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Political Skepticism And Alienation In A Sample Of Young Mexican Children

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Political Skepticism And Alienation In A Sample Of Young Mexican Children

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Content POLITICAL SKEPTICISM AND ALIENATION IN A SAMPLE OF YOUNG MEXICAN CHILDREN by- Patricia Lee Kasschau A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Sociology) August 1972 INFORMATION TO USERS This dissertation was produced from a m icrofilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted. The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction. 1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing P a g e ( s ) I f it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you com plete continuity. 2. When an image on the film is obliterated w ith a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame. 3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being p h o to g raph ed the photographer follow ed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections w ith a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete. 4. The m ajority of users indicate that the textual content is o f greatest value, however, a somewhat^ higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding o f the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by w riting the Order Departm ent, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced. University Microfilms 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 A Xerox Education Com pany 73-741 KASSCHAU, Patricia Lee, 1946- POLITICAL SKEPTICISM AND ALIENATION IN A SAMPLE OF YOUNG MEXICAN CHILDREN. University of Southern California, Ph.D., 1972 Sociology, general U niversity M icrofilm s, A XEROX Company , A nn A rbor, M ichigan (c9 Copyright by PATRICIA LEE KASSCHAU 1972 THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED. U N IV E R S IT Y O F S O U T H E R N C A LIF O R N IA T H E G R A D U A T E S C H O O L U N IV E R S IT Y PARK LO S A N G E LE S , C A L IF O R N IA 9 0 0 0 7 This dissertation, written by .........PAXRIQ XA...I^E..^SSCHAU....... under the direction of h.S.TL.. Dissertation Com mittee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by The Graduate School, in partial fulfillm ent of requirements of the degree of D O C T O R O F P H IL O S O P H Y Date .f.y.Sust..1 .9 .7 .2 . DISSERTATION G MMITTEE PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have i n d i s t i n c t p r i n t . Filmed as received. U n iv e rs ity M icro film s, A X e ro x Education Company TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF TABLES.................................... iii Chapter I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE SUB-DISCIPLINE POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION................... 1 II. POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM ................... ........ 12 III. POLITICAL LEARNING IN CHILDHOOD AND YOUTH 23 IV. SOME UNDER-INVESTIGATED ASPECTS OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION....................42 V. THE MEXICAN CONTEXTS THE POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM.................. 52 VI. DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL SKEPTICISM AND ALIENATION IN A SAMPLE OF YOUNG MEXICAN CHILDRENS THE DERIVATION OF HYPOTHESES 70 VII. STUDY DESIGN.................................82 VIII. DATA ANALYSIS...............................99 IX. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION.................186 APPENDIXES A. SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES........................203 B. QUESTIONNAIRE OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES . . . 237 BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................ 244 ii LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Desire for Broad System Reforms by Grade Level 102 of the Respondent....................... 2. Desire for Broad System Reforms by Grade Level and Social Status of the Respondent..........106 3. Desire for Broad System Reforms by Grade Level and Sex of the Respondent , ................. 108 4. Responses to "Do You Like the President?" by Grade Level of the Respondent................. 114 5. Responses to "Do You Like the President?" by Grade Level and Social Status of the Respon dent ...........................................116 6. Evaluation of the President's Job Performance by Grade Level of the Respondent............. 119 7. Evaluation of the President's Honesty by Grade Level of the Respondent................... 124 8. Evaluation of the President as a Person by Grade Level of the Respondent............. 126 9. Evaluation of the President as a Person by Grade Level and Social Status of the Respon dent 127 10. Evaluation of the President's Benevolence by Grade Level of the Respondent................ 129 11. Evaluation of the President's Benevolence by Grade Level and Social Status of the Respond ent 130 12. Perception of All Laws as Fair by Grade Level of the Respondent......................... . 141 13. Perception of All Laws as Fair by Grade Level and Social Status of the Respondent..........142 iii Table Page 14. Perception of All Laws as Fair by Grade Level and Sex of the Respondent..................143 15. Belief that the Government Knows Best by the Grade Level of the Respondent...............146 16. Belief that the Government Knows Best by Grade Level and Social Status of the Respondent.................................. 148 17. Belief that the Government Knows Best by Grade Level and Sex of the Respondent . . . 150 18. Belief in the Government's Benevolence by Grade Level of the Respondent...............152 19. Belief in the Government's Benevolence by Grade Level and Social Status of the Respondent.................................. 155 20. Perception of Inevitability of Government Outputs by Grade Level of the Respondent . 160 21. Perception of Citizen Influence on the Govern ment by Grade Level of the Respondent . . . 163 22. Perception of Citizen Influence on the Govern ment by Grade Level and Social Status of the Respondent...........................164 23. Perception of Family Influence on the Govern ment by Grade Level of the Respondent . . .167 24. The Best Symbol of Mexico by Grade Level of the Respondent 172 25. The Best Symbol of Mexico by Social Status of the Respondent ........................173 26. The Best Symbol of Mexico by Sex of the Respondent............................... 174 27. Desire to Move Permanently from Mexico by Grade Level of the Respondent........... 177 28. Desire to Move Permanently from Mexico by Grade Level and Social Status of Respondent 178 Table Page 29. Desire to Move Permanently from Mexico by Grade Level and Sex of the Respondent . . 179 v CHAPTER I A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE SUB-DISCIPLINE OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION The intellectual roots of Political Sociology may be traced to the writings of Plato and Aristotle, but its es tablishment as an organized discipline dates from the eighteenth century and the resolution of a long-standing debate regarding the ncessity to distinguish between state and society. Sociology became the study of society, an institutional process independent of the state, and the study of the state as but one societal institution became the province of Political Sociology, Hence, Political So ciology is an old and established sub-discipline within general Sociology. Unfortunately, however, the philosophical tradition of Political Sciology long impeded the growth of empiri cal investigations, and it was not until the early 1950's that large scale research provided some understanding of the patterns of adult political attitudes and behaviors. Since that time, the focus of empirical studies has ex panded to include the examination of the development of these rather enduring political orientations. This new sub-area is labelled "political socialization," a term coined by Herbert Hyman in 1959,1 This lag in the devel opment of political socialization studies is directly at tributable to the lack of systematic studies of adult poli tical behavior prior to the 1950’s; and thus it has been only lately, within the last fifteen years, that the adult studies have provided the necessary empirical and method ological base for investigating the growth of these politi cal attitudes and behaviors over the individual’s life span.^ As a result, there has been a proliferation of studies in the United States during the 1960’s and early 1970’s exploring the thesis that children acquire incipient political attitudes which are clear precursors of atti tudes exhibited by the adult citizenry. After more than a decade of impulsive research activ ity in the sub-area of political socialization, however, the empirical data remains quite limited, and the theoret ical development of the field is essentially stagnant. Michael Brown observes that there are only four books which could be considered major contributions, and two of them are based on the same study conducted in Chicago in 1961.3 At the theoretical level, many major issues have been left unresolved by empirical investigations. Edward S. Greenberg succinctly summarized these areas of disagreement within the field.4 One controversy concerns the relative importance of various stages of the life cycle in the ac quisition of political attitudes and the patterning of political behavior: Does most of their shaping occur in the pre-adolescent period of life or is there significant learning which occurs in adolescence, post-adolescence, and adulthood? A second problem centers on whether the political socialization process is primarily latent or manifest— that is, whether what is learned in childhood is truly political in nature or merely politically rele vant but essentially non-political in nature? Thirdly, a vigorous debate arises around the issue of which are the most important agents of political socialization (the fam ily, the school, the peer group, or the mass media), and what aspects of political learning each of these agents transmit to the growing child. And lastly, there is the unresolved question of the degree to vhich political so cialization of the young yields a relatively homogeneous political culture, that is, the extent to which the politi cal socialization process successfully attains its goals. In short, research in the field has ascertained that while political attitudes may not hold a position of primary cognizance in the life experience of the child, he never theless does possess attitudes and feelings toward objects of the political culture. To date, however, researchers have not been able to delineate satisfactorily the learn ing process, specifying who learns what from whom, and more importantly, tracing the effect of the child’s incipient attitudes and feelings on the development of later, more sophisticated adult orientations. In part, the lack of empirical studies designed speci fically to answer these theoretical questions is due to the lack of sufficient information regarding children's political orientations, which would provide the necessary data base for articulating more meaningful research hypo theses, Hence, much of the research in the 1960's has been devoted to profiling in a descriptive fashion the de velopment of certain political attitudes in children, the focus being what is learned rather than how it is learned. And, indeed, in a relatively unexplored area of investiga tion, data-snooping, as opposed to hypothesis-testing, may be a more appropriate research technique.® A more crucial handicap to the theoretical development of the field, however, has been the overwhelming dominance of the Chicago study, which is psychoanalytic in approach. Conducted in 1961, it is responsible for providing data for many studies published in the field throughout the 1960's and hence for molding the image of the process of political socialization in the United States. The broad picture established by that study is that children begin to acquire attitudes and feelings toward political objects very early (even before grade 2, the earliest grade test ed)? that these attitudes change very little in the aggre gate after grade 5, at which time their pattern already resembles that found in the adult population; and that these incipient attitudes are quite enduring and therefore shape much of later political learning. Numerous authors have attempted to challenge these formulations, suggesting that while the development of many political attitudes may exhibit such learning curves (reaching the asymptote by grade 5), significant political learning still does occur in high school and post-adolescence.7 These findings, how ever, are consistently obscured by the voluminous Chicago data, and thus the above picture remains essentially un modified. If adequate replication studies have been slow to e- merge in the United States, their development to test the generality of the findings in other political cultures has been even more retarded. In part, this may be due to the impact of the landmark study conducted by Almond and Verba in 1965, The Civic Culture, in which they examined the oc currence of attitudes supportive of democracy in five countriesj the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Mexico.® In contrast to the focus of political socialization research in the United States at the time, they relegated the factor of childhood socialization to a position of minor importance in favor of the chronologi cally more recent socialization experiences of education and occupation in explaining the lack of development of a civic orientation in Italy and Mexico as compared with the other three countries. It was not until this decade that Dennis et al. followed up Almond and Verba with a study of children ages 9-16 years old in four of the five coun tries (Mexico excluded) and found that significant cross- cultural differences existed among the children in their commitment to and/or disenchantment with democratic norms and institutions.^ Furthermore, they found that in some cases their orientations reflected that of the adults in the country; in others they did not. My interest developed in that fifth country excluded from the Dennis follow-up study— Mexico. Mexico may be considered a "developing democracy" which is inescapably caught up in the modernizing process.10 While Almond and Verba reported that the Mexican citizenry was highly alien ated in the political arena, scoring the lowest of the respondents from the five countries on most of their poli tical efficacy and trust indicators, the Mexican government is committed to a program of combating apathy and aliena tion in order to integrate the people into a modern politi cal system.I1 This commitment is most clearly articulated through the educational system in the government-supplied, compulsory textbooks, in which a primary aim is to incul cate democratic norms in the young Mexican c h i l d r e n . 1 2 Dawson observes that political socialization theory assumes that citizens in different countries learn to think and feel differently about their political systems, and all political socialization studies to date reveal the birth of these attitudes and feelings early in the in dividual’s life cycle.13 It seems logical, therefore, to seek the roots of the extreme political cynicism and alien ation expressed by Mexican adults in the early orientations of Mexican children to the political arena, Roger Hansen, a critic of the Mexican political economy, has suggested that it is the primary socialization experiences at home and in school that breed a deep-seated distrust and hostil ity that carry over into the political sphere as the child matures? "the attitudes affecting political participation formed in the early years are reinforced by actual exper iences in adult life, and the mold continues with as yet insignificant change from one generation to the next,"14 The purpose of this study, therefore, will be to in vestigate the potential onset of political skepticism and alienation in a sample of young Mexican children. The major question to be answered by the study is whether the young children mirror the rather unique pattern of politi cal alienation which is exhibited by the adult citizenry of the country or whether the government rhetoric presented primarily through the textbooks is succeeding in molding a new, more trusting and supportive individual in the new generation. This study, although utilizing a survey design, is quasi-developmental in conception. By comparing independ ent random samples of children drawn from grades 2 through 9, this one-point-in-time survey seeks to capture the broad outlines of the development of political skepticism and alienation in the young Mexican children. At one end of the life span, the Chicago study concludes that chil dren's political attitudes are overly positive and essen tially molded during the early elementary school years, showing little change into adulthood following that period. At the other end of the life span, Almond and Verba con clude that adult political attitudes, characterized by con siderable alienation and apathy, are primarily shaped by later educational and occupational experiences. This study adopts a more moderate position than either of these, sug gesting that negative political orientations are not merely the frustrated responses of adults, but may actually be so cialized in the children's early attachment to the politi cal system. Such negative political dispositions may be socialized throughout the childhood and adolescent years in much the same way as positive political attitudes, the socialization of which have been clearly documented among American children. Hence, this study intends to show that increasing political skepticism and alienation of Mexican children occurs as a function of the maturation of the political self (exposure to and assessment of the political world), a process which is differentially affected by social class and sexual socialization environments. 9 FOOTNOTES *Herbert H, Hyman, Political socialization (Glencoe* The Free Press, 1959). ^Michael E, Brown, "Alienation and Integration of the Political Attitudes of Suburban Adolescents" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California, 1971). 3ibid. In his literature review, he observes that Children in the Political System by David Easton and Jack Dennis (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1969) and The Devel opment of Political Attitudes in Children by Robert Hess and Judith Torney (New York* Doubleday, 1967) are both based on the questionnaire responses of 12,052 purposively selected white public school children in grades 3-8 in eight large metropolitan areas, (Hereafter this study will frequently be referred to as simply the Chicago study.) A third study, Children and Politics by Fred I. Greenstein (New Haven* Yale University Press, 1965), involves a non- random sample of children in New Haven, Connecticut, in grades 3-8. The fourth major work was a comparative study, Political Socialization by Kenneth Langton (New York* Ox ford University Press, 1969), drawing on a 1964 sample of high school students in Jamaica and a probability sample of high school seniors in the United States. To this list I would add a fifth book, Political Socialization by Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt (Boston* Little, Brown, Inc., 1969); while it adds no new data to the field, it contri butes an excellent evaluation of the status of current re search and theory. ^Edward S. Greenberg, ed., Political Socialization (New Yorks Atherton Press, 19707^ 5According Herbert Hirsch in Poverty and Politiciza tion* Political Socialization in an American Subculture (New York* The Free Press, 1971), political socialization is thus a misnomer since we have been looking mostly at what is learned and not how it is learned. ®Fred I. Greenstein, "The Benevolent Leader* Chil dren's Image of Political Authority," American Political Science Review, LIV (December, I960), 943, observes, "Theo ry building and research hypothesis elaboration might best proceed in the context of concrete research since little is 10 known in detail at present about how political behavior develops." 7 The most important of these other studies include Jack Dennis, Political Learning in Childhood and Adoles cence (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969); M. Kent Jennings and Richard Niemi, "Patterns of Political Learning," Harvard Educational Review (Summer, 1968), 443- 467; Kenneth P. Langton and M. Kent Jennings, "Political Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum in the United States," American Political Science Review, LXII (September, 1968), 852-867; and Richard Merelman, Political Socialization and Educational Climates (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971). ^Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., Inc., 1965). 9jack Dennis, et. al., "Political Socialization to Democratic Orientations in Four Western Systems," Compara tive Political Studies, I (April, 1968), 71-107. l^For insightful observations and analyses of the func tioning of democratic institutions in Mexico, see Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, Democracy in Mexico (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); Kenneth Johnson, Mexican Democ racy: A Critical View (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971); Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture. In the campaign speeches of ex-President of Mexico Gustavo Diaz Ordaz compiled in A Political Handbook, trans lated by Luis Quintanilla (Mexico, 1964), we can observe a strong emphasis on the importance of educating the young into active political participation: "It is important to interest and incorporate our youth into the many tasks of national life, so as to train them in carrying out respon sibilities which some day will rest entirely upon them." 12According to Clark C. Gill, Education in a Changing Mexico (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969, the Secretaria de Educacion Publica directed the Conse jo Nacional Technico de la Educacion to "study and revise the elementary curriculum so that it would contri bute more to the growth of civic responsibility and prac tical skills." (Gill, 1969:38) "Each subject of the text book is intended to fill a dual role, as a vehicle of culture and as. a means of individual development." (Gill, 1969:46). l^Dawson and Prewitt, Political Socialization. 11 ■^Roger D. Hansen, The Politics of Mexican Development (Baltimore: Johns HopKins Press, 1971), p. 224. CHAPTER II POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM According to Michael Brown, much of the ’ ’ increase of interest and research in the field of political socializa tion is attributable to the rather recent efforts in the application of systems theory and the structural-functional models to the analysis of the political system."1 In large measure, this has been the contribution of a single man, David Easton.2 Every political system is necessarily concerned with what Easton has called "system persistence,” and the process of political socialization is seen to play an important role in attaining that goal. Political socialization within the systems-analysis framework may be conceived of as central to the creation and maintenance of support for the political system through its mechanisms for the transmission of the politi cal culture from generation to generation. The political culture is often defined in the Almond and Verba tradition as being composed of the aggregation of individual members4 beliefs and attitudes toward political objects (persons and institutions), the direction and intensity of his af fective orientations toward these objects, and his overall evaluation of the system's relationship to himself as mem ber. 3 This definition of political culture is thus re*- 12 13 stricted to socialization of the participation orienta tions of its members; it does not examine the social structural or institutional apsects of the political cul ture, which help mold those participational dispositions through the socialization process. Easton and Dennis claim that the responses of members to their political systems are in part a cruid pro quo for what they see themselves obtaining from membership in the system; that is, the support offered is specific in nature and contingent on the system producing returns for the mem b e r . ^ Such support could never sustain a political sys tem on an on-going basis since in its daily operations a political system is bound to operate against the best in terests of some of its members in order to benefit others. Hence, more important to the persistence of the system is what Easton has labelled diffuse support, "the generalized trust and confidence that members invest in various ob jects of the system as ends in themselves, . . . It is not contingent on any cruid pro quo; it is offered uncon ditionally. "5 Diffuse support, according to Easton and Dennis, is probably most effectively transmitted as a sense of legitimacy of both authorities and institutions; a second important source would be in the belief of a com mon interest (often translated into a "we-feeling" stimu lated by ideology when members come to see themselves as a people, a nation, with a common past and more importantly 14 a common destiny). The process of political socialization is essential in the transmission of these diffuse, positive orientations toward political objects. When speaking of generating support within a politi cal system, Easton and Dennis observe that it is more use ful to distinguish between different levels of the politi cal system rather than treating it as an undifferentiated whole. They perceive members in the political system as ascribing legitimacy or support to three different levels of government, each'building to a higher level of general ity. At the highest level exists the political community, which broadly refers to the territory and the people in cluded in the political system as well as to the over-arch ing principles of political organization, such as the com mitment to democracy, socialism or communism. At the second level of generality is the political regime. which is comprised of the norms and institutions, such as the norm of voting and the institution of the electoral pro cess. At the lowest level of the political system are the authorities or the incumbent leaders of government. As might be expected, they posit that an individual may withdraw support from any one of these levels of the political system.6 For example, if an individual is un happy about the government, he is most likely to reject the current group of politicians and vote for a new set in the next election. He still supports the regime and the norms. If, however, repeated attempts to place new leaders in office fail, or the new leaders themselves fail, the in dividual might then become disenchanted with the voting procedures and press for changes in the electoral process; he has thus moved his reform efforts from the level of authorities to that of the regime. Finally, if the indi vidual is unable to effect the desired changes in the e- lectoral process, he may push for sweeping changes in the political community, such as pushing for the system to be come more socialistic. A final act of desperation would be for the individual to leave the country entirely, seeking a new political system and new citizenship. As a point of emphasis, Easton adds that "although hostility to and disaffection from the authorities may be the first link in a chain that ultimately leads to the dis solution of the political community, "it is quite possible, and indeed customary, for authorities and regime to change, the community remaining quite stable."^ While Easton's analysis of the function of political socialization in the context of a systems model of politi cal communities is highly elucidating, it is nevertheless one-sided in its treatment of the intimate relationship be tween political socialization and the political culture. The reason is that Easton's definition of the political culture transmitted from generation to generation through the process of political socialization focuses merely on the participational aspect of the political culture (the collective orientations of the citizens toward the politi cal system, including their evaluation of political objects and symbols, their desire or lack of desire to participate in elections and political office, etc.). Such a defini tion, however, ignores the social structural or institu tional aspects of political culture (the structure of authority, norms, values, etc.) which help shape the par ticipation orientations of the members in the culture through the socialization process. In other words, ap propriate participation patterns among the citizenry are in part defined by norms, values and structural arrange ments in the political system, and they are not solely determined by some independent political socialization process. According to Edward Lehman, "Symbols of political in stitutions contain descriptions and values about political participation as well as about the exercise of political power."8 Thus, a responsive government requires a parti cipating citizenry, while a more centralized, authoritar ian political regime requires a more passive, subject ori entation in its community members. In this context, poli tical socialization may be seen as important for coordina ting that institutional and participational side of the political culture in order to ensure stability. For ex ample, if a citizenry were educated for participation in 17 the political system and then confronted with non-respon- sive political structures, the political system would be come unstable; in the same way, if a non-initiating poli tical regime were to confront a passive citizenry, the political community would be similarly threatened with collapse. This matching of the institutional and participational sides of the political culture is not a coincidence, be cause both aspects of the political culture are legiti mated by the same set of cultural values. Lehman observes, that "earlier analysts tended to treat political power in legitimational symbols and political participation in in stitutional ones."® He correctly insists that legitima tions and institutions go together in the political culture. Thus, "responsive political institutions tend to coincide with rational-legal legitimations.1,10 Responsive values in the culture elicit social guidance (not regulation) from the political regime and active participation (not subject passivity) from its members. In contrast, more traditional cultures would tend to evolve political regimes which were more regulating and directive in nature and develop a con comitant passive citizen orientation. Easton referred to the importance of the political socialization process for transmitting the sense of poli tical legitimacy toward authorities and the regime.H It may now be observed just how intimate is the association between the political culture and the political socializa tion process. In a political culture with essentially rational-legal values and legitimational symbols, the political socialization process will be shaped so as to emphasize the development of rational orientations among members and institutions. In more traditional political cultures, the political socialization process will neces sarily emphasize the development of more affective orien tations. The political socialization process will thus be shaped by the political culture and tailored to meet its specific political needs. An example may serve to make this more clear. In the United States, values finding expression in rational-legal symbols of legitimation result in a political regime which is essentially guiding in nature (encouraging various in terest groups to seek the realization of their own goals in a relatively open system) and in a citizenry which ac tively participates in the system (by assessing their in dividual needs and then pressing their demands for the sys tem to meet them). In such a political culture, the poli tical socialization process would be called upon to devel op this rational perspective in the citizens. And, indeed, Joan Moore noted that the formal political socialization of the children in the school results in the development of a "reverent" and a "rational-bureaucratic" political self, "on the one hand . . . implanting an attitude of 19 reverence toward semi-sacred national heroes but also issuing an injunction to the prospective voter to be ac tive, moral, wary, rational and impersonal in his politi cal evaluations."12 jn Easton's language, again, members of the United States' political culture would be social ized into expecting responsive political institutions and encouraged to make demands on the regime for the realiza tion of their specific needs; in essence, this is social ization of a high level of specific support in addition to the socialization of more diffuse support for the regime. In developing democracies, such as we find in Latin America, it is less likely that the values of the more traditional cultures would encourage the socialization of specific support in the members, but rather the affec tive nature of the socialization process in such a culture would tend instead to inculcate higher levels of diffuse support. The values and traditional legitimational sym bols would require an essentially affective socialization process (in contrast to the more cognitive and rational political socialization programs of a culture legitimated by rational-legal values) and the result of such a social ization process would be the infusion of high levels of diffuse support among the citizens with a concomitant low level of specific support for the political culture. In terms of the operating realities of the political system, this would mean that the members would assume a non-demand 20 ing stance with respect to the government; and while their own needs may not be satisfactorily met by the activities of the political regime, their high level of diffuse sup port for the community and regime ensures that it will not be damaged by its failure to meet the specific needs of in dividual Members. This safeguard is extremely important in developing countries, which most often are working with limited resources and diverting resources from the public welfare sector to the industrial sector for investment in the long-range growth of the country. It is most important in such instances for the individual member to maintain his support for the political regime inspite of its disregard for his personal and specific needs. Hence, one function which political socialization can serve in the political culture is to harmonize the participational and the power or institutional sides of the political culture, and in this sense, the nature of the political socialization pro cess may be expected to vary with the specific political needs of the political community. It will be more cogni tive and rational in nature, or more affective and tradi tional, depending on the nature of the political culture and its fundamental values. 21 FOOTNOTES •^-Michael E. Brown, "Alienation and Integration of the Political Attitudes of Suburban Adolescents" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California, 1971), p. 18. ^For in-depth presentation of this theoretical per spective, see David Easton, A Framework for Political Anal- ysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.l Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965) and his A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York* John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1963), ^Edward Lehman, in his article "On the Concept of Po litical Culture: A Theoretical Re-assessment," Social Forces. L (March, 1972), 361-369, prefers a broader defin ition of political culture that refers not only to the participational aspect of it, but also to the institution al and legitimational symbols which comprise it. This article of political culture and its theoretical useful ness, and it is necessary reading for anyone interested in Comparative Political Sociology. 4David Easton and Jack Dennis, Children in the Politi cal System (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1969). 5Ibid., p. 62. ^David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1963), ^Ibid., p. 320. ^Edward Lehman, "On the Concept of Political Culture: A Theoretical Re-assessment," Social Forces. L (March, 1972), 367. For expanded treatment of Weber's character ization of legitimacy and authority in traditional and legal-rational terms, see Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (New York: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 289-449. 9Ibid.. 365. 1QIbid.. 