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The new guerrillas: public administration in the new industrial state

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The new guerrillas: public administration in the new industrial state

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Content THE NEW GUERRILLAS it it it Public Administration in the New Industrial State by James Allen Marshall A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Public Administration June 1973 INFORMATION TO USERS This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted. The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction. 1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may hava necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity. 2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame. 3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at die upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete. 4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced. 5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received. Xerox University Microfilms 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 46106 I I 73-31,654 MARSHALL, James Allen, 1945- THE NEW GUERRILLAS: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE. University of Southern California, Ph.D., 1973 Political Science, public administration University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan © Copyright by James Allen Marshall 1973 THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED. U N IV E R SITY O F S O U T H E R N C A L IF O R N IA THE GRADUATE SCH O O L UNIVERSITY PARK LOS ANGELES. CA LIFO RN IA 9 0 0 0 7 This dissertation, written by ......... James. ......... under the direction of h Dissertation Com mittee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by The Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of requirements of the degree of D O C T O R O F P H I L O S O P H Y Date... DISSERTATION COMMITTEE & ( ) , 2 // Chairman Contents BOOK I: The Old Guerrilla................................. 1 Part I: Introductions...................................2 Chapter 1: Process...................................3 Chapter 2: Content..................................11 Part II: The Old Guerrillas........................... 21 Chapter 1: Guerrilla Warfare.......................22 A Historical Perspective.........................22 Sun Tzu........................................... 29 T.E. Lawrence.................. 32 Frantz Fanon......................................39 George Grivas.................. 44 Developments in Revolutionary Warfare............................ 30 Chapter 2: Mao. ...... 38 Biography......................................... 39 Philosophy................. 84 Organization......................................88 Strategy................................ 99 Tactics.......................................... 113 Post-Victory...................... 130 Commentaries .............................. 132 Chapter 3: Giap....................................132 Biography........................................ 133 Philosophy.......................................170 Organization.....................................173 Strategy......................................... 187 Tactics.......................................... 200 Post-Victory .............................. 210 Commentaries.......... 211 Chapter 4: Che.....................................223 i i Biography...................................... 224 Philosophy..................................... 241 Organization................................... 247 Strategy................... ................... 261 Tactics........................................ 271 Post-Victory................................... 283 Commentaries.............. 289 Chapter 5: Comparison............................301 Commonalities.................................. 301 Differences............... 309 Chapter 6: Charts................................319 Philosophy ................................ 320 Organization............................ 320 Strategy....................................... 321 Tactics............,...... 323 Post-Victory................................... 325 Chapter 7: Conclusion............................328 Notes..............................................330 BOOK II: The New Guerrilla............................. 355 Part I: Introductions........................ 356 Chapter 1: Process................................357 Chapter 2: Content......................*........ 359 Part II: The New Guerrillas........... ..364 Chapter 1: Philosophy............. 365 Christianity................................... 366 The American Tradition.........................372 The American Guerrilla War Experience........................... 385 15 Philosophy points in detail......................................... 390 Chapter 2: Organization.......................... 438 13 Organization points in detail......................................... 439 iii Chapter 3: Strategy...............................469 25 Strategy points in detail...........................................470 Chapter 4: Tactics................................518 30 Tactics points in detail.......................................... 519 Chapter 5: PoBt-Victory.......................... 559 11 Post-Victory points in detail................................560 Chapter 6: Conclusion.............................575 Notes.............................. ................600 v* i v BOOK I: The Old Guerrilla For Ralph 1 PART I: INTRODUCTIONS Hev! Think the time is right for a Palace Revolution. But where I live the game to plav is Compromise Solutiont Well. Then What can a poor boy do except to sing for a RocktNtRoll Band pCause in sleepy London Town there’s just no place for Street Fighting ManI Mick Jagger & Keith Richard! 2 CHAPTER I: PROCESS This is an introduction to the process used in this study, while the following chapter is an introduction to the content. The process and the content intertwine and interact upon one another, but by separating them out I hope to get across some of the thinking behind not only what is presented here but how it is presented. This study is a first effort at a "handbook" of a new guerrilla warfare. What I have in mind is a first step toward the type of handbook Che Guevara wrote for the old guerrilla warfare and which subsequently became the bible for Latin American revolutionaries.* I don't see such wide reading of this work, but I do hope that it will provide public administrators, general administrators, and general readers with food for thought on how their roles in insti tutional settings can be seen in a different and revolu tionary light. There is a real problem with the idea of "new" and I will not claim that the ideas presented here are new or original---semi-new or semi-original, yes, but not new or original. These claims cannot be made for three reasons: (1) as some of the material presented here will Indicate there are people in public administration today doing many of the things suggested here, and there were people doing these things long before 1 was bom; (2) who knows what will be published tomorrow? (Perhaps more importantly, who knows what won't be published tomorrow?); and (3) there is most likely at least one fourteen year old somewhere who has thought the same thoughts and will be going beyond them to morrow. (Einstein's most personally moving insights become boring lectures in high schools so soon that it is discour aging, to say the least.) 3 4 So, let me say that the material presented here is new and original to me and I hope it will prove at least semi-new and original, and thus semi-stimulating, to you. The basic idea of the process used is to get you to en counter these ideas and struggle with them and make them-- in a changed and more personal form---a part of your think ing as you look for meaningful ways to act in institutional settings. The process, then, is geared toward that end. But, obviously, I am restricted to the printed page and the written word, and there is only so much that this can do. I would like to present you with films, tapes, guest speak ers, field trips, and so forth, but that is not possible, so I have sought ways to stimulate you within the parame ters of the tools available. In this my models narrowed down to: Thorstein Veblen Alvin Toffler Marshall McLuhan Robert Townsend The Whole Earth Catalog. Each one of these authors has used a technique, or process, or point of view which I found helpful, and which is incorporated to some extent in this study. Thorstein Veblen. The iconoclast economist had a way of presenting his ideas which I find both useful and ap pealing. He summed up this method in the preface to The Theory of the Leisure Class: Partly for reasons of convenience, and part ly because there is less chance of misapprehend ing the sense of phenomena that are familiar to all men, the data employed to illustrate or en force the argument have by preference been drawn from everyday life, by direct observation or through common noteriety, rather than from more recondite sources at a farther remove. It is hoped that no one will find his sense of literary 5 or scientific fitness offended by this recourse to homely facts, or by what may at times appear to be a callous freedom in handling vulgar phe nomena or phenomena whose intimate place in men's life has sometimes shielded them from the impact of economic discussion.2 Veblen went on to say that he would not footnote his evidence or quotations, since these "are such as will com monly be recognised with sufficient facility without the guidance of citation." He used material which "should be readily traceable to their source by fairly well-read per sons. I am not going quite that far, for reasons cited lat er, but 1 will assume that all of us are working from a fairly common base of information. For example, in the following pages I will not attempt to prove in any rigor ous manner that there is a need for basic and radical changes in society. And since this is a study aimed at stimulating such change, if you do not readily accept that premise, then this is not for you. So, my basic stealing from Veblen is the idea that it is not necessary to cite with seventeen sources the obvious. And, the other side of the Veblen coin, I will try to use examples that are readily accessible to the average person (myself included). Alvin Toffler. Since this study involves future act ions by people in institutions, it is advisable to take a look at the process used in perhaps the most popular "futurist" book yet written, Future Shock. In his intro duction to that book, Toffler writes that The inability to speak with precision and certainty about the future, however, is no ex cuse for silence. Where "hard data" are avail able, of course, they ought to be taken into account. But where they are lacking, the re sponsible writer---even the scientist has both a right and an obligation to rely on other 6 kinds of evidence, including impressionistic or anecdotal data and the opinions of well- informed people. I have done so throughout and offer no apology for it. In dealing with the future, at least for the purpose at hand, it is more important to be imaginative and insightdnl than to be one hundred percent "right." Theories do not have to be "right" to be enormously useful.5 Implicit in Toffler's words is the idea that if we waited until we were sure of being "right" before we spoke, the future would be the present and what was "right" would also be what is. To wait is to let others control the shape of the future---and that id definitely not the aim here. I follow Toffler by trying to be imaginative and try ing to stimulate imagination in you. I also feel that same need he feels to come to grips with the future before it is the present, in short while it is still amenable to our intervention in its shaping. Even if the model built here proves to be ineffective in the real world, the work in volved in creating it (a process which you hopefully take part in) will not have been in vain. As Toffler points out, the maps of the ancient cartographers were so wrong that we view them humorously today, but without those maps new worlds could not have been found and the maps corrected. The point is to try, see what happens, and try again. If we wait until we are sure, we can only wait for death, for only that is sure. Marshall McLuhan. The presentation of data is, in this era at least, incomplete without a bow to Marshall McLuhan, and thus I have looked at him and learned quite a bit about how to present ideas effectively. McLuhan, inci- dently, is one of those rare individuals who attempt to practice what they preach: anyone who has read his books or attended his lectures will agree that in some way he makes you a participant in the event— the medium involves 7 you. An explanation of this is hinted at in Understanding Media in a discussion of hot and cool media. There is a basic principle that distin guishes a hot medium like radio from a cool one like the telephone, or a hot medium like the movie from a cool one like TV. A hot medium is one that extends one single sense in "high definition." High definition is the state of being well filled with data. A photograph is, visually, "high definition." A cartoon is "low definition," simply because very little visual information is provided. Telephone is a cool medium, or one of low def inition, because the ear is given a meager amount of information. And speech is a cool medium of low definition, because so little is given and so much has to be filled in by the listener. On the other hand, hot media do not leave so much to be filled in or completed by the audience. Hot media are, therefore, low in participation, and cool media are high in participation or completion by the audience. Naturally, therefore, a hot medium like radio has very different effects on the user from a cool medium like the telephone.& We may disagree with McLuhan's categorization, but I think his basic premise is valid: some media force the audience to participate (to complete the incomplete Gestalt, if you will) and some do not. I would go beyond McLuhan (or at least my version of what he says) and say that the message transmitted over a cool medium is much more effective because it has been participated in, "personalized," and thus has become a possession, if not a part of, the audience. This is why McLuhan's books and lectures are so effective in that sense: he never puts the whole pattern of his thought up there before you and therefore to make sense of it as a coherent whole you have to complete his unfinished and often ambiguous "mosaic." That is what this study aims at: your participation in the development of the ideas to the extent that they become your possession, and a part of your way of looking 8 at institutions and their potential for changing society. And I have copied McLuhan in my plan for this study by following his method: leave things out, throw in odd angles, and leave pursuable trains of thought only half pursued. This is particularly important since the "message" here involves the activity of people like you, and there is little chance of your acting unless you have had a hand in creating the basic premises for that action. By creating a situation which may force you to participate in that very creation I hope to increase the chance of your acting. Robert Townsend. This study purports to be, at least partially, a "handbook". Townsend's Up the Organization is a handbook, "a survival manual for successful corporate guerrillas." And while its aims are different (the goal in business is not necessarily the same as the goal in the public institution, although it doesn't have to be that way perhaps) the method he uses is informative: it is the shape of the book rather than its content that concerns me here (the content is useful elsewhere). What is that shape? This book is in alphabetical order. Using the table of contents, which doubles as the index, you can locate any subject on the list in thirteen seconds. And you can read all I have to say about it in five minutes or less.8 And he is true to his word as those of you who have read the book can attest. 1 can not be as brief as Townsend, for I think it is necessary to lay a fairly lengthy foundation for the actual "handbook" part of this study, but in that section and as much as possible throughout I will try to be brief, to the point, and accessible. This study is organized around cat egories which, hopefully, will allow a degree of the locatibility which makes Townsend's book so useful. A good handbook has to be pithy to be effective---basic, practical ideas for action are neither memorable nor stimulating when hidden in acres of prose. The Whole Earth Catalog. In writing various sections of this study I experience a degree of cognitive disso nance: here I wanted to write like Veblen and Toffler and Townsend, and then cut out most of it to have the effect of McLuhan, but I couldn't seem to get away from citing sources, quoting extensively, and generally playing the academic-book-writing game. This bothered me and led to a new appraisal of the use of sources here. In the section on the Old Guerrillas sources are used mainly in the traditional way. It is important to indicate where the material came from for reasons of academic honesty and to allow people to follow-up on those sources that interest them. But how could sources be used--- should they be used---in the •■handbook" section on the New Guerrillas? This is where The Whole Earth Catalog inspired me. Here's how: The WHOLE EARTH CATALOG functions as an evalu ation and access device. With it, the user should know better what is worth getting and where and how to do the getting. An item is listed in the CATALOG if it is deemed: (1) Useful as a tool. (2) Relevant to independent education. (3) High quality or low cost. (4) Easily available by mail. CATALOG listings are continually revised according to a the experience and suggestions of CATALOG users and staff. There are some good points here. First, seeing this study as a catalog of sources for independent education. Second, seeing books as tools (as the authors of the Catalog do). Third, updating (if only on your own) the 10 * 'catalog". So, in using sources, particularly and espe cially in outlining the New Guerrilla, I sought to use those sources which not only elaborate a point or provide an example of the point being discussed, but will also provide you with a "tool" to check into. Just the attitude that books are tools to build something is a radical de parture from the traditional use of footnoting, etc. The goal of this study is action and thus it is appropriate to consider the literary sources as potential tools for acting rather than as academic props. Instead of rejecting the use of sources I have aimed at using certain sources in certain ways. Thus the spirit, if not the letter, of Veblen is here. And this really applies to all five authors: none of their methods is fol lowed to the letter, but the spirit is there, and the com bination, hopefully, is a synergistic and effective one rather than a sideshow chorus line. So, this is a study leading toward a handbook of new guerrilla warfare. It contains semi-new semi-original ideas geared toward moving you to think seriously about acting to change society. The process of this enticement to revolution is based on five authors who seem to have hit on effective ways of presenting ideas. It is written from two interrelated stances: (1) you draw your conclusions and I will draw mine-— only difference is that I am going to tell you some of mine, and (2) writing and reading take away from doing, but the lost time can be more than made up by the reduced time needed for subsequent effective action. So much for process. CHAPTER 2: CONTENT This is an introduction to the content of this study, while the previous chapter was an introduction to the process used here. Both these elements are mutually de pendent and separating them has risks, but now that process ideas have been discussed the other half must be looked into. Then they go back together as we get into the body of the study. Basically, what needs looking into here are a number of ideas and concepts which form the basis for what fol lows. Why would anyone want to study guerrilla warfare, and what the hell is a "new" guerrilla? Without some in troduction these questions can be insurmountable obstacles to the rest of the study. So, I will try to explain: my conception of the New Industrial State why we need a new revolution why the old guerrillas simply will not do what can be learned from them, however where the best leverage points lie who the new guerrillas are what the aim of the following pages is. John Kenneth Galbraith has used the phrase "the New Industrial State" as a title for a book and to describe a certain condition. He points out that in the U. S.: Nearly all communications, nearly all production and distribution of electric power, much transportation, most manufactur ing and mining, a substantial share of retail trade, and a considerable amount of entertain ment are conducted or provided by large firms. The numbers are not great; we may think with out error of most work being done by five or six hundred firms.1 11 12 These corporations are "technically dynamic, massive ly capitalized and highly organized" and, as a group, are labeled the "Industrial System*"^ And, "The industrial system, in turn, is the dominant feature of the New Indus trial State. Galbraith's definition is a good place to start, for it crystallizes the idea that the huge corporations have become powerful enough to affect if not control the course of political events in states such as the U. S. But for our purposes the New Industrial State will mean something more. For if we go beyond the single nation state and look at the industrialized states of the world as a whole, we see a multinational Industrial System. Multinational corporations transcend national boundaries, they have budgets in excess of the national budgets of all but the largest nations, they employ huge numbers of people, pro duce significant porportions of Gross National Products, and so on. And just as major corporations in the United States began to cross state boundaries, thus making national regulation necessary, these corporations have crossed national boundaries, without, however, eliciting a parallel response. This then is the New Industrial State as used here. This State increasingly controls the course of life within and among industrial states. And as we have seen in this country, this control has not always been benevolent; the New Industrial State has been shown to be motivated by factors which often cause it to act contrary to the general good. These revelations need no listing here. Suffice it to say that I see the New Industrial State as in desperate need of control by the public for the public interest. This is the reason for the New Guerrilla: to gain control over the now-uncontrolled New Industrial State and through 13 this control begin to build a better human society. This concept of revolution against the New Industrial flies in the face of the conventional wisdom which sees the political institution as the key to progress. The New Industrial State transcends the political state (often making the political state an arm of itself) making the political state an important target but not the central one. Control of the political state can only be effective in a revolutionary sense if it is used to control the New Industrial State. The need for revolution in the developing nations of the world is often clear, as is the extent of their con trol by the New Industrial State. This control is often characterized by phrases such as "economic imperalism", "neocolonialism" and so on. In these countries revolution against political colonialism has not been enough since that brought about only a change in the faces making up the foreign offices of the New Industrial State in those coun tries . In the industrialized states— both capitalist and communist— -the need for revolution is far less clear. But in recent years it has become increasingly evident that a parallel between the developing nations and developed nations can be made: the New Industrial State has its poor colonies and it has its rich colonies. We seldom think of ourselves as a colonial people, but when the scope of control over our lives by the New Industrial State is pon dered we can reach that conclusion. The manifestations of that control---racism, poverty, urban problems, etc.— make revolution necessary; radical changes are needed to solve these problems and to restructure control of society, transferring it from corporations to the people. As Jean- Francois Revel writes, "The purpose of the second world revolution is to create real equality among men, and to 14 give men the political means to decide for themselves on the great matters affecting their destiny."^ Revel, in his book Without Marx or Jesus, maintains that the revolution can only occur in the United States; that this revolution if and when it occurs will then lead the rest of the world into a revolutionary new age. The U. S. will lead the way because it has the economic growth, the technological progress, the future-orientation neces sary for revolution. It also is in the midst of the five simultaneous revolutions crucial to general revolution: political, social, technological and scientific, cultural and philosophical, and in international and interracial relationships.^ Whether we seek revolution in this country because we desire a new society for ourselves or because we accept Revel's ideas and seek to begin a worldwide revolution or because we seek to begin in the heart of the Mew Industrial State, the goal remains the same: a second American revo lution. I will restrict my focus to the United States and direct my efforts toward examining the question of revolu tion here and now; but the implications for the entire Mew Industrial State (of which the U. S. is the flagship) are clear---and should be kept in mind. This necessitates a look at the possibility of revo lution here. It appears cl^ar that armed revolution in this country is not the way since such violence could so disrupt the web of services necessary for the survival of the masses of people in our urban society that millions could die ih a short time if the revolutionaries were even moderately successful in prosecuting their war. This kind of "success,!' however, is hard to foresee since any revo lutionary group would face awesome military might. Other revolutionary groups have faced large armies but always in rural contexts where movement was possible— this is part 15 of the heart of guerrilla warfare— -but in an urban context this advantage is taken away. In the history of modem revolutions there does not appear to have been a successful society-wide urban revo lution. In short, revolutions in the heartland of the New Industrial State will not be violent. If they .come they will take other forms. On the face of it this would make the following anal ysis of the Old Guerrilla, the violent guerrilla, super fluous, but this is not the case. Two points are involved here. First, Americans do not have a familiarity with revolution in anv form: we are not geared to think in terms of creating a revolution in this country. Justice William 0. Douglas has pointed out that this country, once the bastion of revolutionary thinking, no longer thinks in those terms. Yet in the American witchhunt that follow ed World War II the word MrevolutionM became almost subversive. We of the West— rich in the democratic tradition of revolution— no longer published books on the subject. We let the communists preempt the field. Those who wanted books on how to conduct a revolution had to get them from the communist press. In deed, we lost our pride in "revolution" as an American concept and identified it largely with communism. 6 Thus, an immersion in revolutionaries and their lit erature will serve to rekindle those flames in ourselves. Second, the methods of violent revolution, particu larly those involving guerrilla warfare, are transferrable into nonviolent contexts. This is the basic thesis of this book, at least in strategic terms. By learning about guerrilla warfare from the best of the Old Guerrillas we will be learning techniques of revolution which can be applied to a revolution carried out within the institution al structure of the New Industrial State. More specifi- 16 cally, we can learn the organizational skills, strategies, and tactics which can lead to successful revolution through their application in public institutions in America. I focus on the public institutions---public adminis- tration---because this appears to be the best leverage point available in the New Industrial State and in the United States. The governmental institutions can control the New Industrial State, this we already know, and the next step is for the people to gain control of the govern mental institutions. This can involve politics in the democratic tradition, but it can also involve the bureau cratic institutions which make up the fourth branch of government in this country. These institutions are readily accessible (particularly given the nature of the Civil Service System), very powerful, and amenable to change by an influx of New Guerrillas. This emphasis on the public bureaucracy is not an attempt to limit revolution to that arena. It is, rather, an attempt to introduce the idea of the New Guerrilla into an area which is small enough to be relatively manageable and which I have some knowledge of. My view concerning revolution in general is that anv institution can be made into a weapon in this new war of revolution; but the ex trapolations to different kinds of institutions will have to be made by you. So, here the New Guerrillas are the public adminis trators of America. This.is somewhat of a departure from traditional Public Administration writing. Traditionally, this field has focused on three theoretical models of public administration: (1) the scientific-empirical model (2) the business-normative model (3) the political-normative model. The scientific-empirical model attempts to objectiv 17 ely analyze what is, without any prescriptions for what should be. How do organizations and organization members operate? What are the shapes of organizations? These kinds of questions are involved in this first model as in vestigators try to determine the reality of public admin istration. The business-normative model involves a normative stance based on the goals of business, modified for the non-profit orientation of the public institution. The goal of public administration here is efficiency; efficien cy becomes the end-all of administration and the criterion by which public administrators should be judged. In pur** suit of this goal business administration theories and models are brought to bear on public administration. The political-normative model is based on the busi ness model in that efficiency is still desired. But now it is efficiency in the course of carrying out the dictates of political bodies. The heart of this model is the politics- administration dichotomy that characterized public adminis tration for so long. In this view a political entity sets the policy and an administrative entity implements that policy; responsibilities are clear and efficient execution is the major goal. There are many reasons for going beyond these three views of public administration, but two dominate my think ing. First, it does not seem that revolution has been fostered by any of these views. If we had the time we could wait for traditional democratic processes to work their magic, or count on newer ideas of cultural revolu tion to restructure our societies. But we may not have a lot of time; as Herbert Marcuse has said ". . . it is not yet too late, but it may be setting late."^ If this is so, and if traditional means of change have become paralyzed, then we need new means. 18 Second, I agree with authors on revolution that rev olution must be a result of revolutionary changes in all aspects of a society. Revolution, anthropologically speak ing, is a "total social fact." That is, it affects every facet of a cul ture. By definition, therefore, a "revolu tionary situation" exists when, in every cul tural area of a society, old values are in the process of being rejected, and new values have been prepared, or are being prepared, to re place them.8 This demands the involvement and participation of public institutions. But beyond that, if we are to control and change the New Industrial State and solve the problems it has helped create, the public institutions must be intimately involv ed. For they are the arm of government on which these kinds of responsibilities fall, and a quick survey of American history must indicate tb the investigator that public institutions can easily become servants of the New Industrial State rather than of the people. To avoid this there must be a revolution within the governmental bu reaucracy; only this revolution can enable the public ad ministration establishment to become a means of prosecut ing the wider revolution. Thus, I am proposing an additional theoretical model of Public Administration: (4) the New Guerrilla model. This model involves seeing public administration as a free-standing entity capable of creating its own normative values and acting upon them. No longer tied to objective analysis, the norms of business, or the dictates of polit ical decision-makers, this public administration becomes--- ideally-— a vital member of a revolutionary and revolution izing group of American institutions. There are some basic philosophical questions in this 19 fourth model, the most obvious being its relationship to democratic theory. These will be dealt with in detail further along, but it is important at this point to ponder Revel's idea of revolution and creation. He maintains that revolution cannot be an imitation of the past, but, rather, q must be a creation of the future. We have to consider the possibility that the means of this new revolution may not be the means used in former revolutions and that this is not necessarily bad; we have to consider the possibility that other means may not only be more effective but also more representative of the democratic spirit. So, the following pages present a fairly rigorous in vestigation of the Old Guerrilla. Then we move to the creation of the New Guerrilla on the basis of what has been learned from the Old. This creation can be taken only so far by the printed page, the rest of the work is the re sponsibility of the individual. This is why it is so important to absorb the mentality of the Old Guerrillas by studying them closely, for it is this mentality, more than any specific attributes or techniques, that lead to the kinds of innovation necessary to activate the fourth model of public administration. We must avoid blindly imitating the Old Guerrilla, but at the same time we need to gain a "guerrilla perspective" in order to create the New Guer rilla. In all of this there is one basic underlying theme, summed up by the authors of The Whole Earth Catalog: We are as gods and might as well get good at it.10 Speaking from a business perspective, Robert Townsend summarizes the operational alternatives before us in get ting good at it". Two solutions confront each of us: Solution One is the cop-out: you can de- cide that what is must be inevitable; grab your share o£ the cash and fringes; and comfort yourself with the distractions you call leisure. Solution Two is nonviolent guerrilla warfare: start dismantling our organiza tion where we are serving them, leaving only the parts where they are serving us. It will take millions of such subversives to make much difference.H This study is about solution two. So much for content. PART IX: THE OLD GUERRILLAS The revolutionary that I remember from mv childhood impressions walked with a .4$ pistol in his waistband, and wanted to live on his reputation. He had to be feared. Jfle was capable of killing anyone. He came to the offices o £ the high functionaries withthe air of a man who had to be heard. And in reality.one asked oneself, where «as_thi revolation that these people made? Because there was no revolution, and there were very few revolutionaries. — Fidel Castro 21 CHAPTER I: GUERRILLA WARFARE Guerrilla Warfare is not a new phenomenon; it has been a part of man's range of activities ever since an in ferior force attempted to defeat a significantly superior force. This disparity between forces.is the root of guer rilla warfare: when you cannot overwhelm your enemy you must use other means, and some of these other means have come to be classified as "guerrilla warfare." In broad terms, the history of guerrilla warfare can be divided into three parts. The first includes all those guerrilla wars fought prior to the war in Spain in the years 1807 through 1813. The second covers the period from the Spanish guerrilla movement ("guerrilla" means "small war" in Spanish*) through the World War II guerrilla ac tions (often called "partisan war"). And the third brings us from World War II to the present. These periods over lap into one another and we will find trends running through two or all of the periods, or stopping abruptly within one, but for general purposes of understanding these three periods are helpful. Arthur Campbell has pointed out that guerrilla wars fought prior to the Spanish conflict with Napoleon's in vading army did not affect major trends of military 2 thought. Guerrilla wars were often fought on the margins of the Western world by "uncivilized people.!' This, cou pled with the chivalrous rules of war which had evolved in Europe in medieval times, kept guerrilla warfare relegated to the status of an unsavory curiousity. This does not mean, however, that these guerrilla wars were of no importance. The Bible contains stories of guerrilla warfare; the Israelites fought many such wars against various enemies. Judas Maccabaeus is perhaps the 22 23 best known of these earlier warriors. In the second cen tury B.C. the Maccabees fought against the Syrians, who were superior in numbers and had war elephants. The Maccabees had their strengths, too: Judas and his successors, however, were superior to the enemy in morale; they had a tightly knit religious and social organization and a burning faith. They fought for what they knew. They enjoyed wide popular support. They stood on their own ground against an enemy dependent on long and difficult lines of communication. The Jews were able to sur vive even devastating defeats by switching back to guerrilla warfare, and finally managed to consolidate their independence by a combi nation of diplomacy and competent military leadership.3 These factors are familiar to modem observers of guerrilla warfare. Even more familiar to modem observers is Sun Tzu's The Art of War. Unknown to the West until 1772 and then overlooked because of Europe's concept of war---crystal- lized in Clausewitz-— as a formal, patterned engagement of regular armies following certain "rules of war," this book reflected a tremendous advance in military thought. According to Samuel Griffith this is the first mili tary classic, written in the period 400-320 B.C. in China.^ This was a period in Chinese history when everything, in cluding the art of warfare, was in a state of flux. Wan dering experts in every field advised warlords, would-be emperors, and princes about moral and practical matters. But the times demanded practicality, and Consequently, while moralists may fre quently have been unemployed, strategists on the whole lived comfortably---so long as their advice turned out to be good. The author of "The Art of War" was one of these men, and even though he did not fact find a patron in King Ho-lu of Wu, as Ssu-ma Ch'ien says, he must somewhere have found a receptive ear. 24 Otherwise his words would have died as did those of most of his less original contem poraries . 5 The change in war came earlier in China than it did in Europe, and thus for the European reader---even in the late 18th century---Sun Tzu was ahead of his time. Up to the 6th century B.C. war in China had been ritualistic: campaigns were fought according to a code and only during months not used for planting and harvesting. Then the day of the Knight passed, replaced by standing armies using tactics, coordinated in movement, and led by trained pro fessionals. Sun Tzu's work reflects the new, rather than the old and brought the art of war (but not the technology) to a refinement unknown in Europe for centuries to come. The medieval Welsh fought guerrilla wars against each other. Then when the Anglo-Norman invaders arrived they turned their guerrilla skills against them. Not the least of the factors in the Welsh strength was their use of the longbow---a perfect guerrilla weapon, soon adopted by the English with great success— which could pierce the knight's armor. Wales fell to the English, but only after several centuries of battling, andatagreat cost to the in vaders . ^ The Hundred Years War contained a major guerrilla war in France. The Constable of France, Du Guesclin, refused to meet the English occupying armies by the "rules of war,''? using instead night raids, ambushes, harassment, and the like to push the English off of most of the territory they had occupied. Lewis Gann, in his Guerrillas in History., points out that guerrilla warfare in the past has not been limited to peoples fighting invaders: the social element has been pre sent, too. In ancient and medieval times this has meant peasant wars. 25 The history of preindustrial Europe is punctuated witn peasant rebellions. These differed in scope and intensity, from ferocious jaqueries— spontaneous outbreaks without specific long-term goals---to great insurgencies that shook society to its foun dations. But however violent, these risings had serious limitations. Mo European peas- ant-army ever managed to overthrow an entire feudal state. At best, embattled farmers succeeded, like the leaders of the Swiss Ukrantone. in freeing some inaccessible moun tain from foreign rule.' The reasons for this failure include lack of leader ship, trained cadres, and discipline. Lack of communica tions played a major factor by denying the peasant rebels the ability to easily consolidate gains and coordinate battles. Peasant armies could only fight at full strength when there was no pressing work to be done in the fields, a factor which could be fatal when facing a standing army. And the peasant leadership often lacked a program for use if victorious, and men capable of running the increasingly modem and complex states of Europe---often the rebels sought only to show the king that his aides were evil. So peasant wars such as the German Peasants' War (1524-25), the Hungarian peasant insurrection (1514), and the Croatian uprising (1573) did not overturn the existing power structure. These revolts continued, however, on into the 17th and 18th centuries throughout Europe. In the Mew World guerrilla warfare was also common. The Indians of the American continents fought the European invaders after the fashion of guerrillas everywhere-— again they were an inferior force facing a superior force— and they suffered from the same lacks that the peasants in the Old World experience. The American Revolution is a classic guerrilla war fare. Not only were guerrilla strategies and tactics em- 26 ployed— -particularly by Francis Marion (the "Swamp Fox") -— but the general overall strategy was that of the guer rilla. The American Revolution was not a war of massive armies fighting for positions, rather it was a war of man euver fought on many fronts, not the least of which was the diplomatic (witness the tremendous impact of the French fleet). A third group involved in guerrilla warfare in the New World were the black slaves. Brazil, Jamaica, Haiti, and the United States, among others, experienced black guerrilla warfare. Brazil's history is a prime example: In Brazil, black men seeking freedom established their own settlements known as quilombos. where Africans attempted to re- create their own societies on American soil. The most important of these communities was the "Negro Republic" of Palmares in Pernam buco, which maintained its independence throughout most of the seventeenth century. After bitter fighting, the state of Palmares was wiped out in 1694. Its destruction prob ably marked a milestone in Brazilian history. Had Palmares continued to exist, the Portu guese might well have been confined to the coast, facing not one but several independent black states in the interior.8 Authors in the field do not include the French Revo lution among their examples of guerrilla warfare; this rev olution is evidently viewed as a swift uprising and sei zure of power, rather than a drawnout guerrilla struggle. But the Revolution itself, strangely enough, put down a number of guerrilla wars directed at itself: the policies of the Republic, particularly with regard to conscription and religious matters, did not sit well with various fac tions of French society and there were outbreaks of guer rilla war. These were crushed by the government forces, however. 27 With the opening of the 19th centtnry the inevitabil ity of defeat for guerrilla forces vanished, and guerrilla warfare was no longer ignored by military thinkers. The first of this long list of guerrilla engagements occurred in Spain in response to invasion by Napoleon's troops. Spanish guerrilla groups and the scattered regular army, both supplied, advised, and supported by Wellington's British Troops fought the French throughout the country. The war was something Napoleon's troops, used to swift campaigns and living off the land (difficult in poverty- stricken Spain), had not come up against before. The partisans would attack the neglected flanks and rear of invading columns. Strag glers and foraging parties were cut down by enraged peasants driven to desperation by the depredations of the foreign soldiery. Above all, the Spanish guerrillas were supported by Wellington's British expeditionary force, the finest professional army in Europe. The Hispano-British effort crdated a constant drain on the military and financial resources of France. Napoleon was forced to disperse large forces in a wasteful war, troops that might have been used to better advantage in Central Europe. In the end, the British and Spaniards drove the French from the entire Iberian Penin sula, and thereby helped to topple the emperor from his throne,“ At mid-20th-century, this account sounds familiar. This war in Spain presaged the whole range of parti san warfare which would become familiar to the World War II generation. Another war, again involving France, presaged the colonial struggles of the 20th centmry. This was the struggle in Haiti which resulted in a declaration of ind- pendence by the black slaves in 1804. This was a major turning point in the history of guerrilla warfare for it marked the first time that slaves (whether serfs, indentur ed servants, or some other variation on the theme) actually overthrew their masters. 28 Disrupted by the Revolution, France could not support the Haitian French community very well. The slaves had numbers and ideology on their side, and they had outstand ing leadership in Toussaint L*Ouverture and Jacques Dessalines. The terrain and climate helped the slaves, as did the tropical diseases: French soldiers died by the thousands. In this situation the outcome could be easily forecast. So, by 1813 the world had already seen two of the three major forms of guerrilla warfare in operation. These were the partisan form and the anti-colonial form; the third, the social-ideological, was yet to come. Inter estingly enough, a small case could be made for seething the American Civil War at the head of the list of wars of this third form. For although guerrilla warfare was not the predominate form of fighting, it was used extensively (Grierson, Mosby, Stuart, etc.) in a war fought over social and ideological matters. Wherever we place its start, the trend toward the social-ideological form is clear in the history of guer rilla warfare, particularly as the end of colonialism grew near. To keep any listing of the guerrilla wars of this "modem" period up to date is difficult, as movements ebb and flow. For example, there are reports of a resurgence of the Huks in the Phillipines, and Douglas Hyde, writing in 1968, paints this picture: There are at the moment of writing Com munist guerrillas active in Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Burma, the Phillipines, Venezuela, Guatemala, Bolivia, Columbia. There are prob ably a few guerrilla bands still active in Peru, Ecuador, the Republic of Honduras, North Brazil. There may be some in process of formation, despite all that the Communist Party of Indonesia has suffered in recent years, in parts of Java. The Communists give their support to guerrillas 29 now under training or actually being infil trated into the Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia. Angola, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea.10 Truly, we can agree with Francois Sully that this is the "age of the guerrilla."1* Each guerrilla war has its geniuses and its lessons for those who study them, and the dedicated student would investigate all of them, but for our purposes there are a handful of men who must be studied and some general con cepts and major breakthroughs which must be learned. * * ★ SUN TZU Sun Tzu would be important in any study of guerrilla warfare, by virtue of being the first to treat the subject formally in a work that survived. But his work is made vastly more important because of its influence on Mao Tse- tung. Sully goes one step further and says, Sun Tzu has been the bedrock on which most Asiatic writings on war are based. A thorough understanding of Sun Tzu will enable the modem observer to comprehend better the "war of liber ation" as conducted by guerrillas throughout the world.*2 This is to be expected since most Asiatic guerrillas were and are Influenced by Mao. Robert Payne points out that Mao not only quotes Sun Tzu in his own military writings but that he also acted according to many of Sun Tzu's rules of war. Mao was most closely allied with Sun's thoughts in the area of esplo- 13 nage and spying. Since both Sun and Mao sought to win wars without fighting, both homed in on the concepts of de feating the opposing leaders before the battle by wooing 30 their men away, appearing invincible, striking everywhere at once, and so on---this involved skillful use of espio nage, spies, propaganda, and manuever. The basic attitude toward warfare was the same in both men*8 minds. Stuart Schram shows that Mao's use of the phrase nl-shih kung-hsu ("avoiding strength and strik ing at weakness") "...in fact sums up the essence of the ancient strategist's teaching.This helps to explain why when Mao deviated from Sun in a specific tactic (by not leaving a surrounded enemy a way out, for example) he was not deviating from the basic strategic thinking. Mao's knowledge of Sun Tzu was reinforced by the romantic novels he read, for the heroes in these stories had studied Sun Tzu intently. And, finally, the same con ditions which made Sun Tzu's strategies necessary (the na ture of China, the political forces, the peasants, etc.) still largely obtained when Mao was entering the battle. In contrast, Chiang Kai-shek tried to apply Western mili tary thought to an Eastern context and was lost. A good concise summary of the impact of Sun Tzu is given by Samuel Griffith in his translation of The Art of War. It has often been said that had Western leaders read Hitler's Mein Kamof they would have been somewhat better equipped than they were to deal with him. Some familiarity with Mao's speeches and writings, together with the major works which provide their conceptual framework, would assist leaders of the present f eneration to an equal degree. From any col ection of such works, "The Art of War" could not be tfsaitted.15 Sun Tzu's The Art of War is a collection of pithy statements arranged in thirteen chapters. The book is fleshed out by the commentaries of various scholars from the centuries following the writing of the original work. A brief quoting of some of these statements will suffice to 31 give us a feeling for Sun Tzu and lay a foundation for understanding later on. In Sun's model there are five fundamental factors to appraise war by. The first of these factors is moral in fluence; the second, weather; the third, ter rain; the fourth, command; and the fifth, doc trine. 16 Then, a basic fundamental statement which would seem foreign to the classic military writers of Europe: All warfare is based on deception.17 Thus the military leader engages in feints; baits the enemy; pretends weakness, disorder, and inactivity; angers the enemy leaders and confuses them; divides them and wears them down; attacking with surprise and avoids the enemy when they are strong; and knows his own situation and that of the enemy at all times. The great military leader, then, is not the winner of battles. For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy...18 In such a war knowledge becomes a crucial factor. Therefore I say: "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.”19 And battles are not won by men but by thinking. Order or disorder depends on organization; courage or cowardice on circumstances; strength or weakness on dispositions. Thus, those skilled at making the enemy move do so by creating a situation to which he must conform; they entice him with something he is certain to take, and with lures of osten sible profit they await him in strength. 32 Therefore a skilled commander seeks vie* tory from the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates.20 The master strategist "shapes" the situation so that it brings, inevitably, victory. After laying out the basic lines of his strategy, Sun adds chapters on "Weaknesses and Strengths,"Maneuver," "The Nine Variables," "Marches," "Terrain," "The Nine Varieties of Ground," "Attack by Fire^V and "Employment of Secret Agents." These are essentially chapters outlining the tactics that make up the strategies Sun employed and advocated for successful military campaigns. Underlying all of this seems to be a basic commitment to humanity and morality. This commitment is hinted at in places by both Sun and his commentators and perhaps best seen in these passages: Those skilled in war cultivate the Tao and preserve the laws and are therefore able to formulate victorious policies. Tu Mu: The Tao is the way of humanity and justice; "laws" are regulations and institutions. Those who excel in war first cultivate their own humanity and justice and maintain their laws and institutions. By those means they make their governments invincible.21 Thus wrote the literary father of guerrilla warfare in the East. * * * T. E. LAWRENCE T. E. Lawrence became a legend in his own time as 33 "Lawrence of Arabia." He was a strange man, gripped by intellectual and emotional forces beyond the comprehension of many people; the fact that he became an "Arab" leader, accepted as such by the Arabs, and helped lead them in re volt against the Turks (and, implicitly, against European powers, including his own England) is the pinnacle of his strangeness. Strange, too, was his wish for obscurity fol lowing his legendary exploits in Arabia in World War 1. Out of his strangeness, however, came a basic part of the modem European experience in guerrilla warfare. Lawrence was one of a group of English soldiers sta tioned in the Middle East during World War I who believed in the Arab revolt; and with his background in Arab cul ture and language he was the perfect one for the job of uniting British and Arab interests to the mutual benefit of both. This he did— -on his own initiative-— and became an Arab-garbed leader of raiding parties blowing up rail lines, telegraphs, trains, and small Turkish posts. After some years he was leading large Arab armies. He was in strumental in setting up the Arab government upon their seizure of Damascus. At the close of the war Lawrence returned to England and wrote up his experiences-— in a private edition of eight copies, three of which were destroyed. He had no in- 22 tention of his work being published. Fortunately for the historian, military student, and general public Lawrence's work was published. Its importance to guerrilla warfare is clarified by Campbell: If one can except the ancient military philosopher Sun Tzu and Fabius Maximus who though adopting guerrilla tactics commanded a regular army, and certain chieftains and warriors of olden times whose military achievements have never been accurately re corded, the world has yet to produce a man who would deliberately reduce guerrilla war fare to a set of rules and adopt it as a form 34 within a proper strategical plan. This need was first net by an Englishman, T. E. Lawrence.23 Lawrence's guerrilla war experiences thus became textbook material for the student of guerrilla warfare. So much considered an expert on the subject, Lawrence wrote the entry on guerrilla warfare in the Encyclopedia Britannica. But the essence of his ideas on the subject, like Sun Tzu's, is simple— -only the implementation is complex. Carleton Beals condenses it down like this: Lawrence of Arabia remarked that the real success was their belief that the art of war was dialectics. In medicine, the knowledge of bodily weakness is all important; in the material world knowing becomes important. You have to know more than the enemy. You have to spread your message.24 Spreading the message, and fighting his kind of war did not gain Lawrence many friends among the British mili tary establishment; they were still infatuated with Clausewitz and positional warfare and "over the top." And while the Arabs had their own "code,'" Lawrence was able to take the best of the British (via a few well-placed sympa thizers), the Arabs (with the blessing of Feisal), and his own perceptive observations (strengthened by an almost in credible sense of detachment) and blend them into the suc cessful Arab Revolt. Much of this thinking is contained in his Revolt in the Desert, a shorter account of his experiences (the full account is found in Seven Pillars of Wisdom) and a concise abstraction from his experience is in the Britannica art icle. So, let's look at these and draw out some pertinent points. One of Lawrence's major tasks was to unify the Arab tribes into a coherent group both to fight and to rule it- 35 self. He found the man to do this in Feisal on his open ing trip to meet with the Arabs. Meanwhile, here, as it seemed, was offer ed to our hand, which had only to be big enough to take it, a prophet who, if veiled, would give cogent form to the idea behind the activity of the Arab revolt. It was all and more than we had hoped for, much more than our halting course deserved. The aim of my trip was fulfilled.25 Lawrence gained Feisal's confidence and became his right-hand man throughout the course of the war. In fact, a case could be made that Feisal was Lawrence's right hand man, but this depends on which side you read the account from. Lawrence proved to be not only a master in the basic arts of guerrilla warfare (and a fast learner) but also in the delicate art of reconciling feuding tribes to fight to gether against the Turks and for freedom. His strangeness probably helped him here; that, and a clear-eyed view of what needed to be done to accomplish what. Feisal was no slouch at this either. During two years Feisal so laboured daily, putting together and arranging in their natu ral order the innumerable tiny pieces which made up Arabian society, and combining them into his one design of war against the Turks. There was no blood feud left active in any of the districts through which he had passed, and he was Court of Appeal, ultimate and unchalleng ed, for western Arabia.26 Lawrence's basic strategy included winning the coun tryside and confining the Turks to the towns and rail lines. This was accomplished mainly by manuevering the Turkish army according to the movement of the Arab groups, in coordination with the widening presence of the British Army. The results of this strategy became increasingly ap parent as the war progressed-— and as General Allenby, no 36 mean strategist himself, paralleled Lawrence's strategy in the east with a similar strategy in the west, effectively hemming in and destroying the Turks. The inititative was held by Feisal, Lawrence, and Allenby. The two raids to Salt had fixed the Turks' eyes exclusively beyond Jordan. Every move there,.whether of British or Arabs, was accom panied by counter-precautions on the Turks' 7 part, showing how fearful they were. In the coast sector, the area of real danger, the enemy had absurdly few men. Success hung on maintaining them in this fatal misappreciation.2/ The main job of "maintaining this misappreciation" fell to the Arabs, and under Lawrence they performed ad mirably. By blowing up railroads, attacking stations and posts, and making fantastic camel marches all over the map, Lawrence's forces were able to keep the Turks constantly upset, constantly reacting, and constantly unaware of where the real thrust would come. As the outcome became clear to Lawrence he told Feisal of its meaning: "The face of our war has changed, and we gave hurried word of it to Feisal, with counsels of the general revolt to take profit of the 28 situation." Lawrence realized, as have many revolution aries, that the chaos of war is an excellent time for revo lution and he spurred the Arabs to act quickly. "The mass rising we had so long prepared was now in flood, rising 29 higher as each success armed more rebels." In all of this, particularly in those first hectic days and nights in conquered Damascus, Lawrence surely knew himself and his countrymen. My head was working full speed in these min utes, on our joint behalf, to prevent the fatal first steps by which the unimaginative British, with the best will in the world, usually depriv ed the acquiescent native of the discipline of responsibility, and created a situation which called for years of agitation and successive re forms and riotings to mend.30 37 To avoid this, Lawrence ousted the expedient Johnny- come- lately Algerians and set up an Arab government for Damascus in a series of actions that must be considered a textbook for revolutionaries in power. His chapter on this activity in Damascus is entitled "Jerry-Cabinet-Making" and that is exactly what it was. Acting as a deputy for Feisal, Lawrence named an acting Military Governor, a Commandant of troops, an Adjutant Gen eral, a Chief of Public Security. He saw to it that a police operation was set up, that wages were paid, the wa ter supply secured, and the lights turned on at night ("The resumption of street lighting would be our most signal 3 X proof of peace." ) Sanitation services were started, a fire brigade formed, relief work begun for the innocent victims of the war. Lawrence acted swiftly and admits that he was not seeking permanence. Our aim was a facade rather than a fitted building. It was run up so furiously well that when I left Damascus on October the fourth the Syrians had their de facto Government, which endured for two years, without foreign advice, in an occupied country wasted by war, and against the will of important elements among the Allies.32 How was this done, exactly? Lawrence attempted to answer this question in his Britannica article by proposing a "science of guerrilla warfare." It is hard to tell whether or not this was a real attempt at a science, or a facetious cynical slap at other "scientists" (such as Foch and Clausewitz, who are mocked in the article); Lawrence had a reputation for such sarcasms. Whatever his inten tions, his words are a combination of Sun Tzu's pithiness and Lawrence's own literate, aliusion-filled prose about the Arab world and its subtleties. Salient points are quoted below. As was almost inevitable in view of the general course of military thinking since Napoleon, the soldiers of all countries looked only to the regulars to win the war. Military opinion was obsessed by the dictum of Foch that the ethic of modern war is to seek for the enemy's army, his centre of power, and destroy it in battle. Irregulars would not attack positions and so they were regarded as incapable of a decision.33 The Arabs did nothing concrete, but their march recalled the Turks (who were almost into Raberg) all the way back to Medina. There, one half of the Turkish force took up the entrenched position about the city, which it held until after the Armistice. The other half was distrib uted along the railray to defend it against the Arab threat. For the rest of the war the Turks stood on the defensive and the Arab tribesmen won advantage over advantage... Now the Arab aim was unmistakeably geographical, to occupy all Arabic-speak ing lands in Asia. In the doing of it Turks might be killed, yet "killing Turks" would never be an excuse or aim. If they would go quietly, the war would end. If not, they must be driven out; but at the cheapest pos sible price, since the Arabs were fighting for freedom, a pleasure only to be tasted by a man alive.35 Most wars are wars of contact, both forces striving to keep in touch to avoid tactical surprise. The Arab war should be a war of detachment: to contain the enemy by the silent threat of a vast unknown desert, not disclosing themselves till the moment of attack. This attack need be only nominal, directed not against his men, but against his materials...From this theory came to be developed ultimately an unconscious habit of never attacking the enemy at all.36 The corollary of such a rule was perfect "intelligence," so that plans could be made in complete certainty.37 In character these operations were like naval warfare, in their mobility, their ubiq uity, their independence of bases and communi- 39 cations, in their ignoring of ground features, of strategic areas, of fixed directions, of fixed points.38 In irregular war if two men are togeth er one is being wasted.39 Guerrilla war is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge.40 In 50 words: Granted mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy), time, and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraical fac tors are in the end decisive, and against them perfections of means and spirit struggle quite in vain.41 If read from the point of view of the old school of military thinking, you can see why Lawrence's ideas were so odd and so resisted by the British military. Fortunat ely, he was able to find allies within the British struc ture, allies who looked to results rather than methods. And he delivered. In the process Lawrence set the stage for later anti-colonial upsurges which shook every empire- holding nation, including England. Unable to learn from their own history these nations proved unable to cope with a form of warfare formally ex plained by one of their own (and published in their own chief reference work!). * * * FRANTZ FANON Frantz Fanon was not a guerrilla leader, nor can he be considered a guerrilla theorist. But his thinking on the psychological and sociological aspects of revolution and war is something which should not be overlooked by the 40 student of guerrilla warfare. Fanon was a black Algerian psychoanalyst intensely interested in the future of blacks everywhere. At first a scholarly writer and academically oriented, Fanon became a revolutionary writer and activist; part of the reason for this change is to be found in his own profession. David Caute, a Fanon biographer, writes that in the Algerian rev olution The basic ethics of medicine which Fanon had learned in France and which he had be lieved all French doctors would respect were being disregarded on a massive scale. For where, in the rage of a colonial war, does "civilization" make its values felt? Simone de Beauvoir and the Tunisian lawyer Gisele Halimi confirm Fanon's evidence that French doctors took part in torture sessions and later denied all knowledge of the practice of torture*...Doctors were employed to revive prisoners, while psychiatrists helped to ad minister shock treatments.42 As he moved into the revolutionary camp Fanon hid terrorists in his home, obtained drugs, and trained nurses for service with the revolutionaries. In 1959 his jeep hit a mine on the Algerian-Moroccan border and he was severly injured. Counter revolutionaries blew up his car-— fortu nately for Fanon the blast was premature---and shot up a hospital room he had just vacated. After recovering, Fanon was back at work trying to organize supply lines into Algeria from the south. Frantz Fanon died in 1961 at the age of 36 from leu kemia; his moat famous book, The Wretched of the Earth, had just been published in Paris. He did not live long enough to see the Algerian revolution turn away from the ideals he had hoped for: in 1962 Ben Bella and the army put them selves into power and fit themselves into the French colo nial scheme; in 1965 Boumedienne and the army threw out Ben Bella. The situation is familiar, even to the symbology: 41 There are today a Boulevard Frantz Fanon and a Frantz Fanon High School in Algiers. But after the victory the Algerian peasants once again dispersed, reverting to small- scale individual farming and to the eternal struggle to draw life out of the soil.43 This was not what Fanon had wanted. He saw great things arising out of the decolonization process. It transforms spectators crushed with their inessentiality into privileged actors, with the grandiose glare of history's flood lights upon them. It brings a natural rhythm into existence, introduced by new men, and with it a new language and a new humanity. Decolonization is the veritable creation of new men. But this creation owes nothing of its legitimacy to any supernatural power; the "thing** which has been colonized becomes man during the same process by which it frees it self. 54 Thus, decolonization would not only drive out the colonists, change the social structure, and free the en slaved, it would create a new man, a new society, and the dynamics of a new world. Violence used in colonial revolt unifies the people in their common struggle and common danger, this was clear to Fanon, but it also affects the individual. the potential new man. At the level of Individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and re stores his self-respect. Even if the armed struggle has been symbolic and the nation is demobilized through a rapid movement of de colonization, the people have the time to see that the liberation has been the business of each and all and that the leader has no spe cial merit. From thence comes that type of aggressive reticence with regard to the ma chinery of protocol which young governments quickly show. When the people have taken violent part in the national liberation they will allow no one to set themselves up as 42 Mliberators."45 The MThird World," bom and unified In violent rebel lion against the dehumanization of European colonialism, would grow into the force necessary to lead the entire world into a new age. Fanon*s vision is deeply grounded in violence. This is what is best known about his work, and it is true that his whole theory revolves around violence dealt out by the peasant population of a colonial country. Violence alone, violence committed by the people, violence organized and educated by its leaders, makes it possible for the masses to understand social truths and gives the key to them. Without that struggle, without that knowledge of the practice of action, there's nothing save a minimum of readaptation, a few reforms at the top, a flag waving: and down there at the bottom an undivided mass, still living in the middle ages, endlessly marking time. Violence proves to the "powerless" peasant that he can change things, he can create his own world. Sartre, in his preface to The Wretched of the Earth, makes this point very strongly: "...to shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time: there remain a dead man, and a free man..."47 The oppressed peasant frees himself, and at the same time develops a sense of what constitutes his own oppression, thus forearming himself against the rise of neo-colonialism— colonialism perpetrated upon him by his own people,for the benefit of the former colonial power, or a new colonial power. Oppression by anyone becomes a for eign menace, to be dealt with in the same manner as the all too concrete European oppressor. Fanon was realist enough to perceive that the real struggle comes after the armed overthrow of the old order. He 8pent many pages detailing the quick corruption of revo- 43 lutionary leaders, the return of the corrupt civil service, the rise of tribal dictatorships, and the expedient ac tions of the urban middle class. The way to avoid this, or defeat it if it comes into being, is to place revolution ary faith in the countryside. The peasants must use their newly discovered powers to force the party, the leader, the bureaucrat, the state to direct itself toward them, toward the masses, rather than toward emulation of an urbanized, industrialized, "sophisticated" Europe. In a stirring concluding chapter Fanon makes his plea to the peasant masses of the Third World unmistakably clear. He writes: We must leave our dream and abandon our old beliefs and friendships from the time before life began. Let us waste no time in sterile litanies and nauseating mimicry. Leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them, at the corner of every one of their own streets, in all the comers of the globe.48 and: Two centuries ago, a former European colony decided to catch up with Europe. It succeeded so well that the United States of America be came a monster, in which the taints, the sick ness, and the inhumanity of Europe have grown to appalling dimensions.49 and, finally: If we want to turn Africa into a New Europe, and America into a new Europe, then let us leave the destiny of our countries to Europeans. They will know how to do it better than the most gift ed among us. But if we want humanity to advance a step further, if we want to bring it up to a different level than that which Europe has shown it, then we must invent and we must make discoveries.50 Although Sully calls Fanon the theoretician of the Algerian National Liberation Front^ it is clear that most of his ideas were not taken to heart, either in Algeria or the rest of the Third World. Caute points out that Fanon 44 is read widely in Europe and America (he was the black rev olutionary author for American blacks at one point), but that he is little read or known by "the wretched of the earth" he sought to free. And he certainly is not followed by those leaders thrust into power by the anti-colonial movement which has freed most, if not all, of the Third World peoples. The neo-colonialism Fanon so feared runs rampant throughout that new world. * * * GEORGE GRIVAS Cyprus is a Mediterranean island 3,572 square miles in area, with a population of about a half million at the time of the revolt against British rule: 1955-1959 (Con necticut, by comparison, has 5,009 square miles and 3,032,217 people.) This revolt was led by the Archbishop of Cyprus, Makarios, and a Greek Colonel, Grivas. It was carried out according to a "General Flan" that Grivas brought with him from Greece. And this revolt was success ful on the basis of only guerrilla warfare (in the mili tary sphere of the struggle)---there was no movement to a second stage of regular armies. These four points: the size of the country, the role of the church, the "Plan," and the one-stage nature of the war, are each somewhat out of the ordinary and thus worthy of our study. The small area of Cypus is in contrast to the vast ness of China, the emptyness of Arabia and Algeria, and even the relative spaciousness of Vietnam and Cuba. The fact that a guerrilla war was to be fought in such tight quarters necessitated, as we shall see, changes in strategy and tactics. 45 The influence of organized religion lends a certain strangeness to the Cypriot struggle as this is not tradi tional guerrilla warfare strategy. But in Cyprus it was quite effective; Grivas (alias Dighenis, a legendary Greek hero) handled the military operation, Makarios the politi cal. Sully comments that, For the political part of the liberation campaign, Grivas could rely on Archbishop Makarios, whose strong moral authority help ed persuade the Orthodox Church of Cyprus to take an active lead in the movement for inde pendence. For centuries the bishops of Cy prus have been the recognized leaders of this nation. For this reason, the alliance be tween General Grivas and the intractable Makarios was a formidable obstacle to British plans to retain sovereignty over the strate gically located island.52 From March 1956 to April 1957 Makarios was exiled to the Syechelles Islands. In the autumn of 1958 Makarios proposed that Cyprus pass through a period of self-govern ment and then become a completely independent state; nego tiations between the parties (England, Greece, and Turkey) were held in early 1959, and in March of that year Grivas returned to Greece, as Makarios became the chief Greek Cypriot representative in the government of Cyprus. In December he was elected President of the country. The bat tle against the British had been won, both on the island and in the international diplomatic arena, but, unfortunat ely, the animosity between Greek and Turkish Cypriots had increased, threatening civil war on several occasions. Thus, much of the credit for the revolt's success must go to Makarios, It is the nature of things, however, that Makarios's efforts would have been in vain had it not been for the attention Grivas's guerrillas brought to Cyprus: the British colonial position was brought out into the full light of international diplomacy and public opin ion, and a clamor arose that something be done. Without 46 the guerrilla struggle this would not have occurred and the question would not have been examined by the world or, more importantly, by the British themselves. This brings us to Grivas's "General Plan of Insur rectionary Action in Cyprus." Grivas had a good background for writing such a plan: he had attended the Military Academy in Athens, pursued military studies in France, was a staff officer in the Greek Army, joined the underground against the German and Italian invaders (organizing the Xhi group), and fought the Communists in the Greek civil war (1947-1949); in these last two struggles Grivas was allied with the British. With this background Grivas made two personal reconnaissances of the island and then drew up his "Plan." It is broken up into convenient headings used be low. Aim. The aim of the guerrilla movement was to "... draw the attention of international public opinion, espe cially among the allies of Greece, to the Cyprus question which might prove a source of trouble to them unless a 53 settlement were found that satisfied our claims." The British would be continuously harassed, showing them that the revolutionaries would not yield; this would be in con junction with a diplomatic struggle focused on England and the United Nations. The settlement sought must be "in accordance with the aspirations of the Cypriot people and the whole Greek nation. Two major points are evident in this outline of aims. First, military victory is not the goal. Grivas realized that this was nearly impossible given the context he was working in. Second, the aim was to meet Greek aspirations — Greeks sought reunion with Greece (enosis)---and ignore those of the Turkish Cypriots (one-third of the island's population). This narrowness of view was to cause problems as time passed. 47 Procedure. The target was the British Government in Cyprus and the attacks would consist of: (1) sabotage of government installations and military camps, (2) guerrilla attacks on British forces, and (3) passive resistance of the Cypriot population. Sabotage was the prime weapon be cause of the small size of the island. Thus, "The military task of the combat units will have as its principal aim the cover and support of the saboteurs* work, as well as to confuse and divert the attention of the British administra tion in Cyprus. An integral part of this procedure was the support of the Greek nation. Propaganda efforts would be aimed at achieving manifestations of this support such as demonstra tions and calls for international action against the British. A group known as the "Athens Committee" would handle this aspect of the revolt. Sabotage. Special groups dealing in sabotage would remain in the cities and towns of their operations unless in great danger of discovery. Targets would be chosen "by the Leader himself" (Grivas) insuring coordination and economy of effort. Pistols, grenades, dynamite, timebombs, and mines of various types would be the saboteurs' weaponry. Guerrilla Shock Groups. These were the guerrilla groups in the countryside. Their missions were: (1) to assist the saboteurs with cover, support, and operations to cut lines of communication, (2) to harass the police posts and neutralize them, and (3) to carry out missions against military targets as circumstances permit. Grivas went into some detail in outlining where the groups would be formed, how many men they would have, and what kinds and numbers of weapons. Each of the groups would have its own hide-out to serve as a base and a refuge. The groups were not to stand and fight a superior force; they were to disperse and re- 48 group later. Organization of Passive Resistance. This organizing effort was aimed at getting the people to boycott British and Cypriot agents (who would be dealt with by execution squads), to demonstrate, to raise their level of knowledge about the struggle. Intelligence Centres. There would be one such center in each military district to amass intelligence on British troop movements and targets. Supplies. Each group would obtain its own food locally. "In addition, each group should have within its area a reserve stock of tinned food for emergency; any con sumed should be made good as soon as possible.Grivas carried this one step further in light of the fact that the small, and often open, area of the island made hiding out for days a frequent necessity: he had his men carry an eight-day supply of food with them into battle. General. Hide-outs in towns must be set up for people on missions or hiding from arrest. Preliminary Preparations. Four things were done: (I) arms were dispatched to Cyprus (from Greece), (2) Grivas went to Cyprus to spend at least three months detailing the organization and drawing up instructions for the groups, (3) arrangements were made to supply the revolutionary com mittee in Cyprus with material support, and (4) a Benevo lent Fund was established for the families of victims of the struggle. It might be strange, without knowing anything of Grivas himself, to accept the fact that the "Plan" was car ried out with few alterations. This is not because Grivas would not change— -he demanded flexibility— but because he had a passion for organization, especially when it concern ed himself. A meticulous organizer, he left nothing to 49 chance. For example, for months he ate noth ing but citrus fruits, he trained himself physically for the hardships to come, and he destroyed ail his old clothes so no British scout dog could get a scent from them.57 What makes Grivas's "Flan" so interesting is that it is one of the very few times in the history of guerrilla warfare where a detailed plan of action was laid out before the battle had begun---and then adhered to throughout the course of the war. The usual rule is for events to unfold in the ebb and flow of a struggle, and the "plan" to be outlined after-the-fact with the benefit of a rationaliz ing, tidying-up, abstracting hindsight. Grivas enjoyed the luxuries of premeditation and luck: he was not forced into the struggle to save his skin, nor were his plans disrupted by enemy action or unforeseen events. He drew up his plan and then executed it. This execution was strictly guerrilla in nature. This is the fourth major point to be gleaned from the Cyprus revolt. In his work on guerrilla warfare, Grivas noted this aspect of the struggle and the fact that his ideas fly in the face of the conventional wisdom which calls for a transformation of the struggle from guerrilla to conventional warfare. I suggest that the above-mentioned belief is not wholly correct. The best proof is pro vided by the Cypriot liberation campaign which from start to finish used guerrilla methods in the rural districts and underground warfare in the towns, and where a mere handful of combat ants for four full years was able to stand up successfully to a regular army which towards the end numbered 40,000 men; which moreover compelled the political leadership to reach a settlement of the Cyprus question even if, as things turned out, this settlement did not satisfy the Cypriot demand for self-determina tion. 58 Grivas added that the Algerian revolt vriiich finally led to independence from France was similar, in this 50 respect, to the struggle in Cyprus. He concluded that when the aim is a political final solution, then guerrilla war fare can be the sole tool. Arthur Campbell points out that it was not all suc cess in Cyprus, as might be implied in Grivas's work. "By March 1957, Colonel Grivas' armed guerrillas had nearly all been captured or killed, his courier system was in disar ray and many of his more active sympathisers in deten tion. "59 This resulted from the British being able to re lease troops from the Suez into Cyprus. Grivas's guerril las came back, however, and were active right up to the political solution which had been their aim. •k it * Guerrilla wars, particularly in the years following the "early" period have been fought for increasingly spe cific reasons. The motivation runs deeper than societal "code" dictating a state of warfare periodically or any supposed aggressive "need" to fight. The motivation can be negative (against something) or positive (for something). Douglas Hyde, in a book titled The Roots of Guerrilla Warfare, lists those roots which seem most closely tied to the rise of Communist armed struggles, and they reflect, generally, the roots of all modem revolutionary wars. These are: nationalism land hunger desire for rapid change problems experienced by the emergent proletariat of the towns the frustrations of the educated group racial minorities under-administered areas boredom and monotony of life in remote rural areas corruption 51 bad human relations and a failure to communicate by government60 Campbell lists "A Cause" as the first condition for successful revolution. "A cause is essential to a revolu tion since it is only by offering them something worth fighting for that the revolutionaries will divorce the pop ulation from the government to whom their loyalty is wed ded and stimulate active opposition to the existing regime."*** And while "The cause may be of a political, social, economic, racial or even of a trumped-up nature," it must win the support of the masses. For no guerrilla warfare activist and/or theoretician proposes to win with out the support of the people. Over the years we can see a change in the type of cause which motivated people to armed revolt. Partisan warfare was the dominant type of guerrilla warfare in World War II; the cause was survival and anti-German, anti- Italian, or anti-Japanese operations. In the wake of the war and the invincibility of the European powers being broken for all colonial peoples to see the cause became anti-colonialism; guerrilla wars broke out throughout the world (often the extension of Allied-sponsored partisan movements) to overthrow the colonial empires. After the wave of ceremonies bringing down imperial flags passed, the guerrilla movements moved into their present stage: anti- neo-colonialism with social and class motivations. This last stage is not synonymous with Communist guerrilla warfare. Grivas's EOKA in Cyprus was not Commu nist; the Algerian revolt was not Communist (nor was Frantz Fanon); even the Cuban Revolution was not Communist (com munist with a small "c" perhaps, particularly in the case of Guevara) until well after victory was in sight. In fact, a good case can be made for the idea that the inter national Communist movement (Moscow) has actually been a 52 hindrance to revolutionary movements throughout the world, due to its own inherent misperceptions and its dogmatic attachment to the "word" of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. Be cause of the struggles within itself, however, the develop ment of Communist revolutionary thought is a guide to the development of such thought in general. Three main changes can be seen in the Communist line. First, the change from the idea of the quick and relatively clean revolution to the protracted struggle. Second, the move from the city as the revolutionary base to the coun tryside. And third, the drastic change in vanguards from the proletariat to the rural peasantry. These changes were forced by changes in the situation. Marx, like any other man, was a creature of his times; and his times featured violent upheavals in the city. 1848 was a year of violence: an insurrection in Palermo; revolution in France; political demonstrations throughout Germany; riots in Berlin, Vienna, and Madrid; an uprising in Milan; a revolution in Budapest; a rising in Cracow; a civil war in Catalonia; riots in Seville and Vienna; uprisings in Madrid and Posen; and insurrection in Baris. It is not surprising that thereafter when Marx and Engels thought of political power changing hands they tended to assume that this would most probably be achieved by violence. They assumed, also, that it would come about as a result of a short sharp struggle in the cities, the centres of power.62 All of these revolutions ended in failure, which should have told the Marxists something. And it did. It told them that more time was needed to organize the proletariat; the move to the unions was be gun when the street barricades proved vulnerable to newly designed cities (with wide boulevards and wide-open fields of fire for soldiers with modem weapons, professional 53 soldiers) run by the upper classes In concert. Unions, working class parties, electoral struggles, and interna tional cooperation became dominant themes. At this point, The viewpoint of Marx on the use of arm ed struggle by the working class is perhaps best illustrated by the experience of the Paris Commune in 1871. On the eve of the Commune, Marx warned against a premature re volt by the Parisian workers who lacked a genuine proletarian party at their head and had insufficient mass organization, but were being urged by proponents of coup d’ etat tactics to take advantage of the chaos fol- iowing the shattering German victory in the Franco-Prussian War, to seize power from both the counter-revolutionary aristocrats and the capitualationist bourgeoisie.63 The infatuation with the quick victorious struggle was over. The Communist success in Russia in 1917 could be squeezed into the Marxist model (with difficulty of course: witness Leon Trotsky) and thus the idea of the not-so-quick seizure of power in the cities by the proletariat took root. The lack of other successes in capitalist countries was explained by Lenin: "...mature revolutionary situa tions..." had not yet developed. The Communist convention al wisdom was safe. But following World War II came the anti-colonial risings— -and the enormous, crushing victory of Mao Tse- tung in China. It now became apparent that perhaps the Marxist formula was not suited for developing nations. This certainly was the thinking of revolutionaries in those countries, revolutionaries who could not conceive of wait ing for the development of a proletariat before beginning the struggle. The question now became, "Who really con stitutes the vanguard?" This was the question that nearly destroyed the Party in China, until Mao answered it deci sively-— with his actions if not his words. 54 Mao'8 success gave the Communist line new credibility throughout the Third World. No longer must a proletariat be present, no longer must the cities be the center of the struggle, no longer was over-whelming force (necessary for quick victory) a prerequisite. Communist theory had caught up with Communist activists; these activists had never questioned the goal that classless society Marx vaguely outlined---only the means. And with Mao we enter that "age of the guerrilla." To elaborate on the concepts of guerrilla warfare in our "age" in a way that will be enlightening as well as interesting 1 have chosen three men to study. These men are commonly acknowledged by experts in the field to be the three most important writer-activists extant. Samuel Griffith in his introduction to Mao Tse-tung's On Guerrilla Warfare.^ goes into detail on three revolutions: Cuba, Vietnam, and, of course, China. Roger Hilsman, in his foreward to Vo Nguyen Giap's People's War People's Armv^ gives grudging credit to two other guerrilla leaders: Che Guevara and Mao Tse-tung. Jay Mallin, in his introduction to a collection of Che Guevara's writings titled "Che" Guevara on Revolution has this to say: The leading Communist theoreticians of guerrilla warfare have been China's Mao Tse- tung, Viet Nam's Vo Nguyen Giap, and Cuba's Ernesto Guevara. All three have written extensively about guerrilla warfare; all three have experienced successful campaigns.66 And, finally, John Pustay in his Counterinsureencv Warfare devotes chapter 3, "The Evolution of Communist Theory on Insurgency Warfare: An Historical Perspective," to the Soviets, Mao, Giap, and Che.*^ The fact that these writers all knowledgeable in the field, feel that these three men are the essence of modem guerrilla warfare is a help in narrowing down the field, but there are other rea sons to settle on Mao, Giap, and Che. Fist, all three are 55 essentially post-World War II men. True, both Mao and Giap began well before that war, but their best years and their triumphs came following the war. This time factor is im portant, for what was applicable in Marx's day (as we have seen) is not necessarily applicable today. Second, each man represents a different situation. Massive China, standing alone in its struggle. Smaller Vietnam, aided by China and fighting a series of powerful foes. Tiny Cuba, in an internal battle not connected with the end of World War II. Two Eastern nations, one Western. The guiding lights of revolutionaries in the East, and of the West. Dogmatic Communists in the East, and the humanist communist in the West. And so on. Third, and finally, each of the three is a different model of man and a different type of guerrilla. Mao stands at the pinnacle combining both the political leadership and the military leadership, the only one to gain supreme political position after his war. Giap, the military man supreme. And Che, the military leader, philosopher of com munism and revolution, and the only one to lead a group "exporting" revolution. (In addition, Che is the major guerrilla writer on "Post-Victory:" the activities of guer rillas after they achieve power; he also is the only major guerrilla writer who has written a true "handbook" for guerrilla warfare.) Hopefully, this range of ideas, actions, and human types will give us a broad enough, deep enough range of knowledge and understanding to allow us to reach our own conclusions. If a synthesis arises out of a study of these three men, then that part of aim of this study will have been accomplished; if a model of guerrilla warfare emerges then the foundation will have been laid for further work, more immediately relevant to our time and situation. To the New Guerrilla. 56 * * ★ The format used in the following sections on Mao, Giap, and Che needs a word or two of explanation. The gen eral idea is to let these men speak in their own words as much as possible. Their words have been grouped into five categories: Philosophy, Organization, Strategy, Tactics, and Post-Victory. There is a danger in using categories: it tends to break up what is essentially a seamless web; but there is also a benefit: it allows us to focus on cer tain aspects of guerrilla warfare and then, later, to move from point to point (and extrapolate and make analogies) within these categories; in short it makes the material manageable. So that is the first thing to be careful of: don't forget that guerrilla warfare is a seamless web. A second pitfall is my restriction to English sources. This means that the various people who translate these materials have already "filtered" the material. A lack of fluency in Eastern languages makes this restriction manda tory, but it is important to remember that this restric tion is there: what follows does not represent a sampling from everything these men have written. The words of these three by themselves would not be enough. Something of their background, their times, and so forth needs to be added. This need is met in a short bio graphy of each man before his work is presented. No man is free from these influences and they help us to round out our picture of the man and his work. Finally, to avoid the bias which must necessarily be a part of every individual's writing-— particularly impassioned writing in service of a Cause— there are brief commentaries following the present ation of the work itself. These commentaries are restrict ed to salient points by key authors in order to avoid re dundancy. Still, there is the possibility of being over- 57 whelmed by each man's words and losing perspective and balance; this is the third pitfall. Finally, I have left out most material concerning the Communist Party (in Che's case this material is largely non-existent), leaving in enough to indicate its basic im portance. All three wrote much, if not most, of their work for internal consumption, not for academicians and "estab lishment" readers, and this too must be kept in mind. We need to avoid the pitfall of writing these men off because of rhetoric or style. If these pitfalls can be avoided much valuable infor mation can be obtained and digested and synthesized into a model of guerrilla warfare. From this model, yours and mine, we can move into the world of the New Guerrilla. In academic terms this is our "data base ," from which many leaps of faith and hope have been made in the past and will be made in the future. With that in mind we can move into these three men, Mac* Giap, and Che. CHAPTER 2 : M AO Every Communist must grasp the truth: "Polit ical power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun will never be allowed to command the Party. But it is also true that with guns at our disposal we can really build up the Party organi sations, and the Eight Route Army has built up a powerful Party organisation in North China. We can also rear cadres and create schools, culture and mass movements. Everything in Yenan has been built up by means of the gun. Anything can grow out of the barrel of a gun.l 58 59 BIOGRAPHY Mao Tse-tung was bom on December 26, 1893 in the village of Shaoshan in Hunan province. His father, Mao Shun-sheng began as a poor peasant, but after a time in the army he had become a dealer in rice and pigs, and a land owner. Mao recalls that when he was ten his father was a "middle peasant" and later became a "rich peasant" and 2 grain merchant. His mother*s name was Wen Ch'i-mei; he had two brothers, Tse-t'an and Tse-min, and a sister, Tse- hung. As was the rule in Chinese families, Mao's father was a tyrant and his mother was loving and kind. And Mao participated, as did most children in the Buddhism of his mother. Mao started working on his family's land at the age of five and began his formal education with a tutor or in the traditional primary schools. Regardless of the source, Mao got the usual grounding in the Confucian classics; "To supplement this dry fare, Mao, like all Chinese schoolboys of his generation, read the popular novels compiled a few centuries earlier from oral traditions, covering them up % with a classic when his teacher walked by." These novels, particularly The Monkey. Romance of the Three Kingdoms, and Water Margin, are normally associated with Mao's later thought (Water Margin, for example has stories of revolu tionary bandits pitted against a corrupt court and bu reaucracy) to some extent. This connection may be stronger than a westerner would assume, however, due to traditional Chinese reverence for the written word. (Lifton ch VI) Whatever the strength of this connection, Mao showed untraditional resistance to his father's tyranny and the harshness of his school environment, running away from each at least once. In 1904, when he was eleven, Mao was expos- 60 ed to the idea of insurrection on a political level: the Empress Dowager's troops marched through the area on their way to Changsha, the provincial capital, to put down the revolutionary, Hwang Hsing. In 1906 there was a famine and rice riots broke out in Changsha and the governor ordered the rioters executed. Reports vary as to Mao's reactions to these events, but even in this mixed-feelings situation, it is clear that the topic of revolution had broken through the traditional peasant stance of subservience and distaste for disorder. When he was thirteen Mao left his schooling to work fulltime for his father in the fields and with the accounts. His parents found him a wife (four years his senior) and they were married. Mao reports that the marriage was never consummated;^ he later repudiated it and was to find more satisfying marriages later. Life with the family continued to pale for Mao and he sought more formal education. At the age of sixteen Mao entered the Tungshan Pri mary School in Hsianghsiang; this was a modem higher pri mary school and opened Mao's perspectives considerably. As is the case with many Asian revolutionaries, a conscious ness of nationalism arose in Mao's mind before anything else: shortly before leaving for Hsianghsiang he read a pamphlet which deplored China's loss of territories (Korea, Indochina, etc.) and he later marked this as the beginning of his political consciousness.^ At the school Mao was in the company of rich students: Poverty-stricken, given the worst food and the worst sleeping quarters, hating the other students, who referred to him as 'the dirty little peasant from Shao Shan,' Mao had only one resource, his excellence at his work. He studied hard, melted down old candles to fash ion new ones, hid at night over his books while the other students were asleep, and was soon at the head of his class, only to discover that he was now even more despised for being diligent.6 61 Mao's isolation at school threw him back upon books and this is one trait that stayed with him throughout his life. One book that moved him while at the school was Great Heroes of the World, a collection of biographies. Mao was particularly impressed by George Washington: Wash ington had defeated a strong colonial power through years of fighting and had created a nation; China needed such men. In 1911 Mao moved to Changsha to attend the middle school there. Sun Yat-sen'B movement was gaining strength and at the middle school Mao read his first newspaper---a Sun Yat-sen one. The fourth Kuomintang uprising occurred: Hwang Hsing attacked the Canton yamen (government headquar ters), only to be defeated. "Mao was so excited by all this, and by his reading of the newspaper, that he wrote his first article and pasted it on the school wall."^ But philosophies were so confused, the situation so changing, and Mao's thinking so undeveloped that his early writing had no clear direction. He did, however, cut off his own pigtail and those of students who had promised to do so but had backed down ("queue-chopping expeditions"). A representative of the revolutionaries spoke at the school and Mao began preparations to leave and join the revolutionary army. Before he was finished, however, the revolution broke out in Changsha itself. So Mao joined the army there hoping to march on Peking, but Sun's negotia tions with the warlords who had taken power upon the col lapse of the Manchu dynasty denied him that. Mao's service consisted of garrison duty in the service of the younger officers. Sun reached his agreement and Mao left the army --the revolution was over and Mao began to think in terms of a career for himself. He read the advertisements in the papers and toyed with the idea of a trade (soap-making), a police school, law, and commerce. He actually attended a commercial 62 school for a month, but left because most of the work was in English, and he knew very little* He then entered the First Middle School in Changsha— -only to leave after six months. Deciding to educate himself, Mao spent the last half of 1912 reading all day in the Hunan Provincial Library. Here he read through much of the body of Western litera ture: Wealth of Nations. Origin of Species. Huxley's Evolution and Ethics. Mill*s Logic. Spencer's Study of Sociology. Montesquieu's Esprit des lois. Rousseau's Du Contrat social, and so on. Even more important, he was able to read the newspapers and get some idea of contempo rary events. "He also saw for the first time a map of the world and made a study of the history and geography of Russia, the United States, England, France, and other coun tries. "® He knew now what he wanted to be: the eternal student, the man who goes to college and never leaves, delaying his graduation from year to year, accepting some small posi tion in the college-— a junior librarian or a bursar's assistant happy in his reading, and in the absence of responsibilities. He entered the Teachers' Training College at Changsha with Hsiao San (an old friend from the Brimary School), and there he stayed for nearly six years.® These years in school came during a tumultuous time in Chinese politics as the warlord class fought the Kuomintang for control of the country. But Mao had entered a different world and "The turmoil from 1913 bo 1918 natu rally affected Mao in many ways but did not involve him personally."10 He had, however, found two teachers who in fluenced him greatly. Yuan Liu-chi disliked Mao's style as an essayist and changed it from one modeled on Liang Ch'i-ch'ao to one fol lowing Han Yu. Mao thus learned to produce passable classi 63 cal essays---an ability not to be underestimated in Chinese Society. Yang Ch'ang-chi was the professor of ethics at the school and took a liking to Mao. He was strongly moral and had been to Japan, Germany, and England; he lent books to Mao and praised his essays highly. Yang was a believer in Ch'en Tu-hsiu's ideas on progress: democracy and science would reshape China in the pattern of the West, and intro duced Mao to Ch'en1s review Hsin Ch*ing-nien (New Youth). Yang retained his traditional background, however, making his teaching a blend of East and West. In 1915 the School decided to collect a small sum from each student to cover miscellaneous expenses. A pro test arose and Mao eventually wrote the student's manifes to, which was printed and distributed. The School decided to expell Mao and fifteen others, but Yuan, Yang, and two others intervened. Mao distributed pamphlets at the school, leading to some interest shown him by the police. And he participated in driving out some troops who had oc cupied the school ("From 1913 to 1918 Hunan had only one year of peace---the year 1914. Each time there was war, the school had to close down until tranquility returned.")** At the school Mao was exposed to socialism for the first time, and by the start of World War I he considered himself a socialist. But his first published article (April 1917 in Hsin Ch*ing-nien) was a system of exercises he had devised entitled "A Study of Physical Culture". Mao preached physical culture as a means of aiding the Chinese people in withstanding foreign invasions through military action. By this time, then, Mao had become an adherent of Chinese nationalism and was willing to contemplate mili tary means to accomplish the dictates of that belief. This developing of Mao's thinking naturally led to organizations and organizing. 64 As early as 1915, Mao had been elected secretary of the Students' Society at the Normal School, and in this and other con texts he showed himself unceasingly active in promoting both the study of new ideas and the struggle against rigid and old- fashioned notions of discipline. One of his first and most characteristic initiatives was the creation of an "Association for Student Self-Government," primarily with the object of organizing the students for collective resistance against such demands of the school authorities as seemed unreasonable.12 Mao soon went beyond this, putting an advertisement in a Changsha newspaper to gather patriotic people together. This resulted in the founding of The New Citizens Society (also called New Peoples Study Society) in April 1918; "This was one of the most radical student societies in all of China at the time; virtually its entire membership ulti- 13 mately joined the Communist Party." Along with the founding of the Society came the end of school for Mao: the School advanced the date of gradu ation because the provincial governor wanted it for a head quarters, and Mao and his class were thus graduated. Many members of the Society were going to France to study and Mao decided to go to Peking with them for their departure. So, in May he turned the chairmanship of the Society over to another and made plans for the group's departure (he was commander-in-chief of the trip) and left with them in Sep tember. Travel to France was not Mao's main purpose in go ing to Peking, however, since he remained in China when the group left; Mao evidently saw Peking as the next step in his education and the next phase in his activism-— the two grew, interrelatedly, throughout his life. In July, 1918 Li Ta-chao (who with Ch'en Tu-hsiu was a principal founder of the Communist Chinese Party) pub lished his first article on the Russian Revolution; his second, and more famous one, "The Victory of Boshevism" was 65 published in October. Mao had arrived at the right place at the right time. He was able to get a menial job (through Yang Chang- chi, then lecturing there who took him to see Li-Ta-chao the librarian) in the Peking University library, but he was rejected by the students and professors alike, who treated him like a coolie. He again retreated into his reading: Kropotkin, Bakhunin, and Tolstoy among them; he announced that he was an anarchist. Things brightened for Mao as he became better acquainted with Yang's daughter, Yang K'ai- hui. Mao joined the Philosophy and Journalism societies and thus gained the right to attend classes. He also join ed the Marxist Study Group which Li had founded earlier. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, dean of the faculty of Chinese letters, also Influenced him but along the lines of democracy and sci ence. The answers seemed to lie in the West, but at this point in China's history no one was quite sure exactly where in the West to find the anwers for China's particular situation. Early in 1919 Mao accompanied another group of stu dents leaving for France to Shanghai. "As usual, he made most of the journey on foot. Wandering was by now in his blood, and he was determined to wander over all the histor ic places, walk around all the historic walls, and make his way down all the historic roads.Finally, Mao returned to Changsha— -his mother was seriously ill and soon died. Hunan at this time was in ferment. Not only was the military governor brutal, but he represented the pro-Japa- nese clique now in control in Peking. The flash point was reached when the Chinese delegation at the Paris Peace Con ference accepted concessions to the Japanese. The massive student demonstrations on May 4, 1919 gave rise to the May 4th Movement. Mao quickly became involved with his old 66 Society and helped create a United Students' Association in the province in June. Numerous other groups arose, and Mao had a hand in their creation and activities. He also became editor of the Hsiane River Review and it is here that he published his most important work of the period, "The Great Union of the Popular Masses" (nos. 2,3, and 4), focusing on unity and organization as the keys to victory. "The contending sides of a reform or a re volt in history, be it a religious, ideological, social, or political struggle," he wrote, "must each have its unity, for victory depends on the resiliance of the unity. The triumph of the October Revolution was the triumph of the unity of the Russian people."13 Such talk was not appreciated by the governor and he banned the paper. He also closed the Hsin Hunan soon after Mao took over its editorship; Mao then wrote articles for the leading Changsha daily, Ta Kune Pao. Following more organizing, student strikes, and a cer tain amount of violence, Mao went to Peking. His trip in January 1920 was to get outside support and also to put some distance between himself and provincial authorities for a while. During his stay Mao read extensively, includ ing his first reading of the Communist Manifesto: this reading of Marx, Engels, and Kautsky completed his conver sion to Communism and he wrote to the Society in Changsha advising them to set up Marxist study groups. At the end of the month Yang Ch'ang-chi died and Mao most certainly helped console his daughter. In April Mao went to Shanghai and met with Ch'en Tu- hsiu. Chen had recently been released from 6 months deten tion for his support of the May 4th Movement and had turned more strongly to Marxism in prison. Their meeting reinfor ced Mao's own belief in Communism. During his stay in Shanghai Mao worked as a laundryman his first taste of 67 the life of an urban worker. The power struggle in Peking brought a change in the governorship in Hunan. As a result of this a former teach er of Mao's,I P'ei-chi, became director of the Normal Schools and appointed Mao director of the primary school attached to the First Normal School. Mao had supported the more liberal side in the warring going on, and when that side gained the upper hand, his support (and his friend ship with I P'ei-chi) paid off. This position gave Mao considerable status in Changsha and facilitated his efforts to in fluence public opinion in the province. It al so gave him for the first time a certain mate rial basis for his existence and even a degree of comfort. This combination of status and financial stability influenced not only his professional and political activities, but al so his personal life, for it undoubtedly made possible his marriage to Yang K'ai-hui in the following winter, lo The second half of 1920 saw Mao organizing in Hunan province. A Communist group had been established in Peking and Mao now began setting one up closer to home. He set up a bookstall, financed by shareholders. The Changsha oper ation (Culture Bookshop) opened in September, and within a few months seven branches were established in other Hunan towns. The profits from selling the socialist and Marxist books and periodicals were later used to finance the crea tion of a Communist party. In August 1920 Mao had helped found a Russian affairs study group, in September came the Society for the Study of Marxism, and in December he established a branch of the Socialist Youth Corps. Mao's work is indicative of that going on throughout China as the tiny intellectual class combined with the student population in organizations in creasingly Communist and increasingly militant in outlook. By the spring of 1921 there were six "small groups" of Communists in China itself (at Shang- 68 hai, Peking, Changsha, Wuhan, Canton, and Tsinan), and one formed by the Chinese students in Paris, After some preliminary discussions, the First Congress of the party met at Shanghai in July 1921. Among those attending were two delegates from each of the six groups existing in China at this time, plus one representative of the Chinese in Japan, thirteen in all.... The congress was also attended by two Comin tern delegates. Voltinsky had been joined recently by a Dutchman, Henricus Sneevliet, who went under the name of "Maring" and was to play a major role in determining the future orientation of the Chinese revolution.*' The congress was headed by Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Li Ta- chao, both of whom had by now resigned from Peking Univer sity. Security problems led the delegates to leave Shang hai for their meetings the final session was held on a boat on South Lake, near Chiahsing in Chekiang province. (Trouble of this kind was to become familiar: of the cen tral twelve people attending only three survived to lead the Communists to power in 1949, The congress laid out the party organization (a sec retariat for labor but none for peasants), passed resolu tions, and outlined its political action program (mainly organizing labor unions). Formal affiliation with the Comintern was rejected, apparently to avoid anti-foreign feelings, but close ties with that body were evident from the start, and the maneuvering necessitated by this mar riage was to hamper the Chinese Communist Party until Mao finally gained control of the revolution and ran it his way. Mao returned to Changsha as the secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for Hunan province. He moved to absorb the members of the various groups he had had a hand in into the party and to organize trade unions. To accomplish the first task he established the Self-education College in Changsha in August; the college soon had a pre- 69 paratory class and a newspaper. "The heresy" taught at the college (said a decree issued by the governor of Hunan, General Chao Heng-t'i) "may endan ger law and order." The college was therefore dissolved in November 1923. But a few weeks later, on 24 November, it re appeared under the innocuous name of the Hsiang-chiang Middle School.19 The organization of trade unions was more difficult: Hunan was industrially underdeveloped, and the large body of workers was in the coal mines of west Kiangsi. Mao and Li Li-san set up day classes for their children, formed a Workmen's Club, and thus gained the confidence of the work ers. These miners struck in 1922, as did the railroad workers on the Canton-Hankow line. The strikes were even tually successful wages and conditions were bettered--- and the trade union movement was on its way. Mao's work kept him in Hunan and he missed the Second and Third Congresses of the party. (The question of the Third Congress is open to debate: Payne says Mao was pre sent only at some preliminaries in Shanghai, while Ch'en and Schram say he attended) The Third Congress decided to cooperate with The Kuomintang (KMT)---on the advice of the Moscow representative Borodin---and this was a major step in the history of the party. Mao attended the First National Congress of the Kuomintang Party in Canton in January 1924 as a member of that Party. The Kuomintang it self at this time was influenced heavily by the Soviet Union, and thus the marriage was not as difficult as it might seem. Mao returned to Shanghai in March 1924 as the secre tary of the organization department of the Shanghai branch of the party and a member of the Shanghai Bureau of the Kuomintang. Mao was also Hu Han-min's secretary at this point Hu was second only to Sun Yat-sen-— for about three 70 months, and this gave him a great deal of power. Mao was moving among the elites of both parties, but was not part of either elite because of his lack of acceptance by them. His humble beginnings hurt him here just as they had at Peking University. 1924 was not a good year for the Communist-Kuomintang marriage. Highly placed Kuomintang members charged the Communists with creating a bloc within the Kuomintang. An other expedition to the north was unsuccessful. Sun Yat- sen became ill with cancer and would die in the spring of 1925. Under attack by those in the Communist Party opposed to excessive cooperation with the Kuomintang and tired from overwork, Mao left Shanghai and retired to Shaoshan. Thus, as chaos broke out in China Mao was in the countryside among the peasants. This retirement was to have prodigious consequences. The Chinese Communist party under Ch'en Tu-hsiu was dedicated to the overthrow of the existing government by the methods Lenin had introduced: the proletar iat, as the advance guard of the revolution, would take over the functions of the govern ment through its elected representatives. It was the classical thesis classically un derstood. Now for the first time, as he lay in bed in his small village, Mao began to question the validity of the Communist thesis. Accustomed to compromise through his work in merging the Communist and Kuomintang parties, he began to see that the evolution of Chinese communism could come only through a period of compromise. The theory of proletarian upris ings was dubious; the force of China lay in the peasantry. Not in Canton or Shanghai, but in millions of small villages like Shao Shan, lay the seeds of the revolution.20 Mao was about to come into his own. In the spring of 1925 Mao was in the fields, organiz ing the nucleus of his future peasant armies. He did this work for three months---that was how long it took bdfore the "...tall, thin, sunburned man in a sun helmet, travel 71 21 ing under many names, looking like a land agent..." be came enough of a threat to the landlords and militarists of the province that they put a price on his head and sent soldiers to find him. By the late summer Mao was heading for Canton, Where the Party had little, if any, information on his work in Hunan. But the peasants had been affected by Mao's work and by his slogans: "Down with the militar ists!" and "Down with the rich foreigners!" ("rich foreign- 22 ers" replacing "imperialists" for simplicity's sake ), While in Hunan Mao missed the Fourth Congress of the Communist Party and the strikes of May 30th. The strikes in Shanghai and Canton had been put down by Japanese and British troops, and the Chinese urban population reacted against the killings. Mao was not part of this, nor did he become deeply involved upon his return to Canton, Instead, he was made head of the Peasant Movement Training Insti tute, and was also the secretary of the propaganda depart ment- --both of these operations were run by the KMT, and Mao's work was part of the cooperation scheme (which was supported by Stalin) but it was also a reflection of the fact that the Kuomintang evidenced much more interest in the peasantry than the Communist Party. This was the peak of Communist-Kuomintang cooperation, and Mao was at the center of it. And from his position with the Training In stitute he was creating the peasant cadres necessary for peasant revolution; when that day came their loyalties would most likely be to Mao and the form of Communism he represented and not to the orthodox Communists or to the Kuomintang. Chiang Kai-shek's Northern Expedition met with suc cess from its departure in July 1926. Part of this success was attributable to the work done among the peasants by Mao's cadres, but Chiang was not an advocate of peasant revolution and his actions in April 1927 showed where his 72 thinking lay. In that month his troops occupied Shanghai and began killing the city's Socialists and Communists; Chiang set up a government in Nanking. But Mao's work in the countryside, the movement of Chiang's troops north, and the natural development of the peasant situation had set in motion a dynamic that defined the sides in the battle to come. Early in 1927 Mao was sent to Hunan to report on the situation there, and he took this opportunity not only to write a report on the peasant up* risings but to act as a catalyst for them. By October 1926 the peasants had taken control of large areas of central Hunan---these were the peasant associations that Mao him* self had created and supplied with a steady stream of pro paganda from his KMT posts. Mao's report, "Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan" published in March 1927 found him completely on the side of the peas ants. After defending the peasants against charges of "go ing too far" and analyzing the peasant types (rich, middle, and poor), Mao listed the accomplishments ("Fourteen Great Deeds") of the peasants, led by the peasant associations. Then he closed with a paragraph that seems to set the scene for the next quarter-century: All the fourteen deeds enumerated above have been accomplished by the peasants under the leadership of the peasant associations. Considering the general spirit in which they have been carried out and the revolutionary significance they possess, I would ask the reader to think them over and say which of them is bad? I think that only the local bullies and bad gentry will say that they are bad. Curiously enough, it is reported from Nan-chang that in the opinion of Mr. Chiang Kai-shek, Mr. Chang Ching-chiang and others, the activities of the peasants in Hunan are rather to be disapproved. The opinion of Mr. Chiang and Mr. Chang is shared by Liu Yo- chih and other leaders of the right wing in 73 Hunan, who say, "This is simply going Red". But where would the national revolution be without this little bit of Red? If one shouts every day about "arousing the masses of the people", but is scared to death when the people do rise, what is the difference be tween that and Lord Sheh's love of dragons?23 Lord Sheh was so fond of dragons that he had a palace full of drawings and carvings of them, but when a real dragon heard of the Lord's love for them and came for a visit the Lord was frightened out of his wits.24 The Fifth Congress of the CCP took place shortly after Chiang's Shanghai coup. The debates reflected the shattered nature of the Party and its cooperation strate gy: Stalin clung to this strategy for reasons inherent in his struggles in Moscow while some members still sought cooperation and others sought a new way. Mao, who was ready to move, stopped attending the Congress, In partic ular, he was rapidly becoming disenchanted with Moscow's representatives and their attempts to twist Stalin's basi cally wrongheaded view of the situation into something viable; Mao saw the need for a Chinese way. Mao was sent to Hunan by the Party to organize armed uprisings by the peasants the Autumn Harvest Uprising. The aim was to put political power in the peasants' hands and to confiscate and distribute land to the poor peasants. For four months the peasants in Hunan and the surrounding provinces resisted; four regiments, made up of KMT troops who had come over, workers, and peasants were tinder Mao's command. With his troops Mao attacked Changsha, but when superior forces attacked and the Kuomintang troops went over to the other side, Mao was forced to lead the rem nants into the countryside in defeat. Reorganized as the 1st Regiment of the 1st Division of the 1st Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army, Mao's troops set up a base in the mountains of Chingkangshan. Bandits, semi-reformed by 74 political training, swelled Mao's ranks at this critical point. Mao was dismissed from the Politburo of the Party and the KMT ordered his arrest. More important for him, how ever, was the movement of Chu Teh and his army away from their defeat at Nanch'ang. While Mao was skirmishing with Kuomintang troops, Chu was approaching, and the two joined forces in May 1928. This combination of Mao, the political leader, organizing genius, and high level strategist, and Chu, the consummate military leader and tactician, was to carry the Chinese Communist Party (as defined by Mao) through long years of fighting to final victory. In Chingkangshan Mao introduced his famous series of guerrilla slogans as part of his men's training. These three rules and six injunctions (later expanded to eight simpler ones) were pragmatic details based on a rhymed verse which laid out the basic strategy: When the enemy advances, we retreat. When he escapes, we harass. Mien he retreats, we pursue. When he is tired, we attack.25 Although the maneuverings, power struggles, and ideol ogical battles continued within the Party (with Mao receiv ing information on them only after much time had passed), the real struggle had now shifted to the countryside. Mao and Chu worked to develop their army and to create a peas ant base of support; in other areas of China men with similar ideas were working along the same lines. The mili tary-political revolutionary war had opened: Mao and Chu "...counted fifty-seven minor engagements, and thirteen battles during the year they spent on Chingkan-shan; and though they destroyed the opposing armies, they were per fectly conscious that an almost inexhaustible manpower 26 would in time enable Chiang Kai-shek to annihilate them." In the face of this Mao and Chu led their army, in 75 January 1929, down from Chingkanshan into the hills of Kiangsi province. This area would be the scene of the famous five Encirclement Campaigns. It was during this period that Mao consolidated his leadership of the rural revolution. This was not an easy task, as Benjamin Schwaartz indicates in his book Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, which minutely documents the rise of Mao. Schwartz writes: It is thus clear even from official sources that Mao Tse-tung did not achieve his position of preeminence in the Soviet areas without harsh and bloody conflict. We would also suggest that all attempts to view these conflicts as simple conflicts of ideology or "class conflicts" should be regarded with suspicion, that sheer political rivalry intertwined with conflicts on major questions of strategy played a decisive role, and that Mao Tse-tung was not able to im pose his leadership without aid of a party ma chine loyal to himself.27 By the end of 1931 Mao's power was sufficient that he be came chairman of the newly created Soviet Provisional Government. The struggles often became personal for Mao. His wife and younger sister were executed by the Kuomintang in Changsha in July 1930. As Mao gained control over the revolution the pic ture became clearer, and took on the simplicity of military history. In recounting the course of events, however, the fact that the revolution was basically an organizational effort among the peasants must not be lost sight of. Mili tary victory was achieved, to be sure, but that victory would have been impossible without the peasant's support. In this area Mao reigned supreme: he and Chu divided the work, with Mao being the civilian leader and Chu the mili tary. Mao and Chu won the first four Encirclement Campaigns 76 (December 1930 - January 1931; Spring 1931; Summer 1931; April - October 1933) by repulsing the KMT armies thrown against them. They were battles fought against almost over whelming odds. The Red armies survived only by employing great mobility and ingenuity. And mostly, as the Kuomintang generals admit ted later, the Red armies were successful be cause they knew the terrain better, because they were trained for guerrilla warfare, and because they observed all the classic tenets of guerrilla warfare without ever forgetting their main objective: loot, elbowroom, secure footholds.2° But the fifth campaign, immediately following the fourth, was different. Mao's commanders seem to lose their initiative in the face of a new strategy by the Kuomintang. Chiang*s German military adviser convinced him to use a "fiery wall" of concentric circles of blockhouses advancing toward the middle, burning the ground they covered. The peasants grew increasingly hysterical as the fiery wall advanced and the KMT employed brutal terror tactics (over a million peasants died in this c a m p a i g n 2 9 ) > and as the Com munists proved increasingly impotent. The problem was not simply with the new KMT strategy, for Mao and Chu were no longer in control of their armies. The Party had grown increasingly dissatisfied with Mao even as his strength in Kiangsi grew. The Party could not under stand why with such a successful army Mao did not enlarge the Soviets and go over to the offensive. This dissatis faction culminated in May 1933 when Chou En-lai, a support er of the Party's military line, was named political com missar of the Red Army. Mao had "lured the enemy deep" in to the Soviets to be defeated on his own ground, but now the Party demanded the static defense of the Soviets. It was strength against strength and in this kind of battle only Chiang could win. 77 By the early summer of 1934 the decision to withdraw had been made by the Communists, including Mao who was ill with malaria, and a way out of the ring was sought. The first breakout occurred in August and in October the entire Red Army broke out and began moving. The Long March had begun. Among the marchers was Mao's wife, Ho Tzu-chen, who was pregnant. (Mao had been living with her since 1928.) The March is a part of the Mao legend and crucial to the survival of the Red Army. It took the Army far enough to escape from Chiang, and close enough to the peasants to establish a new Soviet base. The March took 370 days, covered some 6,000 miles, and began with 85,000-100,000 men and 35 women---20,000-30,000 arrived alive, and many of these were recruits picked up along the way. Although it is the march of the Mao-Chu army that is usually considered the Long March, the Red armies from the other four major Soviet areas should also be included: the Long March was essentially a gathering of forces from all over China in Shensi province. Under pressure from KMT troops, the Red Army moved to Yenan in December 1936. This began the Yenan period, an other part of the Mao legend. Earlier, in 1935, Mao's brother Tse-t'an died; this left Mao with only one brother alive. In 1937 Mao's wife had gone to the Soviet Union for medical treatment. In her absence Mao fell in love with a well-known film actress, Lan-p’ing, who had come from Shanghai to work in the theatre at Yenan. Mao divorced Ho Tzu-chen and married Lan-p'ing. In December 1936 Chiang Kai-shek was arrested by one of his own generals who wanted to put him on trial---the general and his largely Manchurian army had been ordered to fight the Communists instead of the Japanese, who had oc cupied Manchuria. Mao intervened, for a number of reasons, and Chiang returned to Nanking. One major reason for this 78 move was Mao's desire for a united front against the Japa nese, who were poised to invade China. This strategy work ed and a shaky united front was formed in the spring of 1937. In July the Japanese invaded China. In the face of the Japanese invasion the fighting between the Communists and the Kuomintang continued. In December 1940 Mao's New Fourth Army was attacked and cut to ribbons by KMT troops. From this time on the united front became a political issue as Mao pictured the Red Army fight ing the Japanese invaders patriotically while the KMT vacillated and hindered the Communist effort. There is some truth in this picture, for while the Red Army did not fight the Japanese too aggressively, neither did the Kuomintang: From the end of 1938 to the end of the war in 1945 the KMT troops took no major initiative against the Japanese; in spite of this they still engaged 70 per cent of all the Japanese forces in China. The front lines were stabi lized and the officers and men on both sides conducted a thriving smuggling trade. When in the summer of 1944 Japan launched her final offensive, the KMT soldiers were no longer the hardy fighters of 1938. Years of statement had corrupted and softened them, reducing them not only from field armies to garrison troops but also from warriors to men of clay.30 During these years the Communists under Mao did not slack off: they were expanding their Soviet areas, build ing new armies, and materially improving the lives of the peasants in the Soviet areas. The support of the peasant was crucial and "Here lies the key to the spectacular ex pansion from five base areas of a total area of 100,000 square kilometers and nearly two million people in 1937 to nineteen base areas of a total area of 1 million square ii kilometers and nearly 100 million people in 1945." * In this way the sides were delineated for the final struggle which would come at the close of the World War. 79 The Yenan period was one of the high points in Mao's career as a writer. Basic Tactics. On a Prolonged War. The New Democracy. The Strategic Problems of China's Revolu tionary Wars. The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party of China, and Coalition Government were products of this period. Mao was working out the theoretical under pinnings of the Chinese revolution, and planning for even tual victory. For long periods he would leave the war to his two generals, Chu Teh and P'eng Teh-huai, and write. This was also the period when Mao lost his remaining broth er, Tse-min, who was arrested by the Kuomintang in 1942 and executed in 1943. The end of World War II came unexpectedly soon for the Chinese. Mao and Stalin had foreseen a longer strug gle with the result being a coalition government with the KMT. Now Mao had to decide what to do, while Stalin, at Yalta, had signed a treaty of friendship and alliance with the Kuomintang government. Chiang and Mao met in August 1945, but little came of it. Mao said later of Chiang: 32 "He treated me like a peasant." American aid flowed into China and went to Chiang. General Marshall arrived in early 1946 to try to avoid a civil war, and a truce was arranged in June. But it did not hold up, for Chiang, with his larger army and floods of American equipment, sought a final solution. In July Kuomintang planes bombed Yenan, and in March 1947 Mao and the Party headquarters were leaving for a safer place. Unfortunately for Chiang, Mao's theory of revolutionary war did not depend on the capture of towns, but on the cap ture of people, so the loss of Yenan meant little. Mao concentrated on Manchuria as a strategic objec tive and troops under Lin Piao fought there all through 1948, finally gaining control in October. Manchuria gave the Communists a secure rear base with some industry, 80 destroyed a large portion of Chiang*s army, and gained the Red Army hundreds of thousands of new troops. This was the beginning of the end for Chiang and the KMT. 1949 would be the end. During 1949, the Kuomintang lost its initi ative beyond recovery. No one any longer be lieved in the star of Chiang Kai-shek. The dynamic which had brought the Kuomintang to pow er in the Northern March of 1927 had at last perished. Without loyal soldiers, without a strategy of defense, without any will power, and without any sustaining belief in its own mis sion, it was slowly dying.33 The Red Army swept Chiang's forces away, and on Octo ber 1, 1949 the People's Republic of China was officially proclaimed in Peking by Mao. He was the newly elected Chairman of the Republic. In December 1949 Mao went to the Soviet Union and thereby proved wrong Stalin's insistence that only the Kuomintang could effectively rule China-— his basis for collaboration. The Soviets granted the Chinese a relative ly small loan and promised large numbers of technical as sistants. The alliance was firmly established. And Mao could return home to begin consolidating his country and developing it economically. Land reform was pursued at a rapid pace, and social reform, as exemplified by the Marriage Law, was not far be hind. Mao sought to destroy the old feudal society from top to bottom as fast as possible. The involvement in the Korean War (which has never been fully explained; Schram theorizes that Stalin pushed it not Mao^) slowed this process down. Rebuilding China along radically new lines was accom plished at least partially by great purges in the first two years of Communist rule. These purges were directed against the landlord class and were carried out by local party officials and the peasants, urged on by Peking. No 81 reliable figures exist on the number who died, but it is clearly in the millions. Thus two of the three great cam paigns— -agrarian reform and destruction of counterrevolu tionaries (the third was Korea)---were declared successful by Mao in October 1951. But the terror lasted, officially, until early 1954. Seemingly secure in his rule over China, Mao has put the country through a number of upsetting periods. Whether or not he is completely responsible (as with Korea) he is the dominant figure in China and thus must bear the respon sibility. As for his motivations, this can only be specu lated on. Impatience seems an obvious factor, though. And a clue may be found in Mao's hostile reaction to Khrush chev's anti-Stalin campaign. Schram admits that the attack on the "cult of personality" hit Mao hard because of his own cult, but more importantly Mao disagreed with taking Stalin's actior- ■ * out of the context of that historical per iod and denouncing them as "crimes."35 That this kind of thinking could be applied to him must have been on Mao's mind, if Schram's point is correct. Whatever the exact motivations for his actions, Mao has shaken China to its very core by his actions since tak ing power. Briefly, this has been the course of events: 1953-54 Agricultural Producers Cooperatives organ ized as the first step in the communiza- tion of the peasants. mid 1956 In apparent response to the Soviet invas ion of Hungary, the "Hundred Flowers" per iod opens and allows airing of contradic tions in Chinese society. Mao's February 1957 speech reaffirms the "Hundred Flow ers" theme. June 1957 Having seen the "Hundred Flowers" movement get out of hand, the Communists end this period. Nov 1957 At a Party meeting in Moscow Mao coins his 82 1958 Aug 1959 1960 July 1960 Oct 1962 Oct 1964 Feb 1966 "The east wind prevails over the west wind" slogan and asserts that nuclear war would merely lay the groundwork for the final triumph of socialism. The "Great Leap Forward" begins. The agricultural cooperatives are turned into full-fledged communes; the back yard iron works open up, and industrialization is pushed at a frenzied pace. The agricultural communization program is drastically reduced and communes are turn ed back into cooperatives. The "Great Leap" ends in failure and con fusion. China begins to follow a more moderate pace of economic development, re flected in a return to the Five-Year Plan model. The U.S.S.R. removes all its experts from China. Chinese troops attack India, A Chinese atomic bomb is exploded. The "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" under the apparent leadership of Mao's wife (know in China as Chiang Ch'ing) and the Army, begins. Mostafa Rejai divides it into five periods: (1) anti-bourgeois— directed against people in the Party, army, government, and academic fields accused of bour geois tendencies (2) the Red Guard movement— being "Red" is prized over being "expert" and everyone appears to have been under suspicion for lack of revolutionary zeal (3) a period of compromise-— Mao's forces, the rivals in the Communist Party, and the army attempt to introduce some order into the situation (4) anti-army---the Party strives to re gain control of the situation, while the army remains the only force ca pable of restoring order 83 (5) a period of relative stability^ 1968 The "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolu tion" ends with the Party claiming com plete success. China's recent history has been a series of jumps forward and grudging moves backward. All of this driven by Mao Tse-tung, of whom Payne writes: By 1968 Mao Tse-tung was already in par tial eclipse. The newspapers and magazines still published photographs showing him youth ful and ebullient, the thick, black hair brushed smoothly back, the face gleaming, the lips forming a faint smile. Many of these photographs were recognizably doctored pho tographs from the distant past, and many more bore the telltale marks of the retoucher. What he really looked like, how he really ap peared to the small circle of acquaintances who had access to him, was unknown. He began to vanish into his legend.37 This vanishing process is now far enough advanced that even his appearance with President Nixon on his visit to the People's Republic was not enough to bring him back to life. Mao is now gone into his legend, already embellished by the cult of Mao and the deification of his "Thought" (Mao himself revised his works over the years to keep them consistent and infallible.) and thus obscured and removed from the reality of his life. Robert Lifton brings this receding image back into focus by writing that One might be tempted to dismiss the entire cult of Mao and his Thought as no more than sycophantic indulgence of an old man's vanity were it not for the life Mao has lived and the impact he has made upon the Chinese people. He has in fact come close to living out precisely the kind of existential absolute he has advocat ed. No twentieth-century life has come closer than his to the great myth of the hero with its "road of trials," or prolonged death en counter, and its mastery of that encounter in a way that enhances the life of one's people.38 84 Or, perhaps Mao says it better in one of his poems-- Mao is a moderately good Chinese poet in his own right--- part of which reads: There have always been Many things that were urgent. Although the world spins on Time is short. Millennia are too long: Let us dispute about mornings and evenings,39 * * * PHILOSOPHY The Chinese Revolution was based on Marxism-Leninism. That was the basic underlying philosophy upon which all else was boilt. And even when submerged in order to facil itate a united front in the war against the Japanese, Marx ism-Leninism was there. It was the activist orientation of Marxism-Leninism that appears to have most affected Mao's thinking. What Marxist philosophy regards as the most important problem does not lie in understanding the laws of the objective world and thereby be coming capable of explaining it, but in actively changing the world by applying the knowledge of its objective laws. From the Marxist viewpoint, theory is important, and its importance is fully shown in Lenin's statement: "Without a revolu tionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement." But Marxism emphasises the impor tance of theory precisely and only because it can guide action. If we have a correct theory, but merely prate about it, pigeon-hole it, and do not put it into practice, then that theory, however good, has no significance.40 In the Chinese context the Marxist commitment to ac tion became a commitment to war. "War is the continuation of politics"; in this sense war is politics and war itself is 85 a political action, and there has not been a single war since ancient times that does not bear a political character.41 War is the highest form of struggle, ex isting ever since the emergence of private property and social classes, for settling contradictions between classes, between na tions, between states, or between political groups at given stages of their development. Without understanding the circumstances of war, its characteristics, and its relations to other things, we cannot know the laws of war, cannot know how to direct it, and can not win victory.42 War was seen as necessary to bring about the revolu tion which Mao felt China needed. What is the aim to be achieved by this revolution? The aim is to overthrow imperi alism and feudalism and to establish a people's democratic republic. This people's democratic republic is a republic based on the revolutionary Three People's Principles. It is different from the semi-colonial and semi-feudal state of today, and will also be different from the socialist system of tomor row. Under the socialist system of society, no capitalist are needed, while under this system of people's democracy capitalists will still be permitted to exist.43 ...we can see that the Chinese revolution taken as a whole involves a twofold task. That is to say, it embraces a revolution that is bourgeois-democratic in character (a new- democratic revolution) and a revolution that is proletarian-socialist in character it embraces the twofold task of the revolution at both the present and the future stages. The leadership in this twofold revolutionary task rests on the shoulders of the party of the Chinese proletariat, the Chinese Communist Party, for without its leadership no revolu tion can succeed. To complete China's bourgeois-democratic revolution (the new-democratic revolution) and to prepare to transform it into a social ist revolution when all the necessary condi tions are present---that is the sum total of the great and glorious revolutionary task of 86 the Communist Party of China.^'4 We move from a basic Marxist-Leninist commitment to social change, to an acceptance of war as a viable means of achieving change, to a clearer picture of the shape of the Chinese Revolution. From here Mao's philosophy begins to encompass guerrilla warfare. China's revolutionary war-— whether a civ il war or a national war, it is waged in the special environment of China; and compared with war in general or the revolutionary war in gen eral, it again has its special circumstances and special characteristics. Thus, besides the laws of war in general and of revolutionary war in general, it has also some special laws of its own. If we do not understand them, we can not win victory in China's revolutionary war.45 What is the relationship of guerrilla war fare to the people? Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation, and assistance cannot be gained. The essence of guerrilla warfare is thus revo lutionary in character. On the other hand, in a war of counterrevolutionary nature, there is no place for guerrilla hostilities. Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can nei ther exist nor flourish if it separates it self from their sympathies and cooperation.46 The relationship between the people and the Commu nists had to be a reciprocal one; Mao knew this and opera tionalized it in the conduct of his armed forces. What is political mobilisation? First, it means telling the army and the people about the political objective of the war. Every sol dier and every civilian should be made to under stand why the war must be fought and how it concerns him... Next, it is not enough simply to explain the objective; the steps and policies to attain the objective tnftlat also be made clear, that is, there must be a political pro gramme... Without a precise, specific political programme, we cannot mobilise all the armed forces and all the people to resist Japan to the end. 87 Next, how to mobilise? By word of mouth, by leaflets, and bulletins, by newspapers, books and pamphlets, through theatrical performances and the films, through schools, through mass organisations and through cadres... Next, it is not enough to mobilise only once; political mobilisation for the Anti-Japanese War must be done regularly. Our job is not merely to re cite our political programme to the people, for nobody would care to listen to such recitations; but we must link it up with the developments in the war and with the life of the soldiers and the people, thereby transforming the political mobilisation for the war into a regular move ment. This is a matter of the first magnitude on which victory primarily depends.47 Our Army's Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention have been prac tised for many years, but their contents vary slightly in army units in different areas. They have now been unified and are hereby re issued. It is expected that you will take this version as the standard one for thorough edu cation and strict enforcement. As to other matters needing attention, the high command of the armed forces in different areas may lay down additional points in accordance with spe cific conditions and order their enforcement. 2. The Three Main Rules of Discipline are as follows: (1) Obey orders in all your actions. (2) Don't take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses. (3) Turn in everything captured. 3. The Eight Points for Attention are as follows: (1) Speak politely. C2) Pay fairly for what you buy. (3) Return everything you borrow. (4) Pay for anything you damage. (5) Don't hit or swear at people. (6) Don't damage crops. (7) Don't take liberties with women. (8) Don't ill-treat captives. 48 Finally, Mao's philosophy accepts the primary role of the Party in the struggle and accepts the fact that the struggle will have to be fought by the Chinese themselves. Who are our enemies, and who are our friends? 88 This question is one of primary importance in the revolution. All past revolutionary struggles in China achieved very little, basically be cause the revolutionaries were unable to unite their real friends to attack their real enemies. A revolutionary party is the guide of the mass es, and no revolution ever succeeds when the revolutionary party leads it astray.49 To sum up, we rely entirely on our own efforts, and our position is invincible; this is the very opposite of Chiang Kai-shek who depends entirely on foreign countries. We live plainly and work hard, we take care of the needs of both the army and the people; this is the very opposite of the situation in Chiang Kai-shek's areas, where those at the top are corrupt and degenerate, while the people under them are destitute. Under these circumstances, we shall surely be victorious.50 Victories are not conjured up, however, they must be organized and led. Men must be transformed into units of action and directed toward objectives. This crucial link between philosophy and implementation is "organization." * * * ORGANIZATION Mao organized his forces in many different ways over the course of the long and arduous fighting in China. He had regular troops at many points and could rely heavily on them, at other times his reliance shifted to the guer rilla organizations. The flux of the Chinese Revolution, plus Mao's ability to see all the complexities involved as part of a whole cloth, makes it difficult to abstract out the organizational components, but the understanding we can gain from the effort is worth the frustration. Structure The local armed forces are the Red guards and the workers' and peasants' insurrection corps. The insurrection corps is armed with spears and fowlingpeices and organised on a 89 township basis with a contingent in every township population. Its job is to suppress counter-revolution, to protect the township government, and, when the enemy comes, to assist the Red Army and the Red Guards in war.51 As an example of such organization, we may take a geographical area in the enemy's rear. This area may comprise many countries. It must be subdivided and individual companies or battalions formed to accord with the sub divisions. To this "military area," a mili tary commander and political commissioners are appointed. Under these, the necessary officers, both military and political, are appointed. In the military headquarters, there will be the staff, the aides, the supply officers, and the medical personnel. These are controlled by the chief of staff, who acts in accordance with orders from the commander. In the polit ical headquarters, there are bureaus of pro paganda organization, people's mass movements, and miscellaneous affairs. Control of these is vested in the political chairmen. The military areas are subdivided into smaller districts in accordance with local geography, the enemy situation locally, and the state of guerrilla development. Each of these smaller divisions within the area is a district, each of which may consist of from two to six counties. To each district, a military commander and several political com missioners are appointed. Under their direc tion, military and political headquarters are organized. Tasks are assigned in accordance with the number of guerrilla troops available... In order to unify control, to handle guerril la troops that come from different sources, and to harmonize military operations and lo cal political affairs, a committee of from seven to nine members should be organized in each area and district. This committee, the members of which are selected by the troops and the local political officers, should function as a forum for the discussion of both military and political matters.52 This organizational structuring is based (as will be seen in more detail in the section on Strategy) on Mao's overall view of the conduct of the Chinese Revolutionary 90 War. In guerrilla base areas, the command must be centralized for strategical purposes and decentralized for tactical purposes. Central ized strategical command takes care of the general management of all guerrilla units, their coordination within war zones, and the general policy regarding guerrilla base areas. Beyond this, centralization of com mand will result in interference with subordinate units, as, naturally, the tactics to apply to concrete situations can be determined only as these various situations arise... In a word, proper guerrilla policy will provide for unified strategy and independent activity.53 Structure involves the way the individual is treated and how he views himself relative to the organization. Apart from the role played by the Party, the reason why the Red Army can sustain it self without collapse in spite of such a poor standard of material life and such in cessant engagements, is its practice of de mocracy. 54 The majority of the Red Army soldiers came from mercenary armies; but once in the Red Army, they change their character. First of all the Red Army has abolished the mercenary system, making the soldiers feel that they are not fighting for somebody else but for themselves and for the people. The Red Army has not to this day instituted a system of regular pay, but issues only rice, an allowance for oil, salt, firewood and vegetables, and a little pocket money. Land has been allotted to all Red Army officers and men who are natives of the border area, but it is rather hard to allot land to those from distant areas.55 A unit needs specialists of various kinds. In order to make up for insufficient supplies of ammunition and poor marksman ship, every company should have from three to nine sharpshooters, to be employed exclusively for shooting from ambush at long distances or for shooting at special targets (enemy officers, machine-gunners or artillerymen, couriers, etc.). 91 The commander of each task group and small group should choose particularly sharp-eyed couriers to serve as observers. Normally, a task group commander should have two of these, and a small group com mander one. These men serve exclusively to remedy the insufficiency of battlefield observation.56 Civil Administration Mao was concerned with supporting his armed forces, having secure base areas, and beginning the revolutionary changes he sought for China while the war still was being fought. He tried to meet all these needs and still keep the conflicts inherent in them at a low level. The Land Tax: In Ningkang it is being collected at the rate of 20 percent of the crop, exceeding by 5 percent the rate specified by the Party centre; as the col lection is already under way, the rate should not be altered just now but will be reduced next year. Besides, the sections of Suich- wan, Ling and Yungsin under our independent regime are all hilly areas, and the peasants are so poverty-stricken that taxation is inadvisable. For the maintenance of the government1 and the Red guards we rely on ex propriating the local bullies in the White areas. As to provisions for the Red Army, rice can be obtained temporarily through collecting the land tax in Ningkang, while cash is also obtained entirely through ex propriating the local bullies.57 How shall we make use of three million dollars* worth of Economic Construction Bonds? We plan to make use of them in the following way: One million to be allotted to the Red Army for its war expenses, and two million to be loaned as capital funds to the co-operatives, the bureaux for the regulation of food supplies and the bureaux of external trade.... Our objective is not only to develop production but also to sell our products at adequate prices to the White areas and then purchase salt and cloth at lower prices from them for distribution among the masses of our people so as to break the enemy's blockade and counteract the merchants' exploitation. We must daily accelerate the development of the people's economy, greatly improve the living condi tions of the masses, substantially increase public revenue and firmly lay a material foundation for the revolutionary war and for economic construction.58 All the people of both sexes from the ages of sixteen to forty-five must be organiz ed into anti-Japanese self-defense units, the basis of which is voluntary service. As a first step, they must procure arms, then they must be given both military and political training. Their responsibilities are: local sentry duties, securing information of the enemy, arresting traitors, and preventing the dissemination of enemy propaganda. When the enemy launches a guerrilla-suppression drive, these units, armed with What weapons there are, are assigned to certain areas to deceive, hinder, and harass him. Thus, the self- defense units assist the combatant guerrillas. They have other functions. They furnish stretcher-bearers to transport the wounded, carriers to take food to the troops and com fort mission to provide the troops with tea and rice.59 If we do no other work than simply mo bilising the people to carry out the war, can we achieve the aim of defeating the enemy? Of course not. If we want to win, we still have to do a great deal of work. Leading the peasants in agrarian struggles and distribu ting land to them; arousing their labour enthusiasm so as to increase agricultural production; safeguarding the interests of the workers; establishing co-operatives; develop ing trade with outside areas; solving the problems that face the masses, problems of clothing, food and shelter, of fuel, rice, cooking oil and salt, of health and hygiene, and of marriage. In short, all problems fac ing the masses in their actual life should claim our attention. If we have these prob lems at heart and solve them to the satis faction of the masses, we shall really become the orgainisers of the life of the masses and they will really rally round us and warmly support us. Comrades, can we then call upon the masses to take part in the revolutionary war? We can, absolutely.60 Inte.lUft.ence In order to obtain reliable information regarding the enemy's dispositions, so as to be able to oppose him without losing any opportunities, all guerrilla units should establish groups of scouts. Normally, it will be sufficient if each unit has one platoon, each task group has one squad, and each small group a smaller element. A net work of local scouts should also be estab lished by the group of scouts wherever they go, or by scouts concealed in advance.61 Propaganda Propaganda materials are very important. Every large guerrilla unit should have a printing press and a mimeograph stone. They must also have paper on which to print prop aganda leaflets and notices. They must be supplied with chalk and large brushes. In guerrilla areas, there should be a printing press or a lead-type press. For the purpose of printing training instructions, this material is of the great est importance.62 Communications A network for important correspondence should be set up. Reports of an urgent character can best be transmitted by messen gers on horseback. When this is impossible, we should send out reliable individuals particularly good at going on foot. It is also possible to arrange in advance for the transmittal of secret letters. There are times, too, when we must send out several men, each of them taking a different route, to make certain that the report in question will reach its destination. (This method should be limited to the most important re ports. ) As for ordinary reports that are not particularly important, they are commonly transmitted by runners or messengers on bicycles. There are times when one can al so use faithful individuals from among the local population who are thoroughly famil iar with the routes to carry such reports.63 The peculiar quality of the operations of a guerrilla unit lies entirely in taking the enemy by surprise. Consequently, we must take every possible measure to preserve mili tary secrecy, as described in detail below: (1) The commander of the unit should explain to his subordinates their tasks and the plan for the operation only just before the action begins, or while they are advanc ing. In case of necessity, he should ex plain the whole plan only by stages, so that others learn about each stage only when re quired. (2) The best method for the transmission of orders in a guerrilla unit is by oral ex planations from the commander to his subordi nates. It is necessary to limit written orders insofar as possible, in order to avoid leakage of military secrets. (3) One should not discuss the whole of one's actions and plans with guides or the local population... (4) We should send out faithful and reliable scouts in advance to observe the point where we are going to camp or to lie in ambush along important roads in the enemy's rear, in order to cut off his information. (5) When we advance, our rear guard should take full responsibility for obliter ating and removing all secret signals and road signs. We should also advance by a circuitous route, so that the enemy does not know the direction of our advance. (6) Fixed code names should be used in place of all unit designations, and the use of the real names of units should be strictly prohibited. (7) Except in case of necessity, all documents should be burned immediately after they have been read. (8) Apart from the methods already enu merated, the true plans of a guerrilla unit can also be obscured in certain cases by us ing the local population for the deliberate propagation of false information about the operations of the guerrilla unit, in order to deceive the enemy. Indoctrination and Training Military training all relates to the enemv army. Its purpose is to create greater skill than that of the enemy in each specializ ed art. Subjects. The items requiring particular attention are dispersing, assembling, marksman ship, maneuvering an army, mountain climbing, construction of military works, night fight ing, mountain fighting, fighting on narrow roads, espionage and security measures, search es, liaison, and other such actions.65 In order to assure that all the independent actions of a guerrilla unit attain complete victory, apart from reinforcing military train ing, the most important thing is that we must make certain that the officers and soldiers have a high level of "political consciousness" and of "devotion" to their own cause. Politi cal training is the only method by which this objective can be attained.66 After receiveing some political education, the Red Army soldiers have all become class conscious and acquired a general knowledge about redistributing land, establishing politi cal power, arming the workers and peasants, etc. and they all know that they are fighting for themselves and for the working class and the peasantry. Hence they can endure the bitter struggle without complaint. Each company, bat talion or regiment has its soldiers' council which represents the interests of the soldiers and carries out political and mass work. Experience has proved that the system of Party representatives must not be abolished. As the Party branch is organised on the company basis, the Party representative at the company level is particularly important. He has to supervise the soldiers' committee in carrying out political training, to direct the work of the mass movement, ana to act at the same time as the secretary of the Party branch. Facts have proved that the better the company Party representative is, the better is the company, while the company commander can hardly play such an effective political role.67 Each task group and small group of a guer rilla units should have two nurses, who devote themselves exclusively to emergency care of sick officers and soldiers and to instruction in hygiene.68 96 In order to increase the cultural level of the officers and soldiers, so that they may more easily absorb all kinds of training, each mess unit must carry put literacy training.69 SuppIv Supply was major difficulty in China, and Mao dealt with it in novel ways. However, it must be repeated that guerrilla equipment will in the main depend on the efforts of the guerrillas themselves. If they depend on higher officers too much, the psychological ef fect will be to weaken the guerrilla spirit of resistance.70 In all the armed units of the border region that have been allotted land this year, the soldiers have on the average cultivated eighteen mou per person, and can make or produce practi cally everything foodstuffs like vegetables, and woollen clothing, shoes and socks; shelters like caves, houses, big and small meeting halls; articles for daily use like tables, chairs, benches and stationery; and fuel like firewood, charcoal and coal. With our own hands we have attained the end of being "well-clad and well- fed". In each year every soldier needs only to spend three months in production and can devote the remaining nine months to training or fight ing. Our troops depend for their pay neither on the Kuomintang government, nor on the border region government, nor on the people, but can provide for themselves. Of what great signifi cance this innovation is to our cause of na tional liberation!71 Under present conditions, in order to get over the difficulties, every public agency or armed unit ought to build its own economic base... In order to stimulate the development of pro duction, we should also institute a system of individual bonuses, graded according to the quality of work, for all who take a direct part in it. Further, as the only way to push for ward effectively the work of production, the head of an organisation must assume responsibil ity and personnally take part in it, applying the methods of linking the core of leadership with the broad masses and of linking a general directive with specific g u i d a n c e .72 97 Industries An armory should be established in each guerrilla district for the manufacture and repair of rifles and for the production of cartridges, hand grenades, and bayonets. Guerrillas must not depend too much on an armory. The enemy is the principal source of their supply.73 Mao relied on the base areas to supply most of his troops1 needs. Personal Equipment As for minimum clothing requirements, these are that each man shall have at least two summer-weight uniforms, one suit of winter clothing, two hats, a pair of wrap puttees, and a blanket. Each man must have a haversack or a bag for food. In the north, each man must have an overcoat. In acquiring this clothing, we cannot de pend on captures made from the enemy, for it is forbidden for captors to take cloth ing from their prisoners. In order to maintain high morale in guerrilla forces, all the clothing and equipment mentioned should be furnished by the representatives of the government stationed in each guer rilla district.74 The Unit’s Equipment A guerrilla unit preferably should have the following things: (1) Equipment and explosives for de stroying railroads, telephone and telegraph lines, arsenals, etc. (2) Medicines. Those needed in case of emergencies should be carried according to the season, but dressings, etc., should be pro vided on a permanent basis. (3) A compass, and maps of the area in which the guerrilla unit operates. (4) Light radio equipment, which is especially important in order to be able to report at all times on the situation of the enemy and to listen 98 in on the enemy's reports. (5) A certain quantity of gold coins, to provide for unexpected needs and for buying food.75 In order that our movements may be rapid, apart from doing our utmost to simplify all our organization we should at all times main tain excellent preparations for action (in vestigation and intelligence regarding the front, care of sick soldiers, preparation for guides, preferably employing local peasants whose sympathies lie with the guerrillas, or other reliable persons), and we should also preferably carry three days' dry rations. If this is done, then when we want to move, we move, and when we want to stop, we stop, and there is no need for special arrangements.76 Relations With the Local Populace The "Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention" mentioned in the section on Philosophy sum up quite well Mao's attitude toward the relations between his troops and the people. Bases Even though much of the warfare in China was guerril la warfare, the need for bases was evident. A guerrilla base may be defined as an area, strategically located, in which the guerrillas can carry out their duties of training, self-preservation and development. Ability to fight a war without a rear area is a fundamental characteristic of guerril la action, but this does not mean that guer rillas can exist and function over a long period of time without the development of base areas.77 Weapons Apart from the rifles of the infantry and the cavalry, light machine guns, hand grenades, etc., guerrilla units should also be supplied with pistols and submachine guns. To the extent that the terrain permits it, one can also add heavy machine guns, mortars, and small cannons.78 For destruction of railway trackage, bridges, 99 and stations in enemy-controlled territory, it is necessary to gather together demoli tion materials.79 The Cadres Cadres were a means by which the ideas of the politi cal and military leaders filtered down to the troops and people with little dissipation in strength or distortion of message. We must know how to employ cadres. The responsibilities of the leadership boil down chiefly to two things: to devise ways and means and to employ cadres. Things like making plans and decisions, giving orders and directives, etc., belong to the sphere of "devising ways and means". To realise all these "devices" we must unite the cadres and urge them to work for them, and this belongs to the sphere of "employing cadres".80 Political mobilisation is the most impor tant problem in a campaign against "encircle ment and annihilation"... The Red Army and the entire population must be called upon to fight against the campaign of "encirclement and annihilation" and for the defence of the base area. Except for military secrets, pol itical mobilisation must be carried out open ly and extensively so as to reach all possi ble supporters of the revolutionary cause. The vital point here is to convince the cadres.81 Having a philosophy and an organization is not enough, one needs a strategic plan to follow. Such a strategy uses the organization in a way consistent with the philosophy to pursue the goals inherent in that philosophy. ★ * * STRATEGY Defining strategy, and differentiating it from phil osophy and tactics, is a difficult task. It becomes a judgemental question really, and thus subject to the inter 100 pretation of the definer. Therefore, differences of opin ion can be expected regarding the use points of "strategy" below, but hopefully these differences will not obscure the importance of Mao in this area of guerrilla warfare. In the military field Mao was, above all else, a strategist. He has shown the ability to work on many lev els without losing sight of each level's relationship to the overall strategy. Mao's mastery of strategy is at least partially based on his analysis of the situation ("objective conditions" in the Marxist vocabulary) and the conclusions he reaches on that basis. Wherever there are military opera tions, there is a whole military situation. A whole military situation may cover the entire world, it may cover an entire country, or it may cover an independent guerrilla area or a major independent operational front. Whenever there are various phases and stages to be taken into consideration there is a whole military situation. The task of strategy is to study the laws for directing operations that may affect a whole military situation.82 A vast semi-colonial country that is unevenly developed politically and econom ically and that has gone through a great revolution; a powerful enemy; a weak and small Red Army; and the agrarian revolu- tion---these are the four principal characteristics of China's revolutionary war. They determine the guiding line for China’s revolutionary war and its strategic and tactical principles. The first and fourth characteristics determine the possibility of the Chinese Red Army growing and defeating its enemy. The second and third characteristics determine the impossibility of the Chinese Red Army growing speedily or defeating its enemy quickly, or in other words, they determine the protracted nature of the war and, if things go wrong, the possibility of the 101 war ending in failure. These are the two aspects of China's revolutionary war. They exist simultaneous ly, that is, there are favourable as well as difficult conditons. This is the funda mental law of China's revolutionary war, from which many other laws are derived. The history of ten years of our war has proved the validity of this law. He who has eyes but does not see these laws of fundamental nature cannot direct China's revolutionary war, cannot lead the Red Army to win victories.83 Mao's works reflect a fascination with the two sides of a situation, the Yin and Yang of revolutionary warfare. We can affirm that the protracted Anti- Japanese War will make a splendid page unique in the war history of mankind. The "Jig-saw" pattern of the war is one of its quite peculiar features, which follows from such contradictory factors as Japan's barbarity and insufficient armed strength and China's progressiveness and extensive territory. There have been other wars of this pattern in history, like Russia's three-year civil war after the October Revolu tion. But what distinguishes China's war is its peculiar protractedness and its peculiar extensiveness, both of which beat the record in history. Such a jig-saw pattern manifests it self in the following situations. Interior and exterior lines. The Anti- Japanese War as a whole is fought on the inter ior line; but as far as the relation between the main forces and the guerrilla detachments is concerned, the former are on the interior line, forming the spectacle of a pincers attack on the enemy. The same can be said of the relation between the various guerrilla areas. Each guer rilla area regards itself as on the interior lines, and fdrms with them numerous pincers-like firing lines round the enemy. In the first stage of the war, the regular army operating strategically on the interior line will beat a retreat; but the guerrilla detachments operating strategically on the exterior line will advance in all directions on the enemy's rear in great strides, and advance even more fiercely in the second stage, thereby forming a unique spectacle of both retreat and advance. With and without a rear. It is the main 102 forces that, relying upon the big rear of the country, extend their front to the very line which marks off the enemy's occupied areas. It is the guerrilla detachments that, separat ed from our big rear, extend the front into the enemy's rear. But in each guerrilla area, there is still a small rear for the guerrilla force upon which the establishment of fluid operational lines depends. Distinguished from these are guerrilla detachments dispatched from each guerrilla area which is also the enemy's rear, to engage in temporary activities; such guerrilla detachments have neither a rear nor operation lines... Encirclement and counter-encirclement. Taking the war as a whole, we are no doubt in the midst of a strategic encirclement of the enemy, because he has adopted strategic of fensive and exterior-line operation and we strategic defensive and interior-line opera tions. This is the first kind of encirclement the enemy imposes on us. As we have, with numerically preponderant forces, adopted a policy for exterior-line operation in cam- paignes and battles against the enemy forces advancing on us in separate columns from strategically exterior lines, we can place in to our encirclement one or several of the separately advancing enemy columns. This is the first kind of counter-encirclement we im pose on the enemy. Furthermore, considering the guerrilla base areas in the enemy's rear, each isolated base area is surrounded by the enemy either on three sides...or on four sides... This is the second kind of encirclement the enemy imposes on us. But if we look at the interconnections of the various guerrilla base areas as well as the interconnections of these base areas with the fronts of the regu lar forces, we shall see that we have invturn surrounded a great number of the enemy units;... The bulk and the bits. It is possible that the territories occupied by the enemy may constitute the major part of China Prop er, while the section we keep intact in China Proper constitutes only the lesser part. That is one aspect of the situation. But within that major part, the enemy can, besides the three North-eastesnr.provinees. and certain other sections, hold only the big cities 103 the highways and certain sections on the plains all of which may rank highest in importance, but, in area and population, constitute only a lesser part of the oc cupied territory, while the area of wide spread guerrilla warfare constitutes the major part. That is another aspect of the situation,.. The section kept intact is of course important, and we should concentrate great efforts to cultivate it, not only in the political, military and economic aspects, but, what is also important, in the cul tural aspect. The enemy has already trans formed our cultural centres into cultural backwaters and we must transform the for mer cultural backwaters into cultural centres. Meanwhile the cultivation of the extensive guerrilla areas in the enemy's rear is also extremely important and we should develop them in various aspects, in cluding the cultural. On the whole, China will turn the bulk of the rural areas in to areas of progress and light while the small bits occupied by the enemy, expecial- ly the big cities, will temporarily become dark and backward regions.o'* Since the Sino-Japanese War is a pro tracted one and the final victory will be China's, we can reasonably imagine that this protracted war will pass through the following three stages. The first stage is one of the enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic defensive. The second stage is one of the enemy's strategic defensive and our preparation for the counter-offensive. The third stage is one of our strategic counter-offensive and the enemy's strategic retreat.85 Mao's troops actually fought three wars: the War against the Kuomintang (Civil War), the war against the Japanese (War of Resistance); and the subsequent resump tion of the war against the Kuomintang. Looking at the first two Mao saw some strategic differences that help put his strategies into perspective. It is worth studying the changes in the Party's military strategy. I shall deal separately with two courses of events: the civil war and the national war. In strategy the course of the civil war can be roughly divided into two periods, the earlier and the later. In the earlier period, guerrilla warfare was the principal form and in the later period, regular war fare. But the regular warfare mentioned here is of the Chinese type, as shown by the concentration of forces for a mobile war and a certain degree of centralisation and planning in command and organisation; in other aspects it is still of a guerrilla character and on a low level, and cannot be spoken of in the same breath with the warfare of foreign armies and, in some ways, is even different from that of the Kuomin tang army. Thus in a sense this type of regular warfare is only guerrilla warfare on a higher level. The course of the Anti-Japanese War, so far as our Party's military tasks are con cerned, can also be roughly divided into two period of strategy. In the earlier period (including the stages of strategic defensive and strategic stalemate), guer rilla warfare is the principal form, while in the later period (the stage of strategic counter-offensive) regular warfare will be the principal form. However, the guerrilla warfare in the earlier period of the Anti- Japanese War differs considerably in con tent from the guerrilla warfare in the earlier period of the civil war, because we have the regular (regular to a certain degree) Eighth Route Army carrying out in dispersion the task of the guerrillas; and the regular warfare in the later period of the Anti-Japanese War will also be different from the regular warfare in the later period of the civil war, since we can expect that, given up-to-date equipment, a great change will take place both in the army and in its operations. The army will then attain a high degree of centralisation and organisation; the operations, with their guerrilla character greatly diminshed, will attain a high degree of regularity; what is now at a lower level will then be raised to a higher level...86 105 Thus we see that, throughout the two courses of events, the civil war and the Anti-Japanese War, or throughout the four periods in strategy, there have been three strategic shifts. The first is the change from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare in the civil war. The second is the change from regular warfare in the civil war to guerrilla warfare in the Anti-Japanese War. And the third is the change from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare in the Anti- Japanese War.87 Out of Mao's thinking about the objective and sub jective conditions in China arose his basic strategies for winning the Revolution by military means; these ideas held fairly constant throughout the long course of the wars— largely because Mao's thought was working at a high enough level that seemingly major shifts could be incorporated into the overarching strategy; Revolution. The purely military viewpoint is unusu ally widespread among a number of comrades in the Red Army. It manifests itself as follows: To regard military work and political work as opposed to each other; to fail to recognise military work as only one of the means for accomplishing political tasks.88 And sixthly, one can also understand that the policy of purely mobile guerrilla-like activities cannot accomplish the task of accelerating the nation-wide revolutionary upsurge, while the kind of policies adopted by Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung and by Fang Chih-min are undoubtedly correct-policies such as establishing base areas; building up political power according to plan; deepening the agrarian revolution; and ex panding the people's armed forces by develop ing in due order first the township Red guards, then the district Red guards, then the county Red guards, then the local Red Army, and then a regular Red Army; and ex panding political power by advancing in a series of waves, etc., etc.89 The fact that internationally China is 106 not isolated in time of war is also unprec edented in history. In the past, whether in China or in India, wars were fought in iso lation. It is only today that popular move ments, unprecedented in breadth and depth, have arisen or are arising thoughout the world and are giving help to China... The existence of the Soviet Union especially is a vital factor in present-day international politics and the Soviet Union will certainly support China with the greatest enthusiasm; and this was something completely non existent twenty years ago.90 A strategically protracted war and a campaign or battle of quick decision are two sides of the same thing, two principles to be emphasised simultaneously in the civil war, which are also applicable in the anti imperialist war.91 Mobile warfare or positional warfare? Our answer is mobile warfare. When we do not have a large army, when we do not have replenishments of munitions, and when there is only a single detachment of the Red Army carrying on all the fighting in each base area, positional warfare is basically use less to us. To us, positional warfare is basically something which we cannot afford either in defence or in attack. One of the outstanding characteristics of the Red Army's operations, which ensue from the fact that the enemy is strong and the Red Army is technologically weak, is the absence of a fixed operational front.92 The problem of decisive engagements in the Anti-Japanese War should be divided in to three aspects: to fight resolutely a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle when victory is certain; to avoid a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle when victory is uncertain; and to avoid absolutely a strategic decisive en gagement which stakes the destiny of the nation.93 Having this general foundation we can now look at Mao's ideas on guerrilla warfare. Mobile warfare is the primary form of 107 fighting in the Anti-Japanese War and guerril la warfare should be considered secondary. When we say that in the entire war mobile war fare is the principal and guerrilla wariare the supplementary form, we mean that the issue of the war must be mainly decided by regular warfare, expecially in its mobile form, while guerrilla warfare cannot assume this chief responsibility. It does not follow, however, that the strategic role of guerrilla warfare in the Anti-Japanese War is unimportant. Its strategic role in the entire war ranks next only to that of mobile warfare, for without its support we could not defeat the enemy. This statement implies that the strategic task for guerrilla warfare is to develop itself in to mobile warfare. In the course of the pro longed, ruthless war, guerrilla warfare shoulld not remain its old self but must develop into mobile warfare. Thus the strategic role of guerrilla warfare is twofold: supporting regular warfare and transforming itself into regular warfare.94 The relationship that exists between guer rillas and the orthodox forces is important and must be appreciated. Generally speaking, there are three types of cooperation between guerrillas and orthodox groups. These are: 1. Strategical cooperation. 2. Tactical cooperation. 3. Battle cooperation.95 Centralised strategic command includes the planning and direction of the entire guerrilla war by the state, the coordination between guerrilla war and regular war in each war zone^ and the unified direction of all the anti-Japa nese armed forces in each guerrilla area or guerrilla base area... In regard to general matters, that is, matters of a strategic nature, the lower ranks should report to the higher-ups and follow their instructions so as to ensure co-ordination. Centralisation, however, stops here and it would be just as harmful to exceed this limit and interfere with the lower ranks in concrete matters, like the specific dispositions in a campaign or a battle. For such concrete matters must be settled in accordance with the specific conditions, which change from time to time and from place to place, and are quite be yond the knowledge of the higher-ups at a great 108 distance. This precisely means that decentral ised command should be the principle in direct ing campaigns and battles. This principle generally applies also to operations in regular warfare, expecially when means of communication are inadequate. In a word, it means a guerrilla war waged independently and on its own initiative under a unified strategy.96 Since May 1928, however, a basic principle, simple in character, with regard to guerrilla warfare was already set forth in keeping with the conditions of the time, namely, the formula in sixteen key words: "enemy advances, we re treat; enemy halts, we harass: enemy tires, we attack; enemy retreats, we pursue".97 What is basic guerrilla strategy? Guerril la strategy must be based primarily on alert ness, mobility, and attack. It must be adjust ed to the enemy situation, the terrain, the relative strengths, the weather, and the situa tion of the people. In guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hol low; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas en gage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws. In guerrilla strategy, the enemy's rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed attacked, dis persed, exhausted and annihilated. Only in this way can guerrillas carry out their mission of independent guerrilla action and coordination with the effort of the regular armies.98 In guerrilla warfare, we must observe the principle "To gain territory is no cause for joy, and to lose territory is no cause for sor row. " To lose territory or cities is of no im portance. The important thing is to think up methods for destroying the enemy. If the enemy's effective strength is undiminished, even if we take cities we will be unable to hold them. Con versely, when our own forces aee insufficient, if we give up the cities, we still have hope of regaining them. It is altogether improper to defend cities to the utmost, for this merely leads to sacrificing our own effective strength.99 109 Guerrilla warfare has its place in Mao's arsenal, but it is not a static concept: the guerrilla unit is part of the organic growth of the whole Revolution, and it grows and changes with it. All guerrilla units start from nothing and grow. What methods should we select to ensure the conservation and development of our own strength and the destruction of that of the enemy? The essential requirements are the six listed below: 1. Retention of the initiative; alertness; carefully planned tactical attacks in a war of strategical defense; tactical speed in a war strategically protracted; tactical operations on exterior lines in a war conducted strategically on interior lines. 2. Conduct of operations to complement those of the regular army. 3. The establishment of bases. 4. A clear understanding of the relation ship that exists between the attack and the defense. 5. Hie development of mobile operations. 6. Correct command.100 For the transformation of the guerrilla units now engaged in a guerrilla war into a regular army which can wage a mobile war, two conditions are required, namely, increase in their numbers and improvement in their quality.101 To raise the quality of the- guerrilla units we must improve them politically and organisationally, and along the lines of their equipment, military training, tactics and discipline, gradually remoulding them on the pattern of the regular army and reducing their guerrilla style in work. Politically it is imperative to make both the commanders and the rank and file realise the necessity of raising the guerrilla units to the level of the regular army, to encourage all of them to strive towards this end, and to guarantee its realisation by means of political work. Organisationally it is imperative to establish step by step such military and political set ups, to have such military and political working methods, and to acquire such a regular 110 system of supply and medical service as are required of a regular corps. In the matter of equipment it is imperative to improve its quality, acquire new types of arms and in crease the indispensable means of communica tion. In the sphere of military training and tactics it is imperative for the guer rilla units to rise from what they used to practise to what is required of the regular corps. In the matter of discipline it is imperative to raise the guerrilla units to a point where uniform standards are observed, where every order and requisition is ful filled without fail and where all laxity and unbridled independence are done away with. To accomplish all these tasks requires a prolonged endeavour and is not an overnight job, but they point to the necessary direc tion of development. Only thus can the main regular corps be built up in a guerrilla base area and mobile operations emerge to strike at the enemy more effectively.*02 This body of strategy grew over the years as Mao's forces faced new situations. Me can look at this briefly by reviewing a series of thoughts in chronological order. The phenomenon that within a country one or several small areas under Red political power came into existence amid the encircle ment of White political power is one which, of all the countries in the world today, occurs only in China. Upon analysis we find that one of the reasons for its occur rence lies in the incessant splits and wars within China's comprador class and landed gentry. So long as splits and wars continue within these classes, the workers' and peasants' armed independent regime can also continue to exist and develop. In addition to this, the existence and development of such an armed independent regime require the following conditions: (1) a sound mass basis, (2) a firstrate Party organisation, (3) a Red Army of adequate strength, (4) a terrain favourable to military operations, and (5) economic strength sufficient for self-support.103 The Red Army's operations take the form of campaigns against "encirclement and anni hilation". Victory for us means chiefly success in our campaigns against the enemy's "encirclement and annihilation", that is, strategic and operational victory. Each fight against "encirclement and annihilation" constitutes a campaign which is usually made up of several or even scores of big and small battles. Even though many battles have been won, there is yet no strategic victory or victory of the whole campaign until the enemy's campaign of "encirclement and annihilation" is basically smashed. The history of the Red Army's ten years of war is a history of campaigns against "en circlement and annihilation".105 This policy we pursue in order to gain our political goal, which is the complete emancipation of the Chinese people. There are certain fundamental steps necessary in the realization of this policy, to wit: 1. Arousing and organizing the people. 2. Achieving internal unification politically. 3. Establishing bases. 4. Equipping forces. 5. Recovering national strength. 6. Destroying enemy's national strength. 7. Regaining lost territories. There is no reason to consider guerrilla warfare separately from national policy. On the contrary, it must be organized and con ducted in complete accord with national anti- Japanese policy,105 If one looks at the situation as a whole, the stage of the War of Resistance Ag&inst Japan is over and the new situation and task is domestic struggle. Chiang Kai-shek talks about "building the country". From how on the struggle will be, build what sort of country? To build a new-democratic country of the broad masses of the people under the leadership of the proletariat? Or to build a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country under the dictatorship of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie? This will be a most complicated struggle. At present it takes the form of a struggle between Chiang Kai- shek who is trying to usurp the fruits of 112 victory of the Mar of Resistance and our selves who oppose his usurpation.106 Given Mao's ability to see the larger picture it should not surprise us that he accepted the usefulness of the "united front" a part of his strategy. An important part of the political line of the Chinese Communist Party is to unite with as well as to struggle against the bourgeoisie. An important part of the build ing of Chinese Communist Party is that the Party develops and steels itself in the course of both uniting with the bourgeoisie and struggling against it. Unity here means the "peaceful" and "bloodless" struggle waged along ideological, political and or ganisational lines when we unite with the bourgeoisie, a struggle which will turn into an armed struggle when we are forced to split with the bourgeoisie. If our Party does not understand how to unite with the bourgeoisie in certain periods, it cannot advance and the revolution cannot develop; if our Party does not understand how to wage a resolute and serious "peaceful" struggle against the bourgeoisie while uniting with the bourgeoi sie, it will disintegrate ideologically, politically and organisationally and the revolution will fail; and if our Party, when forced to split with the bourgeoisie, does not wage a resolute and serious armed struggle against the bourgeoisie, it will also dis integrate and the revolution will also fail. All this has been borne out by the history of the past eighteen years.107 The role of Communism is not overly emphasized in Mao's work(with some key exception) and this may be due to the fact that he downplayed this aspect of hits thought in order to build united fronts. But in looking at Mao's strategy we must remember the key contribution to it of the body of Marxist-Leninist thought. • • Mao laid down strategic guidelines for the Revolu tion. The body of tactical operations took these guide lines to the battlefield, political and military, for im plementation. 113 * * * TACTICS Mao's tactics are as creative as his strategies, and often related in the same engaging manner, complete with Chinese folk tales to make the point. It is this folksi ness that makes Mao easier to read than most other tacti cians. This aspect of Mao's work (and it is an important aspect since it helped him gain and hold a leadership) is found in his explanation of the many facets of the Long March. The Long March is also a manifesto. It pro claims to the world that the Red Army is an army of heroes and that the imperialists and their jackals, Chiang Kai-shek and his like, are perfect nonentities. It announces the bankruptcy of the encirclement, pursuit, obstruction and interception attempted by the imperialists and Chang Kai-shek. The Long March is also an agitation corps. It declares to the approximately two hundred million people of eleven provinces that only the road of the Red Army leads to their liberation. Without the Long March, how could the broad masses have known so quickly that there are such great ideas in the world as are upheld by the Red Army? The Long March is also a seeding-machine. It has sown many seeds in eleven provinces, which will sprout, grow leaves, blossom into flowers, bear fruit and yield a harvest in the future.108 With that, we can move into some specific areas. Attack We must not attack strong positions. If the enemy guards his position firmly or defends a strong strategic point, then, unless we have special guarantees or success, we must not attack him. If we attack him, we will waste considerable time, and our losses in killed and wounded will certainly be many times those of the enemy. Moreover, in guerrilla warfare, our artillery is not strong; if we recklessly attack a strong position, it will be very difficult to take it rapidly, at one stroke, and, meanwhile, it will be easy for the enemy to gather his forces from all sides and surround us. On this point, the army and the people must be absolutely firm of purpose and cannot act rettklessly in a disorderly fashion because of a moment's anger.109 Do not fight hard battles. If we do not have a 100 per cent guar antee of victory, we should not fight a battle, for it is not worth while to kill 1,000 of the enemy and lose 800 killed our selves. Especially in guerrilla warfare such as we are waging, it is difficult to replace men, horses, and ammunition; if we fight a battle and ourselves lose many men, and horses, and much ammunition, this must be considered a defeat for us. We must not fight if the situation of the enemv is not clear. When we are encamped in a certain place and suddenly discover the enemy but are not informed regarding hfcs numbers or where he is coming from, we must absolutely not fight, but must resolutely retreat several tens of li (A li is about 1/3 of a mile.)... If the enemy is in force, it is obviously advanta geous to retreat. If his numbers are small and we retreat, nothing more than a little extra fatigue is involved, and there will always be time to return and attack him again later. HI Using the masses to make a surprise atta£k_and,.])rqak-q-bll 99k?4e, When the enemy surrounds us and block ades us, we should rouse the popular masses and cut the enemy's communications in all directions, so that he does not know that our army is already near him. Then we should take advantage of a dark night or of th^ light of dawn to attack and disperse 115 Surprise attacks on isolated units. When we have reconnoitered the enemy's position and have kept our men at a distance of several li, and when he has unquestionably relaxed his precautions, then we advance rap idly with light equipment, before dawn when the does not expect us, and exterminate When a guerrilla unit carries out a sur prise attack, the disposition of its troops should be more or less as follows: 1. We should launch a fierce attack by our main force on the point in the enemy's disposi tion where it hurts the most a really swift and resolute sudden blow. We should also send another force around to carry out energetic action on the enemy's flanks and in his rear, in order to confuse his judgement, and prevent him from fathoming where our main force is located. 2. We should attack one point in the enemy's disposition with all our might, but we should also carry out feigned deployments in other places and make an empty demonstration with a few scattered soldiers, so as to confuse the enemy's eyes and ears, and disperse his forces. 3. If we can determine beforehand the enemy's line of retreat, then we should, within the lim its of what is possible, send a part of our forces to intercept him. If the enemy has his heavy artillery and logistic supply installed outside the village, then we should designate a special small group to seize them. 4. If the guerrilla unit is numerically strong, it should be divided into several columns and should carry out the attack from two, three, or several directions, attempting to cut off the enemy's retreat. But we should consider the mat ter thoroughly, so as to avoid causing confusion in our own ranks, which might result in erroneous ly taking our own troops for those of the enemy. Because of this possibility, it is necessary, in advance of the action, to agree on signals. 5. In the case of a surprise attack on the enemy, if there is reason to fear that enemy re inforcements may arrive from a certain direction, we should send a small body of troops in advance of the action to the route where the reinforce ments may arrive, so as to obstruct their advance, or report this peril to the main force. 116 6. At the time of a surprise attack, the choice of the point on which the brunt of the attack will fall, and the geographical dis tribution of our forces (in general, two-thirds of our men are used for the principal direction of attack, and only one-third for the auxiliary directions of attack) must absolutely be such as to prevent the enemy forces from spreading out or receiving reinforcements and to make it pos sible for us to smash them one by one. 7. The various task groups making up a guer rilla unit should divide their forces within a very short distance of the point where the attack is to be made, and from there make a separate but coordinated advance. The best place for this is the point from which the charge will be made. In this way, we can avoid such misfortunes as losing our way, or the premature division of our forces, and we can also guard against the danger of sur prise attacks by the enemy. For the farther apart are the various independent columns or groups, the more likely they are to be separated by the terrain, and the more difficult it will be to,expect them all to strike at the same mo ment. 11* As soon as the tasks of a surprise attack have been carried out, a guerrilla unit should rapidly withdraw. Before withdrawing, it is best to go a few li, in a false direction, and then afterward turn and go in our true direction, so that the enemy will be unable to discover our tracks, and will not be able to follow us. It is not appropriate for the guerrilla units to take along prisoners, or to acquire large amounts of booty, which hinder our movement. It is best to require the prisoners first to hand over their weapons, and then disperse them, or to execute them. As for booty, it should be dis patched by the local government, or by the popu lation. During the battle, three officers and men out of every company should be given the exclusive task of picking up and gathering together abandon ed rifles and ammunition. After a victorious battle, we should devote all our efforts to col lecting everything on the battlefield, and we can also call upon the population of nearby areas to gather such things together, so that not the smallest trifle is left behind. H5 117 If a surprise attack is defeated, we should rapidly withdraw to the place of assembly de signated in advance. The usual assembly point is in the place where we encamped the previous night. .If our forces are sufficient, we can leave a reserve unit along the designated with drawal route, to look out for prisoners and wounded men.1*® Attacking the enemy requires more thought than physi cal activity if it is to be successfully carried out. When a guerrilla unit has finished concen trating for an attack, and when plans for scouts, courier service, etc., have all been satisfac torily completed, and one is preparing a surprise attack on a certain inhabited place, the commander of the guerrilla unit must first form a clear idea about each of the following points: 1. What is the strength of the military forces defending the given inhabited place? How are they deployed? How are they armed? What is their fighting capacity? How many scouts to sound a warning have they sent out? 2. Is there any other enemy nearby? If there is, how far away is he? Can he quickly come to the aid of the defending forces? Can we imagine how he would come to aid them? From what direction he would come? 3. What sort of roads are there that could be followed by the guerrillas and by the enemy? What hidden roads are there in the vicinity of the place we intend to attack by surprise? What route will we take to get to the place we are attacking? The preceding three points are not only things we should know in view of carrying out a surprise attack; we must also not fail to consider them with reference to our withdrawal after the attack. 4. As for fixing the time of a surprise attack it is best to carry it out at night, for, under the cover of darkness, even if the attack should fail, it can still inspire panic in the enemy. But we can attack at night only if we are thoroughly familiar with the terrain, and have clearly understood the enemy's dispositions or have extremely good guides. Otherwise, we should choose instead to carry out such surprise attacks at daybreak. If a surprise attack is to be directed against a supply depot, it should be carried out in the dead of night, for the men, 118 horses, and military equipment in such a depot will be on the move again very early, at day break. 5. Can the population of the given inhab ited place aid the enemy or not? How can we prevent the population from bringing trouble on itself in this way? While we should think through our plans at length, we should avoid overly subtle plans. An attack on a transport column is one of the most advantageous forms of action for a guerrilla unit, since we can obtain in this manner the weapons, food, and supplies we need.HS We defeat the many with the few---this we say to all the rulers of China. Yet we also defeat the few with the many this we say to the separate units of the enemy forces that we meet on the battlefield. This is no longer a secret and the enemy in general is by now well acquainted with our habit. But he can neither deprive us of our victories nor avoid his loss es, because he does not know when and where we shall strike. That we keep secret. The Red Army's operations are as a rule surprise at tacks. Ambush When the enemy is pursuing us in great haste, we select a spot for an ambush and wait until he arrives. Thus, we can capture the enemy all at one stroke.^20 When we learn from reconnaissance that the enemy plans to advance from a certain point, we choose a spot where his path is narrow and passes through confusing mountainous terrain and send a part of our troops— or a group of sharp shooters-— to lie hidden on the mountains border ing his path, or in the forest, to wait until his main force is passing through. Then we throw rocks down on his men from the mountains and rake them with bullets, or shoot from ambush at their commanding officers mounted on horseback.121 Ambush by luring the enemy, This occurs when our troops, so to speak, prostrate themselves and hold out both arms, enticing the enemy to pene trate deeply. It is carried out by first placing our main force in ambush along the two sides of the road, or in a hiding place on one side, and then attacking the enemy with a small force. This 119 force then feigns defeat and withdraws, luring the enemy deep into our lines, after which the main force rushes out from one side or both sides and carries out a surprise attack.122 Ambushes can be carried out against a vari ety of objectives such as isolated enemy sol diers, couriers, whole mobile units, logistic convoys, transport columns, trains, etc. Fur ther details are given below: 1. When ambushing the enemy's cavalry or infantry, we should choose a spot where they can not use their weapons and where it is not easy for them to manifest their full strength. 2. Ambushes against logistic convoys or transport columns should be carried out in the midst of a forest or in the countryside. 3. Ambushes of small enemy units, or whole mobile units or motorized transport columns are most valuable. But we must first understand their plans, the direction in which they are ad vancing, and the time it will take them to pass. We must also reflect in detail on the location for the ambush and carefully seek out a place likely to contribute to a favorable result. At the same time, we must carefully select in ad vance the route for our own withdrawal. 4. When a guerrilla unit carries out an am bush against a railroad train, our forces can be split into three part. The first part should take up battle positions near the railroad, to guard against resistance from the train. The second part should take up a position on the two sides of the train, and shoot into the carriages. The third part has the task of charging and boarding the train to make a search, unloading the cargo, taking charge of the weapons, etc.123 Targets 1. Destroy railroads and highways within the area of action, as well as important structures along the roads. Telephone lines and telegraph systems are especially important. 2. Destroy the enemy's principal or secondary supply depots. 3. Destroy the enemy's storehouses of food and military equipment. 4. Strike in the enemy's rear, at his baggage train, or at his mounted andvunmounted couriers, as well as at his mounted scouts, etc. Also seize the provisions and ammunition that the enemy is 120 bringing up from the rear to the front. 5. Strike at the enemy's independent task groups and at the inhabited areas that he has not yet solidly occupied. 6. Mobilize and organize the popular masses everywhere and aid them in their own self-defense. 7. Destroy airfields and military depots of the air force in the enemy's r e a r . 124 Counter-Offensive But a counter-offensive is not exactly an offensive. The principles of the counter-offen sive are applied when the enemy is on the offen sive. The principles of the offensive are ap plied when the enemy is on the defensive. In this sense, therefore, there are certain differ ences between the t w o . 125 According to our past experience the situa tion generally cannot be considered favourable to ourselves and unfavourable to the enemy and we cannot switch to the counter-offensive un less we have secured during the phase of re treat at least two of the conditions listed be low. These conditions are: 1. The people give active support to the Red Army; 2. The terrain is favourable for operations; 3. The main forces of the Red army are com pletely concentrated; 4. The weak spots of the enemy are discov ered; 5. The enemy is worn out both physically and morally; and 6. The enemy is induced to commit mistakes.126 Mao speaks to three central problems of starting a counter-offensive. Firstly, win victory in the first battle by all means. We should strike only when we are positively sure that the enemy's situation, the terrain, the people and other conditions are all favourable to us and unfavourable to the enemy. Otherwise we should rather fall back and cau tiously bide our time. There will always be opportunities, and we should not rashly accept battle7l27 Secondly, the plan of the first battle must be the prelude in the plan for the whole cam paign and forms an organic part of it. Without 121 a good plan for the whole campaign it is ab solutely impossible to fight a really success ful first battle. That is to say, even though victory is won in the first battle, if the battle prejudices the entire campaign rather than benefits it, then the victory in such a battle can only be considered a defeat... Hence before fighting the first battle it is necessary to have general idea of how the second, third, fourth, and even the final bat tles are to be fought, and to consider what changes would ensue in the enemy’s situation as a whole if we should win the succeeding battles or if we should lose them.128 Thirdly, consideration must be given to the plan for the next strategic phase of the war. We shall not have thoroughly discharged our responsibility as directors of strategy if we are occupied only with the counter offensive and neglect the measures to be taken subsequently in case we win the counter offensive or perhaps even lost it.129 Relations with Populace and the Enemy Mao's basic orientation toward the local populace is laid down in the "Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention" mentioned in the section on Philoso phy. These rules and points were to be strictly enforced among the troops. Modern warfare is not a matter in which armies alone can determine victory or defeat. Especially in guerrilla combat, we must rely on the force of the popular masses, for it is only thus that we can have a guarantee of success. The support of the masses offers us great advantages as regards transport, assist ance to wounded, intelligence, disruption of the enemy's position, etc. At the same time, the enemy can be put into an isolated posi tion, thus further increasing our advantages. If, by misfortune, we are defeated, it will also be possible to escape or to find con cealment. Consequently, we must not lightly give battle in places where the masses are not organized and linked to us.130 The political goal must be clearly and pre cisely indicated to inhabitants of guerrilla zones and their national consciousness awaken ed. Hence, a concrete explanation of the po litical systems used is important not only to guerrilla troops but to all those who are con cerned with realization of our political goal.131 When the masses are of one heart, everything becomes easy. A basic principle of Marxism- Leninism is to enable the masses to know their own interests. The role and power of the newspapers consists in their ability to bring the Party programme, the Party line, the Party's general and specific policies, its tasks and methods of work before the masses in the quickest and most extensive w a y . 132 We further our mission of destroying the enemy by propagandizing his troops, by treat ing his captured soldiers with consideration, and by caring for those of his wounded who fall into our hands. If we fail in these respects, we strengthen the solidarity of our enemy.133 Retreat In guerrilla warfare retreat is as important, if more important than attack. A strategic retreat is a planned strategic step which an inferior force, unable to smash quickly the offensive of a superior force, adopts in order to conserve its strength and wait for an opportune moment for beating the enemy.134 The problem of timing the beginning of a retreat is of momentous significance...Both premature and belated retreats will of course incur losses. But generally speaking, a be lated retreat causes more damage than a pre mature retreat.135 To convince the cadres and the people of the necessity of strategic retreat is an ex tremely difficult task when they have yet had no experience of it and when the army leadership, necessarily entrusting the de cision on strategic retreat to a few people or even to one person, is not yet so author itative that it enjoys the confidence of the cadres. Owing to the cadres' lack of experi ence and of faith in strategic retreat, great difficulties were encountered on this score at the beginning of the first and fourth counter campaigns and during the entire fifth counter campaign. 136 When we are faced with a large enemy force and do not have sufficient strength to meet its attack, we use the method of circling around. We hasten to a place where there are no enemy troops, and we use mountain trails so that the enemy cannot catch up with us. At the same time, along the way, we utilize the popular masses, getting them to carry on reconnaisance work in the front and the rear, so that we are not attacked by the enemy from either direc tion.137 When the enemy advances, we retreat. If the enemy's forces were weaker than ours, he would not dare advance and attack us. So, when he advances toward us, we can conclude that the enemy is certainly coming with a superior force and is acting according to plan and with preparation. It is, therefore, appropriate for us to evade his vanguard, by withdrawing beforehand. If we meet with the enemy in the course of our march and either do not have clear information regarding him or know that his army is stronger than ours, we should, without the slightest hesitation, carry out a precautionary withdrawal. As to the place to which we should with draw, it is not appropriate to go long dis tances on the main roads, so that the enemy follows us to the end. We should move about sinuously in the near-by areas, winding around in circles. If the enemy appears ahead of us, we should circle around to his rear; if the enemy is on the mountains, we should de scend into the valleys; if the enemy is in the middle, we should retreat on the two sides; if the enemy is on the left bank of the river, we should retreat on the right bank; if the enemy is on the right bank, we should retreat on the left bank. Moreover, in withdrawing, when we come to a crossroads, we can deliberately leave some objects in the branch of the road we do not take and send a small fraction of our men and horses that way, in order to leave some tracks or write some notices or symbols. 124 Or we can write some distinguishing marks on the road we do take to indicate that it is closed. Thus, we induce the enemy to direct his pursuit and attack in the wrong direction.138 Disperse and Concentrate This is the heart of the broad tactical directive to the guerrilla unit. In general, guerrilla units disperse to operate: 1. When the enemy is in overextended defense, and sufficient force can not be concentrated against him, guerrillas must disperse, harass him, and demoralize him. 2. When encircled by the enemy, guer rillas disperse to withdraw. 3. When the nature of the ground limits action, guerrillas disperse. 4. When the availability of supplies limits action, they disperse. 5. Guerrillas disperse in order to promote mass movements over a wide area. Regardless of the circumstances that pre vail at the time of dispersal, caution must be exercised in certain matters: 1. A relatively large group should be retained as a central force. The re mainder of the troops should not be divided into groups of absolutely equal size. In this way, the leader is in a position to deal with any circumstances that may arise, 2. Each dispersed unit should have clear and definite responsibilities. Or ders should specify a place to which to proceed, the time of proceeding, and the place, time, and method of assembly.139 Guerrillas concentrate when the enemy is advancing upon them, and there is opportunity to fall upon him and destroy him. Concentra tion may be desirable when the enemy is on the defensive and guerrillas wish to destroy isolated detachments in particular localities. By the term Hconcentrate,” we do not mean the assembly of all manpower but rather of only that necessary for the task. The remain ing guerrillas are assigned mission of hinder ing and delaying the enemy, of destroying isolated groups, or of conducting mass propa ganda . In addition to the dispersion and concen tration of forces, the leader must understand what is termed "alert shifting." When the enemy feels the danger of guerrillas, he will generally send troops out to attack them. The guerrillas must consider the situation and decide at what time and at what place they wish to fight. If they find that they cannot fight, they must immediately shift. Then the enemy may be destroyed piecemeal. For example, after a guerrilla group has de stroyed an enemy detachment at one place, it may be shifted to another area to attack and destroy a second detachment. Sometimes, it will not be profitable for a unit to become engaged in a certain area*.and in that case, it must move immediately.1^0 Marching and Halting When we are on the march, we must send plainclothes units armed with pistols ahead of our vanguard, behind our rear guard, and to the side of our lateral defenses, in order to spy out the situation and to forestall unexpected attacks by the enemy, or super fluous clashes.1 When we encamp, if there is a presump tion that the enemy may be near, we should send every day a guerrilla company---or at least a platoon---toward the enemy's de fenses to carry out reconnaissance at a distance (from 20 to 30 li) or to join up with the local forces and carry out propa ganda among the masses, in order to inspire them to resist the enemy. If this unit discovers the enemy, it should, on the one hand, resist him and, on the other hand, report to us so that we can prepare to meet the foe or to retreat without being drawn into an unnecessary battle.*^2 Some Miscellaneous (but important) Boints On the basis of a decision by the main force of the army, in time of battle, we send out part of our forces, divided into a platoon to lead the local militia, police, volunteer army, or other popular masses of the peasantry and the workers. These groups use a great variety of flags, occupy mountaintops or villages and mar ket towns, use brass gongs, spears, rudi mentary cannon, swords and pikes, trumpets, etc. They scatter all over the landscape and yell, thus distracting the enemy's eyes and ears. Or, both night and day, on all sides, they shoot off isolated shots to cause panic among the enemy soldiers and fatigue their spirit. Then, afterward, our army appears in full strength when the enemy does not expect it and disperses him by a flank attack.143 When our spies have informed us that the enemy is about to arrive, and if our force is not sufficient to give battle, we should then carry out the stratagem of "making a strong defense by emptying the countryside." We hide the food, stores, fuel, grain, pots and other utensils, etc., in order to cut off the enemy's food supply. Moreover, as regards the popular masses of the area in question, with the exception of old men, women, and children, who are left behind to provide reconnaissance in formation, we lead all able-bodied men to hiding places. Thus, the enemy has no one to serve as porters, guides, and scouts. At the same time, we send a few men to the enemy's rear communication lines, and cut or sabotage his communications facilities.144 When the enemy halts, we harass him. When the enemy is newly arrived in our ter ritory, is not familiar with the terrain, does not understand the local dialect, and is unable to gain any information from the scouts he sends out, it is as though he had entered a distant and inaccessible land. At such a time, we should increase our har assment- --shooting off guns everywhere, to make him ill at ease day and night, so exercising a great influence on both his mind and body. Under such circumstances, I fear that any army, however overbearing, 127 will begin to waver and will become weary. We need only await the time when his spirits are wavering and his body weary, and then, if our armies rush in all together, we can certainly exterminate him completely.145 When the first campaign against "encircle ment and annihilation" was conducted in the Kiangsi base area, the principle of "luring the enemy to penetrate deep" was put forward and successfully carried out. 14-6 Base Areas A base area for guerrilla war can be actually established only when the three afore-mentioned basic conditions have been gradually secured, £.e. the build-up of the anti-Japanese armed forces, the defeat of the enemy and the mobilisation of the masses of the people.147 The Kuomintang, aided by the United States, is mobilizing all its forces to attack our Liberated Areas. Country-wide civil war is already a fact. Our Party's present task is to mobilize all forces, take the stand of self-defence, smash the attacks of the Kuomintang, defend the Liberated Areas and strive for the reali zation of peace. To achieve this aim the following have become very urgent tasks. See to it that in the Liberated Areas the peasants generally get the benefits of rent reduction and that the workers and other labouring people benefit by appro priate wage increases and improved con ditions; at the same time, see to it that the landlords can still make a living and that the industrial and commercial capital ists can still make profits. Unfold a large-scale production drive next year, increase the output of food and daily ne cessities, improve the people's livelihood, provide relief for victims of famine and for refugees and meet the needs of the army. Only when the two important matters of rent reduction and production are well handled can we overcome our difficulties, support the war and win victory. 14-8 Planning There are numerous problems connected with the practice of mobile warfare, such as reconnaissance, judgment, decision, combat disposition, command, camouflage, concentration, advance, deployment, as sault, positional defence, encounter act ion, retreat, night fighting, task opera tions, evading the strong and attacking the weak, besieging the enemy to strike at his reinforcements, feint, anti-air craft devices, operationing when hemmed in by enemy forces, by-passing operations, consecutive operations, operations with out a rear, the need for conserving strength and storing up energy, etc. These problems have assumed many special features in the history of the Red Army, features which should be methodically treated and summed up in a study of operational di rection. and I will not expatiate on them here. Careful planning is necessary if vic tory is to be won in guerrilla war, and those who fight without method do not understand the nature of guerrilla action. A plan is necessary regardless of the size of the unit involved; a prudent plan is as necessary in the case of the squad as in the case of the regiment. The sit uation must be carefully studied, then an assignment of duties made. Plans must in clude both political and military instruc tion; the matter of supply and equipment, and the matter of cooperation with local civilians. Without study of these factors, it is impossible either to seize the initiative or to operate alertly. It is true that guerrillas can make only limited plans, but even so, the factors we have mentioned must be c o n s i d e r e d .150 Conclusion To understand these tactics is easy, but flexibly to employ and change them is not easy at all. Here the three crucial links are time, place and man. No victory can be won uhless the time, the place and the armed units are well chosen. If an 129 attack on an enemy force on the move is made too early, we would expose ourselves and give the enemy force a chance to get prepared; and if it is made too late, the enemy may have come to a halt and concen trated his forces, and we would have a hard nut to crack. This is the problem of timing. If we fix the point of as sault on the enemy's left wing which turns out to be exactly his weak point, we shall easily succeed; but if we fix it on the enemy's right wing, we might be running up against a snag and the attack would pro duce no result. This is the problem of place. It may be easy to score a victory when a particular unit of our forces is dispatched to undertake a particular task and hard to achieve success when another unit is dispateched instead. This is the problem of man. We should know not only how to employ tactics but how to change them.151 Properly employed, tactics will bring victory. And victory brings us into the realm of "Post-Victory"---where the philosophical demands of the revolution will either be met or abandoned. All else becomes prelude to this final stage of revolution. * * * 130 POST-VICTORY Mao didn't see victory on the horizon for years, but when he finally did he began to plan for it. Communist revolutionaries have one key advantage over non-Communists in that they have a ready-made blueprint at least on the philosophical level of what their new world should look like. Mao had that image, molded to the Chinese context, and he has sought to give it life in post-victory China, The task of seizing political power throughout the country demands that our Party should quickly and systematically train large numbers of cadres to administer military, political economic, Party, cul tural and educational affairs. In the third year of the war, we must prepare thirty to forty thousand cadres of lower, middle and higher ranks, so that in the fourth year when the army advances they can march with it and bring orderly ad ministration to newly liberated areas with a population of some 30 to 100 million. China's territory is very large, her population is very numerous, and the rev olutionary war is developing very rapidly; but our supply of cadres is very inade- quate---this is a very great difficulty. In preparing cadres during the third year, while we should rely on the old Liberated Areas to supply the greater part, we must also pay attention to enrolling cadres from the big cities controlled by the Kuomintang.*52 The army is not only a fighting force, it is mainly a working force. All army cadres should learn how to take over and administer cities. In urban work they should learn how to be good at dealing with the imperialists and Kuomintang reaction aries, good at dealing with bourgeoisie, good at leading the workers and organizing trade unions, good at mobilizing and organ izing the youth, good at uniting with and training cadres in the new Liberated Areas, good at managing industry and commerce, good at running schools, newspapers, news agencies and broadcasting stations;, good at handling foreign affairs, good at handl ing problems relating to the democratic parties and people's organizations, good at adjusting the relations between the cities and the rural areas and solving the problems of food, coal and other daily necessities and good at handling monetary and financial problems. In short, all urban problems, with which in the past our army cadres and fighters were unfamiliar, should from now on be shouldered by t h e m .153 Very soon we shall be victorious through out the country. This victory will breach the eastern front of imperialism and will have great international significance. To win this victory will not require much more time and effort, but to consolidate it will. The bourgeoisie doubts our ability to con struct. The imperialist reckon that even tually we will beg alms from them in order to live. With victory, certain moods may grow within the Party— -arrogance, the airs of a self-styled hero, inertia and unwilling ness to make progress, love of pleasure and distaste for continued hard living. With victory, the people will be grateful to us and the bourgeoisie will come forward to flatter us. It has been proved that the enemy cannot conquer us by force of arms. However, the flattery of the bourgeoisie may conquer the weak-willed in our ranks. There may be some Communists, who were not con quered by enemies with guns and were worthy of the name of heroes for standing up to these enemies, but who cannot withstand sugar-coated bullets; they will be defeated by sugar-coated bullets. We must guard against such a situation. To win country wide victory is only the first step in a long march of ten thousand 1JL. Even if this step is worthy of pride, it is compar atively tiny; what will be more wotthy of pride is yet to come. After several decades, the victory of the Chinese people's demo cratic revolution, viewed in retrospect, will seem like only a brief prologue to a long drama. A drama begins with a prologue, but 132 the prologue Is not the climax. The Chinese revolution is great, but the road after the revolution will be longer, the work greater and more arduous. This must be made clear now in the Party. The comrades must be taught to remain modest, prudent and free from arrogance and rashness in their style of work. The comrades must be taught to preserve the style of plain living and hard struggle. We have the Marxist-Leninst weapon of criticism and self-criticism. We can learn what we did not know. We aretnot only good at destroying the old world, we are also good at building the new. Not only can the Chinese people live without begging alms from the imperialists, they will live at better life than that in the imperialist countries.154 ★ ★ ★ Commentaries Commentaries are useful in looking at great figures of any age, but in Mao's case they are particularly helpful since his life has been so varied, so complex, and so im portant in world history. In looking at Mao, his life and work through the eyes of acute observers it will be helpful to use two different foci: the first on Mao before his victory over Chiang, and the second after that victory. We can call these two foci pre-victory and post-victory. Pre-Victory Robert Payne, in his book Mao Tse-tung. provides in sights into many facets of Mao and his leadership of the Chinese revolution over the course of the long pre-victory years. The first, and underlying, thing to keep in mind with Mao is his roots in the vast Chinese past. 133 For example, the Chinese past is riddled with the work of secret societies, warlords, and insurrectionists. It is natural that a man brought up in such a society would act accordingly. When the Chinese Communists established themselves in Yenan in the remote border lands of northwest China, they were following the established practice of Chinese rebels. By carving out a principality for themselves beyond the reach of the central government, and using it as a base, they were merely following a practice hallowed by long usage. Though they claimed to be Marxists, their methods of thought and propaganda were not markedly different from those of the secret societies. Long before the Communist armies conquered China, they had sapped the strength of the Kuomintang by the same methods employ ed by the secret societies in their wars against the reigning dynasties.155 Beyond what might be called an unconscious following of the Chinese tradition, Mao consciously studied the in surrections and wars of the past and learned from them; he focused particularly on the Taiping Emperor, Yen Fu, K'ang Yu-wei, and Sun Yat-sen— -all men who had failed. Mao studied them and was determined to s u c c e e d . *56 But Mao was not by any means a captive of the past. He studied Sun Tzu, but he adapted him to the contemporary Chinese situation. "He was also able to adapt them (Sun's teachings) in the merciless in-fighting which occurred within the Communist party itself."157 And it certainly is a key to Mao's success that he was able to keep from being destroyed in the constant external and internal battling which the CCP engaged in. This adaptability applied to Mao's strategy and tac tics. For example, in the fourth and fifth encirclement campaigns Chaing's air planes took a heavy toll: "...it was only because they were unexpected and because the Red Armies allowed themselves to be caught in the open. After 134 ward, they developed a simple method of 'scattering,' and airplanes rarely troubled them, even during the Long March."158 An integral part of this adaptability was Mao's con scious effort to learn from his past actions. After 1943 study of the first four encirclement campaigns was manda tory in the Red Army, and Mao and Chu Teh learned from each other as they worked together Mao apparently knew the value of the objectivity of another person for so many years. A characteristic of Mao throughout his life was his ability to use anything and everything to further his cause. Payne relates at least one instance where his troops put on KMT uniforms and carried KMT banners and thus wiped out half a KMT division. (Payne adds that this trick is straight out of All Men Are Brothers.>159 Mao's keen electicism was brillant when it applied to the use of him self: his manipulation of his own legend. Although he admitted years later that the Long March had probably been unnecessary (other strategies might have succeeded without the enormous losses incurred in the March) he was fully aware of the positive value of the legendary feat. The Red Army could go anywhere, fight any one, overcome any natural or manmade obstacle---Mao and his invincible Army took on a mystical quality which Chiang never approached.160 Along the same line, Mao was not above associating himself and his cause with the legendary exploits of heroes from China's past. The capture of Yenan by Li Tzu-ching had led to the downfall of the Ming dynasty; the Yellow Emperor was buried nearby; and in All Men Are Brothers the city where much of the action occurs in Yenan (although in another province); and now Mao Tse-tung and his heroic army of Long Marchers came to Yenan to begin their long fight 135 against a new oppressor. Payne observers that "The choice of Yenan....was perfectly deliberate, and was based largely on its historical associations."1^1 Such deliberate at tempts at instant history may appear superficial and obvi ous to Western observers, but in a culture permeated by verbal traditions of heroism associated with venerated geographic locations, such actions were potent weapons of war. Portraits of leaders are another such weapon, and both sides used them, but Mao's pictures were strikingly differ ent. Hitler scowled and accused from a million Ger man walls; Chiang Kai-shek glared frostily; Stalin looked stem and demanding; only the portraits of Mao suggested a twenty-year-old youth awakening from a long dream, the new man, the savior.162* And exactly what China was looking for. The peasants had more than enough of stem frosty warlords, they were seek ing a savior, a legendary figure to sweep them up and lead them to a restoration of China's brilliant past. Mao's image was not based on air, however, and his personal brilliance cannot be understimated in evaluating the Chinese revolution. Those around him knew. They had known him when he was in command of a peasant army less than a hundred strong; and now this solitary man possessed armies greater than any possessed by Napole on, and seemed unaware of his great posses sions. A man who could organize the Chinese peasants in this fashion is not to be de spised. 1^3 And Mao himself knows. Today, stoop-shouldered and sunburned, looking every day more and more like the portraits of Sun Yat-sen taken in his old age, Mao Tee-tung can look out from the ruined temple near Peking, where he occa sionally lives, upon empire he has con quered almost singlehanded. He knows that 136 without him the Chinese Communists would not have succeeded in capturing China, just as it is inconceivable that the Communist would have captured Russia without Lenin. No one else possessed the peculiar talents he had: the patience, the foresight, the astonish ing capacity to learn from his mistakes, the knowledge of military science, and the capacity to think in broad, strenuous out lines all these were predominantly his contributions to the Chinese Communists. He was not simply a political figure: he was the novelist whose novel had become sud denly true, or the poet whose words have suddenly become p e o p l e .164 These are not just Mao's delusions, or the fawnings of an admiring writer, for an objective scrutiny of the history of the Communist Party in China shows that it was completely impotent in its efforts at revolution. Had Mao not moved the action to the countryside, the Party would have been destroyed in the cities as it strove mightily to apply Marxism-Leninism to an impossible situation Chiang came close to accomplishing this anyway, and had it not been for Mao's continuing presence he would have succeeded. Not only was Mao a giant in his own right, but when the peasants compared the two men who emerged from their own intra-party struggles as bitter adversaries, Mao made Chiang look very pale indeed. Chiang Kai-shek, in his victory speech after the defeat of Japan stressed his mili tary successes. "He did not claim that he had freed the peasants from excessive taxation or improved their social welfare, and he made no reference to the perplexing in crease in the number of Chinese Communist.“165 chiang fought only one kind of battle for only one kind of end-- his own rise to power. He faced a different kind of man, however. Mao did not forget the people. He based his strength upon the thousands of social groups in China, and he saw, very early in his ca reer, that power in the modem world is not 137 waged by guns, but by the agreement of the social groups to enforce their demands: and there is no other ultimate power.166 And where Chiang did not even talk about social reforms, Mao not only talked about them, but made the base areas in to living proof that he was not merely talking. When faced with the choice between more of the same warlordism or Com munist land reform, the peasants marched accordingly. Edgar Snow follows up on this theme in his ground breaking Red Star Over China, by explaining what he felt was Mao's strength. The immediate basis of support for the Reds in the North-west was obviously not so much the idea of 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his need* as it was something like fihe promise of Dr. Sun Yat-sen: 'Land to those who till it.' Among economic reforms which the Reds could claim to their credit these four evidently counted most to the peasantry: redistribu*- tion of land, abolition of usury, abolition of tax-extortion, and elimination of privi- 1edged groups.16/ This credibility on Mao's part had great impact on his army, for it gave them something close to home to fight for. Snow observed that Therein lay the superiority of the Red Army. It was so often the only side in a battle that believed it was fighting for something. It was the Reds' greater success at the educative tasks in the building of an army that enabled them to withstand the tremen dous technical and numerical superiority of their e n e m y .168 Not only better at the methodology of education, Mao also had something tangible to hold out as a reward to his pu pils in the Red Army, something Chiang Kai-shek in his com mitment to holding on to feudal powers could never offer them. Beside social reform aimed at the peasant stood the other central pillar of Mao's strength: his commitment to 138 anti-Imperialism. This was a difference between China and Russia: In the Russian revolution there was only one enemy the indigenous bourgeois-imperialist class; while in the Chinese revolution there was an indigenous enemy of dual personality both its own nascent bourgeoisie and the en trenched interests of foreign imperialism. And the Japa nese invasion, followed by American aid to Chiang Kai-shek only Intensified the strength of Mao's appeal to the Chi nese desire to be free from foreign control. The imperialist aspect of China's revolution had other ramifications. Stuart Schram points this out in his book Mao Tse-tune. with reference to the Japanese invasion and its strategic implications. "In the long run the con tinuing Japanese agression was to prove perhaps the most important single factor in Mao's rise to power."169 Not only did the invasion force Chiang to divert some of his forces, but Mao, through his brilliant use of propaganda, was able to portray the Red Army as the courageous defender of the Chinese people while Chiang's troops did nothing but attack him. The peasant reaction to this picture of a traitorous Chiang was predictable. At the same time, Mao's protestations were not with out some basis in fact; and it is fairly clear that he did desire a coalition to protect China from the Japanese. Schram elaborates on this theme: Paradoxically, Mao's very sincerity (or at least partial sincerity) in proposing collaboration to Chiang Kai-shek make him more dangerous as a rival. For it grew out of an intense concern with the fate of China, and this greatly increased his prestige as a leader in the eyes of the now thoroughly aroused peasant masses, who were ultimately to sweep him to power on a wave that was as much a wave of nationalism as a wave of so cial revolt.170 Another spinoff from the anti-Japanese campaign was a fur ther honing of Mao's revolutionary strategies and tactics 139 ---this would stand the Red Army in good stead at the end of World War II. At the end of that war Chiang could point to no major social breakthroughs. "The rampant inflation, waste, and corruption which prevailed in Kuomintang China..."171 plus Chiang's brutal methods of fighting the Red Army— -where millions of innocent peasants died---could convince the peasants to turn only one direction, to Mao. The fact that Mao represented a new morality made this conversion all the easier. Mostafa Rejai sums the situation up this way: The most significant reasons for the suc cess of the Communists included: (1) the in eptness of the Chiang regime and the unpopu larity of KMT dictatorship; (2) the progres sive worsening of domestic conditions and the consequent alienation of large segments of the population; (3) the Japanese invasion, which helped weaken the Nationalists and render the Chiang government unable to con trol northern China, where the CCP became entrenched; and (4) the revolutionary strat egy of Mao Tse-tung and the CCP promise to return to the Chinese people their national pride and integrity.172 Mao's revolutionary strategy and his promise to bring China back to its predominate position can both be traced back to his work in Hunan province. Samuel Griffith in Peking and People's Wars points out that Mao's stay there in 1926-27 opened his eyes to the potential of rural China. "There, in the vast sea of hundreds of millions of illiter ate Chinese peasants, Mao saw the possibility of creating a basis for an agrarian movement which, he was correctly con vinced, would ultimately sweep aside all opposition."173 To a man passionately committed to the Leninist ideal of activism watching the failures in China's cities, this rev elation must have been heartening. No in the cities, but "Here, Mao had decided, was the perfect raw material, read- 140 tly susceptible to manipulation by the Party to serve its ultimate purpose: the seizure of state p o w e r . " * 7 4 And it was here, too, that Mao's strategy evolved, for a movement based on the support of the vast masses of China-— and not on a modem army-— could only succeed on the basis of its conversion of the peasants. Thus Mao's first statement of guerrilla strategy read: (We) divide our forces to arouse the masses, (We) concentrate to deal with the enemy. This was something new, as Griffith points out. For here Mao states the primary mission of a revolutionary army to be agitation and organ ization of the masses; fighting is secondary. This dual task was assigned the Red Army in the Kiangsi period, in the war against the Japanese, and in the opening phase of the Civil War of 1946-49. The Communists devot ed great effort to arousing the masses— - the 'water* in which Mao's guerrilla 'fish* swam.1'° And it is this very point which counter-guerrilla opera tions throughout the world have been so unsuccessful in coping with. Another crucial factor which has been an apparently insurmountable obstacle to counter-guerrilla strategists is the difference in basic thought patterns between the Chi nese (and their students) and their foes in the West. Scott Boorman reveals this basic difference in his excel lent Study, The Protracted Game: A Wei-ch'i Interpretation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy. The book, like the game, like the strategy, tends toward a seamless web that is more felt than thought, but a few major points can be drawn out which cast light on Mao and his strategy— -and on the cul ture which creates such a mind-set. The first lesson is that strategy tends to be cul ture-bound. "The applicability of Western analytic crite 141 ria vanishes, however, when the Western analyst, lay or governmental, attempts to confront the strategic techniques of a culture different from his own."177 Second, strategic games reflect the thought of a cul ture and thus can be used as models of strategies of war fare. It is safe to assume that, historically, there has probably been considerable interaction be tween the strategy of wei-ch'i and the strate gy used in Chinese warfare. If indeed wei-ch'i and Chinese Communist strategy are products of the same strategic tradition, wei-ch'i may be more realistically used as an analogic model of that strategy than any purely theoretical structure generated by a Western social scien tist.178 Assuming these two points to be valid the next step is to touch on the major points of the game itself, leaving the obvious analogies to the reader. Wei-ch'i is a board game involving two people; the board is a grid usually formed by 19 vertical and 19 horizontal lines (361 inter sections); stones are used (181 Black and 180 White) as markers; on each turn a stone is placed on an intersection, turns alternating until the stones are all gone, or all ter ritory is captured. There are two objectives in wei-ch'i: control of territory and capture of hos tile stones. In practice...these two objectives are highly connected in the strategy of the game, capture of enemy pieces normally leading to acquisition of new territory, and construction of ter ritorial bases often but not invariably ---contributing to further captures.179 According to current scoring proce dures, each point of territory (that is, intersection) encircled by a given side and each hostile stone captured or killed by that side counts one point in its total score. The side with the greater number of points wins.iSO Since it takes four stones to encircle one stone (an uneco 142 nomic use of stones), capture of territory has a higher strategic priority that capture or killing of stones. The large number of intersections and stones leads to a long game: "the protracted game". The strategic implications of the slow tempo... are dual. Although one player may be de feated tactically in one part of the board he may recover his position by strategic out-maneuvering of his opponent. In the best-known Western board games of strategy, chess and checkers, on the other hand, a single mistake in tactics is---given op timal play on the part of the opponent— - fatal to the blunderer. Conversely, only a wei-ch'i strategy which takes into con sideration the long-term outcomes of all the tactical combats on the board can en sure wei-ch'i victory, since a policy oriented toward local success often leads to a strategic debacle. By contrast to the orientation of Western strategy to realiza tion of a single decisive tactical engage ment, the concept of tactical success lead ing to strategic victory is alien to the spirit of wei-ch'i. Another characteristic of the game is its jig-saw character: front lines are fluid since stones can be plac ed anywhere on the board; patterns of encirclement and counter-encirclement emerge. There are no secure front lines or safe areas. And victory is never complete high score wins and economic use of stones leads to high score. The edges of the board form natural walls, leading to a more economic encirclement of territory, so play tends to start and concentrate at the edges of the board, rather than in the center. Stones are placed so that they influ ence territory and threaten the opponent's stones but not so that they form tight lines thus tying down a lot of stones in a small area. Three basic principles are essential to good wei-ch'i play: initiative, coordination, and economy. Of the three, initiative is the most important: the goal is to § 143 move, even on the defensive, in such a way that the oppo nents subsequent move is in response to your original move. Thus, you control the direction of the game. This leads to defense-by-offense, a strategy of defending a threatened area or stone by attacking the opponent some where else on the board, thus making him defend and advanc ing your own overall strategic offensive. This takes, of course, coordination over the entire board and the economical use of stones getting the most control and influence for the least stones. Play moves all over the board with many different tactical alms in mind. This flexibility of play tends to convey the impression, especially when the game is be tween good players, that wei-ch'i is form less, even aimless in strategy. No interpre tation could be further from the truth. Con stant re-evaluation of the situation and of the vital points of the position is necessary for good play, and sacrifice of stones or of influence in one region in expectation of more advantageous operations elsewhere is a common motif of higher wei-ch'i strategy. After thus exposing the Western reader to this com plex and intriguing game Boorman goes on to apply the game as a model for analyzing Mao's rise to power. The point has been made, 1 think, and we can conclude with this: It may be desirable to conclude with a word of caution. To introduce a term re cently fashionable in some circles of stra tegic analysis, wei-ch'i strategy is a branch of the art of the dialectic: the dialectic of discontinuous connections, concentrated dispersion, encircled counterencirclement, flexible inflexibility. The paradoxes of the wei-ch'i dialectic are possibly not as insouluble as those of its Hegelian counter part. It is, however, impossible to lay down absolute canons for wei-ch'i command de cisions. 183 Wei-ch'i then helps us to understand Mao's strategy by pro viding another place to look at it from and it helps to 144 clarify the cultural roots of that strategy-— particularly the concept of "edge-of-board play”. Mao was not alone in this strategy. Benjamin Sch wartz, in Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao points out that P'eng Pai had made great strides in such organization al efforts in the early twenties. But Mao did go beyond this is one aspect: "The careful choice of a favorable terrain and the development of a rationalized technique of partisan warfare seem to have been truly original contri butions of the Chu-Mao partnership."*®^ Thus, we see that while the organization side was vital, it needed the mutu ally dependent creation of the military struggle to bring it to ultimate success. In all of this there is an underlying question that may be merely a reflection of an ingrained American bias against Communism in any form anywhere, and that is the simple question: "Was Mao sincere?" He certainly bent over backwards to gain the support of the peasant popula tion, but perhaps this was only expediency in the face of insurmountable obstacles down other roads to power. The "truth” in this just as in the question of the sincerity of the leaders of the American revolution— -lies mostly in Mao's actions after his rise to power in China, and this will be dealt with in the next part, but some hints can be found elsewhere. First, the Chinese revolution was not part of a world wide Communist plan. Schwartz deals with this at length in his book, and presents his conclusion succinctly. It is the conclusion of this study that the political strategy of Mao Tse-tung was not planned in advance in Moscow, and even ran counter to tenets of orthodoxy which were still considered sacrosanct and in violate in Moscow at the time when this strategy was first crystallized; that it was only the force of circumstance which finally led Moscow to provide a facade of 145 rationalization for this new experience.185 This means that Mao's claim to represent the Chinese urge to national identity and freedom from foreigh influence takes on added credibility. He answered to no outside pow er, not even to his ideological brothers in Moscow. The other pillar of Mao's philosophy, the devotion to the peasants, is not on such firm ground however. The shades of difference here are often hard to discern, but Schwartz again sheds much light on the problem. He writes that regardless of the peasant base and the peasant back ground of much of the top leadership of the Party under Mao the obvious conclusion is not the correct one. It would, however, be a grave error to assume that once having achieved power, the aspira tions or intentions of the Communist leaders would necessarily be determined by their peas ant background or by interests of the peasantry. On the contrary, we have every reason to be lieve that these men had thoroughly absorbed the Leninist abhorrencd of 'backwardness' as well as the extravagant Marxist-Leninist be lief in the potentialities of industriali zation even when the circumstances forced them to lurk in the hinterlands. Chinese Communism in its Maoist development can only be under stood when---to modify Trotsky's phrase— -we realize that parties as well as classes decide. The Chinese Communist Party under the leader ship of Mao Tse-tung has been, I would suggest, neither 'the vanguard of the proletariat' in the Marxist-Leninist sense, nor a 'peasant party' in the Marxist-Leninist sense, but an elite of professional revolutionaries which has risen to power by basing itself on the dynamic of peasant discontent.*86 If this is true, if Mao's group was not peasant-orient ed in its philosophy, we can only look to its actions after its victory to determine who benefited in reality. If the life of the peasant has been significantly improved then we can question the validity of Schwartz's position in terms of cause and effect, if not its actual accuracy. If the 146 peasants, who made it possible for Mao to take power, have not benefited then the charge of cynical self-service takes on strength. Post-Victory The course of Chinese history since 1949 is so much a reflection of Mao that commentaries on this period inevi tably end up as semi-psychological speculations on the man. This situation is enhanced by the fact that hard data is lacking in most areas of endeavor. With these points in mind we can take a few glimpses at post-victory China and the results of that long, long struggle. China's history since the Communist victory has been a series of fits and starts aimed at parity with the West in some areas (industrialization and military strength) and superiority in<others (culture and morality). Stuart Sch- ram characterizes this period as one of the "...progressive exaltation of the human will over the rational analysis of the facts." He goes on to explain that One can get somewhat nearer to a balanced view by taking into account three factors: the means employed to reshape the mental ity of the population; the ideas of the leadership regarding their capacity to abolish the natural limits on human actions; and the concrete methods and objectives of economic and social policy. In these terms, one might say that the methods of "thought reform" ...have been constantly utilized in the seventeen years since the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic, on a scale and with an intensity which makes the process an essential attribute of Mao's China. The spirit and the effectiveness of these methods tend to give the leaders an exaggerated idea of their power over men and things, thus en couraging further development of that vol untarism which has been so distinguishing a trait of Mao's thought from the beginning. 147 But this extreme voluntarism collides with the methods of economic development employ ed by the regime, which have, on the whole remained rational... ,18' Forays into irrationality are there, however, as Schram is quick to point out, and these seem to grow out of Mao's basic romanticism and impatience. The Great Leap Forward and the commune movement were certainly periods of irrationality, as evidenced by the subsequent retreats on both fronts. All of these objectives were romantic in the sense that they tended to exalt the power of the human will. A cold analysis of the facts should have told Mao that the communes as originally conceived could not achieve either their economic objective of increasing production or their political objective of social control without a far larger number of skilled administrators and much more effec tive statistical services than the country possessed. He nonetheless pushed ahead with his policy on the assumption that revolution ary enthusiasm and ideological purity could make up for the lack of technical competence and material means.188 In the People's Republic it has always been better to be Red than expert, but this faith in zeal and right-thinking has often failed to build utopia overnight. In short, Schram feels that Mao has overextended him self in his attempt to transform China overnight into a utopia combining the best of traditional China, modern Western nations, and Marxist communism. The gulf between the traditionalist China in which Mao grew to manhood and the intel lectual and organizational needs of a society which is endeavoring to assimilate the most advanced forms of science and technology in the second half of the twentieth century is too vast to be bridged by a single human being....He is today not willing to recog nize that the long period during which his ideas were in harmony with China's needs has come to an end. Hence the constant and in- 148 creasingiy shrill campaigns directed at show ing that every word in his writings is still valid and that every lesson of his guerrilla experience is still applicable today.189 Schram*s analysis of the situation may be accurate, but we must keep in mind that Mao has always taken the long view ("the protracted war" mentality) and that his time- horizon may be longer than ours. Thus what appears as failure to us may be only a tactical setback, not a strate gic defeat. Schram*s point is well taken however: it does appear that Mao desires some kind of certainty that the revolutionary aims he envisioned for China will be pursued after he is gone— -and that the "experts'* do not come to rule China as they have the Soviet Union. The spectre of Lenin must haunt Mao as he nears death. One can't help wishing Mao were still a young man just to see what he could do given another half-century. But since that is not the case we have to deal with what is. The Great Leap Forward was an attempt to move China into Mao's future in the economic sphere. The Cultural Revolution almost a decade later was a similar attempt in the cultural sphere. Bourgeois elements previously missed in the re-education campaigns were to be rooted out by the new hope of the Revolution the student Red Guards. Payne gives this analysis of Mao and the Cultural Revolution: Mao Tse-tung was an old man, suffering from throat cancer, who had been living for a long time in semi-isolation. He had partially recovered his health, but until the beginning of the year he had had very little contact with the outside world ex cept through the newspapers. For a long time he had cherished a growing hatred for Liu Shao-ch'i and for the entire bureauc racy. The "cultural revolution," which had begun as an attempt to change the arts and literature, had grown step by step until it encompassed a revolution which would inevi- 149 tably affect the lives of everyone in China, A new kind of society would come into ex istence, and once more he would assert his personal domination. By setting the youth against the bureaucracy, he hoped to tear down the existing superstructure.*90 Things apparently got out of hand and went further than even Mao could have desired. Finally, the Red Army stepped in and brought some semblance of order back to the People's Republic. And vrtiat was the result? Again we must avoid premature judgements, but there is more than a grain of truth in Rejai's analysis. He writes: The upheaval resulted in a serious set back for China and Mao Tse-tung's leader ship. Widespread domestic violence led to loss of international prestige. . It adverse ly affected China's economic and industrial progress, as well as its once successful (apparently) nuclear development program. It fragmented and weakened the Communist Party as hever before. And it led to the disaffection of the very youth that Mao had set out to "revolutionaize." The military was the only group sufficiently cohesive to assume a decisive stabilizing role.191 Mo one would suggest that a military solution was what Mao desired; we must admit that in this sense, if in no other, the Cultural Revolution failed. Perhaps the ordeal will create the society Mao desired, just as the Long March's hardships, pain, and death created revolutionary victory over the Kuomintang, but it is hard to forsee such a con clusion in the near future. If speed is what Mao desired, he surely failed. Speed may not have been the goal, however. Affirma tion may be closer to the truth. Robert Lifton deals with this aspect of Mao and the Cultural Revolution in his in sightful book Revolutionary Immortality. He characterizes Mao as a revolutionary hero of our age, approaching death increasingly unsure of the firmness of the resolve of his people to carry out his revolution to its logical conclu 150 sion. This is associated with the need of every individual to achieve a form of immortality by being of part of a stream of history that extends deep into the past and far into the future. But if that future is uncertain then death cannot be accepted-— it becomes the end, extinction in the deepest sense of the word. Mao was faced with a situation in which progress for China meant technology and experts and bureaucrats all those things which were so deeply associated with the negative aspects of China's past, with the warlords and foreigners, with the revisionists in the Soviet Union, with the death of other revolutions. Yet Mao needed those things to fulfill the image of his utopia, and by allowing them, even in moderation, he could see a change taking place in the Chinese people, particularly the questioning mind that accompanies science. Revolutionary consciousness was no longer enough it seemed, yet revolutionary con- sciousness apparently had to be the basis for the truly communistic society. Mao was in a bind: he faced what Lifton calls "symbolic death,'" and he reacted accordingly. The activist response to symbolic death --or to what might be called unmastered death anxiety---is a quest for rebirth. One could in fact view the entire Cultural Revo lution as a demand for renewal of communist life. It is, in other words, a call for.re- assertion or revolutionary immortality.192 And Mao went all the way with his activism. A cultural revolution anywhere involves a collective shift in the psychic images around which life is organized. In Maoist China, however, it has meant nothing less than an catastrophe together with a prescription ^reconstituting the world being de stroyed. -193 Lifton sees it as all for nought and calls it the Last Stand, for Mao, the revolution, and the militant's 151 desire to change society. Without going into the new image of man which Lifton sees replacing the man Mao represents, we can take a close look at his conclusion. The question of Mao*s failure is one that cannot be decided conclusively at this point. And the question of failure hinges on the criteria for success. Which brings us back to the question of Mao's sincer ity. It would seem that Mao has remained true to his goals, that he has not used his power for his own selfish ends, that he has honestly sought to do what he felt was good for China— and, more importantly, for the Chinese peasant. By objective criteria the quality of the peas ant's life is much better than it was before the Revolution. China is a free and sovereign state that commands increas ing respect throughout the world. By these criteria-- based on the fcwin pillars of Mao's rise to power Mao can be judged sincere. The intensity of that sincerity can only be judged by the Chinese people themselves, and only after Mao is dead. Whatever our ideology, 1 think we can agree with Lifton's view that Mao is the closest thing to the mythic hero that this centvaty has seen. Mao once wrote of China's awakening that "the earth trembles"; Mao has made the earth tremble and it will tremble long after his physical pre sence is gone. He has become one of the "great heroes of the world" that he so admired in his youth. CHAPTER 3: ©IAP Our revolution has reflected the associ ation between the two revolutionary currents of our time---the socialist revolution and the national liberation revolution. This is a very fundamental strong point.* 152 153 BIOGRAPHY (The life of General Vo Nguyen Giap is not an easy one to write on. There are few sources and Giap, perhaps in emulation of Ho Chi Minh, appears to have revealed little about himself. Only one biography on Giap has, to my knowledge, been written so I will be leaning on it more than I would like to.) Vo Nguyen Giap was bom sometime in 1912 in the vil lage of An-Xa in Quang Binh Province; this is in central Vietnam (Annam) just north of the Geneva cease-fire line (17th parallel) and one of the region’s poorest areas. Giap's father was a respected scholar, and although poor he was given consideration by the people he taught and by those he lived with. Giap must have been influenced to some degree by this father who ”... could remember the days when the major cities of Northern Annam and Tonkin had been free of French rule and he had taken part in the great organized uprising against the French in the years between 1885 and 1888 which had been led by the Emperor Han Nghi.”^ Clandestine organizing and revolution has been a sideline of scholars in Vietnam for generations and Giap’s father was in good company in the Ham Nghi rebellion; he continued this work as a member of one of the many revolutionary nationalist groups that permeated Vietnamese society and struggled for national liberation. The tangled web of the Vietnamese revolution can be seen clearly in Giap's schooling. In 1925 Giap entered the Lvc'e National at Hue. This was a private school founded a few years earlier by Ngo Dinh Kha, a high court official and the father of Ngo Dinh Diem, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and Ngo Dinh Thuc. So it was that Giap attended a school founded by the father of his bitter foe-to-be Diem; both Diem and Ho Chi 154 Minh (under the name Nguyen Tat Thanh) attended the school prior to Giap's entry. The Lvc'e had been created to provide an education blending the traditional and the modem. It was here that Giap first gained the watchful eye of the French police, "...because of his poetic idealism and his ardent advocacy of the revolutionary ideas of Phan Boi Chau---a Vietnamese nationalist who, like Sun Yat-sen in China, is claimed as a 3 hero by both nationalists and Communists in Vietnam." Phan Boi Chau was under house arrest in Hue (he had been betrayed to the French by none other than Ho Chi Minh in 1925) and was visited by students, among them Giap, who eagerly listened to Chau's analyses of world events. Giap was also reading the works of Nguyen Ai Quoc (Nguyen the Patriot), particularly the pamphlet "Colonialism on Trial" which was circulating illegally in Vietnam. Robert O'Neill has uncovered Giap's reaction to the pamphlet: "Giap re cords that to read for the first time a book denouncing colonialism inspired him with 'so much hatred and thrilled us.*"^ Nguyen Ai Quoc, a legend in his own time and the exiled guiding light for budding young Vietnamese revolu tionaries, nationalists, socialists, and communists was, in the opinion of experts on Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, 1924 was the first year of an illegal party known as the Tan Viet (Tan Viet Cach Menh Dane or Revolutionary Association of Vietnam). 1925 and 1926 were years of stu dents Strikes, part of the "quit school movement", organ ized by students in Hanoi. Giap had participated in the students movements and was expelled from the Lvc'e. He re turned to his village; he had wanted to join other students in exile in Canton but practicality forced him to remain in Vietnam. He didn't end his activities, however: he joined the Tan Viet. This was in 1927, and by this time the Tan Viet had split into two wings, one of which was Communist; 155 Giap joined the Communist-oriented wing. Upon joining the Tan Viet Giap was given some pam phlets on Communism, one o£ them a speech by Nguyen Ai Quoc. Giap, according to his own account, took these papers out into the fields, climbed a tree and studied them, finding great intel lectual satisfaction in the idea of a total overthrow of the current order and in the principle of a peaceful international com munity linked by the bonds of Communism. Shortly afterwards, he was recalled to Hue by the Tan Viet to carry out underground activities for the party.5 Giap's career as a revolutionary had begun. The Depression drove down prices for rice and rubber and in 1930 the farmers were faced with near-starvation. The groups prevalent at this time* Ho's Thanh Nien (Revolu tionary Youth League), the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dane (National Party of Vietnam), and the Tan Viet struggled with each other and with the French to take advantage of the situa tion. Ho brought the three groups together in Hong Kong in 1930 in the Indo China Communist Party, but in the meantime the VNQDD struck. Poor communications caused the rebellion to begin piecemeal, and the French were able to crush it quickly. May Day 1930 brought huge protest demonstrations and French machine gunning in the cities. The Communists turned to the countryside and set up soviets (the Nghe An Soviets), which were also crushed by the French. Giap led student demonstrations in Hue and was arrested and sentenc ed to three years in; prison. Ho was arrested in Hong Kong, many leaders were executed, and many fled to China. The Communists went deeply underground. Giap was released for good behavior after a few months in prison, and it seemed as if he had learned the lesson the French had sought to teach him. He threw him self into his studies as he continued his formal education. He passed the tough examinations of the French baccalaureat 156 (equivalent to two years of college In the U.S.) in Hue and moved to Hanoi to attend the Lvc’e Albert-Sarraut for one year of pre-college work. Then it was on to the University of Hanoi to study law and political economy; he took his licence en droit in 1937 and went on to post graduate studies in 1938. During these years the political situation in Vietnam changed. The Popular Front government in France came into power in 1936, and this was translated into permission for increased political activity in Vietnam. Giap entered this new situation as a writer for several newspapers dissemi nating Communist ideas; Giap wrote in both Vietnamese and French. One of the papers Giap worked for, Notre Voix. often received articles from abroad written by P.C. Lin-- this was Ho Chi Minh. Giap’s studies began to suffer because of his renewed political work and he failed to take his Certificate of Administrative Law in 1938, or any other advanced degree. (There is disagreement among sources as to Giap's academic background. Bernard Fall credits Giap with both an LL.B and a doctorate.**) Some time during the late '30's he married the daughter of a professor at the University of Hanoi; he had taken lodgings at the professor's house while attending the University. Lacking money, Giap became a history teacher at the Thang Long private school in Hanoi. Through his journalistic work Giap came to know two key figures of the Vietnamese revolution: Pham Van Dong and Dang Xuan Khu (better known as Truong Chinh). Giap was back in the thick of the Communist movement in Vietnam. In the meantime, the Popular Front experiment in France was coming to an end, and when Germany-— the ally of Communist Russia— -invaded Poland in September 1939, France banned the Party at home and in the territories and issued arrest warrants for most of the top leaders. Before con- 157 tinuing the story, let's look at Giap's situation at this time, 1939. He had risen to share with only a few others the leadership of the strongest political organization in Vietnam. Apart from Ho Chi Minh, Pham Van Dong and Truong Chinh, who was at that time languishing in prison, there was no other leader who could rival Giap's position within the party. To have risen so far by the age of twenty-seven attested to Giap's ability.7 But for the party, and for Giap personally, there were hard days ahead. Ho decided it was time for the Vietnamese leaders to flee to the relative safety of China. So, on May 4, 1940 Giap said goodbye to his wife and her sister and left with Pham Van Dong. Giap's wife had been a strong party organ izer and activist and she and her sister were arrested by the French. Her sister was guillotined and his wife was sentenced to life imprisonment; she died in prison in 1943 of illness (French version) or maltreatment (Giap's ver sion), From this point on, the Vietnamese revolution be came much more than a political and social movement for Giapv Southern China was the cradle of the Vietnamese "arm ed propaganda" and military operations which were to begin shortly. Events on the international level had made this possible: Japan was on the offensive thus distracting Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese Communist were there and suf ficiently strong to help, and the Japanese had so little control over their newly won territories that anything was possible. So the Vietnamese leaders congregated in South ern China and waited for Ho. After a few weeks in Kunming, Giap and Dong met with Ho and Vu Anh. They had several days of discussion and, in late June, Ho sent them to Yenan to attend political school and also gain some military knowledge. But while the two young men were on their journey Paris fell and Ho, 158 feeling that this would drastically change the situation had them recalled. The Japanese entered Indochina in force in September 1940 and became the power behind the French administrative structure, which they allowed to remain. In 1940 two Com munist uprisings, in Tonkin and Cochin China, broke out and were put down by the French. The refugees from these clashes made their way into Southern China and became the recruits for Giap's armed groups. Giap gathered together a group of men and began courses in military operations. He taught them guerrilla warfare. Nowhere in his writings does Giap make men tion of considering any alternative strat egy to that of guerrilla warfare to achieve his aims. In the light of his knowledge of earlier Vietnamese tactics against the French particularly those of Phan Dinh Phung and Hoang Hoa Tham— -and of the meth ods of Mao Tse-tung, it is highly probable that he concentrated on guerrilla methods almost by instinct rather than by an un prejudiced rejection of the methods of con ventional warfare.8 Giap and Dong remained in China to continue organiz ing and training when, in February 1941, Ho Chi Minh re turned to Vietnam after an absence of thirty years. Ho set up headquarters in a cave in an area near the Chinese border called Pac Bo. It was here that the Eighth Congress of the Indo China Communist Party began in mid May 1941. As a re sult of this congress the Viet Nam Doc Lao Done Minh Hoi (Vietnam Independence League) was set up. Its shortened name, Viet Minh. would soon become intimately associated with Giap. Giap had decided that the coastal lowlands were not conducive for the Viet Minh, so he began organizing the people in the highlands of Tonkin. 159 Giap not only recruited Vietnamese; he also organized the Tho and the other minority peoples who lived in the Tokinese mountains. By a combination of propaganda and force, the Viet Minh apparently won over many members of the minorities in the north-— an impor tant factor in the future relations between the mountain peoples and the Vietnamese. This was one of the major accomplishments of the Viet Minh during the war years. At the same time, Giap and his collegues built up the guerrilla units that were to become the first contingents of the army of the Dem ocratic Republic of Viet Nam.9 Giap wasn't too concerned with ideology at this point: one of his best leaders was Chu Van Tan,a bandit. By 1943 Giap had an impressive organization in oper ation. His aimed propaganda teams and regular platoon had taken control of most of the provinces of Cao Bang, Lang Son, and Bac Kan. With these successes, it was easy for Giap to form or re-form Communist cells throughout the rest of Vietnam. On the larger scene de Gaulle was in power in France and this would lead to violence between the French and Japanese in Vietnam. The Viet Minh felt that France would be weakened by Japan and then Japan would be defeated by the Allies-— into the ensuing power vacuum would march Giap's troops and armed propaganda units. Giap was ready to roll south but Ho, freshly released from a Chinese prison (he had not kept his Chinese fences mended as well as he might have), quieted him down with the observation that the rest of Vietnam was not yet that ripe. So Giap selected 34 m£n and formed the first unit of the National Liberation Army. While Ho stressed the need for a propaganda effort he also realized that that very propagan da effort needed a modest military victory over the French. "Unleashed" to that extent, Giap's force overran two small French outposts (Khai Fhat and Na Ngan) on December 24, 1944. 160 Giap's skill in organizing, recruiting, and spreading the Viet_Minh are legendary in North Vietnam today. When the Liberation Army was established on December 22, 1944, it was only a propaganda section of thirty-four men. But within six months it had spread like water, and by June, 1945, the whole northern region between Hanoi and Cao Bang had been transformed into a liberated area.TO The Viet Minh were increasingly able to take advantage of events beyond their control, and the Japanese soon obliged by throwing out the French. On March 9, 1945 the Japanese imprisoned or killed French troops and dismissed the civilian administrators. But the Japanese had few troops and civilian administrators themselves, so the vacuum foreseen by the Viet Minh came into existence— -and the Viet Minh was the only sizable organization in Vietnam (as opposed to the exile groups still in China) ready to take advantage of this situation. Giap was on the verge of military responsibilities beyond his training, as we shall see shortly, but he was well prepared to assume political responsibilities incred ibly large compared to those of a Western general. The importance of the political side of Giap's work cannot be overestimated. Here was a very weak-militarily-organiza- tion which did not actually attack the Japanese until very late in the war and then in only one major engagement (in the Tam Dao mountains),1* but which took on the mantle of a victorious ally at war's end. Political organizing and propaganda paid off. Thus, it was the Viet-Minh that created the first anti-Japanese guerrilla forces in Viet- Nam, that rescued American fliers shot down in Indochina, that provided intelligence to the allies that spread its propaganda among the civilian population, arid that received all the credit for anti-Japanese activities during the war.12 161 At their headquarters at Tan Trao the Viet Minh plan ned for the next move. Time and timing was of the utmost importance. The major part of the Viet Minh activ ities at Tan Trap was preparation for the imminent take-over of the civil administra tion when the Japanese surrendered. Ho re garded this as his only opportunity to achieve power within the foreseeable future. He knew that the British and Chinese Nation alists were to move into Indo China to take the surrender of the Japanese and to dis arm and repatriate them. He also knew that the French would return within months of the ending of the war and that they would be likely to consider negotiations with the Viet Minh only if the latter had already achieved so much strength that they could not be ignored. Consequently the Viet Minh had only a few days in which to make their coup d'etat---the time between the Japanese surrender and the arrival of the Allies. Organizational cadres were dispatched through out the length and breadth of Vietnam, so that within a day or two from the given signal, administrations controlled by the Viet Minh could be set up in Hanoi, Hue and Saigon.13 On August 7, 1945, the atomic bomb fell on Hiroshima. On the 15th Japan surrendered. On August 17th and 18th up risings were staged in Hanoi. Giap, who had been engaging the Japanese in a token battle during this time learned of the Viet Minh call for national uprisings on the 13th (ac tually the call was from a "national" conference called by Ho) and the Hanoi actions. He marched his troops hard through the night and entered Hanoi the following day. On August 19th the Viet Minh took over Hanoi's public build ings. The Emperor, Bao Dai, met with Viet Minh representa tives and agreed that Ho Chi Minh should form a government. On the 25th of August Bao Dai abdicated to clear the way for Ho's government. On this same day the Viet Minh took 162 control of Saigon, In the midst of forming his government, Ho sent Giap to negotiate with the French. The French had asked for the negotiations, and Giap, now Minister of the Interior, met with the French Commissioner for North Viet nam, Sainteny, on August 27th, But Giap knew that the negotiations with the French might not be successful. In a major speech on September 2, the day the independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was proclaimed, he said: They (the French) are making prepara tions to land their forces in Indochina. In a word, and according to latest intel ligence, France is preparing herself to reconquer our country.... The Vietnamese people will fight for independence, liberty and equality of status. If our negotia tions are unsuccessful, we shall resort to arms.14 And while politics dictated that the Minister of Defense be a non-Communist, Giap remained at the head of the Vietnam People's Army. In early September the British landed troops in Sai gon. In October the French were controlling the south. And the Chinese entered Tonkin from the north. The situa tion in Vietnam was very confusing and in a state of flux. The Viet Minh had to keep one eye on the French, who defi nitely wanted Indochina back, and one on the Chinese, who wouldn't turn part of it down if it were offered to them. At this point Ho felt forced to use Giap as a bar gaining point. In late 1945 opposition parties which had entered Vietnam with the Chinese kidnapped Giap and the Propaganda Minister. To get the men back Ho agreed to drop them from his government, and to give not more than four of the ten cabinet seats to people from the Viet Minh. Even though the Viet Minh dominated the elections in January, 1946 and Giap won the vote (97%) of Nghe An Province, it was clear that the Chinese now held the upper hand in the 163 north, in the D.R. V. The French had a stake in getting the Chinese out of Vietnam, too, and they had been negotiating this point since late 1945. The Chinese agreed to leave by March 31, 1946, and by the summer of that year the bulk of Chinese troops had actually gone. In the south the French, with the help of the British, had retaken Saigon and now con trolled the urban areas of Cochin China. Given this situation, the Viet Minh came to terms with the French on March 6th. France recognized the D.R.V. as a "free state" and the Vietnamese agreed not to oppose the French Army when it returned to Tonkin and northern Annam; these troops would be withdrawn during the next five years. Giap came back into the public eye on March 7 when he addressed a rally in Hanoi to explain why the French were being permitted to return. Giap, a pragmatist from the same mold as Ho realized that to resist with arms at this point was risky: "In continuing the military struggle, we would have weakened ourselves and gradually lost our land. We would have only been able to hold several re gions. "15 This was not merely a military consideration, for the famine early in 1945 had killed anywhere from 600,000 to 2,000,000 Vietnamese and left the economy badly weakened. In the negotiations that followed this first agree ment Giap was the major Vietnamese figure. No agreement was reached at these meetings at Dalat in April, and this was hard on Giap, for he had apparently honestly tried to compromise with the French. Giap was very upset at this outcome, and it is possible that at the Dalat Conference he began to think that war between the French and the Viet Minh was imminent. After his return to Hanoi he threw himself into intense preparations to ensure that if war did come, as he felt it must, the Viet Minh would not be 164 overwhelmed in the first onslaught. The French quickly came to regard Giap as the principle threat to peace in Indo China and claimed to see his hand behind all the moves of the Viet Minh in Hanoi to impede the transfer of sovereignty to the French.16 Giap had a free hand in his preparations, for Ho and Pham Van Dong left for France and further negotiation in June, 1946. Ho appointed Giap President in his absence, Giap sought to consolidate Viet Minh power. He dis banded other parties (the VNQDD, Dai Viet, and Dong Minh Hoi for example) and killed many leaders, purged local governments of members of these parties, and suppressed all newspapers not under government control. The Army grew from 30,000 to 60,000 and many irregular units were created throughout the country. Incidents with the French increas ed (they had never ceased in the South, especially in Cochin China). Giap had effectively geared up for war, a war he felt was inevitable. During this year he also re-married. His new wife was a singer, Thuong Huyen, and her marriage to Giap caused a stir: many saw bourgeois motivations in Giap's choice-— but it doesn't seem that anyone said much, which is not surprising. Ho returned from France in October emptyhanded. He formed a new government on November 3rd increasing Commun ist control by eliminating all real opponents. Giap became Minister of National Defense. The Assembly met, approved the new constitution, elected a Permanent Committee to function as the government, and then went into abeyance un til 1953. The Vj.et Minh leaders had effectively stripped for action in the face of solid evidence that the French had come to restore their former position as colonial mas ters. They would obviously fight for that status, and the Vietnamese would, just as obviously, fight to retain their 165 newly won status. The war was not long in starting. The Viet Minh had been using Haiphong for arms shipments, and the French demanded that they be given complete control of customs there by October 15. Tensions mounted as both sides waited. On November 20th the French seized a suspect junk from China. The Viet Minh threw up barricades, the French tore them down, and fighting occurred. A cease fire and another French ultimatum followed. On the 23rd the French bombard ed the Vietnamese part of Haiphong with a naval cruiser, tanks, artillery, and aircraft. The French placed the Vietnamese killed at 6,000, the Viet Minh placed it at 20,000. Another French ultimatum followed their attack. Giap sent the major part of his "main force" (regular army troops) to the northern provinces where he and Ho had begun their struggle earlier. With the main force largely gone, Giap gave respon sibility for local actions to the irregulars forces, the Tu Ve. and what followed is clouded with the fog of a com plex situation. The evening of December 19 the French commander, Morliere, had reports of a planned Tu Ve attack on Hanoi. He called the French soldiers back to their bar racks. At 8 p.m. the Tu Ve attacked, and at 9:30 Giap issued a national call to arms. The French managed to gain control of the towns, while the Viet Minh retreated into the countryside. By the end of March 1947 the French had taken control of the major coastal and delta towns of Tonkin and northern Annam, and of the roads between them. Giap had chosen to pre serve his slender forces so that they could be trained and expanded in the security of the Viet Bac until they had reached suffi cient strength to emerge and challenge the French to fight for their cheap gains of early 1947.1' Giap at this time again became a pawn in Viet Minh poli 166 tics: Ho dropped him from the Cabinet to gain a broader base of support. But Giap remained as Commander-in-Chief. The French made a rapid move toward the Viet Minh strongholds---they too had one eye on China and realized what the situation would be should Mao be victorious---but Giap was able to avoid a major battle. And when the French withdrew the Viet Minh moved back into the area. "Vo Ngu yen Giap described 1948 as a year of great victories and told the Vietnamese that their military successes combined with the changed international situation made it possible for their armies to prepare for a general offensive. The 1R timetable was in the hands of the Chinese Communists...." In December 1949 The Chinese Communists arrived at the Vietnamese border. In early 1950 both The Peopled Republic and the Soviet Union recognized the Viet Minh government. Giap was now ready to move against the French in a general offensive. On the theoretical level, Giap accepted a modified Maoist theory of revolutionary war: a three phase struggle moving from passive resistance to active resistance and preparation for counteroffensive to the general counter offensive. Observers of the war differ, however, on where the lines dividing the phases were. But regardless of how you break down the phases of the war, it is apparent that the early victories and the help of the People's Republic (material, training facili ties, advisors, etc.) led Giap to significantly shorten his timetable for victory. The arena was the Red River in Ton kin, a French stronghold leading to Hanoi. From January to June of 1951 Giap launched three separate offensives in the delta, only to be beaten back three times. On June 18 Giap led a retreat to the mountains. Any other general would have been sacked, but On the Communist side, it probably took 167 all of Ho's prestige to keep Giap in the saddle; or more probably, Giap was retain ed because the erroneous decision to launch the offensive had been made collectively by the whole senior Party hierarchy. The VPA retreated in full to Phase Two of Mao's precepts....19 In the mountains Giap re-thought his position and made a major strategy change: the highlands (rather than the low land/delta) would be the target. This was not merely expediency for it appears that Giap realized that a threat to all of Indochina (Laos and Cambodia included) was far harder for the already over-extended French to cope with than a threat to Tonkin and northern Annam. In the fall of 1952 the Viet Minh went on the offen sive in the Thai country of northern Tonkin and gained con trol of the Laotian frontier. In early 1953 several divi sions moved on Laos. The French sought to block this movement by establishing a strong fort at Dien Bien Phu. In January 1954 it was announced that an Allied conference would meet in April to deal with Vietnam and Indochina. Giap, a politician above all, pulled his men back from Laos and moved on Dien Bien Phu. A pitched positional battle at Dien Bien Phu would violate the theory of protracted war fare-— but wars of revolution are not always won by purely military actions, and a victory over, an annihilation of, the French, at Dien Bien Phu would strengthen the Viet Minh1s hand at Geneva. For the Viet Minh, Dien Bien Phu had a crucial significance. This was the last opportunity before the Geneval Conference for the Viet Minh to show its military strength, its determination to fight uhtil victory. And there were those who thought that General Giap was resolved on victory, no matter the cost, not only to impress the enemy but also to convince his Communist allies that the Viet Minh by its own efforts had earned a seat at the conference table and the right to a voice in its own future.20 168 On April 26, the opening day of the Geneva Confer ence, the final assault was launched on Dien Bien Phu. On May 8 the French surrendered. The miles of trenches dug, the heavy artillery and anti-aircraft guns dragged into position and meticulously camouflaged, and the tons of sup plies brought in on bicycles, trucks, and backs had paid off. And Giap proved that he could learn from his mistakes without becoming a blind follower of dogma; the defeats on the Red River sent him back to protracted war, but this did not blind him to the opportunity presented at Dien Bien Phu and Geneva. The war ended on July 21, 1954 and the last French ship left Haiphong on May 15, 1955. The Viet Minh settled down to rebuild the North, consolidate their power, and prepare for the elections promised for 1956. Although the Viet Minh appears to have believed that the elections would be held, Giap wasn't taking any chances: instructions went out to cadres in the South to go underground for the time being. And those units which came North, in accord with the Geneva agreements, were made up of Southerners and thus provided Giap with a force of men with good knowledge of the South to train for possible return there. The major thrust of the Viet Minh was not, however, military. Too many things needed to be done in the North. Little is known of Giap's exact role in these programmes, which parts he directed, the dif ferences he had with his collegues, especially Truong Chinh, and which parts he had nothing to do with. We do know that he continued to be one of the most powerful of the Northern leaders and that therefore he bears great responsibility for the agonies which befell the North Vietnamese during these years (1954-56).21 Terror, torture, and killing in these programs, particular ly land reform, became so widespread that Ho was forced to 169 back away from Che radical, measures being imposed. In November 1956 Giap's troops crushed a peasant revolt in Nghe Anj; Giap delivered the governments self-criticism speech on land reform. With the failure of the Diem government in the South to agree to the Geneva-required elections, Vietnam again came to be associated with war. The exact role of Giap in any direction of the war in the South is unclear, but his impact is obviously there. As Giap himself has said, the North became the rear area, the revolutionary base, for the soldiers in the South; as China helped the Viet Minh so must the North help the Viet Cong. And if this is so, then Giap would be given his position, in the thick of that logistical operation. Douglas Pike, in his study of the National Liberation Front (NLF) goes into great detail concerning connections between the NLF and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and builds a convincing case for a father-son relationship. But even Pike does not have the necessary documentation to clearly define roles, particularly Giap's, and he is forced to condlude that "Such an effort had to be the child of the North. "22 Obviously, however, 'hadvto be" is not the same as is, Whatever the precise role of Giap, his hand is every where. In the Viet Minh veterans in the ranks of the Viet Cong. In the men trained in the North and sent South. In the general strategy and tactics-— his book People's War People's Armv was published in Hanoi in I960---perhaps even so far as his impatience: Giap's impatience in 1946 and 1951 may be reflected in the Viet Cong's impatience in 1964 ("Giap probably had considerable influence on the 1964 decision to increase the military effort and try for a quick military victory."23)} including the misreading of American willingness to put huge numbers of troops on the ground in Vietnam. In the emphasis on political work over 170 military maneuvers. And particularly in his role as some one to emulate: Ho and Giap emulated, to a large extent, Mao, and the Viet Cong, to a large extent, emulated Ho and Giap. One area where Giap's military thought has clearly influenced the NLF is on a basic strategic level. Giap adhered to the three phase strategy that he had used in modified form with the Viet Minh. Truong Chinh, on the other hand, proposed a theory of general uprising based on the French and Russian models. Chinh was Giap's chief theoretical rival in North Vietnam and his theory apparent ly was in favor in the South until the failure of the South Vietnamese to rise up following the fall of Diem. Then in an apparent repeat of the Red River Delta experience the NLF sought a swift victory in 1964. This too failed. And it may well be that the NLF will win final victory much the way Giap did: by a combination of negotiation and military pressure; theoretically sound protracted war and military expediency. The influence of Giap, even if indirect, in such a result could not be overlooked. His place in mili tary and political history, already secure, would be fur ther strengthened. In a sense though, Vo Nguyen Giap (like the D.R.V. it self) is a child of Ho Chi Minh. This is perhaps best illustrated by this story: Only a few days earlier, when Vo Nguyen Giap had told him (Ho) of the fall of Dien Bien Phu, he had retorted gently, "However great the victory, it is only a b e g i n n i n g ...."24 * * * PHILOSOPHY 171 The basic philosophies underlying the Vietnamese Revolution are inextricably intertwined with Marxism-Lenin ism. This is the essential starting point for Giap in his elaboration of philosophies behind this revolution and the guerrilla warfare that was so much a part of it. Throughout his works Giap related back to Marxism- Leninism. The Vietnamese people's war of libera tion attained this great victory for the reasons we have just enumerated, but above all because it was organised and led by the Party of the working class; the Indo chinese Communist Party, now the Viet Nam Workers' Party. In the light of the principles of Marxism-Leninism, it was this Party which proceeded to: make an analysis of the social situation and of the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves in order to determine the funda mental tasks of the people's national democratic revolution...25 The success of our Party in leading the revolutionary armed struggle and in build ing revolutionary armed forces is the success of Marxism-Leninism. This is the success of wise and creative application of Marxist-Leninist principles on revolutionary war and revolutionary armed forces to the practical situation of a small, weak, colonial and semi-feudal country which had to fight for a long period against a powerful enemy while encircled by imperialism.26 The great victory of our people also stems from the fully correct and very cre ative revolutionary and military line of our Party. This line is actually the Marxist- Leninist theory ingeniously applied to the realities of Vietnam. It reflects the thoroughgoing revolutionary spirit of the Vietnamese working class, the Vietnamese people's tradition of resistance to foreign aggression, the valor and wisdom of the patriotic Vietnamese. At the same time, it crystallizes the finest revolutionary spirit of progressive m a n k i n d .27 172 Marxism-Leninism requires a commitment to the prole tariat, and in Vietnam this has meant the peasants. So it is natural that the peasant's situation should be a part of Giap's philosophy. Our Resistance War was a people's war, because its political aims were to smash the imperialist yoke to win back national independence, to overthrow the feudal land lord class to bring land to the peasants; in other words, to radically solve the two fundamental contradictions of Vietnamese society---contradiction between the nation and imperialism on the one hand, and con tradiction between the people, especially between the peasants and the feudal land lord class on the other---and to pave the socialist path for the Vietnamese revolu tion.28 Our military line is based on the line of a thoroughly national people's democratic revolution; it is the line of the people's revolutionary war, the war of a people made up mainly of peasants, which is aimed at overthrowing imperialism and feudalism, reconquering independence for the nation and giving land back to the tillers.2’ Given a commitment to a Marxist-Leninist revolution and the peasant population of Vietnam, Che next piece of Giap's philosophy becomes the concept of the ' ’people's war". It is this concept, even more than the first two cited above, which completely permeates his writing: revo lution in Vietnam is of, by, and for the Vietnamese peasant masses. Our nationwide resistance war, which was a people's war, was a new development; it was a true revolutionary war, a war by the entire people, a total war. A revolu tionary war, because it was carried out on the basis of the mobilisation and organiza tion of the masses, with the aim of achiev ing a national democratic revolution. A war by the entire people, because it was a war in which a whole nation struggled in unity, each citizen becoming a combatant..• 173 A total war, because armed struggle was frequently combined with political struggle, because at the samfe time as we engaged in a military struggle, we carried out re duction of land rent, land reform, political struggle in urban centers and enemy-occupied areas, and struggle in the economic and cul tural fields.30 The most heroic war for liberation waged by our southern compatriots demonstrates that in our era, the new invention is not only nuclear weapons but the new and very great creation of the masses is the people's war (developed to a high degree) against the war of aggression of imperialism be it in the form of old colonialism or new colonialism. People's war is always victorious and invin cible. 31 Giap contrasts this new creation with the activities of the most recent of Vietnam's combatants to make his point as to the uniqueness of people's war. The United States has a strategy based on arithmetic. They question the computers, add and subtract, extract square roots, and then go into action. But arithmetical strategy doesn't work here. If it did, they'd already have exterminated us. With their planes, for example. Of course they thought they could bring us to heel by dumping bil lions (of tons) of explosives on us. Because, as I told you, they figure everything in bil lions, billions of dollars. They don't reckon on the spirit of a people fighting for what they know is right to save their country from invaders. They can't get it into their heads that the Vietnam war has to be understood in terms of the strategy of a people's war, that it's not a question of men ana materiel, that these things are irrelevant to the problem. Victory calls for something more, and that's the spirit of the people. When a whole people rises up, nothing can be done. No money can beat them. That'8 the basis of our strategy and our tactics, that the Americans fail to under stand. 32 Mixing together these trains of thought with the 174 course of the global Communist movement and the long strug gle for Vietnamese independence, Giap reaches a major phi losophical conclusion. The victory of the Vietnamese people cannot be divided from this support; (of Communist nations) it cannot be disassociated from the brilliant.success of the socialist countries and the movement of national lib eration, neither can it be detached from the victories of the Soviet Red Army during the Second World War, nor from those of the Chinese people during the last few years. It cannot be isolated from the sympathy and support of progressive peoples throughout the world...33 "A weak and small nation and a people's army, once resolved to stand up, to unite together and to fight for independence and peace, will have tne full power to defeat all aggressive forces, even those of an imperialist power such as imperialist France aided by the United States."34 The role of Ho Chi Minh cannot be overemphasized when discussing Giap's philosophy. So ubiquitous is Ho in Giap's writing that he must be seen as an integral part of Giap's philosophy; Ho was the Party and the whole sweep of Vietnamese history, as well as a major part of Giap's per sonal history. In Giap's writing Vietnam and Ho and the Revolution become one. The past dozen years represent but a short period of time in national history, but, during this short period, under the Party's leadership, our people, our nation, have won repeated great successes. The face of our country and our nation has changed completely; The era of indepen dence, freedom, and socialism for our cotintry has begun. The Ho Chi Minh epoch, the nation's most glorious epoch, has been inaugurated.35 Out of this web of thinking comes a dominant philo sophical theme: the need for a catalyst to get the revo lution started. In Vietnam this catalyst was Ho, as artic 175 ulated and elaborated through the Party structure and through men like Giap. Even if a people have right on their side there is still the need for the catalyst-— and that need is spoken to, if circumspectly, by Giap. In the early years, as the political movement of the masses was not strong enough and the enemy's forces still stable, the political mobilisation among the mas ses had all the more to be considered as the main task for the preparation of armed insurrection. The propaganda and organisa tion of the masses carried out everywhere in the country, particularly at the key points was of decisive importance.36 The most appropriate guiding principle for activities was armed propaganda (Propagan da carried out by armed units.); political activities were more important than mili tary activities. and_fighting less impor tant than propaganda: armed activity was used to safeguard, consolidate and develop the political bases. Once the political bases were consolidated and developed, we proceeded one step further to the consoli dation and development of the semi-armed and armed forces.37 Because revolutions are not spontaneous, even though the most abstract level of Giap's thinking makes it appear so, the organization of the revolution, and its initial armed extension, the guerrilla band, takes on great impor tance. Philosophies must be implemented, and implementa tion demands organization; conversely, the shape of that organizing effort will be affected by the nature of the philosophy. * * * ORGANIZATION The organization of Giap's forces is complicated due 176 to the fact that his strategy of revolutionary warfare in volves three types of military groupings, rather than one. In Giap*8 structure the guerrilla band is one of theee groups. It is useful to try to understand the whole struc ture, however, since it may be more in line with certain revolutionary contexts. Structure From the first days, there appeared three types of armed forces: para-military or ganisations or guerrilla units, regional troops and regular units. These formations were, in the field of organisation, the expression of the general mobilisation of the people in arms. They co-operated closely with one another to annihilate the enemy.38 In order to carry out a people's war, the armed forces must have adequate forms of organization comprising main-force troop, regional troops, militia, and self- defense units. The main-force troops are mobile units which may be used in fighting in any part of the country. Regional troops are the mainstay of armed struggle in a region. Militia and self-defense groups are extensive semi-armed forces of the laboring people who, while continuing their production work are the main instru ment of the people's power at the base.39 If we had not organized secret self-defense units during the preinsurrection period, the powerful armed forces such as we had later on would never have come into being; if during the resistance we had not or ganized an extensive.network of self-defense groups and strong regional units, guerrilla warfare could not have developed to a high degree, and still less could we have built a powerful main force. On the other hand, if we had not had a large mobile main force when the armed struggle was at a victorious stage, there would have been no great battles to annihilate enemy forces, no victorious campaigns, and the glorious Dien Bien Phu battle would not have taken place. Today in the South of our country, 177 in che main the armed forces are developing according Co che dame laws as Chose discussed above.40 Even with the changes in terminology, we can see chat Giap envisions Che growth of the armed revolutionary force from tiny guerrilla bands toward a regular army able to launch positional warfare campaigns. At the same time the smaller units (smaller in the sense of the geographic area they operate in and che size of battle they can engage in) co ordinate their activities with the larger units. Thus, for Giap, the structure of the armed revolu tionary group is not static, it changes over time. In his writings, however, Giap does not detail the structure or functions of any of the groups which arise in this process. In general functional terms che groups have responsibili ties as follows: ,, Mliitia .a.pd had by then (1953) reached their maturity.Their fight ing spirit had been heightened through the struggle in defence of the countryside. They had accumulated a wealth of experiences and had equipped themselves with a lot of weapons and equipment captured from the enemy, thus constituting a big reserve for our regular army. Local forces which came into being in 1948 by merging independent companies with part of the militia and guerrilla forces, were now Able to shoulder the combat missions in their own localities, wipe out enemy troops, oppose enemy raids, defend their localities and fight in good co-ordination with our regular forces, militia and guerrillas. The most outstanding feature was the tre mendous growth and high degree of mobility of our regular troops. All our regular divisions and regiments had been organizationally strengthened and re-equipped with new weapons partly taken from the enemy and partly manu factured by ourselves in spite of great dif ficulties and the scarcity of necessary means. The technical and tactical level and fighting capacity of our men had visibly risen through successive drives of training and 178 through major campaigns. They were now quite familiar with mobile and siege warfare and concentrated operations involving sizeable forces and vast scope of action, particularly in mountain regions, and could carry out annihilating attacks, make ddep thrusts, withdraw quickly and fight with initiative, mobility and flexibility.*1 In all wars, the activities of the armed forces are either offensive or defensive. A revolutionary war also uses both these forms but regards offensive activities as the most essential. As a result of concrete practice of revolutionary armed struggle, our military art has created original forms of struggle: ftuerrllla warfare, mobile warfare, and posi tional warfare. **2 Civil Administration The August Revolution overthrew the feudal State. The reduction of land rents and rates of interest decreed by people's power bestowed on the peasants their first material advantages. Land monopolised by the imperialists and the traitors was confiscated and shared out. Com munal land and ricefields were more equitably distributed. From 1953, deeming it necessary to promote the accomplishment or anti-feudal tasks, the Party decided to achieve agrarian reform even during the course of the resistance war. Despite the errors which blemished its accomplishment, it was a correct line crowned with success; it resulted in real material advantages for the peasants and brought to the army and the people a new breath of enthusiasm in the war of resistance.45 Parallel with the fight against the enemy, in order to safe-guard the resistance bases and consolidate the rear, our Party implemented positive lines of action in every aspect, did its utmost to mobilise, educate and organise the masses, to increase production, practise economy, and build local armed and semi-armed forces. Thanks to that, our resistance bases were continually strengthened, and constantly furthered their great effect on the develop ment of the army as well as on the work of serving the frontline.44 179 Even under the pressure of war, Giap was conscious that he was creating the future in his rear areas. In wartime, coordination between accel erating the resistance and carrying out step-by-step revolutionary tasks also means coordination between intensifying the front line and consolidating the rear base area, between fighting the enemy and building and improving our forces so that they will al ways be strong when they fight. The gradual implementation of revolutionary tasks in wartime is also a very basic way to improve and develop the masses' great political and spiritual strength and to develop highly Vietnamese heroism (on) the firm basis of the new production formula of the new social regime ruled by the people.4-5 Propaganda To make everyone thoroughly understand the strategic guiding principle of long term war was not only a big work of organi sation militarily and economically but also a process of ideological education and strug gle within the Party and among the people against erroneous tendencies which appeared many a time in the years of the Resistance War. These were pessimistic defeatism which presumed that our country being small, our population thin, our economy backward and our armed forces young and weak, we would be unable to face the enemy, let alone perse- veringly to wage a long Resistance War, These were subjectivism, loss of patience, eagerness to win swiftly,..46 Indoctrination and Training During the Resistance War, owing to constant fighting, the training of our troops could not be carried out continuously for a lengthy period but only between battles or campaigns. We actively implemented the guiding principles "To train and to learn while we fight". After the difficult years at the beginning of the Resistance War, we succeeded in giving good training to our army... Training was in touch with practical fighting: the troops were trained in accordance with the next day's fight ing, and victory or defeat in the fighting was the best gauge for the control and assessment 180 of the result of the training. On the basis of gradual unification of the organisation and its equipment, the content of training in the various units of the regular army was also systematised step by step,47 To insure that the more our armed forces fight, the greater vitality they acquire and the greater victories they win in a protract ed, resolute struggle, we have implemented the motto "fighting while building and devel oping our forces." We fight in order to b*ild and develop our forces. We build and develop our forces in order to fight vigor ously and win greater victories. We have coordinated the gradual with the rapid development of our forces, in order to seize every opportunity to advance the war toward victory.48 Indoctrination in the Vietnamese context depends on the Party. The most fundamental principle in the building of our army is to put it under the Party's leadership, to ceaselessly strengthen the Party's leadership of the armv.The Party is the founder, organiser and educator of the army. Only by realising the Party's absolute leadership can the army unswervingly follow the class line, the political direc tion and fulfill its own revolutionary task. To carry out and strengthen the Party's leadership . ft.tfcmtjpn qnifl.fr, frg glV.ffl tg the work ofbuildlng the Party and political works. __and the system of Party Committee and bp,litjrcgl <tom l.$£.av.jfo*p bs- f l m l Y m l P l M n - ed. Only thanks to the firm organisation of the Party which serves as the core and leading nucleus in the army can the Party, through its own organisation-— from Party committees down to Party branches---guide the implementation of its line and policies. Here stress should be laid on the important role of the grass-robt Party branch; only when it is strong can the company be strong... It thereby succeeds in concentrating the knowledge of many people and also consolida ting the solidarity based on ideological unity, closely co-ordinating the various tasks in the army, uniting themmind and deeds 181 and increasing the army's fighting strength. Here, we have to emphasise that the method of Party committee taking the lead must al ways be coupled with the method of the com mander allotting the work, in line with the Party's principle of collective leadership and personal responsibility. Political work is Party work and work of mass mobilisation of the Party in the army. Political work is the soul, the sinews of the army. Political work takes care of the building of the Party, guides the education of the army in the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, in the revolutionary line and task of the Party, military line and task of the Party, ensures good relations between officers and men, between the army and the people, between the army and the State, between our army and the armies and people of the brother countries and enables our army to have a high combativeness capable of defeating all enemies.49 This does not mean that, even when the Dien Bien Phu battle was at its height, negative factors never appeared. To maintain and develop this determination to fight and to win was a whole process of unremitting and patient political and ideological education and struggle, tireless and patient efforts in political work on the front line. This was a great achievement of the Party's organizations and branches and of its cadres. After a series of resounding victories, we found in our ranks signs of under-estimation of the enemy. By criticism, we rectified this state of mind in good time. In the long period of preparation, particularly after the second phase of the campaign, when attack and defence were equally fierce, negative rightist thoughts cropped up again to the detriment of the carrying out of the task. In accordance with the instructions of the Political Bureau, we opened in the heart of the battlefield an intensive and extensive struggle against rightist passivity, and for the heightening of revolutionary enthusiasm and the spirit of strict discipline, with a view to ensuring the total victory of the campaign. This ideological struggle was very successful. This was one of the greatest achievements' in political work in our army's history. It led the Dien Bien Phu 182 campaign to complete victory.50 Discipline He who speaks of the army, speaks of strict discipline.51 On the basis of the democratic regime, our army still has a very strict conscious discipline. When we speak of conscious discipline, it means that it is built up on the basis of political consciousness of the officers and men, and the most impor tant method for maintaining discipline is education and persuasion, thus making the armymen of their own accord, respect and remind each other to observe discipline. When we speak of strict discipline, it means that everyone in the army, regardless of rank or office must observe discipline and no infringements are allowed. Our army has always thought highly of discipline because it has been educated by the Party and knows that discipline is one of the factors that improve the combativeness of the army. As an armed collective whose task is fighting and to ensure single-minded ness and united action for its own preser vation and destruction of the enemy, our army cannot abstain from having centralisa tion to a high degree and strict discipline.52 StfEPlY f The question of supply is interesting in Giap's case since he was concerned with the supplying of groups of vastly different sizes and engaged in vastly different oper ations . The sole source of supply could only be the battlefront: to take the material from the enemy to turn it against him. While carry ing on the aggression against Viet Nam the French Expeditionary Corps fulfilled another task: it became, unwittingly, the supplier of the Viet Nam People's Army with French, even U.S. arms. In spite of their enormous efforts, the arms factories set up later on with makeshift means were far from being able to meet all our needs. A great part of our military materials came from war- booty.53 183 While the above is adequate for guerrillas, it is not £or positional warfare groups. Thus, the story was differ ent for Dien Bien Phu. Truck convoys valiantly crossed streams, mountains and forests; drivers spent scores of sleepiess nights, in defiance of diffi culties and dangers, to bring food and am munition to the front, to permit the army to annihilate the enemy. Thousands of bicycles from the town also carried food and munitions to the front. Hundreds of sampans of all sizes, hun dreds of thousands of bamboo-rafts crossed rapids and cascades to supply the front. Day and night, hundreds of thousands of porters and young volunteers crossed passes and forded rivers in spite of enemy planes and delayed-action bombs. Near the firing line, supply operations had to be carried out uninterruptedly and in the shortest possible t&me. Cooking, medical work, transport, etc., was carried on right in the trenches, under enemy bomb ing and cross-fire.54 Sappers and shock-youths from the low lands and the highlands courageously built or repaired the roads and neutralized time- bombs. The enemy destroyed the roads, we mended them; beating the enemy in courage our fighters highlighted their determination to open the road of victory. Even at the extremely difficult sections bombed and strafed day and night by enemy aircraft, our transportation was only a little dis turbed and, generally speaking, was secure. Hundreds of men and women fen cone not flinching from any difficulty anddanger, enthusiastically served the front and con tributed over 3 million w o r k - d a y s . 5 5 Not only did our people supply the army with war material and struggle side by side with the army but they also provided the armymen with the most trivial things like needles and thread, sending them food, gifts and letters of encouragement, conveying to them the enthusiasm of millions of peasants engaged in land reform.56 184 Relations with the Local Populace The Viet Nam People's Army has always seen to establishing and maintaining aood relations with the people. These are based upon the identity of their aims of struggle: in fact, the people and army are together in the fight against the enemy to save the Fatherland, ana ensure the full success of the task of liberating the nation and the working class. The people are to the army what water is to fish, as the saying goes. And this saying has a profound significance. Our Army fought on the front; it has also worked to educate the people and helped them to the best of its ability. The Vietnamese fighter has always taken care to observe point 9 of its Oath of Honour: "In contact with the people, to follow these three recommendations: To respect the people To help the people To defend the people...in order to win their confidence and affection and achieve a perfect understanding between the people and the army". Our army has always organised days of help for peasants in production work and in the struggle against flood and drought. It has always observed a correct attitude in its relations with the people.57 Relations with the Citv Giap and Ho were familiar with the city; the August Revolution was city-based and they had actually held power in Hanoi before the French returned. Thus, Giap thought in terms of a coordinated rural-urban operation; this also was in line with the concept of the whole population's partic ipation in the people's war. As pointed out in the preceding analysis, the rural and urban areas are both important in the armed uprisings and revolutionary war in our country, although they perform differ ent functions. By coordinating armed and political struggles, combining combat with uprisings to appropriate degrees and in var ious strategic operational areas, regarding the rural areas as firm battlegrounds, devel- 185 oping the urban revolutionary forces, and re garding the urban areas as crucial operational areas, we can vigorously attack the enemy in both the rural and urban areas and in all three strategic areas, and compel him to spread his forces out over a wide area. We can also coordinate our activities in various opprational areas, continuously attack the enemy everywhere and at any time, sow chaos in his rear base, and direct powerful blows at him. We can defeat the enemy in a protracted war. We also possess conditions to create opportunities, bide for time, direct timely, vigorous blows at the enemy, and win increas ingly great victories. In people's war in our country, only by attacking the enemy in all three strategic areas (mountainous-rural, rural-delta, and ur ban areas) can we successfully develop the enormous strength of all our revolutionary forces---whose main-force army consists of the workers and peasants— develop the strength originating in the coordination between armed and political struggles and between the war and uprisings, and thereby achieve the greatest victories for the revolution.58 Obviously, the rural areas constitute the stable, long-term base and battleground of the revolutionary war in our country. Firmly rely ing on the rural areas and building solid strong holds in the rural, mountainous, and delta areas are strategic requirements of the revolu tionary war in our country. While building strong, stable bases in the rural areas, our Party has attached great importance to build ing revolutionary bases in the urban areas.59 g p f t g s In April 1945, the Military Conference of north Viet Nam decided to unify the revolu tionary armed forces under the name of Viet Nam Liberation Army; resistance zones were set up, and the North Viet Nam Revolutionary Military Committee organised. In June, the free zone was founded, the ten-point policy of the Viet Minh being implemented everywhere in the 6 provinces of the free zone.60 With the forms of guerrilla fighting and mobile fighting and owing to the enemy's conditions and ours in strength, shaping up 186 of force and topography, etc., there appeared on the battlefronts the situation of free zones interlacing with enemy-controlled areas, intersecting and encircling each other. In the enemy-controlled areas, there were also guerrilla zones and guerrilla bases, another phenomenon of interlacement, intersecting and encircling one another. The process of de velopment of the war was that of ever-widening of our free zones and guexrrilla areas and ever-narrowing of the enemy-occupied areas, advancing towards liberating vast areas, then the whole North.61 General Organization_and the Cadre Army-building and combat realities have clearly Shown that a high-quality army is one that possesses a high combat morale, and in tense determination to attack the enemy, satisfactory technical and tactical levels, skillful fighting methods, neat, light, and scattered organizational patterns, good equipment, and a cadre corps and command units that have firm organizational capabilities, discipline, a stanch perseverance, and high mobility in all terrains and tinder all weather conditions, and whose material and technical requirements are adequately and satisfactorily met.62 Let all cadres, at all levels, enthusiastically move forward, be more determined and valiant, and resolutely fight and defeat and know how to defeat the aggressors so as to make valuable contributions to the glorious task of our people and People's Armed Forces.63 The contingent of cadres and Party members trained in this protracted war constitutes very valuable capital for our Party in leading the war to final victory and constantly accel erating the revolution. As the cells of the Party and as part of the masses, Party branches must connect the Party with the masses and lead them in accelerating the revolutionary war in base areas and stalwartly and resourcefully to struggle against the enemy on all fronts, every day and every hour, under very difficult cir cumstances . 6**- A philosophy and an Organization. Next a basic, gen- 187 eral plan is necessary to bring the organization into oper ation toward implementation of the dictates of the philos ophy: Strategy. * * * STRATEGY The strategy underlying the operation of Vietnamese armed revolutionaries underwent changes over the long course of the struggle. There are three basic periods in volved here: the period leading up to the August Revolu tion, the period ending with Dien Bien Phu, and the recent war against the Americans. The strategies of each period are not mutually exclusive, but they are distinct. Giap's thoughts on strategic matters looked like this in the first period: the Japanese are being routed in Asia and the time is ripe. The shifting from political struggle to arm ed struggle was a very great change that requir ed a long period of preparation. If insurrection is said to be an art, the main content of this art is to know how to give to the struggle forms appropriate to the political situation at each stage, how to maintain the correct relation be tween the forms of political struggle and these of armed struggle in each period. At the be ginning, the political struggle was the main task, the armed struggle a secondary one. Gradually, both the political struggle and arm ed struggle became equally important. Later, we went forward to the stage when the armed struggle occupied the key role.65 News of the Japanese capitulation spread rapidly. Having thoroughly understood the Party's instructions, and taking advantage of the extreme demoralisation of the Japanese forces, the consternation of the puppet govern ment and the vacillation of the security troops, the local Party organisations and Viet 188 Minh organisation immediately took the initi ative to lead the people to seize power even before receiving the insurrection order. On August 12, the insurrection order was pro claimed in the free zone, the Liberation army stormed many enemy's posts and a few days later marched to liberate Thai Nguyen. On August 13, the people in Guang Ngai province arose. On August 19, a splendid victory was scored by the insurrection in Hanoi Capital; on August 23, the insurrection was success ful in Hue, and on August 25, in Saigon. On August 29, the first unit of the Viet Nam Liberation Army entered the Capital city of Hanoi. Throughout the country, in town and countryside, millions of people rose up to wrest back power from the hands of the Japa nese fascists and pro-Japanese puppets, shattering the fetters of the imperialists and feudalists. Basing ourselves on the powerful political forces of the people, backed by military and para-military forces, and on our skill in neutralising the Japa nese army then in dismay, the insurrection cost little blood and rapidly gained success from North to South. In face of the people's powerful strength, Bao Dai abdicated, the Tran Trong Kim puppet government surrendered. On September 2, the Provisional Government appeared before the people. At historic Ba Dinh square, President Ho read the Declara tion or Independence. The Democratic Re public of Viet Nam came into being, a great historical event of South-east Asia.66 The French, aided by their wartime allies, soon re turned, however, and sought to restore their power in Indo china. This called for a new strategy on the part of the retreating Giap. The enemy having altered their strategy, we then advocated the wide development of guerrilla warfare, transforming the former's rear into our front line. Our units operated in small pockets, with independent companies penetrating deeply into the enemy-controlled zone to launch guerrilla warfare, establish bases and protect local people's power. It was an extremely hard war generalised in all domains: military, economic and political. The enemy mopped-up, we fought against mopping- up. They organised supplementary local Viet namese troops and installed puppet authorities; we firmly upheld local people's power, over threw men of straw, eliminated traitors and carried out active propaganda to bring about the disintegration of the supplementary forces. We gradually formed a network of guerilla bases. On the map showing the theatre of op erations besides the free zone, "red zones", which ceaselessly spread and multiplied, be gan to appear right in the heart of the occupied areas. The soil of the fatherland was being freed inch by inch right in the enemy's rear lines. There was no clearly- defined front in this war. It was there where the enemy was. The front was nowhere, it was everywhere.®7 From the point of view of directing op erations, our strategy and tactics had to be those of a people's war and of a long-term re sistance. Our strategy was, as we have stressed to wage a long-lasting battle. A war of this nature in general entails several phases; in principle, starting from a stage of conten tion, it goes through a period of equilibrium before arriving at a general counter-offen sive.®® The long-term people's war in Viet Nam al so called for appropriate forms of Sighting: appropriate to the revolutionary nature of the war as well as to the balance of forces which revealed at that time an overwhelming superi ority of the enemy over the still very weak material and technical bases of the People's Army. The adopted form of fighting was_gueg- illa warfare. It can be said that the war of liberation of the Vietnamese people was a long and vast guerilla war proceeding from simple to complex then to mobile war in the last $rears of the Resistance. Guerilla war is the war of the broad masses of an economically backward country standing up against a powerfully equipped and well train ed army of aggression. Is the enemy stttong? One avoids him. Is he weak? One attacks him. To his modem armament one opposes a bound less heroism to vanquish either by harassing or by annihilating the enemy according to cir- 190 cumstances, and by combining military opera tions with political and economic action; no fixed line of demarcation, the front being wherever the enemy is found. Concentration of troops to realize an overwhelming superiority over the enemy where he is sufficiently exposed in order to destroy his manpower; initiative, suppleness, rapid ity, surprise, suddenness in attack and re treat. As long as the strategic balance of forces remains disadvantageous, resolutely to muster troops to obtain absolute superiority in combat in a given place, and at a given time. To exhaust little by little by small victories the enemy forces and at the same time to maintain and increase ours. In these concrete conditions it proves absolutely nec essary not to lose sight of the main objective of the fighting that is the destruction of the enemy manpower. Therefore losses must be avoided even at the cost of losing ground. And that for the purpose of recovering, later on, the occupied territories and com pletely liberating the country. In the war of liberation in Viet Nam, guer illa activities spread to all the regions temporarily occupied by the enemy. Each in habitant was a soldier, each village a fort ress, each Party cell, each village adminis trative committee a staff. The people as a whole took part in the armed struggle, fighting according to the principles of guerilla warfare, in small packets, but always in pursuance of the one and same line, and the same instructions, those of the Central Committee of the Party and the Government,®* And this "protracted war" would be fought on many fronts. Our people's Resistance War was an all- out Resistance War. Not only did we fight in the military field but also in the political, economic and cultural fields. In the politi cal field, we had, at home, to increase the education and mobilisation of the people, un remittingly strengthen national solidarity and endeavour to smash all the enemy's schemes to divide and deceive our people, while in its foreign policy, efforts had to be made to win 191 over the support of progressive people through out the world, particularly to closely co ordinate with the struggle of the French peo ple and those in the French colonies against this dirty war. In the economic field, great efforts had to be made to build a Resistance War economy, increase production, realise self-reliance and self-sufficiency in order to perseveringly wage the long Resistance War; at the same time we had to do our utmost to sabotage the enemy's economy, to frustrate his plote to grab our manpower and wealth, to "use war to feed war". In the cultural field, we had to develop the culture of the Resistance imbued with a mass character and to heighten patriotism and hatred. Simultaneously, we had to actively struggle to wipe out the in fluence of obscurantist culture in the free zones, to fight against the enemy's debased culture in the occupied zones, to break to pieces the enemy's counter-propaganda, to maintain and raise the confidence and deter mination to carry on the Resistance War of the whole people.70 Stretched thin by the guerrilla warfare the French began to look vulnerable. The enemy found himself face to face with a contradiction: Without scattering his forces it was impossible for him to occupy the in vaded territory; in scattering his forces, he put himself in difficulties. His scat tered units would fall easy prey to our troops, his mobile forces would be more and more reduced and the shortage of troops would be all the more acute. On the other hand if he concentrated his forces to move from the defensive position and cope with us with more initiative, the occupation forces would be weakened and it would be difficult for him to hold the invaded ter ritory, the very aim of the war of re-con- quest id defeated.71 After the failure of the "lightning war" strategy, the French colonialists were com- . pelled to prolong their war of aggression.72 Giap's strategy, outlined in some detail below, had taken its toll. The aforesaid operational plan proceeded from the followingfundamental principles on the strategic directions and direction of operations: First, in the liberation war waged by our people, the most fundamental strategic prin ciple was to destroy the enemv effectives and increase our forces: only by destroying the enemy effectives could we change the balance of forces between the enemy ana us and lib erate territory. If due to the defence or liberation of territory we did not steadily abide by the principle of destroying the enemy effectives, in the end our forces would be easily worn out and we would be unable to defend territory, let alone to liberate it. Therefore it was necessary firmly to grasp this main principle. Second, we had to strike to win, strike only when success is certain, strike to wipe out the enemy. At the start of the war, our military forces were much weaker than those of the enemy, if we did not firmly grasp the principle of striking to win and to destroy the enemy, our forces could not increase, and grow stronger. With regard to our army which was that of an oppressed nation, of the poor toiling people, it was necessary for us firm ly to grasp this principle: to strike only when success is certain; if it is not, then don't strike; to wipe out the enemy but not to wear him out. We had to do in such a way that after a combat, after a campaign, our troops grew stronger, and the enemy troops weaker. Third, because we wanted to destroy the enemy effectives and to strike only to win and not to be defeated, because we had to realize these goals in conditions of the enemy being strong, and we militarily weak, our strategic direction could not allow us to choose other directions than those where the enemy was exposed, and relatively weak and where ire had many favourable conditions in all aspects in order to concetrate our absolute superiority in matters of troops and firepower, for combats of wholesale destruction. Drawing experiences from the successes and failures in the first years of the resistance war, we realized all the clearer this important principle; to attack 193 the sectors where the enemy was exposed or re latively weak.•. Fourth, because our aim was to destroy the enemy effectives, attack the enemy where he was relatively weak, and create favourable con ditions obtaining at that time, whose major feature was the concentration by the enemy of a fairly powerful mobile force in the Bac Bo delta, we should not launch large-scale of fensives upon that powerful mobile mass but seek ways and means to compel him to scatter his forces, first of all in many directions, in this way he would be weaker in every direc tion, and we would have many more conditidns to wipe him out; the best thing was to scatter him in the directions unfavourable to him in topographical conditions, in the use, of wea pons and technique, in transports and supply, etc., and thus we would have many more con ditions to destroy a greater part of his effectives. If the most important point in the Navarre (French commander) plan was to... build at all costs a strongest strategic mobile mass to cope victoriously with our offensives, and moreover, to launch large- scale offensives to destroy our regular forces, the very important point in our Winter-Spring operational plan was to...keep firm the initiative, determinedly compel the enemv to scatter, smash his concentrated mo- bile mass, compel him to split his regular forces in various directions, then choose the directions most favourable to us to destroy him. We strongly believed that we could do that because we had grasped one of the important contradictions of the enemy's aggressive war: the contradiction between the concentration of forces and occupation of territory, the contradiction between build up of a large-scale mobile force and the scattering of his forces to various regions, between the strategic offensive and strategic defensive.73 Giap sees his forces growing and ponders a positional battle; the evolution he speaks of had occurred. According to our military theory, in order to ensure victory for the people's war when we are stronger than the enemy politically and the enemy is stronger than we materially, 194 it is necessary to promote an extensive guer rilla war which will develop gradually into a regular war combined with a guerrilla w a r .74 The French dug in at Dien Bien Phu, the Geneva Con ference would be underway soon, and Giap now has the forces (including artillery and anti-aircraft guns) to humiliate the French. The political consequences of such a defeat were not lost on Giap and when he was ready to fight to victory, the battle ensued and the French had lost Indo china . These great victories of the Viet Nam Peo ple's Army and people as a whole at Dien Bien Phu and on the other fronts had smashed to pieces the "Navarre plan", and impeded the attempts of the Franco-American imperialists to prolong and extend the war. These great victories liberated the North of Viet Nam, contributed to the success of the Geneva Conference and the restoration of peace in Indo-China on the basis of respect of the sovereignty, independence, national unity and territorial integrity of Viet Nam and of the two friendly countries, Cambodia and Laos.75 Dien Bien Phu ended French Indochina and gained Ho, Giap, and the Party the northern half of Vietnam, with their prospects of gaining the southern half through an election bright. But that was not bo be, and Giap moved in to a new strategic period. At first, the revolutionary armed forces of South Vietnam were the self-defence units and armed propaganda units which saw the light of day in the fire of the movement of political struggles of the people. Then big ger units appeared with the extensive de velopment of the militia and guerilla and with guerilla warfare. At present the arm ed forces of the South Vietnam people have grown very swiftly in strength under three forms which co-ordinate closely with one another in military operations: the militia and guerilla. the_local broops and the reg ular army. Though still young and fighting in very hard and difficult conditions, the 195 South Vietnam Liberation armv has succes sively defeated the enemy and has now raised the degree of its political consciousness, and increased its equipment, mobility and fighting strength. In equipment, it mainly relies on the arms and ammunition taken from the enemy and increases its strength in the course of fighting; it is closely linked with the population.76 The North plays a role familiar to Giap; the concept of the "rear" has been with him since the beginning. At present, north Viet Nam is entirely liberated; it is the vast rear of our army. We know that in modem warfare the rear is all the more important. Strengthening of the rear ranks first among the permanent factors which determine the victory of the war.77 The parallels between the French and American situa tions are obvious. Thus it should not come as a surprise that the basic Vietnamese strategy has remained largely the same, while the actors and battlegrounds have changed. By coordinating political struggle with armed struggle, armed insurrection with rev olutionary war, guerrilla war with regular war, and by co-ordinating the fight against the enemy in the three strategic aones, we have created a fresh, (diverse?) strategic situation in which the enemy's modem army is split up, encircled and everywhere attacked from four directions, thus making it impossible for him to find any area that he can call safe in a war where there is no front, no rear, and no definite front line, and where any place can become a battle field. Submerged in the great ocean of people's war, the enemy finds that his eyes and ears are covered. He fights without seeing his opponent, he strikes without hitting, and he is unable to make effective use of his strong cmmbat methods. For this reason, even though the enemy has many troops and much equipment, his forces are scattered, weakened, and unable to develop their efficiency as he wants. Our armed and political forces, how 196 ever, can constantly encircle the enemy and rise up to fight him everywhere.78 The outstanding point in our military art has been the knowledge of how to develop our strength and advantageious fighting methods, and how to prevent the enemy from developing his strength and strong points. We use our strong points to fight his weak point, con tinually destroying the enemy's force and his strategic plans on an increasing scale to de feat him completely.79 Throughout these three periods of the Vietnamese arm ed struggle there are certain strategic considerations which remain more or less constant. The first is a commit ment to flexibility and taking the initiative in devising ways to destroy the enemy's manpower---the primary goal of Giap's strategy. The thorough understanding of the contradic tions and general laws of the aggressive war enabled us to detect the enemy's great weak ness arising from the concentration of his forces. Always convinced that the essential thing was to destroy the enemy's manpower, the Central Committee worked out its plan of action on the basis of scientific analysis: to concentrate our forces to move to the offensive against important strategic points where the enemy's forces were relatively weak in order to wipe out a part of his manpower, at the same time compelling him to scatter his forces to cope with us at vital points which he had to defend at all costs. Our strategic directives were: dynamism, initi ative, mobility and rapidity of decision in face of new situations.80 Our guiding principles are: Actively to keep the initiative, To launch small combats with certain suc cesses, To fight unremittingly, To co-ordinate with all fronts throughout the country.81 Another basic strategy concerns the dimensions of the struggle. A striking characteristic of the people's war in our country at present is that even with in the limited war, the fight against the enemy on all fronts— -military, political, cultural, diplomatic, and so forth is waged at the same time, in which the military and the po litical struggles are the most basic forms of struggle. The military and political strug gles are closely coordinated, assist each other and encourage each other to develop. This coordination is a law of the revolutionary struggle in our country. It is also an ini tiative of our people in the process of the protracted revolutionary war.82 Political struggle plavs a very fundamental role because our basic strength and the enemy’s basic weakness lie in the political field, be cause the enemy schemes to deceive the people by tradition indomitable in political struggle and have a very high political and organiza tional spirit. Once the people have a high revolutionary spirit, they are always a huge force, play a decisive role and are a deciding factor of the revolutionary struggle. How ever, particularly in the present era, the toiling worker-peasant masses and progressive people of the world have made big strides on the road of revolutionary struggle; particular ly in the South our people have been tempered for decades in political and armed struggles; while the administration and army serving the U.S. imperialists are very weak in the polit ical field, our people have ample possibil ities to develpp extensively their political strength and to exploit the great short-comings of the enemy in order to secure victory for us. Armed struggle is a high form of revolution ary struggle; it is playing a very fundamental and important role. Only with the support of armed struggle, can the masses bring into play their political authority. As the enemy is using counter-revolutionary war against the people, to overthrow his domination, it is absolutely necessary for the people to anni hilate and disintegrate the puppet army. In the specific condition of South Vietnam, arm ed struggle should closely combine with po litical struggle; at the same time it should abide by the laws on warfare and plays its role of annihilating as many enemy's forces as possible.83 198 A key strategic concept is the "rear." A strongly organized rear is always a fac tor of success because it is a source of po litical and moral stimulation and mobilization to the front, a source of supply of manpower, materials, and money for the war. As the war grows in scale, the role of the rear becomes increasingly important. We attach the greatest importance to the role of the rear in a war. As soon as the question of armed struggle was posed, another question was also posed-— that of having places where our people's armed forces could be hid den, trained, supplied, strengthened, and could rest. While revolutionary struggle was developing, we created a rear where there had been none, developed it, beginning with po litical bases among the masses, and now have a relatively complete system of popular na tional defense. We can say that in the early days when our Party made the decision to prepare for an armed struggle, we did not have a single inch of free territory; at that time, the only rear we had was our secret po litical bases, and the complete loyalty of the people who had become conscious of their revolutionary cause. It was from these se cret political bases that our Party---our first guerrilla units were then concentrating on armed propaganda, political activities be ing regarded as more important than military activities---endeavored to build up secret bases for the armed struggle, and gradually came to wage partial guerrilla war and to create a free zone. Afterward, during the precious long resistance war, we had vast free zones as a strongly organized rear for the armed struggle, besides the guerrilla bases and guer rilla zones in the enemy's rear. Our rear, which was increasingly strengthened in every aspect, was the starting point from Which our concentrated mainforce units launched of fensive operations on battlegrounds favorable to us; this rear made it possible to prepare and supply efficaciously the armed forces, in increasingly great counteroffensive cam paigns. In the enemy-occupied areas, the areas, the rear was at first places where the politically conscious people hid cadres and guerrilla fighters in underground caches, sometimes for several months at a time; these 199 places developed into guerrilla bases and guer rilla zones. In the liberation war now waged by our countrymen in the South, as a result of the political struggle of the masses com bined with vigorous and extensive guerrilla warfare, liberated zones have come into being and are expanding, playing an increasingly im portant role in bringing about victory.°4 The rear is the internal support so vital to Giap's strategy. He places small value in outside support and thus needs the support of the rear. His time perspective may be a factor, however, as the following positions in dicate: at one time the Chinese constitute a "rear", but at a later time they seem not to have played this role. 1949 saw the brilliant triumph of the Chi nese Revolution and the birth of the People's Republic of China. This great historic event which altered events in Asia and the world, exerted a considerable influence on the war of liberation of the Vietnamese people. Viet Mam was no longer in the grip of enemy en circlement, and was henceforth geographically linked to the socialist bloc.°-> We have thoroughly understood that the Vietnamese people must undertake by themselves alone---rather than asking other people to do it for them---the resistance for regain ing the Vietnamese fatherland's independence and freedom. Our people's great victories have been mainly and primarily the results of the sacrifices and extremely heroic struggle by all our Party, army, and people. In the August Revolution, and in the present re sistance against the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen, our people have arisen by themselves alone to fight and defeat powerful enemies and have fought for a long time in a situation in which our country is surround ed on all sides by the imperialists.86 Another strategic concern is the role of the Party in formulating strategy and tactics. It has been touched on in places and does not need re-emphasis here. Now we can look at tactics used by Giap to see how the above strate gies are implemented in the field. 200 * * * TACTICS Again, we must keep in mind the changing conditions found in Vietnam over the long course of their wars, as this factor affects the tactics used. General tactics cover many areas. Many of the ones Giap concerns himself with in his writings are covered below. Attack Attacks---strong attacks---are the best way to defend and broaden our rear bases, to shrink the enemy rear areas, and to develop strongly and comprehensively the contribution of our rear bases. This is also the essential requirement of the building of the strong holds and rear bases of the liberation war, starting from nothing---from small to large scale---and aiming at regaining, maintaining, and developing---from partially to compre hensively-— the people's right to r u l e . 87 The second solution was: the enemy was concentrating his forces in the Bac Bo delta where the conditions of combat were more fa vourable to him than to our regular forces, to use our forces there would bring us limit ed successes and we might suffer losses. Therefore, it was necessary for us to trans fer our regular forces in other directions irtiere the enemy was relatively exposed, to destroy his effectives more advantageously and compel him to scatter his forces to cope with the situation; meanwhile we should speed up guerilla warfare in the enemy's rear throughout the country. If the enemy attacked our free zones, his forces would be ever more scattered; and our victories in the directions where the enemy was ex posed, would automatically compel him to withdraw from our free zones.88 In the first phase of the Winter-Spring (1953-54) campaign, on the basis of this principle, we launched many offensives on the points where the enemy was relatively exposed, 201 while we pinned down his main forces at Dien Bien Phu, to allow ours to crush him on other fronts, at the same time made necessary pre parations to attack the fortified entrenched camp. In the second phase, when the preparations at the Dien Bien Phu front had been completed, and the repeated successes of our troops on various operational theatres had created new favourable conditions, we attacked the for tified entrenched camp.89 During the same period, to create a diver sion in order to secure conditions for our troops to step up preparations at Dien Bien Phu, the Laos-Viet Nam joint forces had, from Dien Bien Phu, launched an offensive in Upper Laos. Several enemy units were wiped out and the vast Nam Hu basin was liberated. The enemy was compelled to rush more forces to Luang Prabang...90 The tactical thinking leading up to and directing the attack on Dien Bien Phu is illustrative of the best of Giap's work. Dien Bimn Phu being the keystone ef the Navarre plan, we considered that it should be wiped out if the Franco-American imperi alist plot of protracting and expanding the war was to be smashed. However, the impor tance of Dien Bien Phu could not be regarded as a decisive factor in our decision to at tack it. In the relation of forces at that time, could we destroy the fortified en trenched camp of Dien Bien Phu? Could we be certain of victory in attacking it? Our decision had to depend on this consideration along. Dien Bien Phu was a very strongly forti fied entrenched camp. But on the other hand, it was set up in a mountainous region, on ground which was advantageous to us, and de cidedly disadvantageous to the enemy. Dien B&en Phu was, moreover, a completely isolated position, far away from all the enemy's bases. The only means of supplying Dien Bien Phu was by air. These circumstances could easily deprive the enemy of all initiative and force him on to the defensive if attacked. On our side, we had picked units of the 202 regular army which we could concentrate to a-p chieve supremacy in power. We could overcome all difficulties in solving the necessary tactical problems; we had, in addition, an immense rear, and the problem of supplying the front with food and ammunition, though very difficult, was not insoluble. Thus we had conditions for retaining the initiative in the operations. It was on the basis of this analysis of the enemy's and our own strong and weak points that we solved the question as to whether we should attack Dien Bien Phu or not. We dedided to wipe out at all costs the whole enemv force at Dien Bien Phu. after having created favourable conditions for this battle by launching numer ous offensives on various battlefields and by intensifying preparations on the Dien Bien Phu battlefield.91 If we wanted to win swiftly, success could not be ensured. For that reason, in the process of making preparations, we continued to follow the enemy's situation and checked and re-checked our potentialitied again. And we came to the conclusion that we could not secure success if we struck swiftly. In consequence, we reso lutely chose the other tactic: to strike sure ly and advance surelv. In taking this correct decision, we striciv followed this fundamental principle of the conduct of a revolutionary war; strike to win, strike only when is certain: if it is not, then don't. The fortified entrenched camp had quite powerful artillery fire, tank and air forces. This was another strong point of the enemy, a very great difficulty of ours, especially since we had only very limited artillery fire and no mechanised or air forces. We overcame fAgfrltV. , bY dlggiPg a trenches that encircled and strangled the en trenched camp, thus creating conditions for our men to deploy and move under enemy fire... But to reduce the effect of enemy fire was not enough, we still had to strengthen our own firepower. Our troops cut through moun tains and hacked away jungles to build roads and haul our artillery pieces to the approach es of Dien Bien Phu. Where roads could not be built, artillery pieces were moved by nothing but the sweat and muscles of our sol succesB strike.92 203 diers. Our artillery was set up in strongly fortified firing positions, to the great sur prise of the enemy... While neutralising the enemy's strong points, we had to make the most of his weak points. His greatest weakness lav in his sup ply. which depended entirely on his air forces. Our tactics were from the very beginning to use our artillery-fire to destroy the air strips, and our anti-aircraft guns to cope with the activities of enemy p l a n e s . 93 To materialize the principle of striking surely and advancing cautiously, we gave our operational plan at Dien Bien Phu a content which consisted of a series of sieee battles aimed at destroying at a time one or several enemy resistance centres, setting up and tightening our encirclement, limiting and afterwards completely cutting the enemv line of supply and reinforcements and in the end. wiping out the whole of the enemv forces. The campaign was conceived in two phases: (a) In the first phase, we would de stroy the enemv outer resistance centres, set up and tighten our offensive and encirclement positions, narrow down the enemy occupied area, limit and afterwards cut off his line of supply and reinforcements. (b) When we could create sufficient con ditions, we would shift to the phase of gen eral attack to destroy the whole of the enemy forces. Generally speaking the military situation developed in line with the foregoing direction, but in practice this development was more com plicated in d e t a i l .94 (c) We built very solid artillery positions. To secure a powerful fire and the safety for our guns in a rather long time, we built very solid artillery casemates capable of bearing the brunt of the enemy 105mm. and 155mm. can nons; these positions were built at places completely unsuspected by the enemy; they were carved deep into the mountain and hill slopes and so skilfully camouflaged that they could hardly be detected by scout planes and could stand any bombing and shelling. Besides these real positions, we installed sham positions to sidetrack the attention of the enemy, disperse his fire-power in order to waste his bombs and 204 shells.95 Many a time the enemy mobile force at Dien Bien Phu, propped up by artillery and tanks, made reconnaissance incursions into the sur roundings of Dien Bien Phu. But they were re pulsed by small units of our army which, tak ing advantage of the ground and solid posi tions, were able to protect our preparatory work and keep it in secret. In reality, the campaign developed in three phases: (a) First phase: our troops took the northern and north-eastern outer posts, i.e. Him Lam and all the northern sub-sector. (b) Second ohase: it was the longest phase in which the most murderous battles were fought. In this phase our troops annihilated the key defence system of the central sub sector, occupied the eastern hills and the air field, took the enemy in a ring of fire, grad ually tightened the encirclement, narrowed the terrain occupied by the enemy and his air space and prepared to cut definitely his source of reinforcement and supply. (c) Third phase: this was a short phase as all the favourable conditions had been pre pared, our troops took the last height in the east and shifted to a general attack to an nihilate the whole Dien Bien Phu fortified en trenched camp.97 In devising his tactics Giap's thinking was not re stricted in any way: for Dien Bien Phu he brought back trench warfare, a supposedly outdated tactic. In about twelve days, our troops were able to dig a length of over 100 km. of communica tion trenches and combat trenches and build works of all descriptions. The enemy left no stone unturned to wreck our communication trenches and our positions, but despite the bombing and strafing by his aircraft and artil lery, our troops advanced unchecked nearer and nearer the enemy by fighting many great and small battles... The success of this construc tion enabled us to close in upon the enemy on flat ground, solve the problem of food trans port, keep firm the front, fight unremittingly day and night and restrict the effect of the enemy's artillery and aircraft as much as pos 205 sible. On the closing days of March 1954, the building of the positions of attack and en circlement was virtually completed and the starting points were prepared to storm the east ern hills.98 Planning an attack involves many crucial tactical fac tors. Timing Availing itself of the right opportunity, our Party led the August General Insurrection to victory. Had the insurrection broken out sooner, it would have certainly met with nu* tnerous difficulties. It would have been in a dangerous situation had it broken out later, when the Chiang Kai-shek and British armies had arrived in our country. The Party led the people to seize power immediately after the Japanese capitulation and before the Allied forces arrived in Indo-China. The splendid victory of the insurrection was due to its tim ely launching.99 Coordination Also in this period, on the main battlefront, we pinned down the enemy at Dien Bien Phu, thus creating favourable conditions for our troops on other battlefields. In the national theatre of operations, there was also close co-ordination between the main battlefield and the fronts in the enemy's rear. In each theatre, there was al so close co-ordination between the main battle field and the fronts in the enemy's rear.100 In addition to the fighting method based up on coordination among various armed branches, with infantry units constituting the main ele ments, the LAF has also adopted fighting meth ods based upon coordination among the various armed branches themselves. For instance, co ordination between artillery units and crack special units, between engineer and anti-aircraft unitis, and so forth.101 Secrecffand Surprise In our art of fighting against the bandits, both in the past and at present, aecrecy and surprise are outstanding points. Possessing a strong determination to annihilate the bandits, having an intelligent and creative approach, 206 knowing how to rely on the people, and having a high consciousness of organization and disci pline, our armed forces always act unpredictably in fighting the enemy, unpredictably in their direction of attack, their target, time, use of force, scope of attack, manner of attack, and so forth.102 Direction The question of determining correctly the direction of an opportunity for attack is an im portant question in military art. From the practice of insurrection and revolutionary war, we can see that if we attack from one direction with a certain force, we may be able to wipe out a certain enemy force, but this will not greatly influence the general situation and the victory achieved is only at the campaign and tactical level. On the other hand, if we attack from another direction, we can deal a formidable blow to the enemy and gain a victory of strate gic importance.103 Assessment This is an area where Giap has proved himself a mas ter time and time again. In war, a most fundamental problem is cor rectly assessing the enemy's and one's own strength... This assessment must be total and substantial, not only on the military side but also on the political front, not only quanti tatively but also qualitatively, taking in not only troop strength but also the strength of the people's revolution. Seeing not only the enemy's strong points and our side's weak points but also all our strong points and all his weak points. Assessment of the two sides' war-waging ca pability involves comparing not only sheer force but also position, not only real strength and position of the two sides but also the enemy's combat efficiency and our own, and the two sides' strength not only throughout the coun try but also on each battlefield. Me must also compare the strength of the enemy and ourselves in the world and in contemporary times. Only by such a total comparison can we correctly assess our own and the enemy's capability and potential on the battlefield. This comparison of strength must also be 207 based on dialectical viewpoints, seeing all de velopments and changes in our situation and that of the enemy.1*4 An important requirement in military art is a skillful combination of styles of warfare that will respond properly to the concrete sit uation of a given place and time. Each style of warfare must be adapted to the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves and to the strategic situation of each phase of the war.105 Treatment of Local Populace and Prisoners The building of these areas in the political, economic and cultural fields has become an important task and is all the more important for the liberation war in the South. At pres ent the liberated areas are separated from one another but entangle with the enemy-controlled areas, or reach out-of-the-way places; they cover the provinces of the densely peopled del ta and even draw near big and small towns. The liberated areas are not only firm guerilla bases, but are also built to become shining models of a new life, of a new regime in op position to the gloomy state and stifling at mosphere of the enemy-controlled areas.106 By differentiating between the colonial high-ranking officers and the soldiers and sub alterns, and the enemy's unjust war from our just war, our army carried into effect the principle of disintegrating the enemv. Our troops were educated by our Party togive due consideration to propaganda work among the enemy soldiers, to enlighten them so that they could understand that they were not fighting for their own interests but as cannon-fodder to bring wealth to the colonialists. They acquainted them with our lenient policy towards prisoners of war and those who had gone over to our side of their own accord so that they would join our ranks and turn their arms against the enemy.107 Using the Enemv One of the tactics of "unconventional" warfare is to use the enemy's characteristics against him; this is a sort of guerrilla judo. 208 To wipe out the enemy it is necessary, first of all, to concentrate forces. The American troops have been scattered to cope with the com prehensive and powerful people's war. They have not only failed to concentrate their offen sive forces, but have also been compelled to fight according to the will of the southern LAF. In actual combat, in most of the battles, Amer ican troops have failed to find their targets, not because the U.S. imperialists lack modem reconnaissance instruments, but because in the people's war in South Viet-Nam, which has devel oped to a high degree, targets and battlefronts exist everywhere, yet do not exist anywhere. The prevalent phenomenon emerging from the war in South Viet-Nam is that U.S. troops have always been surprised, caught in the LAF's traps, and destroyed.108 Since the U.S. armed forces are the most modem armed forces in the capitalist world, they need abundant war means and important logistic bases. Therefore, we seek to destroy not only American military strength but also the enemy's war means and logistic b a s e s . 109 The organization of the U.S. troops depends heav ily upon war equipment and technology and, as a result, it is very cumbersome and requires istaor- mous logistical support. If technical armaments and logistical supplies were reduced, the U.S. troops would not be able to perform their combat mission, because they would be deprived of what they regard as their strength. After all is said and done, the ratio of U.S. expeditionary troops actually engaged in combat will continue bo be low. This is a bitter fact, a weakness, and a major difficulty for the U.S. imperialist ag gressors. HO On the southern battlefield the LAF's method of attacking cities is being developed... In particular, the attacks launched by the LAF in the heart of Saigon, Hue, and other cities have supported the struggle movement of the urban compatriots, frightened the foe, and filled the hearts of our compatriots throughout the country with elation. The attacks on the cities have demonstrated the marvelous courage, skill, and flexibility of the LAF. On the southern battlefields, the LAF method for attacking military communications, expecially 209 important strategic axes of communications, are very effective. With thetp, the LAF has dis rupted and paralyzed the enemy's ground logistical supply movement and weakened his mobility on the battlefields. The U.S. and puppet troops were forced to shift an important part of their forces to protect and clear their communications, but to date the enemy's military communications still face many difficulties, and his important strate gic routes are still constantly and violently attacked and threatened.HI On the soubhem battlefields, the LAF forces also have other skillful fighting methods, such as those designed to destroy enemy positions, to combine fighting with troop proselytizing in order to disintegrate the enemy ranks, to combine fighting with military revolt in order to destroy one important unit of the enemy after another, to combine political struggle with military strug gle in order to destroy strategic hamlets, to foment revolts in the rural areas, and so forth.112 In each of the above examples the Vietnamese have found one of their enemy's strengths to be, in reality, a weakness. Or they have been able to capitalize on a weak ness that their enemy tried to ignore or compensate for. This is in the best guerrilla tradition: using superior strategy and tactics to overcome material and numerical in feriority. The course of the Vietnamese armed struggle has been long and complex. But in order to get some kind of a han dle on it we can accept the following analysis by Giap as a brief and sketchy representation. It can be said that, at the outset, when our Par ty set forth the policy of preparing for the armed struggle and uprising, we did not have a single inch of free land. At that time, our sole prop was the revo lutionary organization of the people and their already enlightened patriotism and boundless loyalty toward the revolutionary undertaking. Relying on this patriotism, our Party did its best to conduct a revolutionary drive to edu cate, mobilize, and lead the masses in the various forms of their political struggle and 210 in this way to develop its own and the masses' political organizations, to build political bases everywhere, and to see to it that where ver the masses were, there would be a political base and a revolutionary organization. From those political bases, using the motto that "armed political propaganda is more im portant than military matters" — -which President Ho set forth for the first guerrilla units--- our Party did its best to build secret armed bases and, from bottom to top, to step up polit ical struggle in combination with armed struggle. Following this, our Party advance toward guerrilla warfare and the phased armed uprising and building of the Viet Bac Liberation Zone, as well as a number of guerrilla bases in other localitites, all the while vigorously and broad ly developing political bases throughout the country, increasing the masses' revolutionary fervor, and advancing toward successfully con ducting the general uprising, seizing the ad ministration on a nationwide basis, and found ing the Deomocratic Republic of Vietnam.113 The founding of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam be gan the second phase of the Revolution, the Post-Victory phase. All revolutions are eventually judged by their performance (measured against the goals of the revolution ary philosophy) in this phase. * * * POST-VICTORY To speak of post-victory with regard to Giap is to be inaccurate, for he has not yet achieved the complete vic tory he seeks. But there has been a partial victory, and that can be interesting and informative to us— -particular ly in light of the fact that there are few complete vic tories in anyone's life. North Vietnam has faced three major tasks since the Geneva Conference: (1) build the socialist society Ho en- 211 visioned, (2) support the struggle in the South, and (3) withstand attacks by the American air and naval units. These three constraints are reflected in Giap's thoughts about the North since 1934. The successful Resistance War has completely liberated the North. For the first time in nearly one hundred years in modem history, the shadows of an imperialist enemy and colonial soldiers are no longer seen on a half of our country. The successful Resistance War has brought about conditions for the drastic com pletion of land reform. After thousands of years of feudal rule, the system of exploitation of the landlord class has been abolished once for all over a half of our country... At pre sent, economic restoration has been achieved, land reform completed, our people are striving to accelerate the socialist transformation and socialist construction turning the North into an ever-stronger base for the struggle to achieve national unification and continue to complete the national democratic revolution throughout the country.114 South Vietnam is half of a liberated country, The independent, socialist North is an always- existing source of encouragement and support for our compatriots in the South. In the North, we all feel that we are the rear of a great front. And the North intends to fulfill to the utmost its duty as the backup of the front.115 In the north, the air-defense forces' cre ative forms of warfare, from the three kinds of people's armed forces and the proper or ganization and use of forces, have contributed an important part too our victory over the U.S. war of destruction.il® Commentaries It is obvious that any military-political writer tends to edit his work in a personally favorable light and/ or a correct party line. This makes it necessary to brief ly consider the conclusions of people who have studied Giap 212 and the Vietnamese wars. The following selections by no means exhaust the field, but they do cover some major points and help to spur our own critical thinking. Ellen Hammer, in her The Struggle for Indochina. 1940- 1955. puts the Vietnamese wars in better perspective for us by pointing out the impact events outside Indochina had on Vietnam. Rapid turnovers in governments at home in France allowed a few men on the spot to control events, the course of World War II affected the fortunes of the Viet Minh and France drastically, and the rise of Communist China cast doubt on the ability of any Western power to control Viet nam ever again. These are examples of factors that must be included in any analysis of Giap and his theories. Another factor, seldom considered, is what was going on in the rest of France's empire. All was not well, and events in these areas directly affected the French war ef fect in Vietnam. The spring of 1947 ushered in a military im passe. General Leclerc estimated in his report that the French needed an extra division to re turn the military situation in Viet Nam to what it had been in March 1946. This division actu ally set sail in the spring of 1947. Its des tination, however, was not the war in Viet Nam but the revolt in Madagascar. Because of that new sore spot in the empire, the French had to put off their hope of large-scale reinforce ments in Viet Nam. This was a turning point in the Franco-Vietnamese struggle which marked its transformation into a war of attrition: the Vietnamese lacked the force to expel the French, and the French, from this time on,, were unable to dislodge the Vietnamese resistance.117 Following this same theme a little further, we find that what was happening on the Communist side affected their war-making ability. Robert O'Neill focuses on China: The real solution to Giap's logistical prob lems lay through the Chinese Communists. Close contact during the years after World War II en abled the Viet Minh High Command to form an ac 213 curate picture of events in China, and to esti mate the amount of material support which the Chinese would give them as soon as Chiang Kai- shek was defeated. It seems highly likely that Giap knew that little assistance, other than training facilities for a few specialists, would be forthcoming until 1950. After 1950 he could expect to bbtain most of his operas tional needs from his fellow Communists across the border. The fact that Giap commenced his major offensive in late 1950 indicated that the situation in China played a large if not dominant role in determining his own strategies for 1948 and 1949.*18 O'Neill's point is well taken, but it must be mention ed that outside support is a two-edged sword. Obviously, Chinese supplies gave Giap the ability to arm more men with better equipment and thus increase the scope of his opera tions. It also may have led him to rely on materiel more than he should have. One of the charges consistently made against the Americans in Vietnam is that they rely on ma* chines rather than men in a war that can only be won by politically motivated men, and this charge could be leveled at Giap if his Chinese-provided affluence led him to be lieve that he could simply overwhelm the French with metal. The failure of the three Red River Delta campaigns may be blamed, in part, on this. Giap had more and better weap onry than he had ever had and it would be natural for him to press it into service, thinking "If we did this well without such equipment, we will be giants with it." But the French had better equipment and, in the delta, were on their battlefield. Following the disaster, Giap returned to the old ways, and even Dien Bien Phu can be explained in terms of Giap's strengths---planning, organization, and tim- ing---rather than weaponry. O'Neill homes in on Giap's strengths as a general when he uncovers his two major decisions. He must be remembered for two great decisions: 214 first, his move into the most remote parts of Tonkin in 1952-53 and second, his decision to fight a major battle at Dien Bien Phu. In each of these cases he has shown unquestionable mastery of the strategic situation. These two decisions, coupled with his unquestionable superi ority at political organizing and propagandizing, are what enable us to say that Giap made a difference. For without his skills and those two decisions the external events could hot have, in all probability, led to a Viet Minh vic tory. Taking his abilities as general one step further, we are faced with Giap's flexibility. The move to Tonkin oc curred following three major defeats in the Red River Delta, and a lesser man might have fallen back dogmatically on guerrilla warfare, terrorized by the thought of another positional battle against a fortress. But not Giap; when the political climate was ripe and his logistical capabil ity adequate he maneuvered the French into Dien Bien Phu and then methodically cut them to pieces. Flexibility is a prime factor in this. In Communist Revolutionary Warfare George Tanham cov ers many of the strategic, tactical, and organizational factors that led to Viet Minh success. One element in the Viet Minh operation covers these three areas and more: the use of primitive means of logistical supply. The Viet Minh relied on thousands of bicycles, trucks, sampans, junks, and coolies to supply their units, particularly as they grew in size and scope of operation. To a Western observer this system could not possibly work well. However, there were advantages to this primitive system. Coolies were not only plentiful, but able to travel cross-country, and their easily concealed columns were almost immune to air attack.120 Organizationally, this system worked---Dien Bien Phu was the ultimate test, as men muscled artillery and heavy 215 anti-aircraft guns into camouflaged positions with such stealth that the French vastly underestimated the situation. Tactically, it allowed guerrilla warfare to be fought with units much larger than small guerrilla bands large units could be supplied literally anyvrtiere. Strategically, it allowed both the three-phase strategy and the positional strategy to operate with efficiency. Overall this logistic operation was more than a match for that of the French with their airpower. But none of these three aspects is the most important, for it is on the philosophical level that this effort was most important. Giap repeats the phrase “people's war" over and over again in his writings-— repeats it to the point where it loses all meaning. Perhaps this is why this facet of his work, both on paper and in the field, is so overlooked by Western observers. Giap's war is truly a people's war in the basic sense that it is fought by the people: every one of those thousands of people lugging supplies through jungles, over swamps, and up mountains is a soldier and a believer. Thus, the French found themselves fighting a whole country not just a uniformed army. Perhaps the best way to drive home the idea of "peo ple's war" is by means of a story David Schoenbrun tells in his introduction to Big Victory Great Task. One night, in 1954, Schoenbrun's car was stopped behind a truck in a con voy which had become stuck in the mud. Accepting the idea of a night in 100 degree heat, attacked by mosquitoes, he goes to watch what happens in such a situation. I walked across the span bridge to watch the attempt to get the ten-ton truck out of the mud- hole, an almost impossible task without a power crane. From a nearby village came a stream of peasants, each armed with a shovel and a pail or basket of sand and gravel. They covered the truck like ants on a sugar cube. Dozens of shovels dug deeply into the mud around the wheel. More dozens of sand pails and gravel 216 scoops filled in the sucking hole, while up a- head of the truck, their backs straining a- gainst cable lines tied to the bumpers, the legion of porters pulled and hauled until inch by inch the truck moved forward and then, in one burst of liberation, exploded out of the mudhole. The entire operation took less than an hour. A crane on wheels, with a power winch, could not have done it better or more quickly. At that moment I think I fully under stood for the first time what Giap and Pham Van Dong and Ho Chi Minh mean when they talk about a "people's war."121 Beyond its efficiency, compared to a machine, this method of freeing a truck draws the people into the war. It be comes their war because they participate in it in meaning ful ways. Compared to this type of warfare other types be come much more blatantly mercenary. And it seems impossible for mercenaries to truly "win" a war for the minds and heart of a people. Because of the unclear connection between Giap and the war in the South that war has received relatively lit tle attention here, but there are some commentaries on it which are of interest and shed light on Giap and his con cept of warfare. One tremendously important facet of the war in the South is largely overlooked by American authors (until quite recently) and that is the question of right and wrong. It borders on the incredible how American au thors ignore this point in writing on the war-— that we came perilously close to aiding the French in their war indicated how the word "Communist" can blind us to any of the other stars in our constellation of morality and write of it as if it were a mathematical equation divorced from the basic considerations that motivate people. Most American authors now condemn, if only gently, the French for their role in the war with the Viet Minh. The French were colonists trying to turn back the clock, and even F.D.R. frowned on their efforts; the traditional 217 American anti-colonial bias almost overcame the stigma of Communism that the Viet Minh had to bear. But where the United States is concerned the story is different, and this is the case with the war in the South. A good example of this can be found in the writings of the later Bernard Fall. In summing up a chapter in The Two Vlet«Nams he writes: Thus, as the Second Indochina War grinds on, it appears as devoid of easy solutions and as full of pitfalls as the earlier one. This must be ascribed to the fact that most of the pres ently developed countermeasures are essentially conventional guerrilla (rather than revolution- ary-warfare) tactics, with the word "counter'1 added as a prefix: counterguerrilla, counter subversion, counterterrorism, counterinfiltra tion, etc. In addition to these, several old standbys are used: sealing off the insurgent area from external sanctuaries---no matter how much of a strain in manpower or in linear de fenses this may be and regroupment of the civilian support environment. Successful com pletion of such a first phase is then to be followed by the traditional methods of pacifi cation by means of ouadrillage or tache d1 huile (which, as we have seen, had failed the French in the First Indochina War). But all these techniques can merely supple ment but not replace, the need for political action. (Fall goes into the Philippine ex perience and the parallel program for defectors in South Vietnam.) In any case, pardon for the transgressors does not obviate the necessity to improve the physical and, above all, the moral and politi cal lot of the Vietnamese peasantry. Its overwhelming share in the suffering of this murderous war entitiles it to a voice in the decision-making that has thus far been withheld from it. Until that type of reform is effec tively implemented by the South Vietnamese Govern ment, the United States will have to carry virtually single-handed the physical burden of the counterinsurgency---and the moral responsi bility for the way it is being prosecuted.122 This is as far, apparently as Fall ean bring himself to go in dealing with the moral issue involved in the "Sec- 218 ond Indochina War." What he does not say is much more im portant than what he does say, for he does not say that the Viet Cong may be truly more representative of the Vietnam ese peasantry than any of the numerous Saigon regimes we supported and that we had no business preventing (or post poning) what should have been accomplished by means of elections in 1956. In examing Giap we have to consider the possibility that the movement toward independence which he helped lead was morally correct. Phenomenonology teaches us to examine our own inten- tionality as it guides our perception. This certainly must be an integral part of any analysis of guerrilla warfare and the men who participate and lead such warfare. If we conscientiously do this sentences such as the last one quoted above---indicating that the U.S. has to continue fighting reform or no-»— may take on new and possibly re pugnant meanings. Malcolm Browne, author of The New Face of War, has a different view of the war in the Sohth, and this view makes his analysis that much more valuable to us. Browne is particularly good at showing how little things add uptomuch bigger things in a kind of geometric synergy. The use of helicopters is just auch a small item. The U.S. and their allies use helicopters and this seams reasonable. They are faster, can carry a lot, and do all sorts of useful things. One thing they cannot do, though, is make contact with the people of Vietnam in meaningful ways. When the Viet Cong marches through an area the people are affected in a very personal way and following Giap's teachings the troops do all manner of things to enhance this effect— -but when the heli copters fly over, it is a basically neutral act, except when they fire indiscriminatly and then it is a very negative act. (And since the Viet Cong do not have helicopters such instances are never blamed on them.) It is very definitely true, then, that "...the trip 219 to an objective is generally more important than the objective itself."123 And there is more. What does the use of helicopters tell the Vietnamese people? A U.S. infantry advisor: "After all, when you come to think of it, the use of heli copters is a tacit admission that we don't control the ground. And in the long run, it's control of the ground that wins or loses wars."124 a small point, but add it to others and it no longer is small. The Viet Cone kill people and destroy things, no one will dispute this, but here again is a difference. Officials and "cadres" must be killed, but the mass of the people must not be hurt. For tifications, canals, roads, and offices must be blown up, but installations that will be useful after an anticipated Viet Cong victory must be left alone.125 First, in a "people's war" you cannot harm the people. Second, such selectivity earns the respect of the people--- they see you taking care not to harm their basic interests. And third, such care is in direct contrast with the enemy's activities. Having to fight a war from a distance is slop py, killing innocents by the thousands and destroying acres of buildings around the primary target. The people on the ground know the difference and act accordingly. Browne piles on example after example of these nu ances and twists and subtleties until his point is crystal clear: a people's war can only be fought with a people's war. One final example from his book will serve to show that we definitely did not fight a people's war. The 2nd Battaliaon, of the 502nd Airborne was, in 1966, a special company: Each man carried a quartermaster-issue hatch et slung from his belt. Hatchets are not nor mal equipment for soldiers, and in the jungle are not as useful as machetes. But the bat talion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Harry Emerson, had decided to; name his outfit the 220 "Hatchet Battalion," and to equip it according ly. He also sent "Hatchet teams" of commandos in threes and fours into enemy base areas. Emerson offered a case of Scotch to the first man in his unit to kill a Viet Cong with his hatchet.12® In January, 1966 a man in Bravo Company got a Viet Cone with his hatchet following a Viet Cone attack. He brought back the man's head and the GI's had a good time holding it and posing with it. "Bravo Company's commander was Cap tain Thomas Taylor, the son of General Maxwell D. Taylor, former Army Chief of Staff and U.S. Ambassador to Viet Nam."127 The effect of this episode on the Vietnamese peas antry--- the "ground" we tried to win in this people's war— can only be imagined. From an American standpoint, how ever, it can be said that we use to condemn the hatchet- carrying, scalp-taking Indians as "savages" fit only to be wiped out like vermin. There is one other aspect of the war in the South which must be considered to make any analysis of Giap and the Vietnamese Revolution well rounded: organization. Or ganization is an overlooked aspect of the Vietnamese strug gle, North and South, and Douglas Pike in Viet Cong tries to redress the balance. Contemporary reporting of the Viet Minh war dealt almost entirely with Viet Minh oper ations, although the balance was restored in the years that followed with the emergence of works on the political and organizational activities. Likewise with the NLF, virtually nothing has been written on its organizational structure, nor even on its major sociopoliti cal programs of the phone trao tranh dau. the political struggle movement. Yet by any cri terion— -money, manpower, time expended— these activities dominated the day-to-day life of both the rank and file and the leadership and dwarfed the military aspects.12® Pike's book is an attempt to shed light on the organization 221 al activities of the Viet Cone. Which brings us back again to Ho Chi Minh, the un questioned genius of organizing. For without Ho it is doubtful that the Vietnamese Revolution would have amounted to much more than another colonial uprising, swiftly put down and forgotten. It was Ho that kept the idea of free dom alive in the minds of men like Giap for so long and so strongly that he took on the mantle of a saint; and it was Ho who laid down the basic organizational strategies that allowed Giap to fight a truly people's war. Ho's life, in short, has been organizing. Pike writes: From the earliest days, when he worked under Michael Borodin at Whampoa, he had been fas cinated by the social organization, and clearly it was the clandestine cell structure of underground communism rather than, say, dialectical materialism that attracted him to the cause. Most of Ho Chi Minh's politi cal victories in pre-Viet Minh days were the result of his skill in creating, using, and propitiously merging a succession of united- front organizations, each a plateau higher than its predecessor, each increasing the Party's power, broadening its mass base of support, and eliminating its rivals. His technique involved enfolding a rival organi zation into a broader social community as a means of obscuring its individual identity and as a prelude to amputating its leadership, after which it disintegated. Such organiza tion-slaying was not new or unique to Vietnam, but no one has ever performed it more skill fully or so successfully over such a long span of time.129 And: Vo Nguyen Giap may have been the genius of vio lence, Truong Chinh the erudite theoretician, but it was the brillant organizational maneu vering of Ho Chi Minh that delivered the clear victory.1*0 Giap has never risen to prominence on his own, he has always been in the shadow of Ho and an integral part of the 222 Party organization. Because of this we can only guess at his personal motivations, grasping at clues such as the deaths of his wife and her sister at the hands of the French and his desire to follow Ho. He has proved himself able to assert himself, particularly in the purges of the summer of 1946, but he also remains a part of the party, sacrificing his positions and public visibilities to its needs, especially in the tug-of-war between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic. He leaves us with little to go on except his writing and his actions in the field. If we combine what we know of his life with those writings and actions we may, however, come close to the heart of Giap. The major lesson of the Vietnamese Revolu tion is organization, and Giap was, and is, truly an or ganization man. Ho was the genius who planned it on the highest level, but without a hierarchy of men like Giap Ho's abstractions would never have reached maturity in con crete form. Giap's subordination of himself to the organ ization clearly is a major, if not the major, lesson we can learn from him as a person. CHAPTER 4: CHE Wherever death may surprise us, let it be welcome, provided that this, our battle cry, may have reached some receptive ear and another hand may be extended to wield our weapons and other men be ready to in tone the funeral dirge with the staccato singing of the machine-guns and new bat tle cries of war and victory.! 223 224 BIOGRAPHY Ernesto Guevara de la Serna (the "Che" was a nick name, Argentine slang for "Hey man," "Mac," "buddy," or "pal" which he legalized later in Cuba) was bom on June 2 3 14, 1928 in Buenos Aires or Rosario to Ernesto Rafael Guevara Lynch and Celia de la Serna Guevara. His parents were of aristocratic lineage, well educated, and radical for their time and place. As with all children, Che was profoundly influenced by the people who raised him. He was also profoundly influenced by the weakness he carried with him from his early childhood to his death in Bolivia: asthma. The family had moved to the city of San Isidro and there he came down with the asthmatic condition that he strove to overcome the rest of his life. The fami ly's residence was affected by Che's asthma: they soon moved to the drier climate of Alta Gracia, and it was here that Che grew up. The elder Ernesto pushed Che physically to overcome his asthma and as a boy Che was well known for aggressive ness and leadership in both soccer and rugby. Confined at home for periods of time because of the asthma Che was his mother's student and became familiar with literature, and political and social problems; the family's social circle brought Che into contact with freethinkers. And the fami ly obviously practiced, at least with Che, what it preach ed: before starting high school his parents let him tour the northern areas of Argentina. He was gone for the sum mer on the first of the many trips throughout Latin America that were to characterize his life. When Che was seventeen his mother was operated on for breast cancer. The connection between his own asthma, his mother's cancer, and his decision to become a doctor has 225 been emphasized by some of Che's biographers. Martin Ebon writes, for example, that "Ernesto set up a pathetic little amateur laboratory, hoping to develop experiments with guinea pigs that might help to explore the mystery of his mother's illness."^ Whatever the reasons, Che did de cide to pursue medicine as a career and entered the Facu lty of Medicine at the University of Buenos Aires. He studied, worked at a job, played rugby and chess, and travr eled. At this point his parents separated, and Che seems to have remained much closer to his mother for the rest of his life. In 1950 Che made a tour of all of northern and cent ral Argentina by motorbike. When he brought the bike back to the store after the trip to have it serviced the owner was so impressed by his feat that the story and Che's photograph were used in his advertising. In 1952 (with one year to go on his medical studies) Che and Alberto Granados set out on motorbikes to tour all of Latin America. The bikes broke down near Santiago, Chile and they made the rest of the trip on a catch-as-catch-can basis. In Peru they saw the Indian life that was such a far cry from the splendor of the Inca empire. They worked in a leprosarium at San Pablo, Peru and became so well liked by the patients that their farewell was an emotional one. In Caracas the two separated: Alberto to stay and work in a hospital for lepers, Che to fly to Miami on a plane trans porting race horses. After all this, Che returned to school to finish his studies and receive his medical degree. Perhaps the best way to summarize Che's life to this point is to use a paragraph written by Andrew Sinclair in his book on Che. Sinclair writes: By temperment, Che looked on difficul ties as challenges. Disabilities were to be defeated, barriers to be broken. A marked trait of Che's personality through 226 out his life appeared in his early fight against asthma. He became an athlete in spite of terrible attacks which forced him to run off the rugby field to inhale his medicine. He became a hardened traveler who merely halted whenever he could not breathe and went on when he could. He got through a six years* course in three years at university, passing sixteen major exam inations in six months in spite of forty- five serious asthma attacks. His aunt said of this time, "We would listen to him gasping, studying as he lay on the floor to ease his breathing, but he never com plained. For him it was a challenge." By the greatest irony of all, a board of military doctors declared him unfit for any sort of military service, once he had reached the age of eighteen. His military training had to wait a while.5 So did his practice as a doctor. When he had separated from Alberto in Caracas, Che had promised to return after finishing his studies so that the two could talk of medical careers, (but the two would not meet again until 1960) so with companions Che set off to get to Caracas. They arrived in La Paz, Bolivia in July 1953 (the same month that Fidel Castro attacked the Moncada garrison in Cuba and gave July 26th new meaning for revolu tionaries) and found the city filled with the excitment fol lowing the popular revolution a year earlier that had nationalized the mines and givien the peasants land. Thus, it was in Bolivia that Che got his first taste of popular revolution; and it was later in Bolivia that he would die in an attempt to lead a popular revolution. In Bolivia Che met Ricardo Rojo, a young Argentine lawyer exiled for his opposition to Peron, and the two be came friends. Che spent his days studying the Inca ruins nearby (he was intensely interested in archaeology at this time), visiting the cafes with Rojo, and gradually becoming knowledgeable about Bolivian politics. Che was also gain- 227 ing a reputation as an eater; Rojo remembers: We had dinner very late one night at Nougues's house. It was a 'reserve1 meal, to quote Guevara, who could go with out eating for three whole days as easily as he could stay at a table piled with all sorts of food for ten hours at a time. Now that I think back, this way of nourish ing himself was one of Guevara's most im pressive characteristics. Like a savage he would eat amounts of food it was hard to measure, taking all the time in the world and indulging in a sensuality he couldn't suppress. Then he would go through an ascetic period, never by choice, of course, but because of lack of funds and the occassional absence of invitations." In September, 1953, Che, little impressed by what he saw of the Bolivian revolution---he felt it was a half-way measure at best left for Peru with Rojo and others. Che was still on his way to a reunion with Alberto but he eventually wound up in Guatemala instead. It seems that Rojo convinced Che that he would see a "real" revolution there. On the other hand, Che had no money to travel fur ther and Rojo had arranged to get them to Guatemala cour tesy of the United Fruit Company---that object of the revo lution in Guatemala took them by ship to Panama. And from there they moved toward Guatemala in Che's usual way: hitchhiking and just plain hiking. In San Jose, Costa Rica Che had his first view of the Cubans beside whom he would later fight, and like the revo lution in Bolivia they had to bear his cynical scrutiny. It was in San Jose's Cafe de la Reforma that Guevara first came in contact with Cuban exiles who had fought with Fidel Castro in the abortive July 26th attack on the Moncada garrisons. They were a noisy, colorful group, given to tall tales of their exploits, massacres, dynamiting, fight ing in the cities of Cuba, militants in the universities, seizure of weapons, and other violence. Guevara considered them braggarts 228 and urged them to tell a few more of their "cowboy yams," They sold home-made arti cles door-to-door or lived on checks sent by relatives in the United States or Cuba.7 After some time in San Jose the group moved on, and in Jan uary 1954 they finally made it to Guatemala. Guatemala at this time was a haven for Latin American revolutionaries: the coalition government under Jacobo Arbenz Guzman was heavily Communist and oriented toward land reform, both of these facts acting as magnets through out the hemisphere. By the time Che arrived Arbenz had accelerated the policies of his predecessor Juan Jose Are valo to the point where uncultivated land of the United Fruit Company had been expropriated and given to the peas ants. This meant that the revolution's days were numbered, but at this point the country was still delirious with triumph. Che decided to apply his medical skills among the Mayan Indians of Guatemala and went to the Ministry of Public Health to sign up. Everything went well until the minister asked if he were a member of the Party. Che said no but that he supported the ideals of the revolution; the minister told him that he must be a Party member in order to have the job. This did not sit well with Che: he told the minister he would not join out of necessity but only out of conviction, and he never was able to practice his profession in Guatemala. He sold encyclopedias for a time and then a Peruvian exile, Hilda Gadea, was able to get him a position in one of the agrarian reform programs. Che was deeply attached to Hilda and later married her. She had been involved in revolutionary activities in Peru before coming to Guatemala and after meeting Che she and her friends became his tutors in these areas. This point in time seems to be the start of Che's serious in terest in politics: he began to read Marx and Lenin and 229 apply what he was reading to the empirical evidence he had seen on his extensive travels throughout Latin America, the Bolivian revolution, and the Arbenz regime in Guatemala. His studies in Guatemala were shortlived for the end was in sight for the Arbenz experiment. While Rojo, with money from his parents, left to travel in the United States, Che remained in Guatemala, and the CIA helped Carlos Castillo Armas raise an invasion force in Honduras and El Salvador, When the invasion came Che did what he could. Hilda remembers that "Che encouraged the Guatemalans as much as he could. He kept saying, 'You must fight.* One night when some of the boys escaped from the enemy, Che got them to safety in an embassy. He also transported weapons from one place to another until it was impossible for him to continue, and then he took refuge, as I did, in the Argentine embassy." Che himself has said, "I was and still am an ardent admirer of the Arbenz government, though I never occupied a position in that government. When the United States interven tion occurred, I made attempts to organize a group of young men like myself to confront the United Fruit interests. In Guatemala it was necessary to fight, and yet almost no one fought. It was necessary to resist and almost no one wanted to do it."® This intense lesson in the theory and practice of revolu tion would have great impact on anyone, and it seems rea sonable to assume that Che was deeply affected by the ex perience, and that we can find at least some of the moti vation for his later activities in Guatemala, 1954. Hilda had fled to Mexico, so Che refused the embas sy's offer of a plane ride to Argentina and went to Mexico. How he got there is one of those many aspects of Che's life on which you can find different versions: one has him go ing to Mexico City on a train with a safe conduct arranged Q by the embassy, while another has him swimming across a 230 river to get there.10 Whatever the means, Che arrived in Mexico in August, 1954 and was reunited with Hilda. They were married in May 1955 and had their first child, a girl named Hildita in February, 1956. Raul Castro, then in exile in Mexico, may (or may not) have been their best man. On the way to Mexico Che traveled with a Guatemalan, Julio Roberto Caceres Valle, called "El Patojo" (the little one), who would later be killed in his guerrilla activities in Guatemala. They talked of revolution and what had hap pened in Guatemala. When they reached Mexico City they went into the business of photographing tourists. It was almost a natural occurrence for Che to become friendly with the Cuban exile community in Mexico City; his whole life was now almost totally immersed in revolutionary politics and revolutionaries. So, Che and the Cubans be came friendly and when Batista (in the mistake of his life) granted Fidel amnesty, the Cuban community thrilled with excitment. Raul introduced the two men and they became immediate and close friends. The life in Mexico City at this time was exciting for young men with ideals and itchy feet. The atmosphere is summed up very well in Ricardo Rojo's account of his meet ing with Fidel. Guevara had taken him to the apartment where Fidel lived and they found him in the kitchen. Fidel Castro was in the kitchen boil ing a huge pot of spaghetti. The atmos phere of perpetual conspiracy in which the Cubans lived required constant im provisation. Castro kept an eye op^the. ,> spaghetti and, at Guevara's request, be gan briefing me on the plans for his ex pedition. "We have the ship, the arms, and we have men being readied. We're going to Cuba next year. We'111 either be killed or become free men. But right now we have the Mexican police and the Batista 231 spies on our tails. Tell men, are you in good standing with the local police?"!! Che was ready to follow such a man, and he did regardless of the cost. Part of the cost was his wife; Hilda later said of Che's decision to fight in Cuba: "I lost my hus- 12 band to the Cuban revolution." Fidel toured the United States raising money for the cause, and when he returned he and his men, including Che, went into training under the leadership of Colonel Alberto Bayo, a former officer in the Spanish Republican Army and a man well versed in guerrilla warfare. They trained on a ranch in a mountainous area of Mexico. Of the eighty men he trained Bayo rated Che as his best student. The train ing was interrupted by the Mexican police who arrested the nucleus of the group in June, 1956. It is unclear whether Che was among those arrested, but the men were soon re leased as a result of efforts by Mexican ex-President Lazaro Cardenas. The group was ready to embark for Cuba. And Che had his nickname: he used "che" in almost every sentence and the Cubans called him that. So, in November, 1956 the invasion of Cuba began with over eighty men boarding an old launch (designed to carry twenty people) called the Granma. "On November 27 Castro's underground headquarters at Santiago de Cuba received a code message from Mexico, which read, 'Requested edition sold out.' This meant that the revolution was on its way."^ The revolution began as a series of errors that near ly destroyed it before it got going. Bad weather, the age of the boat, and poor navigation caused them to arrive late, at the wrong place, and with most of their equipment long since thrown overboard. On December 5, after strug gling ashore through a swamp and marching toward the Sierra Maestra for several days, the group was attacked and badly 232 mauled by government troops. Twelve to fifteen (the fig ures do not agree among sources) of the original 82 or 83 men managed to escape this initial battle. Che, the group's doctor, was among those wounded. Later, he recalled it this way: I remembered an old story of Jack London's in which the hero, knowing that he is condemned to freeze to death in the icy reaches of Alaska, leans against a tree and decides to end his life with dignity. This is the only image I remember.14 Fortunately for Che, Juan Almeida got him up off the ground, out of his reverie, and walking toward safety. Very few times between this point and the Bolivian disaster does Che lapse into this hero-martyr tone in his writing the writ ing of this period is straight-forward and records the guerrilla at work without the self-conscious imagery of the guerri1la-as-mythic-hero. Che had become a member of the guerrilla group in the most complete way by battling for his life and being wound- ed---the words had ceased and he was now doing it. At this moment he also made another decision. He had joined the Castro brothers in their venture as a friend and as the doctor for the group whatever value he might have as a guerrilla fighter (regardless of his high marks from Bayo) were strictly secondary-— but as a result of this first battle at Alegria de Pio these priorities changed. This was perhaps the first time I was faced with the dilemma of choosing between my dedication to medicine and my duty as a revo lutionary soldier. At my feet were a pack full of medicines and a cartridge box; to gether, they were too heavy to carry, I chose the cartridge box, leaving behind the medicine pack, and crossed the clearing which separated me from the cane field.15 Che was now a guerrilla fighter, an identity which he never gave up. 233 After this initial battle at Alegria de Pio the Cuban military evidently felt that the invasion had been wiped out and went home to their barracks. The survivors of Castro's group finally found one another and began a cam paign of guerrilla warfare that led to complete victory in an almost incredibly short time. The details of this cam paign are chronicled in his reminiscences and as material for his handbook on guerrilla warfare and need not be de tailed here, although an outline is necessary to understand what happened once the military part of the Cuban revolu tion was won. Che established himself as a guerrilla leader from the outset in the Sierra Maestra mountains of Cuba's south east region, and Fidel gave him Increasingly greater re sponsibility as time passed. In March, 1957 Che became a captain and a short time later a commandante or major, the highest rank in the guerrilla army. In July, 1957, Fidel gave Che command of a new column which would operate in a new region away from the main (Fidel's) force. From this point on Che was a member of the very top level of the Cuban revolution, in the company of Fidel, Raul, and Camilo Cienfuegos. In March, 1958 Raul established a second front in the mountains of Oriente province. In August Che's column set out for the central province of Las Villas, and after a march through swamps in the face of a hurricane the column established itself in the mountains of Las Villas in Octo ber. Here Che met Aleida March, a courier between the urban underground and the mountains and, later, a member of Che's group, who he would marry after Batista was over thrown. The rigged elections of November, 1958 were the begin ning of a swift end for Batista. The combination of a general boycott and the preventive measures taken by the 234 guerrilla army made it a sham, and Batista retaliated with a wave of police terror against the general population. This was the cue for Castro to begin the offensive. Col umns led by Che and Camilo cut Cuba in half. Che's column entered the city of Santa Clara in December and destroyed an armored train sent there as a last ditch effort to turn the tide. This was the end arid Batista knew it: on the first day of bhe new year the news that Batista had fled to the Dominican Republic reached Che in Santa Clara. On Jan uary 3, 1959 Che and Camilo entered Havana, and on January 8 Fidel and Raul arrived. The military part of the revolu tion was over. The post-victory, pre-Bolivia period in Che's life is the hardest to chronicle since it involved so much in-fight* ing that was not public and because it includes and extended period where few people knew where Che was and fewer still have said anything about it. The essence of what is known (and known to be reliable) is included below, but it must be kept in mind that this period may remain unknown to us with any degree of certainty for years. It is debatable whether or not Fidel had aspirations to power beyond the winning of a guerrilla war against Batista (in fact the concept of "winning" such a war does not seem to have been the original aim: the invasion was to be a catalyst for a general uprising, and only after the failure of the general strike of April 9, 1958 was military victory clearly the goal) and his actions after this, vic tory lend support to such a view. In the first year of the revolution, Fidel and his movement helped to set up a government of moderate, liberal, middle-aged men with a record of integrity and opposition to Batista. This liberal group immediately began to clash with the more radical group of guerrilla leaders, who felt they had many promises to keep to the Cuban peasants and that radical reform demanded Draconian measures. Soon Fidel 235 had squeezed out all the moderates and had re placed them with comrades from the Sierra Maestra.16 The guerrillas had become champions of the peasants by virtue of their long and intense contact with them in the military campaign, and agrarian reform and a peasant-ori ented revolution became their goal for the New Cuba. When the moderates they brought to power balked at the measures necessary to do this, the moderates had to go. Remembering Che's disappointment with the Bolivian revolution's fail ure to go all the way with its revolution and his experi ence with the dying of the Guatemalan revolution, it is easy to see why he pushed for radical measures to achieve radical aims---gradualism was never for Che. Che had a series of positions in the new government, and he fulfilled many informal roles as well; this is one of the reasons why this period in his life is so complex. He began with a purely military position as commander of La Cabana Fortress in Havana. In May, 1959 Fidel institu- ed the First Agrarian Reform laws nationalizing all large farms and major properties. Soon after marrying Aleida March (June, 1959) Che left on a trip abroad, and this trip serves to point up the tension in Cuba at this time, brought to a head by the agrarian feform and the subsequent resignations of five cabinet members. This (trip) kept him out of Cuba during inter nal and external crises that called for Castro- type flexibilities, rather than Guevara-type dogmatisms. As the country was beginning to lose its traditional foreign economic links, Guevara's trip was designed to establish new contacts abroad.17 After three months visiting countries in Africa, Asia, and Europe Che returned to Cuba. In October, 1959 Fidel placed him at the head of the Industrial Department of National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA). In 236 November Fidel added the Presidency of the National Bank of Cuba to Che's responsibilities. In Che's absence Fidel had purged the government of the more moderate elements and agreed to sell large amounts of sugar to the Soviet Union; presumably this made the climate more accepting of a man with strong positions such as Che. So we are fairly safe in assuming that Che's next trip abroad strengthening trade relations with the various Communist nations was not to get him out of the way for a while. It was on this trip that he first met Tamara Bunke, a German-Spanish interpreter in the employ of the East German secret police who is the "Tania" of the Bolivian campaign. Shortly after his return, in February , 1961 Che became Minister of Industries. April, 1961 saw the Cuban Army defeat the Bay of Pigs invaders. This might lead us to believe that Guevara's stock would soar in Cuba, but this was not the case. Che had belittled the Soviet Union on his trips for their lack of full support for Cuba (and he had justification for do ing this) but at home in Cuba the Soviet-line Communist party was the one that Castro had aligned himself with. Add to this Fidel's need for Soviet aid to stay solvent and Che's position becomes tenuous. It was strengthen, however, in early 1962 when Fidel broke with the leader of the pro- Soviet group, Anibal Escalante, and Escalante left the country. And Che's military leadership helped his posi tion further in the October missile crisis. Che seemed secure. "The year 1963 was relatively quiet for Che; he made 18 only two major public appearances." It appeared quiet, but events were taking place which would cause Che to leave Cuba forever. First, the Cuban economy, in large part Che's responsibility, was faltering: sugar and industrial production were down, inflation was increasing, and consum er goods were often in short supply. This created pressure 237 to replace Che or, at the very least, to convince him to change his policies. Second, Che himself was growing in creasingly disenchanted with life behind a desk, where the only "battles" were speeches exhorting the workers to new sacrifices. Third, he did or did not go through a period of confinement and isolation for some reason. When they first came into power, the Castro group saw Cuba's reliance on sugar as a key to their dependence on other nations. So they sought to diversify the Cuban economy and began to industrialize the country toward self- sufficiency in many kinds of manufactured goods. The prob lems were too great to be solved in a short time and the sugar umbilical was cut too soon. Fidel finally had to call a halt, return to a sugar economy (with Communist nations replacing the American buyers), and slow the pace of industrialization. These were bitter pills for Che, particularly since he had come to see increasing similari ties between the Soviet Union and the United States in their attitudes toward Cuba. Che began to fit in less and less well with the necessities of Cuba's economic survival. He felt uncomfortable from the very beginning in non military roles in Cuba and mentioned to friends that he would rather be fighting the revolutionary fight than man ning a desk in the Ministry. This was more than talk: Ricardo Rojo says that Che had been planning a guerrilla campaign for Argentina with Jorge Masetti, an Argentine journalist, since 1963 at the very latest (the two had met in 1958). "For Che and Masetti the war in Argentina, the social revolution, was inevitable. It was only a matter of promoting it as efficiently as possible."19 So, in 1963 Masetti and thirty men, among them some of Che's, best entered Bolivia and crossed into Argentina to begin the campaign. It seems clear that Che hoped tojote; the fight after the guerrillas had established themselves. 238 "In fact, Masetti had called himself by the nom de guerre 20 1 " of Major Segundo, the second-in-command." Within ten months the guerrilla band had been shattered and Masetti had disappeared into the jungle never to be heard from again. By April 1964, then, Che's plans for a Latin Ameri can revolution had had their first test and their first failure. With these two series of events in his mind, Che traveled for much of 1964 and 1965. In March 1964 he was in Geneva for the Inter-Ameri- can Economic and Social Council on Trade and Development; in April in Algiers for talks with Ben Bella; in December he was at the United Nations; he opened the new year with travels through eight African countries; in February he was in China (where he was hurt by the Communist leaders' coolness); in March he was in Egypt. A common thread running through all these trips was Che's increasingly bitter attacks on the Soviet Union: Che was appalled by the lack of a communist morality on the part of the Soviets. "He castigated the Soviet Union for its econom ic policies toward its allies, suggesting that such struggling countries as Cuba had a right to be subsidized by Moscow and should not be accountable for any deficits they may run up while engaged in their 'revolutionary strug gles. "'21 Che's position was now clear. And it was a position that simply was beyond the boundary of acceptability in a nation almost totally dependent on the Soviet Union for its survival; Che had to go. On March 14 Che returned to Havana....A week later Guevara gave a talk to youth lead ers in the basement auditorium of the Minis try of Industry, relating his impressions of the newly independent African countries he had visited. He was never again seen publicly in Cuba. His post as Industry Minister was quietly taken over by a deputy, Arturo Guzman. The windows of the Guevara residence on Quinta Avenida were closed with shutters. Havana asked, Donde esta? "Where is he?"22 The answer is unclear. Anibal Escalante, back in 239 Cuba and back in a position of influence (his ties with the Soviet Union made this a must for Fidel) alleged that Che had become mentally ill and was in a mental hospital out- 23 side Havana. Martin Ebon devotes a chapter of his Che: The Making of a Legend to the mystery and points to a mem orandum from an "R" in Cuba which turned up in a German version. Ebon links the memorandum to Escalante and quotes sections from it which say that Che was in a sanatorium suffering from exhaustion, severe asthma, delusions of grandeur, and hallucinations in which the dead Camilo Cien- fuegos urged him to return to the armed struggle. Ebon points out that this supposed stay in the sanitarium would account for the time from March to June, 1965 which has never been accounted for in any other way. It seems fairly shaky procedure to accept the word of a man who hated Che on a number of levels as to his where abouts during this time; Escalante was fighting for his political life and was not above lying (he later would be tried and convicted by the Cuban government for conspiracy against the Revolution). The time, however, is still not accounted for, and even Ricardo Rojo, Che's friend, admits that it was a strange time. On May 19th Che's mother died after a brief, but intense struggle with cancer; at no time during her last days was the family able to make con tact with Che, nor was Che present at the funeral. Given Che's closeness to his mother, this would not have happened unless Che was somehow closed off from the world. Rojo refuses to see it as an enforced detention and likens it to an earlier experience: In April 1959, following Castro's trip through the United States, Che had gone through a similar experience. He thought Castro would compromise the course of the revolution by trusting the United States. He frankly told him so and immediately re tired to his house with his iron guard. 240 While Castro worked out the problem, Guevara and his friends remained confined and came out only when the head of the revolutionary government renounced his temptation.24 Whatever the circumstances of Che's disappearance, the result was a clean break with the Cuban revolution. Che decided, or was forced to decide (depending on what you believe), to leave Cuba, to free Cuba of responsibility for his future actions, and to rejoin the armed struggle some where in the world. The evidence, while a bit sketchy, indicates that he first chose the Congo. In the Congo, Che and the Cubans with him served as instructors and advisers to the re bel troops under the leadership of Gaston Soumialet and Pierre Mulele. Their task was not an easy one, for they had to train il literate tribesmen to fight against President Tshombe's well-equipped European mercenaries.25 There was more to it than that, however, for the Congo struggle was also a struggle between the Chinese and the Soviets for leadership of the Third World. The Chinese were supporting the rebels, the Soviets were not, and thus Che's presence there caused the Soviets to put heavy pres sure on Fidel to pull him out. Finally, even though Che had tried to avoid his identification with Cuba and all the problems that entailed for him, he returned to Cuba with two personal envoys sent by Fidel Che had refused to leave when he had first received the word from Cuba. Once more Che was isolated from the public in Cuba, and once more he would leave, but Bolivia would be the last time. November 7, 1966: "A new stage begins t o d a y . " 2 6 This is the first line of the first entry in Che's Bolivian diaries. If we accept their authenticity (which I do) we have the whole story of the Bolivian campaign as seen through Che's eyes. It is not necessary to go into detail about this campaign, but some points must be mentioned. 241 First, Bolivia was seen by Che as only a beginning of a series of guerrilla movements which would dot the face of Latin America. Second, there is good evidence to indicate that the internal strugglings of the various Latin American wings of the Communist party, combined with what may have been a conscious effort by the Soviet-line party to cause Che to fail was a significant factor in his failure. This involves the ambiguous figure of "Tania" and the question of where her ultimate loyalties lay. Third, and most im portantly, Che violated almost every major (and many minor) rule of guerrilla warfare rules he himself lay down in what has become the Latin American guerrilla's bible. Why he did this is obviously open to never-ending speculation, speculation better left to other places. James S. Allen in a Preface to a collection of Che's writings ends Che's story this way: Guerrilla Major Ernesto Che Guevara, on October 8, 1967, at the age of 39, was wounded in battle in the Bolivian mountains and taken prisoner. On the following day, in Quebrada del Yuro, he was murdered by the military tyrants, in the presence of CIA p e r s o n n e l .27 A truly strange and intriguing man had died. In a speech in memory of Che on October 18, 1967, Fidel said about this man: "If we wish to express what we want our children to be, we must say from our very hearts as ardent revolutionaries: 'We want them to be like Che!'"28 * * * PHILOSOPHY The basic underlying philosophy of the Cuban Revolu tion was a desire for change. A basic change sought in the 242 Cuban Revolution, and thus in the guerrilla warfare carried out by Che tinder the leadership of Fidel Castro, was the right of the peasants to own their land. By fighting for this goal the Revolution became continually more radical as time passed: the changes necessary to meet the needs of this basic philosophy would shatter the status quo. Che points out throughout his work that this philos ophy was always with them in Cuba. The men and women of the Rebel Army did not forget that their fundamental mission in the Sierra Maestra and elsewhere was the betterment of the peasantry and their incor poration in the struggle for land... In a revolutionary manner, the land was given to peasants. Great farms of Batista's advocates were occupied, and all state lands in the region were given to the peasants. We were now fully identified as a peasant movement closely bound to the land and with agrarian reform as our emblem.29 All this indicates that the guerrilla fighter will carry out his action in wild places of small population. Since in these places the struggle of the people for reforms is aimed primarily and almost exclusively at changing the social form of land ownership, the guer rilla fighter is above all an agrarian revolu tionary. He interprets the desires of the great peasant mass to be owners of land, own ers of their means of production, of their animals, of all that which they have long yearned to call their own, of that which constitutes their life and will also serve as their cemetery.30 The peasants' desire for land provides the revolu tionary with a base of support, but not necessarily with the catalyst to bring about armed revolt. And it is around the creation of catalytic agents or "subjective conditions" that Che's ideas still create controversy, for he felt that the guerrilla could create these subjective conditions. The objective conditions for the struggle are given in the hunger of the people, in the 243 reaction against this hunger, in the fear un leashed to check the popular reaction, and in the wave of hate that repression creates. Subjective conditions were missing in America - the most important being the consciousness of the possibility of victory through violent struggle against the imperialist powers and their internal allies. These conditions are created through armed struggle, which serves to make more clear the necessity of change (and permits it to be foreseen) and of the defeat and total liquidation of the army (an indispensable condition to every true revolu tion) by popular forces.31 Of course, not all the prerequisites for a revolution are going to be created solely by guerrillas. Certain minimum preconditions are needed to kindle the first spark. The people must be shown that social wrongs are not going to be redressed by civil means alone. And it is desirable to have the oppressor, wittingly or not, break the peace first.32 Out of the interplay of the many factors involved in Che's philosophy of guerrilla warfare comes a first tier of philosophical positions, built on the foundation of the peasants 1 land hunger. We believe that the Cuban revolution re vealed three fundamental conclusions about armed revolution in the Americas: 1. Popular forces can win a war against an army. 2. One does not necessarily have to wait for a revolutionary situation to arise; it can be created. 3. In the underdeveloped countries of the Americas, rural areas are the best battlefields for revolution.33 Much of Che's philosophy, however, was a product of, rather than a producer of, the Cuban Revolution; and Che is candid on this point. Fidel, Che, and the other leaders of the Revolution had vague ideas of a New Cuba but their im mediate goal was to somehow oust Batista. The process of doing this, however, helped them create a philosophy. This is a unique Revolution which some people 244 assert contradicts one of the most orthodox premises of the revolutionary movement ex pressed by Lenin: "Without a revolutionary theory, there is no revolutionary movement." It would be suitable to state that a revolu tionary theory, as the expression of a social truth, is beyond any enunciation of it, that is to say, the revolution can be made if the historical realities are inter preted correctly and if the forces involved are utilized correctly, even if the theory is not known. It is clear that an adequate understanding of the theory simplifies the task and prevents us from falling into dangerous errors as long as the theory cor responds to the reality. Besides, speaking concretely of this Revolution, it should be emphasized that the principal actors were not exactly what one might call theoreticians, but neither were they completely ignorant of the great social phenomena and the laws which control them. With some theoretical know ledge as a base and a profound understanding of reality, it was possible to create a revolutionary theory with the passing of t i m e . 3 4 It happens then (I am drawing on the Cuban experience and enlarging it) that a genuine interaction is produced between these lead ers, who with their acts teach the people the fundamental importance of the armed fight, and the people themselves who rise in rebellion and teach the leaders these prac tical necessities of which we speak. Thus, as a product of this interaction between the guerrilla fighter and his people, a progres sive radicalization appears which further accentuates the revolutionary characteristics of the movement and gives it a national s c o p e .35 Here ends the insurrection, but the men who arrived in Havana after two years of arduous struggle in the mountains and plains... were not ideologically the same men who land ed on the beaches...or who were incorporated in the first phase of the struggle. Their distrust of the peasant had been converted in to affection and respect for his virtues; their total lack of knowledge of life in the country had become a deep knowledge of the needs of our peasants. Their flirtations with statistics and with theory have been 245 nullified by p r a c t i c e .36 To arrive at this final idea of our goals, we traveled far and changed much. Parallel to the successive qualitative changes which took place on the battlefields, there occurred changes in the social composition of our guer rilla and ideological transformation in their leaders.37 Guerrilla warfare makes heavy demands on the individ ual and this affects his philosophical underpinnings. Thus, the individual has to be of a certain type, he must have a certain kind of personal philosophy. To the question as to what the guerrilla soldier should be like, the first answer is that he should preferably be an inhabitant of the zone. If this is the case, he will have friends who will help him; if he belongs to the zone itself, he will know it (and this knowledge of the ground is one of the most important factors in guerrilla warfare); and since he will be habituated to local pecul iarities he will be able to do better work, not to mention that he will add to all this the enthusiasm that arises from defending his own people and fighting to change a social regime that hurts his own w o r l d .38 1 do not know whether Camilo (Cienfuegos) was familiar with Danton's maxim: "De 1' audace. encore de 1'audace et toulours de 1' audace." But he lived it and brought to it additional qualities vital to the guerrilla: the gift of accurate and rapid analysis of a situation and of anticipating future prob lems. 39 To be a revolutionary doctor or to be a rev olutionary at all, there must first be a revolution. The isolated effort of one man, regardless of its purity of ideals, is worth less. If one works alone in some isolated comer...it makes no difference because one fights against advdrse governments and social conditions that prevent progress. To be use ful it is essential to make a revolution as we have done in Cuba, where the whole popu lation mobilizes and learns to use arms and fight together. Cubans have learned how much value there is in a weapon and in the 246 unity of the people. So today one has the right and the duty of being, above everything else, a revolutionary doctor, that is, a man who uses his professional knowledge to serve the Revolu tion and the people.40 But the problem remains posed. Is a Fidel Castro indispensable to a revolution? Within the framework of the Cuban Revolu tion, perhaps Fidel Castro was necessary to show the road, to demonstrate that it was possible to do what he did with his people. But if Fidel Castro was necessary to our revolution, more Fidels are not necessary for the other revolu tions! Yesterday the progressive movement was hunt ing with a magnifying glass for the exact moment when the "objective conditions" and the subjec tive conditions would coincide and provoke the revolution, without, however, ever finding it! Today, the danger is different - to start hunting with the same magnifying glass for a Fidel Castro! And what is lost in the second case is not something small, but political power, which must be the first task of the revolutionist. Until he has obtained it, he has done nothing.41 Che here speaks of four different kinds of men: the peas ant recruit; Camilo Cienfuegos - the equal of Che in his appeal to the masses until his death in a plane crash; him self - the revolutionary doctor; and Fidel. Che obviously saw himself in all four and would demand the qualities of each in his guerrillas. His comments on Castro indicate his seemingly mixed attitude toward him: on the one hand Che acknowledged Fidel's brillance, but on the other he needed to assert that Fidel was no longer "necessary" for more revolution— -but pexhaps Che was? One sore point with many people who desire change is Che's insistence on the necessity of armed struggle. Che was absolutely certain that this was the only way to true victory for the Revolution. When we speak of winning power via the elec toral process, our question is always the same: If a popular movement takes over the government 247 of a country by winning a wide popular vote and resolves as a consequence to initiate the great social transformations which make up the triump hant program, would it not come into conflict right away with the reactionary classes of that country? Has the army not always been the re pressive instrument of that class? If this is so, it is logical to suppose that this army will side with its class and enter the conflict against the new constituted government. By means of a coup d'etat, more or less bloodless, this government can be overthrown and the old game renewed again, which will seem never to end...What appears difficult to believe is that the armed forces would accept profound social reforms with good grace and peacefully resign themselves to their liquidation as a caste. Once a drive for change creates a guerrilla war the guerrillas must be organized. The nature of this organi zation is crucial to success, and it reflects the philoso phy it is based on in many ways. k k k ORGANIZATION The rural guerrilla movement involves a great many organizational components. The whole must work smoothly for it to succeed. Che realized this, and part of the victory in Cuba must be attributed to organizational skills. Structure Do not fix guerrilla organization. Tailor it to your needs.43 Food was distributed share and share alike. This is important, not only because the dis tribution of food is the one regular daily event, but also because the soldiers are sen sitive to fancied Injustices and displays of favoritism. Clothing was distributed by need, seniority, and individual merit; candy and tobacco as a common minimum, plus extras for hardship assignments. Distribution was made by specially appointed persons, prefer ably headquarters personnel. In general, headquarters fulfills the very important ad ministrative duty of coordination, and the most intelligent officers should be assigned there. However, they are not to receive any special treatment in regard to food.44 The distribution was made, the best arms being given to the best fighters, and we dismissed those men who had shown cowardice...45 Civil Administration Civil administration has to be set up within and outside guerrilla territory. Despite some differences, many of the functions on both these fronts overlap. Let us discuss guerrilla territory first. There, various administrative offices are to be organized. In Cuba, propaganda and public health (including hospitals) were under rebel- army control. Other civil functions were reg ulated and institutionalized by a (Judge ad vocate. These included finance, taxation, accounting, warehousing, civil law, and farmer organizations.46 Persons familiar with the law of the land and the needs of the area should be put in charge of the courts. In Cuba, we actually establish ed our own penal code, civil code, regulations for ^ypplying farmers, and agrarian-reform Outside guerrilla territory the functions differ. Propaganda should be of a broader educational nature stressing guerrilla vic tories, Tax collections must be conducted clandestinely by province, state, city or village finance committees. Taxes can be rendered inform of bonds or direct donations, and in the more advanced stages of war, direct taxes can be levied on industrialists. Sabotage activities are to be coordinated with the central command. Under special con ditions assassinations of individuals guilty of major repressive actions are permissible... Set up workers1 and farmers' organizations, supply them with literature, teach them the truth. Thus the masses will be won over and their most responsible people will join 249 in the fight.48 The council---or central department of justice, revolutionary laws, and administra tion- --is one of the vital features of a guerrilla army fully constituted and with territory of it® own. The council should be under the charge of an individual who knows the laws of the country; if he understands the necessities of the zone from a jurid ical point of view, this is better yet; he can proceed to prepare a series of decrees and regulations that help the peasant to normalize and institutionalize his life with in the rebel zone. For example, during our experience in the Cuban war we issued a penal code, a civil code, rules for supplying the peasantry and rules of the agrarian reform. Subsequently, the laws fixing qualifications of candidates in the elections that were to be held later throughout the country were established; also the Agrarian Reform Law of the Sierra Maestra. The council is likewise in charge of account ing operations for the guerrilla column or columns; it is responsible for handling money problems and at times intervenes directly in supply.49 Intelligence Daily and accurate intelligence about the enemy is vital. Espionage must be well plan ned, and well executed by carefully chosen men. Counterespionage is a constant danger, but poor intelligence whether exaggerating or understating— can also do great harm. Generally, men in combat will enhance and exaggerate the danger of the situation. It is not so difficult as it seems to find people to spy on the enemy: Businessmen, professionals, and even priests can be of help and give need ed information.50 Nothing helps the combat forces more than accurate intelligence. You can expect the local residents -to be a spontaneous source of in formation. But be sure to sort fact from fiction. As soon as post offices and mail deliveries can be set up within the guerrilla zone, try to get intelligence about the enemy. Use women to infiltrate the enemy camp. Use trained men and women to spread 250 rumors and sow confusion and fear among the enemy.51 One of the most important characteristics of guerrilla warfare is the notable differ ence between the information that reaches the rebel forces and the information possessed by the enemy. While the latter must operate in regions that are absolutely hostile, finding sullen silence on the part of the peasants, the rebels have in nearly every house a friend or even a relative; and news is passed about constantly through the liaison system until it reaches the central command of the guerrilla force or of the guerrilla group that is in the zone.52 Propaganda The ideas governing the revolution should be disseminated in depth. The propaganda effort should be well organized and carried out by two staffs: one for the nation as a whole, the other for the guerrilla forces. Both of these should be coordinated by one director. Spread national propaganda via periodicals, newspapers, radio, and special leaflets for farmers, workers, and enemy soldiers. Tell the truth about the guerrilla situation, ex plain aims, announce aid received, discuss necessary sabotage, proclaim slogans, denounce enemy crimes and criminals, etc. The most effective propaganda is carried on within the guerrilla zone. Supplement radio broadcasts and printed information with word-of-mouth instructions about air-raid defenses, enemy locations, etc. Information for foreign news sources should confine itself to facts about the war. Radio is the most effective propaganda channel, able to disseminate impassioned appeals all over the country. It can explain;* educate, and influence. Stick to the truth. Remember, a small truth well presented is far better than the most glittering lie. Broadcast fresh news of all battles, enemy terror, guerrilla doctrine, how-to-do-it instruction, and speech es by guerrilla leaders.53 Communications Liaison out to the most distant command or out to the most distant group of guerrilla fighters 251 ought to be Linked in such a way that messages will travel from one place to another via the most rapid system available in the region. This holds for regions of easy defense, that is to say, in favorable ground, as well as in un favorable ground. A guerrilla band operating in unfavorable ground will not be able to use modem systems of communication, such as telegraph, roads, etc., except some radios located in military garrisons capable of being defended. If these fall into the hands of the enemy force, it is necessary to change codes and frequencies, a task that is rather trouble some. 54 Furthermore, other means of communication may be established. One of these that is ex tremely important is the telephone. This can be strung in the forest with the convenience that arises from using trees for posts. There is the advantage that they are not visible to the enemy from above. The telephone also pre supposes a zone that the enemy cannot penetrate.55 Travel For the guerrilla the ability to travel rapidly, quietly, and with certainty is a major key to his success. In favorable terrain (rugged trackless areas) this can be come a problem. (Bolivia:) Loro sent word that he cannot for ward maps; the report he got was verbal and he will come tomorrow to give it.56 (Bolivia:) The latter made a new path before coming back; this path comes out on the river on some rocks and leads to the hill from the other side again on rocks; thus no tracks are left.57 Both of these examples from the Bolivian campaign indicate failures in Che's organization. He lacked accurate maps and seldom know precisely where he and his band were. His men spent huge amount of time hacking paths through dense undergrowth and climbing up and down steep cliffs that more often than not led to dead-ends. Indoctrination and Training In the beginning, the guerrilla soldier learns 252 hts craft on his own, through the very life he lives, and there is no such thing as guerrilla leader who has not gone through this daily self-training. A comrade may teach a soldier a little about the use of arms, combat tactics, how to deal with civilians, etc., but the precious time of the guerrilla should not be wasted on regular training courses. Later, after a sizable area has been liberated, re cruit schools can be set up. These schools will train new soldiers who have not experienced the hardships of the early guerrilla forces. Recruits get their own supplies and do their own housekeeping. They are toughened by com mando courses and long, arduous marches. The recruit centers have their own medical services. Stress rifle marksmanship and ammunition dis cipline. If enough ammunition is available, let the recruits practice with live ammunition.58 Since recruits join up with fuzzy concepts of liberty, freedom of the press, etc., they need indoctrination on guerrilla aims, economic factors and motivations of national history, national heroes, behavior in face of injustice, analysis of the current situation. Set up teacher-training centers and prepare textbooks for indoctrination. Encourage reading and sup ervise the choice of books. Above all, incul cate a reasoning, not a mechanical, self- discipline. This is the best assurance for success when the chips are down in combat. Gradually, standards are raised in the school and hence throughout the whole guerrilla f o r c e .59 ...he brought us eleven new recruits, all of them unarmed. We generally tried to prevent the enlistment of unarmed men...°0 (Bolivia:) A sham battle was carried out which resulted in disappointment on certain points; but, in general, it went well. We must do some work on retreat, which was the weakest point of the exercise.61 Discipline Discipline is necessary. It must be based on reason and personal conviction. Breach of discipline must be punished drastically and painfully. A guardhouse sentence may merely seem like a much-desired rest to a soldier, a period in which he can eat to his heart's con- tent, without inarches, work, or guard duty, with plenty of sleep and leisure time. There fore, deprivation of liberty does not have the ddsired results and is not recommended. But deprivation of the right to carry arms will work in the case of a highly motivated individual."2 In the forces directly under my command, I introduced arrest with deprivation of candy and Cigarettes (for light offenders), and total deprivation of food (for serious offenders). The results were wonderful, but the punishment able only under He (Fidel) also announced the three crimes punishable by death: insubordination, deser tion and defeatism. There are distinct forms of discipline but, fundamentally, there is an external discipline and an internal discipline."5 As an area is taken over, the guerrillas can move about more freely. They must always pay for supplies obtained from friendly sources whether agricultural products or manufactured goods... If lack of funds necessitates the confiscation of goods, issue IOU's. Repay all debts as soon as possible. In liberated areas, the rural population may work the fields for the guerrilla forces and guarantee them adequate, permanent sources of supplies. If necessary, the guerrillas may help the peasants work the fields. Later, they can collect all farm out put for redistribution to local residents, after meeting their own needs. Taxes may be imposed to assist the guerrilla treasury. These should be as light as possible, especially for the small landholder.®6 Taxes can be collected either in cash or in goods. Meat is a vital commodity whose product ion must be safeguarded. Farmers should be ask ed to breed chickens, goats, and hogs---obtained either through purchase or confiscation. Large herds roaming uncultivated areas can be killed and their meat preserved for future use. Their hides should be tanned and used for shoes. Supplies 'should be moved during the night and stored during daytime. Only those directly Supply. 254 involved in the movement of supplies are to know the storage points. Even those living in houses used for storage should learn as little as pos sible about the supply lines* Mules can be used for movement. They are hardy and untiring, and a single animal can carry a load of 220 pounds. They should be well shod and driven by experienc ed men. Under good conditions, trucks can also be used at night.67 We were devoting our time to making contact with peasants who could serve as links and who could maintain permanent encampments as centers of contact with the whole region, which was growing in size. Thus we located houses which we used as supply centers for our troops, and there we installed warehouses from which we drew supplies according to our needs. These places also served as rest stops for the fast stage coaches who moved along the edge of the Maestra from one place to another carrying messages and news.68 Industries We moved from an experimental state to a con structive one, from trials to definite deeds. Immediately we initiated "small industries" in the Sierra Maestra: Like our ancestors, we moved from nomadic life into a settled life; we created centers of production in accord with our most basic needs. Shoe and weapons shops appear ed and we began to build land mines from the bombs which Batista dropped on us.69 In this way we were able to install a shoe fac tory and a saddlery, an armory with an electric lathe, a tinshop and smithy for the purpose, among other things, of making small metal gre* nades to be fired from a gun, an invention of ours....We also built schools, recreation areas and ovens, to bake bread. Later on, the Radio Rebelde transmitter was installed, and our first clandestine newspaper with the same name as the Mambi newspaper of the wars of 1863 and 1895, El Cubano Libre, was published.70 The first manufacturing efforts should therefore be directed toward these objectives. Shoe factories can initially be cobbler in stallations that replace half-soles on old shoes, expanding afterwards into a series of organized factories with a good average daily production of shoes. The manufacture of powder 255 is fairly simple; and much can be accomplished by having a small laboratory and bringing in the necessary materials from outside.71 Connected with the shoe repair works there ought always to be a shop making all classes of canvas and leather goods for use by the troop, such as cartridge belts and knapsacks. Although these articles are not vital, they contribute to comfort and give a feeling of autonomy, of adequate supply, and of self- reliance to the troop.72 This psychological component of guerrilla industries should not be overlooked in estimating their total value to the effort: they are tangible reinforcement of confidence. Personal Equipment The guerrilla fighter is a soldier who, like a snail, carries his home upon his shoulders, and therefore his pack must contain the smallest quantity of items of the greatest possible utility. He must carry only essential articles and guard them against l o s s .73 The ease with which the guerrilla carries out his tasks and adjusts to his environment depends upon his equipment. For us in Cuba, essential gear included hammock, nylon rain cloth, blanket, jacket, pants, shirt, shoes, canvas back-pack, and food such as butter or oil, canned goods, preserved fish, condensed or powdered milk, sugar, and salt. The ham mock was the key to a good night's sleep. String it between two trees under the nylon rain cloth, which can be draped over a single line between the same trees and held out by four corner lines to the earth. A blanket is indispensable, for it gets very cold in the mountains. Dress consists of work shirt and work trousers, matching or not. Shoes must be sturdy. They are among the most important articles of clothing. If at all possible, each soldier should have an extra pair. Nonessentials included: mess plate, spoon, all-purpose knife, rifle oil, cleaning rod and patches, a good cartridge belt that will not lose ammunition, canteen, medical kit, tobacco, matches, and soap. Also useful were: compass, extra nylon rain cloth, change of clothes, pants, underwear, towel, toothbrush and paste, 256 reading books (such as biographies of heroes, history, and economic geography), machete, bottle of gasoline or piece of resinous wood to ignite damp firewood, notebook, pen or pencil, piece of rope, and sewing kit.'^- Logistical Flexibility Che makes a distinction in his work between unfavor able and favorable terrain, and the manner of supply, the kind of communication, and the type of industry differ be tween the two types. The size of the guerrilla band also makes a difference in organizational matters. Supply in open country (unfavorable terrain) is much easier because the inhabitants are more numerous. Hammocks, blankets, waterproof wrap ping, mosquito netting, shoes, medicine, and food can be readily obtained through loyal ci vilians and ordinary stores. If the group is small, it will not be too difficult to get meals. Communications will be fairly easy with re spect to contacting and moving about greater numbers of men. But it will be much harder to relay safely a message to a distant point, be cause the security risk multiplies with the number of handlers. Oral messages, after being repeated too often, get distorted; therefore it is better to use written messages in code. In view of the above-mentioned reasons, industrial activities on the part of guerrillas, such as the manufacture of shoe soles or weap ons, will not be possible. At best, the sit- utation will permit the establishment of small, well-concealed workshops for making cartridges, mines, and other detonating devices---vriiatever seems most vital at a given moment.75 Because of the size of our group, our cook ing now had to be done separately by each squad. Food medicines, and ammunition were dis tributed by squads. In most all the squads, and certainly in all the platoons, there were veterans who showed the new men how to cook, how best to use the food; they also taught them how to pack their knapsacks, and how best to march through the Sierra.76 Medical Care The doctor's role in guerrilla life is a highly 257 important one. Not only does he save lives; but he strengthens the morale of the sick and wound ed. Guerrilla medical care ranges from the simple front-line doctor, often bearing arms, to the doctor enjoying staff and hospital facilities. In all phases, he must possess a keen apprecia tion of revolutionary aims. Proper moral sup port is often a vital part of successful treat ment. An ordinary aspirin administered by a sympathetic, understanding man can mean a great deal to a suffering soldier. In the "seminomad" phase of guerrilla warfare, temporary medical stations where emergency surgery can be perform ed can be set up in friendly households. In the advance phase, regular hospitals equipped with laboratories, diagnostic facilities, and X-ray equipment can be established.77 Among medicines, those of general use should be carried: for example, penicillin or some other type of antibiotic, preferably the types taken orally, carefully closed; medicines for lower ing fever, such as aspirins and others adapted to treating the endemic diseases of the area. These may be tablets against malaria, sulfas for diarrhea, medicines against parasites of all types; in other words, fit the medicine to the characteristics of the region. It is ad visable in places where there are poisonous animals to carry appropriate injections. Sur gical instruments will complete the medical equipment. Small personal items for taking care of less important injuries should also be included.78 Fortifications and Camps In places where permanent encampments are established, the defenses ought to be improved constantly. Remember that in a mountainous zone on ground carefully ehosen, the only heavy arm that is effective is the mortar. Using roofs reinforced with materials from the region, such as wood, rocks, etc., it is possible to make good refuges which are difficult for the enemy forces to approach and which will afford protection from mortar shells for the guerrilla forces.79 Another mission of these persons is to prevent the lighting of fires in places visible from a distance or that raise columns of smoke before 258 nightfall; also to see that the camp is kept clean and that it is left in such a condition when the column leaves as to show no signs of passage, if this is necessary. Great care must be taken with fires which leave traces for a long time. They must be covered with earth; papers, cans, and scraps of food should also be burned.80 Weapons A good set of weapons for a band of twenty- five men would be ten to fifteen single-shot rifles and approximately ten automatic weapons, such as the Garand, sub-machine guns, the Browning automatic rifle, the modem Belgian FAL, or the U.S. M-14. Heavy arms, aviation, cannons, and tanks have little utility value in the type of terrain that is favorable for guerrilla warfare.81 Because of its ease of transport and operation, the bazooka is a very useful weapon, replacing anti-tank rifle grenades against armored vehicles, troop-carrying trucks, or pillboxes. Make each shot count, for on the march a man can carry a maximum of only three rockets.82 For sabotage he needs good saws, lots of dynamite, picks and shovels, railway crow bars— -all items that can be easily hidden, yet easily gotten to when needed.83 A Molotov cocktail (gasoline-filled coke bottle) is a great help and, if beyond arm's throw, use an "M-16". This is what we called a special contraption we rigged up from a shot gun; it was made of a cartridge witbalong wooden rod substituted for projectile, and the cocktail fastened on the forward end of the rod. Using a simple bipod of two sticks, we attained sur prising accuracy and effectiveness up to 100 meters. It is an ideal weapon for attacking an enemy's inflammable installations and also makes an effective antitank w e a p o n .84 Remote-control mines are the most efficient, but their manufacture requires a degree of technical skill that is not always available. Contact mines, fuses, and electrically wired mines are highly useful and particularly dif ficult to breach in mountainous areas. Also, conventional tank traps are excellent for stop 259 ping mechanized forces, expecially when the vehicles are buttoned up or used at night.85 Mined areas constitute a grave danger for the enemy; large areas can be mined for simultane ous explosion, destroying up to hundreds of men.86 Relations With the Local Populace To attain the stature of a true crusader, the guerrilla must display impeccable moral conduct and strict self-control. He must be an ascetic. At first, he will not stress social reform, acting more as a big brother to the poor farmer in matters of technology, economics, morals and culture. He does not steal; if he cannot pay, he leaves IOU's. He bothers the rich as little as possible. Then, little by little, the issues sharpen, people are forced to take sides, and conflict breaks out. At this point, the guerrilla emerges as the people's standard-bearer, just ly punishing any betrayal of the cause, taking from the rich, and giving to the poor. If the owner wants payment, he gives him bonds. These "bonds of hope" bind old and new owner to a common hope for the success of the cause. Whenever there is a particularly juicy plum to be handed out, he tries to set it up as a people's collective, if the popular mentality is ready for this. The guerrilla provides ideology for social reform by personal example - by his ideas, his plans, and lessons from experience. He stress es the force of arms and spiritual dedication. Guerrilla leaders are not men bowed down by daily farm labor. They are men who see the need for agrarian social reform and team up with the people for this goal. First, they personally set the example of armed rebellion. Then, the people get the idea and carry it for ward with practical improvements, thus snow balling it into nationwide rebellion.®' At that period I had to perform my duties as a doctor and in each little village I set up my consulting station,88 Relations With the Citv In the Cuban Revolution the city and its mentality were characterized by the term "Llano" (plain), while the 260 rural area and Its mentality were known as the "Sierra" (mountain). To Che, moral superiority and the arena for decisive action both lay in the Sierra. Full liaison between the Llano and the Sierra was always lacking, due to two fundamental factors: the geographical isolation of the Sierra, and tactical and strategic divergencies between the two groups.88 The Sierra was already confident of being able to carry out the guerrilla struggle, to spread it to other places and thus, from the country side, to encircle the cities held by the dic tatorship; by strangulation and attrition to provoke the breakup of the regime. The Llano took an ostensibly more revolutionary position, that of armed struggle in all the towns, cul minating in a general strike which would top ple Batista and allow the prompt taking of power. This position was only apparently more revolutionary, because in that period the political development of the Llano comrades was incomplete and their conception of a general strike was too narrow. A general strike was called on April 9 of the following year, secretly, without warning, without prior polit ical preparation or mass action. It ended in defeat. Che did not, however, write off the Llano, he simply saw it as a lesser arena to be completely controlled by the Sierra. The increasing number of attacks on cotn- munciations made the situation of Las Villas a very critical one. On arrival, we instituted a complete new system of urban struggle: on each march we took with us some of the best among the city milicianos to a training camp where they were taught sabotage tactics. This bore fasuit in the suburban areas. (Bolivia:) "Instructions for Cadres Who Work in Urban Areas" The formation of a supporting network of the kind that we want should be guided by a series of norms, a generalization of which follows. Action will be fundamentally underground but it will alternate with certain kinds of 261 work in which contact with individuals or or ganizations will be necessary, thus forcing certain cadres to come out into the open. This demands strict sectioning off, isolating every front engaged in this work... Every organized network will have at least the following officials the chief and a person in charge of each of the following: I. supplies II. transportation III. information IV. finances V. urban action VI. contacts with sympathizers^ The organization of a guerrilla movement is risky business, and Che knew this. For those starting out he gave this advice: Absolutely nobody must learn anything beyond his immediate concern. Never discuss plans with anyone. Check incoming and outgoing mail. Know what contact each member has. Work and live in teams, never individually. Trust no one beyond the nucleus, especially not women. The enemy willuundoubtedly try to use women for espionage. The revolutionary secretly preparing for war must be an ascetic and per fectly disciplined. Anyone who repeatedly defies the orders of his superiors and makes contact with women and other outsiders, how ever innocuous, must be expelled immediately for violation of revolutionary discipline.93 If this type of organization---with its ascetic and disciplined members were coupled with a good strategy, victory would be probable. Thus, the next step is to for mulate such a strategy. STRATEGY Che defined strategy is his own way, and this defini tion can provide us with a point of departure in consider- 262 ing the broad general lines of action he proposed for the guerrilla in his struggle. In guerrilla terminology, strategy means the analysis of the objectives we wish to attain. First, determine how the enemy will operate, his manpower, mobility, popular support, weap ons, and leadership. Then plan a strategy to best confront these factors, always keeping in mind that the final objective is to destroy the enemy army. Once this study is made, the objectives evaluated and analyzed, it is necessary to pro ceed with planning of measures for attainment of the final objective. These plans will have to be made in advance, but they will be chang ed as needed during the fighting and adapted to any unforeseen circumstances that may a r i s e .94 The basic goal which enables movement toward other goals of'the guerrilla is the seizure of power, abo&t that there can be no quibbling. What to do with that power can be debated, but for Che that debate was pointless since his underlying philosophy (a peasant-oriented Revolution) an swered any questions. To attain power required both flex ibility and certain inflexible basic rules. There are no unalterable tactical and strategic objectives. Sometimes tactical objectives attain strategic importance, and other times strategic objectives become merely tactical elements. The thorough study of the relative importance of each element permits the full utilization, by the revolutionary forces, of all of the facts and circumstances leading up to the great and final strategic objective: the takingoof p o w e r .95 I limited myself to recommending strongly these three things: constant movement, ab solute mistrust, and eternal vigilance, Movement: that is, never stay put; never spend two nights in the same place; never stop moving from one place to another. Mis trust: at the beginning, mistrust even your own shadow, friendly peasants, informants, guides, contacts; mistrust everything until you hold a liberated zone. Vigilance: con stant guard duty, constant reconnaissance; 263 establishment of a camp in a safe place and, above all, never sleep beneath a roof, never sleep in a house where you can be surrounded, this was the synthesis of our guerrilla ex perience, the only thing along with a warm handshake---which I could give to my friend.96 Within these strategic parameters another strategy involved the support of the peasants; even though the rev olution, by definition, was their Revolution their active support was crucial to the guerrilla's success and had to be actively sought. The peasants who had to endure the perse cution of Batista's military units gradually began to participate in our guerrilla units. In this way our rank and file changed from city people to peasants. At that same time, as the peasants began to participate in the armed struggle for freedom of rights and social justice, we put forth a correct slogan---land reform. This slogan mobilized the oppressed Cuban masses to come forward and fight to seize the land. From this time on the first great social plan was deter mined, and it later became the banner and primary spearhead of our movement.97 Popular support is indispensable. Let us con sider the example of robber bands that roam a certain region. They possess all the charac teristics of a guerrilla band— -homogeneity, respect for their leader, bravery, familiarity with the terrain, and frequently even thorough understanding of tactics. They lack only one thing: the support of the people. And in evitably, these bands are caught and wiped out by police forces.98 (Bolivia:) On another plane: the isola tion continues to be complete....The peasant base has not yet been developed although it appears that through planned terror we can neutralize some of them; support will come later. Not one enlistment has been obtained...99 The necessity of mass support for the success of the guerrilla brings about a consciousness that acts are not only military but political as well. This is one of the 264 distinguishing attributes of the guerrilla: he is a polit ical/military person. If the military situation will be dif ficult from the very first moment, the po litical situation will be just as delicate; if a single military error can liquidate the guerrilla, a political error can hold back its development for long periods. The struggle is politico-military and as such it must be developed and understood.100 And this political skill is vital in retaining the support of the peasants when the established powers bring pressure to bear. The regime responded with all its brutality, and there were mass assassinations of peas ants. Terror was unleashed in the rustic valleys of the Sierra Maestra and the peas ants withdrew their aid; a barrier of mutu al mistrust loomed up between them and the guerrllleros. the former out of fear of reprisals, the latter out of fear of be trayal by the fearful. Our policy, never theless, was a just and understanding one, and the guaiiro population began to return to their earlier relationship with our cause.101 The peasants returned to their abandoned plots of land; they stopped the slaughter of their animals, saving them for worse days; they became used to the savage machine gunn ing, and each family built its own shelter. They also accustomed themselves to periodic fights from the battle zones, with family, cattle, and household goods, leaving only their bohlos for the enemy, which displayed its wrath by burning them to the ground. They accustomed themselves to rebuilding on the smoking ruins of their old dwellings, uncomplaining but with concentrated hatred and the will to conquer.102 Striving for power, building support among the masses, organizing for battle, the guerrilla band passes through stages of growth which can be viewed as strategic steps in its development into an entity capable of overthrowing the established power structure in open war. Che learned these 265 steps, and there concomitant strategies, well in Cuba. At the outset, the essential task of the guerrilla fighter is to keep himself from being destroyed. Little by little it will be easier for the members of the guerrilla band or bands to adapt themselves to their form of life and to make flight and escape from the forces that are on the offensive an easy task, because it is performed daily. When this condition is reached, the guerrilla, having taken up inaccessible positions out of reach of the enemy, or having assembled forces that deter the enemy from attacking, ought to pro ceed to the gradual weakening of the enemy.103 The blows should be continuous. The enemy soldier in a zone of operations ought not to be allowed to sleep; his outposts ought to be attacked and liquidated system atically. At every moment the impression ought to be created that he is surrounded by a complete circle.104 In order to do all this the absolute cooper ation of the people and a perfect knowledge of the ground is necessary... Therefore, along with centers for study of present and future zones of operations, intensive popu lar work must be undertaken to explain the motives of the revolution, its ends, and to spread the incontrovertible truth that vic tory of the enemy against the people is finally impossible.*05 When the guerrilla band has reached a respectable power in arms and in number of combatants, it ought to proceed to the formation of new columns. This is an act similar to that of the beehive when at a given moment it releases a new queen, who goes to another region with a part of the swarm. The mother hive with the most nota ble guerilla chief will stay in the less dangerous places, while the new columns will penetrate other enemy territories following the cycle already described.106 Guerrilla war or war of liberation will generally have three stages: First, the strategic defensive when the small force nibbles at the enemy and runs; it is not sheltered to make a passive defense within a 266 small circumference but rather its defense consists of the limited attacks which it can strike successfully. After this comes a state of equilibrium in which the possibil ities of action on both sides---the enemy and the guerrillas— -are established. Finally, the last stage consists of over running the repressive army leading to the capture of the big cities, large-scale decisive encounters, and at last the com plete annihilation of the enemy.107 At this point the guerrillas are ready to do battle on the enemy's ground. In Cuba this meant moving down from the Sierra onto the Llano. After this campaign the Rebel Army be gan to prepare to move down to the plains. This attack had strategic significance and psychological influence because at that time our weapons could in no way be compared to those of the dictatorial government either in quality or quantity. In this fight we had the best ally there is, but one that is hard to estimate the people.108 The guerrilla war now comes to resemble conventional war, the warfare of columns and positions. After reaching a state of equilibrium when both sides respect each other and as the war's development continues, the guer rilla war acquires new characteristics. The concept of maneuver is introduced: large columns which attack strong points; mobile warfare with the shifting of forces and means of attack of relative potential. But due to the capacity for resistance and counterattack that the enemy still has, this war of maneuver does not replace guer rilla fighting; rather, it is only one form of action taken by the guerrillas until that time when they crystallise Into a people*8 army with an army corps. Even at this moment the guerrilla, marching ahead of the action of the main forces, will play the role of its first stage, destroying communications and sabotaging the whole defensive apparatus of the enemy.109 In Cuba, according to Che, the Sierra and the Llano employed different strategies, with different results. It was at just this time that a tragedy occurred In Santiago de Cuba; our comrade Frank Pals was killed. This produced a turning point In our revolutionary movement. The enraged people of Santiago on their own poured into the streets and called forth the first politically oriented general strike. Even though the strike did not have a leader, it paralyzed the whole of Oriente Province. The dictatorial government sup pressed the incident. This movement, how ever, caused us to understand that working class participation in the struggle to achieve freedom was absolutely essential! We then began to carry out secret work among the workers, in preparation for another general strike, to help the Rebel Army seize the government.110 But the strike failed because of a lack of contact between the leaders and the working masses. Experience taught the leaders of the 26th of July Movement a valuable truth: The Revolution must not belong to this or that specific clique---it must be the under taking of the whole body of the Cuban people.Ill The sierra was ready to engage the army as often as necessary...and to arrive one day at the total seizure of power with the Rebel Army as a foundation. The llano favored generalized armed struggle through out the country, culminating in a revolu tionary general strike that would expel the Batista dictatorship and establish a government of ' ’civilians," converting the new army into an apolitical institution. The clash between these theses was continuous and did not facilitate the unity of command necessary at such moments. The April strike was prepared and ordered by the llano with the consent of the sierra leadership---which did not consider itself able to prevent it, even though it had se rious doubts on its outcome...H 2 These differences were deeper than tac tical discrepancies: The Rebel Army was already ideologically proletarian and thought as a dispossessed class; the urban 268 leadership remained petty bourgeois, with fu ture traitors among its leaders and greatly Influenced by the milieu in which it develop ed. It was a minor struggle for internal con trol in the framework of the great struggle for power. The revolutionary wing did not allow itself to be displaced from power and struggled to conquer all power. The Rebel Army is the genuine representative of the triumphant Revolution.H3 (Bolivia:) The mass struggle in the under developed countries, with a large peasant population and extensive land area, must be undertaken by a small mobile vanguard, the guerrillas, extablished within the people. This organization will grow stronger at the cost of the enemy and will serve as the catalyzing agent for the revolutionary fervor of the masses until a revolutionary situation is created in which state power will crumble under a single effective blow, dealt at the right moment. Understand this well: Thisis not a call to total inactivity, but rather a recommendation not to risk forces in any action where success is not guaranteed. But the working masses must, at all times, exert pressure on the government because this is a class struggle without limited fronts. Wherever there is a proletarian, he is under the obligation to struggle within the limit of his power against the common enemy. H4 The change in Che's thinking is obvious; and the strategic implications are just as obvious: the Revolution must be controlled by the rural guerrillas. The guerrilla's use of violence serves two strategic purposes: it weakens the established power structure and it brings about repression which crystallizes the situation for the peasant population. It also meets the demands of a philosophy which rules out the possibility of true revolu tion by any other means. Now, the guerrilla can begin a campaign of attrition, first in the places nearest anti guerrilla activity, then deep into the enemy's 269 territory to attack his communications, har ass his bases, and lash out in every con ceivable way.115 The dictatorship tries to function without resorting to force. Thus, we must try to oblige the dictatorship to resort to vio lence, thereby unmasking its true nature as the dictatorship of the reactionary social classes. This event will deepen the strug gle to such an extent that there will be no retreat from it. The performance of the people's forces depends on the task of forcing the dictatorship to a decision--- to retreat or unleash the struggle this beginning the stage of long range armed action. The great lesson of the invincibility of the guerrillas will take root in the dispossess ed masses: the galvanizing national spirit, preparation for harder tasks, for resisting e«en more violent repression; hatred as an element of struggle, relentless hatred of the enemy that impels us over and beyond the natural limitations of man and transforms us into effective, violent, selective and cold killing machines. Our soldiers must be thus; a people without hatred cannot vanquish a brutal enemy. We must carry the war as far as the enemy carries it to his home, to his centers of entertainment, in a total war. It is necessary to prevent him from having a moment of peace, a quiet moment out side his barracks or even inside; we must attack him wherever he may be, make him feel like a cornered beast wherever he may move. Then his morale will begin to fall. He will become still more savage, but we shall see the signs of decadence begin to appear.117 The guerrilla labors under obvious constraints: he is a poorly equipped soldier living a surreptious life in a hostile environment seeking to cut up an established power structure. This situation demands certain strategic con siderations. In the case of weapons, consider how they are to be used, the realistic value of such items as tanks and airplanes in guerrilla war fare, the enemy's small arms, ammunition, his 270 customs, etc. Keep in mind that the guerril la's most important source of supply is the enemy himself. So if there is a choice, use the same type of weapons, because the great est danger lies in running out of ammunition-- an item that must be captured from the ene my . 118 "Hit and run" some call this scornfully, and this is accurate. Hit and run, wait, lie in ambush, again hit and run, and thus re peatedly, without giving any rest to the enemy. There is in all this, it would appear, a negative quality, an attitude of retreat^ of avoiding rrontal fights. However, this is consequent upon the general strategy of guer rilla warfare, which is the same in its ul timate end as is any warfare: to win, to annihilate the enemy. Thus it is clear that guerrilla warfare is a phase that does not afford in itself opportunities to arrive at complete victory. It is one of the initial phases of warfare and will develop continuously until the guerrilla army in its steady growth acquires the characteristics of a regular army. At that moment it will be ready to deal final blows to the enemy and to achieve victory. Triumph will always be the product of a regular army, even though its origins are in a guerrilla army.119 When the regiments attacking the Sierra Maestra had been liquidated and the normal front restored, with the effectiveness and morale of our troops heightened, it was decided to begin the march to Las Villas, the central province. In the military order sent us, the principal strategic plan in dicated was the systematic cutting of com munications between the two extremes of the island. Further, I was ordered to estab lish relations with all political groups in the mountainous regions of that area and I was given ample powers to govern the zone under my military command.120 Following the victory in Cuba and with high hopes of victory in other countries, Che extrapolated from the Cuban theory toward a strategy for worldwide revolution. It is, essentially, the guerrilla strategy on a global scale. 271 Our aspirations to victory may be summed up: total destruction ofimperialism by elim inating its firmest bulwark---imperialist domination by the United States of America; carrying out, as a tactical method, the gradual liberation of the peoples, one by one or in groups; forcing the enemy into a difficult fight far from its own territory; liquidation of all of its sustaining bases, that is its dependent t erri t o ri e s .121 To achieve these strategic ends Che proposed a varie ty of tactics. These are the operations that, in the final analysis, bring people into battle and thus win or lose wars. * * * TACTICS Tactics involve many specifics and a lot of flexibil ity. Che wrote on tactics from a number of angles which are important to the guerrilla. In military language, tactics are the practi cal methods of achieving the grand strategic objectives. In one sense they complement strategy and in another they are more specific rules within, it. As a means, tactics are much more variable, much more flexible than the final objectives, and they should be adjust ed continually during the struggle. There are tactical objectives that remain constant throughout a war and others that vary. The first thing to be considered is the adjust ing of guerrilla action to the action of the enemy. The fundamental characteristic of the guerrilla band is mobility.122 Another fundamental characteristic of the guerrilla soldier is his flexibility, his ability to adapt himself to all circumstances, and to convert to his service all of the acci 272 dents of the action. Against the rigidity of classical methods of fighting, the guerrilla fighter invents his own tactics at every min ute of the fight and constantly surprises the enemy.I23 In these cases the essential elements of guer rilla tactics must always be kept in mind. These are: perfect knowledge of the ground; surveillance and foresight as to the lines of escape; vigilance over all the secondary roads that can bring support to the point of attack; intimacy with people in the zone so as to have sure help from them in respect to supplies, transport, and temporary or permanent hiding places if it becomes necessary to leave wound ed companions behind; numerical superiority at a chosen point of action; total mobility: and the possibility of counting on reserves.124 For all these attacks surprise is funda mental because, at least at the moment of fir ing the first shot, it is one of the basic requirements of guerrilla warfare. Surprise is not possible if the peasants of the zone know of the presence of the insurgent army. For this reason all movements of attack should be made at night. Only men of proven discretion and loyalty can know of these movements and establish the contacts. The march should be made with knapsacks full of food, in order to be able to live two. three, or four days in the places of a m b u s h . 125 These general tactics have specific applications in the three geographic environments Che saw for the guerrilla band. Favorable Terrain Contact with the enemy is important. If the region is completely inaccessible to an or ganized army, the guerrillas should advance to areas where they can engage the enemy in combat. With a naturally well-protected refuge, guerrillas can come out to fight in the day as well as night, they are less restrained by enemy land and air observation, they can wage battle with fewer men and for longer duration, and hostile reinforcements can be held off. Needless to say, the guerrilla must con stantly guard all avenues of approach, but this should not deter him from aggressive action.126 ...the relative ease (in favorable terrain) of establishing, free from enemy interfer ence, service activities such as hospitals, training centers, supply dumps, propaganda mills, etc. Moreover, the entire guerrilla force can be better integrated between figh ters and service forces, trainees and veter ans, etc.127 The band's radius of action usually is five or six hours, determined by the number of hours of darkness available to leave pro tected ground, reach the point of action, and return.128 Unfavorable Terrain To wage guerrilla warfare in more or less open country, all the regular principles have to be followed with even more skill and in tensity. The maximum possible mobility is required. Strike lightning-swift blows, preferably at night. Withdraw in a differ ent direction. During the night a man can march 20 to 25 miles. This can be stretched into the early hours of daybreak if the area is not closely guarded and one can risk being seen by the local inhabitants. Introduce variety on the routine, so as not to invite pre arranged ambush. Since shock, not sustained attack is the key to fighting in:, open country, emphasize automatic weapons. At night, especially, it is not marksmanship, but concentration of fire at a short distance that will annihilate the enemy.129 A good number of men for a guerrilla band fighting inwOpen country is ten or fif teen at the most. This number provides good mutual support, presents a formidable front when fires are massed, yet can readily scatter and hide itself when necessary, and the danger of detection when encamped is not too great. Bear in mind that the march rate of a guerrilla force is determined by its slowest member.130 The plains guerrilla must be a swift runner, and it is in open country that hit-and-run tactics reach their fullest expression.131 For major attacks, guerrillas can be mas sed, but immediately thereafter they must withdraw in small, widely dispersed groups. Virtual armies can be organized under a single command without actually merging the various groups. The secret is to be sure to elect the right chief for each band, one who, ideologically and personally, will work well with the maximum leader of the zone.132 BuiIt-u p Areas If it should happen that the battle is pur sued right up to the outskirts of a city and seems to lodge there with some permanency, special procedures will bee:required. But first let it be stated that a guer rilla band never arises by itself in a sub urban area. Such a band will form only when a favorable environment has been created by others, and the band will always be under direct orders of superiors situated outside... In other words, a suburban band will not be able to choose between knocking down tele phone poles or ambushing patrolling soldiers; it will do exactly as told. If its job is to cut telephone poles, electric cableways, sewerage lines, water conduits, or railways, it will confine itself to do just these things, and do them to perfection. Such a band should not number more than four or five men. This is important because the suburban guerrilla is working in excep tionally unfavorable terrain, where the risks and consequences of exposure are tremendous. There is only little distance between the guerrilla's point of action and his refuge, so night action must predominate. He does not emerge into the open until the insurgents besiege the city. Essential qualities of the suburban guer rilla are ‘ discipline, probably to a degree unexcelled by any other, and discretion. He does not count on more than two or three friendly houses where he can get fed, since encirclement inside a house would be fatal. His only armament is a small, easily con cealed personal weapon that will not hamper 275 him while running. His action is limited to surprising one or two enemey troops or carry ing out sabotage on order.133 Combat is the reason-for-being of the guerrilla band. Combat is the climax of guerrilla life. Though each individual encounter may be only of brief duration, each battle is a profound emotional experience for the g u e r r i l l a .134 But combat is also the hardest part of guerrilla warfare to categorize. An attempt can be made, but the flexibility of tactics, the need to innovate on the spot, and the many uses to which one example can be applied must be stressed beforehand. Attack The guerrilla's numerical inferiority makes it necessary always to attack by sur prise, permitting him to inflict dispropor tionate losses upon the enemy. Such an advantage is indispensable, because with equal casualties on both sides, the numer ically inferior guerrilla band would be wiped out much sooner than the more numer ous e n e m y .135 The way a guerrilla army attacks also is different: a sudden, surprise, furious, relentless attack; then abruptly, total pas sivity. The survivors think things have re turned to normal, when suddenly a fresh blow lands from a new direction. An unexpected lightning blow is what counts! 136 Even though surrounded, a well-dug-in enemy with powerful weapons is poor prey. Therefore, the guerrillas make their main effort against rescue columns. Busily mov ing, ignorant of the terrain, apprehensive of everything, and without natural defensive protection, a rescue column is easy prey. It can be taken by surprise at two or three points, sliced in pieces, and— if not com pletely annihilated---left without hope of catching the withdrawing attacker.137 Before launching an attack, drop packs and make a reliable reconnaissance. If the attack is made against a fortified position only to lure in reinforcements to be ambush ed, the commander must be quickly and constant ly informed of all developments to avoid counterencirclement. At night, with enough courage, you probably could assault and wipe out the same position without too much risk. In the encirclement, dig in every time you squeeze toward the enemy.-try to force him to break ranks and flee.13® Once the enemy isooverrun, the platoons re cover, their packs and resume normal activi ties. 139 Victory must be the aim of every attack. In the first stage of guerrilla warfare con ducted in irregular terrain, enemy columns will make deep incursions into rebel terri tory. It is not difficult to ambush the leading elements and make off with their arms, ammunition, and gear while the main body>is momentarily held at bay. If the guerrilla positions are strong enough, you can encircle the whole column. Be sure you have a well- dug-in force against the enemy's front, then hit him hard from the rear. If the location chosen is a natural defile, it should be easy to trap and cut to pieces an enemy force eight to ten times the size of your own. If neither of these is feasible, try the "minuet. (The "minuet" is a tactic which uses small groups of guerrillas at various points en circling the enemy group. Each guerrilla group opens up on the enemy at a different point in time, thus forcing the enemy to shift its front constantly.) You will not capture any supplies thereby, but with a mini mum of personal risk and ammunition, you can severely weaken the enemy for a later kill.140 Fidel, knowing that there was an entire com pany in the lumber camp, doubted that our troops could take the camp; our goal was to attack it, destroy their posts, surround it, and watch for their reinforcements, for we knew very well that troops on the march are much more alert than quartered troops. We established various ambushes, expecting great results from them. At each one we stationed the number of men recessary to deal with the expected enemy strength.141 277 As time passes and the strength of the guerrillas grows, frontal attack on key targets becomes possible. At this point the selection of those targets becomes an issue. In November and December of 1958 we grad ually closed off the highways. Captain Silva completely cut off the Trinidad-Sancti Spiritus Highway, and the Central Highway was damaged seriously when the bridge over the Tuinicu River was partially destroyed. The central railway line was cut at several points and the southern line by the Second Front, while the northern line was cut by Camilo Cienfuegos1 troops. And so the island was divided effect ively. 1^2 But Fidel had already planned the action at El Uvero, and he thought that it would be much more important and would bring us a more re sounding success if we captured the Army post at El Uvero. If we succeeded, it would have a tremendous moral impact and would be spoken of throughout the covin try... 143 We had taken the electric power plant and the entire northwest section of the city. We announced over the radio that Santa Clara was almost entirely in the hands of the Revolution.144 Later the police station fell, with the surrender of the tanks defending it. In rapid succession outpost No. 31 surrendered to Major Cubela, while the jail, the courthouse, the headquarters of the provincial government and the Grand Hotel fell to our forces.145 Ambush A highway ambush mining the truck and shoot ing the survivors---made the most efficient use of our munitions...146 Of course the enemy will react and, instead of dispatching single vehicles, will send through armed convoys. The answer is good se? lection for an ambush site, breaking up the column, and concentrating fire. Also, guard escape and reinforcement routes, know the local population and get them to help out on supplies and transport, roadblocking, and care of wound ed. If all these precautions are followed, the effect on enemy communication will pay rich dividends.147 278 In general, the site of ambush should be at least a day's march from the permanent guerrilla encampment, the location of which is usually known to the enemy.148 The defenses and the whole defensive apparatus should be arranged in such a manner that the enemy vanguard will always fall in to an ambush. It is very important as a psychological factor that the man in the van guard will die without escape in every bat tle, because this produces within the enemy army a growing consciousness of this danger, until the moment arrives when nobody wants to be in the vanguard; and it is obvious that a column with no vanguard cannot move, since somebody has to assume that responsi bility.™ Knowing the methods employed by the heads of Batista's army, we concealed our intentions from the peasants; if one of them happened to pass an area where an ambush was being prepared, we held him until it was over.50 We occupied the hamlet and Fidel disclosed his itinerary to the villagers, calculating that someone among them would pass the in formation On to the Army. We engaged in a small diversionary maneu ver, and while Fidel's column continued its march toward Santiago in full view of all, we made a detour during the night and laid an ambush for the enemy.151 Sabotage In the field sabotage becomes a weaponoof attack and/ or ambush. Sabotage is an important revolutionary means, but it should be differentiated from terrorism. Indiscriminate terrorism against groups of ordinary people is inefficient and can provoke massive retaliation. However, terrorism to repay the cruelty of a key in dividual in the oppressor hierarchy is jus tifiable. But it must never be used to eliminate unimportant individuals whose death would accomplish nothing but invite re taliation. 152 One of the enemy's weakest points is high way and rail transport. It is practically im- 279 possible to guard every inch of a highway or railroad. The route and/or transport passing over it can easily be blown up. Explosives may be obtained through vari ous sources: They can be purchased, extracted from unexploded enemy shells or bombs, or manufactured clandestinely. In Cuba we made our own gunpowder and invented various tricky devices to set if off. ^3 In combat-zone sabotage, strike boldly and frequently, using guerrilla flying squads to support civilian action. Again, the emphasis is on interrupting communications. Also, knock out enemy supply s o u r c e s .154 The vital industries of each region at certain moments will also be destroyed by utilizing the necessary equipment. In these cases it is necessary to have an overall view of the problem and to be sure that a center of work is not destroyed unless the moment is decisive, since this brings with it as a con sequence massive unemployment of workers and hunger. The enterprises belonging to the potentates of the regime should be eliminated (and attempts made to convince the workers of the need for doing so), unless this will bring very grave social consequences. We reiterate the importance,: of sabotage against communications. The great strength of the enemy army against the rebels in the flatter zones is rapid communication; we must, then, constantly undermine that strength by knocking out railroad bridges, culverts, electric lights, telephones; also aqueducts and in general everything that is necessary for a normal and modem l i f e . 155 Defense Defense is not a main tactic of the guerrilla, but Che does mention it. When a defensive type of war is being fought, that is to say, when the guerrilla band is endeavoring to prohibit the passage of an invasion column beyond a certain point, the action becomes a war of positions; but always at the outset if should have the factor of surprise. In this case, since trenches as well as other defensive systems that will be easily observable by the peas- 280 ants are going to be used, it is necessary that these latter remain in the friendly zone.156 Retreat The basic strategies of guerrilla warfare demand well- planned and well-executed retreats: the running as well as the hitting must be effective. A guerrilla chief who takes pride in his role will never be careless about withdrawal. This should be timely, rapid, and carried out so as to save all the wounded and the equipment of the guerrilla, its knapsacks; am munition, etc. The rebels ought never to be surprised while withdrawing, nor can they permit themselves the negligence of becoming surrounded. Therefore, guards must be post ed along the chosen road at all places where the enemy army will eventually bring its troops forward in an attempt to close a circle; and there must be a system of communication that will permit rapid reports when a force tries to surround the r e b e l s . 157 We realized that persecution would now be great, and we decided that those men who could walk ought to move on quickly, leaving the wouiided behind in my care. Enrique Lopez would undertake to furnish me with transportat&on for the wounded, a hiding place, some adjutants, and all the neces sary contacts through whom we could receive medicines and cure the men properly.*58 Marching During the march complete silence must prevail in the column. Orders are passed by gestures or by whispers that go from mouth to mouth until they reach the last man. If the guer rilla band is marching through unknown places, breaking a road, or being led by a guide, the vanguard will be approximately one hundred or two hundred meters or even more in front, ac cording to the characteristics of the ground. In places where confusion may arise as to the route, a man will be left at each turning to await those who follow, and this will be re peated until the last man in the rearguard had passed. The rearguard will also be some what separated from the rest of the column, 281 keeping a watch on the roads in the rear and trying to erase tracks of the troops as much as possible. If there is a road coming from the side that offers danger, it is necessary always to have a group keeping a watch on it until the last man has passed. It is more practical that each platoon utilize its own men for this special duty, with each having the obligation to pass the guard to members of the following platoon and then to rejoin his own unit; this process will be continued until the whole troop has passed. The march should be uniform and in an established order, always the same. Thus it will always be known that Platoon #1 is the vanguard, followed by Platoon #2 and then .Platoon #3, which may be the command; then y/4, followed by the rearguard or Platoon #5 or other platoons that make up the column, always ; in the same order. In night marches silence should be even stricter and the distance between each combatant shorter, so that no one will get lost and make it neces sary to shout and turn on lights. Light is the enemy of the guerrilla fighter at night time. 159 Reserves and Support Guerrillas seldom can spare any forces to constitute a reserve. Yet, a reserve will be needed in deperate, unforeseen situations. One way to prepare for thisrineed is to com pose an elite platoon given special privi leges. Call it "The Joker" or "Suicide Pla toon.1 1 Forge its reputation for heroism by committing it to the most difficult combat situations.1°0 During combat, some of the troops must remain unarmed. These men, usually two or three for every ten armed soldiers, will be used to recover weapons from fallen comrades or enemy soldiers, to take charge of prison ers, to transport wounded men, or to trans mit messages.161 Treatment of the Local Populace and Prisoners This theme, by virtue of its paramount importance to the Cuban guerrilla, permeates all aspects of Che's work on guerrilla warfare. 282 An important aspect of guerrilla tactics is the treatment accorded the population of the region, including the/enemy. Be relent less in the attack and toward traitors, but merciful toward those who fought only be cause they were forced to by the oppressor. If there are no protected operating bases, do not take prisoners; let them go free and give whatever aid you can to the wound ed. In your conduct toward the civilian population, show great respect and demon strate the guerrillas' moral superiority. Do not execute anyone without a hearing un less the situation permits no other alter native. 162 Their stories were the same as all of ours; they had been able to evade the rural guards by seeking refuge in the house of one peas ant after another...163 Some Miscellaneous (but important) Points Security is paramount: no footprints, quick ly broken encampments, 10 to 20 per cent of the personnel awake and on watch while the others sleep, etc.164 The guerrilla combatant is a night com batant. , .165 Despite our ragged appearance, we were able to trick Chicho Osorio, maybe because he was so drunk. Fidel, in an indignant manner, told him he was an Army colonel, that he had come to find out why the rebels had not yet been destroyed, that he was go ing into the mountains to find them (that was why he had a beard), and that what the Army was doing was "garbage." ...In the end, on Fidel's suggestion, he agreed to lead us to the barracks in order to surprise the soldiers and show them that they were poorly prepared and were neglecting their duty.166 But it also made it necessary for us to change camps, for presumably the boy might have talked before being murdered, and he knew we were at Florentino's house.167 ...the men in the armored train had been dis lodged by our Molotov c o c k t a i l s . ..168 These tactics demand a certain type of person to 283 carry them out. Che characterized that person in this way: The guerrilla must constantly guard against encirclement. Not only is it physically dis astrous, but it makes other guerrillas skepti cal of being able to conduct casualty-free hit- and-run operations, A guerrilla must be audacious and optimis tic, even amidst unfavorable conditions and circumstances. He must be adaptable, imagi native and inventive. A guerrilla never abandons a wounded com rade to enemy mercy. Cost what it may, guer rilla wounded are carried off to a safe spot. A guerrilla fighter must be discreet. He never reveals what he has heard, even to his fellow fighters for the enemy will always try to introduce spies into the guerrilla ranks. The guerrilla is physically tough and capable of enduring extremes, not only in deprivation of food, water, clothing, and shelter, but also in bear?in sickness and wounds without medical care, for leaving the battle zone brings with it the risk of cap ture and death. All these conditions presuppose an iron constitution, the strength to survive illness and adversity, the ability to live like a har assed animal. The guerrilla must become a part of the very soil on which he fights.*69 What happens to this kind of person in the Post-Vic- tory era is an especially relevant question where Che is concerned. Can a revolutionary guerrilla fighter adjust to peace? * * * POST-VICTORY As Che knew so well, the Revolution is not won when the military enemy capitulates. The problems that face the guerrilla upon seizing power are awesoue, and the real solutions are not part of any conventional wisdom. Since 284 he struggled with and wrote extensively on the reality of this situation, Che's work provides insight into this un- glamorous (and thus largely ignored), but vital aspect of guerrilla war. The revolutionary government has two essen tial allies: the peasants and the workers. It is a mistake to think that a Revolution benefits all social classes, but we are not going to attack the rich; instead, we will regulate the relationship that exists between employer and employees. The rich who have inherited their wealth and have large landholdings do not have much of a chance, these will feel the weight of the Revolution. The foreign rich who in vested from abroad and stole land with the con sent of the state will also be hurt by the Rev olution. I can call myself a military man... Today I am in another post. I do not pretend to be an economist; I am simply a revolutionary fighter placed in a new trench and, as such, I have to be concerned as few are with the future of the economy on which the destiny of the Revolution depends. But this battle on the economic front is different from those we fought in the moun tains; these are battles for positions, battles where the unexpected almost never occurs. Troops are concentrated, and the attacks are prepared with care. The victories are the result of work, endurance, and planning. It is a war where collective heroism and the sacrifice of all is demanded. This war will not last a day, a week, or a month; it is a long struggle. The more isolated we are, the less we have studied all the characteristics of the terrain in which the fight will take place, the long er the struggle will be. The enemy must be analyzed completely.171 BERGQUIST: You've said Cuba suffers from a "guerrilla" complex. What is this? GUEVARA: A tendency in many government func tionaries to go on acting independently, as if they were still engaged in a guerrilla war and had complete freedom of action, taking orders only from the top chief. In short, a lack of coordination. BERGQUIST: The Revolution, you've said, has made many "mistakes." What are they? 285 GUEVARA: They are errors to be expected in any revolution run by young men, lacking technicians and technique. Much money has been spent, not always wisely. There has been duplication of effort in various government agencies. Many leisure-loving officials have been permitted to continue in office. The government has been lenient in allowing its political enemies to stay on in high posts. But it is our sincere belief that our errors have been fewer and of lesser magnitude than our accomplishments.172 The goals of the Revolution now have to be made con crete, and Che admits that people will be hurt and that all is not as it should be. But beyond that, the Cuban Revolu tion changed the context for the next generation of guer rillas; other fronts will be harder. This means that imperialism has learned, fully, the lesson of Cuba and that it will not again be taken by surprise in any of our twenty republics or in any of the existing colonies. This means that great popular battles against powerful invading armies await those who now attempt to violate the peace of the sepul chers, the Pax Romana. This is important be cause if the Cuban war of liberation with its two years of continual combat, anxieties, and instability was difficult, the new battles that await the people in other parts of Latin America are going to be infinitely more dif ficult. 173 This was a powerful insight into the dynamics, per haps even into a dialectic of guerrilla war— -and one which Che seemingly ignored in Bolivia. Another insight was the necessity of changing human beings in order to truly create the society hazily envisioned in the concept of "the revo lution". First, those who are set in their ways must go. Those men, who lived off the legend of a struggle, in which they did not participate, deceiving the people, looking out for jobs, trying always to be where money was, pushing into all the ministerial cabinets, deprecated by all true revolutionaries, these men were an insult to our revolutionary consciences. 286 Constantly, by their presence, they showed us our sin the sin of compromise in the face of the lack of revolutionary spirit, in the face of the actual or potential traitor, in the face of those weak in spirit, in the face of the coward, in the face of the bully. Our conscience has been cleansed now be cause they have gone in boats to Miami. 174 Then, the real work begins. We have had to fight against this, to try to change this view. A nation cannot be built in a laboratory. It must be built by uniting the people. This is why we want each of our technicians to be part of the people. That is why we have difficulties at present. Some of our technicians are adapting them selves to these changes and are improving, but there are still some who are left over from the previous era. That is why we are determined to create a new man, the man who comes from the working class, from the peasant class, the man who is a product of the Revolution.175 But the tool which we lacked...was the lack of developed cadres at the intermediate level. Our policy of finding cadres is now synonymous with going back to the masses, establishing contact anew with the masses a contact which had been closely maintained by the Revolution in its first stages...176 We can now ask ourselves, "What is a cadre?" A cadre is an individual who has attained sufficient political development to be able to interpret orders emanating from the central power, making these orders his own and conveying them to the masses. At the same time, the cadre should become aware of the masses' needs and desires and their most intimate motivations.177 And motivation becomes a crucial issue. There are always laggards who remain behind, but our function is not to liquidate them--- to crush them and force them to bow to an armed vanguard---but to educate them by lead ing them forward and getting them to follow us because of our example, or as Fidel called it moral compulsion.178 This was the first heroic stage in which 287 men vied to achieve a place of greater respon sibility, of greater danger, and without any other satisfaction than that of fulfilling their duty. In our work in revolutionary education we return often to this instructive theme. In the attitude of our fighters, we could glimpse the man of the future. Total commitment to the revolutionary cause has been repeated at other times during our history. Throughout the October Crisis and the days of hurricane Flora, we saw acts of exceptional sacrifice and courage per formed by all of our people. From an ideo logical viewpoint, our fundamental task is to find the formula which will perpetuate in daily life these heroic attitudes.179 This is why it is so important to choose correctly the instrument for the mobilization of the masses. That instrument must be of a fundamentally moral nature, without forgetting the correct utilization of material incentives, especially those of a social nature. As I have stated before, it is easy to activate moral incentives in times of extreme danger. To maintain their permanence, it is necessary to develop a consciousness in which values acquire new categories. Society as a whole must become a gigantic s c h o o l .180 Che's advocacy of moral incentives, as opposed to material ones, drove a wedge between traditional socialists and himself. This hurt him badly, as Fidel needed the Soviet Union (a traditional socialist nation) to survive. Many writers feel that this split helped Che decide to leave Cuba. It appears, however, that Fidel has now ac cepted Che's ideas more fully and is striving to create a New Man and a New Cuba by use of moral incentives. The shape of the government was a matter of great importance to Che, and the way he perceived it is interest ing to students of government and particularly adminis tration---everywhere. The first steps as a revolutionary state... were strongly colored by the fundamentals of guerrilla tactics as a type of state adminis- 288 tration. "Guerrillerismo" transferred the ex perience of armed struggle from the mountains and fields of Cuba into the various adminis trative and mass organizations, which meant in practice that only the important revolution ary slogans were followed (and often inter preted in different ways by and large) by all the administrative and social organizations. The way to solve specific problems was left to the free will of each of the leaders. Spreading across the whole complex struc ture of society, the fields of action of these "administrative guerrillas" often came into open conflict, resulting in continuous friction, orders and counterorders, different interpretations of the law, which led some of these organizations, in a few cases, to re taliate by issuing their own policies in the form of decrees, totally disregarding the policies of the central body. After a year of painful experiences, we came to the con clusion that it was most essential to change our whole style of operating and to reorgans; ize the state apparatus in the most rational way, following the planning methods known in our sister socialist countries. As a countermeasure, strong bureaucratic structures, which characterized this first stage of our socialist state, began to be set up, but the backlash was too strong, and a whole series of structures, the Ministry of Industries among them began a policy of func tional centralization which overly curtailed the initiative of the administrators. 183. And this is how our Revolution began to suffer from the pracitice we have dubbed "bureaucrat ism. "182 The answer seemed to lie somewhere in between guerriller- ismo and bureaucratism. We must weigh carefully the responsibil ities of each functionary, establish them as nearly rigidly as possible within fixed boundaries, from which he should not depart, and within these limitations, we must give the broadest possible latitudes. At the same time, we must make a study of whatever is of fundamental Importance as against whatever is secondary in the work of the dif 289 ferent units in each state structure and place limits on the secondary, stressing the funda mental, allowing for greater expediency. And we must demand that our functionaries take action, establish deadlines to carry out in structions laid down by the core structures, and exercise proper control. And we must pres sure them into making decisions within a reasonable period of time.183 But still, while military victories may be swift, Revolutions take time. The institutionalization of the Revolu tion has still not been a c h i e v e d . 1 8 4 ■k * * Commentaries It is important to obtain a balanced view of Che and his theories, and one way to do this is to briefly review what some of the people who have studied him have conclud ed. The following selections do not cover the field ex haustively, but they do help us to fill out our own ideas and draw our own conclusions. In their introduction to Che: Selected Works of Ernesto Guevara Rolando Bonachea and Nelson Valdes make some helpful observations. 1. Che sought to generalize the ’ 'permanent ascfetism of the guerrilla fighter”, this "guerrilla communism”. to Fidel's Cuba and its people. And Che sought to do this with moral, as opposed to material in centives. When Che left in 1965 Fidel and others favored the traditional socialist approach, materialism, but by 1969 they had accepted Che's view. 185 2. Che had very definite views on the role of the individual. He believed that, although human 290 activity is conditioned by objec tive conditions, men act con sciously and that, therefore, human activity is not predetermin ed. Instead, men have freedom of choice. Indeed, this is the essential element in Guevarlstn--- the great emphasis on voluntar ism, on subjective conditions. Che developed a radical categor ical imperative: The duty of the revolutionary is to make the revolution. To push history, to catalyze, is the function of the revolutionary. This is the salient feature in his reflect ions on guerrilla warfare.18° 3. Che believed that objective conditions were not all that was involved in revolution, there were subjective conditions as well. And these subjective conditions (the main one being the operation of the guerrilla band itself) could fill the gap left by the absence of some of the necessary objective conditions. This stand was in direct opposition to the traditional Com munist view and it made enemies for Che-- inaction could not be justified any long er if people accepted his view, and young people^^n Latin America began to do just Bonachea and Valdes take issue with Che's position on this: The weakness of the Guevara theory of armed struggle lies in the problem of how it deals with the dilemma of radicalizing the peasants through itw own armed struggle independent of the peasantry.188 Similarly to think that the rootless sugar cane worker or the minifundia peasant of Cuba who joined the guerrilla movement in Cuba had its counterpart in the Indiem population of the Andes overlooks cultural and historlaal differences.189 Further, in Bolivia the peasants were the con servative element: They had been given land and sought to preserve it, while the miners were the radical force. This cast grave doubt 291 on the effectiveness of Che's commitment to the rural battle in Bolivia.190 These are insightful comments on Che and his theories. And they focus on a crucial issue which cannot be divorced from Che: Is the Cuban experience exportable? Che always maintained that it was, and he tried to do it, but as is obvious from the failures in Argentina, the Congo, and Bolivia, this may not, in fact, be the case. In his writ ings on guerrilla warfare Che was careful to point out that he was basing his thoughts on the Cuban experience and that others elsewhere would have to be creative and change his ideas to suit new environments. In his own life, however, Che seems to have been unable to do just this. John Gerassi wrote the Introduction for Venceremos! The Speeches and Writings of Ernesto Che Guevara, and in it he raises two points that add to our picture of Che and his ideas. 1. From the very start Che sought to build Socialist Man in Cuba; he disagreed with the traditional Communists who told him that the socialist economy should be created before you went into building a new kind of man. Che fought this view because he "...felt that a socialist economy in itself is not worth the ef fort, sacrifice, and risks of war and destruction if it ends up encouraging greed and individual ambitionc&t the ex pense of the collective spirit."191 2. Che sought a world based on love. But Che understood more than any man I have ever met that love cannot exist between master and slave. He knew that such relationships have to be destroyed, first. And he knew that once destroyed, the new relationship— - love---does not spring forth automati cally. Love does not come out an establishment from above. It comes from the roots, from people, working at it from below. Love, Che would say, 292 is not a flash of lightning, an instan taneous mystical happening. It is an effort. It is something that one builds up gradually by working at it.*92 It has to be noted that Che could not claim success in either the creation of Socialist Man or a society based on love, but he could claim to have helped set the stage for others to work on. This exposes the age old problem of how to act positively (build a new society based on the highest human ideals) after accomplishing the negative (overturning the old order). It is here that every revolu tion stumbles and most, if not all, fall down. In Che Guevara Andrew Sinclair covers much of the ground concerning the reasons for Che's failure in Bolivia: 1. Che and his Cubans were foreigners in a hemi sphere where revolution has always had a strong nationalistic flavor. 2. The Indians saw the Cubans not only as foreigners but as more white men invading their lands. 3. The already-established land reform stole Che's thunder. 4. These points underlie the fact that Che was un able to recruit one single peasant in the eleven months he was in Bolivia. 5. The band was desperately isolated from the city organizations (which were weak or nonexistent anyway another problem). 6. The revolts in neighboring countries, which would have helped spread the reaction against the guer rillas, fizzled out. 7. The support of the Bolivian Communist Party never materialized. 8. Che himself has to bear much of the blame for the above points, and also for the fact that he al lowed himself, andasthmatic, middle-aged man long out of combat, to try to lead such a risky ex pedition. Time and time again the band had to stop its operations for Che's asthma or attack a town to get the medicines he n e e d e d .193 Che's personality cannot be ignored in analyzing his activities, particularly in Bolivia. There is a strong 293 sense here that Che could be nothing else but a guerrilla leader, and that the need to fulfill this self-image over rode all other considerations; there is a strong sense of the driven man here. Richard Harris in his Death of a Revolutionary points out that the Cuban revolution involved much more than a guerrilla war, and that this helps us to explain some of the problems in Che's theories. 1. Cuba's middle classes backed the guerrillas out of their hatred for Batista and the military was not aggressive in its war against the guerrillas. Thus we can con clude that the guerrillas did not pre cipitate the revolution, rather they were the armed expression of a whole people's revulsion with the existing situation.194 2. With the rush to urbanization in Latin America the cities have been inundated with peasants from the rural areas. The think ing now is that it is here, not in the countryside, that there is a natural basis for revolution.195 Harris does not reject Che's theories completely, (but tempers Che's enfatuation with the peasants) he does point out that they are not necessarily what they seem and that future guerrillas had best be advised of this. Robert Taber, in his M-26: Biography of a Revolution, supports this view. He points out the support of all classes (especially in terms of money, arms, and anti- government resistance) and the low quality and near-absent motivation of the army.196 The break with the middle class es come over the depth of the revolution: the middle classes supported political revolution but not social rev olution, while the fidelitos— especially Che— had become social revolutionaries. In Marxist-Leninist terms, the middle class could support the bourgeois-— democratic rev olution, but not a protetarlan (peasant)— -socialist revo lution. 294 Jay Mallin makes an Interesting point on the impact of Che, his work, and his death on young radicals, in his introduction to “Che1 1 Guevara on Revolution. Mailin's tone, it might be added, throughout the introduction is decidely anti-Communist, anti-radical, and anti-Guevara. This may make this particular observation more potent, how ever. 1. In a sense, in romanticizing Guevara, the present generation of radicals-- those who pride themselves on membership in the category, Under Thirty has re created him in its own image. Guevara and his writings may thus prove more acceptable and enduring as a hero figure for those-who-would-change-the-world in the last decades of the twentieth century than the somewhat shopworn hand-me-downs from previous generations such as Lenin, Stalin, Tito, Mao, and even Ho Chi Minh.197 I think Mallin has hit on an important point, but for the wrong reasons. Earlier in his i n t r o d u c t i o n * ^ he shows how Che did not really understand Communist theoreticians and thus, by accident, became an innovator. And this was the general approach to revolution and change taken by the Cuban revolutionaries in general: unlike their "shopworn" predecesors, the Cubans did not come in with their dogmas flying, but as young men who felt a need for change and tried to go about it the best way they could think up at the moment. This tone is much more in line with a genera tion just as tired of Communist dogma as it is with capi talist dogma. The Cubans launched a revolution that the old-line Communist said could not be done. And after they had done it on their own, without Communist Party support---they, or at least Che, were not afraid to reprimand the "mother" of revolution for not toeing its own ideological line. In an inconoclastic age, it is not hard to see why young people would be attracted to Che and the revolution he help- 295 ed create. Joseph Hanse, in the Preface to Che Guevara Speaks, addresses himself directly to this point. 1. But unlike the majority of those in the immediately preceding decades, they (the young people who led the Cuban Rev olution) depended on their own judgement, their own initiative and their own in dependent efforts to achieve what they sought. They did not fall into either of two very common traps. They did not rely for leadership on the so-called progres sive sector of the national bourgeoisie of their country or on the ossified bu reaucracy running the Communist party.199 These leaders and the team they built appeared on the scene, evidently as fore runners of a great new development in world politics the rise of a generation of revolutionary fighters disinclined to accept either Moscow or Peking or any similar center as a kind of Vatican that in practice serves to stultify both rev olutionary theory and practice.200 This brirgs the issue of Che's popularity into sharp focus. It must be added, however, that what happens after the military phase of revolution is won may be— -unfortu nately so, from Hansen's point of view---strongly tied to the leadership of one or the other of those "traps". This is what Fidel had to face up to: he could not cause Cuba to survive, it seems, without the Soviet Union. And there is the feeling here that Fidel sympathised with Che's ideas but could not implement them. If this is so, did Che see Fidel as he did Lenin? "In our discussion of Lenin, Che made me feel that he looked upon that great revolutionary as almost tragic, as a man who knew that a society built on material incentives was doomed to fail morally, and yet the man who instituted the New Economic Policy."201 One of the great gaps in our knowledge of the Cuban Revolution is the relationship between Fidel and Che, and it is too bad that 296 this is the case. But we can take note of certain points, and toy with historical parallels. Martin Ebon writes that while Che, like Fidel, had ...a penchant for snap decisions, irregular hours, and anti-United States sentiment, he differed from him in several personality traits. Simply put, Che was a purist where Fidel was a realist; Che was rigid, where Fidel was flexible or erratic; Che was uto pian, where Fidel was worldly.202 Ebon also uses an interesting phrase in passing, admittedly to describe Che: "To Che, the permanent revo lutionary. ..."203 Permanent revolutionary. That of course conjures up the Lenin/Stalin-Trotsky contrast, and there may be much to be learned from pondering the Fidel-Che re lationship from that angle. Even if the difference finally comes down to Fidel engaging in permanent revolution by actively using Cuba as a base for other leaders while Che was one of those leaders, that, in itself, says much. There is objective support for Che's position as a permanent revolutionary. He believed that the USSR would keep Cuba as a "sugar mill" just as the US had---neither power would help Cuba industrialize and thus be free of control. The only way out was to obtain markets for indus tries by foresting the creation of revolutionary govern ments in Latin America. The Cuban Revolution needed more revolutions to survive; the Trotsky parallel. In his introduction to The Complete Bolivian Diaries of Che Guevara and Other Captured Documents Daniel James brings some interesting points to light. 1. Bolivia was not the issue at all in the Bolivian campaign, Bolivia was to be sacrificed for the sake of the continen tal revolution as part of Che's overall strategy. This was not, obviously, cal culated to pull in recruits.205 297 2. Che and Fidel were blinded by the mag ical qualities of the Cuban experience. "For them it was but a single leap from a tiny guerrilla foco secreted in the mountains to the conauest of the whole immense continent .."206 Only with this assumption in your mind can Bolivia make sense. 3. Fidel and Che saw the leaders of Bolivia, particularly the military, through Batista glasses. This was not so, the Bolivian military was peasant based and an inte- f ral part of an on-going revolution; the eadership of the country had the support of the peasants, if not the whole popu lation. 207 4. Che failed to organize a well-trained guerrilla band, he tied it to a fixed base, and he was trapped into going into battle well before he was ready to begin his campaign.208 Time seems to have weighed heavily on Che: he wanted to' go on the offensive as soon as possible. 5. Che and his men took pictures of each other, kept diaries, and generally were lax in these important matters of secur ity. James comments: "But men who viewed themselves as moving toward his toric victory could not deny themselves the pleasure of recording it, even though that record jeopardized their final suc cess. "209 This last point is unusual: Che and his men had be come self-conscious revolutionaries, men building their identity as revolutionaries with photographs and diaries rather than by revolution. Ebon^lO refers to Che in Bolivia as an "amateur rebel" who needed someone to question his judgement. Hastening back to Che's relationship with Fidel, it may well be that Che needed a leader to give him plans to carry out (brilliantly, as in Cuba). It is a truism in Zen that something cannot be obtained directly, and this applies to Che. In Cuba he was making a revolution, and thus was a revolutionary; in Bolivia he was (or seems to 298 have been) trying to be the continental revolutionary, and thus prevented himself from making a revolution. He forgot what he was about. And here we come down to the unavoidable need to face up to the man Che, a product of his own history and his own conscious attempts at creation, a man facing middle age with the terrible coughing to remind him of his own frail mortality. Che in his writings stressed the individual and the importance of the individual; philosophies, strategies, theories were all secondary to the individual. So, we are faced with Che and why the need for Bolivia. James artic ulates the feelings that must arise out of a review of Che's life when he says that "He needed a revolution far more than the revolution needed him; without one, would he fall by the wayside and become lost to history."211 And: Nevertheless, Bolivia proved a fortunate thing for Che. Without a power base of his own, and unable to put his abilities to work without direction, Che might, have wandered around for any number of years until he met some obscure end. His record in the Congo and Bolivia was poor and it is doubtful that Castro would have supported him for many more such crusades. If his military activities there seemed to be conducted at random and without any recognizable objective, one might suspect that by dying in the service of his beliefs, Che was to achieve a more important objective of his own.212 Why did Che fail in Bolivia? We have some grasp of the objective conditions that were aginst him and we can see many of the personal characteristics that worked against him, but that is not the full story. Richard Harris in Death of a Revolutionary looks at the situation from many angles and makes some good points. 1. The Cuban Revolution itself worked against the Bolivian adventure by waking the "enemy" up. "It is hard to imagine a guerrilla movement today either (I) deceiving the middle classes into believing it has mod- 299 erate political aims or (2) winning the support of U.S. and international public opinion as romantic freedom-fighters combating a tyrranical regime."213 These elements now concetrate on quick ly eliminating insurgents with trained armies and with winning, at least super ficially, the support of the peasantry. 2. The Communist party worked against Che. The Bolivian Party (Moscow) gave Cuba false information about the situation in Bolivia, prevented young members from joining Che's forces, promised him support but never delivered, and pro vided information about the revolution aries to the Bolivian authorities.214 Moscow, against armed revolutions and for gaining power legally, saw in Che a chance to discredit armed revolution and acted accordingly.215 In fact, Harris says that a major contribution to revolutionary theory provided by Che's death was the true nature of the Party: "...it is now clear that any group determined to bring about an arm ed revolution in Latin America must consider the orthodox Communists to be as great a threat as the repressive forces of the ruling political elites."216 3. A history Che was intimate with con spired to keep him in Bolivia beyond the danger point. "Perhaps he kept thinking of how high the odds had been against the success of Castro's opera tion after the Granma disaster, when only twelve members of the original eighty-man invasion force survived the landing on Cuban soil and made their way to the Sierra Maestra."217 Thus, it becomes apparent that there are really no simple answers to the question of Che and Bolivia. His motivations were complex, his actions rooted in complex causes, and his end complex. One important component of this complexity was Che himself, the ultimate subjective factor. In looking at history and ideologies we tend to di- 300 vorce them from the human qualities involved. I doubt if Bolivia is explained merely by speaking of Che's supposed psychology, but neither is it explained merely by what hap pened or by the ideological rhetoric connected with it. Psychology is often an abtruse subject and the aver age person avoids its. But I think that we can all find some level of empathy for Che's apparent yearning for the revolutionary community. Lee Lockwood was with the Cuban Revolution's leaders in 1965 for an evening of reminis cence; this is what he wrote: One night, after a round of tales had extrac ted its last chuckle, there was a lull, and then I heard Celia say, her low, husky voice throbbing in the darkness as though in rever ie: 'Ah, but those were the best times, weren't they? We were all so very happy then. Really. We will never be so happy again, will we? Never.... "'218 It may sound strange to link guerrilla warfare with being happy. but there it is. And once you've been there there is always the temptation to return....As Che himself said when asked why a leprosarism made such an impression on him: "Because the highest forms of human solidarity and loyalty arise among lonely and desperate m e n . " 2 1 9 To re turn. ... These, then, are selected commentaries on Che and his ideas. Hopefully, they will spur our own creative thoughts on the vast scope of guerrilla warfare, and Che's part in it, as we examine it for clues for our own attempts to change things for the better. If he left us nothing else, Che left us with a call to act. His last letter to his parents summed it up: A will that I have polished with the de light of an artist will now sustain my weak legs and tired lungs. I shall do what must be done.220 CHAPTER 5: COMPARISON After reading the lives, ideas, and commentaries on each of the major three guerrilla warfare leader-writers used here, some commonalities and differences are readily apparent. This type of comparison is helpful in that it allows us to get some general handles on these men and on guerrilla warfare in general. Commonalities A major point, perhaps the first point, to remember is that all three of these men wrote on guerrilla warfare after completing much of their action in the field. Mao wrote on the subject after his personal experience against the Kuomintang forces, Giap after his struggles with the French, and Che after the victory over Batista. Thus, these men, unlike General Grivas in Cyprus, did not have a detailed written plan for guerrilla war before going into action. Their theories, therefore, are based on empirical evidence and not on untested models. It is important to keep this in mind and avoid the idea that a strictly follow ed plan (say, Mao's) will necessarily prove successful in the field. Each of these three, as authors, is careful to point out that his theories are not universal. Each reminds the reader that the theory has to match the situation; that theory grows organically as time passes. This is as it must be, for one of the key components of guerrilla warfare is flexibility. In trying to find points from which we can learn we have to avoid fighting the last guerrilla war— -no one of the three authors would advocate following their 301 302 "line" blindly and trying to recreate China, Vietnam, or Cuba in another place. In their experiences each man went through a process which must have influenced their conception of the ideal society. We might call this the "guerrilla social experi ence" in which a person is immersed in a new world with different norms, values, and relationships. The guerrilla social experience is a communal grouping of people in a highly stressful situation; the people have to depend on each other to the fullest extent. This experience involves activism in the pursuit of high ideals, an activism aimed at radical and rapid change of a whole society; slow pro gress is scorned, action is glorified, and the quick solu tion is the only solution. Finally, this experience in volves a great deal of ecstasy (or Maslow's "peak experi ence"*). The ecstasy of battle, of rapid movement, and of victory. This is a kinesthetic as well as a psychological- intellectual ecstasy, and it ill fits a person for sedate living at the close of the guerrilla campaign. None of the three men studied returned to a less active life after their initial victories. This experience creates a new vision of society for the participants. Why can't society as a whole be the way the guerrilla band was? This question sets up a cognitive dissonance hard to subdue, and the resulting tension can be expected to drive the person to further achievement. Ob viously, the best example of this is Che, but both Mao and Giap have been intensely involved in activist roles in their countries, too. Guerrilla warfare may set up a dynam ic in the participants which cannot be reversed. It also sets up an elite, an "in" group, of people who were part of this intense experience. Those who have not been through it are seen as outsiders and do not have the elite's full trust: They haven't been there. As point 303 ed out, there is evidence to indicate that Mao's wish in fomenting the Cultural Revolution was to allow a new gener ation to "go there." And Che's frustration may have been that he couldn't get the masses "there" in a non-violent context---that bond formed by common participation in vio lence of which Fanon speaks so eloquently may hot be attain able in a non-violent situation, thus creating a huge out group . In their activist roles, none of the three accepted the Marxist-Leninist line whole cloth. In China, Mao rev olutionized Marxism-Leninism by taking it to the country and the peasants, within a protracted time horizon; those who advocated the orthodox way where destroyed by Chiang. In Vietnam, the orthodox strategy was tried and failed, then Giap moved to the country with a peasant force and en gaged in a protracted war. In Cuba, Che was part of a rural-based revolution that received little help (in the sense of uprisings) from the urban areas, and the war there, although shorter than in China or Vietnam, was protracted in terms of orthodox Marxist-Leninist concepts. Mao has cast himself in the role of the next major interpreter of Communism after Lenin and Stalin, and thus has sought to rationalize his "deviations." Giap has not gone this far---he tends to leave the philosophy to others and restricts himself to saying the right thing and winning battles (even to the extent of ignoring his own theories, as at Dien Bien Phu). Che was openly antagonistic to dog matic Communism in Guatemala and found this reinforced in his dealing with the Party in Cuba and Latin America. His tirades against the Soviet Union, in fact, caused Castro no little trouble in his relation with the Soviet Union and were a contributing factor in his journey to Bolivia. In each case, however, the goal of a Communist soci ety (small "c") was adhered to, only the means were ques- 304 ttoned. Communism (large "c") played a role in each man's life in opening his eyes to the problems of modem society and in creating a vision of a better society, but when it came to the means for achieving the destruction of the old and the creation of the new, each learned (usually the hard way) that there was no one best way not even in Marx or Len in. And it did nbt take a Communist to tell them that if you don't have massive resources you find ways of fighting effectively with what you have, Rejai's analysis of Mao as an innovator in the stream of Marxist thought applies to each of the three. Rejai writes about Mao that This originality consists primarily in four things: (1) shifting the locus of revolu tion from the urban centers to the rural areas, (2) developing a communist party based on the peasantry, (3) systematic attention to class alliance and 'united front' tactics, and (4) emphasis on a protracted military con flict based on peasant guerrilla warfare. In these ways Mao's 'model' of the communist rev olution departs from its Soviet counterpart.2 In Che's case the party was not Communist, but could more correctly be called a revolutionary movement. With that exception these points hold true for all three men. The men who make such changes and organize such move ments tend to become a group in and of themselves, an "elite" of sorts, and this is the case with Mao, Giap, and Che. This is basic Lenin, and is to be expected once the idea of the spontaneous mass uprising is rejected as a viable revolutionary strategy. In each of the three cases a relatively small group of people (not of the masses: Mao, Giap, and Che all come from middle levels of their socie ties and were well educated) attempted (or claimed to at tempt, depending on your interpretation) to represent the best interests of the people. They formalized the incoher ent desires of the masses, read these back to the masses, 305 and then led them in violent action to achieve those de sires. In each case victory brought a dictatorship in the name of the masses. In each case, however, there was undeniable mass sup port; the claim of such support was valid. This is graph ically shown in the fact that without a mass base none of the three revolutions could have succeeded---all three rev olutions were mass-supported, if not mass-led. This also reinforces the basic idea that guerrilla warfare can only succeed with the support of the masses. Che's experiences in Cuba and then in Bolivia reinforce this. In Cuba the mass support was there and the revolution succeeded; in Bolivia it was absent and Che paid the price. The role of mass support is important not only stra tegically (in that it leads to victory) but also philosoph ically. For it is a common American idea to discount the idea that the people in these nations desire radical change, but the level of mass support for each of these revolutions refutes that charge. Mass support, in democratic theory, tends to make public acts---including revolution— -"correct" and therefore something to be praised rather than attacked. This is not to say that the masses desired— or even understood---what would be created after the revolution, only that they seriously desired a change in their situa tion, beginning with the overthrow of the old order. When men fight and die for such a change their intensity of be lief cannot be attributed to good propaganda or Communist trickery. The elite leadership in each of these cases did represent the desires, to a formidable degree, of the mass es. And once this is accepted as a basic premise, our out look regarding each revolution may change drastically. This mass support was vital in another way, too. Each revolution was pretty much fought in isolation and thus had to rest on mass support. Where Lawrence had the 306 full weight (and many cheats of gold sovereigns) of the British armed forces behind him in Arabia, China, Vietnam, and Cuba struggled largely alone. China received largely moral support from the Soviet Union, and that only after a long period when Mao's ideas were scorned in Moscow in fav or of the orthodox Marxist-Leninist processes of revolution. By the time the Soviets abandoned Japanese arms to Mao at the end of World War II* the Chinese Communists were well on their way to victory. Much more important, in terms of materiel, were the U.S. shipments to Chiang which continually fell into Mao's hands. In Vietnam, Giap and Ho fought alone until 1949 when Mao was successful. That success did not bring immediate nor vast infusions of aid from the north since Mao himself had a massive country to consolidate on a very slim re source base. Giap had recognized the tenuous nature of out side help and preached self-sufficiency in revolution. Chi nese help increased-— this is unquestionable---but it never reached the level where it became more important to the rev olution than all the many indigenous factors that make for successful guerrilla warfare. Finally, in Cuba Castro's revolutionaries began with next to nothing. Their arms, bought with money raised in the United States Cuban communities, were lost in the dis- asterous landing and first battle, and there seems to have been little replacement from outside the island. Again, the enemy became the revolutionary armory. In each of the three cases, mass support enabled the revolutionary movements to supply themselves. Without these supplies, revolution would have been impossible. Che*8 men nearly starved to death at times in Bolivia be cause they lacked this mass-based supply system. Of the three, Giap depended on outside (Chinese) sup port more than the others. This is logical, since China 307 was on the border and had trained Vietnamese revolution aries and given them sanctuary for years, before the Chi nese Communist revolution even. But this support was not crucial because it was not the key to victory. O'Neill points out that the Chinese Communists took power in 1949 and Giap's first major offensive began in late 1950, lead ing up to the three Delta offensives of 1951.3 On the face of it, this seems to indicate that Chinese support was crucial in Giap's struggle. But two things must be pointed out: (1) this support seems to have caused Giap to switch from a protracted guerrilla war to a short-term frontal assault type of war, and (2) Giap lost all three offensives and retreated both geographically and in terms of strategic thinkings. Thus, we can see that while the logistical sup port beginning in 1949 was important, it was not a key fac tor in victory particularly in a victory so linked to the international political situation. This political component is a common thread in all three revolutions. Mao, Giap, arid Che all realized and practiced what they preached---that revolution was prima rily a political act, and only secondarily a military act. Given the critical need for mass support it is logical from both a philosophical and a strategic view that political work had to take precedence. On a strategic level Mao was the best at this, at a tactical level Giap was supreme, while Che trailed both in each field. Each revolution involved internal political education to get mass support by a mutual invovlement in the goals and actions of the revolution. And there was also the ex ternal political work. Mao working to win over the Soviet Union and, later, the Americans; Giap and Ho working on the French to erode their commitment to the war, while main taining their Chinese alliance; Castro and Che justifying their revolution to American correspondents and spreading 308 Che message throughout Latin America. In each case, with the exception of the Second Indochina War, these men were unable to win American support, but they were able to keep the U.S. neutral in the sense of American troops not enter ing the battle. Given the stance of the U.S. toward Com munist revolution, this was no mean accomplishment. Lack ing U.S. backing, their enemies fell: had Chiang, the French, or Batista had massive U.S. support the outcome might not have been different but it certainly would have been postponed and concluded at a much greater cost. Other commonalities exist, and at all levels of anal ysis (philosophical, strategic, etc.), but to avoid going on and on only two more will be covered here. The first is a short and simple point: each man was involved with a successful revolutionary struggle. These men are not los ers, and thus their words take on added meaning and potency. Second, each has not committed himself fully to the routines of government in a stable society. Ebon points out that this is a common theme among revolutionary leaders: that after victory they "...quickly sought to 'apply the lesson* of their own experience to a continent-wide, or otherwise extended, scene."^ And these three men are no ex ceptions. Mao preached Third World revolution and aided and abetted likely movements— -and he instituted wrenching changes in China (the Great Leap and the Cultural Revolu tion) which demanded a lack of stability. Giap, not by choice it must be admitted, moved to the southern arena. And Che, the epitome of Ebon's theory, moved to the Congo and then to Bolivia. None could remain at a desk in the bureaucracy for long; perhaps the dynamic of revolution in an individual human being can be likened to a drug that is nearly impossible to kick— particularly after one has al ready succeeded spectacularly with it once before. 309 Differences Like the commonalities, there are many differences among the three men. This should not be taken to mean that it is therefore impossible to extract common patterns of thought and action from theqi, for it merely emphasised the fact that revolution must fit its context, and as contexts differ so will revolutions. A basic difference among the three is the nature of the opposition. Mao fought Chinese, then Japanese, then Chinese again. Giap fought French, then Japanese, then French, then Americans. Che fought only Cubans. The first two instances can be considered colonial wars in at least one phase; Cuba cannot be considered a colonial war. All three, however, can be classified as neo-colonial wars in at least one phase and were so seen by each of the men. Linked to the nature of the enemy is the time frame each man was involved in. Both Mao and Giap made brilliant use of the turmoil of World War II to gain their victories; Cuba was in another time frame completely and lacked the "benefit" of a world war to help its revolution along. To contemporary revolutionaries this is one of the attractions of the Cuban revolution---and, of course, of Che---that it was fought in a context (a "peacetime" neo-colonist world) that more nearly matches their own contexts. In China and Vietnam the level of popular unrest was relatively low before the revolutionaries came upon the scene. The populace had become convinced that this was their lot and thus they needed the stimulus of revolution ary leadership. The war helped in this by showing the Chi nese and Vietnamese that their colonial masters were not invincible; and Mao and Giap worked to create a revolution ary consciousness that would lead the masses to act. In Cuba the masses-— including elements of all the social 310 classes---were anti-Batista and needed onLy the focus of the armed guerrilla to move into high gear. Many of the classes were not, however, prepared to back a socialist rev olution and this is where they parted company with Castro and, particularly, the more radical Che. The combination of colonial rule and low revolution ary consciousness made the groundwork that Mao and Giap needed to lay much more extensive than that which Che found necessary. This may help to explain why Che was the least successful of the three in this area; he may have not realized that in other contexts (Bolivia) this kind of groundwork was critical. For Che, the Cuban Revolution may have been too short and too easy to teach him the things he needed to know to move to another country. Within the movements themselves there is a basic dif ference. Both the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions were, regardless of the united front trappings, Communist revolu tions. The leadership of each was firmly committed to Com munist ideology )perceived in their own way of course), and this commitment was taught to their troops. In Cuba there is no evidence that would support labeling that revolution as Communist, Castro was a nationalist lawyer concerned with the plight of his country, not a revolutionary trained in a Communist ideology; Che refused to join the party in Guatemala and did not support "establishment" Communism in his writings. Certainly the Cuban revolutionaries were, or became, socialists and communists (little "c"), but their revolution does not have that dogmatism— -reflected in rev olutionary writings---that is to be found in the other two. This lack of dogmatic commitment appeals to contem porary revolutionaries, particularly after they have in vestigated the role of the orthodox parties in modern revo lutionary movements. And especially after they have ex amined the complicity of the Moscow-oriented party of 311 Bolivia in Che's defeat there. It must be noted also that both Mao and Giap (following Ho) were wise enough to play up nationalism, land, etc. and not Communism. The differ ence is that Mao and Giap were still Communists in the established sense underneath whatever the moment called for, while the Cuban revolutionaries were not and found their political philosophy evolving out of the struggle. An interesting difference is brought to light in Boor man's book on Mao and wei-ch'i.5 For although Mao and Giap had this background of what might be called a "wei-ch'i consciousness" or way of looking at things, and Che did not, they all fought in about the same way. And this similarity cannot be attributed to a teacher-student situation, for the evidence does not support the idea that the Cubans learned at the knee of Mao. Their formal teacher was Alberto Bayo who came out of the Spanish tradition of guerrilla warfare. So here we have a basic difference that does not lead to drastically different consequences. A difference in context can be found in Giap. He is the only one of the three that has had to fight a revolu tionary war in the face of massive American firepower. This has male him, and his collegues in the South, even better at politically organizing the people, for only with the strongest commitment could they withstand the pounding that Vietnam has been subjected to in recent years. It has also made the Vietnamese the masters at guerrilla anti-air craft (particularly anti-helicopter) operations. To see the importance of this difference one needs only to consider Mao's Long March. It is difficult to con ceive of that trek being successfully completed under the massive and continual bombing to which the U.S. has proved it can subject an area to. Had Chiang had massive airpower at this time (and the strategic ability to use it) the out come might have been different. 312 The above is a tactical difference, but there is a basic strategic difference among the three. Both Mao and Giap subscribe to the "stages'1 theory of revolution in which you move from guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare to conventional warfare, and each pretty much followed that pattern in their wars. Che, however, did not subscribe to such a theory as clearly or as strongly. He saw the changes in the war as basically quantitative bigger guer* rilla forces and operations---rather than qualitAtive--- different kinds of armies and operations. This would be a logical conclusion to draw from the experience in Cuba where a guerrilla struggle led alipost directly to success, without any intervening stages. This victory would also lead to Guevara's second ma jor strategic difference with Mao and Giap: the matter of objective versus subjective Conditions. Jay Mallin writes that Guevara argued that it was 'not always neces sary to await the existence of all the con ditions for revolution; the insurrectional focus can create them.1 An insurrection in the form of a guerrilla movement can lead to a general revolution---so thought Guevara. In this, he differed importantly with both Mao and Giap and indeed with Communist think ing generally. He here reflected a naive faith in a sort of magic or mystique about guerrilla warfare that Fidel Castro and he had built up over the years, and which in deed became the foundation for much of Cuba's foreign policies. The mystique may be ex pressed as faith that any guerrilla operation, no matter how small or weak at its inception, can generate the means to its own success, that is, to a Castro-like takeover of power.® There Are at least two ways of dealing with this dif ference. The first is to accept Mailin's view that the unique situation in Cuba (the already-mentioned mass antag onism toward Batista) led Che to believe in the magic of the guerrilla focus. The second is to accept the view 313 given in other works on Che and Bolivia that Che's effort there was not a valid test of his radical theory since he was stabbed in the back by his own "allies". Neither of these ways is really palatable since both seem to contain some measure of truth, and some measure of partisan distor tion. Che certainly overestimated the magical quality of the focus (particularly a focus made up of foreigners) and its ability to overcome competent, aggressive military for ces (something not faced in Cuba), but on the other hand, his detractors ignore the other factors that went into Che's Bolivian defeat. For our purposes it might be best to leave this mat ter unresolved and try to learn something from it as it stands. O'Neill leads the way in this when he tries to ex plain Giap's defeat in the Delta (caused by bad strategy). It would be ridiculous to ascribe this to any thing other than insufficient thought about wider matters of strategy, a common enough fault amongst senior military commanders, but one which might have been avoided had Giap received some formal tuition in the history of strategic thought before he rose to the height of Viet Minh Commander in Chief.7 I think it safe to say that the well-prepared guerrilla strategist of the future will have a more complete educa^ tion in these matters than did Che or Giap. Che himself pointed out that guerrilla warfare is a dangerous business and a harsh master, seldom countenancing mistakes. The difference between success and failure, be tween Cuba and Bolivia may not have been one, then, of strategy so much as one of learning. Giap got a second chance at strategic thinking after the Delta disasters; Che got no second chance in Bolivia. It becomes fairly clear upon examining the stories of these three men and the revolutions they were intimately connected with that the commonalities exceed the differences 314 in importance. I would say that none of the differences discussed above is as important as any one of the basic commonalities to be found among these men. There is one exception to this, however, and it is a difference that must be kept in mind when trying to develop your own pat tern to make sense out of the idea of guerrilla warfare. This one difference involves control of the revolu tion. Both Giap and Che were not the ultimate leaders, both followed another man, and both attributed almost mag ical qualities (which may in fact have been there) to these men. Giap always stood in awe of Ho, and the least chas tisement from him was enough to change his whole outlook on a problem. Che never had the power over Cubans that Castro did (part of this is surely attributable to the fact that Che was not a Cuban) and he realized this; he bowed to Castro in terms of leadership---Cuba was Castro's revolu tion, not Che's. The difference between Giap and Che is that Giap accepted a subordinate role and pursued it with vigor at no time does he appear to have been a threat to Ho while Che increasingly chafed in his role. Che eviden tly saw himself ready to play Castro's role in another (significantly not his own) country and left to do so. In reading Che you get the feeling that he began to feel him self superior to Castro, particularly in terms of the "purity" of his revolutionary thought. Humber two would no longer do. The one man of the three who has never had to play that number two role is Mao. He has been the supreme lead er of the Chinese Revolution throughout its history, with unquestioned power over its course. This is a crucial fac tor to consider when looking at the ideas and actions of the three, for Mao had no one to answer to and thus could do and write exactly what he felt like doing and writing. And he is the only one with the possibility of testing his 315 ideas of utopia completely, unfettered by the need to con- vince superiors of the correctness of his views. Mao, more than any other leader in this century perhaps, has had the opportunity to mold an entire society, an entire people, to his own vision. And that fact puts him in another league entirely from Giap and Che. * * * John Pustay gives a concise comparison of Mao, Giap, and Che in his book Counterinsurgencv Warfare, and his analysis helps to put the three in a common stream of guer rilla thinking. Of Mao Pustay says that the core of his thought is the "unity of opposites" principle, in which the Yin and the Yang are applied to revolutionary warfare. Mao sees strength where others see weakness. Mao's opposites look like this: Enemv Revolutionaries military and economic V manpower and mental strength attitudes airpower V excellent intelligence tanks V propaganda mechanized forces V intelligence geographic area and mobilization Y political mobilization space Y time® In each case the revolutionaries are capable of meeting the enemy's power, not in kind, but with an effective strength of their own. Pustay then covers Mao's concept of the three stages of revolutionary war, his basic strategic principles, and six general principles running through Mao's work. These have all been adequately covered earlier and need not be repeated. Pustay closes with this observation: 316 In summary, the fundamental thread that runs through Mao-Tse-tung's writings on in surgency is the dual concept of adaptation to the realities of a given situation and transformation of conventional weaknesses in to unconventional strengths. Because he ac cepts the ideological thesis of Marx, the in evitability of victory for socialism, he prem ises all designs for strategic and tactical actions on the assumption that time is on his side.9 The belief in the inevitability of victory may well be the key to understanding revolutionary guerrilla warfare. As for Giap, Pustay see him as an elaborator of Mao's thought. Giap was concerned with discerning the lines di viding the three stages of warfare-— understandable given the difference in development of the war in the North as opposed to the South in a complicated situation. Thus, Giap developed criteria for passing from the second into the third stages (stalemate to strategic offensive); his failure in the Delta campaigns indicates that this kind of thinking was not rhetorical but vitally necessary for suc cessful military operations. In this work Giap emphasized the international situation as a factor, a criteria. In his two elaborative amendments to Mao's thoughts on the transition from the second to the third stage, Giap obviously emphasizes the importance of the international political scene upon the conduct of insurgency war. It is this author's contention that Giap's greatest con tribution to the body of Communist insurgency warfare theory is precisely this relating of macrocosmic politics to microcosmic internal war. Given Giap's context (fighting the most powerful enemy in the world) it is easy to understand his concern with the leverage available in world politics. Turning to Che, Pustay points out his attention to the details of guerrilla warfare (an aspect that makes Che's work a true handbook on the subject) and the fact that the Cuban success strengthened the mystique of success that 317 surrounds Maoist and Maoist-type thinking on revolution and Communism. A key divergence from Mao and Giap is seen in Che's statement that not all the objective conditions for success need be present for victory---subjective conditions (the guerrilla focus) can create what is lacking in these objective conditions. In this, as Pustay points out, Che is following (whether consciously or unconsciously) the two ideas of inevitability of success and the Leninist concept of the elite vanguard. But it is in Che's thought on urban guerrillas that Pustay finds the most important addition to revolutionary thought. Che concludes that this aspect has been overlook ed and tries to fill in the gap in his work, stressing co ordination between urban and rural work. This latter point has particularly dangerous im plications in Latin America, where most cities are plagued by masses of unemployed. The poten tial dangers in the marriage of the discontented rural peasants with the discontented newly ur banized and unemployed former peasants through a revolutionary ideology are overwhelming.I* Che's work in Bolivia sought to make this marriage, but it was never consummated. Pustay closes his chapter on these three men with a summary that can be useful to us. He writes that The philosophical core of Communist theory of insurgency warfare, as first proclaimed by Mao Tse-tung and then revised slightly by Vo Nguyen Giap and Ernesto Guevara, is the con cept of finding weakness in strength and strength in weakness. The fundamental strate gic prescription stemming from this concept is the complete politicization of insurgency war fare via the ideological mobilization of the masses in support of the insurgency.12 and: Finally, it appears that the most signifi cant additions to this body of theory to be made in the post-World War II period are Giap's international dimension and Guevara's urban 318 dimension as a subordinate operational element of the rurally dominated guerrilla effort.13 This is a useful summary of these three men, but there is a digression which needs to be made before moving on. Pustay, at the time of writing this book, was a Major in the Air Force at the Air Force Academy^ and was aiming his book at quelling insurgencies in developing countries. In pursuing this aim from a position of influence and authority he has made one crucial twist in thinking: he has associated all insurgency movements with Communism. This was done by restricting his examples to two Communists (Mao and Giap) and turning the third (Che) into a Communist by an act of the pen. This is dangerous since we have a basically anti-Com- munist mentality in this country and thus would oppose any thing linked to Communism. And if insurgency movements are Communist, then we must oppose them. This twist seems aim ed more at preserving the status quo than anything else and indicates the central reason for our inability to compre hend revolution. * * * CHAPTER 6: CHARTS In order to make the leap from violent guerrilla war- fare---the Old Guerrilla to non-violent, Institutional guerrilla warfare---the New Guerrilla---we need a model of guerrilla warfare to give us handles to hold onto. This involves a synthesis and distillation of the major points covered in the analysis of each of these three guerrilla leaders. To make this distillation more useful as a guide for creation of the new model, and just for simple under standing, it will be presented graphically in chart form. I have attempted to outline the areas of concern which can be transferred from Old to New Guerrillas. Hope fully, this method of presentation will focus our thinking on things that need to be done, and only later on how to do them. In short: What does a guerrilla, Old or New, have to consider before designing his/her plan of action? We can put ourselves in the shoes of General Grivas in Greece asking himself the same question upon thinking of Cyprus, keeping in mind however that a plan is never rigid, but al ways flexible. The area of concerns developed from this thinking will then form the skeleton for the New Guerrilla. We will be able to guide the development of a model for prosecuting this new type of guerrilla warfare moving from the general categories used to analyze the three men, (Philosophy, Or ganization, Strategy, Tactics, Post-Victory) through the more numerous areas of concert}, to specific elements of such activity in a new context. At the end of such a de velopmental process we will have a model of the New Guer rilla. * * * 319 320 PHILOSOPHY Desire for change; need for change felt. Destruction of the old society, creation of the new. Definition of the new society. Necessity of a theory of and for action. Goals and theory must be compatible with the people. Definition of the "people". Must reflect the nature and the history of the people. The above pattern is part of a worldwide movement. The people must win their own struggle. A leading group is necessary. Necessity of armed struggle (after all else fails). Two-stage struggle: bourgeois-democratic, then proletarian-socialist Revolutionary war must fit its context. The revolutionary process becomes the content of the win ners. Inevitability of success. * ★ ★ ORGANIZATION Structure: must match the context is geographically organized is internally democratic is functionally divided into: regular, positional, main force regional force, mobile local, semi-armed, militia, guerrilla force develops from guerrilla to 321 regional to main has urban and rural components Organization of forces utilizes political organization and military organization. Cadres are vital for creating and maintaining organizations. Cadres operate internally and externally— -with the people. Command structure is based on centralized strategy with decentralized tactics. Relations with the populace is crucial to organization. Civil administration creates revolutionary change within the context of the war; creates the future in the present. Components of guerrilla struggle include: weapons bases supply communications intelligence propaganda indoctrination and training specialists discipline * * * STRATEGY Strategy directs the operation within the whole situation. Based on careful analysis of the whole situation. Goals, situation, methods must be mutually 322 complementary, Knowledge of self and enemy is vital, Strategic thinking should include: Yin and Yang approach dialectical approach Revolutionary strategy is not military strategy. It is a total strategy including: military political economic social cultural The strategy must have the support of the people. The strategic aims are: destroy enemy personnel increase your own numbers win the support of the people Revolutionary war calls for: strategically protrated struggle tactically quick decisions Passes through stages: strategic defensive or contention preparation for counter offensive or strategic stalemate strategic counter-offensive or general counter-offensive Struggle moves from the country to Che city. Coordination between rural and urban actions. Maintaining the initiative is crucial. Initiative can be maintained even when you are on a defensive. The role of allies can be important. Internal allies and allies outside the country, and in enemy. United Front strategy. Key concepts: attack only when victory is certain develop your strong points; prevent enemy from developing theirs work both sides of the enemy: their front 323 their rear develop a strong rear for your forces create new units as your strength grows generate hatred of the enemy in the people Role of guerrilla warfare: develops into regular warfare supports regular warfare remains the pervasive character- istic of the revolutionary war Revolutionary warfare demands planning and coordination. Demands the flexibility, imagination, and initiative which characterize the conduct of guerrilla warfare. * * * TACTICS Tactical actions advertise the guerrilla band to the people. Reinforce propaganda effort, civil action effort, etc. Actions must be planned on basis of: timing place men Attacks are the best defense. Guerrillas disperse to disappear and work with people, and concentrate to attack enemy forces. Attacks: not on strong positions not on a force which will give a hard battle surprise at night or, second-best, at daybreak unpredictably use feints as part of overall attack cut off or ambush line of retreat withdraw rapidly to a pre-planned location using feints disarm and disperse prisoners 324 after a lecture distribute booty to people attack again and again and again carefully plan attacks perfect knowledge of the terrain favorable, unfavorable, built-up areas surveillance and foresight on lines of escape vigilance over roads of reinforcement relations with people supplies, transport, hiding wounded numerical superiority at point of action total mobility possibility of counting on reserves each attack is part of a series must be planned with this in mind the series* success is the goal Targets: supply columns highways telephone lines railroads airfields telegraph lines supply depots enemy's rear rescue columns Consider the psychological impact when choosing targets. Ambush: a pursuing column a unit retreating from battle a unit lured in upon you couriers mobile units supply columns trains Retreat: timing the start of a retreat is crucial psychological blow (to own troops) of retreat must be dealt with effectively retreat is a good tactic---once guerrilla warfare is understood fully local population screen the retreat "circling around" an enemy unit 325 when the enemy advances, retreat when you meet the enemy unexpectedly, retreat never fight without full information retreat to a pre-planned area wind around off the roads leave signs of travel going the wrong ways All of these actions must be coordinated to be optimally effective. Guerrilla warfare is, above all, a war of intelligence, of wits, of imaginative use of slim resources. Other tactics: propaganda internal, external, among the enemy terrorism very selectively done harassment shoot off the guns don't let the enemy feel secure---ever well-managed, fair, and fruitful base areas secrecy the key to success in a war of intelli gence flexibility to the point of unpredictability * * * POST-VICTORY If possible, the post-victory period should be planned dur ing the struggle so that preparations can be made, thus avoiding disaster and the possible loss of the revolution upon victory. This planning can draw upon the experience in the base areas (liberated areas). Negative aspects: counter-revolutionaries and remnants of enemy must be purged in some manner 326 by violence, by exiling, or by re-education and socialization the pleasure syndrome in one's own forces must be put down Mao called this "sugar-coated bul lets" decadence of the old life versus plain living and hard struggle of the revolutionary (new) life Positive aspects: cadres are crucial they must move in and organize things immediately they are the cement of the struc tures must have them trained and ready get them from the people must learn to run the cities bulk of experience is in the coun try coordination needed multi-faceted problems demand teams avoid "administrative guerrillaism" ---uncoordinated, personal initia tive operations The goal is to implement the philosophy of the revolution in concrete terms. This usually involves some vision of a New Man and a New Society in a New World This usually reflects the distilled virtues of the guerrilla, the guerrilla band, the guerrilla struggle A basic question to be resolved in the post-victory period 327 is the scope of the revolution and the revolutionary vic tory. Do we want: revolutionary victory and consolidation in one society, or the expansion of the revolutionary struggle to the world? * * * CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION This ends Book 1, and serves as a beginning for Book II, The New Guerrilla. We have moved from the basic premise that a "new" way of going about change in the New Industrial State is needed, to a consideration of guerrilla warfare, in its pure form, as an alternative. This consideration was undertaken with the understanding that violent guerrilla warfare was both beyond the parameters of this study and most probably out side the realm of possibility (in terms of success) at this point in time, anywhere in the New Industrial State. Thus, we now have a good grasp of guerrilla warfare and a collec tion of areas of concern which are basic to guerrilla war fare and its successful prosecution. But we cannot stand still with this since guerrilla warfare in its violent form is useless for our purposes. So, it is time to move on again, this time to a con sideration of the New Guerrilla, This will involve the re verse of the process used up to now. In Book I, the Old Guerrilla was subjected to an autopsy-like scrutiny: we took examples apart from many different angles to see what made them tick. Now, to build a model of the New Guerrilla we will take all those parts laid out on the table, re-work them a bit to fit the demands of our non-violent institu tional context, and put them back together again. Hope fully this will result in the New Guerrilla. But it could result in a Frankenstein's monster, a creation not foreseen in the original plan. To avoid this demands an overall plan and vision of what the New Guerril la will need to be like to do the kinds of things we want done. Only with this in mind can the bad parts be thrown 328 329 out and the good parts put together in such a way to a- chieve a good result rather than an unforeseen bad one. This plan and vision, while based on the ideas and semi-visions of Book I, is largely intuitive and thus oper ationally vague (What is a "good" person?). This does not have to be a negative point, however, since one of the bas ic assumptions of this study is that the New Guerrilla, like the Old Guerrilla, is an individual, not an injection molded automaton, and must be an individual given the critical need in guerrilla warfare for flexibility and im aginative initative. In addition to this is the fact that this study is not aimed at creating a god-like New Man, but at devising a set of operational ideas for each of us to consider and use in our own individual way to reach general (and therefore somewhat vague) goals. One more point needs mentioning. In putting together the New Guerrilla many details will be left out, and many valid and effective transfers from Old to New will be left out. This is in line with: (1) the underlying philosophy of this study (vou must create vour model to a large ex tent) which demands creative transfers from Old to New on your part, (2) the very real limitations of time, space, and physical endurance, and (3) a sneaking suspicion that it might not be wise to give away everything (thus blowing the secrecy aspect of the good guerrilla), and (4) an ever present knowledge that I haven't— -and never will---make all those transfers myself. So, with our minds firmly planted in the Old Guerril la, let's move into Book II and create the New Guerrilla: a model for effective action toward radical change in the New Industrial State. 330 Notes BOOK I: The Old Guerrilla Fart I: Introductions 1. Lyrics from "Street Fighting Man". Copyright ABKCO Music, Inc., 1700 Broadway, New York, New York, 10019. Chapter 1: Process 1. Che Guevara. Guerrilla Warfare (NY: Vintage Books, 1961). 2. Thorstein Veblen. The Theory of the Leisure Class (NY: B.W. Huebsch, 1912), p vi. 3. Veblen. The Theory of the Leisure Class, p vi. 4. Veblen. The Theory of the Leisure Class, p vi. 5. Alvin Toffler. Future Shock (NY: Bantam Books, 1970), pp 5-6. 6. Marshall McLuhan. Understanding Media (NY: A Sig net Book, 1964), p 36. 7. Robert Townsend. Up the Organization (Greenwich: A Fawcett Crest Book, 1970), p ix. 8. Townsend. Up the Organization, p xi. 9. Portola Institute. The Last Whole Earth Catalog (Menlo Park: Portola Institute, Inc., 1971), fron- tispiece. Chapter 2: Content 1. John Kenneth Galbraith. The New Industrial State (NY: A Signet Book, 1967), p 21. 2. Galbraith. The New Industrial State, p 21. 3. Galbraith. The New Industrial State, p 22. 4. Jean-Francois Revel. Without Marx or Jesus (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1970), p 22. 5. Revel. Without Marx or Jesus, pp 182-184 6. William 0. Douglas. "A Case for Rebellion" Intel lectual Digest. October 1971, p 43. 7. Herbert Marcuse in a lecture delivered in the spring 331 of 1972 at the University of San Francisco and broad cast over KPFK radio (Los Angeles) on September 11, 1972. 8. Revel. Without Marx or Jesus, p 9. 9. Revel. Without Marx or Jesus, p 235. 10. Portola Institute. The Last Whole Earth Catalog, frontispiece. 11. Townsend. Up the Organization, p xii. Part II: The Old Guerrillas 1. Robert Taber. M-26: Biography of a Revolution (NY: Lyle Stuart, 1961), frontispiece. Chapter 1: Guerrilla Warfare 1. Carlos Castillo & Otto F. Bond. The University of Chicago Soanish-English. Engllsh-Soanish Dictionary (NY: Pocket Books, Inc., 1948). 2. Arthur Campbell. Guerrillas: a History and Analysis (NY: The John Day Company,1967), pp 4-5. 3. Lewis H. Gann. Guerrillas in History (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), p 2. 4. Sun Tzu. The Art of War (NY: Oxford University Press* 1963), p 11. 5. Sun Tzu. The Art of War, p 29. 6. Gann. Guerrillas in History, pp 2-4. 7. Gann. Guerrillas in History, p 5. 8. Gann. Guerrillas in History, pp 9-10. 9. Gann. Guerrillas in History, pp 17-18. 10. Douglas Hyde. The Roots of Guerrilla Warfare (Lon don: The Bodley Head, 1968), p 149. 11. Francois Sully. Age of the Guerrilla (NY: Avon Books, 1968). 12. Sully. Age of the Guerrilla, p 191. 13. Robert Payne. Mao Tse-tung (NY: Weybright and Talley, 1969), pp 105-107. 14. Stuart Schram. Mao Tse-tung (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1966), p 195. 15. Sun Tzu. The Art of War, pp 55-56. 16. Sun Tzu. The Art of War, p 63. 17. Sun Tzu. The Art of War, p 66. 332 18. Sun Tzu. The Art of War. p 77. 19. Sun Tzu. The Art of War. P 84. 20. Sun Tzu. The Art of War. P 93. 21. Sun Tzu. The Art of War. P 88. 22. No author. "Introduction" to T. E. Lawrence. Revolt in the Desert (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran & Com pany^ 1926), p vii. 23. Campbell. Guerrillas: a History and Analysis, p 42. 24. Carleton Beals. Great Guerrilla Warriors (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p 14. 25. T. E. Lawrence. Revolt in the Desert (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran & Company^ 1926), p 24. 26. Lawrence. Revolt in the Desert, p 61. 27. Lawrence. Revolt in the Desert, p 242. 28. Lawrence. Revolt in the Desert, p 293. 29. Lawrence. Revolt in the Desert, pp 305-306. 30. Lawrence. Revolt in the Desert, p 313. 31. Lawrence. Revolt in the Desert, p 326. 32. Lawrence. Revolt in the Desert, p 327. 33. T. E. Lawrence. "Science of Guerrilla Warfare", En cyclopedia Britannica (London: The Encyclopedia Britannica Co., Ltd., 1937), vol. 10, p 950. 34. Lawrence. "Science of Guerrilla Warfare", p 950. 35. Lawrence. "Science of Guerrilla Warfare", p 951. 36. Lawrence. "Science of Guerrilla Warfare", p 951. 37. Lawrence. "Science of Guerrilla Warfare", p 951. 38. Lawrence. "Science of Guerrilla Warfare", p 952. 39. Lawrence. "Science of Guerrilla Warfare", p 953. 40. Lawrence. "Science of Guerrilla Warfare", p 953. 41. Lawrence. "Science of Guerrilla Warfare", p 953. 42. David Caute. Frantz Fanon (NY: The Viking Press, 1970), pp 44-45J 43. Caute. Frantz Fanon. p 57. 44. Frantz Fanon. The Wretched of the Earth (NY: Grove Press, 1961), pp 34-37. 45. Fanon. The Wretched of the Earth, p 94. 333 46. Fanon. The Wretched of the Earth, p 147. 47. Fanon. The Wretched of the Earth, p 22. 48. Fanon. The Wretched of the Earth, p 311. 49. Fanon. The Wretched of the Earth, p 313. 50. Fanon. The Wretched of the Earth, p 315. 51. Sully. Age of the Guerrilla, p 38. 52. Sully. Age of the Guerrilla, pp 60-61. 53. George Grivas. General Grivas on Guerrilla Warfare (NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p 91. 54. Grivas. General Grivas on Guerrilla.Warfare, p 91. 55. Grivas. General Grivas on Guerrilla Warfare, p 91. 56. Grivas. General Grivas on Guerrilla Warfare, p 95. 57. Sully. Age of the Guerrilla, p 58. 58. Grivas. General Grivas on Guerrilla.Warfare, pp 77- 78. 59. Campbell. Guerrillas: a History and Analysis, p 221. 60. Hyde, The Roots of Guerrilla Warfare, pp 131-148. 61. Campbell. Guerrillas: a History and Analysis, p 279. 62. Hyde. The Roots of Guerrilla Warfare, p 14. 63. (ed) William J. Pomeroy. Guerrilla Warfare and Marx ism (NY: International Publishers, 1968), p 15. 64. Mao Tse-tung. On Guerrilla Warfare (NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 196>1). 65. Vo Nguyen Giap. People's War People's Army (NY: Fred erick A. Praeger, 1962). 66. (ed) Jay Mallin. "Che" Guevara on Revolution (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1969), p 25. 67. John S. Pustay. Counterinsurgency Warfare (NY: The Free Press, 19657. Chapter 2: Mao 1. Mao Tse-tung. "Problems of War and Strategy" in Se- lected Works (NY: International Publishers, 1954)7 vol 2, p 272. 2. Stuart Schram. Mao Tse-tung (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1966), p 15. 3. Schram. Mao Tse-tung. p 17. 4. Jerome Ch'en. Mao and the Chinese Revolution (London: 334 0x£6rd University Press, 1965), p 22. 5. Schram. Mao Tse-tung. p 19. 6. Robert Payne. Mao Tse-tung (NY: Weybright and Talley, 1969), p 34. 7. Schram. Mao Tse-tune. p 23. 8. Schram. Mao Tse-tung. p 31. 9. Payne. Mao Tse-tune. p 45. 10. Ch'en. Mao and the Chinese Revolution, p 41. 11. Ch'en. Mao and the Chinese Revolution, pp 43-44. 12. Schram. Mao Tse-tung. pp 37-38. 13. Schram. Mao Tse-tung» p 39. 14. Payne. Mao Tse-tune. p 61. 15. Ch'en. Mao and the Chinese Revolution, p 63. 16. Schram. Mao Tse-tung. p 51. 17. Ch'en. Mao and the Chinese Revolution, pp 56-57. 18. Payne. Mao Tse-tung. p 72. 19. Schram. Mao Tse-tung. p 83. 20. Schram. Mao Tse-tung. p 82. 21. Payne. Mao Tse-tung. p 83. 22. Schram. Mao Tse-tung. pp 74-75. 23. Mao Tse-tung. "Report o£ an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan" in Selected Works, vol 1, pp 58-59. 24. This explanation is found in Selected Works, vol 1, p 303. 25. Payne. Mao Tse-tung. p 105. 26. Payne. Mao Tse-tung. p 109. 27. Benjamin I. Schwartz. Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp 1/7-178. 28. Payne. Mao Tse-tune. pp 116-117. 29. Payne. Mao Tse-tung. p 138. 30. Ch'en. Mao and the Chinese Revolution, p 239. 31. Ch'en. Mao and the Chinese Revolution, p 255. 32. Payne. Mao Tse-tune. p 213. 33. Payne. Mao Tse-tung. p 254. 335 34. Schram. Mao Tse-tune. pp 241-246. 35. Schram. Mao Tse-tung. pp 264-266. 36. Mostafa Rejai. "Introduction" in (ed) Mostafa Rejai. Mao Tse-tung on Revolution and War (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1969),pp 20-22. 37. Payne. Mao Tse-tung. p 315. 38. Robert Jay Lifton. Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution (NY: Random House,1968), p 78. 39. Mao Tse-tung. "Reply to Kuo Mo-Jo" in Ch'en. Mao and the Chinese Revolution, p 360. 40. Mao Tse-tung. "On Practice" in Selected Works, vol. 1, p 292. 41. Mao Tse-tung. "On the Protracted War in Selected Works, vol 2, p 202. 42. Mao Tse-tung. "Strategic Problems of China's Revolu tionary War" in Selected Works, vol 1, p 176. 43. Mao Tse-tung. "The Orientation of the Youth Movement" in Selected Works, vol 3, p 14. 44. Mao Tse-tung. "The Chinese Revolution and the Chi nese Communist Party" in Selected Works, vol 3, pp 100-101. 45. Mao. "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War", p 176. 46. Mao Tse-tung. On Guerrilla Warfare (NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp 43-44. 47. Mao. "On the Protracted War", 204. 48. Mao Tse-tung. "On the Reissue of the Three Main Rulds of Discipline and the Eight Points for Atten- tion---Instruction of the General Headquarters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army" in Selected Works. vol 5, p 155. 49. Mao Tse-tung. "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society" in Selected Works, vol 1, p 13. 50. Mao Tse-tung. "Smash Chiang Kai-shek's Offensive by a War of Self-Defence" in Selected Works, vol 5, p 91. 51. Mao Tse-tung. "The Struggle in the Chingkang Moun tains" in Selected Works, vol 1, p 84. 52. Mao. On Guerrilla Warfare, pp 77-78. 53. Mao. On Guerrilla Warfare, p 114. 336 54. Mao. "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains", p 82. 55. Mao. 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"The Situation and Our Policy After the Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan" in Selected Wprks, vol 5t p 18. 107. Mao Tse-tung. "Introductory Remarks in Selected Works, vol 3, pp 59-60. to The Communist 108. Mao Tse-tung. "On the Tactics of Fighting Japanese Imperialism" in Selected Worlds, vol 1T p 161. 109. Mao. Basic Tactics, p 56. 110. Mao. Basic Tactics, p 56. 111. Mao. Basic Tacticst p 57. 112. Mao. Basic Tactips, p 58. 113. Mao. Basic Tacticst p 58. 114. Mao. Basic Tacticst pp 95-96. 115. Mao. Basic Tactics, p 97-98. 116. Mao. Basic Tactics, p 98. 117. Mao. Basic Tactics, pp 90-91. 118. Mao. Basic Tactics, p 108. 119. Mao. War" "Strategic Problems of China's , p 242. Revolut ionary 120. Mao. Basic Tactics, p 60. 121. Mao. Basic Tactics, pp 60-61. 122. Mao. Basic Tactics, p 102. 123. Mao. Basic Tactics, pp 103-104. 124. Mao. Basic TaptJ.cs, pp 81-82. 125. Mao. War" "Strategic Problems of China's , p 226. Revolutionary 126. Mao. 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Ho Chi Mlnh. p 196. 25. Giap. People's War People's Army, p 35. 26. Giap. People's War People's Armv. pp 69-70. 27. Vo Nguyen Giap. "The Final Phase of Battle" in (ed) Russell Stetler. The Military Art of People's War: Selected Writings of General Vo Neuven Giap (NY: Monthly Review Press, 1^0), p 313. 28. Giap. People's War People's Armv. p 43. 29. Vo Nguyen Giap. "The Political and Military Line of Our Party" in Stetler. The Military Art of People's War, p 163. 30. Giap. "The Political and Military Line of Our Party", p 168. 31. Vo Nguyen Giap. The South Vietnam People Will Win (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1965), p 71. 32. Vo Nguyen Giap. "Their Dien Bien Phu Will Come: An Interview" in Stetler. The Military Art of People's Wgr, pp 329-330. 33. Giap. People's War People's Armv. p 36. 34. Giap. People's War People's Armv. p 153. 35. Giap, Banner of People's War, p 107. 36. Giap. People's War People's Armv. p 78. 37. Giap. People's War People's Armv. p 78, 38. Giap. 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Malcolm W. Browne. The New Face of War (NY: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., l9(»8), p )9. Browne. The New Face of War, p 79. Browne. The New Face of War, p 189. Browne. The New Face of War, p 336. Browne. The New Face of War, p 337. Pike. Viet Cong, pp 50-51. Pike. Viet Cong, pp 42-43. Pike. Viet Cong, p 43. Chapter 4: Che Ernesto Che Guevara. "Message to the Tricontinental: 'Create two, three...many Vietnams'" in (ed) John Gerassi, Venceremost The Speeches and Writings of Ernesto Che Guevara CNY: The Macmillan Company. 1968), p 424. Martin Ebon, Che: The Making of a Legend (NY: Uni verse Books, 1969;, p 10. Richard Harris. Death of a Revolutionary: Che Gue- vara's Last Mission (NY: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 346 1970), p 18. 4. Ebon. Che: The Making of a_Legend. p 14. 5. Andrew Sinclair, Che Guevara (NY: The Viking Press, 1970), p 3. 6. Ricardo Rojo. Mv Friend Che (NY: The Dial Press, 1968), p 26. 7. Ebon. Che: The Making of a Legend, p 29. 8. This is from the introduction to Gerassi. Vencere- mos!, p 11. 9. Harris. Death of a Revolutionary, p 28. 10. This is from the introduction to Gerassi. Vencere- mos!. p 11. 11. Rojo. Mv Friend Che, p 70. 12. Sinclair. Che Guevara, p 13. 13. Ebon. Che: The Making of a Legend, p 35. 14. Ernesto Che Guevara. Reminiscences of the Cuban Rev olution War (NY: Monthly Review Press, 1968), p 44. 15. Che. Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War, p 44. 16. Sinclair. Che Guevara, p 51. 17. Ebon. Che: The Making of a Legend, p 47. 18. Ebon. Che: The Making of a Legend, p 52. 19. Rojo. Mv Friend Che, p 153. 20. Sinclair. Che Guevara, p 84. 21. Ebon. Che: The Making of a Legend, p 55. 22. Ebon. Che: The Making of a Legend, p 56. 23. Harris. Death of a Revolutionary, p 36. 24. Rojo. My Friend Che, p 178. 25. Harris. Death of a Revolutionary, p 59. 26. (ed) Daniel James. The Complete Bolivian Diaries of Che Guevara and Other Captured Documents (NY: Stein and Day, Publishers, 1968), p 80. 27. Ernesto Che Guevara. Episodes of the Revolutionary War (NY: International Publishers, 1968), p 5. 28. Che, Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War, p 25. 29. Ernesto Che Guevara. "Social Ideals of the Rebel 347 Army" in (ed) Rolando E. Bonachea & Netso P. Valdes. Che: Selected Works of Ernesto Guevara (Cambridge: The M. I. T. Press, 1969), p 199. 30. Ernest Che Guevara. Guerrilla Warfare (NY: Vintage Books, 1969), p 5. 31. Ernest Che Guevara. "Cuba: Exceptional Case or Van guard in the Struggle Against Colonialism?" in Bon achea & Valdes. Che: Selected Works, p 63. 32. Ernesto Che Guevara. On Guerrilla Warfare (NY: Fred erick A, Praeger, 1961), p 4. 33. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, pp 3-4. 34. Ernesto Che Guevara. "Notes for the Study of the Ideology of the Cuban Revolution" in Bonachea & Val des. Che: Selected Works, p 48. 35. Che. Guerrilla WarfareT p 35. 36. Che. "Notes for the Study of the Ideology of the Cuban Revolution", p 55. 37. Che. "Notes for the Study of the Ideology of the Cuban Revolution", p 55. 38. Che. Guerrilla Warfare, p 35. 39. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, p xxxii. 40. Ernesto Che Guevara. "The Duty of a Revolutionary Doctor" in Bonachea & Valdes. Chei Selected Works, p 258. 41. Ernesto Che Guevara. "Interview with Liberation" in (ed) George Lavan. CheGuevara Sneaks: Selected Speeches and Writings (NY: Merit Publishers. 1967). p 120. 42. Che. "Cuba: Exceptional Case or Vanguard in the Struggle Against Colonialism?", p 66. 43. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, p 38. 44. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, pp 38-39. 45. Che. Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War. o 146. 46. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, pp 54-55. 47. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, pp 55-56. 48. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, pp 56-57. 49. Che. Guerrilla Warfare, pp 82-83. 50. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, p 48. 348 51. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, pp 61-62. 52. Che. Guerrilla Warfare, p 69. 53. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, pp 60-61. 54. Che. Guerrllla Warfare. p 68. 55. Che. Guerrilla Warfare, p 82. 56. James. The Complete Bolivian Diaries, p 93. 57. James. The Complete Bolivian Diaries, p 95. 58. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, p 62. 59. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, p 63. 60. Che. Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War, p 126. 61. James, The Complete Bolivian Diaries, p 104. 62. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, p 64. 63. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, p 65. 64. Che. Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War, p 62. 65. Che. Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War, p 175. 66. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, p 53. 67. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, pp 53-54. 68. Che. Reminiscences of the Cuban, Revolutionary War, p 96. 69. Che. “Social Ideals of the Rebel Army", p 199. 70. Ernesto Che Guevara. "Four Articles on Revolutionary Warfare" in Che. Episodes of the Revolutionary,War, p 123. 71. Che. Guerrilla Warfare, p 23. 72. Che. Guerrilla Warfare, p 96. 73. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, pp 34-35. 74. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, pp 37-38. 75. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, p 26. 76. Che. Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War, p 92. 77. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, pp 58-59. 78. Che. Guerrilla Warfare, p 46. 79. Che. Guerrilla Warfare, p 52. 349 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. Che. Guerrilla Warfare, p 52. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, p 22. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, p 25. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, p 29. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, pp 41-42. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, p 44. Che. Guerrilla Warfare, p 23. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, pp 31-32. Che. Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War, p 101. Che. Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War, p 200. Che. Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War, pp 208-209^ Che. Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War, p 249. Ernesto Che Guevara. "Instructions for Cadres Who Work in Urban Areas" in Bonachea and Valdes. Che; Selected Works, p 187. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, p 67. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, p 10. Ernesto Che Guevara. "Tactics and Strategy of the Latin America Revolution" in Bonachea and Valdes. Chet Selected Works, p 77. Che. Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War, p 33. Ernesto Che Guevara. "A New Old Che Guevara Inter view" in Bonachea and Valdes. Che: Selected Works, p 369. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, pp 6-7. James. The Complete Bolivian Diaries, p 151. Ernesto Che Guevara. "Guerrilla Warfare: A Method" in Bonachea and Valdes. Che: Selected Works, p 100. Che. Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War, p 193. Che. Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War, p 194. Che. Guerrilla Warfare, p 9. Che. Guerrilla Warfare, p 10. 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 350 Che. Guerrilla Warfare, p 10. Che. Guerrilla Warfare, p 12. Che. "Guerrilla Warfare: A Method", p 101. Che. "A New Old Che Guevara Interview", p 370. Che. "Guerrilla Warfare: A Method", p 101. Che. "A New Old Che Guevara Interview", p 369. Che. "A New Old Che Guevara Interview", p 369. Ernesto Che Guevara. "The Role of a Marxist-Leninist Party" in Bonachea and Valdes. Che: Selected Works, p 107. Che. "The Role of a Marxist-Leninist Party", p 107. Ernesto Che Guevara. "To the Miners of Bolivia" in Bonachea and Valdes. Che: Selected Works, p 186. Che, On Guerrilla Warfare, p 11. Che. "Guerrilla Warfare: A Method", p 95. Ernesto Che Guevara. "Message to the Tricontinental" in Bonachea and Valdes. Che: Selected Works, p 180. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, p 10. Che. Guerrilla Warfare, p 7. Che. "Four Articles on Revolutionary Warfare", p 126. Che. "Message to the Tricontinfental", p 181. Che. Guerrilla Warfare, p 12. Che. Guerrilla Warfare, pp 14-15. Che. Guerrilla Warfare, p 18. Che. Guerrilla Warfare, p 63. p 20. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare Che. On Guerrilla Warfare Che. On Guerrilla Warfare Che. On Guerrilla Warfare Che. On Guerrilla Warfare Che. On Guerrilla Warfare Che. On Guerrilla Warfare Che. On Guerrilla Warfare Che. On Guerrilla Warfare Che. On Guerrilla Warfare p 21. p 21. p 23. p 24. p 25. p 25. pp 27-28. p 43. p 16. 351 136. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, p 16. 137. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, p 36. 138. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, p 41. 139. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, p 42. 140. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, p 43. 141. Che. Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War, p 229. 142. Che. "Four Articles on Revolutionary Warfare", p 132. 143. Che. Reminiscences of the Cuban Revoli^tlonarv War, p 110. 144. Che. Episodes of the Revolutionary War, p 135. 145. Che. Episodes of the Revolutionary War, p 136. 146. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, p 18. 147. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, p 19. 148. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, p 45. 149. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, p 65. 150. Che. Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War, p 156. 151. Che. Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War, p 161. 152. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, p 16. 153. Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, p 18. 154. 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"Interview with Laura Berquist" in Bonachea and Valdes. Che: Selected Works, p 384. 173. Che. "Cuba: Exceptional Case of Vanguard in the Struggle Against Colonialism", p 64. 174. Ernesto Che Guevara. "The Sin of Revolution" in Ger assi. Venceremos!. p 129. 175. Ernesto Che Guevara. "On Economic Planning in Cuba" in Gerassi. Venceremos1. p 149. 176. Ernesto Che Guevara. "The Cadre, Backbone of the Rev olution" in Bonachea and Valdes. Che: Selected Works, p 73. 177. Che. "The Cadre, Backbone of the Revolution", p 73. 178. Ernesto Che Guevara. "On Party Militancy" in Gerassi. Venceremos!, p 246. 179. Ernesto Che Guevara. "Socialism and Man in Cuba" in Bonachea and Valdes. Che; Selected Works, p 156. 180. Che. "Socialism and Man in Cuba", p 159. 181. Ernesto Che Guevara. "Against Bureaucratism" in Ger assi. Venceremos!, p 220. 182. Che. "Against Bureaucratism", p 221. 183. Che. "Against Bureaucratism", p 225. 184. Che. "Socialism and Man in Cuba", p 161. 185. Bonachea and Valdes. 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Che: The Making of a Legend, p 44. 203. Ebon. Che: The Making of a Legend, p 44. 204. Rojo. Mv Friend Che, Chapter 8; Harris. Death of_a Revolutionary. pp 64-65. 205. James. The Complete Bolivian Diaries, p 15. 206. James. The Complete Bolivian Diaries. p 17. 207. James. The Complete Bolivian Diaries. p 19. 208. James. The Complete Bolivian Diaries. PF > 36-40. 209. James. The Complete Bolivian Diaries. P 68. 210. Ebon. Che: The Makine of a Leeend. Chanter 19. 211. James. The Complete Bolivian Diaries. p 68. 212. James. The Complete Bolivian Diaries. P 69. 213. Harris. Death of a Revolutionary. p 51. 214. Harris. Death of a Revolutionary, p 159. 215. Harris. Death of a Revolutionary, p 164. 216. Harris. Death of a Revolutionary, p 204. 217. Harris. Death of a Revolutionary, p 91. 218. Lee Lockwood. Castro's Cuba. Cuba's Fidel (NY: The Macmillan Co., 1967), p 80. 354 219. 220. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. Rojo. Mv Friend Che, p 17. Luis J. Gonzalez & Gustavo A. Sanchez Salazar. The Great Rebel: Che Guevara in Bolivia (NY: Grove Press. 1969), p 41. Chapter 5: Comparison Abraham H. Maslow. Toward a Psychology of Being (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1962) (ed) Mostafa Rejai. Mao Tse-tune on Revolution and War (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1969), p xvii. Robert J. O'Neill. General Giap (NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp 70-71. Martin Ebon. Che: The Making of a Legend (NY: Uni verse Books, 1969), pp 138-139. Scott Boorman. The Protracted Game: A Wei-ch'i In terpretation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy (NY: Oxford University Press, 19o£). Jay Mallin. "Che" Guevara on Revolution (Coral Ga bles: University of Miami Press, 1969), pp 30-31. O'Neill. General Giap. pp 84-85. John S. Pustay. Counterinsurgencv Warfare (NY: The Free Press, 1965), p 30. Pustay. Counterinsurgencv Warfare, p 40. Pustay. Counterinsurgencv Warfare, p 44. Pustay. Counterinsurgencv Warfare, p 49. Pustay. Counterinsurgencv Warfare, p 50. Pustay. Counterinsurgencv Warfare, p 50. BOOK II: The New Guerrilla For Linda 355 Part I: Introductions To subdue the enemv without fighting, is the acm.e of skill. Sun Tzu1 356 CHAPTER 1: PROCESS This chapter is an introduction to the process which is used in this study, with emphasis on the process compo nents peculiar to an analysis of the New Guerrilla. The following chapter will go into the content of this analysis. The process components emphasized in the introductory chapter to the study of the Old Guerrilla hold here, with some emphases. The lack of citations to "prove" points is intensified here since many of the points are (at least) semi-original with me. The tentativeness of conclusions is hard to achieve given the basic situational nature of the New Guerrilla and his/her operation. The mosaic mode is continued with an intensity partially based on the fact that our society is hard to get a handle on in the first place: Who can make definitive statements about society that will stand the test of even a short time? The hand book nature is of heightened importance; in fact, what fol lows could be seen as an attempt to build a handbook for the handbooks of others---again the situational aspect of the context and the individualism of the people involved do not allow one handbook to serve all, each person needs their own. And, finally, the Whole Earth Catalog-type use of sources is consciously applied here. Those sources I men tion are those which I feel can be useful tools for New Guerrillas developing their own frameworks and toolkits for action. The ideas presented here are not as well developed as those found in the Old Guerrilla for two reasons. First, much of the thinking and explication here depends on you the reader making transfers and leaps from the Old to the New Guerrillas. X won't waste our time explaining "ambush," 357 358 I'll assume you know what it means in the Old sense and are with me in the operational definition of the term in the New sense. Second, rather than relating what was I am sketching what might be, and that, almost by definition, cannot be as well developed. Thus, what you have is an unfinished product which you will have to complete to make yours. For example, the section on Philosophy contains the words of many different people, it contains little of their actions. You have to fill in that part by adding their actions to the picture so that you really understand the meaning of the words, the force behind them, the seriousness with which they were spoken or written. Or, another example, my image of an in stitutional ambush may not relate to your situation; you have to create something to fill that gap. Only by your active participation can the New Guerrilla be created in vour image. Finally, there is the time component. These ideas are put down within a definite time horizon. They are not for the ages and should not be taken as such. What may be for the ages is what is already with us: the revolutionary thrust of human progress and the viability of the weak, via guerrilla warfare, to confront and defeat the powerful. If these two things are kept in mind then vour version of the New Guerrilla can never grow out of date. So much for process. CHAPTER 2: CONTENT This chapter is an introduction to the content of the New Guerrilla. Some of the things said in the introduction to the Old Guerrilla may need a brief refreshing. The New Guerrilla model of action is a response to the rise of the New Industrial State, that collection of giant corporations which dominates our lives in the twenti eth century. Dominates it to our common detriment. If you need to be convinced of that dominance or of its detrimental nature, you need to do some spadework before getting into this, since that will not be demonstrated here. The New Guerrilla is a response to the lack of via bility of other modes of changing society. Democracy has not worked; if it had we wouldn't still be searching for means for change. The man-on-the-white-horse idea hasn't worked---our heroes have fallen flat and died young---as well we might expect since the problem is not with a few men at the top but with j£s; until we change ourselves into self-controlling human beings we will continue to be con trolled. The New Guerrilla seeks to show people how to get the power they need to control themselves, to control the course of their own lives, to build that kind of society. The New Guerrilla's battlefield is the whole spectrum of governmental administrative institutions (although many of you may want to try it out in the corporations). This is because that's the easiest place to get in. The minor ity groups have shown us this: civil service tests know no color; now we can add that they know no guerrillas either. It is easiest to infiltrate the government and then use the government to control the New Industrial State (which cur rently controls us) than it is to go head on at the State 359 360 itself. Thus, for the New Guerrilla, the governments are not the enemy, they are a useful tool, no more, no less. And anyway, isn't that what governments were originally sup posed to do: serve all the people? The New Guerrilla is based squarely on the concept that having the answer is not the answer. We all know what the answers to our problems are. Books are written full of answers. Classes are taught full of answers. The media is full of answers. But having the answer is not the answer since having it is not the same as doing it. The New Guer rilla assumes that you already have the answer and want some help in coming up with ideas on doing the answer. If the New Guerrilla is not the answer, is it the way? There is always a tendency to think that your own ideas are the only ones that will work, and that needs to be denied here. The New Guerrilla is a way, not the way. It is a suggested mode of action which has worked for many people in the administrative branch of governments and shows prom ise of working for many more, but it is not the only thing that works. This needs to be clearly stated, so I'll say it another way: the concept of the New Guerrilla is not designed to replace every other mode of action, every other way, it is designed to give a framework to a certain group of activities and to put yet one more tool in the hands of those who would change American society. The new Guerrilla can exist because of one little quirk in the system we live in. Galbraith pointed it out with his concept of the "technostructure" when he showed that technologically advanced industries demand highly ed ucated people and that those people would not, because of their education, put up with repression. I would question the simplicity of that belief (which I think it is, belief rather than fact) since our whole educational structure (media, schools, peer groups, etc.) is designed to incorpor 361 ate all of us into the same interlocking mentality that dominates the New Industrial State, rather than totally ed ucate us. The State has met its need for highly educated people by educating selectively. Get all the scientific and tech nological education you want (including the most sophisti cated psychological and sociological manipulative techniques known to university professors), but don't take any courses, that might change your values. Why don't we teach about real American history, real Communism, real revolution in academic institutions? Because those students which academ ic institutions produce have the power to run the society, and the New Industrial State's gamble is that they will not run it on the basis of any other values except those sanc tioned by the State, and thus, to £lay it safe, divergent values are not introduced. That's the quirk, that's the breach in the wall, that's the potentially fatal flaw in the monolithic struc ture. If we come to have different values that means we can run the State for different ends, because we have been so highly trained in the running of the State that we know it better than anyone else, including the current genera tion of directors. We can take Che's words to heart here. He said of American radicals, "I envy you in the United States. You are in the heart of the beast.Public ad ministrators, and this means all people who work in govern ment without political appointment, are in the heart of the beast. They have the power to control the society, and they do control it— in the name of the New Industrial State. But what happens if their values change? They have just stepped over the line into the strange world of the New Guerrilla. The concept of the New Guerrilla is not new. The group which created the Community Action Program component 362 of the Poverty Program called themselves "guerrillas" and acted accordingly.2 Anthony Burton has written a book ti tled A Programmed Guide to Office Warfare^ which, while somewhat tongue-in-cheek, works along lines which would be familiar to a guerrilla of the institutional stripe. And of course there is Townsend's already-mentioned Uo the Or ganization. Articles increasingly toy with the idea of working from within, infiltration, and out-and-out guerril la jargon. Beyond that there is the often overlooked fact that those who write follow those who act. There are New Guer rilla-type groups already operating in Federal departments, and it is to be expected that there are groups at other levels. The number of individuals who confide that they are working from within-— and actually are---mounts. These would all be fascinating grist for this mill, but you will not find it here. For exposure kills, and the whole point is not to kill but to nurture. So the model built here is based on the violent guer rilla. I feel that if we are to talk about "guerrillas" then we should know about guerrillas, really know about them. That is the purpose of Book I, to get you acquainted with the tried and true Old Guerrilla. Now we are moving into the New Guerrilla. The concept is mentioned more fre quently, with a variety of labels, but here we are (togeth er, if you have been drawn into participating) going to work the idea over and try to come up with something we can all use to some extent, in our own institutional lives. The concept is semi-new, no more, but the version you cre ate will be new and meaningful for you. Two things need to be added at this point. First, I am not trying to "prove" that an analogy exists, in fact, between Old guerrilla warfare and New guerrilla warfare. The links between the two modes of action are intuitive and 363 heuristic rather than concrete and quantifiable. The goal is a guide for action, not an airtight case proving the va lidity of the analogy. Whether the New Guerrilla model is effective is much more important than whether it logically follows, with some sort of scientific rigor, from the Old Guerrilla. Second, the New Guerrilla is not a call to violence or illegality. Violence and illegality are completely be yond the boundaries of the model. This is an important point to digest before going any further: the New Guerril la is a model for action within legal and non-violent bound aries set up by the institutional system itself. Thus, while the language, because of the use of the Old guerrilla warfare base, may smack of violence and illegality, this is not the intent. Again, the New Guerrilla is not a call to violence or illegality. Within the format and general lines of thought dis tilled out of the Old Guerrilla, then, we enter the world of the New Guerrilla. From the jungles of Vietnam and Cuba to the jungles of the governmental institution. From the Great Wall of China to the great walls of bureaucracy. From the Giap who could be mistaken for a Vietnamese peas ant to the New Guerrilla who is just "like" all bureaucrats. Part II: The New Guerrillas "There are many here among us who feel that life is but a Toke. But, you and I. we've been thru that. And this is not our fate. So. let us not talk falsely now. The hour is setting late." Bob Dylan* 364 CHAPTER 1: PHILOSOPHY Of the five categories used here Philosophy is by far the most important. For the categories of Organization, Strategy, and Tactics are strai^it-forward transfers of modes of actions from one field to another, and can thus be con sidered "technical" in nature. Post-Victory involves a vision of a new society, and most of us already have such a vision roughed-out. But Philosophy is another matter, for it must somehow justify such concepts as "revolution," "radical," and "guerrilla warfare" in the face of societal norms that make these terms distasteful at best and trea sonous at worst. The major problem is summed up by Supreme Court Jus tice William 0. Douglas: Yet in the American witchhunt that followed World War II the word "revolution" became al most subversive. We of the West-— rich in the democratic tradition of revolution---no longer published books on the subject. We let the com munists pre-empt the field. Those who wanted books on how to conduct a revolution had to get them from the communist press. Indeed, we lost our pride in "revolution" as an American con cept and identified it largely with communism.! And we still live in the hangover from that period in our history. In attempting to solve this problem it is not enough to look abroad for good and just revolutions or to try to legitimize communist theory for an American audience, the only really effective way to restore respectability to these concepts is to find their roots in our own history and traditions. To do this means we have to relearn (or learn for the first time depending on the circumstances) some key things from our own history and traditions. This, then, is the aim of the Philosophy section: I am attempt 365 366 ing to build an American philosophical foundation for Amer ican New Guerrillas. It is to fill a need, more than any other, that the following is directed. New Guerrillas, like Old Guerrillas, desperately need to feel that what they are doing is right ---this is what enables them to go on under adverse condi tions. And it is my position that the New guerrilla war fare is eminently right in terms of everything Americans traditionally have believed in and stood for. In this Philosophy I focus on three elements: a Christianity strongly based in Judaism and the historical Christ, the American tradition of revolution and radicalism, and the American Guerrilla experience. The format will be similar to that used in the Old Guerrilla: an Introduction, a series of relevant quotations, and a summary-conclusion. And, as with the Old Guerrilla, the information provided will give a good outline, but only an outline. The work needed to flesh it out has to be the responsibility of the person seeking to build a personal model for action. Christianity Christianity and revolution do not seem compatible, but that does not mean they are not. What has happened is that Christianity and revolution have been forcibly sepa rated from their intertwined relationship by the conscious and unconscious activities of those who were responsible for the perpetuation of the religion after the fall of Jerusalem in 70 A.D. Analysis of this separation, and a movement toward reunification, has been started by writers looking into the historical roots of Christianity and the context of the religion's birth. Some of these writers are touched on below in outlining what appears to be a truer 367 version of Christianity's key figure and early years. Perhaps the key to unlocking the revolutionary char acter of the historical Jesus is to realize that Jesus was part of the Jewish religion, a religion that prohibited sub servience to any kings before God, This made Judaism— -and thus Jesus's teachings---automatically revolutionary in an Israel which was a colony of Rome, The tradition of the Maccabees was alive in Israel under the Romans; this revo lutionary undercurrent permeated the time of Jesus. In 4 B.C., near the time of the birth of Jesus, there was a revolt in Israel against the Romans. This was put down and two thousand Jewish insurgents crucified around Jerusalem's walls. As Diane Pike and R. Scott Kennedy write, "...the atmosphere of oppression by the Romans be came almost unbearable to the Jews, and they watched all the more eagerly for God's intervention through His Mes siah, "2 The Jews waited and hoped for the coming of the Messiah to lead them against the Romans and, expelling them, to build the kingdom of God. All Jews did not wait however; many took to the hills and began the guerrilla wars against the Romans which broke out sporadically. Many more felt allied to the fighters in spirit. And all of these became known as "Zealots;" Brief ly, then, the context of Jesus's life was one of a strongly religious people with a tradition of resistance to external secular authority, occassionally engaged in guerrilla war against the Romans, led by the Zealots and waiting for the Messiahic moment to strike massively for freedom once again. Enter Jesus. A man who had lived and taught in Gali lee, the home of the Jewish resistance movement.3 A man who taught a strong Jewish line, close to the teachings of the community at Qumran (site of the Dead Sea Sciroils) where Jews lived strictly by the Law in order to hasten the coming of the kingdom, and who began to see himself as the 368 crucial catalyst for such an event. 'A man who had numerous disciples to spread the word, with an inner twelve that in cluded one Zealot, Simon; two "hotheads," James and John; an "outlaw" or "rebel," Peter; a possible member of the Zealot daggermen, Judas; and at least five men with Macca- bean names (a contemporary indication of Zealot feelings).^ A man whose last days included the takeover of the Temple in Jerusalem during the same period that an insurrection took place: Barabbas was part of that defeated insurrec tion, and Jesus was crucified between two men likely to have been captured insurgents.^ Finally, and most importantly, Jesus was crucified. Crucifixion was the Roman penalty for sedition; stoning was the Jewish penalty for heresy. Thus Jesus's crime was not heresy or any related crime against the Temple leaders, it was what Pilate clearly labeled it on the titulus placed on Jesus's cross: Jesus had placed himself before Caesar as "the King of the Jews." S.G.F. Brandon concludes that: "Thus was Jesus executed as the leader of the revolt which occurred in Jerusalem, at that historic Passover of the year 30."^ Even in this brief account we can see that Jesus him self, the nature of his teachings, and the make-up of his followers place him squarely in the mainstream of the apoc alyptic, Messianist, revolutionary Jews of Roman Israel, That a man should be a manifestation of the turbulence of his times should not surprise us. What may be surprising, however, is that this is not the Jesus that emerges in the Gospels or that has been created by the established church es. The reasons for our distorted picture of Jesus are understandable though. Three dominant ones emerge for this creation of a new image of Jesus. First, in the uprising of 66-70, which was crushed by the Romans, the Mother 369 Church in Jerusalem was destroyed, documents lost, and the membership scattered throughout the Roman Empire. Thus the writers who followed lacked good documentation for their writings (which make up the New Testament). And second, the Gospel writers, led by Mark, did all they could to re move the nationalism from Jesus. Pilate is absolved of guilt and the Jewish hierarchy made the executioners of Jesus. This was absolutely vital for the survival of what had become “Christianity," for the doctrine as originally acted out by Jesus was revolutionary and anti-Roman and if this line continued to be preached the Romans (or any other state) would, logically, stamp it out just as they stamp ed out Jesus. In order to avoid this, Jesus was cleaned up and made a victim of Jewish persecution rather than a threat to the Roman state who was executed for sedition after implication in an armed insurrection. Third, the reality of Jesus's failure had to be dealt with. By Jewish standards Jesus failed the Mes sianic test. He was not able to constrain “all Israel" to walk in the light of the Law; he did not succeed in overthrowing Israel's Roman oppressors; he did not have an opportu nity to rebuild the Temple according to the Law and to gather the remnants of Israel to him. He was killed. As Maimonides suggests, in all these regards, he was no different from other “potential" Messiahs, many of whom we have mentioned in the course of our book* He may have been perfect in his righteous ness and therefore highly respected and much loved. But he could not be considered the Messiah, for he was killed.7 And the Gospel writers strove to overcome this glaring weak ness in Jesus as the object for continued belief. The result of these three factors was a Testament not to a revolutionary Jewish leader, but to a passive Savior who would come again. While this may have enabled Christi- 370 anity to survive, grow, and eventually dominate the reli gious life of the West, it also robbed Jesus of the essence of his secular teachings: the necessity of a people to throw off the oppression which keeps them from living out their membership in the Kingdom of God. Obviously this is a powerful call to arms, and just as obviously it is not the religion which has been used to keep races, ethnic groups, and segments of other populations passive in the face of oppression. The religion that promised a better life after death to the American black slave is not the religion that called Jewish Zealots to action against the Roman oppressors. One example can indicate the depth of the changes which have occurred in Christianity in the last 2000 years, and how far removed it has become from what it originally seems to have been. The Zealot guerrillas, the communes in the wilderness, John the Baptist's followers, and the dis ciples of Jesus were all voluntarily poor. None used or earned money; this was a commitment to a different life as well as a blow against the Romans, vahose money they would have had to use. Because of this the word "poor" became synonymous with the freedom movement in Israel, it became another name for those working for the Kingdom of God. Now, when this idea is read back into many of the teachings of Jesus, the whole meaning is changed; giving to the poor was not an act of charity, it was an act of revolution.& Christian revisionists have indicated through new trans lations that the very language of the New Testament seems to have been used to clean up Jesus and his revolutionary followers. The question then becomes: Was Jesus preaching what we know as ' ‘ Christianity" today (giving to charity) or was he preaching revolution (giving to the poor)? Whether we see Jesus as a sincere person who believed he was the Messiah and structured a "plot" complete with a 371 drug to make him appear dead on the cross (Schonfield's The Passover Plot), or as a would-be Messiah who later became a bit of an embarrassment to his followers (Brandon's The Trail of Jesus of Nazereth). or as a devout Jew who gradu ally grew from a follower of John the Baptist through feel ings that he was Elijah or Moses, to a hope that he could be used by God in the Messiah-role (Pike and Kennedy, The Wilderness Revolt), the revolutionary content is there. This content has been clarified by the release from external omnipotence given Christians by the "death of God" movement. By denying the utility of an external God-figure in men's lives, Christian eyes have returned to the secular world where they belonged in the first place. There is no need to give a history of this movement, nor to elaborate on the parameters of radical Christianity. What is neces sary here is to indicate by a few quotations that the move ment exists, that it is related to the new vision of Jesus and his movement, and that it underlies the various selec tions further on in the presentation of ideas pertaining to Philosophy. Michael Novak relates Christianity to the here-and-now when he writes, The sign of Jesus is the surd: the cross, from which grace does not spare us. Redemption does not bring excape from absurdity, but reconcili ation, the will to struggle, and continual new beginnings. Redemption does not save us from our own infidelities, inconsistencies, cruel ties or conceits, which seem to continue with out end. Christianity is not, in that sense, a religion of salvation; it is a religion of hard and painful reality.9 The world is the Christian focus, the hard and painful real ity. And what is the Christian role in that world? Arthur Gish: To be a Christian is to be a subversive, or at least that is how he will be viewed by society. Since his loyalty is to one who is 372 beyond history, he cannot give his ultimate allegiance to any government, business, class, or any other institution. His views cannot be expected to coincide with the majority view around him. He can be expected to be in continual conflict with the struc tures of the society, for to be at peace with Gdd means to be in conflict with the world. When a Christian is faithful to Christ and re fuses compromise with the demands of society, it is almost inevitable that he will be look ed upon by the power structures of that soci ety as being disloyal and subversive, and so he is. He is a person who dares to call the whole society into question. He is a revolu tionary. 10 In the selections following Jesus's own words are the words of some of these Christian revolutionaries. These words are important to that Philosophy since they are con temporary manifestations of the revolutionary attitude and activity and words of Jesus himself. And they give us con crete examples to relate to in our time. In Christianity, then, can be found a strong pillar supporting revolutionary thought and action. And since Christianity, and the Judaism in which it is so firmly root ed, are the major religions of this society, this pillar supports yjs. It gives ys something to base revolutionary thinking on; it says to ys: your most revered religious leader gives sanction and support to revolutionary acts. The American Tradition To most observers it would seem logical that a nation bom in violent revolution would spawn a society with a rev* olutionary outlook and a reverence for its revolutionary past. This is not the case in this country, however, and the reason for this situation says a lot about our society in and of itself. 373 We have become, essentially, an ahistorical people. Things have moved so fast in reality---the Westward expan sion, the rise of urban areas, war after war---and, more recently, in unreality-— the constant barrage of "new" media fare and "new" products, with their accompanying "new" ads, and a continuing, and accelerating series of "new" fads that we seem unable to put things into historical per spective. We have lost the patterns and threads of our own existence under an avalanche of "newness". On top of this has come a perspective toward events which has found it fashionable to deny causation, or at least simple and direct causal relationships. Things are too complex today, it seems, to determine causes for occur rences in our physical and social environments. The result is that events no longer can be tied together, they seem to happen spontaneously and discretely, like rain or snow; history is no longer caused. Herbert Aptheker, writing on the American Revolution, illuminates this trend. There are many scholars who take an eclectic approach to the origins of the Revolution and attribute it to the existence of a myriad of dis crete and separate "factors" the economic, the political, the social, the religious, the cli matic, the psychological, and others. Through the infinite multiplication of "causes," cause itself is liquidated.A* But, if cause is liquidated how can we possibly control our own destinies? This question points straight to the crucial point be hind the ahistoricism and lack of causation we feel today: We are not supposed to control our own destinies. Just as the established churches replaced Jesus in Christianity by emasculating his words and deeds, our history has been emas culated to deny Americans their revolutionary heritage. For what would happen if Americans came to see revolution as the norm in American history, and thus the right and 374 good thing to do? The established powers in this country would come immediately under attack. But because self- preservation is the primary goal of certain powerful social groupings, we have been robbed or our history. Two trends run in opposition to this state of affairs. The first is a result of the established power structure's inability to keep the lid on. During the early sixties the conservative consensus began to break down. For many, the rediscovery of poverty and racism, the commit ment to civil rights for Negroes, the criti cism of intervention in Cuba and Vietnam, shat tered many of the assumptions of the fifties and compelled intellectuals to re-examine the American past. From historians, and particu larly from younger historians, there began to emerge a vigorous criticism of the historical consensus.12 Events caught up with us and we began to see reasons for contemporary actions that could not be fit into the pattern of America, that passes for history in our educational sys tems. In that history America is never racist, never poor, never imperialistic yet events that we cannot ignore say that today we are all of those and more. To find the roots meant to go back and take another look (a definition of radicalism, by the wayK Secondly, more and more groups began to feel dispos sessed, feeling like people without pasts. The first group to act on this feeling was black America. Black history arose as blacks sought those roots which they had been for cibly tom from. Other minority groups followed suit, and the fragmentation of history seen in most major college catalogues resulted. The common goal of these groups seems to be best summed up by Staughton Lynd writing on the "critic of the American present" who is an actor as well as an observer. Like Thoreau, he wants firm bottom and rocks in place; he wants visions on which he can lean 375 his whole weight; he wants history to do some thing more than caution against complete com mitment: he wants It to help him commit him self with more precision and effect.13 The brief outline to be presented here and the quota tions from key people in American history that follow are aimed at these kinds of goals. The New Guerrilla needs an incisive version of the American past in order to discern the dynamics of this society. Who are the bad guys? Who are the good guys? What have been the actions of the past which led to progress? And, most importantly: Is revolu tion justified, even looked upon with favor, by our history? The answers are not here, only hints, but these hints form a compelling pattern which should at least make us consider that American history is a history of revolution. And that it is a call to arms for contemporary Americans. On final point needs to be mentioned before outlining the revolutionary thread in American history. This is that we have for far too long equated American history with the history of our elites. Jesse Lemisch in an article aptly titled "The American Revolution Seen from the Bottom Up" speaks clearly to this point. Despite our pretensions to social science, we would seem to be hardly more genuinely sci entific than we were fifty years ago. Many social scientists continue to draw conclusions about entire societies on the basis of exami nations of the minority at the top. This ap proach has distorted our view and, sometimes, cut us off from past reality. Our earliest history has been seen as a period of consensus and classlessness in part because our histori ans have chosen to see it that w a y .14 Those who rule may have, as Barrington Moore has put it, "the most to hide about the way society works." And these are the very people who are most favored by history and historical sources. Thus "sympathy with the victims of historical processes and skeptic ism about the victors' claims provide essen- 376 tial safeguards against being taken in by the dominant mythology." (Indeed, Herbert Marcuse has suggested, in defense of Lord Acton's moralism, that a society may be most accurately judged through an examination of its worst in justices; such an approach uncovers "the deep est layer of the whole system, the structure which holds it together, the essential condi tion for the efficiency of its political and economic organization.") This sympathy for the powerless brings us closer to objectivity; in practice, it leads the historian to describe past societies as they appeared from the bot tom rather than the top, more from the point of view of the inarticulate than the articulate.!' This kind of history seems best suited for a democracy since the overwhelming majority of the people are not in the elite but, rather, in the inarticulate bottom. In looking at the American past for help in the pre sent I would suggest some general guidelines. First, that the words of the elite be taken as philosophical statements that are shining ideals, but not necessarily what they act ed on (the hypocrisy of the slaveholder writer of a Decla ration of Independence for men "created equal" is obvious, but this does not deny the power of the words). Second, that in key social movements we need to examine what are usually taken as "minor" figures to get closer to the feel ings of the inarticulate (the support of the common North ern Abolitionist for John Brown's raid, as opposed to offi cial condemnation, is a case in point). Third, that we give careful scrutiny to the wav in which progress, in hu man terms, has been made in this country and compare that with contemporary admonitions on "means and ends" (most of this country's greatest heroes were, at one time or another in their careers, criminals). And, finally, that we ponder whether or not the American past doesn't contain more than enough idealism and revolutionary tradition to enable us to build an indigenous philosophy for radical action (contem porary radicals may find that patriotism and pride in being 377 an American may not, if based on a truer reading of our past, be distasteful at all). With these things in mind, let's look, briefly, at the American past. The seminal source of American history is the Ameri can Revolution. This country was born in revolution against established authority. The midwives were criminals and traitors, people who would have been hanged if caught. The war was long, bloody, and a close thing. There is no way to ignore this but the dynamics behind the scenes seem dis torted. The conventional wisdom is that the Revolution was not really a "revolution" (like that of France) because social classes either didn't exist or were in harmony. This was no social upheaval, but, merely, a change in the hands at the controls. The common people docilely followed their elitist leaders (the richest most powerful men in the colonies) because they believed in them and their ideals. Thus our revolution was "clean," one divorced from contem porary revolutions and liberation movements. Without going into an extended discussion of this view of the Revolution, it can be pointed out that it is under increasing attack. The Revolution was, to the elites in particular, an economic matter. And that part of the colonies, New Eng land, most directly in conflict with the British mercantil ist system was the hotbed of revolutionary thought. The Southern planters were deeply in dept, and thus at the mer cy, of British interests.16 The system was typically colonial: the colonies were sources of raw materials and markets for shoddy goods at inflated prices. Colonial in dustrial development was severely curtailed as the main threat to the whole system. The colonies were something to bleed dry for the enrichment of British financiers. The point is that the political idealism expressed by the Amer- 378 lean elite was not the real issue for them, only a means of gaining control of the continent for their own exploitation and) secondly, a means of motivating the masses who would have to fight the war if it came to that. But the ideals of the revolutionary leadership had a different meaning to the common people of the colonies. The passage of restrictive economic acts by England follow ing the French and Indian War threw seamen and laborers out of work, destroyed small businesses and farms, and, vitally important, shut off the frontier as a means of starting again. On top of this, these classes were disenfranchised (because of property requirements to vote) and victims of economic monopolies based on feudal laws (primogeniture and entail), price fixing, and closed guilds. Louis Hacker calls the victims of this structure "the left-wing of the colonial revolutionary host."17 The point should be clear here that we could logically expect these people to fight a revolution with different goals in mind not merely to hand power over to an indigenous elite---and the emerging facts seem to support this logical conclusion. In "The Revolution as a Democratic Movement" Merrill Jensen makes this point with stunning clarity: "The Declaration of In dependence was taken seriously by many Americans, or at least they found its basic philosophy useful in battling for change in the new states."18 Underline seriously to get the full impact. Jesse Lemisch's article has already been mentioned, but one addition to his thesis should be made. In the Rev olution, the common people were not inarticulate. Their spokesmen were people such as Samuel Adams, Patrick Henry, and Tom Paine. All were from the non-elite, all had failed in business ventures and/or resisted authority prior to their involvement in the Revolution. These men spoke--- and eloquently (Washington: "...I find Common Sense is 379 working a powerful change in the minds of men."19) for the common people and through their efforts mobilized the support necessary for the boycotts, the demonstrations, and, finally, for the violence. Without them there would have been no Revolution, yet none of them was in the national government following the victory. This lack of the leaders of the common people in the national picture following victory indicates that the Rev olution was not concluded with the military victory. Power did indeed pass from a British elite to an American one. The best example of this are the amendments to our own Con stitution: they present an unmistakable movement of non elites into constitutionally sanctioned arenas of society. The amendments to the Constitution are a tangible manifes tation of the on-going nature of the American Revolution. Finally, the American Revolution has been perceived far differently abroad than here. Abroad it was seen as a threat or a hope. In evaluating the quality of the Revolution it is also necessary to remember, if one is to get its full contemporaneous impact, that it was the first successful colonial revolution in history. The imperial powers from Spain to France to Holland to Portugal had all faced colonial insurrections and they had all been put down. But the American succeeded and that fact itself, quite apart from the resulting political and social institutions, had an enormously rev olutionary influence upon the people of the world.20 "All men are created equal." These were Jefferson's words in 1776. They were also Ho Chi Minh's in 1945, in the opening sentences of the Declaration of Independence of the Democrat ic Republic of Vietnam. His use of them was open and intended. American members of the 0, S.S. mission parachuted to Ho in the summer of 1945 recall his efforts to obtain either a copy of the Declaration or an approximation of its essential passages. Whether Ho meant them in the way Jefferson did and one would have 380 to be a fuzzy-minded ideologue to believe so— his resort to the Great Declaration demonstrates that it is no longer the exclusive property of America but belongs to the world.21 The above review of several points essential to under standing the American Revolution gives us something to start from. The movements that followed that era sprang naturally from the Declaration and the Revolution, and if we have a good grasp of those two things then the later movements make sense. At the close of the Revolution and under the new Con stitution (as well as the interim Articles of Confederation) a form of feudalism still existed. Movements in the states largely did away with this feudalism for whites. And the Industrial Revolution was beginning to make noises, thus adding steam to the end of feudalism for whites. To com plete the destruction of feudalism, however, required the end of slavery. This is not to say that the Abolitionists saw this as their major goal their goals were much more humanistic than that---but that the slaveholders faced the end of their feudal system. The Civil War has been called the Second American Revolution and there is validity is so labeling it since it was an obvious extension, by massive violence, of the Dec laration of Independence to the slaves. This Second Rev olution cannot be divorced from the activities of the Aboli tionists, though our conventional wisdom seems to have done just that. Abolitionist agitation in the border states, direct violation of the Fugitive Slave Law, support for John Brown, massive propaganda, and so on tranformed the North into an anti-slavery nation. While the South, due to land-destroying agricultural techniques, the looming clor sure of the new states to slavery, and a commitment to the Southern way of life, became a threatened nation. Conflict broke out, even though there was no chance of Southern vie- 381 tory save through massive European intervention (a threat removed by Lincoln's strategic issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation). The Abolitionists, then, cannot be ignored in review ing American history for revolutionary roots. Their thoughts are included in the Philosophy section. Although feudalism in the traditional sense really ended (although it died a lingering death, particularly in the South with the share-cropping system) with the Civil War, the Industrial Revolution brought a new type of eco nomic context to America. Economic oppression based on land was replaced by economic oppression based on capital and factories. Again, this is the view from the bottom, not the elite view of the heroic rise of capitalism and the fruits it has brought to all of us. The labor struggle began in the first organizing of workers in the factories and continues today in the fields and the professions, with a new surge seemingly imminent in the older industrial and craft unions as younger workers apply the ideals of unionism (take it seriously) to their leaders. If we are to look at American history through the eyes of the masses of common people the labor movement must be included. Some writers have concluded that the Third American Revolution came with the New Deal. But examination of the actions of the Roosevelt years seems to support Barton Bernstein's summary: Using the federal government to stabilize the economy and advance the interests of the groups, Franklin D. Roosevelt directed the campaign to save large-scale corporate capitalism. Though recognizing new political interests and extend ing benefits to them, his New Deal never effec tively challenged big business or the organiza tion of the economy. In providing assistance to the needy and by rescuing them from starvation, Roosevelt's humane efforts also protected the 382 established system: he sapped organized radi calism of its waning strength and of its poten tial constituency among the unorganized and discontented. Sensitive to public opinion and fearful of radicalism, Roosevelt acted from a mixture of motives that rendered his liberalism cautious and limited, his experimentalism nar row. Despite the flurry of activity, his government was more vigorous and flexible about means than goals, and the goals were more con servative than historians usually a c k n o w l e d g e , 2 2 And, as most of us have been taught, the War really pulled the country out of the Depression, not the New Deal. Central to American history since the Civil War is the industrial-urban nature of the society. This context has enabled new movements to occur and has fostered move ments by its very nature. And this context is an accident, it was not planned nor controlled. Michael Harrington re fers to the 20th century as "the Accidental Century" based on an accidental revolution. This accidental revolution is the sweeping and unprecedented technological transformation of the Western environment which has been, and is being, carried out in a casual way. In it, this technology is essentially under private control and used for private purposes; this situation is justified in the name of a conser vative ideology; and the byproduct is a his torical change which would have staggered the imagination of any nineteenth-century visionary. In following their individual aims, industrial ists blundered into a social revolution. There is indeed an invisible hand in all of this. Only it is shaping an unstable new world rather than Adam Smith's middle-class h a r m o n y .23 It is in this context that all post-Civil War social movements must be seen in order to be understood. For only then can we understand that community has come to have a greater meaning to us than individuality. Prior to the Industrial Revolution with its concomitant rise of huge ur ban areas, individuals could exist separately; agriculture on a small scale allows this. After the Revolution, how 383 ever, in order to exist individuals had to act in concert. An ideology which atomized human beings such as agrarianism or rough-and-ready capitalism came into question; and, an ideology which programmed activity in the economic sphere to the detriment of other spheres of life also came into question. In short, the new context demanded new relation ships on all levels, economic, social, cultural, etc., but these did not appear they seemed to be consciously hind ered by those with various kinds of relevant power. In this context the labor movement arose. The labor movement spoke to other groups as well, for here were the workers demanding, and getting, an increasing degree of control---democratic control---over their economic situa tion. This was unheard of and spurred new thoughts in var ious other groups. Workers were saying that they had a right to control their own lives in this new world. And others were listening to what they said. One movement in our history which spans a long period of time and which is involved in many other movements is that of women. These are the ultimate slaves in a male- dominated society, and it has been a long hard (and unfin ished) process of emancipation. Because the man-woman re lationship is so central to human existence this movement, both the old part (the Suffrage movement) and the new (Women's Liberation) is covered in the Philosophy section. Every other movement in American history can be ab stracted out and put at arm's length, and thus not be per sonally compelling. But the women's movement is different. It hits home, literally; it hits sexual roles, our basic identity; and it hits society, just as the other movements do. Because of these aspects it may be the most crucial, particularly in personal terms, of all the movements cover ed here. The Civil Rights movement is another with a long his- 384 tory. Its roots are in Africa and the slave trade, it per meates the Revolution (where slavery was debated and was a strategic military weapon in the South). It is central to the Abolitionists and the Civil War, it is an integral part of the urbanization of America, and it is a sticky point in the history of the labor movement. It is, like the women's movement, a moral issue with ramifications and manifesta tions far beyond the moral arena. Thus, the Civil Rights movement is a strong addition to a philosophy for the New Guerrilla. There are other movements in the American past that are of interest but cannot be included because of space and time limitations, and because this is not a history of America but a sketch of a philosophy for action. So I have limited the sources illustrative of the American revolution ary and radical tradition to these: The American Revolution The Abolitionists The Labor Movement The Women's Movement The Civil Rights Movement. There are some contemporary movements which are not covered, such as the anti-war/anti-draft movement, ecology, consumerism, and the New Politics, Why? Time and space are reasons, but the central reason is that these movements are so recent that they are not part of a historical body of experience which can be used to justify and support con temporary action. These movements are, in fact, the very kinds of activity which their members are seeking to justify and support with older movements. Dr. Spock is not yet a historical hero, but John L. Lewis and Martin Luther King are. And the point is to take the heroes given us by the conventional American history and take them seriously. We have been taught that these are our heroes, but we 385 have been denied Che full picture of their thoughts and activities. We've got the package but it doesn't list the contents. The contents are revolutionary and radical and thus threatening to the same kinds of people that the liv ing, breathing contents were threatening to in the first place. So the trick is to say: Ok, I accept the heroes you've given me-— we both accept them. Now let me tell you what they did to people like yourself, and since you've said that they axe heroes (meaning: people to be emulated), let me tell you what I'm going to do to you. In the excerpts used in the Philosophy section are the words of these heroes. I've tried to choose from those whose actions matched their words, as these are the most useful people to emulate. A review of these people and their words indicates that in American history is another strong pillar supporting revolutionary thought and action by Americans in America. This history says to us that revolu tionary-radical thought and action are American, not foreign or communist, that they are part of our history, and that, most importantly, £§ are called to follow down the same paths, since the American Revolution is not yet completed. On the back of the dollar bill, at the base of the pyramid of the seal are the Latin words, Novus Ordo Seclorum. This translates into "A New Order of the Ages (is Born)i‘" It seems to me that the whole thrust of our history is a call to action to help that New Order grow and mature into the vision that gave it birth. We now have two pillars to support the New Guerrilla. The third is that of the American guerrilla war experience. It is the easiest to deal with, even though it labors under the same distortion and manipulation as the first two. The American Guerrilla War Experience In this era of revolutionary wars, urban rebellions, and wars of liberation, guerrilla warfare, for Americans, 386 has taken on a distasteful connotation. This is only natu ral since American vested interests are usually the targets, directly or indirectly, of such violence. But we need to look behind the contemporary situation at our own past to see where we have been in terms of "anti-establishment" violence. Americans have a long history of violence. This is clearly demonstrated in the Report to the National Commis sion on the Causes and Prevention of Violence entitled The History of Violence in America?4 but we are concerned here with a certain type of violence: guerrilla war. Our his tory contains many instances of this method of waging war, and a brief look at these should make the point. Our Revolutionary War in its entirety was a guerrilla struggle. Aptheker summarizes it this way: The basic nature of the American defense was to take advantage of the terrain and distance and to try to force the British to attack fron tally, prepared and elevated positions. Further, the Americans tried so to maneuver the fighting as to pull the British as far as possible from the coast, since every mile the British marched west brought them that much further away from their only secure base of supply---their fleet.*5 And within this larger picture were the guerrilla leaders: The guerrilla-like conduct of the war show ed itself in the first place in the decisively significant contributions of such out-and-out f uerilla fighters as Andrew Pickens, Thomas umter, Francis Marion, James Williams, William Davies, and Elijah Clarke. These men had been Indian fighters and they applied the tactics thus learned to the anti-British effort.26 Most us remember Francis Marion---the Swamp Fox--- from Walt Disney, but the others are unfamiliar. Most of us recall anecdotes, from American history where the British denounced the ungentlemanly, downright savage, fighting style of the American colonists, but somehow we fail to think of the Revolution as a guerrilla war. This revulsion 387 to, and inability to deal with, the reality of our early struggle can be seen in this passage from The History of American Violence; "...the meanest and most squalid sort of violence was from the very beginning to the very last put to the service of Revolutionary ideal and objectives."27 It is understandable that Americans would want to for get about this aspect of the Revolution. Others, however, did not forget it, and the literary study of guerrilla war fare had its roots in the American struggle. The first professional study of partisan war fare was published in two volumes in Germany in 1786; it was the work of a Captain Johann Ewald who had served with the Hessians in America--- later, as von Ewald, a lieutenant-general in the Danish Army.28 Thus, along with our claim to being the first successful revolution of a colonial people, we can also claim to be the first to use guerrilla war in the cause of revolution and succeed with it. The next major American experience with guerrilla war came in the Civil War. Both sides used guerrilla strategy and tactics to complement the larger, conventional, move ments of troops and major battles. Grierson's audacious and well-coordinated raid into the S o u t h ,29 Confederate guerrilla activity in Virginia in 1862,^0 and the guerrilla struggles that rocked Missouri— -and on the Confederate side gave rise to not only Quantrill, Anderson, and Todd, but also to Jesse and Frank James and the Younger brothers ---for four years^l are major examples of the guerrilla component of the Civil War. And most people have heard of John Mosby and J.E.B. Stuart. Following the Civil War the all-out offensive against the American Indians resumed in earnest. The Indians, lacking parity in equipment, fought a guerrilla campaign across the West that was marked with flashes of brilliance. 388 Skilled horsemen, these Indians, largely from the Great Plains, hit and ran with tactics that would have brought admiration from such mount ed generals as Phil Sheridan, Jeb Stuart, or Erwin Rommel. Theirs was lightning warfare, and at full run they could loose twenty arrows while their longer-shooting foes were trying to reload.32 All of the Indians (with the exception of the Semi- noles) were finally defeated by the overwhelming numbers and superiority of equipment possessed by the whites. But it will still be some time before the names of Sitting Bull, Geronimo, Chief Joseph, and Crazy Horse do not conjure up images of that "lightning warfare.!' The best known defeat suffered by the U.S. Army against the Indians, for example, came against Crazy Horse at the Little Big Horn. Crazy Horse was among the first Indians to realize that the whites fought to kill and to steal land, while the Indians were fighting to count coup (hit a man with a coup stick and then ride off in glory) and steal horses. By the time he convinced the Sioux to change their ways it was too late, but that one victory showed what might have been— and the power of Crazy Horse. Crazy Horse was on his yellow pinto, stripped to breechcloth, a splattering of hailstone marks on his body, the lightning streak down his face, and the red-backed hawk on his head. And when the warriors saw him coming they made a roaring and lined up for a charge.33 With the obliteration of the Indians came a pause in American involvement in guerrilla war on any major scale. World War I, the last "gentleman's war" was an insane meat- grinder lacking any of the intellectual brilliance whifch marks a guerrilla struggle. All it really did— besides destroy millions of lives-— was set the world up for a tru ly world war. During this period (roughly 1898-1934) Amer ican forces did engage in anti-guerrilla operations in Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua,: the Philippines, 389 and China (The Boxer Rebellion), to name only the most prom inent . World War II had at least one American guerrilla com ponent that is well known to the American public: Merrill's Marauders. This is the unit that fought a guerrilla war (in every sense but living off the land: supplies were air dropped) in north Burma in 1944.34 it might be thought that the Merrill experience would have readied this country for other anti-guerrilla struggles, but such was not the case since in Burma we fought the Japanese— -another in vader in a "neutral” country. Thus, we did not face a "people's war" in Burma, and could not learn responses to such a war there. Vietnam is a case in point. It can safe ly be said, then, that the American experience with guerril la warfare is not limited, and that we have used it or fought against it depending on our goals and needs at the time. It is an integral part of our past. Like the other two "pillars" holding up the concept of the New Guerrilla, the American guerrilla war experience is real and meaningful. With this pillar we now have the three so vitally necessary to justify, legitimize, and fa miliarize us with the concepts and ideas that make up the New Guerrilla. And each of the pillars is from the main stream of the American experience. This is the key to the whole Philosophy of the New Guerrilla: that within our own experience are to be found unmistakable support, at the religious, philosophical, and activist levels, for propos ing a model which, admittedly, sounds a bit foreign and off color at first hearing. The New Guerrilla may not be quite as American as apple pie, but certainly the crucial factors which underlie the model are. With this overall approach in mind the collection of quotations from within each of the two major areas, Chris- 390 tianity and The American Tradition (The American Guerrilla War Experience is not covered since it would be redundant to cover ground already covered much more completely in the materials on the Old Guerrilla, and since most of the phil osophical foundations for American guerrilla warfare in the revolutionary sense are covered in The American Tradition.), will present a mosaic Philosophy for the New Guerrilla. There are overlappings, contradictions, and dubious cate gorizations to be sure, but the pattern, the whole cloth, should be apparent. So, using the categories drawn out of the Old Guerril la we can now look at a suggested Philosophy for the New Guerrilla. ★ * •k 1. Desire for change; need for change felt. 1 tell you, then, that the kingdom of God will be taken from you and given to a people who will produce its fruit. Jesus’5 It is not those who are well who need the doc tor, but the sick. I have not come to call the virtuous, but sinners to repentance. Jesus36 Do you suppose these Galileans who suffered like that were greater sinners than any other Galileans? They were not, I tell you. No; but unless you repent you will all perish as they did. Jesus-*' If you make my word your home you will indeed be my disciples, you will learn the truth and the truth shall make you free. Jesus5® At the heart of radicalism is the concept of sin. The radical rejects a rosy, Pollyanna view of the world. Rather he sees alienation, 391 injustice, and oppression which need to be over come. Without the concept of sin, there wouLd be little need to seek change. Both biblical and Marxist faith see the structures of society as fallen and the struggle between good and evil as being important. Both also envision the ultimate victory of justice over injustice. Arthur Gish39 In the perspective of biblical messianism, stability and order take shape on the other side of change. When any particular structure of society becomes so rigid that it blocks change indefinitely, its destruction may be necessary. Richard Shaull4^ Thus concerning evil, Christianity has lit tle to say conclusively as to the whv. but a great deal to say as to what to do about it and within it and beyond it. James Pike^l If these acts of Parliament shall remain in force and your Majesty's Commons in Great Brit ain shall continue to exercise the power of granting the property of their fellow subjects in this province, your people must then regret their unhappy fate of having only the name left of free subjects....We must humbly beseech your Majesty to take our present unhappy circumstances under your royal consideration and afford us re lief in such manner as to your Majesty's great wisdom and clemency shall seem meet. , Samuel Adams42 What, then, are the honest, industrious, and independent freemen of America to do in this case? My guide I have so long followed tells us, Declare independence immediately! Samuel Adams43 Sam Adams realized that the colonialist wanted change, the question was how far they were prepared to go to get it. The change in his writing reflected (and helped shape) the change in the means viewed as legitimate by the people. Every thing that is right or reasonable pleads for separation. The blood of the slain, the weeping voice of nature cries, *T1S TIME TO PART*. Tom Pained 392 But when a long Train of Abuses and Usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object, evinces a Design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their Right, it is their Duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future Security. Declaration of Independence Assenting to the "self-evident truths" main tained in the American Declaration of Indepen dence, "that all men are created equal, and en dowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights---among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," I shall strenuously con tend for the immediate enfranchisement of our slave population. . _ William Lloyd Garrison4^ Must I argue that a system thus marked with blood, ana stained with pollution, is wrong? No! I will not. I have better employment tor my time and strength than such arguments would imply. Frederick Douglass4*® We will sing one song of the meek and humble slave The homy-handed son of the soil; He's toiling hard from the cradle to the grave, But his master reaps the profits of his toil. Then we'll sing one song of the poor and ragged tramp, He carries his home on his back; Too old to work, he's not wanted round the camp, So he wanders without aim along the track. We will sing one song of the children in the mills, They're taken from playground and schools, In tender years made to go the pace that kills, In the sweatshops mid the looms and spools. Then we'll sing one song of the one big union grand, The hope of the toiler and the slave; It's coming fast; it is sweeping sea and land, To the terror of the grafter and the knave. Joe Hill47 We hold these truths to be self-evident: that ail men and women are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. Whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of those who suffer from it to refuse al legiance to it, and to insist upon the institu tion of a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. The Seneca Falls Declaration^ In America, recent events have forced us to acknowledge at last that the relationship be tween the races is indeed a political one which involves the general control of one collectivity defined by birth, over another collectivity, also defined by birth. Groups who rule by birth right are fast disappearing, yet there remains one ancient and universal scheme for the domina tion of one birth group by another---the scheme that prevails in the area of sex. Kate Millett49 By every civilized and peaceful method we must strive for the rights which the world accords to men, clinging unwaveringly to those great words which the sons of the Fathers would fain forget: "We hold these truths to be self- evident: That ail men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unAlienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." W.E.B. Du BoisSO The aim is simple. It is directed at ail white Americans— -the President of the United States, his brother, Robert, the trade-union movement, the power elite, and every living white soul the Negro meets. The war cry is "unconditional surrender-— end all Jim Crow now." Not next week, not tomorrow— -but now. Bayard Rustin^l * * * Destruction of the old society, creation of the new. You will hear of wars and rumors of wars; do not be alarmed, for this is something that must happen, but the end will not be yet. For nation will fight against nation, and kingdom 394 against kingdom. There will be famines and earthquakes here and there. All this is only the beginning of the birth pangs. Jesus52 Immediately after the distress of those days the sun will be darkened, the moon will lose its brightness, the stars will fall from the sky and the powers of heaven will be shaken. And then the sign of the Son of Man will appear in heaven; then too all the peoples of the earth will beat their breasts; and they will see the Son of Man coming on the clouds of heav en with power and great glory. And he will send his angels with a loud trumpet to gather his chosen trom the four winds, from one end of heaven to the other. Jesus53 The old society can be so portrayed that its destruc tion seems only logical. The old men who wield power in society are, in a radical sense, capable of neither marriage nor whoring. They can only live out the shabby drama of their own early years. Their old age is a kind of long, obscene stag party; its game is essentially voyeurism; they must enlist and pay others to play the games that quicken their sluggish blood-— cheap love and cheap death. So they need mercenaries and Madison Avenue; they cannot really make it---neither love nor war. They can only infect us with the illness of false normality, set a stage for a drama call ed, say, the "Great Society," into which they may dump all the illusions of the good life. And all the while, out there in Vietnam, out there in the ghetto, out there in the third world, out there in us, the real drama continues: death as enforceable method, military solutions, fear, nausea, extinction as a social method. Daniel Berrigan^4 All men have a natural right to change a bad con stitution for a better whenever they have it in their power. Samuel Adams^S "Tarquin and Caesar had each his Brutus, Charles the First his Cromwell, and George the Third— " He paused. "Treason!" came in a shout from the Speaker, high on his dais. "Treason! Treason!" cried 395 many Burgesses. Then, in no haste, but with impressive ac cess of dignity— -growing visibly taller, un til he seemed the very embodiment of resolute manhood— he spoke his final words: "— may profit by their example! If this be treason, make the most of it. Patrick Henry56 England since the conquest hath known some few good monarchs, but groaned beneath a much larger number of bad ones; yet no man in his senses can say that their claim under William the Conqueror is a very honorable one. A French bastard landing with armed banditti and establishing himself King of England against the consent of the natives, is in plain terms a very paltry rascally original. It certainly hath no divinity in it. However it is need less to spend much time in exposing the folly of hereditary right; if there are any so weak as to believe it, let them promiscuously wor ship the ass and the lion, and welcome. I shall neither copy their humility, nor disturb their devotion. Tom Paine57 Slavery must be overthrown. Ho matter how numerous the difficulties, how formidable the obstacles, how strong the foes to be vanquish ed— -slavery must cease to pollute the land. William Lloyd Garrisoned Slavery is the disease, and its abolition in every part of the land is essential to the future quiet and security of the country. Any union which can possibly be patched up while slavery exists, must either completely demor alize the whole nation, or remain a heartless form, disguising, under smiles of friendship, a vital, active and ever-increasing hate, sure to explode in violence. It is a matter of life and death. Slavery must be all in the Union, or it can be nothing. Frederick Douglass59 Walter Reuther had words for contemporary radicals on the dual goals of revolution. And I said we knew what we were fighting for --and you only know what you're fighting against. And that's not good enough. You have no moral right to destroy something un- 396 less you thing you've got something better to put in its place. And I said that's the dif ference between what we did when I was a young radical going to the university and what you're doing. And that's a fundamental difference. Walter Reuther®® If the first woman God ever made was strong enough to turn the world upside down all alone, these women together ought to be able to turn it back, and get it right side up again! And now they is asking to do it, the men better let them* Sojourner Truth®* It isaunistake to call Miss Anthony a re former. She is a revolutionist, aiming at nothing less than the breaking up of the very foundations of society, and the overthrow of every social insitution organized for the protection of the sanctity of the altar, the family circle and the legitimacy of our off spring.... , Newspaper Editor0^ on Susan B. Anthony Nor should any one be led astray by the tiresome talk about "social equality." Social equality is a private question which may well be left to individual decision. But, the prejudices of individuals cannot be accepted as the controlling policy of the state. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People is concerned with public equal ity. American is a nation---not a private club. N.A.A.C.P., 1919®3 * * * 3. Definition of the new society. No one can be the slave of two masters: he will either hate the first and love the second, or treat the first with respect and the second with scorn. You cannot be the slave of both God and of money. Jesus®*' 397 So always treat others as you would like them to treat you; that is the meaning of the Law and the Prophets, Jesus®^ If you wish to be perfect, go and sell what you own and give the money to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; then come, follow me. Jesus®® You know that among the pagans the rulers lord it over them, and their great men make their authority felt. This is not to happen among you. No; anyone who wants to be great among you must be your servant, and anyone who wants to be first among you. must be your slave, just as the Son of Man came not bo be served but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many. A Jesus®7 You must love the Lord your God with all your Heart, with all your soul, and with all your mind. This is the greatest and the first commandment. The second resembles it: You must love your neighbor as yourself. On these two commandments hang the wnole Law, and the Prophets also. Jesus®o Scripture says: Man does not live on bread alone. Jesus®9 Sell your possessions and*give alms. Get ydurselvea purses that do not wear out, treas ure that will not fail you, in heaven where no thief can reach it and no moth destroy it. For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also. Jesus70 The Christian message is about the future of man, a future that has already come in Christ. As was noted above, the Christian looks for ward to a new reality which will break into history, a new reality which in fact has al ready come....This new reality is called the kingdom of God. Arthur Gish71 The revolution that is required in the United States is, then, a revolution in the 398 quality of human life, a revolution in the quo tient of human freedom realized by each of us. Michael Novak72 The personal and social content of the new society cannot be separated. The following is about Jesus and the Book of Revelations. He is the "first bom of many brethren"; that is to say, He is not merely pre-eminent in His biological place. His inmost meaning is that He, being, as John indicates, Verbum. offers intelligence and coherence at the heart of things. He is not bound by laws of ancient or modem chaos. Daniel Berrigan?3 Perhaps 1 am mistaken, but I fear too great a bias to Aristocracy prevails among the opulent. I own myself a Democrat on the plan of our ad mired friend, J. Adams, whose pamphlet I read with great pleasure. Patrick Henry74 You are not to enquire how your tirade may be increased nor how you are to become a great and powerful people, but how your liberties can be secured; for liberty ought to be the direct end of your government. Patrick H e n r y 7 5 Young man, you call me father; then, my son, 1 have something to say unto you; keep justice. keep truth---and you will live to think dif- ferently. Patrick Henry76 ...that the elected might never form to them selves an interest separate from the electors, prudence will point out the propriety or hav- ing elections often: because as the elected mi§ht by that means return and mix again with the general body of the electors in a few months, their fidelity to th6 public will be secured by the prudent reflection of not mak ing a rod for themselves. And as this fre quent interchange will establish a common in terest with every part of the community, they will mutually and naturally support each other, 399 and on this (not on the unmeaning name of king,) depends the ptreagtfr happiness of the governed. Tom Paine'' The present time, likewise, is the pecul iar time which never happens to a nation but once, viz. the time of forming itself into a government. Most nations have let slip the opportunity, and by that means have been com pelled to receive laws from their conquerors, instead of making laws for themselves. First, they had a king, and then a form of government; whereas the articles or charter of government should be formed first, and men delegated to execute them afterwards: but from the errors of other nations let us leam wisdom, and lay hold of the present opportunity— to begin government at the right end. Tom Paine78 We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Mem are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalien able Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness. Declaration of Independence The form of government that shall succeed the present government of the United States, let time determine. It would be a waste of time to argue that question, until the people are regenerated and turned from their iniquity. Ours is no anarchical movement, but one or order and obedience. In ceasing from oppres sion, we establish liberty. What is now frag mentary shall in due time be crystallized, and shine like a gem set in the heavens, for a light to all coming ages. __ William Lloyd Garrison'* Americans have a right to work and a right to a lob. John L. Lewis80 If fighting for equal and equitable dis tribution of the wealth of this country is socialistic, I stand guilty of being a Social- ist. Walter Reuther8* That strike was about two questions. It was about the right of a worker to share-- 400 not as a matter of collective bargaining muscle but as a matter of right---to share in the fruits of advancing technology. The other issue was why should workers be victimized by infla- tionary forces, over which they have no control, which erode their real wage position. Walter Reuther82 ...Millions of women are asserting their right to voluntary motherhood. They are determined to decide for themselves whether they shall be come mothers, under tftat conditions and when. This is the fundamental revolt referred to. It is for woman the key to the temple of liberty. Margaret Sanger8* Who knows what women can be when they are finally free to become themselves? Who knows what women's intelligence will contribute when it can be nourished without denying love? Who knows of the possibilities of love when men and women share not only children, home, and garden, not only the fulfillment of their biological roles, but the responsibilities and passions of the work that creates the human future and the full human knowledge of who they are? It has barely begun, the search of women for themselves. But the time is at hand when the Voices of the feminine mystique can no long er drown out the inner voice that id driving women on to become complete. Betty Friedan84 I say to you today, my friends, that in spite of the difficulties and frustration of the moment I still have a dream. It is a dream deeply rooted in the American dream. I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true mdaning of its creed: "We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal." I have a dream that one day on the red hills of Georgia the sons of former slaves and the sons of former slaveowners will be able to sit down together at the table of brotherhood. When we let freedom ring, when we let it ring from every village and every hamlet, from every state and every city, we will be able to speed up that day when all of God's children, black men and white men, Jews and Gentiles, Protestants and 401 Catholics, will be able to join hands and sing in the words of the old Negro spiritual, “Free at last! free at last! thank God almighty, we are free at last!" Martin Luther King8^ ★ * * 4. Necessity of a theory of and for action* If anyone has ears to hear, let him listen! Jesus88 Jesus then went into the Temple and drove out all those who were selling and buying there; he upset the tables of the money changers and the chairs of those who were selling pi geons. "According to scripture," he said, "my house will be called a house of prayer; but you are turning it into a robbers' den." There were also blind and lame people who came to him in the Temple, and he cured them. Mt 21:12-14 See that you are dressed fecr action and have your lamps lit. Be like men waiting for hheir master to return from the wedding feast, ready to open the door as soon as he comes and knocks. Happy those servants whom the master finds awake when he comes. I tell you solemnly, he will put on an apron, sit them down at table and wait on them. Jesus8' I have told you all this so that you may find peace in me. In the world you will have trou ble, but be brave: I have conquered the world. Jesus88 As we shall see, Christian situation ethics has only one norm or principle or law (call it what you will) that is binding and unexception al, always good and right regardless of the circumstances. That is "love"— -the agape of the summary commandment to love God and the neighbor. Joseph Fletcher8^ Then we need to recognise that while one man's witness may do wonders for that man's conscience it will do little, at least immediately, to al ter the course of events. So if a man refuses to organize massive civil disobedience, he may fall into the so-called "liberal's trap," which consists of having one set of principles which make a man opposed to something and another which make him incapable of doing anything about it. William Sloane Coffin, Jr.90 Adam and Eve are the biblical Everyman and Every woman. Their sin is our sin. It is not pro methean. We do not defy the gods by courageous ly stealing the fire from the celestial hearth, thus bringing benefit to man. Nothing so hero ic. We fritter away our destiny by letting some snake tell us what to do. Harvey Cox91 Whether they read Gandhi or Frantz Fanon, all the radicals understand the need for action- direct self-transforming and structure-trans forming action. This may be their most crea tive collective insight. Martin Luther K i n g ’ 2 Now, brethren, we are reduced to this dilem ma, either to sit down quiet under this and every other burden that our enemies shall see fit to lay upon us as good-natured slaves, or rise and resist this and every other plan laid for our destruction, as becomes wise freemen. Samuel Adams°3 Our brethren are already in the field! Why stand we idle here? What is it that gentle men wish? What would they have? Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others may take, but as for me, give me lib erty, or give me death! Patrick Henry9^ When in the Course of human Events, it be comes necessary for one People to dissolve the Political Bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the Powers of the Earth, the separate and equal Station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent Respect to the Opinions of Man kind requires that they should declare the 403 causes which impel them to the Separation. Declaration of Independence That to secure these Rights, Governments are in stituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that when ever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Prin ciples, and organizing it's Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Declaration of Independence We shall organize Anti-Slavery Societies, if possible, in every city, town and village in our land. William Lloyd Garrison95 The Abolitionists of the United States have been laboring, during the last fifteen years, to establish the conviction throughout that slavery is a sin, and ought to be treated as such by all professing Christians. This con viction they have written about, they have spoken about, they have published about— -they have used all the ordinary facilities for for warding this view of the question of slavery. Previous to that operation, slavery was not re garded as a sin. Frederick Douglass96 At Walter Reuther's funeral the audience sang Reut her's favorite old labor song, a hymn to Joe Hill. One of the verses sums up Reuther's drive: And standing there as big as life And smiling with his eyes, Joe says, “What they forgot to kill Went on to organize."97 Another woman field worker, her dark face lit with emotion, handed him a statue of Christ dressed in green and white robes. Slowly, Chavez raised the statue above his head. "Viva," they shouted. "Viva la huelga!" '.'Viva la causa!" '.'Viva Cesar Chavez! "98 The theory of and for action of the labor movement is as old as the movement itself. It is spoken in many ways and 404 many languages* Some may ask why we are not now content to wait for the processes of reason and evolution to bring the result we want. Why do we dis turb ourselves to hasten progress? I answer, because we refuse to sit idly by while other women endure hideous wrongs. Carrie Chapman Catt99 The feminine mystique has succeeded in bury ing millions of American women alive. There is no way for these women to break out of their comfortable concentration camps except by final ly putting forth an effort— that human effort which reaches beyond biology, beyond the narrow walls of home, to help shape the future. Only by such a personal commitment to the future can American women break out of the housewife trap and truly find fulfillment as wives and mothers -— by fulfilling their own unique possibilities as separate human beings. Betty FriedanlOO Of the above grievances we do not hesitate to complain, and to complain loudly and insist ently. To ignore, overlook, or apologize for these wrongs is to prove ourselves unworthy df freedom. Persistent manly agitation is the way to liberty, and toward this goal the Niagara Movement has started and asks the co-operation of all men of all races. Declaration df Principles**)! 5. Goals and theory must be compatible with the peo ple. Again, the kingdom of heaven is like a drag net cast into the sea that brings in a haul of all kinds. When it is full, the fishermen haul it ashore; then, sitting down, they collect the good ones in a basket and throw away those that are no use. This is how it will be at the end of time: the angels will appear and separate the wicked from the just to throw them into the blazing furnace where there will be weeping and grinding of teeth. Jesusl02 405 Not only were the goals Jesus spoke of and the means to them compatible with Jewish Messianic Tradition, but the manner in which he gave the message was also. The parable was Jesus's key tool. This tool allowed abstract ideas to be conveyed to the people in words and images which were 6iose to their own lives. So they waited their opportunity and sent agents to pose as men devoted to the Law, and to fasten on something he might say and so en able them to hand him over to the jurisdiction and authority of the governor. They put to him this question, "Master, we know that you say and teach what is right; you favor no one, but teach the way of God in all honesty. Is it permissible for us to pay taxes to Caesar or not?" But he was aware of their cunning and said, "Show me a denarius. Whose head and name are on it?" "Caesar's," they said. "Well then," he said to them, "give back to Caesar what be longs to Caesar---and to God what belongs to God." Lk 20:20-25 This was a critical exchange, for if Jesus admitted that taxes should be paid he would lose the support of the Zealots, but if he denied that they should be paid he would be speaking treason. Thus his response. But for those who "had ears to hear" there waB a deeper meaning to Jesus's response: the Zealot would realize that nothing in Israel was Caesar's— -there being no king before God— and that therefore what Jesus was saying was that Caesar should be given back nothing. The three men, radical men, of the Revolution used here reflected the thinking, aspirations, and "Common Sense" of the public. Sam Adams is intimately connected with the Boston mobs, the working men, the seamen, the Sons of Lib erty, and the Boston Tea Party. Patrick Henry was a coun try lawyer who made good on abilities learned in the tav erns of Virginia. Tom Paine was a traveling revolutionary who set up shop in America long enough to seal the fate of 406 of the colonies with his pamphlet, "Common Sense". Like their followers; however, they have left us lit tle record. Adams was careful to burn his correspondence. Henry did not preserve copies of his speeches and strongly discouraged others from doing so. Only Tom Paine has left us with a body of work, and even that is slim when we seek to find the whole sweep of the thinking of the common per son of the colonial era, of their goals and theories of and for society. We can, however, be fairly certain of one thing: they took the words of their leaders---elite and common alike— seriously. And this assumption all at once opens up a door to their thinking; the common people fought and died for those words which promised a new age for them, they must have found them compatible with their own think ing to go that far. The Declaration of Independence is largely a list of grievances which justified the Revolution. These griev ances were those the common people felt and knew about. The goal of independence was based on factors grounded in the common people as well as the commercial and political elites. That this was necessary should be obvious since an army was needed to fight the War. Thus the goals and the ory of the Revolution had to be compatible with the people in order to motivate them to fight; only fehen would the closing line of the Declaration include enough people to make it meaningful. And for support of this Declaration, we mutual ly pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor* Declaration of Independence I am an American, free bom, with all the pride of my heritage. I love my country with its in stitutions and traditions. With Abraham Lincoln I thank God that we have a country where men may strike. May the power of my Government never be used to throttle or crush the efforts of the toilers to improve their material welfare and el- 407 evate the standard of their citizenship. John L. Lewis103 Women, like other pppressed groups, feel they have a problem, but the articulation of the problem, much less of a goal and theories related to it, may be difficult. Betty Friedan articulated the problem, and from the problem being spoken arose logical goals and theories. The problem lay burled, unspoken, for many years in the minds of American women. It was a strange stirring, a sense of dissatisfaction, a yearning that women suffered in the middle of the twentieth century in the United States. Each suburban wife struggled with it alone. As she made the beds, shopped for groceries, match ed slipcover material, ate peanut butter sand wiches with her children, chauffered Cub Scouts and Brownies, lay beside her husband at night ---she was afraid to ask even of herself the silent question MIs this all?" Betty Friedanl04 The goals and theories of a movement must conform to the people in the movement, but they must also be at least understandable to the majority population. If they are part of the majority's philosophy that is so much the bet ter. We love our country. We have fought for it in the past and we will fight for it in the future, but we do not relish our patriotism being called into question because we demand our rights as American citizens. Roy Wilkins*^ * * * 6. Definition of the "people;? How happy are the poor in spirit; theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Happy the gentle: they shall have the earth for their heritage. Happy those who mourn: they shall be comforted. Hap py those whohunger and thirst for what is right: they shall be satisfied. Happy the merciful: they shhll have mercy shown them. Happy the pure in heart: they shall bee God. Happy the peacemakers: they shall be calfeed sons of God. Happy those who are persecuted in the cause of right: theirs is the kingdom of heav- Jesusl06 1 bless you, Father, Lord of heaven and of earth for hiding these things from the learned and the clever and revealing them to mere children. JesuslO/ Come to me, all you who labor and are over burdened, and Z will give you rest. Shoulder my yoke and learn from me, for I am gentle and humble in heart, and you will find rest for your souls. Yes, my yoke is easy and my burden light. JeBuslOS For everyone who exalts himself will be humbled, >e exal Jesus] but the man who humbles himself will be exalted. ,109 As he looked up he saw rich people putting their offerings into the treasury; then he happened to notice a poverty-stricken widow putting in two small coins, and he said, "I tell you truly, this poor widow has put in more than any of them; for these have all contributed money they had over, but she from the little she had has put in all she had to live on.u Lk 21:1-4 Over ggainst all of this, revolutionary Marxism has reminded both theology and politics that the promise of God to the proletariat of this misdirected world is both temporal and universal It has to do with the future, not with eternity, and it is concerned with a new humanity for all mankind. It is a promise which rejected and dispossessed humanity has the special qualifi cations to accept and fulfill, because the death being forced upon it prepares it to welcome the resurrection to come, which might appear to those who still have old securities to protect, as death. Charles WestHO Who are the people in the eyes of the Revo lution? Who are these "Men" created equal? 409 Much has been written about this, and the division seems to have been, roughly, between the economic-political leader ship who sought to take power from the British colonial elite and put it in their own hands, and the common people (represented by the likes of Adams, Henry, and Paine). Thus everyone involved in the Revolution had their own ideas as to who the people to be benefited were. That part of it was left vague enough to leave the door open for almost everyone to participate— -thus making it a people's war and insuring eventual victory— -while leaving the shape of any new power structure for the post-victory time. The Abolitionists had a much better picture of the people that were involved in that struggle. The slaves needed emancipation, and more. We have other claims to being regarded and treated as American citizens. Some of our number have fought and bled for this country, and we only ask to be treated as well as those who have fought against it. We are lovers of this country, and we only ask to be treated as well as the haters of it....For my part I mean, for one, to stay in this country; 1 have made up my mind to live among you. Frederick DiuglasslH The idea of industrial organisation and, specifically, the organisation of the vast masses of unskilled workers in this country had been very strong in my mind from as far back as I would say the late 1920's. John L. Lewis*** Working with low-income people is a lot dif ferent from working with professionals, who like to sit around talking about how to play politics. When you're trying to recruit a farm worker, you have to paint a little picture, and then you have to color the picture in. We found out that the harder a guy is to convince, the better leader or member he becomes. When you exert yourself to convince him, you have his confidence and he has good motivation. Cesar Chavez**3 The Abolitionists sought to free a rural slave popu- 410 lation, Booker T. Washington sought to prepare a rural freed population for full entry into American life, but more recent black leaders have had a different people in a different environment to lead. I think, 1 hope, that the objective reader, in following my life---the life of only one ghetto-created Negro---may gain a better pic ture and understanding than he has previously had of the black ghettoes which are shaping the lives and the thinking of almost all of the 22 million Negroes who live in America. ... Malcolm X*** * * * 7. Must reflect the nature and the history of the peo ple. Jesus left that place and withdrew to the region of Tyre and Sidon. Then out came a Canaan!te woman from that district and start ed shouting, "Sir, Son of David, take pity on me. My daughter is tormented by a devil." But he answered her not a word. And his dis ciples went and pleaded with him. "Give her what she wants," they said, "because she is shouting after us." He said in reply, "I was sent only to the lost sheep of the House of Israel." But the woman had come up and was kneeling at his feet. "Lord," she said, "help me." He replied, "It is not fair to take the children's food and throw it to the house dogs." She retorted, "Ah yes, sir; but even house dogs can eat the scraps that fall from their master's table." Then Jesus an swered her, "Woman, you have great faith. Let your wish be granted." And from that moment her daughter was well again. Mt 15:21-28 I have been telling you all this in metaphors, the hour is coming when I shall no longer speak to you in metaphors; but tell you about the Father in plain words. Jesus*15 411 X think the vestments have to go, too. They're the ordinary garb of people 2,000 years ago. My God, I don't know what in the world we're doing wearing the garb that people wore 2,000 years ago. To some people these have meaning -— a great deal of meaning-— but to most of the young people whom I associate with, they look at this garb that the priest's got on, and they laugh. James Groppi110 We talk about the sufferings of blick people and the injustices of society, the meaning be hind the black spirituals. The kids listen and they're reverent. When we start praying for in dividuals who have been arrested or have been beaten by the police, they listen, and the Mass suddenly has meaning for them. James Groppi11' But I am at this juncture of the war prepared to advocate certain forms of civil disobedience as a kind of radical obedience, to conscience, to God, and I would say to the best traditions of America which have won for us the support of allies we no longer hove in this venture. So if this be subversion let it at least be under stood as an effort to subvert one's beloved country into its former way of justice and peace. William Sleane Coffin, Jr. 118 Timing is crucial in a revolution, and since the peo ple must make the revolution, timing depends on the people. It was far safer to inch the colonies toward revolution than to risk all upon a bold push; even Sam Adams cautioned his friends to "wait till the Fruit is ripe before we gather on Samuel Adams*** Patrick Henry knew the colonial people well, and knew where their boiling point was. You may in vain mention to them the duties upon tea, etc. These things, they will say, do not affect them. But tell them of the robbery of the magazine, and that the next step will be to disarm them, and they will be then ready to fly to arms to defend themselves. Patrick Henry**0 In the following pages I offer nothing more than simple facts, plain arguments, and common 412 sense: and have no other preliminaries to set tle with the reader, than that he will divest himself of prejudicd and prepossession, and suffer his reason and his feelings to determine for themselves: that he will put on, or rather that he will not put off, the true character of a man, and generously enlarge his views beyond the present day. Tom Painel21 It would be quite wrong for me to offer any woman easy how-to answers to this problem. There are no easy answers, in America today; it is difficult, painful, and takes perhaps a long time for each woman to find her own answer. First, she must unequivocally say "no" to the housewife image. The second step, and perhaps the most dif ficult for the products of sex-directed edu cation, is to see marriage as it really is, brushing aside the veil of over-glorification imposed by the feminine mystique. The only way for a woman, as for a man, to find herself, to know herself as a person, is by creative work of her own. Betty Friedan122 This advice to women, women-as-housewife, obviously re flects the nature and history of this group. And because of this, Betty Friedan is listened to by this group. Let the blare of Negro jazz bands and the bellowing voice of Bessie Smith singing the Blues penetrate the closed ears of the color ed near-intellectuals until they listen and perhaps understand. Let Paul Robeson singing Water Boy, and Rudolph Fisher writing about the streets of Harlem, and dean Toomer hold ing the heart of Georgia in his hands, and Aaron Douglas drawing strange black fantasies cause the smug Negro middle class to turn from their white, respectable, ordinary books and papers to catch a glimmer of their own beauty. We younger Negro artists who create now intend to express our individual dark- skinned selves without fear or shame. If white people are pleased we are glad. If they are 413 not, it doesn't matter. We know we are beau tiful. And ugly too. The tom-tom cries and the tom-tom laughs. If colored people are pleased we are glad. If they are not, their displeasure doesn't matter either. We buiibd our temples for tomorrow, strong as We know how, and we stand on top of the mountain, free within ourselves. Langston Hughes!23 * * * 8. The above pattern is part of a worldwide movement. Meanwhile the eleven disciples set out for Galilee, to the mountain where Jesus had arrang ed to meet them. When they saw him they fell down before him, though some hesitated. Jesus came up and spoke to them. He said, "All au thority in heaven and on earth has been given to me. Go therefore, make disciples of all the nations; baptize them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, and teach them to observe all the commands I gave you. And know that I am with you always; yes, to the end of time. Mt 28:16-20 Then he summoned the Twelve and began to send them out in pairs giving them authority over the unclean spirits. And he instructed them to take nothing for the journey except a staff — no bread, no haversack, no coppers for their purses. They were to wear sandals but, he added, "Do not take a spare tunic." Mk 6:7-9 Go out to the whole world; proclaim the Good News to all creation. Jesusl24 We are all trying to live in an age of acceler ating change with a static theology. Since the phrase rapid social change serves often merely as a euphemism for revolution, the issue could be put even more bluntly: we are trying to live in a period of revolution without a theol ogy of revolution. The development of such a theology should be the first item on the theo- 414 logical agenda today. Harvey Cox*25 But &s the seenes of war are closed, and every man preparing for home and happier times, 1 therefore take my leave of the sub ject, (the cause of American independence). 1 have most sincerely followed it from beginning to end, and through all its turns and windings: and whatever country I may hereafter be in, I shall always feel an honest pride at the part I have taken and acted, and a gratitude to na ture and providence for putting it in my power to be of some use to mankind. Tom Paine*26 Paine was a newcomer to America when the first stirrings of real revolt began, and soon after it was becoming a glori ous memory he was in France active in their revolution. Thus the following, while perhaps apocryphal, fits Tom Paine. "Where freedom is, there is my home," Benjamin Franklin is reputed to have said to Tom Paine. Paine answered. "Where freedom is not, there is my home."*27 I had learned the bitter lesson that as long as the great mass of workers was unorganized, so long would it be impossible for organized labor to achieve its legitimate goals. When unions neglect to organize the unorganized they pay the penalty of their own neglect. John L. Lewis*28 We are the vanguard in America in that great crusade to build a better world. We are the architects of the future and we are going to fashion the weapons with which we will work and fight and build. Walter Reuther*29 When one surveys the spontaneous mass move ments taking place all over the world, one is led to hope that human understanding itself has grown ripe for change. In America one may ex pect the new women's movement to ally itself on an equal basis with blacks and students in a growing radical coalition. It is also possi ble that women now represent a very crucial element capable of swinging the national mood, 415 poised at this moment between the alternatives of progress or political repression, toward meaningful change. As the largest alienated element in our society, and because of their numbers, passion, and length of oppression, its largest revolutionary, women might come to play a leadership part in social revolution, quite unknown before in history. The changes in fun damental values such a coalition of expropriat ed groups— blacks, youth, women, the poor-- would seek are especially pertinent to realiz ing not only sexual revolution but a gathering impetus toward freedom from rank or prescrip tive role, sexual or otherwise. For to actually change the quality of life is to transform personality, and this cannot be done without freeing humanity from the tryanny of sexually- social category and conformity to sexual stereo- type---as well as abolishing racial caste and economic class. Kate Millettl30 The rise of the Third World nations, particularly those of Africa, gave a new perception to American blacks in their struggle here. When we look at the United Nations and see how these dark nations get their independence ---they can out-vote the western block or what is known as the white world---and to the point where up until last year the U.N. was control led by the white powers, or Western powers, mainly Christian powers, and the secretary ship used to be in the hands of a white Euro pean Christian; but now when we look at the general structure of the United Nations we see a man from Asia, from Burma, who is occupying the position of Secretary, who is a Buddhist, by the way, and we find the man who is occupy ing the seat of President is a Moslem from Africa, namely Tunisia. Just in recent times all of these changes are taking place, and the white man has got to be able to face up to them, and the black man has got to be able to face up to them, before we can get our problem solved, on an international level, a national, as well as on the local level. Malcolm X131 416 9. The people must win their own struggle. Jerusalem, Jerusalem, you that kill the prophets and stone those who are sent to you! How often have X longed to gather you chil dren, as a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, and you refused! So be it! Your house will be left to you desolate, for, I promise, you shall not see me any more until you say? Blessings on him who comes in the name of the L o r d l i JesusUZ The man from whom the devils had gone out asked to be allowed to stay with him, but he sent him away. "Go back home," he said, "and report all that God has done for you." So hhe man went off and spread throughout the town all that Jesus had done for him. Lk 8:38-39 You believe because you can see me. Happy are those who have not seen and yet believe. Jesus133 The situation ethic, unlike some other kinds, is an ethic of decislon---of making decisions rather than "looking them up" in a manual of prefab rules. Joseph Fletcher13^ This cannot be done for the poor and the power less by representatives of established, power ful and possessing classes, nations or races. It can only be done with them, and at times only by allowing them to accomplish 'it for themselves against us who belong to this estab lishment. Charles West135 The unrighteous and oppressive act of the Brit ish Parliament for shutting up this harbor, al though executed with a rigor beyond the intent of the framers of it, has hiterto failed, and I believe will continue to fail, of the effect which the enemies of America flattered them selves it would have. The inhabitants still wear cheerful countenances. Far from being in the least degree intimidated they are resolved to undergo the greatest hardships, rather than submit in any instance to the tyrannical act. Samuel Adams*3* * 417 Garrison and others realized that the slaves were in no position to effect their own emancipation, so the burden fell on the free population. And Garrison pushed his flock to the task. Look, now, at that powerful association, the American Anti-Slavery Society! Look at seven flourishing State Societies! Look at one thousand auxilary societies, and see them multiplying daily! Look at the flood of our publications sweeping through the land, and carrying joy, and hope, and life, and fertil ity, wherever they go! See how many presses have espoused our cause! See how many agents are in the field, how many pens employed, how many tongues loosed, how many prayers offered! And the stream of sympathy still rolls on— its impetus is increasing; and it must ere long sweep away the pollutions of slavery. Willaim Lloyd Garrison137 We know the dimensions of the work to be done, for the work lies mostly right before us, in our own community, in our own backyards. There are neighbors in need of jobs, chil dren trapped in the quicksand of poverty, old folks burdened by insecurity, youngsters drop ping out of school and into delinquency— there are cities to be rebuilt, rural towns to be revitalized, rivers and lakes to be cleaned, air to be made sweet and pure again, forests and meadows to be saved. There are exciting visions to be made real and a Great Society to be built. We in the labor movement are ready to join hands with the millions and millions of our fellow citizens who understand the call to great ness that is sounding through our land. We are ready to start at onee to work on our agenda for tomorrow. Walter Reuther13® Our first job then is to organize millions of Negroes, and build them into block ^systems with captains so that they may be summoned to action over night and thrown into physical motion. Without this type of organization, Negroes will never develop mass power which is the most effective weapon a minority people can wield. Witness the strategy and maneuver of the people of India with mass civil dis- 418 obedience end non-co-operation and the marches to the sea to make salt. It may be said that the Indian people have not won their freedom. This is so, but they will win it. The central principle of the struggle of oppressed minori ties like the Negro, labor, Jews, and others is not only to develop mass demonstration ma neuvers, but to repeat and continue them. The workers don't picket firms today and quit. They don't strike today and fold up. They prac tice the principle of repetition.... A. Philip R a n d o l p h * 3 9 ★ * * 10. A leading group is necessary. And when he saw the crowds he felt sorry for them because they were harassed and de jected, like sheep without a shepard. Then he said to his desciples, "The harvest is rich but the laborers are few, so ask the Lord of the harvest to send laborers to his harvest." Mt 9:36-38 As he was walking along by the Sea of Galilee he saw Simon and his brother Andrew casting a net in the Lake for they were fishermen. And Jesus said to them, "Follow me and I will make you into fishers of men." And at once they left their nets and followed him. Mk 1:16-18 If anyone wants to be a follower of mine, let him renounce himself and take up his cross every day and follow me. , Jesue^O After this the Lord appointed seventy-two others and sent them out ahead of him, in pairs, to all the towns and places he himself was to visit. Lk 10:1 But leadership cannot be external to the people's lives. It was at this point that I could no long er sit behind a desk and think up elaborate 419 programs for people, no matter who they were, I was living a lie. Jesus Christ never sat behind a desk and worked out an involved pro gram. He went out and lived with people. Naomi Longl^l I would propose it for your consideration, whether the establishment of committees of correspondence among the several towns in every colony would tend to promote that general union upon which the security of the whole de pends . Samuel Adams X never rise to address a colored audience, without feeling ashamed of my own color; ashamed of being identified with a race of men, who have done you so much injustice, and who yet retain so large a portion of your brethren in servile chains. To make atonement, in part, for this conduct, I have solemnly dedicated my health, and strength, and life, to your service. 1 love to plan and to work for your social, in tellectual, and spiritual advancement. My happiness is augmented with yours: in your sufferings I participate. William Lloyd G a r r i s o n l ^ 3 To be an abolition agitator is simply to be one who dares to think for himself, who goes be yond the mass of mankind in promoting the cause of righteousness, who honestly and earnestly speaks out his soul's conviction, regardless of the smiles or frowns of men, leaving the pure flame of truth to bum up whatever nay, wood and stubble it may find in its way. To be such an one is the deepest and sincerest wish of my heart. It is part of my daily prayer to God, that he will raise up and send forth more to unmask a pro-slavery church, and to rebuke a man-stealing ministry---to rock the land with agitation, and give America no peace till she repent, and be thoroughly purged of this mon strous iniquity. Frederick Douglassl44 The leaders, if they are really leaders, often come into contact with the conditions of those who follow. After I was on my back again I was kicked again in the head, temples, all parts of the upper body, and an attempt was made to hold my legs 420 apart to kick me between the legs, but I squirmed enough so that they were not able to do that very successfully.... Walter R e u t h e r * 4 5 The sentence of the Court is that you pay a fine of $100 and the costs of the prosecution. Miss Anthony. May it please your honor, I will never pay a dollar of your unjust penalty. All the stock in trade 1 possess is a debt of $10,000, incurred by publishing my paper— -The Revolution— the sole object of which was to educate all women to do precisely as I have done, rebel against your man-made, ungust, un constitutional forms of law, which tax, fine, imprison and hang women, while denying them the right of representation in the goverhment; and 1 will work on with might and main to pay every dollar of that honest debt, but not a penny shall go to this unjust claim. And I shall earnestly and persistently continue to urge all women to the practical recognition of the old Revolutionary maxim, "Resistance to tyranny is obedience to God." Susan B. Anthony14® The Negro race, like all races, is going to be saved by its exceptional mem. The prob lem of education, then, among Negroes must first of all deal with the Talented Tenth; it is the problem of developing the Best of this race that they may guide the Mass away from the contamination and death of the Worst, in their own and in other races. W.E.B. Du Bois147 But the job of leadership is hard and dangerous. The goal has always been the same, with the approaches to it as different as mine and Dr. Martin Luther King's non-violent marching, that dramatizes the brutality and the evil of the white man against defenseless blacks. And in the racial climate of this country today, iu is anybody's guess which of the "extremes" in approach to the black man's problems might personallv meet a fatal catas trophe first— "non-violent" Dr. King, or so- called "violent" me. Malcolm X14^ 421 11. Necessity of armed struggle (after all else fails). Do not suppose that 1 have come to bring peace to the earth: it is not peace I have come to bring, but a sword. For I have come to set a man against his father, a daughter against her mother, a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law. A man's enemies will be those of hie own household. , Jesus Now a man called Barabbas was then in prison with the rioters who had committed murder dur ing the uprising. Mk 15:7 This point is important for it shows the temper of the time in which Jesus preached: he was being condemned to death in the company of men "who had committed murder during the uprising" against Roman authority. I have come to bring fire to the earth, and how I wish it were biasing already! There is a baptism I must still receive, and how great is ray distress till it is over! Jesus150 Up to the time of John it was the Law and the Prophets; since then, the kingdom of God has been preached, and by violence everyone is getting in. . Jesus*-** He said to theqi, "When I sent you out with out purse or haversack or sandals, were you short of anything?" "No," they said. He said to them, "But now if you have a purse, take it; if you have a haversack, do the same; if you have no sword, sell you cloak and buy one, be cause 1 tell you these words of scripture have to be fulfilled in me: He let himself be taken for a criminal. Yes, what scripture says about me is even now reaching its fulfillment." "Lord," they said, "there are two swords here now." He said to them, "That is enough!" Lk 22:35-38 Jesus was preparing his disciples for themmoment when vio lence might be needed, but as the following shows, that moment had not yet come. 422 He was still speaking when a number of men appeared, and at the head of them the man call ed Judas, one of the Twelve, who went up to Jesus to kiss him. Jesus said, "Judas, are you betraying the Son of Man with a kiss?" His followers, seeing what was happening, said, "Lord, shall we use our swordsr" And one of them struck out at the hight priest's servant and cut off his right ear. But at this Jesus spoke. "Leave off!" he said. "That will do!" And touching the man's ear he healed him. Lk 22:47-53 John adds that Jesus turns to the swordsman-— identified as Simon Peter— -and said: Put your sword back in its scabbard; am I not to drink the cup that the Father has given me? jesus152 Before Pilate this situation is further elaborated: Mine is not a kingdom of this world; if my king dom were of this world, my men would have fought to prevent my being surrendered to the Jews. But my kingdom is not of this kind. Jesusl53 On this whole matter of revolutionary vio lence it is hard to see how churches and theo logians who have supported the use of military force in international war can take a position of absolute pacificism in the case of domestic revolutions. All the Christian moral sensitiv ity about the use of violence against persons should be active in both cases. So long as the veto against resistance to political au thorities is withdrawn in those situations in which political authorities can be declared usurpers or tyrants or embodiments of basic disorder, the question of violence must be settled contextually in terms of the real alter natives that people confront. John C. Bennett154 I believe that a person must work in the order ly procedures of society to bring about social justice. But when the orderly procedures do not bring man his rights in society, then a man can go beyond these orderly procedures.... James G r o p p i l 5 5 Can we make it without bloodshed? The question applies to Black Panthers, Angola guer- rillas, Camilo Torres, the Viet Cong, and other wise nice people like the Cornell community (not to mention the United States Army). The same Junebug (J. Jones) speaking at Cornell the day after the occupation of the Straight, on May.4, put it like it is. (His words echo those of another seer, whose sayings have got ten about.) What he said went to the point; gun barrels raised there and then against the Omnipotent Owners, guns produced, traded, bought, sold, hoarded, dreaded, lusted after by trustees, faculty, and students, by all of us otherwise nice people. "All sho'nuff dia logue comes from the barrel of a gun." In deed. Daniel Berriganl56 A Grecian philosopher, who was lying asleep up on the grass, was aroused by the bite of some animal upon the palm of his hand. He closed his hand suddenly as he awoke, and found that he had caught a field-mouse. As he was exam ining the little animal who dared to attack him, it unexpectedly bit him a second time; he dropped it, and it made its escape. Now, fellow-citizens, what think you was the re flection he made upon this trifling circum stance? It was this: that there is no animal, however weak and contemptible, which cannot defend its own liberty, if it will only fight for it, Samuel Adams*-*7 If we wish to be free; if we mean to preserve inviolate those inestimable privileges for which we have been so long contending; if we mean not basely to abandon the noble struggle in which we have been so long engaged, and which we have pledged ourselves never to aban don until the glorious object of our contest shall be obtained-— we must fight! I repeat it, sir, we must fight! An appeal to arms and to the God of Hosts is all that is left us! Patrick Henry158 Volumes have been written on the subject of the struggle between England and America. Men of all ranks have embarked in the con troversy, from different motives, and with various designs; but all have been ineffectual, and the period of debate is closed. Arms as 424 the last resort was the choice of the king, and the continent has accepted the challenge. Tom Paine159 The Abolitionists opposed, basically, violence in their work. But as time passed, illegality and even vio lence were not uncommon. But, while we shall adhere to the doctrine of non-resistance and passive submission to enemies, we propose, in a moral and spiritual sense, to speak and act boldly in the eause of GOD; to assail iniquity, in high places and in low places; to apply our principles to all ex isting civil, political, legal and ecclesiastical institutions; and to hasten the time when the kingdoms of this world will have become the kingdoms of our LORD and of his CHRIST, and he shall reign for ever. William Lloyd Garrison160 Those who profess to favor freedom, and yet depreciate agitation, are men who want crops without plowing up the ground. They want rain without thunder and lightening. They want the ocean without the awful roar of its many waters. This struggle may be a moral one; or it may be a physical one; or it may be both moral and physical; but it must be a struggle. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did, and it never will. Frederick Douglass161 On urging "Men Of Color, To Arms!" Douglass evoked memories of the past. Remember Denmark Vesey of Charleston; re member Nathaniel Turner of South Hampton; re member Shields Green and Copeland, who follow ed noble John Brown, and fell as glorious martyrs for the cause of the slave. Remember that in a contest with oppression, the Al mighty has no attribute which can take sides with oppressors. Frederick Douglass162 Here is the stereotyped argument for all such cases made and provided, which has been used by civil and religious despotism in all ageis. First pass a law that compels men to violate conscience, and then drive them to 425 keep it by conscience. Lyman Beecher163 I Cell yon that 1 have no more hesitation in helping a fugitive slave than I have in snatch ing a laiab from the jaws of a wolf, or disen gaging an infant from the talons or an eagle... Owen LovejSyl64 Violence was an inherent part of the labor movement. Often it was hard to pinpoint blame, but it is part of the history of the movement that battles were fought— -and that the police and armed forces stood beside the corporations rather than the workers. Having this kind of force may have made the corporate leaders less than eager to bargain. My greatest error was to believe too long that the innate fairness and sense of honor of the leaders of finance and industry would cause them to voluntarily work with labor for the solution of our great economic questions and problems of industrial relationship. John L. L e w i s165 The establishment of women on her rightful throne is the greatest of revolutions. It is no child's play. You and I know the conflict of the last twenty years; the ridicule, the persecution, denunciation, detraction, the un mixed bitterness of our cup during the last two, when even good friends have crucified us. Elizabeth Cady S t a n t o n l 6 6 I declare to you that women must not depend up on the protection of men, but must be taught to protect themselves, and there 1 take my stand. Susan B. Anthony167 The women would not commit much violence, but they were pre pared to endure violence committed against them and, increasingly, to defend themselves against such violence. We want the full works of citizenship with no reservations. We will accept nothing less. But the goals must be achieved. They are not secured because it is just and right that they be possessed by Negro or white people. Slavery was not abolished because it was bad and unjust. It was abolished because men fought, bled and died on the battlefield. 426 Therefore, if Negroes secure their goals, immediate and remote, they must win them and to win them they must fight, sacrifice, suffer, go to jail and, if need be, die for them. These rights will not be given. They must be taken. Democracy was fought for and taken from political royalists-— the kings. Industrial democracy, the rights of the workers to organize and designate .the representatives of their own choosing to bargain collectively is being won and taken from the economic royalists— -big business. A. Philip Randolph168 So, we only mean vigorous action in self-defense. And that vigorous action, we feel, we're justi fied in initiating by any means necessary. Malcolm Xl69 * * * 12. Two stage struggle: bourgeois-democratic, then pro letarian-socialist. For great misery will descend on the land and wrath on this people. They will fall by the edge of the sword and be led captive to every pagan country; and Jerusalem will be trampled down by the pagans until the age of the pagans is completely over. Jesusl70 Terrible times will descend on the people, but then it will be over and a new age will dawn. And then they will see the Son of Man coming in a cloud with power and great glory. When these things begin to take place, stand erect, hold your heads high, because your liberation is near at hand. Jesus*71 Obviously, this is not the two-stage struggle outlined in the traditional guerrilla writings, but it is indicative of two things in Jesus's outline of his struggle. First, it is to be a two-staged struggle, with a progression of 427 events leading to a definite end, and then a new beginning. Second, there seems to be an implicit admonition to be pre pared to take advantage of situations as they arise: Watch yourselves, or your hearts will be coarsened with debauchery and drunkenness and the cares of life, and that day will be sprung on you suddenly, like a trap. For it will come down on every living man on the face of the earth. Stay awake, praying at all times for the strength to survive all that is going to happen, and to stand with confidence before the Son of Man. Jesusl72 The concept of stages is to be found in modem authors also. Jesus thought of his task as threefold. He was to announce the arrival of the new regime. He was to personify its meaning. And he was to fcegin distributing its benefits. Similarly the church has a threefold responsibility. . Harvey Cox*73 The hypocrisy of American Revolutionary figures hold ing slaves has been pointed out time and time again in critiques of American History. This sometimes was not bla tant hypocrisy, but a realization that everything could not be won at once, that stages of development might be neces sary to fulfill the idealism of even the radicals such as Patrick Henry (a slave holder who advocated gradual emanci pation). Patrick Henry's battle was to prevent Uhat he regarded as the enslavement of the white peo ple of the new world. His discernment was not at fault when it told him that the black people must wait. It was a "gloomy perspec tive"; but the hour had not come to attempt the overthrow of the domestic evil. on Patrick Henry174 Labor has been involved in a two (or more)-stage struggle. The first stage was the struggle to gain recog nition of labor organizations and their right to bargain with the companies. Once this was achieved, material bene 428 fits for the workers could be sought. Desire for material advancement remained desires only, however, as long as that first stage was not completed. Likewise with women. Legal rights had to come first, and then, within this greatly expanded framework, other things could grow. Now that education, freedom, the right to work on the great human frontiers-— all the roads by which men have realized themselves--- are open to women, only the shadow of the past enshrined in the mystique of feminine ful fillment keeps women from finding their road. Betty Friedanl?5 Today we have student sit-ins, picket lines, selective buying campaigns, and Freedom riders. These activities all add up to "no segregation." They are a natural outcome of the success ful battles of past years through the NAAGP, of its basic victories in the courts in estab lishing the legal status and right of Negro citizens. Today's exciting events follow as a matter of course from the steady teaching of oncoming young people in past years. Once the legal status and constitutional rights were establish ed, the battle to enjoy them follows as night the day. Roy Wilkinsl76 it it it 13. Revolutionary war must fit its context. Remember, I am sending you out like sheep among wolves; so be cunning as serpents and yet harm less as doves. Jesusl77 Jesus taught through parables understandable to his audience of common people; he healed people in the tradition of the prophets; and he quoted scripture incessantly to re mind people of his foundation in what had been before. He 429 was trying to create the Kingdom of God---a goal of the Jewish people---by means which were unddrstandable to the Jewish people. Thus,the whole thrust was within the con text he found himself in. Only by realizing this can we understand people's willingness to believe and to follow. When he went out after this, he noticed a tax collector, Levi by name, sitting by the customs house, and said to him, "Follow me." And leaving everything he got up and followed him. Lk 5:27-28 And by working within this context, Jesus hoped that his activities would be enough to bring about the revolu tion he sought. A jar full of vinegar stood here, so putting a sponge soaked in the vinegar on a hyssop stick they held it up to his mouth. After Jesus had taken the vinegar he said, "It is accomplished"; and bowing his head he gave up the spirit. Jn 19:29-30 The righteousness of an act (i.e., its right ness) does not reside in the act itself, but holistically in Gestalt, in the loving con figuration. the aggregate, whole complex ef all the factors in the situation, the total context. Josph Fletcher*'8 It is an axiom of social change that no rev olution can take place without a methodology suited to the circumstances of the period. Martin Luther King*79 The question of whether or not to fight the British for freedom became one of when they would have to be fought. Patrick Henry saw a need to realize that the factors exist ent at the time said that the time was now. They tell us, sir, that we are weak---un able to cope with so formidable an adversary. But when shall we be stronger? Will it be when we are totally disarmed, and when a Brit ish guard shall be stationed in every house? Shall we gather strength by irresolution and inaction? Shall we acquire the means of ef fectual resistance by lying supinely on our 430 backs, and hugging the delusive phantom of hope, until our enemies shall have bound us hand and foot? Patrick Henry180 Garrison exemplified the Abolitionist approach: ex posure of the problem through speakers, pamphlets, and the Liberator. The context of the time made that a viable way to bring about change, at least in the North. Let our single purpose be---regardless whom it may please or offend among men— -to speak the truth of God in it f e simplicity and power-— not to conceal danger, or gild over crime, or screen the wrong-doer. William Lloyd Garrison181 A strike in tool and die, maintenance and engineering is opportune now because GM has been rushing to complete a great program on 1940 tools and dies, jigs and fixtures. A victory for the skilled men will establish the UAW-CIO as a bargaining agent nationally..,. The watchwords of the GM workers are solidarity and discipline---power under control. Walter Reuther182 The struggle for full citizenship rights can be speeded by enforcement of existing statutory provisions protecting our civil rights. The attack on discrimination by use of legal machinery has only scratched the surface. An understanding of the existing statutes pro tecting our civil rights is necessary if we are to work toward enforcement of these statutes. Thurgood Marshall183 The plain lesson is that we must use every method, every technique, every tool available. We need to devise new tools. Our attack must be across the board and must be leveled at all forms and degrees of second class citizenship. Where one weapon is sufficient, let it be em ployed. Where a combination is required let it be used. Where variations in timing and methods will be effective, by all means let us employ these. But let none of us, in the North or in the South, "activists" or not, fall into the trap, at this.crucial stage, of attempting to solve all problems everywhere by a single method. Roy Wilkins18* 431 You may well ask: "Why direct action? Why sit-ins, marches and so forth? Isn't negotia tion a better path?" You are -quite right in calling for negotiation. Indeed, this is the vdry purpose of direct action. Nonviolent di rect action seeks to create such a crisis and foster such a tension that a community which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue. It seeks so to drama tize the issue that it can no longer be ignor ed. Martin Luther Kingl85 * * * 14. The revolutionary process becomes the content of the winners. As has already been pointed out, the disciples were urged to live a certain kind of life. This is, we can pre sume, the life that people would live in the Kingdom to come. So the disciples were examples of the life to come. My little children, I shall not be with you much longer. You will look for me, and, as I told the Jews, where I am going, you cannot come. I give you a new commandment: love one another; just as 1 have loved you, you also must love one another. By this love you have for one an other, everyone will know that you are my dis ciples. JesuslSo Community must also be seen within the rev olutionary strategy of building parallel struc tures. The movement and the church at its best should be a parabolic community, embodying those ideals it wishes to proclaim to the world. It is the beginning of the revolution. By its very existence the parabolic community, or parallel structure, makes its proclamation to the world. Arthur Gish*87 Moreover, the shape of the new order be comes most clear, not through the definition of a set of ideals, but in a living community, which expresses and at the same time points to a new reality of social existence, and provides 432 a laboratory in which its diverse aspects can be experimentally worked out» To the degree that this happens, such a community provides a sign, in the midst of the revolutionary struggle, of the possibilities that are open there and of the way by which they can become Richard Shaull*88 It was, in all probability, the expecta tion of Lord North, the sister Colonies would totally disregard the fate of Boston, and that she would be left to suffer and all alone. Their united resolution, therefore, to support her in the conflict will, it is hoped, greatly perplex him in the further prosecution of his oppressive measures, and finally reduce him to the necessity of receding from them. Samuel Adams189 There is much to be said for the idea that increasing opposition to England forced the individualistic and in dependent colonies into a union which eventually transcend ed them. The battle for political autonomy created a new, overarching political entity. The distinctions between Virginians, Pennsylvan ians, New Yorkers, and New Englanders are no more. I am not a Virginian, but an American. Patrick Henryl^O The freed slave would obviously be a changed person, but, not so obviously, the Abolitionist would be a differ ent person because of the struggle. There are hints of a new world in Garrison's words. Genuine abolitionism is not a hobby, got up for personal or associated aggrandizement; it is not a political ruse; it is not a spasm of sympathy, which lasts but for a moment, leaving the system weak and worn; it is not a fever of enthusiasm; it is not the fruit of fanaticism; it is not a spirit of faction. It is of heaven, not of men. It lives in the heart as a vital principle. It is an essential part of Christianity, and aside from it there can be no humanity. Its scope is not con fined to the slave population of the United States, but embraces mankind. Wil/iiim Lloyd Garrison*91 433 The idea that a revolutionary process changes a per son can be a two-edged sword, in terms of perpetuating the revolutionary idealism. Success in our business, the trade-union busi ness, means getting workers to middle-class status. You succeed and Huelga is just going to be an exciting recollection. The guy who carried a banner in 1966— -well, in five years you're going to have a hard time get ting him to union meeting. Revolutions become institutions, that's a truism of our business. Look at the Marseillaise. That used to be the rallying cry of the radicals. Now it's the song of state. William K i r c h e r l 9 2 Thus far women have been the mere echoes of men. Our laws and constitutions, our creeds and codes, and the customs of social life are all of masculine origin. The true woman is as yet a dream of the future. Elizabeth Cady Stanton1*^ One day the South will recognize its real he roes. They will be the James Merediths, with the noble sense of purpose that enables them to face jeering and hostile mobs, and the agonizing lonliness that characterizes the life of the pioneer. They will be old, op pressed, battered women, symbolized in a seventy-two-year-old woman in Montgomery, Alabama, who rose up with a sense of dignity and with her people decided not to fide segregated buses, and who responded with un grammatical profoundity to one who inquired about her weariness: "My feets is tired, but my soul is at rest." They will be young high school and college students, the young minis ters of the gospel and a host of their elders, courageously and nonviolently sitting in at lunch counters and willingly going to jail for conscience' sake. One day the South will know that when these disinherited children of God sat down at lunch counters, they were in reality standing up for what is best in the American dream and for the most sacred values in our Judaeo-Christian heritage, thereby bring our nation back to those great wells of democracy which were dug deep by the founding fathers in 434 their formulation of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. Martin Luther King*94 * * * 15. Inevitability of success. Believing the coming of the Kingdom to be God's will of course made it inevitable to believers. This gave Jesus, the prophets, and the disciples strength. Now we are going up to Jerusalem, and every thing that is written by the prophets about the Son of Man is to come true. For he will be handed over to the pagans and will be mock ed, maltreated and spat on, and when they have scourged him they will put him to death; and on the third day he will rise again. Jesusl95 The fact that the disciples believed they had seen, or re ported as believing they had seen, the risen Jesus added to their sense of the inevitability of success. For this was the ultimate accomplishment of Jesus's prophecies about his own role in the creation of the Kingdom, and thus had to have given the disciples a sense of certainity as to the truth of Jesus's teachings that the Kingdom of God would now arrive. The disciples' reaction to the whole experience, and how they were strengthened to action by it, is best summed up in John when they reply to Jesus's explanation of what is going to happen to him very shortly: His disciples said, "Now you are speaking plainly and not using metaphors! Now we see that you know everything, and do not have to wait for questions to be put into words; be cause of this we believe that you came from God.» Jn 16:29-30 435 The atmosphere was charged with tension, and tempers were running high. In this mood, these 125-odd business leaders adjourned for lunch. As they walked out on the street, an extraordinary sight met their eyes. On that day several thousand Negroes had marched on the town. The jails were so full that the police could only arrest a handful. There were Negroes on the side walks, in the streets, standing, sitting in the aisles of downtown stores. There were square blocks of Negroes, a veritable sea of black faces. They were committing no violence; they were just present and singing. Downtown Birmingham echoed to the strains of the free dom songs. Astounded, those businessmen, key figures in a great city, suddenly realized that the movement could not be stopped. Martin Luther King196 We have been reduced to distress, and the arm of Omnipotence has raised us up. Let us still rely in humble confidence on Him who is mighty to save. Good tidings will soon arrive. We shall never be abandoned by Heaven while we act worthy of its aid and protection. Samuel Adams*9? A government of our own is our natural right.... Tom Painel98 The Abolitionists believed they had God on their side and thus could not help but succeed. The Labor Movement does not lay its foundation on religious belief, but there are spiritual forcds on their side. I dreamed I saw Joe Hill last night, Alive as you and me, Says I: "But Joe, you're ten years dead." "I never died," says he. •'I never died," sayshe.l" There have been others also, just as true and devoted to the cause— -I wish I could name every one— but with such women consecrating their lives, FAILURE IS IMPOSSIBLE. Susan.B. Anthony200 Yes, I am personally the victim of deferred dreams, of blasted hopes, but in spite of that I close to- 436 day by saying I still have a dream, because, you know, you can't give up in life. If you lose hope, somehow you lose that vitality that keeps life moving, you lose that courage to be, that quality tnat helps you to go on in spite of all. And so today I still have a dream. Martin Luther King201 ★ * * The foregoing thoughts, drawn from a wide range of movements and persons should give each of us a foundation for the development of a personal philosophy to guide ac* tion in the mode of the New Guerrilla. The first battle to be won, the first step to be taken, is in the mind. Once we know why we want to act, the how becomes a much more simple matter. But for too often we allow our ideology to be an artificial limit on our ability to act-— this is why we need to go back to our roots periodically. The "why" is the simple fact that our revolution is not complete, that our religious heritage and our history as a people calls us to move the revolution ahead. That this means attacking some of the major institutions of con temporary society, specifically the New Industrial State, should not bother us. For we spring from a tradition that took on the Roman Empire, mighty Britannica, the slave power, the corporation bosses, male chauvinism, and a racist society. Our job is to continue the process, and in that process make revolution once more an American term in the full sense of Justice Douglas's analysis. In this sense, the Philosophy of the New Guerrilla is simply asking us to come home. This brings us, both because of the format followed in the previous analysis of the Old Guerrilla and because of the logic of the situation, to a consideration of Or- ganization. Organization is a necessary vehicle to home on. CHAPTER 2: ORGANIZATION In an organizational society human progress is achiev- ed through organizations. Saul Alinsky said it best when he stated that "If you want drama, get a movement; if you want results, you've got to have an organization."! Guer rilla thinking and activities begin with one person, but as more people follow the same line of thinking and action coordination is necessary, if only to confront the massive coordination of the governmental organizations, and, ul timately, the New Industrial State. The significant thing about the New Guerrilla organ ization is that the guerrillas are already inside the or ganizations they seek to capture. This is a unique posi tion, yet humanistic, idealistic people have been a long time catching onto it: while people for ages have been using their organizational positions for personal gain (graft, corruption, nepotism, sex, and so forth) the people on the other side for some reason have felt compelled not to "distort" organizational functions for societal gain. Organizationally, this "distortion" is the essence of the New Guerrilla approach. And it meets many needs which would otherwise compel people not to act as their con sciences tell them; the prime example of this is the very basic fact that by working in the organization for revolu tionary goals the individual is actually being paid to be a radical activist. Now, those doing the paying might not see it that way if they knew what was happening, but hope fully they won't. Another facet of the organization which reduces individual risk is the fact that organizations in the public sector are set up to serve the people. Thus when the guerrillas act they are merely "doing their jobs." 438 439 And who can get upset over that? Obviously people can and do get upset over that, but there will be no charges of treason, perhaps only some fatherly advice to get on the team and play ball. Mao saw his guerrillas as fishes within a sea of fish* es, and thus invisible to tahe enemy they were fighting. This is a requirement of the New Guerrilla as well and it makes Warren Bennis1 idea of the "organic-adaptive organi- zations"? relevant. For the guerrilla band is the epitome of an organic grouping and one which must adapt to its en vironment to survive, much less win. Thus, the New Guer rilla organization needs to be seen as an organic-adaptive organization within a larger organization which, to some degree, is part of the "enemy." The New Guerrilla is a creature of the organization. His/her battlefield is the organization. And his/her vic tories or defeats will be organizational ones. Thus we have the context: organizations, within which the New Guerrilla organizes for different purposes; and that guer rilla organization is the subject of the following pages, organized into categories drawn from the Old Guerrilla. * ★ * 1. Structure: must match the context. It is easier for us today to understand this general requirement than it would have been ten years ago, for to day we have been exposed to the concepts of "ecology" and the "embedding emrironment ." Thus, to suggest that a guer rilla organization within an embedding organization must match that organizational context seems a truism. To rein force it, however, let's cover several points. One of the prime requirements of a guerrilla organi- 440 zation is that It not be exposed (or expose itself) too early in the struggle. Thus while Che Guevara's force in Bolivia won the first battle, that victory spelled overall defeat since they had exposed themselves before they were ready as a viable force. To prevent early exposure the New Guerrilla must remain submerged in the embedding organiza tion, taking on whatever protective coloring that requires. Two easy ways to remain submerged is to refrain from fighting small battles, and to be competent in carrying out the work of the organization. Depending on the organiza tion, a varying degree of the Organization Man facade can be extremely protective: be competent, be bland, be part of the woodwork. Competency is particularly useful since it is required in the Post-Victory world and because it tends to allow marginal ideas (insertions of radical actions into organizational activities) to be accepted on the basis of the person's competency alone. So, the individual plays the organizational role ex pected of him/her. The guerrilla organization, be it two people or a hundred people, plays that role collectively by not ever surfacing as a coherent body. There are enough opportunities within the routine working of the organiza tion to (many of them fostered by the organization itself: newsletters; training sessions, etc.) for members to make those contacts necessary to maintain unity. An employee organisation or union can also help. Another useful part of the organizational context is the fact that most public organizations operate on intel lectual levels— -most do not produce tangible products such as cars, toasters, or so on-— and this in itself legitimizes discussion of alternative plans, approaches, factors, etc. which are necessary to guerrilla planning, communication, and execution. Special planning groups, task forcds, think- tanks are routine in many organizations and their useful- 441 ness to guerrillas is great. In brief, then, the guerrilla organization attempts to use a& many of the contextual factors available .as pos sible in ways which make them useful for guerrilla activi ties. This preserves the guerrillas' slim resources (es pecially time), legitimizes guerrilla activities, and brings the guerrillas into contact with manageable numbers of people who can be recruited. This is a suggested way for the guerrillas to relate to and use the embedding or ganization. Internally, the guerrillas are held together by ideals— -again a stated expectation of their formal work— and by a desire to act-— again an organizational norm. Be cause of this there is little need for constant contact. An interchange of information is vital to develop new tac tics and to coordinate attacks as their strength grows, but the basic activities of the guerrillas become internalized and need little or no outside direction. This is one strength of the New Guerrilla as opposed to the Old Guerril la: the New does not need to remain grouped in order to meet survival needs as these are taken care of by the or ganization— -the New Guerrilla is paid for his/her work. Other internal features are covered in the following points, but it should be remembered throughout that the essence of guerrilla organization is that it meet the de mands of its environment. Only in this manner can it sur vive, grow, and finally achieve victory; for the guerrilla force is a minority group lacking much formalized power within the system and subject to organizational sanctions if it becomes too overt. TOOLS 1. Lawrence and Lorsch's Organization and Environment3 442 is on many levels and reinforces the idea that organi zations need to consider their environment as a re levant operating factor. Also, see (with a critical eye) F.W. Riggs' The Ecology of Public Administra- tlonf 2. Joseph Fletcher's Situation Ethics^ while a philo sophical work, gets to the heart of the contextual or situation approach to action. 3. One good model to consider when developing an organ ization is the Mafia, a far-flung, diverse, dynamic organization held together by ties that transcend hierarchy, authority patterns, etc. Sure, the Mafia is distasteful, but we have to learn wherever and from whomever we can. Two places to start (after The Godfather, book and movie® are: Francis Ianni's A Family Business/ and (ed) Nicholas Gage's Mafia. UqS.Ajg * * * 2. Structure: is geographically organized. Geographical organization springs from a number of factors. First, many, if not most, large institutions are organized geographically and this demands parallel organi zation of the guerrillas. Second, it fits in with the or ganic growth and expansion of guerrillas. And third, it is absolutely necessary in order to get to the clientele (the "people") since the clientele of any major institution are in the areas served by the geographic service outlets, not in the central headquarters. The creation of a geographical organization may be accomplished through a mix of various forces. Transfers to local offices from headquarters, recruitment of guerrilla- types into local offices by people already there and active in the guerrilla organization, tapping like-minded people already in the local offices. These methods indicate im mediately that one key area for control by the guerrillas 443 is Personnel. Control Personnel and you begin to reshape the organization dramatically in a much shorter time than other methods allow. A strong force in the central headquarters is neces sary for supply, communications, legislative liason, etc., but the forces in the field are equally important. For it is in the field that the people are actually served, and without the feedback from the people the central headquar* ters can easily lapse into the benevolent but mis-directed elitist situation we have been in many programs. A guer rilla operation must meet the needs of the people, first because that is the ultimate reason for being, and second because that is the only way to succeed given the inferior position of the guerrillas. Therefore, intimate constant contact with the people is mandatory, and in this country that demands a geographic organizational structure. Communications is vital in this situation. Fortunate ly the state of the art is advanced and is readily availa ble to organizational members. (Unlike Old Guerrillas these guerrillas do not need to set up their own communi cations system, they can legitimately use the existing one.) Regular reports, telephone contacts, conferences, visits by superiors, etc*, are all means readily available to guer rillas and, beyond that, means which they are expected to use. Along the same lines, guerrillas organized at the local level can have significant leverage in the central office, even without much guerrilla support there, by the use of reports. Galbraith's idea of the "technostructure" will come up time and time again in these pages, and it basically means that power resides in many places in the organization. In this instance, power resides in reporting back to the policy makers the information from the field since this is one major factor in the policy making process 444 itself. Manipulation of the data, in the negative sense, is not necessary, the only restraint is how much of the truth to tell in reporting back. The aim is to bend the total organization toward its true task of serving the peo ple, not to break it with a massive attack which will alien ate the necessary supporting structures surrounding the central office (the legislative, executive, and lobbying bodies). In short, geographic organization enables the guerril las to be close to the people where they belong and to in creasingly insert the people into the total organizational equation over time. It also builds a vital base of support for guerrilla operations of increasing strength. * * * 3. Structure: is internally democratic. Democratic organization is essential for a number of reasons. First and foremost, it is an expression of the Post-Victory goal in the here-and-now situation---it is a bit of the future in the present. Second, it is line with democratic ideals having to do with human organizations (as opposed to machine-model organizations). Third, it is necessary because of the very essence of modem thinking as to the relative nature of "truth:" if truth is never ab solute then no one has the right to dictate to others and democracy is a must. And, finally, internal democracy is a motivational factor (meaningful participation is fostered) and a necessity due to the dispersed nature of the guerril la operation— -if the guerrillas are to be effective, the individual members must be granted the right to act on their own within the broad strategic parameters laid down by the concept of guerrilla warfare itself. 445 All of these points could be elaborated on extensive ly, but the general thrust here is the relation of the in dividual to the organization. How does the individual guer rilla view hitn/herself relative to the guerrilla organiza tion? How is the individual treated by the organization? How is the individual involved in the organization? If we seek the "highest" type of answers to these questions it seems clear that the person who sees him/herself &s the organization, who is well treated by the organization, and highly involved is the goal. This type of perception is best fostered by a relationship based on equality and dem ocratic participation since these create self-motivation, creative participation, etc. In short, there can be no drafted soldiers in a truly effective guerrilla organiza tion, and if we are to avoid a self-defeating situation democracy is a must. Beyond the tactical and strategic usefulness of dem ocratic organization, however, is the necessity of building a new society— -the reason for the struggle in the first place. And one of the basic tenets of guerrilla warfare is that the guerrilla force by its very nature begins the pro cess of building this society. Internal democracy is of critical importance since it, in microcosm, outlines the vision of the new society. If the society is to be moved beyond coercive repres sive bureaucratic organization people must become practiced in new modes before victory, this is the lesson of the Old Guerrillas. And it is a lesson which New Guerrillas should heed. Finally, as control of an organization by guerrillas grows that organization can be transformed into an inter nally democratic organization. Again, this is hot hard as might be imagined since democratic organizational struc tures are now "fashionable" in this country. Taken serious- 446 Iv this climate can be used effectively by the guerrillas to further their aims. TOOLS 1. Thomas Thorson's The Logic of Democracy^ gives the best justification of democracy 1 have seen* The pre mise is obscured by the style, but worth the effort. 2. George Berkley's The Administrative Revolution^ is useful in a more pragmatic sense. * ★ * 4. Structure: is functionally divided into: regular, positional, main force; regional force, mobile; local, semi-armed, militia, guer rilla force. Functional division depends on the type of struggle being fought, the amount of control the guerrillas have, and the overall situation. Guerrilla war shifts back and forth among the various types of struggle as the context dictates. Regular, positional, or main force operations occur when the guerrillas are strong enough to engage in frontal type operations. This could occur when the guerrillas had control over an agency and were doing battle with a stub born executive or legislature or lobby. But the limiting criterion is still "never fight a battle you cannot win." Mobile or regional forces can be used, when their strength and the opposition's strength permits, at lower levels, either geographic or hierarchical, to confront smaller opposition forces. The city political machine, the local lobby, etc. are adversaries at this level if we were to use administration of a Federal program as an example. The guerrillas fighting at this level need to look at the 447 possibility of reinforcements from the higher level (can the local Department of Justice office count on support from Washington on voter registration?) when considering this type of struggle. Local, semi-armed, militia, or guerrilla forces are at the boundary between the organization and the people. Here the struggles serve many purposes: small victories (which are large ones to the individual clientele so serv*- ed), propaganda-via-victory, support for clientele organi zations (which could be termed the semi-armed militia in Old Guerrilla terms), and so forth. Again, the guerrillas at this level have to keep an eye on the impact of their operations on the struggles going on at higher levels. If a victory at the local level will cause the legislative body to cut funds, it might be wise to postpone the battle until after budget season. At each of these levels there is a function which re lates to the other levels. Fortunately for the guerrillas at each level these functions tend to parallel the standard functions of the embedding organization. Guerrillas need to be paid, so do organizational employees. Guerrillas need supplies to operate, so do organizational sub-units. Guerrillas need enabling legislation, so do organizational employees. This congruence---in appearance at least— -en ables guerrillas to (1) do two jobs at once, (2) mask their activities under acceptable organizational behaviors, (3) conserve their energies by not having to fight parallel battles, (4) maintain organizational respectability rela tive to necessary, but often unwilling allies, (5) to avoid unnecessary risks (guerrillas have families, too, and it is difficult to ask them to risk all in the struggle), and (6) to use their already achieved training (this negates having to go back and learn new skills---the guerrilla is well trained for his/her work if only he/she realizes it) in 448 new, and more fulftiling, ways. One Old Guerrilla tenet is that you use only that force necessary to fight any particular battle, allowing the rest of the guerrillas to stay in the field, organizing, fighting, and consolidating. The functional division of the guerrilla forces allows this to happen; beyond that this type of organizational division seems natural given the geographic organization of most large institutions. So, by following the natural lines of organization and re inforcing them where necessary, an effective organization can be built. Again, note the advantage the New have over the Old Guerrillas: it is much dasier to add to or modify an existing organization than to start from scratch. * * * 5. Structure: develops from guerrilla to regional to main. This point is essentially a linear application of the last point. There is a progression of structural organiza tions that grows in a guerrilla struggle as the numbers in volved grows. Small numbers can successfully carry on a guerrilla struggle, then as the numbers grow the nature of the struggle can progress to a regional struggle and then finally to a main, or open confrontation, struggle. Each step is within a guerrilla framework, however, since the basic strategy remains that of a guerrilla struggle. In the organizational context the progression can occur in each of the functional levels mentioned in the last point. At each level, the struggle begins with a small group of people fighting the most primitive type of guerrilla war. Then as numbers and power and resources grow the guerrillas are able to take on larger opposition 449 forces, and more openly. This transition allows bigger and swifter victories, and it also helpsthe organization to be come increasingly more like the organizations of the Post- Victory era: organizations openly representing the people in their struggles against repressive elements of society. While this progression does occur, however, the func tional differention outlined in the previous point still remains. This is necessary because of the context: fron tal operations become ultimately necessary at the central headquarters level in order to obtain funding, laws, etc. And regional and local operations, regardless of their in ternal nature, still play their respective roles. What we have then is a progression within each of the functional levels that eventually leads to the open strug gle of a people's organization in the name of the people. And when the clandestine nature of the struggle is no long er necessary then that particular organizational unit has passed into the Post-Victory era. This can occur even though the entire organization has not yet done so. For example, the field office can be congruent with its clien tele and in this way an extension of that clientele, while the organization of which that office is a part is still subject to adverse (special interest) control at higher levels. A next step, in this case, would be to use that clientele support to pressure for transformation at in creasingly higher levels. This is but another aspect of the idea that the shape of the struggle is conditional upon the factors involved. Guerrilla warfare is a necessity not a choice— if frontal attack would work it would be used by both the Old and New Guerrillas. If this is kept in mind creation of a force suitable for the situation is easier. 450 6. Structure: has urban and rural components* In the urbanized New Industrial State which is our t context the idea of urban and rural components is not lit- erally applicable, but metaphorically the distinction is useful. The people— -the clientele we are ultimately concern ed with---are in the "rural areas," they are the rural areas. The"urban areas" are the elites bf society, the re pressive elements which make up the core of the New Indus trial State. And just as in Old Guerrilla warfare, the struggle moves from the rural to the urban arena (with the presence of activity from the beginning in both areas how ever) . The people are the ultimate lever in moving the New Industrial State just as they are the ultimate strength of the Old Guerrilla. This is why the struggle at the local level is so crucial to overall success, for the people through their organized lobbying and protest and their vot ing have the power to capture those areas of the public or ganizational structure (the governments at all levels) which the guerrillas can only hope to control by tangental means. If the immediate goal of the struggle is to capture governments in order to control and transform the New Indus trial State then the people are absolutely necessary, for only they can elect and pressure effectively in the legis lative and executive arenas in the face of the urban strength of the New Industrial State. That is the tactical and strategic level, but that is a superficial level since beneath it is the necessity for the people to control their own destinies. This means that the goal is accomplished by the struggle-— the process be comes the content. Creation of democratic control by the people of their own lives (as opposed to New Industrial 451 State control) can only be accomplished by a rural-based movement, and that movement is the future in the present. What we have, then, is a choice between top-down social change and bottora-up social change. If we can draw on the experience of past revolutions it is clear that rev olutionary change cannot be accomplished in the fullest sense— -a society run by the people---if the people do not create that revolution themselves. The American analogy is the freeing of the slaves; freedom did not immediately bring about the Promised Land for the slaves since they were not prepared in any way to run their own lives. Thus, any social change strategy which relies on paternalistic atti tudes is doomed to fail since these programs do not create New Men but merely more dependent children. The thrust of the struggle moves from the rural to the urban, but this does not mean that the urban area is ignored until its invasion by the rural forces. The urban areas provide---in good guerrilla fashion---the resources for the struggle in the countryside, particularly in the ready-made organizational structure, educational programs, and dispersion of power which so typifies modem America. These things make it easy for guerrillas to manipulate the system for ends far different from those envisioned by the system's creators. So, the urban area is an important re source base as well as the final battlefield. And if the rural work is done properly there will be no fighting in the urban areas, just as there was no significant fighting in Peking, Hanoi, or Havana---victory is assured long be fore that becomes necessary and the cities become the sites of triumphal marches, not pitched battles. TOOLS 1. The literature of community organizing is vital here. 452 I would start with Saul Alinskyl* and then move into some of the more recent things that have been done. 2. A good reader is Toward Social Change: A Handbook for Those Who Wlll^. * * * 7. Organization of forces utilizes political organization and military organization. This organizational point is one of the most impor tant of them all, for it indicates the dual nature of the guerrilla struggle and highlights the often-overlooked (particularly by Americans) political component. Guerrilla warfare, being based on the people, is basically a politi cal struggle. Certainly the military victories are neces sary but they are impossible---on any large scale---without the support of the people, and that support rest on polit ical organization, which rests on political education, the acceptance of which rests on a program and' process which coincides with the aspirations of the people. The military organization, then, springs from the forehead of the polit ical organization. For our purposes we need to transpose "political" in to "educational, " and •tailitary" into "power" in order to make it clear how these concepts fit onto the organizational context. For us, then, power springs from the forehead of education. The guerrilla is an educator. This means he/she must teach people within the organization in order to gain them as participants, allies, or sympathetic neutrals in the struggle within the organization. It also means that he/she must teach the clientele in order to break them out of the restricted vision of American society which they have been conditioned to accept. 'In the Old Guerrilla's work it was 453 essential to get the people to learn that they could win, and this applies to the work at hand here. The people must realize that the society is supposed to be theirs and that they have it within their power to organize and take con trol. This demands a sustained and effective educational effort. People learn through academic instruction and through the behavior of their teachers. The stage is easily set for the former since this is part of many organization's field work and can be legitimately included into new pro grams. The latter, however, is tougher, for the people most hurt by the existing system are those most suspicious of more "words", so actions must be consistent, effective, and in accord with their needs and desires. Every guerril la should be, to some degree, a community organizer in order to accomplish this educational responsibility. The guerrilla is also a seeker and wielder of power. Power resides in the leverage points of organizations (the "technostructure") and is available to those With the req uisite knowledges, competencies, and drive; these attributes are thus mandatory for guerrillas in order for them to get power. Once power, in whatever amount, is obtained it can be used for two purposes. One, to immediately benefit the people through improved services, more effective delivery, better representation and participation and so forth. Two, it can help the struggle to continue and grow by putting in more of the right kind of people (Personnel power) at various levels, by pumping more money into the right pro grams (Budget power), by providing ammunition for struggle at higher levels (Knowledge power; the computer programmer is a powerful person, and so is the statistician: witness MacNamara's ability to overawe Congress and get exactly what he wanted), etc. Both of these should be attended to, 454 particularly to avoid the situation where the expansion of power becomes an end and not merely a means. As long as there is an attitude that gains will be distributed to both areas this should not become a major problem. Of vital importance is the distribution of the newly gained power itself to lower levels of the organization and to the people themselves. This indicates the vast leverage available to those who initially design programs. These people have it in their power, if they are skillful in mani pulating their context (particularly such organizations as legislative committees and agencies like the Office of Management and Budget), to create programs which give power to the people directly. And if, at the other end, the £££ld offices are skillful in their educational work this power can be accepted and well used by the people, giving positive feedback which gives impetus to expanded programs. The point is to get the power to the people so that they can really control their own lives. This demands education, both to de-condition and to educate in the use of power (as well as to build bases of support for the d&caggle to get tthd power to distribute in the first place). And it demands getting and using power toward this end. The guerrilla's life is complex, and his/her work is not easy, but fortunately the current system has prepared or ganizational persons to fulfill the guerrilla^s roles by educating them and giving them access to power. The trick is to realize that competencies already exists in yourself and then to use them for ends not envisioned by the New Industrial elite groups. TOOLS 1. The community organizing literature is valuable here . also. A good "handbook" is Si Kahn's How People Get Power.13 455 2. The field of education is applicable here since guer rillas must be educators. Education as a Subversive Activity^ and Education forAlienatlon*3 are useful introductions to the field. 3. A particularly good case study on the distribution of power to the people is "The Bureaucracy: Antipoverty and the Community Action Program"!” 4. Another handbook, this time on political action, is Michael Walzer's Political Action*?. This covers the whole spectrum of "things to do"An a very short space. * * * 8. Cadres are vital for creating and maintaining organi zations. The cadre is a guerrilla who is skilled in a function al way which enables him/her to handle a position in an or ganization vital to the. maintenance of society. For ex ample, if there are no guerrillas trained to run the fac tories, who will run the factories after victory? The form er managers. Obviously, this is not a satisfactory solution and one which creates a need for trained cadres ready to get in upon victory and run society under a new philosophy. Without cadres the goals of the revolution cannot be oper ationalized in any meaningful sense— -and operationalization is the crucial factor in a revolution's success or failure, not military victory. In Old Guerrilla operations cadres were oftentimes revolutionaries first and technicians later after intensive training in h base area. In our context, however, the reverse is usually true: we have huge numbers of highly trained people who— -significantly— -are already in the organizations, but who lack revolutionary attitudes. This emphasizes the need for internal education discussed in the prior point and indicates that guerrillas here may have an 456 easier time o£ it than the Old Guerrillas since revolution ary attitudes may be more readily acquired than technical skills. Once the cadre is created by a realization o£ his/her technical skill and its relevance to a revolutionary strug gle, the vista is wide open for guerrilla operations. The entire organization becomes one big opportunity for trans- formation and use as a tool for the struggle and to more fully benefit and represent the people. And because all New Guerrillas, by definition, are cadres (they are all trained and educated in some facet(s) of organizational work) there is no need to create a dualism by having mili tary people and cadres. This lessens the possibility of friction, often evident in Old Guerrilla struggles, between these groups. Cadres, then, can gain the vital leverage points in organizations to enable the redistribution of power men tioned earlier to occur. They can divert resources to strengthen the struggle, while denying resources to the opposition. And they can begin the work of creating new types of organizations within the parameters of the exist ing organizations (this is where Organizational Development people, trainers, consultants, etc. can be immensely effec tive). For cadres are at the heart of the organization. And this position demands competency: if Program Budgeting is the game, then be a great Program Budgeter; if statistics, a great statistician; and so forth. Again, the system al ready educates people for these roles and these educated people have only to realize that their roles can be used in different ways to do different things and represent and benefit different people for them to become revolutionary cadres. 457 TOOLS 1. For revolutionary outlook, see the sources used in Philosophy. 2. For technical competence, see University or College catalogues, or in-service training programs. * * # 9. Cadres operate internally and externally---with the people. The internal operation of the cadres should be fairly clear now; they go after the leverage points in organiza tions in order to control and transform them (or in some cases abolish them). But the external operation needs elaboration. Since one of the major goals of the move toward a new society is democratic control by the people, the people need to be schooled in the ways of control. A good example of this process can be seen in the field of Urban Planning, specifically Urban Renewal. The people who are the subjects (victims?) of urban renewal seldom have the education, confidence, or time and energy to interact with the planning elite which will plan for them. This is because every academic or technical field builds up a jargon and set of esoteric procedures in comprehensible to the layperson in order to protect itself from close scrutiny and confrontation. Urban renewal's cover was blown in the semantic switch by dissenters to "Urban Removal", but that was not enough to change the whole process, since that body of academically "respectable" studies, research methodolgies, etc. still stood. So, a number of planners went into the communities and began to school the residents in the ways of The Plant* ner, while representing the people before Planning Com- 458 missions, Boards, etc. Now the jargon was interpreted for the people and their response in turn communicated to the other side. The acceleration of urban renewal programs moderated considerably as a result (other factors were in- volved to be sure). The people who did this work in and for the communities called themselves "advocate planners" and they typify the work that needs to be done by guerril la cadres. Some day we may reach a point where jargon is no long er used, but to get there entails skillful use of that jar gon by cadres and growing numbers of the people in order to manipulate the system in new ways. It is still the jargon- speaker's game (and "jargon" is here used to represent the whole mystification process which "professionals" have developed) and until the game can be changed that jargon must be used as a weapon by the guerrilla. Thus the role of the cadre externally, with the people, is crucial. The cadre needs to be skillful in this educational/ representational work in order not to lose his/her job and leverage point, but it can be done effectively in subtle ways or in blatant ways as the situation allows. A public report sent to the right community person (a perfectly legitimate function of the organizational member) can change the course of a community. But only if the guerril la is looking out (at the people) and not iQ (at the organ ization) will this occur. Democratic public administration as a concept ties together the people and the administrator. This can be seen clearly in the concept of advocacy, for if the admin istrator is to be an effective advocate he/she must be well integrated into the community served. Simplistically, we could see advocacy leading to integration (of administra tion with community), creating a very democratic adminis trative structure---a structure which is truly a manifests- 459 tion of the people. TOOLS 1. Community organizing literature is relevant here, too. 2. Standard works in psychology are useful. I would recommend Maslow and Royce in particular.18 3. A good introduction to "advocacy planning" is found in Paul Davidoff's "Advocacy and Pluralism in Plan- ning"19. Other professions have their advocacy wings today. 4. Sociological studies of minority groups are relevant to get a perspective on a large segment of the "peo ple". You could begin with The Other AmericaZO and go into the literature on minorities which has come to the fore in such quantity. * * * 10. Command structure is based on centralized strategy with decentralized tactics. Given the nature of the guerrilla organization, it may seem incongruous to speak of a command structure, but some coordinating function is absolutely necessary to have an effective organization. By centralizing strategy and decentralizing tactics, the guerrilla organization allows democratic control while maintaining the thrust of the struggle. In the diffuse context of the New Guerrilla the com mand structure is really non-existent in the sense of lines of authority and a supreme commander who gives orders. Rather, the strategy itself commands. The guerrillas accept the concept of the organizational guerrilla struggle and the activities which this entails, then they go off into their own contexts and use the tactics which are applicable there. As the struggle grows there will be coordination, 460 just as there is now among agencies lobbying before Legis lative bodies or in joiifc-programs, but because the very nature of the guerrilla strategy demands a diffusion out in to the people no formalized command structure seems feasi« ble, nor would it be wise since this would definitely trig ger reaction upon discovery. And discovery would be in evitable. The key to the guerrilla's viability is that "I'm just doing my job the best way I know how." This cov- ers a multitude of "sins" but one of them isn't organizing a formal parallel structure to subvert the organization. The strategy is clear: take over organizations through the people in order to use them for the people to control and transform the New Industrial State into a new human era of dignity and democratic self-control. The tactics to be used vary with the situation and therefore cannot be effectively commanded from the top (if there were a "top"), making democracy within the struggle mandatory as well as desirable. There is a clear analogy with the nature of the op position here. Political scientists attempting to maintain the viability of pluralistic theory have made studies which indicate conclusively that there is no "interlocking direc torate" in American society, that the various elites (which they do admit exist) do not meet together in order to co ordinate their operations and thus control American society through a unified command structure. And this is hopeful, as far as it goes, but unfortunately as with many other academic studies it does not go far enough. I maintain that there is an "interlocking mentality" in this country (and increasingly throughout the multi national New Industrial State) which causes pepplfe in the various elites to act in accord without the need to meet to gether. The elites' memberships are drawn from the same kinds of people (socio-economic status, education, expdri- 461 ence, political outlook, etc.) and thus they act the same. So, formally (and to the great relief of pluralist apolo gists) there is no Power Elite. But informally (as the average person senses at times when everything seems to be going wrong) there is. And it is just the dame with the New Guerrillas. They have an interlocking mentality, which consists of what I would call a "shared Idealism" and a commitment to action, which causes them to act in similar ways toward similar goals. Thus the social worker trying to really change a parent's life for the better, and the teacher teaching that parent's child in a meaningful way are working the same street without ever meeting one another. Of course if they did meet their impact might be heightened, and thus com munication (lines of which are already established, legiti mised, and paid for by the system) is beneficial to the guerrilla. In sum, then, the concept of the strategy, based on a realization of a need for a new society, commands the acti vities of the guerrillas, not a general in the Pentagon. And the tactics used are the creation of the guerrillas in the situation, not the dictates of leaders in other situ ations. New Guerrilla warfare, like the Old, is a people's war. And this is why a Philosophy is so vital to the New Guerrillas: it holds them together, leads them, and out lines the vision of the goals to be achieved; it allows for a largely self-commanding guerrilla organization. j £ ★ ★ 11. Relations with the populace is crucial to organiza tion. This point is redundantly obvious by now. So it is 462 really only necessary to point out that the established system dictates, at least formally, a concern for the popu lace. Governmental operations are essentially people-serv ing operations (the use of the term "clientele") and this dictates that people within such organizations be concerned with the populace or clientele. What is different for the guerrillas is that they take that mandate and run with it. Concern leads into all sorts of areas once you see the full ramifications of the idea, and the guerrillas try to act out those ramifications within the constraints of their individual situations. The people are the foundation of the struggle, they are the goal of the struggle, and they are the means of the struggle. The rhetoric of American governments says that government employees "serve the people"; the guerrillas take that seriously and act accordingly. The implications of that insight are also obvious: anything which destroys or maims the people is to be fought (thus the need to trans form the New Industrial State) and anything which enhances the dignity of the people is to be supported (thus the need to redistribute real power to the people). TOOLS 1. All the literature suggested earlier on various pov erty, minority, and ethnic groups is helpful. A better grasp of the "middle" of America will be aided by Richard Parker's The Mvth of the Middle Class*!. 2. Newspapers, magazines, and the audio-visual media are helpful in understanding the particular population you are in contact with. ★ * * 12. Civil administration creates revolutionary change within the context of the war; creates the future in the present. 463 This point has been discussed earlier with regard to the internal guerrilla organization: the internal organi zation is a reflection of the future organization of soci ety. This applies also to "civil administration." Civil administration in Old Guerrilla terms means the administration of base or "liberated" areas. And in the past such administration has reflected the goals of the revolution (usually the communication of production and consumption) and has served as a training ground for cadres. This concept can be transferred to the New Guerrilla's arena if we realize that governmental agencies do actually administer "areas." The "areas" administered are not geographic in the sense that the total life of all the people in a given area is under that organization's jurisdiction, usually the areas are demographic: the elderly, the young, the poor, the sick, etc. But if we see these as "areas" and then realize that the way in which these are administered either makes real the idea of a new society or gives it lie, we will have come a long way in realizing the true signifi cance of the public employee's work. How an area is administered educates the people, in our system usually negatively since our programs tend to be abusive, inadequate, and an affront to the individual's dignity. It also can give hope for a better society, but in our case it denies such hope because people extrapolat ing from the present do not see a significantly improved future. And it can educate people into a new vision of society and into their role in creating it, but not in our system since it tends toward grudging paternalism which educates only in resentment and alienation. By looking at che negative we should be able to see the positive poten tial and realize what could exist in the administration of areas within our society. 464 A prime example in this can be found in the State of Oregon. The laws there relating to pollution (no non-re turnable bottles, no pop-top cans, no destructive detergent ingredients) give an indication to everyone in this country that there is an alternative. "I have seen the future and it works," is a crucial concept to consider in this light, for if an idea works in any one place, then people can have hope that it can work in their place, too. Civil administration of areas under guerrilla organ izational jurisdiction can be used to create a piece of the future in the present and thus stimulate other people's struggle by giving them a hopeful example to emulate. It also confirms, in actions not words, the commitment to a new society by the guerrillas and so creates increasing faith in them and in their strategy. And it recruits new guerrillas to the struggle. We all need to remember that the future is not a given, it is a creation. And unless we create it anywhere and everywhere it is within our power to do so, we can never create it at all. And the people's future can begin at the point of contact between their organizations and themselves. TOOLS 1. Perhaps the most important thing to learn is that everything we do communicates to others; this is vital in the concept of creating the future in the present. The best work along these lines is Marshall McLuhan's Understanding Med la? -2. for if the guerrilla is the medium then we should all understand media. 2. Participatory democracy materials are a help in build* ing better civil administration. Studies on the Com munity Action Program of the Poverty Program would be a useful starting point. Useful articles on this topic can be found in the May-June, September and October 1972 issues of the Public Administration Re view. 465 3. Don't look for much help In relating democracy and public administration from the Public Administration literature: although the titles say that these books will cover that topic, in reality they, do not. An exception to this can be found in (ed) Roscoe Martin's Public Administration and Petnocracv23. This is a collection of essays in honor of Paul Appleby (and contains two pieces by him); after reading these it might be worthwhile to continue on into Appleby him self. 13. Components of guerrilla struggle include: weapons, bases, supply, communications, intelligence, propa ganda, indoctrination and training, specialists, dis cipline. Examples of these should help guerrillas to realize the potential of the things they already have around them. We tend to be blind to new uses for old, familiar tools. Weapons. Basically knowledge, competency, and skill are the weapons of this struggle; they enable guerrillas to get and use func tional positions (which are weapons of a big ger calibre). In order to win your weapons must be better and better used than the enemy's. Bases. Start where you are in the organiza tion, secure that as a base (a safe position with reasonably good supply) before going on to bigger organizational units. Supply. As in Old Guerrilla war the enemy, the people, and the environment are the sup pliers of most things. The telephones, mimeo graph machines, photocopiers, secretarial pools, newsletters, mailing lists, etc., etc., are all there waiting to be used. But guer rillas must also be willing to supply things which cannot be justified {misuse of organiza tional resources cannot really be condoned in this type of warfare, but where to draw the line is a crucial question) or are not avail able. Communications. The standard communications lines are there and are quite adequate for in- 466 forming the clientele. Communications among guerrillas is increasingly trickier as it moves away from standard lines (such as con ferences, routine meetings, letters, etc.) and into such things as guerrilla newsletters (present in some organizations at this time). Intelligence. Guerrillas, by their organiza tional positions, are their own best intel ligence service. The biggest feat in Old Guer rilla warfare is to get someone inside; vou1 re already there. Propaganda. Again the use of organizational resources for this is obviously effective, change the content of the material going out and you've changed a lot. Another leverage position becomds clearly defined. Indoctrination and Training. There are two kinds. The organization and its supportive educational and training structures (including the University) takes care of the first. The second is the responsibility of the guerrillas already in the organization and in contact with a potential guerrilla. Basically an attempt to give the person a new perspective and let him/her draw conclusions which may or may not lead to their becoming a guerrilla. Once they do cross the line, the communication of ex perience in the struggle (tactics, context, targets, etc.) is invaluable. Specialists. Already present in most cases, and highly effective when motivated to differ ent kinds of activities. Guerrillas rely on specialists just like anyone else in the or ganization. In a modern political campaign the computer programmer is a valued member of the team, so it is with the guerrillas. Discipline. A touchy subject. Hopefully two things will lessen the need for thinking over much about this. First, the guerrillas' activi ties are so innocuous that they cannot be accused of anything. Second, the internal consciousness of the individuals would not allow them to ex pose the organization. Since there really is no "organization" in any tangible sense, the need for strict discipline is lessened. Some groups however have used disciplinary actions to keep members in line, but when in doubt about a person exclusion might be a better policy. 467 This rough outline of some of the main components of guerrilla warfare in the New sense indicates that the com ponents are essentially already present. What is lacking is a view of the components as a system which is capable of changing organizations and its actions toward the people. The guerrilla concept is a system which allows us to or ganize the components of organizational life into something meaningful and effective in fostering change. Again, the nature of the components and their specific use depends on the particular organizational context the guerrilla is in. TOOLS 1. Already present in your organization. Any updating may be obtained in in-service training, special courses, or university courses. 2. Imagination (which can be fostered by exchange of in formation and experience) is a key factor in trans forming the ordinary into a guerrilla tool. * ‘ k ★ Members of public organizations in this country are experts, in the empirical sense, in organization. They run organizations, or are run by them, or a combination of both ---organizations are an integral part of their lives. Be cause of this closeness there is the chance that members no longer analyze their organizations and learn from them (a major reason for going back to school for Theory courses) and this is a shame, and to be avoided by the guerrilla. For the best classroom in guerrilla organization is right there in your own backyard. This is the first general point which summarizes the New Guerrilla approach to or ganization. The second is that the guerrilla organization must fit the larger organizational context. This has already 468 been discussed and needs only to be reinforced in this way: in order to fit the larger organization you must know the shape of that organization. Third, guerrillas need not do much more than use their existing embedding organizations to create a full blown organization for themselves. The resources are all there, only the will and the realization of the guerrillas' position is lacking. Finally, will and realization are provided a founda tion, hopefully, in the Philosophy section presented ear lier, and the Strategy section which follows. Once we realize how many of the components of New guerrilla warfare the organizational member already has at his/her finger tips, components painfully built up over years of struggle by the Old Guerrilla, the rise of the New Guerrilla seems almost inevitable. This is not to say that the struggle is easy, but only that so much of the backbreaking labor has already been done that it seems almost criminal not to act. General guidelines---a Strategy— -for that action follows. CHAPTER 3: STRATEGY New Guerrilla stategy has one feature that clearly distinguishes it from Old Guerrilla strategy, and this is the fact that guerrillas are already inside those organiza tions which can be used to reach their goals. Again, Che's words speak to us: "I envy you in the United States. You are in the heart of the beast."1 And while the admininis- trative branch of governments (the primary target of guer rillas) may not be the heart of the New Industrial State beast, it certainly is the heart of the beastAs major ally. Thus, guerrilla strategy is as much a call to action than a list of things to do, since public servants should know what they have to do and they certainly have the skills necessary to do it. A strategy brings these two factors together, leading to action. When looking at this Strategy it is important to re member that any strategy of action, and particularly one as complex and often convoluted as that based in guerrilla war- fare, is a seamless web. This is vital to understanding since to discuss this Strategy I have pulled it apart, try ing to relate the parts back together but inevitably miss ing many inter-relations. So, when considering the strate gic concepts outlined in the following pages it is neces sary to put them back together again and see how the whole thing looks before passing judgement on it. Along with the notion 6f the seamless web there is another thing to recall: that the presentation here de pends in large measure on the elaboration of Old Guerrilla strategy found in earlier sections. Without the background found there, what follows here will not have its full im pact . 469 470 With these things in mind we can move into the Strat egy of the New Guerrilla. A strategy based on a philosophy of and fGr this society, set in the organizational context of this society, and aimed at fighting the struggles that need to be fought in this society. It is to our struggle that the Strategy of the following pages speaks, * * * i 1. Strategy directs the operation within the whole situ ation. The strategic goal is pure and simple: the seizure of power. Having established this, it becomes necessary to move on to the question of how to achieve this goal, that answer being dependent upon the exigencies of the whole situation. Like the Old Guerrilla, the New Guerrilla realizes that there are many strategic plans closed to him/her. Violent revolution is not an option for a number of reasons: the situation is not bad enough to warrant it, the people would not support it, in an urbanized country the people would suffer tremendously, and, given these points, it is extremely unlikely that such a movement could succeed. Frontal political attack is not feasible at this time; re gardless of your political preference "radical" movements (MdGovem or Wallace) do not win, nor do third or fourth parties. And it seems that legislatures are bogged down in pettiness and unable (or unwilling) to take the initiative in the name of the people. The executive and the courts seem to have gone about as far as they can. Beyond the scope of the traditional political struc tures are the community movements, the Common Causes, the Bublic Citizens, and so forth. While these all help, they 471 do not seem to be able to cope effectively with our con temporary problems. Looking at this situation we have to ask where the real power in the public sector lays? And the answer seems clear: in the administrative structures at all levels. This is where the bulk of policy is made and it is where the money is spent, the programs implemented, and the clienteles served. So if we cannot effectively attack the problems elsewhere, perhaps we can be effective here. If it is true that the administrative tail now wags the govern mental dog, then to seize power means to seize the adminis trative structures. "Seize" is precisely the word, and yet it is a loaded word. By "seize" I mean the non-violent, legal taking of administrative power by those with the ad ministrative institution. So, we have narrowed down the strategic goal to the seizure of administrative power by some means allowed by the comments above. Thus, these means have to be non violent, legal, politically quiescent, and not dependent on other branches of government. In short we have the proto type New Guerrilla context. Nonviolent organizational guerrilla warfare within the administrative branch of government. This is the essen tial strategy. It works toward the goal of seizing the administrative branch in order to use the power present there to confront and defeat the New Industrial State and thus give democratic power to the people. The idea of the seizure of power is part of the mainstream of our philoso phical heritage (see Philosophy), while the strategic means fit the context in which we must work. In both these senses, then, the strategy is a good one, a viable one both philosophically and pragmatically. Having arrived at this strategy we have taken another major step toward operationalizing the struggle, for we now 472 have a general blueprint with which to build the struggle in detail. Guerrilla warfare being a warfare of intel ligence it is important to have thought carefully about the strategic plan before proceeding. And each individual needs to think carefully about his/her own strategic plan before proceeding individually. TOOLS 1. The rise to power of the administrative branch has been well documented. Two useful sources to consider are Peter Woll's American Bureaucracy^ and Eugene Dvorin and Robert Simmons' From Amoral to Humane Bureaucracy3. The latter also makes a good case for the necessity of bureaucracy to now be concerned with values and to take the moral initiative. 2. The rise to dominance of organizations in general is well chronicled in Kenneth Boulding's The Organiza tional Revolution^ and this leads into the realiza tion that in the New Industrial State fire might best be fought with fire: organizations with organiza tions. 3. And the rise of the manager is chronicled in James Burnham's The Managerial Revolution*. 4. Concrete examples are always helpful in developing a strategy. I would recommend Mark Day's Forty Acres: Cesar Chavez and the Farm Workers^ as an example of organizing people for action. And Neal Postman and Charles Weingartner's The Soft Revolution: A Student Handbook for Turning Schools Around/as a plan for re building institutions from within. 2. Strategy: based on careful analysis of the whole sit uation. The choice of guerrilla warfare, in the special sense that this phrase is used here, is based on a general analy sis of the situation in this country at this time. It is apparent that radical changes are needed in American socie 473 ty; and this need for change is the first of two crucial points in making strategic choices, for if there were no need for change there would be no need for a strategy of change. That the richest and most (supposedly) enlightened country on earth is beset with ecological crises, relative ly massive poverty, racial discrimination, degradation of the elderly, criminally low levels of health care, dis integrating educational systems, and pervasive social ennui, to mention only a few of our major ills, calls for a basic re-evaluation of ourselves. We are not who we think we are. And once we realize this, we can then do little else but call for change. That brings in the second crucial point: how? The basic analysis here is that the "enemy" is the New Indus trial State, the massive multi»national corporations which control American life with a pervasiveness paralleled only by those political structures which we consider "total itarian. " The deck is stacked against the common person by this State to such an extent that the stacked deck is seen as normal (just as smog is normal in our major cities), and thus we are largely blind to it. In the last few years— particularly with the escalation of the Vietnam War— -our vision has been gradually coming back and the question has been quietly asked: how do we control the State? An answer can be seen in the actions which initially made Ralph Nader famous. Nader went up against General Motors over the criminal lack of safety in the Corvair, we all know this, but think a moment where he went. He went to the Federal Government for legislation to curb such activity in the future. Nader's action, in a nutshell, ended once and for all, our delusion that the "government which governs least, governs beet;" for Nader realized as we all should realize by now, that the government is the 474 only protection the average person has from the New Indus trial State. The government is the power which can control and, ultimately, transform the State into something human. We need change; we need to control the New Industrial State in order to make those changes; and we can only con trol the State by use of the government. Now how do we get control of the government? This question is covered in the previous point and need only be summarized: today a major way to governmental power is through the administrative branch. And administrative power can be gained through New guerrilla warfare. This is the basic thrust, the basic steps to be taken. But the question can well be asked, Aren't there other way 8? There are other ways, to be sure, and they should be used, all of them to their fullest capacity, but we must consider the vital question of time. There is not all that much time available to us in our struggle to build a better world, and thus we need to find ways that not only will work but will work quickly. This is where the New Guerril la comes to the forefront, for this Strategy utilizes al ready existing organizational structures (thus putting it light years ahead of struggling organizations such as Com mon Cause, Public Citizen, Operation Breadbasket, etc.). It taps the massive funds of governments at all levels (thus giving it immediate resources vastly superior to the established organizations such as the N.A.A.C.P., the Sier ra Club, the Ford Foundation, etc.). It brings into im mediate play the trained personnel of government (thus a ? - , voiding the long and painful training processes necessary in new organization such as Chavez's farmworkers, and the numerous community organizing efforts). And it puts gov ernment back where it should be, as the representative of the people. 475 This last point is particularly critical on a psycho logical and philosophical level. What does it say about democratic theory if we must build structures to parallel and/or circumvent democratically constituted structures in order to serve the people properly? It gives that theory lie, it causes people to lose faith end give up on the idea entirely. This is bad psychologically and it is bad phil osophically, not to mention the fact that it diffuses people's effort into areas which have not yet proven to be effective in ultimate confrontations with the massive or ganizational, monetary, and manpower strength of the New Industrial State. Our governments must be made to do their jobs because that is only right, and because that is really the only feasible way to combat the New Industrial State within the limited time horizon we face. What this means is that the New Guerrilla takes the struggle into his/her iob (while it will not be emphasized here, the strategy can work almost as well in General Motors as it does in the Department of Transportation). Non-job activities are not ruled out, in fact they are a necessary part of the overall struggle (the concept of "people's war" with the totality that implies is relevant here), but just as we spend most of our day at work so should the bulk of the struggle be there. This strategy says: Let's go where the greatest leverage is and where we are already established---and where we are paid to be. We don't have much time, so we have to make the most of what we have and that demands that we see our jobs as New Guerrilla battlefields. Just as Meo, Giap, and Che developed strategies that beautifully suited their geographic, demographic, and tem poral contexts, so must we. We live in an organizational society, an urbanized society, a society where people must work to live, and our struggle must be shaped accordingly. 476 By developing a strategy that says to people: You don't have to do new things (like quit your job, learn to farm, and carry a gun), but only do the old things a bit differ ently (in the manner of the New Guerrilla); the requirement of basing strategy on a careful analysis of the whole sit uation is met. The New Guerrilla strategy is appealing for all of the above reasons. It is also appealing, to the individu al, because it is a relatively risk-free strategy of change. Many points along this line have been made, but let me add one further one: since the "enemy" is not the government this strategy does not advocate the overthrow of the government. This eliminates any charge of treason and re inforces the idea that this form of guerrilla warfare is a tolerable, if not admirable, use of administrative power potentials. And each facet of the strategy which reduces risk enhances the individuals ability to participate. TOOLS 1. For evidence that the situation is bad, I would sug gest John Kenneth Galbraith's The Affluent Societvo. Carl Oglesby and Richard Shaull's Containment and Change”, (ed) Robert Heilbroner's In the Name of Pro- fitiO. and Richard Parker's The Mvth of the Middle Class**. 2. Then, keeping in mind the basic concepts in these books, read Newsweek. The Wall Street Journal, and your local paper for about six weeks running. 3. I lean toward a multi-media approach (although the non-book media are harder for individuals to get access to), and I would recommend a series of films which I feel clearly delineate American society. These are (in the order I would recommend seeing them if that were possible): The Wild Bunch, Easy Rider, 2001: A Space Odyssey, and Billy Jack. Every so often they come around again; try and see them. * * * 477 3. Goals, situation, methods must be mutually complemen tary. If we lived in times when control, repression, manip ulation, and so forth were more blatant than they are today (if we have progressed in one area as a society it is cer tainly in our ability to manipulate without appearing to do so) it would not be necessary to say much on this point. Since we live in this time, however, it is necessary to say a few things. First, the situation. If we do not perceive ourselves as controlled, then we cannot condone revolution. In this space I cannot demonstrate to everyone's satisfaction that we are controlled today. Let me only point out that in this democratic society none of us ever voted for smog; none of us ever voted for polluted water; none of us ever voted for adulterated foods, unsafe automobiles, drugs with terrible side-effects, etc.; none of us ever voted for planning-by-land-developers which has led to urban sprawl; and so forth. The political democracy we had when we were still a rural nation served us well, but now we are no longer a rural nation and that same system does not come close to meeting our needs. To continue saying that we live in a democracy is to delude ourselves as to what democ racy means. If democracy means that the people have a voice in those decisions which most intimately affect them, then we do not meaningfully have a democracy. And if we do not now have a democracy we need to go to work to create one. So the situation— -a lack of democratic control over those aspects of our lives most important to us— is com plemented by the goal of expanding democracy. Likewise, the situation where, the New Industrial State makes, uni laterally, those decisions which most affect us is compie- 478 mented by the goal of placing the State under control of the political state, since that is where our democratic controls already exist. These things are complementary, and they are logical. But what about methods? We need a method of: (1) placing the New Industrial State under governmental control in the face of its obvious opposition to this, (2) making the governments responsive to the people in controlling the State in the face of the State's pluralistic aontrol of the governments. It is hard to imagine this happening spontaneously: an outside push is necessary since the internal dynamics of the system as it is will tend to perpetuate the system as it is. We need to force the government to act in new ways. To do this means to apply power as those points with the most leverage. All right, so where are those points? The power of government now lies in the administrative organs in two crucial senses: first, that is where the policy making and regulatory power resides as a result of the evolution of American governmental processes, and, second, that is where the government comes closes to the people since that is where the services are rendered. Fortunately, the administrative branch is also the easiest to get into as an infiltrator. Not many people can ever expect to be come legislators, Presidents or Governors, or Judges---thus closing the other three branches to mass participation in a personal sense but almost anyone can get a civil service 1fib. We see, then, an interesting convergence of situation, goals, and methods, centering on the administrative branch of government. This branch can deal with the situation (given the will to do so), it can be given that will by the infusion (by re-education or actual physical entry of peo ple) of people with new orientations toward democracy and government (this infusion is facilitated by the system it- 479 self), and, finally, it is ail very legal and above-board (a requirement, given the overall context of American soci ety: violent or illegal activity is seemingly not warrant ed and thus frowned upon). Taking all of this into account, the New Guerrilla Strategy appears as a one which not only meets the needs of the abstract framework set up here, but also has the poten tial to work in actuality. It does work as a matter of fact, as empirical evidence indicates. The need is to get the idea operating on a massive scale so that the process can be accelerated enough to meet the strict time con straints under which we must operate. Other things, as mentioned before, have been tried and will continue to be tried, and they are all helpful in the overall struggle. But to ignore the administrative branch in the struggle is foolish. Where else can people so easily obtain secure jobs which are also leverage points at the very heart of the problem? To have a situation where you can be paid to be a revolutionary and ignore it is a rejection of the point under discussion, a rejection of the complementary relationship of goals, situation, and methods found in the administrative branch of government. TOOLS 1. The idea that pluralism can deal with our problems is an ‘ issue that must be dealt with before we can be convinced that new ways are called for. Theodore Low!1 s The End of Liberalisml2 and (ed) William Con nolly’s The Bias of Pluralisml3 are eyeopeners in this regard. 2. The rise of bureaucracy to power in the political structure (the other side of the Hwhere's-the-lever age" coin) is covered briskly and well in Peter Woll's American Bureaucracy!% and Francis Rourke’s Bureaucracy. Politics, and Public Policy**. * * * 480 4. Knowledge of self and enemy is vital. Knowledge of the enemy is vital, that is obvious. Most people are still in a hangover of the anti-government period and still see governments as the enemy. Higher taxes are the focus, not higher prices, because taxes are unnatural, while prices are natural (since we have a free market economy, prices just "happen" like the sun rjiust happens to come up). But this is changing and it is a change in the right direction. The machinations of the economy---with its wide reach ing ramifications on everyone's life---are no more natural than smog. The economy is dominated by giant corporations which administer prices, degrade product quality for pro fit (euphemistically called "planned obsolescence"), and dominate the governmental structures which are supposed to control them. This situation has been labeled, for our purposes, the New Industrial State. And it is obvious that if we are going to fight this State we must know it. Beyond that, however, is the idea that we must know how to do .many of the things that the servants of the State do. For in order to confront the State guerrillas must use the administrative branch, and this demands many of the same kinds of expertise the opposition already has. Guer rillas need technical skills, administrative competencies, political niceties, and, most importantly, all those vari ous and sundry techniques which enable people to "distort" the government to their own ends. Now ask yourself: Who has these very skills in the most abundance? The opposi tion people who have been doing these things so skillfully and for so long that most of us didn't even realize what was happening. So who should we learn from? These same people* One of the traps that radicals have fallen into in this country is that of throwing out their enemy completely. 481 By rejecting everything a conservative or reactionary or just plain crebk does in government these radicals have kept themselves "pure;!1 but they have also denied themselves the best teachers of these crucial skills. Guerrillas can not afford the luxury of such dismissal since they have work to do and must get all the help they can---and fast. So, we need to know the enemy to beat them and to use their own best skills in the cause of their defeat. These are major reasons for studying the enemy closely. Consider the difference between John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson example. What could Kennedy have done in the name of his "cause" if he had had even half the political skill with Congress that Johnson had? The second part of the two required knowledges is knowledge of self. Again this is necessary because of the myths we have been fed in this country. First and foremost, Americans have been led to believe that they are powerless; the system teaches that lesson by subtly pointing out how political movements, social movements, and charismatic leaders never quite achieve what they set out to. Ahd that is, to some extent, true, the American Revolution is not completed even today. But look at what has been left out. Are political movements, social movements, and charismatic leaders the only ways to change things? The system would have us believe so by the simple expedient of never men tioning anything else. What else is there? Take a close look at the three areas mentioned: not one of them begins within the system itself. Again the pluralist trap: Sure go ahead and or ganize to pressure the system from the outside, but mean while the New Industrial State controls the system from the inside. It is time for those who seek change to get in side the system too, for that is where the real power to change things is. The goal should be to not only pressure 482 the system but to be the system. And isn't that the ul timate in democratic theory anyway, that the people and their system of governance be synonymous by being complete ly congruent? Let me add two short asides that will clarify this point: 1. Saul Alinsky said on many occassions that there were two kinds of power: money and bodies. The people al ready have the bodies but they are unorganized, and Alinsky sought to remedy that by organizing them. The people today still have the bodies, but they also have increasing access to the administrative branch and thus to the money, too. 2. Marxist theory proposed a peaceful, legal revolu tion based on two stages: the first stage would be the democratic-bourgeois revolution where the liberal democrats overthrow the monarchy and set up democratic institutions; the second stage would be the socialist-proletariat revolu tion where the proletariat, using the democratic institu tions (democracy is numbers and the proletariat has the numbers), would create the socialist state. Perhaps the second aside gives us a hint as to why the New Industrial State has not allowed its educational outlets to teach any Marxism. For the history of American governance is the history of group after group (slaves, women, young, etc.) gaining access to the political arena ---where numbers count. What I am saying is that people who seek change in this country cannot hope to match the opposition on their own ground and as long as this is at tempted (as urged by that opposition) there will be failure. But if we truly see ourselves as we are, we can see that there is a whole system already built (the first stage) waiting for the people to take it over and use it to create a new society (the second stage). The New Guerrilla is that person who has seen this light and seeks to act accord- 483 ingly; Chat person who realizes that a system for change already exists in this country and need only to be re directed to be effective din new ways. TOOLS 1. On the enemy, see the listing under point number 2 and 3. 2. On the self, a good start can be made with Philip Slater's The Pursuit of Loneliness 16 and Charles Hamp den -Turner's Radical Man*7. 3. If you want to go more deeply into the self aspect, I would recommend Colin Wilson's The 0utsiderl8. R.D. Laing's The Politics of Experienced, and Robert De Ropp's The Master Game: Pathways to Higher Conscious ness Beyond the Drug Experienced. These are hard ' going, but if this is your inclination you'll be well regarded for the effort. 4. M§ny people think the Peter Principle^! and Parkin- soft »s Law are funny, and that is unfortunate for this attitude causes them to miss the point. Read them again with the attitude that it's the truth and see what happens. * it *‘ 3. Strategic thinking should include: Yin and Yana approach; dialectical approach. The Yin and Yang and the dialectical approach are use ful because they sensitize us to the importance of oppos- tions, the use of opposites, and the progression of events on the basis of the clash of opposites. In terms of per ception we need to see value in negative things; (of strengths in weakness and vice-versa) this is an idea men tioned in the last point: we need to learn from those we oppose since they have skills we need to acquire— -for dif ferent ends of course. This is the first benefit of Yin and Yang or dialectical thinking. 484 A second benefit is the realization that situations are never static. There is a problem (the thesis in dia- letical terms) for which we devise a solution (the anti thesis), and here, particularly in American thinking, the problem ends. But in reality it does not end? for the in teraction of thesis and antithesis creates a new situation (the synthesis) which may be a new problem. We are seeing an increased awareness of this process in our own society with the rise of concepts such as "unintended consequences" and "unanticipated results" and the whole idea of ecological thinking where a pattern disturbance creates a whole new patterning of benefits and costs. This thinking is useful to the guerrilla because it sensitizes him/her to the need for careful planning to avoid negative unintended conse quences as much as possible and cut down on the number and severity of unanticipated results. A third benefit bears directly on strategic planning. This is the use of the opposition's own strengths in such ways that they become weapons against them. This requires seeing things in new lights. A prime example is the New Industrial State's need for highly educated people. With out these people the State cannot run, but at the same time these people have the potential to not only see through the State but to run it autonomously (who else can run it?) for whatever ends they choose. This is a Yin-Yang flip-flop: suddenly the employee is the boss and the employer a help less observer (the "technostructure" concept again). Guer rillas need to constantly monitor their situations to find such flip-flops to exploit. Yin and Yang and dialectics are highly developed in tellectual constructs, and their use in what is essentially (particulary in the New sense) an intellectual struggle gives the guerrillas an edge. Just as a wei-ch'i mental set proved valuable in the Old Guerrilla struggles in the 485 East, so the use of new perspectives can prove strategical ly valuable here. TOOLS 1. Scott Boorman's The Protracted G a m e 23 i s a study of wei-ch'i that is entertaining, interesting, and a highly useful introduction to the kind of thinking outlined above. 2. Science fiction is also useful in producing the mind- wrenching flip-flops in perception so useful in a war of wits. Short story collections are a good place to start. I would highly recommend any of Judith Mer- ril's annuals, The Year's Best S-F24. 3. Along the same line, I think that perhaps the best long piece (and it is long) of science fiction which pertains to dealing with a complex highly sophisti cated and convoluted environment is Frank Herbert’s P u n e 25. My only warning is: make sure you have some time when you begin it, because X don't know anyone who was really able to put it down for long. Dune may just be the futurist * s Art of War. * * 6. Revolutionary strategy is not military strategy. It is a total strategy including: military, political, economic, social, cultural. This is one that, in Old terms, this country has yet to understand in its foreign affairs. This blindness can not affect New Guerrillas since it leads to disaster. For the guerrilla personally the totality of strategy means, in its simplest expression, that everything we do is a revolutionary act. This is clear when people give to charities, participate in campaigns, even march in demon strations, we accept these things as part of changing society (which is "revolution"). But our significant blind spot is that most of us do not view our lobs in the same way. Yet the job gets most of our efforts, much of our thogit 486 and provides our financial support. What is necessary is to place the job in the center of the struggle, and see the other activities— -still important as complementing the job. Then we can truly say that everything we do is revo lution. In terms of the job that totality exists also. Ad ministrative work in the public sector covers a wide range of social areas. Power is involved (in our terms this is the "military") obviously, as is politics. Economics is involved, both in the aggregate sense of total government spending and in the personal sense of th6 impact of pay ments, programs, and services on the individual clientele. Social programs hit a broad range of areas: welfare, edu cation, health, recreation, and on and on. Cultural areas are there too, particularly when cultural aspects are re inforced (ethnic group funding, ethnic studies programs, cultural programs of all sorts, non-commercial television, etc.) or downgraded (the homogenization of American history in the schools is a prime example, as is the "wasteland" aspect of commercial television). In short, the adminis trative branch of governments are into everything and thus their use can meet the demand of the revolutionary strategy that it be a total strategy. One other area can be fostered by the guerrillas: democracy. Since this is one of the key goals of the struggle, it should be enhanced by the struggle itself. And the administrative branch lends itself to this very nicely. A little democracy builds an appetite for more, and soon sets up a self-sustaining drive for democratizing society; and a little democracy can be included in adminis trative programs at their point of contact with the people. The Old Guerrillas were careful not to overlook any thing: they attended to details in their relations with the people. Likewise with the New: care shown to a client, 487 office procedures, even the physical setting of the local office can all have a positive or negative affect. If we really take to heart the total nature of the strategy then no detail is too small. The creation of a new society is built on such details. h * * 7. The strategy must have the support of the people. This goes without saying, if you have accepted the underlying tenets of guerrilla warfare, It is a strategic necessity and a philosophical must. But do the people support such a strategy? I think we can discern a clear movement, even in the past five years, toward public acceptance of a broader spectrum of governmental actions. Obviously, the people on the bottom, the poor, the elderly, the handicapped, the young, expect governmental actions in their behalf. But look at the acceptance of wage and price controls recently. Ten years ago that would have been unheard of, but the situation had reached a point where it was so blatantly obvious what was needed that the lower middle class and upper middle class gave the controls support (if only grudging in some cases) and actually demanded stiffer controls over prices. The ecology picbbee presents a similar scene: people from most walks of life now see the government's legitimate role in this area as that of protecting the environment. Control whose prices, protect the environment from whom? There has been a basic change here, one that per tains directly to the possibility of the people's support of a guerrilla strategy. The government is increasingly seen not as the enemy as of old, but as the ally in the struggle bo save the society from the corporate powers. 488 The environmental and coastline initiatives of recent years in California went head-to-head with the developers, power companies, and other major economic powers. And struggles in other states reflect the same growing awareness of ex actly who the opposition is and who the allies are. Thus, where ten or twenty years ago for a strategy of social change to call on people to seize the administrative branch of governments to control the New Industrial State would have been branded as leftist drivel at best and Com munist treason at worst, today such a strategy is increas ingly acceptable. And there will come a day when such a strategy will not be novel at all, and people will wonder why it wasn't done much earlier (just as we sometimes can't understand what all the fuss was with the labor movement). Times have changed. This is not to say that there will be no opposition, only that such opposition will be increasingly without allies to mask it. The New Industrial State is losing its ability to convince the average person that "what is good for General Motors is good for the country", and thus to mobilize masses of support for its own benefit. Increasing ly, the average person is realizing that often what is good for General Motors is bad for the country and wants someone (meaning the govemement) to stop General Motors. The result of this change in American thinking is that if the New Guerrilla truly adheres to a democratic vision of a new society and works with and for the people he/she should be able to count on that support of the peo ple which is so vital to success. TOOLS 1. Sections of Julius Lester's Revolutionary Notes26. particularly "George Wallace and the People", "The Limits of the Student Movement", "The Faith of the 489 Revolutionary", and "Self-Criticism" pertain directly. 2. Anthropology is relevant here since Americans are a many-cultured people. Community organizers already are aware of this, but public administrators have been somewhat slower in picking up on it. Edward Hall's The Silent Laneuage27 can be helpful here. Then start looking at things with an anthropologist's eye---and start asking "Why?" a lot. ★ * * 8. The strategic aims are: destroy enemy personnel; in crease your own numbers; win the support of the peo ple. This point is self-evident, this is how wars are won. But in a non-violent context, what does "destroy enemy per sonnel" mean? We already know what increasing your own numbers means, and we already know about the support of the people, but that first idea is a sticky one. First, it does not mean physically destroying people, for that is not the nature of this struggle. Second, it does not mean eliminating their ability to live adequately in the society. And, finally, it does not necessarily mean turning them out of power. One major difference between the old revolutions of the past (including the American, French, and Russian) and the newer ones (including China and Cuba) was that killing was an accepted means of curbing the opposition in the for mer and not (so much) in the latter. Many Loyalists were killed, their health broken, and their property violently seized in the American Revolution; the spectre of the guil lotine is an image of the French Revolution we all carry; and the Russian Revolution was notorious over the years for purges and the Siberian trains. But in China Mao made efforts to re-educate the defeated enemy and so retain their economic usefulness; and in Cuba Fidel (after execut- 490 ing the most vicious of the Batista people) allowed dis senters to leave in a mass exodus that changed the demo graphics of southern Florida. There are lessons for the New Guerrilla in this significant difference. The thing that makes a person an "enemy" is their con trol of levers of power. If that control is transferred there is no need to break the person. And since the goal of the guerrillas is to use the administrative branch to control the New Industrial State it is clear that people do not need to be broken in order for the changes to occur. So, "destroying" enemy personnel means taking away or strictly controlling their use of the levers of power which they formerly had unrestricted use of. Beyond this there is a need for re-education of the "enemy" so that decreasing amounts of control are necessary. The rise of a humanistic democratic "interlocking mental ity" is a goal worth pursuing, particularly with regard to the rehabilitation of New Industrial State personnel. And this fits into the dual role---power and education---of the guerrillas as it does into the totality of guerrilla strat egy. In this sense, then, enemy personnel are "destroyed:" they no longer exist as enemy personnel because they have been controlled or transformed into something else. Now, let me digress one time in order to meet what may be an immediate negative reaction to this idea. Some might say: Isn't this totalitarian control at its worst, isn*t this Brave New World conditioning or the Skinner box at its worst? Such a question implies that the ultimate * good is a situation where people are not conditioned at all, but is that reality? Is there truly a situation where no one conditions the child, for example? Take out the people* and the environment will condition the child ---it will kill the child since it cannot function to sur- 491 vive. All learning is conditioning, and when we argue about learning we are really arguing about who we want to con dition people. Don’t get caught in the trap (laid by Adam Smith's idea of the "invisible hand") that what we have now are non-conditioned people acting "naturally". The people who run the New Industrial State learned their behavior just like anyone else and it is no more natural than anyone else's, and therefore no better. And because it harms masses of people it is certainly a whole lot worse than other behaviors to be found on the spectrum of human be haviors . If teaching people not to harm their neighbors is bad, then what is good? Such teaching is part and parcel of the "destruction" of enemy personnel. * * * 9. Revolutionary war calls for: strategically protract ed struggle within which are tactically quick deci sions. This is a basic and simple point, but it is also one which must be internalized by the guerrilla. Victory will not come overnight, and disappointment must be felt when it doesn1t. The problems are massive; the opposition is strong and well organized; and the guerrillas are few in number, weak in initial resources, and semi-organized at best. Pragmatically this should tell us not to expect a rapid victory, a quick revolution. Our history tells us the same thing. Over the past two centuries we have seen group after group painfully struggle over generations to gain a jblace of relative equal ity and democratic participation in the society. Now if it 492 took that long for one segment of society to make it we cannot expect the whole society to make a revolution swift ly. This should not cause despair, however, for we do have many advantages over the past and over the Old Guer rilla struggles. Modem technology permits rapid dissemi nation of information and electronic organization: when Ralph Nader goes up against a company everyone learns how it's done---and immediately. (High school and college coaches have commented insightfully on the high quality of play in school sports: their athletes can watch the best in the business every week, while before television how many young players ever got to see the superstars even once?) Vast resources are available and access is easy. And, largely because of the needs of the New Industrial State, we're all a lot smarter in an academic sense than we ever were before and a lot smarter in the street sense too, because of the social movements (televised, to be sure) of the post-WWII era. In short, Americans today are better equipped than an any time in the past for the struggle against the New Industrial State. But it will still be a long struggle. Predictions are useless, for they rely on too many variables subject to sudden shifts, and because they set up false hopes which, when not achieved, cause people to stop trying. "Within our lifetimes" is always the hope, and perhaps it is a real one this time; who really knows? With the acceptance of the protracted struggle, guer rillas move ahead by reducing their impatience— -and pa tience is the name of the game in guerrilla warfare, at the strategic level. At the tactical level, however, the game is different: hit fast and get out. This will become clearer in the section on tactics, but it is necessary to make the point here that tactically quick decisions are a 493 strategic necessity. The guerrillas do not have the resources to go all out for a long time against a well-organized, resource-rich opposition. Further, the longer the guerrillas fight open ly the more exposure they get, thus destroying their “I'm only doing my job" cover and leaving themselves open for organizational sanctions. And even if the battle is even tually won, the guerrillas will be exhausted, easy prey fbr the fresh reinforcements of the opposition. No, the battles must be well planned, quickly executed, and rapidly left behind. * ★ * 10. Passes through stages: strategic defensive or con tention; preparation for counter-offensive or strate gic stalemate; strategic counter-offensive or general counter-offensive. Like the last point, this one deals basically with the time factor. Timing is crucial for the guerrillas, and it is an integral part of planning what to do in given sit uations. The first rule is never attack until everything is right, and this includes your own forces. Thus, the devel opment of the guerrilla struggle follows a progression based on the guerrillas' own strength. When guerrillas are weak---few in numbers, short of resources, just beginning to gain allies and the people's confidence---they do not fight if at all possible, and if forced to fight do so only to cover a retreat. To fight before you are ready is to ask for strategic defeat (even with a tactical victory). This is exactly what happened to Che in Bolivia. So the guerrillas maintain a low profile in the or ganization, gaining competence in their jobs, examining the 494 situation, checking people for possible help, finding out where the power is, and how the clientele can be helped. They gradually build up their resources by gaining leverage positions or recruiting people already in those positions. They build up their own knowledge---a major weapon for later struggles-— and build bridges to the people— -crucial in struggles which involve open hearings and/or political pressure. They minutely examine the defenses of the local opposition for the best place to strike. All this time the guerrillas are building for the stage when battles will be started. When guerrilla strength seems sufficient for opening the war, the second stage is entered, the stage of planning and of minor battles to test resources and train personnel. The opposition begins to see some "difference" in its re lationship with the organization, things aren't as they were before, but it is too soon to tell exactly what it means. The guerrillas are testing themselves and planning for larger operations. Finally when all is ready, the guerrillas go over to the offensive. Perhaps the agency goes after a drug com pany, or a local office after a large tenement owner, or a welfare office fights for new legislation, but whatever the specific situation the careful planning and marshalling of resources has been done, the forces have been tested, and the plans made before any steps are taken. This is the way to win, because this is not America in WWII where by pour ing enough resources on the enemy we drowned them, this is a war where resources are few and cannot be wasted, this is "the war of the flea" not of the elephant. So it is vital that guerrillas see the significance of a "stage" theory of revolution (which is based on the protracted nature of the struggle) and not act prematurely. Offensive action is the most exhilirating action of all and 495 it is the path to overall victory, but it is also the most dangerous for the guerrillas because it exposes them com pletely to attack by a superior force. So this action must be well-planned (with the dialectical bases covered) and then it must be, to reiterate, hit-and-run. If you are not ready to take the drug company, or the tenement owner, or the legislature quickly (by having everything in order with no holes) then you are not ready to begin at all. * * * 11. Struggle moves from the country to the city, with con tinuous coordination between rural and urban actions. This point was covered in the Organization section, and it would be redundant to cover the same ground here. It needs to be pointed out, however, that the country-city dichotomy is an Organization point because it is a Strategy point, and not vice versa. Guerrilla warfare has been, and continues to be a rural strategy that seeks to surround the New Industrial State "city" with the "rural" sea of people and inundate it. ★ * * 12. Maintaining the initiative is crucial. This is a point that ranks right below the necessity for popular support in importance to the guerrilla. Guer rilla warfare is a pattern of actions which eventually leads to victory, but this will occur only if the pattern is constantly manipulated by the guerrillas. If the initi ative is lost it may never be regained again. This reinforces the importance of Yin-Yang and dia- 496 lectical thinking by making the quality of the opposition's response to an action of equal importance to the quality of the initial action. At all times the guerrillas must have a good idea of the alternative responses of the opposition to a certain action by them; in this way the guerrilla ac tions can be chosen to get maximum desired opposition re sponse. If, for example, this is ignored bad things will al most inevitable follow. If the guerrillas use their or ganization to attack, let's say, a labor union for prac ticing racial exclusion in such a way that the union forces Congress to cut off funding for the agency, the guerrillas have defeated themselves. Not only do they not win the battle originally begun, but they lose their organization (in Old terms their "base"); this is obviously to be avoid ed since the initiative as well as the ability to regain the initiative are lost. Initiative is best kept when situations such as the one used above are "finessed" to a positive, but less than optimal solution. The agency gets the union to agree to a quota, a low quota. Some progress is made and-— importantly — a precedent is set for all concerned to base future ac tions on; the "base" remains unexposed and the guerrillas secure in the field; and the initiative is maintained. A radically different picture than found in the first example. And every time a part of the New Industrial State (of which Big Labor is a part) follows the lead of the government (rather than vice versa) the goal of democratic control is that much furthered. Small successes are better than no successes, and certainly better than disasterous defeats. Again, patience is necessary, but not timidity: when things are set up right go after the big one. In all cases one eye must be kept on the question of who will have the initiative at the 497 conclusion of Che encounter. If the opposition has a good chance of having it, the encounter ought to be avoided. One other aspect of the initiative question is to realize that you do not need credit for an event, you just need the event. If guerrillas can skillfully manipulate a situation to the point where the opposition does something "on its own" that’s fine; to ask them to admit that they were forced to do it is an exercise in ego which has no place in a guerrilla struggle. The initiative is maintain ed, the victory won, and progress raade---no headlines are necessary to glorify individuals. Even if feeling good were a goal, the less exposure the guerrillas have the more effectiveness they retain. TOOLS 1. Community organizers are masters at maintaining the initiative, and their literature (mentioned else where) should be looked into. 2. In keeping with the idea that we should learn from those who are good at it, I would also recommend a reading of Aaron Wildavsky's The Politics of the Budgetary Process28 to see how the "pros" try to maintain the initiative in this crucial area. Along these lines check into Robert Art's The TFX Decision29 for an interesting account of a battle in the Defense Department. 3. Richard Neustadt's Presidential Power30 can be of great help here. 4. This is a good place to bring up the question of leadership. Two good sources to start with are: (ed) Alvin Gouldner's Studies in Leadership31 and David Braybrooke's "The Mystery of Executive Success Re-examined"32, * * it 13. Initiative can be maintained even when you are on the defensive. 498 This seems backwards and thus needs some explaining. Simply put, when someone is chasing you they go where you go: they are following you, and thus you have the initia tive: you can take them where you want to (just don't let them catch you!). The guerrillas control the situation, maintain the initiative, with their minds not with their forces, for their forces are inferior, especially on the defensive. So if the mind is sharp and has planned ahead it can use a defensive move to maintain the initiative. An Old example is the retreat which leads the pursuing forces right into an ambush where they are destroyed, or the retreat which leads the pursuing forces away from a vital---but unknown to the enemy---base area. The use in this way of the de fensive is clear. In New terms the picture is not as clear, but the use is still there. For example, budgetary trade-offs are com mon: take a cut here in order to get something else (a new law, program support, etc.) there. The legislators in volved benefit by their own criteria and so does the agency involved. Now, this could be easily used in order to get something that you normally wouldn't dream of even asking for. Suppose an organization traded a budget cut (which was going to be used to hire extra full-time personnel in local offices) for authorization to use community people part-time in those same offices? What would be the result? Greater community participation (democracy) in the program, increased local employment among those people, local sup port for further actions of this type---all good guerrilla goals, which probably would have been unthinkable to legis lators had they been broached frontally, but when tied to an agency "retreat", ones which are perhaps feasible. In committee meetings this idea can be effective. Retreat on a number of minor items (minor in guerrilla 499 terms, not the committee's terms) and then trade those re treats-— made in good faith and a spirit of team coopera tion-— for committee sanction of something important (again in guerrilla terms, not necessarily in the committee's terms). What is evident in these examples is that what is often of vital importance to the guerrilla is only of mar ginal importance to the non-guerrillas, and vice versa, thus "retreats" if skillfully stage-managed are really nothing of the kind, and the victories don't come across as major. In fact people may leave meetings thinking: I wonder why those guys wanted that? So, it seems clear that with imagination real defen sive manuevers can be used to maintain the initiative. And, with imagination, defensive manuevers, basically re treats, can be "created" in order to use them in trades, for covering other manuevers, or simply to build good will. One example from the private sector should suffice to close this point. A big hoopla was made over the warning required on cigarette packages and the removal of cigarette advertising from television and radio. It was a major de feat for the industry. But let's look at it from a dif ferent angle. With the warning there can't be law suits from cancer victims against companies. And the advertising costs of industry have dropped tremendously. Neither of these things could have been accomplished legally by the industry itself, since any agreement among all the manu facturers to add warning and drop advertising would have been in violation of various anti-trust laws, but they were accomplished by the Federal government. This is not to say that the tobacco industry planned it that way, but only to point out that many times defeat is in the eyes of the beholder. And for the guerrilla try ing to maintain the initiative this is a useful lesson. 500 TOOLS 1. Stephen Potter, the father of "gamesmanship", should be considered a3 invaluabLe here. Gamesmanship and Lifesmanship33 are entertaining reading, and they al so show how people use their weaknesses to obtain victory. 2. The whole concept of using the opponent's strength against him bears on the point here. A few sessions of Judo, Karate, or a related martial art couldn't help but bring this concept home in a fashion that far transcends the merely cerebral. * * * 14. The role of allies can be important. Internal allies and allies outside the country, and in the enemy. United Front Strategy. The value of allies is obvious. The guerrilla needs allies within and without the organization. The guerrilla needs allies in the enemy. And the guerrilla needs to know when to use (and when not to) the United Front Strategy. Allies strengthen the forces in the struggle and ex pose more people to the struggle, Something to remember is that the willingness of well-intentioned people to become guerrilla allies increases as the risk to themselves de creases. The more you ask of a person in the way of risk, the less likely you are of getting an ally. The allies internally and externally are fairly obvi ous, but what of the allies within the enemy, the New In dustrial State, or its allies in government? Ralph Nader has hhd experience with these kinds of people: these are the people that send him reports, give him information, open doors for him in his investigations (Hblow the whistle" quietly). They are never revealed, but th6y are there, helping Nader in his work. And the lesson for the guerril la is clear. 501 The concept of allies in the enemy also serves the purpose of emphasizing that everyone who works in that State is not an evil person. If that were the case we'd really be in trouble. Just as we don't want to be blind to things we can learn from people in the opposition neither do we want to assume that everyone on the other side is an enemy. Both assumptions are unwarranted, and both hurt guerrilla chances for success, for guerrillas need all the help they can get. Just as a government report in community hands at the right time can aid that community in fighting something like urban renewal or a new freeway, a corporate report in guerrilla hands can help immensely in choosing targets, planning battles, and gathering supportive information for the eventual struggle. This is a major way allies within the enemy can be of use. But beyond these kinds of things there is the simple usefulness of the contact. Guerrillas within the New Industrial State are not to be ruled out, and contact with public sector guerrillas only heightens the possibilities for that happening. But, as with every thing else, be prudent in exposing yourself. The epitome of all strategy is the United Front. This is where a common enemy makes a united front a logical choice for two formerly contending sides. It accomplishes one obvious purpose, the defeat of the common enemy, and can be manipulated for another, the defeat of the ally. Mao was a master at the United Front, using it successfully against the Japanese, and then turning it on his ally, the Nationalists. What happened was that even though it was a united effort the people somehow got the impression that Mao was reason for the anti-Japanese victory, and thus they acted accordingly at the close of that struggle when asked to give Mao support. The example of Mao can be transposed into New Guerril- 502 la terms. Suppose an agency and an industry get together to rehabilitate a neighborhood. The neighborhood gets re- habilitated and that is good, but if the situation is skillfully managed the people could be brought into the process, thus democratizing it and making it their project. The industry probably wouldn't have this in mind, but that would be the result. Everyone would benefit, including those within the industry trying to bring it around to a new way of operating. The trick in a united front is not to be on the receiving end of the twist. In considering the role of allies guerrillas must exercise caution. People and organizations are not always who they seem to be and this demands the same attention to information, communication, and detail that any other phase of guerrilla activity demands. Guerrillas do not have the luxury of making many errors of judgement, especially when choosing allies. it it it 15. Key concepts: attack only when victory is certain. At first this seems a truism-*-when else would you attack?-— but look again at that last word: certain. Not "likely," not "probable;" but "certain." You go after the sure-thing only. Why? Because guerrillas lack the resources to waste in riskjr operations. And one of those resources is exposure. Exposure after victory is not nearly as threatening as ex posure after defeat. If you win there is a feeling among observers that: Well, maybe you were right anyway; but if you lose it could be: Who are those people and what do they think they're doing? If guerrillas have to beenposed, even a little, it should be for a victory not a "maybe." 503 Because victory is psychologically uplifting to the guerrillas themselves, to allies, to the people, to poten tial guerrillas, to sympathetic observers, and to the gen eral public ("America likes a winner"). This is why Old Guerrillas say that the first encounter must be a victory; this is why community organizers seek a sure thing for their first encounter. Because people who have a history of defeat won't try a second time, they'll give up and say that it's just like everything else they've ever tried: failure. But give them a victory first time out and it's a whole new world-view: We can win. Victory builds credi bility among all concerned---even the opposition. Because constant victory builds inevitability. If the guerrillas never lose a fight they begin, then anybody in a fight with them is at a disasterous psychological dis advantage. This makes the threat of battle a newly found weapon. The mere idea that Saul Alinsky was going to come into Oakland, California sent that city into a round of changes for the better, but had Alinsky been a loser who would have been moved to do anything but yawn? So, victory is itself a criterion for careful con sideration when planning an attack. * * * 16. Key concepts; ddvelop your strong points; prevent enemy from developing theirs. This is clearly based on the knowledge of self and knowledge of the enemy covered earlier, for before you can do either of these things you must know what the strong points are. Major strong points on the guerrilla's side are many. Public organizations have a mandate to act in the name of 504 Che people. They are supposed Co look for ways of beCCer serving Che people and regulaCing various secCors of Che socieCy. They are well-funded and have on-going organize- Cional componenCs of greac value Co guerrillas. They are closely linked wiCh ocher branches of Che governmenC, giv ing chem greac influence and power Chere. And, increasing ly, Chey are Che public policy-making bodies of American socieCy. The New IndusCrial SCaCe has sCrong poinCs Coo. They do noC have Co answer Co Che people in any direcC sense. They can work largely in secreC. They have vase resources, financial and oCherwise. They, Coo, are closely linked wiCh all branches of governmenC and have greac influence Chere. They conCrol Che major educaCional media of Che counCry (Che average child waCches Celevision as much as he/she is in class, noC Co menCion radio, magazines, news papers, ecc.). And Chey, alchough decreasingly, have Che capiCalisC free enCerprise myCh on Cheir side. ElaboraCions on how each of Chese poinCs could be developed (Che guerrilla's) or blocked (Che SCaCe's), are siCuaCional, buC by now Che general ouClines are clear. One crucial difference is linkage Co Che people: Chis is a guerrilla sCrong poinC ChaC needs greaC developmenC, and ic is a SCaCe sCrong poinC ChaC is vulnerable. This is because of Che differenC naCure of Che linkage. The people gee someChing from Cheir linkage wiCh Che public secCor (al chough Che oCher side is ChaC chey pay Caxes), while chey are asked Co buy someChing from Che corporaCions (alchough Che oCher side is whaC Chey "geC" psychologically from Che produce). Already Chis difference is becoming more dis- CincC as Che consumer geCs less and less for his/her money and, aC Che same rime, sees Che corporaCions Caking more and more in non-moneCary Cerms (polluCion is a prime ex ample). These consumers Chen Cum Co Che governmenC for 505 help: to get protection. This difference in what is “got ten" should be exploited. A second, and related, difference ripe for exploita tion is the non-responsive nature of the private sector as opposed to the representative nature of the public sector. Again, the turn of the public to the governments for pro tection and help against the private sector is a leverage point to be used by the guerrillas. If the guerrillas build real bases of support among the people they will have developed the key strong point in the struggle, for the corporations cannot match this relationship short of radi cally changing the nature of the worker-management, con sumer- producer relationships. The people are the key. And the government is, in theory, the people, and that is the crucial strong point which the guerrillas must develop. The corporations have the resources to buy off a lot of people and that is a crucial point which the guerrillas must prevent from being developed. The idea that guerrillas themselves cannot be bought off is a major step in the right direction. * * * 17. Key concepts: work both sides of the enemy: their front and their rear. This point essentially means that any part of the op position is wide open for attack; the rules of conventional warfare, dictating attack only on the “front" no longer apply. What we need to do to clarify the point is spell out the front and the rear in New terms. The New Industrial State has never really accepted the democratic rationale for governmental regulation of their operations; the free enterprise philosophy would not 506 allow this. So in this sense all governmental operations are against their rear since their only acknowledged front is a competitive one in the private sector, playing by their voles. If we go beyond this, however, we can find another definition of front and rear. With their grudging accept ance of regulation, the corporations sought to make the regulatory agencies their allies and thus a secure rear area. This closed off that area to struggle and placed the focus on the legislative bodies, the executive, and the courts as the front. This was good strategy on the part of the corporations because they were eminently equipped to buy off any attacks from those comers: when the aver age citizen attempts to fight the average corporation in those arenas there isn't much question of the outcome (significant exceptions to the contrary are just that: significant exceptions). So the conventional, pluralist line calls for con frontation and battle in this three-branched arena. That is, essentially, the front, The rear, safely secured, is the fourth branch, the administrative branch. What the New Guerrilla strategy does, then, is to open up the entire rear of the New Industrial State to attack, attack from within that rear. The State's own best kept servants are now called on to do battle against them. And while this battle goes on, others become much more effective on the original front; especially since much of the ammunition for that front comes from the administrative branch. This is the general situation. In each specific bat tle the idea also holds true: there can be no front or rear, you attack wherever you can win. By allowing the opposi tion no sanctuary the guerrillas greatly increase their chance of eventual victory. 507 * * * 18. Key concepts: develop a strong rear for your forces. The rear of guerrilla forces is always the people. And the point about the importance of the people has been made enough times to forego repeating. One important thing should be mentioned, however. The other three branches of government, because of their direct or indirect dependence oh the people's votes can be come rear areas for the administrative branch of the high est order. If the people are aroused by the administrative branch's guerrilla operations to participate democratically in society, then we can expect new kinds of legislators, executives, and judges to enter the public sector in in creasing numbers. And these new people can be strong allies of the guerrillas in their struggle, providing them with the necessary resources to not only continue but to expand the struggle. Interconnections like these are one reason why guer rilla warfare is such a complex affair. It is not linear, but mosaic in nature. And when one piece of the mosaic changes, the entire pattern changes. ★ * * 19. Key concepts: create new units as your strength grows. This is almost an organic assumption: it is hard to conceive of a human organization not creating new units as its strength grows. An important condition modifying this is that the guerrillas must not try to move faster than their real (as opposed to perceived) growth allows. Often times wishful thinking about how fast progress is being 508 made can lead to overreaching, and defeat. A second important condition is that the New Guerril las will grow more or less unorganizedly due to the lack of a unified command or centralized force. In Cuba it was well and good for Fidel to say that since we now have such-and- such number of men and weapons we will create an autonomous column under Che add send it so-and-so. But this is not Cuba, and here there already are guerrillas all over the geographic and hierarchic maps, and no central command can, or should, try to keep track of them, "organize" them, and direct their multiplication. If we have faith in the abil ity of individuals to group themselves for action toward idealistic ends then we must allow them to grow and create new units as they see fit in their situation. This is a crucial difference in the New Guerrilla form of warfare. There is no Mao or Giap or Fidel over seeing the whole operation. And because there is not, the creation of new units must be "organic". Hopefully this organic approach will be tempered, as in everything else, by the realization by the guerrillas that there is a cer tain need for coordination. Thus, in expansion the impact of new groups on other guerrilla operations and on atti tudes and behaviors above and below them in the hierarchy should be figured into the expansion equation. TOOLS 1. The creation of new units is an ad hoc affair in many cases. The example of interdisciplinary "teams" in business organizations is a useful one. Also, see Gerald Lubenow's "The Action Lawyers"34. * * ★ 20. Key concepts: generate hatred of the enemy in the people. 509 In a violent guerrilla struggle hatred may be the proper attitude toward the enemy, but in the New guerrilla struggle it is too strong for the situation. I would re place "hatred" with "knowledge:" If people can be educated into a realization, first of the conditions existing in society and second of who is responsible for those conditions, that is enough to cause them to act toward the solution of the problem. They do not need to be exhorted to violence by generating hatred of the enemy in their minds; that is not the goal of the New Guerrilla. American society is in trouble at all levels, from the grinding poverty and brain-destroying malnutrition of the people on the very bottom to the lack of purpose and meaning of the people on the very top. These conditions are caused by a commitment to an economic system that values profit (and the growth that profit pays for) over all else: the New Industrial State. Once these two con cepts are clearly outlined for the people and they are shown how they can act effectively, the guerrillas will have done their Initial job there. We need not kid ourselves as to who needs the educa tion the most, either. The people at the very bottom have a pretty good idea of who's getting what and why in Ameri can society minorities usually do. It is the people who have been taught that the system is good and have actually been allowed to buy (at enormous psychic, physical, and social costs) a few of the more superfluous goodies that need education the most. And all of us need to learn more about how we can act to change things for the better. This is the thing that is so distressing about University educa tion and academic writing: it always seems to stop with the condluding lecture or last chapter of a beautiful diag nosis of exactly what ails the society; and part "b" or the 510 sequel never seems to come around---that part which tells us what we can do to cure the disease. The New Guerrilla is one suggested cure. TOOLS 1. There are more and more excellent things coming out on the nature of American society. Many have been mentioned already. Guerrillas should focus on those things that clearly delineate the outlines of the New Industrial State, what it does to society, and where it is vulnerable. The Ralph Nader studies are excel lent additions to the works already mentioned, es pecially Who Runs Congress?35 2. Not so oddly enough, cartoonists can be of great help here. Walt Kelly's Poeo strips cut through the aca demic verbiage to the visceral level. I would re commend any of his collections as a start. 3. A single source which covers much of the ground about the "enemy*' is Richard Barber's The American Corpora tion: Its Power. Its Money. Its Politics3o. ★ * * 21. Role of guerrilla warfare: develops into regular war fare. Strategically this is the first goal of the guerril las after seizing the administrative branch: to expand the "war" into a general one on the New Industrial State, using government for the people in this struggle. This is so for a number of reasons, most of them pragmatic and obvious, but also for one philosophical reason that is central. The whole point of the struggle is to build a society that is openly of, by, and for the people. Underline openly. So by seeking a conclusion to the struggle in open confrontation with the opposition the guerrillas seek, once again, to build the future in the present. If governments can be transformed by the guerrillas into true people's 511 governments then such a confrontation is inevitable. That is, of course, a big if. And if it cannot be done then the guerrilla struggle must continue, moving into the New Indus trial State itself in a big way to carry the fight there. There is an Old precedent for this: Ho and Giap saw their victories fade on a number of occassions, and each time they went right back to the guerrilla struggle, with ulti mate success. But the development of the guerrilla struggle into regular warfare---in the democratic sense of that term, not the military-— is to be desired philosophically. Also, it would shorten the war significantly, and regenerate peo ple's faith in their governments at a much earlier time. It would be nice to believe that political representatives were looking out for the people's best interests, wouldn't it? What a thing of beauty that would be. Being guerrillas, however, and planning for an even tuality, other plans must be laid just in case things don't work out exactly as hoped. For it is not inevitable that guerrilla warfare can or will develop into regular warfare in the New situation. We can easily envision continual in filtration of the New Industrial State, from the base area of the administrative branch, leading to a complete take over of the State without an open confrontation. In either case, the guerrillas are a key to the struggle. * * * 22. Role of guerrilla warfare: supports regular warfare. If we call open political activity against the New Industrial State "regular warfare" then it is clear that guerrilla warfare does support regular warfare. The guerrillas support the people in their organizing 512 at the community (and higher) levels for action against re pressive activities; against illegal activities, shoddy or harmful goods and services; and for a better society. The guerrillas support actions in legislative bodies and before the courts toward similar ends. In fact, anywhere the New Industrial State is confronted openly the guerrillas can be helpful. Guerrillas have information that people can use, they have resources (meeting places, secretaries, supplies of some types), they have personnel that can obtain informa tion, they have liason contacts which are useful, they have knowledges (particularly of the codes, laws, and regula tions that pertain to a specific case), and they have access to key political actors. All of these things can be brought to bear to help support regular warfare. One thing must be kept in mind in all of this, how ever, and that is that the guerrillas must not over-expose themselves to danger in trying to support regular political struggles. If they do so and are destroyed they not only lose their usefulness in this supporting role but also in their main role as active participants in the guerrilla struggle. A balance must be kept between supporting actions and main-line guerrilla struggles. If this is done, the guerrillas can use their resources with maximum effective ness. * * * 23. Role of guerrilla warfare: remains the pervasive characteristic of the revolutionary war. This is the importance of the guerrilla strategy it self. The strategy is a guerrilla strategy regardless of the precise nature of the specific struggle in question. 513 As mentioned in the Philosophy section, the whole American Revolution was essentially one big guerrilla war even though there were guerrilla, regional, and positional struggles within it. This pervasive characteristic is the key to the en tire struggle. It explains what is going on in an other wise fragmented, disjointed, and confusing non-pattern of events. To make this point clearer, remember that to the observer with no background in the game, wei-ch'i seems like a series of random moves with no overall plan, but one player wins and one loses just the same: there is a pattern that non-initiates cannot see. For the New Guerrilla the concept of guerrilla warfare is the pattern. This view also helps the guerrilla to incorporate seemingly unrelated situations into the struggle. What might be just another routine event (say a report on hous ing patterns) can become, when combined with another event (say the formation of a home-owners council in a neighbor hood) a potent addition to the struggle against such things as housing discrimination or penetration of a neighborhood by apartment builders. If the guerrilla, because of his/ her mental set, is looking for opportunities then he/she will find them in the strangest places. And the strangest places are often the best since they tend to spread the struggle to areas that would only be touched much later if the course of events was strictly linear. Finally, in personal terms the retention of the guer rilla mentality is rewarding. It enables the individual to look for and consider all the possibilities of the situation in which he/she finds him/herself. A job is no longer just a job, a report is no longer just a report, a budget no longer is just a budget-— getting by no longer is enough. The guerrilla mentality, taken through a guerrilla struggle, will create a new person. And a better person. 514 TOOLS 1. A thought-provoking (both in content and format) presentation of a pervasive mental set is found in L. Clark Stevens'est37. His bibliography provides clues for further inquiry into this area. * * * 24. Revolutionary warfare demands planning and coordina tion. By now this should be crystal clear. Suffice it to say that both the planning and the coordination will lack the formalized processes we are familiar with since the guerrillas' situation does not allow (at least in initial stages, and later only for major reasons) such formalities. Without planning and coordination battles cannot be won. The situational differences among all the places guerrillas can and should be operating are so vast that I won't even hazard any examples of how these things shohld be accom plished. 1 would rather suggest a few tools and rely on peoples' own imagination and perceptions of their situation ---and their creative use of the massive planning and co ordinating resources available to them in their organiza tion already. In the New guerrilla warfare everyone has to be a planner and coordinator. TOOLS 1. Anything that tells you how to accomplish a complex human project is a useful tool for this point. Some suggestions: the Theodore White books on Presidential camgaigns: Joe McGinniss' The Selling of the Presi dent 196838: Ralph Nader and Donald Ross' Action for A Chanee3^T and the previously mentioned literature on community organizing. 2. Other complex human projects include filmmaking: any of the good The Making of — . books; high level de- 515 cision-making: David Halberstrom's The Best and the BriehtestfrO: spying: Ladislas Farago's The Game of Foxes***: and, of course, Old Guerrilla warfare; any of the things used in Book 1 that looks immediately good to you. * * * 25. Revolutionary warfare demands the flexibility, imagi nation, and initiative which characterize the conduct of guerrilla warfare. Flexibility, imagination, and initiative. These are the intellectual keys to an intellectually-based warfare made more so in its New form. Flexibility demands an openness and objectivity that allows the guerrilla to cut bait when it's time to flee, and to fish on a moment's notice when the situation is right. There is no room for rigidity (regardless of what it is based on: ego, history, position, or past record), close-mindedness, or narrowness of vision. The biggest threat is not that the guerrilla begins with a lack of flexibility, but that he/she will acquire this trait as time passes. To avoid this, keep in touch with people who will monitor your ideas and tell you what they really think ---and listen to them carefully and see if maybe they aren't right sometimes. Imagination demands wild flights of fancy and the put ting together of disparate pieces of information into creative new patterns. As mentioned earlier I find science fiction to be among the best stimulators and maintainers of imagination. And if the friends who monitor you read science fiction, that's a double bonus. Initiative demands the courage to take a risk, to step out from habituated inertia and trv something. Flex ibility and imagination are ijust games until powered by 516 initiative out into the real world. As said so many times already, the future is in the present: if not today, when? Flexibility and imagination can be fostered, perhaps even taught, but initiative seems to be another matter. 1 think that it can really only be inspired by need, by example, perhaps even by boredom---and that is one of the main reasons for the Philosophy section, to inspire us all to act within realms which are easy for us (but still im portant) for a better society. TOOLS 1. The most evocative thing I've read that pertains to this point is Ignazio Silone's Bread and Wine42. it beautifully pictures the highs and the lows of trying to do the right thing---while never knowing for sure. * * * The strategy outlined here is one of a New type of guerrilla warfare, that is the essence. But, really, there is a deeper meaning here that came through in the Philoso phy section, and again in the section on Organization, and that is that New Guerrillas are really only doing their jobs when they participate in New guerrilla warfare. Cer tainly this is what we must conclude when we look at demo cratic theory, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution; surely this is what comes across as the stated intent of legislation at all levels of government in this country; surely this is the meaning of the charge to be a * ' public servant:" The job of the public servant is to serve the people-— all of the people and only because this job cannot be done effectively by the public servant in the current New Industrial context is it necessary to talk about a "strategy." The New Guerrilla strategy is 517 aimed at transforming our governments into what they should have been all along: expressions of the people, and not branch offices of the New Industrial State. So we now have the outlines of a New Guerrilla strat- egy. This is basically a transposition of Old Guerrilla strategy into the context of the organization. It aims at taking over the administrative branch of governments in order to control, and ultimately transform, the New Indus trial State into something human. Just as we need a strat egy because the governance system is not working, so we need a guerrilla strategy because there doesn't seem to be any other that is more promising; and it is a New Guerrilla strategy because our context is organizational rather than geographic, legal rather than illegal, non-violent rather than violent. To translate this Strategy into concrete acts, we now need to move on to tactics. CHAPTER 4: TACTICS Tactics are the cutting edges of any guerrilla strug gle. They are the specific acts that make the struggle a struggle, that cause it to move forward, falter, or end in defeat. This much is easy to say, but to go beyond this gets us into complicated areas. It is fairly easy to compile the tactical rules and suggestions of the Old Guerrillas, as was done earlier be cause what they have done is history and is there for us to look at. But is it harder to look at a new situation, the situation of the New Guerrilla, and propose tactics. There are historical acts and acts occurring today that can be used as examples of tactics, but beyond this is the problem of creating tactics tailor-made for organizational guerril la warfare. These tactics are being created today in the real world of organizations but they are not easily acces sible as yet, for the very good reason that the struggle is far from over and you don't broadcast your secrets indis criminately in mid-stream.. So what I have done here Is to continue with the for mat used throughout, with its old Guerrilla categories, and to try creatively to use those categories by applying them to organizational settings. To illustrate various tactics and tactical approaches I have brought in examples somewhat familiar to us all. Because of the varied nature of organizations in this country, it would be hard to com pile tactics general enough to satisfy everyone's needs, so the tactics which follow are suggestions not rules. Even with these problems, however, I think we can ex pect tactics to begin trickling out of organizational struggles into print, just as community organizers have 518 519 seen their tactics in print in the past few years. Until we have a large body of such tactical reports and case studies I hope that the tentative work here will at least spur would-be guerrillas to think tactically in their own situations. If it does even that much I will feel the ap proach has been justified. * * * 1. Tactical actions advertise the guerrilla band to the people. Reinforces propaganda effort, civil action effort, etc. Without tactical actions---battles---everything else the guerrillas do lacks credibility, lacks the ability to arouse the people and strengthen their commitment to the struggle. This is why fighting must occur at some point in the guerrilla's activities, even though the battles may be insignificant in military terms. Tactical actions make good on the guerrilla's promise to actually fight for the people. These points are obvious from a reading of the materi als on the Old Guerrilla, but what constitutes "tactical actions" for the New Guerrilla? How do we define "fight ing" in the nonviolent, organizational "battlefield." Let's look at some standard journalistic rhetoric for clues. We read about the "fight for civil rights," con sumers "fighting" a company, legislators who "fight" for their bills, and so on. These are the New fighting: the struggle, which includes all the work behind the actual confrontation, for something. Usually this "something" in volves an action which people on the other side do not want to take or do not want taken-— that is why they fight against it. So we have a situation involving at least two sides, struggling to see whether or not some type'of action 520 will be taken, either by one or both of the parties or by a third party or set of parties. All the examples used in the previous sections in volved fighting in thiB New sense. Each time the guerril las come out into the open and do battle they are engaged in a tactical action. And just as with the Old Guerrillas these tactical actions crystallize all the words, all the work with the people, all the planning and preparation, in to one intense moment in the overall struggle. They rein force the guerrillas' educational effort with the people by showing that this time it wasn't just words. When the fight is at the local level it helps cement the civil action effort by further involving the guerrillas in the community and its most pressing concerns. When the local housing office goes after the tenement owner in court and wins that says something to the people that no amount of rhetoric can ever say. So, these local tactical actions are necessary both to carry the struggle forward and to gain the support of the people. Other levels demand tactical actions, too, but they lack the impact of the people because they are dis tant from them. That does not mean they should be ignored or downgraded, though, since these actions (in the legis lative committees, with the lobbies, in the courts, etc.) give life to the grass-roots struggles. The two types of actions cannot be separated; neither can stand alone and both involve "fighting." TOOLS I. First and foremost, is a careful scrutiny of your organization's enabling laws, legislative mandates for actions, and rules and regulations. In many cases, these sources alone can justify many tactical actions, particularly at the local level. We hear a lot about having enough laws, but not enough enforce- 521 ment and this should bring thoughts of tactical ac tions to the tnind of the guerrilla who "just wants to do his/her job". 2. At the local level the literature on community organ izing is vital for information on how to carry out these fights. Even if the organization has manuals, etc., the community organizers still have a lot to offer in the way of involving the people in the fight ing- --a prime guerrilla aim. * * * 2. Actions must be planned on basis of: timing, place, men. These three factors make up "cues" by which the situ ation can be evaluated. Since guerrillas only attack when victory is certain, these cues must all give the go-ahead before an attack is launched. Timing is critical and usually relates to factors out side the immediate battle area. Will an attack at this time help or hinder legislation now pending, or budget re quests, or a court case in progress? Would postponing the attack allow time for reinforcements, or would you lose forces because of the delay? Would an immediate attack bolster or hurt a just-emerging community group? When's the election? (Martin Luther King was known to delay a demonstration in order to affect a local election.) Will an attack at this time expose the guerrillas too soon, or is an attack necessary to solidify their commitment to the struggle? And on and on these kinds of questions have to be asked and answered (with the Yin-Yang and dialectical in put) before an action is taken. Careful planning, often tedious, is necessary to ensure success. The place of the action is vital. Where do you at tack? Many governmental organizations have a number of 522 means at their disposal to use in attacking the opposition: the courts, the Internal Revenue Service, government pur chasing agreements, inter-agency operations, and so forth just begin to scratch the surface of the number of places where an attack may be launched. And each has its benefits and its drawbacks: do you want publicity and community involvement, or do you want this one done quietly? The choice of place has a lot to say about that. Do you want a court precedent, an informal agreement, or administrative sanctions? The choice here can determine the shape of the next battle. Would involving other agencies spur guerrilla operations there, or is there someone in one of those agencies just looking for an excuse to attack you? And who has what allies in the wings? All of these are questions of place, and you must choose the right place for each specific battle on the basis of criteria far more extensive than the immediate situation would suggest. Men are the ultimate resource in tactical actions and they must be used wisely. First, and most obviously, you need the right people for the attack at hand: if it's a court case you need legal people; if it's a community- type action, community-organizing types; if it's basically political, the liason people are vital, and so on. If the battle is going to involve engineering data, computer-gen erated information, statistics, historical precendents, or whatever, people with these kinds of expertise are neces sary. Now, it is not mandatory that everyone involved be a guerrilla, for there are great numbers of government em ployees who do excellent work in their jobs without ever desiring to become guerrillas— -these can be considered sympathetic neutrals— -and they help bolster the guerrillas always-thin ranks. But where the action may get tough, or, more importantly, where it starts to involve "distortion" of the commonly held perception of the organization's role 523 guerrillas are the only people for the job. The better suited for the action at hand the people are, the more ef fectively the battle will be fought. In brief, then, this gives us some idea of the plan ning that must go into each action. Fortunately, this kind of planning is on the rise in organizations as they move toward task-oriented inter-disciplinary teams which are temporary in nature. This will, increasingly, give guer rillas training in formulating teams to attack specific, limited problems. Again, the resources of the organization which apply to New Guerrilla warfare are staggering when you stop to think about it. TOOLS 1. In the academic field the idea of the "team" approach is linked with Warren Bennis1 Changing Organizations! and the concept of "socio-technical systems". F. E. Emery and E. L. Trist's article "Soco-technical Systems"2 is a good place to start. 2. The aerospace industry has a vast experience with the "team" approach and this information is available to guerrillas who ask. 3. In-house experience and/or training programs can be of great value here. (Also: develop an inventory of the personnel resources available to the guerrillas in your organization— -you may be surprised.) 4. Finally, I have found the literature of sport— -the oldest form of teams around---to be particularly use ful. Read Snorts Illustrated with a new eye and see if there aren't useful things there for guerrillas. * * * 3. Attacks are the best defense. This is one of those truisms that needs little fur ther comment. It is hard for an enemy under attack to go 524 over to the offensive (but watch out for allies called in!) and this defends the guerrilla force by preventing the enemy from attacking. One point needs to be made to link this idea with a previous one. Recall the point on maintaining initiative? Well, attacks maintain the initiative as well as providing the best defense. This is best illustrated by hearkening back to wei-ch'i: a typical defense when under attack in the game is to attack the opponent somewhere else on the board. Thus, your allies can be helpful in your own de fense. Say, for example, that an environmental agency's guer rillas are attacking a developer in a rural area. The developer, to defend himself, attacks the agency through a legislator on the relevant budgetary committee. The guer rillas are in trouble. But let's go further and say that the legislator has made his reputation on tax matters and is in favor---jniblically, to his constituents of strict enforcement of tax laws. If the guerrillas can get a tax investigation underway by their allies in that agency, things may work out all right after all. These types of activities go on all the time, but usually for personal gain. If guerrillas realize that these kinds of activities can also be used for social gains they will begin to see all kinds of possibilities in a previously barren landscape. Remember, however, not to overdo it: the art of guerrilla warfare requires that only precisely that force necessary to win be used in the attack. Any thing more than that is superfluous, unnecessary, poten tially overexposing, risky to allies, and artistically gauche. TOOLS 525 1. What constitutes an attack on the New battleground? The answers to this are sometimes obvious, sometimes not. The more obvious are covdred throughout, the less obvious will have to be dug out and often creat ed on the spot. One example of the not-so-obvious is the use of non-verbal language to "attack" peoplfe. See Julius Fast's Body Languaee3. The New Guerrilla is nothing if not eclectic. * * * 4. Guerrillas disperse to disappear and work with the people, and concentrate to attack enemy forces. This is perhaps the single most important tactical point for the New Guerrilla, for it ties together the idea of the guerrillas as dualists: educators and power seek- ers/wielders. This tactical point operationalizes that dualism. Let's explore this point in two areas. First, the situation where the guerrillas are operating on the local level, among the people. And second, where the operation is internal to the organization (which is not yet guerril la-controlled) , In the community situation the guerrillas should be out among the people as much as possible, doing their routine jobs, helping get services to people, educating them in political activities, building support among groups, and so forth: all the things that guerrillas should be do ing to educate the people toward a new society based on the people's democratic control of the governments and the New Industrial State. After some time this type of work be comes almost second nature to the guerrilla, just as it is to the experienced community organizer, the radical social worker, the storefront lawyer, or any other community ac tivist. The key difference is that the guerrilla is also building up support for whatever attacks are going to be 526 necessary, thus his/her work has an added urgency and a special meaning (This is not to say that other organizers are not in this same position, but only to emphasize that the guerrilla, risking his/her organizational position and perhaps even the organization in such attacks, has an added incentive to do this work well.). So, the individual guerrillas are dispersed through out the community doing their routine work (which is vital: if the routine is not done well, the whole operation is destroyed, for it is the routine that the people depend on) and their guerrilla work at the same time. Then comes time for the attack, perhaps in court, perhaps in administrative hearings, perhaps in legislative committees, and here come the guerrillas with their various weapons: information, surveys, reports, and those community people necessary to carry the day. The opposition no longer is faced with either an inarticulate group of community people or a few harried bureaucrats who are underprepared, but with both, each of which is individually much more articulate and much better prepared. If the guerrillas have done their plan ning and brought to bear the proper kinds of resources in sufficient quantity, victory should be certain. Once the battle is over the guerrillas disperse back into the community. This gets them back organizing and educating immediately and it also denies the opposition a good look at who they are or exactly what they are up to. Facelessness has tremendous advantages in guerrilla warfqre. In the internal situation the operation is much the same. Let's assume that in this organization policy is made in committee, and that the guerrillas want a certain policy made. Long before the date of the meeting they will be out in the various areas of the organization, usually areas where their routine work takes them, educating people on the policy issue. Not necessarily people specifically 527 on the committee, but people in general. Word gets around and the guerrillas' policy suggestion becomes familiar and thus sounds more and more reasonable, particularly since it is based on what "this organization ought to be do ing anyway," So the meeting date arrives and the committee regu lars show up expecting another routine meeting with poor attendance all around and little excitement. But every single committee member who sympathizes with or is in fact a guerrilla is there, while the usual drop-out rate holds up for those who will be in the opposition. And there are all these interested onlookers present too. If the guerrillas have their facts and supporting in formation in order---if they've done their homework---they should have an excellent chance of getting the policy pass ed, particularly if numbers are in their favor. And once the meeting is over they've gone, monitoring, of course, future meetings to. make sure there is no reversal. Should that be attempted the telephone is there and a rapidly assembled group should be able to turn the counter-attack aside. These are both simplistic examples, but they show in simple terms what can be done in the complex situations guerrillas face as they try to get things done. Guerrilla warfare is basically a warfare of educating and organizing the people, thus guerrillas cannot afford to waste their time spinning their wheels among themselves, they must be out among the people educating and organizing-— they dis perse to do this and to disappear from view (twenty individ uals in different parts of town are invisible, but twenty people in the lunchroom every day in intense conversation are a threat). But when the time comes to do battle, there they are in full strength and ready, as if by magic-— they concentrate to attack enemy forces. And after the attack 528 they melt back into the people and disappear, causing the same kinds of frustration and bewilderment that Old Guer rilla forces have caused their opposition since the earli est days of Sun T2U. it it it 5. Attacks: not on strong positions and not on a force which will give a hard battle. This is in line with the point that guerrillas never fight a battle where victory is not certain. Strong posi tions and hard battles are not for the guerrilla; strong positions can usually be taken by attacking supply lines, and potentially hard battles can usually be broken up into a series of smaller battles each of which the guerrillas can win, cutting the once large opposition force to ribbons piecemeal. Even if you can defeat a strong position (you have the forces to do it) or can overwhelm a force that will give a hard battle, think twice, think three times. Can the opposition deliver a counter-attack somewhere else and win there? Guerrilla Warfare is patterned warfare and the entire pattern must be considered before attacks are made, and this becomes increasingly vital as the size of the operation increases. Remember that guerrilla warfare, by its nature, is not geared toward one major victory---a Normandie landing-— but to myriad small victories which see the people rising up against the opposition everywhere and anywhere and continually. You drown the enemy in a sea of drops not in one burst from a water cannon. Later on, however, when the administrative branch is in guerrilla hands, large operations can be planned. But at this point, no. The small guerrilla band has no busi ness risking itself and its hard-won resources in one bat- 529 tie. One example. Conservationists have found that a series of court battles, even if they lose every single one, can prevent an ecologically harmful development for years. And in the meantime they search for other ways to stop it. A series of little battles takes time, and time is on the side of the guerrillas. A major battle, say one mammoth court battle to settle the issue "once and for all", takes less time, can always be lost, and doesn't involve as many people: .someone wins it for them---the people, aren't trans formed at all by the struggle. Where there is no second chance, and while there is still time for patience, the series of little battles is a better decision than a major confrontation. AAA 6. Attacks: surprise; at night or second best, at day break, unpredictably. The element of surprise and the element of unpredict ability are keys to guerrilla operations. The nit-picker is a good part of the guerrilla team, for little things can often be used, particularly in court, to attack the opposi tion, and these certainly come as a surprise. The guerril la with imagination able to relate various types of informa tion to various facets of the law is also impottant for the same reason. The conservationist who unearths an old law that stops a certain type of polluting activity has come up with the unexpected, the surprise. These kinds of approach es can be used by the guerrillas to good effect. The opposition force that thinks it has it made will be sloppy, and thus open for attack. The force that hasn't done it's homework is easy prey for the guerrilla force 530 that has. The opposition force which lets an ambiguous law slide through the legislature can find a real surprise in its guerrilla enforcement (this is a major lesson of The Community Action Program, mentioned earlier). And, most importantly, the force that hasn't maintained its good re lations with the people can be in for a real surprise when the guerrillas bring their support to bear in the battle. In all of these things the element of surprise and unpredictability is vital, for it denies the Benemy" the ability to assemble a defense. This brings up the need for secrecy in guerrilla operations. Secrecy is not as hard as might be imagined, especially when the guerrilla is, to outside observers, just going about his/her business. So, in planning attacks, look for the surprise, the unpredictable, the twist. Aids to doing this are an inter change of information among groups fighting the same kinds of battles, particularly those outside the administrative branch: they seem, unfortunately, to have more flair (per haps because they have more freedom of action) for coming up with the unexpected. TOOLS 1. Materials on groups working in your same area of con cern should be consulted. If it's conservation, The Sierra Club, Nature Conservancy, and like organiza tions; welfare, The Welfare Rights Organization and community organizing activities; pollution, ecology groups, particularly in your locality (allies); and so on. The O.M. Collective's The Organizer's Manual^ has a list of sources which can serve as a start. 2. Ask a librarian for materials in your area of inter est. * * ★ 7. Attacks: use feints as part of overall attack. 531 The feint is a move in one direction which diverts attention from another move in another direction. Only the guerrillas know which is the real move. Feints are linked to the last point: they can screen preparation for an un expected attack. The difference in attitude toward various types of actions (mentioned earlier when talking of making trade offs) is a perfect situation for feints. If, in legisla tive budget committee, guerrillas fight a hard battle for one budget item, attention will be drawn to that and away from other budget items. Which budget items do the guer rillas really want? Only they know. The same can work in getting new enabling legislation. This can be particularly effective if it is known in advance (good intelligence and information about relevant actors) that someone on the com mittee needs a flashy victory over the organization. The guerrillas can give this person their fight and their vic tory and still not lose anything. As the guerrillas' credibility grows feints can be used as threats and as such can manuever the opposition in to a better position for attack, A pending court case can draw the opposition's efforts to preparing for that, mean while the guerrillas are not working on the case at all but preparing a case for, say, an investigation by the Securi ties and Exchange Commission. Then the court case is drop ped without a word and the S.B.C. moves in on the unsus pecting opposition. This shouldn't be overdone, however, for a series of dropped cases will destroy credibility, particularly among the people. Feints help make surprise more effective, they cover other operations, they decoy, they do any number of imagi native things at very little cost to the guerrillas. And in any case they muddy the water just enough so that the op position never quite gets a handle on "what those guys are 532 up to;" TOOLS 1. Aaron Wildavskys' The Politics of the Budgetary Fro- dess.5 iS a must here. 2. This is as good a place as any to suggest Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn's The Social Psychology of Organize- tlons6. This is not light reading, but an understand ing of the dynamics of organizations pays off, not only in the ability to feint more effectively, but in the ability to act more effectively, period. •k * k 8. Attacks: cut off or ambush line of enemy's retreat. There are two lines of thought on this. The first is that you want to destroy the opposition completely, and thus you would want to cut off or ambush their retreat. The second is that it may be to your advantage to allow then to retreat. The first point needs no involved explanation, it is a direct transfer from the Old tactics where it is neces sary to destroy enemy personnel. Thus the ambushed retreat is an excellent tactic. But in the New context there may be times when a beaten, but still intact, opposition may be more useful than a destroyed one, for they may have learned a signifi cant lesson from the experience and change their future be havior. This "educated" opposition would be more to the guerrillas' advantage than a fresh replacement with the same old ideas. In this instance, the guerrillas would re frain from ambushing the retreat. In New terms an "ambush" would be another unexpected attack. Ambushes are always carefully planned, as much as 533 frontal type attacks, perhaps even more so, so the same ideas pertain to ambushes as to other kinds of attacks dealt with earlier. If you are looking for the kill on a drug firm, for example, an investigation and ruling by the Food and Drug Administration could be the first attack. Then as the firm retreated to new packaging (guerrillas anticipate the path of retreat, of course, in order to be able to lay the ambush), fair trade laws could be brought to bear. Then journalistic exposure of illicit operations (say, barbituates sold illegally via Mexico) could be ar ranged. Then a tax investigation and a securities investi gation and so on. Local governments could be brought in as needed. Blow after blow could be administered to the firm until it was driven out of its harmful activities com pletely. The fight could be continued in the legislative arena, now. On the basis of the massive information com piled in the various attacks and ambushes new legislation, adequate funding, and public support for strict enforcement of these new laws could be obtained. This wodld be a major guerrilla victory, and one that started with a relatively routine attack. The possibilities are there to be exploited with careful planning, preparation, and execution, and, as in this example, coordination. In situations such as this one ambush of the opposition's retreat is highly effective. * * * 9. Attacks: withdraw rapidly to a pre-planned location, using feints. After attacking, guerrillas never want to withdraw in disarray. This is particularly important when a defeat has occurred: the guerrillas do not want to be on the receiv 534 ing end of the ambushes just mentioned. So the withdrawal must be planned as part of the overall operation and every one must know beforehand what the destination is, what feints will be used, and so forth, A good example is the budgetary process. Suppose the best attack for more funds of different types fails, is it a rout? It can be if the guerrillas have not prepared an orderly withdrawal to lower funding requests and a more restricted scope of types of funding requested. If such preparations have not been made the opposition could use the situation to dictate the budget, and this is definitely not a desirable position to be in. A well planned with drawal with the proper feints ("a willingness to compromise" is one) can allow the guerrillas to still maintain the ini tiative even in the faae of a big defeat. In the high-powered arenas where guerrillas must get things done the loss of one's "cool" is immediately seized on as a sign of weakness and can destroy in an instant months of hard work to gain the confidence and respect of those you must deal with. Thus it is imperative in these situations to be able to withdraw without seeming to, making the use of feints important. Being a good loser can be political capital the next time around, particularly if the situation is well-managed. No one likes to lose, but it does happen even with the best planning, preparation, and execution, and guerrillas must be prepared to make the best of the situation. Withdrawal is not solely a sign of loss, however. Remember that the guerrilla hits and runs, and that makes an orderly withdrawal a part of any attack plan. Guerril las also want to leave the impression that they are still vigilant in the area after an attack, to do otherwise is to invite disaster. Suppose, for example, that the organiza tion wins a victory over a con artist "painting" houses in a 535 low Income neighborhood. If the guerrillas disperse into other concerns after such a victory, the con artist will be right back into the vacuum. But if the guerrillas have worked with the people effectively, they will hear aboht the first sign of a return and be back on duty it's al most like being able to be two places at once. Here the people become part of the feinting operation-— a tactical plus-— and are also moved toward more activity in their community---a step toward the goal, guerrillas seek. The best way to summarize this point is to say that withdrawal, like all facets of guerrilla warfare must be seen as an important point, meaning that it deserves care ful consideration to get all the impact possible from it. Guerrillas need to do this with everything they do in order to make their resources stretch far beyond what they seem capable of doing. * * * 10. Attacks: disarm and disperse prisoners after a lec ture; distribute booty to people. The concept of prisoners does not really apply to the New Guerrilla, nor does "booty" in its literal sense. Any benefits of a victory should be distributed to the people, but that is the whole point of the fighting anyway, so it does not need a special emphasis. What is important here is the implied ability of opposition members to change their ways. New Guerrillas should keep that in mind and do some educational work among the opposition whenever that is convenient: if you happen to be there anyway there is no reason not to add that factor into what ydu do. The relatively minor usefulness of this point should be mentioned to emphasize the fact that Old Guerrilla ideas 536 cannot be transferred whole cloth to New Guerrilla situa- tiona To try to do so is to live a myth rather than a reality. * * * 11. Attacks: attack again and again and again with care fully planned and executed attacks. Constant attack is the way of the guerrilla fighter. The opposition is massive and will not fall easily, nor are the guerrillas capable of defeating it with one big battle. So the alternative is to keep "chipping away" at it with small attacks. Because of the number of attacks, there may be a ten dency to get sloppy or overconfident. This cannot be allow ed since careful planning and execution are crucial to bat tles where you cannot expect to win on the basis of superior resources, and even more vital when you remember that intelligence is your main resource and that if you slack off on that you are destroying your main weapon. Each attack must be a carefully rendered work of art, each attack. Old Guerrillas often develop a pride in the craftsmanship they show in attacking, and this should be fostered among New Guerrillas. * * * 12. Attack planning: perfect knowledge of the terrain. Here is one of the most important tactical concepts we have: "terrain;" Guerrillas use the terrain as a weapon in their favor by choosing the site of the battle as an integral part of their overall planning. 537 What is "terrain" to the New Guerrilla? It is obvi ously different from the Old use of the term, and somewhat more complicated. For there are three basic terrains to be dealt with: the community or people, the opposition, and the internal. Let's deal with each of these in turn. Over the course of the earlier sections the concept of the people and their community has been gone over fair ly thoroughly. Now we need only add this new twist of perceiving it as "terrain," a place where battles may be fought. In this sense, then, the guerrillas need to know the terrain thoroughly. They need to know the geography, the land use patterns, the plans by various agencies for future land use, the demographics, the agencies residing there, potential allies, the opposition forces, and so on. Guerrillas need to have a mental "map" of their terrain in order to deal effectively with it as an asset in their operations. The opposition's terrain has been covered earlier al so. But remember that battles will have to be fought there too at times, so more knowledge is necessary. In a cor poration: who are the directors, the managers, the "tech nostructure," the stockholders, the customers, the supplies, the contacts within agencies and legislative and executive bodies, where are the skeletons, who's watching them at the moment, etc. Knowledge of their geographic operation is necessary, of their work force (and its demography), of their allies both private and public sector. All these things and more are necessary for creation of a mental map of the opposition when it is a corporation. When the opposition is found in the political, leg islative, executive, judicial, or other framework, similar maps must be drawn. If guerrillas are going to fight any where they have to know the ground better than the opposi tion. And when the ground is the opposition's then there 538 is a lot of work to do. Finally, there is the guerrillas' own terrain, the administrative branch (with its areas of opposition, to be sure). This is the easiest to leam about and the most im portant to know well since the guerrillas will come from here and return here on attacks: this is the primary base area of the New Guerrillas. All of the things mentioned with regard to the other terrains need coverage here, as well as all the areas which cannot be covered in a short space. These are the three general terrains. Then there are the specific terrains, those areas where recruitment is under way, where educational work is being done, or where battles are planned. Each of these needs intensive study as a preliminary to any activity in it. Human terrains are immensely complex and confusing, yet they are also hugely rewarding in and of themselves. And since that is where guerrillas fight they must be in teresting to them in that sense also. The study of human terrains is never done, new things come to light all the time, but onee a good foundation is laid it is relatively easy to stay on top of it, just as it is easier to update an old map than to draw a new one from scratbh. The use of the terrain by the guerrilla is geared toward always fighting an advantageous ground. This is the reason for luring the opposition out into open ground for a fight rather than fighting on its home ground. The more advantageous the terrain (in terms of laws, public opinion, community organizations, political actors, funds, and the whole spectrum of things relevant to a battle) the more certain is the victory. The nature of the specific opposi tion, the precise nature of the battle, and the makeup of the relevant factors involved will go into the decision as to where to fight. The range of options is so vast that I 539 won't even hazard any examples. I can point out, however, that the opposition's ground is usually the poorest ground to fight on— -when the opposition is aware that there is a battle going on (sur prise or feinting or camouflage can lull the opposition). Never rule out an attack there, but be especially cautious. On the other hand, the ground where the guerrillas have the most support is usually the best ground to fight on (this could make the difference between seeking a court decision, a new law in the legislature, or an initiative vote to carry out an attack). The guerrilla seeks to fight on favorable ground. In an organizational setting this can best be illustrated by the concept of "moving the compromise toward yourself."? For example, fights occurred over price and wage decisions while the tacit acceptance of the government's right to administer prices and wages involved in doing battle was ignored by the participants. By fighting the Board over its decisions the opposition showed that it already had accept ed the Board's existence. The compromise had been "moved;1" In short, terrain is another area where the guerril la's knowledge can be decisive and his/her ignorance dis- asterous. In a war of intelligence the side with the best usable knowledge has a tremendous advantage over the other side. TOOLS 1. The areas of the people and the opposition have al ready been pretty well covered in other points. 2. The area of bureaucracy pertains both to the opposi tions terrain and to the guerrillas. Francis Rourke's Bureaucracy. Politics, and Public Policv8 is a good place to start before going into more specialized readings. One concept I particularly like is that of organizational "overlays" found in John Pfiffner and 540 Frank Sherwood's Administrative Organization^. This really drives home the point that there are many "or- f anizations" in the organization, depending on your ocus. See, also, Peter Baku's The Dynamics of BureaucracvlO. 3. From the general sources I would go into those that relate specifically to your terrain: state and local governments, politics, demographics, etc, 4. Your work itself is a laboratory (if you look at it that way) to check out the academic theories and to glean for new information. After all many of the sources academics rely on for information for their books come from the administrative branch of govern ments. 5. Politics is a key terrain for the guerrilla. In this area I'd suggest: Harold Lasswell's Politics: Who Gets What. When. Howll for openers, followed by, Lewis Dexter's The Sociology and Politics of Con gress^ » Allan Sindler's American Political Institu tions and Public Policvl3 and Charles Lindblom's The Policy-Making Processl4. a working knowledge of these is invaluable to trying to get things done in our political context, while at the same time trying to change that context for the better. 6. The nature of the American federal structure makes intergovernmental relations another terrain to be carefully studied and mapped out. Help can be found in the publications of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, such as their Inter governmental Relations in the Poverty Program^. 7. The psychological terrain is a prime concern of the New Guerrilla. Herbert Simon's Administrative Be havior! 6r George Homan's The Human Groupl!. and Edgar Schein's Organizational PsvchologylB are valuable in this regard. For a good case study on the impact of individual personality on institutional activity, particularly high-level policy making, see Stewart A?sop's "Nixon and the Square Majority"19. 8. Karl Deutsch's The Nerves of Government20 not only provides useful terrain-type information, but also directs our thinking toward all manner of organiza tional "nervous systems". * * * 541 13. Attack planning; surveillance and foresight on lines of escape; vigilance over roads of reinforcement. This goes into the point on withdrawal, which was covered earlier, and adds the idea of reinforcement to it. Just as your own withdrawal and that of the opposition must be a part of your planning, so must the possibility of re inforcements, particularly to the opposition. You must know who the possible reinforcing bodies might be, and place them under observation in order to know immediately when they start to move (be careful of the feint---the opposition has been in this business for a lot longer than you have). The planning decision revolves around these ques tions: Is there a high likelihood of reinforcements (will legislative committees get into the fight, will the lob bies pressure us or our allies, etc.)? And if there is, should the attack still be launched? If the answer to the first is No, then planning can go on---with a contingency plan for handling reinforcements just in case. If the answer is Yes, then the answer to the second question may be Yes or No. If it is Yes then the planning of the attack must allow for something to be done about the reinforce ments. If the attack is swift and clean, they may arrive too late. They can be held up by a feint (rumor of a court case against them) or an actual attack (ambush them on the way if frontal attack is out of the question). Or they can be lured into the battle in such a way as to be vulnerable and thus hinder rather than help their allies (a conspiracy charge, whether formal or in the journalistic sense, might turn an alliance into an internal battle). In any event, and these are just a few examples, be prepared for rein forcements as part of the overall attack plan. 542 This concern with reinforcements should re-emphasize the hit and run idea. If the guerrillas linger they may get hit with reinforcements they didn't expect, but if they withdraw rapidly the reinforcements arrive at an empty battlefield. it it it 14. Attack planning: relations with people---supplies, transport, hiding wounded, etc. The people are an integral part of all attacks, it is the level of their involvement which changes from situation to situation. They supply political support, act as lobby ing groups, communications lines, and so forth. Since there won't be any wounded to hide they won't play this Old Guerrilla role in the New struggle, however. Enough has been said already about the crucial role of the people to enable us to pass over the point lightly here. What is important to realize is that the planning of the attack should include the factor of the potential help the people can give. And, again, this is a factor also in choosing the terrain to fight on. Don't make the basic mistake of seeing the people solely as the goal of the struggle and not as part of the means. * ★ * 15. Attack planning: numerical superiority at point of action. This reiterates the point about dispersion and con centration: guerrillas concentrate in order to have numer ical superiority at the point of battle. Numerical superi ority often means physical numbers, but it can also mean 543 superiority in information, popular support, legislative support, or whatever the main weapons of the specific bat tle may be. Numerical superiority can be achieved most obviously by simply having more forces there that the opposition. But there are other ways too (for remember, the guerrillas are numerically inferior overall). One is too stagger the engagements of the battle, moving your forces around so that at each engagement you have superiority. Another is to attack only one segment (choice of terrain aids in this by breaking up the opposition forces as a total unit) at a time. Another is to so structure the battle that the op position only sends out a portion of its forces (a feint can help in this). And, a well conceived ambush can cut off part of the opposition force and "destroy" them while the rest march blithely on. Where the battle is held has a great deal to do with how many guerrillas it will take to overwhelm the opposi tion forces. In a closed legislative session it would take quite a few, especially if the opposition had allies on the committee. In open session, less could be used if members of the affected community could come in. In a session held in the community, fewer still could be used, the exact number depending on the organizational level of the com munity itself---some communities can defend themselves and attack very effectively on their own, in that case the guerrillas would be their allies. Change the terrain, how ever, and even these rudimentary examples change. Insert a company town type of community for the well organized com munity used in the example and it's a whole different bat tle. Regardless of the situation (yet conditional uoon the individual situation) the goal is to have numerical superi ority in whatever form this takes at the point of action. 544 This is one factor in making victory certain every time you attack. One thing the guerrillas should always be superior in is knowledge and planning. This cannot be said enough, for it must become a natural part of the guerrilla's life to always have the edge in the mental aspects of the struggle. TOOLS 1. That mental edge can be enhanced by studying psychol- ogy, since people (and thus the organizations they operate) tend to function on many levels, some of them non-rational. The literature on labor relations can be useful in this light. Richard Walton and Robert McKersie's A Behavioral Theory of Labor Nego tiations^ and Neil Chamberlain's Collective Bareain- ia*nr are two cases in point. Bargaining, manipula tion, the strategy and tactics of dealing with people, these are to be found here---and they are useful for many purposes. 2. Anthony Jay's Corporation Man23 can also be of help here in figuring out some of the people who have to sometimes be ddalt with. * * * 16. Attack planning: total mobility and possibility of counting on reserves. The idea of total mobility is a restricted one in the New sense because the guerrillas are really restricted to working within the broad parameters of their organizations (at least in their lives on the job). So we have to count on communications and coordination to bring about the mobility that the Old Guerrillas have. For example, the guerrilla cannot move his/her attack from a housing agency to a tax agency personally, if it. is to be moved it must be transferred (usually formally) to guerrillas in that agency. This brings in, once again, the question of communi 545 cation and thus coordination among organizations to likewise increase. This is natural since contacts between organizational members have a greater opportunity for being made into contacts between guerrillas as their number in crease in each organization. Again this is the concept of using the normal routines of the job to carry out guerrilla tasks. Total mobility is based on the ability to transfer activities across organizational lines. This is also true of reserves from outside the organization which is engaged in an attack: reinforcing guerrillas from another organi zation will have to be brought to bear through formal means by creating an inter-agency action, or by getting that or ganization to begin independent action. Thus the question of counting on reserves from outside the organization is somewhat complex, and for this reason in the early stages of the struggle extra-organizational reserves should not be counted on---too many things can go wrong. These two facets of attack planning place certain restraints on the nature and scope of the attacks possible and these should be borne in mind when planning attacks. It is better to figure in only certainties and thereby end up fighting fewer battles, than to figure in mavbes and lose some battles. * * * 17. Attack planning: each attack is part of a series-- must be planned with this in mind; the series' success is the goal. This is where the concept of strategy is important as a unifying pattern laid over the individual attacks on a tactical level. Random attacks are all right for harass- 546 ment but for little else: they don't lead anywhere and they use up resources. But if attack planning is always done in terns of a series of attacks leading somewhere, then the struggle has direction and increased strength. Another point that the concept of the "series" brings out is that no one attack should be such that it destroys the viability of the series. A successful attack which bring down the wrath of a major corporation on the com munity, or causes a legislative censure, or exposes too many supporters too soon, is not really a successful attack in the terms guerrillas must use. It is a failure because it threatens the success of the entire operation. A series of attacks can also accomplish things that one attack cannot. A guerrilla force cannot expect to overwhelm a jumbled region of local governments, for exam ple, in one massive reorganization aimed at a regional transportation system. But it can, through a series of planned agreements among local governments achieve the same end over time, and with the added benefit that the local governments do most of the work themselves and thus are much closer to a wide range of cooperative efforts than if regionalization were imposed from above. (This is not to say that there are not benefits to imposition witness Canada's metropolitization of major cities from above but only that what is feasible is not always the ideal and that guerrillas have to do the best they can with what they have.) Other examples of a "stage" approach to change can be found in other areas, and the message is the same: what you can't get all at once you may be able to get by stages. And when you have no other alternative you go for the first stage, that is the first attack of the series. When the series idea is taken to heart it makes plan ning a different matter, a more complex matter. Complexity is one of the major facts of life for the guerrilla. 547 * * * 18. Targets: supply columns, railroads, supply depots, highways, airfields, enemy's rear, telephone lines, telegraph lines, rescue lines. Consider the psycho logical impact when choosing targets. The targets of the New Guerrilla do not really paral lel those of the Old Guerrilla. The targets of the New Guerrilla are fairly obvious from the previous discussions of various points, the mandates of the administrative branch, and the dictates of the specific situations. Guer rillas attack to build a new society, they attack leverage points in organizations, they attack violations of the law by the New Industrial State, and they attack wherever necessary to support these kinds of primary attacks, in cluding legislative committees, lobbies, internal obstacles, and so forth. The point about the psychological impact is important. Particularly the psychological impact of an attack in the minds of the people. Attacks which heighten guerrilla morale and self-confidence and competence are good; but those attacks which inspire, educate, and help the people directly are best. And a steady stream of these attacks (as well as the other more distant kinds which are also vital to the struggle) are necessary. Choice of targets is not a problem in the sense of having to search for targets, there are plenty of targets. The problem is in trying to narrow them down to ones that the small, ill-equippdd, and only semi-coordinated guerril las can deal with at any one time. This is why the ex pansion of the guerrillas is so vital in order to finally win; there are too many targets and not enough guerrillas. * * it 548 19. Ambush: a pursuing column; a unit retreating from battle; a unit lured in upon you; couriers; mobile units; supply columns; trains. Ambush has already been fairly well covered in other points. Just remember the tactical big three: attack, ambush, and retreat. These are the central core of guer rilla tactical operations, and they are most effective when used in a combined pattern. Notice one thing about this point: no part of the opposition force is ever safe from ambush. This is in line with the guerrilla idea of never giving the opposition sanctuary. The threat of an attack or ambush at any time will give even the largest opposition force a certain amount of edginess and perhaps even a certain amount of improved behavior. And as guerrilla successes mount, this threat becomes that much more viable. You won't rob the candy store with a cop inside, and you probably won't rob it if you think there is a cop inside. * * * 20. Retreat: timing the start of a retreat is crucial. Retreat is a crucial part of guerrilla warfare, but it is particularly distasteful to most people on its face, which is why Old Guerrilla leaders talk about it so much. The timing of a retreat is important in order to carry it off successively. It is vital to be abiLe to sense when things have reached the point where defeat is inevita ble if your force remains in the battle. By beginning the retreat early enough it can be masked and not seem so bad ---this is the same as withdrawal, covered earlier but if you stay too long not only will the defeat become obvious, but it may become disasterous. 549 If the guerrillas are attacking at an administrative hearing held by forces from headquarters their local office and their allies do not show up in sufficient strength to achieve a victory, the guerrillas have to pick this up early and act. Let's say that they had a hidden agenda, but had not gotten into it yet. Now they could immediately switch the meeting, without anyone knowing, from an inten sive one with a set goal in mind, to an informational one with neutral qualities for all concerned. Note how the secrecy of the original intent helps make the retreat easier for the guerrillas. But if the guerrillas were to keep hoping that more people wohld arrive they might get into their attack find no support and then have to beat a hasty and obvious retreat, losing credibility all around. When in doubt as to the outcome, retreat. The guer rillas have precious little margin for error to take chances with. * * * 21. Retreat; psychological blow (to own troops) of re treat must be dealt with effectively; retreat is a good tactic---once guerrilla warfare is understood fully. Retreat is a hard pill to swallow even under the best circumstances, and is even harder to take when it caps weeks or months of work to ready an attack. This leads to an inclination to "stay with it just a little longer" that usually ends in a resounding defeat, instead of the post ponement of battle and of victory which retreat can bring. There is a job of education needed here (even for the most experienced) to convince the guerrillas that retreat is a good tactic, given the overall aims and tactics of guerril la warfare. 550 No one likes to give up on something, but many times you must to survive. And if retreat is seen as (1) main taining the initiative, (2) preserving the guerrillas and their allies, and (3) merely postponing the battle, it may be a little easier to take. To use the games analogy: re treat is bad in chess, but it is good in wei-ch'i; and guerrilla warfare is a wei-ch*I affair. • i t * * 22. Retreat: local population screens the retreat; "circling around" an enemy unit. "Circling around" is movement of forces to avoid the enemy. This can be screened by activities of the local population which obscure it. These two points could be stretched to apply to New Guerrilla fighting but they would be stretched out of shape. Suffice it to say that when retreating you avoid another confrontation, and that the opposition's attention can, in some specific cases, be diverted by the local population's activities in areas some distance from the ones you're retreating from and heading toward. * * it 23. Retreat: when the enemy advances, retreat; when you meet the enemy unexpectedly, retreat never fight without full information. The key point here is that you retreat instead of fighting when the fight is not of your making. Guerrillas never want to be caught in a fight somebody else set up. Again this points up the value of intelligence operations within the opposition in order to have an idea of what they 551 might be planning so that you can avoid it or use it to your own advantage. When caught in an enemy advance, say an onslaught by a legislative committee that came completely unexpected, retreat (ask for a postponement in order to find out what's going on). But be careful of ambushes along the path of your retreat. Here again retreat is an excellent tactic, much better than trying to stand and fight when you don't even know what the battle is about or who you're fighting or anything. If at all possible guerrillas should stick to the above maxim: never fight without full information. Since the guerrilla's main weapon is information, why try to fight unarmed? * * * 24. Retreat: retreat to a pre-planned area; wind around off the roads; leave signs of travel going the wrong ways. Much of this was covered in the point on withdrawal, and much of it is obvious, but one part should be empha sized: the pre-planned area. This is vital because in the heat of battle the guerrillas will not have time to either plan or to all get the word on where to go. So they must know before entering battle where to go in case a retreat is called. In the New context this can avoid much confusion. In the budget battle have specific points to which you will fall back to under attack. This way you avoid the situa tion where one guerrilla says one thing and another says something different, and the opposition uses the confusion to cut you up. The same goes for new program requests: 552 have a clearly laid out plan of retreat. When guerrillas know what to do in every case their whole outlook is calmer and more confident and this cannot but help the outcome of the attack itself (perhaps retreat becomes less necessary by virtue of being well planned in advance). * * * 25. All of these actions must be coordinated to be opti mally effective. Guerrilla warfare is, above all, a war of intelligence, of wits, of imaginative use of slim resources. This point summarizes the tactical overview of guer rilla warfare, both Old and New, clearly and succinctily. There are two emphases that need to be made for the New Guerrilla, however. The first is that their war is much more cerebral than the Old style simply because that is the nature of organizations, organizational societies, and, therefore, organizational guerrillas. Intelligence and wits are not only the vital heart of the planning of struggle, but they are the weapons for the struggle, the terrain of the struggle, and much of the opposition to the struggle. Second, the resources are slim in the sense that they seldom match those of the opposition and that the guerrillas do not have direct control over them. This is true, but in terms of the resources the New Guerrillas have access to there is no comparison with the Old Guerrillas; the New are resource-rich. This richness is in a material sense only, however, since the key resources of human time and energy are in short supply. This is why it is so important for people working in the administrative branch of governments to realize just how much power they really have access to and can use if they apply their intelligence and wits to 553 the situation. With those two points made, we need only add that when you put the parts of guerrilla warfare back together again after examining them the whole is a very complex affair. This is yet another reason for agreeing in our New situation that, "Guerrilla warfare is, above all, a war of intelligence, of wits, of imaginative use of slim re sources." And it is situational, so only those in the sit uation know exactly what to do to make use of their intel ligence, wits, and slim resources in the most effective manner; tactics begin at home. TOOLS 1. The major resource of the guerrillas is the personnel of the administrative branch of governments. This may be a cause for despair if we carry the old stereo type of the bureaucrat with us. Look at David Nad- ler's The NOW Emolovee24 for a heartening new view of the "bureaucrat". * * * 26. Other tactics: propaganda---internal, external, among the enemy. "Propaganda" in the New context is "education." And it is one of the two dual roles of the guerrilla in his/her activities. Internally it is important to recruit, train, and maintain the morale and competence of the guerrillas. Ex ternally it is important to help the people gain power and without education they lack the major weapon of the strug gle. Among the enemy education is important for the op portunity it allows guerrillas to create guerrilla allies within the heart of the New Industrial State. 554 The methods of education have already been covered earlier. A simply summary is to say that just as every thing the guerrillas do is revolution, so everything they do is education. Guerrillas have often been compared to saints by their more romantic admirers; they are surely excellent teachers. * * ' i t 27. Other tactics: terrorism---very selectively done; harrassment shoot off the guns, don't let the enemy feel secure---ever. Terrorism and harassment in the New context are a bit too risky, a waste of short resources (human time and energy), and not very effective. The enemy should never feel secure, that is true, but their insecurity should be a result of the threat of attack, not the threat of terrorism or harrassment (however legally and non-violently these terms might be re-defined). This is another difference be tween the Old and the New. * * * 28. Other tactics: well-managed, fair, and fruitful base areas. This has been covered earlier in Organization. But the point is a useful one, for it reminds us that the same activity is a part of many levels of the struggle. Well- managed, fair, and fruitful base areas ("areas" being largely demographic rather than geographic and under the jurisdiction of a public sector organization) build the present in the future (Philosophy), they help mobilize the people into a people's war (Strategy), they provide the 555 guerrillas with a vital base area (Organization), and they are effective to spread the struggle among the people by example (Tactics). And, to anticipate the following section a bit, they are central to the Post-Victory society. This example should help us get a better grasp on the inter-related, inter-connected, complex nature of guerrilla warfare itself. And reme

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Creator Marshall, James Allen (author)

Core Title The new guerrillas: public administration in the new industrial state

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Political Science, public administration

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,Political Science, public administration

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Gardner, Neely (committee chair), Glogow, Eli (committee member), Hickerson, Nathaniel (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-865572

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Identifier 7331654.pdf (filename),usctheses-c18-865572 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 7331654

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Document Type Dissertation

Rights Marshall, James Allen

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