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The Influence Of Anti-Poverty Policy-Making Upon Poverty Decision-Making: 1964-1974

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The Influence Of Anti-Poverty Policy-Making Upon Poverty Decision-Making: 1964-1974

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Xerox University Microfilms
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
REEVES, Thomas Zane, 1941-
THE INFLUENCE OF ANTI-POVERTY POLICYMAKING
UPON POVERTY- DECISION MAKING: 1964-1974.
University of Southern California, Ph.D., 1974
Political Science, general
University Microfilms, A X ERO X Com pany, Ann Arbor, Michigan
THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED.
THE INFLUENCE OF ANTI-POVERTY POLICYMAKING UPON
POVERTY DECISION MAKING: 1964-1974
by
Thomas Zane Reeves
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(Political Science)
February 1974
UNIVERSITY O F SO U T H E R N CALIFO RN IA
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY PARK
LOS ANGELES. CALIFORNIA 9 0 0 0 7
This dissertation, written by
Thomas Zane Reeves
under the direction of h.is... Dissertation Com
mittee, and approved by all its members, has
been presented to and accepted by The Graduate
School, in partial fulfillment of requirements of
the degree of
D O C T O R O F P H I L O S O P H Y
Dean
D ateC ,
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
Chairman
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page
I. ANTI-POVERTY POLICYMAKING ANALYSIS:
AN INTRODUCTION ......................... 1
I. Introduction: Anti-Poverty
Policymaking...................... 2
II. Public Policy Analysis: A Review of
the Literature................. 4
A. Anti-Poverty as Public Policy . 4
B. Anti-Poverty as Policymaking
Content and Process ............. 5
C. Policy Analysis as an Integrated
Analytical Focus ................. 7
D. Anti-Poverty Policy as Independent
w Policymaking............... 10
III. Ethical Issues in Anti-Poverty
Policy Analysis ................... 18
A. Objectivity: Methodology or
Myth for Policy Analysis? . . . 19
B. Ethical Role of the Policy
Analyst: Information or
Advocacy?................. 23
II. ISSUE CONCEPTUALIZATION IN ANTI-POVERTY
POLICYMAKING....................... 42
I. Poverty as a Partisan Issue . . . 42
II. Longitudinal Dimensions of the
Poverty Issue ...................... 44
III. Definitions of the Clientele:
Who Are the Poor?.............. 48
IV. Understanding the Problem: What
Causes Poverty? ................... 54
A. Environment as a Cause of Poverty 56
B. Individual Causes of Poverty:
The Poor Person Typology . . . 57
ii
Chapter Page
V. Finding a Cure: Anti-Poverty
Policymaking as an Option...............65
VI. Measuring Success: Use of Social
Indicators in Poverty Programming . . 69
III. THE NEW FRONTIER AND THE POVERTY ISSUE . . 85
I. The New Frontier "Discovers” Poverty . 85
A. The Role of Intellectuals as
Policy Advisers: Kennedy and
the Intelligensia..................88
B. Kennedy and the Intellectuals:
Symbolic Policymaking ............ 93
C. Professionals as Policymakers:
Heller's Council of Economic
Advisers Fights Income Poverty . . 96
II. JFK as a Symbol: The Great Society's
Adaptation of the Poverty Issue . . . 102
A. Myth Number 1: JFK as a Long-
Time Anti-Poverty Crusader . . . 104
B. Myth Number 2: JFK's Legitimi
zation of the War on Poverty . .106
IV. THE GREAT SOCIETY FORMULATES A NEW
APPROACH TO THE POVERTY ISSUE . . . . .121
I. A Policy Analysis of Johnson's War
on Poverty..............................121
A. The Anti-Poverty Policymaking
Paradigm: Kennedy Men Formulate
Policy in Johnson's Great
S o c i e t y .......................... 123
II. A.Paradigm of Anti-Poverty
Orientations ......................... 127
A. The Exclusive Anti-Poverty
Orientation....................... 127
B. Maximum Feasible Participation
of the Poor as a Paradigm
Orientation....................... 132
iii
Chapter Page
C. Restructured Federalism: Anti-
Poverty Policymaking by Washington
0E0 Administrators.................136
D. Community Development Programming
as an Anti-Poverty Orientation . . 140
E. Volunteerism as an Anti-Poverty
Orientation....................... 141
F. Poverty and the Anti-Poverty
Paradigm.......................... 143
V. ANTI-POVERTY POLICYMAKING IN THE GREAT
SOCIETY....................................150
I. The Failure of the War on Poverty:
Reconsiderations of Rational
Decision Making....................... 150
A. The Unpredictability of Rational
Policymaking: Community Action
and O E O .......................... 151
B. Anti-Poverty Policymaking and
Models of Decision Making . . . 162
C. A Pluralistic Process: Incremental
Realities and Anti-Poverty Policy
Revisions.......................... 167
D. The War on Poverty: Failure
in Rational Decision Making . . . 171
VI. THE IMPACT OF THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION ON
ANTI-POVERTY POLICYMAKING: 1969-1973 . . 183
I. Ideology in Executive Reorganization:
A Comparison of the Job Corps and
Legal Services Decisions ............ 190
II. The Restructuring of Federalism:
Departmental Reorganization .... 197
III. The Restructuring of Federalism:
Regionalization ...................... 206
A. Regionalization of Federal
Agencies.......................... 207
B. Regionalization of Local
Governments....................... 210
iv
Chapter Page
IV. New Federalism Shapes Anti-Poverty
Policymaking........................... 213
A. (1969-70) OEO's Assessment Phase . 214
B. (1971-72) Delegation Phase . . . 218
C. (1973-74) Dismantlement Phase . . 223
V. Anti-Poverty Policymaking and the
Nixon Approach to the Poverty Issue . 232
VII. ACTION: SUBTERRANEAN POLICYMAKING IN THE
WHITE HOUSE (1971-74)................... 249
I. Executive Reorganization as Presi
dential Policymaking.................. 251
II. Anti-Poverty Agencies as Partisan
Resources: ACTION and the Campaign
to Reelect the President...............257
A. To Eliminate VISTA's Community
Organization Thrust ............ 257
B. ACTION Personnel as a Partisan
Resource............................274
III. Realignment of Program Goals and
Objectives to Reflect New Achievement
Ethic Values (1973-74) 288
A. ACTION Poverty Goals: The Shift
from Anti-Poverty to Volunteerism 288
B. ACTION Goals: Balzano1 Achievement
Oriented Volunteerism .... 300
VIII. THE ANTI-POVERTY POLICYMAKING PARADIGM:
FLUCTUATION AND CHANGE..................... 313
I. The Office of Economic Opportunity,
1964-74, R.I.P.: The Failure of
Anti-Poverty Research.................. 314
II. ACTION'S University Year for Action
(UYA): An Effort in Programming
Innovation............................316
A. The Anti-Poverty Policymaking
Paradigm: An Exclusive Anti-
Poverty Orientation...............317
v
Chapter Page
B. Maximum Feasible Participation
of the Poor in Policymaking:
A Second Anti-Poverty
Orientation........................ 320
C. How to Fight Poverty (and Win) on
Paper: Planned-Impact-Programming
as a UYA Anti-Poverty Orientation 327
D. Volunteerism as an Intervention
Strategy....................... 331
E. Anti-Federalism: Direct
Washington Intervention .... 332
III. ACTION'S Staff Institutes (1973) . . 335
A. Replacement of an Exclusive
Anti-Poverty Mandate with a
Social Problem Approach .... 337
B. Maximum Feasible Participation
of Local E l i t e s ..............339
C. Federalism Revisited...........340
D. Volunteerism: A New Kind of
Volunteer.................... 341
E. Planned-Impact-Programming
Concept Expanded ................ 343
F. Balzano's Staff Resocialization
Institutes.................... 345
IV. Restructuring the Anti-Poverty
Policymaking Paradigm..............353
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................... 368
APPENDIXES....................................... 405
A-l. UYA Post-Service Questionnaire . . . 406
A-2. UYA Volunteer Survey.............. 407
A-3. UYA--University Year in Action--
Volunteer Questionnaire Post-Service . 408
B. Attitudinal S u r v e y .................409
C. Pittsburgh Survey ...................... 411
vi
r
Page
Appendix D. Advisory Commission on Inter
governmental Relations.................413
E. Balzano's Goals for ACTION .... 414
F. ACTION Institute Attitude Survey . . 415
G. New Orleans Institute Distribution
of Log Scores....................... 420
H. ACTION Institute Survey II— Form B . . 421
I. Opinion D a t a ...........................423
J. New Orleans Institute Pre-Test/Post-
Test Comparison Attitude Change . . 425
K. ACTION Institute: Attitude Survey . . 429
L. Program Assessment.................... 430
CHAPTER I
ANTI-POVERTY POLICYMAKING ANALYSIS:
AN INTRODUCTION
I. Introduction: Anti-Poverty Policymaking
This research examines anti-poverty policymaking
from a framework of public policy analysis. It focuses on
a policy case study with a somewhat unusual theoretical
approach. The objective is neither reform of anti-poverty
bureaucracy nor a historical description of this uncertain
struggle; rather, the research design is more theoretical
and long-range. A model (paradigm) of policymaker orien
tations which provides linkages with other policies where
attitudes function independently in policymaking will be
tested.
Methodological innovation occurs by considering
anti-poverty orientations as an independent variable.
Independent anti-poverty policy orientations meet criteria
of a good heuristic model: decision-maker attitudes that
were segmental become components of an interrelated
2
policymaking system. Independent policy is not explained
by environmental variables but itself causes policy con
sequences . Policymaker attitudes and orientation become
parameters of policymaking.
By approaching anti-poverty policymaking within
a paradigm of policy orientations, policy content and
process are clarified and interrelated. Strategies and
requisites for social change are delineated.
Anti-poverty attitudes in Nixon's New Federalism
provide interesting comparisons with Johnson's War on
Poverty. Anti-poverty policy orientations of a Shriver,
Kennedy or Johnson are supposedly antithetical to those
of Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and Balzano. But, are they?
Attitudinal research indicates a surprising degree of
policymaker consistency in anti-poverty orientations.
Indicative of independence and intensity of an attitude
is consistency over a decade of anti-poverty policymaking.
Empirically, the anti-poverty policymaking paradigm
is tested in three ways: (1) by constructing a paradigm
of anti-poverty orientations operative during the Great
Society from questionnaires given to 0E0 administrators,
0E0 memoranda and public statements; (2) comparison with
anti-poverty orientations manifest by administrators in
Nixon's 0E0 and ACTION programs; and (3) examining efforts
in Nixon's administration to change anti-poverty orienta
tions .
Particular research emphasis is placed on three
Nixon administration efforts to modify anti-poverty
policymaking orientations: Phillips' attack on 0E0;
ACTION'S experimental anti-poverty programming; and
Balzano's Institutes to resocialize ACTION staff.
First, the scope and approaches in policymaking
literature are surveyed. Emphasis is placed on the role
of a policy analyst in approaching socio-moral issues,
• v
i.e., poverty, discrimination, injustice. Secondly,
dimensions of anti-poverty concepts and programming con
sequences are analyzed. Attention in Kennedy's New Fron
tier is placed on formation of anti-poverty orientations.
Concepts and orientations of the anti-poverty paradigm are
analyzed in the Shriver Task Force's creation of the Eco
nomic Opportunity Act (1964). Anti-poverty paradigm revi
sions leading to final legitimation conclude Lyndon B.
Johnson's four Great Society years.
The research then focuses on the Nixon administra
tion's six years of anti-poverty policymaking. The moti
vating question: Why did anti-poverty programs survive in
the Nixon administration? brought on the hypothesis that
prevailing anti-poverty policy orientations influenced
new decision makers entering this arena. This research
tests intensity of anti-poverty orientations in three case
studies by empirical and descriptive analysis. Finally,
empirical evidence of attitudinal change and paradigm
stability is examined with conclusions concerning the
future of anti-poverty policymaking.
11- Public Policy Analysis: A Review of
the Literature
A. Anti-Poverty as Public Policy
Any newly emerging analytic approach suffers from
semantic confusion and conceptual ambiguity. Contemporary
analysis of public policy (policy science) is no exception.
Impreciseness in policy analysis derives partially from
public popularity and controversy of public issues. Pub
lic policies are perceived in social and ethical terms.
The public policy arena is one in which all men are
experts in the heritage of Jacksonian democracy and the
policy scientist competitively offers his professional
analysis.
Even a basic distinction between public and
5
private policies is elusive. If, as Moynihan suggests,
there are no social interests about which government does
not make policy, then even private decisions have public
implications.^ Individual poverty now has public policy
orientations. Demarcation between political and non
political, public and private, political and other social
2
subsystems is frequently nonexistent. Whether public is
associated with power, legitimacy, or authoritative allo-
3
cation of resources, public policymaking is expanding as
nonpublic policymaking diminishes. Regardless of partisan
orientations, anti-poverty as a public policy is irrevoc
able.
B. Anti-Poverty as Policymaking Content and Process
Differentiation in the literature between policy
content and process is also vague. Policy analysts differ
whether content or process constitutes the central core of
policy analysis. Lack of consensus produces a plethora of
content/process approaches to policymaking.
Public policy content analysis focuses specifically
on "what is being done rather than how it is being done."^
For example, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 repre
sents the substantive content of Johnson's anti-poverty
policy. Anti-poverty policy content includes several
categories for analysis:
5
1. A set of objects to be affected, i.e., the poor.
2. Events or strategy intended or desired, i.e., War
on Poverty programming. (Riecken defines strategy
as a "deliberate allocation of resources . . .
intended to achieve a chosen end.11)®
3. Line of action or consequences intended, i.e., to
raise incomes. (Van Dyke defines action as "a
deliberate selection of one line of action from
among several possible ones.")?
4. A public declaration, i.e., declaration of a total
anti-poverty war.
5. Line of action or consequences actually taken,
i.e., community action.
Traditionally, anti-poverty policy studies focused
O
on content categories or a single case study. Unfortu
nately for theory building, policy content studies are
generally too descriptive and problem oriented.^
A temptation is to treat content exclusively as
public policy.'*'® Yet, policy content does not exist in a
vacuum even analytically. Content and process are in
extricable. Policy content is usually the output of
systemic/subsystemic processes.'*"'*' Anti-poverty policy
content by contrast defines actor role interaction. Anti
poverty policies are Froman's "ways of doing things or
12
decision rules." Policy content derives from how things
are being done. Rational and systematic analysis of the
13
anti-poverty decision making process is still crucial.
Who can disagree with Dror's thesis that a significant gap
exists between policymaking models and how policies are
usually made? Anti-poverty policymaking is prima facie
evidence of the need for rational policymaking models and
procedures.
Within public policy literature, content-process
debate is often a chicken-egg or ends-means dialogue. No
sharp distinction between policy content and process is
ultimately possible. Anti-poverty policymaking analysis
links the decision making process to content as a source
of policymaker attitudes and orientations. Anti-poverty
policymaking orientations are not derived from content but
from analysis of policymaker behavior over a decade.
C. Policy Analysis as an Integrated Analytical Focus
Policy analysis is one alternative analytical
approach available for anti-poverty analysis. Specifi
cally, anti-poverty programs have been analyzed from
various perspectives: legislative process (passage of
the Economic Opportunity Act), public administration
(ACTION, 0E0 operations), elite analysis, group dynamics
(clientele groups), sociological trends (public opinion,
clientele reaction, culture of poverty), etc. Policy
analysis should combine different approaches in providing
data and insights of anti-poverty content and process.
Public policy, even presidentially dominated
foreign policy, is seldom produced by a single political
subsystem. Anti-poverty policymaking is limited by an
independent paradigm but directed by decision making
processes. Reliance upon a single approach to anti
poverty decision making is conceptually narrow for theory
building. Anti-poverty policy analysis requires an
integrated use of several methodologies in several case
16
studies. The researcher's analysis employs policymaking
case studies of ACTION, 0E0, UYA and models of Nixon Job
Corps and Legal Services decision making.
Explanatory or prescriptive policymaking models
are in embryonic stages. Our anti-poverty analysis is
suggestive but only preliminary. Focus on anti-poverty
policymaking in the Nixon administration is a beginning.
Consequently, an anti-poverty policymaking model cannot
currently be prescriptive. As such the prescriptive anti
poverty policymaking model is "less as it was than aspiring
17
reformers wanted it to be." Obvious reform strategies
do not emerge from the paradigm model of anti-poverty
policymaking. Anti-poverty reform theoretically comes
when policymaker orientations are changed and motivation
for reform depends on one's agreement with the orienta
tions .
Rational decision making models assume that
J
clearly defined policy alternatives emerge from synoptic
18
analysis of policymaking. Unless policymakers have
rational decision making models they will "muddle through"
19 20
the policymaking process. Two variables require anti
poverty policy analysts to reappraise rational policy
making models:
1. Lack of empirical evidence supporting any policy
alternative, i.e., is virtually no data how people
escape poverty.
2. Normative problems (ideology, public opinion,
actor orientations and beliefs), i.e., "work
ethic" versus "welfare ethic" orientation.
Clearly defined policy alternatives do not always emerge
from rational decision making models. Even in the 1964
Shriver Task Force preparation of the War on Poverty,
where virtually no political constraints on policymakers
were operative, synoptic (rational) policy analysis was
secondary to policymaker orientations.
Policy analysis is the only adequate methodology
10
for comprehensive anti-poverty analysis. Yet anti-poverty
policy analysis is currently too preliminary for prescrip
tive model-building. Only after extensive data collection
and synthesis with other cross disciplinary efforts can
prescription occur.
D. Anti-Poverty Policy as Independent Policymaking
What difference does it make for analysis whether
one approaches policy as a dependent or independent vari
able? Most policy analyses assume policy outputs are
21
produced by a policymaking system or subsystem. Inno
vative academic and think-tank programs in policymaking
analysis emphasize rational decision making models which
92
produce intended policy consequences. ^
If policy outputs were always dependent products
of systemic processes, rational policymaking analysis
would be reliable and apropos. However, this research
hypothesis is that certain social policies must be
approached as independent policymaking variables and that
nonrational (psychological) models are more appropriate
for policy analysis.
When public policies are viewed as independent
variables one may assume that
11
. . . policy processes vary in accordance with the
issue, or the stakes of the game; that there is a
relationship between decision-structures and types
of public policies. ^
The nature of certain public issues exercises an independ
ent effect upon the policymaking process. Decision makers
entering the policy subsystem will predictively behave in
accordance with orientations dictated by the policy-issue.
Most policymaking systems follow Weber's bureau
cratic ideal of rationality.^ Few public policies are
affected by nonrational ideological or partisan percep-
25
tions. For example, voters are not characteristically
issue-oriented and usually assume party or candidate issue-
26 27
orientations. Voting studies indicate that voters
even occasionally accept incongruent issue orientations
from conflicting sources. The American voter generally
avoids ideological cleavages and usually suffers from
28
issue ambivalence. He seldom views political issues as
nonrational concepts with ethical or moral overtones.
Even Watergate is viewed in curiously amoral terms--"it's
what all politicians have been doing for years."
Yet, on certain types of social issues the
American voter is not apathetic. Socio-moral issues are
often perceived in moral perspectives. Recognition of
12
socio-moral issues, race, bussing, welfare, poverty is
29
high among voters. Voters are concerned about their
30
congressman's vote on these issues. In fact, socio-
ethical concerns often constitute the only issue appealing
31
to Lane's common man.
An ethical dualism or ambivalence toward poverty
32
is one aspect of American culture. Our liberal heri-
33
tage dictates a sympathetic view of the working poor
while our work ethic and Protestant heritage are antago-
34
nistic toward welfare recipients. Ambivalent orienta
tions toward the poor affect socio-moral policymaking in
employment, housing, health care, education, and anti-
35
poverty. Ethical dualism in our cultural value system
is antecedent to anti-poverty policymaking systems.
Paradoxically, poverty as a socio-moral issue is
independent of anti-poverty policymaking systems because
it is dependent on cultural values. Anti-poverty policy
was formulated with the orientations of the policymakers,
i.e., the Shriver Task Force, as the only policymaking
guidelines. Once made, War on Poverty orientations became
fixed anti-poverty assumptions— not even significantly
modified during the Nixon era.
Analysis does not suggest that the War on Poverty
13
36
reflected consensus in society toward the poor. The
War on Poverty reflects an ethical dualism toward the
poor. The War on Poverty as a policymaking approach
37
blended classical and neo-liberal orientations toward
poverty. As will be demonstrated, various political
factors in 1964 provided a form of anti-poverty policy
making which pragmatically supported the poor (more so
than public opinion generally). Appearance of anti-poverty
in 1964 was not indicative of a compassionate national
38
orientation toward the poor. Individuals still maintain
39
an ambivalence toward poverty and the poor.
A number of policymaking studies suggest that
certain public policies are largely shaped by independent
policymaker orientations. Policy orientations are often
defined by public perceptions of policy consequences.
Edelman categorizes policies as either producing
material or symbolic satisfactions.^® (By Edelman's
criteria, the War on Poverty produced symbolic not material
41
satisfaction.) Froman dichotomizes urban policy outputs
42
as either areal (total) or segmental. Both Edelman and
Froman define independent policy categorizations as public
perceptions.
Lowi defines a trichotomy of independent policy
14
43
arenas. Public policymaker orientations are either
distributive, regulatory or redistributive. Policy
classification is dependent on the policymaker's intention
(as defined the policy analyst). Interestingly, the
policy analyst may classify policies quite differently
from the policymaker, i.e., liberals might view the War on
44
Poverty as distributive; conservatives as redistributive.
Consequently, policy analysis must include the psychologi
cal environment of the policymaker--not the policy ana-
45
lyst. Anti-poverty analysis empirically reconstructs
the decision maker's own attitudinal framework as he per
ceives it.
Independence of anti-poverty policymaking is
indicated by correlation with socio-economic variables.
In contrast to Dye's policy correlations in state and
46
local policymaking, anti-poverty policymaking does not
indicate significant dependence on socio-economic factors.
Important variables in local anti-poverty policymaking
are psychological variables— the psychological environment
of local decision makers.
Greenstone and Peterson's comparison of community
action programs in the four largest urban areas indicates
that CAP decision makers pursued incompatible goals in
15
anti-poverty policymaking. Local politicos felt anti
poverty programs should provide economic redistribution
while 0E0 administrators felt political participation to
be the primary goal. Anti-poverty orientations were not
significantly affected by socio-economic variables.
In their study of city councilmen and policy out-
47
comes, Eyestone and Eulau discovered that policymaking
orientations are relatively independent of socio-economic
variables. Councilmanic perceptions or preferences became
in empirical reality independent variables. Significant
correlations did exist between social policies and (1)
social development of the city--irrespective of size, and
(2) scope of municipal government activities. Researchers
attributed the willingness of policymakers to tap available
resources as the most important variable affecting policy
development.
In probably the most comprehensive study of a
48
single community action agency, Marshall found that com
munity representatives were resocialized by participation
as board members. Community representatives showed "a
49
marked increase in political efficacy." Marshall con
cludes that anti-poverty organizations are socializing
agents, "arenas in which political attitudes are being
16
shaped, loyalties and self-images are being influenced.”'*®
In effect, participants entering the decision making arena
assumed existing anti-poverty policymaking orientations.
In an important study of VISTA volunteers,
Gottlieb"*^ found that service as a VISTA volunteer "seems
52
to speed up the politicization process." Findings indi
cate that VISTA socialized its volunteers with a set of
anti-poverty orientations substantially different from
attitudes generally held by either poor people or liberal
53
arts college students. It is remarkable that a brief
(one-year) VISTA experience radicalized volunteer attitudes
so significantly.
Wildavsky's analysis of adversary groups in the
Dixon-Yates controversy indicates that policymaking orien
tations influenced decision makers significantly:
The public versus private power issue . . . partici
pants on each side have long since developed a
fairly complete set of attitudes on this issue. . . .
They have in reserve a number of prepared responses
ready to be activated in the direction indicated by
their sat of attitudes whenever the occasion
demands.54
Public and private power orientations, like anti-poverty
orientations, form parameters of decision making.
Anti-poverty policymaking demonstrates the impor
tance of psychological variables in decision making.
17
Policymakers interpret cultural values through their own
ethical framework into policy orientations. Anti-poverty
policymaking, because it was formulated by a small deci
sion making group with no externally imposed guidelines,
is particularly molded by the policymaker's psychological
environment:
The more intimate the vantage, the more detailed the
perspective, the greater the likelihood that politi
cal actors will loom as full-blown i n d i v i d u a l s .55
Psychological roles of policymakers need analytic reconsid
eration in the literature. Since Freud's unproductive
56
psycho-biographical study of Woodrow Wilson, considerable
loosely defined research has been categorized as psychology
57
and politics. Few psychological studies of political
actors are valuable models.-*® Consequently, many policy
analysts are skeptical of actor personality studies.
Actually, political scientists already utilize
psychological concepts, i.e., party identification, voter
alienation, efficacy, etc. Greenstein"^ classifies
psychological studies of political actors as (1) single
60
actor studies, (2) typology studies which classify actor
personalities,^ and (3) aggregative studies of collective
62
personality types in decision making. Anti-poverty
policy orientations are an aggregate personality framework
18
63
assumed by the Poverty Warrior or 0E0 administrator in
decision making.
A psychological paradigm of socio-moral orienta
tions controls and limits anti-poverty policymaking. This
anti-poverty paradigm functions independently of social
systems/ subsystems. New decision makers entering the
anti-poverty policymaking arena are socialized into
existing paradigm orientations toward poverty and the poor.
Decision makers function in a new psychological environ
ment; their personality assumes the orientations of a
Poverty Warrior.
Ill. Ethical Issues in Anti-Poverty Policy Analysis
Ethical issues are of particular importance to
the policy analyst. Post-Watergate political analysis
suggests that public policy analysts or advisers can no
longer keep quiet nor skirt underlying ethical issues in
policymaking. Anti-poverty policymaking was formulated
partially in response to a nation's discovery of its poor.
Ethical frameworks are seldom employed. Policy
makers make moral assumptions. Morality is often deter
mined by adrenalin or emotion. Despite situational ethics,
Eulau sees two ethical issues of importance to policy
analysis:
(a) Should politics be approached scientifically,
i.e., factual or philosophically, i.e., value
laden?
(b) Should policy analyst perform primarily a neutral-
intelligence-gathering role or an advocacy role
in keeping with his ethical framework?
Ethics suggests a rational process of arriving at ultimate
truths. Are objectivity and scientific rigor professional
goals of anti-poverty policy analysis? If so, the ethical
consequences must be delineated a la the Hippocratic Oath.
A. Objectivity: Methodology or Myth for Policy Analysis?
Unanswered epistemological questions have long
plagued social sciences. Can man achieve objective knowl
edge or truth about his own actions? How one responds
depends upon his view of man as a social observer.
Observer objectivity is ideally obtained whenever percep
tions are not distorted by psychic or social filters.
Contemporary political science is dominated by those who
assume that scientific methodology produces objectively
64
verifiable truths.
Few feel that objectivity means "to be impartial
65
. . . biases, no preconceived values." Even fewer
political scientists accept natural law theory which
suggests that observation of empirical reality (nature)
66
provides an observer with ultimate truth. Social behav
ior was first extensively analyzed by systematic (objec
tive) analysis of the Enlightenment, Systematic social
67
inquiry during the Victorian era, i.e., Marx, Darwin,
and Freud opened up new areas of human knowledge by
objective analysis.
If laws of human behavior could be objectively
68
understood, aberrant behavior could be analyzed and
controlled. Positivism confidently promised that objec
tivity in social science would solve social problems, i.e
war, hate, and poverty.
Although the behavioralist search for value-free
objectivity continues, it is increasingly attacked by
69
normative theorists. Accordingly, prejudices limit
scientific objectivity to a modicum possessed by only the
analytically trained person. There are no ultimate ob
servable truths discoverable in observable phenomena. It
is illustrative that even sacrosant laws of science
70
inevitably change through time. Normative theorists
feel that social analysis based on scientific inquiry is
fallacious. Human behavior is not a controllable experi
ment nor can motivation be externally observed. Roszak
21
maintains that scientific objectivism in social analysis
produces "the worst moral consequences of a technocratic
society.Because man has nonrational and emotive
responses he theoretically is not susceptible to rational
behavior models.
The present research delving into anti-poverty
policymaking assumes that scientific inquiry into non
rational bases of individual behavior i£ desirable. For
example, anti-poverty policymaking flounders on nonrational
analysis of a poor person psychologically trapped by the
72
culture of poverty. Parsons and Weber show nonrational
behavior is logical to the individual actor and may be
rationally analyzed by social scientists (psychologists
assume actor rationality even in abnormal behavior).
Analytically trained, albeit subjective observers,
provide linkage by which rational and nonrational behavior
analysis is combined.^ Observers utilize an analytically
separated observer-phenomena dichotomy while recognizing
inseparability between observer subjectivity and percep
tions of reality.^ Policy analysts are participant/
observers in social action and are capable of constructing
anti-poverty models with explanatory and predicative cap
abilities .
22
Given that a policy analyst cannot assume personal
objectivity and that methodologies for analysis of non
rational behavior are inadequate, what goals and objec
tives can be adopted for anti-poverty policymaking
analysis? Systematic data gathering and systemic
approaches are crucial for policymaking analysis. Explan
atory models for both rational/nonrational behavior must
75
be constructed from empirical data. Lastly, actor
orientations, behavior patterns, and role expectations
must be assessed without overt observer subjectivity.
It is crucial to realize that a policymaker's
analytical focus is often motivated by his own subjective
interests. Direction and intensity of one's interests
often function as a catalyst for inquiry. Even the
trained observer often discovers that for which he had
been looking. Breakthroughs in scientific knowledge often
appear accidental but is actually conformation of the
investigator's intuition. One may hypothesize that Nixon
dismantled 0E0 for primarily partisan reasons and conse
quently miss considerable evidence to the contrary.
Expansions in knowledge often occur when investi
gators refuse to accept immutability of scientific laws
and a priori limit dimensions of hypothetically possible
23
phenomena. It is important to avoid establishing rigid
presuppositions in policy analysis. The essence of
scientific investigation lies in synthesizing empirical
76
methodology with the investigator's fettered vision.
B. Ethical Role of the Policy Analyst; Information
or Advocacy?
What are the ethical obligations of the policy
analyst to the anti-poverty policymaker? Few question
the policy analyst's initial intelligence or information-
gathering function. But is information-gathering a
primary function or supportive of an advocacy role? Per
haps a third policy adviser role exists wherein policy
alternatives are enumerated so that a decision maker
77
chooses his own course of action.
Others see the policy analyst's professional
obligation as more ethically defined. The professional
obligation of the policy analyst has become a central
issue among members of several professional associations,
i.e., American Political Science Association (APSA).^®
Although ad hoc committees moderate polarized
policy views in APSA there are two approaches to policy
79
analysis. The Caucus for a New Political Science
accuses APSA leaders of failing "to state official
24
positions on issues of peace, change, justices as well
as war, stability, and interest aggregation and pollu-
80
tion." Supposedly APSA neutrality constitutes an
abdication of professional (moral) responsibility to
tender policy advice.
An apparent majority of APSA membership define
professional obligation differently. Value choices or
official recommendations on major issues are avoided
because they would cause:
. . . transformation of the Association into a
political pressure group or use of the Association
by any member or group as a vehicle to propagate
political preferences or ideologies .83-
Policy advocacy would ethically violate the political
scientists' vow of objectivity.
Policy advocacy by professionals embroils many
disciplines in their respective professional associations
82
and official journals. The university itself is cur
rently undergoing a similar role clarification as a
critic of public policy. Catalyst for the debate on
policy advocacy was undoubtedly Vietnam which caused
"unprecedented polarization of academic life."®^ Riesman
suggests a threat to academe resides in a
. . . single-minded attention to any major public
issue may well deny for them their long-term social
purposes as unique foundations of cultural thought
and discourse. ^
Groups or institutions who advocate policy alter
natives risk offending public or elite opinions. Advice
may also prove fallacious or even catastrophic. Similar
possibilities did not deter Socrates from making policy
recommendations to young Athenians. Results of profes
sional policy advocacy may be hemlock rather than public
gratitude.
Refusal of an association of political scientists
to advocate policy positions is viewed by the Caucus as
85
a logical manifestation of the behavioral revolution.
Accordingly, APSA does not advocate Nixon's impeachment
or an end to poverty because it is dominated by behav-
86
ioralists and empiricists who avoid ethical decision
making.
The Caucus approach is similar to nineteenth
century historicism which ignored empiricism by accepting
87
comparative and logical approaches to truth. Truth was
relative to one's historical Weltanschauung, paradigm or
sociology of knowledge rather than ultimate truth. The
policy analyst could confidently discover truths of his
epoch. Logical truths determined by historicism should
26
ethically be advocated to society's policymakers. Truths
must be advocated to society or else there occurs an ever-
widening gap between academe and the real world (which
^ „ .88
the Caucus now sees).
The Caucus' role for the policy analyst is one of
activism and advocacy of policy positions based on his
professional expertise. Integration of praxis with
theoria occurs in the professional's subjective but
89
trained analytical powers. The behavioral tradition
now supposedly dominating APSA is based on observer
objectivity and neutrality. Inquiry for truth proceeds
inductively and relies on empirical verification. Gen
eralizations of political behavior are only formulated
following empirical corroboration and intersystem com
parison. Consequently, only individual opinion or middle-
range generalizations could be given as policy advice.
Until predictive behavior models are finally developed
behavioralists cannot professionally (ethically) recom
mend value judgments as truth to policymakers. Policy
advocates who do so, i.e., Henry Kissinger, risk their
90
professional credentials.
Whether policy analysts should function in an
advocacy or informational role will ultimately be an
27
issue of individual conscience. Most promising for
policymaking are decision making models integrating both
91
advocacy and neutrality roles --models encouraging
diversity of opinions regarding policy options during
decision making while not commiting policy analysts to
advocacy of final policies. Consensus building by intra-
92
group conflict can reinforce group integration.
Several prescriptive policymaking models utilize
internal advocacy approaches: (1) partisan mutual adjust
ment,^ (2) bureaucratic politics,^ (3) adversary pro-
gc g/:
ceedings, (4) devil's advocate, and (5) multiple
97
advocacy. Internal advocacy models analyze both
decision maker's political constraints and ethical advice
by policy advisers. Synthesis of descriptive and ethical
considerations in policymaking are crucial prerequisites
98
for prescription. Watergate suggests that presidential
decision making occurred with inadequate descriptive and
ethical policy analysis.
Anti-poverty policymaking demonstrates a lack of
adequate descriptive (information-gathering) and normative
analysis. Anti-poverty policy was hurriedly formulated
with woefully inadequate information and stereotypes of
the poor.
28
Moral consideration of the poor's rights as citi
zens has characteristically been subjugated to political
priorities. Analysis of anti-poverty policymaking suffers
99
from an overdose of Weber's ethical neutrality.
Research suggests that an ethical vacuum in
policymaking is filled by policymaker orientations. In
anti-poverty policymaking orientations function as param
eters of decision making. Major social policies are
indelibly defined by the ethical perspectives of their
progenitors. Nixon anti-poverty policymaking incorporates
the 1964 War on Poverty policymakers. Consequently, anti
poverty policy reform requires a synoptic strategy to
change policymaker orientations. Other social policies
affecting the poor, i.e., welfare, public housing are also
locked into policymaker orientations which make policy
change and innovation difficult.
Anti-poverty as a policymaking framework is a
product of misinformation and stereotyping. This research
will subsequently analyze the consequences of anti-poverty
conceptualization. Anti-poverty policy orientations are
not dependent on a logical policymaking arena.
Anti-poverty is a non- or anti-policy which fails
all taxonomical criteria. Anti-poverty is not: inclusive,
29
mutually exclusive, valid, or reliable. Anti-poverty
lumps together only a few subpolicies affecting citizens
with low incomes.^® Anti-poverty objectives seek to
increase the prosperity of the poor. Anti-poverty is not
against poverty per se or even social subsystems which
cause both poverty and affluence.Anti-poverty policy
orientations seek to increase income levels so that the
degree of poverty does not constitute systemic injus-
Systemically, anti-poverty strategies are compo
nents of broad economic policymaking with particular
emphasis on low income citizens, i.e., income poverty.
Income poverty policymaking is rationally interrelated
with welfare, health, education, housing, and employment
policies (socio-ethical issue of the poor). Anti-poverty
policymaking is an illusory framework for problem resolu
tion. Within compartmentalized arenas, 0E0, HEW, HUD,
Labor, ACTION, and Agriculture attempt to reduce income
poverty. Agency policymakers are limited and directed
by an independent anti-poverty policymaking paradigm.
30
Footnotes to Chapter I
1. Daniel Moynihan, "Policy vs. Program in the
'70's," The Public Interest, No. 20 (Summer 1970), p. 91.
2. The views of various schools of thought in
political science as discussed in Eugene Miller, "Posi
tivism, Historicism, and Political Inquiry," American
Political Science Review, LXVI, No. 3 (September 1972),
796-817.
3. For various approaches to the discipline of
political science, see most-introductory American govern
ment or political science textbooks, i.e., Stephen L.
Wasby, Political Science— The Discipline and Its Dimen-
sions: An Introduction (New York: Scribner's Sons,
1970).
4. Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "Public Policy," Inter
national Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, XIII
(New York: Crowell, Collier & MacMillan, 1968), 204.
5. Austin Ranney, "The Study of Policy Content:
A Framework for Choice," Political Science and Public
Policy, ed. by Austin Ranney (Chicago: Markham, 1968),
p. &.
6. Henry W. Riecken, "The Federal Government and
Social Science Policy," Annals of the American Academy of
Social and Political Sciences, 394 (March 1971), 101.
7. Vernon Van Dyke, "Process and Policy as Focal
Concepts in Political Research," in Political Science and
Public Policy, p. 27.
8. An example of the former is Sar Levitan, The
Design of Federal Antipoverty Strategy (Ann Arbor: Uni
versity of Michigan, 1967); the latter, Clyde E. Jacobs
and John F. Gallagher, The Selective Service Act: A Case
Study of the Governmental Process (New York: Dodd, Mead,
1967).
31
9. Froman, "Public Policy," pp. 205-206.
10. An early example is Stephen Bailey, Congress
Makes a Law: The Story Behind the Employment Act of
1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950).
11. Van Dyke, "Process and Policy," p. 28.
12. Froman, "Public Policy," p. 204.
13. The "science" of public administration rests
upon this assumption among the writers who have directly
related public policy content to policy administration
are Yehezkel Dror, Public Policymaking Reexamined (San
Francisco: Chandler Press, 1968), and Charles Lindblom,
The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision Making Through
Mutual Adjustment (New York: The Free Press, 1965). Also
Amitai Etzioni, "Mixed Scanning: A Third Approach to
Decision Making," Public Administration Review, December
1967, p. 385; Heinz Eulau, ed., "Preface," Behavioralism
in Political Science (New York: Aldine, 1969).
14. Dror, Public Policymaking, p. xi.
15. See David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom,
A Strategy of Decision (New York, 1963), pp. 48-50, 111-
143; Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy, pp. 137-139.
Also, Jerome S. Bruner, Jacqueline J. Goodnow, George
Catlin, A Study of Thinking (New York: Wiley, 1956),
chaps. 4-5.
16. For an excellent overview of current pre
scriptive theories of policy-making in complex organiza
tion, see Alexander L. George, "The Case for Multiple
Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," American Political
Science Review, LXVI, No. 3 (September 1972), 751t785.
17. I. M. Destler, "Multiple Advocacy: Some
Limits and Costs," American Political Science Review,
LXVI, No. 3 (September 1972), 786.
32
26. The political scientists have recently
debated whether or not there has been a "decline" in
(American) ideology. The best presentations of both
sides of this debate are Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology
(New York: The Free Press, 1960); Seymour M. Lipset,
Political Han: The Social Bases of Politics (New York:
Doubleday, 1960), pp. 403-417; Joseph LaPalombara,
"Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and An Interpretation,"
American Political Science Review, LX, No. 1 (March 1966),
pp. 5-16.
27. The studies of American voting behavior are
multitudinous. Two of the theorists who reflect on the
behavior are Philip Converse, "The Nature of Belief Sys
tems in Mass Publics," in Ideology and Discontent, ed. by
David Apter (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 206-216;
and Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American
Politics," American Political Science Review, LVIII, No.
2 (June 1964), 361-382. Also Angus Campbell, Philip Con
verse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes, The American
Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960), chaps. 8-10.
28. "Ambivalence" may be indicated in the
American cultural dichotomy on fundamental democratic
values and anti-democratic attitudes. See McClosky,
"Consensus and Ideology"; and Stanley Budner, "Intolerance
of Ambiguity as a Personality Variable," Journal of
Personality, XXX (1960), 30.
29. It is these "social" issues which not only
evoke the most widespread public interest but also con
stitute the crux of partisan differences. Converse, "The
Nature of Belief Systems," and Herbert McClosky, Paul J.
Hoffmann, Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus
and Party Leaders and Followers," American Political
Science Review, LIV (June 1960), 406-427.
30. Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes,
"Constituency Influence in Congress," American Political
Science Review, LVII, No. 1 (March 1963), 45-56, indi
cate the importance of racial-social issues.
33
18. For an interesting overview of rationality
textbook models, see Victor H. Vroon, "Industrial Social
Psychology," in Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. by
Gardner Linzey and Elliot Aronson (2nd ed.; Reading, Mass.:
Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1970), Vol. V, pp. 227-
240.
19. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy.
20. Joseph L. Bower, "The Role of Conflict in
Economic Decision-Making Groups: Some Empirical Results,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXIX (May 17, 1965),
263-277.
21. Harold D. Lasswell, A Pre-View of Policy
Sciences (New York: American Elsevier Publishing, 1971),
p. 4.
22. For an interesting curriculum proposal in
the policy sciences, see Yenezkel Dror, Ventures in
Policy Sciences: Concepts and Applications (New York:
American Elsevier Publishing, 1971), and Design for Policy
Sciences (New York: American Elsevier Publishing, 1971).
23. Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism:
Ideology, Policy and the Crisis of Public Authority
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1969).
24. Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in
Sociology, ed. by H. H. Gerth and Wright Mills (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 196-198.
25. Professor V. 0. Key'e, Jr.'s work is generally
considered to be the best case for the "rationality" of
the American voter. See his "Public Opinion and the Decay
of Democracy," Virginia Quarterly Review, XXXVII, No. 4
(Autumn 1961), 481-494; and Public Opinion and Democracy
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961).
34
31. Robert E. Lane, Political Life; Why People
Get Involved in Politics (New York: The Free Press,
1959); Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man
Believes What He Does (New York: The Free Press, 1962);
Political Thinking and Consciousness: The Private Life
of the Political Mind (Chicago: Markham, 1961).
32. National character studies or cultural
(Value Systems) analysis have generally been avoided by
political scientists in favor of the more empirical atti-
tudinal surveys; exceptions to this aversion are Gabriel
Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1963); David M. Potter, People of
Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); and Hartz,
The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, 1955).
33. The classical liberal values in the American
political theory are discussed at length in Louis Hartz*s
The Liberal Tradition in America.
34. Potter, People of Plenty, pp. -18-120. This
ambivalence probably stems from our Calvinist heritage;
see Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1930); and the
frontier experiences, Frederick Jackson Turner, The
Frontier in American History (New York: Henry Holt,
1920).
35. Susan S. Fainstein and Norman I. Fainstein,
"American Social Policy Beyond Progressive Analysis," in
Outside, Looking in: Critiques of American Policies and
Institutions, Left and Right, ed. by Dorothy B. James
(New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 212-238.
36. Typical is Sar Levitan, The Great Society's
Poor Law: A New Approach to Poverty (Baltimore:
Brookings, 1969).
37. Lowi, The End of Liberalism, chap. 8.
Robert E. Lane and David 0. Sears, Public Opinion (Engle
wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), chap. 1; Dan
Nimmon, The Political Persuaders: The Techniques of
35
Modem Election Campaigns (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1970), chap. 5.
38. It was the executive who acted as his own
vox populi. See John Bibby and Roger Davidson, On Capitol
Hill: Studies in the Legislative Process (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1967), chap. 7.
39. Lane, Political Thinking and Consciousness,
chap. 4.
40. Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964).
41. Ibid., p. 26.
42. Lewis Froman, "An Analysis of Public Policies
in Cities," Journal of Politics, XXIX (February 1967),
94-108.
43. Lowi, The End of Liberalism.
44. Eugene J. Meehan, Value Judgment and Social
Science (Homewood, 111.: Dorsey Press, 1969), p. 43.
45. Froman, "Public Policy," p. 20.
46. Thomas R. Dye, Politics in States and Commu
nities (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969),
pp. 439-444. Professor Dye accounts for anti-poverty
legislation primarily in terms of Executive initiative
and issue awareness.
47. Robert Eyestone and Heinz Eulau, "City Coun
cils and Policy Outcomes: Developmental Profiles," in
City Politics and Public Policy, ed. by James Q. Wilson
(New York: Wiley, 1968), pp. 37-65.
48. Dale Rogers Marshall, The Politics of Par
ticipation in Poverty: A Case Study of the Board of the
Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency of Greater Los
Angeles (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University o£
California Press, 1971).
36
49. Ibid., p. 94.
50. Ibid., p. 145.
51. David Gottlieb, Vista and Its Voluntee'rs
(University Park, Pa.: Penn State University, 1971).
52. Ibid., p. 143.
53. Ibid., p. 17.
54. Aaron Wildavsky, "The Analysis of Issue-
Contexts in the Study of Decision Making," Journal of
Politics, XXIV (1962), 717, 732.
55. Fred I. Greenstein, "The Impact of Personal
ity of Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush,"
American Political Science Review, LXI, No. 3 (September
1967), 629-641.
56. Sigmund Freud and William C. Bullit, Thomas
Woodrow Wilson (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1966).
Ironically, one of the best politico personality studies
is also of President Wilson: Alexander L. George,
Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House, A Personality Study
(New York: Peter Smith Publisher, 1965).
57. For an excellent survey and analysis of this
literature, see Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality of
Politics," pp. 629-641.
58. Some significant "psycho-political" landmarks
not listed in Professor Greenstein's article are Erik
Erikson's Young Man Luther (New York: Norton, 1958); and
his Gandhifs Truth: The Origins of Militant Nonviolence
(New York: Norton, 1969).
59. Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality of
Politics."
60. An appropriate example for anti-poverty
research purposes is Eric Goldman's, The Tragedy of Lyndon
Johnson (New York: Dell, 1969).
37
61. Perhaps the best example is Richard E.
Neustadt's Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership
(New York: Wiley, 1960).
62. The aggregative typologies have been particu
larly utilized in analyzing legislative bodies: Duane
Lockard, The Politics of State and Local Government (New
York: Macmillan, 1969); John C. Wahlke et al., The
Legislative System (New York: Wiley, 1962), pp. 281-286;
and Frank J. Sorauf, Party and Representation (New York:
Atherton, 1963), pp. 121-146.
63. Hubert H. Humphrey, War on Poverty (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1964). Also see Louis A. Zurchur, Jr.,
Poverty Warriors: The Human Experience of Planned Social
Intervention (Austin: University of Texas, 1970).
64. In the earliest political science journals
one finds an emphasis upon a scientific search for truth.
See Munroe Smith, "The Domain of Political Science,"
Political Science Quarterly, I, No. 1 (March 1886), 5.
65. Louis Wirth, "Preface," in Karl Mannheim,
Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World,
1948), pp. xvii-xviii.
66. The foremost exponent of this Neo-Platonist
view is Professor Leo Strauss. See particularly his
"What is Political Philosophy?: The Problem of Political
Philosophy," Journal of Politics, XIX (August 1957),
343-355.
67. Wirth, p. xviii.
68. Positivist thought originates with the works
of Saint-Simon. For an excellent analysis of the impact
of positivism on contemporary social theory, see Talcott
Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (2 vols.; New York:
The Free Press, 1968), Vol. I, pp. 1-87.
69. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962);
and George C. Homans, The Nature of Social Science
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).
38
70. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
71. See Theodore Roszak's indictment of scien
tific objectivism in his The Making of a Counter-Culture;
Reflections on the Technocratic Society and Its Youthful
Opposition (New York: Doubleday, 1969).
72. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action,
Vol. I, p. 11.
73. The social scientist as participant/observer
is a Parsonian theme adopted directly from Max Weber.
See Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, Vol. II,
p. 715.
74. John Dewey, How We Think (Chicago: Henry
Regnery Company, 1910), particularly chap. 8, "Judgment
and Interpretation of Facts."
75. Marvin Surkin, "Sense and Non-Sense in
Politics," in An End to Political Science: The Caucus
Papers, ed. by Marvin Surkin and Alan Wolfe (New York:
Basic Books, Inc.), p. 24.
76. Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continu
ity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1967). Wolin's indictment of
behavioralism in political science in "Political Theory
as a Vocation," American Political Science Review, LXIII
(December 1969), 1062-1082.
77. This view is suggested by Henry Kissinger
in "An Interview with Oriani Fallaci," p. 22.
78. See American Political Science Association,
Statements by Nominating Groups (Washington, D.C.:
American Political Science Association, 1972), and John C.
Wahlke, "Statements oh Behalf of Nominees Supported by the
Caucus for a New Political Science, " in Statements by
Nominating Groups, p. 1.
39
79. The Caucus for a New Political Science
position is articulated via a collection of essays in
Surkin and Wolfe, eds., An End to Political Science: The
Caucus Papers.
80. "Statements on Behalf of Nominees Supported
by the Caucus for a New Political Science," p. 1.
81. "Statement on Behalf of Nominees Supported
by the Ad Hoc Committee," p. 1.
82. Randall Collins, "Surveying the Sociology
Journals," Change: The Magazine of Higher Learning, IV,
No. 10 (Winter 1972-73), 70-74.
83. George W. Bonham, "After Vietnam," Change:
The Magazine of Higher Learning, IV, No. 10 (Winter
1972-73), 15-16.
84. David Riesman, "The Business of Business As
Usual," Change: The Magazine of Higher Learning, II,
No. 5 (October 1970), 6-8.
85. Christian Bay, "Statements on Resolution on
Participation of Student Members: Statement by Proposers
of Resolution," in Statements by Nominating Groups, p. 9.
86. Surkin and Wolfe, An End to Political Science.
87. Smith, "Domain of Political Science," p. 4.
88. Bay, "Statements on Resolution."
89. There are numerous works carrying forth the
ongoing debate between the behavioralist and normative
theorists. These works occur in all behavioral and social
sciences and probably first occurs historically with Plato
and Aristotle. The following overviews of this contro
versy are representative of the breadth and richness of
the controversy. Heinz Eulau, ed., Behavioralism in
Political Science (Philadelphia: American Academy of
Political and Social Sciences, 1962); Robert A. Dahl,
"The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph
for a Movement to a Successful Protest," American Political
40
Science Review, LV (December 1961), 763-772; Austin
Ramsey, ed., Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics
(Urbana: University of Illinois, 1962). The continued
intensity of intellectual conflict between "normative"
and "empirical" (behavioralist and anti-behavioralist) is
still very evident in the September 1972 American Politi
cal Science Review, LXVI, No. 3; e.g., Eugene F. Miller,
"Positivism, Historicism, and Political Inquiry," 796-817;
David Braybrooke and Alexander Rosenberg, "Getting the
War News Straight: The Actual Situation in the Philosophy
of Science," 818-826; Richard S. Rudner, "On Evolving
Standard Vies in Philosophy of Science," 827-845; Martin
Landau, "On Objectivity," 846-856; Eugene F. Miller,
"Rejoinder to ’Comments1 by David Braybrooke and Alexander
Rosenberg, Richard S. Rudner, and Martin Landau," 857-973.
90. McGeorge Bundy and Henry Kissinger as presi
dential advisers and political scientists have received
their share of attacks upon their professional status.
See Charles Ashman, Kissinger: The Adventures of Super
Kraut (Secaucus, N.J.: Lyle Stuart Inc., 1972), and
David Halberstam, "The Expensive Education of McGeorge
Bundy," Harpers , July 1969, pp. 23, 29, 34-35; and
Kissinger, "An Interview with Oriana Fallaci," pp. 17-22.
Woodrow Wilson apparently combined both roles with a
minimum loss of academic/professional prestige. There
is evidence that the "Progressive Era" represents a
pinnacle of status for the public policy adviser.
91. Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days (New York:
W. W. Norton, 1969), p. 112.
92. Lewis Coser, The Function of Social Conflict
(Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956).
93. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy.
94. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel H o u se,
pp. 751-785. ---------------------— --------
95. Miller, "Positivism, Historicism, and Polit
ical Inquiry."
41
96. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p. 112.
97. Miller, "Positivism, Historicism, and Polit
ical Inquiry."
98. Joseph L. Bower, "Descriptive Decision Theory
from the 'Administrative' Viewpoint," in The Study of
Policy Formation, ed. by Raymond A. Bauer and Kenneth J.
Gergen (New York: The Free Press, 1968).
99. Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation (Philadel
phia: Fortress Press, 1965).
100. OEO's absolute definition of a "poverty line"
was roughly $3,000 in 1965. Although this figure changed,
poverty remained tied to an income definition.
101. Robert J. Lampman, Ends and Means of Reducing
Income Poverty (Chicago: Markham Publishing Col, 1971),
pp. 28-29.
102. Daniel P. Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Mis
understanding: Community Action in the "War on Poverty"
(New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 193.
CHAPTER II
ISSUE CONCEPTUALIZATION IN ANTI-POVERTY
POLICYMAKING
I. Poverty As A Partisan Issue
Anti-poverty issue conceptualization suggests
that Democratic and Republican partisans view the poor
and poverty differently. The set anti-poverty paradigm
provides the framework wherein ideological conflict occurs.
Democratic decision makers generally maintain more revo
lutionary^" policy orientations although post-1966 elite
reactions to community action programs have mitigated this
approach somewhat. Republican decision makers reject
revolutionary symbolism and espouse an achievement ethic
approach to the poor.
Regardless of partisan allegiances anti-poverty
decision makers still employ paradigm orientations in
programming. Both Republican and Democratic administra
tions (1964-1974) worked within the anti-poverty paradigm
in motivating the poor to work within the system rather
42
43
than restructuring political or economic systems.
The anti-poverty policymaking paradigm is a
heuristic model rather than a framework for analysis.
