none have had the impact of
Nehru's visit to Japan in 1957. Yet visits by India's
President Prasad to Japan, and that of the Crown Prince
to New Delhi have provided occasions for the exchange of
mutual assurances of continuing regard. While the sin
cerity of these exchanges is difficult to assess, they
are probably as candid as one can expect of diplomatic
statements. Representative of their tone was the Japanese
Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda's reply to a speech of welcome
in November 1961 in Delhi, which said, in part:
. . . it has always been my belief that the pros
perity of Japan as an Asian nation is not truly
possible unless other Asian nations are also pros
perous, especially India with her large population,
vast area, her rich natural resources and her demo
cratic institutions. Japan and India have much in
common . . . they have, I believe, a common destiny
48
to fulfill In Asia, to walk hand In hand with each
other and with other friendly countries toward
general progress and prosperity.
It Is my strong feeling that destiny has thrust
upon our people the high and noble task of working
together to bring prosperity to Asia and to contrib-
ute to peace and stability In this region.
Japan and India share similar ideals and similar
goals. The national policies of our countries are
founded on democratic concepts, and the principle
of freedom and dignity of the Individual. We share
alike an ardent desire for world peace. This being
so it is my earnest hope that our two countries will
cooperate closely in all efforts to maintain the
peace of the world.20
These sentiments were later summarized in a joint
communique by the Prime Ministers Nehru and Ikeda issued
November 23, 1961, which noted agreement on:
1) The common objective of maintaining world peace.
2) Joint efforts to enhance the authority of United
Nations and the strengthening of its functions in
maintaining international peace and justice.
3) The encouragement of a nuclear test ban.
4) The encouragement of general and complete dis
armament .
5) Promotion of economic and technical assistance
from Japan.
6) Promotion of cultural, educational, and scien
tific exchanges.
Both nations have continued to profess the same
high goals of cooperation toward world peace and the
7CI
India, Foreign Affairs Record, VII, No. 11
(November 1961), 426.
49
progress and prosperity of Asia. The government of India,
however, has seemed more realistic in recognizing the
persistent basic policy differences preventing greater
real cooperation between the two. The equivalent of the
Sino-Indian border war in 1962 would have sent most
nations searching for sympathetic and permanent allies.
Yet India since then appears to have been as Indifferent
to Japan as before despite the fact that Japan was one of
a handful of Afro-Asian powers to side with India in that
crisis. The reason for this continuing aloofness must be
sought, perhaps, in the foundations of their respective
foreign policies.
In both nations these principles have been enun
ciated clearly and simply, and in the case of India is
seen the unusual instance of the leaders of a potential
nation having disclosed these tenets long in advance of
nationhood. It was in 1925 that the Congress Party said
the four basic guidelines for its foreign policy would be:
1) Opposition to imperialism and the colonial rule.
2) Support of subject peoples and oppressed races
in their struggle for freedom and equality.
3) The promotion of peace and abhorrence of war.
4) The avoidance of foreign entanglements.
So consistently were these principles to be applied when
50
independence was achieved, wrote Robert Thrumbull, that
the situational prediction of what India's reactions would
21
be became entirely possible.
These principles are strikingly similar to those
enumerated by Richard L. Park in his contribution to
Foreign Policy in World Politics. They were:
1) An independence of outlook of people too long
dominated.
2) Fear of involvement with others.
3) Determination to assist others to attain politi
cal freedom.
4) Hatred of second and third class citizenship
based on race.
5) Cooperation and mutual goodwill through the
United Nations.
6) An urge for world-wide contacts with special
attention to A s i a .22
While the meaning of India's special preoccupation
with her Asian neighbors may be equivocal, there are no
real dissonances between these lists.
The basic policies of Japan, however, have been
less clear, perhaps owing in no small part to the existence
21
Robert Thrumbull, India Since Independence (New
York: Foreign Policy Association, 1954), p. 46.
22Roy C. Macridis, ed., Foreign Policy in World
Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1962), p. 303.
51
of a vocal left-wing opposition whose voice has sometimes
been mistaken for being more representative than official
policy statements. Fundamentally, however, the formal
statements of Japan's policy goals, expressed by a series
of Liberal Democratic Party leaders freely elected to
power for more than a score of years, are an accurate
representation of the nation's preoccupations when under
stood within the context of Japan's ambivalent relation
ship with the United States and its search for an inde
pendent role in world politics. While Japan would not
sever its special relationship with the United States,
recent events show how deeply they have come to resent
the implication that their role is that of junior partner,
and how much they crave other independent relationships.
The period of this study shows, ironically, how difficult
this search has been for Japan, and how diffident its
diplomacy appeared during its first ten years of United
Nations membership.
In this search Japan has tried to keep a foot in
the Western world, and a foot in the Afro-Asian world, and
found this an ungainly posture. An explanation for this
awkwardness may lie in Japan's oft repeated goal of
52
becoming a bridge of understanding between East and West
on the assumption that Japan is uniquely suited for this
task. Few post-war Japanese statesmen have failed to
voice this ambition, and, speaking before the Foreign
Correspondents Club in Tokyo in March 1955, Mamoru Shige-
mitsu expressed it classically by saying, "... I hope
Japan will be able to serve the true interests of humanity
by playing the role of a bridge between the East and the
West. J He expressed the same idea more fully about a
month earlier before the Japanese-American Society in
New York when he said:
Now, Japan is in a unique position as she is the
repository of Asiatic culture and yet she has
incorporated a good deal of Western civilization.
Mirroring as we do the Asiatic consciousness, we
can interpret the East to the West and vice versa,
thus reinforcing the mental bridge, so to speak,
that spans the two separate worlds.24
This underlying idea has made formal expressions
of Japan's foreign policy goals spare and ambiguous though
23Mamoru Shigemitsu, Major Foreign Policy Speeches
(Tokyo: Public Information Bureau, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 1956), p. 17.
^Ibid. , p. 10.
53
persistent, and, as expressed in the 1957 diplomatic Blue
Book, reducible to three principles:
1) Devotion to the United Nations.
2) Friendship with the free nations.
3) Recognition of Japan's membership in the Asian
community.
These three principles have been repeated often
and with great consistency, but there have been differ
ences in the stress Japan has placed on each from time to
time. One would surmise, for instance, that Japan's early
expectations regarding the United Nations were unrealistic
both as to what it could gain from this affiliation and
what it might contribute to it. In its eagerness to
join, Japan became a full member of such specialized
agencies as the International Labor Organization; the
Food and Agriculture Organization; the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; and
the World Health Organization before it was eligible to
apply for membership in the organization itself. Japan
found Itself celebrating United Nations day during the
occupation years though it had yet to resume celebrating
its own National Day.
Prior to membership Japan seemed to see the United
Nations as both guarantor of Japan's security and a
54
vehicle for the development of her role as "bridge."
Given these expectations the rejection of Japan's applica
tion for membership in 1952 (and on three subsequent
occasions) was shocking and humiliating. Only sometime
after its admission to membership in December 1956 was
Japan to discover that the United Nations was not a stage
for most of Japan's activity. This disappointment has not
led Japan to reject the United Nations, but it has led to
a more realistic assessment of what Japan and the United
Nations can mean to each other, and appreciating this
reality Japan has remained in most ways one of the organ
ization's staunchest supporters.
In the bilateral relationship of India and Japan
there are no serious direct clashes of interest, and yet
in stating that, one has displayed only one side of the
coin. The other side is that, establishing a relationship
almost anew over twenty years ago, they have come to
remarkably fundamental disagreements in the absence of
direct hostility. Whether India has a "double standard
of morality" which inclines toward the East or is truly
nonaligned, neither stance harmonizes with Japan's
assessment of the imperatives of its position in the world
55
which have so far translated Into its orientation toward
the West. It is hoped that, in studying their attitudes
on some of the most compelling issues to come before the
General Assembly during Japan's first decade of member-
ship, some hints may be found regarding how two such
important nations whose fundamental objectives are so
often similar can reach such polar differences in the
arena of international relations.
CHAPTER III
THE RECURRING ISSUES--THIRD WORLD
The more deeply immersed one becomes in the
records of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the
more evident it becomes that the core of the institution's
concern are the recurring issues--some of which occur
sporadically while others occur with tidal regularity.
While special crisis may interrupt the flow of issues,
they will do so only momentarily, and the institution, so
distracted, will return to their measured consideration
as soon as possible. There is, however, little comfort
in this regularity as it becomes clear that these organi
zational preoccupations are also the organization's insti
tutionalized failures.
Choosing to place those recurring issues first
which have most captured the interest of the Third World
is at least partially arbitrary, but perhaps more ration
ally justifiable on the basis of their having become the
focus of attention for the United Nations and of special
56
57
importance to India. As anticipated, for instance, in
Berkes and Bedi The Diplomacy of India, ^ a new United
Nations was emerging during the period of this study, and
India was itself in a special relationship to the nations
which were to cause that change. There is no question
that India played an important role in making Third World
issues salient long before that term became the modish
shorthand for a variety of complex problems. Indian
delegates have proclaimed with pride their nation's
leadership in pressing such issues from the very first
United Nations sessions, and it would perhaps not be too
speculative to assert that India has used the United
Nations as the vehicle for furthering its claim to a share
of the leadership of the Third World. Though that claim
has been laid open to question by the reaction of those
nations to some of India's difficulties, India, nonethe
less, has been constant in its role. In 1971, for instance,
India continued to sponsor most of the important resolu
tions on the salient Third World issues.
*Ross N. Berkes and Mohinder K. Bedi, The Diplom
acy of India (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958),
p. 207.
58
Japan Coo has been Itself in a special relation
ship to the Third World, albeit the basis for that rela
tionship seems to have diminished during the period of
this study. Japan's idea of itself as a bridge between
Orient and Occident, whether romance or reality, has been
more than a passing fancy with Japanese statesmen. This
perception has made these issues important to Japan as
well.
That Third World issues are important to the
organization is shown by the fact that they comprise eight
(The Issue of Southwest Africa, South Africa--Apartheid,
the Issue of West Irian, the Question of Algeria, the
United Nations Capital Development Fund, Southern Arabia—
Aden, Oman, and Yeman, Rhodesia, and the Issue of the
Portuguese Empire) of the fourteen recurring Issues, and
by the volume of space they occupy in the official records.
Combined, these factors seem to make It appropriate to
treat these Issues first in order of their occurrence.
The Issue of Southwest Africa
The area called Southwest Africa (now referred to
in United Nations circles as Namibia) was one of the last
portions of Africa to fall under European colonization.
59
Claimed by Germany in 1884, this vast area encompassing
the Kalihari Desert seemed hopelessly inhospitable, and
of prestige value only. During World War I, however, this
area was wrested from the small German military garrison,
and placed in the custodial care of South Africa by the
Treaty of Versailles. This relationship was later sanc
tioned by the League of Nations which, by designating it
a Class C mandate, authorized South Africa to administer
it as an integral part of the nation.^ During the inter
war years this condition continued with efforts being
made to develop some of the area's mineral resources,
though no apparent efforts were made to develop the native
peoples' political sophistication or desire for self-
government .
Had the League of Nations survived World War II,
the issue of Southwest Africa might not have arisen for
some time for lack of a dramatic reason to reconsider its
status. However, when the League dissolved Itself in
1946 willing its functions to the newborn United Nations,
?
Those areas designated as Class A Mandates were
deemed nearly qualified for sovereignty, while continuing
dependency status was seen as the future for those man
dated areas called Class B and C.
60
Che transfer of the mandate system to the trusteeship
system created such an occasion and, unwittingly, the
organization's first Third World Issue.
While the Charter provided for this transfer of
function, South Africa from the outset refused to acknowl
edge the succession asserting that It was the wish of the
area’s people to be Incorporated Into South Africa. The
Assembly, however, was unconvinced, and proposed a com
promise continuing the area's mandate status provided
South Africa reported periodically to the United Nations
on the status of the area. After the last such report
was submitted in 1948 dozens of resolutions, repeated
hearings, and the threat of action before the Inter
national Court of Justice have not altered South Africa's
intention to annex the area. While the Assembly's 1966
cancellation of the mandate and adoption of a deadline for
the termination of South African authority appeared to
foreshadow some sort of denouement, the stiffening of
that body's resolutions seems to have been matched by
South Africa's determination to ignore them.
During the period of this study the fate of South
west Africa has been the subject of eleven important votes
61
resulting In ten resolutions unfavorable to South Africa.
While India and Japan have often seemed to agree basically
on the Issue, there has clearly been some Important dif
ference which has prevented them from acting similarly on
this issue. The first consideration of this subject
during this period was during the January and February
meetings of the Eleventh Regular Session of the Assembly,
and resulted in the adoption of four resolutions accepting
petitions and noting conditions in Southwest Africa. A
fifth resolution which addressed itself to solutions for
the problem resulted from Committee IV (Trusteeship) con
sideration of a Liberian draft resolution which called
upon the Secretary General to open negotiations on the
question and report to the next session of the Assembly.
These suggestions were adopted as Resolutions 1059 (XI)
and 1060 (XI) by the 661st Plenary Session on February 26,
1957 by votes of 40-11-19 and 40-4-23, respectively.
(All votes will be recorded in an affirmative, negative,
abstain sequence regardless of the outcome on a specific
issue.) India supported the resolutions while Japan
abstained.
Japan was first seated on Committee IV as debate
on this issue was in progress and was welcomed by a
62
number of delegates Including India's who stated (we)
" . . . look forward to close cooperation between the two
delegations which" he felt sure "would have much in com
mon where committee work was concerned . . .
While Japan remained silent through the debate,
the Indian delegate, speaking somewhat earlier, had
expressed his delegation's frustration saying.
The United Nations had assuredly shown great patience
with the Union of South Africa, but he^ doubted
whether the same forbearance would have been shown
if the oppressed population of Southwest Africa had
been white instead of black. In defiance of the
resolution of the General Assembly and the opinions
of the International Court of Justice, the Union was
now trying to annex the territory as if the Mandate
did not exist.5
3
United Nations, Official Record, 11th Sess., Com.
IV, 577th Meeting (December 18, 1956), Par. 11, p. 136.
/ + The somewhat jarring occurrence of the third per
son in some direct quotations from official records is the
result of Committee debates being summarized rather than
cited verbatim as is the practice for Plenary Sessions of
the General Assembly. These sunmaries, however, are
exhaustive, and having been approved by the Individual
delegations before publication, are tantamount to direct
quotation.
5United Nations, op. cit., 574th Meeting (December
13, 1956), Par. 18, p. 120.
63
In October 1957 during the Twelfth Regular Session
of the Assembly another solution was considered by Commit
tee IV. The essence of the proposal was the establishment
of a Good Offices Committee to be composed of the United
States, the United Kingdom, and a third party to consult
with South Africa on the status of the area. The proposal
was adopted by the 709th Plenary Session on October 25,
1957 by a vote of 50-10-20. While Japan supported the
resolution, India abstained. India's abstention seemed
caused by the rejection of an amendment it had proposed
regarding committee selection, and its essentially hostile
attitude toward South Africa seemed unchanged as its
delegate said:
In view of such a record of administration it might
well be asked whether the Sacred Trust handed to the
Mandatory power had been misplaced. The spectacle
of the violation of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in Southwest Africa was destructive of both
the legal and moral authority of the United Nations.
It was clearly the letter's duty to find a way out
of the impasse since it was the international organi
zation which had placed the people in their present
predicament.6
6Ibid.. 12th Sees., Com. IV, 657th Meeting (Octo
ber 1, 1957), Par. 14, p. 30.
64
While Japan voted for the resolution, It made
clear It did not subscribe to the verbal attacks on South
Africa. "The United Nations would gain little from dis
cussing the problem indefinitely without the participation
of South Africa," said the Japanese delegate, and ex
pressed hope that the informal approach would prove valu
able . ^
The Thirteenth Regular Session of the Assembly
routinely considered the question during October, and
renewed the life of the Good Offices Committee and
expressed its deep concern over the question. These
sentiments were Incorporated in Resolutions 1243 (Xlll)
and 1245 (XIII) adopted by the 778th Plenary Session on
October 30, 1958 by votes of 61-8-7 and 51-2-13. Both
India and Japan voted for these resolutions. Later, how
ever, spirited disagreement rose over the circulation of
the verbatim records of the Good Offices Committee--the
confidential nature of which had hitherto been deemed
necessary for the endeavor. This measure for disclosure
^Ibid., 659th Meeting (October 2, 1957), Par. 41,
p. 39.
65
was adopted as Resolution 1333 (XIII) by the 790th Plenary
Session on December 13, 1956 by a vote of 40-21-11. While
India supported the resolution, Japan abstained.
Consideration during the Fourteenth Regular
Session reached the decision to return to direct United
Nations negotiation with South Africa since the efforts of
the Good Offices Committee had not been fruitful. This
decision was embodied In Resolution 1360 (XIV) by the
838th Plenary Session on November 17, 1959 by a vote of
55-5-11. India both sponsored and supported It and Japan
voted for it as well, though neither contributed innova-
tively to the debate.
The Fifteenth Regular Session of the Assembly con
sidered only one Issue of political significance pertain
ing to Southwest Africa, and this was an eleven-power
draft resolution debated by Committee IV calling for the
dispatch of a United Nations commission for an on-site
inspection. It was adopted by the 954th Plenary Session
on December 18, 1960 as Resolution 1568 (XV) by a vote of
78-0-15. While India supported the resolution, Japan
joined a number of Western nations in abstaining. India
broke no new ground in its statement on the issue, while
66
Japan explained its vote saying it
. . . would abstain with great reluctance . . . be
cause in view of Article Seven of the Mandate it could
not but feel that, in the strictly technical sense,
that draft resolution might affect the competence of
the International Court of Justice to adjudicate in
the dispute submitted to it by Ethiopia and Liberia.**
It seemed to be Japan's fear that this resolution
would imply a revocation of the mandate upon which the
Ethiopian-Liberlan case depended. While this did not
prove to be the case, the Court, in 1966, elected not to
hear the case on the grounds that the petitioning nations
were not competent to bring the case to court--an action
generally considered by the Third World nations as an
evasion.
Little change of political direction can be noted
during the Sixteenth Regular Session of the Assembly,
although some frustration was evident in the face of
South Africa's obstinacy to both reason and pressure.
Most politically significant was the rejection of a
Swedish draft resolution which failed to survive Committee
IV debate. The essence of the Swedish proposal was the
6Ibid.. 15th Sess., Com. IV, 1076th Meeting
(December 6, 1960), Far. 27, p. 455.
67
establishment of a new investigating group. This draft
was rejected by the 1247th Meeting of Committee ZV on
December 13, 1961 by a vote of 26-41-26. Japan, with
several Western powers, supported the recommendation while
India abstained. The Japanese delegation during this
round took the occasion to deliver by far its longest and
strongest statement on the subject. Noting the necessity
for some device to induce the South Africans to change
their attitude lest it be established that a member could
Q
defy the United Nations with impunity, the Japanese dele
gate added,
In view of the defiant attitude of the South African
government, the General Assembly had not reached the
end of its frustration. But the position of the South
African leaders was far from comfortable. In spite
of the erroneous principles by which they were guided,
they are still human beings, and must sometimes wonder
why the whole world condemns them. Some day, per
haps, they would realize that they could not be right
and the rest of mankind wrong, and the Japanese dele
gation sincerely hoped that that day was near.10
Similar frustration appears to have characterized
the Seventeenth Regular Session which dissolved the
9Ibid., 16th Sess., Com. IV, 1234th Meeting
(December 1, 1961), Par. 33-34, p. 503.
^Ibid. , Par. 43, p. 504.
68
Special Comnlsslon on Southwest Africa by adopting Reso
lution 1806 (XVII). Its strongest action amounted to no
more than the usual expression of sorrow, and was adopted
as Resolution 1805 (XVII) by the 1194th Plenary Session
on December 14, 1962 by a vote of 98-0-1. As becomes
apparent this resolution, as all others merely expressing
regret, was supported by both nations. The pitch of
Japan's rhetoric, however, remained high and includr
such statements as:
In spite of world opinion and the judgment given by
the supreme judicial agency of the United Nations,
the South African government showed no inclination to
alter its ruthless policy; that situation was all the
more paradoxical in view of the rapid process of de-
colonialization which was taking place throughout the
world, and more particularly in the African conti
nent .
The situation, he added, was "dangerous and becoming
increasingly explosive."^
During the Eighteenth Regular Session the in
creased anti-colonialist militancy on the part of the
Afro-Aslans nations which became apparent in 1961 was
translated regarding this issue into a thirty-eight power
^ Ibid.. 17th Sess., Com. IV, 1386th Meeting
(November 15, 1962), Par. 44, p. 383.
69
draft resolution which reaffirmed all prior condemnations
and for the first time called upon members to apply sanc
tions against South Africa. Debated in Committee IV, it
was adopted as Resolution 1899 (XVII) by the 1257th
Plenary Session of the Assembly on November 13, 1963 by a
vote of 64-6-17. India sponsored and supported the meas
ure, while Japan abstained. Japan, however, remained
critical of South Africa, saying its "... policies were
morally wrong, legally indefensible and politically suicid
al, and could only aggravate the already serious situation
in Southwest Africa.
Acknowledging the emotional nature of the subject
the Japanese delegate went on to say,
. . . the Committee should not allow itself to be
swept away by its emotions. The case now before the
International Court of Justice was undoubtedly one
of the most Important cases the Court had ever had to
consider; its decision would be of great significance
for the fate of Southwest Africa. The Committee
should therefore avoid any action which would preju
dice the Court's Judgment.13
12Ibid., 18th Sess., Com. IV, 1459th Meeting
(October 29, 1963), Par. 36, p. 174.
13
Ibid.
70
The Indian contribution to debate remained meas
ured and dispassionate, and concluded, more in sorrow than
in anger that, ordinary means having been exhausted,
14
political and economic sanctions were the only recourse.
Japan later felt obliged to express its basic sympathy
with the draft resolution explaining its abstention was
based on the conviction that only the Security Council
15
had the prerogative of levying sanctions. Japan's ready
verbal condemnations as contrasted with its reluctance to
put teeth into those sentiments have caused some doubt
about Japan's sincerity. The suspicion that the value of
Japan's trade with South Africa overrides its moral com
mitment on such occasion was later expressed in Committee
IV debate.
In limbo during 1964 because of the paralyzing
financial crisis (discussed later as a special issue), the
issue emerged as hardy as ever in 1965 when a condemnation
of apartheid and the de facto annexation of the area
^ Ibid., 1465th Meeting (November 1, 1963), Par.
1-10, pp. 221-222.
15Ibid., 1473rd Meeting (November 8, 1963), Par.
74, p. 267.
71
coupled with an appeal for aid for the people of Southwest
Africa was adopted as Resolution 2074 (XX) on December 17,
1965 by the 1400th Plenary Session by a vote of 85-2-19.
India supported the measure while Japan abstained. India
took this occasion to note its own opposition to annexa
tion dating back to the first United Nations session, and
characterized that act as "illegal and immoral." The
delegate added:
The Indian Government, which has taken effective
measures to implement the United Nation's resolutions
on the question of Southwest Africa, addressed a
fervent appeal to the major trading partners of South
Africa to apply to that country the sanctions which
had been recommended. ®
Japan found itself in a distinctly defensive posi
tion having been accused by Tanzania of dissembling because
of Japanese Investments in the area. Japan denied this
charge and defended its abstention on the grounds that
sanctions were only within the realm of the Security
Council, saying,
. . . Japan had for a number of years past prohibited
the export of arms, ammunition, and military equip
ment to South Africa and Southwest Africa, and Japan
^ Ibid., 20th Sess., Com. IV, 1570th Meeting
(November 26, 1965), Par. 48-52, p. 323.
72
did not: export petroleum to that area. In the caae
of Southwest Africa, as in the case of apartheid,
Japan was prepared to give full cooperation to law
ful and effective measures decided on by the Security
Council.I?
The regularity of the issue's consideration and
of the Indo-Japanese divergence were altered slightly in
1966 when they were found once more in agreement on the
major resolution on the question. This was Resolution
2145 (XXI) adopted by the 1454th Plenary Session on
October 27, 1966 by a vote of 114-2-3, and called for the
formal termination of League Mandate status in the area
and South Africa's cooperation in substituting United
Nations authority. While this resolution represented a
substantial show of solidarity in "world public opinion,"
it was no great departure in approach to the issue, nor
did it alter the de facto status of the area.
Japan’s support of Resolution 2145 (XXI) does not
represent a change of attitude, but fits, rather, into a
clear pattern of Japan supporting issues without coercive
provisions while withholding its support when even a
modicum of coercion is implied. This reluctance has
^ Ibid., 1581st Meeting (December 9, 1965), Par.
36, p. 413.
73
extended to other Third World questions as well. On
December 13, 1966, for instance, Japan was among those
abstaining on Resolution 2189 (XXI) which modestly asked
members to withhold assistance to Portugal, Rhodesia, and
South Africa until they complied with United Nations
demands even though it was adopted by a vote of 76-7-20.
In treating the issue of Southwest Africa one con
fronts, in a very real way, the forerunner of all Third
World issues, and while this issue has lacked the emo
tional impact of some of the others, its treatment in the
United Nations has followed a pattern which will emerge
as typical and predictable. As is almost always the case
debate on this issue becomes at length stylized and pre
dictable, and a given nation's position can usually be
comfortably fitted into a given category.
In this case it is the basic South African posi
tion that the United Nations simply lacks Jurisdiction in
the matter. Because of the wishes of the people, they
say, it has become a part of South Africa and is certainly
not a United Nations trust. In contrast those devotedly
opposed to South Africa's policies have taken the position
that South Africa is morally and legally bound to submit
74
to the jurisdiction of the United Nations, and having
failed to submit to reason on this question should be
subjected to real sanctions. As time has gone on, more-
over, there has been increasing criticism of certain
Western powers without whose economic support, they
reason, South Africa would have to surrender.
There is, of course, substance to this accusation
which is great enough to make some nations uncomfortable,
and also make it unlikely to be seriously considered by
the Security Council.
When compared to these basic positions those of
the subjects of this study are interesting in that one is
so neatly classifiable while the other strives to escape
categorization. India clearly sides with those opposing
South Africa. In this basically Third World issue India
has no difficulty finding its loyalties, and because of
the discrimination against South Africa's Indian popula
tion which had been imported as laborers beginning in
1860, India's relationship with South Africa has not been
a happy one. Japan, however, reveals that "ungainly pos
ture" previously implied as possibly being the fate of a
nation trying to keep one foot in the West and another in
75
Che Afro-Asian world. While Japan at times spoke with an
almost Afro-Asian fervor, its real behavior was more
moderate, and whether the legal reasons given for its
behavior were valid ones may be best discussed later.
South Africa--Apartheid
Of the United Nations' many recurring issues few
have exceeded in emotional intensity the question of
South Africa's racial policies, and few have been pursued
with greater persistence. The proliferation of African
nations during the 1960's, while South Africa's devotion
to apartheid became even more intense, seems to have made
feelings on this question especially fervent. Indeed,
trying to discover some middle ground for compromise on
this question is likely to earn one little thanks or
satisfaction.
It would seem that neither India or Japan is par
ticularly qualified to cast the first stone in questions
of discrimination. India's Institutionalized caste system
appears so interwoven Into the nation's fabric that its
uprooting seems impossible, though to India's credit it
has acknowledged the problem and written its abolition
into the nation's legal framework. Assuming in this case
76
that intent equates with execution, however, would be
naive. Japan's discriminatory practices while less bla
tant are nonetheless real. Japanese society is by nature
hierarchical, and though mass education has modified old
rigidities, there is still no concealing the pride a
Japanese will reveal recalling his samurai ancestry, or
the racism that was inherent in Japan's ambitious plan for
the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Japan too has
minority problems regarding both its Korean and Chinese
population and the unique group known as Eta. Unlike
South Africa, however, neither Japan nor India has legally
sanctioned its discriminations.
The South African racial problem was first con
sidered in 1952, and since then the United Nations has
given annual attention to the two issues so similar they
must be treated as one--the question of apartheid per se,
and the question of the treatment of peoples from the
Indian subcontinent known in Africa as "Asians." By the
time Japan began participating in this issue some general
characteristics were already discernible, not the least
of which was India's hostility toward South Africa. Of
the twenty-five resolutions considered by the Assembly
77
during this ten-year period, India sponsored fifteen and
voted in favor of all. Japan's support was equally firm
until 1960 after which it often equivocated. Still
another easy generalization is that no other issue has so
thoroughly commanded the unanimity of the Afro-Asian
group, nor has been so studiously ignored by the target
nation.
The first consideration of this issue after Japan's
admission ended with the adoption of two resolutions by
the 648th Plenary Session on January 30, 1957. Regarding
the Indian minority question and apartheid, respectively,
Resolutions 1015 (XI) and 1016 (XI) were adopted by votes
of 42-0-12 and 56-5-12. India sponsored the proposals,
and both India and Japan supported them. While always of
concern to India, the expressions of its delegates to this
time had been restrained. Krishna Menon (India's best
known chief of mission by all odds), noted neither for his
brevity nor restraint, reflected nonetheless a concilia
tory spirit when he spoke regarding both issues. For
instance:
India had no feeling of hatred toward the Union of
South Africa. It believed that the great majority
of the South African people were opposed to the
78
vicious principles and practices of the Government.
Failure to put an end to those practices would in*
evitably create a situation of the utmost danger.
The Indian population of the Union of South Africa
would continue to offer resistance to the Union
Government's racial policies even if it took a
hundred years to force that Government to desist.
The Group Areas Act. which was represented by the
Union of South Africa to the Assembly as domestic
legislation and therefore inviolate, was the crux of
the whole South African problem created by dividing
human beings into categories according to racial
prejudice. Acceptance of such a division by other
states would mean the ultimate dismemberment of all
multiracial countries and continents.
The Japanese spoke regarding both issues stressing
from the outset that Japan was opposed to racial discrimi
nation, and hoped an atmosphere could be created for real
cooperation. Japan's words on both issues reflected the
high hopes with which it initially approached the United
Nations. Its speech on the apartheid issue, however, also
recalled Japan's campaign for nondiscrimination at Ver
sailles in 1919 and similar activity at Bandung, but
relapsed nonetheless into wishful thinking, saying:
A resolute attempt should be made to create an atmos
phere free of irritation and antagonism, an atmos
phere of persuasion. For the purpose it might be
18
Ibid., Special Political Committee, 7th Meeting
(January 7, 1957), Par. 22, p. 25.
79
advisable to designate a few competent persons to
confer with the Government of the Union or with Its
representatives and explore the possibilities of
easing the existing difficulties.
The Japanese delegate concluded that the leaders of South
Africa, being "men of good will," could "hardly refuse to
accept such a proposal.
Consideration of the issue by the Twelfth Regular
Session was concluded on November 26, 1957 with South
Africa refusing to participate in debate. Deploring South
Africa's inaction toward rectifying apartheid, Resolution
1178 (XII) was adopted by the 723rd Plenary Session 59-6-
16 with India sponsoring the measure and both nations
supporting it. A four-power proposal calling for negotia
tion between South Africa and India and Pakistan was
passed at the same time as Resolution 1179 (XII) by a vote
of 64-0-15 with both India and Japan in support. There
was little change in the pronouncements of the two dele
gations except to note that Japan made a special effort
to communicate to South Africa that its vote for adoption
" . . . did not necessarily mean a unilateral condemnation
19
Ibid.. 13th Meeting (January 15, 1957), Par. 11,
p. 56.
80
in absentia of the Union of South Africa for any of its
specific policies. *'2°
The Thirteen Session of the Assembly also consid
ered the question though not so obviously in the same
breath. The apartheid issue was voted on by the 778th
Plenary Session on October 30, 1958, and adopted as Reso
lution 1248 (XXI) with India sponsoring the proposal and
both nations supporting it. This resolution was the cus
tomary expression of regret. Discussion of the Indian
minority issue came later, and the adoption of Resolution
1302 (XIII) urging the use of good offices to obtain nego
tiations came on December 10, 1958 before the 783rd
Plenary Session. In the 69-0-10 vote Japan and India
supported the proposal. There is little evidence of
change in the debate contributions of India and Japan,
though the tone of India's statement was perhaps more
impatient. Japan's otherwise typical statement, however,
was marked by a special appeal (notable in view of their
own frequent use of legalistic justifications):
20
Ibid., 13th Sess., Special Political Conmittee,
57th Meeting (November 1, 1958), Par. 28, p. 75.
81
. . . to the abstaining delegations to view the ques
tion not from the juridical standpoint alone, but in
light of the various other considerations, including
the benefit which the white race would derive through
out Africa from a revision of the apartheid policy.
In 1959 these issues recurred during the Four
teenth Regular Session, and a typical proposal on apart-
held was adopted as Resolution 1375 (XIV) on November 17,
1959 by the 838th Plenary Session 62-3-7 with both nations
supporting and India among its co-sponsors. On December
10, 1959 the usual minorities proposal was adopted as
Resolution 1460 (XIV) by the 852nd Plenary Session 66-0-10
with India and Japan in support. There were no new
departures in debate.
Consideration of the minorities and apartheid
issues would normally have occurred in 1960 during the
first part of the Fifteenth Session, but like so many
other issues it was by-passed for more urgent issues.
Indirectly Influencing all matters in 1960 was, of course,
the Congo crisis, but more specifically in this case the
Special Political Committee (the customary arena for
21
Ibid., 13th Sess., Special Political Committee,
91st Meeting (October 17, 1958), Par. 13, p. 30.
62
debating these issues) was deeply engaged in discussions
on expanding the membership of the Security Council in
light of the proliferation of new nations. Both issues
were considered "out of normal season" not only by the
Special Political Committee and Assembly, but by the
Security Council as well.
Both India and Japan were among the twenty-nine
nations requesting the Council to consider the matter,
and the resulting Resolution S/4300 of April 11, 1961
deplored the situation and called strongly for a change
in the racial policies though it proposed no sanctions.
When further debate on the issue occurred in the Assembly
in April, it first centered in the Special Political Com
mittee where a twenty-six power (Including India) draft
resolution urging specific sanctions was sent to the
Assembly for a vote on April 10, 1961. This proposal
(A/SPC/L.60 Con. 1 and Add. 1,2) failed (47-29-18) to
receive the needed two-thirds majority. India supported
the proposal, but Japan abstained. When the more custom
ary annual condemnation was voted on by the 981st Plenary
Session on April 13, 1961 as Resolution 1597 (XV) by a
vote of 96-1-0, however, both nations supported the meas
83
ure. When Resolution 1597 (XV) reiterated previous reso
lutions on the minority question and was adopted by the
same session 78-0-2 both nations again concurred. During
these late Fifteenth Session debates a more emotional tone
developed. Japan, for instance, expressed itself more
strongly than before saying that the tragedy of Sharpe-
22
ville was compounded by the fact that it appeared to
have taught South Africa nothing. The ultimate result for
South Africa, Japan added, would be the flight of capital
fearing instability.2" *
The change in the tone of India's contribution
was even more marked--conciliatory phrases being dropped
entirely. While India's remarks were brief but sharp,
with implications of expulsion, as Krishna Menon said,
"Member States might eventually have to ask themselves
where there was room for the Union in the Organization."2^
22
The Sharpeville Massacre occurred on May 28,
1960 when a police compound near Johannesburg opened fire
on a crowd of Africans killing 69 and wounding 178.
2**United Nations, Official Records, 15th Seas.
Special Political Committee, 236th Meeting (March 30,
1961), Par. 23, p. 43.
24Ibid.. 241st Meeting (April 4, 1961), Par. 9,
p. 70.
84
Particular drama was lent to the consideration of
these issues at the Sixteenth Regular Session by the
spirited defense of his nation's policies presented by
South African Minister of External Affairs Eric H. Louw
during the 1033rd Plenary Session’s General Debate on
October 11, 1961. Notable itself in view of South
Africa's accustomed boycott of debate on the issues, the
reaction which followed his presentation was particularly
aroused by his odious comparisons of the lot of the black
man In South Africa as compared to that of the black man
in the long established black African nations. The
resulting reaction was extraordinary, and gave rise to an
unprecedented Liberian motion to censure South Africa
immediately. Immediately seconded by Nigeria, the censure
was adopted 67-1-20 by the 1034th Plenary Session on
October 11, 1961. India supported the Liberian resolution
while Japan abstained.
Further debate on the racial issues was restricted
to the Special Political Committee except for the usual
resolution of regret which was adopted as Resolution 1663
(XVI) on November 28, 1961 by the 1067th Plenary Session
97-2-1 with India and Japan supporting. The same Plenary
85
Session, without abstention or negative vote, also passed
the usual Indian minority measure as Resolution 1662
(XVI). In the Special Political Committee, however, two
measures (A/SPC/L.71 and L.72) which anticipated calls for
sanctions soon to be Issued by the Assembly were adopted
November 13, 1961 by votes of 55-26-20 and 72-2-27. In
the case of the former, India supported while Japan
opposed, and in the latter case India supported while
Japan abstained. On this occasion (during which the
United States seemed almost as much on trial as South
Africa) Japan, in one of its longest speeches, was an
unheeded voice of moderation. The United Nations "must
not," it warned:
. . . take any action which would make its ends more
difficult to attain, and make the situation of those
suffering from racial discrimination in South Africa
even more desperate. The U.N. must beware lest its
strong sense of outrage at the continuation of racial
discrimination and its equally strong sense of frus
tration at the Ignoring of its recommendations should
give rise to hasty action which might have the oppo
site effect from what was intended. It must avoid
making martyrs of those responsible for the policies
of "apartheid," and it must avoid putting those now
suffering under such policies in a position where
retaliation, ostensibly directed against the U.N.,
might in fact be directed against them.25
25Ibid., 16th Sess., SPC, 275th Meeting (November
1, 1961), ParT* 37, p. 82.
86
India's delegate restated Its previous position.
During 1962's Seventeenth Regular Session Japan
and India again were found among the Afro-Asian nations
requesting consideration of the issue, though any implied
alliance was short lived. Debate began in the Special
Political Committee where a draft resolution urging volun
tary economic sanctions and boycott pending Security
Council action was passed on to the Assembly for adoption.
The Committee's draft was adopted as Resolution 1761
(XVII) by the 1165th Plenary Session on November 6, 1962
by a vote of 67-16-23. Japan in largely Western company
opposed the measure while India supported it. On this
occasion India, for the first time, hinted at violence,
saying, South African behavior had
. . . created a dangerous and explosive situation.
So far, African movements had been remarkably peace
ful and restrained in the face of continual provoca
tion. A complete failure of the nonviolent methods,
however, had now given rise to a demand for more
militant action.' . The nonviolent movement, inspired
by the actions of Mahatma Gandhi, was being dis
credited and leadership was passing to the hands of
people who felt that only violence could bring about
any change In South Africa. Time was running out
and unless some peaceful solution was found it might
be too late.26
26Ibid., 17th Sess., SPC, 335th Meeting (October
22, 1962),'Far. 15, p. 43.
87
While India duly supported sanctions, Japan equivocated,
commenting sorrowfully that it was "... frustrating to
have to debate such an elementary question as the die-
2 7
crimination of man against man in the present age."*'
The year 1963 again saw consideration of the issue
by both the Security Council and the Assembly, the delib
erations of the former resulting on August 27, 1963 in
Resolution S/5386 calling for an end to arms shipments to
South Africa, but not calling for a general boycott of
South African products. Neither India nor Japan partici
pated in the proceedings. In the Special Political Com
mittee and the Assembly, however, they were among the
fifty-five nations sponsoring a draft resolution which
condemned South Africa for failing to comply with the
United Nations' repeated resolutions, called for the
release of political prisoners, requested members to press
South Africa for compliance, and requested the Secretary
General to report on the resolution's implementation.
This was adopted as Resolution 1881 (XVIII) (106-1-0) by
the 1238th Plenary Session October 11, 1963.
27Ibid., 336th Meeting (October 25, 1962), Par.
37. p. 51.
88
A second round of consideration occurred in
December beginning with the unanimous adoption by the
Security Council of a Norwegian proposal summarizing pre
vious pronouncements. The Assembly combined a forty-nine
and a forty-seven power draft calling for the intensifi
cation of good offices activities and the activity of the
Secretary General in seeking assistance for the perse
cuted into Resolution 1978A and B (XVIII) which was
adopted December 16, 1963 by the 1283rd Plenary Session.
These were adopted overwhelmingly 100-2-1 and 99-2-0 with
India and Japan voting with the majority. India took the
opportunity during this round of debate to attack the
United States and the United Kingdom as well as South
Africa saying:
All trade with South Africa should be brought to a
halt and the lead in that direction should be taken
by the United Kingdom and the United States, which
between them account for over 40 percent of South
Africa's imports. . . . If such sanctions were
quickly and firmly put into effect there would be
drastic changes in the South African regime. The
result would be that a South Africa purged of the
evil of apartheid would be able, thanks in part to
the skills, Initiative, and ability of the whites,
to play a part in accelerating the process of con
tinental unity. If, on the other hand, the leading
Western Powers hesitated, Africa and the world would
be engulfed in catastrophe, for the patience of those
89
who had taken their stand against apartheid was at
an e n d .28
For its part Japan expressed understanding that
lack of response to patience and moderation was resulting
in frustration, but urged that stronger measures should
be taken only by the Security C o u n c i l .29
Owing to the financial crisis in 1964, Assembly
consideration was disrupted but the issue did arise in
the Security Council where during June three proposals
were considered. While neither India nor Japan partici
pated in these deliberations the similarity of the Coun
cil's resolution to the contents of Resolution 1881
(XVIII) would lead one to believe that neither would have
hesitated to support it. In the course of deliberations,
however, Japan was singled out by the Soviet Union as one
of those directly and indirectly helping South Africa--a
charge on which Japan was particularly sensitive.
The Assembly addressed itself to the issue rou
tinely in 1965 after a desultory exchange in the Security
2ft
Ibid., 18th Seas., SPC, 388th Meeting (October
21, 1963), Par. 13, p. 61.
29Ibid., 390th Meeting (October 23, 1963), Par.
34-35, p. 71.
90
Council which failed to produce any substantial gain.
The Assembly voted on a two-part resolution on December
15, 1965--the first declaring the situation was a conti-
*
nuing threat to the peace only treatable with economic
sanctions, and the second seeking funds for the relief of
apartheid victims. Both Resolutions 2054A and B (XX)
were adopted by the 1395th Plenary Session by votes of
80*2-16 and 95-1-1. Both Japan and India supported the
latter, but Japan abstained on the former. While India's
contribution to debate was its customary one, Japan,
singled out first by the Soviet Union and later by Guinea,
called charges of Japan's support of South Africa wholly
groundless. Even though Japan was dependent on trade, it
was said,
When lawful and effective measures involving economic
sanctions against South Africa were taken by the
Security Council, Japan was prepared to cooperate
with it. Japan would continue to enforce its arms
embargo against South Africa.30
Guinea was later to take Japan to task once more over its
"honorary white" status in South Africa, to which Japan
10
Ibid.. 20th Sess., SPC, 472nd Meeting (December
1, 1965), Par. 7, p. 2.
91
replied rather weakly that it would look into the matter.
In 1966 as well similar configurations of Issues
were voted on by the 1496th Plenary Session which adopted
Resolution 2202A and B (XXI) on December 16, 1966. Once
more the respective Issues were the calling for economic
sanctions and trade disengagement by South Africa's major
trading partners and the apartheid victim trust fund. The
first passed by a vote of 84-2-13 and the second 99-1-1.
Japan again abstained on the question of economic sanc
tions. By 1966 the change in tenor of debate is unmistak
able, and only Japan among the Asian nations remained
moderate saying,
While Japan sympathized with the impatience of the
African nations to bring about an end to apartheid
through the application of universal economic sanc
tions against South Africa, it warned them that such
sanctions could only be successful if they were really
applied effectively by all states. Since several
states found it difficult to apply sanctions in the
present circumstances, it was unrealistic to assume
that they could be universal.31
No observation of these votes could fail to note
the total consistency of the Indian position in contrast
31Ibid., 21st Sess., SPC, 539th Meeting (December
9, 1966), Par. 8, p. 240.
92
to the frequent equivocation of the Japanese. The valid*
ity of Japan's role of Asian among Asians seems open to
question when time after time it lends its name to placing
a question on the agenda only to later oppose or abstain
on all but the most innocuous resolutions.
The motivation for Japan's behavior in this case
is a complex contrast to the relative simplicity of
India's position. On this issue India's stance is one of
those basic positions into which argumentation tends to
fall. To the representatives of India this is a clear
choice between good and evil before which all other con
siderations or objections should become insignificant if
not irrelevant. While this attitude is representative of
a large bloc of nations, to India, perhaps more than any
other, has fallen the role of particular adversary vis-6-
vis South Africa, and in light of the long history of the
Indian minority problem in South Africa this is not really
surprising.
Japan's attitude toward South Africa in particular
and the issue in general, however, has been quite differ
ent. Japan has only, for instance, confronted South
Africa on a nation to nation basis, and while relations
93
between them have not been warm they have been correct and
mutually beneficial. South Africa's great mineral wealth
has doubtless given it power beyond its size, and many
industrial nations (Japan being no exception) have been
reluctant to needlessly offend its government even though
deploring its racial policies. For its part South Africa
is happy to take full advantage of its unique position
vis-a-vis the Industrial nations in general, and happy too
to have access to Japan's high quality industrial products
in particular. While the trade which has developed
between Japan and South Africa is modest when compared to
that between Japan and the United States, it is still
highly desirable to a trading nation like Japan, and its
value to South Africa is attested to by their willingness
to bend their racial policies regarding the Japanese.
South Africa's bestowing of "honorary white" status to
resident Japanese has spared them the real sting of dis
crimination, and kept apartheid impersonal.