367. HEaston, A Systems Analysis of Political Life. 22 Joan W. Moore, "Social Deprivation and Advantage as Sources of Political Values," Western Political Quarter ly, XV (June, 1962), 218-219. i CHAPTER III POLITICAL LEARNING IN CHILDHOOD AND YOUTH The persistent theme of American studies of political socialization is that children possess nearly uniformly favorable attitudes toward anything political. One of the conclusions of the Chicago study was . . . that from the most rudimentary stage of his awareness, the child interprets the government as something to further his welfare and that of the people around him. The benevolent, protective, help ful, and otherwise positive qualities of government constitute the first and continuing overall context of evaluation. Even at the end of our test period, when the child is thirteen or fourteen years of age, he seems reluctant to give up his initial, highly positive evaluation. In this we see, perhaps, the early formation of a bond that is hard to loosen.1 Thus, even in high school, when the child has begun to perceive the political process, men and institutions, more realistically, the affective responses remain strikingly positive. Easton and Dennis conclude, "If the child is to develop discontent and desire for change, it is undoubtedly yet to be learned. It will thus be overlaid upon an early basis of high regard for the government."2 To account for this positiveness, Easton and Dennis posit four stages in the child's development of attach ments for the political systems 1. politicization, (the 24 child’s growing awareness of the political sphere outside the family); 2. personalization (the representation of this political sphere in his cognitive images in terms of key authority figures, such as the President and the local policeman); 3. idealization (perceiving these key authority figures as benevolent, powerful and above reproach); 4. in stitutionalization (the growing characterization of the government in terms of its group nature and its institu tional processes).^ For Easton and Dennis one of the major findings of the Chicago study was that the personalization of the President involves that of the office or the role and not that of the m a n . ^ They note that this distinction is what contributes to the continuity of the regime, because should children attach their feelings to the man instead of the office, then every change in leadership would precipitate a crisis of legitimacy. They conclude, "We may interpret the image of the President as an indication of the level of support that the children are willing to put into the structure of authority,"5 Easton and Dennis also highlight the importance of the child’s ability to make the transition in orientation to the government from the idealized personal figures to the impersonal institutions. In part, this transition is ac companied by a de-idealization of the personal figures, but at the same time, the newly perceived governmental institu- 25 tions are endowed with the same overly positive evalua tions that the personal figures initially were.® The main reason for the initial positive orientations both to authority figures and later to institutions is another hey to understanding the political socialization process, the tendency for affective reponse to precede cognitive ability to justify the response. Thus, the child learns first to love America without knowing exactly what it is, where it is, or how it is different from other countries; he knows only that he loves America best and has no desire to live anyplace else.7 Gustav Jahoda notes a similar pattern in the development of the concept of na tionality among Scottish children, commenting that there is a "parrot recital of terms without adequate understand ing" because "The grasp of relationships has failed to keep pace with the acquisition of vocabulary."® In a later article, he adds, "Moreover, some broad and loose associations, normally tinged with a favorable emotional tinge will tend to be established between these words (Scotland, Glasgow, etc.) and certain items of their ex perience. "9 This emphasis on affective responses preceding the development of cognitive ability and therefore operating selectively on cognitive input at a later age has been documented in a variety of studies. Easton and Dennis concluded that the child "is aware of the President and is 26 able to express an estimate of him before there is much understanding of or information about the actual role. A strong positive attitude prevails in advance of knowledge about the President’s actual role performance and this at titude colors the child’s perceptions."10 On the basis of the New Haven data, Greenstein states that "evaluations and ’affective knowledge* about political leaders seem to precede the factual information on which they might be ’based’"} thus, "the structure of cognitive information is erected on a foundation of feelings, assessments, and opinions} and the development of critical faculties waits on a later stage. "H Both of these phenomena in the process of political socialization— the movement from affective to cognitive as sessment of political objects and the movement from the personal to the institutional view of government— may be explained in terms of Piaget's theory of the stages of in tellectual development.I2 While this theory has not proved completely useful in explaining the findings of political socialization studies, it nevertheless provides the great est single theoretical framework in which to interpret many of those findings.13 Richard Merelman asserts that "Piaget's work suggests that there may be a sequential development of political at titudes, which, because it proceeds largely as a function of age, is untouched by education."14 Quite brieflv, 27 Piaget observed that between the ages of seven and eleven the child assimilates much information through his own per ceptions and actions and that much of his mental structure is being re-shaped during this period by the input of new information; and although his mind is capable of performing certain logical operations and thus relying decreasingly on perceptual judgments, the nature of his thinking at this stage of his life cycle remains concrete rather than ab stract. Around age 12, however, the onset of "if-then" hypothesis thought processes allows the child to identify variables in a problem and examine their relationship cri tically; this matks a stage of considerably more sophisti cated thinking. 15 -phe findings from Merelman's own inves tigation were in accord with this theoretical statement* the sixth graders structure their concept of democracy far less completely than do older children, and ninth graders are far more similar to twelfth graders than sixth graders in their cognitive structure of the concept.16 Furthermore, the child's tendency to idealize person al figures of the government is in keeping with Piaget's observations that the young child may be characterized as authoritarian, tradition-bound, arbitrary, primitive, ego centric, a being with an "undifferentiated fear orientated externalized view of the world."I7 In keeping with this description, the child's demand for unreproachable author ity figures is understandable in light of his inability 28 to tolerate ambiguity. Piaget and Weinstein have both doc umented that children initially cognize objects along an unstructured dimension of good-bad, Piaget's theoretical perspectives are also valuable in the explanation of sex and social class differences which have been observed in the process of political so cialization. For example, at the initial affective level of attachment to the political community or the political regime (love for the flag and the national anthem, pride in being American, etc.), there are no differences between working-class and middle-class children, nor between males and females. On the other hand, as the children mature and the level of cognitive input increases, there is a tendency for lower status children to retain their affective-based idealized images of political authorities longer than raid- dle-class children and to exhibit a more intense idealiza- 20 tion of those figures. Furthermore, the lower status children tend to be retarded in their transition from a conception of the government in terms of persons (the level of authorities) to one in terms of institutions (the level of political regime)— such a transition requiring the cog nitive capacity to think in terms of abstract group pro cesses. Much research has been directed toward isolating those aspects of the social class environment which are responsible for shaping these psychological orientations 29 in the children. Greenstein concluded from his study of New Haven children that the explanation of the social class differences in political socialization depended on under standing the deeper psychological factors, such as feelings of personal inadequacy, constricted imagination or cogni tive development, inability to express personal ideas and feelings, and the lack of self-direction and self-confi dence, which may all build into the lower-class child's more affective, less sophisticated response to the politi cal system. From Psychology and Social Psychology comes a growing body of evidence to support Greenstein*s contention. For example, Martin Deutsch and his associates at the Institute for Developmental Studies in New York have focused on the debilitating effect of the lower-class home environment on the personality development of the child, highlighting the retarded language and cognitive development of the child and establishing the subsequent diffusion of these negative effects into all area involving social learning.21 More specifically, Basil Bernstein has documented the existence of a syntactical organization of language in the lower class different from that in the middle class, and he has traced the consequences of such language dif- • 9 9 ferences on cognitive development.^ in essence, he ob served that the character of lower class language inhibits the process of abstracting from experience, the lower-class 30 person being more concerned with description and narration of the concrete; this syntactical organization of the lan guage "sets up constraints on the flow of communication, particularly in its elaboration and logical development."23 Hess and Shipman verified the existent class-determined language differences in their sample of working and middle- class mothers and traced its effects through the mother- child interaction process on the cognitive development of the child; their conclusion is that the language constric tion exhibited by the mother transmitted to the child and thus precludes the opportunity for the child to reflect. Indeed, they found "relatively undeveloped verbal and con ceptual ability" in children from homes characterized by the restrictive range of verbal and conceptual content."24 But, as Easton and Dennis summarize the findings, so cial class differences in the acquisition of political at titudes are only suggestive of trends, and there is nothing to suggest fundamentally different perspectives on the po litical system arising from different positions in the so cial stratification hierarchy.^5 the sex differences revealed by the numerous studies on political socialization are even weaker. Greenstein found that boys generally ex ceeded girls in their expression of interest in politics and their level of political information, but that other wise, sex differences were not significant and not con sistent.2^ Lyons likewise reported no significant sex I 31 d i f f e r e n c e s .27 Easton and Dennis reported a greater ten dency on the part of girls to personalize the government, and they found, as did Greenstein, that boys tended to be come politicized a little earlier than girls.2® Their conclusion, however, was that sex differences were a minor factor in the development of political attitudes. Merelman was the only major researcher to report sex dif ferences favoring girls, but he also concluded that these were small and not really significant.2^ Whyte, in re sponse to the observed sex differences in these studies, claims, "Sex probably has even less importance for pre- high school children who are immersed in essentially the same social environment. In other countries, where sexual roles are more sharply differentiated, perhaps greater po litical differences might a r i s e . "30 (italics mine) Hence, while Easton and Dennis conclude that it is the concentration on citizenship education in the United States which has "provided the impetus toward the ideali zation of political authorities by children . . . and ac counts for both the little cynicism or distrust evident and the surprising consensus among children regardless of sex, geographical region and social class," it seems more profitable to view these differences, or lack thereof, as functions of the social environment to which the child is 32 exposed and its subsequent influence on the social and psychological development of the child.31 The differences in the children’s retention of highly affective and ideal ized views of authorities and institutions and in their adoption of institutional perspectives of the government must be seen as a function of maturation and the acquisi tion of cognitive capacities for abstract thinking.3^ We have seen that differences in the social class environ ments of the children may shape this learning capacity, while the molding environmental experiences of the chil dren of the two sexes do not differentiate them to the same degree. Another aspect of the political socialisation pro cess to receive considerable research attention is the relative contribution of the various agents of socializa tion— the family, the school, the peer group, and the mass media. This question is being approached more directly than issues about the outcome of the socialization process, but the issues are far from being resolved at the empiri cal level. The great need here, of course, is for longi tudinal studies which can assess the input from various sources in terms of content and effective restructuring of the child's attitude structure at the time of input. As such studies are lacking to date, the summary of the findings in this area is still highly speculative. The family is generally considered to be the most important agent in the socialization of political atti tudes. Intuitively, such a statement has tremendous ap peal? the family is the primary agent of culture transmis sion through the socialization process, and much early political earning is non-political in nature, merely gen eralizing to the political arena from non-political learn ing situations. While Easton and Hess- acknowledge that "political learning gets a good start in the family dur ing the pre-school period," they maintain that the most dramatic changes in the child’s political attitudes occur during the elementary school years.33 One of the conclu sions of the Chicago study, then, is that it is the school which has the major impact on the child's political orien tations, even though they admit the child is well on the way to developing a political self by the time he reaches school instruction of citizenship attitudes. Out of that Chicago study, Hess and Torney, along with Easton and Dennis, characterize the function of the home in the poli tical socialization process as serving as the "repository" of the good feelings that the child develops toward the political system and community, on which later cognitions are built. 34 there is some evidence for this state ment. Jack Dennis found that while parents and children do show resemblances in their political orientations, the magnitudes of the relationships are very small.35 This was a replication of findings by Jennings and Niemi, who 34 found that with the exception of party identification, which did show a strong parent-child transmission, a whole host of other political attitudes show only moderate or no relationship.3® Their conclusion was that children are not "carbon-copies" of their parents, and, hence, matura- tional factors, other socialization agents, or change and historical factors must exert their own influence. The proponents of the school as the major socializing agent have not been able to demonstrate their case empiri cally any more effectively than the family advocates. Al though the Chicago study was able to document the growth of political attitudes during the elementary school years, they were unable to attribute their development directly to the school curriculum or the school environment. In deed, Langton concludes that there is surprisingly little support for the impact of curriculum on the development of students' attitudes: although there is a tendency for stu dents with more civics courses to be more knowledgeable, to be more interested in politics, to expose himself to more political input through mass media, to discuss poli tics more often, to feel more efficacious, and to show more tolerance in a democratic sense, all of these differ ences are small.37 Litt found that high school civics courses served only to increase the student's affective response toward the democratic creed, while having little effect on the level of political participation.38 Dawson 35 and Prewitt thus conclude, . , . in absence of formal civic education, members of society would be less informed about the political world. They would have less information about their political structures and processes. It is doubtful, however, that basic political loyalties and attach ments are substantially developed or altered through such formal civic education.39 This is similarly the conclusion of Struve; the data sug gest that school programs as they are presently constitut ed serve as reinforcement rather than a stimulus to change behavior and interest patterns learned at home.40 Far less research has been directed toward assessing the effects of peer group influence on the development of a child’s political orientations. One researcher found that "political orientations are not of major importance among high school friends."41 Hirsch found that peer groups generally ranked lower than other agents of social ization when he asked children in grades 5-12 to rank them as sources of political information.42 The same study by Hirsch pointed to the importance of mass media as the foremost agent of transmission of poli tical information for all age groups in the study. He furthermore learned that media did not become a more im portant source as the result of the decreased prominence of other agents in the socialization process. Media con tent was discovered to be less important than duration of media exposure. Unfortunately, a critical assessment of the importance of media exposure on the development of 36 political attitudes in children waits on the emergence of studies which adequately assess the effect of media on the more general cognitive and emotional development of the child. It is obvious at this point that there is a large gap between the social-psychological theories of political so cialization with their concomitant assumptions and the empirical data base which is slowly accumulating. In this gap we see the greatest weakness of the field of political socialization. While there is considerable agreement re garding what is learned, there is little agreement on how or from whom it is learned* that is, researchers are un able to specify the mechanism of transmission adequately. In large part, this weakness is due to the lack of any ties between political socialization research and broader theoretical frameworks, such as theories of cognitive de velopment, attitude formation, social learning, and the like. It is only out of such a perspective that meaning ful hypotheses may be derived and tested systematically. To this extent, I am in agreement with Sender that what is needed is fewer heuristic models of political sociali zation and more hypotheses which can be tested empiri cally.^ 37 FOOTNOTES David Easton and Jack Dennis, Children in the Poli tical Systemt Origins of Political Legitimacy (New York* McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1969), p. 128. 2Ibid., p. 45. 3Ibid. ^Data from the Chicago study revealed that 98% of the second-grade children identified Eisenhower as President during his eighth year in office, and one month after Ken nedy's inauguration, fully 93% of the second graders test ed correctly identified the new President. Furthermore, the researchers found that the qualities of leadership, benevolence, etc., associated with the President did not change significantly with the change in officeholder or partisan affiliation. ^Easton and Dennis, Children in the Political System, p. 202. ®The President is seen as less benevolent, less per sonal in his relationships with the people of the country, perhaps also as less honest as the child matures. On the other hand, numerous studies have shown that the children's evaluations of the President's competence (working hard, knowing more, etc.) do not show the same decline with in creasing age, but rather often become more positive with increasing familiarity of requirements of the job. This pattern, recorded in the Chicago study, was confirmed in Greenstein's study, Children and Politics. ^David Easton and Robert D. Hess, "The Child's Poli tical World," Midwest Journal of Political Science (August, 1962), 236. 3Gustav Jahoda, "The Development of Children's Ideas about Country and Nationality (Part I: The Conceptual Framework),” British Journal of Educational Psychology. XXXIII (1963), 51. Q Gustav Jahoda, "The Development of Children's Ideas about Country and Nationality (Part II: National Symbols and Themes)," ibid. , 152. 38 *^Easton and Dennis, Children in the Political System, pp. 171-172, ■^Fred I. Greenstein, "The Benevolent Leaders Chil dren's Image of Political Authority," American Political Science Review, LIV (December, 1960), 936. ^2Easton and Dennis, Children in the Political Sys tem, conclude that the child's simultaneous initial attach ment to the local authority figure of the policeman and the national figure of the President disproves Piaget's theory that a child exhibits growing levels of awareness about himself in concentric circles. On the other hand, Jahoda ("The Development of Children's Ideas about Coun try and Nationality: Part I," 48) reaches the conclusion that while such a model was far "too simple and neat to be a realistic portrayal of the child's perspective" on his environment, it nevertheless provided a rough and useful guideline for assessing the child's grasp of relationships among objects from different levels of his social environ ment. C 3 l3For an excellent examination of the usefulness of Piaget's formulations in interpreting the findings of poli tical socialization studies, see Richard Merelman, "The Development of Political Ideology: A Framework for the Analysis of Political Socialization," American Political Science Review, LXIII (September, 1969), 750-767, 14Richard Merelman, Political Socialization and Edu cational Climates (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. , 1971), p. 25. ■ ' ■ - ’ This major shift toward more sophisticated thinking around the ages of eleven and twelve has been recorded by P. S. Freyberg, "Concept Development in Piagetian Terms in Relation to School Attainment," Journal of Educational Psychology, 57 (June, 1966), 164-168. 1®Merelman (Political Socialization and Educational Climates, p. 74) observes that "Age, instead of tighten ing political cognition, simply makes what cognitive or ganization there is more intelligible. Not only is cogni tive structure limited at all grade levels, but some com ponents of democratic theory remain entirely unstructured , . . . Instead cognitive structure is limited to the sym bol to vote, the closeness of the citizen to his govern ment, policy difference, and, rudimentarily, some rules of the political game. It is clear that most adolescents en ter adulthood with an incomplete understanding of democra cy. " 39 17 . . . . A'Merelman, Political Socialization, p. 62. • * - 8Jean Piaget, The Moral Devlopment of the Child (New Yorki The Free Press, 1948); Eugene A. Weinstein, "Devel opment of the Concept of Flag and the Sense of National Identity," Child Development. XXVIII (June,-1957), 166-174. I Q A The differences discussed m this section have shown up consistently in numerous studies including Easton and Dennis, Children in the Political System; Hess and Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children; Greenstein, Children and Politics; and Gustav Jahoda, "The Development of Childrens Ideas About Country and Nation ality! Part I." ^There is a similar tendency for lower-status chil dren to cling to traditional party identification while middle and upper-status children move on to attachment of an Independent Party label to themselves. Furthermore, lower-status children perceive laws as being more rigid (responding affirmatively to the question, "Are all laws fair?"). ^Martin Deutsch, The Disadvantaged Child (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1957). 22sernstein in his article, "Social Class Linguistic Codes and Grammatical Elements," Language and Speech, V (1962), 239, distinguished two linguistic codes (restrict ed and elaborated) and determined that the former was more characteristic of lower-class individuals, while the lat ter was more prominent among middle-class individuals. He concluded, "The restriction of the use of adjectives, un common verbs, the relative simplicity of the verbal form (the middle-class mothers used far more passive verbs), and the low proportion of subordinations supports the thesis that working class subjects, relative to the mid dle-class subjects, do not explicate intent verbally, and in as much as this is so, the speech is relatively non individuated. " 23Ibid., 241. ^4Robert D. Hess and Virginia Shipman, "Early Experi ence and the Socialization of Cognitive Modes in Children," Child Development, XXXVI (1965), 869-886, ^Easton and Dennis, Children in the Political System. ^ G r e e n s t e i n , children and Politics. 40 27schley Lyons, "The Political Socialization of Ghet to Childrens Efficacy and Cynicism," Journal of Politics. XXXIII (May, 1970), 217-226. 2®Easton and Dennis, Children in the Political Sys- tem; Greenstein, Children and Politics. Easton and Dennis interpreted the greater tendency on the part of girls to choose the President as the best symbol of the government in grade 8 at a rate twice that of the boys as "perhaps indicating" a greater tendency to personalize the govern ment. . ... Merelman, Political Socialization. 3®Elliott S. Whyte, "Intelligence and the Sense of Political Efficacy in Children," Journal of Politics, XXX (August, 1968), 710-731, 31Easton and Dennis, Children in the Political System, p. 406. 32Another contributing factor to these social class differences comes from Melvin Kohn, Class and Conformity: A Study in Values (Homewood, 111, i The Dorsey Press, 1969), a study in which he found that children in the middle class were socialized according to the values of self-di rection and independence, whereas lower-class children were socialized with the emphasis on obedience to external authority. This would help to account for the young chil' dren of lower status over-idealizing all authority figures and other findings of political socialization studies in cluding the tendency of lower-status children to view laws as more rigid and to maintain a more traditional party identification rather than moving to the "Independent" category. The valuable contribution of Kohn's study was the tracing of these child-rearing values back to the es sential nature of the work environment of the father, a working-class occupation demanding obedience to superiors while a middle-class occupation generally emphasized great er self-direction and independent decision-making oppor tunities. 22Dennis, Political Learning in Childhood and Adoles cence , confirms that many political attitudes do show little change in the aggregate responses after grade 5. 34Easton and Dennis, Children in the Political System; Hess and Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children. 35oennis, Political Learning. 41 Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, "The Trans mission of Political Values from Parent to Child, American Political Science Review, LXII (March, 1968), 169-184. ■^Kenneth p. Langton, Political Socialization (New Yorks Oxford University Press, 1969). 38Edgar Litt, "Civic Education, Community Norms, and Political Indoctrination," American Sociological Review. XXVIII (February, 1963), 69-75. ■^Dawson and Prewitt, Political Socialization, p. 152, "^Patrick W. Struve, "The Political Socialization of Adolescents: A Study of Students in a Mid-Western High School" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa, 1969). 41 Suzanne Sebert, "Friend and Peer Influence on the Politics of the High School Senior," a paper presented at the American Political Science Association meetings, New York, September 2-6, 1969, p. 14. ^Herbert Hirsch, Poverty and Politicization: Politi cal Socialization in an American Subculture (New York: The Free Press, 1971). 43Gerald Bender, "Political Socialization and Politi- cal Change," Western Political Quarterly, XX (June. 1967), 390-407. CHAPTER IV SOME UNDER-INVESTIGATED ASPECTS OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION Only one observer of the field of political socializa tion has asked the obvious question: What happens when these various agents of political socialization present contradictory pictures of the political system into which the new member is being introduced? Dawson and Prewitt perceive considerable discontinuity in the political so cialization process, although they note there are several forms in which the discontinuity may occur.* For example, what the child learns may not be applicable within the po litical system by the time the child reaches adulthood, a situation very common in developing countries, which are experiencing rapid social change. Also, what the child learns in pre-adolescence may not square with political realities (witness the disillusionment of the young Ameri can idealists as they prepare to enter the political world as participating adults). And lastly, political socializa tion may be discontinuous because messages delivered to the children by various agents of socialization do not concur. The only data bearing directly on this issue is from a study by Laurence Wylie of a small French v i l l a g e ,2 He doc umented the school as presenting the government as concern ed and helpful, the political leaders wise and trustworthy, 42 43 and the citizen as participating and important. At home, on the other hand, the children were learning that the po liticians were corrupt, that the government was evil, and that as adults they should do everything they could to make things difficult for the men in government. Wylie concluded from his analysis that when formal socialization (in the school) is at wide variance with informal sociali zation, generally the formal socialization was ineffective. Admittedly, such discontinuities in the political so cialization process occur in all countries, albeit in vary ing degrees. Dawson and Prewitt suggest that one obvious and little cited reason is that the family, a primary so cialization agent, is engaged heavily in the socialization of experience to be carried out largely within a secondary institution, the political system.3 There has been no at tempt, however, to assess the degree of discontinuity of socialization within various political cultures and to ex amine its effects in creating cognitive dissonance for the child, which he must in some way resolve in his confronta tion with the political system. The whole issue of the generality of the findings from American studies of political socialization to other poli tical communities has not been adequately raised, let a- lone adequately resolved. Easton's students and associ ates from the Chicago study have carried versions of his questionnaire to other western countries, including Chile, 44 Puerto Rico, Japan, Australia and Germany. The findings in dicate that children from all of the other countries dis played less idealization of the key authority figures in the political community than did the American children as reported in the previous chapter, although the pattern of decreasing personalization and increasing awareness of the role and competence qualities with age did follow the pat tern established by the American studies. Furthermore, the cross-cultural replications suggested differential effects of social class backgrounds on the nature of the political socialization within these different political cultures, as well as revealing differences in the relative influence levels of the various agents of socialization (especially the home and school). Kolka is quite correct in insisting that conclusions about the nature of the political social ization based solely on the observation of American children is premature.^ A broader understanding of the process and outcomes of political socialization is to be gained from an examination of the process operating in other political cultures. As noted before, different political communities develop political systems with unique political needs. To some extent, the political socialization process will be tailored to meet those needs, and, hence, we may expect not only the nature of the socialization process to differ a- cross political communities, but its outcomes as well. A study by Okamura of the political socialization 45 process in post-war Japan, a country undergoing consider able social change, is an excellent example of my point.5 He found that children were much less enthusiastic in their responses toward the Prime Minister of Japan, the key au thority figure of the political system, than were American children toward their Chief Executive. In his tentative explanation of the findings, Okamura posited that the school and family existed as more or less neutral agents of socialization, while the mass media— overwhelmingly neg ative in their daily treatment of the Prime Minister— as sumed primary importance in shaping the attitude of the children. Because most of the political socialization research has been conducted in the United States, the examination of growth of alienation and skepticism in the responses of children has been entirely overlooked. Greenstein writes: Possibly the most striking outcome of the New Haven study was the finding that prevailing adult skepticism and distrust of politics and the politician simply did not seem to be present in the grade-school sample. In spite of a variety of attempts to provoke such respon ses during my preliminary interviewing and pre-testing, there was not evidence even of a frame of reference which could make it possible to use questionnaire items tapping the dimension of political cynicism. Moreover, although the final New Haven questionnaires contained a number of items which might have evoked spontaneous references to the malignancy of politicians, only one or two of the 559 children made statements which could be construed in this way.6 This overly-positive orientation of American children, which is verified by all research conducted thus far, is probably reasonably expected in a political culture where all pieces of political information are presented to chil dren with a sugar coating. Certainly, for example, the image of the government presented in the school's curriculum is heavily biased in favor of order and consensus, and there is data to indicate that teachers deliberately avoid the presentation of controversial issues in civics courses.7 There is additional data to suggest that at home parents too present an overly positive picture of politics and gov ernment. 8 The mass media is perhaps the only socialization agent which would present a more realistic image of govern ment and its leaders to the child; but as observed earlier, there is little data available regarding the media habits of children and little understanding of the effect of mass media on their cognitive and emotional development. Even where alienation and distrust have been encoun tered in American studies, the development of such negative orientations has not been examined diligently, as has been the development of positive support for norms and institu tions. The reason probably is that such responses are con sidered inconsequential because they are rare. Jennings and Niemi, studying the transmission of cynicism between high school seniors and their parents, found that only 1/5 of the students were more cynical than their parents, while 3/5 of the parents were more cynical than their children. They concluded conservatively that compared to their parents the students saw very little to be cynical about in national 47 political activity. Observing that children with cynical parents were not significantly more cynical than other children, they suggested that the reason must be the impact of other socialization agents, most notably the school, •'where the thrust is on developing trust in the political system."9 Mo attempt was made, however, to examine those negative orientations which were displayed; the conclusions of the study still emphasized the positiveness of the chil dren's responses. There are only a handful of studies of American chil dren which have been concerned with the'development of dis trust and negative images of the political system. One study revealed that those black children displaying greater political cynicism were the most perceptive and politically aware children, and a second study found that suburban ado lescents "demonstrate considerably less positive levels of diffuse regime support and specific authoritative role sup port than reported in related research on the political at titudes among high school seniors and grade school chil dren. "10 That not all political systems are able to create such a remarkable reserve of good will among their youngest mem bers is evident by examining the limited research findings available from other countries. Greenstein conducted a com parative study in Great Britain, France and the United States, using non-representative quota-samples of pre-ado- 48 lescent children.11 He found that the French children, relative to the children in the other two countries, were politically un-informed and politically suspicious. A second comparative study also found that Belgian and French students displayed higher levels of political dis trust than did Dutch high school and university students.12 Dennis et al. conducted perhaps the most rigorous cross- cultural analysis of the development of commitment to or disenchantment with democratic norms and institutions in four countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy and G e r m a n y ) . 