The reality of poverty cannot be understood by analysis
of anti-poverty policymaking. The poor are only par
tially affected by anti-poverty policies. Poverty is
both a political issue and a moral dilemma. Conceptual
parameters and dimensions of poverty must be compared to
2
the consequences of anti-poverty policymaking.
Crucial investigative concerns included in an
analysis of the poverty issue and anti-poverty policy
making include the following:
II. Longitudinal Dimensions of the Poverty Issue
III. Definitions of the Clientele: Who Are the Poor?
IV. Understanding the Problem: What Causes Poverty?
A. Environment as a Cause of Poverty
B. Individual Causes of Poverty: The Poor
Person Typology
V. Finding A Cure: Anti-Poverty Policymaking as
an Option
VI. Measuring Success: Use of Social Indicators
in Poverty Programming
Investigation of the realities of poverty pre
cedes analysis of anti-poverty policymaker views of that
reality.
44
II. Longitudinal Dimensions of the Poverty Issue
The technological impact of the Industrial Revo
lution brought about a profound gap between rich and poor
in industrialized societies. Ortegian masses were given
the potential of an affluent life and for twentieth cen
tury man happiness acquired a new definition--expectations
3
of material possessions. If one did not possess wealth,
he could not achieve happiness. Poverty was considered
as a moral injustice. Both Democrats and Republicans also
agree that an environment of poverty could not be a condi
tion of happiness or justice.
Symbolically, Democrats seek an eradication of
poverty. Conversely, Republicans historically view
4
poverty as a condition which can be significantly ameli
orated by the individual. Both approaches seek poverty
reduction by economic technology and are committed to the
goal of fighting poverty. However, a fundamental differ
ence in anti-poverty conceptualization is reflected over
appropriate strategy and definition of the poor's problem.
National concern with poverty does not originate
with the Great Society or even the New Frontier. Large
segments of the population experienced poverty (perhaps
45
for the first time) during the Great Depression of the
1930's. However, the War on Poverty which ignited
Johnson's Great Society is not a resurrection of Roose
velt's New Deal. Anti-poverty policymaking (1964-1974)
is sui generis in several significant aspects.
5
First, poverty issues of the Depression were
organic concerns of a society profoundly troubled by the
utter failure of its economic system. There were no con
trived election issues in the presidential campaign of
1932; mass poverty was the only issue. Poverty was not
defined as an economic gap between high and low income
groups. The Depression was not conceptualized in class
antagonism terms or viewed as a maldistribution of income.
Many of the wealthy joined the poverty groups with the
1929 stock market crash.
By contrast, the anti-poverty policy represents
g
a curative strategy designed by Democrats and placed on
the governmental policymaking agenda. Unlike the Demo
cratic New Deal strategy of alleviating mass financial
destitution, the War on Poverty exemplifies Executive
Branch initiation of a curative policy. The curative or
War on Poverty approach was govemmentally introduced and
legitimized as a strategy to eliminate poverty among a
46
minority of citizens.
Poverty policymaking during the New Deal and
Great Society illustrate divergent policymaking styles.
Both are programmatic "statements of intent"^ against
which policy consequences and outputs are compared. As
g
Ripley indicated, poverty policymaking is but one alter
native governmental response to either internal or exter
nal stimuli. The successful adaptive response of the New
Deal to environmental stimuli offers a suggestive compari
son with the Great Society's internal response of struc
tural adaptation.
Secondly, the Depression's economic and social
systems generated specific demands upon the political
system for policy responses while anti-poverty is a
rational model wherein societal goals and a curative
strategy for their achievement are internally formulated.
Issues originating in the social environment are often
non-rational, controversial and reflective of deep ideolog
ical intensity. In contrast, the rationalized anti
poverty issue was publically unknown as a social concern
during the early sixties until introduced by the Executive
subsystem.
Thirdly, anti-poverty was introduced into public
47
9
consciousness by intellectuals who successfully made
educated elites and the Kennedy administration aware of
the gnawing spectre of poor people in an affluent society.
The poverty issue^ was introduced by the Kennedy presi
dency with the Area Redevelopment Act of 1961 and Manpower
Training Act of 1962. Johnson's War on Poverty launched
the anti-poverty struggle with the Economic Development
Act of 1965, the Appalachian Regional Development Act of
1965 and the cornerstone Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.
Both Johnson and Roosevelt viewed poverty policies
as an optimum political blend of idealistic and pragmatic
agenda items.^ The War on Poverty hoped to emulate the
New Deal by tapping humanitarian altruism in American
v
culture while enlisting unpoliticized poor for the Demo
cratic Party. Neither New Deal nor War on Poverty pro
grams were ever subjected to public debate before enact
ment. Pluralistic conflict and compromise followed rather
than preceded New Deal and War on Poverty policymaking.
Poverty programs were only reified and clarified in public
opinion after vulnerable programs were operational. How
ever, a crucial distinction separates Roosevelt's electoral
mandate to enact economic policies and Lyndon Johnson's
creation of the War on Poverty.
48
III. Definitions of the Clientele: Who Are the Poor?
It is important to understand whether a policy
maker or theoretician approaches the poor as a discrete
group produced by particular social structures or as a
universal class phenomenon endemic to all complex
societies. Secondly, are the poor perceived by policy
makers as a relatively homogeneous group/class, e.g.,
poor people, or as a potpourri classification for diverse
and often unrelated subgroups? The investigatory thesis
is that anti-poverty decision makers in Republican and
Democratic administrations have answered poverty questions
quite differently. However, at no time have anti-poverty
decision makers, regardless of early War on Poverty
symbolism, differed in their incremental (non-revolution-
ary) approach to policymaking goals and objectives or
significantly deviated from the anti-poverty paradigm.
Poverty is either caused by particular systems,
i.e., capitalism, or exists in all industrial systems. A
fundamental dichotomy exists between social theorists
12
classified as elitists (group theorists) and those who are
13
class-oriented in their approach. The few efforts to
synthesize class and group theoretical frameworks have not
49
14
been notably successful. Karl Marx and C. Wright Mills
remain separated by an ideological chasm. It is not,
therefore, surprising that former 0E0 director Sargent
Shriver and Howard Phillips are also irreconcilable in
their sociological approaches to the poor.
An analysis of the polemics and ideological
rhetoric in the Democratic War on Poverty and New Deal
portrays "the poor" as an oppressed class (by other social
classes). ^ The Democrats' view of the poor assumes a
Marxian (not Marxist) view of proletarian masses unjustly
16
relegated to poverty by an elitist socio-economic system.
Democratic New Deal and Great Society solutions to poverty
symbolically mandate a major restructuring of the socio
economic system. Whereas the New Deal effectuated an
executive-initiated restructuring of the economic system,
the War on Poverty did not directly restructure the
system. Instead the Great Society attempted to organize
the poor through the innovative mechanism of federally
sponsored but locally controlled community action pro-
17
grams. Although the War on Poverty posited the goal of
organizing the poor to restructure the economic system,
the War on Poverty's real objective was to resocialize
the poor by participatory democracy.
50
Policy analysis suggests that both Roosevelt and
Johnson's conceptions of the poor as an oppressed class
were incongruent with their own policy reform strategies
which did not propose restructuring the socio-economic
18
system. Symbolic goals of Democratic anti-poverty pro
grams profess a desire to alleviate sufferings of the poor
via systemic restructuring. Although Democrats describe
the poor as an oppressed economic class, anti-poverty
policy treats them as a socially disadvantaged group.
19
Once the poor obtain certain equal opportunity advantages
they will be competitive in the socio-economic system.
By contrast, anti-poverty analysis demonstrates
that the Republican view affirms a group conceptualization
of the poor. Howard Phillips, President Nixon's desig
nated liquidator of 0E0, criticizes anti-poverty programs
20
for incorporating a Marxian class view of the poor:
It is wrong to govemmentally treat the poor as a
class apart, with interests and aspirations separate
and distinct from those of society as a whole.*1
The Nixon administration's anti-poverty goals as
reflected in 0E0 and ACTION, disavow the assumption that
the poor constitute an authentic social classification or
22
that total maximum feasible participation of the poor is
a reliable anti-poverty strategy for class liberation.
51
Nixon administration Republicans feel that artifi
cial creation of a separate social classification, e.g.,
the poor, is an encouragement of socialistic class con
sciousness. Concomitant with class awareness will
inevitably occur class dissatisfaction and anomie. Theo
retically, the poor are comprised of heterogeneous sub-
23
groups with unrelated social and economic demands. A
separate anti-poverty policy is seen as impractical in
that policy needs of the poor cannot be separated from
larger policies of society as a whole. Symbolically,
Republican decision makers conceptualize the poor verti
cally as a classification for particular low income social
subgroups; rather than a horizontal classification of
social stratification. Accordingly, the poor's subgroups
are affected by categorical policies designed for the
general body politic, i.e., housing, employment, welfare,
24
etc.
Although there is a fundamental divergence among
policymakers over a theoretical conceptualization of the
25
poor, they generally include the same poverty subgroups.
Disagreements concern symbolic causes and strategies for
reducing poverty. There is agreement among Democratic
and Republican policymakers that substantial amounts of
52
poverty exist in America.
The poor can be statistically aggregated into
several subgroups of mutually exclusive and exhaustive
26
categories: (1) the elderly, 65 years and over;
27
(2) children, under 18 years; (3) adults in female-
28
headed households, 18-64 years; (4) adults in households
29
headed by unemployed males, 18-64 years; and (5) adults
30
in households headed by disabled males. Even rough
categorizations of poverty subgroupings suggest that
causes of and solutions to poverty are more complex and
varied than early anti-poverty policymakers had antici
pated.
Statistical research on the poor demonstrates
31
that the incidence of poverty is non-randomly distrib
uted in the United States among Blacks, Mexican-Americans,
Indians, women, the elderly, rural Southern Whites, etc.
Individuals in these social groups have a greater prob
ability of poverty than do individuals in other social
groups. Articulate spokesmen among high poverty subgroups
32
and social scientists like Thorsten Veblen see poverty
as a non-random or prejudicial persecution by the power
structure against selected groups. For example, Hamilton
and Carmichael believe that "... the colonial white power
53
structure . . . has perpetuated a vicious cycle--the
33
poverty cycle" against black people. Obviously, admin
istration policymakers at 0E0 and ACTION do not interpret
the selective incidence of poverty as a non-random phenom
enon produced by the present economic system. Rather,
poverty is perpetuated by a welfare ethic mentality in
governmental policymaking.
Analysis of the incidence of poverty indicates
that poverty exists in either comprehensive or segmented
social environments. Galbraith suggests that poverty is
34
either case or insular in nature: A poor person or
poor subgroups either find themselves as minority compo
nents of society or within an almost totally poor society,
i.e., Appalachia. Definitions of poverty, like pornog
raphy, are relative to local community standards.
Agreement exists among policymakers concerning
which subgroups qualify as being poor or in a state of
poverty. Lack of policymaking consensus on reform strate
gies is viewed as an indictment of policy analysts who
focus on analyzing characteristics of the poor rather than
building sound theoretical frameworks for solving poverty:
There has been essentially no social science research
in the last 10 years on the question of poverty which
54
has gone beyond a mere cataloging of the character
istics of the poor. . . . Virtually all social
science research has concentrated on the character
istics of individuals who are defined as poor by
the federal government. Being poor is associated
with a set of individual characteristics. . . .
But these are not the causes of poverty.36
Agreement among social scientists and policy
makers on the characteristics of poverty is evidenced in
continuing refinement of poverty indicators while basic
poverty research remains in a primitive stage.
As indicated, there is no conceptual or theoreti
cal agreement among policymakers defining ' ’ poverty1 1 as a
basic sociological classification. As will be demon
strated, conceptual dissonance also pervades the anti
poverty policymaker's orientations toward the causes of
poverty. As indicated, there is consensus between Repub
licans and Democrats on the existence and characteristics
of the poor but dissension concerning causes and cures
for poverty.
IV. Understanding the Problem: What Causes Poverty?
Specific causes of poverty in the United States
are inferential by ways by which the poor are classified.
For example, poverty is associated with old age, unemploy
ment, underemployment, low income, inadequate skills,
youth, illness, or discrimination.
Non-random incidence of poverty among certain
groups and geographic regions suggests two alternative
explanation of poverty: (1) unjust political and economic
subsystems, i.e., capitalism, have deliberately inflicted
an unjust condition of poverty upon selected groups and
37
regions; or (2) the poor have not received or taken
advantage of channels of access to a basically just
« . 38
system.
Respective solutions to poverty are attributable
to how policymakers define causes of poverty. Policy
makers either suggest restructuring the elitist politico-
economic system or opening up economic access and increas
ing social mobility of the poor through resocialization.
Intervening political considerations ameliorate desirable
poverty intervention, i.e., poverty eradication strategies
so that less desirable objectives are suboptimally
39
adopted, i.e, reducing poverty.
Policymakers also differ in their orientations
toward causes of poverty. Generally, War on Poverty
policymakers gave primary stress to environmental or
40
social causes of poverty while Republicans focus more
on psychological or individual motivations of the poor
5 6 I
41 i
person. Democratic policymakers give secondary impor- j
tance to changing the poor's behavior patterns. Republican!
policymakers generally attach less importance to environ
mental or structural causes of poverty.
I . i
! Specific causes of poverty are implicitly assumed
42
| but almost never delineated by policymakers. Even the
j j
| Shriver Task Force in 1964 did not define causes of poverty;
I
: nor how poverty might be prevented. In theory, poverty is
| always described by anti-poverty policymakers as a multi-
! / o '
j faceted and amorphous phenomenon with complex causes.
I Consequently, the anti-poverty policymaking paradigm does
j
! not define specific causes of poverty but rath r focuses
| upon the changing of the most obtrusive manifestation of
i poverty--the poor person.
A. Environment As A Cause of Poverty
!
j War on Poverty decision makers saw the poor
! ■
j trapped at the bottom rung of an unfair socio-economic
| / /
| ladder. Democratic policymakers felt social stratifica- ;
! tion or class differentiation was economically determined. !
! i
| Range of social stratification is equivalent to the gap
! between the rich and poor. Consequently, it is understand-
I able that War on Poverty administrators took for granted
57
that the poor's inferior status and prestige resulted from
relative lack of wealth.
Environmental anti-poverty strategy is to increase
the poor's income in order to improve their political
45
efficacy and social prestige. Ghetto and barrio poverty
could be eradicated by changing economic structures. A
corollary War on Poverty assumption was that significant
political participation (community action) of the poor
would accomplish an economic restructuring of the system.
B. Individual Causes of Poverty:
The Poor Person Typology
If policymakers do not assume environmental or
structural causes of poverty, i.e., the Nixon poverty
fighters, they attribute poverty to various subcultural
or psychological orientations held by the poor and perpe
tuated by governmental welfare policies.
In essence, this psychological or cultural
46
approach implicitly assumes the Poor Person typology.
The Poor Person remains in poverty because a pervasive
culture of poverty socializes him with pathological or
wrong values. Consequently, the poor person is unable to
break the poverty cycle because of an aggregate personal-
58
ity or character deficiency. Governmental welfare policy
does not encourage the poor's response to middle class
work-achievement incentives. Regardless of partisanship,
47
Culture of Poverty or cultural deprivation is inescap
able in its psychological hold upon the poor person:
A 'culture of poverty1 is bom in the slums and
grows with the child. . . . This culture of poverty
becomes a legacy of psychological distortion and
manifests itself in profound alienation from the
larger society and from other people in an intense
feeling of powerlessness. The degradation and
spiritual depression of the poor are omnipresent;
they affect every action that makes up the poor
man's life style.48
The vice-like grip of poverty with its psychologi
cal effect upon poor people can hardly be solved by uni
dimensional anti-poverty strategies.
Recent National Institute of Mental Health studies
of values and attitudes of the poor show that psychologi
cal factors "are even more pervasive than . . . sus
p e c t e d . " ^ Permanent psychological effects of poverty
also are not appreciated by social scientists and anti
poverty policymakers. Often individual anomie caused by
the culture of poverty is viewed as a temporary phenomenon
cured through some strategy of personality adjustment or
behavior modification."^
59
One exemplary study indicates that more than half
of urban slum children have learning problems; i.e.,
reading deficiencies, inability to grasp abstract ideas
or symbols, little curiosity, and difficulty in retaining
concepts.'*'*' One major cause of learning problems is brain
damage suffered during the months before or soon after
birth:
If a child has an inherent difficulty, such as brain
damage or a poor genetic endowment, life in an urban
slum tends to magnify the resulting problem in learn
ing. And if he has no biological difficulty, his
learning capacity may nevertheless be permanently
limited by environmental factors that can be
described as cultural deprivation.-*^
Culture of poverty and the debilitating environment of
the slum interlock in a permanent stranglehold of mental
retardation for the poor.
Even less visible to anti-poverty policymakers
than the poverty impact on mental retardation is the cor-
53
relation between poverty and mental illness. Mental
illness is not attacked in contemporary anti-poverty
54
policymaking because of the difficulty in measuring
progress. Research repeatedly shows that certain mental
illnesses tend to be associated with low socio-economic
levels.Incidence of schizophrenia, alcoholism, and
brain syndromes in low socio-economic levels is especially
60
56
high. While members of all social classes suffer from
mental illness, the predominant type of mental illness
varies from class to class. For example, the highest
suicide rates in Los Angeles occur in upper class dis-
57
tricts (it was precisely a high incidence of suicide
in affluent Western Europe which motivated Durkheim's
classic study).
The degree to which mental illness among the poor
produces socially deviant behavior, i.e., urban riots,
59
crimes of violence, etc., is undetermined. It is also
unknown whether or not restructuring a deteriorating
socio-economic environment produces psychological change
60
in the ghetto dweller. Nor is there research or urban
renewal experience which suggests that physical or envir
onmental changes will be initiated by culturally deprived
individuals.61 The poverty ambient includes lasting
deformation of the poor person's mental health and learning
capabilities. Yet anti-poverty strategies and objectives
attempting to impact psychological problems are not easily
quantified and therefore not included in the policymaking
paradigm.
Anti-poverty policymakers believed that the poor
person needed to change his life-style. The poor need
61
middle-class involvement and political participation.
Supposedly when the poor person experiences the partici
patory process, his interest and efficacy will increase
62
correspondingly. Revealing pluralist assumptions about
the political system, Poverty Warriors focused on anti
alienation or efficacy strategies when political restruc
turing became impossible.
Ironically, both Johnson and Nixon anti-poverty
programs engage in behavior modification of the poor
person, albeit by different strategies. Except in the
zealous initial stages of the Community Action Program
(CAP), anti-poverty strategy has fought poverty by attempt
ing a massive personality change (via operant conditioning
in poor people) rather than restructuring an unjust socio
economic system.
Hyman Bookbinder, a War on Poverty designer, feels
0E0 misunderstood the poor person's personality:
We didn't fully realize what kind of poor we were
dealing with. It wasn't like it was in the 1930's,
when all you had to do was improve the economy and
people went back to work. Here we are faced with
large numbers of blacks and others in the cities
where there are very deep maladies.63
Contemporary approaches to the poor emphasize
64
their erroneous personality values and orientations.
62
Accordingly, escape from poverty is best achieved as the
poor person is persuaded to reevaluate his misplaced
values:
In the United States, the major solution proposed
by planners and social workers for dealing with
’the undeserving poor,’ is slowly to raise their
level of living and eventually incorporate them
into the middle class. And, wherever possible,
there is some reliance upon psychiatric treatment
in an effort to imbue these 'shiftless, lazy, un
ambitious people’ with the higher middle class
aspirations.65
American middle class, not the lower class, defines
normality and social mores for the poor.
Political scientists are also guilty of stereo
typing the Poor Person. For example, the poor may not
be as apathetic as political scientists have generally
assumed. Form and Rytina find that the poor generally
66
support a more democratic system than do elites. Lipsitz
finds that the poor are more likely than elites to favor
67
governmental aid to the disadvantaged. Lipsitz also
suggests that the poor have many grievances which have not
68
yet been formulated into issues (by political activists).
Despite policy symbolism to the contrary, Johnson
anti-poverty policymakers did not seriously propose a
direct Rooseveltian restructuring of the socio-economic
system. Both Republican and Democratic anti-poverty
63
69
policymaking systems posit what Anderson calls a tradi
tional view of poverty perpetuated by the poor person
rather than the system:
. . . poverty is individual and peripheral in nature
and is therefore not the consequence of major struc
tural weaknesses in the socio-economic system. Con
sequently, anti-poverty programs did not involve
major institutional change.'0
While both Democratic and Republican policymakers
seek attitudinal changes within the poor person, change is
defined in significantly different ways.
Republican policymakers believe that the poor have
been socialized by socialistic "welfare ethic" values;
rather than achievement ethic values.^ Accordingly, the
welfare ethic mistakenly teaches: (1) that the socio
economic system is unjustly controlled by a wealthy power
elite; (2) that existence of poverty necessitates special
ized governmental policies for the poor; and (3) that
being poor in itself constitutes an ethical injustice.
In the Republican view, the poor were victimized
72
by a welfare or New Deal socialization process. The
villainous socializing agents are described as Johnson-era
poverty warriors who succeed in politicizing low-income
people with contrived concepts of class consciousness and
discontent.
64
Contemporary ideological contrast between Demo
cratic and Republican views of poverty reflects a cleav
age concerning whether individual liberation from poverty
occurs primarily by internal motivation or external
73
modification of the environment. If poverty is caused
by the system or environment then liberation of the poor
results when conditions of poverty are removed. If
poverty is caused by the actor's psychological framework,
then liberation of the poor occurs when the welfare ethic
is replaced by an achievement ethic.
Antecedent protagonists in this Republican-
Democratic anti-poverty debate are Freud and Marx (with
out Marcuse as synthesizer). The debate over paths to
human liberation from poverty results in paradoxical
philosophical bedfellows: Freud, Timothy Leary, Alan
Watts, Bob Dyland, and Howard Phillips point inwardly
while Marx, Galbraith, B. F. Skinner, Gunnar Myrdal, and
the Kennedys propose environmental restructuring.^
As indicated, despite philosophical differences
separating anti-poverty policymakers, there is consensus
that a poverty problem exists in America. For a decade
both Republican and Democratic decision makers approached
poverty through the anti-poverty policymaking paradigm.
65
The problem of the poor continues as a national political
agenda item,^ i.e., welfare, unemployment, housing, etc.
The persistence of poverty is a political issue which
requires response by governmental policymakers. The
Republican policymaking response has ceased to be anti
poverty policy per se but rather political, economic, and
social policy outputs for the poor mandated by public
76
awareness of the poverty issue.
V. Finding a Cure; Anti-Poverty Policymaking
As An Option
The anti-poverty approach of the early Johnson
Poverty Warriors logically indicated a restructuring of
all social subsystems and economic structures which were
deemed poverty-causing. Symbolically, Lyndon Johnson
promised nothing less than a total societal commitment to
77
a war against all poverty.
Initially, the War on Poverty attempted a just
economic (income) redistribution for the poor. Economic
redistribution would occur peacefully as the poor were
given political power and channels for political partici-
78
pation. Theoretically, legitimate political participa
tion for the poor would provide control of the economic
66
system. Economic redistribution and an end to poverty
would result from making the political system more respon
sive to the masses.
However, initial objectives of War on Poverty
policymakers were incongruent with their stated goals.
Although anti-poverty policymaker goals were comprehensive,
79
their objectives and strategies were suboptimal. The
actual anti-poverty objective was in practice never to
eradicate but rather ameliorate the poverty problem.
Anti-poverty objectives were not stated in prob
lem solving approaches but rather in reduction terminol-
80
ogy. It was a war in which the anti-poverty General
Staff talked of major offensives, fought a few isolated
skirmishes, and seemed genuinely disillusioned when it
did not achieve victory. War on Poverty objectives (not
its lofty goals) were structured to cover up the most
glaring signs of poverty amidst prosperity.
Strategies employed by Johnson Poverty Warriors
were directed toward the wrong enemy. Poverty Warriors
conceptualized the poor as a unified class who must be
encouraged to combat their oppressors--the local political/
economic elites. However, the system proved unwilling
to finance a revolution against itself. Consequently,
67
the War on Poverty was quickly forced to change strategies
by attempting to resocialize the poor to participatory
democracy.
Radical CAP and VISTA projects were opposed by
81
state and local politicians as change agents. Overt
attempts by local anti-poverty projects to gain political
power or economic redistribution for the poor were
repelled. In confrontations with local officials, zealous
anti-poverty warriors were abandoned by a national execu
tive increasingly preoccupied with winning support for
his Vietnam War policy.®^
Revised goals (after 1966) in anti-poverty policy
focused upon motivating the poor to assist themselves
through community organization and voluntary efforts.
Community development projects with sweeping mandates to
organize poor masses for direct action (a la Saul
83
Alinsky) were cast aside for more limited projects which
did not threaten local establishments.
After 1966 anti-poverty strategies of eliminating
poverty were to be achieved by mobilizing inner resources
of the poor so that they might feel efficacious toward the
system. Whereas, St. Benedict, who drained swamps and
cleared the land, might have been the initial patron saint
68
of the War on Poverty, it soon became apparent that St.
Francis, with his inner resources, had once again been
exalted as protector of the poor.
The post-1966 anti-poverty policy objective was
to motivate poor people to change their own plight. Anti
poverty agencies became a
. . . complex transforming machine with internal
parts. The input--the raw material— that is fed
into the machine is people. The output is people.
It is a function of the machine to transform
people.84
Anti-poverty agencies functioned as controlling and
guiding agents for change socialization while avoiding
confrontation with local elites.
Local reactions to anti-poverty goals and objec
tives necessitated a reexamination of national approaches
to the poverty issue. Anti-poverty, the isolation of
poverty policymaking had clearly lost presidential support.
0E0 no longer operated as a General Staff directing a
noble crusade against poverty. In fact, 0E0 was gradually
85
phased out as a separate operational entity. There is
no longer a separate bureaucracy to combat poverty because
Republican decision makers no longer believed that poverty
should be treated as a separate social policy arena.
Because of the limitations of the anti-poverty paradigm,
69
discrete policies for the poor have been rejected in
favor of categorical policymaking. For example, Head
Start as separate anti-poverty agency impacting learning
problems of poor children has been reconstituted as an
early childhood education agency within HEW.
President Nixon's post-Watergate administration
subsumes its poverty objectives under the rubric of
86
general economic policy. The persistence of poverty
amidst national prosperity remains a political agenda
item within the framework of domestic concerns. The
poverty issue is neither perceived by the current policy
makers as illustrative of an unjust political system nor
of a corrupt society. Anti-poverty policymaking may
cease as a discrete policymaking system while the poverty
issue is incorporated into other policymaking systems.
However, any program or organization aimed solely at the
poor will be perceived by policymakers in perspective of
the anti-poverty paradigm.
VI. Measuring Success: Use of Social Indicators
in Poverty Programming
Poor people have consistently been defined in
anti-poverty policymaking as people having insufficient
incomes. Social scientists and policy analysts also
70
define the poor in terms of income levels or other related
87
social indicators. Unfortunately, reliance upon income
indicators has blurred demarcation between social indi
cators and the social reality which they purportedly
represent. The limitations of reliance upon a single
indicator (income) of poverty has severely restricted
anti-poverty policy programming design and evaluation.
Early anti-poverty policy formulators realized
that income statistics were only one indicator of a multi
dimensional poverty phenomenon. Other indicators
obviously could be chosen by policymakers as unidimen-
sional measurements of poverty, i.e., education, housing,
88
employment. But it is still assumed that income is the
single most important measurement of the degree of poverty.
The Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) in 1962
determined a gross income of $3,000 (for a family of 2)
89
to be a reliable poverty-level guideline. This singu
larly inadequate poverty definition was reformulated in
1964 by the Social Security Administration to include
variables of family size, urbanity, and food prices. The
income definition of poverty subsequently adopted by both
CEA and 0E0 for a non-farm family of four was $3,130
90
(raised to $3,335 in 1967). Significantly, no cost-of-
71
living or differential for held assets was included in
the poverty definition.
CEA-OEO poverty calculations are derived from
91
cost estimates for a minimum human diet. It is signifi
cant that a definition based on housing costs would
92
probably result in a higher poverty level. By contrast,
the Department of Labor's estimated necessary moderate
standard of living for an urban family of four was $9,300
93
and the national median income was $8,000.
Unfortunately, while theoretically the distinction
between a social indicator (income) and the reality it
measures exists (poverty), the anti-poverty paradigm
relies on quantifiably measuring poverty. It is falla
cious to assume that wherever low-income indicators are
in evidence that correlative poverty exists. The anti
poverty policymaker often assumes that poverty will
decrease proportionately as the income indicator rises.
In a simplistic analogy: fever may be an indicator of
bodily infection and as fever decreases there may be a
concomitant increase in health. However, health is
restored not by reducing the symptomatic fever but by
treating the causal infection. Poverty is not solved by
increasing income to above the poverty level.
72
Anti-poverty policies see income poverty as a
fixed income level relative to economic conditions
nationally. Accordingly, only a macro-economic strategy
increasing incomes in society would increase the number
94
of people leaving poverty. However, if poverty is a
relative psychological or societal condition, i.e., the
result of systemic injustice, its impact continues until
a significant redistribution of income occurs. Societal
reallocation or redistribution of goods can only be
achieved by revolution or collective policy planning.
The Nixon Council of Economic Advisers, as did the Kennedy
95
CEA, approaches poverty within the purview of total
economic policy, e.g., as general prosperity increases,
poverty will decrease.
As indicated,the existence of poverty is also
96
psychologically and socially a relative state of mind.
Although income level indicators of poverty are employed,
poverty is the feeling among low-income people that an
illegitimate gap exists between rich and poor people.
Class differentiation will not cease whenever the poor
make more than a poverty income.
Accordingly, poverty defined in relative depriva
tion terms, makes an underlying assumption of political or
73
systemic inequality. Poverty is not an income level but
rather an individual's comparison of his income with
others in society:
By standards that have prevailed over most of
history, . . . there are very few poor in the
United States today. Nevertheless, there are
millions of American families who, both in their
own eyes and in those of others, are poor. As
our nation prospers, our judgment as to what con
stitutes poverty will inevitably change. When
we talk about poverty in America, we are talking
about families and individuals who have much less
income than most of us. '
In effect, poverty is (in a Lewis Carroll defini
tion) defined by anti-poverty policymakers as a condition
of being poor. The poor person is "poor in spirit"
because he senses an injustice of being poor while others
are rich. Anti-poverty policymaking assumes that the poor
man must be helped to bridge this economic gap to afflu
ence; significantly, the psychological adaptation of the
poor to middle class achievement values is as crucial to
anti-poverty policymakers. The relative increase in
income is a means to achieving a new psychological per
spective.
Investigation underscores the multidimensional
nature of poverty in America. Analysis shows that the
condition of poverty affects individuals in economic,
74
social and psychological dimensions. Anti-poverty policy
making (1964-74) focused almost exclusively on the eco
nomic, particularly income inadequacy, aspects of the
poverty issue. Both Republican and Democratic administra
tions sought to increase individual incomes. The
Democratic War on Poverty attempted to increase individual
incomes by environmental restructuring strategies, i.e.,
community action. Republicans hoped to increase the
poor's income through psychologically motivating the poor
to inculcate an achievement ethic. Nixon administration
policymakers assumed the Great Society's anti-poverty
paradigm in devising its achievement oriented poverty
strategies and were consequently frustrated.
Poverty and the poor man are not new issues in
American politics. Since the New Deal, governmental
agendas have included poverty as a mandatory policymaking
issue. Anti-poverty policymaking innovates by treating
poverty and the poor as separable policymaking arena.
For the first time, programs and organizations are created
to exclusively affect the problems of the poor. The
reality of poverty as a discrete policymaking arena under
lies the anti-poverty paradigm of policymaker orienta
tions .
75
Footnotes to Chapter II
1. Revolutionary policy suggests a restructuring
of the social, economic and political systems of society.
Non-revolutionary objectives stress increasing access
opportunities to what is basically an equitable system.
2. All governmental responses to poverty fall
under the rubric of "anti-poverty" policy. The War on
Poverty is properly only those programs waged by Lyndon
Johnson (1964-68). Other programs are referred to as
"New Deal," "New Frontier," and Nixon I (1969-72) and
Nixon II (1973-74).
3. This theme is traced in socio-economic history
by Robert L. Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers; The
Lives, Times, and Ideas of Great Economic Thinkers
(3rd ed.; New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967).
4. For discussions of Republican and Democratic
approaches to poverty in the Depression, see Theodore
Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the
Crisis of Public Authority (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969);
Albert U. Romasco, The Poverty of Abundance: Hoover, the
Nation, the Depression (New York: Oxford University Press,
1965).
5. The poverty issues of the Depression era are
classically defined in President Roosevelt's Second Inaug
ural Address (January 20, 1937), "I See One-Third of a
Nation Ill-Housed, Ill-Clad, Ill-Nourished."
6. James E. Anderson, "Poverty, Unemployment and
Economic Development: The Search for a National Anti-
Poverty Policy," Journal of Politics, XXIX (February 1967),
70-93.
7. James N. Rosenau, "Moral Fervor, Systematic
Analysis and Scientific Consciousness in Foreign Policy
Research," in Political Science and Public Policy, ed. by
A. Ranney (Chicago: Markham, 1968), p. 222.
76
8. Randall Ripley; William Moreland and Richard
Sinnreich, "Policymaking: A Conceptual Scheme," American
Politics Quarterly, I, No. 1 (January 1973), 9.
9. This process of anti-poverty issue formulation
will be analyzed in detail in the following chapter. The
first contemporary intellectual to write exclusively con
cerning poverty was probably John Kenneth Galbraith, The
Affluent Society (New York: New American Library, 1958),
p. 252.
10. The War on Poverty as a national anti-poverty
policy with a comprehensive program was later launched
under Johnson's presidency after Kennedy had made poverty
a public issue.
11. The process of agenda-building or public issue
formation is extensively analyzed in Roger W. Cobb and
Charles D. Elder, Participation in American Politics: The
Dynamics of Agenda-Building (Boston: Allyn and Bacon,
1972), chap. 5.
12. Social theorists could also be divided into
elitists (Gaetano Mosca and C. Wright Mills) and social
structuralists.
13. An example of class-oriented social theorists
are the Marxists, Marx and Marcuse and others.
14. Raymond Aron, "Social Structure and the Ruling
Class," British Journal of Sociology, I (March-June 1950).
15. Elinor Graham, "The Politics of Poverty," in
Poverty as a Public Issue, ed. by Ben G. Seligman (New
York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 232.
16. Michael Harrington, "The Politics of Poverty,"
in The Radical Papers, ed. by Irving Howe (New York:
Doubleday, 1966), p. 125.
17. One of the most comprehensive analysis of
community action is Peter Marris and Martin Rein, Dilemmas
of Social Reform: Poverty and Community Action in the
United States (2nd ed.; Chicago: Aldine, 1967).
77
18. Daniel Moynihan, "The War on Poverty,"
Monthly Labor Review, XIX, No. 12 (December 1964), 13-23.
19. The anti-poverty program most illustrative
of this "catch-up" strategy is Head Start. See Sar A.
Levitan, "Head Start: It Is Never Too Early to Fight
Poverty," Federal Programs for the Development of Human
Resources (Washington, D.C.: Joint Economic Committee,
Subcommittee on Economic Progress, 1968), pp. 425-428.
20. Howard J. Phillips, "Evening Edition,"
transcript of tape recording (Washington, D.C., February
6, 1973).
21. Howard J. Phillips, "General Principles"
(unpublished handout), No. 4.
22. Daniel Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunder
standing: Community Action in the War on Poverty (New
York: The Free Press, 1969).
23. Howard J. Phillips, "Howard Phillips--Fulton
Lewis: Transcript of Broadcast Interviews" (unpublished
transcript, Washington, D.C., March 9, 1973), p. 6.
24. 0E0 and the Senate Committee on Government
Operations debate the legality involved in OEO's program
reorganization to reflect the new policy emphasis.
Congressional Record, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., I, No. 43
(March 20, 1973).
25. Anthony Downs, Who Are the Urban Poor?
(New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1968),
pp. 16-17.
26. I. M. Labovitz, "Incomes for the Elderly,"
Federal Programs for the Development of Human Resources,
pp. 345-352.
27. An insightful analysis of the urban poor is
by Jonathan Kozol, Death at an Early Age: The Destruction
of the Hearts and Minds of Negro Children in Boston Public
Schools (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1967), especially
pp. 29-61.
78
28. Problems of matriarchal families are dis
cussed in a Labor Department report, Manpower Report of
the President, 1968 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1968), pp. 96-98.
29. Whether unemployment is related to structural
or market demand causes is discussed in Gardiner C. Means,
"Job Opportunities and Poverty," in Seligman, Poverty as
a Public Issue, pp. 321-335.
30. Herman M. Sommers, "Poverty and Income Main
tenance for the Disabled," in Seligman, Poverty as a
Public Issue, pp. 313-320.
31. The statistical significance of the incidence
of poverty in the U.S. is thoroughly discussed in Robert
J. Lampman, Ends and Means of Reducing Income Poverty
(Chicago: Markham, 1971), p. xi, "List of Tables." Also
see Lester Thurow, Poverty and Discrimination (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings, 1969), chap. 3.
32. A concise summary of Veblen's views of the
system are contained in Max Lemer's introduction to
The Portable Veblen (New.York: Viking Press, 1950),
pp. i-xiv.
33. Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton,
Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America
(New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 22-23.
34. Galbraith, The Affluent Society, p. 252.
35. Walter Dean Burnham, "The Changing Shape of
the American Political Universe," American Political
Science Review, LIX, No. 1 (March 1965), especially pp.
26-29.
36. Howard M. Wachtel, "Looking at Poverty from
a Radical Perspective," Review of Radical Political Eco
nomics , III, No. 3 (Sxammer 1971), 2.
37. Ralph Milliband, The State in Capitalist
Society (New York: Basic Books, 1969).
79
38. Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), chap. 2.
39. Marris and Rein, Dilemmas of Social Reform,
pp. 281-287.
40. Elinor Graham, "Poverty and the Legislative
Process," in Seligman, Poverty as a Public Issue, p. 257.
41. George Gallup, "Two Basically Different Views
Held on Causes of Poverty," in Poverty in Affluence, ed.
by Will and Vatter (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World,
1970), pp. 45-46.
42. One appropriate example is a training manual
prepared for social welfare administrators: Robert
Schasre and Jo Wallach, Poverty in the United States
(Los Angeles: University of Southern California, 1965).
43. One popular reader is entitled, The Social,
Political, and Economic Dimensions of Poverty in the
United States. What are the remaining dimensions?
44. Suggestive of those who see the "powerless"
poor trapped in poverty are the selections contained in
Robert H. Binstock and Katherine Ely, eds., The Politics
of the Powerless (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Pub., 1971),
see chap. 6.
45. Theodore R. Marmor, ed., Poverty Policy: An
Analytical Compendium of Cash Transfer Proposals (Chicago:
Aldine-Atherton, Inc., 1971), chap. 3.
46. "The Poor Person" typology is on aggregation
of personality characteristics which decision makers
commonly assume in describing the problems of poor people.
These personality traits constitute a negative syndrome
which keeps poor people from escaping the throes of
poverty. These characteristics are described in "The
Welfare Ethic," pp. 14-15.
47. The concept of a pervasive "culture of
poverty" was first utilized by Oscar Lewis, Children of
Sanchez: Autobiography of a Mexican Family (New York:
Random House Inc., 1961), Introduction.
80
48. Roger L. Hurley, Poverty and Mental Retarda
tion; A Causal Relationship (New York: Random House,
1969), pp. 18-19.
49. National Institute of Mental Health, The
Mental Health of Urban America (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, April 1969), p. 7.
50. Wachtel, "Looking at Poverty from a Radical
Perspective."
51. Goodrich Wells, Unpublished report, Child
Research Center, National Institute of Mental Health.
52. The Mental Health of Urban America, p. 11.
53. Hurley, Poverty and Mental Retardation.
54. ACTION, Domestic Programs Fact Book
(Washington, D.C., August 1972).
55. Thomas A. C. Rennie, The Epidemiology of
Mental Disorders in a Metropolitan Population (New York:
Cornell University, 1972).
56. August B. Hollingshead, Ten-Year Followup of
Psychiatric Patients (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1972).
57. Los Angeles City Planning Commission, The
State of the City (Los Angeles, 1970), Appendix.
58. Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociol
ogy (New York: The Free Press, 1965).
59. The Kemer Commission suggests that urban
riots were "the consequence of unrealized expectations
and blocked opportunities." Report of the National Advis
ory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: Bantam Books,
1968), p. 204.
81
60. Anti-poverty programs often suggest that
slum clearance (urban renewal) will produce psychological
"hygiene." The often circuitous reasoning is obvious from
the following quote: "Poverty and deprivation are respon
sible for the fact that millions of people still live in
urban and rural slums because they do not earn enough
money. Meanwhile, slums help perpetuate poverty and
deprivation, because they are hurtful to health and
morale, and generate many social aberrations which impede
family and individual progress." [Emphasis added]
Conference on Economic Progress, Poverty and Deprivation
in the United States: The Plight of Two-Fifths of a
Nation (Washington, D.C., April 1962), p. 66.
61. Kenneth Clark and Jeannette Hopkins, A Rele
vant War Against Poverty (New York: Harper and Row,
1968), p. 254.
62. Hyman H. Bookbinder, Communities in Action,
I, No. 2 (July 1966), 25.
63. Hyman H. Bookbinder, "OEO Veteran Sad, Not
Bitter, About Its End," Los Angeles Times, April 13, 1973,
64. Edward C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City:
The Nature and Future of Our Urban Crisis (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1968), p. 126.
65. Oscar Lewis, "The Culture of Poverty," Trans-
Action, I, No. 1 (November 1963), 5.
66. William H. Form and Joan Rytina, "Ideological
Beliefs on the Distribution of Power in the United States,"
American Sociological Review, XXXIV (February 1969),
19-31.
67. Lewis Lipsitz, "On Political Beliefs: The
Frievances of the Poor," in Power and Community Dissenting
Essays in Political Science, ed. by Philip Green and
Sanford Levinson (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 166.
68. Ibid., p. 168.
82
69. Anderson, "Poverty, Unemployment and Economic
Development," p. 93.
70. Ibid.
71. The Nixon policymakers describe a "Rousseau-
type" "... natural instinct of people to help them
selves." Elliot Richardson, Testimony Before Senate
Finance Committee, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (July-August
1970), p. 404. Also see Balzano's achievement ethic
(Chapter VIII).
72. Jeffrey St. John, "War on Poverty: It
Cheated the Poor," Los Angeles Times, April 15, 1973, 3,
7. Also see Phillips, "General Principles."
73. For an analysis of the philosophical param
eter of liberation, see Theodore Roszak, The Making of a
Counter Culture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society
and Its Youthful Opposition (New York: Doubleday, 1969),
chap 3.
74. Obviously, a dichotomization is controversial
to those included. It only reflects one variable--the
method of human liberation. It is partially suggested in
Roszak, The Making of a Counter Culture.
75. One interesting hypothesis for why poverty
persists as an agenda item is offered by Edward Banfield,
who sees cities as magnets which continuously attract the
nation's poor. The highly visible plight of the urban
poor focuses attention on this anti-poverty issue, The
Unheavenly City: The Nature and the Future of the Urban
Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), p. 115.
76. President Johnson initiated and Nixon has
continued shifting the research direction of 0E0 to the
National Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity.
National Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity, Fourth
Annual Report (Washington, D.C., October 1971), p. 10.
77. Congressional Record, 110, pt. 4 (1964),
5287-5288.
83
78. Joseph A. Kershaw, Government Against Poverty
(Chicago: Markham, 1970), pp. 48-50.
79. The unintended consequences of suboptimaliza-
tion are described in Aaron Wildavsky, "The Empty-Headed
Blues: Black Rebellion and White Reaction," The Public
Interest, No. 3 (Spring 1968), p. 3.
80. Kershaw, Government Against Poverty,
pp. 133-138.
81. Saul Alinsky, Communities in Action, I, No. 2
(July 1966), 26.
82. Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding.
83. For an overall view of Alinsky, see Marion K.
Sanders, The Professional Radical: Conversations with
Saul Alinsky (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).
84. John H. Rubel, quoted in Federal Training
and Work Programs in the Sixties, by Sar A. Levitan and
Garth Mangum (Ann Arbor: Institute of Labor and Industrial
Relations, 1969), p. 173.
85. Indications of an 0E0 phase-out were apparent
soon after the first Nixon administration took office.
President Richard M. Nixon, Message to Congress, October 2,
1969.
86. Howard J. Phillips, "General Principles,"
Principle Nos. 2, 3.
87. Perhaps the lengthiest compilation of refer
ences for poverty and welfare is significantly called,
Income Support Schemes: Bibliography and Annotations to
Academic Literature including References to Newspaper
Citations, by Cameron Colin (Madison, Wise.: University
Institute for Research on Poverty, 1970). Also see,
S. M. Miller, Martin Rein, Pamela Roby, and Bertram M.
Gross, "Poverty, Inequality and Conflict," in Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences,
373, pt. II (September 1967), 18-52.
84
88. U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Poverty in the
United States: 1959-1968," Current Population Reports
(Series P-60; Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 11.
89. Mollie Orshansky, "Counting the Poor:
Another Look at the Poverty Profile," Social Security
Bulletin (January 1965), pp. 3-13.
90. Council of Economic Advisers, Economic
Report of the President, January 1964 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 58-59.
91. Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report
of the President, January 1966 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 110-114.
92. Conference on Economic Progress, chap. 3.
93. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1972
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972),
p. 328.
94. U.S. Bureau of the Census, 21; the number of
poor in 1967-69 reached its lowest number due to general
economic prosperty.
95. Economic Report of the President, January
1972. The preface by President Nixon contains no mention
of poverty or the poor but refers instead to "public
service employment programs," welfare reform, and revision
of the "minimum wage," pp. 6-7.
96. Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 115.
97. Victor R. Fuchs, "Redefining Poverty and
Redistributing Income," The Public Interest (Stammer 1967),
p. 91.
CHAPTER III
THE NEW FRONTIER AND THE POVERTY ISSUE
I• The New Frontier "Discovers" Poverty
There are several important analytic concerns in
analysis of the Kennedy administration's poverty policy
making. First, how did the Kennedy administration become
aware of and define the poverty problem in America?
Second, to what extent did the New Frontier perceive
poverty policymaking as an anti-poverty struggle? Most
importantly, in what ways did President Johnson appro
priate Kennedy symbolism in anti-poverty policymaking?
Rapid development of the poverty issue in the
early sixties is both historically and descriptively
interesting but the significance of anti-poverty policy
making rests in a process by which the Executive branch
formulated a major new social policy toward the poor. The
analysis of Kennedy's and Johnson's anti-poverty policy
making is not simply to explain or compare two distinct
presidential policymaking styles. Rather, analysis
85
86
underscores a coherent policymaking process in which
symbols from one policy arena"*" (Kennedy) subsequently
legitimize quite different policy outputs of a later
policy arena (Johnson).
The investigatory thesis is that Johnson's War on
Poverty masks itself as a legitimizing response to poverty
concepts and issues formulated during the New Frontier.^
Yet the substance of Johnson's War on Poverty is quite
different from New Frontier poverty concepts. Johnson's
anti-poverty policymaking involves a process by which New
Frontier symbols are publicly identified with specific
Great Society programs in order to guarantee their legit
imacy to Congress and the public.
Johnson's anti-poverty policy is unique as an
unparalleled synthesis of three general policy output
characteristics. As such, anti-poverty offers important
analogies for similar governmental policy outputs with
certain characteristics: (1) with policy goals and
objectives which are revolutionary, i.e., purpose major
restructuring of elitist systems; (2) which are designed
with minimal public exposure to the particular issue; and
(3) which attempt to involve a disenfranchised clientele,
i.e., the poor, in the participatory political process.
87
Anti-poverty's unique policy characteristics are
a classic example of the President's ability to engage in
synoptic-comprehensive policymaking. Few governmental
policymaking outputs are "... 'legislated' almost en
tirely within the Executive branch and, indeed, virtually
without prodding from congressional or 'outside' clien
teles .
The isolated anti-poverty policymaking process
within the White House offers an ideal case study of macro
policymaking and rational problem-solving. The 1963-64
anti-poverty policymaking arena appeared to be a policy
planner's dream. Two usual political variables in policy
making were absent because of the national "mood of co-
4
operation" following Kennedy's death: issue consciousness
and the partisan political conflict. Unfortunately a
rational decision maker's dream became a programmatic
nightmare.
The research thesis is that Johnson's 1964 anti
poverty programs are properly analyzed as programmatic
modifications of poverty concepts and symbolism developed
by three groups who influenced Kennedy: (1) literary-
intellectual elites, (2) Walter Heller's Council of Eco
nomic Advisers, and (3) Kennedy mythologizers, particularly
88
on Lyndon Johnson’s White House staff.
Contrary to cursory treatment generally given to
Kennedy's administration in anti-poverty policymaking,"*
research underscores its legitimizing policymaking role.
Popular and academic literature both underestimates and
romanticizes Kennedy's role in anti-poverty policymaking.
Analysis places John Kennedy's anti-poverty role in a
more realistic and consistent perspective.
A. The Role of Intellectuals as Policy Advisers:
Kennedy and the Intelligensia
President Kennedy's awareness of poverty as a
national problem was apparently first expressed in
g
December 1962. As a potential legislative program,
Kennedy first mentioned "the poverty problem" to Heller's
Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) for consideration in
the forthcoming national budget (FY 1964).^ The litera
ture consistently describes a troubled president who seeks
out his advisers and asks them to design remedial policies
for coping with poverty.
Information channels to the president are impor
tant and coveted points of access. Therefore, the process
by which Kennedy was made aware of poverty in America is
crucial to his conceptualization of poverty. Research
89
analysis shows that Kennedy did not first become aware of
poverty in 1962-63 but rather that this represents only
the president's first public recognition of the problem.
Kennedy only initiated a staff study of the poverty prob-
9
lem after the intelligensia had legitimized the poverty
issue in 1962-63 as a political agenda issue.
The intelligensia received their first shocking
vision of poverty amidst national prosperity during
1962-63. Previously, America's poor had been invisible
to the intelligensia (a few prophets in the wilderness
withstanding) and general public. One exemplary indicator
of the poor's invisibility to these literary-intellectual
elites emerges from surveying major indices to currently
published books and periodicals.^ "Poverty" as a
separate subject classification first appears in each
cumulative index during 1963 or 1964. Until 1964 the
word "poverty" did not appear as a heading either in the
Congressional Record or the Public Papers of the Presi
dents . Perhaps some future calendar will commemorate
1964 A.D. as the year of the poor.
President Kennedy's voracious literary appetite
is well documented and awesome. Consequently, as the
intelligensia began publishing articles stressing the
90
plight of America's poor, Kennedy read many of these same
12
articles. Biographers agree that two books and a New
Yorker article particularly influenced Kennedy's thinking
on poverty in December 1962. Harrington's widely read
13
The Other America proposed an integrated and comprehen
sive program to overthrow America's "citadel of misery."
Presidential reading also included Dwight McDonald's
14
article, "Our Invisible Poor," in the New Yorker, and
15
Leon Keyserling's economic study of poverty.
Kennedy's decision to move ahead with a poverty
policy was influenced a year later by a Homer Bigart
16
article in the New York Times, describing deprivation
in Appalachia. Kennedy supposedly asked Ted Sorensen to
mimeograph Bigart's article and send it to the entire
cabinet.^ As a prodigious reader, it is probable that
Kennedy read other semidal works in 1962-63 on poverty by
Galbraith,^ Myrdal,"^ and Caudill.^ Poverty was iden
tified by the intelligensia as a noble issue for all
knight errants of Camelot.
Yet at no time did Kennedy attempt to influence
public opinion or follow the intellectuals' lead by
expressing a public concern with poverty as a national
problem. Poverty was never elevated to the programmatic
91
agenda level of the New Frontier. It was Johnson, not
Kennedy, who gave the nation a crusade against poverty.
Until the President's (Johnson) declaration of
January 8, 1964, poverty had not been included in
the lexicon of America’s recognized public prob
lems. Presidents had not spoken, or sent messages
to Congress about poverty as such. Congressmen
had not spoken, or introduced bills on the subject.
Paradoxically, the symbolic concern of government for the
poor would be identified with the New Frontier.
Although the intelligensia identified poverty as
a political problem, poverty as a public issue had not
been legitimized. Poverty was a moral concern of educated
and intellectual elites in 1963. Even though the New
Yorker and the New York Times were publishing articles on
poverty, the Saturday Evening Post and the Reader's Digest
were still preoccupied with the problems of middle-class
affluence. Although Johnson's War on Poverty would
become an issue in his 1964 campaign with Goldwater,
public opinion in 1963 was relatively unaware of poverty
as a political issue.
Even following the War on Poverty, public opinion
did not share the intelligensia's sense of outrage and
22
shock at the poor's plight. Middle-class values and
attitudes toward poverty were largely shaped by experiences
92
of the Great Depression and ethnic immigration. The poor
were not viewed as helpless victims of a ghetto environ-
23
ment but as individuals lacking work incentives (the
achievement ethic). Ambivalence toward the poor is
reflected in a historical compassion for the poor while
affirming that achievement opportunities allow anyone to
escape poverty. Ambivalent middle-class attitude toward
the poor was a basic orientation in shaping later welfare
24
policy toward the poor.
Public opinion never accepted the intelligensia
and anti-poverty policymakers' view of the poor. Con
sequently, consensual and supportive public opinion which
25
existed for Roosevelt's mass poverty programs was never
solidified for the War on Poverty. Intelligensia value
assumptions and attitudes toward the poor were accepted
by anti-poverty policymakers almost carte blanche. Later
conflict with middle-class attitudes, in Congress and
local communities, toward poverty would unfortunately
provide
the incentive needed for the eventual destruction
or dilution of most of the programs . . . to the
point that they no longer filled the purposes for
which they had been established. In fact, the
degree to which individual provisions of the War
on Poverty were altered under public attack cor-
93
related directly with the degree to which these
same provisions attacked American values.
(Emphasis added)
Public opinion polls in the early sixties demonstrate
that a majority felt poverty existed because of individual
character flaws. A consensus (80 percent) of public
opinion felt that poverty would always be an inescapable
27
facet of American society. Clearly, the great American
middle class did not share the intelligensia's moralistic
concern for the poor.