Japan's position regarding the basic debate camps
on this issue has been closer to that of the Western
nations, although it has tried to maintain a foot in each
camp. While the Western position on this issue equally
94
deplores South Africa's racial policies it has been un
willing to go beyond the tool of persuasion In trying to
alter those policies. This reluctance is usually justi
fied on the basis that the matter does not really consti
tute a threat to the peace, and that to impose effective
economic sanctions would require not merely a paper em
bargo but an effective blockade--a step the dimensions of
which are unforeseeable. One cannot discount, moreover,
the probability that some of these nations are sensitive
to the possible validity of South Africa's claim that this
is a domestic issue outside the jurisdiction of the United
Nations altogether. As any nation with a racial or other
minority problem might potentially be the subject of
similar treatment in the future, this may be a door that
some are reluctant to open at all.
From this basic position Japan has separated
itself in two ways not the least of which has been its
attempt to keep contact with its Afro-Asian fellows by
requesting the issue be placed on the agenda. Its other
major separation seems to be its tacit recognition that
the issue 1b within the jurisdiction of the United Nations
at least in the right circumstance. Japan has not ques-
95
tioned the right of the Security Council to impose such
sanctions, only the propriety of the Assembly's recommend
ing them.
On all occasions when the issue is merely the
ritualistic condemnation of the policies Japan is found
with the great majority supporting the resolution.
The Issue of West Irian
Both Japan and India had had special relations
with Indonesia. To Japan, once its occupier, it was, with
its petroleum, tin, rubber, and foodstuffs, the indispens
able crowning jewel of the Greater £ast Asia Co-prosperity
Sphere. Yet Japan's relationship to the Indies was never
a simple master-slave association, for in Indonesia, as
elsewhere, Japan established local governments which gave
at least the appearance of self-government. In Indonesia,
where sentimental ties to the Dutch were weak, this
government was something more than just a cooperative
facade, and indeed, was the nucleus of the government of
the Republic of Indonesia which was to successfully frus
trate all Dutch attempts to reassert colonial authority.
India's relationship with Indonesia for a while
was closer than its relationships with many other Asian
96
nations. While the religious violence which accompanied
the partition of India provided little encouragement for
the development of warm relations between Hindu India and
Islamic Indonesia, their relations were cordial during
the early 1950*s. India had been in the forefront cham
pioning independence for Indonesia, and as nations they
seemed to derive more satisfaction from their shared anti
colonialism than from their differences. This cooperative
spirit reached a climax at the Afro-Asian Conference held
in April 1955 at Bandung, Indonesia--a conference which
Indonesia as host and India, with Nehru's prestige, seemed
to dominate. While the spirit of Afro-Asian solidarity
thrived at Bandung, the tangible results were few. Since
Bandung, Indian-Indonesian relations have cooled substan
tially.
The particular Third World issue involving Indo
nesia in a dispute with the Netherlands was over the
rightful possession of the western portion of the island
of New Guinea. Visited and explored by the usual range
of Europeans beginning in the sixteenth century, its
rightful posessor depended largely on the eye of the
beholder until Dutch rights were recognized in the nine-
97
teenth century. By the middle of the twentieth century
there Is little question that continuing Dutch occupation
of the area was anachronistic in a world of rapidly dis
solving colonialism. However. Indonesia's claim to right
ful possession of the area seemed strained too by con
ventional standards of self-determination. Racially, cul
turally, linguistically and sociologically, the gap
between Indonesian and Papuan is immense, and to date,
though now ruled by Indonesia, it remains an area of
unrest.
The status of Western New Guinea (West Irian) was
brought to the attention of the General Assembly in 1954
by the Indonesian government which claimed Dutch violation
of the November 1948 agreement, and requested the good
offices of the Secretary General in reopening negotia
tions. The Dutch, predictably, demurred, insisting that
the 1948 agreement had continued the status quo in the
area. The Assembly, nonetheless, debated the issue each
year through 1957 and the last of that series of debates
provided Japan an opportunity to express itself.
On that occasion the issue resolved Itself into a
nineteen-power draft resolution (with India among its
98
sponsors) urging a solution using the good offices of the
Secretary General, which was passed by Committee I as
A/C.1/193. When voted on by the 724th Plenary Session of
the Assembly on November 29, 1957, however, it failed
(41-29-11) to attain the necessary two-thirds majority.
On this occasion both India and Japan voted for the draft
resolution (as did nearly all Afro-Asian nations) implying
support for the Indonesian position. Actual debate on the
draft resolution took place in Committee I where Japan
spoke in favor of it saying it had supported Indonesia's
position since Bandung. India spoke at greater length
dismissing the question of self-determination, and saying,
In sponsoring the draft, Indonesia was showing great
generosity and a spirit of conciliation, for despite
its unquestioned sovereignty over West Irian, it was
asking the Netherlands to negotiate such matters as
the territory’s political status, time, joint arrange
ments, and probably the question of inducing the Dutch
to Invest capital In the territory for the mutual
advantage of both states.32
In the wake of this defeat the West Irian issue
lay dormant for a period of nearly four years. During
those years, of course, the United Nations’ Afro-Asian
32Ibid., 12th Sess., Com. I, 912th Meeting (Novem
ber 26, 1957), Par. 12, p. 244.
99
membership swelled, and using the 1960 declaration on
colonialism as a springboard, Indonesia pressed the issue
for debate once more in 1961. The intervening years had,
if anything, made Indonesia's claims stronger, and by this
juncture It was asserting that West Irian was so integral
a part of the nation that even the United Nations had no
right to determine the will of its Inhabitants by pleb
iscite. Toward the Dutch, Indonesia openly threatened
violence.
Debate in 1961 produced two draft resolutions
passed by Committee I (A/L.367/Rev. 1 and A/L.368) which
again failed to attain a two-thirds majority before the
Assembly. The first of these was a nine-power draft
resolution (India among the sponsors) calling for the
resumption of bilateral negotiations. The draft was
rejected by the 1066th Plenary Session of the Assembly on
November 27, 1961 by a vote of 41-40-21 with India sup
porting it while Japan abstained.
The second draft, sponsored by thirteen African
nations, called for both negotiation and self-determina
tion, but also failed (53-41-9) before the same Plenary
Session to gain a sufficient majority. Both India and
100
Indonesia, in the company of the Soviet Bloc and a large
number of Afro-Asian nations, opposed the draft, while
Japan again abstained. India's first contribution to
debate on this occasion was an extensive (55 paragraphs)
speech by Krishna Menon which is hard to characterize as
anything but emotionally anti-Dutch. A week later,
moreover, India's Ambassador C. S. Jha felt called upon
to add another extensive statement (41 paragraphs) in
defense of the Menon statement. The Indian delegate
patiently explained on this occasion that India was
devoted to the principle of self-determination under
proper conditions, but that West Irian was not such a
34
situation.
Japan, for its part, appeared to have modified its
automatic support for Indonesia, and the Japanese delegate
said:
The outstanding position of my delegation on this
issue is that a mutually--and I emphasize mutually--
satisfactory settlement must be obtained by peaceful
^ Ibid. . 16th Sess., General Assembly, 1058th
Meeting (November 20, 1961), Pars. 125-180, pp. 712-718.
^ Ibid.. 1065th Meeting (November 27, 1961), Pars.
84-125, pp. 841-846.
101
means, and that the future well-being of the inhabi
tants must not be neglected.^5
He added,
Before the start of negotiations, my delegation
believes that no condition should be laid down--
neither the transfer of sovereignty over the disputed
area nor the self-determination of its Inhabitants.
These should be the very subjects of the negotiations,
not the prerequisites for them.^6
With the failure of the Assembly to act tensions
mounted and violence did not seem an improbable outcome.
In early 1962, however, the Secretary General managed to
initiate negotiations which concluded in August to the
benefit of Indonesia. This agreement called for the
replacement of Dutch authority by a United Nations Tempo
rary Executive Authority which was, in turn, to be
replaced by Indonesian authority by May 1963, and the
holding of a plebiscite in the area before the end of
1969. For the purpose of terminating this issue before
the United Nations, a Dutch-Indonesian draft resolution
was introduced which contained the essence of the agree
ment. The resolution was adopted as Resolution 1752
35Ibid., Par. 145, p. 847.
36Ibid.. Par. 147, p. 847.
102
(XVII) by the 1127th Plenary Session on September 21, 1962
by a vote of 89-0*14 with both India and Japan supporting
the measure. India, however, after the vote restated its
Xj
position that the area was already rightfully Indonesian.
The question of West Irian is of interest on a
number of different levels many of which may not be of
direct relevance to this study, but might be noticed in
passing, and revolve about the international behavior of
Indonesia. The nation's tendency to use extreme diplo
matic tactics, its attitude toward international organiza
tion, and the importance of the role in all of this played
by the late Sukarno would be themselves fascinating
studies.
For the purposes of this study, however, the
issue again illustrates the tendency of issues to resolve
themselves into identifiable camps, and the tendency of
nations to fit into one of those camps more or less com
fortably. In this case debate crystallized into a Nether
lands' viewpoint and an Indonesian viewpoint, and there
37Ibid., 17th Sess. G.A., 1127th Meeting (Septem
ber 21, 1962), Pars. 247-262, pp. 56-58.
103
was virtually no middle ground. There seems no question
that the Netherlands realized a change of status for this
area was inevitable, and that it was willing to give up
authority to the United Nations for the purpose of holding
a plebiscite and the determination of what the most
reasonable permanent status for the area might be. This
viewpoint, stressing the principle of self-determination,
became the rallying point of those opposed to the pro-
Indonesian position.
The other viewpoint was the Indonesian, and it
insisted the area was an organic part of that nation and
not even subject to the attention of the United Nations.
The position of the Netherlands, in the view of the sup
porters of this position, was merely a facade for the
continuation of de facto colonialism in the area, and
since the area was an organic part of Indonesia the prin
ciple of self-determination was inapplicable.
On this issue India clearly identifies itself
with the Indonesian position unequivocally, and it is
difficult to imagine how their support for Indonesia on
this issue could have been stronger. While it is somehow
Jarring to see formerly colonial areas ignoring the prin-
104
clple of self-determination when acting as nations, it
illustrates at least how automatically and consistently
India has viewed Itself vis-a-vis Third World issues.
Japan, on the other hand, is seen once more caught
In the awkward position of trying to live in two different
worlds. While Japan began by supporting the Indonesian
position, by the time the issue re-emerged in 1961 their
viewpoint had altered materially. It is, indeed, diffi
cult by that time to detect any substantial difference
between the Japanese position and that which congealed
around the basic position of the Netherlands. It may,
moreover, not be too speculative at this point to suggest
that there is beginning to emerge evidence of some basic
evolution in the Japanese attitude during this period.
The Question of Algeria
The debate which occurred in the General Assembly
over Algeria was complicated by the rigidity of the moral
positions assumed automatically by the parties interested
in the issue. While it appeared to some to be a simple
issue of colonialism, to France Algeria's status as an
integral part of the nation was also natural. Not only
did France view the issue with considerable emotion
105
because of the Influence of the European residents of the
area called "Colons/1 it seemed also to believe Implicitly
that the Issue was a domestic one, and not appropriate for
consideration by the General Assembly. Because of this,
France, to the end, declined to dignify Assembly considera
tion In any way. From the outset France declined to par
ticipate In debates on the question, and Implied that the
Assembly's continuing consideration of the issue might
cause it to reconsider its whole relationship to the
United Nations.
While the issue had been under discussion for
some time, Japan first confronted it during the Eleventh
Regular Session when in February 1957 it was one of nine
nations sponsoring a draft resolution expressing the hope
that a spirit of cooperation might lead to a solution of
the problem. As is common when a proposal is as Innocuous
as this, it was adopted unanimously as Resolution 1012
(XI) on February 15, 1957 by the 654th Plenary Session.
The adoption of the resolution was preceded by debate in
Committee I which was notable for the Indian and Syrian
attacks on France which urged the adoption of much stronger
measures. When milder proposals eventually prevailed,
Japan spoke by saying.
106
The spirit of compromise Is the magic key of diplo
macy which opens the locked door of stalemate.
Indeed, it Is that key which again helps us to emerge
from the dark room of confrontation into the bright
hall of conciliation. Let me, on this occasion,
express our gratitude to the six Powers which to
gether with Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand
sponsored the draft resolution . . . for their co
operation in meeting us half way. . . . We owe the
happy culmination of the negotiation to these men of
good will. I assure you, gentlemen, that there has
never been a group of more honest brokers— they are
more honest than even the proverbial honest broker.3®
and.
Thanks to compromise the United Nations has recap
tured its sense of mission, regained its power of
imagination, and reaffirmed the unity of purpose
among its members.39
These remarks, parenthetically, are illustrative of the
optimism with which Japan initially approached the United
Nations.
Later in 1957, during the Twelfth Regular Session,
India and Japan found themselves in agreement again over
the placing of the issue on the agenda, and concurring in
the negative once more when a seventeen-power draft reso
lution urging negotiation was defeated in Committee I.
38
Ibid., 11th Sess., G.A., 654th Meeting (February
15, 1957), Par. 84, p. 1111.
39
J Ibid.
107
The only draft resolution to reach the Assembly on this
occasion was a fifteen-power proposal (India and Japan
being among its sponsors) essentially the same as the
previous one, and it was adopted unanimously as Resolution
1184 (XII) on December 10, 1957 by the 726th Plenary
Session. When Japan spoke before Committee I but ten
months after its Initial statement, its tone seemed more
sober in saying,
. . . peoples In the process of attaining independence
should desist from narrow-mindedness and arbitrary
actions and work for their political, economic, and
social progress in a spirit of tolerance and trust.
With a question as complex as the Algerian ques
tion, precipitant action might only provoke violence
and leave a bitter aftermath. The solution of the
problem required much prudence, tolerance and patience,
as well as a sense of reality and proportion. It
would be intolerable, however, to permit continued
bloodshed. The end did not justify the means.40
The Japanese delegate concluded, "The events that had
taken place since the Eleventh Session were admittedly
disappointing.
Consideration by the Thirteenth Session began, as
usual, with the decision, with broad Afro-Asian support
40Ibid., 12th Sess., Com. I, 921st Meeting (Decem
ber 4, 1957), Pars. 47-48, p. 309.
41Ibid.. Par. 49, p. 309.
108
Including that of Japan and India, to place the item on
the agenda. Consideration of the issue demonstrated once
more, however, the depth of division on all but the most
superficial proposals. A seventeen-power Afro-Asian
draft resolution (including neither India nor Japan)
addressed itself particularly to recognizing the rights
of the Algerian people to independence and urging both
parties to negotiate. While adopted by Committee I
(A/C.I/L.232) on December 13, 1958 by a vote of 32-18-30,
it failed on the same day to attain the necessary two-
thirds majority before the 792nd Plenary Session. India
supported the proposal while Japan abstained, and neither
contributed to debate.
During the Fourteenth Regular Session the treat
ment of the Algeria issue was similar to the previous
year's, opening with the appearance of Afro-Asian solid
arity in placing the item on the agenda dissolving later
into real controversy. Debate was conducted in Committee
I over a draft resolution (A/C.I/L.246 Add. 1) calling
for discussion between France and the Algerian National
Liberation Front, and reaffirming the right of self-
determination for Algeria. Adopted by the Committee on
109
December 7, 1959 by a vote of 38-26-17, it failed to gain
the needed two-thirds majority before the 847th Plenary
Session of the Assembly. Japan abstained while India
both sponsored and supported the measure. This round of
debate was conducted after it was believed General Charles
De Gaulle had accomplished a major breakthrough toward
resolving this on-going crisis, and was largely preoccu
pied with the question of what possible profit could
accrue from passing more resolutions. India summarized
its position saying that it was difficult to find
. . . anything in the draft resolution which could
discourage either party from proceeding with discus
sions, and no mention had been made of the details
of the French offer or of the view expressed con
cerning conditions laid down. To maintain that no
resolution should be adopted or that the sympathy
and support of the United Nations should not be
expressed would be to accept the argument that the
subject was beyond the Jurisdiction of the United
Nations.^
The Japanese delegate, on the other hand, expressed his
feeling that "... inopportune decisions might upset or
destroy the results of the efforts being made to reach a
^ Ibid. . 14th Sees., Com. I, 1073rd Meeting
(December 4, 1959), Par. 20, p. 245.
110
peaceful, democratic, and just solution of the Algerian
problem.
Consideration of the issue during the Fifteenth
Regular Session was marked by events in the Congo and the
influx of new nations. Debated again in Committee I, a
twenty-five-power (including India) draft resolution was
passed asserting the United Nations' responsibility for
promoting Algerian independence. Reflecting the influence
of the new members, this measure was adopted as Resolution
1573 (XV) on December 19, 1960 by the 956th Plenary Ses
sion by a vote of 63-8-27, and while India supported the
measure, Japan abstained. Japan did not contribute to
debate, but said:
. . . While in general . . . United Nations should
not intervene or exercise supervision unless invited
by the parties concerned, the special circumstances
in Algeria justified intervention, because they
involved a colonial war which endangered the peace and
security of the world. France must therefore be told
that the only way to settle the question was to end
the thralldom of Algeria and to give that country its
independence.44
4~^Ibid. . 1077th Meeting (December 7, 1959), Par.
24, p. 270.
44Ibid.. 15th Sess., Com. I, 1132nd Meeting
(December 15, 1960), Par. 7, p. 262.
Ill
The Assembly's last consideration of the question
occurred during the Sixteenth Regular Session, and
revolved around a thirty-four nation draft resolution
calling for the resumption of negotiations between France
and the Algerian National Liberation Front. This issue
passed Committee I without negative votes, and was adopted
by the 1085th Plenary Session on December 20, 1961 as
Resolution 1724 (XVI) by a vote of 62-0-38--both Japan and
India supporting. Japan, but a month before, had ab
stained on a resolution taking France to task regarding
its treatment of political prisoners (Resolution 1650
[XVI]). By this time the level of controversy was low as
indicated by the brevity of debate and the obvious lessen
ing of tension. Though Japan did not speak at all, India
did, saying:
All those problems could be settled only by direct
negotiation between the parties; it was fortunate,
therefore, that there happened to be on the other
side a statesman of the calibre of President de
Gaulle, and on the other, the enlightened leadership
of the Provisional Government. With good will and
understanding, the remaining differences between the
two sides could be resolved; it was essential, how
ever, that negotiations should be resumed without
further delay.45
^5Ibid., 16th Sess., Com. I, 1223rd Meeting
(December 16, 1961), Par. 18, p. 320.
112
The General obliged by dismantling the issue
before further consideration was necessary, when after the
July 1. 1962 referendum on the question France recognized
Algeria's independence within two days.
The question of Algeria did not Inspire debate in
the Assembly in the usual sense of the word, but rather
expressions of degrees of concern. France's boycott of
the issue implied Its rejection of the United Nations'
jurisdiction, but no bloc of nations coalesced around
that position. Indeed those expressions most sympathetic
to France tended to be more fulsome in their praise of
De Gaulle's efforts to terminate the issue, and to recog
nize the "special character" of the French-Algerian rela
tionship. Especially as the issue was drawing to a close
the question became one of whether to press the issue with
further resolutions or to let events in progress run their
course without interference. Despite this relatively low
level of controversy India and Japan are often found in
contrasting columns. Once more India's unswerving identi
fication with the Third World is clear, while Japan's
loyalties to that part of the world seemed superficial.
Apparent too is the impotence of the United
Nations in such issues, for at no time did France acknowl-
113
edge that it had any role in the issue, nor did any of
the United Nations' gestures have any definable impact.
United Nations Capital Development Fund
The question of the United Nations Capital Devel
opment Fund, though among the least emotional of the Third
World issues, illustrates as clearly as any the apprehen
sions of the developed nations vis-a-vis the new nations,
and may suggest one of the significant differences between
the principals of this study. Discussions over the issue
itself seem linked to the "nation explosion" which marked
the decade of the sixties, and was initiated by the adop
tion of Resolution 1424 (XIV) by the 846th Plenary Session
on December 5, 1959 by a vote of 67-0-15. This measure
calling for the study of the question was supported by
both India and Japan.
The subject of the United Nations' technical aid
and development programs is a complex one, and the Capital
Development Fund is but one of its facets. What has dis
tinguished UNCDF from other programs is its apparent
attempt to Institutionalize the idea that capital rich
areas should contribute to capital poor areas without
retaining the customary controls over what is done with
114
the funds which they contribute. While this idea is of
obvious advantage to potential recipients, their enthusi-
asm has not been shared by potential donors, and the
result has been the establishment of a fundless fund which
is but another source of on-going frustration.
From the viewpoint of the principals of this
study, there is little to compare and much to contrast.
India has been an aid receiver, and Japan an aid giver.
While hardly motivated by pure altruism, Japan's policy
regarding aid has been on balance generous even during
periods when its own economic health was not assured.
From the outset it provided aid to the Colombo Plan, and
even between 1950 and 1955 disbursed an annual average of
over $17 million from both official and private sources.
Between 1956 and 1960 this annual average rose to $191.2
million, and by 1966 (the final year of this study) to
$625.1 million. By 1969 Japan's aid (exclusively to Asian
nations) was $1,263 billion (0.76 percent of Japan's
Gross National Product), and its consistent rise leaves
little doubt that its goal of aid equalling 1 percent of
its GNP by 1975 is intended seriously. While the motiva
tions for this program are doubtless tinged with self-
115
Interest, Japan remains, nonetheless, Asia's principal
aid giver.^
Following the decision In 1959 to talk about a
capital development fund there have been five votes during
the period of this study. The first of these came In 1960
when It was decided to establish the fund in principle,
and that it should be given further study by a twenty-
flve-nation committee which was to Include India and
Japan. This measure was adopted as Resolution 1521 (XV)
by the 948th Plenary Session on December 15, 1960 by a
vote of 71-4-10. Despite the proposal's lack of immediate
consequences Japan abstained in the company of Western
nations while India supported the issue. The issues
really being contested were made clear early and candidly
when this measure was debated before Coranlttee II. India
was frank in stating its objections to existing funds, as
reflecting
. . . the philosophy only of those Powers which had
the majority. The underdeveloped countries wanted a
financial organization in which they had an effective
voice and that was why they appealed for the estab-
46
Japan Report, XVI, No. 12 (June 16, 1970), 1-2.
116
lishment of a United Nations capital development
fund.*7
Japan was equally candid when, after expressing an under
standing of the sponsors' position, went on to explain
why it was still an unviable idea. Specifically, Japan
noted that the
. . . capital development fund could not be set up
without the active participation of the countries
which would have to furnish the bulk of its resources.
Those countries had indicated, both in Second Commit
tee and in their replies to the enquiry circulated by
the Secretary General under Resolution 1424 (XIV),
that they were opposed to the establishment of such
a fund at present; they also stated that they would
not take part in the work of the committee mentioned
in operative paragraph two of the draft resolution.
The draft resolution was therefore unlikely to lead
to practical results if adopted, and in the circum
stances his delegation would have difficulty in
supporting it.
Japan added that it would, however, increase its contribu
tion to both the International Development Fund and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
It is not inconceivable that Japan's reluctance to support
this new fund was also rooted in a disinclination to
47
United Nations, Official Records, ISth Sess.,
Com. II, 693rd Meeting (November 26, 1960), Par. 15,
p. 283.
*8Ibid., 705th Meeting (December 6, 1960), Par.
20, p. 363.
117
finance something over which it simultaneously relinquished
control.
The adoption of Resolution 1521 (XV) neither
speeded the development of the fund nor changed any
nation's mind on the subject, and in the following year
it was proposed that the study be continued. This measure
was adopted by the 1084th Plenary Session on December 19,
1961 as Resolution 1706 (XVI). In the 73-3-9 vote India
supported the measure while Japan abstained. Committee II
was once more the stage for debate, and India again stated
its belief that "... the operations and activities of
the fund should not be controlled by its members in pro
portion to their contribution but on the basis of equal
49
voting rights for all." Japan's explanation for its
abstention was almost identical to its 1960 statement.
By 1962 it was clear that the fund was being
deliberately ignored, and that there was little its spon
sors could do about it. As is sometimes the case when
such an impasse occurs, the sponsoring nations gathered
^ Ibid. . 16th Sess., Com. II, 741st Meeting
(November 3, 1961), Par. 20, p. 161.
118
In an impressive array behind a thirty-seven-nation draft
resolution urging practical measures to implement the
previously adopted proposals. This was adopted as Resolu
tion 1826 (XVII) by the 1197th Plenary Session on December
18, 1962 by a vote of 85-0-12. India sponsored and
supported the measure, while Japan abstained in the com
pany of nations such as the United States and the United
Kingdom. Those abstaining made clear that their objection
was not to aid, but to a new aid Institution, and might
well have added especially one controlled by recipients,
not donors. India made no statement on this occasion
while Japan repeated its previously stated position.
So lacking was progress on the fund that the issue
was not considered in 1963, and serious debate was fore
closed in 1964 as well by the financial crisis. This
statement refers, of course, only to Assembly action, and
does not include the raising of the issue at the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) at
Geneva in 1964. The compromise reached by this UNCTAD
conference on the fund issue was contained in Special
Principle XI which endorsed multilateral assistance within
the framework of the United Nations without mentioning the
119
basic principle at issue in the capital development fund
(i.e., the question of who should control it once estab
lished) . This was included in its "Final Act" adopted
June 16, 1964 and later unanimously approved by the Eco
nomic and Social Council on July 24, 1964 as Resolution
1011 (XXXVII).50
In 1965, however, the Assembly adopted the cus
tomary call for study and implementation on December 8,
1965 during the 1391st Plenary Session as Resolution 2042
(XX) by a vote of 60-8-11. India, again, sponsored and
supported the measure while Japan abstained. On this
occasion India expressed the hope that the opposing mem
bers would reconsider, while Japan said:
Efforts must be concentrated on two questions: how
to increase the flow of resources to existing insti
tutions, and how to increase the number of sound
projects which would merit the assistance of such
Institutions. The real cause for the leveling off
of the flow of capital from developed to developing
countries did not lie in the absence of appropriate
50
United Nations, United Nations Yearbook, 1964,
pp. 195-209. This does not include the raising of the
issues at the UNCTAD at Geneva in 1964. So far as this
conference was able to deal with the CDF issue the com
promise of Special Principle XI endorsed the principle of
multilateral assistance within the framework of the UN
without mentioning the basic principle at issue.
120
Institutions, which already existed, but it had its
root In such factors as the balance-of-payments dif
ficulties and strong competing demands for capital
in developing countries themselves as well as in the
gap between the potential need and actual capital
absorption capacity of developing countries.51
The last consideration of the issue during the
period of this study tried again to prod the reluctant
capital producing nations into implementing the recom
mendations of the Assembly. The resulting proposal was
to establish the Fund as an autonomous organ of the
General Assembly thus making its administrative expenses
a regular part of the United Nations budget. This proposal
was adopted by the 1492nd Plenary Session on December 13,
1966 as Resolution 2186 (XXX). On this proposal the vote
was more contentious than usual (76-19-14) and instead of
merely abstaining Japan opposed the measure. Since the
Assembly's resolutions are not legally binding, however,
the Capital Development Fund remains the empty expression
it has been since 1960.
While the issue of the fund lacks impact of a
military confrontation and even lacks the immediate
^United Nations, Official RecordB, 20th Sess.,
Com. II, 985th Meeting (November 16, 1965), Par. 23,
p. 180.
121
humanitarian considerations of other Third World issues,
it is still one of the most fascinating of these questions.
Perhaps here, more than anywhere else, a line is drawn
between capital-producing and capital-requiring nations,
and the result is interesting. The instances of concur
ring votes on the part of the United States and the Soviet
Union are rare enough, and when these appear in the com
pany of Portugal and South Africa it is truly extraordi
nary.
The Indian position on this issue is, of course,
clear. Its favoring of the basic concept of the fund is
both predictable and understandable.
The Japanese position on this issue, however, is
perhaps more complex and more revealing. Japan could, on
this occasion, have changed its vote to court Afro-Asian
friendships without real cost and without altering the
final result, but it did not. Japan might well have
simply juggled its existing commitments to foreign aid,
but it did not. Japan chose, instead, to oppose the idea
essentially, and so doing reveals itself as a developed,
industrialized, trading nation whose pragmatic necessi
ties take precedence over emotions. What suggests itself
122
strongly in this instance is that one is confronted with
a classic North-South issue. In the final analysis even
the Soviet Union, which seems to have used Third World
issues rather cynically at times, comes at length to
forthright opposition. Japan, too, on this occasion
Identifies itself clearly as a nation of the North.
Southern Arabia--Aden, Oman, and Yemen
The issues which have arisen over the area of
Southern Arabia are by-products of the dismantling of the
British Empire, and the declining importance of the Suez
Canal. Although the United Kingdom appeared to be in the
process of dismantling its interests in the area during
this period, these issues still generated substantial
emotional reactions.
The question of Aden was brought first to the
attention of the United Nations in 1963 as a result of the
study of the Committee of Twenty-four--the committee which
dealt with questions on colonialism which had been origi
nally established as the Committee of Seventeen after the
1961 adoption of the landmark declaration on the subject.
Questions about the ultimate fate of Aden had come to the
attention of the Committee in 1962, and bore primarily on
123
the question of whether Aden, In a noncolonial status,
would join the Federation of South Arabia, as decided by
the Aden Legislative Council, or unite with Yemen as
Socialist dissidents preferred. Having heard conflicting
petitions from both Aden and the United Kingdom, the Com
mittee decided to dispatch a fact-finding commission
despite British insistence that it would only Impede prog
ress toward independence. The commission was nonetheless
sent, and refused entrance, and subsequently conducted
its Investigations in surrounding areas. Its eventual
report called for the termination of Britain's Aden Base
and disapproval of Britain's attitude.
The result of these circumstances, after consid
eration both by the Committee of Twenty-four and Committee
IV, was an eleven-power draft resolution which declared
the continuing existence of the base at Aden "prejudicial,"
accused the British of using repressive measures, and
called for self-determination for the Area. Over strong
British objections this was adopted as Resolution 1972
(XVIII) by the 1281st Plenary Session on December 16, 1963
by a vote of 53-23-31. India voted for the resolution
while Japan abstained. Japan did not contribute to the
124
ahort but: brisk debate in Committee IV, but India avoiding
specifics generalized to the effect that "... the vast
majority of member States were in favor of the immediate
52
implementation of the Declaration in Aden."
Despite Resolution 1972 (XVIII), the British con-
tinued to contend that this was an artificial issue
inspired by the United Arab Republic and Yemeni subver
sives, and the reaction of the Committee of Twenty-four
in 1964 was to reiterate the particulars of the 1963
resolution disregarding the evidence Britain marshalled
in support of its position. With at least eleven or
twelve Afro-Asian members consistently supported by Yugo
slavia and three Soviet Bloc nations, the Committee of
Twenty-four has been a vehicle for the expression of views
hostile to former colonial nations. Indeed, the con
sistently anti-Western record of this committee led ulti
mately to both the United Kingdom and the United States
withdrawing from membership on January 11, 1971. On this
particular occasion, however, the financial crisis pre
cluded an airing of the issue before the Assembly in
^2Ibid., 18th Sess., Com. IV, 1515th Meeting
(December 13, 1963), Par. 28, p. 584.
125
plenary session.
In 1965, however, the issue was raised again by
the Committee and placed before the Assembly in the form
of a forty-five nation draft which condemned British
military action and the continuing existence of the mili
tary base, and called for the readmission of political
exiles. This was adopted as Resolution 2023 (XX) by the
1368th Plenary Session on November 5, 1965 by a vote of
90-11-10. India predictably supported the resolution
while Japan abstained. Japan remained aloof from the
debate, but India said, implying the United Kingdom had
chosen the wrong one,
There are two conflicting currents in history; the
dynamic, progressive and creative current of change,
and the disruptive current of reaction and sectari
anism. 53
In 1966 the Committee of Twenty-four. Committee
IV, and the Assembly continued the generally anti-British
debate with accusations of "neo-colonialism" part of the
common tone. This ended abruptly, however, when the
British announced support for the draft resolution pro-
53Ibid., 20th Sess., Com. IV. 1537th Meeting
(October 25, 1965), Par. 30, p. 124.
126
vidlng for a mission to recommend steps toward independ
ence for the region. This support led to the adoption by
the 1490th Plenary Session of Resolution 2183 (XXI) on
December 12, 1966 by a vote of 10C-0-3. Both nations
support this resolution, but only India made its usual
contribution to debate.
On the issue of Aden, as elsewhere, India's un
swerving anti-colonialism emerges as a keynote as does
Japan's reluctance to act as a committed Afro-Asian nation
when there is danger to doing real harm to a friend of
substance. Typical of Japan's tendency to equivocate was
its statement in reaction to the Report of the Committee
of Twenty-four in December 1963 when its delegate said,
" . . .we are firmly opposed to Colonialism and hope for
the early eradication of this anachronism and injus
tice,"^ and added,
However, in our view, certain of the draft resolu
tions, . . . , seem to represent attempts to go too
far and too fast at this time. We feel that they
might hinder, rather than help, the process of de
colonization of the territory concerned. Accordingly,
^ Ibid.. 18th Sess., General Assembly, 1277th
Meeting (December 11, 1963), Par. 58, p. 6.
127
we shall be obliged to abstain on those particular
draft resolutions.55
There were, moreover, issues aside from Aden which
plagued the area, not the least of which was the bitter
civil war in Yemen from which it appeared the United Arab
Republic hoped to attain hegemony in the area while simul
taneously berating British "neo-colonialism." The United
Nations became involved in this issue in 1963 and even
tually contributed to the restoration of peace with the
dispatch of the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission
(UNYOM). Its relationship to the Aden question would have
made it a proper part of this section normally, but deci
sions regarding Yemen were made in the Security Council
and without either Indian or Japanese participation.
There was, however, still another thorny issue
in this area which came to the attention of the Assembly
and its Special Political Committee regarding the ambigu
ous status of Oman. Because this area was dominated by
the British supported Sultan of Muscat, said the Arab
nations, it was subject to British oppression, and in this
55Ibid.. Par. 59, p. 6.
128
assertion were the seeds of another essentially anti-
colonial issue.
This issue first came to a vote in the Special
Political Committee in the form of a draft resolution
implying British wrong-doing and urging negotiations.
While adopted in committee (A/SPC/L.78 and Add.l) on
December 4. 1961 by a vote of 38-21-29, it failed to
achieve the needed two-thirds majority when considered by
the 1078th Plenary Session on December 14 (33-21-37).
India voted affirmatively, while Japan abstained. While
Japan refrained from debate, India added its voice saying
that the historic facts being questioned were subject to
different interpretations and M . . . the Indian delega
tion did not feel competent to pronounce any judgment,"
but would vote for the measure any way as it did not
Interfere with the spirit of free negotiation necessary
for a solution.56 A similar draft resolution (A/SPC/L.88)
later suffered a like fate and India and Japan were found
voting as they had before.
^ Ibid. , 16th Sess., SPC, 305th Meeting (December
1, 1961), Par. 7, p. 230.
129
In 1963, however, Resolution 1948 (XVIII) was
adopted by the 1277th Plenary Session on December 11,
1963, and created a five-nation Investigating committee
to look Into the matter and report to the following
Assembly session. This measure was supported by both
India and Japan, and overwhelmingly by the Assembly as a
whole (96-1-4). While noting that the Sultan's army was
officered In part by seconded British personnel, the com
mittee's Investigation revealed no evidence of British
colonialism or oppression, and no other presence deemed
important enough to mention.
The issue, nonetheless, was raised again in 1965,
resulting in the adoption by the 1399th Plenary Session
of Resolution 2073 (XX) on December 17, 1965, ordering
the United Kingdom to decolonize the area forthwith. In
the 61-18-32 vote on the question Japan and India con
curred in abstaining, and neither contributed to debate.
Treatment of the Oman question in 1966 similarly
ignored the findings of the investigative committee, and
eventuated in a resolution deploring British support of
an unrepresentative regime, and calling on them to end a
number of specified and unspecified colonialist activi
ties. Adopted as Resolution 2238 (XXI) by the 1500th
130
Plenary Session on December 20, 1966 by a vote of 70-18*28,
the issue again found India and Japan abstaining in the
company of a number of Latin American nations and a few
other Afro-Asian nations which had bolted the mainstream.
Neither contributed to debate.
The 1965 and 1966 votes on Oman are of particular
interest because of India's stand on the issues. Japan's
stands on these issues is, of course, predictable, for
in instances where the issues have been even more clear-
cut it has taken refuge in the abstention. In this
instance Britain's essential exoneration by the investi
gatory committee gave Japan more than sufficient occasion
to back away from the measure.
India, however, in this case did deviate, and why
it did so is a question difficult to answer. Had India
been a member of the investigating committee, or had that
committee's report been so persuasive as to move all or
most to its position India's vote would not seem so
unusual. However, India was not a member of that Commit
tee, and there were many nations unconvinced by the report
or simply unwilling to accept its conclusions. India, on
balance, has been among the nations of the world least
131
likely to forgive possible British guilt, or to believe
"neo-colonialism" did not exist where it had been sus
pected.
So unusual is this instance that searching for an
explanation outside the customary rationales of Indian
foreign policy cannot be ignored, and if that door is
opened it is difficult to discount entirely the possibil
ity that India was using this issue to express its dis
pleasure with the Arab nations over their support of
Pakistan. Though India had courted the Arab nations over
the years, neither over the crisis with Pakistan nor the
Sino-Indian Border War had they reacted toward India
except with hostility or Indifference. If India did
choose to strike back, it was certainly a human reaction.
Rhodesia
The political status of Rhodesia differed from
that of South Africa which had possessed nationhood within
the Commonwealth for many years. When the United Nations
first addressed itself to South Africa it was as a nation
among nations. When the United Nations addressed itself
to Rhodesia, however, it was as a British colony in a
world of dissolving colonialism. As concern over Southern
132
Rhodesia began in 1961, Chat region had been substantially
self-governing for about a decade as the British had
retreated from real power. While the Queen reigned,
Britain did not rule. While in other British colonial
situations the removal of British soldiers and adminis
trators radically altered political reality, in Rhodesia
that transformation had already been gradually accomplished
leaving but the facade of colonial rule. Unfortunately
the United Nations has acted as though that facade was
reality.
Though the adjacent territories of Nyasaland and
Northern Rhodesia had emerged as the new nations of
Malawi and Gambia, the white Rhodesians in the south clung
to an anomalous status, a part of which was their 1961
constitution which heavily weighted the vote in their
favor. While allowing for black African representation
in the Parliament, assurances of equal representation had
been studiously avoided. As the determination of the
white population to perpetuate this condition became
clear, the United Nations asked the United Kingdom, while
dissolving its Empire elsewhere, to reassert its colonial
authority in Rhodesia for the specific purpose of effect
133
ing political reform. This the United Kingdom has been
unable to do leading to increasingly rigorous demands on
the part of the Assembly.
The escalating demands of the Assembly's resolu
tions has also had the effect of welding together an
alliance of South African Boers, white Rhodesians, and
Portuguese as beleagured fellow whites. While this odd
alliance may only put off temporarily a day of reckoning
and make its intensity even greater, for the moment they
have succeeded in frustrating the efficacy of the sanc
tions recommended by the Assembly. The casual (even
cavalier) way they have circumvented the United Nations’
counter-measures have added little to the organization's
prestige, and have made it appear not only ineffective,
but what is even worse, irrelevant and silly.
Consideration of the status of Southern Rhodesia
began in 1961 with discussion of the problem during
February before Committee IV. Although the eleven-power
draft resolution transmitted to the 1106th Plenary Session
seemed innocuous in suggesting the investigation of the
question of self-government in Southern Rhodesia, it
inspired a substantial number of negative votes. It was
134
adopted, however, as Resolution 1745 (XVI) on February 13,
1962 by a vote of 57-21-24. The Western powers were
opposed to the resolution, while those abstaining, like
Japan, had close Western ties. India voted for the
measure.
During the Seventeenth Regular Session of the
Assembly Southern Rhodesia twice occupied the body's
attention. In June a thirty-eight power draft resolution
deploring conditions of political inequality in the area,
and calling upon the United Kingdom to remedy the matter
was brought before the 1121st Plenary Session. This was
adopted as Resolution 1747 (XVII) on June 28, 1962 by a
vote of 73-1-27. India both sponsored and supported the
measure while Japan abstained. Again in October a fifty-
one nation draft resolution recalling all previous reso
lutions, noted the lack of any constitutional change in
Rhodesia and exhorted the United Kingdom to greater
efforts in pursuit of that goal. This was debated and
adopted by the 1163rd Plenary Session on October 31, 1962
as Resolution 1760 (XVII) by a vote of 81-2-19. India
again sponsored and supported the measure while Japan
abstained.
135
A sidelight to consideration during 1962 was the
passage in Committee IV of a measure deploring political
arrests in Rhodesia and the banning of the Zimbabwe
African Peoples Union (A/C.4/L.748 and Add.l). While
this measure did not reach the Assembly, it was adopted
by the Committee by a vote of 68*2-12 with both Japan and
India voting affirmatively. During the above considera
tions neither India or Japan contributed substantially to
debate.
In 1963, after a period of unproductive considera
tion in the Security Council during September, the ques
tion was returned to the Assembly where, in October, two
more resolutions of relatively little importance were
adopted. The first of these, inviting the United Kingdom
to transfer sovereignty, was adopted as Resolution 1883
(XVIII) by the 1241st Plenary Session on October 14, 1963
by a vote of 90-2-13. India both sponsored and supported
the measure while Japan abstained. The second noted the
continuation of essentially white government in Rhodesia
and was adopted by the 1255th Plenary Session on November
6, 1963 as Resolution 1889 (XVIII) by a vote of 73-2-19.
Once more India sponsored and supported the measure while
136
Japan abstained.
In the Committee IV debate which preceded these
resolutions India took the occasion to speak, and began
by recognizing that there was a special relationship
between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia, but
hinted broadly that the origins of the relationship might
be best explained by the existence of obvious wealth in
the area.^ The Indian delegate further recalled that
India had
. . . fought against the racial segregation policies
of South Africa from the very first session of the
United Nations and could not accept the point of
view put forward by the representative of the United
Kingdom, which would enable the forces of apartheid
to move forward into the heartland of Africa.
The United Kingdom, he charged, could not be "callous"
58
about the rights of 94 percent of the people there.
The Indian delegate went on to say,
As a sincere friend of the United Kingdom, his dele
gation appealed to It not to destroy the proud posi
tion it held in the hearts of countless Asians and
Africans. While the United Kingdom's relationship
with Southern Rhodesia was said to be special and
57
Ibid., 18th Sess., Com. IV, 1436th Meeting
(October 3, 1963), Par. 49, p. 21.
58Ibid., Par. 54, p. 22.
137
unique, an older and equally special relationship
bound the multinational Commonwealth of Nations
together.
Japan did not contribute to debate.
As the financial crisis halted normal United
Nations activity in 1964 expressions of concern over
Southern Rhodesia were limited to those from the Committee
of Twenty-four which continued to treat the issue as if
the British were still the de facto administering power.
Since the Committee continued to act on the premise that
Britain was still present in force in Rhodesia* when the
issue returned to its usual channels of consideration in
1965 it was essentially unchanged.
As the determination of white Rhodesian authori
ties to be wholly intransigent and to unilaterally declare
their independence became clear* world opinion seemed to
consolidate against them, and when the Assembly took up
this issue again in October 1965, this solidification was
evident. The growing concern first took the form of an
admonition against a declaration of independence* a call
to the members to withhold recognition should such action
59Ibid., Par. 57, p. 23.
138
be taken anyway, and still another call upon the United
Kingdom to take all possible measures to prevent such an
occurrence. This forty-power draft resolution was adopted
by the 1357th Plenary Session on Octiber 12, 1965 as
Resolution 2012 (XX) by a vote of 107-2-1. Dissent from
this overwhelming approval was restricted to South Africa
and Portugal while France abstained. In this instance,
obviously, India and Japan concurred in voting for the
measure, although the measure itself proved to be as in
efficacious as previous resolutions.
On the occasion of debate over this resolution,
India took the opportunity to reiterate its position that
the United Kingdom must "discharge its responsibilities in
putting down any such rebellion,"**® and threatened for
the first time that India "would go to the aid of those
fighting for their freedom."^ Japan too expressed its
"deep concern" over any unilateral declaration of independ
ence, and deemed the events to have reached a critical
60Ibid., 20th Sess., Com. IV, 1524th Meeting
(October 11, 1965), Par. 35, p. 39.
61Ibid., Par. 36, p. 39.
139
62
point which called for a unanimous resolution. Japan
did not refer to its apparent inconsistency in this vote,
and one can only speculate that in this instance it was
swept along by the overwhelming majority and was reassured
by the fact that the demands made on the United Kingdom
were sufficiently imprecise.
The lack of events pointing toward the realiza-
tion of the goals of Resolution 2012 (XX) during the fol
lowing weeks led the Assembly to the adoption of another
similar (though stronger) measure in anticipation of
Rhodesia's expected unilateral declaration of independ
ence. Adopted as Resolution 2022 (XX) by the 1368th
Plenary Session on November 5, 1965 by a vote of 82-9-18,
the measure differed from previous resolutions in placing
specific blame on the United Kingdom for not having imple
mented previous resolutions, and called upon that nation
to use all measures, including force, to prevent
Rhodesia's anticipated action. Both India and Japan
voted for the issue while an essentially English speaking
bloc of nations (including the United States) opposed it.
62Ibid., Par. 52. p. 41.
140
In the debate which preceded the adoption of the
resolution Japan expressed its general apprehension
regarding the declaration of independence saying that it
would not recognize it, but expressed reservations about
certain parts of the resolution especially those calling
for the use of force.Despite these reservations, how
ever, the Japanese delegation was so in sympathy with the
intent and objectives of the draft resolution that it
would vote for it.®4
As anticipated Rhodesia declared Its independence
on November 11, 1965 and, despite the real and threatened
sanctions causing occasional inconvenience, has continued
to act as a sovereign nation to date. The sanctions which
were brought to bear (an imperfect economic embargo) were
the result of Security Council actions taken when that
body was called into session on the same day by Assembly
Resolution 2024 (XX) of the 1375th Plenary Session. The
effects of the Council's efforts, however, have not been
dramatically superior to those of the Assembly.
