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Religion and politics in Aristophanes' "Clouds"

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Religion and politics in Aristophanes' "Clouds"

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Content RELIGION AND POLITICS IN ARISTOPHANES' CLOUDS by Marie Constantine Marianetti A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Classics) August 1990 Copyright 1990 Marie Constantine Marianetti UMI Number: DP22298 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI DP22298 Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY PARK LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90089-4015 This dissertation, written by Marie_Const an t ine _ _ M aria net t i ......... under the direction of hzz. Dissertation Committee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by The Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of re quirements for the degree of CL ’90 M33Z DO CTO R OF PHILO SO PHY Dean of Graduate Studies D a te..... DISSERTATION COMMITTEE Chairperson ii 'Acpispcovco auTq Tq 8iaTpi|3q aTq pvqpq T °^ naTEpa pou Kcootovtivo ToXo, ttou rravTa p£ Ev0appuv£ <af ttioteue o ti prropco va icavco o ti 0eXgo, cTq pqTEpa pou ’EXEvq ToXou Kai o to v aSspcpo pou Ia|3|3a ToXo, y la oXq Touq Tqv aupTrapaoTaoq, aycm q <ai uTTopovq k o to Tqv SiapKEia tgov arrouSoov pou. ’Euiaqq Tqv acpiEpcovoo OTq 0eia pou BouXa Kupiatou rrou T HV ^PXllcn Tr)^ poq0£ia Bev 0a k'cprava ttote a ’ auTO t o otciBio Tqq KapiEpaq pou. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Jeffrey Henderson, who introduced me to Aristophanic charm and ambivalence. Equally, I am indebted to him for his help, interest, friendship, critical comments and intelligent suggestions from the very beginnining to the completion of the dissertation. I would like to express special gratitude to Professor William Thalmann for his patient and detailed readings of the drafts, his contribution in organization and improvement of style, and for his serious remarks about the overall approach of the study. I thank William Wehrle not only for his multiple and painstaking readings of the various drafts, but also for his patience, encouragement and help in formatting and editing the entire dissertation. I would like to thank the Department of Classics at the University of Southern California for all the financial support during the years of my trainining. I am indebted to Professor Moshe Lazar of Comparative Literature for his kindness, understanding, encouragement and assistance during difficult experiences such as oral exams. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction 1 II. Gods, Myths and Festivals: Tradition Versus Novelty 11 III. 0pOVTIOTr)piOV as MuaTppiov 65 IV. The Multifarious Clouds 121 V. The Maculate Socrates 172 VI. Bibliography 214 INTRODUCTION 1 Whereas the tragic poets present man as better than he actually is, as Aristotle says (Po.1448a16-18), the comic poets present him as worse than he is; comedy provides a relaxed vehicle for projecting popular stereotypes through caricature, exaggerated presentations of current events and sociopolitical affairs. Aristophanic comedy has been a valuable source of Athenian social history, and it is particularly revealing of popular customs and beliefs. Thus Aristophanic comedy has been explored extensively in an attempt to evaluate and understand Athenian man and his environment as opposed to the tragic idealization of man. Aristophanic comedy depicts man realistically, his vices, prejudices, anxieties, faults laid bare. Aristophanes' Clouds therefore has generated an immense amount of scholarly literature. But these attempts to evaluate the socio-historical, philosophical, political, and religious aspects of the Clouds have yielded discussions which conflict and make it even more difficult to understand the play's complications. Basically, this difficulty lies in diversity of approach. First, students of the Clouds attempt to evaluate the play in terms of a single artistic aim. There is a tendency to examine one particular subject as it relates to the rest of the 2 play which leads to a generalized conclusion on the basis of incomplete study. Research has generally concentrated on subjective examinations of isolated themes, such as that of Socrates' role, as the essence underlying the play, or the influence and growth of the sophistic movement as being the major target of the Clouds. In this instance I might mention that before I even started writing this project, a colleague asked me why I thought Aristophanes treated Socrates with such cruelty; this example, I think, indicates well certain one sided approaches to the study of the Clouds. Second, studies of the Clouds tend to focus solely on philosophical issues which make the play appear the concern of philosophers more than of classicists. Undoubtedly, philosophy plays a major part in the play, and to ignore its philosophical aspects precludes a complete understanding of the Clouds. But philosophical issues constitute only one part of the play, just as the sophistic art of speaking and the Socratic genius constitute other parts. Third, there are approaches which inquire into more isolated passages (like the initiation scene, for example, at Cl.250-263), or isolated themes (like the generational conflict between the father, Strepsiades, and the son, Pheidippides), and they treat these passages or themes as independent and 3 isolated, without connecting them to the overall plot of the play. Finally, there have been scholarly attempts to evaluate the Clouds on the basis of dramatic 'inconsistencies' and philological ambiguities, without attempting to find validity in the play's apparently contradictory aspects. In general, however, any more complete examination of the Clouds has been presented through a continuous argument, and this constitutes, I think, a major fault, especially when the Clouds itself displays an inherent (and deliberate) thematic disunity. There is, however, general consensus among critics that the Clouds is a difficult play to understand, especially since it involves many ambiguities, the nature of which make it even harder to assess. The Clouds is indeed ambiguous, multivalent, and even contradictory. Throughout my research I have not found a single point or passage which does not reveal contradictory aspects of similar significance. To mention but a few examples: while Socrates tells Strepsiades that the 9 povTioTqpiov does not credit any gods (ttoiouc; 0eou<; ope? ou; rrpcoTov y a p 0eoi/ qpTv vopiap’ ouk eoti. 247-8), a little later he tells Strepsiades that the Clouds are the only goddesses of the Thinkery (aOTai y a p toi povai slai 0£a(, -ra M a 8e to v t’ eoti cpXuapoq. 365), only to add Xaoq and rXooTTav at 424. Or, while the Cloud-chorus entices and encourages Strepsiades to 4 proceed with his plan in defrauding his creditors at 427ff., later in the play the chorus changes its role and the Clouds turn against Strepsiades' plan because of its immorality (at 14 5 4 ff). Nevertheless (and perhaps ironically), the Clouds' contradictory and apparently disjointed plot is what makes the play an intellectual masterpiece, and it is these contradictions that call especially for a study in which all aspects are examined together, considered concurrently in an overall, schematic approach, rather than in a narrowly focused, if continuous, argument. The Clouds is a play of social change, not merely a play about Socrates, or about the sophistic revolution, or even about the presocratic natural philosophers. Thus this is a play of many elements, aspects and themes, and a simple examination of one isolated subject does not contribute to a comprehensive understanding of it. Thus when dealing with change, it is quite impossible to base a discussion on an assumption of unity and continuous argument, since neither explicable continuity nor uniformity accompanies a society during a period of internal change. Rather, the basic characteristics of such a period might be found in the upsetting of cultural homeostasis in both the social and the individual spheres. And this is what the Clouds is about, and Aristophanes' contradictory plot, multiple reversals, and variety of transformational roles underline his intention to portray diverse forces opposed to one another in order to illustrate the changes that the Athenian state experienced and the impact that these changes had upon traditional citizens who still lived mindful of past glories. Social change does not occur overnight, since it is not caused by a single force; general resistance precludes sudden social innovation. Diverse factors can lead a culture through gradual and slow changes, such as diffusion (of populations, ideas, etc.), discovery and invention, acculturation, or through a more drastic change such as rebellion and revolt. Even commercialization in the world today can alter social institutions or people's ideological systems (Linton 1936:306- 40). Similarly, the Clouds of Aristophanes reflects the Athenian state of the mid-fifth century in the process of cultural change by the diverse themes which it explores and by the variety of subjects which it demonstrates. My study therefore is constructed around this concept of social change, and it follows a common approach in dealing with the major subthemes in the Clouds in order to examine comprehensively diverse features treated therein. To illustrate: First, during a period of change, new elements intruding upon a culture come into conflict with the pre-existing elements of tradition (those which have long been 6 an integral part of the society under change). Second, these new elements disrupt and confuse the population of the recipient culture for whom it is difficult to understand the validity of the new elements. Third, the conflicting results of the process of change usually appear in the form of disorganization of the culture, secularization and individualization (Geertz 1973:87- 125;142-69). Although such changes affect essentially all aspects of the society, their effect is most pronounced as concerns the ideological aspect of the society; and when it comes to the ancient Greeks, just as with the marginal or tribal societies today, this aspect involves religious patterns. Religion is an area in society with which people tend to identify themselves profoundly, and they resist ideas which differ from their own conceptions of the divine. Similarly, Aristophanes portrays in the Clouds social and religious effects in the city which were caused by the sophistic movement and the influence of natural philosophy. My study does not exhaust the topic of religion, but it examines some of the major components of the religious picture and it shows how Aristophanes depicts religious changes brought about by natural philosophy and sophistry. To prevent misunderstanding as to how I use the term change in the religious sphere, it is necessary to explain that I do not mean that the anthropomorphic, traditional conception of 7 the gods and the intellectual, empirical conception of the divine differed drastically from one another. But the new conceptions were based on different premises which traditional citizens could not clearly distinguish, understand, or accept, and therefore these religious aspects were for them tantamount to change. Furthermore, the religion of a cultural system cannot be completely segregated from the political domain. Although religion and politics in fifth century Athens were largely under separate jurisdictions, and religious claims were exceptional in political debates, it was still not improper for a politician to obtain a leading role in ritual, since it was not considered inappropriate for a religious functionary to play a political role. But minimum specialization in religious functions and the gradual separation of religion from politics may have led to the development of a more personalized religion (side by side with the public rituals of the polis). In fact, the growth of the mystery cults during the sixth century can be connected with the simultaneous refinement of the political institutions. The gradual separation of religion and politics during the fifth century implies that religion was considered a part of private life. In addition, any social group had its own rituals, and in cult it was represented by all social segments (such as the household, the village, the phratry, tribe, age, sex and even 8 occupation), to the degree that a man's association with a cult indicated his identity in the larger social domain. From the time of the Peloponnesian War, Athenian society became mobile, urbanized and fragmented; many private associations established their own cults. This resulted in an increased choice of cultic associations, and encouraged the tendency to consider religion a matter of individual rather than collective affiliation (Humphreys 1983:242-75). All these gradual changes are depicted by Aristophanes' Clouds, as they reached a culmination point in the second half of fifth-century Athens. This dissertation focuses on transitional stages of traditional values and beliefs. It analyzes the way in which the Clouds reveals the evolution of traditional Athenian beliefs and practices during a period which had unprecedented impact upon subsequent Western Culture. It examines the major factors which may have contributed to the abandonment of rooted religious customs by the Athenians, and it argues that Aristophanes, although writing in a comic vein, commented seriously on the viability of novel ideas introduced to Athens by the sophistic revolution and natural philosophy. I have divided my study into four chapters. Chapter One is a comparative study of the traditional values and beliefs of the Athenians, in particular the central opposition between the 9 anthropomorphic pantheon and a set of religious beliefs based substantially on skeptical or scientific speculation and the sophistic opposition between convention and nature. Chapter Two analyzes Socrates' OpovTioTqpiov as it relates to certain mystery cults (in particular the Orphic, Pythagorean, Bacchic, Korybantic, Eleusinian and that of Dionysus/Sabazius) as parodied by Aristophanes in an attempt to address the problem of the evolution of traditional ideas. It reveals that the novel ideas (atheism, scientific speculation and sophistic preoccupation with the art of speaking) dealt with in the OpovTioTqpiov are organized in a manner similar to that of the older and more traditional religious cults. Chapter Three examines the double role of the Cloud- chorus. It focuses on the Cloud-chorus' transitional and transformational position between traditional values and ethical norms and the novel concepts which invoke cunning, deceit and immorality. It analyzes the double role of the Cloud- chorus as it reflects upon current concepts which brought conflict and confusion to 'ordinary' citizens and reveals many aspects of binary opposition throughout the play. Chapter Four focuses on Aristophanes' composite portrayal of Socrates (natural philosopher, hierophant, sophist) and examines the reasons for this threefold portrayal. It reveals the Socratic persona as reflecting the diverse aspects 1 0 of novel ideals and further, Socrates as a notorious historical figure. My study explores all major themes of the Clouds separately in order to discover the one predominant theme which underlines the play; and this is the provocative (and largely rivalrous) co-existence between the traditional culture and the new ideas of skepticism and intellectualism which attempted to alter it. All four chapters, although focusing on one particular subject at a time, aim to shed light on the diverse forces that led mid-fifth century Athens to a state of socio-cultural transition. And this, I think, is a more comprehensive way to analyze the composite, and at the same time binary, nature of the Clouds itself. Thus the study brings together a variety of factors which in combination affected the established traditional universe of the Athenian society. It demonstrates that a diverse ideology regarding man and his environment confused the conventional ideas through which man and his universe were viewed. And it brings together this ideological diversity into the single heading of social transition or culture change. CHAPTER ONE GODS, MYTHS AND FESTIVALS: TRADITION VERSUS NOVELTY God is day night, winter summer, war peace, surfeit famine; but he is modified just as fire, when incense is added to it, takes its name from the particular scent of each different spice. Heraclitus (fr.67) Heraclitus, the Greek philosopher of the sixth century B.C., noted, in going daily to his favorite bathing place at a river, that people can never put their feet twice in the same water. Each time they return to water's edge, the current has flowed on. Change, he concluded, is a constant factor in a person's experience (Guthrie 1962:1:450;488-92). Culture too is ever changing. Since culture consists of learned patterns of behavior and belief, cultural traits can be "unlearned" and learned anew as human needs change. Thus no individual cultural pattern remains impervious to change, just as no specific item of learning is necessarily immortal (Ember & Ember 1977:424- 44). 1 2 In mid-fifth century Athens certain revolutionary views about man and his religious universe threatened to change the traditional anthropomorphic religion. Aristophanes stresses the significance of such a religious threat in the Clouds, in which he associates "through caricature, natural philosophy with sophistic argument" (Guthrie 1969:3:368). It is the purpose of this chapter to examine the diverse aspects of ancient Greek religion; its importance in the everyday life of the ancient Athenian; the challenges posed by the introduction and influence of philosophico-scientific and sophistic doctrines; and the ingenious Aristophanic travesty of the conflicting issues, as they are represented in the Clouds, as exemplifed by the conflict between Strepsiades (father) and Pheidippides (son) and situated within the interacting forces of tradition versus novelty, convention versus nature, morality versus rationalism, ^G0oq versus Xoyoq. According to Finley, who introduces the subject of Greek religion in his Legacy of Greece, "Greek piety, Greek religion,...appear to be a matter of rituals, festivals, processions, games, oracles, sacrifices-actions in sum-and of stories, myths, about concrete instances in the working of the deities, not of abstract dogmas" (1981:4). On the whole, Greek religion differed from Christianity and other religions of the modern world in that it had no revelation or centralization. 1 3 Greek religion was rather a relationship of one kind or another between the ordinary citizen and a multiplicity of gods without many distinctions between the sacred and the secular.1 A relationship of this kind reached its culmination in the adoration of the gods, fear of what they might cause to happen to mortals, and in the expression of friendly or hostile disposition toward them (Ehrenberg 1962:254-55). A vivid example of intimacy with the gods, and feelings of religious adoration is seen at C/.1478-82. Strepsiades talks to the statue of Hermes which stands in front of his house, and he implores the god to become his counselor in his decision about the cppovTioTfjpiov. Strepsiades is of course sorry about having listened to Socrates, as the Aristophanic plot evolves, but, nevertheless, the passage illustrates customary disposition of friendliness toward the gods: a X X ’ & cpiX’ 'E p p q , p q S a p a x ; Q u p a iv e p o i, p q 8 e p ’ ETTiTpfyqc;, a X X a o u y y v c b p q v eys e p o u T ra p a v o q a a v T O c ; a & o X e o x ip - < a i p o i y e v o u £C p(3ouXoc;, e r r ' a u T o u c ; y p a c p q v SicoKaSoo y p a y a p e v o e ;, e”0 ’ o t i a o i SoiceT. And yet Strepsiades does not hesitate to express contempt and disregard for the gods: he is misled by Socrates, but his negative disposition toward the gods is voluntary and exemplifies a customary, contradictory religious attitude. 1 Concepts/aetions covered by e.g., iEpoc, oaioc;, ayvo^, piaapa, which are related to the concept of pollution/purification, apply to distinct sacred/secular categories: cf. Parker 1983. 1 4 Strepsiades assures Socrates that he would be willing to withdraw all customary services from the gods (sacrifice, libations, incense, 425-6): I t. ou8’ av SiaXcxOdqv y ’ otexvcoq to? < ; aXXoiq ou8’ av anav T C O V , ou8’ av 0uaai(j’ ou8’ av ondaaijj’ ou8’ lni0dr|V XiPavwTov. Greek religion did not depend on a central core of dogmatic beliefs and worship incorporated in a sacred text and formalized priesthood (Gould 1986:7; Muir 1986:193). The gods of the myths were related to the Greeks in a "near, personal and alive" way (Ehrenberg 1962:255). The ordinary Greek religious term 'Beouq vopfoiv" designated all ways of acknowledging the gods: in sacrifice, prayer, libations, temple-building, gift- offering and homage in festivals and cults with an embellished body of rituals, and it did not mean only, or even primarily, belief in the gods (Gould 1986:7). In fact, as Cartledge writes, "religion...was above all the totality of [Greek] public festivals celebrated by each of the hundreds of political communities" (1986:98). The fifth century Athenian community from which we draw the best documentation of festive days was overall a peasant community depending largely "on subsistence farming, carried on with minimal agricultural technology" (Gould 1986:6). Even though it stood apart, indeed, from the rest of the Greek world as one of the most prosperous and advanced communities in the 1 5 political, social and literary realms, a conglomerate empire ready to conquer and expand, the ordinary citizen depended mostly upon his fields and animals for food and survival. No matter how prosperous and advanced a community might be, when technology is still in its basic stages, people, crops and animals can be threatened by disease, and seasonal devastations due to nature itself. In such a society, in which the farmer's year progresses toward anxiety and relief from sowing to harvest season after season, and forms "a pattern of endless recurrence" (Dodds 1973:146), the honoring of the gods can be a daily experience. "By festivals is meant the days set aside by the Athenian state for the worship of deities" (Parke 1977:13). It has been suggested that in fifth century Athens 120 to 144 days of the year were dedicated to festivals (Cartledge 1986:99). The chorus in Aristophanes' Clouds (299-313) provides a striking example of picturesque celebrations by the Athenian state: Xo. napOevoi opfJpocpopoi, e X Q w p e v A ir r a p a v y Q o v a lla A A a S o q , E u a v S p o v y a v K e K p o n o q o y o p e v a i n o X u q p a T O v oO a e p a q a p p q T C o v iepoov, Tva fju c rro S o K o q S o p o c ; ev teAetc<7<; a y la i< ; a v a S e iK V U T a r o u p a v to iq r e deoTq S w p q p a T a , v a o f 0 ’ uyepecpeTq kou a y a X p o iT a , kou n p o o o B o i p a K a p c o v le p w T a T a i EUO TEcpavol t e 0ecov 0 u o (a i 0 a A (a i t e r r a v T o S a n a T a iv w p a i< ;, r'jpl t ’ ETTEpyopEvcp B p o p fa X&pic; eukeA oS gov t e x ° P “ v £ p £ 0 io p a T a kou p o u a a p a p u 5 p o p o < ; auA obv. 1 6 The Greek festivals were similar in ideology to Greek religion as a whole in that the honoring of the gods did not exhibit "rigid distinctions between activities of religious or a wordly character" (Parke 1977:13). The sacred and the secular were counterparts of one another, so that ritual itself was not the only means of worshiping the gods; of equal import were the performance of athletic contests, play-acting in comedies and tragedies, and communal feasting. Thus the Athenian who cried or laughed during the theatrical performances at the city Dionysia, or the runner who competed at the Panathenaea, did not think of his involvement as an act separate from that of a religious ceremony, but as one that would provide especially keen delight for Dionysus or Athena. Since "Greek religion was very closely derived in much of its concerns to insure fertility of crops, or animals or man" (Parke 1977:25), the festivals were part of the Athenian calendar and were distributed throughout the year on specific days. The Athenian calendar was based on the changes of the moon. It consisted of twelve lunar months in which each month contained approximately thirty and twenty-nine days alternately, and which provided the standard framework for the annual festival celebration (Parke 1977:14-24). The Greek religious festivals were "moments of intense, total life" (Gernet 1933:46) aimed at gratifying "the need which 1 7 men feel to get together, to enjoy themselves, to feast, and to make merry, and likewise the need of interrupting and lighting up the monotonous course of daily life" (Nilsson 1940:101), insofar as they promoted the solidarity of the sociopolitical group. Similarly, myth cannot be viewed as forming an independent component within the ancient Greek religion. The traditional tales which were told and retold successively from generation to generation, the stories of the Homeric and Hesiodic gods, the heroic deeds told by the Lyric and Tragic poets, which best reveal the way the ordinary man viewed and explained the world around him, fall into the same pattern of combining the sacred and the secular. For most events (with the exception of the cosmogonic myth) in Greek mythology involve divine intervention in the world of human beings, and set up the prototype for certain human behavior (Kirk 1970:31-41). Strepsiades, for instance, associates himself with Athamas, the king of Boiotia, who was doomed to be sacrificed in order to expiate his cooperation in the plot against his children 256- 7):2 2 Athamas, ruler of Boiotia, was the father of Phrixus and Hele with Nephele. Ino, their stepmother, contrived to sacrifice Phrixus to Zeus with the excuse that the crops did not grow, but Nephele rescued her children by sending them to Colchis on the ram with the golden fleece. Herodotus (vii.197) reports that Athamas was about to be sacrificed in order to expiate his participation in Ino's plot against Phrixus, and Sophocles, in his play Athamas, presents Athamas standing in front of 1 8 I t . etti t i OTE9 avov; oVpoi, ItoKpctTEc;, oionEp |J£ t o v ’ABapavB’ ott< *> < ; pr) Qu o e t e . Besides, the Just Logic considers Heracles the model of bravery for ordinary mortals (1054) and Peleus the model of decency and virtue (1063;1067). Greek religion then, can be expressed mostly in the combination of myth, on the one hand, and ritual, on the other. "Ritual and myth...are both modes of religious response to experience in the world in which 'chaos,’ the threat posed by events which seem to be unintelligible or which outrage moral feelings, is always close" (Gould 1986:8-9). The cornerstone of the ritualistic attitude in ancient Greek religion is expressed in an offering of one kind or another to the gods, from its simplest form of libations, to incense- burning on the gods' altars, to its more complex form of animal sacrifice. Accordingly, Strepsiades includes sacrifice among typical religious behaviors (426). The animal sacrifice, of course, could be a very complicated approach to ritual. Its form depended upon the purpose of the particular festival and the identity of the god for whom it was performed, but its function and purpose were always the same: the sacrificed animal would provide "a shared meal, a communion" between the deity and the Zeus' altar ready to be sacrificed. Strepsiades' association with Athamas is connected perhaps with his association of the Clouds of the 9 povTiaTqpiov with Nephele. Athamas has renounced Nephele in the same sense that Strepsiades is ready to renounce the Olympian gods. 1 9 community, and pave the way for the expression of certain sentiments such as "love, hatred, anger, and anxiety" (Gould 1986:17). Illustrations of ritualistic behavior are not absent from the Clouds. At 984, it is pointed out that it was common for the worshipers to wear cicadas in their hair at the festival of Dipolieia, and to slaughter an ox, which was selected to be offered as a sacrificial victim.3 At 408, Strepsiades roasts sausages for his family at the festival of Diasia.4 At 386, the soup of Panathenaea provides an important ingredient for the communal meal. At 1198, the tasters (npoTtvQai) steal the best parts of the festal meal the day before the festival of 3 The festival of Zeus Polieus held on 14 Skirophorion (June-July). Its principal ceremony, the Bouphonia, involved the murder of an ox, which was related to the myth of the famous contest between Athena and Poseidon for the leadership of Athens. Athena promised Zeus that if he voted on her behalf the first sacrificial victim would be offered to his altar. During the actual ritual an ox was murdered, the murderer ran away, the instrument of death was ceremoniously examined, denounced guilty and thrown in the sea, while the ox was stuffed and yoked to a plough. Its main significance lies in its demarcation of the end of the harvest season (Burkert 1983:136-43; Parke 1977:162-7; Simon 1983:8- 12). 4 The festival of Zeus Meilichios, held on 23 Anthesterion (end of February). The Diasia was a great popular festival in which all the citizens took part. It was a holiday for whole burnt-offerings and an occasion for families to get together for a meal, socialize and present gifts to children (as it is mentioned by Strepsiades at 864 [Parke 1977:120-22; Simon 1983:12-15]). 20 Apaturia.5 At 988, the dance of the Panathenaea forms an important ritual in honor of Tritogeneia.6 The Athenians were obligated by custom to perform certain religious duties for the state, and as Mikalson suggests, the "religious life of the Athenian citizen...was largely structured by his membership in his polis, tribe, deme, phratry, genos and family," to such a degree that "Religion was a significant part of the identity and function of these and most other Athenian social and political groups" (1983:83). 5 The Apaturia was a festival of the phratriai and was based on the separate communities linked by birth. It was held in the month Pyanepsion (October-November) and lasted for three days, during which a different ceremony took place. The first day, the Dorpia, involved a common supper shared by the members of the brotherhood. The second day, the Anarrhysis, involved an animal sacrifice, and the Koureotis, the third day, involved the initiation of new members admitted to the phratry. Athenaeus (4.171 .c-e) says that the Tasters (upoTEvQai or TTpoyeuoTai) were officials who performed a religious ceremony of unknown nature. The day before the festival proper, they stole the choice parts of the festal meal. Thus Pheidippides compares the habitual activity of the Tasters with that of the magistrates (in explaining the old-and-new day idea to Strepsiades). ^This refers to the Pyrrhic dance performed during the festival of the Panathenaea. It involved naked dancers with a hoplite shield whose movements depicted scenes similar to those of fighting men (Parke 1977:36). Tritogeneia is an epithet of Athena, who is associated with water in addition to her connection with cities and citadels. Various scholarly assumptions connect Tritogeneia with the Heraclitan doctrine that light and water were cognate elements, as 'born from etherial water.' Some assert that the goddess sprung from the far western watery limits of the world; and others suppose that it indicates the name of the place where Athena was born. The scholiast on Apollonius Rhodius mentions three rivers called Triton: one in Thessaly, one in Boiotia and one in Libya, the latter being the place of Athena's birth. Tritogeneia is Athena's title in Aesch. Eum.292-3; Horn. II.4.515; and Arist. Knights 1189 (Farnell 189 6:l:267ff.). 21 Consequently, one might say that the overt side of Greek religion was co-extensive with the sociopolitical unit. Its covert side was "an open, not a closed system” (Gould 1986:8), however, since Greek religion did not specify any adherence to a codified dogma or systematic priesthood, and was characterized by the absence of stability and finality, in the same way that Greek mythology appears to be.7 The gods of the myths were not true or false gods, but universal powers which were thought to control the world of the Greeks and, as such could pave the way for other "new powers" (Gould 1986:8).8 All these were the traditional practices and beliefs at the time of Aristophanes' birth ca. 450 B.C. Aristophanes was destined to grow up during an eventful period of Greek history, and to witness both the success of the Athenian empire and the hardship and eventual defeat which Athens suffered in the long course of the Peloponnesian War. The Athenian conquest over Persia at Marathon in 490 B.C., at Salamis in 480 B.C., and the cooperative victory of Sparta 7 Certain myths appear to have come from different accounts with new names, new meanings, or with a reversal of old meanings. The myths of Helen and Orestes provide good examples. Helen was seduced to Troy, she was the reason of the Trojan War, she was the woman of many men; but in Egypt Helen was a virtuous and deceived wife. Orestes exemplifies filial duty to Telemachus in the Odyssey, and an example of moral dilemma in tragedy. 8 Such were the cults of Asclepius and Bendis, which were introduced into Athens toward the end of fifth century. (Farnell 1921:234-79; Parke 1 9 7 7 :6 3 -4 ;1 2 5 ;1 3 5 ;1 4 9 -5 2 ;1 6 8 ;1 7 8 ;1 8 6 ). and Athens at Plateaea in 479 B. C., gave birth, indeed, to an era of rapid expansion of political, economic, artistic and intellectual horizons. The Pentecontaetia (Thuc.1.89-118) was not only the interlude of peace and recuperation from devastating battles for the Athenians, but also a period of cultural prosperity: works of art and literature, a democratic goverment, and an idealistic perception of an open society (Muir 1986:191-2; Thuc.ll.35-46; Dodds 1973:1-13). The Delian League, with Athens at its head, included the majority of maritime cities from Attica to Ionia. The League's expansive plans and focus upon colonization and centralized goverment encouraged frequent traveling from place to place, and brought wide contact between different peoples and the diffusion of various thoughts and ideas that seem to have had a tremendous impact upon the traditional life of mid-fifth- century Athens. Certain exponents of presocratic philosophy and scientific speculation, on the one hand, who based their theories upon the "rational explanation of nature," and the sophists, on the other, who attempted to alter education and claimed to teach the individual the art of public speaking and persuasion, were viewed by the traditional citizen "as...a malicious undermining of all that was good and old especially of morality and religion" (Burkert 1985:307:311). 23 Furthermore, Athens' assumption of hegemony at Sparta's expense, the transfer of the League's treasury from Delos to Athens in 454 B.C., and the use of the League's funds for an elaborate building program in Athens itself, resulted in the subsequent rivalry between the two powers, which led to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C. (Sealey 1976:238-346). The disasters of the war, the two plagues that reduced the population, the gradual devastation of the Attic farms, and the behavior of certain political and military figures, whose interest focused more on individual competition than contribution to the collective well being, challenged also the traditional religion of the Athenian population. Evidently, as Muir suggests, "the standards which had fortified the troops at Marathon and made Athens glorious were no longer upheld" (1986:192). Moreover, the same remark is made by the Just Logic in the Clouds. Obviously, he complains about the abandonment of the customary practices which bred the generation of the Marathon fighters (985-89): Kp. a \ \ ' oOv T a u T ’ ecrriv ekeTvo e£ ’ a v B p a q M ap a 0c *> v o p a xa ^ ppr) rrouBEuaic; £0pEyEV. a u Be t o u < ; vOv e u 0 u< ; ev ip o m o ia i 5 i56 io k e i< ; e v t e t u M x Oo ii, coote p ’ a n a y x £ O 0 ' o T a v 6 p x £ ic j0 a i n a v a 0 r]v a (o i< ; S eo v a u T o u q Tqv aanfBa Tpq TrpoExwv o ^eXq t i< ; TpiToy£V£ip<;. The two plagues at the beginning of the war undoubtedly caused some loss of religious confidence. According to Thucydides' account (II.52.3), the gods that the Athenians had adored and 24 honored so lavishly kept taking away both pious and impious to the degree that the Athenians became careless of the sacred and the profane (unep|3ia£o(JEVou yap toG kokou oi av0p c*>T T o i, ouk eyovTeq oti yevoovTai, iq oXiyc*>p(av eTparrovTO <ai icpoov <ai ooiojv opofooc;). They started doubting the power of the gods and neither fear of the divine nor any human ordinances could restrain them (Qewv 6e 9 o|3o<; q avGpcbrrcov vopo<; ouSetc; aneTpye, 1 1 .5 3 .4 ). Consequently, both external (boundary expansion, foreign influences and contact) and internal factors (the devastation that the plagues brought and the loss of the war) affected the traditional attitude of the Athenians' customary beliefs and practices. Although doubt about the existence of the gods had been implied in literature as early as Homer (Oc/.24.351-5), and the transformation of impiety into reverence for the gods in the face of disaster is described in Aeschylus (Pers.497-99), it was the "conscious affront to religion, derision of the pious and their cult" that "found a theoretical background in the age of the sophists" (Burkert 1985:315) and in the systematic skepticism of rationalism and philosophy. In addition, since the advocates of the new frame of thought were foreigners, the traditional culture of the Athenians, their poetry, customary practices, values and religious ordinances did not appeal to their sentiments. As a result, religious beliefs, which were based on patterns of 25 behavior, gave way to systematic rational speculation about the conception of natural phenomena as divine. The privilege that the poets had held in reciting the stories of the gods in public yielded to philosophical skepticism. The traditional education of gymnastics, the training of the body, basic reading and writing, singing and playing stringed instruments for the sake of satisfying collective needs, gave way to systematic training and stimulation of the individual mind, the fulfilment of intellectual appetite, and techniques of persuasion in political assemblies and lawcourts (Burkert 1985:305-6; Dover 1972a:110-11; Kennedy 1963:chaps. I-III). Every concept of value that was accepted and practiced by the Athenian society under the framework of vopoq, which applied to the customary, traditional standards, was displaced by the appearance of critical speculation about man and his world within the concept of cp u o iq (Ostwald 1969:20-56). M G Q oq, the old story of the poets, yielded to Xoyoq, an account furnished by rationalizing individuals (Ostwald 1986:199-281).9 The change which took place in the traditional culture affected the outlook on religious festivities. The foreign intruders considered them outdated and, in general, as occasions for socializing and recreation rather than as celebrations to honor the gods (Burkert 1985:305-21; Cartledge 1986:99-127; Gould 1986:1- 9 The essential meaning of |j06o<; contrasted with *6yo<; first appears in Pindar 0/.I.29; Nem .7.23, 8.33; cf. Eur. W/pp.197; Diog. Apol. fr.64. 26 33; Muir 1986:191-218; Parke 1977:13-25). Finally, many an old and archaic social custom was displaced by something new and modern. The new social approaches and doctrines created a tremendous generation gap: they appealed more to the youth, who were enticed by their revolutionary character, while they became a threat to the older generation, who reacted to and opposed them. Aristophanes, who reflects in a comic mode the convergence of presocratic and sophistic developments in fifth century Athenian society in the Clouds, articulates the conflicting issues which they brought to the evaluation of traditional beliefs and morality (Dover 1972a:109). Strepsiades represents the traditional position of the older generation toward the anthropomorphic pantheon, and its reaction to novel ideas. Socrates combines elements of scientific speculation and sophistic instruction. Pheidippides represents the thrilled reception of the new ideas and practices by the younger generation (he is conventional and conservative at the beginning of the play, but he yields to novelties after his instruction); and this is best stated in Pheidippides' own words, when he exclaims how pleasant it is to be intimate with what is new and clever, and to be able to despise the established customs (1399-400): 0e. cbq r)5u icaivoTq T T p a y p o ia iv <at 6e£io7<; opiXeTv Kal tg o v KaOeoTtoTcov v 6 ( jw v uuepcppoveTv 5uvao0ai. 27 As for the controversial issues between old and new, these are ascribed to the roles of the Just and the Unjust Logics. Strepsiades, the peasant Athenian farmer (43-5), very likely exemplary of one part of Aristophanes' audience, is in debt on account of his son's extravagant chariot and horse- racing (12-18). He blames the matchmaker, who complicated his simple, rustic life with a high-class wife of aristocratic origin who, in turn, gave birth to Pheidippides, a demanding son with expensive tastes (41-55;59-79). Hopelessly resentful of his son, who opposes his wishes (108-9;119-20), and in trouble with his creditors (19-22), Strepsiades decides to defraud them by becoming a student at Socrates' cppov-ncnrnpiov (126). He has heard that this is the place where young men learn the art of forensic oratory, by which the Unjust Logic can plead an unjust cause and prevail (114-5). Although Strepsiades' plan is corrupt, and his intentions are deceitful, he does not understand that what he is about to do is immoral: Strepsiades thinks that the cppovTia-rnpiov is a place which will help him evade his debts legally, so that to deceive his creditors is not necessarily a dishonest decision for Strepsiades. Moreover, several incidents of immorality and corruption (theft, seduction, adultery, vengeance and gluttony) were not only characteristics of mortals in the Greek culture but were also attributed to the immortal gods in Greek myths: Hermes was a 28 deceitful thief; Hera, the envious wife of Zeus, punished her husband's concubines as she pleased; Zeus, the god of many love affairs, had even the audacity to castrate his father, Kronos. For Strepsiades, to cheat his creditors was not in itself morally significant provided that he accomplish his own ends. Therefore Strepsiades even prays to the gods for help before he joins the 9 povTioTnpiov (127-8): a\X' Eu£otpEvo<; to T o iv 0 e o k ; 8 i8 a £ o p a i a u T o q P a 8 f£ o o v e!<; t o c p p o irn c rrrip io v . He seems surprised and even amazed during his tour of the cppovTioTqpiov. He admires the instruments of geometry and astronomy, and he is amused by the new things he sees and the stories he hears about the Socratic genius. He is so determined to proceed with his training in order to defraud his creditors that to revere the Clouds as the representative deities of the cppovTioTqpiov is merely a trivial and perfunctory matter. Strepsiades gets shaky, doubtful and upset only when Socrates mentions that the Clouds are the "only deities" whom Strepsiades should supplicate (365): I w . o S t o i y a p t o i p o v a i e io i 0 £ a l, raXXa 8 e n a v T * e o t i cp^uapcx;. The sudden announcement of p o v a i 0 e o I is what makes Strepsiades inquire about Zeus, the principal god of mortals and immortals in ancient Greek religion, and he is perplexed by Socrates' reply that "Zeus does not exist" (366-69): I t . o Zeuc; 8 ’ upTv, cpEpe, npoq Try; fry;, O u M | j t t io < ; ou Scot; e o tiv ; 29 Ig o . ttoToc; Zeu<;; ou prj Xr|pr)OEi<;. ouS* e o t i Zeu<;. I t . t i Xeyeic; ou; a X X a T iq u e i; t o u t i y a p e p o iy ’ a n o q > q v ai npGOTOV arravTGOV. Strepsiades apparently has missed the point Socrates had made previously; they do not credit the gods at the <ppovTicrrnpiov (2 4 7 -8 ): I go. t t o (o u <; Bcouq opE? o u ; n p coTou y a p 0 £oi qpTv v o p ia p ’ o u k e o t i. There he interpreted vopiopa as "currency" instead of "the established belief in the gods." Cl.247-8 is the first allusion Aristophanes makes to the current trends with their atheism by contrast with traditional beliefs and practices (Sommerstein 1982:173). Aristophanes, however, arranges the plot of the Clouds in such a way that certain references to philosophical and scientific doctrines are presented to his audience in as unthreatening a way as they are to Strepsiades, until he reaches the climax of the argument concerning Zeus' "non existence." It is with the outspoken denial of Zeus' existence that Aristophanes alludes to atheism directly. Here we have to reckon with the possibility of caricature and Aristophanes' manipulation of popular stereotypes. Since Greek religion had penetrated different aspects of life, it was not strange for the Greeks to have patron deities of various kinds (the shrine of Zeus Ktesios or Hera, for example, should be in every household; 30 and at C/.1478, the statue of Hermes stands in front of Strepsiades' house). In additon, Greek religion was open-ended and allowed the introduction of foreign deities (like Asklepius and Bendis), who were fully acknowledged and worshiped by the people. Consequently, Strepsiades' willingness to revere Socrates' deities, the Clouds, could have been just as natural a veneration of preferred goddesses, among others, in a specific situation (Strepsiades might have thought that the Socratic Clouds are the patron deities of the cppovTio-rrjpiov in the same way that traditional Greeks espoused patron deities). Strepsiades has confused the reverence of the Clouds by the 9 povTioTnpiov's clientele with that of other anthropomorphic deities. Similarly, the uneducated and the poor among the audience, who might have been exposed to and affected by newly introduced ideas, but could not possibly see clearly the threat they imposed on the traditional establishment, might have reacted to the reverence of the Clouds and the argument about Zeus' "non-existence" in a way comparable to that of Strepsiades. After all, the Clouds resemble the anthropomorphic and personal nature of the Greek pantheon in the eyes of the confused Strepsiades. As Socrates affirms, the Clouds can take any form they like (yfyvovTai nav0’ o t i pouXovTar 348). They resemble flocks of wool (ei^acn 5‘ oSv epfoicnv T T S TT ToipE vo io iv, 343), and they can look like a centaur, a leopard, a 31 WOlf Or a bull (q5q hot’ otva^Eyaq e T S e q vecpeXqv KevTaupcp opoiav/q napSaXei q Xu k c o q Taupcp; 346-7).^ ® Skepticism and philosophy generated a social awareness because the proponents of novelties, although they maintained faith more or less in divine forces, all proclaimed religious beliefs far removed from the traditional anthropomorphic religion, state cults and festivals (Guthrie 1969:3:226). In brief, the historical background reveals that the first scientific speculations and presocratic philosophy were developed during the sixth century in Ionia, first founded by Thales, and continued thriving on parallel lines under his successors, men like Anaximander, Anaximenes, Xenophanes and Heraclitus. After a break in the above line of thought, "a new development," leading toward "conscious polemics" against the first presocratics "and the return to poetic form" by the Eleatic School took place (Burkert 1985:307)."* But finally, 1 ^Strepsiades, who confuses the different shapes which the clouds (as natural phenomena) take with the deities of the cppov-ncn-ripiov as being anthropomorphic, might have in mind Nephele (the cloud-shaped) in connection to Athamas, and the hundred-headed Typhoeus. In Hes. Theog. 82Iff., Typhoeus fought against Zeus; and at Theog.869-80, Typhoeus was the father of the storm winds. And Strepsiades associates the Clouds with Typhoeus at 336. 11A philosophical school founded by Xenophanes (ca.540 B.C.) at Elea. Monism was its common tenet. With Xenophanes it was the protest of a monotheist against polytheism. With Parmenides it was a materialist monism. He thought of the universe as an undifferentiated sphere, denied the existence of plurality or change, and believed in the testimony of reason as opposed to that of the senses. With Zeno it contributed to the criticisms of the belief of plurality and change. 32 apprentices of the former, men like Anaxagoras and Empedocles, their students (i.e. Archelaus and Diogenes of Apollonia), and the atomists Leukippus and Democritus "developed their systems of comprehensive rational explanation of nature." The favorite subjects of speculation in the presocratics are the beginnings of the world, apxn> the psTEcopa TTpaypaTa in the sky, and the hidden uncertainties under the earth. All assumptions are taken from tradition, "but are made explicit by the new concepts." Accordingly, there is an order in the world, Koapoq, which is possible through the process of nature, c p u a ic ;, and "which cannot be influenced by man" (Burkert 1985:306) and his traditions, vopo<;. The first allusions to scientific speculations that Aristophanes makes in the Clouds begin as soon as Strepsiades enters the cppov-ricn-rjpiov. The student who opens the door tells Strepsiades how successfully Socrates measured the distance in fleas' feet that a flea can jump (144-52), and how the instruments of geometry (202) are useful in measuring land (203) in general (204). Strepsiades, however, misunderstands the function of the geometric instruments and their purpose. He misinterprets the concept of "measuring land," with "some (magical?) device for distributing all the land in the world gratis to Athenian citizens like himself" (Dover 1968a:123), which, in turn, "would enable the poorest Athenian to become 33 economically independent" (Sommerstein 1982:171). In addition, as Sommerstein notes, "at 215-6 Strepsiades again confuses science with magic" (1982:171). In this incident, the student has just shown to Strepsiades the map of the world. But as soon as Strepsiades sees how close Sparta (which he thought to be far away) is to Athens on the map, he wants them to move it farther away: I t . w<; c y y u q q p c o v . t o u t o p e T a c p p o v T i^ e T e , T a u T f | v acp ' q p c o v a n a y a y s T v rro p p c o r r a v u . The science of astronomy (201) is lampooned by the reference to the study of the subject by the students' asses (194), as their heads bend downward in investigating Tartarus (192), while their TTpw K Tof are facing the sky (193). Furthermore, the scientific lampooning does not exclude the mention of Thales (180), who is assimilated to Socrates in the anecdotal idea of scientific absent mindedness: (various anecdotes ascribe to Thales the role of the "absent minded professor" (Hdt.l.74.2), because he fell into a well once as he was observing the stars); Socrates' situation is a recreation of Thales' absent mindedness, since he was interrupted in a great idea by a lizard "shitting" in his mouth, while "he was investigating the paths and revolutions of the moon" (167-73). Aristophanes, we may suppose, might mention Thales by name in order to create an historically based prelude, so as to allude to the very beginnings of the speculative ideas which 34 were introduced and affected conventional religion. As we will see later, he also mentions one of the first sophists, Prodikos, who is similarly assimilated within the persona of Socrates. He does not mention any other presocratic philosopher or sophist by name, but he alludes to several within the context and plot of the Clouds; I suppose, since Aristophanes treats the cppovTiotr]piov as a combined thinkery of scientific speculation and sophistic argument, he mentions one representative of each in order to define the boundaries of his mockery and c a r ic a tu r e .2 Strepsiades finally meets Socrates, who is hanging from a hook, suspended in the air (217), a posture necessary to allow him to make correct discoveries about celestial phenomena (228). In this instance, Aristophanes uses the cumulative term to peTEcopa rrpaypaTaJ3 which includes specific allusions to the study of celestial phenomena from previous passages (n*iov, 225, oeXqvqc;, 171, aqp, 198, aoTpovopia, 201 and ycoopeTpfa, 202), in order to set the stage for the introduction of the new 12Anaximander, who brought the polos and the gnomon from Babylon (Hdt.ll.19), the first to speculate on sizes and distances of the sun and the moon (as at Cl. 144-52;202-3), and the first to draw a map of the inhabited earth (as at Cl.206-7), is never mentioned by Aristophanes in the entire play. Nor is Protagoras mentioned by name, but his approach to the Aiacrol Aoyoi is alluded to by the two Logics. 1 3 ln addition, the notion of pe-rEtopa alludes to Anaximander's belief of the position of the earth in the center of the universe, in which it maintained an absolute equilibrium, until Anaximenes introduced aqp as the medium which supported it (PI. Phae.99b ). 35 deities. Upon Strepsiades' agreement to commune and converse with the Clouds (252-3), Socrates invokes not only the N e c p e A o u to arise and appear (266), but also the Sovereign Lord 'Aqp (264) and bright Ai0qp (265). Air, of course, one of the four conventional elements in the series of water, fire and earth, constituted the basic substance of the unlimited, ancipov, in Anaximenes’ speculative approach, which disengaged the Milesian cosmogony still farther from the mythical atmosphere. According to Anaximenes, "Air is rarefied into fire, and condensed into wind, cloud, water, earth, stones" (Cornford 1926:543). Aether, on the other hand, whose position was not as clear (at times being taken as the fifth element of the universe, and at times as a form of fire or air) was assigned divine properties in both popular thought and philosophical inquiry, because of its position between heaven and earth (Sommerstein 1982:174).14 In addition air, as the basic substance of the universe, had a tremendous effect upon the contemporary philosopher Diogenes of Apollonia. Socrates’ suspension in the air while observing the celestial phenomena (225-34) is used by 1 4 Ai0ripis particularly important in Euripides. A!0np is the "begetter of men and gods" (fr.839); "the head of the gods" (fr.919); and Zeus (frs.879;941). Oaths are sworn by it in fr.847 and Euripides himself is a worshiper of AiOqp at Frogs 892. In addition, one of Euripides' favorite adjectives in the description of AiOqp is Xapnpoq {Hipp.WQ; Ion 1445; Or. 1087; (fr.443); so too it is used by Socrates at Cl.265. 36 Aristophanes to allude to Diogenes' philosophical views. Diogenes believed that the soul and the mind of living creatures consist basically of air, because "air is composed of minuter particles than any other substance" (A20 D-K; Burkert 1985:320); therefore, for the accomplishment of intelligent thought the air should also be pure and dry (fr.4; A19 D-K; Guthrie 1962:1:129f.;143;470).15 Consequently, for the sake of intelligent thinking, Socrates' mind should be subjected to the purity of the air— a process which would be impossible unless his body, which supports his mind, also be suspended. The argument about Zeus' existence (367-411) involves certain scientific explanations as to how the phenomena of rain and thunder are produced. Strepsiades' notion is that rain is caused by Zeus' "pissing through the sieve" ( k o i t o i n p o T e p o v t o v A C aXp6cb^ <£pqv Sia kookivou oupeTv. 373); and thunder by Zeus' thunderbolt, which is also his weapon against perjurers (395- 7): I t . a X X ’ o K E p a u v o q tto0 e v a 5 c p ip E T a i X a p r r o o v n u p i , t o u t o 5 i 8 a £ o v , Kai KaTo<9p0y£i {3aX X oov r)pa<;, Touq S e ^wvTaq nep^Xeuei. t o u t o v yap 8r) 9 avepco<; o Z eu < ; Tqo’ e tti to u c ; EiriopKouq. All these ideas refer to the "childish and typically rustic notion" (Henderson 1975:194) of the average Athenians, who formed the main targets of skeptics' attacks. But Socrates 1 5 Diogenes of Apollonia said that Homer had spoken not mythically, but truly, about the gods: by 'Zeus' he meant the 'air' (A8 D-K). 37 explains to Strepsiades that the clouds produce both rain and thunder when they collide (376-78) and burst (407-9) by the force of necessity (377;407): Ito. o t o v e p rr^ q o O o o o ’ (j8 o t o < ; ttoM o u Kavayicaa0Goai <pep£o0ai K a T a K p ip v a p e v a i rrA qpsic; o p p p o u Si* a v a y x q v , eTTa papcTai eic; Ip r r in T o u o a i fb q y v u v T a i < a i r r a T a y o O o iv . Although the Socratic theories are not as accurate as those attested to have been held by the presocratics, they combine certain elements of the doctrines of Anaximander and Anaximenes, who asserted that lightning is produced by the wind which causes clouds to burst (A23 D-K;A7 D-K); of Anaxagoras, who held that thunder was a cloud-collision (A84 D-K); and of Diogenes of Apollonia, Leukippus and Democritus, who assigned thunder to friction caused by clouds (A16 D-K; A25 D-K; A93 D-K). Accordingly, the concept of avayKq w as important in the theories of Parmenides, Empedocles, Leukippus and Democritus, who considered it "a cosmological force" (Guthrie 1969:3:100). The Socratic scatological example of thunder, which is similar to the rumbling caused by the soup consumed in the Panathenaeic festival ( o K e y a i t o i v u v a r r o y a a T p i S l o u t u w o u t o u i oTa mnopSaq- 392), and Strepsiades' interpretation of thunder, which equals T To p S q ( t o u t ’ a p a icai T c b v o p a T ’ a M q A o i v , '^ p o v T r j" < a i "T T o p S r)", opolco. 394), once again explore through caricature the conflict between tradition and novelty. Socrates, on the one 38 hand, equates the customary ritual (the common meal) of the most important Athenian festival, the Panathenaea, with nopSq, and Strepsiades, on the other hand, equates the rational explanation of thunder with TT opS q (Henderson 1975:187-203). Strepsiades' ignorance and naivete are emphasized even more when Socrates announces the other god of the 9 povTioTr)piov, the ai0cpio<; STvoq, who rules in place of Zeus (380- 1): loo. qKiOT*, aXX’ ai0epioq S T vo g . I t. A T vo< ;; touti p’ eXeAr)0ei, o Zeuq ouk &v, aXX’ oivt’ auTou A Tvo^ vuvi PaaiXeucov. As Sommerstein (1982:231) and Dover (1968a:192) comment, 87vo<; refers to a round-bottomed cup; and a STvoq-cup stood outside Socrates' cppovTioTqpiov (1473). But Strepsiades' natural supposition that a god named ATvoq not only overthrew Zeus (the Hesiodic myth of succession [Theog. 126-506] includes divine castration: Kronos overthrows Ouranos and Zeus overthrows Kronos), but also that he (ATvoq) took the form of the cup statue which stood outside the cppovTioTqpiov reflects a very conventional thought, since the gods of the anthropomorphic pantheon could disguise themselves in any shape and form they wished; it is not until much later in the play that Strepsiades realizes his confusion, 1472-4). 39 The Socratic ATvo<;, however, alludes to the "rotation theory" of evolution of the universe and its infinite number of worlds, of a vortex, which was first proposed by Anaximander. Anaxagoras also believed that the heavenly bodies were thrown from a central spiral-shaped mass by centrifugal force, and both Empedocles and Antiphon based their cosmogonic schemes on the idea of a rotating STvoq (Guthrie Vols. Il-lll). Furthermore, Socrates tells Strepsiades (who wonders if ATvo<; has replaced Zeus, whose thunderbolt punishes perjurers, 397) that Zeus' thunderbolt is more likely to strike oak trees and his own temples rather than real perjurers like Simon, Kleonymus and Theorus (contemporary politicians and supporters of Kleon, 399-402). Socrates tries to prove that Zeus, thunder and lightning are not divine but empirical. In fact, "Zeus has not been replaced by anyone or anything” since "there is no divine punishment for perjury or for any other crime" (Strauss 1966:19). Thus Strepsiades need not fear Zeus' thunderbolt and lightning in connection with his actions (defrauding his creditors), since the notion of Zeus corresponds to universal principles which support life rather than to divine retribution. Aristophanes intensifies allusions to atheistic tendencies and disrespect for the traditional anthropomorphic gods at the end of the initiation scene, where Socrates tells Strepsiades 40 that he should not recognize any other gods but the Void, the Clouds and the Tongue (423-4): Ico . a X A o t i S q T 1 o u vopieTq q 8 q 0eo v o u S e va TrXrjv a m p qpETq, t o X a o q t o u t ! < a i T a q NecpeAaq icai T q v T X c o T T a v, T p ia t o u t !; The Socratic pantheon varies from passage to passage but does not include any traditional gods. At 365 Socrates says that the Clouds are the only deities of the cppovTicn-qpiov. At 264-5 he invokes Air and Aether (which are compatible with clouds as meteoric phenomena). At 380 Vortex replaces Zeus (and Strepsiades interprets Vortex as divine). At 424 Socrates adds Void and the Tongue to the deities of the 9 povTicrrqpiov in addition to Clouds; and at 627 he swears by Respiration (auaTTvoq)'l 6 as well as by Void and Air. But all Socratic deities are associated with natural phenomena rather than anthropomorphic (or cosmogonic) divine powers. While the Hesiodic Xaoq refers to the primeval entity which sprang into being without cause or effect along with Earth, Tartaros and Eros (Theog. 116-22), the Socratic Xaoq alludes to the presocratic notion of the unlimited: "the unmeasured field of space, which, though called 'the void,' was filled by 'air,' the circumambient envelope of the limited Heaven, the breath (pneum a) of the living world" (Cornford 1926:551). 1 6 'Avanvoq, which is a form of air, was associated by Heraclitus (A16 D-K) and Diogenes of Apollonia (A19 D-K) with the intelligence of the mind; and both the tongue and intelligence were the main targets of sophistic teaching. 41 The concept of the presocratic unlimited did not apply strictly to spatial boundlessness (this purely scientific conception of the unlimited did not appear so early); it rather applied to the divine properties of imperishability, vitality and immortality, "the one attribute of divinity, as conceived in the Olympian religion, which [still] survives when all that is anthropomorphic is rejected" (Cornford 1926:542). As Cornford w rite s , It may rather be thought of as a resuscitation, in a simplified form, of that representation of impersonal divine or magical energy which had preceded the development of personal gods. Thus the renunciation of mythical imagery takes philosophy back to the source from which mythology arose. Whether this living stuff is identified with water (as by Thales), or with air (as by Anaximander), is a matter of secondary importance. In either case the vehicle of life is intermediate between the extremes, the fire of heaven and the earth; it has its place in that gap, filled by the series, water, mist, air, cloud, rain, between Father Heaven and Mother Earth, which was occupied by the eros of mythical cosmogony (1926:542-3). Moreover, as different as the Socratic gods may appear from passage to passage, in actuality they are reduced to three, as Socrates himself claims at 424 (Tpla tcxutI), and most of them represent some form of one another (air, aether, vortex, clouds, void are all natural phenomena). Thus one might say that 42 the atheistic tendencies which shook and threatened traditional beliefs and practices, did not represent atheism in the same way that "we would use the word" (Guthrie 1969:3:231), but rather implied a tendency toward monism.17 Similarly, "the relation of philosophy or science to mythology" should not be viewed as "one of purely negative exclusion" (Cornford 1926:522), but rather as a combination of forces paving the way toward a cultural revival. In addition, even the multiple gods of the Greek anthropomorphic pantheon are reduced to a socialized company, which is imagined "as comprising an extended family of anthropomorphic beings, with Zeus 'the father of gods and men,' as head and master of the company" (Gould 1986:25). Thus the many gods of the Greeks depended upon and were ruled by Zeus, just as physical phenomena depended on the infinity of space. The Zeus of popular religion represents the principle of life (Cornford 1926:556 uses the equation: "Zeus=Zen=life"), as void does for the exponents of philosophic doctrines: both were considered divine powers in an attempt to explain the paradoxes of the world in that they represented superhuman forces (the traditional Greek divinities were anthropomorphic, while the philosophic divine forces were natural phenomena). 17 The Triad refers to the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers and represents the Limited, as opposed to the presocratic notion of the Unlimited. Chapter Two will examine this point. 43 But since neither cultural revival nor social change harvest their crops in limited periods of time, Aristophanes' Socrates, who represents the new, exhibits a rather negative and exclusive attitude toward the Olympian religion; and Strepsiades, who represents the old, embodies the bewilderment and confusion about the new ideas of a society in turmoil— turmoil brought about by imminent change. Socrates enters the domain of the sophists, who taught the art of persuasion, the power of which was as unlimited as the presocratic notion of the physical world, with the worship of the Tongue (424). While the earlier philosophers dealt mostly with the outer world in the study of natural phenomena (with the exception of Heraclitus and Empedocles, who also looked at human affairs, society and the inner self), the sophists felt that the undertaking of "rhetoric-the art of persuasive discourse-not philosophy should be studied" (Brumbaugh 1981:112). Aoyoq and voyoc; became of primary importance to the sophistic movement. "To every logos a logos is opposed" (Burkert 1985:312), taught Protagoras. Myth is irrelevant to sophistic teaching: "The word mythos, obsolete in Attic, is now redefined and revalued as the sort of story that the old poets used to tell and that old women still tell to children" (Burkert 1985:312). The sophists' main concern is the correct use of language, grammar and etymology, 44 clarity in debate, the use of argumentation and objection, the application of logic to lawcourts, craftiness and cunning to the confrontation of fallacy. Aoyo?, however, even as early as Heraclitus constituted "the formula of all being which is law and account" (Burkert 1985:VS8;309). The 9 u o i<; concept of the presocratic philosophers which "used to denote the growing of the cosmos and of all things contained in it from their own laws" (Burkert 1985:312), attempted to alter the traditional and customary approach to vo|jo<; around which religion mainly revolved. The cpuaiq concept, however, threatend to modify custom even more with the new attempt to implant the voycKrcpuoK; antithesis (which was first formulated ca. 440 B.C. by Archelaus, student of Anaxagoras). According to Archelaus, "the just and the unjust, the ugly and the beautiful are not defined by physis but by nomos, by arbitrarily changing human convention" (Diog. Laer.2.6= VS60;A1 D-K). In other words, the c p u o i< ; concept was stretched to embrace human nature also. In fact, as Dodds comments, "Phusis became the slogan of the robber-individual and the robber-society, as 'the survival of the fittest' was in the later nineteenth century and as 'realism' is today” (1973:104). As for vo m o <;, it becomes important to the sophists in regard to both custom and law. 45 Discussion of the vopcxrcpuaic; antithesis would be incomplete unless we consider the role of medicine. It was medicine, indeed, which influenced the formulation of the vopo<r c p u o ic ; antithesis first, since its approach to illness was prompted by the question of whether health is defined by man's condition and physique, or by his customary routine in diet and exercise (Dodds 1973:99). But the role of medicine in the scientific realm was much different from the way disease and cure were conceived traditionally, as a conventional idea of physical or mental affliction caused by magical device or divine intervention and the intake of an appropriate antidote by the afflicted person to overcome his affliction. I assume that Aristophanes in his mockery of the sophistic art of discourse and persuasion makes use of medical terminology to caricature as useless the results of rhetoric and its interference with conventional culture. Strepsiades considers his state of debt a "horse fever" (Ymrepov, 74: Y trrTepoq means VK Tepoq, uScpoc; etc. with a pun on e p o o < ; and iWepcx; "to be ill with the jaundice"); and when Socrates asks him how he was caught up in debt, Strepsiades describes his state of debt as a disease which eats him up (voaoc; p’ erreTpiyev iirniKq, 8eivq cpayeTv. 243). The notion that a voooq "devours" the patient was a very common expression in traditional thought (Aesch. Cho.280-1; Soph. P/7/7.313; Arist. Poet. 1458b 19-24), and Strepsiades equates his debts with a 46 desease rather than with a legal procedure. Strepsiades misinterprets acquisition of the fraudulent argument and the art of speaking as magical power. Socrates trains Strepsiades to think effectively and asks him to think of a device that would remove a five talent lawsuit against him. Strepsiades thinks that he would go to a sorceress to purchase a piece of glass (it was rare, delicate and precious, could kindle fire and was believed to have magical powers; it is associated with gold in Ac/?.74; Hdt.ll.69.2); Strepsiades therefore would place it between the sun and the clerk when the latter entered the case in the list, so that the sun would melt the case away (7 6 6 -9 2 ): I t . q8q napa toToi 9 appaKond>?vaiq Tqv M0ov TauTqv eopaicaq, Tqv xaXqv, Tqv S io < 9 avq, acp’ /jq to rrup aTTTouai; lo o . T q v u a X o v Aeyei<;; I t. cyooye. [Ico.] cp cp c, t i 8qT’ av, [Ico.] el TauTqv XafJdiv, orroTe ypacpoiTO Tqv Sficqv o ypappaTeuc;, o n rco T ep co OTaq < I> 8 e npoq t o v qXiov tck ypappaT* eKTq^aipi Tqq £pqq Skqq; Aristophanes picks up on the confusion that the sophistic v6poe<puoi<; antithesis caused customary tradition and satirizes it from every possible viewpoint. The Unjust Logic argues that he got his name simply because he was the first to conceive the notion of argument in contradiction to established values and justified pleas (toT oiv vopoic; k c < i toiT < ; Sik o u i; TavavTi’ avTiXs^ai. 1040). But while the Unjust Logic uses vopoq to indicate the traditional 47 norms of behavior established by custom (in the same way in which Strepsiades uses it against the behavior of Pheidippides, who Strikes him: aAX’ ouSapou vopfCETai TO V TraTEpa touto rraaxeiv. 1420), at 1071-5 the Unjust Logic justifies indulgence of sexual desire on the basis of natural necessity, which stands in opposition to norms of behavior established by custom: oieeyai y a p , & peipaiaov, ev t u aco<ppov£?v a n a v T a aveoTiv, qSovoov 0 ’ oaoov peXXek; anoaTEp£?a0ai- ttomScov, yuvaiKobv, KOTTapcov, oyoov, ttotgov, Kaxaopoov. k o ito i t i aoi Cqv a£iov, toutcov ia v OT£pq0Q<;; eTev. n ap E ip ’ evteG0ev eI<; toic; Tqc; cpuoEooq avayKa<;. The above passage alludes to the premise of "sophistic opposition between custom or convention (nomos) and nature (phusis) which often permits or even enjoins conduct that nomos would condemn" (Sommerstein 1982:213). Aristophanes attempts to pinpoint the weaknesses of the exponents ofcpuoiq, who attempt to overthrow vopoq, and who appeal to cpuaic without knowing the appropriate time to do so. Pheidippides, who justifies striking Strepsiades on the basis of an animal analogy, is incapable of justifying the analogy's validity and appeals instead to the authority of Socrates (1428-33): oKEyai 5e tou<; aX£KTpuova<; <ai TaXXa to |3oTa touti, oiq tou<; naTEpaq apuv/ETar koitoi ti Siacpspouoiv hpoov ekeTvoi, rrXqv y ’ oti yn<piopaT’ ou ypacpouaiv; I t. ti Sqt’, snEiSq tou< ; aXEKTpuovaq arravTa pipeT, ouk £O0iEiq <ai tqv K O Trpov Kani £uXou Ka0£u5£iq; 4 > e. ou toutov, < * > Tav, eotiv, ouS’ av IcoKpaTEi 8oKo(r|. 48 Moreover, Aristophanes alludes to the abuse of the concept of c p O a ic ; by the sophists, who employ it in an immoral fashion to exploit people. Thus Strepsiades takes advantage of its appeal to get rid of his creditor, who demands interest on the loan. Strepsiades argues that since the sea water does not increase in accordance with the laws of nature, it is against the laws of nature also that the creditor demand to increase his money (1 2 8 9 -9 6 ):1 8 I t . k o X o x ; X ly E ic ;. t ! 5 r ) T a ; T q v O a X a T T a v e a 0 ’ o t i n X e fo v a v u v i vopf^Eic; q n p o t o u ; Xp. pa A f\ aXX’ ’faqv. ou y a p Sficaiov t t X e io v ’ e T v o i. I t . k S t o a u T q p e v , & K a K o S a ip o v , o u & e v y f y v s T a i Im p p E o v T c o v tc o v n o T a p c iv ttX eig o v, o u Se ^qTeTq n o i q a a i T a p y u p io v ttX e o v t o a o v ; o u k aTToSicb^Ei a a u T O V a l i o T q q o l< fa q ; In fifth-century Athens, however, tradition and novelty coexisted side by side "and could draw no sharp line of distinction between sophistai and phusikoi (natural scientists), except in so far as the former word applied to professional teachers, the latter primarily to researchers" (Dodds 1973:94). 18 Strepsiades' creditor uses ou Sfcaiov in the sense that it is unjust, a concept commonly used by the natural philosophers to indicate the balance of opposing forces in the universe. Anaximander (fr.1 D-K), refering to the elements of universe, wrote that "they make amends and payment to one another by their injustice according to the ordering of time." Heraclitus (fr.4) said that "the sun will not transgress the limits of its course; if he does the Erinyes, assistants of Dike, will find him out;" cf. Parmenides (fr.1.14): "Dike holds the keys of the gates of Night and Day." 49 Aristophanes, of course, who caricatures all the intellectuals who threatened the Athenian tradition with their atheistic attitude, whether they represented the sophists or the scientists, treats them all equally. He does not distinguish the former from the latter, but relegates them all to the cppovTioTQpiov and its principal deities, the Clouds, and Socrates' statement reflects this (331-34): Ico. o u yap pa A” oTo0’ OTiq n A e lo T o u < ; aCTai P o o k o u o i 00910- T“5’ © o u p io p a u T E iq , ia T p o T e x v o t q , a 9 p a y i 8 o v u x a p y o K o p r ) T a < ; - k u k X io jv t c x o p ^ v p a p a T O K a p r r r a q , a v S p a q p £ T e o o p 0 9 £ v a - Ka<i ’ o u S e v 8 p a > v T a < ; P o o k o u o ’ a p y o u q , o t i r a u x a q p o u a o T T O o O o iv . But Aristophanes gives the 9 povTioTqpiov a double function. The 9 povTioTnpiov, indeed, is a place in which the disciples conduct research on the pcTecopa upaypaTa, and in which sophistic instruction takes place (as also the allusions to Thales (180) and Prodicos (361) verify) with Socrates as its representative teacher. That the sophists were teachers and "wished to popularize knowledge" (Dodds 1973:92) is reflected throughout the Clouds by the procedures used to train Strepsiades and Pheidippides. Socrates trains Strepsiades in the metrical units of verse (636-59), in the correct use of words (660-93) and in the principles of intelligent thought and proper argumentation (695-790). In addition, sophistic instruction was aimed at the well-to-do youths (i.e., those of the higher social strata), since 50 it was by the high price charged their pupils that the sophists made their living. The youth of the population is more likely also to understand and accept new, revolutionary views about issues concerning morals, politics and religion. This is especially the case in times of crisis (as that which the Athenian state experienced due to the devastating consequences of the Peloponnesian War [Muir 1986:192;201]). Strepsiades, at the beginning of the play, affirms that he is old, slow and too forgetful to learn new material (t t & <; oS v ycpcov KaniXqapcov <ai |3paSu<;/A6yGov aicp i|3G o v axivSaAapouq pa0qaopai; 129- 30). He confuses poetic meters with measures of capacity (cyw pev ou8ev npoTepov qpiEKTew. 643). He does not know how to distinguish a feminine from a masculine noun (opas a naaxei<;; Tqv T£ 0qA£iav k c x A eT c ;/ a^eicTpuova kotoi tcxuto kc ii tov appEva. 662-3). To commit fraud, he plans to buy a Thessalian sorceress, who might hide the moon and thus enable him to avoid paying his debts with the appearance of the new moon (Thessalian witches were famous for bringing the moon down from the sky: PI. Georg.513a; Hor. Epod.5.45-6; Pliny N.H.30.7; Men. Thet.749-52): I t . yuvouKa cpappotKiS’ e I npiapEvoq © e t t c i Aqv Ka0£Aoipi vuKToop Tqv aEArjvqv, eT to i 8q auTqv KaQEip^aip’ eI«; XocpEtov oTpoyyuAov coansp KaTponTov, k5 to Tqpotqv e'xoov. Socrates is fed up with Strepsiades' ignorance and unwillingness to learn the new material he teaches him. He calls Strepsiades foolish and old-fashioned (he smells of the 51 age Of Kronos: K ai nu<;, & p co p E ou Kai Kpovioov o£oo v Kai P eK iceoeX r^ve, 398). He calls him a stupid forgetful peasant (ouk e T S ov o u t o o c; avSp’ aypoiKov ou&apou/ ou6’ arropov ouSe okoiov ouS* ErriXqapova, 628- 9) and sends him to hell (ouk efc K opaK ac; a n o c p 0 £ p £ T ,/e m X ^ a p 6 T a T o v Kai okoiototov yEpovnov; 789-90). Finally, the Clouds advise Strepsiades to send Pheidippides to be taught at the tppouTioTripiov (794-6): Xo. np£?^, & TTpEoPuTa, OU|j(3ouXEUOp£V, e’i'ooi tic; u lo c ; eotiv £KT£0papp£vo<;, tte|jtteiv ekeTuov o v ti aauToO pav0av£iv. Pheidippides, who also reflects a higher class youth through his mother's side (46-8), manages to be trained, and Strepsiades gives to Socrates the price (aXAa toutovi npa>Tov Xapi. 1146), which he had promised to give when he first entered the cppovTioTqpiov (pio0ov 6’ ovtiv’ av/npaTTQ p\ opoupai aoi KaTa0qa£iv touc; 0£ou<;. 245-6). As mentioned above, Prodikos is the only sophist whom Aristophanes mentions by name in the Clouds (361), just as Thales (180) is mentioned among the presocratics (at Cl. 830 Strepsiades calls Socrates the Melian, which might be an allusion to Diagoras from Melos, but Aristophanes never mentions Diagoras by name in the play). Presumambly Aristophanes, in his attempt to caricature all novel movements in the second half of the fifth century, mentions a name of both categories (OuoikoI and oocpioTaf) to support his treatment of the 52 <ppovTioTr)piov as both a research and teaching institute (since their differences were not yet sharply drawn); and also because Prodikos was interested in cosmology in addition to sophistry. Prodikos used language as a tool in his quest for the gods. He assumed that the names of the gods were given by people to physical elements, which were essential for life (the sun, the moon, rivers, springs), or to things, which were necessary for survival (bread, water, wine, fire). Consequently, water came to be worshiped as Poseidon, bread as Demeter and fire as Hephaestus. He also guessed that there was a tendency among the first human groups to worship people who had contributed to knowledge of food production and tool making. He also supposed that the repetitive veneration of all forces contributing to survival, generation after generation, was embedded in the practice of rituals, and commemoration in festivals (Guthrie 1969:3:274-80; Muir 1986:204). Prodikos' cosmogonic theories affected the native tales about the creation of the world and the gods so that mythology was reduced to a historical nucleus and "cult becomes a memorial service" (Burkert 1985:314). The first sophist to become a threat to religion was Protagoras. In his famous work, On Gods, of which only the beginning survives, he writes: "Concerning the gods I am unable to discover whether they exist or not, or what they are like in 53 form; for there are many hindrances to knowledge, the obscurity of the subject and the brevity of human life" (fr.2). Protagoras' agnosticism was drawn from the irresponsible actions and immorality of the gods in the myths themselves. He could not conceive that the gods of the myths could be subject to their own emotions and weaknesses and still exist and be revered by mortals who are subject to stricter moral codes (Guthrie 1969:3:228-9; 1979:238-9). Similarly, the Unjust Logic questions the validity of morality and decency among the immortal gods. He justifies adultery on the grounds of Zeus' multiple love affairs; and he alleges that without persuasive skills a transgressor will be destroyed, but with them he will dismay his plaintiff (1079-81): |joix6<; yap qv tuxq<; aXouq, TaS’ avTepsu; npoq auTov, cb<; ouSev q6iKq<a<;- eTt’ ek to v A ” enaveveyKeTv, kokeTvoc; tb < ; qTTCov epcoTO<; eoti Kai yuvaiK&ov KatToi au 0vqTo<; gov 0eoO ttg o <; peT^ov av Suvaio; Protagoras' position inclined toward relativism. The influence of Heraclitus' idea that existence is a perpetual onward rushing stream whose movements escaped human perception because of hastiness and rapid disappearance, led Protagoras to believe that an objective reality is unthinkable and that only "Man is the measure of all things, of things that are that they are, and of things that are not that they are not" (fr.1). But this relativistic approach limited the dependence of mortals upon immortals, and did not allow room for the opposing forces of 54 good and bad, just and unjust, right and wrong to be seen as related to religious standards, but as functions of human nature (Muir 1986:202). Therefore, Protagoras' position appeared as an atheistic threat to the traditional roots of Athenian society. The traditonal belief that the gods judge, care about or are even aware of men's deeds was challenged by the sophists, who rather perpetuated the idea of "a self-sufficient god in need of nothing" (Muir 1986:203). Gorgias in his treatise, On Nature, or, The Non-Existent, argued that nothing exists, and if anything could exist, it could not be known, as it cannot be communicated; and Thrasymachus, in one of his speeches, writes: "The gods do not see what goes on among men. If they did they would not neglect the greatest of human goods, namely justice..." (fr.8). Accordingly, Aristophanes alludes to the position of the sophists in regard to conventional culture. During the first part of the debate between the two Logics (889-934), the argument concerns justice. The Just Logic asserts that Justice exists and dwells with the gods (napa to T c m Q eo k;, 904, [A iK q sits by the side of Zeus in Hes. Works 259]), while the Unjust Logic claims that Justice does not exist (cpepc y a p , tto G ’c m v ; 903);19 if it existed, claims the Unjust Logic, Zeus would have been punished for 19 jh e argument between the two Logics re. the existence of Justice can be paralleled with that between Socrates and Strepsiades re. the existence of Zeus. 55 destroying his father (n a>q 5qTa A licq q ouaqq o Zeuq/ouie ano^coXev t o v uaTep’ auToO Sqaaq; 904-6 [Hes. Theog. 717ff.]). The Just Logic, which represents respect for tradition, implies that if Justice dwells on the side of the gods, the gods themselves must be just. But the counter-argument of the Unjust Logic not only attacks the fallacy in the belief in justice, but also implies the fallacy and inconsistency of mythology. Aristophanes created the long debate between the two Logics "to express the scandalized reaction to Protagoras' new approach" (Brumbaugh 1981:117) in regard to 5iaaoi Xoyoi, as echoed by Strepsiades' reasoning: "the weak can plead an unjust cause and prevail" (114-5); and to reveal the degree of misunderstanding and confusion in the reaction of the Athenian public, part of whom believed, indeed, that "the weaker cause is twisted as if he were in fact offering to make wrong right" (Burkert 1985:312). Statements counter to the traditional conception of the gods were expressed not only by natural philosophers and sophists, but also from experienced politicians like Pericles. Plutarch reports that Pericles, in his encomium on the men who died in the battle of Samos, affirmed that these very men would become immortal like the gods on the premise that: we do not see them themselves [the gods], but only by the honors we pay them, and by the benefits they do us, attribute to 56 them immortality; and the like attributes belong also to those that die in the service of their country (P er.8). But even more important is that Pericles was a friend and admirer of Anaxagoras, the man who made the rotation of the universe the first act of mind: All living things, great and small are controlled by Mind (Nous)...and the kinds of things that were to be and that once were but now are not, and all that now is and the kind of things that will be-all these are determined by mind (fr.12). Plutarch reports about Pericles' friendship with Anaxagoras: For this man, Pericles entertained an extraordinary esteem and admiration, and filling himself with this lofty, and, as they call it, up in the air sort of thought, derived hence, not merely, as was natural, elevation of purpose and dignity of language, raised far above the base and dishonest buffooneries of mob eloquence, but besides this, a composure of countenance, and a serenity and calmness in all his movements, which no occurrence, whilst he was speaking could disturb, a sustained and even tone of voice, and various other advantages of a similar kind, which produced the greatest effect on his hearers (Per.5). Aristophanes, however, who demurred at novel thinkers, very likely gives Pericles certain responsibility for allowing such charlatans to express their ideas freely, and for letting certain traditional educational principles fade away. Strepsiades 57 justifies to Pheidippides loss of his cloak for "an essential purpose," just as Pericles himself would have put it (coottep rkpiKXeriq, eIq to 8eov ancbXeoa. 859). In fact, Pericles used the same words (e !< ; to Seov) as an excuse for the accounts of his generalship. After he bribed the Spartan king Pleistonax with ten talents to withdraw fron Attica during the Spartan invasion in 445 B.C., he then justified the amount as having been spent for "essential purposes" (Plut. Per.22-3). The Aristophanic allusion to Pericles' own words might well indicate that traditional transformation occured not only along the lines of the exponents of rationalism and liberalism; it was also espoused and promoted by leading politicians, who took advantage of the weakness of the uneducated and conventional masses. Traditional religion was more persistent among the lower classes and the fun of the gods in comedy does not provide evidence against the religious conservatism of the ordinary man. On the contrary, it provides evidence that such amusement is acceptable because religion was well established and sure of itself (Dover 1968b:127-8).20 Furthermore, the new 2 0 "The case for its scepticism (that of the audience of the Old Comedy), rests primarily on its tolerance of the discomfiture of Poseidon in B ird s and the discreditable antics of Dionysus in Frogs. Yet the conclusion that Athenian society in the late fifth century was in general sceptical of traditional religion is not easily reconciled with the evidence from other sources, and rests on a failure of the imagination. To understand pre-Christian religious attitudes requires a great imaginative effort, and those who make it are commonly regarded as impostors by those who cannot. The intimate association of the gods with the fabric of ordinary 58 ideas were espoused by the upper and educated classes with conservative and corruptive tendencies, who took little or no action against the skeptics. Nevertheless, the philosophical doctrines went alongside the maintenance of ancient worship, and gradually the educated abandoned traditional mythology (Lloyd-Jones 1983:133-4); and although Pericles was a friend and admirer of Anaxagoras he was also on good terms with the diviner Lampon (Plut. Per.6). Science and agnosticism nonetheless had an effect on the Athenian festivals. An attempt to harmonize the lunar year of 354 days, on which the Athenian calendar was based, with the solar year of 365 1/4, which was based on Thales' innovations, had failed. As a result, the ritual importance of certain cults overlapped with the attempt to adjust the calendar "with the consequence that ritual ploughing at the Skira festival, for instance, had no correlation with the actual ploughing of the peasants" (Pritchett 1979:165).21 In the Clouds, the chorus recollects in how many ways the moon benefits the Athenians; the moon complains that the Athenians disregard it (eT tci Greek life is something which might be better understood by a Papuan than a bishop, and perhaps best of all by the medieval Christian, whose humour was full of casual blasphemy and prompt to interweave the comic and the tremendous. The fact is that the Greek gods understood laughter; at the right time and place they could take a joke” (Dover 1968b:127-8). 2 1 A festival of women celebrated with secret rites. Like the Thesmophoria, it took place in honor of Demeter, the giver of crops, two days before the Dipolieia on 12 Skirophorion (Burkert 1985:227;230- 33;258; Parke 1977:156-62). 59 0upafv£iv EcpaoKE. Ssiva yap TT£TTOv0Evai/cbcp£Xoua' upaq anavTaq ou Aoyoiq aXX’ s p c p a v c o q - 610-11); they do not keep their calendar right (upaq 5’ ouk ayEiv -raq qp£paq/ou&Ev op0wq, a \ \ ’ ava> te <ai kcitg o kuSoiSottov, 615-6); the gods get angry and complain that they are deprived O f dinners wot’ c it t e iX e T v cp q o iv auTQ Touq 0souq ekcxotote,/rjviK * av yEuo0wai S e ittv o u K anfcooiv o i'K a S E , 617-8), and they return home in sadness at not having enjoyed their due festival as in the good O ld days (Tqq E O p Tqq p rj T U X O V T E q koto Aoyov to> v qpspcov. 619). The chorus refers to the method followed for the calendar change in which "the Greek solution was to insert an extra month at intervals by repeating one of the current twelve" (Parke 1977:24). Accordingly, Aristophanes alludes to the fact that the gods "may well expect a festival-sacrifice from the Athenians on a day which the Athenians, owing to intercalations, are not in fact keeping as a festival" (Sommerstein 1982:194). In addition, most festivals originated from rural and agricultural celebrations of the countryside. But with the Spartan invasion and the destruction of the farms, the rural communities were evacuated and concentrated in the city. Thus festivals were preserved as occasions of celebration, but with diminished significance; they were not looked upon as occasions of ritual tribute to the gods. In a way, this new approach to festivals suggests a situation similar to that of 60 modern holidays during which there is more emphasis on leisure and entertainment than observation of ritual. The debate between the two Logics provides us with allusions to the loss of the significance of festivals. The Unjust Logic attacks the antiquated ideals of the Just Logic by comparing him with the archaic and bizarre ritual of Bouphonia during the festival of Dipolieia (apxoua yc K ai A nro?uto5r| K ai TETTiycov avapEOTa/Kai K q K E iS o u K ai B o u c p o v fc o v . 984-5). The disappointed Just Logic complains that young boys hold their shields (during the ritual of the pyrrhic dance in imitation of battle scenes) as low as their groins in disrespect of Athena (c o o t e ( J * aTTayxeoS’ otov opxeToQ ai riavaSqvafoic; 5eov auTOU(;/Tr)v aorrfSa T p c ; K G o X r jc ; rrp o E X c o v tic; TpiToyEVEiry;. 988-9). Aristophanes' comic genius even subjects to caricature the linguistic arrogance and argumentative nature of the sophists by contrasting it with the Tasters' ritual in the festival of Apaturia. Pheidippides compares the method of the magistrates, who do not accept deposits on the day of the New Moon but on the day before, with that of the npoTEvQai. Strepsiades and Pheidippides argue from different perspectives. Strepsiades is happy to see Pheidippides after his training. He expects Pheidippides to help him defraud his creditors and agonizes with the idea of the old-and-new day (an expression which denotes the first day of the lunar month, on 61 which debts were due, and the last day of the preceding month, on which both plaintiff and defendant were to appear in the magistrate's office to settle a case. If reconciliation failed, however, the case was to be brought to the magistrate on the following day (the new) and the deposits paid. Strepsiades supposedly expected Pheidippides, if his creditors took him to court, to argue that the magistrate had accepted the deposits on the wrong day; thus he would not have to go to court and pay: Tqv evqv K ai veav. 1178). But Pheidippides, who pretends not to understand the common expression that Stepsiades uses, asks if there is such a day (evq yap eoti <ai vea tiq qpepa; 1179), since Strepsiades uses the expression as though old-and-new day is one day. Pheidippides, who explains the legal procedure to Strepsiades (1180-200), confuses him even more, and in order to get rid of Strepsiades' questions gives him the example of the 77poT£v0ai, with whom Strepsiades is more familiar (the old ritual becomes a vehicle to justify legal procedure, while Pheidippides' sophistic manner alludes to the confusion which verbal perversion brought to conventional thought). Evidently, all factors which resulted in the abandonment of customary religious beliefs and practices might have provoked the simple-minded people to view them as consequences of sophistic education. And Aristophanes, who treats the influences of novelty in a comic (even satirical) way 62 in the Clouds, anticipates the danger contained in the ideas diffused "by teachers who were not part of the city and who took away some of its promising young men, a growing lack of respect of traditions, customs and the right of parents" (Muir 1986:215). In the second part of the debate between the two Logics (961-1023), the Just Logic nostalgically recollects the old times during which moderation and respect were men's primary virtues: the men whom the old generation bred and who made Athens great; the men who are ridiculed as old-fashioned by the new educational approaches, which instead produce effeminates rather than strong bodies trained in gymnastics. While the Just Logic disapproves of gatherings and chatterings in the market place (ou O T p c o p u X X o o v koto Tqv ayopav Tpi3oXeKTpaneX’, oTamp oi vGv,/ou5’ e X K o p e v o c ; nepi npaypomou yXiaxpavTiXoy£^£TTiTpiTTTou, 1003-4), the Unjust Logic traps him with Homer's discription of brave and wise men as ayopqTaf (1055-7): H t. e T t’ ev ayopa Tqv SictTpipqv ylyciq, Eyw 8’ ettoivw. e i yap rrovqpov qv,"Opqpoq ouS ettot’ av e tto ie i tov IS lE O T O p ’ ayopqTqv av, ou8e to u c; a o < p o u < ; anavTaq. The Just Logic objects to young men's taking hot baths as an unmanly and cowardly habit (oTiq kokiotov eoti <ai S eiX ov ttoeT tov av5pa. 1046); but the Unjust Logic counter-argues that Heracles (whom the Just Logic considers the greatest-hearted man: Eyw 63 jjev ou&ev’ ‘H p aK X £o u < ; PeXtIov’ avSpa K pivco.1050), is on the contrary a devotee Of hot baths (nou VU X P ® & nTa ttwttot’ e T S e c ; ‘Hpa<Xeia XouTpa;/KaiToi tic; avS pE ioTE poc; i*jv ; 1 0 5 1 -2 ).22 And while the Just Logic acknowledges Peleus as the ultimate ideal of modesty and moderation and the only fortunate mortal (since he was chosen to marry the goddess Thetis simply on the basis of his virtues: k c c i Tqv ©etiv y’ £ynM e Sia to o c o c p p o v fT v o llqXEuq. 1067), the Unjust Logic challenges him on the premise that no one derives any benefit from being modest (ettei ou 8ia to a c o c p p o v E T v tw ttcI)ttot’ e T 8 e < ; qSq/aya0ov ti y£vop£vov; cppaaov, K ai p’ E ^E X E y^ov eittcIjv. 1061-2); for even Peleus, argues the Unjust Logic, was abandoned by Thetis because she preferred a more enjoyable sex-partner (1 0 6 8 -7 0 );2 3 Ht . kSt ’ aTToXiTToOoa y ’ auTov coxst’' ou y a p Pjv uPpioTqc; ou8’ q8uc; ev toT c ; OTpcopaaiv Tqv vukto uavvuxiC£iv- yuvq 8 e auvapoopoupEvq x0 1 «pci- ou S’ eT Kpovinrroq. Aristophanes himself was a product of that generation which experienced the impact of the first sophistic teachings. The cultivated aristocrat of the late fifth century B.C. must have been familiar with the limitations and contradictions that 2 2 This refers to the warm springs at Thermopyiai, which were said to have been created by Athena (Peisander fr.7) or Hephaestus (Ibycus fr.19) for Heracles. 2 3 Thetis is still with Peleus in Iliad (1 .396;18.55-60) or else has returned to the abodes of her father Nereus (1 .358;24.80-83). But in Sophocles (fr.151) she left because Peleus abused her verbally, while she was attempting to make the infant Achilles immortal (Ap. Rh. 4.866- 879). 64 the traditional (anthropomorphic) religious beliefs had imposed upon the ordinary Athenian (he caricatures these limitations in the persona of Strepsiades). His mockery in regard to the introduction of novel gods, religious beliefs and standards of novelty might have been a reaction to the boldness and immoderation of the exponents of the new movement against a people who still relied upon the glories of the past. Thus all intellectuals, foreigners and representatives of novelty "are lampooned to the point of not seeming to be worth serious attention, but embedded in the comedy are signs of some revealing trends" (Muir 1986:215). The popular stereotype views these proponents of novelty as lazy, useless, wicked swaggerers, dangerous vagabonds, proponents of atheism and immorality and ineffective logic choppers; and so Pheidippides alludes to them in the beginning of the Clouds (102-4): aipoT, T T O v q p o i y \ oT8a, t o u <; a^a^ovaq, T o u q c b x p iw v T a q , to u < ; a v u T T o 5 r)T o u c ; M y e i t ; , & v o K a K o B a lp c o v Ic o K p a T q q K a i Xaipecpwv. 65 CHAPTER TWO O P O N TIITH P IO N AS M Y ITH P IO N loo. PouXei Ta 0eTa TTpaypaT* eISevoi aacpax; it I > \ I A « cctt eotiv op0oo<;; I t . loo. Kai auyyevecQai toT c ; NEtplXaiaiv e!< ; Xoyouc;, TaTq qpETEpaiai Saipoaiv; vq A ” , eVttep eoti y£. I t . paXioTa y£. loo. K a 0 l^ £ T O IV U V ETTI T O V lE p O V O K ip T T o S a . I t . 18ou, Ka0qpai. loo. t o u t o v i t o i v u v XafiE T O V O TECpaVOV I t . etti t i oricpavov; oYpoi, IooKpaT£<;, ooanEp p£ t o v ’A0apav0’ o tto o< ; pq 0 u o e t e . loo. o u k , aXXa t o u t o navTa to u c ; TEXoupsvouc; qpETq nooupEv. I t . eT to 8q t i KEpSavoo; loo. Xlysiv yEvqasi TpTppa, KpoTaXov, nainaXq. I \ \ I w 1 1 / aXX EX QTpEpEI. I t . pa t o v A" ou yEuoEi y£ p£- KaTaTTaTTopEVOi; yap naiTTaXq yEvqoopai. loo. £ucpqpE?v xpq t o v TTpEoPuTqv Kai Tqq euxq<; e t t o k o u e iv . Several scholars have agreed that Clouds 250ff. is a parody of a mystery cult initiation of some kind (Adkins 1979:13-24; De Vries 1973:1-8; Dover 1968a:130-1; Guthrie 1952:210-5; Harrison 1908:511-17). The students of the <PpovTioTqpiov are portrayed as a religious community and "the teacher is accorded exaggerated respect and an almost guru like status" (Muir 1986:213). Socrates assigns the students the role of TsXoupEvoi (258) and he assumes the status of a high ( Clouds 250-63) 66 priest, a hierophant, who takes Strepsiades through an initiation ceremony. As has been shown so far, the proponents of novelty are lampooned and caricatured in the Clouds as representatives of amorality and atheism who attempted to eliminate the traditional anthropomorphic pantheon along with all "factors that had once had a religious significance" (Cornford 1922:138). And yet one of the most important trends of the new movement, as Aristophanes presents it, is the idea of the acquisition of a strong group solidarity. At one extreme, the Clouds exposes and reveals the atheistic attitudes of presocratic philosophy and sophistic teachings and, at the other extreme, it presents them as being embodied within a communal religiosity with a centralized priesthood and dogmatic overtones, into which admission is gained by initiation. Before I proceed with the examination of the cppovTioTrjpiov as a religious community, however, it is necessary to give a brief account of certain philosophical issues. In the course of Greek philosophical speculation there were two currents of development, "separate in origin and divergent in tendency" (Cornford 1926:523). The first one, the Ionian, which originated at Miletus and was founded by Thales, gave rise to the rational and skeptical tradition of the 67 presocratics, who "were endowed with an indefatigable curiosity about the nature of the external world, the process by which it reached its present state, and its physical composition" (Guthrie 1962:1:3-4). This school of thought, the philosophic speculations of which were examined in Chapter One, in its endeavor to gratify an intellectual appetite for knowledge, reached a conception of a divine power very different from that of the polytheism of larger Greek society. The god which the Milesian philosophy had conceived- namely, "an indeterminate mass of living stuff" (Cornford 1926:544)-might have had a divine power attributed to its immortal and animate properties, but it was not subject to religious awareness, love and worship. Scientific speculation gained ground and acceptability: polytheism was supplanted by scientific monism, while religion and mythology became the targets of criticism and detachment (Cornford 1926:523). The Milesian tradition abstained from satisfying spiritual needs and aspirations in regard to the question of the destiny of the soul; it did, however, assert that it was "a thing that could neither preserve its material identity after death, nor in any spiritual sense be saved" (Corford 1926:544). By contrast, the second current, the Italian, established in southern Italy by the Samian Pythagoras, remained more associated with the traditional religion insofar as it undertook 68 to reconstruct rather than to eliminate religious life. In the Pythagorean (Italian) tradition, knowledge "is no longer the child of wonder and of the unacknowledged desire for power over nature," but it "became, if not a mere means of virtuous living, at least identified with the well-being and well-doing of the human soul" (Cornford 1926:544). It is in this tradition that knowledge is combined with faith and hope in the pursuit of scientific discoveries and the introduction of novel ideas, and in which the scientific aspect complements the religious. In addition, the Pythagorean current of philosophic inquiry originated in a region where Orphism was widespread; consequently, it was influenced by, and closely associated with, this type of mystical religion. In fact, the Pythagorean brotherhood was intimately connected to mystery religions and organized in a way similar to the mystical cult-society. An initiation ceremony was a prerequisite for admission into the Pythagorean community and involved purification and the revelation of truth. The purification process included an ascetic way of living and abstinence from certain foods, as well as a dress code. Furthermore, Pythagorean purification "was reinterpreted intellectually to mean the purification of the soul by theoria, the contemplation of the divine order of the world," while the sequential revelation "consisted in certain truths delivered by the prophet-founder (outo<; ecp a), and 69 progressively elaborated by his followers under his inspiration" (Cornford 1922:139-40). Thus the Pythagorean tradition remained akin to the ancient mystery cults through its maintenance of a religious character in association with ritual, rules of admission and modes of regulation in pursuing spiritual satisfaction. The essential feature which caused religious cults to be labeled "mystery religions" is found in "a class of rites which were secret, in a sense that the privilege of witnessing them and of receiving the consequent benefits was reserved to those who had undergone a preliminary purification" (Cornford 1926:524); this also distinguished them from ordinary public ceremony administered by the state. Mystery religions were more or less similar to one another in purpose and organization, and overall their basic and common trait was the idea of salvation, life-renewal and spiritual restoration as a consolation for the uncertainties of future life with an implicit preoccupation with the destination of the soul after death. Another important characteristic of the mystery cults, with the exception of the Eleusinian Mysteries, is that they were foreign in origin, style and spirit (Burkert 1987:20- 1).1 They developed and were active in the same geographical 1 Burkert mentions that there must be some Egyptian influence even in the Eleusinian Mysteries, or at least in the Eleusinian mythology associated with the practice of "healing magic" by fire. 70 regions in which science, skepticism and rationalism flourished and spread within the Greek world during the fifth century B.C. The Derveni papyrus, a contemporary Attic Orphic text with commentary (West 1983:67;75-81 ;94), verifies that the essential features of Orphism and its intercult associations were known to Aristophanes, who grasps the opportunity to caricature the cult-based religio-philosophical views of the Pythagoreans, their ascetic and taboo-oriented life "and much of the mumbo-jumbo associated with initiation into 'mysteries'" (Dover 1972b:209). Moreover, there is general scholarly agreement that Aristophanes' depiction of Strepsiades' entrance into the cppovTioTnpiov is similar to the process of an initiation ceremony into a mystery cult. Nevertheless, there is much argument among classical scholars as to which mystery cult in particular the initiation scene in the Clouds parodies; in the argument, the actual text of Clouds frequently gets overlooked. In this chapter I will focus primarily on the play and show that Aristophanes in fact uses elements not just of one but of a variety of mystery cults that were known to him. I will then suggest that features of the Eleusinian Mysteries as well as the Bacchic, the Korybantic, the Orphic and the Pythagorean all play some active role in the mystery-initiation process of the cppovm oTqpiov in the Clouds. 71 The first evidence that Aristophanes uses mystery terminology occurs as soon as Strepsiades knocks at the entrance of the cppovTioTrjpiov and encounters the student who opens the door. Strepsiades' abruptness infuriates him, and the student accuses Strepsiades of interrupting a recently discovered idea (135-7). Strepsiades apologizes and insists that the student reveal to him the miscarried idea (138-9). Instead, the student replies that it is prohibited by divine power that an idea be divulged to anyone except the students themselves (aXX* ou 0 £|ji<; T T X q v to ? < ; (ja0QTa?aiv Xeyciv. 140). Strepsiades insists that he should not be considered an outsider, since he intends to become a solid member of the group (141-2), and the student assents and decides to tell him, provided that Strepsiades considers the revelations holy secrets (Xi^co, vopioai S e TaGTa X P H puaTqpta. 143). The above lines function as an introduction to inform us that the 9 povTioTnpiov is an independent, self-sufficient and closed community. The student sets a boundary between the cppovTioTqpiov and the outside world, and, in addition, he specifies the privileges of the insiders as opposed to the outsiders. The society within the cppovTioTqpiov is exclusive; it has the prerogative of secrecy, and secrecy is what "determines who belongs to the group and who is to be driven away” (Burkert 1983:253). 72 Equally important to the inside/outside dichotomy of a group is the process of initiation. Membership in a social unit is what determines its growth, strength and well-being. The more members there are in a group, the stronger its presence and the more firm its social standing. Hence the harder the admission standards, the more well-founded the group. As Burkert writes, Construction and penetration of barriers through the ritual of initiation are mutually determinant: secret and initiation are features of one of the most successful structural forms in the human community. By referring themselves to the superhuman authority of the holy, such groups have survived for thousands of years (1983:253). Similarly, Aristophanes portrays Socrates' cppovricn-ripiov as a well-established, impenetrable, and secretive society, into which Strepsiades must undergo initiation. The actual initiation ceremony is threefold: Strepsiades sits on an iepov aKipnoSa (254), he is crowned with a a-recpavov (255) and is sprinkled with TpTppa namaXr) (260) (Dover 1968a:130). Although anthropological work on initiation ceremonies has covered a wide range of areas (from the Australian aboriginal tribe-initiation to the sororities and fraternities of American universities), and although it has generally been accepted that an initiation ceremony involves "a status dramatization or a ritual change of status" (Burkert 1987:8), 73 the initiation procedures of the ancient mystery cults are unique. They do not constitute puberty rites or rites of passage connected with biological crises such as birth, maturation, reproduction and death (Norbeck 1974:42). Instead, there is no visible change of status in relation to the individual's identity with his outward social group; rather, the change of status is directed inwards and affects the perspective of the participant in relation to the god or goddess. As Burkert maintains, The agnostic, in his view from outside, has to acknowledge not so much a social as a personal change, a new state of mind through the experience of the sacred. Experience remains fluid; in contrast to typical initiations that bring about an irrevocable change, ancient mysteries, or at least parts of their rituals, could be repeated (1987:8). Initiation into mysteries, therefore, was not obligatory, but rather a matter of individual decision and personal choice. It was accomplished in a secretive manner and was intended to change the mental perspective of the individual in his encounter with the sacred (divine) (Burkert 1987:11). Strepsiades, seems to fall within this very pattern. Before the initiation passage proper, Strepsiades replies affirmatively to Socrates' questions as to whether he wants to know about, and communicate with, the divinities of the cppov/Tio-rnpiov (250- 3): 74 Ig o . pouXei T c t 0 £ ? a TTpaypaT’ eiSevai o a c p c b q S t t ’ e o t i v op0a><;; I t. vrj AC, eVmp eoti y£. I g o . < a i o u y y E V E O 0 a i T a T q N l£ c p £ i\a ia iv dq X o y o u g , T aT q qp£T£paiai Safpooiv; I t . pa^iaTa y£. In addition, Strepsiades decided to join the cppovTicnripiov of his own volition (126-8); he did have a divine experience through his acquaintance with the Clouds (314ff.), and he did change his mind in respect to the traditional pantheon (425-6) after his instruction concerning his new experience with the divinities of the <ppovTiaTr)piov. In examining Strepsiades' initiation procedure, I will attempt to find parallels to the threefold features (enthronement, baptism and coronation) of initiation in the Clouds with all mystery cults that Aristophanes might parody. Dover (1968a:130) suggests that © p o v g o o k ; (254f.) and baptism (260ff.) jibe with parallel features known from Demosthenes (18.259). Demosthenes describes Aeschines' assistance of his mother in initiating people into a cult in which Aeschines purifies the initiates (<a0afpGov tou<; teXoupevou*;), wipes them with clay and bran (nai anoppaTcov tu rrqAw <ai to ? < ; ttitupoiO, raises them from the purification place (<ai avicn-a<; ano tou <a0appoG), and instructs them to say, "I have escaped the bad; I have found the better" (k 'c p u y o v kokov, £5pov apEivov."). ’Aviotok; naturally suggests a sitting posture for the initiates during the process 75 of purification and parallels Strepsiades' enthronement in the Clouds. Demosthenes' description of initiation rites alludes to the celebration of Orphic-Bacchic mysteries of Phrygian origin, in which Sabazius, the son of Rhea or Kybele, was worshiped, and who was identified with Dionysus Sabazius. But the cult of Sabazius in the time of Demosthenes was regarded by traditional Greeks as disgraceful, abusive and foreign. "Sabazios was never admitted even to the outskirts of Olympus" (Harrison 1908:417). In comedy Sabazius reflects the popular tendency for foreign worship and, as Strabo reports of the Athenians, "They adopted many sacred customs from abroad and were ridiculed in comedies for doing so, and this especially as regards Phrygian and Thracian rites” (X.3.471). Aristophanes' allusions to Sabazius are associated with foreign influence (Birds 875f.), orgiastic worship affecting women (Lys. 387ff.) and compelling, irresistible sleep of slaves (caused by excessive drinking: Wasps 5-12).2 As Harrison 2 Ammianus Marcellinus (26.8.2) comments that when the emperor Valens attacked Chalcedon the besieged shouted "Sabaiarius" to him by way of insult. He explains then that s a b a ia is the drink of the poor in Illyria made of barley or corn turned into a liquor (est autem sabaia ex ordeo vet frumento in liquorem conversis paupertinus in lllyrico potus); Hieron C om .7 (in /s.cap.19) comments that there is a drink made from grain and water, which in the provinces of Dalmatia and Pannonia is called sa b aiu m in the local barbarian speech (quod genus est potionis ex frugibus aquaque confectum et vulgo in Daim atiae Panoniaeque provinciis gentili barbaroque sermone appelatur sabaium). O. Schrader, R eallexikon 89, suggests a possible derivation of Sabazius from sab aia. Thus an 76 comments, "Sabazios, god of the cheap cereal drink, brings rather sleep than inspiration" (1908:419), a point especially comparable to Aristophanes' allusions to Socrates in the Clouds: (Socrates is depicted as a low-class, cheap 9 povTioTr)q, who confuses rather than inspires Strepsiades). Furthermore, 0povcooi<; is mentioned in Plato’s Euthydemus (277d) in reference to the Korybantes in the cult of Meter. While Kleinias is puzzled by the questions of the two sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, Socrates attempts to console Kleinias by showing him that the two sophists treat him in the same way that the Korybantes treat those who are to be initiated ( t t o i e T t o v 5 e t c x u t o v , onEp oi e v t q t e X e t q to o v Kop^avroov, o t o v Tr)v 0p o vc*> o iv rroicbai T T E p i t o G t o v , o v av (je X X c o o i t e X e T v ) . Socrates explains to Kleinias that during the Korybantic initiation ceremony there is dancing and merrymaking; and the two sophists (Euthydemus and Dionysodorus) dance about him and perform their sportive gambols with a view to his subsequent initiation (<ai vG v t o u t g o o u & e v aXXo q x°P£^£ T O V rap* Ka> 6pxeTo0ov nal^ovTE, w < ; p£Ta t o G t o teX oG vte).^ Aristophanic parody of the cult of Sabazius would be appropriate for mocking the poverty of the cppov-no-rnpiov and that of the historical S o crates. 3 Dio Chrysostom (O r.12.33) refers to initiations in general with t u KdXoupevtp ©poviap^; for © p ovio po i M qTpw oi as a work of "Orpheus" see Suda 0 654; cf. Nock (1941):557-81; Cole (1984:26-3). 77 Besides ep6vw cn<; (which Dover finds present in the initiation rites of both the Korybantic cult and the cult of Sabazius), in respect to baptism, Dover comments that, "sprinkling (or plastering) of the initiate with various substances" in the purification practice mentioned by Demosthenes "is, of course, a different matter from the general practice of purifying persons and premises by sprinkling or pouring water; it is the latter, not initiation rites, which Justin Martyr Apol. i.62.1 compares with Christian baptism" (1968a:131). Evidently Dover attempts to compare the Christian sacrament with that of the purification practiced by Aeschines, but he omits altogether any mention of sprinkling in the Eleusinian Mysteries. As for the coronation in Strepsiades' initiation, Dover comments that Aristophanes makes use of it for the sake of comic effect by recreating a legendary situation of human sacrifice. Chaplets were used in very many festive occasions, with the result that, in ordinary life, wearing a chaplet would not strike one as being important or in any way associated with initiation. "A chaplet," argues Dover, "is an element not attested in our evidence for initiations" (1968a:131). It is obvious that Aristophanes uses a variety of comic effects in lampooning all representatives of novelties, and therefore modern scholarship should allow the possibility that 78 he might also be indirectly or symbolically representing certain features of mystery cults which it would be considered aoepe*; to portray in a comic play. The possibility, however, that Strepsiades' initiation in the Clouds might depict traits similar to those of the Eleusinian rites has been eliminated on the grounds that the Eleusinian Mysteries constituted a cult that could not be taken lightly in ancient Athens. Therefore, any parody of the Eleusinian rites may have been considered "not as amusing but as blasphemous by Aristophanes' mass audience" (Adkins 1979:15). It is true that the ordinary Athenian citizen might have been closely related to his gods in every aspect of social life and might have put up with their ridicule in comedy, but he would be intolerant of the mockery of the cult of Demeter and Persephone (Dover 1972b:208). The basic reason lay in the fact that the closed group of mystai "was identified with the polis" (Burkert 1983:253), and the polis of Athens was closely related to Eleusis. Hence the Eleusinian Mysteries were incorporated within the state religion and were sacred from the political and social stand-point (Harrison 1908:512). Scholars therefore conclude that mockery of foreign cults would be a more appropriate target for popular humor and prejudice. In particular, the rise of Pythagorean philosophy and its relationship (and debt) to Orphism, suggest that Strepsiades' 79 initiation ceremony is an Aristophanic parody of Orphic Mysteries (Guthrie 1952:210).^ The setting of the c p p o v -r ic r r r ip io v indeed provides the elements familiar to the Orphic-Pythagorean cult-perspective and life-style. The divided concern (between heavenly and earthly matters) of its clientele alludes to Orphic cosmogony and doctrine about the double nature of man, the heavenly and the earthly; that is to say the good and the evil and the need for purification from the Titanic element.5 In addition, Socrates himself impersonates an Orphic figure in his first encounter with Strepsiades. He is raised, prophet-like, suspended high in the air while he contemplates the sun (225). Thus he is like Orpheus ascending a mountain to revere the sun, as the myth reveals.5 Consequently, Socrates alludes to the prophetic 4 Guthrie claims that this suggestion was first proposed by Chr. Petersen (1848:41) and not by A. Dieterich Rhein. MusAQ (1893):275ff., as Harrison maintains in P rolego m ena (1908:511). ®The Titanic element refers to the evil nature of man in the Orphic religion. According to the myth, the infant Dionysus-Zagreus, the son of Zeus and Persephone, was attacked and cut to pieces by the Titans. The Titans boiled his limbs and devoured them, but his heart was saved by Athena. Athena brought it to Zeus, Zeus swallowed it, and a "new Dionysus" sprung from Zeus, the son of Zeus and Semele. In this case, the Titans, the murderers of the god, represent the primeval power of evil. They dismembered the One into many parts, but he was reborn as One again. The Titans were punished by the lightning flash of Zeus and, from the ashes, sprung the race of man. And so man inherits both elements: the good derived from Dionysus and the evil derived from the Titans. ^According to the hypothesis to the Orphic Lithika, Orpheus was devoted to Helios, so every year Orpheus had to appear on a mountain to perform an annual sacrifice to Helios. The sacrifice custom was constituted by Orpheus' father, because when Orpheus was a child, he was almost killed 80 nature of Orphism by the way he addresses Strepsiades as "creature of the day" (223), and thus he makes a distinction between his position as high priest (an Orpheus-like founder of the cult of the cppovTio-rnpiov) and that of an ordinary mortal (Strepsiades). Socrates' invocation to the Clouds (264-6) provides another unique and striking parallel with some of the extant corpus of the Orphic hymns: S i 6 e o t t o t ’ a v a £ , a p l T p q T ’ ’Aqp, o q e'x eiq T q v y q v p E T E c o p o v , ^ a p r r p o q t * Ai0qp, o E p v a i t e 0e o u N E cpcA ai P p o v T r ja iK E p a u - v o i, a p 0 r )T £ , < p a v q T \ & S E a r r o iv a i, t<£> c p p o v T ia T q pETEGopoi. "’Arise, appear to the thinker,’ is taken from the concluding line of an actual hymn, with ’thinker’ substituted for mystes" (Guthrie 1952:213). *AqP (264), Ai0qp (265) and Xaoq (424) also constitute important principles for the beginning of Orphic cosmogony "in a vague order of nature impersonation and the wirlpool of things unborn" (Harrison 1908:515), and certain hymns contain personifications of natural phenomena, such as aither, stars, clouds and winds among others (Guthrie 1952:556-9). Although there is no evidence of a o k i|jt t o u < ; in mystery cult initiation ceremonies, it is used symbolically by Aristophanes as a comic equivalent of O povoq, and it has been attested that candidates for the Eleusinian, the Orphic and the Korybantic by a snake bite, but he found refuge in the sanctuary of Helios and was saved. Cf. Harrison (1908:461-2:512). 81 initiations were in all cases seated (Harrison 1908:514). As for the c r re c p a v o v which follows immediately Strepsiades' 0 p o v c o a iq , there is no evidence for garlanding in Orphic initiation ceremonies. Garlands were, however, used on various religious occasions (as Dover mentions in his commentary) and several cults had special priests whose duty it was to place a garland on people's heads and who were called o -re c p a v o c p o p o i (Guthrie 1952:212; Harrison 1908:157). The wearing of a garland also constituted the final initiation stage for the purpose of consecration and ordination in the case of priests and hierophants (Theo. Smyrn. M ath em .\A 8)J Moreover, literature attests that the initiates into Bacchic mysteries "were garlanded with poplar, because this plant is chthonic, and so is Dionysus, the son of Persephone" (Burkert 1985:294). It is assumed that Aristophanes might also be alluding to Bacchic mysteries and their association with hope and blessedness in the afterlife. The fact that he uses the generic oTE cpavov, without specifying the particular method of coronation, does not belie the probability that he intended to caricature the Pythagorean soul-doctrine by utilizing symbolic representations and indirect allusions to every cult-trait that was known to him. Likewise, Aristophanes employs oK ipnouc; for 7 As stated by Theo. Smyrn. Mathem. (1.18): t e t o p t h 5 e 6 5 q ko! te A o $ Tf(<; etto ttteio k; a v a 8 £ai<; Kai oTEppaTcov ETri6 Eai<;... 5a 8 ouxia<; T u y o v T a iEpo<pavTEiot<; r) tivo<; aAAqc; iEpoaiivry;. 82 enthronement in substitution of epovoc Nor can it be argued that the mystery cult that Aristophanes parodies in the C louds cannot be "Eleusinian, not of the underworld" (Harrison 1908:512), since the most common characteristic of all mystery cults was their promise of happiness, hope of salvation, and blessed circumstances after death. As we will see later, evidence of chthonic elements in the Clouds affirms Aristophanes' allusions to the underworld and the salvatory purpose of the mystery cults (and particularly that of the Eleusinian Mysteries). The final feature of Strepsiades' purification ceremony involves frication with fine flour (TpTppa TrainaAn). According to the scholiast on C/.260, Socrates rubs and hits pieces of porous stone against one another and, collecting their remains, pelts the older man with them: tc sOt o p e v ^ e y c o v o Ic o K p a T r jq A fQ o u q T T E p iT p ip c o v rro o p iv o u q K a i K p o u c o v r r p o q a A X r jA o u q o u v a y a y w v t o o t t o t o u t c o v 0 p a u o p a T a p a X A e i t o v T T p £ a |3 u T r)V c x u t o T c; K a0anep t o i UpeTa TaTq ouXaT<; oi 0 u o v t£ < ;. As was mentioned above, this process is cited in Demosthenes (18.259) in association with the Korybantic rites, when Aeschines and his mother purified the initiates, and it recalls an episode from the Orphic myth wherein the Titans plastered themselves with gypsum in order to disguise themselves when they attacked Dionysus (see n.5; Linforth 1941:307-64). The worship of the Phrygian god Sabazius had 83 already reached Athens by the fifth century, and the Orphic rituals were influenced by his cult. The Orphics apparently adopted the purificatory initiation procedure involving clay for their own rites, and thus invented the slaughter of Dionysus by the disguised Titans in order to justify their own practice of plastering the initiates.8 Although this chapter does not aim at elucidating the origins of mystery cults and their influences, but rather intends to point out that Aristophanes parodies various elements of all cult societies in the C louds, it is difficult to distinguish exactly which cult he has chosen for Strepsiades' purification. Therefore, to say that Strepsiades is initiated into the Orphic society is as unreasonable as to say that he is initiated into the Bacchic or Korybantic cults. Strepsiades is initiated into Socrates' cppov-no-rnpiov which constitutes an amalgam and combination of occult principles and novel thought as well. An important aspect of both the Korybantic and the Bacchic rites, however, is the combination of dance and music, which is employed by both cults as a cure for symptoms of madness (Linforth 1946a:132). The mental disorder which the Korybantic rites succeed in curing (i.e., a turbulant state of mind mixed with confused emotions) springs from some kind of fear the participants experience (Linforth 1946a:134). But in 8 The suggestion has been proposed by A. Dieterich Rhein. Mus. 48 (1 8 9 3 ) : 2 7 5 ff. 84 Plato's account of the Korybantic rites (Law s 790d-791a) there seems to be a sudden language shift from the Korybantes to the mention of the Bacchic rites, which finally suggests that both cults relate to Dionysiac rites, since Dionysus was the god of telestic mania as distinguished from the erotic-philosophical, musical and prophetic madness. With the process of initiation and purification, the god relieves the initiate of "illness and grievous affliction" (Burkert 1985:292), evils which prosecute the family because of a preexisting rage (fury, indignation) (PI.P/?ae<1244de;265b; Linforth 1946b:163-72). As Burkert writes, "Liberation from former distress and from the pressure of everyday life, an encounter with the divine through an experience with the force and meaning of life, are present in Dionysiac initiation" (1985:293). The curative effect of the Dionysiac rites and the individual’s desire to alleviate his state of affliction are very similar to Strepsiades’ fears and anxieties about his debts (incurred by Pheidippides' habitual and extravagant horse- riding); and thus his subsequent decision to join the cppovTioTnpiov in order to defraud his creditors and free himself from debt. The play opens with Strepsiades' soliloquy, in which he recounts his debts (1-24). He has had a sleepless night while Pheidippides dreams of horses (16;24-34), and he fears that the time has come to pay interest to his creditors (16-7). He 85 requests that his slave bring him his accounts (18-20) and, in view of his debts, he wishes that he had knocked his eye out with a stone (21-4): cp ep ’ ’18&0, t ( 0 9E 1 X C 0; S co S eko i pvaq riaafa. T o u ScoSekcc p v a < ; r i a a l p ; t i E x p q a a p q v ; o t ’ e n p i a p q v t o v K O T m o m a v . o'l'poi T a X a q , eY0 ’ E ^ e K o n q v r r p o T E p o v t o v ocp0 a X p o v XiOcp. Strepsiades' decision to join the 9 povTioTqpiov (128) and his intention to learn the fraudulent argument (244-5) result from his desire to avoid a situation which befell him on account of Pheidippides (117-8) and, at the same time, to cure himself of an equine affliction (74;243) that has fallen upon him on account of his wife's upper-class background. Strepsiades cannot even cope with his son's aristocratic upbringing; Pheidippides does not obey his father's wish that he join the 9 povTioTripiov (119), and upon his father's threat of eviction from the house, the son states that, in any case, his uncle Megacles will support his lifestyle (121-5). Thus Strepsiades is confused, mentally and emotionally bewildered. When Socrates purifies him with TpTppa namaXq (260), he does so with a KpoTaXov, which, on the one hand, might allude to the rattling noise produced by the stone-rubbing in the Orphic fashion of initiation (as the scholiast comments), or, on the other hand, KpoTaXov might well allude to the emblem of Dionysiac orgia (Burkert 1985:295). Although there is no evidence that Socrates dances around Strepsiades, Socrates might have moved to the 86 castanet's rhythm. Furthermore, there is evidence that Strepsiades' state of mind is affected positively by the singing of the Clouds, as he asks Socrates to tell him who these ladies are who voice the majestic song (314-5): I t . rrp o c ; t o G A io q , 6 v t i|3 o A c o a c , 9 p a a o v , T iv e q eY o ’ , & l a r KpaTEq, oG toi a l c p 0 £ y ^ 6 tp £ v a i t o u t o t o C E p v o v ; All ancient mystery cults have a specific place of origin, a specific range of activity: they form individual circles and their labeling revolves around ritual patterns, a group of people, a locality and the name of an authority figure which determines their identity. For example, Orpheus is the singer and the prophet; Pythagoras is the philosopher and the charismatic leader; Dionysus, Demeter and Persephone are deities. Nevertheless, their areas of activity, body of rituals and pursuit of renewal of life and salvation of the soul may coincide from cult to cult. Consequently, just as the Orphic and Bacchic myths of Dionysus, with their concern for burial and afterlife coincide, so too do Orphic and Pythagorean asceticism and the doctrine of metempsychosis; there is also a concurrence between Orphism and the Eleusinian Mysteries (Burkert 1985:300). In fact, an Orphic poem dealing with the arrival of Demeter and the bestowal of culture at Eleusis was familiar to Aristophanes and his audience (Staudaucher 1942:77-121; West 87 1983:116-75). In addition, there is just as much evidence in the Clouds that Aristophanes parodies the Eleusinian Mysteries as there is evidence that he parodies other cults. The secrecy that "epitomizes the mysteries is the basket closed with a lid, the cista mystica” (Burkert 1985:276). But Aristophanes neither refers to nor caricatures any of the secretive elements of the Eleusinian Mysteries. It is only the belief of modern scholarship that, if Aristophanes had attempted to imitate the language of initiation specific to the Eleusinian Mysteries, he would have earned the condemnation of the state and his audience. As Burkert says, If m ysticism means personal introspection, the opening of a deeper dimension in the soul until a light shines forth within, then the Eleusinian mysteries were precisely un-mystical. They were celebrated in front of thousands of participants in the sealed initiation hall (1983:248). The entire, threefold initiation process which Strepsiades undergoes at the <ppovTioTr|piov is also present in the Eleusinian pur)oi<;. That epovcooiq formed an introductory ceremony for the candidates of initiation in the Eleusinian Mysteries is attested in Hesychius (Burkert 1983:266). Moreover, the 0p6vcooi<;which takes place in the Eleusinian Mysteries indicates an imitation of the Homeric Hymn to Dem eter (192-211), which portrays Demeter veiled and seated on a stool, covered with a ram's 88 fleece. Eleusinian 0p6vcoa^ thereafter is depicted in the pictorial tradition and it is specifically connected with Heracles' initiation into the Eleusinian Mysteries. Reliefs too present Heracles veiled and seated on a stool covered with a ram's fleece, "while either a winnowing fan is held over him or a torch is brought up close to him from beneath” (Burkert 1985:286)— a depiction which in ancient times was interpreted as a purificatory act by air and fire (Serv. A e n .6.741 ; Georg A .116). In the Homeric Hymn to Demeter the participant is a goddess, while in the pictorial tradition the participant, Heracles, is a puoTnq. Obviously, the psychological effects which the (juoTqq experiences are similar to those of the goddess. Thus the candidate for M uq oic; must suffer the unknown in a state of abandonment and helplessness-a condition which is analogous to the overwhelming state of sadness which the goddess Demeter suffered when in search of Persephone (I refer to the idea that the ritual is the enactment of the myth). As Burkert comments, "whereas the mystai must 'suffer' and were passively affected by the events, the epoptai were 'observers' with a broader, calmer view" (1983:275). A similar situation is no less detectable in the relationship between Socrates and Strepsiades, and this is parodied by Aristophanes in the initiation scene. Strepsiades is frightened by his new experience, and he pleads with Socrates 89 not to sacrifice him (257); and when the prayer is sung and the Clouds appear (263-6), Strepsiades covers his head with his cloak (267-8).^ But Socrates maintains his calmness and explains to Strepsiades that all initiates experience the same routine (258-9). Strepsiades' self-veiling seems to create a situation parallel to those of Heracles' initiation and the Homeric description of Demeter. It is possible, then, that Aristophanes might allude to the Eleusinian Mysteries somewhat cryptically, since his modus operandi includes aspects similar to the operation of various cults. After all, Strepsiades is not veiled from the beginning of the ceremony, but rather covers himself with his cloak to avoid possible inundation by the Clouds. The coronation aspect of Strepsiades' initiation might also allude to two features of the Eleusinian program. First, it is mentioned in literature that during the great procession from Athens to Eleusis the mystai carried a bundle of branches, called P 6 ikx°<;,10 and that "on the day of the mysteries at Eleusis, for instance, the suppliant's branch is the symbol that seals his death" (Burkert 1983:283).11 This ritual requires the 9 According to Dover (1968a:135), tout! indicates that Strepsiades pulls his him ation up over his head. 19Hsch.: Pc*Kxo<;...Kai k X c k S c k ; ev Tau; teAetoik;; Cf. Schol. in Ar. Eq.408: (J6ikxou<; EKaXouv...Kai tou<; K A aS o<; o u < ; oi pucnrou q>Epouai; SerV. Ae/7.6.136. 11 Kallias the dadouchos claimed that it was vopo<;...naTpio^, o < ; av 6q iKE-rnpiav pucrrqpioK;, TE0vavai (in Andoc.110-6). 90 involvement of an appqToq 0ua(a, during which the hierophant demands a symbolic murder, the sacrifice of the suppliant; and it is viewed as "a sacred form of sacrilege" (Burkert 1983:283). Aristophanes then very likely alludes to this Eleusinian ritual by representing Strepsiades as wearing a garland; thus he fears that he will experience an Athamas-like sacrifice (275). Moreover, it might be this symbolic appryroc; 0ua(a to which Socrates refers in his invocation to the Clouds, since no actual sacrifice takes place in the play (uTTaKouoa-re Se^apEvai Suofav <ai to7<; iepoToi xapsToai. 274). The importance of this allusion lies in the idea of the expiation of guilt, which in the myth of Athamas is associated with his contrivance against his children (see Chapter One:n.2). But in the Eleusinian Mysteries, this applies rather to the suppliant's liberation from ancient guilt upon his entrance into a new stage of life and salvation. And it therefore provides similar connotations for Strepsiades' commencement in the cppov-noTqpiov: the need to expiate an upper-class marriage (due to which he abandoned his career as a farmer), Pheidippides' expenditures and his debts. Second, it seems very likely that the allusion to Athamas' sacrifice, in combination with Strepsiades' covering of his head to avoid getting wet at the appearance of the Clouds, parallels Eleusinian purification during the procession from Eleusis to Athens. During this procession a twofold purification involves 91 sprinkling with the blood of a sacrificed pig and a sea bath (Parke 1977:62).12 Therefore, the imaginary Athamas-like sacrifice is not only associated with the symbolic sacrifice of the suppliant during the Eleusinian initiation ceremony, but it also alludes to the actual custom of the pig sacrifice. As for the rain-sprinkling of the cppov-rio-rripiov's principal deities, the Clouds, this may be a cryptic Aristophanic allusion to the customary Eleusinian sea water and blood-sprinkling or, at least, an allusion to baptism of some kind. The final phase of Strepsiades' initiation provides additional parallels to the Eleusinian Mysteries. It is tempting to connect the TpTppa namaXri substance (260), with which Socrates purifies Strepsiades, with the mXavoq and kukewv which the initiates consume before the initiation proper in imitation of Dem eter.13 Aside from the evidence that Aristophanes might parody an Orphic ritual, no one can deny that he may have had in mind some kind of sieved meal, whether it was TTan-raXn, tt eXo iv o c; or kukeojv. In addition, it should not be considered pure coincidence that the Eleusinian mystai received mXavoq and kukeco v the day before the initiation proper. Neither is it 1 2 fh is purification process took place on the second day of the festival and it was known as "Seaward, Initiates!" 1 3 This ritual occurred on the sixth and final day of the festival. According to the Homeric Hym. Dem., when Metaneira, the queen of Eleusis, offered a cup of wine to Demeter, Demeter refused it and asked instead for a mixture of water, flour and the herb pennyroyal. 9 2 coincidental that Aristophanes also places this ritual last, during Strepsiades' preliminary purification, since Strepsiades (as we will see later) has yet to undergo the second initiation (4 9 7 ff.). Even more, Cl.267-74 furnishes an analogy with the last post-initiation ritual of the Eleusinian Mysteries, the nx£H°v°Xoa'- Strepsiades' concern with the arrival of rain, which is caused by the Clouds (267-8), and Socrates' invocation prayer (269-74), allude to a sort of magic rite involving the pouring of water by the initiates in order to encourage rain. And during this rite, the initiates called out the formula ue-kue (Kerenyi 1962:135;1967:141; Mylonas 1961:270-1).14 In both the order followed by Aristophanes and the order of the actual mysteries, the ritual succeeds the initiation. Moreover, there is additional confirmation in the Clouds that Aristophanes does not exclude the Eleusinian Mysteries in his endeavor to produce a cult-like cppov-rioTnpiov. As was mentioned above, Strepsiades undergoes a second initiation and, as we will see later, Pheidippides also experiences one. Strepsiades' second initiation is first suggested by the chorus. 1 4 nxeHovoxoa! took place on the eighth day of the festival and took its name from a spinning, top-shaped vessel with a firm base which was used in the ritual. Each initiate took a pair of such vessels, filled them with water, and tipped one eastward and one westward, uttering the mystic formula u e _ k u e . Hipp. (R&f.5.7.34) writes: T O p£ya Kai a p p r |T o v ’ E X e u o iv ig o v puaTnpiov u e k u e ; cf. Proclus in Timaios (293c) states: e v to T < ; 'E X e u o iv io k ; ispoT^ e <; p e v t o v o u p a v o v o iv o i(3X ettov/T£<; e (3ooov u e ," K a T a f} X E y a v T £ < ; S e e !<; y r j v t o “k u e ." 93 The chorus leader advises Socrates to give Strepsiades a preliminary lesson (476-7): aAA’ eyxdpei to v TrpEoPuTqv OTmep peAAeic; TTpo&i6aoK£iv Kai Siokivei to v voOv auTou Kai Tqq yvcopqc; arroncipco. Strepsiades' second initiation then actually begins at 497ff., and it involves a change of environment. Strepsiades must follow Socrates to an inner room of the cppovTioTrjpiov, a fact which causes Strepsiades to react as though he has to deal with the incubation of Trophonius (505-9):"* 5 Ico. ou pr) AaAqoEic;, aAA’ aKoAou0qa£i<; Epoi avuaac; t i 6cupi G oitto v. I t . eI< ; tco xe^p£ v/uv/ Soq poi p eAit o Gt t o v npoTEpov, cb c ; 5 e8 o ik ’ £yco e’ i'oco KaTaPafvcov coanEp e!< ; Tpo9COvfou. Ico. x ^ P 6 1 1 - t i KunTa^Eic; e 'x^ v TTEpi Tqv 0upav; Strepsiades' double initiation seems to follow the division of the Eleusinian Mysteries into the Lesser and the Greater."* 6 in addition there was an interval between the former and the latter and an analogous interval occurs between Strepsiades' first and second initiation ceremonies. An initiation ceremony 15An oracular sanctuary in Boeotia near Lebadeia. It was customary for those who entered the cave of Trophonius to placate the snakes with honey-cakes. A complete account of the oracle of Trophonius is given by Pausanias (ix.39.5). " I ®The Greater Mysteries were associated with the autumn season of ploughing and sowing, when the new crops are committed to the cold and dark womb of the earth; they took place on 15 Boedromion (September). The Lesser Mysteries were held in Agrai on the lllisos in the month Anthesterion; they balanced the ploughing-sowing association of the Greater Mysteries with the coming of the spring, the time of vegetation rebirth, and their association with harvest. into the Greater Mysteries presupposed initiation into the Lesser Mysteries. Therefore all candidates for the Eleusinian puqoK had to experience a preliminary purification and consecration during the festival of the Lesser Mysteries, and this served as preparation for the candidates' initiation into the Greater Mysteries (Burkert 1983:265; Parke 1977:58). It was in the Greater Mysteries that initiation proper took place, and on the prescribed day, after all requirements had been met, the ijuotcu, on their way to the T£*£cnT|piov (the initiation hall), entered the gateway to the precinct of Plouto, a structure similar to a grotto (Burkert 1983:287). Like that of the Eleusinian mystai, Strepsiades' second initiation takes place inside a grotto-like structure, and the introduction of Trophonius might be an Aristophanic device intended to allude to the program and structure of the Eleusinian initiation ceremony. Aristophanes, however, is very cautious with his allusions to the Eleusinian Mysteries. Not only does he disguise them by combining elements from a variety of cults, but he also reverses the order of the Eleusinian events; or, in instances where he maintains their exact order, he does so with an equivalent allegory (e.g. the sacrifice of Athamas at 257 and the oracle of Trophonius at 508). For example, although Strepsiades' entrance into a structure which recalls the incubation of Trophonius alludes to 95 events taking place in the Greater Mysteries, Strepsiades' formal and elaborate initiation ceremony at 254ff. should be subsequent to the preliminary and preparatory one at 497ff. in order to correspond directly to the programmatic stages between the Lesser and the Greater Mysteries. There is no doubt that Aristophanes parodies features of the Eleusinian Mysteries, but he does so with successful concealment. Evidently, when Aristophanes reaches the climactic point at which Strepsiades will receive his instruction, he does not go beyond the allusion to daw KaTapcuvwv (508) and the oracular shrine of Trophonius. Nevertheless, the oracle of Trophonius was visited with inquiries about immortality and divinity for men, in the same sense that the Eleusinian mystai were preoccupied with future life—namely, life after death. The entrance to Trophonius' sanctuary was considered a visit to infernal regions. "It was a 'descent into Hades' as much as the legendary 'descents' of Heracles, Theseus, Orpheus and other bold heroes. It was therefore no wonder that it was a terrifying exploit" (Guthrie 1950:231).17 A terrifying encounter was also the experience of the Eleusinian mystai as soon as they entered the sanctuary of Plouto (also in the underworld) on their way to the Telesterion, and their 17Ka-rapaoK; ei< ; "AiS ou was a title given to many poems. Kern (1922:304ft.) and Cook (1925:2:1075) refer to the oracular shrine of Trophonius as tc a T a fJ a a io v . 96 subsequent experience in the telesterion itself. As Burkert comm ents, Darkness enveloped the multitude of many thousands and only a few small flames provided a bit of light, in front of which the priests-hierophant, dadouchos, priestess of Demeter-now played their parts. The journey into the underworld suggested in some literary sources was not realized in any concrete sense at Eleusis. Yet the darkness of the sealed room may well have evoked a sense of nearness to Hades (1983:280). But terror finaly subsided with the assurance of blessing and the revelation of the Eleusinian secrets (Burkert 1985:288). Strepsiades' situation is more or less similar. On the one hand he is terrified, while on the other hand, he is willing to receive instruction designed ostensibly to deceive his debtors in the future. In addition to Strepsiades' fear in view of the inner structure of the 9 povTicn-r)piov, which he associates with the incubation of Trophonius, Strepsiades has to enter without his cloak, which he must leave outside before entering (497-500): Igo. Y 8 i vuv KdTaQou Solpomov. I t . qSticqKa t i; I g o. ouk aXAa yupvouq cioievai vopiCeTai. I t . aXX’ ouyi cpGopaacov eyooy' elaepyopai. I g o . KaTa0ou. t i AqpcTq; According to Mylonas' suggestion, there was at Eleusis a room for storing clothes, and the initiates dedicated the garments which they had worn during their initiation to the two 97 goddesses at the same time that the Plemonochoai ritual occurred (1961:279). Consequently, Strepsiades' entrance into the instruction hall of the 9 pov-rioTr)piov and the removal of his cloak might have been an Aristophanic allusion to this Eleusinian custom. Nor did Strepsiades get his cloak back, but rather traded it for knowledge, as he tells Pheidippides at 856- 7, in the same manner in which the Eleusinian mystai dedicated their garments for the sake of holiness and consecration.1 8 But even more important is the third initiation which takes place at the cppov-no-rnpiov, and this is the initiation of Pheidippides. Pheidippides receives his instruction without having undergone a test or an initiation ceremony. While Strepsiades is tested and retested and elaborately initiated into the society of the 9 povricrrnpiov by Socrates, Pheidippides' main instruction consists of the debate between the Just and the Unjust Logics over novel principles of thought as opposed to tradition, rather than principles of divine nature. Furthermore, Socrates is absent from Pheidippides' initiation (886-7): Ic*>. a u T o q |ja 0 r|O £ T a i r r a p ’ o u t o T v t o ? v X o y o iv eyco S ’ a n e a o |ja i. The icpEuq of the 9 povrioTr)piov suddenly stops performing initiation rites and passes his role to the two Logics. Initially, Pheidippides despises the whole circle of Socrates (102-4); he 18The clothes had acquired holiness from the ceremony: I P I.8 4 5 = F G rH 326 F4 comments that some garments were taken home to make swaddling clothes in order to protect newborn babies. 98 is unwilling to join the cppov-ria-rnpiov (108-9); he cannot possibly believe that any profitable learning can be obtained from such a circle (840); but finally, still unwilling, he follows Socrates inside (865-8). And yet Pheidippides, after initial unwillingness and prejudice against the Socratic 9 povTio-rr)piov, becomes a most devoted and indoctrinated disciple. "The notion that the myth corresponds to something in the mystery celebration" (Burkert 1983:280) is especially sustained at the Eleusinian Mysteries in the fact that among all adults, one child was also initiated every year in commemoration of the mythical Demophon or Triptolemus.19 In the case of Pheidippides' horse-riding hobbies and association with the knights (119-20), there is no ambiguity about whether he is a child or an adult. Pheidippides is a young man who has already passed beyond childhood. Even Strepsiades verifies his adulthood by assuring Socrates of Pheidippides' learning ability when he was a little boy (Strepsiades refers to Pheidippides as TTaiSapiov at 878). Socrates, however, confronted with 1 9 Demophon’s baptism by fire in Hym. Dem. (231-55). His name reflects the Sqpo<; of the Athenian community. Triptolemus (Hym. Dem. 153) is presented as one of the 8aaiXfjE<; with no significant importance. It was later that he became important to Athens on the claim that Demeter taught him the gifts of corn and agriculture. Athens used the myth of Triptolemus as political propaganda in order to receive the first-fruit offerings from the rest of the Greek states during the fifth and fourth centuries. Cf. Richardson (1974:194-6: for Triptolemus; 231-6: for Demophon). Xenocrates (fr.98) assigns to Triptolemus the command: yo vE T c; -ripav, 6eou<; KapnoK; ayaXXEiv, £a>a pq olvEaOaiJ Aristoxenus (D.L.8.23; Por.VP39; lam .VP99f.) assigns identical regulations to the Pythagoreans. 99 Pheidippides' rudeness, reluctance, indisposition and child-like stubbornness, does not hesitate to call him an infant, ignorant of the matters of the c p p o v T io T q p io v (868-9): Ic o . v i"|Tt u t i o <; y a p c o t ’ e t i KOI T (O V K p E p a a T C O V o u T p lfJ c o v T (O V £ V 0 a 8 £ . Thus there may be an Aristophanic allusion to the Eleusinian practice of one-child initiation in the treatment of Pheidippides. Furthermore, Pheidippides was selected to be initiated, and his selection was suggested by the Clouds, the principal deities of the 9 p o v T i a - r n p i o v (794-6): X o . h (J £ u ; & T r p E o P u T a , a u p P o u X E u o p s v , e ! a o i t i <; ulo<; e o t i v £ K T £ 0 p a p p £ v o < ;, TTEpTTEIV EKeTv OV O V T I O O U T O U p a v 0 a v £ i v . The above passage undoubtedly conveys the message that the target of sophistic teaching was the youth rather than older citizens. But it also expresses preference (choice) and selection of the young Pheidippides over the mature Strepsiades. The chorus' advice to Strepsiades to send Pheidippides in his place might allude to the selection of a boy for the Eleusinian one-child-initiation. Also, Pheidippides' behavior, reluctance to join the 9 p o v T i c r r r |p i o v and subsequent submissiveness, might very well project the behavior of a child who, depending on parental support and subject to parental will, must at the same time obey his parents' rules and desires. Finally, Pheidippides' instruction involves emulation of the Unjust Logic and inculcation of the novel ideas of the 1 1 00 9 povTioTr)piov; and by the same token, his subsequent indoctrination represents that of the disciples of the 9 PovTioTr)piov as a whole. Thus Pheidippides' initiation is parallel to that of the initiated child at Eleusis, who ought to be very attentive to "what he is told" and ought "to appease the gods in place of all those who are being initiated" (Burkert 1983:281). It seems as though the initiated child at Eleusis functioned as a mediator between the initiates and the gods, as a representative of the community, in a way parallel to that of Pheidippides (who, after his instruction, also represents all the novel elements of the 9 povTioTnpiov). Pheidippides also is the mediator between the initiates of the 9 povTioTr)piov and the outsiders. He is the mediator of the presocratic philosophical ideas and sophistic teaching and the perpetrator of change and transition from tradition to novelty. In addition, this entire notion of change of status exemplifies the purpose of all mystery cults including Eleusis—namely, soul-salvation and life after death. This does not necessarily indicate the concept of immortality (and immortality is never mentioned in connection with Eleusis, since death remains a reality), but it resolves the confrontation with death which is viewed as a new beginning, another kind of life (and equally good: Burkert 1985:289). 101 At the same time, the structural o r g a n iz a tio n 2 ^ 0f the mystery cults, and their conceptual concern with blessing and salvation after death (the idealization of transparency beyond what is concrete and tangible), brings them into juxtaposition with the circles of philosophy, the advocates and followers of philosophical thought and "the spiritual contemplation of the philosopher" (Burkert 1983:248) himself.2 " ' In particular, just as the Pythagorean tradition resembles structurally and conceptually the apparatus of the mystery cults and combines science and religion, Aristophanes approaches his creation of the 9 povTiaTr)piov as a composite of rational intellectualism that is also organized as a mystic society. The Pythagorean religious order did not center upon a ritual, but rather depended upon rules of living which evolved on the basis of things heard from the oral instruction of the master, aKouopaTa, and signs of identity called ouppo^a. Hence the elaborate initiation, te^etq, of the mystery cults was replaced in the Pythagorean religious order by © eoopfa and found its culmination in what had been established as B fo < ; riu0ay6peio<;. In a way similar to the Bioq nu0ayopeio<;, but in combination with 2 0 1 mean the corpus of institutionalized values and beliefs that held them together as separate groups from the community of the polis. 2 1 Burkert maintains that m ysticism as a contemporary concept rose from Platonic influences, since Plato used first metaphors of the mysteries (especially in the S ym . and P h aed .) to indicate the contemplative philosophical methodology, and thus the concept continued in Neoplatonism and Monasticism. 102 tcXeth in this case, the Orphics had also established a peculiar way of life which was expressed in B(oq 'OpcpiKoq (Burkert 1985:303; Guthrie 1962:1:146-340). Furthermore, the fact that Pythagoras was a historical personality reinforces the idea that Aristophanes intended to caricature his cult-like brotherhood under the mask of the historical Socrates by parodying the Socratic cppovTioTqpiov with diverse occult elements. Aside from the Pythagorean religio- scientific concerns, "legends which are old and characteristic introduce Pythagoras as a hierophant of an Eastern style Meter cult who proves his doctrines of immortality by a descent into the underworld" (Burkert 1972:155-8; 1985:299). Thus Aristophanes, by parodying the cppovTioTqpiov as a mystery cult society, has grounds to mock the Pythagorean religious doctrines, the Pythagorean mystery cult-like organization and their life-after-death concerns. The student's reference to Socrates as auTo<; at 219 is an Aristophanic allusion to outoc; stya, "a formula used to introduce sayings attributed to Pythagoras" (Dover 1968a:125; Diog. Laert. viii.46, cf.44=App. Anth.v.34). The Pythagorean preoccupation with piety and purity which inclined toward a highly tabooed asceticism, required that all new disciples be questioned intensely before joining the brotherhood (Burkert 1972:166-91). And so does Socrates require a detailed account 1 0 3 of Strepsiades' purpose in joining the cppovTiaTqpiov (fyQeq S e <aTa ti; 2 3 9-4 6): And at 478-80, Socrates wants to know Strepsiades' disposition in order to initiate him and reveal to him the truth: Ic*>. aye 5q , KQCTeirre poi ou t o v o o u t o O Tporrov, Y v’ auTov dScix; oonq I oti rj&q ’tti t o u t o iq rrpoq ae <aiva<; Trpoocpepco. The Pythagorean concern with wisdom, memory and intelligent thought formed the basic unity of scientific and religious thinking so as to pass beyond the limits of mere ritual and myth (Burkert 1972:161:209-11; Cornford 1922:138- 9). This preoccupation with memory and intelligence is reflected in Strepsiades, who is examined and cross-examined by Socrates for such qualities. In fact, after the chorus states the requirement of memory and thought at 414 (d pvqpcov eT kom cppovTiaTqq), it suggests (478) that Socrates stir Strepsiades' mind in order to test his judgment and intelligence. Furthermore, while Strepsiades thinks he is about to be assaulted, Socrates informs him that he (Socrates) only tries to test his (Strepsiades) memory (482-3): I g o . ouk, aXXa ppax^a oou nuQeoSai pouAopai, s Y (jvqpovi<6<; e T . Certain overlapping Pythagorean and Orphic rules of asceticism, along with dietary taboos, are alluded to in the choral passage-nam ely, a blend of elements from the Bfoq riuQayopeioc; and 'O pcpiK oc; which were incorporated in a society by 1 0 4 the reverence of memory and the observance of monasticism and frugality (412-17): Xo. < * > Tqc; peyaXqq £TTi0upqoa<; aocplac; avSpcorrE n a p ’ qpoov, cbq EuSafpcov iv ’AOrjvafoiq icon ToTq "EXXqoi yEvqoEi e! pvr|pcov eT <ai cppovTiaTqq kou t o TaXam oopov e v e o t i v e v Trj yuyci Kat PH KapvEic; p q 0’ EOTobq pnT£ paSftcov pr)T£ (biyuv ax0£i X lav p q T 1 ap icrrav £ tti0 u (je 7 < ; o’ l'vou t ’ otTTExei Kai yupvaolcov <ai t c o v aXXcov avoqTcov... Ascetic regulations and puritanism found an outlet in certain prohibitory and superstitious ordinances which affected one's daily life.22 For example, the Pythagorean regulation "to enter the sanctuary barefoot" (Burkert 1985:302)22 is alluded to at 858, when Pheidippides asks Strepsiades what he did with his Shoes (toic; 8’ E p 3 a S a c ; tto T TETpocpac;, S i ’voqTE ou;). Apparently, Strepsiades might have been required to leave his shoes, in addition to his cloak, outside before entering the inner 2 2 Dietary taboos excluded the consumption of beans, eggs, meat and wine. Guthrie (1962:1:183) lists the following Pythagorean ascetic regulations: 1. To abstain from beans; 2. Not to pick up what has fallen from the table; 3. Not to stir the fire with a knife; 4. To rub out the mark of a pot in the ashes; 5. Not to sit on a bushel-measure. 6. Not to wear a narrow ring (also given as "Not to wear a ring"); 7. Not to have swallows in the house; 8. To spit on one's nail-pairings and hair-trimmings; 9. Not to make water or stand on one's nail-pairings and hair-trimmings; 10. To roll up one's bedclothes on rising and smooth out the imprint of the body; 11. To touch the earth when it thunders. 2 3 lt has been suggested by Mylonas (1961:191-2) that the candidates for initiation in the Eleusinian Mysteries might have had to be barefoot. There is evidence that the participants at the mysteries in Andania had to attend barefooted (in W.K.F. Dittenberger, 2nd ed., 1915, vol.2, No 736.1.16: oi teXoupevoi to puorrjpia ovuttoSetoi EaTt*>aav), and they were found barefoot also at a stamnos in Eleusis. C.f. the sacred laws of Lucosoura, Ephem ., 1898:249; L. Deubner (1959:78). So Aristophanes may have had additional reasons to present Strepsiades barefooted. 1 05 structure of the 9 povTioTqpiov at 497ff. Moreover, the superstition "not to speak without light" (Burkert 1985:302)2 4 is reflected in Socrates' words, who orders Strepsiades to come out into the light before he receives additional instruction (631-3): t o O t ’ eniXeXqoTai rrpiv pct0£?v. ye pqv a u T o v KaXco 0upa^e SeOpo rrpoc; t o c p u q r r o u l T p £ y i a 6 q < ; ; £ ^ £ i t o v a o K a v T q v X a P < o v ; The Bfoq nu0ayop£ioq, however, with all its rules and regulations, piety and purification, values, superstitious beliefs and principles of asceticism, was underlined by the attempt of the religious community to imitate God by isolating and purifying the soul from the prison-like body. In addition to the view that the soul is contained within the body, the Pythagoreans also believed that god is embodied within the universe. So philosophic contemplation of the universe itself was their means of achieving soul-purification (Cornford 1 9 2 2 :1 4 2 ).25 According to Aristoxenus' comments about the Pythagoreans, 2 4 Burkert (1885:302) states additional Pythagorean regulations: 1. to enter a sanctuary barefoot; 2. Not to dip one's hands in the water vessel at the entrance of the temple; 3. To pour out libations at the handle of the vessel where human lips have not been placed; 4. Not to wear woolen garments; 5. Not to step over a broom or a yoke; 6. Not to break bread; 7. Not to speak without light. 2 5 There was also the belief that Pythagoras had himself reached divinity as reported by Aristotle (fr.192): tou XoyiKoO £coou to psv eoti © eo< ;, to 5e avQ pooTToq, to 5e o T ov nu0ayopa<;. Also Empedocles (fr.112.4, cf.frs.146, 147) believed of himself: ly&b 5’ G p T v 9e6 < ; apPpoTo^, ouketi 0vqTo<;, a saying that 106 Every distinction they lay down as to what should be done or not done aims at communication (or converse, opiXfa) with the divine. This is their starting point; their whole life is ordered with the view to following God (wpcx; TW c < koXou0£ ? v tw ©eco), and it is the governing principle of their philosophy (Ap. lamb. V.P.137, DK, 58D2). Consequently, Strepsiades' initiation into the 9 povTioTr)piov presupposes communication with the Clouds as it is alluded to by Socrates' question (252-3): loo. <ai auyyeveo0ai t o w ; NecpcXaioiv eiq Xoyouq, t o i7<; q p e T E p a ia i Scupooiv; Starting at 627ff. Strepsiades' instruction requires thought and contemplation in answering Socrates' questions. Strepsiades is represented as a creature incapable of original, contemplative thought, while Socrates, endowed with wisdom, is incapable of tolerating Strepsiades' high degree of ignorance. Nevertheless, Socrates gives Strepsiades a choice about what he wants to learn first: measures, words or rhythms. It is in Strepsiades' interest to learn measures first, but Strepsiades' definition of measure deviates somewhat from Socrates' aesthetic approach to the concept of three-and-four measure. In any case, Socrates proceeds with instruction in rhythm (6 3 6 -4 9 ): Ico. aye 5 q , t i |3ouXei n p w T a vuvi pav0av£iv echoed in the Orphic grave tablets in the form of: "From a man thou hast become a god." 1 07 &V ouk e6i5a^(0q<; rrdjrroT’ o uSev; cine poi. T T O T E p O V TTEpi p E T p C O V r} TTEpl ETTGOV q p U 0 p £ > V ; I t . m p i t £>v pETpcov syc^y’- cvayxoq y a p ttote utt’ aAcpiTapoi|3oG napEKonqv Sixoivliccp. Ia>. ou t o u t ’ EpcoTco o ’, aXX’ o t i kckXX io t o v pETpov rjyE?, noTEpov t o TpipETpov q t o TETpapETpov; I t . £yd> p£v o uSev TTpoTEpov qpiEKTEoo. I go. o uSev XlyEiq, covQpconE. I t . T T E p iS o u v u v I p o i Ei p q T E T p a p E T p o v E O T IV qpiEKTEG O V. Ico. e<; KopaKac;. cbq aypoiKoc; eT <at 6uopa0q<;. T a y u y ’ o iv S u v a i o p a v 0 a v E i v r r E p i fb u 0 p c b v . I t . t i 5 e p' cocpEXqoouo’ oi fiu0poi TTpo<; TaXcpiTa; The above passage, in addition to reflecting sophistic educational interests, also alludes to the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers, its relation to the musical scale and its dependency upon the formula of the Pythagorean a p p o v fa. The Pythgorean concept of the external world, the universe, was conceived on a scale similar to that of the body-soul relationship. The soul is purified to reach immortality and surpass its tomb-like body in the same way that God is embodied in the cosmos and the order of the heavenly bodies. As Cornford writes, The living creature (soul and body) is the individual creature or microcosm; the world, or macrocosm, is likewise a living creature with a body and soul. Individuals reproduce the whole in miniature; they are not mere fractions, 108 but analogous parts of the whole which includes them (1922:142). Furthermore, this is similar to what the historical Socrates seems to say in Plato's Gorgias: The wise tell us that heaven and earth, gods and men, are united by a bond of association and love and by justice and temperance or orderliness (Koapi6-rr|<;); an<3 that is why they call this universe an order (koo^oO, not disorderliness (aicoo(jia) or licence (507e). The Pythagorean philosophical approach, then, directs its focus upon the levels of nature and spirit. On the natural level, as Cornford comments, the soul acts as a vital spirit, distinguishing organic living things from mere casual inorganic masses of matter. In that respect it is conceived in Pythagorean mathematico-musical terms as a harmony or ratio expressible in numbers. It is the element of proportion in an ordered compound (1922:149). On the spiritual level, however, the soul is "a compound of good and evil parts - of the elements of limit, order, proportion, reason and the disorderly unlimited element of irrational passion. So considered, it is a permanent immortal thing" (Cornford 1922:149). Following the above frame of thought, Pythagorean mysticism gave special attributes to the numerical sequence of the tetrad regarding the physical level (of limited as opposed 1 09 to unlimited) and the spiritual level (of good as opposed to evil). Thus even numerals are associated with the principle of unlimited and evil, while odd numerals are connected with the corresponding principle of limit and good (Cornford 1926:549- 5 0 ).26 Therefore I suggest that this is what is emphasized by Aristophanes under the Socratic mask: the contradictory tendency of the Pythagoreans between monism and dualism; and this underlines the Clouds entirely. And it is presented against the chaotic background and conflicting powers of diverse intellectualism and traditional norms and values.2 7 In turn, the twofold Pythagorean approach brings up an additional point of binary significance which is alluded to in Socrates' words at 424, where he asks Strepsiades whether he will recognize the divinities of the cppovTioTqpiov, who are reduced to three ( t o Xaoc; t o u t ? te a t T a q N ccpeX aq te a ! T q v r X & T T a v , T p f a t o u t ! ) . I suggest, then, that Socrates' words T p ( a t o u t ! may allude to the Pythagorean monistic, and at the same time dualistic, tendencies. ^A ccording to the Pythagoreans, the Monad is both even and odd, good and evil, limited and unlimited; the Dyad is even, unlimited, an evil and female principle; the Triad is good, limited and represents the male p rin c ip le . 2 7 Burkert (1972:44:n.82; 299:n.73) gives a brief history of the attempts that have been made to trace the theory of ideas, via Socrates, back to the Pythagoreans, and the approaches that have been taken to evaluate the Socratic <ppovTiaTnpiov in the Clouds as a Pythagorean synedrion. 110 As I mentioned in Chapter One, no matter how diverse the Socratic gods may appear from passage to passage, in actuality they are reduced to three, as Socrates himself claims at 424. Thus one might say that the atheistic tendencies which shook tradition did not represent atheism in the same way that we use the word, but rather implied a tendency toward monism. Evidently, Tp(a tout! brings to the surface the Pythagorean significance of the triad which represented the good principle of limit and its association with the axiom of monism as Cornford describes it: "all life is one and god is one" (1 9 2 2 :1 4 0 :1 9 2 6 :5 4 6 ). But the Socratic gods, who are mentioned at 424, are Xaoq, NetpcXai and rxwTTa. One might infer thatXaoq and N ecpeXai can be reduced to one, since they both represent universal natural powers. When it comes to TX^tto, the view might change, since rx&TTa is not a natural phenomenon, but an individual (human) attribute. Consequently, I suggest that the morphology of the above Socratic gods might also have been an allusion to the axiom of dualism, the division of the world unit, on the one hand, and the individual unit on the other, which is represented by the conflicting powers of good and evil, limited and unlimited, light and darkness, as applied to both the universal entity and the soul. 111 Moreover, from allusions in Plato (R ep.589c) and Aristotle (Po/.a.i.12 where he states that the unsocial man is q 0qpfov q eeoq), it has been argued that Pythagoras divided the so u l- doctrine into three parts which corresponded to the tripartite division of existing beings (0£ia, av0pc*>rnvq, aXoyo<;).28 Accordingly, "man is the intermediate nature between the gods above him and the beasts below, the meeting-point of both" (Cornford 1922:148). In a similar way, the soul itself provides for internal reconciliation and concord, as it is the meeting place of the "central religious experience of the divided self, the internal warfare between good and evil, the Orphic double nature of man, the sense of sin combined with the consciousness of inward good and light taking part against inward evil and darkness" (Cornford 1922:147). Finally, in reviewing C/.424 (to Xaoc; tout! tck; N ecpeXaq <ai Tqv TAwttov, Tpfa TotuTi), we may infer that N ccpeX ai correspond to the meeting- point of both the Pythagorean tripartite soul-doctrine and the apologue of the three lives.2 ^ The NecpsAai, indeed, function as intermediaries in the Clouds; they represent the meeting-point between tradition and novelty, in their essence of both natural phenomena and the principal deities of the Socratic cppovTioTqpiov (as we will see in Chapter Three). 2 8 |t passes into later literature, e.g. Herm es (Strob. £ c /.l.3 2 3 .W ): ISeoi 5e yuX“ w ' ©Eia. avepcorrfvq, aXoyo<;. 2 9 For some reason Plutarch (Plac.iv.7.5.; Dox.393 ) ascribes to Pythagoras a twofold division into rational and irrational. 1 12 Besides, Socrates himself in Plato's Republic (iv.443b d-e) associates justice with the three parts of man's soul. Socrates maintains that justice is manifested externally rather than internally, but it depends on internal harmony and thus is achieved only when the three parts of the soul do not oppose one another. In the Republic Socrates talks ofTpfa o v to , while in the Clouds he talks ofTpfa t o u t !.30 The philosophic contemplation of the Pythagorean brotherhood of the divine order of the world in both realms, the individual and the universal, led to a series of intricate concepts which were applicable to a musical scale and to the production of sound. On the individual level such conceptions were formulated upon the physical condition of the body ( Kpaoic;=virtue, strength, beauty, health, etc.), in respect to the equal distribution and proportionate combination of the bodily 30»B ut in truth, justice, it appears, was something like this; not, however, in a man's outward practice, but inwardly and truly must do his business in himself. He must not have allowed any part of himself to do the business of other parts, nor the parts in his soul to meddle in many businesses with each other; but he must have managed his own well, and himself have ruled himself, and set all in order, and become a friend to himself. He must have put all three parts in tune within him, highest and lowest and middle, exactly like the three chief notes of the scale, and any other intervals between that there may be (w u t u teal auvappoaavTa Tpia ovto, akmEp opou<; TpeTc appovia<; aTEyvdx;. V E aT ry; icai uT raT ry; icai p£ar)<;, icai ei SXXa S t t o ije to < £ u T u y y a v E i o v t o , ) ; he must have bound all these together and made himself completely one out of many, temperate and concordant; and then only do whatever he does, getting of wealth, or care of the body, or even matters of state or private conduct." 113 fluctuations (hot and cold, wet and dry etc.: PI. Sym p. 18 6 c ).31 Consequently, the sound of music and the use of charms for physical illness were used in combination to cure a sick soul and a sick body to the point that "the distinction between soul and body were not so sharply drawn as to prevent the Pythagoreans from practicing psychotherapy" (Cornford 1 9 2 6 :5 4 8 ).32 In the Clouds too, Socrates, after realizing that Strepsiades' instruction has failed, asks Strepsiades to lie in bed and try to think of one of his own problems. For the sake of Aristophanic caricature directed toward the contemplative methodology of philosophy, Strepsiades prefers to lie on the ground, since disturbing bugs are creeping out of the bed (709- 15). Conversely, Socrates insists on bed rest as the only alternative (694-8): Ic*>. o u S e v p a A " , a X A a K aTaicXivEiq S c u p r I t . t i 6 p a r , I o j. £ K 9 p o v T i o 6 v t i t c o v o e o u t o u n p a y p a T o o v . I t . prj 8 rj0 \ iketeuoo, ’vTctuS a y \ a \ X ' e'ittep y £ y p n . y a p a l p ’ k 'a o o v a u T a tc x G t EK cppovTioai. Ic*>. o u k EOTi TTapa T a u T * a X X a . In addition, Dover mentions that in "a play by a certain Epicrates" there is the suggestion "that the Pythagoreans were ascetics not from high-minded frugality but simply from the poverty that is the natural result of abstention from usual 31 This concept started with Alcm aeon, a fellow citizen of Pythagoras at Croton. Alcmaeon (fr.4): -rr)v 8 e u y e la v T q v a u p p E T p o v t w v r r o io iv ic p a a iv . 3 2 Simon (1 9 78 :1 8 0-9 9 ) exam ines the role of the ancient philosopher as th e r a p is t. 1 14 work," a connotation which "strikes just the same note as Aristophanes' ridicule of Socrates in the Clouds" (1972b:209). Evidently, Aristophanes' presentation of the cppovTicrrnpiov takes the form of a cult society with allusions to any mystery cult that was known to him, whether Eleusinian, Korybantic, Bacchic, Orphic or Pythagorean. Most particularly, since the mystery cults shared basic features such as the idea of belonging (which mostly expressed itself in the sense of secrecy, the boundary of initiation as prerequisite to admission, and the preoccupation with salvation and life after death), Aristophanes was able to caricature the tendency toward cliquishness among intellectual circles (whether Pythagorean, sophistic, presocratic or the circle of the historical Socrates himself). Aristophanes does not caricature the Eleusinian Mysteries, nor does he reveal any of their secrets. He does use the Eleusinian Mysteries as a model of the Greek tradition to indicate how it was imitated (and at the same time revised) by foreign intruders. And he does this in the same way in which he uses the Olympian pantheon, festivals and traditional beliefs and values to demonstrate how they were revised and altered by the influence of rationalism and skepticism. The Eleusinian mystai believed that they lived a life more pious than that of ordinary people and foreigners, but they were 115 not detached from the rest of the community (Burkert 1985:301). The Eleusinian mystai were not subject to specific living conditions (as those of the Orphic and the Pythagorean cults), dietary taboos or a clothing code, as they did not distinguish themselves from the ordinary citizenry. The Orphic and Pythagorean concerns with a distinctive p fc > < ;, however, gave rise to deviation from what was considered to be normal and common with the formation of a peculiar and select way of life. The institutionalized establishment of exceptional piety, purity and hypochondria has been construed as an objection to the foundation and organization of the polis (Detienne 1970:141- 62; 1977:122-31; 1979:162-237). The dietary taboos and asceticism are seen as individualistic concerns rather than communal contributions, as a rejection of sacrificial meal and festival participation, rituals that formed the pivotal point of the traditional religious beliefs. "At all events," as Burkert comments, "instead of the pre-existing communities of family, city and tribe there was now a self-chosen form of association, a community based on a common decision and common disposition of mind" (1985:303). By the same token, then, the novel conceptions of presocratic philosophy and the indoctrination of sophistic teaching can be viewed as an elitist movement incorporated within a communal association and departure from the 116 traditional establishment. It was the Pythagorean elitist claim and disposition toward a life style segregated from that of others which led to their catastrophe in Croton (Burkert 1 9 7 2 :1 1 7 ).3 3 As a consequence of its distinct way of life, the Pythagorean society formed a strong political force in the city, extracted followers from the upper-class ruling families, and exercised power over the goverment and dominance over the city (Burkert 1972:109; Carter 1986:136). Furthermore, Carter w rite s : If the tradition of the central political role played by the Pythagoreans in Croton is well attested, it would be difficult to keep Pythagoras himself out of it, and the weight of probability must lie with the view that Pythagoras was involved in the political life of the city. At the same time he was also occupied with scientific and speculative thought and observation, and, in Plato's time, long after the original sect had been dispersed from Croton, there were to be seen, wandering through Greek cities the Pythagoristai, who claimed to adhere to the master's teachings: a species of unwashed mendicants and ascetics, the butt of comedians (1986:137). Yet the Pythagorean wanderings and proselytization resemble a similar practice undertaken by the O rpheotelestai, the wandering mystery priests, who appealed to the books of 3 3 In fact, by mid-fifth century, the Pythagoreans were killed and their houses were set on fire. 1 1 7 Orpheus, and themselves were no better than wandering beggars (as they are labeled by Plato in flep .3 6 4 b -3 6 5 a ): Beggar priests and seers come to the doors of the rich and convince them that in their hands, given by the gods, there lies the power to heal with sacrifices and incantations, if a misdeed has been commited by themselves and their ancestors, with pleasurable festivals...and they offer a bundle of books of Musaios and Orpheus... according to which they perform their sacrifices; they persuade not only individuals but whole cities that there is release and purification from misdeeds through sacrifices and playful pastimes, and indeed from both the living and the dead; they call these teletai, which deliver us from evil in the afterlife; anyone who declines to sacrifice, however, is told that terrible things are waiting for him. And so does Aristophanes allude to all proponents of novelty (rrovqpoi, touc; 6^ot£6va^, 102; Touq ci>xpiwvTa<;, Touq avunoSr(Tou<;, 103). Thus foreign intrusion and influence brought turmoil in mid-fifth century Athenian society and affected every aspect of life in respect to social, political and religious institutions. Aristophanes, then, seeing that every phase of novelty threatened the image of Euotpeia which insured the integration of the individual in the community, lampoons every aspect of it in such a way as to proclaim the immorality and suspicion of aoipsia. Before the events of 415, which resulted in trials of ao£p€ia on the basis of the mutilation of the herms and the 118 profanation of the Mysteries, the only earlier genuine trial of impiety was that of Anaxagoras (Ostwald 1986:530).34 His prosecution was undertaken by a decree proposed by Diopeithes circa 437/6 B.C., on the grounds of eioayyeXea0ai t o u < ; t o 0e?a pq vopfCovTa*; q Xoyouq nepi t w v peTapakov S iSo okovtck; (Ostwald 1986:525; Plut. P er.3 2 .2 -3 ). In a passage in Lysias, however, an Eumolpid accuser of Andocides claims that even Pericles had advised prosecution of impiety, on the basis not only of written, but also of unwritten laws (Ag. Andoc.6.10): riepiKXea ttote cpacn rrapouveoai up7v nepi t w v aae(3ouvTwv pq povo x p n °® ai T° ^ yeypappevoiq vopoiq nepi a iiT u v , aXXa Ka? ToTq aypacpoK;, Ka0’ ouq EupoXnfSai e^qyouvTai. But since there is no attested evidence about Pericles' statement, Ostwald, in his attempt to interpret the facts, has assumed that possibly "Pericles in one case may well have advocated recourse to cultic regulations enforceable by priests rather than to written laws," a statement that "whould fit perfectly as an argument against Diopeithes when the latter proposed his decree against Anaxagoras" (1986:531). It would have been in Pericles' interest to recommend that charges of impiety be enacted by religious functionaries so that Anaxagoras would not be subject to condemnation by 3 4 The only Athenian offences known to the Athenians before the trial of Anaxagoras were the conduct of the Archon Megacles, at the time of the Cylonian revolt and Aeschylus' divulgence of the Eleusinian secrets (if indeed a historical occurrence). See Ostwald (1986:528-30). 119 Diopeithes' decree, since Anaxagoras had never aroused suspicion of impiety against any religious cult (Ostwald 1986:528-36). Following verifiable facts, then, I suggest that Aristophanes might have been alluding to Diopheithes' decree of impiety, and possibly to Pericles' proposal that charges of impiety be lodged by the priesthood of the violated cult. Consequently, vopfoai 5e toutcx xph puoTqpia (143) might be interpreted as an Aristophanic allusion to the issues of aaepeia brought up by foreign intellectualism rather than an allusion to the secrecy of the Mysteries themselves. In addition, there is no clear evidence as to what the Eleusinian secrets might have been, except that they best incorporate the sense of belonging and forming a part of a group. Aristophanes parodies various features of the Eleusinian Mysteries and he does so both in order to expose the Pythagorean community and its own appeal to secrecy and to demonstrate that novel ideals, whether scientific speculation, skepticism or philosophic contemplation, have become subject to aoEpeia against what had constituted traditional religion and religious festivities. In fact, it is this Athenian tradition which the chorus praises (288-313); and this does not exclude the Eleusinian Mysteries (|juoto56ic o < : Sopo<;, 303) with all their respect and awe (o£|3 c «;, 302), secrets (appqTcov iepwv, 302), and sacred initiation rites (ev -reX eT cc T q ayfaiq, 3 0 4 )-a piece of patriotic glory that the 1 20 Orphic and Pythagorean contemplative religiosity with its separatist feature of ascetic life attempted to alter. Finally, as the background of the aoePouvTeq of 415 has proved, all trials of impiety included individuals who were close associates, friends and followers of the Socratic circle, the sophistic movement and, in general, the intellectual Enlightenment which exploded during mid-fifth century Athens (Aurenche 1974:191-228; Ostwald 1986:537-50). Therefore, all events preceding the KaKoSaipovicn-ou group of 414 B.C. "provided the most striking evidence that Athens had been polarized along religious lines...which demonstrate that the democratic establishment felt threatened by them, and their enormity is shown by the dimension of the witch hunt they provoked" (Ostwald 1986:533). <t>e. cpo|3eT 5 e 5 q t (; I t . t q v £vr|v te tcai veav. (Clouds 1178) CHAPTER THREE 121 THE MULTIFARIOUS CLOUDS Invisible harmonia is stronger than (or superior to) visible. Heraclitus (fr.54) Aristophanes’ Clouds has been labeled a comedy of ideas rather than a comedy of political focus exploring the corruptions of the Athenian demagogy (apart from an isolated attack on Cleon in the parabasis 581 ff.) and current matters of war and peace. It is, however, political in respect to its treatment of problems that have affected the stability of the polis in the confrontation of religious beliefs with imported ideas of a religious nature: the problems of pedagogy, the effects of rationalism upon morality, and the vopo<rcpuoi<; antithesis as they are illustrated in the encounter between Strepsiades and Socrates, the contest between the two Logics and the generational conflict between father (Strepsiades) and son (Pheidippides). As Henderson states, The essential comedy is built around the Begriffsstutzigkeit of Strepsiades 1 2 2 and the difficulties in which it involves him when he leaves the tolerant safety of his own home to try to hoodwink the city. Socrates and his pupils, Pheidippides, the two Logics and the creditors are secondary characters who illuminate the various facets of Strepsiades' predicament, besides providing much opportunity for the satire of current ideas (1975:70). The Clouds as a play may then best be described as a reflection of conflicting opposites, role reversals, character transformations, and double representations as regards the individual, natural (physical, environmental) and social domains; and the Clouds, as the representative chorus of the comic play, function as intermediaries between these conflicting opposites, in addition to embodying in themselves binary oppositions, role reversals and character transform ation. In Chapter Two I mentioned that the Necp^ai have a double nature as at once natural phenomena and the principal deities of the Socratic cppov-na-rnpiov. Thus their role as intermediaries in the play illustrates the meeting-point between tradition and novelty. Furthermore, in discussing the Pythagorean religio- scientific philosophy, I commented on the tendency to recognize not only the existence of one force (the axiom of Monism) but also that of two opposite forces (the axiom of Dualism). Hence the Pythagorean conception that both the individual (human, microcosm) and the universe (world, 1 23 macrocosm) operate in parallel lines resulted in the belief that in the individual realm nature is explained in terms of the inward conflict between good and evil, while in the universal realm it is conceived in the opposite attributes of light and darkness. In evaluating the Pythagorean philosophy, Cornford states: Light is the medium of truth and knowledge; it reveals the knowable aspect of Nature - the forms, surfaces, limits of objects that are confounded in the unlimited darkness of night. But it is hard to deny reality to the antagonistic power of darkness and evil (1922:141). 1 In turn, following the Pythagorean rationalization of dualism, we find that Aristophanes' Clouds and the Cloud- chorus are both constructed on the basis of similar precepts. The play begins with the interminable night, which is dispelled at the end with the burning of the cppov-ncrrnpiov (the element of fire corresponds to light). Strepsiades' plan to defraud his creditors commences as an evil intention which at the end turns out to be beneficial for himself and his tradition. And the Cloud-chorus' impersonation of Socratic deities is transformed at the end into the impersonation of traditional moralizer. Chapter Three will discuss mainly sets of conflicting opposites. More specifically, it will inquire into the Cloud- 1 Compare also the relevant Orphic belief in the Titanic element as applied to the evil nature of man in Chapter Two. 1 24 chorus' transformational role in Aristophanes' Clouds, the opposing forces that it exposes and the chorus' reflection on the antithetical pairs of the play as a whole. It is this double exposition of the antithetical forces in the comic play which depicts more vividly the conflicting issues between novel ideas and conventional religious beliefs and practices. It is the transformational character of the Cloud-chorus which illustrates the confusion and contradiction that philosophical speculation, skepticism and science brought upon the uneducated, lower-class masses. And it is the antithetical pairs of the Clouds which correspond to the Pythagorean "table of opposites," that reveal Aristophanes' intention to caricature not only the impact of change upon traditional culture, but also the contradictory tendencies of the exponents of novelty themselves. This refers in particular to the inclination of the Pythagorean brotherhood to form separatist groups which stood apart and were different from the rest of the culture, and to the tendency of novel movements to attack the traditional past of a society which depended upon the glories of its past. Therefore, the role of the Cloud-chorus as intermediaries in the play will demonstrate the conflicting coexistence of the old and the new; and the transformation of the Cloud-chorus will exemplify the limitations of traditional culture and clarify social misunderstanding as regards the perception of novelty. 1 25 The antithetical pairs under consideration which are exposed in the Clouds and correspond to both tradition and novelty are as follows: OLD (morality— Good) VS Tradition (gods, festivals, VS rituals, rites) Country life (Strepsiades VS before his marriage) Lower class (peasantry) VS Agriculture (fa rm in g ) VS Outdoor life (good health, VS physical strengh) Hard physical work VS VS VS Physical exercise (performed outdoors) Peasant rascality and vulgarism Cloud-chorus (associated VS with tradition and nature) NEW (am orality-B ad) Novelty (intellectual contem plation, scepticism , m aterialism ) City life (Strepsiades' wife, Pheidippides) Upper class (aristocracy) Political skills and training in the law courts Indoor life (pallor, sickly complexion, cppovTioTqpiov) Idleness and up-in-the- air nebulosities Mental exercise (performed indoors) Sophistic intricacy and deception Cloud-chorus (representing the Socratic deities) The role of the Cloud-chorus is certainly ambivalent. At Cl. 252-3 Socrates specifies that the N e c p e A c n are the deities of the 9 povTioTrjpiov in order to predispose Strepsiades to Cloud- supplication as a requirement for inclusion in the community of the cppovTiaTqpiov (xai auyyeveoOai T a ? < ; NecpeXaioiv e i< ; Aoyou<;,/TaT<; HpeTEpaioi Safpoaiv;). And yet, when Socrates calls upon the Clouds to appear, the Cloud-chorus enters the scene praising the world of nature rather than gloryfying the up-in-the-air 1 26 intellectual nebulosities and sophistic abstractions of Socrates and his crew. In the strophe they align themselves with natural, everlasting divinities, the daughters of Ocean, who leave the deep-roaring sea to rise up to the peaks of the tree-bearing, lofty mountains. They associate themselves with the life- giving water and they present themselves as the caretakers of the crops of the holy earth. They are allies of the rivers and the sea-water and are connected with heavenly light and outdoor life (275-90): X O P O I a e v a o i NecpeXai, apQcojjev cpavepai SpoaEpav cpuaiv Euayryrov rraTpoc; a n ’ ’Q k e o v o u Papuay£o<; uypXcov opEoov Kopu^ac; etti 5ev8poi<6pou<;, Yva TqXEcpaveTq oKomaq acpopcbpeOa icapnouq t ’ ap&opEvav iepav yQova Kai noTapoov £a0E6ov KEXaSrjpaTa <ai t to v t o v k e X o S o v to papuppopov- oppa yap ai0£poc a<apaTov OEXayErrai pappapcaiaiv auyaTq. aXX’ anooEiaapEvai VEcpoq opppiov a0avaTa<; iSeaq £TTi8cop£0a TqXEOKoncp oppaTi yaTav. The divine appearance of the Cloud-chorus and its association with nature, then, depicts the Clouds as natural phenomena, dwellers of the free sky and the open air as well as beneficial to farming, crops and fields. It more or less reflects the conception of the clouds in the ordinary Greek mind as rain- bearing and thus benevolent. In addition, the divine attributes 1 27 of the Cloud-chorus reinforce the Clouds' association with the praise of Attica, the land of Pallas and Cecrops, in the antistrophe. The chorus elaborates on the significance of the festivities, the dancing, the music, the sacrifices and the offering of gifts to the gods throughout the seasons--an encomium with special reference to the City Dionysia and the Eleusinian mysteries (since they constituted the most significant festivals of the Athenian polis, 299-313): Xo. TTap0EVOI opPpcxpopoi, £X0wp£v X inapav x®°vot naXXaSoq, suavSpov y a v KeKpcmcx; oyopevai noXuqpaTov oC aePac; appqToov tepoov, Yva pucrroSoKoqSopoc; ev TEX£Ta?<; ayiai<; avaSsiKvuTar oupavioi<; te 0eok; 8<opqpaTa, vaoi 0’ uyip£cpE?<; koi a y a X p a T a , <ai n p o ao 6o i paKapcov U p to T aT ai EuaTEcpavof te 0 ewv 0ua(ai 0aX (ai te navT o S an aT aiv copaiq, ?ip( t ’ EHEpxopEvcp Bpopia x&P1 ^ eukeX6(8c > ov te xopwv £p£0iapaTa koi pouoa papuppopoq auXwv. The Clouds specifically praise the Athenians for their pious devotion in worshiping the traditional gods. Their song, which has been considered one of the best lyric passages of Attic literature, consists of all elements that comprise the notion of the ancient Greek religion: myths, festivals, gift- offering and sacrifices at the temples of the gods. It is ironic, however, that the Socratic goddesses glorify the Athenian religious rites and observances, while Socrates does not even believe in the gods' existence. 1 28 For Socrates, the Clouds are divinities, the great goddesses of idle men, who bestow intelligence, discourse, understanding, fantasy, circumlocution, incisive and repressive power, as he explains to Strepsiades at 316-18: loo. q ia o T , aAA’ o u p aviai NecpcAai, psyaA ai 0eat avSpacnv apyoTq, aYnep y vw p q v <al 8iaAe£iv <ai vouv qpTv TTapexouaiv <al TEpaTefav icat ncpiXE^iv <ai Kpouoiv Ka5 K aTaXqyiv. The Clouds' flowing form and abstract composition resemble the scientific and intellectual pursuits of the Enlightenment, and, according to Segal, "their airy nature makes them the natural companions of the windy speculations of the m eteorosophistai" (1969:182). For Strepsiades, Socrates' divinities, the Clouds, represent deliverance and freedom. They stand for avoidance of reality and the evasion of his debts. But Strepsiades' actual image of the Socratic savior goddesses is different from the form the Clouds assume when they appear to him. While the Socratic Clouds are personified as mortal women, Strepsiades, who is confused at their sight, thinks that something might have happened to the Clouds Of nature (Ae£ov 8 r) poi, t i TTaOoOoai./e'irrep vccpeAai y ’ eiaiv aXq0cbq, 0vqTcn<; e’ l^aai yuvou£iv;/ou y a p eneTvai y ’ eioi T o ia u T ai. 340-2). Since the Clouds' presentation is ambivalent (as is the reaction/attraction of both Socrates and Strepsiades to them), Strepsiades' notion of the Clouds is associated with nature. At 1 29 336 Strepsiades connects the clouds with Typhoeus, the father of storm winds (“ TrXoKapouq 0’ EKctToyxEcpaXa T u c p £ > ") and with "flatulent whirlwinds" ("TTpnpaivouoaq te 0ueXXo k ;"); at 337 the clouds resemble "aerial long-lived" "crook-taloned birds floating in air" (otEpiaq SiEpaq" "yapyouq T > oioovouq a£povr|XeK')! anc^ 338 Strepsiades sees the clouds as rain producers ("opppouq 0’ uSc x t o o v SpooEpav vE cpE X av'1 -). In addition, Strepsiades' original conception of the clouds, as he admits to Socrates at 330, was that of formed mist, dew and vapor (smoke), attributes that reflect upon certain of their natural properties (pa A", aXX* op(XXr|v Ka> Spoaov auTaq qyoupqv k c u kcittvov e T voi). But 3S Reckford maintains, "Yet Strepsiades' simple-minded idea of them as 'mist, wetness, smoke' emphasizes certain of their tendencies. As the play progresses, mist and smoke come to symbolize the confusions to which mankind is subject" (1967:224).2 So far, judging from their entering lyrics and Strepsiades' judgment of them, the Socratic divinities identify more with the rural Strepsiades and his environment than with Socrates and the atmosphere of the cppovTioTqpiov. They form a part of the natural world, they are associated with light, water and farming, and their outdoor habitat allows them to take delight 2 Also in the Iliad the confusion of the war is presented as blinding mist (fog), but finally the clouds are "blown away by a purgatorial storm which clears the air morally" (Whitman 1958:151-2). Com pare the Xa9a<;...v£<po<: of Pindar (0 .7 .4 5 ; cf.//.23-25) in a context of imagery of rain, fertility and natural growth. 1 30 in the Greek religious festivities. Undoubtedly, the Clouds are associated also with Socrates, who has assigned them uniqueness in respect to their divine powers as he asserts at 365 (aCiTai y a p t o i povai e io i Seal, TaXXa Se t o v t ’ e o t i cpXuapoq)- But even the Clouds, in the role of the presiding deities of the cppovTiaTrjpiov, respect their master and acclaim him the best of the Current pETEcopoaocpioTaf (ou te Xetttototoov Xppcov Ie p eO, cppafe npoq ppaq o t i xPClCsi^'/ou y a p av aXXtp y ’ unaicouaaipEv toov vuv pETEcopoaocpiaTcbv, 359-60). Moreover, another characteristic of the Clouds is their talent to take different shapes and forms (an ambivalent and misleading presentation which confused Strepsiades in the first place in viewing them as anthropomorphic deities). And while the bewildered Strepsiades expects them to look like spread out flocks Of wool (eV^ o o iv 5 ’ o5v Epioioiv TTETtTapEvoiaiv, 3 4 3 ) , instead they present themselves to him in the shape of females (kouxi yuvai^iv, pa A”, ou5‘ otiouv oQtoi S e (b T vaq e'xouoiv. 3 4 4 ). But Socrates finds the opportunity to elaborate on their changing abilities: they take any shape they wish and desire (ylyvo vT ai tt6<v0’ o ti PouXovtoi- 3 4 8 ). In view of the long-haired savage like the son of Xenophantes, the Clouds turn into centaurs in mockery of his affectation (kS t* qv pev VSgooi KoppTnv/ ayp io v Tiva tw v Xaakov toutcov, otovnEp to v Eevo9 & v to u ,/ oKWTTTouaai 131 Tr)v paviav auTou K£VTaupoi<; QKaaav auTaq. 3 4 8 -5 0 ).3 In encountering Simon, the public plunderer, the Clouds become wolves in imitating his inner nature ( 6 1 1 0 9 0 Ivouoou Tqv 9 6 0 1 V o u t o u Xukoi e^ai9 vqq eyevovTo. 352). When they see the cowardly shield- dropper Cleonymus, they make fun of him by turning into deer ( t o u t ’ oipa, t o u t o KXedbvupov o Ot o i t o v fbiyaornv i8 ouoai,/oTi Sc iAo t o t o v t o u t o v ecop co v, £ ^ 0 1 9 0 1 81a t o u t ’ eyevovTo. 353-4). As for their present female shape, it is due to their encounter with the effeminate Kleisthenes ( koi vG v y ’ o t i KAeiaSevq tT 8 ov, opaq, 81a t o u t ’ eyevovTo yuvaT<£<;. 355). The multiphysiognomied Clouds, then, can be fooling and deceptive, and Aristophanes' conception of them represents a reflection on human character, human behavior and human nature. The Clouds comply with the illusionary desires, wishes and hopes of men. They fulfill human fantasies and aspirations; they lead men into the world of dreams and spin them into self- deception and confusion. After a long journey of the imagination, however, the Clouds bring men back to reality (the case of rascal Strepsiades); the Clouds show men as they actually are, and they manifest the power of limitation in human expectations and utopian dreams. 4 3 Compare Ixion's deception, infatuation and intercourse with a cloud in Pindar (Pyth.2). 4 The deceptive nature of the clouds is also illustrated in Homer (//. 14). Hera surrounds herself and Zeus with a golden cloud, an episode that illustrates the fooling power of sexual fantasy, which Hera controls in 132 In fact, the confusing and deceptive intentions of the Clouds are even alluded to as early as their lyric glorification of Athens, its religious rites and elaborate festivals in the parodos. At 311-13, while they commemorate the coming of the spring, rich in Dionysian joy, singing and dancing, excitement and provocations (epeefopaTa, 312) accompanied by the deep- sounding music of the pipe (a festive celebration reflecting on the Clouds' performance as well), they pave the way for their own confusing and teasing role. As Reckford writes, The word, erethism ata, refers to tragic and comic competitions, but in the present context it also means 'teasing,' the gentle and beautiful provocation of our spirits by the dance and song, the music and the wit of a comic performance. Strepsiades is teased into infatuation, but we are stirred to joy by the poet's larger enchantment, as he experiences and transmits a high exhilaration in the god's service-a 'grace' or 'joy of Bromios’ (1 9 6 7 :2 2 5). Furthermore, the Clouds' female shape (which they assume under the mask of Socrates' deities) emphasizes even more their deceptive nature. First, they entice Strepsiades with their majestic song before his acquantance with them. Strepsiades, astonished by their singing voices, thinks that the Clouds are some kind of female heroines (npoq t o G Aioq, av-nPo*£> order to help the Greeks. 133 oe, cppaoov, Tive<; e’ i'o’, & IcoKpaT£<;, a u T a i/ ai <p0£y$;apEvai t o u t o t o a£pvov; poov q p w vai tivec; eIoiv; 314-5). Second, their interest in Strepsiades' wish to be the most eloquent speaker in the Greek world (429-30), along with their promise to satisfy his desires (431-2), seduce him further. Finally, Strepsiades is entirely infatuated with the Socratic goddesses, especially after the Clouds’ assurance that he will obtain the object of his desire since his wishes are only modest (a sarcastic statement with connotations in the opposite direction); and Strepsiades entrusts himself completely to their guile (435-8): X o . t e u ^ e i t o i v u v &v IpEipEiq- o u y a p pEyaXcov e t t iS u p e k ; . a M a o e o u t o v , rrapaSoq 0appobv ToTq qpETEpoiq TTporroXoiaiv. I t . Spaaco TaO0’ upTv nioT£uaa<;- q y a p avayicq p£ niE^ei 8 i a t o u c ; ‘r r r n o u q t o u ^ K o n n a T i a t ; K a i t o v y a p o v o<; p ’ e t t e- TpiyEV. And yet, Strepsiades relies on the Clouds to escape his creditors just because he considers his present state of despair the result of a ruinous marriage (as he mentions at 437-8 above). Indeed, Strepsiades recalls his and his wife's contrasting backgrounds in the opening scene of the play. Besides marriage to a city woman, Strepsiades had to confront also her aristocratic class in the family of Megacles. He describes his life before he married the niece of Megacles as lazy, sweet and unswept. An unshaven farmer, he could sleep whenever he pleased and he subsisted on olives, sheep and honey bees. On their wedding day, Strepsiades' appearance and 1 34 approach reflected his country life (he smelled of wine, cheeses, wool and affluence), while his wife's attitude mirrored the extravagance of city life (she smelled of perfumes, saffron, lustful kisses, expensive taste and gluttony). Combined with her voluptuous nature and sensuality went a rather demanding sexual appetite (41-55):^ eV 0’ q TTpoiJvrjaTpi’ anoXeoQai icatcw q q-riq (je yqp’ snqpE Tqv aqv pqTEpa. epoi yap ayponcoq qBiOToq pfoq, EU pC O TIW V, O tKO pqTOq, £i<q KEipEvoq, Ppucov (JEAiTTaiq Kai Trpo|3aToiq tcai OTEpcpuAoiq. etteit' EyhM0* MeyaKAcouq tou MEyatcAEouq aSEAcpiBqv ayponcoq gov e£ aoTEGoq, O E p v q v , T p u c p c o a a v , E yK £ico iau p G O |j£vq v. TauTqv o t’ lyapouv, auyicaTEicAivopqv £y<b o£cov Tpuyoq, Tpaaiaq, Eplcov, TTEpiouoiaq, q 5’ aS pupou, KpoKOU, KOTayAooTTiapaTtov, BaTiavqq, Aacpuypou, KcoAiaSoq, TEVETuAAfBoq. ou pqv Epco y ’ tbq apyoq ?jv, aAA’ Eana0a, Eydj 5’ av auTq ©oipcmov SEiKvuq toB i n p 0 9 aaiv Ecpaaicov c * > yu vai, Aiav cnra0aq. It seems, however, that Strepsiades' marriage into the urban aristocracy was also a result of seduction and infatuation. He had the desire to live beyond his means and to be fulfiled thereby; and his infatuation with the Socratic divinities reflects this unrealistic desire. In the first place, if Strepsiades had been so pleased with his rustic a n p a y p o c r u v q , he would not have been fascinated by the matchmaker's proposal to marry the niece of Megacles. Second, Strepsiades is carried ^Henderson (1975:73) notices that there is an "obscene double entendre in oTTa0av, which means both "to whack away (make love) continually" and "to squander wool/money"." 135 away by his wife’s charms and the city life just as he is seduced by the Clouds in the indoor life of the 9 povTianrr)piov. Finally, Strepsiades even reproaches the Clouds toward the end of the play, after Pheidippides beats him up (1452-3), just as he blamed the matchmaker for his wedding (41) and accused his wife of encouraging Pheidippides to overindulge in horse- chariots, while he (Strepsiades) himself would envision his son pasturing goats (68-72): t o u t o v t o v u io v X a p P a v o u o * e ic o p f£ e T O - " o t o v a u p eyo te; gov a p p ’ e X a u v q c ; rrp o e ; t t o X iv , o o c m e p M e y a K X e q q , ^ u o t i S ’ e'xoov— " ey o o 5 ’ e c p q v o t o v p e v o 3 v T a q a T y a c ; e < t o G 9 e X X e c o < ;, c o o n e p o T T a T q p a o u , 5 i 9 0 e p a v e v q p p e v o c ;— Strepsiades’ soliloquy at Cl. 41-55 clearly states the opposition in values between the country's simple commodities and the city's insatiable sumptuousness. Also, it prepares the way for the variety of antithetical pairs that occur in the play and highlights the double depiction of the Cloud-chorus. The dichotomy between country and city life brings to surface several opposing issues. The rustic, outdoor activities of Strepsiades are contrasted with the sedentary indoor idlness of the 9 povTioTr)piov. C/.94 introduces the 9 povTiaTqpiov as the habitat Of smart ghosts (yuycov 0 0 9 W V t o G t ’ eo-ri 9 p o v T i a T r ) p i o v ) . As Segal comments, "The opening psychai, with its suggestion of the disembodied Homeric dead, carry us far from the fresh air of the Attic uplands" (1969:179). The 9 pov/Ticrrr)piov is connected 1 36 with the themes of enclosure and lifelessness. Thus the good health and the physical vigor of the rustic life are contrasted with the pale complexion and the sickly look of the 9 PovTiaTr)piov's inhabitants. Pheidippides refers to the Socratic clientele as palefaces (touc cbxpi&vTaq, 102), and, a little later, he makes clear to Strepsiades that he would not even dare meet the knights with the color sapped from his face ( ouk av TTi0ofpnv ou yap av TAafqv iSdv/Touq irmlaq t o xp&pa SiaKEKvaiapevoq, 119-20). And while the rustic Strepsiades emphasizes the physical strengh and vigor of Pheidippides to the Clouds (euooopaTE? yap Kai cKppiya, 799), he associates paleness with Pheidippides' new education (o b q qSopai aou TrpcoTa tqv xpoiav I5u>v. 1171). Furthermore, the themes of colorlessness and sluggishness take different dimensions with the imagery of death and darkness. While Strepsiades associates the earth with agriculture and crop production (poApouq apa/£r)ToGoi. pq vuv t o G t o y ’ £ti 9povTiCeTe- 188-9), the students at the cppovTicnrqpiov look at it with a view to scientific discovery ( C h t o G o iv o G t o i t o k o t o y rjc ;. 188). Strepsiades, who takes for granted that the students search for poAfJouq, insists on assisting them in finding good, big Ones (cyco y a p oTS’ Yv’ dot peyaAoi <ai k o A o i . / t i y a p oYSc Spcboiv oj acpoSp* eyKEKucpoTcq; 190-1), until he is informed that the students examine the darkness below Tartarus ( o G t o i 6' cpepiSicpcboiv u t t o t o v TapTapov. 192). According to Segal, 137 Strepsiades thus not only punctures quackery with sound common sense, but he also sets nature's healthy exuberance (peyaXoi Kai KaXoi, 190), if only as manifested in the lowly bolbos, against the unnatural realm of pale and sickly thought. As a rustic he naturally knows (and cares) about finding onions (or truffles). For him the earth is a practical source of edibles, not a cavern of mysteries (1 9 6 9 :17 9 ). The initiation scene (245-63) which best associates the cppovTioTfjpiov with death, finds expression in the sickly residents of the cppovTicn-qpiov. Socrates' answer to Strepsiades' question as to whom of the 9 povTicrrqpiov’s disciples he will resemble most, is Chaerophon, the half-dead (500-4): I t . eItte 5q vuv poi t o S p qv EmpEAqq & Kai TTpo0upco<; pavS avw , tco tcov paO qT&v ipcpEpqc; yEvqoopai; loo. o uSev S io io e i^ XaipcxpoovToc; Tqv cpuaiv. I t . o'i'jjoi KaKoSafpoov, qpiQvqq yE vqaopai. And while the N e c p eX oi, the Socratic deities, entice Strepsiades and promise to help him defraud his creditors (to gain the object of his longing, 435-6), they entrust him to Socrates, who obliges Strepsiades to enter another dark structure similar to that used in the incubation of Trophonius (507-8). In turn, the image of Trophonius' grotto reflects that of the endless night in the beginning of the play. Strepsiades' troubles, misery and debts seem even more unresolvable during 1 38 the darkness of the night; and Strepsiades wonders whether will ever be day time (& ZeG PooiXeG, to xPhMa T < * > v vuktoov ooov./anepavTO v. ou6etto0’ q(J£pa yEvqoETai; 2-3). Strepsiades longs to create some artificial illumination by ordering his slave to light the lamp (am-e no? Xuyvov, 18), and he hopes that he can have a conversation with the sleeping Pheidippides, who dreams of horses and chariot races. But even the lamp light fails through lack of oil (s'Xaiov npTv ouk eveot’ ev t£> Xuxvop. 56), an incident which reinforces even more Strepsiades’ association with darkness. Therefore, obscurity in his life and gloominess in his finances lead Strepsiades to the lifelessness and dimness of the c p p o v T ic n -q p io v in search of some sunshine. Meanwhile, the seductive divinities of the Socratic cppovTioTqpiov find Strepsiades courageous and spirited, fully prepared and willing to be trained in the law-courts' skillful argumentation (Xqpa pev TrapEOTi tc o8e y'/ouK aToXpov aXX’ ETOipov. 458-9). The Clouds assert that Strepsiades' eloquence will attract crowds of people, who will wait outside his door to consult him, talk with him, and take his advice on actions and pleadings; and they will be willing to pay many talents for his brightness (467-75): Xo. C O O T E y£ C J O U noXXouq e t t i Ta?ai 0upai<; a£i Ka0qo0ai, P o u X o p E v o u < ; a v a ic o iv o G - o 0 a i te K a i Eiq X o y o v eX0eTv T t p a y p a T a K a v T iy p a c p a q 139 ttoAAcov TotAotvTCov, a£ia aq cppsvl aup- PouA euoo| jevou< ; ( jetci coG. Nonetheless, the Clouds lead Strepsiades into a deeper darkness (which in the play is represented by the inner chambers of the 9povTicn-r)piov, and which Strepsiades associates with the incubation of Trophonius). And they do not fail to wish him luck, to commend him on his courageous nature, and to assure him that he will find happiness in his old age by pursuing knowledge and immersing himself in revolutionary new ideas (510-7): Xo. aAA’ i0i xafpoov Tqq avSpEiaq eY veko TauTqq. EUTuxia yEVOiTO T a v 0 p C O T T <9 OTI T T p o q tC G O V £ iq p a 0 u T q q q A iK ia q v £ W T £ p o i< ; T q v c p u o iv a u - t o G n p a y p a o i v x P < *) T '£ £ T a i K a i a o c p fa v e tto o k e T . But while Strepsiades follows Socrates in order to receive his sophistic training and to learn how to plead an unjust cause and defraud his creditors, the Clouds become political moralizers and monitors against dishonesty, deception and charlatanism. The Socratic divinities, the N e c p eA oi, who used to nourish and sustain sophists and diviners from Thurii, medical experts and long-haired idlers with signet rings (t tA e( otou< ; aSTai (3 ookouoi aocpioTa<;,/©oupiopavTEi<;, laTpoTEyvac;, ocppayiSovuxapyoKopqTac;, 331-2), and who used to foster men of airy quackery who do nothing (avSpaq (j£TecopocpevaKaq,/ou8Ev 1 40 SpwvTaq Pookouo’ apyouq, 333-4), now reverse their role, and censure the Athenians for electing Cleon general-C leon, the "hated by god" tanner ( eTt o t o v © e o To i v £x0pov pupoo6eyqv nacpAayova/qvfx’ qp£7o0E oTpaTnyov, 581-2). The Clouds maintain that they warned the Athenians against Cleon’s election with contracted brows, lightning and thunder (tok; oypGq £uvqyo|j£v/icaTTooG|j£v S e i v o , ( 3 p o v r q 8’ E p p a y q Si’ a a T p a T r q q . 582-3). And they claim that even the moon forsook her paths and the sun withdrew into his orb and threatened not to shine any longer if Cleon became general (q aEAqvq 8’ e^eAeittev Taq oSouq, o 8’ qAioq/ Tqv 0puaAAiS' siq eoutov E u 0£<o q £uv£Ai<Gaaq/oG cpavsT v E cp aaK E V G p ? v e ! OTpaTqyqaoi K A e c o v . 584-6). Moreover, the Socratic deities become religious moralizers and lament having been wronged by the Athenians (qSncqpEvoti, 576), on the claim that they benefit their city (as if they were traditional Athenian goddesses instead of Socratic) more than any Other gods (irAEToTa yap 0eoov arravTGOv cbyEAouaaiq T q v ttoAiv, 577). They complain that the citizens never offer them any sacrifices or libations, yet it is they who constantly watch over the Athenians (Saipovwv qpTv povaiq o G 0uet’ oG Se anivSETE,/ a'mvEq TqpoupEv Gpaq. 578-9). The Socratic divinities not only reverse their role and become traditional moralizers in the epirrhema (575-94), but they also sing in praise of Zeus and eulogize the majority of the gods in the Olympian pantheon in 141 the ode (563-74) and antode (595-606). While Socrates spends so long and uses his best arguments to persuade Strepsiades not only that Zeus is non-existent ( 3 6 5 ) , but that A?vo<; has even expelled him (the empirical approach of speculation as opposed to anthropomorphic religion), the NecpeXai, (the representative deities of novelty), announce that Zeus is the great ruler of the gods and the sovereign of the world. The Cloud-chorus sings for Poseidon, the mighty keeper of the trident and the savage mover of land and sea. They glorify their holy and great father sky, who nourishes all living creatures, and the sun, the great power among mortals and immortals, who fills with his bright rays the entire earth (563-74): uyipsSovTa psv 0e£>v Zrjva T u p a w o v eic; yopov npcoTa p eya KiKXqoKW to v te p £ y a o 0£vq Tpiaivqq T a p fa v, y q q te Kai a^ p u p aq 0a X a o - oqq a y p io v p o x ^ v T q v <ai psyaXcovupov qpETEpov n a T E p ’ A i0£pa GEpvoTaTOv, pio0p£ppova rravToov to v 0 ’ irmrovcbpav, o<; vrrep- XaprrpOK; oktToiv kotexei yqc; tteSov, psyac; ev 0eoT<; ev 0vqToTof te 5 a(pcov. The Clouds' commendation continues in the antode. Here the Cloud-chorus sings for Delian Apollo, who dwells on high rocky Kythnos. They call upon Artemis, the dweller in gold-bearing Ephesos, who is revered by the daughters of the Lydians. They invoke the aegis holder, native goddess, guardian of the city, Athena, and the dweller on rocky Parnassos, the reveller 142 Dionysus, who blazes with pine torches conspicuous among the Delphian bacchants (595-606): apcpl poi aCiTE 0 o?P’ a v a £ AqAi£, Ku0vfav e'xcov uyiKEpaTa n h p a v q t ’ ’Ecpeoou p a x a ip a n a y x p u a o v e'xek; oTkov, ev & Kopai oe Au~ Scov peyaXcoq o lp o u o iv q t ’ Enixwpioq qpeTEpa Qeoq alylB oq qvfoxoq, ttoXioGxoc; ’A0ava- ria p v a o a fa v 0 ’ oq <aTex<*>v neT p av ouv Treuicaiq ocXayeT BaKX0 1 1 * ; AeXcplaiv eprrpErrcov KcopaoTqq Aiovuaoq. The position of the Clouds in both the ode (563-74) and antode (595-606) is not at all identified closely with the Socratic doctrines. Rather, it coincides with their entering song in the strophe (275-90) and antistrophe (299-313). In recalling the latter (strophe/antistrophe), Socrates requests that the Clouds appear (so that Strepsiades meet them), and the Clouds emerge, indeed, but instead of praising Socrates, their master, and his nefarious nebulosities, they align with nature (strophe, 275-90) and glorify the traditional religious observances (antistrophe, 299-313). Similarly, the ode (563- 74) and antode (595-606) seem to correspond in structure and theme with the strophe (275-90) and antistrophe (299-313). While in the strophe (275-90) the Cloud-chorus refers to nature in more general terms (the ocean, the mountains, the holy earth, bearer of crops, rivers, and rain), in the ode (563- 74), the Cloud-chorus becomes more specific either by naming gods who represent certain physical elements, or by ascribing to them certain identifiable attributes (they refer to Poseidon as Tpiafvrjq Taplav, 566, and to Helios as oq u T T £pX a|JTT po i<; cxktToiv kotexei ynq tte8 ov, 571-3). And as Dover comments, "it is notable that the chorus resumes its role as clouds (Aither is 'our father,' 569), and does not simply sing as a chorus of Athenians at a festival" (1968a:172). In addition, while the Cloud-chorus' song in the antistrophe (299-313) is an exaltation of the Greek observances of religious rites during festive occasions, in the antode (595-606) it is an invitation to the gods to join the festive celebrations—an occurence which is in harmony with Greek traditional experience and custom. In fact, the invitation to the gods begins in the ode and the gods who are mentioned in the ode are by no means excluded. But there is more explicit identification of the gods in the ode with natural phenomena (water, aether, the sun) than in the antode. Thus in this respect I think that strophe (275-90) and ode (563-74), antistrophe (299-313) and antode (595-606) form bonds of correspondence in theme and, as we will see, they also correspond in position in the play. The Cloud-chorus' praise of traditional values, beliefs and practices (in both choral passages: C /.275-90, 299-313; 563- 74, 595-606) appears to follow the same order. In both instances the Cloud-chorus comes after Strepsiades' initiatory 144 ceremonies (preliminary and proper)® and precedes his multifaceted training and indoctrination in the cppovTioTqpiov, in accordance with the following pattern: I. A) Strepsiades is initiated by Socrates (254-63). Strepsiades' initiation ceremony functions as a prerequisite so as to meet with the religious requirements of the 9 povriaTr|piov before his presentation to the N ecp eX o u , the Socratic divinities. B) The Cloud-chorus glorifies the earth and the elaborate religious rituals of Attica ( 2 7 5 - 9 0 ; 2 9 9 - 3 1 3 ) instead of praising the Socratic airy speculations. C) Strepsiades is introduced to the deities of the cppov-ricn-npiov ( 3 6 5 f f . ) . II. A) Strepsiades follows Socrates for his second initiation, a trial of his intelligence before he is indoctrinated with techniques of speaking (495-508). B) The Cloud-chorus reappears with another praise of tradition (563-74; 595-606) instead of glorifying the new education and the art of speaking and persuasion. C) Strepsiades receives his sophistic training (6 3 4 ff.). 6|n Chapter Two I suggested that Strepsiades underwent a double initiation which seems to correspond to the double aspect of the Eleusinian mysteries in respect to their division into the Lesser and the G reater mysteries; but Aristophanes reverses the order (not necessarily the events) so that Cl. 497ff. (starting with the entrance into the inner chambers of the cppovnoTnpiov which Strepsiades associates with the incubation of Trophonius) indicates the preliminary and preparatory ceremony of the Lesser mysteries, while Strepsiades' initiation at C /.254ff. (which precedes C/.497ff.) is more likely to correspond to the initiation proper of the G reater mysteries. 145 Furthermore, if the sequence followed (in the above pattern) is analogous to the order of A B C, then, we might assume that A corresponds to the introduction of novel views and ideas about the nature of the divine and the impact they exercised on the traditional culture (they are marked by an initiation ceremony to indicate the change of social status by the application of rules and regulations different from those of tradition). B represents old conventional beliefs and practices overemphasized by the Cloud-chorus in critical expositions of the plot (i.e., before or after novel ideas have been overstated); and C correlates to the elucidation of various conflicts between the old and the new (which are especially illustrated in the encounter between Strepsiades and Socrates). For example, the episode following the first entrance of the Cloud- chorus deals with the existence of Zeus, the phenomena of rain and the thunderbolt and in general involves scientific explanations that oppose traditional beliefs of divine nature and cause (mostly it alludes to the speculative approach of the natural philosophers). The episode following the second entrance of the Cloud-chorus exposes educational skills and sophisticated approaches to rational thought and rhetorical artistry as opposed to traditional superstition and rustic vulgarism (mostly it alludes to sophism). Thus Aristophanes' Cloud-chorus (in the above mentioned passages) briefly 146 outlines the customary Athenian religious beliefs and practices in a way that has twofold effect: First it accentuates Strepsiades' tendency to refuse ceremonial services of traditional value to the gods (425-6), and his eagerness to abandon his moral duties in favor of corruption, imported indecency and debauchery (demoralization, perversion). Second it illustrates the confusion and misdirection (Strepsiades reflects on every other citizen of the older generation) which novelty brought to a culture on the verge of change. The encounter between Strepsiades and Socrates brings to the surface additional antitheses between country/outdoor and city/indoor. Besides healthy, physical vitality as opposed to paleness and a sickly-looking appearance, and the hard agricultural work replaced by idleness and up-in-the-air nebulous speculation, the sophistic material of the play stresses practical thinking and vulgarity in farming language as opposed to mental calisthenics and refined ways of speaking. Aristophanes' Clouds is full of scatological humor and "the main function of Strepsiades' obscenity is to provide bumkin farce" (Henderson 1975:74). Strepsiades’ use of vulgar language is associated with the countryside, crude and unpolished naturalness. While Socrates and the Clouds plead with Strepsiades to think and to devise a fraudulent stratagem (723ff.), he spends his time masturbating (ouSev ye rrAqv q to rrkoq 147 ev tq Se^ia, 734). Strepsiades' preference for rustic rawness appears in the play from its very beginning. To mention but few examples, he seems to be amused with the story of the lizard defecating on Socrates' head (171-4) and the gnat's proctal emission of sound (160-4). He associates Socrates' empirical observations with urination and excrement (the phenomenon of rain as depending on Zeus' urination through the sieve at 372 and that of thunder as having the same result with uopSr), 394); his frustration with Pheidippides' undisturbed sleep is expressed in the form of n£p5so0ai (9) and his insults to both the Creditor (a£,£i<;; ettioiXoo/kevtgov utto tov npcoKTOv a t tov OEipatpopov. 1299-300) and Pheidippides (& ^oikkottpwkte, 1330) retain proctal imagery (Henderson 1975:74-8). And Socrates' reaction to Strepsiades' boisterous behavior finds expression, of course, in epithets that label Strepsiades' rusticity and ignorance: aypotKoq, arropoc;, o ko <i6 < ; (peasant, meaningless and helpless, stupid and mischievous). The conflicting opposites, however, no matter how many different areas they might cover in the entire play, are not so sharply drawn as they seem from place to place (Dover 1968a:lix ff.; Whitman 1964:126ff.). These antitheses represent various aspects of one major antagonistic pair-th e struggle between the old and the new (the traditional culture and the impact of novelty), and "take on clear dialectical shape in the 1 48 contest between the Just and the Unjust Arguments. But they inform the action of the entire play as well" (Segal 1969:178). Meanwhile, the Socratic deities, the NecpeXai, after urging Strepsiades into additional darkness with animated wishes, on the one hand, while, on the other hand, they sing on behalf of tradition, continue their role as the presiding goddesses of the tppovTioTnpiov. They stand next to Socrates supervising Strepsiades' mental training and they reinforce Socrates' teaching methodology. At the third strophe (700-6), the Clouds advise Strepsiades to think thoroughly and to concentrate his mind by twisting himself in every possible way. They also incite him to abandon meaningless thoughts by jumping to other ideas, but they warn him to be cautious not to lull himself to sleep: Xo. cppovTi^c 8r) teat 8ia0pei n a v T a Tp o n o v t e o o iu t o v OTp6|3£i ttukvcocjo k;- Tayuc; 8 ’, o t o v e k ; an o p o v neaQc;, e n ’ a W o rrrjSa voqpa (ppEVoq- urrvoq 8 ’ arr£- o t g o yXuicuOupoq oppaTWV. Furthermore, seeing that Strepsiades' learning abilities are worthless and their master's patience has reached its limits, the Clouds propose the solution that Pheidippides be trained instead of Strepsiades (794-6). And then, confident of their persuasive skills, they assure Socrates in the antistrophe (804-12) that everything turns in his favor as a compensation for revering the Clouds instead of any other gods. As a result, 149 they say, Strepsiades is ready to do anything that Socrates bids him. But they also tell Socrates that he should profit as much as he can, knowing Strepsiades' excitement and lunacy, because, as the Clouds explain, it is likely that such things (Socrates' success in attracting disciples) might turn out contrary to expectation: Xo. &p’ a!o0avei ttXeToto Si* rp (jo«; aya0 * auTix’ e£oov povaq 0 eco v; tb c ; ETOipoq o5’ eotiv arrav- Ta 5pav oo’ av keAeuq^. au 8 ’ av5po<; EKnsnXriypEvou K ai cpavEpwq EnqppEvou yvouq arroXay£i<; oti ttXeTotov Suvaoai Taxec*j<;‘ < p iX e T yap to toi- aG0’ ETEpa Tp£n£o0ai. The Socratic patron deities, however, advise Socrates in a rather peculiar manner. So far the Cloud-chorus has appeared either as Socratic or as traditional proclaimer, but it has not implied any proverbial moralization throughout the lyric passages. In the above lines the Clouds appear to suggest that they play a mischievous and treacherous role in the course of events. In brief, they not only infatuate and charm Strepsiades but they also play an amusing game of twisting, twirling and turning their role, Strepsiades and the issues of the play. Evidently, the implication of the changing (turning) events (Tp£TT£o 0 ai, 813), picks up on the maneuvering theme of the play, reflects on the Cloud-chorus' advice to Strepsiades to twist and concentrate (rravTa Tponov T E oauTov/oTpopEi nuKvcoaaq. 701-2) 150 and echoes the "turning" and "twisting" aspects of Strepsiades1 name and actions— "the verb strepho marks the ups and downs of Strepsiades’ attempt to control his environment" (Reckford 1967:227). Strepsiades, indeed, twists and turns around his problems from the beginning of the play—how to support an extravagant son and pay his bills. Nevertheless, he also expects Pheidippides to turn his way of life inside out (ektpe^ov d > < ; tcxxiotci Touq oauTou Tponouq, 8 8 ), and succeeds in twisting him at the end of the Clouds (Strepsiades sends Pheidippides to the c p p o v ric rrq p io v and Pheidippides learns the sophistic art of speaking). Strepsiades' initial failure to persuade Pheidippides to join the cppovTioTrjpiov, subsequently turns him to the cppovTicrrqpiov where the "Whirl" and the flowing Clouds rule. Strepsiades is twisted by Socrates, shifted by the NecpeXai, he tosses and turns in bed bitten by bugs, he twists his creditors and finally, Strepsiades turns his twistings against Socrates. As Reckford points out, The Clouds is, in fact, a play of reversals. In accordance with Strepsiades’ name, Mr. Twister, and with the replacement of Olympian Zeus by Dinos, "Revolution," as king of the universe, the would-be successful wrestler, who would 'twist' out the debts like a comic Odysseus, becomes rather fate's victim, a bouncing ball or spinning top impelled by the lash of "revolution" (1976:92). 1 51 In addition, the turning points, reversals, Strepsiades' twistings, shiftings and oppositions which occur in the C louds are of course reflective of the confusion, manipulation and perversion with which novelty infected the conventional culture. More specifically, the turning points of the Clouds' plot reflect the revolutionary effects of novel ideas upon the traditional citizens. After the Cloud-chorus' suggestion to Socrates of a potential change in the course of events (811-2), the Clouds assume, instead, the role of judges or intermediaries concerning the issues of traditional morality and fraudulent injustice until their final revelation (1454ff.). In the long debate between the Just and the Unjust Logics they maintain eminence (reputation) and moderation. They address both Logics and ask each one to give an exposition regarding the old education and the new so that the listeners may hear both sides and make their choice (934-8): Xo. nauoocre Ka' ^oiSopfaq. aXX’ IrriSei^ai au te Touq TTpoTSpouq S tt' eS IS o co kec;, ou T£ rrjv <aivr)v nafSfiuoiv, o ttc o c; av aicouaac; acpcov avTiXEyovroiv Kpivaq cpoiTa. The Clouds even introduce the debate with dignity and without bias toward either side (949-60). At the end of the Just Logic's case, the Clouds acclaim their support for tradition and praise the men Of Old times (£u5oupov£q ap’ r'jaotv oi £wvte< ; tote. 1028). But 1 52 they approve equally of the Unjust Logic's refined and plausible art (& KojjyoTTpeTTrj p o G o a v c'xw v, 1130), although they warn him to devise a clever scheme against the Just Logic to avoid becoming ridiculous and a laughing-stock (Seivgov 8 e a o i P o u X e u p aT c o v eoike S e T v n p o q outov./eVttep tov a v 8 p ' unE ppaA E ? < a i pr| YeXgot’ o9 Xr)a£i<;. 1034-5). And when the Unjust Logic rests its case and the Just Logic accepts defeat, the Cloud-chorus makes no comments, but only warns Strepsiades that he will regret Pheidippides' training in the new education (o T p ai 8 e aoi/TauTa pETapEXqoEiv. 1 1 1 3 -4 )-a position contradictory to their previous advice that Strepsiades' son would have better chances to learn than Strepsiades himself (794-6). And as though their exposition of contradictory messages to Strepsiades and their suggested siding with the Just Logic (1034-5) were not enough, they once again assume the double role of physical phenomena and traditional moralizers in the second parabasis which follows directly the victory of the Unjust Logic (1115-30). Here the Cloud-chorus addresses the judges in the role of environmental clouds. In the voice of Aristophanes, as Dover comments, "they speak as clouds promising favors in return for award of the first prize and threatening vengeance for an adverse verdict" (1968a:230). It seems, however, that Dover’s comment is insuficiently expressed in this specific passage. 1 53 Dover might be right to suppose that Aristophanes uses the second parabasis to express his wish for approval (and the first prize), but I think that Aristophanes’ concern with fair judgement of the play is also underlined by more profundity. Rather, it is an attempt to demonstrate the complexity of the Clouds' plot itself, because it is here in the second parabasis that the playright indicates to his audience the transition to the role that the Clouds assume in the rest of the play--a role which reflects their original entrance in the orchestra. The Cloud-chorus entered as clouds of nature in praise of customary tradition and now, associated with nature, rain and farming once again, adds the premise of justice as accompanied by good and the premise of injustice as accompanied by evil~a position that justifies Segal's comment, "that the ambiguity in the Cloud-chorus belongs to Aristophanes' original conception of his subject" (1969:175-6). And indeed the Cloud-chorus promises protection of crops and vines (eTtcx to v K a p n o v tekouock; ap rrE X o u q cpuXa^opEV, 1119) from drought and excessive rainfall (goote p h t ’ a u x p o v ttie£eiv p h t ’ a y a v ETToppplav. 1 1 2 0 ), but only in recompense to those who act justly (dxpEXwo’ ek tcov S iK cc fc o v, 1116). On the contrary, the Clouds warn that many catastrophes await the dishonest (q v S’ c m p a o q Tiq, 1121). He will receive neither wine nor any other product from his land (Xap|3avG ov o u t ’ oTvov o u t ’ a X X ’ ou6 ev ek to u 1123) in 154 addition to the destruction of his olives and vines during the sprouting period (1124-5). The tile roof of his newly made brick house will be ruined by hailstones (1126-7), and he will receive heavy rain as his reward during his or a relative's wedding (1 1 2 8 -9 )7 Thus the Cloud-chorus in the second parabasis (1115-30) as well as in the first and second strophes (275-90; 563-74) and antistrophes (299-313; 595-606), the epirrhema (575-94) and antepirrhema (607-26), is associated with the outdoor life, light and the clarity of the sky, fields, crops and farming, gods and festivals, and concerns itself with issues of traditional moral norms. In these instances, Aristophanes' Nccpe^ai rise as drizzling maidens and align themselves with Strepsiades' background and glorious traditional past— themseives assuming the role of divine patronage in the playwright's imagination. During their portrayal as patron deities of the Socratic up-in- the-air nebulosities, however, they depict the complex craftiness of novel elements, and as Reckford states, "we watch the Clouds supervising the sublunar deception of a mortal who is essentially one of us" (1967:223). In fact, the deceptive, inconsistent character of the Cloud- chorus becomes clearer immediately after Strepsiades' knavish 7 Thus rain "would spoil the procession escorting the bride to her new home, and in particular extinguish the torches that accompanied it, obviously an evil omen for the marriage" (Sommerstein 1982:215). 155 encounter with his creditors. The same Clouds who, under the jurisdiction of the cppovTioTqpiov's divine patronage, congratulated Strepsiades for his courage and urged him to accomplish his purpose-to acquire sophistic training in order to defraud his creditors--these same Clouds disapprove of Strepsiades' sophistic treatment of his creditors in the fourth strophe and antistrophe. In the strophe (1303-10) they comment on the degradation of a man who is enamored of evil. They criticize Strepsiades' corrupt tendencies, alliance with mischief and plans to evade payment. Moreover, the Cloud-chorus prepares the audience for the disastrous vengeance that will fall upon Strepsiades and how he will regret the villainy on which he relied—a point which reflects the Cloud-chorus’ concerns with justice and injustice in the second parabasis: Xo. oTov t o TrpaypaTa>v Epav cpXaupcov o y a p yepoov o 5 ’ EpaaSsic; aTToaTepqoai PouXetoi Ta x p n p a e ' a 5 a v £ ia a T o . KOUK EO0’ O T T O O q OU Tq|JEpOV Xr)V|/ETaf t i Trp ayp ’ o to u - TOV TTOqaEI to v oocpr OTqv & v TTavoupy£?v qp^aT* a i9 vqq + t i kokov XaPfiTvt. And in the antistrophe (1311-20) the Cloud-chorus refers specifically to Strepsiades' disappointment regarding his request that his son be skilled in arguing for opinions opposed to justice, so as to conquer any opponent even with a wicked 1 56 cause, since Strepsiades will even wish that his son be struck dumb: oT|jai y a p o u t o v aC m x’ £upr)OEiv o m p rraXai h o t ’ £^r]T£i, eT v o i t o v ulov Seivo v ol yvcopaq Iva v T fa q XsyEiv t o T o i 5iKaioi<;, u o t e v r Kav arravTa<;, oT ottep a v ^u yyE vq T ai, icav XEyg rra p n o vrip ’. ibcoq 5 ’ ‘ i bco<; |3ouXr|a£Tai Kacpcovov auTov eT v o i. Thus the Cloud-chorus prepares the audience for the troublesome encounter between the confused Strepsiades and the rationally combative Pheidippides-an encounter which will lead the Clouds toward their final transformation. The Cloud-chorus maintains a judiciary role in the dispute between Strepsiades and Pheidippides (as it did earlier in the debate between the two Logics). Here, however, the Clouds are more provocative with both the father and the son; during the long debate between the two Logics they praised both Logics but it seems as though they exhibited an implicit association with the Just Logic, the exponent of traditional values and beliefs; and they warned the Unjust Logic to find some clever argument against his opponent so that he would not become subject to ridicule (1034-5). Similarly, the Clouds warn Strepsiades to think of something worthwhile in order to defeat his son who, they believe, must have something upon which to rely for being so unrestrained (strophe 1344-50): 157 X o . a o v e p y o v , & r r p e a p u T a , 9 p o v T i£ £ iv o ttq t o v a v S p a K p a T q a E iq , cbq oO T o q , ei p q TCp 'rren o iQ e iv , o u k a v Pjv o u T C o q a x o X a o T o q . a X X ’ £ O 0 ’ o tc*> 0 p a o u v £ T a i* S q X o v < y e t o i > t o X q p a T av 0 p c b rro u . The Cloud-chorus' address to Pheidippides is no less provocative than its discourse with Strepsiades. The Clouds ask him to be very persuasive in order to prove that the act which he committed is right (1393-4) because father-beating might make the hearts of young people throb (1391-2), but only Pheidippides' strong justification may make the older generation seem worthless (1395-6). At any rate, the confrontation between Strepsiades and Pheidippides is parallel in context and theme with the debate between the two Logics. Both are relevant to the vopoq-cpuoiq antithesis, namely, "the antinomy between the "conventions" of human society and the amoral world of "nature"" (Segal 1969:191). the vopoq-9 uoiq controversy provides the main arguments upon which the Unjust Logic rests his case (1075ff.); and Pheidippides, the spirited disciple of the new learning, brings this forth as an excuse to account for his treatm ent of Strepsiades (1421 ff.). Nevertheless, the Clouds themselves form a part of the vo(joq-9 uaiq dichotomy with the double role they portray. On the one hand, as divinities of the Socratic 9 povTicnrr)piov, are partly connected "with the supposedly amoral process of the natural 1 58 world which encourages Socrates to espouse the Clouds as his divinities now that he has expelled Zeus and the Olympians" (Segal 1969:192), and they symbolize airy speculations and unproductivity. But on the other hand, they are connected with human conventions and the established tradition, with nature's (the physical process) affluence, health, simplicity and Dionysiac vigor. 8 On behalf of human conventions and morality, the Clouds no longer foster the Socratic ypovTioTqpiov with its amoral layout. They consider Strepsiades responsible for Pheidippides' training on the premise that he himself (Strepsiades) turned to evil actions, while Strepsiades blames the Clouds for his sufferings because he trusted them (1452-5): t o u t ! S i’ u p a q , & NecpeXai, t t e t t o v Q ’ eyco, upTv a v a 0 £ iq a r r a v T a T a p a r r p a y p a T a . X o . a u T o q p e v o S v o a u t w a u t o u t w v a 'm c x ; , OTpeyaq aeauTOV ei<; novqpa npaypaTa. The Cloud-chorus' revelation to Strepsiades that he should accept responsibility for siding with evil (aTpeya<; aeauTov elq 8 The concept of < p u a i< ; is ambiguous and can be understood in various ways. Aristophanes knew the earlier thoughts in which its application included moral laws (Anaximander B 1, Heraclitus B 95). "The Clouds' Aeschylean moral stance at the end is perhaps a glance back at this earlier feeling for a natural world governed by a coherent moral order, a refusal to allow the reign of Dinos, for Whirl's ascendancy signifies (at least in part) the amoral, impersonal materialism and determinism of the atomists and their disciples. But protest in the name of order is not confined to the end alone. It pervades the play, yet does not limit its scope to a narrow moralism and anti-intellectualism" (Segal 1969:192). TTovr|pa TTpayjjaTa. 1455), which in turn reflects Strepsiades’ own volition that Pheidippides "turn" his ways and learn rhetoric (eKTpeyov wq tocxioto tou< ; oauTou Tponouq, 88), releases the Clouds from their own playful maneuvers. Finally transformed, they explain that they always cast into misery anyone who is enamored of evil things until he learns to fear the gods (1458- 61): Xo. npcTq rrooGpev TauS’ ckooto©’, ovtiv* av yvwpev TTovnpcov ovt’ epaoTr]v rrpaypaToov, e c o q av auTov £|j|3aAco(j£v eiq Kaicov, o t t c o c ; av dSfi tou< ; Q eoC k ; SeSoiicevai. The moralistic reversal of the Cloud-chorus has generated various scholarly discussions concerning the purpose and the motivation of the chorus' sudden character change. Dover believes that the role of the chorus in the Clouds is "strange and equivocal," (1968a:xxiv) and he notices a deviation from the general practice of the chorus in other comedies of Aristophanes. He maintains that in the Clouds "after the parabasis, at the stage at which in other comedies the chorus tends to degenerate into the hero's claque, the Clouds' alienation from Strepsiades becomes apparent" (Ixix). Dover does not offer any enlightenment as regards the reasons for the chorus' change, but considering the plots of the Knights and W asps (respectively the two plays which preceded and followed the Clouds), he comments: 160 ...let us note that Knights in 424 and W asps in 422 suffice to show that during the period when the first version of Clouds was written the type of comedy which ends with unalloyed triumph and leaves no uncomfortable questions in the audiences' mind was not the only type in which Ar. was interested (xxv). For Whitman the Cloud-chorus' role change is not well inspired and the chorus' final transformation is viewed as "an anomaly in Aristophanes" (1964:129). For Newiger the the Cloud-chorus' reversal takes place because "the good must win out," but he believes that the "Cloud chorus in conception and in role stands in the way of a moralizing ending" and he considers the sudden moralization of the Socratic divinities "a weakness of the play" (1957:69:68). And Pucci emphasizes the "irregularity" of the Cloud-chorus (1960:31). Segal, however, who equates C /.1458- 61 with Aeschylean moralization like that of Darius in P ersians (742), maintains that "the reversal of the Clouds in 1454ff. is only an item in a whole series of carefully calculated reversals which make the ending seem like a peripeteia of tragedy" (1 9 6 9 :1 9 0 ).9 Segal argues that the tragic motive lies in Strepsiades' over-triumphant celebration when he receives his trained son from the cppovTioTrjpiov (1154-68). As in a tragic 9 Darius' ghost prophesied that Xerxes’ greediness to bind Hellespont in order to conquer the Greeks would destroy the Persian army. Similarly, Strepsiades' corrupt plans to defraud his creditors by abandoning tradition and morality turned against him (as the Cloud-chorus reveals). 161 plot, Strepsiades' transient gaiety about his temporary victory over his creditors will undergo a sudden setback-a reversal which reflects also on the Cloud-chorus' advice to Strepsiades, "not to be happy with anyone who can overcome someone with whom he associates" (oT ottgp av/£uyy£vqToti, 1315-6), advice which also reflects on Strepsiades' consent to associate with the N ecpeXai in the beginning of the play (SuyyEveoeai, 252). Finally, with the transformation of the Clouds, Strepsiades emerges from his utopian dreams and reinstates himself in his own generation and rusticity; he re-establishes himself within his tradition and the Olympian gods and he decides to burn the cppovna-rqpiov, the source of all evil. Consequently, the tragic-mannered moralization of the Clouds at the end echoes the < p u o i< ; that Aristophanes knew--the c p u o i< ; that even the natural philosophers (the presocratics) proclaimed as being governed by moral order and of which man constituted an integral part. The Clouds’ association with c p u o ic ; refuses to allow thecpuoiq which the Unjust Logic espouses (Ipol S’ opiXwv/xpw tq cpuoei, oidpTot, yeXa, vopife pq8ev aiaxpov. 1077-78), a cpuoiq surrounded by amorality, materialism and personal determinism. Their [connection with] cpuoiq is the nature in which man "lives in and by the same ordinances which rule all things, even to the stars in the heavens" (Fraenkel 1973:256), the source of energy and life, good health and good judgment 1 62 that stand in opposition to the lifeless stability, death and darkness of the 9 povTicn-r|piov. And so when Strepsiades decides to destroy Socrates and his crew, the Clouds stand on his side without even attempting to stop Strepsiades and to protect their priest (kpeO, 359). In examining the double portrayal of the Cloud-chorus and its final reversal, a role change that reflects various double aspects and a series of calculated reversals in the play itself, we must also take into consideration that Aristophanes' Clouds itself dramatizes a conglomeration of opposing issues and conflicting ideologies (the traditional culture, the Ionian and Pythagorean philosophies and sophism) which at the same time are based on the existence of opposite forces in the world. The antithetical pairs which are portrayed in the Clouds not only reflect upon the changes underlined by the conflicting issues between the traditional culture and the novel elements which were introduced, but also upon the polar opposites of natural philosophers and the Pythagorean dichotomy of the physical world and human nature. Antithetical pairs were very significant in Ionian philosophy concerning the existence of the universe as early as Anaximander, who "could only conceive a definite group of qualities as accompanied by its polar opposite; that which has to be bounded and limited, must be delimited with respect to 163 its opposite" (Fraenkel 1973:263). But even Anaximander's air (the basic substance of all things) was compounded of the qualities of both hot and cold. "Being formless and bodiless it was not an object but something unbounded-undefined like Anaximander's suprasensual apeiron; but at the same time it is hot and cold like the sensible objects that arise from the apeiron" (Fraenkel 1973:268). Moreover, to go beyond Anaximander, Thales' water (as the basis of the universe) was also looked upon as "a complex of higher qualities, including what we shall call mobility, force, life and 'soul'" which stood in opposition to the earth that "meant the whole complex of lower qualities, including passivity, weight, bulkiness and solidity" (Fraenkel 1973:261). It was not, however, until the time of Pythagorean philosophy that the concept of conflicting forces which stood in opposition to one another extended beyond the undefined and unlimited properties of the physical world. The Pythagoreans searched for cosmic principles that would define and qualify both the universe and the individual. Since their basis of the universe was defined on the existence of numbers which consisted of two opposite sets, the even and the odd, the Pythagoreans attempted to employ the concept of number opposition to light and darkness (day and night) as the conflicting pair of opposites in the physical domain, and to the 1 64 antithetical pairs of good and evil in the human domain. Thus the Pythagorean concern with opposite forces had brought into existence what Aristotle labels the "table of opposites" (M et.286a22). The Pythagorean "table of opposites" is composed of ten principles which are arranged in two columns of cognates as they occur in the following sequence (Burkert 1972:51): 1. limit (nepoK;) unlimited (o tT T E Ip O v) 2. odd (TT£plTTOv) even (apTiov) 3. one (kv) plurality (rrAqO oc;) 4. right (8e£iov) left (apioTEpov) 5. male (app£v) female (0q^u) 6 . resting (rjpepoOv) moving (<ivoupevov) 7. straight (eu0u) crooked (<apnuXov) 8 . light (cp u x;) darkness (aKOTOq) 9. good (aya0ov) bad (koikov) 10. square (TETpaycovov) oblong (£T£popqK£<;) In reviewing the Clouds' plot with the conflicting opposites which it illustrates and the Cloud-chorus' double portrayal, it seems that the reversals of the play correspond somehow with the conflicting sets of the "table of opposites." And while the play begins with the unlimited duration of the night, with crooked Strepsiades and his evil plans, the darkness of the 9 PovTioTr)piov and the female divinities of Socrates, the spirits of diverse novel principles (right hand column), it ends with the limited good, the straightening of Strepsiades, and the revelation of light (left hand colum n)-according to the Pythagorean philosophy "the principle of Limit is manifested as 165 Light or Fire, the Unlimited as Air or Darkness” (Cornford 1926:552). Furthermore, I wish to demonstrate that there is a connection between the Clouds' multifaceted reversals, the plot's manifestation of antithetical pairs and Aristophanes’ intention to caricature not only the conflicting coexistence between tradition and novelty, but also to parody the contradictory tendencies of all novel elements which were expressed as antithetical forces: the sophists' vo|jo<;-<pO oi<; antithesis, the speculative opposing physical forces of natural philosophy and in particular the Pythagorean conception of binary oppositions as regards both the universe and the individual. For it was the intellectual perception of existing opposites which set inconceivable boundaries in the minds of the uneducated and simple-minded masses and discriminated against values and practices which were long known and well established. All novel elements did not necessarily diffuse in the traditional culture as part of a smooth and lengthy natural process. Rather, they occurred as a part of criticism of the old and confused the issues which already existed. First, I should cite two scholarly interpretations which present the Clouds as an attack on Pythagoreanism: 166 1. As early as 1847, Grote observed a connection between the burning of Socrates' cppov-ricrrripiov in the Clouds and the destruction of the Pythagoreans at Croton (4:335). 2. Taylor interpreted the Socratic <ppovTia-rqpiov as a site of Pythagorean mysteries and he explained Socrates' charge of impiety as a measure against newly introduced Pythagorean religion (1 9 1 1 :1ff.). Second, I should recall my interpretation in Chapter Two that Aristophanes emphasizes under the Socratic mask the contradictory tendency of the Pythagoreans between the axioms of monism and dualism, which is presented within the chaotic background and conflicting powers of diverse intellectualism and the traditional norms and values. To elaborate a little more, the inconsistency of the Pythagorean brotherhood concerning the dual doctrines of both monism and dualism not only reflected their religious and philosophical system, but also brought them into conflict with the community. The tendency to impose strict rules of admission upon the brotherhood (a trial of intelligence and memory, a distinct dress code, ascetic life and regulations of purity) promoted individual rather than collective responsibility. On the one hand, the Pythagoreans maintained a separatist attitude toward 167 those who did not belong to their cult, and on the other hand, they tried to control them, to exercise a powerful influence in their goverment and to dominate life in the city. Third, it is necessary to present certain criticisms of Heraclitus regarding the Pythagorean doctrine of appovla because I believe that there is a connection between Heraclitus' criticisms, the Clouds' multiple reversals and the use of fire by which Aristophanes chose to finish the present version of the Clouds. Heraclitus was opposed to the Pythagorean moral dualism. He rejected the concept of morality based upon the principle of limit which the Pythagoreans developed in the doctrine of appovia. Heraclitus accepted that there is harmony in opposite forces but he could not visualize it as existing in the imposition of limits which capture the natural process of life. To consider light a good principle and darkness an evil force is as impossible as to desire summers without winters, day without night and peace without war. So Heraclitus proposed, "That men should get all they want is not a better thing: it is sickness that makes health pleasant; evil, good; hunger, plenty; weariness, rest" (fr.111). He enforced the notion that opposites bring balance and harmony into the world and if the opposites disappeared the world would come to an end; and he rejected 168 the concept that limit is good and the main source of harmony and that one side of polar oppositions can be termed good while the other can be called evil. According to Heraclitus the world comprises many opposites which cannot exist without one another: "It is a harmony of opposite tensions, like that of the bow or of the lyre" (fr.51). As Cornford comments, Heraclitus "accepts the changing world we know, with its life process, identifying with the unceasing strife of opposite powers, revolving for ever in the wheel of time and change" (1926:558). And, of course, the substance of change and everlasting flow in the world was conceived by Heraclitus in the element of fire: "All things are an exchange for fire, and fire for all things, as gold for wares and wares for gold" (fr.90). Consequently, I propose that the conflicting forces which Aristophanes parodies in the Clouds do not necessarily stand in polar opposition to one another so as to proclaim that traditional values are good while Enlightenment, skepticism and intellectualism are evil. The Clouds’ reversals rather display the coexistence of traditional Athens and the proponents of novelty while the Cloud-chorus accentuates the confusion and misunderstanding that dominated Athens in the second half of the fifth century B.C. with both tradition and novelty at work. Nevertheless, Aristophanes demonstrates how novelty also attempted to change, and even to despoil, a 169 simple-minded Athenian character under the sway of tradition by the jeopardy of false perception of subjects that formed horizons beyond the reach of popular mentality (as illustrated by Strepsiades). It is unreasonable to believe that Aristophanes was caught in the past and unsympathetic to the future. On the contrary, it seems more likely that he had rather been attracted by the charms of rhetoric and sophistic debates since "his plays present the clash of old and new ideas so vividly that he could be accused of "Euripidaristophanizing," perhaps being himself a catalyst of intellectual change" (Reckford 1987:400). At the same time, however, Aristophanes remained faithful to the Dionysiac spirit, traditional rites and elaborate open-air celebrations, a spirit which he exhibits very vividly in his comic plays and buffooneries and through which he depicts cultural problems of social, political and spiritual change without exhibiting the negative side of the new but the provocative coexistence of the old and the new. But when it comes to the depiction of the c p p o v -n a n -n p io v as a cult society he ridicules the tendency to form closed group- associations as an excuse for soul-salvation with special rights to membership, separatist rules and regulations as applied to philosophical contemplation and the dichotomy of negative and positive oppositions in the world (all features of 170 the Pythagorean brotherhood). Thus with the moralizing transformation of the Clouds toward the end of the play (1458- 62), Aristophanes caricatures the Pythagorean moral division (good vs evil) of human nature as they appear in "the table of opposites." He emancipates his Clouds from the darkness of the cppovTiaTrjpiov and places them in the Dionysiac spirit of the open-air celebration. Thus he restores his Clouds to their own cpuoi<;, not the cpuoi<; according to which "man was considered as a creature sui generis, moving in a world that belongs only to him" (Fraenkel 1973:256). And at the same time, he chooses fire, the element of perpetual change and flow, to burn the 9 p o v T i a T r ) p i o v . In this respect, I suggest that Aristophanes once again plays with the Pythagorean division of the physical world into the opposite forces of darkness (as is depicted in the beginning of the play) and light (as portrayed at the end, in the form of fire): and he uses the element of fire (the Heraclitan symbol of continuous flow and change as opposed to the Pythagorean notion of light in opposition to darkness) to emphasize the determinants of change which he portrays in the Clouds-- change which he depicts so vividly within all conflicting issues at work, and which perhaps even the judges of the Clouds' initial performance in 423 had not understood when they awarded the play only the third prize. But even if the original 1 71 version of the Clouds had a different ending, it would still remain true that Aristophanes depicts Athens in the web of change, since Pheidippides was still educated and indoctrinated in the Socratic 9 povTiaTr)piov and Strepsiades still had to confront his creditors and an insolent son. 1 72 CHAPTER FOUR THE MACULATE SOCRATES Xo. Xa ^P ' & TrpeafSOTa naXaioyevEc;, 0 q p aT a Aoyoov 9 iAopouacov au t e , X e t t t o t & t g o v Aqpwv iepeG, cp p a^E npoq n p a q o t i XPQ~ Ce'c;* ou y a p av aXAtp y ’ unaK ouaaipev tg o v v G v peTEoopoaocpioTcov nAqv q npoSftccp, t u pev aocpfaq nai yvoopqq ouvEKa, aoi Se o t i ppEV0u£i t * e v t o T o i v oSoTq K a i Tcbcp0aXpob rrapaPaAAEK; KavuTToSr)TO<; Kaica noX X ’ ckvexei <6 9 ’ qpTv OEpvorrpooco- tteT<;. ( Clouds 3 5 8 -6 3 ) The central character in Aristophanes' Clouds is Socrates. In the passage above, the N E 9 £Xai address Socrates as "IepeG" (359) and "pETEwpocKxpioTnv" (360)--an address which also exemplifies Aristophanes' threefold treatment of Socrates in the Clouds (Dover 1968a:xxxii-lvii). According to Cornford (as cited by Guthrie) the comic portrayal of Socrates in the Clouds combines, at least three different types which were never united to perfection in any single person: first the sophist, who teaches the art of making a good case out of a bad one; secondly the atheistic natural philosopher like Anaxagoras; and thirdly the ascetic moral teacher, ragged and starving through his own indifference to wordly interests (1969:3:372). 173 In Plato's Apology (19c), Socrates complains that the Clouds prejudiced his fellow Athenians to the extent that they accused him and sentenced him to death. In Plato's Symposium (223c-d), however, produced only seven years after the Clouds' performance, Aristophanes and Socrates appear to be on good terms with one another. At the end of the banquet the comic poet and the philosopher are two out of the three guests who remain sober and awake; they engage in a friendly conversation and even agree on the subject of discussion (i.e. the significance of tragedy and comedy). Furthermore, many years later Plutarch, in De liberis educandis (10c), reports an anecdote regarding Socrates' feelings for Aristophanes' Clouds. When Socrates was asked whether he was angry at the way in which Aristophanes represented him in the Clouds, he replied: "Good heavens no. He has his joke against me in the theater as if it were a big party of friends." From the very few accounts presented which report the relationship between Aristophanes and Socrates, it becomes apparent that ancient literature (Kassel-Austin 1984:3.2) as well as modern scholarship has approached the subject diversely. In modern scholarship since the eighteenth century to the present, painstaking endeavors to understand and answer what has been labeled "The Socratic Problem" have succeeded in dividing opinions into pro-Socraticism and anti-Socraticism 1 74 rather than elucidating Socrates' representation. And yet the extent to which Socrates stirred the Athenian public during the lifetime of Aristophanes is unquestionable. Socrates, the target of the comic poets, the bald, ugly creature with the snub nose and the prominent eyes--"features customarily attributed by the Athenians to satyrs and silenoi" (Dover 1968a:xxxii; PI. S ym p .215 B)--prevailed as the main character in the idealistic writings of Plato and Xenophon. And once again Socrates provides a shadowy personality for scholarly controversy and his image still occupies the attention of many disciplines in our century, as he has become for some an icon of the charismatic leader in the realms of religion, philosophy and politics. The leading sources about Socrates are Aristophanes' Clouds, the Platonic dialogues, Xenophon's Socratic writings and Aristotle's remarks on Socrates (which are based mainly on what he derived from his predecessors' accounts of Socrates). But the only facts that we can depend upon regarding Socrates are that he existed in the second half of fifth-century Athens, was executed by the state in 399 on the charges of "Qeouc; ou vopi^Eiv" (Ap.24b8-c1) and ” 8iacp9efp£iv toC i< ; v£ou<;''(Ap.24b9), and that he did not write anything (Plut. DK:1:104-5; Diog. L a e r.1 .1 6 ).1 Thus modern scholarship's evaluation of the 1The isolated passage of Epictetus (2.1.32) implies that Socrates not only wrote but wrote voluminously; this, however, can hardly stand against 175 enigmatic figure of Socrates derives first from accounts written during Socrates’ lifetime, from individuals who belonged to the same generation as Socrates and encountered Socrates face to face (e.g., fragments of Old Comedy and Aristophanes' Clouds). Second, this portrayal derives from sources written in the next generation by individuals who were young during Socrates' active life and who wrote about Socrates only after his death (e.g., Plato and Xenophon); and finally, from individuals like Aristotle, who were born long after Socrates' death and used secondary material to evaluate Socrates. Scholarly efforts attempting to evaluate and understand the persona of Socrates, however, have led to an overestimated examination of post-Aristophanic (Platonic and Xenophontic) ancient sources which reveal that Aristophanes’ Socrates, is highly and diversely caricatured (natural philosopher, sophist, hierophant). Thus certain scholars have evaluated Aristophanes' the silence of the rest of antiquity and probably refers to writings about Socrates. Cf. phrases like o i toO 2cokpc<tou<; X o y o i (Arist. Po/.1265A11). Cf. PI. P h aed .271a-278b Socrates converses with Phaedrus about the disadvantages of writing as opposed to the advantages of the art of speaking. "He who thinks, then," says Socrates, "that he has left behind him any art in writing, and he who receives it in the belief that anything in writing will be clear and certain, would be an utterly simple person and in truth ignorant of the prophecy of Ammon, if he thinks written words are of any use except to remind him who knows the matter about which they are written" (275c). 1 76 portrait of Socrates as negative or overdrawn.2 But by the same token it is acceptable to say that even the positive and embellished accounts of Socrates given by Plato and Xenophon concur in the terms of their over-idealization. Evidently, critics judge the validity of the ancient sources about the philosopher according to their personal preferences. Preferential approaches, however, to find "right" and "wrong" or "true" and "false" evidence can be misguided because we are dealing with reports about a notorious public figure who struck people differently. Like any public personality ancient or modern Socrates exists only as we see him, not as he "really" was. But the fact that Aristophanes' Clouds is the only primary source which presents a contemporary Socratic portrait not subject to idealism, is also undeniable; thus Aristophanes is valuable because he is hostile and not sympathetic. Aristophanes exposes Socrates, the Athenian citizen, his contemporary, and the impact he had upon Athenian society. Aristophanes' Clouds depicts Socrates from the viewpoint of a 2 T. Gezler in "Aristophanes und sein Socrates," M .H . (1956):65-93, maintains that Socrates is accused falsely of wasting time in talk and finicky argument since he is not responsible for what the Unjust Argument says; C. Ritter in Sokrates, Tubingen, 1931, remarks that Aristophanes' attack on Socrates exhibits a passionate hatred; and E. Zeller in Sokrates und die Sokratiker: Plato und die alte Akademie, Auflage, Leipzig, 1922 (repr. 1963), comments that Aristophanes has heaped on Socrates' head everything hateful and unreasonable that he knew about the sophists (cited by Guthrie 1969:3:361). 177 contemporary familiar with his activities and accomplishments; it portrays a man who must have been known to the Athenian audience who experienced the play directly; and it represents a first-hand account written much before any literary genre arose out of curiosity about the ZcoKpomKoi Xoyoi. The present chapter will focus on Aristophanes' portrayal and treatment of Socrates in the Clouds. It will examine the Aristophanic presentation of Socrates, the Athenian citizen, as the main target of attack on intellectual novelty in Athens during the second half of the fifth century: the introduction of atheistic natural (scientific) speculation, the ascetic individualism of the Pythagorean cult-centered philosophy, and the rise of rhetorical and sophistic approaches to politics. Finally, it will point out that the two unanimous accusations by Socrates' accusers which condemned Socrates to death in 399 (as Plato presents them in the Apology [24b8-c1 ;24b9]: Qeouc; ou vopfoiv and 8iacp0£ip£iv Touq v£ou<;) are nevertheless expounded throughout the Clouds even twenty-four years before Socrates’ execution. A brief examination with a general overview of the Clouds' plot shows that the main themes of the play are atheism, the introduction of new divinities, the sophistication of skilled rhetoric, and the impact which novelty had in confusing the 178 issues of tradition (as illustrated by Strepsiades) and corrupting the youth (as portrayed by Pheidippides). As soon as Strepsiades enters the cppov-ncrrnpiov he is introduced to the celestial phenomena (pe-mopa npaypaTa, 228); he is told that Zeus does not exist (o u 8’ ecm ZcGq, 367); he is required to accept the new deities (252-3) and be initiated in the religio-philosophical domain of the cppov-rio-rnpiov (254ff.); and he is trained in the rules and techniques of rhetoric (476ff.). And Aristophanes selects Socrates to play the role of the master educator and introducer of all novel elements. To say with certainty that Aristophanes' choice of Socrates calls to mind the speculative approach of natural science and philosophy, the Pythagorean brotherhood and the sophists, or that it reflects on Socrates' own activities and interests, may be a matter of opinion or viewpoint. It is true that the playwright caricatures cultural stereotypes and parodies movements of a religious, social and political nature. His mockery includes young and old, peasant and educated, male and female, Athenian and foreigner, the state, contemporary politicians, tradition and novelty. Thus among the diverse burlesque, the comic poet parodies not only the abstractions of intellectualism, the manifest paradoxes of natural philosophy and the disruptive proclivities of the sophists, but he also portrays them as embodied in a contemporary citizen who must 179 have been known for his eccentricity and novel preferences. At the same time it can be argued that Aristophanes did not attack Socrates directly (as an answer at least to those who hold such an approach although the stereotypes of Socrates' persona seemed to fit) but rather that he attacked all those elements which had disturbed the social balance of Athens. Otherwise, why should Aristophanes mention Thales and Prodicos in the Clouds at all? Perhaps the majority of Aristophanes' audience might not have even been capable of distinguishing innovators and innovations unless Aristophanes blended various features of the social scene into a single target. And Aristophanes' purpose as revealed by the Clouds' plot was facilitated by Socrates' popular notoriety. He assigned to Socrates all elements which contributed to changes in the traditional culture. Aristophanes, in fact, was not the only playwright to ridicule Socrates on the stage. Although the Clouds provides first-hand evidence (since it is the only play extant which treats Socrates), fragments of other old comedies indicate that Socrates was mentioned or portrayed by the comic writers Callias, Ameipsias, Eupolis and Telecleides. In addition, Ameipsias' comedy Connus, performed in the same contest as 180 Aristophanes' Clouds, assigned Socrates an important role and even brought Socrates on stage.3 In general, comic treatment of Socrates varied from negative remarks (calling him a buffoon and a starving idiot with a ragged coat) to more complimentary remarks as regards his physical endurance and immunity to fla tte ry ;^ it presented Socrates as unwashed, a thief, a senseless talker, a corruptor of wealthy young men, a lakonizing figure, indulging in wasteful dialectical cunning;3 and besides Socrates' status in Aristophanes' Clouds as the chief ruler of the 9 povTioTnpiov, Ameipsias in the Connus nicknamed Socrates cppovTioTpc;.6 Thus it was customary for Socrates to be ridiculed on the stage as early as the 420's, just as it was customary for philosophers to 3 The Connus won second place in 423 when the Clouds' first version came in third and Connus, according to Plato (Euthyd.272c and 275d, M enex.235e) taught Socrates music. ^Kap-repiKoc;; Xenophon in Mem . 1.2.1 uses the same word. Socrates' one old coat was a byword (Tpfpwv not x*°"va). Cf. Plato, Prot.3356, Sym p.219b. The Cynics used it also and claimed to model themselves on Socrates. D.L.2.28 does not specify in which play of Ameipsias these references come, but scholars since Meineke (CG F.1.203) assert that most likely they are from the Connus. 5 Callias referred to Socrates as one acquiring a solemn and lofty mein; the line in D.L.2.18 reads: *rl 5q ou acpvq kcu <ppovtT<; outco pEya; cf. Eur. Ale. 773 o0to<;, t( oejjvov tea! rr£<ppovTiic6<; PXettek;; other references to Ameipsias are in D.L.2.28 (poverty and endurance), Eupolis, Kock:l:251 (poverty and loquacity), Aristophanes, Birds 1282 (tim e-w asting, logic-chopping; I coxpaTqv rrap aK aS q pE vov XoXeTv recalls Callicles' criticism in PI. G org.4 8 5 d ). ^Socrates is the <ppov-ricn-q<; at Clouds 266 and in Xenophon's Sym p.6.6 (5pa ou, & IcoKpaTE<;, o <ppovTiaTq<; E TTiieaX oupE V C x;;). At Me/77.4.7.6 the USe IS apologetic in purpose. Cf. PI. Apo/.18b. 181 be ridiculed in the theater as late as the mid-fourth century.7 It would thus seem natural for the Athenian audience to expect to be entertained by any individual caricatured on stage who was significantly peculiar, whether a philosopher or a political candidate. As Navia comments, The masses are often able to vent their own frustrations by laughing at those who differ from them, for in that way they succeed in apparently bringing to their level anybody who seems to be more than they. And Attic comedy with its unparalleled range of permissiveness and latitude, proved to be a wonderful means for this. The poets, who wrote not for the scholars of later times, but for their immediate audience, understood it quite w e ll...(1 98 7:4 8). But the presentation of Socrates in the Clouds, the weird and bizarre Athenian, the notorious figure who struck people differently in respect to his disposition and physical appearance, is only one aspect of the question. The other presents the same eerie creature under the mask of the natural speculator, a hierophant and versatile logician. Strepsiades, upon entering the c p p o v - n c r r n p io v , is amazed and bewilderered by the new things he experiences. His first encounter with the student is only a preliminary introduction 7 This is derived from Amphis' fragments (a Middle Comedy poet contemporary with Plato). In D e xid em id e s, Amphis ridicules Plato by saying that the only thing that can be learned from his philosophy is how to frown. 182 to the cppovTiaTqpiov's scientific speculation and experimentation with natural phenomena. Strepsiades' first exposure consists of certain allusions to the main concerns of natural philosophy accompanied by Aristophanic caricature. He is introduced to the systematic approach to studying the earth (192), he encounters astronomy (194-5;201), he is exposed to geometric measurement (202-3), he experiences methodological studies of geography and sees a model map of the whole world (206-7). Strepsiades is informed about Socrates' experimental approaches regarding the distance a flea can jump (145-152), about Socrates’ idea regarding the gnat's intestinal tube (154-164), and about Socrates' interest in the paths and revolutions of the moon (171-2). Socrates' devotion to skeptical experimentation gives rise to the episode of the defecating lizard, which interrupted one of Socrates' great ideas just when he was gazing open-mouthed at the sky (171-3). In turn, the same incident, an Aristophanic allusion to an anecdote about Thales' own scientific devotion, is transferred to Strepsiades' memory, who himself then associates Socrates with the Milesian philosopher Thales (-ri S r jT ’ eiceTvov/ tov G o t^ rjv 0 a u (ja ^ o |je v ; 1 8 0 ) . The allusion to Thales is only a prefatory association with Socrates, as it is immediately followed by Socrates' entrance: he hangs in mid-air from a basket (224-6). And Strepsiades' 183 astonishment at Socrates' position becomes the subject of various Socratic scientific explanations with many allusions to contemporary theories of skepticism about the peTecapa rrpaypaTa (229-234). The encounter between Socrates and Strepsiades subsequently resuscitates additional allusions to presocratic philosophical speculation (the phenomena of rain, 371-4, and thunder, 375-407), only to lead to the denunciation of the traditional pantheon and the replacement of Zeus by Air and Vortex (380). An extended argument, however, has arisen about whether the Clouds' assignment of scientific interests to Socrates might be relevant also to the historical Socrates' pursuits in natural philosophy, or whether it is as it appears, i.e., an Aristophanic invention. A methodology applied by A. D. Winspear and T. Silverberg in attempting to understand the identity of Socrates was based on a genetic application in Socrates' programmatic stages of life (a methodological approach considered by Plato and Aristotle also). Socrates' life and activities were divided into an early and a later stage. This study argued that his humble background produced a young Socrates characterized by honesty, tolerance of poverty, and close connection with the democratic movement; and these were complemented by his dedication to natural philosophy, materialism and skepticism. But Socrates' connection with the 1 84 democratic movement familiarized him with the leading intellectual and political circles of Athens. His contact with individuals of higher status improved his own material and social status. Thus after going through a transitional period of sociopolitical adjustment, Socrates gave in to the conservative nobility and renounced his democratic spirit to gain the approval of wealthy aristocracy, which included individuals like Alcibiades, Aristides' family, Crito, Plato and his relatives (according to Winspear and Silverberg, Plato's "loathing for democracy" is obvious from his works) and Cephalus the affluent manufacturer. The authors maintain that Plato's and Xenophon's apologies are valueless and that all accusations about Plato's uncle Critias were valid (being a member of the Thirty), since it was under Socrates' influence that he became a savage tyrant, while he appeared to have started as a spirited democrat. Furthermore, Winspear and Silverberg concluded that Socrates' religious pursuits conformed to his political views, since "the new gods whom he was accused of introducing were the mystic divinities of the Pythagorean sect - the militant protective deities of international conservatism" (1939:76). The genetic division followed by Winspear and Silverberg in their attempt to reconstruct various stages in Socrates' life does not necessarily accord with Xenophon and Plato. Xenophon's reports do not shed any light on Socrates' childhood, 185 youth and manhood. Nor did Plato witness Socrates' early activities. He mentions, however, in the Apology (31 d) that Socrates' "sign" escorted him from his childhood and in Phaedo (36aff.) there is an account that Socrates was interested in Anaxagoras' natural philosophy during his youth. In certain Platonic dialogues, of course, (Parmenides 127b, Sophist 217c, Theaetetus 183e) Socrates is represented as young and in Parm enides (127b above) he converses with Parmenides circa 450 B.C. But it is not possible to know with certainty what Winspear and Silverberg mean by assigning Socrates "humble origins." Moreover, Socrates' scientific inclination might suggest that his family was affluent enough to afford a good education and leisure to pursue philosophical interests. The citation of Socrates "the thinker," who contemplates "the celestial phenomena" in Plato's Symposium (vi.6ff.), Navia argues, "is undoubtedly a reflection of the sort of language used by Aristophanes"; and although Navia concedes that Plato’s reference does not necessarily allude to the Clouds, he nevertheless suggests that "such language might have been a common form of speech in speaking of Socrates" (1987:55). Aristophanes, however, had witnessed Socrates' activities in the years prior to the Clouds' performance. Consequently, Socrates must have been somewhat similar to the way in which he is portrayed in the Clouds (except for certain exaggerations 186 and transformations which might have been non-factual) in order to be plausible to Aristophanes' audience. Thus Aristophanes’ allusions to natural philosophy through the persona of Socrates must reflect a historical truth regarding Socrates' interest in the speculative approach of natural philosophy. In addition, it is almost impossible to imagine that an inquisitive individual like Socrates, with his daim onion, intellectual curiosity and continuous quest for knowledge, was not affected by the influence which presocratic philosophy exercised upon all the intellectual circles of fifth century. Perhaps even Strepsiades' portrayal in the Clouds as the well-to-do peasant who, reduced to poverty by his wife's and son's extravagance, and who finds refuge in the c p p o v -n o -r r ip io v and searches for inspiration to defraud his creditors, has been intended to allude to Socrates' own approach in seeking solutions to personal problems within the circles of practical skill at law.8 But Socrates' portrayal as a natural philosopher (as evidenced by his contemplation of celestial subjects and natural phenomena) is complemented by his depiction as the ®Probably Aristophanes had in mind a situation parallel to that of Strepsiades and his aristocratic wife, as well as that of Socrates and his wife Xanthippe, who was reputed to be a shrew. Thus there is the possibility that Aristophanes picked up on the connection and brought it on the stage as an allusion to Socrates. And at C/.64 Strepsiades mentions that one of his wife’s favorite names for their son was Xanthippos. See also Guthrie (1969:3:385-6:n .3). 1 8 7 presiding priest of the 9 povTioTnpiov. As a priest, Socrates assigns a religious character to all his activities and declares the 9 pov-rioTr)piov a religious community. The disciple refers to Socrates as avroq (218) and when Strepsiades, happy to see him finally, addresses him {& Ico icp aT e< ;/< A > looKpcmSiov, 222), Socrates, swinging high in his basket, replies (t! pc <a*e7q, & ^qpcpe; 223). Socrates' portrayal in a high position on Aristophanes' stage not only attributes to him airy speculations, but also represents him as separate from the rest of society, since he looks down on Strepsiades (the peasant forced to urbanization after his marriage who was also emblematic of the peasant- class in Aristophanes' audience) and considers him an ordinary 'mortal' creature. Socrates proclaims the atheistic nature of the 9 p o v T i o T r ) p i o v (tto io u c ; 0 e o u < ; o p e T o u ; T rp c o T o v y a p S c o i/q p T v v o p i o p ’ o u k 6 o t i . 247-8), but at the same time he intensifies its religious character and makes clear to Strepsiades that admission of new members must be accompanied by an initiation ceremony (250-62). And yet Socrates' religious beliefs are uncustomary to the traditional-minded in the Athenian audience. He reveres the N £ 9 eXai, he rejects Zeus and he denounces all divinities acknowledged by the Athenian state. He does not hesitate to proclaim his atheism and he denounces, as senseless fabrications, the traditional gods and religious observances. 188 For Zeus as source of rain (368) and thunder (374) in the minds of Aristophanes' conventional audience are substituted the deities of the 9 pov/Tio-rr)piov, the N ccpeA ai (369-71; 375-78); and the Panathenaean soup-ritual provides a Socratic demonstration of the cause of thunder (385-91). Socrates communicates his irreligiosity openly to the others, he attempts to indoctrinate people like Strepsiades, who dwell in the norms of tradition and, with his nefarious nebulosities, he persuades members of the society to espouse atheism (Strepsiades is trained in atheism but finally he supports tradition, while Pheidippides is trained and becomes an ath eis t). The religious characteristics ascribed to Socrates in the Clouds reflect Athenian society's objections to religious innovations and the atheistic issues which were expressed by all proponents of novelty. The presentation of Socrates as atheist becomes even more prevalent in the contrasting portrayal of Strepsiades. The persona of Strepsiades illustrates the peasantry of the Attic countryside displaced by Pericles' war policy and forced to seek asylum in the city (Strepsiades stresses his dissatisfaction in the beginning of the play, 43-5;47;49) only to become confused by its sophistication as they encountered the distracting novelties of rhetoric, science, education, philosophy and politics-an 189 exposure which upset their traditional and rural simplicity. Strepsiades, the disciple of tradition and Olympian polytheism, faces the corruption and decadence of the city as it is manifested in the actions and disposition of his own son, Pheidippides. And yet his wish to rescue Pheidippides brings him to the original source of atheism, demoralization and social affliction. Strepsiades seeks resolution in the 9 povTioTqpiov of Socrates, the majestic master of the Thinking Establishment, himself the disciple of nebulous speculation and the demolisher of tradition and morality. Although the Clouds is a comedy and Aristophanes' comic style must have aroused laughter among his audience, his comments on the seriousness and viability of the novel ideas introduced to Athens by sophistry and natural philosophy cannot be disregarded. The audience's impression of Socrates must have been at least partially unfavorable, especially during the crisis of the Peloponnesian War, in which atheism could be considered by some the prime source of evil and degeneration. The tolerant attitude of Greek polytheism regarding the freedom of activities and the anthropomorphic behavior of the gods could not be conceived in a spectrum remote from that of customary mores. Socrates, the hierophant of the Clouds, does not honor the traditional gods; he deprives them of their power (and authority) over human affairs and does not recognize 190 divine intervention in quotidian activities; and he regards the customary ritualism (prayer, common meal, oracular consultation, festivity, sacrifice etc.) as purposelessly time- consuming. In this respect, Irwin remarks that "it would not be at all surprising if many Athenians regarded the views attributed to Socrates in the Clouds as an insult to the gods" (19 89 :18 9). As was mentioned above, Plato's Apology (19c) presents the first accusation against Socrates as "not recognizing the gods of the city and introducing new divinities." Socrates also mentions that the charges against him arose partly on account of Aristophanes' Clouds— the play which, indeed, exposed Socrates to the public as a hazardous atheist.^ I am not absolutely persuaded that Aristophanes' Clouds alone, presented to the Athenian public twenty-four years before Socrates was brought to trial on these charges, constituted the only reasonable cause for his condemnation to death. I believe, however, that Aristophanes had forseen the threats against 9 A skeptical approach against the religious charges has been taken by I. F. Stone (1988:201 ff.), who argues that the ancient Greek religion was a matter of practice rather than belief, and attempts to prove that Socrates' failure to observe the cults might have been a feature of Athenian democracy. We all know, however, that in matters religious public feeling is not always based on sober argument. The Greek verb vohReiv can certainly include what one says about gods as well as how one observes rituals. Stone seems to disregard the Decree of Diopeithes and other evidence of religious prosecution in the beginning of the Peloponnesian W ar (231 ff.). Dover also takes a skeptical approach in "The Freedom of the Intelectual in Greek Society," T alan ta 7 (1976:24-5). 191 traditional ritualism which novel elements had caused and that the Aristophanic portrait of Socrates was an intentional attack on Socrates, the notorious Athenian citizen. It was Aristophanes who exaggerated the atheistic persona of Socrates in the Clouds, but I do not think that Socrates' activities might have been so inconspicuous in Athenian circles that they needed to be revealed by the playwright. I suppose that Aristophanes simply stirred in his audience an awareness that certain individuals like Socrates might be considered a public threat to tradition, and he intended therefore to erase his celebrity and social respectability.10 As Irwin states, The two charges in the indictment against Socrates are so similar to the themes of the Clouds that it would have been amazingly foolish of Socrates to take the initiative in reminding the Athenians that the very same charges had been brought against him years ago, before anyone knew how Critias and Alcibiades would turn out. His comments are far more intelligible if other people had remembered the Clouds, and he needed to show that its charges were baseless (1989:189). Yet it is doubtful that the idea that Socrates indeed was guilty of those charges of which he was accused began with the Clouds-Aristophanes simply must have elaborated ideas already current in Athens. 1 °T o maintain that the C louds was completely unrelated to the reputation of Socrates, is like saying that the Knights and the W asps were not intended as attacks against Cleon. 1 92 Aristophanes' tendentious portrayal of Socrates which aimed at the defiance of the newly growing intelligentsia as demonstrated in the Clouds in association with certain social misfortunes and political instability provoked the ordinary masses to perceive divine punishment as the major source of the deterioration of the city's welfare. A series of devastating events, such as the plague in the beginning of the war, the failure of the Sicilian expedition, the Athenian defeat in the Peloponnesian war and the loss of radical democracy as well, might have been considered results of divine anger at religious offenses and the rejection of traditional faith and respect for the gods.1 1 But even post-Aristophanic evidence on Socrates, although it provides accounts expressed mostly in connection with utopian principles of Platonic and Xenophontic idealism, shows clearly that Socrates' religious beliefs deviated from current conventional social mores. Nor should it come as a great surprise that a curious and inquisitive mind like Socrates' searched for novel answers regarding the validity of the Olympian pantheon. Presumably, Socrates had equated divinity with the supreme power and wisdom of the mind, and he 11 Critias, in DK 88 B 25 (=TrGF ed. Snell, 43 F 19) and Lysias 12.69 provide evidence of Athenian religious anxiety in the last years of the Peloponnesian War. Also Lysias 6.19 claims that the Athenians should complain against citizens who insult religious rites, and in 6.20 he states that the gods will punish impiety sooner or later. 1 93 considered this power the originator of the universal order and the creator of mankind. The relationship between men and Socrates' supreme Mind was of the same nature and depended on the same principles—men’s minds controlled their bodies, just as god (the divine) controlled universal physical movements. The meeting point in the relationship between God and men was the orpeTr) of the soul, a religious conception which may reflect the Socratic belief that the soul might persist after death. To mention but a few examples, in Plato's Alcibiades (13 3c ), Socrates equates god with the soul in connection with knowledge and thought. In the Apology, Socrates argues that it is not right to neglect God's commands because of fear of death (28e), and that he (Socrates) will obey God and not the Athenians although he is affectionate toward them (29d). In Xenophon's Memorabilia, Socrates is the advocate of a supreme power. At M em A .14.17 Socrates tells Aristothemus: "Just consider that your own mind within you controls your body as it will. So you must believe that the wisdom in the whole universe disposes all things according to its pleasure." He then reveals at M e m A .3 A 3 that this supreme power is not like "the other gods," but it is the being "who coordinates and holds together the whole cosmos."12 According to Guthrie, Socrates, 1 2 The intellectual character of the universal soul as divine mind, and its creative role were emphasized in Socrates' lifetime by Anaxagoras and Diogenes of Apollonia. See Guthrie (1969:3:417-488). 194 uses 'God' or 'the gods' indifferently, but with a bias toward the former, and we have seen mention of a supreme governor of the universe contrasted with lesser gods. In so far as he genuinely believed in the gods of popular polytheism..., he probably thought of them as different manifestations of the one supreme spirit. This was the position of many thinking men, and an apparently different use of 'the god,' 'the gods' and 'the divine* (neuter) is characteristic of the age (1969:3:475-6). Socrates' 9 povTia-rnpiov in the Clouds has rejected anthropomorphism and customary ritualism in favor of the quest for knowledge in the course of speculation. All his divinities in one way or another represent some aspect of the universal or the individual realms. And the cppov-ricnrripiov is portrayed as a closed community in which members must not only undergo initiation, but should also meet the requirements and qualifications of the 9 povTicn-rjpiov's thinking-establishment. As we saw earlier in Chapters Two and Three, Aristophanes' caricature of the Pythagorean religious brotherhood was examined in various ways. Chapter Three mostly presented a paradigm of the dualistic aspect of the Pythagorean ideology as embedded in the existence of opposites in the physical, social and individual domains. But Chapter Two presented all possible Aristophanic portrayal of the occult; it linked Socrates' 9 povTioTnpiov with the Pythagorean cult and 195 demonstrated that the historic Socrates might have espoused Pythagorean religio-philosophical doctrines and ideals. When it comes to post-Aristophanic accounts, as mentioned earlier, it is a controversial enterprise to attempt to interpret specific instances as historical facts, especially in dealing with Plato's capacity to innovate and embellish. What is known, however, is that the Platonic Academy was developed on the traditional Pythagorean model and in Aristotle's time it was fashionable to view Plato as an amagalm of Socrates and Pythagoras (Mef.987a29ff; cf. Dicaearchus fr.41; Cic. Rep. 1.16, De or.I.42, Fin.5.87, Tt/sc.5.10; Numenius ap. Euseb. Praep. evangA 4.5.9; Aug. De c/V.0.8.4). During the generation of Plato's disciples, Pythagorean philosophy and metaphysical speculation were incorporated within civilized life. Later, from the time of Archesilaus, skepticism prevailed and the Academy predominated as basically "Socratic." But the main significance does not lie in the pursuits of the Academy (the Academy's founding occured a generation after the production of the Clouds). Rather, it lies in the fact that, besides the doctrinal trends of Plato's successors, the original dogmas were not Platonic but Pythagorean (Burkert 1972:83-96). Aristophanes' parody of Socrates as a Pythagorean master (auToq, 218) must have had some historical validity. Perhaps Socrates had espoused the Pythagorean divinities (relevant to 196 the accusation against him in the Apology (19c) that he did not recognize the gods who were recognized by the state) and he might have also attempted to utilize his religious beliefs in a way similar to that of the Pythagorean patronage. Aristophanes portrays Socrates as a Pythagorean master who selects individuals for membership in the cppov-ncn-npiov on the basis of wisdom and intelligence. And it was this Pythagorean selectiveness with respect to membership which subsequently promoted cultural individualization and set the Pythagoreans apart from the rest of the society. Perhaps even Socrates' ascetic appearance was connected with the idea of sociopolitical selectiveness which set him apart from those citizens who still remained faithful to their traditional beliefs (at least all those accused of profanation of the mysteries in 415 [as stated by Ostwald 1986:537-50] were born by the the year 450, belonged to the upper economic and social strata, and were friends of Socrates and the sophists). Moreover, Burnet's and Taylor's theory presents Socrates in Plato's Timaeus as an advocate of Pythagorean theory and a connoisseur of Pythagorean wisdom. In addition, Burnet and Taylor consider Tim aeus the best historical document about Pythagoreanism in the fifth century (Burnet 1930:277f.; 308f.;1914:151 ff.; Taylor 1928:178ff.)- It was Taylor who traced Socrates' Pythagoreanism to the Clouds, who saw the 1 9 7 9povTicrrr)piov as a site of Pythagorean mysteries and interpreted the accusation of Socrates on charges of impiety as a measure against newly introduced Pythagorean religion (Taylor 1911:1 ff.); and it was Grote, as early as 1847, who saw a connection between the burning of Socrates' cppovTioTqpiov in the Clouds and the Pythagorean catastrophe at Croton (335). But even Winspear and Silverberg viewed Socrates' charges concerning religion as resulting from his introduction of the mystic divinities of the Pythagorean sect (76). The above authors, however, assumed that in the 420's Socrates was still actively speculative, and they regarded this as the main reason that, in the Apology, Socrates "takes great pains to confuse the issue and to confound the recent suspicion with the earlier attack on Aristophanes" (77). Winspear and Silverberg argued that Socrates' introduction to the mystic divinities of the Pythagorean sect occurred later and by the time of his trial he was entangled in "a conspiracy against the democratic constitution of Athens and an intellectual assault on the whole democratic way of life"(84). Even their interpretation of Socrates' behavior during the trial of the generals implies that he was neither spirited nor brave, but that it reflected "a move in the incredibly complicated game that was being played by both sides in this hectic period" (67). Winspear and Silverberg have supported the possibility that Socrates fell into the web 198 of a political stratagem which attempted to make him an idealist, a game tending to point toward "the whole effort of the conservative faction" (67). The ie p e u q of the Clouds, the Aristophanic portrayal of Socrates, reveres the artistic expression of the Tongue (r\coTTav, 424) besides his devotion to skeptical speculation of the (jE T e c o p a T T p a y p a T o t ( t o Xao<; t o u t ! icai T a q NEcpEXac;, 424). His atheistic religiosity does not end with the members' ritualistic initiation into the communal brotherhood of the cppovTioTrjpiov. One of the deities which Socrates reveres is the art of speaking, the skill of linguistic exercises (a mere game in prolixity which is intended to confuse minds and alter the ordinary meaning of words at least in the view of opponents who were not as skilled, or political minorities). To mention but a few examples: measures and rhythms are notions conceived in distinct terms by Socrates and Strepsiades. Strepsiades, the farmer, thinks of them in value of capacity and considers them necessary for mercenary purposes (in fact, he was cheated by a food dealer: n£pi t & v psTpoov Eycoy'- Evayxoq y a p t t o t e / u t t ’ aXcpiTapoipoO rrapEKonqv SiyoivlKcp, 639-40). But Socrates censures Strepsiades' mercenary concept, as his notion of measures and rhythms is associated with the poetic measures of the iambic trimeter and trochaic tetrameter (641-2). 199 Aristophanes' Socrates is a portrayal of the immediate effects of "Socratism," especially the dishonest rhetorical training and the idea that people should do whatever they can in order to get their own way. Aristophanes' Socrates is unethical and lacks moral principles. He is an exploitative opportunist ready to abuse his interlocutor's weakness, and he is always willing to make the weaker argument strong in order to satisfy his purposes and meet his needs. Socrates' atheism, interwoven with his sophistic opportunism, rejects and weakens the religious sanctions which sustain traditional codes of morality. He rejects traditional notions of divine retribution and promotes injustice. Socrates, the Clouds' sophist, manipulates the citizens' ordinary common sense and abandons the ethical norms on which conventional culture is founded. Aristophanes’ portrayal of the sophistic aspect of the 9 povTiaTnpiov is more prevalent in the encounters between the Just and Unjust Logics, Strepsiades and the creditors and Strepsiades and Pheidippides. Although the encounter between the two Logics briefly presents the differences between tradition and novel ideas and deals with the sophists' concern with the art of speaking, all three encounters also identify especially the effects of "Socratism” in the area of dishonest rhetorical training and in the idea of making a profitable case out of a dishonest claim. But the 200 sophistic element of the Clouds shows clearly additional specific allusions. Besides the scientific interest in natural philosophy, instruction in certain sciences such as mathematics and astronomy was also offered by some sophists (PI. Prof.318e;315c; Guthrie 1969:3:27-51). In addition, the concern of many sophists was the correct and appropriate approach to theoretical aspects of poetry, rhythms, meter, and rules of grammatical gender (PI. Hipp. /Way.285d; Guthrie 1969:3:205;221). And Aristophanes' Socrates portrays this sophistic interest in the cppovTiaTrjpiov. But Socrates is also compared to Prodicos, the best of the peTecopooocpiaTou, by the Clouds' chorus (360-1), an allusion which has been considered to have had a historical foundation and cannot be dismissed as a mere joke (Gomperz 1912:93). Furthermore, evidence indicates a special relationship between Socrates and Prodicos, since Socrates often claims in Plato that he is Prodicus' student and personal friend. In Plato's Euthydemus (277e) an interest shared by Socrates and Prodicos is the accuracy of j names which, according to Socrates, forms the first stage of initiation into the mysteries of the sophists. In the P ro tag o ras (341a) Prodicos' emphasis on accurate distinction between synonyms is associated by Socrates with his habit of requiring his students to be as precise as possible with the particular subject of discussion. In the M eno (96d) Socrates mentions that 201 he has been trained by Prodicos in the same way that Meno was trained by Gorgias. And in the Charm ides (163d) Socrates talks about hearing many discussions of Prodicos as regards the distinction of names. In the Hippias M ajor (282c) Socrates refers to Prodicos as a friend and companion. Finally, a reference in the Theaetetus (151b) mentions that Socrates, after explaining his skill in assisting the birth-pains of men whose minds are full of ideas, hands over to Prodicos and other "wondrous wise men" those people who do not have good ideas in their heads because Prodicos and the other wise men may be capable of helping them. According to the Platonic and Xenophontic reports, Socrates was attracted to sophistic ideals and attended with enthusiasm the sophists' discussions about the notion of justice and the nature of virtue, the relationship between vopoq and cpuoiq and the linguistic objectives of rhetoric. In addition, he was known for his habitual practice of gathering the Athenian youth around him both in public and in private and introducing them to argumentative discussion on various subjects. In the Phaedrus (278b-d) and the Phaedo (90bff.), Socrates insists on training in the art of A o y o i, without which, he believes, men skip the path to knowledge and truth, believe what they are told, and become, therefore, subject to abuse and disillusioment. But Plato, of course, considers Socrates the best master of this art, which is different from contradiction (avTiXoyiKoI-perhaps Plato had Protagoras in mind) and he criticizes the sophists and rhetoricians in the framework of the "uncultured whose desire is not for wisdom but for scoring off an opponent" (Phaedo 91a). Guthrie, however, remarks: The relation of Socrates and Plato to sophists is subtle. It is generally said that, whereas the sophists were empiricists who denied the possibility of a general definition of 'good' on the grounds that it differed relatively to individual men or societies and their circumstances, Socrates (and Plato after him) insisted that there was one universal good, knowledge of which would give the key to right action for everybody everywhere (1969:3:87:n.3). In this respect, Aristotle (Pol. 1260a27) presents Socrates as persisting with one general definition of apeTr) and contrasts him with Gorgias, who applies the notion of ape-rfi to different virtues (also Plato in M eno). But Ernest Barker suggests that "in contrasting Socrates with the sophists, we must remember that in many respects he was one of them" (1959:46). And this is more apparent in Phaedrus (268a-c), where Socrates is depicted as a real rhetorician with sufficient knowledge of dialectic to be compared to a doctor. The true doctor knows many remedies but knows how to apply only the appropriate 203 treatment to a particular patient. On the contrary, a bad doctor does not know how to apply a specific treatment to a specific ailment and thus is compared with an inferior rhetorician, who "through ignorance of dialectic is unable to define the nature of rhetoric" (269b). It is difficult to decide how similar to, or how different from, contemporary sophists Socrates was, especially when dealing with accounts whose historical accuracy may be questioned, and especially in view of their overtones of personal opinion. Furthermore, the point should be made that all writers and speakers in the late fifth-century (including Aristophanes) were influenced by the sophistic revolution, so why should Socrates be an exception? Especially since he actually did consort with them and engaged them in argument? From the popular point of view, Socrates' unique ideas (where he differed from other sophists) were just as novel as the sophists' ideas and therefore just as potentially disruptive. So to try to distinguish Socrates becomes a speculative issue. Not taking pay seems to be the only really important distinction, but Socrates received other valuable benefits (friends in high places). As a matter of fact, Aristophanes presents Socrates in the Clouds as a sophist interested in all major concerns of the sophistic movement. The 9 povTicrrnpiov is also depicted as a 204 place in which various sophistic traits meet. The correct training in language and its objectives figures as an obligation. Rhetorical skill in argument as well as the effects of "Socraticism" in dishonest rhetorical training are reflected in Strepsiades' words at the very beginning of the play (112-5): I t . eTvoi Trap’ outoTc; cpaofv apcpco t w Aoyoo to v KpdTTov’, ocjtk; earn, ucai to v qTTOva. to u to iv to v £T£pov toTv Aoyoiv, TOV qTTOVO, viKav AEyovTa 9 001V T a 8 iK G 0T£pa. Speculation about the meaning of justice predominates in the cppovTiaTQpiov's thinking establishment. So the Unjust Logic wonders on what grounds Zeus has escaped punishment, justice having been present (904-6): Ht . TTobq SqTa A(icq<; ouaqc o Z eu< ; o v k o t t o A g o A e v t o v T iarip' aurou Sqaaq; Contemplation of the nature of virtue revolves around the debate between the two Logics about the marriage of Peleus and Thetis, where they discuss Peleus' virtues. "No," replies the Unjust Logic, Thetis did not marry Peleus for his virtues; on the contrary, Peleus' virtuous nature was the main reason that Thetis left him (1067-9): Kp. Kai Tf)v © e tiv y ’ £ynHe 8 ia t o ococppovsTv o flqAEuq. H t. k S t’ cmoAiTToGaa y ’ auTov coxe T ' ou y a p r’jv u[3piaTq<; ou8 ’ qSuc; ev toTc; O Tpw paoiv ttjv vuicra TTavvuxt£eiv The relationship between vopoq and cpuoiq takes also various dimensions in the 9 povTioTqpiov. The demands of nature (c p u o E o o c ; 205 avay<aq, 1075), as contrasted with the established customs (Ka0eoTu>T{*>v v6(jwv, 1400), are embedded in every level of discussion. Finally, the cppovTicrrnpiov prefers to recruit youths. Strepsiades is constantly scorned by Socrates for the difficulty he has in learning, his forgetfulness and his inability to comprehend new methods of instruction (koi nwq, & p&pe ou <a\ K p o v io o v 6£c*>v K a i fk K K E o e X rjx /c , 398). At last, the NkcpeAoti State the cppovTioTppiov's preference for youth (794-6); Pheidippides replaces Strepsiades and receives instruction successfully. Yet the ypovTiaTrjpiov is a profit-making community. Instruction and training are exchanged for a fee ( p io 0 o v 5 ’ o v t i v * a v /r r p c n - T Q p \ o p o u p a i a o i K a T a G q a c iv T o u q © e o u q , 245-6). In Xenophon's Mem orabilia (1.2.6;1.6.5), however, Socrates seems to criticize the charging of fees by the sophists. He considers it the main cause of deprivation of freedom, since the sophists were obliged to converse only with people who paid them, while Socrates was free to enjoy conversation with anyone he chose. Socrates compares the sophists' charge with prostitution. He equates selling one's mind to selling one's body, and proceeds to adopt the Pythagorean notion of wisdom (1.6.13), that wisdom should be shared among friends and loved ones, since it is a property which cannot be acquired by money (in the same sense Pythagoras achieved political power from this activity as did Socrates). 206 Aristophanes consequently, as mentioned above, portrays Socrates' (ppovTioTqpiov with many allusions to sophistic features and interests. But when it comes to Aristophanes' presentation of Socrates himself, the hierophant of the cppovTia-rnpiov/, Aristophanes seems to allude to Socrates only by those sophistic characteristics which were known to him as typical of Socrates' interest and intellectual involvement (youthful clientele, rhetorical interest, atheistic attitude and cosmogonic speculation). Because when it comes to certain methods either of dogmatic instruction or instruction resulting from dishonest training, Aristophanes seems to put the Socratic persona aside, and instead to present such circumstances differently. The most vivid illustrations of this kind of portrayal in the Clouds are: the long debate between the two Logics ( 8 9 0 - 1 1 0 0 ) , the encounter between Strepsiades and the creditors ( 1 2 1 4 - 1 3 0 2 ) and the final encounter between Strepsiades and Pheidippides after the latter's instruction ( 1 3 2 1 - 1 4 5 1 ) . Socrates is not present during the two Logics' debate, but leaves the premises ( o u t o c ; paG qoeTai n a p ’ o O to T v t o T v A o y o iv /e y d ) 5' a m o o p a i . 8 8 6 - 7 ) . It is the Unjust Logic who asks Strepsiades, after the defeat of the Just Logic, whether Strepsiades wants to take Pheidippides away or let him be instructed in oratory ( 1 1 0 5 - 6 ) : H t . t ( SqTa; TTOTEpa t o u t o v an a yeo 0a i Xa^cbv (3o u A e i t o v uiov, q 5 i5 6 okco aoi Acyeiv; 207 And it is the Unjust Logic who assures Strepsiades that Pheidippides will be returned to him a skilled sophist (1111): H t . apeAei, KopieT t o u t o v oocpicrrrjv Beglov. Socrates appears only at 1145-1169 to return Pheidippides to Strepsiades when, vexed by Strepsiades' curiosity about whether Pheidippides has learned the techniques of forensic oratory, Socrates assures Strepsiades that Pheidippides will be able to defend against any lawsuit (coot’ aTTocpuyoic; Sv gvTiv' av pouAg 8tenv- 1151). Nor has Socrates instructed Strepsiades to mistreat his creditors or Pheidippides to abuse Strepsiades. Thus the body of the Clouds' evidence indicates that Aristophanes was quite familiar with the similarities between the sophists and Socrates as well as with their different approaches.13 Socrates nevertheless is responsible for dishonest rhetorical training and the corruption of young people, since he presides over a cppovTioTrjpiov which recruits youths and in which extreme sophistic doctrines are in 13|n the Clouds commentary (liii), Dover suggests "that although the difference between Socrates and the Sophists was known to Ar., in the sense that the data which constituted that difference were available to his organs of perception, he simply did not see it, and if it had been pointed out to him he would not have regarded it as important. He drew only one basic distinction between the normal and the abnormal man." I understand what Dover attempts to explain, although it seems to me that if one perceives a difference he is capable of seeing it too, but I am tempted to disagree with his suggestion. It is obvious from Socrates' treatment in the Clouds that Aristophanes not only perceived and saw the differences between Socrates and the Sophists, but he also makes assignments based on them in the play. 208 circulation. And in this context he is portrayed by Aristophanes. Pheidippides appeals to Socrates' authority in his encounter with Strepsiades. Pheidippides argues that father-beating can be justified, since even fowls and other animals retaliate against their fathers; and there is no great difference between humans and animals, except in lawmaking (1426-29). Strepsiades tells Pheidippides that in this case, following the fowls' example, he should also eat dung and sleep on a wooden perch (1430-31). Consequently, Pheidippides, unable to justify his animal analogy and prove Strepsiades wrong (o u t o u t o v , & T O V , c o t i v , o u 6 ’ o v IC O K P O T E I S o K o f q . 1432), takes refuge in the appeal to Socrates' authority. Aristophanes' Socrates, the master of the cppovTioTqpiov, with his atheistic attitude, his rejection of cult and myth, his weird deities, his manipulative and opportunist schemes, his scientific insanity, his linguistic games and tendency to corrupt young people, is portrayed as a plague on Athenian society. Therefore Socrates, the nuisance and threat to traditional culture, should be banished from the city of Athens, and the burning of the c p p o v T ic rrrip io v (this is what actually had happened to Pythagoras' house/headquarters) at the end of the Clouds coincides with Aristophanes' double symbolism. First, the fire destroys unwelcome and subversive novelty and second, it purifies the ground for the revival of Athenian tradition. 209 Socrates was no less harmed by the Athenian accusations in 399 than by the provocative Aristophanic presentation of Socrates on the stage of the Clouds in 423. According to Plato's Apology (24b9), corruption of young men constituted the second charge against Socrates. And in the Republic (537e-539c), Plato mentions how Socrates' habitual dwelling upon certain argumentative methods provides an opportunity for young men to abandon traditional mores.14 |n addition, in the Apology (23d2-7), Socrates explains that his accusers mean, by "corrupting," that he offends "things in the heavens and below the earth," "not recognizing the gods," and he seems to indicate that what his accusers mean by the charge is really "making the weaker argument stronger." According to Irwin, Many modern students have accepted this view of how Socrates may have "corrupted" the youth by making the weaker argument stronger. If this view is right, it gives a further reason for believing that the charges of corruption need not be sharply separated from the religious charge; for sophistical, rhetorical and eristic arguments might readily be used to undermine belief in the gods and belief in divine sanctions for moral principles and practices (the Clouds offers obvious examples). It would be natural to mention Socrates' argumentative techniques 1 4 Plato, of course, does not say that Socrates' method was wrong nor does he imply that young men should not be trained in cross-examination; but rather, in this passage, he is contemplating the ideal state. 210 (maliciously or ignorantly misrepresented) to explain how he undermined belief in the gods and in conventional morality (1989:192). Aristophanes' Clouds was produced in 423 during a period in which Socrates' prosecution was not even thought a possibility, especially since in the preceding year (424) Socrates had exhibited heroic excellence in the fight against, and retreat from, Boiotia.1^ Twenty-four unhappy years in the course of Athenian history had yet to pass before Socrates' prosecution. And, although in Plato's Apology Socrates argues that the accusations against him are false and that his accusers were preparing slander against him for many years past, Socrates does not mention any names, but implies that one of his accusers might be a comic poet. So the Clouds of Aristophanes has not been presented in the Apology as the original source of the scandal against Socrates. Nevertheless, even twenty-four years before Socrates' prosecution, Aristophanes’ keen eye anticipated and presented to the Athenian public the same Socratic portrait which subsequently came to confront the wrath of the polis. As I mentioned above, Socrates was a notorious public figure who struck people differently and Aristophanes' Clouds is a valuable source of evaluating Socrates because Aristophanes is hostile 15 Plato mentions three campaigns in which Socrates took part: the siege of Potidaea in the beginning of the war, the defeat and subsequent retreat of the Athenians at Delium in Boiotia in 424 and the battle of Amphipolis in 422. Cf. Apol.28e; Laches 181a; Sym p.219e;220e; Charm ASZa. 211 and not sympathetic. But while this is true, it is nevertheless very difficult to say that, underlying Aristophanes' decision to expose Socrates, there might have been personal emotions of envy, vengeance and animosity.16 Aristophanes simply perceived in Socrates the traits and characteristic tendencies of a movement which eventually led the Athenian state into a stage of cultural change. And given Socrates' notoriousness, eccentricity and compliance with certain novel elements, Aristophanes combines in the portrait of Socrates the embodiment of all non-conventional traits. Aristophanes' Socrates represents the epitome of scientific ostentation and hyperbole which directed attention to the mysteries of nature, the celestial phenomena and their association with the essence of divine power along with a concomitant divertion from devotion to and dependence on, the traditional Olympian pantheon. He is the symbolic condensation of the ethical relativism and religious skepticism of the sophistic movement which undertook the task of instruction in the art of political superiority through linguistic excellence, and this instruction disregarded conventional virtues of morality, divine worship and patriotic devotion. Socrates' 1 6 ln the Frogs, however, Aristophanes does present Socrates as an enemy of the poets. While the chorus praises the intelligence of the renowned bard, it comments on Socrates' engagement in pursuing idle talk; he deprives the art of tragedy of all noble and true thinas (1491-5): xapfev o u v p q Ic o K p a T E i/r r a p a K a Q q ^ jE v o v XctXz'ivJcfnofictXovTa p o u a iK q v /T a t e p e y ic r r a TTapaXirrovTa/Tq^ TpaycpSiKq^ TEyvqc 212 persona is the reflection of individual non-conformity and indifference to the welfare of the public. He is the stereotype of dishonest rhetorical training, the source of confusion in issues which were beyond the reach of the ordinary, tradition- oriented citizens; likewise, he was symbolic of the corruption of young people. Just as Socrates succeeded in confusing Strepsiades and corrupting Pheidippides in the Clouds, there exist many social pests who "Socratize" (as is obvious in the Birds: e X a K o o v o p a v o u v a n a v T £ < ; a v S p a m o i t o t e , / e k 6 | j c o v e t t e i v g o v Ip p u T rc o v EocoKpaTouv, 1281-2, where also there are those who attempt to corrupt the Athenians and succeed). And similarly, Socrates is represented as the "spectral shape” and "monstrous form" which infected the land in the W asps (1035-1042). Socrates, the target of Aristophanic comedy, and simultaneously the celebrity of Plato's and Xenophon's writings, inspired and came to embody different points of view. But the poetic image of Socrates in the extant comedies of Aristophanes is related to major factors which contributed to the social change which the Athenian state underwent during the second half of the fifth century. Despite the immense literature which idealizes the image of Socrates as he appears in certain post-Aristophanic accounts, there are still instances which bring Aristophanes' Clouds into perspective. The following quotation is an editorial 213 piece of the Daily News, a New York newspaper issued in December 12, 1971: Socrates (about 470-399 B.C.), an ancient Greek philosopher, met one of history’s most famous deaths. He was convicted in Athens on a vague charge of "corruption of the young." Then ordered to drink a cup of poisonous liquid called hemlock. Athenians now, 20-plus centuries later, are arguing about whether Socrates had a fair trial, with some erudite attorneys claiming that he did not. About that we do not know. We do know, though, that Socrates had a habit of asking people embarrassing, meddlesome, impudent, or otherwise annoying questions, so persistently that to this day such queries are called Socratic questions. Thus he was, among other things, a public pest around Athens for 50-odd years. So, while it may have been a bit harsh of the Athenians to make the old gentlemen knock himself off, we can understand how they felt, folks, and so, we believe, can you (in Navia 1987:52-53). BIBLIOGRAPHY 214 Abrahams, Roger D., and Bauman, Richard. "Ranges of Festival Behavior," in The Reversible World, edited by Barbara A. Babcock (1978):193-208. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Adkins, A.W.H. "Some Nebulous Thoughts on the Clouds of Aristophanes," Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 15 (1968): 146-7. "Clouds, Mysteries, Socrates and Plato," Antichthon 4 (19 79 ) :1 3-24. Adrados, Francisco R. Festival, Comedy and Tragedy (1972). Translated by Christopher Holme. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975. Arnott, P. Greek Scenic Conventions in the 5th Century B.C. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962. Aurenche, O. Les groupes d' Alcibiade, de Leogoras et de Teucros. Paris, 1974. Bacon, Helen. 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Creator Marianetti, Marie Constantine (author)

Core Title Religion and politics in Aristophanes' "Clouds"

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Classics

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag literature, classical,OAI-PMH Harvest,theater history

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Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c17-686496

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