Perhaps Kennedy sensed this value dichotomy
between the intelligensia and traditional American culture,
for when finally articulating his own abstract conceptions
of poverty, Kennedy rejected the intellectuals' approach.
Functionally, the intelligensia served as a bellweather
of public issues but not as policy advisers in New Fron
tier policymaking.
B. Kennedy and the Intellectuals:
Symbolic Policymaking
Kennedy's paradoxical use of intellectuals in
28
New Frontier policymaking is frequently unappreciated.
On one level, the Kennedy presidency marked a high water
point in the intellectuals' historical advisory role in
presidential policymaking. The New Frontier ambiente and
94
Kennedy's early formation of a private brain trust gave
intellectuals access to White House decision making
(nearly half of the president's top staff appointments
were formerly university professors). Kennedy formed an
29
Academic Advisory Committee in 1958, to advise him in
his presidential campaign and the Kennedy family's tenure
in the White House undoubtedly encouraged a renaissance
30
of culture in Washington, D.C.
On another level, although it is true that some
intellectuals gained presidential access during the New
Frontier,
. . . the totally dedicated intellectuals never
quite trusted him, probably because they knew
that he never quite trusted them.31
32
His most severe intellectual critics accuse Kennedy of
affecting a pseudo-intellectualism or of using intellec
tual advisers for Machiavellian purposes of image building
and support mobilization.
A dual perspective of the intellectual's role in
33
New Frontier policymaking is offered by Joseph Kraft
in reply to Kazin's question, "What is the meaningful
34
relationship of intellectuals to power?" Kraft sees
two possible roles for the New Frontier intellectual: a
public role with its attendant intellectual purposes; a
95
political role: cultivation of an "intellectual stance"
would be politically advantageous in soliciting votes and
money from key electoral states, i.e., California and
New York. The symbolic utilization of intellectuals in
policymaking does not obviate the possibility that the
president and first lady sincerely enjoyed the companion
ship of intellectuals in the White House social circle.
Although Kennedy appreciated the literary style
and brilliance of liberal intellectuals who focused
national attention on poverty, his own approach to
35
decision making was more pragmatic and cautious. Even
Schlesinger and Galbraith were too ideological and radical
in their poverty solutions for Kennedy. In stun, Kennedy
frustrated intellectuals by speaking their language but
not allowing them to influence policymaking. Kennedy's
decision making style required advisers to convert him to
the rationality of their positions rather than to their
36
moral convictions. Poverty would not be fought in the
New Frontier simply because it was unjust; policy timing
37
must also be considered, i.e., the 1964 presidential
campaign.
Paradoxically, the Texan from the Perdenales
allowed excluded Kennedy-era intellectuals, under the
96
auspices of the specially commissioned Shriver Task Force,
a significant role in formulating the anti-poverty policy.
Yet Johnson, because of his later Vietnam policy and
possibly his Southern background, never succeeded in
maintaining symbolic support of the intellectuals.
In conclusion, the poverty issue was raised to
the level of elite consciousness by liberal intellectual
elites in America. Poverty as a national issue occurred
as a consequence of an "unanticipated event" or "circum-
38
stantial reactors," e.g., the extensive literary focus
on the poverty problem in 1962-63. Because Kennedy
cultivated the good will and maintained open communica
tion with intellectuals, he became aware of the political
potential of the poverty issue. However, resident intel
lectuals in the White House were not included in New
Frontier poverty discussions and functioned as legiti-
mizers of the poverty issue until Lyndon Johnson invited
them to join the Shriver Task Force.
C. Professionals as Policymakers: Hellerfs Council of
Economic Advisers Fights Income Poverty
When Kennedy finally decided to reify his abstract
conceptions of poverty, he turned to the professionals.
Most prestigious and favored professionals in the New
97
Frontier were the progressive economists of Heller's
Council of Economic Advisers (CEA):
The Heller Council . . . composed generally of very
able hard working and productive professionals.
Under Heller's driving force, the Council became
a round-the-clock scout on the New Frontier. . . .
In an era of change, the Council advocated change
that spanned economic, social, political, and
technical developments.39
The literature suggests that the energetic CEA was prodded
into poverty analysis in 1963 by the new mood of the
President. For example, the CEA had not even discussed
40
poverty in its 1963 Annual Report whereas the 1964
41
Annual Report devoted much consideration to an analysis
of the poverty problem.
42
Kennedy biographers and mythologizers stress a
view that anti-poverty policymaking originated with the
President. Significantly, Heller^ frequently promotes
Kennedy's role as progenitor of a noble crusade against
the scourge of poverty. Schlesinger portrays a restive
President throughout the spring of 1963 intent upon
implementing some new comprehensive poverty policy for
the upcoming presidential campaign:
Kennedy has reached the conclusion that tax reduc
tion required a comprehensive structural counter
part, taking the form, not of piecemeal programs,
but of a broad war against poverty itself.44
98
Kennedy mythology in anti-poverty policymaking presents
an active Kennedy directing the CEA's anti-poverty policy
making efforts in 1963.
It is incongruent that a progressive group of
economists like the CEA should be oblivious to economic
deprivation in America until aroused by the President and
the intellectuals. This assertion posits Heller's CEA
not as anti-poverty policymakers but as a programmatic
body. Yet, research suggests that Heller's CEA played
the key policymaking role in creating and organizing
Kennedy's policies:
The anti-poverty decision was made by President
Kennedy, who heeded the urgings of his Council of
Economic Advisers (CEA) that the country would be
afflicted permanently with a new structural kind
of poverty unless the federal government attacked
the problem. 4-5
President Kennedy did not veto the CEA's poverty studies
and was quite encouraging in the 1963 preliminary stages.
However, the CEA poverty study was secondary to an impend
ing tax cut proposal which had higher status and resource
allocation on the New Frontier policymaking agenda.
Eventual formation of New Frontier policies on
poverty is primarily due to the perseverence of Robert
Lampman, a professor of Economics who joined the Council
99
in 1962 and had long studied problems of low-income
Americans. He was encouraged by Heller to continue his
income poverty research under the CEA during the spring
of 1963.
Results of Lampman's research, circulated in a
46
series of memoranda in May 1963, were an indictment of
previous and proposed New Frontier legislation. Lampman
argued that the 1962 investment tax credit and the pro
posed tax cut would not significantly alleviate income
poverty. His memoranda demonstrated that "a drastic slow
down in the rate at which the economy is taking people
47
out of poverty" had occurred under the New Frontier, and
that the actual number of poor people increased from 1957
to 1961. Lampman criticized the 'traditional' economists'
view that
poverty was a matter of idlelessness, and that the
entire labor force could be employed if total demand
(spending on goods and services) were matched with
the country's total capacity (its stock of labor
and capital). EVEN if fiscal policy could manipu
late demand to create a job for every unemployed
person, . . . there would still be poor p e o p l e .48
Reportedly Kennedy found the Lampman statistics distress-
49
ing and requested further poverty research. Levitan
feels that Lampman played a catalytic role in focusing
attention of "those at the top" on the poverty problem."*®
100
Professor Lampman resigned from the CEA the
following month in order to return to academic duties.
Chairman Heller created an interagency task force (CEA,
BOB, White House staff) in June 1963, to continue design
ing an overall poverty strategy. Kennedy gave his
approval to the task force and authorized it to carry
51
out "a basic soul searching" on the poverty problem.
The task force, under the chairmanship of CEA
staff member William Capron, focused on inadequate income
52
as a cause of poverty. The essential question became
"How can the poor's income be increased?" To explore
this question, the task force prepared a number of white
53
papers during the summer and fall, 1963, which focus on
proposals for economic policies to supplement the proposed
tax cut in order to increase the poor's income.
Unlike earlier Lampman proposals the Capron task
force only considered alternative economic proposals for
54
alleviating income poverty. Never did the task force
consider social strategies, i.e., community action, for
alleviating social or psychological causes of poverty.
Clearly, nothing similar to the following year's omnibus
Economic Opportunity Act was considered.
101
Political pressures also mounted for a poverty
policy as Heller predicted a decline in defense and space
spending.Only a broad attack on deep-seated structural
rather than cyclical causes of economic stress would avert
projected massive unemployment among low-income groups in
Kennedy's second administration. The task force was also
stimulated to create poverty proposals by a New York
Herald Tribune article in June‘ S reporting that the
Republicans were planning their own poverty program.
Task force development of a poverty policy was
hampered from July-October by a noted lack of interest in
poverty by both the general public and key "high level
government policymakers." Heller's June speech suggesting
various poverty proposals to the Communications Workers of
57
America Convention and a background discussion with
58
journalists provoked few positive responses.
When the CEA presented other governmental policy
makers with task force ideas, responses were largely
skeptical. Several decision makers felt an emphasis on
poverty problems would be a campaign liability for any
administration attempting to win reelection on the basis
of national prosperity. Many decision makers, however,
reversed themselves as Heller included them in the
102
59
policymaking process by issuing a request on November 5
to all domestic cabinet members to submit poverty program
suggestions by November 15 to the Bureau of the Budget
(BOB):
The departments and agencies were asked to examine
their existing programs, suggest new programs or
redirections of old ones, and estimate the added
funding or reorganization of current programs that
would be needed.
The results were predictable as each governmental agency
prepared massive poverty proposals with equally large
budgets designed to expand departmental empires. Not
surprisingly the department's suggestions amounted to
61
little more than a rehash of obsolete agency proposals.
A BOB task force under William Cannon was asked to analyze
agency proposals and given authority to seek new ideas
62
from additional agencies and individuals. Before BOB's
preliminary evaluation could proceed or any recommenda
tions made, the President made his ill-fated journey to
Dallas.
II. JFK As A Symbol: The Great Society's Adaptation
of the Poverty Issue
The role of a policy demythologizer is complex.
Myth cannot be equated with legend, for legends are lies
while myths are additions to what is essentially truth.
103
Myths surrounding political figures are omnipresent and
symbolically important. Myths often function as crucial
symbols in policymaking for decision makers to legitimize
their own priorities. An understanding of the Kennedy
anti-poverty mythology and Johnson's use of that symbolism
is essential in analyzing the rise and fall of the war on
poverty.
Analysis shows that Kennedy's role in encouraging
his staff to conceptualize a poverty policy is significant
and should not be minimized. Yet Kennedy's greater
importance is not one of substantive policymaking but
rather in the "creative aspect of JFK as a symbol."
He has thus become a model, a paragon, a creative
symbol to many people, able to evoke feelings,
provide meanings, and control and direct behavior.^
All of the familiar symbolism is present in "JFK"; his
Peace Corps-type appeal to youth; his charismatic oratory;
and the pathos of martyrdom.
Kennedy symbolic concern for the poor is perpetu
ated by two groups who were interested in presenting
President Kennedy as: (1) having been long concerned
with the plight of the poor, and (2) having resolved to
implement a national anti-poverty policy the following
year. Ironically, both advisers to Johnson's and Kennedy's
104
biographers found a mutual interest in mythologizing JFK
as a symbol of anti-poverty policy. Too many policy
analysts have accepted the mythological portrayal without
critical analysis.
A. Myth Number 1: JFK as a Long-Time
Anti-Poverty Crusader
There is substantial effort in popular and aca
demic literature to portray Kennedy as having "been deeply
moved by his experience in West Virginia during the 1960
64
primary." Some journalists are quite detailed in pre
senting the West Virginia primary as a catalytic point of
commitment for Kennedy:
In 1960 John F. Kennedy went before Appalachia's
poor rural Protestant people to ask their help
in his quest for the presidency. They said yes to
him, those "hillbillies" did, with their long
bodies and craggy faces. . . . John Kennedy worked
hard in West Virginia and never quite knew while
there to what avail. [Kennedy] was the prototypal
"community organizer" from the outside . . . an
alliance was f o r m e d .65
Academic literature generally accepts this mythologized
view of Senator Kennedy in West Virginia. Bibby and
Davidson, without reference to primary sources, describe
Kennedy's psychological poverty trauma:
. . . to the wealthy young Bostonian, the first hand
view of poverty in West Virginia was a new and jar-
, . ring experience . . . the memory of deprivation he
105
had seen in West Virginia was apparently never
erased from his m i n d .66
Blumenthal feels that Kennedy was so "moved" by
his West Virginia experience that ". . .he had called,
67
later in the same year, for a War on Poverty." (In
fact, Kennedy's only reference to a "War on Poverty" is
solely in an international context.) Bibby and Davidson
indicate that Kennedy's West Virginia impressions were a
factor in "the passage of the (1961) Area Redevelopment
Act and the designing of a regional program for
Appalachia.
Upon closer scrutiny and lack of Kennedy's own
comments on poverty in West Virginia, it seems highly
debatable that Kennedy's concern with the problems of the
poor began in West Virginia. Significantly, key biograph
ical accounts by White, Sorensen, Salinger, and Schle-
69
singer do not corroborate Kennedy's psychological
encounter with poverty during his ten days in the West
Virginia primary.
An inconsistency exists between two contradictory
Kennedy myths surrounding the poverty issue. As noted,
the literature attributes Kennedy's poverty metamorphosis
as occurring in 1962-63 with his readings of current
106
periodicals. If Kennedy were genuinely moved by poverty
in 1960 why did he refrain from ever raising the poverty
issue publicly, or initiate staff discussions of poverty
even privately only after it had already been legitimized
by the intelligensia in 1962-63?
The primary function of the policy analyst is not
to play the iconoclast. Exactly when Kennedy became aware
of poverty in America is relatively unimportant, but it
is important that the contradictory myth of JFK as both
longtime advocate and progenitor of poverty policymaking
exists. That this view is generally accepted in the
literature is also remarkable.
Myth Number 2: JFK's Legitimization
of the War on Poverty
The literature generally presents JFK as the
’’ Father of the War on Poverty" with the implication that
President Kennedy's poverty policy was programmatically
implemented by the War on Poverty.
As indicated, Heller's preliminary request for
poverty proposals from governmental agencies resulted in
a policymaking quagmire at BOB. Although Kennedy encour
aged Heller to come up with poverty proposals, he had
certainly not reviewed or committed himself to any
107
particular poverty proposal.
Yet Kennedy's biographers portray a president
determined to launch an anti-poverty program the following
year. Sorensen states that Kennedy "started us working
on a 'comprehensive, coordinated attack on poverty' in
October."^® Schlesinger cites several instances in the
fall supporting the view that an anti-poverty program
"would be the centerpiece of his 1964 recommendations."^
Highly ambiguous plans for a Kennedy anti-poverty policy
are described as programmatic certainties had Kennedy not
been assassinated.
Kennedy's biographers are not alone in their
tendencies to stress JFK as originator of anti-poverty
policy. Key Kennedy policymakers remaining during the
transition phase of the Johnson presidency needed Kennedy
as a symbol of legitimacy. No one better sensed the
symbolic policymaking importance of the martyred President
than Heller who relates a scene with Kennedy three days
before the assassination:
When I got there, John-John followed me into the
President's office. After we shooed him out, I
asked the President whether he wanted our work to
go forward on the assumption that the anti-poverty
program would be part of his 1964 legislative pro
grams. His answer was an unhesitating "yes."72
108
Heller also describes his conversation with
President Johnson the day after the assassination:
. . . the first matter I took up with President
Johnson was the poverty program. His immediate
response was, "That's my kind of program. . . .
I want to move full speed ahead. " ^3
Again, the degree to which policy analysts have accepted
Heller's account of his conversation with Kennedy is a
tribute to the power of symbolism.
Unfortunately, academic policy analysts generally
accept Heller's account of Kennedy's intentions. Donovan
praises Bibby and Davidson's "excellent brief analysis"
of the War on Poverty but laments their acceptance of the
Heller-Kennedy conversation:
Unfortunately, their [Bibby and Davidson] work is
marred by an astonishing casualness about sources.
In the paragraph quoted above . . . no source is
given for the conversation between the Chairman
of the Council of Economics Advisers and the Presi
dent . Yet, the authors feel free to quote the
President directly.^ [Emphasis added]
There were no witnesses to this conversation nor written
memoranda referring to it. Heller did not give his
account of the conversation until a speech made at Indiana
75
State College (Pennsylvania) on March 25, 1965. No
evidence suggests that a man of Heller's stature would
falsify a conversation but rather that anyone might
109
experience difficulty in remembering accurately a brief
conversation made eighteen months earlier.
Nevertheless, the symbolic torch was passed and
President Kennedy's imprintur was given to Johnson's
Great Society programs; even though programs were still
in an extremely amorphous stage of policy development.
Ironically, the policymaking ambience following Kennedy's
death symbolically insured the successful imprelentation
of any Great Society program in 1964.
Johnson immediately chose the War on Poverty as
being ideally suited for the Great Society's gemstone.
The anti-poverty policy combined Kennedy symbolic legit
imacy and Johnson programmatic content:
The Kennedy Administration may have begun work on
legislation of this type but it said little pub
licly; anti-poverty could be presented as an LBJ
program. An influential segment of public opinion
was ready for it. And there was an important fact
--an attack on poverty was Lyndon Johnson's kind
of legislation.76
Anti-poverty's approach to poverty appealed to Johnson's
political and psychological need for distinctive Great
Society programs. Johnson could have selected alternative
Kennedy programs from among the numerous programs pre
viously blocked in a recalcitrant Congress.
However, Johnson astutely avoided Kennedy programs
110
already submitted to Congress. President Johnson feared
the natural tendency to see any Great Society legislative
program as
. . . a compendium of programs either started by
President Kennedy or at least studied or planned
for in his administration.77
Omnibus War on Poverty programs captured as the symbolism
of Kennedy’s New Frontier were still identifiable as
Johnson's Great Society.
The Kennedy administration had only made prelimi
nary poverty policy studies for possible submission to
Congress; that Kennedy poverty legislation would have
differed significantly from previous New Frontier
approaches to income poverty--the Area Redevelopment Act,
MDTA, Appalachia, the Public Welfare Amendments of 1962,
the youth employment program or his proposed National
Service Corps is improbable.
There was certainly no evidence that Kennedy
envisioned the type of comprehensive community action
approach subsequently utilized by the War on Poverty.
Nor are there indications that Kennedy would have deviated
from his past reliance upon the CEA and Heller's proposed
78
program for "Widening Participation in Prosperity."
Ill
VISTA's inclusion in the War on Poverty is indica
tive of the process by which Kennedy symbolism was
attached to Johnson's anti-poverty programs. Kennedy
established a cabinet level study group late in 1962 to
explore the feasibility of a National Service Corps
79
(domestic Peace Corps). Significantly, the study group
included several later members of the Shriver Task Force,
i.e., Shriver, Robert Kennedy, Boone, etc. Task force
recommendations were incorporated into a bill which was
subsequently defeated in Congress.
Several key components of the National Volunteer
Service Act were revised and incorporated into the Eco-
80
nomic Opportunity Act (EOA) the following year.
Generally, Shriver Task Force revisions redesigned VISTA
to be more compatible with EOA's community action
approach. Nonetheless, Kennedy's symbolic commitment to
volunteerism and the poor could be attached to the Great
Society. A similar process occurred with other EOA pro
grams, i.e., Neighborhood Youth Corps, Ford Gray Areas,
etc.
There is little in Kennedy administration eco
nomic- policies or volunteer programs to suggest an anti
poverty approach to poverty policymaking. The anti
112
poverty paradigm relies on the community action concept
to involve the poor in participatory democracy. Anti
poverty approaches the problems of the poor in isolation
and creates special emphasis agencies (0E0) to attack
poverty. Although proponents of community action were
active in Kennedy's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency
they were hardly influential. Kennedy's confidence in
Heller's economic approaches to increasing prosperity for
all never wavered.
President Johnson's selection of Kennedy's
brother-in-law to head an anti-poverty task force is
indicative of the process by which Kennedy's symbolic
legitimization of the War on Poverty was insured.
Kennedy mythologizers provided a symbolic umbrella under
which Johnson's programs were secure. Johnson's State of
the Union address invoked Kennedy's name repeatedly as he
committed his presidency to a War on Poverty. Anti-
82
poverty provided a focus for the nation's emotions
surrounding a recently martyred President.
113
Footnotes to Chapter III
1. For a discussion of the policymaking arena
concept, see Randall Ripley, William Moreland, and
Richard Sinnreich, "Policymaking: A Conceptual Scheme,"
American Politics Quarterly, I, No. 1 (January 1973),
4-44.
2. Ibid.
3. John Bibby and Roger Davidson, On Capitol
Hill: Studies in the Legislative Process (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), p. 220.
4. John C. Donovan, The Politics of Poverty
(New York: Pegasus, 1967), p. 20.
5. There is no single analysis which focuses
upon Kennedy's anti-poverty policymaking.
6. The term "poverty" or "war against poverty"
only appears in Kennedy's speeches once in reference to
international poverty: The Speeches of Senator John F.
Kennedy, Presidential Campaign of 1960, S. Rept. 994,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), Pt. 1, p. 18. It does not
appear in John F. Kennedy, To Turn the Tide, ed. by John
W. Gardner (New York: Harper and Bros., 1962). It is
significant that there is no mention of poverty in any of
the major Kennedy biographies: Theodore C. Sorensen,
Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965); Pierre Salinger,
With Kennedy (New York: Doubleday, 1966); and William
Manchester, Portrait of a President (New York: MacFadden,
1964).
7. James L. Sundquist, Politics and Policy: The
Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson Years (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings, 1968), p. 111.
114
8. The exchange between Heller and Kennedy is
reconstructed in Sundquist, Politics and Policy, p. 112.
However, Flash's analysis of the CEA not only fails to
recount this specific incident but says nothing about
poverty as a public issue, JFK's concern with economic
poverty, nor any distinction between poverty and general
economic policymaking. Edward S. Flash, Jr., Economic
Advice and Presidential Leadership: The Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers (New York: Columbia University Press,
1965).
9. By intelligensia, we are utilizing Latham's
political and class definition of the term: ". . .a
small elite of cultural influentials with something like
a common identity and a common critical stance against
prevailing values of society. In this sense of the term,
'intellectuals' are somewhat set off from professional
classes generally." Earl Latham, ed., J. F. Kennedy and
Presidential Power (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1972),
p. 224.
10. Six major indices use the subject heading
"poverty" for the first time in the following issues:
The New York Times Index for the Published News of 1963
(New York: New York Times Co., 1964); Business Periodi
cals Index: July 1963-June 1964 (New York: H. W. Wilson
Co., 1964); Monthly Catalog of United States Government
Publications: 1962 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1963), Nos. 804-815; The Book Review
Digest: 1962 (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1963);
International Index: A Guide to Periodical Literature in
the Social Sciences and the Humanities, XVII (April 1962-
March 1964), 792 [New York: H. W. Wilson, 1964]; Essay
and General Literature Index: 1960-64 (New York: H. W.
Wilson Co., 1965), 1070. Only the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature, March 1955-February 1957 (New York:
H. W. Wilson Co., 1957), 1953, has an earlier entry for
poverty.
11. Sundquist, Politics and Policy, p. Ill; and
his On Fighting Poverty: Perspectives from Experience
(New York: Basic Books, 1969), p. 7.
115
12. Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days
(New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1965).
13. Michael Harrington, The Other America (New
York: Macmillan, 1962). Also see his later works for
sharp criticisms of the War on Poverty: Toward a Demo
cratic Left (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969); "The Other
America Revisited," The Establishment and All That
(Santa Barbara: Center Magazine, 1970); "A Glib Fallacy,"
The New Leader, XLVII (March 30, 1964), 18-20.
14. Dwight McDonald, "Our Invisible Poor," New
Yorker, XXXVIII, No. 48 (January 19, 1963), 82-132.
15. Leon H. Keyserling, Poverty and Deprivation
in the United States (Washington, D.C.: Conference on
Economic Progress, April 1962).
16. Harry Bigart, New York Times, October 20,
1963, pp. 1, 79.
17. Sorensen, Kennedy.
18. Galbraith, The Affluent Society.
19. Gunnar Myrdal, Challenge to Affluence
(New York: Pantheon, 1963).
20. Harry M. Caudill, Night Comes to the Cumber-
lands (Boston: Little, Brown, 1962).
21. Sundquist, Politics and Policy, p. 111.
22. Dorothy B. James, Poverty, Politics and
Change (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972),
p. 193.
23. Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology: Why the
American Common Man Believes What He Does (Glencoe, 111.:
The Free Press, 1962), pp. 71-72; 330-331.
24. Saul D. Alinsky, "The War on Poverty— Politi
cal Pornography," in Poverty, Power, Politics, ed. by
Chaim Waxman (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1968), pp.
171-179.
116
25. Thomas Gladwin, Poverty, U.S.A. (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1967), pp. 28-29.
26. James, Poverty, Politics and Change, p. 193.
27. George Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public
Opinion, 1935-1971, III (New York: Random House, 1972),
1870; 1910-1911.
28. The best treatment of Kennedy's relationship
to intellectuals occurs in Earl Latham, J. F. Kennedy and
Presidential Power, chap. 4.
29. Kennedy's Academic Advisory Committee was
headed by Theodore Sorensen, 1958-60.
30. Washington, D.C.'s Kennedy Center for the
Performing Arts is a posthumous tribute to this cultural
renaissance.
31. John Cogley, "JFK— A Final Word," Commonweal,
LXXX (May 8, 1964), 190-191.
32. Norman Mailer, "The Leading Man, A Review of
JFK," Cannibals and Christians (New York: Dell, 1970).
33. Joseph Kraft, Profiles in Power: A Washing
ton Insight (New York: New American Library, 1966).
34. Alfred Kazin, Contemporaries (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1962), Latham, J. F. Kennedy, p. 223.
35. See Richard Neustadt, "Kennedy in the Presi
dency, " Political Science Quarterly, LXXIX (September
1964), 321-334; Theodore Sorensen, Decision Making in the
White House (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).
For a insider's personal account of Kennedy decision mak
ing, see Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of
the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969),
pp. 35-36.
117
36. For a comparison of Kennedy decision making
styles with other presidencies, see Alexander L. George,
"The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy,"
American Political Science Review, LXVI (September 1972),
751-790.
37. Sorensen, Decision Making in the White House,
p. 79.
38. Roger Cobb and Charles D. Elder, Participa
tion in American Politics; The Dynamics of Agenda Build
ing (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972), p. 83.
39. Flash, Economic Advice and Presidential
Leadership, p. 274.
40. Council of Economic Advisers, Annual Report
(1963).
41. Council of Economic Advisers, Annual Report
(1964), pp. 56-57.
42. Some of those who have assessed Kennedy
mythology are Henry Patcher, "JFK as an Equestrian Status:
On Myth and Mythmakers," Salmagundi, I, No. 3 (1966);
Sorensen, Kennedy; Tom Wicker, "Lyndon Johnson vs. the
Ghost of Jack Kennedy," Esquire, LXVIII (November 1965),
87-160; Joseph Alsop, "The Legacy of John F. Kennedy:
Memories of an Uncommon Man," Saturday Evening Post,
November 21, 1964} pp. 15-19; Cogley, "JFK— A Final
Word"; Cecil Osbaine, "Kennedy: The Making of a Myth,"
National Review, XX (November 5, 1968), 1113-1114; Mailer,
"A Review of JFK"; William G. Carleton, "Kennedy in
History," Antioch Review, XXIV, No. 3 (Fall 1964), 277-299,
Interestingly, Kennedy mythological aura also surrounded
the First Lady— "Jackie." Katherine A. Porter, "Her
Legend will Live," Ladies Home Journal, March 1964, pp.
58-59; Richard Rovere, "Letter from Washington," New
Yorker, November 30, 1963, pp. 51-53.
43. Heller quoted in Bibby and Davidson, On
Capitol Hill, p. 25.
118
44. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 1009.
45. Richard Blumenthal, "The Bureaucracy: Anti
poverty and the Community Action Program," American
Political Institutions and Public Policy, ed. by Allan P.
Sindler (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), p. 142.
46. Robert Lampman, "Interpretive Summary of
1962 Annual Report," Memorandum to Members of the Council
of Economic Advisers, December 23, 1961; "An Offensive
Against Poverty," June 10, 1963; Lampman and David
Nichols, "Post Poverty Trends," August 5, 1963.
47. Robert Lampman, an economist on leave from
the University of Wisconsin, had previously written
The Low Income Population and Economic Growth, Joint
Economic Committee, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
48. Blumenthal, "The Bureaucracy," p. 143.
49. Bibby and Davidson, On Capitol Hill, p. 225.
50. Sar Levitan, The Great Society's Poor Law:
A New Approach to Poverty (Baltimore: Johns-Hopkins
University Press, 1969), pp. 13-14.
51. Bibby and Davidson, On Capitol Hill, p. 225.
52. Blumenthal, "The Bureaucracy," p. 145.
53. Bibby and Davidson, On Capitol Hill, p. 225.
54. See Robert J. Lampman, Ends and Means of
Reducing Income Poverty (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co.,
1971), p. v; Gabriel Kolko, Wealth and Power in America:
An Analysis of Social Class and Income Distribution (New
York: Praeger, 1962), p. 70.
55. Douglas Cater, "The Politics of Poverty,"
The Reporter, XXX, No. 2 (February 13, 1964), 16-20.
56. Sundquist, On Fighting Poverty, p. 20.
119
57. Blumenthal, "The Bureaucracy," p. 146.
58. Bibby and Davidson, On Capitol Hill, p. 225.
59. Blumenthal, "The Bureaucracy," p. 147.
60. Bibby and Davidson, On Capitol Hill, p. 226.
61. Sundquist, On Fighting Poverty, p. 22.
62. Blumenthal, "The Bureaucracy," p. 147.
63. Latham, J. F. Kennedy, p. 227.
64. Bibby and Davidson, On Capitol Hill; and
Blumenthal, "The Bureaucracy."
65. Robert Coles, "Rural Upheaval: Confronta
tion and Accommodation," in Sundquist, On Fighting Poverty,
p. 103.
66. Bibby and Davidson, On Capitol Hill, p. 223;
Schlesinger, A Thousand Years, p. 1011.
67. Blumenthal, "The Bureaucracy," p. 144.
68. Bibby and Davidson, On Capitol Hill, p. 223.
69. Theodore H. White, The Making of a President:
1960 (New York: Atheneum, 1961); Sorensen, Kennedy;
Schlesinger, A Thousand Days; Salinger, With Kennedy.
70. Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 753.
71. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 1012.
72. Heller, quoted in Phillip Foss and Duane
Hill, Politics and Policies (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth
Publishing Co., 1970), p. 75.
73. Heller, quoted by Sundquist, On Fighting
Poverty, p. 21.
120
74. John C. Donovan, The Politics of Poverty
(New York: Pegasus, 1967), fn. 5, p. 143.
75. Heller, speech at Indiana State College (Pa.)
March 26, 1965, quoted by Sundquist, On Fighting Poverty,
p. 21.
76. Eric Goldman, The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson
(New York: Dell Edition, 1969), pp. 48-49.
77. Tom Wicker, New York Times, January 9, 1964,
p. 701.
78. Heller's Task Force "white papers" during
summer 1963.
79. President's Study Group on a National Service
Program, "Information on a Proposed National Service
Program," S. 1321, HR 5625 (Washington, D.C., n.d.).
80. The linkage between the National Service
Corps and VISTA is corroborated in EOA hearings: U.S.,
Congress, House, Committee on Education and Labor,
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Hearings, Before a
special subcommittee on HR 10440, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1964), pp. 307, 587, 684; U.S., Congress, Senate, Com
mittee on Labor and Public Welfare, on S. 2642, 88th Cong.,
2nd Sess. (1964), pp. 86, 138, 328.
81. Blumenthal, "The Bureaucracy," p. 146;
Sundquist, On Fighting Poverty, p. 9.
82. Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics
(Urbana: University of Illinois, 1967), p. 6.
CHAPTER IV
THE GREAT SOCIETY FORMULATES A NEW APPROACH
TO THE POVERTY ISSUE
I. A Policy Analysis of Johnson's War on Poverty
Unlike the Kennedy era of poverty policymaking,
President Johnson's War on Poverty is extensively dis
cussed in literature. It is repetitious to retrace War on
Poverty struggles or attempt to add historical footnotes.
Major case studies by Donovan,^" Moynihan,^ and Levitan^
adequately analyze the ill-fated War on Poverty and numer
ous popular and academic articles focus on various aspects
of this idealistic crusade (1964-68). One Senate sub
committee alone traveled to 16 cities and received testi
mony from over 700 people in preparing its 15 volume
4
examination of the War on Poverty.
On what basis can the policy analyst approach a
case study which has been thoroughly discussed in the
literature? Further analysis of anti-poverty policymaking
is only justified by the prospect of explaining previously
121
122
unexplained relationships or empirical facts. The anti
poverty analytic process begins by taking an independent
perspective and constructing an explanatory model for the
failure to reduce poverty in America.
As indicated, poverty emerged as an identifiable
policymaking concept in 1962-63, whereas most analyses of
anti-poverty policymaking were conducted and published in
1967-69. In other words, anti-poverty policymaking
literature appeared in tandem with Johnson's War on
Poverty (1964-68). Therefore, anti-poverty policymaking
is generally described as the output of one policymaking
structure--the Johnson Administration.
Both Nixon and Johnson administrations utilized
similar anti-poverty approaches to the poverty issue. The
Office of Economic Opportunity (0E0) has existed six years
within the Executive Office of President Nixon. Anti
poverty policymaking did not cease with the Great Society's
War on Poverty in 1968 nor did the Nixon emasculation of
0E0 destroy the anti-poverty concept. Anti-poverty
policymaking must be approached as a policymaking frame
work independent from particular agencies or administra
tions. Policymaking analysis substantiates the influence
of an anti-poverty policymaking paradigm which prevails
123
for two presidencies over a decade (1964-74).
Policy analysis focuses on the creation of the
anti-poverty paradigm during the formulation of the 1964
Economic Opportunity Act (EOA). Whereas the anti-poverty
literature generally focuses on executive-legislative
policymaking interaction and the implementation of the
Community ACTION Programs (CAP), this investigation
stresses the role of set policymaker attitudes in decision
making.
A. The Anti-Poverty Policymaking Paradigm:
Kennedy Men Formulate Policy in
Johnson's Great Society
President Johnson delegated poverty policy formu
lation to a task force headed by Kennedy's brother-in-law,
Sargent Shriver. Shriver's Task Force spent an intensive
six weeks in designing the EOA and was given unrestrictive
policymaking powers without interference from even the
President. President Johnson requested Shriver's Task
Force to formulate a War on Poverty which would be ready
for a spring submission to Congress. The Shriver Task
Force mandate was unhindered by intra-agency jurisdictions
or congressional committees.
Consequently, the Johnson anti-poverty policymaking
124
arena was an optimal environment for the maximum influence
of professional priorities on policymaking. The policy
making independence of professionals who Shriver charac
terized as "the kind of people you like to bat an idea
against" is perhaps unparalleled in contemporary American
policymaking.
The impact of these select policymakers upon anti
poverty policy output was further increased by the con
gressional post-Kennedy assassination mood of conciliation.
Consequently,
It is doubtful that any single piece of domestic
legislation of similar importance and scope had
moved so rapidly and easily through Congress in a
quarter of a century.5
It was an optimal opportunity to finally reduce poverty
in America.
Ironically, the Shriver Task Force was not com
prised of Johnson men but was
. . . a team of Eastern liberal intellectual-
politicians under the leadership of a member of
the Kennedy family establishment which was given
responsibility for formulating it. No one from
Texas played a key staff role in the formulation
of the anti-poverty legislation with the possible
exception of Bill Moyers, . . .6
Significantly, the elitist Shriver Task Force seemingly
functioned in an ideal policymaking environment and
125
exemplifies a rational decision making model. A small
autonomous task force composed of top professionals from
several disciplines was given substantive policymaking
authority. It included professional administrators,
economists, political scientists, sociologists and commu
nity organizers and had no limiting precedents or operat
ing programs of a poverty nature.
Importantly, political conflict and compromise
was nonexistent as a policy restraining factor. The task
force was confident that the President would accept and
Congress pass whatever reasonable poverty policy which it
might design. Moreover, they were men motivated by a
sense of high idealistic purpose in their goal to fight
poverty.
Following his February 1 appointment, Shriver
assembled a diverse and somewhat fluid policymaking group.
On loan from their respective agencies and academic
institutions, these were men of creativity and demon
strated administrative abilities: Patrick Moynihan,
Harold Horowitz, James Sundquist, and Hyman Bookbinder.
Shriver added his own associates and friends: Adam
Yarmolinsky, Christopher Weeks, Frank Mankiewicz, Paul
Jacobs, and Michael Harrington. These were the policy-
126
making nucleii even though Shriver would later announce
for legitimation reasons a partial list of 157 people who
had given policymaking input.^
The Shriver Task Force was generally representa
tive of liberal/intellectual orientations toward poverty
and the poor. Its enthusiasm for restructuring social
policy toward the poor through rational policymaking was
widely shared in 1964 among liberals and intellectuals.
The intelligensia had discovered the invisible poor in
1962-63 and raised the poverty issue for the first time
since the Depression. As indicated, American public
opinion did not share the task force's view of the poor.
One mission of War on Poverty policymakers would be "a
conscious effort to alter American values toward the
_ „ _ „ 118
poor.
The quixotic desire by the intelligensia to change
contemporary values through rational policymaking is
suggested in responses by "thoughtful American authors"
to Eric Goldman's request for a recommended policy thrust
for the Johnson administration. Barbara Tuchman, David
Donald, Robert Heilbronner, Norman Podhoretz, and Richard
Rovere all urged Johnson policymakers to provide leader
ship in changing "materialistic-commercialism" or
127
achievement values to "moral values; to a concern with
9
poverty and ignorance." Anti-poverty analysis shows the
elitist effort to change cultural values toward the poor
is reflected in a paradigm of policymaking orientations.
The paradigm or model of orientations toward the
poor is formulated by the Shriver Task Force as anti
poverty policy. The anti-poverty policy paradigm is a
unique approach to the poverty issue because of the
assumptions which these policymakers make. Although the
anti-poverty paradigm is difficult to change, certain
orientations were modified during the anti-poverty decade
(see Figure 1).
II. A Paradigm of Anti-Poverty Orientations
A. The Exclusive Anti-Poverty Orientation
War on Poverty goals are stated in ambiguous but
symbolic terms which define anti-poverty strategies as
inclusive, optimal, and process-oriented. Although
ambiguous, EOA only focuses on poverty related program
ming.
Ambiguity is not generally valued in an American
culture which so highly cherishes pragmatism and common
sense. One would expect EOA to delineate how poverty will
128
1964-68
Direct Washington
Intervention
Community Development
Programming
Volunteerism as
Intervention
Strategy
Exclusive
Anti-Poverty
Orientation
Maximum Feasible
Participation of
the Poor
1969-74
Volunteerism as
Intervention
Strategy_____
Exclusive
Anti-Poverty
Orientation
Direct Washington
Intervention Planned-Impact-
Programming
Maximum Feasible
Participation of
the Poor
FIGURE 1. The Prevailing Anti-Policymaking Paradigm
1964-68 and 1969-74
129
be reduced. Yet, as Levin discovered at HEW, policy goals
and objectives are often abstractly stated:
. . . blur this issue if at all possible; . . . a
clarification or sharpening of issues is not always
desirable.10
An ambiguous sentiment to end poverty was employed
by anti-poverty policymakers who faced difficult choices
concerning resource allocation. Symbolic goals to end
poverty within the EOA insured (1) quick and unquestioning
passage by Congress, (2) that no specific local anti
poverty alternative would be prohibited, and (3) un
restricted policymaking power for 0E0 administrators.
EOA is an omnibus potpourri of anti-poverty
symbolism and sentiments.^ The Economic Opportunity Act
sets no guidelines, standards or evaluation procedures.
It promises a total mobilization of community resources to
eradicate poverty. This is to be accomplished by utiliz
ing the maximum feasible participation of local residents
and outside anti-poverty volunteers. VISTA volunteers are
required by EOA to work exclusively in anti-poverty proj
ects and live in the poverty community.
Anti-poverty definitions that exist constitute
non-definitions in their all-inclusive poverty scope.
For example, a target community of the poor is defined as:
130
. . . identical with a major political jurisdiction
such as a county or city, but it may also be a group
of cities or counties. The community should be of
sufficient size and population to allow for the
effective utilization of resources in its attack on
poverty.12
The poverty community is all-inclusively defined so that
a "wide variation" in poverty projects would be possible.
Anti-poverty priorities would depend solely on the "...
nature of the local population . . . locale, and extent
of public and private resources." 0E0 wanted "... com
munities and local organization to develop their own
approaches.
Despite inadequate funding, the War on Poverty was
publicized as an unconditional war which would result in
total victory over poverty in America- ^ with 0E0 as the
15 1 f \
mechanism to eliminate /eradicate- 1 - 0 poverty. In 1968
a Senate subcommittee still believed that America could
. . . eliminate poverty . . . if we so choose to do
so. The task could be completed within 10 years if
sufficient funds were applied, and certainly in 20
years at the most, the scourge of poverty can be
forever banished from America.17
As Levitan suggested, EOA's total commitment
against poverty was "... Washington's usual habit of
a priori assuming that each new piece of legislation will
resolve the problem it is designed to attack."^® Anti-
131
19
poverty was not a comprehensive war and few seriously
believed that America would eliminate poverty in ten years.
Although public opinion perhaps became more concerned with
20
the plight of the poor, polls also indicate mass accept
ance of the biblical view of the poor as an inescapable
facet of society.^
Anti-poverty policymakers designed and inadequately
funded a policy goal which was generally believed to be
unobtainable. Yet, stating the unobtainable may remove
the necessity of stating the obtainable in policymaking.
Anti-poverty's unobtainable or symbolic goals created
ambiguity and allowed 0E0 to define its own guidelines.
Some 0E0 backers felt that vague symbolic goals lent
22
political viability to authentic community based pro-
23
grams. A federal definition of anti-poverty goals was
viewed by the Shriver Task Force as gross paternalism of
the local policymaking process. EOA avoided defining
local anti-poverty goals:
What are they (CAPs) supposed to do? Are they to
make trouble? Create small controversies in order
to avoid large conflicts— or engender as much con
flict as they can? Hire the poor, involve the poor,
or be dominated by the poor? Improve race relations
or enhance racial pride? What is it Washington
wanted?24
132
Ambiguity as to anti-poverty's meaning existed in legisla
tive policy outputs only. The anti-poverty paradigm pro
vided a framework for local administrators to anti-
25
poverty. 0E0 bureaucrats were left free to devise their
own operating standards within the all-inclusive anti
poverty paradigm. Statute ambiguity achieved both
symbolic consensus for a national crusade against poverty
and an unrestricted programming arena for OEO's profes
sional administrators.
The possibility that anti-poverty agencies would
focus on projects which were not poverty oriented was
unthinkable in 1964. Yet, conceptual ambiguity concerning
the poverty issue and anti-poverty policy orientations
undermined a clear authoritative focus on poverty reduc
tion strategies. Consequently, the absolute number of
poor actually increased during most years of the War on
Poverty. Ambiguity over anti-poverty strategies invited
the eventual abandonment of exclusionary poverty focus
during the second Nixon administration.
B. Maximum Feasible Participation of the
Poor as a Paradigm Orientation
Anti-poverty policymaking objectives and strate
gies must theoretically reflect the felt-needs of the
133
community as articulated by elected representatives of
the poor. Maximum feasible participation of the poor in
local anti-poverty policymaking is achieved through
representative participation.
Representation has been a middle class concept
from its origins in Lockean parliamentary democracy and
is inextricably linked to the individual's efficacious
belief in the system and trust in his elected representa
tive. Representative decision making includes a rational,
parliamentary style within a rule of law and is in con
trast to continental representation (Rousseu's "general
will" and Marx's "consciousness"), wherein the representa
tive is deemed representational because he shares a
peculiar group weltanschauung. For example, one may
represent blacks, Mexican-Americans, proletariate, etc.,
simply because he is a group member. Unfortunately,
Lockean representation concepts are not readily accepted
among the poor or among those alienated from the partici
patory democratic process.
Maximum feasible participation assumes that the
poor, not the middle class, will participate and control
26
local institutions. By including elected representa
tives from the geographic area served, the poor would
134
theoretically participate in and accept anti-poverty
programs. Increased participation would also increase
27
both political efficacy and economic mobility.
Unfortunately for effective participation of the
poor, maximum feasible participation included the policy
maker's misunderstandings of poverty and the poor
(Moynihan's maximum feasible misunderstanding). Policy
maker misperceptions of the poor are founded on the belief
that the poor constitute a homogeneous class.
28
A thorough demographic analysis of the poor
indicates a variety of factors which cause and perpetuate
poverty in America. Anti-poverty policymakers in 1964 did
not utilize sophisticated Census Bureau poverty data and
consequently War on Poverty programs ignored several major
poverty groups, e.g., female headed households and the
elderly, so that
even if the 0E0 budget were multiplied tenfold, the
nature of its programs would bypass certain problems
and categories of the poor.29
Myriad causes of poverty and heterogeneity of groups
classified as poor renders broad spectrum policymaking
difficult.
Representation of the poor on CAP boards seldom
reflected the complexity of poverty groups. Participation
135
of the poor in anti-poverty policymaking assumes that the
representative process can function in low-income neighbor
hoods. Representation implies an awareness of, communica
tion with, and trust in one's representative. These
psychological orientations are not easily stimulated among
alienated and anomic social groups. Yet, social scientists
generally describe the poor as having the following per
sonality characteristics: (1) survival-oriented,
(2) apathy, (3) little future conceptualization, (4) envy,
30
hostility toward the non-poor. Unity of the poor is
often based on suspicion and resentment of strangers.
Representation of the poor is often made even more
difficult by informal and ethnically segmented communica
tion systems in urban areas. For example, one 0E0 organ
izer laments the difficulties of communicating with the
poor:
In a metropolitan neighborhood, a survey shows that
80 percent of the residents don't know where a
neighborhood center is located. It has been operat
ing a block or two away for over six months.31
The same 0E0 official further describes the
barriers of communicating CAP meetings:
. . . more traditional approaches have failed to be
completely effective in this communication gap. . . .
Their information comes from far more direct personal
information sources.32
136
In retrospect, it is hardly surprising that
election turnouts for the poor's representatives ranged
33
from 1-5 percent nationally. It was not unusual for
elections to disintegrate into confrontations between
groups of ethnic poor competing for a larger share of
scarce anti-poverty resources, i.e., the EYOA experience
34
in Los Angeles. There are also indications that compet
itive power struggles engendered by CAP board elections
contributed to the denouement of a unified civil rights
35
movement. Ethnic competition for scarce rewards offered
by CAP programs and resulting fragmentation of conflicting
groups contrasts sharply to the often unifying "winner-
36
take-all" rewards of the pluralistic political process.
For example, internecine racial fragmentation in Los
Angeles1 EYOA is in contrast to the racially unified
37
Bradley mayoralty campaign.
C. Restructured Federalism: Anti-Poverty Policymaking
by Washington 0E0 Administrators
Anti-poverty policymaking is appropriately made
by Washington 0E0 administrators in conjunction with local
community groups. State and local governments should
function peripherally in anti-poverty programs.
Significantly anti-poverty policymakers redefine
137
political authority in the American federal system by
encouraging the creation of countervailing power struc
tures to non-national political institutions. Direct
Washington encouragement of grassroots participation is an
innovative anti-poverty approach to fighting poverty.
EOA encouraged the poor to organize and coerce local
decision makers to alleviate poverty.
Anti-poverty policies allowed 0E0 to bypass local
governments in funding local anti-poverty programs so that
CAP programs would not be influenced by local elites.
Anti-poverty policymakers felt that local governments were
insensitive to the poor in administering civil rights
and welfare programs. 0E0 administrators also felt that
no existing non-national governmental unit could adequately
39
coordinate programs across jurisdictional boundaries.
Paradoxically, EOA proposes a coordinated inter
governmental (national-state-local) attack on poverty
while limiting state and local governments to a perfunc
tory watchdog role. Local governments were particularly
ignored wherever non-profit community agencies rather than
local governmental CAP agencies administered community
40
action programs.
138
Theoretically, autonomous community agencies were
responsive to the needs of poverty area citizens via the
41
mechanism of remote decentralization. All local federal
anti-poverty programs were to be coordinated by area
42
CAPs M. . .to provide a coordinated and comprehensive
approach to poverty without basically altering federal
/ 0
patterns. CAP service delivery systems would theoreti
cally "mobilize and use total community resources . . .
in a concentrated attack on poverty,i.e., educational,
family welfare, health, housing, economic development,
consumer information, credit and legal services, etc.
CAPs were to mobilize and coordinate local institutions
in the War on Poverty:
... to mobilize community resources against poverty
through the establishment of linkages among and within
service systems and through other means.45
After 1966, mobilization of community resources
through the establishment of linkages was solicited by
CAPs on a voluntary basis by an extensive "checkoff"
procedure involving approval by all local public agencies
46
for 0E0 program proposals. CAPs were hindered in func
tioning as a coordinating service system by the local
"checkoff" procedure which allowed local power elites to
veto CAP proposals deemed too radical. CAPs were
139
increasingly torn by their efforts to serve both the
powerful and the powerless:
It became increasingly clear that an independent CAP
controlled by the poor was not a viable organization
and that it could not serve two masters, the poor
and the government. Consistency eventually required
that CAP declare whom it represented.47
Direct Washington intervention in local anti
poverty policymaking was essentially an effort by the
Shriver Task Force to subsidize local social restructuring.
Supposedly, non-partisan CAPs would coerce City Hall to
achieve local economic redistribution. Functionally, CAPs
would perform a governmental reform role while simulta
neously providing economic and social services to the poor.
Gresham's law suggests that one role would inevitably
decline, i.e., political reform of City Hall.
Washington anti-poverty orientations demonstrate
a disdain for state and local policymaking capabilities by
patronizingly assuming that "... power structures in
Washington State need shaking up, but not those in Washing-
48
ton, D.C." War on Poverty policy orientations define
federal government, particularly the presidency, as the
governmental structure most responsive to the poor's
needs. Washington felt local political machines and
Southern racist politicos lacked incentive to formulate
140
responsible poverty policies. Clearly, federal anti
poverty policymakers did not intend to strengthen the
effectiveness of local government by providing the incen
tive of anti-poverty monies.^
D. Community Development Programming as
an Anti-Poverty Orientation
Community development or organization approach to
poverty dominated anti-poverty programming during the War
on Poverty. Community organization is an all-inclusive
rubric under which disorganized poor communities are
organized/developed by a catalytic agent, the outside
organizer.
Based on the successes of Saul Alinsky and Ford
Foundation's Gray Areas Project, community development
strategies are both political and economic in nature.
Groups of poor are organized in order to pool their polit
ical coercive power to achieve economic objectives.
Consumer or worker boycotts and strikes might be called
in order to obtain more jobs or better social services.
The key to community organization is the outside
organizer who must subtly show community groups how to
organize and obtain objectives. The organizer must win
the confidence of the alienated poor and not impose his
141
own developmental goals or objectives. He must be respon
sive to the felt-needs of the poor community and suggest
organizational strategies. Whatever the community
expresses as its priorities suggests the organizer's
objective.
Anti-poverty programming encouraged community
development projects until 1966 when reactions by non
national governments and local elites required their
emasculation. Community organizers threatened local
establishments whenever attempts were made to redistribute
political and economic power. Organizers' efforts to
encourage class action suits and racial integration were
particularly disruptive to local elites.
Community development as an anti-poverty orienta
tion was replaced by a Planned-Impact-Programming (PIP)
approach to programming. Whereas community development
was unstructured and qualitative in results, PIP was highly
planned and dependent on measurable indicators of success.
E. Volunteerism as an Anti-Poverty Orientation
One of the unique orientations in the anti-poverty
paradigm is the utilization of volunteers as a means of
reducing poverty. Volunteerism itself is a cultural value
142
probably derived from the nation's frontier experience.
As a symbolic revitalization of volunteerism, President
Kennedy's inaugural address called upon Americans to "ask
not what your country can do for you . . ." Kennedy's
symbolically successful Peace Corps had sent thousands of
volunteers to fight poverty in developing nations.
Anti-poverty policymakers believed volunteers
could alleviate domestic poverty as well. Theoretically,
well-trained volunteers would be able to reach the hard
core poor who had not been helped by macro economic
policies. The volunteer who knew and understood the poor
community would supposedly be able to reach the poor.
Volunteers would be able to organize the poor and help
them gain access to establishment economic and political
institutions. Volunteers would also be effective in
mobilizing outside and community resources in anti-poverty
proj ects.
Anti-poverty policy paradigm orientation envisioned
a particular type of volunteer which would be most effec
tive. Volunteers in VISTA, CAP and other anti-poverty
programs were required to work full time and live in the
poverty community. Volunteers were to be paid a cost-of-
living stipend and live on the economic level of the poor
143
community. Most volunteers were young and from college
liberal arts backgrounds. Characteristically, anti
volunteers were prepared to use community organization
strategies.
F. Poverty and the Anti-Poverty Paradigm
The Shriver Task Force fulfilled the presidential
mandate to design a War on Poverty which would be readily
identifiable as the cornerstone of the Great Society.
The Shriver Task Force succeeded in formulating a totally
new approach to the poverty issue. As poverty policy
makers, task force members were able to approach and
identify poverty as a distinct policymaking arena. His
torically, the poverty issue had always been considered
by policymakers in economic or political decision making.
The framework or paradigm of anti-poverty orienta
tions constitutes a reference point for decision makers
or administrators who formulate programs exclusively for
the poor. Unlike welfare, public assistance, public
housing which also affect the poor, the anti-poverty
framework shapes the direction and structure for actors
planning poverty reduction strategies. Alternative
policies designed for comprehensive treatment of poverty
144
have not been developed because of the limiting anti
poverty paradigm. Most significantly, broad spectrum
intervention strategies for poverty reduction have not
been based on the realities of poverty.
The anti-poverty approach to poverty was not
rejected following local reactions to the War on Poverty
in 1966. Nor was the anti-poverty paradigm discarded
following the Republican ascendency in 1969. For ten
years the anti-poverty framework prevailed over poverty
decision making. Although a few anti-poverty orientations
were revised, radical restructuring of the paradigm has
been unsuccessful.
145
Footnotes to Chapter IV
1. John C. Donovan, The Politics of Poverty
(New York: Pegasus, 1967).
2. Patrick Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunder
standing: Community Action in the War on Poverty (New
York: The Free Press, 1969).
3. Sar A. Levitan, The Great Society's Poor Law:
New Approach to Poverty (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
1969).
4. U.S., Congress, Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower and Poverty,
Examination of the War on Poverty (15 pts.; Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967).
5. Donovan, The Politics of Poverty, p. 37.
6. Ibid., p. 29.
7. This legitimization aspect is indicated by the
list's categories of professional groups: "Education and
Civic Groups," "Business and Agriculture," "State and
Local Officials," "Labor," "Task Force from Government
Agencies," and "Participants from Government Agencies."
Hearings before the Subcommittee on the War on Poverty
Program, pt. 1, Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, U.S.
House of Representatives, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washing
ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), pp.
23-25.
8. Eric F. Goldman, The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson
(New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1969), p. 163.
9. Ibid., pp. 163-165.
10. Arthur Levin, The Satisfiers (New York:
IflnCall Publishing, 1970), pp. 16, 20.
11. Lowi, The End of Liberalism, pp. 234-235.
146
12. U.S., Department of Commerce, Economic Devel
opment Administration, Handbook of Federal Aids to Commu
nities: 1966 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1966), p. 42.
13. U.S., Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, As
Amended An Act (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print
ing Office, March 1, 1970), #1485, 10-11.
14. President Lyndon B. Johnson, State of the
Union Address (January 8, 1964), Public Papers of the
Presidents: 1963-64, I, 112-120.
15. Ibid., March 16, 1964, I, 375-380.
16. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare, Hearings on Economic Opportunity Act
of 1964, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1964. U.S. House, Com
mittee on Education and Labor, Hearings of the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1964.
17. U.S., Senate, Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower and Poverty,
Toward Economic Security for the Poor, 90th Cong., 2nd
Sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1968), p. vi.
18. Levitan, The Great Society's Poor Law, p. 11.
19. Kenneth B. Marshall, in Hearings before the
Committee of Education and Labor, U.S., House, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess., Economic Opportunity Act, Amendments of 1967,
20. Louis Harris, quoted in Office of Economic
Opportunity, A News Summary of the War on Poverty, October
24, 1966, p. 1. In 1965 only 50% of an American cross-
section sample said they "often feel bad" over the way
"some people in the U.S. still go hungry"; in 1969, 63%
expressed this view. Harris felt that his results indi
cated that "... the rank and file of Americans are not
without both guilt and compassion for the condition of the
less privileged."
147
21. George Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public
Opinion, 1935-1971, Vol. Ill (New York: Random House,
1972), 1910-1911.
22. Ralph M. Kramer, Participation of the Poor:
Comparative Community Case Studies in the War on Poverty
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 3.
23. Lowi, The End of Liberalism, p. 234; John G.
Wofford, "The Politics of Local Responsibility: Adminis
tration of the Community Action Program— 1964-1966," in
On Fighting Poverty: Perspectives from Experience, ed. by
James Sundquist (New York: Basic Books, 1969), p. 75.
24. Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding,
p. 4.
25. U.S., Office of Economic Opportunity, Partic
ipation of the Poor in the Community Decision Making
Process (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
August 1969); Community Action Program Guide B2d (Washing
ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965.
26. Kramer, Participation of the Poor, p. 199.
27. Whether CAP boards felt economic or political
power to be the most important anti-poverty goal would
vary with the political machine strength of local city
halls, see David J. Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson,
"Reformers, Machines, and the War on Poverty," in City
Politics and Public Policy, ed. by James Q. Wilson (New
York: Wiley, 1968), pp. 267-292.
28. The following observations on the demography
of the poor are taken from an excellent demographic anal
ysis by the staff consultant to a Senate subcommittee on
poverty: Harold L. Sheppard, A Search for New Directions
on the War on Poverty, Appendix to Toward Economic Security
for the Poor, pp. 79-99.
29. Sheppard, A Search for New Directions, p. 83.
148
30. These personality characteristics of the poor
are a composite of the following works: Kenneth Clark,
Dark Ghetto (New York: Harper, 1965); Clark and Hopkins,
A Relevant War Against Poverty; Warren C. Haggstrom, "The
Power of the Poor," in Poverty: Politics and Power, ed.
by C. Waxman (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1968), pp.
114-115.
31. "Sorry, Wrong Number: Communication and the
Poor," Communities in Action, I, No. 1 (May 1966), 3.
32. Ibid.
33. Kramer, Participation of the Poor,
34. Dale Marshall, The Politics of Participation
in Poverty: A Case Study of the Board of the Economic
and Youth Opportunities Agency of Greater Los Angeles
(Berkeley: University of California, 1971).
35. Moynihan, "The President and the Negro: The
Moment Lost," Commentary, XLIII (February 1967), 31-45.
36. Participation by the poor in community action
can be classified as a debate, game or fight (Kramer,
p. 182) or other typologies for "purposive community change
at the community level": Roland L. Warren, Types of Pur
posive Social Change at the Community Level (Brandeis
University Papers in Social Welfare, No. 11; Waltham, Mass:
Brandeis University, 1965). These typologies are quite
similar to March and Simon's models of conflict resolu
tion in organizations. James G. March and Herbert A.
Simon, Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1958), pp. 129-130.
37. Douglas Shuit, "Bradley Appoints 2 Deputy
Mayors, 5 Staff Assistants," Los Angeles Times, June 30,
1972, pt. II, p. 1. The contrast between anti-poverty
organizations and campaign organizations is characterized
in the personal career of Manuel Aragon, Jr. Aragon was
formerly head of the Los Angeles EYOA until forced to
resign because of racial infighting. Aragon was active
in Bardley's mayoralty campaign and was appointed Deputy
Mayor.
149
38. Donald T. Allensworth, The U.S. Government
in Action: Public Policy and Change (Pacific Palisades,
Calif.: Goodyear Publishing, 1972), pp. 91-93.
39. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations, A Commission Report: Intergovernmental Rela
tions in the Poverty Program, April 1966 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 23-25.
40. Advisory Commission, A Commission Report, pp.
2-3.
41. William J. Williams,"Attacking Poverty in
Watts Area Small Business Development Under EOA of 1964"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern
California, 1966).
42. Advisory Commission, A Commission Report,
pp. 23-24.
43. Lowi, The End of Liberalism, p. 232.
44. 0E0, Community Action Program Guide, p. 3.
45. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
46. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
47. Kramer, Participation of the Poor, p. 265.
48. Lowi, The End of Liberalism, p. 232.
49. Advisory Commission, A Commission Report,
pp. 23-24.
CHAPTER V
ANTI-POVERTY POLICYMAKING IN THE GREAT SOCIETY
I. The Failure of the War on Poverty: Reconsiderations
of Rational Decision Making
Analysis of anti-poverty policymaking contributes
to an understanding of decision making models usually
employed by policy analysts. Decision making by policy
makers, i.e., the Shriver Task Force, is patterned and
rational. The formulation of the War on Poverty must
consequently be similar to other rational decision making
models or policymaking. The creation of the anti-poverty
policy paradigm, although not a usual policymaking event,
nonetheless forces a reconsideration of contemporary
decision making analyses.
The problem for anti-poverty policy analysis is
MHow is it possible for totally unreliable policy to be
formulated in the optimal policymaking situation? i.e.,
the Shriver Task Force." Unreliable policy is not sug
gestive of policy content but rather public policy is
unreliable when the policymaking process produces conse-
150
151
quences which are random or unpredictable. An objective
of good policymaking is planned-rational policy conse
quences and only predictable social intervention against
poverty is ethically justifiable. The Shriver Task
Force's misunderstanding of anti-poverty concepts, par
ticularly community action (CAPs) and maximum feasible
participation of the poor, and its structural organization
of 0E0 raise important questions about the rational
decision making model.
A. The Unpredictability of Rational Policymaking:
Community Action and 0E0
In its policymaking outputs, the Shriver Task
Force fails a crucial indicator of rational policymaking
predictability. The policy consequences of EOA's commu
nity action program was never envisioned by Congress, the
White House, or even the Shriver Task Force itself.
Donovan underscores the policymaking failure:
I have been able to uncover no evidence, even "cir
cumstantial," which indicates that the Shriver Task
Force inquired deeply into the probable implications
which "participation of the poor" in community action
in Northern urban ghettos might have.l
The predicted consequences and the actual impact of com
munity action were quite different.
152
Effectiveness of community action programs was
predicated upon maximum feasible participation of the poor
in local policymaking. Adam Yarmolinsky, Shriver's second
in command, confirms that the maximum feasible participa
tion concept was discussed from the very first task force
meetings and that members simply viewed it as:
. . . the process of encouraging residents of poverty
areas to take part in the work of community action
programs and to perform a number of jobs that other
wise might be performed by professional social
workers.... The possibility of major conflict
between organized poor and politicians in city hall
was simply not one that anybody worried about.^
[Emphasis added]
Although the Shriver Task Force did not anticipate
the revolutionary thrust of some CAPs, EOA's language
clearly prescribes a total commitment of community
resources to attack poverty which would be
. . . developed, conducted, and administered with
the maximum feasible participation of residents of
the areas and members of the groups served.3
Community action is theoretically an innovative
means of mobilizing support and community organization
when institutional channels fail to produce responsive
public policies to the poor.
CAPs assumed that the poor were not represented
in the local policymaking process and that the poor must
153
participate directly in policymaking in order to gain
political power.^ Supposedly the poor remain in poverty
because they are politically powerless** and community
action provides political efficacy by participation in
anti-poverty decision making.
Community action as a social action mechanism
also allows the poor to compete as a pressure group in the
g
pluralistic process and even pressure public agencies as
an organized clientele.^ The Shriver Task Force felt
community action would
. . . assist the poor in developing autonomous
institutions which are competent to exert political
influence on behalf of their own self-interest.8
[Emphasis added]
Robert Kennedy, whose Committee on Juvenile Delin
quency and Youth Crime members contributed the community
action concept to the Shriver Task Force, argued for
maximum feasible participation of the poor as a means of
achieving a voice in democracy:
The institutions which affect the poor . . . are
huge complex structures, operating far outside their
control. They plan programs for the poor, not with
them. Part of the sense of helplessness and futil
ity comes from the feeling of powerlessness to affect
the operation of these organizations. . . . This
means the involvement of the poor in planning and
implementing programs; giving them a real voice in
their institutions.9
154
Community action programs varied significantly in
both their anti-poverty programming and their actual
inclusion of the poor on policymaking boards.^ EOA pro
visions were purposely ambiguous and all-inclusive in
order to allow the widest possible local interpretations--
even radical interpretations. The significant variation
in local interpretations of community action is indicative
of the Shriver Task Force's failure to analyze the conse
quences of the Economic Opportunity Act.
Only the few members of the Juvenile Delinquency
committee on the Shriver Task Force had even a superficial
understanding of community action's radical potential.
No Task Force members predicted the political repercus
sions which the CAPs ultimately produced. Community action
was viewed by policymakers as a vehicle by which poor
blacks could bypass prejudicial local governments in the
12
South. Policymakers neither analyzed nor anticipated
the most significant aspect of their own legislation
before passage.
From the Shriver Task Force formation in February
to EOA's passage in August, the major issues in policy
making were states rights, 0E0 impact in rural areas, and
aid to parochial education. Never was maximum feasible
155
participation of the poor an issue in Shriver Task Force
or Congressional policymaking.^
Congress as well failed to realize impact of
EOA's community action provisions. EOA traversed the
formal political process of debate in Congress and its
appropriate committees; yet the legislative process had
only symbolic significance in legitimizing task force
decisions. Conflict and legislative compromise were
absent as the symbolic rites^ of legislative process were
enacted. Congress failed to contribute even its usual
policymaking "watchdog" role.^ Consequently, the Eco
nomic Opportunity Act represents an almost total coopting
of the separation of powers by a small group within the
White House.
Rapid passage by a Congress that had frustrated
many Kennedy legislative proposals is a testament to
Johnson's legislative acumen. Anti-poverty policy con
tent, prepared by the Shriver Task Force, was introduced
almost without warning. Representative Adam Powell, House
Committee on Education and Labor chairman, appointed him
self chairman of a select ad hoc subcommittee on poverty.
Subcommittee hearings were orchestrated to advertise
broad support for the poverty bill.-^ Of the 79
156
individuals appearing before the Powell subcommittee, no
less than 33 were members of the Shriver Task Force and
all but nine witnesses were in favor of the EOA bill."^
Republicans Goodell and Frelinghuysen complained of being
18
"stampeded" by Powell and all subcommittee Republicans
voted against the bill.
Virtually the same rubber stamp policy legitimiza
tion process was repeated in the House Rules Committee
and the Senate. Again, an ad hoc Senate subcommittee
heard many of the same pro-EOA witnesses appearing earlier
19
in the House. Despite two days of Senate and three days
of House floor debate, congressional modifications of EOA
20
were of minimal importance.
Unfortunately for anti-poverty policy consequences,
community action and maximum feasible participation con
cepts were legitimized but not analyzed in crucial commit
tee and subcommittee deliberations. Johnson's psycholog
ical mandate following Kennedy's assassination encouraged
Democrats to reject both the Republican's "loyal opposi-
21
tion" role and Congress' own policymaking role. Legis
lative passage of the War on Poverty subsequently proved
to be a pyrric victory for OEO's congressional relations.
157
The policymaking arena of Johnson's Great Society
produced a poverty policy defined by a few decision makers
with extraordinary authority within the White House.
Important EOA concepts, community action and maximum
feasible participation, became public policy without under
going analysis or political compromise. Anti-poverty
concepts reflect values and attitudes held primarily by
liberal intellectuals in 1964 toward the poor.
No alternative approaches to poverty were con
sidered in the anti-poverty policymaking process and
policymakers failed to predict the political consequences
22
of War on Poverty implementation. Community action con
cepts were defined after their implementation by local 0E0
administrators and CAP organizers. 0E0 program adminis
trators ultimately became anti-poverty policymakers in
1964-66 rather than Congress, the Shriver Task Force or
even the President.
The Shriver Task Force also failed on a secondary
level to design an 0E0 capable of performing its prescribed
functions. 0E0 was incapable of fulfilling the herculean
task required by the Economic Opportunity Act. Although
composed of experienced administrators, the Shriver Task
Force created an agency whose authority was confused and
158
weak yet whose mandate was nothing less than the eradica
tion of poverty. The Shriver Task Force created an organ
izational confusion to accompany the conceptual ambiguity
of community action and maximum feasible participation.
The Shriver Task Force mandated to 0E0 functions
of planning, programming, and coordinating all federal
anti-poverty programs. By 1965, 0E0 claimed that it had
successfully "translated a Congressional mandate into a
,23
working program. In reality the combination of opera
tional, programming, and coordinating functions within 0E0
proved to be dysfunctional for agency survival. 0E0 was
not solely a unifunctional planning group, i.e., CEA, or
coordinating planning agency, i.e., OMB within the Execu
tive Office.
OEO's multifunctional creation by the Shriver Task
Force is reflected in EOA statute requirements:
(a) . . . assist the President in coordinating
the anti-poverty efforts of all Federal agencies.
(b) . . . information concerning those programs
is readily available.
(c) . . . prepare a five year national poverty
action plan showing estimates of federal . . .
expenditures . . . needed to eliminate poverty in
this country within alternative periods of time.
(d) . . . estimation of (anti-poverty) funds
necessary to finance all relevant programs . . . and
any new programs which may be necessary to eliminate
poverty in this country.24 [Emphasis added]
159
In addition to national planning and coordinating
responsibilities, 0E0 also administered the following
programs and agencies: CAP, VISTA, Head Start, Job Corps,
Neighborhood Youth Corps, College Work Study, Adult Basic
Education, Rural Loans, Small Business Administration,
Foster Grandparents, Work Experience programs, and Special
Programs. By 1971, only Special Programs were still
administered by 0E0. Steadily from 1965 to 1971, 0E0
agencies were operationally delegated to HEW, HUD, Labor,
Agriculture, and ACTION, and by 1967, over one third
($446 million) of OEO’s budgetary funds ($1.5 billion)
was operationally delegated to other departments. 0E0
delegated programs were funded with 0E0 monies and
supposedly "operated according to guidelines established
25
in cooperation with 0E0." Not surprisingly, 0E0 efforts
to coordinate or control delegated programs proved ineffec
tual .
0E0, faced with an impossible mandate of coordi
nating all anti-poverty programs and research (1,070 by
1970 in 57 governmental agencies and bureaus), adopted
an information-gathering and dissemination function.
OEO's Information Center coordinated anti-poverty programs
by publicizing and distributing programmatic information.^
160
Understandably, OEO's Office of Planning, Research,
and Evaluation received a low priority as "crises prob
lems" of initiating new programs and local organizational
difficulties overwhelmed OEO's concern with systematic
27
data retrieval and evaluation. A 1968 Senate subcommit
tee complained that 0E0 still had not prepared:
. . . an annual series of published reports which
indicate to what extent poverty has been reduced
and which of various program measures have contrib
uted to this reduction. There have been some frag
mented reports on cost benefits, but there is no
overall comparative evaluation of different pro
grams .28
Anti-poverty planning and evaluation increasingly
meant programming only those projects and programs which
promised the greatest degree of statistical progress.
Congress began in 1966 to evaluate 0E0 programs by meas-
29
ures of cost-effectiveness analysis and congressional
anti-poverty appropriations were tied to OEO’s ability to
demonstrate a significant reduction in poverty. 0E0 often
utilized questionable statistical indicators in efforts
to show a change in poverty statistics. However, the
number of poor decreased slightly only during times of
economic prosperity and low unemployment (1965-67).
By 1966 OEO’s mandate to set goals and objectives
in a national war on poverty assumed a quantitative
161
emphasis. OEO "purists" recognized the danger in focusing
on measurable objectives:
. . . it . . . can lead to asking the wrong ques
tions. It is all too easy to substitute the con
crete for the important, and it is frequently
done.30
reduction:
. . . would be the number of people moved past a
family income benchmark we call the poverty line.
To move people past an arbitrary line is not our
objective but it is a measure which can be applied
to our real ob' ctives. It is a necessary com-
unobtrusive measures of evaluation within a long term
struggle against poverty, i.e., the Job Corps emphasis on
psychological change. Increasingly, OEO planning and
evaluation shunned intangible or high cost factors in
favor of projected quick reductions in measurements of
poverty.
On the local CAP level, OEO demanded quantitative
objectives for anti-poverty programs:
. . . which are of sufficient size and scope to show
promise of concrete progress toward the elimination
of poverty and a cause or causes of poverty.32
Local CAPs had wide latitude in interpreting EOA
guidelines but OEO expected measurable results as OEO's
OEO decided that the major indicator of poverty
promise. .
Initially many anti-poverty projects projected
162
own budgetary funding increasingly depended on its ability
33
to demonstrate progress to Congress. OEO's inability to
show measurable success in reducing poverty rendered OEO
vulnerable to its congressional and administrative enemies.
Empirically, the failure of OEO to reduce poverty
in America is statistically well-documented. Anti-poverty
analysis does not reveal whether or not the anti-poverty
paradigm is ideologically correct. Yet anti-poverty anal
ysis must evaluate policymaking consequences. Analysis
focuses on the Shriver Task Force's failure to predict
anti-poverty policy outputs and its design of an agency
incapable of meeting stated objectives. The task force
failure is best assessed by comparison with alternative
decision making models.
B. Anti-Poverty Policymaking and
Models of Decision Making
As 1966 amendments to the Economic Opportunity Act
indicate, anti-poverty policy consequences were not antic
ipated by task force and elected policymakers. Compara
tively, anti-poverty is analogous to other poverty
policies whose implementation produced unintended conse
quences, i.e., Medicare,^ public housing,^ and public
welfare policies.^6 Hopefully, decision making models
163
make the policymaking process more rational and predict
able. Random or unpredictable policy outputs suggest that
theoretical policymaking models are not sufficiently
refined. Policy analysis must consider in what ways anti
poverty decision making patterns conform to currently
utilized models of decision making analysis.
Decision making models explain, elucidate and
perhaps predict policy c o n s e q u e n c e s . - ^ However, there is
no model which best serves all decision making analyses:
systems,'*® analysis, elite,group, ^ rational,^ incre
mental,^ and institutional^® decision making frameworks
add a distinctive focus and perspective. The appropriate
ness of each model must be tested against empirical
political phenomena, i.e., anti-poverty policymaking.
Anti-poverty policymaking suggests important
reconsiderations of rational, incremental, and institu
tional models of policymaking analysis. Systems and group
models approaches to anti-poverty decision making do not
explain the isolated, elitist nature of the Shriver Task
Force. Anti-poverty1s approach to poverty was not the
output of pluralism or a systemic function.
The anti-poverty policymaking case reflects a
rational model of decision making by administrative
164
professionals. Rational decision making models do not
include a partisan debate and compromise function. The
rational model ideally includes a key policymaking role
for administrative professionals^ who are free from the
political vortex. For example, the New Public Administra-
45
tion approach feels that
. . . appointed policymakers should exhibit greater
willingness to accept responsibility for decisions
and be less secretive about the problems of making
and implementing policy.^6
Rational or planning models of decision making represent
natural tools of administrative science.
President Johnson's adoption of PPBS/PBSB (Plan-
48
ning-Programming-Budgeting Systems) is an affirmation
of the rationalism in social policymaking. OEO was par
ticularly active in applying rational decision making
49
models, i.e., systems analysis and as the first agency
in the domestic area ". . .to make a PPBS study.
The Shriver Task Force experience suggests that
increased policymaking power for the administrative pro
fessional"^ ignores the reality of politics. For example,
CO
Lowi's juridicial democracy requires elected officials
to make authoritative public policies while professional
administrators are reduced to functionary roles. Specific
165
policy goals, objectives, and guidelines are written into
legislation to prevent substantive interpretation by
administrative professionals or bureaucrats. Representa
tive democracy supposedly placed policymaking legitimacy
in the elected representatives rather than administrators.
By contrast, incremental decision making models
assume that policymaking cannot be considered independ
ently from partisan political consequences. Because of
anticipated partisan reactions, policymakers often do
little more than make minor policy increments in a partic-
53
ular direction (partisan mutual adjustment). Conse
quently, the usual incremental approach limits the vision
of decision makers in formulating radical or innovative
public policies. However, unlike anti-poverty policy
making, incrementalism insures that policies outputs are
adjusted to partisan priorities.
Anti-poverty policymaking by the Shriver Task
Force represents an excellent example of rational decision-
54
making by professionals and is a deviation from the
pluralistic system's usual incremental style. Anti-poverty
policy formation demonstrates that pluralistic competition
does not always demand incremental policymaking. A common
policymaking assumption that the political system inevit
166
ably restricts major policymaking innovation and planning
is invalidated by anti-poverty case analysis.
Reformers^-* often assume that elitism precludes
rational and responsive policymaking because supposedly
the status quo nature of democratic elitism dictates that
only incremental policies approved by the elites are
enacted. Political conflict theoretically occurs whenever
proposed public policies threaten to change the establish-
_ 56
ment:
Political struggle is usually found when changes in
public policies are proposed. But because decision
making by governmental elites is a very conservative
process, dramatic changes in process are very rare.
Policy innovation normally occurs by . . . incre
mental changes in policies extending over decades.”
Nonetheless, a partisan political arena dominated by elites
and prone to incrementalism produced an innovative poverty
policy. A totally new approach to poverty was conceived
by professionals employing a rational decision making
model. Values and orientations of Shriver Task Force
professionals were subsequently incorporated as set orien
tations of later anti-poverty policymaking.
Ultimately, elitist creation of anti-poverty
58
policy suggests a reconsideration of representative
democracy's basic concepts:
167
In implementation, it (EOA) is antithetical to
rational and responsible administration, because
the principle of representation is antithetical to
the principle of administration.59
Coincidentally, elitist anti-poverty policymakers
held liberal, humanitarian views of the poor. Yet, the
unaccountable, isolated framework of the anti-poverty
policymaking process indicates systemic weaknesses which
were later apparent in the Executive's Tonkin Gulf and
60
Watergate decisions. The President as Chief Legislator
and in his delegation of power to White House advisers,
i.e., Shriver Task Force, underscores the contemporary
erosion of Hamilton's checks and balances.
C. A Pluralistic Process: Incremental Realities
and Anti-Poverty Policy Revisions
Elite groups who had traditionally played a role
in poverty policymaking did not long remain silent. OEO's
"year of crisis" occurred in 1966-1967, as Congress,
interest groups, and non-national governmental agencies
amended the Economic Opportunity Act and reconstituted
0E0. Failure to include usual policymaking groups in 1964
had increased OEO's vulnerability:
Thus the . . . War on Poverty . . . reached that
point where the normal process of congressional
review began to tighten legislative control of
administrative action, while at the same time those
168
forces within the Executive branch which seek "co
ordination, 1 1 "clear-cut policies," and sound admin
istrative practices were spinning their web of
detailed procedures and restrictions.61
Less than two years after its highly symbolic pronounce
ment, the War on Poverty was reformulated.
House opposition and evaluation of OEO's 1967
budget requests was particularly devastating. The Commit
tee on Education and Labor which earlier served as EOA's
legitimizer made substantive changes both in budgetary
allocation and 0E0 structure. In contrast to earlier
discretionary budget powers, most of OEO's community action
monies were earmarked for structured achievement-oriented
programs, i.e., Head Start, Jobs Corps, adult employment
programs, e t c . ® ^ Maximum feasible participation of the
poor was reinterpreted as a maximum of one-third partici-
63
pation on CAP boards by local residents.
Although the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Com
mittee, under the leadership of the Kennedys, did not
designate funds for specific program activity, 0E0 did not
emerge unscathed. Senator Dirksen succeeded in cutting
0E0 appropriations to the House level and Senator Byrd in
prohibiting funds to "rioters" or "subversives."®^ Final
amendments to OEO's 1967 budget represented a victory for
169
65
those wishing to curtail community action.
The following year Congress attached a "bosses and
boll weevil amendment" (Edith Green); further asserting
itself in the process of anti-poverty policymaking.
Following a resolution by the Conference of Mayors,^ the
Green amendment allowed local governments to administer
all private CAP agencies.
Non-national governments had also been excluded
from the 1964 anti-poverty policymaking process. The
reaction of the Conference of Mayors and the Governors was
predictably most severe where CAP agencies or VISTA proj
ects had interpreted ambiguous community action guidelines
fi 7
as a mandate for political power redistribution. ' Con
frontation between City Hall and the insurgent poor:
". . . not only failed to change the balance of urban
political power, but also affected congressional support
for the CAPs."^
Mayors from "machine cities"^ (vis. "reform
cities") pressured CAP boards to distribute material
rewards to the poor thereby actually reinforcing local
political structures. Mayors and governors, backed by
Congress, proved quite adroit in depoliticizing the initial
170
radical thrust of the War on Poverty.
Perhaps the most unexpected participation in War
on Poverty policymaking revisions came from federal
agencies. A confidential White House task force^® under
the chairmanship of Bertrand Harding, IRS deputy commis
sioner, evaluated OEO's administrative performance during
its initial eight months. The task force report was
critical of OEO's apparent inability to make long range
policies so that its "crises" atmosphere could be relaxed.
Over 100 recommendations, including many designed to help
OEO coordinate all anti-poverty federal programs, were
recommended and Harding appointed OEO deputy administrator.
Anti-poverty policy was not formulated by existing
agencies in 1964 but rather by the interagency Shriver
Task Force. A new executive coordinating agency with
theoretically high status was created. Unfortunately, OEO
was solely dependent on a Presidential agenda increasingly
absorbed by Vietnam.^ As the President's support for OEO
waned, Executive agencies followed the 1966 congressional
lead in reshaping anti-poverty policy:
(OEO) found itself two years later in serious diffi
culty . . . within the Executive Office of the
President. It has frequently been noted that the
Office of Economic Opportunity has been engaged in
171
a struggle with at least two departments, Labor and
HEW. The ultimate fate of OEO is more likely to be
determined by the subtle manner in which the Bureau
of the Budget has gradually taken the measure of its
Executive Office rival.^ [Emphasis added]
By 1969, OEO had lost many operational programs
as Congress attempted to enforce tighter administrative
control of OEO agencies by delegating them to federal
departments. Anti-poverty programs found themselves
within massive bureaucratic organizations, often as the
agency's symbolic emissary to the poor.
Congress, non-national governments, Executive
Office groups and departments finally participated in War
on Poverty programming. Although anti-poverty programs
survived largely intact within new structures, OEO's role
was reduced to a symbolic commitment to eradicate poverty.
The War on Poverty: Failure in Rational
Decision Making
Anti-poverty analysis does not simply describe
the rise and fall of Johnson's War on Poverty. Case
studies of the War on Poverty are often complete with
epitaths or eulogies. Although War on Poverty programs
were delegated to other cabinet departments and OEO itself
struggles for survival, anti-poverty policymaking con
172
tinues in a post-War on Poverty environment. Anti-poverty
policymaking in the Nixon administration involves new
governmental structures, with entrenched partisan clien
teles, in an attempted redefinition of anti-poverty
orientations.
Ironically, the most significant changes in the
anti-poverty policy paradigm occur not with the 1969
Republican White House takeover, but in Johnson's lame
duck years (1967-68). Delayed participation in anti
poverty policymaking by traditional policymaking groups,
i.e., congressional committees, bureaucracies, and local
politicos, resulted in depoliticization of community and
maximum feasible participation concepts.
Ironically, analysis of anti-poverty policymaking
indicates decision making styles proposed by the federal
ists. Rational decision making signified checks and
balances; concentrated power in any single agency of
government led to irrationality. Good policymaking in
The Federalist^ occurred whenever several decision making
groups participated. Rational policymaking was a prag
matic evaluation and emphasis on policy consequences. It
was formulated by non-professional administrators after
deliberative public debate. The Shriver Task Force fails
173
the federalists' policymaking prescription.
The federalist model is an incremental decision
making approach with a difference. Synoptic or compre
hensive policymaking was possible in the formative stages
of the American political system. Policymaking power was
shared with only a few groups representing the power
brokers in government. The early policymaking process was
neither concentrated in the presidency nor stymied by
numerous veto points. It is perhaps in reaction to the
cumbersome nature of contemporary policymaking that
presidential power has become unresponsive and concen
trated.^
Obituaries for the Great Society's War on Poverty
must first assess the degree and intensity with which
anti-poverty policy concepts survive. Reorganization of
governmental agencies for functional or partisan reasons
should not be misleading in that policymaking orientations
exist independently from particular structures. As long
as the poverty issue is perceived by society as a policy
making agenda item, new structures will be created to
fight poverty.
Anti-poverty policy analysis delineates five key
orientations held by Shriver Task Force members toward
poverty and the poor. These orientations comprise a
paradigm of policymaking orientations. Certain anti
poverty orientations were later changed and other orienta
tions added to the policymaking paradigm, i.e., quantita
tive measurements of progress. Yet, basic anti-poverty
orientations to poverty have proven remarkably independent
and resistent to modification. Programmatic goals and
objectives are demonstrably consistent in both Nixon and
Johnson anti-poverty policymaking. (It is significant
that, despite the delegation of OEO programs, only Job
Corps has been eliminated.)
Final assessment of anti-poverty policymaking
must be within a comparative framework of Nixon and
Johnson administrations. Only within that framework can
prescriptive or explanatory policy analysis occur.
175
Footnotes to Chapter V
1. Donovan, The Politics of Poverty, p. 42.
2. Adam Yarmolinsky, "The Beginnings of OEO," in
On Fighting Poverty: Perspectives from Experience, ed.
by James Sundquist, p. 49.
3. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Title II,
§202(a)(3).
4. Sanford Kravitz, "The Community Action Program
--Past, Present, and Its Future?," in On Fighting Poverty:
Perspectives from Experience, p. 60.
5. Daniel P. Moynihan, "What is Community Action?"
The Public Interest, V (Fall 1968), 3-8.
6. Kramer, Participation of the Poor, p. 13.
7. Wofford, "The Politics of Local Responsibil
ity," p. 70.
8. Sargent Shriver, Community Development, I,
No. 5 (June 1966), 5. Also see Community Action Workbook
(Washington, D.C.: Office of Economic Opportunity, 1965),
III, 7.
9. Robert F. Kennedy, Hearings, Economic Opportu
nity Act of 1964, p. 305. The President's Committee on
Juvenile Delinquency played a key intellectual role in
developing the community action concept. Key juvenile
delinquency committee members, selected by Robert Kennedy,
were "radicals" on the Shriver Task Force. For a syn
thesis of the group's intellectual climate, see Lloyd Olin
and Richard Cloward, Delinquency and Opportunity (New
York: The Free Press, 1960).
176
10. Ralph Kramer's comparison of California bay
area CAP programs is suggestive in constructing four typal
models of CAP programs. Each model is ultimately derived
from interpretations of OEO guidelines and the ambiguous
EOA '64.
11. Examples of "radical” interpretations, e.g.,
the poor actually do control policymaking, are analyzed
in detail by Kenneth Clark and Jeannette Hopkins, A Rele
vant War Against Poverty (New York: Harper, 1968),
pt. v.
12. Yarmolinsky, "The Beginnings of OEO," p. 49.
13. Richard Blumenthal, "The Bureaucracy: Anti
poverty and the Community Action Program," in American
Political Institutions and Public Policy, ed. by Alan
Sindler (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), p.
169; Yarmolinsky, "The Beginnings of OEO," pp. 48-49.
14. Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Use of Politics
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1967).
15. Bibby and Davidson, On Capitol Hill, p. 239.
16. Ibid., p. 240.
17. Ibid.
18. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Education
and Labor, Hearings on the Economic Opportunity Act of
1964, III, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1964, 1150.
19. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare, Hearings on the Economic Opportunity
Act of 1964, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1964, June 17, 18, 23,
25.
20. Donovan, The Politics of Poverty, p. 37.
21. Ibid., p. 34.
22. Blumenthal, "The Bureaucracy," p. 169; Clark
and Hopkins, A Relevant War Against Poverty, pts. v-vi.
177
23. Sargent Shriver, "The First Step ... On a
Long Journey," Congressional Presentation, April 1965.
Washington, D.C.: Office of Economic Opportunity, 1965),
p. 6.
24. National Advisory Council on Economic Oppor
tunity, Continuity and Change in Anti-poverty Programs:
2nd Annual Report. Washington, D.C.: March 1969, p. 13.
25. U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity, The
Quiet Revolution (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1967), pp. 7, 9.
26. U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity, Catalog
of Federal Domestic Assistance (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1970).
27. Levitan, The Great Society's Poor Law, p. xi.
28. U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Employment, Man
power and Poverty, Toward Economic Security for the Poor
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
p. 64.
29. Ibid., p. 63.
30. Robert A. Levine, "Systems Analysis in the
War on Poverty," Hearings before the Committee of Educa
tion and Labor, House, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., Economic
Opportunity Act, Amendments of 1967, pt. II, pp. 1431-
1436.
31. Ibid., p. 1433.
32. Ibid.
33. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Title II-A
§211, F(l-3), 1969 amendments included, 30.
34. Theodore R. Marmor, "Congress: Medicare
Politics and Policy," in Sindler, American Political Insti
tutions and Public Policy, pp. 2-66; Eugene Feingold,
Medicare: Policy and Politics (San Francisco: Chandler,
1966).
178
35. Henry J. Aaron, Shelter and Subsidies; Who
Benefits from Federal Housing Policies? (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1972); James Wilson, "Planning and
Politics," Journal of the Institute of Planners, XXIX,
No. 4 (November 1963), 242-249.
36. For a representative analysis of welfare
policy and Nixon's analysis of "what went wrong" in
welfare, see Eliot Richardson, Testimony before U.S. Senate
Finance Committee, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., July-August 1970,
pp. 404-414.
37. Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 17, 35.
38. David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of
Political Systems," World Politics, IX (1957), 383-400;
A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1965); The Political System (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf,
39. Thomas R. Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler, The
Irony of Democracy: An Uncommon Introduction to American
Politics (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1972), p. 246.
40. David B. Truman, The Governmental Process
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955); Mancur Olson, Jr.,
The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the
Theory of Groups (New York: Schocken, 1965).
41. For a survey of various rational decision
making models in the literature, see L. L. Wade and R. L.
Curry, Jr., A Logic of Public Policy: Aspects of Politi
cal Economy (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1970).
42. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, pp. 17, 35.
43. For a treatment of the relationship between
public policy and governmental institutions, see Carl J.
Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1941). The specific
relationship between the presidency and anti-poverty
policymaking is treated in several works, i.e., Donovan,
Bibby and Davidson, Blumenthal, et al.
179
44. Examples include Lowi; Francis E. Rourke,
Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1969); Harold Seidman, Politics, Posi
tion and Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970);
Austin Ranney, ed., Political Science and Public Policy;
James C. Charlesworth, ed., Integration of the Social
Sciences Through Policy Analysis (Philadelphia: American
Academy of Political and Social Sciences, October 1972),
pt. II.
45. The New Public Administration group is repre
sented by Frank Marini, Toward a New Public Administration
(San Francisco: Chandler Publishing, 1970); Dwight Waldo,
Public Administration in a Time of Turbulence (San Fran
cisco: Chandler Publishing, 1971). There are interesting
theoretical parallels of this group with the Caucus for a
New Political Science.
46. H. George Friedrickson and Michael D. Regan,
"Administering Public Policy," Policy Studies Journal,
I, No. 2 (Winter 1972), 74.
47. Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior (New
York: McMillan, 1957); Models of Man: Social and Rational
(New York: Wiley, 1957); The New Science of Management
Decision (New York: Harper and Row, 1960). Yehezkiel
Dror, Public Policy Re-examined (San Francisco: Chandler,
1968); Harold D. Lasswell, A Pre-View of Policy Sciences
(New York: Elsevier, 1971).
48. Fremont J. Lyden and Ernest J. Miller, Plan
ning, Programming, Budgeting (Chicago: Markham, 1967);
Robert L. Chartrand, Kenneth Janda, Michael Hugo, eds.,
Information, Support, Program Budgeting, and the Congress
(New York: Spartan, 1968); Robert Haveman, The Economics
of the Public Sector (New York: Wiley, 1970).
49. Levine, "Systems Analysis in the War on
Poverty," pp. 1431-1436.
50. Shriver, House hearings, 1967, pt. II, p.
1430.
180
51. Lowi; Peter Bachrach, A Theory of Democratic
Elitism; A Critique (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1967); Moynihan, "The Professionalization of Reform,"
pp. 1-10.
52. Lowi, The End of Liberalism, chap. x.
53. Charles F. Lindblom, The Intelligence of
Democracy: Decision Making Through Mutual Adjustments
(New York: The Free Press, 1965), and The Policymaking
Process (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968);
"The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administration
Review, XIX (Spring 1959), 79-88.
54. Moynihan, "The Professionalization of Reform,"
55. E. E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign
People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), pp. 89-90.
56. Dye and Zeigler, The Irony of Democracy,
p. 246.
57. Ibid.
58. Lowi, The End of Liberalism.
59. Ibid., p. 233.
60. Numerous discussions in the literature
analyze the impact of the contemporary presidency in
national decision making. Richard Neustadt, "Presidency
and Legislation," American Political Science Review,
XLVIII (September 1954), 641-671; XLIX (September 1955),
980-1021; and Neustadt, "Politicians and Bureaucrats," in
The Congress and America's Future, ed. by David Truman
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965).
61. Donovan, The Politics of Poverty, pp. 72-73.
62. U.S. Senate, Toward Economic Security for the
Poor, p. 2.
181
63. Sargent Shriver, "Memorandum from the
Director" (September 1966) inserted in House hearings,
1967, pp. 886-889.
64. U.S. OEO, A News Summary of the War on
Poverty, see following issues for accounts of and reactions
to the EOA 1966 amendments: I, No. 32 (October 24, 1966),
1-3; I, No. 30 (October 10, 1966), 1-9; I, No. 29 (October
3, 1966), 1-3.
65. Allensworth, The U.S. Government in Action,
pp. 91-93.
66. U.S. Conference of Mayors, Resolutions
Adopted, Honolulu, Hawaii (June 21, 1967) inserted in
House hearings, 1967, p. 2399.
67. National Advisory Council on Economic Oppor-
tunity, Continuity and Change in Anti-Poverty Programs
(March 1969).
68. David J. Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson,
"Reformers, Machines, and the War on Poverty," in City
Politics and Public Policy, pp. 267-292.
69. Ibid., p. 267.
70. Donovan, The Politics of Poverty, p. 80.
71. See both Donovan and Goldman, for descrip
tions of the struggle between domestic and foreign policy
priorities.
72. See Dror's distinction between explanatory
and descriptive policy analysis in "Some Diverse Approaches
to Policy Analysis: A Partial Reply to Thomas Dye,"
Policy Studies Journal, I, No. 4 (Summer 1973), 258.
73. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John
Jay, Selections from the Federalist, ed. by Henry Commager
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1949), p. 85.
182
74. David Wise, The Politics of Lying: Govern
ment Deception, Secrecy and Power (New York: Random
House, 1973).
CHAPTER VI
THE IMPACT OF THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION ON
ANTI-POVERTY POLICYMAKING: 1969-1973
Despite possible War on Poverty success in
increasing awareness and participation opportunities for
the poor, few empirical successes in reducing poverty
could be demonstrated to Congress or OEO critics in 1969.
Even favorable evaluations of OEO relied on impressionistic
measures of progress in eradicating poverty:
. . . despite its problems and incidents of self-
defeating militancy, the War on Poverty has stirred
substantial progress toward racial equality and
easing the plight of the poor. The controversial
community action programs may have stirred counter
reaction, but they were productive in that they led
to some sensitivity and sympathy to the problems of
the poor.I [Emphasis added]
After four years both supporters and foes of War
on Poverty programs were frustrated in attempts to measure
the impact of the anti-poverty policymaking.
Even in 1973, congressional and OMB evaluations
of OEO still found difficulty in measuring social change
and impact. Analysis of the 1974 governmental budget
183
184
concludes that community action evaluation is impossible
because "there is obviously no set of measures by which
the effectiveness of CAAs can be effectively measures.
Daniel Moynihan, urban affairs counselor to both
Presidents Nixon and Johnson, criticizes amorphous anti
poverty programs because "few could survive the scrutiny
q
of cash-flow analysis."
The anti-poverty program enacted in 1964 came to
embody many of the ambiguities and uncertainties of
an ambitious services strategy directed at the prob
lems of poverty. A good deal of money was being
expended. It could not be shown that it was going
to the poor. It was going . . . to purchase serv
ices, which could not be shown to benefit the poor.
And yet what was the alternative.4
The lack of clear successes was compounded by a
political environment receptive to reformulation of anti
poverty poverty programs and policies. Public opinion,
Republican victory in 1968, and Johnson's indifference
frustrated the War on Poverty. Public opinion polls
indicated that OEO's mission was misunderstood:
Throughout the Nation, there existed considerable
anxiety about the promotion by a Federal agency of
the twin concepts of community organization and
maximum feasible participation of the poor. Often
the program seemed less clear to recipients and
participants.5
The Republican administration, with new ideologies and
campaign promises, seemed determined to change all poverty
185
policies, i.e., welfare, health care, anti-poverty, etc.
Despite a favorable political arena for change, the diffi
culties of changing anti-poverty policy orientations
became apparent to OEO's Republican administrators.
Not the least obstacle to anti-poverty policy
change was the President's own agenda in 1969. The tradi
tional "honeymoon" period with the Democratic 91st Congress
was fragile and other social policies had higher priority
on Nixon's New Federalism agenda. This investigation's
content analysis of the New York Times and Wall Street
Journal (1969-1971) indicates that welfare reform received
twenty articles for each anti-poverty article. The
President was more interested in his distinctive welfare
reform package and other policymaking objectives than in
revising Democratic anti-poverty programs.
Because of Presidential policymaking priorities,
OEO agencies and programs were not generally affected
beyond personnel changes until implementation of the
Reorganization Plan of 1971 when anti-poverty agencies were
reorganized as a facet of the President's comprehensive
New Federalism proposals.
Not until FY 1974 did the President suspend OEO
operations. Only after the Presidentially interpreted
186
electoral mandate of 1972 did Republican ideologies attack
OEO program and philosophical assumptions. Even the 1973
ideological attack was of low level priority and initiated
only in response to the President's decision to reduce the
size of the President's Executive Office.
The grand design of the Nixon administration on
Inauguration Day, 1969, did not include an ideological
attack upon the War on Poverty. The White House was more
interested in the six Great Goals^ of New Federalism:
Welfare Reform, Revenue Sharing, Governmental Reorganiza
tion, Peacetime Prosperity, Natural Environment, and Health
Care. Recalcitrant 91st and 92nd Congresses succeeded in
frustrating most New Federalism goals in the President's
first term while Watergate and the 93rd Congress stymied
second term Nixon goals. The sudden 1973 attack on OEO
represents a radical departure from OEO's relative obscur
ity during the first Nixon administration.
Although anti-poverty policymaking was not high
on the Presidential agenda, Presidential prerogative to
make poverty policies was not shared with Congress.
Initially, the White House attempted to allay
congressional fears that the President would continue
Johnson's early domination of anti-poverty policymaking.
187
Following congressional participation in the 1966 EOA
amendments and Johnson's focus on Vietnam, congressional
subcommittees played an increasing role in anti-poverty
decision making.
In February 1969, the President announced support
for a One year extension of OEO programs prior to the
June 30 expiration deadline. Supposedly, the Presidential
extension would permit joint congressional-executive oppor
tunities for OEO program evaluation:
How the work begun by OEO can best be carried forward
is a subject on which many views deserve to be heard--
both from within Congress, and among those many others
who are interested and affected, including especially
the poor themselves. By sending my proposals well
before the Act's 1970 expiration, I intend to provide
time for full debate and discussion.8
Congressional anti-poverty policymakers, especially on
the appropriate Senate subcommittees, interpreted the
extention as an invitation for joint congressional-execu
tive anti-poverty policymaking:
By requesting an extension of the present poverty pro
gram and by avoiding proposals to wreck or abolish
the program, the Nixon administration seems to have
set the stage for a working partnership with Congress
to attain these common goals.9
OEO congressional supporters interpreted the
Presidential extension of OEO funding as a commitment to
188
maintain War on Poverty programs.
Cooperative executive-legislative anti-poverty
policymaking was short-lived. On April 10, reacting to
persistent rumors that OEO's Job Corps would be phased
out, 25 Democratic Congressmen and Senators sent Nixon a
telegram requesting a congressional role in program eval
uation^ so that
. . . a clearer role could be developed for the role
which the Office of Economic Opportunity can be
expected to play in poverty programs which are dele
gated to other agencies.H
Congressional participation in Job Corps policy
evaluation was closed the following day when Labor Secre
tary Schultz announced a reconstituted Job Corps which was
to be delegated by OEO to the Department of Labor.
Labor's version of Job Corps would (1) operate with
$100 million less than its current $280 million budget,
12
(2) phase out 40 conservation camps. Remaining urban
Job Corps camps would become Residential Manpower Centers
to serve:
Disadvantaged youth whose needs can best be served
in a residential setting will be enrolled . . . the
full resources of the communities in which the . . .
Centers will be located will be utilized to provide
manpower services rather than attempt to duplicate
these services as is presently the case in most Job
Corps camps. Recruitment of youth . . . will be
189
directed to the immediate area and state in which
they are located.!^
This investigation hypothesizes that after ini
tially offering to include Congress in Job Corps deci
sion making that the President reversed himself. The
President's March decision occurred despite scheduled
April Senate subcommittee hearings on Job Corps. Ironi
cally, of all OEO programs, Job Corps had been most exten
sively analyzed and evaluated. Job Corps study results
by Lou Harris,^ hardly a secret at OEO, were released at
the April subcommittee hearings and demonstrated:
. . . beyond a shadow of a doubt that Job Corps has
worked in terms of arousing deep motivation--being
able to make plans for the future, get along with
other people, a real chance of being a success,
knowing what they want to do, getting along with
their family . . . it was happening in their heads.
That is where they changed.15
The decision to delegate Job Corps to Labor was
not necessarily a Presidential indictment of Job Corps in
that the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act assumed that suc
cessful anti-poverty programs would be spun off to depart
ments. The significance of the Job Corps decision for
Presidential anti-poverty decision making is twofold:
(1) the Presidency early defined anti-poverty policymaking
as a White House function, not Congress; and (2) future
190
anti-poverty decisions were subordinated to considerations
of executive reorganization and welfare reform.
I. Ideology in Executive Reorganization: A Comparison
of the Job Corps and Legal Services Decisions
Ideological overtones of the President's delega
tion of Job Corps received considerable emphasis in the
press. Republicans supposedly eliminated Job Corps
because of its expense and communalization of its trainees.
To ascribe primarily partisan motivations to the Job Corps
decision is facile, yet ignores a more comprehensive goal
on Nixon's policy agenda. Investigation shows that Job
Corps was neither an isolated partisan vendetta against
an odious Democratic program nor the opening round of an
attack on anti-poverty programs.
To understand the broader Presidential approach
to anti-poverty decisions, this investigation will compare
two different Presidential decisions during 1960-70 to OEO
agency survival. Contrast between Nixon's 1969 Job Corps
and 1970 Legal Services Program (LSP) decisions is illumi
nating. Since their 1965 inceptions, both LSP and Job
Corps were continuously criticized for radical activities ?-&
However, unlike Job Corps, criticism of LSP originated with
governors from both political parties while criticism of
191
Job Corps was more partisan.^ Strong support of LSP by
legal associations was an important intervening decision
making variable.
President Nixon, in his August 11, 1969 statement
on 0E0 reorganization, stressed his confidence in OLS:
The Office of Legal Services will. . . be streng
thened and evaluated so that it reports directly to
the Director. It will take on central responsibil
ity for programs which help provide advocates for
the poor in their dealings with social institutions.
. . . Disadvantaged persons in particular must be
assisted so that they fully understand the lawful
means of making their needs known and having those
needs met.18
Within six weeks of the President's August statement, an
EOA amendment introduced by California's Senator Murphy,
passed the Senate by a narrow 5-vote margin. Murphy's
amendment would give governors an absolute veto power over
LSP budgets and would nullify the 0E0 Director's authority
19
to override gubernatorial vetoes. The Senate had
singled out LSP from all 0E0 agencies in passing its
restrictive amendment.
Significantly, Nixon-appointed 0E0 Director
Rumsfeld testified against Murphy's amendment in later
20
Senate and House subcommittee hearings. The nature of
the Nixon-Rumsfeld support of OEO's Legal Services Program
against conservative criticisms is important.
192
Intensity of Rumsfeld-Nixon LSP support was
severely tested in December 1970, when Governor Reagan,
following recommendations of his State OEO Director,
vetoed the 1971 budget of the California Rural Legal
21
Assistance (CRLA) because of ", . . gross and deliberate
violations of OEO regulations and its failure to represent
22
the true legal needs of the poor."
Nixon was faced with overriding the veto of the
powerful Republican governor of California in order to
sustain a legal aid program for the poor. Ironically,
even Vice President Agnew began attacking OEO's Legal
23
Services Program. Surprisingly, the new OEO director
overrode the governor’s veto and increased the 1971 CRLA
budget.^
CRLA gained a reprieve but its vulnerability
within OEO had been underscored. In 1971, the Ash Council
recommended that LSP be made a semi-independent corpora-
25
tion and the 1973 EOA amendments established an autono
mous corporation similar to the United States Postal
26
Service. However, restrictions against class action,
criminal, political activity, and union organizing made
the new Legal Services Corporation acceptable to the
governors.
193
The Legal Services experience suggests a fruitful
case study of lawyers' role as a clientele group. All
27 28
major legal and judicial associations strenuously
supported CRLA and the Legal Services Program. A distin
guished team of 13 evaluators investigated the CRLA con-
29
troversy and summarized their conclusions from a legal
perspective:
While not perfect, CRLA is an exemplary legal services
program, providing a balanced approach between ortho
dox legal services and highly successful impact
legislation.30
Predominance of lawyers among elected representa-
31
tives has been often noted and analyzed, yet they have
seldom acted as a clientele or pressure group in the
political system. The substantial support given OEO's
Legal Services Program represents an important exception
to this g e n e r a l i z a t i o n . ^ Support given by the President,
Rumsfeld, and other lawyers is in contrast to opposition
by non-lawyers Senator Murphy and Governor Reagan.
OEO's own LSP evaluation in 1970-71 demonstrated
that LSP could be evaluated both as a legal aid program
33
and an anti-poverty program. Investigating attorneys
were
. . . more successful in assessing the Legal
Studies Program as a program of legal assistance
194
than as an anti-poverty effort. That was the result
of accepting the proposition that professionals in
the field are the appropriate judges of the quality
of their colleagues' work appearing to leave little
measure of impact except provision of s e r v i c e .34
Investigators evaluated LSP highly as a legal
35
services delivery system in that supplying legal serv
ices to a disadvantaged clientele complemented the highest
ideals of the legal profession. However, as an anti
poverty strategy, LSP's success could not be clearly
36 37
demonstrated to the Comptroller General in 1973.
Significantly, executive reorganization of OEO in
March 1969 elevated only two programs to an independent
status within the agency: the Office of Health Affairs
and LSP. As such:
These changes represent a reordering of priorities,
particularly by emphasizing health services and the
legal advocacy on behalf of the poor.38
Two OEO programs, both with strong outside support
from major legal and medical associations, were protected
39
from a growing anti-OEO mood in 1969. LSP and Health
Services were stayed from congressional and state pres
sures for increased state and gubernatorial control over
anti-poverty programs by making them independent agencies.
Nixon administration support of one OEO program
(LSP) and elimination of another (Job Corps) is intriguing,
195
particularly because LSP was ideologically more threaten
ing to Republicans than Job Corps. In addition to legal
profession support the Nixon reorganization design must
be emphasized. Job Corps transfer to Labor and Head Start
to HEW is best understood as motivated by the President's
plan to reorganize the executive branch. Legal Services
was not part of Nixon's grand design; certainly no one
suggested delegating LSP to Attorney General Mitchell's
office. The comparative Job Corps and LSP experiences
indicate the President's policy emphasis on structural
reform rather than ideological program analysis.
The investigatory thesis is that a reorganizational
explanation to Nixon's decision making pattern provides a
rational and consistent decision making model. Too often,
Nixon's critics and defenders explain his decisions by a
contradictory ideological framework in order to justify
both anti-Communism of the fifties and his trips to China
and Russia.
For Richard Nixon, the structural reorganization
of government underlies major domestic objectives, i.e.,
revenue sharing, welfare reform, etc. Governmental struc
ture and organization must be efficiently rearranged to
fulfill neglected functions in government. Accordingly,
196
previous public policies were unresponsive because govern
ment was dysfunctional and bureaucratic, i.e., poverty
and the unheavenly city persist because bureaucracy is
incapable of responding adequately.
Investigative analyses of President Nixon's public
40
papers indicate his view of governmental structure as
unresponsive or paraphrased: "Policymaking power is overly
concentrated in Washington but ineffectual because it is
diffused among fragmented agency jurisdictions." Govern
mental agencies are inefficiently managed and desperately
in need of reorganization. The Nixon objective is to
reorganize executive agencies so they are (1) rational:
agencies with related goals and objectives to be combined;
(2) efficient: agencies should streamline organization
and budget by cost-effectiveness; and (3) decentralized:
agencies should encourage decision making at levels
closest to the people.
The research thesis is not that Presidential
priority on Executive Reorganization excludes concern with
ideological implications of public policy but rather that
ideological considerations are secondary and therefore
often left to White House subordinates who are more ideo
logical in orientation. Nixon's approach to anti-poverty
197
policymaking demonstrates the consistent reflection of
reorganization priorities. The President's 1969 Job Corps
decision and his failure to support Murphy's attack on
Legal Services indicates non-ideological priorities. It
is inadequate to explain these two decisions and later
reorganization decisions as a conspiratorial Republican
plot to dismantle Democratic War on Poverty programs.
II. The Restructuring of Federalism:
Departmental Reorganization
Executive reorganization of existing agencies and
creation of new agencies is characteristic of the con
temporary Presidency^ and has occurred continuously
since the passage of the 1949 Reorganization Act. Ninety
Presidential Reorganization Plans have been submitted to
Congress since 1949 and 70 implemented. HEW, HUD, and
the Department of Transportation are fruits of Executive
Reorganization Plans. Bipartisan acceptance of Executive
Reorganization is demonstrated by extension of the Reorgan
ization Act for 24 years without basic congressional
42
review.
No previous reorganization plans compare in scope
and innovation with those proposed by Nixon's Advisory
Council on Executive Organization (the Ash Council).
198
Culminating in its final report of May 1971, the Ash
Council made reorganizational recommendations for the
total scope of executive activity.
The Ash Council approached governmental restruc
turing based on Nixon's three principles: rationality,
decentralization, and efficiency by designing a compre
hensive but efficient structure to perform governmental
functions:
. . . programs with similar goals would be placed in
one department under the same leadership. Many of
the decisions on resource allocation now being made
by OMB would be the responsibility of those involved
in the actual administration of such programs.43
Theoretically, fragmentation and duplication of
federal research, planning, and programming could be
greatly reduced by rational administrative reorganization.
In one of its early conciliatory actions, the
91st Congress (1969) extended the President's reorganiza
tion powers for two years and for the next 18 months,
implemented Ash Council recommendations to: (1) strengthen
the Interstate Commerce Commission,^ (2) create an Office
of Telecommunications Policy in the White House,
45
(3) create the Environmental Protection Agency,
(4) create the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-
46
tration in the Department of Commerce, and (5) organize
199
the Domestic Council and the Office of Management and
Bus ine s s (OMB).^
The most extensive reorganization of the Executive
48
Office was in Reorganization Plan Number 2 (1970) which
created OMB and the Domestic Council. Ash Council recom
mendations reorganized the Executive Office along dual
functional lines. The interagency Domestic Council would
coordinate domestic policy priorities by deciding "what
49
government should do."
The most powerful structure created by the Ash
Council's Reorganization Plan was OMB. More comprehensive
in policymaking scope than its predecessor, Bureau of the
Budget, OMB represented "a basic change in concept and
emphasis.OMB went beyond BOB's budgetary powers in
exercising a systemic analysis of all Executive Office
administrative functions:
. . . fiscal analysis, program evaluation and coordi
nation; improvement of Executive branch organization,
information and manpower systems, and development of
executive talent.51
OMB became the executive watchdog on all depart
mental performance and evaluation and was particularly
interested in Executive Office agencies. Although not
widely noticed, OMB also began requiring closer federal
200
52
interagency cooperation at regional and local levels.
OMB's rapid accumulation of power in the Mixon administra
tion produced an historic congressional reaction over
issues of impounding, zero budgeting, and departmental
reorganization.
OMB had a major impact on OEO's anti-poverty pro
gramming thrust. OEO was frustrated throughout the
sixties by its contradictory mandate to both operate
programs while fulfilling coordination, evaluation, and
research functions in the War on Poverty. The Economic
Opportunity Advisory Council (EOAC), the Ash Council, and
others recommended that OEO's evaluation function be
CO
transferred to the White House and in 1970 this function
was given to OMB. In 1971, most of OEO's operational
activities were shifted to other executive departments.
Despite its 1966 National Anti-Poverty Plan,"^ OEO lost its
anti-poverty coordinating function to EOAC (1968) and to
the Urban Council (1969). In 1973, OMB proposed a reduc
tion in the White House Staff size by abolishing OEO
altogether.
The reorganization of OEO and OMB's creation
greatly strengthened OEO's emphasis on poverty research
and development (R & D) projects via a new Office of
201
Program Development. OEO budget requests for research
and development projects increased $100 million (200 per
cent) in two years (1969-1971).^
OEO emphasis on poverty research demonstrates the
partisan orientations of even objective research designs
and conclusions. Two OEO research and development studies
reveal subjective poverty research because of policymaker
56
orientations toward the causes and cures of poverty.
1. In 1968, OEO's Institute for Research on
Poverty contracted with a private organization to perform
a three-year pilot project on negative income tax effec
tiveness with 1,213 New Jersey families. ^ The project
was designed to test if negative income tax can be used
as a work incentive and an alternative to welfare payments.
After only ten months, the OEO director reported
that preliminary results supported President Nixon's con-
58
troversial welfare reform plan because research showed
that "there is no work disincentive as a result of guaran
teed payments.Although final results of the study
were not available until June 1973, OEO published a pam
phlet in May 1971 supportive of the President's Welfare
Reform Proposal.^ OEO also began similar research
202
projects involving the rural poor in Iowa and North
Carolina.^
2. In December 1969, OEO funded an extensive
62
research project into the use of Education Vouchers as
a means by which parents could "purchase their children's
education at schools of their choice."^ The question:
"How does the voucher system combat poverty?" was secondary
to:
. . . effective control over the character of public
schools is largely vested in legislators, school
boards, and educators, not parents. If parents are
to take responsibility for their children's educa
tion, they cannot rely exclusively on political
processes to let them do so. They must also be able
to take individual action in behalf of their own
childrenT^S
This investigation does not assess the educational
merits of voucher education systems but rather suggests
that even OEO research and development activities were
politicized.
The Reorganization Act of 1949 did not permit
consolidation of entire departments. It is significant
that the President's successful reorganization efforts of
1969-70 did not threaten the bailiwicks of congressional
committee chairmen and early Executive Office reorganiza-
203
tion proposals received widespread public and congressional
65
support in committee hearings.
Executive-congressional conflict on executive
reorganization occurred in early 1971, when the President
introduced legislation to reorganize executive depart-
66
ments. As the President admitted in his 1971 State of
the Union address, his plans constituted a changing of
the balance of power within the federal system of govern-
67
ment. The Presidential proposal included three funda
mental changes affecting departmental structures:
a) Organizational Reform, which would combine 14
departments and independent agencies into four new super
cabinet departments of Community Development (DCD), Human
68
Resources, Natural Resources, and Economic Affairs.
b) General Revenue Sharing, which would apportion
$5 billion to states and cities on a formula basis for
69
unspecified uses. Congress authorized $30.2 billion
for five years in the State and Local Fiscal Assistance
Act of 1972.
c) Special Revenue Sharing, which would consoli
date 130 federal programs into six broad interest areas,
not including poverty. Four hundred and seventy federal
204
programs would be eliminated and the money saved ($11 bil
lion) distributed in broad interest categories to states
and cities.
It is important to understand the larger framework
of executive reorganization within which anti-poverty
decision-making transpired.
Ash Council recommendations proposed a strong
secretary for each of the four departments who would
receive appropriations directly from Congress. Appropria
tions would not be earmarked and the Secretary would
completely control his own budget. Each department would
be highly structured, led by an authoritative secretary,
with clear accountability and responsibility at all
levels.^ By organizing around "goals, not political
72
constituencies," government would theoretically become
responsive and less manipulated by groups.
OEO's case is typical of the President's desire
to create a more controlled bureaucracy. OEO would no
longer serve its special constituency, the poor, but
rather become part of the Department of Community Develop
ment and of Human Resources. No single department would
represent the poor but rather under special revenue
sharing, anti-poverty programs would compete for a total
205
allocation (currently $.6 million) from local governments.
Yet special revenue sharing would not require that its
money even be spent on poverty programs.^ impact of
executive reorganization and revenue sharing would be to
make distinctive anti-poverty programs possible only on
the local level at the discretion of local governments.
It is improbable that Ash Council recommendations
were partisan orientations. The Ash Council was comprised
of professionals with unquestioned expertise and experi
ence^ in organizational management and is analogous to
the Shriver Task Force (1964) in its rational approach to
synoptic decision making. Similarly, both groups of
policymaking professionals considered themselves and their
recommendations apolitical or professionally motivated.
Yet Ash Council's recommendations for departmental
reorganization were revolutionary by proposing a radical
shift in the federal balance of powers^ which would
. . .not only diminish the power of the federal
government as a whole, but it would diminish its
[Congress] power within the Central government and
permit the executive branch to make policy and bud
get decisions which Congress itself now makes.76
Proposed reorganization plans would require
Congress to relinquish appropriations authority to the
four departmental secretaries.^ Traditional committee
206
jurisdictions would be nullified by the drastic reduction
in the number of departments.
Structural reorganization proposed by the Ash
Council combined with revenue sharing would mean a signif
icant reduction of congressional powers in domestic policy
making. Conversely, executive control and local partici
pation in policymaking would increase considerably if the
reorganization plans were implemented. Machiavelli and
Marx did not assume that powerful men voluntarily divest
themselves of power. Yet rational planners on the Ash
Council felt congressional committee chairmen would do
otherwise.
Ill. The Restructuring of Federalism: Regionalization
The magnitude of President Nixon's executive
reorganization proposals is not widely appreciated. The
President's proposals not only include reorganization of
the bureaucracy in Washington but also the broader reorgan
ization concept of New Federalism. New Federalism contains
Nixon's belief about which level of government should make
domestic policy. Executive reorganization and revenue
sharing reflect the President's desire to reallocate
federal authority downward.
207
Revenue sharing and executive reorganization were
mechanisms to "bring government closer to the people."
Accordingly, state and local governments were supposedly
frustrated because Washington excluded them from meaning-
78
ful decision making.
By contrast, the War on Poverty interpreted local
decision making as best served within non-institutional
community groups although neither Nixon nor Johnson anti
poverty policymakers question the concept of local
decision making.
Nixon's understanding of local decision making is
unique in its interpretation of localization as regionali
zation. The Nixon administration has both (1) regionalized
the federal bureaucracy, and (2) regionalized local govern
ments. Although often overlooked, successful implementa
tion of the regionalization approach, via the coercion of
OMB, represents a major policy innovation of the Nixon
administration.
A. Regionalization of Federal Agencies
Until the Nixon administration, administrators in
federal agencies maintaining regional offices, tended to
view regional assignments as undesirable career assign-
208
merits. However, since 1969, federal regional offices have
increasingly become centers for administrative decision
making. That regionalization succeeded is a testament to
OMB's effectiveness under Director Ash.
President Nixon's decentralization of agencies by
regionalization is based on the same basic principles of
New Federalism:
(1) Rationalization. Agencies should have common
regional boundaries and centralized office
locations.
(2) Coordination. A Regional Council approach to
interagency decision making and coordination
should be expanded.
(3) Decentralization. Authoritative decision making
capabilities must be delegated to regional level
administrators.79
To insure that regionalization did not remain
administrative sentiment, BOB and later OMB was given
authority to review "existing relationships between cen-
80
tralized authorities and their field operations." HUD,
HEW, Labor, OEO, SBA and ACTION (1971) were required to
show (a) how unnecessary steps in delegation process are
being eliminated, (b) more efficient reorganization,
(c) more authority given to administrators on the lowest
81
level, particularly in program funding decisions.
209
By July 1969, regional boundaries and ten regional
offices were designated,®^ and by October 1970, regional
headquarters had been relocated. Regional councils were
83
operational by January 1971 and by early 1973, most
84
programmatic funding was allocated by regional offices.
The Regional Council's role in New Federalism was
not supposedly to expand the federal role locally but
rather to function as active intergovernment liaisons be-
85
tween state-local and Washington. Nixon assured each
governor that regionalization would allow an "effective
partnership between states and federal government."®®
. . . you and your staff will now be able, for the
first time, to deal with most senior field officials
of the Departments of HEW, HUD, and Labor, and the
OEO and SBA.87
The ten regional councils were instructed to:
. . . develop and maintain close working relation
ships with state and local governments, to coordi
nate grant programs in a responsive manner to other
levels of government . . . to be especially attentive
to the needs of the chief executives of state and
local governments.88
Regionalization is biased toward state executives
and regional clearing houses. The case of Region IX
(California, Hawaii, Arizona, and Nevada) is indicative.
Although regional offices are located in the most populous
state, California, these offices are not localized.
210
Regional offices are in San Francisco, the region's third
most populous city although the major population center is
Los Angeles and California government located in Sacra
mento. Phoenix and Honolulu are hardly suburbs of San
Francisco. Consequently, each regional agency has been
forced to maintain regional subrepresentatives in major
89
population centers. Washington agency headquarters
maintain regional operation desks. HUD alone maintains
90
77 Area and Insuring Offices in ten regional offices.
Regionalization has merely added another layer to the
federal bureaucracy.
Regional levels of decision making in the federal
system is fait accompli yet its objective of bringing
federal agencies closer to local and state policymakers
has only contributed another level of bureaucracy.
Ironically, a second aspect of the Nixon decentralization
thrust, the regionalization of local government, contrib
utes even a second bureaucratic layer.
B. Regionalization of Local Governments
Retiring HUD Secretary Romney felt the greatest
accomplishment of his administration had been
. . . the movement of decision making from Washington
to the States and local communities, which are better
211
able to determine their needs and priorities in
which they should be handled. ! ! T9T
Romney observed a crucial shift downward in the
federal balance of power, not to individual local govern
ment but to associations of local governments. Again,
OMB is the successful policy executioner.
OMB Director Ash pushed the creation and streng
thening of metropolitan and regional clearinghouse associa
tions. Rather than negotiating directly with a myriad
network of local governments and special districts in
grant application and review, OMB requires preliminary
review by clearinghouses. Some 415 regional clearing
houses, each an association of local government represent
atives, operate in 1,809 counties as screening agencies
for multimillion dollar federal grants. Initiated in
1965, regional clearinghouses function primarily in plan
ning regional solutions to problems of pollution, trans
portation, conservation, etc.
In 1973, OMB expanded the clearinghouse role to
include review of all health, mental health, education,
92
manpower, and related social service program proposals.
An expanded clearinghouse role was opposed by the National
Association of Counties and several heavily populated
212
counties which expressed opposition to clearinghouse
domination by smaller units of government and intrusion
93
into "human services" policies.
The regional clearinghouse for a six-county area
of Southern California, the Southern California Associa
tion of Governments (SCAG), exemplifies clearinghouse
power. SCAG, with 113 cities and six counties as equal
members, reviewed and approved during the first quarter
(FY 1973) 148 grant requests for $101,441,495.94 SCAG
expanded review powers was opposed by Los Angeles and
San Diego Counties because of "duplication and cumbersome
95
problems of bureaucracy."
Both regionalization of local government and
federal bureaucracy represent major revisions in American
federalism. Regional clearinghouses and the regional
office are new layers of governmental decision making.
Government has not been brought nearer the people and
another layer of bureaucracy has been introduced. Region
alization reflects the President's confidence in executive
decision making by giving stronger authority to governors,
regional offices of federal agencies, and executive coun
cils of regional clearinghouses. Increased power has not
been given to representative bodies at the national, state
213
or local level.
IV. New Federalism Shapes Anti-Poverty Policymaking
Given the emphasis on executive reorganization,
analysis reveals three phases of anti-poverty decision
making in the Nixon administration:
a) (1969-70) Assessment Phase. Anti-poverty pro
grams, with the Job Corps exception, are unaffected by
executive reorganization. All OEO agencies are system-
ically evaluated by either task forces or OEO's Office
of Research and Development.
b) (1971-72) Delegation Phase. OEO agencies are
delegated and later transferred to executive departments
and newly created ACTION.
c) (1973-74) Dismantlement Phase. OMB tries to
dismantle OEO because of the swollen size of the Executive
Office. The elimination of OEO is justified on ideologi
cal grounds by Director Phillips.
OEO decision making stages (1969-74) reflect the
President's reorganization plans. Only in 1973 do ration
alizations to dismantle OEO for ideological reasons
coincide with reorganizational considerations.
A. (1969-70) OEO's Assessment Phase
214
Despite early dismantling of Job Corps and attacks
on the Legal Services Program, the first two years of the
Nixon administration was a period of programmatic evalua
tion by OEO of its programs. It is also a period when the
legislative mandate to coordinate all anti-poverty pro
grams was confused by the functioning of the Advisory
Council on Economic Opportunity (ACEO) by Nixon's creation
of the Urban Council in 1969.
In January 1969, the Urban Affairs Council was
organized to coordinate all anti-poverty programs and
thus joined the ACEO, OEO, HUD, HEW, and later ACTION in
a mandate to coordinate national anti-poverty programs.
President Nixon asked the Urban Affairs Council to
study and refocus anti-poverty policymaking:
At my direction, the Urban Affairs Council has been
conducting an intensive study of the nation's anti
poverty programs, of the way the anti-poverty effort
is organized and administered, and of ways in which
it might be made more effective. That study is
continuing.96
In order to give the Urban Affairs Council time to
submit anti-poverty recommendations, the President
extended OEO appropriations one fiscal year. (However,
OEO authorization by Congress did not occur until December
1969.)
Anti-poverty coordination and planning was
entrusted in 1969 to the Urban Affairs Council, not to
OEO, even though OEO had submitted to the President a
requested Phase I four-year plan (1968-72) in FY 1967 to
fight poverty.^ OEO's National Anti-Poverty Plan included
the goal of ending poverty in America by 1976. OEO with
its ten-year strategy was the first civilian agency to
98
program and plan objectives by PPBS methodology. OEO's
National Anti-Poverty Plan was ignored by President Johnson
and even kept from public scrutiny by an "administrative
99
confidential" classification.
Anti-poverty coordination was further confused by
the Urban Council which, like other ad hoc advisory groups
created by the Executive Office, was ineffectual. The
inability of the Urban Affairs Council to coordinate anti
poverty programs is attributable to an Executive Office
tendency to appoint problem solving committees. Key
administrators find themselves on numerous overlapping
committees/task forces, each charged with finding solutions
to complex social problems. For example, in November 1969,
the President created a Council for Rural Affairs'*- ^ whose
membership almost totally overlapped with the Urban Affairs
216
Council. In June, Nixon asked the Urban Affairs Council
to study the hunger problem in America.Yet these men
had primary responsibility in administering their own
departments.
The Urban Affairs Council was unable to coordinate
the War on Poverty and the Economic Opportunity Council,
whose major function was theoretically to advise the 0E0
director "with respect to policy matters," was left to
atrophy in 1969.
The 1969 EOA amendments required that 0E0 opera
tions be evaluated and monitored by the Executive Office.
Similar recommendations had been made earlier in the year
by a General Accounting Office (GAO) study of 0E0 activi-
103
ties. Frustrated in efforts to assess OEO impact in
1967, Congress had requested GAO, for the first time, to
evaluate the effectiveness of a social change agency.
The Comptroller General's assessment of OEO was
difficult to put in quantitative perspective:
. . . this has been a difficult and unprecedented
review for the General Accounting Office, dealing
as it does with a relatively new program, and deal
ing as it does with many types of programs which
were difficult to measure in any quantitative way.104
GAO recommended that OEO turn over anti-poverty coordinat
ing and evaluation functions to BOB or an independent
217
agency within the Executive Office.
OEO's strengthened Office of Planning, Research,
and Evaluation (OEO/PRE) was given the responsibility of
evaluating OEO agencies and operating procedures. An OEO
task force, headed by the chairman of the Economic Oppor
tunity Council directed and reviewed OEO/PRE conclusions.
The degree to which individual OEO agencies could demon
strate quantifiable progress in reducing poverty was
crucial in these studies.
By mid-1970, studies were underway of Community
Action, Head Start, Public Manpower Programs,Family
106
Planning Services, and Comprehensive Health Centers.
During 1971-72, evaluations were implemented on Day Care
Services,Migrant Services,and VISTA. Although
data collection and analyses were contracted to independent
consultants, OEO/PRE prepared its own final report and
recommendations.
By 1969, reactions by politicians and the public
to OEO were mixed as programs such as Head Start, Foster
Frandparents, and Medicare Alert had general acceptance
while Community Action, VISTA, LSP, and Job Corps were
controversial.^^ OEO's independent study of VISTA^^
volunteers indicated the political connotations of certain
218
OEO agencies. The one-year VISTA volunteer's service
proved to be a significant politicizing experience. The
VISTA volunteer was alienated and radicalized by VISTA
itself: "... the manner in which VISTA has operated and
dealt with volunteers contributes to the feeling of dis
enchantment and bitterness.
Research suggests that VISTA's radical socializa
tion of its volunteers probably increased during the
1970-71 period. Such startling findings did little to
endear VISTA to the new Republican policymakers at OEO.
Given the increasing number of poor and antagonism
engendered by certain OEO programs, i.e., VISTA, many OEO
sympathizers feared for its survival. Although the Nixon
agenda was not focused on destroying OEO but rather on
reorganizing government, OEO's ideological vulnerability
rendered it particularly accessible to executive reorgani
zation plans.
B. (1971-72) Delegation Phase
The Ash Council in 1971 recommended not only that
OEO programs be delegated to departments but that OEO also
be
. . . given to new departments, and that economic
219
opportunity research, development and evaluation be ,
conducted by the Domestic Council and the Office of
Management and Budget.114
The President rejected the Ash proposal to abolish
115
OEO although he did end all OEO funding two years
later. Nixon instead began transferring OEO agencies to
departments and the newly created ACTION agency. OEO,
which had lost its coordinating mandate in 1969, began
losing its operations arm in 1971.
Supposedly, the delegation of OEO operations to
other departments would allow OEO to focus on anti-poverty
116
research, program development and evaluation. President
Nixon emphasized the new freedom which a narrower focus
would give OEO:
. . . OEO is to be the cutting edge by means of which
government moves into unexplored areas, the experi
mental temper will be vital to its success. It
should be free to take creative risks. It should set
up a variety of demonstration projects and carefully
test their effectiveness and systematically assess
the results.
In his January 1971 budgetary address (FY 1972), President
Nixon again reiterated his support for OEO's "leadership
118
role in research, development, and evaluation" of social
programs.
The delegation of OEO programs to other departments
220
has seldom been clarified in debate surrounding OEO,
particularly the implications of delegation and transfer.
The Economic Opportunity Act (EOA) of 1964 gave OEO
authority to delegate its programs to other departments.
OEO would supposedly experiment with anti-poverty program
models on a demonstration scale. Once operationally
proven, successful anti-poverty programs would be dele
gated to appropriate departments. Richard Boone, former
Shriver Task Force member and probable originator of the
maximum feasible participation concept, felt OEO
. . . should not have any operating function or
operating programs, except it should have an innova
tive function, as suggested by the President, and
that all operating programs be placed in appropriate
agencies. Experimental programs would be operated
by OEO.119
Delegation of successful programs would allow an unencum
bered OEO to function as a poverty monitor upon delegated
programs:
Any delegation agreements for anti-poverty programs
should be drafted to require . . . OEO ... to set
up guidelines, dispense funds and monitor performance
in such a way as to ensure that a department operat
ing a delegated program keeps its focus on the needs
of the poor.120
As the Executive Office agency committed to the
special needs of the poor, OEO would theoretically enforce
221
programmatic and budgetary evaluation of delegated pro
grams .
Although the EOA created and delegated several
anti-poverty programs to other agencies, no programs were
ever voluntarily delegated by OEO. The delegation process
121
was initiated by Congress in 1968 when it requested
the Executive Office to study whether or not Job Corps
and Head Start should continue under direct administration
of OEO or be delegated to other agencies.
The delegation process was implemented by Nixon
in 1969 when he submitted the congressionally requested
study and recommended that (a) Head Start be delegated to
HEW by July 1969, and (b) comprehensive Health Services
and Foster Grandparents be soon delegated to HEW.
President Nixon announced in March that Job Corps
122
would be delegated to Labor, and by June 1971, most
OEO programs had been delegated. Whenever delegated pro
grams legally remained a part of OEO, an inevitable pat
tern of agency transferral followed the delegation process.
The Nixon administration's reliance upon delegation rather
than elimination of OEO programs reflects the President's
priority of executive reorganization. As reflected in the
222
1973 attacks on OEO, delegation reflected a growing dis
illusionment with special programs for the poor based on
a failure to reduce poverty.
Only successful programs, by EOA guidelines, were
intended to be delegated. However, the Nixon approach
meant that OEO operational programs were transferred in
order to make them successful. Since anti-poverty programs
had not measurably succeeded, its programs were delegated
to experienced agencies. For example, Head Start was dele
gated to HEW because ". . .it would be possible to
strengthen it by association with a wide range of early
123
development programs within the department." Delega
tion to departments would make anti-poverty programs more
successful and allow OEO to concentrate on research and
<- 124
experimentation.
Although not a major issue, struggle for OEO con
trol includes key aspects of the confrontation between
the Nixon Presidency and Congress. Analysis of OEO is
approached within the framework of a larger Constitutional
struggle for power. The President’s goal of governmental
reorganization, including revenue sharing, shaped anti
poverty decision making. As Presidential-Congressional
struggle for power intensified in 1972-73, the President
reorganized and streamlined the Executive Office.
223
C. (1973-74) Dismantlement Phase
By June 1971, major OEO programs had been dele
gated to departments and ACTION, a newly-created anti
poverty agency which included several former OEO programs,
had been formed within the Executive Office. OEO was
further demoralized when OMB requested that OEO cut its
forthcoming FY 1972 budget by $150 million (including
125
delegated programs). OMB's requested cut was consid
ered unusually large for a preliminary round of negotia
tions and indicated that OEO’s operations sacrifice was
insufficient to maintain agency survival.
Congress retaliated by passing a two-year $6 bil
lion anti-poverty bill which authorized an additional
$160 million more than the President request and included
126
OEO projects previously rejected by President Nixon.
The President vetoed the congressional amendments because
of its unacceptable provisions:
(1) . . . the President would be prohibited from
spinning off successful and continuing programs
(OEO) to the service agencies.
(2) . . . Congress has written into OEO legislation
an itemized list of mandatory funding levels for
15 categorical programs.
224
(3) . . . the National Legal Services Corporation
differs crucially from the proposal originally
put forth by this administration.
(4) But the most deeply flawed provision of this
legislation is Title V, "Child Development
Programs."127
The President's veto was narrowly sustained.
Although never explicitly stated, progressive
disillusionment with OEO was undoubtedly exacerbated by
the steady increase in the number of poor during Nixon's
first term.1^8 in contrast, the number of poor declined
by approximately 5 percent each year from 1964 to 1968.
According to Census studies, those earning less than the
poverty level income increased by 1.2 million in 1970.
Additional poverty increases in 1971-72 only increased
frustration in the White House and OEO.
Relative increase or decrease in selected poverty
indicators is correlated to economic expansion or reces
sion rather than anti-poverty programs' independent impact
129
on poverty. Increase in poverty during the Nixon
Presidency is related to economic factors rather than OEO
130
efforts to fight poverty. By June 1973, even a sympa
thetic Economic Opportunity Council concluded:
. . . the economic development aspects of the Eco
nomic Opportunity Act have had only a marginal
impact on improving the long-term well-being of
the poor.131
225
Unless anti-poverty programs can demonstrate
immediate, hard data to substantiate progress in reducing
poverty, they are considered failures. The Nixon adminis
tration theoretically did not abandon its efforts to fight
poverty in 1972-73 but rather abandoned OEO as a credible
agency in that struggle.
Anti-poverty policymakers in both parties view
poverty as insufficient income. The Council of Economic
Advisers (CEA) annual report estimates that $9.7 billion
132
annually would lift all Americans out of poverty and
that poverty could be eliminated in six to eight years if
a minimum income plan, including a negative income tax,
were implemented. One of the President's Six Great Goals
is implementation of a guaranteed national income--the
133
Family Assistance Plan (FAP). FAP, with appropriate
work incentives, nearly became law in late 1970 as the
Nixon administration's poverty strategy. Poverty in
America could theoretically be eliminated by raising the
poor's income. Deflationary economic measures, combined
with income assistance to the poor, would supposedly be
the most effective strategy to reduce poverty.
Anti-poverty programming under Johnson took eco
nomic expansion for granted so that the community action
226
approach could emphasize individual participation and
opportunity approaches to alleviating poverty. Nixon
efforts to deflate the economy resulted in an increase in
the number of unemployed although OEO continued its social
involvement approach to ending poverty.
During 1972, the administration sought ways to
aid the poor via increased economic opportunity and OEO's
highest priority became to secure the right of every
American to participate in our Nation's economic life.
The President asked OEO to answer these questions:
What determines an individual's capacity for growth
and achievement? What can be done to awaken this
capacity and develop it? How can we be sure that
these capacities, when they are available, will be
fully used and properly rewarded?135
President Nixon spoke of "the challenge of bringing
136
unproductive people into active economic roles." OEO
should "... help people become productive participants
in the economy rather than focusing on the conduct of
137
income support or other ameliorative activities."
OEO's economic mandate focused on experimenting with impact
models which demonstrated economic benefits for the poor.
The 1972 amendments to EOA reflect the "economic
impact on the poor" emphasis. -^8 Amendments focus on
Community Economic Development (CED). Thirty-six
227
Community Development Corporations (CDC) were funded by
0E0 with goals of expanding (1) economic and business
development, (2) community development and housing, and
139
(3) manpower training for poor people. The purpose is
to reduce poverty by "arresting tendencies toward depend
ency, chronic unemployment, and community deteriora
tion."140
EOA amendments were to "strengthen, clarify and
coordinate the relationship of CDCs to other federal pro
grams for economic development" by allowing local CDCs to
receive funding from departmental economic development
programs, i.e., HUD, Commerce, and SBA. EOA amendments
also require the OEO director to submit annual reports to
Congress outlining CDC progress in utilizing alternative
federal funding in various OEO agencies. CDCs were also
to receive capital funding via the creation of a develop
ment loan fund which included two revolving loan accounts:
the Rural Development Loan Fund and the Community Develop
ment Loan Fund. The OEO director could make direct loans
or guarantee commercial bank loans to CDCs. He could
also make available to the development loan fund certain
discretionary funds. The OEO director is also required
to investigate the feasibility of establishing development
228
banks and similar institutions and report the results to
141
Congress.
Comparison between the Community Action Programs
and CDC underscores the philosophical shift in Nixon
approaches to the poverty issue. In 1963 CDC was a small
component within OEO's Community Action Program. FY 1974
Budget requests $39 million for CDC and proposes that CDC
be shifted from OEO to the Office of Minority Business
Enterprise (OMBE).^^
Both CAP and CDC are given vaguely defined socio
economic objectives of implementing social involvement
and economic opportunity for the poor. Neither CDC nor
CAP possesses resources and authority to accomplish broad
social and economic objectives. Without comprehensive
poverty policymaking priorities, social and economic
intervention agencies are continually competing for scarce
resources.
The contrast between CAP and CDC, between the War
on Poverty and New Federalism, is comparative emphasis on
either social or economic priorities. President Nixon
emphasizes an economic reordering of poverty priorities.
CDCs, in contrast to CAPs, are expected to:
229
. . . have a massive impact on the national economy
and the quality of life for the poor. Substantial
social improvements would be the by-product of a
valid economic development project.1^3
The Ideological Assault on OEO began in January
1973 when Nixon named Howard Phillips, formerly director
of OEO's Program Review Office, Acting Director of OEO.
Five months later, Nixon requested Phillips' resignation
due to a federal judge's ruling which ordered the adminis-
144
tration to cease all efforts to dismantle OEO.
Unwisely for an unconfirmed director, Phillips
received considerable publicity from his oft-stated desires
145
to eliminate OEO. The federal court ruled that only
Congress could decide whether to terminate a program and
that appropriated OEO money must be expended to implement
programs rather than dismantling them. Phillips' actions
were in violation of (1) the EOA which had been authorized
through FY 1974; (2) the Reorganization Act which prohib
ited dismantling; and (3) OEO memoranda announcing OEO
termination were not published in the Federal Register.
Federal Judge Jones also ruled that Phillips was illegally
on the job because his name had never been submitted for
confirmation. Consequently, Acting Director Phillips was
forced to resign.
230
Rapid succession of directors is not unusual in
an agency with four directors in the last five years.
However, it is unusual when an agency is delivered into
the hands of one whose philosophy is counter to the
agency's fundamental mission and seeks to dismantle the
agency with all deliberate speed.
Consider Phillips' four key "General Principles":
1. It is unwise to sustain a separate service
system for the poor, apart from and in competi
tion with the systems intended for society as
a whole.
2. It is wrong to goveramentally treat the poor as
as a class apart, with interests and aspirations
separate and distinct from society as a whole.
3. Social change is not necessarily desirable per
se. . . . The kinds of changes which OEO has
tended to work are in many cases undesirable.
4. Social programming is, at root, based on social
values. Those who have authority make decisions
on the basis of their social philosophies.
This fact argues strongly for the President's
plan to return social decision making to private
citizens and to public officials.146
Anti-poverty policymaking assumes that the poor
are a separate group in society with interests and needs
distinct from the rest of society. Social change Is
highly desirable. Furthermore, anti-poverty program
experimentation and demonstration models must be tried on
a national level. Anti-poverty programs have consistently
felt that the poor must be mobilized and even occasionally
exert coercion on elected officials.
Even though Phillips1 orientations toward poverty
are similar to the President’s, ideology was not the
causal factor in the 1973 decision to dismantle OEO. The
partisan dismantling of OEO could have occurred at several
opportune junctures in Nixon's first term. Yet as in
earlier decisions on Job Corps and Legal Services, ideology
does not prove to be a consistent explanation of Nixon
decision making.
President Nixon's decision to deliver OEO to
Phillips is partially explained by the continued increase
in the number of poor (1970-73). But more consistent
with Nixon priorities is his emphasis on executive reorgan
ization. By 1972 the White House staff had swollen to the
largest in its history with 4,250 employees. In November
1972, the President promised "to do a better job (through
out government) with fewer people" and "set an example on
the White House staff,by ordering a 60 percent cut
in the size of the Executive Office size to begin July 1,
148
1973 --the day OEO was to cease existence. The Presi
dent had the opportunity to cut almost 2,000 OEO employees
from the Executive Office. By contrast, 0MB and the
232
White House staff were not reduced. Given the 1972 move
ment to reorganize the Executive Office, the choice of
OEO as a symbolic sacrifice was obvious. Nearly all OEO
operations had been transferred or delegated, but not
eliminated, to other departments. All anti-poverty pro
gram evaluation was carried out by OMB and OEO's Research
and Development mission was carried out by CEA and depart
mental staffs.
V. Anti-Poverty Policymaking and the Nixon
Approach to the Poverty Issue
OEO's programs, despite their unpopularity among
many Republicans, successfully institutionalized the anti
poverty policymaking framework. Clientele support for OEO
had been developed, not among the indifferent poor, but
rather OEO staff, and volunteers. OEO had trained and em
ployed thousands of community organizers and workers. The
influence of clientele groups was symbolically strengthened
by a belief that anti-poverty commitment was synonymous
with governmental policy toward the poor. Nixon abandon
ment of OEO would symbolically indicate desertion of the
poor. Yet, if OEO agencies were delegated to other depart
ments, symbolic commitment to the poor could be maintained
233
while controlling anti-poverty policymaking
The difficulty of keeping the poverty issue on the
President's decision making agenda is underscored by Nixon
anti-poverty policy fluctuation. The 1969 and 1973 con
frontations with Congress indicate that anti-poverty
decision making was made by the President's "auxiliary
eyes and ears," the White House staff which had expanded
to its greatest size and emphasized a division of labor.
The President's decision making agenda was filtered and
isolated by a command system controlled by H. R. Haldeman
and John Ehrlichman. Consequently, anti-poverty decisions
were ratified by the President but formulated by White
House appointees in OEO.
An alliance between OEO and the Presidency guaran
teed OEO's survival against Congress which, as articulator
of state and city anti-OEO fears, did not succeed in
revising anti-poverty programming until Presidential
interest shifted to foreign policy in 1966. In the Nixon
administration a reversal in OEO status occurred when the
Senate became OEO's defender while White House appointees
in OEO attempted to philosophically change OEO. Groups
which formerly opposed OEO, i.e., communities, legal and
medical associations, began supporting OEO. Subcommittee
234
hearings during the Nixon administration reveal a para
doxical scenario: angry Senators castigating OEO bureau
crats for attempting to curtail or eliminate OEO programs
and funding.
The consistent Nixon approach to domestic policy
making is indicated by anti-poverty decision making which
demonstrates a priority on restructuring government.
Delegation of OEO programs reflects a dependence on
Presidential Reorganization Plans and even the decision
in 1973 to abolish OEO reflects a desire to reduce White
House staff size rather than the ideological fervor of
Howard Phillips.
The appearance of Howard Phillips is suggestive
of the degree to which anti-poverty policymaker orienta
tions toward poverty have remained stable for a decade.
Anti-poverty analysis reveals five assumptions which were
dominant during both Republican and Democratic adminis
trations .
(a) An Exclusive Anti-Poverty Orientation. EOA
endorses a vague and sentimental commitment against
poverty. Anti-poverty projects were mandated to fight
economic poverty. Alternative approaches or dimensions
on poverty were unacceptable.
235
(b) Community Participation. Both Nixon and
Johnson administrations promoted the goal of local partic
ipation by local governments rather than the Democratic
reliance on ad hoc community groups.
(c) Restructured Federalism. The War on Poverty
envisioned alternative political structures on the local
level interacting directly with Washington while the Nixon
approach created regional structures. Both approaches
assume that existing federal structures need modification
for effective policy implementation.
(d) Planned-Impact-Programming. Both administra
tions evaluated OEO performance and success by narrow
quantitative criteria. Anti-poverty programming has been
forced to demonstrate improved quantitative performance
criteria to OMB.
(e) Volunteerism as an Intervention Strategy.
Anti-poverty policymaking in both administrations relied
on full-time volunteers to organize the poor for social
action projects.
Anti-poverty orientations in both Democratic and
Republican administrations prevented OEO from becoming the
experimental agency envisioned by EOA. Consistency of
236
anti-poverty attitudes toward poverty and Presidential
reluctance to eliminate anti-poverty programs demonstrates
both the (1) difficulty of changing low priority issues
on the Presidential agency, and (2) acceptance of anti
poverty orientations toward poverty by decision makers
from different ideological backgrounds.
237
Footnotes to Chapter VI
1. Robert A. Levine, The Poor Ye Need Not Have
with You: Lessons from the War on Poverty (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1970).
2. Edward R. Fried, Alice M. Rivlin, Charles L.
Schultze, and Nancy H. Teeters, Setting National Priori
ties: The 1974 Budget (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 1973), p. 198.
3. Moynihan, The Politics of a Guaranteed Income,
p. 54.
4. Ibid., p. 55.
5. National Advisory Council on Economic Opportu
nity, Third Annual Report (March 1970) (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing, 1970), p. 6.
6. Newspaper citations from the Wall Street
Journal and the New York Times relating to general welfare
policies are chronologically given in Colin Cameron,
Income Support Schemes: Bibliography and Annotations to
Academic Literature Including References to Newspaper
Citations (Madison, Wise.: Institute for Research on
Poverty, 1972), pp. 170-259.
7. President Richard Nixon, "State of the Union
Address to Congress" (January 22, 1971), reprinted in
Nixon: The Third Year on His Presidency (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1972), 2-A-6-A.
8. Nixon, Public Papers: 1969, p. 113.
9. Senator Gaylord Nelson, "Comment by Senator
Nelson on President's Poverty Message," Closing of Job
Corps Centers, U.S. Senate, Hearings before the Subcommit
tee on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1969), p. 9.
238
10. Telegram sent to President Nixon in the White
House, reprinted in Closing of Job Corps Centers, pp. 10-
11.
11. Ibid., p. 11.
12. Closing of Job Corps Centers, p. 196.
13. Ibid., p. 197.
14. Louis Harris and Associates, "A Survey of
Ex-Job Corpsmen" (April 1969) in Closing of Job Corps
Centers, pp. 26-145.
15. Ibid., p. 145. Also see Job Corps Reports
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968).
16. National Advisory Council, Third Annual
Report, p. 6.
17. U.S., Congress, Senate, Legal Services Pro
gram of the Office of Economic Opportunity, Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty of
the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., 1969.
18. Nixon, Public Papers: 1969, p. 655.
19. Senator George Murphy, New York Times,
October 18, 1969, p. 1.
20. U.S. Senate, Legal Services Program of OEO,
p. 7.
21. Letter from Edwin Meese III, Executive
Secretary to Governor Reagan to Frank Carlucci, reprinted
in Nominations: 1971, U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearing
before the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1971, pp. 29-30.
22. Lewis K. Uhler, "A Brief Statement by Mr.
Lewis K. Uhler, Director of the California State Office of
Economic Opportunity," reprinted in Nominations: 1971,
p. 29.
239
23. Vice President Spiro Agnew, "What's Wrong
with the Legal Services Program," American Bar Association
Journal, LVIII (September 1972), 930-932.
24. Frank Carlucci, "New Grant Increase,"
reprinted in Nominations: 1971, p. 63.
25. U.S., Congress, House, Establishment of a
Legal Services Corporation, Hearings before the Subcommit
tee on Equal Opportunities of the Committee on Education
and Labor, 93rd Congress, 1st Sess.,
26. Ibid.
27. Resolution adopted by American Bar Associa
tion Board of Governors, October 18, 1969, reprinted in
Legal Services Program of the OEO, pp. 8-9.
28. Resolution of the U.S. Judicial Conference,
reprinted in Legal Services Program of the OEO, p. 8.
29. Before the California Rural Legal Assistance,
Evaluation Conference, Reporter's Transcript Proceedings
of August 21, 1970, reprinted in Nominations: 1971
(Appendix), pp. 189-248.
30. Ibid., p. 245.
31. Donald R. Matthews, "United States Senators:
A Collective Portrait," International Social Science
Journal, XIII (1961), 622.
32. Joseph A. Schlesinger, "Lawyers and American
Politics: A Clarified View," Midwest Journal of Political
Science, I (1957), 28.
33. Fred D. Baldwin, Evaluating the OEO Legal
Services Program: Working Papers (Washington, D.C.: Office
of Economic Opportunity, July 1972).
34. Ibid., p. 39.
35. Ibid., pp. 38-39.
240
36. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., "Law Reforming in
the Anti-Poverty Effort," University of Chicago Law
Review, XXXVII (1970), 242.
37. U.S. General Accounting Office, The Legal
Services Program— Accomplishments of and Problems Faced
by Its Grantees (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting
Office, March 1973), pp. 58-62.
38. National Advisory Council on Economic Opportu
nity, Third Annual Report, p. 2.
39. Ibid.
40. See President Nixon, Public Papers: 1969 and
Public Papers: 1971. Also see "Papers Relating to the
President's Reorganization Program" (March 1971), pp.
10-12.
41. The Brownlow Commission, the Hoover Commis
sions, the Rockefeller Committee on Governmental Organiza
tion, and other presidential task forces have been histori
cally important in proposing governmental expansion and
reorganization.
42. U.S., Congress, Senate, To Extend the Reorgan
ization Act, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Executive
Reorganization and Government Research of the Committee
on Government Operations, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess, 1971.
43. National Advisory Council on Economic Oppor
tunity, Fourth Annual Report, p. 8.
44. The President's Advisory Council on Executive
Reorganization, A New Regulatory Framework: Report on
Selected Independent Agencies, January 1971 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971).
45. Nixon, Public Papers: 1970, pp. 260-261.
46. U.S., Congress, Senate, Reorganization Plans
Nos. 3 and 4 of 1970, Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Executive Reorganization and Government Research of the
Committee on Government Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
241
Government Printing Office, 1970), particularly Reorgani
zation Plan No. 4 of 1970.
47. Nixon, Public Papers: 1970, pp. 257-263
00
Ibid.
49. Ibid., p. 258.
50. Ibid., p. 259.
51. Ibid., p. 260.
52. Ibid., p. 262.
53. National Advisory Council, Third Annual
Report, p. 3.
54. Office of Economic Opportunity, National
Anti-Poverty Plan, FY 1968-FY 1972.
55. National Advisory Council, Third Annual
Report, p. 1.
56. Other 0E0 poverty research projects which
also demonstrate the new Nixon emphasis on economic re
search are John J. McCall, Earnings Mobility and Economic
Growth (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corp., October 1970),
70 pp.; Stephen J. Carroll and John E. Rolph, A Stochastic
Model of Discrimination on the Labor Market (Santa Monica,
Calif.: Rand Corp., October 1970), 36 pp.; Stephen J.
Carroll, Part-Experience and the Transition from School
to Work (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corp., October 1970),
71 pp.
57. New York Times, May 19, 1968, p. 77.
58. 0E0, Preliminary Results of the New Jersey
Graduated Work Incentive Experiment (Washington, D.C.,
February 1970).
59. New York Times, May 3, 1970, p. 23.
242
60. OEO, Further Preliminary Results of the New
Jersey Graduated Work Incentive Experiment (Washington,
D.C., May 1971).
61. Wall Street Journal, June 3, 1969, p. 20,
col. 4; New York Times, May 3, 1970, p. 23.
62. OEO, OEO Touches Your Life (Washington, D.C.,
June 1972), n.p.
63. OEO, Education Vouchers: A Report on Financ
ing Education by Grants to Parents (Cambridge, Mass.:
Center for the Study of Public Policy, December 1970).
64. Ibid., p. 1.
65. Note Senator Ribicoff's opening statement,
Reorganization Plans Nos. 3 and 4 of 1970, p. 1.
66. President Nixon, MThe President's Message to
Congress on Executive Branch Reorganization," reprinted
in Papers Relating to the President's Departmental Reorgan
ization Program, March 1971 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 20.
67. Nixon, Public Papers: 1971, pp. 473-474.
68. President's Departmental Reorganization
Program.
69. S. 680, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1970, §401,
501.
70. President's Departmental Reorganization
Program, pp. 19-20. Also see James Rubenstein, "Revenue
Sharing and Reorganization," Exhibit 17 included in
Establish A Department of Community Development, Hearings
before the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate,
92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1972, pp. 772-794.
71. President Nixon, "Government Reorganization,"
March 25, 1971 Speech to Congress, reprinted in Nixon:
The Third Year of His Presidency, 73A-74A.
243
72. Ibid., 75A.
73. Rubenstein, "Revenue Sharing and Reorganiza
tion," p. 782; also see Fried, Rivlin, Schultze, Teeters,
Setting National Priorities; the 1974 Budget, p. 196.
74. Nixon: The Third Year of His Presidency, p.
78A; also Fried et al., Setting National Priorities,
pp. 276-278.
75. Roy L. Ash, Statements in A New Federalism,
pp. 247, 257.
76. U.S., Office of the Executive, "The Presi
dent's Departmental Reorganization Program: The Proposed
Department of Community Development--A Report and Review,"
March 1971, reprinted in Establish a Department of Commu
nity Development, p. 965.
77. Walter Kravitz, "Some Effects of the Presi
dent's Reorganization Proposals of 1971 on Congressional
Committee Jurisdictions: The Legislative Committees,"
Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service
(July 2, 1971).
78. The Nixon Years— Lift of Leadership
(Washington, D.C.: Committee for the Re-election of the •
President, 1972), pp. 31, 67.
79. Nixon, Public Papers: 1969, pp. 256-257.
80. Ibid., p. 257.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid., pp. 387-388.
83. Nixon, Public Papers: 1971, pp. 49-50.
84. George Romney, "Accomplishments of HUD:
1969-1972," HUD Challenge, IV, No. 2 (February 1973), 29.
85. Nixon, Public Papers: 1971, p. 49.
244
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid., p. 50.
88. Ibid.
89. Representatives are located in Arizona,
Hawaii, Nevada, and in Northern, Central, and Southern
California. It is significant that Southern California,
with 50 percent of the population, has one representative.
90. Romney, "Accomplishments of HUD," p. 29.
91. Ibid.
92. "Executive Committee Actions ..." Forum:
Southern California Association of Governments, VII,
No. 3 (May 1973), n.p.
93. Ray Zeman, Los Angeles Times, August 22, 1973,
Pt. II, pp. 1-8.
94. "Facts about A-95," Forum, VI, No. 5
(November 1972).
95. Zeman, Los Angeles Times. August 22, 1973,
Pt. II, p. 1.
96. Nixon, Public Papers: 1969, p. 112.
97. OEO, National Anti-Poverty Plan, p. 3.
98. Ibid., p. 4.
99. Ibid., p. 3.
100. Nixon, Public Papers: 1969, p. 655.
101. Executive Order 11493 of November 13, 1969.
102. National Advisory Council, Third Annual
Report, p. 1.
245
103. Elmer B. Staats, Economic Opportunity
Amendments of 1969, p. 328. For a later GAO evaluation
of OEO, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Need for More
Effective Audit Activities (Washington, D.C.: Office of
Economic Opportunity, April 1973).
104. Staats, Economic Opportunity Amendments,
p. 328.
105. Michael C. Barth and Edward M. Gramlich,
"The Inflation-Unemployment Tradeoff and Public Employ
ment" (Working Papers of the U.S. Office of Economic
Opportunity, May 1971).
106. U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity, An
Evaluation of the Neighborhood Health Center Program:
Summary of Results and Methodology (Washington, D.C.:
Office of Economic Opportunity, May 1972).
107. W. R. Prosser, Working Papers: Day Care in
the Seventies, Some Thoughts (Washington, D.C.: Office
of Economic Opportunity, May 1972).
108. Patricia Koshel, Working Papers: Migration
and the Poor (Washington, D.C.: Office of Economic
Opportunity, July 1972.
109. There are two analyses of VISTA: (OEO)
David Gottlieb, VISTA and Its Volunteers (University Park,
Pa.: Pennsylvania State University, March 15, 1971);
(ACTION) "Task Force on Volunteer Support," October 29,
1971.
110. National Advisory Council, Third Annual
Report, p. 6.
111. Gottlieb, VISTA and Its Volunteers.
112. Ibid., p. 140.
113. Ibid.
246
114. National Advisory Council, Fourth Annual
Report (October 1971), p. 5.
115. Nixon, Public Papers: 1969, p. 649.
116. Ibid., p. 653.
117. Ibid., p. 654.
118. Ibid., pp. 91-92.
119. Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1969,
p. 337.
120. National Advisory Council, Second Annual
Report (March 1969), p. 17.
121. Nixon, Public Papers; 1969, p. 113.
122. Ibid., p. 114.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid., p. 656.
125. New York Times, October 14, 1970, p. 37.
126. New York Times, November 16, 1971, p. 19.
127. Nixon, Public Papers: 1971, pp. 1175-1176.
128. New York Times, November 14, 1971, p. 41;
Wall Street Journal, May 10, 1971, p. 4.
129. New York Times, August 20, 1969, p. 1 and
January 17, 1969, p. 15.
130. Wall Street Journal, May 10, 1971, p. 4.
131. National Advisory Council, Sixth Annual
Report (June 1973), p. 5.
132. New York Times, January 17, 1969, p. 15.
247
133. Moynihan, The Politics of a Guaranteed
Income, p. 3.
134. Ibid., pp. 54-55.
135. Nixon, Public Papers: 1969, p. 655.
136. Ibid., p. 656.
137. Ibid., p. 655.
138. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, as
amended, Title VII.
139. National Advisory Council, Sixth Annual
Report, pp. 10-11.
140. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, as
amended, Title VII.
141. Ibid., Title VII, §714.
142. Budget of the U.S. Government, FY 1974,
Appendix, p. 243.
143. National Advisory Council, Sixth Annual
Report, p. 53.
144. Jack Jones, Los Angeles Times, April 12,
1973, 1:12.
145. U.S. Senate, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., Con
gressional Record, CXIX, No. 43 (March 20, 1973). Please
note exchange letters under title, "Legality of OEO
Termination," from Senator Ribicoff to Howard Phillips,
February 8, 1973, and vice versa, February 16, 1973. Also
note the following talks by Mr. Phillips as transcribed
by OEO: "Annual Banquet, Middlesex Bar Association"
(Boston, March 21, 1973), 15 pp; "Transcript of Broadcast
Interviews, Howard Phillips-Fulton Lewis" (Washington, D.C.
March 9 and 12, 1973), 18 pp.; "Evening Edition with
Martin Agronsky" (Washington, D.C., February 6, 1973),
20 pp.; "Howard Phillips' Speech (Washington, D.C.,
February 6, 1973), 7 pp. Two indicative newspaper articles
248
on Phillips during this sensitive period were David S.
Broder, "It's 1984 and You Are There— With OEO's Howard
Phillips," Los Angeles Times, February 12, 1973; "Poverty
Agency's Birth Tied to "Marxist Idea,"' Los Angeles
Times, February 4, 1973, p. 4.
146. Phillips, "General Principles," 2 pp.
147. Robert C. Toth, "White House Aides Ordered
to Cut Staffs," Los Angeles Times, September 9, 1973,
p.4.
148. The Congressional Quarterly, XXXI, No. 5
(February 3, 1973), 229.
CHAPTER VII
ACTION: SUBTERRANEAN POLICYMAKING IN THE
WHITE HOUSE (1971-74)
There are myriad motivations precipitating the
creation of a new agency within the White House. ACTION,
the volunteer agency was formed in 1971 by coalescing
seven existing agencies with a newly created experimental
program. Unlike OEO, which the administration inherited
from the Democrats, ACTION is an original Republican
approach to the poverty issue.
This case study analysis of ACTION'S genesis and
short history underscores variables often ignored in
Presidential policymaking studies. Analysis of ACTION
provides insights into the nature of subterranean policy
making in the Executive Office and is in contrast to the
more visible Executive Office activities of OMB, the
Domestic Council, CEA, which receive priority on the
Presidential policymaking agenda. The subterranean
policymaking arena within the White House is hidden from
249
250
public scrutiny and seldom receives Presidential attention.
The Executive Office includes several little
noticed agencies: the Office of Emergency Preparedness;
Science and Technology; OEO; ACTION'S eight anti-poverty
agencies; etc. Policy scientists and public are often
unaware that the Executive Office includes such anomalies
as Foster Grandparents and the National Student Volunteer
Program.
Much can be gained from a policymaking analysis
of obscure anti-poverty programs in the White House--a
far more fertile ground than policy scientists have
imagined. Although minor executive agencies receive scant
attention on the Presidential agenda, these agencies
receive inordinate attention from the White House staff.
Unlike larger agencies which are administratively removed
from the White House (who on the White House staff cares
about Forest Service activities?), ACTION'S director
reports directly to the President. Although ACTION is
budgetarily insignificant, its activities are influenced
by prevailing Presidential policy priorities as inter
preted by White House staffers. ACTION is a barometer of
partisan activities in the Executive Office.
251
Secondly, it is important to focus on minor
Executive Office agencies because White House staffers
and ACTION decision makers expect agency activities to be
ignored by the media, public opinion, and scholars. Few
noticed when ACTION programs and employees were utilized
as resources in the President's 1972 reelection campaign.
Partisan machinations in minor Executive Offices is more
probable than with the highly public OMB, Cost of Living
Council, or Energy agency.
Agency obscurity is not equated with partisan
inactivity or insignificance. Significant political
objectives influenced ACTION'S creation and activities
within the White House— particularly during the 1972 re-
election campaign.
I. Executive Reorganization as Presidential
Policymaking
Analysis of OEO demonstrates that the goal of
reorganizing government was President Nixon's primary
policymaking priority. Based on Ash Council recommenda
tions, reorganization focused on streamlining federal
bureaucracy and decentralizing decision making to local
levels. The President's basic plan to reorganize depart
ments failed in Congress but decentralized decision making
252
was partially implemented and encouraged by revenue
sharing.
Reorganization includes restructuring the Execu
tive Office itself. Consequently, OEO programs were
delegated to other agencies and OEO marked for dismantle
ment. In this paradoxically uninviting environment,
ACTION, a new anti-poverty agency, was organized. A new
agency was generated in an era of departmental consolida
tion and new personnel were brought into the White House
at a time of Presidential emphasis upon staff and budget
ary reductions.
ACTION'S formation in the White House and OEO's
continuance until 1974 illustrate a delegated arena in
Presidential policymaking. Both anti-poverty agencies,
OEO and ACTION, were insignificant pawns in the President's
grand design of governmental reorganization. Their prox
imity to power means that ACTION and OEO are maximized
for the political goals of White House staffers.
The President's Reorganization Plan Number 1 of
1971 creating ACTION proposed merger of nine agencies from
five departments: (1) OEO (VISTA, National Student Volun
teer Program), (2) HEW (Foster Grandparents Program,
Retired Senior Volunteer Program, Teacher Corps),
253
(3) State (Peace Corps), (4) HUD (Office of Voluntary
Action), and (5) Small Business Administration (Senior
Corps of Retired Executives, Active Corps of Retired
Executives). ACTION would bring together 20,000 volun
teers, 1,600 employees; with an annual budget of $140 mil
lion (FY 1972)^ within the White House.
Congressional response to the Reorganization Plan
underscores the difficulties of unilateral Presidential
attempts to reorganize even the Executive Office bureauc
racy. Ash Council recommendations for reorganization
fail to recognize political realities within the congres
sional committee system. Committees are functionally
oriented to executive departments and restructuring
agencies would require a restructuring of committees.
Reorganization proposals, although organizationally well
conceived, need more political incrementalism or "muddling
through."
Resolutions of disapproval and roll-call opposi
tion to the President's Reorganization Plan are indicative
of an highly specialized division of labor within Congress.
Special and standing subcommittees proliferate in over
lapping jurisdictions whenever policies and programs are
created. Consolidation of seven programs within ACTION
254
added new committees to an already complicated committee
structure.
Executive reorganization hearings did not involve
poverty committees but rather organizational committees.
Since 1964, OEO programs had been authorized by the Senate
Labor and Public Welfare Committee. Yet the Committee on
Government Operations' subcommittee on Executive Reorgan-
2
ization and Government Research held hearings on ACTION'S
proposed creation. The Labor and Public Welfare Committee
was excluded from ACTION authorization hearings and only
later reviewed ACTION activities and budgets.
Failure to include key poverty committeemen in
reorganization hearings is reflected in the Labor and
Public Welfare Committee Chairman's introduction of a
3
resolution of disapproval preceding the reorganization
hearings. Yet in 1972, members of the Labor and Public
4
Welfare Committee sponsored the ACTION bill.
As ACTION'S creation suggests, executive reorgani
zation on even a small scale, results in a prolonged
kaleidoscope of committee interaction. Committee hearings
on ACTION authorization in 1972 were confusing and incon
clusive. Subcommittees not participating in reorganiza
tion hearings conducted their own hearings of various
255
ACTION agencies. In the spring of 1972, three separate
subcommittees (Aging, Employment, Manpower and Poverty,
Human Resources) heard testimony on ACTION programs of
particular interest to their subcommittee.'* Not until
g
July 1973, two years after ACTION'S inception, did the
Senate finally authorize an ACTION bill. For two years,
ACTION
. . . operated . . . without the benefit of authoriz
ing legislation. It has had to look for its authori
zations of appropriations to four different pieces
of legislation. It has been responsible to more than
15 committees and subcommittees of Congress.7
Committee reaction and confusion over ACTION'S
creation suggests that major Presidential reorganization
proposals are improbable until Congress shares executive
reorganization policymaking.
The rationale for ACTION'S governmental reorganiza
tion is complicated by both partisan and organizational
motivations. ACTION brought together various agencies
which utilized either full or part-time volunteers.
Ostensibly, the purposes were those of other Presidential
reorganization plans: financial savings, greater manage
rial efficiency, and consolidation around common functional
or systems goals. The statute invoked by President Nixon
required that ACTION'S creation:
256
. . . promote the better execution of the laws the
more effective management of the executive branch
and its agencies and functions, and the expeditious
administration of the public business (and) to
increase the efficiency of the operations of the
Government to the fullest extent practicable.8
President Nixon chose not to attack past anti
poverty policymaking in soliciting support for ACTION but
rather promised that ACTION would "build on what we've
Q
learned" in poverty programming. In view of clientele
and congressional support for existent ACTION agencies,
the administration compromised for a modified ACTION con
solidation of seven rather than nine agencies (Teacher
Corps and Office of Voluntary Action were not included).
Minimally, Senate subcommittee members required
that reorganization not have a deleterious impact on
agency programming. Subcommittee hearings were to deter
mine if
. . . the trade-off that may result between efficacy
of recruitment and personal management and motiva
tion as to each program is worth enough to warrant
approval of Reorganization Plan No. 1.10
Congressmen could little ignore that the reorganization
was opposed in part or totally by 87 organizations and by
11
every ACTION volunteer and ex-volunteer support groups.
Opposition groups believed that reorganization violated
principles of rational planning and programming.
257
II. Anti-Poverty Agencies as Partisan Resources:
ACTION and the Campaign to Reelect
the President
The investigatory thesis is that ACTION'S reorgan
ization did not accomplish standard reorganizational
objectives but rather the administration's partisan
priorities. This analysis does not judge the validity of
ACTION'S politicized objectives any more than the partisan
objectives embodied within the War on Poverty. Analysis
does show the inadequacy of accepting ACTION'S simply and
synoptically stated reorganization objectives.
The research thesis is that Nixon policymakers
designed ACTION to accomplish two partisan objectives:
(a) to eliminate VISTA's community organization thrust and
to create an alternative VISTA program, and (b) to utilize
agency personnel and policy goals as partisan resources.
Investigation indicates that ACTION'S partisan
objectives were only partially understood by ACTION'S first
director, Joseph Blatchford (1971-73), while Michael
Balzano, ACTION'S second director (1973- ) initiated a
comprehensive partisan redirection of the agency.
A. To Eliminate VISTA's Community Organization Thrust
VISTA recruiting literature describes changes
258
which have occurred since the sixties when VISTA recruited
large numbers of volunteers to serve in community develop
ment projects. VISTA literature faults the community
organization concept as misguided:
The concept of community development— helping groups
of poor people help themselves--was an ideal theory,
but turned out to be vague in practice. [It] . . .
proved to be futile when in many instances volunteers
didn't know what the poor needed and wanted. They'd
get groups of people to come to meetings, then wonder,
"What did we organize them for?"12
Economically underdeveloped communities were seldom eco
nomically developed by VISTA volunteers so that the commu
nity development approach seemed unworkable.
Community development or community organization
was based on approaches developed by Saul Alinsky and
others which required the volunteer to live in a community,
gain its confidence and ascertain: (1) What were the
community's "felt-needs," i.e., health, transportation,
housing, etc.; and (2) who were the unofficial leaders
and key organizations. Community organizers would develop
a strategy whereby community people could alleviate poverty
by their own initiative. Volunteers provided the organi
zational expertise for unorganized citizens to escape
poverty.
259
Community development projects utilized a par
ticular type of volunteer: the young (idealistic) liberal
arts graduate. Thousands of "A.B. generalists” were
trained for VISTA and Peace Corps projects. Few voca
tional or technical skills were required, just idealism
and a grasp of the basic community development approach.
Even vocational project volunteers were overwhelmingly
liberal arts graduates trained both in vocational skills
and as community developers. Teaching agriculture or
working in health clinics gave access to organizing com
munities. For example, two Brazil Peace Corps training
projects which were to establish school lunch programs and
4-H agricultural clubs were comprised entirely of liberal
arts trainees. ^
Both Peace Corps and VISTA drastically reduced
the number of community development projects following the
1966 reactions. Community development projects are no
longer encouraged by ACTION and disregarded as a politi
cally radical anti-poverty orientation. Supposedly, commu
nity organization failed because it was not derived from
the community but rather reflected volunteer preferences.
Community development in VISTA mistakenly
260
. . . stressed the impact of VISTA service on the
volunteer, with programs developed and monitored by
the VISTA staff and the volunteers themselves,
rather than by community groups.14
By contrast, ACTION has forced VISTA to program
projects which emphasize new structural criteria:
The current phase of VISTA emphasizes working
through sponsoring groups to address problems
identified by low-income communities. The VISTA
programming system has been designed to (a) place
emphasis on goal oriented programming, (b) be done
by a local sponsor, (c) be participated in by mem
bers of low-income community, and increase the cap
acity of community members to solve their own
problems.15
Over 100 VISTA projects were closed for not meet
ing ACTION'S controlled criteria. Other projects were
redeveloped and over 100 new projects begun which reflect
the new emphasis at VISTA.^ In two years under ACTION
over half of VISTA's projects were radically affected by
application of ACTION'S new criteria.
Nixon appointees in OEO's Office of Policy and
Program Development initiated evaluations of all OEO pro
grams (1969-70). OEO's conclusions concerning VISTA
political activities were particularly alarming as a study
by Gottlieb of VISTA's socialization impact upon its
v o l u n t e e r s ^ received widespread attention in Congress and
OEO. Gottlieb's survey indicated that VISTA's one-year
261
experience radicalized one third of its volunteers and
moved a majority to more left social and political orien
tations . Gottlieb found that 48 percent of former VISTA
volunteers (-30 years) were "suspicious of all government
18
change programs."
In 1969, VISTA's Office of Evaluation prepared a
confidential assessment of volunteer activities in
appropriate activities of a social or political
nature that were leading to consequences which were
deleterious to effective achievement of the goals
of the projects which they were assigned. ^
Volunteers were engaging in local activities which must
be controlled.
Michael Balzano, OEO senior staff member and later
ACTION director, studied VISTA training approaches and
concluded that training of community organization volun
teers was inappropriate and often a facade for radical
political organization:
The only problem with the so-called relevant activi
ties, such as politically organizing the poor under
the guise of community organization, is that such
activities were never proposed to Congress and would
never be sanctioned by that body. There is nothing
wrong with organizing the poor politically. It may
be worthwhile activity which should be carried out.
But that is not a VISTA function.21 [Emphasis added]
VISTA personnel and volunteers who believed that organiz
ing the poor was their primary mandate were supposedly
262
undermining VISTA's service orientation.
Balzano's assessment of liberal arts graduates
serving in VISTA is not sympathetic:
It is perhaps one of the greatest ironies of our
time that the great majority of middle class Ameri
cans worked their way into the middle class, yet
their children who have never wanted for the lux
uries of life do not recognize the experience of
their parents as being in the realm of the possible.
Our young people today seem to mock the very idea
that anyone of this country can better h i m s e l f . 22
Balzano recommends that VISTA actively recruit non-college
and skilled volunteers who have an achievement ethic:
If VISTA had an overabundance of skilled tradesmen
flocking to its door wanting to be of service, there
would be no need to tell these people about the
achievement ethic. They believe in it because they
are living it. These people are trying to work
their way into the middle class. The children of
the middle class, who constitute the bulk of VISTA
volunteers, are least likely to believe in that
ethic and it will be the task of any successful
training program to drive this home. If the volun
teers do not believe it, how can they be expected
to motivate anyone?23
Middle class volunteers were ideologically subverting a
rags-to-riches ethic for the poor.
VISTA evaluations convinced Nixon appointees in
OEO that the liberal arts volunteer in community organiza
tion projects was ideologically unpalatable. VISTA must
be restructured to attract skilled volunteers to struc
tured (non-community organization) projects. Theoreti
263
cally, volunteers should be successful examples of mobil
ity from lower to middle class.
An ACTION comparison of national (non-target) and
locally recruited (target) VISTA volunteers suggests that
reliance upon full-time non-target volunteers is out-
O /
moded. Target volunteers were found to have an equal
amount of skills with national volunteers and greater com
munity rapport. The concept of target VISTA volunteers
serving their own communities dovetailed with the Presi
dent's decentralized policymaking approach. ACTION
argued that non-target VISTA volunteers were inferior to
local volunteers from target communities.
Initially VISTA was ignored while OEO program
analysts pondered various VISTA alternatives. For 18
months, VISTA languished in a status of benign neglect:
From January 1969 until September 1970 . . . this
administration failed to nominate a Director for
VISTA. A large portion of senior staff positions
as well as five of the ten regional administrators
. . . were filled with "acting" personnel. By the
summer of 1970, the morale of the program was so
low that program officers and VISTA volunteers were
separately demanding conferences to express dis
satisfaction with the administration's policies of
neglect.25
In July 1970, VISTA volunteers and ex-volunteers
met in Washington to confront OEO and VISTA administrators
264
and form the National VISTA Alliance (NVA) as an advocate
group to press for VISTA reforms.
Balzano and other Nixon appointees in OEO's Office
of Policy and Program Development viewed NVA complaints as
protests of the middle class:
Dissatisfied with VISTA's list of volunteer taboos,
unhappy with state and local rules prohibiting volun
teer involvement in certain kinds of social problems,
i.e., racial integration, upset over what they per
ceived as changes in administration priorities and
resenting Nixon's abolition of "all" occupational
draft deferments.27
NVA complaints reflected the ideological chasm between
volunteer and the Republican administrators.
NVA fears of a partisan reaction against VISTA
were exacerbated a few months later when OEO interoffice
memos, surreptitiously made public, disclosed administra
tion intentions to eliminate VISTA via the mechanism of
executive reorganization:
.. . I do not think the Agency (OEO) can politically
eliminate this program. The program (VISTA) would
have to be eliminated in the context of a much broader
governmental reorganization in which case both VISTA
and Peace Corps could be eliminated for a total
savings of $133 million.28 [Emphasis added]
A month later, NVA reacted predictably when the ACTION
reorganization plan was announced:
. . . our worst fears had been realized. The
265
President had merely chosen a politically less
hazardous means of submerging the VISTA program in
the "context of a broader governmental reorganiza
tion.'^
NVA viewed ACTION'S inclusion of VISTA as a covert Repub
lican attempt to control VISTA community organization
activities and volunteers.
The administration attempted to alleviate merger
anxieties with two inducements: (1) VISTA's organizational
identity and exclusionary anti-poverty policy emphasis
would be institutionalized within ACTION organizationally,
and (2) by promising that domestic anti-poverty funding
would receive an additional $20 million above previous
budgetary requests (thereby obviating financial savings
as a rationale for reorganization). However, VISTA's
expectation of agency autonomy and budgetary increments
were not realized.
It is revealing that neither VISTA nor ACTION
administrators participated in the agreement defining
VISTA's status within ACTION. Senator Javits, member of
the Labor and Public Welfare Committee, conferred with
OMB director Schultz concerning an ACTION organizational
plan to protect VISTA's survival.^ Javits and Schultz
agreed that VISTA, which had been without a permanent
266
director, would be headed by a director for Domestic and
Anti-Poverty Programs. Both VISTA and Peace Corps Asso
ciate Directors would receive substantial authority as:
. . . line operators of ACTION'S programs and will
be supported in a staff capacity by the Assistant
Directors. The net result of these changes will be
to show that the two Associate Directors will be
ACTION program operators.31
VISTA's identity and exclusionary commitment to
anti-poverty programs (a commitment reiterated three times
in Schultz's brief letter)^2 were guaranteed by the
Schultz-Javits agreement.
OMB made assurances that the President's promised
33
$20 million above budgetary requests would
be applied to research and demonstration in the
innovative use of volunteer manpower to help solve
domestic community problems.34
In July 1971, director-designate Blatchford assured Javits
that an additional $20 million would be used for VISTA
programming:
It will all be committed to domestic programming;
the majority of it will be used in projects author
ized by domestic legislation. The actual details
. . . have not been worked out because we wish to
wait for full consultation on it before we make a
final determination.35
VISTA expectation of budgetary and programmatic expansion
were disspelled following Blatchford's Senate confirmation
267
by congressional failure to appropriate the additional
money.
Within a year the NVA denounced ACTION'S supposed
deception:
. . . the VISTA program has been severly cut back.
In the face of promises of a strengthened VISTA
program, we now see a manpower of volunteers in the
field at its lowest ebb in years. . . . In the face
of promises of decreased overhead costs by merging
the administration of constituent programs, we see
skyrocketing administrative costs. . . . These
figures speak for themselves— the regular VISTA pro
gram has been cut back under ACTION.[Emphasis
added]
VISTA supporters naively believed that controversial pro
gramming would be expanded by unsympathetic 0E0 adminis
trators .
ACTION'S first appropriations and independent
authorization bill was passed by the Senate in July 1973,
two years after the ACTION Reorganization Plan. For two
years, ACTION agencies survived by continuing resolution
and reallocation of authorized funds. Senate subcommit
tees which had not participated in reorganization hearings
were hardly anxious to appropriate the President's
promised $20 million increment to VISTA.
ACTION director Blatchford blamed Congress for
ACTION'S budgetary woes and programming cuts. Yet, the
268
President had promised that ACTION would bring about a
"restructuring our system of volunteer services," and that
a "more efficient operation of government would result."
The President also promised that ACTION would provide
broader volunteer service programs and more volunteers
working with public and private agencies and governments.^7
The director of ACTION, a small agency within the Execu
tive Office, gains little by failing to fulfill Presiden
tial promises even when budgets are cut. White House
proximity makes the fulfillment of a Presidential promise
politically visible.
ACTION policymakers in the Office of Program and
Policy Development, began preparation following the
President's January speech, to develop an experimental
alternative to VISTA which would be operative by the next
fiscal year (July).^® An acceptable ACTION program was
developed by reallocating the existent authorized budget
between seven agencies. ACTION policymakers utilized
approved agency budgets to provide both a VISTA alterna
tive and an organizational resource in the reelection
campaign.
Community organization projects made VISTA vul
nerable to the ACTION search for programming resources
269
and the Economic Opportunity Act (EOA) provided the
mechanism for reallocating VISTA programming monies. EOA
Title VIII is divided into two parts which authorize both
full-time and part-time, short-term and experimental
volunteer programs. OMB encouraged VISTA to reevaluate
its primary focus on full-time volunteers:
It is understood that Part B of Title VIII has
either not been implemented at all or has received
only token implementation because of policy or
funding decisions. Accordingly, it would appear
to provide latitude for new programs.40
EOA experimental monies provided Blatchford a resource
for fulfilling the President's pledge to expand "VISTA
type activities— given the funds available and in the
41
time allowed."
However, EOA allowed only 10 percent of VISTA's
total appropriations to be diverted by the director for
42
experimental programs. In March, OMB recommended that
the 10 percent maximum ($3.5 million) be lifted, thereby
arousing NVA fears that
. . . without legislative restraints, the director
could eventually shift emphasis of VISTA from full
time volunteers working in poor communities to part-
time volunteers working in non-poverty related
areas. T 3
270
VISTA's reliance on nationally recruited full-time volun
teers was shifted to a reliance on locally recruited
part-time volunteers in non-traditional VISTA agencies.
ACTION'S budget during fiscal years 1972-1974 is
complex; as one might expect from a budget which was
created by merging eight authorized budgets (FY 1972),
followed by a continuing resolution (FY 1973), and finally
its own act (FY 1974). Nonetheless, programming and
budgetary trends during ACTION'S first fiscal years reveal
a major reallocation of decreasing operational resources.
Reallocation priorities reflect Blatchford's dual objec
tive of simultaneously creating a VISTA alternative pro
gram and utilizing ACTION resources in the 1972 reelection
campaign.
VISTA's share of the total ACTION budget declined
from the FY 1971 peak of $36 million to $25.3 million
(FY 1974).^ ACTION'S budget consistently shows an inter
esting peak in FY 1973 rather than the agency start-up
FY 1972. The research thesis is that FY 1973 increased
expenses reflect ACTION'S partisan activities during the
1972 campaign.
VISTA volunteer strength remains constant as
agency expansion resources and manpower are diverted to
FY 1972 FY 1973 FY 1974
45
Domestic Budget $70,010 $102,796 $92,399
Volunteers (Domestic)^
Full-time 4,586 7,802 7,356
Part-time 12,939 58,100 117,090
VISTA only 3,626 4,924 3,844
Program Support 15.9 14.6
experimental anti-poverty programming. VISTA was not
numerically cut but rather not expanded.
ACTION'S VISTA-alternative program would demon
strate the viability of university students as associate
VISTA colunteers. Months before passage of the Reorgani
zation Act, Executive Office personnel designed a program
to be operational by fall.^
To prepare an alternative VISTA program which
demonstrated anti-poverty innovation, ACTION'S Office of
Policy and Program Development (OPPD) rapidly expanded in
the fall of 1971 to a full-time staff of 29 professionals.
Within two months of ACTION'S authorization, OPPD opera
tionalized a VISTA-alternative--the University Year for
ACTION (UYA). By September UYA programs at eight univer
sities had placed 551 full-time volunteers in the field
and in January, fourteen new schools and 458 more
272
volunteers were added.
UYA was the mechanism by which VISTA resources
were channeled into anti-poverty programming innovation.
Scarcity of resources at ACTION'S creation is underscored
by ACTION'S accelerated push to operationalize UYA's anti
poverty approach. After deciding to operationalize UYA
in January 1972^ following time for local programming
during the fall, OPPD expended efforts in starting UYA
• o 50
programs m September.
Eight universities in August were quickly selected
51
for UYA projects and given VISTA monies in order to
prepare planning proposals for UYA programs. ACTION con
tracted with independent consulting firms to assist uni
versities in proposal writing, student recruitment and
52
training. In addition, OPPD staff members worked with
universities in order to operationalize September UYA
programs. OPPD again gave 14 universities planning grant
53
monies for further UYA expansion in January.
UYA, described by its director as "VISTA in edu-
54
cation," was funded with VISTA monies to experiment with
university students as associate VISTA volunteers. Volun
teers were full-time students but not required to attend
classes. Students received federal monthly stipends and
273
earned full academic credit for service in anti-poverty
organizations.
The National VISTA Alliance's reaction to UYA's
unexpected creation with the VISTA monies was delayed but
vengeful as UYA was portrayed as a "mechanism for the
death of VISTA." NVA accused ACTION of deception: "The
simple fact is that it (UYA) has been funded at the gen
eral expense of VISTA and has contributed to the weakening
of the program in general.
ACTION avoided EOA's 10 percent maximum on experi
mental VISTA projects by funding direct volunteer costs
under regular VISTA monies and management or indirect
costs under the 10 percent experimental proviso. Con
sequently, ACTION was not limited to 10 percent of the
total VISTA budget (approximately $3.3 million) but rather
utilized (FY 1973) $8.5 million"^ to underwrite VISTA's
rival.
After an experimental year, UYA was judged to be
a success and transferred from OPPD to operational status.
By fall 1974, UYA budget and volunteer strength were
approximately half that of VISTA.
VISTA was confronted with a budgetary rival in
allocation of scarce ACTION resources. While maintaining
274
a maximum overall budgetary level, ACTION was still able
to create an alternative to VISTA. OPPD is experimenting
with other anti-poverty approaches and proposes to imple
ment successful programs.
UYA's operational survival is strengthened by
institutionalized clientele support from fifty-five uni
versities which were successfully mobilized to resist NVA
attempts to restrict UYA activities in Congress.
B. ACTION Personnel as a Partisan Resource
ACTION, because of its Executive Office location,
is a significant case in the agency politicization process.
Agency politicization, implemented by Presidentially
appointed senior staffers, brings about ideological modi
fications in agency programming and policymaking. ACTION,
with civil service personnel from the War on Poverty era
and anti-poverty orientations toward poverty was trans
formed from a partisan liability to a resource. Specifi
cally, ACTION personnel and policies were politicized as
campaign resources in 1972.
Minor agencies within the Executive Office have
long been politicized for current partisan priorities.
0E0 and the War on Poverty attempted to mobilize low-
275
income groups for the Democratic Party. Similarly,
ACTION'S modified anti-poverty thrust to achievement-
oriented volunteerism is an exercise in political mobili
zation. However, investigation demonstrates that
Executive Office politicization of ACTION civil service
personnel was not politics as usual and the degree to
which minor civil service personnel were politicized
during the reelection campaign and afterwards, is indica
tive of a new dimension of Presidential power over the
bureaucracy.
ACTION employees were politicized in 1972 by
three methods: (1) recruitment and selection of civil
service (GS) personnel sympathetic to administration
orientations, (2) transferral of unsympathetic personnel
to peripheral jobs, and (3) utilization of Presidential
appointees in overlapping campaign roles.
(1) Recruitment and selection of sympathetic civil
service personnel. Any agency obviously attempts to
recruit staff sympathetic to administration and the agency
goals. ACTION'S controversial creation made careful
employee selection imperative so that ACTION consistently
made partisan orientations the most important criteria in
276
its recruitment and selection process.
Recruitment and selection of sympathetic GS per
sonnel in ACTION was facilitated by two developments
peculiar to agencies created by executive reorganization
and decentralization: (1) expansion in the number of
Presidentially appointed positions in Washington, and
(2) creation of numerous regional GS positions.
NVA charged that by spring 1972 ACTION head
quarters staff had increased by 25 percent and that sig
nificant expansions occurred in three sensitive offices:
(1) Public Affairs (from 30 to 40 positions) , ^ (2) OPPD
58
(from 5 to 23 positions), and (3) Staff placement (from
60 to 120 positions) .^ ACTION records indicate OPPD's
growth was even greater than NVA claimed: from 6 to 29 in
six months. Strangely OPPD rapid expansion is not
reflected in ACTION'S budget which showed 23 employees in
FY 1972 and 7 employees in FY 1973.
Dramatic increase in the Office of Staff Placement
(OSP) is attributed by the Federal Times to active partisan
recruitment:
The ostensible primary purpose of the office is to
locate competent administrators. . . . A staff of
120 is unquestionably excessive for an agency that
had only 300 domestic employees at the time of
277
merger. Rumors concerning the office are rampant,
and it has been speculated by some that many ACTION
employees are actively involved in front running
the 1972 campaign— consequently politicizing a pre
viously non-political program.61
Alan May, OSP's director, systematically recruited former
Republican activists into key ACTION staff positions in
preparation for the campaign.
ACTION, created with a staff of approximately
1,700 employees, had 180 former VISTA career personnel,
20-150 GS transfers from other domestic agencies, and
approximately 1,250 employees classified by State Depart-
62
ment (FS) classification. ACTION maintained nearly
two-thirds of its staff on higher paying FS rather than
GS positions^ even while reducing overall staff size.
Consequently, regional VISTA employees were merged
with newly appointed FS colleagues:
We immediately started to staff-up, around the VISTA
program people, and we added management people:
regional attorneys, grants and contracts adminis
trators . . . and so on.64
Analysis indicates that ACTION'S selection of new regional
personnel was based primarily on regional campaign needs.
Surreptitiously leaked ACTION memoranda provides
an intriguing view of partisan recruitment and selection
criteria for staff positions. OSP was given total
278
responsibility for all recruitment and selection. ACTION
agencies could not recruit staff but only accept or reject
OSP recommendations. Partisan orientations proved to be
the major prerequisite for employment. One candidate for
ACTION'S Colorado State director had the following quali
fications :
She has been active in politics in Denver for some
years and has done such things as: Republican
Committee Woman for Denver precinct 1410 since
1960, was co-chairman of U.S. Senate Campaign in
1968 (Republican), co-chairman of Shoemaker for
Mayor (Republican) in Denver, and was on the cam
paign committee for state legislator in 1964, 1966,
1968, and 1970. She has been active in the Colo
rado Federation of Republican Women.65
Memos indicated that an Elliot Richardson staff member
recommended his former campaign manager for Massachusetts/
Rhode Island director. Although admitting that his quali
fications were only "fair," the memo promised that "he
66
would be very reliable for our purposes."
One regional representative for UYA was hired
directly from the Southern California Committee to Reelect
the President in May 1972. Despite UYA focus on univer
sity programs, the regional representative had neither
advanced degrees nor previous experience in anti-poverty
programs. However, he was active in Baltchford's un
successful congressional campaign and a member of the
279
California State Republican Central Committee.
Political patronage is hardly a new phenomenon in
American politics nor characteristic of one particular
political party. Party workers have long been recruited
for minor administrative offices. Yet symbolically anti
poverty programs were viewed as idealistically untainted
by partisanship. The availability in 1971-72 of numerous
appointive positions in ACTION provided a campaign
resource for the party faithful.
(2) Transferral of unsympathetic GS personnel
to peripheral jobs. ACTION'S merger combined two ideolog
ically diverse personnel groups. Civil service line
employees in existent agencies, i.e., VISTA, Foster Grand
parents, etc. were generally registered Democrats from
career War on Poverty backgrounds. In July 1971, ACTION'S
only regional staff consisted of VISTA employees recently
separated from 0E0.
Employees with primarily FS classifications were
recruited for newly created positions within ACTION.
Presidentially appointed ACTION staff were placed over a
civil service and partially unionized bureaucracy. Par
tisan cleavage between largely ex-VISTA staff and the new
280
ACTION staff was reflective of a broader confrontation
between President Nixon and a hereditary bureaucracy.
Removal of civil service employees is extremely
difficult whereas transferral is more easily facilitated.
Consequently, OSP systematically planned the transferral
of ACTION employees who were politically unacceptable.
Combined with OSP's extensive campaign to recruit person
nel with sympathetic partisan views, ACTION would provide
a manpower resource in the reelection campaign.
The mechanism for removing politically undesirable
GS employees was ACTION'S specially created Federal
Assistance Review Office (FAR). In order to implement
the President's decentralized bureaucracy, OMB requested
each agency in 1969 to create a FAR unit to:
. . . serve as a long-range planning group to study
and analyze program and management system needs:
first to further the effective decentralization
... to the Regions, and later to maintain a con
tinuing review of possible program and management
system improvements.67
Ironically, decentralization was to be implemented by
transferring nineteen middle-level (GS 12-15) regional
employees to Washington. ACTION publicized the proposed
FAR transfers as an "important and career-building assign
ment." Each FAR participant was offered the Washington
281
68
position at an equal or higher GS scale. Each regional
position vacated by FAR transfer would be filled by OSP
selected staff.
ACTION employees selected as FAR participants
interpreted their proposed transfers differently. FAR
nominees were informed by letter and given ten days to
either decline or accept transfer. They were warned that
transfer refusal would constitute a "basis for proposing
your separation from the agency.
Before announcing the FAR nominations, ACTION
advertised a number of new regional positions which were
open to employee application until a March 31, 1972 dead
line. On April 3, ACTION notified 19 employees of their
transfer to the Washington FAR unit and not until April
10 did FAR nominees receive a full FAR job descriptions.^
Upon notification of their FAR reassignments, two
Region IX (San Francisco) nominees were joined by 12
other employees in petitioning Congressmen to investigate
Hatch Act violations of:
. . . the use of employment by the United States in
order to influence a Federal election or for a
reward for political activity in support of politi
cal party candidates, and . . . with the deprivation
of or attempt to threaten a private person, on
account of a political activity in support of or
opposition to any political candidate.^
| ACTION'S FAR nominees had few illusions concerning their
| summons to Washington headquarters.
f |
The petitioning employees publicized interoffice
I memoranda between the regional director and deputy direc- j
! tor, the director and ACTION Associate Director Mould j
which stated that . . it is imperative that certain
individuals be either transferred or terminated from the
Region IX staff." Consequences of delayed staff termina
tion were described as "adverse publicity and deteriora
tion of morale that might do irreparable damage to the
72
election campaign" in California.
The degree to which the ACTION San Francisco staff
was evaluated by political criteria is stressed in the
memoranda. The regional director recommended that ACTION'S
! !
California State director be allowed to remain because
; "I would not expect to use (him) . . . to any great degree
in political activity.A former VISTA program analyst
was to be either transferred or terminated because he had
been
j .. . involved in the Brown campaign in 1962.
. . . but since John would be assigned here in
San Francisco, I don't see that he could ham
us politically.74
283
Anyone who had worked for the defeat of Richard Nixon ten
years earlier was clearly suspect. Another Region IX
employee filed a Civil Service Commission protest stating
that she had been terminated because she registered as a
Democrat and was accused of being a close friend of San
t 1
Francisco Mayor Alioto and Assemblyman Brown.^
Indications that FAR transfers were linked to the
President's reelection campaign and that particularly
Region IX transfers were preparatory to the California
campaign were widely circulated in the press during April
! 76
j 1972. Senator Cranston, who one month later introduced
|
| |
I the 1972 ACTION Act, was particularly concerned with
i
i ". . . partisan political activities in the policymaking
j and personnel decisions of ACTION."^7 Blatchford's press
i
reviews were increasingly accusatory:
In May, Blatchford got into trouble with Congress
when it was revealed that he was seeking the trans
fer of 19 regional officials to Washington, D.C.,
on purely partisan political grounds.78
| In a reminiscent style Blatchford defended FAR to the
Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee:
. . . make it crystal clear that we wish no one to
assume those responsibilities because they fear
declination will result in termination, because we
want it crystal clear that the required civil serv- j
ice language . . . was not meant to imply . . . !
284
termination . . . , because we want to make it
crystal clear that this office is of the highest
importance and highest priority within our agency
and not "dumping grounds" for those we wish to
remove from our regional office.79 [Emphasis
added]
When questioned by the committee, Region IX director
refused to answer questions concerning political criteria
mentioned in the memoranda.
In apocolytic anticipation of Watergate, Senators
Cranston and Eagleton requested the United States
Attorney's Office and the Civil Service Commission to
investigate alleged Hatch Act violations. Coincidentally,
OSP director May resigned to reenter a private career and
ACTION notified FAR nominees that they could "remain in
80
the region without loss of pay or status."
ACTION'S reshuffling of politically untrustworthy
personnel for campaign purposes was thwarted by unexpected
publicity in 1972. However, ACTION director Balzano
reinstituted employee politicization in 1973 for partisan
programming.
(3) Utilization of ACTION Presidential appointees
in overlapping campaign roles. In addition to recruitment
of partisan personnel and reshuffling of GS employees to
aid the reelection campaign, certain ACTION personnel
285
served in overlapping campaign roles. The only recogni
tion of this duality is director Blatchford's role as one
of the President's surrogate candidates.
Blatchford's surrogate role as emissary to youth
was neither identifiably partisan nor separable from his
role as ACTION director. Frequent trips during the cam
paign to key states with press conferences highlighting
local ACTION projects in low-income areas are not blatantly
partisan. Nor is even an address before the Los Angeles
World Affairs Council stressing the Nixon youth accom-
81
plishments overly political.
However, a Chicago speech to the Organization for
the Rebirth of the Ukraine reflected a more partisan role:
Today . . . sidewalks have become narrower for
protest marchers and welfare lines. The political
Bonnie and Clydes, the Weathermen are gone. These
days you don't even see much of the Abbie Hoffmans
and Harry Rubins unless you happen to tune in your
television sets to the Democratic National Conven
tion. 82
Typical of the surrogate candidate's overlapping
campaign function was Blatchford's stand-in for Nixon to
receive a painting, "Nixon at Andau." The highly romanti
cized painting portrays a grave Vice President receiving
Hungarian refugees at the Austrian border in 1956. The
painting was presented by the National Republican Heritage
286
Groups (Nationalities) Council to Nixon via Blatchford in
an unveiling ceremony:
. . . intended to highlight the importance of ethnic
vote in the 1972 campaign. . . . The ceremony was
attended by representatives of all nationalities
groups active in the campaign.83 [Emphasis added]
Admittedly, Blatchford was not a major surrogate
candidate and even in California was not utilized to the
degree of Romney, Finch, Rienecke, et al. Although
insignificant, a minor administrator in an unimportant
White House agency was utilized as a campaign resource.
Nor was Blatchford the only ACTION/Washington
employee redirected as a campaign resource. In muckraking
style, the Federal Times charged that ACTION'S Office of
Research and Writing (ORW) operated as a campaign vehicle
by employing three FS employees:
... on a full time basis to produce campaign
speeches and keep abreast of Republican Party
election affairs. . . . A recent assignment of
this group . . . was to assimilate data from
Republican Party factbooks detailing state-by-
state demographic statistics on voter r eg istration.
ORW members were charged by the Federal Times with taking
orders from Blatchford1s campaign manager who supposedly
. . . operates as Blatchford's political arm on a
salary close to $30,000. Her travel budget for
this fiscal year was estimated at nearly $100,000.
She is regarded as a political protege of Presiden-
287
tial advisor Robert Finch.
Sources say she works closely with John Treanor,
Blatchford1s advance man. Both are foreign service
employees whose political activities are restricted
by the Hatch Act.
Also involved in the operation, according to
sources, is Barry Berg, speechwriter for . . .
Ruckelshaus. (Berg) . . . was recently detailed
. . . to ACTION'S Office of Research and Writing
for purposes of organizing it into a unit.85
Although most of the Federal Times allegations are "blind
copy" and rely on unnamed sources, the investigator's
encounters®® with these ACTION administrators substantiate
their dual political campaign roles.
This investigation of ACTION'S creation and
activities during the reelection campaign (1971-72)
underscores its partisan aspects. ACTION'S creation by
departmental reorganization reflect an effort to control
radical VISTA programming rather than usual reorganiza-
tional objectives. ACTION both recruited and transferred
personnel for campaign objectives. Analysis demonstrates
that ACTION partisan activities were reflective of a
pervasive campaign orientation which affected even the
most unimportant White House agencies in 1972.
288
H I . Realignment of Program Goals and Objectives to
Reflect New Achievement Ethic Values
(1973-74)
In addition to deradicalizing VISTA and creating
a reelection campaign resource, ACTION began in 1973 to
significantly modify anti-poverty policymaking assumptions
concerning poverty.
ACTION goals and programming were changed from
anti-poverty orientations to those more reflective of an
achievement oriented view of the poor. Coercive changes
in basic policymaker values and orientations to poverty
demonstrate an additional politicizing variable in a minor
executive agency. Politicization of ACTION anti-poverty
goals and programs is most significant in the post-election
Balzano era (1973-74).
A. ACTION Poverty Goals; The Shift from Anti-
Poverty to Volunteerism
This investigation shows that ACTION'S central
raison d'etat was changed by Balzano from anti-poverty to
volunteerism in 1973. Among Executive Office staff mem
bers, 0E0 and ACTION were viewed as anti-poverty agencies
with similar goals and objectives. Although under
Blatchford ACTION and 0E0 were somewhat similar, Balzano
289
has departed from OEO's anti-poverty mandate to a distinc
tive ACTION emphasis on achievement oriented volunteerism.
Both anti-poverty and volunteerism are approaches to
poverty problem solving.
Nixon's 1968 campaign promised "a new reliance on
voluntary efforts" and volunteers "a new level of official
87
public recognition.' The President created a National
Program for Voluntary Action and promised that volunteer
88
support would be "a major goal" of his administration.
Ostensibly, ACTION was created within the White House to
coordinate the volunteerism movement.
Volunteerism is portrayed as an untapped remedy
for social problems.
. . . One of the greatest potential forces for
solving contemporary social problems is volun
teerism, the helping hand that each of us can
give to those in need.89
Volunteer service would theoretically strengthen individ
ual character by bringing out "the best instincts within
the American people"^® and insure participatory democracy:
The American tradition of voluntary improvement—
of freely committing one's time and talents in the
search for civic improvement and social progress--
gives an extra dimension to the meaning of
democracy.91
Voluntary, without governmental coercion, helping one's
290
neighbor was viewed by President Nixon as a deep cultural
value derived from the Bible and frontier experience:
The concept of people voluntarily working together
to improve the quality of life in their communities
and the nation is deeply rooted in our American
tradition.92
Volunteerism would not be limited to full-time volunteers
but rather would involve millions of Americans.
Upon taking office, director Balzano reaffirmed
his commitment to the President's help-thy-neighbor
philosophy:
I believe in this agency and the philosophy on
which it is based. What is more, the President
believes in this agency and agrees with that
philosophy. It is a philosophy which says that
those of us who are more fortunate than others
should take the time to help others to help them
selves . 93
Volunteerism as a cultural value is non-partisan and
reflective of Kennedy's earlier emphasis on volunteeristic
idealism, i.e., the Peace Corps. Both Johnson and Nixon
administrations' anti-poverty policymaking approaches
volunteerism as a method of encouraging participation and
decentralizing decision making. Both the Democratic War
on Poverty and the Republican New Federalism share the
orientation that anti-poverty decision making should
involve volunteers as a method of reducing poverty.
Balzano summarized the Nixon view of local
volunteerism:
He (Nixon) has continually expressed the belief
that those in the community who are close to the
problems, understand those problems and possible
solutions to them better than those who are con
centrated in Washington, D.C.
He has expressed his desire to decentralize
decision making so that those who are close to the
problem can rightly assume control over the solu
tion. 94
Both War on Poverty and New Frontier poverty policymaking
accepted volunteerism as a problem solving strategy.
Great Society volunteers focused on exclusively poverty-
related problems and to assist the poor. Balzano has
rejected an exclusive anti-poverty orientation and focuses
on motivating individuals to adopt an achievement orien
tation. ACTION discarded its exclusive Blatchford era
(1971-72) emphasis on anti-poverty projects and expanded
its minority clientele, e.g., black, brown, red, to include
European groups. Balzano modified ACTION'S mission so
that it reflects the President's volunteerism mandate to
alleviate all social problems.
Several factors influenced Blatchford to continue
an exclusive programming emphasis on non-European minor
ities and poverty problems: (1) substantial Senate and
VISTA opposition to ACTION programmatic changes,
292
(2) Blatchford's Peace Corps familiarity with anti-poverty
programs, and (3) the pervasive influence of anti-poverty
orientations.
Repeatedly during hearings on the ACTION Reorgani
zation Plan, Nixon administrators stressed a commitment
to fight poverty. A strong ACTION pledge to continue
exclusive anti-poverty orientations was essential to
Senate confirmation:
. . . there is no question that among the missions
of the agencies, addressing the problems of poverty
is No. 1. I would see no change in that and I want
to seek no change in that.95
Even in late 1972, ACTION stressed to a subcommittee that
its predominant mission was p o v e r t y .^6
Throughout his term, Blatchford consistently
stressed a commitment to anti-poverty volunteerism, prob-
97
lems of poverty, and poverty-oriented programs. The
ideal VISTA volunteer was described as an "individual who
lives daily with poverty and knows it best and who under-
go
stands the poverty syndrome. ° ACTION would supposedly
maintain its poverty orientation by choosing local project
sponsors who work closely with the problems of poverty and
those related to people living in poverty.^9
293
. . . the whole operation of ACTION, the whole dedi
cation and commitment of this program is to solving
problems . . . ; problems related in some way to
the way people live and desire to have a better
life— poverty related problems.100
ACTION was designed by Republicans as a means of utilizing
volunteers to reduce poverty.
ACTION'S exclusive anti-poverty goal was not the
rhetoric of a partisan director. VISTA, Peace Corps, UYA,
etc. designed and evaluated programs by measurable anti
poverty impact. Local projects were required to demon
strate a relationship to poverty and poverty objectives
were essential in all ACTION programs.
Blatchford's exclusionary emphasis on anti-poverty
programming was neither the President's intent nor
Balzano's later perspective. ACTION'S intention was to
focus on community rather than anti-poverty problems.
Community problems include any social problem which the
community so defines and may only secondarily reduce
poverty. For example, better health care may result from
VISTA volunteers working in health projects but a reduc
tion in poverty is only hypothetical.
The President consistently emphasized that volun
teers cannot be limited to anti-poverty projects:
294
We have already had considerable experience in
dealing with the problems of poverty through the
use of volunteers. Now we must build effectively
upon this experience and find new ways to use more
effectively the volunteers presently serving in
poverty areas, as well as in all other areas, and
to stimulate new programs so that additional num
bers of volunteers can assist in the solution of
community and national problems!-^ [Emphasis
added]
Blatchford avoided an exclusive ACTION anti-poverty
orientation and the ACTION goals did not include poverty
reduction whereas EOA proposed to eradicate poverty.
ACTION merges selected poverty and social service
agencies into one organization. ACTION does not even
include all volunteer agencies, i.e., Teacher Corps, etc.
ACTION'S seven agencies embody Nixon's alliance between
103
the generations by combining four programs primarily
for youth (VISTA, Peace Corps, UYA, NSVP) and four elderly
programs (Foster Grandparents, RSVP, SCORE, ACE). ACTION
combines volunteer agencies with conceptually disparate
goals. Only VISTA maintains a direct anti-poverty
emphasis. For example, RSVP and NSVP volunteers come
from all income brackets and work in social problem proj
ects. Foster Grandparents have low incomes, are paid a
minimum wage, and work in agencies for handicapped chil
dren. ACTION reflects a volunteer programming diversity
295
of social problem orientations.
ACTION policymakers accepted exclusive anti
poverty orientations (1971-72) without expanding the
President's broader social intentions. Following the
1972 election, Nixon filled Blatchford1s vacated position
with Balzano whose personal background indicated a new
direction in ACTION programming. Originally an illiterate
sanitation worker, Balzano earned his doctorate while
working on the White House staff under Charles Colson.
Balzano viewed his role as
. . . "the President's envoy to the world of ethnic
blue collar workers"; the resident hard hat in the
White House; and Nixon's favorite garbage collec
tor.
Because of my overt commitment to America, its
government, its flag, and its traditional values,
I have been called "a middle American cheer
leader."104
Balzano's dissertation on VISTA and his experiences as an
0E0 Senior Program analyst, reflected a disenchantment
with exclusive anti-poverty programming.
Balzano expanded ACTION'S anti-poverty thrust to:
. . . broaden opportunities for volunteer service
among all Americans and increase the effectiveness
of volunteer efforts in solving community problems.10^
Theoretically, ACTION failed to achieve momentum during
the Blatchford era because of compartmentalized policy
296
maker attitudes:
The real tragedy of this is that whatever momentum
we might have had as a result of the merger has been
hampered if not totally stopped. Our prime concern
must be to revitalize that momentum again; further
we must achieve that programming potential envisioned
as emanating from the merger (ACTION).106
Balzano's mission at ACTION was to reorganize the agency
so that it reflected the Presidential intent to "above all
make our programs responsive to the broad base of the
American people."
Balzano felt that anti-poverty orientations
reflected public opinion in the early sixties but that
the seventies demanded a programmatic shift:
The programs of the 1960's operated under a
far different mandate than those of today. Their
focus, approach and programmatic style enjoyed the
sanction of the majority of Congress and, to a
large extent, the American people.
. . . the national attitude which prevailed in
the 1960's had changed markedly. Traditional
sources of support for our program in Congress had
been reduced substantially. The American taxpayer,
the very source of our existence, had been dis
illusioned about the ability of our programs to
change with the times.107
Balzano believed ACTION should be programmatically
involved in social projects which local establishments
would support.
Balzano outlined six agency goals which were
297
intended ". . .to provide for the first time a direction
which is specific to the entire agency and its mandate."-^®
Balzano's belated ACTION goals came as a surprise to those
who argued for ACTION'S creation in 1971. Nonetheless,
Balzano's goals are a major redirection of ACTION anti
poverty programming.
Balzano's goals do not mention poverty or tradi
tional minority groups but rather heterogeneous communi-
• • • the Agency will try to serve a broader spec
trum of people of all kinds and not try to deal
with "social and economic" problems of all kinds.
. . . The purpose is to avoid being too narrowly
characterized by the public at large and to avoid
becoming associated with one segment of the popu
lation. 110 [Emphasis added]
Supposedly, 0E0 suffered because it appealed to a few
minority groups. ACTION should not be limited to the
poor or non-European minorities but rather expanded to
include labor unions and European ethnics. ACTION should
help not only poverty communities but also non-poverty
communities with volunteers:
The community is to include the total community in
a given area, such as the Polish American Congress,
or labor unions, i.e., local groups that heretofore
were not being considered as part of the "target
population" of government programs. Further, it
includes any type of group that traditionally has
298
not sought help from the city, county, 0E0, or any
of the other established agencies.HI
In order to implement ACTION'S new thrust into communi
ties excluded by anti-poverty orientations, i.e., unions,
European ethnics, Balzano required resocialization insti
tutes for all administrative personnel which would
theoretically result in attitudinal changes regarding
112
poverty orientations.
A prototype thrust into European ethnic communi
ties was originally developed as VISTA's Project Senior
Find, which recruited elderly European ethnics as VISTA
volunteers to apprise isolated European ethnics of social
services. Project Senior Find was conceived and imple
mented in 1972 by ACTION Region V director Myron Kurupas.
Kurupas, long active in Ukranian affairs was one of the
1971 charter members of the National Republican Heritage
Groups (Nationalities) Council which was
. . . formed at the instigation of the Republican
National Committee . . . (to) offer(s) the oppor
tunity to Republican office-seekers . . . closer
coordination with leaders of ethnic communities. H-3
The Council was formed as "the first national ethnic aux
iliary to a political party in American history" to:
. . . incorporate all American ethnic groups into
the organization and get as many ethnic Americans
299
involved in this year's campaign as is possible.
Balzano, after leaving 0E0 to join the White House staff
in 1972, toured 30 states during the reelection campaign-^
as "the eyes and ears of President Nixon for ethnic and
116
blue collar communities." Balzano's activities were
directed by White House aide Charles Colson, whom Balzano
maintains is "one of the cleanest guys in government. "H?
Balzano is attempting a total reorientation of
personnel attitudes by gambling that a bureaucracy can
learn new policy orientations. Key to Balzano's attitudi-
nal restructuring are regional training and programming
staff who are supposedly crucial in shaping volunteer
attitudes. Volunteer training sessions must theoretically
be redesigned to prevent radicalization of VISTAs.
Balzano conducted an intensive one-month reorientation
conference for all training and program officers.
Can deeply held anti-poverty orientations be
changed? This investigation analyzes three efforts during
the Nixon administration to change anti-poverty orienta
tions: Howard Phillips' programmatic changes at OEO;
UYA's effort to create an alternate VISTA model; and
Balzano's attitudinal reorientation efforts. The extent
to which anti-poverty decision maker orientations are
300
changed reflects the independence of anti-poverty
approaches to poverty.
B. ACTION Goals: Balzano1s Achievement
Oriented Volunteerism
Subterranean policymaking occurs in all minor
agencies of the Executive Office. Analysis of decision
making in a newly created executive agency underscores a
long neglected arena of Presidential policymaking with a
wealth of political activity and potential policy studies.
Case studies of minor Executive Office agencies and
reorganization plans provide insights into a subterranean
level of policymaking in the White House.
The ACTION case study underscores several general
izations about minor Executive Office agencies as
(1) politicized partisan resources; (2) reflective of
Presidential priorities and intent interpreted by White
House staff; and (3) personalized fiefdoms administered
by White House staff proteges, i.e., Balzano (Colson),
Phillips (Haldeman), Blatchford (Finch).
The President is isolated and inattentive to minor
Executive Office activities and subterranean policymaking.
Yet ACTION and its little noticed agencies are not
removed from the Presidency as a reflection of Presiden-
301
tial orientations and priorities. ACTION, unlike even
cabinet level departments, is headed by a director who
is a protege of a key White House adviser. Presidential
advisers struggle to place their lieutenants as directors
or staff members of minor White House agencies. These
proteges, i.e., Balzano, Blatchford, Phillips, viewed
their agencies as ideal instruments to demonstrate the
efficacy of Presidential goals and directives. Often
agency policy orientations must be reshaped. If so,
publicity for successful administrative experiments may
gain White House recognition.
This investigation analyzes a decade of anti
poverty policymaking from its 1964 inception to its 1974
restructuring. Analysis has focused on the influential
role of anti-poverty policymaker orientations. Empirical
analysis will demonstrate the independent influence and
degree to which predetermined anti-poverty concepts shape
all approaches to the poverty issue.
Analysis of anti-poverty policymaking identifies
five orientations which were accepted as an anti-poverty
policymaking framework. Decision maker anti-poverty
orientations were derived from the early sixties' Zeitgeist
302
and cultural ambivalence toward the poor. Anti-poverty
orientations also reflected a Democratic desire to
incorporate new groups of alienated poor into the
Democratic Party.
Anti-poverty orientations articulated by the
Shriver Task Force and subsequent War on Poverty decision
making reflects a framework of orientations toward
poverty:
(a) Exclusive poverty orientation. Poverty
reduction objectives should be stated in all programming.
Poverty goals exclude all objectives which cannot be
measurably shown to reduce poverty.
(b) Community development. Anti-poverty program
ming objectives and strategies must theoretically reflect
felt-needs of the target community as articulated by
elected representatives from the poor. The community
development orientation was replaced after 1966 reactions
with Planned-Impact-Programming.
(c) Restructured federalism. Anti-poverty policy
making is appropriately made by Washington OEO administra
tors in conjunction with local community groups. Non
national governmental units are bypassed as unreliable
poverty policymakers.
j
(d) Volunteerism as intervention strategy. Hard
I core poverty can be significantly reduced by mobilizing |
volunteers to teach the poor.
(e) Maximum feasible participation of the poor.
: The poor should participate in local decision making to
; i
the maximum extent possible in order to create political
efficacy and economic achievement orientations. Far from
guillotining anti-poverty programs in 1969, the Nixon
administration engaged in anti-poverty programming for
six years. Although Nixon appointees continued most anti
poverty programs, no ideological modifications in existing;
War on Poverty orientations were attempted until 1973.
Anti-poverty programs remained intact even though dele
gated to other departments. ACTION, created in 1971 from
| a composite of seven volunteer agencies by executive
! reorganization, was a realignment of anti-poverty programs!
in order to implement new administrative approaches to the
; poverty issue. j
The President's FY 1974 budgetary message
| announced his intention to either transfer or abolish six !
; Executive Office agencies in order to save $2 million,
304
and trim the size of the White House staff from 4,250 to
1,935 professionals. More than 60 percent of the cut
would be enacted by the abolishment of 0E0. Yet, ACTION'S
budget and staff were unaffected by the proposed economies.
This investigation demonstrates that ACTION'3
reorganization occurred for partisan objectives in the
1972 reelection campaign. Recruitment of party activists,
politicization of VISTA staff and programming reflect
partisan objectives. Reorganizational objectives of
administrative efficiency and budgetary savings were not
obtained. It is highly improbable that the President
increased the White House staff size by 25 percent in
order to create a new agency.
This investigation has also emphasized the pre
vailing anti-poverty approach to poverty utilized by both
ACTION and 0E0 administrators. The intensity of anti
poverty orientations will be tested by UYA, ACTION, and
0E0 efforts to innovate in poverty policymaking.
305
Footnotes to Chapter VII
1. U.S., Congress, Senate, Reorganization Plan
No. 1 of 1971, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Execu
tive Reorganization and Government Research of the Commit
tee on Government Operations, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess.,
1971, p. 1.
2. U.S., Congress, Senate, To Extend the Reorgan
ization Act, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Execu
tive Reorganization and Government Research of the Commit
tee on Government Operations, 92nd Cong., 1st. sess.,
1971, Also see Reorganization Plan No. 1.
3. U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record,
92nd Cong., 1st Sess., April 26, 1971, S.R. 108.
4. U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record,
92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., April 4, 1972, S.3450.
5. U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record,
93rd Cong., 1st Sess., March 8, 1973, S.1148.
6. Ibid., July 18, 1973, S.1148.
7. Ibid.
8. U.S. Code, §901(a), Title VIII, as quoted by
President Nixon in his message to the House of Representa
tives, in U.S. House, Congressional Record, 92nd Cong.,
1st Sess., March 24, 1971, H.Doc. 92-74, p. 3.
9. Nixon, Public Papers: 1971, p. 466.
10. Senator Jacob Javits, in Reorganization Plan
No. 1 of 1971, p. 3.
11. Reorganization Plan No. 1, p. 62.
12. VISTA, VISTA Volunteer Magazine (Washington,
D.C.: Office of Economic Opportunity, n.d.), p. 20.
306
13. Peace Corps, "Brazil Goias School Lunch and
Minas Gerais RCA Ag.," A Training Project of the Experi
ment in International Living (Brattleboro, Vt., July 7-
September 29, 1967), n.p.
14. ACTION: Fiscal Year 1974 Budget Domestic
Programs, Submission to the Congress (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1973), Appendixes
1-2.
15. Ibid., pp. 1-3.
16. Ibid.
17. Gottlieb, VISTA and Its Volunteers.
18. Ibid., p. 140.
19. VISTA, Office of Evaluation, "An Analysis
of the Conflict and Controversy Associated with VISTA
Volunteer Activity— Its Causes, Consequences and Cures"
(Washington, D.C., March 30, 1970).
20. Michael P. Balzano, Jr. "The Political and
Social Ramifications of the VISTA Program: A Question
of Ends and Means"(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Georgetown University, 1971), pp. 72-228.
21. Ibid., pp. 476-477.
22. Ibid., p. 473.
23. Ibid., p. 474.
24. ACTION, A Study of Target and Non-Target
VISTA Volunteers (Washington, D.C.: ACTION, March 1973),
52 pp.
25. Thomas L. Newberry, Testimony in Reorganiza
tion Plan No. 1, p. 36.
26. National VISTA Alliance, "Priority Resolu
tions" (Washington, D.C., July 27, 1970), p. 1. (mimeo)
307
27. Balzano, "The Political and Social Ramifica
tions, VISTA," p. 10.
28. John Wilson, "Memo from John Wilson to Frank
Carlucci," reprinted as Exhibit 2 in Reorganization Plan
No. 1, p. 53.
29. Newberry, Testimony, p. 38.
30. "Letter from George P. Schultz to Hon. Jacob
K. Javits," Exhibit 39, in Reorganization Plan No. 1,
pp. 396-397.
31. Schultz, "Letter," p. 396.
32. Ibid., pp. 396-397.
33. Nixon, Public Papers: 1971, p. 466.
34. Arnold R. Weber, "Questions Re: ACTION by
Senator Charles Percy for Arnold R. Weber, Associate
Director, 0MB," Exhibit 25 in Reorganization Plan No. 1,
p. 364.
35. Joseph H. Blatchford, in U.S., Congress,
Senate, Nomination on Joseph H. Blatchford, Hearings
before the Committee on Labor Public Welfare, 92nd Cong.,
1st Sess., 1971, p. 4.
36. Douglas A. Richardson, Testimony in ACTION
Act of 1972 and ACTION Domestic Programs, pt. II, p. 334.
37. Nixon, Public Papers: 1971, p. 470.
38. Ibid.
39. Blatchford, Nomination, p. 33.
40. Office of Business and Management (0MB),
"Briefing Book on Reorganization Plan No. 1," submitted
as Exhibit 36 in Reorganization Plan No. 1, p. 392.
308
41. Joseph H. Blatchford, "Response to Congres
sional Inquiry of March 24, 1972," Letters and Documents
(Washington, D.C.: ACTION, April 5, 1972), p. 3.
42. U.S. Code, §29993a, Title VIII, §821.
43. Newberry, Testimony, p. 39.
44. "169.4 Million Requested for ACTION Pro
grams," InterACTION, I, No. 10 (July 1973), 1.
45. ACTION FY 1974 Budget, p. v.
46. Ibid., p. ix.
47. Blatchford, Nomination, p. 33.
48. Arlene Krimgold, Everything You Always
Wanted to Know About UYA*: University Year for ACTION:
An Evaluation (Washington, D.C.: ACTION/University Year
for ACTION, February 1973), p. 11.
49. ACTION, "Planning Grant Guidelines: Univer
sity Year for ACTION" (Washington, D.C.: Office of Policy
and Program Development, n.d., issued Fall 1971), 16 pp.
(mimeo) .
50. Blatchford, Nomination, p. 5.
51. Krimgold, Everything You Always Wanted to
Know About UYA*, p. 11.
52. Most of this training and consulting assist
ance was contracted to the General Learning Corporation:
Proposal to ACTION to Prepare Volunteers for the Univer
sity Year for ACTION (Washington, D.C.: General Learning
Corporation, July 8, 1971), n.p.
53. Krimgold, Everything You Always Wanted to
Know, p. 14.
54. Jerry M. Brady, "University Year for ACTION:
A Report," given before the 27th National Conference on
Higher Education (Chicago, 111., March 6, 1972), p. 3.
55. Hon. Frank Thompson, Jr., in ACTION Act of
1972, p. 308.
56. ACTION FY 1974 Budget, p. 2-1.
57. National VISTA Alliance, "VISTA Heading for
Oblivian: A Report on Fiscal Mismanagement and Poor
Administration in ACTION," Washington, D.C., n.d. (mimeo).
58. ACTION FY 1974 Budget, p. 6-2.
59. NVA, "VISTA Heading for Oblivion," p. 6.
60. ACTION Act of 1972, pt. II, pp. 235-236.
61. NVA, "VISTA Heading for Oblivion."
62. George C. Koch, in Blatchford Nomination,
p. 35.
63. ACTION FY 1974 Budget, p. 6-2.
64. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare, Nomination: Christopher M. Mould,
Hearings before Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., September 1972, p. 23.
65. Ibid., p. 10.
66. Ibid., p. 23.
67. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare, Nomination: Charles W. Howe, Jr.,
Hearings before Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1972, p. 12.
68. Ibid.
69. Christopher Mould in ACTION Act of 1972,
p. 88.
70. ACTION Act of 1972, pt. I, pp. 88-89.
71. Ibid., pt. I, p. 90.
310
72. John A. Butler, "Personnel Changes in Region
IX," ACTION, Region IX Memoranda to Christopher Mould,
reprinted in ACTION Act of 1972, pt. I, pp. 100-101.
73. Ibid., p. 102.
74. Ibid., p. 94.
75. Rosetta Gainey, "Letter to A. T. Briley,"
in ACTION Act of 1972, pt. I, pp. 106-111.
76. Badhwar, October 18, 1972. The leaked memo
randa are reprinted in ACTION Act of 1972, pp. 99-111.
77. Sen. Alan Cranston, in Nomination on Charles
W. Ervin, Hearings before the Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, U.S. Senate, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess.,
October 12, 1972, p. 8.
78. Inderjit Badhwar, "Use of ACTION— Employees
Alleged in Nixon Campaign," Federal Times, October 18,
1972.
79. Blatchford, in ACTION Act of 1972, pt. I,
p. 61.
80. Nomination: Christopher M. Mould, p. 19.
81. Joseph H. Blatchford, "Nixon and Youth,"
Speech delivered before the World Affairs Council of Los
Angeles (June 23, 1972).
82. Blatchford, excerpts from speech, in Badhwar,
"Use of ACTION," p. 1.
83. "Hungarian Masterpiece Unveiled for Washing
ton Visitors," California Republican Nationalities News,
I, No. 2 (November 1972), 3.
84. Badhwar, "Use of ACTION," p. 1.
85. Ibid.
311
86. One example: In the spring of 1973, the
investigator was approached by Treanor and Williams to
work in Blatchford's campaign for Mayor of Los Angeles.
Blatchford subsequently decided not to run.
87. Nixon, Public Papers: 1971, p. 456.
88. Nixon, Public Papers: 1969, p. 911.
89. President Nixon, "President Supports Volun
tarism," InterACTION, I, No. 10 (July 1973), 2.
90. Michael P. Balzano, "Balzano Places Community
First," InterACTION, I, No. 7 (April 1973), 1.
91. Nixon, Public Papers: 1971, p. 456.
92. Ibid., p. 378.
93. Balzano, "Balzano Places Community First,"
p. 1.
94. Balzano, InterACTION (July 1973), p. 1:3.
95. Mould, Nomination, p. 9.
96. Ibid., p. 11.
97. Blatchford, Testimony in Reorganization Plan
No. 1, pp. 112-113.
98. Ibid., p. 115.
99. Ibid., p. 127.
100. Ibid., p. 131.
101. ACTION, "Planning Grant Guidelines," p. 1.
102. Nixon, Public Papers: 1971, p. 33.
103. President Nixon, "Text of Nixon's Speech at
University of Nebraska," 1971: The Third Year of the
Nixon Presidency (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quar
terly, 1972), p. 111-A.
312
104. Balzano, InterACTION (April 1973), p. 1.
105. Michael P. Balzano, ACTION News, May 15,
1973, p. 1.
106. Balzano, InterACTION (July 1973), p. 5.
107. Ibid.
108. Russ Pratt and Jack Butler, "Washington
Meeting with Mr. Balzano," ACTION: Region IX Interoffice
Memo to All ACTION Staff (May 14, 1973), p. 1.
109. Balzano, InterACTION (July 1973), p. 5.
110. Pratt and Butler, "Washington Meeting with
Mr. Balzano," p. 1.
111. Ibid., p. 2.
112. Balzano, InterACTION (July 1973), p. 5.
113. California Republican Heritage Groups (CRHG)
Council handout, Los Angeles, September 1973.
114. National Republican Heritage Groups
(Nationalities) Council handout distributed by CRHG Coun
cil, Los Angeles, September 1973.
115. The National Observer, September 22, 1973,
pp. 1-3; Chicago Sun Times, May 18, 1973,p. 56.
116. Washington Evening Star and Daily News,
March 16, 1973, A-13; May 26, 1973.
117. Balzano, "University Year for ACTION Con
ference Dinner," Speech delivered on November 2, 1973,
Washington, D.C.
CHAPTER VIII
THE ANTI-POVERTY POLICYMAKING PARADIGM:
FLUCTUATION AND CHANGE
Three approaches during the Nixon administration
attempt to change anti-poverty policymaking. Rather than
immediately abolishing War on Poverty agencies and pro
grams, the Nixon administration encouraged bureau heads in
modifying past anti-poverty approaches to reflect the
goals and objectives of Nixon's New Federalism. Assess
ment is made of comparative successes in three efforts to
change anti-poverty policymaking:
I. The Office of Economic Opportunity (0E0). 0E0
focused on programmatic research into new anti-poverty
models which could be adopted by federal and state agen
cies. As indicated, OEO's extensive research sits on
dusty shelves and 0E0 is scheduled to be dismantled in
1974.
II. The University Year for Action (UYA). The
Nixon administration created ACTION (1971) and the experi
mental UYA program as alternative program models for
313
314
anti-poverty policymakers. ACTION'S Office of Policy and
Program Development designed UYA as a break with tradi
tional anti-poverty policymaking approaches by creating
innovative and creative programs.
III. ACTION'S Staff Institutes (1973). The anti
poverty case study analyzes ACTION'S brief history under
two directors: Blatchford (1971-72) and Balzano (1973-74).
It notes Blatchford's disinclination and Balzano's dedi
cation to changing anti-poverty policymaking orientations.
Anti-poverty policymaking analysis will focus on Balzano's
intensive resocialization Institutes for ACTION staff as
an instrument of attitudinal change.
I. The Office of Economic Opportunity, 1964-74, R.I.P.:
The Failure of Anti-Poverty Research
Anti-poverty policymaking is_ OEO's mercurial
history during a brief decade of existence. As indicated,
the Nixon administration did not initially liquidate 0E0.
Rather, 0E0 underwent five years of policy experimentation
and programmatic revisions: First phase (1969-70) deci
sions to depoliticize OEO's operational programs; second
phase (1971-72) delegation of OEO operations to executive
departments and OEO's redirection to anti-poverty research;
315
and final victory of Howard Phillips' ideological dis
mantlement of 0E0.
Nixon administration efforts to remold 0E0 pro
gramming were unsuccessful. 0E0 never fully escaped its
status as a War on Poverty program within the Nixon
administration and remained a political liability to
Republicans. Finally, 0E0 succumbed to Phillips' partisan
assault and larger executive reorganization priorities.
Despite its demise, 0E0 policies and programs
represent a thesaurus of anti-poverty orientations. OEG
was the mechanism of anti-poverty policies. 0E0 and the
War on Poverty were simultaneously forged from the Great
Society crucible. Analysis of the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations isolates discrete orientations which com
prise a paradigm of anti-poverty policymaking. Anti
poverty orientations reflect values which policymakers
assumed regarding poverty, the poor, and social change in
1964.
The extent to which the 1964-68 anti-poverty
policymaking paradigm remains operative in the changed
policymaking environment of the Nixon administration must
be assessed. The anti-poverty paradigm is not a rigid
mechanism but rather a system in fluctuation. Particular
316
policymaking orientations may change or be replaced with
out invalidating paradigm influence as an independent
policymaking variable. Policymaking analysis indicates
a changing anti-poverty paradigm from 1964-1974 (see
Figure 1).
0E0, not the anti-poverty paradigm, is dead.
Republican administration anti-poverty programs do not
have OEO's partisan albatross. It was perhaps improbable
that 0E0 would innovatively break the anti-poverty para
digm. However, Republican anti-poverty policies should
logically produce a new policymaking paradigm.
Analysis focuses on two efforts during the Nixon
administration to specifically change anti-poverty pro
gramming. ACTION'S University Year for Action is an
attempt to change anti-poverty orientations by creating
new anti-poverty programming. Dr. Balzano's Staff
Institutes proposed to change the policymaking paradigm
by changing decision maker attitudes about programming.
II. ACTION'S University Year for Action (UYA): An
Effort in Programming Innovation
As indicated, UYA was created simultaneously with
ACTION'S own inception in 1971. UYA was structured by
ACTION'S Office of Policy and Program Development (OPPD)
as an experimental alternative to VISTA programming.
Theoretically, UYA would be the first' * ' of several inno
vative models in anti-poverty programming. Existent
anti-poverty orientations would supposedly be changed by
OPPD's new anti-poverty program models.
2
UYA's three original goals focus on mobilizing
student volunteers and universities as anti-poverty
resources. UYA later posited four agency goals which also
stress UYA's potential as an anti-poverty vehicle:
(a) To provide effective manpower to work on poverty
problems.
(b) To decentralize volunteer program administration
using educational institutions.
(c) To combine community service and academic study
in an integrated one-year program.
(d) To encourage university assistance to local
poverty communities.3
In contrast to regular VISTAs, UYA volunteers
would theoretically be able to mobilize student and uni
versity resources in fighting poverty.
A. The Anti-Poverty Policymaking Paradigm:
An Exclusive Anti-Poverty Orientation
As UYA's first and last goals emphasize, UYA's
primary goal^ is to fight poverty and assist the poor.
Other UYA educational or volunteerism goals were secondary
UYA is above all, a program to assist Americans of
low income and disadvantaged circumstance.5
318
Thus, though there are other goals, the main goal is
assistance to the community. If this goal is kept
in clear and primary focus . . . the secondary goals
will be achieved. By producing a successful result
in the poor community, you will provide university
involvement and a genuine experiential educational
gain for the volunteer.^
Even following Dr. Balzano's nomination as ACTION
director in 1973, UYA publications still stressed UYA's
primary objective as service to the poor.^
ACTION'S experimental UYA program incorporated
OEO's exclusive anti-poverty orientation without modifica
tion. UYA accepted the paradigm's mandate that only
poverty-related projects were legitimate programming
activities. Perhaps the preponderance of former VISTA
staff members in ACTION assumed UYA would take an exclu
sionary anti-poverty stance. Nonetheless, research
demonstrates that ACTION'S presidential mandate did not
exclude non-poverty or social service projects. Dr.
Balzano in 1973 quickly moved ACTION programming away from
its exclusive anti-poverty orientation.
UYA volunteer attitudes reflect the agency's
singular emphasis on traditional anti-poverty orientations.
A majority (70 percent) felt UYA trained them very well to
fairly well in an understanding of poverty. A majority
(72 percent) also felt UYA was very to somewhat effective
319
in fighting poverty (Appendix A-l). An attitudinal
survey administered by the investigator to 157 UYA volun
teers and staff in 1973 indicates strong consensus that
ACTION'S primary goal is to fight poverty (Appendix B).
Until Balzano, university-proposed UYA projects
were unacceptable to Washington unless they projected a
reduction in poverty levels. Projects which focused on
solving social problems found randomly in the general
(non-target) populace were rejected as possibilities.
For example, a university-proposed project with volunteers
as counselors to teenagers facing unplanned pregnancies
was denied because it would not reduce poverty.
A significant factor is missing: There is no state
ment of the poverty problem, so that the project
components are directly focused on a target popula
tion as a project which comes within the legislative
mandate to help alleviate poverty.8
However, when the same unplanned pregnancy project was
redrawn so that all girls were classified by the county
as potential welfare recipients, e.g., the poor, the pro
ject was approved by UYA regional administrators.
The point that the girls are now welfare recipients
and will continue to be if no remedial action such
as your program is taken should be made clear.9
UYA requested that volunteer counselors assisting the
girls be instructed in the relationship of pregnancy to
320
poverty.
I think the volunteers should have a clearer concept
of the relation of the projects to the poverty of
their clients.
One must conclude that the primary problem of a poor girl
who is pregnant is her poverty.
UYA volunteers were allowed to work in seven types
of projects: Health, Economic Development, Education,
Consumer Protection, Administration of Justice, Housing,
and Environmental Protection--if projects could quanti-
fiably demonstrate an acceptable poverty impact. ^
B. Maximum Feasible Participation of the Poor in
Policymaking: A Second Anti-Poverty Orientation
Analysis of War on Poverty policymaking under
scores maximum feasible participation by the poor as a
crucial anti-poverty concept. The poor or target popula
tion were to participate in local anti-poverty policy
making. 0E0 community action agencies were required to
include elected representatives of the target community
on their policymaking boards. Theoretically, the poor's
representatives would express community felt-needs to the
board. Hostile reaction to this participatory concept in
1966-67 by local elites and Congress indicates that no
other orientation in the anti-poverty paradigm was
321
attacked so vociferously.
Despite antagonistic reactions by local elites,
the belief that the poor should participate to the maximum
degree possible is deeply held by anti-poverty policymakers
and program administrators. Professor Neil Gilbert
administered two unpublished surveys in March-May 1967
(during a period of nation-wide reaction to CAP politi
cizing activities) to Pittsburgh Community Action Agency
staff (N=256). Several items (see Appendix C) measure
staff feelings concerning participation of the poor in
anti-poverty policymaking. A majority of CAA staff
(1) preferred that citizens be included as policy and
decision makers, (2) that citizen evaluations of programs
be used as a guide, (3) could give specific examples of
how citizen participation had changed policies, and
(4) were unsatisfied with the degree of citizen partici
pation.
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations conducted a series of questionnaires (Appendix
D) in 1965 which asked CAA executive directors:
1. Has the participation of poor in policymaking
been useful? (142--yes; 3--no)
2. Do you have representative neighborhood organi
V
322
zations that give advice on program policy?
(117— yes; 54--no)
A thorough analysis of citizen participation
models is beyond the scope of this study. Varied local
participatory models were employed depending on a host
12
of socioeconomic variables. To some degree the poor
did participate in anti-poverty policymaking. Participa
tion by the poor in policymaking became an inescapable
orientation in the anti-poverty policymaking paradigm of
values.
Although theoretically an experimental program,
UYA policymakers inculcated a variation of ''maximum"
feasible participation. UYA consistently stressed the
role of the poor in policymaking even though the poor
seldom became policymakers in practice. UYA guidelines
required university programs to include the poor in two
ways:
1. Consulting with them to define tasks to be accom
plished by student volunteers which meet locally
defined needs.
2. Incorporating representatives of the poverty com
munity into such decisions as the allocation of
volunteers and policy decisions in the management
of the program.^
The difficulty of assessing locally defined needs or
deciding who is representative of the poverty community in
323
metropolitan areas is left to local UYA proj ects.
University proposals to UYA were asked to attack
community problems which were of high priority to the poor
14
themselves. OPPD predicted that failure would inevit
ably result when the poor were excluded from local UYA
program planning.^ University program directors who were
unaware of local target community needs were requested
to consult community organizers in program design and
16
problem identification.
The investigator's survey of UYA volunteer and
staff attitudes show that most respondents believe the
poor should be involved in UYA policymaking (Appendix B).
Representative UYA volunteers encouraged ACTION to ensure
that community people have a substantive voice in policy
decisions.^ UYA director Brady reaffirmed UYA's commit
ment to involving the poor in local policymaking:
. . . it is only the press of time which has pre
vented greater participation. . . . Our guidelines
spelled out these matters quite clearly. It is
difficult for us at the Federal level, however, to
set standards to insure that this occurs. It is a
local matter . . . and the responsibility of project
directors to ensure community participation on
policy decisions. °
Theoretically, the poor would express their felt-needs, to
which universities and federal government would respond
324
with UYA programs.
UYA admitted that involvement of the poor in pro
gram policymaking on local colleges and universities would
be difficult. Yet, somehow UYA was certain that educa
tional institutions would welcome community control of
a federally-funded academic program on campuses. UYA's
experiment would be ultimately evaluated on:
. . . how successfully the parties involved can merge
and harmonize two potentially conflicting interests--
those of the poor and those of the university.
. . . universities which did not previously have
roots in the poverty community are gingerly feeling
their way toward gaining participation of the poor
in the goal setting and governance of UYA on each
campus.20
Participation of the poor in UYA programs seldom
occurred. Minority students (from all income levels) did
participate as UYA volunteers but local policymaking by
the poor was never enforced by UYA/Washington.
UYA was trapped by its anti-poverty assumptions
concerning participation of the poor in policymaking.
Other War on Poverty attitudes and policy orientations
were assumed toward the poor:
1. UYA, like 0E0, patronizingly assumed that
problems and concepts are self-evident. For example, UYA
literature never attempts a definition of the poor, target
325
population, or the community. The poor are assumed to be
those with inadequate income or from disadvantaged cir
cumstances . The poor is used synonymously with community
91
or ghetto^-1 - as self-explanatory concepts.
The community, if defined at all, is geographi-
22
cally defined. No attempt is ever made by UYA to uti
lize a gemeinschaft or communitas definition. Conse
quently, community agencies are those with particular
catchment areas rather than agencies with involvement or
legitimacy connotations (community agencies versus agen
cies in the community). UYA, like VISTA, required volun-
23
teers to live in the poverty community or low-income
areas as a means of becoming part of the community.
2. Most egregious of all UYA War on Poverty
assumptions is its continued failure to specifically
define a role for the poor's participation. UYA, although
not to the same extent as 0E0, promised the poor partici
pation in policymaking. In a style discussed by Professor
24
Lowi, Washington pronounced noble sentiments of the poor
participating in their own decision making destiny. Yet,
there are no authoritative guidelines for participation
and local programs are free to develop their own standards
for the poor's participation.
326
ACTION, like OEO, suggested contradictory and
varying models to bring the poor into the decision making
process. Washington simultaneously encouraged different
participation models:
(1) The poor as policymakers:
. . . to insure community participation on
policy decisions.25
. . . members of the community who can help make
policy decisions.26
. . . will be incorporated into the decision
making of process of program development,
management, and placement of v o l u n t e e r s .27
(2) The poor as advisers to UYA:
. . . seeking advice and direction from the
community.28
. . . would need the skills and experience of
community organizers.29
(3) The poor as social service recipients:
. . . UYA program directors will design programs
which will be of maximum assistance to the poor.30
. . . in developing programs on behalf of the
poor.31
UYA policymaker attitudes reflect an orientation that the
poor should be included as policymakers but ambiguity
regarding how they are to be involved.
Lowi contends that ambiguous policymaking, without
clear policy guidelines, contributes to a crisis in public
authority. UYA's automatic inclusion of the anti-poverty
327
orientation regarding maximum feasible participation of
the poor only confused authentic participation in univer
sity projects. University programs, like CAPs under OEO,
were given no policy guidance and were frustrated in
involving the poor.
C. How to Fight Poverty (and Win) on Paper:
Planned-Impact-Programming as a
UYA Anti-Poverty Orientation
Research demonstrates that UYA policymakers
limited themselves to projects which were poverty related.
UYA policymakers did not experiment with broad social
problem (non-poverty) projects. ACTION'S limited anti
poverty mission, later drastically revised under director
Balzano, occurred because policymakers assumed rigid
paradigm anti-poverty orientations.
Acceptable UYA methodologies or strategies for
fighting poverty are rigidly fixed. UYA employs only one
method of reducing poverty— by policies employing planned-
impact-programming (PIP). Planned-Impact-Programming is
32
a process consisting of five steps:
1. State the specific poverty problem in measurable,
quantifiable terms, i.e., third grade students
in school read an average of 1.0 year below the
national average.33
328
2. Set a realistic measurable objective that will
reflect the impact of the volunteer project on
the poverty problem, i.e., selected third grade
students will read an average of .5 below
national norm in one year.
3. State how the volunteer project will achieve
impact, including the role and objectives of
the volunteer.
4. Using the time phased benchmarks, state how and
when progress toward the project objective will
be measured.
5. State how the project can be institutionalized,
i.e., taken over by low-income people or by
resources other than UYA volunteers.
Only projects demonstrating components of Planned-Impact-
Programming in anti-poverty fields were acceptable to
UYA/Washington.
The programming concept is crucial to UYA projects
as a planning mechanism in helping define priorities,
design methods, and choose strategies . . . Mto achieve
A I
defined objectives.1 Supposed benefits of the program
ming approach include an elimination of ill-defined
activities which were usually characteristic of volunteer
projects, i.e., simply providing manpower for various
35
projects. Programming as a planning process provides
concrete, measurable objectives for UYA volunteer, admin
istrator and community agency supervisor.
Unfortunately, as Moynihan points out, programming
329
Of.
is too often confused or identified as policymaking.
Failure to distinguish between programming and policy
making leads to policymaking frustration. Moynihan
stresses that programming ”... only relates to a single
part of the system; policy seeks to respond to the system
37
in its entirety.”
Moynihan pleads for systemic policies--not frag
mented programs. Programming without policymaking is too
38
narrowly defined. Programming is directed toward
changing specific situations while policymaking hopefully
changes an interrelated system. Singular reliance upon
programming denies the systemic nature of social problems
and policymaking.
UYA places sole emphasis on planned-impact-
programming as a means of achieving its objective--the
reduction of poverty. UYA does not employ alternative
principles of: (1) systems analysis of input-output
processes, (2) cost-benefit analysis, or (3) program
on
budgeting. 7 UYA has not considered alternatives to
achieving an effective reduction in poverty. PIP is
easily quantifiable and produces short-term measures of
success. UYA could not wait for long term results (long
40
linked administrative technology) nor did it possess
330
resources or influence to attack the total poverty prob
lem.
Consequently, UYA accepts PIP as a suboptimizing
approach in order to make tangible the intangible (poverty)
and produce immediate successes. Policymaking at UYA, as
with the War on Poverty, focuses exclusively and compart-
mentally on programming in limited projects. No compre
hensive policy or programming considers where all these
suboptimizing steps are leading or if the systemic
disease of poverty is being cured.^
Suboptimal planning and emphasis on narrow pro
gramming forces a UYA focus on impact (quantifiable
results). Hard data must be demonstrated in the reduction
of poverty. Three-month benchmarks are planned so that
periodic progress can be measured. Statistical indicators
of progress may be attitudinal, economic, physical or
anything else, so long as they are measurable. For exam
ple, 38 additional women will be employed; 50 percent of
the TB victims will be identified in one year, etc.^
Quantification of objectives occurs even in such activi-
43
ties as counseling and education of the handicapped.
UYA incorporates the anti-poverty policymaking
orientation that the best anti-poverty projects are those
331
whose problems are most easily quantified. The number of
potential anti-poverty projects is severely limited by the
quantification criteria. Consequently, "UYA programs
will be composed of a very limited number of focused proj
ects with clearly stated and quantifiable objectives."^
Projects which portend greatest statistical
change, vis-a-vis anti-poverty priorities, are most
attractive to program administrators.^
Programming emphasis on impact indicators occurred
in 1966-67 as local and congressional elites reacted to
46
controversial community development projects. Concrete
results became paramount. Subversive (to local establish
ments) anti-poverty projects were controlled by imposing
programming structure and statistical monitoring.
UYA, from its 1971 inception, continuously
informed Congress (and everyone else) of its unending
47
progress against poverty and high cost effectiveness
48
ratio.
D. Volunteerism as an Intervention Strategy
UYA is designed to test a new variant of volun
teerism— the full-time student volunteer. ACTION'S only
agency rationale is its volunteer emphasis. Program
332
matically, ACTION'S seven agencies treat varied problems
with differing voluntary methods. Volunteerism is con
sistently emphasized by the President and ACTION as a
great untapped resource for solving social problems. UYA
volunteers are virtually unanimous in their belief that
volunteerism can solve community problems (Appendix B).
While volunteerism remains a stable value in the
anti-poverty policymaking framework, its volunteer mode
is changing. War on Poverty volunteers, i.e., VISTA,
Peace Corps, were (1) recruited nationally, (2) full-time,
(3) paid a federal stipend. Increasingly, ACTION volun
teers are (1) recruited locally, (2) part-time, and
(3) unpaid. Full-time volunteers are frequently assigned
tasks of mobilizing or coordinating part-time volunteers.
UYA accepted en toto the full-time, paid, university
recruited volunteer model.
E-, Anti-Federalism: Direct Washington Intervention
Anti-poverty policymaking assumes that the federal
government must directly solve the poverty problem. State
and local governments are viewed as obsolescent barriers
to effective anti-poverty policymaking. Supposedly, local
elites inevitably block political and economic redistribu-
333
tion to the poor. UYA policymakers believed they could
serve the poor "better than the county commissioners and
49
city governments have done . . . in the past."
Confidence that the federal government is the
most responsive governmental structure to the disadvan
taged developed during the early sixties era of civil
rights policymaking. UYA volunteers still believe that
the federal government is more concerned about the poor
than state or local governments (Appendixes A-2; B).
Post-Watergate attitudinal surveys'*® suggest that in
creasing confidence in local institutions and decreasing
faith in federal government may be indicated.
Congressional reaction, reflected in the 1966 EOA
amendments, attached a gubernatorial veto to OEO projects
as an effort to channel anti-poverty programming through
the states. UYA, like OEO, views state intervention in
programming as an unfortunate political necessity. UYA
contracts directly with universities in defining local
programming priorities.
California's Governor, beginning with a veto of
OEO's Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA) program, is most active
of the states in monitoring local anti-poverty programming.
UYA monitoring is carried out by the Governor's Advisory
334
Coordinating Council for Public Personnel Management
(ACCPPM). Each ACTION agency is monitored by different
gubernatorial agencies, i.e., Foster Grandparents (Com
mission on Aging), VISTA (State OEO), etc. The degree to
which state agencies are involved in local programming
ranges from the perfunctory to veto exercise. In all
instances, state monitoring agencies must assert their
control.
ACTION'S perception of local government is at
best benign. UYA programs are not obligated to inform
locally elected officials of project activities. ACTION'S
regional personnel and university staff determine commu
nity problems and contact local host agencies. UYA often
works with local social service agencies in cooperative
projects but at its own incentive.
ACTION programming creates a new layer of local
anti-poverty structures and activities. Coordination with
local agencies affecting the poor seldom occurs. Local
officials are usually not asked how the UYA resource might
be integrated into local priorities or master plans. Anti
poverty policymakers assumed that a responsive federal
government must go directly to the people, not to the
people's representatives.
335
The University Year for Action proves to be only
narrowly experimental within parameters of the anti-poverty
policymaking framework. UYA, as a Nixon administration
innovation in anti-poverty policymaking, is locked into
the same assumptions as the War on Poverty. Despite a
direct presidential mandate to create alternatives to War
on Poverty programming, ACTION policymakers remained
inflexible. New actors entering the anti-poverty policy
making arena were guided by the orientations of their
predecessors,
ACTION, like OEO, did not develop innovative anti
poverty programs during the first Nixon administration.
The anti-poverty policymaking paradigm was not altered by
UYA programming. Once policymakers are socialized by set
orientations, innovation is difficult. Anti-poverty policy
analysis will now focus on efforts to resocialize policy
makers as a catalyst to programming changes.
III. ACTION'S Staff Institutes (1973)
The most determined and comprehensive effort to
restructure the anti-poverty paradigm began in 1973 under
ACTION director Balzano. Dr. Balzano, in his Ph.D.
dissertation on VISTA, concludes that the key to agency
336
policymaking and programming change lies in first changing
51
staff attitudes. Anti-poverty decision-making is futile
if the bureaucracy accepts outmoded assumptions. Existing
staff must be either retrained or dismissed.
Dr. Balzano believes that ACTION staff members
/
must share common goals and objectives in an integrated
52
policymaking approach. Resocializing ACTION'S 1,800
employees would not be an easy task. ACTION is comprised
of staff members from seven-member agencies located in
ten regional plus Washington offices. Most regional staff
are career civil servants with War on Poverty backgrounds.
The success of Balzano's intensive efforts to change
policymaker attitudes toward poverty and the poor is an
indicative test of the anti-poverty paradigm's independ
ence.
Dr. Balzano delineates anti-poverty policymaking
orientations which must change. Proposed revisions are
significant and comprehensive. Balzano desires a volun
teerism paradigm to replace the old anti-poverty framework.
Anti-poverty policymaking orientations must be either
modified or replaced by new agency goals. Balzano's
assault upon the independent policymaking framework would
modify anti-poverty orientations as follows.
337
A. Replacement of An Exclusive Anti-Poverty
Mandate with A Social Problem Approach
ACTION memoranda and literature view the agency
mandate as exclusively anti-poverty. Even experimental
programs, i.e., the University Year for Action, rejected
proposed projects which could not prove an anti-poverty
programming thrust. Repeatedly ACTION claimed to be an
anti-poverty agency (even though an exclusionary anti
poverty emphasis was never suggested in presidential
53
statements).
Balzano expands ACTION'S mandate to attack any
social problem for which local communities seek assistance.
Community leaders are encouraged to become involved in a
variety of volunteer projects: tutoring, Boy Scouts, Red
Cross, etc. Ideally civic clubs would be given full-time
ACTION volunteers whose task is to mobilize substantial
54
numbers of part-time volunteers.
Community problems are always defined in uni
dimensional concepts by Balzano:
The problems to be tackled by ACTION, such as
illiteracy and malnutrition, are henceforth to be
seen in isolation, and not as symptoms of more
serious conditions such as poverty or racism.55
Poverty is only one alternative focus among"social and
56
economic problems of all kinds."
338
Related to ACTION'S expanded mandate is a redifi-
nition of traditional poverty and minority clienteles.
Balzano believes ACTION has unnecessarily "... created
its own enemies by focusing only on the poor and minori-
57
ties, and considering everyone else the problem."
Accordingly, new ethnic minorities must be included in
ACTION goals and objectives. ACTION will no longer exclu
sively focus on Appalachian Whites, Blacks, Chicanos, and
Indians. The target community now includes groups who
were not assisted by OEO or other established agencies,
i.e., Polish American Congress, Ukranians, Asian-Americans,
58
and labor unions.
Income based definitions or poverty levels are no
longer used by Balzano in defining clienteles. Whenever
local groups request help, irrespective of poverty levels,
59
they may be assisted by ACTION. Balzano wants ACTION
staff to expand its poverty orientation to include all
social problems. The poor as a clientele must be redefined
as the community with its diversity of minority and socio
economic groups.
339
B. Maximum Feasible Participation of Local Elites
Dr. Balzano theoretically wants to return power to
60
the people through decentralized decision making.
Balzano*s goals for ACTION emphasize involvement by local
citizens in the design and operation of programs. However,
Balzano does not envision an analogous orientation to the
anti-poverty community action approach.
Balzano seeks to involve an untapped source of
volunteerism which OEO ignored— community and business
leaders. ACTION must look to establishment organizations
and leaders who can mobilize volunteer resources. Small
CAP or social activist organizations are ineffectual in
social problem solving. Balzano has faith in the business
community:
We have been operating on a poverty model . . .
we're going to turn this poverty model into a
business model.
In the future the local organizations which
ACTION will deal with will be those which have the
financial means to support volunteer work.
Rather than initiating local projects, ACTION should "ask
local communities where we may assist them in what they
62
are now doing." Balzano hopes to change ACTION'S commu
nity action orientation to one supportive of ongoing
community activities.
340
C. Federalism Revisited
As indicated, anti-poverty policymakers are
guided by a mistrust of state and local governmental
structures. Federal government is viewed by policymakers
as the policymaking level most responsive to the poor and
needed social change.
Balzano's six ACTION goals (Appendix E) stress new
appreciation for non-national governments. Rather than
bypassing layers of federalism, ACTION will "participate
in the innovative efforts of state and local governments"
and "support programs of local governments."6^ Theoreti
cally, local and state governments will no longer be
patronizingly avoided by Washington's anti-poverty
warriors.
As indicated, ACTION programming has been decen
tralized into ten regional offices. As Balzano reshapes
agency priorities in Washington, ACTION regions interpret
policy on a (local) regional bases. Theoretically,
. . . regional directors who live and work close to
the problems facing local communities, bypass the
federal bureaucracy in bringing their views and
ideas to bear on the programs and policies of
ACTION.64
ACTION'S regional staff supposedly will assess local
community needs and serve as liaison with non-national
341
governmental units.
D. Volunteerism: A New Kind of Volunteer
Reliance on volunteers is firmly entrenched in
the anti-poverty policymaking framework. Although still
accepting volunteerism per se, Balzano posits a revised
volunteer modus operandi.
Anti-poverty programs utilize a distinctive volun
teer profile: volunteers are recruited nationally, paid
a federal cost-of-living stipend, and work full-time.
Balzano's goals seek increased numbers of community volun-
65
teers serving in their own communities-. Balzano feels
that volunteer service should follow a part-time model:
The idea of volunteer service is to be restored to
its traditional American scope: the full-time
volunteers of the 0E0 formulation are to be diluted
as much as possible by traditional part-time volun
teers . 66
Whereas only a few thousand full-time volunteers could
work directly on anti-poverty, Balzano foresees hundreds
of thousands of part-time volunteers being mobilized to
serve in their own communities.
ACTION will retain a full-time volunteer core as
volunteer mobilizers in local communities. However, ACTION
must recruit and train a new full-time volunteer type to
342
replace War on Poverty community organizers. Full-time
ACTION volunteers supposedly need a different perspective
of poverty and its cures. As Balzano's dissertation
urges, volunteer training must give trainees a proper
understanding of poverty.
The anti-poverty policymaking paradigm approaches
poverty as an environmentally caused circumstance.
Liberation from poverty theoretically occurs by changing
economic and political variables, i.e., the poor escape
poverty by a guaranteed income, better education, etc.
Poverty is viewed as an injustice perpetrated upon
selected individuals (victims) by the establishment
because of racism, capitalism, etc. Anti-poverty program
ming reflects an injustice/redistribution view of poverty
causes.
Dr. Balzano, himself once an illiterate garbage
collector, feels that escape from poverty begins when the
67
poor accept the achievement ethic. The achievement
ethic to Balzano is "consistent within the American tradi-
68
tion, i.e., God helps those who help themselves." The
spirit of volunteerism would show the poor that "in this
69
country it is indeed possible to improve oneself"; that
the poor "be trained and encouraged to participate in the
343
American dream."
Accordingly, a new type ACTION volunteer is needed.
Balzano believes that the achievement ethic is passe among
young ACTION volunteers:
. . . it is an idea which is seldom found in the
person under thirty, and I believe practically non
existent in the student of college age and under.
Our young people today seem to mock the very idea
that anyone in this country can better himself.71
Balzano believes that ACTION must recruit volunteers who
already possess the achievement ethic--the working class:
. . . there would be no need to tell these people
about the achievement ethic. They believe it
because they are living it. These people are try
ing to work their way into the middle class. The
children of the middle class, who constitute the
bulk of Vista's volunteers, are least likely to
believe in that ethic. . .. If the volunteers do
not believe it, how can they be expected to motivate
anyone?^^
Properly trained ACTION volunteers supposedly will free
the alienated poor by teaching the achievement ethic.
Part-time community people, voluntarily helping their
neighbors are the best evidence that the achievement ethic
works.
E. Planned-Impact-Programming Concept Expanded
Dr. Balzano accepts the need for producing statis
tical success in solving problems. Policymaking goals,
344
objectives and evaluations should be measurable whenever
rationality permits. ACTION program administrators must
73
follow Balzano's Management by Objective procedures and
planning manuals.^ Management by Objective is little
more than OMB required systemic planning and cost analysis.
Although a valid approach, Balzano sees PIP as too
conceptually narrow. Balzano believes that heterogeneous
communities require a diversified approach by ACTION.
Theoretically, ACTION'S approach has been segmental and
compartmentalized into individual ACTION agencies.
ACTION'S seven agencies must assume an integrated program
matic thrust. Various ACTION agencies should respond
creatively to community problems by working together in
problem-solving (integrated programming).
Balzano's staff training Institutes would
supposedly break down compartmentalized agency attitudes.
Staff attitudinal changes "must occur from regional staff
76
all the way through headquarters personnel." Rather
than plan the impact of a single agency, ACTION staff must
view the total ACTION impact upon heterogeneous commu
nities .
Balzano's policymaking framework is radically
different from the operative anti-poverty policymaking
345
paradigm. Intensive staff training Institutes represent
a bold attempt in attitudinal change strategies. Balzano
is convinced that occasionally staff attitudes must change
regardless of employee attrition:
It is my opinion that it can, but not without
suffering enormous losses of manpower. As we have
already noted, people in and outside of VISTA will
see these changes in the course of the program as a
sellout and wreak havoc on whatever administration
is in power at the time.??
Intensive seminars for ACTION employees are designed to
modify the anti-poverty policymaking framework as rapidly
as possible.
F. Balzanofs Staff Resocialization Institutes
Dr. Balzano contracted with the University of
Colorado's Center for Action Research (CAR) to conduct
five regional Institutes. Each Institute was attended by
ACTION personnel from two federal regions and Washington
staff. All ACTION personnel, from secretaries to the
director were required to attend an intensive five-day
Institute.
In virtually non-stop sessions, Institute partici
pants were saturated with new ACTION programming and
policymaking goals. Institute staff used lectures, small
group discussions, project work groups, films, and
346
question and answer methodologies. As indicated, the
Institute's objective was not consensus-building but to
change decision maker orientations.
The Center for Action Research gave pre and post-
Institute tests of participant attitudes. CAR's data
form the empirical fodder for testing the independence
of the anti-poverty policymaking paradigm (see Appendix
F). Analysis data are drawn primarily from the regional
Institute (New Orleans) which evidenced the most intensity
and heterogeneity of staff-participant responses.
Three instruments were devised by CAR to collect
participant response data:
(1) Participant logs provide positive and negative
responses to Institute activities (Appendix G).
(2) Pre-Test/Post-Test Attitudinal Survey
(Appendix H).
(3) Institute Program Assessment Responses.
CAR data indicate a peculiar dynamic in participant
orientations and attitudinal change.
Seventy-one New Orleans participants were given
a pre-test attitudinal survey (55 items). Half of the
participant responses on eight issues are compared on a
pre-/post-test instrument. The remaining participants
are given a post-test instrument assessing their
347
perceptions of Balzano's objectives.
Participants asked to give their post-Institute
views of Balzano's opinions show statistically significant
changes on five of eight items. CAR data show that before
participating in the Institute, eight participant atti
tudes were different from Balzano's (Table 1, Appendix I).
CAR concludes that five post-test responses were closer
to Balzano's opinion than to the participants' own pre
test opinions (Tables 2 and 3, Appendix I). Supposedly
on most issues, Balzano's persuasive powers had been most
effective with Institute participants.
Comparison of pre- and post-test attitudinal
change among participants indicates that on 16 items,
participants demonstrated a statistically significant
level of change (Appendix J). CAR interprets these
statistical results (.01-.05) as an indication of substan
tial attitudinal change (Table 1).
Detailed analysis of participant responses suggests
a somewhat more complicated dynamic in attitudinal change.
Significant statistical change occurred in 16 (31 percent)
of 51 responses. Analysis of response sets indicated that
attitudinal change centered on two issues (Appendix K):
(1) expanding ACTION to include European Ethnic group
348
clienteles, and (2) a need for more administrative effi
ciency .
Only slight attitudinal changes are suggested in
decision maker attitudes toward traditional anti-poverty
orientations, strategies for eliminating poverty, or
environmental causes of poverty. Nor are there signifi
cant attitudinal changes toward agency goals or broad
Nixon administration policymaking priorities. Participant
attitude changes are limited to specific issues. Partici
pants were persuaded to accept new clienteles (not reject
old ones) and a need for more administrative efficiency.
Attitudinal change is limited to two peripheral
policymaking orientations. Nonetheless, if participant
changes do occur, the anti-poverty paradigm is made vul
nerable. Closer analysis of pre/post-test methodology
show several factors as interrelatedly invalidating the
degree of participant change:
1. All evaluation instruments were designed and
conducted by those conducting the Institutes (CAR).
Although not assuming dishonesty, CAR exercised conflict
of interest by independently evaluating itself. Indica-
tively, Balzano did not utilize ACTION'S Office of Policy
and Program Development for evaluation purposes.
349
2. The pre-/post-Institute instrument is pecu
liarly designed so that total comparison is incomplete:
(a) All participants were given a pre-institute
(55 questions) attitudinal survey. Yet only
half are given the post-institute attitudinal
survey. The remaining half are asked for their
perceptions of Balzano's opinions (CAR compares
participant pre-test attitudes with their post
test perceptions of Balzano views; a comparison
with dubious validity).
(b) Generalizations and conclusions which CAR derives
from the attitudinal data are selective. Par
ticipant response correlations between instru
ments are not always compared, i.e., Program
assessment and attitudinal responses. There is
no grouping of participants by career backgrounds
or SES data (which would assist in attitudinal
analysis).
Closer analysis of participant log scores shows
a disparity between regional and Washington participants.
Overall, Institutes had a positive rating from partici
pants (77 percent). However, most (78 percent) of the
negative responses came from regional personnel. Signifi
cantly, regional staff participants were from predominantly
career civil service personnel while Washington partici
pants included a number of Balzano appointees and non
professional staff (Balzano's wife was a Hartford Insti
tute participant).
More detailed analysis of the Institute's Program
Assessment responses indicates attitudinal change as more
350
overt than subliminal. Statistically, CAR's pre-/post-
test results suggest significant attitudinal change among
participants. As demonstrated, attitudinal change was
limited to two peripheral policymaker orientations. Par
ticipant responses to the Program Assessment test show
that Balzano's media was the message.
Attitudinal responses from the Program Assessment
instrument (Appendix L) indicate that Institute partici
pation did not produce attitudinal change among ACTION
staff. ACTION Institutes informed participants that anti
poverty attitudes were unacceptable as decision making
orientations.
Significant statistical evidence indicates that
participants view the Institutes as indoctrination sessions
designed to lecture rather than teach. Many participants
note a lack of consensus-building. Participant dissatis
faction is indicated in the following assessments of the
Institute (Appendix L):
(1) It did not provide maximum opportunity for
participation (No. 5).
(2) Too much time spent in lectures; not enough
time in discussion groups (Nos. 6, 15).
(3) Although a statistically significant degree of
cooperation existed among Institute participants
351
(r * 0.05), there was not a spirit of coopera
tion among staff and participants (No. 7).
Forty percent of the participants felt there
was some participant tendency to separate into
cliques (No. 8).
(4) Although not statistically significant, 40 per
cent of the participants felt the pressure of
time was not conducive to learning (No. 14).
Dr. Balzano had not intended to win a popularity
contest among staff with his ACTION Institutes. A higher
priority was the changing of decision maker orientations
toward poverty. If participants accept Balzano's re
socialization approach then the anti-poverty paradigm is
rendered ineffectual.
Statistical evidence indicates that Institutes
did not change participant attitudes or behavior. How
ever, Institutes informed participants of sanctionative
and acceptable decision maker orientations. When asked
to what degree attitudinal change occurred during the
Institutes, participants suggested a subtle distinction
between attitudinal change and changing one's orienta
tions .
Statistically significant evidence indicates that
participants did not change their own attitudes. However,
participants did change their behavior and became more
knowledgeable because of Institute participation.
352
Participants felt that others in the group became more
knowledgeable. Yet there was not a similar certainty
among participants that others had changed their attitudes
or behavior.
Substantial numbers of responses to open-ended
questions on the Institute Assessment instrument corrobo
rate Institute impact on participant orientations.
Intensive structured sessions hardly constitute a model
learning environment. Participants did learn Balzano's
goals and objectives for ACTION. However, few partici
pants changed their own orientations toward the anti
poverty paradigm.
Institute participants learned that formerly
accepted decision making orientations during Blatchford's
era were no longer acceptable. ACTION administrators
learned that anti-poverty paradigm orientations would
evoke negative consequences. Decision makers who defy or
criticize ACTION or its rejection of anti-poverty policy
making risk undesirable results: criticism, harassment,
demotion, transferral, or dismissal. The role of advo
cating officially unpopular views in an agency is ethically
admirable but hardly rewarding.
353
IV. Restructuring the Anti-Poverty
Policymaking Paradigm
Robert McClendon, director of the ACTION Insti
tutes, became head of ACTION'S Office of Staff Placement
(OSP). Analysis of OSP's politicized role in selecting
and recruiting staff during the 1972 reelection campaign
suggests a similar role for McClendon. Balzano's own
willingness to make massive staff changes is well docu
mented. The coercive mechanism remains: not dismissal
but rather transferral to Omaha. Dr. Balzano may success
fully destroy the anti-poverty policymaking paradigm by
removing anti-poverty policymakers from Washington.
The underlying thesis of the anti-poverty policy
making paradigm is that fixed orientations function as an
independent variable. For a decade (1964-74) anti-poverty
policymaker orientations were not dependent on changing
administrations or partisan mandates. During this period
new decision makers, regardless of their backgrounds,
assumed five similar policymaking orientations.
Because of its fixed parameters, anti-poverty
programming experimentation and innovation was stymied.
At 0E0, Howard Phillips attempted programmatic change
within existing agencies and among 0E0 staff. ACTION'S
354
experimental University Year for Action was a new program
created within the traditional anti-poverty framework.
Both UYA and 0E0 failed programmatically to dismantle the
anti-poverty paradigm.
Dr. Balzano's staff resocialization Institutes
are a more effective strategy of attitudinal change.
Correctly, Balzano believes an actor's psychological
environment or orientations must be changed prior to pro
grammatic innovation. Incorrectly, Balzano believed that
intensive Institutes would accomplish attitudinal change.
Only by long range coercion of remaining staff coupled
with careful recruitment of those who share Balzano's
views will the anti-poverty paradigm be replaceable.
Anti-poverty policymaking analysis is not ulti
mately a test of a particular paradigm. The analytic
model is only an aid to understanding phenomena. In sum,
"the research worker is a solver of puzzles, not a tester
78
of paradigms." The puzzle is twofold: the failure of
policymakers to alleviate poverty and the continued annual
increase in the number of poor since 1964. Paradigm-
testing was not an appropriate model for early War on
Poverty policymaking:
355
. . . paradigm-testing occurs only after persistent
failure to solve a noteworthy puzzle has given rise
to crisis. And even then it occurs only after the
sense of crisis has evoked an alternative candidate
for paradigm.79
The crisis of anti-poverty policymaking failure and policy
analysis necessitates a testing of basic orientations.
This investigation analyzes subterranean policy
making in two minor Executive Office agencies: ACTION
and 0E0. As such, it is the analysis of a policymaking
failure. The centralization of anti-poverty policymaking
in the Presidency produced unintended and ineffectual
policy consequences. Anti-poverty policymaking (1964-74)
failed to reduce the number of American poor. Rather, an
additional conceptual approach and bureaucracy for poverty
was created. Because of higher priorities on the Presi
dential policymaking agenda, White House advisers appro
priated anti-poverty agency resources for partisan
objectives.
Anti-poverty policy analysis indicates several
causes and reforms for poverty policymaking. It becomes
the task of the policy analyst to advocate reform within
the realities of the politically feasible. Policymaking
recommendations do not envision a major restructuring of
prevailing elites or policymaking systems. American
356
cultural ambivalence toward poverty does not permit major
poverty policy changes.
Among factors contributing to the failure of anti
poverty policymaking is the centralization of policymaking
in the Executive Office. Further centralization of
poverty policymaking and agencies in the White House
would only exacerbate anti-poverty's failures. Poverty's
importance on the Presidential policymaking agenda was
secondary even in the Johnson Presidency to domestic
issues of consensual affluence. Whereas cultural value
ambivalence surrounds socio-moral issues, i.e., the poor,
racism, pornography, etc., consensus on economic inter
national policy action, i.e., inflation, energy, defense,
etc., dictates priority policymaking attention by the
President.
Presidential inattention to poverty policymaking
results in subterranean policymaking by the White House
staff. More centralized poverty policymaking authority
in the Presidency would inevitably result in increased
policymaking powers for White House advisers. The "im
perial presidency" is focused on issues of resource
allocation for the consensual majority. More centralized
policymaking power in the Presidency would still result
357
in no Presidential policymaking on poverty issues.
Anti-poverty policymaking indicates that poverty
policymaking must be decentralized. Both Johnson and
Nixon administrations advocated anti-poverty policymaking
on the local level. Decentralization in the War on
Poverty was aimed at representatives of the poor while
New Federalism was directed toward local elites. The War
on Poverty antagonized local elites and New Federalism
failed to involve the poor in decision making.
Poverty policymaking demonstrates that the
alienated poor must participate in decision making. The
non-poor may feel somewhat efficacious toward policymaking
system and be satisfied with representative democracy.
Representation of the poor in CAPs failed because efficacy
and trust in any representative does not exist. Repre
sentation became competition between poverty groups, i.e.,
racial, for allocation of scarce anti-poverty resources.
Although representative democracy has failed
among the poor, participation by the poor in decision
making must be achieved in successful poverty policy
making. Representatives of the poor should be appointive.
Poverty decision making would occur in a commission form
of government wherein diverse interests are included.
358
Until the poor believe in the electoral process, appointed
poor citizens should be included in poverty policymaking,
i.e., welfare recipients members, elderly poor, etc.
Centralized policymaking presently exists in various
policymaking arenas, i.e., welfare, housing, employment,
anti-poverty, etc., and is a failure in all aspects.
Decentralization of poverty policymaking potentially
produces legitimate and authoritative policies.
This investigation also underscores the narrow
focus of anti-poverty and all poverty policymaking.
Decision makers must be given the capability to formulate
comprehensive poverty policies. Poverty policies are
segmental and circumscribed by focusing on unidimensional
aspects of poverty: lack of or inadequate income, housing,
employment, education, socio-politico organization,
health, legal aid, etc. Anti-poverty was the first
policymaking approach to conceptualize poverty as an
isolatable decision making arena. Yet, anti-poverty
viewed poverty as problem derived from inadequate income.
War on Poverty programs also lacked the authority to
devise integrated policies for poverty reduction.
Anti-poverty policymaking was further emasculated
359
by the organization of anti-poverty agencies. 0E0 and
ACTION were given impossible multifunctional and opera
tional mandates. This investigation suggests that an
integrated poverty agency should be created to formulate
comprehensive poverty policies.
A federal poverty agency should focus on coordi
nation, research, and regulation of all poverty programs.
The poverty agency would function as a semi-autonomous
agency similar to the Fund for the Improvement of Post
Secondary Education, the Legal Services Corporation, and
the Special Action Task Force on Drug Abuse. The poverty
agency would not emulate 0E0 and ACTION'S operation of
programs. The poverty agency would also find experimental
poverty projects which stressed multidimensional aspects
of poverty. Unlike 0E0, the poverty agency would regulate
budgets and programs in federal departments. The poverty
agency would function as OMB in approving poverty appro
priations .
The poverty agency cannot be another federal
agency which interprets its mandate as the poor's advocate
against non-national governmental units. Poverty program
ming should be encouraged in non-national governments and
coordinated by regional clearinghouses. Locally submitted
360
poverty proposals would be screened by regional clearing
houses, even though clearinghouses currently contain a
serious deficiency in their unequal representation of
urban areas. The federal poverty agency would be governed
by a rotating board of directors who would be primarily
from non-national governments. The poverty agency's
senior staff would be staffed by professionals from various
disciplines.
An anti-poverty policymaking paradigm has been
constructed and tested. Analysis of descriptive and
empirical data substantiate independent influence of the
paradigm in anti-poverty policymaking. Paradigms are not
permanent nor do they state policy imperatives. Anti
poverty analysis or use of a paradigm does not solve the
poverty problem. However, recognition of a paradigm of
policymaker orientations is crucial to rational analysis
of decision making alternatives.
The anti-poverty paradigm of policymaker orienta
tions demonstrates both the original vision and later
rigidity of poverty policymaking. Varied policymaker
orientations toward the poor limit innovative policymaking
by devastating simplicity and ambiguity: maximum feasible
361
participation, community action, achievement ethic,
welfare ethic, etc. Poverty orientations reflect cultural
ambivalence toward the poor and policymaker orientations
indicate varied components of that ambiguity.
Whether the anti-poverty paradigm or some other
poverty policymaking framework (the achievement paradigm)
shapes poverty programming is ultimately detrimental for
policy experimentation. The federal creation of a semi-
autonomous body of professionals governed by non-national
government representatives is designed to prevent the
domination of policymaking by any independent policymaking
paradigm. It is an affirmation of the thesis that the
most just policies are produced by professionals experi
menting with policy conceptualization within the realities
of political realities. This investigation demonstrates
that innate policymaking truth neither resides in the
professional nor the clientele. The Shriver Task Force
and Ash Council underscore the political vulnerability of
rational-synoptic decision making.
362
Footnotes to Chapter VIII
1. ACTION, Office of Policy and Program Develop
ment (OPPD), "Planning Grant Guidelines: University Year
for Action" (Washington, D.C.: n.d., 1971 circa), p. 1.
2. ACTION, OPPD, "Program Terms and Conditions"
(Washington, D.C.: n.d., 1971 circa), p. 1. Also see
Dick Graham, "University Year for Action," Change
(February 1972), p. 7.
3. ACTION, "UYA Monitoring and Evaluation,"
ACTION Clearance and Approval Request Memoranda (Washing
ton, D.C.: ACTION Education Programs, March 23, 1973),
n.p.
4. Jerry Brady, "ACTION Memorandum: Resolutions
of the Conference. To: UYA Conference Participants"
(Washington, D.C.: ACTION, December 15, 1971), p. 6.
5. Charles J. Tooker, "The Answer Is the Ques
tion" (unpublished paper, San Francisco: ACTION, Region
IX).
6. Ann Ventre and Russ Pratt, "Definitions and
Assumptions: The Planned Impact Programming Process"
(unpublished paper distributed; San Francisco: ACTION,
Region IX, October 1972), p. 1.
7. ACTION, "University Year for Action," ACTION
News (Washington, D.C.: ACTION/Office of Public Affairs,
October 1973), p. 5.
8. Russell R. Pratt, "Minutes of Project Review
Committee Meeting--December 13, 1972," ACTION, Region IX
Memorandum (San Francisco, December 15, 1972), p. 5.
9. John Horan, "Letter to Mrs. Ann Ventre"
(San Francisco: ACTION, Region IX, March 15, 1973), p. 1.
363
10. Ibid., p. 2.
11. ACTION, UYA, Programmatic Terms and Condi
tions (Washington, D.C.: UYA, January 1, 1972), p. 1.
12. Community Representation in Community Action
Programs; Final Report (Boston: Brandeis University/
Florence Heller School for Advanced Studies in Social
Welfare, Report No. 5, March 1969), foreword.
13. ACTION, UYA, Programmatic Terms and Condi
tions , p. 1.
14. ACTION, OPPD, "Planning Grant Guidelines,"
p. 12.
15. ACTION, UYA, "University Year for Action
Planning Aids and Guidelines" (Washington, D.C.: UYA,
February 1972 circa), p. 7.
16. Ibid., p. 8.
17. ACTION, UYA, "Volunteer Caucus: Recommenda
tions" (Washington, D.C.: UYA Conference, November 2-5,
1971), p. 1.
18. Brady, "ACTION Memorandum: Resolutions of
the Conference,"
19. Jerry Brady, "University Year for Action: A
Report," speech given before the 27th National Conference
on Higher Education in Chicago, 111. (March 6, 1972),
transcript, p. 6.
20. Ibid., p. 8.
21. Balzano, Inter-ACTION. I, No. 7 (April 1973),
1.
22. ACTION, UYA, Planned Impact Programming
Guidelines (Washington, D.C.: UYA, August 1972), p. 8.
364
23. ACTION, UYA, Programmatic Terms and Condi-
tions, p. 1. Also see UYA, "Evaluation Instrument,"
November 28, 1972, p. 1.
24. Lowi, The End of Liberalism.
25. Brady, "UYA: A Report," p. 8.
26. Brady, "ACTION Memorandum," p. 5.
27. ACTION, UYA, Programmatic Terms and Condi
tions, p. 1.
28. Brady," UYA; A Report," pp. 8-9.
29. ACTION, UYA, "UYA Planning Aids and Guide
lines," p. 8.
30. ACTION, UYA, Programmatic Terms and Condi
tions , p. 1.
31. Jerry Brady, "Program Planning in Volunteer
Training," Memorandum to UYA Program Directors (Washing
ton, D.C.: Office of Policy and Program Development,
January 26, 1972), p. 1.
32. Ventre and Pratt, "Definitions and Assump
tions," p. 2. Also see Tooker, "The Answer Is the Ques
tion."
33. ACTION, UYA, Planned Impact Programming
Guidelines, p. 12.
34. Ibid., p. 1.
35. Ibid., p. 2.
36. Daniel P. Moynihan, "Policy versus Program
in the '70's," Public Interest, No. 20 (Summer 1970),
pp. 90-91.
37. Ibid., p. 92.
38. Ibid., p. 93.
365
39. Joyce M. Mitchell and William C. Mitchell,
Political Analysis and Public Policy (Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1969), pp. 621-626.
40. George A. Shipman, Designing Program Action—
Against Urban Poverty (Tuscaloosa, Ala.: University of
Alabama, 1971), p. 117.
41 • I b i d - » PP* U S -1 1 9 .
42. ACTION, UYA, Volunteer's Project Analysis
Handbook (Washington, D.C.: UYA, n.d., 1972 circa),
p. 16.
43. ACTION, UYA, Planning Aid Guidelines
(Washington, D.C.: UYA, ), p. 3.
44. ACTION, UYA, Planned Impact Programming
Guidelines, p. 2.
45. ACTION, UYA, Planning Aid Guidelines, p. 2.
46. Brady, "UYA: A Report," p. 7.
47. Harold Fleming, Letter to Mr. Zane Reeves,
ACTION/OPPD (October 6, 1971).
48. ACTION, UYA, UYA Volunteer Effectiveness
(Washington, D.C.: UYA, April 1973), p. iii.
49. "Polls: What Does America Think of Itself?,"
Newsweek, December 10, 1973, pp. 40-48.
50. Brady, "UYA: A Report," p. 15.
51. Balzano, The Political and Social Ramifica
tions of VISTA, p. 472.
52. Russ Pratt and Jack Butler, "Washington
Meeting with Mr. Balzano," ACTION/Region IX Memoranda to
All ACTION Staff (San Francisco: ACTION, May 14, 1973),
p. 3.
366
53. ACTION'S exclusive anti-poverty orientation
is discussed in the analysis of Blatchford directorship
(1971-72).
54. Balzano, "ACTION" lecture given to New
Orleans Institute, New Orleans, La. (August 26, 1973).
55. ACTION, "ACTION Institute: Institute Survey
II— Form B," Statement No. 9 p. 2 (see Appendix G of this
study).
56. Pratt and Butler, "Washington Meeting with
Mr. Balzano," p. 1.
57. ACTION, "ACTION Institute," statement No. 13,
p. 2 (see Appendix G).
58. Pratt and Butler, "Washington Meeting with
Mr. Balzano," p. 2.
59. Balzano, Inter-ACTION, July 1973, p. 5.
60. ACTION, ACTION News, May 15, 1973, p. 1.
61. ACTION, "ACTION Institute," statements Nos.
4 and 17.
62. Pratt and Butler, "Washington Meeting with
Mr. Balzano," p. 2.
63. Balzano, "Six Goals," Nos. 1 and 2 (see
Appendix E of this study).
64. ACTION News, May 15, 1973, p. 3.
65. Balzano, "Six Goals," No. 5.
66. ACTION,"ACTION Institute," No. 2.
67. Balzano, The Political and Social Ramifica
tions of VISTA, p. 473.
68. Ibid., p. 467.
367
69. Ibid., p. 472.
70. Ibid., p. 455.
H
Ibid., p. 473.
C M
r-~
Ibid., p. 474.
73. Robert McClendon, "Management by Objective,"
lecture at New Orleans Institute.
74. Thomas Bird, Planning Manual (Boulder, Colo.:
University of Colorado, Center for ACTION Research,
April 1972), No. 42.
75. Balzano, Inter-ACTION, July 1973, p. 5.
76. Ibid.
77. Balzano, The Political and Social Ramifica
tions of VISTA, p. 472.
78. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964),
p. 143.
79. Ibid., p. 144.
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________ . ________. OPPD. "Program Terms and Condi
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Office of Public Affairs. Inter-
ACTION, I, No. 10.(July 1973).
________ . ________. "Response to Congressional Inquiry
of March 24, 1972." Joseph H. Blatchford.
Letters and documents. Washington, D.C.: ACTION,
April 5, 1972.
________ . ________. A Study of Target and Non-Target
VISTA Volunteers. Washington, D.C.: ACTION,
March 1973.
395
U.S. ACTION. Everything You Always Wanted to Know About
UYA*: University Year for ACTION--An Evaluation,
by Arlene Krimgold. Washington, D.C.: ACTION/
University Year for ACTION, February 1973.
________ . . UYA. Planning Aid Guidelines:
University Year for ACTION. Washington, D.C.:
ACTION/UYA, August 1971.
. . UYA. Programmatic Terms and
Conditions. Washington, D.C.: UYA, January 1,
1972.
________ . . UYA. "University Year for Action."
ACTION News. Washington, D.C.: ACTION/Office
of Public Affairs, October 1973.
________ . . UYA. "Evaluation Instrument."
Washingtin, D.C.: UYA, November 28, 1972.
________ . . UYA. Planned Impact Programming
Guidelines. Washington, D.C.: UYA, August 1972.
________ . . UYA. "University Year for Action
Planning Aids and Guidelines." Washington, D.C.:
UYA, February 1972 circa.
. . UYA. UYA Volunteer Effectiveness.
Washington, D.C.: UYA, April 1973.
________ . . UYA. Volunteer's Project Analysis
Handbook. Washington, D.C.: UYA, n.d., 1972
circa.
_. Congress. ACTION Act of 1972 and ACTION
Domestic Programs. Pts. I, II. Pub. L. 93-
93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 1973.
______. ___________ . General Accounting Office. The
Legal Services Program— Accomplishments of and
Problems Faced by Its Grantees. Washington, D.C.
General Accounting Office, March 1973.
396
U.S. Congress. Monthly Catalog of United States Govern
ment Publications: 1962. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1963.
________ . . House. President Nixon's message
to the House for Reorganization Plan No. 1.
Congressional Record, 92nd Cong. 1st Sess., March
24, 1971, H.Doc. 92-74.
________ . . House. Committee on Education and
Labor. Economic Opportunity Act. Hearings
before Committee on Education and Labor, 88th
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1964 on H.R. 10440.
________ . . House. Committee on Education and
Labor. Hearings before the subcommittee on the
War on Poverty Program, pt. I, Economic Opportu
nity Act of 1964. 88th Cong., 2nd Sess.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1965.
________ . . House. Committee on Education and
Labor. Hearings, Economic Opportunity Act,
Amendments of 1967, pt. II, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1968.
________ . . House. Committee on Education and
Labor. Establishment of a Legal Services Corpo
ration. Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Equal Opportunities of the Committee on Education
and Labor, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1972.
. . Joint Economic Committee. The Low-
Income Population and Economic Growth, by Robert
J. Lampman. Washington, D.C., Joint Committee
Print, Study Paper 12, 1959.
______. ___________. Library of Congress. "Some Effects
of the President's Reorganization Proposals of
1971 on Congressional Committee Jurisdictions:
The Legislative Committees," by Walter Kravitz.
Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Congres
sional Research Service, July 2, 1971.
397
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare and the Special Committee on Human
Resources. ACTION Act of 1972 and ACTION Domestic!
Programs. Subcommittee on Aging. Washington,
D.C., April 1972.
________ . . Senate. Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare. Closing of Job Corps Centers.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Employment,
Manpower, and Poverty, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.,
1969.
________ . . Senate. Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare. Domestic Volunteer Service Act
of 1973. Hearings before Special Subcommittee
on Human Resources, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1972.
S. 1148, S.S. 1338.
. . Senate. Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare. Economic Opportunity Act of
1964, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1964.
________ . . Senate. Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare. Economic Opportunity Amendments
of 1969. Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Employment, Manpower and Poverty of the Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., 1969.
________ . . Senate. Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Subcommittee on Employment,
Manpower and Poverty. Examination of the War on
Poverty, 15 pts. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1967.
________ . . Senate. Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare. Legal Services Program of the
Office of Economic Opportunity. Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower and
Poverty of the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969.
398
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare. Nomination: Charles W. Howe, Jr.
Hearings before the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1972.
_______ . . Senate. Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare. Nomination: Christopher M. Mould.
Hearings before Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1972.
________ . . Senate. Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare. Nomination: Joseph H. Blatchford.
Hearings before the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1971.
________ . . Senate. Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare. Nomination on Michael P. Balzano,
Jr. Hearings before the Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1972.
________ . . Senate. Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare. Nomination on Charles Ervin.
Hearings before the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1972.
________ . . Senate. Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare. Nominations: 1971. Hearings
before the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1972.
________ . . Senate. Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare. Toward Economic Security for the I
Poor. Hearings before Subcommittee on Employment,
Manpower and Poverty of the Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1968.
________ . . Senate. Committee on Government
Operations. Establish a Department of Community
Development. 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.
399
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Opera
tions . To Extend the Reorganization Act.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Executive
Reorganization and Government Research of the
Committee on Government, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess.,
1971.
______. ___________. Senate. Committee on Government
Operations. Reorganization Plan Number 1 of 1971.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Executive
Reorganization and Government Research of the
Committee on Government Operations, 92nd Cong.,
1st Sess., 1971.
______. ___________. Senate. Committee on Government
Operations. Reorganization Plans Nos. 3 and 4 of
1970. Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Executive Reorganization and Government Research
of the Committee on Government Operations, 91st
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1970.
. . Senate. "Legality of OEO Termina
tion." Congressional Record, 93rd Cong., 1st
Sess., CXIX, No. 4 (March 20, 1973).
________ . . Senate. "The Speeches of Senator
John F. Kennedy Presidential Campaign of 1960."
S.R. 994, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, 1961.
________ . Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census.
Current Population Reports, Series P-60.
Washington, D.C., 1969.
________ . . Bureau of the Census. "Counting
the Poor: Another Look at the Poverty Profile,"
by Mollie Orshansky. Social Security Bulletin,
January 1965, 3-13.
________ . . Bureau of the Census. Statistical
Abstract of the United States: 1972. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.
400
U.S. Department of Commerce. Economic Development
Administration. Handbook of Federal Aids to
Communities; 1966. Washington, D.C.; U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1966.
________ . Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
National Institute of Mental Health. The Mental
Health of Urban America. Washington, D.C.; U.S.
Government Printing Office, April 1969.
________ . ________. Social Security Administration.
Poverty Studies in the Sixties... A Selected,
Annotated Bibliography. Washington, D.C.:
Social Security Administration, 1970.
________ . Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD). "Accomplishments of HUD: 1969-1972,"
by George Romney, HUD Challenge, IV, No. 2
(February 1973), 29.
________ . Department of Labor. Manpower Report of the
President, 1968. Department of Labor Report.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
1968.
________ . Office of Economic Opportunity (0E0). "An
Analysis of the Conflict and Controversy Asso
ciated with VISTA Volunteer Activity— Its Causes,
Consequences and Cures." Washington, D.C.:
VISTA, Office of Evaluation, March 30, 1970.
. ________. Catalog of Federal Domestic
Assistance. Washington, D.C., April 1, 1970.
________ . ________. Communities in Action, I, No. 1
(May 1966).
________ . ________. Community Action Program Guide.
Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1965.
________ . ________. Community Action Workbook.
Washington, D.C.: 0E0, 1965.
401
U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity. Community Develop
ment, I, No. 5 (1965), pt. III.
________ . ________. Dimensions of Poverty in 1964.
Washington, D.C.: 0E0, 1965.
________ . ________. Education Vouchers; A Report on
Financing Education by Grants to Parents.
Cambridge, Mass.: Center for the Study of Public
Policy, December 1970.
________ . ________. Evaluating the OEO Legal Services
Program: Working Papers, by Fred D. Baldwin.
Washington, D.C.: OEO, July 1972.
________ . ________. An Evaluation of the Neighborhood
Health Center Program: Summary of Results and
Methodology. Washington, D.C., May 1972.
________ . ________. Evaluation of the Office of Economic
Opportunity Child Development Center. Rockville,
Md.: Westat, Inc., December 1972.
_____. ________. "The First Step ... On a Long
Journey." Congressional presentation by Sargent
Shriver. Washington, D.C.: OEO, April 1965.
________ . ________. Further Preliminary Results of the
New Jersey Graduated Work Incentive Experiment.
Washington, D.C.: OEO, May 1971.
________ . ________. The Inflation-Unemployment Tradeoff
and Public Employment, by Michael Barth and Edward
Gramlich. Washington, D.C.: OEO, 1971.
________ . ________. Job Corps Reports. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1968.
________ . ________. "Narrative Summary of the Economic
Opportunity Amendments of 1967." March 1968.
402
U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity. National Anti-
Poverty Plan FY 1968-FY 1972 (June 1966).
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1973.
_______. __________. A News Summary of the War on Poverty
Washington, D.C.: OEO, n.d.
_______. __________. OEO Touches Your Life. Washington,
D.C.: OEO, June 1972.
________ . . Participation of the Poor in the
Community Decision Making Process. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, August
1969.
________ . . Preliminary Results of the New
Jersey Graduated Work Incentive Experiment.
Washington, D.C.: OEO, February 1970.
________ . . The Quiet Revolution. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967.
________ . _. Working Papers; Day Care in the
Seventies; Some Thoughts, by W. R. Prosser.
Washington, D.C.: OEO, May 1972.
________ . . Working Papers: Migration and the
Poor, by Patricia Koshel. Washington, D.C.:
OEO, July 1972.
________ . President. Advisory Commission on Intergovern
mental Relations. A Commission Report: Inter
governmental Relations in the Poverty Program,
April 1966. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1967.
________ . . Advisory Council on Executive
Reorganization. A New Regulatory Framework;
Report on Selected Independent Agencies, January
1971. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print
ing Office, 1971.
403
U.S. President. Council of Economic Advisers (CEA).
Economic Report of the President, January 1963.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1964.
. — - — . CEA. Economic Report of the
President, January 1964. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1964.
________ . . CEA. Economic Report of the
President, January 1966. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1966.
________ . _. CEA. Economic Report of the
President, January 1972. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1964.
________ . . National Advisory Council on Eco
nomic Opportunity. National Advisory Council on
Economic Opportunity Fourth Annual Report.
Washington, D.C., October 1971.
________ . . National Advisory Council on
Economic Opportunity. Second Annual Report,
Continuity and Change in Antipoverty Programs,
March 1969. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1969.
________ . ________. National Advisory Council on
Economic Opportunity. Sixth Annual Report,
June 1973. Washington, D.C.: Advisory Council
Rough Draft, 1973.
________ . ________. National Advisory Council on
Economic Opportunity. Third Annual Report, March
1970. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print
ing Office, 1970.
________ . ________. Proclamation. "Reorganization
Plan No. 1 of 1971, to Consolidate Various Volun
tary Action Programs." The Federal Register,
June 10, 1971, 11181.
! 404
I
i
| U.S. President. Public Papers of the Presidents of the
| United States. Washington, D.C.: Office of the
Federal Register, National Archives and Records
Service. Lyndon B. Johnson, Vols. I-IV, 1963-64-
68.
; ________ . . Public Papers of the Presidents of
the United States. Washington, D.C.: Office of
the Federal Register, National Archives and
Records Service. Richard M. Nixon, 1968-72.
______. _________ _. Study Group on a National Service
Program. "Information on a Proposed National
Service Program. S. 1321, H.R. 5625."
Washington, D.C., n.d.
APPENDIXES
405
406
APPENDIX A-l
UYA Post-Service Questionnaire
(September/October 1972)
Question 7. How well do you rate yourself ... at three points in
your UYA experience:
Understanding poverty: Causes and conditions
Excellent Good Fair Poor
Before UYA 19 44 53 14
After 6 months 37 72 14 0
After UYA 58 63 4 0
N = 125
Question 15. How would you rate UYA as an anti-poverty program,
considering its cost to the federal government and
time expended?
Very effective in helping reduce poverty 40
Effective in helping reduce poverty 32
Somewhat effective in helping reduce poverty 18
Not effective in helping reduce poverty 10
100
407
APPENDIX A-2
UYA Volunteer Survey
(June 1972)
Question 12A. Rate the following institutions on concern for the
poor in the U.S.:
Don't
Excellent Good Fair Poor Know NA
Federal Govt. 33 153 313 196 37 12
(4.4) (20.6) (42) (26.3)
(5) (1.6)
Your State Govt. 25 153 271 240 43 12
(3.4) (20.6) (36.4) (32.3) (5.8) (1.6)
Your Local Govt. 31 135 268 248 51 11
(4.2)
(18.1) (36) (33.3) (6.9) (1.5)
Your University 104 234 241 119 35 11
(14) (31.5) (32.4) (16) (4.7) (1.5)
University in general 43 175 221 220 68 17
(5.8) (23.5) (29.7) (29.6) (9.1) (2.3)
N = 744
408
APPENDIX A-3
UYA— University Year in Action— Volunteer Questionnaire
Post-Service (October 1972)
Question 7a. What best describes your attitude about the education
to the poor in your area?
N %
Problems can be solved by people displaying
more good will and effort 65 20.1%
Problems can be solved by more funds and
resources from government 46 14.2
Problems can be solved by more efficient
use of current resources 52 16
Problems can be solved by these methods
but poor must play a part 147 45.4
Problems seem largely insoluble 14 4.3
N = 324 100%
Question 7b. What best describes your attitude about
themselves?
the poor
Poor people need better education and
N %
training 231 73.3%
Poor people need better job opportunities
Poor people need better instruction in
27 8.6
how to manage their money
Poor people must largely solve their own
11 3.5
problems 31 9.8
Problems are largely insoluble 15 4.8
N = 348 100%
409
APPENDIX B
ATTITUDINAL SURVEY
Directions; Below are some statements on which your opinions are
solicited. All individual responses will remain strictly anonymous.
Please check (WO whether you strongly agree (A), agree (a), are
uncertain (U), disagree (d), or strongly disagree (D).
1. ACTION programs should concentrate on trying to achieve more
political participation for the poor.
A... 46
a... 34 J = 2.628
U... 16
d... 18 S— = 1.058
_ x
2. The most important goal of ACTION is to fight poverty
A... 34 _
a... 52 X = 2.628
U... 22
d... 26 S = 1.225
D... 10
3. ACTION programs should focus on creating more jobs for the poor.
A... 20
a... 21
U... 11
d... 12
D... 1
4. The federal government has traditionally been more responsive to
the needs of the poor people than local governments.
A... 26 _
a... 40 X 2.719
U... 22
d... 24 S- = 1.317
_ x
D... 16
410
APPENDIX B (Continued)
5. "All power to the people" should be an appropriate guideline for
the role of poor people in determining local program priorities.
A... 34
a... 34 X = 2.52
U... 10
d... 44 s _ =
X
1.236
D...
6. Volunteerism represents a great untapped resource in solving
community problems.
A... 60
a... 58 X = 1.924
U... 12
d...
D...
S_
X
= 0.329
411
APPENDIX C
PITTSBURGH SURVEY
Mayor of Pittsburgh's Committee on Human Resources. Surveys given by
Neil Gilbert to Pittsburgh Community Action Agency staff and Commu
nity representatives
Question 4. How would you prefer citizen evaluations of neighborhood
programs be used?
N
JL
1. As a guide 103 36.5
2. Criterion for satisfaction 24 8.5
3. One of a number of sources for program
change 56 19.9
4. Major source for program change 91 32.3
0. No information 8 2.8
Question 2. What do you think about the statement that "In America
today, anybody willing to work hard can get ahead"?
1. Strongly agree 56 19.9
2. Agree 82 29.1
3. Disagree 95 33.7
4. Strongly disagree 45 16.0
0. No information 4 1.4
Question 6. What do you believe is the primary cause of poverty?
1. Lack of effort 33 11.7
2. Circumstances 75 26.6
3. Both 141 50.0
4. Neither 29 10.3
0. No information 4 1.4
412
APPENDIX C (Continued)
Question 14. Please explain why you are either satisfied or dis
satisfied.
N
1. Satisfied: more influence, more people listen
to us, more power. 5
2. Satisfied: things are getting done, social
change. 24
3. Satisfied: people are being educated. 14
4. Satisfied: interaction, good issues raised,
participants are diligent. 10
5. Dissatisfied: not enough influence. 16
6. Dissatisfied: things not getting done, not
meaningful. 22
7. Dissatisfied: not enough participation, poor
are not represented. 123
8. Dissatisfied: poor are not knowledgeable enough
to make decisions. 4
9. No code. 26
%
(43.6)
0. No information. 38
413
APPENDIX D
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations conducted a
series of 4 questionnaires under the auspices of the following asso
ciations :
1. The National Association of Counties questionnaire, sent to
the chief elected officials in all counties with community
action programs (CAPS) (N=518).
2. The National League of Cities questionnaire, sent to the
mayors of cities with 50,000 or less population having
CAPS (N=85).
3. National Association for Community Development, sent to the
directors of all state OEO agencies (N=49).
4. National Conference of Mayors, sent to all CAA executive
directors (N=483).
There were 483 Community Action Agencies (CAA) conducting programs
in 518 counties and in 85 cities (of less than 50,000 population).
All questionnaires were mailed in December 1965.
Significant Questions
1. Executive directors of CAA were asked: "Has the participa
tion of the poor in policymaking been useful?" 199 re
sponded: 142— yes; 3— no. A frequent comment was that
representatives of poor helped point out needs that other
wise would have gone unnoticed.
2. "Do you have representative neighborhood organizations that
give advice on program policy?" 117— yes; 54— no.
3. "Has the anti-poverty program in your community increased
the political organization and activity of the poor?"
86— yes; 84— no.
414
APPENDIX E
BALZANO’S GOALS FOR ACTION
Goal 1. To mobilize volunteers to participate in the innovative
efforts of local governments, communities, and institutions to solve
local social and economic problems.
Goal 2. To support those programs of local governments, institu
tions and communities which will call upon volunteers to demonstrate
new ways of solving community problems and will lead to a continuing
effort supported by local resources.
Goal 3. To increase the participation of the full range of
community organizations on voluntarism..
Goal 4. To stimulate interest by the local citizenry to join in
the efforts to solve local problems and to generate such interest by
allowing local citizens greater input in the design and operation of
programs.
Goal 5. To increase the relevance of volunteer activity by
generating and utilizing greater numbers of community volunteers
serving in their own communities and drawn from all quarters of the
community.
Goal 6. To create and stimulate new approaches to voluntarism.
APPENDIX F
ACTION INSTITUTE ATTITUDE SURVEY
I.D. NUMBER__________
1. What are the major objectives of ACTION?
2. What do you perceive to be the role of ACTION in the 1970's?
3. How should the success of ACTION and its programs be measured
in the future?
There are five possible responses for each of the following items:
VERY WELL (VW), WELL (W), POORLY (P), or VERY POORLY (VP). Please
mark the appropriate response according to your own attitudes and/or
behavior. The middle category (?) is designed to indicate an
essentially neutral opinion about the item. Please answer ALL items
in one fashion or another, making sure that you have NO MORE THAN ONE
RESPONSE FOR EACH ITEM.
4. Other professions are actually more vital to society than mine.
VW W ? P VP
5. There are fundamental differences of opinion between ACTION staff
persons which must be reconciled if ACTION is to be successful.
VW W ? P VP
6. I have a pretty good idea of the direction I would like to see
ACTION take in the future.
VW W ? P VP
7. While bureaucratic organizations are probably the best way of
administering governmental programs, there are problems inherent
in such organizations that simply cannot be solved.
VW W ? P VP
8. Not very many people understand how difficult it is to make an
agency run smoothly.
VW W ? P VP
9. The dedication of people in ACTION is most gratifying.
VW W ? P VP
416
10. I have a hard time visualizing what the effect of ACTION will be
10 years from now.
VW W ? P VP
11. ACTION must either broaden its base or be deselected.
VW W ? P VP
12. The trouble with most organizations is that the people at the
top are not adequately familiar with the everyday problems of
those below them.
VW W ? P VP
13. A group which tolerates too many differences of opinion among
its own members cannot exist for long.
VW W ? P VP
14. Most people would stay in ACTION even if their incomes were
reduced.
VW W ? P VP
15. Our nation could become so affluent that no one could truthfully
claim that his standard of living was unreasonably low.
VW W ? P VP
16. While it is essential for the helping professions to gain the
support of poor persons, it is far more important to gain the
support of influential non-poor persons in the community.
VW W ? P VP
17. The ghetto or slum is not a disorganized community.
VW W ? P VP
18. The difference between the lives and upbringing of some groups
leads to a lack of admiration for one another. For example,
what appears to be integrity in one group appears to be rigidity
in another; what appears to be dishonesty in one group appears
to be flexibility in another.
VW W ? P VP
19. The way people treat you is more important than material comforts
and security.
VW W ? P VP
20. Regardless of one's place in life, the rules are pretty much the
same for everyone.
VW W ? P VP
21. Knowing that most people have more than you do is one of the
worst things about being poor.
VW W ? P VP
22. The goal of "eliminating poverty" is unrealistic.
VW W ? P VP
23. The best way to help the poor is to give them money with no
strings attached.
VW W ? P VP
417
24. The deference we give to people should be based on their
achievements.
VW W ? P VP
25. By reading the local newspaper regularly, one can identify most
of the influential persons in a community.
VW W ? P VP
26. The problem of chronic unemployment and poverty in this country
is largely the fault of our country's way of causing and handling
it (i.e., the fault of the 'system' as a whole) rather than the
fault of individuals.
VW W ? P VP
27. People inherit most of their abilities and talents.
VW W ? P VP
28. One of the best ways to help the poor is to teach them more
adaptive behavior patterns.
VW W ? P VP
29. A society without compromise is totalitarian.
VW W ? P VP
30. People should be treated the way they deserve to be treated.
VW W ? P VP
31. While the values of different racial and ethnic groups should
be preserved, every individual has to be able to work within
the system.
VW W ? P VP
32. Earlier in this century foreign bom whites suffered poverty,
discrimination, and physical abuse similar to that experienced
by today's minorities. These people and their children comprise
today's 'ethics' and 'blue collar workers.'
VW W ? P VP
33. Revenue sharing is a useful, workable concept.
VW W ? P VP
34. In the 1950's, the white ethnics and labor people supported the
minority civil rights movements.
VW W ? P VP
35. Richard Nixon's election constituted a mandate for closing down
OEO and other social welfare programs.
VW W ? P VP
36. Without militancy, blacks could never have gotten civil rights
legislation passed during the 60's.
VW W ? P VP
37. One of the main faults of federal social welfare programs has
been their artificial and rigid standards for determining eligi
bility.
VW W ? P VP
418
38. Government and business should be required to hire blacks in a
ratio roughly proportionate to their ratio in the surrounding
communities.
VW W ? P VP
39. White ethnics, blue collar, and labor people all have something
in common— they pay for the poverty program with their taxes,
but they receive no benefits from these programs.
VW W ? P VP
40. ACTION'S biggest problem is that its clients are not powerful
enough to give it the necessary political support.
VW W ? P VP
41. Quota hiring of minority group members undermines the achievement
system.
VW W ? P VP
42. Quota hiring should be extended to all white and other non-white
minority groups.
VW W ? P VP
43. Militancy never got blacks anywhere.
VW W ? P VP
44. It is possible to change society "non-politically."
VW W ? P VP
45. People in ACTION don't have much opportunity to exercise their
own judgment in their work.
VW W ? P VP
46. The Office of Economic Opportunity is being dismantled and many
of its programs are being cancelled. Do you think, on balance,
that OEO was worthwhile?
Yes No____
47. It has been asserted that OEO commanded little support among the
general American population. Do you agree with this assertion?
Yes No____
If you do agree, which of the following reasons was most important?
(Check one)
because most of the programs were perceived as being wasteful
and ineffective.
because, by and large, the American has little social conscience.
because the agency was directly or indirectly subsidizing
militants and revolutionaries.
the non-poor, non-black community did not think blacks deserved
help.
because poor whites were excluded from the program.
because, by and large, the American does not know anything about
actual OEO programs.
COMMENTS.
419
48. Do you think that state and local governments are able to combat
the problems of poverty without a substantial amount of federal
assistance? Yes____ No____
Do you think that local governments are willing to combat the
problems of poverty without a substantial amount of federal
assistance?________Yes____ No____
Do you think that state and local governments will effectively
administer federal government anti-poverty funds without
explicit federal directives and supervision?
Yes No____
49. Do you feel any groups have been particularly neglected by the
ACTION programs? (Check one or more)
Jews White Ethnics
Blacks ____Indians
The Aged ____Chi canos
Others
50. If you were asked by the local residents of a lower class mixed
community to send a volunteer into a community to help begin an
adult education program, which of the following organizations
would you first look to as a possible source of cost-share and
volunteer support? (List in order of priority)
a local fraternal organization
the local police department
the local Model Cities program
the local Board of Education
a local trade union
Other
51. In five words or less, what do you think is the cause of
poverty?
APPENDIX G
NEW ORLEANS INSTITUTE DISTRIBUTION OF LOG SCORES
D.C. IV VI Other Total
Scores f % f % f % f % £ %
NEGATIVE
Poor
1 3 1 8 0 0 1 12 3 4
0 — .25
Fair
3 8 0 0 1 8 0 0 4 6
.26 — .50
Average
9 24 6 50 3 23 2 25 20 28
.51 — .75
Good
10 26 3 25 4 31 3 38 20 28
.76 — 1.00
Excellent
15 39 2 17 5 38 2 25 24 34
Totals 38 100 12 100 13 100 8 100 71 100
421
APPENDIX H
ACTION INSTITUTE SURVEY II— FORM B
The following are a number of statements which relate to
issues raised in Dr. Balzano's first presentation. Beneath each
statement there is a scale. On this scale please indicate the extent
to which the statement expresses your own views about ACTION and the
directions it should take in the future.
1. VISTA is not popular and never has been. ACTION is now con
strained to accept the limits imposed by that unpopularity.
This expresses my opinions VW W ? P VP
2. Thd idea of volunteer service is to be restored to its tradi
tional American scope: The full-time volunteers of the OEO
formulation are to be diluted as much as possible by traditional
part-time volunteers.
This expresses my opinions VW W ? P VP
3. VISTA as conceived by President Kennedy was prohibited from
becoming involved in efforts toward racial integration and in
political affairs. We should now return to that conception of
volunteerism.
This expresses my opinions VW W ? P VP
4. In the future the local organizations which ACTION will deal with
will be those which have the financial means to support volunteer
work.
This expresses my opinions VW W ? P VP
5. The lack of clearly defined objectives on a national level has
given ACTION the flexibility to respond to local needs and goals.
This expresses my opinions VW W ? P VP
6. The proposal to increase the interchangeability between Peace
Corps and VISTA volunteers is intended to decrease the likelihood
that programs, directors, and volunteers will develop strong
working philosophies of their own.
This expresses my opinions VW W ? P VP
7. Researchers, including Dr. Balzano, have found that during the
1960's a particular political and philosophical orientation
characterized volunteers. This orientation was anti-establishment.
This expresses my opinions VW W ? P VP
8. VISTA has always suffered because its goals, although clearly
defined, were contradictory.
This expresses my opinions VW W ? P VP
422
9. The problems to be tackled by ACTION, such as illiteracy and
malnutrition, are henceforth to be seen in isolation, and not
as symptoms of more serious conditions such as poverty or
racism.
This expresses my opinions VW W ? P VP
10. On four different occasions the President has discussed the goals
and philosophy of ACTION. Important goals are (a) to provide a
vehicle for bridging the generation gap; (b) to work through
local initiative and local programs to solve local problems;
(c) to increase the involvement of the private sector; and
(d) to expand and test innovations in volunteerism.
This expresses my opinions VW W ? P VP
11. All programs, directors, and volunteers will henceforth strictly
adhere to directives from the administration, as enunciated by
the President and translated by Dr. Balzano.
This expresses my opinions VW W ? P VP
12. The full potential of the ACTION merger has not been realized
because ACTION staff have not understood the Presidents goals.
They have opposed a successful merger, and the agency has been
too political.
This expresses my opinions VW W ? P VP
13. ACTION has created its own enemies by focusing only on the poor
and minorities, and considering everyone else as "the problem."
This expresses my opinions. VW W ? P VP
14. People in ACTION have been advocates of their own programs to
the exclusion of others.
This expresses my opinions VW W ? P VP
15. It is beneficial to have at least a few volunteers whose
philosophical orientation could be characterized as anti
establishment.
This expresses my opinions VW W ? P VP
16. It is essential for program directors to have their own well
articulated working philosophy.
This expresses my opinions VW W ? P VP
17. Dr. Balzano said, "We have been operating on a poverty model.
. . .We're going to turn this poverty model into a business
model."
Please discuss the implications of this for you in your job:
423
APPENDIX I
OPINION DATA
TABLE 1. Differences between participants* opinions and Dr. Balzano*s
perceived opinions
Question
Number
My Opinion
(Pre-Test)
RESPONSE MEANS
Dr. Balzano's
Opinion (Post-
Test Form A)
Difference
between
Means
1 2.33 3.06 - .73*
5 2.06 2.03 .03
8 2.67 3.54 - .87*
12 3.35 4.42 -1.07*
13 2.37 4.00 -1.63*
14 3.73 4.21 - .48*
15 3.16 2.87 .29
16 4.06 3.42 .64*
*Indicates that a difference is statistically significant.
TABLE 2. Mean response to each question on three forms
Question
Pre-Test
(My Opinions)
Post— A
(My Opinions)
Post— B
(Balzano*s
Opinions)
1 2.33 2.70 3.06
2 2.93 2.60
3 3.36 3.00
4 3.51 3.18
5 2., 06 2.25 2.03
6 2.25 2.27
7 4.12 3.93
8 2.67 *
*
3.27 3.54
9 2.35 2.18
10 4.62 4.48
424
TABLE 2 (Continued)
Pre-Test Post— A Post— B
Question (My Opinions) (My Opinions) (Balzano's
Opinions)
11 3.75 3.27
12 3.35
* *
4.03 4.42
13 2.37
* *
3.90 4.00
14 3.73 4.03 4.21
15 3.16 3.09 2.87
16 4.06 4.12 ♦ ♦ 3.42
*
♦between the two columns indicate that the means
column are significantly different.
in either
TABLE 3. Changes and differences of opinion
Question
Difference between my
opinions (Pre-test) and
my opinions (Post-test)
Differences between my
opinions (Post-test) and Dr.
Balzano's opinions (measured
on Post-Test)
1 .37 .36
2 .33
3 .36
4 .33
5 .19 .22
6 .02
7 .19
8 .60^ .27
9 .17
10 .14
11 .48
12 .68A .39
13 1.53A .10
14 .30 .18
15 .07 .22
16 .06 JO*
♦Indicates that the difference is statistically different.
425
APPENDIX J
NEW ORLEANS INSTITUTE PRE-TEST/POST-TEST COMPARISON
ATTITUDE CHANGE
The following are findings for the pre- and post-test instrument
items generated by the evaluation staff of CAR. The items which
appear are identified by their pre-test numbers. These items were
coded according to the following 5-point forced choice response scale:
5— Corresponds very well with my attitude and/or behavior.
4— Corresponds well with my attitudes and/or behavior.
3— Neutral opinion.
2— Corresponds poorly with my attitudes and/or behavior.
1— Corresponds very poorly with my attitudes and/or opinion.
A) Significant difference between pre-test and post-test means.
16. The dedication of people in ACTION is most gratifying,
pre-test mean (N=64) 3.19
post-test mean (N=63) 3.68
t value 2.72
This difference is significant at the .01 level. Participants agreed
with this item more after the Institute than before.
19. ACTION must either broaden its base or be deselected,
pre-test mean (N=62) 3.35
post-test mean (N=64) 4.22
t value 4.48
This difference was significant at beyond the .01 level. Participants
agreed with this item more after the Institute than before.
20. The trouble with most organizations is that the people at
the top are not adequately familiar with the everyday
problems of those below them.
pre-test mean (N=64) 3.22
post-test mean (N=65) 3.74
t value 2.27
This difference is significant at the .05 level. Participants agreed
with this item more after the Institute than before.
26. The full potential of the ACTION merger has not been
realized because ACTION staff have not understood the
President's goals. They have opposed a successful merger,
and the agency has been too political,
pre-test mean (N=63) 3.35
post-test mean (N=31) 4.03
t value 2.39
426
This difference is significant at the .05 level. Participants agreed
with this item more after the Institute than before.
27. ACTION has created its own enemies by focusing only on the
poor and minorities, and considering everyone else as
"the problem."
pre-test mean (N=64) 2.38
post-test mean (N=31) 3.90
t value 6.00
This difference is significant at well beyond the .001 level. Par
ticipants agreed with this item more after the Institute than before.
28. VISTA has always suffered because its goals, although
clearly defined, were contradictory.
pre-test mean (N=64) 2.67
post-test mean (N=29) 3.28
t value 2.43
This difference is significant at the .05 level. Participants agreed
with this item more after the Institute than before.
30. The goal of "eliminating poverty" is unrealistic,
pre-test mean (N-64) 3.13
post-test mean (N=29) 3.75
t value 2.64
This difference is significant at the .01 level. Participants agreed
with this item more after the Institute than before.
34. The difference between the lives and upbringing of some
groups leads to a lack of admiration for one another. For
example, what appears to be integrity in one group appears
to be rigidity in another; what appears to be dishonesty
in one group appears to be flexibility in another,
pre-test mean (N=64) 4.02
post-test mean (N=65) 4.37
t value 2.29
This difference is significant at the .05 level. Participants agreed
with this item more after the Institute than before.
37. Knowing that most people have more than you do is one of
the worst things about being poor,
pre-test mean (N=64) 2.56
post-test mean (N=65) 3.55
t value 4.55
This difference is significant at beyond the .001 level. Participants
agreed with this item more after the Institute than before.
40. By reading the local newspaper regularly, one can identify
most of the influential persons in a community,
pre-test mean (N=64) 2.30
post-test mean (N=65) 2.72
t value 2.02
427
This difference is significant at the .05 level. Participants agreed
with this item more after the Institute than before.
41. The problem of chronic unemployment and poverty in this
country is largely the fault of our country's way of
causing and handling it (i.e., the fault of the "system"
as a whole) rather than the fault of individuals,
pre-test mean (N=65) 3.11
post-test mean (N=65) 3.75
t value 3.21
This difference is significant at the .01 level. Participants agreed
with this item more after the Institute than before.
42. People inherit most of their abilities and talents,
pre-test mean (N=65) 1.85
post-test mean (N=64) 1.48
t value 2.82
This difference is significant at the .01 level. The effect of the
Institute was to cause disagreement with this statement.
47. Earlier in this century foreign bom whites suffered
poverty, discrimination, and physical abuse similar to
that experienced by today's minorities. These people and
their children comprise today's "ethnics" andBblue collar
workers."
pre-test mean (N=64) 3.27
post-test mean (N=64) 3.95
t value 3.35
This difference is significant at the .01 level. Participants agreed
with this item more after the Institute than before.
49. In the 1950's, the white ethnics and labor people supported
the minority civil rights movements,
pre-test mean (N=63) 2.13
post-test mean (N=64) 2.84
t value 3.67
This difference is significant at the .01 level. Participants agreed
with this item more after the Institute than before.
54. White ethnics, blue collar, and labor people all have some
thing in common— they pay for poverty programs with their
taxes, but they receive no benefits from these programs,
pre-test mean (N=65) 2.60
post-test mean (N=65) 3.08
t value 2.13
428
55. ACTION'S biggest problem is that its clients are not
powerful enough to give it the necessary political support,
pre-test mean (N=64) 2.84
post-test mean CN=65) 3.62
t value 3.35
This difference is significant at the .01 level. Participants agreed
with this item more after the Institute than before.
429
APPENDIX K
ACTION INSTITUTE: ATTITUDE SURVEY
(See Appendix F)
Classification of survey items.
A. Change: Item numbers which indicate significant changes
C-1--5 levels) in participant attitudes.
B. No change: No significant attitudinal change by participants
in any direction.
Items:
I. ACTION agency organizational efficiency, administrative
harmony and future.
No change: 5, 8, 6, 10, 13, 14, 7
Change: 9, 12, 20
II. ACTION expansion to include new clientele groups; ethnic
history.
No change: — Change: 32, 34, 39, 11, 18
III. Political goals of the Nixon administration.
No change: 33, 35, 46, 47 Change: —
IV. Nature of poverty; the poor; anti-poverty policymaking
No change: 15, 16, 23, 36, 38, 41, 42, 44, 43, 48, 17, 19,
28
Change: 40, 22, 26
V. Horatio Alger syndrome.
No change: 20, 24, 30, 31
Change: 25, 27, 32
Type of questions
No stat. change Sig. change
Group I 7 3
Group II 0 5
Group III 4 3
Group IV 13 3
Group V 4 3
Total 28 14
X2 = 13.867
df = 4
r = 0.05 significant
430
APPENDIX L
PROGRAM ASSESSMENT
Question 5. Do you feel the Institute provided you maximum oppor
tunity for participation?
f_____________%
YES 39 58
NO 25 37
NR 3 4
Question 6. I would like to have more time spent in: __f
1. Discussion Groups/Question § Answer 22
2. Program Development 11
3. Revenue Sharing 5
4. Training Exercises 4
5. M. Balzano Directives 4
6. Professor Higman 4
7. Odyssey 4
8. Ethnics 3
I would like to have less time spent in:
1. Lectures 12
2. Task Force/Group Presentations 7
3. Games 4
Question 7. Do you feel that an atmosphere of cooperation existed
among participants?
f_____________%
YES 54 81
NO 7 10
NR 6 9
X2 = 21.26
df = 2
r = 0.05 significant
Between staff and participants?
YES 29 43
NO 27 40
NR 11 16
431
Question 8
Question 9
a
b
Was there a tendency for participants to separate into
cliques?
f %
E-2
YES 35 52
NO 27 40
NR 5 7
X2 = 3.57
df = 2
r = 0.05
not significant
If yes, was this tendency detrimental to the
achievement of Institute objectives?
Do you feel that during the Institute most people in
the group
Changed their attitudes?
YES 32 48
NO 25 37
NR 10 15
X2 = .43.
df = 2
r = 0.05
not significant
Changed their behavior?
YES
NO
NR
Became more knowledgeable?
YES
NO
NR
18 27
37 55
12 18
X2 = 3.383
df = 2
r = 0.05
not significant
62 93
3 4
2 3
X2 = 33.72
df = 2
r = 0.05
significant
432
Question
b
c
Question 11
Question 14
. Do you feel that during the Institute you
. . Changed your attitudes?
YES
NO
NR
Changed your behavior?
YES
NO
NR
Became more knowledgeable?
YES
NO
NR
39 58
23 34
5 7
X2 = 2.099
df = 2
r = 0.05
not significant
14
48
5
X
df
r
2 _
66
1
0
X
df
r
•2 _
21
72
7
10.08
2
0.05
significant
99
1
0
41.232
2
0.05
significant
. Do you feel that a consensus was reached among partici
pants concerning the role of ACTION in the future?
YES 39 58
NO 27 40
NR 1 1
X2 = 1.1
df = 2
r = 0.05
not significant
. Was the pressure of time conducive to learning?
YES 35 52
NO 27 40
NR 5 7
X2 = .518
df = 2
r = 0.05
not significant
Question 15
433
Was there enough time for discussion outside of formal
groups?
f_____________%__
YES 37 55
NO 26 39
NR 4 6

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Asset Metadata

Creator Reeves, Thomas Zane (author)

Core Title The Influence Of Anti-Poverty Policy-Making Upon Poverty Decision-Making: 1964-1974

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Political Science

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,political science, general

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Lammers, William W. (committee chair), Anderson, Totton J. (committee member), Clayton, T. Ross (committee member)

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