^ Ibld.. 1544th Meeting (November 1, 1965), Pars.
24-26, p. 161.
64Ibid.. Par. 27, p. 161.
141
Subsequent Assembly consideration of Rhodesia
took place both in October and November 1966. A general
condemnation of the area's racial policies was adopted
during the 1450th Plenary Session on October 22, 1966 as
Resolution 2138 (XXI) by a vote of 86-2-18 with both India
and Japan supporting the measure. In November, however,
debate returned to the question of imposing the organiza
tion's will on the white regime, and this resulted in a
fifty-eight power draft resolution calling for the imposi
tion of sanctions and the use of force by the United King
dom. This was adopted on November 17, 1966 by the 1468th
Plenary Session as Resolution 2151 (XXI) by a vote of
89-2-17 with India supporting the measure while Japan
abstained.
Japan became unwillingly Involved in debate on
the issue when it was named by the delegate from Guinea
as being in the company of the United States, France,
United Kingdom, Italy, West Germany and Belgium as "accom
plices" of the Ian Smith regime. Japan was quick to deny
this, and went on to raise the question of the propriety
of the Assembly's deciding on the need for and the use
142
of force, other means not having been exhausted.^ This
stand, of course, was inconsistent with Japan's vote in
favor of Resolution 2022 (XX), although far more consist*
ent with its usual attitude toward the use of sanctions
in similar situations. India, on the other hand, was
consistent throughout the issue, and on this occasion
strongly reasserted Britain's obligation to act saying.
Its failure to get rid of the Smith regime would go
down in history as the great betrayal by the United
Kingdom government of the trust placed in it by the
African people.®6
In the case of Rhodesia, as it has happened on
other issues, the question was not one of approving or
disapproving some principle. While some of the nations
important in this issue might not have been entirely
candid in phrasing their positions, none have favorable
things to say about the white Rhodesian government. What
became the basic issue in this instance was whether force
should be used to gain Rhodesian compliance. To those
Ibid., 21st Sess., Com. IV, 1621st Meeting
(November 2, 1966), Far. 25, p. 143; and 1629th Meeting
(November 8, 1966), Pars. 42-46, pp. 200-201.
66Ibid., 1608th Meeting (October 14, 1966), Par.
18, p. 63.
143
nations In support of the basic Third World position there
is no question that all means, including military force,
are appropriate to correct racial injustice in Rhodesia.
Implicit in that position seems to be a view of Britain's
position vis-a-vis Rhodesia which consistently overesti
mated the ability of Britain to apply such power. Those
opposing the adopted resolution were equally consistent
in balking at the use of force.
While Japan is found supporting some resolutions
it might have been usually expected to oppose, it was
careful to qualify its support orally with objections to
the use of force provisions, and it eventually resorted to
its usual position. India was as constant and predictable
as usual.
The Issue of the Portuguese Empire
Portugal, first on the colonial scene with hold
ings in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, may well be the
last to depart that scene--a fact seemingly overlooked in
the preoccupations of dismantling the empires of Great
Britain and France. Had a concerted attack on colonialism
been planned after World War II, Portugal, with its rela
tively weak metropolitan resources, might have been the
144
most likely first target. Ironically, however, Portuguese
Imperialism appears to have been discovered almost acci
dentally.
During Portugal's initial fourteen years of United
Nations membership it held its empire almost unchallenged
except for India's continuing pressure over the enclaves
of Goa, Diu, and Damao--a situation which ended in Decem
ber 1961 with India's resort to a military solution.
Since then, however, Portugal has been the subject of
much unwanted attention which, given its inability to
respond in kind and its relative isolation on the issue,
has doubtless been extremely frustrating. However, in the
face of world public opinion, the tide of history, and
real and potential violence, Portugal has remained stead
fastly uncompromising on this question.
Portugal's empire did not become a United Nations
issue until the Fifteenth Regular Session of the Assembly
at which time a thirty-six power draft resolution (with
both India and Japan among the sponsors) was considered
by the 992nd Plenary Session on April 20, 1961. Calling
for the reform of Portuguese colonial administration and
the establishment of a Committee of Inquiry, it was
145
adopted as Resolution 1603 (XV) by a vote of 73-2*9 with
India and Japan favoring the measure. Both spoke on
behalf of the measure--Japan in a conciliatory manner
expressing the hope that
. . . the Government of Portugal will courageously
accept its solemn obligation to undertake to pro
vide the people of Angola with proper opportunities
for their eventual self-determination.*"
India, however, immediately cited Goa, and went on to say,
. . . Portugal has not paid heed to the signs of the
time. Today in Angola there are serious disturb
ances. The indigenous population is fighting for
its freedom.
India called further for the cessation of all repressive
acts.
Portugal's colonial philosophy has not been a
notably progressive one. Little has been done to in
crease the political sophistication of the people or their
educational level, and evidence of bettering economic
conditions is marred by countervailing evidence of brutal
ity and repression. Given the paternalistic outlook of
**^Ibid. , 15th Sess., General Assembly, 992nd
Meeting (April 20, 1961), Par. 90, p. 419.
68
Ibid., Pars. 166-167, p. 426.
146
the Portuguese and their Insistence that the areas are
(like France's one time position on Algeria) organic parts
of the Portuguese nation, it is not surprising that they
did not respond any more significantly to this first reso
lution than they have to subsequent ones.
In June, responding to a request by forty-five
nations (including Japan and India) the Security Council
met and called on Portugal to observe human rights in their
colonies in accordance with Resolution 1603 (XV). This
resolution was reaffirmed in terms rather more deprecating
to Portugal during the Sixteenth Regular Assembly Session
in Resolution 1742 (XVI) by the 1002nd Plenary Session on
January 30, 1962 by a vote of 99-2-1--Japan and India
supporting. While Japan was silent during debate, India
advised that
It is the view of my delegation that Portugal should
agree to Angola's independence and announce its in
tention of transferring power by a very early date.
This will at once have an electrifying effect. It
will help pacify the Angolan people and reduce bitter
ness. . . . We are glad that this has been urged by
countries like Brazil and Australia, which have been
traditionally friendly and sometimes, one may feel,
even partial to Portugal,^9
69Ibid., 16th Sess., G.A., 1096th Meeting (January
25, 1962), Par. 37, p. 1271.
147
Increasing criticism of Portugal's colonial
policies produced a very strong condemnation by the
Seventeenth Regular Assembly calling once more for its
referral to the Security Council. This thirteen power
draft resolution (India among the sponsors) was adopted
as Resolution 1819 (XVII) on December 18, 1962 by the
1196th Plenary Session. The vote was 57-14-18 with India
supporting and Japan abstaining as did the United States
and other Western powers. This resolution was in some
ways redundant since Resolution 1807 (XVII) had already
condemned the Portuguese strongly and called for Security
Council action should compliance be lacking. It stopped
short of demanding sanctions, however, and Japan had
supported that resolution.
This debate was the occasion for some heated
exchanges following the Indian delegate's speech of Decem
ber 6, 1962 which said in part,
In the name of national prestige Portugal is perpe
trating the most barbarous and tyranlcal policies on
the people of its colony Angola, as also in its other
colonies, and the inherent tragedy of the situation
is that none of this need have happened. . . . It is
not as though Portugal were being asked to grope in
the dark or take a leap into the unknown. If there
were a will, conditioned by political sagacity and
even by considerations of self-interest in the long
148
term, Portugal would emulate the forward-looking
colonial policies of Its oldest ally, the United
Kingdom, and of France. In pursuing its own spe
cial brand of colonial policy, Portugal has shown
an utter disregard . . . for the principles en
shrined in the Charter and for the Universal Decla
ration of Human Rights.
The Portuguese delegate immediately took India to task
saying, " . . .my delegation wishes to make it very clear
that we do not recognize any moral authority for the
Indian delegation to criticize us.1 '^ Recalling that
over the issue of Goa but a year before it had been the
Indian delegate who had denied the authority of the United
Nations saying, "Charter or no Charter, Council or no
Council," the Portuguese concluded by branding as hypo
crites nations which "... come to this rostrum to
preach principles which are at variance with one's own
72
practice . . These remarks set off a chain of bitter
exchanges which were to continue through the period of
this study. On this occasion Japan chose, for the first
time, to explain its abstention questioning both the
70Ibid., 17th Sess., G.A., 1185th Meeting (Decem
ber 6. 1962), Par. 33, p. 1006.
71Ibid., Par. 42, p. 1007.
72Ibid., Par. 43, p. 1008.
149
legality and advisability of sanctions.
The question was returned to the Security Council
again in July 1963 resulting in a resolution (S/5380)
asking for the prevention of the sale of arms to Portugal,
but did not come before the Assembly again until November
of that year. The Assembly first resolved to hear rebel
leader Henrique Calvao, and later adopted Resolution 1913
(XV1I1) on December 3, 1963 during the 1270th Plenary
Session. This measure, placing the issue once more before
the Security Council, passed by a vote of 91-2-11 with
both India and Japan supporting it though neither con
tributed substantially to debate.
In 1965 the issue was taken up again in the
Assembly, and there resulted another resolution labeling
Portugal's attitude as a "threat to the peace." This was
passed by the 1407th Plenary Session on December 21, 1965
as Resolution 2107 (XX) by a vote of 66-26-15 with India
among those supporting it while Japan abstained. Once
again heated exchanges occurred in Committee IV as India
said:
Like the racist cliques in Rhodesia and South Africa,
the Portuguese Government was defying world opinion
and persistently refusing to carry out United Nations
150
resolutions because it felt certain of direct and
Indirect assistance from certain highly industrial
ized colonial great powers.73
India further said, "All states should stop giving direct
and indirect aid to Portugal: otherwise they would be
aiding and abetting a serious crime against humanity.
. . ,'*74 Portugal again questioned India's morality and
consistency, to which India replied that in the case of
Goa it had not merely acted in its own behalf but had
"liberated" the area "on behalf of the entire world."7^
Japan added a routine statement endorsing the
spirit of the resolution, and expressing sorrow over
Portugal's uncompromising policies.^
The last vote taken during this study's period
was that of December 12, 1966 adopting Resolution 2184
(XXI) during the 1490th Plenary Session. Passed by a vote
^ Ibid., 20th Sess., Com. IV, 1585th Meeting
(December 13, 1965), Par. 14, p. 447.
74Ibid.. Par. 15, p. 447.
75Ibid., Par. 37, p. 449.
7®Ibid., 1592nd Meeting (December 18, 1965), Par.
78, p. 494.
151
of 70-13-22, It urged the Security Council to oblige all
members to sever diplomatic and economic ties with Portu
gal. Both Japan and India supported this measure whicht
aside from Its novel appeal to the Council, reaffirmed
all previous resolutions.
What altered Japan's tendency to equivocate on
this occasion--making Resolutions 1819 (XVII) and 2107
(XX) now palatable--ls not readily apparent. In previous
votes a certain consistency in Japan's voting behavior
become clear as it was clear vis-a-vis South Africa and
other Third World issues. As noted before that consist
ency lies in Japan's willingness to play the role of an
Asian nation either when world-wide agreement was over
whelming, or when the proposed resolution was too innocu
ous to matter. When, however, sanctions were Involved
Japan has resorted to abstaining or opposing. Its vote
on Resolution 2184 (XXI), then, seems to be a real revers
al. In debate the Indian contribution offered no sur
prises or departures, and the Japanese, unfortunately,
did not choose to clarify their apparent change of heart.
It is often difficult to divine, let alone scien
tifically prove, what underlies the motivations for a
152
nation's behavior. It is frequently necessary to compare
what a nation says with what it has done over a period of
time in search of real consistency, and there are times
when even this does produce entirely satisfactory results.
This seems one of those occasions.
The most obvious conclusion in this case is that
Japan reversed itself in search of Afro-Asian favor at
small risk. As the issue was debated before Committee IV,
however, Japan's support was qualified and its statements
implied a feeling of hurt over some of the accusations
which had been made against it--for instance, those of
Guinea. Japan's representatives seem sensitive to allega
tions that it had supported this colonial regime, and it
specified pointedly that Japan had sold no arms to the
Portuguese, had no programs of investment in the area, and
had scrupulously complied with the Security Council's
resolutions regarding this issue. While stating that
Japan would vote for the resolution, it voiced reserva
tions regarding the sanctions and enforcement aspects of
the measure which, it deemed, were more properly within
153
the purview of the Council.
It does seem clear that this vote cannot be under
stood divorced from the whole context of Third World
issues within which Japan seems increasingly sensitive tof
if not vulnerable to, accusations of supporting colonial
or racist regimes. Having been accused of this during
debate over Resolution 2151 (XX), Japan expressed real
indignation, although it did not alter its usual absten
tion.
The month which ensued between debate on Rhodesia
and Portugal, however, had not seen a total reversal in
Japan's policies on Third World questions either, for but
a short time later it was to abstain once more on a reso
lution recommending less stringent economic sanctions
against South Africa (Resolution 2202 [XXI] adopted Decem
ber 16, 1966). If there was a difference in principle
between the cases of Rhodesia, Portugal, and South Africa,
it is difficult to perceive, and if there is no difference
in principle, Japan's stand is even more difficult to
explain.
^ Ibid. , 21st Sess., Com. IV, 1654th Meeting
(December 5, 1966), Pars. 9-11, pp. 391-392.
154
The recounting of the history of these eight
Important Third World Issues during the ten-year period
of this study calls for some concluding analysis at least
some of which has already been suggested in connection
with the specific questions. All of the material pre
sented in this chapter and the conclusions drawn from it
are best understood as being part of a transitional period
during which the mature nations of the organization were
rapidly losing ground to formerly dependent areas, and
the organization's very raison d*etre was being altered.
The "nation explosion" which began in 1960 with the
admission of sixteen new African nations, had by the end
of 1966 added another twenty-one natione--all save Cyprus
and Malta clearly Afro-Asian nations.
Since this revolution in the membership profile
of the organization there has been a greater emphasis on
the role of the United Nations as midwife to new nations
and foe of empire, and the Declaration of Colonialism
adopted as Resolution 1514 (XV) on December 14, 1960 by
the 947th Plenary Session by a vote of 89-0-9 was a truly
comprehensive statement to that end. (It is of interest
to note that the abstaining nations were Australia, Bel-
155
glum, Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, Spain, South
Africa, United Kingdom, and the United States.) The
adoption of the Declaration was followed by the formation
of a committee to oversee the implementation of its pro
visions which had, by 1962, established an on-going per
sonality as the Committee of Twenty-four. While contain
ing Western members, the Committee's seemingly permanent
alliance of Afro-Asian and Soviet bloc nations has domi-
78
nated it to the consistent embarrassment of the West,
a fact which led ultimately to the resignation of both the
United Kingdom and the United States in 1971. Not only
has this membership revolution altered the Institution's
focus of attention, but it has also changed the tone of
its debate over these issues.
The ultimate distillation of the information pre
sented in this chapter are the sixty-nine occasions during
78
The membership of the first full Committee of
Twenty-four was Australia, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Chile,
Denmark, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Ivory Coast,
Madagascar, Mall, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tangianlka,
Tunisia, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay,
Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. Changes in membership at the
close of this study's period were restricted to the expan
sion of Tangianlka to the United Republic of Tanzania,
and the substitution of Afghanistan for Cambodia.
156
this period on which India and Japan were called upon to
vote on important questions, and in the course of which
they concurred exactly thirty-four times. This simple
mathematical notation, however, represents no basis for
conclusions without recalling some other pertinent facts.
Certainly one of these Important facts is that of these
votes there were twenty-four which most people would agree
were substantially more contentious than the others Judged
on the basis of numerical disagreement evident in the
vote itself, the vigor of verbal debate, or the measure's
threat to impose real political or economic sanctions.
With this in mind the other side of the coin becomes
apparent. India and Japan found it possible to disagree
on a number of occasions over relatively unimportant
issues.
Perhaps the clearest generalization which can be
drawn from this record is that India's reaction to such
issues is as automatic and instantaneous as a Babinskl
reflex. India not only proclaims its loyalties lie with
the Third World, but acts the part with almost total con
sistency. While India may not, in size and economic
development, appear as typical of that genre of nation,
157
emotionally and Ideologically It is one of them. The
quality and depth of that Ideological conmitment (perhaps
incomprehensible to one whose orientation is basically
Western) seems at least as strong as their protestations,
and seems almost to assert the principle that imperialism
and colonialism can only be perpetrated by the traditional
imperial nations. Conversely it seems to assert as well
that nations which have gone through a colonial experience
are incapable of acting immorally toward other nations at
all. While India would undoubtedly deny such assertions
categorically, its voting record is too strikingly con*
sistent to ignore.
Only once during the period of this study did
India depart from its wholehearted identification with
the Third World, and that was on a relatively unimportant
issue of Oman in 1966. Otherwise India has alternatively
led or swum in the mainstream of the Third World line even
when usually cherished principles have seemed to stand in
the way. While it is difficult to characterize India's
role on such issues as one of leadership (that role being
dependent on factors not wholly within one nation's con
trol) , it has been in the forefront of all but one of
158
these struggles. Not only has India routinely supported
these issues, but even more revealing has sponsored more
than half of them (thirty-eight). In its role as sponsor,
moreover, India has lent its name not merely to conven
tional condemnations of certain situations, but also to
many of the more activist proposals.
Japan, on the other hand, displays a distinctly
different behavior pattern despite its self-proclaimed
devotion to membership in the Afro-Asian group. The most
obvious generalization which can be made on that pattern
is that the Japanese are prepared to talk about anything,
but as calls for action escalate their enthusiasm wanes.
While Japan can be found among the sponsors of some of
these resolutions, those that it does sponsor are typi
cally ones calling for the discussion of an issue.
Routine resolutions to consider the South African racial
question (or to condemn it without sanctions) account for
sixteen of the thirty-four occasions on which India and
Japan concurred. Japan has, in almost every case,
declared its moral support for the Third World position,
but has chosen to modify that support by taking into
account the special circumstances which attend each issue.
159
This approach, as such, is not uncommendable, and might
be viewed pragmatically as an improvement over India's
automatic reaction. A realistic view, for instance, of
the unique conditions prevailing in Rhodesia and a more
consistent application of the principle of self-determi
nation regarding West Irian would have made India’s
position less open to the suspicion of bias. In Japan's
treatment of these issues, however, there appears to be
more than a consistent pragmatism. Time after time Japan
has resorted to a legality or technicality to explain its
nonsupport of a measure containing the most modest sanc
tions, or has specifically qualified its support to
exclude approval of such measures. In view of this con
sistency one cannot but wonder if the technicalities are
the whole truth of Japan's position.
It is difficult not to entertain the possibility
that Japan plays the role of Afro-Asian group member so
long as it does not jeopardize a valuable friendship or
trading relationship. In each case, save one, Japan has
had recourse to special circumstances, a legality, or the
nonexhaustion of alternative roads in order to avoid
voting for real sanctions. While Japan would undoubtedly
160
deny such an assertion categorically, the consistency of
the voting record remains.
Given the above it is not surprising that India
is more often found in the company of large numbers of
Afro-Asian nations when votes are tallied while Japan
finds itself in that company mostly when concurring with
India on routine measures. When they do not concur, how
ever, Japan is never in the company of more than six (more
typically three or four) Afro-Asian nations, and is quite
often the sole Asian dissenter. The occurrence within
these issues of sixteen occasions on which Japan found
itself in this solitary position could lend substance to
the characterization of "orphan Japan."
In light of these consistencies vis-a-vis the
Third World and the issues it has found most compelling,
it seems legitimate to ask if the outlooks of these
nations correlate significantly with some of the other
major nations, and on the basis of these issues selected
especially for their importance, the answer would seem to
be tentatively affirmative. If asked specifically if
there were an affinity between Japan's voting behavior and
that of the United States the answer would be yes, but not
161
as completely as some might assume. Japan concurred with
the United States on twenty of the votes recorded in this
chapter, and abstained in nine other cases which could be
interpreted as favoring the American position. These
tended to occur on the least routine measures within this
body of votes.
If, on the other hand, asked specifically about
the possible affinity between India and the Soviet Union
the answer would be even more affirmative--on forty-three
of the sixty-nine possible occasions they concurred. In
pursuing this four-way comparison, moreover, India's
relative lack of agility on these questions is demon
strated by the fact that, with the exception of those
votes which were unanimous, India concurred only once
with the United States, as compared with Japan's concur
rence with the Soviet Union on eleven occasions. While
these comparisons do not prove anything, they do suggest
that the presuppositions about the relationship between
Japan and the United States, even during this relatively
diffident period of its foreign policy, were less than
complete, and that the correlation between India and the
Soviet Union is greater.
162
Further, one cannot help but note the ease with
which the Soviet Union used most Third World issues to
cultivate those nations. Only on the issue of the Capital
Development Fund did its identity as a developed nation
of the North show through clearly. Having little or
nothing to lose on most of these issues, however, it has
understandably made the most of them adding a predictable
ideological cant to their support. The United States,
however, has been caught in the dilemma of wishing to
court the friendship of the new nations while retaining
its traditional friends many of whom are the targets of
the Third World issues. Given America’s foreign policy
preoccupation with Europe it has often had to support
those traditional friends (or at least not oppose them)
thus sacrificing those possible new ones and laying itself
open to some unpleasant and emotional charges. This con
sistency has, on occasion, made the United States almost
as direct a target on these issues as the original
colonial power.
Japan, on the other hand, not so burdened with a
policy dominated with European imperatives, has displayed
a greater reluctance to sacrifice its possible position
163
vis-a-vis the Third World, even though it has had diffi
culty maintaining a truly healthy one.
The degree to which this is true seems borne out
by the basic positions which, as was suggested in the
treatment of the individual issues, tend to evolve on
these recurring questions. India almost always is to be
found at one extreme of the basic issues while the United
States is more likely to be found at the other. Japan,
typically, strives for some middle ground even when there
seems little room for such a position and its justifica
tions may seem a little contrived. Japan, nonetheless,
has tried to maintain flexibility on these Issues, and
increasingly so since the nation explosion.
It does not seem appropriate to leave this subject
without noting a change in the tone of debate on these
issues beginning in 1961. While it may not be possible
to identify the specific cause of the change, the organi
zation's altering membership pattern, its increasing
emphasis on colonial questions, and the sometimes bitter
legacies of the Congo crisis were doubtless contributory,
but whatever was most responsible there is no ignoring
debate on these issues took an ugly turn. While these
164
Issues are Intrinsically emotional ones they had been
treated with a notable moderation up to that time— a fact
which makes the change that much more obvious. Third
World nations in general and India in particular partici
pated in this change, and seemed to reserve particular
intensity for those nations which chose to defend them
selves. While notable in marking a change over the period
of this study, the question of "tone" of debate is also
a contrast applicable to the two principals of this study.
In general the Indian contributions to debate have been
among the more colorful (even flamboyant), particularly
when compared to Japan's much shorter and much lower-key
contributions.
The validity of these generalizations and their
possible relationship to the overall world outlook of
each of the principals of this study will be re-examined
in the concluding chapter.
CHAPTER IV
THE RECURRING ISSUES--COLD WAR AND INTRINSIC
The inclusion in a single chapter of those recur
ring Cold War and Intrinsic Issues described in Chapter I
might be thought of as excessively concentrating the most
dramatic questions. Actually these Issues are by no means
dull, they too have tended, like the Third World issues,
after years of repeated consideration, to have reached an
annual stereotyped routine.
The Cold War issues, as many of the Assembly's
other recurring issues, reached that body after their
solution by the Security Council was blocked by the use of
the veto. When shunted to the Assembly, they have been
considered routinely, and often treated to the sort of
annual palliative resolution which is the despair of those
who would have the United Nations a more effective and
vigorous organization. When this occurs, of course, the
United Nations does not solve anything.
This has been the case with these issues which
have tended to divide the opinion of the organization's
165
166
membership along Cold War lines, for, while the sinqplidty
of Cold War loyalties has now been replaced by a greater
awareness of the world's complexity, the issues of China's
representation, Korea, Hungary and Tibet had their roots
in a time when many believed that the Cold War was neces
sary and that communism was monolithic and evil. This
being the case these questions might be expected to have
been among the institution's most Insoluble ones. Rather
remarkably this has, in the long run, not been the case.
The organization has, in part at least, resolved one of
them (China's representation), a solution to another
appears underway outside the United Nations arena (Korea),
and the Assembly has been prudent enough to discard two
particularly insoluble ones (Hungary and Tibet).
Those issues defined as intrinsic (Palestine and
Cyprus) present unique problems because of the seeming
irreconcilability of the contestants and their resistance
to compromise. In these issues the moves of the contest
ants are self-generating (that is to say not dependent
upon the actions of third parties). They do not gear
their actions to the circumstances of the Cold War or of
the Third World, nor do they seem to care particularly
167
about the consequences of their actions in other areas.
Because these Issues are essentially self-contained they
are both highly unpredictable and resistant to solution
as well.
The Issue of the Representation of China
China's position as a founding member of the
United Nations and as a permanent member of the Security
Council was more a product of American insistence than
China's power, and it is ironic that it was over the
rightful possession of that position that the circumstances
arose which allowed the United Nations to act as a collec
tive security organization for the first time. It was,
of course, over the issue of China's representation that
the Soviet Union had absented itself from the Security
Council at the time of the outbreak of the Korean War in
1950, and without that absence the basic resolutions which
made the United Nations a major participant in that
struggle would not have been adopted. It is also ironic
that it was the struggle in Korea and China's participa
tion in it by the end of 1950 which further complicated
9
the issue. Branding the People's Republic of China as an
aggressor in this instance made it more difficult for the
168
organization to extend membership to the mainland govern*
ment, and, as is often the case, the solution to this
seemingly insoluble problem proved to be time.
The Issues surrounding China's representation had
been rather sharply defined by the time Japan was admitted
to United Nations membership in 1956, and the contrasting
positions of India and Japan on the issue were shortly to
become equally sharp. Understanding those differences,
however, is even more interesting in light of the two
nations' contrasting experiences vis-A-vis China Itself.
Sino-Japanese relations are historically long and
sporadically intimate. The cultural similarity of these
two nations is obvious, and the apparent student-teacher
relationship between the two reinforced the myth that
Japan's talents extended only to imitation. These ties
are not only recognized in Japan, but on occasion over
blown as when some Japanese use the phrase Dobun Doshu
(same script— same people) Implying an unrealistic degree
of similarity, and yet, in peculiar contrast, at the peak
of its nationalistic fervor Japan seemed to regard China
with an almost amused contempt. It seems probable that
the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 marked the beginning of
169
the latter attitude, for thereafter Japan acted toward
China In much the same way as the Western nations. Even
when after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 Japan became
the revolutionary headquarters of Asia It was more as
patron than partner. As the twentieth century progressed,
moreover, Japan’s relationship with China became almost
entirely exploitive. Aside from cultural and political
relations, close economic relations between the two seemed
ordained by the accident of geography. The alteration of
Japan's basic trade patterns with the Asian mainland then
seemed as Impossible as does the end to Japanese-American
trade seem today.
Japan's historic concern with China did not simply
vanish as a result of World War II and its aftermath,
although the nature of that concern has changed. China,
previously weak and disunited, presented a wholly new face
to the world after 1949. The Communist rulers of China
brought to their task an unaccustomed purity and ideologi
cal fervor which seemed to unite the nation as never
before. They had, during their first years, an impressive
list of domestic accomplishments, and had faced a powerful
military opponent as well. In contrast Japan's military
170
might had been dismantled, Its military leaders dis
credited, and its new pacificism was reflected in its very
constitutional form. The diffident Japan of the decade of
the fifties contrasted both with the new assured China
and its previous self as well.
Japan's economic relationship with China was
destroyed by the war and its aftermath, and there has been
little to indicate its resurrection. Today Japan's trade
patterns have reoriented toward the West, and revolution
ary China's goal of industrialization has made it a con
sumer of the raw materials it might once have exported.
Efforts to restore that trade relationship have, there
fore, been fitful, and have been further deterred by
questionable Chinese trade practices and the Japanese
suspicion that trade could be used as a political weapon.
Trade with China has consequently been dwarfed by that with
North America, and even exceeded by that with Taiwan,
although the changing circumstances of East Asia seem sure
to bring as yet unpredictable changes.
Japan's emotional attitude toward China, if it is
possible to generalize, seems to have been one of apprehen
sion tinged with guilt. While some Japanese speak today
171
as though World War II and its preceding events were
Irrelevant or even unreal, they must wonder if China
harbors resentment over the war and envy of Japan's eco
nomic miracle. Lack of apprehension in Japan over the
development and sophistication of Chinese nuclear weapons
is unthinkable, and Japan's leaders have had to balance
the risks of accommodation against the benefits on exist
ing reality. The choice of the latter, however, does not
represent an overwhelming consensus, and the contrasting
platforms of the five major political parties for either
the 1967 or 1969 elections indicate how sharply divided
they are on this basic point. The compromising caution of
the Democratic Socialists, the vague "World Socialism" of
the Clean Government Party, the pro-Mainland stances of
the Communists and Socialists all represent degrees of
departure from the policies of the ruling Liberal-Democrats
(who indeed are not at one with themselves). Additionally,
of course, Japan's attitude toward China is influenced by
the actions of others not the least of which is the United
States. America's desire to reach a better accommodation
with China which eventuated in President Nixon's trip was
but one of a series of shocks to Japan which have caused
172
a re-evaluation of the nation's attitude toward China.
The election of Kakuei Tanaka to the presidency of the
LDP (and prime ministership) over Eisaku Sato's selected
successor seemed to signal the beginning of such a re
assessment, the consequence of which was Japan's recogni
tion of the People's Republic of China.
While Japan today is apprehensive of China it is
not terrorized. Respecting China's strengths, Japan is
also aware of China's weaknesses. The goods displayed at
Chinese trade fairs seem crude to the Japanese, and their
substitution of Ideology for technological ability naive.
Yet China's sheer size nearby is a pervading presence
next to which even the nuclear umbrella of the world's
greatest power is small comfort. While doubtless moderat
ing, Japan’s fundamental view of China will probably
remain that of a rival with whom accommodation must be
undertaken with caution.
The attitude of India toward China has undergone
serious change while remaining the same in some fundamental
ways. Prior to World War II Sino-Indlan relations were
typically low in intensity, and whatever unpleasantness
existed between the two areas was perceived as attributable
173
to the British. The reasons for low Intensity political
relationships were firmly rooted in geography and the
technology of the time.
The consequence of the above was that the newly
independent India was able to approach China— Communist or
Nationalist--with fewer preconceptions and prejudices than
Japan. Also, as have other previously colonial peoples,
India brought to its international relations a feeling
of innocence, free from past guilts, in which they acted
with fewer inhibitions than did established nations.
With this lack of Inhibition India chose to try to accom
modate with its neighbor to the north.
India's policy of accommodation was based on a
number of considerations not unrelated to this feeling of
innocence. It was assumed that a special bond existed
between Asians because of their prior colonial (or ex
ploited) status, and that this special virtue enhanced
their ability to cooperate. This feeling that real dis
agreement between such people was all but unthinkable was
Implicit in the spirit of Bandung of 1955.
India determined, moreover, that economic develop
ment had to be its first priority thereby precluding an
174
expensive military. This reality was eventually trans-
lated Into a defeatist attitude within the Indian military
vis-a-vis China. India's neutralism, India's inter
national morallsm, India's sentimental Aslanism, and
India's dedication to economic progress have all played
their roles in shaping the nation's attitude toward China,
and it reached a peak of mutual friendship in 1954 with
their joint acceptance of the Panch Shila--the five prin
ciples of peaceful co-existence which include: (1) mutual
respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity;
(2) mutual nonaggression; (3) noninterference in internal
affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful
co-existence.
India had occasion to reconsider its attitude
toward China when in the fall of 1962, after a protracted
series of Incidents along the Northeast Frontier Area
(NEFA), large scale hostilities broke out during which the
Indian army was mauled by the well-armed, well-supplied,
well-organized, and well-acclimated Chinese. The objec
tive merits of the conflicting claims is here secondary
to the effect this turn of events had on India's attitude
toward China, and popular reaction, at least, was an over
175
night reversal as crowds of Indians changed cries for
Sino-Indian brotherhood into obscenities and demands for
revenge. Thousands, perhaps millions, of Indians volun
teered their gold ornaments and jewelry to finance the
struggle as India, momentarily, seemed to find its soul
in crisis.
There can be no doubt that this was one of India's
more difficult moments, sweeping away, as it did, one of
the cornerstones of their international relationships.
Friendship with China based upon the Panch Shila was re
placed by the image of a hostile China accusing it of
imperial goals greater than those entertained by the
British. After this abrupt reversal Sino-Indian relations
have somehow never been quite the same, and it is against
this complex backdrop that the question of China's repre
sentation in the United Nations must be viewed.
The first consideration of the question of China's
representation in the United Nations during the period of
this study came in September 1957 at India's behest. This
request to consider the issue (A/L.224), however, was
rejected by the General Committee (a committee of the
whole)--an action confirmed when its reverse (a proposal
176
not to consider the question) was adopted on September 24,
1957 by the 686th Plenary Session as Resolution 1135 (XII)
by a vote of 46-27-7. While Japan joined the United States
and others in supporting the resolution, India opposed it
in the company of Soviet bloc and neutralist nations as
well as a few less predictable ones like Denmark and
Norway.
The Indian delegate spoke in favor of admission
saying that it was not so much a question of whether as
when. He went on to say:
It is not possible to disregard this question. It
Involves 600 million people who have reached politi
cal maturity and who have made great economic prog
ress. India has a 3,000 mile frontier with China.
During four or five thousand years of our relations,
we have never fought a war with China, and China
has never fought a war with us.1
Later he added:
There are some, like the representative of Peru, who
think that the government has not purged itself of
aggression, and so on, forgetting thereby that we
have recently admitted a member who, by our founda
tion deeds, is prohibited from being admitted. Time
^United Nations, Official Records. General Assem
bly, 12th Sess., 686th Meeting (September 24, 1957),
Par. 156, p. 125.
177
passes and we have to make certain changes this
way. 2
Japan's silence throughout the debate makes It
Impossible to gauge the degree to which this reference
stung. In the vote, however, Japan honored Its April 1952
recognition of the Nationalist Government, and opposed the
Indian position.
India's sponsorship of the mainland government
continued In 1958 and 1959 and again resolutions were
passed by the Assembly specifically excluding considera
tion of the Issue from the agenda. On September 23, 1958
the 755th Plenary Session passed Resolution 1239 (XIII)
for exclusion by a vote of 44-28-9. Once more, on Septem
ber 22, 1959, the 803rd Plenary Session adopted the same
proposal to exclude the Issue from the agenda as Resolu
tion 1351 (XIV) by a vote of 44-29-9. On both of these
occasions India, as sponsor, led the fight for admission.
In 1958, for Instance, the Indian delegate raised
and dismissed the question of timeliness as being over
ridden by the urgency of the matter. Minimizing the Im
portance of the bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu, he said:
2Ibid.. Par., 173, p. 127.
178
Peaceful negotiation would be assisted If the
Chinese people could think that the General Assembly
is looking at this problem rather than ignoring it.
. . . It is no use our ignoring the fact that sooner
or later--sooner if we are wise, and the sooner the
better for us--this problem will have to be solved
in terms of historic reality.3
By 1959 India's position might be interpreted as
having receded from complete enthusiasm for the People's
Republic of China, but its support was still firm. To
delegates who had expressed concern over India's "integ
rity" Krishna Menon replied that India was best qualified
to worry about it, and referring directly to the border
troubles and "... we shall sit down and talk like
civilized people and friendly governments . . . ," adding:
We are asked, "In view of your disillusionment about
China, then why do you bring this item here?" There
again, I submit, that it is not, shall I say, a very
generous way of looking at us. We do not bring the
question of China here because China is our neighbor
or because China is on friendly and diplomatic rela
tions with us. We ask countries like the United
States, for example, or various other countries who
have hostile feelings toward China, if you like,
quite legitimate perhaps, who are unfriendly to her,
who do not regard China as trustworthy, who regard
^Ibid., 13th Sess., 755th Meeting (September 23,
1958), Par"! 54, p. 105.
179
China as having committed aggression, we have asked
them in the past to let China take her place here.4
There is no denying the consistency of the Indian posi
tion, although India had no idea at that time how sorely
that consistency was to be tested. On neither occasion
did Japan contribute to the debate, but both times voted
against the Indian position.
India's sponsorship of the People's Republic In
1959 was its fourth, and proved to be its last as the
spirit of Panch Shila progressively faded. In March 1959
the Tibetan revolt flared, and the Dalai Lama fled to
India. In August, though road building into Indian claimed
territory had been known of since 1957, Prime Minister
Nehru openly accused Peking of provoking border incidents
significantly loosening the Sino-Indian embrace. Sponsor
ship of the issue thereafter fell first to the Soviet
Union, and later to Albania.
While India's disenchantment with China ended its
sponsorship of the mainland government, it did not change
India's support for its admission. The Indian delegation
^Ibid.. 14th Sess., 803rd Meeting (September 22,
1959), Par. 14, pp. 90-91.
180
has persisted in championing universality, and this con
sistency was to survive severe testing.
In I960, as China's Great Leap Forward was failing
and Soviet technicians were being withdrawn from China,
the Soviet Union nonetheless sponsored the issue. The
deciding vote was taken by the 895th Plenary Session on
October 8f 1960 when Resolution 1493 (XV) to exclude the
issue from the agenda was adopted by a vote of 42-34-22.
As always debate was heated. The contribution of the
Indian delegate was predictable, and did not depart from
the references made to the issue by Prime Minister Nehru
who had (as had so many other Chiefs of State during the
extraordinary General Debate at the opening of the Assem
bly's fifteenth session) addressed the 882nd Plenary
Session on October 3, 1960. While acknowledging India’s
difficulty with China, its membership was still deemed to
be a matter of doing the right thing whether likeable or
not. Japan did not contribute to debate, and voted
against the mainland once more.
The year 1960 marked an end to the raising of this
question as little more than meaningless ritual.
The issue was raised again in 1961 by both New
181
Zealand and the Soviet Union--the former asking for con
sideration of the problem while the latter called for both
the seating of the People's Republic and the removal of
the Nationalists. Although it proved to be an unnecessary
precaution the United States thought it prudent to have
the issue defined as an "important" issue thus requiring
a two-thirds majority for passage. A five power draft
resolution (Japan among the sponsors) was adopted by the
1080th Plenary Session on December 15 as Resolution 1668
(XVI) by a vote of 61-34-7 with Japan supporting the meas
ure while India opposed it. The Soviet Union's draft
resolution (A/L.360) was defeated on the same day 36-48-20
with India and Japan once more in opposite columns. On
this occasion Japan, as a sponsor of the "important" issue
resolution, spoke on the issue in the style which was to
characterize its subsequent contributions to debate. In
a distinctly legalistic tone the Japanese delegate re
counted the background of China and Taiwan vis-a-vis Japan,
and noted that the existence of contesting parties made it
necessary to invoke Resolution 396 (V) which had made the
principles and purposes of the Charter a real issue in
cases such as the representation of China.
182
It Is with these thoughts In mind that my delegation
has joined with the delegations of Australia, Colom
bia, Italy and the United States in presenting a
draft resolution (A/L.372). The Japanese delegation
earnestly hopes that the Assembly's consideration of
the question of Chinese representation will be solidly
based upon a realistic and well balanced appraisal of
all the complex factors involved, in accordance with
the purposes and principles of the United Nations as
set forth in the Charter and with the best interests
of the World Community.5
India did not contribute to debate.
The issue was brought to the agenda again in 1962
sponsored by the Soviet Union again acting alone. The
1162nd Plenary Session of the Assembly defeated its draft
resolution (A/L.395) on October 30 by a vote of 42-56-12
with India voting for the measure while Japan opposed it.
Dismissing consideration of the issue during 1962 with
only the above, however, would ignore one of the year's
most dramatic events--the outbreak of the Sino-Indlan
border war. This caused the Indian delegate to note that
the Peoples Republic of China has committed flagrant,
massive and premeditated aggression on the eastern
and western sectors of our territory, while glibly
talking of peaceful negotiation.6
5Ibid., 16th Sess., 1072nd Meeting (December 6,
1961), Par. 129, p. 946.
^Ibid.. 17th Sess., 1159th Meeting (October 26,
1962), Par. 106, p. 597.
183
He went on to say, however,
My delegation has always supported the principle of
universality in regard to the membership of this
world organization. We also think that the only
effective way to check Chinese military adventurism
is to make it accept its responsibilities as a mem
ber of the world organization and thereby be subject
to the views and disciplines of this august body.7
Japan too spoke to the question in a tone similar
to that of her delegate's 1961 speech, though spelling out
more directly its objection to the expulsion of the Repub
lic of China. The Japanese delegate characterized It as
"wholly unjustified," and to that added.
My delegation would like to recommend that the solu
tion of this problem should be based on the following
three factors: first, it must be in conformity with
the purposes and principles of the Charter; secondly,
it must be sought by peaceful means; thirdly, it
must contribute to the peace and security of the Far
East and of the entire world.8
By 1963 the public animosity between the Soviet
Union and China had escalated, and all efforts to compose
their differences on ideology and nuclear development had
failed. Given this hostility it seemed somehow inappro
priate for the Soviet Union to continue acting as sponsor.
7Ibid.
®Ibid., 1160th Meeting (October 29, 1962), Par.
195, p. 619.
184
and that role consequently fell to Albania whose draft
resolution to oust the Nationalists and seat the mainland
government was considered that year. It was that draft
resolution (A/L.427) which was defeated by the 1248th
Plenary Session on October 21 by a vote of 41-57-12 with
India and Japan voting on opposite sides. Japan's con
tribution to debate was a virtual repetition of its pre
vious speeches, while India remained silent.
Though the continuity of consideration was Inter
rupted by the preemptive character of the financial crisis
in 1964, the issue was raised again in November 1965.
Once more sentiment for the mainland was deemed high
enough to warrant the precaution of designating it an
"important" question, and for this purpose an eleven-power
draft resolution was submitted to the Assembly (both the
United States and Japan were among the sponsors). This
was adopted as Resolution 2025 (XX) on November 17, 1965
by the 1380th Plenary Session by a vote of 56-49-11 with
India and Japan in opposing columns. This precaution
proved at length to be unnecessary, but by a very small
margin. The vote on this occasion made it clear that a
new high point in pro-malnland sentiment had been reached,
185
and had the "Important" question ruling not been in force
It is possible that one of those abstaining might have
been induced to make a simple majority in favor of the
mainland.9 The 1965 vote on representation itself
(47-47-20) marked a high point of pro-malnland sentiment
during the period of this study, and a high point which
was to stand for some time. It was not until the Twenty-
fifth Session of the Assembly that a plurality for the
People's Republic was achieved for the first time pre
saging its admission by the Twenty-sixth Session, October
25, 1971. During the Twentieth Session's debate, however,
Japan repeated its legalistic call for moderation and a
" . . . realistic and balanced evaluation of all the com
plex elements of the question, without animosity and
without prejudice in the highest interest of the world
c o m m u n i t y . "10 India, again did not contribute to debate.
9
Those abstaining were Austria, Burundi,
Camerouns, Chad, Chile, Cyprus, Iceland, Iran, Jamaica,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Maldive Islands, Netherlands,
Portugal, Rwanda, South Africa, Senegal, Trinidad and
Tobago, and Tunisia.
lOunited Nations, Official Records. G.A., 20th
Sess., 1380th Meeting (November 17, 1966), Par. 12, p. 2.
186
but both nations voted their usual ways.
By 1966 the Albanian draft resolution to oust the
Nationalists and replace them with the People's Republic
was being also co-sponsored by Algeria, Cambodia, the
Congo (Brazaville), Cuba, Guinea, Mall, Romania, and
Syria. However, the crucial issue again could be seen as
the "important" issue question as much as the representa
tion issue per se. This was advanced in an American draft
resolution (co-sponsored by fourteen other nations includ
ing Japan) which was adopted as Resolution 2159 (XXI) on
November 29, 1966 by a vote of 66-48-7 with India and
Japan in opposing columns. The precaution proved, how
ever, unnecessary as the Albanian draft (A/L.496) was
rejected on the same day by the 1481st Plenary Session
46-57-17 with India voting for the mainland and Japan
against. While India was again mute, Japan contributed a
predictable statement noting the devotion of the Republic
of China to the United Nations and saying:
In contrast, doubt must persist in everyone's mind
as to whether the People's Republic of China is
indeed willing to carry out the obligations and
responsibilities of a member of the United Nations
and prepared to endeavor, as we all do, to enhance
187
the prestige and authority of this organization.H
On this occasion the Italian delegate, whose
expressed hope was to open up new lines of approach to the
problem, suggested a draft resolution for the further
study of the question which was rejected 34-62-25 during
the same Plenary Session. While Japan joined the United
States and others in supporting this proposal, India
opposed it in company so mixed as to Include Australia,
South Africa, and the Soviet bloc as well as many Afro-
Asian group nations. This was the last occasion on which
an issue pertaining to the representation of China arose
during the period of this study.
It seems fair to characterize the China represen
tation issue as one of the more emotional, compelling,
and persistent questions to plague the United Nations, and
while classifiable as a Cold War issue it was a question
divisive In other ways as well. Indeed perhaps no other
issue was able to produce such unaccustomed alliances.
In part because of this, the variety of positions
on this issue were many, and it is less possible here to
^ Ibid.. 21st Sess., 1479th Meeting (November 28,
1966), Par. 13, p. 2.
188
speak of basic positions. Most nations expressing them
selves on the question had something mildly Innovative to
contribute to the debate. In another sense, however, the
issue became oversimplified to the extent that opposition
to the seating of the mainland government was identified
as an American issue, and when that seating came about, it
was viewed as an American defeat as much as a victory for
the People's Republic.
