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Political Development And Political Parties In Turkey
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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND
POLITICAL PARTIES IN TURKEY
toy
Selcuk Ersin Onulduran
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(Political Science)
February 1973
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University Microfilms
300 North Zeeb Road
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A Xerox Education Company
73-14,430
ONULDURAN, Selcuk Ersin, 1945-
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL PARTIES
IN TURKEY.
University of Southern California, Ph.D., 1973
Political Science, general
; University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan
I
TH IS D ISSER TA TIO N HAS BEEN M IC R O FILM E D EX A C TLY AS RECEIVED.
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
TH E GRADUATE SCHOOL
U N IV E R S ITY PARK
LOS ANGELES. C A L IF O R N IA S 0 0 0 7
This dissertation, w ritten by
SELCUK ERSIN ONULDURAN
under the direction of hhS.... Dissertation Com
mittee, and approved by a ll its members, has
been presented to and accepted by T he Graduate
School, in p a rtia l fu lfillm en t of requirements of
the degree of
D O C T O R O F P H IL O S O P H Y
Dtdn
n,„ February 1973
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
/
Chairman
PLEASE NOTE:
Some pages may have
i nd i st i net print.
F ilmed as rece i ved.
University Microfilms, A Xerox Education Company
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES..................................... iii
INTRODUCTION ....................................... 1
Chapter
I. MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT . 6
Modernization
Modernization in the Political Sphere*
Political Development
II. THE BEGINNINGS OF POLITICAL REFORM . . . 33
The Tanzimat (Reform) Era
Constitution, Absolutism, and the
1908 Revolution
III. THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN TURKISH
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT........... 55
Political Parties and Developing
Nations
Political Parties in Pre-Republic
Turkey
Political Parties in Modem Turkey
IV. PARTY IMAGES AND VOTER CHARACTERISTICS . . 124
V. CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS ............... 160
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY...................... 179
i i
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Types of Political Systems ................ 27
2. 1965 and 1970 Population of Selected
Western Turkish Provinces . . .......... 127
3. 1965 and 1970 Population of Selected
Eastern Turkish Provinces ............... 128
"Educated" Population and Votes Received
by RPP in Western Provinces............. 132
5. "Educated" Population and Votes Received
by RPP in Eastern Provinces............. 134
6. Elite Professions and Votes for RPP in
Selected Western Turkish Provinces .... 137
7. Elite Professions and Votes for the Justice
Party in Selected Western Turkish
Provinces ............................. 139
8. Members of Elite Professions and Votes
Cast for the Republican People's Party
in Selected Eastern Provinces .......... 140
9. Members of Elite Professions and Votes Cast
for the Justice Party in Selected
Eastern Provinces ....................... 141
10. Members of Non-Elite Professions and Votes
Received by the Justice Party in
Selected Western Provinces ............... 144
11. Members of Non-Elite Professions and Votes
Received by the Republican People's Party
in Selected Western Provinces . ........ 145
12. Members of Non-Elite Professions and Votes
Received by the Justice Party in
Selected Eastern Provinces ............... 148
i i i
Table Page
13. Members of Non-Elite Professions and Votes
Received by the Republican People's Party
in Selected Eastern Provinces .......... 14-9
14. Members of Elite and Non-Elite Professions
and Votes Received by the Turkish Labor
Party in Selected Western Provinces . . . 152
15. Members of Elite and Non-Elite Professions
and Votes Received by the Turkish Labor
Party in Selected Eastern Provinces ... 153
16. Illiteracy and Votes for the Turkish
Labor Party in Eastern Turkey.... 156
i v
INTRODUCTION
As in all of the other developing nations, a social
and political transformation is taking place in Turkey.
This country shares many characteristics of underdevelop
ment with the other countries of the so-called "third
world." Yet, it is unique in that it is the direct
inheritor of a great empire which had ruled lands of three
continents for half a millenium.
The modernization efforts which are being exerted
in earnest these days are a part of the continuing process
of political and social reform which began in the eight
eenth century. By the beginning of the nineteenth
century, the empire found itself the victim of continued
military defeats in the battlefield and incessant civil
disorders and uprisings at home. It was then that the
need to modernize became most apparent. The initial
attempts in this vein were focused on the modernization of
the army. For instruction and equipment, the Ottoman
leaders turned to Europe.
With European technical aid came European cultural
influence. The political ferment in Europe in the middle
of the nineteenth century influenced the Ottoman
1
2
intellectuals and the leaders of ethnic minorities within
the empire, aoon, the educated elite wanted the people
to enjoy the same rights and liberties their Western
contemporaries enjoyed. Une way to exert meaningful
pressure on the government was to organize into political
societies, meanwhile, the political leaders in the
Ottoman Empire could not cope with the new demands of
the intellectuals, ^o, they exiled most of those who
raised objections to the traditional oppressive rule of
the government. Thus, the handful of intellectuals who
either escaped out of the country or were banished started
the first continuous and effective campaign against
political traditionalism in Turkey.
This study attempts to follow Turkish political
development from the 1839 fanzimat reforms to the present.
The emphasis is placed on political parties especially
in the post-republic period.
Chapter one establishes the differentiation between
the broad concept of modernization and the more specific
term political development.
In the second chapter, the beginning of Turkish
political development is examined. This period which
began with the first Tanzimat Edict of 1839 is especially
important for the subsequent political developments in
the country. The 1839 Edict is the first official act
3
which in a way acknowledged the superiority of the West by
attempting to pattern the political institutions and
the nature of civil rights and liberites after the
European example. The Tanzimat period set the tone for
all of the development efforts that followed.
The I876 Constitution was the end result of all
the concerted efforts of many different groups working
for political reform in the Ottoman Empire.
With the beginning of parliamentary monarchy in
the Ottoman Empire, various factions emerged adhering
to one political philosophy or another. The strongest
of these factions, the Ottoman Society of Union and
Progress, later became a formal political party. Thus,
party politics, and with it greater mass involvement in
political life, began in Turkey.
Chapter three explores the beginning of party
politics and traces the development of the four most
important parties in republican Turkeyi the Republican
People's Party, the Democratic Party, the Justice Party,
and the Turkish Labor Party. Each one of these parties
has made a unique contribution to Turkish political
development. The RPP was the party under which the
country completed the transition from a single party
regime to a multi-party regime. The culmination of
opposition to the single party rule of the RPP was the
4
Democratic Party. Phis party "brought politics to the
people"* mass participation on a one man, one vote basis.
With the closing of the DP following a military coup,
the Justice Party became the inheritor of the Democratic
Party votes. The JP represents both moderate liberalism
and reactionary fanaticism in the country. -The Turkish
Labor Party championed the far left socialist ideas. It
was closed recently and there is now a lack of a formal
channel of communication for Marxist socialists in
Turkey.
In chapter four, a comparison of voter preferences
with population characteristics is made. Through this
device an insight is meant to be gained into the party
attributes, and the nature of their support.
Finally, chapter five summarizes the study and draws
conclusions including a few predictions about the future
of Turkish politics.
For the past year Turkish politics has been in a
state of flux. As the young, recently politicized groups
became impatient with the slow speed of economic devel
opment in the country, they decided to take the matter
in their hands by acts of terrorism designed to warn
the politicians. The army, on the other hand, thought
that the civilian government did not deal with these
acts of terrorism with the required swiftness and severity.
The military sent an ultimatum to the government
warning that a military takeover could happen again if
political stability did not return soon. The result of
this warning was the resignation of the Demirel cabinet
and the formation of an "above parties" government, a
sort of national coalition. Thus, Turkish political
development passed another test, and civilian political
leadership prevailed.
The commitment of the Turkish military appears to
be strong to civilian rule. One way of measuring this
could be an analysis of the decision making process
and the identification of the key decision makers. Also
one could take into account the rapidity and severity
with which any overt or covert attempts of a military
takeover is dealt by the civilian government. In the
case of Turkey, the rebel colonel Talat Aydemir could
not find support among the military in 1965* He was
subsequently tried and executed.
At this time, the multi-party democratic system is
functioning quite smoothly and the prospects of its
continuation are good.
CHAPTER I
MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
Modernization In Turkey may be studied from the
point of view of two distinct, but interrelated conceptsi
the behavior of the people Including their general sets
of values and daily living patterns on the one hand, and
the institutions of the society on the other. When the
process of modernization begins in a traditional, but
well established society such as the Turkish society, it
is the attitudes of the people and their behavior in all
facets of social activity that changes first.
Although we often see the stimulus for modernization
coming from the people and the institutions adapting
themselves to the new challenges, it is not always a
unidirectional stimulus-response relationship that exists
between the people and the institutions.
The Ataturk reforms in Turkey which resulted in the
emancipation of women, the secularization of the state
and the adoption (at least in the cities) of Western
ways in daily life were executed primarily through the
modernization of the institutions first, and then the
people.
The people-lnstitutlons dichotomy will be most easily
7
understood as we shift to a discussion of modernization
In general and political development In particular.
Modernization has become a popular focus of Interest
for political scientists in recent years. Sociologists
before them had paid attention to this phenomenon with a
different emphasis.
Modernization has gained a special, almost holy,
meaning for the rulers of emerging nations, and the road to
salvation from hunger, disease, and backwardness was seen
as passing through modernization. Therefore, for both the
academicians studying politics, and the ruling elites
practicing politics, modernization has become an all
important term. As David Apter puts it, "Modernization
is a special kind of hope. Embodied within it are all the
past revolutions of history and all the supreme human
desires."*
What is modernization? The definitions given for this
term are almost as many as the people who write about it.
Yet, remarkably enough, there is a good deal of consensus
among various scholars as to what the main characteristics
of modernity are. In many of the recent writings on this
subject, urbanization, industrialization, effective govern
ment, literacy, social mobility, and mass communication
1David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization
(Chicagoi The University of Chicago Pre3s, 1965). P» !•
8
all recur as characteristics associated with modernity.
Etymologlcally, the word modern was seen In the late
Latin writings of around sixth century A.D. and has been
In English usage ever since. Its connotatlve meaning did
change however, from one of pejorative (In the sixteenth
century English) to one of desirable. Of course, In
current usage modern means, "of or pertaining to the
present and recent times as distinguished from the remote
past."3
Modernization, as social scientists use the term,
Involves the whole of the society, Including Its economy,
belief system, culture, and politics. This study will
primarily focus on the political aspect of modernization.
Modernization in Its broad, sociological sense will only
be of secondary concern to us.
The political aspect of modernization is one of the
most difficult to define and measure objectively. Other
aspects of modernization, for example, economic develop
ment, are comparatively easy to measure. Indicators of
economic development can be Identified with relative
precision, and quantitative data Is often available in the
form of Industrial production figures, financial statistics
2The Oxford English Dictionary. Vol. VI (1933).
3Ibld.
9
and so on. The political aspect of modernization lacks
this precision.
For the sake of clarity and ease of identification,
this study will refer to the political aspect of modern
ization as political development. Political development
involves change in the political make-up of a society over
a period of time. The immediate question which comes to
mind here isi "What kind of change?” This question
implicitly inquires about the direction of change in the
polity. This problem will be addressed to below as we deal
with definitions.
Definitions!
A. Modernization
"Modernization," says C. E. Black, "may be defined as
the process by which historically evolved institutions are
adapted to the rapidly changing functions that reflect the
unprecedented increase in Man's knowledge, permitting con
trol over his environment, that accompanied the scientific
k
revolution." His emphasis is on the comparative histor
ical development of institutions and functions. This
view ties modernization to innovation and the spread of
Cyril E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization
(New Yorki Harper and Row, 19^6), p. 7.
10
knowledge In the recent centuries.
According to Mr. Black, modernization occurs In four
phases. These phases are stages through which societies
must pass as they transform themselves from traditional to
modern societies
1, Challenge of modernity. This Is the initial exposure
to the outside, modern world. Here a group emerges which
advocates modernization as good and desirable.
2, Consolidation of the modernizing leadership. During
this phase the rulers of the traditional order are deposed
either peacefully, or (as is most frequently the case in
developing nations) through violent means.
3, Economic and social transformation. The society is
next transformed from a predominantly agricultural and
rural one into an industrialized and urban one.
if. The integration of society. This Is the final phase
where the transformation In many aspects of social life
produces a fundamental reorganization of the whole of the
society. This reorganization Is not without its perils,
however. C. E. Black warns us of this in his study of
modernization!
Modernization must be thought of, then, as a
process that Is simultaneously creative and
destructive, providing new opportunities and
prospects at aghlgh price in human dislocation
and suffering.
^Ibld.. pp. 67-68.
6lbld.. p.27.
11
Another author, Dankwart Rustow, views modernization
as, " . . . rapidly widening control over nature through
7
closer cooperation among men." and he astutely adds, "It
transforms both man and society, but most of all man's
mind."®
The two component parts of this definitioni coopera
tion among men and control over nature, cover essentially
the whole spectrum of efforts which are directed toward
modernization. As men cooperate, they communicate. They
form formal and Informal organizations and groups such as
political parties and consumer groups, or International
organizations such as the United Nations, In order to
achieve rapid technological advances or enhance the chances
for peaceful coexistence.
Control over nature Implies the exploitation of
natural resources and the myriad efforts toward the
advancement of scientific knowledge and technology.
Rustow views modernization within the context of the
modern nation-state, thus the central theme of his booki
A World of Nations. 1967, Is nation building. Within
this context the author examines the constituent elements
of the nation state such asi unity, authority, and
n
Dankwart A. Rustow, A World of Nations (Washington,
D.C.i The Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 3»
8 I b i d .
12
political participation, and concludes that as models of
modernization neither the communist, nor the Western
democratic systems are readily transferable to the modern
izing nations. Every nation will have to find Its own
optimum political or economic system. One favorable
sequence of tasks to be completed In order to establish the
nation-state and progress toward modernization, Is the
establishment of authority over the population, then the
achievement of unity In the country, and finally the
realization of equality of the citizens. Mr. Rustow
predicts that this sequence Is the most likely one that
will provide rapid modernization.
In one of the better known studies on modernization,
Daniel Lerner succinctly states* "Whether from East or
West, modernization poses the same basic challenge— the
o
Infusion of 'a positivist spirit.'" Professor Lerner's
focus Is on the modernizing man In the Middle East, and he
approaches the whole of modernization through the use of a
concept called empathy. This term Is defined as, "the
capacity to see oneself In the other fellow's situation."10
One of the major assumptions Mr. Lerner makes Is that
the empathetlc capacity Is most often found In the Western,
o
Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society.
(New York* The Free Press, 1958). P* ^5*
10I b l d . . p . 50.
13
participant society. The modern society's citizens are
above all else participants In social or political events.
To be a participant a person will have to have opinions
on public matters and he must believe that If he expresses
these opinions they will make a difference, or that his
expressed opinions will have potential of bringing about
change. When measured against the Indices of modernity
which Mr. Lerner constructed (literacy, urbanism, media
participation, and empathy), opinion range of a person In
creased as he was on the positive side of the indices.
During his analysis Mr. Lerner came across a group
which had scored low on all of the above Indices, but
which had a relatively high opinion level. This group,
then, had empathy, a desire to be better, an imagination
of how things could be. This group was the transitionals.
A transitional man Is one who has begun to break away from
traditional ways, but who has not yet attained full
modernity.
The term modernizing actually best describes the
transitional man. It seems that once the choice Is made
by a person that he is not content with the present
tradition-oriented way of life, then his becoming modern
Is only a matter of time. In other words, the transitional
man is In motion and he is closer, at least in spirit, to
the modern man than he is to the traditional man. The
transitional man or society Is In motion, It is In a
dynamic state, and it has passed the "fall-safe” point
In the Journey toward modernity.
So, Daniel Lerner*s book, The Passing of Traditional
Society, looks at modernization from a psychological point
of view and an Indirect definition of modernization Is
given thusi "In modern society more Individuals exhibit
higher empathetic capacity than In any previous society."11
Another scholar who dwells on the psychological
aspect of modernization is David C. McClelland. In a
fairly recent article, after pointing to the differences
in speed and quantity of modernization between various
developing countries, he poses the question: "What
12
impulse produces economic growth and modernization?"
One should seek the answer to this question In the psyche
of the members of the modernizing society. Professor
McClelland speaks of a "mental virus" as the cause of
apparent infection of some with a restless, energetic
disposition, seeking economic and social betterment of
the self. This "mental virus" is identified as "n Ach."
This is the personal virtue which is the moving force
behind a person's modernization efforts. We can assume,
then, that a society where a majority of the citizens are
11Ibld.. p. 51• (Italics in the original.)
12
David C. McClelland, "The Impulse to Modernization,"
Modernization. 1966, pp. 28-39.
15
Infected with this "virus" is well on its way to modernity.
This is an Interesting idea which cannot be operationalized
very easily. Thus, virus "n Ach" is not really a useful
concept for the empirical researcher. It is however an
intriguing label for the motivational factors involved in
the modernization of the individual.
Alex Inkeles also looks at the individual separately
11
when he considers the modernization process. J He
divides the modern man into two partsi "one Internal,
the other externalj one dealing with his environment, the
1 1 1.
other with his attitudes." The environmental manifesta
tions of modernization are such things as urbanization,
mass communication, education, industrialization, and
politicization. All of these are found in modern societies
but they do not necessarily constitute modernity for the
individual who finds himself amid all of these. In fact
the peasant who comes to the big city to find better
conditions of living and higher economic gain, may be Just
as tradition bound as before he left his village. The
second aspect of modernization, that of the modernizing
mind, is the most Important single element.
Modern man has a readiness for new experiences and
*^Alex Inkeles, "The Modernization of Man,"
Modernization. 1966, pp. 138-152.
l4Ibld., p. 139.
16
he is open for innovation and change. What the author
emphasizes here is a certain state of mind, a psychological
disposition which makes it possible for him to break away
from tradition and become future oriented.
As we look through the various definitions and
descriptions of the characteristics of modernization,
certain common factors begin to emergei
1. Modernization means an effort to manage nature
for the maximum benefit of man.
2. Modern man believes that the world is comprehen
sible .
3. In the modern societies the battle between
superstition and science has been won in favor of science.
4. Modern man has the capacity to form opinions
about events and phenomena around him, and he expresses
these opinions.
5. Modernized societies show an advanced state of
urbanization, a high rate of literacy, effective mass
communication, and industrialization.
6. Punctuality, a precise sense of time, and
organized efficiency in private and public affairs is
another characteristic of a modern society.
7. Modern man is open to new ideas, welcomes change
as a means of bettering his lot, and shows a high degree
of "empathy."
8. In the modern society the people believe in
distributive justice, and the government, either directly
or Indirectly attempts to see to It that the citizens
enjoy at least a minimum of social and economic security.
9* Modern man shows an aspiring attitude toward
life, has chosen Individual goals over famlllsm, and has
shed fatalism In favor of mundane self reliance.1^
A more complete definition than those presented
above, and one encompassing most of these nine character
istics, can be the followingi Modernization Is a societal
and Individual process whereby a conscious and deliberate
effort Is made to transgress the present boundaries of
social existence. This process Is directed toward the
multiple goals of human mastery of nature and innovative
and rational behavior with the ultimate purpose of
bettering the conditions and standards of life.
This definition encompasses both the technological
and social aspects of modernization. It is also not
time or culture bound. One could Just as easily use this
definition for the ancient Greeks as he could for any one
of the contemporary countries.
The emphasis on "Innovative" and "rational" Implies
two thingsi
1. The striving toward modernity will be a new and
1^This characteristic was Inspired byi Everett M.
Rogers, in association with Lynn Svenning, Modernization
Among Peasants. (New Yorki Holt Rinehart, and Winston,
Inc., 1969).
18
consequently non-tradltional behavior. The modernizing
society will get its stimulation not from the past, but
from the future and it will be a forward looking society
which will not try to explain and legitimize the present
with experiences of the past.
2. Rationality of behavior implies that actions
and reactions will be the result of a calculation which
will minimize the costs and the risks, and maximize the
returns. Such a behavior would not be influenced by
superstition or religious dogma, but by empirically
observed phenomena.
In the first part of the definition where we mention
human mastery of nature, the reference is to industrial
and technological development.
How can this definition be operationalized? A number
of indicators can be found to correspond with the concepts
included in the above definition of modernization.
1. The operational correspondent of non-traditional
ism or social Innovativeness would show itself as new
social institutions such as a new educational system or,
as we see in the Turkish case, a new set of social
regulations such as the adaptation of the Gregorian
Calendar and the Latin scripts. Also, symbolic, but
profound changes such as changing the headgear from the
fez to the western hat and the Introduction of equality
between men and women are all indicators of breaking away
19
from tradition.
2. Rational social and Institutional behavior
can be operationalized by translating this into secularism,
which is the separation of the state and the church. At
the Institutional level, the recruitment to government
offices can be a key. If personal merit is the chief
criterion of awarding government jobs, we can speak of
institutional rationality.
3. Man’s mastery over nature can be operationalized
In terms of economic growth and Its Indicators such as
energy consumption, steel production, foreign hard currency
reserves and the balance of payments and so forth.
k. Finally, bettering the conditions and standards
of living can be operationalized by referring to such
Indicators as number of dwellings versus the population!
sanitary conditions! infant fatalities; and life expect
ancy, nutrition, and grams of animal protein consumption
per capita.
So, as we have seen, modernization encompasses all
facets of social life. Now let us turn our attention to
a more particular and limited part of the society in
which modernization is taking place. This sphere is the
political life.
B. Modernization in the Political Spherei Political
Development
20
The term political development, rather than political
modernization. Is used here In order to distinguish It
from the more general term, modernization. This differ
entiation Is not meant to Imply that political development
takes place In a vacuum Independent of other social forces.
This Is not so. However, political development does have
Its own characteristics and It should be considered
sometimes as a dependent variable vls-a-vls other social
spheres, and at other times as an Independent variable.
For example, If an elite with Marxist political convictions
comes to power In a given country, the economic system
and the arrangement of social classes In that country will
necessarily change. Here the political system may be
studied as an Independent variable. On the other hand, If
the political machinery of the government reacts to certain
changing social sentiments (as In the case of the approval
and, subsequently, the repeal of the amendment to the
United States Constitution on the prohibition of alcoholic
beverage consumption), then the political system may be
studied as a dependent variable. In most societies the
political activities and especially decisions made and
actions taken by the political sector of society affects
most of the other aspects of social life.
Various societies find themselves In various stages
of political development. Quite possibly we can discern
two or more societies that have very similar Institutions
21
or similar sets of natural or social resources which are
quite different as far as their over all degree of
modernization goes. Here one Intervening variable could
be the degree of political development one of the two
countries enjoys.
How can political development be defined? In modern
political science literature there are varied opinions
on this subject. Some authors look at political develop
ment as a measure of how democratic a country's political
system Is. Others view development In terms of political
stability and the establishment of strong government.
Still others equate nation building and national
integration to political development. Gabriel Almond and
Bingham Powell, Jr. in their 1966 book, Comparative
PolItlest A Developmental Approach, emphasize role
differentiation and subsystem autonomy as criteria of
political development.1^ During the process of political
development, new roles are established or some old social
roles wither away and most Importantly various structures
In the society begin to perform specialized functions.
Thus, the role of legislation is separated from that of
execution, or the administration of justice Is placed In
different hands than those of the rule maker (legislator)
^Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative
Politics! A Developmental Approach (Boston and Torontoi
Little, Brown and Co., I960).
22
17
or the executive branch. ' This basically Is what Is
meant by role differentiation.
Role differentiation takes place In an increasingly
secular environment. The more differentiated and special
ized the roles in a society, the more secular It will
probably become, although role differentiation and secular
ization could conceivably develop Independently.
Almond and Powell consider political parties, pressure
groups, and the mass communicatIons media as subsystems
within the society. And these subsystems are seen as
elements of the political infra-structure. They consider
first the existence and then the autonomous functioning
of these subsystems essential to political development.
