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The Relationship Between The Development Of Strategic Nuclear Weapons Systems And Deterrence Doctrine In The Soviet Union And Communist China

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The Relationship Between The Development Of Strategic Nuclear Weapons Systems And Deterrence Doctrine In The Soviet Union And Communist China

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Content THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC
NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND DETERRENCE DOCTRINE
IN THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA
by
Young Hoon Kang
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(Political Science)
February 1973
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University Microfilms
300 North Zeeb Road
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A Xerox Education Company
73-14,416
KANG, Young Hoon, 1922-
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND DETERRENCE
DOCTRINE IN THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA.
University of Southern California, Ph.D., 1973
Political Science, international law and relations
University Microfilms, A X E R O X Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan
© Copyright by
I
| Young Hoon Kang
1973
i
i .
I
THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED.
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
TH E GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY PARK
LOS ANOELES. CALIFORNIA 9 0 0 0 7
This dissertation, written by
under the direction of Dissertation Com
mittee, and approved by all its members, has
been presented to and accepted by The Graduate
School, in partial fulfillment of requirements of
the degree of
D O C T O R OF P H IL O S O P H Y
YOUNG HOON KANG
February 1973
>IS$ERTATION COMMITTEE
f r S u J > f 6 £--•>
PLEASE NOTE:
Some p a g e s may have
in d is tin c t p rin t.
Filmed as received.
University Microfilms, A X erox Education Company
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF
Chapter
I.
II.
Page
TABLES ..................................... v
INTRODUCTION............................... 1
Statement of the Problem ............... 1
Weapons Systems and the Types of
Action to be Deterred
Weapons Systems' Capabilities and
the Ways to Deter
Importance of the S t u d y ............... 19
Methods of Investigation ................ 24
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
SYSTEMS IN THE SOVIET UNION................ 36
Strategic Offensive Nuclear Weapons
Systems....................................36
The Yield of Nuclear Weapons
The Range of Nuclear Weapons
The Accuracy of Delivery Means
Reaction Time and Mobility of
Strategic Offensive Missiles
Strategic Defensive Nuclear Weapons
Systems...................................87
Information Capabilities
Interceptors
ii
Chapter Page
III. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
SYSTEMS IN COMMUNIST CHINA...... 102
Sino-Soviet Military Relations . . . 104
The Period of Cooperation, 1949-59
Deteriorating Relations, 1960-63
Cold War Relations, 1964 to Present
Strategic Offensive Nuclear Weapons
S y s t e m s..................... 117
The Yield of Nuclear Weapons
The Range of Nuclear Weapons
Strategic Defensive Nuclear Weapons
Systems . . . . . . . . . . 140
IV. NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES AT VARIOUS
STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT AND THEIR
IMPLICATION FOR DOCTRINE...... 143
Soviet Strategic Nuclear Weapons
S y s t e m s .................. 143
Soviet Strategic Weapons Capabilities
and Their Implications for the Kinds
of Military Actions
Soviet Strategic Weapons Capabilities
and Their Implications for Ways
to Deter
Chinese Communist Nuclear Weapons
S y s t e m s............................ 165
Chinese Communists' Nuclear Weapons
Systems Capabilities and Their
Implications for the Kinds of
Military Actions
Nuclear Weapons Capabilities and
Their Implications for Ways to
Deter
iii
Chapter Page
V. THE KINDS OF WAR AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP
TO DETERRENCE.............................. 173
War As An Instrument of Policy . . . . 174
The Problems of Escalation...............188
National Liberation Wars— What and How . 201
Kinds of War As the Object of Deterrence . 219
VI. TARGET SYSTEMS IN DETERRENCE DOCTRINE . . 225
Aggressors as a Target of Retaliation . . 228
Hostage as a Target of Retaliation . . 234
Counter-War-Supporting-Capabilities . . 237
Counter-War-Supporting-Fighting
Capabilities ......................... 240
Ideological Nature of Threatened Targets . 245
VII. MODES OF DETEREENCE THREAT .............. 253
Preemption..................................254
Second-Strike Strategy ................... 261
A Launch-on-Warning Concept ............ 265
Deterrence-Plus Formula ................ 271
VIII. CONCLUSIONS.........................281
Summarization...............................281
Soviet Union
Communist China
The Relationship Between Technology and
Deterrence Doctrine ................... 300
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................... 310
Translations of Newspapers and
Periodicals . . . . . 311
iv
Table
1.
2.
LIST OF TABLES
Page
Development of Soviet Nuclear Weapons
Systems......................................37
Communist China's Nuclear Weapons Test . . 103
v
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
The purpose of this study is to investigate the
relationship between the development of nuclear weapons
and the development of the doctrine of deterrence in the
Soviet Union and Communist China.
Historically/ the relationship between the
development of technology and the development of doctrine
is a two-way proposition. The requirement of new
weapons often is the result of doctrinal demands which
arise from the military necessity to solve strategic
problems created by the limitations of existing weapons
systems. The development of the tank during World War I
is a case in point. When a combination of barbed-wire
entanglements and interlaced machine gun fire forced a
battlefield stalemate, the British Army developed the
tank, a vehicle immune to bullets, yet capable of ramming
1
its way through barbed-wire barricades.1
Conversely, a new doctrine can be the product of
a new weapon. An example of this is the military use of
the airplane. The invention of the flying machine was
one of man1s cherished dreams, a dream finally realized
when the Wright brothers produced the first heavier-than-
air flying machine in 1903. But at the beginning of
World War I, the reaction of the major adversaries,
Germany, France and England, to the airplane was slow and
uncertain; only later in the war were airplanes adopted
for use in military operations.^ The role given the
airplane at the beginning of World War I also was un
imaginative. When the British Army formed the Royal
Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, A History of
Warfare (New York: World Publishing Co., 1968), p. 479;
P. E. Cleator, Weapons of War (New York: Thomas Y.
Crowell Co., 1967), p. 175.
2
Montgomery, op. cit., p. 482; Cleator, op. cit.,
p. 169; George H. Quester, Deterrence Before Hiroshima:
The Airpower Background of Modern Strategy (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), p. 11; Walter Raleigh,
The War in the Air, I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922);
pp. 92-93; C. F. S. Gamble, The Air Weapon (London:
Oxford University Press, 1931), pp. 110-277; Dudley Pope,
Guns (New York: Spring Books, 1969), p. 223.
Flying Corps, the planes initially carried neither bombs
nor guns but were used solely for reconnaissance.
However, in the relationship between the develop
ment of nuclear weapons systems and the development of
doctrine, at a certain stage a new doctrine was the
product of new weaponry and at other stages the require
ment of new weapons was the result of doctrinal demands.
For example, when the United States deterrence doctrine
of "massive retaliation" was officially announced by
former Secretary of State John F. Dulles in his January
12, 1954 speech, it was based on existing nuclear weapons
systems, the superiority of the United States over its
chief adversary in these systems, and the avowed desire
not to build limited-land war conventional forces. On
the other hand, in recent years. United States strategic
requirements have appeared to demand new weapons systems,
as evidenced in the discussion on the development of
multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV)
3
Cleator, op. cit., p. 169.
4
and antiballistic missiles (ABM).
Though it is difficult to analyze the relation
ship between technology and doctrine from the point of
view of cause and effect relations in communist countries
who exercise tight control over military information,
this study assumes that trends and patterns in the rela
tionship between the capabilities of nuclear weapons
systems and doctrine can be identified by analyzing the
data derived from unclassified sources and the contents
of doctrinal pronouncements.
In studying the relationship between technology
and doctrine, consideration of situational problems such
as the adversaries' nuclear capabilities and doctrine,
and their alliance, are also important. However, this
study limits its zone of consideration to the development
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Diplomatic and Strategic Impact of Multiple War
head Missiles, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Nation
al Security Policy and Scientific Defelopments of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives,
91st Cong., 1969; and U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, Scope, Magnitude, and Implications of the
United States Antiballistic Missile Program, Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Military Applications of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 90th Cong., 1st sess.,
1967.
of strategic nuclear weapons systems® and the relation
ship of this development to deterrence doctrine in the
Soviet Union and Communist China. For the purpose of
this study, deterrence is defined as the effort to dis
courage the enemy from taking a certain type of military
action by means of a threat that makes it seem less
attractive than other possible alternatives.® In this
5
Nuclear weapons systems can be classified into
two categories: tactical and strategic. Tactical as
well as strategic nuclear weapons may be used for both
deterrence and war-fighting. Tactical nuclear weapons,
however, have close relationships with ground maneuvering
elements such as infantry and armor units in combat opera
tions. Thus, not only their deterrence roles are closely
interwoven into a role of combat operation but also their
capabilities are closely related to that of ground forces
as an integrated combat power. Therefore, this study is
concerned only with strategic nuclear weapons systems as
combat power, independent from ground maneuvering units.
Strategic offensive nuclear weapons systems are capable
of delivering warheads or bombs against industrial or
population targets or combat forces located behind the
front lines, and strategic defensive weapons designed to
defend against such attacks by strategic offensive nuclear
weapons. Furthermore, for the purpose of this study,
strategic nuclear weapons systems are taken to be inter
continental and medium bombers, intercontinental ballistic
missiles, orbital systems such as the FOBS, intermediate
and medium range ballistic missiles and submarine-launched
ballistic missiles.
^Deterrence has two aspects: the kind of action
to be deterred and the way to deter. Various definitions
of deterrence imply these two aspects in different words.
6
light, deterrence is concerned with two aspects of doc
trine: the type of military action to be deterred and
the ways to deter.
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines deterrence as,
"to hinder or prevent action by fear of consequences, or
difficulty, risk, unpleasantness, etc." K. J. Holsti
means by deterrence, "to prevent certain actions by poten
tial adversaries by threatening military retaliation," in
International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (Engle
wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1967), p. 352. Y.
Harkabi defines deterrence as "the inducement of another
party to refrain from a certain action by means of a
threat that this action will lead the threatener to in
flict retaliation or punishment," in Nuclear War and
Nuclear Peace (Jerusalem: Israel Program for Scientific
Translations, 1966), p. 9. According to Raymond L.
Garthoff, deterrence is ”counter-action designed to pre
vent a potential opponent from taking certain actions he
might otherwise undertake because of risk of incurring
greater losses than gains," in Soviet Military Policy
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 110. Glenn H.
Snyder states that deterrence means "discouraging the
enemy from taking military action by posing for him a
prospect of cost and risk outweighing his prospective
gain," in Deterrence and Defense: Towards a Theory of
National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1961), p. 3. According to Thomas C. Schelling, deterrence
is concerned with "influencing the choices that another
party will make, and doing it by influencing his expecta
tions of how we will behave," in The Strategy of Conflict
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 13.
Henry A. Kissinger states that "deterrence seeks to pre
vent a given course by making it seem less attractive than
all possible alternatives,” in The Necessity for Choice:
Prospects of American Foreign Policy (New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1960), p. 12. Bernard Brodie defines deterrence
as "simply the effort to erect appropriate disincentives
to counteract the incentives which the opponent feels for
our destruction, disincentives which not only guarantee
Weapons Systems and the Types of
Action to be Deterred
Traditionally, the size of the zone of military
operations has been conditioned by the capability of
weapons in terms of range. It has been a common rule in
military operations to coordinate the combat elements of
fire and maneuver until the final strategic objectives
are conquered or neutralized.
However, with the development of intercontinental
weapons capable of striking the final strategic objectives
without support of ground maneuvering units, the strategic
weapons have become a combat power which could possibly
fulfill certain military tasks without coordination with
any maneuvering units. Examples are the employment of
the B-29 strategic bomber in World War II and the use of
the B-52 strategic bomber in the Vietnam War beyond the
front lines of the ground forces.
The development of strategic nuclear weapons
systems especially suggests that military operations at
various levels such as intercontinental, continental and
him pain if he attempts to attack us, but also heighten
his uncertainty about the immediate results of his con
templated attack," in “The Anatomy of Deterrence," World
Politics, XI:2 (January, 1959), 180.
8
local theaters, can be waged separately and independently
because of an unprecedented destructive power and extended
ranges of strategic nuclear weapons systems. In this
respect, question can be raised as to the level or levels
of military operations national leaders attempt to deter
or fight.
According to Lenin, "the replacement of the
bourgeois by the proletarian state is impossible without
•7
a violent revolution." Thus, Lenin stressed the inevit
ability of war until the complete triumph of communism.
Furthermore, traditional communist doctrine prescribes
two kinds of war:
•just wars,'— wars that are not wars of conquest
but wars of liberation, waged to defend the people
from foreign attack and attempts to enslave them,
or to liberate the people from capitalist slavery,
or lastly, to liberate the colonies and dependent
countries from the yoke of imperialism; and
secondly, ‘unjust wars'— which are wars of con
quest waged to conquer and enslave foreign coun
tries and foreign nations.®
7
V. I. Lenin, State and Revolution (New York:
International Publishers, 1932), p. 20.
®Short History of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House,
1945), pp. 168-169.
This communist dogma insists that if a war is waged by a
communist country against a noncommunist country or by
proletariat against bourgeoisie, it is necessarily a just
war. Conversely, if a communist nation is attacked by a
noncommunist country or by the bourgeoisie, it is an
unjust war. Thus, one might interpret this to mean that
according to communist doctrine, a just war is a war in
which the communists are ready to take the initiative.
An unjust war is a war for which they are not yet ready
but are compelled to fight.
Traditional classifications of war, i.e., just
and unjust, however, do not coincide with the classifica
tions of military operations at various levels such as
intercontinental, continental and local theaters from the
point of view of the kinds of military actions to be
deterred.
Under these circumstances, the leaders of the
Soviet Union and Communist China have revealed different
attitudes toward the effect of the development of nuclear
weapons systems upon the role of war as an instrument of
policy.
The views of the leaders of the two communist
10
countries on the role of war as an instrument of policy
are closely related to the question of what kinds of war
should be deterred. Their views on the relationship
between different kinds of war explain their positions
on the objectives of deterrence. In this respect, the
problems of escalation and the problems of national wars
of liberation are two major doctrinal issues in Soviet
and Chinese Communist discussions with reference to the
objectives of deterrence.
The differing positions held by the leaders of
the two countries on the kinds of war as the objects of
deterrence cure closely related to the effect of nuclear
weapons capabilities visualized by them at the different
stages in the development of nuclear weapons systems.
At a certain stage, the two communist countries were com
pelled to best utilize their continental weapons capabil
ities to cope with the strategic situation where the
enemy's intercontinental weapons' capabilities prevail.
They have been in a poor position to tackle deterrence
problems with their inferior nuclear weapons capabilities
vis-a-vis the enemy. In this respect, this study attempts
to analyze the effect of nuclear weapons systems at
11
various stages of their development upon the development
of deterrence doctrine in terms of the types of war as
the objectives of deterrence.
Weapons Systems* Capabilities and
the Ways to Deter
Traditionally, weapons have two functions:
offense and defense. A tank can be employed offensively
or defensively according to the strategic situation.
Whether the tanks are employed defensively or offensively,
they are expected to fight to dominate the battleground or
deny it to the opponent until the final targets are
neutralized or conquered. Thus, the functions of a weapon
depend on the nature of the maneuver of the strategic
forces.
However, with the development of nuclear weapons
systems which can reach the final targets without the
support of maneuvering ground forces, the functions of the
strategic weapons system— intercontinental and continental
— have been specialized into offense or defense, while a
short range nuclear weapons system can still be employed
for the tasks of both offense and defense according to the
nature of the plan of maneuver in tactical situations.
Reflecting these conditions, in 1962, the Soviet
12
leaders begem to recognize strategic missile strikes and
operations of amti-missile defense as new forms of military
operations. In their book, Soviet Military Strategy,
Marshal D. V. Sokolovskii emd his colleagues list four
different types of military operations: (1) strategic
missile strikes, (2) operations of the emti-missile
defense, (3) military operations in ground theaters, and
(4) military operations in naval theaters.®
Explaining strategic missile strikes and opera
tions of the anti-missile defense as new forms of military
operations, Sokolovskii further stated in 1964:
Now an essentially new form of military action has
moved to the foreground— strikes by strategic
nuclear missile forces against the enemy's military,
economic emd political targets. This form of mili
tary action determines the essence of the methods of
waging a nuclear missile war, should one break out.
It cannot be included in attack or defense in their
usual definitions. Operations of the troops of the
anti-missile defense and the anti-aircraft defense
in defending the country and the armed forces from
the enemy's nuclear strikes will became one of the
9
V. D. Sokolovskii et al., Soviet Military Strat
egy, trans. by Herbert S. Dinerstein, Leon Goure, and
Thomas W. Wolfe (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1963), p. 405.
13
chief forms of military action in a nuclear missile
war. This form of military action also differs in
principle from defense in its usual definition.10
The selection of a nuclear strategy involving
strategic missile strikes is dependent upon both techno
logical and doctrinal factors. Technologically, the
strategy of strategic missile strikes is closely related
to the pre-launch survivability and the effective pene
trability of strategic offensive missiles. Pre-launch
survivability depends upon both the hardening, mobility
and ABM defense of strategic offensive missiles and upon
the accuracy and penetration capabilities of the enemy's
weapons systems. Penetrability depends upon the number
and penetration aid capabilities of strategic offensive
missiles and upon the capabilities of the opponent's
strategic defensive weapons systems.
Assuming some adequate or tolerable degree of
survivability and penetrability for strategic offensive
nuclear weapons systems, strategic missile strikes— with
or without a corresponding ballistic missile defense—
10
Krasnaya Zvezda, August 25 and 28, 1964, in
Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XVI:38 (October 14,
1964), 14-15.
14
could be translated into two classes of threat: a deter
rent threat and a war-fighting threat. A deterrent threat
implies largely countervalue retaliatory strikes, while a
war-fighting threat may refer to either a planned surprise
attack or to second-strikes intended to achieve specific
military objectives.
When strategic offensive weapons systems can
survive an enemy counterforce attack and destroy the
enemy in retaliation, the deterrer has the option of
adopting a second-strike strategy, a strategy designed
to destroy the attacker after the deterrer has survived
a nuclear surprise attack. But, when strategic offensive
nuclear weapons systems do not possess pre-launch sur
vivability, the deterrer must fire its strategic offensive
missiles either before the enemy's strategic offensive
missiles hit their targets or before they are fired.
When the deterrer's missiles are launched before
the enemy's missiles reach their targets, the deterrer's
action is called a launch-on-waming strategy. When the
deterrer's missiles are launched before the enemy's
missiles are fired in anticipation of a possible strike
by the enemy, the deterrer*s action is called a preemptive
15
action.
When a planned surprise attack is launched against
an enemy's forces and retaliatory capacity without antici
pation of an attack by him, a first-strike situation takes
place. A first-strike strategy is at one extreme of
nuclear strategy with a second-strike at the other extreme.
A launch-on-warning and a preemptive attack belong to an
intermediate category between the two extremes.
The selection of strategy in terms of a second-
strike, a launch-on-warning, a preemptive action or a
first-strike is technologically dependent upon the degree
of accuracy, the relative numbers and the quick informa
tion and reaction capabilities of strategic offensive
weapons systems and upon the basing and vulnerability of
the strategic missile forces of both the deterrer and the
deterred. In reality, the survivability of strategic
nuclear forces cannot be judged on an "all or nothing"
basis. Consequently, in a nuclear exchange, a nuclear
power is likely to adopt a strategy of mixed options in
order to best utilize the prevailing survivability of its
strategic nuclear forces in waging and terminating a
nuclear war on terms favorable to itself.
16
A second-strike becomes feasible when strategic
offensive weapons systems enjoy survivability on the basis
of hardening, mobile basing or ABM defense. A launch-on-
warning involves three steps: (1) detecting the launching
of an enemy's missiles, (2) analyzing the information and
determining to what extent the launch endangers strategic
forces, and (3) launching missiles toward their targets
before the missiles themselves can be destroyed by incoming
enemy warheads.
A preemptive strike, to be effective, must be
based upon most timely and precise information on every
aspect of the enemy's activities. The feasibility of both
a preemptive strategy and a first-strike strategy rests
upon a number of other conditions. The accuracy of
strategic offensive nuclear weapons systems must be good
enough for the task of counterforce against "hard"
targets, as well as soft ones. Depending upon the enemy's
force mix and survival capability it may be necessary to
attack or neutralize sufficient portions of mobile forces
(e.g., strategic bombers and submarines). The numbers of
accurate strategic offensive nuclear weapons must be
sufficient for the destruction of a substantial proportion
of the enemy's strategic offensive forces without the
expenditure of the entire force in the attack. And the
attacker must have sufficient retaliatory reserve force
to prevent the residual enemy strategic offensive forces
from retaliating. Even with sufficient numbers of highly
accurate strategic offensive missiles, a first-strike
strategy and a strategy of preemption are impractical if
the bulk of the enemy's strategic offensive forces are
mobile or well-defended.
Once the capability of anti-ballistic missile
defense is introduced into the nuclear weapons inventory,
the combined capabilities of strategic offensive and
defensive forces, vis-a-vis that of the enemy must be
considered in the development of nuclear strategy. Under
this condition, the calculation and estimate of surviv
ability and penetrability of strategic offensive forces
will become more complicated and difficult. Consequently,
strategic decision-making in regard to the modes of
retaliation will face more uncertain conditions.
In order to cope with uncertain conditions,
nuclear powers at both ends of nuclear confrontation might
take the measures necessary to strengthen both the
18
survivability and penetrability of their strategic
offensive nuclear forces. These measures will depend
upon the objectives and strategies and may not be the
same for both sides.
Doctrinal guidance or the strategic objective of
the deterrer is, therefore, another important factor in
the development of a nuclear strategy. For example, the
United States has chosen to adopt a second-strike strategy
even in this stage of sophisticated weaponry. This choice
is in keeping with the United States concepts of assured
destruction deterrence and strategic stability based upon
mutual assured destruction.
On the other hand, technological and doctrinal
factors could be combined in the development of a war-
fighting strategy (whether first-strike or not) in the
Soviet Union. If the number and accuracy of strategic
offensive nuclear weapons have attained a high level, if
the enemy's strategic missile forces are vulnerable and
can be destroyed in sufficient numbers by some fraction
of the attacker's force, and, especially if ABM capabil
ities offer sufficient protection against any retaliation,
a war-fighting strategy becomes feasible. In a strict
19
sense, a war-fighting strategy is not, however, an element
of deterrence doctrine, although it may be closely related
to deterrence.
This study is concerned primarily with deterrence
doctrine, more specifically with the deterrence of a
strategic nuclear attack. This does not imply that the
Soviet Union and Communist China are interested only in
deterrence in developing their respective strategic forces
and policies. Retaliatory weapons capabilities are cer
tainly not the sole interest of these two Communist coun
tries. War-fighting and damage limitation are constant
themes in their military literature and some Soviet
weapons developments may be viewed in that light. These
subjects are touched only to the extent that they are
directly related to the development of deterrence doctrine.
Importance of the Study
A great number of articles and books have been
written on the military forces of the Soviet Union and
Communist China. These works can be classified, generally,
into five categories: (1) history of the armed forces,
C2) relationship between military strategy and policy,
20
(3) military doctrine, (4) development of weapons systems,
and (5) analysis of military reportage in Soviet and
Chinese Communist publications.
The first category is concerned with the history
of the armed forces of the Soviet Union, in which present
status and mobilization potential are discussed. The
history and evaluation of the People's Liberation Army of
Communist China also is presented, placing it within the
context of the Chinese revolution.^ The second category
deals with major factors underlying current trends in
Edgar O. Ballance's book, The Red Army: A Short
History (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), is con
cerned with the present status of the Soviet armed forces,
while Colonel Michel Garder's book, History of the Soviet
Army (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), is a survey
of the armies of Tsarist and Soviet Russia from Peter the
Great to Nikita Khrushchev. On the other hand, Samuel B.
Griffith II's, and John Gittings* books, respectively,
are historical accounts of the transformation of the
Chinese People's Army from a revolutionary force to an
established army of national defense. Griffith, The
Chinese People's Liberation Army (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co., 1967); Gittings, Role of the Chinese Army
(London: Oxford University Press, 1967); Richard M.
Bueschel's book, Communist Chinese Air Power (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), is another historical account
which ranges from the period preceding the civil war up
through the Sino-Soviet dispute and the "Cultural Revolu
tion. "
21
Soviet strategy, the military role in Soviet politics, and
a broad range of strategic problems as they have affected
relations between Moscow and Peking.^
Works belonging to the third category, military
doctrine, generally are accounts of the evolution of
Soviet and Chinese communist doctrinal thinking on military
matters in recent decades. They also show the awakening
Works done by Thomas w. Wolfe examine the major
factors underlying current trends in Soviet military
strategy. See his Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965) and The Soviet
Quest for More Global Mobile Military Power (Santa Monica:
RAND Corporation, December, 1967, Memorandum RM-5554-PR)4
Raymond L. Garthoff treats the relevancy of military power
to communism, pointing out the necessity of modifying the
principles of Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet Union in the
process of industrialization, in Soviet Military Policy
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966). Roman Kolkowicz
analyzes the problems arising from the military role in
Soviet politics in The Soviet Military and the Communist
Party (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).
Regarding the Sino-Soviet conflict, Walter C. Clemens, Jr.
and Donald S. Zagoria examine the development of serious
conflict between the Soviet Union and Communist China.
Clemens' work covers the period from the death of Stalin
in 1953 to 1968; Zagoria1s book deals with the development
of the relations between the two communist giants during
the period from the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union to the 22nd Party Congress, held in 1961.
Clemens, The Arms Race and Sino-Soviet Relations (Stanford:
The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1968);
Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict: 1956-1961 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1962).
22
of Soviet and Chinese theoreticians to the implications
of nuclear weapons systems.^ The fourth category,
development of weapons systems, is concerned with esti
mates of the nature and size of the military forces of
the principal powers in terms of weapons systems. Within
this category, such publications as The Military Balance,
Jane’s All the World's Aircraft, Jane's Fighting Ships,
and annual Defense Reports of the United States Department
of Defense, present annual estimates of the comparative
strength of Western Alliances, Communist powers and non-
aligned countries. An example of the outstanding analysis
of communist publications can be seen in the translation
and analysis of Voennaia Strategiia (Military Strategy)
and Kung-tso Tung-hsun (Bulletin of Activities). Military
Strategy, first published in the Soviet Union in mid-1962,
represents the first comprehensive treatment of Soviet
Some examples are H. S. Dinerstein, War and the
Soviet Union (New Yorks Frederick A. Praeger, 1962);
Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962); Alice Langley
Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962).
23
military strategy and has aroused intense interest among
Western military analysts. The Bulletin of Activities,
which fell into the hands of the United States government
and was released in August, 1963, contains valued)le infor
mation on the People's Liberation Army.^
However, no study has yet attempted to compare
the relationship between doctrine in general and deter
rence doctrine in particular, in the Soviet Union and
Communist China and the development of weapons systems.
This study hopes to contribute specifically to the under
standing of the development of deterrence doctrine in the
two communist countries in relation to the development of
their nuclear weapons systems by analyzing similarities
and differences in the development of deterrence doctrine.
This study further hopes to contribute to clarification
of the nature of Sino-Soviet relations. It suggests that
the relationship between the two communist countries began
to deteriorate when they disagreed over key elements of
14
Sokolovskii et_al., op. cit.y J. Chester Cheng,
The Politics of the Chinese Red Army: A Translation of
the Bulletin of Activities of the People's Liberation
Army (Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution
and Peace, 1966).
24
deterrence doctrine— the objectives of deterrence and the
ways to deter.
Most Western observers of communist affairs
attribute existing tensions between the two communist
giants to a struggle for leadership of the international
Communist movement, complicated by basic historical,
cultural, territorial, economic, social and military
differences. However, this study suggests that existing
tensions between the Soviet Union and Communist China have
been related closely to the attitudes of the leaders in
the Soviet Union and Communist China toward the problem of
deterrence. Similarities and differences in the develop
ment of deterrence doctrine by the two countries will
provide new light on Sino-Soviet relations.
Methods of Investigation
This study employs a comparative analysis as a
method of investigation. Two crucial questions are
(1) what to compare, and (2) how to compare. In this
study, the comparison is between two functions of stra
tegic nuclear weapons systems, strategic offensive and
strategic defensive, and the two aspects of deterrence
25
doctrine, the types of action to be deterred and the ways
to deter, with special reference to the Soviet Union and
Communist China.
As to the problem of how to compare, this study
attempts to distinguish each stage in the development of
nuclear weapons systems in the two communist countries
for comparative purposes and to identify weapon capabil
ities as the basis for the development of deterrence
doctrine at various stages. However, chronologically
defined stages in the development of nuclear weapons
systems in the Soviet Union do not correspond to the
chronologically defined stages in the development of
Chinese Communist systems.
Comparison is further complicated by the fact
that Chinese Communist leaders, when Sino-Soviet relations
were close, used capabilities of Soviet nuclear weapons
systems to formulate their own deterrence doctrine. There
fore, Chinese Communist military doctrine in general, and
deterrence doctrine in particular, cannot ignore the state
of Sino-Soviet relations, which affects both the scope of
Soviet military aid to Peking and the degree of mutual
dependence upon nuclear development. It Is important for
26
the purpose of comparative analysis to distinguish between
a period of Sino-Soviet cooperation and a period of
deterioration, and to identify the Chinese Communist
leaders1 understanding of Soviet nuclear capabilities
that are available to them.
With regard to the capabilities of nuclear weapons
systems, this study is concerned with yield, range,
accuracy and response time, and other characteristics,
such as throw-weight and numbers of the strategic
offensive weapons systems, and information and intercep
tion capabilities of the strategic defensive weapons
systems. Yield denotes the force of a nuclear explosion,
which is expressed in terms of the number of tons of TNT
which would produce an equivalent energy release. A
nuclear explosion with a yield equivalent to one million
tons of TNT is described as 1 megaton (1 MT). The
accuracy with which missiles deliver their warheads against
a target on the ground is measured in terms of the circu
lar error probable (CEP). This is the radius of a circle
centered on the target within which 50 percent of the
warheads can statistically be expected to fall.
The nuclear weapons1 yield and the accuracy of the
delivery missile and reentry vehicle have close relation
27
ships with target strategy or at least targeting options.
In order to achieve the required destruction of the
targets, a certain combination of yield and accuracy is
needed, depending upon the hardness of the target. If
destruction of a target is based on a certain PSI of over
pressure, it may require high yield warheads with less
accuracy in delivery, or lower yields with better
accuracy. Dr. Herbert York, Dean of the Graduate School,
University of California at San Diego, explains the rela
tionship between yield and accuracy in a more concrete
fashion:
The killing power of a warhead against a hard target,
such as a missile silo depends much more critically
on accuracy than on yield. In fact, a factor of three
in accuracy makes up for a factor of 25 in yield, and
a factor of 4.6 in accuracy makes up for a factor of
100 in yield. To be more specific, a Minuteman MIRV
warhead having a yield of 200 kilotons and an accu
racy, or CEP of about one-eighth of a nautical mile
has a 95 percent chance of destroying a so-called 300
PSI target (which is the typical estimate of the
strength or hardness of a missile silo). Similarly,
a Poseidon MIRV warhead having a yield of 50 kilotons
and an accuracy of about 1/16 of a mile has the same
probability of destroying a missile silo.^5
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, ABM, MIRV, SALT, and the Nuclear Arms Race,
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Inter
national Law and Organization of the Committee on Foreign
28
Thus, the categories of yield and accuracy have a close
relationship in causing required destruction of the
targets.
When the combination of yield and the accuracy is
not sufficient to destroy hard point targets, weapons can
Relations, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., March 16, April 8, 9,
13 and 14, May 18 and 28, June 4 and 29, 1970 (Washington,
D.C.s U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 61.
Relating yield to accuracy to achieve a given kill prob
ability, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, testi
fying before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate,
stated that in order to destroy 80 percent of the Minute-
men in hardened silos, the Soviet Union needs the 5 MT
warhead with an accuracy in the range of between 0.2 and
0.3 of a nautical mile or the 20 MT warhead with an accu
racy of somewhere in the range of 0.6 to 0.8 of a mile,
with enough numbers to cover one on one. Cited in U.S.
Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Authoriza
tion of Military Procurement, Research and Development,
Fiscal Year 1970, and Reserve Strength, Hearings before
the Committee on Armed Services, 91st Congress, 1st Sess.,
on S.1192 and S.2407, Pt. I, March 19, 20, 25, 26, and 27,
April 1, 2, 3, 15, 16, and 17, 1969 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 161-162 (here
after cited as Authorization for Military Procurement,
Fiscal Year 1970). According to Samuel Glasstone's book,
The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 507-508, only the
strongest reinforced concrete structures can resist over
pressures of 24 pounds per square inch, and overpressures
of 24 PSI can be produced by a 20 KT weapon at the dis
tance of 0.2 miles from ground zero and by a 2 MT weapon
at the distance of approximately 1 mile from ground zero.
These figures represent an example of the capabilities in
terms of yield and accuracy for the task of destroying a
certain of hard target.
29
be applied to soft targets only, doctrinally implemented
in a countercity strategy. However, as the yield and
especially the accuracy of weapons are improved, hard
targets can be separated from area targets and can be
attacked in a counterforce strategy.
The range of a nuclear delivery vehicle— a bomber
or a missile— is one of the critical elements of weapons
capabilities, i.e., the ability to reach the target area.
There is no absolute standard for the classifications of
the range. But commonly accepted categories with missiles
are intercontinental (5,000 nautical miles or more),
intermediate (1,500-4,000 nautical miles), medium (300-
1,500 nautical miles), and short (300 nautical miles or
less) ranges.The range of a ballistic missile depends
upon the relation between its payload and the power of
its rocket motors. The improvement of the range can be
16
U.S. Department of Air Force, Guided Missiles
Fundamentals (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1964), pp. 15-16; Abram Chayes and Jerome B.
Weisner, eds., ABM (New York: The New American Library,
1969), p. 221; Ian Smart, Advanced Strategic Missile: A
Short Guide (London: Institute for Strategic Studies,
1969), p. 2; Nels A. Parson, Missiles and the Revolution
in Warfare (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962),
p. 9; Izvestia, December 22, 1963.
30
achieved by reducing payload based on the improved yield
to weight ratio,1^ and strengthening rocket motor power by
adding stages which are fired in sequence, or by improving
the motor or its propellant. In any event, the inter
continental capability of weapons (whether based on inter
continental range or mobility) creates a strategic
situation where the two super-nuclear powers face a
direct battle on their home territories.
Response capabilities of nuclear weapons systems
in terms of preparation time for firing missiles also have
significance in the development of deterrence doctrine
from the point of view of selecting alternative methods
of retaliatory action. Considering the speed of the
ICBM— 5,000 nautical miles in half an hour— and the
limited time available to detect an incoming enemy
17
This term is used to compare nuclear weapons
designs for a specific application. For example, a war
head for a certain missile would have a maximum allowable
weight. Thus, the weapons designers would probably
attempt to maximize the yield for this allowable weight
within the other constraints of size, shape, etc., of the
weapons systems. Yield implies the total energy released
in a nuclear explosion.
31
18
target, a response of exposed nuclear forces while under
enemy attack is possible if they can survive the attack
or when the strategic forces are capable of quick
19
response. Response time depends mostly on the nature of
propellant. The rocket motors may use either a liquid
propellant or a solid propellant. Old liquid propellants
are highly corrosive and cannot be placed in the missile
According to statements by Deputy Secretary of
Defense David Packard and the Director of Defense Research
and Engineering John S. Foster, the Perimeter Acquisition
Radar (PAR) has a detection range of about 1,000 to 1,500
miles against an expected ICBM. With the capability of
this radar, U.S. Air Defense Command expects to have a 15-
minute warning time. Authorization for Military Procure
ment, Fiscal Year 1970, p. 167; Scope, Magnitude and Impli
cations of the U.S. ABM Program, p. 15; U.S. News and
World Report (February 29, I960), pp. 44-48; Time (March
14, 1969), p. 25; Air Force and Space Digest (April, 1958),
p. 59; ibid. (March, 1960), p. 35; ibid. (July, 1960),
p. 52; ibid. (September, 1965), p. 111.
19
Missiles with liquid fuel such as the Atlas and
the Titan I have a capability to launch after 15 minutes
as they must be fueled immediately prior to launch time.
However, solid fuel missiles like the Minuteman are capable
of almost instantaneous action to enemy attack. Air Force
ROTC Air University, Fundamentals of Aerospace Weapons
Systems (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1960), pp. 281, 292, 395, and 397.
until immediately before firing. However, an improved
version (storable liquid) can be stored in the missile
for long periods. Solid propellants can also be stored
for long periods inside the missile. The liquid propel
lants are further characterized by longer burning duration,
while the solid propellants are characterized by shorter
burning duration suitable for high-speed missiles.
Because of their highly corrosive nature, liquid
propellants other than storable ones do not permit the
strategic forces to respond quickly to an enemy attack.
This creates a serious problem in regard to the surviv
ability of the strategic nuclear forces by requiring a
considerable time in fueling missiles immediately prior
to launching. On the other hand, although a storable
liquid propellant allows the strategic forces to respond
more quickly than a corrosive liquid propellant, it also
creates a problem for concealing or covering the missile
against enemy surveillance and attack due to its enormous
size. However, this problem has been proved as not insur
mountable as evidenced in the construction of hardened
silos for the SS-9.
Two main elements governing the capabilities of
33
strategic defensive nuclear weapons systems are informa
tion and interception. Information capabilities are based
on the ability to detect, identify and track an incoming
enemy weapon. The basic need is a network of radar warning
and control systems. A radar of World War II type, pro
viding a means of tracking a moving object, is a mechani
cally steered line-of-sight system with a single beam of
low energy for BMD. Therefore, it cannot cope with
multiple incoming reentry vehicles.
However, the development of a phased-array type
of radar reduced that problem to a considerable extent,
which makes the phased-array radar possible for a ballis
tic missile defense system to cope with the multiple
incoming objects. With its reflector, a phased-array
radar, consisting of a large flat face on which are
mounted numerous separate antennae, transmits numerous
beams which provide extremely flexible coverage at a
considerable range. An example of this type is the
United States Perimeter Acquisition Radar which has a
20
detection range greater than 1,000 miles.
20
Authorization for Military Procurement, Fiscal
Year 1970, op. cit., p. 158.
34
Interception is based on the ability to intercept
reentry vehicles, either exo-atmospherically, or upon or
after, entry of the atmosphere. Due to the speed of the
strategic offensive missiles and the limitation of target
detection range, the ballistic missile defense capabili
ties are at present practically limited to interception
during the latter part of the mid-course and the terminal
phase of offensive missile flight.^ However, as tech
nology advances, this limitation will be further elimi
nated.
The transition from mid-course phase to terminal
phase can be considered to take place at the moment when
reentry vehicles enters the earth's atmosphere. There
fore, a defensive missile aimed at an interception during
the mid-course phase can be described as an exo-atmospheric
interceptor, while one intended to intercept during the
terminal phase is described as endo-atmospheric.
Exo-atmospheric interception requires missiles of
considerable range, which has the advantage of defending
a wider area than a shorter range missile. However,
Smart, op. cit., p. 7.
35
exo-atmospheric interception further requires the earliest
possible warning, tracking, and discrimination to allow
the missiles to reach the altitude of interception, while
endo-atmospheric interception requires extremely high
acceleration. An endo-atmospheric missile is designed
for point defense.^
Regarding source materials, this writer found much
of the military information on the Soviet Union and
Communist China generally available to the public to be
fragmentary and indirect. Furthermore, due to the tight
control exercised by Communist countries over military
information, the data derived from unclassified sources
may not be ideally accurate or complete. Additionally,
a "new" development in the weapons systems of a Communist
country may be new only in the sense that it is perceived
by foreign observers for the first time. Despite these
limitations, available information offers a representative
picture of the current Soviet and Chinese Communist
arsenals and their deterrence doctrines.
22
Ibid., p. 8.
CHAPTER II
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS
IN THE SOVIET UNION
This chapter is concerned with the characteristics
of nuclear weapons systems in the Soviet Union, including
yield, numbers, payload, range, accuracy and response time
of strategic offensive weapons systems, and information
and interception of strategic defensive weapons systems
(Table 1} .
Strategic Offensive Nuclear Weapons Systems
The Yield of Nuclear Weapons
The Soviet Union successfully tested its first
atomic bomb in 1949 and its first hydrogen bomb in 1953.
Both tests came earlier than Western intelligence had
expected and exemplified the level of scientific and
technical proficiency which had been attained in the
Soviet Union.
36
TABLE 1
DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS
Yield & Accuracy
Range
Year
Bombers Missiles Ships
1949 First atomic bomb
test
TU-4 (Bull)
1950
1951 T—1 (300 miles)
1952
1953 First hydrogen
explosion
1954 Badger (4250 mi.)
Bison (7100 mi.)
T-2 (100-1800 mi.)
1955 Bear (7800 mi.)
1956 CEP: 6.25-13.5 mi.
for ICBM-dev.
stage
Shyster (750 mi.)
Guild (22 mi.)
1957
First ICBM test
Guideline (28 mi.)
1958 Moratorium on
nuclear testing
G-class sub
Z-class sub
1959
Bounder
Backfin
w
TABLE 1 (Continued)
Year Yield & Accuracy
Bombers
Range
Missiles Ships
1960 CEP: 1.25 mi.
GM destroyer,
for ICBM Kotlin, Krupny,
Kynda, Krista
1961 58-MT bomb test Blinder (2000 mi.) SS-7 (6900 mi.) Serb BM (650 mi.)
Badger-C (3000 mi.)
Bear-B (7800 mi.)
1962
1963 "High degree of SS-8 SS-8 (6900 mi.) J-class sub
accuracy" SA-5 Griffon Helicopter carrier-
for ICBM Moskva
1964 "Stunningly high Bear-C (7800 mi.) SA-3 Goa Serb-underwater
accuracy" SA-4 Ganef launching
for ICBM Galosh H-class sub
E-class sub
1965 SS-11 (6500 mi.)
SS-13 (5000 mi.)
1966
1967 SS-9 (7500 mi.)
U»
00
TABLE 1 (Continued)
Year Yield & Accuracy Bombers
Range
Missiles Ships
1968 MRV test
1969
Y-class sub
Sawfly (1300 mi.)
1970 CEP: 0.5 mi.
for SS-9
Based on information derived from source materials such as The Military
Balance (ISS)i Jane’s Fighting Ships; Jane's All the World’s Aircraft; Secretary of
Defense Posture Statements, Hearings before various committees of the U.S. Congress.
1 0
VO
40
Until 1954, the Soviet Union tested only an
average of two nuclear bombs or devices a year.^ After
1955, testing became exceedingly active. Moreover, Soviet
leaders began to publish basic information on nuclear and
hydrogen technology in Soviet newspapers of general cir
culation, and they boasted of their "important new
achievements” in the field of nuclear development.^
In 1956, former Secretary of Defense Charles B.
Wilson warned the United States Congress that atomic
stockpiles in the United States and the Soviet Union were
approaching the point where either country could "prac-
tically wipe out the world." Soviet leaders likewise
were concerned with the size and number of nuclear weapons.
They warned at the thirty-ninth anniversary of the Soviet
armed forces that atomic, hydrogen or "even more powerful
New York Times, October 28, 1954; November 24,
1955. L. W. Nordheim, "Tests of Nuclear Weapons,"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, XI:7 (September, 1955),
254.
2
New York Times, June 14, 1955; November 27, 1955.
3
New York Times, February 10, 1954; March 30,
1956; and September 11, 1956.
41
4
bombs" would rain on the United States in another war.
Former Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev reportedly told
Polish journalists in Mayr 1957, that the Russians had a
hydrogen bomb which was so big they dared not test it.^
By the end of 1958, a moratorium on nuclear
testing had been established. There can be little doubt
that Soviet leaders were convinced this moratorium would
enhance their strategic posture vis-a-vis the United
States by inhibiting American efforts to improve its
weapons efficiency.^ However, the moratorium was dis
solved in the fall of 1961 when the Soviet Union set off
the largest man-made explosion in history. Many Western
4
New York Times, February 24, 1957.
5
New York Times, May 31, 1957.
6
Louis Henkin, ed., Arms Control; Issues for the
Public (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1961), p. 153; Walter C. Clemens, Jr., The Arms Race and
Sino-Soviet Relations (Stanford: The Hoover Institution on
War, Revolution and Peace, 1968), p. 25; Lincoln P. Bloom
field, Walter C. Clemens, Jr., and Franklyn Griffiths,
Khrushchev and the Arms Race: Soviet Interests in Arms
Control and Disarmament, 1954-1964 (Cambridge: The MIT
Press, 1966), pp. 244-250.
42
observers, including Dr. Edward Teller, were convinced
that the Soviet Union could not have made such great prog
ress without prior secret testing during the moratorium.^
Premier Nikita Khrushchev, in an impromptu speech
at a reception in the Kremlin in August, 1961, disclosed
that the Soviet Union had the ability to construct a
rocket carrying a warhead with an explosive power equiva
lent to 100 megatons of TNT,® a statement which if true,
testified both to Soviet experience in constructing giant
warheads and to the existence of a booster capacity to
Q
lift such heavy payloads. A 58-megaton bomb, detonated
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Rela
tions, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Hearings before the Commit'
tee on Foreign Relations, Executive M, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess., 1963, p. 420? Earl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush: The
Test Ban Trap (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1963), p. 469.
0
New York Times, August 10, 1961. Khrushchev also
reportedly said about a bomb that it had a yield equiva
lent to 100,000 tons of TNT (September 11, 1961).
9
Center for Strategic Studies, The Soviet Military
Technological Challenge (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown
University, 1967), p. 35 (hereafter cited as Center, The
Soviet Military Technological Challenge). New York Times,
January 6, 1962. Ralph E. Lapp, Kill and Overkill (New
York: Basic Books, 1962), p. 36.
43
by the Soviet Union on October 30, 1961, was expected to
produce "fantastic downwind fallout." The United States
Atomic Energy Commission discovered, however, that the
test series had not been as "dirty" as had first been
presumed.*®
Western experts who analyzed debris from the
58-megaton bomb learned that the device was encased in a
lead jacket. They reasoned that had the bomb been wrapped
in Uranium-238 rather than lead, the yield would not only
have exceeded 100 megatons but would have created greater
radioactive fallout as well.**
The development of such a large yield nuclear
weapon seems to have had a dual purpose— political and
military. Politically, Soviet leaders could use a gigantic
weapon as a tool of terror in international relations and
New York Times, December 12, 1961; and June 18,
1962. Also see Ralph E. Lapp, The Weapons Culture (New
York: W. W. Norton, 1968), pp. 47-48.
^ New York Times, January 6, 1962; Center, The
Soviet Military Technological Challenge, p. 37; Lapp,
Kill and Overkill, p. 36.
44
as a symbol of advanced Soviet technology in the eyes of
underdeveloped countries. Militarily, a large yield
nuclear weapon in the 50-100 megaton range would have an
overkill capacity for counter-city target strategy. It
would have a strategic significance as a weapon of intimi
dation in a psychological warfare. Furthermore, with a
lesser degree of accuracy than a smaller yield weapon, it
could be employed effectively against "hard targets" such
as missiles protected in hardened silos.
The Soviet nuclear test series in 1961 and 1962
included very high altitude and atmospheric tests. These
tests were believed to have provided the Soviet Union
with information about effects of high yield, exo-
atmospheric thermal blast and radiation, especially on
electronic and communication systems which have direct
relevance to the development of any system of anti-
12
ballistic missile defense.
12
Center, The Soviet Military Technological Chal
lenge, p. 35; U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, Scope, Magnitude, and Implications of the United
States Antiballistic Missile Program, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Military Applications of the Joint Commit
tee on Atomic Energy, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1968), p. 38.
(Hereafter cited as Scope, Magnitude, and Implications of
the U.S. ABM Program.)
45
Thus, after analysis of the 1961 and 1962 test
series, the long-held assumption that the United States
possessed a decisive technological lead in nuclear weaponry
needed to be re-evaluated. Indeed, this test series indi
cated that Russia may have pulled ahead of the United
States in some areas of nuclear weapons technology, par
ticularly in large-yield warheads and anti-missile missile
13
technology.
However, Dr. Foster testified before Congress in
1967, that the Soviet Union had gone to smaller, not
larger, yields since 1963.^ The Soviet leaders appeared
13
The Atomic Energy Commission indicated that the
Russians had made advances in certain areas, especially in
improving yield-to-weight ratio in the megaton range.
New York Times, December 8, 10, 1961. Also see Charles
Murphy, "Two Views on Bomb Test," Life (February 16, 1962),
p. 74. Dr. John S. Foster, Jr. stated in 1963, "Now, to
date the Soviets have had several times the experience of
the United States in yield above one megaton," cited in
Scope, Magnitude, and Implications of the U.S. ABM Program,
p. 37. New York Times, September 6 and December 8, 1961;
January 20, 1962; also. Center, The Soviet Military Tech
nological Challenge, p. 36.
14
Scope, Magnitude and Implications of the U.S.
ABM Program, p. 38. A trend in the size of warheads in
the Soviet nuclear weapons systems development is suggested
also in an Institute of Strategic Studies publication:
46
to have carefully weighed the advantages and disadvantages
of large yield warheads from the point of view of their
strategic implications. Former Secretary of Defense
MCNamara also stated in 1963 that most missions against
military targets could be achieved through use of two or
three smaller weapons instead of one very large warhead.
Very high-yield warheads, he said, were relatively inferior
as second-strike weapons because of the difficulty of
making them survived)le— to harden, camouflage or make
mobile the huge rockets required to deliver these
weapons.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul H. Nitze further
stated in November, 1967, at Congressional hearings:
Types of ICBM Estimated Warhead Yield In Service
SS-7
SS-8
SS-9
SS-11
SS-13
5
5
MT
MT
20-25 MT
1-2 MT
1 MT
? 1961
1963
1965
1966
1968
Source: The Military Balance: 1970-1971 (ISS), p. 107.
15
U.S. Congress, Coranittee on Foreign Relations,
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, p. 101.
47
The single 10-megaton warhead yields 20 times the
megatonnage of the ten 50-kiloton individually tar-
getable warheads. However, the missile armed with
the ten 50-kiloton warheads could destroy ten times
as many airfields, soft missile sites, or other soft
military point targets; 1.2 to 1.7 times as many hard
silos; and 3.5 times as many cities of 100,000 popu
lation. 16
Generally speaking, warheads in the Soviet nuclear
weapons systems have become smaller as new types of the
ICBM have been introduced into weapons inventories. But
at the same time Soviet leaders have not neglected the
large yield weapons systems. The development of the SS-9
is a case in point.
The SS-9, the world's largest operational ICBM
with a throw-weight of 12,000 to 15,000 pounds, allows
a wide range of options as to payload. It could carry a
single warhead with a yield of 20 to 25 megatons, three
5-megaton warheads, six warheads with a total yield of
1 to 2 megatons, or 18 to 20 warheads with a yield of 20
17
kilotons. Furthermore, the Soviet Union can easily
^ Scope, Magnitude, and Implications of the U.S.
ABM Program, p. 48.
17
A'William Beecher, "Soviet Missile Development
Puzzles Top US Analysts," New York Times, April 14, 1969;
Mark B. Schneider, "Red Missiles and SALT," Ordnance,
LV:303 (November-December, 1970), 255.
48
accommodate the increased weight of both individual re
entry vehicle guidance systems and the vernier propulsion
units for terminal guidance.It can also accommodate
the increased weight of a high degree of warhead hardening
against the neutron, gamma ray and X-ray effects of anti-
1ft
ballistic missile interceptors' nuclear warheads.
In recent years, the development and testing of
the SS-9's three reentry-vehicle configuration has become
one of the major topics of discussion among Western
military observers. Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird
stated in his Fiscal 1972 Defense Budget Statement:
It should be kept in mind that although the Soviets
probably have no MIRV'ed missiles operational at
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of
ABM Systems, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Commit
tee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969), p. 201. (Hereafter cited as Strategic and Foreign
Policy Implications.)
19
Rex Pay, "New Effort Aimed at X-ray Protection,"
Technology Week, 20:1 (January 2, 1967), 10-12; Harman
Lowenhar, "Hardened Electronics," Space/Aeronautics, 52:3
(August, 1969), 36-43; and Philip J. Klass, "Radiation-
Hardened Avionics Gain Interest," Aviation Week and Space
Technology, 91:10 (September 8, 1969), 88-103.
49
the present time, MRV's have been tested many times
on the SS-9 since August, 1968.2®
In a United States-style MIRV system, several separate
warheads can be carried on a single booster, each warhead
assigned to a different target. In a MRV system, several
separate warheads also can be carried on a single booster,
but they will be assigned to one or several targets
without having an independently targeted mechanism.
Secretary Laird also suggested that Soviet advanced re
entry vehicle guidance systems may be designed to employ
individual vehicle guidance systems for an eventual MIRV
21
capability, rather than an American-style MIRV bus.
U.S. Department of Defense, Statement of Secre
tary of Defense Melvin R. Laird on the Fiscal Year 1972-76
Defense Program and the 1972 Defense Budget, before the
House Armed Services Committee, March 9, 1971, p. 46.
(Hereafter cited as Laird, Fiscal Year 1972-76 Defense
Program and 1972 Defense Budget.)
21
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Intelligence and the ABM, Hearings before the
Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969), p. 24; U.S. Department of Defense, Statement
of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, Fiscal Year 1971
Defense Program and Budget, before Joint Session of the
Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees,
February 20, 1970, pp. 103-104. (Hereafter cited as
Laird, Fiscal Year 1971 Defense Program.)
50
Considering these capabilities, Dr. John S. Foster,
Jr. believes that the SS-9 is a counter-force weapon. He
stated in 1969 at hearings before Congress that "the cap
ability and the purpose of our MIRV's are against the
Soviet defense, and the capability of their (the Soviets)
22
MIRV's appears to be against our Minutemen."
The Range of Nuclear Weapons
There are two stages in sequence in terms of range
in the development of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons
systems: (1) intermediate and limited intercontinental
capabilities, and (2) intercontinental capabilities.
Intermediate and limited intercontinental capabil
ities . In the 1950's, the major Soviet delivery vehicles
for strategic nuclear weapons were long-range bombers,
intermediate-range ballistic missiles and submarines
22
U.S. Congress, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Diplomatic and Strategic Impact of Multiple Warhead Mis
siles, Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Secur
ity Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee
on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), p. 245
(hereafter cited as Diplomatic and Strategic Impact).
New York Times, August 6, 1969.
)
51
modified to accommodate ballistic missiles. Immediately
after World War II, Soviet leaders had explicitly
expressed their concern over development of modem weapons
systems, especially nuclear weapons, and the means to
transport warheads across vast oceans. A former Russian
Air Force technical officer who defected to the West,
Colonel G. A. Tokaev, recalls a Kremlin conference which
he attended in April, 1947, when he heard Georgi Malenkov
stress the urgent need for the Soviet Union to develop
planes or rockets "capable of flying across the Atlantic
23
and back in one hop." Joseph Stalin reportedly said at
the same conference that possession of intercontinental
weapons "would make it easier for us to talk to the
gentleman-shopkeeper, Harry Truman, and keep him pinned
24
down where we want him." These statements by Stalin
and Malenkov made clear that the Soviet Union foresaw a
new strategic requirement based on the assumption that a
new threat had developed at a distance of more than 5,000
23
G. A. Tokaev, Stalin Means War (London: Genge
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1951), p. 115.
24 .
Ibid.
52
miles.
The first Soviet long-range bomber was the TU-4,
code named Bull, by NATO, which was a Soviet version of
the U.S. B-29. A noted Russian designer, Andrei N.
Tupolev, in just two years copied a B-29 which had landed
intact at Vladivostok, Siberia, in 1944 and had been
refused permission to leave.^ By the end of 1945, the
Bull was in production. It later carried Russia's first
atomic bomb.
However, it was not until 1954 that the Soviet
leaders became confident of their ability to launch an
attack against some North American cities from bases in
either northeast Siberia or in the Murmansk area. This
capability was disclosed in the 1954 display of the
Badger and Bison bombers with ranges of 4,250 miles and
26
7,100 miles, respectively. These jet bombers again
25
Center, The Soviet Military Technological
Challenge, p. 45.
26
Jane's All the World's Aircraft (1962-63),
pp. 212 and 303; Military Balance (1968-69), p. 54;
Aviation Week and Space Technology, 88:12 (March 18, 1968),
189; ibid., 90:10 (March 10, 1969), 145; and Aerospace
Technology, 21:2 (July, 1967), 10.
53
drew foreign attention in 1955 by flying over Moscow on
Aviation Day. Another long-range bomber, TU-20, the Bear,
was first seen at Tushino in July, 1955, and has since
became standard armament in the Soviet Air Force. Range
27
of the Bear is said to be 7,800 miles. Considering the
operational radius, however, Soviet bombers were barely
capable of either a one-way mission against the United
States or limited operations against targets across the
bordering oceans.
After the Soviet Union successfully launched its
first intercontinental ballistic missile in 1957, there
was dissent among Soviet leaders over the role of long-
range bombers. Until 1960, Khrushchev time and again
28
disparaged their effectiveness, while many military men
28
Khrushchev agreed with military specialists
who "believe that both bomber aircraft and fighters are
in the twilight of their existence." Pravda, October 11,
1957, in Sokolovskii, op. cit., p. 351. He also declared
in 1960 that "the air forces and navy have lost their
previous importances in view of the contemporary develop
ment of military technology," and even forecasted the dis
continuation of the manufacture of bcmbers. Pravda, Janu
ary 15, 1960, in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XII:2
(February 10, 1960), 10.
54
defended the combat potentialities of aircraft.^ Conti
nued development of long-range bombers, however, indi
cated that Khrushchev lost the argument.
Two new bombers— the Bounder and the Backfin— were
identified in 1959 by Western observers.The Bounder
was an improved version of the Bison and was assumed to
have served as a research and development aircraft. The
29
Marshal Malinovsky, the successor of Marshal
Zhukov as Minister of Defense, said in November, 1957, in
an address to the graduates of the Moscow military acade
mies, "Victory in combat will be achieved by the combined
efforts of all the arms and components of armed forces,"
Pravda, November 25, 1957. The newspaper of the Soviet
Air Force, Sovetskaya Aviatsiia (Soviet Aviation), carry
ing information about tests on a new type of fighter air
craft, contended that "there are no insurmountable
barriers for Soviet pilots," Pravda, December 15, 1967, in
Current Digest of the Soviet Press, IX:50 (January 22,
1958). Marshal I. Bagramyan, Deputy Minister of Defense,
also stressed in his statement on the 40th Anniversary of
the Soviet Armed Forces that "Soviet military science con
siders it necessary to master all types of weapons and
all means of armed struggle," Komnmunist, 2 (February,
1958), in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, X:8 (April
2, 1958), 10.
30
Military Review, XXVIII:12 (March, 1959), 89;
ibid., XLIIIrlO (October, 1963), 104; Aviation Week and
Space Technology, 88:12 (March 18, 1968), 189; ibid.,
90:10 (March 10, 1969), 145; Air Force and Space Digest,
43:1 (January, 1960), 46; and ibid, 43:5 (May, 1960), 44.
55
Backfin, medium-range bomber, was reported to have a
maximum speed of nearly Mach 1.
Stalin and his aides did not appear to have been
satisfied with development of ground-launched missiles in
its initial stages. Georgi Malenkov, former Soviet
Premier, reportedly expressed his dissatisfaction at a
Kremlin conference in April, 1947. A Soviet V-2 missile,
produced under the supervision of German technicians, was
31
said to be "good for 400 kilometers and no more." All
research and development of missile technology appeared
geared toward the single goal of an advanced warhead
delivery system, since missiles have advantages in terms
of speed, penetration, dispersal and hardening of their
sites.
Development of medium and intermediate range
missiles began immediately after the Soviet Union took
over German V-2 production blueprints and facilities in
1946. By the 1951-52 period, an improved version of the
V-2 with a range of about 300-500 miles was reported to
31
Tokaev, op. cit., p. 105.
56
32
have been produced. This missile, later referred to as
the T-l, was believed to have been propelled by a single
liquid fuel rocket engine. By late 1955, a two-stage T-2
rocket, an advanced version of the T-l, was reported to
be in production following a large number of test firings
in 1954 and early 1955. Estimates of its range varied
33
from 1,000 to 1,800 miles. The NATO codenamed Shyster,
with a range of 750 miles, has been in service since
1956.34
A United States radar station in Turkey detected
in 1955 evidence that a Soviet long-range rocket was
being test-fired, suggesting to Western observers the
possibility that the Soviet Union would acquire a long-
32
Military Review, XXXVIIIsl (April, 1958), 72-73;
Jane's All the World's Aircraft (1962-63), p. 416; Avia
tion Week and Space Technology, 88:12 (March 18, 1968),
190; ibid., 90:10 (March 10, 1969), 146; Asher Lee, ed..
The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1959), p. 416.
33Ibid.
34
Military Balance (1968-69), p. 54; Aviation Week
and Space Technology, 88:12 (March 18, 1968), 190; ibid.,
90:10 (March 10, 1969), 146.
57
35
range missile by 1956. A Soviet publication stated in
1965, that "since 1956, the Soviet Union has had inter-
36
continental rockets." However, it is more plausible
that the Soviet's main nuclear developments were their
medium and intermediate range missiles until 1957, when
they successfully launched their first intercontinental
ballistic missile, the T-3 model, SS-6 ICBM. Despite
this successful test, this weapon was reportedly deployed
only after 1959.^
Reports of the construction of what appeared in
1958 to be IRBM bases in Poland, East Germany and Czecho
slovakia strongly suggested that these weapons systems
35
Military Balance (1962-63); also see Lee,
op. cit., p. 151.
36
A. A. Strokov, "Military Art in the Postwar
Period," in William R. Kintner and Harriet F. Scott (trans.
and ed.), The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military
Affairs (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968),
p. 201.
37
For a detailed analysis on the deployment of
the ICBM, see Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic
Power and Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: Chicago Univer
sity Press, 1966), pp. 50-57. Acknowledging the credibil
ity of Soviet threats on the basis of assured destruction
capabilities. Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner stated on March 11,
1969, “We had, as a result of the lack of any credible
58
were approaching operational status. It was estimated
during this period that the Soviet Union had about 30
IRBM bases deployed along its borders, 21 facing Western
Europe and eight in Siberia. From these bases, Soviet
IRBM1s covered targets throughout Western Europe, the
Middle East and the Far East.
Another strategic delivery means possessed by
the Soviet Union, submarine-launched missiles, was
reported to Western observers for the first time in 1958.
However, sometime during the period from 1954 to 1955,
Soviet leaders decided to construct a missile-firing
intelligence information and because of the intensity of
the cold war, to make some assumptions which, in the end,
turned out to be untrue. Namely, at the time we believed
that the Soviet Union was building a very large offensive
force. We reacted this way, first in the bomber period,
1947-52, and then again in the ballistic missile period,
1952 [sic]-1960, and we conditioned our responses to
possible, but not as it turned out later, actual threat."
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Strategy and Science; Toward a National Security Policy
for the 1970*s, Hearings before the Subcommittee on
National Security Policy and Scientific Development of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (March
11, 13, 18, 19, 24, and 26, 1969), p. 3.
38
Military Review, XL:2 (May, 1960), 72.
59
submarine fleet that would become the cornerstone of their
naval forces. Discussing this matter, Khrushchev said in
1964:
Ten years ago the question arose of the need for
rearming our navy, which was based at that time on
cruisers, destroyers, and other vessels, mostly
surface ships. These weapons had become in many
ways obsolete for waging war in present day conditions,
since all surface craft are now vulnerable both from
the air and from shore; they can be destroyed by the
enemy from a great distance. We, therefore, posed
the task of doing everything to rearm the naval forces
and make the submarine fleet the cornerstone of the
naval forces* might.39
According to Khrushchev, "Cruisers are fit only
for diplomatic missions to foreign countries."^® He
reportedly halted cruiser construction in 1956 and
replaced "big ship" sailor Admiral Kusnetsov with Admiral
Gorshkov, a proponent of submarines, missiles and small
41
ships, as Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Naval Forces.
39
Pravda, July 9, 1964, in Current Digest of the
Soviet Press, XVI:28 (August 5, 1964), 5.
40
Cited by Commander H. G. Dudley, Sr., “The Future
Role of Soviet Sea Power," U.S. Naval Institute, Proceed
ings, 759 (May, 1966), 46.
41
Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the
Nuclear Age (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 44.
Also see Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy (New York:
60
Thus, earlier Soviet concept of a balanced fleet gave
way to new emphasis on missile submarines.
The submarine-launched missiles first reported
were the "Comet" series.^ The Comet was a single-stage,
liquid-fueled rocket with a range of about 500 miles. It
was said to be completely waterproof for towing behind
submarines. A submarine was reportedly able to tow three
of these missiles in a launching canister, A single-stage
surface-to-surface missile, the T-l, with a range of 300
miles, was also used by submarines and ground f o r c e s . ^
Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 50. Soviet missile expert
Pokrovsky also stressed in 1956 that nuclear submarine
fleets and nuclear surface fleets would be capable of
operating for a long time at sea without relying on
coastal bases. Maj. Gen. G. I. Pokrovsky, Science and
Technology in Contemporary War, trans. and annotated by
Raymond L. Garthoff (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1959), p. 45. George John Geiger, "Soviet Sharks...The
Newest Threat," Sea Classics, 11:2 (October, 1969), 44.
42
Military Review, XXXVIII:1 (April, 1958), 72;
ibid., XXVIII:6 (September, 1958), 81; Siegfried Breyer,
Guide to Soviet Navy (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute,
1970), p. 57.
43
Military Review, XXXVIII:! (April, 1958), 72.
61
Although these missiles were capable of being fired from
submarines, they were believed to have no subsurface
launching capability.
During the 1958-59 period, several Z-class sub
marines reportedly were modified to accommodate ballistic
jnissiles.44 They were fitted with large conning towers
i
and two vertical launching tubes. Another missile sub
marine, the G-class, was believed constructed at
Komsomolsk and Severodvinsk beginning in 1 9 5 8 . In any
event, from 1954 to 1960, Soviet leaders gave the role of
submarines in a future war precedence over surface ships.
In the 1950‘s these missile-armed submarines were con
sidered to have a transoceanic capability that could
threaten only the coastal areas of the United States.
44
Military Review, XLVI:6 (June, 1966), 105;
Jane's Fighting Ships (1967-68), p. 451; Center, The Soviet
Military Technological Challenge, p. 46.
45
Military Review, XLVI:6 (June, 1966), 108;
Jane's Fighting Ships (1967-68), p. 451; Aerospace Tech
nology, 21:3 (July 21, 1967), 96; The Military Balance
(1967-68), p. 46; Center, The Soviet Military Technologi
cal Challenge, p. 47; Geiger, "Soviet Sharks . . . ,"
p. 49.
62
Intercontinental capabilities. After the Soviet
Union successfully tested its first intercontinental
ballistic missile in 1957, the quality of the Soviet
ICBM's continuously improved. The 1961-62 Soviet missile
test series disclosed a new achievement. Twostage,
liquid-propellant ICBM's, the SS-7 and the SS-8, were
seen for the first time by Western observers in the
November, 1964, Moscow parade.^ The range of these
weapons was reported to be approximately 6,500 miles, and
they were said to make use of storable liquid fuel. Less
sophisticated liquid fuels previously used involved care
ful preparation in the field, and they were complicated
and dangerous to store and handle. Storable liquid fuel,
on the other hand, reduced technical difficulties and
planning limitations inherent in liquid fuel. The SS-7
and the SS-8, with a throw-weight of 3,000 to 4,000
pounds, can carry warheads with a yield of more than 5
megatons.
Jane's All the World's Aircraft (1966-67), p.
472; The Military Balance (1967-68), p. 46; Center, The
Soviet Military Technological Challenge, p. 52; Aero
space Technology, 21:3 (July 31, 1967), 98.
63
Two more new ICBM's were observed for the first
time on May 9, 1965, in the parade marking the twentieth
anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe. One
was the SS-11 and the other the SS-13.*^ The SS-11, with
storable liquid propellants, has a throw-weight of approx
imately 1,500 pounds and can carry a single warhead with
a yield of about 1 to 2 megatons. The SS-13 is said to
have a range of approximately 6,000 miles with solid
propellants. With a throw-weight of approximately 1,000
pounds, the SS-13 can carry a single warhead with a yield
of approximately 1 megaton. Nevertheless, this weapon is
the Soviet Union*s first operational solid-propellant
48
ICBM. The special significance of the solid-propellant
ICBM is that it can be designed not only for emplacement
in hardened silos, but also for a mobile option.
47
Jane's All the World's Aircraft (1966-67), p.
472; Military Balance (1967-68), p. 46; Center, The Soviet
Military Technological Challenge, p. 52; Time (March 14,
1969), p. 24.
48
In his 1969 Defense Posture statement, however,
former Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford reported
that Soviet new solid fuel ICBM's "appear to be no better
than our earliest 'Minuteman' missiles, first deployed in
Fiscal Year 1963." U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on
Armed Forces, Authorization for Military Procurement,
64
During the celebration of the Bolshevik Revolu
tion's fiftieth anniversary in 1967, Western observers
reported another new three-stage ICBM, the SS-9, which
49
can be used for intercontinental and orbital launchings.
Utilizing storable liquid propellants, the SS-9 is the
world's largest operational ICBM with a throw-weight of
approximately 12,000 to 15,000 pounds. The SS-9 can carry
a single warhead with a yield of 20-25 megatons, three
5-megaton warheads, six warheads of 1 or 2 megatons or
eighteen warheads with a yield of 200 kilotons.^®
Research and Development, Fiscal Year 1970, and Reserve
Strength, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Forces,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. on S.1192 and S.2407 (Pts. I and II)
(1969), p. 28 (hereafter cited as Authorization for Mili
tary Procurement, Fiscal Year 1970).
49
Aerospace Technology, 21:3 (December 18, 1967),
22; ibid., 21:8 (October 9, 1967),15; ibid., 21:11 (Novem
ber 20, 1967), 18; New York Times, November 4, 1967; ibid.,
April 26, 1968; American Security Council, The ABM and the
Changed Strategic Military Balance; A Study by a Special
American Security Council Committee of 31 Experts, Co
chaired by Willard F. Libby, William J. Thaler, and Nathan
F. Twining (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1969),
p. 15; Military Balance (1969-70), p. 6.
50
Laird, Fiscal Year 1971 Defense Program, p. 35;
Gen. John C. Meyer, "The Soviet Threat," Ordnance, LV:303
(November-December, 1970), 246; Beecher, op. cit.;
Sunday Star, November 10 and 29, 1970.
65
In addition to these ICBM's, there were reports
as early as 1960 that the Soviet Union was working on an
ultra long range missile which could be launched across
the Southern Hemisphere rather than across the Arctic
Ocean. This project appears aimed at bypassing the pro
tective radar screen constructed by the United States
along the expected missile route over the Arctic Ocean.
This type of missile would require a range of 10,000 miles
or more.^^ Khrushchev claimed on March 16, 1962, the
development by the Soviet Union of a "global missile"
capable of bypassing the early warning system located in
the North by circling the earth and striking from a
different direction.^2 He stressed that United States
warning devices had lost their meaning entirely with the
advent of this "global rocket." Khrushchev's disclosure
was confirmed in 1964 by Marshal V. Sudets, Commander-in-
Chief of the Soviet Anti-aircraft Troops, who said:
51
Military Review, XLI:1 (January, 1961), 100;
Military Balance (1968-69), p. 54.
52
Pravda, March 17, 1962, in Current Digest of
the Soviet Press, XIV:13 (April 25, 1962), 6.
66
The appearance of global missiles, which can strike
from any direction, has negated the value of the
system for the early inflight detection of ballistic
missiles that the Americans built to their north.53
This appears to suggest the development of Fractional
Orbital Bombardment Systems (FOBS) which has the advantage
of flying at a much lower altitude (about 100 miles) and
thus gives much less warning to defense radars of its
approach.^
Regarding ship-launched missiles, the coast guard
mission of the Soviet navy was extended in the 1960's to
include that of the world oceans. From 1954 to 1960,
Soviet leaders stressed the role of submarines in a future
Izvestia, January 5, 1964, in Current Digest of
the Soviet Press, XVIsl (January 29, 1964), 22.
54
Ian Smart, Advanced Strategic Missile: A Short
Guide (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969),
p. 24. U.S. Department of Defense, Statement of Secretary
of Defense Clark M. Clifford: The Fiscal Year 1970-74,
Defense Program and 1970 Defense Budget (January 15, 1969),
p. 43 (hereafter cited as Clifford, The Fiscal Year 1970-
74, Defense Program). For depressed trajectory ICBM's,
also see U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations,
Department of Defense Appropriation for 1972, Hearings
before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
House of Representatives, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971),
p. 172 (hereafter cited as, Department of Defense Appro
priation for 1972).
67
war at the expense of their surface ships. The year 1960,
however, marked a turning point in the development of
naval missiles with emphasis switching from the submarine
fleet to other surface ships. Two "Kotlin-class"
destroyers were converted into guided missile destroyers
with surface-to-air missiles in 1960 and 1966.55 The
"Krupny-class" was designed specifically to carry surface-
to-surface guided missiles and was believed put in service
by I960.56
By the early 1960's, two more new destroyers, the
57
Kynda and the Kresta classes, became operational. They
were equipped with surface-to-surface and surface-to-air
missiles. The Kresta class also is designed to carry
helicopters. Another Soviet guided missile destroyer is
55Jane's Fighting Ships (1967-68), p. 457.
S^Ibid., p. 458; Military Balance (1967-68), p. 8.
According to Military Review (June, 1966), p. 108, the
"Krupny-class" became operational in 1957-58.
5^Jane's Fighting Ships (1967-68), p. 456; Center,
Soviet Military Technological Challenge, p. 48; Military
Balance (1967-68), p. 8; Time, 91s8 (February 23, 1968),
24; U.S. Congress, House, The Changing Strategic Naval
Balance: U.S.S.R. vs. U.S.A., prepared by the American
Security Council at the request of the Committee on Armed
Services, House, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1968), p. 18.
68
the Kashin class. The Kashin, Kynda said the Krupny
classes are officially designated as rocket cruisers,
CO
according to Jane's Fighting Ships. In addition, one
of the Sverdlev class cruisers, "Dzerzhinski," was fitted
in 1961-62, with a close range missile fired from a twin
launcher tandem.59
Though the Kresta class was the first Soviet ship
to carry helicopters, it was not until 1963 that the Soviet
Navy began to construct so-called helicopter carriers.
These carriers with 30 to 35 helicopters aboard have been
at sea since the spring of 1968.^^ They form an important
segment of the Soviet fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean.
However, to date there has been no indication that the
58
Jane's Fighting Ships (1967-68), p. 456.
59
Ibid., p. 454; Military Balance (1967-68), p. 8.
60
Military Review, XLVIII:3 (March, 1968), 105;
Time, March 14, 1969, p. 25; Navy, 10:11 (November, 1967),
7. Former Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford stated
in his Statement on the Fiscal Year 1970 Defense Budget
that the Soviet Mediterranean squadron included the tem
porary deployment of the helicopter carrier "Moskva" with
an ASW capability. Authorization for Military Procurement,
Fiscal Year 1970, p. 8. ,
6 9
Soviet Navy intends to develop the larger United States-
style attack carriers. Light helicopter carriers appear
to indicate a newly-emerging Soviet naval plan to carry
out amphibious missions or perhaps anti-submarine warfare
missions, not only in traditional areas of Soviet opera
tions but in such regions as the Indian Ocean as well.
The strategic importance of these carriers would be
further enhanced with the development of new vertical
take-off and landing aircraft (VTOL) which could be
employed in an offensive role.
At the same time, Soviet leaders have continuously
developed missile-armed submarines as the backbone of the
Soviet fleet. The G-class submarine is said to carry the
Sark-type ballistic missile, formerly codenamed Snark by
NATO. This missile is reported to have a range of 600
kilometers and was first displayed in 1962. Equipped
with four missile launchers, the J-class went into service
61
in 1963. In addition to these more recently constructed
submarines, a conventional type of submarine, the W-class,
built during the period from 1950 to 1957, was equipped
6^Jane*s Fighting Ships (1967-68), p. 451.
70
with a special deck for carrying guided missiles and
62
inclined missile launchers.
Since 1961, the Soviet Navy also has been equipped
with another type of missile, the 650-mile Serb. The
Serb is considered a second generation submarine ballistic
missile and appears to have a configuration comparable to
6 3
the first generation Polaris in yield and accuracy.
The Serb is believed capable of underwater launching and
was observed for the first time during the 1964 Revolution
Anniversary Parade. Several types of submarines such as
the H- and E-classes and a modernized Z-class boat are
64
believed armed with the Serb missile.
The appearance of a Soviet nuclear-powered sub
marine had been expected by Western observers since the
62
Ibid. Geiger, "Soviet Sharks . . . ," p. 44.
63
Military Balance (1967-68), pp. 7 and 46;
Military Review XLVIIi3 (March, 1967), 73; Center, The
Soviet Military Technological Challenge, p. 47; Aerospace
Technology, July 31, 1967, p. 96; Aviation Week and Space
Technology, 90:10 (March 10, 1969), 146; Military Review,
XLIII:3 (March, 1963), 106; New York Times, July 22,
1962.
64
Military Review, June, 1966, p. 108; New York
Times, November 8, 1964.
71
world's first nuclear-powered surface ship, "Lenin," was
launched in 1957. However, it was not until 1961 that
specific information on nuclear submarine development was
disclosed.^ Then in 1966 it was announced that a Soviet
nuclear submarine had completed its first underwater
circumnavigation of the globe.^ Secretary of Defense
Laird told a Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services
and Appropriations Committee in February, 1970, that the
65
New York Times, October 8, 1961. According to
an estimate by Military Review, XLII:4 (April, 1962), 105,
the Soviet Navy was estimated to have three nuclear sub
marines in service and three under construction by the end
of 1961. Another source suggested that nuclear submarines
equipped with ballistic missiles participated in the armed
forces' field exercises in July, 1962. Kishida Junnosuke,
Kendai no Senso (Modem War) (Tokyo: Kodan-sha, 1965),
p. 50. The Institute for Strategic Studies estimated in
1966 that the Soviet nuclear submarine production was at
the rate of at least five a year, having a total of about
15 Soviet nuclear submarines. Military Balance (1966-67),
p. 5. Also see Jane's Fighting Ships (1967-68), p. 450.
66
Pravda, April 3, 1966, in Current Digest of the
Soviet Press, XVIII:17 (May 18, 1966), 12; New York Times,
April 17, 1966; Center, The Soviet Military Technological
Challenge, p. 49. Since then the Soviet leaders have
repeatedly stressed that the Soviet Navy's main striking
power consists of nuclear powered submarines. Soviet
Military Review, 10 (October, 1967), 32; Ibid., 11 (Novem
ber, 1967), 17. This Soviet nuclear submarine, codenamed
"Y," is said to be armed with 16 tube-fired ballistic
missiles. Los Angeles Times, December 26, 1969.
72
Soviet Union had constructed a new nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarine, the Y-class, which had been
67
operational since September 1, 1969. This new submarine
is similar to the U.S. Polaris and carries sixteen mis
siles with a range in excess of 1,200 nautical miles.
Moreover, it has been reported that a third
generation missile, Sawfly, with a range of approximately
1,300 miles, has been added to the arsenal of Soviet
nuclear submarines.®® It has been further reported that
the design of the Soviet SLBM's which enables them to
be launched on a depressed trajectory, significantly
shortens their flight time, thus providing the capability
69
of threatening an adversary's alert bombers. In
67
Laird, Fiscal Year, 1971 Defense Program, pp.
36 and 104; Los Angeles Times, December 26, 1969; Military
Balance (1969-70), p. 8.
68
Aviation Week and Space Technology, 90:10
(March 10, 1969), 146; Laird, Fiscal Year, 1971 Defense
Program, p. 105. According to Laird's report, the Sawfly
missile was noticed for the first time in a Soviet parade
in 1967, Military Balance (1969-70), p. 7; Laird, Fiscal
Year 1972-76 Defense Program and the 1972 Defense Budget,
p. 47.
69
Department of Defense Appropriations for 1972,
p. 171.
73
addition, nuclear power has made possible the development
of a true submarine which can remain submerged for a very
long period of time and strike at targets anywhere in the
world. Consequently, Soviet naval doctrine, in terms of
strategic deterrence, has been given a firm foundation
upon which it can grow into maturity.