This characterization of the issue is unfortunate
in obscuring the complex motivations so many nations
brought to the question. Many, otherwise friendly to the
United States and normally found voting with it, were
found voting against it, while others with reasons to
oppose or be neutral on the issue were for it.
It is not difficult to categorize the Indian and
Japanese positions on the question. The Indian position
was clearly the anti-American (or pro-People's Republic)
position, while Japan's position was steadfastly pro-
American to the very end. While there were more than
nine votes during the period of this study, there were in
effect nine occasions for sentiments to be displayed on
the subject. On none of these occasions, nor in any of
189
the peripheral votes, did they deviate. Leaving the
question characterized as a simple display of pro- or
anti-American sentiment (or pro-Soviet sentiment inasmuch
as India never failed to concur with the Soviet Union),
however, would be not merely oversimplified, but probably
Inaccurate.
In the case of India, that nation's commitment to
a principle survived trials which would have changed the
opinion of many other nations. One cannot but be im
pressed when confronted by consistency which can survive
even open military hostilities. While, as suggested, it
is difficult to define basic positions on this question,
India's, perhaps, came closest to representing a consensus
of the pro-Mainland stance with its emphasis on the prin
ciple of universality as a desirable characteristic for
the organization's membership.
In the case of Japan, however, its own character
istic deviation seems to appear again in its emphasis on
legalisms. While the arch-type American approach to the
question tended to emphasize its moral aspects, Japan
avoided this position even though moral considerations
may have been part of their motivations. It seems clear.
190
for instance, that Japan felt some sort of moral obliga
tion to the Republic of China and its agreements with that
government. Even though Japan had been having serious
second thoughts regarding its China relationships for
some time, the Japanese were never able to bring them
selves to vote for the ousting of Nationalist China,
Throughout the consideration of this issue Asia's
two largest democracies remained unalterably opposed.
The Issue of Korea
Korea has been an area of concern to Japan long
before it became an area crucial to international organi
zation. Japan's sixteenth century adventures, Saigo's
insistence on Korean involvement but twenty years after
Ferry, the 1894 to 1905 power struggle over the area, and
finally Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910 are evidence
of this concern. To Americans weaned on World War II*s
historical interpretations this interest was seen as but
a link in the chain of Japanese continental ambitions.
Viewed more dispassionately, however, it is clear that
when the Japanese spoke of the peninsula as a dagger
pointed at its heart it was not mere rhetoric. While an
independent Korea was no threat, Korea dominated by a
191
powerful third party was a matter of deep concern. Geo-
polltically (unfashionable though the term may be) Korea
was to Japan what the Lowlands were to Great Britain.
This reality seemed confirmed when the United States (as
the power occupying Japan) reacted to the threat of a
hostllely united Korea as had the Japanese earlier.
India's relationship to Korea has been vastly
different historically, and different in the more recent
past as well. The relationship of India to Northeast Asia
has always been tenuous, and what has been said about
India and Japan could apply equally well to the broader
area. These areas are geographically remote from each
other, and transactions have been limited largely to
intangibles. Regarding the events of 1950, too, there
were different factors in play as well. In addition to
the above noted differences when hostilities began in 1950
occupied Japan was essentially a spectator while India, a
signatory of the United Nations Charter even before
achieving formal nationhood, was a potential participant.
The postwar history of Korea itself was a depress
ing one complicated in no small part by the makeshift
nature of American policy. The end of the war in the
192
Pacific had come unexpectedly, and caught many unprepared
for some complex problems. Korea appears to have been one
of those unforeseen problems. A part of the Japanese
empire since 1910, Korea had been a land culturally and
politically oppressed for decades. Considered to be lack
ing In admi.. strative expertise, an interim organization
period prior to self-government was seen by the United
States as necessary, and as the war ended precipitously
an agreement was reached by the United States and the
Soviet Union to divide the peninsula temporarily at the
thirty-eighth parallel for accepting the Japanese sur
render. The United States was suspicious of communist
Influences in the hastily self-organized Korean government,
and did not recognize it, thus setting in motion a complex
chain of events which were to lead to the formal establish
ment of the Republic of Korea (August 15, 1948) and the
Democratic People's Republic immediately thereafter. It
was hoped that this would at least offer some choice to
the Korean people when elections were ultimately held
after reunification. With the passage of time, however,
this temporary division began to look increasingly perma
nent, and the two Koreas decreaslngly able to communicate
193
rationally--a condition which has prevailed until the very
recent past.
This area became one of crucial concern to the
United Nations in June 1950 when it erupted with military
action. Previously the United States had armed and
trained a modest land force in the south along constabu
lary lines in order to provide internal security, while
in the north the Soviet Union had created a larger and
more heavily equipped force trained for conventional war
fare. When this army of the north crossed the thirty-
eighth parallel it brushed aside the feeble resistance,
and within weeks the remnants of the American and South
Korean forces clung precariously to a tiny enclave around
the port city of Pusan.
Action over Korea was initiated in the Security
Council which, owing to the voluntary absence of the
Soviet Union over the China representation issue, was able
to act with some dispatch. Before the Soviet Union
returned to participate in the work of that body, it had
launched the United Nations* first and only adventure in
collective security--a fact which alone would have made
this issue a pivotal one in the history of the organize-
194
tion. Of the sixty•member nations, fifty-three signified
their willingness to support the principle of collective
action, and eventually sixteen nations contributed armed
forces to the effort. While (aside from those of the
United States) these constituted only about 10 percent of
the participating personnel, they were of symbolic impor
tance as was the less dramatic assistance tendered by
thirty other nations.
By the time Japan became involved as a United
Nations member hostilities in Korea had ceased (in July
1953) , and the peninsula had been divided by a truce line
believed permanent for the foreseeable future. This divi
sion, however, was viewed by the United Nations as a tem
porary expedient with no more validity than the thirty-
eighth parallel, and the organization's long range role
in this area was still seen as that of the instrument
through which Korea was to be unified. It was, Indeed,
this same legal fiction which had made it relatively easy
for the organization to approve the crossing of the thirty-
eighth parallel to pacify the north and unite the nation
late in 1950.
By 1957 annual debate over Korea had become
195
Institutionalized and unproductive. As Is the case often
on recurring Issues the positions become so solidified
that even the words and arguments become sterilely repe
titious, and the objective merits are sacrificed for
debating points. Often, too, such issues become reduced
to some specific point which is more symbolic than sub
stantive. In the case of Korea this symbolic or proxy
issue has come to be the vote over whether both the north
and the south should be allowed to participate in the
debate. The seemingly inevitable conclusion during the
period of this study was the invitation of the south and
exclusion of the north. This surrealistically pointless
ritual is made even more inane by the probability that the
north, not recognizing the jurisdiction of the United
Nations, would refuse the invitation if tendered. It was
in this general milieu Japan first confronted the issue
as a member.
Debate on Korea is conducted in Committee I, whose
recommendations are later confirmed by the Assembly in
Plenary Session. This was the case in 1957 when the usual
resolution regarding debate participation was adopted on
November 29 by the 724th Plenary Session as Resolution 1180
196
(XII) by a vote of 54-9-16. Japan voted with the majority,
while India abstained along with Afghanistan, Burma,
Cambodia, Ceylon, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Yemen, Egypt,
Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Morocco, Nepal and Yugoslavia--
a group of nations which for a time seemed to concur auto
matically.
India's courting of China and desire not to offend
the Soviet Union probably accounts for its equivocation
on the issue--an equivocation of long standing.12 while
India voted against the branding of China as the aggressor
in 1951, it had participated in the United Nations effort
in Korea at least to the extent of furnishing a field
ambulance unit. Japan, on the other hand, though plagued
by a feud with the Republic of Korea until the signing of
the Japanese-Korean Treaty in 1965, had to cope with more
immediate and unpleasant realities. To Japan, at least,
Summarlzations of India's attitude toward the
UN intervention in Korea can be found in the Indian Council
of World Affairs, India and the United Nations (New York:
Manhattan Publishing Co., 1957), pp. 147-157; and Ross N.
Berkes and Mohinder S. Bedl, Diplomacy of India (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 105-139.
197
a divided hostile Korea was preferable to a united hostile
one. This has led Japan to side firmly with the anti
north line. India and Japan have been at opposite ends
of this debate with Japan opposing North Korean partici
pation in debate though paying lip service to the princi
ple of revtnification. India's feelings on this issue,
however, have seemed more intense, and the Indian delegate
in 1957 spoke of reunification as ". . . not only desir
able but necessary to the stability of the Far East," and
as a key which . . would open the way to the solution
of other questions, t o o . "I-*
In 1958 Committee I consideration began with the
rejection of separate proposals by the Soviet Union and
India both of which had the effect of inviting North Korea
to participate in the debate. The resolution finally
adopted, however, was the American proposal to invite only
the Republic of Korea. This draft was adopted by the
781st Plenary Session on November 14, 1958 as Resolution
1264 (XIII) 54-9-17 with Japan supporting the measure
^^United Nations, Official Records, Com. I, 12th
Seas., 903rd Meeting (November 15, 1957), Par. 42, p. 193.
198
while India abstained. While Japan did not contribute to
Committee I debate, India again called for a government
elected under International supervision. India also noted
the reported withdrawal of Chinese volunteers, and
expressed the hope that others would follow this example.1^
Consideration of Korea In 1959 went further than
the usual proxy issue in voting a condemnation of the
government of the north and reaffirming the United Nations
goal of reunification. This fourteen-power p r o p o s a l ^
specifically included the noting of conmunist intransi
gence, a reaffirmation of the goal of unification, a call
for the establishment of United Nations authority in all
of Korea, and the continuation of the United Nations Com
mission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
(UNCURK). This resolution was adopted by the 851st Plenary
Session on December 9, 1959 as Resolution 1455 (XIV) by a
vote of 54-9-17. It is notable, apropos of the previous
^Ibid., 13th Seas. 978th Meeting (November 7,
1958), Par. 8, p. 175.
^Australia, Belgium, Colombia, Ethiopia, France,
Greece, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Philippines, Thailand,
Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United
States.
199
assertion regarding proxy issues, the degree to which this
vote coincides with that on the proxy issue regarding the
manner of its placement on the agenda. Once more Japan is
found supporting the measure and India abstaining In the
same company while the Soviet bloc opposed the measure.
There was no signal contribution to debate by either
Japan or India on this occasion.
In 1960 Korea was somewhat overshadowed by the
institution's preoccupation with the Congo, however, Com
mittee I did eventually debate the proxy issue once more.
While the Soviet Union's draft resolution Inviting the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was rejected
(33-54-7), the most complicated maneuvering arose over the
American proposal to Invite the Republic of Korea which
was promptly amended by Indonesia to include an Invitation
to the DPRK as well. Rather than vote against its own
resolution the United States further amended the resolu
tion to include the provision that the north must fully
acknowledge the competency of the United Nations, and in
this form (A/C.I/L.268) it was adopted on April 12, 1961
by a vote of 59-14-23 with India abstaining and Japan
supporting the proposal. While Japan spoke In support it
200
broke no new ground, whereas India expressed strong
feelings on the American amendment to its own resolution
saying:
Adoption of the United States subamendment would,
Instead of contributing to a solution of the Korean
problem, make participation by the North Korean
Government even more unlikely. That Government has
unquestionably used rather harsh language with
regard to the United Nations, but its strictures had
been directed mainly against the resolutions that
had been adopted without its participation. If it
was permitted to take part in the discussions with
out being subjected to humiliation, it might become
more amenable to persuasion.16
The central draft resolution of 1961 was a fifteen-
nation proposal (A/C.I/L.305) reaffirming previous resolu
tions and the United Nations' objectives regarding Korea.
This was adopted by the 1087th Plenary Session as Resolu
tion 1740 (XV) on December 20, 1961 by a vote of 60-11-27.
India abstained while Japan supported the resolution, and
neither contributed substantially to debate.
In 1962 consideration of Korea occurred on both
the symbolic issue and the substantive issue of the organ
ization's goals. The Soviet Union proposed a draft reso
^United Nations, Official Records. Com. I, 15th
Sess., 1145th Meeting (April 12, 1961), Par. 31, p. 34.
201
lution (A/C.I/L.318) which extended an Invitation to both
the north and the south, but this was rejected by Commit
tee I on December 11 by a vote of 29-54-14 with Japan
voting against the proposal while India abstained. While
this vote was not the central issue of 1962 in the Korean
matter, it is noted because of interesting changes which
were to appear in other 1962 votes. On the same day, for
instance, a vote was taken on an American proposal (A/C.I/
L.321) which extended an invitation to the Republic of
Korea and called attention to the persistence of the DPRK
disavowal of the United Nations' competency. The proposal
was adopted by Committee I 65-9-26. The significance of
this vote appeared to be that for the first time India was
not among the abstainers but among those supporting the
proposal. While little original debate took place on the
issue, India made a special point of defending the compe
tence of the United Nations as something which flowed from
the Charter and was not dependent on the whim of a
nation.
*^Ibid.. 16th Sess., 1217th Meeting (December 13,
1961), Par. 20, p. 285.
202
Later a fifteen-nation draft resolution reaffirmed
the previous resolutions and was adopted by the 1200th
Plenary Session as Resolution 1855 (XVII) on December 19,
1962 by a vote of 63-11-26. Both India and Japan voted
for the resolution. Interpretation of this change as
evidence of India*s reconsideration of policy as a result
of the Sino-Indian Border War does not seem unreasonable
although India did nothing to clarify the issue in debate.
One of the major issues raised in debate, however, was the
labeling of the United Nations1 garrison in Korea as
"foreign troops"--a characterization to which Japan took
strong exception. Departing from the usual routine, the
Japanese delegate stated that the United Nations forces
. . . were not foreign troops in the ordinary sense
of the term and the use of the words "foreign troops"
appeared to be part of a propaganda campaign to dis
credit the United Nations forces and the United
Nations presence in Korea.
Japan was especially sensitive over this issue because of
the American military presence in Japan and Okinawa, and
had previously displayed it when Nehru, on the occasion
^ Ibid.. 17th Sess., 1304th Meeting (December 17,
1962), Par. 10, p. 292.
203
of his 1956 visit, had compared Japan and Hungary.
In 1963 the questions of participation and re*
affirmation of past policies arose again. The north-south
invitation issue recurred in a Mongolian draft resolution
(A/C.I/L.334) to which Japan was opposed while India was
found returning to the abstention column. However, when
a fourteen-power draft resolution reaffirming previous
actions was considered by the Assembly a change occurred.
This proposal was adopted as Resolution 1964 (XVIII) by
the 1280th Plenary Session on December 13 by a vote of
65-11-24. Both Japan and India supported the measure.
India did not participate in debate, but Japan noted that
the Korean problem remained unchanged despite improving
East-West relations because of the intransigence of the
north,19 and on a second occasion made a particular point
of complimenting the Republic of Korea for its adherence
to the United Nations' directives and its success in
creating political stability and democratic institutions .2°
19
Ibid.. 18th Sess., 1347th Meeting (December 9,
1963), Par. 27, pp. 195-196.
^ Ibid.. 1350th Meeting (December 11, 1963), Par.
33, p. 216.
204
Following the voting hiatus of 1964, the issue of
Korea returned to the agenda in 1965 for its customary
treatment. A thirteen-power draft resolution approved by
Committee 1 was adopted by the Assembly's 1408th Plenary
Session on December 21 as Resolution 2132 (XX) 61-13-34.
The negative votes were essentially those of the Soviet
bloc, while India, for the third time, supported the meas
ure as did Japan. While India did not participate in
debate, Japan took the occasion to speak briefly of the
successful conclusion of its treaty with the Republic of
Korea. Characterizing Korea as one of the few remaining
legacies of World War II, Japan noted that a treaty had
not been easy to achieve because of the past. In conclud
ing it Japan recognized the Republic of Korea as the only
lawful government, and did so in the belief that it would
contribute to the long-range stability and peace, and
eventually a "unified, independent, and democratic
Korea."21
While the eventual outcome of the issue in 1966
21Ibid., 20th Sess., 1425th Meeting (December 21,
1965), Pars. 38-41, pp. 455-456.
205
was the reaffirmation of the propriety of the United
Nations' role in Korea, the Committee I debate was notable
for Its consideration of a fourteen-power proposal spon
sored in the main by Soviet bloc nations which amounted
to a direct counterattack on the traditional United Nations
position on Korea. Calling for an end to United Nations
responsibility for reunification since it was essentially
domestic matter more likely to be solved through bilateral
negotiation than with United Nations interference, the
operative sections of the draft resolution would have had
the Assembly remove all United States and other United
Nations forces from Korea within six months, dissolve
UNCUKK, and terminate future discussion of the issue by
the Assembly altogether. This proposal (A/C.I/L.389) was
rejected in Committee I on December 16, 1966 by a vote of
21-61-25. India abstained on the issue and Japan opposed
it. While the Soviet Union and its allies persisted in
trying to end future consideration of the issue, they
were again frustrated, and the usual reaffirmation of
the reunification policy was adopted on December 19, 1966
by the 1499th Plenary Session as Resolution 2224 (XXI)
by a vote of 67-19-32. Where Japan supported this
206
measure, India was once more found in the abstaining
column. Why India chose to abstain on this occasion after
casting three affirmative votes for similar resolutions
is difficult to explain, and unfortunately, India did not
elect to clarify the matter during debate. It is possible
that there was no specific cause, but rather an accumula
tion of minute causes which were not unrelated to the
nation's decreasing tensions with China coupled with the
Increased American military presence in Southeast Asia.
Whatever the reasons, it did represent a return to a pre
vious position rather than a new departure.
It would be difficult to overestimate the impor
tance of the issue of Korea to the United Nations or as a
Cold War landmark, and perhaps, because of this importance
it has been particularly Insoluble within the context of
the United Nations. The extremes of the basic positions
which evolved on this question were the Cold War extremes
which could allow for no compromise. On the one hand
there were those who have from the outset questioned the
legality of the United Nations role in the area, and on
the other hand those who not only supported the existing
role but insisted that the organization’s ultimate job was
207
to unify Korea as a nation. In relationship to these
basic positions Japan, in this case, has been the constant
one in full support of the United Nations’ active role in
Korea. As this amounted to support not only of the
American position, but of the Republic of Korea as well,
it was not always easy for Japan to do so cheerfully. The
constancy of that support, however, was perhaps ultimately
helpful in allowing Japan to compose its differences with
its old and sometimes difficult neighbor. It is of great
Interest to note at this Juncture that the suggestions
made in 1966 by the Soviet Union may well contain the key
to the composition of the problem of Korea. So long had
this issue been a ritualized part of the United Nations'
role in the Cold War that the continued Intervention of
the organization may have become a positive deterrence to
the solution of the problem. In any event, in both 1971
and 1972, the United Nations decided not to consider the
issue for fear that it might somehow interfere with the
informal talks between the north and the south.
It was India, in this case, which seems to have
sought a middle ground. While supporting the most ambi
tious role for the United Nations on three occasions.
208
India's real inclination seems to be to equivocate on the
issue without going to the extreme position of the Soviet
Union. While India did, on three occasions, these seem
more evidence of India's pique with China rather than a
reflection of its true feelings.
It seems inappropriate, moreover, to leave this
subject without noting that the means of achieving a solu
tion to the Korean problem suggested by the Soviet Union
in its 1966 attack on the question may have been prophetic,
while all the United Nations1 efforts have been but vain
repetition.
The Hungarian Issue
The involvement of the United Nations in the
Hungarian uprising began on October 28, 1956, some seven
days after the outbreak of fighting. The question was
considered at the request of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France in the Security Council as it became
clear that the revolt was to be suppressed by the military
intervention of the Soviet Union. Debate occurred on
October 28 and again on November 2 and 3 without producing
draft resolutions for votes. As the intervention became
increasingly patent, however, an early morning meeting on
209
November 4 found Che United States proposing a resolution
calling on the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces forth
with. Despite the 9-1-1 vote in favor of the resolution
it did not survive the Soviet Union's veto. Subsequently
the Security Council voted 10-1 to refer the matter to
the General Assembly as provided for by the Uniting for
Peace Resolution passed in 1950.
The November 4 Emergency Session of the Assembly,
22
its second Emergency Session within a week, considered
an American proposal charging the Secretary General with
continuing observation of the situation on the scene and
making reconsnendations toward the ending of the inter
vention. Though adopted 53-8-7 the Assembly's resolution
was in vain. The issue, argued the delegate of the
Soviet Union, was domestic, and the Secretary General's
request for the admittance of United Nations observers
was refused by the Hungarian government on November 12,
1956. Even though supporting resolutions were adopted.
22
The first had been called to consider the Suez
Crisis. Indeed so Intertwined did these two events seem
at the time that it seems almost awkward to write of one
without the other.
210
and the Soviet Union was condemned for its violation of
Hungarian Independence and the United Nations Charter, the
continuing refusal of Hungary and the Soviet Union to
comply with the Assembly's recommendations made their
effect increasingly academic. The major tangible result
of the United Nations involvement was an exhaustive report
on the revolt compiled from interviews with refugees which
tended to confirm the worst Implied by the Assembly's
resolutions. However, faced with a fait accompli, the
Assembly dropped the issue temporarily, but later voted
on a series of resolutions regarding Hungary.
Although this occurred before Japan's admission
to membership the issue was touched upon in Japan's maiden
speech by Foreign Minister Mamoru Shlgemitsu on December
18, 1956, and he left no doubt regarding what Japan's
position would have been when he said,
In regard to the situation in Eastern Europe, we
Japanese cannot but feel deep sympathy for the plight
of the people of Hungary. We fervently hope that
the voice of the Hungarian people will be heard and
that their situation will be relieved in accordance
with the resolutions of the General Assembly.23
^United Nations, Official Records, G.A., 11th
Sess., 623rd Meeting (December 18, 1956), Par. 68, p. 727.
211
In the following month Japan was among the twenty-
four powers sponsoring a draft resolution establishing a
special committee to observe and report on Hungary, and
calling upon both Hungary and the Soviet Union for appro
priate assistance. This was adopted as Resolution 1132
(XI) by the 636th Plenary Session on January 10, 1957
by a vote of 59-8-10. Japan supported the measure while
India abstained. The negative votes, of course, were
those of the Soviet bloc less Hungary.
On this occasion the Japanese delegate referred
to Shigemitsu's speech and added,
. . . my delegation would like to appeal to the
Government of Hungary to reconsider the position it
has hitherto taken with regard to the implementation
of the existing resolutions of the United Nations on
this question, and to cooperate in accordance with
its obligations under the Charter of the United
Nations."4
While India did not contribute to this debate it
had delivered its view of the situation on December 10,
1956 before the 614th Plenary Session. At that time
India's Ambassador Krishna Menon, while displaying no
^Ibid. . 634th Meeting (January 9, 1957), Par.
118, p. 845.
212
Illusions about the objective circumstances of the issue,
declined to support resolutions condemning anyone. "We
believe," he said,
that resolutions which Involve condemnation, which,
in their logical consequence, would be followed by a
declaration of who is an aggressor and who is not,
and would thereby stultify the United Nations, are
not the elements that would assist in a solution,
We deeply regret that, in spite of everything which
has been done, both here, in Moscow, in Budapest, and
everywhere else, the Hungarian government had not
found it possible to arrange for an early date for
the Secretary General to visit Hungary. No one
believes that the visit of the Secretary General by
itself would transform the situation overnight, but
we believe that it would relieve tension, . . .25
Noting that it was impossible for the United Nations to
make cooperation by force, he concluded,
My delegation therefore finds Itself faced with a
draft resolution . . . moved by the United States
and its supporters with considerable parts of which
we are in agreement, but we cannot subscribe either
to its phraseology or the implications of some of
its paragraphs.
India was also careful to suggest no animosity toward
the Soviet Union,
2^Ibid. , 614th Meeting (December 10, 1956), Par.
56, p. 609.
26Ibid. , Par. 60, p. 610.
213
Later during the Eleventh Regular Session o£ the
Assembly the question of acceptance of the report of the
special consulttee arose as a thirty-seven nation draft
resolution. This report was favorably received by the
adoption of Resolution 1133 (XI) by the 677th Plenary
Session on September 14. 1957. 60-10-10. Highly critical
of the Soviet Union, the report was opposed by the nine-
nation Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia. Japan voted for the
report's acceptance while India continued to abstain.
The third important consideration of the issue
during the period of this study was conducted in 1958
during the Thirteenth Regular Session of the Assembly,
and resulted in the most comprehensive single resolution
on the issue. This thirty-seven nation draft resolution
contained nine basic points which were
1. An expression of appreciation for the Special
Committee report.
2. An endorsement of the Special Committee's report.
3. A statement deploring the Hungarian-Soviet
refusal to cooperate.
4. A statement deploring the repression of the
fundamental rights of the Hungarian people by
the presence of the Soviet Union.
5. A condemnation of the Hungarian-Soviet defiance
of Assembly resolutions.
214
6. A call for both Hungary and the Soviet Union to
desist from the use of repressive measures.
7. A denouncement of the execution of Imre Nagy and
Pal Maleter.
8. A warning that the United Nations was continually
aware of the situation.
9. The appointment of Sir Leslie Munro as "watchdog"
on the issue.
The above points, after two days of debate, were
adopted as Resolution 1312 (XII) by the 787th Plenary
Session on December 12, 1958 by a vote of 54*10-15. Japan
supported the resolution while India abstained, and
neither contributed to debate.
The issue of Hungary was revived once more in
1959 in the course of the Fourteenth Regular Session of
the Assembly when a twenty-four nation draft resolution
was proposed deploring disregard for previous resolutions,
calling again for cooperation, and requesting the respon
sible United Nations officials to continue their efforts.
This was adopted as Resolution 1454 (XIV) by the 851st
Plenary Session on December 9, 1959 by a vote of 53-9-17.
Once more Japan supported the measure and India abstained.
While the issue would have been again considered
in 1960 the attention of the organization was preempted
215
by the Congo crisis, and consequently, further considera
tion waited until 1961. The 1961 consideration finally
crystallized into an uninnovatlve sixteen nation draft
resolution which was adopted as Resolution 1741 (XVI) by
the 1087th Plenary Session on December 20, 1961 by a vote
of 49-17-32. Japan supported the measure while India
abstained and neither contributed to debate. Perhaps the
most notable feature of this vote is the extent to which
it seems to reflect the organization's changing member
ship. The dramatic increase in abstentions appears to be
evidence either of the indifference of these new nations
to what perhaps seemed to them a dated European issue, or
their unwillingness to become involved in a Cold War issue.
The finale of the Hungarian issue came in the
course of the Seventeenth Regular Session in 1962, and
centered on an American draft resolution which was first
discussed in the Special Political Committee. While this
proposal reaffirmed all previous resolutions and requested
the Secretary General to take any initiatives which might
be helpful, it recognized that further United Nations
representations on the matter were unlikely to be useful,
and hence, provided the issue no longer be placed on the
216
agenda. This proposal was adopted by the 1200th Plenary
Session as Resolution 1857 (XVII) on Decenfcer 20, 1962 by
a vote of 50-13-43. In this last vote on the issue of
Hungary the continuation of the trend toward abstention
is clear, and the list of abstaining nations constitutes
an impressive roster of Afro-Aslan nations. Japan sup
ported the measure, and India, in apparent reversal,
supported it as well.
Prior to the final vote on Resolution 1857 (XVII)
India asked that separate votes be taken first on the
operative paragraphs the first of which contained the
reaffirmation of previous resolutions while the second
provided for future exclusion of the issue from the agenda.
In voting against the first and for the second India
seemingly sought to demonstrate it wished merely to termi
nate the issue. Neither nation contributed to debate.
There is little in belaboring the basic positions
with regard to the issue of Hungary. Few Issues have
been so clear in dividing opinion along Cold War lines,
or left so little room for maneuver between the position
which held the intervention of the Soviet Union in Hungary
to be naked intervention, and that position which held the
217
entire matter to be a domestic Issue. This, perhaps. Is
why debate on this question was not particularly inven
tive, and why the principals of this study had so little
to say on the question. Both of their contributions to
debate were limited, and this seems particularly uncharac
teristic of India's style in the organization.
There is also little point in belaboring the
relative positions of these nations--Japan clearly sided
with the Western or American position while India, by
abstaining consistently, sought to divorce itself from
the issue as much as possible.
The Issue of Tibet
The remote anachronistic theocracy that was the
Tibet of 1950 had long had a rare fascination for many
Westerners. Even for those who knew the area to be part
of China's irredenta the likelihood that the new Chinese
government would try to control an area so poor and
passive after decades of war and revolution seemed remote.
That government, however, undertook the military occupa
tion of Tibet in 1950 thus rendering academic conflicting
views regarding its proper legal status.
While Japan has had no special relationship with
218
Tibet, India has long been concerned with the region. It
was because of this concern, perhaps, that India, when
speaking to the China representation Issue, was able to
allude to the long peace which had existed between the
nations. It indeed might not be too venturesome to sug
gest that those centuries of peace owed more to the exist
ence of Tibet as a buffer zone than to a continuing Slno-
Indlan agape. The termination of that circumstance began
in 1950 when Eastern Tibet was occupied by China, and
continued in 1951 with the complete occupation of the area.
Since India's attitude was that it was not the automatic
inheritor of British policies in the area, It did not feel
bound to honor the efforts which had been made in the past
to insure Tibetan autonomy. It did, however, note with
regret that China had chosen military action over "more
enduring" approaches, only to be told by Peking that it
was purely an internal matter and that India was still
working under foreign influences. India's mild assertion
of Tibetan autonomy was similarly answered. In the end
India accepted the fait accompli in the name of friendship
between the two nations, and its role in tabling the
Tibetan appeal to the United Nations is testament either
219
to the Immense skill of Chinese diplomacy or the Immense
trustfulness of the formulators of India's foreign policy.
From the outset China began sweeping programs
aimed at the Sinlcization of Tibet by the imposition of
the Chinese language, dress, customs, and the like under
the supervision of communist party cadre. This program
was such that in November 1956 and March 1957 the Dalai
Lama asked Prime Minister Nehru for refuge in India, but
was persuaded by his promises of good offices to return
to Tibet.2^
The whole truth regarding the events of the revolt
in Tibet will probably never be known because of the
remoteness of the area and the absence of objective ob
servers. However, a revolt began in 1958 which was to
continue into 1959, and was marked by the arrival of the
Dalai Lama in India on March 20, 1959 having fled Lhasa
in fear of his personal safety. It was also in 1959 that
the Sino-Indian territorial dispute over some 55,000
square miles of Ladakh and Northeast Frontier Area lands
27
George N. Patterson, Peking versus Delhi (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1964), p. 159.
220
began.
Whatever the objective realities of the situation
some 20,000 refugees were moved to accompany the Dalai
Lama into exile, and journalistic expressions of dismay
over the "rape of Tibet" were common In Asia.
The Issue of Tibet was raised first before the
General Assembly in September 1959, and was placed on the
agenda at the behest of Ireland and Malaya. Since the
dispatch of tangible aid to Tibet was an idea never
seriously entertained the debate which occurred centered
largely on the degree of displeasure which should be
expressed. It was eventually concluded that the events
in Tibet could be safely deplored, and a call made for
respect for the fundamental cultural and religious rights
of the Tibetan people. This was adopted as Resolution
1353 (XIV) by the 834th Plenary Session on October 21,
1959 by a vote of 45-9-26. Japan was among those voting
for the resolution, and it was opposed only by the Soviet
bloc. Perhaps the most striking feature of the vote on
this ineffectual resolution was the list of abstainers.
They were Afghanistan, Belgium, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon,
Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, India,
221
Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Portugal,
Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sudan, Union of South Africa, United
Arab Republic, United Kingdom, Yemen, and Yugoslavia.
Neither Japan nor India contributed to debate,
and the resolution produced no discernible result.
In 1960 a vote of 49*13-35 placed the issue of
Tibet on the agenda for consideration by the Fifteenth
Regular Session, but formal consideration of the question
was precluded by the preemption of time caused by the
Congo crisis. The similarity of the profile of that vote
to consider compared to the previous year's resolution on
the question, however, leaves little doubt that it was
fairly representative of sentiments, and the previous
abstainers were joined by many new members. Again Japan
voted for the issue while India abstained, and neither
spoke to the question.
The issue arose for a third time during the Six
teenth Regular Session in 1961 when a four-power draft
resolution was submitted which reaffirmed the previous
resolution. This was adopted by the 1085th Plenary
Session on December 20, 1961 as Resolution 1723 (XVI) by
a vote of 56-11-29. Once more Japan supported the resolu-
222
tlon while India remained among the abstainers, and
neither contributed to debate.
The press of other issues and, perhaps, the futil
ity of repeating pointless resolutions caused Tibet to
slip from the regular agenda until 1965 when a letter was
sent from the Dalai Lama to the Secretary General calling
for sympathy and support for Tibet which he described as
"on its deathbed as a nation."28 Responsive to this a
seven-power draft resolution was proposed which recalled
previous resolutions and recounting the essential points
of human rights violations in Tibet, called for an end to
these practices. The debate on this proposal spanned
three Plenary Sessions during which a score of nations
expressed themselves. Those nations favoring the resolu
tion did so for the reasons which had been expressed on
previous ones, while those opposing it characterized it
aB an artificial and Irrelevant issue because of its
essentially domestic nature, and an issue designed only
to delay the admission of the mainland government. While
that may have been among the motives, it was not among the
^New York Times, August 21, 1965, p. 3.
223
imnedlate one since the representation Issue had already
been resolved for another year during the previous month.
When voted upon on December 18. 1965 by the 1403rd Plenary
Session It was adopted 43-26-22 as Resolution 2079 (XX).
While there was some shifting between the abstaining and
opposing columns, much the same nations were found not
supporting the question.
While Japan continued to support the Issue, the
most striking change was that of India from abstention to
support. Speaking before the 1394th Plenary Session on
December 14 the Indian delegate delivered an almost Im
passioned admission of error. Recalling India's previous
position, he explained that It had been based on assurances
of China's peaceful Intent. These assurances, he conti
nued, led India to believe that It could better the lot of
the Tibetans more by neutrality than by opposition, but
that now the presence of 50,000 refugees in India demon
strated the futility of that hope.29
^United Nations, Official Records. 20th Sees.,
1394th Meeting (December 14, 1965), Pars. 29-42, pp. 5-6.
224
An explanation of India's change of heart on this
issue would doubtless have to take into account the trauma
of the 1962 Border War, and the Sino-Pakistani flirtation
as well. Even so it is difficult for a nation as proud
and self-assured as India to admit to error at all.
That this reversal has not signaled a revolution
in Indian foreign policy is clear. Indeed it is almost
regrettable that this issue did not arise again in 1966
so it could be compared with, for instance, India's shifts
on the question of Korea. It was, however, a shift which
found India and Japan concurring on a Cold War issue.
The Question of the Palestine Refugees
So complex and emotional are the issues funda
mental to the question of relations between Israel and
the Arab nations that one's grasp of reality itself is
dependent on when one's narrative begins. It is best
perhaps to begin with the admission that the solution
reached by United Nations mediator Ralph Bunche in 1948
was not a perfect one. In a very real sense the greatest
thing recommending it was that it satisfied no one. The
fundamental Imperfection of the settlement lay in the
basic rejection by the Arab nations of the legitimacy of
225
the Jewish nation, and this has remained unreconciled for
over twenty years. An unfortunate victim of this multi
lateral intransigence has been that group of about one
million Arab refugees who have since languished in camps
unwanted by Israel and unassimilated by the other Arabs.
The Arab nations have declined to aid and resettle
these people on the grounds that they should rightfully
return to their ancestral homes in Palestine, and they
have maintained that they are Israel's problem and respon
sibility. Israel, on the other hand, has not been anxious
to re-absorb so many potentially disloyal people, and has
refused to acknowledge that responsibility. As the posi
tion of both sides has solidified, the refugees seemed
hopeless victims of circumstance.
During the period of this study there have been
recurring annual occasions to deal with this issue, and
these most frequently were concerned only with the con
tinuation of relief to the refugees. Measures calling for
the routine renewal of this relief activity were consid
ered in 1957, 1958, and 1959 with no untoward controversy.
In 1957 such a measure was adopted as Resolution 1191
(XII) on December 12 by the 728th Plenary Session by a
226
vote of 52-0-19. In 1958 relief activity was confirmed in
Resolution 1315 (XIII) on December 12 by the 788th Plenary
Session 57-0-20. In 1959 the same theme was confirmed by
Resolution 1456 (XIV) on December 9 by the 851st Plenary
Session by a vote of 80-0-1. On each of these occasions
there was protracted debate before the Special Political
Comnittee to which both India and Japan contributed. As
is often the case these statements tended to become
rather uniform. Japan's delegate, for instance, tended
to avoid reference to the political problems central to
the question, and merely express the hope that the ques
tion could be solved in the near future along with sym
pathy for the plight of the refugees. It was typical too
that the Japanese delegate would recall its nation's long
record of contribution to refugee relief (Indeed Japan had
contributed since 1954) and regret that the contribution
could not be larger.^
The Indian delegate on these occasions was prone
to display a much greater concern with the central polit
ical issues and, although his statements are discemibly
^Ibid., Special Political Com., 12th Sess. 78th
Meeting (December 6, 1957), Par. 41, p. 156.
in
biased In favor of the Arab position the tone was moderate.
In these statements India's position emerges as one which
thinks it unfair to compensate the wrong done to Jews in
the past by new wrong to the refugees, and the conviction
that "payment of compensation, both by law and morality,
was a matter of right and not a c o n c e s s i o n .
In 1960 the issue was not considered, or, more
accurately, circumstances delayed consideration of the
question until the latter part of the Fifteenth Session.
When eventually faced in April 1961 the organization had
two draft resolutions to deal with. The first of these
was an American proposal to empower the Sixteenth Regular
Session of the General Assembly to conduct a full review
of the operations of United Nations Relief and Works
Administration for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) with a par
ticular eye to the rights and future welfare of these
people. Another five nation draft recommended Increased
contributions to relief work and the establishment of
machinery to safeguard the property rights of the
^ Ibid., 71st Meeting (November 27, 1957), Pars.
10-21, pp.“l3?-135.
228
refugees. As debate developed it became clear that the
American proposal was taken to symbolize an anti-Arab
position, while the opposite was true regarding the five-
power proposal. Ultimately the American draft resolution
(A/SPC/L.65) was rejected by the Special Political Commit
tee on April 18, 1961 by a vote of 30-31-15 with India
opposing the measure while Japan abstained. The five-power
proposal, however, was transmitted to the Assembly where
It was adopted as Resolution 1604 (XV) on April 21, 1961
by the 993rd Plenary Session by a vote of 37-17-18. While
India supported the issue Japan abstained. Neither nation
contributed significantly to debate.
In December 1961 the refugee issue was again
considered and two draft resolutions resulted. The first
was an American proposal dealing with the routine conti
nuation of UNRWA, and the second a sixteen-power proposal
calling for the renewal of negotiations on the broad
issues. The latter measure (A/SPC/L.80) was rejected by
the Special Political Committee on December 19, 1961 by a
vote of 34-44-20. Japan voted in favor of the issue while
India, in the company of the Arab nations, opposed it. In
the case of the first it was adopted as Resolution 1725
229
(XVI) on December 20, 1961 by the 1086th Plenary Session
62-0-37 with both India and Japan supporting the Issue.
On this occasion Special Political Committee
debate was opened by a long and heated exchange between
Israel and Saudi Arabia. India, although among the first
to express an anti-Israel viewpoint, spoke with moderation
noting the complexity of the issue, the United Nations*
responsibility in the matter, and the right of the
refugees to a choice between compensation and repatria
tion. "A more earnest attack," the Indian delegate said,
should be made on the refugee situation and the
United Nations should give a lead. It should not be
beyond Arab and Israel statesmanship to endeavor to
solve the problem reasonably and justly in order to
arrive at a settlement which would be in the best
interest of over a million people who had been up
rooted from their homes.32
Japan did not contribute to debate.
Treatment of the Palestine refugee issue during
the last five years of this study was in no way distin
guished from its treatment during the first three years
having again been reduced to routine renewals of existing
^2Ibid.. 16th Sess., 310th Meeting (December 7,
1961), Parpp. 259-260.
230
services and appeals for Increases In voluntary contribu
tions. Such resolutions were adopted as Resolution 1856
(XVII) by the 1200th Plenary Session on December 20, 1962
(100-0-2), Resolution 1912 (XVIII) by the 1269th Plenary
Session on December 3, 1963 (82-1-24), Resolution 2002
(XIX) by the 1328th Plenary Session on February 20, 1964
(without objection), Resolution 2052 (XX) by the 1395
Plenary Session on December 15, 1965 (91-1-7), and as
Resolution 2154 (XXI) by the 1469th Plenary Session on
November 17, 1966 (68-0-39).
On the evidence of the votes alone an identifica
tion of the respective preferences of Japan and India for
either the Arab or Israeli position would be difficult.
Speculation that Japan's concurrence with Israel and
India's concurrence with the Arabs on an issue such as
the defeated 1961 call for the resumption of negotiation
represents such evidence is not overwhelmingly persuasive.
Yet the impression of an anti-Israel bias on the part of
India emerges from their delegates statements on the
question.
For confirmation of this impression, however, one
must turn to the several votes occurring in the Security
231
Council in June 1967 which, though technically lnadmiss-
able as beyond the time span of this study, seems too
useful to ignore.
On this occasion Japan and India were able for
the first time to react simultaneously as members of the
Council, and again while concurring on innocuous issues
went their separate ways on more serious ones. When on
June 14, 1967, for instance, the Soviet Union's draft
resolution condemning Israel was defeated 4*0-11, India
supported the proposal while Japan abstained. With the
lack of verbal evidence it is difficult to determine if
Japan is truly pro-Israel or merely reluctant to offend
other friends. On India's part, however, an anti-Israel
bias seems to be the case. The Security Council state
ments of the Indian Ambassador were discemlbly hostile,
and this hostility continued into the debates of the Fifth
Emergency Session of the General Assembly which occurred
later in the month.
Cyprus
The Cyprus issue seems almost timelessly spasmodic
rather than properly recurring. The hatreds involved in
this issue represent centuries of inextricably complex
232
events tinder several civilizations. The origins of the
troubled recent history of Cyprus are found In Its period
of rule by the Ottoman Empire which left this rugged
Island populated with both Orthodox Christian Greeks and
Moslem Turks--the former representing a four to one
majority. British colonial occupation of the island did
nothing to diminish the hatred between these two groups,
and even during those years when Cyprus served as the
detention point for Jews unsuccessful in reaching Pales
tine there was disorder and agitation for enosis (union
with Greece). By the mid-1950's violence between Greeks,
Turks and the British had become widespread, and it was
then that the United Nations became involved in the situa
tion. That involvement led in 1960 to the establishment
of Cyprus as a separate nation, and to its admission to
United Nations membership.
While it was hoped that nationhood would mute the
old suspicions and hatreds, Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and
the United Kingdom signed a precautionary treaty of
guarantee in which they agreed first to consult in the
event of internal breakdown, and second, reserved the
right to intervene unilaterally on behalf of the treaty
233
should agreement elude them. While realistic, this has
also made it easy for the parties to threaten interven
tion, and strained the relations between those signatories
bound together in other treaty relationships as well, and
unfortunately, the new nation’s domestic politics were
soon marked with violence. By December 1963 Cypriot was
killing Cypriot with fraternal zeal, and the Greek-
Turkish-British peace-keeping force was hard pressed to
police uneasy ceasefires.
Because of the financial crisis of 1964 the
Cypriot government had no choice but to seek help from
the Security Council. The Council (Including neither
India nor Japan in 1963) established the United Nations
Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) hoping this neutral presence
would calm the situation but, as events have unfolded,
this originally five to six thousand men quasi-military
and quasi-police force has never been wholly successful.
Intensely aware at that time that the organization's
commitments to peace-keeping operations could be chal
lenged, members were asked to support this effort with
voluntary contributions, and as the situation has pro
longed itself the existence of UNFICYP has been repeatedly
234
extended for brief periods.
This issue has been immensely complicated by the
mutual distrust displayed by all major actors and their
willingness to think the worst of each other. The politi
cal machinations of Archbishop Makarlos alone may well
provide fascinating material for some future playwright.
It is because of these hatreds and distrusts that such
Intrinsic Issues seem so resistant to solution. Indeed,
confronted by such an issue, so unyielding to the usual
standards of reason and logic, the United Nations appears
particularly ineffectual. Violence is never far from the
surface, and the likelihood of internal political stabil
ity seems remote. When in Kay 19 71 U Thant in the waning
days of his tenure as Secretary General asked for a
renewal of UNFICYP he noted little perceptible Improvement
in the situation, and noted the continuing necessity for
a more than three thousand men multi-national force to
keep the population from resorting to violence.
The first exposure of the Cyprus problem in the
United Nations occurred prior to Japan's admission. Pre
dictably the principle of self-determination was noted as
applicable to the population of Cyprus, and while the
resolution adopted In 1954 had no immediate effect, it
set the stage for further consideration of the issue in
1957 and 1958. This initially desultory consideration of
the issue in 1957 resulted in the passing of Resolution
1013 (XI) on February 26, 1957 by the 660th Plenary Session
(57-0-1). But a simple call for negotiation, it was sup
ported by both India and Japan. Later consideration was
given to a Greek draft resolution (A/C.I/L.197) tending to
favor the island's Greek population though the principle of
self-determination was passed by Committee I. When con
sidered by the Assembly, however, it was rejected by the
731st Plenary Session on December 14, 1957 failing the
necessary two-thirds majority 31-24-24. Both India and
Japan abstained on this proposal and neither contributed
to debate.