1 3 jn that study, children were ob served to show national differences which did not neces sarily parallel those recorded by Almond and Verba among the adult populace of the c o u n t r y .14 For example, the Italian youth showed considerably higher levels of poli tical efficacy than might be expected on the basis of levels recorded in the adult citizenry; British youth, on the other hand, were relatively less sophisticated in the development of their concept of democracy and sense of political efficacy. It would seem, therefore, that not all political com munities succeed as well as the United States in imbuing young members with such a trusting and unchallenging orien tation toward the political system. But the thesis that cynicism, alienation and distrust might not be reserved for frustrated adult participants but rather are rooted 49 in the child*s initial responses to the political system is still relatively unexplored. Jennings and Niemi claim that political cynicism is primarily the reflection of a general distrust of people. If so, one might logically expect to find such responses throughout the life cycle, rather than specific to adult years. This is the thesis that will be examined with data collected from Mexican children. 50 FOOTNOTES iRichard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, Political Socialization (Bostons Little, Brown and Co., Inc., 1969), 2Laurence Wylie, Village in the Vancluse (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), 3Dawson and Prewitt, Political Socialization. ^James Kolka, "Political Socialization: A Cross-Na tional Comparison" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Uni versity of Kansas, 1969), ^Tadao Okamura, "The Child's Changing Image of the Prime Minister: A Preface to the Study of Political So cialization in Contemporary Japan," Developing Economics. VI (September, 1965), 566-586. C L Greenstein, "The Benevolent Leader," 935. "^Ralph C. Preston, Teaching Social Studies in the Elementary School (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968), p. 218, ^Roberta Sigel, "Image of the President," American Political Science Review, LXII (March, 1968), 216-226; Karen Orren and Paul Peterson, "Presidential Assassin ation: A Case Study in the Dynamics of Political Sociali zation," Journal of Politics. XXIX (May, 1967), 388-404. 9M. Kent Jennings and Richard Niemi, "The Trans mission of Political Values from Parent to Child," 178. l^Edward S, Greenberg, "Orientations of Black and White Children to Political Authority Figures," Social Science Quarterly, XLIX (September, 1970), 561-571; Brown, "Alienation and Integration in the Political Attitudes of Suburban Adolescents," 123. 11Fred I. Greenstein and Sidney Tarrow, "Political Orientations of Children: The Use of a Semi-projective Technique in Three Nations," a paper presented at the 65th Annual Meeting of The American Political Science Association, New York, September 2-6, 1969. 51 l^Frank Pinner, "Parental Over-protection and Politi cal Distrust," The Annals, 361, (1965), 20-31. 13oennis, et. aJ.., "Political Socialization to Demo cratic Orientations of Four Western Systems." ^Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture. CHAPTER V THE MEXICAN CONTEXT! THE POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM Mexico is best described as a country in transition from a traditional to a modern political state.1 This stage of social development involves not only a polarity of societies and institutions, but also of attitudes and world views. The traditional world can be characterized by superstition, resignation in the face of opposition, re sistance to change, and submission to authority; the mod ern world view, on the other hand, calls for the rational and competent individual to manipulate his environment ef fectively. In many ways, then, the movement from a tradi tional to a modern culture involves changes in attitudes as well as in social institutions.2 Much of the Mexican population still retains this traditional perspective, although the political regime and its leaders are wholly committed to the modernization pro cess and seeking to accelerate it wherever p o s s i b l e .3 it was Almond and Verba who initially utilized the distinction between a "subject" and a "participant" stance toward the government, the former characterizing the individual who orients toward it as merely a passive recipient of its de- 52 cisions and actions and the latter representing the indivi dual who seeks actively to influence the outcomes of gov ernment. 4 Almond and Verba proceeded to characterize the bulk of the adult Mexican population as occupying a subject position in their political system. Several other observ ers of the Mexican political-economy have also described the Mexican population in this way, and although there is not much agreement on exactly how extensive is the tradi tional (subject) stance, there is consensus about its be ing excessive. Both Roger Hansen and Octavio Paz consider at least 25% of the adult population to be totally outside the political system (this segment comprising most of the rural and Indian population which is non-Spanish speaking and thus isolated not only physically but also culturally) and another 55% to be politically apathetic subjects (thpse individuals who feel totally helpless to influence the po litical system but who nevertheless consider themselves part of it).5 Hansen and Paz characterize a mere 10% of the adult Mexican population as being in a "participant" stance, exercising democratic norms and making political demands on the system; this group is profiled as being drawn almost exclusively from the upper-middle income groups in the bureaucracy and the upper-income groups from the private sector. Joseph Kahl, on the other hand, is more generous in his estimation of the size of the parti cipating sector in modern Mexico, indicating that most of 5 4 those in the large cities, middle and lower classes alike, should be included.6 With respect to the Mexican adult population's posi tion. specifically in the political world, both Kahl and Almond and Verba report the same pattern of response— Mexicans are extremely positive in their feelings toward the nation of Mexico and the symbolic achievements of their Revolution, while at the same time, they are highly alien ated from the current day-to-day operations of the govern ment (its outputs) and its leaders.^ For example, in re sponse to the question in the Almond and Verba study re garding what aspects of their country they were most proud, Mexicans responded most frequently, "The government and its political institutions," at a level close to that of British subjects; on numerous other items of the survey, however, Mexican respondents displayed high degrees of al ienation (relative to the respondents from the four other countries, the Mexican citizens being least likely to per ceive the local, state or national governments as having an impact on their daily lives, least likely to expect equal treatment from the police or the government bureau cracy, and least likely to exhibit a sense of political efficacy).8 Kenneth Johnson comments on this situation by observing that the distinction between nation and state is still viable in Mexico while it has been blurred in other modern political systems: the people of Mexico "love their 55 nation, but they often disparage the state. Nationalism is the allegiance of the people to itself, its legends, heroes, values, and only incidentally to the incumbent government. "9 Almond and Verba stressed that this pattern of alien ation— an association of high levels of system affect and general endorsement of the system "with a lack of experi ence with political inputs and an almost total rejection of political outputs"— was unique to Mexico, not being ob served in any other country studied.^ This pattern has since been verified by other observers of the Mexican po litical scene.*-*- The Mexican is positively oriented to his nation and political regime on the most general and symbolic level; at the same time he does not expect any better performance from the actual government. He is alienated not only from the authorities, but also from many of the norms and institutions of the political regime such as the electoral process (less than 1/3 of the eli gible voters have participated in recent elections and less than 1/3 of these voting expressed satisfaction with going to the polls), protection of civil liberties (most Mexicans feel unable to influence an unjust local or na tional regulation), e t c .*2 This character of Mexican political culture is illus trative of Murray Edelman's point in The Symbolic Uses of Politics that "emotional commitment to a symbol is associ 56 ated with contentment and quiescence regarding problems that would otherwise arouse concern."13 Thus, inspite of the negative orientations to the output of the political system and the lack of attachment to the . - authorities and many aspects of the political regime, the Mexican popula tion can nevertheless remain highly attached to their poli tical community, feeling that the Mexican Revolution has made a difference in their lives and will continue to do so.1^ That the Revolution still lives for many Mexicans further supports Edelman's contention that "symbols are the only means by which groups not in a position to analyze a complex situation, rationally may adjust to it, through stereotypization, oversimplification, and reassurance."15 In summary, the Mexican adult position in the politi cal system is defined by institutional and legitimatiohal symbols in essentially traditional or subject terms. Al mond and Verba warn that the Mexican political system is "living off the capital of system affect," and unless gov ernment output performance can match the aspirations of its citizens, instability is the inevitable end result.16 How ever, Edelman would suggest that the symbolic creation of the on-going Revolution to which all political leaders dutifully make appeal, would serve to legitimate the poli tical regime independent of the record of its output. In the language of David Easton, the symbol of the Revolution and democracy would create sufficient levels of diffuse 57 support to allow the regime to continue to operate while risking the levels of more specific support from community members. And, indeed, Kahl has documented that the rheto ric of the Revolutionary ideals does prevent the disen chantment of Mexicans with their political leaders from spreading to the level of the political regimei "he (the Mexican) does not blame the Revolutionary institutions for the chicanery of his fellow citizens, which he sees merely as a reflection of the Mexican temperament."17 In examining the origins of political alienation and cynicism of the Mexican adults, Hansen comments, "Their primary socialization experiences in the family and at school most often breed in them patterns of distrust and hostility which obstruct formation of loyalties extending much beyond the nuclear or extended family structure. . . . As political followers they fear that their allegiance will be betrayed; as political leaders, they perpetuate the pattern of betrayal."18 Numerous authors have docu mented the pervasiveness of such attitudes as fatalism, in terpersonal distrust and hostility among the Mexican peo ple.19 Kahl observed the ramifications of such personality dimensions in operations of the business sector of the Mexican system, many businessmen believing that one could only trust members of his family to help build a business and thus avoiding bringing in outsiders when the business needed e x p a n d i n g .20 Martin Greenberg also observed similar 58 bureaucratic behavior peculiar to the Mexican scene— a basic feeling of insecurity, the highly personal nature of business relationships, and a very high rate of turnover.21 It is not surprising, therefore, that Almond and Verba and other researchers should find these enduring personality traits spilling over into the political arena in the form of cynicism and apathy. Nevertheless, the Mexican government is committed to a program to overcome apathy and alienation and to inte grate the Mexican people into a modern political system.22 In making the transition from a political system based on personal connections, favoritism, and an obedient popula tion to one based on honest government, responsiveness to popular demands, and civic participation, one necessarily concludes that Mexico "clearly has a way to go to reach the second pole of the continuum. "23 &ncj there is obvious ly much in the generalizations on Mexican character which is more appropriate to the authoritarian end of the con tinuum, because the perception of authority as arbitrary and unmanipulatory encourages the Mexican to fall into the role of discontented follower more easily. Thus, Mexico is faced with a tremendous education problem; educating the citizenry to become participants involves inculcating new values and new perspectives on human nature. The Mexican government has always assumed that education was an important ingredient in the creation 59 of a sound modern political system, and since the 1940's, education reforms and the extension of educational facili ties to all parts of the country have been priority consid erations. But in its authoritarian manner, the government has insisted on the adoption of a single curriculum in all primary and secondary schools, a curriculum designed "to contribute more to the growth of civic responsibility and practical s k i l l s . "24 The nature of civic education in Mexico is highly af fective. Children are repeatedly exposed to symbols of the government in terms of the Revolution of 1910, the flag, or the national anthem, and considerably less emphasis is placed on developing attachment to the institutional as pects of the regime or the authority structure. There are several reasons for this affective emphasis in the formal political socialization program presented in the government supplied compulsory textbooks. First, there is a tremen dous drop-out rate in the Mexican educational system, and for many rural people in particular, their one or two years in school represent the only prolonged, meaningful contact they will have with the state of Mexico. Any al legiance they are to develop for a government seated a thousand miles away in the Federal District must be devel oped rapidly during these first few years of schooling. Recalling Piaget's contributions, at the lowest grade levels, children do not possess the reading skills nor 60 the cognitive capacity to understand abstract concepts, and hence the most effective socialization of feeling and belief in the political system in these early grades must necessarily be an affective approach, emphasizing attach ment to the political community or nation irrespective of the nature of the specific political regime. It is only in the upper elementary and secondary grades that the con cept of democracy is introduced and the outlines of Mexi co’s democratic political system are explained to the chil dren. The children are then instructed about the obliga tion of the citizen to vote and otherwise participate in his political system by showing interest and concern for the development of the country; they learn about individual liberties which are guaranteed by the Constitution and about labor rights, welfare reform and other democratic institutions and processes which characterize the Mexican political system. A second reason for the primarily affective approach in the formal political socialization program in Mexico follows from the discussion in Chapter Two— Mexico, as a developing country, relies heavily on diffuse support for the political system while it attempts to allot its limit ed resources to maximize economic growth without sacri ficing political stability. Because its resources are limited, what the Mexican government invests in the in dustrial sector to promote economic growth in long range 61 terms is necessarily witheld from consumption by the mass of Mexican people. When farmers and workers do not see their living conditions improving significantly over the decades, they are likely to become disenchanted with the government, unless they can be persuaded to identify first and foremost with the nation of Mexico and accept that "what is good for Mexico, is also good for me."25 Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the government would place heaviest emphasis on the socialization of affect for the political community and be less concerned about the devel opment of knowledge about and commitment to processes and institution at the regime level.2® The goal of educating the public into a participating frame of mind must be matched by opportunities for exer cising those new values and goals within the political system. While the Mexican government stands behind the rhetoric of democracy, it has a long way to go before it can be considered as an operating reality of those princi ples. The present-day government of Mexico defies char acterization as either authoritarian or democratic, con taining elements of both. Gonzalez Casanova remarks, "Its forms are a combination of legitimacy and violence, of re publican law and traditional institutions."2^ Because of the commitment of the government to the goal of economic growth, the Mexican system has developed in its own way.28 Gonzalez Casanova points out that the Mexican Constitution of 1917 embodies many institutions and practices which originated in Europe and the United States, but because these institutions do not meet the needs of Mexico, they have a "ritualistic function which is absent in their places of origin."29 Following the dec ade of civil war, Mexico needed a strong Executive to chan nel the country’s resources into economic growth and to combat regionalism in the development of a single nation state. He observes, "respect for the balance of power would have been respect for the conspiracies of a semi-feu- dal society,"30 The real problem for Mexico is not its di vergence from classical theories of economics and democ racy, but its inability to deal effectively with the in ternal and external dynamics of inequality. Political scientists are unable to agree among them selves on the level of democracy which has been achieved within the Mexican political system. One eminent Latin American scholar considers Mexico to be one of the more democratic countries in Latin America, ranking it fourth after Uruguay, Chile, and Costa Rica.3^ For many political scientists, however, the presence of a President essen tially unchallenged in power and the control by a single political party disqualify Mexico as a democratic country. But the Mexican leader’s appeal to the rhetoric of democ racy is not totally unfounded or misleading. It should be remembered that Latin American democracy is really con- 63 ceived of more in terms of social justice and economic e- quality than in the strictly political terms (one man, one vote) that characterize its definition in the United States.33 this point in time, anyway, the concern for political representation may have lower priority in these countries than the concern for income re-distribution and extension of individual rights and liberties to all members within the political community. If a government moves successfully toward the realization of economic equality and social justice, the pressure for political rights may be reduced or non-existent. On the other hand, there is a reasonable possibility that as the political culture ma tures and the country develops, that citizens will be less content with government largess and will begin demanding their political rights for participation in the government decision-making process. Indeed, there is some justification for this line of reasoning if we examine the nature of Mexican politics. It is only those upper-income groups in Mexico which actively and consistently exercise their democratic rights by voting and by petitioning the Supreme Court, by organizing politi cal groups and opposition parties, by demanding recognition of and protection for their civil liberties and the like. Furthermore, it is in those states of Mexico that are most prosperous where the greatest opposition to the single-par ty electoral system, is found.34 The only major political 64 party opposition to the single party of PRI, which domin ates the political system, is comprised mainly of the well-to-do businessmen and old wealthy families of Mexico. A Mexican social scientist has observed that the Mexican middle class does not support the main party, PRI, to the same extent as the workers and farmers.36 woui<j appear that with increasing prosperity, the people have a larger stake in the game and are more likely to want the game played by the rules in the book. Some observers of the Mexican political economy have commented on the increasing institutionalization of power in the political system— a movement away from the placement of the decision-making power solely in the extra-institu tional mechanism of the PRI party to the political office of the President.36 There is a growing civil service corps in Mexico, and technicos are increasingly taking over positions of decision-making in economic development and management from politicos. This movement of the Mex ican government toward institutionalization and bureaucra tization should eliminate much of the personalism and cor ruption which has characterized even modern-day politics in much of Mexico. Thus, we can see that there is a dual aspect of poli tical socialization in operation. As the citizenry be comes better educated, it will begin to make demands on the political system. The political system, on the other hand, is evolving toward a position of institutionalized and regularized government process that can accommodate those demands. Education and political socialization be come crucial in the development of a democratic political community. The longer the child remains in the educational system, the greater will be his exposure to formal politi cal socialization. As the formal political socialization program moves beyond the affective level of the early grades to more rational and instructive approach in second ary and high schools, the child begins to learn about the democratic system, what his obligations and rights are within it, and most importantly, how to place demands on the political system to realize them. At this point, the political authorities and the political regime should be maturing in the same fashion as the citizenry for the poli tical community to retain stability. 66 FOOTNOTES ^See Gonzalez Casanova, Democracy in Mexico; Martin C. Needier, Politics and Society in Mexico (Albuquerque, N. M.: University of New Mexico Press, 1971); Hansen, The Politics of Mexican Development. 2Needler, Politics and Society in Mexico, p. 100. 3Gill, Education in a Changing Mexico; Joseph A. Kahl, The Measurement of Modernism (Austin, Texas* Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Texas, 1969). ^Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture. ^Hansen, The Politics of Mexican Development; Octavio Paz, The Labyrinth of Solitude (New Yorks Grove Press., Inc., 1950). ®Kahl, The Measurement of Modernism. ^Ibid.; Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture. ®Almond and Verba, ibid. ^Johnson, Mexican Democracy* A Critical View, p. 205. l^Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture. ^Hansen, The Politics of Mexican Developments Johnson, Mexican Democracy* A Critical View; Robert C. Scott, Mexican Government in Transition (Urbana* University of Illinois Press, 1959); David W. Abbott, "Political Aliena tion in Mexico and Italy*' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1966). l2Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture. • * - 3Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Ur bana* The University of Illinois Press, 1964), p. 32. 14Kahl in his study, The Measurement of Modernism, found that 78% responded affirmatively that Mexico is better off today because of the Revolution, and only 30% of his sample responded that they felt that the existing political parties were not providing adequate solutions to current problems facing Mexico. 67 -^Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics, p. 40. ■^Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, p. 227. l^Kahl, The Measurement of Modernism, p. 116, ^Hansen, The Politics of Mexican Development, p. 204. l^Paz, The Labyrinth of Solitude; Hansen, The Politics of Mexican Development; Almond and Verba, The Civic Cul ture f Kahl, The Measurement of Modernism; Needier Politics and Society in Mexico. 2®Kahl, The Measurement of Modernism. 2-*-Martin H. Geenberg, "Bureaucracy in Transition: A Mexican Case Study" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Uni versity of Connecticut, 1969). 77 . . . . ^According to L, Vincent Padgett, The Mexican Politi cal System (Boston: Houghton Mifflin CoTT 1966), pp. 43- 44, "The established aim of the regime and its governments is continuous strengthening of support through expansion of facilities for dissemination of the revolutionary na tional myth. The Indian, revolutionary heroes, great events, revolutionary goals, and current policies are woven together to create an orientation in political so cialization that supports the legitimizing argument for the system. . , . The revolution tradition emerges as centering on the core idea of Mexico for the Mexicans. . . . In the nationalist revolutionary synthesis progress and modernization occupy high places in the hierarchy of val ues and are explicitly connected with the goal of strength ening the nation, based on wider distribution of oppor tunity and a higher standard of living for the masses." ^Needier, Politics and Society in Mexico, p. 87. 24Gint Education in a Changing Mexico, p. 38. 2^In this context, the Olympic Games symbolized Mexi co's playing host to the world. Although the Mexican gov ernment was heavily criticized for the expense involved in preparing for the games, an expense many critics felt that Mexico could ill-afford, the government countered by as serting that the Games would focus the eyes of the world on Mexico, thereby appealing to the pride of all Mexicans. This logic also explains the attempts by the Mexican gov ernment to make loans to other Latin American countries inspite of its own stature as a developing country— being 68 in a position to loan money to other governments, Mexico is telling her own people as well as the world that she is among the "have" nations rather than the "have-not" nations. 2®One of the often-repeated themes of the compulsory textbooks used in the educational system is that the great est honor that can come to a Mexican child is to be able to fight and die for his country. Each child is required to memorize a pledge in the government textbook, "Mi Ser- vicio a Mexico." According to Padgett, the creation of heroic personalities is central to the codification of Mexican history presented in the government textbooks: "anyone who has defended Mexican soil with personal in«- tegrity and sacrifice, whether he won or lost, is a hero." (The Mexican Political System, p. 18.) 2^Gonzalez Casanova, Democracy in Mexico, p. 133, 28Gonzalez Casanova, Democracy in Mexico, is perhaps the single most valuable analysis of the operating demo cratic realities of the Mexican political system and is essential reading for anyone wishing to understand the Mexican system in historical context. 29Ibid., p. 7. 30Ibid.. p. 68. 31Ibid., p. 70 32Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "Measuring Democratic Change in Latin America," Journal of Politics, XXIX (February, 1967), 129-166. 88In campaign speeches of the 1964 election, compiled in A Political Handbook. Diaz Ordaz commented, "Democratic government cannot be defined only as government of the people, by the people and for the people. Democracy also means an economy of the people, by the people and for the people." ^According to Needier (Politics and Society in Mexi- co, p. 86) it is true that that the opposition to the PRI Ti stronger in the cities and'.the more developed areas of the country. Thus, to take a typical example, in the legislative elections of 1961 the opposition parties won 35.32% of the vote in the Federal District and 33.01 % of the vote in Lower California North, but less than 1% in the states of Chiapas and Tlaxcala. Gonzalez Casanova 69 (Demoracy in Mexico) reports that in the 1964 Presidential election, one of the most contested in history, that PRI had the greatest support in the five poorest states and the greatest opposition in the richer states of Baja, Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon and the Federal District, where opposition often ran as high as a third of the vote cast 35jose Luis Reyna, "Desarollo economico: Distribu- cion del poder y participacion politica: el caso mexican- o," Ciencias politicas y sociales, 50 (October-December, 1965), 469-486. ^Scott, Mexican Government in Transition; Bo Anderson and James D. Cockcroft, "Control and Co-*optation in Mexi can Politics'* in Latin American Radicalism, ed. Irving Horowitz (New Yorks Random House, 1969), 464-496j Raymond Vernon, The Dilemma of Mexican Development (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965). CHAPTER VI DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL SKEPTICISM AND ALIENATION IN A SAMPLE OF YOUNG MEXICAN CHILDREN! THE DERIVATION OF HYPOTHESES David Easton claims that every political system must engender a certain level of support among its members, and political socialization of the young is one of the most important means of accomplishing this task.* A brief re view of the limited data available reveals that not all political systems are as successful as the American sys tem in generating overwhelmingly positive orientations among the children toward the political culture and all of its many facets. Indeed, in the instance of Mexican children, we can observe several factors which could reasonably be expected to mitigate against the development of such positive orien tations to the political authorities and the political re gime. For example, it can be seen that the child is con fronted with different pictures of the Mexican political system from different political socialization agents. The school textbooks tell the child that Mexico is a democracy and that it is his obligation to support his government and 70 71 country under all circumstances. Government leaders ap peal to the ideals of democracy and refer to PRI as the legitimate embodiment of the on-going revolutionary spirit. At home, on the other hand, the child is most likely to have a set of politically alienated parents (an observa tion based on The Civic Culture study and others), and consciously or unconsciously, they are likely to convey their political discontents to their children. Further more, as the child grows older and matures intellectually, he is likely to examine his social environment more criti cally and perceive incongruities for himself: he will hear the democratic and revolutionary rhetoric but perceive that the well-being of his family and the other people of Mexico changes little from one presidential regime to the next; he will learn that other democracies have several political parties from which to choose alternative courses of action while in Mexico he has no viable alternatives at the ballot box even if he does express his discontent in good faith. Thus, as the Mexican child grows older he is likely to encounter extreme discontinuity in the political social ization process (either from the discordant images of the government conveyed by the government textbooks as compared to his parents, or, given the possibly neutral or positive stance of his parents, the mismatch of government rhetoric with the daily realities of living Mexico). Assuming an adult model of political apathy, alienation and cynicism, 72 social learning theory would suggest that the young Mexi can children might develop similar responses in resolving the cognitive dissonance they should experience from the input of disparate pieces of information about their poli tical world. Additionally, we would expect the onset of this alien ation early in the development of the child's attachment to the political system if, indeed, Jennings and Niemi are correct in their assertion that political distrust is a reflection of a more deep-seated psychological disposition of interpersonal distrust and hostility.2 Surveys and in-depth case studies revealed the pervasive fatalism and distrust among the Mexican people, enduring personality traits which have been linked to the nature of primary socialization experiences within the family. Since many political attitudes and values are learned within non-poli tical contexts and generalized only later to the political world, much of this learning occurs early in life and is quite resistant to change.3 Hence, inspite of the govern ment's elaborate attempts through the use of the compulsory textbooks to educate the new citizens into a "participant stance" and a more favorable orientation to the political system, most observers of the political scene would con clude that the political alienation and cynicism of the Mexican adult population will inevitably be passed on as part of the political culture to the younger generation. 73 Such political attitudes are merely a reflection of a more general social orientation or value perspective, and thus, they are subject "only to slow and marginal change within each generation."4 Easton's analysis leads us to expect that there will be a specific pattern in the development of the resulting alienation.5 Whereas increasing age of the child should expose him to increasing discontinuities in the political socialization process and lead him to resolve the cogni tive dissonance by rejecting the political system, the first negative reactions should center on the most immedi ate level of government in the child's experience, the level of authorities. The growing child should thus feel decreasingly positive about the President, who is the key authority figure of the government and the only political leader to receive widespread coverage in the daily mass media. It further seems reasonable to expect that the child's rejection of the political regime would need to be based on understanding the nature of institutions and norms and understanding the principles of a democratic political sys tem. Since the concept of democracy and the Constitutional outlines of the Mexican government are not presented in the textbooks to the child until the later elementary school years, it seems unlikely that disenchantment with Mexican government institutions and norms would set in 74 before junior high school; by this time, the child has be gun to realize that Mexican democratic institutions are far removed from the ideals of democracy and even far re moved from the operating realities of other political democracies.® In part, the delay of the onset of negative orientations directed toward this level of the political system waits on the development of an awareness of its existence and meaning apart from the public officials occupying positions within the structure; it also waits on the growing realization that a change in leaders pro duces few, if any, dhanges in the circumstances of Mexico. At the level of political community, little rejection is anticipated from the children. Even at the adult level, where attitudes are molded in part by the frustrations of trying to cope within the political system with insurmount able economic and social problems, extreme rejection of the political leaders and institutions leaves untouched the overwhelming feeling of loyalty Mexicans feel for their country and the concept "Mexican." Thus, it seems unlikely that even the most alienated of the young children would express rejection of the political system at this ultimate level. Within this outline of developing political skepti cism and alienation in Mexican children at various stages of the life cycle, broad social class and sex differences may be anticipated. Social class differences, reflecting 75 those found in the United States, have been discovered in each of the countries where a replication of political so cialization studies has been conducted* upper-status children consistently possess a broader cognitive environ ment and are thus able to pass more quickly from an af fective, personalized view of the political world to a more cognitive, impersonal, institutional perspective and also show less tendency initially to over-idealize author ity figures. Such broad social class differences have been suggested as being due to differences in the social environment that have been shown to have some cross-cul tural uniformity.