Almond and Powell define political development as,
" . . . the Increased differentiation and specialization
of political structures and the Increased secularization
1 f t
of political culture."
Clearly the Western democratic industrial states are
considered to be the most politically developed systems.
This Western bias is Identifiable throughout the book.
In an earlier article, Gabriel Almond gave a defini
tion of political development in terms of "the acquisition,
17Ibld.. pp. 22-23.
l8Ibid •, p. 105.
23
19
by a political system, of some new capability." In
this definition, "new capability" Is the key phrase.
This is what differentiates political development from
other kinds of political change.
Professor Almond further elaborates upon his defini
tion and explains what is meant by new capability!
The criterion of political change, then,
is the acquisition of a new capability, in the
sense of a specialized role structure and differ
entiated orientations which together give a
political system the possibility of responding
efficiently, and more or less autonomously to
a new range of problems.20
The capabilities which all political systems must
acquire, according to Gabriel Almond arei 1) Integrative
capability, 2) International accommodative capability,
3) Participation capability, and 4) Welfare or distribution
capability. These capabilities are essential for the
maintenance of the political system. The integrative
capability involves the creation of national unity and a
centralized bureaucracy. The international accomodative
capability is the ability for the political system to
conduct its own affairs in the international arena. This
capability provides the national system with the means of
^Gabriel A. Almond, "Political Systems and Political
Change," American Behavioral Scientist. VI (June, 1963).
p. 7.
20I b i d . , p . 8.
24
responding to violent (war) or peaceful (diplomatic
negotiations) International stimuli involving Itself. The
participation capability is the capability which we associ
ate with the democratic societies. Here the citizens take
active part in the governmental process and acquire a
civic culture.
Another political scientist, Samuel Huntington, has
paid special attention to political development in his
writings. The opening sentence of his, Political Order
in Changing Societies. 1968, reveals the gist of the
author's understanding of political development: "The
most important political distinction among countries
concerns not their form of government but their degree of
21
government." The degree of government, indeed the
extent to which political power is accumulated and used
toward producing a highly institutionalized, effective, and
stable government, is the determining factor as to how
politically developed (or to use Huntington's terminology,
politically modern) a country is. The advantage of this
kind of an approach to the study of political development
is that it is closer to being value free and it does not
necessarily view the western democratic system (however
desirable it may be) as the ideal form of government, and
21Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order In Changing
Societies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
19557, p.i.
25
the totalitarian dictatorships as the aberration.
In terms of definitions, Professor Huntington
distinguishes political development from political modern
ization. Political development Is " • . . the creation
of complex, autonomous, coherent and adaptable political
22
organizations and procedures,” and political moderniza
tion is " . . . the centralization of power for social
reform and the expansion of power necessary for group
assimilation,"23
In a way, Huntington's characteristics of a politi
cally modern society! rationalized authority, differenti
ated structure, and mass participation, resemble those of
many other political scientists writing on the subject.
The focus on institutionalization when he talks about
political development, however. Is Mr. Huntington's
distinguishing mark. In a 1965 article, Professor
Huntington severly criticizes the criteria used by various
scholars when examining political development. His
principal complaint is that political development Is
often thought of as uni-directlonal, and the various
definitions of political development do not allow for a
reversion of the process toward political decay. As a
remedy he proposes to define political development as the
22Ibld., p. 324.
23Ibld.. p. 324.
26
institutionalization of political organizations and
24
procedures.
Thus, through the use of political institution
alization on the one hand and social mobilization on
the other, Huntington constructs a model of classifying
political systems. This model involves the four ideal
typesi civic, contained, corrupt, and primitive.
The civic society is where both social mobilization
and political institutionalization are high. The United
States and the Soviet Union are examples of this.
Where both of these variables are low, the system is
a primitive one. It is suggested that when social
mobilization is low, but political institutionalization
is high, there is the contained political system.
Finally, if social mobilization is high but institution
alization is low, we get the corrupt political system.^5
These categories are rather vague. Operationalization of
these concepts would require the development of specific
measures of political institutionalization and social
mobilization. Only then could they be useful models for
political development research. In short, the Huntington
model looks like the followingi
2U
Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and
Political Decay,” World Politics, XVII (April, 1965),
pp. 386-430.
25I b i d . , p. 409.
TABLE 1
2?
TYPES OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS
Social Mobilization Political Institutionalization
High Low
High Civic Corrupt
Low Contained Primitive
Sourcei Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development
and Political Decay," World Politics, Vol.
XVII (April, 1965). p. ^09.
Dankwart A. Hustow and Robert E. Ward examine politi
cal development in terms of both the output of the politi
cal system in the form of governmental decisions and the
effective carrying out of these decisions, and the inputs
in terms of popular interest and involvement in the politi
cal affairs. They describe the modern political system
in terms of the following eight characteristics!
1. A highly differentiated and functionally
specific system of governmental organization!
2. A high degree of integration within this
governmental structure;
3. The prevalence of rational and secular pro
cedures for the making of political decisions!
The large volume, wide range, and high effi
cacy of its political and administrative decisions!
5. A widespread and effective sense of popular
identification with the history, territory,
and national identity of the state;
6. Widespread popular interest and involvement
in the political system, though not necessarily
28
In the decision making aspects thereof*
7. The allocation of political roles by achieve
ment rather than ascription* and
8. Judicial and regulatory techniques based upon
a predominantly secular and impersonal system of
law.2o
Political development, then, is given a broader meaning
here, unlike the treatment of the subject in terms of
the institutionalization in the society as proposed by
Samuel Huntington.
Yet a close examination of the above characteristics
will reveal that they deal in particular with political
aspects of the society. It seems that if taken as criteria
for analyzing political development, these characteristics
will render a more complete definition than an exclusive
focus on institutionalization.
There is, however, a considerable obstacle that needs
to be overcome before this framework can be useful as a
research guideline. The eight Rustow and Ward character
istics are not very well defined in terms of operational
research. There could be a need to develop indicators
to use in any data collecting effort. In addition, some
of the characteristics such as basing the Judicial function
on an impersonal system of laws* the use of achievement
26
Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, eds.,
Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton,
New Jersey« Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 7.
29
criteria in recruitment to political roles, would be
extremely difficult to ascertain since those in a position
to give information would not be likely to admit favoritism
or personal arbitrary rule.
In an Interesting article, Alfred Diamant defines
political development in terms of the adaptability of the
27
political system to new goals and demands.
After labeling the political system in a society the
"dominant problem solver," Mr. Diamant gives us this defi
nition of political development
In Its most general form, then, political
development is a process by which a political
system acquires an increased capacity to sustain
successfully and continuously new types of goals
and demands and the creation of new types of
organizations.2®
In order for the system to sustain this process on
a continued basis, a centralized and differentiated polity
is a necessity. The centralization of authority is
especially important during the early stages of political
development where various autonomous tribes, local
loyalties and the like will have to be brought under the
control of the central government.
Differentiation of roles in the political system
27
'Alfred Diamant, "The Nature of Political Develop
ment," Political Development and Social Change, ed. by
Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (New Yorki John
Wiley and Sons, 1966), pp. 91-91•
28I b l d . . p. 92.
30
provides for specialization In the government and the
creation of specialized Institutions which will help
Integrate newly acquired skills and functions.
Lucian Pye also sees political development In terms
of building capabilities of an effective state and a
consciousness of nationhood. He succinctly points out«
"Political development then becomes the process by which
communities that are nation-states only in form and by
29
International courtesy become nation-states In reality.”
As requirements of becoming a "real" nation-state,
the maintenance of public law and order, the ability to
mobilize national resources to serve a specific number
of national goals, and the capacity to enter into and
uphold international commitments are enumerated.
In further elaboration, Professor Pye statesi
Development entails the translation of
diffuse and unorganized sentiments of nation
alism into a spirit of citizenship, and
equally the creation of state institutions
that can translate Into policy and programs
the aspirations of nationalism and citizen
ship. In brief political development Is
nation building.30
The trouble with this definition of political
development Is that it can only be applied to nations
which are in the earliest stages of their political
29
^Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development
(Bostom Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 37*
3° I b l d .. p. 38.
31
development. The goings on In countries where the
minimum requirements of nation-statehood have been met,
but which are going through different stages of political
change are not covered by this definition.
As a more general definition, we might offer that
political development is a process of growth, in the life
cycle of a nation-state, where those who make up the
substance of a nation, the people, participate in the
endeavors of building effective government, rational and
Impartial laws and differentiated and functionally specific
political institutions.
In this definition, the mention of a life cycle
with regard to nations is intended to imply an Incessant
growth and change rather than expected death. The
definition is confined to nation-states for the sake
of simplicity, and because this is the prevalent current
model of political organization. Participation of the
people in governmental affairs is regarded as a character
istic of developed societies because modern man regards
as natural that he should have a say in the decisions
of the modern state that can so profoundly affect his
life.
By effective government we mean that ultimately
there should be one political power which is the holder
of legitimate coercive power, and which, through this
32
weapon, conducts the day to day affairs of the state.
The government can be termed effective if the decisions
made by it are carried out by a network of competent
administrative bureaucracy, and if it can maintain
civic order. By impartial and rational laws, it is
Implied that all of the citizens are treated as equals
before the law, and that the sources of the law are
temporal rather than religious.
Finally, differentiated roles and specific functions
mentioned in our definition implies that where there
is a concentration of roles in the same institution,
there are limited checks on the powers. And if the
political institutions are not assigned specific roles,
competence and expertise in the performance of a
given political function (for example, rule making,
rule execution, or distribution of Justice) will
suffer.
So far we have discussed the general idea of modern
ization and political development. Next, the political
development of Turkey will be the focus of our interest.
CHAPTER II
THE BEGINNINGS OF POLITICAL REFORM
A. The Tanzlmat (Reform) Era
Although this study is primarily concerned Kith the
political development of modern Turkey of post 1923. (the
date of the establishment of the republican form of
government) no such attempt can ignore the most Important
period of the Ottoman reform movement which started in
the late 1830's. This serious move toward modernization
is called the Tanzlmat. a Turkish word meaning reorganiza
tion. The Tanzlmat move was engineered by the prime
minister of the time, Mustafa Resid Pasha. The Tanzlmat
Rescript which was proclaimed in 1839. bore the seal of
the newly enthroned Sultan Abulmecid, but its background
goes to the time of the reformist, Sultan Mahmut II.
Sultan Mahmut II was an autocratic ruler who had
decided that the main reason behind the recent Ottoman
defeats in the military field was the backward condition
of the army and the corrupt and Inefficient practices of
the then current main corps of land forces, the Jannlsaries.
The Jannlsaries had constituted the main Ottoman
fighting force for hundreds of years. The members of
this corps of devoted professional soldiers were selected
34
mainly from among the young children of the non-Moslem
population of the empire. The young recruits were then
brought to the capital and were duly indoctrinated and
educated, as well as converted to the Moslem religion.
The Turkish military history is full of the stories of
heroism and military victories attributed to the
Jannlsaries.
By the late eighteenth century, however, the old
glory had begun to fade away and the Jannlsaries had
become a restless corps of malcontents who caused trouble
at home and whose war front performance, too, left much
to be desired. Sultan Mahmut decided to abolish this
military force and replace it with a reorganized and
modernized army modeled after the Western armies.
The opportunity arose in 1826 when the Jannlsaries
attempted yet another revolt and the sultan dissolved the
Jannlsary forces# and a new army, the Asaklr-1 Mansure-1
Muhammedlye. the victorious Mohammedan soldiers army,
was established.
The significance of the abolishing of the Jannlsaries
is that the civilian, bureaucratic forces of the early
nineteenth century who were instrumental in bringing
Mahmut II to power had prevailed over the military forces
of the day, and in fact had the sultan feel secure enough
to abolish a sizeable portion of the military establishment*
Following the dissolution of the Jannlsaries, the
35
Ottoman modernization shifted toward a modernization of
the governmental structure and the economic and financial
systems of the Empire.
The Ottoman Empire was In a state of decline by
1839. Sultan Mahmut, In the decade Immediately preceding
the Tanzlmat Rescript made a conscious effort to create
a new bureaucracy. A bureaucracy which would streamline
the day to day operations of the governmental machinery,
and which would have a Western outlook, was the purpose
of his attempts. To this end, to various Important posts,
the sultan appointed men who had Europeanized minds and
people who either received their education abroad or
who had a knowledge of one of the Western languages.1
The importance of familiarity with a Western language
had become all the more pronounced following the 1821
Greek revolt. Up to that time the translators employed
by the government were members of the local Greek minority
who conducted foreign correspondence and were influential
in the making of foreign policy decisions. In 1822, the
Sultan Mahmut II, created a Translation Bureau where men
were employed as translators and young men were instructed
1Roderlc H. Davison, "Environmental and Foreign
Contributions," Political Modernization In Japan and
Turkey, ed. by Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow
(Princeton, New Jersey* Princeton University Press,
1966), p. 96.
Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern
(London* Oxford University Press, 1961), p.
Turkey
36
3
In the Western languages. The Influence of the new
elite that emerged from the palace translation bureau,
caused the beginnings of an Intellectual movement which
was becoming Increasingly displeased with the absolutism
of the sultan. Thus, the Tanzlmat Rescript was partially
designed to placate the more vocal critics of the regime.
The actual author of the Tanzlmat Rescript was Mustafa
Resld Pasha, who had been a civil servant and a diplomat.
He was the Ottoman ambassador to Paris, and later, to
London where he also held the office of the Ottoman
foreign minister. In 1839, Resld Pasha was still the
foreign minister when he read the Imperial Rescript of
Gulhane as the reform edict is called.
The contents of the Rescript reveals that it was
basically a document promising to the citizens that their
treatment by the government would be on a more egalitarian
basis, and that the life and property of the subjects
would be secure.
The sultan declared that he wished to cease the
practice of farming out of the taxes to privileged
individuals who would collect them in the name of the
government while paying a sum to the government which
approximated the expected tax revenue. This system had
^Serif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought
(Princeton, New Jersey! Princeton University Press, 1962),
p. 211.
37
caused a justified complaint among the tax payers, for
the collectors sought to make a profit with the result
being a de facto Increase In the taxes.
Furthermore, all citizens, Moslem or non-Moslem, would
be treated equally before the law and criminal and civil
trials would be conducted In public. To prepare the new
legislation, the existing Supreme Council of Judicial
Ordinances (Meclls-1 Vala-yl Ahkam-1 Adilye) was to be
increased In number, and the members of the Council
would be charged with codifying the general principles of
I I
the Rescript Into concrete laws.
The Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances was not
a representative body like the British Parliament.
Nevertheless, it was an advisory body where discussions
on the laws took place. In fact, It appears that the
Sultan Abdulmecid regarded this Council as a quasl-
parliament and followed rules similar to those governing
the relationship of other European monarchs with their
parliaments, In his behavior toward the Council.'’
The Tanzlmat Rescript did not result in a measurable
Improvement of the conditions In the country. Another such
edict was proclaimed In 1856 which primarily touched upon
^"Tanzlmat," The Encyclopedia of Islam. 193^. IV» 656.
^Recai G. Okandan, Amme Hukukumuzun Anahatlarl
(Istanbul1 Fakulteler Matbaasi, 1968), pp. 71-72.
38
the same principles. The minority rights Issue Including
Increased equality of Moslems on the one hand, and Chris
tians and Jews on the other, was emphasized. The sultan
also promised not to break the principles set down in the
edict. This promise Is significant because here the
sultan enters a contract with the people and at least the
people are regarded as an entity toward whom the govern
ment felt responsible.
Both the 1839 and 1856 edicts suffered from the same
weakness. Neither of them provided a means of enforcement.
In fact the main sanction In the second decree was that
those who did not abide by the new rules would be forever
damned and cursed by God!
The I856 reform edict was annexed to the Paris Peace
Agreement. It appears that this new edict, and especially
the sections emphasizing the equality of all religious
groups in the empire, was inspired by the direct sugges
tions of the Western powers such as Britain, France, and
Austria In order to undermine any further demands Russia
might make as the protector of the Eastern Orthodox
Christians in the Ottoman Empire.
The egalitarian and tolerant character of the new
edict (the 1856 edict) was more pronounced when compared
to the 1839 Gulhane edicti
£l wish] . . . that none of my royal subjects
will be forbidden from conducting the services
of their religion and that none will be subjected
39
to Injustice and torture because of this and
that none will be forced to change religions
or religious sects . . . .°
The edict prohibited official discrimination against any
class of citizens because of their language, religion, or
race.
. . . all statements, words and discrimination
will be deleted and banned forever, from the
decisions of the High Council, which imply
that of the (various) classes of subjects of
my exalted reign, one is inferior to another
because of language, religious creed or race. . . J
The inclusion of a ban for racial discrimination is
very significant especially for a society where remnants
of slave trade were still evident and which was composed
of several different races.
Despite all the promises made, the conditions with
regard to the administration of the empire did not improve
much. The administrative officials^ either through igno
rance or deliberate effort, did not fully promulgate or
enforce the Tanzlmat regulations. The Moslem majority
and especially the uneducated did not look upon the
egalitarian outlook of the 1839 or the 1856 documents with
unreserved favor. To them, equality with the non-Moslems
may have meant a lowering in their own status.
^Ibld.. p. ?4. (Translations of all Turkish texts
are by the author of this study.
7I b l d . , p. 74.
40
The Tanzlmat movement was a well intentloned but
largely Ineffective effort to stop or at least
slow down the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Yet
there was no stopping the new Ideas of nationalism
sweeping through Europe from affecting the non-Turkish
minorities of the empire. The government was not equipped
to meet this new and powerful challenge. Repression did
not work and an attempt at Integration, an attempt to
create an "Ottoman nation" was not successful. One author
who has specialized on the Tanzlmat period statesi "In
the long run, the single most failure of the Tanzlmat
period was the attempt to hold the empire together with
Q
the doctrine of Osmanllllk." This Idealistic and maybe
a little romantic concept of Osmanllllk or Ottomanlsm
takes as Its basic premise that It Is possible for all
the races and religions to live together under the banner
of the Ottoman Empire.
The nineteenth century, however, saw the greatest
separation and sedition among the national minorities
making up the Ottoman Empire. By the end of the 1800's,
the sultan's (Abdulhamld II) tactics had alienated most
of the minority members in the capital and the ties between
Turkey and the satellite states of Serbia, Montenegro,
Q
Roderick H. Davison, Reform In the Ottoman Empire
1856-1876 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1963), p. 407.
41
Romania, and Egypt had loosened almost completely.
How should one assess the Tanzlmat or reform movement
prior to the 1876 constitutional period? Certainly this
movement cannot be summarily dismissed as mere window
dressing prompted by the need to show the European powers
that the Ottoman Empire was a viable state with a promising
prognosis.
Already, in the winter of 1853, the British ambassador
to Russia, Sir Hamilton Seymour, was boldly, yet discretely,
suggesting to Tzar Nicholas!
. . . we have on our hands a sick man— a very
sick man. It will, I tell you frankly, be a
great misfortune If one of these days he should
slip away from us before all necessary arrange
ments were made.9
The sick man was, of course, the Ottoman Empire. In
reply, the Tzar observed a few days later:
If your government has been led to believe
that Turkey retains any element of existence,
your government must have received incorrect
information. I repeat to you, the sick man Is
dying, and we can never allow such an event to
take us by surprise. We must come to some
understanding.10
The British did not want to see the Russians take up
a strong foothold at the Turkish Straits and the disinte
gration of the empire was temporarily postponed by their
^Lord Eversley, (Eversley, George John Shaw-LeFevre)
The Turkish Empire (New York: Howard Ferrig, 1969), p. 295*
10I b l d . , p. 296.
42
opposition to the Russian schemes.
While the Ottoman Empire was approaching the final
stages of its life, it saw that death was imminent
unless a rejuvenation was attempted. The Tanzlmat reforms,
then, should be taken as a last ditch effort to save the
life of the empire.
The program of modernization launched by the Tanzlmat
Rescripts was a self-defense against the intrusions of
the West. The systematic modernization of especially the
armed forces, which began during the reign of Selim III,
was continued and an attempt was made to extend it into
the bureaucratic machinery of the empire.11 The corruption
of the officials and the alien nature of the reforms
slowed down the assimilation of the modern ways.
The political reformation displayed during the
Tanzlmat period was again short of the ideal goals. The
major contribution of Tanzlmat to the political development
of Turkey was the introduction and the establishment of a
custom of consultation in the governmental decision
making process (mesveret). The personal, absolutist rule
of the sultan was slightly diminished during this period.
With the deposition of Sultan Abdulaziz in 18?6, this
kind of personal rule came to an end until 1878, when
Halil Inalcik, "The Nature of Traditional Society*
Turkey," in Political Modernization In Japan and Turkey.
ed. by Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow. (Princeton,
New Jersey* Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 62.
43
Sultan Abdulhamid II suspended the 1876 Constitution and
dissolved the parliament, ruling the country as an absolute
monarch until 1908, the beginning of the second constitu
tional period,
B. Constitution, Absolutism, and the 1908 Revolution
One of the most Important landmarks of Turkish
political development was the Introduction In 1876 of a
constitution and the conversion of the regime Into a
constitutional monarchy. This first try at constltultonal-
ism unfortunately did not last very long and the parliament
was adjourned and the constitution suspended in 1878 for
thirty long and painful years.
The Intellectual history of Turkey indicates that
the events which lead to the 18?6 Constitution were largely
precipitated by the actions of a handful of Turkish
literary-political elite who operated largely from exile
In Prance and England.
This group was called the Young Ottomans. Among the
more prominent members of this group were Namlk Kemal, All
12
Suavi, Mustafa Fazll Pasha, Zlya Pasha, and Mehmed Bey.
All of these people had held government Jobs at one time or
another, and all were well acquainted with the West and the
Western languages.
12
S. Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought.
p. 4 4 .
44
Although the association of these people was political
In nature, the Young Ottoman group was not a political
13
party In the precise sense of the word. J They did not
have a formal program and did not seek to come to power
themselves. In fact there were differences of opinion
among them as to the finer details and methods of their
opposition to the oppressive government in Istanbul. The
chief culprits In their eyes were All and Fuad Pasha who
were the two statesmen at the helm of the Ottoman Empire
at the time along with the Sultan Abdulazlz. The opposi
tion to autocratic rule of the government was mostly
directed at All and Fuad, but it was the sultan who lost
his throne at the end.
The deposition of Abdulazlz marked the close of the
autocratic rule and the 1876 Constitution was soon to
come. The main character of this period is Midhat Pasha.
Midhat Pasha was the Chief of the Council of State which
was established as a court with jurisdiction over disputes
involving the state on the one hand and the citizens on
the other. He was a man deeply and sincerely committed
to constitutionalism, and would accept nothing less. His
colleagues at the time who were in the cabinet (he was also
a member of the cabinet as the Chief Justice of the Council
1-^R. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 18 56-1876.
P. 175.
^5
of State) were not altogether convinced of the desirability
of promulgating a constitution, although all agreed upon
the need for reform.
The result of Midhat Pasha's deep seated constitu
tionalism was that he convinced a few of his colleagues
of the Incompetence and autocratic excesses of Abdulazlz
and especially his Prime Minister Mahmut Nedlm Pasha.
There was a cabinet change in 1876 and the members of
the new cabinet, which Included some members of the old
cabinet Including Midhat Pasha, decided on the deposition
of Sultan Abdulazlz and the enthronement of the heir
apparent. Prince Murat, as Murat V.
Unfortunately for him and possibly for those Intellec
tuals who suffered most later for thirty some years under
the autocratic rule of Abdulhamld n, Murat's delicate
nerves could not take the emotional shock of becoming the
king and he too, had to vacate the office of the sultan
a few months after his accession by reason of Insanity.
This turn of events was no doubt a disappointment for
Mldhat Pasha because Sultan Murat, even before his becoming
the sultan, was known to have expressed a desire for estab
lishing a constitutional regime If he ever became the
14
sultan.
Finally, It was decided by Mldhat and his friends
14 1
Okandan, Amme Hukukumuzun Anahatlam, p. 134.
46
that Abdulhamid who was next In line of succession to the
Ottoman throne, should be offered the Sultanate. He read
ily accepted with the understanding that he would soon
promulgate a constitution and call for elections for a
parliament.
Abdulhamid was not a monarch who was genuinely
Interested In a constitutional regime and a sharing of his
power. To this end, his Initial tactics were stalling the
promulgation of the constitution, and the deliberate
deletion from the constitutional draft, expressions which
could be taken as limiting his powers. One notorious
article of the 1876 Constitution, article 113, gave the
monarch the exclusive power to exile those who raltrht
Incite a riot or otherwise endanger the security of the
state. This "catch-all" article was later used by the
sultan to banish all those whom he considered to be a
threat to himself.
The fate of Mldhat Pasha was also indicative of the
grudging way Abdulhamid II acceded to the Idea of constitu
tionalism. Mldhat Pasha was a man of genuine patriotism
and one who was loved and respected by his countrymen.
Furthermore, he was Instrumental In the deposition of the
two sultans who had preceded Abdulhamid. For Abdulhamid,
the pathological fear of forcible abdication was an
important driving force. Finally after various governor
ship posts in the empire, Mldhat Pasha was accused of
^7
complicity In the "murder" of Sultan Abdulazlz (previously
Abdulazlz's death was certified by credible physicians,
both foreign and Turkish, to be suicide). Mldhat returned
to Istanbul expecting a fair trial, but receiving a grossly
unfair one complete with perjuring witnesses. He was found
guilty and his death sentence commuted to life In prison
as an "act of clemency" by Abdulhamid,
Mldhat Pasha was killed In his prison cell In Talf,
Arabia under mysterious circumstances and most probably
on the orders of Abdulhamid, on May 8, 188*+.
The Tanzlmat period come to its conclusion with the
publication of the 1876 Constitution and the opening of the
first Ottoman Parliament in Istanbul the next year. The
I876 Constitution was the first of its kind for the
Ottoman Empire. The significant thing Is that as in
the Tanzlmat edicts, the influence of European nations on
the Ottoman rulers was a very Important reason for its
promulgation.
To understand the degree to which the West had
Interest In the Ottoman Empire, we must keep In mind that
In the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire still held
the title to a vast territory from the Arabian peninsula
to Serbia. The underdeveloped state of the Ottoman econ
omy, the bankrupt treasury, and the millions of minority
1^Encyclopedia Brltannlca. 1972, XV.
48
people living In the empire, were all contributing factors
for European Interest in Turkey.
The industrial revolution that was taking place in
Europe stimulated the European merchants and industrialists
to look at Turkey as a profitable market. The capitula
tions which were special advantageous rights bestowed
upon foreigners in Turkey made them exempt from Turkish law.
The weak empire, which needed the strong European countries
loans to survive, could not refuse demands from them which
violated sovereign powers of the state and Ottoman
national integrity.
Thus, the time of announcement of the new constitution
was also selected as a moment which would create the most
favorable impact in Europe. The Istanbul Peace Conference
which had convened to negotiate the terms of a peace
agreement between Turkey and Serbia had delegates from
all the major European powers. The Sultan Abdulhamid II
chose this stage to announce that the Ottoman Empire was
going to have a constitution like those seen in Europe
and that the security of life and property of foreigners*
Moslems, Jews, and Christians would be under the guarantee
of a constitution. In fact, then, "the thought that lay
in the foundation of the promulgation of the constitution
was not a desire to put the domestic affairs of the state
in order, but to deceive the Europeans who continually
wanted change In the Ottoman Empire."1^
As a constitution, the 1876 Constitution was not
unlike many of Its European contemporaries. It contained
provisions for personal freedoms and establishing the
governmental institutions and procedures.
The constitution was drawn up by a group of men who
were not necessarily legal scholars. The continual
pressure from the sultan against the Inclusion of
democratic principles and the necessity of compromising
some of the principles according to Abdulhamid II's wishes
for the sake of expediency resulted in a document somewhat
lacking In internal consistency and one which was hardly
responsive to the needs of the country.
Another significant point on the nature of the I876
Constitution Is that It was not prepared by a duly elected
constituent assembly. It was regarded by the sultan as a
gift to the people? not a document drawn up by the rightful
owners of political liberties, or their elected representa
tives .
The 1876 Constitution of the Ottoman Empire provided
for a top-heavy political system whereby the sultan and
the executive branch of the government had unchecked powers
not comparable to those political powers accorded to the
*^Furuzan Husrev Tokin, Turklyede Slyasl Partller ve
Slyasl Dusuncenln Gellsmesl 1839-1965 (Istanbul1 Elif
Yaylnlari, i9^5)• P« 26.
50
parliament. For example, the sultan had the powers of
declaring war or peace on foreign countries, and making
international agreements as well as being the commander-ln-
17
chief of the armed forces.
Furthermore, of the two chambers of the parliament,
the Upper House (A.van Mecllsl) was appointed directly by
the sultan and it had the power to review and reject
legislation passed by the Lower House (Mebusan Meollsl) on
the grounds that a particular piece of legislation may be
against the rules of accepted order, or religion, or
18
national security, or even the rights of the sultan.
The making of laws was a complicated procedure. The
most significant rule was that the proposal of new
legislation or amendments to existing laws was a privilege
of the cabinet. The members of the parliament could only
petition the sultan that they be permitted to propose a
certain piece of legislation. Even if the permission was
granted, the proposed law was to be formulated and drawn
up by the Council of State, not the members of the
19
parliament.
Needless to say, this severe limitation could
^Article Seven of the 18?6 Constitution in Bulent
Tanor and Taner Beygo, Turk Anayasalari ve Anayasa Mahkemesl
Kararlarl(Istanbult Tlpo Basimevi, 1966), p. 8.
*^Ibld.. Article Sixty-four.
*^Ibld.. Article Fifty-three.
51
effectively take the initiative away from the legislature
and make it nothing more than a "rubber stamp" parliament.
In fact, because of this and other similar deprivations the
contemporary Intellectuals sometimes sarcastically
referred to the first Ottoman Parliament as the "Yes, Sir!"
Parliament.
Two other points must be made on the question of how
the legislature was Inadequately armed as opposed to the
executive. First, although the Council of Ministers
(the Cabinet) could request the dissolution of the parlia
ment in certain situations of impasse between itself and
the legislature, the legislators could not cast a vote of
non-confidence and cause the fall of the cabinet. Second,
the sultan was under no time limit or obligation to sign
and promulgate a law passed by the two houses, thus any
legislation that displeased the sultan or tended to
Infringe upon his rights, as he conceived them, could be
effectively killed by the sultan at will.
On the rights of the citizens and other individuals
residing within the boundaries of the empire, the I876
Constitution contained quite liberal provisions.
The main guiding principle was that all official acts
would be based on a presumption of equality of all citizens
before the law. As for religion, the constitution did not
contain any sanctions against those who may have attempted
to violate its provisions. This in effect left the
52
citizens at the mercy of the government. Especially the
sultan, armed, with the blanket authority accorded to him
with Article 113 to banish those whom he found objection
able, could and did relegate the political liberty in the
country to naught.
How are we to assess the 1876 Constitution? First of
all, it was the first constitution the Ottoman state ever
had, and the fact that it was deemed necessary to have a
constitution at all is significant. This shows that the
Ottoman rulers could no longer turn a deaf ear to the winds
of political liberty sweeping over Europe. Secondly, this
document, as inadequate as it may have been, if sincerely
upheld, and amended when necessary to reflect a trend
towards a democratic (constitutional) monarchy, could
have strengthened the political make-up of the state.
In reality however, the constitution remained as
not much more than a window dressing effort to appease
the Europeans anxious for reform in the empire in order
to protect their economic and political Interests.
One major institution created by the constitution, the
legislature, did an admirable Job for the short time it
was in session. The quality of debates and the real
concern the deputies showed for the declining state of the
empire bore testimony to the potentials of good that could
have come from the legislature.
The Independence of thought shown by the parliament
53
was too much for Abdulhamid II, and the excuse he needed
occured during I878 as the Turko-Russian War broke out.
The sultan adjourned the parliament because of the war and
the need for making expedient decisions without debate.
So, In effect the first constitutional period came to an
end on February 13, 18?8. Although the constitution
was permitted to remain In the books, Its provisions
were not enforced for the next thirty years.
The period of three decades of personal rule and
repression by Abdulhamid II was the worst deprivation of
freedom In the Ottoman Empire. The sultan established a
large army of spies whose duty was to send reports to the
sultan on the activities of those suspected of plotting
against the sultan. The unconfirmed estimates were that
in Istanbul out of every five adults, one may have been
a spy. The press was completely censored, and the freedom
of thought and assembly were reduced to nothing.
The thirty years of Hamldlan repression left Turkey in
a state of paralysis and all the efforts of the govern
mental machinery were directed toward maintaining the
status quo and keeping the sultan on his throne. The
confidence of the people In their government was almost
completely lost and In contrast to the Tanzlmat period,
the statesmen, "though often unpopular because of their
Innovations, were at least respected by virtue of the
54
prestige attaching to their origin, position, or personal-
20
ity. Abdulhamid's bureaucrats were simply detested."
The absolutism of Abdulhamid gave birth to several
secret revolutionary societies which cropped up in all
parts of the empire. One among them, the Ottoman Society
of Union and Progress, (Osmanll Ittlhad ve Terakkl Cemlyetl)
prevailed over others and was instrumental in the deposi
tion of Abdulhamid II and held the reigns of the empire
until the end of the First World War.
The activities of the Union and Progress Society were
directed by a triumverate in later years, comprising of
Talat, Enver, and Cemal Pasha. The political development
of Turkey entered a new phase after 1909 with the rise to
power of the members of the Union and Progress Association.
From then on, in the political life of the country, a
new entity started to take part: a political party. It
is on this aspect of political development that our
attention will be focused next, following a general discus
sion of the role of political parties in the politics of
modernizing nations.
20
Peter F. Sugar, "Economic and Political Moderniza
tion! Turkey," in The Political Modernization in Japan
and Turkey, ed. by Robert Ward and Dankwart Rustow
(Princetom Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 159.
CHAPTER III
THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN
TURKISH POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
I, Political Parties and Developing Nations
Political parties came onto the stage of Turkish
politics towards the end of the nineteenth century. This
almost coincided ’ .vith their formal appearance in European
politics. Until the nineteenth century, factional
politics had been the ordinary manifestation of lnter-group
political activity. Even then, politics remained In
the realm of the elite.
With the development of representational Institutions
and the extension of voting rights to a greater number of
citizens, the term and phenomenon of political parties
emerged.^
The first mass democratic party of Thomas Jefferson
had one essential mode of operation: winning the consent
2
of the majority of voters. The Jeffersonian understanding
^■Joseph A. Schleslnger, "Political Parties: Party
Units,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
1968, XI, p. ^28.
^Alfred de Grazia, Political Behavior, Vol I: The
Elements of Political Science (New York: The Free Press,
1962), p. 191. s7~
56
of political party served as the model to the early
parties. Then, the Idea of nominating candidates In
party conventions was a new addition to political life.
The Jeffersonians held conventions In Pennsylvania, New
York, New Jersey, and Delaware to nominate their candidates
3
to various elective offices. Until the Introduction of
the conventions, the notable citizens used to present
themselves as political office candidates In various
regions. With the party conventions, the nominations, at
least in theory, had a potential of being democratic. This
profoundly changed the face of politics In America. Now
that party conventions were Instruments through which one
could reach candidacy, grass roots organization became
Important. The popularization of candidate selection meant
that more people, truly representing the social upbringing
of the majority of the voters could have a chance of becom
ing candidates. This selection in turn could result In
elected officials being not members of an elite, but more
like the voters themselves, sharing the same values as
they did and having a first-hand understanding of their
problems.
As we shall point out later, the social origins of
the candidates and politicians of modern Turkey still
V. 0. Key, Jr., Politics. Parties, and Pressure
Groups (New York« Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1958), pp. 221-
222.
57
remain somewhat apart from that of the voters. Often,
the cost of political campaigns and the traditional sense
of Inadequacy the common peasant has of himself as a
"governor” makes It difficult for "ordinary people" to
become political leaders.
How are political parties defined? Professor Sigmund
Neumann gives a comprehensive definition of political
party asi
the articulate organization of society's active
political agents, those who are concerned with
the control of governmental power and who
compete for popular support with another group
or groups holding divergent views. As such,
it is the great Intermediary which links
social forces and Ideologies to official govern
mental Institutions and relates them to polit
ical action within the larger political com
munity.^
Thus, Professor Neumann Implicitly assigns them the role of
interest aggregation when he talks of political parties as
intermediaries linking social forces and ideologies to
governmental Institutions. This role of interest aggrega
tion and later, articulation is more explicitly assigned
to political parties by Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell.
Almond and Powell differentiate between at least three
styles of interest aggregation! 1) Pragmatic-bargaining:
style. This is the style which we see in the Anglo-
l i
Sigmund Neumann, "Toward a Comparative Study of
Political Parties," in Comparative Political Parties, ed.
by Andrew J. Milnor (New Yorki Thomas Y. Crowell Co.,
1969), PP. 26-27.
58
American system. The giving and taking on issues, the
compromising and crystallization of national questions
take place as political parties conduct their activities.
2) The absolute-value oriented style refuses compromise.
The methods of tackling problems and their ultimate
resolution are pre-determined according to the theories of
the driving ideology behind the party. Both the dogmatic,
pure forms of Communist and Fascist Party systems are
examples of this style. Since all answers are to be found
in the party's ideology, references need not be made to the
"outside world." Thus, groups which fall outside of the
party's orientation are generally either completely ignored
or under-represented. 3) Tradltlonallstlc styles of
aggregation typically rely on the experiences or ideas of
the past to propose policy alternatives for the future.^
Another definition of political party links it to a
program and elections* "A political party is an association
established by people united on a certain political program
with the purpose of realization of the alms of the program
through normal election channels."^
This shorter definition is limited in its scope
^Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, Comparative
Politics! A Developmental Approach (Bostoni Little, Brown
and Company, 1966) pp. 108-109.
^Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Slyasl Muesseseler ve Anavasa
Hukuku (Istanbul! Sulhi Garanmatbaasi, 1966), p. 147.
59
however. Political organizations with declared or
undeclared revolutionary methods would not be covered by It.
Political parties went from being vehicles of the
elite In gaining a say In the governmental process, to
becoming articulators of the Interest of the public. Thus,
the emergence of mass parties In the twentieth century
made politics more accessable to the common man. Especially
following the Second World War* both the Fascist Italian
and German experiences, and the post war expansion of
Russian political influence through local communist parties
in Eastern Europe, have shown us the potential of political
parties as powerful entities in national politics, sometimes
influencing international affairs.
Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner took a mass party
orientation as the mark of a true party in an article on
7
the development of political parties. By a political
party they understandi
1. Continuity in organization.
2. A manifest organization with good communication
between local and national units.
3. Determination by the leaders to capture political
power.
4. A concern for enlisting popular support.
7
Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, "The Origin and
Development of Political Parties," in Political Parties and
Political Development, ed. by Joseph LaPalombara and Myron
Weiner (Princetom Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 6.
60
All of this points to a well organized and well
established national political party. In fact, many
political parties In developing nations and some of the
parties in the advanced countries would not be considered
political parties when rigorously examined under the light
of these qualifications. The modern mass parties of this
century have to adopt all of these conditions if they are
to have a reasonable chance of perpetuating their lives
and, ultimately coming to national political power.
What place do political parties occupy In developing
nations? First of all, In a traditional society, political
parties can hardly exist because in and of itself a
political party is a complex organization which is a threat
to the heretofore unquestioned authority of the government.
A desire for change is necessary in any society if the
political party is to become something outside of a paper
organization. When this desire for change occurs, then
the traditional society is already heading toward modernity
and it has become a transitional or modernizing society.
Therefore if we find real political parties in a given
society, we can assume that it is a modernizing or modern
society.
In developing nations, elites which are restless for
partnership in the exercise of power often seek a power
base to back up their demands, and the masses provide such
a base. This base is only useful, however, if they are
61
mobilized around the Ideals of the contesting groups, and
a political party Is an optimum device to spread Ideas
and enlist support. This Is why most autocratic regimes
do not allow the establishment of political parties which
are not under their control.
In the modernization process the political party
assumes an important role. What Is expected of It Is not
only the clarification of issues, but also political
education of the masses. Ideally, in the underdeveloped
countries, political parties, while competing legitimately
for political power, should nevertheless, be helpful to the
government in Its efforts of modernizing the country. In
developing societies, the political parties develop along
side of a modern bureaucracy, an increasing education level,
and a modern army. Often, in a modernizing country with a
multi-party system, elections themselves are remarkably
educational for the local population. In Turkey, for
example, a full-blown campaign with politicians in city
clothes, party posters with clever election slogans, rallies
and propaganda techniques (loud speakers, dropping leaflets,
and so forth) are sometimes an awesome sight to the simple
peasant. At other times, however, the peasants, now
somewhat experienced in the double talk of campaigning
politicians and empty compaign promises, were known to
band together and keep campaigning politicians from entering
their village.
62
In short, political parties leave a profound Impres
sion on the modernization and political development of
underdeveloped countries. Often, impatient leaders or
military juntas see political parties as nuisances which
slow down the unification and rapid economic development
of the country. Sometimes the deep-rooted factionalism
because of tribalism or religious or linguistic differences
reflects itself in party politics. Then elections turn
into a bloody show of force between the adherents of
different political parties, and parliamentary debate
is reduced to petty inter-party bickering. Under these
circumstances, it is impossible not to sympathize with
the complaints against party politics. The solution,
however, does not lie in the abandonment of multi-party
activity or parliamentary democracy. Closing of legitimate
political parties and suppression of opposition is not a
long-term solution. The real remedy lies with better
political education of the masses and better methods of
political socialization. The government should try to be
more responsive to the needs of the citizens and should
open easily accessible channels of communication. If this
is done, smooth operation of democratic political procens
and legitimate competition for political power will be
inevitable.
11, Political Parties in Pre-Republic Turkey
The political atmosphere of the latter half of the
63
nineteenth century In Turkey was one of repression and
secret political societies. The purpose of these
societies was the overthrow of the absolutist sultan,
Abdulhamid II, and the return to constitutional rule.
During this period, there were three schools of
thought around which the Turkish intellectuals and their
politicized supporters gathered. These werei
1. Westernism
2. I siamIsm
3. Turkism®
These three schools were often at odds with each other.
The "Young Turks" groups which were loose associations
of discontented Turkish intellectuals, contained members
with leanings to all three of these Ideas. Mostly,
however, they were characterized by Westernism and Turkism.
The Ottoman Society of Union and Progress was the
strongest and the most Influential of the various fragmented
Young Turks associations. The Union and Progress Society
was established in 1889 in Istanbul by a group of students
of the military School of Medicine. Among its founding
members were: Dr. Ibrahim Temo, Dr. Abdullah Cevdet,
o
Ishak Sukuti, and Mehmet Resit.
O
Furuzan Husrev Tokln, Turklye'de Slyasl Part Her ve
Slyasl Dusuncenln Gellsmesl 1639-1965 (Istanbul: Ellf
Yayinlarl, 19^5)» p. 42.
9Ibld., p. 32.
64
The Union and Progress movement grew rapidly and
started to open chapters at home and abroad. The most
Important of these branches was the one In Paris. The
leader of the Paris group was Ahmet Riza. He was Influenced
by the philosophy of Auguste Comte, and published the
Influential Journal, Mesveret.10 The title meant consulta
tion, which reflects on the kind of government, a government
of consultative administration between the sultan and a
council, which was longed for. This Journal was smuggled
into the capital and widely read by the Intelligentsia.
A second, important political group which largely
functioned abroad was the Tesebbus-1 Sahsl ve Adem-1
Merkezlyet Cemlyetl, (the Personal Initiative and Decentral
ization Association) under the leadership of Prince
Sabahattin. This association had two basic guiding
principles; "Personal Inltitlative," which was Its eco
nomic doctrine and which espoused a liberalism based on
the personal initiative and free enterprise system; and
"decentralization" which was its administrative doctrine.
By decentralization the association understood a federal
type of government with greater independence of local
governments of the provinces in local matters. Prince
Sabahattin was probably friendly to the idea of ethnic
states within the empire, especially in the Armenian
Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 198.
65
revolutionary Tashnag societies. He is done injustice
here. He was an idealist and an optimist who envisioned
an Ottoman nation made up of people of different religions
and national origins, living peacefully and in loyalty to
the Ottoman Empire.
In contrast, the Union and Progress people were
Turklsts. They saw the salvation of the empire in instil
ling a national pride and a consciousness of Turkism in
the majority who were Turks.
A further division between the two factions of the
Young Turks, one following Prince Sabahattin, the other
Ahmet Rlza, was about the tactic to be used to reach the
common goal of the deposition of Abdulhamid. While Prince
Sabahattin thought it acceptable, even desirable, to ask
for the aid of friendly Western powers to overthrow
Abdulhamid, Ahmet Riza and his followers opposed any
foreign intervention, saying that any foreign intervention
would be an insult to the Turkish national honor.11
The Young Turks sought to reconcile their differences
at a Congress in February, 1902. As it turned out, Ahmed
Riza's supporters who were in the minority and Prince
Sabahattin's supporters drifted further apart in their
positions and the first Young Turk Convention of 1902 gave
birth to the "Personal Initiative and Decentralization
11Dogan Avcloglu, Turklye'nln Duzenl (Ankarai Bilgi
Yaglnevl, 1971). pp. 164-165.
66
Association" as a rival to the "Union and Progress Society."
The prince continued his efforts of conspiring to
rally support for his cause of overthrowing Abdulhamid
through a military coup. He persuaded Sir Edward Greg
and Clemenceau to give an approving nod in his direction.
His attempts were frustrated by the sultan, however, and
he never had a chance to put his dreams of a harmonious,
12
multi-nation empire into effect.
Although there was a second attempt of unity among
the contending factions of the Young Turk movement in
Europe, this unity was never realized. The 1907 Congress,
again in Paris, produced only a superficial unity among
the Young Turks.
Meanwhile, the Union and Progress Party had gained
considerable strength through the Joining of young,
idealistic officers, and through merging with small,
patriotic, revolutionary groups among which was Mustafa
Kemal's (Ataturk) Vatan ve Hurrlyet (Fatherland and Freedom)
society.
By 1907, the sultan's despotism had become unbearable
and the discontent of the officers in the army who were
young as well as the Ottoman intellectuals posed enough
of a threat that Abdulhamid had no choice but to grudgingly
12I b i d . . p. 165.
6?
re-establish the constitutional regime with a proclamation
on July 31. 1908.
The Union and Progress Society gained the control of
the 1908 Parliament and in opposition was the Ahrar Flrkasl
(The Liberal Party). The politics of the Second Ottoman
Parliament was full of personality battles among the
politicians, and most of the debates were dominated by
the pressures of the Balkan Wars. The deposition of
Abdulhamid and the succession of his brother Mehmet Hesat
changed the position of the sultan vis-a-vis the parliament
and weakened the executive. The change was not of great
significance, however. The autocratic rule of the sultan
was now replaced by a more tolerant dictatorship of the
Committee of Union and Progress.
By 1923. many changes had taken place in Turkish
politics. The old empire had disintegrated, a new national-
state had been born and the republican form of government
had been established.
At this point in this study, it seems appropriate to
assess Turkish political development up to the single
party regime of Republican Turkey which began in 1923*
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the
Ottoman Empire found Itself in shambles. The external
pressures on the state, coupled with corrupt and incompe
tent civil servants, created the illusion of an existence
for the empire, the real fabric of which was full of
68
moth-eaten holes.
The national groups making up the empire gained a
consciousness of cultural heritage and national Identity,
and almost all of them wanted to become Independent
countries with territories carved out of the empire. The
political machinery of the empire was outmoded and
completely Inadequate. For centuries, the military super
iority of the Turks as well as their system of centralized
administration had seemed adequate. But, by the end of
the eighteenth century, the times had changed and what was
the arrangement that was once smoothly working, had begun
to break down.
In the early times, the quasl-milltary administrative
system was based on a hierarchical arrangement whereby
the Turks were the soldiers and responsible statesmen
placed on the top, and the Arabs, the Kurds, the Jews, and
the Greeks as well as other small minorities by and large
filled the other, lower positions of the Ottoman society.
The Ottoman Empire could not create out of the
heterogeneity of its population an Ottoman nation. There
were no cultural ties between different religions and
racial groups, no commonality of language or customs, and
most importantly, no commonality of purpose. The attempts
of creating an Ottoman nation seems to have been doomed
from the start.
The Tanzlmat reform movements and other attempts at
69
modernization were not primarily self-inspired. The
Ottoman modernization always came as a reaction rather
than as a process of natural growth. The theocratic state
and the Caliph-Sultan were too religious dogma bound to
effectuate radical reform. As the military power of the
sultan eroded, so did the effectiveness of his orders with
a resultant loss in the efficiency of the government.
Arbitrary rule by the desperate monarchs Abdulmecit and
Abdulhamid and the autocratic frame of mind of such
capable reformers as All and Fuat Pasha did not leave room
for the sharing of political power. Differentiated
institutions with specific roles came too late. Even in
the I876 Constitution, the sultan was the head of the
executive, and at the same time he enforced vast powers
normally regarded in the sphere of legislatures in more
developed societies.
The few elections held until the republic and for some
time thereafter, were not entirely free and the level of
political education of the majority of the people was such
that rational political choices were impossible to make.
Often, the people voted for the best known, and frequently,
the richest and most influential members of the community.
Personalities have traditionally played a greater than
desirable role in Turkish politics. This was especially
true during the pre-republican era.
For several decades preceding 1923. the country had
70
been involved in some kind of war. The population was
too depleted, too tired, and too neglected for the slow
brewing needed for mature political development. The
handy Turkish peasants with ultimate confidence in the
good will and wisdom of their rulers were not too demanding
of good government. The 1789 French and the 18^8 European
revolutions only affected a top stratum of educated elite,
and even then the religious devotion of some of the
intellectuals prevented them from demanding the abolition
of the sultanate. Furthermore, the West from which they
received most of the intellectual Influence could not
provide easily adaptable models for modernization. The
late nineteenth century Europe had by and large nation
states whereas the Ottoman Empire was a patchwork of a
multitude of nationalities.
One of the positive political contributions of the
reform movements of the late nineteenth century was the
establishment of the Consultative form of government. The
administrative decisions of the period were often the
result of deliberation by a small group or council made up
of trusted aides or ministers of the sultan. There was a
negative side to this approach and this was the increased
influence-peddling. Since membership in the high councils
was still based on personal selection, various devices and
bribery were used to gain governmental posts.
The most politically active period of the pre
71
republic era was the Second Constitutional period. During
the years 1909-191^, the general atmosphere of freedom,
following three decades of despotism, was much abused. The
new, unassimilated political freedoms were taken as
license for political misbehavior. Factionalism, personal
ity clashes and indiscretion in the conduct of governmental
business especially in the parliamentary debates became
normal fare of the day. The assassination of Prime Minister
Mahmut Sevket Pasha gave the Union and Progress Party the
opportunity they were looking for to silence the opposition.
The strong arm tactics used during the investigation
concerning the assassination served more the interests of
the party than the interest of justice. In fact, by 191^.
the start of World War I, the regression to the oppressive
government of the Hamldlan Period (Abdulhamid's reign) was
almost complete. There was one exception, however. Now
Instead of an essentially one-man rule, the dictatorship
was perpetuated by an oligarchy of Union and Progress
leaders, especially the triumvirate of Enver, Talat, and
Cemal Pasha.
So, in short, the period in Turkish political life
which lasted from 1839 (Tanzimat reforms) to 1923
(proclamation of the republic) should be characterized as
the period of political Infancy in terms of our initial
definition of political development.
Following this period, the holders of political power
72
In Turkey found themselves confronted with the impossible
task of nation building and state building at the same
time. The emergence of a leader of the caliber of Ataturk
during the post World War I Independence struggle was most
fortunate for Turkey, for he proved to be as good a
politician and statesman as he was a military commander,
III. Political Parties in Modern Turkey
The most prominent feature of modern Turkish politics
is the high level of division between the major political
parties. True to European political party tradition, the
political parties of Turkey not only disagree on what the
major issues are at the parties' leadership level, but
disagreement also lies deep among the supporters. In
extreme cases, devotion to parties reaches the level of
fanaticism.
In a given election year, several issues appear over
which disagreement is expressed. Basic problems faced by
all developing nations are also present in Turkey. Eco
nomic development, increasing the level of literacy, and
social reforms are all controversial problems widely
debated in the campaign speeches.
Historical factors also contribute to the cleavages.
Traditionalists, remnants of Ottoman traditional beliefs,
are constantly at odds with reformists. Of late, rightists
of capitalistic-liberal persuasion continually clash with
73
leftists of socialist tendencies.
The style of local politicians often leaves much to
be desired. Personalities and personal doings are fre
quently made into campaign Issues and some speeches reach
levels of character assassination.
The audiences to whom the election campaigns are
addressed are basically of two kindsi the urban elites,
and the rural masses. Approximately 20 percent of the
population are urban area dwellers and 80 percent live
in villages or small communities. Of the total population,
roughly 40 percent are literate and 60 percent are not.
Given these two conditions, one must always keep in mind
that there are two Turkeys in a way. One is the urban,
literate, and relatively modern Turkey, and the other is
the rural, illiterate and traditional Turkey. The Turkish
political parties, all of which claim to be mass parties,
feel obliged to be able to offer something for everybody.
This could account for the apparent inconsistencies an
observer of Turkish politics and campaigns sometimes
notices. Keeping in mind special characteristics of Turkey,
let us next look at the major political parties of modern
Turkey. As typical examples, four political parties have
been selectedi The Republican People's Party (Cumhurlyet
Halk Partlsl). The Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti). The
Justice Party (Adalet Partlsl), and The Turkish Labor
Party (Turklye Iscl Partlsl). Of these, two are now
?k
defunct: the Democratic Party and the Turkish Labor Party.
Their Inclusion was deemed necessary because of the unique
contributions of each to the political development of
Turkey.
A. Republican People*s Party.
The Republican People's Party Is as old as the republic
Itself. The origin of the party goes to the end of World
War I. Following World War I, the Allied powers decided
to divide not only various dominions of the Ottoman Empire
among themselves, but also the Turkish fatherland Itself,
the Anatolian Peninsula. This caused the cropping up of
organized reslstence groups in various parts of the country
which called themselves the Defense of Rights Associations
(Mudafaal Hukuk Cemlvetlerl) . These Independent associa
tions were later consolidated Into one organization called
Anatolia and Rumella Defense of Rights Associations
(Anadolu ve Rumell Mudafaal Hukuk Cemlyetlerl). The
political backbone of this organization was the remnants
of the Union and Progress era. Thus, even the further
change from the Defense of Rights Organization to the
People's Party In 1923 did not spoil the political conti-
13
nuity at the organizational level.
In 1923. this Defense of Rights organization took the
11
-'Tunaya, Slyasl Muesseseler ve Ahayasa Hukuku.
p. 238.
75
name People's Party and In 1924, changed Its name to the
14
Republican People’s Party. The Republican People's
Party (henceforth RPP) remained in power for twenty-seven
years. During the first twenty-three years of the republic
there was no formal opposition party in the parliament.
The RPP had successfully led the country through the early,
difficult years and slowly prepared the people for the
multi-party regime which began in 1946. The Republican
People's Party has had to be the political nanny of Turkey
in the early years. Becuase it also formed the government
for nearly three decades, and had to make unpopular politi
cal decisions, it was often resented by the people. It
was attractive to the elite but not very well liked by
the majority of the people toward the end of its rule.
Even today, the RPP still has not been able to attain the
goal of being a truly mass party. It still draws Its
chief support from the bourgeoisie, and those dominant
classes of the first twenty-five years of the republic
such as the bureaucrats, city intellectuals, military
officers, and the traditional class of "notables" in the
country-side Including Influential people and large land
owners.1^ The party is strong in agha (large land owner)
1^Kemal H. Karpat, Turkey's Politics (Princeton, New
Jerseyi Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 394.
^W. B. Sherwood, "The Rise of the Justice Party in
Turkey," in World Politics, XX (October, 1967), p. 56.
76
dominated eastern provinces and In Ankara, the capital
city.
The Republican People's Party's election symbol Is
six arrows. These symbolize the six principles of the
party's program which was drawn up In the convention of
May 10, 1931* These are: Republicanism, Nationalism,
Populism, Statlsm, Secularism, and Reformism.1^
These principles are commonly called the principles
of Kemalism, the nearest thing the Republican Party has
ever had to an Ideology. The six principles were formally
Incorporated Into the first Turkish Constitution In 1937.
17
when party and state had, In effect, merged into one.
A brief explanation of each of these principles will
18
clarify their meaning:
1. Republicanism: This Is one principle on which
no compromise is likely. Both the 1924 and the 1961
Constitutions have as their first article the provision:
"The Turkish state is a republic." This principle is
accepted by all political parties and no discussion of
whether or not the republican form of government is good is
1^K. Karpat, Turkey's Politics, p. 395*
17
For full text of 1924 Constitution as amended in
1937. see B. Tanor and T. Beygo, Turk Anayasalarl. pp. 40-58,
18
A more detailed description of these Is given in
Donald E. Webster, The Turkey of Ataturk (Philadelphia:
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1939).
Chapter IX.
77
permitted.
2. Nationalism! The nationalistic movement which
Identified Itself with "Turks" rather than "Ottomans" had
its beginnings in the Young Turk period. As mentioned ear
lier, especially the Union and Progress Party had Turklst
leanings. The writings of sociologist and Unionist, Ziya
Gokalp develop this theme. The 1961 Constitution gives a
new twist to the term Turk when it frees the term from
ethnic or religious connotation by saying! "Every individ
ual who is bound to the Turkish state by ties of citizen
ship is a Turk."*^ The nationalism of the RPP is not a
discriminatory one. The nationalism here is meant to show
the all encompassing nature of the party addressing itself
to all citizens.
3. Populism: The emphasis here is on a classless
society where all the citizens have the right to vote and
run for office regardless of social origin, or economic
status. The populism of RPP was not altogether successful
in attracting a large following especially in the multi
party political competition. The elitist impression it
gave the voters still prevails, especially among the
peasants.
4. Statlsm: This term should not be taken in the
^Turkish Constitution, (1961), art. 54.
78
sense it is used in totalitarian regimes of communism or
fascism. It simply means that the state, along with and
in support of the individuals, engages in economic activ
ity. Today, several large state enterprises where the
capital is supplied by the state and the private sector,
operate successfully especially in the fields of energy
production, textiles, steel production, and various mining
activities.
5. Secularism: This principle is still vitally
important in Turkish politics. Reactionaries and religious
fanatics would rather see the demise of the secular state
and bring back the Moslem state. In bringing about the
Westernization of Turkey, Kemal Ataturk's most important
step had been the secularization of the political system
by abolishing the Caliphate and separating church and
state
6. Reformlsmi This terra has a special meaning in
Turkey. It specifically refers to the Ataturk reforms
which converted the country from the "Eastern" Ottoman
traditions to the "Western" republican ways. They Include
the abolishing of the traditional headgear: the Fez. and
replacing it with the Western hatj also the changes in the
20
For a detailed study of the secularization of Turkey,
see Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey
(Montreal: McFill University Press, 196*0 •
79
national script from Arab characters to the Latin alphabet.
The RPP sees itself as the guardian of the Ataturk reforms.
The historical development of the Republican People's
Party is quite complex and its main characters are numerous.
Basically this development can be examined in two sections:
a) the single party period and b) the multi-party period.
a) The single party period. This period lasted from
1923 to 19^6, and is considered the preparatory period for
democracy in Turkey. Between 1923 and 19^6, the Republican
Party, first under Ataturk, and later under Inonu, ruled
the country with a free hand, pretty much without formal,
organized opposition. The Turkish single party regime
under the RPP never really idealized this system and it
only existed because the educational level of the population
and the political atmosphere of the country in general was
not considered to be ripe for democracy. Maurice Duverger
gives this analysis of the Turkish single party period:
The Turkish single-party system was never
based upon the doctrine of a single party.
It gave no official recognition to the
monopoly, made no attempts to justify it
by the existence of a classless society or
the desire to do away with parliamentary
strife and liberal democracy. It was always
embarrassed and almost ashamed of the monop
oly. The Turkish single party had a bad
conscience— differing in this from its
fascist or communist bretheren, who offer
themselves as models to be imitated.21
21
Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, p. 277.
80
Kemal Ataturk had always believed In the democratic
Ideal and he thought It desirable, Indeed necessary, to
have more than one party In the parliament. As early as
192A, a formal opposition party was attempted. On November
17, 192^, the Progressive Republican Party (Terakklperver
Cninhnrlyet Flrkasl) was established by (among others) two
famous commanders and close colleagues of Ataturk and
Ismet, Kazim Karabeklr and All Fuat Cebesoy. Rauf Orbay,
22
another close associate, was one of the charter members.
The new party was formed as a reaction to the sweeping
reforms, not because the leaders of the new party did not
believe in their substance, but because the speed of the
reforms was thought to be too fast.
The Progressive Party intended to curb the powers of
23
the president, not to replace him. J One of the points
of their program was that the president should keep
himself above party politics. Further, they wanted to
establish first-degree elections rather than the second-
degree voting system which then prevailed. The party had
greater liberal leanings than the RPP. It was more for a
free enterprise system and the individual's rights. The
activities of the Progressives caused a lot of heated
22
F. Tokin, Turklye'de Sl.vasl Partner, p. 70.
^Lord Kinross, Ataturk (New York: William Morrow
and Company, 1965). P* ^9.
81
debate and agitation in the parliament, and one of the
opposition supporters, Halit, was killed in the parliament
2 L
building,
In 1925, the Kurds in Eastern Turkey revolted under
the leadership of Sheikh Said. He was a relicrious fanatic,
extremely displeased by the secularism of the new regime.
The government's reaction was swift. First, a Law
for the Maintenance of Public Order was passed, giving the
government extraordinary powers to suspend or supress any
organization which might encourage rebellion, and then the
Progressive Party was closed because of its rightist
leanings and softer attitude in the face of the rebellion.
The only other experiment with an opposition party was
the establishment of the Liberal Republican Party (Serbest
Cumhurlyet Flrkasl) by Ataturk's close friend Fethi Okyar,
at Ataturk's suggestion. The party was established on
2 * 5
August 12, 1930. The emotionalism and the excessive
criticism of the government and the fundamental reforms of
Ataturk which followed the establishment of the party,
convinced both Ataturk and Fethi Bey that the political
atmosphere of the country was not yet ripe for public,
formalized criticism of the government.
2^Ibid., P. ^50.
2^Karpat, Turkey's Politics, p. 65.
82
The Ataturk reforms had not, as yet, been fully
established and considering that only seven years had
passed since the war of independence, the tranquility of
the country had not been secured fully by 1930. During
one of Fethi Okyar's political tours through western Turkey
some demonstrators spoke against the reforms and others
threw away their hats symbolizing their distaste for the
Westernization of the country. The fanatics who Joined
the Liberal Party started a concentrated religious campaign
condemning the secularism of the new state. Fethi and
his associates were severely criticized in the parliament
for the behavior of some of their supporters and finally
concurring with their critics, they declared the Liberal
Party closed as of November 17, 1930*
The Liberal Party experiment was Turkey's last attempt
at "guided democracy" with a government approved loyal
opposition party. What emerged after 19^6 with the estab
lishment of the Democratic Party, was multi-party politics
of a genuine nature. This will be touched upon later when
we will discuss the development of the Democratic party.
The high-handed rule of the RPP continued through the
1930's and the Second World War. In the mean time, internal
opposition was growing in the parliament among the members
of the RPP. Especially the strict rule necessitated by
the delicate neutrality in World War II lost many friends
to the People's Party. Ironically, the People's Party was
83
becoming less and less the "people's party" with every
passing year.
The president of Turkey in 19^, who was also the
chairman of the Republican People's Party, was Ismet Inonu.
He had been elected president following Ataturk's death
in 1938. Despite other shortcomings he might have, Inonu
has a most admirable quality: his belief in the democratic,
open society. He may not have been the most democratic of
rulers, or his regime may not have occurred in the most
politically open society, but his dedication to the
democratic principle and basic belief in a competitive
political system was essentially what eased Turkey into the
multi-party system following the Second World War.
In his opening speech before the parliament in 19^,
Inonu stated:
Our administration is a people's
administration in every sense of the word.
This administration is developing the
democratic principles according to the
nature of Turkey and its special conditions.
As we were finding the practical precautions
of Turkey's rule by the people, from the
first day we have refrained and will always
refrain from falling into an imitation rule.26
This speech was meant as a reaffirmation of adherence to
democratic Ideals and a condemnation of the fascist and
communist regimes which he stressed were not imitated by
26
Metin Toker, Tek Partiden Cok Partiye (Istanbul:
Milliyet Yayinlari , 1970), p. 48.
84
his government, although they were in vogue at the time.
The single party period in the RPP's history continued
until the establishment of the Democratic Party in 1946.
b) The Republican People's Party during the multi
party period. The history of the RPP after 1950 Is the
history of an opposition party with increasing progressive
ness and an inclination to the left of center.
Because of the prevalent election system where the
majority of votes won all the parliamentary seats in a
given district, the RPP which had 46 percent of the popular
votes was represented in a parliament of 487 members by
only 64 deputies. Thus, on May 14, 1950, following a
peaceful election, and a voter turnout of 89 percent, the
27
27 years of uninterrupted rule of the RPP came to an end.
The Republican Party in opposition proved to be a
formidable opponent to certain schemes of the Democratic
Party towards the end of their rule in I960. As economic
conditions worsened, the Democrats sought to silence the
opposition through various means until the end, when
even violent and illegal schemes were thought about. The
Republican Party has not been able to win a majority of
the votes since 1950* Even today in 1972, twelve years
^Richard D. Robinson, The First Turkish Republic
(Cambridge, Massachusettsi Harvard University Press,
1965), p. 141.
85
after the military coup that brought the Democratic Party
rule to an end, the RPP suffers from the bad images it
had created during the twenty-seven continuous years in
power, and the tight administration during the war years
(World War II). The 1961 elections gave the RPP 37
28
percent of the votes and a plurality in the assembly.
This caused the formation of a coalition government with
Ismet Inonu as the prime minister. The coalition was not
an entire success and lasted until 1965 under Inonu's
leadership, but with different parties' partnerships as
cabinets changed. The coalition governments were the
last time the RPP has been in power.
In the last few years, Ismet Inonu and his lieutenants,
especially Bulent Ecevlt (who is the present chairman of
the RPP following Inonu's recent resignation), declared a
new party position with regard to economic and social
development policies. This is the decision of declaring
the RPP to be a party which stood at the "left of center."
The left of center philosophy is one which, the RPP
thinks, is most beneficial to Turkey and the social and
economic development of the people. Actually they say,
this label does not change the character or the philosophy of
^Joseph S. Szyllowicz, "The Turkish Elections! 1965."
Middle East Journal. XX (Autumn, 1966), p. ^75*
86
the party, it only defines and structures it. Bulent
Ecevit, one of the chief architects of this new formulation,
sees left of center as the place of those who believe in
democratic principles with a forward looking reformism,
and those who feel a moral responsibility for the poor.
In a book published following the 1965 elections (when the
new label probably cost many votes to the RPP from those
who were frightened away by the word "left”), Ecevit
enumerated the characteristics of a left of center attitude
ass
--(The left of center), because it rejects
all restrictions placed upon human beings
(and because) it wants man to have the control
of his own living and working conditions, is
democraticj
— Because it wants to save man from Inequality
of opportunity and injustice in living condi
tions it is for social Justices
— Because it wants to mobilize all the latent
material and spiritual power in human beings,
(and because) it wants to put human beings in
a position of giving direction to their own
living and working conditions, it is reformist. ^
The general theme of left of centerism emphasizes a
reformist social Justice and a democratic, socially
conscious political system. Economically a continuation
of the statist policies of the Republican Party is to be
maintained with greater emphasis on cooperative enterprises
among the peasants and more Just distribution of national
2^Bulent Ecevit, Ortanin Solu (Istanbul: Kim Yayinlari,
1966), pp. 90-91. -------------
87
income, where the gap between the very rich and the very
poor would not be as great as in the present day.
This declaration of where in the political spectrum
exactly they stood, cost many supporters to the RPP.
Following the announcement of the new party position, the
forces of the rightist rival parties immediately started
to spread the libellous propaganda that the left of center
position was tantamount to socialism and, of course, every
body knew what that meantt a "Moscovite Communism."
Immediately it became clear that the RPP leaders had to
reeducate their own troops and through them the voters, as
to the meaning of left of centerism. Inonu said in a
speech, "Left of center characterizes the forty some
30
years of application and the future aims of our program."^
In another occasion, again leader Inonu stated, "The
phrase, left of center, is the scientific name of RPP's
31
known election platforms and written programs." The
party officials sometimes tried to tell the people that
this was nothing new, nothing to fear, but simply a tighten
ing of terminology and a declaration of purpose. Address
ing some intellectuals who still accused the Republicans
with establishmentarianism and lack of courage because
3°Ibld.. p. 65.
31Ibid., p. 67.
88
they did not come out and embrace socialism per se, the
same officials stressed that in fact under the new slogan
the party was more than ever committed to the public good.
In short, in 1965 the Republicans gambled on the enlightened
political thinking of the voters, but could not reap the
benefits they had hoped for.
It appears that if the RPP can resolve the ongoing
feud within its organization between those who adhere to
a center or right of center political philosophy and those
who are committed to left-of-centri sm then it will be
able to rally all the enlightened and reformist liberals
around itself. Otherwise the bitter factionalism develop
ing between the two factions may well spell the demise of
the party.
What does the Republican People’s Party promise to the
voters? Quite a lot. In fact quite a bit more than it
seems possible to accomplish in a reasonably short time.
The 1969 election platform promises to change the estab
lished order and bring about reforms within the framework
32
of a multi-party democratic system of government.
The main theme of the platform is that the party, if
it comes to power, will help the villagers, who make up
two-thirds of the population in Turkey, better their
-^2Cumhurlyet Halk Partisi, Halktan Yetkl Istlyoruz
(Ankarat Ulusal Basimevi, 1969). p. 123.
89
living conditions and provide the much desired land
reform. This will mean that all the farmers will have a
chance to own the land they work on, which might currently
belong to absentee land owners. In addition, the land
which belongs to the government will be distributed to
those farmers who do not own a field on which to farm.
The program also emphasizes an increased agricultural
production and accelerated industrialization. Above all,
the RPP says, every person has the right to live like a
human being with dignity, enough food in his stomach, and
a knowledge that his future is secure. They promise to
develop the heretofore neglected eastern half of the coun
try, provide technical and financial assistance to the
peasants living in the mountainous regions of the country
where arable flat land is scarce. This would primarily
be done by diverting the peasants' efforts to raising
animals instead of crop farming.
The foreign policy of the RPP would stay along the
lines of the Western Alliance with greater emphasis on
national sovereignty rights over foreign (American) bases.
On the whole, the primary aim of the RPP program is
rapid development and self-sufficiency in a short time.
The financing of the projects described in the program
would be possible, the RPP leaders say, through the
redirection of national resources, a tax reform whereby
loopholes would be closed, increased productivity through
90
33
hard work, and better education. ^
The Republican People's Party remains In the opposi
tion In present day party politics. It Is a mass party
in that all sections of the population support the party
with their votes. For the majority of the voters, however,
the RPP maintains the Image of being the party of the
intellectuals and government officials and other white
collar workers. The new reformist talk of the leaders has
not yet been assimilated by the rank and file party members.
This creates a formidable problem for the Republican Party
because the local party officials and members who are in
day to day contact with the voters do not all promote the
principles of left-of-centrism with the same vehemence.
In the most recent months, a new leader, Bulent Ecevit,
was elected as the party chairman after the nearly four
decade long leadership of Ismet Inonu. At the moment the
dissidents call his election a victory for the leftist
elements of the party. Ecevit himself is a dedicated
Republican who believes in Western style democracy, but sup
ports the welfare state and left of center politics. His
youth and vigor, coupled with a change in leadership from
the old timers to the new blood, may provide the much
needed change for the party. Thus, the "new" Republican
-^Ibld.. Section 16, pp. 113-119.
91
People's Party may possibly persuade the majority of the
voters of Its sincerity that once In power, it will bring
about change and prosperity.
B. The Democratic Party.
The Democratic Party was established by four dissident,
but prominent members of the Republican People's Party on
January 7, 19^6.^
The period immediately preceding the announcement of
the new party had been full of discomfort among some of
the members of the RPP, and the victory of Western democracy
over the fascist, single party states of Europe no doubt
stimulated the growth of the necessary political medium
for the establishment of the multi-party regime in Turkey.
The architects of the new party were Celal Bajiar,
former prime minister and economist to Ataturk; Adnan
Manderes, a young former lawyer from western Turkey; Refik
Koraltan, a member of the parliament; and Fuat Koprulu, a
well-known historian and professor.
The membership of the new party grew rapidly and its
leaders ably and successfully organized party branches in
many provinces. The general elections of 19^6 brought
sixty-one deputies from the Democtatic Party into the
Grand National Assembly (as the Turkish Parliament is
officially called). "The Democrat Party had shown itself
-^M. Toker, Tek Partlden Cok Partlye. p. 113*
92
a lusty Infant."3' * The elections were condemned by Demo
crats as rigged and the final results of the election were
hotly protested by the Democratic party officials. The
pressures by the gendarmerie on behalf of the government
were the chief sources of complaint.
It seems that President Inonu and some of his col
leagues were genuinely Interested In the establishment of
an opposition party In the country. Both In words and
deeds, the top echelons of the RPP hierarchy supported the
multi-party Idea and Turkey's entry Into the democratic
era.
In the four years between 19^6 and 1950, the Democrats
proved to be strong and intelligent opponents who championed
liberal economic and political causes and gave a tough
fight to the government on controversial Issues.
The Democrats continually complained of political
pressure and curtailment of their activities caused by
over zealous bureaucrats seeking to gain the favor of the
government. The prime minister of the day, Recep Peker,
declared the DP (Democratic Party) to be a quasi-revolu-
37
tionary organization causing unrest in the country.
-^Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey.
P. 307.
3^Cem Erogul, Demokrat Parti (Ankara: Sevinc Matbaasi,
1970), p. 19.
37I b l d .. p. 33.
93
Ismet Inonu, on the other hand, Issued a declaration on
July 12, 1947, stating that he would be Impartial to
both parties and that the Democratic Party was not a
revolutionary organization but a legitimate political
party.
In addition, the RPP brought before the parliament a
new election law based on a system where the majority of
the votes won all the seats in a given election district.
The new rules were democratic and included secret balloting
and open counting of the votes.
The first truly free and openly contested election
in Turkey took place on May 14, 1950* This was a big step
forward in the political development of Turkey. Referring
to the original definition of political development given
above, this election, where groups other than those in
power openly competed for political power and where all
had a reasonable chance of winning was indeed one factor
of political development realized.
The results of the 1950 election clearly showed that
the effective campaigning of the DP and the discontent
caused by the prolonged one party rule by the RPP were
enough to change the political power holders. The election
returns gave 53*35 percent of the popular votes and 83.57
percent of the Grand National Assemble seats to the Demo
crats, whereas only 39.78 percent of the votes, but 14.40
percent of the seats went to the People's Party. The
94
discrepancy between the percentage of the popular vote
and the percentage of seats gained was due to the "winner
take all" majority system In force during this election.-^®
When the parliament opened in the fall of 1950, the
RPP which had held power in Turkey for almost three decade
had only sixty-nine deputies as opposed to 408 of the
Democratic Party out of the total of 487 chairs in the
parliament.
The first years of the Democratic Party rule passed
with great promises and with hope for the future. During
their first four years in power, the Democrats amended
and liberalized the Press Law, relaxed restrictions on
political liberties, and made an inflationary, but never
theless strong, economic "great leap foward." The
government made many investments and opened credit to many
villagers through the state owned Agricultural Bank.
Professor Kemal Karpat summarizes the period in these words
As a result of these investments, an
economic boom took place during 1951-1953*
The resulting social well-being greatly
favored the Democratic Party, which easily
won the national elections in 1954, primarily
on the basis of its achievements in the
economic field.39
^ Nermln Abadan, Anayasa Hukuku ve Sl.vasl Blllmler
Aclslndan 1965 Seclmlerlnln Tahllll (Ankarai Slyasal
Bilgiler Fakultesi, 1966), p. 393*
-^Kemal Karpat, Turkey's Politics, p. 420.
95
The Democratic Party consolidated its power during
these first years and improvement in the daily lives of the
masses as well as growing accessibility of the government
to the people, especially to those of Democratic Party
affiliation, made the government come closer to the people.
On the strength of its first four years in office,
the Democrats won even a greater majority in the 195^
elections. Our of the 5^1 assembly seats, the Democrats
won 503• and the RPP won only 31* with the Democratic
share of the popular vote increasing to 56.61 percent and
L lq
the People's Party's share decreasing to 3^.78 percent.
Thus, the Democrats had secured absolute power in
the Grand National Assembly. Soon, however, signs of
Lord Acton's famous observation, "Power tends to corrupt,
and absolute power corrupts absolutely," appeared.
Even during the 1950-1953 period, the Democrats
showed signs of taking a strong stand against the opposi
tion. A law passed in 1953 confiscated all the property
and wealth of the Republican People's Party on the grounds
iii
that these riches were illegally acquired.
The repressive methods of the party increased, becom
ing more intolerable, and the press and the intellectuals
^Nermin Abadan, 1965 Secimlerinin Tahlili. pp. 393-
39^ .
iti
C. Erogul, Demokrat Parti, pp. 87-88.
96
slowly began to lean toward supporting the RPP which now
championed the liberal causes* This Indicates a complete
reversal of roles between the two parties. Until 1950.
the Democratic Party was the one which complained of the
government's high handed tactics, partisanship of the
bureaucrats and unfair treatment In the use of the state
owned national radio network. Now, following their defeat,
the RPP began to advocate a system where rule of law and
basic guarantees for personal freedoms and the freedom of
the press prevailed.
The popularity of the Democratic Party amonpc the
voters continued, however. The DP appealed to the masses,
the peasants, and the small businessmen. In the beginning,
the inflationary economic policies made the government
popular with the small and large farmers alike to whom
credit, through the Agricultural Bank, was made readily
available.
The Democrats also appealed to the traditional
segments of the society by reinstituting Arabic as the
language of prayer and by opening more schools of religious
instruction and mosques. Clearly, a relaxation in the
diligence with which the Ataturk reforms were defended and
upheld, was not hard to sense.
The 1957 elections were again a victory for the
Democrats, but the vote in their favor had diminished by
5.65 percent and although the number of voters had increased
97
by 3,171,670, the DP vote increased only by 162,357.^
So, either the new voters did not like the DP as well as
their elders, or some of the old timers grew disenchanted
with their new party.
Toward 1959 the Democratic leaders, especially the
Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, were growing increasingly
Impatient with the opposition and any kind of criticism.
They began to view the RPP and other small opposition
parties as nuisances. Menderes is reported to have said,
"Our government and party is a rose. But our complaint is
43
from the pricking thorns beside it." ^ The main thorn,
of course, was the Republican People's Party.
The press was no doubt another thorn, but the
Democrats tried to take care of that by a most repressive
Press Law. This law made it a crime to criticize the
government or the government officials. It was also a
crime to publish items of a nature which would impair the
confidence of the people in their government. Thus, news
of political corruption or anything that pointed to a
fault of the government was forbidden to be printed. What
is worse, the newspapers did not have the right or the
42
The figures were calculated from tables given by
Abadan, op. clt.. pp. 191-193*
^Fahir Glritlioglu, Turk Slyasl Tarlhlnde Cumhurlyet
Halk Partlslnln Mevkll (Ankara: Ayylldiz Matbaasi, 19^5).
p. 10.
98
opportunity to prove the truth of their allegations. It
was not at all uncommon to see blank columns in the news
papers in the latter part of the Democratic rule, because
the police, armed with a court order, would come into
the press room during press time and remove the objection
able material from the printing presses. And all this,
when the 192*4- Constitution, which was then in force, saidj
"Article 77— The press is free within the law, and it
l l h ,
cannot be inspected or examined prior to publication."
The second major repressive measure the Democrats
passed was the Law on Assemblies and Demonstrations. This
law was intended to curb the occurrence of most political
rallies and demonstrations by the members of the opposition
against the government.
Finally, the straw that broke the already heavily
loaded camel’s back came when the Democratic Party leaders
decided to open a parliamentary investigation into the
supposedly subversive activities of the RPP and a certain
segment of the press. The decision establishing the
investigative parliamentary committee and the law empowerir^
this committee with extraordinary powers which are generally
bestowed upon courts of law was passed on the twenty-eighth
of April, I960. The law made it possible for the committee
L l L l .
The Turkish Constitution of 192*4-, art. 77.
99
to forbid the publication of any newspaper they chose, for
bid all assemblies, confiscate any and all papers,
documents, and other materials during the course of the
Investigation. Rulings made by the committee were final
and could not be appealed. All the means In the hands of
the government, the new law said, could be used by this
committee.
On April 28, i960, the university students began to
riot against the government and nine days later, the ten
years of Democratic Party rule ended with a military take
over. Ironically, the party which pioneered the first
multi-party, democratization period in the country, also
caused the first military overthrow in the republic period
of the country.
The Democratic Party's main contribution to Turkey's
political development was that, politics became "everybody's
business." The villagers and common folk saw that the
local party notable had more "pull" in the capital than
the district government. The party members could get
things done, talk to government officials without fear or
reservation. While the Republican People's Party had the
slogan that they made the reforms "for the people, in
spite of the people," the Democrats could be responsive
to the people. The Democratic Party's democracy was a
regime where the people, at least those who supported the
party, were taken care of.
100
The fatal mistake of the Democratic leadership, and espe
cially Menderes, was that they did not play an integrative
role between the members or supporters of the opposition
parties and their own followers. In fact, the Democratic
Party and its chief opponent, the Republican People's
Party, were really not so divergent in view of the then funda
mental understanding of the way political power should be
exercised and the values in the society allocated. This
kind of fundamental difference between the parties' inter
pretation of how society should be ordered for the best
government and the fastest advancement did not occur until
the emergence of the Marxist Turkish Labor Party of which
we will speak further below. If one examines the campaign
issues raised by either the DP or the RPP, while they were
in the opposition, one would see that there is a remarkable
similarity between the demands the "outs" made from the
"ins." It is also interesting to note that issues such as
the freedom of press, the fairness of the election law,
the Impartiality of the state radio, freedom of thought
and assembly, and the independence of the universities, were
almost exactly the same in 1957-1960 as they were in 1946-
1950* It seems that from the point of view of political
development, a rapid development period in 1950-1957 was
followed by a regression from 1957 to i960.
This could be due to the fact that the constitution
which was made in 1924 in response to the requirements of
101
the day did not have an adequate system of checks and
balances and constitutional safeguards against going back,
once a certain state was achieved In the level of democra-
izatlon the nation had reached. The 1961 Constitution
was made to fill this gap, and once and for all settle the
questions on the relationships, and respective rights and
responsibilities, of the various branches of the state on
the one hand and the rulers and the ruled on the other.
While Menderes and his followers brought politics to
the village, they also brought a divisiveness which was
unheard of until then. Both the RPP and the Democratic
Party are guilty of fanning the political passions of
rival party followers. Before the May twenty-seventh
Revolution, things got so bad, especially among the less
politically mature segment of the Turkish society, that
sometimes, for example, the fathers of young girls would
not permit them to marry men of a different party sympathy
than that of their own. In some villages, two coffee
shops had to be maintained, one for the Democrats, the
other for the People's Party followers. The coffee shop
is an Important social center in the villages. It is the
place where most men (and never the women) go right after
dinner every night and stay until bed-time. It is the
place where men play games, share the village news and
gossip, close business deals, and tell tall hunters' tales.
The coffee shop is the integrative center in the village.
102
Given this Importance of the coffee shop, It Is not diffi
cult to judge the extent to which polarization must have
occurred to cause the separation of coffee shops.
The Democrats paid greater attention to building
highways in the country. This caused an Increase in
communication between the villages and the nearest larger
towns. The story Daniel Lerner tells us in The Passing of
Traditional Society, about a small village near Ankara,
called Balgat, involves the visiting of the village with
a four year interval in 1950 and 1 9 5 ^ The village had
changed lmmeasurably in the first four years of the Demo
cratic rule. The main road that passed near the village
brought it into closer contact with the outside world. The
changes that took place in Balgat are indicative of what
happens to villages once they are given access to the
cities. Once the road is built, modernization is not to
be held back from seeping into the village life.
In spite of its erratic behavior in trying to modern
ize the country and despite the unsound economic expansion
during its rule, the Democratic Party did make a tangible
contribution to the pocket-book of the average villager.
The Democrats did build many highways and they did bring
water to many villages and for this the peasants never ceased
^DanielLerner, The Passing of Traditional Society.
1958, pp. 19-42.
103
to support them or their successors (as It turned out) at
the polls.
The first ten years of multi-party rule in Turkey
taught the average citizen that since so much effort was
expended to gain his vote, his vote must be worth something.
The consciousness of the power of the electorate was indel
ibly etched in the minds of the voters. Thus, although the
Turkish citizens are still at the stage of "subjectr-cltizensf
politically, they realize that they alone have the power
to "hire or fire" the politicians.
Following the May 27, i960 coup, a lawsuit was brought
against the DP by a former party member claiming that the
party did not meet one of the technical legal requirements
of holding party conventions as required by law and also
that the DP acted against its own bylaws. The court acted
in September, i960, and the Democratic Party was permanently
closed.
When the Democratic Party was closed, more than three
million followers of the party were left in a vacuum. They
no longer had a party to Identify with and rally around.
Two new parties were formed to fill the vacuum and lure
the Democratic votes: The New Turkey Party (Yenl Turklye
Partisi) and The Justice Party (Adalet Partlsl). The former
has not been very successful and almost all of the former
DP sympathisers looked upon the Justice Party as the
successor to the DP. Next we will study the Justice Party,
104
currently the party which holds the majority of seats In
the Grand National Assembly.
C. The Justice Party.
In both Its personnel and Its program, the Justice
Party Is a very close successor to the old Democratic
Party. This party was established In February, 1961, by
the retired army general, Ragip Gumuspala. General
Gumuspala, although he went along with the revolution, was
known to have "a lukewarm attitude toward the military
46
scovernment and a distinctly conservative bent."
General Gumuspala soon recruited many of the former
DP officials and It was a matter of changing a few faces
and the name when time came to establish a nationwide
party organization.
Durinc the first few years of its existence, the prime
concern of the Justice Party members In the parliament
was to secure amnesty for those who had been sentenced to
various prison terms by the special court convened follow
ing the May 27, I960 Revolution.
A little later, In 1964, the new party faced a leader
ship crisis with the sudden death of General Gumuspala.
The man in line for the succession was a medical doctor
with considerable political experience, Dr. Sadettln Bllgic.
^Walter F. Welker, The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961
(Washington, D.C.i The Brookings Institution, 1963). P» 94.
105
But the hard campaigner In the party convention was a
forty-one year old American-educated civil engineer named
Suleyman Demlrel. Mr. Demlrel had a successful career as
a contractor and as the representative of a large American
firm. His critics dubbed him "Morrison Suleyman," after
the years he spent as the Turkish representative of the
Morrison Corporation.
Another issue raised during the leadership fight was
that Mr. Demlrel allegedly belonged to a masonic lodge.
This accusation was tantamount to labeling him a religious
subversive, an atheist and possibly, an unpatriotic person.
This is the implication of being a mason among the uneduca
ted, conservative circles.
Another accusation directed against Mr. Demlrel was
that he was backed by foreign and domestic capitalists
as a favorite for first the chairmanship of the Justice
Party and later, If the party won elections, as the prime
minister.
Demlrel vehemently denied both allegations and even
produced a document (which some claim to be forged) prepared
by the masonic ladge of Turkey to the effect that Mr.
Demlrel was not then, and had never been, a member. His
opponents were equally quick In circulating a purported
photocopy of a membership registry showing Demlrel as a
member.
Demlrel retortedj
106
I have said that 'those who are desirous
of public service live In a prlass house' ....
Therefore, let me point out this clearlyt I
do not have the smallest fear of anybody's
attacks, Insinuations or lies. . . . The tar
get of these lies goes well beyond my person.
This target Is private enterprise, foreign and
domestic capital, legitimate profit (and Its
purpo^s) and enmity toward western civiliza-
These rumors about Demlrel still persist today,
especially among the opposition sympathizers. Most of
these accusations point to one characteristic of Turkish
politics, that it is still more a politics of personalities
than a politics of issues. Of late, however, especially
with the new ideas injected into political life by the
leftist intellectuals, issues are bec:inninp: to take
precedence over personalities.
Leaving the attacks upon Mr. Demirel aside, his
personal qualifications and style of campaigning was
thoroughly reminlcent of American style politics. Son of a
village notable, Mr. Demlrel became the general director
of waterworks at the age of thirty-three and later leaped
into national politics, which he viewed as service to the
nation. His hand-shakinc tours of the country, speeches
which change emphasis depending upon the nature of his
audience, and his repetition of being a strong adherent
47
Suleyman Demirel, Yazdlklarl ve Soyledlklerl (Ankara:
Adalet Parti si and Merkez Nesriyati, 1965). PP* 69-70.
107
of democratic principles certainly point to a superb
adeptness at politics. His abilities of survival in the
face of crises and circumvent Inc tough issues more than
made up for his relative political Inexperience.
After Suleyman Demirel came to the helm of the Justice
Party, he promoted the party's conservative Image by making
frequent references to God and religion, and the Justice
Party began to behave more like its predecessor, the
Democratic Party.
The same social classes that supported Menderes and
his party support the Justice Party. The rich land owners,
well-to-do capitalists, and the bourgeoisie mostly follow
the JP (Justice Party). Ironically, although the Justice
Party basically stands for ideals which, under the present
day conditions, do not appear to promise a rapid develop
ment to the villagers, most of Its support comes from the
peasants and farmers. Actually JP promotes itself as the
party of the poor.
In Its economic policy the Justice Party rejects the
strong government participation in the economy as proposed
by the RPP. Furthermore, many of the state monopolies
would be turned over to private control according to their
program. The Justice Party works to promote economic
development through private initiative In Turkey. The
state spendings would be decreased and the private investors
would be encouraged to invest in the less developed parts
108
48
of the country.
It is difficult to see how the JP will overcome
natural resistance of private enterprise to go into areas
which require great initial capital outlay (which, given
the little capital accumulation in private hands, is nearly
Impossible) and slow profit returns. The Western economic
development model which required a large period of time
plus exploitation of colonies at the beginning, is not
readily applicable to Turkey. Some modifications resulting
in the state's playing a greater Initial role is necessary
and this the JP is not willing to provide.
The Justice Party came to power after the 1965
elections by winning 53 percent of the popular vote and
240 deputies out of the total of 450 in the National
49
Assembly. It continued in power until March 12, 1971.
when following the increasing disorder in the country and
the threat of armed agitation by Marxist students-turned-
urban-guerrilas, the armed forces made it clear in a
memorandum to the president of Turkey that they did not
have confidence in the Demirel government and hinted at
a military takeover if things did not improve, and the much
needed social and economic reforms were not made. Approx
imately one month later Mr. Demlrel resigned and an "above
N. A. Badan, 1965 Seclmlerlnln Tahllll. pp. 130-131.
^Joseph S. Szyliowicz, "The Turkish Elections* 1965."
Middle East Journal. XX (Autumn, 1966), p. 475.
109
parties" government was established by Professor Nlhat
Erim.
The Justice Party's economic policies and lax attitude
toward communist agitators as well as the armed "counter
agitators" of the right caused many Intellectuals to shy
away from the party. Consequently, there Is a "vacuum" of
theory In the party's policies. It tries to appeal to
all segments of the society although by definition differ
ent segments of society are In a conflict of Interest.
One party cannot please both the land owners and the
peasants, both the Industrialists and the workers, and so
on. But the Justice Party refuses to take a firm stand
and mark Its place in a continuum from right to left. The
JP is often accused of using religion toward Its political
ends and of permitting infractions from the strict secularism
of Kemalism.
These accusations not withstanding the Justice Party
is the only party which has been able to communicate
with the masses and contains In its ranks people of all
walks of life in large proportions. Especially with the
recent division in the Republican People's Party over the
leftist party stand, the Justice Party is almost sure to
win a few more elections, until its liberal (economically
speaking) policies will prove to be unworkable and the
economic development of the country not substantial or
rapid enough.
110
If one views the Justice Party as one end of the
political spectrum, the Turkish Labor Party Is at the
left extreme. Next we will look at the development of
the Turkish Labor Party, which for the first time In
Turkish history represented the political organization of
the far left In a legitimate fashion.
D. The Turkish Labor Party.
The Turkish Labor Party (Turklye Iscl Partlsl) was
a new party which emerged as a result of the political
awakening that followed the i960 Revolution. Although
socialist movements had been seen in the past, until
1961, there had not been a serious attempt to establish
and perpetuate a socialist party, and certainly not one
with parliamentary representation as the Turkish Labor
Party had.
The Turkish Labor Party was established on February
1 3, 1961, with the purpose of sending workers' representa
tives to the parliament.^ The first founders were a group
of trade unionists of rather modest backgrounds.
The first leaders of the party who were bonaflde
labor leaders, felt that since there was a voter potential
among the workers, once there was a labor party all their
^°Kemal H. Karpat, "Socialism and the Labor Party
of Turkey," Middle East Journal, XXI (Spring, 1967),
pp. 157-172.
Ill
votes would flow to them. ^ This rather naive hope
was never realized. At the beerinnlnc:, the Turkish Labor
Party was not Intended to be seriously competing to train
access to political power. It seems that even the first
leaders thought of their party more In terms of a dressed-
up pressure group than a political party competing to
come to power.
The first version of the TLP (Turkish Labor Party)
intended to influence the established order and the
parties in the parliament to pass legislation upholding
the rights of the laborers and If elected to parliament,
to work In this direction themselves. In 1962, there
was a leadership crisis In the TLP, and ,1ust then, the
confirmed socialist lawyer Mehmet All Aybar was available
for the leadership and he was elected as the chairman of
the party.
Mehmet All Aybar was born to a wealthy Istanbul
family in 1912. He studied law In Paris and was appointed
as a law professor to the Istanbul University. Later,
in the late 19^0's, he was dismissed from the University
because of his Marxist Ideas, and he had been practicing
law in Istanbul at the time of his election to the TLP
-^Metin Toker, Solda ve Sagda Vurusanlar (Ankara:
Akis Yaylnlari, 1971), p. 33.
<2
leadership.^
The Turkish Labor Party brought the ideas of class
consciousness to the Turkish political life. After the
establishment of the party, election campaigns were filled
with talk about a just distribution of national income,
exploitation of the Worker's Labor Land Reform, living
like "human beings," being free of the land owner's
pressures and influence, and the coming to power of the
real masters of the nations those who live by selling
their labor.
When Mr. Aybar became the leader of the TLP, his
first priority was the establishment of party branches
throughout the country, but his repeated efforts failed.
The workers, whose interests the party was supposed to
*53
represent, were weary of its rigid dogmatism. ^
Despite the implicit rejection of oommunism by the
party in an effort not to run afoul of the law, and not
to be seen as associated with the Russian Communists (thus
becoming more palatable to the rural masses)»the support
for the party came almost wholly from the urban intellectu
als. By 1963. the party had established organization
and branches only in seven of the sixty-seven provinces,
^2N. Abadan, 1965 Seclmlerlnln Tahllll, p. 23^.
53
V>K. Karpat, "Socialism and the Labor Party of
Turkey," Middle East Journal, p. l6l
113
whereas the next smallest party had 150 chapters. In
the municipal elections TLP polled only O .36 percent of
the votes.
Next year, in 1964, the first national convention
of the TLP met in Izmir. The majority of the delegates
were from the central office and the executive committees
of the provincial branches. The rank and file were
represented only at a ratio of one in one thousand dues
54
paying delegates. This arrangement obviously placed
the emphasis on the ruling elite of the party and caused
"grumbles" among the rank and file members.
The convention drew up the official party program.
The main points in the program werei
— The party believes in democracy.
--Major means of production and the industrial
enterprises will be nationalized.
— Private ownership will be permitted only as a
secondary measure and will be limited to personal
property.
— The right to inheritance will be recognized, but it
may be restricted in the interest of the public.
--Natural resources will be nationalized.
— Land ownership will be limited and the large
agricultural lands will be distributed to the poor peasants.
^ Ibld., p. 162.
m
— The economic development of the country will be
conducted according to a centrally conceived and adminis
tered compulsory plan.
— In the area of foreign policy, Turkey will reduce
its foreign bilateral (mainly with the United States)
commitments, and conduct a more independent peaceful
foreign policy of friendly relations with its neighbors
(including the U.S.S.R. in the North).^
The party officials tried to canvass especially the
villages and other rural areas and attempted to convince the
peasants that the TLP was the only party which was truly
on the side of the people. Mr. Aybar often referred
to the example of the natural phenomenon of boiling water.
He spoke of the accumulation of heat energy up to ninety-
nine degrees centigrade, and finally at 100 decrees centi
grade water began to boil and evaporate. He wanted to
have this kind of an accumulation of enercy before the
revolution by the people (the evaporation in the water
example) to establish the socialist order would be
., , 56
possible.
-^Turkiye Isci Partisi, Turklye Iscl Parti si Programl
(Istanbul» TLP, 1964).
^Mr. Aybar summarized his views in an interview
conducted by the prominent Turkish Journalist and Editor,
Abdi Ipekcl in 1969. Seet Abdi Ipekci, Llderler Dlyor
K1 (Istanbul» Ant Yayinlari, 1969), pp. 132-150 and
pp. 238-262.
115
The revolution would presumably be a nonviolent one.
Possibly there would be a massive voter turnout to bring
the Turkish Labor Party to power. The chairman, Mr.
Aybar, never advocated going outside of the means and
options open to his party and his party's followers as
prescribed in the constitution. His interpretation of
the constitutional principles as creating a society and
an atmosphere which is open to socialsim and closed to
capitalism is not entirely accurate. Indeed the constitu
tion does seek to establish a public welfare oriented
state but it is not in any way a socialistic constitution.
Furthermore, the Turkish Labor Party did not believe that
Turkey's advancement and economic and social modernization
was possible with the methods of the capitalist world.
The utopian, happy society was to be brought about with
the methods of "scientific socialism" and by the people
themselves, not through the efforts of liberal technocrats
or the high-handed, superimposed reforms of a well-meaning
but inadequate establishmentarian political party.
The 1965 election returns fed fuel to the optimism
of the TLP leaders. The party won 15 seats in the parlia
ment, and 3 percent of the votes. For the first time
in Turkish political history, socialsit deputies were
openly advocating their points of view and a new twist
had been brought to parliamentary politics. The results
of the election alarmed some of the politicians and by
116
the 1969 election campaign, many parties, especially the
Republican People's Party, were advocating more radical
reforms and their party platforms included watered-down
clauses on nationalization of certain economic activities
(for example, import— export activities and oil reserves)
similar to those long advocated by the Turkish Labor
Party.
Probably because of the low voter turnout and
internal factional troubles the TLP had on the eve of
1969* as well as the fact that other parties were gaining
some votes from the TLP, the party polled 35*000 less
votes in the 1969 elections.
As a result of increasingly violent acts committed
by a handful of socialist city guerrilas, the TLP attracted
more and more trouble in the two years following the 1969
elections. Although the TLP remained a more moderate
bastion of socialist activity, its Marxist ideology and
vocal criticism of the government coupled with the terror
ist activities of a certain group of young Marxists,
disenchanted many sympathizers from the socialist cause.
Finally, the government brought suit against the
Turkish Labor Party before the Constitutional Court,
which has jurisdiction over the closing of political
parties. The government contended that the TLP, through
the writings of its prominent leaders, was spreading
seditious ideas among the people and especially encouraging
117
secession of some of the eastern provinces to form a
<7
Kurdish independent state.
A resolution passed by the fourth National Congress
(convention) of the Turkish Labor Party, was especially
cited as Indicative of the party's separationist
tendencies. In one article of this resolution, the party
congress saidi
6— The fourth Grand Congress of the Turkish
Labor Party. . . accepts and proclaims that. . .
it is the natural and requisite revolutionary
duty of our Party which is the unforgiving enemy
of all anti-democratic, fascist, oppressive
chauvinistic nationalist currents, to support
the struggle of the Kurdish people to make use
of its constitutional citizenship rights and
realize all of its other democratic desires
and hopes.58
The prosecution contended that the reference to
"other democratic desires and hopes" in the above text
was Intended as the desires of the Kurds to establish an
independent, or at least an autonomous state. Supporting
its argument by the writings of the TLP officials, the
prosecution asserted that the Turkish Labor Party's activ
ities were against article fifty-seven of the constitution
which says in part, "... the activities of political
parties have to conform to the fundamental provision that
^ For a summary of court proceedings and the decision
of the Constitutional Court, see: Resml Gazete (Official
Gazette of Turkey), (January 6, 1972), no.
58Ibid., p. 11.
118
<9
the state, with Its nation, Is Indivisible. . . .
After considering the case, the Turkish Constitutional
Court announced on January 6, 1972, its decision to close
the Turkish Labor Party. With this decision, one of the
most vocal critics of the established order was silenced.
This is, of course, not the end of the socialistic
movement in Turkey. Although this particular party was
closed, it is not against the law to establish another
socialist party and indeed, one will probably be opened
again In the near future.
The socialist Turkish Labor Party's contribution to
Turkish Political development has been a significant one.
First, for the first time the politicians bepran to talk of
social justice, just distribution of the national income
and a class consciousness. During election campaigns, the
TLP campaigners spoke to the people in a language they
could understand. They spoke of the majority coming to
power, a revolutionary happening from the bottom up and
they tried to convince the peasants that since they held
the most votes, they should elect people most like them
selves to the parliament. To make their offer good, the
TLP put many people who sold their labor for a living, into
the ballots as candidates for the national legislature.
59
Turkish Constitution, art. 57.
119
All of their efforts did not bear fruit. It was soon
clear that the average peasant could not be easily swayed
by talk of a happy tomorrow. First of all, the peasants
lacked the self-confidence that they could be the rulers
and that a cab driver or a small farmer could be just as
cood a representative in the parliament, as a lawyer, a
bureaucrat, or a rich land owner. Secondly the peasants
probaoiy thought that this small party with big dreams and
much maligned grandiose schemes to chance the fundamental
principles of the heretofore established order, could not
possibly come to power in a short enough time to build the
villace road to the main hierhway before the snow of winter
came or to find a teacher for the empty school building
in the villace. Furthermore, it may be that as many parties
began to speak of social justice, land reform, agricultural
reform, and so forth, to the unenlightened average voter,
everybody sounded like everybody else, and he thought he
might as well vote for the party in power, for maybe next
year it would be his village's turn to have electricity or
water to irrigate the land. On the other hand, while
some intellectuals found the TLP's procram too moderate
and its proposed methods too inadequate. Others, though
leaning toward the left, found the docmatism of the TLP too
rigid and its proposed methods too radical. In short, the
Turkish Labor Party lost many votes because of its own
120
intransigence or internal instability on the one hand, and
because its kind of "scientific" approach could not find
a ripe audience amone: the masses on the other hand.
Another contribution of the new socialistic movement,
(which was spearheaded by the TLP) was a negative one, and
it set their cause back at least ten years, maybe more.
Toward the end of the 1960's, the decade of socialist
awakening for Turkey, a group of impatient young socialists
and revolutionary Marxists decided to take direct action
and armed assault, abduction, and political murder (the
killing of the Israeli consul in Istanbul) were the results.
This caused a crackdown on all leftists and alone with the
revolutionaries, the bona fide democratic socialists were
also condemned and the freedom of activity for all social
ists curbed. This contribution of socialism to Turkish
political development opened the eyes of the establishment
and the politicians, and made them realize the clear and
present danger posed by the small but active minority
among the youth, to the unity and tranquility of the
country. According to Professor Nihat Erim, who was
recently the prime minister for over a year, the situation
was thusj
Professional agents, trained, armed and directed
from outside Turkey, were able to transform
some leftist student organizations into urban
guerrilla units which carried out kidnappings,
bombings and political killings. Openly
proclaiming they were Marxlst-Leninist and
Maoist, yountr terrorists manaered to turn some
121
of the universities Into communist arsenals
and strongholds, preparing for the establish
ment of a Communist People's Republic In
Turkey. With extreme rightists, on the
other hand, forming paramilitary organiza
tions modeled after Hitler's storm troopers
and preparing for a Holy War against "Com
munists" and the government unable to
control the situation, the country was on
the brink of civil war and/or a communist
takeover,60
The reaction of the political system to this kind of
threat posed by Turkish Marxists should have been twofold.
While the government tried to alleviate the symptoms of
the threat by tightening the security and bringing to
justice the suspected felons, it should also have tackled
the causes lyinp: deep under the symptoms. These causes
were economic and social. As modernization takes hold
In the Turkish society, dissatisfaction with the present
set of alternatives increases. The person who "made do"
with little wants a little more. The most effective way
of dealing with any problem is to resolve the basic con
flicts causing the problem. In Turkey, two of the most
basic problems can be solved by a sincere land reform effort
and by a serious attempt at tax reform. Both of these
reform measures will provide means for closing the gap
between the rich elite and the poor mass. If these reforms
Nihat Erim, "The Turkish Experience in the Light
of Recent Developments," Middle East Journal, XXVI,
(Summer, 1972), p. 249.
122
are made, then there will be less cause for desperate
attempts by frustrated people and one of the conditions
for uninterrupted development, stability, will be met.
The Turkish Labor Party lived a stormy life in its
ten years until it was closed, but Turkish political life
is probably more varied and more open now because the TLP
once participated in it.
So far we have followed the development of the four
most Important political parties in Turkey. The contribu
tion of each one to Turkish political development has been
unique. The Republican People's Party has been the archi
tect of today's democratic Turkey. The Democratic Party
was the first path breaker on the way to a multi-party
system. The Justice Party emerged from the severe disrup
tion of the normal political development process (the i960
military takeover) to become the first truly mass based
party in Turkey. Finally we have discussed the Turkish
Labor Party, a unique political entity in Turkey, a Marxist
socialist party. As the first Turkish political party
with an ideology in the technical sense of the word, a
tight organization, and a drastically radical program to
reshape the Turkish society, the TLP is a most Interesting
party for the political scientist, if not for its accom
plishments, at least for its attempts.
Political parties are well established components of
Turkish political life and all indications are that they
are here to stay. The better established the political
parties become, the more serious is the competition among
them to attract enough voters to make a strong showing in
elections and eventually come to power. Although all
parties by definition have the ultimate object of coming
to power, the real contention is often among two or three
strong parties. Traditionally, the People’s Republican
Party and the Justice Party (whose predecessors were the
Democratic Party) are the two parties which most of the
voters support. Both of these parties have established
images as to the kind of voter they attract and the prin
ciples they advocate.
In the next chapter we will concentrate on the
attributes assigned mainly to the JP and the RPP, and
to a lesser extent to the TLP. These attributes which will
be expressed in the form of testable propositions (hypoth
eses) will be evaluated against voting data obtained from
a sample of Turkish provinces.
CHAPTER IV
PARTY IMAGES AND VOTER CHARACTERISTICS
This chapter Is concerned with the images of political
parties in current political writings and discussions in
Turkey. The parties selected for this are the Justice
Party and the Republican People's Party. The Turkish
Labor Party which is now defunct is also studied, but in
a more limited way. The votes analyzed were cast in the
1965 and the 1969 general elections.
In Turkey each province constitutes a discrete
election district. There are a total of sixty-seven
provinces in the country. A governor or vail is the chief
administrative officer in each province. Under him are
the district governors or kaymakams who administer smaller
towns called Ilces. The next two levels down the adminis
trative hierarchy of a province are the sub-districts or
bucaks with a director and the villages with their
headmen called muhtars. All of the administrative officers
in a province are appointed by the central government
except for the village headmen who are elected for a term
of four years.
The Turkish provinces vary according to size, degree
of development and demographic characteristics. While
125
neighboring provinces are often somewhat similar in many
ways, there is a definite variation in modernity from
region to region within the country.
If one considers all aspects of modernization at
once, the country can be divided into three larce sections*
western Turkey, central Turkey, and eastern Turkey. The
western part of the country is the most developed and the
east is the least developed with the central Turkish prov
inces being in a transitional state, displaying the least
homogeneity. The contrast between western Turkey and
eastern Turkey is quite apparent when we consider indicators
such as electrical power consumption and production,
hospital beds, doctors, schools, and factories. fhe West
has more than the East in all cases. The Turkish govern
ment is concentrating more of its efforts nowadays in the
east but the separation, unofficial as it is, nevertheless
exists.
In the hope that this contrast in the degree of devel
opment will help to crystallize the political differences,
the sample provinces, from which voting data were collected,
were selected from eastern and western Turkey.
In order to minimize bias in the selection of the
sample provinces, a geographic criterion was developed and
used thus* Turkey lies between approximately twenty-seven
degrees east longitude and forty-five dep-rees east longi
tude. This gives a spread of eighteen meridians across
126
the length of the country. When this number Is divided by
three, each of the three regions mentioned above falls
under six meridians. Therefore, the western provinces
which were Included In the sample fell between the longi
tudes of twenty-seven degrees east and thirty-three degrees
east, and the eastern provinces fell between thirty-nine
degrees east and forty-five degrees east longitudes.
Within these arbitrary geographic boundaries making
up eastern and western Turkey for our purposes, are a few
provinces which are under different Influences culturally
and economically because of being close to the Black Sea
or the Mediterranean Sea. Because of this added variable,
these provinces could not be considered as purely eastern
or western. After the exclusion of these provinces, there
remained fifteen provinces In the East and fifteen In the
West. All the data on population characteristics and voter
preferences were collected on these thirty provinces.
The provinces thus selected are the followlngi
a) The selected western Turkish provinces, In
alphabetical orderi Aydln, Balikesir, Bllecik, Bursa,
Canakkale, Denlzli, Edlrne, Istanbul, Izmir, Klrklarell,
Kocaeli, Manlsa, Sakarya, Teklrdag, Usak.
b) The selected eastern Turkish provinces, again In
alphabetical orderi Agrl, Bingol, Bitlls, Dlyarbakir,
Elazig, Erzlncan, Erzurum, Gumushane, Hakkarl, Kars.Mardin,
Mus, Siirt, Tunceli, Van.
127
All of the numerical data was taken or calculated
from the census and election figures published by the
State Institute of Statistics of Turkey. A general
population census Is conducted every five years In Turkey.
Most of the figures were for the year 1965 as the detailed
1970 census figures were not available at the time this
research was being done. The election statistics were
obtained for both the 1965 and the 1969 elections. The
next election will take place In 1973*
Tables two and three will give an Idea of the popula
tion size of the provinces Included in the sample.
TABLE 2
1965 AND 1970 POPULATION OF SELECTED
WESTERN TURKISH PROVINCES
Province
Name
1965
Population
1970
Population
Yearly rate
of Increase
(per thousand)
Aydln 524,449
567,360
31
Ballkesir 708,3*12
752.595
12
Bilecik 137.881 138.754 1
Bursa 7 5 6,664
847,605 23
Canakkale
350,317 360,337 6
Denizll 463,366
511,804 20
Edirne
302,917
318,318 10
Istanbul
2,295,359 2,995.191 53
Izmir 1,234,667
1,430,360 29
TABLE 2--Continued
128
Province
Name
1965
Population
1970
Population
Yearly rate
of Increase
(per thousand)
Kirklareli 258,386
257,477
-1
Kocaeli 315.127 383,552 39
Manisa 748,545 793.366 12
Sakarya 423,363
455,640
15
Tekirdag 287,698 296,898 6
Usak 192,877
208,388
15
Source: Republic of Turkey State Institute of
Statistics, 2 5 Eklm 1970 Genel Nufus Sayimi
Telgrafla Allnan Geclcl Sonuclar, Publica-
tion no. 616 (Ankara: 1970) .
TABLE 3
1965 AND 1970 POPULATION OF
SELECTED EASTERN TURKISH PROVINCES
Province
Name
1965
Population
1970
Population
Yearly rate
of Increase
(per thousand)
Acrri 264,961 292,976 34
Bingol 150,521 178,331 15
Bitlis
154,069
185,284
37
Diyarbakir 475,916
575,283 38
Elazig
322,727 378,349 32
Erzincan 258,586 277,647
14
Erzurum 628,001
685,955
18
TABLE 3--Contlnued
129
Province
Name
1965
Population
1970
Population
Yearly rate
of Increase
(per thousand)
Gumushane 262,731 282,466 14
Hakkari 84,091 102,927
40
Kars 606,313 663,088 18
Mardin 397,880
457,693
28
Mus 198,716
233,919 35
Siirt 264,832 3 3 0 ,111
45
Tunceli
154,175
159,672 7
Van 266,686 326,069
40
Source: Hepublic of Turkey State Institute of
Statistics, 25 Eklm 1970 Genel Nufus Saylroi
Telgrafla Allnan Geclcl Sonuclar,Publica
tion no. 6l6 (Ankara: 1970).
Voting Behavior in the Sample Provinces
In Turkish politics, certain stereotypes have emerged,
in the experience of the last twenty years. One of them
type-casts the Republican People's Party as the party of
the educated classes and the elite. Another labels the
Justice Party as drawing its support from the masses of
villagers and the unsophisticated voters. The Turkish
Labor Party, on the other hand, was not regarded by some
as a "real" party. Many thought of it as a diversionary
activity of the urban idealists who wanted to dabble in
130
socialism.
To explore these kinds of impressionistic attributes
generally assigned to political parties, a number of
hypotheses will be generated and an attempt will be made
to find support for them correlating voter attributes with
voting record for primarily the Justice Party and the
Republican People's Party and secondarily for the now
defunct Turkish Labor Party.
Hypothesis I« As the vote for the Republican People's
Party increases, so does the percent of the "educated"
population in the sample provinces.
To explore how true this statement is, first a
determination of what "educated" means for Turkey is
needed. In a country where the rate of illiteracy has
been traditionally high (currently it is approximately
fifty-one percent) the premium placed upon education is
high. For various reasons such as inadequate facilities,
lack of money and lack of teaching personnel, university
education is not as common as in the advanced countries.
The high school curriculum, on the other hand, is made
stronger, since it is a terminal school for most people.
Taking these factors into consideration, a person in Turkey
can be labeled "educated" if he is a high school graduate
as well as, of course, if he is a college graduate.
As for the parties whose votes will be examined, the
Justice Party and the Republican People's Party were
131
selected because they are the two biggest parties In the
country. Together they received 81.6 percent of the total
votes in 1965 and 74 percent of the votes In 1969. As a
result of the most recent (1969) elections out of the 450
member house, 399 members belonged to either one of these
parties (JP has 2 5 6, RPP has 143) or 89.28 percent of
the house votes were controlled by these two parties.
In hypothesis I the "educated" were determined by
adding the number of high school graduates and the number
of graduates of colleges, universities and other comparable
Institutions of higher learning. Vocational training school
graduates were excluded because It was thought that a
generalised education might better equip a person for
rational party choice than a specialized vocational educa
tion where exposure to liberal arts subjects could be
limited or nonexistent.
In this hypothesis the independent variable is the
education level and the dependent variable is the votes
cast for the RPP. The data for the western provinces are
presented in table four. (See following page.)
In order to analyze the data from table four, a
correlation technique called Spearman Rank Order Correlation
was selected. Rank Order Correlation was thought to be more
suitable than others because the actual frequencies are
often collected from a number of sources and although
there is no particular reason to doubt their general
132
TABLE 4
"EDUCATED" POPULATION AND VOTES
RECEIVED BY RPP IN WESTERN PROVINCES
Province
Name
"Educated"
Population
Votes Received by RPP
1965 Election 1969 Election
Aydln
3.531 37.771
42,036
Balikesir
6,203 6 9,040 6 2,144
Bllecik
737 16,315
14,066
Bursa
7,092 63.891 63.515
Canakkale
2,437 32,099 32,745
Denlzl1
2, 584 44 ,929 38,607
Edlrne
2,275
29,180 28,140
Istanbul 160,237 18 5,1*79 203.309
Izmir 32,310 120,337 136,071
Kirklarel1 2,410
27,123
2 1,704
Kocaell 6,843 31.622 33.194
ManIsa 4,534 61,760 63.356
Sakarya 3,27^
2 6,334 34,240
Teklrdag 2,429
30,206 20,897
Usak
851 18,737 19.005
Source: Calculated from Republic of Turkey State
Institute of Statistics, 1965 Population
Census. Social and Economic Characteristics
of the Population. Publication no. 56f t
(Ankara: 1969); and 12 Eklm 1969 Mllletveklll
Seclml Sonuclarl.Publication no. 610
(Ankara: 1970) .
133
accuracy, there is no way of ascertaining how accurate
individual scores for the cases (provinces) actually are.
Therefore Rank Order Correlation would be more suitable
than others as a means of comparison.
When the 1965 votes cast in favor of the RPP were
correlated with the percent of "educated" people in the
selected western provinces, the coefficient of correlation
was rs=.01, a result which is statistically insignificant.
This result would tend not to support hypothesis I in
the western provinces. Turning our attention to the
selected eastern Turkish provinces, the data are shown
in table five. (See following page.)
In the eastern group of provinces the correlation of
the percentage of the "educated" population with votes for
the Republican People's Party yields a coefficient of
rs=.47 which is statistically significant at the .10 level.
This result confirms hypothesis I for the 1965 elections
in eastern Turkey.
In 1969» fewer voters voted for the RPP in general.
Its share of the vote fell from 28.7 percent in 1965 to
27.^ percent in 1969- When the same relationship between
the educated population and the vote for the RPP was
analyzed, the results turned out quite different in the
West. While the correlation remained weak, the direction
became negative with rs=-.2^. This result is still not
significant, but the indication is that the "educated"
13^
TABLE 5
"EDUCATED” POPULATION AND VOTES
RECEIVED BY RPP IN EASTERN PROVINCES
Province
Name
"Educated"
Population
Votes Received by RPP
1965 Election 1969 Election
Agri 92 5
13,173 20,339
Bingol 401 13.942 6,024
Bitlis 476 6,608
14,295
Diyarbakir
3,513 2 5.695 8,825
Elazie:
2,379
31,014 21,661
Erzincan 1,730 20,389 20,90?
Erzurum 5,225 43,854
38,529
Gumushane 716 7 2,011 ?3,807
Hakkari 225
9,33S
9,467
Kars 2,521 53.706 52,368
Mardin 1,055 26,611 16,558
Mus 664 10,615 10,419
Siirt 840 21,79S 14,069
Tunceli 480 13,705
8,080
Van 1,100 32,276 8,477
Source: Calculated from Republic of Turkey State
Institute of Statistics, Census of Population
Social and Economic Characteristics of the
Population 2k October 1965. Publication no.
$68 (Ankara: 1969)s and 12 Eklm 1969
Mllletveklll Seclml Sonuclarl, Publication
no. 6l0 (Ankara: 1970).
135
took their votes elsewhere. In the East, the 1969 votes
yielded a correlation lower than in 1965* The coefficient
obtained was a statistically insignificant rs=.36.
One explanation for this drop for the eastern pro
vinces could be that because of the new, left-of-center
policy proposals of the RPP, the traditionally more con
servative "educated" voters of the East turned away from
the RPP. In 1965, 30.^ percent of all the RPP votes came
from eastern sample provinces. In 1969* this percentage
fell to a mere 11 percent. When we consider the total
votes cast for all parties in Turkey, in 1965 the eastern
votes of the RPP constituted 8.3 percent of all Turkish
votes. In 1969 the votes from the sample eastern provinces
made up 3 percent of the total votes cast in the election.
All of this points to the conclusion that the Republican
People's Party was no longer favored by even a significant
minority in the East.
These data suggest that hypothesis I is not to be
accepted with the exception of the eastern sample for the
1965 election. As expected, the difference in the degree
of modernization between the eastern provinces and the
western provinces contributed to widely differing correla
tion coefficients. In conclusion, the data indicate that
the "educated" vote does not necessarily belong to the
RPP.
Another long standing belief in Turkish politics is
136
that while the Republican People’s Party is supported by
the members of the elite professions such as doctors,
lawyers, teachers, and other white collar workers, the
Justice Party draws its support from the non-elite
professions such as common laborers, farmers, and other
blue collar workers The second and third hypotheses are
concerned with these party images. There are two parts to
each one of these hypotheses. One deals with the Republican
People's Party while the other deals with the Justice Party.
Hypothesis Ilai As the percent of elite professionals
increases in the sample provinces, so does the vote for
the RPP.
Hypothesis Ilbi As the percent of elite professionals
increases in the sample provinces, so does the vote for
the JP.
Hypothesis Illai As the percent of non-elite profes
sionals increases in the sample provinces, so does the vote
for the JP.
Hypothesis Illbi As the percent of non-elite profes
sionals increases in the sample provinces, so does the vote
for the RPP.
To see if voting data support hypothesis Ila, the
data presented in table six were analyzed.
1This is basically similar to the classifications
used by the State Institute of Statistics of Turkey in the
census questionnaires. Slight condensations and modifica
tions have been made for clarification.
137
TABLE 6
ELITE PROFESSIONS AND VOTES FOR
RPP IN SELECTED WESTERN TURKISH PROVINCES
Province
Name
Number of
People in Elite
Professions
Votes for RPP
1965 Election 1969 Election
Aydin 8,878
37,771
42,036
Balikeslr 11,840 69.040 62,144
Bilecik
2,279 16,315
14,066
Bursa 15,458 63,891 63.515
Canakkale 5.709 32,099 32,745
Denizli 6,300 44,929 38,607
Edlrne 4,900 29,180 28,140
Istanbul 145,381 185,479 203,309
Izmir 38,839 120,337 136.071
Kirklareli 4,336 27.123 21,704
Kocaeli 7,854 31,622 33.194
Mani sa
10,455
61,760 63.356
Sakarya 7,084 26,33^ 34,240
Tekirdag 4,152 30,206
20,897
Usak 2,786
18,737 19.005
Sourcei (Same as for table five)
In the comparison of elite professions with voter
preference, the Independent variable is the elite profes
sions and the dependent variable is the votes cast for a
138
given party which, in hypothesis II a is the RPP.
A correlation of the 1965 votes for the RPP and the
number of those engaged in elite professions in the
selected sample western Turkish provinces yielded a coeffi
cient of rs=.37» Thus, this statistically insignificant
result tends to refute hypothesis Ila which is that the
elites support the RPP. The second part of the same hypoth
esis, that the elite professions support the JP, could
be verified if we correlated the JP vote with elite
professions in the same provinces and for the same election.
These data are presented in table seven. (See following
page.) When the correlating was done, it yielded a
coefficient of rs=.43, which indicates that indeed the
Justice Party won proportionately even greater support
from the elite professions as the Republican People's
Party. So, it is true that during the 1965 elections in
the western provinces, the RPP and the JP were supported
by the elite professions at about the same degree.
In eastern Turkey the 1965 vote correlated at the
level of rs=.45 for the RPP and rs=.43 for the JP.
(Related data is presented in tables eight and nine. See
pages following table seven.) This again, shows that
there was not a great difference between the elite profes
sions’ support for the two parties.
In 1969» the correlation of voter preference with
the percentage of elite professionals yielded, in the
139
TABLE 7
ELITE PROFESSIONS AND VOTES FOR THE
JUSTICE PARTY IN SELECTED WESTERN TURKISH PROVINCES
Province
'lame
Number of
People in Elite
Professions
Votes for JP
1965 Election 1969 Election
Aydln 8,878 130,247 100,751
Ballkeslr 11,8/10 152,847 124,138
Bileclk
2,279 29,793
24,264
Bursa 15.4 58 189,515
163,706
Canakkale 5,709 75,863 70,625
Denlzli 6,300 86,887 72,377
Edirne 4,900 53,736 43, 544
Istanbul 145,381 331.447 286,841
Izmir 38,839 2 51.189 206,198
Kirklareli 4,226 53,104 33.554
Kocaeli 7,8 54
58,931 52.671
Manlsa
10,455 160,713
130,828
Sakarya 7,084 71.625 64,263
Tekirdac;
4,15 2
54,100 40,970
Usak 2,786 31.187 22,537
Sourcei (Same as for table five)
140
TABLE 8
NEMBERS OF ELITE PROFESSIONS AND VOTES
OAST FOR THE REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY
IN SELECTED EASTERN PROVINCES
Province
Name
Number of
People In Elite
Professions
Votes for RPP
1965 Election 1969 Election
Agri 2,506
13.173
20,339
Blngol 1.317
13,942 6,024
Bltlis 1,827 6,608
14,295
Diyarbakir 6,889 25,695
8,825
Elazig 5,688 3 1,014 21,661
Erzincan
3,557 20,389 20,907
Erzurum 8,668 43,854 38,529
Gumushane 2,458 23,011 23,897
Hakkarl 686 9,338 9.467
Kars 5,926 53,706 52,368
Mardln
3.717
26,611 16,558
Mus 1,738 10,615 10,419
Sllrt 3,417 21,798 14,069
Tunceli 1.679 13,705 8,080
Van
3.239
32,276 8,477
Sourcei (Same as for table five)
TABLE 9
MEMBERS OP ELITE PROFESSIONS AND VOTES
CAST FOR THE JUSTICE PARTY
IN SELECTED EASTERN PROVINCES
Province
Name
Number of
People In Elite
Professions
Votes for JP
1965 Election 1969 Election
Avrl 2,506 14,746 28,2 52
Blnp;ol
1,317
9,866 7,014
Bitlls 1,327
18,644 18,607
Diyarbakir 6,889 31,963 42,934
Elazlfz: 5,688 38.111 28,346
Erzlncan
3,557 3.103
29.08L
Erzurum 8,668
95.875
97,622
Gumushane 2,458
32,983 29,095
Hakkarl 686
1.373 7.750
Kars 5,926 58,361 67,614
Mardln
3,717
26,828 38,296
Mus 1,738 10,149 6 ,368
Slirt
3,417
22,310 19.225
Tuncell
1,679 10,985
9,972
Van
3,239 21,585
22,232
Sourcei (Same as for table five)
142
eastern provinces rg=.26 for the RPP and rg=.56 for the
JP. In the West the correlation was a significant rg=.48
for the RPP and a very low rs=.28 for the JP. These
results are interpreted as partially supporting hypotheses
Ila and lib, but not to the extent that where there is a
high concentration of elite professionals, only the RPP
vote is high. The Justice Party also attracts elite profes
sionals' votes. It is difficult to determine why this is
so. One reason probably is that in our initial definition
of the elite professions, managerial and entrepreneurial
classes as well as civil servants were included. It is
probable that the Justice Party is accepted to be more of
a friend of the businessman than the avowedly statist
(economically) and left-of-centrist RPP.
The Republican People's Party's program and the 1965
and 1969 election platforms contained measures for tighten
ing the control of import and export transactions as well
as programs for the extension of public services to all
parts of the country. While the RPP was not reluctant to
recognize the value and place of private property and
private enterprises, it nevertheless adhered to a policy
of greater participation of the state in economic life.
This is in contrast to the economic liberalism of the JP.
Since the elite professionals would be most readily
(and negatively) affected from the expansion of state
participation in economic life, it is natural that the JP
143
would have better correlations between the percent of
elite professions and votes cast for a given party.
Out of the eight possible correlation coefficients for
the 1965 and 1969 elections, the RPP ended up with two
significant correlations (West, 1969 rs=.48 and East, 1965
rs=.^5) and the JP had three significant correlations
(West, 1965 r =.43 and in eastern Turkey in both 1965 anc*
1969 rg=.43 and rs=.56).
In sum, from this data, it appears that the belief
that the RPP is the party of those in the elite professions
has little grounds and the belief that the JP is gaining
support among the elites seems to be accurate.
Hypotheses Ilia and Illb are intended to show whether
the converse of the situation is true. Here we want to
see whether the non-elite professionals (and this group
includes the backbone of Turkish society, the peasants)
support the JP or the RPP. In these hypotheses, the vote
is again the dependent variable and the percent of non
elite professionals is the independent variable. The
numerical data on votes and members of non-elite professions
are presented in tables ten and eleven on following pages.
Looking at the 1965 elections, we see first that the
Justice Party's votes correlate with the numoer of non
elite professionals at a level of rs=-.52 in the western
provinces and rs=.06 in the eastern provinces. In the 1969
elections the same two variables correlated rs=-.50 in the
TABLE 10
MEMBERS OF NON-ELITE PROFESSIONS AND VOTES
RECEIVED BY THE JUSTICE PARTY
IN SELECTED WESTERN PROVINCES
Province
Name
Number of
People in Non-
Elite Professions
Votes for JP
1965 Election 1969 Election
Aydln 226,936 130,247 100,751
Balikesir 334,302 152,847 124,138
Bursa 72,520
29.793
24,264
Canakkale 327,312 189,515
163,706
Denizli 202,260 86,887 72,377
Edirne 140,440 53,736 43,544
Istanbul 723,576 331,447 286,891
Izmir 491,501 2 5 1,189
206,198
Kirklareli 123,420 53,104 33.554
Kocaeli 144,010
58,931 52,671
Manisa
348,355 160,713
130,828
Sakarya 168,972 71,625 64,263
Tekirdag 136,865
54,100 40,970
Usak 81,658
CO
•
H
22,537
Sourcei (Same as for table five)
1^5
TABLE 11
MEMBERS OF NON-ELITE PROFESSIONS AND VOTES
RECEIVED BY THE REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY
IN SELECTED WESTERN PROVINCES
Province
Name
Number of
People in Non-
Elite Professions
Votes for RPP
1965 Election 1969 Election
Aydln 226,936 37,771
42,036
Balikesir 33^,302 69.040 62,144
Bilecik 72,520
16,315
14,066
Bursa 327,312 63,891 63,515
Canakkale 175,813 32,099 32,745
Denizli 202,260 44,929 38,607
Edirne 140, 440 29,180 28,140
Istanbul 723,576 185,479 203,309
Izmir 491,501 120,337 136,071
Klrklareli 123,420 27,123
21,704
Kocaeli 144,010 31,622 33,194
Manisa 3^8,355
61,760 63,356
Sakarya 168,972 26,334 34,240
Tekirdag 136,865
30,206 20,897
Usak 81,658 18,737 19,005
Sourcei (Same as for table five)
146
western provinces and rs=.27 in the eastern provinces.
The results are significant for western Turkey at both
the .10 and .05 levels. For eastern Turkey they are not
significant.
The negative correlation in the West reveals that it
is false to assume that if a province is ranked high on the
JP vote it will be ranked high on the percentage of non
elite professionals it has. In fact these results indicate
quite the opposite. So, the image of the justice Party
as the party of the non-elites is not justified in the
sample western provinces.
Since the positive correlations obtained for eastern
Turkey are so weak, it seems reasonable that we reject
hypothesis Ilia.
Turning our attention to the RPP and hypothesis Illb,
we found that, for the 1965 elections in western Turkey,
the rs=-.40 and for the 1969 elections, again in the
same region, rs=-.60. Both of these results are signifi
cant at the .10 level. In the East for 1965 rs=.30 and
for 1969 rs=.26. Again, in view of the weak positive
correlations and the stronger negative correlations, it
seems proper to reject hypothesis Illb.
These results are consistent with the findings for
hypotheses Ila and lib. It appears that the JP and the
RPP share similar clientele in western Turkey. The
reason for this similarity between the supporters of the
14?
two parties is the kinds of promises made by either party
at election times. An impressionistic content analysis
of the RPP and the JP programs reveals that in both the
allocation of the resources, and the identification of
possible revenue sources to finance economic development
plans, they show a great similarity. Both parties would
like to appeal to the same great block of the voters,
the peasants, and this partially accounts for their
often indistinguishable position on many issues.
The Justice Party votes correlated at a higher coef
ficient than the RPP votes with the non-elite professions
in the selected provinces. Hypotheses Ilia and Illb had
set out to explore the validity of claims that the non
elite professionals preferred the JP rather than the RPP
as a part of its purpose. This second part of the hypoth
esis is not supported by our data. (Data on the eastern
provinces are presented on following pages in tables twelve
and thirteen,) It is true that the jp votes correlate
negatively with population engaged in non-elite professions,
but so do the RPP votes.
An interesting point emerges when we compare the
elite professionals' correlation coefficient with the non
elite professionals' correlation coefficient for votes
received by the RPP in eastern Turkey in 1965* While this
coefficient is rs=.30 for non-elite professions, it is
rs=.45 for elite professions. This can be interpreted in
148
TABLE 12
MEMBERS OF NON-ELITE PROFESSIONS AND VOTES
RECEIVED BY THE JUSTICE PARTY
IN SELECTED EASTERN PROVINCES
Province
Name
Members of
Non-Elite
Professions
Votes for JP
1965 Election 1969 Election
Agri 103,560 14,746 28,252
Blnscol 63,642 9,866 7,014
Bltlls 57.650
18,644
18,607
Diyarbaklr 187,970 31,963
42,934
Elazip: 121,964 38,111 28,346
Erz incar: 109,011 30,103
29,084
Erzurum 281,578
95,875 97.095
Gumushane 113,401
32,983 29,095
Hakkari
36,359 1,373
7,750
Kars 263,162 58,361 67,614
Mardln
165.873
26,828 38,296
Mus 81,781 10,149 6,368
Siirt 103,662 22,310 19,225
Tunceli 63.254 10,985
9,972
Van 108,520 21,585
22,232
Source: (Same as for table five)
149
TABLE 13
MEMBERS OF NON-ELITE PROFESSIONS AND VOTES
RECEIVED BY THE REPUBLICAN PEOPLE’S PARTY
IN SELECTED EASTERN PROVINCES
Province
Name
Members of
Non-Elite
Professions
Votes for RPP
1965 Election 1969 Election
Agrl 103,560
13.173 20,339
Blngol 63,642 13,942 6,024
Bitlis 57,650 6 ,608
14,295
Dlyarbakir 1*7,970 25.695 8,825
Elazig
121,964 31,014 21,661
Erzincan 109,011 20,3*9 20,907
Erzurum 281,578 43,854 38,529
Gumushane 113,401 23,011 23.897
Hakkarl 36,359 9,338 9,467
Kars 263,162 53,706 52.368
Mardln
165,873
26,611 16,558
Mus 81,781 10,615 10,419
Siirt 103,662 21,798 14,069
Tuncell 63,254 13.705
8,080
Van 108,520 32,276 8,4?7
Sourcet (Same as for table five)
150
the light of the economic circumstances of eastern Turkey.
In this mountainous region of the country, flat agricul
tural land is rather scarce and the large patriarchal land
owners (agas) dominate the agricultural life. Thus, the
higher correlation in the East of vote with elite profes
sions instead of the non-elite professions, which include
the share-croppers, might be attributed to the negative
influence of the agas because of the left-of-center views
and land reform promises of the RPP.
The analysis of voting data for the two most recent
elections reveals inconclusive evidence concerning the
classes of people engaged in gainful employment and their
apparent party preference. It seems that neither the
Justice Party nor the Republican People’s Party has a
monopoly over any certain class of people. This is
consistent with the "mass party status" of both of these
parties. The Justice Party leads in the correlations over
the Republican People’s Party, but the RPP came in a very
close second in most instances. It appears that the
Turkish voter does not have a class consciousness nor does
he have a class identification for either of the largest
political parties in the country.
One party which continually called for a class
consciousness throughout its short political life was the
Turkish Labor Party. It had been using Marxist ideas in
its propaganda and trying to educate the voters with regard
151
to what a class conscious society could do to develop
itself and how certain working classes could lead a
"revolution” toward "true" democracy.
It is possible to assume then, that given the cam
paign rhetoric used by the TLP and its party program, those
voters who were engaged in the non-elite professions would
support the party which tried to appeal to them most.
Consequently one could expect that the highest TLP votes
came from those provinces where there was the highest
concentration of people who were engaged in non-elite
professions. Hence, hypothesis IV isi the greater the
percentage of non-elite professionals, the greater the
Turkish Labor Party vote will be.
In this hypothesis, support for the TLP in the form
of votes is the dependent variable and the non-elite
professions' members is the independent variable. The
data are based on 1969 elections only, because only in this
election did the TLP complete its party organization in
all the provinces, receiving at least some votes from
each one of them. The data are presented in tables fourteen
and fifteen on the following pages.
When we correlated the votes cast for the TLP in
western Turkey with the percent of the population engaged
in non-elite professions, a coefficient of rs=-.32, which
is statistically insignificant, was obtained. For eastern
Turkey, the same correlation yielded rs=-.06, which is
152
TABLE 14
MEMBERS OF ELITE AND NON-ELITE PROFESSIONS
AND VOTES RECEIVED BY THE TURKISH LABOR PARTY
IN SELECTED WESTERN PROVINCES
Province
Name
Members of
Elite
Professions
Members of
Non-Elite
Professions
1969 Vote
for the TLP
Aydin 8,878 226,936 2,949
Balikesir 11,840 334,302
4,911
Bllecik 2,279
72,520 592
Bursa 15.458 327,312 5,382
Canakkale 5.709 175.813
2,706
Denizli 6,300 202,260 3,028
Edirne 4,900 140,440
4,347
Istanbul 145,381
723,576
34,633
Izmir
38,839 491,501
11,085
Kirklareli 4,226 123,420
3,839
Kocaeli 7,854 144,010 1,914
Manisa
10,455 348,355 5,334
Sakarya 7,084 168,972
1,825
Tekirdag 4,152 136,865 3,378
Usak 2,786 81,658 1,243
Source: (Same as for table five)
153
TABLE 15
MEMBERS OF ELITE AND NON-ELITE PROFESSIONS
AND VOTES RECEIVED BY THE TURKISH LABOR PARTY
IN SELECTED EASTERN PROVINCES
Province
Name
Members of
El lte
Professions
Members of
Non-Ellte
Professions
1969 Vote
for the TLP
Agrl 2, 506 103,560 1,290
Bingol
1,317
6 3,642 778
Bitlis 1,827 57,650 346
Dlyarbaklr 6,889 187,970 3,330
Elazlg 5,688 121,964 1,410
Erzincan
3,557
109,011 958
Erzurum 8,668 281,578 3.387
Gumushane 2,458 113,^01 720
Hakkari 686
36,359 15^
Kars 5.926 263,162 13,003
Mardin
3,717 165,873 317
Mus 1,738 81,781 2,282
Siirt 3,^17
103,662 911
Tuncell 1,679
63,254 7,187
Van
3,239
108,520 952
Source: (Same as for table five)
15^
also statistically insignificant.
In view of these findings, we would have to reject
hypothesis IV. The direction of the correlation is
negative, although it is extremely weak in especially
eastern Turkey. It is interesting to see that in the
parts of the country where there is the greatest concen
tration of poor, non-elite professions' members, which are
the people the TLP would most like to appeal to, it did
not receive significant support. Why is this? One
explanation is that the party's program though presented
in a down to earth language, was not understood and
because it proposed so many drastic changes was not trusted,
A way to verify this explanation would be to run a
correlation between the rate of illiteracy in each pro
vince and votes cast for the TLP. The expectation would
be that there would be a negative correlation between
the two series of variables. In the ranking here, the
percent illiterate is used to give a more precise reflec
tion of the truth. Otherwise provinces with a large
population would have more illiterate people and would have
to be ranked above a province with fewer inhabitants whose
total population could be illiterate.
A correlation was run for the eastern provinces which
showed low support for the TLP although they had propor
tionately a greater number of people who could benefit
most should the TLP come to power. The data are presented
155
in table sixteen. (See following page.)
Just as we expected, the direction of the correlation
is negative and the coefficient value is rs=-.60 which
is significant of the .10 and the .05 levels, and strong
enough to support the explanation just given. In western
Turkey, incidentally, the direction of the correlation
between illiteracy and votes for the TLP is also negative
although the correlation is weak at rs=-.38.
In fact, the then chairman of the TLP, Mehmet Ali
Aybar, also complained that they were not yet able to make
the masses understand what they were talking about and that
this was one major cause of vote loss for the party.^
One last generally held belief in Turkish politics
concerning the TLP remains to be explored. This is the
belief that the Turkish Labor Party drew greatest support
from the educated people. Hypothesis V can be posited asi
the greater the proportion of the "educated," the greater
the TLP vote in the sample provinces. In this hypothesis,
our independent variable is the percent of "educated"
population and the dependent variable is the vote for
the TLP. For the eastern sample provinces, there was
a strong correlation between education and vote for the
TLP at rs=.69. In the West, the direction of the
correlation remains positive but the coefficient drops
to an insignificant rs=.ll.
156
TABLE 16
ILLITERACY AND VOTES FOR THE
TURKISH LABOR PARTY IN EASTERN TURKEY
Province
Name
Number
Illiterate
Percent
Illiterate
1969 Votes
for TLP
Ap:ri 141,813
73.87 1,290
Bin^ol
85.291 73.87 778
Bltlis 89,214 76.18 346
Diyarbaklr 274,512 74.11 3,330
Elazlp; 159,934
61.93
1,410
Erzlncan 113,320 54.54 958
Erzurum 314,613
62.41
3,387
Gumushane 130,396 63.09
720
Hakkari 52,096 82.38 154
Kars 297.373
62.24
13,003
Mardin 243,922
79.79 317
Mus 113.691
75.^2 2,282
Silrt 158,447 78.88
911
Tunceli 72,622 61.01 7,187
Van 156,257 75.80 952
Source: (Same as for table five)
157
These results are taken as partially supporting
hypothesis V. In eastern Turkey it appears that those
who understood the party program of the TLP were the
educated, and the greater their concentration in an election
district (province) the greater the vote was for the TLP.
This was not the case for the West however. Education
was apparently not a factor there for voting for the TLP.
Conclusion
Where do all these findings leave us with regard to
party images? It seems that for the Republican People's
Party, the image of being the party of the educated and
the elite is not entirely true. Our data indicate that
the RPP has a broader base than that. It is correct to
assume that it has a good deal of support among the elite
professions and the better educated population, especially
in the East, but as the negative correlations indicated,
the non-elite professions do not support the RPP.
The justice Party also does not fit its stereotyped
image of being the party of the non-elite and the few
rich land owners. It too has a good deal of support among
the elements of the population who are well-educated and
who are members of the elite professions. Eastern Turkey
2
Abdi Ipekci, Liderler Diyor Ki, p. 239.
158
displayed a lower correlation in 1969 (rs=.26) for the
RPP when the elite professions were compared with the vote.
But 1969 was a bad election year for all political parties.
Not only was the voter turnout a low (for Turkey) 64.3
percen., out also the independent candidates got an
unprecedented 5*6 percent with 5H »023 votes, which was
the fourth largest total in the whole election.
In western Turkey, the traditional stronghold of the
Justice Party, the correlations of vote with kind of
profession the voters belonged to revealed that especially
among the non-elite professions, profession correlations
are negative for support of the JP.
The Turkish Labor Party did not live up to its
expectations in the 1969 election and did especially poorly
among the illiterates in the East. The negative TLP
correlations were strong enough for the whole of our
- sample, however, to dispute its own claims that it was the
party of the poor and the common laborers. So, the image
some had of the TLP as not a serious contender for power,
and that it was basically a creation of the intellectual
leftists was probably justified. Unfortunately for the
political scientist, this unique party no longer exists.
It would have provided an interesting subject for study.
The findings in this chapter give one the impression
that the Turkish political parties are in a state of
159
changing old images and enlisting new support from
different segments of the society. Quite possibly the day
may not be too far away when the Turkish voters too,
as do their counterparts in the developed nations of
the world, will vote for issues and not parties or
personalities. When this happens of course, Turkish
political development will have achieved one of its
goals.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS
The wave of modernization that began with Selim III
In the eighteenth century is still carrying Turkey on
its crest in the 1970's. The political development of
the country was also accelerated soon after Sultan Selim*s
reign. The basic political activity of the Tanzimat
period had been conspiratorial in nature. Often the
political groupings had the common goal of ending govern
mental autocracy through the dethronement of the sultan.
The "Young Ottomans" was one prominent example of such
groupings.
With the Tanzimat rescripts, the administrative
and financial reforms were introduced in the hope that
the Ottoman Empire could be saved from disintegration.
The destruction of the empire, the leaders of the time
thought, would probably come as the result of external
pressures on the Ottoman state emanating mainly from
the West. As Dankwart Rustow calls it, this modernization
160
was "defensive modernization."1 Not only was it defensive
but it was also imitative. From the beginning, moderniza
tion in Turkey was understood as trying to become like the
Europeans. By the beginning of the twentieth century,
however, "Europe" was at odds with Turkey and one of the
many difficult tasks confronting the founders of the
republic was no doubt to reconcile this contradiction
with their own consciences. In fact, one line from the
Turkish national anthem written around this time (1921)
voices the resentment felt against the West in these words
". . . that single fanged monster you call Civilization. .
. ." The "Civilization" condemned here was of course the
European civilization as represented by Invading Greek
forces who were backed by the "Allies."
The political forces of the early nineteenth century
werei the Ulema, who were the doctors of religious law,
the military, and the bureaucracy represented by the
palace clerks and provincial officials. The sultan,
although the nominal head of the state and the armed
forces, was not at a politically strong position at all
times. As soon as Mahmud II consolidated his own power,
the abolition of the Jannlsary corps was effected, thus
1Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Development of Parties in
Turkey," in Political Parties and Political Development,
ed. by Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (Princeton,
New Jerseyi Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 114.
162
doing away with one major threat to the sultan.
Although both the 1839 and the I856 imperial rescripts
of the Tanzimat period were important steps in the
political development of the country, they did little to
give a chance to the people to have a say in their futures
or the way they were currently being governed. The
significance of the rescripts was mainly that for the first
time the sultan was promising something to the people, that
is, in this act there was an implicit acknowledgement of
the legally equal status of the people. The lack of
sanctions to compel the government (sultan) to abide
by its promises was the main drawback of the Tanzimat
documents which rendered them all but meaningless.
The Young Turks, who were romantic Idealists, tried
in vain to create an Ottoman nation and to stop the rapid
disintegration of the empire. The effects of the French
Revolution had already started claims of independence by
the national minorities and it seems in retrospect that
even without the catalytic effect of World War I, the
empire was destined to be broken up sooner or later.
Largely due to outside pressure, but also partially
because of the work of the Young Turks, the I876 Constitu
tion was granted to the people. As with almost all of the
political reforms in Turkey, the I876 Constitution came
from above and the people or their representatives had
no voice in its formulation. This royal "gift" naturally
163
favored the sultan In Its relationship with the parliament
created by the constitution. Even then, the slight
sharing of power dictated by the 1876 Constitution was
too much for Sultan Abdulhamld II and two years later
the parliament was dissolved on a pretext and the meager
constitutional rights of the people were suspended for the
next three decades.
What followed this was the classic example of the
autocratic ruler falling into the vicious circle of
clamping down on the freedom of the people for fear of
deposition and the rising danger of dethronement because
of the Increased oppression. This insecurity of the
autocratic rulers must come from the fact that their
powerbase is usually very narrow and limited to the
support of a loyal military cadre of commanders, and in
the Turkish case, the "divine right" of the sultan to
be the sultan and caliph.
What followed the despotism of Abdulhamld was the
Union and Progress administration. The Union and Progress
Association can be viewed as the result of the long
struggles of the clandestine political organizations which
cropped up at various parts of the empire. The Union
and Progress Party proved to be the best organized and
the most durable of political associations in Ottoman
Turkey. It was also the first political group which
became a regular political party. Its distinguishing
164
characteristic, when compared with the Young Ottomans,
was that the Union and Progress Party members had the
ultimate aim of coming to power, whereas their predecessor
political groups wanted reform or change of personalities
but they did not want to assume the reigns of the govern
ment .
The most prominent political change following the
Tanzimat movement was the introduction of a system of
consultative government. Even during the absolutist rule
of Abdulhamld II there are indications that the sultan
acted with the advice of a close clique around him. At
its best form the consultative government resembled
something of a quasi-parliament, without the formal
responsibilities and powers of a real legislative assembly.
Unfortunately for the political development of the
country, the Union and Progress Party quickly turned
itself into a ruling elite with Enver, Talat, and Cemal
Pashas at the helm. The first decade of the twentieth
century witnessed the beginning of a short oligarchy in
Turkey. Although elections were held during this period
the "big-stlck" tactics of the Union and Progress Party
reduced them to political forces conducted under the
shadow of the gendarmerie.
Still, the Ottoman parliament during the Union and
Progress era showed instances of brilliant debate and
it succeeded in passing laws on administrative and economic
165
reform in the country.
The Union and Progress Party had come to power
promising freedom with the 1908 Revolution. The war years
and the resultant economic crises did not provide the best
of opportunities for the development of democracy, however.
Furthermore, the Influence of Germany on the Union and
Progress triumvirate and especially Enver Pasha did not
particularly encourage democratization. One Important
achievement as far as political development itself is
concerned was that the Union and Progress era provided
Invaluable experience in party politics. The political
heritage of the Union and Progress Party was partially
absorbed by the Republican People's Party, after the
Turkish War of Independence as the new republic was being
established. Many of the first deputies in the first
national assembly were former Union and Progress members
who succeeded in escaping out of British controlled Istan
bul. Professor George Haddad also points out this benefi
cial effect of the Union and Progress Party in providing
the training grounds for future party politicsi
The constitutional revolution, however,
in spite of the period of unrest that it
had inaugurated, was not without its benefits.
It made it possible for the peoples of the
Empire, Turks and non-Turks alike, to gain
acquaintance with the process of parliamen
tary government and to discuss affairs of
state and the principles and theories
166
2
underlying imperial policy and administration.
If nothing else, the Union and Progress rule Initially
gave a taste of freedom to the people and provided a
glimpse of what could be if there was true parliamentary
democracy, thus they, perhaps inadvertently, sowed the
seeds of political awakening which flourished much later,
after yet another World War.
What followed the Union and Progress regime was
the imminent disintegration of the Ottoman Empire which
came as a result of the defeat suffered by Germany and
Turkey in World War I. Out of the ashes of the destruction
of war rose new Turkey, Just like the legendary phoenix,
except that unlike the reborn bird, the new country was
poor, tired, and much smaller than its predecessor. It
was, however, quite homogeneous in ethnic make-up, language,
and religion.
During the first few years of republican Turkey's
life, its new rulers tried to secure the allegiance of
all factions of the society. The years from 1923 to
approximately 1928 were spent by Ataturk and his colleagues
in the generation and consolidation of enough political
power to become the undisputed legitimate political
authority in the country. In addition, the basic legal
2
George M. Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule in
the Middle Easti The Northern Tier (New Yorkt Robert
Speller and Sons, Inc., 1965). p. 57*
167
framework for a Westernized nation-state was laid down In
this period with the new constitution (1924) and the new
codes regulating the dress, the abolition of the sultanate
and the Caliphate, the acceptance of Western standards of
time and calendar and the new alphabet (1925-1928),
The new Turkey Inherited the basic administrative
machinery and bureaucratic skills of the civil service
of the Ottoman state. This may have been both a blessing
and a curse. What the new political elite wanted was to
make Turkey Into a modern Western state as soon as possible.
The Ottoman state was definitely traditional and Eastern
In outlook, thus the Inherited skills brought with them
old habits which had no place In the new republic.
In all Justice it must be said, however, that the
Ataturk reforms were most readily accepted by this elite
corps, the bureaucrats, It was the local government
officials who wore the Western hat first or brought their
wives to official social functions where the public mixing
of the sexes occurred for the first time.
In the first years of the republic, and for a short
time thereafter, the victorious army commanders, who
succeeded in securing the independence of the country
from foreign domination, held prominent political positions
both In and out of the new parliament. Soon, however,
Ataturk saw that the ultimate success of democracy In
Turkey would only be possible by the continued and stable
168
growth of the civilian part of the government. Thus, In
1927 the two most prominent men In the young republic,
Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) and General Ismet (Inonu) resigned
from the army.-^
Did this mean that the army was finished as a major
political force In early republican politics? Not neces
sarily. George S. Harris points out thati
. . . the role he fAtaturkj envisaged for
the military was far more than that of
defender of the country's external fron
tiers. It was to be a fountalnhead of
progressive practlcesi In short an organ
for the spread of the reforms he consid
ered vital. Further, It was the ultimate
base of power for this regime, the guardian
of Its Ideals', as he explained to the
people of Konya In 1931*^
Gradually, as the republican form of government
became well established, the bureaucracy and the Republican
People's Party organization became the chief source of
support for the government. The army was never thought of
as being completely out of politics, however. It was
simply subordinated to a civiliaa rule in politics. The
retired soldiers still continued to take part in political
life by running for the Grand National Assembly seats.
Their number did dwindle as the time passed. For example,
^George S. Harris, "The Role of the Military in
Turkish Politics, Part I," The Middle East Journal. XIX
(Winter, 1965), pp« 5^-66,
^ I b l d . . 5 ^ -5 6 .
169
during the first five assemblies of the Turkish parliament,
deputies of military background constituted more than 15
percent and sometimes approximately 20 percent of the total.
From the sixth to the tenth assemblies, this ratio gradually
fell to no more than 4 percent.-*
With the coming to power of the Democratic Party in
1950, the pay and prestige of the military steadily
declined. Although therMenderes government certainly did
not abuse the military intentionally, it did not try to
reinstate its political prominence either.
The Turkish army represents a good cross section of
the society. The officiers' training schools are open to
all classes of people and in practice this open approach
to recruitment works quite well. Ordinarily a child begins
to attend the government run military schools at an early
age (secondary school level) and then ultimately, if he is
successful in his studies, he is admitted to the War Aca
demy. The bulk of the officers belong to the middle-
income families and the military service remains one of
the most important vehicles of social status improvement.
While the officer corps is politically aware, it is never
theless on the side of preserving the status quo and
evolutionary change rather than violent revolutions. The
^Frederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cam
bridge, Massachusetts! The M.I.T. Press, 196^), p. 181.
170
army’s high level of discipline and the strong esprit
de corps among the officers does not leave room for
extremist ideologies. Those who are attracted to such
extremism do not find support among the fellow officers.
There is certainly need for a detailed sociological study
of the background of military officers and this kind
of a study would aid greatly to any interpretation of
the political behavior of the soldiers in recent history.^
Following the Second World War, the Turkish military
received large amounts of military aid from the United
States under the Truman Doctrine. Especially after the
participation of the Turkish forces in the Korean War
and the admission of Turkey into the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), more and more young officers
were trained abroad. This, coupled with rapid mechaniza
tion of the armed forces, resulted in the army becoming
the most modern institution in the society.
While the army was becoming stronger, the Democratic
rulers were beginning to show signs of weakness and
political ineptitude, as well as favoratism and corruption.
All of this created growing discontent among especially the
Two works on this subject arei Morris Janowitz,
The Military in the Political Development of New Nations
(Chicagoi The University of Chicago Press, 1964-, and
Nur Yalman, "Intervention and Extricatiom The Officer
Corps in the Turkish Crisis" in Henry Bienen (ed.) The
Military Intervenes (New Yorki Russell Sage Foundation,
171
Junior officers. Without going into detail, it must be
pointed out that as early as 195^ and 1957. clandestine
organizations were being formed by the Junior officers in
7
Ankara and Istanbul. The first public sign of conspiracy
in the military ranks came to light in 1957* A group
of eight officers were denunclated to the government by
a major called Samet Kuscu. Nothing came of the subsequent
trial, however, because the conspirators were adamant in
their denials that a revolutionary group existed. In
the end, Major Kuscu himself was sentenced to prison for
making false accusations.
The May 27, I960 revolution should be evaluated in
light of the past performance of the Democratic Party. It
became clear soon after the revolution that of the thirty-
eight officers who formed the National Unity Committee
which was the military Junta in charge of the coup, the
majority were sincere in their initial promise of turning
over the government to civilians as soon as possible. Those
favoring prolonged military dictatorship in order to achieve
radical economic and social reforms were outvoted and sent
abroad as "counselors" to distant Turkish embassies around
the world. Thus, there were twenty-four in the Junta left.
7
For a detailed description of the revolutionary
activities of young officers, seei Omer Sami Cosar and
Abdi Ipekcl, Intllalln Ioyuzu (Istanbul: Uygun Yayinevl,
1965).
172
The experience of the May 27, I960 revolution, and
the military rule for a little over one year, proved to
be of little lasting value in effectuating real reforms in
things such as the more Just distribution of national
Income and land ownership. The soldiers turned over the
reins of government to the civilians probably thinking
that the politicians had now "learned their lessons."
The recent political chaos the country found Itself in
probably made some think that military rule ended too soon.
In fact, the March 12, 1971 memorandum of the armed forces
sent to the parliament demanding stronger measures to be
taken against communist agitators and speedy passage of
reform laws was probably meant as a threat of another
coup.
Of course, both the May 27, i960 coup and the March
12, 1971 memorandum are indicative of the attitude of the
military as "guardian angels" of the Kemalist republic
in Turkey. The fact that the military preferred not to
take direct action in 1971 shows that they are none too
eager to become Involved directly in political decision
making once more. Many foreign observers since the
"memorandum" likened the action of the Turkish military to
that of the Greek colonels who performed a coup d'etat in
Greece in 1967* This likening is not entirely correct.
The difference between the Greek and the Turkish military
actions vis-a-vis a perceived threat of socialist takeover
173
Is one of not only quantity but also quality. Whereas,
the Greek military leaders actually assumed civilian
declslon-maklng authority, the Turkish military only asked
for Improved and stronger civilian leadership.
Is the recent re-emergence of the Influence of the
military in Turkish politics a setback In the process of
the political development of the country? The answer
should probably be a qualified yes. From the point of
view of established western democratic political tradition
which Turkey avowedly takes as Its ideal, the military
should operate in a different sphere and any encroachment
Into the territory of the civilian political authority Is
in a sense a "bad mark."
The fact that the Turkish military seems to favor the
civilian democratic government as proved by the ouster
of "the fourteen" from the Junta In I960 and, the reluc
tance of the military to stage another coup in 1971 is
an Indication that this "bad mark" is neither too low
nor irremediable.
This study attempted to show what stages Turkish
politics, especially party politics went through between
the Tanzlmat reform movement and the present time. The
patterns that emerged In the experience of the past fifty
to sixty years clearly Indicate that several conditions
of political development have been met.
First of all, in Turkey there are now functionally
174
specific institutions and political functions are per
formed by institutions or government agencies charged with
them. For example, a research done by this author
several years ago on the decision-making process in Greece
and Turkey concerning the Cyprus crisis, revealed that in
Turkey foreign policy decisions were made by the cabinet
(as they are supposed to be) and not by, for instance,
a group of trusted advisers and the prime minister or the
president.
Secondly, the civilian politicians are accepted by
both the various political groups and the military as the
legitimate power holders. Only the military seems to
regard itself as a guarantor of Kemalist ideals and in the
last resort, sin arbiter, when the politicians fall too
deeply into fruitless bickering or show signs of laxity
in the face of threats to the well-being of the republic.
This is where the Turkish political development has been
slow. It seems though, that as the electorate becomes
more discriminating in voting and the political parties
become less given to useless bickering, this weakness will
be remedied and the soldiers will return to the barracks
completely.
Thirdly, Turkish politics is definitely party politics
now. The political parties are not a sham. They are well
organized and quite sophisticated at least at the head
quarters level. They will have to refrain from cheap
175
propaganda tactics and emphasize issues rather than person
alities more if they are to make major and meaningful
contributions to the overall development of politics in
Turkey.
Fourthly, the political participation of the masses
has increased tremendously since the beginning of the
multi-party era in 1950* Although there was a drop in
voter turnout in the 1969 elections compared to others,
still the important thing is that every citizen of voting
age does have the right to vote. Sometimes, however,
because of the high rate of illiteracy or the various
pressures exerted on the voters especially in remote
eastern villages by landlords, the vote cast for a given
party may not be the result of national consideration of
all the available alternatives. Our research indicates
that both major political parties are supported by
various segments of the society and Turkish political
parties are on the way to becoming genuine mass parties.
The role of illiteracy does not appear to be very
strong in voter turnout. A correlation of illiteracy
with voting yielded low positive correlations for 1965
and 1969 elections in the West (r =.29 and r =.33 respec-
s s
tively). In the East a low but negative correlation
resulted for the 1965 and the 1969 elections (r =.-.15
s
and r =-.01 respectively). In general, political parti-
s
cipation still remains limited to voting. The citizens
1?6
are oriented mostly toward reacting to the output of
governmental functions. This accentuates the condition of
being subject-citizens. One possible measure of the
degree of "participant citizen" orientation could be a
comparison of membership in pressure-groups such as labor
unions, consumer groups and quasi-political groups such as
womens' and youth auxiliaries of political parties. Pre
sumably, the greater the proportion of population engaged
in such participatory acts, the nearer will the Turkish
Q
population be to achieving "participant-citizen" status.
Fifthly, Turkey possesses a complex bureaucratic
organization and as a rule, decisions by the power
holders are executed. The efficiency of the bureaucracy
needs to be improved and measures to this end have been
taken in recent years. Nevertheless, instances of corrup
tion and favoritism do seem to occur in Turkey more fre
quently than in more developed nations. This is another
place where improvement is needed.
Finally, as modernization takes the country more and
more firmly in its grip, new groups, such as labor unions
and pressure groups begin to emerge. As this happens,
new agents of interest articulation are formed and a
regression away from the democratic form of government
8
These concepts of "participant" and "subject" citi
zens are developed in Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba,
The Civic Culture (Princetom Princeton University Press,
1963) pp.IB ff.
177
becomes increasingly difficult. In addition, the peasants
are becoming more politically aware and political party
programs will have to reflect their needs if any one
party hopes to capture the majority of the votes.
What lies in the future for Turkey? The democratic
institutions in the country are almost complete and there
is a consensus both among the political parties and the
military that the ideal regime is a civilian democratic
regime. It is also likely that the military will continue
to be a strong factor in Turkish politics for some time
to come. The likelihood of overt military action is quite
low. One thing that could reduce this likelihood even
further would be rapid and decisive measures taken by the
parliament to alleviate the acute injustice in income
distribution and land ownership. The danger to continued
civilian political rule and stability will come from
petty bickering among the politicians. The political
parties will have to assume a more conciliatory tone in
campaign rhetoric and promote goodwill among their follow
ers. The division between the supporters of the Democratic
Party and the Republican People's Party which emerged in
the 1950-1960 period was carried over to the post-coup
period.
The causes of this deep polarization were many. Among
them is the vindictive attitude the newly elected
178
(in 19$0) DP lower echelon supporters had toward the
allegdly oppressive government of the RPP and its followers.
Psychologically the supporters of the RPP were probably
not prepared for such a decisive loss as they suffered in
1950.
The attacks on the previous administration and the
"loser complex" seems to have made the RPP followers overly
defensive and sensitive to criticism. Thus, in the mid-
1950's when the DP began to introduce its own oppressive
methods the identity of the victims changpd from the DP to
RPP followers which added further fuel to the already
heated war of political accusations. The unforgiving
attacks of the opposition leaders on the government
reflected to the common man. In recent years with the more
moderate policies of both Inonu and Demirel this division
appears to be somewhat lessened.
The real test will come in 1973• when the national
elections are due. It is hoped that once again the Turkish
people will go to the polls to demonstrate that they can
effectively and peacefully use the power they now have to
shape their destinies as a result of a century of continued
political development.
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Public Documents
Republic of Turkey State Institute of Statistics. Census
of Population Social and Economic Characteristics
of the Population 24 October 1965. Publication
no. 568. Ankara* S. I. S. Printing Office, 1969.
Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet istatistik Enstitusu. 12 Ekim
1969 Milletvekili Secimi Sonuclari. Yayin no. 610.
Ankara* Devlet Istatistik Enstitusu Matbaasi, 1970.
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University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses
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Asset Metadata
Creator
Onulduran, Selcuk Ersin
(author)
Core Title
Political Development And Political Parties In Turkey
Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree Program
Political Science
Publisher
University of Southern California
(original),
University of Southern California. Libraries
(digital)
Tag
OAI-PMH Harvest,political science, general
Format
dissertations
(aat)
Language
English
Contributor
Digitized by ProQuest
(provenance)
Advisor
Greene, Thonas H. (
committee chair
), Anderson, Totton J. (
committee member
), McClelland, Charles A. (
committee member
)
Permanent Link (DOI)
https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-798887
Unique identifier
UC11363425
Identifier
7314430.pdf (filename),usctheses-c18-798887 (legacy record id)
Legacy Identifier
7314430
Dmrecord
798887
Document Type
Dissertation
Format
dissertations (aat)
Rights
Onulduran, Selcuk Ersin
Type
texts
Source
University of Southern California
(contributing entity),
University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses
(collection)
Access Conditions
The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...
Repository Name
University of Southern California Digital Library
Repository Location
USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA
Tags
political science, general