At Greek insistence the issue was again raised
for debate in 1956 at which time consideration was for the
most part restricted to Committee I. This debate revolved
about draft resolutions sponsored by Colombia, Iran, and
Belgium reiterating the provisions of past proposals. The
Colombian proposal called for the dispatch of an observa
tion group to promote negotiations and afford good offices
236
as appropriate, the Iranian proposal endorsed self-
government for Cyprus while calling for a conference of
Involved nations, and the Belgium resolution called for
an end to terrorism and the resumption of efforts to
reach a friendly solution. These were voted on in Commit
tee I as A/C.I/L.225, A/C.I/L.226, and A/CI/L.229, respec
tively. The Colombian proposal was rejected by a vote of
17-17-47 with both Japan and India abstaining. The Iran
ian proposal was adopted 31-22-28 with India opposing
while Japan abstained. The Belgian draft was also rejected
11-22-48 with India again opposing the issue while Japan
abstained. In apparent recognition that it would not be
adopted, the surviving draft was not voted on by the
Assembly in Plenary Session.
On this occasion Assembly action was restricted
to the consideration of a Mexican draft resolution which
expressed confidence that continuing efforts would be
made to reach a peaceful solution. This was adopted
without objection on December 5, 1958 by the 782nd Plenary
Session as Resolution 1287 (XIII). Efforts toward that
peaceful solution resulted shortly in the area's perilous
experiment in nationhood.
237
It was the hope that feelings of nationalism
overriding the old hatreds would be generated by the in
dependence Cyprus attained August 16, 1960, but the situa
tion, never stable, reverted to open hostilities by
December 1963, at which point the Council acted to estab
lish UNFICYP, as described, and re-asserted the United
Nations1 role as focus for mediation between the con
tenders .
During 1965 consideration of the question was
largely by the Security Council which had little choice
but to continue its support of UNFICYP in a series of
three month renewals. The most contentious and politically
significant debate on the issue, however, occurred in
December when a draft resolution recommended by Committee
I was adopted by the Assembly as Resolution 2077 (XX) on
December 18, 1965 by a vote of 47-5-54. The thrust of the
resolution was to condemn in advance outside interference
other than that of the United Nations, and, given the cir
cumstances, the target of the resolution was Turkey which
had threatened intervention on behalf of the outnumbered
Turkish Cypriot minority. India voted for the proposal in
the company of other Afro-Asian nations despite the treaty
238
of guarantee's provision for intervention. Japan was
among the curious combination of Soviet bloc powers, NATO
members, European neutrals, and American allies from
elsewhere in abstaining. Those opposing the measure were
Albania, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United States.
The capacity of this intrinsic issue to create surrealis-
tic effects was mirrored not only in the vote, but in
debate as well. While Japan did not contribute to dis
cussion, India's delegate offered the opinion that "there
is only one people in Cyprus--the Cypriot people," and
reassured all that the unity of the Cypriot people was
"sacrosanct" as was the unity of its state.^3
It is unlikely that the adoption of Resolution
2077 (XX) had the slightest effect on any events in this
issue, and had UNFICYP proven unable to establish a mini
mum of security for the Turkish Cypriots it would hardly
have deterred Turkish intervention. Subsequent events
seem to have confirmed the continuing need for a neutral
presence on the Island, and by 1966 the United Nations'
^ Ibid. . Com. I, 20th Sess. 1411th Meeting
(December 14, 1965), Par. 1, p. 357.
239
consideration of the issue was restricted to renewing
(by then on a six-month basis) the existence of UNFICYP.
The issue of Cyprus is one over which it is diffi
cult to generalize or find the usual basic positions.
Essentially it is an issue which almost everyone wishes
would go away. As reflected in the attitudes of India and
Japan, however, it is another illustration of how readily
these nations can diverge, and this illustration is
especially stark with regard to Cyprus which is of so
little real import to either. The problems which plague
Cyprus existed before there was a modern Japan or a modern
India and would survive the destruction of either or both.
Equally, were the problems of Cyprus to disappear or Cyprus
itself to be destroyed by some natural catastrophe it
would make little difference to either. Yet even in this
instance of low intensity interest these nations find
occasion to disagree.
Perhaps the most self-evident conclusion regarding
recurring issues is that the pitch of debate is substan
tially lower on Cold War and Intrinsic issues than it is
on Third World lssues--both in general and on the part of
the principals of this study. Though few issues have
240
shaken Che organization so deeply, the tone of the rhetoric
on these Cold War and Intrinsic questions has remained
measured when one might otherwise expect it to have been
emotional, and perhaps this is made even more marked by
having first been exposed to the several Third World
issues. This apparent difference cannot be explained on
the basis that the principals of this study did not care
about these issues, for some have had a very special
importance to them. India, for instance, cared enough
about the China representation issue to act as sponsor on
three of the occasions recorded here, and even after open
hostilities with China doggedly persisted in support of
its membership.
This generally milder expression on the part of
both regarding the issues of this chapter is all the more
notable in view of the consistency with which they have
failed to concur on these questions for, it could be
argued from the simple evidence of these votes, that each
displays an almost ideological dedication regarding the
Cold War issues at least. The distillation of the record
leaves one with thirty-five votes all of which were con
tentious, and on these India and Japan concurred on but
241
six (17 percent). This evidence would seem to Indicate
that these two great Aslan democracies share few percep
tions, and that evidence becomes more negative on closer
examination. Those few instances on which they did concur
were limited to that difficult time in India's history
following its Border War of 1962 with China, and while it
altered its position on a few occasions, in at least one
case that alteration was temporary. It would be diffi
cult, then, to support the position that this represented
a real change of heart. Indeed this record is exception
ally consistent.
In the case of one of the concurring votes
(Hungary 1962) India's sole motivation was to have the
issue removed from future agendas, and this it made clear
in a preliminary vote. In the case of concurring votes
on the issue of Korea, India reversed itself again and had
returned to its usual stance by 1966. Only on the single
instance of Tibet did India display an unequivocal change
of position.
On these issues, too, the underlying loyalties of
the principles are somewhat clarified--though more strongly
in one case than in the other. Japan's concurrence with
242
the United States on these Cold War issues is complete.
The Indian position, however, is somewhat obscured by its
concurrence with the United States on the six occasions
mentioned and by its free use of the abstention on these
Issues. Formally India and the Soviet Union concurred on
but thirteen of the thirty-five votes (all of those regard
ing China) but on many occasions India abstained in ways
which can be interpreted as favorable to the Soviet Union.
This was the case on five of the votes on Hungary, three
on Tibet, and eight on Korea. As previously suggested,
moreover, perhaps five of the occasions on which India
concurred with Japan and the United States were not of
particular significance.
There is, of course, the alternative of giving
full credence to the Indian interpretation of the Indian
position. As Japan on Third World issues often seemed
in search of a middle ground, so India's positions on
Cold War issues could be seen as a search for a middle
ground, and that would be consistent with their stated
aims. India's dedication to the China representation
issue is remarkably consistent, although on some of the
other issues India may have found total consistency more
243
difficult to maintain. The interpretation of India’s
position on these issues as being some sort of search for
a position between East and West is not Inconsistent and
cannot be dismissed.
This is, of course, the second time that there
has occurred a slight hesitation in the otherwise con
sistent direction of Indian foreign policy, and as that
example occurred in another category of Issues one hesi
tates to accept the "face value" theory without some
reservations. While this second thought may have been
most obviously evident over Korea, it seems also detect
able in the Southern Arabia question after the outbreak
of hostilities with China. While, given the fact that
India had returned to its accustomed stance by 1966, it
would be a mistake to read too much significance into
this deviation, it should not go unnoted, nor unlamented
that India did not choose to explain its reasons for this
episode.
While it is difficult to be mathematically exact,
a look at the votes recorded on the Cold War issues show
that the near perfect Afro-Asian solidarity evident over
Third World Issues here breaks down substantially. On the
244
issue of Hungary, for instance (in 1957 when the organiza
tion's Afro-Asian complement was twenty-eight), India
voted eight others on Resolution 1132 (XI). In 1961 on
the same issue (the number of Afro-Asian members having
increased to forty-eight) India voted in the company of
twenty-nine others. While this number is substantial, it
does not seem great enough to warrant the application of
the term "bloc." Similar generalizations can be made
about the other Cold War issues as well. India has, over
the years, voted with majorities of such nations on these
issues, but at no time has this majority approached their
solidarity on Third World issues.
Regarding the Issues presented here as "Intrinsic"
(the Palestine Refugee and Cyprus questions), it is im
possible to generalize for lack of a substantial body of
evidence. Even if this were not so, glib conclusions
would be made difficult by the degree to which these
issues can be permeated by other kinds of questions
despite their basically self-contained nature.
Cyprus, for instance, since its admission to the
United Nations in 1960 in the company of sixteen new
African nations, has chosen to identify itself as on
245
unaligned nation, and Archbishop Makarios attended the
nonaligned summit conferences in Belgrade <1961) and Cairo
(1964). This may account for the tendency on the part of
such nations to treat the problems of Cyprus as having
been Inspired by Western imperialism generally, and India's
unrealistic assertions of December 14, 1965 on the unity
of the Cypriot people.
In the Palestine Refugee issue India's and Japan's
votes have concurred substantially. In nine of the twelve
votes recorded, humanitarian considerations have prevailed
in order to keep some kind of aid, however inadequate,
flowing to the dispossessed Arabs. On such issues Japan
and India have concurred despite the fact that many Afro-
Asian nations have abstained to express an essentially
negative position lest any hint of approval indicate
acceptance of Israel. Though India has sought to court
the Arab nations by nonrecognition of Israel and general
hostility toward it, it has not seen fit to use the
refugees as a pawn in the game. When on three occasions,
however, matters of principle were introduced as side
issues, India sided automatically with the Arab nations.
On those occasions Japan found itself twice in the company
246
of Israel, and once demurred by abstaining. One hardly
need labor the point that this issue is easily permeable
by considerations generated by the broader United States-
Sovlet Union conflict.
It is more difficult to find a pattern regarding
Cyprus save to note the tendency for India to be in the
Soviet Union's column during the issue's early considera
tion, and for Japan to be in the American column. During
the 1965 debate leading to the adoption of Resolution 2077
(XX), however, India voted with the Afro-Asian group,
while Japan voted with a curious combination of Soviet
bloc and Western nations.
The concurrence of India and Japan on these
Intrinsic issues was on thirteen of the nineteen recorded
votes (including those routine renewals of aid to the
refugees). If those renewals are excluded, however, they
concurred on four of ten votes. Regarding Palestine there
were three Issues which were clearly contentious, and on
all of these India and Japan were in disagreement. In the
case of Cyprus five issues seemed more contentious than
the others, and Japan and India disagreed on three. It is
perhaps worth noting too that neither nation contributed
247
as heavily to debate on these issues as they had on the
Third World questions.
CHAPTER V
THE AD HOC AMD SPECIAL ISSUES
The categorization of issues considered by the
United Nations is difficult as one approaches the middle
ground between extreme types. No one would question the
recurring nature of the issue of Southwest Africa or China
representation, but how can one best categorize the Congo
crisis or the issue of the financial crisis. It does not
seem unreasonable to Include them with the few clearly
identifiable ad hoc issues (the Lebanon Crisis; the
Tunisian Complaint, Bizerte; and the Cuban Complaint,
1961-62) on the basis that they seem to possess a quality
which is more episodic than continuing. This is to say,
really, that they have a more definable time span during
which each episode built to a climax and then subsided.
In the case of the special issues this time span
was fairly protracted, while the duration of the ad hoc
issues was relatively shorter and their velocity greater.
While the idea of international crises having a velocity
248
249
may not be quantitatively measurable, qualitatively it is
the vast difference between a Berlin crisis and a U-2
crisis. In the case of a Berlin crisis there is typically
a significant period during which everyone becomes aware
that “something is going to happen." There is not only
precognition of a developing crisis, but also a measured
and almost graceful pattern to the development of the
situation. There is that most precious commodity of all--
time--time during which that sometimes subtle and elabo
rate threat system which became a characteristic of Cold
War crises is brought into play by both parties. Such
episodes suggest the unfolding of a familiar drama, or
perhaps the unfolding of a chess game the future moves of
which are limited by the opening the players choose.
A high velocity crisis (of which the U-2 crisis
is a classic example) has, however, much greater surprise
and spontaneity. The U-2 crisis was obviously one that
no one planned and illustrates perfectly the kind of
chagrin which attends both participants and bystanders
when they are taken so completely by surprise.
If a study founded on United Nations activity is
undertaken in the belief that it will produce a succession
250
of dramatic and episodic crises, disappointment is cer
tain. These few ad hoc and special issues often represent
the United Nations' most expeditious failures as con
trasted to the Institutionalized failures which are the
recurring Issues. Of these relatively episodic issues
few are eventually really amenable to solution by the
United Nations. As evidenced by Ernst B. Haas' treatment
of the subject in his "Collective Security and the Future
International System,"! the United Nations does not have
a spectacular problem-solving record. In dealing with the
first two decades of the institution's history he identi
fied fifty-five disputes referred to its action organs,
only eighteen of which can be classified as having been
wholly or in part settled on the basis of a United Nations
resolution. Only sixteen of these issues occurred during
the ten-year period of this study, and the majority were
questions on which neither India or Japan were obliged to
take sides--hence, the brevity of this chapter.
Richard A. Falk and Wolfram F. Hanrieder, eds.,
International Law and Organization (New York: J. B.
Lippincott Co., 1^68^, pp. 2$9-3^4.
251
The Lebanon Crisis
Japan's admission to the United Nations came at a
lively time owing to the coincidence of the Hungary and
Suez crises, but Japan's first real encounter with an ad
hoc issue as defined for the purpose of this study did not
come until the middle of 1958.
The circumstances of this Issue were marked by
both high political content and velocity, and illustrated
at an early date the kind of equivocal position Japan
would find Itself in on more than one occasion. The issue
itself was joined by an accusation by Charles Malik of
Lebanon that the United Arab Republic was engaging in
"indirect aggression" and Interference in the internal
affairs of Lebanon by infiltrating arms and armed bands
of rebels across the Syrian frontier. This infiltration,
he added, was accompanied by a virulent press and radio
campaign for the overthrow of the Lebanese government.
The response of the Security Council to the Lebanese charge
was the dispatch of an observation group to verify that
infiltration was occurring. This decision was adopted as
S/4023 on June 22, 1958 by a vote of 10-0-1 (the Soviet
Union abstaining).
252
The limitations on the movement of the observation
group made it impossible to either prove or disprove
Lebanon's contentions regarding infiltration, but in any
event the political situation continued to deteriorate.
In consequence, at the request of Lebanese officials
(acting under the right to individual and collective self*
help provision of the Charter*-Article 52) a substantial
contingent of American Marines was landed near Beirut on
July 15, 1958 in hopes of stabilizing the situation.
Simultaneously the United States called for a Security
Council meeting to deal with the issue, and maintained
the American action was only an emergency measure designed
to protect the "independence and political integrity" of
Lebanon. Out of the debate which took place between July
15 and 22 came four draft resolutions.
The first moves in reaction to the American inter
vention in Lebanon took place in the Security Council
where a draft resolution authored by the Soviet Union
first called for the withdrawal of American troops from
Lebanon (and collaterally British troops from Jordan).
This was defeated on July 18 after only the Soviet Union
voted for the measure. Japan, in its first year as a
253
nonpermanent member of the Security Council, abstained on
the issue in the company of Sweden. There followed a
Swedish proposal to terminate the United Nations Observa
tion Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) and this too was rejected
when supported only by Sweden and the Soviet Union.
A counter proposal by the United States calling
for the expansion of UNOGIL and its supplementation by a
United Nations police force, however, deferred to a
Japanese compromise proposal which was limited to expand
ing the existing observation group to a size commensurate
with its task. While the Japanese attempt at compromise
was defeated by the Soviet Union*s veto, it is interesting
to note for, among other reasons, its evidence of Japan's
continuing faith in compromise during the early years of
its membership. As a result of these Council failures,
the question was sent to the Third Emergency Session of
the General Assembly under the provisions of the Uniting
for Peace Resolution.
The defeat of the Japanese draft resolution was by
no means a total fiasco. It was noted by the Secretary
General that the proposal fell just short of adoption, and
he Increased the size of UNOGIL from 125 to 200 men anyway.
254
This de facto, chough modest, success would have doubtless
pleased the Japanese Foreign Office had not the Secretary
General assumed that the sponsor of such a resolution
would surely be willing to contribute to its implementa
tion. The Secretary General, however, did so assume, and
requested a ten-man Japanese contingent for UNOGIL only
to be turned down by the Japanese government on the basis
of its constitution's famous Article Nine (9) in which
Japan foreswore not only war and its threat as an instru
ment of national policy but armed forces as well. This
was the first time Japan was brought face to face with its
essentially incongruous relationship to the United Nations,
and in circumstances which were particularly embarrassing.
Not only was Japan in the position of refusing to help
implement a decision of the institution it proclaimed as
central to its foreign policy, but also it was declining
to support a measure it had itself suggested. While
embarrassing enough at this particular juncture, even more
serious is that Japan has yet to reconcile this incon
sistency.
While the Emergency Session of the Assembly called
for by the United States eventuated in the adoption of a
255
merely pro forma resolution, there was sufficient debate
to identify the basic position of most important parties.
The divisions on the issue were deep, and had it not been
for the Arab nations themselves suggesting an agreeable
compromise, the Issue's fate before the United Nations
might well have been no action at all. However, Resolu
tion 1237 (ES HI) adopted unanimously on August 21, 1958
by the 746th Plenary managed to achieve the kind of
"lowest common denominator" agreement which is the best
which can be hoped for in such situations. Calling for
mutual respect for sovereignty, noninterference in inter
nal affairs, nonaggression, and the earliest possible
withdrawal of foreign troops, its very triteness and lack
of direction were probably best calculated to cool the
situation.
Though the resulting resolution was pallid, debate
itself was active between August 8 and 21, and scores of
nations (India and Japan among them) expressed their
opinions on the crisis. While the positions expressed by
the principals of this study did not conflict violently,
the tone of their contributions could lead one to believe
that they would have been in opposing columns on anything
256
but a compromise like Resolution 1237 (ES III). Japan's
inclination was to begin from the kind of compromise
eventually reached, and it seemed inclined to accept at
face value the American statement that it wished its
troops withdrawn at the earliest possible moment. The
Japanese delegate strongly expressed his nation's desire
for peace and Its appreciation of the potential for
tragedy in such a situation, but also insisted.
In my view, it is the duty of this emergency session
to create the conditions necessary to permit the
early withdrawal of United States and United Kingdom
forces from Lebanon and Jordan. It is the earnest
hope of my government that all the countries con
cerned will endeavour in a spirit of mutual accommoda
tion to bring such a condition into being.3
India, on the other hand, sought immediately to
Identify itself with Arab nationalism, and went so far as
to characterize the violence which had occurred in Iraq
during July as "misunderstood" and part of the inevitable
United Nations, Official Records. General Assem
bly, 3rd Emergency Sess., 736th Meeting (August 15, 1958),
Pars. 78-91, pp. 46-47.
3Ibid., Par. 91, p. 47.
257
march of Arab nationalism.^ The Indian delegate predict
ably criticized the American and British role saying.
In our view, the whole situation will continue to
be full of danger and will continue to be explosive
so long as foreign forces remain on the soil of
Lebanon and Jordan. There can be no settlement, and
Indeed no talk of an acceptable, workable, and dig
nified settlement, and no return to normalcy until
this element of foreign troops has been removed.5
While the vote on this issue must be recorded as
a concurring vote, the statements of India and Japan
reveal clearly that agreement was obtainable only at a
very low level, and that Japan would not have supported
most proposals India might have suggested. India would
doubtless have supported much stronger resolutions, but
could not refuse to support this compromise sponsored as
it was by the Arab nations.
The Tunisian Complaint— Bizerte
The events occurring in and around Bizerte in
July 1961 were in a real sense an explosion of continuing
French frustration over Algeria--a frustration which was
^Ibid.. 738th Meeting (August 18, 1958), Par. 112,
p. 67.
5Ibid., Par. 117, p. 67.
258
to bring France eventually to the brink of revolution.
France's continuing post-World War II military involvement
had inured the nation to world public opinion, and it is
difficult to say why this incident was different from the
unhappy norm. However, the speed and harshness of
France's reprisal against Tunisia on this occasion seemed
somehow special, and perhaps as important as the fact that
France had crossed an international frontier.
There were, of course, two sides to the question.
Although the immediate cause of the incident was the
Tunisian blockade of the French base at Bizerte in viola
tion of an agreement reached in 1958. it was compounded by
continuing Tunisian aid to the Algerian rebels. Despite
this the nature of the French retaliation seemed to place
the burden of guilt at France's door, and demonstrate its
contempt for the new nations of the world.
The question was raised by Tunisia before the
Security Council on July 22, 1961, and that body called
for an Immediate cease-fire and return to the positions
held by both parties prior to the Incident. After several
indecisive days the Tunisian delegate renewed complaints
of continuing French violations, which, being denied by
259
France, led the Council to a hopeless deadlock. The
inability of the Council to act led the Soviet bloc and
large numbers of the Afro-Asian group to call for the con
vening of a special session by means of a letter dated
August 7, 1961, and the resulting Third Special Session
of the General Assembly set August 21, 1961.
Japan's absence from the list of nations sponsor
ing the Special Session was striking contrasted to its
on-going expressions of solidarity with the Afro-Asian
group, and out of character with Japan's accustomed
willingness to talk about anything so long as sanctions
are not called for. After five years of membership in
the United Nations it might be questioned if Japan had not
here abandoned its dreams of bridging the gap between
developed and emerging nations, but in view of other evi
dence this does not seem the case. More and more the
developing nations, however, have been inclined to regard
Japan with suspicion, and as Aslan only nominally. And,
Indeed, Japan's achievement of material well-being has
made it very different from the typical group member, and
its continuing successes have set it even further apart
from them. Ironically India's more modest achievements
260
have made it easier for them to act enthusiastically with
the Afro-Asian group.
Debate on the Bizerte incident exemplified the
equivocal position in which Japan found itself. While
wanting identification with the group* it did not want it
at the expense of its relations with France* and Japan
neither approved of the events nor chose to vote for reso
lutions condemning France's action.
Coupled with the apparent reassessment of Japan's
position in the Afro-Asian group seems to have been addi
tionally a reassessment of the ultimate importance of the
United Nations to its foreign policy. While no nation
has ever approached that organization with greater hopes *
reality was almost inevitably less than expectations* and
in reporting on the Foreign Ministry's diplomatic Blue Book
in the August 26* 1961 edition of Main!chi it was particu
larly noted that ministry officials had recognized that
the organization was incapable of keeping the peace in
the East-West struggle.
When the thirty-two power proposal noting the
violation of Tunisian sovereignty and calling for imme
diate negotiations was adopted as Resolution 1622 (S III)
261
by the 1006th Plenary Session on August 25, 1961 by a
vote of 66-0-30, India sponsored and supported the issue
while Japan abstained. In the debate which preceded the
resolution India's delegate condemned the French action
saying,
. . . there can be no compromise about the principle,
which, I submit, derives from the fundamental purpose
of the Charter of the United Nations, that the pres
ence of foreign troops on the territory of a State
without the letter's consent and agreement is not
permissible, and that such presence violates the
sovereignty of that country. The United Nations
cannot escape the responsibility for a clear enun
ciation of this principle, which is the basis of the
draft resolution.6
The Japanese delegate, however, noting the expressed
desire by both sides to negotiate said,
. . . the draft resolution contains some provisions
which do not seem to contribute to the creation of
a climate which will enable both parties to arrive
freely at an amicable solution of the problem. For
the above reasons, my delegation finds it difficult
to subscribe to the draft resolution.7
^Ibid., 3rd Special Sess., 977th Meeting (August
21, 1961), Par. 169, p. 29.
^Ibid., 1006th Meeting (August 25, 1961), Par. 72,
p. 134.
262
The Cuban Complaint--1961-62
The mention of Cuba In connection with the United
Nations brings immediately to mind the missile crisis of
1962. While this would seem the most obvious Cuban crisis
to consider, neither India nor Japan was obliged to take
a position on the issue even though their sympathies are
generally known. Japan, understandably apprehensive of
such unstable circumstances combined with the threat of
nuclear weapons, nonetheless rallied to the support of the
United States hoping that everything would be all right.
India, on the other hand, was unconmonly silent, or,
perhaps, too preoccupied with its border war with China
to react vigorously. The extent to which the missile
crisis was treated by the Times of India as of secondary
Importance to the border war seems almost myopic.8
From the American viewpoint, however, the missile
crisis so overshadowed all else that the previous history
of Cuban complaints against the United States has been
obscured, as was debate on the Issues which was typically
a
Times of India. October 20, 1962 through October
28, 1962, passim.
263
Co gravitate from the Security Council to the General
Assembly.
That the relationship of Fidel Castro's Cuba to
the United States was to be unconventional became clear
soon after the revolution. Historically, the United
States has had a proprietary interest in Cuba too obvious
to dwell on, and many Americans were pleased to see the
ragged ranks from the Sierra Maestras depose the venal
Batista government in the belief that this Cuban populist
was bringing a new purity of purpose to the scene. While
routinely recognized by the United States, Cuba drifted
more and more into the world of issues understandable only
in terms of the Cold War, and the ebullient behavior of
Castro and Khrushchev at the opening of the extraordinary
Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly on September 20,
1960 removed any doubts regarding the former's orientation.
As American optimism turned to dismay, hostility
grew and was replied to in kind by the Cuban government.
This hostility was expressed in the United Nations in
July 1960 when Cuba brought complaints to both the General
Assembly and the Security Council charging the United
States with economic aggression and Interference in Cuba's
264
domestic affairs. The Council decided that the issue
might be more appropriately dealt with by the Organisation
of American States, and the Assembly postponed debate
until the Fall and then postponed it again.
It is known now that the Cuban complaints had
substance, for it was at about that time that the United
States Central Intelligence Agency had completed plans for
the Invasion of Cuba, and even earlier in 1960 that agency
had organized hundreds of exiles Into the Frente Revolu-
cionario Democratico. In August 1960, President Eisen
hower had authorized the $13 million budget for prepara
tion of the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion.
Complaints specifically alleging imminent invasion
were brought to the Council in January 1961 and were
debated without action. Subsequent discussion took place
in the General Assembly where debate was rendered academic
by the invasion itself on April 17, 1961. The quick and
decisive defeat of that invasion ended the most inglorious
American foreign policy venture within memory, and lent
credence to whatever charge the Cubans cared to make. It
was obvious that a military adventure of such a scale
could only have been launched with American assistance,
265
and the cover devised by the CIA was embarrassingly trans
parent. Even so, the most dynamic position the Assembly
took at the time was to urge all members to take whatever
peaceful action they could to remove existing tensions.
Again the Issue was dropped only to be revived on November
1961 when Cuba again accused the United States of "immi
nent aggression."
Given the obvious reluctance of both the Council
and Assembly to consider the Issue again, inaction would
not have been surprising, but finally the question was
debated affording the members an opportunity to express
themselves. The focus for debate became a Mongolian draft
resolution (A/L.385/Rev. 1) Calling for noninterference in
the affairs of other nations and reaffirming the principle
of self-determination. While first considered by Committee
1, this draft was eventually defeated on February 20, 1962
by the 1105th Plenary Session of the Assembly by a vote
of 37-45-18. On this occasion Japan was silent in debate,
and India's contribution was brief and platitudinous.9
Q
United Nations, Official Records. Com. I, 16th
Sees., 1240th Meeting (February 14, 1962), Pars. 9-18,
pp. 419-420.
266
The structure of this vote is of interest not only
with regard to the principals of this study, but also as
a confirmation of this regional issue's conversion into a
Cold War issue. The supporters of the draft resolution
included the Soviet bloc and the coterie of neutralists
which was so cohesive at the time— a cohesion which prob
ably gave rise to fears that yet another bloc was coalesc
ing. At the time India was a consistent member of that
group, while Japan was among those voting negatively on
the issue. Abstaining on this question, in addition to
the European nations who usually adopted a neutral stance
on such Issues, were a surprising number of Afro-Asian
nations representing a variety of circumstances, and
illustrating the fragility of that putative bloc.'*-®
One hesitates to assert that the February 20, 1962
vote on the Mongolian draft resolution is a mirror image
of what the Assembly would have done if, by some insanity,
the October crisis had been entrusted to it. However,
their proximity in time and similarity of circumstance
Cameroun, Central African Republic, Congo (Leo
poldville), Congo (Braraville), Gabon, Ivory Coast, Laos,
Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Pakistan, Senegal,
and Tunisia.
267
cannot be wholly overlooked. While It Is unlikely that
the votes would have been Identical, owing to the shock of
the crisis if nothing else, it may be that this relatively
obscure ad hoc issue offers a glimpse of what the senti
ments of the world community might have been in October
even though in this situation the culpability of the
United States was more clearly in question.
The Congo Crisis
The protracted Congo Crisis will doubtless stand
as one of the landmark events in the history of the United
Nations for a number of reasons among which are its exem
plification of the concept of "preventive diplomacy," and
the extent to which the organization became a contestant
in the issue. The notion called "preventive diplomacy"
posits the value of limiting the scope of the Cold War,
and thus callB upon international organization to inter
vene in crisis situations which might otherwise attract
great power attention. In the Congo (frequently cited as
an example of such intervention), however, the United Na
tions became more deeply Involved than it had anticipated.
On June 30, 1960 Belgium ended its eighty-year
rule of the Congo, and the Republic of the Congo was bom.
268
Whether or not Belgium anticipated the breakdown of the
new nation, the disintegration of internal order was swift
as its Force Publique mutinied, and within a fortnight:
requests for military aid from the United States and the
United Kingdom had been made and rejected. As Belgian
paratroopers again moved into some areas, the Soviet Union
charged the West with aggression, and the Congo, approach
ing the brink of the Cold War, requested assistance from
the Secretary General of the United Nations.
The crisis was clearly a matter for the attention
of the Security Council, but the Secretary General faced
the awkward reality that there were no black African
nations on that body. Secretary General Dag Hanmarskjold
was, therefore, careful to consult those African nations
informally, and they unified behind a proposal requesting
Belgian withdrawal and the insertion of a United Nations
sponsored force. Tunisia subsequently represented the
African view on the Council. The Tunisian draft was
adopted by the 873rd Session of the Security Council as
S/4387 on July 13, 1960 by a vote of 8-0-3 (China, France,
and the United Kingdom abstaining). Within four days
contingents of the original 3,500-man Operation des
269
Nations Unlaa au Congo (ONUC) ware deploying to restore
and keep peace in the region. This original force, com*
mended by Swedish General Carl von Horn, contained con
tingents from Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and Tunisia,
and later, when it swelled to 20,000, it also had troops
from the United Arab Republic, Indonesia, Sudan, Nigeria,
India, Ethiopia, Ireland, Sweden, Liberia, and Canada.
Of these contributors India, whose political motivations
were at times questioned, was the greatest with a 5,700-
man brigade.
The mere presence of ONUC, however, was short of
being the magic formula for peace, and it found itself
often impeded by the presence of Belgian troops particu
larly in the area called Katanga which was being encour
aged to secede from the Republic. Because of this a
Ceylon-Tunlsla draft resolution was considered and adopted
unanimously as S/4405 by the 879th Session of the Council
on July 22, 1960. This measure called for the speedy
withdrawal of Belgian troops and their noninterference
with the movements of ONUC.
The question of the propriety of a United Nations
agency's involvement in what could be considered domestic
270
or tribal affairs was a matter of prime concern, While
the feeling remains that such Involvement Is Inappropriate,
under the press of events It became clear that some degree
of Involvement was going to be necessary if the restora
tion of order was to be accomplished, and Inevitable if an
economically viable nation was to eventually emerge.
The adoption of S/4405 occasioned the withdrawal
of some Belgian troops, but in the Katanga area they
remained and excluded ONUC forces. The suspicion that
Belgium was more than a spectator in that area's seces
sionist movement caused the Security Council to respond
by reaffirming its prior resolutions, calling on Belgium
to withdraw from the Katanga, and, while reaffirming the
United Nation's neutrality, empowering ONUC to carry out
its mission in Katanga as well. This Ceylon-Tunisia
proposal was adopted by the 886th Session of the Council
as S/4426 on August 9, 1960, 9-0-2 (France and Italy
abstaining).
When Swedish troops began to displace the Belgians
in the area beginning August 12, the Secretary General,
to keep the United Nations' role neutral, disavowed any
intent to suppress the Katanga separatist movement, and
271
this disavowal proved to be a watershed in the Congo
crisis. Congo Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, wanting all
possible United Nations assistance, voiced criticism of
this policy as did the Soviet Union whose subsequent dis
affection ended this rare episode of Security Council
effectiveness.
In the total collapse of authority in the Congo
which followed, ONUC, in its own defense and in order to
prevent even greater bloodshed, found it necessary to
violate Its rule of noninterference. With the need for
a broader mandate for ONUC the Security Council met to
consider a third Ceylon-Tunisia proposal which called for
the disarming of certain Congolese units and the channel
ing of all aid through ONUC (a barb pointed at both Belgium
and the Soviet Union). Though solidly backed by the Afro-
Aslan group members, the resolution was defeated by a
Soviet Union veto at which point the matter was trans
ferred to the Fourth Emergency Session of the General
Assembly at American instigation under the Uniting for
Peace Resolution.
The result of the Fourth Emergency Session was the
adoption of a resolution containing strong support for the
272
Secretary General and the Security Council's actions.
This seventeen-nation proposal also called for volunteer
aid for the Congo, but aid only to be channeled through
ONUC. It was adopted as Resolution 1474 (ES IV) by the
803rd Plenary Session on September 20, 1960 by a vote of
7-0-11 (the Soviet bloc, France, and the Union of South
Africa abstaining). While neither Japan nor India were
among the sponsoring Afro-Aslan nations, their affirmative
votes supported previous actions. While Japan did not
contribute to debate, the Indian delegate spoke in support
of the resolution saying,
We believe that the Congo should be helped to achieve
unity. The United Nations can greatly assist the
people of the Congo in the achievement of this unity.
It has a positive role to perform. It is desirable
that United Nations should set in motion the processes
of conciliation. Above all, we think, that the Congo
should be insulated from outside military assistance.
The rendering of assistance by the United Nations for
the maintenance of peaceful conditions ensures that
extraneous factors will not disturb or retard the
restoration of peaceful conditions, and will help to
preserve the unity, integrity and political independ
ence of the Congo.ll
^United Nations, Official Records, General Assem
bly, 4th Emergency Sess., 863rd Meeting (September 19,
1960), Par. 234, p. 99.
273
Although Resolution 1474 had clarified the nature
of the division among United Nations members and the
Secretary's mandate, it pacified nothing, and the politi
cal confusion continued to compound around the central
theme of the Lumumba-Kasavubu conflict— a conflict in
which the West felt Increasing disenchantment with the
Congo's Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and increasing
confidence In its President, Joseph Kasavubu. In early
September, there had been a series of political moves by
each which might have seemed comic opera but for their
consequences. Their upshot, however, was that each had
dismissed the other creating in effect separate rival
governments, and the question of which of these power con
tenders merited recognition by the United Nation was to
become the next focus of attention for the Assembly during
its Fifteenth Regular Session.
The basic question which confronted the Assembly
was which delegation represented the Congo. While the
Lumumba group was sponsored by eight African nations all
of which were contributors to ONUC, the greatest support
was for the Kasavubu group, and despite three separate
moves to delay a vote Resolution 1498 (XV) was adopted by
274
the 924th Plenary Session on November 22, 1960 seating
the latter. While the vote was superficially a respect
able majority (54-24-19), It was supported by no African
and few Aslan nations. Noteworthy negative votes were
cast by the Soviet Union and India, and while Japan voted
for the measure it did not contribute to debate at all on
the question during 1960. India spoke for the return of
the question to the Credentials Comnittee in hopes that
events would lead to a reconciliation of the contending
forces. When a vote became inevitable, however, the
Indian delegate said that while recognizing Kasavubu as
Chief of State it would vote against the measure because
it
. . . considers that any decision to seat one of the
contending delegations at this time will amount to the
by-passing of the Parliament, perhaps even a subver
sion of that body. . . . The first task of United
Nations should be to use all its influence and author
ity for bringing about the restoration of parliamen
tary institutions, the convening of the Parliament
which, whatever legalistic arguments to the contrary,
today stands suppressed.12
This vote marked a serious break in the hitherto nearly
perfect accord between the West and the Afro-Asian group.
12Ibid., 15th Sess., 924th Meeting (November 22,
1960), Pars. 131-132, p. 973.
275
and the subsequent arrest of Lumumba by troops presumably
under the command of Congo Army Chief Joseph Mobutu on
November 27, 1960 caused the withdrawal of five African
members from ONUC.
The detention of Lumumba caused renewed, if
futile, activity in the Security Council where a trio of
resolutions were proposed and defeated. A Western draft
for the protection of all human rights failed 7-3-1 (the
result of a Soviet veto), a Soviet Union draft resolution
calling for the freeing of Lumumba, the disarming of
Mobutu's forces, and the removal of all Belgians failed
2-8-1, and a Polish draft calling only for the freeing of
Lumumba failed 3-6-2, all during the Council's 920th
Meeting on December 13, 1960.
Responding to the failure of the Security Council
to act, the General Assembly took up the matter in a
slightly less direct form. The first contending draft
was an eight-power (India among the sponsors) draft call
ing for economic aid, the freeing of all political
prisoners, and noninterference in domestic politics. It
failed 28-42-27 during the 958th Plenary Session on
December 20, 1960. An Anglo-American draft resolution
276
against unilateral Intervention and In favor of the United
Nations' stabilizing the situation failed (43-22-32) at
the same time to gain the necessary two-thirds majority,
and further consideration was put off until the second
session. On both occasions Japan and India were In oppos
ing columns--India voting for and Japan against the eight-
power proposal, and Japan voting for and India against the
Anglo-American draft resolution. In both cases large
numbers of Afro-Aslan nations abstained.
The debate leading up to these rejections was
marked by substantial participation by India's Ambassador
Krishna Menon who, on December 16 before the 950th Plenary
Session, delivered a long and emotionally charged speech
dealing with the inability of the Security Council to
react to provocations against the United Nations forces
in the Congo. In remarks which filled some ten pages of
official records he deplored the breakdown of authority,
the lack of respect for the United Nations, the lack of
respect for India, the indignities suffered by Indians at
the hands of the Congolese, and implied indifference to
Ill
the situation on the part of the Secretary General.^3
Ambassador Menon stated the forceful opinion that the
United Nations should "govern or get out,"^ although he
later modified India's position saying.
We are not among those who would want to withdraw from
there on slight pretext. More than our dignity, more
than our safety, more than our pride is Involved. It
is the United Nations which is involved.15
The Indian Ambassador exceeded his own oratorical
exploits on December 19, 1960 before the 957th Plenary
Session when he responded at length (more than fifteen
pages of official record) to the Belgian delegate's impli
cation that India's attitude might cool their relationship.
This response might be characterized as a reasonable and
measured attack on the Anglo-American draft, a rather
bitter attack on the Secretary General, and a vitriolic
attack on Belgium which concluded by saying that India was
". . , not likely to be Intimidated by the threat of
^ Ibid., 950th Meeting (December 16, 1960), Pars.
179-313, pp. 1449-1465.
14Ibid.. Par. 71, p. 1315.
15Ibld.. Par. 95, pp. 1318-1319.
278
Belgium to spoil relations.”1®
Humor being a commodity rare in the United
Nations' records it would be difficult to resist noting
that at the 1:50 A.M. termination of this tour de force
the Assembly's President adjourned the meeting saying,
"It seems hardly necessary to put the proposal to a
vote."17
The seating of the Kasavubu delegation and the
arrest and subsequent execution of Patrice Lumumba appears
to have done immense damage to African confidence in the
Secretary General and the West. While apparent Western
insensitivity to the feelings of the new African nations
may be explained, it cannot be explained away, and when
news of Lumumba's death was confirmed in February 1961,
the Security Council met again in an atmosphere of hostil
ity and recrimination against Hamnarskjb'ld. After the
defeat of measures which in various degrees condemned
Belgium and demanded the firing of the Secretary General,
^ Ibid. . 957th Meeting (December 19, 1960), Pars.
179-313, pp. 1449-1465.
17Ibid., Par. 316, p. 1465.
279
an amended Ceylon-Liberia-United Arab Republic proposal
was adopted as S/4741 by the 942nd Session on February 21,
1961 by a vote of 9-0-2 (France and the Soviet Union
abstaining). The burden of the resolution was a mandate
to quash the civil war In the Congo by all means, end the
operation of all non-ONUC military groups, reconvene a
Congolese parliament, and re-organize the Congolese army.
This new mandate for United Nations action seemed
desperately needed, and by the summer a force of nearly
20,000 men had begun to restore order to the Congo once
more.
The substance of the Council's resolution was
mirrored in the Assembly when the second session of the
Fifteenth Regular Session met in March and April 1961
and considered a series of similar draft resolutions.
Debate spanned twenty plenary sessions and culminated in
four votes on April 15, 1961.
The first of these was taken on a twenty-one
power Afro-Asian draft which recalled previous resolu
tions, called upon Belgium to comply, called for the
removal of all Belgian and mercenary troops, and called
on all members to effect the implamentation of the
280
resolution. This was adopted as Resolution 1599 (XV) by
a vote of 61-5-33. As a sponsor India voted affirmatively
while Japan abstained in the company of such Afro-Asian
nations as Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo
(Leopoldville), Laos, Pakistan, Philippines, and Thailand.
The second vote was on a seventeen-power Afro-
Asian draft reaffirming the appropriate Assembly and
Council resolutions, and suggesting refinements in the
cooperation of foreigners and Congolese alike. This was
adopted as Resolution 1600 (XV) by a vote of 60-16-23.
Japan, a sponsor, supported the measure while a large
Afro-Asian group which included India abstained. The
Soviet bloc and some African nations voted negatively.
The third draft called to a vote was a Soviet
Union sponsored measure calling for the guarantee of no
acts violating the unity, independence, and territorial
integrity of the Congo, and the convening of a parliament
within twenty-one days. This measure (A/L.341) was
defeated 29-53-17--lndia voting yes while Japan opposed
it. Those abstaining were almost all Afro-Asian nations.
The final vote came over a four-power (Ceylon,
Ghana, India and Morocco) draft to appoint a committee to
261
Investigate the death of Lumumba, and It was adopted as
Resolution 1601 (XV) by a vote of 45-3-49. While India's
vote was affirmative, Japan's was one of fifteen Afro-Asian
abstentions.
Japan, silent through all previous debate, spoke
before the 972nd Plenary Session on March 30, 1961 in
order to clarify its basic position. "My country," said
Ambassador Koto Matsudaira,
is wholeheartedly in sympathy with the legitimate
desires of people under colonial status to shape
their own destiny. We are eager to assist them in
their efforts ultimately to gain independence and we
do so because in the last analysis they alone can
promote their national welfare, freed from any
external intervention.18
In one of Japan's lengthier contributions to debate its
delegate concluded that ONUC’s main objective should be
the elimination of outside Interference, and that it should
be made strong enough for that mission. He concluded as
well that United Nations assistance must proceed on the
principle of respect for Congolese sovereignty and domes
tic affairs, and yet with enough flexibility to cope with
18Ibid., 972nd Meeting (March 30, 1961), Par. 59,
p. 139.
282
the unexpected. Almost parenthetically he added a note of
support for the Secretary General and opposition to plans
for paralyzing the office through reorganization.1^
India's delegate too made another lengthy contribution to
debate before the 977th Plenary Session on April 5, 1961
at which time he pursued India's usual anti-Belgium and
anti-Katanga themes though at a greatly reduced emotional
level.
The establishment of new guidelines for the scope
of ONUC and Secretariate discretion in the Congo by no
means meant the end of difficulties. The establishment
of the new participant role for the United Nations and its
affirmation by the General Assembly did, however, signal
the end to debate for a seven-month period. What remained
undone, however, was the immensely difficult task of
accommodating the warring Congolese elements with tools
still inadequate. What seemed to be agreement on the
formation of a unified parliament vanished with the
apparent duplicity of Mblse Tshombe who seemed again to
19
Ibid.. Pars. 88-92, p. 142.
283
have Katanga on the secessionist road and once more in
conflict with ONUC in August and September 1961. (Ex-
Congolese Premier Tshombe, it will be recalled, then per
sonified the secessionist movement of mineral-rich Katanga
Province for reasons suspected to have less to do with
nationalism than venery and Belgian mining interests.)
It was in the midst of this chaos that Dag Hammarskjold
met his death in an air crash en route to negotiate with
the Katangese leader on September 18, 1961.
While the loss of this respected (and controver
sial) international civil servant was widely mourned, the
cease-fire agreement which followed his death was system
atically violated by Tshombe*s forces, and on November 13,
1961 the Security Council met again to discuss the issue.
The result was a Ceylon-Llberia-United Arab Republic
draft resolution adopted as S/5002 by the 982nd Session
on November 24, 1961 by a vote of 9-0-2 (France and the
United Kingdom abstaining). More than any resolution (at
least any adopted by the full membership) S/5002 was the
strongest grant of power to the new acting Secretary
General U Thant to take whatever measures necessary to
destroy the separatist movement and support the central
284
government. The result In the field was a full scale
assault on the Katanga rebels and mercenaries, and the
resumption of negotiations. Assisted by American Ambassa
dor Edmund Gulllon agreement on unification was attained
in the Kitona Declaration of December 21, 1961, although
the Implementation of this agreement was not always in
good faith. Indeed, it was some time before separatist
hopes were entirely dead.
Unlike the other Security Council resolutions on
the Congo, the General Assembly had no occasion to endorse
S/5002 directly. It does not seem unreasonable, however,
to take the Assembly's December 20, 1961 vote to continue
financial support for the United Nations mission as an
Indirect endorsement. That support was adopted as Resolu
tion 1732 (XVI) by the 1086th Plenary Session by a vote
of 67-13-15--both India and Japan voting affirmatively.
The task of pacification and stabilization was a
long one, and not until January 1963 did the separatist
military operations cease. During 1963 a gradual reduc
tion of ONUC forces began, but the last unit did not
depart until June 30, 1964--leaving the Congo to enjoy a
brief period of relative peace. It was the kind of peace,
285
however, which was to lead to a seventeen-day period of
lusty Security Council debate In December 1964 over con
tinuing unrest and Intervention, and another vague resolu
tion calling for nonintervention and the stabilization of
the Internal situation. This was passed as S/6129 on
December 30, 1964, 10-0-1 (France abstaining) and was never
endorsed or rejected by the General Assembly.
In the Initial stages of the Congo Crisis one
finds a rare Instance of super-power agreement. Even
after Security Council consideration ended, the September
1960 Assembly vote on Resolution 1474 (ES IV) showed a
high Incidence of agreement which was shared by India and
Japan. This early solidarity was to prove unfortunately
vulnerable and disappear completely by November 1960.
Whether wholly justified or not, the circumstances
which turned unanimity into suspicion involved not only
the immediate question of Belgium's good faith on the
Katanga question, but also the issue of how penetrated by
the influence of the Soviet Union were the supporters of
Patrice Lumumba. Whether or not the United States, for
instance, was correct or not in its assessment of Lumumba
is at this point of secondary importance. What remains
286
important is that that perception led the United States
into assuming an anti-Lumumba stance the result of which
was to make subsequent United Nations debate and actions
discordant. Even worse, whether justifiable or not, the
Western insistence on the Kasavubu delegation in November
1960 laid foundations for suspicion between the West and
the Afro-Asian group which was to reach a peak in later
years and later votes. On this issue, curiously, Afro-
Asian solidarity was more legend than reality, for, not
withstanding Patrice Lumumba's latter day sainthood, only
four of the sixteen African nations admitted in 1960 cast
negative votes or abstained on Resolution 1498 (XV). Un
fortunately, the four were nations the Secretary General
had particularly relied upon in this crisis. In this
first issue involving an Afro-Asian split Japan and India
found themselves on opposing sldes--Japan voting with the
United States and the West While India voted negatively.
In December 1960 the votes regarding the fate and
freedom of Lumumba seem further evidence of the deteriorat
ing rapport between the West and the Afro-Asian group, and
also found India and Japan on opposite sides. This was,
at least until December 20, 1961, to continue in subse-
287
quent votes as well.
Taken as a whole these votes on the Congo Crisis
do not evidence great rapport between India and Japan.
When an Issue enjoys a fair degree of unanimity or lacks
substantial conflict, India and Japan can and do agree.
The reverse of this proposition seems to be, however, that
where there Is room for political disagreement on an issue
Japan and India tend to find it. While this tendency is
more marked in Cold War Issues, it cannot be ignored in
Third World Issues. In the case of Resolution 1599 (XV),
for instance, which branded as guilty Belgium and other
Western nations, Japan appeared reluctant to embarrass its
friends in the West even though it thus risked alienating
some members of the Third World. India, on the other hand,
is never reluctant to expose neo-colonialism. Another
characteristic which presents itself is that India seems
reluctant to admit that fellow Third World actors are
capable of even momentary lapses from total rectitude. In
the case of Resolution 1600 (XV), for instance, which im
plied that Congolese officials had not been cooperating
with the United Nations, India abstained, although barely
four months before the Indian delegate had deplored at
288
length precisely that condition.
While this study does not claim statistical sig
nificance, on the evidence of the Congo Crisis, one would
have to conclude that the attitudes of India and Japan
differ substantially. There were in the most active days
of considering this situation nine landmark votes. They
were
1. Resolution 1474 (ES IV) September 20, 1960
(supporting the Security Council action and
calling for voluntary aid)
2. Resolution 1498 (XV) November 22, 1960
(seating the Kasavubu delegation)
3. The Eight-Nation Draft Resolution of December 20,
1960 (calling for the freeing of political
prisoners and noninterference in domestic
politics)
4. United States-United Kingdom Draft Resolution
of December 20, 1960 (calling for no unilateral
intervention and support for the United Nations
activities toward stabilization)
5. Resolution 1599 (XV) April 15, 1961
(calling for the removal of Belgium and mercenary
troops)
6. Resolution 1600 (XV) April 15, 1961
(reaffirming previous resolutions)
7. The Soviet Union's Draft Resolution of April 15,
1961 (calling for no activities violating
Congolese unity, sovereignty, or territorial
integrity)
8. The Four-Nation Draft Resolution of April 15, 1961
(calling for the investigation of Lumumba's death)
9. Resolution 1732 (XVI) December 20, 1961
(affirming financial support for the Congo
operation)
289
Only on Che two least controversial of these did India
and Japan agree, and these were the first (over which
there was a remarkable degree of solidarity), and the
last (which India as a participant in ONUC could hardly
but support).
At this juncture of the Third World emerging with
even greater Influence In United Nations circles, it is
difficult to establish any firm or unquestionable conclu
sions from the evidence of the Congo Crisis. In most
votes there was evident disagreement among those nations
who were often later referred to as a bloc. At this point
in time they acted like anything but a bloc.
If in search of some consistency, however, there
is at least one in the regularity of American and Japanese
concurrence on this issue. While the question of the
Congo was clearly not one of first magnitude importance to
either nation's foreign policy, it would appear that some
underlying interest caused both to travel much the same
path. While there was some correspondence between the
votes of the Soviet bloc and those of India, it was by no
means as consistent as they concurred on five of the nine
votes. Perhaps as significant as those concurring votes,
290
moreover, was the fact that they differed on some Impor
tant Issues, not the least of which Involved continuing
financial support of ONUC. And, as shall be seen in the
next section, that issue was to become one of major sig
nificance to the organization as a whole.
If, as this issue progressed, either India or
Japan had any important second thoughts on this issue
they were not on the part of Japan. In December 1960,
however, it would appear that India was re-examining the
question of whether this issue was worth the candle to
the organization before concluding that it must support
what the United Nations had started. In the long run,
however, India was faithful to its commitment to the organ
ization.
The Financial Crisis
There would seem on the surface to be little
episodic drama in the problems of financing the operation
of an international organization, but it was over such a
question that one of the United Nations' grimiest moments
came. Unlike some other issues the seeds of the crisis
were a rather long time in growing, and their blossoming
in 1964-65 seemed almost anti-climactic. The financial
291
crisis reflected no threat of violence. It was rather
a legal Issue but one of sufficient Importance to Involve
the consultation of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) for an advisory opinion. It was an issue, too, which
Involved little dispute over the objective realities of
the situation, but rather was one concerned with the
meaning and effect of that reality vis-a-vis the Charter
of the organization itself. Because of these circumstances
the financial crisis had the kind of singularity which
may some day make it seem to historians especially impor
tant in the life of the organization--the issue being
whether any member nation can elect to Ignore the Charter
itself whenever it feels moved to do so.
Financial crisis is no stranger to the United
Nations, and, indeed, much of its life has been lived on
the brink of financial disaster. While the first politi
cal act of a new nation may well be to apply for member
ship, its very last financial action is likely to be the
payment of its United Nations assessment. Indeed, were it
not for timely bond Issues and the voluntary contributions
of some members beyond their normal assessments, bank
ruptcy could well have overtaken the organization often.
292
The origins of the financial crisis which peaked
in 1964-65, however, were not so mundane as the cumulative
effect of the inability or reluctance to pay. They were,
rather, the expense of maintaining simultaneously two
extensive peace keeping forces, and the refusal of some
nations to pay their share of the cost of these opera
tions . Both the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)
which patrolled the uneasy truce between Israel and the
United Arab Republic since 1956, and ONUC, which policed
the political birth pangs of the Congo from 1960 to 1964,
were extraordinary on-going expenses far in excess of any
contingency fund the United Nations could have hoped to
have accumulated. While the reluctance of smaller members
to pay for these activities might have been overcome or
ignored, the refusal of two major powers--the Soviet
Union and France--represented a deficiency too large to
bear gracefully if at all. By 1964 the arrears of the
Soviet Union alone were the equivalent of half the organ
ization's annual budget, and by September of that year the
total arrears for the peace-keeping missions specifically
was $112,300,000.
While a detailed history of this crisis Is
293
inappropriate here. It would be unrealistic not to note
that it resolved Itself into a struggle between the United
States on the one hand, and France and the Soviet Union on
the other, over the authority of the organization to make
financial assessments for peace-keeping operations within
the meaning of the United Nations Charter.^0 It became,
too, a kind of test of whether the United States could
continue its position of dominance within the organization
at a time when its membership structure was undergoing
rather extraordinary changes.
The financial crisis itself might be thought of
as developing in two phases; the first centering on the
meaning of Article 17 (1) and (2) of the Charter dealing
with the approval and payment of the budget, while the
second involved the application of Article 19, which pro
vided for loss of vote in the Assembly for nations two
years in arrears in paying its assessment. While the
first hint of the Soviet Union's unwillingness to pay its
20
For an exhaustive study, see Laurence Schirman
and David Wilkinson, International Law and Political
Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968}, pp.
211-249.
294
share of ONUC expenses came from the Czech delegate on
Committee V on October 21, 1960, given the history of the
Soviet Union's refusal to support UNEF, the import of the
statement within the context of the Soviet bloc was not
lost. Following the flat Czech assertion that It would
refuse to finance an "imperialist conspiracy," however,
subsequent arguments by the Soviet Union took the more
legalistic line that it would not support operations which
had not been properly authorized. The Secretary General,
they maintained, had exceeded his authority, and these
were not expenses within the meaning of Article 17. The
contrasting American position was that they were within
the meaning of Article 17, and it was this view which pre
vailed with the adoption of Resolution 1583 (XV) by the
958th Plenary Session on December 20, 1960 by a vote of
47-17-24. Japan voted for the proposal while India
abstained, and neither chose to express themselves on the
issue.
While this victory for the American position gave
apparent weight to the legality of the extraordinary
expenses, it had no effect on the delinquent members, and,
faced with the continuing refusal to pay, additional
295
weight was sought in the form of an advisory opinion from
the ICJ on the meaning and applicability of Charter Arti
cle 17 (1) and (2) to the circumstances.
Even when questioning the competence of the ICJ to
deal with deeply contentious cases, the integrity of the
Court is seldom questioned. Yet, it is no secret that
judges are men, and that in practice their legal opinions
rarely stray far from the views of their nations. Con
sequently, even though the wording of the request for the
advisory opinion was made as legalistic as possible, its
political importance could not be masked. As submitted
to the Court the question was simply if expenditures for
UNEF and ONUC were "expenses of the organization" within
the meaning of Article 17 (2), and even this, it was
argued by some nations including India in debate before
Committee V, was too political a question. The proposal^
to request the opinion was adopted and the Court, in turn,
handed down a split opinion on the question on July 20,
1962. Argumentation before the Court followed wholly
Resolution 1731 (XVI) was adopted December 20,
1961 with Japan's support and India's opposition.
296
predictable lines, and there were contrasts though no
surprises in the nine*to-six decision that the peace
keeping expenditures were within the meaning of the
Charter. (The justices from both France and the Soviet
Union were among those dissenting.) What followed con
firmed the Indian opinion that the issue was "too politi
cal."
While rejections of opinions and decisions of the
ICJ are rare, it was soon clear that this opinion would
alter no one's position. No opinion of the Court, oppo
nents argued, could give legality to obviously illegal
operations, nor confer legal powers to the General Assem
bly which it did not possess under the Charter. With the
basic jurisdictional and technical competence of the Court
itself being challenged, the General Assembly found Itself
in the position of having to decide if it should accept
the opinion of the Court despite evidence that acceptance
would accomplish nothing. Many members felt that it might
be best to avoid the issue directly by merely "taking
note" of the advisory opinion, but the majority felt the
Court's opinion should be simply "accepted." Many who had
opposed Resolution 1731 (XVI), Including India, felt it
297
would be unwise to demean the authority of the organiza
tion's highest legal organ, and voted that acceptance.^2
The vote to accept the advisory opinion was an over
whelming 76-17-8. Neither principal of this study spoke
on the issue at the time though support for the American
position was a major point of Foreign Minister Masayoshi
Ohira's September 21, 1962 General Debate address to the
General Assembly.
While the effect of Resolution 1854 (A) and (B)
appears to be the isolation of the delinquent members and
the formation of a solid front against them, they remained
as unmoved by the Assembly action as they had been by the
Court. The year of diplomacy which followed was as un
productive as those which had gone before.
The question of applying the organization's sole
sanction against financial delinquents as provided in
Article 19 did not arise suddenly, nor was it introduced
by the United States, nor was its first target the Soviet
Union. The automatic invocation of Article 19 was
expected by many, for it had very nearly been invoked
^Resolution 1854 (A) and (B) (XVII), December 19,
1962.
298
against Haiti In 1963. Whlla deprivation of the Assembly
vote for nations two years delinquent in assessed contri
butions is a credible threat against a member the size of
Haiti, the credibility of the threat seems to diminish in
direct proportion to the increasing size and importance
of the member, and the apparent enthusiasm with which the
United States took up the issue in direct confrontation
with the Soviet Union is, for that obvious reason, sur
prising. As the January 1, 1964 date for passing the two
years arrears mark approached, the United States appeared
to welcome the coming showdown, and in December 1963
American Ambassador Adlal Stevenson made it clear that the
challenge would be made on the basis that rigid adherence
to the Charter was essential. With the issue joined the
United States hoped to reconstruct, if possible, the sub
stantial solidarity enjoyed by Resolution 1854 (XVII).
As had been the case regarding Article 17 the American
arguments were legal, and sought to avoid the political
realities of the situation. The contention that the
application of Article 19 was a matter of mathematical
calculation rather than a political choice would doubtless
have scored well in a debate contest, but it lost much
299
force in the face of the Soviet Union's promise to treat
such an application as an unfriendly act with political
consequences. Implicit was the threat that if denied the
vote in the General Assembly the Russian delegation would
no longer be present. While some stood firm in the face
of the threat, others wavered fearing for the life of the
organization itself, and the solidarity began to crumble.
Those who stood for the upholding of the principle of
collective responsibility such as Japan, ^3 were often to
have second thoughts as the question continued to inhibit
the Assembly. The United States, despite having won all
the battles faced losing the war, and had only the threat
of reconsidering its own obligations to fall back on.
In order to avoid a confrontation over Article 19
in 1964, the normal opening date for the regular General
Assembly session was twice delayed in hopes that negotia
tions would strike upon some compromise solution, but
proposal after proposal was advanced only to be rejected.
23
See the address of Ambassador Akira Matsui to
the UN Correspondents on June 16, 1964. Japan Report. X,
No. 12 (June 30, 1964), 6-7.
300
AC length the Assembly did meet under an interim agree
ment which avoided voting by decreeing that the Assembly
had acted provided there were no objections to an issue--
an arrangement which was at best awkward in matters of
minor consequence, and otherwise wholly futile. Con-
J
fronted with the clearly unsatisfactory nature of the
prolonged operation of the interim arrangement to avoid
voting, the loss of support feared by the United States
because of its participation in the Stanleyville rescue
operation in November 1964,^4 the increasingly appar
ent desire on the part of many members to return to normal
voting procedures, the American position collapsed.
Defeat was confirmed on August 16, 1965 when Ambassador
Arthur Goldberg rose to Inform the Assembly that the
United States, while still adhering to the principle that
24
It will be remembered that American Air Force
planes had been used to transport 600 Belgian paratroopers
to Stanleyville (now Kisangani) on November 24, 1964 in a
largely successful attempt to rescue a group of hostage
noncombatant Europeans whose lives were being threatened
by the rebels. While 29 were executed by the rebels, by
the time the operation was concluded on November 28, 1964,
some 1,800 Europeans and 300 Congolese had been rescued
and airlifted to Leopoldville (now Kinshasa).
301
Article 19 was applicable In the situation, would not
Insist on ltB Invocation so that the normal procedures of
the Assembly might resume. The Ambassador added a warning
that the United States would not feel bound in the future
to pay for United Nations activities to which it objected
--a hollow threat unaccompanied by specific action.
It is difficult not to ask why this issue was
forced if the United States was unwilling to press it to
its logical conclusion, and how deeply, in the long run,
may the legal authority of the Charter be affected by
having been rejected for convenience by the two super
powers. While it is too soon to render judgment, it is
conceivable that in retrospect this crisis may be viewed
as a watershed in the history of the United Nations com
parable to that of the withdrawal of Japan from the League
of Nations. Some day Wilkinson's assessment of the impor
tance of the issue as a minor and momentary loss of
American prestige may seem of secondary importance to what
i t meant to the very legal fabric of the o r g a n i z a t i o n , ^
at the very least the substantial nonpayment of these
^Schirman and Wilkinson, op. clt., p. 248.
302
obligations Is the main factor contributing to the United
Nations' chronically precarious financial situation.
Both India and Japan were curiously mute during
direct debate over the landmarks of this issue, but did
express themselves in the course of general debate.
Before the 1290th Plenary Session on December 4, 1964( the
Japanese delegate treated the issue as one among many.
Japan's support for the American position was firm, and
while recognizing the primary responsibility of the Coun
cil in such matters, maintained that "the General Assembly
should act on behalf of the Security Council if the latter
is unable to perform its peace-keeping function because of
the exercise of the veto."
The Indian delegate took note of the question
before the 1301st Plenary Session on December 14, 1964
though rather more resignedly. Expressing India's adher
ence to the principle of collective responsibility, he
said, "We at the same time recognize that no member state
can be compelled to contribute either troops or funds to
such operations." The avoidance of confrontation and the
definition of the scope of the Assembly's powers and
functions seemed of utmost importance to India.
303
So awkward had been Che prolonged voting crisis in
the General Assembly and so fearful had members been of an
even more basic disruption that the end of American
Insistence on the application of Article 19 was met with
an audible sigh of relief. In both the worlds of journal
ism and diplomacy this return to normalcy was applauded by
those on both sides of the issue.
Japan had been steadfast in its support of the
American position and the United Nations' right to assess,
and had voted positively on the three crucial resolutions.
India's record shows it voting twice negatively and once
positively. At the least the Indian abstention on Resolu
tion 1583 (XV) seems inconsistent in light of its intimate
involvement in ONUC. Why would any nation contribute so
generously in terms of manpower to an activity it did not
believe to be a normal and legal thing for the United
Nations to be doing, and what other interpretation can be
made of Krishna Menon's "hawkish" speeches of December 16
and 19, 1960 on the Congo situation.2® In the case of
Resolution 1731 (XVI), however, whatever the political
26
See pp. 276-278 supra.
304
influences on India may have been, their arguments about
the relative legal and political content of the request
for the advisory opinion were certainly borne out by
events. Perhaps of greatest interest was the change in
India's position on Resolution 1654 (XVII) which supported
the Court's position once it had rendered an opinion. In
this instance India argued that regardless of the wisdom
of the request in the first place, the opinion, once
given, must be honored if the authority of the court is
to remain unblemished.
While these ad hoc and special issues do not con
stitute a large enough body of evidence to warrant any
generalizations as such, their correlation to the other
evidence will be treated in the concluding chapters.
CHAPTER VI
THE ATOM, ARMS CONTROL, AND OUTER SPACE
In writing of the Intricacies of arms control,
atomic energy, and the technological innovations important
to international relations the trend has been to treat the
subjects separately. The choice in this study to consider
these Issues together in a general category is for the
purpose of convenience and because of the conviction that
they are important for many of the same reasons.
As previously suggested both India and Japan have
manifested many differences, and high among these have
been distinct outlooks on military matters since World
War II. Traditionally, Japan has placed a high value on
the martial arts and virtues. This cultural preoccupation
was one of the features of Japanese life which fascinated
some of the first Western observers, and the esteem in
which the military was held during much of Japan's modem
history was great. The metamorphosis caused by Japan's
defeat in World War II has made the Japanese today the
305
306
apparent antithesis of their former chauvinistic selves.
Today, devotion to Article 9, the unprecedented constitu
tional provision renouncing not only war as an instrument
of foreign policy but the maintaining of armed forces as
well, neutralism, and the display of militant pacifism
have become the earmarks of a vocal segment of Japanese
society. One of the more obvious evidences of this out
look has been the designation of Japan's military estab
lishment euphemistically as the National Police Reserve
(Keisatsu Yobitai), the Safety Force (Hoantai), and
finally the Self-Defense Force (Jieitai), and its slow
growth from an initial size of 75,000 to its present size
of under a quarter of a million. They too have been
unwilling to dignify the military by including it in the
cabinet, and unwilling to admit the possibility of using
this force outside the home islands.
Nongovernmental manifestations of neutralism,
pacificlsm--dramatic as they are--seem often taken for
the mainstream of Japanese public opinion barely sup
pressed by the conservative government. While the
Japanese public opinion polls reported in Douglas Mendel's
The Japanese People and Foreign Policy indicated in
307
August 1957 a reluctance to approve rearmament or the
amendment of Article 9* they also showed 64 percent of
those Interviewed answering yes to the question, "Does
Japan need military forces?" Almost forgotten too Is the
reality that even an event as climactic as the 1960 riots
preventing the Elsenhower visit, while toppling a Prime
Minister, did not prevent the renewal of the Mutual
Security Pact or break the rule of the Liberal-Democratic
Party. Nor, moreover, after a decade of anticipation,
were the antl-Security Pact forces able to make a good
showing In the crucial Diet elections of 1969 prior to Its
decennial renewal date. Yet the annual observances at
Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Yaizu^ are recurring reminders of
the depth of this sentiment.
Generalizations about India's "national attitude"
toward the military must be undertaken with great caution,
too, since India's history is not one history, and since
Yaizu is the Shizuoka fishing town which was the
home port for the Ill-fated "Fortunate Dragon" which was
dusted with nuclear fallout as a result of the American
hydrogen bomb test of March 1, 1954 on Eniwetok island.
308
the attitudes of India as a modern nation have been
colored by its experience as a colony. While there are
in that nation some extremely life-revering sects--such
as the Jains--there is also in the mainstream of the Hindu
caste system an esteemed warrior class to say nothing of
other noted martial traditions such as the Punjabi and
Sikh. What appears to emerge is a national attitude which
has neither disparaged nor defied the military.
India's views of national priorities, however,
have conspired to relegate the military to a rather low
position at least until 1962. India's nonalignment, its
early courting of China, and its emphasis on economic
development have combined to de-emphasize its Importance.
The Indian army, equipped with weapons modem in World
War I, was disastrously mauled by the Chinese in the North
East Frontier Area in 1962, and this, combined with subse
quent encounters with Pakistan, probably account for
2
sharply increased defense budgets.
2
K. Subrahmanyan, "Five Years of Indian Defense
Effort in Perspective," International Studies Quarterly,
XIII (June 1969), 159-189.
309
Despite its technological deficiencies India has
been active in support of the United Nations1 peace
keeping activities and in its own behalf as well. To
India's credit few nations have been as willing to con
tribute to the organization's peace-keeping and observa
tion operations and perhaps few have seemed so suited to
representing a neutral presence owing to the nation's
nonalignment in the Cold War. The invaluable role played
by Indian forces in the Operation des Nations Unies au
Congo (ONUC) and the United Nations Emergency Force
(UNEF) are noteworthy, although it should also be noted
that the nation's response to the demands of the inter
national organization have not been automatic as evidenced
by its minimal participation in Korea.
India has also used its armed forces in its own
behalf, having had occasion to engage both Pakistan and
China, and it also used force to snuff out the Portuguese
enclaves of Goa, Diu, and Damao. However, both conscious
choice and economic reality have conspired to restrict
the Indian military establishment to a secondary position
no larger than one capable of coping with its subconti
nental neighbors.
310
There le no particularly graceful or meaningful
way to present the data necessary for this chapter, and
hopefully Its presentation chronologically within the
major categories will serve as It has elsewhere. As Is
also true elsewhere In this study, these data are not
exhaustive Inasmuch as many votes are really duplications
over the same basic Issue. The votes presented here then
are a distillation of those believed to be of greatest
significance.
Prior to Japan's admission to the United Nations,
India had some ten years of membership during which to
establish a record on arms control Issues the essence of
which might be characterized as a relatively primitive
approach to such questions. India's conviction appears
to have been that fear of aggression is at the root of
conflict and that only when the possibility of war has
been physically precluded will nations turn to peaceful
solutions. India's "the way to disarm is to disarm"
approach to the subject, then, led it to encourage all
great power moves in the direction of arms limitations.
Its favoring of any move to outlaw weapons regardless of
circumstances and controls has made its position most
311
compatible with that of the Soviet Union. Until 1957,
moreover, It appears for reasons which have never become
apparent merely reacting to great power proposals, but
since then has been more free in expressing Its own
views. ^
Japan soon began to establish a voting record, and
was doubtless pleased to be among the eighteen nations
sponsoring Resolution 1115 (XI) on the peaceful uses of
atomic energy which was adopted unanimously by the 637th
Plenary Session on January 11, 1957. During the following
year it was to find two occasions to express Itself on
atomic energy issues, and eleven dealing with arms control.
A variety of United Nations groups have addressed
themselves to questions regarding arms regulations and
atomic energy aside from the General Assembly, the first
of which, curiously, was the defunct Military Staff Com
mittee. It was evidenced early that there was an appre
ciation of the difference in the nature of atomic and
conventional weapons, and almost from the outset discus-
A more extensive summarization of this period can
be found In Berkes and Bedi, The Diplomacy of India,
pp. 62-79.
312
slons were held separately on many substantive matters in
the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Con*
ventlonal Armament. While some attempts were made to
consolidate these issues In the early 1950's, their
independence has prevailed and each has evolved an arena
for negotiation particularly tailored to the demands of
the nations most directly Involved. In the case of atomic
energy, after the early and fruitless efforts of the
Atomic Energy Commission, the scene of debate has often
been the General Assembly where there has continued to be
a sufficiently intimate connection between the issues to
warrant treating them in the same section of this study.
The first consideration of these issues during
the period of this study was in 1957 culminating on
November 14, 1957 before the 716th Plenary Session which
unanimously adopted Resolution 1145 (XII) establishing a
formal relationship between the United Nations and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Resolution
1147 (XII) establishing a committee to study the effects
of radiation. The greatest contention, however, had
occurred in Committee I where a Japanese proposal
(A/C.I/L.174) calling for a simple suspension of nuclear
313
tests was defeated by a vote of 18-32-31. While Japan aa
sponsor voted for the proposal, India abstained. An
Indian draft resolution calling for a test ban in connec
tion with a variety of atomic and arms controls measures
was also debated and finally reached the General Assembly
where it was rejected by its 718th Plenary Session on
November 19, 1957 by a vote of 24-34-20 with India voting
for the measure while Japan abstained.
While India left its abstention on the Japanese
proposal unexplained, Japan explained its abstention on
the India draft resolution as a reflection of its convic
tion that India's elaborate preconditions "were not the
way to obtain the suspension with any degree of imme
diacy . The rejection of their simpler proposal left
the Japanese delegate "perplexed but not dismayed.
The most comprehensive atomic weapons resolution
was the November 14, 1957 Resolution 1148 (XII) which made
^United Nations, Official Records. General Assem
bly, 12th Sess., 716th Meeting (November 14, 1957), Par.
94, p. 458.
^Ibld.. Par. 95, p. 458.
314
recommendations on suspension, reducing production of
fissionable material, reducing stocks of arms, and inspec-
tion. Though adopted by the 716th Plenary Session by a
vote of 59-9-15 both India and Japan abstained without
explanation.
The issue of arms control, too, saw proposals
adopted and defeated. The first proposal adopted was
originally a Belgian draft resolution calling for dissemi
nation of information regarding the dangers of a continuing
arms race and the destructive modem weapons. This was
passed as Resolution 1149 (XII) on November 14, 1957 by
the 716th Plenary Session by a vote of 71-9-1 with both
Japan and India voting for the measure.
Discussion and votes were also addressed to the
continuation of the disarmament committee and the nature
of its membership. The most important of these proposals
was the Soviet Union's draft resolution (A/L.230) which
conflicted directly with an alternative six-power draft--
a confrontation further complicated by the introduction
of an Albanian proposal (A/L.236). These were considered
by the 719th Plenary Session on November 19, 1957. The
first voted on was the Soviet Union's draft which sought
315
to expand the membership of the Disarmament Committee to
that of the whole as contrasted to the six-power proposal
which called for a small representative expansion of its
membership. The Soviet Union's proposal was defeated
9-46-24 with Japan voting against the proposal while India
abstained.
The Albanian proposal was considered next, and
defeated 19-38-19 with India voting for the measure while
Japan voted against it. The distinguishing feature of
this measure was that its limited expansion of the com
mittee's membership Included a higher proportion of neu
trally oriented nations. Although potentially in conflict
with the six-power draft (sponsored both by Japan and
India in the company of Canada, Paraguay, Sweden, and
Yugoslavia) the Indian delegate explained his favorable
vote on the basis that its suggestions on membership were
by no means the only acceptable ones.
Decision was reached at length with the adoption
of the six-power draft as Resolution 1150 (XII) by a vote
of 60-9-1 with India and Japan voting for the resolution
they had sponsored. These votes during 1957 totaled 9--
5 relating to atomic energy questions and 4 to other
316
disarmament questions. Japan and India concurred in all
the Important questions, although they disagreed on four
questions of lesser Importance.
In 1958 there were six relatively Important votes
on Issues Involving atomic energy weapons and three relat
ing to disarmament. Three of the atomic energy Issues
were decided In Committee I on October 31, 1958. The
first of these were an Irish draft resolution (A/C.1/206)
and a fourteen-power draft resolution (A/C.I/L.202 Rev.l
and Add.1,2) which addressed themselves to nuclear pro
liferation and the discontinuation of nuclear testing
respectively, and which were defeated In the first case by
a vote of 37-0-44 and in the second by a vote of 26-36-19.
In both cases India supported the measure while Japan
abstained. The third measure (a seventeen-power proposal
for a test ban while negotiations were in progress) was
passed on to the 779th Plenary Session which adopted It
on November 4, 1958 as Resolution 1252A (XIII) by a vote
of 49-9-22. Both India and Japan abstained. At the same
time Resolution 1252B (XIII) (which urged the seeking of
a test ban through the assistance and good offices of the
Secretary General) was adopted 55-9-12. Once more both
317
nations chose to abstain, and on neither occasion did
they did explain their abstentions.
On December 13, 1958 two additional resolutions
regarding atomic questions were adopted without negative
votes. These were Resolution 1344 (XIII) approving the
work of the conference on the peaceful uses of atomic
energy, and Resolution 1347 (XIII) commending the report
on the effects of radiation.
In the area of disarmament a notable Soviet Union-
sponsored draft resolution was debated before Committee I
(A/C.I/L.304), and rejected October 31, 1958 by a vote of
10-39-32. The essence of the Soviet Union's proposal was
to reduce military budgets by an across-the-board 10 to 15
percent and to channel the monies saved into aid and
development programs. While this kind of proposal is
often dismissed as an empty gesture, the Soviet Union has
been successful in using such gestures to court the Third
World with little risk. While India abstained on this
issue, Japan voted against it. Rather typically in debate
Japan cautioned against attempting great leaps before even
small steps had been taken, saying "all useless rhetoric
318
and unworkable proposals should be avoided.
Two other diearmament related measures were
adopted by the 779th Plenary Session on November 4, 1958
as Resolution 1252C (XIII) and 1252B (XIII) by respective
votes of 75-0*3 and 75-0-3. These measures called for the
study of the disarmament committee. Japan and India con
curred In support of both measures.
During this year the principals of this study
found themselves concurring In six of the nine cases at
hand and on all adopted resolutions. Once more the
Instances of nonconcurrence were over rejected issues
such as the unqualified nuclear test ban and the broad
percentile decrease in military budgets. During the
nearly two months of debate the approaches of the two dele
gations showed nothing unexpected. India's support or
opposition to particular issues tended to remain as ver
bally colorful as was the accustomed style of Ambassador
Krishna Menon, while the approach of the Japanese remained
essentially "low posture."
6Ibid.. Com. I, 13th Sess., 965th Meeting (October
28, 1958, Par. 32, p. 117.
319
Setting the year 1959 apart from the predictable
considerations on atomic energy questions was the Immi
nence of France's first atomic weapons test in the Sahara
which eventually took place on February 13, 1960. Con
sideration of this impending test was undertaken by
Committee Z in November, and culminated on the twelfth
with two votes. The first of these rejected a rather
mild three-power draft against the tests while an Afro-
Asian draft resolution (with both India and Japan among
the sponsors) was adopted. It was this proposal, asking
France to refrain from conducting the test, which was
adopted as Resolution 1379 (XIV) by the 840th Plenary
Session on November 20, 1959 by a vote of 51-16-15. Both
Japan and India supported the resolution, although the
tone of their rhetoric on the issue differed markedly.
Once more Krishna Menon's contribution was impassioned as
he called upon France to desist ". . . as a noble gesture
in keeping with France's tradition and as an indication of
respect for world opinion.Japan, in its customary low
7Ibid. . 14th Sess., 1045th Meeting (November 6,
1959), Par. 27, p. 103.
320
key, urged France to reconsider, and reluctantly affirmed
its sponsorship of the resolution agreeing ". . . with its
basic objective though not necessarily with its wording or
scope,"8
Two additional measures were adopted relating to
atomic weapons and were eventually adopted by the Assem
bly. The first of these. Resolution 1380 (XIV) on the
prevention of nuclear proliferation, was adopted by a
vote of 68-0-12 by the 841st Plenary Session on November
20, 1959 with both India and Japan favoring the measure.
The second measure, recommending a broad test ban, was
adopted as Resolution 1402A and B (XIV) by the 842nd
Plenary Session on November 21, 1959 by votes of 78-0-2
and 60-0-20 respectively. Again both principals favored
the measures.
Mildly significant action on disarmament was
restricted to the unanimous adoption of Resolution 1378
(XIV) (an uninnovative expression of support for disarma
ment) by the 840th Plenary Session on November 20, 1959.
®Ibid., 1048th Meeting (November 10, 1959), Par.
20, p. 119.
321
In all four votes on these Issues in 1959 Japan and India
concurred*
The first consideration of an atomic energy Issue
in 1960 was In fact a continuation of the Sahara test
Issue of 1959. Whether or not any nation had really
believed the Assembly's resolution on the question would
be effective, the reaction to its having been ignored, at
least, gave a semblance of surprise. The aftermath of
the test itself, then, was a request for a special session
made by a group of twenty-two Afro-AsIan nations among
which was India. In pursuing the matter, however, the
Secretary General found only fourteen other nations in
favor of such a session--slx short of the necessary forty-
two. In this instance Japan's reluctance to offend a
Western friend was overridden by its particular concern
over atomic issues, and it was among the nations support
ing the call for a special session.
Other atomic issues arising during 1960 were of
more conventional variety, and arose in more conventional
ways and times. These issues were to assume the usual
form of draft resolutions eventually adopted as the
Fifteenth Session of the Assembly sought to end its work
322
for the year. These measures were debated in Committee 1
beginning in September, and came at length to adoption by
the 960th Plenary Session on December 20, 1960. The first
proposal was Resolution 1576 (XV) which dealt with the
prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,
and passed by a vote of 68-0-26. The second measure,
originally a three-power (Austria, India, and Swedish)
proposal urging the continuation of the test suspension
and early agreement on its permanence, was adopted 88-0-5
as Resolution 1577 (XV). The third and final Important
measure was a twenty-six power (including India and China)
proposal regarding test suspensions which differed in
advocating international control of suspension. This was
adopted as Resolution 1578 (XV) by a vote of 83-0-11.
India and Japan concurred In support of all these meas
ures .
The issue of disarmament as such was not consid
ered during the 1960 segment of the Fifteenth Session
owing to preoccupation with the Congo crisis. The cus
tomary resolution on the question was eventually adopted
unanimously as Resolution 1617 (XV) on April 21, 1961.
During this session, then, India and Japan concurred on
323
five votes or expressions of concern.
Almost es if to compensate for the institution's
preoccupation with the Congo in I960, there were in 1961,
more than the usual votes and resolutions on these related
issues. In all there were nine votes, two of which were
on important procedural questions.
Opening debate in October occurred over stage*
setting procedural questions and one important resolution.
The procedural questions, which were defeated in Committee
I, concerned the manner and priority for the discussion
of a nuclear test ban agreement and a possible test sus
pension, and which should take precedence in debate.
While an American proposal (A/C.I/L.281) providing that
the ban and suspension should be discussed simultaneously
was passed on October 18, 1961 by a vote of 54-13-32,
later the same day an Indian proposal (A/C.I/L.282) giving
precedence to the discussion of a suspension was adopted
83-10-4. In this rather pointless parliamentary maneuver
ing Japan supported while India opposed the first measure,
while both supported the second.
The other significant event of October regarding
nuclear questions was the spectacular resumption of
324
testing by the Soviet Union. That nation had made no
great secret of its intention to end the voluntary suspen
sion which had been in effect since 1958, and had hinted
broadly that it would be no common test. The conversion
of the threat to reality came on the heels of the Commit
tee I procedural agreement with the detonation of an
estimated 25 megaton device on October 23, 1961. A larger
test was promised in the near future.
The reaction of Comnittee I was the adoption of
an eight-power draft resolution (Canada, Denmark, Iceland,
Iran, Japan, Norway, Pakistan, and Sweden) appealing to
the Soviet Union to forego its promised 50 megaton test.
This appeal was ultimately adopted by the 1043rd Plenary
Session on October 27, 1961 as Resolution 1632 (XVI) by a
vote of 87-11-1 with both Japan and India voting affirma
tively, though neither contributed to debate. Three days
later the Soviet Union detonated a 50 megaton thermo
nuclear device somewhere in Siberia.
Institutional persistence, however, prevailed over
discouragements, and Committee I found itself confronted
with another series of proposals on nuclear questions.
The first of these was a six-power (Ethiopia, Ghana, India,
325
Nepal, United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia) draft resolu
tion recommending the "continuation" of the test suspen
sion. This was adopted as Resolution 1648 (XVI) by the
1047th Plenary Session on November 6, 1961 by a vote of
71-20-8. While both India and Japan supported the meas
ure, both the United States and the Soviet Union, in a
rare display of great power solidarity, opposed It. On
the same date the Assembly adopted another resolution
recognizing the need for a test ban under international
control (an Anglo-American draft). This was adopted as
Resolution 1649 (XVI) by a vote of 71-11-15 with both
India and Japan supporting the issue.
Consideration continued during November resulting
on the twenty-fourth in the adoption of two resolutions,
the first of which was a fifteen-power proposal on the
designation of Africa as a "de-nuclear!zed zone." This
was adopted by the 1063rd Plenary Session as Resolution
1652 (XVI) by a vote of 55-0-44--India voting for the
measure while Japan abstained. The second proposal was
a declaration banning nuclear weapons adopted as Resolu
tion 1653 (XVI) by a vote of 55-20-26. India and Japan
voted for this measure.
326
Consideration of nuclear issues in 1962 was con
cluded in December with the adoption of two additional
resolutions. The first, requesting an inquiry into the
willingness of non-nuclear powers to agree to neither
make nor obtain such weapons, was adopted as Resolution
1664 (XVI) by the 1070th Plenary Session on December 4.
1961 by a vote of 58-10-32. Both India and Japan voted
for the proposal. The second, calling for the prevention
of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, was adopted
unanimously as Resolution 1665 (XVI) at the same time.
Resolutions dealing with disarmament were re
stricted to two. The first, a Ghana, India, United Arab
Republic proposal appealing for agreement on a negotiating
body was adopted unanimously as Resolution 1660 (XVI) on
November 28, 1961 by the 1067th Plenary Session. The last
significant proposal was a United States-Soviet Union
draft resolution urging the resumption of negotiations.
As no one is willing to vote against virtue, this measure
was adopted as Resolution 1722 (XVI) by the 1085th Plenary
Session December 20, 1961.
In this year, as in others, there was a fairly
high degree of concurrence between Japan and India. While
327
there was little of a spectacular nature in the two dis-
armament votes, the nine nuclear issue votes offered a
variety of questions most of which inspired some disagree
ment. Despite the potential for disagreement Japan and
India concurred on all but two questions neither of which
indicated areas of serious conflict.
The volume of atomic and disarmament issues during
1962 returned to a more normal level while the importance
of the issues considered remained about the same. Impor
tant issues arose in the form of proposals before Commit
tee I. The first (A/C.I/L.310) was a thirty-seven power
draft (including India) condemning nuclear tests which
called for progress toward that end to be reported to the
Assembly by December. This proposal was adopted by the
1165th Plenary Session as Resolution 1762A (XVII) on
November 6, by a vote of 75-0-21 with Japanese and Indian
support. A concomitant and refining Anglo-American pro
posal called for a treaty with international verification,
and was adopted at the same time as Resolution 1762B
(XVII) by a vote of 51-10-40 with both Japan and India
supporting the measure.
While there were other votes on routine items, the
328
only other vote of importance seems to have been in
December over whether there should be a conference on pro
hibiting the use of nuclear weapons. This twenty-one
power (including India) draft was adopted as Resolution
1801 (XVII) by the 1192nd Plenary Session on December 14,
1962 by the remarkably sparse vote of 33-0-25 (the total
membership at this time being 108). While India supported
the issue, Japan abstained.
In the background of these 1962 votes, of course,
was the breakdown of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Con
ference (ENDC) in Geneva--an event which must have been
profoundly discouraging to those emotionally conmitted to
the success of arms control. Whatever pessimism was felt,
however, was submerged in that extraordinary institutional
persistence which seems always to have the strength to
pass another resolution. On this occasion it was Resolu
tion 1767 (XVII) adopted by the 1173rd Plenary Session on
November 21, 1962 by a vote of 84-0-1, which called for
the resumption of the Conference. Both India and Japan
supported the measure.
Once more India and Japan are found concurring on
these Issues except for one of no particular significance.
329
To those sensitive to the potential for nuclear
destruction always with the world, the year 1963 will be
remembered for, among other things, the achievement of the
partial test ban. When viewed as the product of year
after dreary year of repetitious negotiation the partial
ban applying only to atmospheric testing seemed a dis
tressingly modest achievement, but when viewed as at least
a step beyond the preceding drift and malaise it was a ray
of hope to say the least. It would be politically tin-
realistic not to note as well the role that declining
Sino-Soviet relations played in the conclusion of the
treaty. It was indeed characterized in Halperln's Sino-
Soviet Relations and Arms Control as a temporary American-
Russian coalition at the expense of the Chinese.^ it would
be unrealistic, too, to ignore the role played in this
question by the Soviet Union's growing apprehension over
China following the widening Slno-Sovlet split.
In the treatment of the nuclear and conventional
armament questions before the General Assembly, however.
9
Morton H. Halperin, ed., Sino-Soviet Relations
and Arms Control (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Insti
tute of Technology Press, 1967), p. 326.
3 3 0
there was no special recognition of this new circumstance.
The first such issue was adopted as Resolution 1884
(XVIII) without opposition by the 1244th Plenary Session
on October 17, 1963, and banned nuclear weapons from outer
space. The second, similarly unopposed, was adopted as
Resolution 1896 (XVIII) by the 1256th Plenary Session on
November 11, 1963 and called for the continuing study of
the uses of atomic energy.
The most controversial of the 1963 resolutions,
however, came in the form of a nineteen-power draft
requesting the Geneva Conference to strive for a treaty
barring the use of nuclear weapons. This measure was
opposed by many Western nations before Committee 1 and
before the Assembly where it was, nonetheless, adopted as
Resolution 1909 (XVIII) by the 1265th Plenary Session on
November 27, 1963 by a vote of 64-18-25. While India
voted for the measure Japan was among those abstaining on
the basis that the issue could not be separated from
general and complete disarmament.
Consideration of Issues pertaining to nuclear
weapons concluded with the adoption of Resolution 1910
(XVIII) and Resolution 1911 (XVIII) by the Plenary Session
331
on November 27, 1963. The first resolution requested an
extension of the partial test ban to a comprehensive one,
and was passed 104-1-3, while the second called for the
de-nuclearization of Latin America and was adopted 91-0-15.
Japan and India supported both.
The sole disarmament issue of the year was adopted
as Resolution 1908 (XIX) by the 1265th Plenary Session on
November 27, 1963 by acclamation. The resolution called
for the resumption of work at Geneva and broad agreement
to ease tensions.
In 1963 Indian and Japanese concurrence was again
high, though the one occasion of disagreement was signifi
cant. India was once more willing to vote for the sur
gically simple solution for the nuclear weapons problem,
while Japan again pleaded the complexities of the issue
and continued to support the western position.
There was nothing unusual about the nuclear and
disarmament Issues anticipated for 1964 except they, like
other Issues, were sidetracked by the financial crisis.
In the normal course of things they would have included
1. General and complete disarmament
2. The suspension of all nuclear and thermo-nuclear
tests
332
3. The banning of nuclear weapons
4. The designation of Africa as a de-nuclearized
zone
5. A nonproliferation agreement
Had normal procedures been in effect It is likely that
the Assembly would have acted in some way on all of these,
and taken some note of the first Chinese nuclear tests
which had occurred on October 16 as well.
As it was, the lack of voting on formal resolu
tions did not entirely preclude debate, and in those
opening sessions known as General Debate both nations
expressed their hopes that the nuclear test ban might be
extended to include underground tests and their regret
that China had chosen to produce such weapons. India made
a particular point of speaking of its ability to produce
such weapons and conscious choice not to do so (a point -
Japan might have made as well with equal appropriateness).
In the course of the Twentieth Regular Session In
1965 the Assembly was able to debate and deal with most
of the items which had perforce been sidelined in 1964.
There were three votes in the area of nuclear affairs, the
first of which brought the adoption of Resolution 2028
(XX) on nonproliferation by the 1382nd Plenary Session on
333
November 19, 1965 by a vote of 93-0-5. Japan and India
both voted for the measure. Two other areas touching on
the area of nuclear weapons were voted on by the 1368th
Plenary Session on December 3, 1965. These, Resolution
2032 (XX) calling for the suspension of all nuclear tests
and Resolution 2033 (XX) declaring the de-nuclearization
of Africa, were adopted 92-1-14 and 105-0-2 respectively.
On both India and Japan voted favorably.
In the field of general disarmament two items
were raised, the first of which called for a world-wide
disarmament conference. This was adopted as Resolution
2030 (XX) by the 1384th Plenary Session on November 11,
1965 by a vote of 112-0-1. The second, calling for the
continuation of the work of the ENDC, was adopted as
Resolution 2031 (XX) by the 1388th Plenary Session on
December 3, 1965 by a vote of 102-0-6--with Japan and
India supporting.
During 1965, then, Japan and India agreed on all
issues listed.
Consideration of disarmament and related nuclear
issues during 1966 covered much the same areas as treated
before (with one exception) and with much the same results.
334
On the foundation of Comnittee I consideration, six reso
lutions were eventually adopted, the first of which was
Resolution 2149 (XX) adopted on November 4, 1966 by the
1458th Plenary Session by a vote of 110-1-1. Condemning
all actions hampering agreement on nonproliferation, this
measure was supported by both India and Japan.
Two other nuclear related issues came to a vote
on November 17, 1966 before the 1469th Plenary Session,
and urged, first, the conclusion of a nonproliferation
treaty and, second, the convening of a conference of non
nuclear powers to discuss how best to secure their safety
while preventing proliferation. The first of these ques
tions was adopted as Resolution 2153A (XXI) by a vote of
97-2-3 with India and Japan supporting the measure. The
second was rather more reluctantly adopted as Resolution
2153B (XXI) by a vote of 48-1-58. While Japan supported
the measure India registered the only negative vote
explaining quickly that its objection bore in no way on
the question of proliferation itself, but was based on the
conviction that such a conference would be inappropriate
and contrary to the best progress of nonproliferation.
The Indian delegate also expressed the opinion that secur-
335
ity requirements of aligned and nonaligned nations were so
different that such a conference would be meaningless.^
Those abstaining on this issue represented a broad cross-
section of East, Vest, and Third World nations.
Three more issues were to come to a vote on
December 5, 1966 before the 1484th Plenary Session of the
Assembly on nuclear related issues. The first, adopted
as Resolution 2162A (XXI), urging the study of the effects
of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, was given unanimous
approval. The second, regarding the expansion of the
nuclear test ban to all environments, was adopted as
Resolution 2163 (XXI) by a vote of 100-1-2--Japan and
India concurring on both. The third issue, calling for
a conference to consider the prohibition of nuclear and
thermo-nuclear weapons, was adopted as Resolution 2164
(XXI) by a vote of 80-0-23. While India supported the
measure, Japan abstained.
General disarmament questions were also put to a
vote on December 5, 1966 before the 1484th Plenary Session
^United Nations, Yearbook for 1966 (New York:
UN Office of Public Information^ 1968), pp. 8-15, 18.
336
as Sections B and C of Resolution 2162 (XXI) cited above.
Section B urged the continuation of the observance of the
prohibition on chemical and biological warfare, and was
adopted by a vote of 91-0-4 with Japan and India voting
for the measure. This resolution, incidentally, repre
sented the last of a series of attenq>ts to embarrass the
United States for its use of riot gas in Vietnam, and had
been previously fought out before Comnlttee I. By the
time it reached the Assembly's Plenary Session It had been
rendered meaninglessly vague. Section G, which was
adopted by a vote of 98-0-2, called upon the ENDC to
resume its work, and was supported by both Japan and
India,
A third issue was introduced, debated, and passed
upon after a fashion, although that fashion amounted to
an indefinite tabling of the matter. The original pro
posal, introduced by the Soviet Union, was for the removal
of foreign military bases from Asia, Africa, and Latin
America, and it became quickly clear that there would be
no graceful way of disposing of the question. The closest
approach to graceful disposition came in the form of
Resolution 2165 (XXI) which ordered Committee I to forward
337
the question to the ENDC for further consideration. This
was adopted 94-0-10 with both Japan and India supporting
the measure without comment.
During 1966, then, India and Japan found themselves
concurring in six of the eight issues of some significance.
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
Whether the Soviet Union realized how galvanizing
the effect of Sputnik I would be may never be known, but
it could have scarcely chosen a more dramatic way to
demonstrate an advanced missile capacity. So secure did
the Soviet Union feel in its superiority that it knew its
November challenge to the United States to a "missile
shoot" would go effectively unanswered, and increasingly
American protestations about sophistication and miniaturi
zation seemed curiously Irrelevant beside the cold statis
tics on the disparity of weights in orbit between Sputnik
1 and Explorer I. This challenge to American pride in
technological achievement stung deeply and was not to
remain unanswered. As competition for more and more spec
tacular achievements in space proceeded, moreover, un
anticipated uses for space-related technology have
appeared, and more and more real had seemed the possibility
3 3 8
that man might eventually use outer space in undreamed of
ways.
While the subtleties of precisely what might be
involved in the use of space for purposes other than
peaceful were Imperfectly understood, the implications
during the late 1950's of the invulnerability of missiles
launched from space were lost on few. And, in a world
sensitive to the perils of thermo-nuclear war, these
possibilities were not long in coming to the attention of
the United Nations. The radical possibilities introduced
by a new dimension to earthly conflict as well as the
obvious aspects of space as an arena for East-West tech
nological conflict per se seemed sure to place this issue
in the category of Cold War issues, and this evaluation
seemed borne out by the relatively contentious treatment
of the question during both regular Thirteenth Assembly
sessions.
Discussion of the peaceful use of outer space was
first formally held in Committee I where controversy sur
rounded the question before its substance was even
approached. The issue of what body was to be responsible
for discussions became the first major difficulty, and
339
this resolved Itself into two competing proposals one of
which was sponsored by twenty powers led by the United
States, while the other was a three-power (Burma, India,
and the United Arab Republic) draft. The first (A/C.I/
L.200) called for the appointment of an eighteen-nation
ad hoc committee for the purpose, while the second (A/C.I/
L.224) called for consideration of the question by the
Assembly acting as a committee of the whole. In the
rejection of the latter and adoption of the former, India
and Japan were in opposite columns. This was reflected in
the December 13, 1958 adoption of Resolution 1348 (XII)
by the 792nd Plenary Session by a vote of 53-9-19, which
found Japan supporting and India abstaining on this
measure creating the eighteen-nation committee.
Debate on this issue was tinged with Cold War
recriminations from the moment American Ambassador Henry
Cabot Lodge and Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin contrib
uted opening remarks before Committee I. Indeed, so much
friction over what might otherwise have been a wholly
procedural matter seems unlikely outside that context for
there appeared to have been no ulterior motives. When
Japan's Ambassador Koto Matsudaira spoke on November 20,
1958 it was in a conciliatory tone appealing for com
promise on this essentially procedural matter. Specifi
cally he expressed the hope that the two drafts might be
combined into a "single unanimously acceptable text."
The important thing, he added, was to begin the study of
the "scientific, administrative, and legal aspects of
outer space," important today as were the discoveries of
new continents in the sixteenth century.H In response
to thlB appeal India's Ambassador Krishna Menon rose
immediately to say that "there was no hope of unanimous
12
agreement on a single draft." In speaking on the sub
ject on November 24, however, the Indian delegate recog
nized that both resolutions had become symbolic of Cold
War positions, and urged further efforts toward agree
ment .
^United Nations, Official Records. Com. I, 13th
Sess., 992nd Meeting (November 26, 1958), Par. 9, p. 232.
12Ibid., Par. 11, p. 232.
^ Ibid., 995th Meeting (November 24, 1958), Par.
20, p. 244.
341
Positions on this symbolic question did not sub
stantially alter, however, and the sponsors of the three-
power proposal eventually registered their protests and
disapproval by abstaining not only on the twenty-power
draft, but on their own proposal as well. India, in the
company of Czechoslovakia. Poland, the Soviet Union, and
the United Arab Republic, continued its protest by boy
cotting the meetings of the Eighteen Nation Space Commit
tee after its establishment by Resolution 1348 (XII).
During 1959 efforts to stimulate fruitful discus
sions were revived with greater promise of success, but
not without a small Incident of Cold War-tinged contro
versy. While the greater promise was reflected in the
adoption without objection on December 12, 1959 of Resolu
tion 1472 (XIV) establishing a new twenty-four nation
committee to study the questions of space, the continua
tion of some controversy arose in Committee I over a
Belgian amendment which pointedly restricted committee
participation to members of the United Nations. Though
this amendment (A/C.I/L.138) was adopted, the vote of
44-15-16 reflects a degree of disagreement. Japan voted
for the proposal while India joined the Soviet bloc and
342
others opposing it. It was clear that the exclusion of
mainland China from possible participation in discussion
on the question was the motivation for this amendment,
thus accounting for the controversy over the issue.
In Committee I discussions Japan took the occasion
to comment on its own modest space program, and to praise
the 'Cooperative and patient efforts of the United States
and USSR representatives” leading to agreement.^ India
later rose to justify its boycott of the ad hoc committee
as the outgrowth of the nonparticipation of one of the
major members, and took the occasion to express its pleas
ure at the new cooperative turn of e v e n t s .
Though apparent agreement seemed to indicate the
possibility of further fruitful discussion under the
guidance of the general applicability of the principles
of the Charter and International Law, and the free explor
ation of space without national appropriation, the work
of the ad hoc committee was all but totally unproductive.
The Intervening Congo crisis and U-2 incidents were not
l^Ibid., 14th Sess., 1080th Meeting (December 11,
1959), Pars7“T-4, p. 285.
15Ibid., Pars. 9-13, p. 286.
343
conducive to agreement on issues containing even a hint
of Cold War significance, and the subsequent static
inertia on space seems to have reflected this reality.
Wholly Ignored in 1960, it was not until the end
of 1961 that the issue was effectively removed from the
Cold War arena as the two major space powers agreed out
side the context of the United Nations to mutually advan
tageous ground rules. With the establishment of agreement
between the United States and the Soviet Union, questions
on the peaceful use of outer space became noncontroversial
ones on which Japan and India concurred. Between 1961 and
1966 there were, therefore, a series of routine resolutions
adopted. In 1961 and 1962 Resolutions 1721 (XVI) and
1802 (XVII) routinely adopted committee reports. In 1963
Resolution 1963 (XVIII) commended the space related work
of the World Meteorological Organization and the Inter
national Telegraphic Union, while in 1965 Resolution 2130
(XX) endorsed the continuing work of the committee.
Finally in 1966 Resolution 2222 (XXI) approved in outline
a treaty governing the activities of nations in space
exploration. All of these resolutions were adopted with
out objection.
344
Agreement, of course, did not end discussion, and
both Japan and India had occasion to voice their major
concerns. On these occasions it became apparent that each
emphasized different aspects of the problem, and this
theme was to be replayed with minor variations. India
continued to be preoccupied with the military implications
of space even after the major space powers seemed to have
agreed between themselves that there were far more practi
cal and economic ways to exchange destruction on earth
than in space. In 1961, for instance, the Indian delegate
expressed apprehension that ", . .if outer space were
once used for warlike purposes, it would be very difficult
to restore it to peaceful use."^® Again in 1962 India
called for a joint United States-Soviet Union declaration
eschewing the use of outer space for military purposes.
At the same time the Japanese delegate was empha
sizing the positive aspects of the endeavor and the possi
bilities it offered for greater cooperation. In 1961,
*^Ibld., 16th Sees., 1213th Meeting (December 7,
1961), Par"! ITT, p. 264.
^Ibld.. 17th Sess,, 1294th Meeting (December 7,
1962), Par"! 21, p. 240.
345
for instance, noting the rapid space strides made by the
United States and the Soviet Union, and even Japan, he
said.
Since space activities necessarily Ignore national
boundaries, the time would come when no nation would
be able to remain indifferent to them; moreover, no
nation, however large, could effectively promote
space activities without the cooperation of other
states.
This being true, he added, the United Nations, because of
its comprehensive nature, was best suited to promote this
kind of activity.In 1962 as well, while noting the
undercurrent of apprehension regarding potential military
uses of outer space, he emphasized the positive side by
welcoming the American statement pledging no bombs in
space unless compelled by extraordinary circumstances.
On this occasion, too, Japan spoke positively of "the
amazement felt by the people of the world over the spec
tacular achievements that had been made by the great
powers in the conquest of space."*-®
18
Ibid.. 16th Sess., 1212th Meeting (December 6,
1961), Par. 5, pp. 257-258.
*~®Ibid.. 17th Sess., 1292nd Meeting (December 5,
1962), Par. 14, p. 229.
346
The central characteristic of the Issues treated
In this chapter Is their Intimate relationship with tech
nology. While It has long been possible to treat the
Issue of disarmament as a complex problem, that complexity
has undergone a manifold Increase owing to the contribu
tions of technology. The relative simplicity of a world
In which territorial water limits could be determined by
the effective range of the shore batteries is a world to
be recaptured only in Imagination. While science and
technology has obviously enhanced this complexity It is
interesting to note that the organization, for all its
recognition of that fact, so often comes to adopt Its
annual resolutions on these matters In a bloc and often
on the same date.
Because these Issues have at their foundation
questions of what man can now do to himself and others,
it would not be surprising to find them intimately asso
ciated with the Cold War or whatever great power rivalries
might replace It. As these issues bear heavily upon what
such powers are capable of doing to each other, they have
been specifically difficult to resolve. Progress has been
painfully slow, and typically agreements modest when com-
347
pared to the tine and effort expended In their pursuit.
As Issues full of Importance to the time's major rivalry,
it would not be unreasonable to anticipate that nations
would vote on them as Cold War questions. Reality, how
ever, is somewhat different.
The impression that Japan and India tend to concur
on these issues rather more than they have on other types
of issues is confirmed by the crude mathematics of the
matter. Of the sixty-one votes recorded in this study
during this period there was Indian-Japanese concurrence
on forty-eight of them or nearly 80 percent. This level
of agreement is markedly higher than on those other sug
gested categories of issues. In the case of recurring
Third World Issues, for instance, there was a 50 percent
agreement rate between the principals, while on a specific
issue like the Congo the rate of agreement dropped to
below 25 percent. While it is true that these votes but
scratch the surface of what would have to be taken into
account, if one were to be comprehensive in one's treat
ment of these questions they, nonetheless, represent a
substantial body of evidence which cannot be ignored.
That these issues seem to vary from expectable
348
patterns is supported too by the ease with which the prin
cipals of this study found themselves supporting the posi
tions taken by both Cold War contestants. While it is
true that India's concurrence with the Soviet Union and
Japan's concurrence with the United States was in each
case forty or more, many were on issues (some thirty-one)
on which the United States and the Soviet Union themselves
concurred, and India often supported the position of the
United States and Japan rather than of the Soviet Union.
It is interesting to note, for instance, that India's
thirty-eight occasions of concurring with the United
States were almost as many as its forty-two with the
Soviet Union, and Japan's forty concurrences with the
United States do not overwhelm its thirty-six with the
Soviet Union.
On these Issues then the principals do not conform
to any predictable or established pattern--surely not
those which might be described as a Cold War pattern.
While there is superficially no intrinsic difference in
these Issues great enough to alter the tendency observed
elsewhere for the principals to disagree whenever possi
ble, there is clearly some feature of them which causes
349
them to behave very differently. This does not mean that
this is an area in which the two nations have reached some
consistent mutual enlightenment. There have been disagree
ments , but rarely the kind which leads to animosity or
leaves permanent scars.
Neither is this to say that the principals'
approach to the problem are the same (or even similar).
As noted earlier, for instance, India's approach to arms
control is a relatively simple one. This has led India
to minimize differences over ways and means, and rather
consistently favored the simple solution or "giant step"
approach to the problem. While this could be thought of
as favoring the basic approach of the Soviet Union, there
is no evidence that this is anything more than coinci
dental. Japan, on the other hand, seems to have tended
to be more skeptical of the simple approach, and less
inclined to take the question outside the established
channels of discussion such as the ENDC. In the case of
a question such aB disarmament, described so aptly by
Inis Claude as circular, it is not possible to say that
Japan's approach is more or less primitive than India's,
but it is clear that Japan is more cautious, legalistic,
350
and sensitive to the complexities of the question. Of
the two principals it is also clear that India is the
more active in this area. While this could probably be
made an overall generalization, in the case of these
issues India is found among the sponsors of sixteen meas
ures as compared to eight for Japan, and it almost appears
that 1957 marks the year India chose to begin a more
active role in these areas. This is not to say that Japan
is inactive in this area, for that would be contrary to
fact. No nation is more sensitive to questions regarding
nuclear power or conventional armaments. One evidence of
this is that on the votes recorded here Japan abstained
on only eight occasions--a rather low number for a nation
whose diffidence in international affairs during the
decade of this study often manifested itself in that way.
While there does not seem to be any detectable
trend toward a change in the attitude of either nation on
these issues during this period (at least from the evi
dence of their votes and statements), both are faced with
realities far more complex than their statements might
indicate. Both Japan and India seem to exhibit a desire
for a world much different from the one which is, but are
351
captives of a reality neither has been able to change. In
the case of India, for instance, that previously referred
to desire to relegate the military to a position of
secondary Importance was undermined by the events of 1962,
and since that time the nation has Incurred substantial
expenditures for modernization and maintained the world's
fourth largest military establishment. During the final
years of this study's period India spent an average of
about 3.8 percent of its Gross National Product on defense,
India's greatest military expenditures during the period
of this study was in 1963-64 when it rose to 4.4 percent
of the Gross National Product. While this had fallen to
3.2 percent by 1969, India's aggregate expenditure was the
seventh largest In the world--roughly comparable to that
of Italy and exceeded only by the United States, Soviet
Union, United Kingdom, China, France and West Germany.
Japan's nearly professional pacificism, too, has
often masked the fact that it is among the most powerful
nations of the world militarily. While the numerical size
of its military has remained modest at about a quarter of
a million men, its equipment is most modem, and its power
enhanced by the guarantees of its security pact with the
352
United States. An additional benefit of that security
arrangement has been to keep Japan's defense costs at an
extraordinary low level. During the final years of this
study's period those costs were in the neighborhood of
1.4 percent of the Gross National Product and since have
gone even lower. Despite the low cost, however, Japan is
20
one of the world's most powerful military forces.
It is Ironic too that in these principals are
Asia's two most likely new candidates for the thermo*
nuclear club. While of the two India would find it more
difficult to bear that task economically, the advent of
relatively cheap plutonium and the green revolution make
it more feasible today than ever before. On the other
hand, India's Increased security on the subcontinent
resulting from the weakening of Pakistan and its apparent
closer ties with the Soviet Union may continue to deter
its acquisition of such weapons. In the case of Japan the
Japan's level of defense spending was set at
about seventh largest in the world in Herman Kahn's The
Emerging Japanese Superstate (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall Inc., 1970i, pp. 163-164, and set at larger
than any other Far Eastern nation save China in 1968 by
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament (New
York: Humanities Press, 1970), p . 84.
353
technological and economic feasibility of acquiring such
weapons is patent, and the deterrence substantially emo
tional. While It Is difficult to Imagine a nuclearly
armed Japan after so many years of Hiroshima Day obser
vances , it is also difficult not to try to imagine one as
Its ties with the United States loosen as it seeks an
Increasingly Independent course. That similar thoughts
have crossed the minds of some Japanese Is also difficult
to discount in light of the substantially similar charac
teristics of Japan's space experiment rocket Mu and the
American Minuteman missile.
The most notable aspect of the consideration
given to outer space per se is the obvious rapidity with
which great power agreement can overcome disagreement.
Once the great powers had concluded that this area should
be excluded from normal rivalries In a rare display of
"great power preventive diplomacy" the insoluble quickly
succumbed to reason. There is, of course, nothing neces
sarily sacred or permanent about the removal of this
question from this kind of conflict, but the longer the
great powers agree to exclude space from conflict, the
more likely is that agreement to become institutionalized.
354
In the midst of harmony, moreover, the Indian and
Japanese attitudes toward space were clearly different,
and not unlike the division of opinion evident in the
United States over space exploration. India--profoundly
conservative--seems fearful of the change this new tech
nology may bring, particularly as it may add new dimen
sions to international violence. One would hardly be
surprised if India were to suggest the money might be the
better spent for the solution of some earthly problem.
Japan--with pride in its own space achievements and a
willingness to embrace the new as its very own--seems
anxious to explore this new dimension. Whatever moral
value one wishes to assign to either approach, one must
at least recognize the difference.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS AND INDICATIONS
Whether it is a strength or a weakness, a charac
teristic of social science is that it seldom succeeds in
operating far from value judgments, and when it does
approach that scientific ideal of pure objectivity it
often comes closest to pointless scholasticism. In
asserting the value of studying comparatively the inter
national attitudes of India and Japan it is difficult to
say which error is most prominent. It would be pointless
to compare the foreign policy attitudes of nations whose
consequence individually is limited and whose mutual per
ceptions are unimportant, but the nations in question are
not individually inconsequential nor are their areas of
interest remote from each other. On the contrary their
individual and mutual importance is great not only to
themselves but to others as well, and perhaps this asser
tion reveals the underlying raison d*etre of this study--
the belief that the international stability of Asia is
355
356
Important and that the perception of two such consequen
tial resident powers is important within that context.
In pursuit of some appreciation of the world out
looks of these great Asian democracies within the context
of their activity in the United Nations, it has been neces
sary to distill drastically the records of that organiza
tion. As a glance at any United Nations Yearbook would
reveal, the nineteen ad hoc, recurring and special issues
including the tangled technological questions of the atom,
armaments, and space recorded in this study, are a mere
fraction of those which have engaged the attention of the
organization in some way. They have in common a degree
of contention and importance (as opposed to many questions
which are almost wholly routine), and they are questions
on which both nations have been obliged to take a stand.
While it is doubtful that any such list could lay claim
to any absolute validity, it is believed that these Issues
represent a sufficiently broad range of Interests to allow
for some reasonably valid judgments about the attitudes of
these nations.
It is also true that the individual votes recorded
here are but a handful as compared to the total voting
357
activity which occurred in the organization. The General
Assembly alone adopted nearly 1,300 resolutions during
this period, and that figure does not take into account
the hundreds of draft resolutions which failed adoption
nor the thousands of votes which occurred in the Assembly's
consult tees. What is recorded here, then, is a distilla
tion of a distillation, for within these selected issues
the routine and repetitious have been eliminated whenever
possible. It is true, then, that the votes discussed in
this study are weighted on the side of controversy and
contention, and that weighting is Intentional. Since a
basic purpose of this study Is an assessment of the basic
attitudes of the principals, the emergence of those atti
tudes in conflict seems far more likely than does their
emergence in tranquility.
As suggested in the opening chapter persons aware
of international relations in general and Aslan inter
national relations in particular might feel instinctively
that there was not a high degree of coincidence between
the world outlooks of the principals of this study. It
seems reasonable to assert, moreover, that an Informal
reading of the evidence gathered here would generally
358
reinforce that impression. As one surveys the stends,
statements, and general approaches of these two nations
within the context of the United Nations, It is impossible
not to be aware that one is confronted by two differing
outlooks despite the similarities of goals and alms each
has expressed. The degree of activism evident, the readi
ness to put forward an opinion, the tone of the rhetoric,
the alacrity of arriving at a moral judgment, the general
orientation of each leaves an overwhelming impression that
one is examining two nations whose orientation is quite
different. Without having bothered to count one might
well suspect that the arithmetical balance of the votes
recorded would be on the side of India and Japan not con
curring. This, however, is not the case.
The votes recorded in Chapters III through VI are
in fact 206 concentrated overwhelmingly in the recurring
issues and secondarily with those concerning the atom,
armament control and outer space. (For a more detailed
breakdown of their distribution, see Appendix I.) On
these 206 possible occasions to differ, Indin and Japan
in fact concurred 108 times. While Implying no statisti
cal significance, this is interesting given the fact that
359
these votes are a distillation weighted with relatively
contentious Issues. While Interesting, neither should
this be mistaken for evidence that behind some facade of
great difference there in fact lies a deep similarity of
viewpoint, for as is seen repeatedly as the level of con
tention over a specific issue rises so rises the likeli
hood that India and Japan will display some difference in
attitude. Indeed, aside from those nations which spring
to mind most readily as representing almost certain con
flict, the principals of this study seem to be among those
least likely to be concurring on important questions.
Before attempting to extract further significance from
crude arithmetic, however, it may be Important first to
see if the evidence of this United Nations activity in
general supports the foreign policy goals and the self-
image each nation seems to have chosen for itself.
As suggested in Chapter II the goals and roles
each nation has chosen to pursue are relatively easy to
identify. While Richard L. Park's list of principles
presented in that chapter may not be comprehensive, it
does represent a good point of departure against which
to compare India's record in the United Nations. Although
360
even the most comprehensive recounting of the activities
In the United Nations would not be a perfect reflection
of the outside world, it does provide a fascinating
stylized stage, and the issues treated in this study have
been among the most salient events to have taken place on
that stage.
In answer to the basic question of whether India's
United Nations activities bear out the principles of its
foreign policy, the reply would be affirmative although
with certain qualifications. India, it Is suggested,
displays an independence of outlook (or at least a search
for independence) characteristic of a people long domi
nated. This understandable desire for independence has
perhaps manifested itself most importantly in the nation's
search for a policy which avoids choosing sides or taking
part in what it deems the traditional great power con
flicts. Most certainly the evidence gathered here bears
out India's success in avoiding conformity to the major
power struggles which marked the era. India has been
prominent among the nations trying to turn the organiza
tion's attention away from that concern and toward others,
even though no such effort could be completely successful.
361
In achieving that degree of Independence, however, India
also seemed at times merely to have chosen a different
kind of regimentation or alternate conformity no less
rigid than that of the East or the West.
There has also persisted the feeling that there
Is a bias In India's independence, its protestations to
the contrary notwithstanding. It is, indeed, difficult
to delve through the United Nations records for the decade
of this study without coming to suspect that there is some
difference in India's attitude toward the East and the
West. It is obvious that India has not, does not, and
would not condone many actions of China and the Soviet
Union, but often enough to be noticeable its reaction has
been to seek refuge in the abstention. There seems as
well to be a different tone to statements pertaining to
one side as the special verbal barb, heaviest irony,
worst implications, and most ringing condemnations have
been reserved for the West. This seems to be the case
whether India's delegate has been Krishna Menon, C. S. Jha,
or any of the several other able diplomats who have spoken
for India in the United Nations.
It is difficult to avoid the feeling that India is
362
intrinsically more suspicious of the West, and given the
nation's long colonial experience this Is understandable.
It may be useful too in this context to realize that
behind the words and speeches India is a nation with a
place in the world like all other nations. Part of the
reality of India's nationhood is the proximity of China
and the Soviet Union and the remoteness of the United
States, and a very human prudence may play some part in
this difference as well.
The second principle suggested was that India
revealed a fear of involvement, and there is nothing in
the evidence compiled here to contradict that general
proposition. In no way does India evidence any desire
for permanent political entanglement, and perhaps its
most vigorous attempt to reach meaningful accord with
another nation were its attempts to eliminate possible
areas of conflict with China. In that case, as in the
cases in which India has attempted to lead the nations of
the Third World, its commitments have been more moral than
concrete. The burden of the evidence is that the idea of
India participating in any international agreement the
likes of NATO or SEATO is unlikely.
363
Park's third and fourth principles regarding
India's determination to help others toward independence
and oppose discrimination based on race are abundantly
supported by the United Nations evidence presented here.
Indeed, given the evidence amassed in Chapter III it might
not be too much to assert that within the context of the
United Nations this has been the nation's major single
concern which it began early and has pursued relentlessly.
Few would quibble with the intrinsic commendability of
these goals nor the consistency India has displayed since
the very beginnings of the organization. This record,
however, seems on at least one occasion flawed when India
appeared at least to arrive at an interesting new defini
tion of "self-determination" in supporting the cause of
an old friend. While India's consistency on the West
Irian question could well be questioned, it is not the
first nation to display such a lapse.
The fifth principle of promoting cooperation and
good will through the United Nations is another which on
balance must be seen as supported by the evidence. Few
nations, if any, have been more steadfast in their support
of the United Nations, its Charter, its principles, its
364
subsidiary organs, and its importance to world order.
While it might be possible to dismiss some of India's
ardent support of the organization as predictably trite
rhetoric, there seems behind that rhetoric a genuine
enthusiasm and respect for the United Nations. The length,
intricacy, and ardor of India's contributions to debate
seem to indicate a continuing faith on the part of India
in the efficacy of the "great debate" approach to some
problems, and, despite the fact that India remains a
relatively poor country, it has on many occasions con
tributed generously to the organization.
It must be noted, however, that India has been
capable of subordinating its devotion to the United Nations
to its own interests, and using it to try to impose its
own views of what is proper cooperation and good will. In
the tumult which accompanied the partition of the sub
continent into a Hindu and Moslem state, India never let
principle stand in the way of national interest, nor can
one seriously Imagine it complying with a United Nations
decision on Kashmir ceding it to Pakistan. Indeed few
nations have been as candidly defiant of the United
Nations as was India over the issue of Goa in the course
365
of which India made it perfectly clear that it would work
its will in the formerly Portuguese enclave, the United
Nations notwithstanding. The case of the Congo is another
example of India having second thoughts on the wisdom of
its support for the institution unless the views of the
organization on what its role in the situation should be
complied more clearly to Indian views. This is not meant
to single out India as having a uniquely hypocritical
attitude toward the organization, but rather to put in
perspective its sometimes overwhelmingly moral posture
regarding the inviolability of the principles of the
Charter and its devotion to them. Needless to say India
is not alone in this charade.
Neither is there much question that India has
sought world-wide contact on the basis of the evidence
collected here. In the United Nations as elsewhere India
has tried to construct for itself a unique role which
transcends its physical location and is founded rather on
its particular moral position. Perhaps it is mostly for
this reason that it becomes necessary to question its
principle regarding a special attention to Asia. If there
is any special attention given to Asia it does not seem
366
manifest in the conventional ways at least, nor does it
seem particularly obvious in the evidence gathered here.
Park's list of principles is of interest in and
of itself, but takes on more Interest when viewed against
the Image India's political leaders have sought to project
as found in those principles enunciated by the Congress
Party in 1925.* At that time they stated their basic
guidelines to be:
1. Opposition to imperialism and colonial rule
2. Support of subject peoples and oppressed races in
their struggle for freedom and equality
3. The promotion of peace and abhorrence of war
4. The avoidance of foreign entanglements
The evidence of India's behavior in this study in
a sense bears out devotion to these principles and in
another sense, as suggested above, requires some of the
terms used to be rather narrowly defined. Opposition to
imperialism (whatever, as suggested by Hans Morgenthau,
*
that may mean) is an international cliche made universal
by its vagueness. In the case of India, however, its
^Robert Thrumbull, India Since Independence
(New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1954), p. £6.
367
meaning seems frozen In 1925. Colonialism, dead or dying
during this period, is as alive to India as ever. Oppres
sions and discriminations are the same as those obvious
from the 1925 viewpoint and have not expanded as times
have changed. The consistency of Indian principles is a
parochial consistency. The love of peace and abhorrence
of war is perhaps the trltest of all international cliches,
and India's sincerity in using it is hardly unquestionable
as it has engaged in four wars in its first twenty-five
years of history as a modem nation. Only the last prin
ciple seems honored without substantial qualification
during the period of this study, as India has been unwill
ing to commit Itself to others, and only recently sought
closer ties with the Soviet Union. While India has been
willing to receive, it has been unwilling to give prior
commitment to another. A possible exception to its avoid
ance of foreign entanglements might be thought of as its
commitment to the United Nations, but this too, as sug
gested above, is not unflawed.
The object of the preceding criticism of India's
principles as opposed to reality is not meant to paint the
nation as particularly hypocritical, although it might be
368
possible. Like every nation whose policies are clothed
In elaborate morality (such as the United States) the
dangers of being harshly judged are Inevitable unless the
claimant can truly be, like Caesar's wife, above reproach.
Perhaps a fairer statement of reality is that no
nation's foreign policy can be reduced to a wholly con
sistent set of moral principles though India has been
among those nations most anxious to present an ideal-
politlk face to the world. Behind that face, however, is
a nation with material necessities as well as moral goals
--secular priorities as well as principles. Among the
realpolitik priorities India seems to have placed In its
highest category Is its wish to accommodate with Its two
greatest continental neighbors--China and the Soviet
Union. While the pursuit of this goal has never been
without pitfalls it may now have become even more diffi
cult with the realization of a goal with which India has
been long identified--the seating of the People's Republic
of China In the United Nations. Even now It is clear that
membership is no panacea for the organization, and it will
be Interesting to evaluate later (perhaps in the record of
United Nations activities during the decade of the 70's)
369
whether India may have to choose between accommodating
with both or merely one. While India’s courting of China
during part of this period is obvious as is Its lack of
success, whether a causal relationship exists between
India's failure to woo China and its usual support of
positions favorable to the Soviet Union is an open ques
tion. India has often seemed reluctant to offend the
Soviet Union, and the relative positions of China, India,
Pakistan and the Soviet Union over the question of
Bangladesh could be interpreted as a further solidifica
tion of that position.
This reach for accomnodation has not meant that
India was amenable to capture by either ideologically.
India's protestations about not wishing to be a part of
the traditional Cold War appear real although whether this
is a matter of principle opposed to the Cold War as much
as a desire for the independence to lead still another
bloc is also an open question. India's courting of the
Arab nations, general activism on Third World issues in
the United Nations, and automatic hostility toward its
selectively defined imperialist nations make It difficult
to Ignore this possibility entirely.
370
One would ordinarily think India would display a
great interest in her other inmediate surroundings but
there is little evidence that India has a consuming
interest in Asian nations at least in the conventional
sense. While always willing to be among the most active
in multilateral displays of Afro-Asian unity, there is
little evidence of its concern with the conventional
welfare of these nations individually. With the exception
of India's continuing unhappy relationship with Pakistan,
it is difficult to think of a significant Indian bilateral
relationship (with the possible exception of Indonesia)
with another Indian Ocean nation (a natural area for the
development of common Interests). The reason for these
generally cool relationships are as many as there are
other nations in the area, but there are some factors
often cited as significant. One of these is the existence
in many of these nations of Indian minorities unpopular
in many places. This has blunted the likelihood of the
acceptance of greater Indian influence, and even led (as
in Uganda) to the tragic irony of people of Indian origin
suffering extreme discrimination from black African
governments in whose cause India has fought since becoming
371
a nation. India Is also handicapped In these relations by
having little to offer of real substance. For all Its
size India Is a nation still struggling Itself to succeed
economically, and without notable success. Unable In a
quarter century of Independence to substantially Increase
the per capita Income of Its own people, India has had
little to offer save advice.
It Is perhaps In part because of these frustra
tions over lack of progress that some of India's more
negative observable reactions emerge. The motivations
for some of these negative peaks such as South Africa and
Portugal are quite obvious as are the reasons for India's
ambivalence toward the United Kingdom. Less obvious in
motive, however, has been India's almost automatically
negative reaction to the United States which, though
always clothed in a situationally appropriate rationale,
is still obvious In the evidence gathered.
Had the United States opposed India's Independence,
made hostile gestures toward it, or sought to Impede its
natural progress this would be understandable, but this
has not been the case. The cause of independence for
India was popular in the United States, the nations are
372
too remote from each other to have serious clashes over
material things and, if anything, the United States has
been more generous to India than any other nation.
Between 1949 and 1957 the United States gave India
$1 billion in loans and grants (of a total of the
$1,325,000,000 India received), and while that aid has
subsequently diminished the United States has since con
tributed 44 percent of the aid to India (the next largest
contribution being the USSR with 18 percent).^ This
suggests that the reasons are more psychological than
material. If that is the case it must have been galling
for India's Nehru to have had to appeal to President
Kennedy for military aid in November of 1962 (especially
in the light of India's previous position on such American
aid to Pakistan)3 and a continuing source of frustration
to India's leaders to be repeatedly Indebted to the United
States.
2
Ronald Segal, The Agony of India (New York:
Stein and Day, 1965), pp. 189-191.
3Indian Council on World Affairs, India and the
United Nations (New York: Manhattan Publishing Co., 1957),
p. 59.
373
In speaking of Japan's basic stance and the prin
ciples under which it purports to operate, the task is
simpler since the list is smaller. However, that smaller
list, being far less specific than that of India, is more
difficult to criticize in its vagueness. The constant
self-proclaimed guides to Japan have been, however,
(1) devotion to the United Nations; (2) friendship with
the free nations; and (3) recognition of Japan's member
ship in the Aslan community. While not so specifically
spelled out, moreover, the fourth oft repeated goal of
Japan's policies has been to attain its own transcendent
role as the "bridge" of understanding between contrasting
worlds.
Regarding the first principle of Japan's devotion
to the United Nations, there seems little reason to ques
tion the sincerity of that devotion. Although Japan's
diplomatic style in the United Nations has been relatively
quiet and conservative (never approaching India's periodic
flamboyance), it has been a constant and stabilizing mem
ber which has shown its devotion in other ways. The con
tinuing importance which Japan places on the organization
has had to endure a measure of trial not so much because
374
of anything the organization has done or not done yis-4-
v I b Japan, but rather because of what Japan may have un-
realistically expected of the organization. The remarks
of the Japanese delegate over Algeria early in the
nation's membership (February 15, 1957) reflect this
optimism, just as his remarks on the same subject some
months later (December 4, 1957) reflect the sobering of
that optimism.^ The chagrin Japan seems to have experi
enced at that time, however, did not seem to drive it to
a cynical rejection, but toward a more realistic assess
ment of what might be expected with the organization. It
may be too that toward the end of this period of study
Japan was displaying a degree of apprehension regarding
what the organization was becoming, but the nation has
remained a staunch supporter of the organization, the
letter of the Charter, and its many mainstream and periph
eral activities, and remains among those most generous in
voluntary aid to the United Nations.
Japan's modified attitude toward the organization
appears to be genuinely reflected in the speeches offer'd
^Supra, Chapter III, pp. 104-107.
375
during General Debate by Japan's chiefs of mission to the
United Nations in recent years. The most recent of these
was delivered by Ambassador Toru Nakagawa on September 27,
1972 and stressed efforts toward disarmament, efforts
toward economic and social development, and finally the
strengthening of the United Nations' organisation and
finances while virtually omitting reference to the organic
ration as a political problem solver. This does not seem
to signify, however, the end of Japan's faith in the
United Nations in this field, for simultaneously and as
part of its thrust to strengthen its "organization" Japan
clearly desires to become a permanent member of the
Security Council. To this purpose, in part at least, were
addressed some of the Ambassador's remarks regarding the
new multipolarity of the world's power, Japan's growing
financial contribution to the organization, and the
specific reference made by United States Secretary of
State William P. Rogers to the effect that the absence of
Japan as a permanent member is a handicap if the Security
Council is to maintain its influence and authority.^
^Japan Report, XVII, No. 20 (October 16, 1972),
3-5.
376
Japan's drive for a permanent seat and the accompanying
need to amend the Charter opens the door, of course, to
problems of definition grave enough to cripple the organ
ization unless approached with extraordinary wisdom,
restraint and good will.
Japan's support for the organization, however,
has also been flawed with an equivocation Important enough
to cast doubt on Japan's relationship to the organization
especially as a potential Security Council member. As
suggested previously Japan's protestations of support and
devotion have been marred by Its unwillingness, for either
constitutional reasons or reasons of domestic politics, to
support with manpower the organization's peacekeeping
functions upon which It would presumably prefer to rely.
This dilemma acutely embarrassed Japan early in its career
in the United Nations over the Lebanon Crisis at which
time It declined to contribute manpower to an observation
group whose enlargement it had recommended. The question
of the relationship of Japan's anti-war clause in its
constitution to Its obligations under the United Nations
Charter remained unresolved, surfacing once more during
the period of this study. This happened on the occasion
377
of the Congo Crisis when Japanese Ambassador to the United
Nations Koto Matsudaira dropped a chance remark that he
would favor a Japanese contribution to ONUC if it were
constitutionally possible. This apparently casual remark
found its way into the Japanese newspapers of February 22,
1961, and by the following day the Socialist Party opposi
tion was questioning the Prime Minister on the issue in
the Diet. While it was passed off at that time as Matsu
daira 's personal opinion, a day later he retracted the
statement altogether.
It is difficult to overemphasize the depth of this
inconsistency both as one of Japan's major unresolved
domestic issues, and as it relates to and may handicap its
international relations. As a domestic problem it doeB
not seem possible that Japan can go on forever (present
evidence to the contrary notwithstanding) with the ques
tion of the existence of armed force, the nature of the
armed force, and the potential role of the armed force in
an unresolved condition. There is the persistent feeling
that no society as important and dynamic as Japan's can
leave so Important an issue uncomposed, and may even at
length have to reach some consensus on the question of
378
nuclear weapons. Given the ideological nature of the
"opposition" in Japan, however, there may be no consensus,
and this issue may remain unresolved for longer than any
one would care to predict. .
As a United Nations related issue the implications
today are the same as they were in 1957 when Japan found
Itself recomnending what it would not itself do. The
moral inconsistency of a permanent member of the Security
Council ordering others to do what it is unwilling or
unable itself to do could not be concealed nor could it
help but further weaken the authority of the Council.
This is an inconsistency no amount of voluntary financial
contribution will ever wholly overcome.
As the second principle of its foreign policy
Japan has consistently spoken of its friendship with the
"free" nations, and It should be recognized that this is
a euphemism for relationships much deeper than mere good
feelings for all nations enjoying some internal political
liberties. The basic reality and major innovation of
Japan's post-World War 11 world has been the development
and periodic reinforcement of its economic orientation
toward North America, and the United States in particular.
379
and this has translated Itself Into political reorienta
tion as well. While Japan disagrees with many 'free"
nations, it rarely disagrees with the United States and
its friends among the mature nations of Europe on impor
tant Issues, and this is amply demonstrated in the evi
dence compiled in this study. This is not to say that
Japan has been the willing lap dog of the United States.
There should be no illusions about the growth of those
strong economic ties always having been smooth, for that
is simply untrue. Indeed if anything the occurrence of
disagreement was a positive deterrence to the growth of
trade. On many occasions Japanese manufacturers have
reluctantly adopted self-imposed export restrictions in
the face of an overt or tacit threat of a restrictive
American tariff, and Japan's reaction to America's dollar
manipulation in 1971 was not positive. The capacity to
disagree has extended to political matters as well, and
has been noticeable on those questions unresolved by the
1952 peace treaty such as Okinawa. The area of security
matters too have never been entirely quiet, nor has Japan
known quite how to react over Vietnam. It fell, of course,
to the lot of Japan to chair the Security Council when the
380
Issue was placed on the agenda In February 1966, and what
followed was to be one of the nation's most embarrassing
moments In the United Nations. When, after a day of talk
and nearly a month of Inaction, Ambassador Akira Matsul
attempted In a letter to the group's members to charac
terize the consensus of the members as being for early
settlement within the context of the Geneva Accords, his
efforts were curtly rejected by the Soviet Union, Mall and
Bulgaria.
Within the context of the routine activities of
the United Nations divergence has tended to concentrate
in the areas of Third World questions such as Rhodesia and
the Portuguese Empire, although with those questions as
the weight of the particular issue becomes more Important
Japan tends to vote with its economically allied friends.
While this may sound as though the nation's motivations
are extraordinarily venal, it is also possible that the
kind of nation Japan has become compels it to think and
act in certain ways.
The third stated principle of Japan's foreign
policy is its recognition of its membership in the Asian
community, and Ironically this is possibly the most dubious
381
principle of all. Japan Is, to be sure, an Asian nation
geographically and racially, but so singular has been its
history in modern times that one cannot be so sure that
Japan is Aslan culturally or psychologically. Japan's
efforts in the final three decades of the nineteenth
century to avoid second-class nationhood and reverse the
unequal treaties set in motion forces which were to set
that nation apart from many other Asian peoples, and even
at rather early dates make their views of Japan an ambiv
alent mixture of admiration and apprehension. This is a
reality Japan has been reluctant to recognize, but is
nonetheless patent in the evidence gathered here.
During the period of this study, Japan has seemed
anxious to identify itself with the causes of the Third
World at least to the extent of being always willing to
support the consideration and debate of a Third World
issue, and in all such issues discussed here Japan is
among those placing such items on the agenda. Quick to
cite its own history of sensitivity over issues of racial
discrimination and its struggle against it, Japan appears
to have believed it could use its past (dating back to
Versailles and later) record to dim present realities.
382
While it is impossible to measure how deep, if at
all, this illusion of Japan's meafcership in the group ever
was, it is not difficult to see why the vestiges of the
illusion ended during this period. Time after time Japan
has failed to support General Assembly resolutions con
taining concrete recommendations, and while each occasion
had its own rationalization, taken together their cumula
tive effect was not lost on the Third World. This aliena
tion from the Third World group has been most marked in
the "post-Congo" years as the dilenma posed by the ir
reconcilability of its second and third principles.
Coming to terms with the dilenma may well have contributed
to Japan's diffidence during this period.
All of this bears heavily, of course, on the idea
of Japan as the East-West bridge. Entering the United
Nations in late 1956 Japan seemed to look upon the organ
ization as the perfect vehicle for bridge-building only
to find within a short time that member nations did not
leave their prejudices at the entrance. Japan seems also
to have discovered that, despite what it may think of
itself, that perception may not be shared by others.
While Japan wished to keep a foot in the Afro-Aslan camp.
383
it was clear as this period progressed that at least some
of those nations regarded Japan as alien, and Japan
appears to have become somewhat defensive on the question
on occasion. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest
that one of Japan's bridge supports is not too solid.
Viewing Japan's principles against its United
Nations activity during this period, one finds, as is
likely true of all nations, supportive and contradictory
evidence. In the broadest sense, however, its principles
are about as supported by the evidence as were India's,
though in neither case is this a very definitive state
ment .
As true of Japan as of India there seems little
plausible chance of constructing a list of consistent
idealpolitik principles on the basis of the evidence
gathered here or any other body of evidence for that
matter. There are, however, some consistencies of behav
ior which emerged and may be more realistic substitutes
for broad principles.
While India's realpolitik world seems mostly influ
enced by the presence of the Soviet Union and China,
Japan's is complicated by the additional demanding presence
384
of the United States--a presence which it cannot ignore.
Japan's most basic problem during the period of this study
and today as well seems that of balancing its natural
concerns with China, the USSR, and the balance of Asia with
its special relationship with the United States. So far it
appears that its special relationship with the United
States has played a governing role when a given question
has been important, as seen repeatedly in the evidence of
this study. This special relationship was evident, for
instance, in Japan's unaltered support of the American
position on China representation through the last battle
despite the possibility of defeat.
As noted before this relationship has not been
unmoved by difficulties, nor is its influence as automatic
as is sometimes implied. Given the variety of ways in
which these nations have addressed each other since
Commodore Perry, it would truly be remarkable if there were
not a degree of ambivalence detectable in this relation
ship. It is notable, however, that on balance the unique
relationship begun in the Inauspicious circumstances of
defeat and occupation saw during the period of this study
the United States as "the most liked" nation by far In
385
Japanand today continues, evidenced by an unbroken
series of pro-American governments. Needless to say the
massive economic ties between the United States and Japan
do nothing to loosen this relationship.
Neither, however, can Japan ignore its geographic
position in Asia, and while its relationship with the
United States during this period made that relationship
less urgent, it was inevitable that it should re-emerge.
While previously Japan had been preoccupied with China and
Russia, during the period of this study Japan was re
establishing real and material relations with a variety
of Asian nations (including India) while maintaining an
essentially low posture diplomacy. This process was not
always easy given past relations, but by the time the
period of this study was coming to a close, it did not
seem unnatural for Japan to be playing a leading role in
the establishment of the Asian Development Bank and the
Asian and Pacific Council. Though not a stated principle,
Douglas H. Mendel, Jr., The Japanese People and
Foreign Policy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1961), p. 50.
386
so clear is Japan's activity In that direction that it Is
surprising It is not more openly acknowledged.
Among Japan's Asian relationships that with India
has been as openly proclaimed as important to Japan as any
specific one, yet there has been little reciprocity in
that recognition. For the most part Japan has chosen to
keep the political side of these relations at a low key,
though it has not been possible to keep the economic side
invisible.
It is Asia too that contains two of Japan's more
ambivalent relationships--those with Korea and China--and
while neither has been easy, Japan has chosen to compose
these differences insofar as possible when the opportunity
arose. During the period of this study (November 1965),
Japan was able to regularize its relationship with the
Republic of Korea, and in 1972 took the opportunity to
normalize relationships with the People's Republic of
China. While this has cast a shadow over its relationship
with the Republic of China, it is consistent with Japan's
desire to establish the strongest possible relationships
in Asia.
While hostility is rarely an overt policy or
387
principle, one must note that probably Japan’s most nega
tive relationship has been with the Soviet Union— now
representing Japan’s most important unresolved issue from
World War II. During the period of this study, while
Japan voted at variance with the Soviet bloc in the United
Nations almost always on the questions covered, the Soviet
Union was also the nation evoking by far the most negative
reaction among the Japanese people.^ The reasons for this
are probably many, but in the recent past likely to stand
out to Japan are the Soviet Union's eleventh hour attack
on Manchuria in 1945 in violation of a neutrality pact,
and the fact that large numbers of Japanese remain un
accounted for in the aftermath of that episode. In the
post-war years, moreover, the Soviet Union has not been
easy for Japan to deal with, having frustrated Japan's
early bids for membership in the United Nations and today
continuing to hold islands in the north which the Japanese
feel are intrinsically Japanese.
Fortunately, negative relations in this case have
not meant hostile relations, and at worst their dealings
7Ibid.
3 8 8
can be characterized as correct though at times cool.
While Japan and the Soviet Union may perceive two different
worlds (and reflect that perception in their United Nations
votes), this has not prevented speculation that Japan may
still have a role to play in the development of Eastern
Siberia. It is conceivable that Japan's reconciliation
with the People's Republic of China could move the Soviet
Union toward both settling its differences with Japan and
inviting Japanese participation in Siberia, thus substan
tially improving this relationship. Even in the event of
no change at all Soviet-Japanese relations would remain
correct, and Japan, if not overburdened with warm friend
ships, would at least not be haunted by active hostilities.
It was suggested earlier that there were basic
categories of issues which might be significant, and serve
at least as a basis for organizing the evidence gathered
here. The somewhat technical differences between Issues
which were convenient for organizing the material into
recurring, ad hoc, and special Issues, do not emerge as
especially Important from a comparative analytical view
point although the two interrelated special issues are
possibly of landmark significance to the organization.
389
More significant in comparing national attitudes were
those which suggested the existence of important thematic
differences, and there are detectable differences in the
manner in which each nation has approached these Third
World, Cold War, intrinsic and technological issues.
While no real claim of statistical significance
is made for these data some simple arithmetic would seem
to Indicate that there are indeed differences in attitudes
related to these major themes. Taking the evidence of the
recurring issues as the most stable and long term, it
would seem that real differences do exist and may be
marked. In the category of Third World issues, for in
stance, sixty-nine votes are recorded in which Japan and
India concurred thirty-four times. In the category of
Cold War issues where thirty-four votes are recorded, how
ever, the principals concurred on only six occasions. It
is difficult to Ignore the gap between a crude concurrence
rate of about 30 percent and 17 percent. There is a sur
prisingly high rate of concurrence on atomic and arms
control issues (see Appendix III) despite some substantial
differences in the basic approaches of the two nations. On
those Issues sixty-two votes were recorded on which India
390
and Japan concurred forty-nine times, or nearly 80 percent.
It la more difficult to read any significance Into
the record on those Issues characterized as Intrinsic as
the number of votes is so small. Superficially, however,
of the nineteen votes cast on those issues the principals
concurred on thirteen. This, however, may be a substan
tial distortion since It includes those nine votes for
the routine continuation of relief for the Palestine
refugees. Without those votes there were ten occasions
on which to vote, on which India and Japan concurred four
times. (See Appendix II for a listing of votes recorded
on recurring issues.)
The evidence (at least arithmetical evidence) of
the special and ad hoc issues is omitted from this com
parison in the belief that each contains special elements
and is in some way unique. It does riot seem distorting
to suggest, however, that there is nothing contradictory
in that evidence. On balance, Japan's and India's atti
tudes toward these basic issues represent substantial
differences, the comparative significance of which is
hard to measure absolutely.
Although difficult to measure it is impossible to
come away from years of United Nations records without the
impression that there are some nations which almost auto
matically agree and some that do not. A prophecy which
came to mind on the basis of such visceral feelings was
that over an issue such as the Congo Crisis (on which
India and Japan concurred only on the two least contro
versial votes), there would be a much higher rate of con
currence between India and Yugoslavia on the one hand and
Japan and Australia on the other. While such dramatic
results were not expected, the prophecy proved Itself as
both Austral!an-Japanese and Indian-Yugoslavian concur
rences on those votes were nine of nine.
Intrigued by such a comparison, one is led to
speculate on some other comparisons which might be made,
and some which unfortunately cannot be made on the basis
of this evidence. Of more than passing Interest, for
Instance, might be the attitude of the Republic of Korea
or the People's Republic of China over the same range of
issues, but obviously the absence of these entitles from
the organization during the period of this study prevents
such a comparison. There are, however, some peripheral
comparisons which are possible and of Interest because of
392
the peculiar relationship of the nation to one or both
principals of this study. In addition to the most obvious
power struggle relationships a few relationships which
suggest themselves are, for instance, the United Kingdom,
the Republic of China, Pakistan, and out of further
curiosity, perhaps Australia and Yugoslavia. Each of
these represents some special relationship to one or both
of the principals.
While the above evidence of differing attitudes is
of interest comparatively, it does not indicate (although
it may suggest) the attitudes of the principals toward
other major actors on the scene, and for this one must
return again to comparing votes on the issues treated.
While this would seem a simple thing to do, to be entirely
accurate about the meaning of any comparison could quickly
become very complex indeed and lead one into making a
series of relatively arbitrary value judgments on the
relative importance of issues. In hopes, then, that in
even so limited a body of evidence a law of averages will
prevail, the comparisons will be kept as simple as possi
ble.
Perhaps the most obvious possible area of interest
393
is to see if, in this evidence, there is detectable sig
nificant correlation between the principals and the major
Cold War participants. On all of the votes over recurring
issues (122 in all), India concurred with the Soviet Union
on sixty-three (about 51 percent) occasions, while Japan
concurred with the United States on sixty (about 49 per
cent) , One could, in both cases, substantially raise this
crude figure by "interpreting" abstentions as being pro
one side or the other, but this again becomes risky and
potentially arbitrary. It is perhaps more telling to
illustrate the negative by pointing out that on only
twelve of these occasions did Jaj>^|^yjacur with the Soviet
Union, and on only ten did
States. (And, it will bej
occasions there were sovj
If the above figures do
ships, they do seem to ini
Certainly another si
that of the principals with those nonaligned nations--
sometimes referred to as the Afro-Asian bloc or the Third
World--which has at times appeared to constitute a third
cohesive group in United Nations politics. While the
he United
lation-
tive ones.
nship is
393
Is to sec if, in this evidence, there is detectable sig
nificant correlation between the principals and the major
Cold War participants. On all of the votes over recurring
issues (122 in all), India concurred with the Soviet Union
on sixty-three (about 51 percent) occasions, while Japan
concurred with the United States on sixty (about 49 per
cent) . One could, in both cases, substantially raise this
crude figure by "interpreting” abstentions as being pro
one side or the other, but this again becomes risky and
potentially arbitrary. It is perhaps more telling to
illustrate the negative by pointing out that on only
twelve of these occasions did Japan concur with the Soviet
Union, and on only ten did India concur with the United
States. (And, it will be remembered, on some of these
occasions there were some very special circumstances.)
If the above figures do not prove any positive relation
ships, they do seem to indicate some rather negative ones.
Certainly another significant relationship is
that of the principals with those nonaligned nations--
sometimes referred to as the Afro-Asian bloc or the Third
World--which has at times appeared to constitute a third
cohesive group in United Nations politics. While the
Idea Chat there is such a bloc (at least in the sense that
there is a Soviet bloc) has been effectively destroyed by
careful scholarship such as that of Thomas Hovet in his
Bloc Politics in the United Nations,** there have been
periods when certain nations seemed to appear automatic
ally In the same voting column. In terms of this study
the strongest evidence which could be compiled for the
existence of such a bloc appears predictably in those
Third World issues on which its cohesion is very strong.
Given the constantly varying number of nations so defin
able it is not possible to make any numerical generaliza
tions. However, on Third World issues the cohesion of
those nations is extremely high, India is found in their
company Invariably, and Japan, often not concurring with
the group, is most frequently the lone Asian nation in
that category.
While the definitive composition of the "bloc"
may be always open to question, a uniquely consistent
Q
Thomas Hovet Jr., Bloc Politics in the United
Nations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, i960),
passim.
395
member has been Yugoslavia (which it was suggested above
had a high correlation with India over the issue of the
Congo). In many ways there seems to be little compar
ability between Yugoslavia and India politically, econom
ically, culturally or in many other ways. The pragmatic
Marxism of the relatively developed Balkan state seems to
contrast rather than compare to much of what would charac
terize India. Yet these two nations are found to have
concurred, on the recurring issues, nearly 80 percent of
the time (nearly twice as often as Japan and Yugoslavia),
substantially supporting the similarity of viewpoint
suggested in the issue of the Congo.
While it would be presumptuous to assert that
this was proof of anything, it suggests at least a much
stronger affinity of views between these two putative
leaders of Third World opinion than exists between India
and the United States, Japan or the Soviet Union. More
than any other characteristics made obvious by these
issues is India's membership in the Third World group
despite other pressures to the contrary.
The other correlation suggested in connection
with the Congo issue was that between Japan and Australia
396
which, In that instance, concurred perfectly. Taking into
account the full battery of recurring Issue votes, how
ever, this consistency is not as dramatically borne out
as the two nations concurred on about 60 percent of the
votes--a rate which one suspects would fall within the
range of normalcy given this material which, in the
absence of strong enmities or ideologic affinity, seems
to be between 45 and 60 percent. It is curious, however,
that this rate of concurrence observably exceeds that
between Japan and the United States.
Such crude comparisons standing alone are impossi
ble to assess, and some other comparisons become valuable,
therefore, as base lines. While the best comparisons
would be exhaustive ones best accomplished with the aid
of a computer, some indications of guidelines can perhaps
be more easily suggested by examining those few compari
sons above. These may also help to reinforce or refute
some of the suggestions which have been made regarding
the principals1 real attitudes, or may at least be in
triguing curiosities.
Both India and Japan have claims to a special
relationship with the United Kingdom of long historic
397
standing. To Japan the United Kingdom was for decades the
Western power of greatest significance even before It
became Its first great power ally. While this association
was marred by the events of World War XI, the United King
dom remained among that handful of national reported by
Douglas Mendel as "most liked."® In the case of India
there is not only the long history of colonial status
which binds, but also India's status In the Commonwealth
(cited by Free as second only to the United Nations in
Indian parliamentarians' priorities for cooperation), and
the apparently indelible mark of Britain on India's
governmental machinery. While India has freely invoked
this "special relationship" in debate, there Is little
evidence of its reality on the basis of the votes recorded
here. In the body of recurring Issues votes which are
the core of this study, India and the United Kingdom have
concurred on only about 27 percent of the votes (as com
pared to the India-United States rate of about 8 percent,
India-Soviet Union 51 percent, and India-Yugoslavia 80
percent). There is no doubt that this represents how
Q
Mendel, op. cit., p. 50.
398
differently the attitudes of the two nations are on
colonial or Third World Issues even In a period of dis
appearing empire.
In contrast, Japan concurred with the United
Kingdom about 52 percent of the time (a little more fre
quently than with the United States), despite Japan's
fitful efforts to keep a foot in the Third World camp.
It would seem that Japan's basic attitudes toward the
world are substantially more compatible with the United
Kingdom's and within the 45-60 percent of concurrence
one suspects would be normal for Japan in its relations
with other "free world" nations.
There are in some comparisons, however, surprises
which invite exposure and call for some sort of specula
tion. In the case of China (the Republic of China), for
instance, there is a surprising correlation with both
principals of this study— in one case partially explic
able, but in the other rather mystifying. The rate of
concurrence with Japan on the recurring issues is about
85 percent--the highest of the comparisons made. If
there was any consciousness of this high correlation on
the part of either it was not apparent, and it does not
399
seem possible to attribute It to any deliberate process.
While Japan had, since signing its separate peace with
the Republic of China, developed a fruitful relationship
with that government and displayed a certain sense of
responsibility for that nation's plight, it has not acted
with it in political coordination or alliance, nor does It
seem to represent the kind of neutralist commitment which
explains so easily the high correlation between India and
Yugoslavia. Indeed, when the opportunity came to normal
ize its relationships with the People's Republic of China,
the loss of its relationship with the government on Taiwan
does not appear, to have deterred Japan. The similarity
of outlook, possible geographic influences, and mutuality
of allies which might be used to explain their high rate
of concurrence on these United Nations issues do not seem
to have had anything like the durability so high a rate
of agreement would suggest.
Almost as surprising is the rather high rate of
concurrence between India and the Republic of China--
nations whose mutual perceptions one might ordinarily
guess would not be great. India was the second non-Soviet
bloc nation to recognize the People's Republic of China
400
(December 30, 1949), and the first to establish full
diplomatic relations (April 1, 1950). India, moreover,
often led the fight in the United Nations for the seating
of the mainland government and the exclusion of Taiwan,
and has never been characterized as having much in common
with the Republic of China. Despite the basically nega
tive nature of this relationship, the rate of concurrence
between India and China on the recurring issues was about
50 percent.
Still another unexpectedly high rate of concur
rence existed between India and its most traditional enemy
--Pakistan. While relations between these two nations
have never been fully composed since the time of parti
tion, on these recurring issues they have concurred about
65 percent of the time. When one considers how almost
automatically these two nations have aligned on opposite
sides of the major power struggles this is surprising and
confusing. While India's and Pakistan's mutual occupation
of the Indian subcontinent has not impelled them to the
kind of cooperation one might expect, clearly their atti
tudes are not wholly exclusive. Undoubtedly the key to
this rather high rate of concurrence is to be found in the
401
nature of each as an ex-colonial area and more nations of
the underdeveloped "South" than of the mature and indus
trialized "North." On issues such as those regarding
South Africa, it seems, Indian-Pakistani agreement is
substantial, and it is agreement at this level which
translates into this rather high rate of concurrence. On
Cold War issues only this percentage drops to about 26
percent almost all of which were recorded after Pakistan's
re-evaluation of its basic position as a result of the
Sino-lndlan Border War of 1962.
While the attraction of Third World loyalty is
great, what eventually becomes clear is that the nations
in this category are capable of generating the same kinds
of divisive differences that occur between the more
mature nations. On the Cold War issues treated in this
study, for instance, that cohesion begins to break down
although India is usually to be found among the largest
group of such nations.
While India's position vis-a-vis this still grow
ing group of nations is clear, its apparent feelings of
leadership of the group may be overblown, and any feeling
that it conananded some special loyalty from such nations
402
has been severely tested. There Is no evidence detectable
here that India Is a magnet which automatically attracts
such nations for moral guidance. Indeed, evidence regard
ing India's ability to lead this group may well be nega
tive. As pointed out by one Indian journalist regarding
the Sino-Indian Border War:
Only Malaysia and Ethiopia supported India while the
balance was neutral and often hostile. The very
fact that countries like Ceylon, Burma and Nepal
despite the compulsions of geography, history, and
politics, did not rally round to India's support,
revealed the weakness of Indian [sic] position in
Asia and Africa.10
The evidence of India's second major crisis of the decade
of the sixties (that with Pakistan) was no more consoling
than the first. A Free Trust of India correspondent
informally polling 110 United Nations delegations found
sixty-three neutral (save for being for peace), nineteen
avowedly hostile to India, while twenty-eight others chose
to ignore the issue. Of those hostile, eleven were the
nations of the Arab League whose favor India had courted
^Dlnkar Sarikan, "India's Relations with Asia and
Africa," United Asia. XVII, No. 1 (January-February 1965),
15.
403
for years with Its policy of nonrecognition of Israel.^
While both of the above citations are from Individuals
associated with the Nationalistic Swatantra Party It Is
still evidence and not opinion.
Japan's position regarding this group seems clear
enough. Regardless of how it views itself as a leader,
its putative peers do not seem to share that perception.
Japan may be Asian, but it is not of the group. What may
suggest itself is that at least as Important as Japan's
political orientation toward the "free" nations are its
economic realities. It may be that the most significant
difference which separates Japan from these nations is
that Japan is a nation of the industrialized North and not
of the South in the sense that those terms have been used
as a shorthand to describe the mature Indus trially devel
oped nation as opposed to those which are not. While
hardly definitive, Japan's voting behavior over the United
Nations Capital Development Fund strongly suggests this
might be the case.
1XM. R. Masani, "India's Foreign Policy," United
Asia. XVIII, No. 1 (January-February 1966), 17.
404
To a discernible extent this final chapter dwells
upon Third World Issues. This is not only because of
India's particular relationship to these issues, but
because these Issues became, during this period, the
organization's major recurring preoccupation. The signif
icance of the year 1960 not only as the year of the Congo
Crisis, but also as the beginning of the nation explosion
has been suggested, and it appears that the change this
symbolized did not take long to become apparent. Between
1960 and 1961, four of the eight Third World issues had
been introduced and were added to the standard agenda of
the Assembly, and a fifth was revived. While this could
be coincidence, its representing a changing design seems
more likely. Not only were issues like Rhodesia and the
Portuguese Empire introduced at this time (issues which
were to become as institutionalized as those involving
South Africa), but also was the tone and tempo of debate
on such issues to change. As previously noted in Chapter
III, debate on most of these issues became strident, and,
as is apparent from the chart depicting consideration of
the recurring issues over the time span (Appendix IV),
there was a burst of activity on these issues during the
405
period. It can also be noted that thereafter Third World
Issue consideration continues to exceed that of Cold War
issues substantially•
This is not to say that the Cold War and intrinsic
issues were unimportant during this period, but the former
were perhaps of decreasing importance. While able to
rouse great heat at times in the long run, the United
Nations was found to be an inappropriate forum for ques
tions involving great power interests. As these issues
related to the principals of this study it is clear that
one of them approached the issues with great caution while
the other approached them with a boldness almost out of
character for the period. In Cold War related questions
the abstention was often India's refuge on these questions
except for that of the representation of China, and on a
few other exceptional occasions. Japan, on the other
hand, had a perfect record of support for what would
inevitably be characterized as the American position. It
is probably on the basis of this Cold War issue consist
ency and Japan's unswerving verbal and voting support of
the American position on issues such as the Financial
Crisis that Japan came to be viewed as the certain
406
supporter of the United States positions, obscuring the
many times this has not been true.
So small is the numerical evidence of the special
and ad hoc issues that it would be foolishly scholastic
to attempt to give them even crude statistical signifi
cance. They do nothing, however, to alter the basic
speculations suggested by the recurring issues. In a
sense the ad hoc Issues could be thought of as a side show
to the "real business" of the Assembly. There was, how
ever, nothing amusing or secondary about them when they
occurred. In its time the Lebanon Crisis evoked many of
the same forces at work in the Middle East today, the
Bizerte Incident the same Third World emotions still so
easy to call upon, and in retrospect the Cuban Complaint
of 1962 was a muted prelude to what was In October of that
year to be one of the Cold War's most climactic crises.
Both principals played in these situations the role one
would have come to expect from their performances in the
recurring issues even to Japan's abstention on the resolu
tion regarding the Bizerte Incident lest some of its pro
visions damage the climate for negotiation.
407
The two special issues may well be seen in historic
perspective as curiously related landmarks the first of
which (the Congo) may symbolize the beginning of the
organization's preoccupation with Third World questions
and also being in part responsible for the second (the
Financial Crisis) which found the legally affirmed fabric
of the Charter tom. In these crises neither principal
behaved unusually. As suggested earlier, India's votes
coincided perfectly with the Third World position which
happened on five of nine recorded votes to coincide with
the position of the Soviet Union. Japan's position, more
over , coincided perfectly with that of the United States--
a fact which might have forecast some of Japan's difficul
ties in the Third World during the later years of the
study. In the Financial Crisis, as well, Japan's support
of the American position was total while India (though
voting to accept the opinion of the International Court
of Justice) represented the basic (and ultimately vindi
cated) position that the question was too permeated by
the East-West power struggle to be solved by United
Nations legalisms.
The basic outlooks and attitudes of both princi-
408
pals seem not only consIstent, but In some Instances
remarkably durable In the face of strong motivations for
change. During this first decade of Japan's membership
in the organization, there seems to have been little or
no lessening of Japanese diffidence in international
relations. While Japan, by the end of this period, may
have been somewhat more aware that its real priority of
importance lay not in the United Nations or the Third
World, its economic dynamism still contrasted sharply with
its low posture diplomacy.
India, to a similar degree, exhibited during this
period little change in its basic attitudes. While most
observers would agree that India had occasion during this
period to question some of its previous attitudes toward
international relations, the only evidence apparent in
this study is that India hesitated but briefly on such
issues as Tibet and Korea before returning to its usual
behavior patterns. Nor did the evidence of lack of
support in time of crisis from those it had presumed to
be its friends cause It to alter its unswerving path on
Third World issues. India's confidence survived this
decade almost untouched.
409
The contrasting attitudes of these two great Aslan
democracies is clearly marked--more clearly perhaps than
the physical differences between the two nations would
Indicate. What presents Itself most obviously in trying
to divine the underlying causes of these differences is
the importance of the years of colonial status suffered
by India. While Japan has known discrimination and still
displays a sensitivity regarding such things as racism,
its modem history has been in large part a struggle to
overcome the possibility of such discrimination by improv
ing Itself and its image. (Japan seems to care far more
about the image it presents in contrast to the relatively
more introspective Indians.The ultimate result of
this improvement has been the development in Japan of the
kind of substance which has made it a power among powers.
In contrast India's years of colonialism seem to
have left a scar which will be long in disappearing.
Despite the richness of India's culture and civilization
it still appears to suffer from the kind of inferiority
12
Lloyd A. Free, Opinions of Parliamentarians in
India and Japan (Princeton, N.J.: Institute for Inter-
natlonal Social Research, 1958), passim.
410
complex which translates into assertiveness and suspicion.
This is not to say that Japan as a nation is confident,
self-possessed, and without self doubts. Indeed, during
the period of this study one of the most mystifying incon
gruities of Japan was the coexistence of its economic and
technological dynamism and its political diffidence.
Evidence of Japan's inferiority complex is legion, but
seems to translate into a different sort of compensation.
While India preaches, Japan builds and organises and
attempts to outdo all others in whatever the endeavor may
be. Beginning with the Tokyo Tower and Aslan Games of
the 1950's through the Olympic Games of 1964 and 1972,
and Expo-70, the desire to impress others with visible
evidence success is apparent.
Whether or not one could have predicted with cer
tainty the leanings of the principals in the circumstances
of the subsequent years is impossible to prove, yet there
are accumulations of evidence too great to ignore.
India's recently increased reliance on the Soviet Union,
for Instance, should hardly come as a shock. In terms of
this study India's relatively strong record of support for
the Soviet Union, its distinctly negative correlation with
411
the United States, and its relatively hostile relations
with China could hardly lead to another conclusion.
India's internal political preferences notwithstanding,
its search for powerful and nonhostlle neighbors is
limited.
Japan's leaning toward the United States too
should not tax the imagination of one looking for predic
tive information in the evidence gathered here. Japan's
future predictability, however, seems less certain. As
traditional Japanese independence feeds upon its achieve
ment and its new confidence in a world altered by the
"Nixon shocks" of the summer of 1971, it must reassess its
position in the world. While, with the settlement of the
major political differences between the United States and
Japan, one might expect an even stronger alliance among
equals, this does not seem to be the case. Although the
compelling economic relations between the two are likely
to cause the continuation of some political ties, one must
expect them to loosen as Japan searches for a more meaning
ful independent role.
The ultimate significance of the compared and
contrasted views of India and Japan is in what they may
412
forecast for the role of each vis-a-vis the other and Asia
In general. Regarding each other there Is little evidence
that India and Japan have a firm political base upon which
to build an intimate relationship. They have, however,
developed an Important economic relationship which is
likely to continue whether political relationships between
the two are good, bad or indifferent. Indeed, any more
intimate relations between them are more likely to arise
out of such practical matters than from an ideological
conciliation.
Seeing each as a factor in the Asia of the future,
it seems that the attitudes, capabilities, and viewpoints
exhibited during the period of this study suggest a
markedly different role for the two nations. At least
three or four factors would seem to preclude India's
assuming a serious leadership role in Asia--factors
intrinsic to India rather than those debatable ones
involving how others view her. In simple material terms
India has little surplus to translate Into international
Influence even If It wished to, and while it Is hoped
that the Green Revolution may substantially relieve its
most pressing economic demands, it has more than enough
413
unsolved domestic problems to engage its attention. In
Its foreign policy InclementatIon, moreover, Its history
of minimally Important bilateral relationships with most
Aslan nations and abhorrence of entangling commitments
combine to make a future image of an India providing
dynamic leadership difficult to envision. All of these,
viewed against the general impression of the rigidity of
Indian views and policies, seem to make the nation an
unlikely candidate for a dynamic new role.
Although Japan's diffidence during this period
results in a "low posture" diplomacy which appears the
antithesis of dynamic leadership, Japan perhaps exhibited
more qualities compatible with leadership than did India.
Japan, to begin with, has substance, and has increasingly
translated a portion of that material substance into real
and potential international influence. Despite the stigma
of the past and suspicion of Japan today by many Aslan
nations, its post-war role has been essentially more
positive vis-A-vls most Aslan nations, and provides a
plausible foundation for the future. Perhaps even more
important in the long run is the capacity Japan has
exhibited for change, for clearly it made substantial
414
adjustments during the period of this study and subse
quently as well. Japan, furthermore, has not deliberately
renounced entangling commitments, and Its willingness to
engage In such agreements Is an obvious advantage In
pursuing a role of leadership.
While Japan's future role as a leader of Asia is
contingent In no small part on the kind of role China
chooses to play in the future, Japan seems to possess the
qualities needed for it to play a far greater role than
its present one. And moreover, in viewing a possible
role for Japan In the future. Is It possible to forget the
Japan of the past--a nation accustomed to a leading role?
APPENDICES
Page
Appendix I. Votes Recorded in Each Category 416
II. Votes Recorded on Recurring Issues 417
III. Votes Recorded on the Atom and Arms
Control 422
IV. Recurring Issues by Year and
Categories 425
415
APPENDIX I
VOTES RECORDED IN EACH CATEGORY
Category
Recurring Issues
The Third World Issues
The Cold War Issues
The Intrinsic Issues
Number of Votes
Sub Total
69
34
19
122
Ad Hoc and Special Issues
Ad Hoc Issues
Lebanon
Bizerte
Cuba
1
1
1
Special Issues
Congo 9
Financial Crisis 3
Sub Total 15
Atom, Arms Control, and Outer Space
Atom and Arms Control 62
Outer Space 7
Sub Total 69
TOTAL 206
416
APPENDIX II
VOTES RECORDED ON RECURRING ISSUES
The Third World Issues
Southwest Africa
Resolution 1059 (XI) February 26, 1957
Resolution 1143 (XII) October : 25, 1957
Resolution 1360 (XIV) November 17, 1959*
Resolution 1568 (XV) December
18,
1960
A/C.4/L.713 December
13,
1961
Resolution 1805 (XVII) December 14, 1962*
Rexolution 1899 (XVIII) November
13.
1963
Resolution 2074 (XX) December 17. 1965
Resolution 2145 (XXI) October 1 27, 1966*
South Africa--Apartheid
Resolution 1015 (XI)
Resolution 1016 (XI)
Resolution 1178 (XII)
Resolution 1179 (XII)
Resolution 1248 (XIII)
Resolution 1302 (XIII)
Resolution 1375 (XIV)
Resolution 1460 (XIV)
29-nation request for SC
A/SPC/L.60
Resolution 1597 (XV)
January 30, 1957*
January 30, 1957*
November 26, 1957*
November 26, 1957*
October 30, 1958*
December 10, 1958*
November 17, 1959*
Decenrt>er 10, 1959*
Consideration,
April 11. 1961*
April 10, 1961
April 15, 1961*
*Votes on which the principals concurred.
**There are a few peripheral issues mentioned in
the text which are not recorded as votes.
417
418
Special Motion to Censure South Africa
October 11, 1961
A/SPC/L.71 November 13, 1961
A/SPC/L.72 November 13, 1961
Resolution 1663 (XVI)
Resolution 1761 (XVII)
Resolution 1881 (XVIII)
Resolution 1978A (XVIII)
Resolution 1978B (XVIII)
Resolution 2054A (XX)
Resolution 2054B (XX)
Resolution 2202A (XXI)
Resolution 2202B (XXI)
November 28, 1961*
November 6, 1962
October 11, 1963*
December 16, 1963*
December 16, 1963*
December 15, 1965
December 15, 1965*
December 16, 1966
December 16, 1966*
West Irian
A/C.1/L.193
A/L.367 (Rev.1)
A/L.368
Resolution 1752 (XVII)
Algeria
Resolution 1012 (XI)
Resolution 1184 (XII)
A/C.1/L.232
A/C.1/L.246
Resolution 1573 (XV)
Resolution 1724 (XVI)
November 29, 1957*
November 27, 1961
November 27, 1961
September 21, 1962*
February 15, 1957*
December 10, 1957*
December 13, 1956
December 7, 1959
December 19, 1960
December 20, 1961*
United Nations Capital Development Fund
Resolution 1521 (XV) December 15, 1960
Resolution 1706 (XVI) December 19, 1961
Resolution 1826 (XVII) December 18, 1961
Resolution 2042 (XX) December
8. 1965
Resolution 2186 (XXI) December 13, 1966
Southern Arabia
A/SPC/L.78
A/SPC/L.88
Resolution 1948 (XVIII)
Resolution 1972 (XVIII)
Resolution 2023 (XX)
December 4, 1961
November 28, 1962
December 11, 1963*
December 16, 1963
November 5, 1965
419
Resolution 2073 (XX)
Resolution 2183 (XX)
Resolution 2238 (XXI)
Rhodesia
Resolution 1745 (XVI)
Resolution 1747 (XVII)
Resolution 1760 (XVII)
Resolution 1883 (XVIII)
Resolution 1889 (XVIII)
Resolution 2012 (XX)
Resolution 2022 (XX)
Resolution 2138 (XXI)
Resolution 2151 (XXI)
Portuguese Empire
Resolution 1603 (XV)
Resolution 1742 (XVI)
Resolution 1819 (XVII)
Resolution 2107 (XX)
Resolution 2184 (XXI)
December 17, 1965*
December 12, 1966*
December 20, 1966*
February 13, 1962
June 28, 1962
October 31, 1962
October 14, 1963
November 6, 1963
October 12, 1965*
November 5, 1965*
October 22, 1966*
November 17, 1966
April 20, 1961*
January 20, 1962*
December 18, 1962
December 21, 1965
December 12, 1966*
The Cold War Issues
China Representation
A/L.224
Resolution 1135 (XII)
Resolution 1239 (XIII)
Resolution 1351 (XIV)
Resolution 1493 (XV)
A/L.360
Resolution 1668 (XVI)
A/L.395
A/L.427
Resolution 2025 (XX)
A/L.469
A/L.496
September 1957
September 24, 1957
September 23, 1958
September 22, 1959
October 8, 1960
December 15, 1961
December 15, 1961
October 30, 1962
October 21, 1963
November 17, 1965
November 17, 1965
November 29, 1966
Korea
Resolution 1180 (XII)
Resolution 1264 (XIII)
Resolution 1455 (XIV)
November 29, 1957
November 14, 1958
December 9, 1959
420
A/C.1/L.268 April 12, 1961
Resolution 1740 (XVI) December 20, 1961
A/C.1/L.318 December
11.
1962
A/C.1/L.321 December
11.
1962*
Resolution 1885 (XVII) December
19,
1962*
A/C.1/L.334 December
9.
1963
Resolution 1964 (XVIII) December 13, 1963*
Resolution 2132 (XX) December
21.
1965*
Resolution 2224 (XXI) December 19. 1966
Hungary
Resolution 1132 (XI) January 10, 1957
Resolution 1133 (XII) September 14, 1957
Resolution 1312 (XIII) December 12, 1958
Resolution 1454 (XIV) December 9. 1959
Resolution 1741 (XVI) December 20, 1961
Resolution 1857 (XVII) December 20, 1962*
Tibet
Resolution 1353 (XIV) October 21, 1959
Vote to place on Agenda (1960)
Resolution 1723 (XVI) December 20, 1961
Resolution 2079 (XX) December 18, 1965*
The Intrinsic Issues
Palestine Refugees
Resolution 1191 (XII) December 12. 1957*
Resolution 1315 (XIII) December 12. 1958*
Resolution 1456 (XIV) December 9. 1959*
A/SPC/L.65 April 18, 1961
Resolution 1604 (XV) April 21, 1961
A/SPC/L.80 December 19, 1961
Resolution 1725 (XVI) December 20. 1961*
Resolution 1856 (XVII) December 20, 1961*
Resolution 1912 (XVIII) December
3,
1962*
Resolution 2002 (XIX) February 20, 1964*
Resolution 2052 (XX) December 15, 1965*
Resolution 2154 (XXI) November
17, 1966*
421
Cyprus
Resolution 1013 (XI) February 26. 1957*
A/C.1/L.197 December 14. 1957*
A/C.1/L.225 December 4.
1958*
A/C.1/L.226 December 4. 1958
A/C•1/L.229 December 4. 1958
Resolution 1287 (XII) December 5. 1958*
Resolution 2077 (XX) December 18. 1965
♦Votes on which the principals concurred.
**There are a few peripheral issues mentioned in
the test which are not recorded as votes.
APPENDIX III
VOTES RECORDED ON THE ATOM AND ARMS CONTROL
1957
Resolution 1147 (XII) November 14, 1957*
Resolution 1145 (XII) November 14, 1957*
A/C.1/L.174 November
14, 1957
A/L.232 November 19, 1957
Resolution 1148 (XII) November 14, 1957
Resolution 1149 (XII) November 14, 1957*
A/L.230 November 19, 1957
A/L.236 November 19, 1957
Resolution 1150 (XII) November 14, 1957*
1958
A/C.1/L.206
A/C.1/L.202
Resolution 1252A(XIII)
Resolution 1252B(XIII)
Resolution 1344 (XIII)
Resolution 1347 (XIII)
A/C.1/L.204
Resolution 1252C(XIII)
Resolution 1252D(XIII)
1959
Resolution 1379 (XIV)
Resolution 1380 (XIV)
Resolution 1402A(XIV)
Resolution 1402B(XIV)
Resolution 1378 (XIV)
October 31, 1956
October 31, 1958
November 4, 1958*
November 4, 1958*
December 13, 1958*
December 13, 1958*
October 31, 1959
November 4, 1958*
November 4, 1958*
November 20, 1959*
November 20, 1959*
November 21, 1959*
November 21, 1959*
Novenber 20, 1959*
1960
Appeal for Special Session on Sahara Test*
Resolution 1576 (XV) December 20, 1960*
Resolution 1577 (XV) December 20, 1960*
Resolution 1578 (XV) December 20, 1960*
Resolution 1617 (XV) April 21, 1961*
422
423
1961
A/C.1/L.281 (Rev. 1) October 18, 1961
A/C.1/L.282 October 18, 1961*
Resolution 1632 (XVI) October : 27, 1961*
Resolution 1648 (XVI) November 6, 1961*
Resolution 1649 (XVI) November 6. 1961*
Resolution 1652 (XVI) November 24, 1961
Resolution 1653 (XVI) November 24, 1961*
Resolution 1664 (XVI) December 4, 1961*
Resolution 1665 (XVI) December 4, 1961*
Resolution 1660 (XVI) November 28, 1961*
Resolution 1722 (XVI) December 20, 1961*
1962
Resolution 1762A(XVII) November 6,
1962*
Resolution 1762B(XVII) November 6,
1962*
Resolution 1801 (XVII) December 14, 1962
Resolution 1767 (XVII) November 21,
1962*
1963
Resolution 1884 (XVIII) October 17, 1963*
Resolution 1896 (XVIII) November
11.
1963*
Resolution 1909 (XVIII) November 27, 1963
Resolution 1910 (XVIII) November 27, 1963*
Resolution 1911 (XVIII) November 27. 1963*
Resolution 1908 (XVIII) November 27, 1963*
1964
None
1965
Resolution 2028 (XX) November 19, 1965*
Resolution 2032 (XX) December 3, 1965*
Resolution 2033 (XX) December 3, 1965*
Resolution 2030 (XX) December
3»
1965*
Resolution 2031 (XX) December 3, 1965*
424
1966
Resolution 2149 (XXI)
Resolution 2153A(XXI)
Resolution 2153B(XXI)
Resolution 2162A(XXI)
Resolution 2163 (XXI)
Resolution 2162B(XXI)
Resolution 2162C(XXI)
Resolution 2165 (XXI)
November 4, 1966*
November 17, 1966*
November 17, 1966
December 5, 1966*
December 5,
1966*
December 5,
1966*
December 5, 1966*
December 5. 1966*
*Votes on which the principals concurred.
**There are a few peripheral issues mentioned in
the text which are not recorded as votes.
APPENDIX IV
RECURRING ISSUES BY YEAR AND CATEGORIES
Issues
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
C N C N C N C N C N C N C N C N C N C N
Third World Issues
Southwest Africa 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
South Africa Apartheid 4 2 2 2 1 1 3 13 1 1 1 1
West Irian 1 2 1
Algeria 2 1 1 1 1
UN Capital Dev. Fund 1 1 1 1 1
Southern Arabia 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Rhodesia 1 2 2 2 1 1
Portuguese Bqpire 1 1 1 1 1
Sub Total 72 21 31 24 39 35 4 5 45 63
Cold War Issues
China Representation 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 21
Korea 1 1 1 1 3 1 2 1 1
Hungary 2 1 1 1 1
Tibet 1 1 1 1
Sub Total 5 3 4 3 7 1 2 3 22 2
APPENDIX IV (Continued}
Issues
1957
C N
1958
C N
1959
C N
1960
C N
1961
C N
1962
C N
1963
C N
1964
C N
1965
C N
1966
C N
Intrinsic
Palestine Refugees 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Cyprus 2 2 2 1
Sub Total 3 3 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TOTAL 10 7 5 6 4 5 2 9 4 17 5 7 5 8 1 0 7 8 7 5
C - Japan-India Concurring Vote
N ■ Japan-India Nonconcurring Vote
426
BIBLIOGRAPHY
427
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources
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1959.
14th Session, September 15. 1959 to December
13,
1959.
15th Session, September 20, 1960 to April 12, 1961.
16th Session, September 19, 1961 to June 28, 1962.
17th Session, September 18, 1962 to December 20.
1962.
18th Session, September 17, 1963 to December 17.
1963.
19th Session, December 2., 1964 toi September 1
»
1965.
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1965.
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Special Political Committee.
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428
429
United Nation#. Official Records.
Special Political Committee.
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1959.
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1960.
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1961.
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1962.
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1963.
20th Session, September 22, 1965 to December 17,
1965.
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1966.
Committee I.
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1957.
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1958.
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1959.
15th Session, September 21, 1960 to April 21,
1961.
16th Session, September 20, 1961 to February 15,
1962.
17th Session, September 19, 1962 to December 18,
1962.
18th Session, September 17, 1963 to December 13,
1963.
20th Session, September 22, 1965 to December 21,
1965.
21st Session, September 20, 1966 to December 17,
1966.
Committee II.
14th Session, September 15, 1959 to December 4,
1959.
15th Session, September 21, 1960 to December 14,
1960.
430
United Nations. Official Records.
Committee II.
16th Session,
1961.
17th Session,
1962.
20th Session,
1965.
21st Session,
1966.
Committee IV.
11th Session,
1957.
12th Session,
1957
13th Session,
1959.
14th Session,
1959.
15th Session,
1961.
16th Session,
1961.
17th Session,
1962.
18th Session,
1963.
20th Session,
1965.
21st Session,
1966.
September 20, 1961
September 19. 1962
September 12, 1965
September 20. 1966
November 12, 1956
September 24, 1957
September 10, 1958
September 15, 1959
September 21,
1960
September 20, 1961
September 19, 1962
September 17, 1963
September 22, 1965
September 20. 1966
to December
*
C D
to December 17,
to December 17,
to December 15,
February 22,
to December 12,
to March 13, i
to December
11,
to April 20,
to December 20,
to November 14,
to December 13,
to December 20,
to December 17,
United Nations. Yearbook, 1956. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1^58.
________ . Yearbook, 1957. New York: Columbia Univer-
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Yearbook.1958. New York: Columbia Univer-
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431
United Nations. Yearbook. 1959. New York: Columbia
University Press. 1961.
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Yearbook^ 1961. New York: Columbia Univer-
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Yearbook. 1965. New York: Columbia Univer
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Yearbook. 1966. New York: United Nations,
Officfe of Public Information, 1968.
Secondary Sources
Books and Pamphlets
Association for Aslan Studies. Cumulative Bibliography
of Asian Studies, 1941-1965. Boston: G. K.
Hall, 1969”
Berkes, Ross N., and Bed!, Mohinder S. The Diplomacy of
India. Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1958.
Falk, Ricl.ard A., and Hanreider, Wolfram F. Inter
national Law and Organization. New York: J. B.
Lippincott Company, 1968.
432
Free, Lloyd A. Opinions of Parilamentarians in India and
Japan. Princeton, N.J.: Institute for Inter-
national Social Research, 1958.
Halperln, Morton H., ed. Slno-Soviet Relations and Arms
Control. Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Press, 1967.
Hovet, Thomas, Jr. Bloc Politics in the United Nations.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, I960!
India (Republic). Indian Foreign Policy. Bombay:
Publications Division, Ministry of Information,
1961.
Indian Council of World Affairs. India and the United
Nations. New York: Manha1tan Pub11shing Comp any»
1957.
Levi, Werner. Free India in Asia. Minneapolis: Univer
sity of Minnesota Press, 1952.
Macrldis, Roy C., ed. Foreign Policy in World Politics.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc.,
1962.
Mendel, Douglas H., Jr. The Japanese People and Foreign
Policy. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1961.
Millard, Thomas F. Our Eastern Question. New York: The
Century Company, 1916.
Nihon Kokusai Kyokal. Japan and the United Nations.
New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1958.
Olson, Lawrence A. Japan in Postwar Asia. New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1970.
________. In Ten Years, In Fifty Years: Comments on
China. New York: American University Field
Service, 1958.
433
Olson, Lawrence A. Japanese Interest In India. New York:
American University Field Service, 1958.
________. The Japanese In India Today. New York:
American University Field Service, 1961.
Patterson, George N. Peking versus Delhi. New York:
Praeger Publishers, 196^.
Poplal, S. L., ed. India 1947-50. Vol. II. London:
Oxford University Press, 1959.
Power, Paul F. Gandhi on World AffairB. Washington,
D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960.
Scheinman, Lawrence, and Wilkinson, David. International
Law and Political Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown
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Segal, Ronald. The Agony of India. New York: Stein and
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Shlgemltsu, Mamoru. Major Foreign Policy Speeches.
Tokyo: Public Information Bureau, Ministry of
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Shulman, Frank J., ed. Japan and Korea--An Annotated
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Periodicals
Horie, Shlgeo. "Economic Relations Between India and
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Asset Metadata

Creator Brynildsen, Richard John (author)

Core Title The World Outlook Of India And Japan As Reflected In Their Participation In The United Nations, 1957-1966

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Political Science

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag history, modern,OAI-PMH Harvest,political science, international law and relations

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Berton, Peter A. (committee chair), Berkes, Rose N. (committee member), Totten, George O. (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-882200

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Legacy Identifier 7331329

Dmrecord 882200

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Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

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