In the 1960's, the capability of the ICBM had
been further supplemented by air-launched missiles and
public displays also disclosed further new developments
of strategic bombers. Four new bombers appeared in the
1961 Aviation Day show, the Badger-C, Bear-B, Bounder and
Blinder. The Blinder and the Bounder were believed to be
supersonic bombers. The range of the Badger-C, the
Bear-B, and the Blinder were 3,000, 7,800, and 2,000
miles, respectively.^® The Badger is the counterpart of
71
the U.S. B-58 and is intended to replace the Badger.
70
Jane's All the World's Aircraft (1966-67), pp.
357 auid 362; Military Balance (1968-69), p. 54. According
to another source, Blinder's range is 4,250 miles with a
speed of Mach 2 to 2.1, Military Review, XLIII:10 (October
1963), 105; ibid., XXIXsl (April, 1959), 71.
71
Military Balance (1967-68), p. 8; Center, The
Soviet Military Technological Challenge, p. 45.
74
Continuous efforts by the Soviet Union in the
development of its bomber capabilities were further dis
closed in 1964 with the appearance of an advanced version
of the Bearr designated the Bear-C and reportedly having
a range of 7,800 miles and a speed of 500 miles per
72
hour. It is still further reported that the Soviet
Union has been developing a new bomber, the NATO desig
nated Backfire. This new bomber reportedly has a low-
73
altitude supersonic capability.
Although these developments seemed to refute
Khrushchev's position that the Soviet Union intended to
replace bombers with missiles, the actual facts have
proven otherwise. It is well worth noting that these new
bombers have been equipped with such sophisticated weapons
" 7 A
as air-to-air and/or air-to-surface missiles. * So
equipped, long-range bombers no longer are vulnerable to
72
Jane's All the World's Aircraft (1966-67),
p. 358.
73
The Washington Post, November 18, 1971.
74
Jane's All the World's Aircraft (1966-67),
p. 358. Also see Military Balance (1967-68), p. 8;
Center, The Soviet Military Technological Challenge, p. 45.
75
enemy air defense weapons. They are now capable of
delivering strikes against targets deep within enemy
territory while remaining a great distance outside the
enemy defense zone.
The Accuracy of Delivery Means
Information on accuracy of Soviet nuclear weapons
systems is harder to obtain them any other capabilities
such as yield and range. However, the development of
Soviet nuclear weapons systems in terms of accuracy can
be divided roughly into three phases: the 1950*s, the
early 1960's, and the late 1960's.
In the 1950's the accuracy of Soviet nuclear
missile weapons systems was not high enough to enable
them to discriminate a point target from other objects.
Pokrovsky stated in 1956,
In firing a rocket with an atomic or hydrogen war
head over distances of several thousand kilometers,
one can suppose that the dispersion of the points of
impact will not exceed the zone of destruction of
the atomic or hydrogen explosion.75
75
Pokrovsky, op. cit., p. 73.
76
He estimated that "the landing point of intercontinental
rockets does not deviate from the target point by more
than 10 to 20 kilometers (approximately 6.25 to 13.5
miles).
It is not clear that these figures represent
circular error probability (CEP), which denotes the radius
of the circle within which 50 percent of the missiles
aimed at a target can statistically be expected to fall.
If this is so, missile weapons systems might be good
counter-city strategic missions.
Seemingly, Soviet leaders gained confidence in
the accuracy of their nuclear missile weapons systems after
they conducted tests in 1960 across an 8,000-mile Pacific
firing range. The first shot reportedly hit the water
less than 2 kilometers (1.25 miles) from the predetermined
76
Ibid., p. 174. Ralph E. Lapp recalls that at
the beginning of the development of a long-range missile
to carry the H-bomb in the United States, many missile
experts felt that the best attainable CEP would be 20
miles. Cited from Lapp, Kill and Overkill, p. 67.
77
77
point. This is still not a high order of accuracy,
considering that even the 20-megaton warhead needs to have
an accuracy in the range of 0.6 to 0.8 of a mile in order
to destroy 80 percent of the missiles in hardened silos.7®
But, this improvement of accuracy of course has a stra
tegic significance for soft target strategy.
In any event, in the 1960's, emphasis on guidance
accuracy had become one of the main issues in Soviet
policy discussions on the status of the nuclear missile
weapons systems. Apparently referring to the Soviet
nuclear tests of 1961 and 1962, Marshal Krylov stated in
1963, "Results of recent tests bear witness to Soviet
strategic rockets' high degree of accuracy in striking a
selected target."7® Krylov used words such as "super
77
Jane's All the World's Aircraft (1962-63), p.
418; Neville Brown, Nuclear War; The Impending Strategic
Deadlock (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 81.
78
Authorization for Military Procurement, Fiscal
Year 1970, pp. 161-162.
79
Izvestia, November 17, 1963, in Current Digest
of the Soviet Press, XV:46 (December 11, 1963), 30.
78
sniper accuracy," but he did not disclose any specific
figures regarding a CEP for the missiles. Krylov, again
testifying as to the accuracy of the strategic rockets,
stated in November, 1964, that "stunningly high accuracy"
was vividly demonstrated during the latest tests in the
Pacific.
However, at the end of the 1960's, the Soviets
appeared to be successful in achieving a high degree of
accuracy. Dr. John S. Poster, Jr., Director of Defense
Research and Engineering in the Department of Defense,
stated in August, 1969, before the United States House of
Representatives s
Now, the SS-9 carrying a large warhead would have
more than adequate capability against a Minuteman
silo, because the SS-9 carries a very large total
payload and is rather accurate.
80
Pravda, November 19, 1964, in Current Digest of
the Soviet Press, XVI:47 (December 16, 1964), 33.
81
Diplomatic and Strategic Impact, p. 245.
Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird stated in his 1970
Defense Report that "at the present time, the accuracy of
the SS-9 with a single large warhead is considered suffi
cient to destroy a Minuteman in its silo, and it is esti
mated that the accuracy could be further improved," Fiscal
Year 1971 Defense Program, p. 103. According to a New
York Times report, “Each SS-9 could carry three 5-megaton
warheads, each of which with an accuracy of a quarter of
79
Considering a 10 or 20 megaton yield warhead atop the
missile weapons systems, Soviet boasts about accuracy of
their missiles cannot be taken lightly. Improved accuracy
may have provided the Soviet Union with the capability of
destroying enemy hardened targets. It is estimated that
the SS-9 might attain an accuracy as high as 0.25 n.m.
82
CEP. It is expected that the accuracy of the SS-9 will
be further improved in the mid-late 1970's.
Judging from the trend in improvement of a CEP
for the Soviet nuclear missile weapons systems, Russian
strategic offensive weapons systems in the 1950's could
a mile, could destroy a Minuteman silo," New York Times,
June 12, 1969. A Time article, "Busload of Megatons,"
suggests that a Soviet missile, SS-9, is a serious threat
to U.S. missile installations. Time, 93:26 (June 27,
1969), 14.
82
"Strategic Warfare," Space and Aeronautics, 53:1
(January, 1970), 66? Smart, op. cit., p. 25. Ralph F.
Lapp estimates uprated potential of the SS-9 as follows:
Number of MIRV's per missile 1 3 6 10 20
Warhead yield (MT) 20-25 5 1.5 0.5 0.1
Accuracy (CEP-yard) 1,800 400 300 210 160
Cited from “SALT, MIRV And First-Strike," Science and
Public Affairs, XXVIII:3 (March 1972), 25.
80
hardly discriminate between any point target or a military
objective and an adjacent populated area. Thus, Soviet
nuclear weapons systems in the 1950's could function only
as area weapons and did not possess credible counterforce
capability.
Soviet nuclear weapons in the early 1960's had
the capability of selecting an independent target from
surrounding objects, but it was only in the late 1960's
that the Soviet nuclear weapons systems, in terms of
accuracy, were improved sufficiently to destroy hardened
point targets. With a hard-target kill capability, wider
strategic options have been opened to the Soviet leaders
in such forms as first strike and counterforce strategy
in addition to a counter-city second strike. On the other
hand, such problems as the survivability of nuclear
strategic offensive forces and the dependability of
nuclear strategic defense weapons have become important
doctrinal issues.
Reaction Time and Mobility of
Strategic Offensive Missiles
The reaction time of strategic bombers can be
reduced by such measures as ground and/or airborne alert.
It appears, however, that the reaction time of strategic
81
bombers was not a crucial topic of discussion among the
Soviet leaders in the latter part of the 1950's. In 1957,
Khrushchev said that "both bomber aircraft and fighters
are in the twilight of their existence."®® It thus
appears that the Soviets were focusing their attention on
the reaction time of their missiles.
The nature of propellants is closely related to
the reaction time and mobility of strategic offensive
missiles. The development of Soviet missile propellants
can be divided roughly into three phases: the 1950's,
the early 1960's, and the latter period of the 1960's.
In the 1950's, the first generation cryogenic
Q
liquid fuel missiles had to be fueled just prior to
launching because the fuel used was so volatile that it
had to be kept at extremely low temperatures until the
missiles was fired. The dependence on this type of liquid
fuel resulted in precious time lost in firing preparation.
Even with the advanced liquid fuel developed in
the latter 1950's, such missiles as the Atlas and the
83
Pravda, October 11, 1957; ibid., January 15,
1960.
82
Titan I took more than fifteen minutes in firing prepara-
84
tion. Since the Ballistic Missiles Early Warning System
(BMEW) could provide only fifteen minutes of warning
85
time, sufficient time was not available for the prepara
tion and firing of missiles once a warning had been given.
Consequently, the Soviet first generation of ICBM's appear
to have been questionable in providing quick enough reac
tion to warning of an enemy action.
84
The U.S. Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR) has
a detection range of over 1,500 miles against the expected
ICBM's. On the other hand, the Ballistic Missile Early
Warning System (BMEW) is capable of detecting a missile
over 2,500 miles away. If an ICBM has a speed over 12,500
m.p.h., the PAR can provide a warning time of less than
10 minutes while the BMEW can provide approximately 15
minutes of warning time. However, even with advanced
liquid-fuel used in the missiles, such as the Atlas and
the Titan I, missiles can be launched only within 15
minutes. Solid fuel missiles like the Minuteman are cap
able of almost instantaneous reaction to enemy attack,
although the United States has not developed a launch-on-
waming doctrine. Authorization for Military Procurement,
Fiscal Year 1970, p. 167; and Scope, Magnitude and Impli
cations of the U.S. ABM Program, p. 15. Also see Time,
March 14, 1969, p. 25; U.S. News & World Report, February
29, 1960, pp. 44-48; Morton H. Halperin, Contemporary
Military Strategy (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967),
p. 26; Air University, Fundamentals of Aerospace Weapons
Systems (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1961), p. 265.
®^Air University, op. cit.
83
In the earlier part of the 1960's, a storable
fuel was developed for the second generation ICBM such
as the SS-7,®6 and with the development of storable liquid
fuel, missiles no longer needed to be fueled immediately
prior to launching time. At this point, the Soviet
leaders began to suggest that their missiles could react
quickly to the warning of an enemy attack. They stated
that their missiles would take off even before the
37
enemy's first missiles reached their targets. '
Quick reaction to warning of an enemy action
takes on added significance if strategic offensive nuclear
weapons cannot survive enemy strategic offensive strikes
and if a first-strike strategy is not adopted. In that
case, quick reaction time could form the basis for the
development of a launch-on-waming strategy. The Soviet
leaders appear to have been interested in this strategic
concept but they did not develop it fully.
86Military Balance (1970-71), p. 107.
87
I. Glagolev and V. Larionov, "Soviet Defense
Might and Peaceful Coexistence," International Affairs
(Moscow), November, 1963, p. 32; Krasnaya Zvezda, August
25 and 28, 1964, in Current Digest of the Soviet Press,
XVI:38 (October 14, 1964), 17.
84
In 1965, the Soviet leaders had initial success
Op
in the development of a solid fuel. With this fuel, a
missile is not only capable of almost instantaneous
response to enemy attack and is safely handled, but it
is almost more readily adaptable to mobile launchers.
With this initial development of solid fuel, the Soviet
leaders began to stress its importance. But their con-
89
tinuous build-up of storable liquid fueled missiles
suggests that some technological problems remained to be
solved before the transition to solid fuel could be made.
Nevertheless, since 1965, the Soviet leaders have
discussed the importance of mobility of missiles operating
on solid fuel. Marshal Krylov, in a statement in 1967,
88
Colonel V. Datsenko et al., “Missiles Stand
Guard Over Peace," Ognoyok, 25 (June, 1965), 4-7, in
Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XVII:27 (July 28,
1965), 6; Air University, op. cit., pp. 66 and 94.
89
Estimated number of ICBM's built since 1965:
Type Propellant Number in Service
SS-9 Storable Liquid 280 1965
SS-11 Storable Liquid 950 1966
SS-13 Solid 60 1968
Cited from Military Balance (1971-72), pp. 55-57.
85
made the connection between mobility and the use of solid
fuel:
The attention of scientists and specialists is
focused on the further improvement of rockets
capable of being launched from mobile launching
sites. The Soviet Union has achieved substantial
success in solving this program, having created small
size intercontinental missiles powered by solid fuel
and launched from a caterpillar tread vehicle.90
In keeping with this emphasis on mobile launching
capabilities, the latest model IRBM, the Scamp, was dis
played in the May 9, 1965 Moscow Parade as a complete
weapons systems including a tracked erector/launch
vehicle. No detailed information is available on its
operational status, but Jane's All the World Aircraft
reports that the Scamp systems have been deployed adjacent
to the frontier with Communist China near Buir Nor in
91
Outer Mongolia.
90
Pravda, November 19, 1967, in Current Digest of
the Soviet Press, XIX:46 (December 6, 1967), 28; New
Times, 8 (February 28, 1969), 5.
91
Jane's All the World Aircraft (1970-71), p. 637;
ibid. (1971-72), p. 575. According to the Military Bal
ance (1970-71), p. 6, development continues of the solid
fuel Scamp; the same source suggests that about 70 IRBM's
cover targets in China
86
At present, the mobility of Soviet strategic
offensive weapons systems appears to be based on a limited
92
number of mobile IRBM and missile-launching submarines.
No model of a mobile ICBM has yet been reported, and
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff, is of the opinion that a Soviet "mobile ICBM is
not expected to be available for deployment for several
years."9 3
"The Soviets have a substantial nuclear-powered,
ballistic missile submarine fleet. The most capable com
ponent of this fleet is the Y-class which, like the U.S.
POLARIS, has 16 tubes for launching missiles. The number
of such submarines has grown from four operational units
in January, 1967 to 25 as of January, 1972. Additional
missile tubes on the older H and G class subs give the
Soviets a total approaching 500 launchers in the opera
tional inventory (January, 1972). At least another 17
Y-class submarines are in various stages of assembly and
fitting out, and could bring the operational force of
Y-class submarines to 42 as early as the end of 1973.
With a continuation of the current production rate of
9-10 units per year, the USSR would develop an operational
force of Y-class submarines considerably larger in numbers
to the current POLARIS force by the mid-1970‘s." U.S.
Department of Defense, Statement of Secretary of Defense
Melvin R. Laird, Annual Defense Department Report, Fiscal
Year 1973, before the House Armed Services Committee,
February 17, 1972, p. 39.
93
Department of Defense Appropriations for 1972,
p. 171.
87
Strategic Defensive Nuclear Weapons Systems
The Soviet Union has devoted great effort to
active air defense, first against strategic bombers and
then against strategic missiles. The capabilities of
Soviet strategic defensive weapons systems can be analyzed
from the point of view of their two main components:
information and interception capabilities.
Information Capabilities
In 1946, the Soviet Union began to deploy its
first early warning radar systems along the Western and
Baltic coast and in the Soviet Far East along the Pacific
coast. By the mid-1950's, Russia also developed an air-
Q A
borne radar picket capability. The Soviets have spent
"substantially more on air defense against strategic
bombers than the United States," including a complex
94
Asher Lee, "Strategic Air Defense," in Lee,
op. cit., pp. 124-125; Robert A. Kilmarx, A History of
Soviet Air Power (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962),
pp. 266-267.
88
95
system for early warning and defense against aircraft.
Soviet leaders have claimed since 1961 the capa
bility of destroying missiles in flight. However, detec
tion and warning capabilities appeared to have been far
behind anti-ballistic missile development. Air Marshal V.
Sudets stressed in January, 1964, the importance of early
detection and warning of air attack at great distance.
But he did not touch upon information capabilities with
regard to ABM defense systems.
In April, 1966, Marshal Malinovsky reported to
the Twenty-third Congress of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union the completion of an extensive defensive
U.S. Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara's Defense Posture Statement, Hearings
before a Joint Session of the Senate Armed Forces Commit
tee and the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense
Appropriations on the Fiscal Year 1968-72 Defense Program
and 1968 Defense Budget, January 23, 1967, p. 42.(here
after cited as McNamara, 1968 Defense Posture Statement).
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Status
of U.S. Strategic Power, Hearings before a Subcommittee
of the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 90th Cong.,
2nd Sess. (1968), p. 197. Los Angeles Times, January 19,
1969.
96
Izvestia, January 5, 1965, in Current Digest of
the Soviet Press, XVIrl (January 29, 1964), 23.
89
belt ranging from the Baltic coast across the routes of
missile approach from the United States to the Soviet
Union. This air defense belt was named for one of the
anchors in the line— the city of Tallinn, capital of
Estonia. This system was originally believed to be an ABM
97
system. Though the possibility of an ABM role cannot
be excluded, the prevailing view in the United States
intelligence community is that Tallinn is an anti-aircraft
system. There is a strong suspicion among a number of
United States technical specialists that the Soviets may
have upgraded some of their SAM system.®®
The radars associated with the Tallinn system
appear to possess a certain degree of bassistic missile
defense capability, but they are believed to be insuffi-
Q Q
cient to cope with "a very sophisticated ICBM attack."
Diplomatic and Strategic Impact, p. 276.
98
Ibid., p. 248; Strategy and Science: Toward a
National Security Policy for the 1970*s, p. 283; Department
of Defense Appropriations for 1972, p. 173.
99
Diplomatic and Strategic Impact, p. 277;
Clifford, 1969 Defense Posture Statement, p. 44.
90
Improvements in the quality of this system can be made
without detection, however, and could be highly important.
When the Tallinn system is combined with the Hen House
radars, it becomes "upgraded into a very effective ABM
system.”^®
In recent years, development of Soviet radar tech
nology is believed to have run parallel with that of the
United States, with phased-array radars for ballistic
missile defense receiving emphasis.The Soviet
leaders "are continuing construction of their ballistic
102
missile defenses around Moscow." u These defenses
include ballistic missile early warning (BMEW) radars
known as the Hen House'*’ ^ target acquisition, discrimina-
100
Diplomatic and Strategic Impact, p. 277; Mark
B. Schneider, "Russia and the ABM," Ordnance, LVI:311
(March-April, 1972), 374; Jane's All the World's Aircraft
(1971-72), p. 568.
^^Authorization for Military Procurement, Fiscal
Year 1970, pp. 1352 and 1820.
102
Laird, Annual Defense Department Report, Fiscal
Year 1973, p. 44.
103
Laird, Fiscal Year 1972-76 Defense Program, and
the 1972 Defense Budget, a Report on President Nixon's
Strategy for Peace, p. 169; Schneider, op. cit., pp.
373-374.
91
tion and tracking radars known as the Dog House phased-
array radars and Try Add tracking and interceptor guidance
radars. The Hen House is an extremely large long-range
acquisition and tracking phased-array radar. It is
reported to be operational at a number of locations with
sites near Irkutsk on the Angara River, not far from the
Mongolian border; in Northwest Russia near the Barents
Sea; and in Latvia, not far from the Baltic Sea. The Hen
House tracks a number of targets while searching for
others, acquiring information which it can subsequently
transmit to the Dog House Radar.
The Dog House is also a sophisticated phased-array
radar of exceptionally large size, shaped like an A-frame
building with sides about 400 feet square. The Dog House
radar,
located near Moscow and operational since 1969, is
believed capable of tracking U.S. missiles at ranges
in excess of 1,500 n.m., sorting warheads from
decoys and selecting targets for ABM's.
104
“Soviets Closing Gap in Avionics, Computer
Science Military Development,* Aviation Week & Space Tech
nology , 95:17 (October 25, 1971), 42-43.
105
Ibid., p. 41.
92
Information on incoming warhead targets acquired by the
Dog House is then passed on to the Try Add Radar. The
Try Add is a much smaller Galosh site radar reportedly
capable of final tracking of limited numbers of incoming
warheads and guiding ABM's to interception.The capa
bility of this radar is reportedly being improved.
Interceptors
In the earlier period of the 1950's, the Soviet
Air Defense was developed for the task of anti-aircraft
defense. The Soviet's first anti-aircraft missiles, the
1956 version of the air defense missile family, were
assigned the code name "Guild" by NATO. The Guild, a
one-stage, radio guided and liquid fuel air defense
missile, has a slant range of 22 miles with a speed of
106
"Soviet Radar Expertise Expands," Aviation
Week & Space Technology, 94:7 (February 15, 1971), 15.
"Soviet Closing Gap in Avionics Computer Science Military
Development," ibid., p. 43; Schneider, "Russia and the
ABM," pp. 373-374; Brig. Gen. Harry N. Cordes, "The Stra
tegic Threat," Air Force Magazine, July, 1971, p. 54;
William Beecher cited American specialists' views in the
following words: "The Soviet Triad missile radar could
handle only one or two targets at a time," New York Times,
May 23, 1971.
93
Mach 2.5.107
Another surface-to-air guided missile, SA-2, given
the code name "Guideline* by NATO, was first seen in the
1957 military parade in Moscow and has become a standard
Soviet air defense missile deployed widely and in large
108
numbers. It has a slant range of about 25 miles and a
speed at burn-out of Mach 3.5. Both the Guild and Guide
line reportedly use TNT warheads, but there is speculation
that the latest model of Guideline might also use a nuclear
109
warhead. Another air defense missile was observed in
the parade in Moscow on November 7, 1960. This was iden
tified as an improved version of the Guideline which used
107
Military Review, XLVI:3 (March, 1966), 104;
Aerospace Technology. 21:3 (July 31, 1967), 96.
^**Jane's All the World's Aircraft (1966-67) , p.
467; Military Balance (1964-65), p. 4.
109
Aerospace Technology, 21:3 (July 31, 1967), 99;
Military Balance (1970-71), p. 6. According to Jane’s All
the World's Aircraft (1971-72), p. 566, the latest model
of Guideline "was claimed by the Moscow commentator to be
far more effective than earlier versions and the fact that
the enlarged warhead is white-pointed may imply that it is
of a nuclear type."
solid fuel and has a speed of Mach. 3.^®
In 1964, two new models of surface-to-air guided
missiles were shown in public for the first time. One
was SA-3 Goa and the other was SA-4 Ganef. The SA-3 Goa
was compact enough to be carried on the vehicle that was
used as a tracker for the trailer transporters of Guild
and Guideline; the SA-4 Ganef was twin-mounted on tracked
carriers and may also have been assigned to ground forces
in the field for a surface-to-surface role.^'*'
However, in the 1960's, the Soviet Union attempted
to solve the whole new series of air defense problems
created by strategic offensive nuclear missile weapons
systems. Even the latest anti-aircraft defense weapons
such as the SA-5 missile system, unless upgraded, could
not provide adequate anti-ballistic missile defense. The
SA-5, NATO code name "Griffon," was first displayed in
^^Military Review, XLVI:3 (March, 1966), 104;
Aerospace Technology, 21:3 (July 31, 1967), 96.
Jane's All the World's Aircraft (1966-67), p.
467; Military Balance (1968-69), p. 5.
95
112
Moscow on November 7, 1963. It appears to be basically
two-stage, but the warhead may separate after the second
stage burn-out and use an in-built rocket motor for the
final stages of interception. It is regarded as a long-
range anti-aircraft missile with limited defense capabil-
113
ities against tactical and air-launched missiles.
The Tallinn air defense installations are reported
to be SA-5 systems.These systems cover virtually the
entire European portion of the Soviet Union. In regard
to the anti-ballistic missile capabilities of these sys
tems, Dr. Foster stated in 1969 before Congressional
hearings:
Initially we saw the deployment of a number of sites
involving radar and missiles. We could not obtain
detailed information on the radar, and for that reason
we had to make some general assumptions about the
likely nature of the system. . . . Subsequently, we
112
Aerospace Technology, 21:3 (July 30, 1967), 99;
Military Balance (1965-66), p. 4; Center, The Soviet Mili
tary Technological Challenge, p. 61.
113
Jane's All the Worlds Aircraft (1971-72), p.
5 6 8 .
H ^ Diplomatic and Strategic Impact, p. 262.
96
have obtained more information on the radar, and
the conclusion is that it is not advanced enough
to be able to cope with a very sophisticated ICBM
attack. The difficulty, however, is that almost
any air defense system has some ballistic missile
defense capability against some kinds of re-entry
vehicles and, in particular, against our existing
re-entry vehicles.
Under these conditions, Soviet Defense Minister
Malinovsky stated in his report to the Twenty-second Party
Congress in October, 1960: “The problems of destroying
missiles in flight have been successfully solved."^®
In February, 1962, Malinovsky further hinted at
Soviet capability for anti-ballistic missiles. In his
statement on the forty-fourth anniversary of the Armed
Forces Day, he said, "Our anti-aircraft forces have equip
ment and weapons capable of destroying the enemy's air
and space means of attack at enormous distances and alti-
1 1 7
tudes." Khrushchev suggested with more concrete words
115Ibid., p. 277.
116Pravda, October 25, 1961.
117
Pravda, February 23, 1962, in Current Digest
of the Soviet Press, XIV:8 (March 21, 1962), 22.
97
the development of Soviet anti-ballistic missile capabil
ity. In July, 1962, in a statement to visiting American
newspaper editors, he asserted that "Soviet antimissile
missiles could 'hit a fly in' outer space. Malinovsky,
in his speech at the All-Army Conference on Ideological
Questions in October, 1962, confirmed Khrushchev's and his
own earlier remarks, and said again that "we have success
fully solved the problem of destroying enemy missiles in
119
flight." Malinovsky also boasted, in February, 1963,
that the Soviet air defense forces then comprised not only
120
anti-air but also anti-missile defense forces.
In this regard, further Soviet technological
improvement was evidenced in 1964 with the display of
another model of air defense interceptor, code named
"Galosh" by NATO. The Galosh is a large solid-propellant
anti-ballistic missile missile which is believed to have
118
Izvestia, July 19, 1962, in Sokolovskii, Soviet
Military Strategy, p. 315.
119
Krasnaya Zvezda, October 25, 1962, in Sokolv-
skii, op. cit., p. 315.
120
Pravda, February 23, 1963, in Current Dxgest of
the Soviet Press, XV:8 (March 20, 1963), 9.
98
a range of several hundred miles and to carry a nuclear
warhead in the 1-2 megaton range.121 It is therefore
suitable for interception at high altitude and for area
defense. Dr. Foster is of the opinion that "this improved
Soviet ABM warhead raised the possibility that one defen
sive explosive burst could destroy more than one threaten
ing object."122
The Galosh ABM system provides area defense cover
age for Moscow and cities in the European-Russian area.121
An area defense missile such as the Galosh is referred
to as an exo-atmospheric interceptor. With its long
range, it has the advantage of defending a larger area,
but it does require the earliest possible warning. Since
an exo-atmospheric interceptor is designed to intercept
while the incoming enemy missile is still in outer space,
121
Military Balance (1969-70), pp. 6-7; Diplomatic
and Strategic Impact, p. 243; Scope, Magnitude, and Impli
cations of the U.S. ABM Program, p. 64.
122
Diplomatic and Strategic Impact, p. 243.
123
Ibid., p. 250.
99
the time period between the time the attacking missiles
first appear to the radar and the moment of interception
should be long enough for interpreting the radar signals,
identifying potential targets, tracking and discriminating
between incoming objects and guiding the interceptor
missiles to interception points in outer space— a range
of several hundred miles from the surface of earth.
A point worth noting in regard to ABM capabilities
in 1968 is that Soviet leaders apparently slowed construc
tion of the ABM system for unknown reasons. Former Secre
tary of Defense Clark M. Clifford stated in January, 1969,
"During the past year the Soviets apparently curtailed
construction at some of the Galosh ABM complexes they were
deploying around Moscow."124 However, Secretary of
Defense Melvin R. Laird confirmed in March, 1971, in his
report on the Fiscal Year 1972-76 Defense Program and the
1972 Defense Budget that "Soviets are continuing construc-
U.S. Department of Defense, Statement of Secre
tary of Defense Clark M. Clifford? The Fiscal Year 1970-
74, Defense Program and 1970 Defense Budget, January 15,
1969, p. 267.
100
1 JE
tion of their ballistic missile defenses." In
February, 1972, Secretary Laird reported that "there are
four ABM-1 Complexes at Moscow which provide 64 missiles
on launchers. All four complexes are now operational."
However, he expressed his confidence in "the ability of
Poseidon and Minuteman III to penetrate all known Soviet
ABM defenses."126
In any event, the Soviet Union has been working
for many years on an anti-ballistic missile defense
system. However, one major weakness appears to be the
lack of a high-acceleration type endo—atmospheric ABM
defense missile. An endo-atmospheric missile, with its
relatively short range, can only protect a single target
area and, therefore, is referred to as a point defense
missile. By enhancing the pre-launch survivability of
strategic offensive missiles, a point defense missile has
a doctrinal significance for a second-strike strategy.
125
Laird, "Toward a National Security Strategy of
Realistic Deterrence," in Fiscal Year 1972-76 Defense Pro
gram and the 1972 Defense Budget, p. 169.
Laird, Annual Defense Department Report, Fiscal
Year 1973, p. 44.
101
A basic requirement of an endo-atmospheric missile
is an extremely high acceleration capability. Its high
acceleration capability, which enables it to be fired after
the enemy's missiles have entered the atmosphere, allows
it to take advantage of the radar's ability to discrimi
nate warheads from penetration aids such as chaff, decoys
127
and balloons. Because of this necessity for extremely
high acceleration, however, the development of an endo-
atmospheric defense missile is considered to need more
complicated technology them that required to develop an
128
exo-atmospheric missile. The limitation of their
present ABM technology might be a factor in the Soviet
leaders' decision to deploy an area ABM defense rather
than a point defense system.
127
Scope, Magnitude, and Implications of the U.S.
ABM Program, p. 9.
128
Smart, op. cit., p. 8.
CHAPTER III
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS
IN COMMUNIST CHINA
This chapter is concerned with the characteristics
of nuclear weapons systems in the Republic of China in
terms of lethality and range (Table 2). Having tested its
first nuclear weapon in 1964, Communist China is, in con
trast to the Soviet Union, a late joiner in the atomic
club. Chinese research and development of nuclear missile
technology has not yet reached the stage where accuracy
and response time of nuclear weapons systems can become
a significant factor in doctrinal issues. Furthermore,
there is little detailed information available on this
aspect of weapons development.
Until they were able to test their first nuclear
bomb, Communist Chinese leaders attempted to formulate
their own deterrence doctrine on the basis of Soviet
nuclear support instead of following Soviet doctrine. To
determine the nature and scope of the nuclear capabilities
102
103
TABLE 2
COMMUNIST CHINA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS
Date Yield Delivery Means
October 16, 1964 20 KT Tower
May 14, 1965 20-40 KT Air dropped
May 9, 1966 200 KT Air dropped
October 27, 1966 10-20 KT MRBM (Soviet-type
SS-4 Sandal)
December 28, 1966 300-500 KT Tower
June 17, 1967 3 MT Air dropped
December 24, 1967 15-25 KT Air dropped
December 27, 1968 3 MT Air dropped
September 23, 1969 25 KT Underground
September 29, 1969 3 MT Air dropped
October 14, 1970 3 MT Air dropped
November 18, 1971 20 KT Tower
January 7, 1972 20 KT Air dropped?
SOURCE: Based on information derived from source
materials such as Military Review, Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, New York Times, Washington
Post, and Japan Times.
104
upon which the Chinese Communists have developed their
own deterrence doctrine, this chapter also deals briefly
with Sino-Soviet military relations from 1949 to the
present.
Sino-Soviet Military Relations
Sino-Soviet military relations from 1949 to the
present can be divided roughly into three phases:
(1) cooperation, 1949-59; (2) deteriorating relations,
1960-63; and (3) cold war relations, 1964 to the present.
The Period of Cooperation, 1949-59
From 1949 to 1957, Sino-Soviet military relations
were close. In 1955, the Soviet Union withdrew its troops
from Port Arthur and transferred all Russian interests in
rare metals to Communist China. The Soviet government
also decided, in that same year, to furnish Communist
China with scientific, technical and industrial assistance
to promote research work on the peaceful use of atomic
energy.* Previously, the Soviet Union had done its best
*New China News Agency release, January 17, 1955;
also Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy: A
Historical Analysis (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1966), p. 178.
105
to assist in building a modem industrial system in
Communist China. China's modernization plans were based
mainly upon Soviet blueprints, specifications and con
struction techniques.
Meanwhile, the degree of Communist China's depend
ence upon the Soviet Union was well manifested in Commu
nist China's foreign trade. Yeh Chi-chuang, Minister of
Foreign Trade, claimed in October, 1956, that the propor
tion of Communist China's trade with the Communist bloc
countries, mostly with the Soviet Union, rose from 26
percent in 1950, to 61 percent in 1951, and to 70 percent
2
by 1956. Under these circumstances, Soviet efforts to
assist Communist China were praised by Peking as symbols
of "benevolence" and true communist "internationalism."
From a strategic standpoint, those benevolent
efforts can be viewed as a shrewd effort by Soviet leaders
to build a "lean-to-one-side" system in Communist China,
through which the Soviet Union could consolidate and
2
Calvin Suev Keu Chin, A Study of Chinese Depend-
ence Upon the Soviet Union for Economic Development as a
Factor in Communist China's Foreign Policy (Hong Kong:
Union Research Institute, 1959), p. 95.
106
strengthen its undisputable position of leadership. As a
result, there appeared to have been some limitations as
to the level to which Communist China might be “allowed"
to build. For instance, Soviet aid was given Communist
China for complete construction of light piston aircraft,
tanks, submarines and small patrol crafts. But allocation
was made only for the partial construction and assembly of
jet fighters and none at all for any heavy bombers or
warships.^
The leaders of Communist China appeared to be
determined to modernize the People's Liberation Army. At
this time there was "an evident willingness to acknowledge
the main doctrinal aspects of the new Soviet military
4
thinkings." The emergence of atomic weapons was recog
nized as having led to a new development in military
science.
Garthoff, op. cit., p. 178; John Gittings, The
Role of the Chinese Army (London: Oxford University Press,
1967), p. 131; Richard M. Bueschel, Communist Chinese Air
Power (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), pp. 41-42.
4
Alice L. Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the
Nuclear Era (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1962), p. 36.
107
By 1957, Sino-Soviet cooperative military rela
tions had developed even further. In October, 1957, a
secret agreement with regard to “new technology for
national defense" was concluded between the two countries.^
Soviet leaders have not specifically discussed this matter,
but they have implicitly acknowledged its existence by
publicly criticizing the Chinese leaders for exposing
joint military secrets. Contents of this agreement have
never been disclosed. However, the Peking government
stated:
The Soviet government unilaterally tore up [in June,
1959] the agreement on new technology for national
defense, concluded between China and the Soviet
Union on October 15, 1957, and refused to provide
China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical
data concerning its manufacture.6
Communist China implied in this statement that
a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning
its production were promised by the Soviet Union. One
assumption may be that the contents of the agreement were
^Hsinhua, August 15, 1963, and Hung Ch*i (Red
Flat) also Jen-min Jih-pao (People*s Daily), September 6,
1963.
6Ibid.
108
probably so vague that each party vras able to interpret
the pact liberally. In any event, as time passed, leaders
of Communist China appeared to realize the definite limi
tations of Soviet military assistance. Former Defense
Minister Peng Teh-huai's remarks made early in 1958
reflected the then existing state of national affairs.
He said:
Some comrades had only a partial understanding of
modernization but failed to appreciate that the
modernization of our army must be established on
the basis of our industrialization.?
Concurrently, "The New Draft Program of Combat
Training," issued in 1958, suggested that Peking had made
a new decision in strategic policy. According to Alice
Langley Hsieh, once a senior staff member of the RAND
Corporation, two important tasks were listed in the new
program: to increase the political consciousness of all
personnel, and to study Mao Tse-tung's writings on military
Q
matters. The new program also emphasized the importance
7
"Translations of Articles from Peiping Chieh-
fang-chun Pao," in Joint Publication Research Service,
764-D, pp. 9-11.
8
Hsieh, op. cit., p. 110.
109
of mastering "existing weapons and technical equipment
and the special features of terrain and climate of our
A
country.
Before adopting this new military program, the
Chinese Communist leaders apparently "stubbornly sought
to get the Soviet Union to hand over atomic bombs to
them."^® However, encountering Soviet reluctance to fur
nish nuclear weapons, Communist China finally decided to
produce its own nuclear weapons.^ Instead of providing
nuclear weapons, the Soviet leaders appeared to have
9
Chieh.-fang-ch.un Pao, January 16, 1958, in Sur
vey of China Mainland Press, No. 1786, June 6, 1958.
10
M. A. Suslov, reporting on Sino-Soviet polemic
at Plenary Session of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee, said
on February 14, 1964 that "it is known that the C.P.R.
leaders have stubbornly sought to get the Soviet Union to
hand over atomic bombs to them. They took extreme offense
that our country did not offer them samples of atomic
weapons," Pravda, April 3, 1964, in Current Digest of the
Soviet Press, XVI:13 (April 22, 1964), 12.
^According to Radio Moscow (July 10, 1964), "The
Chinese leaders have been at great pains— this is not a
secret— to get the Soviet Union to give them the atomic
bomb. The Soviet government naturally could not consider
this since it might have led to the most serious conse
quences ."
110
proposed such joint defensive systems as a joint naval
command in the Pacific and an integrated air defense
In 1958, the leadership of the C.P.S.U. [Communist
Party of the Soviet Union] put forward unreasonable
demands designed to bring China under Soviet mili
tary control. These unreasonable demands were
and firmly rejected by the Chinese govern-
Chinese Communist leaders interpreted Soviet abrogation
of the agreement on new technology as a reprisal for
China's rejection of joint defense efforts, which were
designed to bring China under Soviet military control.
Under these circumstances, the Sino-Soviet dispute boiled
into the open during the 1960's.
Edward Crankshaw, The New Cold War: Moscow vs.
Peking (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963), pp. 108-109;
Garthoff, op. cit., p. 179. Suslov also said in his above
mentioned report that "starting in 1958, the C.P.R.
government began with increasing frequency to take various
steps toward undermining Soviet-Chinese friendship and
through its uncoordinated actions in the international
arena to create difficulties not only for the Soviet Union
but for other socialist countries as well," in Current
Digest of the Soviet Press, XVI:14 (April 29, 1964), 4.
12
system. In this light, the following passage is worth
noting:
■^jen-min Jih-Pao and Hung-ch'i, September 6,
1963.
Ill
Deteriorating Relations, 1960-63
Publication of a series of articles, "Long Live
14
Leninism!" in April, 1960, was a turning point in the
dispute. The Soviet Union saw an unshakable determina
tion by the Communist Chinese to challenge Soviet leader
ship in the international communist movement. Once the
dispute developed into open polemics, the Chinese Commu
nist leaders clearly put on the record their views on war
and peace. Under these circumstances, there was Chinese
Communist concern over the availability of the Soviet
nuclear umbrella to protect China's foreign policy and
national security until China could develop its own nu
clear weapons.
The Chinese Communists' first order of business,
therefore, was to dissuade the Soviet leaders from
obstructing China's development of its own nuclear
weapons systems. In January of 1960, the National People's
Congress Standing Committee passed a resolution stressing
that Communist China would not be bound by any disarmament
^ Peking Review, No. 17 (April 26, 1960) .
112
agreement except with its expressed consent, and that it
would accept no disarmament agreement unless it had par-
15
ticipated in negotiations. This resolution clearly
reflected the Chinese Communist's suspicion of the reli
ability of Russian assistance in producing nuclear
weapons.
Meanwhile, deteriorating military relations began
to be reflected in Sino-Soviet border conflicts. Accord
ing to a Chinese Communist report:
In April and May of 1962, the leaders of the Commu
nist Party of the Soviet Union used their organs and
personnel in Sinkiang, China, to carry out large-
scale subversive activities in the H i region and
enticed and coerced several thousands of Chinese
citizens into going to the Soviet Union.
Then, accusing Soviet leaders, Communist China further
stated:
The Soviet side has flagrantly carried out large-
scale subversive activities in Chinese frontier
areas, trying to sow discord among China's national
ities by means of the press and wireless, inciting
^ Peking Review, 111:4 (January 26, 1960), 19.
16
Jen-min Jih-pao and Hung-ch1i, September 6,
1963.
1 1 3
China's minority nationalities to break away from
their motherland.17
Countering these Chinese Communist accusations, Russia
covin tercharged:
Since 1960, Chinese servicemen and civilians have
been systematically violating the Soviet border.
In 1962 alone, more them 5,000 violations were
recorded. Attempts are even made to arbitrarily
"take over” some pieces of Soviet territory.!®
These charges and countercharges suggest that the Sino-
Soviet alliance had been completely transformed. Chinese
Communist leaders were convinced that the Soviet Union
was "intoxicated with the idea of the two 'super-powers'
19
establishing spheres of influence throughout the world."
Furthering discord, the Soviet government decided
in August, 1963, to conclude a partial nuclear test ban
treaty with the United States and Great Britain. This
decision was viewed by the Chinese leaders as a plot aimed
at further depriving the Chinese people of their right to
Hsinh.ua, May 8, 1964.
18
Pravda, September 21-22, 1963.
19
"Apologists of Neo-Colonialism," Hsinh.ua, Octo
ber 21, 1963, in Current Background, No. 720 (October 24,
1963).
1 1 4
produce their own nuclear weapons.
To make matters worse, Peking had been given
indications by Moscow which definitely suggested a serious
limitation in the scope of Soviet nuclear protection for
Communist China. Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Malinov
sky stated in 1962, "Soviet military power would defend
only those socialist states friendly to the Soviet
20
Union." Thus, he suggested that Soviet support to
Communist China in case of war was conditional. Soviet
leaders continuously criticized the Chinese Communist
pursuit of "special aims and interests,” which went beyond
the legitimate interests of the socialist camp, and they
made it clear that such special aims and interests "cannot
be supported by the military power of the socialist
camp."2^
20
Tass, January 24, 1962, cited in Garthoff,
op. cit., p. 186.
21
Pravda, September 21-22, 1963, cited in Garthoff,
op. cit., p. 186. Y. Zhukov stated in June, 1964,
"Peking's leaders continue from time to time to pronounce
highfaluting, insincere phrases that in the grave hour of
trial, China and the Soviet Union will always be united.
But each reasonable man will say to them, 'how do you
intend to provide this when such dirty anti-Soviet cam
paigning is unfolded in China.'" Pravda, June 21, 1964.
Cold War Relations, 1964 to the Present
In 1964, Sino-Soviet Military relations deterio
rated to the point of a "kind of war."^ More them 5,000
military clashes along the Amur River between the two
Communist giants were reported during the period from
23
1964 to 1965. In recent years, as if alarmed by the
Chinese Communist militant attitudes, top Soviet leaders
have made frequent visits to the Siberian regions and have
urged the people to strengthen their border defense. A
military assistance pact, signed in 1966 between the Soviet
Union and the Mongolian People's Republic was another
reflection of ever-increasing tensions along the Sino-
Soviet border areas. It is believed that provisions for
the stationing of Soviet troops on Mongolian territory
O A
were made in a secret clause of that pact.
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin also suggested that
the Soviet Union would not be involved in any Communist
Chinese crisis. Izvestia, June 20, 1964.
22
Pravda, September 2, 1964.
23
Tairiku Junpo, No. 322, September, 1967, p. 11.
New York Times, January 16, 1966.
1 1 6
In 1966, Soviet authorities deliberately ordered
a public showing of a new missile base in the vicinity of
Bratsk near Lake Bykal with missiles of 1,500—2,000 mile
range. These missiles could reach Sinkiang, Peking, and
25
Shanghai— but not Tokyo, Japan. Thus, Sino-Soviet
military relations have deteriorated within twenty years
from close alliance to cold war.
Tairiku-mondai, 16:4 (April, 1966), 17.
26
A report on the Sino-Soviet Conflict and its
Implications by the Subcommittee on the Far East and the
Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of
Representatives, found that "primarily, the dispute has
developed into a conflict over the priority of strategies
as vehicles to advance the Communist World revolution,"
and further states some of the points at issue and the
respective positions regarding the question of strategy
and tactics as follows: (1) Moscow believes there is a
real possibility that world war can be avoided. However,
Peking believes that “imperialism" is an inevitable source
of wars. (2) Moscow maintains local wars are not needed to
advance socialist causes. Local war can get out of con
trol, risk world war, and hence must be avoided. On the
other hand, Peking maintains that until "imperialists" are
destroyed, local wars are inevitable. (3) Moscow claims
world war would be ruinous, while Peking contends that
although a nuclear war would be destructive, "imperialism"
would perish and socialism could re-create with extreme
rapidity, a "beautiful new civilization." (4) Peking
charges the Soviets with failing to support national liber
ation struggles because of its view toward the risk of
local wars precipitating larger conflicts. (5) Moscow has
taken the line that disarmament is feasible and desirable.
But Peking maintains disarmament prior to the final
117
Strategic Offensive Nuclear Weapons Systems
The Yield of Nuclear Weapons
Two phases are noted in the development of nuclear
weapons systems in Communist China. During the first
phase, covering the period from the establishment of the
Communist regime on the China mainland until 1964, the
Chinese Communists laid the foundation for basic research
and development of nuclear energy. In the second stage,
from 1964 to the present, they succeeded alone in produc
ing and testing atomic and hydrogen devices.
destruction of "imperialism" is inconceivable, unattain
able, and undesirable. (6) Peaceful coexistence has
become a principal plank of Moscow's foreign policy. On
the other hand, Peking's view is that liberation movements
are strengthened only by struggle— not peaceful coexist
ence. (7) According to Moscow, the role of international
Communist front organizations should be to serve as a
means for mobilizing non-Communists as well as Communists.
To Peking, front organizations must be used in the strug
gle against "imperialism" and their value is directly pro
portionate to their responsiveness to Communist control
and manipulation. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Sino-Soviet Conflict, Report by the Sub
committee on the Far East and the Pacific of the Committee
on Foreign Affairs, March 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23, and
31, 1965. HR 84, pp. 4R-5R. (Hereafter cited as Sino-
Soviet Conflict.)
1 1 8
Chinese Communist leaders became interested in
the development of nuclear weapons immediately after the
conquest of power in 1949. They set up the Office for the
Development of Nuclear Energy within the Center of Science
and Technology. No detailed information about activities
of this office in its earlier days is available but Kuo
Mo-jo, President of the Center of Science and Technology,
reported in April, 1954, that the Center had laid the
grounds for basic research on nuclear energy.^
An agreement on scientific and technical coopera
tion was concluded in April, 1955, between China and
Russia, with the Soviet Academy of Science sending a dele
gation to Peking in December, 1955, to crystalize mutual
cooperation. This cooperation included Soviet assistance
for the training of nuclear specialists and providing
28
Peking with nuclear research facilities. In 1956,
27
Tetsuo Hayakawa, "Chukyo no Genshiryoku ni
Kansuru" (A Study of Communist Chinese Ability of Nuclear
Energy), KDK series, No. 5 (Tokyo, 1964), p. 2. New China
News Agency Bulletin, January 17, 1955.
2 8
S. C. Chien, "Development of Nuclear Research in
the Chinese People's Republic," Joint Publications Re
search Service, No. 3601 (Washington, D.C., 1960), p. 2.
1 1 9
Communist China joined other Communist nations in a co
operative, "socialist," nonmilitary nuclear research pro
gram at Dubna (near Moscow). Peking finally withdrew its
90
specialists in 1965. * The Communist Chinese implied that
the Soviet Union also agreed in October, 1957, to provide
Peking with "a sample of an atomic bomb" and technical
data concerning its manufacture.^®
Reflecting the spirit of cooperation, the Chinese
Communist appraisal of the importance of nuclear weapons
followed closely that of the Soviet Union. Chinese
censorship that initially had been imposed upon the role
29
Garthoff, op. cit.r p. 178. Chi Wang, "Nuclear
Research in Mainland China," Nuclear News, May, 1967,
p. 16.
30
Jen-min Jih-pao and Hungsh'i, September 6, 1963.
Also, see Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict,
1956-1961 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962),
p. 10; Garthoff, op. cit., p. 180? Thomas W. Wolfe,
Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1965), p. 218; Walter C. Clemens, Jr.,
The Arms Race and Sino-Soviet Relations (Stanford: Stan
ford University Press, 1968), p. 16. In the author's
personal interview with B. N. Zanegin, China Division,
Academy of Science, Moscow, on May 12, 1969, in Los Ange
les, California, it was revealed that no such written
agreement ever existed between Peking and Moscow.
120
of nuclear weapons in modern warfare came to an end in
1955. Not only did the nature of nuclear weapons begin
to be discussed, but it was admitted that nuclear weapons
could "devastate a wide area and contaminate the atmos-
31
phere with deadly radiation." A series of photographs
and articles concerning nuclear warfare appeared in the
32
Chinese Communist army publications.
Communist China, with Soviet aid, began operation
of its first heavy water type experimental reactor— 7,000
33
to 10,000 kilowatts capacity— in Peking in 1958, followed
shortly thereafter by construction of more atomic reactors.
31
New China News Agency release, March 31, 1955,
in Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1020 (April 1, 1955).
32
New China News Agency, April 4, 1955, in Survey
of China Mainland Press, No. 1022 (April 5, 1955).
33
Asahi Shinbun, August 9, 1963; Clemens, op. ext.,
p. 16; William L. Ryan and Sam Summerlin, The China Cloud
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), p. 179; Tetsuo
Hayakawa, "Chukyo no Kenshiryoku Riyo ni Kansuru Kenkyu"
(A Study of Communist China's Utilization of Nuclear
Energy), KDK Series No. 5 (Tokyo, 1964), p. 5; "Nuclear
Progress in Red China," Chemical Engineering Progress,
56:3 (March, 1960), 16-17.
121
When Liu Shao-ch'i, then President of the Chinese People's
Republic, stressed at Moscow in November, 1960, Communist
China's hope to become a nuclear power, he suggested the
34
country already had four atomic reactors in operation.
However, various sources of information could not agree
either to the number and location of these reactors or to
other facilities related to research and production of the
nuclear weapons.
34
New China News Agency, November 24, 1960.
35
Mark Oliphant, Professor of Physics at the
Australian National University, made a report on the num
ber of reactors after his visit to the China mainland In
September, 1964. Professor Oliphant was assured that
"there were no other reactors in China except that in the
Atomic Energy Institute No. II." [Mark Oliphant, "Report
Over Pots of Teas: Excerpts from a Diary of a Visit to
China," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, XXII:5 (May,
1966), 38.] However, Walter C. Clemens, Jr., implied
another research reactor constructed in Communist China
when he wrote that "in 1958, there was established in China
another Institute of Atomic Energy Research" in addition
to "the research reactor and cyclotron promised by Moscow
in 1955 which commenced operation near Peking in 1958,"
Clemens, Jr., op. cit., p. 16. According to a U.S. Army
Journal, there are four locations of reactors; that is,
Peking, Shenyang, Sian, and Chungking, Military Review,
XLVII:8 (August, 1967), 19. Tetsuo Hayakawa, a Japanese
expert on Communist China's nuclear matters, agrees with
Military Review as to the number of reactors but he dis
agrees to the locations of them. Hayakawa is of the
opinion that the Soviet Union and Communist China agreed
122
In any event, the leaders of Communist China pro
jected a ten-year period for the development of nuclear
weapons. Mao Tse-tung said in 1958, "It is entirely
possible for atom bombs and hydrogen bombs to be made in
36
a ten-year period of time." Marshal Nieh Jung-chan,
Chairman of the Scientific and Technological Commission,
also said in August, 1958, "In the not too distant future
we should master the newest techniques concerning atomic
fission, thermonuclear reaction, and the use of atomic
energy in all fields."37
in December, 1957 to a construction project of nuclear
reactors at four places— Peking, Shenyang, Sian, and Chung
king; later the Soviet Union hoped to change a location
from Shenyang to Harbin in Manchuria. Having been unable
to agree with each other, both sides finally compromised
to the following locations: two reactors at Peking, one
each at Sian and Shahyar in Sinkiang. Hayakawa, op. cit.,
p. 6. However, according to an Associated Press report.
Red China has established two reactors at Peking, one each
at Shenyang, Sian, Chungking, and Shanghai, and Plutonium
Slug-fabrication plant at Paotow. The Japan Times,
February 10, 1971.
36
New China News Agency, June 17, 1967, in Survey
of China Mainland Press, No. 3964 (June 21, 1967).
37
Bulletin, Institute for the Study of the USSR,
VIII:8, 17. The newest techniques referred to here seem
to suggest gaseous diffusions methods, according to U.S.
information sources. New York Times, November 2, 1966;
Military Review, XLVII:8 (August, 1967), 19.
1 2 3
These remarks by the leaders of Communist China
suggest that Peking had embarked on a course different
from the Soviet Union in the development of nuclear
weapons systems. The Soviet Union first developed atomic
weapons and then expanded its program into hydrogen
weapons. China, however, decided to work simultaneously
on the development of both atomic and hydrogen weapons and
to head straight toward possession of an over-all nuclear
weapons system, skipping or shortening the period for some
transitional stage. Behind this decision lay Communist
China's determination to make a Soviet nuclear umbrella
unnecessary and to thwart Russian attempts to bring Com
munist China under their military control.
In the end, the Soviet government "unilaterally"
tore up the 1957 agreement on new technology and in August,
1960, recalled nearly 3,000 of their technicians. Chinese
Communist leaders, however, never gave up their nuclear
qo
aspirations. They indicated, even more frankly, that
despite economic difficulties, Peking was determined to
38
Hsinhua, August 15, 1963; Hung Ch'i and Jen-min
Jih-pao, September 6, 1963; Clemens, Jr., op. cit., p. 20;
Garthoff, op. cit., p. 184.
124
work “a hundred years on producing its own nuclear
39
weapons." This determination was reflected in Ch'en Yi's
press conference for Japanese newsmen on October 28, 1963 .
at Peking. He said:
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev once stated that the
manufacture of A-weapons costs much money, so China
may in the end have no money to make trousers with.
But, in my view, China will have to manufacture the
most modern weapons with or without trousers.
The world was caught by surprise when Communist
China successfully exploded its first atomic bomb in
October, 1964. It was not the speed of the weapon's
development but rather the quality of the bomb that caused
astonishment. By the beginning of the 1960's, Western
nuclear experts had predicted that Communist China would
be able to test its first atomic bomb at any time, since
Plutonium 239, required for a test of an atomic bomb,
39
"Statement of the Soviet Government, September
21, 1963," in Peter Berton, comp., The Russian-Chinese
Dialogue: 1963 (Los Angeles: University of Southern
California, 1963).
40
Kyodo, Japanese News Agency, October 28, 1963.
125
could be accumulated through, operations of the research
41
reactors.’x
However, Communist China's first atomic bomb was
a Hiroshima-type Uranium 235 bomb rather them Plutonium
239. Preliminary analysis by the United States Atomic
Energy Commission showed that the device was built of
enriched Uranium, and used a relatively advanced trigger
A O
mechanism. Separation of Uranium 235 from the far more
abundant Uranium 238, in raw Uranium, is an extremely
difficult process carried out by Western nuclear powers in
two ways: gaseous diffusion and electromagnetic methods
for processing enriched Uranium 235 to weapon-grade
41
New York Times, October 17, 1964. Morton
Halperin has speculated that the Chinese Communists might
have expected to test their own atomic bomb by 1960 had
the Soviet leaders fulfilled their obligations under the
1957 agreement. Morton H. Halperin, "Sino-Soviet Rela
tions, 1957-1960," in Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Con
trol, ed. by Morton Halperin (Cambridge: The MIT Press,
1967), p. 124.
42
New York Times, October 22, 1964, and October
21, 1965.
126
(89-90 percent).43 This suggests that Communist China was
determined to produce nuclear weapons in quantity at the
earliest possible date.
Two years and eight months later, Communist China
again surprised the world by successfully testing its
first hydrogen bomb. It was an extraordinary achievement
to test its first Uranium 235 atomic bomb and a hydrogen
44
bomb in such a short span of time. Considering this
Regarding the Chinese enrichment process. Dr.
Vein Cleave has concluded, after a comprehensive research
on nuclear proliferation, that "China is apparently using
a combination of gaseous diffusion and electromagnetic
separation at this time." He further elaborates that
"these two methods complement one another. The gaseous
diffusion method cam more easily attain the lower degree
of enrichment (10-20% U-235), requiring a plant somewhat
smaller them the plants used in the United States for full
enrichment. The electromagnetic separation method is
suitable for handling the smaller quantities of partially
enriched uranium, and completing the process to weapon-
grade (80-90%)." William R. Van Cleave, "Nuclear Prolif
eration: The Interaction of Politics and Technology,"
Unpublished Ph.D dissertation (Claremont College, 1967),
p. 87. Arnold Kramish and Walter C. Clemens, Jr., also
suggest that Communist China very probably adopted a
method of combination of gaseous diffusion and electro
magnetic separation. For details, see Kramish*s article,
"The Great Chinese Bomb Puzzle— and a Solution," Fortune,
73:6 (June, 1966), 157-185, and Clemens, Jr., op. cit.,
p. 23.
44
The United States took about two years and
eleven months until its first hydrogen bomb test in Novem
ber, 1952, after President Truman decided to initiate the
1 2 7
rapid pace in nuclear weapon development, former United
States Secretary of Defense Robert MCNamara estimated at
the end of 1965 that Communist China would produce enough
fissionable materials in the next two years to begin a
small stockpile of nuclear weapons.
A Nationalist Chinese source reported that in
addition to a gaseous diffusion plant at Lanchow, Commu
nist China had constructed nuclear installations at Yumen,
project in January, 1950? the Soviet Union took about four
years and Great Britain took four years euxd eight months.
The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission estimates China's
nuclear progress since its first test in the following
chronology: 20 KT on October 16, 1964; 20-40 KT on May 15,
1965; 200 KT on May 9, 1966; 10 KT on October 26, 1966;
300 KT on December 29, 1966; megatonnage on June 17, 1967.
New York Times, October 22, 1964; May 15, 1965; October
21, 1965; May 14, 1966? May 21, 1966; October 28, 1966?
December 21, 1966; June 18, 1967; and August 2, 1967.
Also see Ralph E. Lapp, The Weapons Culture (New York:
W. W. Norton, 1968), p. 25; and Nihon Keizai (Japanese
Economics), July 24, 1967, in Daily Summary of the Japanese
Press, June 24-26, 1967, p. 16.
45
New York Times, December 16, 1965? June 20, 1967.
According to The Sources of the Western World, about 30
atomic bombs of up to 200 kilotons already exist in Commu
nist China's nuclear weapons inventory by 1967. Military
Balance, 1967-68, p. 9; The Washington Post, January 5,
1968; Sankei, July 1, 1967, in Daily Summary of Japanese
Press, July 1-3, 1967, p. 33.
1 2 8
Kansu Province and Haiyen, Tsinghai Province.^® The same
source said that an atomic energy plant at Yumen put into
operation in 1967 had a large reactor for the production
of an estimated 200 kilograms of Plutonium 239 a year. ^
Although Chinese Communist sources divulge few
details of their nuclear programs, the Chinese apparently
have made steady progress. They successfully conducted
their second hydrogen bomb test in December, 1968, their
third in September, 1969, and their fourth in October,
1970.^® The Atomic Energy Commission estimated the yield
of the detonation on these occasions to be about 3 mega
tons, about the same as the first test.
46
Chinese Communist Affairs, 5:2 (April, 1968);
Washington Post, September 1, 1968; Washington Sunday
Star, August 30, 1970.
48
New China News Agency, December 28, 1968; Far
Eastern Economic Review, LXVIII:16 (April 16, 1970), 18;
Charles H. Murphy, "Mainland China's Evolving Nuclear
Detection," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, XXVIII:1
(January, 1972), 30.
129
Well worth noting is Communist China's first
49
underground test conducted on September 23, 1969.
Although there is little information available on this
test, the fact that the test was held, in itself, marked
another milestone in China's nuclear program. Two recently
conducted tests, one in November, 1971, and the other in
January, 1972, reportedly detonated the yield of 20 kilo-
tons. Military observers speculate that the devices
tested could have been warheads for either the medium or
intermediate-range ballistic missiles or triggers for a
50
hydrogen bomb. It also suggests that Communist China is
approaching a technical level where it can attempt to
compete with the United States and the Soviet Union in the
nuclear arms race.
Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird stated before
a joint session of the Armed Service Committee and the
Senate Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations on the Fiscal
49
Washington Evening Star, October 5, 1969; Far
Eastern Economic Review, LXVIII:16 (April 16, 1970), 18.
^ New York Times, November 19, 1971; Japan Times,
January 9, 1972.
130
Year 1971 Defense Program and Budget:
The intelligence community does not believe that they
[the Chinese Communists] have achieved a probable
objective of a thermonuclear warhead in the weight
range required for possible MRBM use. . . . Should
the Chinese decide to deploy a MRBM in the immediate
future, they would have to rely on fission warheads
for this purpose.51
In any event, the Chinese Communists have progressed more
rapidly them, any other country in the development of
nuclear weapons systems. They now may possess every basic
requirement for the development and production of nuclear
weapons systems required for their strategic objectives.
The Range of Nuclear Weapons
Major Chinese Communist delivery means for nuclear
weapons are strategic bombers, medium-range ballistic
missiles, and missile-firing submarines. Communist China
is no match for the Soviet Union in development and use of
strategic long-range bombers. Peking has only a few
IL-28 light jet bombers, Beagles, with a range of about
1,500 miles, and TU-4, Bull, piston engine medium bombers,
with a range of 4,000 miles, that were transferred from
51Laird, Fiscal Year 1971 Defense Program, p. 108.
1 3 1
the Soviet Union to Communist China by the end of the
CO
Korean War. The Chinese Communist Air Force also is
believed to have some TU-16's, Badger, medium jet bombers,
with a range of about 4,000 miles, which made their first
53
appearance over Moscow in 1954.
The Bull, a Soviet copy of the U.S. B-29 strategic
bomber, has long been obsolete by Western air force stand
ards. But for the Chinese Communists it still appears to
be a valuable strategic means of combat. Some Bull
bombers are reported to be used for long-range recon-
52
According to Richard M. Bueschel, Communist
China's IL-28 medium bomber was first spotted across the
Yalu River in December, 1952 and by 1956 more than 250 of
these jet bombers were in use. By the end of 1964, the
Communist China bomber regiments were equipped with about
300 IL-28 jet bombers but, in the late 1960's about 160
were still estimated to be in Chinese service. Bueschel,
Communist Chinese Air Force (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1968), pp. 33, 73, and 134. General Samuel B.
Griffith, II, estimates that the Communist Chinese Air
Force is generally credited with about 300 to 400 IL-28
jet bombers. Griffith, The Chinese People's Liberation
Army (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 224.
53
Raymond L. Garthoff suggests that the Soviet
Union had provided Communist China with one TU-16, in
Garthoff, op. cit., p. 185. However, a Japanese source
indicates that Red China's Air Force had seven TU-16's.
Cited from Shoji Fujii, "Red China's People's War Strategy
and Nuclear Warfare," Tairiku Mondai, 15:4 (April, 1966) ,
44.
132
54
naissance.
It was worth noting that the Russians did not give
Communist China any modern long-range bombers. But it
must be pointed out that Communist China at no time dis-
55
played any keen interest in obtaining long-range planes.
At the present time, the backbone of the Chinese Communist
bomber force consists mainly of the IL-28 light jet
bombers, known for their extremely limited operational
radius.
Peking appears to have had access by 1959 to funda
mental technical data on missile weaponry (at least for
experimental purposes), if we consider Khrushchev's June,
1959, remarks to Averell Harriman,^® in which Khrushchev
54
Griffith, op. cit., p. 225; Bueschel, op. cit.,
p. 75.
55
U.S. Congress, House, Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, Impact of Chinese Communist Nuclear Weapons Prog
ress on United States National Security, Report of Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, 90th Cong. (1967), p. 3.
56Life, July 13, 1959, p. 36.
1 3 3
suggested that a supply of a certain rocket had been given
to Communist China. ^
Peking also was reported to have established in
1963, the Fifth Ministry under the direction of Lieutenant
General (Artillery) Ch*iu Ch'uang-Ch'eng. Responsible for
the design and production of missile weapons systems in
57
Western observers tended to think that Communist
China needed more time to produce missiles as a delivery
means of nuclear weapons than the time needed to produce
an atomic bomb. However, Nationalist Chinese and Japanese
sources suggest that development of missile-delivery sys
tems was keeping pace with atomic weapons production.
For more details, see Griffith, op. cit., p. 286, and
Min-tsu Wan-pao, September 11, 1962. According to a
Nationalist Chinese source, Communist China organized a
missile training battalion in 1958 and two missile bases
were established in Daren and Renun. In July, 1959, a
Russian missile technician was reported to have inspected
the Hainan Island in order to construct a missile base
there. The same source further suggested that Communist
China was provided with the J-l, T-l, T-5, and T-7 types
of missiles which had ranges of approximately 300 miles by
the Soviet Union. This information has not yet been con
firmed by any other source. Min-tsu Wan-pao, September 11,
1962, cited in Shoji Fujii, "Red China's People's War
Strategy and Nuclear Warfare," Tairiku Mondai, 15:4
(April, 1966) , 47.
134
58
China, the ministry increased the tempo of missile
development more rapidly than expected by the West. A
Japanese source suggested as early as 1966 that Communist
China already was producing several different types of
CQ
missile. *
As a result, when Communist China conducted its
first nuclear missile test in October, 1966, Peking boast
fully announced: "The guided missile flew normally and
the nuclear warhead accurately hit the target at the
appointed distance, effecting a nuclear explosion.It
was estimated that the guided missile used in Communist
China's fourth nuclear test was a ballistic missile in the
medium-range category.®^
58
Griffith, op. cit., p. 222; Bueschel, op. cit.,
p. 70? Masami Hamano, "Red Chinese Army's Stepping Up War
Preparation," Tairiku Mondai, 15:6 (July, 1966), 60.
59
Asahi Shinbun, February 27, 1966, in Daily Sum
mary of Japanese Press, March 3, 1966, p. 9.
^ Peking Review, 9:44 (October 28, 1966), iii.
61
Aviation Week & Space Technology, 87:6 (August
7, 1967), 23; Junnosuke Kishida, "Chinese Nuclear Develop
ment," Japan Quarterly, XIV:2 (April-June, 1967), 144;
Lu Yung-shu, "Chinese Communist Nuclear Tests Viewed After
the Eighth Blast," Issues and Studies, V-5 (February,
1969), 2.
135
Communist China is believed to have completed the
development of an MRBM with a range of about 1,100 kilo
meters (687 miles) and to have deployed this missile
CO
mainly in North Western and North Eastern China. With
this range, bases on the China mainland could threaten the
western part of Japan, northern areas of the Philippines,
Korea and Formosa.
Communist China appears to have organized its
first missile unit under the name of Artillery Number Two,
sometime before June, 1967, when first public mention of
CO
the unit was made. Artillery Number Two appears to be
a basic organization for a future strategic missile force.
Considering the speed of missile development, as
shown by the test of a medium-range missile in October,
62
According to intelligence sources, Communist
China had deployed by 1970 a few medium-range nuclear-
tipped missiles and is preparing for more widespread
deployment of missiles capable of reaching the heart of
the Soviet Union. New York Times, November 23, 1970;
Military Balance (1971-72), p. 40.
63
Wu Yun-kuang, a Nationalist Chinese expert on
Communist China, views that this artillery unit was organ
ized some time in 1966; "Study of Communist China's Artil
lery No. 2," Fei-ching Yen-chiu (Taipei, September, 1967),
in Joint Publications Research Service, 44680 (March 14,
1968) , pp. 4-6.
136
1966, Communist China is expected to test its first inter
continental ballistic missile in the not too distant
future. Former Secretary of Defense McNamara stated in a
speech before the NATO Council on December 15, 1965, that
Communist China would not be able to test her first ICBM
until 1975. But in his 1967 posture statement, the Secre
tary mistakenly admitted that Communist China might con
duct either a space or a long-range ballistic missile test
before the end of 1967.64
64
McNamara, Fiscal Year 1968-72 Defense Program
and 1968 Defense Budget, p. 42. A Japanese expert at the
Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tetsushi Okamoto, and a
senior staff member of the RAND Corporation, Alice Langley
Hsieh, admit the possibility that Communist China will
launch a satellite before testing an ICBM, because of
political and technological considerations. Sankei, June
6, 1967, in Daily Summary of the Japanese Press, June 9,
1967, p. 27; New York Times, January 27, 1967; Statement
of Alice Langley Hsieh, Senior Staff Member of the RAND
Corporation, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Military
Application of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 90th
Cong. (November 6 and 7, 1967), p. 80. A Japanese expert,
Junnosuke Kishida, holds that Communist China should be
able to fire its first ICBM by 1970 at the latest.
"Chinese Nuclear Development," Japan Quarterly, XIV:2
(April-June, 1967), 145. On the other hand, J. I. Coffey,
Chief of the Office of National Studies of Bendix System's
Division, expressed his doubt about the possibility of
Communist China's deploying even a token ICBM force before
1975. Coffey, "The Chinese and Ballistic Missile
Defense," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December,
1965, p. 17.
137
However, Secretary McNamara revised his estimate
of Chinese Communist development of ICBM * s and stated in
September of the same year that the initial ICBM capabil
ity would be in early 1970 and a modest force by the mid-
1970's.66 Former Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford
contradicted his predecessor's view and reported in 1969,
before the Committee on Armed Forces, United States Senate,
that "an initial operating capability with an ICBM will
not be achieved until 1972 at the earliest, and more
likely later."66
In February, 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin R.
Laird expected the start of flight testing by Communist
China for an ICBM during 1970, and estimated it would be
at least three years before an operational system could
be deployed. ' To support Secretary Laird's estimate,
65
Secretary McNamara's address before the United
Press International editors and publishers in San Francis
co, California, on September 18, 1967, U.S. News and World
Report, October 2, 1967, p. 110.
66Authorization for Military Procurement, Fiscal
Year 1970, p. 29.
6^Laird, Fiscal Year 1971 Defense Program and Bud
get, p. 37. According to a New York Times report (July 1,
1968), Communist sources in Moscow suggested that Communist
China has developed an ICBM.
138
Communist China reportedly launched its first space satel
lite in April, 1970, lofted by a multi-stage booster, the
first stage of which was an intermediate-range missile
capable of being fired at least 1,500 miles. Consider
ing the type of booster needed to launch the Chinese
Communist space satellite, most experts fully expect
Communist China to achieve an operational ICBM capability
in the 1970's, and also develop medium- and intermediate-
range ballistic missiles simultaneously.
Communist China's submarine force consists of
G-class and W-class boats.A Japanese expert on
68
New York Times, November 23, 197.
69
Jane's Fighting Ships (1967-68), p. 54; Military
Balance (1966-67), p. 10; ibid. (1967-68), p. 11; Griffith,
op. cit., p. 227. According to Jane's Fighting Ships
(1967-68), one G-2 class submarine was built at Dairen in
1964 and another is being completed there; Alice Langley
Hsieh also confirmed this and stated that "China is con
structing a Soviet type G-2 class submarine, that is con
ventionally powered and capable of firing three missiles
with a range of about 400 miles." Hearing before the Sub
committee on Military Application, November 6 and 7, 1967,
p. 80. According to Samuel B. Griffith and Leonard A.
Humphreys, as the Chinese Communist navy's sole offensive
weapons, Communist China's fleet of submarines consists of
about 30 submarines, of which 21 to 24 are Soviet W-class,
and some of which have had ramps installed for launching
missiles. In addition to W-class, the Chinese have had
two newer Soviet G-class boats, each of which has three
139
Communist China's military affairs suggested, "The missile
used in the fourth nuclear test was probably a missile
70
capable of being carried by G-type submarines." Despite
their limited strength, these submarines could theoreti
cally provide Communist China with a potential to threaten
neighboring countries.
In summary, the Chinese Communists appear to have
proceeded simultaneously with MRBM and ICBM development.
An operational force of MRBM's together with a limited
number of medium jet bombers and submarines could pose a
threat to United States bases in the Pacific area and to
United States allies in the Far East and Southeast Asia.
tubes for missiles. Griffith and Humphreys, "Communist
Chinese Strategy and Military Capabilities, 1967-76," in
Yuan-li Wu and others, ed., Communist China and Arms Con
trol (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), p. 45.
Also see John Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army
(London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 143; Raymond
L. Garthoff, "Sino-Soviet Military Relations," The Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
349 (September# 1963), p. 91.
70
Junnosuke, Kishida, op. cit., p. 229. Los
Angeles Times reported on December 7, 1967, that "the U.S.
Navy has solid evidence that three vertical launching tubes
capable of hurling missiles 380 miles, have been placed
aboard each the submarines at Dairen in Southern Man
churia. "
140
Strategic Defensive Nuclear Weapons Systems
Khrushchev made in June, 1959, a remark to Averell
Harriman that the Soviet Union had shipped numerous rockets
71
to China; General Samuel B. Griffiths, II, expert on
Communist China Military Affairs, speculates that "these
•rockets' were SAM and air-to-air types. a Japanese
source also suggests that the Soviet Union had provided
Communist China with some sample of missiles, including
surface-to-air missiles prior to 1960; it is further
estimated that Communist China had supplied its front
units with SAM types of surface-to-air missiles which
seemingly shot down Nationalist China's United States made
7 ^
U-2 reconnaissance planes since 1962.
According to a New China News Agency report,
Communist China had brought down "U.S. Made high altitude
?1Life, July 13, 1959, p. 36.
72
The Chinese People's Liberation Army, p. 224.
^Shoji Fujii, “Red China's People's War Strategy
and Nuclear Warfare," Tairiku Mondai, 15:4 (April 1966),
45.
141
reconnaissance planes” since the beginning of 1958.7* In
1962, Kuo Mo-jo, the President, of the Chinese Academy of
Science, boasted of the air defense capability of Communist
China, saying that "we can shoot down any high altitude
U-2 plane."75
It is reasonably assumed that the present air
defense systems in Communist China are based on various
types of anti-aircraft guns, MIG interceptors, and some
74
According to New China News Agency, July 9, 1964,
ten U.S. made espionage planes of the Nationalist Chinese
air force which had been brought down by the Communist
Chinese Army since 1958 are as follows:
An RB-57A aircraft which intruded into China's air
space over the Shantung area on February 18, 1958.
A B-17 aircraft which intruded into China's air space
over the Kwangtung area on May 29, 1959.
An RB-57D which intruded into China's air space over
North China on October 7, 1959.
An RF-101C which intruded over the Fukien area on
August 2, 1961.
A P2V-7, over the Liatung area on November 6, 1961.
A U-2, over East China on September 9, 1962.
A P2V-7, over East China on June 19, 1963.
A U-2, over East China on November 1, 1963.
A P2V-7, over North China on June 11, 1964.
A U-2, over East China on July 7, 1964.
75
Jen-min Jih-pao, September 14, 1962.
142
SA-2 Guideline surface-to-air missiles.^® Communist China
not only possesses no ABM capabilities at present, but
also has revealed no sign for the development of ABM
systems.
76
"Lessons to be Learned from Unsuccessful Opera
tions of a Certain Mobile Anti-Aircraft Artillery Groups,"
Bulletin of Activities, No. 12 (March 10, 1961), in The
Politics of the Chinese Red Army, trans. by J. Chester
Cheng (Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolu
tion and Peace, 1966), p. 326; Military Balance (1968-69),
p. 11; ibid. (1970-71), p. 58.
CHAPTER IV
NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES AT VARIOUS STAGES OF
DEVELOPMENT AND THEIR IMPLICATION FOR DOCTRINE
Based upon the analysis in Chapters II and III,
the development of Soviet nuclear weapons systems can be
generally divided into three time periods: 1949 to 1959,
1960 to 1964, and 1965 through the present. Communist
China's development of nuclear weapons can be divided into
two phases: 1949 to 1964, and 1964 to the present. This
chapter is concerned with the implications of strategic
nuclear weapons capabilities at various stages of their
development for deterrence doctrine.
Soviet Strategic Nuclear Weapons Systems
Soviet Strategic Weapons Capabilities and
Their Implications for the Kinds of
Military Actions
The scope of the zone of military operations can
be conditioned by the range of weapons systems. With the
development of strategic weapons capable of striking
143
144
targets at the intercontinental levels of violence, the
relationship between military operations at various levels
of violence such as intercontinental, continental and local
has become one of the main doctrinal issues from the point
of view of military actions to be deterred or fought.
During the first stage in their development of
strategic nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union developed
weapons such as intermediate and medium range ballistic
missiles and strategic bombers. These weapons, with their
range, were obviously effective within the Eurasian Conti
nent, but they had limited effectiveness against targets
across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Thus, from the
point of view of the range of delivery, the Soviets were
able to operate effectively only at local and continental
levels within the Eurasian Continent, while the United
States was equipped with effective long range interconti
nental weapons. Under these circumstances, in responding
to a local conflict, the Soviet leaders would have risked
United States retaliation at the intercontinental level of
violence.
On the other hand, from the point of view of
exercising influence upon the United States through its
allies, a local military operation within the Eurasian
145
Continent could not be treated in the same way as an
operation beyond that continent. Since the Soviet leaders
were capable of using countries within the Eurasian Conti
nent as hostages, they could exert pressure upon the United
States through its allies within that continent. But they
could not apply a hostage strategy to those countries
located beyond the Eurasian Continent or to those countries
within that continent which did not have a strong alliance
with the United States.
Along with their hostage strategy which suffered
from these limitations, the Soviet leaders resorted to
making rather exaggerated claims of their achievements in
the development of intercontinental strategic missiles'
capabilities. They were apparently aware of the political
and psychological effect these claims would have upon
those countries located beyond the Eurasian Continent as
well as upon the United States. One of the major problems
in advancing exaggerated claims of strategic weapons capa
bilities, of course, is to keep the real weapons capabil
ities under absolute secrecy. In this respect, the Soviet
leaders were helped greatly by the nature of their closed
society and the tight control held over military informa-
146
tion.
From the point of view of rendering support to
their own allies or of becoming directly involved in a
military operation for which they were not yet prepared,
the Soviets could not hide behind exaggerated claims of
weapons capabilities. Thus, a gap arose between their
deterrence doctrine which was based upon exaggerated
claims of weapons capabilities and their war-fighting
doctrine which needed to be based upon the actual capabil
ities of their weapons systems in the event that deterrence
should fail.
Under these circumstances, the measures necessary
for avoiding a war needed to take priority over other
military policy requirements, including ideology. In
other words, since their weapons capabilities were not
effective in coping with military operations at the inter
continental level, the Soviet leaders were determined to
avoid a clash with the United States at that level. While
their weapons capabilities were effective enough for
military tasks within the Eurasian Continent, the Soviets
also stressed the necessity of avoiding local level con
frontations even within that continent. Should such a
147
confrontation have been escalated, they would have had to
meet an intercontinental level of violence with their
limited weapons capabilities. Thus, the Soviet leaders
suggested that weapons capabilities for a top level of
violence were necessary before limited local war could be
controlled.
In the earlier period of the 1960's, the Soviet
leaders began to have confidence in their weapons capabil
ities at the intercontinental level of violence. The
second generation ICBM's, the SS-7 and the SS-8, both with
a range of 6,900 miles, became the backbone of the Soviet
deterrent forces. These ICBM forces were supplemented
by missile-launching submarines and strategic bombers.
With the extended range of these weapons systems,
the Soviet leaders were no longer so concerned with the
possibility of a local level of violence being met with a
high level of violence. At the same time, the role of a
hostage strategy in Soviet deterrence doctrine diminished
and became subject to reconsideration. A hostage strategy
is based upon strong ties between threatened countries.
With the development of intercontinental-range delivery
means, the Soviet leaders may have become more interested
148
in dividing the Western countries and isolating one nation
from its allies than in capitalizing upon the ties between
countries.
Under these circumstances, it became necessary to
classify war into appropriate categories regarding the
types of military actions to be fought or deterred. From
the point of view of deterrence doctrine, limited local
wars within the Eurasian Continent needed to be distin
guished from local wars beyond that continent. From the
theoretical point of view, of course, no distinction was
necessary. But, practically speaking, the geographical
locations of troubled areas do make a difference.
In the earlier period of the 1960's, the Soviet
Union was able to face possible confrontations at an
intercontinental level as well as a local level within
the Eurasian Continent. But they were not yet fully capa
ble of supporting local conflict beyond the Eurasian
Continent. Furthermore, they made no attempt to retaliate
against local action beyond that continent at the inter
continental levels of violence. Thus, they needed to
continue to avoid direct involvement in local wars beyond
that continent. In this regard, the Soviet leaders
classified the two different types of local conflicts—
those within and those beyond the Eurasian Continent—
into two kinds of war: local war and national liberation
war. The former referred to a local war between nations,
while the latter referred to a civil war in which foreign
countries might or might not be involved. The Chinese
Communists, on the other hand, insisted that there was
little difference between local wars and wars of national
liberation. Thus, as discussed in the following chapter,
the classifications of wars and the relations between them
have become one of the key doctrinal problems in the Sino-
Soviet dispute.
However, in the latter period of the 1960's, the
Soviet leaders further developed their nuclear weapons
capabilities in terms of local wars beyond the Eurasian
Continent. The deployment of light helicopter carriers,
for example, suggested an emerging Soviet capability for
carrying out amphibious missions at any theater of opera
tions throughout the world. The distinction between a
local conflict within the Eurasian Continent and a local
war beyond that continent have lost doctrinal significance.
150
Soviet Strategic Weapons Capabilities and
Their Implications for Ways to Deter
In the 1950'sf Soviet strategic nuclear weapons
systems, generally speaking, were at the low level of the
yield-to-weight ratio with comparatively greater CEP.
The Soviet leaders appear to have been concerned with the
size of the warhead in terms of destructive power. There
was a trend toward developing large yield nuclear weapons.
Khrushchev reportedly said in 1957 that the Soviet Union
had a hydrogen bomb which was too big to test. A large
yield nuclear weapon can be employed not only for area
targets, but also for the purpose of psychological war
fare in intimidating the adversaries.
During the latter period of the 1950's, the Soviet
deterrent threat was based primarily upon the limited
capabilities of strategic bombers against the United
States and upon the IRBM/MFBM in addition to strategic
bombers against the Eurasian Continent.^ Strategic
bombers can be considered a counterforce weapon if they
can penetrate to targets. With their relatively slow
1
Pravda, November 15, 1958; ibid., May 9, 1959.
151
speed, however, Soviet bombers might well have had diffi
culty in penetrating the United States air-defense system
before United States forces were launched.
The accuracy of Soviet missile delivery systems
was not high enough to enable them to discriminate a point
target from surrounding objects, but it was sufficient to
strike any soft target on the Eurasian Continent by sur
prise. Considering the large numbers of MR/IRBM's
deployed, the Soviet Union had the capability to deal
effectively with strategic problems that might occur in ,
the Eurasian Continent, but she was confronted with stra
tegic conditions beyond that continent for which she had
only limited capabilities. Under these conditions, the
Soviets could exploit the psychological aspects of their
direct retaliatory threat, but they could not implement
their limited capability into a concrete war-fighting
strategy should deterrence fail.
The Soviet leaders were able to advance a more
realistic mode of deterrent threat to an intercontinental
power in the earlier period of the 1960's when their first
generation of ICBH's was operational. Deterrent capabil
ities still had limitations, however.
152
Despite the Soviets* claim of a high degree of
accuracy in their strategic offensive missiles after the
2
tests of 1961 and 1962, the improved CEP for their stra
tegic nuclear weapons systems during these tests suggests
that they still had only area target capabilities. With
these capabilities, a counterforce strategy is infeasible
against hardened enemy targets. Thus, the Soviet weapons
capabilities could be effectively implemented into minimum
deterrence and not into a strategy for fighting nuclear
4
wars.
So long as the United States relied mainly upon
strategic bombers for its strategic retaliatory capabil
ities, the Soviet leaders appear to have been satisfied
with their anti-air defense capabilities. Defense
2
Izvestia, November 17, 1963, in Current Digest of
the Soviet Press, XV:46 (December 11, 1963), 30; Pravda,
November 19, 1964, in Current Digest of the Soviet Press,
XVI:47 (December 16, 1964), 33.
3
Jane's All the World's Aircraft (1962-63), p. 418;
Neville Brown, Nuclear Wart The Impending Strategic Dead
lock (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 81.
*A discussion on this point may be found in
Chapter VII, "Modes of Deterrence Threat, Retaliation of
Unspecified Magnitude."
153
Minister Malinovsky declared, on the forty-fourth anniver
sary of the Armed Forces in 1962, that Soviet anti-aircraft
had equipment and weapons capable of destroying the
enemy's air attack at enormous distances and altitude.^
However, as the United States developed and
deployed its strategic offensive missile weapons systems
such as Minuteman, the Soviets appear to have become con
cerned with the pre-launch survivability of their strategic
nuclear forces. Soviet ICBM's were not yet hardened and,
although anti-missile missile tests had reportedly been
conducted successfully by then,6 Soviet ABM capabilities
were negligible.
Under these circumstances, Soviet strategic
offensive forces appear to have been vulnerable to an
enemy missile strike. However, in 1964, the Soviet
leaders recognized the possibility of the nonfatality of
5
Pravda, February 23, 1962, in Current Digest of
the Soviet Press, XIV:8 (March 21, 1962), 22.
6
Ibid.
154
7
an enemy surprise attack. This nonfatality referred to
the survival of retaliatory capabilities. Marshal
Sokolovskii stated that "modem disclosure and warning
systems ensure the prompt delivery of a devastating
Q
retaliatory nuclear blow. . . .” When strategic offensive
missiles are vulnerable prior to launch and a first-strike
strategy is not or cannot be adopted, the nonfatality of
an enemy surprise attack may require a launch-on-warning
policy.
Reflecting these conditions, Glagolev and Larionov
argued:
In this age of radio electronics and targeted ready-
to-fire rockets, a counter-strike will follow the
first strike in a matter of minutes. First rockets
and bombers of the side on the defensive would take
off even before the aggressor's first rockets to say
nothing of his bombers, reached their targets.9
7
Marshal Sokolovskii stated in 1964, that "in
today's conditions, the suddenness is not fatal." Cited
in Krasnaya Zvezda, August 25 and 28, 1964, in Current
Digest of the Soviet Press, XVI:38 (October 14, 1964), 15.
8Ibid.
g
Glagolev and V. Larionov, "Soviet Defense Might
and Peaceful Coexistence,” International Affairs (Moscow),
November, 1963, p. 32.
155
Glagolev and Larionov's mention of a counterstrike which
will follow an enemy strike before "the aggressor's first
rockets, to say nothing of his bombers, reach their tar
gets," suggested that a launch-on-waming strategy could
be put into operation by Soviet strategic offensive
weapons systems. However, these statements appear to be
in contradiction to then prevailing Soviet information
capabilities. In the earlier period of the 1960's, Soviet
Ballistic Missile Early Warning capabilities appeared to
be "not advanced enough to be able to cope with a very
sophisticated ICBM attack."10
In a launch-on-warning strategy, the decision to
launch must be made in a few minutes. Under these circum
stances, there is a possibility of human error as well as
of false alarms. In this regard, the Soviet leaders
appear to have been concerned with "malfunction in the
operation of a radar system" and "defect in the electronic
10
Diplomatic and Strategic Impact of Multiple War
head Missiles, p. 277.
156
equipment of armed missile combat systems.n11 This might
be another reason why the Soviet leaders have not fully
developed the concept of a launch-on-waming even though
they were apparently concerned with this concept in the
earlier period of the 1960's.12
In the latter part of the 1960's, the Soviet
leaders improved the pre-launch survivability of their
13
nuclear systems. An ABM defense system was deployed;
hardened silos were constructed; and the mobility of
strategic offensive forces was strengthened by the
V. D. Sokolovskii et al., ed., Soviet Military
Strategy, trans. by Herbert S. Dinerstein, Leon Goure and
Thomas W. Wolfe (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1963), p. 289.
12
For detailed information, see section on Retali
atory Strikes of Unspecified Magnitude, Chapter VII.
13
Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird stated in
June, 1972, at the hearing before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, that "a number of ICBM's is covered in the
Moscow area but the protection given them by the Moscow
ABM is very limited." U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on
Armed Services, Military Implications of the Treaty on the
Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the
Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services,
Senate, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess. (June, 1972), p. 42.
Hereafter cited as Military Implications of Treaty on
Limitations of ABM Systems.
157
addition of ballistic-missile-launching submarines which
were capable of intercontinental strategic missions.
In 1966, Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky said
for the first time that "our anti-aircraft resources
ensure the reliable destruction of any enemy planes and
many [emphasis added] missiles."^ In that year, the
Soviet leaders began to deploy their ABM system around
Moscow. This system reportedly consists of 64 launchers
designed to fire long range, high altitude exo-atmospheric
interceptor missiles such as the Galosh. Furthermore,
development of Soviet radar capabilities is believed to
have run parallel with that of the United States. The
Soviet ABM system has, therefore, been deployed to provide
an area defense for Moscow and the surrounding region.
The deployment of a partial area ABM defense
system around Moscow might have to do with such strategic
objectives as the protection of national command and con
trol systems against enemy nuclear attacks and accidental
nuclear strikes, or against an attack by a weaker nuclear
14
Pravda, April 3, 1966, in Current Digest of the
Soviet Press, XVIII:17 (May 18, 1966), 12.
158
power such as Communist China. Perhaps, assuming that
in the foreseeable future the United States would base its
nuclear strategy upon the concept of mutual assured
destruction, they saw no immediate threat to their ICBM's.
Another possibility is that the Soviet leaders
have developed and deployed a partial area ABM defense
system rather than point defense capabilities because of
limitations in their present ABM technology. It is
reported that the Soviet leaders are actively working on
research and development related to the development of new
ABM components. These include a new missile which has a
"controlled coast capability and restartable engine."
Such new developments as this can provide a high degree of
15
flexibility in countering a variety of threats.
Along with the development of an ABM defense
system, the Soviet leaders continued to construct, in
1966, protective facilities like hardened silos^® and to
^Department of Defense Appropriation for 1972,
pp. 156-172.
16McNamara, Posture Statement, Fiscal Year 1968-
72, Defense Program and 1968 Defense Budget, p. 40.
159
voice some interest in them from the point of view of pre-
1 " 7
launch survivability. Launching from "stationary under
ground sites" has been emphasized, but in conjunction with
18
launching from mobile launchers. As far as is known,
the Soviet ground-mobile system does not yet include a
mobile ICBM, but it does include a limited number of
mobile MRBM's. These, in addition to missile-launching
19
submarines and strategic bombers equipped with air-to-
17
Krasnaya Zvezda, November 18, 1967.
19
Growth of SLBM as cited in Military Balance
(1971-72), p. 56, is as follows:
USA USSR USA USSR
1961 96 Some 1967 656 130
1962 144 Some 1968 656 130
1963 224 100 1969 656 160
1964 416 120 1970 656 280
1965 496 120 1971 656 440
1966 592 125 (mid-year)
Regarding Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missiles,
during the 1964 Revolution Anniversary Parade, several
types of submarines such as the H, E and Z-classes were
observed for the first time. These boats were believed
to be armed with the Serb missile. The Serb, with its
range of approximately 650 miles and with its underwater
launching capability, was considered to have a configura
tion comparable to the first generation Polaris in yield
160
20
air and air-tO-surface missiles, form the basis of the
Soviet mobile launching system. The measure taken to
assure the pre-launch survivability of ICBM's 'remains the
21
hardening and separation of launch silos." The emphasis
upon both stationary underground sites and mobile systems
suggests that the Soviet leaders were concerned with
diversified measures for pre-launch survivability.
In recent years, it has been learned that the
Soviet leaders are striving to develop even more sophisti
cated weapons in terms of the MRV and MIRV. The Soviets
began to test MRV's in August, 1968, and are now deploying
and accuracy. Furthermore, the Soviets had constructed
a new nuclear-powered submarine, the Y-class. It had been
operational since September, 1969, and a third generation
missile, Sawfly, with a range of approximately 1,300 miles,
had been added to the arsenal of Soviet nuclear submarines.
20
Regarding air-to-surface missiles, NATO code
name Kangaroo is the largest of the air-to-surface missiles
seen in the Soviet Union. It was first seen in the Soviet
Aviation Day display at Tushino in 1961 and is carried by
the Bear. This missile reportedly has an estimate range
of about 350 n.m., as cited in Jane*s All the World's
Aircraft (1971-72), p. 566.
^ Military Balance (1965-66) , p. 3? ibid. (1968-
69), p. 5; ibid. (1969-70), p. 6.
161
22
them. Secretary Laird holds that the Soviet MRV system
“has the capacity to alter the pattern of the so-called
2 3
footprint presently." As for independently guided re
entry vehicles, he thinks that "Soviet MIRV capability
could be achieved next year."2* Soviet technology is
believed to be developing to a level that would enable
them to provide their strategic forces with a MIRV capa-
25
bility in the not too distant future. The Soviets are
expected to need more time to catch up technologically
with the United States in high-accuracy capabilities,
although with multiple warheads— especially MIRV— their
advantage in ICBM throw-weight may well make up for any
22
Laird, Fiscal Year 1972-76 Defense Program and
the 1972 Defense Budget, March 9, 1971, p. 46.
23
Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limi
tations of ABM Systems, p. 41.
24
Annual Defense Department Report, Fiscal Year
1973, p. 7.
25
In June, 1972, at the hearing before the Senate
Armed Services Committee, Secretary Laird said that "the
United States has about a two-year lead in the more criti
cal MIRV technology."
162
disadvantage in accuracy. In any case, there seems no
reason to presuppose that the USSR cannot achieve the
accuracy of present United States systems in a very short
time.
Along with the development of the MRV and MIRV,
the improved accuracy of Soviet strategic offensive forces
has brought about a new strategic implication. In 1971,
Secretary Laird warned that
. . . with this improved RV accuracy, the projected
Soviet SS-9 missile force could pose a serious
threat to the future survivability of underground
Minuteman silos.26
Thus, the development of Soviet nuclear war-fighting cap
abilities deserves serious attention by the Western world.
A large yield weapon such as the SS-9 can also be
used against "soft" targets in a counter-city targeting
strategy. But the SS-11 and the SS-13 are more than
adequate for the mission of a counter-city strategy. It
might be argued that a weapon large enough to carry a
25-megaton warhead could be exploded outside the range of
a Sprint-type terminal phase interceptor but still
26
Department of Defense Appropriations for 1972,
p. 47; Diplomatic and Strategic Impact of Multiple Warhead
Missiles, p. 245.
163
obliterate a large ground area target while using penetra-
27
tion aids to nullify a long-range anti-ballistic missile. '
But the deployment2® of the SS-9 began even before the
United States decided, in 1967, to deploy a "thin ABM
system," the Sentinel, oriented primarily toward defending
the United States population against a potential Chinese
missile attack in the mid-1970's.
It also may be argued that the Soviet leaders took
advantage of the large booster developed in space explora
tion and new missile technique as they came along. Or,
the Soviet leaders might have decided to develop a large
yield weapon such as the SS-9 for a war-fighting mission
from the beginning.
In any event, the improvement in the accuracy of
strategic offensive nuclear weapons such as the SS-9
27
Michael Getler, "Arms Control and the SS-9,"
Space/Aeronautics, 52:6 (November, 1969), 43.
28
Western observers reported for the first time
the SS-9 during the celebration of the Bolshevik Revolu
tion's 50th anniversary in 1967. But, according to
Military Balance, the SS-9 has been in service since 1965.
164
combined with the development of sophisticated defensive
nuclear weapons will certainly allow the Soviet leaders
to develop a new strategic option in the future. These
combined improvements in strategic offensive and defensive
nuclear forces could facilitate the employment of a first-
strike strategy. A first-strike strategy becomes feasible
when strategic offensive nuclear weapons systems capabil
ities are sufficient to destroy the enemy's strategic
29
offensive forces at an unacceptable level and when
29
Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Defense Department
Research and Development Chief, reportedly stated that 420
SS-9's, carrying three separately targetable warheads with
one-quarter mile accuracy could destroy about 95 percent
of the 1,000 Minutemen in their underground silos; cited
in New York Times, October 28, 1969, and March 22, 1972;
Human Events, June 10, 1972, p. 5; Michael P. London,
"Safeguard: Is There A Choice?," Space/Aeronautics, 52:6
(November, 1969), 51-52. Regarding first-strike capabil-
ity, Ralph F. Lapp stated: "Warhead statistics do not
tell the full story of first-strike since the execution of
an effective first-strike— targeted on 1,000 Minuteman
sites, with a 95 percent kill— would require more than
single initial salvo, unless the targeters assigned more
than one MIRV per aim point and these MIRV's were vectored
by different SS-9's. For example, a launch of 300 SS-9's
would probably involve a 20 percent failure in the boost-
phase so that even a sextupled missile would commit only
1,440 MIRV's, and of these perhaps 20 percent might fail
to be directly accurate or fall into a marginal category,
leaving 1,152 warheads on good trajectories. But there
would be no way to cover all 1,000 aim points with such a
blitz. The attackers would be compelled to depend on
165
strategic defensive nuclear forces capabilities are suffi
cient to defend the population at an acceptable level
against enemy residual strategic offensive nuclear weapons
after a first strike.
Chinese Communist Nuclear Weapons Systems
Chinese Communists' Nuclear Weapons Systems
Capabilities and Their Implications for the
Kinds of Military Actions
In the 1950's, Chinese Communist deterrence doc
trine appears to have been based solely upon the capabil
ities of Soviet strategic offensive nuclear weapons
systems. Consequently, it was difficult for Communist
China, as a non-nuclear power, to understand the charac
teristics of nuclear weapons systems and their implica
tions for modern warfare. The Chinese were forced to wait
for concrete information until Soviet military leaders
resolved their dispute over nuclear weapons capabilities
telemetered data about MIRV performance to program a
follow-up salvo at uncovered aim points. This could
involve assignment of back-up MIRV's to several hundred
silo targets." Ralph F. Lapp, "SALT, MIRV and First-
Strike," Science and Public Affairs, XXXVIII:3 (March,
1972), 25.
166
and their implications for military doctrine.
During this period, Russian leaders seem to have
withheld from the Chinese Communists the fact that the
Soviet claims over the capabilities of their nuclear
weapons were greatly exaggerated. After the successful
Soviet launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile and
an earth satellite in 1957, the Chinese were particularly
susceptible to these overstated claims.
Apparently accepting Khrushchev's description of
the ICBM as an "absolute weapon"’ *® at its face value, the
Chinese Communists took the view that "an atomic attack is
no longer a threat to the people.Believing in 1957
that the Russian satellite and ICBM were symbols of Soviet
superiority over the United States in the field of military
technology, the Chinese Communists appear to have envisaged
a relative strategic parity between the United States and
30
Pravda, November 29, 1957, in Current Digest of
the Soviet Press, IX:46 (December 25, 1957), 13. Khrush
chev said in his interview with W. R. Hearst, Jr., Editor
in-Chlef and owner of Hearst Newspapers and International
News Service, that "we now possess the absolute weapon,
perfected in every aspect."
31
Chieh-fang-chun Pao, July 17, 1958.
167
the Soviet Union. In this respect, the latter part of the
1950's in Communist China can be considered, for the pur
pose of comparison, as corresponding roughly to the period
from 1965 to the present in the development of Soviet
doctrine, the period in which the Soviets have based their
strategy on a relative nuclear weapons parity between the
United States and the Soviet Union. During this period,
Mao Tse-Tung revived his "Imperialism and All Reaction-
32
aries are Paper Tigers" theme visualizing a nuclear
stalemate between the United States and the Soviet Union.
32New China News Agency, October 31, 1958, in Cur
rent Background, 534 (November 12, 1958). Mao Tse-tung,
in his talk in August, 1946, with Anna Louise Strong, first
set forth his often repeated strategic slogan that "the
atom bomb is a paper tiger." When Mao stated this "theo
retical" point by simple allegory, it was about one month
after the beginning of the so-called "third revolutionary
civil war" in July, 1946. At that time, Mao and his staff
were busily preparing to evacuate their headquarters at
Yenan. As Lin Piao later recollects, Mao's paper tiger
concept armed the Red Army ideologically and "swept away
the fear that some people had of U.S. and Nationalist
forces." Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Vol. V (New York:
International Publishers, 1960), p. 100; Tung Chi-ming,
An Outline History of China (Peking: Foreign Language
Press, 1959), p. 425; Lin Piao, “The Victory of the Chinese
People's Revolutionary War is the Victory of the Thought
of Mao Tse-tung," Hung Ch'i, October 1, 1960, cited in
Selections of China Mainland Magazines (Extracts of China
Mainland Magazines was the title of this publication up to
May 23, 1960 issue), 231 (October 18, 1960), 12.
168
During the latter part of the 1950's, the Chinese
Communists visualized the possibility of limiting the
scale of war within the boundary of a nation and the possi
bility of waging limited and local war by the peoples of
the world against the "imperialists" forces. Moreover,
they held that only victory in a limited scale of war
could avert a third world war. Therefore, according to
the Chinese Communist leaders, with limited local war
weapons capabilities a world war might be deterred.
During the period from 1964 to the present, Coirmu-
nist China has depended primarily upon medium range
bombers and MRBM*s which are effective only for bordering
countries. From the point of view of the range of delivery
means, however, Communist China has been confronted with
strategic situations under which it has to cope not only
with an adversary's medium range bombers and IRBM/MRBM's
but also with their intercontinental nuclear weapons
capabilities.
Under these circumstances, limited strategic
options in terms of military action at various levels
could, to a certain extent, be the same for the Communist
Chinese today as they were for the Soviets in the 1950's.
169
Communist China, however, has revealed a different doctri
nal attitude toward the nature of military actions at
various levels of violence.
While the Soviet leaders adopted a hostage strate
gy, exerting pressures upon the allies of the interconti
nental nuclear power, the Chinese Communist leaders have
adopted a strategic option which aims at isolating an
intercontinental nuclear power from the rest of the world
and dealing with strategic problems on the basis of piece
meal tactics on a global scale.
While the Soviet leaders visualize military actions
at three different levels— intercontinental, continental
and local, the Chinese Communists appear to envisage mili
tary actions at only two different levels— intercontinental
and local. For the Chinese Communists, a military action
at an intercontinental level is a world war, while that
at a local level is a national liberation war. Chinese
Communist attitudes toward the nature of a world war
appear to be in accord with that of the Soviet leaders,
both agreeing that a world war involves two super-powers—
the United States and the Soviet Union. However, dis
agreeing with the Soviet leaders about the categories of
170
local wars, the Chinese Communists recognize but one type
of local war, the national liberation war. They then
divide the national liberation war into two types— the
larger and the smaller. For the Chinese Communists, it
is the larger scale of national liberation war in which
they might be directly involved and which they want to
deter.
Regarding the relationship between larger and
smaller scale national liberation wars, the Chinese Com
munists recognize the possibility that a smaller scale
national liberation war could escalate into a large scale
national liberation war. As Sino-Soviet relations have
deteriorated from close alliance to cold war and the
Soviet leaders have become “intoxicated with the idea of
the two super-powers establishing a sphere of influence
throughout the world," the Chinese foresee more likelihood
of such an escalation.
Nuclear Weapons Capabilities and Their
Implications for Ways to Deter
Attempting to isolate an intercontinental nuclear
power from the rest of the world and deal with strategic
problems on a piecemeal basis as they do, the Chinese
171
Communists1 target strategy also differs from that of the
Soviet Union.
Target selection must be based on available
weapons' capabilities and the targets selected should be
vital enough to make a contribution to the overall stra
tegic objectives. In this respect, the Chinese Communists
appear to be in need of a credible and justifiable link
between the targets in the people's liberation wars and
those of a world war which they want to deter.
The Chinese Communist leaders have continuously
stressed ideological aspect of targeting strategy in their
deterrence doctrine. When they advocate the destruction
of aggressors, they imply only the "decaying forces of
imperialism" or "doomed forces of reaction," which must
be absolutely distinguished from the people and the forces
of socialism. For the Chinese Communists, "doomed forces
of reaction" in the people's war fronts are closely
related to, or allied with, the "decaying forces of
imperialism."
Therefore, the Chinese Communists contend that a
simultaneous waging of the people's war all over the world
means to divide the forces of an intercontinental nuclear
172
power whose interests are interwoven with that of the
"doomed forces of reaction" of local states. In the
Chinese Communists' view, a function of communist ideology
is to unite the peoples of an intercontinental nuclear
power and the peoples of the local states or nations
against the combined forces of the ruling classes of the
intercontinental nuclear power and the local states or
nations.
With regard to the modes of deterrent threat, the
Chinese Communists are primarily concerned with the prob
lem of isolating the "main enemy," the United States, from
the rest of the world and with mobilizing the people's
revolutionary struggle on a global scale against a common
political target. Thus, Chinese Communist deterrent
threat has been based on an indirect approach with which
they plan to destroy the allies of an intercontinental
nuclear power by piecemeal tactics, eventually isolating
the intercontinental nuclear power from the rest of the
world.
CHAPTER V
THE KINDS OF WAR AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP
TO DETERRENCE
This chapter is concerned with the relationship
between nuclear capability in the Soviet Union and Commu
nist China and the types of war they want to deter.
In the early stages in the development of nuclear
weapons systems in the Soviet Union and Communist China
(1949 to 1959 for the Soviet Union, and 1964 to the present
for Communist China), the modified role of war as an
instrument of policy and the problems of the escalation
of a minor war into a larger war were the key issues in
discussions of military doctrine.
During the period from 1957 to 1960, prior to the
development of its own nuclear capabilities, Communist
China was protected by the Soviet nuclear umbrella.
During that period, the Communist Chinese appear to have
appraised the United States-USSR relationship as based on
a mutual nuclear stalemate. Holding as they did this
173
174
belief in nuclear parity and in their own protection by
the Soviets, the chief concern of the Chinese appears to
have been with wars of national liberation. The Soviets
seem only to have come to a belief in their own nuclear
equality with the United States during the latter part of
the 1960's. It is only since that time, therefore, that
they have fallen into line with the Communist Chinese and
turned their attention to the key doctrinal problem of
wars of national liberation.
War As An Instrument of Policy
Traditionally, communists have viewed the capital
istic system as the cause of war. According to Lenin,
“The replacement of the bourgeois by the proletarian state
is impossible without a violent revolution."^ Although
for propaganda purposes, communists invariably claim that
they oppose war and support peace, they have not in prac
tice ruled out war to advance their purposes. Lenin
declared:
V. I. Lenin, State and Revolution (New York:
International Publishers, 1932), p. 20.
175
To deny all possibility of national wars under
imperialism is wrong in theory, obviously mistaken
historically, and in practice is tantamount to
European chauvinism.2
Thus, to the communists, war is always inevitable until
the complete triumph of socialism.
During the first stage of nuclear development,
leaders in the Soviet Union and Communist China have not
agreed on the role of war as an instrument of policy.
Official Soviet manifestation of a change in the tradi
tional communist view on war was first voiced in February,
1956, by former Soviet Premier Khrushchev at the Twentieth
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).
Visualizing "mighty social and political forces possessing
formidable means to prevent the imperialists from unleash
ing war," Khrushchev advanced two doctrinal novelties which
ran counter to "Leninist principles." One was "the possi
bility of preventing war in the present era," based on the
2
Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. I, Part 2 (Moscow:
Foreign Language Publishing House, 1950), p. 571, quoted
by the editorial departments of Jen-min Jih-pao and Hung-
ch*i, in Current Background, No. 723 (November 21, 1963).
176
O
proposition that "war is not fatalistically inevitable"?
the other was his concept that the transition to socialism
may be achieved by different means in different countries,
i.e., parliamentarianism.* Khrushchev referred mainly to
world war. He disparaged the role of civil war in the
process of remaking society, a position that fitted his
new concept that parliamentarianism could be a form of
transition to socialism.
After the successful launching of an ICBM and an
earth satellite, Soviet leaders were eager to exploit
their scientific gains for political purposes. L. Ilyichov
stated:
It is not just a matter of increase in the weight
and prestige of one's country. It is a question of
a change in the balance of forces between socialism
and capitalism— strengthening of the former and the
weakening of the latter.5
3
New Times (Moscow), No. 8 (February 16, 1956),
p. 22.
4Ibid.
"*L. Ilyichov, "The Sputniks and International
Relations," International Affairs (Moscow), March, 1958,
p. 7.
177
Under these circumstances, Soviet leaders insisted, "The
time of the universal rule of imperialism is gone irrev
ocably."6
However, Moscow realized the fact that its achieve
ments by 1957 in the field of military technology could
not serve it as the basis for military offensive strategy.
Soviet leaders appeared to have been preoccupied with the
problem of how to prevent or deter an all-out nuclear war.
Khrushchev stressed in 1958:
In our age, the age of atomic energy and international
rockets, any country which attempts to settle inter
national disputes by force of arms hazards its own
existence by so doing.7
Although Soviet leaders advanced the concept of
limited conflict in terms of non-nuclear local war as late
Q
as 1959,° they did not go into detail on the question of
local and limited war. In 1959 when Khrushchev discussed
war at the Twenty-first Congress of the Communist Party
6
Soviet News (London, Soviet Embassy), No. 4371
(November 7, 1960), in G. F. Hudson et al., The Sino-
Soviet Dispute (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962),
p. 167.
7
International Affairs (Moscow), November, 1958,
p. 4.
O
New China News Agency, November 22, 1957.
1 7 8
of the Soviet Union, he was mainly concerned with the
possibility of excluding world war from the life of
Q
society.3 Liberation movements in colonies and semi
colonies were mentioned as powerful world forces but were
not specified as wars of liberation.
These views on the classifications of war do not
coincide with traditional communist concepts, to wit:
(a) 'just wars* are not wars of conquest but wars of
'liberation,' waged to defend the people from foreign
attack and from attempts to enslave them, to liberate
the people from capitalist slavery, or lastly to
liberate colonies and dependent countries from the
yoke of imperialism; and (b) 'unjust wars,' wars of
conquest waged to conquer and enslave foreign coun
tries and foreign nations.10
Thus, by classifying war into two categories, the tradi
tional communist doctrine insists that if a war is waged
by a communist country against a noncommunist country or
Khrushchev's report to the 21st Party Congress,
New Times (Moscow), No. 7 (February, 1959), p. 44; ibid.,
No. 10 (March, 1959), p. 6. Khrushchev again stressed the
possibility of excluding-war scheme in his speech in Indo
nesia on February 21, 1960. Ibid., No. 9 (February, 1960),
p. 7. N. Talensky also said in his article, "On the
Character of Modern Warfare," that "war as an instrument
of policy is outliving itself," International Affairs,
October, 1960, p. 27.
^ Short History of the CPSU (Moscow: Foreign Lan
guage Publishing House, 1945), pp. 168-169.
179
proletariat against bourgeoisie, it is necessarily a just
war. However, to a communist, just wars not only include
wars to defend the people from foreign attack but also
imply a war that is used to extend communist rule beyond
a national boundary. Lenin said:
If war is waged by the proletariat after it has con
quered the bourgeoisie in its own country and is
waged with the object of strengthening and extending
socialism, such a war is legitimate and 'holy.'H
In this respect, the Soviet leaders' classifications of
war, as well as their perception of the role of war as an
instrument of policy, were criticized by the traditional
ists.
Chinese Communists, on the other hand, are con
vinced that wars of one kind or another will always occur
until the "imperialist system and the exploiting classes"
are destroyed. Following the traditional communist classi
fication of just and unjust wars, Chinese Communist leaders
advocated war as an instrument of policy, while the
Russians were concerned with eliminating war to settle
international disputes. The Chinese Communists have
11Lenin, Sochineniia (Works), Vol. 27 (Leningrad,
1952), p. 299.
180
argued, "Only with guns can the whole world be trans
formed."^
Rejecting Khrushchev's idea of the possibility of
peaceful transition to socialism in different countries
through parliamentarianism, leaders of Communist China
held,
Limiting the class struggle to the parliamentary
struggle, or regarding the latter as the highest
and decisive form to which all the other forms of
struggle are subordinate, is actually desertion to
the side of the bourgeoisie and against the prole
tariat. 13
The Chinese Communist further argued:
Under certain conditions, the proletariat can utilize
the parliamentary platform to expose the festering
scores of bourgeois society, to educate the masses
and to accumulate revolutionary strength so as to
prepare to seize political power by armed force.
But it is absolutely impossible to use parliamentary
struggle to replace revolution by violence.14
^ Peking Review, 10:29 (July 14, 1967), 10; ibid.,
10:32 (August 4, 1967), 5; ibid., 10:36 (September 1,
1967), 11.
^ Ibid., 10:36 (September 1, 1967), 9.
14,.,
Ibid.
181
Under circumstances where Sino-Soviet relations
had deteriorated to the point of a “kind of war," and the
United States-Soviet relations were perceived by the
Chinese Communists to have changed into a kind of
"alliance," Peking appeared to have been concerned with
wars other than world war. The Chinese, moreover, classi
fied wars, other than world war, into two categories of
their own: smaller and larger people's war.
Communist China believes that so long as imperial
ism and other systems of exploitation exist in the world,
there will be unjust war, started by reactionary ruling
classes to suppress and loot an oppressed nation or coun
try. Consequently, just wars waged by oppressed nations
and countries against aggression, oppression and exploita
tion are entirely unavoidable.^
However, the Chinese Communist leaders after 1966
stressed the likelihood of a war with the United States,
and they have perceived a war on the China mainland in
Shih Tung-hsiang, "The Deciding Factor of Vic
tory or Defeat in War is Man," Hung-ch'i, No. 7 (June 4,
1965), in Selections from China Mainland Magazines, No.
477 (July 6, 1965), p. 5.
182
terms of a larger scale of conflict. They have told the
Chinese people that:
We should make full preparation against a war of
aggression which the U.S. imperialism might launch
at an early date on a large scale, with nuclear or
other weapons, and on several fronts.16
The Chinese must at this time be fully aware of
their lack of intercontinental strategic offensive capa
bilities. Furthermore, they must seriously doubt the
reliability of Soviet nuclear support. Accordingly, the
leaders of Communist China have understandably been pre
occupied with the kinds of war which they believe they
might be forced to wage.
In the third stage of nuclear weapon development
in the Soviet Union, the reliability of Soviet nuclear-
missile weapons has been greatly enhanced by improving
the mobility, reaction time and accuracy of these systems,
while the capabilities of strategic defensive weapons for
limiting damage has also been improved.
16
New China News Agency, January 18, 1966, xn
Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 3622 (January 24,
1966), p. 3; Peking Review, 9:15 (April 8, 1966), 9.
183
Under these conditions, discussions relating to
the role of war as an instrument of policy have been
raised to a different plane from the previous stages and
show the effect of the development of nuclear weapons
systems. Since 1965, Soviet military theoreticians have
actively discussed the concept of just and unjust war.
Stressing the class nature of a new world war, Colonel
V. V. Glazov stated that "a new world war will bear a
clearly defined class character and will be a decisive
1 7
armed clash of two opposed social systems.Colonel Y.
Ribkin also contended,
Should the imperialists unleash a nuclear war, the
communist response to it will cause mankind to suffer
enormous losses, but it will be a just w a r .18
17
V. V. Glazov, "The Regularity of Development and
Changes of Methods of Armed Conflict," Communist of the
Armed Forces, June, 1965, documented by William R. Kintner
and Harriet Fast Scott, trans. and ed., The Nuclear Revo
lution in Soviet Military Affairs (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1968), p. 87.
18
Y. I. Ribkin, "On the Nature of World Nuclear
Rocket War," Communist of the Armed Forces, September,
1965, in Kintner and Scott, op. cit., p. 111. For a de
tailed examination of the Ribkin article, see Roman Kolko-
wicz, The Red "Hawks" on the Rationality of Nuclear War
(Santa Monica: RAND Corp, March, 1966, RM-4899-PR).
Also see Joseph J. Baritiz, "Soviet Military Theory: Pol
itics and War,” Military Review, September, 1966, pp. 3-10.
184
Marshal Sokolovsky, supporting the aforementioned junior
officer's position on the justification of a world war,
repeated his previously expressed viewpoint that
from the side of the socialist countries subject to
imperialist aggression, it [a new world war] would
be a just war insofar as it would be directed at
the liquidation of imperialism.^
Thus, the "just war" concept discarded in the latter
period of the 1950's was partially revived in a new classi
fication of war in 1961^® and was fully reinstated in the
Soviet image of war in the latter period of the 1960's.
Leaders of Communist China, on the other hand, have
suggested that Communism would survive even a thermonuclear
19
Marshal of the Soviet Union, V. D. Sokolovsky,
and Major General M. I. Cherednichenko, "On Contemporary
Military Strategy," Communist of the Armed Forces, April,
1966, in Kintner and Scott, op. cit., p. 268.
20
At a joint meeting of the party organization of
the Higher Party School, the Academy of Social Science and
the Party Central Committee's Institute of Marxism-Leninism
on January 6, 1961, Khrushchev clearly stated for the first
time that "in present day conditions, it is necessary to
distinguish between the following kinds of war: world war,
local war, and wars of liberation or popular uprisings.
This is necessary in order to work out correct tactics
with regard to these wars.” Kommunist, No. 1 (January,
1961), in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XII:4
(February 22, 1961), 8.
185
war. According to Mao Tse-tung, in November, 1957, at a
Moscow meeting of the Communist and Workers' Parties:
Let us imagine, how many people will die if war should
break out? Out of the world's population of 2,700
million, one third— or, if more, half— may be lost.
It is they and not we who want to fight; when a fight
starts, atomic and hydrogen bombs may be dropped. I
debated this question with a foreign statesman. He
believed that if an atomic war was fought, the whole
of mankind would be annihilated. I said that if worse
came to worse and half of mankind died, the other
half would remain while imperialism would be razed to
the ground and the whole world would become socialist;
in a number of years there would be 2,700 million
people again and definitely more.21
21
Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Gov
ernment, September 1, 1963, compiled by Peter Berton,
The Chinese-Russian Dialogue of 1963 (Los Angeles: Univer
sity of Southern California, 1963). In a statement
released on September 21, 1963, Soviet leaders accused the
Chinese Communist leaders for their unreasonable attitudes
toward thermonuclear war and stated that "have these men
in Peking pondered on who would perish in the flames of
a thermonuclear war, should it ever break out? The im
perialists, the monopolists? Unfortunately, not only
them— they would start the War, but its flames would con
sume large masses of working people— workers, peasants
and intellectuals, Pravda, September 21-22, 1963, in New
Times, No. 39 (October 2, 1963), p. 43. M. A. Suslov, in
his report at the Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central
Committee, February 14, 1964, said, "No party that really
cherishes the interests of the people can fail to appre
ciate its responsibility in the struggle for averting
another world war." New Times, No. 15 (April, 1964),
p. 47.
186
Mikail Suslov, Soviet Communist Party secretary
and Presidium member, slightly distorted Mao's remarks
and said on February 14, 1964, in his report to the CPSU
Central Committee Plenum, that "Mao Tse-tung tried to
prove at the 1957 Moscow conference that the cause of the
struggle for socialism would even benefit as a result of
22
a world thermonuclear war."
Classifying all war into two categories, just
and unjust, Communist China holds that no matter how mili
tary technology develops and weapons systems advance, the
communist concept of just and unjust war must never change
until imperialism is destroyed.
Refusing to be cowed by the threat of a world
war, the Chinese Communists argue:
We consistently oppose the launching of criminal wars
by Imperialism, because imperialist war would impose
enormous sacrifices upon the peoples of various coun
tries (including the people of the United States and
other imperialist countries). But should the im
perialists impose such sacrifices on the peoples of
various countries, we believe that, just as the expe
rience of the Russian revolution and the Chinese
22
Pravda, April 3, 1964, Current Digest of the
Soviet Press, XVI:13 (April 22, 1964), 10.
1 8 7
revolution shows, those sacrifices would be repaid.
On the debris of a dead imperialism, the victorious
people would very swiftly create a civilization
thousands of times higher than the capitalist system
and a truly beautiful future for themselves.^
At this point, Russian and Chinese leaders have
disclosed some similarities, as well as differences, in
the appreciation of the role of war as an instrument of
policy. They could not agree as to the role of war as a
tool of policy when their weapons were inferior to the
enemy's. But, when they believed that their own weapons,
for the Soviet leaders, or their allies', for the Chinese
Communists, could cope with an enemy in a nuclear world
war situation, the differences in their views disappeared.
The traditional communist position of war as an instrument
of policy re-emerged in the development of military doc
trine in the Soviet Union.
When the leaders of both countries perceived that
their nuclear weapons' capabilities were not effective
enough to deal with the then prevailing strategic problems,
they were concerned mainly with two categories of war
23
"Long Live Leninisml," Peking Review, 3:17
(April 26, 1960), 12.
1 8 8
within their respective weapon capabilities: the Soviet
Union in terms of world war and local war, and Communist
China in terms of both small and larger people's war.
However, leaders of both countries evidenced
differences in dealing with world war and a larger people's
war. The Soviet leaders stressed the possibility of
excluding world war from the life of society before the
victory of socialism, while the Chinese Communist leaders
advocated full preparation for a war in which they might
be involved. Still, the Soviets are also preparing for a
world war, and the Chinese Communists are not welcoming
world wars in which they might be involved.
The Problems of Escalation
At the first stage in the development of their
nuclear weapons systems, Soviet leaders realized the diffi
culties of justifying a nuclear world war. They under
stood this would endanger the Soviet Union because Russian
intercontinental nuclear capabilities were limited and
inferior vis-a-vis the United States. They further
realized that although the Soviet armed forces were ade
quately equipped for any combat mission in the Eurasian
189
theater of operations, war with the United States would
be a different matter.
Soviet leaders visualized implications of a
massive United States retaliation within the communist
concept of "just" wars. Any Soviet "just" war might pro
voke retaliation by United States strategic offensive
forces. Furthermore, the communist concept of "just"
war, together with traditional communist doctrine on the
inevitability of war, might invoke United States preven
tive actions.
Under these conditions, Soviet leaders stressed
the infeasibility of nuclear world war as an instrument
of policy and the inevitability of the escalation of a
minor war into a world war. Major General G. I. Pokrovsky
0 A
stated in 1955, "The era of local war is over."
N. Talensky also declared in 1955, "There is no difference
in the tactical and strategic use of atomic weapons, nor
News (Moscow), No. 7 (April 1, 1955), p. 7, in
V. D. Sokolovskii, ed., Voennaia Strategiia (Soviet Mili
tary Strategy), trans. by Herbert S. Dinerstein, et al.
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963),
p. 290.
190
could there be any."^
Bulganin emphasized the same military viewpoint in
a letter to President Eisenhower on December 11, 1957,
when he wrote that the limited war concept "not only is
utterly inconsistent from the military point of view, but
26
is extremely dangerous politically. ...” Colonel I.
Baz also stated in 1958, "Each local, small war has a ten
dency to become the prologue to a world war, sooner or
later transforming itself into a world-wide military con
flagration.”^ Until 1960, the same Soviet doctrinal
position on the inevitability of the escalation of a minor
war into a world war continued to be a main theme.
N. Talensky, "About Atomic and Conventional
Weapons," International Affairs, January, 1955, p. 25.
The same idea of Talensky*s is also revealed in an article,
"Guardian of Peace and Security," International Affairs,
February, 1958, p. 21.
^ Pravda, December 12, 1957. Khrushchev also
expressed the same idea when he told a group of Brazilian
newsmen, "If such wars (limited wars) break out, they may
quickly develop into a world war." International Affairs,
December, 1957, p. 8.
27
*'Cited in Raymond R. Garthoff, The Soviet Image
of Future War (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press,
1959), pp. 95-96.
191
Chinese Communist leaders also saw the possibility
that a limited local war could escalate into a larger
scale war, as they began to doubt the reliability of
Soviet nuclear support and became aware of their lack of
intercontinental strategic capabilities. However, the
Chinese attitude toward escalation differs from that of
the Soviet Union. The Chinese blame escalation on the
United States strategy of "nuclear blackmail and nuclear
threat." The Soviet Union stresses an inherent tendency
of war to escalate.
The Chinese argue:
A so-called theory of "escalation" on the unleashing
of an aggressive war is now prevalent among U.S.
ruling groups. They divide a war into a number of
thresholds, each consisting of a number of rungs
. . . the aim is nothing less than to slacken the
vigilance of the world's people, so that they will
be faced by a fait accompli by the U.S. aggressor
before they know it.28
The Chinese further contend that the United States govern
ment "is attempting to use the action of gradually extend
ing the war, as well as the threat to escalate it even
28
April 24, 1965, Renmin Ribao editorial, in
Peking Review, 8:18 (April 30, 1965), 14.
192
29
more." In this context, a Peking authority apprehen
sively declared, "Should U. S. imperialism dare to attack
China, either on a limited or full strength basis, the
only result will be the total annihilation of the U.S.
invaders."30
As Soviet leaders gained confidence in the develop
ment of their new weapons systems and military capabili
ties, they saw the necessity of adjusting their doctrinal
position. They wanted it to serve a dual purpose of cor
responding to the newly-developed weapons capability and
its justification of employment, while at the same time
meeting communist doctrinal requirements. A turning point
in the development of the Soviet image of war became
evident at the beginning of 1961 when Khrushchev classi
fied war into three categories: world war, local war and
29
March 1, 1965, Renmin Ribao editorial, in Peking
Review, 8:10 (March 5, 1965),13.
30
Chen Yi, "A New and Great Anti-U.S. Revolutionary
Storm is Approaching," Peking Review, 9:2 (January 7,
1966), 7; Peking Review, 9:15 (April 8, 1966), 8.
193
wars of liberation.According to Khrushchev's defini
tion, world war is a war between the "imperialist" coun
tries and the Soviet Union; local war is a war between the
"imperialist" countries and the noncommunist countries,
as well as a war between the "imperialist" countries and
communist countries other than the Soviet Union; and wars
of liberation are those wars between the "imperialist"
countries and "oppressed" dependent nations.
A point worth noting in this new classification
of war is the inevitability of liberation wars and also
the possibility of averting local wars. Khrushchev stated:
If the peoples of all countries are united and mobil
ized, if they wage a tireless struggle, uniting their
forces both within each country and on an international
scale, wars can be averted. . . . There will be wars
of liberation as long as imperialism exists, as long
as colonialism exists. These are revolutionary wars.
Such wars are not only possible but inevitable, since
the colonialists will not voluntarily grant the
peoples' independence.32
The release of wars of liberation from the fetters
of the inevitability of escalation appeared to be a
31
Kommunist, No. 1 (January, 1961), in Current
Digest of the Soviet Press, XIII:4 (February 22, 1961), 8.
32Ibid., pp. 8-9.
194
parallel to the deployment of unsophisticated first genera
tion Soviet ICBM's. When the Soviet Union was in the
uncomfortable situation of deterring a world war in the
1950's, it stressed the avoidability of war in general,
without classifying wars into various types, and advocated
the inevitability of a minor war escalating into a world
war. However, immediately after the Soviet Union secured
considerable offensive capability, its first concern
appeared to be a rehabilitation of the concept of the
justifiability of war in order to meet communist doctrinal
requirements.
When Khrushchev struck wars of liberation from the
category of inevitable escalation, Soviet armed forces
still were not in a position to support effectively
national-liberation wars militarily in any theater of
operations beyond the Eurasian continent— from the point
of extended logistic support and amphibious operations.
However, the second generation ICBM's, which were
tested from 1960 to 1962 along a Pacific firing range,
were more sophisticated and effective than previous models
and contributed to the development of a nuclear weapons
system more efficient in combat readiness, response time
195
and survivability to attack. The year 1962 also marked a
turning point in the development of naval craft and bomber
capability.
Along with the development of these weapons sys
tems' capabilities, Soviet leaders further changed their
doctrinal position from averting a local war to waging a
conflict. Soviet Military Strategy, edited by Marshal of
the Soviet Union, V. D. Sokolovskii, is the first major
work by the Soviet military on limited or local war doc
trine. The writers, urging readiness of retaliatory
capabilities to meet small-scale local wars which the
"imperialists" might initiate, indicated for the first
time the Soviet position that limited or local wars might
be fought without escalation into a world war.^ Though
33
Sokolovskii, op. cit., p. 288. Nevertheless,
until 1964, Soviet leaders continuously recognized the
danger of escalation of a minor military conflict into a
larger scale war. They stated, "In our day, when the
development of international relations has led up to the
close intertwining of the economic, political, strategic
and all other interests of states, and when there exists a
ramified system of alliances— in these conditions a clash
in some one area that might appear to be of a purely local
nature can very quickly involve many other countries."
New Times, No. 2 (January 15, 1964), p. 38. Colonel V.
Glazor, analyzing local war conceptions, stresses that
"local war, apt in any case to spark off a global explo
sion, will become a thousand times more dangerous if the
196
limited space was given in the book to the problem of
limited and local wars, one of the main features of the
•
work was the public notice of a shift in Soviet military
emphasis, from primary preoccupation with the prevention
of local wars, to the problem of readiness to fight them.
The writers of the Sokolovskii book treated the
concept of local war rather vaguely. But they did state
that "under modem conditions, any local military conflict
if not nipped in the bud, can grow into a world war with
34
unlimited use of nuclear weapons." From 1960 to 1965,
in admitting the possibility that a world war could
develop from local wars, the Soviet position on limited
wars drew close to the view of the Chinese Communists.
By the beginning of the 1960's, Soviet military
leaders acknowledged the role of ground forces armed with
tactical nuclear missiles with a range of up to hundreds
NATO strategians resort to nuclear arms." New Times, No.
48 (December 2, 1964), p. 8.
34
Sokolovskii, op. cit., p. 396. Sokolovskii's
position is also seen in B. Teplinsky's article on "NATO's
'Limited War' Plans," New Times, No. 23 (June 9, 1965),
p. 9.
197
35
of miles. The Kremlin began to claim that Soviet ground
forces had a capability in nuclear weapons which insured
the accomplishment of basic tactical and operational tasks.
With this capability, the Soviet leaders held that their
ground forces had become capable of operating successfully
"both under nuclear conditions and in those where only
conventional means of attack are used."^®
With regard to the scope of operations, Soviet
leaders stressed that "this zone is limited only by the
location of strategic targets subject to attack,rather
than the boundary of nations. Soviet perception of both
nuclear and non-nuclear conditions for ground operations
suggests the existence of the issue of a “fire-break"
between nuclear weapons and conventional ones. However,
35
Sokolovskii, op. cit., p. 302; Izvestia, October
20, 1962, in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XIV:3
(November 21, 1962)? Pravda, February 23, 1963, in Current
Digest of the Soviet Press, XV:8 (March 20, 1963), 8;
Krasnaya Zvezda, August 25 and 28, 1964, in Current Digest
of the Soviet Press, XVI:38 (October 14, 1964), 18.
36
Col. Gen. S. M. Shtemenko, "Combat Training of
Ground Troops for Modern War," Army, XIII:8 (March, 1963),
48.
37
Sokolovskii, op. cit., p. 95.
198
no detailed discussion of the matter appeared in public
Soviet literature. In any event, general denial of the
inevitability of escalation and the acknowledgment of the
possibility of waging a local war represented a notable
change in the Soviet position on limited and local war
doctrine.
For the Chinese Communists, who believed in 1957
that the Russian satellite and ICBM were symbols of Soviet
superiority over the United States, the scale of war could
be limited, and a limited and local war could be success
fully waged by the peoples of the world against the
"imperialist" forces.^® Under these circumstances, the
leaders of Communist China warned,
They [the U.S. imperialists] are aware that the
United States is lagging far behind the Soviet
Union in military science and technology, and they
will suffer extremely serious consequences if they
dare venture to start a world war.39
38
Yu Chao-li, "Excellent Situation for the Strug
gle for Peace," Peking Review, 3:1 (January 5, 1960), 15.
39
Yu Chao-li, "Imperialism-Source of War in Modern
Times— and the Path of the Peoples' Struggle for Peace,"
Peking Review, 3:15 (April 12, 1960), 18.
199
In July, 1958, when Khrushchev accepted a Western
proposal for a summit meeting to discuss the Middle East
crisis, a Jen-min Jih-pao editorial expressed the more
militant position of Communist China:
If the U.S.-British aggressors refuse to withdraw
from Lebanon and Jordan, and insist on expanding
their aggression, then the only course left to the
people of the world is to hit the aggressor on the
head.40
At the same time, the Chinese Communists openly revived
the "U.S. imperialism paper-tiger” line and the Taiwan
liberation themes. They pledged to liberate Taiwan and
subsequently organized rallies and demonstrations in which
the "U.S.-imperialism-paper-tiger" theme was consistently
repeated. Moreover, to back up the political slogan, the
Chinese Communist Army began to shell the off-shore
islands, Quemoy and Matsu, on August 23, 1958. These
events suggest graphically that in 1958 the Chinese Commu
nist leaders no longer followed the Soviet position on the
impossibility of limiting the scale of war. Moreover, the
Chinese held that only victory in a limited scale of war
40
Jen-min Jih-pao, July 20, 1958, in Peking Review,
No. 22 (July 29, 1958), p. 5.
2Q0
could avert a third world war.^
The Chinese position on recognition of local war
as an acceptable political method appeared to be based on
their assumption that the balance of terror, based on
newly developed nuclear-missile weapons systems, is an
absolute balance. The Chinese Communists argued:
After the appearance of new weapons of mass destruc
tion, neither side dared to use it because both
possessed it. This was the case with oacteriological
weapons, which were not used in the two world wars.^2
41
Yu Chao-li, "Excellent Situation for the Struggle
for Peace," p. 19. In the now famous article, “Long Live
Leninism!," written by the editorial department of Hung-
ch'i in commemoration of the ninetieth anniversary of the
birth of Lenin, a passage also reads: "The more broadly
and profoundly this struggle is waged and the more fully
and thoroughly exposed are the brutish faces of the belli
cose U.S. and other imperialists, the more will we be able
to isolate these imperialists before the people of the
world, the greater will be the possibility of tying their
hands and the better it will be for the cause of world
peace. If, on the contrary, we lose our vigilance against
the danger of the imperialists launching a war, do not
work to arouse the people of all countries to rise up
against imperialism but tie the hands of the people, then
imperialism can prepare for war just as it pleases and the
inevitable result will be an increase in the danger of the
imperialists launching a war." Peking Review, 3:17 (April
26, 1960), 12.
*2Peking Review, 5:18 (May 4, 1962), 15.
201
Under an absolute balance of nuclear terror, the Chinese
Communists concluded that escalation need not be feared,
and therefore, they could fight a war of limited scale.
National Liberation Wars— What and How
From 1949 to 1959, the Soviet Union dealt with
the problem of war mostly in general terms without spe
cifically distinguishing a world war from a local war.
Furthermore, Soviet military theoreticians were not con
cerned with the problems of national liberation wars.
Until 1960, Soviet leaders used such terms as
"local," "small," "minor," and "liberation" wars indis
criminately, all indicating wars other than world wars.
Two cases seem to illustrate the Soviet inconsistency.
In 1956 when the storm was gathering in the Suez Canal
zone, a Soviet journal, International Affairs, stated in
an editorial, "In the event of a colonialist attack upon
Egypt, the war of the Egyptian people against the foreign
43
enslavers would be a just war of liberation." But in
43
International Affairs (Moscow), September, 1956,
p. 14.
202
1958 when the Algerian rebels proclaimed the "provisional
government of Algeria," a Russian writer called the war
in Algeria a war waged by two states, without designating
44
xt as a national liberation war.
On the other hand, the Chinese Communists believed
that as long as an imperialist system existed in the
world, there would be unjust wars started by reactionary
ruling classes to suppress an oppressed nation or country.
Consequently, they contended that revolutionary just wars
waged by oppressed nations and countries against aggression
and oppression are entirely unavoidable.
At the second stage in the development of their
nuclear weapons systems, the Chinese Communist leaders
envisaged a possibility of war with the United States.
They believed that their efforts to cope with a world power
V. Mednedev, "Republic Proclaimed," International
Affairs (Moscow), November, 1958, p. 101. In 1961 when
Khrushchev made a distinction between local war and wars
of liberation, the 1956 Egyptian Incident was classified
as a local war, while the Algerian War became an example
of wars of liberation. Khrushchev's speech at a meeting
of party organization, January 6, 1961. Kommunist, No. 1
(January, 1961), in Current Digest of the Soviet Press,
XIII:4 (February 22, 1961), 8.
203
could be effective only if they could successfully mobilize
the "people's revolutionary struggle" on a global scale
against an enemy who possesses nuclear world war capabil
ities until they, themselves, command weapons systems with
intercontinental capabilities. In this light, Chinese
Communist leaders held that:
It is imperative to rely upon the unity of the people's
revolutionary forces in all countries, win over to our
side all the forces that can be won over, from the
broadest possible international united front, and con
centrate our blows on the main enemy of the people of
the world.45
Translating the so-called "unity of the People's
Revolution Forces" policy into a global strategy, Lin
Piao, former Chinese Communist Defense Minister, argued:
Taking the entire globe, if North American and Western
Europe can be called the "cities of the world," Asia,
Africa and Latin America constitute the "rural areas
of the world.” In a sense, the contemporary world
revolution also presents a picture of the encircle
ment of cities by the rural areas . . . everything is
divisible. And so is this collossus of U.S. imperial
ism. It can be split up and defeated. The people of
45
New China News Agency, May 8, 1965, in Current
Background, No. 761 (May 12, 1965), p. 7.
204
Asia, Africa, Latin America and other regions can
destroy it piece by piece, some striking at its head
and others at its feet.*®
Being confronted with a super-power, namely the
United States, the leaders of Communist China certainly
do not have many alternatives other than to develop
opposition within the framework of national liberation
wars. Besides, mobilizing the "people’s revolutionary
struggle" on a global scale, this tactic appears to be
the best strategy for Peking to follow in order to cope
with the existing de facto situation.
In his speech at a Peking rally, in celebration
of the twentieth anniversary of the victory in the war
with Japan, Lo Jui-ching, former Chief of General Staff,
stated:
U.S. imperialism can definitely be defeated also
because the United States is now beset by all the
revolutionary peoples waging anti-imperialist strug
gles; militarily speaking, it has become weaker and
more helpless in the face of people's war as compared
with the predecessors, Fascist Germany, Japan and
Italy.
*®Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's
War," Peking Review, No. 36 (September 3, 1965) , pp. 24-26.
*^New China News Agency, September 4, 1965, in
Current Background, No. 770 (September 14, 1965) , p. 3.
205
However, Peking's leaders do not explain how national
liberation wars can be successfully waged under the cir
cumstances where the Soviet Union has allegedly "allied
itself with U.S. imperialism," with the "two super-powers
establishing spheres of influence throughout the world."
As the Soviet leaders gained confidence in
development of their nuclear weapons systems, they revived
the concept of wars of liberation. However, the Soviet
version of wars of national liberation differed from that
of Communist China.
Defining wars of national liberation, Khrushchev
said, "They are popular uprisings through which insurgent
A Q
people are fighting for the right of self-determination.nHO
A. Galkin, a Russian military theoretician, visualized two
kinds of relations involving armed conflict: relations
between the communist countries and the imperialist states,
and relations between the "imperialist" states and the
48
Kommunist, No. 1 (January, 1961), in Current
Digest of the Soviet Press, XIII:4 (February 22, 1961),
9.
206
noncommunist countries.^® This analysis can be carried
one step further by visualizing two types of war between
communist countries and "imperialist" states: world war
between the Soviet Union and the "imperialist" states, and
local wars between communist countries other than the
Soviet Union and the "imperialist" states. It also is
possible to distinguish two kinds of "imperialist" non
communist wars: local war between "imperialist" states
and independent noncommunist countries, and wars of liber
ation between the "imperialist" states and the "oppressed"
nations.
It must be noted, from a technical point of view,
that there is little difference between local wars and
wars of liberation. When the Soviet Union made a distinc
tion between the two types, they seemed to have made it on
the basis of the character of the belligerents. At this
point, Soviet leaders justified only wars of liberation as
revolutionary wars and considered these conflicts as
inevitable. However, they visualized the development of
49
A. Galkin, "Some Aspects of the Problem of Peace
and War," International Affairs (Moscow), November, 1961,
pp. 30-31.
207
uprisings solely in terms of guerrilla warfare and did not
project the image of wars of liberation into a further
conventional plane, to say nothing of nuclear situations.
Thus, they acknowledged a permanently local character of
a war arising from relations between "imperialist1 * states
and "oppressed" nations.
Kremlin leaders took the viewpoint that the role
of the national bourgeoisie in anti-imperialist struggles
should not be discouraged. They said that "national
democracy" under the leadership of a national bourgeoisie
was one of the most expedient forms of approach to the
unfurling of an ever broader anti-imperialist struggle.5®
Moreover, the Soviets apparently held that communist
strength in the "oppressed" nations was not yet strong
enough to wage a national liberation war, alone, against
the "imperialist" states. Approaching wars of liberation
in this way, the Soviet Union has eliminated the danger
of escalation of national liberation wars by admitting
Text of Tass Summary, August 26, 1960, cited in
Hudson et al., op. cit., p. 150. I. Ivanov, "The Present
Stage in the Struggle Against Colonialism," International
Affairs (Moscow), October, 1961, p. 28.
208
the weakness of national liberation forces and relieved
themselves of the obligation of rendering support as the
first communist country. Certainly, the capabilities of
weapons systems had not yet been developed to such an
extent that it could be used to support noncommunist
countries and the "oppressed" nations beyond the Eurasian
continental theater of operations.
Khrushchev admitted in October, 1961, at the
Twenty-first Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, that the differences in class interests are begin
ning to show more distinctly in the national liberation
movement. But he did not change his position on leader
ship in that movement. He continuously envisaged the
possibility of winning a stable parliamentary majority
backed by a mass revolutionary movement in the former
colonial countries. He stressed that the national libera
tion movement at the first stage "eases the carrying out
of future socialist changes in a peaceful, bloodless
51
G. Starushenko, "The National Liberation Move
ment," International Affairs (Moscow), October, 1963),
p. 5.
209
The leaders of Communist China, on the other hand,
define wars of liberation as wars waged by oppressed
52
nations to achieve or to uphold national independence.
Accordingly, Peking seems to distinguish between two
aspects of national liberation wars: (1) an oppressed
nation fighting for its national independence; (2) an
oppressed country fighting for the protection of its
national independence. This latter aspect of war, accord
ing to Soviet classification, belongs to the category of
local war. This is an important point of difference
between the Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders in their
definition of wars of liberation. In the eyes of Peking,
it is meaningless to distinguish local war from wars of
liberation. For the Chinese Communists, a war can be
called a local war from the point of view of the initiator,
who is always the "imperialists" according to the classic
communist doctrine or the same war might be called a
national liberation war from the point of view of the
responder, who is the "oppressed nations or countries."
52
Hsinhua, November 18, 1963, in Current Back
ground , No. 723, November 21, 1963.
The imperialists' local war and the oppressed nations' or
countries' liberation wars are only the opposite side of
the same coin.
The Chinese Communists contend,
By their policies of aggression and war, the imperial
ists, headed by the United States, have brought about
ceaseless local wars and armed conflicts of every
description in many places, and especially in Asia,
Africa and Latin America.53
When the "imperialists" send in their troops or use their
"lackeys" to suppress opposition in the oppressed nations
and countries, the ensuing war is a war of national libera
tion from the point of view of the oppressed people's
fighting for, or upholding, national independence.^
Therefore, leaders of Communist China do not distinguish
military problems of Communist bloc countries from those
in noncommunist independent countries and nations under
colonial rule.
The Peking Communists argue that, thanks to the
"unflinching struggle of the anti-imperialist revolutionary
forces," imperialism is daily being weakened. Under these
211
circumstances, the Chinese Communists have stressed that
oppressed people not only are able to win national libera
tion and achieve complete independence, but also they are
able to contribute to isolating the imperialists from the
people of the world and tying their hands, thus waging a
"blow-for-blow" struggle against the imperialists' policies
of war and aggression.55
Furthermore, the mainland regime remains aloof
from the spirit of cooperation with national bourgeoisies
which they had exhibited at the Bandung Conference in
1955. They begem to argue, beginning in 1959, that the
key to a rapid, uninterrupted transition to socialist
revolution is the firm grasping of hegemony in the demo
cratic revolution by the proletariat, through the commu
nist party.For the Chinese Communists, to allow
leadership by a national bourgeoisie in national liberation
55
"Long Live Leninism!" Peking Review, No. 17
(April 26, 1960), p. 12.
^"The Victory of Marxism-Leninism in China,"
Ten Glorious Years, 1949-1959 (Peking: Foreign Language
Press, 1960), p. 4.
212
wars means only the creation of a cause for a later revo
lutionary war. If the state machine of the bourgeoisie
remains intact, it is fully able to crush the majority
forces of the working class party, even if the working
class party commands a majority in parliament.^7
Moreover, envisaging a powerful revolutionary
storm rising over the continents of Asia, Africa and Latin
America, the Chinese Communists wish to deny leadership
to a national bourgeoisie in wars of liberation. Conse
quently, there is a sharp contrast between the Soviet and
the Chinese Communists over strategic concerns in wars of
liberation.
Soviet leaders acknowledge that most typical forms
of struggle in national liberation conflicts are guerrilla
warfare,^® while the Chinese leaders view both regular and
irregular warfare as acceptable strategy which may be
57
"Long Live Leninisml," p. 21.
58
Kommunist, No. 1 (January, 1961), in Current
Digest of the Soviet Press, XIII:4 (February 22, 1961), 9.
Y. Polgopolov, "National-Liberation Wars in the Present
Epoch," International Affairs (Moscow), February, 1962,
p. 21.
213
employed according to the situation. The Soviet Union
views guerrilla warfare as an internal affair of the
country concerned and stresses that it should be confined
within the boundaries of the insurgent nations. The main
concern of the Soviet leaders has been how to localize
wars of liberation in the nuclear age.
In contrast to the Soviet position, the Chinese
Communists classify the process of wars of liberation
into three stages: (1) strategic defense, (2) strategic
C Q
stalemate, and (3) strategic offense. Both regular and/
or irregular warfare as the main strategic form of national
liberation wars might be employed according to the stra
tegic stage. Mao Tse-tung described in his work, "On
Protracted War," the relationship between strategic stages
and forms of warfare. In the first stage, the strategic
defensive, mobile warfare is the principal form and posi
tional warfare and guerrilla warfare are supplementary
forms; in the second stage, classified as strategic stale
59
Shu Toku (Chu Teh) , Chugoku Kyosanto no Yugeki
Senjutsu (Guerrilla Tactics of the Chinese Communist
Party) (Japan: The Japanese Communist Party, 1951), p.
98.
214
mate, guerrilla warfare would be raised to the principal
position supplemented by mobile and positional warfare;
finally, in the third stage, the strategic offensive,
mobile warfare would again be raised to become the princi
pal form, supplemented by positional and guerrilla war
fare.60
Strategically speaking, the Chinese Communist
regime seems to view the situation of mutual nuclear
stalemate as the second stage of world revolution, i.e.,
strategic stalemate. They advocate that this prophesied
transitional stage for world revolution be fully exploited
to advance the revolutionary base and weaken the enemy's
position. In this light, guerrilla warfare, within the
framework of wars of liberation, should be strongly
supported by members of the communist bloc in order to be
prepared for the final stage of a communist all-out general
counteroffensive.
Since 1965 there has been some indication of
changes in the Soviet position on the cause of national
60
Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Vol. XI (New York:
International Publishers, 1955), pp. 183-188.
215
liberation wars. Major General K. S. Bochkarev stated:
One of the most acute antagonistic contradictions of
the modem era is the contradiction between the world
systems of imperialism and the peoples of colonial
and dependent countries and young national govern
ments. In its soil grow the local colonial wars of
imperialism and the national liberation wars of
oppressed peoples.61
A point worth noting is a new relationship between
the "imperialist" states and “national governments" as
another cause of national liberation wars. Bochkarev
further visualizes the possibility of national liberation
wars even in highly developed capitalist countries. He
holds:
In societies where the voracious laws of imperialism
operate, the people of these countries can also prove
to be victims of the predatory policies of a stronger
aggressive power, and this forces them to carry on a
desperate battle with alien enslavers.62
Soviet leaders contend that, in newly developing
countries especially, more and more significance is being
lent to the struggle of people for economic independence,
K. S. Bochkarev, “On the Character and Types of
War in the Modem Era," Communist of the Armed Forces,
June, 1965, in Kintner and Scott, op. cit., p. 79.
62Ibid., p. 82.
2 1 6
and for the abolition of military bases and "imperialist"
strong points in their national territory.®"* Thus, Soviet
military theoreticians have come close to the Chinese
Communists' view that imperialist local wars and oppressed
nations' or countries' liberation wars are only the
opposite side of the same coin.
In 1958, immediately after the successful Soviet
launch of its first earth satellite and ICBM, the Chinese
Communist attitude toward wars of national liberation
heralded the Soviet view which, emerged several years
later. Communist China, pledging the liberation of
Taiwan, attempted to set an example in its 1958 Taiwan
Strait crisis for the strategy of national liberation wars
63
Major Gen. N. Ya Sushko and Col. S. A. Tyush-
kevich, eds., National-Liberation Wars-Marxism-Leninism
on War and the Army, documented in Kintner and Scott,
op. cit., p. 97. Former Secretary of Defense Clark M.
Clifford stated in his statement on the Fiscal Year 1970
Defense Budget, "In practice, the U.S.S.R. has avoided
identification with Castro-ite guerrilla-movements in the
Latin American republics, and has not openly supported
their emergence in Africa. But it is too soon to predict
that the Soviets will soon cease to fish in troubled
waters or end their support for the concept of 'wars of
national liberation.'" Authorization for Military Pro
curement, Fiscal Year 1970, p. 9.
217
by eliminating "imperialist" strong points in their
"national territory." Furthermore, stressing the justifi
cation of national liberation wars, mainland China sup
ported the Algerian rebellion as the classical form of
the "just" colonial war, while the Soviet Union called
the war waged by two states, without designating it as a
revolutionary war.®4
In these discussions, there are both similarities
and differences in the attitudes of the leaders of both
countries toward the problem of wars of national libera
tion. In the late 1950*s, Soviet leaders did not even
use such terms as "wars of liberation" in discussing prob
lems of war and peace. They desired to avoid clashes at
the lower levels by assuming the inevitable escalation of
a minor clash into a larger war. However, Chinese Commu
nist leaders have always stressed the important role of
wars of national liberation as an instrument of policy.
Different national security requirements faced
by the two communist countries should be a factor in
64
V. Mednedev, “Republic Proclaimed," Inter
national Affairs (Moscow), November, 1958), p. 101.
218
accounting for this difference. The Soviet leaders suc
ceeded in establishing buffer zones around the Soviet
Union after World War II. The Chinese Communist leaders,
on the other hand, have failed even to unify the nation.
Taiwan still is occupied by the Chinese Nationalists.
Thus, the Chinese Communists are naturally eager to seek
every strategic opportunity to finish their uncompleted
mission— to conquer Taiwan— while the Soviet leaders do
not have uncompleted missions in regard to their territory.
Furthermore, Soviet leaders did not envisage the
prevention of a world war as a chance to advance their
national-liberation war strategy, as the Chinese Commu
nists did. When Soviet leaders included wars of national
liberation in the classifications of war, Soviet strategic
offensive weapons systems were strong enough to cope with
world war problems, but not yet in a position effectively
to support wars of national liberation.
However, leaders of both communist countries agree
on the role and definition of wars of national liberation,
when they are convinced that in various kinds of war they
can counter enemy actions.
219
Kinds of War as the Object of Deterrence
According to the surveyed open literature, the
Soviet leaders in the 1950's and the Chinese Communist
leaders in the latter part of the 1960's, had a common
interest in regard to the object of deterrence. As dis
cussed in the first section, leaders of the two communist
countries were primarily concerned with the problem of
deterring a nuclear power from initiating a full-scale
war in which they might be directly involved. For the
Soviets, this was a world war or a nuclear attack on the
Soviet Union; for the Chinese Communists, it was a large-
scale people's war which they might be forced to fight on
their own home territory.
To deter any large-scale violence, Soviet leaders
attempted to eliminate every possible source of conflict
on the basis of an assumption of inevitability of a
limited scale of war into a world war. Every kind of war
or violence became the object of deterrence in Soviet
doctrine.
The Soviet Union was strong enough to meet limited
violence on the Eurasian continent, but it was not in a
position to cope effectively with a world war and local
220
wars beyond the Eurasian continent. Accordingly, in the
1950's, Soviet leaders hoped to deter any war which might
involve them in a direct confrontation with the United
States in a place other than the Eurasian theater. The
Russian concept of the inevitable escalation of a minor
war into a world war reflected the Soviet leaders'
acknowledgment that the United States and its Western
allies could escalate any local conflict into whatever
scale of violence at will.
In the latter period of the 1960's, the Chinese
Communists also hoped to deter any nuclear power from any
war in which they might be directly involved. To do so,
Chinese Communist leaders encouraged small-scale violence
on a global scale to tie the hands of their assumed
enemy. For the Chinese Communists, therefore, the object
of deterrence was a large-scale war in which they might be
involved but not a small-scale war beyond their national
boundaries.
Soviet objects of deterrence from 1965 to the
present and Chinese Communist objects of deterrence in
the latter part of the 1950's have been limited to a
world war. The Chinese believed that a world war could
221
be deterred by the unprecedented destructive nature of
the new weapons systems and by an absolute balance in
international relations. The Soviet leaders also began to
acknowledge the class nature of a world war. However,
their doctrinal expressions have not been as positive
as those of Communist China in expressing their fear of
the survival of mankind in a nuclear world war.
At this juncture, a significant point in the
development of Soviet deterrence doctrine is a change in
attitude toward the kinds of war as the objects of deter
rence. When the Soviet leaders struck wars of national
liberation from the category of inevitable escalation,
they were not yet in a position effectively to support
these wars of liberation beyond the Eurasian continent
from the point of view of weapons capabilities. Then,
Soviet technology was narrowly able to provide Soviet
doctrine with a foundation for deterring a world war and
a local war in the Eurasian theater. But this foundation
was not flexible enough to serve as a base for deterrence
of liberation wars on a global scale.
Therefore, it is more plausible that the Soviet
leaders wanted to make clear their position on noninvolve-
222
ment in a local conflict beyond the Eurasian continent.
Moreover, the responsible areas for deterrence were
narrowly defined, by limiting the applicability of the
concept of inevitable escalation only to the communist
bloc countries.
However, as the capabilities of Soviet nuclear
weapons systems for the various strategic missions at
various levels of violence have been improved, Soviet
leaders have not only eliminated the concept of inevitable
escalation but have advanced their doctrinal position on
the possibility of fighting any scale of local war.
At this point, the following observations can be
made: when the Soviet capability for a top level of
violence is thought to be ineffective, the desire to
avoid a clash at that level is excused on the basis of
mutual destruction. At the same time the desire to avoid
a clash at lower levels is excused on the basis of inevit
able escalation. But when a top level of violence is
thought to be an effective way to counter enemy actions,
the problem of violence at a lower level can be separated
by discarding the concept of the inevitability of escala
tion.
223
With emergence of new specialized weapons and new
forms of military operations, however, the capabilities
for the top level of violence are not necessarily adequate
to perform every type of combat, task at a lower level.
Consequently, when Soviet leaders were able to separate
strategic problems of a lower level of violence from that
at the top level, they needed to be very cautious in
deciding the scope of the applicability of their existing
capabilities of weapons systems.
The Chinese Communists also discard the concept
of inevitability of escalation, when the capability for
the top level of violence is thought to be an effective
means of countering enemy actions. However, the leaders
of Communist China advocate a different view from that of
Soviet leaders on the question of avoiding a clash when
the capability for a top level of violence is thought to
be ineffective. Avoiding a clash at the top level is
excused on the basis of engaging at lower levels.
Thus, by establishing the framework for the deter
rence of the top level of violence on the basis of the
capabilities for a lower level of violence, the Chinese
Communist leaders need not adjust their deterrence doctrine
224
to the development of the capabilities of weapons systems.
In this respect, the Chinese Communist leaders did not
need, and will not need, to modify their deterrence doc
trine as the military technology develops.
CHAPTER VI
TARGET SYSTEMS IN DETERRENCE DOCTRINE
This chapter is concerned with the nature of
targets threatened in deterrence doctrine. The leaders
of both communist countries have expressed their respec
tive target systems in deterrence doctrine in terms of
aggressor, hostage and ideology.^ The Soviet and Chinese
leaders appear to refer to the United States when they use
the term aggressor in speaking of targets of retaliation.
When they advance a hostage targeting formula, they point
to those peripheral countries which have close security
Pravda, March 20, 1957; November 19, 1957; Novem
ber 15, 1958; February 22, 1959. V. D. Sokolovskii et
al., Soviet Military Strategy, trans. by Herbert Diner-
stein, Leon Goure and Thomas W. Wolfe (1st ed.; Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963; in Moscow:
Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of
the USSR, 1962; 1963; 1968). Survey of China Mainland
Press, No. 3622 (January 24, 1966), p. 3; Peking Review,
3:15 (August 12, 1960), 24; 3:17 (April 26, 1960), 12;
8:36 (September 3, 1965), 32; 9:38 (September 16, 1966),
8.
225
226
relations with the United States. When they speak of
targeting strategy in ideological terms, the objects to
be retaliated against are the "decaying forces of imperial
ism" or the "doomed forces of reaction." These forces are
to be distinguished from the forces of socialism.
In addition, in developing their targeting strat
egy during the earlier part of the 1960's, the Soviet
leaders' concern was with counter-war-supporting capabil
ities, with destruction of the enemy's industrial and
administrative-political centers. It is significant that
the Soviets do not use the term "counter-city strategy"
in discussions of target strategy. Instead, they have
used such terms as "all the industrial and administrative-
political centers of the U.S.A.,” or "the economic, trans
portation, military and administrative centers of the
United States and its allies."**
Pravda, February 25, 1962; February 23, 1963;
Radio Moscow, June 29, 1962; Krasnaya Zvezda, August 25
and 28, 1964.
3
Pravda, February 25, 1962; Radio Moscow, June 29,
1962.
227
A counter-city concept suggests the indiscriminate
killing of people and is in direct opposition to the
traditional communist, doctrine of the liberation and well
being of the common man. With their use of the concept
of counter-war-supporting strategy, the Soviets focus
attention upon the destruction of war-making potential and
the immobilization of nerve centers for war. The avoidance
of the term "counter-city strategy" appears to be an
attempt to camouflage the important point that industrial
and administrative-political centers are located, for the
most part, within cities.
Since 1966, the Soviet leaders have included
counter-war-fighting capabilities in their targeting
doctrine. At that time, they began to develop a targeting
strategy aimed at the destruction not only of the enemy's
industrial and administrative centers but also at the
destruction of its armed force, including its missiles.
This counter-war-supporting-fighting capability can be
directed toward two types of targets, "soft" and "hard."
"Soft" targets include strategic bomber forces and area
targets such as industrial and administrative centers,
while "hard” targets include missiles in hardened silos
228
and underground command and control centers.
Aggressors as a Target of Retaliation
During the period when the Soviet leaders based
their deterrence strategy on limited nuclear weapons capa-
4
bilities such as strategic bombers and land-based IRBM's,
Soviet targeting objectives were expressed in vague and
general terms. The Soviet leaders were found to use such
ambiguous expressions as "wipe from the face of the earth,"
"put out of commission," or "no chance of survival."^
During this period, submarine-launched missiles
were a part of the Soviet weapons inventory. Submarine-
launched missiles reported in 1958 were the "Comet" series
which were single stage, liquid fueled rockets with a range
of about 500 miles. A submarine was reportedly able to
tow three of these missiles in a launching canister, but
they were believed to have no subsurface launching capa
bility. Moreover, they reportedly were not given any
strategic mission at intercontinental levels at this point.
Cited in Military Review, XXXVIII:1 (April, 1958), 72;
Siegfried Breyer, Guide to Sovifet Navy (Annapolis: U.S.
Naval Institute, 1970), p. 57; Center for Strategic
Studies, The Soviet Military Technological Challenge
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 1967), p. 47.
5Pravda, March 15, 1958; March 31, 1958; December
7, 1958; December 24, 1958.
229
These expressions, considering the then prevailing weapon
capabilities, sound like nothing but an attempt to use
terror to exaggerate the Soviet's inferior strategic offen
sive capabilities and to deceive the West with regard to
Soviet strategic potential. An exaggerated Soviet threat
runs parallel with its inferior strategic offensive capa
bilities, and its vague warnings of destruction are only
a reflection of the unsophisticated nature of the then
prevailing weapons systems.
It is believed that the Soviet Union began to equip
its army with the ICBM some time in 1959.® Even though
the Soviet leaders conducted their first test of an ICBM
in 1957, they later insisted, “Since 1956, the Soviet Union
n
has had an intercontinental rocket." Soviet leaders
apparently attempted to mislead the Western world into
For a detailed analysis, see Arnold L. Horelick
and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1966), pp. 50-57.
7
A. A. Strokov, "Military Art in the Postwar
Period," in William R. Kintner and Harriet Fast Scott,
trans. and ed,, The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military
Affairs (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968) ,
p. 201.
230
believing that the capabilities of the Soviet IRBM were
that of the ICBM. Reflecting this gap between the
weapons' real and apparent capabilities, the Soviet
leaders' designation of intercontinental level targets
was expressed in vague and imprecise terms such as
Q
"aggressors," "America's vital centers," or "warmongers."
In connection with this vague expression of target
strategy, a Soviet threat was made in terms of "annihila
tion."^ Soviet leaders repeatedly used phrases such as
"a smashing rebuff to the aggressors," “inflicting devas
tating counterblows," and "severe retribution," which
8
Pravda, March 20, 1957; November 19, 1957; Kom-
munist, No. 2 (February, 1958), pp. 34-38; Pravda, Novem
ber 15, 1958; February 22, 1959; Izvestia, February 23,
1961; Krasnaya Zvezda, April 5, 1961.
g
Kenneth E. Boulding enumerates three kinds of
threat in international conflict: the threat of punish
ment, the threat of conquest, and the threat of annihila
tion. According to Dr. Boulding, the threat of punishment
implies making things uncomfortable for another by military
action in order to sway the policies of other nations in
its own favor; the threat of conquest connotes a menace
to absorb another into its own empire and the threat of
annihilation means to threaten the threatened to destroy
it completely. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General
Theory (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), pp. 256-258.
231
appeared to imply mutual destruction. Khrushchev stated
in 1958 that, in the age of atomic energy and interconti
nental missiles, "any country which attempts to settle
international disputes by force of arms hazards its own
existence by so doing."10
Thus, "mutual destruction” was stressed as the
threat in the Soviet deterrence doctrine. But this threat
was based on weapons systems which were still under
development rather than those which were already opera
tional. With apparent, rather than actual, capabilities
of nuclear weapons systems, Soviet deterrence doctrine
was not in a position to develop a concrete target strategy
in a world war.
On the other hand, the leaders of Communist China,
attempting to deter a large-scale people's war in which
mainland China might become a major battlefield for
fighting the "imperialist forces," designated the aggres
sor's invading forces as the targets threatened in their
deterrence doctrine. They warned:
^ International Affairs (Moscow), November, 1958,
p. 4.
23 2
We should make full preparations against wars of
aggression which U.S. imperialism might launch at
an early date on a large scale, with nuclear or other
weapons, and on several fronts. All our work must
be on the footing of readiness to fight. . . . We
shall be more than a match for such a thing as U.S.
imperialism, and final victory will certainly be
ours.
With the nuclear capability currently available
to Chinese Communist leaders, Peking's deterrence doctrine
does not have many options for its targeting strategy in
a war against the United States, one of the major nuclear
powers. Lacking intercontinental nuclear capabilities,
China has not yet been in a position where it can attempt
to mislead the world into believing that its limited cap
abilities are an effective means by threatening to retal
iate against transcontinental targets to deter one of the
major nuclear powers from a world war.
By acknowledging invading forces as the targets
threatened in their deterrence doctrine, Chinese Commu
nist leaders stress the importance of dividing the enemy
forces on many fronts. Translating this strategic concept
^ “Chinese PLA Holds Conference on Political Work,"
Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 3622 (January 24,
1966), p. 3.
233
into doctrinal terms, the Chinese state, "The United
States is now beset by all the revolutionary peoples waging
1 p
anti-imperialist struggles."■L^ In the eyes of the Chinese
Communists, "U.S. imperialism" bands together all the
revolutionary countries into a single common front, united
against a single object. Consequently, the anti-imperial
ist revolutionary struggle against "U.S. imperialism"
will create a condition where United States forces, in
responding to the challenge of so-called revolutionary
peoples of the world, would be forced to divide their
strength on many fronts.
These points were stressed in Lin Piao's article,
"Long Live the Victory of People's War." According to
this view, the "people's revolutionary struggle," on a
global scale, will allow the Chinese Communists to divide
their main enemy, the United States, on many fronts.
12
Lo Jui-ching, "The People Defeated Japanese
Fascism and They Can Certainly Defeat U.S. Imperialism
Too," Peking Review, 8:36 (September 3, 1965) , 32;
"Ambassador Wang Kuo-chuan's Statement," Peking Review,
9:38 (September 16, 1966), 8.
234
Hostage as a Target of Retaliation
When armed with nuclear weapons which cannot
destroy intercontinental targets but which can strike
targets within intermediate range, leaders of both commu
nist countries indicated their interest in holding hostage
United States allies located within their nuclear range.
Former Soviet Premier Khrushchev, stated in 1958:
With the present methods of destruction, the emer
gence of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the develop
ment of intercontinental ballistic missiles, with
submarines armed with ballistic and winged missiles—
of what significance is it that the NATO armed forces
can link up Paris and Oslo in a matter of seconds?
Today one can merely push a button and not only air
fields and means of communications between different
military staffs fly up in the air but entire cities
go up in smoke and whole countries can be destroyed,
so vast is the destructive power of the modem
weapons man has devised.13
Through a hostage strategy, Soviet leaders
attempted to persuade NATO allies of the United States
that even the United States strategic offensive weapons'
superiority could not prevent their destruction in the
event of nuclear world war. Khrushchev, in 1959,
reportedly asked the West Germans,
13
Pravda, November 15, 1958.
235
They [Western military men] would have you believe
that the United States stands to lose least from a
war. Even if this were true, does this make you
Germans feel any better?-*-4
The Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral S. G.
Gorshkov, also warned in 1962, in regard to Turkey,
If Turkey continues to fulfill the role to which it
has been assigned in the plans of the military blocs
of NATO and CENTO, then, in the event of war, a
nuclear rocket blow will, of course, be inflicted on
Turkey. *-5
These statements suggest that Soviet leaders hoped to
deter the United States from destroying the Soviet Union
by holding its allies as hostages.
Immediately after their first test of an atomic
bomb in October, 1964, Chinese Communist leaders hinted
at a hostage strategy toward Japan. Criticizing the
Japanese government, the Peking government stated,
They [the Sato government] axe intent on helping
U.S. imperialism promote its policies of nuclear
blackmail and threats and nuclear war preparations,
thereby pushing the Japanese nation towards the abyss
of nuclear calamity.
14Pravda, May 9, 1959.
15
Pravda, February 2, 1962.
^ Peking Review, 7:51 (December 18, 1964), 8.
236
Communist China, however, has not warned any
neighboring country other than Japan. This suggests that
the Chinese Communists classify their neighboring coun
tries into two strategic categories: one for which the
hostage strategy can be applied, and the other for which
the ideological nature of threatened targets is primarily
stressed. The hostage strategy implies dealing with a
country kept as a hostage as one entity, while a targeting
strategy, in terms of ideology, suggests treating a nation,
which is a target of retaliation, from the point of view
of class struggle. However, they appear never to have put
too great importance on this hostage strategy with regard
to Japan. Being primarily concerned with the strategic
guidance for the people's war, Chinese Communist leaders
seem mainly interested in exploiting a neighbor's internal
problems from the point of view of class struggle.
Strategic concepts of the people's war stress
primarily the importance of separating the country from
its allies; the hostage strategy relies on a close rela
tionship between the country taken as hostage and its
allies. Consequently, the people's war strategy and the
hostage strategy do not agree in their basic strategic
237
requirements. The hostage strategy can be effective only
when it is based on a defensive strategy which aims at
maintaining a status quo, while the people's war strategy
can be successfully employed when the situation is favor
able for changing a status quo.
Counter-War-Supporting-Capabilities
In the earlier period of the 1960's, the Soviet
leaders had been successful not only in deploying their
first generation of ICBM's for combat missions but had
also developed a new generation of ICBM's, the SS-7 and
the SS-8. These ICBM's were supplemented by the G and
the I-class, and the H, E, and Z-class submarines equipped
respectively with the Sark and the Serb type ballistic
missiles and the Badger-C and Bear-B type missile-carrying
strategic bombers. Thus, the range of the Soviet stra
tegic offensive nuclear weapons system was extended to
fully cover targets in the United States. In 1962,
Soviet leaders claimed,
We are capable of wiping from the face of the earth
with one rocket-nuclear blow, any target, all the
industrial and administrative-political centers of
238
the U.S.A.17
However, the accuracy of their missile weaponry was still
only good enough for "soft" targets. These developments
led the Soviets to a new formulation for their targeting
system: a counter-war-supporting capabilities formula.
In advancing a target strategy in terms of counter-
war-supporting capabilities, the Soviet leaders stressed
an "all-devastating counterblow at the economic, transpor
tation, military and administrative centers of the United
18
States and its allies." They admitted that this target
ing strategy was basically no different from a counter
city strategy. In October, 1964, Marshal Sokolovskii
commented on the concept of city sparing: "In any case,
this would be impossible, since military objectives are
IQ
situated close to population centers."
The Soviet leaders attributed their counter-war-
supporting targeting strategy to two characteristics of
^Pravda, February 25, 1962; Kommunist, No. 7
(July, 1962), p. 13.
1®Radio Moscow, June 29, 1962.
^ Krasnaya Zvezda, August 25 and 28, 1964, in
Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XVI:38 (October 14,
1964), 16.
239
the enemy's weapons: the "considerable quantity" of those
weapons and their growing invulnerability. In the second
edition of their Military Strategy, Marshall Sokolovskii
and his colleagues stressed that
the delivery means of nuclear strikes against the
enemy's strategic weapons is a more difficult task
than striking large cities. These difficulties are
due mainly, first, to the fact that such weapons
exist in considered)le quantity, and, second, the
majority of them, especially the missiles, which
under present conditions are absolute weapons, are
emplaced in underground bases that are difficult to
destroy, and on submarines, etc., and the trend toward
increasing this invulnerability is constantly grow
ing. 20
Thus, the Soviet counter-war-supporting targeting strategy
appeared to reflect the limitations of prevailing nuclear
weapons capabilities rather than an adherence to the doc
trine of mutual assured destruction.
Considering the accuracy of Soviet strategic
offensive nuclear weapons' capabilities and the surviv-
Leon Goure, Notes on the Second Edition of
Marshal Sokolovskii's Military Strategy (Santa Monica;
RAND Corp. Memorandum RM-3972-PR, February, 1964), p. 30.
The point of enemy weapons' quantity is also repeated in
I. Glagolev and V. Larionov, "Soviet Defense Might and
Peaceful Coexistence," International Affairs (Moscow),
November, 1963, p. 32.
240
ability of United States strategic weapons capabilities
which was based on underground hardened silos and a
variety of land, sea and air-launched nuclear missiles,
it would not appear that the Soviet leaders had the option
of developing a target strategy in terms of counter-war-
fighting capabilities.
The Chinese Communist leaders have not yet con
cerned themselves with the problems of target strategy in
terms of counter-war-supporting capabilities. Obviously,
their nuclear weapons' systems cannot provide them, at
this stage, with a doctrinal foundation on which counter
war-supporting capabilities target strategy at the inter
continental levels can be developed.
Counter-War-Supporting-Fighting Capabilities
As the Soviets attain more dependable and flexible
capabilities in strategic offensive nuclear weapons sys
tems and as they develop the capabilities of the strategic
defensive nuclear missile weapons systems, another aspect
of Soviet targeting concept has emerged. The nature of
the armed forces, as strategic targets, has been more
specifically defined since 1966. According to Marshal
241
Sokolovskii and his colleagues in an article entitled,
"On Contemporary Military Strategy":
The economy of the country, the systems of government
administration, the aimed forces, including strategic
nuclear forces— all these are easily accessible to
modem means of battle and could be destroyed in a
very short time.21
In October, 1964, Marshal Sokolovskii had made a
statement on the impossibility of separating military
objectives from surrounding industrial-administrative
centers.22 considering his remarks, this new Soviet posi
tion on a target strategy based on counter-war-supporting-
fighting capabilities appears to have reflected then
developing weapons capabilities, such ICBM's as the SS-11,
the SS-13, the SS-9, and an anti-ballistic missile missile,
the Galosh.
Major General V. Voznenko wrote an article, "The
Dialectics of Development and Change in Forms and Methods
of Armed Conflict," which appeared in Communist of the
^^Kintner and Scott, op. cit., p. 273.
22
Krasnaya Zvezda, August 24 and 28, 1964, in
Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XVI:38 (October 14,
1964), 16.
242
Armed Forces, in June, 1966. It reflected changes in
strategic guidance of the armed forces that might have
been given as a result of the Twenty-third Congress of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Voznenko stated:
Ideas about the main objectives now are not only
strategic nuclear weapons and groupings of armed
forces but are also objectives composing the basic
military-economic power of the enemy, the organs of
his government and organs of higher military command
as well as those of his moral potential and will to
fight.23
It is worth noting that Voznenko newly added the "organs
of his government and organs of higher military command"
to the list of Soviet strategic target systems, which
seem to be closely related to the deployment of an ABM
system around Moscow.
Furthermore, since 1965, the class character of
a new world war began to be discussed. Lieutenant Colonel
Y. Ribkin argued:
23
Kintner and Scott, op. cit., p. 322. However,
Soviet target strategy does not specifically explain
whether Soviet strategic offensive missile weapons systems
with their improved accuracy can destroy enemy missiles
in the underground silos.
243
Mankind will suffer enormous loss. But it must be
kept in mind that the degree of damage which inevit
ably will be brought to civilization by such a war
[nuclear world war] in many ways depends on the speed
of the armed struggle. The more decisively and
quickly the aggressive acts of imperialism are sup
pressed by the force of our weapons, the fewer the
negative results of war.24
This argument appears to imply a target system of
counter-war-fighting capabilities. In order to "decisively
and quickly” suppress "the aggressive acts of imperialism"
by the force of their weapons, the Soviet leaders had to
destroy the "imperialists"' strategic offensive forces,
including their nuclear weapons. In this respect, Marshal
Krylov, Commander of the Strategic Rocket Troops, listed
the following targets for Soviet weapons: delivery sys
tems, weapons storage, fabrication sites, military
installations, military industries, centers of politico-
25
military administration, command and control. The above
24
Y. I. Ribkin, "On the Nature of World Nuclear
Rocket War," Communist of the Armed Forces, September,
1965, in Kintner and Scott, op. cit., p. 111.
25
Marshal N. Krylov, "The Strategic Rocket Forces,1
Nedel'ya, No. 36 (September, 1967). Cited in W. T. Lee,
"Rational Underlying Soviet Strategic Forces" (Technical
Note, Stanford Research Institute, 1969), p. 24.
244
statements do not specify whether the targets to be hit
are "soft" or "hard." Accordingly, Soviet target strategy
in terms of counter-war-fighting capabilities is still
vague and unspecific. It is apparent, however, that the
Soviet leaders have not been satisfied with a counter-war-
supporting capabilities only formula which is a component
of minimum deterrence. In this regard, Western experts
need to watch closely the Soviets' development of "hard"
target capabilities in conjunction with the development
of counterforce strategy.
Chinese deterrence doctrine during the latter
part of the 1950*s was not concerned with the problem of
targeting strategy in terms of counter-war-supporting-
fighting capabilities. During this period, Chinese Commu
nist leaders depended solely upon Soviet nuclear capabil
ities for the development of their own deterrence doctrine.
Assuming that the nature of the balance of terror, based
on newly developed nuclear-missile weapons systems, is an
absolute balance, the Chinese appeared to have paid little
attention to the problem of targeting strategy in regard
to the deterrence of a nuclear war.
245
Ideological Nature of Threatened Targets
In the latter part of the 1950's, when the Soviet
Union expressed its targeting strategy in vague and gen
eral terms, a reflection of their then prevailing nuclear
weapons' capabilities, the term “aggressors" used in Soviet
doctrinal expressions appeared to imply state organizations
as a whole, without distinguishing ruling class from the
ruled. Consequently, the Soviets did not stress the ideo
logical nature of the threatened targets.
But as Soviet leaders revealed a new aspect of
targeting strategy— counter-war-supporting and war-
supporting-fighting capabilities formula— in the 1960's,
they also began to re-emphasize the ideological nature of
war, including a nuclear world war. But their point of
emphasis with regard to the ideological nature of targeting
strategy in Soviet deterrence doctrine, did not necessarily
coincide with Chinese Communist doctrinal expressions.
Soviet leaders acknowledge the formulation and
affirmation of socialism on an international scale as a
basic content of the modem historical process. They
hold: "In its political nature, world war, if it is
started by the imperialists, would be a strongly pronounced
246
26
class war, a war of two world systems." Yet Soviet
leaders do not trouble to explain how to distinguish
working people from the "imperialists" in capitalist
countries in a world war, even though they envisage simul
taneous nuclear action over a short period of time against
vital centers and enemy armed forces.
Chinese Communist leaders have consistently
included an ideological aspect of targeting strategy in
their deterrence doctrine. Whenever they advocate "the
destruction or annihilation of aggressors," the aggressors
definitely imply only the "decaying forces of imperialism"
or "doomed forces of reaction," which must be absolutely
distinguished from the people and the forces of socialism.
Immediately after the Soviet launching of the
ICBM, Chang Wen-tien stressed in an article in November,
1957:
If the imperialist aggressive bloc dares to start
a war against the socialist countries, it is certain
26
Colonel S. V. Malyanchikov, "The Character and
Features of Nuclear Rocket War," Communist of the Armed
Forces, November, 1965, in Kintner and Scott, op. cit.,
p. 174.
247
that the whole capitalist system will collapse
entirely.27
Yu Chao-li also stated in 1960:
If the imperialists should insist on launching a
third world war, it is certain that several hundred
million more will turn to socialism; then there will
not be much room left in the world for the imperial
ists, while it is quite likely that the whole struc
ture of imperialism will utterly collapse.28
It will be recalled that in the article in
Hung-ch1j, "Long Live Leninismi," the Chinese Communist
leaders put themselves on the record clearly. They stated
that if the imperialists
should dare to fly in the face of the will of all
humanity by launching a war using atomic and nuclear
weapons, the result will be the very speedy destruc
tion of these monsters encircled by the peoples of
the world, and the result will certainly not be the
annihilation of mankind.29
Concerning Peking*s hopes to push the entire
capitalist system into complete collapse, Chinese Communist
27
Chang Wen-tien, “Forty Years' Struggle for
Peace," Jen-min Jih-pao, November 2, 1957, in Survey of
China Mainland Press, No. 1648 (November 8, 1957), p. 20.
2^Peking Review, 3:15 (August 12, 1960) , 24.
29Ibid., 3:17 (April 26, 1960), 12.
248
strategy in the 1958 Taiwan Strait adventure was explained
by Anna Louise Strong. She suggested an interesting point
in recalling a conversation with P*eng Teh-huai, Defense
Minister at that time, who stated that the Chinese Commu
nist army had fired a few shells, just to get the attention
of the Nationalist Chinese soldiers. This fire was "puni
tive in nature," P'eng said, because their leaders had been
"far too wild" in raiding the mainland. Miss Strong wrote:
But that it is hard for the 130,000 troops and civil
ians in Tsinmentao to stand . . . the pestering
hunger and cold and that therefore Peng had ordered
his troops to stop shooting for a week in order to
give Tsinmentao a chance to bring in supplies. Only
they must use no American convoys . . . then he [Peng]
announced that he had ordered his troops hereafter
not to fire on Tsinmentao's air field or wharf or on
the bay or ships, on even days of the month, so that
the compatriots on the island may have steady trans
port and entrench themselves for a long time to come.
Chiang's stubborn grasp of Tsinmentao thus becomes
a weapon for Peking . . . to befriend the enemy
soldiers in Tsinmentao to make them allies toward
a wider victory.30
In calling for destruction of the "imperialists"
but not the working peoples, the Chinese Communist leaders
appear to have either overlooked, or purposely refused to
30
New Times, No. 46 (November, 1958), pp. 9-11.
249
recognize, the implications of the destructive nature of
nuclear weapons in order to exploit the psychological
effects upon the enemy of their doctrinal position. In
any event, leaders of both communist countries have demon
strated their keen interest in the ideological nature of
targeting strategy in their respective deterrence doc
trines, even though the Soviet Union had temporarily
disparaged the role of ideology in its deterrence doc
trine when the capabilities of its strategic nuclear
weapons systems were far inferior to that of the United
States.
Both countries took a similar position in threat
ening the enemy located within intercontinental range by
taking hostage allies located within the range of their
intermediate range weapons. However, Soviet leaders put
much more emphasis than the Chinese Communists upon the
hostage as a target of retaliation. Since the hostage
strategy relies on a close relation between the hostage
country and its allies, over-all Soviet strategic objec
tives, during the period when the hostage strategy was
stressed, appeared aimed mainly at maintaining the status
quo and treating the enemy and its allies as one strategic
250
entity.
Chinese Communist leaders, on the other hand,
stressed the importance of dividing the enemy forces on
many fronts, isolating him from his allies and distin
guishing the ruling class from the ruled. They did not
appear to attach much importance to the doctrinal position
of hostage strategy.
Generally speaking, Soviet leaders attempted to
mislead the world into believing that the capabilities of
their nuclear weapons under development were the same as
weapons systems already deployed. While the Soviet
leaders based their target strategy upon apparent rather
than actual capabilities, their target strategy was
expressed in vague terms, and their deterrence doctrine
as a whole suffered from the lack of logical consistency.
Chinese Communist leaders, however, based their
deterrence doctrine on either their actual weapon capabil
ities or their belief in available weapon capabilities.
Consequently, Chinese Communist deterrence doctrine has
always enjoyed a logical consistency, although it might
lack sophistication.
As the capabilities of nuclear weapons systems
251
improved in range and yield, the tone of Soviet targeting
strategy changed from vagueness into concreteness in terms
of a counter-war-supporting-capabilities formula. Counter-
war-supporting-capabilities strategy implies an extended
formula of the hostage strategy. Thomas C. Schelling
stated:
As long as each side has the manifest power to destroy
a nation and its population in response to an attack
by the other, the "balance of terror" amounts to a
tacit understanding backed by a total exchange of all
conceivable hostages.31
However, the hostage strategy inherently contains a weak
point. No hostage strategy is likely to prove effective
against a country led by an irrational leader such as a
trigger-happy paranoid or one seeking national martyrdom.
Thus, the Soviet leaders appeared to have set a
goal in the development of nuclear weapons systems which
could provide doctrine with a counterforce capability.
When the Soviet leaders advocated targeting strategy in
terms of counter-war-supporting-fighting capabilities, the
31
Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 239.
(A Paperback edition.)
252
capabilities of Soviet nuclear weapons systems appeared
to have been effective for second-strike-counter-war-
supporting-capabilities strategy, but ineffective for
counterforce strategy. In this light, a mixed formula of
counter-war-supporting-fighting-capabilities targeting
strategy seemed to reflect the Soviet leaders' aspirations
for counterforce capabilities which might be an important
element of first strike strategy.
CHAPTER VII
MODES OF DETERRENCE THREAT
Modes of deterrence threat supposedly are designed
not only to discourage an enemy from taking undesired
military actions but also to be effectively implemented
into military actions when deterrence fails. In this
respect, the development of deterrence doctrine in terms
of the mode of deterrence threat is closely related to
the development of the nuclear weapons capabilities and
war-fighting doctrine. However, this chapter is concerned
only with the development of the nuclear weapons capabil
ities and its relationship with the development of deter
rence doctrine in terms of the modes of deterrence threat.
Along with the development of nuclear weapons
systems' capabilities, the leaders of the Soviet Union
appear to have formulated their modes of deterrence threat
in terms of preemption, second-strike, a launch-on-warning
and deterrence plus formula. A preemptive action is a
"first-strike designed to knock out the adversary's
253
254
offensive forces, population, or industry in anticipation
of a possible strike by him."^ A second-strike implies a
mode of retaliation which is designed to destroy the
attacker after the deterrer has survived a nuclear surprise
attack. A launch-on-waming refers to a missile strike
launched while the enemy's missiles are in the air, but
before they reach their targets. A deterrence plus for
mula implies retaliation plus a war-fighting strike.
While war-fighting strategy is not the subject of this
study, one point is worth noting. Soviet modes of deter
rence to a world war which were expressed only within the
framework of retaliatory actions in the earlier part of
the 1960's were expressed in conjunction with a strategy
of war-fighting in the latter period of the 1960's.
Preemption
Since 1954-55, the Soviet Union had limited one
way suicidal intercontinental bomber capabilities, and
1
Strategy and Science? Toward a National Security
Policy for the 1970's, p. 282.
255
Russian leaders could have launched a surprise attack upon
the United States. However, a surprise attack was a risky
option for the Soviets. There was the danger of enemy
retaliation. In addition, it contradicted the traditional
communist concept of "defensive war." In this light, the
concept of preemptive actions might satisfy Soviet doc
trinal requirements of deterrence.
The Soviet concept of preemptive actions appeared
in print for the first time in a Soviet military journal
in 1955. General Kurochkin wrote an article on the subject
stating:
In order to further guarantee the security of our
motherland against an aggressor's surprise attack,
it is necessary to be in a state of full fighting
readiness and to be able to deal preemptive blows
against an enemy who is preparing to attack.2
To make preemptive retaliation effective as a mode of
deterrent action, most timely and precise information
would be necessary in addition to appropriate weapons
2
Voennaia mysi (Military Thought), No. 5 (May,
1955), p. 18. For more detailed analysis, see D. S.
Dinerstein, War and Soviet Union (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1962), pp. 189-211; Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet
Strategy in the Nuclear Age (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1962), pp. 84-87.
256
systems and effective strategic offensive capabilities.
In this context, the Soviet leaders asserted:
Marxist-Leninist science is fully capable of fore
seeing such a significant phenomenon in the life of
society as the transition from a condition of peace
to a condition of war.3
But Soviet assumptions of the omnipotent capability of
Marxist-Leninist science most likely was a desperate
attempt to bridge the gap between their insufficient
deterrent weapons capabilities and their doctrinal
A
requirements.
Foreseeing the possibility of preemptive actions
on the basis of a wrong interpretation or false informa
tion on enemy activity, Soviet leaders declared in 1959:
3
R. Rotmistrov, "Surprise in the History of War,"
Voennyi vestnik (Military Herald), No. 11 (November, 1955);
Voennaia mysl (Military Thought), No. 8 (May, 1955).
Cited in Dinerstein, op. cit., p. 196.
^In a study by a special American Security Council
Committee, 31 experts state that Soviet leaders' repeated
statements— nuclear war is "not inevitable"— are, "an
Aesopian way of saying they consider they have the capabil
ity of disarming us so effectively that we can neither
launch nor wage a nuclear war." The ABM and the Changed
Strategic Military Balance: USSR vs. USA (Washington,
D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1969), p. 17.
257
A state on whose territory a nuclear load is dropped,
whether by evil intent or owing to a technical fault
or other accident, is hardly going to investigate how
it happened, but will be obliged to react to it as to
a military attack, as to the unleashing of war.5
Soviet leaders appeared to become concerned with Western
reaction to their position on preemptive actions in forms
of preventive war. General Kurasov, attempting a rebuttal
of Dinerstein's article, "The Revolution in Soviet Stra
tegic Thinking," argued:
Theoretical statements in the press, by individual
authors, on measures to frustrate an aggressor's
surprise attack were interpreted in the Western press
as a summons to preemptive war.6
In an article in the August, 1958 issue of
International Affairs, another military theoretician, N.
Talensky, disparaged the significance of a nuclear sur
prise attack. This seemed to have been closely related
5
New Times, No. 39 (September, 1959), p. 15.
Major General (Ret.) Borris Teplinsky also states that
"there have been repeated indications that war might result
if the man at the controls of some complex military tech
nical equipment loses control of his nerves, or makes some
mistake. This technical equipment is itself not always
reliable and is a potential source of accident that could
have fatal consequences." New Times, No. 8 (February,
1961), p. 7.
6V. Kurasov, “On the Question of the Preemptive
Blow," Krasnaya Zvezda, April 27, 1958.
258
to the Soviet leaders' apprehensions as expressed in
Kurasov's article. In any event, the advocacy of the
need for a preemptive action advanced in 1955 and then
subsequently dropped out of public discussion for several
years, until it returned to view in 1960-61 in the pro
fessional military press.7
In 1959, as the United States and the Soviet Union
began to put their first generation ICBM's into opera
tional status, the survivability of strategic offensive
forces against surprise attack appears to have become a
major doctrinal concern. From the technical point of view,
the first generation ICBM's appear to have had various
limitations in combat readiness. Their liquid fuel
engines took perhaps more than half an hour to ready for
firing. Moreover, the size of the huge Soviet boosters
was a major problem in maintaining secrecy. Hiding the
missile sites was absolutely necessary if they were to
avoid becoming easy targets for United States strategic
bombers, ICBM's and submarine-launched missiles.
7
Sokolovskii et al., Soviet Military Strategy,
p. 17.
259
Under these circumstances, Soviet nuclear weapons
appeared to have little value, unless they were used as
weapons of surprise. As if to reflect the then prevailing
conditions in the development of these capabilities,
views on preemptive actions appeared again in 1961 in the
statements of Soviet spokesmen.** Soviet Defense Minister
Malinovsky stressed at the Twenty-second Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the need for "effec
tively repulsing a surprise attack by the enemy and
thwarting his criminal designs."® Marshal M. Zakharov
also stated in his article, "Mighty Army of a Great
People," that Soviet armament, composition, strength and
high combat readiness enable Soviet armed forces "to
strike an immediate and crushing retaliatory blow at any
aggressor who tries to disrupt the peaceful creative labor
For discussions on this subject, see Robert
Dickson Crane, ed., Soviet Nuclear Strategy; A Critical
Appraisal (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic Studies,
Georgetown University, 1965), pp. 34-41. Also see U.S.
Analytical Introduction to the Sokolovskii book, op. cit.,
pp. 16-20.
9
Pravda, October 25, 1961, in Current Digest of
the Soviet Press, XIV:1 (January 31, 1962), 20.
260
of the Soviet people.This same point was repeated in
Sokolovskii's book.^
Soviet leaders soon ceased repeating their earlier
hints at preemptive actions. A mode of deterrence threat
in terms of preemption can be feasible only on the basis
of a counterforce capability. Some experts on Soviet
military affairs argue that the lapse in discussion of
preemption by Soviet writers may well have been due to
changes in technology. They note that discussion on this
matter begem during a period when Soviet leaders could
send off bombers and then recall them in case advance
warning of am "enemy attack" was a false alarm. Such
advance warning is more important and also harder to
receive in the "soft-missile" age. But it may also be
12
less pressing in a “hardened-missile" age. However, as
10Izvestia, February 23, 1961, in Current Digest
of the Soviet Press, XIII:8 (March 22, 1961), 40.
^Sokolovskii et al., op. cit., pp. 313-314.
12
Crane, op. cit., p. 37.
261
Soviet nuclear weapons counterforce capabilities are
improved, it will be more plausible to hear their leaders'
doctrinal pronouncements on preemptive actions increase.
Second-Strike Strategy
Terms such as a "smashing rebuff to the aggres
sors," "devastating counterblows," and "severe retribu
tion," suggest that the Soviet deterrent action was based
upon automatic retaliatory actions. However, the Soviet
concept of automatic retaliation seemed to be different
from the United States strategy of "massive retaliation,"
which was first advocated by Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles in 1954 and was designed to deter limited
scale Communist aggression. The Soviet concept referred
to the Soviet strategic position which was projected to
counter different levels of violence with a corresponding
level of deterrence action.
Former Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev told
Averell Harriman in 1959, "If you send in tanks, they will
burn and make no mistake about it. If you want war, you
262
13
can have it, but remember it will be your war.”
Incorporated into the concept of the inevitable
escalation of a minor war into a general war, the deter-
ree's action and the deterrer's corresponding counter
action are supposed to escalate from one level of violence
to the next higher level, until they reach the highest
step on the escalation ladder. But Soviet leaders did
not dwell clearly on how this escalation takes place.
In 1960, Khrushchev suggested that Soviet second-
strike strategy was based upon the survivability of
strategic offensive forces. He attributed this surviv
ability to the vastness of Russian territory. He stated:
We are developing such a system that if some means of
retaliation were knocked out, we shall always be able
to resort to duplication of the means and hit the
targets from a reserve position.
Marshal Sokolovskii also held that the vastness of Russian
territory gave Russia the advantage in placing and shelter-
Averell Harriman, "My Alarming Interview with
Khrushchev," Life, July 13, 1959, p. 33.
14
Pravda, January 15, 1960, in Current Digest of
the Soviet Press, XII:2 (February 10, 1960), 11. Also re
printed in Harriet Fast Scott, Soviet Military Doctrine;
Its Continuity, 1960-1970 (Stanford: Stanford Research
Institute, 1971), p. 77.
263
ing missiles so as "to make them invulnerable to enemy
reconnaissance and to strategic means of attack.
These statements suggest that second-strike retaliation
would be possible if a large number of weapons could be
deployed.
From 1964 to the present, the Chinese Communist
development of nuclear weapons systems has corresponded
roughly to that of the Soviets from 1949 to 1959. During
this period, the leaders of Communist China have taken a
similar doctrinal position to that of the Soviet Union on
second-strike in kind. Lo Jui-ching, former Chief of
General Staff of the People's Liberation Army, stated:
Our opposition to U.S. imperialism has always been
clear-cut. Our principle is: we will not attack
unless we are attacked; if we cure attacked, we will
certainly counterattack . . . on whatever scale the
United States attacks us, we will reply on the same
scale.I®
^Sokolovskii et al., op. cit., p. 59.
^Lo Jui-ching, "Commemorate the Victory Over
German Fascism! Carry the Struggle Against U.S. Imperial
ism Through to the End!," Peking Review, VIII:20 (May 14,
1965) , 14.
264
A Chinese Communist version of second-strike in
kind implies a communist military counteraction to "im
perialist” local military action, including nuclear attack.
With the weapons available to them, leaders of Communist
China do not have any wider strategic option than to
respond to local military actions by a nuclear world
power. Consequently, the Chinese have time and again
described their version of second-strike in kind in terms
of a "people's revolutionary war." For this doctrinal
position, the Chinese Communists have stressed two condi
tions. One is the weakened position of "imperialists"
due to the "unflinching struggle of the anti-imperialist
revolutionary forces," and the other is a powerful revo
lutionary storm rising over the continents of Asia, Africa
and Latin America.
Under these circumstances, "people's revolutionary
wars" on a global scale against "imperialists' aggression"
in terms of local wars, the Chinese Communists contend,
not only contribute to tying "imperialists"' hands, but
also to isolating them from the people of the world and
further weakening their position. Thus, the "anti
imperialist revolutionary forces," within the framework
265
of wars of liberation, can contribute to the preparation
for the final stage of a communist all-out general counter
offensive in the destruction of "imperialism." Ch'en Yi
said, "Together with the other peoples of Asia and the
whole world, we will do our part in overthrowing U.S.
imperialism "^
A Launch-on-Waming Concept
So long as the United States relied mainly upon
strategic bombers for its retaliatory capabilities, the
Soviet leaders might have hoped that the vastness of
Russian territory, combined with Soviet air-defense cap
abilities would provide them with a foundation upon which
to base their second-strike strategy. But, in 1962, when
the United States began to deploy such strategic offensive
missiles as Minuteman I, Soviet air-defense capabilities
and the vastness of Russian territory no longer provided
a credible foundation for a second-strike strategy. Soviet
ICBM's such as the SS-6, the SS-7 and the SS-8 presented
17
Chen Yi, "A New and Great Anti-U.S. Revolu
tionary Storm is Approaching," Peking Review, 9:2 (January
7, 1966), 7.
266
themselves as "soft" targets to the enemy strategic
offensive missiles and, although anti-missile missile
18
tests were reportedly conducted successfully by then,
Soviet ABM capabilities were negligible. After 1963,
Soviet missile-launching submarines reportedly were
assigned a strategic mission at intercontinental levels,
but they were equipped with a rather limited range of
19
missiles such as the Sark and the Serb. Under these
circumstances, the future pre-launch survivability of
currently deployed ICBM's, the central element of Soviet
strategic forces, appears to have become questionable.
It was at this point that the Soviets began to
emphasize the quick reaction time of their second genera
tion ICBM's, a quick reaction time based upon the use of
the less volatile storable liquid fuel which did not need
to be fueled immediately prior to launching time. In
18
Pravda, February 23, 1963, in Current Digest of
the Soviet Press, XIV:8 (March 21, 1962), 22.
19
These missiles were said to have a range of
less than 700 miles. Jane's Fighting Ships (1967-68),
p. 451; Military Balance (1967-68), pp. 7 and 46.
267
1963, Glagolev and Larionov warned that a counter-strike
would follow a first-strike within a matter of minutes.^0
Other Soviet leaders predicted that "the Strategic opera
tion will be rapid and of short duration," but admitted
that the results of the strategic operation "are difficult
even to imagine at the present time."21
In 1964, visualizing a future nuclear exchange,
Marshal Sokolovskii said: "The forces and weapons of the
anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense . . . may go into
22
operation simultaneously with the retaliatory strike.
Anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense weapons, to serve
any purpose at all, must go into operation before the
enemy's missiles reach their targets. In the event of a
possible counterforce attack, if a retaliatory strike is
put into operation simultaneously with this defense system,
20
Glagolev and V. Larionov, "Soviet Defense Might
and Peaceful coexistence," International Affairs (Moscow),
November, 1963, p. 32.
21
Leon Goure, Notes on the Second Edition of Mar
shal V. D. Sokolovskii's "Military Strategy" (Santa Monica:
The RAND Corp, 1964), p. 68.
22
Krasnaya Zvezda, August 25 and 28, 1964, in Cur
rent Digest of the Soviet Press, XVI:38 (October 14, 19640,
17.
268
it too must be launched before the enemy's missiles reach
their targets. Although a launch-on-warning strategy is
not specifically mentioned, these statements strongly
suggest that a launch-on-waming was a doctrinal concept
discussed among Soviet theoreticians.
Statements by Defense Minister Malinovsky, how
ever, suggest that the Soviet leaders were not yet sure
about the nature of their retaliatory strikes. In the
second edition of Soviet Military Strategy, Malinovsky is
quoted as saying that
. . . the main problem is considered to be the work
ing out of means for reliably repelling a nuclear
surprise attack.23
On Armed Forces Day in 1964, he again said:
Soviet servicemen are persistently studying and per
fecting methods of reliably repelling a surprise
nuclear attack of the enemy by promptly dealing him
a crushing retaliatory b lo w .2^
In 1964, an anti-ballistic missile missile, the
Galosh, was observed by Westerners for the first time.
23_
Goure, op. crt., p. 65.
24
Pravda, February 23, 1964, in Current Digest of
the Soviet Press, XVI:8 (March 18, 1964), 33.
269
But the advanced radar and data processing capabilities
associated with an ABM system appear to have been weak
areas in the Soviet strategic weapons system.25 Explain
ing the capabilities of Soviet Air Defense in 1964,
Marshal V. Sudets, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Air
Defense Troops, stated:
The tasks of early detection and warning are handled
by the signal forces. Their units have various
modern radioelectronic devices. They make it possi
ble, at any time of the year of day and regardless
of meteorological conditions or interference, to
detect any means of air attack at great distances, to
identify it, to determine the coordinates accurately
and to indicate promptly the targets for the anti
aircraft missile troops and for the missile-carrying
aircraft of the Air Defense Forces.26
In this statement, Sudets discussed only anti-aircraft
defense and did not touch upon anti-ballistic missile
defense. This seems to have reflected the then prevailing
capabilities of ballistic missile early warning and detec
tion systems.
25
Diplomatic and Strategic Impact of Multiple War'
head Missiles, p. 277.
26
Izvestia, January 5, 1964, in Current Digest of
the Soviet Press, XVI:1 (January 29, 1964), 23.
270
Not until 1966 was an air defense system with a
certain degree of ballistic missile defense capability
mentioned. Such a system, the Tallin, was referred to for
the first time by Marshal Malinovsky in his report to the
Twenty-third Congress of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union in that year. Moreover, a relatively
sophisticated phased-array radar such as the Dog House
probably became operational only in the latter half of the
27
1960's. Therefore, it can be reasonably assumed that,
in the earlier period of the 1960's, Soviet radar capabil
ities associated with an ABM system were still in the
developmental and testing stage and lacking in reliability
for the tasks of ballistic-missile warning. Consequently,
the Soviet leaders may have been unable to fully develop
a launch-on-warning concept. Although they remained
interested in this concept, during the period from 1963
to 1965, Soviet leaders' acknowledgment of their effort
for perfecting reliable modes of retaliation suggests that
they were caught in a rather unsettled and uncertain
27
"Soviet Closing Gap in Avionics, Computer Scxence
Military Development," Aviation Week & Space Technology,
95:17 (October 25, 1971), 41.
271
doctrinal position in regard to the modes of retaliation.
Deterrence-Plus Formula
In the mid-I960's, the Soviet leaders continued
with the construction of hardened silos and began to
deploy their third-generation ICBM's such as the SS-11,
SS-13 and SS-9.^® It was also at this time that they began
to deploy their ABM system around Moscow. With these
developments, the survivability of Soviet strategic offen
sive missiles was greatly enhanced.
Along with these developments, the Soviet leaders
began to reveal a new emphasis in their position on
retaliatory action. Previously, the Soviet leaders sug
gested deterrence as the only strategic objective in regard
to a world war. Soviet modes of deterrence threat were
expressed only within the framework of retaliatory actions.
But, in the latter part of the 1960's, the Soviet leaders
advanced their position on deterrence of a world war in
conjunction with a strategy of war-fighting.
28
MCNamara, 1967 Defense Posture Statement, p. 40;
Military Balance (1970-71), p. 107.
272
In 1966, Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky stated
that the strategic offensive forces "constitute the chief
means of deterring an aggressor and of routing him
29
decisively in war." On the eve of Missile Troops and
Artillery Day in 1967, Marshal Krylov stated the same
position in the following words:
Any attempt to carry out a nuclear missile attack on
the Soviet Union . . .will prove fatal for its ini
tiators . . . up-to-date automatic devices make it
possible to strike a most forceful rocket blow
instantly against any grouping of aggressive forces
and to achieve decisive results in the very first
minutes of armed combat.^0
In 1969, Krylov again stressed that the mission
of the strategic offensive missiles was not only for
deterrence but also for fighting a nuclear war. He
described the strategic missile troops "as the main deci
sive force for deterring an aggressor and for defeating
31
him should he unleash a nuclear-missile war."
29
Pravda, April 3, 1966, in Current Digest of the
Soviet Press. XVIII:17 (May 18, 1966), 12.
30
Pravda, November 19, 1967, in Current Digest of
the Soviet Press, XIX:46 (December 6, 1969), 28.
31
Pravda, November 19, 1969, in Current Digest of
the Soviet Press, XXI:47 (December 17, 1969), 6.
273
With the development of more sophisticated offen
sive and defensive weapons systems, the phrases "routing
him decisively" and "defeating him" appear in Soviet
expressions of doctrine. Thus, the Soviet leaders have
made it clear that they are not content simply to react
to the enemy's initiative in the field of nuclear strategy.
Once a nuclear exchange begins, they appear to be deter
mined to gain the initiative. As their weapons systems
have developed, the Soviets have related their retaliatory
strategy more closely to the strategic objective of
defeating the enemy. If a nuclear war cannot be avoided,
they will make every effort to terminate such a war on
terms advantageous to themselves.
In this respect, the trend in the development of
Soviet nuclear weapons systems as manifested in the
development of the SS-9, ABM systems and in over-all
32
numbers and throw weight of ICBM's is rather alarming.
32
Strategic Force Strength as follows:
November 1, 1970 Mid-1972
USSR USA USSR USA
ICBM Launchers 1520* 1054 1550* 1054
SLBM Launch Tubes 475 656 580 656
Heavy Bombers 140** 565 140** 531
ABM Launchers 64 0 64 0
274
It is at this stage of development that strategic offensive
forces' "hard" target capabilities and area ABM capabili
ties begin to have implications for the development of a
surprise first-strike strategy.
At present, the Soviet leaders appear to be
interested in developing the combined capabilities of
strategic offensive and defensive nuclear weapons systems.
In this regard, the provisions of the Soviet leaders'
agreements with the United States on May 26, 1972 are
worth noting.^ According to the ABM treaty, the Soviet
Union agrees to limit its ABM capabilities to 100 inter
ceptors stationed at Moscow and to another 100 interceptors
at ICBM sites in area remote from the national capital.
They also agree not to develop, test or deploy ABM inter
ceptor missiles capable of delivering more than one
♦Includes SS-ll's at MR/IRBM complexes.
♦♦Excludes about 50 Soviet tanker and several reconnais
sance aircraft.
Cited from Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, "National
Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence," in Annual
Defense Department Report, 1972, p. 40.
33
For detailed information, see Weekly Compilation
of Presidential Documents, Vol. VIII:23 (June 5, 1972);
ibid.. Vol. VIII:25 (June 19, 1972).
275
independently guided warhead. And they further agree not
to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which
are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-
based.
According to the basic provisions of the Interim
Agreement to the limitation of strategic offensive forces,
the Soviet leaders agree not to construct additional
fixed land-based ICBM launchers other than those already
under active construction at the time of the final signing
of the interim agreement. They also agree not to convert
land-based launchers for "light” ICBM's into launchers for
"heavy" ICBM's. They balked, however, at a concrete
definition of what constitutes a "heavy” or large missile
and at a prohibition on operational land-mobile ICBM
launchers. They further agree to limit SLBM launchers
and the submarines that carry them to the numbers either
operational or under construction as of the date of the
final signing of the agreement. Additional launchers may
be constructed only as replacements for obsolete ICBM
launchers or for launchers on older submarines.
The agreements specify a ceiling of 62 submarines
and 950 SLBM launchers for the Soviet Union and 44 sub
276
marines and 710 SLBM launchers for the United States.
Launchers over 740 (the presumed current number including
those on submarines under construction) for the Soviets
and over 656 SLBM's for the United States may be replace
ments either for equal numbers of obsolete SLBM's or for
obsolete ICBM's. Thus, the Soviets were given generous
terms for converting some obsolete missiles into additional
modem SLBM's and ICBM's.
The agreements further permit modernization of
strategic offensive ballistic missiles. Therefore, the
Soviet leaders are allowed to develop the MIRV and to
achieve large numbers of warheads within their existing
payload capacity. With MIRV and its larger missile forces,
the Soviet Union might eventually surpass the United
States in total warheads.
These agreements not only freeze for five years
the present Soviet superiority over the United States in
numbers and throw-weight of ballistic missiles, but also
allow the Soviets to overcome the current American advan
tage in both the numbers and advanced technology of the
warheads atop those missiles.
The Soviet leaders' refusal to agree to the
277
prohibition on operational land-mobile ICBM launchers and
to a common definition of a "heavy" missile can hardly be
judged at this moment. But these refusals might suggest
that the Soviet leaders have still left unresolved some
elements of their doctrinal requirements. Or they may
have purposely kept some parts of the agreements ambiguous
in order to exploit them later to their own advantage.
Chinese Communist leaders, on the other hand,
also assumed, in the late 1950's, that the nature of the
balance of terror, on the basis of the newly developed
nuclear weapons systems, was rather stable. They held
that neither side dared to use nuclear weapons because
both possessed them, as was the case with bacteriological
weapons, which were not used in the two world wars.^4
Under these conditions, Chinese Communist leaders
visualized that the United States "massive retaliation"
strategy has become ineffective. Accordingly, they have
stressed that the communist bloc could effectively meet
any "imperialist" local or limited military action. They
“ ^ Peking Review, 5:18 (May 4, 1962), 15.
278
hold, "only victory in this struggle can avert a third
world war."^ Assuming an absolute stability in the
balance of terror, on the basis of nuclear missile weapons
systems, the Chinese have naturally developed this deter
rence position: Only by communist revolution that meets
the "imperialists' local military action" with military
counter action, can the communist bloc prevent the nim-
perialists" from unleashing a world war. ° Thus, the
leaders of Communist China have advanced their mode of
world war deterrence into a "blow-for-blow struggle"
against an "imperialistic" limited war.
At this point, some similarities and differences
in the modes of retaliation between the Soviet and the
Chinese Communist deterrence doctrines stand out. When
the capabilities of their respective nuclear weapons
systems were far inferior to that of the enemy's, the
leaders of both communist giants advanced a mode of retal
iation in terms of second-strikes in kind. Soviet leaders
^ Ibid., 3:1 (January 5, 1960), 19; 3:17 (April
26, 1960), 12.
^ Hsinhua, November 18, 1963, in Current Back
ground , No. 723 (November 21, 1963), p. 13; Peking Review:
VI:47 (November 22, 1963), 14.
279
used such terms as, “a smashing rebuff to the aggressors,"
and "devastating counterblow" in referring to weapons
systems which were still under development rather than
those which were already in operational status. But the
leaders of Communist China, conceding the inferiority of
their nuclear weapons, predicted final victory in a war
against a nuclear world power would be won through the
superior morale of their fighting men.
Leaders of both communist countries believe it
possible to maintain the balance of terror at a certain
stage in the development of nuclear weapons systems. The
Soviet leaders were apprehensive over a new spiral in the
arms race at the end of the 1960's, although they suggested
that the essence of the strategic balance, once achieved
on the basis of strategic nuclear weapons systems' capa
bilities, would not be altered. Chinese Communist
leaders, on the other hand, visualized in the latter part
of the 1950's, a perfect balance, due to their belief that
nuclear weapons would not be used in war.
Soviet leaders have not yet clearly disclosed a
first-strike strategy in their doctrine, although they have
hinted from time to time at an interest in such a strategy.
Soviet modes of retaliation, on the basis of the combined
280
capabilities of strategic offensive and defensive nuclear
weapons systems, imply that first-strike strategy cannot
be completely ruled out. Soviet leaders might be tempted
to gamble on the unleashing of a nuclear world war, if
they entertained illusions that their effective nuclear
defense capabilities could deter an attack on their coun
try or if they are convinced that their nuclear capabil
ities would destroy the enemy.
Viewing the balance of terror as stable, on the
basis of a strategic offensive nuclear weapon capability,
Chinese Communist leaders have been more interested in
strengthening their world war deterrence through a "blow-
for-blow" struggle in terms of a people's war. As their
military technology develops, their appreciation of the
power of nuclear weapons systems might become more sophis
ticated and probably would follow the pattern of the
Soviets in the development of retaliation. However,
Chinese Communist deterrence, a "blow-for-blow" struggle
in terms of the people's war, can in the future be more
plausibly stressed, to the degree that they will be able
to command their own ICBM forces.
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
This chapter suggests an answer to the question
set out in the introductory chapter— what effect do nuclear
weapons systems capabilities have at different stages of
development upon the concept of deterrence? It also
summarizes the effects of nuclear weapons capabilities in
the different stages of development upon the ways to deter.
This chapter further draws some generalizations on the
relationship between the development of nuclear weapons
and the formulation of deterrence doctrine in the Soviet
Union and the Republic of China.
Summarization
Soviet Union
In the 1950fs, the Soviet leaders were primarily
concerned with the problem of deterring the United States
from initiating a full-scale war in which they might be
directly involved. For the Soviet leaders, this was a
281
282
world war or a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union.
In order to deter a world war, a nuclear stalemate
or nuclear superiority at the intercontinental level was
deemed necessary. But, during most of this period, medium
range bombers and intermediate and medium range ballistic
missiles were the main strategic nuclear offensive forces
of the Soviet Union. Supported by these weapons systems,
the Soviet leaders were capable of dealing effectively
with military problems that could occur in the Eurasian
land mass. By holding United States allies hostage to
nuclear strikes, the USSR could also exert a deterrent on
the United States if needed. But, Soviet strategic
weapons capabilities were inferior to those of the assumed
enemy— the United States— at the intercontinental level,
making a nuclear stalemate difficult to attain.
Under these circumstances, the Soviet leaders were
concerned with the type of military actions to be deterred.
They approached this problem from two directions: ideolog
ical and strategic. From the ideological point of view,
in 1956, they modified the traditional communist view on
war as an instrument of policy and on the inevitability
of war until the victory of socialism. At the same time.
283
they advanced two doctrinal points: the possibility that
the strength of socialism could prevent war in the present
era and the possibility of a transition to socialism
through parliamentarianism. Based on these premises, the
Soviet leaders denounced war as an instrument of policy
and discussed the possibility of excluding war from the
life of society. This position on the role of war as an
instrument of policy ran counter to the traditional commu
nist doctrine which advocates the inevitability of war
until the entire world is communized.
In regard to the strategic point of view, the
Soviet leaders were concerned with military actions at
three different levels— intercontinental, continental or
theater-wide, and local, and the relationship between them.
In speaking of military actions at the intercontinental
level, they stressed the mutual destruction which would
result from a world war. However, in the 1950's, Soviet
strategic weapons capabilities were insufficient to
threaten destruction of the United States or to establish
what has since become known as a situation of mutual
assured destruction. In this regard, the Soviet leaders
exaggerated their claims of achievement in the development
284
of intercontinental strategic missiles capabilities. They
were apparently aware of the political and psychological
effect that these claims would have upon those countries
located beyond and within the Eurasian Continent, as well
as upon the United States. One of the major problems in
advancing exaggerated claims of strategic weapons capabil
ities, of course, is to keep real weapons capabilities
under absolute secrecy. In this respect, the Soviet
leaders were helped greatly by the nature of their closed
society and the tight control held over military informa
tion.
Regarding military actions at continental and
local levels, the Soviet emphasis on the desirability of
avoiding clashes with the United States or its allies at
those levels was based on the concept that a minor clash
between the two powers in Europe inevitably would escalate
into a large war, and finally, into a world war. In the
absence of a nuclear stalemate at the intercontinental
level, the Soviet leaders, in responding to an interconti
nental power's local action, would have had to consider
the possibility of being retaliated against at the inter
continental level of violence, a level of violence for
285
which they were unprepared. They were, therefore, unable
to advance any concept for the control of escalation.
Consequently, they expressed their desire to avoid a
clash at lower levels on the basis of the inevitability
of escalation.
After the Soviets successfully tested their first
ICBM and an earth satellite in 1957, the so-called missile
gap was bom. This gap grew out of a Western fear that
the Soviet Union would attain an advantage in interconti
nental ballistic missiles. The United States leaders were
concerned that the Soviets might produce large numbers of
such missiles before comparable United States weapons could
be put under operational command.
Though the missile gap of 1957-61 later turned
out to be in favor of the United States rather than the
Soviet Union, the Soviet leaders attempted to exploit the
political and psychological effect of the United States
perception of Soviet ICBM capabilities during this period.
In 1961, the Soviet strategic weapons capabilities were
rather limited in numbers. But the Soviet leaders began
to classify military actions at various levels of
violence— intercontinental, continental and local— into
286
world wars, local wars and national liberation wars. At
this point, the Soviet leaders began to discuss the class
character of war from the traditional ideological posi
tion. They discarded the theory of the inevitability of
escalation.
In other words, when Soviet nuclear weapons capa
bilities were finally thought to be effective for counter
ing enemy actions at a top level of violence in terns of
yield and range, or when they were able to convince the
enemy that this was so, violence at lower levels was
separated from top level violence and local wars once
again were considered to be justifiable. In this regard,
the Soviet leaders first released guerrilla warfare type
local wars and then, conventional type local wars, from
the fetters of "inevitable escalation."
From the theoretical point of View, when rendering
assistance to troubled areas, no distinction between
guerrilla warfare type local wars and conventional type
local wars appears to have been deemed necessary. But,
practically speaking, the geographical locations of
troubled areas did make a difference. At that time, the
Soviet Union was supposed to have enough capabilities to
287
support local war within the Eurasian Continent under
conventional and nuclear conditions. But they were not
yet capable of supporting local war beyond the Eurasian
Continent conventionally. Furthermore, they appear to
have realized that nuclear weapons capabilities for the
top level of violence were limited in the deterrence of
conventional military actions at lower levels.
Under these conditions, military actions at lower
levels beyond the Eurasian Continent were envisioned as
guerrilla warfare type local wars. The Soviet leaders
held that national liberation wars were usually military
actions of this type. Furthermore, they stressed that
guerrilla warfare type local wars or national liberation
wars were internal affairs of the country concerned and
should be confined within the boundaries of the insurgent
nations. Thus releasing national liberation wars, but not
conventional types of local wars, from the fetters of
"inevitable escalation," the Soviet leaders could adjust
their ideological position so that it would meet doctrinal
requirements for the classification of war into just and
unjust categories without the risk of becoming directly
involved in a war for which they were not yet prepared.
288
As their newer generation of ICBM's, the SS-7
and the SS-8, were developed and tested, the Soviet
leaders altered their position on the problem of limited
local war. They began to affirm the possibility of
fighting conventional type local conflicts without those
conflicts necessarily escalating into a world war. The
Soviet leaders began to imply that a local military action
was nothing but an "imperialist" test of Soviet strength.
Such a conflict had to be dealt with effectively and
instantly at the outset in order to prevent its escalation
into a large scale war.
Along with these changes in the Soviet leaders1
attitudes toward the role of war as an instrument of
policy and the relationship between military actions at
various levels of violence, the Soviet leaders' object of
deterrence was finally narrowed down to the category of
military actions at an intercontinental level— world war.
In the earlier period of the 1960*s, Soviet modes of
deterrence to a world war were expressed only within the
framework of retaliatory actions. But, in the latter part
of the 1960's, the problems of deterrence were discussed
in close relation with the problems of fighting even a
world war.
Regarding the problem of target strategy, in the
latter period of the 1950's, the Soviet leaders were using
ambiguous targeting terminology such as "aggressors,"
"America's vital centers," or "warmongers." These terms
reflected their insufficient weapons capabilities for
intercontinental missions. In connection with these vague
expressions of target strategy at the international level
of violence, the Soviet leaders adopted a hostage strategy
and attempted to exert pressure upon the United States
through her allies. A hostage strategy relies on a close
relationship between the country taken as hostage and its
ally or allies. It assumes an effective alliance system
in international relations. Furthermore, a hostage nation
should be geographically located within the effective
range of weapons capabilities. With their intermediate
and medium range weapons, the Soviets were capable of
using as hostages only those countries within the Eurasian
Continent. Consequently, they could not develop hostage
strategies for enemy military actions in areas beyond the
Eurasian Continent. Under these circumstances, liberation
movements in those areas were considered to be powerful
290
world forces, but they were not referred to specifically
as wars of liberation.
With regard to the modes of retaliation, the
Soviet leaders were purportedly concerned with alleged
Western plans for launching a surprise attack. In order
to cope with such a situation, they appear, in 1955, to
have become interested in preemptive actions. To make
preemptive retaliation effective as a mode of deterrent
action, most timely and precise information on enemy
military plans and activities, in addition to appropriate
weapons capabilities, is necessary. The Soviet leaders
claimed that Marxist-Leninist science provided them with
omnipotence in the acquiring of information.
For several years, the Soviets advocated pre
emptive action. But they appear to have been concerned
with the Western reaction to their position on preemptive
actions in forms of preventive war. They were also con
cerned with the possibility of a preemptive action being
based upon a wrong interpretation of enemy activities or
upon false information regarding those activities. Thus,
in 1959, the advocacy of preemptive action dropped from
public discussion, and automatic retaliation in terms of
291
second-strike strategy was suggested as a mode of deter
rence action. Soviet threats in terms of automatic
retaliation were couched in an urgent fashion, suggesting
that there would be no time for the exercise of reason.
This urgent tone was softened in the earlier
period of the 1960's when the Soviet leaders were able to
employ their first generation ICBM (SS-6) for operational
status and when they deployed their second generation
ICBM's, the SS-7 and SS-8. With these new ICBM's, they
improved the capabilities of their nuclear weapons systems
in terms of accuracy and reaction time, in addition to
greater range and yield. However, even the improved CEP
for their strategic offensive missiles had only area
target capabilities, and their pre-launch survivability
was based upon concealment and dispersion.
With these weapons capabilities, the Soviet leaders
developed a target strategy in terms of counter-war-
supporting capabilities and modes of deterrent threat in
terms of second strike. The Soviet countervalue target
strategy against war-supporting capabilities in terms of
the destruction of enemy industrial and administrative
centers is nothing but the Soviet counterpart of a
292
Western counter-city concept. Since a counter-city con
cept suggests the indiscriminate killing of people and is
in direct opposition to the traditional communist doctrine
of the liberation and well-being of the people, the Soviet
leaders appear to have attempted to avoid the term
"counter-city" strategy and to camouflage the important
point that war-supporting capabilities such as administra
tive centers are located within cities.
Regarding the modes of retaliation, the Soviet
leaders might have hoped that the concealment and disper
sion of strategic offensive forces in the vastness of
Russian territory, combined with Soviet air-defense
capabilities would provide them with a foundation upon
which to base their second-strike strategy. So long as
the United States relied mainly upon strategic bombers for
its retaliatory capabilities, the Soviets might have con
sidered these measures adequate. But, in the early 1960's,
when the United States began to deploy strategic offensive
missiles such as Atlas, Titan and Minuteman I, the pre
launch survivability of Soviet strategic offensive forces
for a second-strike strategy became doubtful.
In this regard, the Soviet leaders appear to have
293
considered a launch-on-waming strategy. While this
strategy was not adopted officially, it was discussed by
various Soviet theoreticians. They appear to have been
concerned with the limited capabilities of then prevailing
weapons systems, specifically radar systems, with the
possibility of fatal error involved in the use of highly
sensitive modem weapons systems, and with the possibility
of the outbreak of a nuclear war with its consequences.
In the latter part of the 1960's, the Soviet
leaders further improved the capabilities of their nuclear
weapons system through the development of the SS-9 with
MRV*s, ABM systems around Moscow, hardening of the stra
tegic offensive missiles and the development of more
advanced submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Con
sequently, they improved the capabilities of pre-launch
survivability and penetrability of their strategic offen
sive weapons systems.
Target strategy in terms of counter-war-supporting-
fighting capabilities began to be advanced in 1964-65.
However, the improvement in the accuracy of strategic
offensive nuclear weapons did not necessarily parallel the
development of target strategy in terms of the counter
294
war-supporting-fighting capabilities. The Soviets relied
more on yield than on accuracy. Not until 1969 did
Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and
Engineering, warn that the SS-9, armed with three large
warheads, would have more than adequate capability
against more than one Minuteman silo. This raised the
possibility of a missile exchange ratio unfavorable to the
United States and favorable to a Soviet counterforce
strike.
Target strategy in terms of the counter-war-
supporting and fighting capabilities has developed in
close relationship to the development of a retaliatory
mode of action, not only within deterrence, but also
within a war fighting framework. At present, the Soviet
leaders appear to be more interested in developing the
combined capabilities of strategic offensive and defensive
nuclear weapons systems with which they might be able to
wage and terminate a nuclear war on terms favorable to
themselves, should deterrence fail. The Soviet leaders
might be induced to consider the possibility of creating
conditions for a first-strike strategic option under which
they could limit their own losses to an acceptable level,
295
and, at the same time, inflict unacceptable destruction
on the enemy.
Communist China
During the period from 1964 to the present, Commu
nist China has depended primarily upon strategic bombers
for its deterrence. These bombers have recently been
supplemented by MRBM's which are effective only for the
neighboring countries, including Soviet Siberia and the
adjacent Asian regions. These capabilities are far
inadequate for strategic missions at the intercontinental
level.
Nevertheless, the Chinese Communist leaders have
been confronted with the problem of coping with a war
involving intercontinental nuclear powers. This situation
is identical to that with which the Soviet leaders were
faced in the 1950's. The leaders of Communist China have
been primarily concerned with the problem of deterring
intercontinental nuclear powers from initiating a war in
which they might be directly involved. For the Chinese
Communists, the object of deterrence has been a large
scale people's war which they might be forced to fight on
their own home territory.
296
Under these circumstances, the Chinese Communists,
following the traditional communist doctrine, classified
war into two categories: just and unjust. They hold
that if a war is waged by a communist country against a
noncommunist country, it is a just war, and that if a war
is waged by a noncommunist country against a communist
country, it is an unjust war. Thus, based on these
classifications of war, the Chinese Communist leaders did
not need to modify the traditional communist view on war
as an instrument of policy as the Soviet leaders did in
1956.
While the Soviet leaders visualize military
actions at three different levels— intercontinental,
continental and local— the Chinese Communists envisage
military actions at only two levels— intercontinental and
local; the former is a world war, while the latter is a
national liberation war. They further divide national
liberation wars into two types: the larger and the
smaller. For them, it is the larger scale of national
liberation war in which they might be directly involved
and which they want to deter.
Regarding the relationship between military
297
actions at various levels of violence, the Chinese Commu
nist leaders visualize the possibility that a smaller
scale national liberation war could escalate into a larger
• scale national liberation war, especially under circum
stances in which Sino-Soviet relations have deteriorated
and United States-USSR relations have improved. However,
they do not dwell on the subject of the relationship
between world war and national liberation wars.
Even when they formulated their deterrence doc
trine under the protection of the Soviet nuclear umbrella
in the late 1950's, the Chinese Communists' attitude
toward the types of military actions as the object of
deterrence, except in regard to the relationship between
world war and national liberation wars, had been the same.
Assuming that the balance of terror under the Soviet
nuclear umbrella would cancel the deterrer's threat and
the deterree's counter-threat, the Chinese Communist
leaders advanced their own version of deterrence threat
in terms of a "blow-for-blow" struggle. The deterrent
threat and "blow-for-blow" struggle are contradictory on
the surface. But the Chinese Communists stressed that a
"blow-for-blow" struggle at local levels of violence would
298
contribute to the deterrence of a world war by weakening
the enemy's overall strategic capabilities.
The Chinese Communist leaders had based this
deterrent strategy upon their assumption that a condition
of mutual nuclear deterrence between intercontinental
nuclear powers is a sort of absolute balance. Thus,
after the Soviets successfully tested their first ICBM
in 1957, the Chinese Communists viewed the Soviet concept
of the inevitable escalation of a minor war into a larger
war as a sign of capitulation to the enemy, and insisted
upon the validity of fighting local wars in order to
deter an intercontinental nuclear power from taking
military actions at intercontinental levels of violence.
Regarding the role of local war as an instrument
of policy, the Chinese Communist leaders stressed the
importance of isolating the enemy from its allies exter
nally, and separating the ruling class from the ruled
internally. In this way, they have hoped to tie the hands
of their assumed enemies, the "imperialists," and destroy
them on a limited local scale. Consequently, the Chinese
Communist leaders did not adopt a hostage strategy which
presumes a close relationship between the country taken
299
as hostage and its ally or allies.
Even after the rupture of her relations with the
Soviet Union, Peking stressed national liberation wars
throughout the world as a means to deter an interconti
nental nuclear power from initiating a larger scale
people's war against Communist China. The Chinese Commu
nists have advocated a simultaneous waging of national
liberation wars all over the world. They hope that an
intercontinental nuclear power, in supporting the "doomed
forces of reaction and revisionism" of local states with
whom its interests are interwoven, would find its forces
divided.
Thus, the development of the objects and modes of
deterrence in Soviet and Chinese Communist doctrine can
not be compared on the basis of common categories. The
Soviet leaders primarily have taken a direct approach in
the development of deterrence doctrine; they have attempted
to match an enemy threat with a deterrent threat at every
level of violence. The Chinese Communists, on the other
hand, have taken an indirect approach; they have attempted
to match an enemy threat at a certain level of violence
with a deterrence threat at another level of violence.
300
This difference has been closely related to the different
nuclear weapons capabilities as well as to different
strategic objectives of the two communist countries.
As the Chinese Communists develop their MR/IFBM's,
they may pursue a hostage strategy vis-A-vis the United
States similar to that pursued by the Soviet Union, and
they may also pursue a strategy of direct threat to the
Soviet Union as a mode of deterrence. Furthermore, when
they obtain ICBM capabilities (as they are shortly
expected to), they may also pursue a strategy of direct
threat to the United States. In addition, their threat
in terms of national liberation wars may be strengthened
as they perceive that they have achieved a nuclear stale
mate with the United States States at the intercontinental
level of violence.
The Relationship Between Technology and
Deterrence Doctrine
The analysis of the relationship between the
development of strategic nuclear weapons systems and the
formulation of deterrence doctrine in the Soviet Union
and Communist China suggests that, at certain stages,
discrepancies have existed between the requirements of
301
pronounced doctrine and the prevailing weapons capabili
ties.
In the latter period of the 1950's, Soviet stra
tegic forces were equipped with such intermediate and
medium range weapons as medium bombers, IR/MRBM's and
submarine fleets. These were effective in terms of range
for missions in or near to the Eurasian Continent.
Soviet intercontinental strategic weapons capabilities
were limited to strategic bombers and were insufficient
for intercontinental strategic missions. Even though the
Soviet leaders conducted their first test of an ICBM in
1957, it is believed that they began to equip their armed
forces with ICBM's only after 1959.
Nevertheless, they attempted, even before 1959,
to mislead the Western world into believing that the
capabilities of their available missiles were those of
ICBM's. Thus, they advanced their deterrence doctrine
at the intercontinental level on the basis of partly real
(limited strategic bomber capabilities), and partly
imaginary or pretended (ICBM's) capabilities. Reflecting
this gap between the weapons' actual and professed capabil
ities, the Soviet leaders' deterrent target strategy at
302
the intercontinental level was expressed in vague and
general terms such as "aggressors," "America's vital
centers," or "warmongers." In connection with this
expression of target strategy, Soviet modes of retaliation
were expressed in exaggerated terms such as "a smashing
rebuff to the aggressors," and "inflicting devastating
counterblows."
At the end of the 1960's, another gap between
weapons capabilities and doctrinal requirements was in
evidence in the relationship between the development of
nuclear weapons systems and the formulation of deterrence
doctrine. The Soviet addition of counter-war-fighting
capabilities to their targeting strategy of counter-war-
supporting capabilities in the latter part of the 1960's
was based, in large measure, upon their development of
"hard" target and ABM capabilities. In relation to this
target strategy, Soviet modes of retaliation have been
related to a war-fighting strategy. However, at present,
a discrepancy still exists between war-fighting doctrinal
requirements and counter-force weapons capabilities,
through the continuous development of these capabilities
is reducing the degree of discrepancy. As the degree of
303
discrepancy has been reduced, general terms such as "the
groupings of the armed forces" in target strategy have
changed into more concrete terms such as delivery systems,
weapons storage, command and control, etc.
In the latter period of the 1960's, the Chinese
Communists faced problems similar to those faced by the
Soviet Union in the latter part of the 1950's. Like the
Soviets, the Chinese Communists had to cope with inter
continental strategic problems with limited theater
strategic weapons capabilities. Unlike the Soviets, how
ever, they followed an indirect approach and attempted to
use the people's war to counter the threat of the inter
continental nuclear powers.
Since the people's war strategy has not attempted
to match the enemy's weapons capabilities at all levels
of violence, the Chinese Communists have, in fact, placed
relatively little emphasis upon the relationship between
weapons systems and deterrence doctrine. Or they may
have realized that the absence of a nuclear stalemate at
the intercontinental level made little use of the effect
of IR/MRBM*s upon deterrence strategy versus an inter
continental nuclear power. This relationship between
304
weapons capabilities and doctrine in Communist Chinese
experience also can be considered a discrepancy in a
different sense.
The Soviet type of discrepancy can emerge when
weapons capabilities at a certain stage of development
cannot meet the requirements urgently demanded by doc
trine, and when the deterrer pretends to meet doctrinal
requirements with prevailing weapons capabilities. The
Chinese type of discrepancy can develop when prevailing
weapons capabilities such as the IR/MRBM's do not satisfy
an established doctrinal requirement, such as an inter
continental strategic mission, and when the decision is
not made to base doctrinal requirements on pretended
weapons capabilities.
When the former type of discrepancy prevails, the
credibility of deterrence tends to be based on secrecy
and deceit. Since doctrinal pronouncements cannot be
fully backed by weapons capabilities should deterrence
fail, the deterrer must be careful about threatening
postures or excessive provocation. In this regard, it is
worth noting the Soviet leaders' modification, in 1956,
of the traditional communist view on war as an instrument
305
of policy and their recent agreement with the United
States to the limitation of their defensive system to two
ABM sites and to a five-year freeze of their offensive
missile weapons systems at present levels.^
However, at the beginning of the 1960's, when the
Soviet leaders were able to develop nuclear weapons systems
which met their pronounced doctrinal requirements, one of
their first concerns was the revival of the traditional
communist position on war as an instrument of policy. The
real reason behind the Soviet decision to enter the agree
ment on arms limitations cannot be stated precisely at
this stage. But the Soviet leaders appear to have utilized
the time period between the start of SALT in 1969 and the
present agreements in order to catch up with the United
States in certain areas and to surpass the United States
in others. Whatever changes have taken place in the bal
ance of strategic nuclear forces between the Soviet Union
It is reported that under the arms agreement, the
Soviet Union is allowed to go up to 313 SS-9's and 62
Ballistic missile launching submarines. Presently, the
Soviets have 288 SS-9's and 25 operational Y-class sub
marines with 17 more under construction. Washington Post,
May 3 and June 14, 1972; New York Times, May 27, 28, and
June 14, 1972.
306
and the United States since the start of SALT in 1969, it
is believed by many that the agreement will be an impor
tant factor in the development of Soviet nuclear strategy
as long as the Soviet leaders abide by their decision on
the agreement.
Even if they abide by the terms of the agreement,
an important question may be raised as to what extent the
agreement will actually inhibit them in the development
of nuclear weapons capabilities. Quantitative limits were
placed on the numbers of both strategic defensive and
offensive missiles. Both the United States and the Soviet
Union have the option of deploying up to a total of 200
defensive missiles in two sites and the number of ICBM's
has been limited to what they currently have in place.
But the leaders of both countries have left open the
possibility of improving the quality of their missiles by
increasing the numbers of warheads in terms of MRV and
MIRV's these missiles can carry and by improving their
accuracy. Since the number of Soviet ICBM's currently
exceeds that of the United States, the agreement may
allow Soviet strategic offensive forces to gain perceptible
superiority over the United States. The limitations
307
imposed upon the development of nuclear powered submarines
give a considered)le advantage to the Soviets. Under the
terms of the agreement, the Soviets are allowed a ceiling
of 62 boats while the United States is allowed 44. These
ceilings allow the Soviets to add 20 submarines to those
presently operational or under construction, while the
United States is limited to the addition of 3 to their
present fleet of nuclear submarines. Considering recent
trends in the modernization of Soviet ICBM's and Y-class
submarines, it appears that the Soviets are free to do
essentially what they would have done in the absence of
an agreement.*
In improving the capabilities of their strategic
nuclear forces, the Soviets have largely closed the gap
between actual and pretended capabilities and eliminated
the discrepancy which necessitated secrecy and deceit in
2
Dr. William R. Van Cleave, Associate Professor,
School of Politics and International Relations, University
of Southern California, and an adviser to the U.S. SALT
delegation, strongly advocated this position at the Hear
ings before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate,
in July, 1972. See Military Implications of the Treaty
on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and
the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms, pp. 570-592.
308
their nuclear pronouncements. When the Chinese type of
discrepancy prevails, the credibility of deterrence does
not need to be based on secrecy and deceit. Furthermore,
the deterrer does not need to attempt to avoid a threaten
ing posture and excessive provocation in regard to its
indirect approach— the people's war or national liberation
wars. Consequently, for example, unlike the Soviets, the
Chinese Communists have not felt it necessary to modify
the traditional communist view on war as an instrument of
policy.
Based on these Soviet and Chinese Communist
experiences in the development of nuclear weapons systems
and the formulation of deterrence doctrine, a typology of
the relationship of these two variables, technology and
doctrine, can be established.
Type one is the relationship in which there is
little or no discrepancy between the two variables. Type
two is the relationship in which deterrence doctrine is
formulated on the basis of partly real and partly imagi
nary or pretended weapons capabilities. However, as the
imaginary or pretended weapons capabilities are gradually
transformed into real capabilities, the relationship moves
309
in the direction of a type one situation. The type three
relationship between technology and doctrine is one in
which deterrence doctrine has not implemented some aspect
of existing weapons capabilities.
A typology of this type has a very limited func
tion of predictability for the development of the rela
tionship between technology and doctrine. Change from
one type to another can occur in either direction. The
nature and direction of change are determined by the
factors at work in each individual case. The factors
having a bearing on typology include not only technologi
cal and doctrinal development, but also those ideological
or political considerations which are involved in the
selection of nuclear strategy.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
310
Translations of Newspapers in Bibliography
Chieh-fang-chun Pao— Liberation Army Newspaper.
Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao— China Youth Newspaper.
Izvestiia— News.
Jen-min Jih-pao— People*s Daily.
Krasnaia (Krasnaya) Zvezda— Red Star.
Kuang-ming Jih-pao-— Kuang-ming Daily.
Pravda— Truth.
Sovetskaia aviatsiia— Soviet Aviation.
Sovetskii flot— Soviet Fleet.
Translations of Periodicals in Bibliography
Ajia Keizai— Asian Economy.
Asahi Janaru— Journal of Morning Sun.
Che-hsiieh Yen-chiu— Philosophical Study.
Chi-hua Ching-chi— Planned Economy
Chieh-fang-chun Hua-pao— Liberation Army Pictorial.
Chung-kuo Ch*ing-nien-— China Youth.
Chuo Koron— Central Public Opinion
311
312
Fei-ch'ing Yen-chiu— Study of Communist Affairs.
GaikS Jiho— International Affairs.
Hsin-hua Pan-yueh-kan— New China Semi-Monthly.
Hung-ch'i— Red Flag.
Kaigai Jijo— Foreign Affairs.
Kommunist— Communist.
Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil— Communist of the
Armed Forces.
Kung-tso Tung-hsin— Bulletin of Activities.
Kyosanken Mondai— Communist Bloc Problems.
Nauka i zhizn— Science and Life.
Nedelia— Week.
Ogonek— (Little) Light.
Partiinaia zhizn— Party Life.
Sekai— World.
Sekai Shuho— Weekly World Report.
Shih-chieh Chih-shieh— World Knowledge.
Shih-shih Shou-ts'e— Current Affairs Handbook.
Starshina Serzhant— Master Sergeant.
Tairiku Mondai— Continental Affairs.
Toa Jiron— Far Eastern Opinion.
Ushio— Tide.
Voennyi vestnik— Military Herald.
Volksarmee— People's Army.
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“U.S. Again Upgraded Estimate of Size of Third Chinese
Atom Test." New York Times, May 21, 1966.
"U.S. Offensive Forces." Los Angeles Times, June 28,
1969.
"U.S. Status Shaky, Says Symington." Los Angeles Times,
April 25, 1968.
Wicker, Tom. "Soviet Explodes Atomic Weapon of Inter
mediate Force Over Asia." New York Times,
September 2, 1961.
Wilson, George C. "China Test-Fires Hydrogen Bomb High
Above Earth." Los Angeles Times, December 28,
1968.
________ . "U.S. Can't Destroy Its ICBM's After Launch."
Los Angeles Times, April 5, 1969.
________ . "Senate Threat Aimed at Multiple Warheads."
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________ . "Russia Perfecting MIRV, Tests Hint."
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Wohlstetter, Albert. “Safeguard Critics Contradict
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401
E. Unpublished Manuscripts
Van Cleave, William R. "Nuclear Proliferation: The
Interaction of Politics and Technology." Unpub
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate
School, Claremont College, California, 1967.
Yin, John Yuan-shi. "Sino-Soviet Dialogue on the Nature
of War from 1956 to 1962." Unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation. University of Southern California,
Los Angeles, California, 1967.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Kang, Young Hoon (author)

Core Title The Relationship Between The Development Of Strategic Nuclear Weapons Systems And Deterrence Doctrine In The Soviet Union And Communist China

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Political Science

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,political science, international law and relations

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Christol, Carl Q. (committee chair), Swearingen, Rodger (committee member), Van Cleave, William R. (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-796369

Unique identifier UC11363533

Identifier 7314416.pdf (filename),usctheses-c18-796369 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 7314416

Dmrecord 796369

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Kang, Young Hoon

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA