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A system of participation and allocation preferences in organizations

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A system of participation and allocation preferences in organizations

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Content A SYSTEM OF PARTICIPATION AND ALLOCATION PREFERENCES IN ORGANIZATIONS by Katherine Irene Miller A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Communication Theory and Research) December 1985 UMI Number: D P22395 All rights reserved IN FO R M A TIO N T O ALL U SER S The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. UMI' Dissertation Publishing UMI D P22395 Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 4 8 106 -1 346 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY PARK LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90089 P f. CM ' *8 S ' This dissertation, written by Katherine Irene M ille r under the direction of her. Dissertation Committee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by The Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of re quirements for the degree of DO CTO R OF PH ILO SO PHY Graduate Studies j / Decjnfof G n Date December 4, 1985 DISSERTATION COMMITTEE ; ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I , i i ! i j In keeping with the spirit of this dissertation, I hope I can j properly allocate thanks to those who participated in helping me through this project. Not all helped equally, and not all need my I I acknowledgements, but many have contributed and deserve thanks. I First, I am extremely grateful that Peter Monge has been my i t advisor for the past four years. At both ends of the country, he has I provided a perspective on scholarship which is invaluable. His pen- j 1 J chant for quality thinking, writing, and researching has kept me busy, challenged, and excited. > i I Second, my thanks go to my committee members: Peter Clarke, j : Janet Fulk, Ron Rice, and Patricia Riley. My committee members’ per- ] j spectives on organizations and research have kept me stimulated, and their support has made the process of getting this degree a less ' ] j stressful — dare I say fun? — experience. Third, the work of the Scanlon/National Science Foundation I I t ! ] research teams at both USC and MSU was essential to the completion of j this dissertation. Sufficient recognition is never given to those ; doing the grunt work of mailing, coding, keypunching, and verifying. i Nevertheless, thanks are deserved by Noshir, Mike, Dayna, and Jean i at USC; and by Julia, Cathy, Julie, and Keith at MSU. Special thanks go to Vince Farace for creating and overseeing the MSU half of our complex research system. ii j Fourth, thanks go to disparate people for inspiration and moti- 1 vation. Throughout my life, my parents have set standards which | have kept me challenged. Even if they don't know exactly what I'm : doing, I know how proud they are when I succeed. The second important I I i motivator to acknowledge is Eric Eisenberg. Five years ago, I was a | college senior vacillating between law school and public relations. Eric opened the door on academia for me, and I haven't turned back since. Finally, I'm grateful that Jim is the loving, silly, argumenta tive, optimistic, dogmatic, affectionate person that he is. In all j ways, I am a better person for having him as part of my life. TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page 1. THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW . . ............................ 1 A Typology of the Effects of Participation ............... 2 Attitudinal Effects, . 3 Cognitive Effects .... 7 Behavioral Effects .... ........................... 10 Equity and Distributive Justice ..... ............... 14 Social Psychological Roots of Justice . ............. 14 Current Statements of Social Justice .......... 17 Current Debates in Social Justice ................... 19 Use of Allocation Norms: Empirical Research . ........ 22 Allocation Differences and Participation ........ ..... 27 A System of Organizational Participation and Equity .... 31 The Scanlon Plan of Participative Management . ........... 34 Psychological Condition: Identification . . ......... 35 Psychological Condition: Participation .............. 36 Psychological Condition: Equity.............. .... 37 Differential Norms in the Scanlon Process .... 39 2. METHODS................... .............................. 47 Sample..................... 47 Research Procedures..................... . * ............ 49 Operationalization...................................... 51 Participation........................... 51 Cognitive Effect: Learning ........................... 52 Behavioral Effect: Activities ............. 53 Affective Effect: Job Satisfaction .... ........... 54 Allocation .................................... 54 Indirect Attitudinal Outcome: Commitment ............. 56 Moderator Variables ................................. 57 iv Chapter Page Analysis................. 58 Measurement Models .... ......................... .59 Structural Equation Models ............ 60 3. RESULTS,................... 63 Preliminary Analyses ...... ............. ...... 63 Confirmatory Factor Analyses ... ............... .... 64 Standard Scales: Internal Consistency ......... 66 Original Scales: Internal Consistency .......... ... 72 All Scales: Parallelism......................... 82 Preliminary Path Analysis .... ............. ..... 86 Scanlon Model ....................................... 95 NonScanlon Model ............ ............ 104 Subgroup Path Analysis ........ .......... .... Ill Summary: Scanlon versus Comparison Companies......... 128 Summary: Old Employees versus New Employees . . . . . 129 Summary: Company A versus Company G ............... 131 Summary: Supervisors versus NonSupervisors . ......... 132 Summary: Scanlon Reps versus NonScanlon Reps......... 133 4. DISCUSSION ............................. 135 Measurement Models . ..................... 135 General Path Models ..............................137 Scanlon Model................................... . . 137 NonScanlon Model............. 138 Comparison of General Scanlon and NonScanlon Models . 139 Subgroup Comparisons ... ............................. 141 Cultural Explanation: Scanlon vs. Comparison Companies ......... 141 Developmental Explanation: Old Employees vs. New Employees ...... ....... 142 Cultural Development Explanation: Company A vs. Company G ...... ..... 147 Chapter Page Situational Explanation: Supervisors versus NonSupervisors ..... .......... ...... 149 Situational Explanation: Representatives versus NonRepresentatives ......... ............. .151 Summary of Subgroup Comparisons ..................... 152 Limitations and Directions for Future Research ........... 154 Summary ............. 158 References................. 162 LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Frequency Summary ..... ..................... 2A. Items and Factor Loadings for JOBSAT ............ .... 67 2B. Deviations for JOBSAT .......................... .... 68 3. Deviations for final version of JOBSAT .......... .... 69 4A. Items and Factor Loadings for COMMIT ....... .... 70 4B. Deviations for COMMIT ........................... 5. Deviations for final version of COMMIT ...... .... 73 6. Items, factor :loadings> and deviations for SCLEAEN .... 74 7. Items, factor loadings, and deviations for NSLEARN .... 75 8. Items, factor loadings, and deviations for SCPART . .... 76 9. Items, factor loadings, and deviations for NSPART . .... 77 10. Items, factor loadings, and deviations for SCACTV . .... 78 11. Items, factor loadings, and deviations for NSACTV . .... 79 ! 12. Deviations for final versions of NSLEARN, SCPART, and NSACTV- . .......... ............. 1 13. Deviations for LEARN......... . .............. 14. Deviations for PARTICIPATE............ .... 84 15. Deviations for ACTIVITIES.................... . .... 85 1 16. Parallelism deviations for SCLEAEN and NSLEARN . . .... 87 17. Parallelism deviations for SCPART and NSPART . . . .... 88 l 18. Parallelism deviations for SCACTV and NSACTV . . . .... 89 19. Parallelism deviations for JOBSAT and COMMIT . . . .... 90 ; vii Table Page 20. Stability Analysis for Company A ...... . - . . . . . ... . 92 21. Stability Analysis for Company G ............... .... 93 22. Stability Analysis for Companies B, C, D, E, and F .... 94 23. Correlation matrix for All Scanlon Companies . . . .... 96 24. Correlation matrix for NonScanlon Comparison Companies 97 | I 25. Correlation matrices for Old Employees and New ' Employees ............... 98 ! 26. Correlation matrices for Company A and Company G 99 ! | 27. Correlation matrices for Supervisors and ; NonSupervisors 100 \ 28. Correlation matrices for Scanlon Representatives and NonScanlon Representatives .... ........ .... 101 29. Group Comparison: Scanlon Companies and NonScanlon ! Comparison Companies . .......... 113 30. Group Comparison: Old Employees and New Employees . . . . 114 ! 31. Group Comparison: Company A and Company G 115 i | I I 32. Group Comparison: Supervisors and NonSupervisors .... 116 J I ! ; 33. Group Comparison: Scanlon Representatives and j NonScanlon Representatives . . . . .................. 117 i t i i viii I I i i LIST OF FIGURES i Figure Page ! 1. A system of Organizational Participation and Equity .... 33 2A. SCANLON MODEL of Participation and Allocation ............ 44 2B. NONSCANLON MODEL of Participation and Allocation ........ :45 3. Hypothesized SCANLON MODEL with path coefficients and standard errors .... 1Q2 ; 4. Final Revised SCANLON MODEL with path coefficients | and standard errors............ 105 I 5. Hypothesized NONSCANLON MODEL with path coefficients 1 and standard errors ........ ................ ... 106 I 6. Final Revised NONSCANLON MODEL with path coefficients ! and standard errors ....... 108 j 7. Revised SCANLON MODEL: Confirmation with new data......... 109 j 8. Revised NONSCANLON MODEL: Confirmation with new data ... 110 1 | 9. SCANLON MODEL Comparison: Scanlon Companies versus I NonScanlon Comparison Companies ..... ........ .... 118 j i j 10. SCANLON MODEL Comparison: Old Employees versus j New Employees ........ ........................ ..... 119 11. SCANLON MODEL Comparison: Company A versus Company G ........... ........... ....... 120 j 12. SCANLON MODEL Comparison: Supervisors versus NonSupervisors ......................................... 121 13. SCANLON MODEL Comparison: Scanlon Representatives versus NonScanlon Representatives . ......... ...... 122 14. NONSCANLON MODEL Comparison: Scanlon Companies versus NonScanlon Comparison Companies .......... .... 123 15. NONSCANLON MODEL Comparison: Old Employees versus New Employees ........ .......... 124 ix j Figure ^ 16. NONSCANLON MODEL Comparison: Company A ! versus Company G ......... . .............. I ■ ' 17. NONSCANLON MODEL Comparison: Supervisors versus ; NonSupervisors ............ ............ 1 I [ 18. NONSCANLON MODEL Comparison: Scanlon Representatives j versus NonScanlon Representatives . . ........ . . 19. SCANLON MODEL Comparison (Post Hoc): Old Employees versus New Employees .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20. NONSCANLON MODEL Comparison (Post Hoc): Old Employees versus New Employees ........... CHAPTER ONE: THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW I i I Two of the most crucial aspects of organizational functioning are making decisions and allocating rewards. Separately, these two i areas have received a great deal of theoretical and empirical atten tion, though participation and allocation have rarely been linked i conceptually. However, the way in which decisions are made in an , organization can influence both the allocation methods used and employee perceptions of these allocation procedures. Furthermore, j decision making and allocation systems can both influence important ! individual and organizational outcomes such as satisfaction, per- i i formance, commitment, and organizational productivity. j I In contrast to social scientific thinking, : the link between , decision making and allocation has been made in several practical managerial systems. For example, the Scanlon Plan and ImproShare are two managerial systems which involve both employee participation in decision making and bonuses based on organizational productivity. Advocates of these plans see both participation and allocation systems as necessary prerequisites to improved employee morale, i l productivity, and organizational commitment. The research reported here will link the concepts of decision making and allocation by proposing a conceptual system of direct and indirect effects of participation in decision making. An important moderator variable in this model will be employees' 1 perceptions of allocation within the organization, and particularly j the notion of equitable treatment of organizational participants, j This system of participation and allocation will then be tested with j j a variety of employee groups to investigate the differential adoption | I | of participation and allocation norms. I I This chapter will begin by presenting a typology of the effects t ( I of participation which have been proposed by theorists and research- : 1 ers. This typology will concentrate on effects on individual workers I rather than effects on the group or organization. Following the presentation of this typology, an allocational variable which has j been proposed to link some of these effects, equity, will be dis- | \ 1 i cussed. Third, this chapter will consider some of the contingencies | i | which might influence the type of participation preferred (and most i ; 1 effective) for workers. These contingency variables will be derived j I j from past research in participation as well as current debates in the j field of social justice and equity. Finally, a participative program I which can provide a test of the proposed relationships, the Scanlon ; Plan, will be discussed. 1 A Typology of Effects of Participation A wide variety of effects of participation on individual / . workers has been proposed in research and theory on organizational behavior. This section will discuss the prevalent effects which have been considered in the literature, dividing these effects into the categories of (1) attitudinal effects, (2) cognitive effects, and (3) behavioral effects. j Attitudinal Effects The majority of research investigating participation in deci- ' sion making has considered the effects of participation on the atti- ! I tudes of workers. One of the most well-known early studies of 1 J participation considered an attitudinal effect. Coch and French i j (1948) proposed that if workers were given the opportunity to parti- j cipate in decisions about the implementation of work changes, the workers would identify with the changes and be less resistant to them. Coch and French tested this hypothesis in a field experiment at a garment factory in Haywood, North Carolina. In the past, this factory had experienced problems with productivity and employee turnover when work groups were switched to a new type of task. Coch and } | French studied three groups whose tasks were changing. One group was t f j given an opportunity to participate in planning new work procedures. A second group was allowed representative participation. A third j group did not participate at all in decisions about their new tasks, j Coch and French found that the participative groups (particu- i I larly the group with full participation) showed less resistance to changes in work procedures than workers who did not have an opportu nity to participate. The productivity of participative groups 1 i k returned to a reasonable level in a relatively short period of time and turnover was reduced. Coch and French reasoned that these re- . . suits were due to a lower level of resistance to change among groups that had the opportunity to participate in decisions about the change. In recent years, this interpretation has been challenged. Bartlem 3 ' and Locke (1981) have suggested that differences in productivity i I I among the three groups were more likely a function of differences in the explanations of the job change given to the groups or the train- j , i I ing that the groups received. However , these reinterpretations do j i ( I ; not mitigate the great influence that Coch and French’s research has I | had in the area of participation. This influence has resulted in I 1 ! the consideration of a number of other attitudinal effects of parti- I I cipation. j i The attitudinal variable which has received the most concentra tion as an effect of participation in decision making is job satis- • . ! faction. The link between the opportunity to participate in decisions i | and job satisfaction has been derived primarily from the "Human I Relations" school of management (Argyris, 1964; McGregor, 1960). Human relations theorists advocate a management style which concen- ! ! trates on satisfying the higher order ego needs of workers, including i I 1 needs for achievement, affiliation, and independence. The link between participation and satisfaction suggests (1) that participa tion in decision making is one way to satisfy these higher order needs, and (2) that the satisfaction of these needs will lead to greater satisfaction with work. A wide range of research has investigated this proposed link between participation in decision making and job satisfaction. This research is reviewed by Locke and Schweiger (1979) and Miller and Monge (1985). Locke and Schweiger, after reviewing 43 studies, con- i elude that "with respect to satisfaction, the results generally favor participative over directive methods, although nearly 40 percent of j i the studies did not find PDM to he superior" (1979, p. 316). Locke ! 1 and Schweiger further note that these results are consistent over I laboratory studies, field experiments, and correlational studies. ! I The lack of influence of research setting in studies of PDM is further supported by Schweiger and Leana (1985). However, in a meta-analysis I of the research linking participation with job satisfaction, Miller and Monge (1985) reached somewhat different conclusions. These researchers found a relatively strong relationship (_r = .46) between the perceptions of a participative climate and work satisfaction. I However, there were much lower correlations between job satisfaction ! and (1) perceived participation on specific issues ( j c .21) and ' j (2) actual participation, typically involving single activities such 1 as democratic work groups ( _ r = . 16). Although Locke and Schweiger and Miller and Monge differed somewhat in their conclusions about the , j nature of the participation-satisfaction relationship, the reviews agreed that the majority of research supports the existence of this attitudinal effect of participation. A third attitudinal variable which has been related to partici pation in decision making is job involvement. Lodahl and Kejner (1965) defined job involvement as psychological identification with work and the importance of work for an individual's self image. Several researchers (Blood & Hulin, 1967; Ruh, White, & Wood, 1975; Siegel & Ruh, 1973) have suggested that participation in decision making will lead workers to see their jobs as a more central aspect j of their lives. Like the link between participation and satisfac-ri . . i | tion, these researchers typically argue that workers will see a job | t j with participation as more involving because of the satisfaction of j ! higher order ego needs. These researchers also suggest that the link j ! between participation and job involvement will be mediated by factors I such as personal background and work values. i ! ! A final attitudinal variable which has been linked to partici- j pation in decision making is organizational commitment. This outcome ! I has been most strongly advocated by researchers considering the , Scanlon Plan of participative management (Frost, Wakely, & Ruh, 1974). ! j However, other theorists (e.g., Anthony, 1978) also propose that ' participation will strengthen the sense of team and organizational identity held by individual employees in an organization. Organiza- ; tional commitment has been defined as (1) a strong belief in and i I l acceptance of the organization’s goals and values; (2) a willingness I i to exert considerable effort on behalf of the organization, and (3) j I a strong desire to maintain membership in the organization (Mowday, ' Steers, & Porter, 1979). The link between participation and commit” ment has typically been proposed as an indirect one through the development of cognitions about the organization and an individual’s place in the organization (Frost, Wakely, & Ruh, 1974). The link I between participation and commitment could also be seen as mediated by the actual behaviors and communication engaged in during partici- } pation. Kiesler (1971) and Salancik (1977) suggest that organiza tional commitment is a function of "binding" behavioral acts which are explicit, irrevocable, public, and of free volition. Participa tion in organizational decision making could well involve such binding behaviors. Cognitive Effects The cognitive effects of participation in decision making are often proposed as the intervening factors which explain more visible attitudinal and behavioral effects. However, in recent years, there has been a series of calls for greater concentration on the impor- .u tance of worker knowledge as a precursor and effect of successful participative programs (Locke & Schweiger, 1979; Lowin, 1968; Miles & Ritchie, 1971; Schuler, 1980). In fact, the final words of Locke and Schweiger’s comprehensive review of the participation literature address this issue: If participation is to be used as a tool for the furtherance of man’s (sic),happiness and well being, then it must be in a context that recognizes not only individual differences in knowledge and ability, but the primacy of reason over feelings in organizational decision making (1979, p. 328). There have been two major cognitive effects of participation proposed in theory and research. First, it has been suggested that participation in decision making will lead to increased utilization of information from lower levels of the organizational hierarchy (Anthony, 1978; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). This "upward sharing" of information, in fact, is the reason many managers and social scien-: tists support paticipation in the workplace. This line of reasoning assumes that the workers themselves have the most complete and de tailed information about how work should actually be done in an 7 organization. Thus, the use of participative management should effectively utilize the knowledge and skills of all individuals in the organization. Miles and Ritchie (1971; Ritchie & Miles, 1969) have referred to this reasoning as the "human resources" approach to participation. They support this approach, and contrast it with a "human relations" approach to participation in which managers are interested in satisfying workers rather than using their talents and knowledge in the decision making process. It should be noted that this upward cognitive effect is one with eventual influence on the company or work group as a whole, rather than the individual worker. A second proposed cognitive effect of participation is downward information dissemination. That is, it is proposed that participa tion in decision making will result in the individual employee having increased knowledge about the organization and his/her part in the organization. This effect has been proposed as an intervening mechanism which will lead to higher productivity and organizational commitment. Propositions regarding downward information dissemina tion have typically taken one of two forms. First, it has been pro posed that participative workers will have more and better knowledge about particular decisions and thus will be better able to implement those decisions. This reasoning was used in the original participa tive research of Coch and French (1948) and has been proposed since then by Maier (1963), Melcher (1976), Strauss (1963), and Vroom and Yetton (1963). It has also been proposed that participative employees will have a greater understanding of the entire organization, its standing in the marketplace, and the part that individual employees play in the greater scheme of things (Bass, 1970). Frost, Wakely, and Ruh (1974) term this worker knowledge "Identification" and see it as a necessary part of a successful par- I ticipative management program. Third, some researchers have proposed that participation in i decision making will lead individual employees to have a more accu- . . rate perception of reward contingencies in the organization. This ! cognitive effect has been proposed primarily by researchers using an expectancy approach to participation (e.g., Mitchell, 1973; Schuler, 1980). Specifically, these researchers have proposed that participa- I tion leads to more accurate knowledge of the effort-performance rela tionship and the performance-reward relationship. According to I Mitchell (1973), "through participation, the individual should know j fairly well which behaviors are likely to be rewarded and which are not" (p. 674). With improved knowledge of these two expectancy rela tionships, employee motivation, performance, and satisfaction should be improved. Finally, several researchers have argued that participation in decision making will lead to lower levels of role conflict and role ( ambiguity (Morris, Steers, & Koch, 1979; Schuler, 1977; Schuler, Aldag, & Brief, 1977). Morris, et al. found that participation in decision making was the most important predictor of role conflict and the second most important predictor of role ambiguity in a sample of clerical, professional, and blue collar employees. It has been ! suggested that this cognitive impact of participation on role per- i i ceptions will lead to higher levels of satisfaction with work and ; I job performance (Schuler, et al . , 1977). i ' ! i Behavioral Effects ■ I j Perhaps the simplest behavioral effect of providing workers j I with the opportunity to participate in the workplace is that employ- I | ees will, indeed, engage in more participative and communicative I I behaviors. The institution of a program of participation certainly i does not guarantee these behaviors (for example, see research on in dustrial democracy in Yugoslavia by Obradovic, 1970, and Obradovic, i ' French, and Rodgers, 1970), but participative and communicative | behavior seems more likely in a work setting which encourages parti- j ! i cipation. Some particular behaviors which might be increased by a 1 participative climate are consultation with superiors, encouragement | ' I '• of other employees to get involved in participative programs, volun- j teering for special committee work, or a search for information rele- 1 vant to the organization. j At a level beyond this, however, two major behavioral effects j of participation have been explored in the research literature. I First, researchers working from Locke's (1966) theory of goal-setting ; | I i ' (Latham & Marshall, 1982; Latham, Mitchell, & Dossett, 1978; Latham,& Saari, 1979; Latham & Steele, 1983; Latham & Yukl, 1976) have inves tigated the hypothesis that participation in goal setting will lead \ to higher levels of worker productivity. For a review of this re search, see Latham & Lee (1985). In general, this research has not 10 i borne out a strong relationship between participation in goal-setting I j and individual performance. A meta-analytic review of this research J ■ (Miller & Monge, 1985) found a correlation of .11 between participa- j I j tion and performance in goal-setting research. However, employees ! who participatively set goals tend to set relatively high goals for i ! themselvesc(see Latham & Lee, 1985). j The second major behavioral effect of participation proposed has been individual performance or productivity. Research on this I effect of participation has been second only to research on job satisfaction. However, reviews of these studies provide mixed con- . elusions about the effect of participation on productivity. Locke and Schweiger (1979) conclude in their review of 46 of these studies i that "with respect to the productivity criterion there is no trend in favor of participative leadership as compared to more directive I ! styles" (p. 316). Further, Locke and Schweiger found no effect for I research setting in these studies. However, a meta-analytic review I of this research (Miller & Monge, 1985) found a strong effect for research setting in studies investigating participation and producti- 1 vity. Excluding goal-setting studies (discussed earlier),-the corre- i lation between participation and productivity in field studies was .27, while the correlations in laboratory research were -.33 for studies manipulating leader behavior and -.01 for studies manipu- . . lating task or group structure. It is interesting to note that in spite of mixed support for the link between participation and productivity, researchers and | practitioners alike continue to assume its viability. For example, Mitchell (1980), after citing the inconclusive review of Locke and Schweiger (1979), states that "The results of the participation i l i research, however, generally suggests that regardless of the nature I » | of the moderating condition, the participation-attitude and behavior | | | relationships are positive" (p. 332). ; ■ I j In sum, then, a variety of attitudinal, cognitive, and beha- vioral effects of participation have been proposed. Proposed attitu- ' i dinal effects of participation include decreased resistance to change and increased job satisfaction, job involvement, and organizational commitment. Proposed cognitive effects of participation include l I increased upward sharing of information, increased knowledge about . | the organization and the individual's part in the organization, more i accurate perceptions of reward contingencies, and reduced role con- j j flict and ambiguity. Proposed behavioral effects of participation j include increased communication and other participative behaviors, the setting of more difficult goals, and improved worker performance 1 and productivity under some conditions. j F Some of these effects of participation appear to be relatively direct. For example, increases in communication and actual partici pative behavior, knowledge gains received through participative chan nels, and job satisfaction are typically proposed as relatively : direct effects of participative programs in organizations. However, several other effects in this typology are probably less direct. For | example, the effect of participation on job performance is typically 12 j seen to be mediated by worker knowledge, participative behavior per j se, and worker motivation. The effect of participation on organiza- l I ! tional commitment may be mediated by knowledge of the organization, 1 l J self perceptions of participative behavior, and job satisfaction. ! I | One theoretical mechanism which has been proposed to link the j notion of participation with the notions of performance and organiza- l I tional commitment is Equity Theory (Adams, 1963; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1976). This theoretical mechanism has been especially I prevalent in work on the Scanlon Plan of participative management I (Frost, Wakely, & Ruh, 1974). In particular, it has been proposed that individuals who participate in the organization will gain know- i 5 ledge about the contributions and outcomes of a wide range of organi- ! zational "shareholders." It is only when an employee sees that all shareholders (employees, management, financial investors, customers, I » ! and union) are being equitably treated that the employee will be I i i commited to the company and productive on the job. The next section f | of this chapter will review theories of equity and distributive j justice. First, the roots of distributive justice and equity theo- i ries in social psychology will be considered. Second, three impor tant current statements of justice theory will be presented. Finally, i issues that are currently receiving a great deal of attention and debate in the literature on social justice will be presented. The relevance of these issues for equity in organizations — particularly in reference to participative systems — will be considered. 13 Equity and Distributive Justice I Social Psychological Roots of Justice i Three important statements regarding social justice were made ■ in the early 1960s and have influenced a great deal of theory and research in social psychology. The first of these was Homans' (1961, 1 j 1974) statement of justice in his exchange theory of social behavior. , I ! | The second was Blau’s (1964) theory of exchange. Finally, Adams I I 1 j (1963, 1965) provided more specific elaboration of behavior in his ! equity theory. Homans' (1961, 1974) theory of social exchange rests in large ! part on his "fundamental rule of distributive justice." This rule 1 i i i states that in an exchange relationship, an individual has two expec- ; tations: (1) that rewards will be proportional to costs, and (2) that ! i ■ ! net rewards (profits) will be proportional to investments. Homans I believes that this rule is universal. However, the weightings given i to investments, rewards, and costs may vary for different cultures, ; individuals, or situations. Homans suggests that the proportionality belief arises from (1) direct intuition resulting in specific links between investment and profit, (2) experience with the environment, ! and (3) experience with exchange. When a person does not receive deserved rewards, he/she experiences "emotional behavior" (anger for under-compensation or guilt for over-compensation). Because of indi vidual self-interest, the threshold for experiencing anger is much more easily reached than the threshold for experiencing guilt. Homans states that his rules of justice are applicable in both direct 14 exchange relationships and third-party exchange relationships. How ever, he prefers to concentrate on direct exchanges in which the same person is the source and beneficiary of the exchange. | 1 ' Blau (1964) discusses justice in terms of the expectations in-. ' j dividuals develop regarding social relationships. Blau discusses i three types of expectations: (1) general expectations about benefits to be received from all aspects of social life, (2) expectations about the rewards of associating with a particular individual, and (3) comparative expectations regarding the profits (rewards minus costs) I to be received in social relationships. Blau concentrates on the third type of expectation in his discussion of justice. Blau distin- | ! I j guishes between the "going rate of exchange" (determined by rules of ; j supply and demand) and the "fair rate of exchange" (a normative stan- j dard defining "justice" for the exchange). The going rate of ex change creates probabilistic expectations and the fair rate of ex change creates moral expectations, violations of which evoke social disapproval. i . ! Adams’ (1963, 1965) theory of inequity focuses more squarely on the "causes and consequences" of inequity in social relationships. In the "cause" portion of his theory, Adams draws explicitly on Homans' concept of distributive justice in defining equity as the proportionality of perceived input/outcome ratios in an exchange relationship. Adams concentrates on the perceptual nature of this relationship, thus explicitly considering relationships that appear equitable to one participant and inequitable to the other. On the 15 j consequence side of the theory, Adams draws from cognitive dissonance ' theory in proposing methods of resolving inequitable situations. He j i i ■ suggests that individuals may (1) alter inputs, (2) alter outcomes, j (3) cognitively distort inputs and outcomes, (4) leave the field, | i | (5) alter the inputs or outcomes of the other (either actually or ; I j cognitively), or (6) change the comparison person. Adams also pro poses "admittedly crude" rules for choosing among these modes of I I inequity resolution. [ These three early formulations of social justice theory are si milar in several ways. All consider the notion of comparing what has been put into a relationship with what the individual is getting j out of the relationship. All three suggest that the result of per- ! j ceived inequity in a relationship is discomfort for the individual. ! However, these three theories highlight different aspects of social justice. Homans’ statement provides the first and most fundamental < , j look at social justice, concentrating on how standards of justice are | developed in the individual. Blau considers the role of societal | norms in justice perceptions, and draws a distinction between a | "moral" sense of justice and a "supply and demand" sense of justice. Adams more carefully delineates the equity formula and also considers the ways individuals deal with inequity in relationships. It also should be noted that Adams discusses "equity" rather than "justice ." As Cohen and Greenberg (1982) state, this is "a practice that has produced some confusion and considerable discussion of the most basic form of ’the' rule of distributive justice" (p. 15). The next section will consider current theoretical statements on social j justice. | Current Statements of Social Justice I The early statements of social justice by Homans, Blau, and j Adams generated a great deal of research in social psychology. Much j of this research has followed the model developed by Adams and his I colleagues in which two types of research are typical. First, many studies investigate how individuals react to being over and under- rewarded. For example, a great deal of research has contrasted different modes of equity resolution for "employees" being paid by time wages or piecework wages (see Greenberg, 1982, for a review of research). A second typical research paradigm has placed individuals I j in the position of the allocator, investigating the situational and t f personal attributes which influence allocation decisions (see Schwinger, 1980, for a review). Several theoretical revisions of social justice theory have arisen from this research. The three j most prominent will be considered in this section. Walster and her colleagues (Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, ) i 1973; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978) have expanded on Adams' formulation of equity theory to develop what they consider to be a broad-based social psychological theory which explains behavior in a wide variety of situations. Walster, et al. have expanded on earlier versions of justice theory in three important ways. First, they have provided a new version of the equity formula which allows the incorporation of negative values for inputs or outcomes. Second, Walster, et al. developed a general distinction between restoration I 1 of "actual equity" and restoration of "psychological equity-" This l j distinction has led to the hypothesis that over-benefitted indivi- \ j duals will restore psychological equity while under-rewarded indivi- ! duals will attempt to restore actual equity. Third, Walster, et al. have attempted to widen the range of situations in which equity j theory is applied. Most of the research stemming from Adams’ theory l has involved compensation in the workplace. Walster and her col- ■ leagues have also looked at victim-exploiter relationships, philan thropist-recipient relationships, and intimate relationships. A ! great deal of argument has arisen from Walster, et al.’s attempt to i make equity theory a basic theory of social behavior (see, e.g., Utne t j & Kidd, 1980). These concerns will be considered in more detail in a later section of this chapter. A second line of theory and research is that of Lerner and his i colleagues (for a review, see Lerner, 1980) on the "belief in a just J world." Lerner proposes that most individuals develop this just ! world theory through universal aspects of development in which chil dren gain a "psychology of entitlement." Lerner's research on this theory (e.g., Lerner & Simmons, 1966) has typically involved investi gating how individuals react to people who are suffering without cause. His research on attitudes toward undeserving victims indi cates that individuals tend to derogate those who are suffering, thus sustaining the just world hypothesis. In related research, Lerner has also identified several forms of justice which operate for ! individuals (Lerner, 1975). These forms of justice are (1) needs, I (2) entitlement, (3) parity, (4) equity, (5) law (or Darwinian justice), and (6) justified self-interest. i j Finally, Leventhal and his associates (e.g., Leventhal, 1976, : 1980; Leventhal, Karuza, & Fry, 1980) have criticized the general i viability of equity theory in explaining much of social behavior. They suggest that individuals use several different allocation norms (e.g., those suggested by Lerner above) rather than only considering the equitable distribution of rewards. Leventhal has proposed a justice-judgment model of allocations! decision making in which indi viduals (1) decide which justice rules are applicable, (2) estimate the amount and type of outcome the recipient deserves based on each rule, (3) combine the outcomes deserved on the basis of each rule into a final estimate, and (4) evaluate the justice of actual outcome by comparing the actual to the deserved outcome. Leventhal also acknowledges that this sequence will only be enacted when justice is important in the situation. He suggests that individuals often do not care at all about justice in allocations. Current Debates in Social Justice The above three statements of current theoretical positions in social justice point to several clear issues of debate among theo rists. Walster, et al. are attempting to claim equity theory as a general theory of social behavior. Others believe that this is not only an ambitious effort, but a foolhardy one, too. Utne and Kidd (1980) comment: j To summarize, equity theory's world is just too simple. j • First, people care about things other than justice. | Second, reactions to inequity are not monolithic. People j can and do live with the knowledge of inequity, yet they do not always feel distressed about their own or others' 1 ; misfortunes and act to change them. Finally, people j are not passive recipients of information, they actively j j scan their environments for reasons, using these reasons i | to structure their environment so that it will be less j ambiguous, unjust, and distressing (p. 68). ! Utne and Kidd are far from alone in their concern about the value of equity theory. The debate essentially comes down to whether or not justice is the only (or most crucial) norm for allocation driving human behavior. This issue typically takes two forms in the J i literature. The first is a consideration about whether justice — in any form — has a great deal of bearing on the way individuals be- , t I J have. For example, Leventhal (1976) doubts that justice is even con sidered in many situations. Similarly, Messick and Sentis (1983) have suggested that it is just as Important to consider individual's i preferences (typically self-interest) as it is to consider percept i i tions of fairness in allocation decisions. ; I The second (and more prevalent) form this debate takes is to i i suggest that allocation norms other than equity are important in determining individual behavior. As mentioned above, Lerner (1975) delineated six modes of justice — needs, entitlement, parity, equity, law, and justified self-interest. Reis (1979) (cited by Cohen & Greenberg, 1982) has distinguised 17 different forms of justice. Deutsch (1975) in considering justice in various societies, has identified 11 different forms of justice. In the midst of this multitude of allocation rules, however, three emerge which have 20 created the most theory, research, and debate. The three justice I • rules most often considered are (1) equity (sometimes called the j j contribution principle), in which outcomes are allocated proportion- j j ally to inputs to the exchange, (2) equality, in which outcomes are ! j ! allocated equally to all involved in the exchange, regardless of I I I inputs, and (3) needs, in which outcomes are allocated with the goal i of meeting the needs of those involved in the exchange. | ) Unfortunately, a great deal of debate on this issue has in volved semantic arguments rather than empirical research. For j example, Walster and her colleagues (Walster, et al., 1978; Walster I i j & Walsater, 1975; Austin & Hatfield, 1980) argue that all allocation I rules are really forms of the equity principle. Cohen and Greenberg j ! I I (1982) summarize their argument: j i - ' ] Situations where other principles appear to have an effect I J are incompletely specified, as on closer examination, ; an "input-like" variable can be shown to be present. j Where equal outcomes are thought to be just, there is no need to point to an equality norm of justice, only to recognize that the relevant input for recipients is equal. ; Just and equal protection before the law, equal oppor- ; j tunity, and equal suffrage apply in situations where all | recipients "possess equal humanity" and thus all deserve i equal outcomes (p. 30). Messick and Sentis (1983) make a similar argument for why I equality is the only distribution rule. They state that "the issue is not whether equality is important but on what dimension the equality should be established" (p. 68). However, regardless of whether allocation principles are being subsumed under one semantic heading, it’s clear that many theorists advocate the importance of considering the justice principles of needs, equality, and equity, I and other (nonjustice) allocation principles such as self-interest, ! j when evaluating exchange in social relationships. j i ' [ ; A second major point of debate in the field of social justice j | is the issue of procedural justice. Several theorists (e.g., Lerner ^ 1 i | and Whitehead, 1980) are now contending that there is more to social I I justice than allocation decisions. Rather, these scholars suggest that researchers should consider the fairness of the procedures through which these allocation decisions are made. However, there ' has been little research in the area of procedural justice, and the 1 area seems in great need of conceptual and empirical clarification ! (see Cohen & Greenberg, 1982, for comments). I i ! The next section of this chapter will consider research results i I i I J relating to the first debate discussed above, i.e., whether many ! allocation norms are used in exchange relationships. There has not j i J been extensive research investigating variables that predict the use I i of different allocation norms. However, research which has been j conducted can be divided into studies investigating (1) demographic I j characteristics, (2) personality, (3) characteristics of the situa^- j tion, and (4) cultural factors. In general, the research conducted I has contrasted the allocation norms of equity, equality, and needs. I A few studies have also considered self-interest or preference in allocation. Use of Allocation Norms: Empirical Research Demographic Characteristics. The demographic characteristic most often considered in research on allocation decisions is sex 22 , (see Major & Deaux, 1982, for review). Generally, this research has J I indicated that when given a choice between equity and equality alio- ' | ! . cation strategies, women will tend to use the allocation strategy j 1 which will underbenefit themselves while men will tend to use the I | allocation strategy which will overbenefit themselves (see, e.g., Leventhal & Anderson, 1970; Leventhal & Lane, 1970; Mikula, 1974). j For example, a woman who has higher inputs than her partner will use J an equality rule of allocation, while a man who has higher inputs will use an equity rule. This generalization depends to some extent, j however, on the situation. Almost all of these studies involved si tuations with zero-sum allocations. "Thus, it is generally impossi- . | I , ble to determine in these experiments whether women, in comparison to | I men, are allocating less reward to themselves or more rewards to j I 1 their partners" (Major & Deaux, 1 9 8 2 , p. 5 1 ) . On the other end of j ! | ; the allocation decision, it has been found that women may be more ; tolerant of being underbenefitted than are men (Kahn, 1972). Also, i there is evidence that women are more concerned about procedural jus- j ! ! I tice than men are (Schmitt & Marwell, 1972). j A second demographic variable used in investigations of alloca tion is age. Hook and Cook (1979) provide an excellent summary of developmental research on allocation judgments. Hook and Cook argue that allocation principles systematically shift with increasing age. Children under the age of six are most likely to use either self- interest or equality as a basis for allocation decisions. Neither of j these principles require a consideration of inputs. As children grow, however, allocation decisions tend to be made more on a princi- i j pie of contributions (equity). Until the age of 13, this contribu- ; tions principle tends to be ordinal in nature (the person who does more should get more). After 13, a proportional allocation rule will I be used with increasing frequency (rewards directly proportional to j inputs). I Personality Characteristics. Because it is simpler to code the sex of research participants than the personality of research parti cipants, scholars know much more about sex differences in allocation decisions than about personality differences. However, two persona lity characteristics have received some attention for predicting j allocation decisions. The first of these is Protestant Work Ethic I ' (PE), a multidimensional concept designed to operationalize the ideas of Max Weber. Major and Deaux (1982) have summarized this research. j I ! In general, studies have found that there is not a difference in ) ! allocation rules used, per se, but in the way inputs to a relation- I j ship are weighted. High PE individuals tend to give substantial ■ weight to inputs that indicate individual effort and hard work. Low PE subjects do not give these inputs extra weight. A second personality variable considered is measured by the "Belief in a Just World" scale developed by Rubin and Peplau (1975). Lerner (1980) has reviewed research on this scale and concludes that the belief in a just world is an enduring personality trait that individuals hold to a greater or lesser degree. This personality trait can be used to make predictions about allocation decisions. However, no research has investigated how this personality charac teristic influences the use of different types of allocation norms. | Situational Characteristics. Most of the research on differen- j i tial use of allocation norms has been performed in a laboratory | i rather than a field setting. Thus, no research has systematically contrasted a wide variety of contexts in which allocation decisions are made. However, Mikula (1980) has outlined the characteristics of situations in which contribution, equality, and need principles will be enacted. The contribution principle will be accepted as an adequate basis for allocations especially in those situations in • which the goods to be distributed were acquired at least I partly by independent work and in which their amount is ' contingent upon the size of the contribution made ... ' For the equality principle, the typical field of j application would be a type of social relationship | with a primary orientation towards solidarity and with . j the common elements and the equality or similarity between the partners as the most salient feature of their rela-;. v j tions . . . Using the need principle, finally, appears ! appropriate in those cases in which the allocator bears J the responsibility for the welfare of the recipients, I with the recipients being totally dependent on the goods , to be distributed for the satisfaction of their central needs (p. 136). Mikula points out that given these situational constraints, a contribution principle will be most common in economic relationships. In fact, Schwinger (1980) states that "most people now live under and accept the existing proportionality principle of industrial society as far as wages are concerned” (p. 105). In contrast, an equality j principle will be common in intimate relationships, or in cases of intergroup competition or external threat affecting all partners equally. Finally, the need principle will be seen in impersonal 25 social relationships, or in "intimate relationships whose primary function lies in the promotion of well-being and personal develop ment on the part of the members" (Mikula, 1980, p. 136). Cultural Characteristics. Two types of research on the effect of cultural characteristics on allocation decisions can be considered. Major and Deaux (1982) review the experimental research comparing subjects of different nationalities. They conclude that North Ameri- i j cans may be more concerned with equity than are other nationalities, but do not speculate on the reasons for these cultural characteris tics. Greenberg (1982) considers work relationships in a variety of nations, contrasting them to the U.S. in terms of the justice norms typically in operation. He finds that Britishers place greater em phasis on nonperformance factors such as need when making pay raise decisions than Americans, but also notes that wages and performance are certainly not independent in the British system. In contrast, j Greenberg notes that Japanese companies use group incentives which blur the connection between performance and wages. Japanese firms tend to their employees’ needs by providing lifetime employment and a familial work atmosphere. Although uncharacteristic of Socialist ideals, Greenberg finds that "work according to performance" is the crucial norm in the Soviet Union. Soviet workers are motivated to perform through offers of incentive bonuses which are a large percen tage of their total pay. Finally, Greenberg sees the Netherlands as an example of a culture which values consistently high inputs regard less of the equity or inequity iii the situation. 26 Allocation Differences and Participation The preceding section of this chapter has delved extensively into the issue of social justice. The social psychological roots of ' social justice were considered, and current theoretical statements of ; justice theory were presented. Then, two major debates in the field of justice were discussed, (1) the importance of procedural justice, and (2) the possibility that justice is not crucial in human behavior ' I and that equity is not the most important justice norm in operation. Finally, research investigating the use of different justice norms by individuals with different demographic or personality character istics, or by people in different situations or cultures, was re- , i viewed. This section considers possible implications of theory and research in social justice for participation in decision making. i The typology of attitudinal, behavioral, and cognitive effects of participation developed earlier in this chapter provides little insight into the possibility that, in a manner similar to allocation norms, individuals have differential norms for participation. How ever, some of the research on the effects of participation in the workplace can be brought to bear on this issue. As discussed earlier, in their meta-analysis of participation in decision making, satisfac tion, and productivity, Miller and Monge (1985) found that there was a relatively strong relationship (r = .46) between the perception of a participative climate and work satisfaction. There were much... lower correlations, however, between satisfaction and (1) perceived i participation on specific issues (r_ = .21) and (2) actual | participation, typically involving single activities such as democra- j | ! j tic work committees (i: = . 16) . Lower correlations were generally j i ! j found for the relationship between participation and work producti- i i , vity. In goal-setting (single issue) studies, the correlation . j between participation and productivity was .11. In all other field ! t studies (typically multiple issue and participative climate studies), ! the correlation between participation and productivity was .27. Although this research on the attitudinal and behavioral effects of participation does not have direct bearing on the notion of individuals preferring different modes of participation, the pat tern of results does speak to the issue. In general, studies which ! investigated the perceptions of a participative climate or participa tion over a wide range of organizational issues found stronger rela tionships with satisfaction and productivity than those considering participation on single issues or in single activities. There are I several explanations for these findings. First, it is possible that I j participation over a wide range of organizational issues and activi ties is crucial for creating affective and behavioral outcomes in an organization. However, there is also a methodological explanation. If different individuals gain outcomes from different types of participation (e.g., committee participation, participation in I work groups, individual meetings with supervisors), correlations which consider only single-issue or single-activity participation . . will be.attenuated. Only when considering participation over multi ple issues, or perceptions of overall participation in the 28 ! organization, will the actual strength of the relationship be tapped. ; Thus, the measurement or manipulation of participation may have i i ! affected the strength of relationship found in these studies. A simi-l I I lar effect was found in a meta-analysis of fear appeals and attitude i i change by Boster and Mongeau (1984). If this interpretation of the ! results of the participation studies is correct, it provides evidence that individuals prefer different modes of participation in the work place. There is also some evidence for individual and situational differences in desire for participation in decision making. For , . ; example, Steers (1977) found that females are more participative than J males. This study also indicated that situational factors have a ! greater influence on participativeness than individual characteris- ' j tics. There have been several studies which have investigated the role of personality on participativeness (Abdel-Halim, 1983; Tosi, ' 1970; Vroom, 1960; Vroom & Man, 1960). These studies have typically investigated the personality characteristics of authoritarianism and need for independence, but results have been inconclusive. Other researchers have suggested that values mediate the effects of parti cipation, and that only certain types of employees (e.g., upper-level managers) will benefit from participating in decision making (Hulin, 1971; Singer, 1974). It should be noted that none of these personal moderating vari ables proved valuable in accounting for variance in the meta-analysis i discussed above (Miller & Monge, 1985). It should also be stressed that all of these studies considered individual characteristics which I J would predict participation in general in the workplace, rather than usage of different modes of participation. Several scholars have J called for a more personalized approach to participation, though. I 1 For example, Singer (1974) states that: While the necessity for determining a "one best" leader ship style for the "composite worker" is understandable j from a financial and expediency standpoint, to assume that all workers desire PDM opportunities is to lack sensitivity to individual needs — the antithesis of the humanization that ardent proponents of PDM advocate (p. 359). The consideration of situational variables as mediators in the relationship between participation and attitudinal, cognitive, and i J behavioral outcomes has been more fruitful. The most comprehensive i ! examination of situational variables in the participative process is I j presented by Vroom and Yetton (1973). These theorists consider dif- i J ferent decision situations and provide rules for deciding the optimal ; level of participation in the decision making process. They propose both rules to protect the quality of the decision (the leader infor mation rule, the goal congruence rule, and the unstructured problem I rule) and rules to protect the acceptance of the decision (the accep tance rule, the conflict rule, the fairness rule, and the acceptance priority rule). Most of the research on this model has been descrip tive in nature — i.e., self-reports about how managers behave in different decision situations. Several normative tests (e.g., Vroom & Jago, 1978) , though, have also indicated that decisions made within participative modes specified by the "rules" were more effective. 30 | Vroom and Yetton’s approach to participation in decision making ! is useful in indicating that situational constraints play an impor- I I tant role in determining the appropriateness of participation in the ' ! I j decision making process. Their model, however, is prescriptive in j ; nature, and does little to inform us as to whether individual employ- I j ees might prefer and work with different norms of participation in I the workplace. ' In sum, although there is no direct evidence that situational, personal, or cultural factors influence the mode of participation preferred by individuals, several indirect pieces of evidence can be I ; brought to bear on this issue. First, a meta-analysis of the effect I I of participation on productivity and satisfaction (Miller & Monge, 1 1985) showed stronger effects for multiple issue/activity measures i i than for single issue/activity measures. This could be an artifac- | I tual finding resulting from individuals preferring different modes of ! i participation. Second, researchers have found some evidence that i I | personal characteristics such as authoritarianism influence the : desire to participate in general. Finally, Vroom and Yetton's model suggests that situational constraints, too, play a role in deter-... mining the appropriateness (and perhaps desire) for different modes i of decision making. A System of Organizational Participation and Equity Thus far, this chapter has presented a number of proposals about participation, equity, and organizational outcomes. First, it was proposed that the effects of participation in decision making can 31 j be usefully divided into attitudinal, cognitive, and behavioral l j effects. Second, it was proposed that some of these effects were ! direct (communicative behavior, knowledge increases, job satisfaction) | and some were indirect (performance, organizational commitment). | Third, it was proposed that one theoretical mechanism that has been used to link participation with indirect effects (particularly orga-v. , nizational commitment) is equity. Through a review of the distribu- I i tive justice literature, a major debate was uncovered. This is the question of the allocation norms preferred by individuals (particu larly equity norms versus outcome maximization norms) and the contin- 1 gencies which mediate allocation preference. Finally, the participa tion literature was examined to determine if there was also evidence | | j that individuals preferred different modes of participation. J I From this groundwork, a system of relationships can be proposed which links the concepts of participation and equity with direct and i I ; indirect outcomes. This system of relationships is presented in j j Figure One. In this model, the opportunity to participate in deci-:' ! . | sion making has immediate cognitive (e.g., knowledge gains), beha- i vioral (e.g., participative behavior), and attitudinal (e.g., job satisfaction) effects. There is also an indirect attitudinal effect of participation, organizational commitment. The relationship be^ tween participation and commitment is moderated by all three of the direct effects of participation, with the behavioral and cognitive links further moderated by perceptions of allocation. As employees j behave in more participative ways and learn more about the IMMEDIATE COGNITIVE EFFECTS (e.g. , knowledge gain) \ t INDIRECT EFFECTS (e.g., productivity, org. commitment) IMMEDIATE BEHAVIORAL ♦ EFFECTS (e.g., parti cipative behaviors) ALLOCATION PERCEPTIONS PARTICIPATION I i I IMMEDIATE ATTITUDINAL EFFECTS (e.g., job satisfaction) Figure 1. A system of Organizational Participation and Equity I ! organization, they come in contact with more organizational partici- | I i j pants and gain knowledge about the system of allocation in the orga- j nization. This will lead to perceptions of equity and organizational j 1 i i ■ | coimnitment. ! ! t t Further, research on differential allocation norms suggests ! i j that this model will not be a good fit for all employees in an orga- ] nization.: Rather, there is evidence that some employees hold outcome i maximization norms and are uninfluenced by perceptions of equity in ! the organization. These employees might also hold different norms for participation in the organization, as suggested by the review of i situational and personal determinants of participation above. The \ i next section of this chapter discusses a management system, the Scanlon Plan, that incorporates the notions of participation, equity, ; and outcomes for use in testing the model presented in Figure One. j Following this discussion, variables that could differentiate between ! preference for equity and outcome maximization in Scanlon companies are presented. j The Scanlon Plan of Participative Management The Scanlon Plan (Frost, Wakely, & Ruh, 1974) is a plan of participative management and profit-sharing designed to increase com- : pany productivity and profitability through the competent use of human resources. The Scanlon Plan was developed by Joseph Scanlon in the 1930s as part of an attempt to save a steel mill from financial failure. Since that time, variations on the Scanlon Plan have been adopted in a wide variety of companies throughout the United States. 34 Although the Scanlon Plan was developed and is still introduced to i | improve company productivity, it is, at heart, a plan for changing | the cognitions * attitudes , and behaviors of individual workers : i through the "Three Psychological Conditions." ! I ! The three psychological conditions necessary for the success of i j a Scanlon Plan are:(1) the identification of the organization and j the employees, (2) the opportunity to participate and become respon- I , sible, and (3) the realization of equity. These three psychological conditions can be thought of as defining the Scanlon Culture. 1 Smircich (1985) has stated that organizational culture is tradition ally defined as "a fairly stable set of taken-for-granted assumptions, shared beliefs, meanings, and values that form a kind of backdrop i for action" (p. 58). This is precisely the way Scanlon theorists and practitioners view the psychological conditions — as the assumptions,' beliefs, and values which are necessary for the successful implemen-a tation of the Scanlon Plan. According to Frost, Wakely, & Ruh (1974); i i All principles of management that encourage people to ' identify with their work group, that encourage people to participate as much as they can, and that continually j focus on equitably rewarding all members of the organi zation are seen as ways of applying the Scanlon Plan philosophy (p. 1). j Psychological Condition: Identification The psychological condition of identification suggests that it is crucial for employees to possess knowledge about all of the "shareholders" in the organization. These shareholders include cus tomers, financial investors/owners, management, and employees. Frost, > Wakely, and Ruh (1974) point out that individual employees often know _________________ 35 little about the goals of the organization, its competitors, its mar- | ket, its product lines, its financial health, and especially, where i ' t , ! an individual’s own effort fits into the larger scheme of things. i i Scanlon theorists suggest that such knowledge of the company and the individual’s place in it is essential for meaningful participation in j I the organization. j It should be noted that this use of the term identification is very different from traditional meanings of identification, in which j the term refers to an emotional attachment. In fact, the most central aspect of the identification condition in the Scanlon Plan is j ' cognitive in nature. That is, the individual must have knowledge j about the organization to effectively participate. An organization ' must also be concerned with the acquisition of identification know- j ledge. This involves the communicative/behavioral notion of informa- < I 1 tion seeking. Thus, Scanlon Plans often include formal mechanisms j I 1 ! designed to facilitate the process of employees learning about the organization. In fact, in one form of the Scanlon Plan, extensive informational meetings and a 90% ratification vote are required before the Plan is adopted. I Psychological Condition; Participation The second "psychological condition" of the Scanlon Plan — the opportunity to participate and become responsible . — is based on the notion that the people who have the most complete knowledge about how a job can be accomplished are the employees themselves. Thus, em ployees are encouraged to make innovation suggestions. The content 36 of participation is not limited to an individual’s job or work group, i rather, employees are encouraged to participate in decisions on a ; wide gamut of organizational issues. It should be noted, however, ! j that management typically retains final say on most organizational I j decisions. Employees are seen as valuable assets; however, Scanlon ! companies also pride themselves on having management that is compe- I ' ' t | tent for taking responsibility for final decisions. I ! ! . The primary mechanism to facilitate participation in Scanlon j companies is the committee. Though each organization is different, j j most Scanlon companies have two types of committees. The first, j j typically called a production committee, involves employees who are i ' ■ engaged in similar tasks. Production committees encourage innovation I suggestions about the work process. The second, usually called a screening committee, typically involves employees from a wide cross- i ; section of the organization. Screening committees review general j ! suggestions and consider company-wide concerns. The Scanlon Plan ! ! i also acknowledges that participation could involve channels other 1 than the committee structure. Frost, Wakely, and Ruh state that: "On the assumption that everyone is striving to be effective, even ' j if effectiveness means only minimal survival, employees are alert to ! opportunities to increase the assurance of survival or effectiveness j ] i by individual or collective effort" (p. 60, emphasis added). The emphasis in Scanlon is definitely on the collective committee effort. Psychological Condition: Equity j The third and final psychological condition of the Scanlon Plan is the realization of equitable outcomes by the employee. This condi-; | tion suggests that individuals will continue to identify with and c j I contribute to the organization only as long as they perceive that they have equitable relationships with the organization. Equity is de^ 1 ! 1 fined by Scanlon researchers and practitioners as the fair treatment j i ^ j of all shareholders in the organization: employees, customers, finan- | cial investors/owners, and management. j I l The realization of equity (fair treatment) involves the compari son by the individual of inputs to and outcomes from the organization. Supposedly, in a nonScanlon company, equity is realized through the j ! i wage system — a fair day's work for a fair day’s pay. In a Scanlon I i i j j company, however, the employee is making additional contributions in the form of knowledgeable innovation suggestions to improve the pro- I ; ductivity of the company. Hence, the realization of an equitable relationship requires additional outcomes for the individual. In j Scanlon, this outcome is a monetary employee bonus. : j The Scanlon bonus is almost always tied to company productivity I rather than individual productivity. Hence, an individual who sub mits a great many valuable suggestions is rewarded no more than the j individual who makes no suggestions. The formula for computation of the bonus allocation varies from company to company, but typically the bonus pool is defined as some percentage of company profits. The ! bonus pool is then divided proportionally among employees such that employees who have a higher regular salary will receive a larger j share of the bonus pool. Frost, Wakely, and Ruh point out that: Equity is thus defined as each person’s getting the same | percentage bonus. This definition of equity depends on ! the existence of a sound, fair salary structure. While l every employee gets the same percentage, the actual dollars j I each person receives depends on his (sic) base pay and [ how many hours he (sic) works (1974, p. 16). ; { In summary, then, Frost, Wakely, and Ruh assert that the three l ; crucial psychological conditions necessary for the effective use of the Scanlon Plan are the identification of the organization and its i 1 constituents, the opportunity to participate, and the realization of | I t equitable treatment for all shareholders in the company. When these ( three psychological conditions are met, Scanlon theorists suggest that a variety of outcomes will result. On the individual level these I outcomes include: (1) commitment to the organization, (2) satisfac- i tion with work, (3) increased innovation suggestions, and (4) in-r j i 1 j creased individual productivity. These individual outcomes should i then translate into company outcomes of: (1) increased productivity, t I ' (2) increased profitability, and (3) a competitive edge in the mar- | 1 ketplace gained from being an innovative company. Differential Norms in the Scanlon Process The Scanlon Plan is based on three psychological conditions, one of which is the realization of equity for all shareholders in the organization and one of which is participation by employees. Scanlon ! i proponents suggest that satisfaction with work, organizational com mitment, and productivity are all the result of an individual’s parti cipating in the organization and realizing that everyone receives j their fair share of outcomes for what is being contributed. However, research and theory on social justice strongly suggests that equity 1 may not be the driving force it is assumed to be for all individuals. I j j Rather, it may be more important for some individuals that everyone ! 1 j is treated equally rather than equitably, or it may be more important ; i I for individuals to maximize their own outcomes (justified self- i i I interest) than to see that equity is being achieved. Moreover, research on social justice suggests that people who prefer equity I may differ systematically from those who prefer equality or self- j ( interest allocation norms. The participation literature also suggests i 1 that individuals may have different norms for participation based on j similar contingencies. Each of the explanations for differences in ! i allocation and participation norms discussed above can be considered j ; in an organizational, or Scanlon,.context. A demographic or personality characteristic explanation would l J j suggest little more for allocation and participation inside a Scanlon > I : | firm than for allocation decisions in the laboratory. That is, a | I j ; personality explanation would suggest that individuals differ in ! their allocation norms depending on the degree to which they believe I 1 j in a just world or exhibit a protestant work ethic, and would differ I j in participation norms depending on authoritarianism or need for in- t 1 dependence. Similarly, one demographic explanation would suggest that individuals would differ in the degree to which equity (or out come maximization) is important depending on gender. An interesting analogy can be made from the developmental explanation of allocation decisions. Research suggests that allocation principles will change j from self-interest to equity as an individual matures. It is I possible that allocation decisions in the organization also move from i self-interest to equity the longer the individual works for a company I i ! that espouses equity norms. Just as a child learns the norms of the ' society while growing up, an individual may learn to apply the equity , and participation norms of Scanlon after socialization into the orga nization. A situational explanation provides additional interesting ideas about how individuals in Scanlon companies might differ in terms of I their allocation and participation norms. An important situational determinant in organizations is role occupancy. The situational constraints of a supervisor are very different from the situational 1 r ' constraints of a line worker. A line worker may see his/her role in the organization primarily as a "job" and may simply want to perform I assigned tasks and maximize individual outcomes. In contrast, a ! supervisor may see a future career with the company. Such a person might be more likely to advocate participation in the decision making j I process and embrace a reward system which clearly recognizes indivi- 1 dual contributions. Other roles which could influence allocation and ! ; participation norms are whether an individual serves on committees within the Scanlon structure, whether an individual is involved with the union in the company, and whether an individual serves in a line or staff capacity within the organization. ' A cultural approach provides some interesting notions of dif ferential allocation norms. In recent years, many researchers have f ; considered the notion of corporate culture (see, e.g., Deal & Kennedy,! 1982). It seems possible that some organizations create a culture in ] t t which equity and full participation are the norm, and other organiza- j I i tions create a culture which encourages employees to work in an j individualistic way to maximize individual outcomes. As discussed earlier, the Scanlon Plan can be seen as a system designed to develop a culture which encourages the three "psychological conditions" of identity, participation, and equity. Thus, there are two critical ! comparisons that can be made in terms of corporate culture predictions; regarding allocation and participation norms. First, it is likely that Scanlon firms have different norms of participation and alloca tion than nonScanlon firms. Second, it is possible that Scanlon firms develop norms for equity after they have had the plan in opera- j tion for a given period of time. This would suggest that firms who-: . j just adopted the plan would differ from long-term Scanlon companies. ! | i Therefore, it is possible that individuals in Scanlon companies i I i I could differ in their allocation and participation norms based on a 5 ' developmental process, their roles in the organization, or the cul-^ I j ture of the organization. One set of people should participate in ! the organization in ways advocated by the Scanlon structure (commit tees, Scanlon meetings, work team meetings), exhibit communicative behaviors commensurate with these participation channels (encouraging I the involvement of others, volunteering for Scanlon tasks), gain knowledge about the Scanlon system of management, and develop commit ment to the organization when all shareholders in the organization j are being treated equitably. A second set of people would 42 participate in the organization in individualistic ways (talking with supervisors and other coworkers), exhibit communicative behaviors i I j which do not involve the formal management system, gain knowledge I I ! i | about how to improve individual performance, and develop commitment I j to the organization when individual outcomes are maximized. Because I j the first system of relationships proposed above is closely tied with i ■ the management system, it will be called the SCANLON MODEL. The ! second system of relationships, emphasizing individual activity and i i i outcome maximization, will be called the NONSCANLON MODEL. The SCANLON and NONSCANLON models are presented in Figures 2A and 2B. | They draw from the general model presented in Figure One, and dif- j j ferentiate between Scanlon and NonScanlon modes of participation and j allocation. j i Given the discussion of contingency variables for the predict ' tion of Scanlon and NonScanlon models above, the following predic-r i tions can be made. I I ! IA. For Scanlon companies, the data will fit the Scanlon model [ better than the NonScanlon model, whereas, IB. For NonScanlon companies, the data will fit the NonScanlon model better than the Scanlon model. r | 2 k . For Long-Term employees, the data will fit the Scanlon model better than the NonScanlon model, whereas, 2B. For Short-Term employees, the data will fit the NonScanlon model better than the Scanlon model. 3A. For Old Scanlon companies, the data will fit the Scanlon model better than the NonScanlon model, whereas, 3B. For New Scanlon companies, the data will fit the NonScanlon model better than the Scanlon model. SCANLON PARTICIPATION SCANLON LEARNING SCANLON ACTIVITIES JOB v EQUITY PERCEPTIONS ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT SATISFACTION Figure 2 k . SCANLON MODEL of Participation and Allocation NONSCANLON LEARNING OUTCOME MAXIMIZATION PERCEPTIONS NONSCANLON ACTIVITIES ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT NONSCANLON PARTICIPATION JOB SATISFACTION Figure 2B. NONSCANLON MODEL of Participation and Allocation For Upper Level employees, the data will fit the Scanlon, model better than the NonScanlon model, whereas, For Lower Level employees, the data will fit the NonScanlon model better than the Scanlon model. For Representatives on Scanlon Committees, the data will fit the Scanlon model better than the NonScanlon model, whereas, For NonRepresentatives on Scanlon Committees, the data will fit the NonScanlon model better than the Scanlon model. CHAPTER TWO: METHODS ; This chapter outlines the methods used to investigate the i differences among individuals in terms of allocation and participation I norms. First , . the organizations from which data were collected are l discussed, and procedures used in data collection are presented. j Then, the operationalization of variables is considered. Finally, the analyses used to examine different patterns of participation and j ! I allocation preferences are presented. I i Sample I i \ Data for this study were collected from seven Scanlon firms and ' j I two NonScanlon firms. All of the organizations studied are manufac- j I i i j turing firms, and most are located in the midwest. The following is , a brief description of each organization. I J | Company A. Company A is a family-held firm founded in 1905. I 1 This company serves the transportation and information display indus- ; try with products based on the technologies of glass fabrication, film coatings, and plastic moldings. Company A is located in the I midwest and employs 750 people. This company has had the Scanlon Plan for approximately 30 years and has a management system consi dered to be highly decentralized and permissive. In addition to the \ Scanlon committee structure, this company has a matrix work structure. Company B. Company B is a family-owned manufacturer of fine 47 I hand-crafted furniture which has been in existence for over 100 years. ! i j Company B adopted the Scanlon Plan in 1972, and views it primarily as , | an incentive plan rather than as a management system. Management at j j ; I Company B has not whole-heartedly endorsed the plan and generally j exhibits a "Theory X" style of employee relations. In recent years, I j the company has been plagued by high turnover, low morale, and ' productivity decreases. Company C. Company C is a 12-year-old midwestern company which ' I does short-run printing of academic items. It employs approximately 80 people and has recently become highly computerized. Company C i ' adopted the Scanlon Plan in 1980 and enjoyed a 300% profit increase J i ! j in the next 3 to 4 months. Since then, however, profits have flat- : I tened. Company C is typically involved in price rather than quality i competition. Company D. Company D is a 15-year-old aluminum anodizing and ; ! aluminum fabrication firm located in the midwest. The company has always been profitable, and instituted the Scanlon Plan in 1981. Company D employs approximately 80 people. i Company E. Company E was founded in 1968 and produces parts for the automobile industry. Company E tried out the Scanlon Plan in 1972 as an incentive system. The plan failed. Company E reconsidered the plan and instituted it again in 1975, using it as a management system. Company E employs approximately 70 employees working in two plants, one in the midwest and one in the southeast. Company F. Company F produces and refines magnetic wire. Company F is over 50 years old and adopted the Scanlon Plan in 1982. i 1 This company has several plants, two of which are run with the Scanlon; i I j Plan. These two plants employ approximately 200 employees and are ! I I located in the southeastern United States. ! | 1 , | Company G. Company G produces gauges and other parts used | primarily in the petroleum industry. Company G has been using the [ I 1 Scanlon Plan for less than one year. The headquarters of Company G | I and five other, plant locations are run with the Scanlon Plan. These plants are located primarily in the midwest and south. j Company H. Company H is a nonScanlon firm which is owned by j ' the same investors as Company D. Company H produces coil anodizers. ; j The company is located in the midwest. I ' Company I. Company I is a nonScanlon plant of Company F. ! i j It is located in the southeastern United States. j j Research Procedures j ■ Data for this study were collected as part of a larger research ! i project investigating the impacts of the Scanlon Plan on individual i j and organizational outcomes over time. Some of the procedures j described below were crucial for the design of other portions of the research project, but are not intrinsically important to this invest tigation. However, as data collection methods could have an impact ! on the results obtained, the procedures will be described as com pletely as possible. Data for this research project were collected from each Scanlon company weekly for a full year. Each week, a systematic sample of '.9 49 Individuals from each organization was chosen to be surveyed. This I procedure continued, without replacement, until the entire organiza- j tion was censused. The procedure was then repeated until 52 weekly samples of data were collected for each organization. ! I The sampling cycle for each firm was determined in part by the size of the company. An attempt was made to procure a sample of 40 employees each week from each company in the sample. However, for smaller companies, an eight or 12 week cycle was instituted, depend ing on company preference. I Each week, questionnaires were sent to a contact person in each j firm. This contact person then distributed the questionnaires to the j I individuals in that week's sample. Individuals receiving question- ( l naires were requested to fill out the questionnaire, seal it in an ‘ I envelope provided by the researchers, and return it to the contact person. The contact person then sent weekly shipments of completed I I questionnaires back to the researchers. A set of archival records j regarding firm productivity and innovation suggestions was also col- j lected for each firm. NonScanlon firms considered in this research were identified through discussions with Scanlon firm representatives or through trade associations. An attempt was made to match control companies with Scanlon companies on traits such as size, product, market, and geographic location. For NonScanlon firms, cross-sectional data were collected. A version of the questionnaire was produced using termi nology that would be understandable to employees outside of Scanlon firms. The questionnaires were sent to the companies, filled out by employees (confidentially), and returned to researchers on a one- | shot basis. | | Operationalization I j This study required the operationalization of: (1) participa- i • tion channels, (2) cognitive effects (learning), (3) behavioral I effects (activities), (4) affective effects (job satisfaction),.(5)’ allocation perceptions, (6) indirect outcomes (organizational com mitment) , and (7) moderator variables expected to influence the use of participation and allocation norms. The operationalization of j each of these variables is discussed below. I Participation ; | Participation was measured through a series of items which I ! ■ asked employees how much they "PARTICIPATE in using the following to SOLVE PROBLEMS in meeting our company’s commitments to its customers, i | | financial investors/owners, and employees." The participation sub- , I 1 t ! [ items were (I) suggestion system, (2) work group meetings, (3) pro- I | duction committee meetings, (4) screening committee meetings, (5) I 1 union (when applicable), (6) other departments in the company, (7) I my supervisor. Each of these items used a 9-point response format that ranged from "Not at All" through "Somewhat" to "To a Great Extent." It was proposed in Chapter One that individuals would use dif- I ferent methods of participation depending on a variety of intervening variables. The items measuring participation included both Scanlon 51 methods of participation (suggestion system, work group meetings, | I I j production committee meetings, screening committee meetings) and j I J NonScanlon methods of participation (other departments, my super- i I j visor). It should be noted that the availability of participation ! } channels could influence scores on participation items. In the Scanlon system, however, a concerted effort is made to make all chan nels accessible to all employees. Thus it seems likely that dif ferences of participativeness are not a function of differential channel availability. Cognitive Effect: Learning The cognitive effect of participation was operationalized < I 1 through the Scanlon concept of "identification." As discussed ear- j I lier, the issue of identification involves the information an em- J ployee has about the company, its shareholders, and an individual’s I ♦ t | relationship with the company and the ways in which the employee i j gets this information. Learning was operationalized by asking individuals how they learn about the company’s commitments to its customers, employees, 1 and financial investors/owners. Employees were asked how much they learned about company commitments from each of the following sources: (1) other employees, (2) written reports and postings, (3) my super visor, (4) top management, (5) elected Scanlon representatives, (6) Scanlon meetings, (7) bonus performance report, (8) my work group, i I (9) union (for companies which had a union). Each of these items used a 9-point response format which ranged from "very little" 52 through "some" to "a great deal." Like participation, it was proposed that individuals would use different methods of information seeking (Scanlon and NonScanlon) | based on a variety of intervening variables. The subitems of this i information-seeking question included both NonScanlon means of seek ing information (other employees, written reports and postings, my supervisor, top management) and Scanlon means for seeking information (elected Scanlon representatives, Scanlon meetings, bonus performance l report, my work group). Behavioral Effect: Activities : The behavioral effect :of participation was measured through a series of items which asked employees about activities they use to t j meet company commitments to customers, financial investors/owners, I and employees. The activity subitems included both Scanlon and Non Scanlon activities. The Scanlon activities included were: (1) volun- | teer for election as a Scanlon representative, (2) make suggestions l to improve the Scanlon process itself, (3) encourage people to get j involved, and (4) attend Scanlon conferences. The NonScanlon activi- 1 J ties included were: (1) make suggestions that I think will improve productivity, (2) accept almost any type of job assignment if the work needs to be done, (3) read monthly department and company per- j formance reports, (4) look for ways to improve how I do my job, and (5) participate in performance reviews with my supervisor. Again, a nine-point response format was used here which ranged from "Not at All" through "Somewhat" to "To a Great Extent." Affective Effect: Job Satisfaction i ( One immediate affective ;bu:tcome of participation,, job :satisfac- | tion, was considered. Job satisfaction was measured with the Satis- j I I faction with Work subscale of the Job Descriptive Index (Smith, Kendall, & Hulin, 1969). This scale was developed as a unidimensional measure of satisfaction with work, and the original authors provided extensive evidence of its reliability and validity. Because of the use of both descriptive and evaluative terms in the scale, however, some researchers have questioned its unidimensionality. Smith, Smith, and Rollo (1974) refactored the work subscale of the JDI and found an evaluative factor and a descriptive factor. Thus, this scale should be carefully evaluated before being accepted as unidimensional. Allocation It was proposed in the first chapter that individuals differ in the allocation principles that influence relevant outcomes. Thus, it was necessary to operationalize several principles of allocation. Two basic principles were considered; these are equity and outcome maximization. Allocation principles were measured through three sets of items.] Each set of items included one section asking employees how much various organizational constituents SHOULD benefit from meeting commitments and one section asking employees how much various organi zational constituents DO benefit from meeting commitments. There was one set of items for meeting commitments to customers, one set of items for meeting commitments to financial investors/owners, and one set of items for meeting commitments to employees- As this re- i search was primarily concerned with the perceived exchange relation- | ship between the organization and the individual employee, only the j third set of items (meeting commitments to employees) was considered. i I Thus, the items under consideration asked employees to first consider "Who BENEFITS if we meet our company’s COMMITMENTS to its I employees?" The constituents considered were: (1) our customers, (2) financial investors/owners, (3) employees, (4) myself, (5) management, I (6) union (if applicable). These constituents were rated on level of benefit with a nine-point scale ranging from "Not at All" through 1 "Somewhat" to "To a Great Extent." Employees were then asked to con- ! sider "Who SHOULD BENEFIT if we meet our company’s COMMITMENTS to i I its employees?" The constituents considered and response format used I were identical to the question on actual benefit. | The measurement of these items allowed for the operationaliza- 1 tion of outcome maximization and equity. Outcome maximization was I I measured through the "Who BENEFITS" subitem of "myself." That is, | I individuals may see themselves as benefiting from "Not at All" _ . t ; through "To a Great Extent." Those employees who perceive that they are benefiting to a greater extent from meeting the organization’s I commitments are maximizing their own outcomes. Equity was computed as a function of the difference scores between "Who SHOULD BENEFIT" and "Who BENEFITS" items. Specifically, the difference between "should" and "benefit" scores for each organizational constituent (customers, financial investors/owners, employees, myself, management, 55 and union) was computed. As equity theorists hypothesize that both overreward and underreward are sources of distress for the individual, the absolute value of this score was taken to account for perceived i | inequity through both over and underbenefit. Equity was then defined j i l as the sum of all the individual equity scores. ! I I Although difference scores can be problematic, they have been ! used with good success in communication research investigating coori entation (Eisenberg, Monge, & Farace, 1984; Hatfield & Huseman, 1982). Coorientation and equity are similar in that they both involve a com parison of perceptions — in the case of equity, a comparison between deserving and outcome. Thus, difference scores seemed appropriate | I for the measurement of this concept. ] | Indirect Attitudinal Outcome: Commitment | One indirect outcome of participation channels, organizational ; i ; commitment, was considered in this study. Organizational .commitment , l i was measured with the Organizational Commitment Questionnaire (Mowday, Steers, & Porter, 1979). As Mowday, Steers, & Porter conceptualize I it, commitment can be seen as an integral part of the Scanlon culture. These theorists state that commitment involves "an active relation ship with the organization such that individuals are willing to give l i > something of themselves in order to contribute to the organization's well-being" (p. 226). j Mowday, Steers, & Porter (1979) conceptualized commitment in terms of three factors: (1) a belief in and acceptance of organiza- I tional goals and values, (2) a willingness to exert effort on behalf of the organization, and (3) a strong desire to maintain membership in the organization. In the OCQ, items were designed to tap these i three concepts. However, analyses performed to test the reliability j I and validity of the scale tested the scale for unidimensionality. \ i Mowday, Steers, and Porter state that the analyses "generally re sulted in a single factor solution and support the previously stated conclusion that the items are measuring a single common underlying I construct" (p. 232). Thus, it is reasonable to treat the OCQ as a ; l unidimensional measure of organizational commitment. Moderator Variables j The propositions developed in Chapter One suggested that indi- j viduals will differ on allocation and participation norms based on several cultural, situational, and developmental variables. Five moderator variables were considered in this study. Two of these con- , sidered organizational culture differences, one considered a develop mental explanation, and two considered situational differences. Two moderator variables were considered to investigate whether or not corporate culture influenced allocation, participation, and information seeking modes in an organization. Both of these varia bles deal directly with the Scanlon Plan, as companies with the : Scanlon Plan should develop a culture favoring equity norms rather than maximization norms. This difference was considered through (1) a comparison of Scanlon and nonScanlon (control) firms, and (2) a comparison of a long-time Scanlon firm (Company A) with a new Scanlon ( firm (Company G). One moderator variable was considered to investigate individual"] i I developmental processes influencing allocation, participation, and ! i ! i ( information seeking modes. Specifically, research suggests that indi-1 1 I viduals may "grow into" the norms of the organization as they learn , I about the culture. Thus, the tenure of the employee in Scanlon com panies was used as a moderator variable. It should be noted that this f research did not include panel data which would allow the assessment | I of the actual development of participation and allocation norms.over time. However, contrasting employees who have been with the organi- . zation for a long period of time with organizational newcomers seems j I a reasonable way of tapping this developmental hypothesis. This pro- I cedure is analogous to testing hypotheses about the development of I allocation norms in children by comparing children in different age j I I groups. i | Two moderator variables considered situational differences I j which could influence allocation, participation, and information ; seeking. The first situational variable considered was whether or i | not employees had responsibility for others in the organization — i J essentially this is a measure of location in the organizational I j hierarchy. The second situational variable considered whether or not employees had served as representatives on Scanlon committees. Analysis The investigation of differential modes of allocation and par-: ticipation involved two types of analysis. These are the evaluation of measurement models and the estimation and comparison of structural ; ^ 58 equation models. These two steps of analysis will be discussed separately. ! Measurement Models i ! I The measurement of participation, learning, and activities | i I (discussed above) included a variety of techniques individuals could ! use to participate in and identify with the organization. Some of these were NonScanlon techniques which could aid in learning about i | individual rewards and contributions; some of these were Scanlon j .1 i i techniques which could provide information about how all shareholders in the organization were being treated. i , j Confirmatory factor analysis was used to investigate the mea- I surement structure of these items. Specifically, this analysis was I ] used to confirm a structure in which Scanlon strategies of learning, participation, and activity loaded on factors separate from NonScanlon * strategies of learning, participation, and activity. Confirmatory i factor analysis was also used to confirm the factor structure of i other variables measured with multiple indicators, i.e., satisfaction with work and organizational commitment. i i J It could be argued that using confirmatory techniques on esta blished scales such as the JDI and OCQ is not advisable. If the confirmatory factor analysis indicates that certain items are not internally consistent with other items, the confirmatory technique 1 would advocate eliminating these items from the scale. Such scale reduction would limit the ability to compare the present research with previous research on satisfaction and commitment using the JDI 1 I i 59 and OCQ. Thus, the use of confirmatory techniques on the OCQ and JDI ! | i I can be seen as an attempt to use the highest quality scale possible, | j with the realization that some generalizability might be sacrificed. I : j It seems desirable for social scientists to constantly seek improved j j measurement techniques rather than resting on a few scales which have ! .. I ■ gained a reputation for quality and utility. j The measurement models were confirmed using the PACKAGE compu- j ter program (Hunter, Cohen, & Nicol, 1982). The confirmatory factor | I analysis subroutine of PACKAGE allows the researcher to specify an a priori factor structure. The program then provides a matrix of j correlations among cluster items, correlations between factors, and ! i factor loadings, using communalities in the diagonal. The unidimen sionality of the proposed factors can then be assessed using three { criteria proposed by Hunter (1977): homogeneity of item content, ! i internal consistency within clusters, and parallelism of items in a , I cluster with outside variables. If an item is found to be not inter- I I nally consistent or parallel, that item can be eliminated and the factor reassessed, again using the criteria of content, consistency, and parallelism. | Structural Equation Models f In Chapter One, Scanlon and NonScanlon models of participation and allocation were presented. These two path models were con-::. .- . . structed and analyzed using data from all Scanlon companies. Review of theory and research also suggested cultural, situa tional, and developmental variables which would predict the efficacy 60 of one of these models or the other. Most of the five variables dis cussed involved two groups of individuals (e.g., committee partici- 1 pants vs. noncommittee participants). Those that didn't (e.g., ; I the developmental explanation) could be easily divided into two j I groups (old employees vs. new employees). Thus, the Scanlon and , NonScanlon models fit to the data for all employees were fit to the data for the ten subgroups (two groups each for five variables). The data input to all path models were the correlations among factors identified in the confirmatory factor analysis discussed above. Path models were analyzed using the LISREL V computer program j i i (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1981). This program provides estimates of para meters in linear structural equations through the method of maximum likelihood. LISREL V also provides a chi-square goodness-of-fit test | i for models which are overidentified. The models fit in this study j are less than fully recursive, so they are overidentified and model j l fit statistics could be computed. ! l The models were evaluated in several ways. First, the models specified were compared to a null model of no relationship among the variables (Bentler & Bonnett, 1980). Significance for this goodness- of-f it test (chi square difference test) was set at alpha = .05. Second, the t-values for all model parameters were examined to evalu ate the significance of individual causal linkages. The critical ! value for these tests was also set at alpha = .05. Modification indices were also examined to identify portions of the model in which local improvements were possible. If modification indices suggested the possibility of adding links to improve the fit of the model, the conceptual reasonableness of those links was considered. < If the new links were consistent with theory and research on alloca- ! tion and participation, the model was revised and reevaluated. ! Finally, for each of the ten groups, the Scanlontand NonScanlon models were compared in terms of model residuals and chi square values to determine which model provided a better accounting for the variance j CHAPTER THREE: RESULTS I This chapter presents the results of research investigating the J issues of differential norms for participation and allocation that | i ! were discussed in the first two chapters. First, the frequencies of | data subgroups are presented. Second, results of confirmatory factor analyses investigating standard and original scales are considered. j This involves the presentation of results of analyses of internal con- ! sistency and factor parallelism. Third, the testing of the Scanlon \ and NonScanlon path models proposed in Chapter Two is considered and [ I model revisions presented. Finally, comparisons of the fit of these ^ I models for the ten subgroups under investigation are discussed. ! Preliminary Analyses i Preliminary analyses were performed to determine the number of employees from each company in the data sample and the number of em- I ployees per subgroup under investigation. "Scanlon Representatives" were defined as employees who were currently Scanlon representatives or who had been Scanlon representatives in the past. "Supervisors" J were defined as employees who had responsibility for others in the company. "Old employees" were defined as those who had been with the company for more than five years. This value was chosen in discus sions with company representatives as a time representing relatively complete socialization to the organization. The frequencies are pre- j I sented in Table One. This table also includes the average tenure for 1 i employees of Scanlon companies. Confirmatory Factor Analyses Confirmatory factor analyses were performed to determine if the ! [ proposed scales for measuring Scanlon and NonScanlon Learning, Parti cipation, and Activities were unidimensional. Factor analyses were ! I also performed on the standard scales used to measure job satisfac- j tion (the Job Descriptive Index; Smith, Kendall, & Hulin, 1969) and j organizational commitment (the Organizational Commitment Question-.> j . . l . I j naire; Mowday, Steers, & Porter, 1979). The confirmatory factor ana- ' lysis was performed using the Multiple Groups subroutine of PACKAGE i i | (Hunter, Nicol, & Cohen, 1982). The proposed factors were evaluated 1 i I 1 in terms of the three criteria set forth by Hunter (1977). These i three criteria are item content, internal consistency of factors, and parallelism of factors with outside variables. This discussion will ; ' I , deal first with the internal consistency of the standard scales (OCQ I and JDI) and then with the internal consistency of the original i I 1 l i Scanlon and NonScanlon scales. Because internally consistent factors . i are a necessary prerequisite to investigations of parallelism, the I I issue of parallelism will be considered last. i i I Internal consistency deviations are the difference between the actual inter-item correlations and the correlations predicted from the proposed factor structure (product of item factor loadings). ■ | With the sample of 1487 respondents used in these analyses, deviations 64 | SUBGROUP Number Average I of Tenure ! Employees (years) j Company A 417 7.71 i Company B 187 * Company C 82 4.72 Company D 44 7.34 Company E 66 3.95 t Company F 1 208 9.03 l Company G 571 10.01 Company H 53 * Company I 117 * Old Employees (More than 5 years) 913 New Employees (Less than 5 years) 532 Supervisors 357 NonSupervisors 1090 Scanlon Representatives 448 NonScanlon Representatives 973 * Interval level data not available for subgroup Table 1. Frequency Summary: Employees per subgroup and average tenure. I of less than .05 can be reasonably attributed to sampling error. | Larger deviations indicate possible problems with the proposed factor j i ! . structure. j Standard Scales: Internal Consistency j i j It was predicted that the"18. items of the satisfaction with work ! subscale of the Job Descriptive Index would load on one internally I l I consistent factor (JOBSAT). Table 2A presents the items and loadings | t | for this factor computed in confirmatory factor analysis. The devia- ' i tion matrix for Job Satisfaction is presented in Table 2B. The devi ation matrix shows a number of deviations larger than would be ex- . _ pected from sampling error. There are also a number of factor load- j * I ' ings which are relatively small (e.g., .07 to .32). Thus, it appears j t j that the Job Satisfaction factor structure Is not strong or unidimen- . ! 1 I sional. In an attempt to improve the factor, a series of analyses j ' i | were performed in which items were eliminated sequentially until the ! | deviations and factor loadings indicated a unidimensional factor [ structure. The final factor solution included nine of the original ! i 1 i 18 items from the work subscale of the Job Descriptive Index. The deviations and factor loadings for the final version of Job Satisfac tion are presented in Table 3. The standard score alpha for this \ i i factor was .76. It was expected that the 14 items of the Organizational Commit- | ment Questionnaire would load on one internally consistent factor (COMMIT). Table 4A presents items and factor loadings produced in confirmatory factor analysis. Table 4B presents the deviation matrix 66 Item Content Loading VAR49 Do the following words describe your work? Fascinatlong .52 VAR50 Routine (Reverse Coding) .47 VAR51 Satisfying .69 VAR52 Boring (Reverse Coding) . 66 VAR53 Good .53 VAR54 Creative .61 VAR55 Respected .55 VAR56 Hot (Reverse Coding) .24 VARS 7 Pleasant .57 VAR58 Useful .32 VAR59 Tiresome (Reverse Coding) .46 VAR6Q Healthful .33 VAR61 Challenging .61 VAR62 On your feet (Reverse Coding) .07 VAR63 Frustrating (Reverse Coding) .20 VAR64 Simple (Reverse Coding) .32 VAR65 Endless (Reverse Coding) .23 VAR66 Gives sense of accomplishment .66 Standard Score Alpha for factor = .82 I Table 2A. Items and factor loadings for Job Descriptive Index— Satisfaction with Work factor (JOBSAT). 67 ; O n Items_____________________ . ____________________________________________________ 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 49 -- 50 .15* -- 51 -.01 -.07* — 52 -.01 .08* .01 — 53 -.03 -.09* .09*-.02 — 54 -.14* .08*-.02 .00 .00 55 .01 -.04 .05 -.04 .02 .01 — 56 -.08*-.02 -.08*-.06*-.02--.07*-.08* — 57 -.03 -.11* .01 -.09* .04 -.08*-.02 .14* — 58 -.03 -.04 .02 .02 .06*-.01 .06* .00 .03 — 59 -.05 .02 -.05 .02 -.05 -.09*-.04 .08* .07*-.09* — 60 .04 -.04 -.01 -.03 .00 .03 .05 -.01 .10*-.02 .02 — 61 .08* .07* .04 .08*-.02 .12* .01 -.11*-.10* .03 -.10*-.02 — 62 -.02 .02 -.05 -.07*-.02 -.04 -.04 .22* .11*-.01 .12*-.05 -.13* — 63 -.09*-.07*-.02 -.04 -.01 -.10* .03 .13* .14*-.08* .19* .05 -.16* .06* — 64 .02 .18*-.03 .15*-.02 .09*-.02 -.03 -.15* .06*-.07*-.11* .19*-.01 -.22* — 65 -.09*-.05 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.05 -.02 .03 .02 -.06* .11* .04 -.08* .02 .23*-.08* — 66 -.02 -.06* .12*-.02 .07* .01 .08*-.09*-.07* .07*-.08*-.02 .08*-.08*-.01 .04 .00 — Table 2B. Deviations of observed from expected correlations (internal consistency) for JOBSAT. *deviations greater than expected from sampling error (p .05) Items 49 52 53 54 55 58 60 64 66 49 — 52 -.01 — 53 -.03 -.01 — 54 .11* -.02 -.03 — 55 .00 -.04 .01 -.03 — 58 -.05 .00 .04 -.05 .03 — 60 .05 .00 .01 .03 .06* -.02 64 .00 .13* -.04 .05 -.05 .03 -.11* — 66 -.05 -.02 .05 -.05 .05 .03 -.01 .00 — Standard Score Alpha for final version of JOBSAT = = .76 ^deviations greater than expected from sampling error, p . 05. Table 3. Deviations of observed from expected correlations (internal consistency) for final version of JOBSAT. Item Content Loading VAR67 I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected to help this company be successful. .53 VAR68 I talk up our company to my friends as a great company to work for. .83 VAR69 I feel very little loyalty to this company. (Reverse coding) .42 VAR70 I find that my values and this company's values are very similar. .68 VAR71 I am proud to tell others that I am a part of our company. .83 VAR72 I could just as well be working in a different company as long as the work was similar. (Reverse coding) .55 VAR73 This company really inspires the very best in me in the way of job performance. .70 VAR74 It would take very little change in my present circumstances to cause me to leave this company. (Reverse coding) .55 VAR75 I am extremely glad I chose this company to work for over others I was considering when I joined. .79 VAR76 There's not too much to be obtained by sticking with this company indefinitely. (Reverse coding) .67 VAR77 Often, I find it difficult to agree with this company's policies on important matters relating to its employees. (Reverse coding) .46 VAR78 I really care about the fate of this company. .58 VAR79 For me, this is the best of all possible companies to work for. .80 VAR80 Deciding to work for this company was a definite mistake on my part. (Reverse coding) .68 Standard Score Alpha for factor = .91 Table 4A. Items and factor loadings for Organizational Commitment Questionnaire factor (COMMIT). 70 Items 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 67 68 .14* — 69 -.06* -.04 -- 70 .08* .05 -.09* — 71 .09* .11* -.06* .06* — 72 -.09* -.09* .12* -.05 -.09* — 73 .06* .00 -.06* .12* .02 -.04 — 74 -.08* -.09* .12* -.08* -.09* .13* -.05 — 75 .03 .02 -.05 -.01 .03 -.03 .02 -.06* — 76 -.10* -.10* .09* -.07* -.07* .07* -.04 .10* -.02 — 77 -.11* -.04 .04 .07* -.06* .07* .04 .09* -.06* .10* — 78 .13* .03 -.03 -.01 .06* -.03 -.02 -.01 .04 -.04 -.11* — 79 .01 .02 -.06* .02 .02 -.01 .02 -.06* .07* -.02 -.01 .05 — 80 -.07* -.03 .12* -.06* -.03 .04 -.06* .08* .02 .07* .01 -.02 -.01 — ^deviations greater than expected from sampling error, p .05. Table 4B. Deviations of observed from expected correlations (internal consistency) for COMMIT. for Commitment. As with the Job Satisfaction factor, there are a | number of large deviations and several small factor loadings. Thus, a sequential elimination of items was used to reach the most parsimo- I j nious and internally consistent factor. The deviations for the final 1 version of Commitment are presented in Table 5. The standard score i alpha for this factor was .90. It should be noted that all nega^ . i i tively scored items in the Organizational Commitment Questionnaire I were eliminated by the final version of the factor. Original Scales: Internal Consistency j It was predicted that there would be separate Scanlon and Non- 1 Scanlon factors for items tapping the general concepts of Learning, l 1 Participation, and Activities. Thus, confirmatory factor analyses ! were performed which grouped the Items into the subscales of Scanlon I Learning (SCLEAEN), NonScanlon Learning (NSLEARN), Scanlon Participa- I tion (SCPART), NonScanlon Participation (NSPART), Scanlon Activities, I (SCACTV), and NonScanlon Activities (NSACTV). The item content and I factor loadings for these six scales are presented in Tables 6A I through 11A. The deviations of observed from predicted correlations i for these scales are presented in Tables 6B through 11B. I It is clear from Table 6B that the Scanlon Learn factor is in-: ternally consistent. Table 6A also indicates consistently high fac- I tor loadings for this factor, and an alpha of .83. Thus, this factor was accepted as hypothesized. Tables 9A and 9B also indicate that j i the two items In NonScanlon Participation form an acceptable factor with an alpha of .82. However, the other four factors are not as 72 Items 67 68 71 73 75 78 79 67 — 68 .05 71 .00 .04 — 73 .01 -.02 .00 — 75 -.04 -.02 -.01 .02 — 78 .06* -.03 .00 -.04. .00 — 79 i o O' * -.02 -.02 .03 .06* .01 Standard Score Alpha for final version of COMMIT = .90 ^deviations greater than expected from sampling error, p .05. Table 5. Deviations of observed from expected correlations (internal consistency) for final version of COMMIT. Item Content Loading How much do I LEARN about our company’s commitments to its customers, financial investors/owners, and employees from... VAR25 Elected Scanlon representatives? .74 VAR26 Scanlon meetings? .83 VAR27 Bonus performance report? . 66 VAR28 My work group? .76 Standard Score Alph for factor =.83 Table 6A. Items and factor loadings for Scanlon Learn factor (SCLEAJRN). Items 25 26 27 28 25 26 .01 — 27 CM 0 • 1 .02 — 28 .02 -.02 • o' o — All deviations smaller than expected from sampling error, p .05. Table 6B. Deviations of observed from expected correlations (internal consistency) for SCLEARN. 74 Item Content Loading How much do 1 LEARN about our company’s commitments to its customers, financial investors/owners, and employees from... VAR21 Other employees? .49 VAR22 Written reports and postings? .71 VAR23 My supervisor? .77 VAR24 Top management? .77 Standard Score Alpha for factor = .78 Table 7A. Items and factor loadings for NonScanlon Learn factor (NSLEARN). Items 21 22 23 24 21 — 22 .03 — 23 0 • 1 I « o — 24 -.05 .00 .04 — All deviations smaller than expected from sampling error, p .05. Table 7B. Deviations of observed from expected correlations (internal consistency) for NSLEARN. 75 Item Content Loading How much do I PARTICIPATE in using the following to SOLVE PROBLEMS in meeting our company's commitments to its customers, financial investors/owners, and employees? VAR29 Suggestion system? .58 VAR30 Work group meetings? .73 VAR31 Production committee meetings? .80 VAR32 Screening committee meetings? .81 Standard Score Alpha for factor = .82 Table 8A. Items and factor loadings for Scanlon Participation factor (SCPART). Items 29 30 31 32 29 — 30 .07* — 31 -.03 -.03 — 32 i • o -.03 .08* — *Deviations greater than expected from sampling error, p .05. Table 8B. Deviations of observed from expected correlations (internal consistency) for SCPART. 76 Item Content Loading How much do I PARTICIPATE in using the following to SOLVE PROBLEMS in meeting our company's commitments to its customers, financial investors/owners, and employees? VAR33 Other departments in the company? .73 VAR34 My supervisor? .73 Standard Score Alpha for factor = .82 Table 9A. Items and factor loadings for NonScanlon Participation factor (NSPART). Items 33 34 33 — 34 -.01 — Deviation less than expected from sampling error. p . 05. Table 9B. Deviations of observed from expected correlations (internal consistency) for NSPART. Item Content Loading To MEET our company's commitments to its customers, financial investors/owners, and employees, I: VAR38 Volunteer for election as a Scanlon representative .70 VAR40 Make suggestions to improve the Scanlon process itself .80 VAR41 Encourage people to get involved .75 VAR43 Attend Scanlon conferences .58 Standard Score Alpha for factor = .80 Table 10A. Items and factor loadings for Scanlon Activities factor (SCACTV). Items 38 40 41 42 38 — 40 -.05 — 41 .00 .05 — 43 .04 .01 -.05 — All deviations smaller than expected from sampling error, p .05. Table 10B. Deviations of observed from expected correlations (internal consistency) for SCACTV. Item Content Loading To MEET our company's commitments to its customers, financial investors/owners, and employees, I: VAR35 Make suggestions that I think will improve productivity .63 VAR36 Accept almost any type of job assignment if the work needs to be done .44 VAR37 Read monthly department and company performance reports .60 VAR39 Look for ways to improve how I do my job .64 VAR42 Participate in performance reviews with my supervisor .52 Standard Score Alpha for factor = .70 Table 11A. Items and factor loadings for NonScanlon Activities factor (NSACTV). Items 35 36 37 39 42 35 — 36 -.05 — 37 i • o • e - .05 _ _ 39 .05 .05 -.05 40 .04 -.04 .05 i 0 1 1 All deviations smaller than expected from sampling error, p .05. Table 11B. Deviations of observed from expected correlations (internal consistency) for NSACTV. 79 clearly acceptable. The NonScanlon .Learn factor (Tables 7A and 7B) ! ; ! ! has one Item with a comparatively low factor loading ("other employ ees" with a loading of .49 versus other items in the factor with I i I I | loadings of .71 to .77). The Scanlon Participation factor (Tables 8A and 8B) has several deviations which are greater than that expected j ; by sampling error. The Scanlon Activities factor (Tables 10A and 10B)j I ' ; has several deviations which are on the border of that expected from i i ! ! sampling error (.05), and the NonScanlon Activities factor (Tables ' 1 11A and 11B) has a number of somewhat high deviations (.04 and .05) ; and several items with low factor loadings (.44 and .52). Thus, an ! I effort was made to improve on these factors by deleting items. , i ! The Scanlon Activities factor was not significantly improved with! I the deletion of any items. Thus, this factor was accepted in spite ' | ' of some borderline deviations. However, a unidimensional structure ; I : for NonScanlon Learn was reached with the deletion of Item 21 ("Other < l i i . ' employees"), a unidimensional structure for Scanlon Participation was | reached with the deletion of Item 29 ("Suggestion system), and a uni- i \ ] dimensional structure for NonScanlon Activities was reached with the l deletion of Item 36 ("Accept almost any type of job assignments if the work needs to be done"). The internal consistency deviations and reliabilities for the final versions of these modified factors are presented in Tables 12A through 12C. There were high zero-order correlations between the Scanlon and NonScanlon subscales of each general concept. The correlation between Scanlon and NonScanlon Learn was .68, the correlation between Scanlon > Items 22 23 24 22 — 23 i .« o — 24 .00 .oo Standard Score Alpha for NSLEARN = .80 Table 12A. Deviations of observed from expected correlations (internal consistency) for final version of NSLEARN. Items 30 31 32 30 — 31 .00 — 32 o o • .02 Standard Score Alpha for SCPART .83 Table 12B. Deviations of observed from expected correlations (internal consistency) for final version of SCPART. Items 35 . 37 39 42 35 — 37 -.04 — 39 .05 -.01 — 42 o o • .05 -.04 Standard Score Alpha for NSACTV = .69 Table 12C. Deviations of observed from expected correlations (internal consistency) for final version of NSACTV. and NonScanlon Participation was .-67, and the correlation between ! | Scanlon and NonScanlon Activities was .68. Thus, confirmatory factor , i ! analyses were performed to determine if there was evidence for J f j general factors of learn, participation, and activities. The devia- i | tions for these analyses are presented in Tables 13, 14, and 15. Al- i though the alphas for these factors are relatively high, there are 1 I I j a great many deviations greater than that expected from sampling | ! error. Moreover, there is no consistent pattern of high deviations which would indicate that single items could be dropped to make the j factors internally consistent. Thus, the notion of general Learn, j Participation, and Activities factors was rejected, and the Scanlon and NonScanlon factors discussed earlier were accepted for further I i i j analysis. ; All Scales: Parallelism I ' The concept of parallelism suggests that all items within a fac- I i ! i ! tor should have homogeneous item to total correlations with outside , j factors. For example, if all the items in a given factor have the I , same item-total correlations with an outside factor, the items in the 1 i first factor are said to be parallel with respect to the outside fac tor. In practice, deviations from this model that are smaller than i | one would expect from sampling error alone reflect parallelism. For example, to test for parallelism between the Scanlon Learn ! factor and the other factors, the mean correlations between Scanlon i Learn items (Items 25, 26, 27, and 28) and each of the other factors were computed. Then, for each outside factor, the deviations 82 Items 21., 22... 23 24 25 26 27 28 21 22 .08* 23 .06* .02 — 24 .01 .04 .10* — 25 -.02 -.06* -.08* -.02 — 26 r • o 00 * -.05 -.05 -.06* .09* — 27. ■ K SO 0 • 1 .07* I • o 00 * -.04 .03 * .10 28 -.01 i o > . o * .04 i • o Ui * .06* .05 .03 Standard Score Alpha for combined LEARN factor = .87 * deviations greater than expected from sampling error, p .05. Table 13. Deviations of observed from expected correlations (internal consistency) for combined Scanlon and NonScanlon LEARN factors. 83 Items 29 30 31 32 33 34 29 — 30 .06* — 31 -.02 -.04 — 32 -.01 -.02 .11* — 33 -.05 -.05 .01 .01 — 34 .01 .06* -.07* -.10* .08* — Standard Score Alpha for combined PARTICIPATE factor = .85 * deviations greater than expected from sampling error, p .05. Table 14. Deviations of observed from expected correlations (internal consistency) for combined Scanlon and NonScanlon PARTICIPATE factors. Items 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 35 -r- H 36 .03 — 37 -.02 .13* — 38 -.05 -.06* .03 — 39 . 10* . 16* .02 I o 00 * — 40 .05 -.11* * 00 0 • 1 .03 -.03 — 41 .01 -.05 * -.06 .04 -.02 .09* — 42 -.03 -.01 .00 - . 0 2 :-.05 -.02 .02 — 43 l • o » * 00 o • 1 .00 .10* -.11* .06* -.02 I i ■ K O t - H • Standard Score Alpha for combined ACTIVITIES factor = .83 * deviations greater than expected, from sampling error, p .05. Table 15. Deviations of observed from expected correlations (internal consistency) for combined Scanlon and NonScanlon ACTIVITIES factors. 85 ! between the actual Scanlon Learn item-to-outside factor correlations j , I I and the mean Scanlon Learn item-to-outside factor correlation were I I ; computed. The parallelism deviations are presented in Tables 16A ! and 16B through 19A and 19B. Deviations that are smaller than .05 are within sampling error. i i I Table 17A shows that parallelism for the Scanlon Participation e , ; factor is excellent - — no deviations are larger than what would be j | expected from sampling error. The NonScanlon Participation and Non- 1 I I Scanlon Learn factors also show reasonably good parallelism. The I 1 parallelism for the other factors is not as strong. A number of devi-. ! ! 1 ations in these factors are larger than would be expected from sam- I ' I * j pling error. However, part of this can be explained through indivi- ; ■ dual factor loadings. For example, in the Scanlon Learn factor, item ^ i j 27 has correlations which are consistently lower than the mean item- ' to-outside factor correlations. However, this item is also the least reliable in the factor (communality of .44 as compared to .55, .68, | I I | and .58). In cases where problems of parallelism could not be attri- j buted to the reliability of individual items, an effort was made to ' I j improve the factor by deleting nonparallel items. However, no items I i 1 : could be deleted without negatively affecting the internal consis- ( ’ ' I tency or reliability of the factor. Thus, these factors were retained] without change for further stages of analysis. | I Preliminary Path Analysis The scales accepted from confirmatory factor analyses were used as input into a series of path analyses on the entire data and on 86 OUTSIDE FACTOR Mean Item-Factor Correlation Deviations (Actual - Mean) for Individual Items . . 25 26 27 28 NSLEARN .62 -.02 .02 .05 .05 SCPART .50 .01 .05 . 13* .09* NSPART .46 -.04 .02 .08* .12* SCACTV .32 -.02 .04 .07* .06* NSACTV .36 -.05 .01 .02 .04 JOBSAT .24 -.03 .04 .07* .06* COMMIT .33 * 00 o • 1 .01 .05 .01 Table 16A. Parallelism Deviations SCLEARN factor. i I OUTSIDE Mean Item-Factor Deviations (Actual - Mean) for FACTOR Correlation Individual Items 22 23 24 SCLEARN .63 -.02 .01 .02 SCPART .46 * -.10 .02 .08* NSPART .56 -.15* .13* .03 SCACTV .32 -.04 .01 .04 NSACTV .40 -.04 .04 .01 JOBSAT .32 -.08* .05 .02 COMMIT .38 -.01 .02 .02 * deviations greater than expected from sampling error. p .05. Table 16B. Parallelism Deviations NSLEARN factor. OUTSIDE FACTOR Mean Item-Factor Correlation Deviations (Actual - Mean) for ......Individual Items 30 .31 32 SCLEARN .53 I • o to .00 .02 NSLEARN .48 -.02 .01 .00 NSPART .67 .02 .01 -.02 SCACTV .57 -.05 .00 .04 NSACTV .50 .04 -.02 -.03 JOBSAT .31 .00 .01 -.01 COMMIT .30 .01 .01 -.02 All deviations less than expected from sampling error. p .05. Table 17A. Parallelism Deviations SCPART factor. OUTSIDE FACTOR Mean Item-Factor,,. Correlation Deviations (Actual - Mean) for Individual Items 33 34 SCLEARN .46 I • o .02 NSLEARN .54 -.03 .04 SCPART .63 .05 .05 SCACTV .42 .05 .06* NSACTV .50 -.04 .04 JOBSAT .38 .02 .02 COMMIT .30 -.04 .04 | * Deviations greater than expected from sampling error, p .05. Table 17B. Parallelism Deviations NSPART factor. i I 88 OUTSIDE FACTOR Mean Item-Factor Correlation Deviations (Actual - Mean) for Individual Items 38 40 41 43 SCLEARN .30 -.04 .01 .02 .03 NSLEAEN .30 -.07* -.01 .07* .01 SCPART .51 -.02 -.01 .04 ■-,01. NSPART .40 -.07* .00 .08* -.02 NSACTV .63 -.05 .08* .09* -.11* JOBSAT .28 -.07* -.02 .08* .01 COMMIT .24 -.08* .00 .14* -.06* * Deviations greater than expected from sampling error, p .05. Table 18A. Parallelism Deviations SCACTV factor. OUTSIDE Mean Item-Factor Deviations (Actual - Mean) for FACTOR Correlation Individual Items 35 37 39 42 SCLEARN .28 -.06* .07* .09* .09* NSLEARN .32 -.07* .08* .13* .12* SCPART .38 .00 .02 .12* .09* NSPART .38 .00 -.01 .12* .09* SCACTV .54 .05 -.04 .11* .08* JOBSAT .25 -.03 .01 -.09* .10* COMMIT .28 -.01 .01 .03 -.02 * Deviations greater than expected from sampling error, p .05. Table 18B. Parallelism Deviations NSACTV factor. OUTSIDE Mean Item-Factor FACTOR Correlation Deviations (Actual - Mean) for Individual Items . 49 52 .53.. 54 55 . 58 59 64 66 SCLEARN .17 .01 .02 -.01 .04 .06*-.07*-.02 -.11* .05 NSLEARN .22 .03 .04 -.04 .09* .07*-.11* .02 -.12* .04 SCPART .20 .04 .03 -.05 .07 .07*-.12*-.01 -.03 .03 NSPART .27 .05 .05 -.07* .10* .08*-.10*-.10*-.04 .02 SCACTV .20 .04 .03 -.02 .05 .03 -.06*-.02 -.05 .02 NSACTV .22 .05 .00 -.02 .07* .07*-.07*-.06*-.08* .02 COMMIT .25 .06* .03 .05 - -.01 .09*-.10*-.05 -.20* .10’ * Deviations greater than expected from sampling error, p .05. Table 19A. Parallelism Deviations JOBSAT factor. I OUTSIDE FACTOR Mean Item-Factor Correlation Deviations (Actual - Mean) Individual Items for i 67 68 71 73 75 78 79 SCLEARN i .33 -.06* .02 .01 .11* .00 -.09* .03 1 NSLEARN .38 I o * .03 .01 .12* -.02 * -.11 .02 SCPART .29 .00 .05 .02 .07* -.01 -.11* .00 NSPART .31 .01 .05 .03 .07* -.01 -.10* -.04 SCACTV .26 .05 .05 .01 -.01 -.04 I t o 00 * .00 NSACTV .35 .13* .05 .03 .00 -.05 -.08* -.05 * * -JOBSAT- - --... .36... -.. -.03 .05 .03 .08 .00 -.11 -.02 * Deviations greater than expected from sampling error, p .05. Table 19B. Parallelism Deviations COMMIT factor. 90 i data from employee subgroups. Because the data used in this inves- ^ 1 ' j tigation were collected over an eight or eighteen week time span (depending on the company), an analysis of variance was conducted to j check on the stability of the data over time. The analytical tech- i niques of path analysis and structural equation modelling make the ■ t : . . . . i I assumption of cross-sectional data (Hannan & Young, 1977). Thus, ; 1 ! ! a check on the stability of data collected over time was necessary | i ■ ; before these statistical techniques could be used. Separate stabi- | i lity checks were run for Company A and Company G because (1) these l companies were on slightly different time schedules than the others, * and (2) these companies represented analysis subgroups in and of j I themselves. The data for Companies B through F were collapsed for ■ 1 : stability analysis because the time frame of collection was identical I ( for the companies and no subgroup analyses were planned for the I I i separate companies. No stability analyses were necessary for Compa- I nies H and I, as data in these comparison companies were collected at : I 1 i one point in time. The results of the stability analyses are pre- | i ‘ sented in Tables 20 through 22. None of the F values are significant.j ' i J Thus, it seems clear that the data are stable over time. j ' I ; • i ; Correlations among variables of interest for path models were ’ ' j ! computed for all relevant subgroups: (1) All Scanlon, (2) NonScanlon ; Comparison Companies, (3) Old Employees, (4) New Employees, (5) Com pany A, (6) Company G, (7) Supervisors, (8) NonSupervisors, (9) Scan- j I I Ion Representatives, and (10) NonScanlon Representatives. The corre- ! lations were computed using the PEARSON CORR subroutine of SPSS (Nie, 91 SCLEAR] NSLEARl ' : SCPART NSPART SCACTV NSACTV JOBSAT COMMIT j | EQUITY I OUTMAX Week 1 23.2 18.0 13.9 10.2 21.6 26.4 26.9 53.5 0.8 8.8 Week 2 20.0 17.2 12.8 10.2 19.2 25.6 26.5 50.7 1.2 8.5 Week 3 22.2 17.6 12.7 11.0 17.4 26.0 27.0 54.0 1.1 8.4 Week 4 19.6 16.0 11.9 9.3 16.9 27.0 27.8 53.0 1.1 8.3 Week 5 21.9 14.6 12.9 9.9 15.0 25.6 27.3 51.5 1.2 8.4 Week 6 22.6 16.2 13.1 10.2 18.9 26.3 26.5 51.8 1.1 8.2 Week 7 19.2 15.4 10.4 8.8 15.7 27.0 27.6 53.9 1.8 8.7 Week 8 20.2 15.4 13.7 10.1 16.3 23.3 26.9 51.5 1.5 7.9 Week 9 20.0 15.6 14.8 11.1 23.0 27.2 27.4 51.8 1.5 8.0 Week 10 24.7 18.8 15.4 11.2 20.4 29.0 30.9 53.8 0.7 8.4 Week 11 21.0 15.8 12.5 9.4 17.6 24.4 26.5 54.2 1.0 8.7 Week 12 19.1 15.5 12.6 8.6 16.9 25.7 28.8 54.8 1.0 8.7 Week 13 19.8 16.05 10.74 8.38 16.42 24.8 24.8 50.8 2.5 7.9 Week 14 20.4 16.9 13.6 11.0 20.5 26.9 26.5 51.7 0.6 8.4 Week 15 22.1 17.5 14.7 11.3 19.2 26.2 28.6 55.0 0.9 8.4 Week 16 21.4 17.3 14.8 11.3 20.0 26.6 25.5 53.3 0.7 8.2 Week 17 21.7 16.6 13.8 11.4 19.2 26.7 24.6 50.6 1.1 8.1 Week 18 22.0 17.4 14.1 10.2 19.2 27.0 27.1 53.4 0.9 8.2 F = .86 .87 1.08 1.22 1.22 .85 .96 .64 1.21 .92 P = .62 .61 .37 .25 .25 .63 .51 .86 .25 .55 Table 20. Stability Analysis for Company A. H H > > H H <3 <d Pi Pi H H <3 M H w w < Q o C/D M c - 4 t - i Pm Pm < <3 PP § PD CJ CO a C/D a to O O O' C/D 5S co 13 ■ C/D 53 * " “ D U W H C3 O Week 1 17.9 13.9 9.8 9.1 19.6 26.4 26.0 53.3 1.4 8.4 Week 2 17.8 12.0 8.6 8.4 16.6 25.8 26.2 50.4 1.5 8.2 Week 3 20.3 13.6 12.0 9.3 21.4 27.2 24.4 50.1 1.0 7.9 Week 4 16.2 13.3 9.2 8.0 17.1 25.1 26.7 49.0 1.3 7.8 Week 5 19.7 13.7 13.8 9.5 18.6 26.7 29.6 50.0 1.4 3 8 . 1 Week 6 19.1 13.1 9.2 8.6 21.0 26.2 27.7 50.0 0.9 8.0 Week 7 21.9 15.8 10.6 8.6 20.0 26.6 27.1 52.0 1.3 8.3 Week 8 17.4 12.2 7.6 9.1 17.3 25.5 26.2 45.8 1.6 8.2 Week 9 16.7 13.5 10.3 8.2 17.0 25.2 27.5 47.5 1.4 7.7 Week 10 21.1 15.4 8.8 7.7 19.2 27.2 26.4 49.7 1.5 8.2 Week 11 18.0 13.6 8.9 7.3 18.8 26.1 27.6 48.1 1.0 7.8 Week 12 21.2 14.1 11.4 9.2 19.3 27.1 27.8 52.6 1.4 8.1 Week 13 22.6 14.5 9.1 9.6 15.0 26.2 26.9 51.1 0.8 8.6 Week 14 18.0 13.4 9.4 8.2 16.7 23.9 25.0 47.5 2.2 7.9 Week 15 19.2 13.5 10.0 8.9 18.4 27.3 24.9 48.0 1.2 7.9 Week 16 17.9 12.7 8.5 7.4 16.9 25.9 25.0 48.3 1.7 7.9 Week 17 21.4 15.4 10.4 9.8 19.4 26.4 26.6 51.8 0.9 8.0 Week 18 19.5 13.1 11.6 8.7 21.0 27.4 26.5 51.0 0.7 8.5 * 0 ^ I I I I 1.47 .10 1.03 .42 1.02 .26 .68 .83 .93 .54 .54 .93 1.45 .11 1.17 .28 .87 .60 .67 .83 Table 21. Stability Analysis for Company G. 93 I 1 ! i i i i i i i SCLEARN NSLEARN SCPART i 1 ■ 1 NSPART . SCACTV I NSACTV [ ; JOBSAT 1 COMMIT EQUITY OUTMAX 1 Week #1 22.2 17.0 15.5 10.2 21.1 26.7 28.3 51.5 1.7 8.1 Week i n 21.7 16.1 15.2 10.2 20.3 26.9 27.1 49.7 1.4 7.6 Week #3 19.5 15.2 11.2 9.2 16.7 25.0 26.5 46.6 1.6 7.8 Week #4 21.4 14.9 14.2 9.3 18.8 25.8 26.3 45.3 1.7 7.9 Week #5 20.3 15.4 14.1 10.4 21.3 26.8 28.1 47.6 1.6 7.4 Week #6 21.1 15.6 14.8 9.4 21.6 27.5 27.0 47.6 1.5 7.8 Week #7 20.2 15.2 13.5 9.7 20.2 25.0 27.9 47.4 1.4 7.6 Week #8 20.6 15.5 13.4 9.7 20.9 26.9 27.2 49.6 1.6 7.5 ' F = .68 .62 1.94 .66 1.75 1.58 .95 1.04 .28 .80 P = .69 .74 .06 .71 .10 .14 .47 .40 .96 .59 Table 22. Stability Analysis for Companies B, C» D, E, and F. 1 94 Hull, Jenkins, Steinbrenner, & Bent, 1975). These correlations were corrected for attenuation due to measurement error using the factor i reliabilities obtained in the confirmatory factor analysis on the entire data set discussed above. These correlations are presented . . i in Tables 23, 24, and 25A and 25B through 28A and 28B. ; I The Scanlon and NonScanlon path models proposed in Chapter One 1 I were first run on data from all Scanlon companies. This was done in order to maximize the fit of the models to the data before proceeding ! with subgroup analyses. Path models were run using the LISREL V com- ; puter program (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1981). Models were evaluted in | terms of (1) the fit of the model to the data, (2) the difference j between the proposed model and the null model of ho relationship, and j (3) the significance of individual links in the model. If the model j did not fit the data well, modification indices were examined to ! determine if the addition of theoretically consistent links could ' I significantly improve the fit of the model. Model fitting procedures I for the Scanlon and NonScanlon models will be discussed separately. | j Scanlon Model The hypothesized Scanlon Model, with path coefficients, standard f errors, squared multiple correlation coefficients, and chi square j values is presented in Figure 3. Although this model is signifi-a | I cantly better than the null model of no relationship (chi square dif- j ference of 2760.88 with 7 degrees of freedom), it is clear that this model is not a good fit to the data. The chi square for this model i I is 332.66, with 8 degrees of freedom. This value is significant, 95 ""1 I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1. SCLEARN — 2. SCACTV .465 — 3. JOBSAT .324 .400 — 4. EQUITY . 130 .106 .153 — 5. COMMIT .455 .340 .460 .233 — 6. SCPART .70 .726 .410 .104 . 393 — 7. NSLEARN — ; 8. NSACTV .581 — 9. JOBSAT .432 .433 — 10. OUTMAX .235 .248 .161 — 11. COMMIT .510 .452 . 463 .325 - 12. NSPART .800 .749 .556 .218 .417 — | Table 23. Correlation matrix used in LISREL path models. 1 Correlations corrected for attenuation. All Scanlon Companies (N = 1479) 1. SCLEARN — 2. SCACTV .370 — 3. JOBSAT .556 .392 — 4. EQUITY .081 .049 .189 — 5. COMMIT .218 .420 .650 .199 — 6. SCPART .602 .543 .320-.035 .361 — 7. NSLEARN — 8. NSACTV .623 — 9. JOBSAT .419 .619 — 10. OUTMAX .322 .402 . 280 — 11. COMMIT .410 .535 .650 .254 — 12. NSPART .8261.053 .396 .180 .374 Table 24. Correlation matrix used in LISREL path models. Correlations corrected for attenuation. SUBGROUP: NonScanlon Comparison Companies (N = 170) 10 11 12 1. SCLEARN 2. SCACTV 3. JOBSAT 4. EQUITY 5. COMMIT 6. SCPART 7. NSLEARN 8. NSACTV 9. JOBSAT 10. OUTMAX 11. COMMIT 12.. NSPART Table 25A. .480 — .377 .388 — .119 .099 .174 — .475 .360 .518 .208 — .739 .753 .465 .114 .444 .592 — .456 .464 .227 .246 .519 .505 , 154 — ,518 .256 — .858 .766 .607 .198 .450 — Correlation matrix used in LISREL path models. Correlations corrected for attenuation. SUBGROUP: Old Employees (N = 913) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1. SCLEARN — 2. SCACTV .425 — 1 3. JOBSAT .232 .418 — 4. EQUITY .174 .108 .134 — 5. COMMIT .425 .323 .420 .279 — 6. SCPART .613 .681 .315 .108 .331 — 7. NSLEARN — 8. NSACTV .572 — 9. JOBSAT .401 .404 --- 10. OUTMAX .247 .261 .159 — 11. COMMIT .500 .381 .420 .424 — 12. NSPART .727 .726 .508 .246 .376 — Table 25B. Correlation matrix used in LISREL path models. Correlations corrected for attenuation. SUBGROUP: New Employees (N = 532) 98 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 1. SCLEARN — 2. SCACTV .378 — 3. JOBSAT .278 .405 — 4. EQUITY . .140 .121 .082 — 5. COMMIT .489 .249 .381 .144 6. SCPART .718 .656 .316 .131 .451 — 7. NSLEARN — 8. NSACTV .601 — 9. JOBSAT .355 . 392 — 10. OUTMAX .228 .295 .137 — 11. COMMIT .444 .365 .381 .436 — 12. NSPART . 771 .762 .558 .194 .384 Table 26A. Correlation matrix used in LISREL path models. Correlations corrected for attenuation. SUBGROUP: Company A (N = 417) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 1. SCLEARN — 2. SCACTV .456 -- 3. JOBSAT .333 .321 — 4. EQUITY .136 .153 .216 — 5. COMMIT .435 .335 .487 .243 — 6. SCPART .578 .688 .453 .068 .262 — 7. NSLEARN — 8. NSACTV .542 9. JOBSAT . 477 .389 — 10. OUTMAX .188 .218 .180 — 11. COMMIT .471 .404 .487 .241 — 12. .700 .709 .545 .165 .309 Table 26B. Correlation matrix used in LISREL path models. Correlations corrected for attenuation. SUBGROUP: Company G (N = 571) 12 12 99 10 11 12 i 1. SCLEARN — 2. SCACTV .480 — 3. JOBSAT .322 .282 — 4. EQUITY .082 .111 . 108 — 5. COMMIT .443 .344 .529 .253 — 6. SCPART .731 .710 .339 .115 .407 — 7. NSLEARN — 8. NSACTV .622 — 9. JOBSAT .410 .410 — 10. OUTMAX .270 .229 .223 — 11. COMMIT .516. .457 .529 .246 — 12. NSPART .766 .775 .421 .223 .444 - Table 27A. Correlation matrix used in LISREL path models. Correlations, corrected for attenuation. SUBGROUP: Supervisors (N = 357) 10 11 12 1. SCLEARN 2. SCACTV 3. JOBSAT 4. EQUITY 5. COMMIT 6. SCPART 7. NSLEARN 8. NSACTV 9. JOBSAT 10. OUTMAX 11. COMMIT 12. NSPART . 434 — ,300 .339 — ,143 .076 .140 — ,443 .321 .442 .231 — ,670 .667 .337 .064 .365 — ,519 — .379 .344 — .220 .239 .133 — .491 .430 .442 .330 — .763 .653 .483 .199 .375 — Table 27B. Correlation matrix used in LISREL path models. Correlations corrected for attenuation. SUBGROUP: NonSuperviSors (N = 1090) 1. SCLEARN — 2 1 SCACTV .495 3. JOBSAT .261 .364 — 4. EQUITY .094 .078 .192 .— 5. COMMIT .507 .499 .562 .215 — 6. SCPART .717 .740 .343 .077 '.515 — 7. NSLEARN — 8. NSACTV .604 — 9. JOBSAT .456 .382 — 10. OUTMAX .300 .398 .186 — 11. COMMIT .551 .521 .562 .268 12. NSPART .784 .716 .515 .298 Table 28A. Correlation matrix used in LISREL path models. Correlations corrected for attenuation. SUBGROUP: Scanlon Representatives (N = 448) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1. SCLEARN 2. SCACTV .407 — 3. JOBSAT .329 .377 — 4. EQUITY .158 .124 .143 — 5. COMMIT .442 .302 .421 .251 — 6. SCPART .660 .630 . 382 .112 .356 - — 7. NSLEARN — 8. NSACTV .562 — 9. JOBSAT .413 .436 — 10. OUTMAX .203 .169 .119 — 11. COMMIT .497 .430 .421 .332 12. NSPART .792 .740 .566 .182 Table 28B. Correlation matrix used in LISREL path models. Correlations: corrected for attenuation. SUBGROUP: NonScanlon Representatives (N = 973) SCLEARN .700 (.017) .103 \ (.028) .139 _J15iL (.028) SCPART SCACTV * E Q U m — T o zo T ■> COMMIT .335 (.020). .410 .022) JOBSAT 2 R for dependent variables: SCLEARN: .490 chi square = 332.66 SCACTV: .527 df = 5 JOBSAT: .168 EQUITY: .020 all coefficients significant, COMMIT: .229 Figure 3. Hypothesized SCANLON MODEL with path coefficients and standard errors. ' and the chi square to degrees of freedom ratio is well over five (the i I value suggested by Wheaton, Muthen, Alwih, & Summers, 1977, for a I i good fitting model). Thus, modification indices were examined and links were added to the model in an attempt to improve its fit to I the data. I | Four links were added to the model. In sequence, the links 1 j added were: (1) from Scanlon Learn to Commitment, (2) from Scanlon ; Activities to Job Satisfaction, (3) from Job Satisfaction to Equity, i and (4) from Scanlon Learn to Scanlon Activities. The addition of I these four links seemed theoretically justifiable. The links from t ; Scanlon Learning to Scanlon Activities and from Scanlon Activities | to Job Satisfaction is justifiable through theory on the Scanlon pro cess itself. Frost, Wakely, and Ruh (1974) contend that cognitive j change (identification) is a necessary precursor to behavioral change I and that behavioral change is a necessary precursor to attitude change. These theorists also provide justification for the link | between Job Satisfaction and Equity. That is, these theorists con- i tend that there is a strong relationship between feeling good about i j your job and your place in the organization and perceiving that the i | organization is an equitable place to work. Finally, the link be tween Scanlon Learn and Commitment, indicating the development of commitment through knowledge, is supported both by theorists in the I area of organizational commitment (Mowday, Steers, & Porter, 1979) J and by Scanlon theorists. After these four links were added, an insignificant link from 103 1 Scanlon. Activities to Equity was. dropped from the model. The final j I ■ . . . I j model is presented in Figure 4. All of the path coefficients in this ; • model are significant, and, as with the hypothesized model, this | j model is a significantly better fit than the null. Additionally, i ! the chi square value for this model is quite low - — 17.35 with five j | ; | degrees of freedom. Although this value is still significant, the ; i ; ! chi square to degrees of freedom ratio is less than 5, indicating a : f good fit of the model to the data. 1 NonScanlon Model , ! The hypothesized NonScanlon Model, with path coefficients, stan- j I j dard errors, squared multiple correlation coefficients, and chi square; ; 1 i ! values is presented in Figure 5. Like the hypothesized Scanlon Model, ! the NonScanlon Model is significantly better than the null model (chi | I i j square difference of 3811.81 with ^even degrees of freedom). However, ' \ j j this model is also a poor fit to the data. The chi square value is ' 383.73 with eight degrees of freedom. This value is significant, and the chi square to degrees of freedom ratio is well over five. Thus, i I modification indices were examined in an effort to improve the fit i 1 of the model to the data* i i Three links were sequentially added to improve the fit of the j I t NonScanlon Model. The added links were: (1) from NonScanlon Learn to Commitment, (2) from NonScanlon Activities to Commitment, and (3) i I from NonScanlon Participation to Commitment. The links between Non- ] Scanlon Participation and Commitment and between NonScanlon Activities and Commitment can be justified through the work of Salancik (1977) SCLEARN .328 . 020) t.085 (.023) .700 (.017) .090 ,(•025) .785 .139 SCPART * SCACTV EQUITY ■> COMMIT (.023) (.020) .253 .216 (.031) .124 (.025) .031) JOBSAT o R for dependent variables: SCLEARN: .490 chi square = 17.35 SCACTV: .531 df = 5 JOBSAT: .190 EQUITY: .030 All coefficients significant, COMMIT: .330 Figure 4. Final Revised SCANLON MODEL with path coefficients and standard errors. 106 NSLEARN .800 (.014) .137 N (.029) .168 I . (.021) (.016) » NSACTV NSPART * OUTMAX * COMMIT (.029) .556 .422 {.020) JOBSAT o R for dependent variables: NSLEARN: .640 chi square = 383.73 NSACTV: .561 df = 8 JOBSAT: .309 OUTMAX: .075 All coefficients significant, COMMIT: .274 Figure 5. Hypothesized NONSCANLON MODEL with path coefficients and standard errors. • and Kiesler (1971). These theorists, propose that commitment is a function of binding behaviors.. These behaviors could well be the ' ties factors. The link between NonScanlon Learn and Commitment can be supported using the same reasoning as in the Scanlon Model. The final model is presented in Figure 6. All of the links in this model are significant * and the model is significantly better than the null model. Xn addition, the chi square is very low — 12.88 with five degrees of freedom. This value is insignificant at i I the .05 level, and the chi square to degrees of freedom ratio is less I than three. Thus, it appears that this model is a good fit to the the efficacy of the revised Scanlon and NonScanlon Models. These model confirmations are presented in Figures 7 and 8. Figure 7 indi- 1 data. Thus, confirmation is provided for the quality of the revised | model. Figure 8 indicates that the NonScanlon Model is not a good : . fit to the new data. The chi square value is significant and the i chi square to degrees of freedom ratio is greater than five. An exa- type measured in the NonScanlon Participation and NonScanlon Activi- i data Because this, research was part of a larger project investigating ! I the Scanlon Plan over time, additional data were available to confirm ; cates that the revised Scanlon Model is an excellent fit to the new ! mination of the modication indices suggested that the addition of I links between NonScanlon Learn and NonScanlon Activities and between NonScanlon Activities and Job Satisfaction would significantly improve the fit of the model. It should be noted that these links were 107 108 -.411 (.039) NSLEARN .487 031) .800 (.014) .137 ^ (.029) .168 .749 .175 NSPART » NSACTV OUTMAX » COMMIT (.016) (.029) (.019) .292 (.028) .556 .327 (.022) (. 020) JOBSAT R^ for dependent variables: NSLEARN: .640 chi square = 12.88 NSACTV: .561 df = 5 JOBSAT: .309 OUTMAX: .075 All coefficients significant, COMMIT: .418 Figure 6. Final Revised NONSCANLON Model with path coefficients and standard errors. SCLEARN .622* (.026) t —. 040 \(.035) 589* SCPART * SCACTV T7U357 237* (.038) JOBSAT 9 R for dependent variables: SCLEARN: .387 SCACTV: .319 JOBSAT: .133 EQUITY: .035 COMMIT: .137 Figure 7. Revised SCANLON MODEL Confirmation with new data. .264* (.032) chi square = 11.58 df - 5 * p < .05 NSLEARN .508* » NSACTV (.034) (.035) NSPART .368 (.031) JOBSAT R.2 for dependent variables: NSLEARN: .396 NSACTV: .258 JOBSAT: .135 OUTMAX: .044 COMMIT: .153 Figure 8. Revised NONSCANLON MODEL Confirmation with new data. .223 (.033) chi square = 99.20 df « 5 * p < .05 ! added in revisions to the hypothesized Scanlon Model. The confirma- i tion of the NonScanlon model on new data indicates that this causal I ! chain may well be appropriate for representing NonScanlon processes, i as well. i Subgroup Path Analysis i The Scanlon and NonScanlon models which were good fits to the j 1 | data for all Scanlon employees were then fit to the data for subgroups^ I . ; of interest. Specifically, the contrasts of interest were: (1) All ! Scanlon Companies versus NonScanlon Comparison Companies, (2) Old | Employees, versus New Employees, (3) Company A versus Company G, (4) | 1 Supervisors versus NonSupervisors, and (4) Scanlon Representatives I i versus NonScanlon Representatives. Based on cultural, developmental, \ i I and situational explanations, predictions were made in the first two [ j chapters as to which model (Scanlon or NonScanlon) would be a better i fit for each of these subgroups. Thus, correlations for each subgroup^ i were used in path analyses of th'e Scanlon and NonScanlon models. \ : j i Comparisons among these subgroup models can be made in two major ; ways. First, comparisons for each type of model, Scanlon and Non- ; i ' Scanlon, can be made for each subgroup. This comparison can be made I I both in terms of the overall fit of the models (was the Scanlon or I NonScanlon model a better fit to the data for each subgroup), and in terms of individual coefficients between similar variables in the Scanlon and NonScanlon models (i.e., comparison of the Scanlon Parti- j | cipation to Job Satisfaction link in the Scanlon Model and the Non Scanlon Participation to Job Satisfaction link in the NonScanlon I I ■ 111 I Model). The overall model and individual link comparisons for each : j subgroup are presented in Tables. 29A and 29B through 33A and 33B. ( A second valuable comparison is consideration of similarities j ; and differences in each model (Scanlon and NonScanlon) for "competing" I | subgroups (i.e., old employees and new employees). This comparison I could yield information about different patterns of relationships in I ! 1 | the same models for different subgroups of employees. These compari sons for the Scanlon models are presented in Figures 9 through 13. j These figures includerpath coefficients, standard errors, chi square ■ ! I I measures of overall fit, and squared multiple correlation coefficientsj for the dependent variables in each model. The comparisons for the ! NonScanlon models are presented in Figures 12 through 16. I ' j ! A brief verbal summary of important points of comparison for i ! each competing subgroup pair is presented next. In these summaries, j references are often made to "significantly" better model fits and | ! "significantly" different path coefficients. Model fit comparisons were made using the chi square difference statistic. It should be i I * \ noted that this statistic is not entirely appropriate for this test, as hierarchically ordered models are not involved. Rather, the com- I parison is between models with different variables. The chi square difference test does, however, provide the best currently available ' basis for comparison. Path coefficients were said to be "signifi- i cantly" different if the confidence intervals (.05 level) of the two ' coefficients did not overlap. [.. Overall Model Fit Comparison SCANLON MODEL: chi square = 12.88, df = 5 NONSCANLON MODEL: chi square = 17.35, df = 5 Individual Link Comparison Standard errors in parentheses, * p .05 SCANLON NONSCANLON MODEL MODEL Participation to Learn .700* (.017) .800* (.014) Participation to Activities .785* (.023) .749* (.016) Participation to Job Satisfaction .253* (.031) .556* (.020) Learn to Equity/Outmax .090* (.025) .137* (.029) Learn to Commitment .328* (.020) .487* (.031) Equity/Outmax to Commitment .139* (.020) .175* (.019) Job Satisfaction to Commitment .335* (.020) .327* (.022) i Table 29A. SCANLON COMPANIES Group Comparison ! Scanlon Model versus NonScanlon Model j Overall Model Fit Comparison SCANLON MODEL: chi square - NONSCANLON MODEL: chi square = 82.88, df = 5 79.52, df = 5 Individual Link Comparison Standard errors in parentheses : , * P -05 I SCANLON MODEL NONSCANLON MODEL Participation to Learn .602* (.062) .826* (.043) Participation to Activities .502* (.081) .716* (.054) Participation to Job Satisfaction .152 (.084) ' .396* (.071) Learn to Equity/Outmax -.035 (.077) .117 (.087) Learn to Commitment -.205* (.058) .152 (. 101) Equity/Outmax to Commitment .074 (.058) .004 (.062) Job Satisfaction to Commitment • .750* (.020) .502* (.062) Table 29B. NONSCANLON COMPARISON COMPANIES Group Comparison Scanlon Model versus NonScanlon Model 113 Overall Model Fit Comparison SCANLON MODEL: chi square = 9.61, df = 5 NONSCANLON MODEL: chi square = 75.46, df = 5 Individual Link Comparison Standard errors in parentheses, * p .05 SCANLON NONSCANLON MODEL MODEL Participation to Learn .739* (.022). .858* (.017) Participation to Activities .878* (.032) .766* (.021) Participation to Job Satisfaction .399* (.044) .607* (.026) Learn to Equity/Outmax .062 (.035) .125* (.042) Leatn to Commitment . 320* (.028) . 723* (.046) Equity/Outmax to Commitment .104* (-027) .067* (.024) Job Satisfaction to Commitment .379* (.0 2 8 ) ; .459* (.029) Table 30A. OLD EMPLOYEES Subgroup Comparison 1 Scanlon Model versus NonScanlon Model ; Overall Model Fit Comparison ' SCANLON MODEL: chi square =2.98, df = 5 i NONSCANLON MODEL: chi square = 8.47, df « 5 t . . . . . I Individual Link Comparison Standard errors in parentheses, * p .05 ] SCANLON NONSCANLON j MODEL MODEL Participation to Learn .613* (.034) .727* (.030) Participation to Activities .674* (.040) .726* (.030) Participation to Job Satisfaction .057 (.054) .508* (.037) Learn to Equity/Outmax .151* (.043) .145* (.049) Learn to Commitment .319* (.037) . 408* (.049) Equity/Outmax to Commitment .180* (.037) .303* (.035) Job Satisfaction to Commitment .322* (.037) .272*. (.039) Table 30B. NEW EMPLOYEES Subgroup Comparison Scanlon Model versus NonScanlon Model 114 Overall Model Fit Comparison SCANLON MODEL: chi square = NONSCANLON MODEL: chi square = 20.73, df = 5 17.72, df = 5 Individual Link Comparison Standard errors in parentheses» * P .05 SCANLON MODEL NONSCANLON MODEL Participation to Learn .718* C.Q34) . 771* (.031) Participation to Activities .794* (.052) .762* (.032) Participation to Job Satisfaction .088 (.059) .558* (.041) Learn to Equity/Outmax .127* (.050) .079 (.058) Learn to Commitment .407* (.042) .349* (.061) Equity/Outmax to Commitment .066 (.041) .329* (.041) Job Satisfaction to Commitment .263* (.042) . .270* (.047) Table 31A. COMPANY A Subgroup Comparison Scanlon Model versus NonScanlon Model Overall Model Fit Comparison SCANLON MODEL: chi square - 54.13, df = 5 NONSCANLON MODEL: chi square = 25.53, df = 5 Individual Link Comparison Standard errors in parentheses, * p .05 SCANLON NONSCANLON MODEL MODEL Participation to Learn .578* (.034) .700* (.030) Participation to Activities .637* (.037) .709* (.030) Participation to Job Satisfaction .441* (.051) .545* (.035) Learn to Equity/Outmax .072 (.042) .099 (.047) Learn to Commitment .298* (.036) .385* (.046) Equity/Outmax to Commitment .125* (.035) .098* (.034) Job Satisfaction to Commitment .361* (.036) : .387* (.039) Table 31B. COMPANY G Subgroup Comparison Scanlon Model versus NonScanlon Model 115 Overall Model Fit Comparison SCANLON MODEL: chi square = 10 NONSCANLON MODEL: chi square = 21 .96, df = 5 .69, df = 5 Individual Link Comparison Standard errors in parentheses, * p .05 SCANLON MODEL NONSCANLON MODEL Participation to Learn .731* (.036) .766* (.034) Participation to Activities .771* (.055) .775* (.034) Participation to Job Satisfaction .280* (.071) .421* (.048) Learn to Equity/Outmax .053 (.054) .208* (.063) Learn to Commitment .294* (.043) .324* (.064) Equity/Outmax to Commitment .184* (.042) .062 (.043) Job Satisfaction to Commitment .414* (.043) .354* (.045) Table 32A. SUPERVISORS Subgroup Comparison Scanlon Model versus NonScanlon Model i i l j Overall Model Fit Comparison SCANLON MODEL: chi square = 6.25, df = 5 NONSCANLON MODEL: chi square = 26.50, df = 5 Individual Link Comparison Standard errors in parentheses, * p .05 SCANLON NONSCANLON MODEL MODEL Participation to Learn .670* (.023) .763* (.020) . Participation to Activities .683* (.030) .653* (.023) Participation to Job Satisfaction .200* (.038) .483* (.027) Learn to Equity/Outmax .111* (.031) .131* (.034) Learn to Commitment .326* (.025) .194* (.024) Equity/Outmax to Commitment .139* (.025) .194* (.024) Job Satisfaction to Commitment .325* (.026) .315* (.027) ! Table 32B. NONSUPERVISORS Subgroup Comparison. Scanlon Model versus NonScanlon Model Overall Model Fit Comparison SCANLON MODEL: chi square = 25 NONSCANLON MODEL: chi square = 9 .94, df = 5 .80, df = 5 Individual Link Comparison Standard errors in parentheses, * p . 05 SCANLON MODEL NONSCANLON MODEL Participation to Learn .717* (.033) .784* (.029) Participation to Activities .793* (.046) .716* (.033) Participation to Job Satisfaction .156* (.065) .515* (.041) Learn to Equity/Outmax .047 (.048) .094 (.052) Learn to Commitment .328* (.036) .411* (.054) Equity/Outmax to Commitment .094* (.035) .032 (.037) Job Satisfaction to Commitment .444* (.036) .411* (.039) Table 33A. SCANLON REPRESENTATIVES Subgroup Comparison Scanlon Model versus NonScanlon Model I Overall Model Fit Comparison SCANLON MODEL: chi square = , NONSCANLON MODEL: chi square = Individual Link Comparison 1 Standard e r r o r s in parentheses, ; 19.23, df = 5 9.49, df = 5 * p .05 SCANLON NONSCANLON MODEL MODEL Participation to Learn .660* (.024) .792* (.020) Participation to Activities .640* (.033) .740* (.022) Participation to Job Satisfaction .240* (.037) .566* (.026) Learn to Equity/Outmax .124* (.033) .158* (.039) Learn to Commitment .321* (.028) .465* (.041) Equity/Outmax to Commitment . 158* (.027) .223* (.025) Job Satisfaction to Commitment .293* (.028) .291* (.030) Table 33B. NONSCANLON REPRESENTATIVES Subgroup Comparison Scanlon Model versus NonScanlon Model i SCANLON COMPANIES I SCLEARN I SCPART SCACTV EQUITY COMMIT JOB SAT R.2 for dependent variables: SCLEARN: .490 chi square = 17.35 SCACTV: .531 df = 5 JOBSAT: .190 EQUITY: .030 all coefficients COMMIT: .330 significant, p < .05 i NONSCANLON COMPARISON COMPANIES i -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SCLEARN 205* 602* 502* EQUITY * COMMIT * SCACTV JOBSAT R^ for dependent variables: SCLEARN: .362 chi square SCACTV: .298 df * 5 JOBSAT: .170 EQUITY: .041 * p < .05 COMMIT: .512 Figure 9. SCANLON MODEL Comparison Scanlon Companies versus NonScanlon Comparison Companies 118 i OLD EMPLOYEES .739* (.02 SCLEARN -.168 (.032) SCPART .878* > SCACTV (.032) 087 (.044) (.044) ,320* R.2 for dependent variables: JOBSAT EQUITY . . . • ■ 1 . Q 1 * - COMMIT SCLEARN: .546 chi square SCACTV: .580 df = 5 JOBSAT: .220 EQUITY: .033 * p < .05 COMMIT: .363 379* (.028) 9.61 NEW EMPLOYEES SCLEARN I f I 319* (.037) 613*, (.03; .012 \ (.040) 674* 180* SCPART * SCACTV EQUITY ■» COMMIT (.040) (.037) i .057 (.054) I I I I I I (.04 JOBSAT I for dependent variables: SCLEARN: .376 chi square SCACTV: .464 df = 5 JOBSAT: .176 EQUITY: .039 * p < .05 COMMIT: .315 Figure 10. SCANLON MODEL Comparison Old Employees versus New Employees 119 COMPANY A SCLEARN 407* .(.042) 794* + SCACTV EQUITY COMMIT .347* (.059) JOBSAT for dependent variables: SCLEARN: .516 chi square = 20.73 SCACTV: .448 df - 5 JOBSAT: .168 EQUITY: .021 * p < .05 COMMIT: .295 I i COMPANY G SCLEARN .088* (.037) * COMMIT * SCACTV EQUITY 441* ^ (.051) 192* 1 for dependent variables: SCLEARN: .334 chi square SCACTV: .478 df = 5 JOBSAT: .205 EQUITY: .049 * p < .05 COMMIT: .324 Figure 11. SCANLON MODEL Comparison Company A versus Company G 120 SUPERVISORS SCLEARN .731* (.03 SCPART 084 (.055) .771* > SCACTV (.055) .083 (.071) .280 (.071) r2 for dependent variables: ,294* .043) 053 (.054) JOBSAT EQUITY (.042) COMMIT 414* SCLEARN.: .534 chi square SCACTV: .507 df = 5 JOBSAT: .118 EQUITY: .013 * p < .05 COMMIT: .383 10.96 NONSUPERVISORS SCLEARN SCPART . .670* (.023 -.02 (.030) 111* .683* SCACTV EQUITY (.030) (.025) .206 (.038) 107* * COMMIT 200* (.038) R^ for dependent variables: •JOBSAT SCLEARN: .449 chi square SCACTV: .445 df = 5 JOBSAT: .137 EQUITY: .029 * p < .05 COMMIT: .308 Figure 12. SCANLON MODEL Comparison Supervisors versus NonSupervisors 121 SCANLON REPRESENTATIVES SOT .EARN .717* (.03 SCPART .156* (.065) R^ for dependent variables: JOBSAT .180*. (.04. EQUITY (.035) r444* (.036) COMMIT SCLEARN: .514 chi square SCACTV: .550 df = 5 JOBSAT: .144 EQUITY: .039 * p < .05 COMMIT: .459 NONSCANLON REPRESENTATIVES SCLEARN SCPART .660* (.024 -.016 (.033) .640* » SCACTV (.033) .226* (.037) .240* (.037) R for dependent variables: .321* .028) . 124* (.033) JOBSAT EQUITY (.027) - * ■ COMMIT 102* (.033 293* (.028) SCLEARN: .436 chi square SCACTV; .397 df. = 5 JOBSAT: .177 EQUITY: .032 * p < .05 COMMIT: .293 Figure 13. SCANLON MODEL Comparison 122 ___ J ! SCANLON COMPANIES 411 (.039) NSLEARN 800 .13 (.014) ( NSPART TTTJTFT -» NSACTV .556 ( . 020) 175 OUTMAX » COMMIT 27 (.022) r2 for dependent variables: JOBSAT .29 (.028) NSLEARN: .640 chi square = 12.88 NSACTV: .561 df = 5 JOBSAT: .309 OUTMAX: .075 all coefficients COMMIT: .418 significant, p < .05 NONSCANLON COMPARISON COMPANIES .088 .119) NSLEARN .826* (.043) .117 (.087) .152 ! NSPART .716* ( . 0 5 4 ) NSACTV - .329* (.087) ' .396*' (.071) .191 (.084) OUTMAX' — * COMMIT (.062) 502* (.062) r2 for dependent variables: JOBSAT NSLEARN: .682 NSACTV: .513 chi square JOBSAT: .157 df = 5 OUTMAX: .168 COMMIT: .411 * p < .05 = 79.51 Figure 14. NONSCANLON MODEL Comparison Scanlon Companies versus NonScanlon Comparison Companies 123 OLD EMPLOYEES -.836 -NSLEARN f58 (.017) NSPART .766 (.021) -♦NSACTV .607 (.026) r2 for dependent variables: JOBSAT ,056) ♦ COMMIT (.042) > OUTMAX (.042) (.024) .48 (.037) .459 (.029) NSLEARN: .736 chi square = 75.46 NSACTV: .587 df = = 5 JOBSAT: .368 OUTMAX: .073 all coefficients COMMIT: .540 significant, p < .05 NEW EMPLOYEES NSPART .726 -NSLEARN < 1 2 7 (.030) (.030) NSACTV .508 (.037) r2 for dependent variables: JOBSAT 218 (.063) * COMMIT .145 (.049) > OUTMAX (.049) (.035) .117 (.049) .272 (.039) NSLEARN: .529 chi square = 8.47 NSACTV: .527 df - 5 JOBSAT: .258 OUTMAX: .080 all coefficients COMMIT: .396 significant, p < Figure 15. NONSCANLON MODEL Comparison Old Employees versus New Employees 124 JOBSAT for dependent variables: NSLEARN: NSACTV: JOBSAT: OUTMAX: COMMIT: .594 .581 .311 .091 .373 chi square df = 5 * p < .05 = 17.72 ! COMPANY G -.411* (.060) i NSLEARN 385* .046) -<700* (.030) I I I 709* 162* * OUTMAX > COMMIT (.034) ^ NSPART * NSACTV (.030) (.047) .315* (.047) < 3 8 7 * (.039) JOBSAT I I for dependent variables: NSLEARN: .490 chi square NSACTV: .503 df = 5 JOBSAT: .297 OUTMAX: .053 * p < .05 COMMIT: .363 Figure 16. NONSCANLON MODEL Comparison Company A versus Company G SUPERVISORS -.104 (.083) NSLEARN '1766* (.034) .208 (.063) .775* »NSACTV * OUTMAX (.034) (.043) (.065) (.045) NSPART .421 (.048) R^ for dependent variables: JOBSAT COMMIT NSLEARN: .587 chi square NSACTV: .501 df = 5 JOBSAT: .177 OUTMAX: .078 * p < .05 COMMIT: .380 NONSUPERVISORS NSLEARN ..194 NSACTV >OUTMAX >COMMIT (.023) (.034) (.024) JOBSAT NSPART .483 (.027) R^ for dependent variables 315 (.027) NSLEARN: .582 chi square = 6.25 NSACTV: .426 df = 5 JOBSAT: .233 OUTMAX: .069 all coefficients COMMIT: .398 significant, p <_ .05 Figure 17. NONSCANLON MODEL Comparison Supervisors versus NonSupervisors SCANLON REPRESENTATIVES .339* (.068) NSPART NSLEARN 784* (.029) 716* (.033) .341* *■ NSACTV * OUTMAX (.052) (•037) .346* (.050) »COMMIT .515 (.041) *JOBSAT R^ for dependent variables: NSLEARN: .615 NSACTV: JOBSAT: OUTMAX: COMMIT: .513 .265 .162 .475 1* (.039) chi square = 9.80 df = 5 * p < .05 NONSCANLON -.379 REPRESENTATIVES NSLEARN .080 I NSPART (.022) NSACTV OUTMAX 2 2 2 . . - . - P COMMIT .556 (.026) JOBSAT R^ for dependent variables: NSLEARN: .627 chi square = 9.49 NSACTV: .548 df = 5 JOBSAT: .320 OUTMAX: .046 all coefficients COMMIT: .405 significant, p < Figure 18. NONSCANLON MODEL Comparison Scanlon Representatives versus NonScanlon Representatives 127 i Summary: Scanlon versus Comparison Companies j ' 1 Comparisons between all Scanlon companies and the comparison com-' j ! panies must be made with caution, as the model fit was maximized for 1 l 1 the "All Scanlon" data group and the maximal fit models were then i . . I ! used for other subgroup analysis. Thus, it would be expected that i ! both Scanlon and NonScanlon models: would fit better for Scanlon com- j i panies than for comparison companies. This is indeed the case. The 1 I Scanlon and comparison company chi squares for the Scanlon model are i | " j j 17.35 and 82.88, and the Scanlon and comparison company chi squares j j for the NonScanlon model are 12.88 and 79.51. Both models are good • fits for the Scanlon companies. Neither model is a good fit for the j * comparison companies. 1 ) The effect of Scanlon participation, learning, and activities on ! I i outcomes such as job satisfaction and commitment are consistently stronger for Scanlon companies than for the comparison companies. I Several of these differences are not significant, however, because of • | ( the large standard errors in the comparison company path model. One I striking difference in the Scanlon model, however, is in the Job j Satisfaction to Commitment link. Specifically, job satisfaction has i , a much stronger impact on commitment for the comparison companies | (.750) than for the Scanlon companies (.335). There are also several significant differences between these ; j groups in the NonScanlon model. Again, the Job Satisfaction to Com- j i mitment link is stronger for comparison companies (.502) than for Scanlon companies (.327). Second, the Outcome Maximization link is I 1 ! 128 | stronger for Scanlon companies. (.175) than for comparison companies j I i 1 (.004). Third, the NonScanlon Learn to Commitment link is stronger ; ! for Scanlon companies:(.487) than for comparison companies (.152). j i Finally, the link between NonScanlon Participation and Commitment is | I I strongly negative for Scanlon companies (-.411) and insignificant for | ; j j comparison companies (-.088). i , Summary: Old Employees versus New Employees For both old employees and new employees, the Scanlon model is a j I ; better overall fit to the data. This difference is striking for old j employees (chi square of 9.61 versus 75.46). For new employees, how- I i ever, both models were exceptional fits to the data (chi squares of | ! j 2.98 and 8.47). i j For the Scanlon model, five path coefficients are significantly 1 ! i different for new employees and old employees. Specifically, (1) the j : I Scanlon Participation to Scanlon Learn link is stronger for old em ployees (.739) than for new employees (.613); (2) the Scanlon Parti- i i 1 t cipation to Scanlon Activities link is stronger for old employees I i (.674) than for new employees (.399); (3) the Scanlon Participation to | I j Job Satisfaction link is stronger for old employees (.399) than for j 1 i j new employees (.057); (4) the Scanlon Learn to Scanlon Activities I link is slightly negative for old employees (^.168) and nonsignifi cant for new employees (.012), and (5) the Scanlon Activities to Job ; ; Satisfaction link is stronger for new employees (.379) than for old employees (.087). It should be noted that all of these links are in the "front end" 129 of the model; i.e., links which:are precursors to equity and commit- | 1 : ment. Also, the differences in the Scanlon Participation to Scanlon Activities link and the Scanlon Activities to Job Satisfaction link I (the strongest differences noted) suggest that there are different ; E • ' I 1 mechanisms in the determination of job satisfaction in the Scanlon I i j process for old and new employees. Specifically, it appears that ^ « l Scanlon participation channels have a direct impact on job satisfac- ■ tion for old employees. However, the effect of these channels (com- j I » mittees and work teams) is indirect for new employees, with the causal: I ........ ’ influence "routed through" the actual behaviors encouraged by these j j channels of participation. j For the NonScanlon model, six path coefficients are significantly ! different for new and old employees. Specifically, (1) the NonScanlon^ I • | 1 Participation to NonScanlon Learn link is stronger for old employees ! i I (.858) than for new employees (.7 27); (2) the NonScanlon Participation' ! to Commitment link is negatively stronger for old employees (-.836) j ; I 1 than for new employees (-.218); (3) the NonScanlon Learn to Commitment! [ link is stronger for old employees (.723) than for new employees j i | ' (.408); (4) the NonScanlon Activities to Commitment link is stronger | ; for old employees (.488) than for new employees (.272); and (6) the l ! Outcome Maximization to Commitment link is stronger for new employees i I ; j (.303) than for old employees (.067). It should be noted that all but one of these significantly dif ferent links are In the "back end" of the model, i.e., links that I .... - ' I include a direct path to commitment. Moreover, these contrasts i 130 ! suggest a different process in the formation of commitment for old i employees and new employees. Specifically, the commitment of old i employees: is directly affected by learning, activities, and job satis-. I faction., However, the commitment of new employees is more strongly ’ t i influenced by perceptions of outcome maximization within the organi- ! ( J j zation. j • Summary: Company A versus Company G { ' I For Company G, the NonScanlon model is a significantly better ' overall fit than the Scanlon model (chi squares of 25.53 versus . . 3 j - | 54.13) . For Company A, .there is no significant difference in fit for ! . . . * I the two models. Both the Scanlon and NonScanlon models fit the data i . for Company A reasonably well (chi squares of 17.72 for the NonScanlonj | model and 20.73 for the Scanlon Model). 1 " For the Scanlon model, four path coefficients are significantly ; different for Company A and Company G. Specifically, (1) the Scanlon ' Participation to Scanlon Learn link is stronger for Company A (.718) than for Company G (.578); (2) the Scanlon Participation to Job Satis-j i | j faction link is stronger for Company G (.441) than for Company A ! i : i (.088); (3) the Scanlon Learn to Scanlon Activities link is negative , j for Company A (-.192) and positive for Company G (.088); and (4) the | Scanlon Activities to Job Satisfaction link is stronger for Company A | (.347) than for Company G (.018). [ I I ! Like the. Old Employees/New Employees contrast, these links are [ all in the "front" portion of the Scanlon Model. Also like the Old ! Employees and New Employees, these contrasts suggest a distinction i between indirect.and direct determinants of job satisfaction for I ■ ; ! these two subgroups. Specifically, it appears that the participation . . . . I i channels have a direct impact on satisfaction for Company G employees,! j but an indirect impact (through specific activities) for Company A ! \ employees. J | For the NonScanlon model, two path coefficients are significantly- i ! i ! j different for Company A and Company G. Specifically, (1) the NonScan-j I I I Ion Activities to Commitment link is stronger for Company G (.315) than for Company A (.067) ; and (2) the Outcome Maximization to Commit-J ment link is stronger for Company A (.329) than for Company G (.098). j These differences suggest another distinction between direct and - j indirect paths for these subgroups. It appears that NonScanlon beha- j viors have a direct impact on commitment for Company G employees. ] j However, the impact of behaviors on commitment for Company A employees! is filtered through perceptions of outcome maximization. ' Summary: Supervisors versus KonSupervisors i j As predicted, the Scanlon model is a significantly better fit j I for supervisors than the NonScanlon model (chi squares of 10.96 ver- J i j '< sus 21.69). Also as predicted, the NonScanlon model is a signifi- S ; cantly better fit for nonsupervisors than the Scanlon model (chi I , squares of 6.25 versus 26.50). ! j No paths in the Scanlon model have significantly different coef- 1 i j ficients for supervisors and nonsupervisors. Only one path in the NonScanlon model has significantly different values for these two j ; subgroups. Specifically, Outcome Maximization has a greater impact on1 j Commitment for nonsupervisors (.194) than for supervisors :(.062). 1 - : j In sum, the patterft of relationships for both Scanlon and Non- j I ' Scanlon processes are essentially the same for supervisors and non- , ' supervisors. However, as predicted, the Scanlon system of relation- i ships is the better fit for supervisors, while the NonScanlon system j ! ! of relationships is the better fit for nonsupervisors. i j ■ :........................................ ! j Summary; Scanlon Reps versus NonScanlon Reps J For both Scanlon representatives and NonScanlon representatives, | the NonScanlon model is a significantly better fit to the data. The ! i | chi square for both NonScanlon models are excellent (9.8 and 9.49) , ! I . . . ; while the chi squares for both Scanlon models are marginally accepta- : ; ble (25.94 and 19.23). j ! ! I One path in the Scanlon model is significantly different for I ; Scanlon representatives and NonScanlon Representatives. Job Satis- > ' I faction has a greater impact on Commitment for Scanlon reps (.444) I j than for NonScanlon reps (.293). Two paths in the NonScanlon model ] J ! are significantly different for these subgroups. First, the effect of i i NonScanlon Activities on Outcome Maximization is stronger for Scanlon I j reps (.341) than for NonScanlon reps (.080). Second, the Outcome i : Maximization to Commitment link is stronger for NonScanlon reps ! (.223) than for Scanlon reps. To summarize, as hypothesized, the NonScanlon system of rela- i tions is a better fit for the data for NonScanlon representatives > j than the Scanlon model. However, not as hypothesized, the NonScanlon t I ! model is also a better fit for Scanlon representatives than the ] ! Scanlon model. Second, it appears that job satisfaction has a larger I I impact on commitment for Scanlon representatives than for NonScanlon | ; j representatives. Third, it appears that Scanlon representatives' 1 1 activities translate into a greater degree of reward than the activi- ; ! ties of NonScanlon representatives. However, this sense of reward (Outcome Maximization) translates into organizational commitment more strongly for NonScanlon representatives than for Scanlon represen tatives . 134 CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION i This chapter discusses the implications of analyses presented in | Chapter Three. First, implications of the confirmatory factor analy- > i I ses performed on original and established scales are considered. Se- j cond, the general Scanlon and NonScanlon path models fit to the data I are considered in terms of both differences between the hypothesized | l and final models and the strength of path coefficients. Next, the ! contrasts between these two models (Scanlon and NonScanlon) are dis- ! I ! cussed. Then, subgroup model comparisons are considered in terms of | - I their support for cultural, developmental, and situational determi- i nants of differential participation and allocation norms. Finally, ^ i ! limitations of this study and directions for future research are j ! discussed. | t I » , I ' Measurement Models ; The original items measuring participation channels, learning, ! . and activities formed six factors: (1A) Scanlon Participation, (IB) NonScanlon Participation, (2A) Scanlon Learning, (2B) NonScanlon | Learning, (3A) Scanlon Activities, and (3B) NonScanlon Activities. The Scanlon and NonScanlon factors were highly correlated (average . . . . . . i I correlation, r = .68), but, considering the internal consistency and ! I ! parallelism of the factors, they were clearly independent. This i ! i 135 finding lends, considerable credence to the notion that individuals use ! roup and Scanlon modes of participation, learning, and behaving in ■ different ways than they use individual modes. The measurement models for organizational commitment and job satisfaction were also interesting. The Organizational Commitment Questionnaire (Mowday, Steers, & Porter, 1979) has in recent years been considered a highly reliable and valid scale for the measurement of commitment. The current analysis suggests that when the factor structure is examined in depth for internal consistency and parallel ism (as opposed to a , simple, check of Cronbach's alpha for reliabi- | I I ! lity), the quality of this scale is not so obvious. It is possible ! that the complete scale was not as sound as predicted because of the i sample used. For example, all of the negative items in the OCQ were i ; subsequently d r o p p e d , indicating that respondents were not success- ! fully interpreting these items. However, this sample, a mix of white j and blue collar workers with educations typically above high school, is certainly not atypical of many used.in organizational research. Thus, it seems reasonable to suggest that more caution and careful j analysis be exercised in the use of this standard scale. A similar caution should be issued for the use of the Job Descriptive Index in the measurement of job satisfaction. As noted earlier, there has been recent debate about the quality of this scale. The analysis in this study provide evidence for the argument that the i work subscale of the JDI is not a strong unidimensional measure. How ever, it should be noted that this analysis did not find descriptive 136 and evaluative factors as previous investigations have (Smith, Smith, & Rollo, 1974). General Path Models Scanlon Model Two differences between the hypothesized Scanlon model and the final Scanlon model are striking. First, links were added between Scanlon Learning and Scanlon Activities and between Scanlon Activi ties and Job Satisfaction. The addition of these two links supports Scanlon Plan theorists' (e.g., Frost, Wakely, & Ruh, 1974) conten tions that the Scanlon Plan is a sequential process in which identi- i ! fication is necessary for participative behavior which is necessary I for attitudinal outcomes. However, it should be noted that the link ■ t between Scanlon Learning and Scanlon Activities is negative (though j l I small). Thus it appears that although the general effect of partici- j i 4 | pation on participative behavior is positive, the residual effects ! i [ of Scanlon learning about the organization on participative behaviors , I 1 1 is negative. I ! j The second striking difference between the proposed and accepted j ! I I ! Scanlon models is the addition of a direct link between Scanlon | i 1 ; Learning and Organization Commitment. This link is relatively strong j (.328). Thus, it appears that cognitions regarding the Scanlon Plan | are sufficient for developing commitment to the organization without : the strong intermediate effect of an allocation variable such as equity. It should be noted that the link between Equity and Commit ment is also significant, but much smaller than the link between 137 Learning and Commitment. i i i 1 NonScanlon Model , i j , The most interesting feature of the final version of the Non- < * I Scanlon path model is the multiple determinants of organizational • t I I commitment. Every variable in the model has a significant direct | impact on commitment. This involves the addition of three links to ^ i ! the hypothesized model. A link between NonScanlon Learning and Com- | i mitment was added (.487) and a link between NonScanlon Activities and Commitment was added (.292). As with the Scanlon model, above, the j addition of these two links indicates the importance of the direct | f | impact of behavior and cognitions on commitment, without the neces- j I sity of an intervening variable, though the link between outcome ! j | maximization and commitment is also significant... However, the most interesting additional variable influencing i . | commitment is NonScanlon Participation. This link is relatively j strong and negative (-.411), but the zero-order correlation between ! I these two variables is strong and positive (.417). Thus, this path ' I 1 i can be interpreted in the same way a partial correlation coefficient would in investigating spurious, suppressor, or interaction effects I (see Bagozzi, 1980; Kenny, 1979). That is, it appears that after the l ! | I , direct cognitive, behavioral, and attitudinal effects of participa tion have been removed, the variance remaining in the relationship between participation and commitment is strongly negative. Substan- ' tively, this suggests that if employees do not receive positive cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioral benefits from participative | channels, the use of these channels may well have a negative impact I i on commitment to the organization. i i Comparison of General Scanlon and NonScanlon Models In addition to the differences between hypothesized and final i I models discussed above, the general Scanlon and NonScanlon models can I be compared in terms of the value of path coefficients in both models. For example, the coefficient between participation and learning var- ; iables in the NonScanlon model (.800) is significantly larger than in the Scanlon model (.700). The difference in the learning to commit- J 1 I ment link is also significant, though again relatively small (.328 j in the Scanlon model versus .487 in the NonScanlon model). ! j The largest, and perhaps most interesting, contrast between | these two models is in the participation to job satisfaction link. j i i ( The link between Scanlon participation and job satisfaction has a | i i I i 1 • , coefficient of .253 while the NonScanlon participation to job satis- ■ faction link has a coefficient of .556. Thus, it appears that the ' I ; i ; NonScanlon channels of participation (other departments in the com- j , pany, my supervisor) had a much larger effect on satisfaction than | ! the Scanlon channels of participation (work group meetings, produc- ! I , i i tion committee meetings, screening committee meetings). This sug gests that a complicated, or even systematic, program of participa tion is probably not necessary for the improvement of employee atti- i ! tudes. The simpler activities of talking to the supervisor and other | j departments had a much stronger impact on satisfaction than the i complex system of committees set up by the Scanlon Plan. Thus, it 139 may well be more important for managers to develop an atmosphere in i i ! which a variety of modes of participation are encouraged rather than i a specific system of committees and activities for facilitating i | participation. Finally, one similarity between these two models should be noted ; In both models, the link between allocation perceptions (equity and j outcome maximization) and commitment is relatively small, though j significant. As mentioned earlier, this fact underlines the impor tance of direct impacts of cognitions, participative behavior, and I satisfaction on commitment, and de-emphasizes the importance of 1 | intervening allocation perceptions. This finding provides support I I j for Salancik's (1977) notion of commitment as a function of binding I behaviors. Salancik, building on work by Kiesler (1971) has sug- ! gested that organizational commitment is the function of binding and public behaviors within the organization. Eisenberg, Monge, and i 1 Miller (1984) found support for this position in their study of com- i munication network participation and organizational commitment. The i I direct impact of participation channels and behaviors on commitment provides further evidence for this model of organizational commitment j The small effects of allocation perceptions also have a bearing l j on the literature in distributive justice. In particular, this t j finding speaks to the debate regarding the role of justice and allo- cation in driving attitudes and social behavior. This research sup ports Leventhal's (1976, 1980) contention that distribution is not regularly considered in social interaction. Indeed, neither equity nor outcome maximization were strongly related to any other i * j variables in the model. I I | i Subgroup Comparisons j t Cultural Explanation: Scanlon vs. Comparison Companies i As expected, there was a strong difference between the path mo- j i i j dels for Scanlon companies and NonScanlon comparison companies. As ! ! mentioned earlier, these comparisons should be made with caution, as ; I fit on the Scanlon data was maximized. In spite of this caution, how-| ever, the differences between the two models are striking. These j differences can be analyzed in two ways: (1) the immediate effects of j i participation, and (2) the determinants of commitment. ! I The immediate effects of participation are consistently weaker ! ! for comparison companies than for Scanlon companies. This contrast < , I j is particularly marked for the Scanlon model and for the effect of participation on job satisfaction. This provides support for a ] "cultural" explanation of participation effects. This explanation ! ; i suggests that the Scanlon companies have developed a culture in which j i participation influences important individual outcomes. Schneider I i (1979) has used somewhat different terminology for this phenomenon, I j J discussion "subclimates" in organizations. The results of this sub- ' group comparison suggests that Scanlon companies have developed a "climate for participation.'.' | A second key difference between Scanlon and comparison companies : I can be seen in the determinants of organizational commitment. In l i 1 Scanlon companies, commitment is most strongly influenced by learning I and by allocation preferences. In the comparison companies, commit- j I ment was most strongly influenced by job satisfaction. This suggests that the Scanlon Plan (a systematic management plan including worker education) may lead employees to a rational development of organiza tional commitment, one based on cognitions about the organization and , a weighing of the inputs and outputs of various organizational con tributors. In contrast, the comparison company employees.develop organizational commitment affectively; they are committed to the organization if they like their jobs. This finding lends partial support to a cultural explanation of allocation norms. It was hypo thesized that Scanlon employees would value equity while comparison company employees would value outcome maximization. This is not the cases. Instead, Scanlon employees consider both equity and outcome maximization, while neither of these notions are important to com parison companies. Thus, it appears that Saanlon companies have a culture which values "allocation" rather than a culture that values "equity." Developmental Explanation: Old Employees versus New Employees The overall differences between the old employee and new em ployee models were not as expected. As hypothesized, the Scanlon model was a better fit for old employees than the NonScanlon model. ; This difference was substantial (chi squares of 75.46 and 9.61). How-j ! I i ever, the Scanlon model was also a better fit for new employees. The i i difference between the two models for new employees was quite small. In fact, both models were excellent fits to the data for new 142 i employees. Hence, the developmental explanation is given limited sup-' | port here. Old employees seem to have retained Scanlon norms much j J more successfully than NonScanlon norms, but there is no evidence ( that the acquisition of these norms takes long after joining the i organization. "Old employees" were defined, as those who had worked I ! with the company for longer than five years. It is possible that : i i | Scanlon norms develop much more quickly than five years. The support , i i ! given above to the cultural norms for allocation and participation in . f i j Scanlon companies suggests the possibility that Scanlon companies have^ I a "strong" culture in which socialization is accomplished in much I less than five years. | I I ; A post hoc analysis using two years with the company as a cutoff 1 ' i j between "old" and "new" employees was performed to test this idea. ; I The results of this analysis are presented in Figures 19 and 20. The * overall model results do not provide support for the "early social!- i 1 zation" hypothesis. In fact, the pattern of chi square statistics is ^ I quite similar to the groups with the five-year cutoff, though the | values of the chi squares are somewhat higher. However, it should be j I j I noted that the individual coefficients in both Scanlon and NonScanlon i J models are lower for new employees in the two year model than for new J employees in the five year model. This gives some support to the j developmental explanation of participation and allocation norms. To . ! examine more detailed differences between the hypothesized (five year)[ I old and new employee models, it is again helpful to consider the ! i immediate effects of participation and the determinants of commitment. 143 J OLD EMPLOYEES SCLEARN .601* (.025> EQUITY ■ ■ ■ < ^06*...> COMMIT * (.027) * . SCACTV .308* (.036) JOBSAT SCLEARN: .361 chi square = 25.90 SCACTV: .356 df = 5 JOBSAT: .166 EQUITY: .028 * p < .05 COMMIT: .295 f NEW EMPLOYEES SCLEAJRN 303* .500* (.0431 SCPART SCACTV EQUITY * COMMIT JOBSAT for dependent variables: SCLEARN: .250 chi square = 2.98 SCACTV: .320 df = 5 JOBSAT: .063 EQUITY: .017 * p < .05 COMMIT: .233 Figure 19. SCANLON MODEL Comparison (Post Hoc Analysis) Old Employees (More than 2 years) vs. New Employees 144 OLD EMPLOYEES NSLEARN .139* (.032) NSPART ulU*. (.027) .439* (.028) NSACTV __ (.032) , 158* (.030) * OUTMAX t H 2 * L ( ■310* (.029) COMMIT “JOBSAT • j R for dependent variables: NSLEARN: .386 chi square NSACTV: .262 df = 5 JOBSAT: .193 OUTMAX: .056 * p < .05 COMMIT: .298 NEW EMPLOYEES -.011 (.054) NSLEARN 355* 047) .498* 131* OUTMAX ^227*--^ COMMIT (.041) ^ * ^ NSPART (.043) (.049) .114* (.047) .305* (.047) JOBSAT for dependent variables; NSLEARN: .254 chi square NSACTV: .248 df = 5 JOBSAT: .093 O U T M A X : .049 * p < .05 COMMIT: .309 25.53- Figure 20. NONSCANLON MODEL Comparison (Post Hoc Analysis) Old Employees (More than 2 years) vs. New Employees 145 I The immediate effects of both Scanlon and NonScanlon participa- j i tion are consistenly stronger for old employees than for new em- . ; 1 : ployees. This provides support for a developmental explanation of ! participation effects. Perhaps a more interesting comparison here, ' i i though, is the consideration of direct and indirect effects of parti- j I j J cipation on job satisfaction for old and new employees. This com- j ) parison can be seen in the Scanlon Models for old and new employees. ; ! i j Specifically, for old employees, there is a direct impact of channels j of Scanlon participation on job satisfaction. However, for new ; | employees, this effect is indirect and routed through specific beha- I 1 viors, such as volunterring for election as a Scanlon representative, j ■ making suggestions to improve the Scanlon process, encouraging people | , to get involved, and attending Scanlon conferences. ' i " : ! This difference between direct and indirect effects of partici- 1 i t ; i pation for old and new employees suggests the existence of a develop- j I mental process somewhat akin to operant conditioning. That is, new j ! ! employees participate in the organization via various channels. The I i ) behaviors performed in these participative channels lead to the deve- I lopment of job satisfaction. However, it appears that over time the I specific behaviors are no longer a necessary intermediate step in the ; ! influence of job satisfaction. Instead, for employees with longer j tenure, participation in the channels alone leads to higher levels of satisfaction. Differences between new employees and old employees in the deter- i minants of commitment can be seen most clearly in the NonScanlon I j model, though the same pattern is somewhat evident in the Scanlon j ! model. For old employees, there is a strong, direct, and positive j . I j impact of learning and activity on commitment. For new employees, | the effect of these two variables is routed through outcome maximiza- ! ! i ! tion ("What do I, myself, get out of meeting our commitments to I I j employees"). Again, this supports a developmental notion in which | I many "typical" norms of American business (e.g., workers vs. manage- | \ j ment, every employee out for him/herself) are replaced by the norms of the Scanlon Plan, j Cultural Development Explanation: Company A versus Company G l I Differences between Company A and Company G were hypothesized i | 1 based on the idea that the Scanlon organizational culture would deve- j ! lop in organizations over time. Company A has had the Scanlon Plan J I j for over 20 years, while Company G began the Scanlon Plan less than ! . a year before this study was conducted. Thus, it was expected that J Company A would exhibit group and equity norms for participation and allocation, while Company G would exhibit individual and outcome maxi-j ! mizatlon norms for participation and allocation. ! I ' I ! As predicted, the NonScanlon model was a significantly better fit than the Scanlon Model for Company G. However, there was no dif- j ' ference between the fit of the Scanlon and NonScanlon model for Com- • i ; pany A. Both models were reasonably good fits to the data. These results give limited support to the notion of cultural development of participation and allocation norms. It appears that Company G had j I not yet fully developed the norms advocated by the Scanlon Plan. 147 However, Company A, after 20 years with the Scanlon Plan, apparently ; i retained both individual and group norms for participation and alio- i i cation. As with the other subgroups discussed above, further dif- , ferences in these models will be considered in terms of the immediate : | effects of participation and the determinants of organizational com mitment . In general, there were stronger immediate effects of participa- i I i tion for Company A than for Company G. Few of these differences are j l I significant, however. The largest exception to this is the path ; between Scanlon Participation and Job Satisfaction. This link is much stronger for Company G (.441) than for Company A (.089). There are three possible explanations for this. First, it is , possible that the channels of participation are still regarded as a j I novelty by employees in Company G and thus have a large impact on job satisfaction. For employees in Company A, these same channels are a normal part of organizational life and provide little increase in j i satisfaction. A second explanation for the differences in the Scan- ; Ion Participation to Job Satisfaction link is that the causal direc tion could be misspecified for Company G. That is, it seems possible j that in the initial stages of the Scanlon Plan, employees who are i I ! more satisfied with their work are more willing to participate in i | Scanlon Committee activities. Finally, the discrepancy in this link could be explained as a difference in direct and indirect paths from Scanlon participation to satisfaction in Company A and Company G. That is, it appears that the satisfaction of Company A employees is ! directly affected by Scanlon Participation, while satisfaction of Com-; I , pany B employees is affected by participation through specific beha- ■ viors. This situation was also noted in the path models for old em- * ! ployees and new employees. This comparison is puzzling, however, be- j I 1 cause Company A (the old Scanlon company) exhibits the same indirect , pattern of relationships as the new employees, while Company G (new i I Scanlon company) exhibits the same direct pattern of relationships as I i j ' the old employees. . In terms of the determinants of commitment, there was only one j » significant difference between Company A and Company G. This is the J ( | link between outcome maximization and commitment in the NonScanlon j I ! j model. This link was much stronger for Company A than for Company ! ! 1 G. Again, this supports the notion that Scanlon companies develop a ' ' | culture which values allocation (particularly outcome maximization in i | this case) rather than a culture which values equity. In fact, equity1 ; has a larger effect on commitment for Company G than for Company A. Though this difference is not significant, it could indicate that in i early stages of the Scanlon Plan, employees take the proposed equity norms of Scanlon to heart, but switch to outcome maximization norms as the Plan becomes less novel. ! Situational Explanation: Supervisors versus NonSupervisors i I j As predicted, the Scanlon model was a better fit for supervisors than the NonScanlon model. Also as predicted, the NonScanlon model I was a better fit for NonSupervisors than the Scanlon model. These I i findings support a situational explanation for the development of j participation and allocation norms. That is, it appears that super- I j i visors have more wholeheartedly adopted the norms of Scanlon, perhaps ’ t 1 i because they see a continuing career with the organization and want j ! to be a "team player." In contrast, nonsupervisors may see their ; ^ employment as strictly a "job" and simply want to concentrate on | maximizing individual outcomes. j | The immediate effects of participation on cognitive, affective, ! and behavioral outcomes were generally stronger for supervisors than I i for nonsupervisors. Again, this pattern supports a situational expla nation for differences in participation preferences. A variety of ( | ' theorists in the area of participation have suggested that participa- j ! ' j tion will be more effective for higher-level employees because of the 1 I j complexity of decisions involved in the job.(e.g, Vroom & Yetton, i I t 1973), and this research provides some support for this notion. How- j ! , I ; i ever, it should be noted that none of the individual link differences i [ ; in immediate effects of participation were significant, j Consideration of the determinants of commitment again reveals I no significant differences between supervisors and nonsupervisors. : : However, it is interesting to note that the effect of equity on com- j j j mitment was larger for supervisors than nonsupervisors and the effect i of outcome maximization on commitment was stronger for nonsupervisors 1 I ; ; than for supervisors. Though these differences were not significant, I this pattern again provides some support for a situational explana tion of allocation norms in which supervisors prefer equity norms I while nonsupervisors prefer outcome maximization norms. i I Situational Explanation: Representatives versus NonRepresentatives j I ; As predicted, the NonScanlon model was a better fit for nonre- | 1 presentatives than the Scanlon model. However, not as hypothesized, i ! the NonScanlon model was also a better fit for Scanlon representa- | tives. It should be noted, however, that the Scanlon models were not I particularly bad fits for either representatives or nonrepresenta- . / j { tives (chi squares of 25.94 and 19.23). Thus, given these overall ! I ! models, it doesn't appear that a situational explanation considering I the representative and nonrepresentative roles is useful in explain- i ing differential modes of participation and allocation. I I None of the links between participation and immediate effects of | I 1 I participation are significantly different for representatives and ■ nonrepresentatives. The pattern of relationships show generally | < stronger effects of Scanlon participation for representatives than for ! ’ * I . nonrepresentatives, and stronger effects of NonScanlon participation J | j I for nonrepresentatives. This trend should come as little surprise, ' I considering the criterion used to separate these subgroups. j In terms of determinants of commitment, there were only two sig- j nificant differences between representatives and nonrepresentatives. ; I 1 First, outcome maximization had a larger effect on commitment for non-| representatives than for representatives. This difference provides | i ; a small amount of support for this situational explanation of allo cation norms. However, the link between equity and commitment was also larger for nonrepresentatives than for representatives (though j i this difference is not significant). The second significant 151 difference in determinants of commitment is the link between job j j ! I satisfaction and commitment in the Scanlon Model. This link is i ■ larger for nonrepresentatives than for representatives. This provides' i ! j some support for the notion that nonrepresentatives develop commitment j to the organization in a more affective manner than representatives. However, the difference between these links is small, and the rest of 1 ; the model does not support this explanation. I Summary of Subgroup Comparisons This section will review the subgroup comparisons discussed j above and consider the general conclusions that can be reached about \ cultural, developmental, and situational explanations for differences , ’ I ' in participation and allocation preferences. ! ! j ; Cultural Explanation. Considerable support was given to the : j notion that there are cultural differences among organizations which | I contribute to difference preferences for allocation and participation.! Comparisons between Scanlon companies and NonScanlon companies indi- ] j cated that (1) the immediate effects of participation were stronger I for Scanlon companies than for NonScanlon companies, (2) the commit ment of Scanlon employees was developed rationally through knowledge of company and allocation norms within the company, while the commit- i ment of NonScanlon employees was developed affectively through satis- I faction with work, and (3) that Scanlon companies exhibited a culture which valued allocation not apparent in the comparison companies. | I This last finding may be particularly interesting (and perhaps dis- I heartening) to Scanlon theorists. The Scanlon Plan strongly advocates^ j the importance of equity among all contributors to the organization. , However, it appears that this emphasis leads employees to concentrate ! ' on allocation in general (outcome maximization and equity) rather 1 ■ than focus on the equitable rewards received by all contributors to i I the organization. Some support for a cultural-explanation was also j 1 ! ! given in the comparison between Company A and Company G. This com- I ] ] parison supported the notion of the over time development of partici- J l 1 i pation effects and a culture which values allocation. Developmental Explanation. A fair amount of support was given j I ! i for a developmental explanation of participation and allocation norms,; [ I f I though it appears that these norms may well be internalized in Scan- , 1 t • Ion employees in less than five years. Participation effects were ! 1 i | generally stronger for old employees than for new employees. It also , appears that the satisfaction of old employees is influenced directly j I I ! by participation channels while this effect is routed through specific J - . behaviors for new employees. There was also evidence of the dimi- ! I | nished importance of outcome maximization over time, which supports | a developmental explanation of allocation norms. I ( I Situational Explanation. A situational explanation of partici- i j ' pation and allocation norms considering supervisory and nonsupervi- , i j sory roles was supported by this study. This support was provided ! I | in (1) the overall fit of the model, (2) the pattern of participation | I | effects, and (3) the pattern of determinants of commitment. None of j the differences between supervisors and nonsupervisors were particu- > I larly large, however, There was little support given to a I situational explanation considering the participation of employees as i ! representatives in Scanlon committees. I j Limitations, and Directions - for ^Future Research I This study had a number of limitations, many of which suggest I ! ways in which this research could be improved or extended. This | ! ! i ! section will discuss the limitations of this study and propose fur- : ther ways in which the participation and allocation norms in organi- j i i zations could be fruitfully explored. i One clear way in which this research could be improved is in the j I measurement of several variables in the model. In particular, the ! I measurement of the learning and allocation variables could be greatly J ! ! improved. : l The typology of participation effects presented in Chapter One , proposed that the key cognitive effect of participation for the indi- , J 1 t j vidual employee was increased knowledge about the organization and : j j f j the individual's role in the organization. This study measured cog- ! ; nitive effects with a variable which considered a number of sources ! | for information and the degree to which these sources were used by the employees. Although the use of information sources may provide a rough approximation of knowledge gains through participation, a far ; stronger statement about cognitive effects could be made if actual ! knowledge gains of employees were measured. Such a measure could include both knowledge about the organization as a whole and knowledge about how the individual employee's job fits into the larger scheme ! i of things. 154 I ------- --------------- ■■ "” 1 Allocation norms (equity and outcome maximization) were measured ' | in this study with items asking how much various shareholders in the 1 organization benefit and should benefit from meeting organizational ! j commitments. Employees responded on a scale ranging from "not at \ | all" to "to a great extent." Equity was measured as the difference | between how much shareholders should benefit and how much they do J ' benefit. Although this scale is adequate for measuring allocation ! norms among employees, more sophisticated measurement techniques j 1 I t might well provide more valuable and accurate information. For exam- | I pie, magnitude estimation techniques might provide a more precise j measurement of perceived over-reward and under-reward in the organi- j J zation. Employees could be asked "If 100 is a fair share of reward < t j from this organization, how much reward are you receiving?',' Of | I i ' course, use of a scale like this would require the training of em ployees in the use of magnitude estimation scales. However, the 1 i j quality of information produced by these scales could well be worth I I 1 | the additional research effort. ] 1 | In addition to better measurement of variables included in this > model, our knowledge of participation and allocation norms could be nefit immensely through the extension of this model to other varia- l bles. In general, the inclusion of other variables considered in the j typology of participation effects considered in Chapter One would be | J useful. ; First, future research should consider indirect effects of par ticipation other than organizational commitment. In particular, the < I i i individual productivity of workers should be considered as an outcome j in this model. Considering the highly conflicting results of re- . ' i search linking participation and productivity (see Locke & Schweiger, J ; 1979; Miller & Monge, 1985), a detailed study investigating differen- ! tial norms of participation and their impact on productivity could | j be extremely valuable. ! Second, this research could be usefully extended to consider | ! ! j other immediate behavioral outcomes of participative channels, parti- ' j cularly communicative outcomes. Research on participation in deci- J ■ sion making has typically taken place in the fields of management, j organizational behavior, and industrial psychology. However, in the | ! I 1 field of communication, many researchers have been interested in the I notion of involvement in communication networks. It would be inter- i ! esting to investigate whether the availability of participation chan- ■ ! nels increases employee network participation. Beyond simple network j ! participation, further research could investigate the impact of parti-! ' i i I cipation channels on the occupancy of various network roles and parti- | cipation in different types of networks (i.e., production, mainte nance, and innovation networks). A second way to extend this ' i I research to more particular communication variables would be to con- ! sider the exact nature of the communication resulting from increased < ! J participation channels. Scanlon Plan theorists advocate the use of I these channels for innovation suggestions. It would be interesting to investigate the nature and quality of suggestions resulting from j j different types of participation channels. | Third, this research could be extended to consider other atti- • tudinal variables considered in the typology of participation effectsJ ' t i ; In particular, researchers could consider the degree to which the I I I models provided in this research aid in the explanation of resistance j to change and job involvement. j In addition to better measurement and extension to new variables,! ! 1 I this research could be usefully extended through a more detailed and ' I | intensive look at some of the relationships investigated. In parti- ! i cular, a useful investigation would be an in-depth look at the effect . of communication on the use of allocation norms. Researchers in the J i | i area of distributive justice have for many years investigated the:. j I ! influence of culture, personality, situation, and stage of develop- I . . . . I ment on allocation norms. However, none of these researchers have t I I j considered the social influence of communicative processes on the use 1 1 . I of equity, equality, needs, or outcome maximization norms. An in- j j I ' teresting laboratory investigation could provide individuals with an ! ! j : allocation situation and ask them to make an allocation decision. > I Then, these individuals could be placed in groups to discuss these allocation decisions and make a group decision about allocation. i I Analysis of the group interaction and the direction of allocation i | shifts could provide useful information about the role of social and j | communicative influence in the allocation process. i | Finally, future research should investigate the precise nature of the formation of participation and allocation norms over time. This research provided a great deal of support for the notions that j participation and allocation preferences are a function of time, both at the individual developmental level and the organizational culture | ■ level. However, this research could not assess the mechanisms through' i which allocation and participation norms changed over time. Such an j investigation could take a number of forms. First, a cross sectional j : study could consider an organization just adopting the Scanlon Plan j i i | I and follow it through the initial stages of the plan. The research i reported in this study attempted such an investigation in studying a i new Scanlon Company (Company G) weekly for a full year. However, the investigation did not begin until six months after the Scanlon Plan j i I had been instituted, and one year may not be a sufficient time period ! to document cultural changes in the organization. However, this re- i search is an important first step in considering changing allocation ! i i i and participation norms at the organizational level. At the indivi- i I dual level, it is necessary to follow the socialization of individuals' from their entry into the organization to document the ways in which | [ allocation and participation norms are acquired. This investigation l was not possible in the present research and anonymity requirements j precluded the possibility of identifying individual employees across i | j time. Perhaps the most comprehensive way to investigate the develop ment of individual norms over time would be through a series of in tensive interviews with employees or diaries kept by employees as I ! they move through the socialization process. 1 Summary This research considered two issues of importance to both | organizational scholars and practitioners: participation and alloca- I tion. The investigation of these concepts involved the intensive i [ study of a group of organizations using the Scanlon Plan, a managerial system involving formal and informal worker participation and bonuses i | for increases in productivity. This study investigated differential ! | norms for participation and allocation in these organizations, and ! I I i j considered several explanations for the formation of these norms. | i : Companies with the Scanlon Plan are attempting to develop a I strong organizational culture emphasizing identification, participa tion, and equity. This research suggests that Scanlon companies do ■ i indeed have a strong culture. It also appears that this culture is | I ' instilled relatively quickly in new employees and is most whole- i I i i heartedly internalized by supervisors in the organization. However, j 1 ■ ! the culture found in this research is not quite the culture that is i | ; ; idealized by Scanlon proponents. j I ! Scanlon theorists suggest that identification — knowledge about | r i | organizational shareholders — is an important first step in the : development of individual commitment and performance. This research j suggests that this emphasis on identification results in a definite t ! difference between employees in Scanlon and NonScanlon companies. | | Specifically, it appears that the attitudes of Scanlon employees are ! developed through a rational analysis of information about the firm I and allocation within the firm. NonScanlon employees develop commit- I I ment affectively through satisfaction with work. The second important component of the culture of Scanlon is } participation through both formal and informal channels. However, | contrary to Scanlon proponents, it is primarily the informal channels j of participation which influence satisfaction and commitment. More- i j over, individuals who participate in Scanlon committees are no more "in tune" to the organizational culture than nonparticipants. ! The third major focus of the "Scanlon Culture" is allocation. I I Scanlon practitioners try to develop a culture in which employees value equitable treatment of all shareholders in the organization. This research suggests that Scanlon employees do indeed value equity. However, they also value maximizing their own individual outcomes. I | In suni, it seems that the Scanlon culture is one which centers em- i ! ployees’ attention on general systems of allocation within the or- ; ganization. i I j The results of this study have both practical and theoretical i i implications. For the practitioner, these results suggest that a J formal system of participation and bonuses within an organization leads to desired attitudinal outcomes. However, these outcomes may | not be worth the cost. First, the informal channels of participation were generally as effective as the formal in engendering desired j affective, behavioral, and cognitive outcomes. Thus, the complex I system of committees may not be necessary for producing the outcomes f : that Scanlon managers hope for. Of course, it may be easier for organizations to institute a system of committees than to convince managers to use a generally more participative leadership style, j Second, the emphasis on equitable rewards to all shareholders has led 160 ' employees to a concentration on the reward structure in general. If ' 1 this preoccupation with allocation comes at the expense of other • ’ organizational activities, it could be counterproductive to both i employees and the organization as a whole. , Theoretically, this research highlights several important points | J which should be continually considered in work on participation and j ! ' ! allocation in organizations. First, it is clear that individuals i differ systematically on norms for participation and allocation. This; research suggests that these differential norms are a function of the ] | organizational culture, the socialization of the individual in the | organization, and the roles an individual plays within the organiza- ! i 1 tion. Second, this research points to the importance of distinguish- ; I ing between formal channels of participation and an informal parti- ' I cipative climate. Miller and Monge's (1985) meta-analysis of the ' i I i i participation research highlighted the importance of this distinction,] ; i j and the current research provides more evidence that a participative ; I ; climate is just as (or more) effective as formal committees in engen- I i ■ _ 1 dering positive cognitive, affective, and behavioral outcomes. Third, i i • ' this research points to the paramount role of time in organizational j I ! research, both at the organizational and Individual level. 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Creator Miller, Katherine Irene (author)

Core Title A system of participation and allocation preferences in organizations

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Communication Theory and Research

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,sociology, organizational

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Monge, Peter (committee chair), Clark, Peter (committee member), Fulk, Janet (committee member), Rice, Ronald (committee member), Riley, Patricia (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c17-707165

Unique identifier UC11343552

Identifier DP22395.pdf (filename),usctheses-c17-707165 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier DP22395.pdf

Dmrecord 707165

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Miller, Katherine Irene

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

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