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Setting The Pattern Of Contemporary International Relations In The Middleeast: 1953-1958

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Setting The Pattern Of Contemporary International Relations In The Middleeast: 1953-1958

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Content SETTING THE PATTERN OP CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE
MIDDLE EAST* 1953-1958
by
Charles Herald Wagner
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(International Relations)
August 1972
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I
I
73-784
WAGNER, Charles Herald, 1943-
SETTING THE PATTERN OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: 1953-1958.
University of Southern California, Ph.D., 1972
Political Science, international law and
relations
University Microfilms, A XE R O X Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan
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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
T H E GRADUATE SCHOOL
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This dissertation, written by
. .Charles. . H e r aj. d.Wajgn e r............
under the direction of hJLa... Dissertation Com
mittee, and approved by all its members, has
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D O C T O R O F P H IL O S O P H Y
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TABLE OP CONTENTS
LIST OP TABLES
Page
iv
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION 1
Summary of Scope and Objectives
The Analytic Levelt Seeing It Whole
Definition of Terms and Assumptions
II. SETTING THE STAGE
12
The Clash of Alien Cultures
The Development of Nationalism
Nationalist-Revisionist Ideology and
International Relations
The Traditional-Conservative Regimesi
Ideology and Foreign Policy
Other Factors Influencing Middle East
International Relations
The Immediate Historical Dynamics of the
Czech Arms Deal
The Logic of the Hypotheses
The Analytic Categories
Issue Areas and Event Types
Actors and Targets
Coding Replicability
Time Period and Data Universe
IV. RELATING GENERAL FINDINGS TO HYPOTHESES . . 63
Techniques for Presenting Findings
The Overall Increase in Conflict and
Decrease in Cooperation
Qualitative Changes in Conflict
and Cooperation
General Structural Change in
International Relations
fPatron-Client" Restructuring of
International Relations
The Decline of Neutrality
Arms Races and Preoccupation with
III. HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY
Military Security
i i
Chapter Page
V. RELATING ISSUE-AREA FINDINGS TO HYPOTHESES. . 91
The Middle East and the East-West Cold War
Expansion and Polarization of Arab
Cold War Interactions
Arabo-Islainic Response to the
Presence of "Aliens"
VI. A MISSED OPPORTUNITY?.......................... 100
Post Facto Analysis
Minimizing Lossest The Arab-Israeli Conflict
The Arab Cold Wan Minimizing Losses
Extrapolation of Findings and Recommendations
APPENDIX I ....................... 118
APPENDIX I I ......................................... I22
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................... 131
i i i
LIST OP TABLES
Table Page
1. List of Analytic Categories Used to Describe
Various Kinds of Cooperative and Conflictive
Events Taking Place between Interacting Nations ^6
2. Definition of Issue Areas and Examples . . . 53
3. Normalized and "Weighted" Data on Conflictive
and Cooperative Relations among Nations in
the Survey for the Year 1953...............
4. Normalized and "Weighted" Data on Conflictive
and Cooperative Relations among Nations in
the Survey for the year 1 9 5 ^ ............ °5
5. Normalized and "Weighted" Data on Conflictive
and Cooperative Relations among Nations in
the Survey for the Year 1955...............
6. Normalized and "Weighted" Data on Conflictive
and Cooperative Relations among Nations in
the Survey for the Year 1956 67
7. Normalized and "Weighted" Data on Conflictive
and Cooperative Relations among Nations in
the Survey for the Year 1957 68
8. Normalized and "Weighted" Data on Conflictive
and Cooperative Relations among Nations in
the Survey for the Year 1958 69
iv
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
SUMMARY OP SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
The immediate aim of this paper is to investigate
empirically an intuitively deduced, hypothetical pattern
of international relations development in the Arab Middle
East and Israel where nations have become dependent on
great power arms and aid inputs in their attempt to cope
with regional conflicts. In order to test this postulated
pattern, the author has collected large quantities of data
(10,000 items covering the years 1953 to 1958) which
permit the measurement of conflictive versus cooperative
interactions among nations of the Middle East, on the one
hand, and Middle Eastern interactions with the two great
power blocs, on the other.1
Even a limited historical perspective suggests that
the years after World War II to late 1955 (when Soviet
arms were first offered to Egypt via Czechoslovakia) were
critical to the development of increasingly hostile and
1These data were taken from the Middle East Journal
chronology and Les Cahiers de L'Orient Coniemporalnl
1
polarized patterns of international relations among the
above states from 1956 to the present. The author does not
wish to assert, however, that the introduction of Soviet
arms to Egypt was solely or even most importantly respon
sible for the suggested deterioration of international
relations after 1955. Many subsystem changes — including
nascent nationalism, the newly achieved political indepen
dence of many Middle East states, and the rise of the army
and mass legitimacy in politics — culminated in the
breaking of the Western bloc arms monopoly over the area.
This latter event may be thought of as the last major
ingredient (the sine qua non) of greatly altered Middle
East international relations after 1955.
The author theorizes that, after this last major
ingredient was added to the already explosive mixture of
Middle East international politics, a number of inter
national political phenomena could be expected to emerge.
At a general level, one would expect the total level of
conflict in the Middle East subsystem and in great power
bloc interactions with the subsystem to proportionally
increase across time. Conversely, the level of cooperative
interactions should proportionally decrease. Structurally,
one would expect conflictive interaction patterns to
become more pervasive and more polarized, while cooperative
patterns become less pervasive and more polarized. More
specifically, the author will investigate all of the
3
following hypotheses, which are intuitively derived from
historic circumstance (see Chapter Three),
(1) Patterns of conflict and cooperation among
nations in the survey will be restructured or, at
least, "intensified" in terms of great-power
alignments, (a) Client states of one great power
bloc could be expected to come into increasing
conflict with client states of an opposing
great-power bloc, (b) Furthermore, client states
will establish increasingly cooperative and non-
conflictive relations with their great-power
patrons and increasingly non-cooperative and
conflictive relations with great powers who
support subsystem opponents.
(2) Subsystem state neutrality should be
increasingly difficult to maintain, as opposing
client states seek to expand their influence
and rally non-committed states to their side,
(3) Arms races may be anticipated, and one would
expect a proportional increase in the amount of
data dealing with military security interactions.
(*0 Nationalist-revisionist states (Egypt, Syria,
and Iraq) will increasingly have conflictive and
less cooperative relations with "traditional" or
status quo powers (the Arab monarchies and Lebanon).
"Like" regimes will develop increasingly cooperative
and less conflictive relations.
(5) A reading of the literature on Middle East
international relations suggests that Middle East
states are not interested in becoming involved in
the East-West cold war. (a) One could, therefore,
hypothesize that any increase in subsystem conflict
interactions or decrease in subsystem cooperative
interactions would largely concern "local" inter
national issues (the Arab-Israeli conflict, the
Arab cold war. Western colonialism, or Arab unity),
(b) Furthermore, one may find a reluctance on the
part of client states to actively support a great
power patron on the East-West cold war.
(6) For politico-cultural reasons, subsystem
issues dealing with the intrusion of an "alien"
power (in this instance, a non-Arabo-Islamic power)
may be expected to generate the most frequent and
most violent conflict activity of any major local
conflict issues.
Many of these hypotheses have implicit corollaries
which will also be subjected to data based analysis. For
example, the corollary of hypothesis "la" would read as
followsi "Client states of the same great power bloc
will develop increasingly cooperative relations,"
Once the preceding hypotheses have been subjected to
data based analysis, it will be of interest to ask how any
behavior modifications on the part of the United States
might have affected or might still affect Middle Eastern
international relations — particularly since the United
States is now the only arms supplier of Israel.
Finally, the reader will have noted that the above
hypotheses have been stated in fairly abstract terms. In
fact, the more distant objectives of this paper are to
suggest some theoretical principles regarding a particular
pattern of Third World international relations development
which are based on great power military inputs as an
indicator of major change in subsystem international re
lations. Such extrapolations from the present study are,
of course, dependent on some relatively firm conclusions
derived from data on Middle Eastern international relations
development.
Now that the central thrust of this research has been
identified, it will be of interest to examine, in greater
detail, the historical perspective, scope, and methodology
on which it is based.
THE ANALYTIC LEVEL*2
SEEING IT WHOLE
Many Middle East area studies experts ascribe to the
notion that Middle Eastern international relations are
generated primarily from social forces and unique circum
stances which are indigenous to. that region. Most seem
to dwell on the "individual" or "societal" level of
analysis* that is. they stress religio-linguistic or
3
cultural values (e.g., the concept of jihad), the role
of the army or other domestic power bases, or the
personalities and social backgrounds of Middle Eastern
political leaders in their attempts to theorize about
international relations phenomena in the area. Often,
area studies scholars either ignore or minimize the notion
that forces originating from the "larger" international
system (particularly from the two great power blocs)
might well have a large impact on the development of
international relations among the relatively weak states
in the Middle Eastern subsystem as well as the
2
J. D. Singer, "The Level of Analysis Problem in
International Relations," The International System*
Theoretical Essays, in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (eds.)
(Princeton, New Jersey* Princeton University Press, 1961),
PP. 75-92.
3
An Islamic tenet which provides that, in most
circumstances, the only theologically possible relationship
with non-Islamic society is "holy war."
international relations that those states have with the
rest of the world.^
Professor Binder, for example, explains that the
balance of terror between the great powers has severely
limited great power control over "friends" in the Middle
East.^ He concludes, therefore, that Middle Eastern
states are free to pursue local issues and interventions
without fear of great power intervention. Binder*s thesis,
however, overlooks an important analytic distinction
suggested by the Sprouts who point out that there is
• • .a sharp distinction between the psychological
environment (with reference to which an individual
defines choices and takes decisions) and the
operatienal environment (which sets limits to z
what can happen when the decision is executed).
The implications for international relations in the Middle
East should be apparent. Regional actors may initiate any
variety of foreign policies in apparent disregard of any
extra-national influences (a case which seems highly
unlikely)! yet their ability to obtain a wide range of
^Works by the following cleave to this pattern*
Leonard Binder, The Ideological Revolution in the Middle
East (New York* Wiley, 19o*0, pp. 25*4-278* Malcolm Kerr,
The Arab Cold War (New York* Oxford University Press,
19&7) passim* J~Harris Proctor, Islam and International
Relations (New York* Praeger, 1965)* and Hisham Sharabi,
Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World (New York*
Van Nostrand. 1966). passim.
^Binder, ibid., p. 255.
^Harold and Margaret Sprout, "Environmental Factors
in the Study of International Politics," International
Politics and .Foreign Policy, in James N. Rosenau (ed.)
(Glencoe* Free Press, 1961), p. 109*
7
policy objectives is very much in doubt, since the Middle
East is characterized by a low level of indigenous power
(capability). And "imported power" seems likely, therefore
to have significant impact on international relations
destinies of Middle Eastern actors. It is precisely for
this reason, then, that the author has emphasized, in a
double sense, an international systemic focus. In the
first sense, the author is referring to the "imported power
argument just put forth. Second, the primary empirical
research effort of this paper is at the "systemic" level
of analysisi i.e., it is composed of data describing
what kind of foreign policy action(s) one nation directs
toward another. The major assumption is, then, that much
may be learned about international relations by merely
observing the external behavior of nations. In the final
analysis, of course, this kind of information is insuf
ficient. Undoubtedly, international relations events are
the result of an extremely complex set of interacting and
mutually influencing variables which would include both
regional and international systemic forces. In light of
this seeming truism, some attempt to see the whole
"picture" does seem in order. The following chapter will,
therefore, be dedicated to an admittedly brief but
important effort to place this research in historic
7
perspective. In so doing, a conscious endeavor to expose
the individual, institutional and socio-cultural (in short,
the regional, sub-national) components of Middle Eastern
international relations development will be made.
Immediately, however, some semantic problems and latent
assumptions must be exposed.
DEFINITION OF TERMS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The following paragraphs seek to explain some of the
"special" terminology used in this paper so that some
level of consistency may be maintained. In each case, the
terms to be discussed or defined are underlined.
So many recent papers on international relations
are over-burdened by polemics concerning appropriate
methodology (i.e., "traditional" vs, "behavioral" or
"quantitative") that the present writer has decided to
avoid becoming mired in this difficulty. Suffice it
to say that there is much to be said in favor of both
approaches — if, indeed, a large distinction should be
made. Obviously, intuition or "wisdom" must guide the
empirical researcher so that he may ask the proper
research questions. It i6 hoped that the present analysis
will clearly demonstrate that an eclectic approach (i.e.,
^Since quantitative-empirical studies of the central
phenomena under consideration simply do not exist, much of
the traditional review of literature is obviated. There are,
however, numerous traditional analyses of the central
phenomena which have been utilized in the construction of
the following chapter — particularly the latter part.
one which combines traditional "insight" with a good deal
0
of empirical "evidence") is most valuable and useful.
An often used term here is the "subordinate"
international system as a means of identifying the Arab
Middle East and Israel. First, a system is a collection
of interacting entities or units (in this case, states)
which have, in some sense, a boundary and which may be
characterized in terms of the entities* interaction
structures — the patterns formed by the frequency and
kinds of interactions among the units. A subordinate
international system, then, would be a system of states
which, in some vital sense, is dependent on the outside
environment (the "larger" or great power international
system, in this case) to maintain vital interests of the
subordinate system members. In terms of international
relations — characterized as they are by anarchy and
Q
hegemonial struggles on the part of soverign states7 —
the primary need is state security to be maintained by
0
The phrase was borrowed from and responds to a
methodological critique by J. David Singer, "The Incompleat
Theorists Insight Without Evidence," Contending Ap-
?
roaches to International Politics. K. Knorr ana J. Rosenau
eds.) (Princetons University Press, 1969)# passim.
q
7The assumptions and hypothetical insights made here
on the nature of the international political system are
largely drawn from Hans Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations
(New Yorks Alfred Knoph, 19481, passim! See, also,
John Herz, "The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State,"
International Politics and Foreign Policy, J. N. Rosenau
(ed.) (Glencoes Free Press, 1961), pp. oO-86.
military preparedness (for both defensive and/or offensive
purposes)} hence, the critical dependency which estab
lishes a subordinate international system's status is a
military one. Members of the subordinate international
system are dependent on the great powers (or great power
blocs) of the international system for needed arms and
military guarantees, if they are to survive among other
competing, soverign states.
Turning to the Middle Eastern case, one can readily
perceive that the whole area is a power vacuum and
highly dependent on the great powers for allies and
armamentst thus, its "subordinate" status is, by
definition, readily established. Not so manifest is the
treatment of the Arab Middle East (excluding the Maghreb)
as a (regional) subsystem of the international system.
There is a real psychological, functional, and geographic
boundary which cuts the Arab Middle East off from the
rest of the world. It has often been noted, for example,
that Arab nationalism is religio-linguistically based.
The fact, for example, that the Arabs believe God gave
them the Koran in Arabic (not to be translated) auto
matically meant that the Arabic speaking peoples were an
elite, chosen people. Also, the predominently Sunni
Moslem Arabs are estranged from their Shi'ite Persian
neighbors to the North, since the Sunni-Shi*ite difference
11
is roughly parallel to the Catholic-Protestant division
in Western culture of an earlier day. Geographically
speaking, the Arabs (whose borders are contiguous) have
been cut off from contact with Southern Europe by the
Mediterranean Sea. What little contact they have had with
their southern neighbors* who are separated by the vast
Sahara desert barrier, has resulted in the enslavement
of the latter.10 Israel is, of course, a logical
inclusion in the Arab Middle East system by virtue of
its geographic position and frequent hostile interactions
with Arab states. It is also possible to think of the
Middle East subsystem in terms of issues considered
vital to it — such as Arab nationalism and socialism,
anti-colonialism, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the
so-called Arab Cold War.
10Willard A. Beling, Professor of International
Relations at the University of Southern California, has
suggested, for instance, that the reason Pan-Africanism
is not a viable doctrine for Arab North Africans stems
from the racial stigma implicit in the "slave" status of
blacks in the Arab world. See W. A. Beling, "Eurafri-
canismi Alternative to Pan-Africanism," Maghreb Digest.
Vol. IV, No. 4 (April 1966), pp. 1-15.
CHAPTER II
SETTING THE STAGE
The present chapter will examine the complex set of
forces and circumstances shaping international events in
the Middle East up to the Czech arms deal. In the first
part of this discussion, an effort to expose the
differences between two Arab regime types will be made,
since these differences seem particularly relevant to an
understanding of why Egypt eventually sought arms from
the Eastern bloc. Common factors affecting the behavior
of both types of regimes are also discussed. Once this
analysis of the physical and psychological environment
of Middle Eastern international relations is complete, a
review of the more immediate historical dynamics of the
"Czech" arms deal may be undertaken. Throughout this
chapter, the author has attempted to expose the entire
spectrum of forces which shaped Middle Eastern international
relations up to the time of the Czech arms deal.
THE CLASH OP ALIEN CULTURES
The nationalist-revisionist regimes differ markedly
from the Arab monarchies along several key dimensions --
including the social background of their leaders, leader
ship support and legitimating values, socio-cultural
12
13
characteristics of the population, regime ideology, and
the degree to which exposure to the West (i.e., "modern,"
secularized society) has had an impact on them. Much of
the impetus for change in the Arab world has come from
contact (usually in the form of colonialism) with the
technologically advanced West, On the positive side of
the ledger, the West was a harbinger of new ideas — in
every sector of life from freedom and democracy to how to
build a better mousetrap.^
To understand the importance of this contact, one
must comprehend the extent to which a revealed religion
2
(Islam) totally controlled the thinking and actions of
Moslem society prior to the European "invasion." The
ultimate loyalty of the Arab Moslem was (and, for the most
part, still is) to his other-worldly (fatalistic) religion.
"Church" and state were "one" in Arab society, and religion
prescribed not only the correct impersonal political
behavior for the believer but, also, the proper behavior
for most personal matters as well. The Arab socio
political system was a totalistic theocracy, and, since
it was revealed by Allah and favored the Arabs, it was not
*A normative problem is apparent. The author only
assumes that material increase (where there is poverty),
technological progress, political freedom, and an ability
to accommodate political, economic, and social change
may be considered desirable.
2
Islam literally means submission to God.
14
to be changed. Furthermore, political history until the
3
European invasion had confirmed the validity of Islam.
The Arabs to that date had been either victorious on the
field of battle or they had converted their conquerors
(e.g., the Ottoman Turks).
The European conquest was a new matter, since the
invaders were far superior militarily and refused to be
converted. At least one impulse arising out of this situ
ation, then, was reformist and emulative.
The West was great and strong! by study and
imitation, it might be possible to discover and
apply the elusive secret of its greatness and
strength, and generations of eager students
and reformers toiled in the search. They may
not have loved us, or even understood us, but
they did admire and respect us.2
There is, to be sure, a "negative" side of the ledger
to be considered. The Europeans came as rulers and not
necessarily as good "Samaritans." Resentment and enmity,
the usual result of imparity between nations or individuals,
were exacerbated by a good deal of forceful manipulation of
existing Arab regimes as well as by the clash of alien cul
tures. One need only read of the incidents concerning the
creation and development of the Suez Canal to become aware
of the extent to which Europeans interferred with local
rule and "used" the indigenous population of the Middle
■^See Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Islam in Modern History
(New Yorks Mentor Press, 1957), P. 42.
4
Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West (Bloom
ington s Indiana University Press, 1964), p. 45,
15
East. William Polk describes some of this history as
follows I
The Egyptian governor was to purchase over half of
the stock of the Lesseps' company, but the stock
gave him few rights and was held under various res*
trictions. Egypt was to get 15 percent of the net
profits of the company but was to furnish a labor
force of nearly 20,000 men to dig the canal. Then,
as the company needed new sources of revenue, the
Egyptian treasury was literally plundered of
untold amounts. • . .5
In addition to these kinds of abuses, there are a
number of specific Muslim doctrines which could only
increase the desire of the Arabs to rid themselves of the
invading aliens. Most importantly, one must understand the
concept of the jihad or holy war.
As bellum .justurn the jihad was a permanent obligation
upon Muslims collectively, until the dar al-harb
(i.e., the territory ruled by non-Moslems) would be
reduced to nonexistence. The ultimate establishment
of Pax Islamica • . . was a duty imposed on the
believers to be carried out by a continuous process
of warfare, psychological and political if not
strictly military.®
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONALISM
This chapter, of course, is greatly interested in the
cognitive changes in Middle Eastern perceptions made possi
ble or resulting from exposure to the West — particularly
^William Polk, The United States and the Arab World
(Cambridge* Harvard University Press, 1965). p. 90.
^Majid Khaduri, "The Islamic Theory of International
Relations and Its Contemporary Relevance," Islam and Inter
national Relations. William Proctor, ed. (New York* Pr&eger,
1965). P. 29.
16
where these changes have affected the course of inter
national relations in the area. Of singular importance in
this regard is the attempted importation and incorporation
of Western nationalism on the part of the "new" regimes in
the Middle East. Nationalism, be it myth or reality,
requires that the "first" loyalty of the citizen be directed
toward the social community called the nation. As has been
shown, several forces which would naturally stimulate the
growth of loyalty and identification with one's nation were
set in motion by the European impact. The importation of
technology (which stimulated the growth of new secular ideas
and social institutions) and the failure of Islamic civili
zation to convert or conquer the Europeans combined with a
unified desire to oust the infidels who were "exploiting"
Arabdom and threatening the Pax Islamica. Other elements
supportive of a more positive (integral) nationalism were
obviously present. A common language, religion, history,
and other appropriate symbols of cultural unity were very
much in evidence and fit naturally into the framework of
this imported concept. Awareness of these positive elements
was often goaded into existence by the challenge of Euro
pean colonialism. (Algeria's revolution is a good case
in point.) The major requirement of the European brand
of nationalism was, however, difficult to incorporate in
the Middle East.
17
. . .in Europe and the Americas we define our
identity and loyalty in terms of nationality —
that is, to varying extents, by the polity of
which we are citizens, the country we inhabit,
the stock from which we are deemed to descend,
and the language we speak. For Muslims, the basic
division — the touchstone by which men are separ
ated from one another, by which one distinguishes
between brother and stranger, is that of faith —
of membership of a religious community.'
No leas than a dramatic change in loyalties and social
values was, therefore, required in the Middle Eastern case
for the Western brand of nationalism to succeed. Further
more, since it was born of tribal society, Islam tended to
reinforce and abet the traditionally decentralized pattern
of political power in the Middle East. The religion recog
nized any government as legitimate which protected and
defended its hence, it had no arguments with the many
Middle Eastern despots who gave central government in the
area a "bad" reputation as the conscriptor for armies or
the tax collector. Islam did, however, provide an elab
orate set of rules and regulations for the extended family
system, the clan, and the tribe. Not surprisingly, there
fore, political organization in the Middle East existed
primarily along these lines, and loyalties were principally
to these kinds of social units.
As might be anticipated, the required transfers of
loyalties were most likely to occur in relatively urbanized
areas which had the most extensive contact with the West.
?Lewis, oj>. cit.. p. 71.
18
(The argument is a bit tautological* since the Europeans
made contact in the cities.) City-life naturally encour
ages the breakdown of localisms, since it generally throws
together peoples of diverse origins. Furthermore, it was
in the cities that technology and modern education were
first introduced. It was also in the cities that the
intense dislike of Europeans was most likely to develop —
through job discrimination, segregated housing, schooling,
etc. Hence, it is not difficult to understand why the
nationalist-revisionist regimes evolved out of a relatively
urbanized and Westernized setting. The new regimes which
came to power in Egypt (1952), Syria (195*0# Iraq (1958),
Tunisia (1956), Algeria (1962), and in Libya (1969) were
all colonized at one point, and all had significant urban
populations (with the exception of Libya).® A generally
opposite pattern prevails among the Arab monarchies. Saudi
Arabia, Libya (until recently), Kuwait, Jordan, and Morocco
all had relatively less contact with the West, and all have
relatively small urban areas. There are, of course, excep
tions to the rule in the case of the monarchies, and, at
present, all of these regimes are experiencing a good deal
of domestic nationalist opposition. It may be noted,
however, that Saudi Arabia, which was never colonized, is
Q
The criteria which have been selected to distinguish
regime types would probably not fit any one regime exactly.
It is felt, however, that these criteria do fit many of
the regimes under consideration. In the time period con
sidered in this survey, only Egypt and Syria really had a
chance to develop nationalist-revisionist characteristics.
19
probably the most stable of these "old" regimes.
In the cities, then, there evolved a small group of
"new" Middle Eastern men who were (typically) Western
educated, relatively secularized, who both admired and
reviled the West, and whose loyalties were developing along
modern nationalist lines. They became the urban proletariat,
the petit bourgeoisie, or the small but significant profes
sional strata of Middle Eastern society. Although small in
numbers, these people were politicized and were beginning
to utilize and learn the technology which made their
European masters strong.
It was from these groups, then, that the new
nationalist-revisionist leadership was to be drawn.
Typically, the new leadership rose to power through a
military coup against a feudalistic power structure which
had almost always allied itself with a West bloc country.
The now-famous Egyptian coup-d'etat of 1952, for example,
had its origins in the 1936 Anglo-British treaty. After
the treaty was signed,
The Egyptian army was. . . theoretically an ally of
the British, and so Britain was anxious to improve
itt at the same time, the Wafd (the ruling political
party in Egypt wlich represented the interests of
the landed aristocracy) badly needed to gain popu
larity. Por the first time the Military Academy was
opened to young men who came from classes other than
the land-owning aristocracy.9
^Peter Mansfield, Nasser’s Egypt (Baltimore* Penguin
Books, 1965)* P« 35*
20
Many of the leaders of the Egyptian revolution
(including Nasser) were a product of this back door to
advancement through the ranks of the military. Once
this critical step was taken, it was merely a question
of consolidating a position and waiting for the right
time to strike.
NATIONALIST-REVISIONIST IDEOLOGY
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Having rather diffusely described some of the
forces — both positive and negative — which
contributed to the creation of nationalist-revisionist
regimes in the Middle East, one may now summarize
observations and draw some conclusions regarding
ideological change and the foreign policies of these
new regimes. The new regimes have had relatively more
contact with the West than have the traditional regimes.
This means that their populations and leaders have
become more secularized, more urban, more politicized,
more technologically advanced and more resentful of the
West than those of the monarchies. These changes, in turn,
have paved the way for the growth of modern nationalism —
which requires a shift in loyalties from an other-worldly
religion and local social units to a wider group called
the nation. With all of these developments comes an
attendant change (or revolution) in regime ideology and
21
goals which greatly influences the international behavior
of the new regimes.
At a greatly generalized level of analysis, this
nationalistic ideology may be characterized as being
Messianic, egalitarian, idealistic, and change
(revisionist) oriented.*0 The degree to which Arab
nationalist leaders feel a zealous sense of "mission"
is revealed in these rhetorical questions posed by the
young Abdul Nasser in 1935*
Where is dignity? Where is nationalism? Where
is what one can call the activity of youth? It
has all disappeared and the nation lies asleep
like the inhabitants of a cave. Who can wake
them up, these miserable creatures who are not
even aware of their own condition?!!
A sense of mission obviously requires a value to be
implemented, and, as Aristotle observed,
The chief cause of . . . revolutionary feeling
(is). . . the desire of equality, when men think
that they are equal to others who have more than
themselves. . . .
Domestically, nationalists proclaim their desire to lower
class barriers (doing away with the old privileged classes)
and provide for social mobility through education. It is
to be expected, of course, that the relatively small group
The author does not wish to present these character
istics as mutually exclusive categories; they are highly
interrelated. But their sum-total does seem to describe
a great deal of nationalist-revisionist behavior.
**Mansfield, o£. cit•, p. 35»
12
As cited in Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change
(Bostoni Little, Brown, and Co., 1966), p. 4.
of "new" men In the Middle East should seek to shape more
men in their own image, if for no other reason than to
consolidate their political base. Externally, the zealous
desire to promote equality was expressed in national
independence movements to rid the Arab nation of alien
masters — both Israeli and European. The nationalist-
revisionists, having been exposed to the excesses of
colonialism, were highly motivated to rid themselves of
the aliens. And, if the nation be the highest "good,"
then all necessary sacrifices would naturally be made to
protect it.
Furthermore, the promotion of Arab nationalist
equality could not stop at the borders of the nationalist-
revisionist regimes. Since these borders were "artifi
cially” created by the European colonialists, their
legitimacy was open to question. And, in any case, the
message of Arab nationalism applied to all Arabs — whether
under monarchical or nationalist rule. Hence, the
nationalist regimes came into increasing conflict with
the traditional regimes once the former had a chance to
establish themselves.
Devotion to principles (idealism) in defense of the
nation and desire for rapid "revision" of the old order are
other values embodied by nationalist leaders. Idealism on
behalf of the nation is manifest in their refusal to
submit to the dictates of power politics and their
relatively modest (i.e., non-luxurious) life-styles.
Middle East nationalists have made some costly inter
national economic and political sacrifices for the
independence or strengthening of Arab countries. The
boycott of Prance (for her role in North Africa), of
Israel and Western companies doing business with Israel,
and the refusal of Egypt to join a pro-Western alliance in
order to procure arms are all examples of idealistic-
nationalist behavior largely promoted by the "new" regimes.
It is further worth noting that even though necessity has
driven nationalist leaders to seek arms from the Eastern
bloc, they have consistently outlawed the Communist Party
in their countries and have not permitted Eastern bloc
intervention in local politics.
Commitment to revision and progress is not a
surprising value to be held by men whose own lives were
greatly transformed by Western ideas. For the nation to
be strong and unified, it must educate its citizens in
the economic applications of technology, and it must
inculcate nationalist loyalties in the citizenry. Both
goals require vast revisions of the old order. Inter
nationally, this ideological orientation has made it
difficult for status quo countries to comprehend and
relate amicably to the nationalist-revisionists. In a
very immediate sense, the nationalist-revisionists seek
to change the very foundations upon which the traditional
24
regimes are built-- the traditiono-charismatic pattern
of political authority and the feudalistic structure of
political power. Additionally, nationalist-revisionist
relations with Western bloc countries have come on
increasingly difficult times, since the capitalist
ideology and perceived interest in the status quo of the
latter has often run counter to revisionist ideology
and practice. On the international economic side of the
ledger, the new regimes (intent as they are on rapid
economic progress) often perceive Western business firms
as being only exploitative undertakings — extracting raw
resources at bargain prices for large profits which are
repatriated and not reinvested. Demands for large-scale
non-political aid and trade have also led to difficulties.
Probably the largest outstanding difficulty between
Western bloc countries and the nationalist-revisionists,
however, lies in their respective attitudes toward
revision of the political order. The logic of the East-
West cold war has often found the West supporting any
regime which promised even short-run domestic and inter
national political stability. Nationalist (non-communist)
revisionist regimes seeking change in the political order
were usually opposed on the grounds that political
instability might somehow work to the advantage of the
East bloc. Also, to the extent that revisionism meant
anti-colonialism, at least two West bloc countries
25
(Britain and Prance) would find themselves in opposition
to the nationalist revisionists. Finally* it should be
pointed out that* in the Middle East* vital oil supplies
were in the hands of the traditional regimes — a fact
which reinforced the West's conservative orientation.
r
THE TRADITIONAL-CONSERVATIVE REGIMES*
IDEOLOGY AND FOREIGN POLICY
The discussion to this point has mostly concerned
the new regimes in the Middle East. Often* character
istics of the "old" regimes were implied and not stated*
hence* a summary of these characteristics and how they
affect the international behavior of the old regimes is
in order.
Traditional regimes have had relatively less
exposure to the technology* political ideas* and
"brutality" of the West. Their populations are, therefore,
relatively more religiously motivated* less politicized,
amid less demanding of change. Such being the case*
political loyalties remain strongly identified with small
social units and to the notion of a religious community.
Leadership is legitimate insofar as it promotes and
protects Islam. Leaders often claim to be related to the
Prophet or one of the Caliphs (successors) in their efforts
to legitimize their rule* and feudalistic socio-political
patterns usually prevail. Political support comes most
26
strongly from the landed aristocracy and, at least
passively, from the less urban segments of the population
(i.e., the peasantry or Bedouin tribes).
These facts translate into a considerably different
political ideology and foreign policy posture for the
traditional regimes. They are certainly not the complete
opposites of the nationalist-revisionists, but they are
less "nationalistically" idealistic, less "expansionist,"
less change (progress) oriented (perhaps, even, reaction
ary), and are less egalitarian. They do exhibit, however,
varying degrees of religious idealism which, as has been
shown, has a very direct bearing on their relations with
the more secular, nationalist-revisionist regimes. This
idealism also very much explains the unwillingness of
traditionalist regimes to have "normal" relations with the
"atheistic" Eastern bloc. Since their populations are
less politicized and their active political support comes
largely from a "privileged" class, they are even further
less likely to relate amicably to the "proletarian"
ideology of communism. At the same time, they are likely
to find more ideological and social compatibility with
the capitalistic and non-atheistic Western bloc. The logic
developed here is well supported by experience. The
monarchies have probably all been approached by the Soviets
but have always rejected offers of arms assistance (except
in the case of Morocco which has reverted to Western
27
connections).
The traditionalists, of course, had to get arms from
some outside source in order to deter both external and
internal security threats. And since they refused to do
business with the Eastern bloc on ideological grounds,
they had to do business with the West ~ a circumstance
which left them in a poor bargaining position. It was
only natural that Western nations would exact political
favors for their arms support, since they had long been
accustomed to having exclusive control over the Middle
East. The Arab traditional regimes have acquiesced to
Western political desires in order to procure armaments.
They joined or supported (or, at least, did not violently
oppose) the Western-sponsored, anti-communist Baghdad Pacti
they took a "milder" position on the Arab-Israeli conflictj
and they supported the West on cold war issues in the
U.N. and elsewhere. They did all these things during a
period in which there was widespread anti-Western sentiment
in the Arab world occasioned by Western colonialism or
Western support for Israel. The point to be made here, of
course, is that the monarchies were able to make such
foreign policy choices in the short run, because prevailing
socio-political conditions (mentioned at the outset of
this section) either actively or passively encouraged them.
28
Although some of the monarchies even now broadcast
appeals for Islamic unity (usually as a counter-offensive
to the new regimes which appeal for Arab national unity),
they cannot be characterized as possessing an expansionary
ideology or motivation. In fact, the monarchies came in
for increasing domestic Arab nationalist opposition during
the 1950s. Those that survived were content to “hold the
line," much less expand their influence.
These two regime types do, of course, hold certain
strong cultural values in commoni hence, their differences
are often of degree rather than of kind. The nationalist-
revisionist regimes are, at most, in a transitional phasei
their nationalist character is incomplete.
• . .the driving force of nationalism has become
more and more religious the more the movement has
penetrated the masses. Even when the leaders and
the form and the ideas of the movement have been
nationalist on a more or less Western pattern, the
followers and the substance and the emotions were
significantly Islamic.13
Undoubtedly, the relatively common hostile response
both regime types exhibit toward both Western colonialism
and Israel is a product of Arabo-Islamic culturej although
the nationalist response has been more vigorous. Certainly
the fact that Lebanon (which is half populated and ruled by
Arab Christians) has maintained rather neutral relations
14
with Israel is illustrative of the preceding argument.
^Smith, oj>. cit., p. 81.
14
The peculiar position of Lebanon in Middle Eastern
international politics will be discussed at length elsewhere.
29
Not only Is It apparent that all Middle Eastern regimes
hold certain common characteristics which affect their in
ternational behavior, it is also certain that the simple
dichotomy between Arab regime types, which has been depicted
here, is an over-simplification of reality for the sake of
discussion. Particularly in the contemporary Middle East,
it would be a mistake to closely identify moderate-
conservative regimes (such as Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia)
with heavily traditional-conservative regimes (like Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf States). Similarly, moderate-
revisionist states (Egypt, Libya, Algeria, and Yemen) should
not be mentioned in the same breath with radical-revision-
ists (Iraq, Syria, South Yemen, and the Palestinians).
Finally, a good deal of stress has been placed in this
discussion on the importance of ideological orientation in
the generatien of foreign policy actions. Obviously, a good
deal of ideological "frosting" may cover the "cake" of old-
fashioned seIf-interest. At this point, it seems appro
priate to conclude with the summary comments of one who has
spent much time and effort in the analysis of the phenomenon
under consideration.
• • .it seems sensible to assume that the radical-
conservative division is a long-term, deeply rooted
reality that will persist, in varying degrees of
intensity, well into the future. The division
arises. • .out of an internal social, cultural,
economic, psychological, and moral crisis within
Arab society. . . . It is a crisis of legitimacy
and authority, of participation and representation,
of collective self-identification and self-assertion,
of social equality and economic welfare and many
30
other things. Mixed into this, of course, is a large
component of ambition, opportunism, self-delusion,
and vested interest on the part of old and new leader
ship groups.15
OTHER FACTORS INFLUENCING MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
Along with the factors which help one distinguish new
and old regime foreign policy styles, there are two other
broad variables which must be assessed in the analysis of
Middle Eastern international relations -- personalities of
leaders and geopolitical setting. At least one author is
convinced, for example, that the Sue* War of 1956 was very
much the result of leadership idiosyncracies.
Men bulk larger in the story than governments or im
personal societal forces. Democratic ideals, the
complexity of modern politics, lightning communication
and the interdependence of nations are often thought
to have reduced the personal influence of individual
leaders on events. But Suez was like the wars of
old-time kings in the degree to which nations and
armies were set in motion by the personal philosophies
ambitions, and animosities of such men as Ben-Gurion,
Nasser, Sir Anthony Eden, Premier Guy Mollet of
France, Nikita S. Khrushchev, Eisenhower, and
Dulles.16
Some of the above leadership characteristics are, of
course, the result of social background influences and
perceived role definitions, but men such as Nasser and
Ben-Gurion would seem to have certain flamboyant and
^Malcolm H. Kerr, "Persistence of Regional
Quarrels," Sovlet-Amcrican Rivalry In the Middle East,
ed. J.C. Hurewitz (N.Y.i Praeger, 196$), P. 230.
^Kennet Love, Suezi The Twice Fought War (N.Y.i
McGraw-Hill, 1969). P . T
31
impulsive personality traits appropriate for dramatic
decision-making (if not NgoodM leadership).
Geography has had and will continue to have much to
do with the course of Middle Eastern international re
lations. In the broadest perspective, the Mediterranean
has become a rather logical arena of competition between
East and West. Both blocs regard it as the backdoor to
their respective military alliances* and both recognize
its petroleum resources and water bridge (Suez) between
two oceans as strategically important. The Middle East
has seen many invasions come and go and contains few
natural barriers to invasion. Populations are gathered
around major sources of water. Historically, then, the
two great river valley civilizations in the area — the
Nile and Mesopotamia regions — have been centers of
rival political power which have periodically vied for
regional hegemony. Hence, at least part of the struggle
between monarchical Iraq and revisionist Egypt must be
understood in geopolitical terms.
THE IMMEDIATE HISTORICAL DYNAMICS OF THE CZECH ARMS DEAL
The preceding discussion sought to isolate and de
scribe several factors influencing the international be
havior of two types of Middle Eastern states. Presently,
an attempt will be made to analyze historically the more
immediate circumstances under which the prototype
32
nationalist-revisionist regime (Egypt) came to buy arms
from the Eastern bloc. This task first requires a look
at the Middle Eastern arms policy of the Big Three
Western powers (Britain, France, and the United States)
during the period in which they controlled all arms
movements in the area.
Since Britain, France and the United States were
allies in the East-West cold war (which represented the
most serious challenge to their security), it was not
surprising that they sought to harmonize their arms
policies toward the Middle East. To this end, they
signed the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950.
The Tripartite Declaration called for joint allied
management of arms exports to the area, based on
estimated needs for internal security and external
defense) expressed vigorous opposition to the
forcible change of boundaries or armistice linesi
and encouraged local participation in a Western-
sponsored collective defense system for the region,
offering the prospect of generous supplies of modern
arms as an inducement. The United States, however,
refused bids altogether from states that were still
locked in dispute with Britain and France. . . .17
Although the national interests of the Big Three did vary
in the Middle East — primarily on the issue of continued
colonialism — their "perceived" common interests in
maintaining a peaceful status quo were greater than any
divergent impulses.1* * United States leaders did try to
17j.C. Hurewitz, "Origins of the Rivalry," Soviet-
American Rivalry in the Middle East, ed. J.C. Hurewitz
(N.Y.i Praeger, 196?), pp. 37-39.
^Perceived interests probably varied from objective
interests, a matter to be discussed in the conclusions.
persuade both Britain and Prance to give up their colonial
possessions in the Arab world, because it was realized
that continued colonialism in the area could drive the
Arabs toward the Eastern bloc and/or otherwise harm
Western interests in the area. But a more vital interest
in the unity of the new NATO alliance kept the United
States from exerting greater pressure on the colonial
powers (particularly on France). Whatever the differences,
the combined "perceived" interest of the Big Three in
maintaining a steady flow of oil for NATO, in keeping
the Suez Canal open, and in defending the Middle East
from direct or indirect communist invasion made their arms
limitation agreement initially successful — in the sense
that none of the Big Three violated its terms. By
August 195**, however. Prance began to secretly supply
arms to Israel in a deliberate attempt to thwart Egypt's
anti-French-Algerian policy.*9 *phe Tripartite Agreement
was soon thereafter scrapped by both Britain and France
for reasons which are best explained from the perspective
of Middle Eastern actors.
To understand the failure of Western arms policy in
the Middle East, one must focus on Egyptian policy
reactions to at least three conflict issues affecting her
security and implicit (if not explicit) ideological
^Peter Calvocoressi, Suez» Ten Years After (N.Y.i
Pantheon Books, 1967)» pp. 37-39.
34
program — the Arab-Israeli conflict. Western colonialism,
and the East-West cold war (with particular emphasis on
the Baghdad Pact). These reactions were, of course, more
vigorous and hostile than those of other Arab regimes,
since Egyptian leadership and citizenry were on the thresh-
hold of developing modern nationalist loyalties.
Probably the most intractable and damaging issue,
with regard to a successful Western arms policy in the
Middle East, was the Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite
border incidents in the early 1950s, there were encourag
ing signs of detente. Israel and her Arab neighbors
managed to arrive at a number of agreements designed to
reduce “infiltration" conflict, and there was even an
agreement in principle to the idea of joint Arab-Israeli
use of the Jordan River waters. Somewhere along the way,
however, efforts at detente went awry. One authoritative
work on the Suez crisis suggests that the deterioration
in Egyptian-Israeli relations came soon after the de
parture of Israeli Premier Moshe Sharett and the return
20
to power of the less-compromising David Ben-Gurion. v
20
Much of the covert political-historical data of
this period are just now coming to light. Even the “facts"
are, of course, open to interpretation. The following
work, however, is well-documented and researched and is
more sympathetic and objective in its analysis of Egyptian
motives and actions than other Western-authored works —
particularly those written during the time period in
question. See, Kennet Love, Suez» The Twice Fought War
(N.Y.i McGraw-Hill, 1969)* passim.
35
Responding to a variety of stimuli, Ben-Gurion and the
Israeli military decided upon a provocative strike at the
Gaza refugee camp in early 1955* Chief among these
stimuli was the threat of an improved climate of relations
between Egypt and Britain (and the West in general) re
sulting from Britain's agreement to evacuate and repatriate
her large military base at Suez in July 195**« It was
well-known that Egypt was seeking arms from the West
(still considering the Communist bloc to be anathema) and
would most likely have gotten them — with or without
Egypt's agreement to join an anti-communist, Western-
dominated defense pact (what later became the Baghdad
Pact). Also, despite certain indications of tension re
laxation in Egyptian-Israeli relations, there were still
several irritants. Egypt's refusal to sign a peace treaty
with Israel and refusal to permit Israeli navigation of
the Suez Canal and Straits of Tiran were problems further
exacerbated by small-scale Fedayeen attacks on Israeli
21
territory. The new appeal to nationalism and revision
ism of the Egyptian regime might also have been perceived,
even at that time, as a new kind of threat to Israel.
Certainly it was known by Israeli leaders that Israeli
21Fedayeen may be considered to be Arab terrorists,
Arab irregular forces, or Arab freedom fighters — de
pending on one's persuasions vis-i-vis the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
36
nationalism was the apparent force which permitted her to
survive against awesome odds — in a barren land with no
friendly neighbors. Could not* then, an Arab nationalism
— particularly one which unified all the Arabs against
aliens — lead to Israel's undoing?
Whatever the motives, the relatively large-scale
Israeli raid on Gaza in February 1955. which was not in
apparent retaliation for any proximate Egyptian violation
of the ceasefire, initiated a new level of conflict
which spiralled upward to the Suez invasion. A newly
established nationalist government could not, of course,
ignore the Israeli escalation.
. • .Egyptian policy changed radically as a result of
large-scale Israeli attacks on the Gaza Strip. The
first one, costing the lives of thirty-eight Arabs
and injuring thirty-one others, was made on February
28, 1955. shortly after Ben Gurion returned to the
government as defense minister. Although Israel
sought to justify this strong action on the alleged
ground that Egypt had been employing NaggressiveH
activities against her territory, the UNTSO Chief
of Staff denied Israel's allegation.22
Nasser's response was to organize Fedayeen raids,
seek more arms — first, from the West) then, from the
East — devote more money to war preparation, and order
the regular Egyptian army to shoot first and ask questions
later.
22Fred J. Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma (N.Y.i
Syracuse University Press, 1968) , p. 190.
3?
It would be misleading to argue, however, that the
conflict with Israel was the only force suggesting the
logic of an arms deal with the Eastern bloc. Western
colonialism was still in the process of winding down in the
Arab world, and nowhere was it more bitterly opposed than
in Egypt over the continued presence of British troops in
Suez and the unsettled status of the Sudan. The ne
gotiations over the evacuation of Suez were particularly
difficult and made no headway while Churchill headed the
British government — despite the fact that Egypt had
granted Britain the "right of return" to Suez in case of
an attach on Egypt by a foreign power. With the advent of
the Eden government, however, United States pressure on
Britain combined with broad hints from Egypt that an
evacuation agreement would clear the way for Egypt's
membership in a Western defense pact were sufficient to
produce an evacuation agreement on July 27, 195^.
It should be obvious, at this point, that regional
conflict issues had much to do with Egyptian policy re
actions to the East-West cold war issue.
Every move to secure Arab collaboration in the
struggle with the Soviet Union was viewed by Arab
nationalists as an occasion (or perhaps an excuse)
for reinstating some measure of Western control
over their affairs. Moreover, the Western
(especially American) identification with the
creation and support of Israel made it impossible
for the Arab states to join permanently with those
38
they considered the friends of their enemies.23
By September 195^» then, Egypt's Revolutionary Command
Council announced that, although Egypt was pro-West in
the East-West cold war, 72 years of occupation made it
impossible for her to immediately join a Western defense
2k
pact. Nasser wanted to build the Arab League organi
zation into a defense pact, armed by the West, but aimed
at defending the Arab world against any invader — not
just the Communist bloc. The British, feeling they had
been betrayed, turned to an ancient rival of Egypt
(Iraq) in their endeavor to recruit an Arab country to
join with Turkey in the defense of the Middle East from
the Soviet Union. "When Iraq and Turkey announced in
January 1955 that they were to conclude such a pact, the
lid blew off in Cairo."2^ Prom this time forth, the
tension between Britain and Iraq, on the one hand, and
Egypt, on the other, continued to mount and figured
prominently in Egypt's turn to the East. Also worth
23jehn S. Badeau, The American Approach to the Arab
Werld (N.Y.i Harper and Row, 19bb), pp. 41-42.
2k
Cahiers, llftme Annie, Fascicule XXX (2* Semestre,
195M. pp. 124-125.
2^John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East (N.Y.i
Praeger, 1958), pp. 5^-55.
39
noting is ths fact that ths origins of the Arab cold war
were undoubtedly born of the difference of opinion be
tween Egypt and Iraq concerning the degree to which an
Arab state should be willing to compromise its sovereignty
to obtain arms and assistance from greater powers.
• • .the conclusien of the pact broke the solidarity
of the Arab League and threatened Egypt's leader
ship. It looked for a time as if Egypt would break
up the league by insisting on Iraq's expulsion or
by withdrawing itself. In the end the League sur
vived because neither rival wished to take the re
sponsibility for its breakup, but behind its
transparent facade each bent its energies to lin
ing up the other Arab states. In this contest, the
Egyptians scored all the successes.26
Given British and French colonial involvements in
the Middle East, it is not surprising that Nasser, just
prior to the Czech arms deal, made his most intensive arms
buying effort with the United States — because it had no
former colonies and had voiced pledges of impartiality on
the Arab-Israeli issue. On March 10, 1955* Nasser made
a request to buy a limited number of arms from the United
Statesi the request was not denied but placed out of
reacht
When President Eisenhower saw the Egyptian list of
desired arms he exclaimed* "Why this is peanuts!"
Nevertheless, as Eisenhower candidly described in
Waging Peace, the United States stalled. Washington
was refusing credit or barter and demanding cash
payment of an amount that would have emptied Egypt's
reserves of foreign exchange. Selling Nasser arms
would have caused a vigorous outcry among American
26Ibid
40
Zionists* and it was impossible to predict what
reaction it might provoke Ben-Gurion to make.2?
In summary, it is evident that a number of mutually
influencing and reinforcing variables* woven into the fab
ric of Middle Eastern international relations of the early
1950s* produced the circumstances necessary (if not suf
ficient) for the introduction of Eastern bloc arms to
Egypt. The West became increasingly reluctant to sell
arms to Egypt for a variety of reasons. The Western
colonial powers (Prance and* to a lesser extent* Britain)
saw that Egypt was unalterably opposed to colonialism.
France went so far as to arm Israel for this reason.
Britain* while she had resolved her major "colonial"
obstacle to better relations with Egypt, still had
colonial interests in the Middle East and the stigma of
the past to cloud her relations with Egypt. Furthermore,
Britain's support for Iraq* since the latter had become the
linchpin of the anti-communist Baghdad Pact, further
strained Anglo-Egyptian relations. All Western countries
— and particularly the United States — were loathe to
arm Egypt for a variety of reasons relating to the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Zionist pressures in domestic politics,
sympathy for European Jews in the wake of Nazi atrocities,
and the upsetting influence that arming Egypt might have
in Arab-Israeli relations all figured prominently in the
2?Love, o£. cit.. pp. 88-91.
41
perspectives of Western leaders. Finally, the United
States was more desirous of protecting the unity of the
NATO alliance than of running the risk of arming Egypt to
the detriment of Western colonialism.
From the Egyptian perspective, the new nationalist-
revisionist character of Egypt made her much more sensi
tive (i.e., hostilely reactive) to her enemies and vice
versa. The excesses of colonialism and most importantly,
the threat of Israeli power after the Gaza raid made it
imperative for Egypt to seek armsi this she could only
do by turning to the Eastern bloc.
CHAPTER III
HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY
THE LOGIC OP THE HYPOTHESES
It will be remembered from the introductory comments
of this paper that it postulated an increase and polari
zation in hostile international relations among Middle
Eastern states as a result of various indigenous subsystem
changes which culminated in the Egyptian-Czech arms deal.
At this point* however, one may well object that increased
conflict would have taken place in the Middle East even in
the absence of Soviet arms inputs — given the irrational
ity of culturally motivated conflicts and the revolution
in political ideology in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. Un
doubtedly, for example, Arabs and Israelis would have gone
after each other with stones and scimitars, if that were
all they had. But the fact that all parties to conflict
in the Middle East had modern weapons in increasing
quantities after 1955 meant that their mutual suspicions
and anxieties increased as well as their perceived power
and that the consequences of their conflict were far more
deadly and carried the potential of involving the great
powers in a world war. The logic of this most general and
kZ
^3
"guiding" hypothesis, therefore, seems quite compelling —
particularly, if one takes even a casual glance at the
obvious "watershed" in Middle Eastern international re
lations before and after 1955, Nasser's increased re
sistance to Israel and his nationalization of the Suez
Canal (occasioned by the withdrawal of the Anglo-American
offer to finance the Aswan dam) was soon followed by the
tripartite invasion of Egypt in 1956. In 1957 and 1958,
the Arab cold war intensified.
The seven hypotheses listed in the introduction to
this paper are merely more specific cases of the general
hypothesist hence, they may be justified in the same
general terms. The remainder of the chapter will, then,
be concerned with the research model used to "test" the
validity of these hypotheses.
THE ANALYTIC CATEGORIES
The "testing" of these expected relationships natural
ly requires the dyadic measurement of conflict and co
operation between interacting Middle Eastern states and
their patron states over time — both before and after
1955. The twenty-two World Event Interaction Survey
(WEIS) categeries developed by Charles McClelland, et al..
in conjunction with data processing techniques are well-
suited to this task with slight revision.1 These twenty-
two "basic" categories are used to record almost all inter
national relations phenomena between official national
actors in the form of (a) what country (b) takes what action
(c) toward another country. Discrete bits of relevant
information are first collected and recorded in English ~
in the present case, on data processing cards. The result
ing data collection is called the descriptive deck. The
next step is to convert these bits of information to
numeric values and record them on data processing cards
which, then, can readily be aggregated and counted by the
computer! the resulting data collection is called the
2
analytic deck. To this end, then, all countries in a
particular study are assigned a numeric value as well as
the different kinds of actions (WEIS categories) which
they direct toward one another. Since the very essence of
any behavioral study centers on the operational meaning
and utility of its analytic categories, much time and effort
^Por a listing of these categories and instruction on
how they are used see Charles McClelland, et al.. World
Event Interaction Survey Handbook and Codebooki Technical
Report No. 1 (Los Angeles> University of Southern
California, mimeo., 1969)* PP. 11-21.
2
All cards in both decks have been dated and numbered!
hence, any analytic deck card may be traced back to its
descriptive deck origin.
^5
must now be spent In explaining how the WEIS taxonomy will
be used here.
In order to facilitate the analysis of Middle Eastern
state behaviors along a cooperation-conflict continuum, it
was necessary to both reorder and regroup the WEIS
categories into eight larger rubrics. The table on the
following page summarizes these changes. The eight major
categories in table one represent intuitively derived,
logical and meaningful groupings of the WEIS categories.
They are more or less ordered so that the most cooperative
acts are listed first, followed by less cooperative to
increasingly conflictive acts. The subcategories of
table one are, of course, the WEIS categories — reordered
and renumbered and sometimes repeated to fit into the
eight major categories. Each subcategory in the table
contains brief descriptions of the kinds of behavior it is
intended to cover.
Any such taxonomical scheme is, of course, fraught
with operational difficulties. Clearly, the arrangement
of these categories would, at best, indicate those acts
whose intent only usually fits appropriately in one of the
more or less ordinal categories. Absolutely no precise
interval or gradation of cooperation versus conflict action
should be inferred from the taxonomy. Since, however, the
old saying that "actions speak louder than words" seems
46
TABLE 1. — List of analytic categories used to describe
various kinds of cooperative and conflictive
events taking place between interacting nations
I. COOPERATIVE SUPPORT ACTION BEHAVIOR
11 REWARD — assist with economic or technical aid,
grant privilege as non-hostile reward
12 REWARD — assist with military aid
13 IMPLEMENT — otherwise implement an agreement —
e.g., on political unification
II. COOPERATIVE VERBAL SUPPORT BEHAVIOR
21 APPROVE — praise, hail, give verbal support, ex
press gratitude, condolences, salu
tations, back other country's policy,
public demonstration of support
22 PROMISE — promise policy, material, or action
support at future time, assure or re
assure
24 AGREE — make substantive agreements, or agree to
future action or policy (usually double
coded)
25 COMMENT — explain or state support or integra
tive policy or action
III. VERBAL "CHANGE AND INFORMATION SEEKING" BEHAVIOR
31 REQUEST — ask for clarification of policy of an
other, material assistance, actioni
launch appeal or supplication
32 PROPOSE — offer proposal, urge action or policy,
make state invitation, offer to
mediate
33 CONSULT — confer under amicable circumstances
IV. COOPERATIVE ACTION OR VERBALIZATION SEEKING RE
DUCTION OF CONFLICT
41 YIELD — surrender, physically retreat, retract
statement or accusation, admit wrong
doing (as a reaction to another's pro
test, accusation, etc.)
42 GRANT — express regret, apologize, return
seized persons/property, suspend
47
TABLE 1. — Continued
sanctions, diplomatic recogni
tion, privilege, truce
43 CONSULT — hold talks in order to resolve a
dispute, consult as a mediator
44 AGREE — make or implement agreement to reduce
conflict
45 COMMENT — make optimistic comment on conflict
issue
46 REQUEST — make request designed to reduce
conflict
4? PROPOSE — make proposal designed to reduce
conflict
V. PARTICIPATION
53 CONSULT — meet under unknown circumstances
or neutral circumstances
55 COMMENT — neutral comment on a situation,
decline to comment, explain or state
neutral policy, announce failure to
reach a "cooperative" agreement
VI. VERBAL CONFLICT -- REACTIVE
61 REJECT — reject proposal, demand, etc., refuse,
oppose
62 DENY — deny accusation, policy action or
position
63 PROTEST — informal complaint and formal protest
65 COMMENT — make pessimistic comment on conflict
issue or explain or state policy
which will maintain or increase level
of conflict, justify conflict action,
announce failure to reach a conflict
reduction agreement
VII. VERBAL CONFLICT — INITIATORY
76 ACCUSE — criticize, charge, denounce
77 DEMAND — demand (no sanction stated)
78 WARN — warn (no sanction general or specific
in statement)
79 THREAT — threaten (general or specific sanction
in statement), ultimatum
48
TABLE 1. — Continued
VIII. CONFLICT ACTION
81 DEMONSTRATE — government sponsored civilian or
military demonstrations, exer
cises, displays (not including
"routine" parades)
82 REDUCE RELATIONSHIP — suspend aid, halt negoti
ations, break relations,
cancel planned event, re
duce routine activity,
boycotts, embargoes, bans
83 EXPEL — expel personnel or organization
84 SEIZE — seize position, arrest or detain
persons
85 FORCE — military engagement by government forces
and certain kinds of irregular forces
highly relevant in the present instance, the kinds of
cooperative actions that usually only take place between
friendly or allied nations (like foreign aid or military
assistance) were placed in the first category of
cooperative acts. (An act is here defined as an event
involving the movement of goods or personnel, or contact
which is in some sense physical as it takes place between
nations. It is to be distinguished from mere verbal
behavior which may or may not promise future action.)
Very closely related to support-action behavior is
verbal-support behavior. In most instances, however,
verbal-support behavior requires less sacrifice on the
part of the donor than does action-support behaviort
hence, verbal support would indicate slightly less intense
cooperative behavior.
The third basic category, labeled "Verbal Change and
Information-Seeking Behavior" for want of a better rubric,
seems clearly less of a cooperative behavior than the first
two categories, but is closely related to the fourth
category, "Cooperative Action Seeking Reduction of Conflict
The third category, however, was judged more cooperative
than the latter, since it describes proposals, requests
and meetings which occur in a situational context which
is implicitly or explicitly non-hostile. Category four,
on the other hand, describes the same verbal activities
plus physical "grant" and "yield" actions which arise
from a hostile or conflictive context.
The fifth basic category, "Participation," is best
understood as a neutral one falling somewhere in between
conflict and cooperation. Its inclusion in the present
instance is designed primarily to measure the full range
and intensity of a nation's international activity.
Hence, it contains "comments" and "meetings" whose
contextual circumstances are either neutral or unknown
(due to insufficient information in the source material).
The original WEIS formulation made no effort to distin
guish between the hostile and non-hostile circumstances
of meetings and comments, since it was not necessarily
interested in separating out events on a hostility-
cooperation continuum. As can be seen from table one,
the present work has attempted such distinctions. This
50
effort was prompted by McClelland's research finding
that 35.5 percent of his 1966 WEIS data fell in the
3
comment and consult categories.
The remaining three major categories, which all
represent groupings of conflict behaviors, are the same
as those used by McClelland and Hoggard. The distinction
made between defensive and offensive verbal conflict is
one based on initiation versus reaction behavior.
Rejections of proposals and demands, denials of accusations,
and protests are reactions to actions taken by other
states 1 whereas, accusations, demands, warnings, and
threats are usually initiatory events. Also, and perhaps
more important, demands, warnings, and threats all carry
the possibility, overt or covert, of the use of physical
sanctions 1 hence, the category "Verbal Conflict —
Offensive" represents a meaningful escalation of con-
flictive rhetoric over the preceding category.
Quite logically, the most intense conflict events
involve conflict actions. When national actors are
through demanding, warning, and threatening, they may
resort to force, seizure, expulsion of enemy personnel,
breaking of diplomatic relations, or demonstration of
^See Charles McClelland and Gary Hoggard, "Conflict
Patterns in the Interaction Among Nations," International
Politics and Foreign Policy. J. N. Rosenau, (ed,),
(Glencoe 1 Free Press, rev. ed., 1969). P. 715.
51
military muscle. These actions generally require more
sacrifice (viz.. cost of military mobilization or threat
of retaliation, etc.) than do verbal conflict activities.
It should be emphasized at this point that the
twenty-two basic WEIS categories have not been much
changed in the present taxonomyt they have merely been
regrouped into a more logical cooperation-conflict
continuum. The rules for coding the subcategories remain,
therefore, relatively unchanged. Since, however, the
WEIS Handbook which contains instructions for coding,
was not too explicit on many coding problems, and since
some changes in the categories have been made, the
present author developed a set of rules — both general
and specific — which, in conjunction with the WEIS
Handbook should eliminate coding difficulties and
regularize coding practice. The general coding rules
may be summed up as followsi
(1) Extract as much information as possible
from descriptive deck items (when coding the
analytic deck)t but do not code any information
that is not fairly explicitly derived from the
descriptive statement.
(2) Identify individual state actors and tar
gets (recipients of actions) as specifically
as possible.
(3) Use the eight "major" categories as guide
lines for appropriate coding. Where a sub
category is clearly inappropriate for the
major category, "mark" the analytic card so
that it may be retrieved as a special case.
52
(4) The explicit wording of the descriptive
deck items should usually be taken as a guide
to correct coding. (The categories of PROTEST
and ACCUSE* and WARN and THREAT may occasion
ally require departure from this rule.)
(5) Use "wisdom" where doubt exists and no coding
rule seems to apply. (It is hoped that this rule
will not have to be invoked too frequently.)
In addition to these general coding rules, a number
of much more specific coding rules were devised to cope
with coding problems peculiar to the Middle East and
the particular objectives of this study. So that the
reader will have no doubt as to the meaning of the
findings* these rules have been listed in Appendix I.
ISSUE AREAS AND EVENT TYPES
Prom the preceding section, the reader will
remember that a number of conflict issues seem to
characterize much of the international relations
activities of Middle Eastern states and their relations
with the East and West blocs. It will also be recalled
that many of the hypotheses listed in the "Introduction"
related to some of these conflict issue areas. Accordingly*
the researcher has "marked" each analytic deck card (which
describes an individual, bilateral interaction of a hostile,
neutral, or cooperative nature) as pertaining either to
no issue area or to any combination of the following
lj ,
In other words, five card-columns of every analytic
card were reserved for the coding of these issue areas. If
none of the issue areas applied to a particular interaction,
53
issue areast the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arab cold war,
Arab unity, Western colonialism, or the East-West cold war.
Table two describes the criteria according to which a
particular event interaction was classified as pertaining
to one or more of these issues.
TABLE 2 — Definition of issue areas and examples
I. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
All events which concern the conflict between
Israel and the Arab states, including attempts
to resolve the conflict.
II. ARAB COLD WAR
Any event relating to the ideological differences
(or attempts to resolve such differences) between
the traditional or conservative Arab regimes —
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq (until the
July 14, 1958 coup) — and the nationalist-
revisionist Arab states — Egypt, Syria (after
1954) and Iraq (after 1958). Often, the conflict
centers on matters deemed to concern the inter
national policies of the "greater" Arab nation
and is, therefore, highly associated with attempts
to create a united Arab international political
front — e.g., Egypt's disputes with Iraq (over
the Baghdad Pact), Jordan (over Jordan's close
association with Britain), and Lebanon (over
Christian Arab control of Lebanon and Lebanon's
close association with the Western bloc).
III. ARAB UNITY
Any event relating to Arab attempts to achieve
united, military, commercial, economic, political.
these five columns would be filled with zeros. If the
interaction concerned, say, the Arab cold war and the East-
West cold war, then the columns reserved for these issues
would be marked with numbers other than zero, while the
remaining columns would be marked with zeros, etc.
5*
TABLE 2 — Continued
culturalt or social policies, progress, programs,
or agreements, or the failure or disagreement,
etc., relating to such attempts.
IV. COLONIALISM
Events concerning "Western imperialism" (alleged
or real), i.e., Arab protests against Prance in
Algeria, England in Suez, Jordan, Buraini Oasis,
Yemen. Sometimes US and Western activities in
connection with the Eisenhower Doctrine, Israel,
and Baghdad Pact are labeled "imperialist."
V, EAST-WEST COLD WAR
Events concerning positive neutrality, the
Eisenhower Doctrine, international Communism,
or the Baghdad Pact, are concerned with the
Cold War.
In addition to being classified by issue area, each
event interaction was characterized as being primarily
concerned with cultural, economic, military security, or
political matters. Cultural events would concern
education exchange programs and cultural accords or
events concerning such programs or accords. Economic
events involve any event concerned with aid or regulation
of same — except where such matters are being very
obviously manipulated for political reasons (e.g., the
boycott of Israel by the Arabs or the withdrawal of
Western financing of the Aswan dam). Military security
events involve such interactions as armed clashes, arms
aid agreements, and/or military alliance activities, or
events concerning such activities. Finally, all other
55
events are to be considered "political" in nature — in
cluding those interactions where event types "overlap,"
or where no event type is obvious.
ACTORS AND TARGETS
The "core" countries of this study are the major
states of the Arab Middle East (Egypt,^ Iraq, Jordan,
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria) and Israel. These countries
may either initiate or receive acts with one another.
They may also initiate or receive actions vis-4-vis
Britain, France, the United States, the Soviet Union,
other Western countries (or the West in general), or
other Eastern bloc countries (or the East in general). It
is evident that all actor and target countries of this
survey are discrete, identifiable entities — with the
exception of the latter two labels. The rubric "other
Western countries or the West in general" refers to Italy,
West Germany, the Benelux countries, Canada, and Norway.
->Only or* card-column was reserved for the coding of
event typesi hence, it was necessary to use "political"
event types as a "catch-all" category.
6
In February 1958, Egypt and Syria joined to form the
United Arab Republic (UAR). From that point on, the UAR
was considered an actor and a target in this study. Both
Syria and Egypt continued, however, to take some foreign
policy actions independently from one anotheri hence, both
were retained as independent actors and targets, unless
either of them specifically acted or received actions in
the name of the UAR. In practice, this meant that almost
all UAR activity involved only Egypt.
Also* Middle Eastern countries frequently make reference
to the "West" or the "Western bloc"i thus* the "West in
general" is also included with the "other Western countries"
classification* Similarly* the Eastern bloc would
include all countries of the Warsaw Pact or any references
to the "East" or the "Eastern bloc."
CODING REPLICABILITY
A major tenet of scientific research is that research
findings must be reproducible by any expert (qualified)
researcher. If the present study were to qualify as being
scientifically sound* it would* therefore* have to be
tested for the reliability of its coding procedures.
Two such tests were run on all coding procedures in the
present instance.
In the first test* the author requested a research
7
assistant to code all data taken from the Middle East
Journal chronology for the year 1955 — following quite
limited coaching on coding rules and procedures. Out of
909 interactions coded* the author then made what he
considered corrections in 165 items or 18.2 percent of
the datat this figure includes corrections on categories
and issue areas. This means that inter-coder agreement
7
The author wishes to express his gratitude to
Mary Witt for her assistance in making these inter-coder
tests.
57
occurred 81.6 percent of the time. The researchers
were not, of course, working independently in this
instancei hence, this procedure cannot be called a
true reliability test.
In the second test, intra-coder reliability was
checked. That is to say, the present writer tested his
ability to reproduce his research findings. Out of 300
interactions (taken from the 195^ data), the researcher
was able to replicate his eight-category coding system
at the 92 percent level, his issue areas at the 86
percent level and his event type classification at the
g
94 percent level. There was a long time lag between
the initial coding of the data and the second coding)
thus, memory of initial coding probably did not greatly
influence the reported agreement levels.
As in most social science coding procedures of the
quantitative content analysis variety, there were some
times choices to be made between rigidly following coding
rules and using one's "understanding" of a particular
situational context to arrive at the categorization of an
event interaction. Faced with such dilemmas, the
researcher elected to permit his area studies background
to guide his coding practice rather than rely on arbitrary
O
Agreement levels were calculated not on an item-by-
itera basis but on an overall basis.
coding rules — which can only be guides for ooding
practice, in any case.
TIME PERIOD AND DATA UNIVERSE
A critical part of any social science study relates
to the sources of information utilized to produce its
findings. Indeed, a major tenet of the scientific
approach is that hypotheses must be exhaustively and
empirically researched before they can be generally
accepted or rejected. In this respect, the present
study must be evaluated as an initial effort, since all
information used to produce its findings was gathered
from two, readily available sources — the chronological
sections of the Middle East Journal (MEJ) and the
Cahiers de L*Orient Contemporaine (Cahiers).
The data were collected from 1953 to 1958, inclusively,
so that the periods immediately before and after the
breaking of the Western arms monopoly could be compared.
Data from the MEJ covered all six years of this time
period, while data from the Cahiers covered the years
1953. 195^. 1957. and 1958.9
Amid contradictory findings on the best sources of
international relations data for the Middle East, these
^Data collecting is very time consuming. It was
decided, therefore, to omit Cahiers data for 1955 and 1956,
since 1955 was a "transitional" year and 1956 was largely
preoccupied with the Arab-Israeli conflict.
59
two sources probably represent the best combination of
any two — given time limitations.10 Out of four years
for which both sources were used in tandem, 54 percent of
the analytic deck (i.e., of all interactions) was taken
from the Cahiersi 46 percent was from the MEJ. There was
an approximate 10-15 percent overlap11 in redundant
descriptive deck entries from both sources, but the Cahiers
consistently gave more detailed information.
There were also qualitative differences between
the Cahiers and the MEJ data which made them, by and large,
a good balance for one another. Only on the Arab-Israeli
issue did the MEJ consistently pick up more information
than the Cahiers. The latter source had more information
on all the other issue areas} this was so, probably because
Azar finds that the New York Times Index combined
with the MEJ yielded the best combination of "chronology-
type" interaction data on the Middle East. These two sour
ces had only an 11 percent overlap of information, and
numerous other sources used yielded only 31 percent more
data during 1956 and 1957* See, Edward Azar, et al..
A Quantitative Comparison of Source Coverage for Events
Data, Department of Political Science. Michigan State
University (East Lansingt Mimeo, no date), pp. 10-13*
Burro we 8 and Spector found, however, that the Cahiers
(which was not used by Azar) gave twice as much data as
the MEJ and New York Times Index together on Syria, Jordan,
and the United Arab Republic between 1965 and 1967, See
Robert Burrowes and Bert Spector, Conflict and Cooperation
Within and Among Nations. Department of Political Science,
ftew York University (N.Y.i Mimeo, April, 1970), pp. 5-6.
^Identifying duplicate information from the two
sources was not a major difficulty in this study, since
the dating of duplicate events seldom differed.
60
it had more detailed information which linked issues
with event interactions. In any case, issue area coverage
differences between the two sources did not exceed a
20 percent variance, on the four year average. The MEJ
had more information on economic relations than the
Cahiers, because it is probably widely read by American
businessmen with interests in the area. Finally, although
information has been calculated for only one year (1957)*
it was found that 46 percent of the MEJ data (compared
with 39 percent of the Cahiers data) concerned conflict
interactions — as opposed to cooperative interactions.
One of two relatively serious problems involved
in using these two information sources was the fact that
the data were "thin" in both chronologies for the years
1953 and 1954. The author theorized that the paucity of
data in these early years might be related partly to
relatively quiescent international relations activities
in the Middle East at that time and/or partly due to
small staff size and publication budgets of these two
sources. A letter concerning this problem was sent to
the editors of the MEJ and brought the following responses
The sole reason for the increase in the data of the
Chronology in the years you mention (i.e., the years
after 195*0 was a conscious editorial decision to
expand the chronology. The material available for
inclusion has always exceeded the space available and
apparently staff time was not a problem.I2
12
Letter from Peter Nulty, staff member of the MEJ.
Washington, D.C., March 17* 1971*
61
In concluding this chapter* one is obliged to air
some of the epistemological assumptions implied by the
use of the MEJ and Cahiers chronologies as primary sources
of information* First, these are public sources of in
formation! they do not pretend to contain all the secret
proceedings that usually shroud foreign policy decision
makers in a cloud of mystery* Indeed, much of the secret
history of this period is still not known. Recent books
by Copeland, Heikal, Lacouture, Love*and Nutting* for
example (see bibliography), continue to shed new light
and new interpretation on events and personalities in
Middle Eastern international politics of the 1950s*
Unfortunately, memoirs and biographies are often apolo
getic, and much information often seems to be just so
much abrasive for a particular axe-grinder. Other works,
seeking what the bard called the "bubble reputation,"
offer only anecdotal information — designed to enhance
their author's reputation as having been privy to. much
confidential diplomacy. The net result of exposure to
this literature is a considerable amount of confusion
over facts and interpretation* The conclusion that may
be drawn is that "overt” data (e.g*» the Cahiers and MEJ)
must be credited with being generally more reliable
and less subject to dispute as compared with "covert"
data sources.
Admittedly there is, of course, a body of once-secret
information which is now generally accepted and which
was not included in the chronologies. Most problematic
in the present instance was the secret plan of Britain,
France, and Israel to invade Egypt and overthrow Nasser.
Although the MEJ would not have shown the cooperation
of these three nations, it would naturally have shown
their hostility toward Egypt and vice versa. Ultimately,
it would be desirable to incorporate once covert infor
mation in a study of this type -- time permitting.
At this time, however, the author assumes that the past
external, overt behavior of nations will provide a
reasonably accurate guide for the description, explan
ation and even prediction of that same behavior. In
other words, it is felt that nations cannot "play"
international politics for a very long period of time
without revealing a great deal of information about
all aspects of their foreign policies — despite attempts
to conceal diplomatic activities.
CHAPTER IV
RELATING GENERAL FINDINGS TO HYPOTHESES
The purpose of the present chapter is to discuss
findings in relation to all hypotheses which are not
associated with the specific issue areas. In other words,
the findings presented here will represent the aggregate
of all interactions concerning all issues and event types.
They will depict the total levels of cooperation and
conflict among nations in the survey on a year-by-year
basis. Hence, the discussion will largely focus on
hypothetical insights relating to alignments, neutrality,
and changes in patterns of cooperation and conflict.
TECHNIQUES FOR PRESENTING FINDINGS
One of the more difficult problems involved in a
quantitative analysis of the present variety is the
creation of a balance between overly-complicated and
overly-simplified presentations of findings. In the
present case, the form of this compromise may be seen
in tables three to eight on the following pages which
may be read more or less like road map mileage charts.
Each cell entry contains two figures. The "top" figure
represents the percentage of actions taken by an actor
63
ACTORS
TAELS 3.— Normalized and "weighted" data on conflictive and cooperative relations
among nations in the survey for the: year 1953 Average N = 9
1 . S
EGY IRQ JOR LEE SAU SYR UA? ISR
5P J;
' P ’ R N
USA V/SG WST USR ESG
7Cffi
il> 0 I
EGY
.00
2.0
.Oil-
2.5
.05
2.0
.00
2.0
.06
2.0
N A . 9 h *
2.0
.73*
5.0
ony.
• f i
1.5
.29
2.0
, l p
1.0
.58* —
10.
.1°
0.5
.13
1.0
IRQ
. l h
2.5
.O il
3.0
.09
2.5
.09
1.0
.12
2.0
N A .90*
1.0
.67*
0.5
.72*
1.0
,h0
0.5
---------
.57* —
2.5
--------- ---------
JOR
2^1
.Oh
2.5
.00
2.0
• ° 5
2.0
.00
2.5
N A . Q3*
3.5
2?
i.o
------—
.31
1.5
---------
.30 —
3.0
— — — — — —
LEE
5??
---------
.05
2.5
.12
2.0 4?o
. 93*
1.5
.63*
1.0
.67*
1 ^
X • v
.27
1.5
---------
^ —
- -------- —------
SAU
ill
.06
2.0 ^ • 5
1?? i??
N A
0 , <
l.b No*
--------- —
.20
5.5
—
--------- ---------
SYR
.08
1.5
.00
5.5 3?6 5
.CQ
1.5
V A
2.0 i?r i?r
. 56*
1.0
—
,60* —
3.0
- --- - - - - ------—
UAR NA N A F A N A N A na
A
. -1 . * "i N A N A N A NA NA NA N A
ISR
6?y
---------
a?8*
--------- ---------
, 72*
1.0
.'■ - /A
--------- —
<£?
--------- A n * _ _ _ _ _
1.5
--------- ---------
ERN
---------
1?8
---------
iir
---------
T v ' A
i\n
i?r
FRN
v *
i ■
USA
,00
§.o
---------
5?o
—
5.5
N A
WSG * if c
1.0
N A
---------
USR N A
---------
ESG N A
^Figures marked with asterisks represent conflict levels higher than system average
ACTORS
TABLE 4.— Normalized ar.d "we ighted" data on conflictive and cooperative relations
among nations in the survey for the year 1954 Average N = 6
TARGETS
EGY IRQ JOR LEE SAU SYR UAR ISR FRN FRN USA WSG AST USR ESG NET
TTP V
.41
.17
.00 .00
.25
NA .61* .67* .43 . 50* .53* .55*
.00 .60* .43
2.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
1.5
5.0 4.0
2.5 3.5
3.0
13. 0.5 1.5 2.5
TPn
.36 .00 .11 .00 .40 NA 1.0* .60*
---
.20
.25 .35 .67* . 75*
.72-
.LIxty
2.5
2.0
1.5 0.5
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
1.5 3.5 0.5 0.5
1.0
JOR
i?3
.00
1.5
.00
1.0
.00
i.5
411
i.5
NA .92*
6.5
.22
1.5
.50*
0.5 5??
.50*
0.5
--- --- •o
LEP
,03
• °2
.00 .00 .06 NA .60” ' ' .80* .43
.44
.29
47*
___
.67* .50'
2.0 2.0
1.5 1.5
3.o 1.0 1.0 1.0
1.5
1.0
4.5 0.5 0.5
SAU
.00 .20 .00 .14 .00 NA 1. 0* .40
--—
. 72* .60*
.53*
--- — ---
2.0 1.0
2.5
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 3.0
SYR
.09 .43
.00 . 06 .00 NA . 84* .40
. 75* .57*
.60*
.57*
--- — ---
2.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 1.0 2.0 1.0
0.5
1.0 1.0
3.5
UAR NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
ISR
.96*
_ _
.88*
.75*
_ _ _ _
. 84* w. \ . 72*
_ _ M
.69*
_ _ _
.68* .00
___
.00
3.5
4.0
0.5
1.0 1.0 2.0
3.5 0.5 0.5
PRN
.41
_
.00
_ _ _
.40
_ _ _
NA .00
3.0
0.5
1.0 1.0
FRN
.33 NA .00
1.0
o.5
USA
.00 .00 .00 .00
.33
.00 NA .20
1.5 0.5 1.5
1.0
0.5 0.5
2.0
V/SG
— — — — — — .00
0.5
— — — - — “ NA — — —
USR
.00
___ _ _ _
.00
— — — _ _ _
NA .20
1.0
0.5
1.0
ESG
NA
---
*Figures marked with asterisks 'represent conflict levels higher than system average
TAELS 5.— Normalized and "weighted" data on conflictive and cooperative relations
among nations in the survey for the year 1°55 Average N = $
TARGETS
EGY IRQ JOR LEE SAU SYR UAR ISR PRN FRN USA W S G V/ST USR ESG E3T
EGY
.42
2.5
.25
1.5
.18
2.0
.11
3.5
.09
4.5
NA .90*
13.
. 50*
1.0
---
.25
1.0
---
.33
3.0
.00
0.5
---
.00
1.0
IRQ
.10
2.0
.00
1.0
.00
1.5
.00
1.0
.00
1.5
NA
—
.00
1.5
---
.00
0.5
---
.00
2.0
--- --- ---
JOR
.00
1.0
.14
1.5
.00
1.0
.00
2.0
.00
1.5
NA .69*
1.0
.67*
0.5
--- ---
.33
2.0
--- --- ---
LEE
.09
2.0
.00
1.5
.00
1.0
.00
0.5
.00
1.5
NA .50*
1.0
--- - —
.17
1.0
---
.33
1.5
— — —
—— --—
SAU
.00
2.5
.20
1.0
.00
1.5
.00
0.5
.00
2.0
NA
---
.50*
1.0
---
.40
1.0
---
j?r
— ---
SYR
.00
3.5
.33
2.5
.00
2.0
.00
1.5
.00
2.0
NA
. PQ*
2.6
UAR NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA' NA NA
ISR
.91*
15.5
■---
ilf
--- ---
.75*
1.5
NA .50*
1.5
---
4 ?
---
.36
5.0
--- ---
iis*
ERN
.31
2.5
— ——
.00
1.0
---
O * y _
2.0
—
NA
6 ?
FRN
.17
1.0
NA .40
1.0
USA
W S G
.22
2.0
” “ “ .20
1.0
.14
1.5
— — —
.20
1.0
NA
T V ’ A
.36
2.0
I I Ou
USR
.00
1.0
NA
---
ESG
.00
1.0
■ V A
i - - I ' \
---
^Figures marked with asterisks: represent conflict levels higher than system average
ACTORS
TABLE 6.— Normalized and "weighted" data on conflictive and cooperative relations
among nations in the survey for the year 1956 Average N = 9
TARGETS
EGY IRQ JOR LEB SAU SYR UAR ISR BRN FRN USA WSG WST USR ESG EST
vrv •50* .00 .00 .00 .00 NA .91* .84* .84* .72* .55* .80*--- .00 .00
^ 0.5 1.0 0.5 1.5 1.0 6.5 8.0 5.5 3.0 1.0 18. 1.0 1.0
TRQ .36 .17 .00 -- .29 NA 1.0* . 54* .84* .14 -4S*--- -- --
IRQ 1.5 2.6 0.5 i.o 1.5 1.5 0.5 l.Q 3.0
TnB .12 .08 .00 .20 .14 NA .96* .82*............ .83*.............
J0I< 2.0 1.5 1.0 1.0 2.5 5.5 1.0 2.0
«b i?8 — i°.°5 i?o i?8 NA i?o* ...........i?8*........ .....
CAT! .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 NA 1.0* .85* 1.0* .57*-- .81*... .......
bAU 2.5 0.5 1.5 1.0 1.0 0.5 1.5 0.5 1.0 3.0
cvd .00 --- .00 .00 .00 NA .90* 1.0* 1.0* .86* .75* ,93* .00 .00
SIK 2.0 2.0 1.0 0.5 2.0 1.5 1.5 1.0 1.0 4.5 1.0 1.0
UAR NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
tco .86*-- .98*-- -- .90* NA -- --- .10 -- .24 .43
ISR §.0 5?o 1.0 1.0 2.5 1.0
BRN a 69* .18 .14 --- -- -- NA .83*
4.5 1.0 1.0 1.5
FRN .77*...................... NA .56*
2.5 1,0
0SA ik 0?°5 — “
» ....................NA 1 %
TTCD .06 ——— — — — — — — —--— — — NA .80*
UbK 2.0 1.0
pen .00 ——— ——— ——— — — ——— NA .40
£SQ 1.0 0.5
♦ F ig u re s marked w ith a s te r is k s re p re s e n t c o n f l i c t le v e ls h ig h e r th a n system averag e
TABLE 7.— Normalized and "weighted" data on conflictive and cooperative relations
among nations in thei survey for thes year 1957 Average
N = 19
TARGETS
EGY IRQ JOR LEB SAU SYR UAR ISR BRN FRN USA WSG WST USR ESG EST
EGY
i6 .F
sfr
.46*
6.5 i?5
,00
i.5
NA
%91*
3.0 s ? § *
.65*
1.5
2.0
,86*
^.0
,06
i.o
*12
£.0
IRQ
.44 .04
. . .
.06 .48* NA
.93*
.21
. . .
.07
. . . . . . . . . -
1.0
1.5
1.0
1.5 0.5 0.5 1.5
3.0
JOR
,64*
4.0 i ]l
.18
0.5
.00
2.0
,61*
£.5
NA
3 ?r
.50*
1.0
-
.43
2.0 i?r
.84*
0.5
i?r
,62*
2.0
LEB
i?r
- - .00
1.0
.24
2.5
NA -— - -
.15
1.5
.43
2.5
- — .64*
0.5
SAU •25
.00 .00 .00
. . .
NA .97*
. . . . . .
.25 .69* .54*
_ _ _ . . .
2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0
0.5
3.0
SYR
.04 • 72# .57* .75*
.46* NA .96* .80* .92*
.82* .78* .84*
6.0
.04 .21 .10
1.5 1.5
3.0
1.5
2.0
2.5 0.5 0.5 3.5 1.5 1.5 0.5
2.0
UAR NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
ISR
.84*
. . .
.95*
. . .
.83* .94* NA
.35
.44 .46*
. . . ...
.92*
2.5
2.0
0.5 2.5
1.0 1.0
2.5 0.5
BRN
.71*
.06
.27
. . . . . .
NA .36
1.0 1.0 1.0
0.5
FRN
.36
0.5
NA
- - -
USA
.62* .06
.07 .09
.20 .84* NA
1.5 1.5
2.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0
WSG
0.5
— ——
- - — ——
• • • NA
USR
.00
— M O W - . . .
.00 NA .83*
1.5
2.0 1.0
ESC
i ? 8
NA -
♦ F ig u re s marked w ith a s te r is k s re p re s e n t c o n f l i c t le v e ls h ig h e r th a n system average
ACTORS
TABLE 8,— Normalized and "weighted" data on conflictive and cooperative relations
among nations in the survey for the year 1958 Average N * 11
TARGETS
EGY IRQ JOR LEB SAU SYR UAR ISR BRN FRN USA WSG WST USR ESG EST
EGY
j?r
.82*
2.0
.60*
2.0 i T
.00
1.5 i?r
,82*
2.5 sfr
.84*
5.0
iT :i»?r
.06
3.0
.28
1.5
.3.4
4.5
IRQ
.40 .20
.37
.70*
.35
WWW
.38 .48* .40 .63*
iir
WWW
.00
.05
1.5 2.5 0.5
1.0
2.5 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
1.5 1.5
JOR
.88*
1.5
&
w w w
.00
1.0 ia . r 4?o*
.29
0.5
--------------
.11
1.5
.00
0.5 £1
WWW
--------------
WWW
LEB
.69*
. . .
.50*
WWW
.83* .82*
WWW
.00 .17 .05
WWW
.07
WWW — — — WWW
2.5 0.5
2.0 *.5 0.5 0.5 3.5
5.0
SAU
i K ft?°5 i?8
w w w
i?8
—
WWW
318*
WWW
--------------
- - -
SYR
.05 .54* .50* .77* • 55*
1.0*
— _ ___ _ _
.84*
WWW
.79*
WWW -------------- WWW
1.5
1.0
2.5 1.5
1.0
3.5
1.0
1.5
UAR
.17
1.0 i?r
.68*
2.5
—
2.0 i:?
—
tfr 0.5 s?r
~ w --------------
ii8
ISR
2.0
6?r
ftT 6 ?r
--------------
i?5*
is*
--------------,
•!!o'
,40
1.0 •Y.o'
,64*
1.0
--------------
•fs
BRN
.29
.00
2.0
.00
WWW WWW
.85* .00
0.5 1.5 1.5
1.0 1.0
FRN
— - - - - - - - - - - - -
.00
WWW WWW - - - - - - - - - - - -
0.5
USA
t? 3
,06
6.0
WWW
#?r
,00
i.o
WSG
— — —
M W www
- - - - - - -— —
USR
.25
__ _
.69*
ww w
.00
___
.86*
3.5 0.5
1.0
0.5 0.5
ESG
.00
1.5 0.5
♦ F ig u re s m arked w ith a s te r is k s re p re s e n t c o n f l ic t le v e ls h ig h e r th a n system averag e
70
country (listed vertically along the left-hand margin)
toward a target country (listed horizontally) which
were conflictive in nature out of all actions (both
conflictive and cooperative) taken by that actor toward
that target for a particular year. The reader will,
of course, remember that an eight-category coding system
.(table one) was used to collect information on con
flictive and cooperative interactions and that three
of its categories expressed hostility, one expressed
neutrality, and four expressed cooperation. In the
process of aggregating statistics for a particular cell
entry, the author summed the number of conflict actions
in all three conflict categories which occurred between
an individual actor-target dyad during a particular
year. The same procedure was also performed on all
cooperative categories, except for the fact that only
half the frequency value of category four was included
in the sum of cooperative actions, since category four
was less cooperative in nature than the other three
categories of cooperative behavior (refer back to section
on analytic categories).1 A fraction was then created
for each actor-target dyadt its numerator was the sum
of conflict actions, while its denominator was the sum of
conflict and cooperative actions (i.e., total actions).
^The weighting procedure was arbitrarily chosen.
71
(It should be noted that the neutral category — number
five -- was omitted from consideration.) The formula for
each cell-entry fraction would, then, be as follows (where
C refers to the number of actions in a particular numbered
n
category listed in table one)s
c6 + c7 * c8
CELL ENTRY FRACTION ■ ----------------------------------
C^ + Cg + ^ C6 + C + Cg
The resulting fraction was then converted to a percentage
value, in order that it might be readily comprehensiblei
this value will, hereafter, be referred to as the conflict
index. To illustrate, it was found that three out of 22
total actions undertaken by Iraq toward Egypt in 1953 were
conflictive in nature. Since the fraction 3/22 converts to
l*t percent, a conflict index figure of .14 may be found in
table three to describe this particular relationship. It
should also be noted that the conflict index describes, in
effect, the level of cooperative action taken by Iraq
toward Egypt in 1953i since 14 percent was conflictive, 86
percent was cooperative in nature. This figure will be
called the cooperation index.
Immediately below the conflict index is another figure
rounded off in intervals of .5. This figure represents
the frequency weight carried by the conflict index. The
72
frequency weight is arrived at by dividing the denominator
of each cell-entry fraction by the average cell-entry de
nominator (hereafter referred to as the average N). The
average N is computed by dividing the total number of
possible cell entries into the total number of cases
(actions) for a particular year. In the Iraq to Egypt
case, the total number of actions directed by Iraq toward
Egypt in 1953 was approximately 2.5 times larger than the
average number of actions.
A few more procedural mechanics of the preceding
tables must be explained before moving on to more im
portant matters. The reader will note that conflict
indices above the ,44 level have been marked with an aster
isk. This simply means that indices so marked equalled or
exceeded the average level of conflict for all nations in
2
the survey for the entire time period. By establishing
this system-wide conflict index for total time, one is
given a good relative standard for inter-year comparisons
of conflict levels for the system as a whole as well as
for individual nation-dyads. Other symbols on the follow
ing tables indicate that information was not applicable for
^Between 1953 and 1958, it was found that 3#673 actions
out of a total of 8,962 (or 45 percent) were conflict
actions. This figure, again, excludes half the number of
actions in category four and all neutral actions (category
five).
73
a particular year (NA) or that no data or not sufficient
data-^ were found for particular nation-dyads (as indicated
by three dashes). Blank spaces in the table indicate that
relationships were not possible, given the definition of
actors and targets in the preceding chapter. Most of
the abbreviations for national actors are obvious,
with the exception of the "ESG" and "WSG" designations
which refer to the "East in general" and the "West in
general" as earlier defined.
Finally, it seems appropriate to return to the
question posed at the outset of this section regarding
complexity versus over-simplicity of findings. By
aggregating all data into essentially two dimensions
(cooperation and conflict), findings have been greatly
simplified, while knowledge of the precise distribution
of data into eight basic categories (to say nothing of
the 32 sub-categories) has been lost. The detailed
analysis of these distributions would provide enough
material for another dissertation! A final data simpli
fication was the arbitrary aggregation of findings on
a year-by-year basis (from January 1 to December 31)
instead of by shorter and/or longer time periods. The
year has advantages as a basis for data aggregation,
since any lulls or increases in international relations
3
Where frequency weight values fell below the .5 level,
findings were considered too "thin" to be worth reporting.
74
activity which are related to yearly celebrated activities
or natural "seasonal" differences — such as weather,
religious or national holidays, military parades, agri
cultural trade, etc. — would be relatively the same
from year to year. That is to say, their effects would
be approximately the same during any one-year period.
In any case, it should become increasingly clear that
the present means of aggregating information is suffi
cient for the analysis of questions posed by this paperi
hence, it is felt that an appropriate balance between
complexity and simplicity has been attained.
THE OVERALL INCREASE IN CONFLICT
AND DECREASE IN COOPERATION
The expected "watershed” in Middle Eastern inter
national relations occurring after the introduction of
Soviet arms to the area was strongly confirmed by the
data. The level of conflict in the system as a whole
(i.e., all nations in the survey) increased by 17
percentage points in the years after 1955. From 1953
to 1955 conflict actions accounted for a mere 34 percent
of the data, while in the 1956 to 1958 period, conflict
actions constituted 51 percent of the data. Similarly,
of course, the level of cooperation in the system as a
whole fell off by 17 percentage points in the years after
1955* It is worth pointing out that the percentage point
differences in the. data from the two periods might well
75
have been greater had all the data on the Suez war been
available.** Although the "direction" of the above
findings would seen obvious even to the casual observer,
the amount of "dislocation" is not so obvious.
QUALITATIVE CHANGES IN CONFLICT
AND COOPERATION
Another finding, related to the preceding observation,
went contrary to expectations. It was anticipated that
the proportion of "physical" conflict (military clashes,
demonstrations, expulsions, seizures, arrests, etc.)
would increase during the later time period relative to
the amount of "verbal" conflict (threats, warnings,
accusations, negative comments, etc.). It was felt that
as conflict among nations generally increased, they would
be likely to take more "drastic” measures toward one
another — especially where their national security seemed
threatened. In the Middle Eastern case, the obvious
increase in activity in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the
Arab cold war, the continuation of colonialism, and
Soviet attempts to penetrate the area all made it seem
i i
It should be noted that once the Suez war broke out,
coding of Arab-Israeli military clashes was stopped — the
number and variety of such clashes being beyond the infor
mation capacity of the MEJ and Cahiers chronologies.
Coding was resumed after the cease-fire. One would expect,
therefore, an even greater increase in the proportion of
conflict data — of, particularly, the "physical" variety -
in the 1956-1958 period than was actually reported.
likely that the hypothesis would be borne out. In fact
the changes in verbal versus actual or physical conflict
proportions were not great. From 1953 to 1955# 31 per
cent of conflict data was of the "physical** variety,
while from 1956 to 1958, this proportion changed to
26 percent. This latter figure should probably be
revised "upward" to compensate for the fact that the
physical violence of the Suez war was not included in
the datai hence, the difference in the proportions of
physical conflict versus verbal conflict between the two
periods was probably nil.
Findings on the corollary of the preceding hypothesis
were also mildly surprising. Actual or "physical" support
actions (e.g., military, economic, and technical aid or
integrative actions) amounted to eight percent of both
physical and verbal support behavior (categories one
and two) for the years 1953 to 1955. From 1956 to 1958,
actual support actions proportionally increased to
15 percent of both kinds of support behavior. Appar
ently, increased international conflict in the latter
period had the effect of drawing some nations together
into "qualitatively" closer bonds of cooperation, while,
at the same time, the overall level of cooperative
interaction fell off.
77
GENERAL STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
In conjunction with the preceding overall qualitative
change in the international relations of nations in this
survey, one might well anticipate related structural
change — as determined by changed conflict or cooperation
indices and/or changed frequency weights. In the present
instance, structural change may be thought of as having
three components — direction, intensity, and frequency of
reiteration. A directional change between an actor and
a target nation would occur when the composition of actions
directed by an actor toward a target changes from "pre
dominantly conflictive" to "predominantly cooperative"
over time and vice versa.^ Intensity change refers to
changes in conflict and cooperation indices. Higher con
flict indices (i.e., those approaching 1.00) indicate more
intense conflict and vice versa. More frequently occur
ring interactions have, of course, higher frequency weight
values; in as much as these change, the strength of the
bonds of any particular relationship change — thus affect
ing structure.
^By "predominantly conflictive," I mean conflict
indices above the system average for total time — in the
present case, .^5# Similarly, by "predominantly co
operative," I mean cooperation indices above the system
average — .55.
Looking first at predominantly conflictive relation
ships, one perceives that considerable directional change
has occurred between the 1953-1955 period (T^) and the
1956-1958 period (T2)• During T2 the number of conflict
relationships above the system average (as marked by
asterisks on the preceding tables) nearly doubled in
comparison with T^. The number of such relationships
was 78 for and 137 for T2.^ It is furthermore
evident that the intensity of conflict increased from
T1 T2 — indicating higher levels of conflict in
extant and new conflict relationships. During T-^ the
average conflict index for conflict relationships
above the system average was ,693» while during T2 this
index grew to .775* Moreover, the average frequency
weight of conflict relationships above the system average
remained relatively unchanged (2,32 for the early period
and 2,2k for the later period), despite the fact that the
number of conflict relationships nearly doubled in the
1956 to 1958 period. It is apparent, then, that the
structure of conflict has been qualitatively and quanti
tatively altered during the six years of this survey,
^It should be pointed out that these figures do not
reveal how many conflictive relationships in remained
conflictive in T2 as opposed to how many cooperative
relationships in T^ became conflictive in T2*
79
After 1956* above average conflict relationships were
both more pervasive and more intense (or polarized),
while the average frequency of their occurrence remained
undiminished.
Looking now at the other side of the "coin," one
sees that the largest change in the structure of pre
dominantly cooperative relationships was direction. Dur
ing T^, there was a total of 168 actor-target dyads
which exceeded the system average cooperation index,
while this figure fell off by 20 percent to 133 during
Tg, The average cooperation index and frequency weight
of predominantly cooperative relationships did not change
from to T2 — remaining ,87 and 1,6 respectively,
during both time periods.^ In summarizing these changes,
one may say that cooperative international relations
among nations in this survey were moderately reduced after
1956, while the average intensity and frequency of co
operative interaction remained undiminished.
At first glance, it seems rather paradoxical to
find that the overall structure of predominantly
cooperative international relations remained much more
stable than the structure of conflict. At the outset,
it will be remembered, it was hypothesized that
?The average cooperation index of predominantly
cooperative relationships (.87) may be raad as a conflict
indejc of ,13*
cooperative international relations would become less
pervasive and more polarized, since it seemed that
increased conflict would naturally have the effect of
rupturing once cooperative relationships. Furthermore,
since nations would tend to seek closer bonds with
"allies" during periods of intense conflict, it was felt
that remaining cooperative bonds (in Tg) would be, on
the average, more intense and more frequent. It is, of
course, this expected change in intensity and frequency
which failed to emerge in the data. By looking at only
the most intense cooperative relationships, one would expect
that this hypothesis might show more validity; hence,
relations with .70 to 1.00 cooperative indices (.00 to
.30 in the tables of conflict indices) were averaged for
the three year period of and for the three year period
of S2 , Again, differences were minimal — suggesting
Q
the limited validity of the hypothesis.
"PATRON-CLIENT" RESTRUCTURING
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
At a more specific level of generalization, it was
postulated that the structure of conflict and cooperation
in the international relations of nations in this survey
would be altered according to the logic of arms patron-
Q
Averages tend to conceal extreme cases, but a look
at the preceding tables fails to indicate any extreme cases
in the area of predominantly cooperative relationships.
client relationships (hypothesis "1" in the introduction).
Part "a" of this hypothesis predicts that, "Client states
of one great power bloc could be expected to come into
increasing conflict with client states of an opposing
o
great-power bloc,"7 Looking first at the climate of
inter-Arab relations during T1 and T2» it is apparent
that the clients of the Eastern bloc (Egypt and Syria)
and those of the Western bloc (Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq,
and, to some extent, Saudi Arabia) came into increasing
conflict with one another during T2, while their relations
during were harmonious. During T^, all inter-Arab
relations had cooperative indices which exceeded the
system average for cooperation. Only Egyptian and
Syrian relations with Iraq and Jordan approached the
dividing line between cooperation and conflict. Except
for the 1956 war, which seemed to interrupt this emerging
inter-Arab conflict pattern, T2 produced a picture of
inter-Arab relations which was half hostile and half
cooperative.
^The whole notion that great power bloc alignments
are causally related to the restructuring of inter-Arab
relations (hypothesis one "a") is manifestly and inextri
cably associated with the restructuring of inter-Arab
relations on the basis of regime-type differences
(hypothesis four). The latter hypothesis is examined in
light of issue area findings in the following chapter.
In the meanwhile it may be safely argued that the rivalry
of the great powers, in supplying arms to differing Arab
regimes, had the effect of exacerbating Arab ideological
conflict.
82
Turning now to Arab-Israeli relations, one finds,
with some reservations,that changes in the patron-client
structure led to changes in Arab-Israeli relations in a
manner consistent with the hypothesis in question. Egypt's
average conflict index toward Israel was .82 in and
.95 in Tg. Considering Israel as an actor, one sees that
her average conflict index toward Egypt in was .82 and
.83 in Tg, while similar figures describing her actions
toward Syria were .77 in Tj^ and .9^ in (Again, these
figures omit the physical conflict data of the Suez war
of 1956.) In yet another instance, then, it would seem
that the receipt of Eastern bloc arms after 1955 by Egypt
and Syria co-occurred with their increased involvement in
conflict with a subsystem opponent armed by the West.
It should be further noted that the corollary of
the present hypothesis — which would read something like,
"client states of the same great power bloc should have
relatively cooperative relations" — is supported by the
data on inter-Arab relations, but not by the data on Arab-
Israeli relations. The implication of this finding
seems to be that where there is a clash of alien cultures
involved, one cannot expect the logic of the present
hypothesis to be operative — i.e., capable of explaining
and describing international relations phenomena in
patron-client terms. This finding, of course, presages
83
some of the more specific issue-area analysis (hypothesis
six) and will be shelved for now.
Part "b" of the first hypothesis suggests that client
states will develop increasingly cooperative relations
toward their great power patrons and increasingly con
flictive relations toward the "opposite" great power bloc.
The expected pattern is readily visible in Egyptian and
Syrian relations with the East and West blocs from
to Tg* Syria has no significant relations with the East
during T^, while Egypt has good but extremely sparse
relations with the Soviet Union and an average cooperation
index of .81 with all the East bloc (EST on the tables)
during T^.10 During T2, Syria and Egypt both develop
cooperation indices in the .90 region in their relations
with the Eastern bloc* while the average frequency weight
of their interaction increases from 1,3 to 2.5 (in the
case of Egypt) and .00 to 1.5 (in the case of Syria).
Egypt's and Syria*8 average conflict indices with the
Western bloc (WST on the tables) change from the lower
.50 region in to the lower .80 range in T2 — with
very high frequency of interaction levels compared to
their interaction with the Eastern bloc. Most interesting
*°Egypt*s hostility toward communism as a system
(rather than as a specific regime) accounts for most of
her conflict actions toward the Eastern bloc during T^.
m
in the present instance, is the fact that United States
relations with Egypt have undergone the most dramatic
change in intensity and even direction. During T^
Egyptian-American relations were predominantly cooperativei
Egyptian actions toward the United States were 65 percent
cooperative. These relations became predominantly con
flictive in Tg» reaching an average conflict index
of .78.
The relations of Western client states with the
Western bloc are a bit more complex. Jordan. Lebanon
and Iraq all had average cooperation indices in the .65
region with the West (WST) during T1# while Saudi Arabia
and Israel had average conflict indices of .55 with
the West during the same time period. Moving into Tg»
Jordan and Lebanon were initially hostile toward the
Western bloc, but soon developed extremely cooperative
relations as they became more dependent on the West for
help in Arab cold war struggles. Israel, too, becomes
more cooperative toward the West, developing an average
cooperation index of .73 during Tg. Only Saudi Arabia
and Iraq come into increased conflict with the West
during T2» raising their level of conflict to .50 and
.70, respectively. The rather independent behavior of
these countries toward the West might be explained by
the fact that their geopolitical position insulated them
from some of the subsystem conflict which would have
85
forced them to become more dependent on the West for arms.
Also, these two countries were major suppliers of oil
for NATO countries which, at the time, could not easily
have found alternative sources of supply.
Western bloc client states' actions toward the
United States were decidedly more cooperative in nature
than toward the bloc as a whole. This posture was no
doubt related to the fact that the United States had
no colonial possessions in the area, Iraq, Jordan, and
Lebanon all maintained cooperative indices in the .80
region with the United States for both time periods,
while Saudi Arabia's and Israel's actions toward the
United States barely qualified as conflictive in direction
in both T-^ and Tg. Israel's conflict index with the
United States decreased during Tg.
THE DECLINE OP NEUTRALITY
When the word "neutrality" is brought up in
discussions of Middle Eastern international politics,
the Western observer usually points to Lebanon and
marvels at that country's ability to plot a course around
the troubled waters of Arab-Israeli relations. This fact
is rendered doubly miraculous by the fact that Lebanon
shares a lengthy border with Israel. The conflict
indices tables, of course, indicate that where Israel
and Lebanon interact, mutual hostility is certainly
expressed at almost the same level of Intensity as other
states bordering Israel. The average frequency of
interaction is, however, much smaller (and often non
existent), and conflict is usually at a verbal level.
The fact that Lebanon is governed by relatively bourgeois
Christian Arabs must certainly explain, in great part,
her atypical (i.e., non-Muslim) response to Israel.
This same set of cultural circumstances, however, was
also responsible for her civil war of 1958. This war,
which pitted pro-Nasser, Moslem Arabs against pro-Western
Christian Arabs, ushered Lebanon to the fore in inter-
Arab conflict. Lebanon's inability to avoid involvement
in conflict after the diplomatic revolution of 1955 was,
of course, not unusual. It has already been shown that
the number of conflictive international relations nearly
doubled from T^ to T2.
Saudi Arabian relations with other Arab states
offer another, lesser-known example of an effort at
neutrality which failed. Saudi Arabia certainly had
some advantages over Lebanon in her attempt to steer a
middle course in inter-Arab relations. Her geographic
position on the periphery of the area, her vast oil
resources which gave her some leverage vis-&-vis the
West, her central position in Arab Moslem culture, and
her support for "Arab-first" causes all made her a much
87
more likely candidate for neutrality in the Arab cold war.
Despite obvious regime-type differences, Saudi Arabia
consistently supported Egypt on major issues affecting
the latter's future. On June 9, 195**. for example,
Egypt and Saudi Arabia issued a joint communiciud announcing
defense integration measures and opposition to Western
efforts to bring Arab countries into a regional defense
pact,11 While supporting Egypt, Saudi Arabia did not
go far out of her way to alienate her one-time Hashemite
rivals — the kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan. Under the
so-called Arab Solidarity Agreement of early 1957# for
example, Saudi Arabia substantially aided the Jordanian
national guard (in order to alleviate Jordan's dependence
on Britain) and tried to mediate disputes between Syria
and Egypt, on the one hand, and Iraq and Lebanon, on
the other. Despite efforts to stand on "middle ground,"
Saudi Arabia came under increasing fire from Syria and
Egypt during T2 for at least three reasons. Regime-type
differences would, no doubt, account for some of this
increased conflict, but Saudi Arabia's dependence on
Western bloc arms and refusal to deal with the Soviet
Union — even indirectly, through Egypt — also provide
ample reason for her increasingly troubled relations with
11MEJ. Vol. 8, No. 3 (Summer, 195*0. p. **57.
88
revisionist regimes. Finally, Saudi Arabia's attempts to
remain on fairly good terms with conservative regimes
while mediating conservative-revisionist conflicts, led to
increasing difficulties with revisionists! the latter were
in no mood to compromise, since they were riding a popular
wave of sympathy in the Arab world in the wake of the
Suez war.
ARMS RACES AND PREOCCUPATION WITH
MILITARY SECURITY
That there was a large-scale expansion in and pre
occupation with military security measures in the Middle
East after 1955 seems an undeniable fact to even the lay
observer. It is surprising, therefore, to find that
there was actuslly a proportional decrease in the amount
of data dealing with military security interactions.
During T1# 1,572 interactions out of 3»535, or 4^.5 per
cent, were classified as being primarily concerned with
military security, while 2,5^5 interactions out of 7,137,
or 36 percent, were so classified during T2. This some
what paradoxical finding is no doubt related to a general
expansion of all types of international relations during
T2 in combination with a general expansion in the amount
of information collected by the MEJ and Cahiers.
A closer look at the military security data concern
ing "physical" military assistance or implementations of
89
military security agreements and "verbal" military support
behavior (including endorsements* promises* and agreements
concerning military security) serves to confirm the in
creasing arms competition among patron and client states
12
of opposing sides. During T^, the data showed Western
bloc countries taking a total of 26 physical and verbal
military support actions toward the Arab states and Israel*
while the Eastern bloc directed a total of nine such
actions to the same target countries. Out of all these
actions* only four were for "physical" military assistance.
During T2» the Western bloc increased its total of military
support actions to 1^5 out of which 5^ were of the
"physical" assistance variety. The Eastern bloc increased
its military support actions to 4 3 out of which 15 were for
"physical" military assistance. Western bloc assistance
was concentrated on four states — Iraq, Jordan* Lebanon*
and Israeli while Eastern bloc assistance was concentrated
on Egypt and Syria.
The "physical" and "verbal" kinds of military sup
port actions correspond to categories one and two of table
one. Admittedly* much information on arms deliveries,
agreements* etc. are considered highly secret activities
which do not immediately get reported in public information
sources such as the MEJ and Cahiersi but it is felt that
the "direction" of the present findings would be confirmed
by the inclusion of "missing" (covert) data.
90
The growth of American involvement in the "post-Suez"
period was quite extensive, as the Eisenhower Doctrine
sought to fill the power vacuum occasioned by British and
French disengagement from the area. During T2» then, the
United States directed a total of 92 military support
actions to the Middle East (representing 64 percent of all
Western bloc actions), 31 of which involved physical
military assistance. American aid was primarily to the
same countries listed above as primary Western bloc aid
recipients — with the notable addition of Saudi Arabia,
which received 10 percent of America's military support
attention and none from other Western countries.
CHAPTER V
RELATING ISSUE AREA FINDINGS TO HYPOTHESES
The present chapter seeks to analyze those data
which were classified as being associated with one or
more of the following issue areas which have been
previously identifiedt the East-West cold war* the
Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arab cold war, and Western
colonialism.1 The remaining three hypotheses, of
course, require comparison and analysis of issue area
findings (Appendix II),
THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE
EAST-WEST COLD WAR
Considering the greater immediacy of security threats
arising from Western colonial occupation, Israeli reprisal
or attack, and/or inter-Arab clashes based on regime-type
differences, one should not be surprised to find that
Arab countries were relatively less interested in becoming
involved in the East-West cold war (hypothesis five).
Interactions with the Eastern and Western blocs (i.e.,
actions in both directions) totaled 977 out of which
ibata manipulation and aggregation for this section of
the paper follow the same procedures used in the preceding
section with the exception that category four frequency
values were not reduced by a factor of .5 as they were for
the data collection as a whole. The result will show up as
slightly increased cooperation indices and slightly reduced
conflict indices on issue area findings.
91
92
435 (or 45 percent) were conflictive. Arab state inter
actions in other conflict systems were much more numerous
(all averaging approximately 1,400) and were much more
conflictive. The average conflict indices for bellig
erents in the Arab Israeli conflict was .85t the Arab
cold war generated an average conflict index of •51t
finally, the Arabs' conflict with the West over colonialism
generated an average .56 conflict index.2
Given this evident desire to avoid involvement
in the East-West cold war, one might well postulate
that Arab states would have desired to avoid backing
their great power patrons in this conflict system.
Revisionist regimes reiterated on several occasions
their "positive neutrality" in the Cold War and pointed
out that local communists were not permitted to partici
pate in Arab politics. The data on the East-West cold
war show, however, that both Egypt and, particularly,
Syria were generally more supportive of the East and
more critical of the West on this issue after the East
began arming these two states. Egypt's actions toward
the West were 66 percent hostile out of 64 actions,
while her actions toward the East were 31 percent hostile
out of 36 actions. Syria was even more polarized on
2The8e figures include interactions among all states
considered in this survey — not just the immediate
participants in a particular conflict issue.
93
this issue. Seventy percent of her 104 actions toward
the West were conflictive, while only 17 percent of
her 30 actions toward the East were conflictive.
The conservative Arab regimes also became somewhat
polarized on this issue. Iraq. Jordan (with the excep
tion of the brief Palestinian-led, Nabulsi government),
Lebanon, and even Saudi Arabia all had cooperation
indices in the ,70 region with the Western bloc and in
the .50 region with the Eastern bloc. Jordan was
particularly hostile to the East (directing 37 actions
68 percent of which were conflictive), while Lebanon
was particularly supportive of the West (directing 33
actions 27 of which were cooperative).
In summary, then, the East-West cold war issue did
tend to polarize Arab states along patron-client lines.
On the other hand, Arab involvement in this conflict
was considerably less frequent and less intense than in
other, more immediate conflicts.
EXPANSION AND POLARIZATION OP
ARAB COLD WAR INTERACTIONS
In the preceding pages, it was shown that Arab
clients of the Western bloc came into increasing conflict
with Arab clients of the Eastern bloc. It was further
observed that much of this increase in conflict was
probably based on ideological differences between
revisionist and traditional Arab regimes. In the present
instance, then, it will be of interest to find out just
how much of this increase was linked to interactions
concerning the Arab cold war (see hypothesis four). To
this end, the author has computed conflict and cooperation
indices for all inter-Arab interaction using data which
pertained only to the ideological, "Arab" policy disputes
between the nationalist-revisionist regimes )Egypt, Syria,
and Iraq — after the 1958 coup) and the conservative
regimes (Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon). At
3
a most general level of analysis, average inter-Arab^
interactions concerning the Arab cold war were found
to be highly cooperative in the period between 1953
and 1956 (the average cooperation index was .75)* In fact,
no inter-Arab interaction dyad exceeded the system average
conflict index of .^5 during this early period.
In the 1957-1958 period, there was a quite dramatic
i f ,
expansion and polarization in the Arab cold war conflict.
The average inter-Arab conflict index rose to .58, while
the average frequency of interaction grew from nine
•^Arab cold war data generated by Arab state interaction
with the Eastern ur Western blocs are not considered.
ii.
Since the burgeoning of Arab cold war activities was
"delayed" and probably stimulated by the events of 1956
(i.e., the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt), the
author decided to aggregate Arab cold war data using
different time spans from those used in the analysis of
other issue areas.
95
(in the early period) to 25 (in the later period). That
polarization of conflict occurred according to regime type
differences is apparent, since the average conflict index
between regimes of differing types was ,64 in the 1957-1958
period.^ Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon^ were the most
frequent and belligerent participants in this struggle!
all had conflict indices with opposing regime types in
the .70 region.
Only Saudi Arabia and Iraq (to a lesser extent)
tended to deviate from the expected pattern of Arab
cold war behavior. As has been remarked, Saudi Arabia's
attempt to maintain friendly relations with all Arab
states was beginning to fall on hard times vis-&-vis
7
revisionist Arab states. While her actions toward
Egypt and Syria were 70# cooperative on Arab cold war
matters, these latter states countered with actions that
were 59# and 69# (respectively) conflictive toward
Saudi Arabia, Most unexpectedly, Iraq, which was the
object of much revisionist criticism — for her
^Only those relationships which exceeded (in number)
the average frequency of interaction (25) were considered
in the computation of this index.
6
The most active and conflictive participants are
listed first.
^It should be noted, of course, that just beyond the
time period of this survey, Saudi Arabian relations with
revisionists (particularly Egypt) greatly deteriorated —
viz., the Yemen civil war.
participation in the Baghdad Pact, support of the Eisen
hower Doctrine, and for her leadership in the Arab
Federation (the conservatives' response to the United Arab
Republic's Arab unity movement) — did not respond in
kind. Egyptian and Syrian actions toward Iraq were at the
•80 conflict index level, while Iraq's response was at the
.50 level. Part of Iraq's mild response was the result of
regime change 1 after July 1958, the new nationalist-
revisionist Kassim government in Iraq was decidedly more
friendly toward the United Arab Republic, but still held it
at arms length — refusing to join the union. Prior to
the coup, however, Iraq apparently assumed more of a de
fensive-conciliatory posture toward the revisionists than
generally realized, although many of her actions flagrant
ly flaunted espoused nationalist goals and purposes.
The notion that "like" regimes will tend to interact
more cooperatively than linlike" regimes (the corollary of
the preceding hypothesis) is also confirmed by the Arab
cold war data. Although cooperative interactions concern
ing Arab cold war matters were not very numerous among
similar regimes, it was found that all Syrian and Egyptian
interactions were cooperative during the 1957 to 1958
period, whereas they were 90 percent cooperative during the
earlier period. Arab "conservatives'" mutual interactions
were, on the average, 83 percent cooperative during 1957-
97
1958 and 79 percent cooperative during 1953-1956. In
summary, then, cooperative interactions between similar
regimes tended to increase in intensity after 1956, al
though these interactions were relatively less numerous
than interactions between differing regime types.
ARABO-ISLAMIC RESPONSE TO THE
PRESENCE OP "ALIENS"
Area studies experts have often noted a number of
specific cultural traits and doctrines which seem to lie
at the root of Arabo-Islamic society's hostile response to
"alien" (i.e., non-Arabo-Islamic) society. Chapter two
mentioned, for example, the Islamic doctrine known as the
lihad or holy war. This Islamic tenet placed an obligation
on the Muslim community to expand the territory ruled by
Islam by whatever means necessary. Any setback in that
expansion ceuld only be considered temporary in character.
Given these kinds of cultural imperatives, it seems only
logical to assume that any conflict among Arab states
(possessing cultural homogeneity) would be relatively less
frequent and less intense than conflict between Arab
states and non-Arabo-Islamic states.
This postulate is overwhelmingly confirmed when one
compares the issue area data findings on the Arab cold war
with those of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Inter-Arab con
flict between 1953 and 1958 generated 1,361 total actions
98
out of which 695 or 51 percent were conflictive. The
conflict between Israel and the Arab states (involving
fewer actors) generated 1,^57 actions out of which 1,239
or 85 percent were conflictive. The degree of confirmation
is, no doubt, aided by the fact that Israel is acting out
a cultural imperative of her own.
Arab conflict with Western countries over the issue
of colonialism generated considerably less conflict than
the Arab-Israeli issue, but still more than inter-Arab
conflict. 771 interactions out of 1,378, or 56 percent, of
Arab state interactions with the West over colonialism
were conflictive. There are, of course, at least two ap
parent reasons which explain why the colonial issue did not
generate the amount of conflict with the Moslem states that
the Arab-Israeli conflict did. Western colonialism was a
quickly fading phenomenon in the Middle East during the
Q
period of this survey. Britain was the only Western
country with remaining colonial ties in the Arab East, and
these were largely dissolved with Britain's withdrawal
from Suez in 1955, Prance still had colonies in the
Maghreb or Arab West, of course 1 but this presence was not
8
It should be pointed out that many Arabs consider
Israel's presence as only another facet of Western colon
ialism. But for present purposes, I have treated it as
being analytically discrete.
99
an immediate challenge to the Arab states studied in this
survey — with the possible exception of Egypt. There was
also the matter of British and French participation in the
Suez invasion of 1956, but this was a rather short-lived
affairi hence, after 1956, colonialism declined in im
portance in relation to other regional conflict issues.
Second, by the 1950s, Western colonialism had lost
most of the idealistic drive which characterized it at
its inception. The cultural imperative of accepting the
"white man's burden" had lost ground in Western countries.
Western leaders could, therefore, weigh the virtues versus
the liabilities of colonialism in a more or less objective
manner and conclude , in many cases, that the "game was not
worth the candle." Colonialism as a social force simply
did not have the ideological tenacity nor staying power
possessed by Zionism or the dictates of Arabo-Islamic
culture.
CHAPTER VI
A MISSED OPPORTUNITY?
The fact that the hypotheses examined by this paper
have, by and large, been supported by the data indicates
that an overall "deterioration" of international relations
among the nations of this survey has taken place. It is
further evident that almost all facets of this deterior
ating pattern have run counter to the interests of the
United States and the Western bloc in general. Local con
flict has been greatly polarized along patron-client
lines — with Western bloc countries allowing themselves
to become closely identified with Israeli interests in the
Arab-Israeli conflict and with conservative Arab regime
interests in the Arab cold war. More abstractly, subsystem
conflict has greatly increased, while states opting for
neutrality find their course more and more difficult.
It is, of course, impossible to say just how much of
this deterioration in international relations was caused
by East-West arms competition in the area, since the
factors influencing this deterioration are numerous, and
since the period of time examined in this study is too
limited for a more complete understanding. Many Middle
100
101
East international relations analysts of the 1950s tended
to blame all the area's problems on Abdul Nasser of Egypt.
While it seems certain that Nasser's behavior was a key to
the determination of international relations in the Middle
East, it has also been shown that a host of other factors
were critical. Among these other factors, it has been
argued that cultural imperatives, the rise of Arab nation
alism, international systemic (military) inputs, and (more
immediately) the behavior of Israeli leader David Ben
Gurion were, at least, equally critical factors.
The present study has, of course, considered the
breaking of the Western arms monopoly as the last pre
requisite for increased conflict in the Middle East, since
shortly after the introduction of Soviet arms a "quantum"
leap in conflict occurred. It is apparent that arms com
petition increased opposing patron states* mutual suspicions
of one another, while it also increased their capability
(or, at least, their perception of capability) to make
war. Furthermore, it certainly made their military clashes
more violent and deadly. Finally, the importance of East-
West arms rivalry in the Middle East is underscored by the
possiblity of local conflict escalating to great power con
flict and nuclear war.
With so much at stake, it seems imperative to conclude
with an effort to relate the implications of this paper's
102
findings to an appropriate American foreign policy in the
Middle East (past and present) and to suggest some system-
wide requirements for successful arms control.
POST PACTO ANALYSIS
The first question which naturally comes to mind is,
"Did the Western bloc miss an opportunity to forestall the
breaking of their arms monopoly over the Middle East?"
Since Britain and France had colonial interests which
almost ruled them out as arms suppliers for Egypt, the
response to this question must largely concern Egyptian-
American relations. Based on the historical analysis
undertaken in Chapter Two, it seems certain that the United
States could have sold Egypt the modest number of arms she
requested, thus preventing her recourse to the Soviets —
in the short run. The long run success of such a policy
would certainly have required domestic and international
political riiks by an American executive as well as great
diplomatic efforts.
Internationally, the United States would have had to
risk the unity of the NATO alliance and would have had to
vigorously persuade its NATO allies that the avoidance of
Soviet arms introduction in the Middle East was an end de
voutly to be desired. The United States, of course, held
several trump cards in the NATO alliance. Since it was
NATO's principal armer and guarantor, it held considerable
103
Influence over Its alllee. In other words, pressure could
have been brought to bear — particularly on Prance — to
unify Western arms policies toward the Middle East (which
already existed in "word" under the Tripartite Declaration
of 1950).1
The United States, by seeing to it that arms de
liveries to the Middle East (including Israel) were strict
ly controlled, might have lessened Israel's temptation to
2
strike at Gasa. Had this strike taken place in any case,
it should have met with vigorous Western condemnation
and unveiled hints that Western aid would be cut off in
the event of further provocations. Herein, of course, lies
the gravest political risk for an American President —
that of domestic electoral punishment resulting from
policies running counter to Israeli policy. There are
^Evidence of Washington's ability to restrain its
NATO allies is cited in President Eisenhower's memoirst in
1955* the United States persuaded France to hold back the
sale of Mystere IV jets to Israel for a period of several
months. See Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years»
Waging Peace (Garden Citys Doubleday, 1965)* P. ^9.
2Just how disproportionately favorable Western bloc
arms deliveries to Israel were in comparison with arms
deliveries to her principal military rival, Egypt, is a
matter of public record. See, for example, the appendices
to the following work which piece together, from various
sources, the quantity and variety of arms given Egypt and
Israel by the Western bloc from 1950 to 1955* Fuad
Jabber, The Politics of Arms Transfer and Control* The
United States and Egypt's Quest for Arms. 1950-1945
(Santa Monicas Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar,
1972), pp. 61-62.
104
indications, however, that perceptions of electoral punish
ment outrun actual risks. President Eisenhower's con
demnation of the Israeli, British, and French attack on
Egypt occurred just prior to his landslide reelection in
November 1956, In addition to the stick, the United States
would also have needed to brandish the NcarrotN to make an
Arab-Israeli accommodation attractive to both parties.
Finally, the United States would have had to resist
the temptation of meddling in inter-Arab politics — taking
the risk that domestic instabilities occasioned by internal
social change would not necessarily work to the detriment
of Western interests. It could well be argued that Egypt's
and (to a lesser extent) Syria's expansionary socialist
posture in Arab politics might not have developed or would
not have developed so quickly had they not been armed by
the Soviet Union. In late 1954, for example, Egypt's
Revolutionary Command Council issued the following state
ment (as summarized by the Cahiers) explaining her position
on a Western oriented Middle East defense pact*
• • .although Egypt is not hostile to the West, 72
years of occupation has made it impossible for her to
enter a defense pact with the West. It would only be
after a period of complete independence that Egypt
could consider such an association. Egypt leans
toward the West, and its economic ties are with the
West. Ideologically it opposes communism. Mili
tarily it feels that only the U.S.S.R. menaces the
Middle East with invasion. Egypt desires to rein
force the Arab world to defend it against Israel
105
and communists, Left to themselves the Arabs will
naturally turn toward the West to ask it for arms
and assistance, and* with time, the masses will no
longer suspect the West.3
It is certainly possible that the Egyptians or the
Syrians might have turned to the Eastern bloc despite
prodigious efforts on the part of the United States, owing
either to ideological differences or to the Arab world's
lingering resentment of Western colonialism, Syrian
Ba'athists, for example, had a socialist philosophy which
certainly leaned toward the East. The Egyptian leader
ship, however, had no such ideological program, but did
have some natural proclivities in that direction,
MINIMIZING LOSSESi THE ARAB-
ISRAELI CONFLICT
Taking now a 15 year leap, one can see at a glance
that the pattern of East-West arms competition in the
Middle East, which was set in the 1950s, is still es
sentially operative in contemporary times. The "outside"
parties to conflict are (now, more visibly) the United
States and the Soviet Union who are backing essentially
the same Middle Eastern clients they did 15 years ago.
Even in the absence of data based support, it still seems
^Cahiers.llSme Annie, Fascicule XXX (2e Semestre,
195*0, PP. 12&-125.
106
apparent that East-West arms competition in the Middle
East acts to exacerbate local conflict issues. Since
June 1967* of course, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been
the primary source of conflict in the area and the primary
source of East-West arms rivalry. At this point, one
might well ask how the United States could modify its
behavior in the Middle East in order to minimize regional
conflict and secure its interests in the area. If nothing
else, the findings of this paper certainly argue for an
understanding of the role that psycho-cultural differences
may play in Third World international conflict and that
such an understanding should be incorporated in the form
ulation of American foreign policy. The fact that it was
found that the Arab-Israeli conflict outstripped the
intensity and frequency of all other conflict issues in
Middle Eastern international politics means, ipso facto.
that heavy American involvement on behalf of Israel is
likely to generate more Arab animosity than any other
American policy other than direct American intervention in
an Arab country. Conversely, the Soviet Union, by sup
porting the Arab position on this issue, is likely to
generate more Arab "indebtedness” and favor than on any
other issue.
Almost all national interest oriented analyses con
cerning United States involvement in the Middle East
107
consider Israel a diplomatic liability rather than an
asset. Even Israeli leaders openly admit that the foreign
offices of all Western countries have reached this conclu
sion! hence, they make their appeals for aid in terms of
a moral commitment. As Malcolm Kerr suggests.
The fundamental point is that both in the eyes of
Moscow and Washington, it is influence in the Arab
world, not in Israel, that is the long-term prize
in the game. The Arab states represent tangible
political assets on the international chessboard)
expansive and strategically located territory,
large population, Ik votes in the United Nations
and over half the world's known oil reserves.**
An assessment of current American interests in the
Middle East would show that the United States has lost
some ground but that most of its interests, although
threatened, are still intact. American oil companies still
operate in the area and distribute Arab oil to Western
markets.^ Strategically, the United States has lost
^Malcolm H. Kerr, "The Middle East Conflict,"
Headline Series. No. 191 (October, 1968), p. 52.
^American owned oil companies operating in the Arab
world repatriate approximately $1.5 billion per year in
foreign exchange earnings, while the United States foreign
trade balance with the Arab world totals a "positive”
$850 million per year. These "favorable" balances are
rather important to the United States which is going
through a period of chronic balance of payment difficulty.
It is also interesting to note that the Western bloc no
longer acts in a monolithic fashion. France, which (with
the loss of its Algerian colony) has stopped arming
Israel and started arming oil-rich "revisionist" Arab
countries, has recently obtained new oil concessions in
Iraq and Libya.
considerable ground to the Soviet Union which has obtained
military port facilities in several Arab countries. No
major Arab country has declared itself a member of the
Eastern bloc, but several Arab countries are increasingly
dependent on the Soviet Union. And several American-
supported conservative Arab countries are quite vulnerable
to coup attempts by local revolutionaries whose efforts
are aided by the fact that their conservative governments
have an "unholy" alliance with the primary armer of
Israel. The fact that the climate of international re
lations in the Middle East has been rendered much more
unstable by the Arab-Israeli dispute certainly augurs ill
for American interests. It is apparent that war could
break out again at any moment. It further seems that a
miscalculation arising out of some incident like the
Israeli bombing of the U.S.S. Liberty could escalate to
blows between the super powers — particularly now that
the Soviet Union has conventional forces on a par with or
superior to those of the United States in the Mediterranean.
Finally, the security of Israel, which domestic
American politics identifies as at least a moral interest
of the United States, does not currently seem to be
threatened. In the long run, however, that security could
become untenable as Arab countries achieve technological
progress and learn to use the weapons provided by their
109
Soviet patrons* unless Israel acts now to trade territory
for peace. The small territorial size of Israel makes
her quite vulnerable to surprise attack — even with
conventional weapons.
The burden of the argument to this point strongly
suggests that the United States (and probably all countries
considered in this survey) would greatly benefit from a
scaling down of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Assuming,
for the moment, that the current emotional climate of
hostility and the divergence in claims and bargaining
positions make the complete elimination of the conflict
an immediate impossibility, some sort of de facto or
de .jure arms control would seem a likely place to start
the ball rolling toward at least "lower case" peace.
The responsibility for"initiating such an agreement could
take place at the great power level — where there seems
to be some interest in such an arrangement.
Russia and the United States are certainly aware
that any large-scale renewal of violence in the Middle
East is fraught with escalation dangers. For the Soviets,
such escalation might actually weaken their relations
with Arab clients, since they most likely would not be
willing to underwrite their clients carte blanche.
The Russians received some "intimations" in June 1967
that the underwriting of a weak client can be dangerous
and costly. While American presidents Johnson and
Nixon are both on record as saying that they regard the
Middle East situation as more dangerous than that of
Southeast Asia* both their administrations continued a
policy of supplying Israel with F-4 Phantom jets —
weapons having a highly "offensive" potential which
have been used by Israel in the humiliating and provocative
deep-penetration raids on Egypt in January 1970. To
counter a repeat of these raids* the Soviets erected a
large surface-to-air missile network in Egypt and recently
(late 1971) added some new punch to the Egyptian air force
by supplying Soviet TU-16 bombers with air-to-surface
missiles as well as a new squadron of MIG-23s flown by
Soviet pilots.^ Despite these recent Soviet additions*
it is evident that much of Soviet military aid to Egypt
has been "defensive" in character. Secretary of State
Rogers has even publicly commented on the "moderate" level
of the Soviet arms flow* albeit prior to the recent Soviet
additions. In contrast* the Nixon administration has
provided arms aid averaging $466 million per year to Israel
between 1970 and 1972. At their height* arms sales to
Israel during the Johnson administration totaled $100
million per year.^______
^Newsweek, December 13* 1971. P. 47.
^Robert c. Toth* "Paradox Seen in Nixon's Support for
Jerusalem*" Los Angeles Times* Pebruary 2* 1971* P. 15.
I l l
Furthermore* military analysts almost unanimously agree
that American weapons supplied to Israel give that country
a "preponderance" rather than a "balance" of power in the
Middle East* Clearly* then* the responsibility for
restraint in the delivery of more weapons of all types to
the area lies mostly with the United States -- the only
serious potential armer of Israel.'
Restraint* however, has not been forthcoming. The
United States just announced a new agreement to supply 42
more Phantom jets and 90 Sky Hawk fighters to Israel
partly in response to recent Soviet deliveries but mostly
in return for that country's promise to enter "proximity"
talks with Egypt concerning the reopening of the Suez
Q
Canal. Ironically* this move seems to have completely
sabotaged the American peace initiative. Egyptian
President Sadat* feeling he had been subjected to the
ultimate American perfidy and under increasing fire in
Egypt* backed out of the American plan -- to which he had
at one point agreed.
Despite this setback, it is felt that both Israel and
her patron are in the presence of a real opportunity to
?0n the Arab side, a lack of Soviet support might well
be compensated for by an alternate supplier — e.g., France
or the People's Republic of China. But Arab states cur
rently supplied by Moscow would not be willing to jeopardize
that status unless severely threatened nor would they wish
to provoke the United States into providing even more arms
for Israel.
Q
New York Times. February 6, 1972.
112
unwind the Arab-Israeli conflict. Conditions for a
Middle East peace settlement have become increasingly good
in recent months — due principally to changed Egyptian
leadership, the decline of the Palestinian commando move
ment, and the Egyptian realization that the Soviet Union
is not willing to provide her with enough war materiel for
a "second round." Sadat has reiterated on several oc
casions, despite domestic opposition, that he would commit
Egypt to a permanent peace agreement with Israel in ex
change for the return of occupied Egyptian territory. He
has furthermore indicated greater and greater flexibility
in terms of the timing and other details of such an
agreement. So far, the Israeli government has opted
for territory rather than a peace settlement. And the
failure of the United States to qualitatively restrain
arms shipments to Israel in the post 1967 period has made
it quite unlikely that effective American pressure can be
brought to bear on Israeli leaders which could convince
them to opt otherwise.
The fuse to conflict seems, however, to be getting
shorter again, and it appears that the cease fire has al
most run its course. The fact that Egypt has been unable
to satisfy her diplomatic objectives vis-&-vis the Soviet
Union (which refuses to arm its client to the "teeth"),
Israel, or the United States may well lead Egypt to renew
fighting on a small scale. Renewed low-level fighting
would lessen the claim of Israel to Arab territory ~
which grows with the length of occupation! it might also
inflict "unacceptable" casualty rates on the far out
numbered Israeli army. Israel's response might be to
compromise, but, more likely, it would be to retaliate
at a higher level of conflict — e.g., recommence the
deep-penetration raids. Such retaliation would probably
force the superpowers to take action — possibly to
Egypt'8 benefit, possibly to the detriment of all
concerned. Sadat's restraint to date has been commendable,
particularly considering the pressure he is receiving
from striking students and disenchanted junior officers
to take more positive action. So far his response has
been increased tough talk, but it seems likely that talk
will not satisfy his critics.
THE ARAB COLD WARi MINIMIZING LOSSES
Since the June War, the Arab cold war has wound down
considerably, as it became apparent to the Arabs that only
a unified Arab front could hope to successfully confront
Israeli power. The disengagement of Egypt from Yemen,
the calming down of hostile propaganda broadcasts, and the
passing of the Nasserist era have been major landmarks in
this process. Indeed, it seems rather indicative of
this new era that nationalist-revisionist and tradition
alist regimes alike gave little more than lip service to
114
the Palestinian commando movement —- which threatened both,
at one point, with becoming the new popular nationalist-
revisionist force in the Middle East.
It is possible, of course, that any major settlement
of the Arab-Israeli conflict could lead to a reinitiation
of inter-Arab difficulties — as in 1957. In the present
instance, however, there are several mitigating circum
stances which would tend to restrain such a development.
In 1956, Nasser was heralded as a hero in defeat, since
in the face of overwhelming odds (i.e., the tripartite
collusion to invade Egypt) he had risked all and had
survived — relatively unscathed and with the invading
powers in disrepute. No such wave of popular enthusiasm
is likely to greet President Sadat should he be able to
make peace with Israel on the terms he has outlined.
His would be the actions of a "loser" granting an enemy
something in order to recoup losses. Also, the passage of
time has created some disillusionment with the nationalist-
revisionist regimes' ability, despite dedication, to
provide panaceas for the nagging socio-economic problems
of underdevelopment.
The United States and other Western countries may
have a real opportunity to win back some of the influence
and other*'bsnefits to be had in the Arab world, if they
try to steer a neutral, or at least "light-handed" course
115
in inter-Arab polities. Nationalist-revisionist disen
chantment with the Soviet Union will no doubt occur as
the latter attempts to collect on its debt in the Arab
world by occasional attempts to influence local politics.
One suspects that the development of a Soviet satellite
in the Arab world would be all that is required to under
mine Russian influence. The reaction of Egypt and Libya
to the recent Communist coup attempt in the Sudan and
Sadat's recent "difficulties" with the Soviets offer some
evidence of this approaching phenomenon. From an inter
national point of view.
We may discover that it is better to have
"correct" relations based on shared economic
interest with revolutionary regimes, such as
Algeria and Libya, than to overextend our
selves politically with more traditional,
less popularly based Arab regimes.9
The findings of this paper suggest that the exclusive
"arms" identification of the Western bloc with conservative
Arab regimes has served to exacerbate relations between
conservative and revisionist regimes and has alienated
Arab revisionists from the West. A more even-handed policy,
which avoids "heavy" involvement on behalf of any client
not under direct "outside" attack, could act to limit this
kind of polarization. In any case. Western countries
^Robert E. Hunter, "In the Middle in the Middle East,"
Foreign Policy. No. 5 (Winter, 1971-1972), p. 1^8.
116
would be foolish to ignore opportunities for "better"
relations with revisionists ~ including opportunities to
provide modest arms for such regimes.
EXTRAPOLATION OP FINDINGS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In concluding, one is very tempted to suggest that
many of the hypothetical insights borne out by findings in
the Middle Eastern case may also apply to other Third
World areas where the East-West cold war could convenient
ly superimpose itself on local conflict issues. The
author is aware that many intervening variables (such as
differing cultures or geopolitical circumstances) could
alter the impact of great power rivalry in various Third
World regions. On the other hand, the Third World will
increasingly become an outlet for any Soviet expansionist
aims, since the "lines" separating East and West are well
drawn in the developed world, and the penalties for cross
ing them are potentially great.
If findings concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict offer
any analogy, the areas where Soviet penetration could be
most effective would be those where clashes of alien
cultures eccur — as between India and Pakistan, Greece
and Turkey over Cyprus, or in the recent Nigerian civil
war. Otherwise, the familiar pattern of traditional-
conservative versus nationalist-revisionist regime
117
squabbles may also offer opportunities for Soviet pene
tration. In both types of situations* this paper would
recommend a very even-handed or even "hands-off" United
States policy toward Third World belligerents in an at
tempt to avoid some of the intense polarization and in
crease in conflict which developed in the Middle East.
Should mitigating circumstances make a more active American
role difficult or impossible to avoid* the author would
only hope that the United States would carefully choose
clients whose underwriting would cause the least damage to
"realistically" defined American national interests. In
the Middle Eastern case* the author would suggest the
following national interest imperatives for the United
Statesi
(1) Avoid direct confrontation with the
Soviet Union.
(2) Limit regional conflict so as to avoid
a continuation of the kind of polarization
and other effects described in the central
hypotheses of this paper.
(3) Contain Soviet influence and military
capabilities in the Middle East.
(4) Retain access to airspace and military
facilities in the areai assure a steady flow
of oil to our NATO allies and Japan.
(5) Maintain and increase profitable econ
omic relations with Arab countries.
APPENDIX I
Some Specific Coding Rules
A. Identification of Targets and Actors
1. When an actor takes an action toward "imperialists"
he is acting tomard the "West in general."
2. When an actor takes an action toward "Zionists"
he is acting toward Israel.
3. Since it is frequently impossible to distinguish
between official and paramilitary activities in the
Arab-Israeli conflict, actions undertaken by guerrilla
and regular army forces should be counted as "official"
actions taken by the country on or from whose soil
they are operating.
k, A ship with an Israeli cargo should be considered an
Israeli ship for coding purposes.
5* When Jewish citizens of Arab countries are expelled,
treat Israel as target nation.
6. Arab and Israeli complaints to United Nations organs
about one another should be treated as complaints to
one another, rather than as complaints to the United
Nations,
7. Where it is possible to separate United Arab Republic
actions into Egyptian or Syrian actions, do so. Simi
larly, when it is possible to distinguish Egypt or
Syria as a "target" of action, do so.
8. Government press should be treated as an official actor.
B. Definition of Categories
1. Code "officially received" foreign aid by nation "A"
from nation "B" as a "21 approve" on the part of
nation "A" toward nation "B."
2. Parliamentary ratification of a treaty should be
treated as subcategory "approve."
118
119
3. An agreement to meet or consult between two nations
should be coded in one or two "agree" subcategories.
4. Separate and discrete agreements, comments, etc.,
which are made and listed together, should be
individually coded.
5. If nation "A" warns nation "B" concerning the danger
posed to nation "B" by nation "C," then code the
action of "A" to "B" as subcategory ”31 request,"
only if "A" is generally thought to be more
Triendly" toward "B" than "C." If this latter
distinction cannot be made, code HAM to "B" action
as subcategory "46 request." In both cases, code "A"
to "C" action as subcategory "65 comment."
6. When country "A" requests country "B" to make
sanction or support actions toward country "C,"
code "A" to "B" actions as subcategory "request"
and "A" to "C" sanction actions as subcategories
"warn" or "threat" and "A" to "C" support actions
as subcategory "approve."
7. When trying to distinguish between a "45 comment"
(comment designed to recuce conflict) and a "65
comment" (comment designed to maintain or increase
conflict), one should code according to the motives
of the actor and not according to the objectively
analyzed impact of the comment.
8. When a public pronouncement may be coded as other
than a "comment," do not code it as a "comment."
9. When nation "A" grants asylum to a political refugee
from nation "B," code the action as a "65 comment."
10. An assertion of "positive neutrality" in the East-
West cold war (usually made by nationalist-revisionist
regimes) should be treated as subcategory "45 comment."
11. Actors who undertake actions classified under category
IV (cooperative action or verbalization seeking reduc
tion of conflict) need not be party to the conflict
they are seeking to diminish! that is to say, they
may be mediators of conflict.
12. The "33" subeategory of "consult" is used to classify
meetings whose implicit or explicit purpose is to dis
cuss some sort of "cooperative" agreement or mutual ac
tion which is not designed to reduce conflict between
120
the contracting parties. Meetings which discuss trade,
aid, or which explore integration measures, or which
terminate in a joint communique identifying major
areas of agreement are examples of subcategory
"33 consult,"
13. The "43" subcategory of "consult" is used to classify
meetings whose implicit or explicit purpose is to
discuss means of resolving conflict. Mediators may
also be party to a "43 consult" action,
14. The "53 consult" action occurs when national repre
sentatives meet under "neutral" or "unknown"
circumstances.
15. When the level of diplomatic representation at an
on-going meeting is increased, code the "consult”
action again.
16. Arab League meetings are not coded in the "consult"
subcategory, unless they are held at the level of
cabinet ministers. Where interactions take place
between specifically named actors at Arab League
meetings, these actions should be coded,
17. The "protest" category is reserved for official
complaints or protests. Accusations are more general,
less well-founded and are often initiatory actions.
18. When an Arab state promises aid to the Algerian rebels,
code the action as a "79 threat" to France, since
France considered Algeria as part of her national
territory.
19. Code "alleged" conflict actions, unless there's good
reason to believe that allegations are not true.
20. "Rumor" data should be rejected as inaccurate, unless
context or subsequent events make it evident that
"rumored" reports were accurate.
21. Since demonstrations in the Middle East are often
government sponsored, those which are in "agreement”
with the foreign policy of nation "A” and take place
on the territory of nation "A" and which are directed
toward specific target nations should be coded in
subcategory "demonstrate." Other demonstrations are
ignored for coding purposes.
121
22, When country "AN confiscates the official press of
country "B," code as subcategory "reduce relationship."
23* An increase in the territorial waters limit of a
nation should be treated as a ”65 comment" to non
specific target nations and as a "reduce relationship"
to specific target nations.
24. Refusal to grant diplomatic recognition should be
coded as subcategory "reduce relationship."
25* United States and British military "build-ups”
(both offshore and land based) which follow the Iraqi
coup of July 1958 should be coded as "81 demonstrate"
against the United Arab Republic (or specific
components) and as "12 reward" for Lebanon and/or
Jordan.
26. When nation "A" accuses or protests a violation of the
Arab-Israeli truce, code as a "one-way" accuse or
protest and as a "two-way" "85 force."
27. Arab-Israeli armed clashes are always "double-coded"
"85 ferce" actions, unless the United Nations Mixed
Armistice Commission finds one party guilty of attack
or in the case of a mining incident.
APPENDIX II
Issue Area Data in Raw Form '-***<
The tables on the following pages are similar to
those produced in the text of Chapter Four, except for
the fact that cell-entry fractions have not been converted
to conflict indices and frequency weight valuesThey
also differ in the respect that only "issue area" data
(as defined in Chapter Three) are used in their compilation
and in the respect that they contain data aggregated for
periods of two, three, and four years. Hence, each of the
following tables is identified by issue area and time span
covered. To refresh the reader’s memory, a cell-entry
fraction of, say, 15/24 would indicate that 15 out of 24
actions made by an actor toward a target nation were
classified as being conflictive during a particular time
period.
■^Furthermore, in the composition of cell-entry
fractions, category four (action designed to reduce a
conflict) was not reduced by a factor of ,5» since the time
required to perform this task was inordinate compared to
the value to be gained.
122
ACTORS
123
A. A r a b - I s r a e l i c o n f l ic t is s u e a r e a d a ta f o r th e y e a rs
1 9 5 3 -1 9 5 5
TARGETS
EGY IRQ JOR LEB SAU SYR UAR ISR BRN PRN USA USR ESG
EGY
2
TZ
l
9
0
B
0
7
0
10 iz£ 11
2
5
z§
IRQ
0
TZ
0
TZ
0
9
0
3
0
B
14
T3
2
5
0
Z
2
5
l
T
JOR
1
TZ
0
0
0
TZ
0
7
0
tt I
2
TT £
8
ZZ
0
T
LEB
0
TZ
0
To
0
PF
0
3
0
TZ
20
Z5
6
TZ * z?
SAU
0
To
0
z
0
T3
0
3
0
3
TZ
l
Z
0
T
2
3
SYR
0
TZ
1
B
0
TZ
0
TZ
0
3 J?
2
7
2
3 zf
UAR
ISR
2
z
£
2
9
16
Z3
13 2 14 4
ZZ Z 33 5
BRN
1
9
0
Z
0
7
0
Z
0
3
0
3
10
33
PRN
0
Z
0
Z T^
USA
2
TZ
0
z
2
TH
1
9
0
3
l
TZ
»
USR
0
Z
0
T
0
T
0
3
4
TT
ESG
0
B
0
Z
C V J l T ' i i H j t M r - t | C \ J OKM OH OH
ACTORS
124
B. Arab-Israeli conflict issue area data for the years
1 9 5 6 -1 9 5 8
TARGETS
EGY IRQ JOR LEB SAU SYR UAR ISR BRN PRN USA USR ESG
EGY
6
15 IS
i
if To m u
16
T7
To
0
5
0
s
IRQ
it
sl
0
7
0
Z
4
TT
0
T § i
2
5
l
3
2
S
2
£
JOR
5?
2
13
0
B
0
To sl
148 5
T37 t
4
£
1
2
1
s
1
T
LEB
SAU
UAR
USA
USR
ESG
1 0 0 01 21 3 1
9 5 9 lo T3 SS 3 2
1 0 0 0 4 42 6 1 3
25 H 51* 9 Iff 55 5 I ?
c vp 0 8 10 _4 3 106 8 3 11 0
SXR 12 15 51 11 II TTS I 4 12 15 51 11 It TTS I 4 13 3
o o 2 1 2 0
1 1 2 1 2 ^
rep 112 9 112 6 11 89 14 i _1 11 i
T3T 15 535 7 15 9B 15 7 10 35 8
PPM 10 o 2 0 0 1 1 14
BRN 15 S 9 1 T 3 1 32
PRN | T irf
7 1 3 1 ^ 6 1 16
I 5 3 I T 2 5 S T 5 3
0 0 1 26
TS 1 V 55
0 8
T 9
H|H C M Km
ACTORS
125
C. Arab cold war Issue area data for the years 1 9 5 3 -
1956
TARGETS
EGY IRQ JOR LEB SAU SYR UAR ISR BRN PRN USA USR ESG
EGY
JOR
SAU
SYR
UAR
BRN
PRN
USA
USR
ESG
12 1 2 _2 __4 2
2% 9 7 12 17 2
TRO 11 3 1 1 5 2 0 1
IRQ To b tt v t£ z t t
To I
T PR 2 1 0 0 1
LEB 13 7 5 7
0 3 0 4 1
5 ? ? 5 H
17 0 10 1 21
IT 15 5 ? 5 T I 1
1 0
1 1
0 1
I 1
0 1
2 I
I —* | t —* Ml t- * M | h - » H*|0
ACTORS
126
D. Arab cold war Issue area data for the years 1957-
1958
TARGETS
EGY IRQ JOR LEB SAU SYR UAR ISR BRN PRN USA USR ESG
EGY
%
iO
55
18
32
16
2?
0
5
1
1
10
To 3 32
0
3
1
3
IRQ
11
?5
6
27 1$
1
3
16
31
T§
0
T
l5
1
Z
19
4
5
1
1
JOR
% 3?
1
11
0
13
21
97
12
33
4
3
1
1
23
2
7
6
5
LEE
2
11
4
13
0
13 %
41
55
3
0
s
4
S9
6
5
2
5
SAU
11
33
0
10
0
ZZ
1
13
12
So
2
5
1
1
4
5
2
2
2
9
0
1
0
1
SYR
0
2
24
23
46
55
a
22
32
3
4
5
4
5
£
0
5
UAR
2
5
6
TZ
8
1
Z
2
2
14
17
0
1
ISR
4
5
1
Z
4
5 z
2
Z
2
z
i
5
4
9
4
3
BRN
4
7
4
IS
0
13
0
13
1
T
6
3
11
13
PRN
0
1
0
5
1
1
l
T
USA
8 8
0
ZZ
4
50
0
7
16
Z3
USR
0
3
i
9
n
li
10
10
0
9
0
1
ESG
0
3
0
3
ACTORS
12?
E. Western colonialism issue area data for the years
19 5 3 *1 9 5 5
TARGETS
EGY IRQ JOR LEB SAU SYR UAR ISR BRN
EGY
6
19
1
9
0
12
0
9
1
1
48
52
IRQ
20
0 0
7
0
3
2
I
2
2
6
10
JOR
IT
0
7
0
T
0
5
0 2
2
2
5
LEB
1
15
0
7
0
7
0
9
0
7
2
5
SAU
1
19
2
7
0
5
0
ll
0
7
SYR
1
n
if
0
5
0
7
0
Z
1
UAR
ISR
BRN
FRN
28 0 0 16
52 3 5 25
USA S i r § 2
USR Y y
ESG §
12
21
17
6 1
9
2
3 1
3
I
1
11 1
4
5
Z
7
I?
2
2
1
T
y v
CMkM rH|CM H|CM
ACTORS
128
F . W estern c o lo n ia lis m is s u e a re a d a ta f o r th e y e a rs
1 9 5 6 -1 9 5 8
TARGETS
EGY IRQ JOR LEB SAU SYR UAR ISR BRN FRN USA USR ESG
EGY
11
12
24
IS
IRQ
2
If
JOR
sf
I
LEB
6
IT
0
5
0
3
SAU
4
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0
S l5
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O
11
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15 K
UAR
0
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1
2
ISR
1
BRN
If
6
3
4
13
FRN
21
59
0
l
USA
14
15
2
3
2
9
USR
0
IS
2
5
6
7
ESG
l
3
10 7
0 16
12 12 IS IS
2 0 1 0 2
i f I f
3
2 2
i 0 8 0
3 13 53
I
0 2 1 1
12 Ilf 2 I
0 6 0 2
9
5o 2
3
_Z
n
8
if
2 0
3
l
2 6
2
2 1
3
12 5 2 2
l 2 0
l If 1
l
if
1
5
8
2
2
1
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2 0 0 12
5
I 15
15
0
l
96
53
Til
50
36
1
3
4
7
10
15
8
4
12
2
2
l
T
U 8
11
21
0
2
4
If
4
3
2
s
2
2
2
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20
29 «
12
13
0
I
18
21
21
2lf
8
0
11 2
1
I
2
2
0
I
0
I
0
I
ACTORS
129
G. East-West cold war issue area data for the years
1 9 5 3 -1 9 5 5
TARGETS
EGY IRQ JOR LEB SAU SYR UAR ISR BRN PRN USA USR ESG
JL
19
0
%
0
10
0
nr
0
10
2
3
8
TZ
0
I I§
6
17
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9
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z r
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7
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0
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1
9
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7
0
5
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7
2
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0
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1
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0
9
0
7
0
S
0
7
0
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0
1
0
l
0
n
1
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0
IT
0
9
0
E
1
1
0
H
2
9
0
Z
0
IT
0
Z
l
I
l
l
2
z r
1
5
2
5
_Z
13
l
ZT
0
1
0
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0
1
0
2
0
Z
0
10
1
Z
2
5
0
Z
2
I
2
5
2
5
0
1
2
7
0
z
1
1
J j - U f r C V J l O ^ rHkM
ACTORS
130
H. E a s t-W e s t c o ld w ar is s u e a re a d a ta f o r th e y e a rs
1 9 5 6 -1 9 5 8
TARGETS
EGY IRQ JOR LEB SAU SYR UAR ISR BRN PRN USA USR
EGY
6
7
4
7
2
7
£
9
0
5 *
6
7
4
3
18
77
2
IS
IRQ
iJ
1
7
0
1
0
7
4
7
*
2
71
0
I
2
33
1
JOR
6
IS
2
S
1
3
0
IT
11
27
1
I
4
7
13
27
11
IS
LEB
1
0
1
0
T
0
7 1$
2
7 7?
4
3
SAU
To
0
3
0
9
0
7
4
71
1
I
1
T
6
7S
1
7
SYR
0
3
I§
6
IT
6
7
U
4
5
4
5
#
2
17
UAR
1
2
1
1
ISR
2
7
2
7
1
1
1
3
1
I
2
7
1
BRN
i jk
1
7
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
PRN
0
1
1
1
USA
12
To
33
17 TT
2
19
§
1
1
2
17
USR
0
27 \
0
7
0
2S
14
19
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0
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i
t£
4
17
I?
i?
1
1
I I I
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Asset Metadata

Creator Wagner, Charles Herald (author)

Core Title Setting The Pattern Of Contemporary International Relations In The Middleeast: 1953-1958

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program International Relations

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,political science, international law and relations

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Beling, Willard A. (committee chair), McClelland, Charles A. (committee member), Morgner, Aurelius (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-772912

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