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Models In The Study Of Political Development: A Critique
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Models In The Study Of Political Development: A Critique
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MODELS IN THE STUDY OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: A CRITIQUE by Shah Wall Khan A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Political Science) September 1972 INFORMATION TO USERS This dissertation was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this docum ent have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted. The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction. 1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Pagejsj". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity. 2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame. 3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete. 4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced. University Microfilms 300 North ZMb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 40100 A Xarox Education Company 72-27,668 KHAN, Shah Wall, 1930- MODELS IN THE STUDY OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: A CRITIQUE. University of Southern California, Ph.D., 1972 Political Science, general University Microfilms, A X E R O X Company , Ann Arbor, Michigan (c) Copyright by SHAH VALI KHJUt 1972 THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFIIACD EXACTLY AS RECEIVED. UNIVERSITY O F S O U T H E R N CA LIFO R N IA THE Oft A DU ATE SCH OOL UNIVERSITY PARK LOS ANOCLES. C A LIFO R N IA # 0 0 0 7 This dissertation, written by under the direction of hy&a.. Dissertation Com mittee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by The Gradu ate School, in partial fulfillment of require ments of the degree of D O C T O R OF P H I L O S O P H Y Dt*m D a ,' .I™!1 . 9. 7 . 2. DISSERTATION COMMITTEE PLEASE NOTE: Some p ag es may have I n d is tin c t p r in t. Filmed as received. U niversity Microfilms, A X erox Education Company ACKNOWLEDGMENTS It is my pleasure to express my deep gratitude to all those individuals and institutions who have been of assistance to me in the pursuit of my graduate study in the United States. My debts to Professor George 0. Totten are immeasurable, who aroused my interest in this subject and without whose patience and intellectual guidance, the work could not have been completed. I would also like to record my profound sense of appreciation and gratitude to my committee members. Professor Fred Krinsky and Professor Willard Beling for their unwavering moral support and guidance. I would also like to express my deep intellectual debt to all my teachers at the University of Southern California and the University of California, at Los Angeles, particularly, James Coleman, Ivan Hinderaker, Richard Rosecrance, David Wilson, Dwaine Marvick, Charles McClelland, Gerald Rigby, Totten Anderson, Joseph Nyomarkay, and Carl Christol. Last, but not least, I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to all members of my family for their unbounded moral support and love. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS........................................... ii LIST OF FIGURES............................................. V PART I THE FRAMEWORK Chapter I. INTRODUCTION.................................. 2 II. MODELS: A GENERAL THEORETICAL ANALYSIS . . . 5 PART II THE FOUNDATIONS: INTELLECTUAL AND THEORETICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT III. CLASSICAL MODELS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT . . 32 Development Models in Classics of Political Sociology Comte: Rational or Consensus Model of Development Marx: Conflict Model of Development IV. DEVELOPMENTAL MODELS IN THE TYPOLOGICAL TRADITION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES.......... 65 Toennies: From Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft Durkheim: From Mechanical Solidary Society to Organic Solidary Society Weber: From Traditionalism to Modernity Redfield: From Folk to Urban Society V. DEVELOPMENT MODELS IN CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND MODERN SOCIOLOGY: A STRUCTURAL- FUNCTIONAL APPROACH ....................... 118 Malinowski's Functionalism Radcliffe-Brown'a Functionalism Parsons: Systems Analysis (A Synthesis of Classic, Typological, and Functional Traditions Merton: Functional Model for Analysis of Change iii Chapter Page PART III THE CURRENT THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT VI. MACROTHEORETICAL APPROACHES ........... Deutsch: Cybernetic Approach Eaaton: Systems Model Almond: Functional Model The Contributions of Macrotheories to the Study of Developing Areas VII. MIDDLE-RANGE THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT......... Social Mobilization and Political Development Attempts at General Correlations of Economic Development with Political Development Lyle W. Shanon Seymour Martin Lipset Karl de Schweinitz James Coleman Phillips Cutright Conclusions PART IV SOME GUIDELINES TO FUTURE RESEARCH VIII. SOME RESEARCH GUIDELINES AND CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS.............................. State of Political Development Theory Neglected Areas of Research Prospects of a Subfield of Political Development 175 273 325 BIBLIOGRAPHY 356 LIST OP FIGURES Figure I. Page Boundary Exchanges Between the Primary Sub-Systems of Society......................... 147 II. Political System 210 PART I THE FRAMEWORK 1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Perhaps the most significant fact in the contempof rary world is the emergence of several scores of "new nations" in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The future shape of mankind and the kinds of problems it will face will depend enormously on the character of social, economic, and political institutions adopted in these "developing nations." The subject of "political development" today is of unrivalled importance both philosophically and theoreti cally. This dissertation is the outgrowth of my long interest in the problems of political development. The object of this dissertation, among other things, is to provide a review and critical analysis of the major theoretically oriented models that are used for the stodgy of political development and to suggest some guidelines for future research. This study is analytically divided into four parts. Part I provides a general theoretical analysis concerning the uses and limitations of "models" in the processes of theory construction and serves partially as a framework for the critical analysis and exposition of current theoretical approaches to the study of political development. 2 3 Part II develops one of the theses of this disserta tion that current theoretical approaches to the study of political development have their intellectual origins in the following sources: (a) the classics of political theory; (b) the classics of political sociology as repre sented by Marx and Comte; (c) the typological tradition in the social sciences as represented by Weber, Durkheim, and Redfield; and (d) cultural anthropology as represented by Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown. An examination of the above theoretical sources is followed by the proposition that all these sources are synthesized in the grand system of Parsons, who provides the major source of inspiration to current theoretical approaches. Part III employs a simple two-fold typology of current theorists in terms of macrotheoretical and middle- range theoretical approaches and critically examines and evaluates their theoretical and substantive contributions to the study of political development. David Easton, Gabriel Almond, and Karl Deutsch are chosen as the well- known exponents of the three major macrotheoretical approaches, viz., "systems analysis," "functional or structural-functional analysis," and "cybernetics" or "communication systems analysis," respectively. No attempt is made to examine all middle-range level theories, but the efforts of contemporary theorists 4 at a general correlation of economic and social development with political development are examined to determine the validity of their theories. The concluding Part IV brings together into a coherent focus, the state of political development research. In sum, this study seeks to explore within the framework of a simple typology of theories, the theoretical assump tions and contributions of some major macro and middle- range theories, to systematize and assess their findings and to point out neglected aspects of research in the hope of bringing added clarity to a burgeoning sub-field, enhance its theoretical relevance, and hopefully to pro vide a new sense of purpose and direction. CHAPTER II MODELS: A GENERAL THEORETICAL ANALYSIS The goal of any science is to develop a valid, precise, and verified general theory. The physical sciences have developed a mutually accepted general theory over the past 300 years. It treats events involving matter and energy and describes these events in the language of mathematics. This explains why there is comparatively little methodological discussion and still less methodological polemic among the physical scientists. However, the social sciences by and large, lack such a general theory.^ In political science, the scientific movement is a relatively recent phenomenon, dating from half a century ago, but gaining great momentum in the early 1950's. The realiza tion that political science has been lagging behind over the social sciences in its goal of becoming a scientific discipline has acted as a spur and led to intensified and hectic efforts in the direction of methodological self- consciousness, conceptual precision, and scientific rigor in an effort to catch up with the other disciplines. The ^Anatol Rapoport, "Uses and Limitations of Mathe matical Models in Social Sciences," in Llewellyn Gross, Symposium on Sociological Theory (Evanston, 111.: Row, Peterson, 1959), pp. 348-355. 5 6 consequence has been a plethora of competing theories, models, methodologies, conceptual frameworks, and para digms. The problem is that none of them is widely accepted and none of them has a deductively powerful theoretical strucutre. Since methodology is inextricably linked with model and theory building, methodological issues can never be resolved until simultaneous advances are made in laying an accepted foundation of pure theory. Furthermore, the efforts of political science to build a body of valid general theory cannot succeed without cross-cultural comparative research. This intellectual effort has moved into sharper focus in recent years as political scientists have attempted not only to develop such concepts as political culture, political socialization, and political development, but also to operationalise them. It is not surprising that it is in the area of comparative politics and political development in particular that specialists have tended to emerge as macrotheorists and systematic model-builders. The universe of the social sciences is so broad, and deals with such a multitude of variables, that a great deal of the energy of the social scientist is exhausted in the process of selecting the fundamental entities of his interest. In order not to be bogged down by the great number of possible variables in theoretical research in 7 political science, it has often proved helpful to construct a "model" out of assumptions and hypotheses of a specific type of society or of government and then to work within 2 the framework of that model. As a result, numerous models have been ruled out. Before we discuss their relevance and structure in social sciences, it would be desirable for us to recall briefly the role of models in scientific study. Models: Scope and Definition The construction of a general theory of behavior requires effective procedures for determining the applica tion of such theory at a variety of levels; models are useful in this task. Mankind has frequently developed metaphysical systems to give order and meaning to existence. All through human history man seems to have felt a need to conceptualize reality in terms of some abstract system, in terms of symbols or models. The political scientist, Karl Deutsch, has suggested that the whole process of understand ing, from its early stages to the creation of a final theory, is carried on by means of symbolic models.^ A 2 Arnold Brecht, "Political Theory," The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: McMillan co., Vol. XT, 1957J, p. 310.------------ 3 Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (New York: The Free Press, 19657”! p " * 8 symbol is used as a short-cut to recall one or more things. We must then connect our symbols by the use of some operat ing rules. Together, the set of symbols and the set of operating rules form a symbol system or a model.4 Gener ally, any language is such a symbol system. More specifi cally, a system of geometry, or a model, physical or abstract, of some process, or a conceptual scheme in any science, are all symbol systems of this kind. Models are, therefore, central and strategic. Scholars interested in promoting scientific research should accord to model building a preeminent place in their work. Models, of some kind of analytic structure, are present in every piece of research, certainly in any research which steps beyond the mere accumulation of data. The process of scientific explanation, prediction and verification invariably involves the use of models.^ Despite the fact that models are so indiscriminately and widely used, controversy still revolves about the term. It is not yet sharply defined in the social sciences. It is as slippery a concept as is currently in use by social scientists.^ Bewilderingly different concepts of 4Ibid., p. 10. 5Ibid. 6Irving Louis Horowitz, "The Search for a Development Ideal: Models and Their Utopian Implications** in Developing Nations; Quest for a Model, W. Beling and G. 0. Totten (eds.) (Mew Vork7 Van Mostrand Relnhold Co., 1970), p. 84 9 models exist and there is harly any agreement among the social sciences about the characteristics relevant for definition of model as such. In political science, until recently there has been little concern for a sharper definition of the term "model'’ or for specifying a set of 7 general criteria by which all models might be evaluated. The indiscriminate usage of the concept has reached a point when it is treated as an undefinable "primitive term” Q in our professional vocabulary. The literature on models refers to no less than twenty different types, e.g., mathematical structures, logical nets, physical systems, verbal models, analogies, empirical models, rational models, empirical-mathematical models, pictorial models, descriptive models, correlational, mechanistic, organismic, arithmeti cal, axiomatic, operating, causal, and statistical models. Even typologies and constructs are sometimes called models. In view of the great diversity of subject matter in the social sciences, scholars have used models which are suffi ciently different, thereby frustrating attempts to settle for some simple and sovereign definition of model. Adopting a broad general definition of model within which we could 7Carl G. Hempel, Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, , pp- — ®R. T. Golembiewski, et al., A Methodological Primer for Political Scientists (Chicago: Rand McNally t Co., Inc., p. 443.----------- 10 construct some distinct sub-types and their combinations would be one way of ordering the chaotic universe of models. Golembiewski and associates give us such a broad definition: "A model is a structure embodying a set of variables having a specified set of inter-relations, but which variables and relationships need have only limited correspondence with the empirical phenomena and relations among empirical phenomena to which they refer. A model is characterized by the use of measurement at least at the ordinal level in abstracting variables from empirical Q phenomena.1 It is evident from this general definition of model that models, however useful they may be, are not a substitute for theory. Explanation or evaluation may be furthered by the use of models, but models do not explain or evaluate. Models have heuristic value. They may suggest ways in which elements interact, but they do not as modelB explain interactions. Explanation is a function of theory. Models can become theories, of course, but the distinction between them needs to be preserved. In sum, we may think of models as intermediate steps along the road to theory. Abraham Kaplan has suggested that overdependence on the importance of models may lead to overemphasis on the impor tance of symbols, concern for logical form at the expense 9Ibid., p. 445. l^Eugene J. Meehan, Contemporary Political Thought (Homewood, 111.: The Dorsey Press, 1967), pT 294. 11 of content, and rigor at the price of meaning and overimpli cation. Finally, there is the compelling temptation of often succumb to the usual pitfall— easy forgetfulness of the fact that their models are not theories. The evaluation of models poses as many problems as does their definition. There are no formal rules for the evaluation of models. One helpful general principle would be to base our evaluation of the usefulness of a model on a firm grasp of both the properties of the model and the empirical conditions to which the model is being applied. In the last analysis the major determinant of the value of any model should be the objective of the inquiry. The purpose of inquiry provides a basis for evaluating the assumptions on which a model functions, whether the model is used for descriptive, normative, organizing, explaining or predictive ends. Since the aim of all scientific inquiry is not after all to build elegant or interesting models but to produce sound theoretical explanations and impregnable evaluations, the criteria for evaluating a model should be forcing the data to fit the model.Model builders too Evaluation of Models **Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct cisco: Chandler Publishing Co., I7ST . (San Fran- -85. 12 related to its theoretical promise— how far along the path way to theory a given model has come. In evaluating models we shall review the relevant literature to gain perspec tives that might help us in setting our own criteria. Some scholars have suggested the following criteria for evaluation of models, each purports to be an index of progress toward theory: validity, flexibility, generality, measurement sophistication, significance, internal logic, 12 and predictive capacity. Each of the above criteria can be further sub-divided for purposes of detailed discussion and clarity. It must be remembered that questions concern ing evaluation of a model are closely related to questions of definition. Validity The validity of a model may refer to any of at least three things: the correspondence of the elements of a model with the empirical reality which it purports to represent, the model's susceptibility to operationalization, and the relative absence of errors of structural commission. The literature on models is most concerned with the question of correspondence to reality. There is a rich variety of scholarly opinions on this question. To some 12 Golembiewski, et al., op. cit., p. 430. 13 scholars, like F. H, George, models consist only of structures.13 Models are not tied to any specific set of data, but rather are intended to apply to several discrete observations. Deutsch defines models as "symbols which are put in relations or sequences according to operating rules."1* To Paul Meadows, models are "patterns of symbols, rules, and processes regarded as matching, in part or in 15 totality, an existing perceptual complex." Anatol Rapoport, Kenneth Arrow, and many others have taken the same general stand in conceptualizing models as structures. Other scholars, such as Herbert Simon and Allan Newell, define model both in terms of structure and empirical con tent. To them models have both form and content (the totality of empirical assertions that the model makes about the real world phenomena to which it refers). Thus, their concept of model is synonymous with a theory. They further divide content into logical properties (the facts that can be extracted from the model by applying the laws of logic) and psychological content (the empirical propositions the 13 F. H. George, "Models and Theories in Social Psy chology," in Llewellyn Gross (ed.), Symposium on Sociologi cal Theory (Evanston, 111.: Row Peterson, 1959), p. 35. 1*Karl Deutsch, "Mechanism, Organism, and Society: Some Models in Natural and Social Science," Philosophy of Science (July, 1951), p. 230. 15Paul Meadows, "Models, Systems and Science," Ameri can Sociological Review, 22 (February, 1957), p. 3. 14 scientists are in fact able to derive from it).^® A third group of scholars, including Eugene Meehan, M. J. Levy,^ and N. Wiener,^-® have differentiated formal models from material models. Levy has identified both mathe matical models (ways of ordering abstractions about empiri cal phenomena ) and empirical models (ways of ordering concepts about empirical phenomena). To Meehan a formal model consists of a set of carefully defined elements and the rules for manipulating them; the whole system is usually reduced to symbolic form. An informal model may combine formal and empirical considerations.*® Since social scientists are increasingly using and recognizing the impor tance of both formal and material models, the controversy assumes value purely in a semantic sense. The question about the degree to which an analytic structure must corre spond with reality, to be considered a model, has not been settled. Deutsch seems to take a rather ambiguous position on this point. He asserts that models must be tested for *®Herbert A. Simon and Allan Newell, "Models: Their Uses and Limitations," in Leonard D. White (ed.), The State of the Social Sciences (Chicaao: University of Chicaao Press, 1955), pp. 56-83. 17 M. J. Levy, Jr., The Structure of Society (Prince- ton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1952) , pp. 29-33. *®A. Rosenbleuth and N. wiener, “The Pole of Models in Science," Philosophy of Science, 12 (1945), 317-18. 19 Meehan, op. cit., pp. 292-297. 15 their relevance to determine whether they match those aspects of the empirical process in which one is inter ested to a degree of accuracy sufficient for one's purposes. Whether or not a model matches reality must be established by some physical process, that has one kind of outcome if the matching is close enough and another outcome if it is 20 not. Meadows also asserts that some degree of correspon dence with reality is necessary. Some scholars, such as Simon and Levy, take the posi tion that models need have very little correspondence with reality: "Models do not reflect empirical phenomena with very detailed accuracy. . . . The most rarefied and abstract models may prove to be extremely useful. When results deviate from predictions, attention is focused on those factors causing the deviations. More than this is not to be expected from models.Simon similarly holds the view that all types of models "have a great deal of content that has no correspondence with the phenomena to which they are applied." Simon believes that at a suffi ciently microscopic level, "a theory will more closely mirror the neurological and psychological properties of its information processing system (e.g., the human brain) than it will anything to be found in the outside world. 20 Deutsch, Nerves of Government, op. cit., p. 11. 21M. J. Levy, op. cit., pp. 30-31. 22 Simon and Newell, op. cit., p. 74. 16 De Fleur and Larson concur, indicating that many models with unrealistic assumptions and containing struc tural relationships not analogous to relationships among the empirical phenomena in question have yielded accurate 23 predictions about real world outcomes. A diametrically opposite view is held by May Brodbeck and Herman Meyer. Brodbeck characterizes models as isomor phic theories and provides a precise meaning of model in the following fashion: "Two theories whose laws have the same forms are isomorphic as structurally similar to each other. If the laws of one theory have the same form as the laws of another theory, then one may be said to be a model for the other.This definition of model in terms of an isomorphism between theories, is said to be an unam biguous meaning for that term. She calls for a one-to-one correspondence between the elements of the model and the elements of the thing of which it is a model. Meyer pro poses a definition which involves a strictly isomorphic relationship between the model and the reality it 2 R describes. 2 3m . l . De Fleur and O. N. Larson, The Flow of Infor mation (New York: Harper, 1958), p. 92. 2*May Brodbeck, "Models, Meaning and Theories" in Llewellyn Gross (ed.), Symposium on Sociological Theory, op. cit., p. 379. 25Herman Meyer, "On the Heuristic Value of Scien tific Models," Philosophy of Science, 12 (1945), pp. 3, 7-18. 17 In view of the sharp differences of views on this question, we cannot hope to arrive at a point of view that will forge some consensus. It seems to this writer a reasonable position to propose that models need not be totally isomorphic; a limited correspondence should suffice. The evaluation of a model in terms of its correspondence with a perceived reality should be based ultimately on the ability of the model to generate hypotheses that would promote the cause of theory-construction. Operationality The correspondence of the model to perceived reality may not be of such strategic importance as its operation ality. Sociologists frequently cite Bridgman's original definition of operationalism in his recent work, as the classic formulation of this concept: "In general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of operations. If the concept is physical as of length, the operations are actual physical operations, namely, those by which length is measured; or if the concept is mental as of mathematical continuity, the operations are mental operations, namely those by which we determine whether a given aggregate of magnitudes is continuous. It is not intended to imply that there is a hard and fast division 18 between physical and mental concepts or that one kind of concept does not always contain an element of the other; this classification of concept is not important for our 26 future considerations." More specifically, operationalism in contemporary sociology is equaled with explicit, clear-cut research operations which can be standardized and are capable of 27 duplication by social scientists working independently. Any model-building effort becomes futile unless the model is susceptible to operationality. A model may be said to be operational if it can be referred back to empirical phenomena through the testing of derived propositions. Deutsch calls this testing of correspondence a "critical process," that is, a physical process the outcome of which 2 R depends critically on the extent of that correspondence. ° If the model itself is of an empirical type, it should con tain propositions dealing with the empirical world. Alter nately such propositions should be deducible from the model. Any model, however elegant, is not fruitful, if it lacks the potential for operationalization. 2fi P. W. Bridgman, "Remarks on the Present State of Operationalism," Scientific Monthly, 79 (October, 1954), p. 224. ^Gideon Sjoberg, "Operationalism and Social Research," in Symposium on Sociological Theory, op. cit., p. 606. 28 Deutsch, The Nerves of Government, op. cit., pp. 86-87. 19 However, the ability and originality of the scholar in devising operational techniques is also important. One should guard against errors both of structural commission and omission. The validity of a model is likely to be compromised by omitting variables that centrally interact with other variables in reality or by incorporating vari ables that strategically interact with other variables in the model having no counterpart in reality. Flexibility Next to validity, we consider flexibility as the second most important criterion for the evaluation of models. Flexibility may be defined as the susceptibility of the model to changes in the number, nature, or interrelation of variables during the model's use as a guide to research. A flexible model permits the introduction of new data and even new concepts, without negating any of the originally stated relationships among variables. No model can ini tially represent a comprehensive picture of reality. As the scholar delves more deeply into his problem area, new research suggests new insights and additional meaningful questions. A model should be so constructed that it may be expanded without doing violence to its original structure 20 (without being reconstructed) . Robert Merton suggests this 29 as the optimum strategy of research. In commenting on this point, George emphasizes the importance of a "flexible framework which would serve as a scientific tool for research to encompass the experimental work in progress, and be precise enough to avoid the pit falls of ordinary language; and yet again be capable of being used as approximate models for theories to answer questions of varying generality at any time."3® We can conclude this discussion by suggesting that the greater the flexibility of the model, the more fruitful it is for science. Generality and Organizing Power Generality is the third characteristic, after valid ity and flexibility, that we would consider in evaluating the usefulness of models. Generality refers to the number of sets or systems of empirical phenomena to which any model may usefully be applied. In addition to breadth of application, the generality of a model may refer to the level of abstraction at which a model operates. Philosophers of science subsume breadth 29 R. K. Merton, Social Structure and Social Theory (Glencoe, 111.i Free Press, 1957). 30George, op. cit., p. 334. 21 of application and level of abstractions under the term generality, as both seem to be closely related. We may first identify the developmental aspect of a model by delineating the following successive stages, each stage implying a more extensive structure in the model. At any point in time a model: (1) may identify simply a set of variables; (2) may identify a set of phenomena and state that they interact; (3) may identify a set of phenomena, and inciate the pattern of their interaction; and/or (4) may identify a set of phenomena, identify the pattern of their interaction and attempt explicitly to account for all possible variance in their relationships. As a general rule, we may say that the generality of a model is inversely related to the exactness of its struc ture and to the degree to which the model is isomorphic with reality. The greater the generality of the model, the broader its scope of application and hence the greater its promise for scientific inquiry. Particularistic models often provide advantages of exactitude as well as validity. But again, as Meadows points out, "to stay within the confines of the particularistic model yields exactitude at the price of fullness, validity at the cost of generality."31 Since generality is often gained at the expense of validity, the model-builder must exercise 31Meadows, op. cit., p. 7. 22 caution in designing any given model. One significant way to test the generality of a model would be to see whether the model applies to sets of phenomena other than those from which it was originally abstracted. Thus, the gener ality of a model is as much an empirical question as it is 32 a logical one. If there are identifiable regularities among different types or systems of phenomena, then the model builder should be able to design models with sub stantial generality. Our concept of generality resembles Deutsch*s idea of the organizing power of a model. The "organizing power" of a model consists in the degree of its correspondence to other empirical processes byond the range of those in respect to which its relevance was first established. "Organizing power in this sense is indicated by the range of additional situations for which the model would be relevant and by the precision and specificity of each 33 relevance in each class of such cases." Simplicity and Economy of Representation Another important quality of a good model is its simplicity and economy. In order to be economical, the ^Golembiewski, et al., op. cit., pp. 438-439. 33 Deutsch, The Nerves of Government, op. cit., p. 17. 23 model must be in some respects simpler than the empirical situation modeled. In Deutsch1s words, "its construction and operation must require less of those factors (such as material resources, physical or intellectual labor, calcu lating steps and so on) that happen to be in short supply at the time and place of our work."34 Recognizing that for the social scientist a theory is often in effect a system of reference, Rapoport con tends that it is sufficient if a model contains the essen tials, no matter how crudely simplified some of the social process.^ Levy, De Fleur and Larson similarly assert that the function of a model is to point out where to look and under what conditions to make the observations. Some scholars, however, take the opposite position and call for extensive structure in the model so as to establish a strict isomorphism of relations as well as elements.37 Landon is also interested in the comprehen- 3 8 siveness of the model's structure. 34Ibid. 35 Rapoport, op. cit., p. 371. 3®Levy, op. cit. pp. 29-3 3f Larson and De Fleur, op. cit., p . ITT 37 Meyer, op. cit., p. 121. 38 Ivan D. Landon, "The Role of the Model in Explanation," Journal of Genetic Psychology, 7 4 (June, 1949), pp. i65=*r: 24 Combinatorial Richness The combinatorial richness of a model is measured by the range of com!* nations or patterns that can be generated from it.39 Measurement Performance Social scientists recognize the fact that many useful models do not make use of measurement theory. Yet the nag ging question is still with us, namely, whether some kind of measurement should be a part of any model. Since con sensus exists that scientific knowledge should be intersub- jectively valid and transmittable and hence couched in an objective, consistent language, at least ordinal measure ment is considered necessary in model construction.^ Measurement may be qualitative or quantitative. The former involves the application of scaling theory, which included the theories of the ordered metric and less powerful scales; the latter involves more sophisticated forms of measure ment, involving the use of measurement theory, e.g., the 39 Deutsch, The Nerves of Government, op. cit., p. 17. 4ft C. H. Coombs, MTheory and Method of Social Measure ment, " in Leon Festinger and Daniel Katz (eds.), Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences (New Yorki The Dryden Pr-ss, 15531, pp. 471-535.--------- 25 theories of interval and ratio scales. We must be careful not to confuse measurement with operationalism and mathe- matiration. Operationalism is the principle that the mean ing to be given to any concept resides in the operations which give rise to the measure of the concept. Mathemati- zation involves the formatization of relationships which have been abstracted from their empirical referents focus ing on the logical explication and elaboration of these relationships.4^ Rapoport thinks that mathematics is 42 superbly suited to serve as the language of all science and Kemeny goes further and asserts that all scientific theories— numerical or other--are mathematical. We may conclude our discussion of measurement performance with a caveat that quantification must not become an end in itself. Measurement has no value in itself, unless it promotes the cause of theory construction. Deutsch1s advice to young social scientists is to study more mathe matics but with the insistence that no amount of mathemati cal knowledge will relieve them from the responsibility of judging the relevance of their models against their fund of factual knowledge as social scientists. All analytic work in the social sciences is primarily tied to evaluating 41J. G. Kemeny, A Philosopher Looks At Science (Princeton, N.J.i Van Nostrand, 1959), pp. 14-35. 42 Rapoport, op. cit.. p. 371. 26 the realism of assumptions and the appropriateness of models.4* * Internal Logic and Rigor Usefulness of a model also depends upon its internal logic and rigor. Internal logic refers to the fact that a model should be so constructed that empirical propositions can be logically deduced from its structure. In Deutsch's language, the “rigor" of a model consists in its ability to give unique answers at each step of the calculations or more broadly speaking at each step of applying the operat ing rules. The debate about whether a model can explain “why" as well as “how" finally seems to be settled in h 44 London's contention that models cannot demonstrate "why. Uses of Models Models can play an important role in the pursuit of knowledge. Deutsch points out that models can serve at least four distinct functions: the organizing, the predic tive, the heuristic, and the mensurative. Alternatively we may say that models may be used to describe, explain (how not why), predict, and verify. Some scholars also 4^Deutsch, op. cit., p. 43. 44I*ondon, op. cit. , pp. 169-72. 27 stress the operating use of models, as they are related to the process of theory construction and verification. The functions/ indeed, are interdependent, yet they can be analytically separated. Description Most models that we come across in the social sciences are descriptive. Descriptive models may be helpful in con ceptualizing particular problems, but they have limited scientific significance. Descriptive models usually pro ceed on the following lines: They (1) identify a problem or problem area; (2) indicate that there are certain vari ables; (3) characterize the variables in some fashion; and (4) state that they interact in some way. Contemporary social scientists are not satisfied with the process of description alone. A. F. Bentley had contended that when a scientist has described everything, nothing more is left 4 5 to be done. Very few social scientists of today would agree with him. Organizing Function By organizing function is meant the ability of a model to order and relate disjointed and discrete data 45 See A. F. Bentley, The Process of Government Bloomington, Ind.t Principia Press, 1949). 28 and to slow similarities or connections between them that had previously remained unperceived. Explanation Function An explanatory model may be defined as one which indicates specific variables. It explains how certain events have constant relations, and facilitates in under standing a process of determinate relations. Predictive Function Explanations almost invariably imply some predic tions. Golembiewski suggests that predictive models are usually more general in application, and less extensive in structure.The predictive power of a model is considered to be its most important attribute. Rational models-- based on certain untested postulates— provide indetermi nate approximations to reality. They are used to determine when and how reality and the model's prediction diverge. 46 Golembiewski, op. cit., p. 445. 29 Heuristic Function The heuristic function of a model is to lead to the 4 7 discovery of new facts and new methods. When predic tions of a model cannot be verified by the existing tech niques, they may yet serve a heuristic function. Verification As Braithwaite has indicated, models are used in applying hypotheses to testable particulars, after generat ing data into untested theories. Conclusion Throughout history men have thought in terms of imageB and models. Model-building has been an indispens able aspect of any scientific endeavor. The literature dealing with models shows a rich variety of conflicting perspectives and points of view, yet there seems to be some consensus about the central importance of model- 47 Deutsch, Nerves of Government, op. cit., p. 9. 48 R. B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation {Cam bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953). 30 building in contributing to scientific theory construction. Our discussion about models attempted to bring some order in an area where controversy abounds. He take the point of view that model-building is a necessary step in the direc tion of theory-building and a theoretical model (one which is empirical, structurally isomorphic, and quantitative) may be considered a low-level theory. The preceding systematic discussion concerning models, we hope, will provide a helpful groundwork for our critical examination and systematic analysis of classical and modern models in the study of political development. PART II INTELLECTUAL AND THEORETICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT. 31 CHAPTER III THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF CURRENT APPROACHES TO POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT Claasical Models of Political Development Today the study of political development and moderni zation has become a burgeoning subfield in comparative politics. Scholarly interest in social and political development, however, is indeed not a recent phenomenon; it goes back to ancient Greek thought and legend. The current efforts toward understanding the dynamics of poli tical development (in the developing nations) are not intel lectually or conceptually entirely new. What is new in recent studies may be efforts at explicit conceptualization and conscious theory building, but the phenomenon of devel opment and change has been the subject of grand theories in the past. Most contemporary scholars agree that our cur rent efforts to understand aspects of social and political development owe a great deal in terms of their conceptual scheme and theoretical insights to classical models. Cur rent theoretical efforts can be better appreciated in the 32 33 context of past contributions. Establishing intellectual antecedents of our modern theoretical ventures would also help us in their critical analysis and evaluation. It should be pointed out at the outset that the term "politi cal development" so popular in modern political science vocabulary was not used by past theorists. Nor did they make any distinction in their conceptual schemes for identifying and isolating the phenomenon of social change separately from that of political development. Classical theorists were primarily concerned with the phenomenon of change on a broad macro-societal or historical level that encompassed dimensions of social change, economic growth, and political development. The fact that political devel opment, as conceptualized in most modern conceptual ver sions, was not the subject of theorizing in the past in no way implies intellectual or methodological naivete in the classical scholars. It simply was not the way they looked at society. Their holistic approach militated against examination of segmental aspects of society. One of the shortcomings of modern theorists of political development is this ignorance of, or reluctance to relate their own efforts to, past theoretical tradition.* Studies of change and development have usually been of great interest to sociologists and anthropologists. The advanced state of David E. Apter, Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization, tinglewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1968. 34 theory in the area of social change naturally has served as a model for theory building in the area of political development. This explains why most modern theorists of political development have borrowed concepts and theories from sociology and anthropology. Not all the theories of social change will be examined here, only what are considered the most relevant classic models of political development and social change that have been influential in shaping our current theoreti cal efforts and the methodological issues of political development. It is not difficult to establish the antiquity and universality of the concept of development. Greek thought was suffused with the ideas of development, growth, and progress. The basis of all Greek science was the concept of physis which directed and dominated their thinking more than any other idea. The term physis meant to the Greeks 2 literally the way things grow. The concept of physis from the Eleatics (c450 B.C.) onward, was applied to social and cultural entities as much as to physical. The physis of anything— man, dog, tree, kinship system, polis— was simply the pattern of growth and change that was supposed 2 On this see, F. M. Cornford, Princlpium Sapientine; The Origins of Greek Philosophical Thought (Cambridgei Cambridge University Press, 1952), pp. 179-181. 35 to be inherent in it, natural to its very structure, nature or being. Given this central assumption of Greek thought the concern of science for any Greek was to identify the way things grow— the physis of everything he was studying. More specifically, this task involved at least four things: (1) The investigation of the origin or original condition, for in it lay, ex hypothesi, the essential elements of the thing in their pristine state. (2) The identification of the cycle or pattern of change, from origin to end, that was uniquely characteristic of the thing and its type. It was here, of course, that the idea of stages is brought into the picture, for everything has a sequence of stages natural to it. (3) The identification of the end, the goal, or telos of the process, for in growth, all changes are, by definition, relative to a specific end or result. This explains the teleological character of much Greek and subsequent Western concern with change and development. (4) The identification of the force or factor that through continuous operation gives dynamism to the whole pattern of development. What the Greek philosophers meant by political devel opment can be understood against the background of the Greek city-state which was an integrated system of social ethics with no distinction between state and society. The Greeks conceived of the state as a moral entity and the 36 citizen could realize his moral perfection only by partici pation in the affairs of the state. Both Plato and Aristotle regarded politics as the sovereign or supreme science, because it was concerned with the definition of the moral end of man and the management of the state's business. In light of this intellectual climate of their time, both Plato and Atistotle have definite ideas about the right kind of political order. The morally right political order or the social state in each case is equated with a politically developed society. For Palto a politi cally developed society would be a society where rulers are virtuous and are guided by their knowledge of the good. A politically developed state is the one in which the citizens can attain their moral perfection. Plato's conception of a politically developed ideal is expressed thus: Unless either philosophers become kings in their countries or those who are called kings and rulers come to be sufficiently inspired with a genuine desire for wisdom; unless. . . political power and philosophy meet together. . . there can be no rest from toubles. . . for states. . . for all mankind. . . there is no other way of happiness either for the state or for the individual. . .3 Cornford goes on to say: Plato places overwhelming emphasis on the quality of elite in contributing to political 3 F. M. Cornford The Republic of Plato New York* Oxford University Press/ 1945. 37 development of the state. A rightly ordered society is the one ruled by the virtuous ruler. And a genuinely virtuous ruler is the one who loves knowledge for its own sake, who finds happiness in the contemplative life, and who resists offers to take political life.4 The developmental perspective of the Greeks, used in its sociological aspects, is nowhere better illustrated than by Aristotle in his famous treatment of the nature (physis) of the state and in his conception of the ideal or politically developed state. At the very beginning of his Politics, he begins with the family, for, he says, "He who considers things in their first growth and origin, whether the state or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them." Aristotle then passes to the state's developmental pattern which is, he tells us, in three stages: family, community, polis. In his conception of the ideal state, Aristotle depends more on the social and institutional framework than on individuals. A mixed constitution based on the middle classes is Aristotle's best state. In a politically developed state power will be vested in the middle class which will be numerically superior to both poor and rich combined. In his Politics, he declares: A state aims at being, as far as it can be, a society composed of equals and peers; and the middle class, more than any other, has this sort of composition. . . the best form of political society is one where power is vested in the middle class 38 and secondly, that good government is attainable in those states where there is a large middle class. The idea of development was not unfamiliar to Christian tradition. When St. Augustine wrote The City of God at the beginning of the fifth century, he laid the Christian view of mankind squarely in a developmental perspective. In the Augustinian view, God created the whole world, but as against the early Hebraic view, he created potentialities that required time for their actualization. In Augustine's philosophy of history the whole of mankind's past, present, and future was placed in a pattern of unfolding of what had been in the begin ning merely latent or potential. Thus in Augustine's framework the entire unfolding process extending several thousand yearB had proceeded with a necessity that was the result of internal immanent forces, although all this took place under God's undoubted Sovereignty. This devel opmental perspective— a heritage of the Greek philosophy— 6 never entirely disappeared from Christian thought. 5 Ernest Barker, The Politics of Aristotle (New York: 1962), pp. 181-182. 6 Robert A. Nisbet, "Developmentalism: A Critical Analysis," in John C. McKinney and Edward A. Tiryakian (eds.), Theoretical Sociology (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1970), p. 172------ ^ 39 Development, far from being a contribution of the 19th century as is usually supposed, is in fact a master prin- 7 ciple of Western philosophy. The developmental perspec tive has had, indeed, differing emphases in the two mill ennia since Aristotle. For instance, the seventeenth century was not as developmentally oriented as were the 8 18th and 19th centuries. The Hobbesian and Lockean interest in the comparative studies of the origins of existing prepolitical primitive people certainly appears to place the problem on developmental foundations. The Enlightenment is usually considered a most logical point of departure if one is interested in the origins of sociological theory. The Enlightenment thinkers considered all aspects of man's life subject to critical examination. Self-examination, an understanding of their own actions, their own society and their own time, was an essential function of theorizing. By knowing, understanding, and recognizing the main forces and tenden cies of their epoch, men could determine the direction, and control the consequences, of these forces. Enlighten ment thinkers assumed that through reason and science man could attain ever greater degrees of freedom and devel opment. Intellectual progress was to serve constantly to 7 Ibid. 8Ibid. 40 further man's general progress and society's development. Knowledge of reality, whether social or natural, depends on the unity of reason and observation in the scientific method. The Enlightenment thinkers were as interested in society and history as they were in nature and these were treated as an indivisible unity. By studying man and nature one could learn not only about what the past has been like but also what is possible. Likewise by studying society and history one could learn not only about the working of the existing social order but its inherent possibilities. The existing social order was studied "scientifically" in order to learn how to trans cend it. These premises of the Enlightenment were either accepted, modified, or rejected in the subsequent development of sociological thought. Much of western theorizing about society developed as a reaction to the Enlightenment. The emergence of sociology as a separate discipline in the early part of the 19th century also witnessed the efforts of some of the fathers of sociology who theorized at macrosocietal level in order to explain the phenomena of social change and evolution. Some of them were con cerned with the general trend of history and its meaning. They endeavoured to explain the past development of society and sometimes to predict the future course of history in terms of a definite developmental pattern. 41 For such 19th century thinkers as Spencer and Comte, the pattern of social evolution was one of linear ascent, for others like Spengler it was cyclical, and for still others like Marx it was dialectical. Darwin’s Origin of the Species in 1859 certainly gave great fillip to developmental perspective, but it is important to remind ourselves of the fact that the major models of developmentalism in the Social Sciences— those of Comte, Marx, Spencer and others— had been pub lished before Darwin's masterpiece. The seminal eighteenth century works of Rousseau, particularly his Discourse on the Origins of Inequality was a remarkable piece of anthropologically oriented social evolutionism. Adam Smith and Condorcet in some of their works utilized the develop mental perspective. Some scholars suggest that it would be easier to maintain the proposition that social develop- mentalism preceded biological than to defend the contrary, although neither proposition, stated so unqualifiedly, 9 is entirely correct. The developmentslist tradition of the West, while not oblivious to events, was more inter ested in the past conceived as a set of conditions changed and occasionally transformed by process. The developmen- talist was interested in things--species, institutions, structures, and conditions rather than specific, datable 9 Ibid., P. 171. 42 happenings. Furthermore the developmental1st was inter ested in things in the process of undergoing change. Our very brief review suggests that development is one of the master ideas of the West that is found in most major 10 systems since the time of the Eleatic philosophers. Development Models in Classics of Political Sociology Comte: Rational or Consensus Model of Development The "father of sociology," Auguste Comte was con cerned with the general trend of society and its meaning. He sought to explain the past development of society and to predict its future in terms of a definite pattern. Some scholars have characterized Comte as, first and fore- 11 most, the sociologist of human and social unity. Human history is a single entity in his perspective. Like many of his contemporaries, Comte believed that modern society was in crisis; as a consequence, one social order was disappearing and another social order was in the process of being born. The conclusion Comte arrived at from the 10 Ibid., p. 178. 11 Raymond Aron* Main Currents in Sociological Thought, Vol. I, (Mew York: Basic Books, Inc. 1965). 43 analysis of contemporary society is that the basic con dition of social reform and change is intellectual reform. The result of his analysis of the contempory crisis in terms of the opposition between the theological-military social type and the scientific-industrial social type is that Comte the reformer was not a theorist of revolution a la Marx nor a theorist of liberalism a la Montesquieu or de Tocqueville; he was essentially a theorist of the 12 positive science, he called sociology. The function of sociology was to understand the necessary, Indispensable and inevitable course of history in such a way as to better promote the realization of the new order. The sociological theory of Comte forms a system at the center of which one finds two correlated propositions: the law of the three stages and the theorem that the theo retical sciences form hierarchy in which sociology occupies the summit. Comte's sociology is divided into two major parts, social statics and social dynamics. Statics involves the study of the conditions of the existence of society, while dynamics requires study of its continuous movement or of the laws of succession of the individual stages. Statics consists essentially in analyzing what Comte called the social consensus. A society is comparable to a living organism. It is impossible to study the functioning of an 12Ibid., p. 61. 44 organ without placing it in the context of the living creature. Likewise, it is impossible to study politics or the state without placing them in the context of the society at a given moment. Social statics thus consists of the analysis of a society's structure and also the analysis of its elements at a given moment that determine the consensus which makes the collection of individuals into a collectivity, the plurality of institutions into a unity. The main facet of statics is order; the main facet of dynamics is a theory of social progress which is tanta mount to the fundamental development of society. More specifically, social synamics will retrace the succes sive and necessary stages of the development of the human mind and of human societies. In both cases Comte's method implied subordination of partial observations to the prior comprehension of the whole. Comte here antici pates modern systems analysis. But in the Comtean view, order and progress are not incompatible; they are closely interrelated. No real social order can be established if it is incompatible with progress and no durable progress is possible if it is not consolidated in order. The task of sociology or social dynamics is the discovery of an abstract order in which the major changes of human civilization have followed one another. Throughout the 45 movement, the solidarity and unity of society must be preserved; otherwise, the movement would result in a complete decomposition of the social system. Comte's doctrine is based on the idea that every society is united by means of the agreement of minds or consensus universalis. Social dynamics, Comte says, must begin with the study of development as such. But thereafter the question may be asked whether development is the equivalent of progress and Comte thought that it was. Comte's theory of progress or evolution in broad general lines supports the idea of linear ascent. But Comte understood that progressive development does not follow a straight line. Not only oscillations may occur but the speed and progress can be modified by human interference— by positive scien tific method. Comte'a sociological theory regarding the factors of progress is introduced by a statement that progress is observable in all aspects of society. Progress is physical, moral, intellectual, and political. The intellectual phase, however, is fundamental in Comte's conception. In a qualified sense Comte was an intellectual determinist as some people consider Marx an economic determinist. For Comte history is fundamentally the history of the progress of the human mind. Comte leaves unanswered the problem of relationship between the progress of the human intelligence 46 and transformations of the economy, or politics or of society. However, in the Cours de philosophic positive, Comte states that history as a whole is essentially the 13 development of the human mind. Comte left little to chance or accident in the development of human history, for he maintained that the crucial advances in the history of the human mind could have been foreseen by a superior intelligence because they answered a discernible need. But this does not mean that the movement of intelligence determines the transformation of other social phenomena. In Part V of the Cours de philosophic positive and in Part III of the Systemes de politique positive, Comte explains how the transition from the one stage to the next is effected primarily by means of the opposition between the different segments of the society. Depending on circumstances, the cause which becomes instrumental to disintegration of a society and the advent of the next may be in politics, in economics, or in intelligence. Neverthe less, Comte recognizes the primacy of the progress of intelligence, because (a) the major stages in the history of the human race are determined by the dominant way of thinking or its philosophy, (b) the final stage is that of universal positivism, and (c) the dominant instrument of human development is the constant intellectual criticism 13 Aron, op. cit., p. 82. 47 which nascent positivism brings to bear on contemporary society dominated by theology and fetishism. Thus Comte's central idea, may be expressed in the following manner: social phenomena are subject to a strict determinism which operates in the form of an inevitable evolution of human societies--an evolution which is itself governed by 14 the progress of the human mind. Thus, Comte, though he called on sociology to look, not for causes and effects in history, but rather for uniformities, nevertheless, in his own theory of social evolution, implicitly attributes causal primacy to the intellectual (cultural aspect) sphere by describing the three successive states of human thought; namely, the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive or scien tific, which were also the bases of the three historical 15 forms of social organization. Comte's theory of the progress of society put forward a view that underlies a good deal of the theore tical foundation of the later evolutionists.^*® The study of progress, he emphasized, was greatly facilitated by the fact that the development of all societies is governed by ^Aron, op. cit., p. 78. 15 Amitai Etzioni and Eva Etzioni (eds.) Social Change (New York: Basic Books, 1964) , pp. 3-7. 16 . Timasheff, op. cit., p. 25. 46 the same laws, so that the development of general prin ciples may begin with the study of the advances made by the developed societies. For Comte this vanguard of humanity, the advanced society, was evidently France. This interpretation of history in terms of general laws was the chief intellectual contribution of Comte. In his Systems of Positive Polity, Comte unequi vocally states the law of the progress of human civili zation as moving through three stages: The experience of the past proves in the most decisive manner, that the progressive march of civilization follows a natural and unavoidable course, which flows from the law of human organization and, in its turn, becomes the supreme law of all practical phenomena. He further states: The fundamental law which governs the natural progress of civilization rigorously determines the successive states through which the general development of the human race must pass. On the other hand, this law necessarily results from the instinctive tendency of the human race to perfect itself. Consequently, it is as completely independent of our con trol as are the individual instincts the com bination of which produces this permanent tendency. Comte describes the law of the three states thus: I believe that history may be divided into three grand epochs or states of civilization, each possessing a distinctive character, spiri tual and temporal. They embrace civilization at once in its elements and its ensemble. Of these the first is the theological and mili tary epoch. 49 In this state of society, all theoretical conceptions whether general or special, bear a supernatural impress. The imagination completely predominates over the observing faculty, to which all right of enquiry is denied. In like manner, all the social rela tions , whether special or general, are avow edly and exclusively military. Society makes conquest its one permanent aim. Industiral pursuits are carried on only so far as is necessary for the support of the human race. Slavery, pure and simple, of the producers, is the principal institution. Such is the first great social system produced by the material progress of civilization. The second epoch is metaphysical and juridical. Its general character is that of possessing no well-defined characteristics. It forms a link and is mongrel and transitional. . . observa tion is still kept subordinate to imagination, but the former is, within certain limits, allowed to modify the latter. These limits are gradu ally enlarged, until in the end, observation conquers the right of examining in every direc tion. At first it obtains this right in ref erence to a 1 special theoretical conceptions and gradually, by force or exercise, as to general theoretic ideas, which constitute the natural termination of the transition. This period is one of criticism and argument. Under temporal aspects, industry in this epoch becomes more extended, without as yet acquiring the upperhand. Consequently, society is no longer frankly military and yet has not become frankly industrial, either in its elements or in its ensemble. The special social relations are modified. Industrial slavery is no longer direct; the producer, still a slave, begins to obtain some rights in his relations with the military....Nevertheless the general social relations soon undergo a modification. The two aims of activity, conquest and production, advance pari passu. Industry is at first favored and protected as a military resource. Later its importance augments; and finally war is regarded and systematically pursued as a means of favoring Industry--which is the last term of the intermediate regime. 50 Lastly, the third epoch is that of science and industry. All special theoretic conceptions have become positive and the general conceptions tend to become so. As regard the former, observation predominates over imagination; while, reference to the latter, observation has dethroned the imagination, without having as yet taken its place. Under temporal aspects, industry has become predominant. All the special relations have gradually established themselves on industrial bases. Society, taken collectively, tends to organi2e itself in the same manner, by making production its only constant aim.17 Comte believed, however, that a further philosophical explanation of the law of the three stages was necessary, one which would reduce the law to human nature. He believed this could be readily done, since individual development passes through the same three stages that social development does. In the course of the sophisti cated disucssion of the development of the most advanced societies (of the West), Comte established correlations between the basic intellectual stages, and stages in the development of man's material life, types of social units, types of social order, and prevailing sentiments. These 18 correlations appear as follows: Intellectual Material Type of Social P H w ------ ------- PnTE Theological Military The family Metaphysical Legislative The State Positive Industrial Humanity (Race) 17 From Auguste Comte, Systems of Positive Polity & Co., 1877), "General Appendix (London: Longmans, Green Early Essays," Vol. 12, pp. 555-58, 572-73. 18 Timasheff, op. cit., p. 26. 51 Type of Order Order Prevailing Sentiment Domestic Collective Universal Attachment Veneration Benevolence The importance of Comte for the student of political development lies in the fact that his theory marks the tran sition from the interpretation of human history in terms of divine providence to the interpreation of history in terms of general laws. Comte observed that the positivist method is indispensable for understanding human behavior and socie tal development. In brief, the sociology which he offers is the study of the laws of historical development. Marx: Conflict Model of Development The Marxist theory of history is basically a theory of progress, although not a linear progress— for it con ceived history as a series of violent conflicts rather than a smooth progress to higher plateaus. Marx's theory is perhaps the most forceful theory emphasizing a single determining factor in social and political change. Marx's theory is extremely important as an attempt to achieve a systematic theory of social structure and change. It is usually considered to be the first systematic sociological theory of change focusing on conflict as the mechanism of change. It is important to note that, whereas the Marxist theory of social change could have been constructed independently of its philosophical premises, on the basis of empirical study of 19th century capitalist society of Western Europe, such was not its genesis, Although Marx spent many hardworking years, painstakingly documenting his theory with historical illustrations, his conceptual scheme of social structure and social change was basically a logically necessary premise for the demonstration of the proposition that socialism must inevitable triumph in the 19 modern world. Marx's philosophy was materialistic and materialism forms the basis of his theory of social change, According to Marx, only matter exists, consciousness being an epiphenomenon, a manifestation of motion in brain cells. Marx's theory of social change may be reduced to two basic postulates. The first postulate is the one of the materialistic interpretation of history or economic determinism, According to this view the economic factor is the most decisive and fundamental determinant of the structure and development of society. The economic struc ture of society, consisting essentially of the technolo gical means of production, determines the social organi zation of production, namely, the relations into which men must and do enter to produce goods more efficiently than they could if working separately, These relations of production, according to Marx, develop independently of the human will, Moreover, the mode of production (oganization of production) not only limits but also, in the final analysis, shapes the whole superstructure of society: its political organization, law, religion, philosophy, art, literature, science, and morality. The second postulate of Marxist theory relates to the dynamics and mechanics of change, According to this view social change must be understood in terms of a dialectical conflict with its three ever-present phases, Marx in this dialectical materialism maintained that everything in the world, including society itself, passes by a kind of dialectical necessity through the three states of affirmation or thesis, negation or antithesis, and re conciliation of opposites or synthesis, On this higher level of synthesis the dialectical process continues with new conflicts and their resolutions always marking the historical process. To simplify the exposition of the Marxist theory of social change, we must quote probably the most famous passage which occurs in the preface to A Contribution to The Critique of Political Economy, in which Marx summar izes with unusual lucidity his theory of society and social change, as a whole; 54 The general conclusion at which I arrived and which, once obtained, served to guide me in my studies, may be summarized as follows. In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of produc tion. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society— the real foundation on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite form of social conscious ness. The mode of production of material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production in society come into conflict with the existing relations of production, or— what is but legal expression of the same thing— with the property relations within which they had been at work. From forms of development of the forces of production, these relations turn into their fetters. Then comes the period of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformation the distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philo sophic— in short ideological— forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so we cannot judge of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness must rather be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social forces of production and the relations of production. No social order ever disappears before all the productive forces for which there is room in it, have been developed; and the new relations of production never appear before the material 55 conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society. Therefore, mankind always takes up only such problems as it can solve; since, looking at the matter more closely, we will always find that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions necessary for its solution already exist or are at least in the process of formation. In broad outline, we can designate the Asiatic, the Ancient, the feudal and the modern bourgeois methods of production as so many pochs in the progress of the economic formation of society. The bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the social process of production— antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism, but of one arising from conditions surrounding the life of individuals in society; at the same time the productive forces developing in the womb of bourgeois society create the material conditions for the solution of that antagonism. This social formation constitutes, therefore, the closing chapter of the prehistoric stage of human society. The essential idea of the Marxian theory of change, then, is that the mechanism of the historical movement is the contradiction, at certain moments in evolution, between the forces and the relations of production. The forces of production seem to be essentially a given society's capacity to produce, a capacity which is a function of scientific knowledge, technological equipment, and the organization of collective labor. The relations of production seem to be essentially distinguished by rela tions of property. Into this contradiction between the 2®Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, trans., N. Tl Stone (dhicago: CEarles H. Kerr,-1^04) 56 forces and relations of production, Marx introduces the idea of class conflict, which becomes the mechanism of social and historical change. In revolutionary periods— that is , periods of contradiction between the forces and relations of production— one class is attached to the old relations of production which are becoming an obstacle to the development of the forces of production, and another class, on the contrary, is progressive and represents new relations of production, which instead of being an obstacle in the way of the development of the forces of production, will favor the maximum growth of those forces. Marx and his followers applied this dialectical conflict theory of social change to contemporary Western society, which they called capitalist. In this society, they argued, the social organization of production that came into existence with the Industrial revolution Is expressed in the existence of two classesi the bourgeois or the owners of the means of production, and the pro letariat or the working class. According to Marxian theory, struggle is inevitable between the two classes and will result, as class consciousness and militant action develops, in the overthrow of the existing capi talist system. Capitalism's heir will be a socialist society characterized by collective ownership of the means 57 of production, leading ultimately to a classless and, indeed, stateless society. This dialectical conflict of the forces and rela tions of production, expressed in the inevitable struggle between two classes, implies a theory of revolution or social change; for in this view of history, revolutions are not mere political accidents, the results of the machinations of particular heroes or villains, but the expression of a historical necessity. Revolutions perform necessary functions. Revolutions or significant social change occur only when the conditions for them are ful filled. Capitalist relations of production first developed in the womb of feudal society because of its inner dia lectical contradictions. Now, as a result of the inherent contradictions of capitalist modes of production, socialism has begun in the womb of capitalism. Marx on Colonialism and Modernization. The insight ful significance and relevance of the Marxian theory of social change to our understanding of some of the processes of political development and social transformation in the developing world is self-evident. However, Marxist writings dealing with the non-European world, colonialism, and modernization have remained largely unexploited by modern theoreists. Marx's own views on colonialism and 58 modernization can be gleaned from his major theoretical writings* newspaper and magazine articles* and correspon- 21 dence. Only recently has much been done in this area. It is true that the founding fathers of Marxism did not concern themselves much with what is now called the underdeveloped world* and their remarks on the subject 22 are ambivalent. This ambivalence may have been caused by the fact that most of what Marx had to say about the non-Western world was not said in his principal theoretical writings* but scattered in numerous newspaper articles and in his correspondence* which do not demand neat and elegant theoretical exposition. Marx's views on the nature of the society or socie ties over which European colonialism was establishing its hold beg many theoretical problems. In discussing the stage of economic development* Marx emphatically brings out 21 For the recent literature see a very useful com pilation by Shlomo Avineri {ed.)* Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization (New York: Doubleday and Company* Inc. 1969); George Lichtheim* The Concept of Ideology (New York: Random House* 1967)% Karl Wittfogel* Oriental Despotism (New Haven: Yale University Press) Chapter Donald Mi. Lowe, The Function of China in Marx* Lenin* and Mao (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press* 1966); E. M. S. Namboodiripad, The National Question in Kerala (Bombay: National Publishers* 1966). 22 Peter T. Bauer* "Marxism and the Underdeveloped Countries*” M. M. Drachkovitch (ed.)* Marxist Ideology in Contemporary World (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University frreFsrTT?if* p. 140. 59 the dialectical tensions inherent in every historical period and then goes onto specify the stages of historical development: In broad outline we can designate the Asiatic, the Ancient, the feudal, and the bourgeois methods of production as so many epochs in the progress of the economic formation of society. Three of the four modes of production mentioned here had already been discussed by Marx in the Manifesto. The Asiatic mode of production is a new one. It is obvious that, whereas all but the first one are analytical and historical in their nature, the Asiatic mode of production appears to be merely a geographic designation. Again, whereas the three familiar modes are dialectically re lated, the Asiatic seems to stand apart from the others. The Asiatic mode of production does not fit into Marx's systemic exposition. Neither is it integrated into his dialectical series of the modes of production, nor does Marx show how the Asiatic mode develops internally into any of the other ones. Marx never really admits this discre pancy in his theoretical analysis, yet time and again he warns his disciples not "to metamorphose my historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe into 60 an historico-philosophic theory of the general path every 23 people is fated to tread." In the same letter he ex plicitly limits the historical scope of Das Kapital to Western Europe. Marx is thus faced with the painful realization that his theory of historical development of modes of production is applicable to the West alone. However, in so far as the non-Western world is being trans formed in the direction of capitalism, this occurs as pointed out in the Manifesto, because of the impact of Western bourgeois society, not as a consequence of an in ternal development of the Asiatic mode of production or through the agency of internal social forces. And yet, Marx does include the Asiatic mode of production in his theory of the "progress of the economic formation of society." In his numerous articles on aspects of contem porary Indian and Chinese society and Asiatic mode of production Marx's analysis consists of two propositions: first is the basic proposition of Oriental societies as unchanging, stagnant and hence unhistorical; to this is added the second proposition that the stationary nature of society in Asia is the result of its unique mode of ^In Marx's letter to the Russian Socialist Journal Otechestvenniye Zapiski dated in 1877, as quoted in S, Avineri (ed.), Karl MaTx on Colonialism and Modernisation op. cit. , p. 6. €1 production, baaed on common property and giving rise to Oriental despotism.24 The Marxian concept of history was profoundly influenced by Hegel and to both of them history meant man1s process of changing his environment; where there is no change, as Marx thought was the case in India and China, there is no history. The Oriental societies in this sense, 25 Marx thought, had no history. Since the Asiatic mode of production had no inner dynamism or dialectical elements of internal change built into its own system, out of its womb there arises no new more developed society. The Asiatic mode of production does not fit into the Marxian historical materialism and poses a serious challenge to the assumption that Marx developed a philosophy of history universal in its appli cability . Since Oriental society lacks the internal dynamics of dialectical conflict, it cannot evolve toward capitalism, and, since Marx postulates the ultimate victory of socialism on the prior universalization of capitalism, he necessarily arrives at the reactionary position of having to endorse European colonial expansion as an unfortunate but necessary 24 S. Avineri, op. cit., p. 12. 25 Karl Marx, "The Future Results of British Rule in India" in New York Daily Tribune, August 8, 1853. 62 26 step toward the victory of socialism. Just as the brutalities of capitalism are necessary for the triumph of socialism so the horrors of colonialism are dialecti- cally necessary for the world revolution of the proletar iat since without them the colonial countries will not be able to free themselves from their unchanging backward ness. Since the Asiatic mode of production does not have its own internal mechanisms of change, an external agent is needed and the imperial country's own motives and rationalizations in bringing about change are irrelevant in Marxian analysis. It is a merit of Marx's scientific analysis that he dissociates his vehement and vitriolic moral indignation and social critique against capitalism and colonialism from historical judgment. There have been hardly any more devastating critiques of colonialism and capitalism than Marx's, yet to Marx capitalism is still necessary for the annihilation of old Asiatic society and for laying the material foundations of Western society in Asia, as an agent of external change in non-European societies. The stagnant and unchanging nature of non- European society is thus a drag on the progress of history and so a serious threat to his postulated rise of socialism. Thus Marx's writings on the non-Western world justify and ^®Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (Cambridge, l4£b), pp. 150-17i. 63 defend the brutal and unfortunate Western colonialism as a necessary agent of modernization. Marx's analysis of the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 in India and the Taiping Rebellion in China, again showed lack of basic sympathy with anti-colonial revolts. Marx dismisses both these efforts as regressive instances of anti-Western outbursts in Asia. Marx had little patience for attempts at a partial defensive modernization introduced by other rulers in Asia, for example, military modernization. Marx i m p l i e s t h a t m o d e r n i z a t i o n , t o b e s u c c e s s f u l , h a s t o b e t o t a l and t o c h a n g e t h e w h o le o r d e r o f s o c i e t y ; this cannot be achieved by mere administrative or political reform, but has to be based on a prior structural change i n . s o c i o - e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s . D i a l e c t i c a l l y , E u ro p e a n expansion, with its consequent total annihilation of the A s i a t i c mode o f p r o d u c t i o n , seem s t o Marx t h e o n ly way t o 27 achieve total modernization. With all his sympathetic and profound interest in the non-Western world, Marx re mained essentially a Europe-oriented thinker, and his in sights into Indian and Chinese society pose serious chal lenges to his general philosophy of history which obviously was based on his European experience and European histor- 28 ical consciousness. 27 S. Avineri, Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modern ization, op. cit., p. 35"! 28 Ibid. 64 Our main purpose in this chapter was to trace the intellectual and theoretical origins of the modern approaches to the study of political development. Our analysis reveals the fact that "development” has been one of the master ideas of the West which has found expression in most dominant systems of thought since the early Greek philosophers. The fathers of political sociology like Comte and Marx who theorized at the macrosocietal level were inter ested in expounding theories of social change and devel opment. In their attempt to explain the general trend of history and its meaning, they theorized in terms of a definite developmental pattern. Comte's theory presented a pattern of social evolution that was one of linear as cent, whereas, for Marx the course of social and political development was dialectial. The significance of Marx to our study of political development is under scored by the fact that very few theorists of social change and political development have ignored his brilliant insights. Some have attempted to repudiate his theories, others have reaffirmed them but all had to reckon with them. Our next chapter will pursue the theme of tracing developmental models in the typological tradition of the social sciences as represented in the works of Ferdinand Toennies, Emile Durkheim, Max Webber and Robert Redfield. CHAPTER IV DEVELOPMENTAL MODELS IN THE TYPOLOGICAL TRADITION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES Pitrim Sorokin has pointed out that one of the per sistent aspects of sociological analysis is the age-old tradition of typing societies and social entities anti thetically; this tradition may be traced back to the philosophical enterprise of the classical Greeks and to the speculation of Confucius.* Despite the age of the tradition it still has a marked resilience and vitality and continues to be one of the fundamental approaches to sociological and political phenomena. Perhaps the strong est case was made by Durkheim, at the turn of the century, for the development of social morphology.3 This viewpoint was again eloquently expressed by Radcliffe-Brown3 in the 4 'thirties and more recently by Tiryakian. Some of the ^■Pitrim Sorokin, in Preface to F. Toennies* Community and Society, translated by C. P. Loomis (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1957). 2 Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, Primitive Classifi cation, translated and edited by Rodney Needham (London: Cohen and West, 1963). 3A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, A Natural Science of Society (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press' l9 57), pp. 32-39. 4E. A. Tiryakian, "Typological Classification," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: MacMillan, , pp. 177-186 65 66 leading theorists in contemporary political science have utilized this method. The construction of classes, categories, or types is a necessary aspect of the process of inquiry by means of which we reduce the complex to the simple, the unique to the general, and the occurrent to the recurrent. Typifica- tion is a natural aspect of the social process. The indi vidual is an integral part of society and he makes some sense out of his experiences by means of typification. Typification as a cardinal feature of cognition is the development of a selective and persistent attitude of an actor toward his environment. Typification is a process in conduct that so organizes the field of action that interaction can proceed on an orderly basis.^ Perceiving the world and structuring it by means of categorical types, typification is an essential and intrinsic aspect of actors to their situation. Largely through accepting in the socialization process the typifications people habitually assume under given conditions, the social world of the individual, is structured by a multitude of typesi types of people, types of activity, types of relationships, 5For an excellent analysis of "symbolic interaction" as the fundamental datum in the approach of sociology to human conduct, see G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Presir, TT5TJ and g7 H. Mead, Movements of Thought in the 19th Century (Chicago: University olT^HIcago t*ress, 1934) . 67 types of situations, and the like. Thus, the everyday activity of people, their behavior within the vast complex of social interaction, results in the construction of a vast number of folk typifications which, in effect, struc ture society. In contrast to common folk, what the scien tist does, is to construct these types more precisely and rigorously so as to make them more serviceable for his scientific endeavors. In order to comprehend the world of concrete experience, the scientist introduces order by the achievement of abstract generality, by ignoring the unique, the extraneous, and the non-recurring. To conceptualize means to generalize to some degree. To generalize means to reduce the number and variety of objects by conceiving of some of them as being identical in certain ways or for certain purposes. The reduction of the object world reduces the number and variety of relations to be examined and explained. In short, all concepts are generalizations and all generalization implies abstraction and reduction; and one aspect of this is the process of typification. Within the field of more formal inquiry this process is manifest in the explicit construction of types and typologies.® 6 John C. McKinney, "Sociological Theory and the Process of Typification" in John C. McKinney and Edward Tiryakian (ads.). Theoretical Sociology (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), pp. 236-269 . 68 Such familiar antithetical conceptualizations as Toennies' Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft forms; Durkheim's mechanical and organic solidarity; Weber's traditional and legal authority; Ratzenhofer*s conquest state and culture state; Wundt's natural and cultural polarity; Cooley's primary and secondary groups; Main's status society and contract society; Mclver's communal and associational relations; Spencer's militant and industrial forms; Sorokin's familistic versus contractual relations; Redfield's folk-urban continuum; Becker's sacred and secu lar societies; and in current political science literature, George Modelski's agraria and industria; Fred Rigg's pris matic and fused political systems, are examples of this rich tradition. The polar types exemplify the view that it is necessary to distinguish fundamentally different types of societies as social organization in order to establish a range within which transitional or intermediate forms can be conceptualized and comprehended. The polar extremes are obviously ideal types, although some of the aforementioned theorists are inclined to treat their types n as ontological entities rather than as conceptual devices. One of the important conceptual advances resulting from ^For an excellent treatment of typological tradition and its methodological problems see John C. McKinney, "Constructive Typology and Social Research" in John T. Doby, et al., (eds)., An Introduction to Social Research (Harrisburg: Stackpole Co., 1954), pp. 159-198; John C. McKinney, op. cit. pp. 236-269. 69 polar type formulations is the point that in recent years continuum has become a vital notion in the comparative analysis of social phenomena. The polar types establish the outer limits as standards by means of which the process of change or intermediate structural forms can be compre hended and explained from the perspective of the con- g tinuum. It is in this sense that the antithetical polar type conceptualizations play an important role in analyses of social change and political development. A brief exami nation of the significance of some of the type-constructs would therefore seem to be pertinent to our understanding of the phenomena of political development and change. The early social scientists assumed that mankind had undergone a regular and ordered development. The major problem confronting them was to discover what this develop ment was and what sequence of changes characterized it. The eager enthusiasm of the early social scientists in constructing their pictures of social origins and develop ment, their largely ethnographic and historical data, their comparative method, all inevitably launched them upon programs of typological construction. They sought to establish the existence of certain types of society, types of social structure, and types of development or change. Many of the early social scientists like Comte, Marx, O John C. McKinney and C. P. Loomis, op. cit., p. 558. 70 Spencer, Maine, Toennies, Durkheim, and Weber, visualized an ordered, if not linear, development of society; and their early efforts went into the construction of the types of society, institution and civilization sequence. The recent rapid growth of interest in systems analysis, in macro-politics, in cross-cultural and compara tive study of political systems and institutions and socio- economic-political development places a renewed emphasis on construction and systematic classification of types. An elaborate and rigorous typology of political systems, or types of sub-systems or structures would greatly facili tate comparative research and lessen the chances of adopt ing too simplistic a view of political development, social mobilization and its conditions. In view of the contem porary "explosion" of research in political science, new methodological experiments and greatly expanding and extended views of the range and type of research problems, one can predict with a certain degree of confidence that a great increase in typologizing will take place. For a primary purpose of typologizing is to identify, simplify, and order data so that they can be described in terms which make them comparable. Since typification can function at any level of abstraction and it can be utilized with respect to problems varying from a micro to a macro level and scope. In short, typologies must be understood as repre 71 sentative of a pragmatic research methodology and as being subordinate to the aim of research which is the establish ment of uniformities of explanatory value. In our ensuing chapters we shall have occasion to demonstrate the current applicability of some of the typologies, and thereby to illustrate the continuing use fulness of this approach in current analyses of political development and social change. Toennies: From Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft The last quarter of the Nineteenth Century was marked by the blossoming of the theory of social evolution and along with it a new analytical approach to sociology emerged. Toennies, Tarde, Durkheim, and Simmel made out standing contributions to this trend. The work of Toennies is regarded as second only to that of Weber in the scope 9 and depth of its influence on contemporary sociology. Toennies, like Spencer, views society as growing more and more complex, in a linear process. He traces the general development of society from what he calls Gemeinschaft (community) to Gesellschaft (society) as one in which traditional, primitive, closely knit communities are torn and uprooted, to be supplanted by a large, 9Amitai Etzioni and Eva Etzioni (eds.), Social Change (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1964), p. 5. 72 urbanized, industrial society in which human relationships are impersonal and instrumental. He visualizes this as an irreversible trend. Toennies conceives of all social relations as products of the human will. There are two types of will. The first is essential or natural will, which is characterized by a basic, instinctive organic tendency which derives human activity as from behind. The second is arbitrary or rational will, which is characterized by a deliberative, purposive form of volition which determines human activity with regard to the future. These two modes of will explain the existence of two basic types of social groups. A social group may be willed into being because sympathy among the members makes them feel that this relationship is a value in itself. This type of group Toennies called Gemeinschaft. On the other hand, a social group may arise as an instrument to attain some definite end; this kind of group, the expression of rational will Toennies called Gesellschaft. These two concepts refer not only to types of human groupings, but also to genetic stages of growth-- Gesellschaft emerging through the detachment of persons and services from the framework of Gemeinschaft. According to Toennies, a Gemeinschaft entity would be characterized by the possession of the following attributes: unity, a division of labor based upon mutual 73 aid and helpfulness; an equilibrium of individual wills in mutual interdependence; authority based upon age, wisdom, and benevolent force; common habitat; common action directed toward common given goals; kinship; friendship; reciprocal and binding sentiment; common language, custom, and belief; diffuse obligations; mutual possession and enjoyment; sacred tradition; and the spirit of brotherhood. In short, Gemeinschaft is a relationship of concord based upon bonds of: (a) blood (kinship); (b) place (neighbor hood); or (c) mind (friendship).10 Toennies, in his major work, studied the following instances of Gemeinschaft: family, neighborhood, and friendship groups. On the other hand, a Gesellschaft may be distin guished in terms of the following characteristics: separa tion rather than unification; individualism; action in terms of self-interest; positive definitions and regula tions; delimited spheres of contact; money and credit rela tionships, dominated by merchants, capitalists, and a power elite; obligations limited and the feelings and strivings of others disregarded on the level of sentiment; and lack of mutual familiar relations. In sum, the GeBellschaft- like entity based upon rational will consists in contrac tual and functionally specific relationships deliberately established for the attainment of planned objectives and 10John C. McKinney and C. P. Loomis, op. cit., p. 559. 74 goals.11 The Gesellschaft Is organized and articulated through (a) convention; (b) legislation; and/or (c) public opinion and exists in city, national, and cosmopolitan t ^ 12 life. Toennies utilized the concepts of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft first of all as "ideal types" in the analysis of social structure. In addition, however, he utilized 13 them also to refer to genetic stages of growth. Gesellschaft emerges through the detachment of persons and services come to be brought under a money economy on the free market. Toennies utilized these concepts for the analysis of data of history and found the main evolutionary path of history to be a transition from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft. Toennies1 psychologically relevant and psychologically based dichotomous concepts certainly helped in setting a tradition of thinking which may articu late the relationship between the personality system and 14 the social system. The influence of Toennies* conceptual forms is seen in the subsequent similar dichotomies developed by Durkheim and Henry Maine, and carried further by Weber and Parsons. 11Ibid. 12Ibid. 11Timasheff, op. cit., p. 98, 1^John C. McKinney and C. P. Loomis, "The Typological Tradition," in Joseph Roucek (ed.) Contemporary Sociology (New York: Philosophical Library, 1958). 75 Durkheim; From Mechanical Solidary Society To Organic Solidary Society Emile Durkheim, in his celebrated study, The Division of Labor in Society, polarized society into two types. The first is the mechanical solidary society, wherein beliefs and conduct are alike. People in such a society are homo geneous mentally and morally, hence communities are uni form, integrated, and non-atomized. Durkheim believed that in this type of society a constellation of beliefs and sentiments common to all men exists, which he character ized by the attribute of exteriority and constraint. Exteriority refers to the fact that the conscience as totality is never a product of the members of society at any one particular point in time. Constraint refers to the crucial point that individual membership of a mechani cal solidary society cannot morally refute its collective conscience. Offense against and violation of the collec tive conscience is moral offense and is punishable by repressive law. The second polar type in Durkheim*s formulation is the organic solidary society. Durkheim, along with many of his contemporaries, appears to believe in social evolutionism. Evolutionism appears, for example, in his theory of social growth from mechanical solidary to 76 organic solidary society. The organically solidary society is characterized by the integration and inter dependence of its parts. The division of labor in society is a result of the struggle for existence and the speciali zation of labor stimulated individualism and differentia tion. People in such a society are heterogeneous, their mental and moral similarities have disappeared. The primary consequence of the division of labor, diversity, specialization and resultant heterogeneity lead to the weakening of the "conscience collective." Spontaneous relations between individuals are replaced by contractual associations. Crime is no longer an offense against common moral sentiments and becomes an offense against personal rights. In his study Suicide, Durkheim brought about a change in his conception of the "conscience col lective." The evolutionary change from mechanical solidary to organic solidary does not result in an automatic loss of "conscience collective," but in an alteration in its forms.15 The idea of evolutionism did not dominate or obfus cate Durkheim*s thought.*® However, it appears not only in his theory of growth from mechanical to organic solidarity, and in his assumption of the necessary stages 15 McKinney and Loomis, op. cit., pp. 560-561. *6Timasheff, op. cit., p. 117. 77 in social organization, but also in his view that contem porary primitive socieites represent earlier periods in 17 evolutionary development. Durkheim's chief interest was in empirical research and theory construction. He suggested that sociology sorely needed a social morphology and the primary task of this branch would be to develop a systematic classifica- 18 tion of social types and relate them to social structure. He gave theoretical support to the typological approach by his emphatic and eloquent advocacy of the comparative method and by his conceptualization of individual and social phenomena as reproductions of a corresponding "social model. Weber: From Traditionalism to Modernity The concept of ideal-type is not new in sociological theory. It goes back to the nineteenth century when the science of sociology arose with the attempt to combine an organismic concept of society with the attempt to combine an organismic concept of society with a positivism of procedure. Early sociological theory was evolutionary; its materials were historical; its method was comparative. l?ibid^ 18 John c. McKinney, "Sociological Theory and the Process of Typification,H op. cit., pp. 255-256. 19Ibid. 78 Early social scientists wanted to establish the existence of certain types of society, types of social structure of smaller scope than society and types of development and change, which they assumed mankind had undergone. Since the experimental method was difficult and statistical methods were not yet developed, the comparative method 20 was refined by the use of the comparison of types. The social scientists who have made basic use of the concept of "social action" for the analysis of social life have been the most apt to use ideal-types; however, ideal- types are not the exclusive property of any single school of sociological theory. The contemporary formulations of ideal-types are usually associated with the name of Max Weber, who, more than any other sociologist, approaches 21 sociology by way of the ideal-type methodology. The work of Weber is unsurpassed in the scope and 22 depth of its influence on contemporary social science. The encyclopedic range of Weber's work is not the subject of our review. Only those aspects of Weber's work will be touched upon that have contributed to contemporary 20 Don Martindale, Community, Character, and Civlli- zation (Mew York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 33-3?. 21Ibid. 22 Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (Glencoe, 111.s The Free Press, 1949), pi 500. 79 studies of political development and change. More speci- fically we shall examine Weber's model of ideal-types and his theory of social and political change under a charismatic leader. Weber defined sociology as a "science which attempts the interpretative understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course 23 and effects." Science, as Weber conceives it, has uni versal truth for its objective, but historical and socio logical science begins with a procedure that depends upon the personality and situation of the observer, his frame of reference, the method of organization of his material as a result of values previously established. Weber believed that the objective of universal truth cannot be discovered unless the subjectively conditioned frame of reference is followed by procedures of universal validity. Those procedures begin with an attempt to demonstrate propositions of fact or of causal relations. The causal relations are of two types: historical causality, that is, analysis of the influence exerted by various antecedants of a particular and unique event, and sociological causality, that is regular connection between one term and another. There is an intimate relationship between ^Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, translated by A. M. Henderson and T. Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 88 80 analysis of events and establishment of general proposi tions. History and sociology mark two avenues of approach; historical comprehension requires the use of general propositions and these can be demonstrated only by begin ning with historical analyses and comparisons. In Weber's thought there is a close association between historical and sociological causality, which are both expressed in terms of probability. This interdepen dence of history and sociology appears most clearly in Weber's conception of the "ideal-type," which is in a 24 certain sense a synthesis of his epistemological doctrine. Max Weber's brand of sociology, that is, sociology con ceived as a generalized conception of socio-cultural reality, emerges as one of the answers, perhaps the answer, to problems which agitated many of the best minds for a considerable period of time. His basic concepts of "understanding on the level of meaning" and of the "ideal- type" are the product of a century-long discussion about 25 the nature of history as a branch of knowledge. Weber thought that human motives, far from "explain ing" the emergence and the operation of social institu- 24 Raymond Aron, Man's Currents in Sociological Thought, Vol. II (New York: Paosin Books, 1967), p . 201. 25 Werner J. Cahnman, "Max Weber and The Methodologi cal Sciences," in Werner J. Cahnman and Alvin Boskoff (eds.), Sociology and History (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 103. 81 tions, could be made comprehensible only on the basis of institutional analysis. It was for this purpose that the 2 6 tool of the "ideal-type" was forged. Weber sought to refute the historicist school by emphasizing that studies of culture and history cannot avoid the use of typological concepts; that the most important task is, therefore, to 27 attempt to make these concepts explicit. At the start of his academic career, the scholarly community in Germany was engaged in a methodological controversy in which the issue at stake was the reconciliation of the idealistically based, but at the same time, meticulously accurate, his toriography of the 19th century with the accepted scien tific code which required conformity with the laws of causality. Weber, carrying the argument against Manger, maintained that the propositions of abstract economic theory are a special case of a kind of concept construction which is peculiar to the cultural sciences. Weber argued that the formulation of theoretical proposi tions in economics as exact laws' is possible but that such propositions are relevant in a socio-cultural context. In this case economic theory does not express a "law", but presents a "model;" it offers "an ideal image of events in 26Ibid., p. 115. 27 B. Bendix, “Max Weber," The International Encyclo pedia of the Social Sciences, op. ci£., pp. 493-500. 82 the commodity market under conditions of a society organized on the principles of an exchange economy, free competition and rigorously rational conduct." We are dealing here with an accentuation, an enhancement of actually existing elements of reality— in this case of ■rational action"— to the point of their fullest poten- 28 tiality, amounting to the image of a "utopia." This definition of economic theory defines the ideal- type. The ideal-type then is not a description of con crete reality. Rather it is an ideal limiting concept with which the real situation or action is compared, so that it may be properly appraised in line with the cate gories of "objective possibility" and "adequate causation." In Economics and Society, where Weber presents a condensed discussion of methodological issues, it is said that ideal-typical constructions delineate "what course human action of a certain kind would take, if it were strictly purposive— rationally oriented, undisturbed by error or emotions, and if, furthermore, it were unambiguously oriented toward one single, especially an economic, 29 purpose." 28 Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, op. cit., pp. 89-91. 29 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, op. cit., p. 5tT. 83 Heber uses ideal-types to designate three kinds of 30 concepts. 1. Ideal-types of historical particulars, such as the capitalism of Western European society. Here capitalism represents an intelligible reconstruction of a global and particular historical reality; capitalism is global in terms of being a whole economic regime; but particularly since capitalism has been fully realized only in Western societies (according to Weber). The ideal-type of a historical particular remains a particular reconstruction, since the sociologist selects a certain number of traits from the historical whole to constitute an intelligible entity. 2. A second kind is that of ideal-types which desig nate abstract elements of the historical reality, elements which are found in a large number of cases. If capitalism is an example of the first species, bureaucracy is an example of the second. In the first case we are dealing with an actual historical entity, unlike any other, whereas in the second case we are referring to an institution, which does not cover a whole regime, and of which one finds many examples at differing moments in history. These ideal-types of elements characteristic of society occur on various levels of abstraction, for example, 30Ibid., p. 201. 84 bureaucracy, the three types of authority, or at the high est level of abstraction is the level of the types of action: rational action, traditional action, and effective action. 3. The third species of ideal-types are those that constitute rationalizing reconstructions of a particular kind of behavior. For example, according to Weber, all propositions in economic theory are merely ideal-typical reconstructions of the ways men would behave if they were pure economic subjects. Economic theory conceives economic behavior as consistent with its essence, this essence being defined in a precise manner. The study of social action, society, culture, or history, Weber believed, calls for the method of the ideal-type. Weber, it should be made clear, did not claim invention of the ideal-type, rather he sought to make explicit a procedure commonly used in scientific study. In all his encyclopedic studies, Weber used the ideal-type as the central conceptual tool. Weber defines the ideal-type thus: An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accen tuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct.31 ------- jt----------------------- E. A. Shils and H. A. Finch, Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences (Glencoe, 1ll.: The Free Press, 1949), p. TTTI 85 The ideal-type is a neutral construct. It is formed by exaggeration or accentuation of one or more traits or points of view observable in reality. The type thus con structed may be called ideal because it exists as an idea. The ideal-type represents the logical conclusion of 3 2 several tendencies of Weberian thought. It is related to Weber's notion of comprehension, in that every ideal- type is an organization of intelligible relations within a historical entity or sequence of events. It is related to the attempt characteristic of all scientific disciplines, to render subject matter intelligible by revealing its internal rationality. It is related to Weber's partial conception of causality in that it helps to understand historical elements or entities, as partial comprehension of a total whole. Weber rejected the old view of science as capable of penetrating to the essence of things in order to unify them in a complete system which would be a total reflection of reality.^ Weber believed that no system was capable of reproducing all reality, because reality is infinite. Nor can any concept wholly reproduce the utter diversity of particular phenomena. In other words, there is no knowledge which is not hypothetical. 32 Raymond Aron, op. cit., p. 201, 33 Julien Freund, The Sociology of Max Weber,(trans lated from the French by Mary IIfora, (New York:Pantheon Books, 1968), pp. 60-61. 86 The ideal-type, as Weber conceptualized it, was but another instance of the selection which social scientists must always make, since they necessarily approach reality from certain points of view which are determined by their value orientation. Value orientation merely provides a sense of direction to the work and helps to eliminate inessentials. It does not, however, in itself ensure the necessary precision of concepts. That is the function of the ideal-type. The ideal type offers a means of concept construction appropriate to the historical or individualiz ing method, which sets itself the goal of studying reality and single phenomena in all their unique individuality. Weber raised the question: is it possible to formu late individualized concepts, since it is commonly thought that all concepts are general by their very nature? Capitalism is a particular manifestation of economic life, as Protestantism is of religion. To try to explain capitalism or Protestantism by subsuming them under the general concepts of economics or religion would be insuf ficient, as it would leave out those aspects which give them originality. Satisfactory results are not obtained even if we attempt to define unique segments of reality by the addition of features common to all the forms of capitalism or Protestantism or by establishing an average of the features peculiar to the various forme of those two phenomena. 87 Weber's solution to this dilemma lies in a special concept of ideal-type. An analogy perhaps would clarify our point. Avarice is a general concept, but the miser portrayed by Shakespeare in The Merchant of Venice is a type. Shylock is not an average miser. Through a process of exaggeration and accentuation, Shakespeare has endowed him with a characteristic individuality. He is, as it were, an ideal miser. Shylock does not represent the traits common to all misers; rather, he is the embodiment a i of all that is typical in that particular predilection. Weber's definition of the ideal type in which he speaks of the one-sided accentuation of traits of individual phenomena, arranged in a unified analytical construct, should also be understood in this sense. Weber emphasized that in its conceptual purity, the 35 ideal-type is never encountered anywhere in reality. The ideal-type of capitalism as an analytical construct, for example, unites those characteristics which give it its originality as an economic doctrine, although they may be found only as diffuse phenomena in reality and although any one of them may be absent in a concrete economic organization. The ideal-type of capitalism also comprises 34 Julien Freund, op. cit., pp. 62-63. •^^Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, op. cit., p. 89. 88 its various trends and its final goals, even if they are nowhere fully attained. The one-sided accentuation or stylization of traits is also important, since it is a precondition of the enlargement of characteristic traits and of the formulation of a coherent and non-contradictory analytical construct. The practical applications of doc trines of capitalism in historical situations are usually ambiguous, being the result of compromise. The ideal- type of capitalism, on the other hand, offers a rational model of the doctrine; i.e., its logical organization as distinct from the fluctuations of reality. The ideal-type is thus an ideal and consistent representation of a par ticular historical entity, obtained through the utopian rationalization and one-sided accentuation of characteris tics and original traits, for the purpose of giving a coherent and unambiguously clear meaning to elements in our day-to-day experience which would otherwise seem incoherent and chaotic. In Weber's opinion, some of the abstract theories of his day were mere ideal-types. Classical economic theory in Weber's opinion, actually provided an illustration of the kind of synthetic constructs that have been conceived as "ideas of historical phenomena." Classical economic theory presented not an abstract theory, but an idealized picture of events in the commodity market under conditions 89 of exchange operating in terms of free competition and rigorously rational do not. Relations and events of historical life were selected and formed into an internally consistent system. Classical economics presented an idealization of certain elements of historical reality. Its theory was really a utopian-like construct, an ideal- type .3 ® Heber took special care to distinguish the ideal-type in his sense from other notions with which it could possibly be confused. To begin with, the ideal-type was not a hypothesis, although it could be useful in formulating hypotheses. The true role of the ideal-type is to be an intelligibility factor on the two levels of research and scholarly exposition. The construction of ideal-types enables us to render judgments involving causal imputation, not because the ideal types themselves are meant to serve as hypotheses, but because they permit us to construct hypotheses, drawing on an imagination fortified by experi ence and disciplined by methodology. By developing a rationally devised utopian concept, we learn what is unique about a course of events, a situation, or a doctrine, by showing in each particular instance to what extent reality departs from the unified and utopian analytical construct. The ideal-type thus serves as a kind of yardstick. 36Ibid., p. 89. 90 The ideal-type is not a description of reality, though it aims, in part, at developing unambiguous descrip tions. The ideal-type is not to be identified with reality in the sense of expressing reality's true essence. On the contrary, precisely because it is unreal and takes up a step away from reality, it enables us to obtain a better intellectual and scientific grasp of reality, although necessarily a fragmented one. The relationships of an ideal-type to empirical data consists solely in the fact that, where relationships of a particular type referred to by the abstract construct are discovered or suspected to exist in reality to some extent, we can make the charac teristic features of this relationship pragmatically clear 37 and understandable by reference to an ideal-type. The ideal-type is not to be confused with ethical imperatives. "The idea of an ethical imperative, of a 'model* of what 'ought' to exist, is to be carefully distinguished from the analytical construct, which is 'ideal* in the strictly logical sense of the term."38 It seeks perfection of a logical, not a moral, order, and it excludes all value judgments. A scientist who is interested, for example, in constructing an ideal-type of 3^Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, op. cit., p. 90. 38Ibld. , pp. 91-92. 91 Christianity with a view to studying its cultural signifi cances must not relate Christianity to his own subjective point of view of what it ought to be. Nor is the ideal- type a stereotype, statistical average, or abstract organic concept, law, or moral judgment. Rather, it is "an ideal limiting concept with which the real situation or action is compared" so that it may be properly appraised in line with the categories of objective reality and adequate causation. Weber urges that the basic purposes of the ideal- type is "to analyze historically unique configurations or 39 their individual components in terms of genetic concepts." Weber exemplifies his point with the concept of the "church" and "sect." Supposing we are interested in some historical phenomena such as Christianity in the Middle Ages, Weber insists that we must be prepared to admit that there exists in fact an enormous and infinitely varied mass of details with most baffling variety of forms and nuances of clarity and significance. A systematic study, Weber maintains, would proceed by asking what are the Christian elements of the Middle Ages. A combination of articles of faith, church law, norms, customs, maxims of conduct, are fused into an "idea." The ideal-types of the church and sect represent two idealized types of 39Ibid., p. 93. 92 arrangement of the critical elements of religious institu tions which may help the student in the analysis of Chris tianity in the Middle Ages. Weber is conscious of the fact that formulations of the "essence of Christianity" are ideal-types of only relative and controversial validity. He insists, however, that such ideal-types are of great value for research and systematic exposition. "They are used as conceptual instruments for comparison with and the measurement of reality."4® Weber did not regard ideal-types as natural forms, immanent essences, or as goals of cognition as in them selves containing reality or constituting a complete scien tific system. They are only instruments, heuristic means of establishing clearly the meaning of the subject under discussion.4^ In a more specific sense, Weber thought of them as purely experimental procedures which the scientist develops deliberately and arbitrarily, in response to the needs of his research and which he gives up without any reluctance if they do not come up to his expectations. The value of ideal-types is determined by their usefulness in research. If they are not serviceable, the scientist is free to construct other more useful ideal-types. In themselves the ideal-types are neither true nor false, but 40Ibld. , p. 97. 41 Julien Freund, op. cit., p. 66. 93 4 2 simply, like any other technique or tool useful or useless. Weber defended the construction of new ideal-types for the progress of science. As civilization evolves and changes, and as reality is in a constant state of flux, a definitive synthesis of reality is out of the question. The scientist must therefore never forget the limitations of the concepts with which he works. Since the scientist cannot really understand more than a very limited and everchanging part of the huge kaleidoscopic flow of events in time, it is this realization that defines the role and methodological 43 significance of ideal-types. In short, Weber seems to believe that ideal-types were procedures by which histori cal materials were made useful for the general purposes of science. As applied to historical materials, Weber char acterized ideal-types as devices for description, as implements for comparison and measurement and, under special circumstances, as procedures for developing and testing hypotheses. Since ideal-types are so central to the methodologi cal approach of Weberian thought, the component elements of the ideal-type and the criteria for constructing them are particularly important, and Weber went to some length 43Ibid. 94 to delineate them. The ideal-type contains both conceptual and observational materials, both being required for the type. However, such conceptual and historical materials are not put together arbitrarily. The relationships expressed in an ideal-type are such as "our imagination accepts as plausibly motivated and therefore objectively possible and which appear as adequate from the nomological standpoint. "Objective possibility" and "adequate causation" are the criteria for forming conceptual and observational materials into a type. The ideal-type is thus the cornerstone of the theory of objective possibility and adequate causation. In forming the ideal-type as a conceptual tool, items and relations actually found in historical and social life supply the materials. However, the student has in some sense extended his conceptions beyond the social reality presented to him. He has abstracted, sharpened, and extended relations actually perceived. The principle of objective possibility as a criterion of such conceptualization requires that the con ceptual form so produced represents an empirically pos sible state of affairs or imagined world. The criterion of objective possibility applied to this imagined world requires that it be an empirically feasible world— that 44 Weber, Methodology of the Social Sciences, op. cit., p. 92 . 95 is— a logically possible world. In other words, Weber's application of the criterion of objective possibility to ideal-type construction attempts to draw the line between science and metaphysics.45 The second criterion for the selection of components for the ideal-type is that they be such as "appear ade quate from the nomological standpoint." That is, the items should be "adequate" in terms of the causal laws of science. Here Weber in spite of the ambiguities of his presentation, seems to be concerned with the question: how a historian can provide adequate causation for a particular event when most historical situations are the result of a conjoint operation of a complex number of factors? Weber seems to mean that a historian should be guided by the laws of science as established at the moment for his assignment of significance to some factors rather than to others.4® Weber thus opposes the naturalistic and purely determinis tic conception of history, while maintaining the validity of causal explanation.4^ In a word, history itself is not rational, but the historian is able to rationalize it in some measure. In fact, to the extent that the historian succeeds in formulating probabilistic objective judgments -------- rs-------------------------- Don Kartindale, op. cit., p. 47. 46Ibid., pp. 47-48. 4^Julien Freund, op. cit., p. 76. 96 in the form of an adequate relationship between cause and effect he makes a scientific knowledge of history possible, despite the irregularities due to chance or accident. In Weber's view, no logical obstacle prevents the existence of 4 8 a science which is concerned with the unique. Weber was fully conscious of the shortcomings of his ideal-type methodology. One of the recurrent criticisms leveled against his ideal-type is that he presented it only in a broad outline, without pursuing all its methodo logical implications. Critics argue that Weber's ideal- type method leads to a scattering of approaches and analyses at the expense of systematization. It was also unfortunate that Weber's discussion of the ideal-type is not unambiguously clear, since its fullest statement occurs in the course of his critique of Eduard Meyer's historical methodology rather than in connection with his positive statement about ideal-types. Some students have rejected the ideal-types altogether, on grounds that they are inadequate theories or incomplete models. One difficulty with the Weberian theory of ideal-type arises from the fact that Weber uses it, not only to designate, as it were, a tendency within all concepts in the sciences of culture, 49 but also to designate certain precise species of concepts. 48Ibid. 49 Aron' OP- cit., p. 202. 97 Critics have also pointed out the possible pitfalls that Eft accompany the use of ideal-type theory. One such fre quent shortcoming is the fact that the student might con fuse the .deal-type with actual reality. Weber was sharply critical of reification of concepts. Yet many scholars who use the ideal-type device succumb to this temptation. A second difficulty arises because one will regard the construct as a procrustean bed into which to force the data. Furthermore, one might hypostasize the ideas so that they assume the character of real forces. If these dangers are averted, the ideal-type can become an extremely useful device with which to confront reality. In spite of some legitimate criticisms, the intellec tually responsible character of Weber's formulation of ideal-type is evident. The monumental scholarly studies of Weber in which he utilized the ideal-type construct bear testimony to its usefulness as an ingenious methodological device.^ Weber's theory may be regarded as the most lucid and coherent of the many endeavors made to give greater precision to the concept used in the social sciences. The ideal-type method has the great advantage of preserving, by means of precise concepts, the unity and originality of 50 Irving M. Zeitlin, Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 19$8), p . T26 . 51Timasheff, op. cit., p. 182. 98 a historical phenomenon whenever we seek to study it in its singularity. The use of ideal-types in the study of political development can be of great importance. An ideal-type need not be confined to accentuating aspects of reality in a frozen state. Developmental sequences may also be posited and built into ideal-type constructs. If, for instance, one talks of stages of political development and keeps firmly in mind that these are relatively arbitrary intellectual constructs, then the idea of stages and developmental sequences can have great heuristic value. Ideal-types can also be formulated as hypotheses that could help in build ing middle range theory in the field of political develop ment . Ideal-types of Authority Perhaps the most famous illustrations of Weber's ideal-type theory is his depiction of three types of legitimate authority, each resting on a distinct mode of claiming legitimacy.52 Weber himself considered that political sociology was one of his major contributions. In our current literature dealing with political develop ment and modernization, the almost ubiquitous use of the S2Ibid., p. 179. 99 concepts of modern, traditional, and transitional society, bears testimony to Weber's profound conceptual impact. Weber believed that the exercise of authority is a universal phenomenon. The distinctive feature of authority is a belief system that defines the exercise of authority as legitimate. Weber distinguishes three types of authority on the basis of differences in the legitimating belief systems that validate them: traditional, charismatic, and legal. These types indicate the relationships between a Supreme Ruler (e.g., a prophet, a king, or a parliament), an administrative body, and the masses of the ruled (e.g., followers, disciples, or citizens). Traditional authority is based on the belief in the legitimacy of an authority that has always existed. In other words, authority is legitimated by the sanction of tradition. In traditional authority, the present order is regarded as sacred, inviolate and eternal. The persons exercising authority generally are masters who enjoy per sonal authority, usually by virtue of their inherited status. The dominant person or group is thought to have been preordained to rule over the rest. Their commands are legitimate by virtue of the fact that they are in accord with custom, but they also possess traditionally the prerogative of free personal decision, so that not only conformity with custom, but personal arbitrariness xoo also is a characteristic of traditional authority. The persons subject to the commands of the masters are fol lowers or subjects who are bound to the rulers by personal dependence and a tradition of loyalty--a pious regard for his time-honored status. Such personal obedience and loyalty to traditional authority is reinforced by such cultural beliefs as the divine right of kings. The organization appropriate to traditional system consists either of patrimonialism or feudalism. In patrimonialism government is considered as the ruler's private domain. Government offices originate in the household administration of the ruler. Government admin istrators are personal servants and representatives of the ruler; usually they are members of his household— relatives and favorites— on whose obedience the ruler can rely. The administrators are subject to the customary or arbitrary commands of their ruler so that their sphere of activity and power is a mirror image of the master at a lower level. By contrast, in a feudal society, officials are not per sonal dependents, but socially prominent allies— vassals, tributory lords— who have given an oath of fealty, and who have independent jurisdiction by virtue of grant or con tract. Generally traditional authority is oriented toward perpetuation of the status quo, and is ill-suited for adaptation to social change. It resists change as the 101 latter is likely to undermine its very foundations. In general the traditional ruler is guided by the customary laws of equality and moral justice or by personal expedi ency, not by fixed and formal prejudices. Too much arbitrariness on the part of the ruler can undermine the authority of the sacred tradition that justifies the domination of the traditional ruler; it may provoke a resistance aimed not indeed at the system, but at his person or at his favorites. History provides many and varied examples of this type of authority. Indeed, all systems of government prior to the development of the modern state would seem to exemplify traditional authority. What is lacking in such a system of authority and admin istration is a clearly defined sphere of competence subject to impersonal rules, technical training, a rational admin istrative hierarchy, including a regular system of promo tion and often financial remuneration. In many countries of the developing world we still see examples of traditional authority. Raymond Aron, however, has argued that it is hard to find an illustra tion of traditional domination in present societies, precisely because domination is no longer based on tradi tion . Even in those societies which have preserved king doms and chiefdoma, traditional authority persists symboli cally, but not actually.53 53 Aron, op. cit., pp. 236-37. 102 Charismatic authority is legitimated by a widespread belief on the part of the ruled that that ruler and his mission or order are inspired by divine, supernatural, or transcendent powers. Weber defines charisma (a term he borrowed from Rudolf Sohm) as the exceptional quality of a person who appears to possess supernatural, superhuman, or at the least, unaccustomed powers, so that he emerges as a providential, exemplary, or extraordinary person, and for this reason is able to gather disciples or followers 54 around him. The charismatic leader is a man who demands obedience on the basis of the mission he feels called upon to perform. His claim to legitimacy is valid if those whom he seeks to lead recognize his mission. And he remains their master and undisputed leader as long as he proves himself and his mission in their eyes. He derives his authority solely from the demonstration of his power and from his disciples' faith in that power, whatever that power is conceived to be. Charismatic authority is the exceptional type of political power, not because it rarely occurs, but because it sets aside the routines and usages of normal political 55 life. Weber saw legal and traditional domination as permanent structures that provide for the everyday needs 54 Julien Freund, op. cit., p. 232. 55Ibid. 103 and expectations of the community. Such permanent struc tures are not well adapted to times of trouble and crisis when the needs of the community are extraordinary. Hence in times of crisis the natural leader is neither the official nor the master, but the man who is believed to possess extraordinary or super gifts of body and mind. People surrender themselves to such a leader and turn away from established rules and submit to the unprecedented order that the leader proclaims when faced with extra ordinary times of trouble or crisis. Charismatic leader ship, however, can and does occur under non-crisis situa tions under permanent systems of domination. Charismatic behavior is not peculiar to political life alone, for it may be found in other areas of social life, such as religion, art, morals, and even economic life. In the realm of politics, charismatic authority may assume a variety of forms— that of the demagogue, the dictator, the military hero, or the revolutionary leader. The leader heads a new social movement and his followers and disciples are converts to a new cause. There is a sense of "mission," of being called to spread the new gospel, a sense of rejecting the past and heralding the future. Charismatic authority usually acts as a revolutionary force inasmuch as it involves rejection of traditional values and a rebellion against the established order. 104 There is also an anarchistic element in charismatic move ments, as they show a contemptuous disdain for routine tasks and problems of organization, and administration, since the leader's sacred and divinely inspired mission must not be secularized by mundane considerations. The foundation of charismatic authority is emotional rather than rational, since the whole impetus of that activity rests mostly on blind and fanatical trust and uncritical and unrestrained faith. Charisma implies a break with continuity whether legal or traditional. It challenges the established order, undermines customary and time-honored institutions and appeals to a new concept of human relationships. It may be both destructive and constructive. Charismatic authority is opposed to both legal and traditional authority which are limited by respect for law or custom. It recognizes neither institu tions nor rules, nor customs nor precedents. It is a law unto itself and the word of the leader is sufficient reason for obedience. The apparatus of charismatic authority dispenses with servants or officials in its scheme of things. It has only apostles, disciples, and followers. The important element in such charismatic situations is not stability but movement and even upheaval. All revolutions are not charismatic, nor are all charis matic authorities revolutionary. Nevertheless, most 10S modern revolutions beginning with Cromwell's, generally had that character. What we now call personality cult comes under the heading of charismatic phenomena. The desire for change which animates charisma may be condi tioned by economic or political factors, or by a transfor mation of attitudes in the religious or intellectual sphere. Historically speaking, reason has been a revolu tionary force which produced charismatic regimes at a time when some countries were passing from the stage of patrimonialism and feudalism to legal authority. The great problem of charismatic authority is that of succession. Since charisma is associated with the person of the leader, how is the system to be perpetuated after the death of the leader? How are people to be brought back to a normal, stable, everyday existence? Because of routinization of charisma, it sooner or later returns to a traditional or legal legal form of government. Legal authority is legitimated by a belief in the supremacy of the law, whatever its specific content. In such a system the ruled render their obedience not to a person— whether traditional chief or charismatic leader— but to a body of impersonal rules that are deliberately established to further the rational pursuit of collective goals. These principles include the obligation to follow 106 directive originating from an office superior to one's own, irrespective of who is the incumbent of this higher office. The beat prototype of legal authority is the modern government which has a monopoly over the legitimate use of physical coercion and the same principles are reflected in its various executive agencies that are bureau cratically organized. In legal systems of authority, while superiors have authority over subordinates, everyone is subject to the authority of the official body of rational, impartial rules and regulations. Legal authority, in sum, is "a government of laws, not of men." In his treatment of political sociology, Weber takes traditional authority and charismatic authority as givens, and his attention is focused on their transformations and 5 6 re-emergences in the course of history. But in his treatment of legal authority he adopts a developmental per spective and explains its emergence and development from 57 the other two types. Whereas traditional authority endures and is largely static, and charismatic authority erupts from time to time, it is the legal authority that is the specific product of human deliberation, whose ^Peter Blau, "Critical Comments on Weber's Theory of Authority," American Political Science Review, LVII, 2 {June, 1963), p. 307. 57 Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber; An Intellectual Por trait (new York: Doubleday 6 Co., 1960), pp. 3fl4-¥7. 107 development in the history of Western Civilization Weber treats in great detail. Weber's analysis of feudal and patrimonial authority, from which absolute monarchy and representative institu tions more or less concurrently developed in Western Europe, is too detailed to review here, but the essence of this process resulted in the governments' monopolization of coercion and was accompanied by a development of legal rationality that ultimately culminated in the modern con- 5 8 cept of a legitimate legal order. His discussion of the development of legal rationality also focuses on sociology of law which is devoted to a study of the increasing ration ality of legal concepts and practices as they developed in the West. Weber's own bird's-eye view of the process of increasing rationality of law gives us a summary statement of the problem: From a theoretical point of view, the general development of law and procedure may be viewed as passing through the following stages: first, charismatic legal revelation through "law prophets;" second, empirical creation and finding of law by legal notables . . . ; third, imposition of law by secular or theocratic powers; fourth and finally, systematic elaboration of law and professionalized administration of justice by persons who have received their legal training in a learned and formally logical manner.” 5^Ibid., p. 387. 59 Max wtber, Max Weber on Lay in Economy and Society. (Cambridge: Harvard University £ress, 1454), p. 303. 108 Weber made it clear that his three systems of authority were simply ideal-types. The nature of authority in any given historical case would be a combination of any two or three of them.®® The ideal-types of authority do not correspond to any empirical case or to the average of all cases, but they are intentionally designed in this form, as Weber stresses.®*- They are not a substitute for empirical investigation of historical situations but frameworks for guiding research by indicating the factors to be examined and the ways in which the observed patterns differ from the ideal-type. One of the problems in Weber's treatment of authority is that his focus on legitimacy leads him to take the existence of legitimate authority for granted. He never systematically examines the struc tural conditions under which it emerges out of other forms 6 2 of power, e.g., conquest. Weber talks about how charis matic movements are ultimately transformed into legal- rational authority, but his theory does not include an analysis of the historical conditions and social processes that give rise to charismatic eruptions in the social 6 3 structure. He has no theory of revolution. 60Ibid., pp. 336-37. ®1Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Translated by A. M. Anderson and T. Parsons (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1947), p. 111. 6 2 Peter Blau, op. cit., p. 307. 63Ibid., p. 309. 109 Weber's Theory of Social Change In his methodology of the social sciences, Weber subjected the idea of progress to a sophisticated critique. Some serious students of Weber have suggested that his view of history alternates between the charisma of the his analysis of authority, Weber certainly sees the decline of charisma as a major historical tendency. In his own words: It is the fate of charisma, whenever it comes into the permanent institutions of a community, to give way to powers of tradition and of rational socialization. This waning of char isma generally indicates the diminishing impor tance of individual action. Weber's insistence that charismatic leadership gives way to routinization and that it represents an ever recurring phenomenon, may give rise to a plausible pendulum theory of history as suggested by Hills and others. Other scholars of Weber disagree with this simplistic theory of history imputed to Weber, as it does not do justice to the sophistication and subtlety of Weber's approach. Reinhard Bendix, a noted modern exponent of Weber's ideas, great man and the routinization of bureaucracy. 64 In 64 H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, eds., From Max Weber; (New York: Oxford University Press, 65 Ibid., p. 253 110 believes that Weber was not Interested in developmental theories but utilized this double perspective as a guide to empirical research. It is erroneous to assume, Bendix argues, that Weber conceived charisma and bureaucracy as mutually incompatible poles.®® The "decline of charisma" that Weber talks about, is less the statement of a histori- 67 cal trend than the explication of a term. For Weber, charisma and its routinization were omnipresent possibili ties in all phases of history and all types of authority 6 8 and had to be examined anew in each instance. In Weber's treatment of the sociology of law, he did not identify all positive and dynamic historical forces with charisma and all negative and retrogressive forces with routinization. More specifically, the decline of charisma and its routinization were associated with innovating activity that occurs under routinisation. Indeed, Weber regarded the development of legal rationality as a major factor in the emerging distinctiveness of Western civili zation. Weber's analysis does not always subscribe to a theory of dynamic breakthroughs in history due to charis- 6 9 matic great men. In his analysis of the emergence of ®®Bendix, op. cit., p. 328. 67Ibid. 68Ibid. 69Ibid., p. 329. Ill the modern state based on legal-rational authority Weber declined to take the historian*s approach of tracing his torical changes as concrete sequences of events and per sisted in sociological analyses in terms of the compara tive and typological procedure, in order to delineate the distinctive aspects of historical change that call for a 70 causal analysis. While the concrete developmental aspects of the emergence of the modern state were beyond the scope of his research, the institutional prerequisites of the modern state were adequately treated. It is not difficult to see Hegel's marked influence on Weber's philosophy of history and historical develop ment. Weber's analysis of history as a causal succession of unique events, his emphasis on ideas in relation to action, his typological procedure and finally his treat ment of charisma and tradition as contrast conceptions for the development of rationalism and legal domination 71 in Europe, all point to Hegel's philosophy of history. In line with the Hegelian approach, Weber insisted that nature consists of cyclical and repetitive events, whereas history is made up of non-repetitive acts. Not what people do, but what they think about their actions is the proper subject for analysis. Weber thought that not 7®Bendix, op. cit.. p. 380. 71Ibid., p. 384. 112 ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men's conduct. Hegel maintained that the analysis of hunan actions "from the inside" would require the formulation of logically related concepts; we may compare this to Weber's device of the ideal-type by which he attempted to formulate in logical purity the rationale that lies 72 behind mens' actions. Hegel envisaged the history of the Occident as a cumulative manifestation and unfolding of the idea of freedom. This view of Hegel finds a para llel in Weber's analysis of religious, legal, and organi- 73 zational rationality in Western Europe. Weber's metho dological procedure in terms of the ideal-type device led to an emphasis on the developmental character and freedom of Western civilization in contrast with the relatively static character and the coercion of Oriental 74 society. Weber saw genuine differences between the Occident and the Orient, and his monumental studies were designed to highlight these differences. Redfield: From Folk to Urban Society The folk-urban typology of Redfield has been the best known and most controversial formulation in cultural 72Ibid., p. 384. 73Ibid., pp. 384-385. 74Ibid. 113 anthropology during the last four decades. In spite of profuse criticism, it has inspired a great amount of 75 research. Redfield's scheme defines an ideal-type, the folk society. Redfield holds that this ideal-type is a mental construct and “no known society precisely corresponds 7 € to it. ..." It is “created only because through it we may hope to understand reality. Its function is to suggest aspects of real societies which deserve study, and especially to suggest hypotheses as to what, under certain 77 defined conditions may be generally true about society." Redfield has formulated an ideal-type version of folk society by linking together a set of attributes. He does not concern himself with the delineation of the urban type which is supposed to be composed of the opposite attributes, and hence becomes the polar antithesis. The folktype of society is characterized as follows: 75----------------------------------- See the following for significant criticisms of the folk-urban continuum: Neal Gross, “Cultural Variables in Rural Communities," American Journal of Sociology, LIII (March, 1948), 344-350; Oscar Lewis, Tepoztlan Revisited, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1951)7 Julian Steward, Area Research: Concepts and Methods (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1950); Gideon Sjoberg, “The Preindustrial City," American Journal of Sociology, LX (march, 1955), 438-445; Horace Miner, "fcfie Folk Urban Continuum,” in Amit&i Etzioni and Eva Etzioni, op. cit., pp. 147-158. 76Robert Redfield, "The Folk Society," The American Journal of Sociology, LII (1947), p. 294. 77Ibid., p. 295. 114 Such a society is small, isolated, nonliterate, and homogeneous, with a strong sense of group solidarity. The ways of living are convention alized into that coherent system which we call a "culture." Behavior is traditional, spontaneous, uncritical and personal; there is no legislation or habit of experiment and reflection for intel lectual ends. Kinship, its relationships and institutions, are the type categories of experi ence and the familial group is the unit of action. The sacred prevails over the secular; the economy is one of status rather than of the market. 8 Redfield derives the characteristics of folk society by discovering the common traits of those societies which are least like those of the urban West. Since Redfield never actually discusses the urban pole of the continuum, implicit is the idea that it stands for urbanized society in general and that modern Western society represents the specific case most closely. The folk-urban continuum developed, of course, from earlier conceptual schemes of Toennies, Maine, and 79 Durkheim. Redfield1s empirical study in Yucatan was done 80 to test a specific hypothesis. Redfield took the isola tion and homogeneity of the community as an independent variable. Organization or disorganization of culture, secularization, and individualization were taken as dependent variables. The implied hypothesis in Redfield*s 78Ibid. 79 Robert Redfield, "Rural Sociology and the Folk Society," Rural Sociology, VII (March, 1943), pp. 68-71. 80 Robert Redfield, The Folk Culture of Yucatan, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1^41). 115 study was that loss of isolation and heterogenity are causes of disorganization, secularization, and individual ization. Consideration of data from Yucatan led Redfield to the conclusion that, although there is no single neces sary cause of secularization and individualization, increase of contacts, brining about heterogeneity and disorganization of culture, constitute one sufficient 81 cause of secularization and individualization. Another important empirical study by Redfield— his Timbuctoo study— was an attempt to avoid the limitations of the Yucatan research and of relevant rural-urban studies which were made in situations of rural contact with cities of Western civilization. But inherent in the continuum, as a hypothesis provoking construct, is the idea that increased contact with any dissimilar society, not just with Western urban society, results in change in other variables of the ideal-type. It was this hypothesis that was tested in Timbuctoo in Africa. The theoretical impli cations of the Timbuctoo study were that lack of isola tion, marked population density, and heterogeneity seem to be accompanied by disorganization, secularization, and impersonalization, even in the absence of Western influ ences and contacts. 81Ibid., p. 369. 116 The ideal-type dichotomous conceptualizations, with the idea of continuum underlying them, are hypotheses- provoking devices as exemplified by Redfield. Probably the most valuable feature of the continuum is the fact that it provides a framework within which various theo retical fields may be integrated to provide greater under standing of the nature and course of cultural or political change. It is clear that such theoretical progress will involve the clarification, refinement, and addition of important variables in such change. It is also clear that the linear continuum will evolve into a more complex 82 and more insightful construct. Redfield*s folk society type is less generalized and abstract than any of the sets of concepts formulated by Durkheim, Toennies, and Maine. As a consequence, Redfield has succeeded in better operationalizing his concept as a device in cross-cultural research and facilitated the comparative study of 8 3 societies. Our main objective in this chapter was to critically analyze developmental models in the typological tradition of the social sciences, in order to be able to see their impact on our current theoretical approaches to the study of political development. 8 2 Horace Miner, **The Folk-Urban Continuum," op. cit., p. 147. 83 John McKinney and C. P. Loomis, op. cit., p. 563. 117 By providing comparisons of social phenomena at the level of total societies in developmental terms and by developing such concepts as the "stages of development," "continuum," and the "ideal-type," the typological tradi tions of the social sciences has exerted a powerful influence on our current efforts at theory-building. This tradition has provided the very theoretical foundations of the modern approaches to the study of political development. The impact of this theoretical tradition, however, has come to us largely through the works of scholars in modern cultural anthropology and sociology. It is to their contri butions that we now direct our attention. CHAPTER V DEVELOPMENT MODELS IN CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND MODERN SOCIOLOGY: A STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL APPROACH The s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l a p p r o a c h t o t h e s t u d y o f s o c i a l p h e n o m e n a c a n b e t r a c e d b a c k , a t l e a s t i n i t s g e r m i n a l f o r m , t o t h e f o u n d i n g f a t h e r s o f s o c i o l o g y a n d t h e n f o r w a r d , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h r o u g h t h e w o rk s o f D u rk h e im , P a r e t o , a n d C o o l e y . B u t i t w as o n l y i n t h e s e c o n d q u a r t e r o f t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e o f c u l t u r a l a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s l i k e A. R. R a d c l i f f e - B r o w n , R a lp h L i n t o n , a n d B r o n i s l a w M a l i n o w s k i , t h a t t h i s a p p r o a c h a t t a i n e d a r e s p e c t a b l e s t a t u s i n s o c i o l o g y . I t s a d v a n c e i n r e c e n t y e a r s t h r o u g h t h e w r i t i n g s o f T a l c o t t P a r s o n s , M a r io n L e v y , R o b e r t M e r t o n , a n d o t h e r s h a s b e e n s o s p e c t a c u l a r t h a t i t may b e s a i d t o b e t h e m o s t a c c e p t e d a p p r o a c h t o d a y i n s o c i o l o g y a n d a l s o i n A m e ric a n p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e . T h e l e a d i n g t h e o r i s t s i n t h e f i e l d o f p o l i t i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t s t u d i e s a r e f u n c t i o n a l i s t s a l m o s t b y s e l f - d e f i n i t i o n . T h e f u n c t i o n a l a p p r o a c h i n p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e d e r i v e s i t s i n s p i r a t i o n fro m f u n c t i o n a l t h e o r i s t s i n s o c i o l o g y i n g e n e r a l a n d T a l c o t t P a r s o n s i n p a r t i c u l a r . 118 119 We may briefly note in the following pages the genesis and scope of functionalism. The question as to what is functionalism cannot easily be answered, for the term "function” (and its adjectival form, "functional") in sociology and cultural anthropology, is given different, and sometimes contra dictory, meanings. However, most functionalists define function as a contribution made by a part to some whole, to a society or a culture, for example. This is the meaning often attributed to function by Radcliffe-Brown, Linton, and Malinowski and also, germinally, in the theoretical structures of Durkheim. Thus, the functional approach frequently refers to the emphasis upon the integration of parts into wholes. Leaving aside the terminological confusion, observation of recent developments both in sociology and cultural anthropology shows that the movement known as functionalism may be interpreted as maintaining the typothesis that all social phenomena go together and that sociological theory should be focused upon them. The basic functional theorem reads as follows: A social system is a real system in which the parts perform functions essential for the persistence (eventually, the expansion or strengthening) of the whole and therefore are interdependent and more or less completely integrated. 120 Sometimes the expression "functional analysis" is used to designate the study of social phenomena as effects of specified social structures such as kinship systems; therefore, it commonly appears in the compound form, "structural-functional." The functional approach is older in biology, psychology, cultural anthropology, and sociology than in political science. In biology we learn that an organ performs a function or functions essential for the survival of the organism or of the species to which it belongs. The functional approach in biology, therefore, stresses the interdependence of parts and every organism is regarded as a system of functionally interrelated parts. In psychology, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but developing in the 1920's and 1930's, the Gestalt school maintained that any element of the mental process must be studied in the context of the whole, because the meaning of every element varies in accordance with the total configuration of which it is a part. In cultural anthropdlogy the functional approach was anticipated by Franz Boas, who in 1887 wrote: "The art and characteristic style of a people can be under stood only by studying its products as a whole.”* ^Franz Boas, Science, Vol. IX, p. 485. 121 Functionalism in anthropology developed much later, in apposition to evolutionism. Although functional sociolo gists can trace back their genealogy within their own discipline, they usually credit cultural anthropologists like Radcliffe-Brown, Malinowski, and Linton as the major 2 sources of this inspiration. This preference may be attributed to the fact that the above mentioned anthro pologists were great champions of the scientific metho dology and more rigorous and explicit in their conceptual ization of the functional approach, than the founding fathers of sociology. Malinowski 1s Functionalism Malinowski attempted a theoretical codification of the functional approach in his Scientific Theory of Culture and dismissed the rough approach to functionalism that reduces it to the almost useless proposition that every- 3 thing is related to everything else. To avoid this pitfall, the procedure of isolation is advocated. Malinowski suggested that research should start with functional isolates. As viewed by him, a functional 2Don Mortindale, op. cit., p. 3&ronislaw Malinowski, A Scientific Theory of Cul ture and Other Essays, ( Chapel' Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944). 122 Isolate Is institution. Institution refers to a social group as well as to established methods of procedure. Malinowski stated that each institution carries out at least one social function which is to say it meets an established social need. Malinowski's primary scientific interest was in the study of culture as a universal phenomenon and in the development of a methodological framework that would permit the systematic study of speci fic cultures in all their peculariarities and lead the way 4 to systematic cross-cultural comparison. Two axioms, Malinowski declared must underlie every scientific theory of culture. First, every culture must satisfy man's biological needs and also provide for occasional relaxation and the regulation of growth. Second, every cultural achievement is an instrumental enhancement of human psysiology, referring overtly or indirectly to the satisfaction of bodily needs.® In fact Malinowski expressed the view that it is possible to link up functionally the various types of cultural response, such as economic, legal, educational, scientific, magical, and religious to biological needs. 4 Rhoda Metraux, "Bronislaw Malinowski," Inter- national Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, IX (New York:— McMillan Co., , p. 541J---- 5 Timasheff, op. cit., p. 227. 123 The Introduction of the concept of "political cul ture" as an essential variable in our current theories of political development may be largely attributed to the inspiration afforded by Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown. They constitute the bridge between Durkheim and modern sociological functionalism, particularly as presented by Parsons. Our current efforts in treating culture, social struc ture, and polity as interdependent parts of a broader social system may also |»e traced back to cultural anthro pology . Radcliffe-Brown1s Functionalism The most notable contribution of Radcliff-Brown was his application to primitive societies of some of the ideas of functional (systems) theory which led to a revolution in the analysis and interpretation of social relations. He turned social anthropology from its pre occupation with historical development and psychological extrapolation to the comparative study of persistent and changing social structures.^ Radcliff-Brown*s general theory of society produced three connected sets of questions. The first set deals ®W. E. H. Stanner, A. R. Radcliffe-Brown,; in international Encyclopedia'of the social Sciences, op. cit., p. 285. 124 with static or morphological problems. What kinds of societies are there? What similarities and dissimilar ities can be noticed among them? How are they to be classified and compared? The second set of questions deals with dynamic problems. How do societies function? How do they persist? The third set deals with developmental problems. How do societies change their types? How do new types come into existence? What general laws relate to the changes ? The general theory dealing with these problems was transferred from biology and bore a heavily Spencerian functional cast in its emphasis on physical, institutional, and cultural adaptation. Radcliffe-Brown also substituted the concept of social system for that of culture. He con sidered the requirements of a science of human society to be threefold: first, to treat social phenomena as natural facts and therefore subject to discoverable necessary conditions and laws; second, to adhere to the methodology of the natural sciences; and third, to enter- g tain only generalizations that can be tested and verified. This hard core methodological approach, with its stress on empiricism and scientism, explains why the cur rent functional theorists in sociology and political 7Ibid., p. 289. 8Ibid., p. 287. 125 science express their intellectual debt more to cultural anthropologists than to the early founding fathers of sociology. Parsons: Systems Analysis (A Synthesis of Classic, Typological, and Functional Traditions) It is no exaggeration to state that perhaps no other contemporary social scientist has influenced the theorists in the field of political development studies more than Talcott Parsons. At the same time it is true that none of the development theorists is an avowed disciple of Parsons. Yet most leading theorists of development utilize concepts, categories, or conceptual frameworks elaborated by Parsons. The reasons for the pervasive influence of Parsons are not very far off to seek. Firstly and most importantly, the Parsonian system in all its panoramic intellectual dimensions combines and synthesizes the three major traditions which are the sources of current theory-building efforts in political development studies. The intellectual training and theoretical apprenticeship of Parsons, as he discusses his own scholarly development, reflect the influences of Comte, Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Spencer, Pareto, Freud, Marshall, Malinowski, 126 Radcliffe-Brown, Henderson, and many other theoretically 9 diverse scholars. Secondly, Parsons is unquestionably the grand theorist par excellence of "systems theory" and as such a source of great intellectual inspiration and theoretical innovation for political development theorists, who by the very nature of the intellectual climate or theoretical fad of our time are "system" theorists. Thirdly, of the system approaches, structural- functionalism is the approach which enjoys undisputed theoretical legitmacy and primacy in current sociology and political science and since Parsons is an outstanding exponent of that approach, it is easy to see why Parsons' influence is so pervasive.Fourthly, since functionalism has come to be identified with ParBons and at the same time it has come to be synonymous with the scientific approach to the social science, it is rather difficult to find a ^Talcott Parsons, "The Point of View of the Author" in Max Black (ed.), The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons: A Critical Examination (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1961) pp. 312-219; Edward Devereux, Jr., "Parsons Sociological Theory," Ibid., pp. 3-7. *°See Alvin Gouldner's brilliant analysis of the reasons for Parsons* pervasive influence in Part II of his recent publication The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (New York: Basic b o o k s inc., 1 9 7 0 ) ppl 178-340. 127 modern social scientist who would dare not to subscribe to the scientific approach. No attempt will be made here to present a panoramic or over-all view of Parsons’ massive intellectual achieve* ments. Such a task is not only not relevant from our point of view, but also difficult to accomplish in view of the subtleties, complexities, and developing refinements of his ponderous, theoretical work covering a period of more 12 than three decades of prolific writing. What is more relevant for our purposes is not an analysis of the sub stantive contributions of Parsons as a social theorist but his conceptualization of the social system and the impre- sive body of analytic concepts, of categories, and of typologies that he generated. The Parsonian concepts, typologies, categories or their refined or revised versions are the very vocabulary of the modern political development theorist. It is to this particular aspect of Parsonian contribution that we now turn our attention. ^See M. J. Levy's article on functionalism in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, op. citi, where he explains that functlonaiiJiA IS today synemymous with the scientific approach. 12 There Is an impressive body of secondary litera ture on controversial interpretations of his work. Some claim that his theory is discontinuous and contradictory, others see a developmental pattern in his work, and still others contend that it has remarkable consistency and essential unity. 128 Parsons Is the leading exponent of the concept "social system." Despite extensive usage of the concept by other theorists, its development by Parsons on many levels of abstraction and its application by him to a wide range of human interaction gives him undisputed primacy in its use. Parsons; Pattern Variables The Parsonian model of the social system is based on the premise that the complex affairs of a society could not be carried on unless they were organized in some systematic way. There is a further underlying hypothesis that human societies, regardless of the level of their development--from the very primitive to the most complex-- have so much in common that there must be a set of fun damental organizing principles shared by all societies but developed to much higher degrees of articulation in some than in others. The aim of Parsonian general theory of social system is to discover what these basic principles are and how they operate. The cross-cultural similarities of social organization and process emerge because, given the nature of the human organism and the physical environ ment, certain problems must be solved if man is to live as a social animal--that is, to use scarce means coopera tively and socially and more or less rationally to attain 129 given ends. Now the Parsonian model, unlike the classic economic model, Implies that cooperation always tends to break down, because few of the ends of human activity are "final," most being simply means to more remote ends and also because of the differential consequences for the cooperators, e.g., differential sharing of the costs and benefits of cooperation. This raises the question of social justice, causes strain, and Is the reason why systems do not maintain themselves automatically. In the Parsonian model, therefore, it is suggested that unless integrative measures can render differential consequences acceptable, or the social system can provide coercive structures to 13 deal with non-acceptance, cooperation will not persist. A brief exposition of Parsonian system has to begin with his theory of action. Parsons begins with an actor in a situation. The actor is a more or less socialized human being, endowed with the organismic characteristics of energy, capacity for learning depen dency and vulnerability, high sensitivity to stimuli, capacity to use symbAls and to remember and to anticipate and a number of other significant properties that are normally elicited in the life course of an individual living in society. The situation within which the actor 13 Talcott Parsons, working Papers in the Theory of Action (Glencoe, Illinois: Wje’ rree Press, 1953), p. 211. 130 acts is composed of physical objects, cultural objects (artifacts, language, valueB and belief systems, symbols of various kinds) and social objects, which may be either individual actors or collectivities. Action is behavior that is in some sense directed toward goals; it has motivational significance. Action, in the Parsonian view, is not just a specific reaction to a momentary stimulus but rather has some systematic quality. An actor's motivations may be regarded as classifiable into cognitive, cathetic, and evaluative modes. Corresponding to the three motivational modes there are cognitive, appreciative, and moral standards. Moti vated actors seeking goals or gratifications and oriented to shared values or standards, thus interact in patterned ways. A process beginning with goal-directed behavior and ending with attainment of the goal is an action cycle; it occurs within a system of social action. A system of social action is composed of three types of sub systems: 1. THE PERSONALITY SYSTEM consists of at least two individual actors and their internalized "need disposition^* which are the sources of motivational commitments to var ious types of goals and to various patterns of behavior. 2. THE SOCIAL SYSTEM, or the structure of social organization, consists of defined roles and their asso ciated and institutionalized (internalized and shared) role expectations ■ expected performances and sanctions. 131 3. THE CULTURE SYSTEM consists of the heritage of knowledge/ beliefs, ideas, technologies, mores, customs, habits, laws, values, standards norms, together with the symbols, both tangible and intangible that represent them. In 1969 Parsons added a biological system after the above three were developed. Now, none of these systems is entirely independent of the others. The culture system is the major binding element. Cultural elements are embo died in personality systems, otherB in social systems, and still others are out there in the environment analogous to natural resources, that are always available for use in action processes. It is a major attribute of the culture system that it furnishes a certain degree of assurance that all individual members of a system of action will see objects in essentially the same terms. Indeed according to Parsons a posited condition of the survival of the systems of action is that the members be bound to gether and their behavior patterns be stabilized and coor dinated in this fashion to a rather high but unspecified 14 degree. Parsons conceives of the interrelationships of the personality systems, social systems, and cultural systems in such a way that all three participate jointly in the determination of concrete action systems and yet each is 14 Chandler Morse, "The Functional Imperatives" in Max Black, The Social Theories of T. Parsons, op. ci-fc., p. 106. 132 regarded as an analytically separate order of systems, partially independent, but partially interpenetrating the others. Although for certain analytical purposes, we may focus our attention on one order of system at a time, a general theory of action will necessarily involve 15 systematic discussion of all three. Parsons conceives of a system as consisting of at least two units, with the units thought of as analyzable in their own rights as systems or as parts of systems at higher levels of organization and abstraction. Whatever the focal unit— an individual, a collectivity, a society or a role— its external systemic relation is to other units which from the point of view of the focal unit represent components of a situation. The focal unit is designated as the actor. The actor bears a relation to objects in a situation which may be nonsocial (physical objects or cultural resources) or social (individual actors and collectivities). The systemic relationship is one of action in the Parsonian framework. The analysis of action, then, is essentially the examination of the action and situation as units in a system. "The distinction between unit and system is, of course, relative. What is unit in terms of one point of reference may always be treated as system from another; this view of macroscopic-microscopic 15Edward C. Devereux, Jr., in Max Black (ed.), The Social Theories. . . op. cit., p. 30. 133 relations is fundamental to our whole treatment of action."^6 Unlike many other theorists who insist on a constant vantage point, i.e., either the individual or the group, from which reality must be viewed. Parsons finds reality within certain limits, in both perspectives. Viewed separately, any one work of Parsons might be heavily microscopic or macroscopic as is the case when the chief referent is society. Any student of Parsons would notice that his theory moves from an action frame of reference to one of inter action and thence to the concept of social system and culture.17 "The Social System" according to Parsons, "consists in a plurality of individual actors interacting with each other in a situation which has at least a physical or environmental aspect, actors who are motivated in terms of a tendency to the 'optimization of gratification* and whose relations to their situations,including each other, is defined and mediated in terms of a system of culturally 16 Talcott Parons, R. F. Bale and E. A. ShiIs, Working Papers in the THeory of Action (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press 1^53) p. 168. 17 Edward Devereux, op. cit.,p. 26 134 18 structured and shared symbols.” It is not made up of ”the total action of concrete persons and collectivities, 19 but only their actions in specific roles.” "A social system,” he goes on to say, ”may be analyzed on four levels of generality so far as its units are concerned: (1) individuals in roles are organized to form what we call (2) collectivities. Both roles and collectivities, however, are subject to ordering and control by (3) norms which are differentiated according to the functions of these units and to their situations and by (4) values which define the desirable kind of system of relations."2^ The relationship of structure to process is expressed by Parsons thus: "Process in any social system is subject to four independent functional imperatives or 'problems' which must be met adequately if equilibrium and/or continuing existence of the system is to be main- 21 tained.” The four problems are those of: 18 Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1951), pp. 5-6. 19 Parsons and Neil J. Smelser, Economy and Society, (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press 1956), p. 2l. 20 Talcott Parsons, "An Approach to the Sociology of Knowledge" manuscript of a paper read at the Fourth World Congress of Sociology at Milan, Italy, September 1959, p. 3. 21 Talcott Parsons and Neil J. Smelser, Economy and Society, op. cit., p. 16. 135 G Goal Attainment A Adaptation 1 Integration L Latency The goal attainment problem is that of keeping the action system moving steadily toward its goals. Goal attainment marks the culmination of an action cycle. An action cycle of a sub-system comes to an end when it has completed its contribution to the functioning of a larger system. Goal-attaining is the actual producing of that "identifiable something which can be utilized in some way 22 by another system. M Now the goals are never wholly of one type. They may be principally adaptive, implementive, integrative, or pattern maintaining. Parsons views the goal-attaining process as being chiefly a function of power manifested by decision making at the policy level, the allocative level, the operative or technical level and finally through a coordination of levels. Depending upon the type of goals, the goal attaining process is marked by characteristic power articulations. Goal attainment is defined by Parsons as "a relation between 22 Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies, (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1960) p. IT. 136 a system and the relevant parts of the external situation 23 in which it acts or operates." in other words the goal product (output) of one social system is a resource (input) for another. The concept of goal and goal-attaining is most elaborated by Parsons with respect to bureaucratic organization. Adaptation is the process of mobilizing the tech nical means required for (a) goal attainment, and (b) latency. The adaptive problem is the problem of properly perceiving and rationally manipulating the empirical world for the attainment of goals. Parsons conceives that all ends are goals and therefore that adaptation is relevant only to goal attainment. In short, the mobilization of means is the adaptive function. Integration is the process of achieving and main taining appropriate emotional and social relations (a) among those directly cooperating in a goal attainment pro cess, and (b) in a system of action viewed as a continuing entity. The main problem of integration is that of holding cooperative units in line, of creating and maintaining "solidarity," despite the emotional strains involved in the processes of goal attainment and the manner of sharing the fruits of cooperation. The integrity of a system of action is embodied in the sense of solidarity that binds 23Ibid» p. 17. 137 Its members together, that provides them a sense of collec tive belonging, of mutual interdependence. The Family is the prime example of a solidary action system. Generally speaking this feeling of solidarity is always limited. Willingness to make specific contributions in exchange for somewhat diffuse benefits (e.g., glory, reputation, or honor) and willingness to contribute to maintaining the integrity of the system, are aspects of solidarity. Integration is a necessary aspect of both task-performance and system maintenance processes. In the Parsonian view latency consists of two related problems. The first, pattern maintenance is the problem of stabilizing a set of (latent) commitments to a set of goals that has been "legitimized" by the cultural value pattern of the system. The second, tension management is that of eliminating the residual tensions that occur within member units as the result of the fact that no goal attainment process carried out by any action system is likely to gratify every participating unit completely. Latency is an interlude between successive goal-attainment processes. It is not a period of passivity or inactivity, but the activities, whatever they may be, consist of re* storing, maintaining, or creating the energies, motives, and values of the cooperating units and so do not explicitly advance the larger system toward its goal. The latency 138 problem is to make sure that the cooperating units have the time and the facilities, within a suitable conditioning environment, to constitute or reconstitute the capacities needed by the system. The four functional problems have close interrela tionship in the Parsonian scheme. The G and A problems taken jointly constitute the "task orientation area" of instrumental activity and the I and L problems jointly constitute the "social emotional area" of "expressive activity." Task performance requires solution of both the adaptive and the integrative problems as preconditions for goal attainment. Parsons implies that the task- performance process terminates in goal-attainment and that the system-maintenance process terminates in pattern maintenance and tension, in tension-management (i.e., latency). The processes involved in both cases are those of adaptative action (instrumental activity). The relation of adaptation and integration to system-maintenance is the 24 precise inverse of their relation to task-performance. The four functional problems in the Parsonian model 25 operate at both a microanalytic and a macroanalytic level. 24 Chandler Morse, "Functional Imperatives," op. cit., p. 115. 25 Talcott Parsons et al, Working Papers..., op. cit., p. 212. 139 At the micro-level the functional problems are postulated to specify the phases through which individual actors in a small action system and the action system as a whole must progress during an action cycle. At the macro-level the functional imperatives provide a means of (a) allo cating roles analytically among four functional sub systems of any given system and of (b) sorting out the input-output flows among these sub-systems. The func tional problems serve an important aim in the Parsonian model, i.e., to establish a link between the psychological make-up of the man and the way in which he organizes 26 social relationships and behavior. It is one of the fundamental premises of the Parsonian model that the psychological make-up in man in large degree explains his social organization and 27 behavior. The functional problems or imperatives, thus, are an important device for moving1 between individual psychology and social behavior. Man is viewed as goal seeking, adaptive with respect to the environment, and integrative with respect to his social and emotional relationships; and he is regarded as an individual, with private yet socially conditioned needs. These crucial facts about man explain the patterns of culture. 26 Chandler Morse, op. cit., p. 119. 27 Ibid., p. 120. 140 They also explain much about the shapes of personality systems and social systems for these are formed by the processes that transmit culture from generation to generation molding the need dispositions of individuals and the structures of role responsibilities in society. In other words, human experience cumulates not only as culture but also as social organization. The Functional Problems at the Macro or Societal Level: Structural-Functional Analysis If micro-analysis is concerned with interaction between individual role incumbents, macro-analysis is con cerned with the flows--inputs and outputs— among groups of occupants of similar or closely related roles. The analysis of society as a social system in terms of four functional imperatives at the societal level is first undertaken in Economy and Society. Each society, being a social system, must contain roles with responsibilities for solving the four basic system problems at the societal level. Any complex society, Parsons believes, has four sets of specialized roles, one for each of the basic problems. Each such set of specialized roles, Parsons argues, constitutes a sub-system of society and obeys the 141 28 laws governing the operation of the social system. Two basic dichotomies underlie Parsons' delineation of the four functional imperatives of any social system. He maintains the view that the action generated within any social system is in part directed toward its external situation and in part toward its internal situation. The internal-external dichotomy is one axis. The second axis is the instrumental— consummatory dichotomy. Parsons views some activity as instrumental in that its product represents the means to a goal and not the goal itself, whereas other activity is consummatory in that the product per se of the activity represents goal attainment. The following are the four functional sub-systems of any complex society. G The polity (goal attainment) A The economy (adaptation) I The integrative sub-system L The latency (or pattern-main- tenance and tension management) sub-system Even in a complex society all the sub-systems may not be developed or differentiated to the same degree, and certainly at any particular historical stage of development they will presumably not be. Parsons, in 28 Parsons et aL, Economy and Society, op. cit., pp. 13-19. 142 his Economy and Society, divides each of his model'b sub-systems in the same four-fold way. For example, the sub-system economy is divided into four sub-systems in this fashion: G Production sub-system A Investment capitalization sub system I Entrepreneurial sub-system L Economic commitments sub-system Let us now go babk to the analysis of four major sub-systems of society that constitute society's macro structure. The four sub-systems of the larger modern society are differentiated by their assumption of activity predominantly devoted to one of the four functions. The execution of such activity is its functional imperative. The A-Sub-system: The Economy The economy which is specialized in the adaptive function of society is regarded as producing generalized facilities as means to a large number of possible uses. The facilities produced by the economy include wealth and income. The adaptive function is closely related in the nature of things to the goal attainment function since adaptation is concerned with "the problem of controling the environment for purpose of goal attainment." In complex 143 systems, with a multiplicity of goals, the distinction between the adaptive and the goal-attainment functions is clear, but this may not be the case in a simple society. The G-Sub-system: The Polity Organization oriented to the generation and alio- cation of power fall in cell G and would in the Parsonian view include most organs of government, much of banking and the corporate aspect of organizations. The *goal of the polity is to maximize the capacity of the society to attain its system goals, i.e., collective goals. We define this capacity as power as distinguished from wealth. .. (though wealth is) an ingredient of power... , r "Power is the generalized capacity to mobilize the resources of the society including wealth and other ingredients, such as , loyalties, 'political responsi bility', ect., to attain particular and more or less 29 collective goals of the system." Thus the goal of the polity is to maximize power. This explains why Parsons places the system of banking and finance, which exercises a measure of control over purchasing power, in the polity. 29 Parsons at al Economy and Society, op. cit., p. 144 The I-Sub-system; The Integrative Sub-System of Society The integrative sub-system of society "is the producer of another generalized capacity to control be havior analogous to wealth and power, i.e., solidarity. Solidarity is the generalized capacity of agencies in the society to bring into line the behavior of system units in accordance with the integrative needs of the system, to check or reverse disruptive tendencies to de viant behavior and to promote the conditions of harmonious 30 cooperation. Those sub-systems are predominantly integrative whose functional imperative is the marshalling of agreement out of potential or actual conflict, such as is done by political parties and interest groups. Those sub-systems whose functional imperative is the institu tionalization of norms such as is done by the courts are also primarily integrative. Hospitals and health agencies also belong here since they motivate the individual whom they serve to the fulfillment of institutionalized expectations, i.e., to act in accordance with the expec tations specified by the sick-status role. The adaptive activities of the member units of an action system are not always mutually supportive, indeed to a degree they may be mutually obstructive and conflictual. Hence it becomes 30 Ibid., p. 49. 145 necessary to produce a certain amount of solidarity by taking steps to reward good performances and to punish poor performances by negative sanctions or penalties and in general to make the member units feel that their activities have been duly appreciated. The problem of integration for a given social system is one of extending and maintaining the range of solidarity to a point of in clusiveness more or less commensurate with the boundaries of the given social system. The L-Sub-System: Pattern-Maintenance and Tension- Mangement Performance of the latency function in society contributes to system-maintenance. The function of latency is to contribute stability to the institutionalized norms and internalized motivational commitments that constitute the basic structural elements of action systems. These norms and commitments tend to change under pressures arising from the cultural system or from abnormal motiva tional tensions resulting from strains in any part of the 31 social or personal situation. Stabilization against destabilizing influences arising in the culture system is "pattern maintenance;" 31Ibid., p. 17. 146 stabilization against similar influences arising from strains is "tension-management." They differ from the integrative process in the sense that they focus on the unit of the system, not the system itself, hence are latent, which implies that they are essential conditions of the larger functioning, rather than the functioning 32 itself. Churches, schools, research activities, the arts, the family and kinship groups perform primarily a 33 pattern maintenance or a tension management function. Each of the four sub-systems possesses distinctive functional problems or dimensions of social structure and process and hence give rise to differentiated organizations. Where Parsons treats society as a whole as the point of reference,the four sub-systems constitute its component units. However each sub-system (for example the economy) must also face all four system problems at its own sub system level, viz., the problems of adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and latency. These specialized needs may in turn be assigned to specialized departments within each sub-system, which also have to meet all four problems in their own right. 32lbid., p. 50 33 Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Society, op. cit., p. 46. 147 4 FIGURE I Boundary Exchanges Between the Primary Sub-Systems of Society 7*/ * c 4£/T4± cr *«/>/ i o I r> 0 % § a * 1 5 i v * c S+4.StJ T f r # ! Z Sul- Syjr*~t k * i a <0 k i £ I * N , * 3 t * VJ & s/snt'j SXS/*+9 L /9frr£K* CCat t'f* r Co»ro*+*;ry 34 Parsons, et al., Economy and Society, op. cit., p. 68. 148 The result of this Parsonian perspective is a long series of systems nesting within systems like a Chinese magic box. Parsons exploits the systemic analysis to great advantage in his Economy and Society. In this way, while analyzing a given system at a given level of system, one ignores whfct goes on inside its components sub-systems and attends only to exchanges among them, in the form of inputs and outputs. But after one has analyzed the exchange of inputs and outputs across sub-system lines, one must look inside the sub-system components and analyze them in the same way, looking for the sub-systems which handle their own systems problems. Examine what happens to the inputs received, how they are processed within the sub-system unit, and how the relevant output is gener ated. It must be noted that what is goal attainment for the sub-system is delivered as output to the system as a whole. If one holds this Parsonian systemic perspective for a rather long time, proceeding upward until one has reached society as a whole as one's final system-referent, and downward until one is dealing with the exchanges within individuals between the organic system and the personality system, one presumably has a complete account of the total action system of the society in question. The Parsonian analysis, it should be noted, is not in terms of any static structural concepts but in terms of the 149 continuous flow of phased and interlocking processes of interchange within and between systems. The interrelatedness of the cultural, personality, and social systems and the linage between the adaptive, goal-attaining, integrative, and latency sub-systems of social system and the interdependencies of levels in systematic analysis are overwhelmingly evident in Parsonian systems analysis. The hierarchical nature of systems for Parsons requires that any unit may be analytically differentiated as a system at the same time that it compri ses a unit of the higher level system of which it is a part. Basic to the idea of systemic linkage is the idea of boundary maintaining, differentiated systems, each of which does what it does, but...does not do what the other does. “This specialization of function requires that there be a process of interchanging inputs and outputs between units (sub-systems) of the system, on the one hand, and between the system, through the agency of the units and its environment, on the other." Parsons, identifies "support" and "legitimation" as requirements for differ entiation of function and the subsequent systemic linkage which must occur between formerly undifferentiated units. Both support and legitimation involve ideological beliefs and the prevailing climate of public opinion in the community. A stable social system. Parsons maintains, is 150 a boundary-maintaining system, i.e., relative to its environment. It maintains certain constancies of patterns, 35 whether static or dynamic. ParBons identifies four conditions of stability that are supported by various boundary maintaining devices; first, there is the stabi lity of the normative pattern itself; second, there is a minimum level of commitment of acting units to act in accordance with the relevant expectations; third, there is acceptance of a commonly understood "definition of the situation;1 1 fourth, there is the integration of the normative complex of the particular social system in question with that of the larger system of which it is a part. The sources of variability against which boundary maintaining devices may be marshalled may also come from environmental factors outside the aystom. Although change and tension are integral and impor tant dimensions in Parsons' thinking, it remains true that the conceptual scheme centers in the concept of equilibrium and that the primary focus of attention is upon problems of integration.^6 The final picture of society that emerges in the Parsonian view is not a neatly articulated "organic system" in full control of its own internal processes 35 Parsons, Social System, op. cit., p. 482. 36 Robin M. Williams, Jr. "The Sociological Theory of T. Parsons" op. cit., p. 90. 151 and mechanisms. It is instead a picture of a loosely federated congeries of systems and sub-systems of various sorts, each with its own crucial degrees of freedom. All these systems are conceived as standing in relationships of interpenetration , interdependence with one another. In view of this heirarchical concept of systems, any concrete pattern of action has consequences for many different sorts of systems, but no particular course of activity can serve at the same time and with optimum effectiveness all the needs of all the systems upon tahich it impinges. The needs which necessarily remain unsatisfied for even a while become sources of strain and tension with potentially disruptive consequences. Pattern Variables In the foregoing analysis we have critically reviewed what are essentially universals in Parsonian theory. We dealt with certain general properties of action and interaction and of personality, social, and cultural systems as Parsons conceives them; and we have briefly examined his systems analysis in terms of struc tures and functions. In effect we have delineated the Parsonian model rather than a substantive theory. Here Parsons has a conceptual scheme, but no variables. 152 The conceptual scheme to be useful, however, should provide a intelligent guide for pointing out the kinds of phenomena for which suitable variables need to be developed. Parsons' quest for appropriate variables for his theoretical system was guided by three main criteria. First, the variables should be completely general and permit comparisons between groups of any sort whatsoever and across cultures. Second, the variables should be relevant for his action frame of reference. In Parsonian action framework it means that when applied to particular actors they should be able to classify role expectations, and when dealing with cultural systems, they should serve to classify types of normative patterns. Third, the variables should be relevant for the analysis of the functional problems about which system differentiation takes place. They should be able to demonstrate that a change in state of any one of the variables would have some 37 important consequences in terms of system functioning. The result of Parons' thinking about these problems was the birth of the set of pattern variables that soon became well-known: Affactivity vs. Affective Neutrality Diffusion vs. Specificity Particularism vs. Universalism Quality vs. Performance 37 Edward C. Devereux, op. cit., p. 39. 153 These are regarded by some of his students as Parsons* single most important theoretical formulation. His earlier efforts to classify types of social structure followed the lead from Toennies1 distinction of Gemelnschaft and Gesellschaft and from Weber’s refinements thereof. But in the course of his researches, he became convinced that, although a given social structure might show attributes suggestive of one polar type, it often possessed other attributes not necessarily represented by that same polar type. Parsons found that Toennies* dicho tomy concealed a number of independently variable distinc tions. He consequently attempted to isolate these variables with the result that he came to see all of action as direc tional, toward one or the other alternatives of the five dichotomies termed by Parsons as **pattern variables." The pattern variables of action orientation (or of value orientation or role definition, as they are variously called) constitute in the Parsonian theory of action the most persistent link between personal, cultural, and social 38 systems. They become a major basis for classifying social systems as wholes and for analyzing social roles in The Social System, and later for characterizing phases of 38 Talcott Parsons and Edward A. ShiIs (eds.), Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press- , 1051), pp. 76-91. 154 action in group processes in the Working Papers and in Family# Socialization and Interaction Process. The catego ries have developed in Parsons' thinking over an extended period. He has utilized them extensively for comparing social structures (institutions) and to characterizing specific role structures. As Parsons sees them# the pattern variables states in the most general terms "constitute categories for the orderly description and comparative analysis of systems of 39 action as systems." They may be applied at four analy tical levels. On the concrete level of empirical action they exist as five direct choices which the actor must explicitly or implicitly make before he can act. On the collectivity level they constitute aspects of role defini tion or of role expectation whereby roles are characteris tically specified in terms of one side or the other side of the dilemma indicated by the pattern variables. On the cultural level they represent aspects of value standards. Finally# insofar as an actor's personality is committed to value standard# such an actor will habitually choose the horn of the dilemma specified by adherence to that standard. In starting his analysis with an actor in a situa tion Parsons contends that an actor must make five separate 3®Talcott Parsons# "Some Comments on the State of the General Theory of Action#" American Sociological Review. XVIII, 6 (December 1953), 623. 155 choices before the action will have a determinate meaning for him. Meaning does not automatically emerge in a situa tion, but rather, is based upon the actor's selection of one or more of these five sets of alternatives posed for him in any situation. The actor's subsequent action is taken in accordance with his choice(s) and the necessities for choice are termed the dilemmas of action. The choice of any one alternative over another is one of preference or primacy not of exclusive and inflexible rigidity and the choice becomes patterned only after repeated choices in 40 one direction or another. Let us see how the dilemmas were conceived. 1. Affectivity vs. affective neutrality is the gratification-discipline dilemma and involves the problem of accepting an opportunity for gratification without regard for its consequences. This dilemma is posed because, on the one hand, no action system can be organized or inte grated unless members renounce some gratifications and, on the other hand, enjoy some gratifications. In an organized action system the most direct path to gratification is through expressive orientations. Adhering to such an orientation represents affectivity. Eschewing such a path for instrumental, evaluative, or moral considerations means *°Parsons and Shils (eds.), Toward a General Theory of Action, op. cit., pp. 78-79. 156 renunciation of gratification, i.e., discipline. Such an orientation represents affective-neutrality. Affective- neutrality orientation is usually involved in instrumental or task-oriented situations: the situation or relationship is not to be enjoyed in its own right but to be evaluated and used. 2. Specificity vs. diffuseness is the dilemma of defining the relationship which the object(s) has to actor. This dilemma is concerned with the scope or inclusiveness of relationship. If the relationship is indefinitely wide in scope, infinitely broad in involvement, morally obli gating and significant in pluralistic situations, then it can be defined as diffuse. The marriage relationship may serve as a prototype of the diffuse relationship. At the opposite pole is the highly specific character of the relationship between boss and secretary which is more or less a contractual relationship, involving a clearly specified and limited set of rights. 3. Particularism vs. universalism is the first of two dilemmas which pertain to modes of categorizing social objects. Essentially the dilemma is whether cognitives or cathectic criteria should take precedence in defining the relationship. Shall the object be judged in terms of some universal or general frame of reference or in terms of some particular frame of reference in which the actor is 157 himself involved? Whether some one is an erudite scholar, a competent secretary, or a beautiful woman are matters to be determined on universalistic criteria. One should choose a lawyer on the basis of his competence (universal- istic ground) and not on the ground that he is friend, neighbor, or cousin (particularistic). 4 * Quality (ascription) vs. performance (achieve ment) is the dilemma which turns upon whether the primary consideration in defining a relationship is given to some ascriptive quality of the object--age, sex, beauty, status, possessions, and so on— or to some particular complex of performances. How the actor behaves would depend upon whether he accords primary treatment to an object on the basis of what it is in itself, who or what the person is (quality), on the one hand, oir what he has done, can he be expected to do, and the quality of his performance (per formance) , on the other. 5. Collectivity orientation vs. self-orientation is the collective vs. self-interest dilemma. Subscription to values commonly held by a collectivity and conformity with the value pattern because such a course is a "good thing" in itself and because of obligation of responsibility to the referent action systems are ingredients of a col lectivity orientation. if such subscription is made for private instrumental advantage or because of fear of 158 reprisals, it is self-orientation. Active dissent or deviation from commonly held values is also representative of self-orientation. It seemed to Parsons that in some relationships moral considerations (claims of some super ordinate collectivity upon the individual or sub collectivity) are expected to be given primacy, whereas in others they are not. This dilemma concerns the primacy of moral standards in a procedure of evaluation. Parsons sees four of the sets of pattern-variables as being paired. The first two sets— affectivity vs. neutrality and diffuseness vs. specificity— constitute attitudinal chains which focus on the actor and are termed the "orientation set." The second two sets above--particu- larism vs. universalism and quality vs. performance— constitute the "object-categorization pairs." These five dichotomies represent for Parsons the universal dilemmas of orientation which must somehow be resolved before any determinate orientation is achieved. Since these variables are conceived as being analytically independent of one another, the set thus generates, by cross tabulation a typology of thirty-two logically possible patterns of orientation. But in this theoretically derived typology. Parsons notes, there are many empty cells. Parsons also noted that empirically certain com binations of variables cluster whereas others never occur. 159 For example. Parsons notes that In kinship groups, roles are always functionally diffuse, particularistic and collectivity-oriented and also affective to the extent 41 that instrumental action does not have primacy. On the other hand, in the Western type of social structures, roles are marked by universalism, specificity and affective neutrality. Parsons then raises the question: what determines the actor in a situation to select a particular pattern of variables? In principle it might be wholly a matter of free individual preference, rooted in the personality structure. But Parsons is not interested in this explanation. For him the more important fact is that those choices tend to be defined by the cultures and institutionalized in the form of normative patterns held to be appropriate for different types of relational systems. Parsons' structural-functional analysis borrows heavily from the work of Durkheim and Malinowski. Unlike his predecessors, Parsons has not produced a direct exposition of structural-functional analysis yet in Parsons grand framework and diverse empirical researches, ^Talcott Parsons, The Social System, op. cit., pp. 153-155. ------------------- 160 It has grown in richness and complexity. Parsons inor dinate devotion to systematic analysis has certainly contributed to its logical and conceptual completeness. In spite of the off-repeated charges of conservatism staticness of his conceptual framework. Parsons special contribution to systems analysis in one sense lies in the area of what he calls dynamic analysis. Parsons has attempted to bring in at every step of his systems analysis the relevant psychological and motivational factors which provide the forces, strains, and tensions in social systems and lend dynamics to his analysis. The pattern variables represent a convenient way of talking about certain appar ent constancies in social structures, before their internal processes and dynamic laws are fully understood by the application of Parsonian functional imperatives. The chief contribution of Parsonian conceptual scheme is not an attempt to formulate a theory of any concrete phenomena, but it is the attempt to present a logically articulated conceptual scheme. The Parsonian conceptual framework comes closer than any other modern synthesis to an actual conceptual linkage of considerable parts of anthopology, economics, political science and sociology. Admittedly the linkage is highly 161 abstract, yet it serves to place the several social sciences in a new perspective. The conceptual richness of his structural-functional approach has the potential of producing prolific resources for building middle-range theory in social science. The cardinal aim of Parsons'work was nothing less than the development of a conceptual scheme capable of subsuming all analytical knowledge of social conduct of a certain general level of abstraction. That Parsons has been fairly successful is evidenced by his unsurpassed influence on contemporary social science. His influence on the modern theorists of political development is pervasive and profound. His conceptual framework, concepts, and categories are utilized in varying degrees by most of the leading theorists of political development, including Almond, Coleman, Apter, Pys, Eisenstadt, Lipset, Riggs, Deutsch and Binder. After briefly reviewing contributions of Robert Merton's functional analysis, we will proceed to critically examine in the next chapters the current macrotheoretical and middle-range theoretical approaches in the study of political development. 162 Merton: Functional Model for Analysis of Change Robert K. Merton has made some important contribu tions to functional theory, particularly in the area of its applicability to the study of dynamics and change. Perhaps more than any other contemporary theorist he has stressed the interdependence and interplay of empirical 42 research and the growth of functional theory. The postulates of functional analysis provide the most perva- 43 sive point of view in all of Merton's writing. The func tional orientation guides Merton's inquiry and analysis of data by setting forth explicitly the consequences of these data for the larger structures of theory to which they are related. The larger structures of theory imply in Merton's view the practicing of strict scientific method which he describes and analyzes. Merton attempts to codify systematically a paradigm or model for functionalism, an effort designed to present "the hard core of concept, pro- 44 cedure and inference in functional analysis." His own 42 Timasheff, op. cit. p. 230. 43C. P. Loomis and Z. K. Loomis, Modern Social Theories (Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand Co., Inc.,1965, 2nd edition), p. 265. 4*R. K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Illinois: Glencoe, The Free Press, 1949), p. 49. 163 works meticulously observe his own functional dictum: The theoretic framework of functional analysis must expressly require that there be specification of the units for which a given social or cultural item is functional. It must expressly allow for a given item having diverse consequences, functional and dysfunctional, for indivi duals, for subgroups and for the more inclusive social structure and culture.45 The "given item" which may be functional or dysfunctional is by no means limited to goal-achievement oriented acti vities. Beliefs, sentiments, actual behavioral norms, status roles and many other items prove upon Merton's analysis to possess functional or dysfunctional qualities for specified units. Merton makes explicit the distinction between mani fest and latent functions, a distinction found in implicit form in the works of numerous scholars. Today this distinction is employed extensively by American social scientists. Merton views manifest functions as "those objective consequences contributing to the adjustment or adaptation of the system which are intended and recognized by participants;" latent functions as " those which are neither intended nor recognized;" and dysfunction as "those observed consequences which lessen the adaptation or adjustment of the system."46 Thus, to cite a well-known 45Ibid., p. 30. 46Ibid., p. 51. 164 example of Merton's, a manifest function of economic consumption is use, while one of its latent functions is the enhancement of prestige. Again, Merton explains how political machines serve the latent function of fulfilling the existing needs of various groups in society that are not fulfilled by official institutions. Merton's attention to latent functions is very valuable in the analysis of dynamics and change, because they are apt to be overlooked in the usual social analysis of change. In Merton's view his model or paradigm of function alism is intended to perform the following: 1. bring into the open assumptions, concepts, and pro positions used in sociological analysis; 2. isolate the skeleton of fact, inference, and theoretic conclusion; 3. provide an economical arrangement of concepts and their interrelations for description; 4. require that each new concept be logically derivable from previous terms of the paradigm; 5. promote cumulative theoretic interpretation; 6. suggest systematic cross-tabulation of basic concepts; and 165 7. assist codification of methods of qualitative analysis in a manner approximating the rigor of quantitative ana lysis.47 Although what Merton means by paradigm is not exactly stated, it seems to be no more ambitious than a device for instituting systematic description— a provisional outline of items that it is advisable for the functional 48 theorist to study. The functional theorist, Merton's paradigm suggests, must ask the following questions of himself: 1. To what items are functions computed? 2. What situations can be adequately analyzed on the basis of observed motivations of the participants? 3. What are the sources of function and dysfunction? 4. What items are assumed to be functional? 5. How is the intervening variable to be validly estab lished as a functional requirement in a situation where one cannot experiment? 6. By what mechanisms are functions fulfilled? 7. How can one most accurately determine functional alter natives? 47lbid.. pp. 12-16. 48 D. Martindale, op. cit., p. 56. 166 8. How does a structural contact limit functional vari ation? 9. How is one to account for structural strains in the social system? 10. To what degree is functional analysis limited by the 49 difficulty of locating adequate samples of social systems? Merton's paradigm is certainly not a systematic or axiomatic theory but consists of a set of items considered to be crucial and a set of questions to be asked at an early 50 stage of study. The paradigm is described as a provi sional codified guide for adequate and fruitful functional analysis. Merton is not concerned with specifying the functional requirements of a social system in toto, nor with an elaboration of all its elements and processes in a grand general theory. Although acknowledging that there is no substitute "comprehensive schematic analyses" from general theory, he believes that a more efficient allocation of theoretical resources is represented by attention to "theories of the middle range*H theories intermediate to the minor working hypotheses evloved in abundance during the day-by-day routines of research, and the all-inclusive speculations comprising a master conceptual scheme from 49Ibld., pp. 49 ff. 50 Don Martindale, op. cit., p. 57. 167 which it is hoped to derive a very large number of empirically observed uniformities of social behavior.51 Merton sees increasingly refined theory developing through successive approximations by which the initial concep tualizations are re-cast, reconceptualized, and re specified.52 Propositions and middle range theory emerging from fragmented research, in Merton's view, are highly amenable to consolidation into a general theory if the 53 research site is chosen for its strategic importance. Merton's long standing interest in the problems and dynamics of social change is reflected in his early social-historical studies.54 Merton has remained the functional analyst of change and stability. Merton takes the position that functional analysis, like any other theoretical orientation, makes an intrinsic ideological commitment neither to the "glorification of the existing state of things" nor to its debasement. In his view, functionalism is neither conservative nor radical, although diametrically opposed ideological implications can and have been imputed to it. Merton asserts that functionalism 51Ibid., pp. 5-6. 52 C. P. Loomis and Z. K. Loomis, op. cit., p. 247. 53 Merton, op. cit., p. 10. 54 See Merton's 1937 paper with Sorokin: "Social Time: A Methodological and Functional Analysis," The American Journal of Sociology Vol. 42, No. 5, March 1937, pp. 615-29. 168 and social change are inextricably bound. In his own words: . . . functional analysis includes, not only a study of the functions of existing social structures, but also a study of their dysfunctions for diversely situated individuals, subgroups or social strata, and the more inclusive society. It provisionally assumes, as we shall see, that when the net balance of the aggregate of consequences of an existing social structure is clearly dysfunctional, there develops a strong and insistent pressure for change. Again on the neutral aspects of functional analysis, he states: By focusing on dysfunctions as well as on functions, this mode of analysis can assess not only the bases of social stability but the potential sources of social change. To the extent that func tional analysis focuses wholly on func tional consequences, it leans towards an ultra conservative ideology to the extent that it focuses wholly on dysfunctional consequences, it leans toward and ultra radical utopia. * In its essence,' it is neither one nor the other. Merton sees all social phenomena in the course of history possessing both stable as well as changing structural components in an inevitably changing world. In his words: As we survey the course of history, it seems reasonably clear that all major structures in due course have been cumula tively modified or abruptly terminated* In either event, they have not been eter nally fixed and unyielding to change. But, at a given moment of observation, any such social structure may be tolerably well accommodated both to the subjective values of many or most of the population, and to the objective conditions with which it is 169 confronted. To recognize this is to be true to the facts, not faithful to a preestablished ideology. And by the same token, when the structure is observed to be out of joint with the wants of the people or with the equally solid conditions of action, this too must be recognized. Who dares do all that may become a func- ee tional analyst, who dares do less is none. Merton in his works deals with directed change as well as incremental and unplanned change. Directed change in the hands of the "social engineer," Merton argues, is bound to fail unless the concepts of manifest and latent- 5 6 functions are taken into consideration. Merton's functional theory of social change regards the strains and tensions between the cultural expectations and the social realities as a source of social change. In this connection, we should make reference to Merton's well-known typology of modes of individual adaptation to change. Merton views both goals and norms as culturally determined values. As such, they provide reference points by which adaptation to the "culture- bearing society" is made by individuals occupying different positions in the social structure. ®^Merton, op. clt., pp. 40-41. 56 Ibid., p. 81. 170 A Typology of Modes of Individual Adaptation57 Modes of Adaptation Cultural Goals Institutionalized Means ~~ I. Conformity Acceptance Acceptance II. Innovation Acceptance Rejection III. Ritualism Rejection Acceptance IV. Retreatism Rejection Rejection V. Rebellion Rejection of Rejection of pre prevailing ends vailing norms and and substitution substitution of of new ones. new ones. Conformity represents adaptation in which both the ends and means are positively evaluated. It is the mode of adaptation for most people in a given society in whatever position they occupy. The commitment of most people in a society both to ends and to norms constitutes the chief component of the stable society. Innovation/ or the rejection of institutionalized norms at the same time that a high evaluation is placed upon the culturally prescribed goals, is the mode of adap tation which tends to be used by a sizable minority of individuals who feel a lack of realistic opportunities for achievement of the goal by institutionally sanctioned means. Merton illustrates this by reference to accumulation 57lbid., p. 133. 171 of wealth as a success goal in American society and the rejection of institutionalized norms may lead to white collar forms of delinquency and crime in the lower classes. Ritualism is a mode of adaptation by which cultural goals are rejected and the institutionalized norms accepted. The ritualist is generally the overconformist. Individuals who are in the lower classes may be more inclined to adapt by innovation, whereas the lower middle class tends to ritualism. Retreatism is a privatized rather than a collective 5 8 mode of adaptation of the socially disinherited. People who experience a sudden and abrupt break in the familiar normative framework and established social relations of their lives also opt for this mode of adaptation which is manifested by a "nostalgia for the past and apathy in the „ „ 59 present. Rebellion as a type of adaptation "presupposes alienation from reigning goals and standards" and expendi ture of effort to "bring into being a greatly modified social structure."60 Rebellion involves a genuine trans valuation, where the direct or vicarious experience of 58Ibid., p. 155. 59 Ibid., p. 189. 60 Ibid.. p. 155. 172 frustration leads to full denunciation of previously prized values.61 Merton thinks that two factors contribute to the adaptation by rebillion. One is the pressure for achievement coupled with restrictions of opportunity, particularly in the lower classes in the American case. The other factor is ambivalent and conflicting norms re sulting from an admixture of open class and caste norms in the society. Merton makes it clear that conformity is model for all groups, and to the degree that deviant adap tation occurs it is a subsidiary pattern sufficiently established as such by its being engaged in by any sizable minority. The non-conforming adaptations are usually employed by the minority which may in time supplant the conforming adaptations and are likely to do so to the degree that they are functionally superior for a greater number of the populatipn than the prevailing behavior patterns. We have completed now the task of tracin g the theoretical and intellectual origins of current approaches to the study of political development. This chapter attempted to develop the partial thesis of this writer that the Parsonian framework in a unique way synthesizes the theoretical insights of some leading social science theorists of the past. Furthermore, it is largely the 61Ibid., p. 156. 173 Parsonian framework that is the main source of current efforts at macro and middle range level theorizing in the area of political development. PART III THE CURRENT THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 174 CHAPTER VI MACROTHEORETICAL APPROACHES The most significant consequence since the early 1950's of what we have come to call the "behavioral revo lution" in political science was the development of scien tific rigor and methodological self-consciousness on the part of political scientists. Along with this scientism there was a search for discovering suitable neutral and universal models or frameworks for the analysis of poli tical life cross-nationationally and cross-culturally. Following Thomas Kuhn, some scholars are increasingly using the term paradigm instead of model or framework.* As used by Kuhn a paradigm is just a framework that gives organization and direction to a given area of scientific 2 investigation. In spite of the significant progress during the last couple of decades, political science, is still a discipline in its scientific infancy. He are, to *See Robert T. Holt and John M. Richardson, Jr., "Competing Paradigms in Comparative Politics" in Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner (eds.), The Methodology of Compara tive Research (New York: The Free Press, 1970). 2 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revo lutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Edition, 1964), pp. 11-13. 175 176 borrow an expression from Kuhn, still in our preparadig- matic stage. Such a stage in the development of a science is characterized by much random fact gathering which, in the absence of a theoretical framework for seeking some particular form of information, is usually confined to 3 the wealth of data that are readily available. Some of the problems faced by a scientific discipline at this stage are noted by Kuhn thus: If a body of belief is not already implicit in the collection of facts--in which cases more than 'mere facts' are at hand— it must be ex ternally supplied, perhaps by a current meta physic, or another science, or perhaps by per* sonal and historical accident. No wonder, then, that in the early stages of the devel opment of any science, different men con fronting the same particular phenomena, describe and interpret them in a different way.' Whether political science will move from this period of confusion and competing paradigms into a stage where a paradigm is consensually accepted and most of the activity becomes normal research cannot be predicted from the vantage point of today. Some well known scholars believe that by and large the battle over the question of the desirability of the scientific approach to the study of politics has been won.5 This does not, however, mean that the discipline ^Ibid., p. 20. 4Ibid., p. 17. 5 Robert Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument of a Successful Protest" American Political Science Review, LU (4) 1961, pp. 763-772. 177 today stands on the rock of a scientific foundation. We have a long way to go before this goal can be accomplished. Holt and Turner suggest that ideally speaking scientific research in its simplest form involves the following: (1) the deduction of a hypothesis from a set of theoretical propositions; (2) investigations to determine whether the facts of relationships predicted by the hypothesis manifest themselves empirically; (3) typically, the hypothesis involves a predicted relationship between at least two variables and takes the general from of "if A— then B."6 It would be neither a shocking nor an enlightening statement to say that the volume and percentage of research work which follows the above ideal is very limited in political science. The reason for this state of affairs is not only the infancy of our scientific discipline, but also the weakness of our theoretical structure. Holt and Turner have suggested the central problem clearly: The theoretical structure in political science is not deductively powerful, and hence the rigorous deduction of hypotheses is, with few exceptions,impossible. Most hypotheses that are tested by political scientists are either the looser implications of a rather amorphous theory or are simply the researcher's hunches about a reasonable outcome of empirical research. Indeed much of the research in the field is not oriented toward hypothesis-testing at all, but is ®Holt and Turner, The Methodology of Comparative Research, op. cit., p. 6. 178 exploratory in nature and is undertaken to aid in the development of hypotheses. At least in the foreseeable future political science will continue to be an arena of competing models, paradigms, and frameworks. In this chapter we undertake an examination of some major macro-theoretical models in comparative politics which are essentially variations of systems analysis. A general theory in its most ambitious form is a single theoretical framework that attempts to explain and predict all human behavior. Its grand edifice endeavours to include the four analytical levels— individual, small group, institutional and cultural— and all areas of human behavior. In the real empirical world all these levels and areas do operate together and it is ideally the function of general theory to make them operate together in a theoreti cal sense. General theory has been receiving greater attention in recent social science literature apparently because the present disciplines have become sufficiently sophisticated that they are beginning to tackle problems which no longer lend themselves to the narrow confines of a single discipline. Attempts to develop a general theory have been made in recent social science by Parsons and ShiIs, Kuhn, Grinker and Hiller. All these theories are still in the formulative stage. Most of those who have attempted to construct a general theory have done so 7 Ibid., p. 7. 179 within the context of systems theory. The promise of general theory has been great; it provides a comprehensive interdisciplinary theoretical approach; it provides a much more efficient theory of change; it offers the opportunity to improve middle range theory. The need for a "general theory" or macro-framework in any scientific discipline cannot be denied. Recent developments in political theory are in a large measure the result of the application of systems analysis. "Systems analysis" or "systems theory" unfortunately cannot easily be defined or explained for reasons that will become clear as we proceed with our analysis in this chapter. The political science field is divided not only be between systems theorists and others, but among the growing number of writers who use a systems framework, there are also considerable differences, sometimes even bordering on contradictions. We may distinguish four slightly different varia tions within the broad framework of the systems approach: (1) general systems theory; (2) system analysis; (3) struc tural-functional or simply functional analysis; and (4) communications system theory or cybernetics. 180 Of these four variations within the systems approach, only one approach, viz., general systems theory, has not yet been utilized in the comparative politics and political development field; it has been employed largely in the field of international relations. The other three systems approaches represented in the works of particular authors cited will be examined in the following pages. It should be understood that there is considerable overlapping between these types, and many theorists combine different features of the types presented here. Very few writers could be exclusively fitted into one category. Some scholars note that political scientists use general systems theory rather casually and unsystematically. Since general systems theory is the broadest in its conceptual framework, its elements may be found in all four types and general systems theory can claim, to a certain extent, that it in fact encompasses all these types in a formal sense. The convergence of these approaches would become clearly visible as we proceed with our examination of the works of Deutsch, Easton, and Almond. We will now turn our attention to an examination of systems analysis, its uses and limitations in the study of political development. In one sense we may claim that from the very begin ning of political thought, thinkers have attempted to isolate the political system from the remainder of society. 181 However, what distinguishes the modern political scientist is his more self-conscious "systems" approach and his more refined tools of analysis. Although the concept of systems in its more explicit and self-conscious form has appeared only recently in political science, yet it seems to have exercised a pervading influence. As our preceding analysis in earlier chapters has suggested, political scientists have drawn upon the works of biologists, physical scientists, engineers and other social scientists in adapting systems analysis, but it has largely been through the works of Parsons that they have come to employ this approach in the study of politics. The major theorists of political devel opment, like Almond, Coleman, Apter, Riggs, Holt, Lapalombara, Wiener, Lucian Pye, Eisenstadt, Binder and many others, have consciously adopted the Parsonian con ceptual framework, categories, or vocabulary. Deutsch: Cybernetic Approach The study of political life using the communications system frame of reference of "cybernetic model," as it is usually called, has not made much headway in modern poli tical science. However, in view of the potential this model has for the scientific study of human behavior, we consider it worthwhile to examine the usefulness of this model specifically for the study of political development. We will first briefly examine its usefulness as a frame of reference in the field of comparative politics. 182 The close relationship between politics and communi cations has been historically appreciated by statesmen and scholars alike. Indeed, shrewd thinkers like Machiavelli have pointed out the fact that the state of politics is a function of the communications process. Communication is the very heart of human society. The pattern of a communications system with its more or less well-structured channels constitutes in a sense the skeleton of the social body which envelops it. The content and flow of communi cations is the very substance of human interactions and determines the direction and course of social development in all its dimensions. Since communications permeate the social environment and encompass the major aspect of social behavior— human relations in terms of man's capacity to send and receive innumerable messages— the analysis of processes of human communication should indeed be one way of studying social life. Social scientists in recent years are increasingly inclined toward the view that it is possible to analyze all social process in terms of the structure, 0 content, and flow of communications. During the last two decades or so there has been an impressive body of literature that utilizes the theme of 8 For an insightful introduction to the non-linguis- tic dimensions of social communications, see Edward T. Hall, The Silent Language (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, T 51 T 9 T ! 183 the impact of communication on political behavior. Howeverf it was the pioneering work of Karl Deutsch that introduced a serious systematic effort to utilize communication as the key concept in the analysis of political phenomena. The following analysis undertakes a review of Deutech's comunications theory to evaluate its proper place in the g study of comparative politics and political development. In a number of publications during the last two decades Karl Deutsch has consistently recommended as a model for the social sciences the conceptual scheme popularized by his former colleague at M.I.T. Norbert Weiner under the name of "cybernetics." The "theory of communication and control/' that is, the theory of steering or of government, arose in the 1940's and 1950's in science and technology. Some of its intell ectual and theoretical implications have been spelled out originally in the work of Norbert Wiener and then following him many others, including Claude Shannon, Warren Weaver, John von Neumann, W. Ross Ashby, George A. Miller, Colin 9 See the following works by K. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality (New York: John Wiley f c &ons, Tnc., 1953)} The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communica tion and Control (Glencoe, ill.: The £ree Press, 1963); Idem et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of fllirEorleal Experience (Princeton, N. J. : Princeton UniversityPresi^ 1957); Idem and William J. Fotlz (eds.), Nation-Building (New York: Atherton Press, 1963). 184 Cherry, Herbert Simon, and Allen Newell.*0 In developing his theory of messages, Norbert Weiner, a mathematician, first used the word cybernetics, which he derived from the Greek kubernetes, or steersman. Cyberne- tics as conceptualized by Weiner and others is fundamen tally a body of theory and technique for the study of pro babilities in different but analogous universes such as certain types of machines, animals, individual human beings, societies, and nations and the ways in which message transactions function to control such universes.** Ashby uses the communications framework in an even broader sense referring to the ways in which the physical environment excites signals in the central nervous system— together with the ways in which the human being operates upon the Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics; or. Control and Com munication in the Animal and the Machine (New York; John Wiley i Sons, 1948); Wiener, flhe tfumanTTse of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society (Boston; Houghton Mi fill in, 1951). For a relatively different explication of cybernetics, see W. Ross Ashby, Introduction to Cybernetics (New York: John Wiley, 1956); Ashby, Design for a Brain TNew York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960). See also, Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1949); John von Neumann, The Computer and the Brain (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958); George A. Mi1ler, Language and Communication (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951); Colin Cherry, On Human Communi cation; A Review, a Survey, and a Criticism (CambrlAge^ MIT Press— Wiley, 1957) ; Herbert Simon an<T^llen Newell, "Information Processing in Computer and Man," American Scientist. LII (September, 1964), 281-300. **Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings, op. cit., p. 15. 185 the physical environment. In these broad terms the organism and the environment form a single system in which the organism affects the environment and the environment affects 12 the organism. Thus the study of cybernetics to Ashby becomes the study of all possible machines, the word machine being used to include men and animals as well as inanimate systems. Wiener's interest was in the character istics and processes of the feedback systems, which were defined by him as systems controlled on the basis of com paring an actual state with some prearranged norm or pre ferred state and then releasing energy to reduce the diff- 13 erence. In Wiener's view the process of our adjusting to the contingencies of the outer environment and of our living effectively with that environment, is the process of recei ving and using information. A society, Wiener, therefore, argued, can only be understood through a study of messages and the communication facilities which belong to it.14 In our technological society we have many examples of mechanical feedback systems, for example the thermostatic control systems for maintaining desired temperatures in our homes or the automatic pilot in a ship or aircraft, guided missiles systems, etc. The cybernetic point of view 12 Ashby, Design for a Brain, op. cit., p. 87. ^Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings, op. cit., p. 24. .... 14Ibid., p. 16. 186 enables us by force of analogy to compare the basic func tions of such feedback systems or servomechanisms with certain minimally necessary, if not sufficient, functions of living systems such as the individual human being, the group, the corporation, or the nation state. Once we succeed in identifying the processes of such feedback systems, it should be possible to describe organizations on each level in terms of the probability that its components will perform their appropriate functions. Once we have information about these matters, it becomes possible to develop hypotheses in the form of "if A— then B" proposi tions, to predict the system's behavior and also the con flicting, and comparative or integrating interactions between or among systems. In short, the general cybernetic viewpoint suggests "that all organizations are alike in certain fundamental characteristics, that every organization is held together by communication, and that no two or more individuals or organizations have touch with each other except through channels of communication, including the human central nervous system.In these terms a modern nation state may be viewed essentially as a communications system--a 15 Robert C. North, "The Analytical Prospects of Com munication^ Theory," in J. C. Charlesworth (ed.), Contem porary Political Analysis (New York: The Free Press'] 1967) , p. 302. 187 decision and control system— which relies upon the ex change of messages in both its domestic affairs and its 16 foreign relations to regulate and control its behavior. Many scholars hold that cybernetics is a new, powerful way of analyzing complex systems and that it offers hope for a new, unified approach to the social sciences. We may now proceed to discuss some major concepts in the cybernetics approach that are helpful in the tasks of theory-building in political science. In his Nerves of Government, Deutsch, far from stating that he is presenting a rigorously defined deductive theoretical scheme, modestly claims only to be presenting "a point of view" and a "body of ideas and suggestions." This does not have the elements of a paradigm, in the sense defined by Kuhn, yet we find all of the essentials of a paradigm at least partially articulated.^7 Paying due regard to problems of systematic theory building, Deutsch presents explicit definitions of a set of basic concepts in terms of which reality is perceived. Cybernetics is defined, following Wiener, as the "science *6Ibid., p. 301. 17In spite of Deutsch*s sincere commitment to syste matic analysis, his argument cannot be easily presented in view of the complexity of the necessary explication. For tunately, a rather neatly compact presentation of his ideas adapted by him from his Nerves of Government is available in an article by him: X88 of communication and control." The focus of this approach is delineated as "the systematic study of communication and control in organizations of all kinds . . . The view point of cybernetics suggests that all organizations are alike in certain fundamental characteristics and that every 18 organization is held together by communication." Since governments are organizations, Deutsch suggests, we should utilize those concepts of communication theory in 1 Q terms of which information processes can be represented. Before examining Deutsch's major concepts— information and feedback— we need to look at his general model of an infor mation processing system, i.e., the propositions in terms of which the behavior of such systems can be analyzed. Deutsch's General Model Deutsch might have chosen one of several mechanisms that are information processing systems. The error control led regulator which Deutsch chooses as his model is very common in complex weapons control and guidance systems. Holt and Richardson describe the characteristics of the model chosen by Deutsch in general terms as follows: "The system has information, either internally or externally 18 "Communication Models and Decision Systems," in J. C. Charlesworth (ed.). Contemporary Political Analysis, op. cit., pp. 273-299. 19 Deutsch, Nerves of Government, op. cit., p. 189 imposed, about a set of states of goals to be attained. These goals may refer either to the maintenance of the system itself (i.e., the restriction of internal variables within specified limits) or to more purposive objectives. The latter may also be defined as the attainment of a set of states, but in this case not directly related to the 20 maintenance of the system.'1 Now we would like to know: how does Deutsch use the mechanism of the error controlled regulator for his own conceptual scheme? In Deutsch's system internal mechanisms compare the error signal "with memory," which includes information about the state of the system and to the degree that the system has this capacity, previous learned behavior. When the system is in a state that differs from a particular goal an error signal is generated. The process of compar ison initiates the initial corrective action. Here we are let to talk about the important concept of feedback. The feedback network in the system carries information about the effects of previous increments of corrective action. Thus the feedback of information affects the production of new corrective increments in a continuous dynamic process until the goal is attained. 20 Holt and Richardson, "Competing Paradigms in Com parative Politics," in J. C. Charlesworth (ed.). Contem porary Political Analysis, op. cit., p. 39. 190 The Concept of Information He have just noted that organizations are viewed, in general, as information-processing systems. He may now discuss Deutsch*s concepts in somewhat more detail. The central concept in Deutsch*s scheme is information. Infor mation is defined as a "patterned relationship between 21 events. "The important thing about information is thus not the amount of energy needed to carry the signal, but the pattern carried by the signal, and its relationship to the set of alternatives available in the same information- carrying channel of communication . . . The meaning of this information is something else again; it depends on the relationship of the pattern of the signal to the set of patterns stored in the receiver." Deutsch defines a channel of communication as a sequence of such processes and "infor mation is that aspect of the stated description of each stage of the channel that has remained invariant from one 22 stage to another." The effectiveness of information at the receiver depends on two classes of conditions. First, at least some parts of the receiving system must be in highly unstable equilibrium, so that the very small amount of energy carrying the signal will be sufficient to set off a much 21Karl Deutsch, "Communication Models and Decision Systems" in J. C. Charlesworth (ed.), op. cit., p. 274. 22Ibid. 191 larger process of change. Applying this insight from communications engineering to problems of social change, Deutsch alerts us to the role of ideas in inducing or prompting social changes and suggests that it has relevance for studies of the conditions favoring political reform or technological innovations in different countries. In deal ing with problems of social and political development, the search for "promising instabilities," that is, instabilities relevant for possible innovation should be rewarding.23 Secondly, the selectivity of receivers is related to, among other things, the richness and specificity of infor mation already stored in them. The selectivity of the receiver in receiving information is illustrated by Deutsch by the relatively crude example of the relationship between lock and key. Obviously, the effectiveness of any key in turning a particular lock depends only slightly on the energy with which it is turned and far more on the corres pondence of the configuration of its notches with the con figuration of the tumblers (i.e., the richness and speci- 24 ficity of information) in the lock. The good thing about this concept of "information” is that it can be measured and counted and thus the perfor mance of communications channels in transmitting or 23Ibid., pp. 275-76. 24Ibid.. p. 276. 192 distorting information can be evaluated in quantitative terms. The fact that social scientists may have to use some of the cruder rather than the more refined methods for measuring the amounts of stored or transmitted infor- 25 mation does not bother Deutsch. If we can measure information, no matter how crudely, then, he argues, we can also measure the cohesion of organizations or societies in terms of their ability to transmit information with smaller or larger losses or distortions in transmission. The smaller the losses or distortions, the more cohesive is the organization and the more efficient is a given communications channel or a given chain of command. It is this central concept of information that Deutsch applied in his first major study. Nationalism and Social Communication, where he conceptualizes a cultural or ethnic community as a network of communication channels and a political system as a network of such channels and chains of command and then proceeds to measure the inte gration of individuals in a people by their ability to receive and transmit information on wide ranges of different topics with relatively little delay or loss of relevant 26 detail. The usefulness of his conceptual scheme for the study of traditional societies is pointed out by Deutsch, 25lbid., p. 277. 26 K. w. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communica tion, op. cit., pp. 70-74. 193 when he suggests that the ability to communicate widely and effectively on nontraditional topics may be relevant for the cohesion and learning capacity of peoples and political systems in countries undergoing rapid indus- 27 trialization. In political systems that are suffering from all kinds of internal cleavages and conflicts, the information approach offers an independent way of not only measuring basic cohesion, but also of showing the extent and depth of the remaining area of effective mutual com munication among its members. This way Deutsch suggests help us in predicting the chances for strongly unified behavior of the political system in particular situations 2 8 of serious conflict and crisis in a political system. The Concept of Feedback Rejecting the classic equilibrium model that has dominated social sciences for so long, Deutsch suggests a model of dynamic equilibrium from the field of electronic communication, which is based on the principle of feedback. The thermostats in our homes, automatic elevators in our office buildings, guided missiles and anti-aircraft guns all are bases on feedback mechanisms. In such systems, 27 Deutsch, "Communication Models and Decision Systems," in J. C. Charlesworth (ed.). Contemporary Poli tical . . . ," op. cit., p. 278. 28Ibid., pp. 278-79. 194 first of all, an initial major internal imbalance or dis equilibrium will be reduced. This inner disequilibrium must be of a particular kind, such that it can be reduced by bringing the whole system into some particular relation vis-a-vis the outside world. This relation of the system to the outside world is called its goal. Secondly, in order for the system to approach the goal effectively the feedback condition must be given, which implies that the system must receive information concerning the changes in its distance from the goal brought about by its own performance. Thirdly, the system must be able to respond to this information by further changes in its position or behavior, so as to attain its goal. And finally, if these changes are effective and the system reaches its goal, 29 some of its inner drive usually will be lowered. The similarity of these processes of steering, goal seeking and homeostasis (autonomous control by which certain states like body temperature are maintained at an even level) to certain processes is strikingly illustrated by Deutsch. Political systems may seek goals in domestic and foreign policies. The attainment of such goals requires, in terms of Deutsch1s model, that they guide their be havior by a stream of information concerning their own position in relation to these goals; their remaining dis tance from them and the actual results of their own most --------- jb-------------------- Ibid., p. 280. 195 recent steps to approach them. Again, governments like homeostatic systems try to maintain some state of affairs they consider desirable. In order for them to succeed in doing so they must receive information concerning the extent and rate of disturbances so as to be able to guide the magnitude and speed of their countermeasures. One advantage of feedback analysis is that it per mits us to identify and in principle to measure a number of elements in either goal-seeking or homeostatic process in terms of which the efficiency of a feedback system in reaching its goal can be measured. Four such measurable factors suggested by Deutsch are: (1) load, (2) lag, (3) gain, and (4) lead.^ Another advantage of a feedback model is that it permits us to ask a number of significant questions about political systems that are usually not even raised in traditional analysis. The load in terms of information theory is the extent and speed of changes in the position of the target relative to the goal seeking system. Here we can raise questions about the amount of load on the political system or any of its sub-systems, that is, we want to measure the amount and rate of change in the domestic or international situation with which the political system must cope. 30 Ibid., p. 283. 196 The lag refers to the amount of time between the reception of information concerning the position of the target and the taking of steps in the goal-seeking behavior system. The greater its lag in relation to its load, the less likely is a system to reach a changing goal (or moving 31 target). The above relationship suggests many new ques tions for political scientists in analyzing the causes and consequences of the lag between the emergence of a new situation and the execution of responding decisions. The gain is the amount of actual change in behavior that results. Relating this factor to political systems would raise such questions as: what is the speed and size of the reaction of a political system to new data it has accepted? How quickly do political systems or sub-systems respond with major recommitments of their resources? The lead is defined as the distance of the accurately predicted position of the moving target (goal) from the actual position from which the most recent signals were 32 received. The greater this lead in terms of time, the greater is the probability of hitting the target (or rea ching the goal). "The changes of success in goal-seeking are always inversely related to the amounts of load and lag. Up to a point they may be positively related to the amount of gain, although at high rates of gain, this 31Ibid. 32Ibid.. p. 284. 197 relationship may be reversed; and they are always positively 33 related to the amount of lead. The idea of lead applied to political systems means in effect the capability of a government to predict and to anticipate new problems effectively. It is very clear that all kinds of intriguing ques tions relating to political systems can be raised with the help of the conceptual vocabulary of cybernetics. The overall performance of political decision systems will depend upon the interplay of all the factors discussed above. Deutsch believes that not only objective analysis and evaluation of political systems in terms of efficiently reaching their goals but also normative evaluation (in terms of the kind of personality and character they produce and the kind of opportunities of individual development they offer) is made posible in quantified measurable 34 terms by his cybernetic approach. Critical Evaluation The foregoing analysis presented a broad and general explication of Deutsch's cybernetic model and attempted to discuss its relevance, utility, and significance for the study of political phenomena. Now, we may turn our 33Ibid. 34Ibid., p. 286. 198 attention to a critical evaluation of the cybernetic model. Deutsch has produced a highly original and abstract work which undoubtedly establishes him among the seminal poli tical thinkers of our time. The ambitious goal which Deutsch sets for himself is no less than providing a fresh general frame of reference for the political science discipline in terms of the cybernetic model and suggesting fruitful guidelines for research of traditional concerns not only of political science but also of political philo- 35 sophy within this new framework. The Nerves of Govern ment is an intellectual tour de force both in terms of its brilliant execution and remarkable success in attaining its stated goals. Visualizing political systems as being charged with the task of "steering" and manipulating human behavior, Deutsch suggests that they must collect information about internal and external environment process and store it and render decisions on the basis of it. Thus he be lieves that the models of cybernetics, communications flows, and feedback processes will prove to be suggestive and productive analogies for the qualitative and quantitative study of political systems. His work provides a series of ingenious insights and fresh vistas for research that 35 Holt and Richardson, "Competing Paradigms in Comparative Politics,1 1 op. cit. , p. 40. 199 are relevant to the performance stability and adaptability of political systems or sub-systems. It is a measure of Deutsch's stature as a political thinker that in spite of his commitment to empirical theory and value-free science and unlike some hard core methodo logists he sets himself to the much needed task of inte grating some of the perennial and compelling normative issues (e.g., nationalism, cosmopolitanism, individual development, and freedom) of politics within his cybernetic model. Another merit of Deutsch1s work is that he uses the concepts of cybernetics to develop rigorous definitions of some widely yet loosely used terms in social science literature, for example, “consciousness," "development," "will," "power," "integrity," and "dignity," thereby we have the promise of a social science able to deal mathema tically with several issues that have hitherto remained amenable only to analysis on a philosophical plane. In a discipline which in its long and chequered history has not had the benefit of explicit conceptuali zations and models that could serve as its frame of refer ence, ad hoc subject-wise or topic-wise conceptualization has been the established practice. In more recent times the equilibrium model either implicitly or explicitly has profoundly affected the cognitive, evalutive, and research orientation of a large number of political scientists. 200 The drawbacks of the equilibrium model are by now familiar to most political scientists who are engaged in a frantic search after more appropriate "models' 1 that will bring our disciplline to post-Newtonian age. Professor Deutsch certainly deserves the compliments of our discipline for discovering a strikingly suitable model* Neither the fact that cybernetics is intellectually fashionable in today's world, nor because it comes ready-made with a mathematical apparatus is in itself important; its signifi cance lies in the realization that communications and control--the two basic processes of political decision making— are embodied in its conceptual scheme. The cybernetics model in the concepts of "information" and "feedback," as some scholars have suggested, provides both the means and the measure of the adaptiveness or non adaptiveness of a system to a changing critical environment. Finally, we seem to have found a "dynamic equilibrium" model that can do justice to the world of constant change and flux that we call politics. Notwithstanding Deutsch's remarkable achievement, we cannot conclude this discussion without raising some serious problems in regard to his formulation. Whereas when we examine it in terms of Deutsch*s avowed aim of presenting a "point of view" and a "body of ideas and suggestions" it certainly attains brilliant success, but 201 if we look at it as a serious attempt at scientific para digm building, the results turn out to be mixed if not wholly disappointing. Whereas different "perspectives," "conceptual schemes," and "frameworks" are necessary and helpful in opening up new avenues for research and providing fresh angles from which political systems could be looked at, the serious task of scientific advance in the field remains unattended. In view of its panoramic breadth and essential eclecticism, serious doubts may be raised about its legitimacy as a new general theory of political systems.^ The central weakness of Deutsch*s model is that it does not go very much beyond the level of an insightful prolegomena in the direction of a serious attempt at rigo rous general theory construction. A wealth of insights and rich applications of the basic cybernetics model relevant to the structure, process, and performance of political systems are suggested, but where do we go from there? It is only possible to progress from his cardinal concepts— information, feedback, and channel— to his par tially articulated theoretical model, and then to deduction of theorems only by intuitive processes. Of the few logi cal deductions from his model (theorems), very few are confirmed in his work. Maybe this is harsh criticism. 202 and failure to confirm the deductions from his model, after all, should not be held against the author. However, it is this task which is cardinal to the scientific advance of our discipline. Holt and Richardson assert, on the basis of personal experience, that the disarming simplicity with which Deutsch suggests applications of his cybernetic model are very deceptive and believe that a serious attempt to work within his theoretical model will require a painstaking 37 task of methodological restructuring. Deutsch's ingenious application of the cybernetics model to the Btudy of political systems persuades us to believe that a rigorously developed cybernetics model may have exciting possibilities for scientific analysis of political life, but that task remains incomplete, for the theorems derived by Deutsch in many cases are the product of his brilliant intuitive insights rather than logical formulations. It is quite possible that the theorems derived from cybernetic theoretical model may resemble the intuitive insights presented by Deutsch but cybernetics today offers no laws describing what kinds of information flow structures are necessary to produce various dimensions 38 of intelligent behavior. In view of our limited knowledge 37Ibid., p. 41. 3®M. E. Maron, Cybernetics," International Encyclo pedia of the Social Sciences, III, op. cit. , 5-<>. 203 of cybernetics, there exists only the faintest outlines of such organizational principles. This does not, however, contradict the thesis that such design principles exist, 39 can be described, and can be implemented. Aside from the problems of rigorous theory building in terms of the cybernetics model, we may raise some questions in regard to its applicability in the analysis of political systems. While accepting the fact that in Deutsch1s hands the cybernetic analogy produces some very exciting and interesting insights, some scholars see diffi culties in using it as a workable model for the study of political systems. On a structural level the question can be raised: Will the same model, its principles, and equations, that may be useful for relatively closed and formally structured electronic systems produced by men to fulfill pre-set goals, also open, be useful for multi functional, relatively loosely structured and pluralistic human societies? Is it really possible to effectively measure the messages received, contained, and recombined in the minds of decision makers and non-decision makers at various levels of hierarchy in a political system? Assuming that this were possible, the mind simply staggers at the thought of mapping the ever shifting channels and 204 flows of Information in any complex society. It may also be argued that the cybernetic model when applied to political systems or society produces confusion of theory and oversimplification of problems. The significance of this criticism can be well illustrated with reference to the transmission of "information." "Communication" is a mechanical process in electronic communications systems and the term implies nothing with respect to the meaning of transmitted patterns or the socio- psychological or cultural processes of interpretation. It is a matter of common knowledge among social scientists that the meaning of symbols in communication is a function not of their fixed patterns alone but of fixed patterns and variable social and cultural contexts. Again symbols are interpreted by individuals who react to the symbols differently with regard to the situations or the actors who use them. If we give recognition to all the dynamic variables that we have noted in the process of the transmission of information, we find that the cybernetic model loses its seductive simplicity. It may be highly prolific in suggesting fascinating analogies, but actual normal re search, either in terms of theory articulation or empirical 40 Herbert S. Lewis, American Anthropologist, 66 (1964), 965. 205 investigation pose serious if not insurmountable problems. The falacy of equating mechanical "information" transmission with meaningful communication has been com pounded by further pairing with the exceedingly abstract nations of "power," "will," "consciousness" and "culture." We cannot completely accept the author's claim that in the mere fact of such measurement of information we have a new key to our problems in social sciences. Turning our attention now to problems of operation alization of his theory, we cannot fail to note that Deutsch's serious commitment to systematic research is fully extended and he presents many researchable descrip tive and analytical hypotheses. Yet one cannot escape the gnawing feeling that he should have devoted more time to operationalization of some of his major ideas or at least should have focused on one real case for extensive analysis. In spite of the fact that, the cybernetic model is intellectually fashionable in the climate of the present day social sciences, considerable controversy still rages about its usefulness. Some regard it as the best link 41 between psychocultural and political knowledge. Some others regard the concepts of communications theory ^Charles A. McClelland, "Communications: inter national Aspects," The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 111, op. cit. 99. 206 rewarding because "they span the traditional gap between the psychology of behavior and physiology of those mechanisms that generate behavior including cognitive behavior. . . The language of cybernetics may prove rich 42 and versatile enough to permit the theory of knowledge." Some admire the parsimony of the cybernetic model as one of its strongest features, in as much as it seeks to 4 3 explain everything in terms of communications. On the other hand N. Wiener, the founding father of communications theory, has expressed some reservations about its application to the social sciences: I mention this matter because of con siderable and I think false hopes which some of my friends have built for the social efficiency of whatever new ways of thinking this book [Cybernetics] may contain...the main task of the immediate future is to extend to the fields of anthropology, of sociology, of economics, the methods of the natural sciences in the hope of achieving a like measure of success in the social fields. From believing this necessary they come to believe it possible. In this I maintain, they show an excessive op timism. . .44 *2Maron, op. cit. 5. 43 Michael Haas, "International Relations Theory” in Michael Haas and Henry Kariel (eds.), Approaches to the Study of Political Sciences (Pennsylvania: Chandler Pub lishing Co., 1970), 458.--- **As quoted in Deutsch, The Nerves of Government, op. cit., 189. 207 We do not know whether Wiener has changed his mind after he read The Nerves of Government. On our part, we feel that, in spite of the many research undertakings stimulated by Deutsch*s work, their theoretical import has been rather limited. The potential of this model in organizing power has not been reac hed and yet seems reachable. A consensus of opinion among serious scholars seem to be emerging to the effect that the accumulation of confirmed hypotheses is the best route to general theory. Deutsch*s valiant effort (in spite of some of the short comings that we noted) to build an operational model of political systems, his serious commitment to systematic analysis and the wealth of testable hypotheses that he offers, go a long way in paving the foundations for a general theory in political science. Easton: Systems Model Our discussion of macrotheoretical approaches in comparative politics would be incomplete without reference to David Easton's work, who is perhaps the most well known exponent of systems analysis in political science. Easton's work obviously shows his familiarity as well as his 208 indebtedness to general systems theory and structural- functional analyses; however, he believes that his two recent theoretical publications represent "strategy toward a general theory substantially different" from the other 45 general theoretical frameworks. It should be noted at the outset that neither Easton nor any other reputed scholar has utilized the Eastonian "systems analysis" for the study of political development yet the pervasive popularity of "systems analysis" in political science demands that Easton's "systems analysis" be examined to determine its usefulness for the study of political devel opment . Our task fortunately has been facilitated by the fact that the basic elements of Easton's paradigm are very succintly stated in Chapter II of his A Systems Analysis of Political Life and in an article entitled "Categories for the Systems Analysis of Politics" which he offered as an overview of the paradigm developed in both of his major theoretical volumes.46 The implications of his paradigm 45 David Easton, "Categories for the Systems Analysis of Politics” in David Easton (ed.) Varieties of Political Theory, (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1966)p. TT3. See'also his A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York, John Wiley 6 Sons, Inc., 1$65); A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New j'ersey,Prentice-Hall, Inc., 209 for comparative politics are noted by Easton in his earlier work: The fruitfulness of the approach is suggested by its implications for the comparative study of political institu tions. Given the discovery of similar or identical tasks in every political system, contemporary or historical, it would then be possible to examine com paratively the way in which these insti tutions fulfill the same tasks under differing conditions in each political system. Political science would then be in a position to draw generalizations that pass beyond the experience of any one political system or of the systems in any one culture or civilization. Let us first review some basic elements of the Eastonian paradigm. Easton's is the earliest attempt to provide an operational model of the political system "as those interactions through which values are author itatively allocated for a society."48 "Political interac tions in a society," he states, "constitute a system of behavior which is analytically separable from the total social system."49 Easton's systems analysis is concerned essentially with the fundamental question of how author itative decisions are made and executed for a society. The system operates through interrelated activities within. 47David Easton, The Political System (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1953), p. 319. 48 David Easton (ed.). Varieties of Political Theory, op. cit., p. 147. 49Ibid., p. 144. 2X0 but analytically separate from, the rest of the social system and distinct from the environment. The political system framework is represented diagrammatically thus: # A? £At T FIGURE II Political System The first requirement of Easton's systems analysis is to identify the political system by its fundamental units and to establish its boundaries. Thus it is possible to discriminate between the essential variables within the system (the allocation of values and the relative frequency of compliance), the environmental variables that influence the system and the outputs and outcomes of the system. Easton discusses some properties of a political system. The units of the political system are identified as political actions, structured in political roles and 211 political groups. Second, political systems have members. Some members who usually speak in the name of or in behalf 50 of the system are designated as the "authorities." Third, the boundaries are defined by all those actions which are more or less directly related to the making of binding decisions for society. Fourth, political systems have inputs and outputs. He identifies the inputs as consisting of "Demands" and "Supports." Demands provide the "information" which the system must process and the energy and resources needed by the system. The volume and multiplicity of demands leads to political activity (authoritative allocation of values) because, not only not all demands can be satisfied but satisfaction of some of them requires a special organized effort by society. "Support" is another aspect of inputs. "Support" is identified as the energy or resource, in the form of actions or orientations which are needed to keep the system running. The domain of support, Easton states, must be examined in relation to three objects, namely, the poli tical community, the regime and the constitutional principals (rules of the game) which legitimate action and furnish authority. Easton, then, identifies the mechanisms of support. Mechanisms of support are the means by which a 50Ibid., p. 152. 212 steady flow of support is maintained for the system. Outputs can be a mechanism of support if the decisions made within the political system satisfy the continuing flow of day-to-day demands made upon it. Political socialization, i.e., the process by which members learn to appreciate and obsorb the political attitudes and orien tations of a political system, is identified as another mechanism of support. Fifth, the environment of the political system is identified as an important variable affecting it. The environment includes other sub-systems within the total social system, e.g., economy, ecology, demography, personality, social structure, culture, etc. These cons titute the major set of variables structuring i and shaping demands from outside the political system. The "ongoing culture" of society influences the goals, the style and the procedures of the system. The internal variables of the system include the system of representation, the nature of the constitution, etc. These also influence the charac ter and structure of inputs. Easton, goes into an elabor ate analysis explaining how inputs are transformed into outputs. Sixth, there is the concept of feedback. It is the feedback mechanism that connects authority and membership so that responses of members are communicated to authority and can produce further action by authorities. 213 Seventh, political outputs are considered as another property of political systems. "These are the decisions and actions of the authorities."^ Eighth, it is assumed that systems "must have the capacity to respond to disturbances and thereby to adapt 52 to the conditions under which they find themselves." Ninth, they may be subjected to stress. Tenth, systems have empirically discoverable "life processes," i.e., "those fundamental functions without which no system could endure, together with the typical modes of response 53 through which systems manage to maintain them." At first glance Easton's conceptual scheme appears to be neat and elegant. There is a system operating in the environment. It has inputs (demand and support) and outputs (decisions and actions of authorities) which are connected by a feedback which generates further action and keeps the system of action in operation. However, the charming simplicity of Easton's model disappears as he begins to deal with the complex conceptual problems that inevitably arise in any attempt to develop an all- embracing conceptual framework. ^Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, op. cit., p. 344. 52 Easton, Varieties of Political Theory, p. 146. 53Ibid., p. 153. 214 It is obvious that the concept "System" is of crucial importance in Easton's formulation for he asserts that "if the idea system is used with the rigor it permits and with all its currently inherent implications, it provides a starting point which is already heavily freighted with 54 consequences for analysis." It would not be unreasonable to believe that Easton presents his "systems analysis" as a formal model whose deductive implications and logical consequences constitute a well developed body of theory. Indeed his clearly stated ambitious goal is: "to develop a logically interrelated set of categories, with strong empirical relevance that will make possible the analysis ( 55 of political life as a system of behavior. Here it seems very obvious that it is the general systems approach which Easton is talking about. However, he seems to reject this approach when he asserts that "we may define a system as any set of variables, regardless of the degree of interrelationship between them."56 By opting for a defini tion of "the system" that is so broad and all embracing Easton's model becomes virtually devoid of any theoretical 57 element. The concept "any set of variables regardless 54Ibid., p. 147 55Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, p. 25. 5®Eaeton, Varieties of Political Theory, p. 147. 57 Holt f c Richardson, The Methodology of . . op. cit., p. 44. 215 of the degree of interrelationship between them" is too loose to generate deductive implications and logical consequences. Easton's justification that he uses such a broad conception of "system" to avoid arguments about the reality of systems is not convincing for the argument 58 is really postponed rather than disposed. If Easton's model is to be something theoretically more important than an interesting set of descriptive categories he must settle the question whether a political system is 59 really a system. Indeed Easton assumes the existence of an empirical political system when he explains his view of the "systems analysis, ” thus: "Systems Analysis," as I shall conceive it takes its departure from the notion of political life as a boundary— maintaining set of inter actions embedded in and surrounded by other social systems 60 to the influence of which it is constantly exposed." An analytical mode of the political system, in order to be useful, must clearly distinguish the political from other aspects of total social behavior. Easton recog nizes this when he asserts: "[it] would be pointless, if 58 Meehan, Contemporary Political Thought 59 Richardson 6 Holt, op. cit., p. 44, p. 170. 60 Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, p. 25. 216 not impossible, to push ahead in our analysis and to con ceptualize political life as an open and self-regulating system, as I shall, unless it were feasible both analy tically and empirically to distinguish a political system from its total environment."®^ Easton's efforts to distin guish "political system" from other social systems are not totally successful. He states: "what distinguishes poli tical interactions from all other kinds of social inter actions is that they are predominantly oriented toward c 2 the authoritative allocations of values for society." Since authoritative allocation of values in society is a function that is also performed by other social systems like the family, church, business organizations and educational institutions, Easton tries to meet this difficulty by suggesting that such "parapolitical" systems of society are only "subsystems," whereas the "societal political system" (obviously the state) embraces a wider range and haB special legitimate coercive capacities to mobilize resources and support. It appears that Easton's attempt to delineate the "political" brings him into the uncomfortable position of equating the "political system" to the "national sovereign state." The key concepts em ployed in Easton's definition of "the political" namely 61Ibid., p. 48. 62Ibid., p. 57. 217 "authoritative" "society" "policy" are not logically pre cise; they are sometimes contradictory. In the final 6 3 analysis, "political" remains vague and ambiguous. Easton's analysis presents some serious internal difficul ties. Easton makes a distinction between systems persis tence of any kind of political system and systems mainten ance (of a particular kind of political system), claiming that the former concept is oriented towards explaining change as well as stability. But the theoretical potential of the concept is lost when we note that "persistence" as defined is only a definition and therefore unfalsifiable. Beyond these terminological and conceptual short comings, we may also question the goal of theory as ex pounded by Easton. The goal of behavioral science in Easton's conception is to "put kinds of questions that reveal the way in which the life processes or defining functions of political systems are protected."**4 Again, very much in the functionalist tradition, Easton is con cerned with "the basic processes through which the political system regardless of its generic or specific type, is able to persist in a world of either stability or change.” 63 M. Evans, "Notes on David Easton's Model of the Political System," Journal of Commonwealth Political Stu dies, 8(2), July 197B',"p."'117-133. ®*Eaaton, A Framework for Political Analysis, p. 99. 216 The justification as to why Easton selects these aspects for examination is neither explicit nor satisfactory. The essential variables of the system are defined as the capacity of a society to allocate values for its members 65 and assure their acceptance. Persistence is defined as the continuation of the capacity of a system to make 66 and execute binding allocations on its members. Stresses, are defined as activities that endanger the capacity to execute such binding decisions. In the Parsonian fashion, Easton has produced a whole universe of definitions, that are not tightly put together in a logically rigorous conceptual structure. A contemporary theorist assesses Easton's systems analysis in these devastating terms: "the result is a highly abstract structure that is logi cally suspect, conceptually fuzzy and empirically almost useless. Easton's "political system" turns out to be an abstraction whose relation to empirical politics is virtu ally impossible to establish. The promise of a conceptual framework with "high empirical reference" simply has not been fulfilled."67 65Ibid., p. 98. 66 Ibid., p. 87. 67 Meehan, Contemporary Political Thought, p. 174. 219 While systems theory is an excellent analytical tool and appears to be a useful integrative mechanism, it is a theory about systems not about human behavior. One must first build a theory about human behavior before adding systems theory. Neither systems theory nor mathe matical theory can be substituted for theory about human behavior without reducing its usefulness. However, there is all too often an assumption made that if one uses systems theory, one need not worry about the human elements in the theory, that is, systems theory is a good way of taking man out of social behavior. A lot of confusion has been generated by this blind worship of systems theory. We need to remember the admonition of Morton Kaplan that the first thing to be said about systems theory is that it is not a theory. It consists of a set of concepts. When the concepts of systems theory are employed to con struct theory in the area of political science, they can be usefuli when they are used to evade the problems of substantive theory they can be misleading. There is no such thing as theory in general. There is theory about some specific subject matter. Holt and Richardson, in their evaluation of Easton, conclude that although he employs some of the concepts 220 and terminology of conventional forms of "systems analysis," the propositions that are presented as a model, to further research do not go very far beyond a mere set of interes ting but adhoc statements about government. Easton's framework, by discarding the formal model of the general systems theorists, does not meet the fundamental require ments of a scientific paradigm and therefore does not contain the inherent deductive implications and conse- 68 quences for a whole pattern of analysis. The criticisms of Eastonian "systems analysis" touched upon above were mainly directed toward pointing up its shortcomings as a scientific paradigm or theoretical 6 9 model. However, if we look at Eastonian "systems analysis" not as a scientific paradigm, but a unified conceptual framework for the analysis of political life, a different picture will emerge. in the opinion of Prof. John C. Wahlke, Easton's systems analysis is a model of high-quality metatheory, that is, work about the problems of theorizing rather than the substantive results of 68 Holt & Richardson, The Methodology of . . ., p. 44-45. ®®See Chapters II in Holt t Richardson, The Metho dology . . . for a good discussion of a scientific paradigm. 221 70 theorizing. Easton's conception of the meaning of theory is Parsonian and he does not think of theory in terms of explanation but in terms of the production of conceptual 71 frameworks. Considered as a broad and unified conceptual frame work that would provide inventory of all the categories, variables and variety of data involved in the analyses of political life, Easton's "systems analysis'* marks an important landmark in the study of political science. Some further refinements and modifications of his framework will be needed as more scholars utilize this framework in their own research designs. First of all, it is important to provide a conceptual framework for dealing with the changing structure of a system and its activities or functions. Reacting against the overemphasis on struc tures that is characteristic of traditional and institu tional approaches in political science, Easton has neg lected serious concern with structural elements. Not only his approach to structures is over-static, but he also ignores that both structure and function may be viewed 70See John C. Wahlke's review of Easton's "A Frame work of Analysis" in The Annals of the American Academy, , 1966, pp. 179-180. 71 Meehan, Contemporary . . , p. 170-174. 222 72 as aspects of social process. He talks about the structural elements of a political system as a whole in terms of the political community, the regime and the authorities, but he has not yet furnished the analytical concepts required to analyze the concrete sub-systems of a 7 3 political system. Second, the total system is not an easily manageable entity. It is too unwieldly and cumbersome. The parts of the system are not isolated or independent but are constan tly in interaction with one another and with the environ ment. A serious difficulty in Easton's "systems analysis" grows out of this constant flux of the system. Political behavior is the consequence of the dynamics of interaction of the various parts of the system in their environment. Easton's effort in distinguishing system-maintenance from simple equilibrium analysis is very helpful but more con ceptual refinement is needed, so that while recognizing, that the parts of the system are, in constant interaction with each other, the scholar should be able for practical reasons to examine the system at as stationary a point in time as possible, to grasp relevant relationships of a suspended moment. 72Bertram Gross's review of Easton's book, in American Political Science Review, 61, March 1967, pp. 156-156.---------------------------- 73Ibid.. p. 157. 223 The problem of boundaries provides another difficulty in Easton's "systems analysis." This problem is aggravated when we attempt to analyze the political systems of the developing areas where the boundaries between political, economic and social systems become even- less salient and visible than in developed systems. If we accept Easton's "systems analysis" simply as a broad framework for the analysis of political life, it is essential to deal with many other aspects of perfor mance beyond a systems mere persistence. Easton is ambi valent in regard to his theoretical commitment to function alism, but his implicit commitment is evidenced by the typical functionalist questions raised by him in his "systems analysis." For instance, on several occasions Easton has said a systems analysis asks the most inclusive question of all, "How do any and all political systems manage to persist in a world of both stability and change?" and has answered this by stating: Ultimately the search for our answer will reveal what I have called the life processes of political systems - those fundamental functions without which no system could endure - together with the typical modes of response through which systems manage to sustain them. The analysis of these processes, and of the nature and conditions of the responses, Loosit as a central problem of politi cal theory.7' 74 Easton, A Systems . . . p. 17. 224 This overemphasis on questions of the system stability, persistence and survival blinds him to raise other important questions about political systems and their performance. For instance, we need concepts that permit us to answer the question: How does a system perform in producing various kinds of values in various quantities and qualities to satisfy the needs and demands of such- and-such kinds of individuals, groups and societies? The Eastonian model when applied in concrete historical situa tions would certainly need alterations and additions. The relationship between structure and performance needs fur ther elaboration and embellishment* In creating and developing new concepts and cate gories for the "systems analysis" of political life, Easton has performed a pioneering task but the job of understanding political life remains unfulfilled if we failed to explore in all its multi-dimensional complexity the interrelationships of society, its sub-systems, its environment and the political aspects of all three. Ber tram Gross characterizes the Eastonian system as a pre sputnik model, conceived of in disciplinary terms (in terms of political science) when the forward thrust in systems analysis, is inter- or supra-disciplinary.75 This may require that Easton must go further than what ha has done 75 Gross, op. cit*, p. 158. 225 in adapting and improving upon, concepts from other disci plines . Easton's "systems analysis" is neutral in terms of his preferences for any set of moral values or societal goals. In terms of hie conceptual framework, his major moral concern relates to the persistence of political systems. But political systems just do not exist in a moral vacuum. In his first major work Political System (1953) his forceful and convincing prescription related to the fact that students of general theory should seek moral clarity by providing the "categories for examining the moral premises out of which the theory itself emerged."*® Unfortunately Easton has sidestepped this vital aspect of analysis in his more recent works. Macrotheories like Eastonian "systems analysis" have a built-in quality of abstraction at the highest level, thereby providing a framework for analyzing all political systems. The hypotheses and generalizations generated by them are so braod as to give very little substantive picture of the actual operations of different kinds of political systems in different stages of their political development. This is not to deny the value of Easton's framework. Easton's systems analysis constituted an important landmark 76Easton, The Political System (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1953), p. 319. 226 in the development of political analysis from traditional, historical and institutional approaches to an approach that opened the way to a more systematic behavioral enquiry. His general theory of political systems as we noted earlier lacks the potential deductive power and theoretical richness of what Kuhn called a scientific paradigm, but its value lies in suggesting a frame of analysis that a political scientist needs if he is to ask the significant questions and to select the significant features of any political system he is examining. He was the first political scientist to characterize political phenomena in terms of a system of action. His conceptual ization of politics in terms of a political system, that exists in an environment, that responds to it as does any behavioral system, was an important step toward the scien tific study of politics. His systems analysis in terms of input-conversion-output-feedback-environment, emphasizes again and again the behavioral nature of political systems. In his major theoretical works Easton has presented a lucid and comprehensive account of "political systems ana lysis" as the recommended form within which a substan tive theory of political life can be cast. It was the cardinal theme of Easton's first major work The Political System published in 1953 that political science has lacked a systematic theoretical framework that would give meaning, coherence and direction to research and eliminate the 227 prevailing confusion as to the scope and nature of the discipline. Since then his systematic statement of the whole framework of political systems analysis as an approach to political study, has gone a long way in the fulfillment of his vision of political science as a discipline anchored in a unified conceptual framework. Indeed Easton might almost be considered the Political Scientists* Talcott Parsons.^ Almond’s Functional Model The most ambitious attempt to introduce a functional approach in contemporary political science has come from the writings of Gabriel Almond, who has applied in political analysis the structural-functional framework developed by 78 Parsons and Levy. Like Parsons in sociology and Easton in political science, Almond is engaged in a search for a "general theory of politics." Indeed, he seems to believe that his introductory essay in The Politics of the Develop ing Areas contain a "functional theory of the polity." 77 Eugene Meehan, Contemporary Political Thought, op. clt., p. 168 78 Gabriel Almond, "A Functional Approach to Compara tive Politician” in Gabriel Almond and James Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas, op. cit.; "A Develop mental Approach to Political Systems," World Politics, XVII (January, 1965); Political Development, op. cit.i and Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Poli tics: A Development Approach, pp. cit. 228 Almond believes that his functional theory of politics specifies the elements of the polity in such form as may ultimately make possible a probabilistic theory of politics. Almond's conception of a probabilistic theory of politics is stated by him very well in the following terms: . . . all political systems can be compared in terms of the relationships between func tions and structures. That is, in a par ticular political system at a particular interval of time, [sic] there is a given probability that function A will be performed by structure X (e.g., that political demands will be made by associational interest groups). This proposition assumes that all the political functions can, in some sense, be found in all political systems, and that all political systems, including the simplest ones, have political structures.79 The probability relationship, which ultimately can be presented in statistical and perhaps mathematical for mulation, remains the central concern of Almond's concep tion of theory building: What we have done is to separate political function from political structure. In other words, we have specified the elements of the two sets, one of functions and the other of strnctures, and have suggested that politi cal systems may be compared in the terms of the probabilities of the performance of the specified functions by the specified struc tures. In addition, we have specified styles of performance of function by structure which makes it possible for us at least to think 79 Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 30-31. 229 of a state of knowledge of political systems in which we could make precise comparisons relating the elements of the three acts-* functions, structures and styles'— in the „0 forms of a series of probability statements. Combining the elements of Weber, Parsons, and Easton, Almond defines the "political system" as "that system of interactions to be found in all independent societies which performs the functions of integration and adaptation (both internally and visa vis other societies) by means of the employment, or threat of employment of more or less legitimate physical compulsion." The many complicated problems associated with the definition of the term "system" in functional theory are ignored by Almond. He simply lists some properties of "systems” as: (1) comprehensive ness; (2) interdependence; (3) existence of boundaries; (4) every system has a structure; (5) the same functions are performed in all political systems; (6) all structures perform more than one function; (7) all systems are mixed, in the sense that they combine "traditional" and "modern" elements. Having defined the properties of his "political system," Almond gives us an analysis of sevenfold func tional categories in terms of input and output functions. 80 Almond, "A Functional. . . op. cit., p. 59. 81lbld., p. 7. 230 It should be noted here that they are not the "functional requisites" that are necessary elements of any functional theory, including Parsonian. The sevenfold schema is: A. Input Functions (political) 1. Political Socialization and Recruitment 2. Interest articulation 3. Interest aggregation 4. Political communication B. Output Functions (Governmental) 5. Rule-making 6. Rule-application 7. Rule-adjudication A typology of structures is produced for each of the above seven variables, together with a typology of styles asso ciated with each structure and all are defined in terms of a modified set of Parsonian pattern variables. In the foregoing analysis we have very briefly pro vided Almond's conceptual framework or as he calls it, "functional theory of polity." Now, we will discuss at some length, Almond's theory of political development that emerges from his functional approach to political analysis. Almond's Functional Theory of Political Development In Almond's scheme political development is impli citly assumed as the movement from a traditional polity to 231 a modern polity. The modern political system is distin guished from the traditional one on two major dimensions: (1) structural differentiation— structural-nondifferentia- tionj and (2) secular-theocratic culture. Almond identifies four input and three output functions that all political systems perform. A modern political system has differen tiated structures for the performance of these functions. Modern political systems are secular in their political cultures whereas traditional systems tend to be theocratic. In addition, Almond points out several secondary dimensions which distinguish the modern style from the traditional one. The modern styId of political socialisa tion is predominantly specific and universalistic. The traditional style of political socialization is predomi nantly diffuse and particularistic and tends to create loyalty to a specific local group and only indirectly to the large political system. The style of political recruit ment is measured on a continuum of ascriptive-achievement dimension, as well as on a particularistic-universalistic dimension. A modern polity has achievement and universalis tic criteria and conversely a traditional system is pre dominantly ascriptive and particularistic in recruitment criteria. The interest articulation function in a modern political system is performed by associational interest groups. The style of interest articulation in a modern 232 polity tends to be mamffest, specific, general, and instru mental; whereas in traditional political systems the interest articulation function is performed by other than associational interest groups in a latent, diffuse, par ticular, and affective style. The function of interest aggregation in a modern political system is performed by political parties in a secular, pragmatic, and bargaining style. Political communication function in a modern polity is characterized as autonomous, neutral, and pene trative. It is further distinguished from the traditional style of communication by its predominantly manifest, specific, generalistic, and neutral characteristics. Almond does not discuss the modern style of output functions with the same detail as he does the style of input func tions. In brief, Almond characterizes the modern political system as being structurally differentiated and secular and as a system in which the input functions are performed in 82 a particular specified style. In this initial formula tion of structural-functional approach, Almond implicitly conceived of political development in terms of the movement of the polity from the traditional to the modern pole. In recent formulations, he has refined his theory and gone beyond the simple identification of structures and func- 82Ibid., pp. 3-64. 233 tions of systems that give the system its identity. He points out the need to think of systems as functioning at different levels. One level of functioning involves the performance of the political system as a whole in its rela tions with other social systems and the environment, which Almond characterises as systems capabilities. He lists five categories of capability which any political system must perform in some measure. These five functional requisite capabilities are: (1) extractive, (2) regula- 8 3 tive, (3) distributive, (4) symbolic, and (5) responsive. The second level of functioning is internal to the system and refers to the conversion processes or functions— the particular way systems convert inputs into outputs. Obviously the kind of performance of the system in its environment (or capabilities) is related to the particular kind of structural-functional performance or conversion 84 inside the system. Political recruitment and socializa tion functions which indirectly affect the internal efficiency and operation of the system and hence its per formance are characterized as system-maintenance and adaptation functions* Almond concludes that the aims of comparative research on political systems must be: (1) to discover and compare capabilities and profiles summarizing 83 Almond, Political Development, op. cit., p. 190. 234 the flows of inputs and outputs between these political systems and their domestic and international environments; (2) to discover and compare the structures and processes which convert inputs into outputs; and (3) to discover and compare the recruitment and socialization processes which maintain these systems in equilibrium or enable them to 85 adapt to environmental or self-initiated changes. If the general theory of political system consists of the discovery of the relations among three different levels of functioning— capabilities, conversion functions, and system maintenance and adaptation functions--then the particular theory of political development is conceptualized as dealing with those transactions between the political system and its environment that affect changes in general systems performance capabilities that in turn are asso ciated with changes in the performance of the conversion 86 functions. in his most recent work, Almond has presented a lucid formulation of the nature and strategy of his theory of political development which is quoted in full here: The theory proposes that the structural and and cultural patterns of political systems and their related behavior in their domestic and international environments can be explained by the way they encountered and 85Ibid., pp. 205-6. 86lbld.. p. 191. 235 solved (or failed to solve) certain common problems of political growth. From a theo retical point of view, this required progress in two directions. First, we now had to specify the way in which changes in the envi ronment of political systems— pressure and threats from or new opportunities in the international environment, or the changes in domestic social structure and culture— triggered off structural, cultural, and functional changes within the political system. Thus the relationship between cen tral and local political organs, the homo- geneity-heterogeneity of the political culture, the structure of the party and interest group systems, the characteristics of the bureau cracy, in any political system, could be explained in terms of the particular ways in which this common set of environmental chal lenges affected the political system— the order in which they were experienced, their magnitude and intensity, and the ways in which elite groups responded to these challenges. Second, we began to appreciate that these structural and cultural changes brought about by environ mental challenges had to be viewed as instru mental to changes in the patterns of per formance of the political system as a whole in its domestic and international environ ments . ®' Since the performance of a political system, its conversion characteristics, and the operation ef its recruitment and socialization processes are explainable in terms of a particular history of interactions between the political system and its social and international environments, what Almond is proposing is an approach to political development in terms of systematic comparative history. This, he suggests, should be done with a common 87Ibid., p. 23. 236 coding scheme, a set of categories and hypotheses about 88 their interrelations. Almond maintains that if we could get good measures of the flow of inputs and outputs in political systems over a period of time, we should be able to relate cultural and structural changes for the evalua tion of a political system in terms of sets of scores of performances according to standards specified by political elites and philosophers, as a means of bridging the gap between behavioral and normative approaches to the study of political development. He speculates about the possibility of developing and computing a "liberty score," a "justice score," and a "welfare score,” so as to be able to measure a political system*s performance in terms of ethical scores. Almond*s Functional Theory -- An Assessment The following critique of functional theory will 89 focus essentially on the work of Gabriel Almond. Host of our comments and criticisms, however, will be applicable 8<Ibid., pp. 219-20. 89 See the following for some general criticisms of the structural-functional approach: Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1061); Carl 6. tiempel, "The Logic of Functional Analysis," in L. Gross (ed) Symposium on Sociological Theory (Evanston: Row, Peterson and Co., 1959); Max Black, "Some Questions About Parson's Theories," in Max Black (ed.), The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons, op. cit.; Robert Brown, Explanation In Social Science (Chicaqo: Aldine, 1963); Richard S. Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966); Kingsley Davis, The Myth of 237 to the works of other noted functionalists in political science, e.g., Fred Riggs, David Apter, William Mitchell, Robert Holt, and J. Coleman. The "functional theory" of "political systems" has been subjected to a variety of criticisms. For the sake of clarity and systematic organization of material, we will address our inquiry first to some general criticisms of functionalism, and then proceed to the following problems in Almond's formulation: (1) the theoretical legitimacy of Almond's functional model; (2) the conceptual and terminological problems; (3) the failure to define relationships, among its several analytical concepts; (4) the problems of application of Almond's func tional theory to the study of political development; (5) the confusion of facts with values; (6) the failure to deal with questions of values. Through the influence of Merton, Levy, and particu larly Parsons, structural-functionalism seems to have Functional Analysis," American Sociological Review, 24 (1959); Martin Landau, "On the Use of Functional Analysis in American Political Science," Social Research 35, 1 (1968); w. G. Runciman, Social Science and Political flheory (Cambridge; The University Press, 1963). 238 attained new heights of academic acceptance in current political science literature. Its impact has been parti- cularly pronounced since the publication of Almond and Coleman's modern classic, The Politics of the Developing Areas. In a recent commentary by William Flanigan and Edwin Fogelman, which attempts to evaluate and assess the the impact of functional theory in political science, the authors hold the view that "it is not too much to say that we are all functionalists now." They suggest that func tionalism has taken three different forms in political science: eclectic functionalism, empirical functionalism, 90 and structural-functionalism. In spite of its current popularity as a useful framework for the analysis of some significant problems in the cross-national and cross- cultnnal study of political systems and political develop ment, we cannot ignore some serious limitations of this approach. For one thing, it is grand system approach with 91 neo-Hegelian overtones. It is on the whole a tiresome method of working and in its Parsonian formulation remains excessively pompous and incomprehensible. The problems of 90 William Flanigan and Edwin Fogelman, "Functionalism in Political Science," in Don Martindale (ed.). Functional ism in the Social Sciences (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1965). 91 David Apter, Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization, op. cit., p. 5. 239 operationalizing its concepts for empirical research remain intractably difficult and they seriously curtail its usefulness. "Functional explanations" require at a minimum, the concept of a system, a statement of the rules of inter action within that system, definition of the various states of the system, a list of the functional prerequisites of the system, and some knowledge of the mechanisms by which 92 systems function and adjust. The quality of a functional explanation will obviously depend upon the degree to which these difficult requirements are met. In political science, in view of the relative newness of this approach and in view of the rather casual and dilettantic attitude toward this approach, the exacting requirements of adequate func- 93 tional explanations are rarely fulfilled. Furthermore, functional explanations are usually weak because of the difficulty of stipulating the rules of correspondence between concept and empirical data. Another major source of confusion in functional explanations arises because of the facility with which unwarranted assumptions can be introduced into them, as the grand system is vulnerable to such laxity. 92 Eugene Meehan, Contemporary Political Thought; A Critical Study, op. cit., pp. !tfrti"l61. 93 Martin Landes, op. cit., p. 49. 240 The central concepts of functionalism are intractable to precise definition. The concepts of "system," "func tion," and "structure" are all susceptible to a variety of divergent connotations and contradictory interpretations which creates more confusion than clarity. In view of the difficulty of meeting the logical and scientific require ments of functional theory, most theorists relax their standards and criteria of scientific rigor, thereby diluting the explanatory power of their propositions. In this context, Kingsley Davis is quite right in insisting that functional analysis is not distinguishable from analysis 94 in general. This also explains why we are all func tionalists now. Turning to the application of functionalism in political science, we notice that although functionalism is accepted by a large percentage of scholars, yet most of them use it as a broad analytical frqaawork rather than as a theoretical model for seeking explanations. More specifically in the area of "political develop ment," most scholars seem to be enamored of the functional approach, but their own works employ traditional historical and institutional approaches to provide explanations in the jargon of functionalism. David Apter characterizes some 94 Kingsley Davis, op. cit. 241 distinguished writers in the area of "political development 95 studies" as neo-institutionalists. Let us now turn our attention more specifically to Almond's "functional" theory. The first problem that attracts our attention in regard to Almond's formulation of functional theory is the basic issue; Is Almond's approach to functional theory real or nominal? On the one hand, Almond is generally accepted as the leading exponent of functionalism in political science, on the other, some leading scholars, including, functionalists consider his functionalism as merely nominal. For example, Holt and Richardson question the theoretical validity of Almond's functional theory and Meehan argues that Almond's formula tion of the functional theory is simply a classification scheme that can be used to order data, and that it is func- tionalism in name only. Similarly, S. E. Finer contends that Almond's effort to use a "systems" model is not only unnecessary but positively confusing. He seriously ques tions the validity of Almond's theory and cogently argues 97 that it is not a functional theory. 95 Apter, Some Conceptual. . ., op. cit., p. 8. 96 Holt and Richardson, op. cit., pp. 34-37} Meehan, op. cit., p. 176 97 S. E. Finer, "Almond's Concept of 'The Political System:1 A Textual Critique," Government and Opposition, 5, 1 (1969-70), pp. 3-21. 242 Apart from questioning the very legitimacy of Almond's "functional theory," scholars have raised many theoretical and conceptual objections to his formulation. The major thread that runs through most such criticisms is the view that Almond fails to show that his use of the con cept "function" is scientifieally viable. Zt is argued that his use of the term is tautologous and that there is no connection between his proposed seven functional cate- 98 gories and functional theory. This writer agrees with this major theoretical criticism of Almond. Once it is accepted that Almond's functional categories are not derived from a theoretical model of functionalism, it follows that there is no logical compulsion to use his cate gories. Almond advances no theoretical reason why he selects these seven particular functions rather than others, except to state that he derives them from his observation 99 of the operation of Western democratic political systems. Zn effect, Almond is accepting the fact that his "func tional theory" is not really functional in a theoretical sense, but rather that it provides a checklist of inter esting functions which could be used as categories for Qg R. E. Dowse, "A Functionalist's I*>gic," World Politics, 18, 4 (July, 1966), pp. 607-622. 99 Almond, "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in Gabriel Almond and James Coleman (eds.), op. cit., p. 16. 243 cross-national and cross-cuLtunal comparisons. Indeed, the concept of "functional requisites" does not appear in Almond's essay. It should be obvious to any student that a classification of functional categories does not fulfill the requirements of "functional theory."100 Problems of terminology and definition also impair Almond's analysis. The lack of clarity in the definition of basic concepts and a certain degree of confusion in their logical relationships makes it very difficult to determine the theoretical usefulness of Almond's paradigm. Almond has borrowed heavily from Pareenian terminology of func tionalism, yet the usage in Almond does not correspond to the meaning of the terms in the Parsonian system. For instance, he uses the concept of "function" but does not refer to a system in which the function has meaning. Again, Almond employs the Parsonian "ppttern variables" but not as dichotomies. Since the pattern variables are considered as continua and not dichotomies, the outcome of interactions among the variables remains uncertain. Almond's essay provides a good illustration of the difficulties and pit falls involved in wholesale borrowing of concepts without regard to the context from which they were separated.101 100Holt and Richardson, op. cit., p. 35. 101Meehan, op. cit., p. 176. 244 "Systems" are defined by Almond as sets of inter actions, but neither "system" nor "interaction" is defined. Combining the Parsonian, Weberian, and Gastonian defini tions, Almond defines the "political system" as "that system of interactions to be found in all independent societies which performs the functions of integration and adaptation by means of the employment, or threat of employ- 102 ment, of more or less legitimate physical compulsion." Now, Almond's conception of the "political system" is not only too loosely defined, but contains ambiguities that create some confusion in his analysis. The meaning of "independent” remains unexplained and its relation to terri tory is left open. The "political system" we are told, coexists and interacts with other "systems” in the society, but these other systems are a residual category and left specifically undefined. Almond talks of the "boundary" which implies that there are "points where other systems •ad and the political system begins," but the boundary drawn by Almond, which distinguishes it from other systems, namely, the unique attribute of being "political," is not analytically viable. The identification of political system with the use of legitimate ph$*i£al coercion in societies, leads to a confusion between analytical and 102 Almond, A Functional Approach. . ., op. clt., p. 7. 245 103 existential boundaries. In effect, Almond identifies the state with the political system, which is considered by some scholars as a narrow view of the political system as a subsystem of the society. Spiro contends that "the poli tical system is more important, moee encompassing and 104 'greater1 than the social system." Almond's definition is not only narrow but betrays a formalistic notion of politics not far removed from the "sterile" institutionalism against which Almond claims to have been rebelling. Finer wonders whether this narrow definition of the "political system" will embrace those primitive polities on whose behalf this conceptual scheme has been undertaken. There are certainly societies that just do not use coercive sanctions. Weber and Lasswell's famous definition of "politics" define it as an "activity" which is ubiquitous in society, being found in any kind of group, not just in "the political system." The distinguishing quality of the political system is not the legitimate exercise of physical coercion, but the possession of paramountcy or sovereignty over all other 103 See Herbert Spiro's review of Almond's "Compara tive Polities," in The Journal of Politics, 23, 3 (1967), p. 904. *°*Herbert J. Spiro, "An Evaluation of Systems Theory," in James C. Charlesworth (ed.), op. cit.,'go 170. 105Finer, op. cit.. p. 7. 246 groupings in society. Only one of the methods of exercising this sovereignty may be the use of physical coercion. We also experience some difficulty in understanding sose important attributes of Almond's analytical framework, tfiz.: (1) interdependence of parts; (2) the existence of a boundary; and (3) the concept of "subsystem autonomy." Almond's analytical framework is compatible with neither. The concept of "subsystem autonomy" is hardly applicable in totalitarfcaa political systems and it is also incompatible with the notion of interdependence of parts. The explana tory power of the criterion of interdependence is very limited unless the degrees and modalities of the interde pendence of parts are specified. Such criteria are never specified by Almond. The lack of rigorous definitions causes some confu sion in distinguishing Almond's "structures" and "func tions.” First, he does not explicitly define many of the structures like political party and interest group that are central in his analysis. There is a confusing tendency to define structures in terms of their functions. For instance, interest groups are defined as groups that arti culate interests; political parties are structures that aggregate interests. One serious problem in defining 106Ibid., p. 10 247 structures in this fashion is that propositions linking structure and function will be logical propositions empty of any empirical content. Almond's ambition of developing a probabilistic theory of the political system cannot be 107 accomplished in this way. Similar confusion can be noticed in Almond's ambigu ous, loose, and multi-sided conception of "function" which is either defined as marking a boundary or as a process. The logical relationship between "structure," "process," and "functions" remains ambiguous and ill-defined, thereby seriously impairing the theoretical aspects of Almond's 10 8 paradigm. We cannot clearly identify which propositions are theoretical and thus are empirically testable, and which are logical and true by definition. In sum, we cannot find a good researchable puzzle (problem) whose solution would help in the further articulation of Almond's para digm.109 Alexander Groth raises serious questions about the usefulness of Almond's functionalism in the study 6f poli- development.110 The widespread use of Almond's functional 10^Holt and Richardson, op. cit., p. 34. 10BIbid., p. 35. 109Ibid., p. 36. 110Alexander J. Groth, "Structural-Functionalism and Political Development: Three Problems," World Politics, 23, 3 (September, 1970), pp. 485-497. 248 approach is attributed to the obvious concessions or retreat from the empirical world. Almondian terms such as "interest articulation," "aggregation," "communication," "rule-application," "rule-making," "rule-adjudication," "state-building,” "political socialization," and "political culture," are very loose and capable of various interpreta tions. For instance, "aggregation of interests" before an American party platform committee is a clearly observable process. However, "aggregation" in the mental process of an African Tribal Chieftain may be no more than a theoreti cal instrument in the mind of outside scholars. Likewise, "articulation of interests" is a process which is at once so complicated and subtle, that we could hardly exclude anyone from the presumption of articulation. The imprecise, loose and broad connotation of Almondian terms which impairs their theoretical and practi cal usefulness is also illustrated by the concept of "political culture.” To claim that the behavior of citi zens and therefore of the political system is affected by the political culture of a society makes some sense, but such a proposition is far from precise to generate any empirically testable hypothesis. In order to be theoreti cally useful we need more precisely and unambiguously defined terms that are logically related to other terms in 111Ibid., p. 487. 249 an "if-. . .then" kind of proposition that can be empiri cally tested. For instance, unless we know (1) what kinds of "political culture" held by (2) what kinds of individuals are (3) pre-requisites to what kinds of behavior under (4) what kinds of circumstances, our ability to decide what value should be attached to what response, would be very limited.112 The generally low level of precision of Almondian concepts is further exacerbated when applied to existing political systems in developigg areas where it becomes difficult to distinguish between "political socialization," "political recruitment," and "political culture." The failure to define relationships among its seve ral concepts is certainly one of the major shortcomings of Almond's functionalism. All we learn in Almond's formula tion is that an impact upon any one part of the "system" produces an impact upon all other components of the system. But this kind of imprecise assertion of simple interdepen dence leaves us far short of a formula with which we can 113 begin to quantify data. What kinds of social and political activity may be universally regarded as evidence 114 of change" is not clearly articulated. 112Ibid., p. 488. 113Ibid., p. 490. 250 In sum* the central problem of functionalism* Its Inevitable disappointment* is that its functions— or real categories— could be safely reshaped and multiplied into all but infinite numbers— are roads which, lead everywhere and nowhere. 15 Almond's functional theory presents some universal axioms of political development. Briefly stated* political development in his theory involves a progression toward greater structural differentiation and increased specializa tion and secularization in the roles of those who compose these structures.116 Alexander Groth* having applied the Almondian universal criteria of political development to particular historical periods in recent American and British history contends that Almond 1 s functional universals of development are not really universals. He argues that differentiation and secularization are not necessarily 117 required in political development. Almond's attempt to use morally neutral categories in his characterization of political development cannot conceal his ideological preference for democracy. His model of political development is a close approximation to the Anglo-American conception of democracy. Implicit in his analysis of political development is the underlying 115Ibid.* pp. 491-492. 116Almond and Powell* op. cit., pp. 34-35. 117Groth, op. cit., pp. 492-499. 251 assumption that equates political development with democratization. The fallowing statement by Almond illus trates how his normative concerns might conflict with his role as a political scientist: The problem of generalization and predic tion . . . is of particular concern for two reasons. First, we are ethically concerned with the problems of political development and political change in the contemporary world. The ppospects for democracy and human welfare in many parts of the contemporary world are unclear and troubling. We regard the confusion and often threatening events of the last twenty years, and the search for solutions to the problems of instability and internal welfare as challenges to us as citizens and as political scientists. They are a part of the challenge to all the social scientists to help men describe, explain, and predict the events of social life in order that they may grapple with their problems in a rational manner.il® A major shortcoming of Almond's developmental model is that it is concerned with the characteristics and condi tions of modernization but offers no theory about the processes of political development. There is no systematic 119 way of locating any particular direction to social change. "How" and "why" structural differentiation and cultural secularization takes place is never fully articulated. Specific propositions relating various variables of struc 118 Almond and Powell, op. cit.. p. 300. 119 Chong-Do Hah and J. Schneider, "A Critique of Current Studies of Political Development and Modernization," Social Research, 35, 1 (1968), pp. 140-145. 252 tures and cultural components in logically Interrelated statements for empirical testing, that could further the i • articulation of his paradigm of political development, are difficult to find in Almond's work. A testable proposition in political development will give us the conditions under which certain political transitions occur. For instance, it will tell us which properties in the "traditional society" are most conducive to structural differentiation or institutional growth and which aspects 6f political cul ture are likely to become secularized. Almond rightly observes that all political systems are dualiatic that combine both "modern" and "traditional" elements. Yet, without a general theory of political development, he is unable to answer many of the questions about the mixed nature of American political system. For instance, why do certain structures in modern America (Black Panthers or southern whites) tend to resort to par ticularistic criteria for education, while the American public schools tend to have universal ones? How can American political party organizations and trade unions, dominated by oligarchic leadership, contribute to the egalitarian and democratic process of the American society? Such questions cannot be answered satisfactorily by ad hoc explanations, but require a generalized theory of political development. 120 Hah and Schneider, op. cit., p. 144. 253 Our recurrent concern with the failure of functional and other models of development to provide empirically testable hypothesis/ should not be assumed to lay claim to the view that overcoming that obstacle would solve all our problems in the study of political development. As David Apter in his recent study has argued, the problems of poli- tical development in the final analysis are problems of moral choices. The major dilemma for the modernizer comes in deciding the choice of the proper ratio of resources to 121 be spent on coercion and information. No amount of increased empirical knowledge of the linkage between "struc ture, " "function," and "system," can overshadow the cen trality of values in political development and choice. Functional theory fails to establish at least some under lying social and political relationships (values) as signi ficant "behavioral universals" for these allegedly neutral 12 2 goals of survival and adaptation. Finally, the conceptual, theoretical and methodologi cal problems of functional theory are exacerbated by the fact that empirical research with its concepts and cate gories becomes difficult because the latter have not been developed with a view to their operational ability. The 121 Apter, Some Conceptual Approaches. . ., op. cit., p. 6. 122 Groth, op. cit., pp. 498-499. 254 difficulties of operationalizing functional concepts limits the possibilities of empirical research. This difficulty must be solved before Almond's scheme may become a useful tool in comparative research. None of our criticisms however, in any sense invali dates tthe rich and diverse contributions of Almond's func tional theory. An objective assessment of Almond's contri bution cannot be made without reference to the infant state of scientific theory in political science. Comparing Almond’s functional theory with the highly developed scien tific paradigms in the physical sciences is to do an unwarranted injustice to his courageous efforts. Almond's effort must be seen as an important stage in the development of a general theory or scientific paradigm: the laying forth of an analytical framework. The need for such a general theory in political science is obvious. In the words of W. G. Runciman: . . . the fact remains that some form of functionalism is the only current alternative to Marxism as the basis for some kind of general theory in political science. . . . But its usefulness must be assessed by the value of the explanatory propositions to which it guides the investigator of a parti cular problem. It may, if nothing else, provide a framework for the comparative dis cussion of different political systems, for which the vocabulary of traditional political theory is no longer adequate. It may direct attention to causes and effects which would otherwise pass unnoticed. . . . It is only as a would-be general theory that it becomes 255 more likely to be misleading than helpful/ and to by-pass the search for the rigorous and testable statements of cause and effect out of which a political science is to be constructed.123 The spatial temporal and theoretical generality of func- 124 tionalism appears to be its strength. This suggests that it might well serve as a framework for a general theory of politics. The need for a general theory of politics is also emphasized by Herbert Spiro/ who considers "systems theory” indispensable to political science in all its branches. Whatever our main focus of inquiry, we can best approach answers to the questions we are raising by conceptualizing politics in terms not only systematic but systemic. Martin Landau affirms that structural-functionalism has constituted the most acceptable paradigm for the study of politics and administration in developed/ developing, and underdeveloped countries. It has generated, in his opinion, a considerable amount of theorizing and has moved 126 us toward the construction of Store rigorous theory. 123 W. G. Runciman, op. cit., pp. 122-123. 124 J. D. Hanson, "Functionalism in Political Science,” Political Scientist, 6, 1-2 (1970), pp. 1-11. 125 Spiro, "An Evaluation of Systems Theory,” op. cit., p. 165. 126 Landau, op. cit., p. 63. 256 Flanigan and Fogelman doubt the ability of func tionalism to provide a scientific theory of politics, however, they point out that it has enriched the discipline 127 in a variety of ways. Having discussed the need for a general framework for the study of politics, we may now turn our attention more specifically to Almond's contribution. In spite of the many shortcomings that we noted in Almond's formula tion, it is largely his contribution that the possibility of examining political life as a system is today on the agenda of theoretical research in political science. Until recently the comparative method as applied, has been essentially parochical, insufficiently contextual, inadequately systematic, unnecessarily restrictive in technique and only nominally comparative. It is the measure of success of Almond's functionalism, that within a decade it has become the most acceptable paradigm for the study of politics in western and non-western, developing and developed political systems. It has provided a unified and 12 8 universal framework for the study of politics. Almond's effort to provide a comprehensive checklist of functions and categories which, he claimed, all political systems from the very primitive to the very modern— perform 127 Flanagan and Fogelman, op. cit., p. 84. 128 Landau, op. cit., p. 63. 257 and by reference to which they can be compared, was a monu mental success. Professor MacKenzie believes that no one yet has improved on his analysis of the elements of the 129 polity. Almond's avowed ambitious goal was the development of a probabilistic theory of the polity containing theoreti cal propositions linking structures, functions, and styles. The lack of clarity in the definition of basic concepts and some confusion in their logical interrelationships has seriously limited the scientific quality of Almond's para digm, but it has certainly enriched the discipline of political science. First, there are several heuristic con tributions to political analysis: (1) it has sensitized political scientists to the complexity of interrelationships among social and political phenomena; (2) It has drawn atten tion to a whole social system as a setting for political phenomena; (3) It has encouraged considerations of functions served— particularly latent functions— by political actors or groups; (4) It makes it possible that political science gets its insights from other disciplines; (5) It puts concepts like stability, development, and change in a more theoretical framework; (6) It shows what theories political science now has or lacks; (7) And it aids in the formulation 129 W. J. MacKenzie, Politics and Social Science, New York: Pelican, 1967. 258 of broad and unspecific hypotheses that are helpful to empirical inquiry. Almond's framework provides a rich source of stimu lating research hypotheses. It emphasizes the reciprocal influence among all sorts of things— people, groups, norms, values, institutions, and wants. It gives common denomina tors for comparison among all kinds of political systems. It can lead to the development of specialized typologies of political systems and a basis for predicting the pattern of political development under various possible circumstances. Although Almond's functionalism provides analysis in macro terms, many scholars have been inspired by this approach to depart from analysis of the system as a whole and in restricting their focus to more manageable middle range problems, which are much more amenable to empirical research. Functionalism can be combined with theories of the micro-level. In sum, Almond's functionalism is by no means a fully developed scientific paradigm, but even as a loose analytic approach to the study of comparative politics and political development, it has made substantial contributions. 259 The Contributions of Macrotheories to the Study of Developing Areas In the preceding analysis we critically examined three major current macrotheories in the study of compara tive politics. It was not our intention to discuss the contributions of all major theorists. That task would be too formidable to handle in this study. It was decided to select one well known spokesman of each macrotheoretical approach and examine his theoretical contributions to the sub-discipline of comparative politics. The theoretical works of Karl Deutsch, David Easton and Gabriel Almond were examined as representing the three macrotheoretical approaches of "communications (cybernetics) systems," "systems analysis" and "functional analysis" respectively. The concept of system is crucial in all these approaches, although each of these approaches uses slightly different concepts, categories and terms. The task of a system theorist is to distinguish the system by drawing the boundaries between the system and its environment. To say that a system exists, however, he must be able to specify a set of elements and a set of relationships be tween the elements that are essentially invariant. The next task of a system theorist is to search for rules of interpretation which enable him to establish correspondence 260 between some aspect of nature and the structure of his model. Once, such correspondence is established, several interesting puzzles relating to the maintenance, adaptation, control, regulation and growth and decline of the systems can be posed for solution. Besides, an elaborate set of concepts and theorems can be brought to bear on the puzzle- solving enterpriseThe converging interests of all system theorist were noted by Karl Deutsch in a recent essay: General systems theory largely drew upon the early collaboration of biologists, mathemati cians and medical and social scientists. In time their interests came to overlap and con verge with the originally non-mathematical concepts of a social system developed by Talcott Parsons and his collaborators; with the interest of David Easton in the study of a political system; with Kenneth Boulding's interests in organization and economics; and with the interest in communication theory and cybernetics developed by Norbert Wiener and w. Ross Ashby.131 We have already discussed the usefulness and shortcomings of Deutsch1s cybernetic approach in the study of compara tive politics and political development. David Easton's "systems analysis," in spite of his protestations, essen- 132 tially follows the logic of functional analysis. in view 130 Holt a Richardson, op. cit.. pp. 37-38. ^^Deutsch, Approaches to the Study. . . , p. 88. 132 Jerone Stephens, The Logic of Functional and Sys tems analysis in Political~5cience, unpublished disserta tion , Indiana University, 1967, pp. 255-284. 261 of this fact, we will combine and examine in the following pages the contributions of Easton's "systems analysis" and Almond's "functionalism" to the study of developing areas. The emergence of several new nations in the post World War II period and the consequent problems of multi faceted developments in these states, caught political science at a time when it was already undergoing a metho dological revolution. At the intersection of these two revolutions was born a new sub-field of "political devel opment" studies within the field of comparative politics. The concept of the "political system" which is so crucial in all macrotheoretical approaches to the study of political life, signalized this revolution in political science. It broke new grounds for the study of developing areas. It paved the way to the treatment of the developing areas as a meaningful unit of analysis. The significance of the concept of "political system" in the study of developing areas can be better appreciated by recapitualing the basic aims of systems analysis in political science. In the words of Easton: We can try to understand political life by viewing each of its aspects piecemeal. We can examine the operation of such institutions as political parties, interest groups, government and voting; we can study the nature and conse quences of such political practices as manipu lation, propaganda, violence; we can seek to reveal the structure within which these practices 262 occur. By combining the results we can obtain a rough picture of what happens in any self-contained political unit. In combining these results, however, there is already implicit the nation that each part of the larger political caucas does not stand alone but is related to each other part; or to put it positively, that the operation of no part can fully be understood without reference to the way in which the whole itself operates. If Easton emphasized the study of the whole polity and the interrelationships of its parts, Almond stated another important related aspect of the aim of "systems analysis," in the following words: "To separate analytically the structures which perform political functions in all socie ties regardless of scale, degree of differentiation and 134 culture." Thus, the development of the concept of "political system" implied not only understanding of poli tical life in a holistic sense, but also the establishment of a set of categories, components and attributes that constitute the political system. This theoretical break through was requisite for any systematic study of compara tive politics. Until the advent of new macrotheoretical approaches, the study of comparative politics was based on so-called formalistic studies of relationships that focused on legal, 133 D. Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Politi cal Systems," World Politics, April, 1957, p. 383. ^^Almond and Coleman, op. cit. , p. 5. 263 constitutional, institutional and normative aspects of 135 Western government. The main shortcomings of the tradi tional approach to comparative politics have been that it has been too narrowly descriptive; has concentrated too much on form and structure to the exclusion of actual political behavior and the dynamic processes of politics; has made too little use of the techniques and findings of other Social Sciences; haa concerned itself too little with politics in the non-Western world; and has been 136 insufficiently grounded in political theory. Rustow characterizes the development of comparative politics in three phases. In the first phase, the universe was western democracies, the focus was on legal-constitutional institutions and the theoretical framework was neat. The second phase witnessed changes in all three spheres— the universe became the whole of Europe, the focus was enlarged to include the role of political parties, political inter est groups, public opinion and propaganda; and the theory was revised to include sociological and psychological in sights. The third phase is the current stage in which the whole world haa become the object of political scientist’s 135 Roy C. Macridis, The Study of Comparative Govern ment, Garden City, New Yorlc: Doubieday, 1955, Chapter I. 136 UNESCO, Contemporary Political Science, p. 84 264 study and there is no consensus on the focus and theore- 137 tical framework. The major difference between traditional and modern approaches to the study of comparative politics is that the former is marked by descriptive, formal and limited studies; the latter is characterized by analytic, scientific and systematic studies. Perhaps the main reason for the present intellectual ferment in comparative politics is a widespread feeling of disappointment and dissatisfac tion with the traditional country-by-country descriptive a 1 IB approach to the subject. The widespread acceptance of the concept of "the politi cal system" by students of comparative politics marks a major shift away from the study of formal and legal relationships to the study and relationships of actual political behavior in volving formal and informal aspects with greater reliance placed upon empirical data. Secondly, the universality of the political system is established by assuming a set of in dispensable political functions performed in every society 139 from the most primitive to the most advanced. The cardinal 137 D. Rustow, "New Horizons for Comparative Politics" World Politics, IX {July, 1957), pp. 530-541. 138 Roy C. Macridis S > B. E. Brown (eds.), Comparative Politics, op. cit., pp. 1-12, 139 B. E. Brown, New Directions in Comparative Poli tics (New York, 1952), p. 1. 265 merit of this macro-framework is that it permits a very comprehensive classification and explanation of similarities and differences among all kinds of political systems that are at different stages of their political development. This encourages the development of generalizations and hypotheses about political phenomena. It also liberates us from reliance upon sterile country-by-country descrip tive approach. The construction of broad frameworks for comparison between developing and developed areas, the development of new taxonomies and classifications of political systems, the creation of new concpts and categories that do justice in explaining the complexity of the universe of western and non-western political systems and, finally, the appli cation of more rigorous and scientific methods of investi gation,— all this has been made possible by our new macro- theoretical approaches. Let us examine some of these contributions a little more closely. The concept of "the political system" not only provided a general framework with analytical categories for the comparison of politics in all social settings, but allied with the functional orientation, generated new categories of meaningful comparison. The following is a simplified list of categories: 266 1) Political culture or the Foundations of Politics— includes such factors as history, traditions, ecology, belief-systems, values, orientations and attitudes. 2) Political Dynamics or input functions--includes inter est groups, parties, political socialization and recruit ment, communication systems. 3) Output Functions or Decision-Making— includes govern ment power and authority, i.e., rule making, rule appli cation , rule adjuducation. 4) Patterns of Policy--includes effects of policy decisions, policy content, quality of decisions. The "structural-functional" and “systems*1 frameworks have also opened up the possibilities of comparisons at different levels of analysis. Comparisons between western and non-western political systems, at the total system level can generate only the broadest generalization and may not be of great help in the indepth understanding of a particular political system. However, this deficiency can be eliminated by changing our level of analysis and offering a lower level of generalization. The structural- functional approach suggests that all political systems perform certain universal political functions and that all political systems are “mixed" systems in the cultural 267 sense, but we are told that they differ in the relative dominance of the components of "modernity" and "tradi- 140 tion." Thus within the universalist framework of struc- tural-functionalism, question of division of western and non-western has received considerable scholarly attention. It is agreed that the differences between them are only one of degree, still it is argued that "developing areas" should be considered as a separate and distinct unit of analysis. Pye observes: Compared with either traditional or modern industrial societies the transitional societies represent a far greater diversity for differ- erences in their traditions are compounded by differences in the degree, intensity, and form with which they have been affected by the dif- fusian of the world culture. Nevertheless, the political processes of most of them seem to show a striking number of shared characteristics, accounted for, it would seem, by their common experience of breaking down traditional forms and attempting to introduce institutions and practices which originated in the now indus trialized areas...It should therefore be possible to outline in gross terms some of the main characteristics of what might be called the ... transitional or non-western political process. Thus by not generalizing for all political systems we are able to establish a meaningful and distinct unit of analysis called "the developing areas." 140Almond & Coleman, op. cit., p. 11. ^^Lucian Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building, New Haven: Yale University Press, 19<>lJ, p. 15. 268 The structural-functional approach in studying the developing societies has focused on political development and modernization. Focusing on modernization may reveal basic differences between the developed and developing political systems. In traditional societies there were no distinct boundaries between the political and other social functions. One could not study politics of the new nations with the traditional yardstick of western political institutions and practices since such institutions were, more or less, absent in traditional societies. It is the merit of structural-functional approach and the new uni versal categories established by it, such as political socialization and recruitment, interest aggregation, and communication, that we can discern a functioning polity in 142 traditional societies. Structural-functionalism by delineating the features of a "modern" and a "traditional" political system, enables us to focus on the dynamics which lead to political devel opment and modernization. "Political modernization" in structural-functional terms refers to those processes of differentiation of political structure and secularization of political culture which enhance the capability of a society's political system. 142 Gabriel Almond & Bingham Powell, op. cit., Chapter I. 269 Structural-functional framework has also generated new taxonomies or typologies of political systems. There is considerable diversity among the developing nations in the particular mix of elements of "modernity" and "tradi tion" that they possess. Coleman used seven categories in describing the functional specificity of structures in Asian and African political systems: (1) political democracy; (2) tutelary democracy; (3) terminal colonial democracy; (4) modernizing oligarchy; (5) colonial and racial oligarchy; (6) conservative oligarchy; and (7) tra ditional oligarchy. He classified the Latin American countries on a different basis as: (1) competitive; 143 (2) semi-competitive; and (3) authoritarian. Apter developed a three-fold typology for sub-Saharan Africa: (1) the mobilization system; (2) a consociational system; 144 and (3) a modernizing autocracy. Shils also offered a slightly different typology: (1) political democracy; (2) tutelary democracy; (3) modernizing oligarchy; (4) totalitarian oligarchy; (5) traditional oligarchy; and 145 (6) nationalistic and theocratic oligarchy. The macro- theoretical frameworks have inspired an incredible flow of 143 Almond and Coleman, op. cit., pp. 562-567. 144David Apter & Carl Roseberg, "Nationalism and Models of Change in Africa," in The Political Economy of Africa (Washington, D.C. : George Washington University / 1959) . 145 Edward Shils, Political Development in the New States (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1962). 270 literature dealing with various aspects of political devel opment. Most such studies deal with the relationship of political development to one particular variable that they choose to study. The focus of several studies is under standing the "why" and "how" of political development. The role of human personality in the economic and political development of states was thoroughly explored in a new theory of social and political change by Everett Hagen*4® 147 and Daniel Lerner. The psychological aspect of motivation became the basis of a new theory of economic development in a remark- 148 able analysis by David McClelland. The role of religion in political development has not been studies as carefully as it deserves, but some 149 important studies have appeared. Robert Bellah and Donald 150 Eugene Smith have attempted to correlate religious beliefs and their relationship to modernization. *46Everett Hagen, "How economic growth begins: A Theory of Social Change," Journal of Social Issues, 19, 20-23, 1963. 1 A 7 Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, op. cit. 14®David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society (Prince ton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand-) 1961) . *4®Robert N. Bellah, "Religious Aspects of Moderni zation in Turkey and Japan" in Finkle & Gable Political Development...., revised edition, op. cit., pp~ 128-140. 150d . E. Smith, Religion and Political Development, (Boston; Little Brown, 1970). 271 Some scholars have focused their research interests in pursuing the idea that the process of political devel opment can be studied with great profit and clarity by understanding the strategic role played by the "modernizers" or the agents of modernization. A major study in this area is Edward Shils perceptive analysis of the role of intel lectuals in the political development of new states. Also 151 significant are the studies of elites in the new nations. The role of the military as a modernizing agent has received considerable attention particularly with refer ence to Latin America. Modern armies have become a symbo lic expression of a commitment to modernization and development. Because the military is usually a prime beneficiary of internal resources and foreign aid, it possesses usually more of the skills and resources needed for modernization than any other sector of population among the new nations. Janowitz’s is the first major 152 study in this area. The most thorough going theoretical analysis within a functional framework of the role of bureaucracy in i51Edward Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of New States," World Politics, 12, 329-368, April 1960; Lester Seligman, "Elite Recruitment and Poli tical Development," Journal of Politics, 26, 612-626, Aug. 1964. ^^Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Ana lysis (Chicagoi The University of Cnicago Press, 1964). 272 political development is credited to Fred Riggs. The bureaucracy forms an important element of the modernizing elite in many of the developing areas. Rigg's general view is that premature or too rapid expansion of the bureaucracy when the political system lags behind tends to inhibit the development of effective politics. The social and economic concomitants of political development have been subjected to several searching analy ses. In the next chapter we will focus on the relation of economic and social development to political development, where the works of Deutsch, Lipset, Coleman, Cutright, and others would be more thoroughly examined. The role of political parties in the process of political development is another area which is receiving every growing attention. Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner in an article examine parties and party systems as independent variables affecting some crucial problems con- 153 fronting the developing nations. The major theses of the authors is that parties can have a positive impact on na tional integration, legitimacy, political participation and 154 the management of conflict. 153 See Joseph La Palombara, (ed.) Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton university Press, 1953).--- ---- 15*See Myron Weiner and J. La Palombara, (eds.) Poli tical Parties and Political Development, op. cit. CHAPTER VII MIDDLE-RANGE THEORETICAL APPROACHES In the foregoing analysis, while discussing the con tributions of the macrotheoretical approaches to the study of political development# we made reference to the spate of theories at the middle-range level that are being developed in the general area of political development. It is not our intention to attempt the formidable task of critically examining all such theories. However# the efforts of some leading theorists who have attempted to correlate political development with economic develop ment and social mobilisation will be subjected to critical examination. It is the opinion of this writer that progress in the subfield of political development can be achieved by the development of middle-range empirical theory. Within the framework of "systems’ 1 or "functional" analysis# there is considerable scope for the construction of middle-range empirical theory. While it is often thought that the ideal theory is the general theory# which provides the unity of knowledge by a unified framework# there are a number of advantages that middle-range theory has over general theory. We should recognize these advantages and realize that even with a fully developed general theory# middle-range theory will 273 274 continue to pl*y a significant role. Nearly all of what is considered as hard, scientific theory in the social scienaes is middle-range empirical theory. One of the obvious advantages of the middle-range theory is that it can limit the range of phenomena covered by the theory to that which can most efficiently be abstracted with minimum information requirements. In other words, middle-range theory is designed to describe, explain, and predict a certain type of behavior on a simple analytical level. Some examples would be "the role of social mobilization in political development," "the rela tion of economic development to political development," and "the role of the bureaucracy in political development." A second advantage of middle-range theory is its wider latitude of assumptions. It is easier to develop and to use than general theory. By operating at the middle- range it refrains from genralizations that are universally valid. This provides a great deal of flexibility to the theorist who is more concerned with explaining the phenomena in a restricted area of human experience. By eliminating a number of variables irrelevant to a particular analysis, middle-range theory becomes the most efficient method of slow, but solid, scientific advancement. We now turn our attention to two major middle-range theories in the field of political development. 275 Social Mobilization and Political Development Cybernetics is a theory of control and Mcosnmunica tion" processes in such electronic systems as computing machines and servo mechanisms (such self-steering machines as "homing" torpedoes). These machines have the character istics , among other things, of adjusting their performance progressively in response to signals from their own past activity— the now well known "feedback” principles. One significant advantage of such systems is that they are held to furnish a dynamic equilibrium model much superior to clas sical models in their approximation of processes of "self- direction,” "development," "learning," etc. Secondly, they are not only analogous to organisms and societies in complex ity and dynamics, but also can be fully described by mathe matical techniques. In this, as Deutsch points out, we have the promise of a social science able to deal mathematically with "irreversible changes in structures, . . . growth . . . self-transforming processes, in short, history."* In his first major work, Deutsch for the first time, applies the concepts of cybernetics to an empirical problem in the field of social sciences, namely, the problems of nationalism, its characteristic features, its sources, *Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality (New York* John Wiley f i fitons, inc., 1953). 276 "configurations of symptoms, and typical sequences of development." Deutsch had been interested in the phenomena of nationalism for quite some time, as it continues to be the major political sorce operative in the contem porary world. The relevance of Deutsch*s study of nation alism to the theoretical problems of national building is so obvious that it need not be discussed. The problems of political development necessarily require the develop ment of nationalism and national identity. Nationalism is an essential requisite for nation-building. The new nations of today in several cases are simply congeries of ethnic, linguistic, cultural or tribal groupings. How such societies where the vast majority of people have deep-seated and profound loyalties to their own ethnic, reginal, tribal, or linguistic groups, succeed in forging from the stuff of such primorial loyalities the fabric of nationalism, is of strategic significance to the stu dents of political development. Deutsch realizes that, since a nation is not an animal or vegetable organism, its evolution from tribes to nation need not go through any fixed sequence of 2 Deutsch*s interest in nationalism is reflected as early as the 1940's in his article: "The Trend of Euro pean Nationalism: The Language Aspect," American Political Science Review, IIIVI, 3 (1942), 533-541. 277 stages or steps. Yet he speculates in one of his recent works that the most frequent sequence in modern Asia and Africa may well be something on the following lines: Open or latent resistance [of diverse groups] to political amalgamation into a common national state; minimal integration to the point of passive compliance with the orders of such an amalgamated government; deeper political inte gration to the point of active support for such a common state but with continuing ethnic or cultural group cohesion and diversity; and, finally, the coincidence of political amalgamation and integration with the assimilation of all groups to a common language and culture— these could be the main stages on the way from tribes to nation* Rejecting the predominantly descriptive and empiri cal orientations of political science, Deutsch proposes an examination of nationalism with an emphasis on devel opment of concepts with operational meaning, use of quan titative date, and the construction of theory. To achieve his well articulated aims, he draws upon concepts developed in various social science disciplines which take account of the differential clustering of geographic, linguistic, social, cultural and economic phenomena; these concepts share common features which make it possible to replace them by more general nations derived from communications theory. The communications frame of reference is very hospitable to a multi-disciplinary approach and Deutsch 3 Karl Deutsch, "Nation-Building and National Devel opment: Some Issues for Political Research," in Karl Deutsch and William J. Foltz (eds.), Nation-Building, (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), pp. 7-8. 278 utilizes it to launch a concerted attach on problems of nationalism. The development of nationalism is viewed as a function of the complementarity (effectiveness) of social communications, which may be measured through a series of tests integrating the methods and data of sociology, social psychology, and anthropology with political science, history, and economics. Xncindentally, in view of the emphasis on communications theory, it should be noted that the research is not an investigation of the dimensions of communications. Deutsch claims no more than the fact that the theory provides a general frame of reference and a concrete plan in terms of which problems of traditional concern to political science are reformulated and clarified. The author has begun a systematic collection of relevant sociological and statistical data for the study of nationalism, especially in India, Czechoslavakia, Finland, and Scotland. The data are those on population and wealth distributions, traffic and migration patterns, areas of languages, dialects and cultures, effective market areas, areas of predominance of important social institutions and strata audiences of the mass media, educational institutions, etc. Deutsch believes that surveys of this sort provide "a more detailed and realistic picture of the very uneven world in which politics may function." In dis cussing these phenomena Deutsch considers their possible 279 These suggest measures of the efficiency of a channel and of the relative efficiency or complementarity of any stage or part of the system in relation to others. Deutsch believes that in the mere fact of such measurement we have a new key to problems in natural and social sciences, for “information" is indeed the "stuff . . . dreams are made of." Yet it can be transmitted, recorded, analyzed and measured. He makes a bridge from cybernetics to social science by joining the concept of information with the concept of culture, for culture also consists of "patterns." In Deutsch*s view, culture may be divided into "cultural channels" (relatively fixed communication facilities and perhaps also "habits," preferences and institutions), and cultural "information," consisting of those elements of culture considered to involve communication, e.g., "knowledge, values, traditions, news, gossip and command." Thus, in Deutsch*s perspective information in this sense is the central concept for the study of nationalism. "Cultural complementarity," the efficiency with which individuals or groups transmit cultural information, is the basis of community and nationality and increases or 5 Karl Deutsch, "Nationalism and ..." op. cit. p. 69. ------------------------ 6Ibid., p. 64. 2 80 and actual rates of change which he believes thus can show the limitations which they pose to what men can do in the future; and, by contrast, it can single out the most prominent areas for action. A somewhat simplified statement of Deutsch*s theory is that, in modern society, processes of industrialization and urbanization, with increasing literacy and mass com munication, lead to the social mobilization of a population. By means of the data and methods of economic history, population theory, and statistics, important elements in the population may be identified, their mobilization trends analyzed and the probability of national conflicts gauged. Deutsch also presents a simplified model based upon lin guistic assimilation and developed with quantitative data, which shows the possibilities of the scheme through an examination of social mobilization and assimilation in Finland, Czechoslavakia, India and Scotland. Let us now analyze his theory in somewhat greater detail. The crucial concept in communications theory is information. Electronic communications systems transmit not events but a patterned relationship between events and it is the pattern that constitutes information. Methods have been developed for measuring this information and so obtaining measures of losses and distortions in transmission 4Ibid., p. 137. 281 decreases with various changes In Industrialization, urbanization, mobilization and participation of the masses. At this point of our analysis it is necessary to explain certain terms and concepts used by Deutsch since these are not only new but are used in an unconventional sense. Deutsch distinguishes the concept of community from that of society to pave the ground for the later operational concepts of assimilation and mobilization. He defines society in terms of the interdependence of people "by the division of labor, the production and dis tribution of goods and services. On the other hand, he introduces the elements of cooperation, complementarity, consensus, and the sense of indentity to the concept of community. He identifies the concomitant growth of commu nication, as One crucial factor in the development of community. National unity in other words is found in the development of a community, communication is defined as "the storage, recall, transmission, recombination and reapplication of relatively wide ranges of information. . . memories, symbols, habits and operating preferences." Cardinal importance is given to the function of communication in measuring the degree of national unity. 7Ibid., p. 61. 8Ibid., p. 70. 282 The existence of communication among people, however, is the prerequisite for both society and community. In order for a society to become a community the mere existence of communication flow is not enough. It requires communi cation over a vast spectrum of subjects and through this process,there has to develop a learning capacity which “involves the learning of many new habits and the un learning of many old ones." A community shows, as com pared with a society, a higher degree of learning capacity and communication flow over a vast range of subjects which we can find in an area with a common culture. Deutsch defines cultural integration as assimilation and takes assimilation as the indicator of national unity. The term mobilized population is defined in measurable terms as follows: We may delimit this mobilized population (i.e., population mobilized for mass communication) by various yardsticks of measurement: the set of persons who live in towns; the set of persons engaged in occupation other than agriculture, forestry, and fishing; the set of persons who read a newspaper at least once a week; the set of persons who pay direct taxes to a central govern ment; or who are directly subject to military conscription; the set of persons who have at tended public or private schools for at least four years; the set of persons attending markets at least once a month; the set of literate adults, of movie-goers, or radio listeners, of registered voters for elections, or of insured 9Ibid., p. 99. 283 persons under special secruity schemes; or all persons working for money wages in units with five or more employees; and many more.10 In short according to Deutsch the mobilized people are those who are exposed to mass communication and live in a place which is well under way in the process of initial industrialization in a society which has experienced considerable degree of economic development. Those who do not fall under the fourteen indices of mobilized people are characterized as the "underlying population." Deutsch then proceeds to develop an operational index of assimilation in terms of the use of a predominant language and defines the assimilated population as "those who have already become speakers of the predominant lan guage .* ,XXThose who do not speak the predominant language are designated as "the differentiated population." He are now in a position to examine some major propositions of Deutsch*s theory and his operational scheme of national development. Deutsch assumes, in accordance with his model, the assimilated people to be the key political force for stability and discovers the primary source of political instability to lie in the magnitude of mobilized but differentiated people in the country. 10Ibid., p. 100. 1XIbid.. p. 102. 284 It follows from his theory that linguistically unassimilated people who are exposed to mass communication in an interdependent society will inevitably become cognizant of their mutual difference with the assimilated people and its intensification will eventually lead to a 12 conflict situation. The opposite of the above proposition will lead to national integration and development. Pursuing the same theoretical stance of his first major work, Deutsch in a more recent seminal article argues that the mobilized but differentiated people may have to experience frequent acts of discrimination due to their being a minority and yet the condition of their being mobilized will spawn new needs which take the form of an 13 increased volume of demands on government. The uneven rate of progress between mobilization and assimilation suggests another proposition. Economic and technological development make possible the rapid rate of mobilization but on the other hand the linguistic and cultural assimilation takes a longer period of time.14 This cultural lag helps increase the ratio of the mobilized but differentiated (MD) to the mobilized and assimilated people (MA). The relative increase of MD in relation to MA 12Ibld.. p. 100. 13Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review LV, 3 (September, 1961), pp. 493-514. 14Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and . . ., op. cit., p. 99. 285 will lower the level of political stability and national unity. Thus the examination of the size and rate of change in MD and MA together with mobilized underlying (MU) and differentiated underlying (DU) will enable one to predict the prospect of national conflict and the state of national integration. The shift of the relative proportion between mobilization and assimilation spells the major cause of change in the degree of political integration in 15 the nation. While not using the full sweep of his grand theory of communication, and yet deriving a simplified model from it (based upon linguistic assimilation and developed with quantitative date), Deutsch shows the possibilities of empirical research through an examination of social mobilization and assimilation in Finland, Bohemia, India and Scotland. With more adequate data and better use of computer technology, Deutsch suggests that the study of the assimilation-differentiation processes may be based upon rates of change and that predictions of the "if — then" form become possible. A mathematical model repre senting this situation (developed with the aid of Robert M. Solow) is provided in an appendix. 15Ibid. , p. 123. 286 Turning our attention to the operational problems of Deutsch's model, we are told that our major task is to measure cultural complementarity (the efficiency with which individuals or groups transmit cultural information, which is the basis in Deutsch*s model of community and of nationality and increases or decreases with various changes in social, economic, or political conditions). Since cultural information is measurable, measures of cultural complementarity can be derived from it. A number of pos sible procedures are suggested, such as measuring the re lative complementarity of individuals or groups from dif ferent cultures by observing differences in their perfor mances on word association tests, or their ability to join together in task groups.^® Deutsch illustrates the use of the concept of complementarity in his study of national assimilation in the four above-mentioned countries of heterogeneous culture. Subcultural groups are assimi lated to the culture of the dominant group as their cultural complementarity increases, for complementarity means availability for communication. He divides the17 population into segments in different degrees of comple mentarity or readiness for assimilation to the culture of 16Ibid., p. 84. 17lbid., p. 82. 287 the dominant group, on the basis of the degree of their familiarity with the dominant language. Rates of change in the size and distributions of these segmented popula tions, computed from census data, show assimilation trends and permit probable predictions about the future course of assimilation. Deutsch*s study is a good example of what can be done by applying interdisciplinary approaches to some of the major political problems of our age. Any critical evaluation of Deutsch*s work must take cognizance of the author's own frame of reference, i.e., Deutsch claims to present no more than a theoretical framework and a concrete plan for the study of nationalism. In the previous chapter we have had occasion to critically examine the problems of the suitability and applicability of the cybernetics model to the study of political life. It is not intended to repeat or paraphrase those arguments at this point. However, we should examine the relevance of the cybernetic model to the study of nationalism. While admitting the fact that the application of the cybernetics model to the study of nationalism may have been an intellectual tour de force on the part of the author we take issue with the author on several counts. The key concept in his theory is communications. A somewhat simplified statement of his theory is that nationalism arises when a group of people having communi 288 cation among themselves but barriers to communication with other people are thrown into economic or military contact with other people because of industrialization, urbanization, or conquest and become aware of their dis tinctive cultural characteristics. The theory takes into account caste and class differentials, demographic changes, division of labor, assimilation, and a large number of other sociological variables but its guiding idea is communication. Deutsch utilizes the concept of “informa tion" as defined in electronic communication systems (i.e., patterned relationship between events). "Communi cation" is a mechanical process and the term implies nothing with respect to the meaning of the transmitter patterns or what is more important to the social-psycho- logical processes of interpretation. Students of semantics and symbols know that the meaning of symbols in communi cation is a function not only of their fixed patterns but also of the social context and the stituation of the actors who use them. For the author to find a solution to many problems in social sciences just in the “measurement of information" certainly is an exaggerated claim. Deutsch's ingenious attempts to connect the concept of “information" with the concept of culture (for culture also consists of patterns) is admirable, but it can only serve as an analogy, not as a basis for measurement. 289 A major weakness of Deutsch'a theory is that he is able to use his model in much of his discussion only by introducing many extraneous social, political, and economic relationships and processes which are not an intregal part of his cybernetic model. (For example, migration, division of labor, social mobility, racial hatred, clan loyalty, political coercion, etc.). In certain instances the author lapses into using the concept "social communication" in the common sense uses of "sharing of ideas" and "mutual understanding" and not in the theo- 18 retical sense of patterned relationship. Perhaps the most serious limitation of Deutsch's model is that value elements and motivational factors in the development of nationalism are not systematically incorporated into the theoretical framework. Deutsch attempts to deal with values either by assuming that they are built into the concept of culture or by treating them separately as qualitative variables that influence rates 19 of mobilization and assimilation. The motivational factors are not accorded even this scant attention. Commitment to the cybernetics model places Deutsch in an uncomfortable position at times. His profound knowledge of the history 18 Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, op. cit., p. 65-72. 19 See H. D. Lasswell's Critique of Deutsch*s book in the American Political Science Review, ILVIII (June, 1954), pp. 554-55 290 of nationalism and his intuitive understanding persuade him to give compelling recognition to the role of values and ideology in the growth of nationalism, but his model theoretically cannot accomodate these variables. Deutsch is thus made to resort to explanations that go beyond the explanatory power of his model. Having noted some conceptual and methodological shortcomings in Deutsch*s cybernetics model for the study of nationalism, we may now turn our attention to the one substantive study of national assimilation in four countries 20 of heterogeneous culture, already mentioned. The major shortcomings of his theory emerge from the unbridgeable hiatus between the model and his operational scheme and his simpleminded identification of cultural integration with political integration and development. The importance of communication in the growth of a community is repeatedly emphasized by the author. In the context of a heterogeneous cultural society, Deutsch proposes to use the predominant language {language spoken by the largest number of people) as the operational index to community building and therefore to national integra tion. It is obvious that Deutsch underscores the central 20 Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and . . ., op. cit. 291 importance of a common language in building up a community from a functional point of view rather than taking language as one essential element in the development of a community. He recognizes the possibility of building a community "by a variety of functionally equivalent arrangements" like (a) similarity of communication habit, (b) facilities for learning and teaching, (c) frequency of contacts, (d) material rewards and penalties, (e) values and desires, 21 and (f) symbols and barriers. * If each element indicates movement toward greater similarity and magnitude, it is 22 assumed to promote the rate of assimilation. But he hardly pays any attention to developing a more comprehen sive index so assimilation than can be provided by language alone. Perhaps the easy availability of data on language assimilation persuaded the author to ignore other possible significant factors in the measurement of cultural inte gration, national unity, and political development. Or, he may regard language as the representative index from the point of view of convenience. Regardless of what persuades him to do so, the fact remains that his single factor index is inadequate for explaining either assimila tion, integration, or national unity. A wealth of illus trations from world history can be marshalled to support 21Ibid., p. 71. 22Ibid., pp. 130-136. 292 the view that language alone cannot be either a sufficient or necessary condition of assimilation* Deutsch*s formulation of assimilation in terms of the language aspect alone renders his model vulnerable to criticism on the ground that national unity cannot be considered identical with cultural assimilation. If the author assumes that language assimilation is the requisite condition for eventual cultural assimilation and subse quent national unity, then he should spell out other intervening variables in his model that lead to national integration and also explain why uni lingual nations at times experience serious problems of political instability. The author's operational index of assimilation, based on the sole factor of language, restricts the scope of appli cability of his model, on the one had, and raises serious questions about the contribution it makes to our understan ding of the subject of national integration and political development. We encounter, more or less, the same difficulty in Deutsch*s concept of social mobilization. Scholarly studies by Lester Milbrath, Seymour Lipset, and others have suggested that a socially mobilized population is 23 more active politically than the underlying population. 23I#ester Milbrath, Political Participation (New Yorkx Random House, 1968). 293 Social mobilization certainly facilitates political mobili zation, but it is not the necessary condition for the poli ticization of the people. The political mobilization of peasants in revolutionary activities particularly in the developing nations of the world is a fact within which the political dynamism and social change in these societies cannot be fully appreciated. The sequential relationship between social mobilization and mass political participation by city dwellers is certainly verified in the historical experience of European nations, which Deutsch incorporates in his operational scheme. The methodological problem that is raised here confronts us with the question: Can a model of social mobilization and political integration extracted empirically from the European experience claim the scope of application of a general theoretical model for national integration? The processes of social mobilization and poli tical development in the new nations may not necessarily follow the European pattern. This certainly raises serious questions about the usefulness of Deutsch's model in under standing or predicting the dynamics of social communication and political development in the new nations. The preceding critical analysis of Deutsch's theory of social mobilization and political development is not intended as an assertion that his theory is totally wrong, but that it is incomplete and inadequate and cannot be con- 294 aidered aa a general model of political development or even national integration. In hia aecond major theoretical atudy (which we wrote, along with some of hia colleaguea) entitled Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, Deutach has attempted to overcome some of the theoretical and opera tional problems of his first study. Since the object of his aecond study is not relevant to our inquiry, we shall now proceed to examine same major attempts at general correla tion of economic development with political development. Attempts at General Correlations of Economic Development with Political Development A venerable tradition of political discourse that relates democracy to economic development has the authority of Aristotle to support it. It is not intended here to trace the history of that tradition. Nor is it intended to discuss in this Chapter the general problem of the rela tionship between economic and political systems as it is conceptualized in Marxian theoretical framework. That subject is too well known in political sociology. The more specific recent interest in the relationship between economic development and political systems, arising lirgely out of the political independence of developing nations, 295 however, will receive attention here. Weber, in his well known thesis on the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism, had suggested that modern democracy (a politi cally developed state) can operate effectively only under capitalist industrialization. However, he saw no necessary connection between capitalism and democracy. Weber had simply suggested a particular syndrome (interrelated cluster of Protestantism, economic development, monarchy, gradual political change, legitimacy, and democracy), a historically unique concentration of elements that produced both demo cracy and capitalism in the Western world. It was noted earlier, that with few exceptions all American political theorists abstract their model of poli tical development either explicitly or implicitly from the theoretical framework of Western democracy. The dramatic rapidity with which constitutional governments in the new nations rise and fall, the intermittent coups d'etat and military take-overs of civil regimes, the sporadic eruption of violence and civil wars— in a word, the fragility and instability of political structures— seem to have under mined the glowing optimism about the inevitable progress of democracy. In the quest for answers to the problems of political instability among the new nations, many inter esting propositions and ingenious theories have been suggested. Social and behavioral requisites of stable 296 democracy have been explored afresh In the context of the experience of the new nations. Of these efforts, the most relevant and significant from the point of view of our area of investigation are attempts at the general correlation of economic development with political development. Following the end of World War II and the dramatic success of the Marshall Plan, the theory that economic development would promote democratic regimes and foster conditions favorable to world peace was officially adopted in Truman's Point Four Program and in the International Development Act and Mutual Security Act (1951) passed by Congress. Social scientists, particularly the economists, were well equipped in the 1950's vigorously to research economic development in the new nations and its political consequences from the foreign policy viewpoint of the United States. Such policy-oriented views and recommenda tions, while very insightful in some instances, will not be discussed in this Chapter. 24 See the following: Eugene Staley, The Future of Underdeveloped Countries: Political Implications of Economic Development (New York: Harper & Bros., 1^54); Charles Wolf, Jr., Foreign Aid: Theory and Practice in Southern Asia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UnlVAgfllty Prfiffl, 1960); R. E. Asher, et al., Development of the Emerging Countries: An Agenda for Research (Washington. D.C.: The Brooxings insti tution,1962); Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Politics of Under development," World Politics, IX, 1 (October, 1956); Max F. Millikan and Donald slacjcmer (eds.), The Emerging Nations (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1961);'R. A. Packenham,----- "Political Development Doctrines in the American Foreign Aid Program," World Politics, XVIII (January, 1966); 297 The idea that democracy (or political development or self-government) requires the fulfillment of certain social, economic, and political prerequisites has a long history in colonial administration. Many British and other colonial administrations have extensively discussed the idea of "fitness" for self-government on the part of their colonies. Disregarding these largely descriptive impressionistic and speculative efforts, we will now turn our attention to some significant efforts by American social scientists to probe the interrelation of economic and political development. Lyle W. Shanon Lyle W. Shanon, in early 1958, attempted to test a commonly held belief or hypothesis that economic develop ment, along certain lines is a prerequisite for self- 25 government. Shanon*s study, based on a statistical analysis of 198 areas (88 self-governing and 110 non-self- governing) using 17 indicators of economic development, concluded that although "development is positively Hans Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid," Ameri can Political Science Review, LVI (June, 1966); RobertTT! Goldwin (ed.), Why Foreign Aid7 (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963); £. F. Shumacher, *A Humanistic Guide to Foreign Aid," Commentary (November, 1961). 2SLyl« W. Shanon, "Is Level of Development Related to Capacity for Self Government? An Analysis of the Economic Characteristics of Self-Governing and Non-Self-Governing Areas," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, XVII (July, 155SV, 367-81.------- ----------------- 298 correlated with political status we can by no means say that d e v e l o p m e n t i s a p r e r e q u i s i t e t o s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t . S e l f - 26 government is found at every level of development." Shanon did find in his testing procedures that economic development and political status had a one-way relationship, that is, a certain level of development was needed to attain the capacity for self-government, yet there were as many as 53 out of 88 self-governing states that scored a level of development below the cutting point set up in his analysis, thereby leading to his above mentioned conclusion. Shanon undertook another study in order to further test socio-economic development as a predictor of change in 27 the political status of a country. In this study of 33 new states that achieved political independence during 1950-1960, Shanon attempted to see how effective are the socio-economic development variables and demographic vari ables as predictors of political change and found that pop ulation size was the most efficient predictor (with an accuracy of 83%) of change of status from a dependent to an independent state. The other 56 indicators of socio economic development that Shanon devised varied from 51% 26Ibid., p. 42. 27 Lyle H. Shanon, "Socio-Economic Development and Demographic Variables as Prediction of Political Change," Sociological Quarterly, III (January, 1962), pp. 27-43. 299 to 76% in predictive efficiency. Shanon expresses some skepticism about the scales he developed while concluding: Although we may hypothesize that political development has a social framework as does economic development, the data from which the scales have been built do not indicate a social framework that is predictive of change in political status. ® The dangers of predicting change in political status of a country disregarding the climate of the international political system are fully shown, when we see that even countries with very small population size are politically independent today. Seymour Martin Lipset Professor Stuart Dodd published an article in 1954 dealing with the relation of economic development to the 29 development of democracy. However, it was Professor S.M. Lipset*s pioneering work that set the stage for more systematic analyses on the relation of the level of economic development to the development of democracy.^® --------5TS------------------------- Ibid., p. 42. ^Stuart C. Dodd, "The Scientific Measurement of Fitness for Self-Government," The Scientific Monthly, LXXVII, 2 (February, 1954). 30seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisities of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Review, LII (1959), pp. 69-105. This article is incorporated into the second chapter of his book^ Political Man (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 300 The central hypothesis of Lipset's study which he attempts to test empirically states: "the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain 3 1 democracy.” J' L This hypothesis was tested for validity by an extensive use of empirical data. For the measurement of economic development, he develops various indices in the degree of industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and education. Recognizing the political, cultural, and historical differences between the various geographic areas that his study encompasses, the author grouped European and English- speaking nations into two categories, i.e., stable demo cracies, on the one hand, and unstable democracies and dictatorships on the other. However, the classification of Latin American nations is based on a different criterion, that is, dictatorships are combined against stable dictator ships. Havirg classified political systems by different criteria, Lipset proceeds to conduct his comparative analysis "among countries within the same political culture area." In other words, the author groups the nations of the two different political culture areas respectively into the more democratic and the less democratic nations. He computes various indices of economic development to provide tables for comparison. His finding was that the more 31Ibid., pp. 49-50. 301 democratic countries maintain higher levels in each index of economic development than the less democratic countries within the same political culture area. Let us now examine the reliability and validity of Lipset's findings. The first difficulty we encounter in his analysis is the confinement of the scope of comparison within the same political culture area. The author's preference in following this intra-cultural instead of cross-cultural and cross-national comparison within a universal framework seems to demonstrate that there are non-economic factors which reduce the usefulness of economic development as a significant independent variable. If we are right in assuming that non-economic variables also influence democracy, the next problem would be to ascertain specifically the degree of influence of economic develop ment on democracy. The author does not explore any such specific questions that would give us some idea as to what level of economic development would be a necessary or suf ficient condition for democracy. A more general statement establishing a general correlation between economic develop ment and democracy does not help us in understanding the complexity of such relationship. His findings show that democratic countries show greater achievement in higher levels of income, industriali zation, urbanization, and literacy. But they do not 302 explain why these factors lead to democratic development. Here the author commits the folly of equating modernization with democracy. The eloquent examples of Japan, Germany, and Soviet Russia conclusively demonstrate that moderniza tion is compatible with various kinds of political systems. The mere description of findings without an explanatory theory is not likely to advance our knowledge of the causes and conditions of political development. More specifically, some of the empirical findings of Lipset remain unexplained. For instance, we find that the difference between the per capita income of democratic and non-democratic countries in Latin America is $52, whereas the range of per capita income in the European stable democracies is $420-$1453 and $128-$482 in the European Dictatorships. Assuming that there is a direct relationship between income level and democracy, the fol lowing questions remain unexplained in Lipset*s analysis: Why does it take $52 to differentiate the democratic from the non-democratic countries in Latin America, when it takes as much as $387 to differentiate between political systems in European and English-speaking nations? And, how can the fact that some of the European dictatorships maintain a higher per capita income than some of the European Democracies be explained by his hypothesis? A similar criticism can also be directed against the attempt to correlate other indices of economic 303 development, i.e., industrialization, urbanization, and education, with democracy. Without introducing other his torical or cultural variables that would adequately explain the emergence or survival of democracies, Lipset*s focus on unilateral relationship of economic development to democracy gives us only a partial and truncated picture of a more complex phenomenon. Weber, with his characteristic insight, observed that the simultaneous development of democracy and economic modernization in Europe was an historical coincidence; Lipset*s error seems to be in the fact that he formulates this correlation into a universal principle to be valid in different countries under different historical situations. On this point, Harry Eckstein has this to say: It is more likely, however, that the two are associated simply because their roots lie in the same historical conditions— that is to say, because the process of industrialization and democratization coincided and did not while both were being achieved gradually, frustrate one another.** This is not to suggest that Lipset*s analysis should be rejected. He has performed an excellent job in introducing this important theme for a more careful and systematic analysis. There are many shrewd observations and theoreti- ^larry Eckstein, A Theory of Stable Democracy, Research Monograph, No. lU (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 42. 304 cal proposiations in Lipset's analysis that open up new avenues for empirical research. In the following pages we will review the work of other scholars who have followed his lead. While much of the literature in this area has been concerned with the conditions and the prospects for democracy, some scholars are now attempting to correlate economic development with another phenomenon of political change, that of Communism and, more specifically, the 33 strength of Communist parties. Professor John Kautsky has hypothesized that the rela tionship between economic development and Communist party strength is curvilinear. In other words, he asserts "that Communist party strength is lowest at the lowest stage of economic development, rises gradually with economic devel opment, crests at a fairly high level of such development 3 A and declines sharply with the highest level.” Karl de Schweinitz Professor Karl de Schweinitz*s study, Industrlaliza- 35 tion and Democracy, is an important work that attempts ^John H. Kautsky, Communism and the Politics of Development (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., l96fl), pp. 184-206. 34Ibid., p. 187. ^Karl de Schweinitz, Industrialization and Demo cracy (New York: Free Press of klencoe, 1964). 305 a comprehensive examination of the history of some of the relationships between economic growth and political devel opment. He engages in a historical review of some economi cally industrialized countries to discover a causal rela tionship between economic development and a particular type of political development, vis., democracy. He believes that "guided democracy is the only democracy possible for developing societies now emerging into industrialism. De Schweinitz attempts to lay down explicitly the condi tions that "are necessary to, but not sufficient for, democracy.” From these as premises, he deduces the politi cal prerequisites for economic growth and discusses the effects upon different political systems of different levels of income. The major thesis of his study is that whereas industrialization and democracy were closely con nected in the nineteenth century, the rise of socialist states in the twentieth century has severed this relation. Following Max Heber, de Schweinitz argues that the development of democracy has not been the natural outcome of the industrialization process under any set of circum stances, but an historical coincidence that happened to prosper under speicific conditions in the Western world. Since such an "historical syndrome" is not present in the developing socieites of today, the natural growth of demo cracy can hardly be expected in the wake of 306 industrialization. The case studies of Germany and Soviet Russia convinced him that democracy was neither the neces sary consequence of industrialization, nor industrializa tion the corollary of democratic political development. De Schweinitz does not deny or minimize the dynamic interplay between economic growth and political institu tions. Indeed, he emphasizes it and goes so far as to assert that "true" democracy is not possible in a poor country. Democracy requires a certain minimum of economic development, but this is not, in fact, the likely outcome when the currently underdeveloped countries have success fully industrialized. Democracy is, of course, possible in wealthy nations, but a poor country cannot be democratic because democracy rquires, first, a considerable degree of consensus on fundamental political values, and, second, a considerable degree of individual rationality, neither of which is likely to develop. Poor countries will not have the requisite individual rationality simply because they cannot afford the massive investments necessary to provide mass education. There are several reasons that militate against the development of requisite consensus in under developed countries of today. First, in a poor and stag nant society, economic life assumes the character of a zero-sum game that de-emphasizes societal cooperation and consensus. Second, the fundamental loyalties of the people 307 i n d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s a r e s m a l l e t h n i c , t r i b a l , r e l i g i o u s , r e g i o n a l , o r k i n s h i p g r o u p s t h a t w i l l w o rk a g a i n s t t h e d e v e lo p m e n t o f n a t i o n a l c o n s e n s u s . A f t e r a h i s t o r i c a l r e v i e w o f t h e i n d u s t r i a l d e v e l o p m e n t a n d p a r a l l e l p o l i t i c a l d e v e lo p m e n t i n t h e f o u r adv anced n a t i o n s o f E n g la n d , A m e ric a , G erm an y , a n d S o v i e t R u s s i a , t h e f o c u s o n t h e d i s s i m i l a r i t y o f c o n d i t i o n s b e tw e e n them a n d t h e u n d e r d e v e l o p e d n a t i o n s t o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n i n t h e l a t t e r w ou ld n o t b e c o n d u c i v e t o sm o o th d e v e lo p m e n t o f d e m o c r a c y . By a p e n e t r a t i n g c o m p a r a t i v e a n a l y s i s o f t h e " t a k e o f f 1 B ta g e o f e c o n o m ic g r o w th , d e S c h w e i n i t z p r e s e n t s t h e c a s e o f why i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n i s n o t a " s u f f i c i e n t " b u t o n l y a " n e c e s s a r y " c o n d i t i o n f o r p o l i t i c a l d e v e lo p m e n t. I n t h e e a r l y p e r i o d s o f i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n i n t h e W e s te rn d e m o c r a c i e s , i t w as p o s s i b l e t o h a v e a h i g h l e v e l o f c a p i t a l f o r m a t i o n an d i n v e s t m e n t by k e e p i n g w a g e s an d c o n s u m p tio n l e v e l s dow n, w i t h o u t r e s o r t i n g t o " t o t a l i t a r i a n " c o n t r o l s o v e r l a b o r f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g r e a s o n s : (1) r e l a t i v e l y p e r m i s s i v e e n v ir o n m e n t f o r l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s ; (2) technology needed for totalitarian control over labor did not exist; (3) workers did not have the example of "demonstration effect;" (4) workers could emigrate; and (5) labor unions were new and relatively powerless conservative. In the underdeveloped countries the 308 foregoing conditions do not prevail and labor unions are usually there and organized to strike at the first blush of industrialization. De Schweinitz, therefore, argues that the underdeveloped nations of today face more labor dis content and accordingly have more incentive to impose totalitarian controls, which have been made possible by revolutions in weapons and communications technology. The new states incline toward totalitarian control of labor by enforcing necessary sacrifices for the sake of a great future. Furthermore, de Schweinitz argues that the nine teenth century liberal tradition is inappropriate for twentieth century development. Democratization in the Western world resulted from the demands of rising entrepre neurial and laboring classes, but these groups now find it much more difficult to gain "autonomy" in the underdeveloped societies of today. Thus the "Euro-American route is closed" and the emerging nations must achieve economic development and democratic development by other means. Another major reason why industrialization will not result in the development of democratic institutions in the underdeveloped nations is the phenomenon of state-sponsored growth which de Schweinitz believes is somehow required in the twentieth century. The social discontent of today's emerging societies, the abject conditions of poverty, the 309 need to catch-up with the advanced societies, the absence of an able and active entrepreneurial class, international pressuress— all lead in the direction of state sponsored development. Growth spreads from the state to society, not vice versa, as it did in the West. In view of this situation, de Schweinitz argues that societies that are being made ready for economic growth by the state, cannot develop the autonomy and independence with which to shape and control the institutions of the state. In short, the underdeveloped countries will not be pluralistic, as the Western democracies were when they finished their indus trial revolutions. The state sponsored and controlled process of industrial development therefore is not likely to promote democratic political development. Furthermore, if economic development ' ■ * political democracy became a matter of choice, it would a general tendency of underdeveloped countries to choose the former. At this juncture de Schweinitz severely criticises those critics of underdeveloped countries who resent the applica tion of non-democratic methods to promote economic develop ment. He forcefully argues that the Western world should cease measuring the moral worth of other nations in terms of free elections and majority rule. To quote: No more than freedom can democracy be consi dered apart from the growth of income. To make free elections and majority rule the 310 measure of a nation's moral worth when it scarcely produces enough Income to subsist is to reveal one's ignorance of the historical genesis of democracy in the West. That is to say, it is to apply tests to non-Western nations that the Western nations themselves did not pass when they were a comparable stage of economic development. De Schweinitz*s sympathetic attitude toward underdeveloped countries wbich take a different route from Western demo cracies seems to stem from his strong doubts that economic development necessarily entails political democracy. The historical evidence he marshalls suggests to him that in the British case the circumstances w e u such that economic development assisted the evolution of democratic institu tions; in the U.S. democratic institutions preceded economic development and assisted it. In Germany the link between industrialization and democracy was beginning to break and and led to an unstable democracy. And finally, in the Soviet Union totalitarian industrialization led to a com plete break between industrialization and democracy. The case studies suggest that there is no necessary, causal relationship between industrialization and democracy. His prognosis for democracy in the underdeveloped nations is gloomy. Any critical evaluation of de Schweinitz must be prefaced by the fact that he makes a powerful argument in 36Ibid., p. 278. 311 refuting the existing uni-directional causal theory which postulates democratic political development as the conse quence of economic development. His vigorous critique of the existing theory and its negative invalidation, is, however, not sufficient proof that the reverse theory is valid. His excellent delineation of the varying (not uni direction) relationship between economic development and political development in no way conclusively proves that underdeveloped countries have no other alternative but totalitarianism. By overstating his case, de Schweinitz might fall into the same fallacy which he originally set out to disprove. The mere enumeration of some political and sociological factors that allegedly militate against the development of democracy in the underdeveloped nations does not constitute an adequate theory. His conclusions might prove to be valid, but in the absence of a more powerful theoretical framework, his thesis does not go beyond an educated guess. Indeed, some contemporary scholars traversing the same historical ground have come to conclusieas that are diametrically opposed to those of de Schweinitz. Cyril Zebot in a provacative study, The Economics of Competitive Coexistencei Convergence Through Growth, states and boldly defends his thesis that the Western nations, the Soviet bloc, and the underdeveloped nations will, if they have 312 continuing economic growth, come to resemble one another in 37 all of the most fundamental values. In the absence of a theoretical structure, de Schweinitz*s formulation assumes the nature of adhoc arguments whose validity can be accepted if substantiated by meticulous historical evidence. But he relies essen tially on secondary Bources for the substantiation of his theory. Some scholars have persuasively argued that the emergence of democratic political institutions in the West did not represent a victory of society over the state, as contended by de Schweinitz. There is reason to believe that the state organization in most Western countries sub stantially increased in the whole period of industrial!za- 38 tion. De Schweinitz does not offer any systematic analysis as to why the underdeveloped countries will emerge from the "take-off" stage without a pluralistic group structure. Most students of the politics of the developing areas have correctly emphasized the fact that the people in these societies belong to traditional groups such as the tribe, 37Cyril A. Zebot, The Economics of Competitive Coexistence: Convergence Through Growth (New York: Frederick Praeger , 1^4}. 3fiSee Kenneth Boulding*s Review in The American Economic Review. 55 (March, 1965), pp. 181-182. 313 the caste, the communal, parochial or linguistic group, or the village. This suggests that through the early stages of industrialization, the underdeveloped societies will be filled with pluralistic groups that are not creatures of the state. Arthur Lewis has presented the opposing view that poor nations can be as democratic as rich ones have 39 been. Similarly, Myron Weiner and L. Rudolph have pre sented a picture of multiplicity of groups and pluralistic competition for political power in Indian politics. Another shortcoming of de Schweinitz's argument stems from his assumption that not only the state will have an important role in the process of industrialization, but that it must, because of the supposedly unique problems of twentieth century industrialization, monopolize the process by totalitarian control. The actual history of under developed countries suggests that they are attempting to follow a variety of models of development and resorting to all kinds of mixing of models. De Schweinitz does not even envisage the possibility of "mixed economy" that divides control between public and private sectors. Arthur Lewis, Politics in West Africa (New York: Frederick Praeger, 19tfiT. ^ " ~ ~ Myron Weiner, Party-Building in a New Nation (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 19^7)i and L. Rudolph and S. Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967). 314 De Schweinitz also fails to appreciate the real significance of the technological revolution through which we are still. The advantages that accrue to "late comers" in industrialization by switching from traditional methods of production to modern methods have not been sufficiently taken into consideration. Thus, the twentieth century economic problems do not make state-monopoly or totalitar ianism as the only alternative, available to the developing nations. His image of a monolithic government in an under developed country fanatically pursuing a program of economic growth by destroying all other groups in society is neither realistic nor can be proven by empirical evi dence. Samuel P. Huntington's major proposition in his excellent work Political Order in Changing Societies to the fact that the major reason for lack of political development in developing societies is the weakness of political and governmental institutions.*^ Governments in developing societies will naturally share the characteris tics of their societies. They are divided into various groups and sub-groups as their societies are they too are underdeveloped as their societies are. They usually lack the ability— political, economic, and administrative— to 41S. P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Gonn.i Yale University Press, 1968). 315 42 control and suppress all groups and local loyalties. Despite some shortcomings, de Schweinitz has pro vided an important corrective to the uni-directional theory of economic developing causing political development. His sympathetic understanding of the need on the part of under developed nations to resort to non-democratic methods to achieve rapid development offers a good counterpoint to some ethnocentric criticisms. The author needs to be com plimented for opening up an important subject for scholarly disputation. His work points up the need for a more extended and more thoroughly empirical study of the problem. James Coleman Ja m e s C o lem an i n t h e c o n c l u d i n g c h a p t e r o f The 43 Politics of the Developing Areas, pulls together the dif ferent strands of political development analysis within a functional theoretical framework. In this study he expli citly follows Lipset's hypothesis and framework to test the relationship between economic development and level of political competition in 7 5 developing nations. Coleman proceeds with the major working hypothesis that there is a nancur Olson, Jr., "Some Social and Political Implications of Economic Development," World Politics, 17 (April, 1965), pp. 543-545. 43 Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas, op. cit. 316 positive correlation between economic development and political competitiveness. The following eleven indices of economic development were used: (1) per capita incomes; (2) gross national product; (3) the number of persons per doctor; (4) per vehicle; (5) per radio; (6) per telephone; (7) per newspaper copy; (8) per capita energy consumption; (9) per cent of population in cities over 100,000; (9) per capita population literate; and (11) primary school enrollment. Disregarding the findings on inter-area comparison o f L a t i n A m e ric a n a n d A f r o - A s i a n c o u n t r i e s an d t u r n i n g h i s attention to findings relevant to his hypothesis, Coleman notes the degree of consistency between the level of economic development and the degree of competitiveness of political systems. In both major areas on ten out of eleven indices, the competitive countries had the highest average score, the semi-competitive the next highest, and the authoritarian countries the lowest. Summing up his conclusions, Coleman states: The major hypothesis that economic development and competitiveness are positively correlated is validated when countries are grouped into major differentiating categories of competitiveness and when mean scores of economic development are employed. But when the individual countries are examined, the hypothesis is weakened by negative correlations between 44Ibid. 317 economic scores and degrees of competitiveness. Furthermore# Coleman suggests that economic modernization contributes only one dimension of the ensemble of determinants shaping political institutions and behavior in the developing nations. On the basis of evidence Coleman finds it impos sible to confirm the generalization that industrialization is a certain way of ensuring the emergence of democracy. It is not difficult to point out logical# conceptual# and methodological problems in Coleman's analysis. The general weakness of this analysis, as the author himself admits# is that For the majority of countries the inadequate state of our knowledge makes it impossible for us to differentiate more finely the degree of competitiveness within the three (broad) categories. Putting countries into particular geographic areas like Latin America# Asia# and Africa raises the often repeated methodological debate over universalism and cultural rela tivism. The concept of competitiveness is not made opera tional enough for precise measurement. But the most serious shortcoming of his analysis is brought in sharp relief when Coleman resorts to a combination of historical and "social law" explanations in resolving the striking deviations from his hypothesis. When deviations are explained away by resorting to unique historical circumstances in general 45Ibid. 3X8 instances, the potency of the generalizing power of his hypothesis is seriously undermined. We will return to this critical theme in the concluding part of this chapter for some final observations on this subject. Phillips Cutright Building on the foundations furnished by Lipset, Phillips Cutright presents by far the most sophisticated sociological attempt to measure the relationship between political development and economic or rather socio-economic development. Defining the degree of political develop ment of a nation in terms of the complexity and specializa tion of its national political institutions, he places each nation on a continuum of political development which will allow it to be compared with any other nation in the world. The principal hypothesis tested is that political institutions are interdependent with educational systems, degree of urbanization, and the distribution of the labor force. Filling the gaps in the measurement methods of his predecessors, Cutright develops two major indices of poli tical development in terms of elective executive and party *6Phillips Cutright, "National Political Develop ment: Measurement and Analysis," in Nelson Folsby, etal. (eds.), Politics and Social Life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963), pp. 569-82, originally published in American Sociological Review, XXVIII (April, 1963). 319 oriented legislature, devises scores for qualifying the indicators and calculates for each of the seventy-six nations from all continents except Africa, individual vari able scores and a composite score of political development for a period of twenty years (1941-1960) . Utilizing mathe matical and statistical procedures, Cutright measures the degree of association between political development and other types of socio-economic development. Contrary to the findings of Lipset and Coleman, he finds that of the several independent variables considered, the communications development index (formed by summing the T scores, a given nation received on newspaper consumption, newsprint consumption, telephones, and the number of pieces of domestic mail per capita) had a Pearson zero-order asso- ciati on with political development of .80, whereas economic development had an association of only .68 with political development. 47 This leads Cutright to the conclusion that the com munications index may be a better indicator of political development than an economic development index (formed by combining the T scores for a given nation of per capita measures of energy consumption, steel consumption, income in U.S. dollars, and the number of motor vehicles). A Scattergram on pages 572-573 in Cutright's analysis shows 47Ibid., pp. 574-75. 320 the steady increase in the level of political development as the level of communications development increases. The fact that a variety of independent variables (i.e., communica tions, urbanization, education, and economic development) had different degrees of positive relation with political development suggests to Cutright the insight that we should not be too hasty in abandoning the use of multiple criteria. The multiple correlation coefficient of all these indepen dent variables was .85. The intercorrelations of indepen dent variables (different aspects of national, social, economic, and political life) supported the idea that social systems are indeed systems— that is, their parts are interdependent. Conclusions In the preceding analyses the works of some contem porary scholars have been critically reviewed. All of them are concerned with the question of relationship between economic development and political development. All of them have consensus on the existence of a relationship between economic development and political development, but the questions with regard to the specific kind of relation ship and the degree of economic influence on political 4^Cbid., p. 582. 321 development are answered in divergent ways, leading to different conclusions. with the possible exception of Lipset, a major weak ness of all the scholars is the absence of a powerful theoretical structure. Most scholars seem to be content with presenting some crude aggregate data on industrializa tion and economic development and relating it to some aspects of political development. But such simple correla tions of economic development and political development can hardly be characterized as theoretical approaches. Such correlations far from being a theory call for a theoretical explanation. A common assumption of almost all scholars under review is to equate democracy with political development, thereby neglecting to study the relation of economic devel opment to political development in a non-normative or non- ideological sense. The studies under review demonstrate the complexity of interaction between economic and political aspects of life, yet the crude and simple analytical frameworks employed by the scholars do not do justice in discovering the dynamic or dialectical aspects of this interplay. A more well-rounded theory will have to be based on more interdisciplinary research, for such supposedly simple questions as why and how economic or political development 322 takes place cannot be answered without reference to the configuration of societal values and cultural patterns. The insights of psychological and sociological theories of personality and social change need to be integrated in a theoretical framework that attempts to explain the rela tionship of economic development to political development. Omission of non-economic factors that might be the crucial intervening variable between economic development and political development not only oversimplifies empirical reality, but robs the theories of any intrinsic theoretical value. It should be obvious to most observers of develop ing societies that the value of economic well-being ranks differently in the total hierarchy of values in different societies. But our scholars have ignored this fact and lumped together all the underdeveloped countries into one category so as to be able to provide a common oversimpli fied base for theory construction. Such oversimplified theories lose their relevance when applied to specific countries and socieites. We are still far from under standing the exact nature and complex role of intervening variables between economic development and political development. Beyond these theoretical shortcomings, the existing theories of simple correlational analyses are not grounded in meticulous empirical research. The study of the 323 simultaneous rise of democracy and economic development in the Western world still remains on a conjectural and specu lative plane. More systematic comparative studies of history within the framework of a more sophisticated theoretical framework would give us answers about the dynamic interplay of economic growth and political develop ment. The studies under review have opened up an important subject for more extended and more empirically based study of the problem. PART IV SOME GUIDELINES TO FUTURE RESEARCH 324 CHAPTER VIII SOME RESEARCH GUIDELINES AND CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS State of Political Devlopwent Theory In the preceding chapters we undertook a review and critical analysis of major macrotheoretical and middle- range theoretical approaches to the study of political development. In view of the incredibly vast amount of literature in this field, it is impossible to review the entire field in detail, within the scope of this study. However, by focusing on major approaches we hoped to discern the directions and dilemmas of our field of investigation. We can now explore more fully the implications of our analy sis both in terms of the directions in which this subfield is moving and also in terms of the major conceptual, tech nical, and methodological problems that confront it. Our typology of theories was helpful in analytically differ entiating major approaches and placing each approach in a hierarchy of levels. We may note here that very few scholars work wholly within one approach. Future con ceptual and theoretical breakthroughs will result from 325 326 attempts to imaginatively combine two or more of these approaches and by intelligently integrating single proposi tions and middle range theories into a broad general theoretical framework. In a broad sense we suggest that the major problem that needs facing in the political development field is: how to more effectively integrate in a theoretical context analytical frameworks, quantitative methods, and empirical studies of different areas. It is above all this theoreti cal sphere that needs more development and integration. The theoretical structures in the field of political devel opment, as our preceding analysis has suggested, lack vigor, power, and generalizing ability. It is not our intention to repeat or recapitulate the specific criticisms and limitations of the theoretical efforts that have been made, but to raise the level of dis cussion to a more general plane and reflect on the state of theory in political development studies. As our previous analysis has suggested there is a lush growth of competing models and paradigms in the field of political development. These models range from those that are conceptually rich and could be developed into theoretically powerful instru ments to those that are conceptually very feeble and border on simple devices for data collection. What Holt and Richardson have said about the state of theory in compare- 327 tive politics in general accurately applies to the state of theory in the political development field. They write: All of the different types of paradigms , however, suffer from a major shortcacting— they have virtually no deductive power; that is, there is no set of pro positions from which one can deduce in a logically tight manner a wide range of additional propositions, some of which can be empirically verified.^ The grand models of Easton, Almond, Deutsch, and Riggs, inspired largely by the Parsonian scheme, in spite of argu ments and claims to the contrary, remain essentially con ceptual frameworks. They are certainly a little more potent than simple heuristic schema. But in their present formulations they are very weak deductive theoretical models. Even the Parsonian model of the social system, which is supposed by him and his followers, to be a power ful deductive theoretical structure on close analysis and actual application has not ascended beyond a comprehensive taxonomical framework which presents an interesting way of looking at social phenomena and organizing them in suitable categories for analytical purposes. If the imperative need in comparative political theory is for more rigorous deduc tive theory, it is obvious that we need to develop such powerful deductive theoretical models. Holt and Richardson suggest the following five-step program for developing 1 Holt and Richardson, op. cit., p. 41. 326 "pure scientific" models that would be deductively power ful: First a small group of theoretical primitives must be established. Second, additional concepts must be defined, using only these theoretical primitives and some specifically identified logical (or mathe matical) operations. Third, a set of axioms must be developed using only the concepts and operations defined. Fourth, a set of propositions must be deduced from these axioms for empirical testing. Fifth, criteria of admissibility and rules of inter pretation must be developed.2 Realizing the rigorous nature of their suggested schema and conscious of the fact that the intellectual and methodolog ical orientation of even modern behaviorally oriented political scientists (not to speak of the vast majority who still employ traditional methods of research), does not equip them with the competence in handling the body of rules that establish the principles of deduction. Holt and Richardson suggest that political scientists must turn to mathematics for these rules of logic and believe that until this is done the grand macrotheoretical models will remain essentially heuristic. In the opinion of this writer, whereas Holt and Richardson's assessment of the state of theory in compara tive politics is very accurate, their suggested cure for the problems of theory building is simply a counsel of perfection. In the present state of our field, the appli cation of deductively powerful mathematical models is hard 2Ibid. 329 if not impossible because the areas in political science where this kind of mathematical analysis can be applied are limited. The rationalistic approach based on sophis ticated mathematical models in the works of Kenneth Arrow, Gordon Tullock, William Riker, Anthony Downs, James Buchanan, and many others clearly illustrate the limited range of political phenomena with which they can deal, thereby suggesting their inadequacy as acceptable models in comparative politics. The bewilderingly large numbers of variables which are of strategic significance in under standing the processes and problems of political develop ment, the essentially normative and non-quantifiable nature of at least some of these variables and the difficulties and methodological problems in developing measurable indices that would be valid cross-culturally, reduce signi ficantly the application of deductively powerful mathemati cal models in the field of political development. Without recapitulating the unabated debate concern ing the desirability and feasibility of scientific metho dology, it is appropriate for us to indicate our own point of view and preference. Very few political scientists today would seriously challenge the need for scientific study of our field. The point at issue is not "scientism" per se, but the kind and degree of "scientism." This writer strongly believes in the scientific approach to the study 330 of political development but takes exception to the "per fectionist" or "pure scientific" approach. I believe that some evangelists of pure scientific approaches will have to modify their perfectionist ideology, because the current and future research experiences of scholars will convince them of the intractable difficulty of the application of "perfectionist" and pure scientific methodology to certain elusive and unmanageable aspects of political phenomena. The theoretical stance suggested by this writer is clear cut: confronted with the choice between competing theoreti cal models and paradigms, our field or sub-field would do better to choose a broad, deductively weak, model, capable of application to a wide range of political phenomena and political behavior, than to seek for a narrowly based "pure scientific," deductively powerful, theoretical frame work capable of successful application only to very limited aspects of political phenomena and behavior. In other words, it is suggested that our commitment to scientific methodology should be tempered by a realistic assessment of the degree of scientism that is possible and desirable in specific areas of research. Harold Lasswell, who has been a great advocate of the scientific method, has at the same time suggested that political scientists will have to reconcile themselves to the view that some sciences will continue to be more scientific than others. Anatol Rapopart, 331 in a similar view, has argued for the advantages of descrip tive theory at this stage of the development of our field. This, however, does not imply giving up the battle for a more scientific political science; it simply suggests a research strategy that is likely to promote scientific approach at a realistic pace and level. The dream of a more rigorous and scientific theory in our field is not likely to be realized, if we continue to use systems theory only in terms of its heuristic power (providing interesting biological and mechanical analogies). Development of deductively powerful systems models is con ceivable, but the inherent limitations of such an approach have already been pointed out. In the present stage of the development of our field optimum success could be achieved by pursuing the arduous yet rewarding strategy of middle range empirical theory. The field of political development is particuarly hospitable to such an approach. The large number of struc tural, normative, and behavioral variables that must be taken into account in talking about political development provides unlimited scope and opportunities for developing interesting propositions which could then be empirically tested. Another advantage of middle range theorizing is that it is amenable to all kinds of theoretical perspec- 3R. X. Merton has been an advocate of this approach in sociology. 332 tives, thereby emancipating the field of our investigation from the monopoly of, let us say, the structural-functional approach. By proclaiming the sovereignty or undisputed supremacy of one particular theoretical perspective (how ever productive it may be), we are not likely to promote a climate of healthy and open competition among different theoretical and methodological approaches. As Deutsch and Almond, in their presidential address to the National Conference of American Political Science, have pointed out, the discipline of political science is wide enough to accom modate all kinds of approaches that will advance our knowl edge of political phenomena. But the scientific advance ment of our field cannot be served by focus on middle range empirical theory, if we show laxity and carelessness in developing precise definition*, well articulated con cepts and fail to specify operational indices for purposes of measurement and testing our low level propositions and middle range theories. Some familiarity and competence in rules of logical deduction and interpretation is a must for every political scientist, regardless of his metho dological orientation. The lack of operational indices for such essential concepts in systems theory as functionality, interdependence, equilibrium, capacity, etc., has seriously undermined its efficacy in pronoting empirically verified theory. 333 We have devoted enormous intellectual resources to the development of a grand overarching general theory of political development that could possibly bring order and coherence to the whole sub-field of political development studies. The effort is not totally wasteful, but we are nowhere near such a theory. In the opinion of this writer, only through innovative and courageous intellectual endeavors in a multitude of divergent and conflicting directions will it be possible for a gradual consensus to emerge with regard to the outlines of a useful general theory of political development. Until such time, our focus on middle range empirical theory would enable us to investigate and integrate selected aspects of political development, national and cross-national. The use of models in all their varied functions (as elaborated in our Chapter II) is likely to flourish in political development research. The use of models has always been very useful in the scientific advancement of any discipline. Since social and political phenomena are usually in a state of constant flux, reality can be cap tured by abstracting its essence through the theoretical device of model-building. It is in this sense that Max Weber's statement that the social sciences have been endowed with eternal youth becomes meaningful. The variety of norms, cultures, behavior patterns, and structures with 334 which we are concerned in political development research, suggests that in the future we may have to resort to exten sive use of model-building. Neglected Areas of Research A remarkable aspect of political development studies is its spectacular burgeoning and efflorescence. Within a short period of even less than twenty years the incredible amount of research accomplished testifies to the new £lan and dynamism in the field of comparative politics. Since the major contributions have been produced by American political and social scientists, political development studies, like the earlier behavioral studies in political science, are fast becoming an area of specialization of American political science. It is not intended here to assert that scholars in other countries are not producing any significant research products; the nature of scholar ship in many other societies by and large follows the clas sical and traditional pattern of broad general, institu tional, historical, and "impressionistic" style, undisci plined in methodological orientation and unrestrained in their scope. The atheoretical nature of such scholarship diminishes its scientific validity and additive quality. The strong influence of Marxian thought and categories of 335 analysis in Europe also lends ideological coloring to political development studies, thereby vitiating their value-free and objective quality. It is far from our inten tion to suggest that American scholars are free from these or many other flaws, yet the fact remains that the current commitment of American social scientists to empirical and behavioral approaches has certainly accorded them an edge in the production of more methodologically self-conscious and scientifically oriented studies, particularly when we examine the works of better known theorists among them. An encouraging aspect of political development studies is the growing realization by leading theorists in America that increasing intellectual collaboration between American and foreign theorists in this field would be prolific and produce more insightful studies of the problems of political development. Such cooperative intellectual efforts hitherto are very limited in their scope and accomplishment. The growing crop of American-trained non-Western scholars in the field of political development studies, it seems, will surely join in this intellectual endeavor in the foreseeable future. The major burden of political development studies is carried by American universities and research organizations. It is this aspect, among several others, that has contri buted to particular emphases and characteristic features of 336 political development studies. The ideological, cultural, normative, and intellectual orientations of current American social and political science with all their strengths and limitations permeate the fabric of political development studies. In spite of their growing depth and breadth, political development studies show lopsided growth and par tial or total neglect of certain relevant areas of research. A systematic inventory of all the major propositions and research findings in this area that could demonstrate in clear relief errors of omission and commission is neither available nor could such a task be easily accomplished. A codification of significant research studies in our field would be immensely valuable both in terms of understanding the contours and trends of research, pointing out the neglected aspects and charting future strategies of research. Without the benefit of such a codified inventory of research efforts and findings, we will attempt to catalogue some major lacuna in political development studies that hope fully would be helpful in directing the research efforts of scholars in particular uncharted areas. Karl Deutsch has pointed out that in the historical growth of a discipline one can easily see the overemphasis or underemphasis or neglect of certain data, variables and perspectives. Perhaps it is in the very nature of the growth of a discipline that it is marked by overemphasis 337 of certain variables and perspectives thereby leading dialectically to the discovery of neglected areas. Be that as it may, our task is to discover the major neglected aspects of study. Neglect of Historical Dimension A striking instance of the lamentable neglect of a very crucial and indispensable aspect of political develop ment research is the omission of the historical dimension. The very term "development" inherently connotes a historical dimension and its neglect cannot easily be explained. Some European critics of American political science like Runciman, Bernard Crick, and Dahrendorf believe that the neglect of the historical, as well as the ideological, dimension is a characteristic feature of American social science.4 There is certainly an element of truth in such criticisms, yet this writer believes that such neglect is largely the offshoot of our intellectually fashionable con cern with the study of political behavior, which in the minds of scholars has a salient existential dimension. 4 W. G. Runciman, Social Science and Political Theory, op. cit.t Bernard Crick, The Smerican Science of Politics, op. cit.f Rolf Dahrendorf, "European Sociology and the American Self-image," Archives Europlanes de Sociologie, 2 (1961), 364. 338 If the history of economic development theory is any guide, it is obvious that an empirically grounded political development theory cannot develop without full utilization of the historical dimension, both individually and compara tively for several nations. The processes, problems, and predicaments of political development in the "developing nations" can be better appreciated and theoretical insights and hypotheses about it can be developed by studying the history of political development in the Western world. We have a vast reservoir of knowledge in the profusely docu mented political history of almost all Western nations. In its present form it is useful as raw material for pur poses of political development theory building. Such raw historical data can be a prolific source of new insights and theories only when the modern political development theorist filters this source into the more sophisticated categories and conceptual schemes of today. Stanley Hoffman writing about the "long road to theory in the field of international relations," some years ago had suggested the importance of historical sociology as a source of theory- building in international systems theory. We can claim that historical sociology is of even more crucial impor tance in the building of political development theory. Contemporary studies of political development have had to depend to some extent on historical materials but 339 such material is so utilized largely for purposes of des cription and has not been skillfully employed for theory construction. In recent years some studies have appeared stressing comparison at single points in time using quanti tative data, but historical comparisons using both quali tative data and quantitative data (if available) have made very little progress.5 Most historical studies again use largely qualitative data in an analytical framework and hardly go beyond impressionistic and speculative level. The injection of conceptual clarity, methodological rigor, and use of empirical data in a comparative historical framework would go a long way in the growth of political development theory. Neglect of the International Perspective in Systems Analysis Another significant missing link in analyses of political development is the systematic discussion of the interrelationship of the international environment to e See the following: S. N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires (Glencoe: Free Press, 1963); Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship (New York: Wiley, 1964); S. M. Lipset, The First New Nation (New York: Basic Books, 1963); S. P. Huntington, "Political Modernization: America vs. Europe," World Politics, XVIII (April, 1966), 378-414; Cyril Black, The Dynamics of Modernization (New York: Harper & Row, 1966); Robert Ward and D. Rustow, Politi cal Modernization in Turkey and Japan, op. cit.; Barrington Moore, Jr., Social 6rlglns_of Democracy and Dictatorship (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). 340 domestic political development. Neo-Marxist theorists like Horowitz and Merle Kling have discussed the impact of foreign control of domestic economy and its implications for political development, but their analysis loses much of its generalizing potential as it is not presented in a systematic theoretical perspective. Among systems theorists, Almond and Powell have particularly emphasized the theoreti cal importance of relating the capabilities and performances of political systems to their domestic and international environments. Almond writes that the aim of research on political systems must be "to discover and compare capabil ities profiles summarizing the flows of inputs and outputs between these political systems and their domestic and international environment.*'® But such efforts at interrela tion of domestic and International environment have largely remained in the theoretical sphere; no serious empirical study has been accomplished. Neglect of Religion A curious omission in political development research is the religious dimension of social life. The neglect of this crucial aspect of social life is all the more surpris ing when we know that most political scientists today ®I. L. Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development, op. cit.; Merle Kling, "Towards A Theory of Political Instabil ity in Latin America," op. cit. 341 recognize the significant part it plays in the developing societies. A considerable amount of reserach has been accomplished relating the economic and cultural aspect of society to political development. But there has been hardly any systematic effort to relate the varieties of 7 religious experience to aspects of political development. This omission is particularly difficult to understand since a venerable tradition in social science, at least from Weber and Durkheim to Parsons, has attempted systematically to explore the theoretical importance of religious dimen sions in explaining human behavior, both on micro and macro- societal levels. Weber's major theoretical contribution in his classic work The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of O Capitalism was his suggestion that there is an inner coherence to all societies in the form of a systematic relationship among the social, economic, and political aspects of behavior, on the one hand, and the spirit or ethos of the society, as best expressed in its religion, on the other. Weber in his famous thesis saw the political development of Western society in a unique historical syndrome that related the Protestant ethic to the rise of the rationalistic institutions of capitalism and democracy. 7 Donald Smith, Religion and Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970) . ®Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the spirit of Capitalism, op. cit. 342 To test his hypothesis Weber attempted to explore the rela tionship of the main religions of the East to the secular institutions they fostered. In this writer's opinion the role played by religion in shaping the total behavior of man in developing societies is so pervasive and profound that no study of political development can be considered com plete without systematically exploring its relation to religion. Neglect of Normative Aspects Inherent in the very concept of political development is a normative aspect. Development for what? The general answer is modernization as an end. A strange paradox with most development theorists is that, on the one hand, they assume democracy as the end of political development, but on the other hand they are so sensitive to the charges of being branded as "traditionalists" or "normative theorists" that they do not want to articulate their own conception of a right or politically developed order. Most of them also shy away from suggesting strategies for political develop ment in the new nations. Such significant normatively oriented aspects as political rights, civil liberties, and freedoms have been very little researched in the developing nations. Even those political scientists who specialize 343 in normative theory have added very little to the normative aspects of political development studies. . t. Neglect of Ideology A third significant variable relevant to aspects of political development that has not received adequate systematic analysis is the ideological dimension of politics. This neglect is very paradoxical because on the one hand we have an unabated debate still raging about the relative merits and shortcoming of democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian systems as models for modernization and on the other we do not employ ideology as a variable in systemati cally explaining or predicting the process of political development. Adam Ulam has attempted to systematically incorporate ideology as a vital dimension in the process of political development. He saw Marxism as a natural ideology for a developing nation in the initial stages of its politi- q cal development. The absence of ideology as a relevant variable in theories of political development, to this writer, may be explained by at least two factors. First, the great major ity of leading theorists of political development believe that we are living in an age marked by the "end of ideology." q 7Adam ulam, The Unifinished Revolution (New York: Random House, 1964). 344 Even if this hypothesis were empirically verified by the current experience of the Western world, it is rather diffi cult to see its relevance for the non-Western world. A second plausible reason appears to be an underlying assump tion in most conceptualizations that political development means democratic development. Once we assume that politi cal development is equal to democracy, then, the focus of theoretical attention shifts from the variable of ideology to discussing the social and behavioral prerequisites of democracy. As our analysis in Chapter VII has shown, there is an impressive body of theoretically oriented lit erature concerning the requisites of democracy. Neglect of Sequences of Political Development Kautsky, Organski, ShiIs, Coleman, and many other theorists have talked about the stages and sequences of political development. Lucian Pye has proposed that six major crises are faced by a political system in the process of political development. The relationship of these crises to other social, economic, or political aspects of society could become an interesting focus for middle range theoriz ing. Theorizing about the sequences of these crises may also be very fruitful, but there are very few empirical studies in this interesting area. Questions involving sequence and rate of change are broad enough to allow for 345 comparisons of non-Western and Western countries (thereby remedying the neglect of Western countries in the study of political development). One advantage of this approach would be the generation and formulation of hypotheses that will have greater generalizing power and applicability, after the relevant contextual conditions are included. Nordlinger, in a brilliant article, illustrates the uses of systematically ordering the field of political develop ment research in the form of a series of explanatory hypotheses. Neglect of Political Structures The study of political structures or institutions has a venerable tradition in political science. But our present preoccupation with functional theory has led to the impres sion that almost any structure could perform the functions which are requisite for system survival. This predominantly functionalist approach has deprived us of a focus on politi cal structures. Legislatures, courts, and executives have received much lets attention than is needed. Parties, interest groups, and the military have been studied, on the other hand, rather extensively. Riggs' suggestion in his *®Eric Nordlinger, "Political Development: Time Sequences and Rates of Change," World Politics, 20 (April, 1968), 494-520. 346 very recent essay that we can overcome the preoccupation with functions associated with functional analysis by synthesizing it with the concept of structural requisites, seems to be a worthwhile idea to this writer. A structural requisite is defined by him as a necessary though not a sufficient condition for the performance of a given func tion.11 Neglect of Social Stratification and Class Conflict Theories of political development have scrupulously avoided systematic discussion of social stratification as a possible relevant variable. This omission again seems to be explainable in terms of the particular intellectual and ideological orientation of the main stream of American social science that deemphasizes social stratification and class conflict as relevant variables in social analysis. The generally accepted fact that social stratification and class conflict have not played as salient a role in the political development of America as compared to Europe seems to make American social scientists less sensitive and alert to theoretical analysis in class terms. The cultural belief in and penchant for consensus, solidarity, and ^Fred Riggs, "Systems Theory: Structural Analysis," in M. Haas and H. Kariel (eds.), op. cit., pp. 194-235. 347 stability militates against discussion of class conflict as a significant social fact. The general rejection of Marxist categories of class conflict may also explain why stratifi cation analysis fails to find favor with American social scientists. Among major theorists of political development, Lipset presents some interesting hypotheses concerning the role of class conflict in the political development of Western European nations, but fails to pursue this theme in a theoretical context with reference to the new nations. Apter some fifteen years ago presented a framework for the comparative analysis of politics in terms of a social stra tification framework, but his recent writings on Ghana, Uganda, and other African societies do not utilizie this framework. Neglect of social stratification is particularly surprising since the structural-functional approach which is the dominant trend in political development studies is particularly amenable to it. The main analytic purpose of structural-functional analysis is to highlight the relation ships among different sub-systems and parts of society and to show what functions these parts perform in sustaining the social system. It is the few neo-Marxist theorists that view politi cal development in terms of class conflict. Scholars such as Horowitz, Merle Kling, C. W. Mills, and John Kautsky believe that the existing stratification system in the 348 developing nations is the major stumbling block to indus trial growth and political modernization.^ They conceive that political development and modernization will occur from the dialectics of class conflict, first between the feudal aristocracy and the new rising bourgeosie, later between the national bourgeosie {who they believe would align itself with the neo-colonialists) and the peasantry and factory workers. It is this writer's belief that identifi cation of categories of class conflict with Marxism as a rationale for its rejection deprives us of a very signifi cant structural variable in understanding the problems of political development in developing nations. Many new nations still have a kind of feudalistic social structure where the economic and political interests of a small land owning aristocracy come in sharp conflict with the vast majority of landless peasants and poor workers. The exis tence of the conflicting interests of these two classes cannot be denied; however, conflict in each instance may not take necessarily a violent form. Regardless of how we define political development, its essence would involve, among other things, incorporation and participation of all classes, at least to some extent, in the political system. ~ " n --------------------------------- I. L. Horowitz, The Three Worlds of Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966); John Kautsky (ed.), Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Wiley, i5ti)j Merle Kling, "Toward a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America,” in John Kautsky (ed.), Ibid. 349 The existence of class conflict between a feudal aristo cracy and a landless peasantry, or between a national bourgeosie and the poor urban workers, and how this con flict is resolved may help us in understanding a dynamic aspect of political development. Neglect of a Developmental Perspective in Systems Analysis The stability and equilibrium oriented bias of systems analysis may have discouraged theoretical efforts in the direction of formulating a conception of the politi cal system which is developmental. It is by testing a developmental concept of a political system against man's historical political experience that we may construct a developmental theory of political systems. An approach to political development in terms of systematic comparative history deserves serious scholarly attention. Some systema tic efforts to view political systems in a development perspective have been made recently by Almond and Powell, but they are largely concerned with focusing and directing theoretical speculations and research rather than in pre- 13 senting a theory. In a sense, it is true that a formalized theory of political systems in developmental terms would be 13 Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics; A Developmental Analysis, op. cit. 350 a premature theory for we have not even seriously begun the task of empirically testing our developmental hypothesis through historical and contemporary studies. Neglect of the Study of Political Leadership A casual glance at the turbulent history of "new nations" would convince any observer of the important and vital role played by political leadership. In a transitional political situation when the norms of traditional society break down in the process of modernization, the free- floating loyalties of the traditional masses look for attach ments and this situation usually gives rise to charismatic leadership. In spite of bold recognition of the crucial importance of leadership in the process of political development, we have a lamentable lack of theoretical knowledge about political leadership in the developing nations. Little progress in the theoretical understanding of charisma and charismatic leadership has been made beyond Weber's contribution. In spite of the continuing emergence of newly independent states that are headed by a succession of now-rising and now-falling political leaders, no syste matic theories or even propositions about them have been suggested that could be empirically tested to define their role in processes of political development or regression. A first step in this direction would be to develop a 351 typology of political leadership in terms of personality, social background, ideological orientation, etc. Neglect of the Study of Political Violence and Revolution Another remarkable omission in studies of political development is any systematic discussion of political violence and revolution. In spite of the fact that politi cal violence and recurring revolutions in the developing nations are the order of the day, very little theoretical effort has been made to incorporate this aspect in politi cal analysis. Again, the wide popularity of structural- functional approach with its built-in bias for stability encourages the tendency for equilibrium-oriented analysis. Implicit in the approach, though rarely articulated, is the belief that costs of rapid violent and revolutionary change in human terms are more formidable than those of gradual change. A recent attempt by Chalmers Johnson in his Revolutionary Change to present a theory of change and violence within the framework of structural-functionalism hardly advances either the understanding of revolution or of political development.14 Perhaps the most clear demon stration of this failure was reflected in the attempt by a l^See Horton Kaplan's criticism of Johnson's theory: "Systems Theory in Political Science," in Social Research, op. cit. 352 group of social scientists who in a symposium edited by 15 Eckstein attempted to deal with problems of internal war. The illustrious scholars and their theories remain shrouded in a cloud of theory, hardly coming to grips empirically with the problems of political violence and revolution. Prospects of a Subfield of Political Development What are the prospects of political development emerging as an identifiable subdiscipline in political science? A noted scholar writing a decade ago asserted that there was no evidence indicating the emergence of such a subdiscipline.16 The question obviously can be answered at different levels. If we take into consideration the number of political scientists who are interested and involved in political development studies or the number of courses being offered on the politics of the developing areas, certainly it is impressive enough to claim the status of a subfield in the discipline. Furthermore, the amount of published literature is incredibly large and growing at an exponential rate. Journals dealing either fully or ^Harry Eckstein (ed.), Internal War (New York: Free Press, 1968). 16Ralph Braibanti, "The Relevance of Political Science to the Study of Underdeveloped Areas," in Ralph Braibanti and J. J. Spengler (eds.). Tradition,,Values. and Socio-Economic Development (Durham, N.fi.: tuke University Press, 19fcli, p. 139. 353 partially with political developmental aspects are prolif erating. The number of dissertations in American univer sities dealing with aspects of political development has been steadily rising. All these indicators suggest growing interest in development studies but from a theoretical and methodologi cal point of view, it will be some time before such a sub discipline might emerge. Political development studies, as our preceding analysis has suggested lack analytical sophis tication, substantive refinement, and methodological autonomy. The major contributions which political science has made to political development theory has occurred in the two established fields of comparative politics and public administration. It is not inconceivable that in the near future the other specialities in political science— notably empirical theory— would bring to bear on the problem of political development a relevant unbroken intellectual tra- dition or a body of hypotheses and theories comparable to those of economics that generated a subdiscipline of "growth economics." However, in view of the contemporary trend toward interdisciplinary approaches, it seems futile even to raise questions about the conceptual differentiations or methodo logical autonomy of political development theory. In the initial part of our analysis in three separate chapters we 354 have analyzed how the corpus of hypotheses, Insights, theories, and methodologies in the fields of sociology and anthropology has influenced in numerous subtle ways our con temporary efforts in political development theory, it is not suggested here that studies of political development should not or may not have any autonomous status; rather it is intended here to emphasize the importance of studying the non political aspects of political development. Since political development, however defined, cannot be explained in purely political terms, the social, cultural, and economic aspects of society that are theoretically related to political development need to be explored and empirically verified in the context of a well-grounded political development theory. The best route to political development theory would be to have an empirical focus on "political development" and to utilize the impressive corpus of established insights and theories in the social sciences in general for the cul tivation of verifiable theories in the field of political development. In other words, we are suggesting that politi cal development as a subfield may have some identity of its own in terms of an empirical focus, but the problems of political development are so closely intertwined with those of economic development and cultural change that it may not be possible for political science to predict the direc tion of political development without substantially greater 355 interdisciplinary research. 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Creator
Khan, Shah Wali
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Core Title
Models In The Study Of Political Development: A Critique
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Doctor of Philosophy
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Political Science
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Totten, George O. (
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), Beling, Willard A. (
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855758
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political science, general