^ More specifically within the Mexican context, however, we might expect the unique pattern of alienation and cyni cism in the adults to be mirrored in the children. It has already been established that the family plays an important role in the formation of the child’s initial feelings and attachments within the political culture. Because families occupy different strata in a multitude of social struc tures, members from different families may logically be expected to develop different attitudes, perspectives, opinions and values regarding a wide variety of social concerns, political and non-political alike; offspring may similarly be expected to share these differing perspec tives, Family socialization is thus seen to be fundamen tal in the perpetuation of social class differences. 76 In Mexico, there are marked differences in the poli tical behavior of upper-middle and lower social classes. The lower classes tend to legitimate the political regime while negating the current leaders by asserting that the government is honestly trying to realize the goals of the Revolution, and it is merely the corrupt nature of Mexican politicians which prevents it. It is the upper classes, on the other hand, where the active protest and demands for political reform originate.8 it is this group which is full of hope for taking their place in the expanding economy and realizing a good life for themselves. However, they too are the ^nes who find it nearly impossible to con vert their education into a good job and their good job in to a good income.9 It is this group which seeks to enter the political arena only to find that personal connections count for more than objective competence. Thus, it is this upper-middle status group which is experiencing the explo sive combination of rising expectations and perceived rel ative deprivation. Quite consistently, it was the middle- class university students who were out demonstrating in the street calling for the death of the President, a con siderable breach of cherished Mexican tradition.10 Thus, it would seem most likely that upper-middle class children would have parents and older siblings who are engaged in "reality-testing" the "democratic" political system and being thwarted in their efforts to press for political 77 reforms. Such discontents in these upper-middle status families with the sham of democracy is likely to be passed on to the children, and thus children from this socio-econ omic strata should express greater cynicism and alienation earlier and more intensely at both the level of authori ties and the level of regime. In Mexico, unlike many other Western countries, the social environment of men and women differs considerably. According to Stevens, the concept of machismo pervades all of Mexican culture.11 The impact of this cult of masculinity is most clearly seen in the realm of politics, considered all over Latin America as man's business.13 in Mexico, however, women did not even gain the franchise until the mid-1950's. There is little data available documenting women's participation in politics, another reflection of the male orientation in it, Abbott, in a study based on the Almond and Verba data, found that Mexican women were considerably more politically alienated than men.13 Blough, again in volving a secondary analysis of The Civic Culture data, found that while Mexican women exhibited much lower rates of political participation (voting, belonging to political organizations, etc.), there were surprisingly few sex dif ferences in the attitudes of the sample toward the democra tic process and toward elements of the Mexican political system. He commented, "there is evidence that as children, 78 especially in the schools, girls are less inclined than boys to assert themselves, and more likely to show hostil ity or resignation toward their circumstances. Out of their total experiences, women seem to have acquired a more deeply rooted distrust of other people than have Mexican men.*'*4 Thus, sex may be considered, as is age or social class, as a more or less summary independent variable, standing for a variety of differential social experiences, and we may expect gross sex differences in the pattern of the development of political skepticism and alienation. Specifically, girls may be anticipated to develop earlier and more intense negative reactions to political authorities and to the political regime than Mexican boys. As the drop-out rate of girls is high within the educational system, however, some attenuation of the sex differences in the upper grades (at the junior high level) may occur, since those females remaining in the school system would in all probability be those com- . . is ling from homes characterized by more egalitarianism. Summary Statement of Derived Hypotheses (1) As age increases (summarized by grade level thereby standardizing input from all agents of socialization), there will be increasing levels of political skepticism and alienation (representing the resolution of cognitive dissonance created by increasing perceptions of discon- 79 tinuities in the political socialization process). (A) ‘ The political skepticism and alienation will manifest itself earliest at the level of author ities in a decline of the positive qualities attri buted to the President. (B) The political alienation directed toward the level of the regime manifested as powerlessness and distrust will not appear strongly until the junior high years. (C) The political alienation directed toward author ities and later toward the regime will not spread to the ultimate level of the political system, the com munity or the nation, (2) Upper-status children will develop feelings of skepti cism and alienation earlier and more strongly on each of the levels of the political system where alienation is expected to develop ' (i_. e,, the authorities and the re gime) . (3) Girls will develop feelings of skepticism and aliena tion earlier and more strongly on each of the levels of authority and regime. 80 FOOTNOTES ^Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life. ^Jennings and Niemi, "The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child." ^Hansen, The Politics of Development in Mexico, p. 224. 4Ibid. 5Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life. ^Gonzalez Casanova (Democracy in Mexico, p. 7) ob serves, "Every citizen of an underdeveloped country forms the habit of comparing the orthodox model with the pagan reality in which he lives, and he becomes obsessed, mor- aly and intellectually sick of comparing. Comparison is part of his rhetoric or criticism, of his satisfaction or wrath. The people of Mexico, too, have the habit of com paring ideas and juridical models with reality." This attitude he perceives as the product of long-standing frustration with government, ^Kohn (Class and Conformity) found considerable cross- cultural generality in the work values and therefore the parent values associated with child-rearing as they con tributed in the social stratification hierarchy. ^In the 1964 Presidential election, the opposition to PRI, the PAN candidate, polled 22% of the vote in Baja California, 25% of the vote in the Federal District, and 16% of the vote in Nuevo Leon, PAN repreentatives in the same election gained from 30% to nearly 40% of the vote in those areas. PAN’s major source of support has been documented as being essentially middle and upper class, consisting of wealthy businessmen and many of the old wealthy families whose fortunes have dwindled considerably. 9Johnson (Mexican Democracyt A Critical View) docu ments that the average university graduate in Mexico, a tiny proportion of the population, can rarely expect to earn more than $160/month. Even in Mexico, a salary such as this is very little. Kahl (The Measurement of Modern ism) observes that an individual with a secondary educa 81 tion in Mexico is less likely to find a starting job in the white collar level than is the similarly educated man in Brazil (71% of the men with secondary education in Brazil find white collar jobs as opposed to 52% in Mexico). •^Johnson (Mexican Democracy: A Critical View) and Karl M. Schmitt, "Communism in Mexico Today," Western Political Quarterly. XV (March, 1962), 111-124, record that since the inception of the PRI political party in 1929, it has not been acceptable to attack publicly the President of Mexico, While his policies and cabinet min isters may be criticized with discretion, the President is seldom criticized verbally or in the media. Thus, students demonstrating in the street, calling for the death of the President, is an extreme expression of discontent. H Machismo presents the picture of the aggressive male protagonist, alone and withdrawn, constantly preoccupied with the image he is conveying, constantly concerned to create the impression of masculinity and courage, in vulnerability and indifferent to the attack of others. For greater descriptions of its peculiar character, see Vernon, The Dilemma of Mexico’s Development; Paz, The Labyrinth of Solitude; and Hansen, The Politics of Mexi can Development. l^Evelyn P. Stevens, "Mexican Machismo; Politics and Value Orientations," Western Political Quarterly. XVIII (December, 1965), 848-857, observes that at the top of the Mexican political structure stands the President who be haves in a way reminiscent of the Mexican stereotype of the macho: powerful, intransigent, at times capricious, but usually just. ■^David W. Abbott, "Political Alienation in Mexico and Italy" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1966). CHAPTER VII STUDY DESIGN Site of the Studyt The Federal District was selected as the site of this study because it constitutes one of the main modernizing sectors of Mexico, according to Joseph Kahl and numerous other authors who have critically examined the political economy of the country. Outside of the large urban areas of Mexico, the inhabitants retain much of the traditional world-view and life-styles. The Federal District, on the other hand, represents the cultural, economic and political center of Mexico. As the government proceeds in its task of "nation-building," the fruits of its labors must first be realized in that city which serves as the seat of the government: If the Mexican people feel distant and alien ation from the government when they live within walking distance of the Chamber of Deputies, how must those people feel who are working in the fields a thousand miles away? The government has long realized the value of the educational system in its goal of integrating the people into the modern Mexican political culture. The result has been the attempt by the government to rigidly control formal political socialization in the schools by supplying 82 compulsory textbooks which have been prepared for distri bution by the government. For this program of civic edu cation and political indoctrination to be effective in promoting in the children a feeling of pride in Mexico and a desire to participate within the political system, the children must have exposure to the prepared curricu- y * lum. In much of Mexico, however, the drop-out rate from the educational system is extremely high. Of the children enrolling in the first grade in 1957, only 23% were still enrolled in the sixth grade by 1952.3 In contrast, in the Federal Dustrict, the drop-out rate is significantly lower than in the remainder of the country, with approximately 75% of the children of primary school age being enrolled in I960,4 Thus, it would appear that nowhere in Mexico do children receive more prolonged exposure to the formal political socialization provided by the government text books than in the Federal District. It is the children of the Federal District who should be most familiar with the institutional outlines of the political system, with the responsibilities involved in the citizen role, with the definitions of concepts such as democracy, civil liberties, etc., and who generally as they mature should be most prepared to assume a participating stance with respect to the government. In sum, then, the Federal District has been chosen for this study because it is prototypical of the develop- 84 ment of modern Mexico. Perhaps nowhere in Mexico is the concept of "Mexican" as well developed as in the Federal District; and perhaps nowhere else is the rhetoric of democracy given even token attention in the country. The Federal District foreshadows, indeed overshadows, the rest of Mexico. Thus, while this study may not be representa tive of all of Mexico, it is indicative of trends to be seen as Mexico's developing political and economic system extends meaningfully to the rest of Mexico. Sample Designt A 39-item illustrated questionnaire of political ati- titudes was administered to a sample of Mexican children in grades 2 through 9. In the first stage of sampling, eight schools within the Federal District were purposively selected so as to maximize the social status distribution of the respondents: several primary and secondary schools were chosen from well-to-do and middle-class neighbor hoods where parental occupations were primarily bureau cratic and professional in nature, and several other pri mary and secondary schools were located in overwhelmingly working and lower class neighborhoods where parental oc- cupations were mainly semi- and unskilled. In the second stage of sampling one classroom per grade was chosen at random within each school. To facili tate administration of the questionnaire, it was given to an entire class at one sitting; the final sample size for 85 data analysis, however, was achieved by drawing at random 25 working/lower class respondents and 25 middle/upper class respondents per grade from the pool of responses gathered in the three or four different classrooms for that grade. For example, the fifty second-grade respon dents were chosen at random from a pool of approximately 90 responses gathered from a total of four different second grade classrooms representing four different schools scattered throughout the city. The advantage of such a procedure was to minimize the effect of any unique classroom experience by including respondents from several classrooms in the sample for each grade level. The independent samples for each grade were further homogenized in the analysis of the data by control ling for the sex and social status of the respondent. As there was considerable variation in the social class levels of the respondents within a single school, the status variable is based on the father's or mother's oc cupation as reported by the respondent rather than rely ing on school attended as the gross indicator of social status. Use of the Questionnaire Technique with Young Childrent Any research technique involves certain advantages and disadvantages, and the researcher must live with them.0 The disadvantages, however, are compounded when the re 86 spondents are children rather than adults. Too often, children are treated as mini-adults, although they are not. The child has a limited range of experience in the world, and his cognitive capacities for interpreting those ex periences are similarly limited. In constructing a questionnaire to be administered to children, one must make allowance for these consider ations. For example, on the most simple level, what may be meaningful as a question for an adult may not appear so to a child. Very often, a simple and straight-forward question does not elicit a response from the child, al though a simply re-worded version will. In a structured questionnaire situation, the researcher can be careful to use simple sentences, but even then, he cannot control for the meaning of the words for the child within his realm of experience. Moreover, the researcher is unable to guarantee that each child will attach the same meaning to each question. Because of their limited, albeit growing, cognitive capacities, very young children are unable to think in abstract terms; they are able to respond only to the spec ific and the concrete. A very young child might thus con front items on the questionnaire which do not tap any thing within his personal range of experience, but he might nevertheless attempt to respond by virtue of being in a question-answer situation. Limited language skills 87 can further handicap the child in the accurate expression of his feelings and attitudes. These problems are espec ially troublesome in a study of political attitudes in young children, because the subject of politics does not have much salience in the life experiences of the child, and much political learning may be essentially latent in nature. Hence, as Marian Yarrow concludes, "Cognitive limi tations, limitations in verbal comprehension and facility, and characteristics of thought in childhood set the lower limits, developmentally, at which one can expect awareness and the power of generalization necessary for attitudes or values.Thus, where one may expect logical consist ency in responses from adults, it may not be forthcoming in the responses from children. This distinction is seen most clearly in test-retest situations for assessing re liability of attitude measures, a procedure that assumes an underlying consistent attitude structure in the respond ent. Children's responses may vary considerably from item to item, let alone test to test, even though they are answering each question as honestly as possible. Chil dren may literally approach each item in a series of ques tions independently (as adults are assumed to do) and hence not try to formulate consistency in their response patterns over items; in fact, the child is unlikely to perceive the questions as a series of related items where- 88 as the adult mind would be alert for such patterns. Within this context, then, the use of the question naire for collecting data from the sample of Mexican chil dren must be viewed with caution when interpreting the findings. The disadvantages of its use are many, as ate its advantages. If a child's attitudes are inadequately formed, the presentation of forced-choice alternatives may lead the child to make a response he would not have made in an open-response situation. On the other hand, given the language limitations of the child, the formula tion, of specific alternatives might enable the child to express feelings where he might otherwise have been unable to articulate them. In this case, we do not know whether any particular child finds revealing his political atti*- tudes is extremely distressing; and, if so, if he feels more comfortable in the impersonal anonymous situation of the questionnaire as opposed to the personal interview situation. In sum, we do not really know if the child is answering the questionnaire honestly, nor do we know how intensely he feels about any particular response he does make. And quite probably, if the questionnaire were re-administered to the same children, the profile of re sponses from any given child would vary somewhat. We would hope, nevertheless, that the aggregate pattern of responses from the children would remain essentially the same from test to re-test. 89 As an alternative to the questionnaire technique, the personal nature of the experimenter-child relationship would have its own biasing effects. Furthermore, prolong ed interviewing in a foreign language is unrealistic, es pecially when the respondents are children and communica tion between child and adult is tenuous in nature. It was for these reasons that I chose the questionnaire in order to facilitate gathering data, and having made that decision, I am prepared to live with its disadvantages. Pre-test of the Questionnaire! Prior to using the questionnaire, it was administered to a small group (N=27) of children in the first and sec ond grades of a school in the Federal District. These children, who were as young or younger than the children of the larger sample, displayed little difficulty in an swering any of the items on the questionnaire. For this reason, it was decided to continue with the administration of the questionnaire to the sample of children grades 2-9. Administration of the Questionnaire: It seemed appropriate that the questionnaire should be administered in the classroom by the teacher who regu larly conducted the class rather than by an outsider who would move from school to school, either a Mexican ex- perimentor or myself, an "Anglo.*' It was felt that in this way the questionnaire would cause less disruption, and it could more easily be completed as an integral part 90 of the educational process. This consideration is most important when testing in the early elementary grades. It seems logical that when attitudes are only vaguely formed they will be more subject to situational influences in their expression than more solidly formed attitudes. Too little information is available, however, on the ef fects of various experimental situations on the response patterns of children. Whereas questionnaires administered to adults are carefully constructed so as to avoid the prevalent "socially-desirable" and "acquiescent" response- sets, we do not know to what extent children are prey to such habits in responding. There is evidence that children are willing to give answers of which they are unsure in order to please a friendly investigator.8 When the re search situation is further complicated by the nature of the subject-area being value-laden (as is possibly the case in the study of political attitudes), there is a real question as to whether the interview situation can be as effective as the more impersonal situation of the ques tionnaire which would allow the child to answer more hon estly in the confidence of his anonymity. Thus, to minimize biasing factors in the response situation of the children in this sample, the regular teacher conducted the questionnaire session. The disad vantage of such a procedure, of course, is the lack of control over the actual presentation of the questionnaire. 91 since each teacher may read or otherwise administer the questionnaire in an idiosyncratic manner. To counteract this situation as much as possible, the teacher was given a set of printed instructions detailing how to present the questionnaire, in addition to verbal instructions. Reports from the teachers following administration of the questionnaire indicated that they had encountered no dif ficulties with it in the classroom. Problems in Approximating a Panel Study with a Survey Design Techniques This study seeks to delineate the broad outlines of the development of political skepticism and alienation in young Mexican children by employing a survey approach. Ideally, the developmental nature of the research problem demands a panel study design, in which the same individ uals are observed repeatedly over time. By comparing age- graded random samples of individuals at one point in time with a survey technique, we are at best appoximating the panel design, and the slippage between the two research designs must be discussed. In approximating a panel design, the survey technique^ such as the one employed in this study, must make one ten uous assumptions that whatever changes are perceived a- cross grade levels represent the systematic variation which derives from development rather than influence of some uncontrolled variable(s). Specifically, we assume 92 that certain variables which might affect political skepti cism and alienation are sufficiently randomized across grade level subgroups (grades 2-9) that an assessment of developing political attitudes can be made (The reader will recall that for each grade, 50 students were selected ran- domingly from a pool of respondents drawn from a number of schools and a number of classrooms). Thus, when we observe that children in the upper grades offer higher or lower levels of endorsement on certain attitude items than younger children in the survey, we would like to conclude that, if we were to follow a group of individuals as they matured over those grades, they would exhibit attitude changes reflecting the gross pattern revealed by the one-point-in-time survey. Quite realistically, however, the older children have been ex posed to historical events which have shaped their current attitudes, events that the younger children will never ex perience directly (for example, the older children witnes sing the student demonstrations of 1968, the election frauds of the 1970 Presidential election, the furor over hosting the Olympic games, etc.). Furthermore, even where there is overlap in exposure to historical events (such as the on-going student discontent), the older students' atti tudes are often shaped by previous experiences (e.£, remem bering 1968) and therefore selectively perceiving and in terpreting the events in a different way from the naive 93 younger children. Hence, using a survey design in place of the more appropriate panel design, it is not possible to separate out the developmental or maturational aspects of atti tudes formation from the unique experiential aspects. Marian Yarrow notes that "Some investigators indeed have talten the position that the concept of developmental stages in perceptual, cognitive, and motivational aspects of behavior is relatively useless, that experiential fac- tors account for most of the variance."3 Her reply, how ever, is that "present information leaves us without full answer, and it is well worth investigating how far in the life cycle maturational level is significant in accounting for variance in attitudes and values."10 while panel de signs are more appropriate for observing the developmental process, they, too, are not free from the confounding ef fects of experiential factors? furthermore, they are prob lematic in many other ways. Hence, most often, a one- point-in-time survey is used to approximate the more cost ly and time-consuming panel study. It is more convenient, and researchers are generally content to accept the as sumption that the broad outlines of the developmental pro cess can be captured in large-scale survey data. The findings of such a study, however, should always be in terpreted with caution, because of the significant slip 94 page conceptually between the two techniques. A Note on Problems in Operationalization of Concepts in this Study: Originally, this study was conceived with the inten tion of examining the generality of the findings of the political socialization studies of American children to another, different political culture— in essence, a cross- cultural replication of the synthesis of these studies. Hence, nearly all of the items incorporated in the Mexican questionnaire were previously validated questionnaire items borrowed mostly from the New Haven and Chicago studies. In constructing a broader theoretical framework in which to examine and interpret the incipient political attitudes of the young Mexican children in particular, however, new ideas and concepts emerged that are only weakly operation alized by items in this questionnaire. While this situa tion is regrettable, it is an integral part of the re search act, involving the inevitable working back and forth between the levels of theory and data. As a re sult of my year-long sojourn in Mexico during the data collection phase of my project, I developed a broader understanding of Mexican culture, which encourages me to ask more penetrating research questions in the data anal ysis, questions which are not directly addressed by the questionnaire items. Thus, while I am better prepared to interpret the Mexican children’s responses within the 95 context of their unique political culture, I also find myself formulating research hypotheses which can be only roughly assessed within the confines of the collected data. To be more specific, my personal observations of Mexi co confirm the pervasiveness of a general distrust among Mexicans, a distrust most frequently displayed in the business and political spheres of activity. Confronting the dramatic rejection of the government and its leaders among the adults with whom I had contact, it was diffi cult to see how children could be socialized into a posi tive attachment to the government in a culture so com pletely characterized by distrust. Hence, I began to formulate hypotheses regarding the development of alien ated feelings toward the political system in the children as they matured. Furthermore, given the pattern of adult responses in the political system— that is, to consistent ly reject leaders of the government and many of the regime norms and institutions while leaving untarnished their love for the nation of Mexico and the symbolic political community— it became apparent that children too should begin to express similar patterns of trust and attachment, or lack thereof, as they become more enmeshed in the poli tical culture through the process of maturation. Hence, I felt it important to assess the children's attachment to the political system at each of the three levels— the authorities, the regime, and the community. To look at 96 the political system as an undifferentiated whole would overlook many of the subtleties of the growing alienation and skepticism among the young children. While my ques tionnaire does contain items examining the child's at tachment (trust) at each of these levels of the political system, the items unfortunately do not outline the same levels of measurement, and hence cross-level comparisons are limited. We may assess the growing disenchantment at the level of authorities, or at the level of regime norms and institutions, or at the level of the symbolic commun ity; but we will be unable to assert that attachment at one level is stronger or weaker than at another. On the other hand, we should be able to see whether disenchantment sets in earlier at the level of authorities than at the level of regime or community, authorities being the most immediate level of contact for the child in the political system. 97 FOOTNOTES 1-Kahl, The Measurement of Modernism; Hansen, The Poli tics of Mexican Development; Paz The labyrinth of Solitude. ^George F. Bereday and Bonnie B. Stretch, "Political Education in the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.," Comparative Educational Review, VII (June, 1963), 7-16, note that every formal political socialization program is a mixture of civic education and political indoctrination. The former refers to educating the child about the rights and responsibilities of the citizen role, the structural out lines of government, etc. In contrast, political indoc trination is more concerned with the transmission of ide ological premises which support the particular political system (e.g., instruction of the child on the principles of democracy and communism). ■^According to Gill (Education in a Changing Mexico), many of the rural schools in Mexico operate without the fourth through sixth grades because none of the children in this area can afford to attend school for more than a couple of years. 4Gill, Education in a Changing Mexico. 5The following schools were included in the sample* Colegio Peterson (located in the Lomas district), Colegio Mexico (located in Unidad Morelos), Escuela Ciudad Reynosa (located in Colonia Reynosa), Escuela Efren Valenzuela (located in Unidad San Juan de Aragon), Instituto Estado de Mexico (located in Colonia Claveria), Escuela Luis Hidalgo Monroy (located in Colonia Acalapa), the Mexican American School (located in Colonia Santa Maria) and the Normal School (located in Colonia Roma), ®See Fred M. Kerlinger, The Foundations of Social Research (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1964) for an anal ysis of the advantages and disadvantages of various re search techniques. ^Marian R. Yarrow, "The Measurement of Children's Attitudes and Values" in The Handbook of Research Methods in Child Development, ed. Paul H. Mussen (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960), p. 656. 98 8Jahoda, "The Development of Children's Ideas about Country and Nationality: Part I"; Yarrow, "The Measure ment of Children's Attitudes and Values." 9Yarrow, "The Measurement of Children's Attitudes and Values," p. 649. 10Ibid.. p. 649. I1Of the 39 items included on the Mexican question naire, 23 items had appeared in the Easton (Chicago) stu dy, 7 items in the Greenstein (New Haven) study and 3 items in Jahoda’s study. CHAPTER VIII DATA ANALYSIS We have hypothesized that Mexican children develop increased skepticism and alienation toward their leaders (level of authorities) and their government (level of re gime) but not toward Mexico as a nation (level of commun ity). Moreover, this developing skepticism and alienation should be especially pronounced for upper status children and female children. In this study, grade level (a close correlate of age) may be viewed as a summary independent variable. Most ob viously, of course, it represents a rough measure of edu cational attainment and, as such, the summary of a variety of formal education influences, including teachers, curri culum, textbooks, social climate of the school, etc. At the same time, however, grade may also express the number of years exposure to certain relevant non-school experi ences; for example, a fourth-grade child is in his fifth year of school, but his seventh year of television expo sure, his tenth year of family influence, and at an age when his peers may be starting to influence his behavior. Grade thus serves as a rough indicator of input from all sources, as well as a rough estimate of the child's stage 99 100 of intellectual development within a Piagetian framework. Similarly, the specification variables in this research design, sex and social class, may be considered as summar izing a variety of socialization experiences acting on the individual. Children's Perceptions of the Need for Broad System Reforms in Mexico The rational suggests that the Mexican child is ex posed to a relatively discontinuous political socializa tion process as he matures in the political world. He re ceives discordant images of the political system, either from a set of alienated parents contradicting what is learned in school from the government textbooks or from juxtaposing reality on those same textbook images. In any event, it is hypothesized that as the Mexican child grows older, he will perceive these discrepancies and realize that the Mexican political and economic system needs considerable reform. The perception of the gross distortions of ideals in the operating realities of the political system should create a situation of dissonance for the child, which he should attempt to resolve either by seeking to change Mexico to conform more to the ideals of government or by withdrawing support from the system. The perception of such inadequacies in the realities of the Mexican system in contradiction of government rhetoric, however, is a necessary prerequisite to the development of 101 skepticism and alienation in the responses of the children to the political world. Thus, the desire for broad system reforms in Mexico may be viewed as a global measure of dis content with the political system that should precede the expression of more specific forms of skepticism and alien ation directed against the authorities and the regime. To assess whether the young Mexican children did have such perceptions, they were asked, "If you could change Mexico, how would you change it?" It seemed triat if a child was aware of the gross inadequacies of the Mexican system, he would like to see some major reforms of it, and, indeed, many of the children did respond to the effect that they would like to see Mexico become more socialistic, more democratic, more independent of the United States, etc. Many other children, however, answered the question in more personal terms (wanting more playgrounds, more ice-cream, a subway close to their home, etc.) or simply not to change Mexico at all. * Thus, it appeared there was suffi cient range of response on the item to stratify the sample according to those who perceived the need for broad social and political reform in Mexico and those who did not. In keeping with our rationale, then, we would expect that as the Mexican children grow older, they would per ceive the operating realities of the Mexican political system to be grossly inadequate; and they would desire to see broad changes occur in the system, as indicated by TABLE 1.— DESIRE FOR BROAD SYSTEM REFORMS BY GRADE LEVEL OF THE RESPONDENT Desire for System Reforms Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 No 72.0 50.0 50.0 44.0 42.0 24.0 32.0 24.0 42.3 Yes 28.0 50.0 50.0 56.0 56.0 76.0 68.0 76.0 57.7 £ N 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 400 dyar.18 p<,001a ^The reader should not categorically dismiss these low values of d™. as indicating there is no relationship in the table. As an asymmetric statistic, cL—j . is extremely sensi tive to any deviations from the diagonal of the table (the linear relationship), a sensitivity that grows more crucial as the table elongates in one direction. Thus, slight fluctuations in cell percentages or mild curvilinearity in the data will dampen the values of dyx very rapidly. By including all grade levels between the second and ninth grades, rather than collapsing the tables into a trichotomy on the grade variable, I have opened the tables up and there are likely to be random variations in adjacent grade levels that even out considerably over the entire grade span. These small random variations, however, will affect d^ negatively. The reader, being warned of this situation, should seek to examine the total line of development across all grades; percentage differences will probably tell the reader more than the single summary d^ value for the table. 103 responses to the above discussed item. Table 1 reveals that the hypothesis is supported— whereas only 28% of the second qraders perceive the need for broad system reforms in Mexico, fully 76% of the ninth graders do. We may next specify this relationship between increas ing age and growing demands for system reforms by social status and sex. Upper-status children, being socialized into a broader cognitive social environment and having par ents who consistently see the discrepancy in the political system between the norm of citizen participation and the reality of citizen exclusion, will be more likely to voice the need for system change than will lower-status children. However, this status difference in the desire for system reforms should operate primarily at the level of the upper grades, when children have achieved more cognitive aware ness of their social environment (including the political world) and they are receiving political information from more than a single source (the government rhetoric of the textbooks). Thus, when age and class interact in a parti cular combination (i. e., upper-status children in the junior high grades), we should logically expect a heighten ed negativism directed toward the political system. What constitutes positive evidence for this somewhat complex interaction hypothesis? First, we expect upper- status ninth graders (the uppermost grade tested in this study) to exhibit the highest levels of demand for system I 104 reforms, as well as the highest levels of more specific forms of skepticism and alienation directed toward the authorities and the regime, because it is at this grade level that the two forces of age (maturation) and class combine to exert the strongest effect. Secondly, in the same context, we expect greater status differentials in the responses of the children in the upper grades than in the lower grades; that is, second graders should be more homogeneous (regardless of class origins) in their re sponses and ninth graders should be more varied in their responses according to their class background. Thirdly, we anticipate upper-status children will develop reform attitudes and express skepticism and alienation earlier than lower status children, as the age and social status variables begin to interact. The sex interaction hypothesis may be derived in much the same way as that for social status. Girls, being ex cluded from the political world by definition in tradition al home roles, are expected to exhibit greater demands for system reforms, as well as greater alienation and skepti cism, than boys, who are socialized for participation in the broader social world; this difference, however, should be more manifest in the upper grades when the boys and girls alike have the cognitive maturity to perceive the political world in some complexity and must deal with the inconsistencies presented them in the political socializa- 105 tion process. Thus, while girls may develop reform atti tudes and feelings of alienation and skepticism earlier than boys, the greatest difference between girls and boys should be observed in the upper grades. Returning to the data, then, it can be observed from Table 2 that upper-status children recoqnize the n e e d for system reforms in greater percentages than lower status children in all grade levels. What is even more interest ing is that the percentage of upper-status children making a judgment in favor of system change jumps dramatically be tween grades 2 and 3, and again between grades 4 and 5, several years sooner than a similar breakthrough for lower- status children, which occurs between grades 6 and 7. The earlier development of this perception among the upper- status children is consistent with the rationale suggest ing their earlier cognitive development, and it is also consistent with the pattern demonstrated in studies of American children as well as those of children in other countries. Moreover, the greatest difference between upper and lower status children occurs in the late elemen tary school years when the upper status children, by vir tue of superior cognitive ability, are more able to per ceive and evaluate system functioning; the differences diminish somewhat (although they never disappear) as lower status children "catch up" to upper status children in the junior high grades in their ability to perceive and evalu- TABLE 2.*—DESIRE FOR BROAD SYSTEM REFORMS BY GRADE LEVEL AND SOCIAL STATUS OF THE RESPONDENT Desire for Grade Level Total System Reforms 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Lower Status No 76.0 52.0 56.0 56.0 52.0 28.0 36.0 28,0 48.0 Yes 24.0 L&.O 44.0 44.0 48.0 72.0 64.0 72.0 52.0 $ N 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100,0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 200 Upper Status No 68.0 48.0 44.0 32.0 32.0 20.0 28.0 20.0 36.5 Yes 32.0 52.0 56.0 68,0 68.0 80.0 72.0 80.0 63.5 % N 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 200 dyx holding lower status constant = 118 p<.001 cL^. holding upper status constant = .18 p C . 001 I 107 ate system functions. We expect girls to express a greater demand for system change, because they are virtually excluded from that sys tem by traditional role definitions which confine them to home and neighborhood, while boys are socialized to feel competent to move about in a larger social world. Table 3 reveals, however, that boys perceive the need for system reform in larger proportions at each grade level (except for grades 6 and 7, where there is an unexplainable re versal), Furthermore, there is a dramatic increase in the percentage of boys making such an assessment between grades 2 and 3, several years sooner than a similar break through for the girls between grades 4 and 5. At the jun ior high level, however, girls fall considerably behind boys aqain in their endorsement of system reforms, and by the ninth grade, only 65% of the girls desire system changes as opposed to 88% of the boys. Thus, our hypo thesis is not borne out by the data. Having shown that many young Mexican children do per ceive the need for broad sweeping changes in the economic, political and social system of Mexico, presumably because it does not conform in any way to the ideals which are es poused, the question becomes, do the young children seek to reduce the dissonance thus created by rejecting the political system at any level? More specifically, as the children mature, do they increasingly reject the political TABLE 3.“ DESIRE FOR BROAD SYSTEM REFORMS BI GRADE LEVEL AND SEX OF THE RESPONDENT Desire for System Reforms Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Boys No 71.0 41.2 41.9 44.7 46.2 26.7 25.0 12.5 39.9 Yes 29.0 58.0 58.1 55.3 53.8 73.3 75.0 87.5 60.1 * 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 100.0 100.0 N 31 34 31 38 26 30 24 24 238 Girls No 73-7 68.8 63.2 41.7 37.5 20.0 38.5 34.6 45.7 Yes 26.3 31.3 36.8 58.3 62.5 80.0 61.5 65.4 54.3 i 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 19 16 19 12 24 20 26 26 162 for boys = .18 p^.001 d for girls « * .19 p<.001 109 community as unworthy of their trust and support? The Children’s Attachment to the Political System at the Level of Political Authorities We shall examine first the children's attachment to the most immediate level of the political system, that of the authorities. The children of this sample were asked to evaluate their feelings of attachment to the President, the key political figure of the Mexican political system and the only personage to receive extensive coverage in the media. Measuring the degree of attachment to or affection for the President was done with the following series of items designed to assess the President's image on a number of dimensions, including his competence (items 1 and 2), his benevolence (items 3 and 4) and his personal character (item 5)s 1. Compared to most men, the President works more equal don't know less___ 2. Compared to most men, the President knows more equal don't know less___ 3. Compared to most men, the President likes more people the same number of people___ don't know fewer people___ 4. Compared to most men, the President is the best person in the world a good person___ not a good person don't know 5. Compared to most men, the President is more honest as honest less honest___ don't know___ 110 The children were then asked to evaluate even more direct ly their feelings for th^ President and their ratings of his job performance: 1. Do you like the President? very much enough don't like___ don't like at all don't know 2. Do you think the President is doing a good job? very good _ good not very good______ poor don't know___ Originally, the intention was to construct a scale from these items in order to achieve an overall rating of the President from the child, but attempts in this direction were largely unsuccessful. Yarrow warns, "One cannot use scales with children unless one has evidence that the children have reasonably organized or crystalliz ed attitudes on the issue studied."1 As noted in the previous chapter, where we might expect logical consisten cy from an adult respondent on a series of questions, we do not find it among the children in this sample. The scalability of the items was tested by three standard techniques; both the Guttman and the factor analysis re vealed multi-dimensionality among the items and hence un suitability for scaling according to those techniques. The third scaling technique, a simple Likert summation rating, was justified on the basis of each item signifi cantly differentiating in terms of the total score; how ever, due to the lack of substantial consistency among the items, the decision to scale was dropped entirely.2 Given I l l that children tend to hold less consistent attitude sets, it was felt that item analysis would yield a more sensitive analysis of the data. Indeed, Yarrow too concludes that “if an investigator is interested in the formation of atti tudes or values, in the processes of change over time. . . more 'qualitative' measures would seem necessary."3 The first and most striking finding of the children's responses to the Presidential authority figure is that there is very little expression of negative feeling or skepticism among the children in this sample; they are es sentially positive in their feelings toward the President. A brief examination of the marginal frequencies of respon ses for the entire sample will illustrate this finding: 1. Compared to most men, the President works more 49.8% equal 20.8% less 15.3% don't know 14.3% 2. Compared to most men, the President knows more 61.3% equal 23.5% less 4.3% don't know 11.0% 3. Compared to most men, the President likes more people 59.3% the same number of people 19.8% fewer people 9.0% don't know 12.0% 4. Compared to most men, the President is the best person in the world 6.8% a good person 66.8% not a good person 10.8% don't know 15.8% 5. Compared to most men, the President is more honest 31.0% as honest 33.0% less honest 9.8% don't know 26.0% The two items asking the children to assess more directly their feelings toward the President elicit a higher per- 112 centage of negative responses. While such direct ques tions may allow the child the opportunity to answer more bluntly and honestly, the higher percentage of negative responses could also be an artifact of question construc tion: in the following two questions, the children were given the option of two positive and two negative respon ses of varying degree as well as the neutral or "don't know" response, and possibly the children were more will ing to mark the lesser of two negative responses in these questions than the single negative response in the above five items. 1. Do you like the President? very much 23.5% enough 27.0% don't like 16.5% don't like at all 9.5% don't know 23.5% 2. Do you think the President is doing a good job? very good 25.5% good 29.0% not very good 20.8% poor 8.3% don't know 16.5% The favorable rating of the President's qualities (competence, benevolence, and personal character) range around 50% for the entire sample, while the negative re sponses range between 4 and 16%. This finding was not to be predicted from our rationale. While the two items call ing for the direct evaluation of the President indicate higher levels of rejection (25-30% of the sample when com bining the two negative responses categories), the posi tive responses (combining the two positive categories in the same fashion) remain at the 50% level. It thus ap pears from an examination of the marginal frequencies of 113 the individual items that the Mexican children of this sample are not gripped by political skepticism; in the majority, these children feel the President is a good man, is doing a good job, and even those children who are un willing to make such endorsements are also unwilling to condemn the man completely. Although our rationale suggested that there should be a higher level of political skepticism and alienation ex pressed toward the President than has thus far been reveal ed here, it is probable that such rejections of the Presi dential figure may occur at later ages only and hence be blurred in the examination of marginal frequencies based on the entire sample. We will thus look at the development of these attitudes over grades, concentrating first on the two direct evaluations of the President, Expressions of liking the President There is a curious development in the feelings of liking/disliking the President across grade devels. From Table 4, it can be seen that the percentage expressing the most negative opinion varies little by grade level, while the percentage expressing the less negative response of "don't like" increases moderately from 4% in the second grade to 25% in the ninth grade. The percentage of posi tive responses, however, (combining the "like well enough" and "like very much" categories) drops dramatically from TABLE 4,— RESPONSES TO "DO YOU LIKE THE PRES ID BUT?" BY GRADE LEVEL OF THE RESPONDENT Do you like the President? Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Don't Like At AH 8*0 10.0 8.0 14,0 16.0 12.0 4.0 4.0 9.5 Don't Like 4,0 14.0 18.0 20.0 22.0 6.0 22.0 26.0 16.5 Don't Know 8.0 18.0 10.0 28,0 18.0 34.0 30.0 42.0 23.5 Like Well Enough 44.0 22.0 30.0 26.0 26.0 28.0 22.0 18.0 27.0 Like Very Much 36.0 36.0 34.0 12.0 18.0 20.0 22.0 10.0 23.5 % N 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100,0 50 100.0 50 100,0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 400 dyx=-.15 P^.OOl 115 80% in the second grade to 28% in the ninth grade, and though some of the loss is recorded in the increase of negative responses, most of it is converted into "don*t Know" responses (by the ninth grade 42.% are unable to de cide whether they do like or dislike the President). Com mencing around the fifth grade, children are much less willing to express affection for the President, while they are concomitantly reluctant to express disaffection; the large percentage of "don't know" responses may indicate that a process of re-evaluation is occuring. At any rate, responses to this item indicate some support for our ra tionale, although the actual expression of extremely nega tive responses is lower than might have been expected. Examination of the marginal frequencies of Table 5 confirm our hypothesis that upper-status children are slightly more likely to express a negative response but more likely to make that negative response extreme (12% as opposed to 7% of the lower-status children choosing the response "don't like at all"); and at the same time, they are significantly less likely to profess liking the President "very much” (only 17% made that response as com pared to 30% of the lower-status children). Furthermore, larger percentages of upper-status children express their negative feelings at an earlier age than do the lower-sta tus children— whereas only 4% of the latter express a TABLE 5»— RESPONSES TO "DO YOU LIKE THE PRESIDENT?" BY GRADE LEVEL AND SOCIAL STATUS OP THE RESPONDENT Do You Like Grade Level Total the President? 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Lower Status Don't like at all 0.0 8.0 8.0 16.0 12.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 7.0 Don't like 4.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 4,0 24,0 28,0 15.5 Don't know 0.0 20.0 0.0 32.0 20.0 28.0 20.0 48.0 21.0 Like well enough 56.0 12.0 28.0 20.0 32.0 32.0 20.0 16.0 27.0 Like very much 40.0 44.0 48.0 16.0 20.0 32.0 32.0 4.0 29.5 i 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 200 Upper Status Don't like at all 16.0 12.0 8.0 16.0 12.0 4.0 4.0 4,0 12.0 Don't like 4.0 12.0 20.0 24.0 28.0 8.0 20.0 24.0 17.5 Don't know 16.0 16.0 20,0 24.0 16.0 40.0 40,0 36.0 26.0 Like well enough 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 20.0 24.0 24.0 20.0 27.0 Like very much 32.0 28.0 20.0 8.0 . 16.0 8.0 12.0 16.0 17.5 $ N 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 200 holding lower status constant = -.19 p-^.OOl dyx holding upper status constant = -.11 p-^.009 116 I 117 negative response of any Kind in second grade, 20% of the former do, and while 96% of the lower-status children in that grade express positive feelings, only 64% of the up per-status children do. Again, the largest social status differential in the children's negative evaluations occurs during the late elementary school ’ years and during the transition into junior high school (grades 5 through 7); by the late junior high grades, the lower-status children appear to have overcome the restraining influence of great er initial over-idealization of the authority figure in early childhood and the pattern of their evaluation of the President approaches that for upper-status children. At all grade levels, however, lower-status children consistent ly report liKing the President in larger percentages than do upper-status children, and the lower-status children are similarly late in the registration of large percentages of negative responses (not until grade 5 do fully one-third of them express such feelings). Differences between boys and girls in the expression of liKe/disliKe for the President are inconsistent and therefore not in support of our rationale (see Table 1 in Appendix A). The pattern of development over grades re veals that boys in general express more negative feelings toward the President in grades 4 through 6, whereas girls are generally more negative in grades 3 &nd 9. The remain ing grades show little difference in the response of the 118 two sexes. Evaluation of the Presidents job performance The responses to the item evaluating the President’s job performance are slightly more positive than the re sponses on the previous item concerning the affection for the President. Observing the pattern of these responses over grade levels in Table 6, we find some support for our hypothesis that increasing age brings increasing levels of negative evaluations of the President’s job per formance. In contrast to 74% of all second graders who feel that the President is doing at least a good job (com bining the "good" and "very good" responses), only 46% of the ninth graders are so convinced} and conversely, while 18% of the second graders feel he is doing a poor or not very good job, fully 44% of the ninth graders feel this way. Surprisingly with increasing grade levels, there is a tendency for the extreme responses, positive and nega tive alike, to drop off; and the children more frequently express moderate content or discontent: the "very good" ratings drop consistently from 54% in grade 2 to 8% in grade 9 while the "good" responses concurrently increase from 20% to 38%. Examination of the evaluation of the President's job performance according to the social class of the respond ent reveals somewhat unexpected and inconsistent differ- TABLE 6.— EVALUATION OP THE PRESIDENT BS JOB PERFORMANCE BY GRADE LEVEL OF THE RESPONDENT Do you think the President is doing a good job? Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Bad 6.0 16.0 6.0 18.0 8.0 8.0 2.0 2.0 8.3 Not Very Good 12.0 14.0 20.0 22.0 28.0 16.0 22.0 32.0 20.8 Don*t Know 8.0 16.0 14.0 20.0 16,0 24.0 14.0 20.0 16.5 Good 20.0 20.0 32.0 26.0 22.0 36.0 38.0 38.0 29.0 Very Good 54.0 34.0 28.0 14.0 26,0 16.0 24.0 8.0 25.5 $ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 iOO.O 100.0 N 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 400 d y x = - . 1 0 p < . 0 0 1 119 120 ences. The reader is referred to Table 2 in Appendix A. As expected, upper-status children are slightly more like ly to evaluate the President's performance negatively; but, surprisingly, they are also somewhat more likely to evaluate his performance positively. Furthermore, this is a pattern which maintains fairly consistently over all grades. Thus, the social class hypothesis is not supported by responses to this item. The pattern t>f sex differ ences in the responses are likewise inconsistent and non significant. Table 3 in Appendix A will reveal that boys are generally more negative in their evaluation of the President's job in grades 2, 6, and 7, whereas girls are decidedly more negative in grades 3 and 4. After examining the responses to two items asking the children for direct evaluation of the President and his job, a few general observations are in order Our ration ale predicts the occurrence of widespread skepticism in the young Mexican children. While our analysis of the response patterns by grade level does reveal increasing rejection, the level of rejection is perhaps not quite as strong as anticipated from our rationale. It is obvious that there is some erosion of affection for the President with increasing age, but does this rejection constitute more than the process of de-idealization that character- » izes the responses of children in American and other studies? This distinction between the process of de-ide I 121 alization and the onset of political skepticism requires an arbitrary judgment} acknowledging this fact, I never theless feel that these findings should be interpreted within a framework emphasizing the onset of skepticism as opposed to de-idealization. I suggest that the decrease in positive evaluations to very low points for the ninth-grade respondents may reasonably be interpreted as representing serious erosion of support for the President, an erosion which is especi ally marked for upper-status, junior-high children. Ac cording to Michael Brown, there is no way to measure what constitutes a serious erosion of support (the on-going existence of the political system is generally prima facie evidence for the maintenance of the minimal level of support required).4 Thus, we are unable to quantify the meaning of the apparent decrease in the positive eval uations of the President. The dramatic increase in the percentage of "don't know" as opposed to negative respon ses and the similar increase in the milder negative re sponses in contrast to the more extreme ones are partly responsible for casting doubt on the rationale predicting widespread skepticism in the children. We have already alluded to the possibility that the children for some reason may be reluctant to mark an extremely negative re sponse even though their feelings may lie in that direc tion. There is, unfortunately, no way to confirm that 122 speculation. Hence, we are still left with the unresolved question, does the level of negative evaluations toward the Presi dent expressed in these two items constitute growing poli tical skepticism or is it more in keeping with the de-ide alization process which has characterized the children's responses to the political world in other countries, in cluding notably the United States? This study precludes the possibility of meaningful cross-cultural comparisons* however, one cannot ignore that in response to comparable questions, American children respond much more positively in their evaluations of their President than do the Mexi can children.5 While constituting non-conclusive evi dence, this fact encourages the interpretation that the negative evaluations of the Mexican children represent more than mere de-idealization. Evaluation of the President's competence The more specific items concerning the President's competence (his work output and knowledge) reveal little change over grade levels (see Tables 4 and 5 in Appendix A), This pattern is in keeping with the findings of the Chicago and New Haven studies, as well as many cross-cul tural ones, that qualities of the President related to role performance often show little change over grades and, in deed, may even show slight increase in favorable evalua 123 tions as the child becomes more familiar with the role de mands of that job. The social class differences on both of these items on the President's competence are inconsistent arid not significant. On both items regarding the President's com petence, girls are considerably more positive in their evaluation of him, a finding which contradicts our hypo thesis that girls would show greater distrust and rejec tion of political authorities. Furthermore, this pattern holds over most grade levels (see Tables 8 and 9 in Appen dix A). Evaluation of the President's personal qualities The perception of the President's more personal qual ities and his benevolence do show a significant decrease with increasing age of the children in the sample. For example, the rating of the President’s honesty drops con siderably— 54% of the second graders will assert he is more honest than most men, while only 16% of the ninth graders believe that, . It should be noted that while the percentage of favorable ("more honest" ) ratings drops, there is no concomitant increase in the percentage per ceiving the President as "less honest," which one would expect in light of our rationale; the tendency, instead, is to come to see the President as no more or less honest than most men. We thus seem to be dealing with a process TABLE 7.— EVALUATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S HONESTY BY GRADE LEVEL OF THE RESPONDENT Compared, to most men, the President is Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Less Honest Don't Know Equally Honest More Honest 12.0 20.0 14.0 54.0 10.0 38.0 22.0 30.0 12.0 14.0 34.0 40.0 12.0 26.0 38.0 24.0 4.0 20.0 44.0 32.0 12.0 24.0 36.0 28.0 4.0 40.0 32.0 24.0 12.0 26.0 46.0 16.0 9.8 26.0 33.3 31.0 % N 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 400 - -.08 p C .005 124 125 of de-idealization on this dimension of the President's character rather than with the onset of intense rejection of the man as a person and a leader. Our rationale is further not supported with respect to the social class and sex hypotheses— in both cases there is no significant re lationship (see Tables 10 and 11 in Appendix A). There is a similar de-idealization pattern in the de velopment of the responses to the President's evaluation as a person over the grades in the sample, In Table 8, whereas 30% of the second graders are willing to endorse the President as "the best person in the world," no ninth grader feels that ways on the other hand, an overwhelming 70% of the ninth graders do believe that the President is a "good" person and they are no more willing to label the President "not a good person" than are second graders. Again, this pattern of response can scarcely be called sup port for our rationale predicting widespread skepticism and rejection. It is obvious that the overwhelming respon se to this item is essentially positive. It should also be noted that the idealization is lost rather quickly— the percentage of children calling the President of Mexico "the best person in the world" dropping dramatically between grades 2 and 3 and fading out in the following grades. Social status specifies this relationship between in creasing age and the decreasing positive evaluation of the President but not as predicted; the lower-status children TABLE 8.--EVALUATION OF THE PRESIDENT AS A PERSON BY GRADE LEVEL OF THE RESPONDENT Compared to Most Men, the President is Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Not a good person 8.0 20.0 14.0 16.0 12.0 8.0 4.0 4.0 10.8 Don’t know 8.0 22.0 10.0 16.0 8.0 18.0 18.0 26.0 15.8 A good person 54,0 48.0 72.0 64.0 76.0 72.0 78.0 70.0 66,8 Best in the world 30.0 10.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 6.8 % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 400 dy3.--.O5 P<.01? 126 TABLE 9.— EVALUATION OF THE PRESIDENT AS A PERSON BY GRADE LEVEL AND SOCIAL STATUS OF THE RESPONDENT Compared to Most Men, the President is Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Lower Status Not a good person 0.0 20.0 12.0 24.0 8.0 0.0 4.0 4.0 9.0 Donft know 4.0 16.0 8.0 12.0 12.0 24.0 20.0 28.0 15.5 A good person 44.0 48.0 72.0 56.0 72.0 72.0 76.0 68.0 63.5 Best in the world 52.0 16.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 12.0 * 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 200 Upper Status Not a good person 16.0 20.0 16.0 8.0 16.0 16.0 4.0 4.0 12.5 Don't know 12.0 28.0 20.0 20.0 4.0 12.0 16.0 24.0 16.0 A good person 64.0 48.0 72.0 72.0 80.0 72.0 80.0 72.0 70.0 Best in the world 8.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 f l 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 25 25 ! 25 25 25 25 25 25 200 < ^ yx holding lower status constant = -.15 p< .001 dyx holding upper status constant = .04 p ^ .115 127 r 128 express considerably greater idealization of the President in the lower elementary grades (52% of the lower-status second graders endorse the President as being the "best person in the world" while only 8% of the upper-status second graders do). However, this class differential washes out in the upper grades where the overwhelming majority of upper and lower-status children evaluate the President as a good person. In general, there are non-substantial differences be tween the boys and the girls in each grade in their pattern of responses on this item (see Table 12 in Appendix A), During the early grades only are girls more likely to say that the President is "not a good person," and boys are much more likely to hold onto the notion of the President's being "the best person in the world," some boys making the judgment as late as the seventh grade. The item involving the President's liking people (a measure of his benevolent qualities) suffers a small de cline across grade levels in the sample, but the President is never seen by the majority as being unfriendly. The percentage of children believing that the President likes more people than most men drops only from 68% to 50% be tween grades 2 and 9; thus, even by grade 9, the majority of children believe that he is friendly. The percentage of children believing that he likes people remains essen tially unchanged over the grade levels, again in contradic- TABLE 10.~EVALUATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S BENEVOLENCE BI GRADE LEVEL OF THE RESPONDENT Compared to Most Men, the President Likes Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Less people Don't know As many people More people 6.0 8.0 18.0 68.0 8.0 24.0 12.0 56.0 10.0 12.0 28.0 50.0 4.0 8.0 20.0 68.0 10.0 6.0 16.0 68.0 10.0 10.0 26.0 54.0 4.0 18.0 18.0 60.0 20.0 10.0 20.0 50.0 9.0 12.0 19.8 59.3 $ N 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 400 dyx ■ -.04 p^.O76 129 TABLE 11. — EVALUATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S BENEVOLENCE BY GRADE LEVEL AND SOCIAL STATUS OF THE RESPONDENT Compared to Most Men, the President Likes Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Lower Status Less people 4.0 0.0 12.0 0.0 . 4,0 4.0 0.0 24.0 6.0 Don't know 4.0 20.0 8.0 16.0 8.0 12.0 16.0 12.0 12.0 As many people 16.0 20.0 20.0 16.0 12.0 20.0 20.0 12.0 17.0 More people 76.0 60.0 60.0 68.0 76.0 64,0 64.0 52.0 65.0 - 1 7 ° 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 200 Upper Status Less people 8.0 16.0 8.0 8.0 16.0 16.0 8.0 16.0 12.0 Don't know 12.0 28.0 lo.O 0.0 4.0 8.0 20.0 8.0 12.0 As many people 20.0 4.0 36.0 24.0 20.0 32.0 16.0 28.0 22.5 More people 60.0 52.0 40.0 68.0 60.0 44.0 56.0 48.0 53-5 C P 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 200 holding lower status constant = -.06 p ^ .046 dy^ holding upper status constant = -.01 p .363 131 tion of our prediction of increasing rejection of the Pres ident over grades. The social class response patterns to this item are in the direction predicted by our hypothesis— upper-status children are consistently more likely to judge the Presi dent as liking fewer people at every grade level except the ninth. Furthermore, upper-status children are less likely than lower status ones to say the President likes more people, perceiving more realistically that he likes the same number of people as most men. As there is little change in the pattern of endorsement on this item over grades, there is similarly little difference between the social status pattern of responses in the lower grades and the pattern in the upper grades; hence, our interaction social status hypothesis is not supported by this item. And, once again, the differences between boys and girls in their responses to the item are inconsistent and non-signi ficant (see Table 13 in Appendix A). Desire for system reforms and alienation directed toward authorities The child’s discontent with the operating realities of the Mexican political system (presumably based on his perception of its discrepancy with the ideals of government as well as the operating realities of other democratic sys tems) is assumed to lead him to respond in favor of broad system reforms for Mexico. As such, then, the desire for 132 broad system reforms in Mexico is viewed as an intervening variable between age and the expression of specific forms of skepticism and alienation at the levels of authorities and regime. We have already shown that age does correlate with the expression of demands for system change; it now remains to be seen if the desire for system reform in turn correlates with each of the items tapping skepticism and alienation directed toward the President. Our theoretical rationale predicts that those children perceiving the need for system reforms in Mexico should be more likely to withdraw support from the political system at the level of authorities, by expressing dislike for the President, negatively evaluating the job he is doing, per ceiving him as a bad person, etc. In most cases, the cor relations between the desire for system reforms and the presidential evaluation items are weak to moderately strong and all in the expected direction (the reader is referred to Tables 14, 15, and 15 in Appendix A). For example, while 31% of those desiring system changes do not like the President, less than 25% of those believing that Mexico is essentially fine the way it is express a dislike of him; moreover, only 43% of those requesting system reforms like the President in contrast to 63% of the rest of the sample. Similarly, those individuals desiring reforms are somewhat more likely to give the President a "poor" rating (32% as compared to 25% of those not desiring system change), while 133 at the same time, they are less likely to give him a posi tive rating (only 50% as opposed to 65% of those not desir ing system reforms). Those children desiring system re form^ are also less likely to refer idealistically to the President as the "best person in the world," but, at the same time, they do not register higher levels of rejection, because they do not label the President as "not a good person" significantly more frequently than the remainder of the sample. The relationship between perception of the President as a friendly man and the desire for system re forms is similarly weak and is in the expected direction. There was no relationship between the desire for system re forms and the items evaluating the President's working hard, his knowledge, or his honesty. Thus, the desire for system reform does correlate in the expected direction with each of the items evaluating the President, although many of the relationships are weak er than anticipated. It seems, therefore, that the child's vague discontent with the political system expressed in the desire for broad system reforms is retarded in its evolution into more specific forms of skepticism and alien ation at the most immediate level of the political system— the authorities. Summary of findings at the level of authorities In summary, then, any assessment of the children's de- 134 veloping attachment to the political system at the most immediate level of authorities based on their feelings to ward the President reveals only partial support for the rationale that with increasing age Mexican children will experience increasing political skepticism and alienation. On the items just discussed, concerning the President's personal character, his competence and his benevolent qual ities, there is surprisingly little rejection expressed by the children in the sample, even at the upper grade levels. Rather, the President consistently comes to be viewed mere ly as a good person (instead of the best person in the world) or as equally honest (rather than more honest), etc. The pendulum, however, never really swings over to substan tial negative evaluation within the grade range considered here, and we are therefore unable to substantiate our the sis of pervasive skepticism and alienation in the young Mexican children as they become familiar with the political world. Hence, one might be tempted to conclude that these findings characterize a process of de-idealization as op posed to the onset of skepticism and alienation. A cursory examination of Table 17 in Appendix A will alert the reader to the fact that on identically worded items, American children sampled in other studies record much higher levels of endorsement in early grades on all the items and show much smaller downward re-assessment across.grades than do the Mexican children of this study. While the lack of a 135 truly cross-cultural research design prevents us from con cluding that Mexican children are more negative in their characterization of their hey political figure than Ameri can children, I think the findings' in Table 17 of Appendix A urge the reader not to interpret the Mexican children's developing political orientations at the level of author ities as being characterized merely by a process of de idealization. He should rather be aware that the down ward trend in very positive evaluation by these Mexican children appears to be considerably more extreme than that observed in American children of similar ag£; and this finding encourages the conclusion that Mexican children are experiencing levels of political skepticism which extend beyond that expected to develop in a process of de-ideali zation (accompanying maturation of the political self). In contrast to the items just discussed which reveal surprisingly little negative evaluation of various dimen sions of the President as a person and a leader, the items first discussed calling for the more direct assessment of the President’s job performance and an affirmation of af fection for the man reveal considerably more negative orien tations in the young Mexican children— levels of rejection which can conceivably be labelled as skepticism and alien ation. Between 25% and 30% of the sample expressed defin itely negative feelings while 50-55% expressed positive en dorsements; an examination of the response patterns on 136 these two items by grade level and social class of the respondents, however, revealed that negative evaluations increased significantly with grade level, most markedly among the upper-status respondents. Thus, by the level of junior high school, the percentage of positive evaluations has dropped dramatically (only 28% reporting they like the President and 44% feeling that he is doing at least a good job as President) and the percentage of negative evalua tions has risen substantially (30% reporting they do not like him and 34% feeling he is not doing a good job). In addition, there is a substantial part of the sample choos ing a "don't know" response on these items, children who may be considered as still assessing, or possibly re-asses sing their feelings on the matter. At any rate, these items reveal a substantial erosion of support for the Prestr ident at the upper grade levels of this sample, especially among-upper status children. Examination of Table 18 in Appendix A confirms that this rejecting group of students constitutes a core of the sample which fairly consistently condemns the President on a number of dimensions, that is, a core which is quite com pletely alienated from that figure. For example, 67% of those children believing that he is doing a bad job also dislike him, while only 5% of those believing the President is doing at least a good job dislike him; of those condemn ing him as a bad person, 69% dislike him and 72% feel he is I 137 doing a bad job while only 1% like him and 16% feel he is doing at least a good job. The Children's Attachment to the Political System at the Level of Political Regime The concept of political alienation has come to be viewed as comprising two dimensions— political distrust and political powerlessness (or in its positive form, political trust and political e f f i c a c y ) . ^ Political trust refers to an individual's faith in the good intentions of political leaders and1 government, and political efficacy refers to the individual’s expectations that the average citizen can exert influence on government outcomes. Recent research has indicated that these two concepts are correlated, but not necessarily one and the same. Thus, the two dimensions of alienation should be distinguished and dealt with separ ately if possible.^ When assessing the child's support for the political regime, it may be important to distinguish between trust and efficacy dimensions; for example, Mexican children may develop negative attitudes on one dimension but not on the other. Hence, in this study, we will examine a series of items designed to measure feelings of efficacy on one hand and feelings of trust on the other. The items designed to measure political efficacy (or powerlessness) include: 1. Does your family have a say about what happens in the government? 138 2. Do the citizens of Mexico have a say about what happens in the government? 3. Do you think that what happens in the government will happen regardless of what the citizens do? The items designed to measure trust in the government in clude : 1. Are all laws fair? 2. Do you think that the government generally knows what is best for the people of Mexico? 3. The government of Mexico helps and protects the people. Do you think it is doing that job very well fairly poorly don't know We are interested in whether the young Mexican chil dren as they mature become distrusting of the political re gime and feel powerless to effect changes in the government. We have suggested in the rationale that the rejection of the political regime would be retarded compared to that of the political authorities, because the level of the politi cal regime is more removed from the concrete experiences of the young child. The ability to perceive the government as a set of institutions and norms depends in part on the cog nitive capacity of the child— a second grader may be total ly unaware of the political system apart from the Presi dent whereas a fifth or seventh grader would possess a broader understanding of the functioning of government in dependent from the men occupying public offices. And logi cally, this awareness of institutions must precede any ra tional evaluation of them. Hence, we would expect rejec- 139 tion of the political regime (norms and institutions) to come at a later age on the average than the rejection of personal figures. We further suggested that there would be relevant social class differences in this developmental pattern: possessing a broader range of cognitive experi ences and coming from a family that is more likely to cri ticize the system, the upper-status child should be more familiar with, more critical of and more rejecting of the political regime than the lower-status child. We also hypothesized sex differences in the direction of greater distrust and powerlessness among the girls since politics is marked as boys’ business, and girls are generally ex cluded from considering the social environment beyond the home and neighborhood as their domain. As with the Presidential evaluation items, some ef forts were made to scale the efficacy and trust items, but again such attempts were not successful. The efficacy items.had been borrowed from the Easton study where they had been validated by a factor analytic technique. A factor analysis of the same items in this study revealed nearly total independence among the items, and hence no effort was made to treat them in any scale fashion.® The decision was made again to treat the items individually in the data analysis on the assumption that such a procedure would result in a more sensitive analysis of the children’s responses. 140 Feelings of political trust We will begin the analysis of the children's attach ment to the political regime with an examination of their incipient feelings of political trust, looking first at their satisfaction with the most immediate and concrete aspect of government output— that of the laws. As pre dicted, there is decreasing categorical acceptance of all laws as fair with increasing age. Whereas 68% of the second graders believe all laws to be fair, only 18% of the ninth graders do; and, conversely, while only 20% of the second graders perceive the existence of some unjust laws, 64% of the ninth graders do, A child must first per ceive that some laws made by the government are unjust be fore he will be motivated to seek reforms; as long as he perceives all laws as fair, he will support the government unquestioningly. Perception that not all laws are just hardly constitutes political alienation in itself; it may, in fact, be a realistic assessment of the world. But that critical evaluation must certainly precede development of alienation. Table 13 reveals the predicted social class differ ences in the assessment of the laws, but they are not so marked as might be expected: upper-status children con sistently report with greater frequency across the grades that all laws are not fair while lower-status children are more likely to insist that they are. Furthermore, as TABLE 12.--PERCEPTION OP ALL LAWS AS FAIR BY GRADE LEVEL OF THE RE3PONDME Are All Laws Fair? Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 No 20.0 34.0 44.0 50.0 54.0 54.0 58.0 64.0 47.3 Don't know 12.0 28.0 8.0 12.0 16.0 22.0 16.0 18.0 16.5 Yes 68.0 38.0 48.0 32.0 30.0 24.0 26.0 18.0 36.3 £ N 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 400 d y x 0 CM . 1 II p ^ . 0 0 1 141 TABLE 13.--PERCEPTION OF ALL IAW5 AS FAIR BY GRADE LEVEL AND SOCIAL STATUS OF THE RESPONDENT Are All Grade Level Total Laws Fair? 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Lower Status No 16.0 40.0 40.0 44.0 18.0 48.0 52.0 56.0 43.0 Don't know 8.0 24.0 4.0 20.0 28.0 28.0 20.0 20.0 19.0 Yes 76.0 36.0 56.0 36.0 24.0 24.0 28.0 24.0 38.0 $ 100.0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 100.0 N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 200 Upper Status No 24.0 28.0 48.0 56.0 60.0 60.0 64.0 72.0 51.5 Don't know 16.0 32.0 12.0 4.0 4.0 16.0 12.0 16.0 14.0 Yes 60.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 36.0 24.0 24.0 12.0 34.5 $ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 200 dyx holding lower status constant = -.19 p^.OQi! dyx Holding upper status constant = -.21 TABLE 14.— PERCEPTION OF ALL LAWS AS FAIR BY GRADE LEVEL AND SEX OF THE RESPONDENT Are All Laws Fair? Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Boys No Don't know Yes 9.7 16.1 74.2 32.4 29.4 38.2 41.9 9.7 48.4 52.6 5.3 42.1 46.2 19.2 34.6 50.0 16.7 33.3 37.5 16.7 45.8 58.3 20.8 20.8 40.8 16.4 42.9 $ N 100.0 31 100.0 34 100.0 31 100.0 38 100.0 26 100.0 30 100.0 24 100.0 24 100.0 238 Girls No Don't know Yes 36.8 5.3 57.9 37.5 25.0 37.5 47.4 5.3 47.4 41.7 33.3 25.0 62.5 12.5 25.0 60a0 30.0 10.0 76.9 15.4 7.7 69.2 15.4 15.4 56.8 16.7 2 6 .5 $ N 100.0 19 100.0 16 100.0 19 100.0 12 100.0 24 100.0 20 100.0 26 100.0 26 100.0 162 for boys = -.16 p<.001 d^. for girls = -.22 p<.001 144 predicted, the status differences are most marked in the late junior high grades. Our sex hypothesis is similarly confirmed by Table 14 — girls are much less likely to categorically endorse all laws as being fair than are boys. Also, this difference is more marked at the junior high grade level than at the lower grades. Thus, with increasing age, there is increasing aware ness that not all government outputs are desirable. Poli tical trust, according to David Easton, however, represents diffuse support for the political system and hence is not very dependent on specific outputs of the r e g i m e , 9 Poli tical trust characterizes the feeling of the individual that the government will do what is right and good for him. Because of its virtual independence from specific outputs of the regime, it allows the regime to perform tasks which might operate against the best interests of some segments of the community membership while promoting interests of other segments and to do this without losing the support of any of the members. Thus, the development of the feel ing among the new, young members of the political commun ity that "the government knows what is best for the people of Mexico" is extremely important for the on-going func tioning of the political community, and the development of substantial levels of distrust with increasing age would be a serious problem for the political system. 145 Examination of the marginal frequencies of Table 15 suggests that a clear majority of the entire sample (near ly 57%) believe that the Mexican government does know what is best for the people, while less than a quarter of the sample disagree. What is more important, however, is the growing percentage over grades believing that the govern ment does not always know what is best for the people (in creasing from 16% in the second grade to 36% in the ninth) and the concomitant drop in the percentage supporting the government’s position (decreasing from 64% in the second grade to 44% in the ninth). Thus, by the ninth grade the percentage distrusting the government is nearly as great as that trusting it. Closer examination of the table re veals that the level of distrust increases most dramatical ly between elementary school and junior high school, some what later than the period of major re-assessment on the President evaluation items, which occurred most often be tween grades 2 and 3 or 4 and 5. This finding is also in keeping with our rationale which suggested that disenchant ment at the level of political regime would develop in later grades because of the prerequisite of viewing the government in institutional terms, a stage in the develop ment of the political self which awaits a certain level of cognition, maturity and exposure to appropriate educa tional input (emphasizing the democratic outlines of Mexico's government). TABLE 15*— BELIEF THAT THE GOVERNKEJT KNOWS BEST BX THE GRADE LEVEL OF THE RESPONDENT Does the Govern ment Know What is Best for the Peo ple of Mexico? Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 No 16.0 14.0 18.0 14.0 20.0 30.0 32.0 36.0 22.5 Don't know 20.0 30.0 lo.O 28.0 14.0 22.0 16.0 20.0 20.8 Yes 64.0 56.0 66,0 58.0 66.0 48.0 52.0 44.0 56.8 % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 400 = “*10 P<.00i 147 Our rationale predicted greater levels of distrust among the upper-status segment of the sample, and this hypothesis was borne out by the data. Looking at the marginal frequencies in Table 16, the upper-status chil dren were significantly more likely to state that the government did not know what is best for the people (27% compared to 18% of the lower-status children), while at the same time, they were less likely to assume the trust ing position (53% as compared to 61% of the lower-status sub-sample), A more important finding from Table 16 is that these social class differences become considerably more marked in the late elementary and junior high school years, around the ages of ten or twelve, when the child should begin developing his awareness of the institutional side of government according to the Piagetian developmental framework. While the percentage of lower-status children developing a distrusting stance does increase over grades 2 through 9 from 12% to 28%, the increase in the percentage of upper-status children over the same grades is consider ably more dramatic, rising from 20% to 44%. By grade 9, 56% of the lower-status children still express trust in the government, while less than one-third of the upper- status children do. At all grade levels, the upper-sta tus children express distrust in greater percentages than the lower-status children; moreover, the major jump in the percentage assuming a position of distrust occurs between I TABLE 16.--BELIEF THAT THE GOVERNMENT KNOWS BEST BY GRADE LEVEL AND SOCIAL STATUS OF THE RESPONDENT I Does the Govern ment Know what is Best for the People? Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Lcjwer Status 1 No 12.0 20.0 20.0 8.0 8.0 28,0 20.0 28.0 18.0 Don't know 20.0 24.0 16.0 36.0 16.0 24.0 20.0 16.0 21.5 Yes 61.0 56.0 64.0 56.0 76.0 48.0 60.0 56.0 60.5 $ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 25 H 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 200 - ? ■ • 1 ■ Upper Status No 20.0 8.0 16.0 20.0 32.0 32.0 44.0 44.0 27.0 Don't know 20.0 36.0 16.0 20.0 12.0 20.0 12.0 24.0 20.0 Yes 60.0 56.0 68.0 60.0 56.0 48,0 44.0 32,0 53.0 $ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 200 holding lower status constant = -.05 p .112 dyx holding upper status constant = -.15 p<.001 148 149 grades 5 and 6 (and again between 7 and 8) for the upper- status respondents, several grades earlier than for lower- status children, who show such a sharp increase around the beginning of junior high school. Thus, greater percentages of upper-status children assume a distrusting orientation to the government in earlier grades, as our hypothesis sug gested. Furthermore, the pattern of upper-status chil dren's responses in the junior high grades indicates the development of substantial distrust, as a greater percent age state they are unwilling to trust the government’s knowing what is best than the percentage maintaining that it does. In contrast to the social class hypothesis, the sex hypothesis was not consistently supported by the data. The marginal frequencies of Table 17 suggest that over all grades girls are slightly more likely than boys to reject the idea that the government generally knows what is best for the people and slightly less likely to endorse the government's omniscience. This pattern, however, is reversed in grades 4, 5, and 7. That dy^. is higher for girls than for boys is attributable to smaller random variations over the grades in their decreasing positive and increasing negative responses. In spite of the con siderable variation in the response patterns from one grade to the next, the girls exhibit dramatic and fairly consistent declines of trusting responses in the junior TABLE 17.“ BELIEF TEAT THE GOVERNMENT KNOWS BEST BY GRADE LEVEL AND SEX OF THE RESPONDENT Does the Govern ment Know What Grade Level . Total is Best for the People? 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Boys No Don't know Yes 12.9 22.6 64.5 11.8 29.4 58.8 22.6 16.1 61.3 15.8 31.6 52.6 19.2 11.5 69.2 30.0 20.0 50.0 25.0 4.2 78.8 33.3 25.0 41.7 20.6 21.0 58.4 i N 100.0 31 100.0 34 100.0 31 100.0 38 100.0 26 100.0 30 100.0 24 100.0 24 100.0 238 Girls No Don't know Yes 21.1 15.8 63.2 18.8 31.3 50.0 10.5 15.8 73.7 8.3 16.7 75.0 20.8 16.7 62.5 25.0 30.0 45.0 38.5 26.9 34.6 38.5 15.4 46.2 25.3 20.4 5^.3 $ N 100.0 19 100.0 16 _ 100.0 19 100.0 12 100.0 24 100.0 20 100.0 26 100.0 26 100.0 162 d for boys = -.06 p<.034 j r - A - dyx for girls = -.14 p<.001 151 high grades with concurrent substantial increases in responses of distrust; the pattern of responses for boys in this period is still considerably more variable. The last item designed to measure the children's level of political trust/distrust examines their percep tion of the government as kind and benevolent. According to Easton and Dennis, from the most rudimentary stage of his awareness, the child interprets the government as something to further his welfare and that of the people around him. The benevolent, protective, helpful, and otherwise positive qualities of government constitute the first and continuing overall context of evaluation.I® So long as the government is perceived in this light, there appears to be little reason to attempt to influence it. The apparent level of distrust exhibited in the re sponses to this item (regarding how well the government was doing its job of helping and protecting the people of Mexico) is much lower than that recorded by the previous item— only 8% of the sample suggest that the government is doing a "bad" job, while nearly a quarter of the sample distrusted the government's knowing what is best for the people. Unfortunately, the response format of the two questions varied: the latter consisted of a simple agree/ disagree with a "don't know" response also available, while the former allowed a three-point rating (very well, fair, poor) in addition to the "don't know" response. TABLE 18.~BELIEF IN THE GOVERNMENT'S BENEVOLENCE BY GRADE LEVEL OF THE RESPONDENT Does the Govern ment Help and Protect the Peo ple of Mexico? Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Poorly 0.0 2.0 8.0 16.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 8.0 8.0 Don't know 8.0 10.0 10.0 8.0 4.0 12.0 4.0 14.0 8.8 Fair 32.0 46.0 38.0 54.0 66.0 62.0 ?4.0 76.0 56.0 Very well 60.0 42.0 44.0 22.0 22.0 16.0 10.0 2.0 27.3 $ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 400 * = -.23 p^.OOl 152 153 Thus, the lack of "poor" ratings may be attributable to the presence of the additional category "fair,” which did, indeed, obtain the highest percentage of responses. From Table 18, it can be observed that an overwhelm ing 56% of the entire sample selected the more or less neutral response of "fair” rather than choosing the strong ly-worded negative response category, "poor," That only 8-16% of the children across all grades did choose the strongly-worded negative response, however, indicates that the children are not strongly distrustful of the govern ment. This is not to say, however, that the young Mexican children are blindly trusting of the government, since there appears to be considerable re-evaluation of the gov ernment's benevolence across grades; the percentage of the "very well" responses drops dramatically from 60% in the second grade to a mere 2% in the ninth grade, while the more cautious or neutral response of "fair" increases from 32% to 76%. This shift itself indicates the weaken ing of an extremely trusting orientation into one which is, perhaps, watchful or wary— the government thus appears not to be above reproach any longer. The lack of very negative feelings predicted by our rationale, however, sug gests the absence of widespread, deep-rooted rejection which would jeopardize the diffuse support for the entire political system. Our rationale predicts that upper-status children 154 should be significantly more likely to choose the strongly- worded negative response "poor” than lower-status children. Examination of the marginal frequencies of Table 19 re veals, however, that they are only slightly more likely to do so (compare 8.5% to 7.5%), The major social class dis tinctions are to be seen at the opposite end of the rating scale— upper-status children respond "very well" signifi cantly less frequently than lower-status children (22% as compared to 33% of the latter) preferring the more neutral response category of "fair" from grade 3 on. The differ ence between the two social classes is greatest in the early elementary years when the lower-status children ex hibit a far greater trust in the government; as they pro gress across grades, these lower-status children experi ence greater disenchantment as reflected in the movement toward the less positive rating of "fair." Although both social classes show some development in downward re-evalu ation of the government's benevolence between grades 4 and 5, the major developments occur between grades 7 and 8 for the upper-status children and between grades 8 and 9 for the lower-status children. The sex differences in response patterns of this item are not significant. Whereas our hypothesis suggested that girls would be more negative in their rating of the govern ment, they are not; girls consistently respond with the more neutral "fair" than boys, who more frequently opt TABLE 19.“ BELIEF IN THE GOVERNMENT'S BENEVOLENCE BY GRADE LEVEL AND SOCIAL STATUS OF THE RESPONDENT The Government Helps and Protects the People Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Lower Status Poorly Don't know Fair Very well 0.0 4.0 24.0 76.0 4.0 8.0 44.0 44.0 8.0 8.0 28.0 56.0 20.0 4.0 48.0 24.0 4.0 8.0 64.0 24.0 4.0 12.0 60.0 24.0 12.0 8.0 64.0 16.0 8.0 12.0 80,0 0.0 7.5 8.5 51.5 32.5 * N 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 200 Upper Status Poorly Don't know Fair Very well 0.0 12.0 40.0 48.0 0.0 12.0 48.0 40.0 8.0 12.0 48.0 32.0 12.0 8.0 60.0 20.0 12.0 0.0 68.0 20.0 16.0 12.0 64.0 8.0 12.0 0,0 84.0 4.0 8.0 16.0 72.0 4.0 8.5 9.0 60.5 22.0 - J 7 ° N 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 200 -------- dy^. holding lower status constant = “.25 P <.001 d ^ holding upper status constant = -.20 p <.001 155 156 for either the very positive or the very negative evalua tion. This pattern is fairly consistent throughout the grades, so we can conclude that our hypothesis is not supported (see Table 19 in Appendix A). As would be anti cipated, however, girls move more quickly from the "very well" rating to the "fair" rating than boys, the difference between the sexes being greatest in the junior high years. Desire for system reforms and political distrust Once again viewing the desire for system reforms as an intervening variable between age (grade) and the expression of feelings of alienation at the level of political regime, we expect those children who express demands for system re form to exhibit higher levels of distrust of the govern ment. Examination of Tables 20, 21, and 22 in Appendix A indicates some support for this reasoning. There is a small, but consistent, relationship between the desire for system change and the perception of unjust laws* those children who desire reforms are somewhat less likely to endorse all laws as categorically fair than the rest of the sample. Furthermore, those children perceiving the need for change are also twice as likely as the rest of the sample to distrust the government's knowing what is best for the people. Lastly, only 2% of those not desir ing reforms challenge the government’s benevolence (help ing and protecting the citizens) as opposed to 12% of those 157 demanding system reforms; and while 38% of the former trust the government, only 20% of the latter do. Thus, as in the case of the Presidential evaluation items, the vague discontent registered among the children in the de mands for system changes is less strongly converted into specific distrust of the political regime; the relation ships between desire for system reform and the distrust items, while all in the expected direction, are only weak to moderate in strength. Summary of political distrust findings In summary, then, the items measuring political trust indicate at least that a movement away from a totally trusting position grows with increasing grade level. By grade 9, only 18% feel all laws are fair, 44% believe that the government knows what is best for the people and 2% believe that the government does a "very good" job pro tecting and helping the people. Placing this growing dis enchantment in perspective, it is stronger in the upper grades, among the upper-status children and among those children who perceive the need for broad system reforms in Mexico. That it is the upper-status children who ex press less trust is a finding peculiar to the Mexican poli tical culture, such findings not being observed in other countries where political socialization studies have been conducted. I 158 I have suggested that non-endorsement of all laws as fair is not equivalent to rejecting all government outputs, nor is the perception of the government's doing merely a "fair" job as opposed to a "very good" one equivalent to a feeling of pervasive distrust of the government. Clearly, it is not, and to that extent I must conclude that my ra tionale specifying the development of pervasive political distrust among the growing Mexican children is not support ed. What is equally clear, however, is that as the chil dren mature, especially the upper-status, their blind trust in the government is seriously eroded, and their position with respect to the government could best be char acterized as watchful or wary. The government is no longer free from their criticism; its actions are likely to come under close scrutiny and may even be negatively evaluated. It is, nevertheless, a long way from the neutral or luke warm position of sizeable segments of the sample to this confirmed rejecting position of only a handful of children. Feelings of political efficacy What is most important, however, is that the percep tion of the need to influence the government (and hence the dropping of the feeling of blind trust in the government) should precede efforts to influence the government and the evaluation of one's ability to do so. If children perceive the need to influence the government, they should be less 159 likely to worry about whether they would or would not be able to affect it (political efficacy or powerlessness). A quick perusal of the marginal frequencies on the political efficacy items reveals that for the first two items less than 50% of the sample can give an efficacious response, while nearly one-third express non-efficacious responses. Non- Effica- Don't Effica cious Know cious 1. Do you think that what 47.0% 21.8% 31,3% happens in the government will happen regardless of what the citizens do? 2. Do you think that the 47.5% 18.3% 34.3% citizens of Mexico have a say about what happens in the government? 3. Do you think that your 54.4% 26.1% 19.5% family has a say about what happens in the government? On the third item, a slightly larger percentage is able to make an efficacious response (54%)while only 19.5% respond negatively. Examining the pattern of responses to these items over grades, however, we find more interesting dif ferences. The children's responses to the first item, regarding the inevitability of government outputs shows little change over grades, with the exception of a slight in crease in the percentage of negative responses in the jun ior high school between grades 8 and 9. At all grade TABLE 20.— PERCEPTION OF INEVITABILITY OF GOVERNMENT OUTPUTS BY GRADE LEVEL OF THE RESPONDENT Perception of Inevitability of Government Outputs Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Yesa 38.0 26.0 28.0 28.0 26.0 26.0 34.0 44.0 31.3 Don't know 26.0 38.0 10.0 30.0 16.0 18.0 14.0 22.0 21.8 No 36.0 36.0 62.0 42.0 58.0 56.0 52.0 34.0 47.0 $ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 400 = .00 p < .4-51 ^he reader is reminded that the perception of government outputs as inevitable and not subject to citizen influence constitutes a non-efficacious response,: whereas denial of their inevitability represents an efficacious response. 161 levels, between 25% and 40% of the sample feels that gov ernment outputs are inevitable and therefore non-influence- able. The pattern of social class differences among the children's responses was not in keeping with our hypothesis that upper-status children would show greater belief in the inevitability of government. Table 23 in Appendix A demon strates that in grades 2 through 5, the upper-status re spondents consistently respond efficaciously more frequent ly than the lower-status ones, and although this pattern reverses itself dramatically in grade 6, it re-establishes itself in grades 7 through 9, with the gap between the dis tribution of responses of the two classes being reduced considerably. The sex patterns in the responses to this item are similarly inconsistent and non-supportive of our hypothesis that girls would exhibit greater perception of government inevitability. Table 24 in Appendix A will confirm that girls respond efficaciously on this item almost as fre quently, and in some grades, more frequently than boys. Even in the late junior high school years, when the per centage of girls making efficacious responses drops signi ficantly below that of boys, the increase is recorded in "don't know" responses rather than among non-efficacious responses. Hence our sex hypothesis once again is not supported by the data. 162 The second efficacy item, perception of the citizens* ability to influence the government,does display a sharp and steady decline in the percentage of efficacious re sponses with increasing grade levels. The percentage feeling that the citizens of Mexico are able to influence the government drops from 66% in grade 2 to 30% in grade 9, but more interesting from the standpoint of our rationale is the increase of the non-efficacious responses over that same period from 20% to 60%. Our hypothesis regarding in creased alienation among the- older respondents appears to be supported by this item, nearly 50% of the junior high children reporting that the government is non-responsive to the citizens of the country. Our social class hypothesis regarding greater power lessness expressed among upper-status respondents receives curious support from this item. In the lower elementary' grades, the social class pattern of responses follows that frequently observed in other countries— upper-status chil dren expressing efficacious feelings in greater and growing percentages compared to lower-status children (in grades 2 through 5, 68%, 32%, 76% and 52% of the upper-status chil dren respectively responded efficaciously as compared to 64%, 40%, 60% and 32% of the lower-status children). But beginning in grade 6 there is a sharp and dramatic reversal of the pattern, and between grades 6 and 9 the percentage of upper-status respondents voicing efficacious feelings TABLE 21.— PERCEPTION OF CITIZEN INFLUENCE ON THE GOVERNMENT BY GRADE LEVEL OF THE RESPONDENT Do the Citizens Have a Say About What Happens in the Government? Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 No 20.0 24.0 26.0 32.0 32.0 36.0 44.0 60.0 34.3 Don't know 14.0 40.0 6.0 26.0 22.0 16.0 12.0 10.0 18.3 Yes 66.0 36.0 68.0 42.0 46.0 48.0 44,0 30.0 47.5 * 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 400 « * -.14 p <.001 163 TABLE 22. — PERCEPTION OF CITIZEN INFLUENCE ON THE GOVERNMENT BY GRADE LEVEL AND SOCIAL STATUS OF THE RESPONDENT Do the Citizens Have a Say About What Happens in the Government? Grade Lisvel Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Lower Status No 12.0 20.0 32.0 40.0 28.0 20.0 40.0 44.0 29.5 Don't know 24.0 40.0 8.0 28.0 24,0 20,0 12.0 12.0 21.0 Yes 64.0 40.0 60.0 60.0 48.0 60.0 48.0 44.0 4 9.5 % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 200 Upper Status No 28.0 28.0 20.0 24.0 36.0 52.0 48.0 72.0 39.0 Don't know 4.0 40.0 4,0 24.0 20.0 12.0 12.0 8.0 15.5 Yes 68.0 32.0 ?6.0 52.0 44.0 36.0 40.0 16.6 45.5 c l p 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 200 dyx holding letter status constant = -.07 p< .038; dy^ holding upper status constant = » -.21 p<.Q01 165 drops from 44% to 16%, while the percentage of lower-sta tus respondents remains essentially the same, around 48%. Even more revealing is the percentage gain in non-effica- cious responses among upper-status respondents during this period— they double their representation in this category from 36% to 72%, while the lower-status children post a modest increase from 28% to 44%. Thus, while our junior high school subjects do feel somewhat powerless to influ ence the government, the upper-status children at that grade level are particularly likely to express such feel ings (nearly three-quarters of them perceiving that the government is non-responsive to the demands of the citizen ry). Furthermore, such response patterns are in keeping with the pattern suggested by the Almond and Verba study of Mexican adults, and thus it appears that the children are actually being socialized into the peculiarly Mexican political culture. While we have noted in passing that the development of the ultimate pattern of response to this item occurred quite late, during the junior high school years, it should be emphasized that this finding is in keeping with our ra tionale which predicted that negative evaluations of the political regime would develop at a later age than the child's assessments of the political authorities, which represent his initial introduction into the political world. 166 Sex differences in the response patterns on this item were inconsistent and non-significant (see Table 25 in Appendix A). Only in the ninth grade is there variation in the pattern and that should best be regarded as samp ling variation. The last of the political efficacy items, the percep tion of the respondent's own family having an influence on the government, shows little development over grades in a way reminiscent of the government inevitability item. The percentage of non-efficacious responses peaks in the sixth and seventh grades and then drops again in the later junior high school years, a finding which is not to be accounted for, either in terms of our rationale or in light of previ ous findings of this study. They probably represent ran dom fluctuations in an essentially non-relationship. The majority of the sample in all grades except the third express efficacious responses to this item, and only in grades 6 and 7 do a reasonably large percentage of the children express non-efficacious responses. Hence, this item cannot be said to reveal pervasive feelings of power lessness among the children. The unusual nature of this item may be further reveal ed by the fact that the social class differences which are predicted by our rationale and have been validated for most of the other items do not attain on this item, while the sex differences posited by our rationale but not supported TABLE 23.— PERCEPTION OF FAMILY INFLUENCE ON THE GOVERNMENT BY GRADE LEVEL OF THE RESPONDENT Does Your Family Have a Say About What Happens in the Government? Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 No Don't know Yes 14-. 0 28.0 58.0 12.0 48.0 40.0 22.0 28.0 50.0 16.3 26.5 57.1 36.0 18.0 46,0 30.0 20.0 50.0 16.0 18.0 66.0 10.0 22.0 68.0 19.5 26.1 54.4 $ N 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 99.9 49 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 399a = .05 p<.048 ®One missing observation* 167 168 on most of the items are demonstrated by this item. (The reader is referred to Tables 26 and 27 in Appendix A.) The sex differences, while in the expected direction with girls more frequently expressing feelings of powerlessness for family influence, are not statistically significant. An examination of Table 28 in Appendix A will demon strate that the perception of family ability to influence the government does not correlate well with the perception of the citizen's ability to influence the government and correlates only weakly with the perception of government outputs as inevitable. The other two efficacy items, by contrast, are more highly correlated, such that an individ ual who feels that the citizens are powerless to influence the government are significantly more likely to perceive government outputs as inevitable. Cross-tabulation of some of the political trust and political efficacy items (see Table 29 in Appendix A) further reveals that the percep tion of family influence operates independently from them. Whereas those individuals who register feelings of power lessness on the items regarding citizen influence and gov ernment inevitability are significantly more likely to re cord feelings of distrust on the government benevolence and omniscience items than individuals not registering powerlessness on those items, individuals who indicate feelings of powerlessness on the family influence item are not significantly more likely to express feelings of 169 political distrust of the government than individuals who do not perceive the family as powerless. Thus, with the exception of the family influence item, there appears to be a relationship between those feeling distrustful and those feeling powerless. The only explanation that I can offer for the unusual response pattern surrounding the family influence item is that the family, as opposed to the citizenry or the govern ment, represents a more immediate and tangible object of the child’s experience. Being a less abstract concept to a child, its evaluation by him may be less cognitive or rational (as in the case of the citizenry and government) and more affective or wish-fulfillment in nature. Desire for system reforms and perceived powerlessness In contrast to the political trust items, the politi cal efficacy items show little relationship to the expres sion of desires for system reforms. Our rationale pre dicts that those children demanding change should be more likely to perceive the government outputs as inevitable and to assess the possibility of citizen or family influ ence on those outputs as very low. The data do not con firm this hypothesis. In all cases, dy-*- is less than .07 and statistically, as well as substantively, insignificant. Summary of findings at the level of regime A very brief summary of the children’s developing 170 orientations to the political system at the level of regime would undoubtedly be helpful to the reader at this point. Political alienation is conceived of as consisting of two dimensions, political distrust and political powerlessness. The political distrust items reveal the children in gen eral moving away from an extremely trustful position to ward the government to one better described as wary. The items of political efficacy, however, reveal a more serious decline over grades, with only approximately one-third of the ninth graders still making efficacious responses on the two consistent efficacy items (excluding the family influ ence item). Thus, there appears to be some serious erosion of support for the political regime in the upper grades, on both the trust and the efficacy dimensions. In both in stances, this erosion of support was most severe for upper- status children in the upper grade levels. A brief cross item analysis further demonstrated that registration of feelings of distrust were related to the expression of feelings of powerlessness (again, excluding the family in fluence item). Lastly, it should be observed that, as our rationale predicted, the major negative evaluations of the children with respect to the items of efficacy and trust develop on the whole at a later age than do their negative evaluations of the Presidential authority figure. 171 The Children's Attachment to the Political System at the Level of Political Community At the level of political community, we anticipate little rejection by the children, regardless of social class, sex, level of political information or desire for system changes. Kenneth Johnson summarized the findings of many observers of the Mexican political system when he observed that Mexicans love their nation, while they often disparage the s t a t e . 12 That even the most alienated among the Mexican adult citizenry still love Mexico and take pride in her symbols and accomplishments while distrusting the government and its leaders has been widely document ed, 13 This overwhelming attachment to the political com munity can similarly be observed among the young Mexican children from the data collected for this study. Salience of the political community When the children were asked to choose the best symbol of the government (or the political regime), they overwhelm ingly chose the President, and increasing with grade level, the Constitution of Mexico (see Table 30 in Appendix A). In contrast, when the children were asked to choose the best symbol of Mexico, they consistently chose the flag and the national anthem, symbols of the political community rather than the President or the Constitution or PRI, symbols of the political regime. Mexico, the nation or the political TABLE 24» — THE BEST SYMBOL OF MEXICO BY GRADE LEVEL OF THE RESPONDENT The Best Symbol of Mexico Total Grade c o • r l b D n Level $ £ Is Presidenl u © • 3 - P $ N C O b O • H XI PRI g © © § o r - 3 c S C 3 < 3 j O C O ( I 5 E l Q 2 8.0 40.0 20.0 16.0 4.0 4,0 4.0 0.0 4.0 100.0 5 0 3 4.0 28.0 26.0 18.0 4.0 2.0 8.0 0.0 10.0 100.0 50 4 6.0 38.0 32.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 12.0 100.0 50 5 14.0 4 - 8 . 0 22.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 2.0 4.0 100.0 50 6 18.0 42.0 30.0 8.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 50 7 6.0 56.0 16.0 8.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 12.0 0.0 100,0 50 8 4.0 56.0 30.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 4,0 100.0 50 9 0.0 40.0 40.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 12.0 4.0 100.0 50 Total 7.5 ^3.5 27.0 8.5 1.3 1.3 2.8 3.5 4.8 100.0 400 TABLE 25. THii BEST SYMBOL OF MEXICO BY SOCIAL STATUS OF THE RESPONDENT T h e B e >st S y m b o l o f M e x i c o T o t a l S o c i a l S t a t u s C o n s t i t u t i o n F l a g N a t i o n a l A n t h e m P r e s i d e n t S o l d i e r H ffi. P y r a m i d S o m e t h i n g E l s e D o n ' t K n o w , $ N L o w e r U p p e r 9 . 0 6 . 0 4 2 . 0 4 5 . 0 3 1 . 5 2 2 . 5 8 . 5 8 . 5 1 . 0 1 . 5 1 . 5 1 . 0 3 . 0 2 . 5 1 . 0 6 . 0 2 . 5 7 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 100.0 2 0 0 2 0 0 T o t a l 7 . 5 4 3 . 5 2 7 . 0 8 . 5 1 . 3 1 . 3 2 . 8 3 . 5 4 . 8 1 0 0 . 0 4 0 0 T o t a l B o y s G i r l s S e x -VJ • Vjl 1 0 , 5 I 3 . 1 C o n s t i t u t i o n * U\ 3 9 . 5 F l a g • o ro ro vO Ui • • o n ro N a t i o n a l A n t h e m 00 • Vji 00 00 » * O 00 P r e s i d e n t »-3 tr ® 1 . 3 1 . 7 0 . 6 S o l d i e r od © 0 1 c+ CO o H O H> & o o • 1 . 3 1 . 2 P R I 2 . 8 ro to • * vO P y r a m i d ui • Ui VjO CjJ • • NJ -£• S o m e t h i n g E l s e ■£■ 00 6 . 7 1 . 9 D o n ' t K n o w 1 0 0 , 0 .. 1 0 0 . 0 i 1 0 0 . 0 •4ft. T o t a l £ o to O' VO ro oo w ro CK i w bd 0 Co O tr* o > T ) dd H i co w o •= d 1-3 » t?a tc ft s W.T 175 community, thus appears to have salience in the children's orientations above and beyond that of the particular poli tical regime and its incumbent leaders. Furthermore, this pattern is consistent over grades; at all levels the poli tical community has precedence. Examining the frequency with which respondents from the two social class groupings choose symbols of Mexico, we find no substantial differences in their preferences, and thus our hypothesis is supported. Upper-status re spondents are slightly less likely to perceive the nation al anthem as the best symbol of Mexico, preferring in stead the "other" and "don't know" categories. Similarly, our sex hypothesis is supported because there were no substantial differences between boys and girls in the symbols they choose to represent Mexico. Boys are slightly more likely to choose regime symbols (such as the Constitution) while girls choose the flag and the national anthem somewhat more frequently. Those children desiring system reforms for Mexico do not characterize Mexico in symbolic terms which differ from those children not desiring system reforms (see Table 31 in Appendix A), We have thus seen that the political community has overwhelming salience in the political world of the young Mexican child. This finding, while predicted, is never theless surprising given the pervasive exposure of the 176’ Presidential figure in the Mexican political system. It would thus appear that even very young Mexican children are able to distinguish meaningfully between the state and the nation. Attachment to the political community The children’s attachment (or rejection) of the poli tical community was measured by an item asking them if they would like to move permanently from Mexico. This item ad mittedly calls for a response of extreme dissatisfaction" and rejection from the child, and as expected less than 20% of the entire sample of yoxmg Mexican children expressed the desire to do so. As can be seen from Table 27, the highest level of rejection of Mexico comes in the second grade (42% indicating they would choose to move away from Mexico), but that finding could be interpreted to mean that the initial bond of attachment to the country is not yet fully formed by that age. By grade 3, the percentage will ing to leave Mexico permanently has dropped to 16%, a level about which it fluctuates through junior high school. This pattern lends credence to the above interpretation of the second graders' responses. The slight rise in the percent age expressing a desire to leave Mexico in the sixth and seventh grades is not seen to be anything more than smp- ling variations. Table 28 reveals that there are some social class TABLE 27.—DESIRE TO MOVE PERMANENTLY FROM MEXICO BY GRADE LEVEL OF THE RESPONDENT Desire to Move Permanently From Mexico Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 No 58.0 84.0 88.0 86.0 86.0 74.0 86.0 88,0 80.5 Yes 42.0 16.0 12.0 14.0 14.0 26.0 14.0 12.0 19.5 $ ioo.o 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 400 TABLE 28.— DESIRE TO MOVE PERMANENTLY FROM MEXICO BY GRADE LEVEL AND SOCIAL STATUS OF THE RESPONDENT D e s i r e t o M o v e P e r m a n e n t l y F r o m M e x i c o G r a d e L e v e l , T o t a l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 L o w e r S t a t u s N o 60.0 8 4 . 0 9 2 . 0 8 8 . 0 8 8 , 0 7 2 . 0 8 8 . 0 96.0 8 3 . 5 Y e s 4 0 . 0 1 6 . 0 8 . 0 1 2 . 0 1 2 . 0 2 8 . 0 1 2 . 0 4 , 0 1 6 . 5 * 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 N 2 5 2 5 2 5 2 5 2 5 2 5 2 5 2 5 2 0 0 U p p e r S t a t u s N o 5 6 . 0 8 4 . 0 8 4 . 0 8 4 , 0 7 2 . 0 76.0 8 4 . 0 8 0 . 0 7 7 . 5 Y e s 4 4 . 0 1 6 . 0 16.0 1 6 . 0 2 8 . 0 2 4 . 0 16.0 2 0 . 0 2 2 . 5 * 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 , 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 , 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 N 2 5 2 5 2 5 2 5 2 5 2 5 2 5 2 5 2 0 0 h o l d i n g l o w e r s t a t u s c o n s t a n t = - . 0 8 p ^ .003 d y x h o l d i n g u p p e r s t a t u s c o n s t a n t = -.05 p < . 0 5 8 1 7 8 TABLE 29*— DESIRE TO MOVE PERMANENTLY EROM MEXICO BY GRADE LEVEL AND SEX OF THE RESPONDENT Desire to Move Grade Level T o t a l Permanently From Mexico 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Boys No 5 8 . 1 8 2 . 4 8 7 . 1 8 1 . 6 8 0 . 8 70.0 8 3 . 3 8 7 . 5 7 8 . 6 Yes 4 1 . 9 1 7 . 6 1 2 . 9 1 8 . 4 1 9 . 2 3 0 . 0 1 6 . 7 1 2 . 5 2 1 . 4 i 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 N 3 1 3 4 3 1 3 8 26 3 0 2 4 2 4 2 3 8 Girls No 5 7 . 9 8 7 . 5 8 9 . 5 1 0 0 . 0 7 9 . 2 8 0 . 0 8 8 . 5 8 8 . 5 • 8 3 . 3 Yes 4 2 . 1 1 2 . 5 1 0 . 5 0 . 0 2 0 . 8 2 0 . 0 U . 5 U . 5 1 6 . 7 % 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 N 1 9 16 1 9 1 2 2 4 2 0 26 26 1 6 2 for boys = - . 0 5 p <.025 dyx for girls *= - . 0 6 p < . 0 1 7 180 differences in the expression of the desire to move per manently from Mexico, a finding that was not predicted by our rationale (a null hypothesis had been predicted in stead). While social class is significantly related to the desire to move permanently (Tau-b=.13, significance 0.000), an examination of Table 28 reveals that in each grade, upper-status children are only slightly more will ing to leave Mexico permanently than lower-status children, with the exception of grades 6 and 9, in which the percent age differential is significantly greater. As predicted by our null hypothesis, the sex differ ences in the desire to move permanently from Mexico are inconsequential. Table 29 suggests, in general, girls are slightly less willing to desert Mexico than boys (16.7% of the girls express this desire as opposed to 21.4% of the boys), but there is considerable random variation over the grades in this pattern. The desire to move permanently from Mexico is also unrelated to the children’s perceptions of the need for system reform, children willing to leave it (see Table 32 in Appendix A). Summary of findings at the level of community Thus, the attachment to the political community is firmly established by grade 3, and the social class and sex of the respondent have little impact on the intensity of that attachment. To further substantiate the hypo thesis that rejection of the political regime and its leaders does not necessarily lead to a rejection of the political community in the expression of the desire to move, an examination of Table 33 in Appendix A will re veal that the desire to move from Mexico is not signifi cantly related to negative evaluations of the President's job performance, expression of disaffection for the man, distrust of the government's intentions to help and to protect the people or disbelief that the government knows what is best for the people of Mexico. 182 FOOTNOTES ■^•Marian R. Yarrow, "The Measurement of Children’s At titudes and Values," in The Handbook of Research Methods, ed. Paul H. Mussen (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960), p. 689. 9 . . ^The following is the correlation matrix for the Presidential evaluation items: A B C D E F G Total Score A 1.00 .56 .38 .54 .49 .53 .48 , 60 B 1.00 .70 .59 .41 .33 .24 .50 C 1.00 .46 .59 .36 .24 .50 D 1,00 . 66 .53 .55 .57 E 1.00 . 68 .72 . 64 F 1.00 .74 .72 G 1.00 .73 Total 1.00 A=President's Work B=President's Knowledge C=Presi- dent's Honesty D=President's Liking People E=Presi- dent as a Good Person F=Liking the President G=President's Job Performance The coefficient of reproducibility for a Guttman scale in cluding these items is .7957, substantially below reason able reliability ratings for a Guttman scale. The "Total" column indicates the correlation of each individual item with the total score obtained by merely summing the re sponses on the individual items. •^Yarrow, "The Measurement of Children's Attitudes and Values," p. 686. ^Michael E. Brown, "Alienation and Integration in Po litical Attitudes of Suburban Adolescents" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California, 1971, p. 18. ^Fred I. Greenstein, "The Benevolent Leader: Chil dren’s Images of Political Authority," American Political Science Review, LIV (December, 1960), 938, demonstrates the following distribution of responses in his sample of New Haven children when they were asked to evaluate the President: 71% very good 21% fairly good 4% not very good 1% bad 4% don't know. These figures may be com pared in a rough fashion to the distribution of responses of the Mexican children in this sample to the items of liking the Presidents 23.5% very much 27.0% well enough 183 16.5% don't like 9.5% don't like at all 23.5% don't know and evaluating the President's job performance 25.5% very good 29.0% good 20.8% not very good 8.3% poor 16.5% don't know. Thus, whereas Greenstein recorded 93% of his sample of American children giving the President a "good" or "very good” rating, only 50% of the Mexican children in this study give their President such a posi tive rating, ®The distinction between efficacy and trust in the concept of alienation was first made by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (The Civic Culture). It has since been developed by William Gamson, Powe r and Pi sc onte nt (Home wood, 111.: The Dorsey Press, 1968) and Jeffrey Paige, "Political Orientation and Riot Participation," American Sociological Review, XXXVI (October, 1971), 810-819. ^There are severe problems with construct validity in the operationalization of the analytically distinct con cepts of efficacy and trust? attempts to construct a mea sure of efficacy free from contamination by the trust di mension have resulted in operational definitions which are far removed from the original concepts. ®The efficacy items included in this survey were a- mong the highest loading items from the Easton study, which had isolated these dimensions in the children's de veloping concept of political efficacy. A factor analysis of the children's responses to these items in this sample (principal factoring with varimax orthogonal rotation based on a minimum eigenvalue of 1.0) revealed that none of the items loaded significantly on any single factor; furthermore, when a factor analysis was done on the junior high responses alone (on the assumption that an incipient crystalization of the concept of political efficacy might be delayed until later years), it was found that again none of the items loaded significantly on any of the fac tors and that the factor leadings in some cases were lower than for the entire sample. Following is the correlation matrix of the trust and efficacy items: A B C D E F A 1.00 .20 .21 .21 -.01 .01 B 1.00 .37 .22 -.03 .12 C 1.00 .26 -.02 .16 D 1.00 .01 .16 E 1.00 -.12 F 1.00 A=Perception of All Laws as Fair B=Evaluation of the Government's' Benevolence C=Belief that the Govern ment Knows Best D^Perception of Citizen Influence on the Government E=Perception of Family Influence 184 on the Government F=Perception of Inevitability of Government Outputs The factor loadings for the entire sample and the junior high subsample are: I. Entire Sample II. Junior High Subsample Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 A .35507 .18897 -.29685 .22761 .04033 B .54415 .11137 -.46877 -.00477 .11727 C .60851 .09756 -.56299 -.00477 .12794 D .44344 .02401 -.58172 -.06541 .11857 E -.07552 .16252 .08944 -.33912 .48854 F .34537 -.53694 -.42510 -.15700 -.21055 Factor analysis, as a technique for isolating dimensions of a concept, is not particularly reliable without a sound theoretical framework to support the analysis. In the ab sence of such a sound rationale, we discover that the fac tor analytic solutions will vary greatly from sample to sample; what appear to be important dimensions of the con cept from a factor analysis of the responses from one sam ple may be relatively unimportant (or low loading) dimen sions in a factor analysis of the responses from second and third samples. Without a sound rationale to guide the factor analysis, the researcher may be allowed to intro duce too much of his own interpretation into the results of the analysis and thereby obscure the real meaning of the responses. The use of the factor analysis technique in this particular case is further complicated by the re spondents being children. Very often, children do not have crystallised attitudes which will yield themselves up to systematic analysis of the dimensions involved. While factor analysis may be a useful technique to follow the generation.of such attitude complexes over grades, its use in such an exploratory capacity should be judicious in light of the above discussion. The fact that the two fac tor analyses of the responses of the Mexican children in this study, one of the entire sample and a second of the junior-high subjects alone, yielded totally different fac tor analytic solutions and that the latter should show lower factor loadings on many items than the former, is a reminder of the weaknesses of factor analysis in its mul tiple solutions, a problem which is compounded by use with children respondents, whose attitude structure is, by nature, uncrystallized. ^David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965). 10David Easton and Jack Dennis, Children in the Politi cal System: Origins of Political Legitimacy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1969), p. 128. 11Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture. 12Kenneth Johnson, Mexican Democracy: A Critical View (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971), 205. CHAPTER IX DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS Data presented in this study provides only partial support for our theoretical rationale. The Mexican chil dren in this sample are neither overly accepting nor mas sively rejecting of the political system. Nearly all of the items measuring attachment to the political system at the levels of the political authorities and the political regime reveal decreasing percentages of positive evalua tions with increasing age, and in many instances, concom itant increasing percentages of negative evaluations. Thus, while the marginal frequencies for each of these items confirms that only a small percentage of the entire sample elect the negative responses, those responses are disproportionately clustered in the upper grades of the sample. In contrast to the children in the lower grades, then, the children in the junior high years express con siderably less affection for the President, evaluate his job performance less satisfactorily, exhibit considerably lower levels of trust in the government and feel signifi cantly less efficacious in the political arena. Further more, as predicted by our rationale, the upper status chil dren tend to express negative evaluations of the author- 186 187 ities and the regime in greater proportions at earlier grade levels than do the lower status children; and these social class differences are most marked in the junior high grades. In contrast, the hypothesized differences in the response patterns between boys and girls appear on very few items; those differences that exist are incon sistent and thus not in support of the rationale. The major unresolved issue in this study is distin guishing the normal process of de-idealization (accompany ing the maturation of the political self) from the onset of confirmed political skepticism and alienation. Inevi tably, any decision regarding where one ends and the other begins involves an arbitrary value judgment in the same way as does the decision regarding what constitutes danger ously low levels of diffuse support in a political system (an issue discussed in the previous chapter). Acknow ledging the arbitrariness of such a judgment, however, I intend to interpret the findings of this study for the reader, characterizing the distinction between de-ideal ization and alienation as reasonably as possible. On some of the items measuring the children's attach ment to the political authorities and the regime, the de velopmental pattern of responses over grades appears to reflect merely the process of de-idealization: on these items, the decreasing percentage of positive responses re corded with increasing grade level is generally accom 188 panied by increasing percentages of less positive, neutral, or "don't know" responses rather than by in creasing percentages of negative responses. The aggre gate re-evaluation of the President as a person is a typical example of this de-idealization patterns the percentage of children endorsing the President as the "best person in the world" drops sharply with increasing grade level, although the percentage cynically responding that he is "not a good person" does show an increase over the same period (the majority response at all grade levels is that the President is a "good person"). Similarly, in the upper grades, the children come to characterize the President as merely equally honest or equally friendly in contrast to the younger children who are more likely to insist that he is more honest and more friendly than most men; at no time, however, does a large percentage of the sample depict the man as less honest or less friendly. Moreover, the President's role-related qualities suffer even less decline in evaluation over grades. Such findings can hardly be interpreted as constituting the extreme alienation from the President as a person and leader that is predicted by the rationale. However, informal compari sons with findings in studies of American children using identically-worded items suggest the initial levels of i- dealization of the Mexican President appears to be sub stantially lower and the ensuing "de-idealization" much 189 more severe among Mexican than American children. While such comparisons admittedly are limited by the lack of a truly cross-cultural study design, they nevertheless en courage the conclusion that "de-idealization" appears to be a far more corrosive process in the Mexican children than in the American. At the level of the political regime, other items re flect this apparent de-idealization. For example, the over whelming majority of the sample (82%) is unwilling to sti pulate that all laws are fair, but it does not necessarily follow that the children therefore reject all laws of the regime; in all probability, larger percentages of the chil dren are merely better able to perceive political reali ties. Evaluation of the government's job in helping and protecting the people is another item displaying the de idealization pattern— the percentage of children believing that it is doing a "very good" job declines sharply, but there is no drastic increase in the percentage condemning it for doing a "poor" job. The children in the upper grades are more likely to evaluate the government's per formance as "fair," reflecting a watchful or wary orienta tion in contrast to the more trusting one of the children in the lower grades. But, again, cursory examination of American findings appear to indicate de-idealization in Mexican children is far more severe than that displayed by American children of similar age spans. While these above items may capture nothing more than a process of de-idealization in the developing response patterns of the children across grades, other items, also measuring their attachment to political authorities and the regime, reveal significantly higher levels of rejec tion that deserve to be labelled alienation. For example, the two items calling directly for an evaluation of the President— the expression of affection for the man and a rating of his job performance— elicit greater percentages of negative responses than the items discussed above. In both of these direct evaluations, nearly a third of the sample in the junior high school grades express negative opinions, proportions approaching those making positive endorsements. Similarly, more than a third of those chil dren also distrust the government's knowing what is best for the people of Mexico. And lastly, the majority of children also respond efficaciously on the items concern ing government inevitability and citizenry influence. That negative evaluations are expressed by junior high school respondents on these items as frequently, or more so, than positive evaluations is indeed evidence of growing politi cal skepticism and alienation at this level, and hence sup port for our theoretical rationale. One explanation for some items eliciting proportion ately more negative responses than others is the variation in question-format. Most of the items capturing large 191 percentages of negative responses allow equal opportunity for the expression of positive and negative opinionsj they are either simple or expanded agree/disagree questions. Most of those items which seem to depict a process of de idealization, on the other hand, allow the respondent to choose from among a positive, a neutral and a negative response in addition to the "don't know" response category, which is present in all questions; on these items, then, the response patterns indicate a consistent preference by the children for the neutral category over the negative One. That the structure of a question can affect the re sponse patterns to it has been well-documented by studies of attitude measurement with adults; given the vaguely formed attitude structure of children, it is safe to as sume that the format of forced-choice questions will great ly affect the expression of their attitudes. Our theoretical rationale predicted significant social differences among the respondents in the development of political alienation. Upper status children are expected to exhibit greater cognitive development at earlier ages by virtue of their exposure to a broader social environment, and, indeed, within the political arena, the rationale ap pears supported because the upper status respondents show greater levels of awareness reflected in more frequently perceiving the need for broad system reforms in the politi cal economy of Mexico. The upper status children, thus 192 being more aware of the political world as well as the broader social environment, are expected to exhibit nega tive evaluations of the political leaders and the regime in greater proportions and at earlier ages than lower sta tus children. This pattern attains on nearly every item of the data analysis. The most important finding, however, is the high level of political alienation expressed by the upper status children in the junior high grades; the ero sion of support for the authorities and the regime is far greater for this particular segment of the sample than for the rest. In the junior high grades, these children rela tive to ones of lower status express much less affection for the man, feel more politically inefficacious, possess greater distrust of the government, etc. The percentage of upper status children in these grades espousing these negative orientations is sometimes twice as great as the percentage offering positive endorsements. This finding is in keeping with our rationale, suggesting these chil dren are more likely than lower status children to have older siblings and parents who are "reality-testing" the "democratic" political system, being thwarted in their ef forts at reform and communicating their discontent to the younger children in the family. It is possible that the upper status children in the junior high grades from this sample will be among the students from the university who will be demonstrating in the streets in 1980. 193 The anticipated differences between boys and girls in the development of alienation are not visible. The boys and girls show very few real differences in their develop ment of attitudes toward objects in their political world, probably because they are exposed to the same formal poli tical socialization experiences in the school, and they are not actively involved in the political arena.at their age. The findings from this study, then, do not discon- firm those of William Blough, who found differences be tween Mexican men and women restricted to political be havior rather than political attitudes,1 It may be that within the modernizing sector of Mexico that includes the Federal District the differences between the general so cialization experiences of boys and girls are decreasing, moving in the direction of greater egalitarianism? and, hence, differences in the cognitive and affective develop ment of attitudes are less marked than they would be in a more traditional culture. Greater differences in the attitude development of boys and girls might be expected in the rural sections of Mexico, which are still charac terized by a more traditional culture. More likely, how ever, the selective sample of girls remaining in school at the upper elementary and junior high grade levels (re call the high drop-out figures for girls) probably come from those families that are most egalitarian in nature. In further support of our rationale, the alienation developing among the Mexican children at the levels of po litical authorities and regime has not spread to the ulti mate level of the political community. The political com munity (i. e., the nation of Mexico) has greater salience in the political world of the young Mexican children in this sample than does any single political figure or sym bol of the current regime; this finding is particularly surprising given the massive dominance of the President and the political party, PRI, in the political, economic and social picture of Mexico. In addition to the salience of the political community is an emotional attachment to it so strong that even intense rejection of political leaders and institutions can not shake the child's love for Mexico, her legends, heroes, and traditions. Even among the most alienated segments of the sample— the up per status children in the junior high grades— there is no increased desire to leave Mexico permanently, and fur thermore, any expression of such a desire does not appear to be based on dissatisfaction with the political system at lower levels. In this regard, then, the Mexican children display a pattern of alienation which is distinctly Mexican. Its broad outlines— increasing rejection of the state, its leaders and institutions, without tarnishing loyalty to the 195 nation— are the same as those of the adult citizens in the political culture, Roger Hansen is thus justified in his assertion that "The attitudes affecting political partici pation formed in the early years are reinforced by actual experiences in adult life, and the mold continues with as yet insignificant change from one generation to the next."2 The children appear to learn at an early age that they must not expect much from their government— it cannot be trusted to know what is best for the people and then carry out its functions to help and protect them. Fur thermore, at a very early age, they feel helpless to influ ence the government. But reject Mexico and what their rev olution stands for, they will not. This outcome of the political socialization process is predictable when understood in the context of the Mexi can political culture. The formal political socialization program in Mexico is more concerned with the growth of af fective, emotional responses to the political system than with the inculcation of more cognitive, rational ones. There are two important reasons for this emphasis found in the government textbooks. First, children in Mexico are exposed to formal political indoctrination only for the two or three years that they are in school; the educa tion of a more rational and competent political being is thus limited by the unsophisticated level of intellectual development of the child during these early school years. 196 Secondly, the Mexican government, being considerably au thoritarian in structure, is less willing to encourage the active participation of the masses in decision-making pro cesses (preferring a supportive but passive citizenry) and is therefore less interested in the inculcation of rational political orientations among the children. As the Mexican children mature toward adulthood and are exposed to ideas through the process of education, they begin to decipher the meaning of the democratic rhetoric of the government. If they attempt to participate in the decision-making processes or desire to push for system re forms, they must play by the "rules of the game." Accord ing to Gonzalez Casanova, "Within the participating sector, organization and protest must observe the rules of the game. They must exist within the government or among its friends, whatever their ideology, and allow the latter to control protest, pressures and d e m a n d s . ” 3 Thus, students coming out of the universities seek to participate in the decision-making processes by forcing the political regime to stand by its democratic rhetoric, and when they find the leadership channels essentially closed and the govern ment non-responsive to their demands, they take to the streets in angry demonstrations, where the government deals harshly with their blatant challenges to the sys tem. Martin Needier observed that "The significant poli tical issues affecting the stability of the system. . . 197 derive not from the alienation of the poor, but from the will of the better off to participate."4 We previously discussed the problems of resource allo cation faced by a developing country such as Mexico. Ma jor investments in the industrial sector of the country to promote long-range growth deprive the masses of the country of immediate and concrete gains in their standard of living. To prevent the development of alienation among large segments of the people who find their needs thus unsatisfactorily met, the formal political socialization process attempts to build high levels of diffuse support which will give the political system stability. Mexican children are therefore taught to believe that they owe their unquestioned loyalty to Mexico (every textbook con tains a pledge which the children recite, "Mi Servicio a Mexico"— my service to Mexico) and that their words, thoughts and actions should be for the improvement of their country. The political Symbols of the on-going Revolution and the mestizo culture, its legends and heroes, assuage the discontent that might otherwise be expressed against the political system because of its failures to meet the needs of the masses. Thus, although the citizens may not like the government and its leaders, they continue to express pride in the symbolic political community and political regime, while disparaging the political realities. To 198 this extent, the formal political socialization process in Mexico appears to have been largely successful. The political leaders consciously try to reinforce this pro cess by identifying the current political regime with the Revolution through PRI (the institutionalized revolu tionary party as it translates), and very often, political office holders will refer to themselves as "revolution aries, " The results of this study indicate that the children are being socialized into the political culture in such a way that they will assume the passive but supportive role this government regime desires in its citizens. While the children distrust the government and its leaders, they nevertheless love Mexico and would never desert her. Fur thermore, in all probability as adults, they will make few demands on the government, thereby allowing the government to make the decisions according to whatever priorities they select. From the standpoint of the political system, the crucial variable of stability is thus maintained. It appears, then, that the formal political socialization process in Mexico effectively builds a base of diffuse sup port at the most affective level of response among the youngest members of the political system which endures in to adulthood, thereby providing the national government with sufficient support to continue its program of econ omic development. The children are learning to have pride 199 in the development of Mexico and all things Mexican, and hopefully in their government, while at the same time they are learning not to make specific demands on it. It is those children (most commonly, upper-status children who persist in the educational system) who seek to rationalize or regularize the decision-making processes and the allotment of authority in the system who represent the greatest threat as well as the greatest asset in the development of the Mexican political economy. The percent age of children who progress beyond the secondary level of school and come to demand rational political procedures with more widespread allocation of authority is indeed a small segment of the population. Thus, it appears that continuity rather than change will characterize the devel opment of the Mexican political economy in the foreseeable future. The system is essentially stable, citizen orien tations matching institutional requirements. As the coun try continues to modernize and the educational system in culcates new value orientations into the people, rational ity and participation may replace blind faith and resigna tion in the citizenry and responsiveness and honesty may overcome personalism and betrayal in the government’s leaders and institutions. Political socialization is, afterall, a two-way process. It shapes and is shaped by the political culture) the socialized beings are followers and office-holders alike. But it must be remembered that whatever happens in the development of Mexj" distinctively Mexican. Cross-cultural replications and t . studies of political socialization are _nt and have long been neglected. It is premature _■ conclude on the basis of American studies alone what constitute the essential outlines of the political socialization process. The emphasis in this study has been on the demonstration of the way in which that process is molded within the poli tical culture. At the same time that there are these uni que factors in the socialization process, there are also revealing similarities. We have alluded before to the dis tinction between developmental and experiential components in the growth of attitudes and the virtual impossibility of distinguishing their relative inputs. Political socialization studies are in a position to draw on a wide range of such broad theoretical formulations as developmental psychological theories, social learning theories, etc. Because much.political socialization re search is conducted with children, often very young chil dren, the researcher must bring to the research knowledge regarding child and developmental psychology. Children are not mini-adults. The most challenging problem facing the investigator is to penetrate the child's world-view and to- understand it not in adult terms but in the terms of the child himself. This problem demands sensitive 201 research techniques and sensitive research investigators. While the survey design with the questionnaire was ade quate for gathering data on the aggregate attitude re sponses of the children, it is essentially an insensitive research tool for investigation of the development of at titudes in young children. At this point, more qualita tive techniques are required to reveal the precise nature of the socialization process on attitude formation. In this regard, longitudinal and cross-cultural studies will prove invaluable in elucidating the outlines of the so cialization process. The major strides in political socialization research, then, must come at the levels of more sophisticated theo retical frameworks to interpret empirical findings and more sensitive research techniques to gather the necessary data. The emphasis must be put back on the process of socialization. 202 FOOTNOTES ^William J. Blough, "Political Participation in Mexico: Sex Differences in Behavior and Attitudes" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1967). 2Hansen, The Politics of Mexican Development, p. 204, •^Gonzalez Casanova, Democracy in Mexico, p. 69. ^Needier, Politics and Society in Mexico, p. 89. I APPENDIX A SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 203 TABLE 1.—RESPONSES TO “DO YOU LIKE THE PRESIDENT?" BY GRADE LEVEL AND SEX OF THE RESPONDENT Do You Like the President? Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Boys Don't like at all 9.7 11.8 6.5 13.2 26.9 20.0 4.2 4.2 12.2 Don't like 3.2 8.8 19.4 23.7 11.5 0.0 20.8 25.0 13.9 Don't know 9.7 20.6 12.9 28.9 23.1 30.0 29.2 33-3 23.5 Like well enough 41.9 23.5 29.0 23.7 26,9 30.0 33.3 33.3 29.4 Like very much 35.5 35.3 32.3 10.5 11.5 20.0 12.5 4.2 21.0 * 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 31 34 31 38 26 30 24 24 238 Girls Don't like at all 5.3 6.3 10.5 16.7 4.2 0.0 3.8 3.8 5.6 Don't like 5.3 25.0 15.8 8.3 33.3 15.0 23.1 26.9 20.4 Don't know 5.3 12.5 5.3 25.0 12.5 40.0 26.9 50.0 23.5 Like well enough 47.4 18.8 31.6 33.3 25.0 25.0 15.4 3.8 23.5 Like very much 36.8 37.5 36.8 16.7 25.0 20.0 30.8 15.4 27.5 $ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 19 16 19 12 24 20 26 26 162 dy^ for boys = -.16 p<.001 dyx for girls = -.15 p<.002 204 TABLE 2. --EVALUATION OF THE PRESIDENT’ S JOB PERFORMANCE BY GRADE LEVEL AND SOCIAL STATUS OF THE RESPONDENT Do You Think the President is Doing a Good Job? Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Lower Status Bad 0.0 16.0 4.0 20.0 8.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 7.0 Not very good 4.0 12.0 28.0 20.0 24.0 8.0 28.0 28.0 19.0 Don't know 12.0 20.0 12.0 20.0 28.0 28.0 16.0 24.0 20.0 Good 28.0 20.0 16.0 24.0 12.0 44.0 32.0 44-.0 27.5 Very good 56.0 32.0 40.0 16.0 28.0 16.0 20.0 4.0 26.5 $ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 200 Upper Status Bad 12.0 16.0 8.0 16.0 8.0 12.0 0.0 4.0 9.5 Not very good 20.0 16.0 12.0 24.0 32.0 24.0 16.0 36.0 22.5 Don't know 4.0 12.0 16.0 20.0 4.0 20.0 12.0 16.0 13.0 Good 12.0 20.0 48.0 28.0 32.0 28.0 44.0 32.0 30.5 Very good 52.0 36.0 16.0 12.0 24.0 16.0 28.0 12.0 24.5 $ N 100.0 25 100.0 25 100,0 25 100.0 . 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 200 holding lower status constant = -.14- .002 dyX holding upper status constant = -.07 p< .071 205 TABLE 3• — EVALUATION OF THE fRESIDfiST'S J03 PERFORMANCE BY GRADE LEVEL AiMD SEX OF THE RESPONDENT Do You Think the Grade Level Total rresiaerro is uojjig a Good Job? 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Boys Bad Not very good Don’t know Good Very good 3.2 19.4 9.7 16.2 51.5 17.6 2.9 14.7 29.4 35.3 6.5 19.4 9.7 29.0 35.5 18.4 21.1 21.1 28.9 10.5 7.7 34.6 7.7 19.2 30.8 10.0 23.3 23.3 23.3 20,0 4.2 20.8 4.2 37.5 33.3 0.0 33.3 16.7 33.3 16.7 9.2 21.0 13.9 26.9 29.0 $ N 100.0 31 100.0 34 100.0 31 100.0 38 100.0 26 100.0 30 100.0 24 100.0 24 100.0 200 Girls Bad Not very good Don't know Good Very good 10.5 0.0 5.3 26.3 57.9 12.5 37.5 18.8 0.0 31.3 5.3 21.1 21.1 36.8 15.8 16.7 25.0 16.7 16.7 25.0 8.3 20.8 25.0 25.0 20.8 5.0 5.0 25.0 55.0 10.0 0.0 23.1 23.1 38.5 15.4 3.8 30.8 23.1 42.3 0.0 6.8 20.4 20.4 32.1 20.4 i N 100.0 19 100.0 16 1 100.0 19 100.0 12 100.0 24 100.0 30 100.0 26 100.0 26 100.0 162 dyx for boys = -.09 p .012 d y ^ for girls = -.11 p<.012 206 TABLE 4. — EVALUATION OF THE PRESIDMT'S WORKING HARD BY GRADE LEVEL OF THE RESPONDENT Compared to Most Men, the President Works Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Less hard 8.0 18.0 10.0 24.0 18.0 22.0 12.0 10.0 15.3 Don't know 16.0 12.0 10.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 16.0 30.0 14.3 As hard 12.0 22,0 22.0 34.0 16.0 32.0 14.0 14.0 20.8 Harder 64.0 48.0 58.0 56.0 34.0 34.0 58.0 46.0 49.8 $ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 400 dyx = -.06 p< .041 207 TABLE 5*— EVALUATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S KNOWLEDGE BY GRADE LEVEL OF THE RESPONDENT Compared to Most Men, the President Knows Grade Level 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Less Don't know As much More 4.0 14.0 8.0 74.0 6.0 18.0 18.0 58.0 6.0 6.0 32.0 56.0 6.0 12.0 28.0 54.0 0.0 10.0 22.0 68.0 8.0 6.0 34.0 52.0 0.0 12.0 26.0 62.0 4.0 10.0 20.0 66,0 4.3 11.0 23.5 61.3 2 N 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0 400 = .00 p< .454 208 TABLE 6. — EVALUATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING HARD BI GRADE LEVEL AND SOCIAL STATUS OF THE RESPONDENT Compared to Grade Level Total Most hen, the President Works 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Lower Status Less hard 8.0 16.0 16.0 28.0 16.0 24.0 4.0 12.0 15-5 Don't knoi-7 16.0 8.0 4.0 8.0 16.0 12.0 24.0 40.0 16.0 As hard 4.0 24.0 8.0 36.0 20.0 48.0 12.0 4.0 19.5 More 72.0 52.0 72.0 28.0 48.0 16.0 60.0 44.0 49.0 % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 200 Upper Status Less hard 8.0 20.0 4.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 8.0 15.0 Don't know 16.0 16.0 16.0 8.0 4.0 12.0 8.0 20.0 12.5 As hard 20.0 20.0 36.0 32.0 12.0 16.0 16.0 24.0 22.0 More 56.0 44.0 44.0 40.0 64.0 52.0 56.0 48.0 50.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 200 d h o l d i n g l o w e r s t a t u s c o n s t a n t = - . 1 1 p < , 0 0 6 y* d ^ h o l d i n g u p p e r s t a t u s c o n s t a n t = . 0 1 p < . 4 3 3 209 TABLE ?. — EVALUATION OF THE PRESIDENT’ S KNOWLEDGE BY GRADS LEVEL AND SOCIAL STATUS OF THE RESPONDENT Compared to Most Menf the President Knows Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Lower Status Less 4.0 8.0 8.0 4.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 4.0 4.0 Don't know 8.0 16,0 4.0 12.0 16.0 4.0 16.0 12.0 11.0 As much ■ 4.0 16.0 28.0 24.0 12.0 36.0 24.0 4.0 18.5 More 84.0 60,0 60.0 oO.O 72.0 56.0 60,0 80.0 66.5 $ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 400 Upper Status Less 4.0 4.0 4.0 8.0 0.0 12.0 0.0 4.0 4.5 Don't know 20.0 20.0 8.0 12.0 4.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 11.0 As much 12.0 20.0 36.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 28.0 36.0 28.5 More 64.0 56.0 52.0 4a.o 64.0 48.0 64.0 52.0 56.0 * 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 200 dyj, holding lower status constant = -.01 p<.4?2 d^. holding upper status constant = .01 p<.393 210 TABLE 8. — EVALUATION OF THE HtESIDMT'S WORKING HARD BY GRADE LEVEL AND SEX OF THE RESPONDENT Compared to Most Men, the President Works Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Boys Less hard 6.5 20.6 12.9 26.3 15.4 . 20.0 8.3 20.8 16.8 Don't know 16.1 11.8 9.7 10.5 19.2 13.3 12.5 20.8 13.9 As hard 6.5 20.6 25.8 36.8 23.1 33.3 16.7 16.7 23.1 Harder 71.0 4-7.1 51.6 26.3 42.3 33.3 62.5 41.7 46.2 * 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 31 34 31 38 26 30 24 24 238 Girls Less hard 10.5 12.5 5.4 16.7 20.8 25.0 15.4 0.0 13.0 Don't know 15.8 12.5 10.5 0.0 0.0 10.0 19.2 38.5 14.8 As hard 21.1 25.0 15.9 25.0 8.3 30.0 11.5 11.5 17.3 Harder 52.6 50.0 68.4 58.3 70.8 35.0 53.8 50.0 54.9 % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 19 16 19 12 24 20 26 26 162 d y x for boys = -.07 p-2 .034 for girls = -.05 p<~.159 211 TABLE 9• “ EVALUATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S KNOWLEDGE BY GRADE LEVEL AMD SEX OF THE RESPONDENT Compared to Most Men, the President Knows Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Boys Less Don't know As much More 3.2 9.7 9.7 77.4 8.8 23.5 11.8 55.9 9.7 9.7 35.5 45.2 2.6 10.5 31.6 55.3 0.0 19.2 23.1 57.7 13.3 6.7 40.0 40.0 0.0 8.3 25.0 66.7 4.2 8.3 29.2 58.3 5.5 12.2 2 5.6 56.7 % N 100.0 31 100.0 34 100.0 31 100.0 38 100.0 26 100.0 30 100.0 24 100.0 24 100.0 238 Girls Less Don't know As mudh More 5.3 21.1 5.3 68.4 0.0 6.3 31.3 62.5 0.0 0.0 26.3 73.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 50.0 0.0 0.0 20.8 79.2 0.0 5.0 25.0 70.0 0.0 15.4 26.9 57.7 3.8 11.5 11.5 73.1 2.5 9.3 20.4 67.9 $ N 100.0 19 100.0 16 100.0 19 100.0 12 100.0 24 100.0 20 100.0 26 100.0 26 100.0 162 dyx for boys = -.02 p- ^ .313 8^ for girls = .01 p<.440 212 TABLE 10.— EVALUATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S HONESTY BY GRADE LEVEL AND SOCIAL STATUS OF THE RESPONDENT Compared to Most Men, the President is Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 ? 8 9 Lower Status Less honest 12.0 8.0 12.0 16.0 4.0 12.0 0.0 4.0 9.0 Don’t know 4.0 12.0 8.0 16.0 16.0 24.0 40.0 28.0 24.0 As honest 20.0 16.0 28.0 44.0 48.0 32.0 20.0 44.0 31.5 More honest 60.0 40.0 48.0 24.0 24.0 32.0 36.0 20.0 35.5 % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 200 Upper Status Less honest 0.0 4.0 12.0 4.0 4.0 12.0 8.0 20.0 10.5 Don't know 20.0 16.0 8.0 36.0 16.0 16.0 28.0 20.0 28.0 As honest 8.0 28.0 40.0 32.0 40.0 40.0 44.0 48.0 35.0 More honest 48.0 20.0 32.0 24.0 40.0 24.0 12.0 12.0 26.5 c p 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 K 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 200 dyx holding lower status constant = -.12 p ^ .003 dyx holding upper status constant = “.05 p< .117 213 TABLE 11.--EVALUATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S HONESTY BY GRADE LEVEL AND SEX OF THE RESPONDENT Compared to Most Men, the President is Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 r o 7 8 9 Boys Less honest 16.6 8.8 3.2 10.5 3.8 20.0 4.2 20.8 10.9 Don't know 19.4 35.2 19.4 28.9 23.1 20.0 37.5 16.7 25.2 As honest 16.1 17.6 35.5 42.1 46.2 40.0 29.2 54.2 34.5 More honest 48.4 38.3 41.9 18.4 26.9 20.0 29.2 8.3 29.4 2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 31 34 31 38 26 30 24 24 238 Girls Less honest 5.3 12.5 26.3 16.7 4.2 0.0 3.8 3.8 8.0 Don't know 21.1 43.8 5-3 16.7 16.7 30.0 42.3 34.6 27.2 As honest 10.5 31.3 31.6 25.0 41.7 30.0 34.6 38.5 31.5 More honest 63.2 12.5 36.8 41.7 . 37.5 40.0 19.2 23.1 33.3 2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 19 16 19 12 24 20 26 26 162 for boys = -.10 .006 dyjj. for girls = -.06 p<,087 TABLE 12.— EVALUATION OF THE PRESIDENT AS A PERSON BY GRADE LEVEL AND SEX. OF THE RESPONDENT Compared to Grade Level Total Most Men, the President is 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Boys Not a good person 3.2 17.6 12.9 18.4 11.5 13.3 4.2 0.0 10.9 Don't know 12.9 17.6 12.9 18.4 7-7 16.7 16.7 25.0 16.0 A good person 58.1 52.9 67.7 57.9 76.9 66.7 79.2 75.0 65.5 Best in the world 25.8 11.8 6.5 5.3 3.8 3.3 0.0 0.0 7.6 i 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 31 34 31 38 26 30 24 24 238 Girls Not a good person 15.8 25.0 15.8 8.3 12.5 0.0 3.8 7.7 10.5 Don't know 0.0 31.3 5.3 8.3 8.3 20.0 19.2 26.9 15-4 A good person 47.4 37.5 78.9 83.3 75.0 80.0 76.9 65.4 68.5 Best in the world 36.8 6.3 0.0 0.0 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.6 i 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 19 16 19 12 24 20 26 26 162 dyx for boys = -.06 p<-.051 d^ for girls = -.06 p<,064 215 TABLE 13.“ EVALUATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S 3EKEVOLEHGE BY GRADE LEVEL AND SEX OF THE RESPONDENT Compared to Most Men, the President Likes Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Boys Less people 6.5 8.8 9.7 2.6 11.5 13.3 4.2 12.5 8.4 Don't know 9.7 20.6 16.1 10.5 11.5 6.7 I0.7 12.5 13.0 As many people 16.1 11.8 22.6 18.4 7.7 23.3 12.5 20.8 16.8 P I ore people 67.7 58.8 51-6 68.4 69.2 56.7 66.7 54.2 61.8 $ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 31 34 31 38 26 30 24 24 238 Girls Less people 5.3 6.3 10.5 8.4 8.3 5.0 3.8 26.9 9.9 Don't know 5.3 31.3 5-3 0.0 0.0 15.0 19.2 7.7 10.5 As many people 21.1 12.5 36.8 25.0 25.0 30.0 23.1 19.2 24.1 More people 68.4 50.0 47.4 66.6 66.7 50.0 53.8 46.2 55.6 * 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 19 16 19 12 24 20 26 26 162 d y x for boys = - . 0 1 p^,372 for girls = -.08 p'c.044 216 • TABLE 14.— RESPONSES TO "DO YOU LIKE THE PRESIDENT?" BY RESPONDENT'S DESIRE FOR SYSTEM REFORMS Do You Like the President? Desire for System Reforms Total No Yes Don't like at all 8.3 10.4 9.5 Don't like 11.2 20.3 16.5 Don't know 20.7 2 5.5 23.5 Like well enough 31.4 23.8 27.0 Like very much 28.4 19.9 23.5 % N 100.0 169 100.0 231 100.0 400 dyx = -„17 p< .001 TABLE 15*— EVALUATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S JOB PERFORMANCE BY RESPONDENT'S DESIRE FOR SYSTEM REFORMS Do You Think the President is Doing a Good Job? Desire for System Reforms Total No Yes Bad 9.5 7.4 8.3 Not very good 16.0 24.2 20.8 Don't know 14.2 18.2 16.5 Good 28.4 29.4 29.0 Very good 32.0 20.8 25.5 $ N 100.0 169 100.0 231 100.0 400 dyx = -.12 p<.002 218 TABLE 16. — EVALUATION OF THE PRESIDENT AS A PERSON BY RESPONDENT'S DESIRE FOR SYSTEM REFORMS Compared to Most Men, the President is Desire for System Reforms Total No Yes Not a good person 13.6 8.7 10.3 Don't know 12.4 18.2 15.8 A good person 62.1 70.1 66.8 Best in the world 11.8 3.0 6.8 , w I 3 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 169 231 400 TABLE 17 • --CHILDREN'S VIEW OF THE FRESIDMT* A COMPARISON OF CHICAGO3- AND MEXICO CITX DATA Item Chicago Findings Mexico City Findings Grades 2/3 Grades 7/8 Grades 2/3 Grades 7/8 Compared to most men, the President works Harder 68.5 82.5 56.0 41.0 As hard 25.0 12.5 17.0 23.0 Less hard 7.0 4 - . 5 13.0 17.0 Compared to most men, the President More knows 75.0 88,0 66.0 57.0 As much 24.0 9.5 13.0 30.0 Less 1,0 2.5 5.0 4.0 Compared to most men, the President More honest is 85-5 53.0 4-2.0 26.0 As honest 14-. 5 4-7,0 34.0 34.0 Less honest 0,0 0.0 11.0 8.0 Compared to most men, the President likes More people 77.0 53.0 62,0 57.0 As many people 21.0 4-7.0 15.0 22.0 Less people 2.0 0.0 7.0 7.0 Compared to most men, the President The best person in the world is 49.0 5.0 20.0 1.0 A good person 51.0 85.0 51.0 75.0 Not a good person 0.0 19.0 14.0 6.0 aSource: Robert D. Hess, "The Socialization of Attitudes Toward Political Authority* Some Cross National Comparisons," International Social Science Journal. XV (1963), 547. 220 p d P c + S ' o p £ cn C _ | . o ' ® 4 H i O 4 3 o ® W H - 0 1 o ' a 3 o p m o a * 3 © 4 c o o 3 « H- m g 3 OP * 3 © o ® t n H - w c r o 3 f f i w c + t n h - cn H a OP ® M H* 09 s & P £ ft o 3 *T J 4 ® W H- P - a H - P H O O His work o o o o £ o o ~o o UN NO V/x ON His knowledge His honesty His liking people o o O n O n U n NO NO His being a good person o o ON CO U n U1 U1 O n U0 U1 U n VjJ Liking him o ~o o 4 = - -v> N > U n Un t o £ Hating his job performance I Z Z TABLE 18. — INTERCORR ELATION MATRIX O F THE PRESIDUITIAL EVALUATION ITU'S TABLE 19.— BELIEF IK THE GOVERNMENT'S BENEVOLEHCE BY GRADE LEVEL AND SEX OF THE RESPONDENT Does the Government Help and Protect the People of Mexico? Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 9 Boys Poorly 0.0 2.9 9.7 15.8 7.7 10.0 16.7 12.5 9.2 Don't know 6.5 11.8 12.9 10.5 7.7 10.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 Fair 35.5 iH.2 35-5 50.0 57.7 56.7 62.5 87.5 51-7 Very well 58.1 64.1 in.9 23.7 26.9 23.3 20.8 0.0 31.1 d > P 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 31 34 31 38 26 30 24 24 238 Girls Poorly 0.0 0.0 5.3 16.7 8.3 10.0 7.7 3.8 6.2 Don't know 10.5 6.3 5.3 0.0 0.0 15.0 7.7 26.9 9.9 Fair 26.3 56.3 42.1 66.7 75.0 70.0 84.6 65.4 62.3 Very well 63.2 37.5 47.4 16.7 16.7 5.0 0.0 3.8 21.6 $ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 19 16 19 12 24 20 26 26 162 222 TABLE 20.— PERCEPTION OF ALL LAWS A3 FAIR BY RESPONDENT*3 DESIRE FOR SYSTEM REFORMS A i - f t ATT Desire for System Reforms Total Laws Fair? No Yes No 43.2 50.2 47.3 Don't know 16.6 16.5 16.5 Yes 40.2 33.3 36.3 f i 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 169 231 400 dy^ = -.08 p-^.016 223 TABLE 21.— BELIEF THAT THE GOVERNMENT KNOWS BEST BY RESPONDENT'S DESIRE FOR SYSTEM REFORMS Does the Govern ment Know What is Best for the Peo ple of Mexico? Desire for System Reforms Total No Yes No 14.2 28.6 22.5 Don't know 25.4 17.3 20,8 Yes 60.4 54.1 56.8 d P 100,0 100.0 100.0 N 169 231 400 dyx = -.11 p <.002 224 TABLE 2 2 i — BELIEF IS THE GOVERNMENT'S BENEVOLENCE 31 RESPONDENT'S DESIRE FOR SYSTEM REFORM S D o e s t h e G o v e r n m e n t H e l p a n d D e s i r e f o r S y s t e m R e f o r m s T o t a l P r o t e c t , t h e P e o p l e o f M e x i c o ? N o Y e s P o o r l y . 2 . 4 1 2 . 1 8 . 0 D o n ’t k n o w 8 . 9 3 . 7 8 . 8 F a i r 5 0 . 9 5 9 . 7 5 6 . 0 V e r y w e l l 3 7 . 9 1 9 . 5 2 7 . 3 % 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 N 1 6 9 2 3 1 4 0 0 = -.23 p - ^ . O O l 225 TABLE 23.“ PERCEPTION OF INEVITABILITY OF GOVERNMENT OUTPUTS BY GRADE LEVEL AND SOCIAL STATUS OF THE RESPONDENT Perception of Inevitability Grade Level Total of Government Outputs 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Lower Status Yesa Don't know No 44.0 32.0 24.0 40.0 24.0 36.0 52.0 8.0 40.0 32.0 36.0 32.0 16.0 12.0 72.0 32.0 20.0 48.0 36.0 24.0 40.0 48.0 24.0 28.0 31.3 22.5 40.0 $ N 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100,0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 200 Upper Status Yes Don't know No 32.0 20.0 48.0 12.0 52.0 36.0 4.0 12.0 84.0 24.0 24.0 52.0 36.0 20.0 44.0 20.0 16.0 64.0 32.0 4.0 64.0 4.0 20.0 40.0 25.0 21.0 40.0 i N 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 25 100.0 200 dyx holding lower status constant = .04 p^ .16?; dy^ holding upper status constant = -.03 p<.243 aYes represents a non-efficacious response on this item. 226 TABLE 24.— PERCEPTION OF INEVITABILITY OF GOVERNMENT OUTPUTS BY GRADE LEVEL AND SEX OF THE RESPONDENT Perception of Inevitability of Government Outputs Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Boys Yesa 41.9 26.5 25.8 31.6 26.9 26.7 33.3 45.5 31.9 Don't know 25.8 38.2 16.1 26.3 19.2 20.0 12.5 12.5 22.3 No 32.3 35.2 58.1 42.1 53.8 53.3 54.2 41.7 45.8 $ 100.0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 3i 34 31 38 26 30 24 24 238 Girls Yes 31.6 25.0 31.6 16.? 25.0 25.0 34.6 42.3 30.2 Don't know 26.3 37.5 0.0 41.7 12.5 15.0 15.4 30.8 21.0 No 42.1 37.5 68.4 41.7 62.5 60.0 50.0 26.9 48.8 $ 100.0 100.0 . 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 19 16 19 12 24 20 26 26 162 dyx for boys = .04 p^.144 for girls = -.06 p<c.098 aYes represents a non-efficacious response on this item 227 TABLE 25.— PERCEPTION OF CITIZEN INFLUENCE ON THE GOVERNMENT BY GRADE LEVEL AND SEX OF THE RESPONDENT Do the Citizens Have a Say About Grade Level Total What Happens in the Government? 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Boys No 19.4 23.5 25.8 31.6 26.9 40.0 45.8 70.8 34.0 Don't know 16.1 44.1 6.5 26.3 23.1 10.0 8.3 4.2 18.5 Yes 64.5 32.4 6?.? 42.1 50.0 50.0 45.8 25.0 47.5 £ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 31 34 31 28 26 30 24 24 238 Girls No 21.1 25.0 26.3 33.3 37.5 30.0 42.3 50.0 34.6 Don't know 10.5 31.1 5.3 25.0 20.8 25.0 25.0 15.4 17.9 Yes 68.4 43.8 68.4 41.7 41.7 45.0 42.3 34.6 47.5 a p 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 19 16 19 12 24 20 26 26 162 for boys = -.14 p^.OOi for girls = -.14 p<.001 228 TABLE 26.— PERCEPTION OF FAMILY INFLUENCE ON THE GOVERNMENT BY GRADE LEVEL AND SOCIAL STATUS OF THE RESPONDENT Does Your Family Have a Say About What Happens in Government? Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 ? 8 9 Lower Status No 16.0 12.0 20.0 20.0 40.0 36.0 28.0 4.0 21.0 Don't know 24.0 32.0 28.0 28.0 16.0 20.0 12.0 24.0 23.0 Yes 60.0 56.0 52.0 52.0 44.0 44.0 68.0 72.0 56.0 $ 100.0 100.0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 200 Upper Status No 12.0 12.0 24.0 12.5 32.0 24.0 12.0 16.0 18.1 Don't know 32.0 64.0 28.0 25.0 20.0 20.0 24.0 20.0 29.1 Yes 56.0 24.0 48.0 62.5 48.0 56.0 64.0 64.0 52.8 $ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 200 dyx holding lower status constant = .02 p < ■ .262 dyx holding upper status constant = .07 p< .044 229 TABLE 27.““PERCEPTION OF FAMILY INFLUENCE ON THE GOVERNMENT BY GRADE LEVEL AND SEX OF THE RESPONDENT Does Your Family Have a Say About What Happens in Government? Grade Level Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Boys No 12.9 8.8 19-4 10.8 23.1 30.0 16.7 12.5 16.5 Don't know 35.5 55.9 38.7 24.3 11.5 13.3 13-3 33.3 29.1 Yes 51.6 35.3 41.9 64.9 65.4 56.7 50.0 75.0 54.4 $ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 31 34 31 37 2b 30 24 24 237 Girls No 15.8 18.8 26.3 33.3 50.0 30.0 15.4 7.7 I 24.1 Don’t know 15.8 31.3 10.5 33-3 25.0 30.0 3.8 30.8 21.6 Yes 68.4 50.0 63.2 33.3 25.0 40.0 80.8 61.5 54.3 $ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 19 16 19 12 24 20 26 26 162 dyx for boys = .07 p^ .031 dyx for girls = .05 P^.133 230 I n e v i t a b l e g o v e r n m e n t o u t p u t s 1 . 0 0 o o o o o M- o n t o 5 6 o o T J o p f£ o p. F a m i l y i n f l u e n c e C i t i z e n i n f l u e n c e I n e v i t a b l e g o v e r n m e n t o u t p u t s I E Z H 3 P o> a o H- c+ H- N § % n § o < D Q > o < P t * § 3 f f i V) 3 c+ P 4 & e ( 0 H J r * p H - 3 OT P 3 O - 3 o c+ O o c+ H - 3 < m 0 P £ p H i - 9 1 <+ P 3 P- T) o H H* c+ H- O P H s o p o *<! o o o o I • M- ( S ) o o o o ro o\ o V j J o o o r o o o KO to ~o ) - * ■ ro ro ro i - * o V j O I O o l - J ' A l l l a w s a r e f a i r G o v e r n m e n t H e l p i n g a n d p r o t e c t i n g G o v e r n m e n t k n o w s b e s t C i t i z e n i n f l u e n c e F a m i l y i n f l u e n c e I n e v i t a b l e g o v e r n m e n t o u t p u t s Z £ Z T A B L E 29. — I N T E R C 0 R R E 1 A T I 0 N M A T R I X OF P O L I T I C A L E F F I C A C Y AND P O L I T I C A L TRUST I T E M S TA.BLE 3 0 .— THE BEST SYMBOL OF THE GO VERNM ENT BX GRADE LEVEL OF THE RESPONDENT Grade Level The Best Symbol of the Government Total Police Voting Congress Flag 0 N 4 - > ® 1 h © 3 CQ -a Supreme Court Consti tution President H $ Na 2 6.0 6.0 11.0 7.0 17.0 8.0 5.0 30.0 10.0 100.0 100 3 5.1 4.1 6.1 24.5 10.2 2.0 11.2 29.6 7.1 100.0 98 4 3.1 14.3 12.2 8.1 3.1 2.0 6.1 42.0 9.1 100.0 98 5 4.5 9.1 5.7 16.0 3.4 1.1 28.2 25.0 6.8 100.0 88 6 3.4 13.9 12.5 6.8 0.0 4.5 22.7 28.2 8.0 100.c 88 7 2.0 13.0 7.0 8.0 1.0 3.0 28.0 33-0 5.0 100.0 100 8 2.0 6.1 4.1 17.3 2.0 3.1 22,4 33.7 9.1 100.0 98 9 0.0 9.0 8.0 13.0 0.0 9.0 31.0 22.0 8.0 100.c 100 Total 3.4 9.4 8.2 12.6 4.6 4.1 26.1 30.4 8.0 100.c 770 aEach respondent was asked to select two options. 233 TABLE 31. "THE BEST SYMBOL OF MEXICO BY THE RESPONDENT'S DESIRE FOR SYSTEM REFORMS The Best Symbol of Mexico Total Desire For g System Reforms •H +> •H -P W § o Flag National Anthem President Soldier M £ Pyramid Something Else i Don't Know N No 6.5 43.8 27.8 9.5 1.8 1.8 2.4 3.0 3.6 100.0 169 Yes 8.2 43.3 26.4 7.8 0.9 0.9 3.0 3.9 5.6 100.0 231 Total 7.5 43.5 27.0 8.5 1.3 1.3 2.8 3.5 4.8 100.0 400 234 TABLE 32.— DESIRE TO MOVE PERMANENTLY FROM MEXICO BY RESPONDENT'S DESIRE FOR SYSTEM REFORMS Desire to Move Desire for System Reforms Total From Mexico No Yes No 82.2 79.2 80.5 Yes 17.8 20.8 19.5 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 N ■169 231 400 = .03 P < .130 235 T a rT.F. 33, — R E L A T I O N S H I P B E T W E E N R E S P O N D E N T '5 D E S I R E T O M O V E P E R M A N E N T L Y F R O M M E X I C O A N D S E L E C T E D P R E S I D E N T I A L E V A L U A T I O N A N D P O L I T I C A L T R U S T I T E M S I t e m d y x L e v e l o f S i g n i f i c a n c e L i k i n g t h e P r e s i d e n t .02 . m R a t i n g t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s j o b p e r f o r m a n c e .01 . 2 7 7 B e l i e f i n t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s k n o w i n g b e s t .02 .267 B e l i e f i n t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s h e l p a n d p r o t e c t i o n . ( & .059 A P P E N D I X B QUESTIONNAIRE OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES 237 SEXO: K _____ F OCUPACION DEL PADRE __ OCUPACION DE' LA MADRE GRADO ESCOLAR ED AD _______ 1. ictiXL ES EL NOMBRE DE NUESTRO PAIS? 2, <*SABES QUE SIGNIFICA LA PALABRA GOBIERNO? SI ____ NO 3. ABAJO HAY ALGUNAS FIGURAS DE CARAS Y LUGARES QUE TU CONOCES. PON UNA X EN LOS DOS ESPACIOS QUE REPRESENTAN MEJOR LO QUE TBS NUESTRO GOBIERNO. P O L I C I A V O T A C I O N C O N G R E S O U> C O F O L I C I A V O T A C I O N C O N G R E S O BANDERA CONSTITUCldN B E N I T O J U A R E Z a SUPREMA CORTE PRESIDENTE o/y j^yi ^OJAL S3 EL NOMBRE DEL PRESIDENTS, DE LA REPUBLICS? . w eCUAL ES EL NOMBRE DEL GOBERNADOR DEL E5TADO DE MEXICO? ' GUSTAVO BAZ ____ ALBARRAN ____ C. HANK GONZALEZ 6. iCUAL ES EL NOMBRE DEL REGENTE DEL DISTRICK) FEDERAL? URUCHURTU ____ CORONA DEL ROSAL MARTINEZ DOMINGUEZ 7. iTE SIMPATIZA EL PRESIDENTS DE LA REPUBLICA? MUCHO ____ BASTANTE_____ NO ME SIMPATIZA / 1 NO ME SIMPATIZA NADA NO SE_____ 8. £CREES QUE EL PRESIDENTE ESTA HACIENDO UNA BUENA LABOR? MUY BUENA ___ BUENA NO MUY BUENA _ ✓ MALA ____ NO SE_____ CONGRESO SUPREMA CORTE PRESIDENTE 239 CONGRESO SUPREMA CORTE PRESIDENTE a. £QUIEN HACE US LEYES EN MEXICO? MARCA CON UNA X 10 QUE CREAS QUE 'ES U RESPUESTA CORRECTA. SUPREMA ✓ CONGRESO ______ CORTE PRESIDENTE NO SE b. cQUIEN DIRIGE AL PAIS? MARCA CON UNA X LO QUfi CREAS QUE ES U RESPUESTA CORRECTA. 'SUFREMA , CONGRESO ____ CORTE PRESIDENTE_____ NO SE c. <*QUIEN AIUDA MAS AL PAIS? MARCA CON UNA X LO QUE CREAS QUE ES LA RESPUESTA CORRECTA. SUPREMA y CONGRESO ____ CORTE PRESIDENTE NO SE 10. SI PUDIESES CAKBIAR MEXICO l C'cdMD LO CAMBIARIAS? 1 1 . A B A J O E S T A N A L G U N A S F 1 G U R A 5 D E B A N D E R A S B E D I F E R E N T E S P A I S E 5 D S L K U N D O . E S C R I B E EL. N O M B R E D E H U E S I R Q PAIS D E B A J O B E S U B A N D E R A . r r r r r r r n r r m ^ Sf&SSR^ K S 5 C S ? S ? R 5 ® 5 5 e « 5 ^ R J g 3 R 5 © ? S 5 S R R 5 5 ? S S 3 8 8 R R 8 X S 8 5 5 8 5 R R 5 8 R R S ffi5 5 5 5 8 8 S /" ssssssa . . . . r _ _ _ _ 1 ^ W M J ) 4 i V ||||| 1 2 , S I T E S A B E S E L N O M B R E D E L P A I S D E C U A L Q U I E R A D E L A S O T R A S B A N D E R A S . R E G R E S A T E Y E S C R I B E L O D E B A J O D E L A B A N D E R A C O R R E S P O N D E N T S . 1 3 , ( j C U A L E S S O N L A S T R E S C O S A S Q U E N A S T E G U S T A " D E i N U E S T R O P A I S ? 2 4 0 12. SI TE SABBS EL NOMBRE DEL PAIS DE CUAIQUIERA DE LAS OTRAS BANDERAS, REGRESATE Y ESCRIBELO DEBAJO DE LA BANDERA OORRESFONDIENTE. 13. fiCUALES SON LAS TRE5 COSAS QUE HAS TE GUSTAK DE NUESTRO PAIS? 14. cEN CUAL OTRO PAIS DEL KUNDO., APARTE DS MEXICO, TE GUSTARIA VIVIR? I QUERRIAS VIVIR AHf FOR .EL RESTO DE TU VIDA? / / 51 NO ■ NO SE _ 1 5 r ' ( j S A B E S L O Q U E E S U N P A R T I D O P O L I T I C O ? SI ____ NO i i i m > m — I | — i i 16. MENCIONA LOS NO' *J?ZS DO LOS PARTIDOS POLITICOS QUE C0N02CAS; 17. C *DE QUE PARTIDO POLITICO ES EL PRESIDENTS? _________ _____ 240 18. cQUE £3 LO PRIMERO QUE PIERSAS CDAfcDO OYES .EL NOKBRE ! , l-ffiXIOO”? fC0 CCESTITICICE 1 V Q l vi»I T . ! v - L ' a' I . U . m H I H ' 3 0 N A C I C N A 1 PRI 1 P I R A M 3 D E O T R & C D S A 1 9 ^ V O T A R A S C U A N D O T E N G A S E D A D P A R A H A C S E L Q 7 2 4 1 PIRAKIDE 3 1 !»»»» OTM COSA t NO SE 19. ( * VO TARAS CUANDO TENGAS EDAD PARA HACERLO? / SI NO NO SE 20. dCRSES QUE El, GOBIERNO DE MEXICO GENERALMENTE SABE ID QUE ES MEJOR PARA EL PUEBLO DS MEXICO? ST NO / NO SE 21. HOY EN DIA, HAY MUCHOS DIFERENTES TIPOS DE GOBIERNO * PON UNA X ENSEGUIDA DEL NOMBRE DEL PAIS QUE TIME UN GOBIERNO COMO EL DE MEXICO. CUBA .... SSTADO U* DOS ESPANA __ FRANCIA CHINA CANADA INGLATERRA _ RUSIA / f 22. r QUE Cl,ASS DE GOBIERNO TIENE MEXICO? MDNARQUiA D E M O G R A C I A DICTADURA REPUBLICA COMP LET A IAS ORAGIONES SIGUIENTES PONIENDO UNA X KNSEGUIDA DE IA RSSPUESTA QUE CREAS ES LA CORRECTA. ' / 23. COMPARADO CON IA MAYORIA DE LOS IIOMBRES, EL PRESIDENTE DE MEXICO TRABAJA / ' MAS IGUAL MENOS NO SE / r 2A. OOMPARADO CON LA MAYORIA DE LOS HOMBHES, EL PRESIDENTE DE MEXICO SABE ' MAS IGUAL MENOS NO SE / / 25. COMPARADO CON IA MAYORIA DE LOS HOMBRES, EL PRESIDENTE DE MEXICO ES * / MAS HONSSTO ____ IGUAL DE HONSSTO ____ MENOS HONESTO NO SE 26. COMPARADO CON LA MAYORIA DE LOS HOMBRES,EL PRESIDENTE DE MEXICO SIMPATIZA CON f / MAS GENTE ____ LA MISMA CANTIDAD DE GENTE MENOS GENTE NO SE 27. COMPARADO CON IA MAYORIA DE LOS HOMBHES, EL PRESIDENTE DE MEXICO ES / / 7 f A O T ) T r * r \ TOTT/i T •n-r/l r\- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - 242 . . . / 2 5 . C O M P A R A D O C O N L A M A Y O R I A D S L O S H O M B R E S , E L P R E S I D E N T E D E M E X I C O E S / / MAS HONSSTO IGUAL DS HONESTO MENOS H0NE3T0 NO SE . 26. COMPARADO CON LA MAYORIA DE LOS HOMBRES,EL PRESIDENTE DE MEXICO SIMPATIZA CON , / MAS GENTE LA MISMA CANTIDAD DE GENTE _____ MENOS GENTE NO SE / r 27. COMPARADO CON LA MAYORIA DE LOS HOMBRES, EL PRESIDENTE DE MEXICO ES / / MAS RICO IGUAL DE RICO MENOS RICO _ NO SE / / 28. COMPARADO CON LA MAYORIA DE LOS HOMBRES, EL PRESIDENTE DE MEXICO ES LA I-SJOR PERSONA DEL MUNDO UNA BUENA PERSONA / NO ES UNA BUENA PERSONA NO SE 29. EL GOBIERNO AYUDA Y PROTEGE AL PUEBLO MEXICANO. HAGS SU TRABAJO / MUY 3IEN BIEN KAL NO SE________ / 30. AQUE TAN FRECUENTEMENTK HABLAN TUS PADRES DE LO QUE PASA EN EL GOBIERNO? / FRECUENTEMENTE NO TAN FRECUENTEMENTE NUNCA NO SE 242 / 31. cQUE TAN FRECUENTEMENTE HABLAS CON TUS PADRES DE LO QUE PASA EN EL GOBIERNO? / FRECUENTEMENTE NO TAN FRECUENTEMENTE____ NUNCA ___ NO SE 32. <PIENSAS QUE TU FAMILIA TIENE ALGO QUE DECIR ACERCA DE LO QUE EL GOBIERNO HACS? ✓ / SI _____ NO NO SE______ 33. cPIENSAS QUE TODAS LAS LEYES SON BUENAS? SI _____________ NO NO SE 3^. cPIENSAS QUE LA VOTACION ES IMPORTANTE? / / SI NO NO SE 35. cCREES QUE LOS QUE TRABAJAN EN EL GOBIERNO SE PREOCUPAN DE LO QUE TU FAMILIA PIENSA? / / SI ____________ NO NO SE , 36, c CRESS QUE EL GOBIERNO ES DEMASIADO GRANDE Y OOMPLICADO PARA QUE ENTIENDAS LO QUE ESTA SUCEDIENDO? ✓ / s SI NO NO SE ___ / 37. cCREES QUE LA GENTE DE MEXICO TIENE UNA OFORTUNIDAD PARA DECIR LO QUE PIENSAN ACERCA DE COM3 SE LLEVA EL GOBIERNO? 243 U U i / X M u i w m p * ------- c U i m c o w u a c o j LO QUE ESTA SUCEDIENDO? * / SI NO NO SE 37, cCREES QUE LA GENTE DE MEXIOO TIENE UNA 0FORTUNE)AD PARA DECIR LO QUE PIENSAN ACERCA DE 00M0 SE LLEVA EL GOBIERNO? SI NO NO SE 38. -cCREES QUE LO QUE SUCEDE EN EL GOBIERNO SEGUIRA SUCEDIENDO SIN IMFORTAR LO QUE LA GENTE HAGA? SI NO NO SE 39. DE LAS SIGUIENTES PERSONAS, iQUIENES TRABAJAN PARA EL GOBIERNO? E POLICIA PESERO . 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Creator Kasschau, Patricia Lee (author)

Core Title Political Skepticism And Alienation In A Sample Of Young Mexican Children

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Sociology

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,Sociology, general

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Ransford, H. Edward (committee chair), Acock, Alan C. (committee member), Williams, Margaret Todaro (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-774529

Unique identifier UC11363289

Identifier 7300741.pdf (filename),usctheses-c18-774529 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 7300741

Dmrecord 774529

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Kasschau, Patricia Lee

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA